Triumph of self-determination: operation stabilise and United Nations peacemaking in East Timor

Triumph ofSelf-Determination

Praeger Security International Advisory Board

Board C01hairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul W ilkinson, Professor ofinternational Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study ofTerrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.)

M�mbers Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) 'Iherese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affilirs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation N ationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Mic had Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Pau l M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O'N eill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) S hibley Telhami, Anwar S adat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Govern­ ment and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Triumph of Self-Determination Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in EastTimor

John R. Ballard

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut

•

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ballard, John R., 1957Triumph of self-determination : operation stabilise and United Nations peacemaking in East Timer I John R. Ballard. P· cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 973-0-3 13-34841-9 {alk. paper) 1. East Timer-History-Autonomy and independence movements. 2. East Timer-Politics and government-20 02-. 3. United Nations-East Timer. I . Title. DS649.6.B35 2008 959.8704-dc22 2007035285 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2008 by John R. Ballard All rights reserved. No portion ofthis book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the pub lisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007035285 ISBN-13: 978-0-313-34841-9 First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 0 6 8 8 1 A n imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www. praeger.com Printed in the United States of America �:·-·�··

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The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organiz.ation {Z39.48-1984). 10

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In honor of Private Leonard Manning, New Zealand Army, and the other service-members who died bringing freedom to East Timor.

Miiita1y service is the ultimateform cfpatriotism

Contents

Preface Acknowledgments

IX XIII

1

1.

Background for Timorese Independence

2.

Changing Global Power Structures during the 1990s

15

3.

Developing Consensus: Regional Affairs and the UN

27

4.

UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

43

5.

Anticipating Intervention: Planning and Deployment

56

6.

Initial Military Operations

69

7.

Stabilizing East Timor

84

8.

Building a New Nation

105

9.

Lessons for a New Century

125

Appendix A: A greement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese through a Direct Ballot

143

Appendix B: Code of Conduct for Participants in East Timor Popular Consultation

147

viii

Contents

Appendix C: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264

151

Appendix D: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272

155

Appendix E: Extracts from the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

159

Notes

179

Glossary

203

Selected Bibliography

207

Index

215 A photo essay follows page 68.

Preface

On September 20, 1999, Major General Peter Cosgrove of Australia embarked the national commanders of his newly created international force in a small commercial plane and flew from Darwin, Australia, to Dili, the capital of the breakaway Indonesian province of East Timor. When the nine officers disembarked in the Dili airport, they were met by armed Indonesian army troops and escorted in an old school bus past scenes of horrific devastation in the city. Looting and burning were still in progress. The Indonesians had agreed to the arrival of a United Nations-sponsored international force to bring peace to the area, but the situation in East Timor remained extremely volatile. General Cosgrove had elected not to conduct a forcible military assault into East Timor, as was originally called for in the plan his staff had devel­ oped. Only the previous day, he had successfully negotiated the permissive entry of his forces into the island province with Indonesian general Kiki Syahnakrie, the local military commander. By entering into East Timor without the force of arms, General Cosgrove was accepting extreme risk, arriving with only the sponsorship of the U nited Nations and the endorse­ ment of its regional partners as protection, yet he did so because he had an acute sense of what the military and political necessities in East Timor were at the time. Indonesian forces would still greatly outnumber his coalition troops for several days, and the lawlessness of a region subject to the whims of rampaging militias would pose threats for weeks to come, yet General Cosgrove's acceptance of these risks both set an unusual tone for military action and significantly helped ensure the success of his unique mission in East Timor-known as Operation Stabilise.

x

Preface

In many ways the fruition of a decade of multinational peace opera­ tions, General Cosgrove's mission was precedence-sening in its use of regional power to effect a United Nations' mandate designed to assist in the self-determination of a new nation. Operation Stabilise confirmed the value of regional coalition response in Southeast Asia and demonstrated the special influence that the modern United Nations can exert in specific circumstances. It also cast a new role for superpower involvement in the world's crises by showing that the United States could accept and execute a subordinate coali­ tion role just like other concerned nations. The intervention in East Timor was not the first of Indonesia's internal problems to reach the world stage, yet it set a standard for the potential resolution of so many other problems plaguing that diverse and complex nation. By the spring of 2000, the upheaval in East Timor had been resolved through one of the most effective military interventions of the past century. Yet Stabilise was only one of several United Nations operations that helped bring freedom to the Timorese people. Two significant changes in the international defense realm during the 1990s-the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise in importance of the U nited Nations-completely recast the glo bal interplay among nations. The fall of the Soviet Union not only freed the United States from a preoccupation with Soviet threats, but it also enabled America's acceptance and support of other regional power structures. The new importance of the United Nations among global powers resulted in increased UN involvement in the world's issues, particularly in the case of abuses of human rights, and finally brought the organization to a position of true influence on the world scene. These changes set the stage for a wholly new and more successful type of UN intervention. General Cosgrove's Operation Stabilise was successful not only because likely combat was avoided and security restored but also, and more important, because it built upon the previous efforts of Ian Martin's United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor and bridged to subsequent actions under Sergio Vieira de Mello's U nited Nations Transitional Admin­ istration in East Timor. All of these UN efforts helped to develop governance and new national institutions while essential democratic processes matured in Timor. Thus, a series of UN actions over time enabled the relatively rapid establishment of a new nation, where once there had been only u nrest and unacceptable violations of human rights. This is the story of the men and women of military units and international aid organizations from around the world who made operations in Timor truly humanitarian and admirably effective in only a few short years. They had the support of committed nations, and they had exceptional leadership, but it was the professional and personal efforts of many hundreds of individuals that really made UN support for the Timorese people successful.

Preface

xi

This is also a story of the significant efforts of the Timorese themselves, as they worked to establish their new nation. Perhaps more than any other event of its decade, the birth of East Timor was fraught with complex prob­ lems. The Timorese had to persevere for over twenty-five years to gain an opportunity to decide their future. But when given the chance, they acted in huge numbers, against real opposition, to determine their own future. The path chosen by East Timor's leaders and the great effort expended by the people there reveal much about what is important to a new nation and much more about the value people place on independence and personal freedom. The lessons of the UN operations in Timor should stand as guideposts down the new path of military operations in the twenty-first century. Multi­ national engagement clearly will remain a primary context for military intervention in the forthcoming decades. Even given global preoccupation with a campaign against terrorism, success in twenty-first-century military operations will also require a greater level of understanding and coordination among the host of national and international organizations that engage in the world's affairs. New national roles and new relationships with nonstate actors will certainly need to be developed in a more connected world. Cultural sensitivity and diplomacy will be required in new ways and in greater depth-particularly on the part of military commanders. At the same time, the historic fundamentals for success in a more uncertain and more complex age will remain as they have been for centuries, firmly rooted in leadership, professional skill, and discipline. All of these lessons are evident in the actions that the UN took to help the Timorese people reach independence. General Cosgrove and his immediate subordinates were shocked at the devastation they saw upon their arrival in Dili. Over the course of a few short months the eyes of the world were opened to the issue of Timorese ind ep end ence, and in a true refl.ectio n oft he lo fry goals oft he United Nations Charter, people from all over the world pitched in to help. Operation Stabilise was the last of the twentieth century's multinational interventions and the first of a different kind of global action for the new century. It facilitated the creation of a new nation where before there had been little interest and little of value. The UN focus on the development of good governance and the establishment of fundamental institutions of justice and culture, while also working to establish a real functioning economy for the Timorese, gave the new nation viability, vitalty i , and vision. For those who seek to make the world a b etter place, the lessons of the intervention in East Timor can improve the nature of peacemaking and nation building in the century.

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been written without the support of several orga­ nizations: the Joint History Office of the United States Pacific Command; the libraries at the United States Joint Forces Staff College, the United States Naval War College, and the National Defense University; the Australian and New Zealand armies; New Zealand's Massey University; and the faculty and staff of both the Naval War College and the National War College (who endured my long preoccupation with a small island conflict for far too many months). They were all important to this effort, and my thanks and deep appreciation go to each member of these fine, professional organizations. Beyond anyone else, this book has been supported by the diligence and encouragement of my beloved wife, Rosaline. She has been my best friend and my wise sounding board throughout this journey; her uniquely valuable insight and her genuine love and devotion have made every part of this book and everything in my life better. It is also for our beloved Renee and Lauren. Although it has benefited from a great deal of government information, this book does not reflect the views or opinions of the United States Department of Defense or the governments of New Zealand,Australia, or the United States; nor does it reflect their policies or those of any of the institutions listed above. The views expressed in this book are mine alone, as are any errors or OmiSSIOnS. John R. Ballard Alexandria, Virginia

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Chapterl Background forTimorese Independence

But somewhere in that tiny, distant half island, a spark was flickering, and a small segment of humanity was not only struggling to assert its rights, but more importantly was calling upon the United Nations to act in fulfillment of its Charter.l

Neglect and indifference dominate the unfortunate history of East Timor. Half an island four hundred miles northwest of Australia, just a bit smaller than the state of New Jersey, and with a population of only 800,000, it was never the focus of much attention. Dry in summer, rainy in winter, normally bleak, mountainous and malaria-plagued, East Timor has never been and will never be a tourist spot. No strategic minerals are found there and it controls no important waterways or facilities.2 Yet, small East Timor has seen more than its share of conflict and devastation.3 Many other nations have endured centuries of strife to gain their independence, but few have suffered more for less reason in order to finally manage their own affairs. No story of the campaign to bring East Timor freedom can be contextually complete without some insight into the history of the Timorese people. Sandalwood brought the Chinese to Timor as early as the thirteenth century, but the island remained free from colonization until the early 1500s. Following the famous voyage of Vasco de Gama to India in 1498, the Portuguese expanded their influence throughout Southeast Asia, focused principally on the rich spice trade, which at that time was dominated by Muslim and Venetian traders. A great naval victory in 1509 resulted in the defeat of the sultan of Egypt's opposing armada and ensured Portuguese hegemony over India and Southeast Asia.4 Soon thereafter, King Jo3.o Ill of Portugal dispatched an expedition, which eventually visited Timor. Coincident with the search for nutmeg and cloves, the Pope also charged the Portuguese with convening the area to Christianity. A Timorese settlement founded by

2

Triumph of S elf-Determination

the Portuguese in 1 561 included Dominican friars to do the Pope's work, but it was the export of horses and slaves that really piqued interest and brought Europeans to Timor. The first lasting Portuguese settlement in East Timor occurred in 1 633. Over time European influence grew to spawn a new community in the island-the mestizos, or topsasses-a mixed race. The Dominicans continued to make converts while becoming rich from sandalwood trading. The Portuguese were opposed in the region by Indonesian Muslims throughout the last half of the sixteenth century and later in the same period by another European competitor: the Netherlands. After independence from Spain in 1 5 8 1 , the Dutch expanded their influence throughout modern-day Indonesia in the early seventeenth century. They eventually took control of Kup ang and the western part of the island in 1 63 7. This faet was eo nfirmed by treaty in 1661, rhus establishing a dissatisfying Dutch-Portuguese cohab­ itation of the island. Like the Portuguese before them, the Dutch showed little interest in the possession, but they did mount a series of military pacification campaigns and largely secured themselves at peace in the west of the island by the mid-1700s.5 The Portuguese retained authority over the island's eastern section but did not take direct control of its affairs until 1701, when they appointed a wealthy trader, Ant6nio Coelho Guerreiro, governor in East Timor. Yet, even he made little difference locally. He tried unsuccessfully to set up a relationship with the local rulers, but "Timor lingered on, amidst the usual quarrels. " 6 The governor was so far d istant from the main Portuguese interests in the area-in fact, six thousand miles from the Viceroy of Go a, his direct administrator, and he had so few resources and such difficulty com­ municating within the mountainous island, that he remained largely inef­ fectual and isolated in his capitol city of Lifao, in what is known today as the Ambeno or Oecussi enclave. Realistically, control was exercised by the Dominicans and the mestizos-descendants of the Portuguese soldiers and traders and the local women. What control the Portuguese were able to accomplis h in Timor was largely due to their ability to rake advantage of rivalries among the local tribal leaders -they did not strongly garrison their half of the island.l But even under such benign rule rhe population of Timor was nor totally accepting of foreign administration. The Timorese rebelled against the Portuguese several times during the eighteenth century. In 17 42, a Dominican friar led the mutiny.8 There was sufficient unrest rhar rhe capital was moved to the port of Dili in 1769 after rebels took control of Lifao and forced the governor to fl e e.9 Another revolt led to the secession of the kingdom of Mambara in 1790 . 1 0 Unstable and really quire poor, East Timor was deemed not worth much effort at the time; "The Dutch in Indonesia harassed the Portuguese occupation but, on the whole, Portugal's share was so small that the Dutch saw no p arricu lar interest in getting rid of their neighb ors." 1 1

Background for Timorese Independence

3

After a short spell under British control during the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch returned to West Timor in the early nineteenth century to begin a series of negotiations to purchase East Timor. The Portuguese were uncoop­ erative, and a series of border disputes began, largely centered on the ques­ tion of the enclaves held by both nations within the boundaries of the other state's half of the island. The debate continued for over fifty years without sufficient concern to bring a resolution. The Dutch and the Portuguese finally came to agree on their division of rights within Timor in 1 893, and then a convention was signed at The Hague in 1904 to confirm the adminis­ tration internationally, but the distress o f the Timorese only grew during the same period . Indifference toward East Timor was not limited to administrative efforts. The Portuguese built little there and contributed only minimally to education and internal improvements. The region remained a backwater through the mid-nineteenth century, staying "little more than a trading post." 12 Coffee growing was instituted to replace the sandalwood trade in the 1850s, but few other changes were made and the productivity of the province contin­ ued to stagnate in the last half of the nineteenth century. In order to generate some improvement and profit after so many years without a worthwhile return, the Portuguese eventually instituted a forced-labor program in 188 4 designed t o increase efficiency on the backs of the Timorese. Portuguese control became more focused in 1896, when the colony's administration became independent of supervision b y the colonial governor in Macau, and beginning in 1908 the administration instituted a head tax on all males between the ages of eighteen and sixty. 1 3 These unpopular actions resulted in intermittent conflict with the Timorese for over a decade, which came to a head in two instructive revolts in 1910 and 1 9 12 . THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY REVOlTS AND THE END OF PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

These revolts originated from a multitude of causes more deeply rooted in shocks to Timorese culture than simply due to the harshness of colonial administration. As in many other colonies, East Timor was managed by two linked local governmental systems: one Portuguese and one Timorese. Where Portuguese management left off, local tribal leaders formed a buffer and bridge to the activities of the people. As long as the tribal leaders supported and were supported by the Portuguese, the Timorese people were relatively complacent. With a disruption in this interrelated system of governance came rebellion. One of the major problems in the Portuguese administration of East Timor was the general incompetence of the lower-level administrators in the province. Although several of the governors were adequately attuned to their tasks, frequently their immediate supporting staffs were populated by

4

Triumph of S elf-Determination

" military miscreants" cast off into oblivion from other regions of the Portu­ guese empire, due to corruption or ineffe ctive performance.14 The low calib e r of these people meant that the most common interface between the local leaders in Timor and the local Portuguese government was normally ineffi­ cient and sometimes even confrontational. During the decades preceding the revolts, the administration of Timor was also rocked by a rapid series of short-tenured military governors whose major emphasis turned the area fro m a lack!uster trading post to something of a military camp . 15 These two factors created an ever-widening gap of professionalism and consistency between the Portuguese and Timorese leadership. The arrival of ambitious Governor Jose Celestino da Silva in 1894 finally brought with it much greater continuity of policy (he governed for fourteen years), and also a significant effort to reduce the authority of the Timorese leaders within the power structures of the colony. Da Silva waged a campaign of domination in Timor, which brought him much greater autonomy from Lisbon but also reduced the power of the local chiefs and devastated several areas of Timor for years to come. 1 6 The people of Timor never fully adjusted to the autocratic approaches of these men, and when the inevitably unpopular head tax came into effect in 1908 , it was viewed as yet another attack on the power of the local chiefs by an ever more inconsistent and omnipresent Portuguese administration. 1 7 Da Silva continued his assaults o n the Timorese b y starting a land redistri­ bution scheme and even efforts to reorganize so me of the local tribes. 1 8 He audaciously demanded that all schooling be conducted in Portuguese and required the children of the chiefs to attend such schools. By the time Da Silva instituted taxes on salt, alcohol, and hunting, a revolt was not far dist ant . 1 9 To compound this discontent, three different governors followed Da Silva in the two years after his departure. This instability would have pave d the way for an uprising in Timor under most conditions, but when the republic was declared in Portugal in 1910, the lack of coherent policy for the colony opened the door for the Timorese to force a change of administration. The revolt began with the murder of a local Portuguese administrator, after he insulted a local chief. The indifference of the Portuguese, combined with fervent local unrest, resulted in an uprising that took the Portuguese nearly eighteen months to suppress. A local chief, Dom Bonaventura, brought together several other tribal groups and actually marched on the Portuguese capital in Dili. Residents of the city wer e kill e d, buildings were destroyed, and government house was even looted. The Portuguese brought in African troops from Mozambique to suppress the revolt, "reportedly resulting in 3,424 East Timorese killed, and 12,567 wounded, and 289 Portuguese killed and 600 wounded . "20 The spirit of the revolt also caused an intervention in West Timor in 1912-191 3,21 which led to the first international recognition of the Timorese situation in the twentieth century when The Hague Court

Background for Timorese Independence

5

intervened to clearly establish the border between East and West Timor. In response to the revolt, the Portuguese introduced a true civil government in Dili and after 1913 £naily reestablished effective control o ver the province. Some authors, and many in East Timor, conclude from studying the colonial period that the Timorese adopted an attitude of ongoing struggle ((unu in Tetum) toward their governors.22 This attitude would grow in power and legend through the twentieth century. Still, the European population of Timor remained small. No real incentive existed to bring in colonists. For a time the territory even served as a penal colony, and after 1930 the Portuguese tried to bring settlers for the develop­ ment of a plantation economy, but that, too, failed.23 Although some sem­ blance of normality had been constructed by the time Europe entered World War Two, " incredibly Dili had no electricity, no water supply, no paved roads, and no telephones."24

WORLD WAR TWO I N T IMOR

More unfortunately, 1942 brought a new and even less beneficial admin­ istration to East Timor. First, the Netherlands and Australia landed troops in Timor, without Portuguese permission, in order to defend against the Japanese. Then in February of that year, twenty thousand Japanese troops invaded the island and occupied the Portuguese colony. Japan pushed into the region because its 1937 war with China required greater and greater resources, particularly oil, and 25 percent of its oil was supplied by the then Dutch East lndies (now Indonesia) surrounding the tiny Portuguese colony. The Japanese clearly saw Timor as an outpost supporting the expanding Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere they were building in the region. After the attack on Pearl Harbor just two months earlier, the J apanese were seeking advanced bases from which to protect the riches of Southeast Asia from the expected Allied riposte. Timor's position northwest of Australia facilitated Japanese defense of the region, so they invaded not for gains in Timor but to support objectives elsewhere. After the fall of Singapore, the defeat of the combined British, Dutch, Australian, and United States fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea gave the J apanese clear superiority in the region. On March 9, 1942, the Dutch surrendered their Timorese possessions to the aggressor without resistance. The Portuguese did nothing to protect East Timor either. But the Australians did not leave the Timorese to the mercy of the conquering Japanese; they retained a group of several hundred soldiers in order to oppose the Japanese control of Timor and stave off a potential invasion of their own country. The result of the Australian commitment was both a long and devastating guerilla war and some significantly greater interest b y the Australians in the province to their northwest.

6

Triumph of S elf-Determination

The three hundred men of the Australian 22nd and 24th Independent Companies fought along with many local militias to harass and kill Japanese soldiers until being forced to withdraw in January 1943. Casualty estimates include only forty Australians and nearly fifteen hundred Japanese-no tally of Timorese injuries is recorded, but it is estimated that J apanese reprisals following the departure of the Australians reduced the population of East Timor by possi b I y seventy thousand !25 MODERN TIMO R AND ITS EARLY INDEPENDENCE EFFORTS

The end of the war in 1 945 brought both the return of the Portuguese and renewed sentiment for East Timorese independence. It also brought some in newly formed Indonesia to call for Timor's incorporation into their "country" as they began their own struggle with nationhood . Theoretically, the Portuguese goal was to assimilate the Timorese into their own way of life.26 But this was never effectively accomplished and some would argue was never really pursued in Timor as it was in other Portuguese colonies. In 1950 less than 2 percent of Timorese were considered to have been assimi­ lated or deemed "culturally modern" by the Portuguese.27 As Portugal struggled to retain control in East Timor, coaptation of the indigenous elite became an ever-growing part of its strategy. The cultivation of a class of assimilados was seen as a method to better control the province through a Timorese buffer administration. Though technically all inhabitants of the colony had been granted citizenship, in practice only those meeting certain property and taxation requirements were permitted to vote-all of these were found among the assimilados.28 T h e educational work of the Catholic Church was key to the success of this effort, largely because literacy in Timor was tragically low and the church bore the greatest burden for education outside the urban areas. Only in 1964 was primary schooling made compulsory for young Timorese children.29 An important by-product of this educational role of the church was an important increase in membership among the local population. Although the number of conversions had been small through the war years, by 1 952 the church had accomplished significant growth and was a major contribu­ tor to pro-Portuguese sentiment. Church membership again increased mark­ ed!y, from perhaps sixty thousand in 19 52 to almost two hundred thousand by 1973.30 At the same time, the percentage of Timorese among the episcopate also grew sharply. Portugal did execute a series of colonial reforms in the 1 950s and 1960s. Lisbon fully incorporated Timor into the state in 1951 and improved the administrative structure of the colony to include a Legislative Council in 1963. During this period Portugal also significantly increased its financial support in a series of five-year development plans. Even so, over the entire

Background for Timorese Independence

7

period, the record shows very little real improvement in the lot of the average Timorese. A 1962 report made to the United Nations General Assembly noted, "In the post-war period there has been no significant progress in the economic development of Timor." 31 This effort coincided with the general European trend toward decoloni­ zation that followed the end of the world war. Portugal's African colonies rose up seeking independence beginning with Angola in 1961. The revolt in Guinea-Bisseau started in 1963, and the insurgency in Mozambique followed the next year. Portugal poured thousands of soldiers into Africa and began a long and unsuccessful campaign to halt these movements. All three nations were independent by 197 5. Similar movements were well publicized all around the world. Radio and newspapers, even the government's A Voz de Timor and the Catholic Seara, made these facts known in East Timor, and the movement for Timorese independence grew in strength, even in the isolated hamlets of the countryside, with each success by another former Portuguese colon y In 1959 a small revolt in the eastern pan of East Timor had been brutally put down by the Portuguese, resulting in the deaths of hundredsY The Por­ tuguese began a troop buildup in 1962 to stand against the growing opposi­ tion in Timor. The following year the new governor was a colonel appointed from the army staff, and the portion of the Portuguese defense budget directed to operations in Timor was increased to a level equivalent to half the pro vine e's revenues for that year. 33 These efforts appeared to eo main the rebellious activities, but in fact, from that point on, discontent continued to grow in the colon y. Still, East Timor's fust real chance for independence did not come until well after it had been accomplished by other Portuguese colonies, and only then with the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon in 1974. By then, the Timorese had developed a true opposition movement. In late April of that year the government in Lisbon fell to a coup d'etat lead by leftist military leaders who sought democracy and decolonization following the painful conflicts in Africa. Within weeks of the changeover in Portugal, East Timor was home to three separate political movements, each with a different plan for the region's future. The fust and most popular, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), was based within the pro-Ponuguese elite in Dili. lt sought continued association wit h Portugal at fust but turned in time to favor independence. The Association of Timorese Social Demo­ crats, or ASDT, favored a period of decolonization lasting eight to ten years, sufficient time for the necessary political and economic structures to develop in East Timor. Finally, the third and smallest of the most influential groups, the Timorese Popular Democratic Association, or APODETI (originally the Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia), pushed for East Timor's incorporation into neighboring Indonesia. Many believe that the APODETI was a product of the Indonesian Intelligence Service (BAKIN), which certainly funneled funds to the organization. .

8

Triumph of S elf-Determination

Had there been more unity among the widely spread and easily isolated communities of East Timor, a truly national movement might have brought freedom easily from the distracted administration in Lisbon. Such a dominant movement might also have deterred Indonesian concerns about instability in its eastern border area. But a divisive civil war soon broke out in East Timor-a conflict with clear potential for socialist venues-and the fleeting opportunity for independence in 1974 turned sour. The Portuguese wanted to establish mechanisms to permit gradual decol­ onization but found ever-growing opposition to the idea. Faced with popular pressure from within and slow progress toward consensus by other groups, in September 1974 ASDT changed its program to demand immediate inde­ pendence and its name to the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN).34 Even though it enjoyed the bulk of popular support and had made a coalition with the UDT, FRETILIN had also become very threatening to Portuguese efforts aimed at gradual decolonization and to stability in the region overall. In early 1975, although the Portuguese had established a transitional government to precede the election of a Popular Assembly, APODETI refused to participate with FRETILIN initiatives, thus paralyzing development of consensus among the Timorese factions. By the summer of 1975 conditions had worsened to the point that the UDT launched a counter-FRETILIN coup in Dili. On August 1 1 , the airport and the communications center in the capital fell, and arrests of FRETIUN leaders began under the guise of freeing the territory from "communist influence."35 The Portuguese called for talks among the factions, but soon the condt i i ons of civil war existing within East Timor made mediation appear fruitless. The local Portuguese forces disintegrated and the Portuguese administrators fled to Atauro Island. During the following weeks FRETILIN established its own administration in East Timor. With growing problems in Lisbon com­ plicating rhe already complex problem, the Portuguese soon lost most of the ir real influence within East Timor, and by late November FRETILIN unilaterally declared East Timorese independence. The UDT and APODETI rejected FRETILIN's declaration, as did the Portuguese. More important, the chaotic events in East Timor had also become very threatening to Indonesia. Since early 1975, the Indonesian government, through BAKIN, had acted where possible against efforts for East Timorese independence. With FRETILIN's declaration, Indonesia's concern grew substantial, and o n December 7 approximately ten thousand Indonesian troops invaded the province. The conventional-force invasion followed an operation codenamed Komodo that was designed by senior Indonesian military officers to add chaos to the situation and set conditions for the invasion. The real motivations behind the Indonesian invasion remain murky. Many analysts claim that Indonesia acted simply to expand its territory and to stop the advance of communism within the region. There also have been many claims of U.S. support for and even U.S. impetus behind rhe Indonesian

Background for Timorese Independence

9

action, because, in the p eriod of the ongoing Cold War, the interests of the United States seemed always to be directed at stopping the advance of com­ munism, and many at the time believed that FRETILIN was a Communist Party organization. Certainly there was a high-level meeting between U.S. President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and President Suhano immediately prior to the invasion, wherein President Ford indicated he would not oppose Indonesian action.36 Suhano seemed to have indicated that he had little choice in the matter given the circumstances of the u nrest in Timor.37 The other regional partners, Australia and New Zealand , also seem to have anticipated the invasion and done nothing to prevent it. The issue remains important not because of the motivations for the invasion, but for the treatment of the Timorese people afterward and the struggle for independence that arose and remained active over the two decades that followed . As Jamsheed Marker noted, however, "While the general international response to [the Indonesian invasion of] East Timor was a grimace and a sad, helpless shrug of the shoulders, there were notable exceptions. "3 8 Significant among those exceptions, from 1975 onward, was the United Nations.

THE ORIGINS OF INDONESIAN RULE

Portugal acted quickly to bring the situation before the United Nations, and on December 22 the Security Council voted to deplore the Indonesian intervention.39 The same resolution confirmed the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and called for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal. Four months later a second Security Council Resolution, numbered 3 89, reiterated the call for Indonesian forces to leave East Timor. Unfortunately, the Indonesians took no heed of the then largely impotent Security Council40 and went on to establish a provisional government in Dili; by May 1976 the Indonesian government claimed East Timorese sup p on for integration and two months later formally declared East Timor to be its twenty-seventh province. Soon, the new territory was closed to outside observers. The full impact of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor is difficult to judge. Significant variations in economic and census data make even deter­ mining the population of East Timor in 1975 d ifficult. But it is certain that the Indonesian invasion preceded a massive crackdown on the proindepen­ dence movement. One official British assessment n ares : The Indonesians themselves acknowledge that about 80,000 East Timorese died in the late 1970s, out of a population of some 650,000. Some Non­ Governmental Organizations (NGOs) suggest as many as 200,000, or about one third of the territory's pop ulation, died. Immediately after the invasion, East Timer' s misery was cornpo unded by a famine, exacerbated by the po !icy of establishing strategic hamlets and the consequent dismption of normal

10

Triumph of S elf-Determination farming. Comparison of the last Portuguese and first Indonesian censuses, taking into account up to 40,000 East Timorese who fled abroad, suggests a minimum figure of o ver 100,000 deaths.41

This wo u Id mean one-sixth oft he East Timorese popu latio n was destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the Indonesian invasion. Constancio Pinto provided a vivid p icture of life under the Indonesian invasion in his book East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the East Timorese Resistance. He confirms that thousands fled and alleges indiscriminate Indonesian bombing, murder, and even rape during the first days following the invasion; soon his family was also in flight.42 Although the military wing of FRETILIN, known as FALINTIL/� and its supporters fought back, they were no match for the sophisticated weaponry of the American-supplied Indonesian Army.44 In response, the Timorese resistance turned to guerrilla warfare tactics to continue the struggle, and the short campaign to p acify the province turned into a prolonged conflict. Pino describes over eighteen months of fighting, during which the Timorese suffered under mortar and rocket fire as well as naval gunfire and aerial bombardment directed by American OV-1 0 obser­ vation aircraft.45 FRETILIN wisely included an information campaign as a part of its efforts to resist the Indonesians, and in time its strength grew despite casualties from the fighting. Pino joined the movement in 1976 at age thirteen.4 6 FALINTIL brought the fight to the Indonesian military (ABRI),47 using small bands of guerillas focused directly on countering Indonesian military activity in three different zones. In addition, FALINTIL developed and employed a special, mobile force, the Brigada Choque, which could rapidly move to reinforce the guerrilla bands when they needed help.48 Every bullet counted for the impoverished FALINTIL, so it depended upon a defensive strategy, lying in wait for Indonesian mistakes. Unfortunately the Indonesian forces had overwhelming numbers and a significant technology ad vantage. With a major landing operation in Dili on December 7, FALINTIL had to resort to the strategic defensive and simply endure the Indonesian occupation. Michael Smith has described FALINTIL's campaign against the Indone­ sian military as having three phases. The first phase, from 1975 to 1978, was led by Nicolau Lobato, the group's first commander.49 Initially, FRETI­ LIN/FALINTIL activities held the Indonesians to the main population centers and kept most of the countryside free of Indonesian control. 5° But eventually the Indonesian forces developed a concerted plan to wipe out the resistance movement, and they began to fight several large-scale battles, incrementally clearing the territory from west to east and along the way reducing FALINTIL from some twenty-seven thousand fighters to fewer than five thousand. Meanwhile, the often heavy-handed approach used by

Background forTimorese Independence

11

the Indonesians gave rise to numerous human rights violations, including the massacre of five Australian journalists in Balibo in October 19 75, most I y illustrated by attacks against unarmed Timorese. Such attacks began to grow more violent and more flagrant as the FALINTIL maintained pressure and as time passed. Behind these operational tactics was an ever-developing political organ that focused the Timorese on how to continue the struggle, but during the early years it remained relatively weak. 51 After 1977, though, increasing pressure from the Suharto regime and internal problems within FRETILIN caused a turn for the worse in East Timor.52 In 1977 the Indonesians adopted a new strategy designed to encir­ cle and destroy the FALINTIL. Using significant reinforcements, additional airpower, and even napalm, the ABRI methodically strangled the Timorese opposition in the countrysideY In a climactic battle on Mount Matabean on December 3 1 , 1978, Lobato was killed and the main FALINTIL base was destroyed. By 1979 the ABRI had effectively marginalized the FALINTIL and pushed most Timorese resistance underground. Thus the first phase of nearly conventional combat operations was clearly won by the larger and more technologically superior Indonesian military. In the second phase, from 1 979 until about 19 87, the FALINTIL turned to more traditional guerrilla tactics. This period saw the rise of Xanana Gusmao, who rose to command FALINTIL in 1981, following a period of disarray in the aftermath of the death of Lobato. It was during this period of the fight that the Timorese resistance movement really developed its power and the relationship it needed with the Timorese people in order to mount an effective campaign. In the 19 80s, FALINTIL ea me to be "supported secretly with money and provisions by a large number of the East Timorese population, known as the Rede Clandestina," clandestine network or front.54 It was this support mechanism that gave FALINTIL its real power, as it was generally so weak militarily that it had to depend upon infiltrating Indonesian units and conducting high-risk attacks against numerically supe­ rior Indonesian forces just to obtain sufficie nt arms and ammunition to carry on the fight. During this period the ABRI even forcibly mobilized the Timorese population to hunt down the remaining FALINTIL guerrillas.55 This new campaign wreaked havoc on the local population and caused significant death and devastation.56 FRETILIN attempted a major move back into Dili in 1982, but it, too, was defeated, the defeat leading eventually to a cease-fire in 1983 negotiated by Gusmao. Meanwhile the external sup­ port mechanisms for FALINTIL (primarilythose of Jose Ramos-Horta, who served as the Permanent Representative of FRETILIN to the U N for ten years), began to attract international attention toward the plight of the Timorese people. With the hobbling of FALINTIL the Indonesians changed their approach to governance in East Timor. To its credit, the Suharto government actually

12

Triumph of S elf-Determination

provided more aid to the Timorese than they had ever seen under Portuguese rule. As British assessments r e ve aled : After 1982, Indonesia adopted a " hearts and minds" strategy, attempting to win over the population with large-scale economic and social development. . . . The evidence suggests that conditions, including human rights, generally improved for a time after about 1983, and the level of armed conflict gradually diminished. The International Committee of the Red Cross {lCRC) was allowed to operate and have access to d etainees. 57This is not to say that conditions in East Timer improved to the point that armed resistance ceased, however; over twenty thousand ABRI troops remained in Timer to maintain pressure against the approximately five hundred FAUNTIL guerrillas. That situation changed very little over the intervening years, with ongoing friction between the Indone­ sian military forces assigned to stabilize the province and the proindependence groups becoming a normal backdrop to life in East Timer.

INDONESIA CONSOLIDATES ITS HOLD O V E R EASTTIMOR

Indonesia tried a variety of techniques to p acify the province during the 1980s, none of which worked well enough to remove popular support for the guerrillas. Unlike its activity in other provinces, Indonesia executed a strong de velopment policy and tolerated the local language and religious preference of the Timorese people, albeit with a continued large and active military presence. One of the by-products of this approach was a strength­ ening of the influence of the Catholic Church in East Timor, shepherded by Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo. The church became a focal point for East Timorese identity within the overwhelmingly Muslim nation of Indo nesia . East Timor was eventually opened to tourists following President Suharto's visit there in 1 9 8 8 , ostensibly to demonstrate to the world that Indonesia was de veloping the area, but internal conflicts remained intermittent. Even Suharto, fearing visible opposition, avoided real contact with the people upon his arrival in Dili in 1 98 8 . Pope John Paul ll's visit in October of the following year also gave rise to a proindependence demonstration, which embarrassed the ABRI.58 Similar demonstrations before the visiting U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, John M onj o, in 199 0 left no doubt that Indonesia had much work to do if it really sought stability in East Timor. The 1990s initially saw little change in the u nstable opposition between the Indonesians and FRETILIN in the province, but both sides made changes in an attempt to end the conflict. The ABRI focused increasingly on commu­ nity work, a sort of hearts-and-minds program; yet, its deployed numbers in East Timor remained high. Within the opposition, Xanana Gusmao reorganized FRETILIN in 1990 and created the CNRM, or National Council

Background forTimorese Independence

13

of Mau bere Resistance, in order to bring together all forms of opposition to Indonesia within East Timor.59 The efforts of Jose Ramos-Horta also began to bear fruit in the early 1990s as he pushed to retain international and United Nations focus on the ongoing crisis in his homeland.60 The most far-reaching event of the early decade was, however, the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre.

Constancio Pinto described the massacre in his book East Timor's Unfin­ ished Struggle: On November 12, a huge crowd of people went to the memorial mass for Sebastiiio Gomes, at the Motael Church. After the mass, they marched to the Santa Cruz Cemetery to put flowers on Sebastiiio's grave. As the crowd marched through Dili, many of the marchers unfurled banners and shouted pro-independence slogans. S uch a demonstration, such a large and open dis­ play of pro independence sentiment, had not taken place in East Timor since Indonesia's invasion. By the time the procession reached the cemetery, there was a crowd of thousands of men, women, and children chanting slogans and waving flags and banners . . . . As the demonstrators arrived at the cemetery, there were already Indonesian troops nearby. After the demonstrators arrived and had a brief ceremony in memory of Sebastiiio, a few army trucks came and started to unload troops . As the gathering was breaking up, soldiers began marching toward the crowd, and suddenly j ust opened fire without any warn­ ing. There was no provocation.This description matched the views of several other eyewitnesses; the result was over two hundred dead and as many inj ured, many of them young people. Among these eyewitnesses were American j o ur­ nalists Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman. Among the dead was at least one foreigner, a citizen of New Zealand.61 The incident caused outrage worldwide and a new wave of criticism of Indonesian control in East Timor. -

Xanana Gusmiio understood the impact of the tragedy and became even more involved in a campaign of diplomacy and media management that was instrumental in alerting the world to the massacre. Gusmiio was interviewed by many major media channels and obtained worldwide attention, which had the desired effect of calling even greater attention to the occupation and Indonesia's overall security effort. INDONESIA'S ACTIONS D RAW INTERNATIONAL S C RUTINY

In some ways, the Santa Cruz massacre was the beginning of the end of Indonesia's authority in East Timor. Ramos-Horta, as the FRETILIN/ CNRM permanent representative to the United Nations, pressed unsuccess­ fully for a U N peacekeeping force, bur the incident resonated in several capitals, particularly in Lisbon. Allan Nairn and others began to speak out in their home countries. Because the massacre received so much international

14

Triumph of Self-Determination

press attention, many who had never before known much about Timorese issues began to pay attention to the Indonesian activities there. Even so, the ABRI did not reduce its efforts to ensure stability in the province. In fact, even in the face of mounting press coverage, it continued to crack down on CNRM activities and to aggressively seek out the leaders of the movement. As a result of his high profile, Xanana Gusmao became a prime target of the Indonesian effort, and its campaign to smother the independence movement resulted in his capture in Dili and imprisonment in 1992. Gusmao's capture only temporarily reduced FALINTIL's activities in East Timor (he was quickly replaced as field commander by a succession of loyal subordinates), and in the end, his incarceration only provided him more influence in his efforts to bring attention to the situation in East Timor. Though in May 1993, Gusmao was publicly tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Indonesian government62 and was incarcerated in a prison in Jakarta, he was rarely out of control of the independence effort and only grew in stature as an international freedom fighter as the years passed. His sentence was commuted to twenty years by President Suharto in August 1993, but many began to call for his release or a reduction in his sentence to house arrest. Until he was released in late 1 999, Gusmao successfully led the resistance movement and served as an international symbol of the plight of the Timorese from within his prison cell. Over the following four years, the Timorese struggle found more and more support around the world. The Timorese people and their supporters finally swept the world news in 1 9 96 when two of their most influential leaders won the Nobel Peace Prize. The No bel committee chose Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta, both leaders in East Timor's resistance effort for twenty years, for their "work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor." Even given the growth of support for Timorese interests, the announcement of Belo and Ramos-Horta's selection for the Peace Prize delivered a huge blow to Indonesia's ongoing effort to delegiti­ mize the Timorese agenda. Though the Indonesian foreign minister claimed to be astounded by the No bel Committee decision, there was no doubt that awarding the prize to the two Timorese "dramatically magnified world awareness of their efforts and put pressure on governments" 63 to act. With the military component of CNRM's effort still alive after Gusmao's capture and the huge informational boost of the Peace Prize selection felt around the world, the pressure on the Indonesian government to justify its campaign in East Timor began to stimulate new methods of ending the crisis. Unfortunately for Indonesia, less than a year later the Asian economic crisis ripped the financial foundation from its efforts in East Timor and forced an end to the thirty-year-old administration of President Suharto. The combina­ tion of these events in the same year eventually gave the East Timorese the opportunity to press their case for independence.

Chapter 2 Changing Global Power Structures during the 1990s

The last half of the twentieth century was dominated by the structure of global power that was established in the wake of World War Two . That Cold War system drove a separation of the major powers into two general camps and made it very difficult for nations to change alliances from one camp to another. Although the Cold War power balance was dominated by the threat of superpower nuclear war; it also had the tendency to reduce the incidents of conventional war around the globe as both democratic states; dominated by the United States; and the communist states; dominated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC); worked wherever possible to minimize conflicts that had a potential for escalation to superpower involvement. This backdrop of rigid power confrontation helped obscure smaller movements like the call for East Timorese independence. This rigidity also created some very complex international relationships; and prominent among those was the association between the United States and Indonesia. Indonesia under Presidents Suharto and Sukarno was strongly anticommunist; thus it was seen as supportive of United States interests and due to its important geostrategic position astride the Strait of Malacca; Indonesia benefited from large American aid programs. Far down among the implications of such aid was the question of United States support for Indonesia during its campaign to stabilize the situation in East Timor. THE RISE O F THE INDONESIAN STATE

Indonesia is a huge; populous country that is not well understood by many in the world; particularly Americans and Europeans . In several important ways Indonesia shares much historically with the United States; Australia; and even East Timor; but in other ways the rich history of Indonesia points

16

Triumph of S elf-Determination

to important cultural differences and unique approaches that should be rec­ ognized to objectively understand the role of Indonesia in the independence movement of the East Timorese. A far-flung, diverse country, with over three hundred distinct ethnic groups speaking some seven hundred languages, Indonesia includes over thirteen thousand islands spread across nearly two million square kilomet ers. Its 225 million people also make it one of the world's most populous nations. Indonesia sits astride one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, the Strait of Malacca, and produces a significant percentage of the globe's natural gas and petroleum products. Like Timor and much of the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia's modern history was significantly influenced by its colonization by a European power: the Netherlands. The Dutch began an interest in the spice trade on Java in the early nineteenth century, but over the following century they did little for the local people, particularly in education and welfare or to advance self­ government. In 1902 the colonial government began encouraging settlement on other islands to relieve population pressures in Java; this was the beginning of a transmigration program that Indonesia would later pursue even more aggressively. It was only in 1 9 1 8 that the People's Council (Volksraad), a largely advisory body to the Dutch governor general, met for the first time. Although it approved the colonial budget and could propose legislation, the People's Council lacked effective political power and remained a stronghold of the colonial establishment. The first great leader of Indonesia, Sukarno, began his rise to power in the 1920s.1 He established the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in 1 928; the PNI stressed mass organization and noncooperation with the colonial authorities and espoused an ultimate goal of independence. Sukarno had a talent for bringing together Javanese tradition, Islam, and his own version of Marxism to gain a huge mass following; yet he advocated the establishment of a secular rather than an Islami c st at e.2 By the late 1920s, the growing Indonesian desire for independence was obvious, but not universally popular, particularly with the Dutch administra­ tion. Sukarno was arrested in December 1929, tried, and convicted of sedition. He served two years in prison, but when the PNI was dissolved and replaced by the Indonesia Parry (Partindo) in April 1931, Sukarno soon became a member. Partindo also called for independence and was repressed by the Dutch, and it, too, was dissolved in 1934. In the meantime, Sukarno had been arrested again and exiled without triai;J he went to ground for a while but reentered politics after the Japanese occupied the country in 1942. From that point he was to play the central role in the struggle for independence. Indonesian national consciousness grew significantly under Japanese occu­ pation in the mid-1940s. As mentioned previously, the Japanese occupied Indonesia to secure its rich natural resources. After the March 1942 surrender of the Netherlands Indies administration, the people of Indonesia soon

Changing Global Power Structures, 1990s

17

observed alternate methods of rule. Although harsh, the Japanese occupa­ tion opened the way for a sense of Indonesian nationalism in several ways. First, it showed that there were alternatives to Dutch administration. Even more significantly, during the occupation the Japanese increased t h e level of participation by Indonesians in politics, administration, and the military.4 The Japanese relied on local elites to administer the countryside, and for the first time it became clear that indigenous leaders could manage t h eir own affairs. From these beginnings grew new local political organizations and a core of the future Indonesian military. The Dutch language was even discarded in favor of Malay and Japanese-making way for an Indonesian nat ional language. Indonesian art and culture grew stronger as well.5 When the Allies began their counteroffensives in the closing months of the war, the Japanese even promoted an Indonesian independence movement as a means of frustrating Allied reoccupation. THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION, 1945-1950

In 1942 Sukarno had agreed to cooperate with the Japanese, as his only viable option, and he b ecame increasingly valuable to them as the war pro­ gressed. As the Japanese became more and more d esperate during 1944, they announced that the entire Indonesian archipelago would become inde­ pendent. This promise seemed to justify Sukarno's collaboration, at least in pan, and was certainly a tremendous boon to the Indonesian people, effectively accelerating their move to independence in relation to the former European colonies neighboring them. The new nation's territory was to include not only the Netherlands Indies bur also Portuguese Timor, Brits i h North Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula.6 This extended Japanese construct was the heart of Sukarno's Greater Indonesia Policy and has been the source of several internal problems ever since.l The Jakarta Charter formed the basis for the Indon esian state and Sukarno was chosen as its first president. The debate over what kind of nation Indonesia should become was far­ ranging, and unfortunately quite brief. The major dilemma facing the new nation was how to coalesce the divergent views of a huge and populous "nation" of so many ethnic subgroups that shared little and differed in culture, linguistics, and religion. One issue that needed resolution was the role of Islam in the state; another was the form of representation accorded the cultural and ethnic minorities; finally, the relationship between national and individual power needed to be resolved in a manner that fit Indonesia's people. Sukarno eventually resolved these issues with his five principles, or Pancasila: "They are: b elief in one supreme God; justice and civility among peoples; the unity of Indonesia; democracy through deliberation and consensus among representations; social justice for all." 8Pancasila d idn't make everyone happy, but it did provide a common foundation for the new state.

18

Triumph of Self-Determination

Two days after the Japanese surrender, on August 17, 1 945, Sukarno formally declared Indonesia's independence and raised the red-and-white national flag. One of his first challenges was in dealing with the victorious Allies once they returned to Indonesia. "The Allies had no consistent policy concerning Indonesia's future apart from the vague hope that the republicans and Dutch could be induced to negotiate peacefully. Their immediate goal in bringing troops to the islands was to disarm and repatriate the Japanese, and liberate Europeans held in internment camps. Most Indonesians how­ ever believed that the Allied goal was the restoration of Dutch rule."9 After an uneasy period of peaceful coexistence, on October 28, 1945, major violence erupted in East Java. British troops clashed with armed Indonesian groups, and the British commander and hundreds of his troops were killed. Although the British launched a counterattack in late November costing thousands of lives, it was obvious that the Allies eventually would have to accept the new republic. Eventually, the Dutch, who wanted something short of full independence for Indonesia, accepted a "Net herlands-Indo nesian Union under the Dutch crown . . . . The archipelago was to have a loose federal arrangement, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), comprising the republic (on Java and Sumatra), southern Kalimantan, and the 'Great East' consisting of Sulawesi, Maluku, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and West New Guinea . " 1 0 A formal agreement to this effect was signed i n May 1947, but the Dutch continued trying to exert control in the region, even intervening with troops later, in July 1947. The international reaction to the Dutch position was clearly negative; the United Nations Security Council even established a Good Offices Committee to sponsor further negotiations. The Dutch were not the only problem Sukarno faced. Internal weakness was already evident in Indonesia, as a breakaway regime known as Darul Islam stirred up local unrest in West Java - a movement that wou Id continue to plague Indonesia until 1962. Also, local clashes between republican armed forces and procommunist elements broke out in Septemb er 1948. Of note, it was when this revolt was violently put down that the United States first began to view the Indonesian republicans as anticommunist and began to pressure the Netherlands to accommodate Indonesian independence efforts. The Dutch attempted to intervene militarily in Indonesia a second time, in 1 94 8 , arresting and exiling Sukarno to northern Sumatra. This action aroused significant, negative international reaction among members of the United Nations Security Council, including the U nited States, and in January 1949 the Security Council demanded the reinstatement of the republican government. Finally, the Dutch agreed to recognize the fully independent Indonesian state, withdraw all Dutch military forces, and hold elections for a constituent assembly. Sovereignty was formally transferred on December 27, 1949. The Indonesian nation was born after a lengthy labor as an unwieldy federal creation comprising sixteen entities. By May 1950, however,

Ch angi ng Global Power Structures, 1990s

19

aggressive action by the national government brou ght t ogether all these states into a unitary Republic of Indonesia with Jakarta as the capital. Unfortunately, internal unrest resident at its creation never ceased to plague the new state. Indonesian society was deeply divided by ethnic, regional, class, and religious differences. Treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society has always been pr oblematic; unrest in West Java and Ambon broke out within months of the nation's founding and has continued into the cur­ rent century. This internal divisiveness and its threat to the Indonesian state became a driving force around the government's decision making concerning East Timor. INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE: THE C RUCIAL YEARS, 1950-1965 Sukarno again became president of the newly independent nation in 1950, but his powers were much more limited than those he had held under the 1945 constitution. Not only were presidential powers weaker, but other competing power centers in the country also had matured since 194 5 . In particular, given its important service during the revolution, the Indonesian military had assumed a greater role in government affairs. The militar y was no t a unified force either ; it also reflected the significant divergent opin­ ions of Indonesian society. Even so, some senior military officers garnered sufficient power to organize demonstrations in Jakarta on October 17, 1952, in an attempt to pressure Sukarno to dissolve parliament. Sukarno refused and the army chief of staff was obliged to resign in a presidential shake-up of military commands. Jockeying for power between the president and the milt i ar y in Indonesia remained a theme of Indonesian politics for five decades. Still, efforts to reform were taking place in Indonesia. The country's first general election finally took place on September 29, 1 955, years after first promised. The following D ecember, work began on a new constitution to replace the provisional document of 1 950. Unfortunately, "no single group, or stable coalition of groups, was strong enough to provide enduring gov­ ernment management. The result was chronic instability and six cabinet changes between 1 950 and 1957. " 1 1 Nationalist, communist and Islamic factions all jockeyed for dominance. The military even attempted a coup d'etat in October 1 956, and although the coup failed, its instigators were only forced underground to continue their efforts in defiance of Jakarta. In March 1957, a second military-led revolt broke out in Ujungpandang; by that time the Darul Islam movement had spread to Aceh and southern Sulawesi. President Sukarno declared martial law. The next year Indonesia suffered through yet another military insurrection. Over the following two years the instability only worsened in Indonesia and began to effect changes in Sukarno's foreign agenda. The Indonesian Communist Party was growing in influence, and Sukarno viewed it as a

20

Triumph of Self-Determination

counterweight to balance the influence of the military, so he improved rela­ tions with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Relations with the United States, on the other hand, worsened, and Washington began to provide " clandestine aid" to rebels in Sumatra .12 With problems both within and without, the future of the new nation did not appear bright. Continued Dutch occupation of West New Guinea led to another break­ down in relations between Jakarta and the Netherlands in 1960. Conflict was only averted when a compromise was worked out u nder United States aus­ pices in which West New Guinea was first turned over to the United Nations and then to Indonesian administration. The United Nations replaced the Dutch there in October 1962, and in May 1 9 63, Indonesian authority was estab­ lished. A UN-monitored popular consultation, the Act of Free Choice, was conducted in 1 9 69 to d etermine if the primarily Papuan population wanted to join the republic. The local community leaders voted unanimously to approve incorporation in an act not unlike what would occur in East Timor in 1999. Still, criticism of the process by foreign observers and suspicions of Indonesian pressure threw the legitimacy of the referendum into question. In the wake of Malaysia's creation on September 16, 1963, a wave of anti-Malaysian and anti-British demonstrations broke out in Jakarta, result­ ing in the burning of the British embassy. Union workers seized British plan­ rations and other enterprises, which were then turned over to the government. Within weeks Sukarno decided that Indonesia had to act against the perceived Malaysian threat. Indonesian military units infiltrated into Malaysia but were intercepted before they could establish an effective base of operations. Thus b egan the Malaya Confrontation involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, as well as Indonesia and Malaysia. When the United Nations General Assembly finally chose Malaysia as a nonperma­ nent member of the Security Council in December 1964, Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the world body. Sukarno ruled through a complex balancing act in which he played com­ munist, Muslim, and military interests against one another to retain control. After the failure of the Constitutional Assembly to d evelop a more effective governmental structure in July 1 959, Sukarno assumed even greater power and ushered in a period called "Guided Democracy." In reality, it was more authoritarian than democratic. 1 3 As the years passed and Sukarno aged, he found the management of his authoritarian balancing act increasingly d iffi­ cult. Economics was never his strong suit and the vitality of the state began to suffer soaring inflation and debt. THE 1965 COUP AND A NEW ORDER UNDER SUHARTO

By 1965 Indonesia was in desperate 5traits, menaced by internal unrest and division and an increasingly skeptical international community. The rapid

Changing Global Power Structures, 1990s

21

growth of pro communist factions within the country was opposed by Islamic groups and the Indonesian military; the situation was anything but stable. The Indonesian military was itself divided in its support for President, with the opposition counting the army chief of staff, General Nasution, and one of his most influential senior commanders, Major General Suharto, among its number. 14 This chronic instability exploded into a coup d'etat on September 30, 1965. Six generals were murdered on the first night; the state radio station was captured, and other military units stepped in to restore order. As a result many communists were purged in bloody repressions on Java, Bali, and elsewhere. Some believe that Sukarno was responsible for mastermind­ ing the coup with the cooperation of the Indonesian Communist Party and that the purges were designed to purify both organizations. Some scenarios even alleged United States involvement in the purge based upon the sizable American military assistance programs provided to Indonesia . So me still believe these were designed to establish a pro-United States, anticommunist constituency within the Indonesian armed forces. In reality, the original coup was most likely put into effect by a small splinter element of the military, 1 S but the aftereffects of the coup abruptly changed the path of Indonesian history. In the three months following the September 30 coup, a violent anticom­ munist and anti-Chinese reaction resulted in some three hundred thousand casualties and eventually brought General Suharto to power. After extensive purging of both the left and the right and any other threatening elements of Indonesian society, Sukarno finally signed an executive order on March 1 1 , 1966, transferring authority to Suharto. Sukarno was kept under arrest until his death in 1970. The Suharto regime truly brought a new order to Indonesia; in particular, the new government realigned the country's political dynamic, effectively destroying the influence of the communist party and elevating the Indonesian military (ABRI), to a position of preeminent influence. To ensure that the communists would never again pose a challenge to his authority, Suharto created powerful new intelligence bodies in the wake of the coup: the Oper­ ational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) and the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (Bakin). Suharto's "New Order" was also clearly authoritarian, characterized by tight centralized control and long-term personal rule. Suharto made all important policy decisions and carefully balanced competing interests within the still very diverse society that was Indonesia. Within his bureaucratic state the army played a central role (with its raison d'etre defined as dwifungsi: a permanent dual political-social function within Indonesian nationhood ) . Beginning in the revolutionary period, the army had assumed a dominant role in the highest ranks of the government and civil service, and on the federal, regional, and local levels as well. "As early as 1947, the

22

Triumph of Self-Determination

military under the leadership of General Sudirman had begun setting up its own, parallel system of government so that each civilian official, from pro­ vincial governors down to district supervisors, would be matched with a corresponding figure from the military." 1 6 The Indonesian military viewed itself as father and guardian of the nation and had often been d issatisfied with the chaos of parliamentary democracy. After 1958, the military grew so influential that it was recognized as a national functional group deserving direct representation within the national assembly. 17 The army also repre­ sented a significant force within the national economy. For these reasons military actions in Indonesian took on a very different influence than in many other nations, and the role of the armed forces in East Timor, as in many other areas of Indonesian society, exerted much more authority than many understand. Suharto's regime was extraordinarily stable compared wit h its predecessor, largely due to the military's strong loyalty to the regime and wide-ranging administrative power. Another factor in his regime stability was the estab­ lishment of social, class, religious, and professional organizations to develop horizontal bonds within Indonesian society. One example of this use of federations was the creation of the Golkar "Party" in 1971. Golkar was a nominal collection of trade unions and param ilitary organizations designed simply to provide an electoral vehicle for the Suharto government in the 1971 national election (which was the first election held since the 1 950s). Golkar succeeded then in focusing support for Suharto and remains a dominant force in Indonesian politics. Indonesia was a very different nation after 1965. The internal reforms also led to changes in Indonesian foreign relations and regia nal objectives. These changes were key to the eventual movement to East Timorese independence. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SUHARTO

Suharto brought dramatic change to Indonesian foreign policy as well. After 1966 Indonesia developed a moderate approach to its international relations, although it was clearly inclined toward the West and focused most on regional issues. Indonesia maintained a foreign policy that kept it free from potential conflicts between the Soviet Union and the U nited States. Relations were restored with many Western countries; the Malayan Con­ frontation was resolved on August 1 1 , 1966; and in September, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations. Meanwhile Indonesian ties with Beijing were suspended. Then Indonesia joined Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was technically nonaligned but clearly friendly to the West. Yet, Indonesia remained heavily dependent upon Japanese, American, and Western European assistance and private investment. In 1 967 the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia met for the first time to develop

Ch angi ng Global Power Structures, 1990s

23

international economic support, and the United States and Japan provided the start-up donations. The next year the World Bank began loans to Indonesia. U.S. President Richard Nixon visited Indonesia in 1969, and Suharto visited the United States the following year. One common effort transcending the Sukarno and Suharto eras was the ambition to build a state whose territories would extend from the west coast of Sumatra to the eastern border of lrian Jaya. Although territorial claims against Malaysia were dropped in 1966, the western half of the island of New Guinea (Irian J aya) and the former Portuguese Timor were incorporated into Indonesia in pursuit of this goal. Such expansion was not well accepted in the region generally and was met with substantial international criticism, notably from Australia. West New Guinea, as Irian Jaya was then known, 1 8 had been incorpo­ rated into Indonesia on May 1 , 1 963, following a period of United Nations administration of the former Dutch colony. A plebiscite was promised, but before it could be conducted the Free Papua Movement (OPM) became active, and Indonesian forces were instructed to combat it. In reaction to international pressure, Suharto agreed to hold the plebiscite, implemented under Indonesian terms. During the voting, local councils were strongly pressured to approve incorporation into Indonesia, yet, the UN General Assembly approved the outcome of the plebiscite, and in November Irian Jaya b ecame Indonesia's twenty-sixth province. Resistance to Indonesian rule by the OPM continued, though, well after the integration of the province into Indonesia. The ongoing crisis in Irian Jaya, combined with similar resistance move­ ments in Ambon, Aceh, and East Timor, came to dominate an increasingly unstable internal security environment in Indonesia during the 1970s and early 1980s. Indonesian riots in 1974 were followed by arrests and a crack­ down on the press. As previously noted, Indonesia invaded East Timor the following year. International response to the invasion was uncertain and sporadic. Domestically, the invasion was portrayed as an internal security issue . Had the conflict been resolved quickly, any hope of Timorese self­ determination might have been snuffed out; yet the fighting continued and grew increasingly difficult to justify. The following summer, Indonesian troops were sent again into Irian J aya, and the Indonesian military began even more heavy operations in East Timor. The Indonesian operation in East Timor modulated in intensity but remained problematic for years; the resulting combat killed tens if not hundreds of thousands of Timorese and also resulted in significant Indonesian casualties. Internationally, Indonesia worked during the period to build its reputation and increase its involvement in regional issues. Indonesia disagreed with the other ASEAN nations over the response to the 1978 crisis in Cambodia, but its role in the negotiations to end the civil war there in 1988 and 1 989 rein­ forced its importance within the region both at home and abroad.

24

Triumph of Self-Determination

O ver the same period, however, Indonesia's troubles were confounded by growing economic problems. The close control of the national economy exerted by Sukarno had left Indonesia weak; over time Suharto and his close advisers improved the health of the Indonesian economy, but it remained at risk due to heavy d ep end ence on foreign markets and loans. From 1971, in response to pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Suharto placed ever more restrictive controls on the banking system, and in the following year, a rice production crisis led to riots and an economic downturn. The 1974 global oil crisis even hurt oil-exporting Indonesia due to recessions in America and Western Europe. Indonesia erupted in riots that shook the government. As a result Suharto embarked upon a gradual reformation of the Indonesian state to improve economic conditions. The Indonesian economy regained strength during the oil crisis of 1979-1980, but foreign investment in the country began to fall, due to heavy government restric­ tions and high subsidies for state-owned companies. By 1983 the economy had lost its momentum. Indonesia's geostrategic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and controlling the Malacca and Sunda Straits, made it vitally important to the security of the United States and its allies. Due to its strategic position astride the most significant maritime chokepoint in the region, the U nited States provided significant military aid and equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. Indonesia has also benefited from American security relation­ ships with other regional states, including Australia and the Philippines. Suharto's authoritarian politics and his attempts to control areas such as East Timor with a heavy hand eventually came u nder criticism not only from other government officials bur, more important, from the international press and supranational bodies such as the United Nations. THE FALL O F T HE BERLIN WALL AND T H E RISE T O PROMINENCE O F SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

As with most states created following the end of World War Two, Indo­ nesia's early years were influenced significantly by the superpower confron­ tation of the Cold War. Both Sukarno and Suharto operated internationally within artificial boundaries established by the superpower orbits of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although Sukarno toyed with communist leanings for a short period following the 1 9 65 coup, Suharto was strongly pro-West and reinforced relations with the United States. He visited Washington in 1970 following President Nixon's visit to Jakarta the previous year. Still, bilateral relations have not been the only method of international cooperation between Indonesia and other states. The United Nations played an important role in the recognition of Indonesia as an independent nation

Ch angi ng Global Power Structures, 1990s

25

and was involved with many of the country's " internal" disputes, such as those p ertaining to Irian Jaya and East Timor. Another k ey to und erstanding Indonesia's approach to international affairs has been the role of ASEAN in the region. From its inception Indonesia was a proud and influential mem­ ber of ASEAN, which normally holds a strict noninterventionist approach to the resolution of issues among its member states. There is value in the view that Indonesia's international relations were most significantly affected during the last half of the twentieth century by the UN, ASEAN, and the superpowers. Although Indonesia was nonaligned formally, it still demonstrated a clear drift toward favored relations with the United States, particularly under Suharto. Except for the immediate period of the 1 965 coup, the U nited States provided military aid to Indonesia every year between 1950 and 1992, when the U .S. Congress cut funding due to Indonesian actions in East Timor. 1 9 This aid not only reinforced ties between the United States and Indonesia but also helped the Indonesian military to retain its very influen­ tial position in Indonesian society. There is even evidence to demonstrate that the United States government knew about the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor and did nothing to prevent it.2° Certainly it was the superpower politics of the time that made the individual rights of the Timorese pale in comparison to the benefits of a strong and anticommunist Indonesia. And in 1975 the United Nations was particularly ineffective; ASEAN, then only eight years old, was never vocal concerning internal disputes. Indonesia still paid no attention to the condemnation of the Security Council later rhe next year. By that time t i had developed the story that the Timorese had actually called for the Indonesian invasion to help restore order. With Indonesian help, the remnants of the pro integration movement were formed into a " Regional Popular Assembly," which quickly called for integration into Indonesia on May 31, 1 976.21 Indonesia certainly acted in part because of the radicalism of the FRETILIN government. In the global politics of the mid-1970s, such actions were not rare. The next decade wit­ nessed little change, either in Timor or within the international context. It was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR in the final months of the decade that international power structures b egan to shift, making way for new approaches to the issue of East Timor. After 1989, the new world order had room for condemning Indonesian actions in Timor. The Santa Cruz massacre led to significant worldwide condemnation and, when Indonesia failed to show improvement, eventually to the end of foreign aid and then the 1992 dissolution of the Inter­ Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which had had as its goal rhe impro vement of the Indonesian economy through foreign cooperation . Still, the Suharto regime was so powerful in Jakarta that few expected any change to rake place.

26

Triumph of Self-Determination

THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND THE FALL OF SUHARTO, 1998

The 1 990s saw not only Indonesia's first strong steps as a regional power but also its greatest defeat-the economic collapse of 1997-1998. The countries worst affected by the 1 997-1 998 financial crisis were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand; given the precarious state of the Indonesian economy at the time, the effects of the crisis were devastating. When the full impact of the Asian economic crisis became evident in Indo­ nesia, the Suhano regime scrambled to intervene, but between August 1997 and January 1998, the Indonesian rupee lost 76 percent of its value, and the Indonesian stock market lost nearly 60 percent of its value.22 This downturn established both an economic and a political crisis in Jakarta, which even a $40-million bailout package could not stop, given President Suhano's inability to effect change. Suhano resigned in May 1998, bringing his vice president, B. J . Habibie, to power in a caretaker government pending new national elections. However, the change of leadership in Jakarta was far too swift and Suhano's control too strong to make the transition of power easy. Within weeks of taking office, Habibie, a much weaker yet more emotional man than Suhano, who did not fully comprehend the complex forces within Indonesian society, opened the door to change concerning East Timor when he agreed to consider some son of special autonomy. Habibie was the wrong leader for a period of crisis in Indonesia, but his desperation created a unique opportunity for the Timorese, which was soon bolstered by international support from the United Nations, Portugal, Australia, and the United Kingdom. For over a year following Habibie's statement on East Timor, a "complex web of events, choices made, and hard decisions taken by a range of players"23 produced a diplomatic and media sensation that would, in turn, eventually create conditions for United Nations intervention in East Timor and Timorese independence.

Chapter 3 Developing Consensus : Regional Affairs and the UN

The selection of two East Timorese men as Nobel laureates in 1 996 escalated the stakes of the debate over East Timor's future. The momentous global changes that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1 9 89 and ended with the resignation of Indonesian president Suharto in May 1998 completely reshaped the prospects for the Indonesian region. Throughout the 1990s interested regional powers and the United Nations cooperated to set unique conditions for change, but these efforts still fell far short of ensuring self­ determination in Timor. Still, the a ctivities of the United Nations, Australia, the United States, and, to a lesser degree, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reveal important perspectives on the response to crisis in East Timor. The United Nations interest in East Timor began in 1960, when the General Assembly added "Timor and dependencies" to the areas where Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter applied .1 At the time, Portugal d s i puted the propriety of the United Nations action, but little was done otherwise. Only after the change of the Portuguese government in 1974 did international effons for Timorese self-determination begin to advance. And when Indonesia invaded Timor in 1975 both the Security Council and the General Assembly urged respect for the "territorial integrity of East Timor" and called for an Indonesian withdrawal. In its Resolution 384 of December 22, 1975, the Security Council specifically focused on the rights of the East Timorese to self-determination and condemned the use of force in the area by Indonesia.2 Although the Security Council promised to hold Portugal accountable and to remain involved, the United Nations soon lost any focus on East Timor and demonstrated little influence over the situation in the short term. Annual reaffirmations of the UN's commitment to Timorese self­ determination continued through the end of the decade, but little progress was made on the issues until the early 19 80s, when United Nations-sponsored

28

Triumph of Self-Determination

talks involving Indonesia and Portugal began. Timorese representatives were included in these talks, but little tangible result was evident. In 1995, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, sponsored a new series of talks with more broad representation, called the All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD). The AIETD was conducted annually in Austria from 1995 to 1998.J For the first time, this dialogue began to produce a softening of attitudes and showed some promise o f eventually delivering an alternative to continued strife in East Timor. In another major contribution to the resolution of the Timorese issue, newly appointed UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan designated Pakistani Ambassador Jamsheed Marker as his personal representative for East Timor in February 1997. This act not only signaled the growing interest of the United Nations and its new chief in the issues of the province but also engaged one of the most skilled of international diplomats in the effort to resolve the ongoing conflict there. Marker would make significant contribu­ tions throughout his assignment, and Secretary-General Annan would main­ tain a focus on East Timor over the challenging years to come. MODERN EAST TIMOR UNDER INDONESIAN RULE

At the time, East Timor included thirteen districts,4 including the enclave of Oecussi, halfway down the western coast of the island in West Timor terri­ tory, and two offshore islands, Atauro and Jaco, for a total area of some fifteen thousand square kilometers (see map, East Timor and its Districts) . The capital city, Dili, was the largest town b y far, having some one hundred thousand inhabitants. The city of Baucau, some one hundred kilometers east of Dili, was the second largest town in the territory, but with only about twenty-five thousand people. The towns of Viqueque, southwest of Baucau, and Suai, southwest of Dili on the southern coast, were also important centers of nearly twenty thousand inhabitants. But the landmass of East Timor and all activities by any group within it were dominated by the area's mountainous terrain, which was made more difficult to travel through because of a poor system of roads and only three small airports. During the rainy season, the roads were often destroyed by landslides, the rivers swelled to become impassable in areas, and movement around the region became extremely perilous. Such terrain made enforcing security difficult for the Indonesians and the insurgent campaign of FAUNTIL much easier.5 Life in East Timor continued as a sporadic but deadly, intermittent, guerrilla-driven civil war between the TNI forces, who were tasked with providing security in the provinces, and the proindependence militia groups who continued to resist what they saw as an Indonesian occupation of their homeland. John Martinkus, in his book The Dirty Little War, an Eyewitness Account of East Timor's Decent into Hell, 1 997-2000, shows that 1997

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30

Triumph of Self-Determination

Timorese worked tirelessly for international action through a variety of international channels but seemed to gain little ground . Martinkus was no stranger to Timor, having visited there regularly starting in 1994. His analysis succeeded in separating the fact from myth and other fiction in a ban le where both sides did everything to win? The TNI forces were assigned by the Indonesian government to bring security and stability to East Timor, while the FALINTIL guerrillas wreaked havoc whenever possible with such plans to firmly establish Indonesian sovereignty. Both sides used savage tactics, but most journals i ts , Martinkus included, felt com­ passion with the proindependence Timorese militia. Few reports show the commitment and valor of the individual TNI soldiers, who fought profes­ sionally for over twenty years. Some twenty thousand of them are estimated to have lost their lives in the service of Indonesia. Martinkus chronicled life in the towns of East Timor and with the FALINTIL forces. He befriended many Timorese and witnessed their muti­ lated bodies and the terror tactics of the elite TNI units of KOPASSUS assigned to duty in Timor.8 He returned to East Timor in 1997 to cover the ongoing war in greater detail. Through Martinkus, one can understand both the frailty of the FALINTIL effort (which was reduced at times to little more than six hundred fighters hiding in the Timorese countryside, pined against nearly twenty thousand TNI troops) and their amazing dedication over the long duration of their fight.9 At the end of May 1997, the FALINTIL initiated two particularly daring attacks, one in Baucau and another on the Indonesian police (BRIMOB) headquarters in Dili. 1 0 These assaults coincided with the elections held following the fall of Suharto in Jakarta. This capability to conduct such sizable attacks showed the FALINTIL to be much stronger than many b elieved and caught the attention of some in the Indonesian and Australian governments. If the Indonesian forces had not been ab le to subdue the gu er­ rill as in Timor after over twenty years, there certainly must have been a significant level of support for their actions among the local people. As most insurgency movements are judged enduring after ten years of activity, the FALINTIL clearly demonstrated that the Timor revolt would not be pacified with a continuation of the approach previously taken by the Indonesian government. So m ething had to change. The East Timorese resistance was also strengthening itself politically, and in a significant move in April 1 99 8, the National Council of Timorese Resistance, or CNRT, was formed with the representation of all the key independence movements in East Timor. " Most importantly, the CNRT brought together Fretilin and the U DT, agreed upon a common strategy for the resistance movement and selected Xanana G usmao as its president . " 1 1 The creation o f CNRT and the selection o f Gusmao unified the Timorese independence movement for the first time, and even though its leader was still in prison in Jakarta , his dynam ic style invigorated the movement in a

Developing Consensus

31

way few others could have done and he was able to begin a final third phase of FALINTIL action in East Timor designed to push even more e ffectively for independence. 1 2 This third phase of operations conducted by FALINTIL saw it transform from a weak band of guerrillas into a much more professional insurgent force) with a new strategic vision. FALINTIL developed a series of "impenetrable mountain bases with excellent observation posts and good communications . " 1 J It then began a progressive return to the urban areas of East Timor) through the development of a system of secret safe houses. Indonesia was forced to deploy some sixty thousand troops to combat the renewed FALINTIL offensive. 1 4 So) as happens on rare occasions in history) the international interest in East Timor was rising in intensity at the same time that Indonesian security efforts were struggling to demonstrate effec­ tiveness and that the CNRT and its very capable leader were coming to an even more powerful position. INTERNATIONAL D IPLOMATIC ATTENTION

The year 1997 was one of significant change in the international perspective on East Timor. In part the reason was the notoriety gained for the Timorese cause by the No bel Prize awarded to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Hona. More and more people were voicing opposition to the Indonesian practices in East Timor. Even more significant) however) in a real power sense) was the s ele ction in 1997 of Kofi Annan as the new Secretary-General of the United Nations) for Annan was to become a staunch and dedicated advocate for self-determination of peoples and would pay particularly dose attention to the situation in East Timor throughout his tenure in New York. As a result of the increasing violence in East Timor) and of the attention in gained in the international media) the UN Commission on Human Rights conducted a new assessment of the situation in the territory in 1997. In April that commission expressed concern over the reports of human rights violations in Timor but still saw cooperation by Indonesia as a potential solution. In response) the United Nations formally renewed its efforts as an advocate for the Timorese) and former Pakistani ambassador Jamsheed Markerl.'l (the Secretary-General's Personal Representative for East Timor) began an even more aggressive effort in his dialogue with the Indonesian officials. 16 Marker visited Jakarta and East Timor in March and discussed the issue with President Suharto and key members of his government) includ­ ing the chief oft he Indonesian special forces and Su harto's son-in-law) Major General Prabowo Subianto) who in many ways was the architect of the Indonesian activities in Timor. Through General Prabowo) Ambassador Marker also met at Jakarta's Cipinang prison with Xanana Gusmao, who impressed him with his energy and commitment. Following the visit to

32

Triumph of Self-Determination

J akarta, Marker traveled to Dili to meet with Bishop Belo and the East Timorese governor, Abilio Soares, to press the breadth of the negations even fu nher and observe conditions on the ground for himself. 1 7 Finding room for progress, Ambassador Marker briefed Annan and returned again to the region in July to cement an opportunity for more fruitfu I dialogue among representatives of all the parties: Indonesia, Portugal, and the East Timorese. Meanwhile, following Marker's visit to Jakarta, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa had visited Indonesia and also met with Xanana Gusmao . Mandela saw in Gusmao many of his own qualities (perhaps remembering his own long servitude in prison) and immediately appealed for Gusmao's release. This appeal, combined with the attention gained by Belo and Ramos-Horta's Nobel Prize and the continuing international anen­ tio n paid to Timor, funher embarrassed the Indonesians. 1 8 In August, an agreement between Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal (Ali Alatas and Jaime Gama, respectively) instituted a new series of in-depth discussions on Indonesia's future concept for East Timor: some "special status" to be defined, but based on a wide-ranging autonomy. Citing Indonesia's intention to gradually reduce its military presence in East Timor and its agreement to release East Timorese political prisoners, this dialogue pointed to a possible diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Of note, the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministries had agreed with an increased level of involvement b y the East Timorese in the dialogue . The next major diplomatic meeting was conducted in October 1997 in New York, where models of autonomy as an interim solution were circu­ lated for discussion among the Indonesian and Portuguese delegations. Following that event, Ambassador Marker conducted a meeting of the AIETD, which, though it was supposed to exclude political discussions, such as autonomy, did at least involve the Timorese directly and, in this 1997 meeting, actually included the fruitful participation of Bishop Belo, Jose Ramos-Horta, Abilio Soares, and Mari Alkateri. 1 9 Even though the AIETD meeting ended without consensus, even without a final statement, at least the Timorese had been involved. Kofi Annan used a scheduled state visit of President Suharto to South Africa in December 1 99 7 to ask President Mandela to press for Xanana Gusmao's release to house arrest and full involvement in the negotiations. Mandela happily agreed. He reported back to the Secretary-General that Suharto did not seem opposed to the ideas, but in actuality, nothing was done in Jakarta.20 In late December, Ambassador Marker returned to Jakarta, where among other impressions, he was struck by the "sense of disquiet and feelings of apprehension" 21 resulting fro m the deepening financial crisis striking the nation and the increasing ill health of Suhan o, who had been forced to cancel foreign trips and public appearances.

Developing Consensus

33

The year 1998 brought only more cause for concern in Jakarta and, in doing so, seemed at &st to harden hearts against the diplomatic progress being made by the UN. In January Indonesia's Ali Alatas seemed to reject any concept of interim autonomy even after the dialogues of the previous summer, and Portugal's G ama's rejected any such movement, which he viewed as a step backward. Marker then tried to set up a meeting between President Suharto, Portuguese prime minister Antonio Manuel de Oliveira Guterres, and Ko£. Annan in London, which the British government was happy to host. Everyone else agreed to the meeting in principle, but the Indonesian government demurred . Eventually, it was revealed that Suharto was too ill to attend and that his representative, Vice President B. J . Habibie was not fully informed about the Timor situation; therefore the govern­ ments could not discuss the issue. Even so, Kofi Annan was so energized about East Timor that he met with both Suharto and Habibie personally to discuss East Timor. In his discussions with Habibie, it became obvious that the Indonesian vice president was emotional about the issue but not very well informed or empowered.22 Marker continued his diplomatic efforts through the early spring of 199 8, but it was very clear that all the attention in Jakarta was being redirected against the financial crisis in the country. Unfortunately for Indonesia, Suharto's magic was insufficient to the task, and rising u nemployment and food prices led to riots in April. Those riots resulted in the death of six students, which, in turn, led to even more unrest across the country, and eventually to a student takeover of the National Assembly building. On May 2 1 , 1998, President Suharto of Indonesia resigned, and B. J. Habibie took his place and assumed full responsibility for both the economic crisis and the East Timor question. Very quickly thereafter, he dispatched Foreign Minister Alatas to New York to hand-deliver a proposal of "special status to East Timor, with wide-ranging autonomy. "23 INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTIONS DIVERGE

Habibie's offer (in which Marker saw many ideas that must have come from Alatas) seemed at &st to bring new life to the international dialogue and an answer to Timorese prayers.24 But the Indonesian government was clearly not in a stable condition and the positive nature of its shift in attitude was still far from a practical solution to the everyday problems of governance in East Timor. In addition, none of the details that were needed to produce a workable transition plan existed. Though the UN still believed Indonesia could maintain order in Timor through some transition period, the Portuguese and many Timorese distrusted Habibie's offer instinctively and feared it was merely a diplomatic maneuver. In fact, the Indonesian president's proposal

34

Triumph of Self-Determination

was so unexpected that it was rejected initially by the East Timorese resistance leaders. Meanwhile, even given the strong efforts for a diplomatic solution and apparent openness to change by the new Indonesian government, events in East Timor showed the local situation only worsening. On June 1 5 , some fifteen thousand Timorese students had demonstrated for the release of Xanana Gusmao from prison in Indonesia. Later the same month a major clash between opponents and supporters of integration occurred in Dili. These events eventually caused the Indonesian civilian and military admin­ istrators in East Timor to begin a campaign designed to protect the integra­ tion effort and disrupt proindependence activities, though at the time they were pledging to reduce troop levels in Timor. The situation on the ground in East Timor continued to deteriorate. Three European Union ambassadors conducting a fact-finding tour of East Timor had to be evacuated after proindependence and prointegration groups clashed in mid July, and even Ambassador Marker was cautioned against visiting Dili and had to restrict his travel to Baucau instead.25 A few weeks later, on August 12, Indonesian Major General Damiri and Colonel Tono Suratman met with local leaders, including Joao Tavares, Eurico Guterres, and Cancio de Carvalho, and informed them that they must organize "to protect integration."26 To make matters worse, on August 2 1 , Gusmao formally rejected the autonomy proposal from his prison cell. As often happens, once the option of changing the status quo is made formally, both sides actually hardened their positions and began digging in their heels. To the outside world Indonesia appeared to be acting to reduce tensions in East Timor. In fact, at least some in positions of responsibility were clearly collaborating to develop aspects of a military campaign designed to thwart the push for independence. Some of the best evidence of Indonesian deception comes from intelligence-gathering efforts conducted as a matter of course by Australia and the United States. For example the Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) monitored radio communications among Indonesian military units and headquarters in Dili, Bali, and Jakarta through the sum­ mer of 199 8 . These intercepted communications made it quite clear that Indonesia's claim to be reducing forces in East Timor was a sham. Instead of a reduction to a troop level of about six thousand in the province, the Indo­ nesian military forces there were actually increased to nearly eighteen thousand, up from just less than sixteen thousand the year before.27 Soon after the July clashes, the Indonesians decided to provide arms and other forms of support to motivate antiautonomy militias in Timor-an operational shift to incite internecine conflict and proxy war to combat FRETILIN .28 Though few understood it at the time, these competing actions in East Timor had reached such a level by September that any diplomatic solution could no longer be enacted in a secure environment. Both sides clearly felt

Developing Consensus

35

opposed to moderate options, and the local Indonesian administration had committed itself to opposing any form of autonomy. When Bishop Belo conducted talks on the issues on September 1 0 and 1 1 at Dare, the prointegrationists had already ceased to listen. By October 1998, the UN-sponsored talks had developed a proposal for self-administration in East Timor, as either permanent or transitional auton­ omy, in consultation with East Timorese leaders. Unfortunately, in Dili on October 6 Governor Abilio Soares demanded that all government employees opposing integration immediately resign, rhus putting the administration fully in the hands of prointegrationists. As a result, the following week some thirty thousand Timorese called for Soares's resignation. Clearly, the Timorese were aware that the position of the local administration had hard­ ened against autonomy. And the next day, October 12, thousands more Timorese protested in Baucau against the TNI.29 Tamrat Samuel, an aide to Ambassador Marker, wrote upon his return from an October visit to Dili, "There is a new political climate in East Timor, marked by an u nprecedented degree of open defiance of Indonesian authority." 30 The Indonesians only redoubled their efforts in response. During the first week of November, Indonesian troops conducted a series of raids on villages in Manufahi district, and several hundred KOPASSUS soldiers arrived in Kupang in an operation designed to reinforce the antiautonomy militia efforts in East Timor.31 Following these events, as well as more civilian injuries in the small Timorese town of Alas, the Portuguese government temporarily suspended its participation in the consultations with Indonesia, citing "the new atrocities in East Timor. " 32 Kofi Annan called yet again for stability and peace in the territory. He specifically demanded an end to Indonesian military operations in East Timor, so there was little doubt in the UN that the Indonesian military was a pan of the problem, and not the solution, of conflict in East Timor. 33 Jamsheed Marker continued his Herculean efforts to mediate the violence through a series of meetings during this same period, though he later noted, "Expectations of both the pro-independence and pro­ integration groups had never been higher, and the spirit of compromise was a commodity that was dwindling rapidly and inexorably."34 The history of independence movements is dominated by the difficulty observers have in distinguishing between those working to bring freedom for groups of people and those who simply reject authority. It has been said often that " one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist. " There can be no doubt that the members of the Indonesian military who had served and were serving in East Timor viewed its continuing security and prosper­ ity as their proper concern, and from that perspective, the ongoing efforts of FAUNTIL were clearly more in the insurrectionist vein and presented a threat to "the nation" that needed to be combated. The FAUNTIL leadership clearly felt that their strong support b y many in East Timor justified con­ tinuing violence against the TNI. Both sides saw potential victory in the

36

Triumph of Self-Determination

offing during 1999-which only increased the pressure and the level of vio­ lence. In fact, Xanana Gusmao and the leadership of the Timorese resistance who still valued negotiations were increasingly being viewed as moderates, in light of the actions of some Timorese whose rage drove them to more extreme attacks against the TNI. International concern about events in East Timor had grown signifi­ cantly in Portugal, the UN, Great Britain, the United States, and many other nations as the months passed, but it took another decisive turn beginning in December 1 99 8. At that time, Australian prime minister John Howard, with a full knowledge of the role of the Indonesian military in East Timor,35 sent a letter to Indonesian pr esident Habibie pledging support during any "special election" to determine Timorese desires for autonomy or integra­ tion. Howard was not specifically advocating Timorese independence, but his letter clearly added pressure on Jakarta to defuse the increasingly tense situation. 36 On January 5, the Australian government proclaimed that the Timorese were entitled to self-determination. Then, late in the month, the mercurial Habibie responded to the growing international pressure for action in East Timor by officially offering a referendum to the Timorese people. 37 On January 27, 1999, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas stood alo ngsid e Information Minister Yunus Yosfiah as Yosfiah announced that the Indonesian cabinet had decided to grant "regional autonomy plus" to East Timor and, if that was not acceptable, to the Timorese, that they were prepared to "release East Timor from Indonesia . " 38 Alatas then announced that Xanana Gusmao would be released to private detention.39 People worldwide were astonished by the news. 1999: THE PIVOTAL YEAR FOR ALL EAST TIMORESE

The January decision by President Habibie to declare publicly that he would consider independence for East Timor was the event Timorese leaders advocating self-determination had, for years, dreamed might occur. Even if most observers considered Habibie's actions less stimulated by a willingness to see East Timor set free than by the need he saw to resolve some of the less egregious of his nation's many difficult problems and gain traction o n eco­ nomic recovery; letting the Timorese vote seemed to be an easy way to vent some of the pressure on a seemingly intractable, yet nonfundamental, issue from the Jakarta perspective. But Habibie's efforts were woefully confounded by his own inexperience and the lack of support he maintained in his own national assembly. Habibie was clearly viewed as a transitional president, and few (including Suharto's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri) believed he could carry out such an important initiative as Timorese independence. Consternation and collusion were rife within the Indonesian government. Even as Habibie was promising an autonomy choice, the violence in Tim or

Developing Consensus

37

continued, as the Mahidi Militia, with TNI support, killed independence supporters in Ainaro and in Zumalai.40 On January 28, talks began again in New York between Ambassador Marker and the Directors-General of the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministries to determine how Timorese acceptance of the offer of "regional autonomy plus" was to be determined. After several days of d iscussion, an understanding was reached on February 8 outlining a number of major components for the autonomy proposal. This u nderstanding provided the foundation for some form of vote, or "popular consultation" (as it was labeled to accommodate Indonesian rejection of the term referendum), to determine the wishes of the Timorese people. But such an agreement in New York did little to clarify the impact of such a vote in the minds of the Timorese, who continued to watch militias wreak havoc in their towns with Indonesian military (TNI) support. For examp le, pro integration militia men and local TNI had recently attacked Guiso village in the Maubara district and arrested several persons. 4 1 I n all likelihood, in February 1 999 most people of influence in the Indo­ nesian government and military still believed that they had sufficient influence over prospective voters in East Timor to ensure a safe and generally pro­ Indonesia result. Even if President Habibie could envision an independent East Timor, members of the TNI expected that the idea of special autonomy would translate into very little change in East Timor. The facts were that the heady combination of rising expectations and vicious internecine conflict meant that very little could likely remain the same in Timor. Secretary-General Annan welcomed the Indonesian transfer of Xanana Gusmao from prison to house detention and expressed the hope that Gusmao's transfer would enable him to participate actively in the discussions about East Timor's future, thus ensuring better representation of all inter­ ested parties. Some suspect Gusmao was only released to add legitimacy to what was believed to be a " controllable referend urn." Such expectations proved to be quite incorrect. The Indonesian government's willingness to release Gusmao illustrates how poorly it understood the sentiment of the people in East Timor and other pro-East Timorese factions around the world. Meanwhile the TNI and its militias were continuing their campaign of intimidation in Timor. According to James Dunn, in the official U nited Nations report on " Crimes against Humanity in East Timor," TNI activity in February entered a new and more active phase. On February 16, according to a South China Post report, Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudradjat, then head of the KOPASSUS intelligence force in East Timor, convened a meeting of militia leaders and called for the killing of local proindependence leaders and their families. Dunn found evidence that on February 17 Joao Tavares told a meeting of local leaders in Bobonaro that they would be fired if they did not mobilize their citizens for a progovernment rally in Balibo.42

38

Triumph of Self-Determination

According to Dunn, Tavares informed those attending the Balibo rally that there would be war if people were to reject the autonomy proposal. General Wiranto stated in Jakarta that the TNI would continue to deploy the militia to help maintain security. And on February 24, two Timorese were shot dead in Dili, not by militia, but by TNI troops in civilian clothes.43 One month later, at ministerial-level tripartite talks in New York, agree­ ment was reached on the use of a direct ballot to consult East Timor's people about whether they would accept or reject an autonomy proposal. At a joint press conference with the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal, the UN Secretary-General expressed the continued concern of all the parties regarding the situation in East Timor while still welcoming the positive dip­ lomatic steps to pro mote dialogue and reconciliation amongthe East Timorese. At this point it still appeared that diplomatic efforts might actually lead to change in East Timor without addit ional violence; unfortunately the con­ tinuing militia activities in the province soon crushed this naive hope. THE MILITIAS DOMINATE D IPLOMATIC EFFORTS

March in East Timor was a month of killing and increasingly broad intimidation. More than one thousand Timorese from Guiso village are reported to have fled into the mountains after militia attacks on March 8 . And although Gusmao and Tavares agreed about the same time t o cooper­ ate for a cease-fire, on the March 16 militiamen surrounded the Carmelite convent in Maubara, accused the nuns of supporting the independence movement, and threatened to kill them. On March 26, according to at least one person present, Governor Soares ordered that priests and nuns should also be killed during a meeting with militia leaders. Finally, on April 6 in Liqui'fa, as many as fifty Timorese were murdered by prointegration militia in the church compound, with tacit TNI involvement.44 The killings in Liqui'fa were another key step away from any hope for a compromise solu­ tion and placed everyone involved in Timorese issues on notice that security concerns needed to be addressed if any lasting progress was to be made. Both Secretary-General Annan and U .S. president Bill Climon issued strong condemnations of the attack and called upon President Habibie to act in order to prevent future such occurrences. After he was informed of the attack at the church, Gusmao obviated the cease-fire agreement and directed FALINTIL forces to defend themselves and their supporters. General Wiranto told the media in Jakarta that the massacre had been the result of conflict b etween "rival groups." Dunn demonstrates that Wiramo was well informed concerning the real facts of the militia a ctivities in East Timor and should have been held responsible for the orchestration of the ami-independence campaign.45 The problem was that President Habibie was far too weak to exert real pressure on the Indonesian

Developing Consensus

39

military. In fact, many scholars expected that the TNI, through Wiranto, might actually push Habibie from power. Only one day after the killings actually took place (and before they had become publicized) General Wiranto had been visited by Admiral Dennis Blair, U.S. Navy, the American military commander in the Pacific region. Blair had been directed by the U .S. National Security Council to tell Wiranto how seriously the U nited States viewed the rising toll of violence in East Timor.46 Australia was also devel­ oping very detailed intelligence assessments that made the culpability of TNI personnel in the killings in East Timor very clear.47 The United States and Australia increased their intelligence production and cooperation concerning East Timor.48 As news reports of killings in Liqui'fa grew more and more numerous in early April, the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative contacted top Indonesian and Portuguese officials to push for more aggressive controls over the situation. The Indonesian government responded positively to the suggestion that an impartial inquiry be undertaken to establish the facts sur­ rounding the killings, but it did little to rein in the criminal activities. Later in the same month Secretary-General Annan welcomed the signing of an agreement, initiated by Indonesia's national Human Rights Commission, which committed all the parties in East Timor, both proindependence and prointegration groups, to ending violence in the territory. The agreement cre­ ated a Commission on Peace and Stability for East Timor, comprising repre­ sentatives of pro ind ep end ence and pro integration groups, lo ea! aut horities, local police commands, and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI/ABRI). Meanwhile, in East Timor, a series of tit-for-tat reprisal killings followed immediately from the Liqui'fa attacks. The Dunn Report outlined the violence: April 12: at Cailaco in Bo bonaro area, six villagers are kidnapped and then murdered by Halilintar and TNI troops in house of Manuel Soares Gama. A Falintil group retaliates, killing Gama and 2 TNI troops. April 13: In revenge attack a force of TNI and militia, led by Lt. Col. Burha­ nuddin Siagian and Joiio Tavares reportedly kidnap, torture and then kill six Cailaco villagers. April 16: Belarmino de Cruz:, a brother of Lopez:, is reportedly killed at Ladubar. April 17: Massacre at home of Manuel Carrascaliio. Manuelito, Manuel's son, and at least 1 1 others are killed by Aitarak and BMP [Besi Meral Putihj members, following a militia rally, addressed b y Colonel Tono S uratman. Team Alpha militia murder Virgilio de Sousa, an independence s upporter, at his home in Bauro, Lospalos.49

During the last militia attack on April 17, the visiting foreign minister of Ireland, David Andrews, was able to observe clear complicity o n the p arr of

40

Triumph of Self-Determination

the TNI. Andrews immediately issued an indignant report to President Habibie and others upon his return.50 General Wiranto flew to Dili, but seemingly only to reassure those concerned that the situation was under control. The warning signs of future unconstrained militia violence in order to prevent Timorese independence were already quite clear. Ministerial-level talks in New York concluded on April 23 with agreement to settle the East Timor question via a popular consultation-with conditions that permitted the Timorese to accept or reject the proposal for autonomy within Indonesia. The agreement, to be signed on May 5, allowed the Indonesian foreign minister to secure the final approval of the Jakarta gov­ ernment. At a joint press conference with the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal, the Secretary-General welcomed the Indonesian government's commitment to carry out its responsibility for law and order and the protec­ tion of civilians. He also underlined the responsibility of all the parties that had signed the agreement creating the Commission on Peace and Stability in East Timor to end the violence to fulfil! their obligations without delay. Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas promised that Indonesia would " assume our responsibility to make sure that a conducive situation will be existing in East Timor" toward the implementation of the agreements. He added that the Indonesian military and police were determined to accept responsibility for keeping " law and order and peace and tranquility in East Timor. " 5 1 The same d a y the Catholic Church i n East Timor reported the killing o f between fifty and one hundred Timorese i n Suai.52 I n an extreme effort to stop the escalating local violence, Bishop Belo hosted a meeting on April 26 to empower the Commission on Peace and Stability for East Timor recom­ mended by the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal. The commission involved the representatives of everyone with any stake in the future of the East Timorese, but it, too, failed to stop the violence. Only four days later, the bodies of eleven prointegrationists were reportedly found in Bauhati.53 Still fully cognizant of the extent of the TNI involvement in Timor, Aus­ tralian prime minister Howard kept the pressure on President Habibie by arranging a summit in Bali on April 27.54 The killings in Liqui'
Developing Consensus

41

UN Secretary-General Annan dispatched an assessment team to East Timor on May 4 to evaluate the situation and discuss the availability of facilities with the Indonesian authorities for the establishment of the U N mission needed t o supervise the popular consultation. The following day, the 5 May Agreements, or May 5 Accord-one main agreement and two supplementary agreements on security arrangements for the implementation of the popular consultation-were signed in New York. (See Appendix A.) Annan stressed that the UN was determined that the popular consultation "is free, fair and thorough. And noting that, under the agreement, "security in East Timor is the responsibility of the Indonesian Government," he wel­ comed the assurances given by President Habibie that his government would fulfill effectively its responsibility for law and order and the protection of all civilians. Still, Annan also expressed his " grave concern about the recent increase in violence in East Timor and urged "all el ements and political tendencies in East Timor to refrain from any resort to force and to cooperate with the United Nations."57 "

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTS

Airhough the situation in East Timor seemed to reach a stalemate in 1 9 9 8 and actually grow more violent in 1 999, it was the concern of outsiders, in the UN and in Australia, Portugal, and the United States, that seemed to force a change in the politics of Indonesian power. Great Britain, New Zealand, South Africa, Japan, and Austria also added diplomatic pres­ sure to push for a resolution of the situation in Timor. Certainly no referen­ dum would have been authorized by President Suharto, so his fall and the resulting rise to power of the very weak Habibie administration created a key opportunity for the Timorese. Yet, even Habibie would never have com­ mitted to strong change had it not been for the very clear and sustained pressure from Kofi Annan, John Howard, Nelson Mandela, and several other national leaders. Internal instability in Indonesia also contributed to opening a window of change. The economic crisis, the changing role of the military in Indonesian society, and the importance of religious and other domestic cultural con­ cerns also contributed to the decision to make the East Timor problem go away. The leadership of Gusmao and the positive media attention gained by Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta also contributed, but in the final analy­ sis, it was the persistent diplomatic work of Kofi Annan, J amsheed Marker, J aime Gama of Portugal, and Ali Alatas of Indonesia that created the chance for a viable popular consultation and a road toward self-determination for the Timorese.58 Without a strong United Nations, with both international influence and skilled, dedicated personnel, there would have been little chance that the Timorese would have ever gained the opportunity to demon­ strate their desire for freedom.

42

Triumph of Self-Determination

On May 7, 1999, the Security Council adopted its Resolution 1236, wel­ coming the May 5 Agreements and creating a United Nations organization to assist in the consultation. Specifically, the mission mandate called for the organization "to organize and conduct a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indo­ nesia or reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia." Resolution 1236 also stressed the Indonesian government's responsibility to maintain peace and security in the territory. Three weeks later, on May 25, the G eneral Assembly autho­ rized $35 million to cover the initial requirements of the organization, to be named the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). With the pro mise of Indonesian support and the expectation of a normal, secure environment in East Timor to conduct the voting, most people antic­ ipated that the greatest challenge to be faced by the members of UNAMET would be the distribution and accurate accounting of the ballots. Few people outside the region could have anticipated the turmoil that would actually arise in Timor during the consu hatio n as opposing militias tried to influence the vote and then ultimately attempted to destroy the very land they said they loved.

Chapter 4 UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

With the agreement of the Indonesian government to hold a popular consul­ tation on the future of East Timor, the May 5 Accords outlining the signifi­ cant modalities of the process, and the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1246 on June 1 1 , the stage was set for the East Timorese to make their desires for independence or integration known.1 Yet, accomplishing everything that was required for the consultation within only ninety days, in an area as remote as Timor, was clearly a tremendous challenge.2 Though the door to independence was open, many people would have to work extremely hard to make a legitimate voting process work before Indonesia would accept such a result, and some in the Indonesian government were still working to influence the polling process to their advantage. Thus, UNAMET would be the midwife for any legitimate polling result in Timor. UNAMET was designed to manage the process and oversee the fairness of the voting in a region where many suspected it might be hard to obtain a free and objective result. Yet, it was by no definition an intervention force and had to rely on Indonesian security capability at all times. UNSCR 1246 specifically stressed "the responsibility of the Indonesian Government in the maintenance of peace and security in East Timor to ensure the integrity of the ballot and the security of international staff and observers. " The mission included "up to two hundred eighty civilian police officers to advise the Indonesian Police, as well as fifty military liaison officers to maintain con­ tact with the Indonesian Armed Forces."J The Habibie government had accepted this responsibility within the May 5 Accords; unfortunately all the important diplomatic cards were still not on the table in August, and few of the key decision makers had anticipated the impact of the Timorese referen­ dum on a future independence.

44

Triumph of Self-Determination

The "popular consultation" authorized by Indonesia was much more than a straw vote to determine opinions. It was well planned and included the oversight of many concerned countries and multiple, internationally supervised voting sites. UNAMET was a significant commitment b y the United Nations. lt included political, informational, and electoral components and was eventually funded with over $80 million for four months of opera­ tions. The voting had been originally proposed for September 9, given the time it would take to establish UNAMET and conduct the polling prepara­ tions; however, that date was rejected by the Indonesian government.4 A new planning date was set for August 8, which set UNAMET on an extremely fast timeline, but the vote was eventually delayed until August 30 by the Indonesian government after several procedural issues became problematic. Clearly, Indonesia was unprepared to deal with the momentum that the popular consult initiative had gathered and still believed that the crisis in Timor could be averted if emotions were allowed to cool. Unfortunately for the Indonesian government the genie was not to be put back in the bottle in East Timor. THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN EASTTIMOR

To prepare for the voting, the UN staff began preliminary operations within the first few weeks after UNAMET's conception. Using contributions from Portugal, Australia, Japan, and Great Britain already existing in the UN Trust for East Timor, personnel from multiple sections of the UN Head­ quarters in New York swung into action to create UNAMET and recruit the nearly seven hundred people needed to administer the consultation.5 On the first of June the newly appointed Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in East Timor, Ian Martin,6 arrived in Dili to join the initial contin­ gent of UNAMET personnel. Martin pledged "to make sure that its people can choose their future after a fair campaign, in a secret ballot."7 A Chief Military Liaison Officer, Brigadier General Rezaqul Haider from Bangladesh, and a Chief of the Civil Police Component, Commissioner Alan Mills of Australia, joined Martin later in the month to form the upper leadership of UNAMET. One of the basic tasks of UNAMET was to inform the Timorese people of the process and importance of the popular consultation. To help in this effort, UNAMET began a public information campaign in mid June, using printed materials, radio broadcasts, and even videotapes in four languages.8 (See Chart 1 for an example of a UNAMET information poster.) One of the videotapes included a personal message by Kofi Annan assuring the people of an impartial vote and urging all sides to be tolerant and show restraint.9 Over the summer this effort would produce over seven hundred thousand pieces and reach into every pan of Timor and most of the areas of

UNAMI:T ••:d Ll:.c Vo1= fer I.:d.cpc.:d.ct:.cc UNAMET - UNITED NATIONS M ISSION IN EASTTIMOR - UNAMET

If you

accept

autonomy. . .

11.._ � 11... �

�

... The United Nations will recognise East Timer as a

part of Indonesia .. .Easr

Timer will become an autonomous region

within Indonesia ... The United Nations will monitor the implementation of the autonomy proposal

( :lun 1 . t:NAlvl FT ill f. • rr··.tl i< •u <.:om•J'"' i�.n j1< ·�. �•

1 n • rr•

1 '7t':'9

45

46

Triumph of Self-Determination

the globe where Timorese had moved since 1975. Th e UNAMET chief

information officer was David Wimhurst of Canada. Information sharing was only one aspect of the preparations necessary for the voting to take place. Everyone in UNAMET was aware of the poten­ tial for intimidation by the proautonomy militia and the TNI forces still resident in East Timor. To counterbalance their presence; John Howard and others had pressed for and secured the active participation of civilian police in Timor. The first contingent of the se officers arrived in Dili on June 2 1 . 1 0 As UNAMET was a neutral presence designed only to facilitate the voting process; its police would act to ensure that the security procedures of the local forces were fair and impartial. Civilian police (Civ-Pol) had been employed under UN auspices several times duringthe previous decade (most notably in Haiti from 1994 to 1996) . 1 1 Eventually the Civ-Pol presence in East Timor would number over two hundred seventy; from twenty-seven nations. 1 2 The third critical personnel component of UNAMET was a first of its kind for the United Nations: its group of military liaison officer (MLO) teams. The UN staff had foreseen the delicate nature of the security situation; and Ambassador Marker had worked out an agreement with Foreign Minister Alatas and General Wiranto accepting the MLOs; not as military observers as was common in the UN framework; but as liaison officers . 1 3 Directed by Brigadier Haider; teams of fifty military personnel from thirteen countries were located through East Timor; aligned with the major TNI units in the province.14 The duties of these liaison teams were to observe TNI actions and to inform the U NAMET staff concerning the state of secu­ rity in rheir respective areas of operations. lncidentally; these officers assigned could also reinforce a dialogue supporting nonintervention by the TNI commanders. Thanks to rhe aggressive action of Kofi Annan and his deputy Secretary­ General Louise Frechene; " U NAMET was established with a rapidity that was unprecedented in United Nation's annals . . . . The Australians were the first to jump in with aircraft; helicopters and jeeps. From rhe UN's logistical base in Brindisi; Italy; a fleet of giant Russian Antonov aircraft ferried vast quantities of technical equipment, transport and supplies. And the Japanese sent in trucks; vehicles and communications material; including a large number of transistor radios for carrying UNAMET's message throughout the island . " 1 5 By June 3 0 all rhe critical elements of UNAMET were i n place in East Timor; but the security situation was still too threatening for anyone to be confident the process could proceed without incident. The level of militia violence had nor really declined; and lan Martin had called several rimes since his arrival for a halt to the violence. Kofi Annan had air ead y accepted a delay of voting by two weeks on J une 23, largely due to continuing violence. UNAMET and other UN offices in East Timor had become the focus of

UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

47

several attacks in the waning days of the month, and the position of UNAMET staff was growing increasingly perilous. Again, on June 30, Mar­ tin and Jamsheed Marker both pressed the Indonesian authorities in Dili and Jakarta for action to suppress the militia activities. 16 The Indonesians pledged assistance but took no meaningful action to reduce the threat to UNAMET, the consultation or the East Timorese. On the second of July in Sydney, Marker still expressed optimism that the promises of the Indonesian authorities would be fulfilled. He expressed confidence in the assurances of J akarta that additional security forces would help and that the end of military control of the police in East Timor would improve the security situation. In fact, both moves by Indonesia resulted in increased militia violence and intimidation. After several more days of attacks the president of the UN Security Council called for Indonesia to fulfill its promises and demanded both an investigation into the violence and trials for those responsible. Mary Robinson, the UN High Commis­ sioner for Human Rights, made a similar appeal two days later, with equally disappointing resu Its. 1 7 After s o much discussion o f the role Indonesia had agreed to play i n reducing violence i n East Timor, it i s worth noting that many other national leaders had "incontrovertible" evidence of the Indonesian military's plans for violent retribution by the militias. 1 8 Certainly Australia, the U nited States, and Great Britain had shared sufficient intelligence to make their leaders aware that the voting would be accompanied or followed by signifi­ cant militia attacks. The Australian Defence Signals Directorate "had provided details of specific links between particular TNI officers and militia leaders" 1 9 and had also implicated General Wiranto. Why, then, did the United Nations continue with the voting process, given that several of its member states knew that p eopie would be killed as its direct result? The on!y fair assessment would emphasize the precarious nature of the relations between Australia, and Indonesia-the two dominant neighbors involved in the situation. There can be no doubt that Prime Minister Howard of Australia knew that the Indonesian military was behind much of the militia violence. He pressed President Habibie to permit the incorporation of a peacekeeping force during their summit in Bali. But Howard also knew Habibie was in a very weak position. Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas has said he sup­ ported special autonomy for East Timor, but not independence.20 Habibie managed to convince him but had not convinced everyone in the government that East Timor should be allowed to determine its own future. Many in the Indonesian military who had shed sweat if not blood over years in East Timor were opposed to " giving in." Howard and his government elected to trust the Habibie government and believe that it could control its own military rather that damage the special relationship Australia held with Indonesia during an important period of change. The United States-and Great Britain, much farther away, and commensurately less concerned with the East

48

Triumph of Self-Determination

Timorese-was satisfied to let the Australians keep the lead.21 Although the pressure was maintained on Indonesia, the voting process was allowed to proceed. THE REG ISTRATION OF VOTERS

After a three-day delay by Kofi Annan-due to continued serious threats, particularly in the western region of East Timor, and continued assurances by Indonesian foreign minister Alatas that investigations into the militia violence were proceeding-UNAMET finally began its real work in mid July.22 Registration was conducted beginning on July 1 6, both in East Timor and in other sites around the world . Within the week that followed more than two hundred international observers were accredited by the United Nations, and UNAMET included over four hundred United Nations volun­ teers and even three international o fficials, who comprised a commission designed to hear complaints and assess procedural challenges.23 Even so, as the registration began, Ian Martin and his team were imme­ diately confronted with continuing militia violence and intimidation. On the first day militiamen attacked villagers in Suai, and threats of violence were made elsewhere in Timor. The problem in Suai continued for several days, and then a similar outbreak occurred in Lebos. By July 22, when chief elec­ toral officer Jeff Fischer gave his first registration press conference, it was already obvious that the turnout would be high. With two hundred sites open for registration, Ian Martin could claim that over 239,000 people had been processed by July 27. Martin was very happy with the numbers regis­ tered, bur he had some real concerns about the inadequacy of the security environment. The other issue in his eyes was the continued isolation of the some 50,000 displaced East Timorese, who were being obviously restricted from returning to register by the prointegration militias. On the other side of the conflict, UNAMET had secured the containment of the proindepen­ dence militia after coordination with Gusmao and a meeting between FALANTIL commander Taur Matan Ruak and Brigadier Haider. Still, there was great international uncertainty as the referendum approached. The United States had sent its Assistant Secretary of State, Stanley Roth, and Australia had sent its foreign minister, Alexander Downer, to observe the registration process (both had been intimately involved in both the negotiations and the intelligence assessments) Other nations sent representatives as well-all to ensure that the critical process of establishing a voting baseline was accomplished fairly and without interference. One of these national election monitors, Tim Fischer of Australia, later published an insightful account of his service in East Timor, which showed the intensity and complexity of the work to be done.24 Many leaders were skeptical that Indonesia would permit the process to continue unfettered. It is almost certain that the Indonesian government and

UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

49

its military commanders expected that the referendum would result in a pro integration resu it. The military governor and his staff also like!y expected that their giving the pro integration militia freedom of action would intimi­ date any fence-sitters and further reduce the number of proindependence votes. In short, Indonesia's leaders anticipated a managed referendum that would secure their claims to East Timor. Thus the period preceding the election saw Indonesian military forces sit back and give full rein to their militia sur­ rogates. As they were very new to such an electoral process, and faced with a lack of security in their neighborhoods, the East Timorese were not expected to register in large numbers. Most of the substantive debate over issues took place between interested nations and within the UN, as local referendum campaigning was spotty at best. As the date for the event approached, however, both the level of the international dialogue and the level of local violence increased markedly. The registration process, begun on July 16, reached a peak of activity during its last week. As the £nal day, August 6, approached, the numbers of registered voters nearly doubled, eventually reaching over four hundred thirty thousand .25 UNAMET had managed the registration of over twenty thousand East Timorese per day without major complications. Ian Martin and his staff were very pleased with the result. Noting that "security was still inadequate" and concerned by the inability of some fifty thousand Timorese still forcibly displaced in areas under prointegration militia control (and thus unable to register), Martin confirmed that the consultation would be conducted as scheduled on August 30 .26 Still, there was much to do to prepare for the actual vote. First of all, real campaigning had yet to prepare the East Timorese people for the consulta­ tion; both sides needed to be able to conduct informed debates on the inde­ pendence issue. For this reason Ian Martin had already pushed for the release of Xanana Gusmao from prison in Surabaya, Indonesia; his request was denied by the Indonesians. Second, an additional team of international election monitors needed to be emplaced in East Timor to ensure the credi­ bility oft he vote. Finally, security needed to be increased to give the population a sense of safety during the actual vote. Two days after the registration was completed the head of the Indonesian nationalist party, Megawati Sukarnoputri (daughter of former President Sukarno ), arrived in East Timor calling for reconciliation and integration. Her actions were not only a signal to many of the true intentions of the mainline Indonesian politicians of the old school but also a harbinger of future concerns as she was certainly expected to remain very influential in Jakarta. During mid August a Code of Conduct for the campaigning prior to the popular consultation voting was developed and signed by some of the major parties developing in East Timor (see Appendix B).27 U NAMET was slightly

50

Triumph of Self-Determination

restructured to accommodate the huge voting turnout expected, and UNAMET even began to collect weapons from those willing to voluntarily surrender them.28 On August 1 8 Ian Martin and several senior Indonesian officials actually visited Viqueque, Suai, and Maliana, the locations of some of the most enduring violence, to discuss additional security measures. After that visit Martin publicly called for the removal of some of the Indonesian Army officers who had been associated with the militias.29 There were dearly two competing agendas and two campaigns at work for the support of the voting public. Proindependence activities were largely subtle (posters of Xanana Gusmao, for example) and carried on mostly by FALINTIL, as oven displays were controlled b y the government. On the other hand, there was a very visible display of prointegration fervor. One election observer wrote, "From 17 August, Indonesia's independence day, the red and white Indonesian flags proliferated around . . . and remained standing through the election period. These flags were found in every village and hamlet, even in very remote spots. There was also a very wide dissemi­ nation of red and white tee-shins and caps with the word autonomi written on them. "30 The rallies held to engender campaign support were also con­ ducted to very different standards. Pro integration rallies in the districts were often more frequent, with people transported from outside the local area, but were normally small in size, attracting few local inhabitants. In contrast, proindependence meetings were rarely supported with any resources but still attracted many more participants.31 I ntimid atio n can be a difficult thing to prove-yet there were dear signs in East Timor that the people were experiencing a variety of subtle and nor-so-subtle pressures to vote against autonomy. Simple rumors of the loss of jobs and other forms of government support if autonomy was chosen were common, but more oven threats became commonplace as the end of August approached. In the Ermera district Amhony Smith noticed that "local militia and militia groups from out of town would ride into town in the afternoon, usually waiving guns in a thinly veiled threat to the population." 32In the Bobonaro district, where the militias were quite strong, Peter Banu observed even more determined actions by proimegration militias, noting, "Throughout the campaigning period ( 1 4-27 August), the TNI and militia stepped up their activities, which included several murders, house burnings, widespread intimidation and the indiscriminant terrorizing of whole communities."33 Links of support between the TNI and the proau­ tonomy militias were often obvious. Damien Kingsbury observed that "in Maliana, the local Halilintar militia openly operated out of the local TNI headquarters. The police, mostly from the paramilitary Brimob (Mobile Brigade) group, actively assisted militia members with transport and were reponed by eye-witnesses to have shot villagers when the militia rampaged through the village of Memo, near Maliana."34

UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

51

Violence garnering international attention had erupted on August 20 and 23, and on the 24th the Security Council deliberated intensely over the unsettled situation, considering another delay of the consultation, but in the end deciding to continue partly because " East Timor's people have regis­ tered to vote in great numbers, indicating their determination not to be deterred by the intimidation. "35 Other nations were also following events in East Timor very closely. A U.S. congressional delegation visited Timor, and Senator Tom Harkin was so struck by the situation that he called upon President Clinton to send peacekeepers immediately in order to head off violence during the referendum. The U .S. State Department claimed it was too late to send troops.36 FALINTIL SHOWS RESTRAINT

Though errors and misj udgments can be identified on both sides (TNI and FALINTIL) in the run-up to the popular consultation, the admirable restraint demonstrated by FALINTIL in the final days prior to the voting deserves special mention. As Michael Smith noted in his assessment of the events of the period, " A major factor that contributed to alleviating the burden . . . to restore and maintain security (after the consult) was the behavior of FALIN­ TIL. This was exemplary throughout the period of violence in the lead-up to, and following, the ballot. "37Taur Matan Ruak, the FA UNTIL commander in the field, cantoned his forces "in four locations and agreed not to eo nd u et military operations or carry weapons outside these cantonments,"38 though it did not disarm or surrender its weapons. This was a risky, yet very politi­ cally savvy, strategic decision, as the violence that continued during the consultation was clearly then the work of pro integration forces. Ruak's leadership of FALINTIL was sorely tested as the violence levels continued to rise toward the end of the month; yet he was backed by Xanana Gusmao, and his forces held fum in the cantonments. Smith noted, This strategy of disengagement was a most difficult decision, particularly given that FAUNTIL's s upport came from the civilian population that was being so cruelly treated by the militias. Ruak's decision was predicated on the belief that the militia violence was being orchestrated by TNI elements, partly for reasons of deniability but primarily to force FAUNTIL to engage the militias in order to give the appearance of a "civil war," similar to what occurred in 1975. As difficult as it was for FALINTIL to remain disengaged, Ruak never lost sight of the crucial fact that the Indonesian army was in the process of leaving East Timor, and he assessed that to take a ction would further escalate the violence and jeopardize future prospects for international support.-19

As with many of their crucial decisions made in 1999, Ruak's and Gusmao's disengagement strategy would prove invaluable as events progressed .

52

Triumph of Self-Determination

On Friday, August 27, a particularly violent riot in Dili sparked world­ wide concern, and the next day the government of Indonesia lashed out to tell the world community that Jakarta did not need foreign advice on how to maintain security in East Timor before the ballot. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas still rejected calls for international peacekeepers, and a foreign min­ istry spokesman said the clash in Dili was "not major." In response the UN called yet again for Indonesia to curb the militias. Ian Martin demanded that the Indonesian police take tougher action, to include arresting those carrying guns in public. Members of U NAMET noted that members of the heavily armed and well-equipped eight-thousand-man Indonesian police force deployed to Timor failed to intervene when militia violence occurred in fro nt of them. Tim Fischer was reminded of the d estruction during the fall of Saigon in 1975 as he surveyed the scene in Dili immediately after his arrival on August 26. There was "plenty of evidence of large numbers of hard-core militia" in and around the provincial capital.40 Many of the Indonesian elite were already moving out of the province, either because they had been warned of the violence to come or because the result of the vote was a foregone con­ clusion.41 Even so, to Fischer there was still the belief on the part of many Indonesians that the vote could still produce a close result, giving credence to an effort to discount its validity or least make a case for delaying indepen­ dence to support the desires of a large majority that voted for integration. The prointegrationists still "thought they were close enough to argue that the status quo should be maintained."42 Kofi Annan and a host of other o fficials were working hard with the government of Indonesia to ensure a more aggressive approach by its security forces in East Timor. Also in response, U . S. president Bill Clinton warned Indonesia that relations with the United States would b e seriously damaged and international aid might be reduced if there was more violence during the referendum Hundreds of polling centers had been established, three thou­ sand East Timorese had been hired to assist in the vote, and over sixteen hundred independent observers had been accredited from Portugal, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ireland, New Zealand, Spain, and the European Union.43 "There would be one U NAMET CivPol officer at each of two hun­ dred polling centers, and they would each b e assisted by at least two armed Indonesian police officers, their joint duties being the sealing, collection, transport and security of the ballot boxes."44 Despite all forms of intimida­ tion, repeated violence, and some d elay, the East Timorese were finally allowed to vote on their future. Immediately prior to the event, Xanana Gusmao broadcast a speech to the Timorese people from his prison in J akarta. In the speech, the indepen­ dence leader not only called for reconciliation and unity bur also laid out the foundation vision for a new state of East Timor.45 After addressing the need for economic and social development, he called for all Timorese leaders to .

UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

53

"lend their skills, their knowledge and energies to contribute together to the building of the Nation."46 For Gusmao, after so many years of strug­ gle, independence must have seemed a foregone conclusion; yet unfortu­ nately, he could not have imagined the additional struggle that was yet to come. MONDAY, AUGUST 30: VOTING DAY Despite the violence which had again threatened the process in the week preceding the poll, all 200 polling centers in the Territory were open on polling day, and the voters cast their ballots in a calm and dignified manner. While the last reports are still coming in to UNAMET, it is clear that the turnout has been extraordinary. Well over 90 per cent of all registered voters have cast their ballots. -KofiAnnan

As the East Timorese formed to vote in the very early hours of August 30, Tim Fischer noted, "I could not believe the commitment and absolute joy on so many faces as people proudly held up their registration cards and their identity papers."47 There was even violence during the vote in Arsaber and Gleno, but thousands still stood in long lines to cast paper ballots. In fact, nearly half of those registered were said to have voted by 10 a.m. Some had camped out overnight. One man said, "I am very happy, but scared. This is a proud day for East Timor. This is our right. We have waited a long time for this day. Scared or dead, it's our choice to choose."4 8 Still, " mobs armed with machetes, guns and samurai swords wandered the streets of Dili," while, back in Jakarta, President Habibie went on television asking voters to vote for special autonomy.49 Average people, often with children in tow, walked for miles simply to mark a piece of paper. Though some charges of voting irregularities were later made, the pro­ cess on August 30 was fairly administered, and it was closely supervised by several groups, from among three categories: local observers, Indonesian observers, and, most important, various international observers (these included people from the Australia-East Timor International Volunteers Project, the International Federation for East Timor, the Portuguese National Observer Mission, and Asian Nations for Free Elections, among others) . It could be assumed, though not often proven on the ground, that the local observers were inclined toward independence. It was more common that the Indonesian observers opposed independence. Still, each site was observed by officials from at least two different categories, and mobile observers moved throughout the countryside monitoring the process as an additional check. As another powerful lever for fairness, the Catholic Church issued appeals to vote one's conscience, show toleration for opposing votes, and work for reconciliation after the vote. so

54

Triumph of Self-Determination

Ambassador Marker described the day's events, noting, "Everywhere we were greeted with joy and enthusiasm, with tears, embraces, and the kissing of hands, and with thousands of pairs of hope-filled eyes." 51 Average people traveled sometimes for many miles to do an extraordinary thing-to deter­ mine their own government-and they did so in huge numbers. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and U .S. State Department spokesman James Foley both hailed the turnout on voting day as " extraordinary." Even the Indonesian government made positive comments about the voting process.52 Secretary-General Annan, however, also expressed d ismay at the murder of a forty-nine- year-old East Timorese member of the UNAMET staff, Joel Lopez Comes, who had been stabbed to death by militiamen. A convoy of nearly 150 UN workers in seventeen vehicles was held hostage for eight hours in Gleno, southwest of Dili, by militiamen, reputedly assisted by Indonesian soldiers. The militia goal in Gleno seemed to be the prevention of the ballot count, and only the personal intervention of civilian police commissioner Alan Mills in a UN helicopter could facilitate the removal of the ballots. Fears of widespread violence were generally u nfulfilled, but the situation remained extremely tense, with numerous fires being set, bullets being fired, and the Indonesian police remaining largely passive. All the individual ballots were transported in sealed blue plastic boxes to a central facility in Dili, where the result was tabulated. The vote took a few days to count, but the result was momentous. Of 451 ,792 registered voters, 344,580, over 78 percent, had voted for indepen­ dence. Less than ninety-five thousand Timorese had voted for autonomy within Indonesia .B Kofi Annan announced, "After 2 4 years of conflict, East Timor now stands on the threshold of what we all hope will be a process of orderly and peaceful transition towards independence . " 54 The next day the main pro-Jakana u mbrella group dismissed the vote result and accused UNAMET of supporting the proindepend enc e movement. "Most of the pro-integration supporters have come to the conclusion that UNAMET is really encouraging and backing the people of East Timor to break away from Indonesia," said United Front for East Timor Autonomy (UNIF) spokesman Basilio Araujo . "What outcome will one expect from all this garbage? Only God knows, but one thing is for sure, in computing terms it says: garbage in, garbage out."55 Although President Habibie welcomed the ballot as " very good, peaceful and fair,"56 in Jakarta, in Dili black-shined militiamen set buildings on fire and briefly seized control of the airport, where they harassed passengers trying to board the daily flight out of East Timor. " Eurico Guterres, the leader of the main Aitarak (Thorn) militia, said pro-independence students and members of the political elite would not be allowed to leave East Timor. "S7 Clearly, the Indonesian government, the Indonesian military leadership in East Timor, and the pro autonomy militia had all believed their scare tactics would sufficiently intimidate the majority of Timorese, causing them not to .

UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

55

vote for independence. With that expectation dashed, the militia began enforcing a reign of terror-designed either as revenge or as a last-ditch effort to preserve their own interests. In any case, the Indonesian police and military did nothing to stop the militia from tearing East Timor apart and driving thousands away from their homes. The first days of September 1999 were marked by the worst kind of devastation in East Timor. Everyone was surprised by the degree of lawlessness that resulted from the shock and rage of the voting result for independence. Certainly the Indonesians were not willing to stop the violence, and the United Nations had woefully few of its members on the ground. UNAMET appeared to be in real danger. Indonesia deployed additional police, but it also set up special charter flights to evacuate certain citizens from East Timor in the face of spiraling, out-of-control militia violence.58 The Indonesian government had sought to solve its East Timor problem by pacifying the population through a form of special autonomy that was not an opening to future provincial independence movements and was acceptable to the Indonesian military. Historically Indonesia had done much for East Timor, and President Habibie was sincere in his desire to consider autonomy options. Still, few outside Timor understood the real fervor of the Timorese people. Even without any real history of democracy, the appeal of independence after so much violence generated an overwhelming response that startled everyone. With so much at risk, the proautonomy militias reacted with even more ruthlessness, and the United Nations could do nothing credible to stop the destruction. With so much emotion and such a history of mistrust, the events in East Timor could no longer be controlled without outside intervention. Thousands of Timorese refugees were streaming toward the western border, and many thousands more were running from towns and hamlets into the hinterland to hide from potential reprisals. 59 The United Nations had no dedicated military forces, and clearly Indone­ sian units had failed to prevent or control the violence. The other nations of the world that cared about East Timor needed to assist and do so quickly. A few nations had already commented on the availability of troops, and for the first time, the Indonesian government said, on September 3, that it might be necessary to consider sending U N peacekeepers to the territory.60 The call for an international military intervention force could no longer be delayed. Thankfully, planning for such a force had been under way for several months.

Chapter 5 Anticipating Intervention: Planning and Deployment

East Timor now stands on the threshold of what we all hope will be a process of orderly and peaceful transition towards independence. The coming days, however, will require patience and calm from the people of East Timor. I hardly need stress how important it is for its leaders to exercise wisdom and reason.1 -KofiAnan

When the UN-brokered talks between Indonesia and Portugal developed a baseline agreement for the East Timor referendum in May 1999, the possi­ bility of a military mission there was already a strong possibility, but the role of a military force in East Timor remained uncertain for a long period afterward. The civil unrest manifested during the UNAMET registration process should have been a clear indication to regional military leaders, particularly in Australia, New Zealand, and other ASEAN member states, that there was increasing potential for international military involvement in East Timor. Yet, as is all too common today, the scope and mission specifics for any military commitment in East Timor were a "moving target" in the regional capitals until the very final days prior to the crisis. Even so, in Australia, the United States, and New Zealand, planning efforts were conducted early and well to at least develop an appreciation of the situation in East Timor and devise possible military courses of action.2 Several planning sessions were conducted with direct support from the other nations, including U.S. planning-team visits to Australia, Australian exchanges with New Zealand, and at least one training session between American and Australian officers focused on conducting information operations.3 It was commonly assumed in the region that should UN military action be needed in East Timor the U.S. would play a large role and would most likely be the leader of any multinational coalition used there. This was a valid assumption

Anticipating Intervention

57

given the recent history of UN-sponsored multinational operations, when only the major powers had successfully exercised the function of lead nation in a United Nations-sponsored military intervention. But in actuality, the end of the Cold War had changed the multinational dynamic in a way that would make the role of the lone superpower quite different than it had been in the previous decades. For its part, the United States had begun unilateral planning for a range of potential military operations in East Timor from the first weeks of the year. The U.S. Pacific Command's4 situation assessment team had deployed to Jakarta in January 1 99 9 and again in May to conduct initial estimates of the situation and prepare for possible evacuations of U.S. citizens. Key mem­ bers of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) staff in Okinawa, Japan also conducted mission analysis during May and June as the UN was moving to establish UNAMET. By early July, comprehensive planning for a situation in East Timor had been completed at the national, political and military levels in Washington (between the United States and Australia, with coordination with Great Britain) and in New York (between the United States and the UN).5 Multinational coordination had also begun in earnest at the military strategic level all across the Pacific, though it was principally focused on Australia, as the military relationship between the U.S. and New Zealand was quite strained. 6 Originally, the U .S. planning effort was focused only on the noncombatant evacuation of key personnel, but over time, military planners expanded the effort to include the actual use of forces in a peace enforcement context, either unilaterally, within a coalition force, and/or under the banner of the United Nations. When U.S. planners submitted their first concept of operations for review in July 1 999, it envisioned that American units would "force a peace" in East Timor and then turn over the mission to maintain the peace to an Australian-led coalition? Given a UN sanction, this was not an unlikely scenario from the military perspective, and such circumstances clearly matched previous patterns of U.S. force employment around the globe. It was considered likely enough in July that the U .S. force commander, Marine Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, was placed on a two-day notice to deploy.8 The telling element was that there was at that time no suspicion that Australia might become the lead nation for any intervention in East Timor. This false assumption would be a critical factor in the eventual construction of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) . At the time these U.S. planning efforts were under way, Australia was modifying its military command structure as a part of the measured but deliberate move toward more joint solutions within many Western nations. As a consequence of this effort, a new military headquarters was created, Australian Theatre, which was to play a key role in the development and execution of military action in East Timor.9 Under headquarters, Australian Theatre (then commanded b y Air Vice Marshall Bob Treloar of the Royal

58

Triumph of Self-Determination

Australian Air Force), the commander of the 1st Division, Major General Peter Cosgrove, was slated to command any major deployment of forces as Commander, Dep lo ya b le Joint Force Headquarters (DJ FHQl. 1 0 General Cosgrove was well suited to the task that he would find in East Timor for several reasons. First of all, he was a veteran combat soldier who was well familiar with the rigors of small unit operations from his heroic tour of duty in Vietnam. Second, he was a graduate of some of the best military schools. He had received a solid education in current joint opera­ tional thinking as well as a strong understanding of U .S. doctrine from his time as a student at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico and British doctrine at the British Army Staff College, Camberley, in the UK, as well as the Australian Joint Services Staff College and the Indian National Defence College. He was well liked and respected by com­ manders in the region and was well trusted by both the Australian Chief of Defence Force and prime minister. All of these factors would aid him in mis­ sion accomplishment in East Timor. As luck would have it, General Cosgrove and his headquarters had previ­ ously participated in a coalition exercise named Rainbow Serpent in 1998 and been scheduled to conduct a bilateral exercise with U.S. forces, named Crocodile '99. These exercises, combined with previously scheduled training events in Brunei and elsewhere in the region, helped develop common approaches, prestage personnel, and forces and equipment that would be important for success in East Timor. Perhaps more important, many regional military planners had come to form bonds of mutual respect and real trust with their Australian counterparts during such exercises. This trust would enable INTERFET to form and begin operations more quickly than most multinational commands had in p ast operations. Across the Tasma n Sea, New Zealand had also begun planning for a small but important role in any eventual military commitment in Timor. Air Marshal Carey Adamson, the New Zealand Chief of Defence Force, had begun prep­ arations soon after President Habibie had agreed to the consuhation . 1 1 The Kiwis took a "whole-of-government approach" to the formation and training up of their potential contingent at the national level, and they also adopted a joint process at the operational level, standing up first a Joint Operations Planning Group in March, and then an intergovernmental East Timor Watch Group in mid April. 1 2 By June, as the situation in East Timor continued to hold the attention of regional governments, the New Zealand Defence Force had been given approval to bring a " reinforced co mp any group" to increased readiness levels. 1 3 For a small military with minimal resources, eventhat size of force would tax the annual operating budget, and given the lack of certainty still remaining that the mission might nor be needed, it took particular fore­ sight for senior leaders to press for and gain the resources necessary. Through the early months of 1999, both Australia and the United States, along with several other nations, had worked diplomatically to induce

Anticipating I nte rvention

59

a reduction in the violence in East Timor and to stimulate Indonesian efforts to provide security there. But these diplomatic efforts were not the only ongoing activities designed to help manage the East Timor crisis. The Australian intelligence services were working hard to infiltrate the local structures in East Timor and to glean all available information through signals and imagery intelligence sources. As previously d iscussed, by mid March 1999, Australian intelligence sources had identified the links between the militia commanders and the Indonesian military commanders in East Timor and had made it clear that they were working together to destabilize the province. For example, the Australians had clear evidence of personal con­ nections between militia leader Cancio da Carvalho and the chief of staff of the military district responsible for East Timor, Brigadier General Mahadin Simbolan.14 There was no doubt that the Indonesian military was deceiving the world as to its activities and objectives. At about the same time, Prime Minister Howard's government in Canberra decided to increase the readiness level of General Cosgrove's 1st Brigade, headquartered across the sea from Timor in Darwin.1.1 This decision left no doubt that military forces from Australia were anticipated to be needed in the near future. To investigate further, the Australians initiated P-3C Orion 1 6 signals intelligence flights in the area around East Timor to intercept military radio communications; their efforts were supported by U.S. EP-3 (Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics System) aircraft, new computer equip­ ment, and other technical assistance. 1 7 By April, during the Liqui
60

Triumph of Self-Determination

detailed observations of the arming and training of the militias by the TNI, TNI participation in atrocities, and its preparations for the rampage that followed the vote for independence.24 By May the Australians also had dozens of hours of intercepted telephone conversations from militia leaders. There could be no doubt of the impending storm of violence. Thus, in June there was direction to the military to refine preparations for employment in East Timor-at least for an evacuation of noncombatants. The Australians sent a high-level military team to J akarta in late June, led by the vice chief of their Defence Staff, Air Vice Marshal Doug Riding. He attempted to discuss the evidence of TNI complicity with the militias with senior TNi leaders, but his evidence and advice were largely ignored. Mean­ while, through their normal daily activities in Timor, the Australian military and civilian police contingents within UNAMET were also adding valuable information to the growing list of TNI-supported efforts aimed against the independence leaders in East Timor.2'i Through July and August, the intelligence linking the TNI with militia actions remained incontrovertible. With each passing week data indicating the severity of the potential postreferend urn violence also grew increasingly conclusive. Unfortunately the Howard government began to discount the value of the intelligence as their trust in the Indonesian government's ability to control events in East Timor grew. By the end of August, Australian intel­ ligence had even identified the existence of an Indonesian "evacuation plan," Operation WIRAD-HARMA,26 but the Howard government had turned such a blind eye to the intelligence that the foreign minister claimed that "the level of violence came as a surprise to me. "27 Luckily, military planners had continued their work just in case military force might be needed. Even though it surprised some U.S. and Australian government officials, the military leaders of several nations had been acting all along to forestall militia violence or at least minimize its impact. The Australian Defence Force had developed Operation Spitflre to evacuate its citizens, and potentially others, from East Timor. New Zealand had signed on to support Spitflre with helicopters and some Special Air Service troopers. The United States ordered two of its ships, USS M o bile Bay, an Aegis cruiser, and USNS Kilauea, a logistics support ship, to take positions in the Timor Sea on August 28 to assist the Australian effort and develop a U.S. presence on scene. The Indo­ nesians also increased the readiness of their forces and deployed navy ships to the area as a show of force, although the presence of two U .S. warships signaled U . S . commitment to future operations, if required, and thus con­ tributed as a deterrent to Indonesian actions. At the same time, U .S. liaison officers deployed as a Pacific Command Planning Liaison Team (PPLT) from Okinawa to Brisbane, Australia, to refine coalition planning.28 Unfortunately, the postreferendum violence in East Timor continued u nchecked .29 Admiral Blair designated the two U.S. warships as Joint Task Force-Timor Sea Operations (JTF-TSO) in the early days of September. By that time the

Anticipating Intervention

61

3rd MEB staff under General Castellaw had developed a series of scenarios in case President Clinton directed a U.S. military presence in East Timor. Even before those decisions were made) however) U .S. forces began providing logistics support to Australia. Castellaw immediately established a headquar­ ters in Darwin and manned an office within the Australian Theatre head­ quarters building. A growing U.S. Air Expeditionary Group began to form in Australia and to provide daily cargo and personnel transportation.30 Still) the problem was that Australia and many other interested nations remained formally focused on using the traditional diplomatic mechanisms to pressure Indonesia into developing a safe environment in East Timor. As the use of military force is appropriately the last resort of a government) political leaders are often reluctant and unpracticed in its application. Prime Minister Howard's government did not reveal all that it knew about the complicity of the TNI in East Timor to its public or to President Habibie) because to do so would reduce the diplomatic leverage that Ho ward believed to be working in Jakarta . The Howard government certainly did share what it knew with the United States) and to a lesser degree with Great Britain and New Zealand. All of these nations had increased their diplomatic pressure on Indonesia through the summer and close!y monitored events in EastTimor as U NAMET did its work in the days preceding the vote. All of these diplomatic efforts would come to a head through the good fortune that the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC)31 had previously been sched­ uled in Auckland) New Zealand) for mid September. This meeting meant that all the key non-Timorese players, including Howard, Habibie, and President Clinton) would be in attendance during the early p art of September.32 POSTCONSUlTATION EAST TIMOR

The results of the popular consultation were announced by the U nited Nations on September 3 . In a second session on the same day, the Security Council also condemned the violence that had occurred before and after the vote and called on the government of Indonesia to provide appropriate security in the region. Yet) in direct contravention of these efforts, the days following the completion of the referendum witnessed the worst violence the East Timorese had experienced since the 1975 Indonesian invasion. Houses were destroyed in many towns, fires were set throughout many villages, and in general the property of all known pro independence supporters was threatened by roving gangs of prointegration militia. There can be no doubt that the local Indonesian administration in East Timor took a hands-off approach to the devastation. The worId co u Id only watch as the majority of East Timorese were assaulted by a minority of militiamen supported by TNI passivity. The level of violence in East Timor coincident with the lack of aggressive action by Indonesian security forces made military intervention by the other

62

Triumph of Self-Determination

concerned nations inevitable. The only questions were the level of UN involvement and the exact role of international military forces. At a mini­ mum the citizens of other nations would require evacuation if the violence continued; in the worst case the United Nations might be required to inter­ vene, as authorized by the UN Charter, to ensure the safety of the people remaining in East Timor. The presence of UNAMET increased the likeli­ hood of UN involvement because it gave the Secretary-General a direct responsibility for those participating in the management of the popular con­ sultation, and there were clear signs that they would need to be evacuated under military protection. Four members of UNAMET had already been killed since the voting, and six others were missing in the confusion. On Saturday September 4, the violence in East Timor forced fifty-four members of the UNAMET civilian police contingent to flee Maliana. One of them said of the militia, "They don't respect anything. They are out of co ntro I now-crazy. "33 Even Bishop Belo's home was torched in the militia rampage. General Wiranto pledged to send more troops to the province, but few believed such action would in any way reduce the level of violence. Many in Dili and in New York were talking about peacekeepers, but few thought that any action could occur soon enough to halt the violence in Timor. UNAMET began to evacuate East Timor. By the end of the first weekend in September the U nited States govern­ ment had decided that external force would be required to stop the violence in East Timor. After discussing the problem with Prime Minister Howard, President Clinton announced his support for a UN security force deploy­ ment on Monday, September 6, and acknowledged that the U.S. would "do what we can" to stop the desrruction.34 The U.S. State Department immedi­ ately weighed in to place the blame for the violence in East Timor squarely on the Indonesian military. The following day, the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, no stranger to U N intervention decis ion making, pres­ sured Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas to deal with the crisis in East Timor or invite the international community in, and quickly.35 Only thirty-five people were officially confirmed dead in East Timor on Monday, but some said the number was really in the hundreds. Rumors of forced deportation were rife, and regional news reporters wrote of thousands leaving per hour-with the real perpetrators being identified as KOPASSUS.36 On September 7, due to continued escalation in the violence in East Timor, the Indonesian military declared martial law in the province. In Jakarta, the crisis was threatening President Habibie's already weak posi­ tion. The results of the popular consultation had shocked many in influential positions in Indonesia and seemed to open the door for a host of other internal problems to intensify. Calls for President Habibie's resignation were voiced after his attempt to pacify the East Timor problem grew worse instead of better with the proindependence vote. Indonesia's presidential frontrunner, Megawati Sukarnopurri, and party colleagues discussed the possibility of

Anticipating Intervention

63

refusing to recognize East Timor's vote for independence, and many described Habibie as a lame duck, concurring that his chances of reelection were zero. Even some members of his inner circle urged him to resign.37 On Wednesday, September 8, with the level of violence still increasing, the UNAMET mission decided to leave East Timor. Secretary-General Kofi Annan told a news conference in New York that he hoped some presence could be maintained in East Timor to help protect the two thousand East Timorese refugees in the mission, but this depended " o n the understanding that the military around the building will continue to provide protection . "38 Given that the Indonesian forces in East Timor had consistently failed to provide such support, it was clear that other nations would need to intervene, at least to protect their own citizens. Even though General Wiranto appo inted a new commander in East Timor, Major General Kiki Syahnakrie, and charged him with creating a safe atmosphere, few had any confidence that he would succeed.39 The question was no longer if a military intervention would be needed, but more simply what its mission would entail. The U .S. was still reluctant to send its own troops into what was a very dangerous environment but was actively working with the other concerned nations to identify support requirements. Defense S ecretary William Cohen stressed that the Indonesian government must either bring the violence under control or invite an international force in under the auspices of the United Nations.40 Most American decision makers preferred a United Nations solution to such problems, and the Clinton administration was par­ ticularly inclined to use such a response, but even under UN sponsorship, putting together an international force with Indonesian concurrence would be fraught with danger. The issue of an Indonesian " invitation" was considered crucial by most involved in order to maintain at least the semblance of Indonesian govern­ ment support for the UN efforts. If Indonesia rejected the results of the consultation or refused to permit outside assistance in order to quell the violence, the situation could push Indonesia into real opposition-most likely open support of the proautonomy militias and a repeat of the situa­ tion in 1 975. Although many observers felt that Jakarta was culpable for allowing the militia violence, it was quite a different issue to directly oppose a sovereign nation over its ability to maintain security for its own and other citizens. President Habibie's weak position and the important role the Indo­ nesian armed forces played in Indonesian society invited a secondary, but even more damaging, crisis of government control in Jakarta. Secretary­ General Annan had given the Indonesian government a two-day deadline to restore order after reports of continued violence by pro-Jakarta militia with support from Indonesian troops. The Indonesian armed-forces spokesman, Major General Sudrajat, officially rejected any such deadline as u nrealistic, noting that the Indonesian military was still capable of bringing peace to the territory. Jakarta continued to assert that it would consider international

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Triumph of Self-Determination

intervention in East Timor only after its National Assembly ratified the referendum vote for independence, and that would take at least a month. Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, holding talks with the five-member U N delegation of diplomats in Jakarta, also argued against the need for UN peacekeepers.41 Meanwhile, others in Indonesia were working to reverse the results of the popular consult by any means possible. Reporters on the scene and the BBC reported that shiploads of refugees from East Timor were flooding into Kupang port in West Timor on Indonesian warships, passenger liners, and ferries. Quoting unnamed UN sources, the media b lamed the prointegration militias for "forcibly deporting proindependence East Timorese people to West Timor," and the provincial governor "for promising to feed, clothe and house them and, to protect them from the trauma created by the West in East Timor. "42 The commander of the Indonesian armed forces, General Wiranto, appointed a new commander to take charge of East Timor. Wiranto told reporters Major General Kiki Syahnakrie would take control of the territory, which had been placed under martial law: " His duty is to take over public installations and, secondly, to create a safe atmosphere."43 THE WEEK O F D E C I S IONS

In view oft he devastation wrought by the militias, a five-member Security Council team, including the ambassadors from Britain, Malaysia, Slovenia, and Namibia, was dispatched by Kofi Annan on Thursday, September 9, bound for Jakarta and Dili to help assess the problem.44 Indonesia wel­ comed the emergency mission, but President Habibie still ruled out any international peacekeeping force in the territory until the Indonesian National Assembly could approve East Timor's secession, a procedure that could take months.45 The mission parameters for the military role in post­ consultation East Timor remained uncertain for days, but by September 10, when the UN assessment team began its work, it was clear that some military role was required. Australia acted along two avenues during the early days of September: continued diplomacy and troop preparation. As the Australian press was blaming President Habibie for the violence in Timor, the Howard govern­ ment warned that Indonesia had hours-not days-to restore order.46 Meanwhile the catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay left Darwin with Australian Army troops on board for the Timor Sea. Additional Australian troops, ships, and aircraft were also placed on twenty-four-hour standby. In Can­ berra, the Australian military was already making contact with its counter­ parts in countries likely to join Australia in any peacekeeping force in East Timor. Commitments were already being sought by the Australians for an international force of around five thousand United Nations-sanctioned peacekeepers, which could include up to two thousand Australian troops.

Anticipating I nte rvention

65

The United States had already been engaged diplomatically, both indi­ vidually and through the UN, supporting East Timorese self-determination. Yet the question of U.S. military involvement in East Timor had still to be fixed. While President Clinton professed sympathy for East Timor's desper­ ate plight, Pentagon officials argued that with fourteen thousand troops in Kosovo, U .S. resources were already stretched too thinly.47The White House announced that the United States would not decide whether to send forces to East Timor until the United Nations assessment team returned from the island: "The U.N. team will report back within the next couple of days and make an assessment on any potential international peacekeeping force. "4 8 American Secretary of State Albright also warned the Indonesian foreign minister that time was running out. Meanwhile, President Clinton had already dispatched Admiral Blair from Honolulu to meet with General Wiranto and personally explain the importance of gaining control in East Timor-with little result.

Behind the scenes both the United States and Australia were coordinating with the United Nations to develop plans for an intervention in East Timor. Even before the governments involved had made final decisions, a small group of officials from the Australian Embassy were working in Washington to coordinate a broad range of issues that would facilitate decision making by the United Nations. For weeks, basic dialogue and frequent meetings had been under way to produce consensus on the need for an intervention and a basic framework for planning. By September 9 the two governments had agreed sufficiently to forward to the United Nations in New York a baseline mission analysis of the political-military tasks required to resolve the crisis in East Timor. That document envisioned the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (U NTAET) as a vehicle "to shape the future of an independent East Timor. "49 It included as planning assumptions the ratification of the independence vote by the Indonesian parliament by November 1999, Indonesian cooperation with the UN, the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary­ General, and a UN mandate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the use of a civilian police (Civ-Pol) component, as well as the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. Thus the plan underestimated both the time available for the UN to act and the threat conditions in East Timor. By the time it was presented the nature of the crisis made peace operations under Chapter VI very doubtful. Still, the details of the proposal did point out several concerns that would become increasingly important to the successful conclusion of the crisis in Timor. For one, the document noted the importance of an early selection of a leading nation and a force commander. Second, the document noted the importance of accelerated military planning prior to the concurrence of Indonesia to facilitate the identification of forces and the development of the rules of engagement (ROE). Finally, among other issues, the proposal submitted to UN planners clearly demonstrated the need to coordinate for

66

Triumph of Self-Determination

security in the transition between the control of Indonesian forces and the arrival of sufficient U NAMET military and police forces. The planning document clearly identified that the Indonesian police in East Timor were marginalized by the Army and not viewed as credible guar­ antors of public security due to their " failure to quell militia activity and other violence. "50 Too few East Timorese were members of the police, and no other groups in country were suitable to assume public security duties; therefore it would be very difficult for any resident capability to assume responsibility for security in Timor should the Indonesian Army depart. Finally, the transition plan identified that, as there was "no tradition of East Timorese experience with democratic self governance," and there were " deep divisions among the East Timorese militias and political parties," the transi­ tion to an elected East Timorese government would not be easy. Though this planning document was never implemented as t i was originally intended, it did greatly speed up the development of basic planning assump­ tions within the United Nations and contributed to several other interagency planning efforts in the United States and Australia. There is no doubt that the document did outline the foundation principles for the future employment of U NTAET. And it is likely that several of the issues identified in the docu­ ment directly influenced the actions of the nations involved as the crisis accelerated each day that week. Saturday, September 1 1 , was a particularly crucial day. President Habibie decided not to attend the APEC summit, even as President Clinton, en route to Auckland on Air Force One, was condemning the Indonesian military for "aiding and abetting" the violence in East Timor. The U N Security Council also met to debate the situation in East Timor, where some two hundred thousand people had been reported fleeing their homes. 51 The International Monetary Fund also had suspended talks with Jakarta-part of the employ­ ment of economic power by the member nations over financially strapped Indonesia. The United States also cut off arms sales and military cooperation with Indonesia. Australia did much the same; and the European Union suspended arms sales to Indonesia as well. The following day, Sunday, September 12, President Habibie formally accepted the employment of international peacekeeping forces in East Timor in a phone call with Secretary-General Annan and a speech to the Indonesian people. Habibie noted, "Too many people have lost their lives since the beginning of the unrest, lost their homes, and security. We cannot wait any longer. We have to stop the suffering and mourning immediately. " 52 Pressure was mounting in other nations to support an intervention as well. Ministers from around the world were convened at the APEC summit in Auckland, New Zealand, and although the host, New Zealand prime minister Jenny Shipley, had hoped to avoid the issue, East Timor soon dom­ inated side discussions. All the right people were together in the region, at just the right time. In particular, President Clinton s vocal support for action -

'

Anticipating I nte rvention

67

in East Timor during the APEC summit was a clear catalyst for multinational action. Although the specified U .S. policy had been not to get involved militarily in East Timor, the pressure of events eventually drove C!inton to consult with Congress about a troop deployment and to call General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman of the J oint Chiefs of Staff, and direct the refinement of military options. He later met privately with Prime Minister Howard to discuss the details of the international force. Active U .S. participation in the international diplomatic effort helped place Australian concerns in a proper global context, showing the level of concern outside Southeast Asia, as did strong support from the United King­ dom. The international press added to the rationale for intervention by revealing even more of the Indonesian plan to forcibly resettle the proinde­ pendence East Timorese.·B Soon the call for action against East Timor vio­ lence had generated rare, comprehensive international consensus for intervention operations. Even Prime Minister Shipley eventually decided that the level of violence in Timor required outside action, and so she agreed to send a Royal New Zealand Navy frigate to Darwin to assist the Australian armed forces, should an evacuation be necessary. Canada, Japan, Great Britain, Portugal, Brazil, Thailand, and other Southeast Asian nations also joined in the dialogue concerning potential military contributions. The pressure grew so intense that rumors indicated that his key generals were moving against President Habibie. "There was talk that President Habibie was set to resign and hand power to a triumvirate-General Wiranto, the Minister for Interior Affairs, General Syarwan Hamid, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas." A well-placed Jakarta source told the Sydney Morning Herald, " Wiranto is frustrated that the TNI [army] has been the object of protest and ridicule and that this is happening while he is armed forces commander."54 Among many, such ridicule came from Megawari Sukarnoputri, who noted in reference to the TNI actions in East Timor, "As an Indonesian citizen, I am saddened, concerned and ashamed . " 55 As if internal pressure from his own military and opposition groups was not enough, President Habibie certainly reacted to the economic pressure from both the Clinto n ad ministration and the International Monetary Fund. Both threats to cut off the financial aid that had kept Indonesia economically viable in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis of 1997 were extremely significant. State Department spokesman James Rubin said that "productive relations between Indonesia and the international community, including rhe IMF, depend on Indonesia adopting a constructive approach towards ending the humanitarian disaster in East Timor. "56 In other words, if Jakarta did not cooperate concerning East Timor, the aid money would stop flowing to Indonesia. With Habibie's acceptance, the UN was freed to develop an international force designed to hair the violence in East Timor. Certainly Australia and rhe

68

Triumph of Self-Determination

United States would play key roles in any international force, but the real composition of the force had yet to be determined. France and Italy had joined the growing list of nations pledging forces, but it was the command responsibility and financial sustainment that were critical to the formation of the force. By design U .S. military support in East Timor was limited to unique capabilities that could not be provided by other members of the coalition. Specifically, logistics, intelligence, communications, and civil­ military affairs were deemed U .S.-unique capabilities for the crisis in East Timor. Yet, support by the U .S. in East Timor must be viewed in a wider context as well. Significant U.S. aid had been supplied to Indonesia during the decades preceding the crisis, and U .S. diplomatic and economic leverage was believed to exert a strong influence on the government in Jakarta. The formation of INTERFET was the next key step to solving the crisis in East Timor, but it would have to be taken while the operation was under way.

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Chapter 6 Initial M ilitary Operations

I have made clear that my willingness to support future economic assistance from the i nternational community will depend upon how Indonesia handles the situation from today forward. The Indonesian government and military must not only stop what they are doing but reverse eo urse. They must halt the viole nee not j ust in Dili but throughout the nation. They must permit humanitarian assistance and let the U.N. mission do its job. They must allow the East Timorese who have been pushed from their homes to return safely. They must implement the results of the balloting. And they must allow an international force to help restore sec urity.1 -President Bill Clinton

The UN intervention force began to take shape quickly after President Ha bib ie authorized its use: It had to. The devastation in East Timor never seemed to stop . UNAMET was forced to evacuate completely on September 1 4 , 1999, leaving only a few volunteers to shepherd the hundreds of refugees in the UN compound.2 Indonesian soldiers promprly looted the site. Although President Habibie had agreed to the use of international troops to restore order in Timor, there were immediate questions about the level of TNI cooperation that would be extended to the international force. To the Indonesian people Habibie had indicated that the government had invited international troops to cooperate with the TNI to restore order; when speak­ ing with Secretary-General Annan, Habibie had seemed to indicate that the TNI forces would simply withdraw, permitting the international forces to execute operations without any approval by or coordination with the TNI.3 As the TNI was clearly considered a party to the devastation in East Timor, most nations had no desire to coordinate activities with the Indonesian military; still, Indonesia had forces already in the crisis area and some legitimate claims as a host nation.

70

Triumph of Self-Determination

The second issue of the day concerned the composition of the international force. Many in Indonesia hoped to maximize the p articipation of Asians in the international force to the exclusion of Australian; American; and other " Western-model" personnel. There were several problems with this. First of all; the nations most desired b y Indonesia were the "Asian" member states of ASEAN;4 most of whom were willing to contribute; despite the long standing nonintervention policy of the ASEAN alliance; but their available units were few in number and not trained for overseas operations. Addition­ ally; most of the ASEAN states did not have the logistics capability to mount an operation so far from their shores. Indonesia viewed the ASEAN nations as less threatening than Australia and nonregional states like the United Kingdom and the United States; however; those nations were much better experienced in intervention operations than their ASEAN counterparts. Finally; r egardless of the degree of cooperation with the TNI and the actual composition of the intervention force; lessons learned during similar operations during the 1 990s had shown that the role played by a "lead nation" was critical to operatio nal success.5 Not o nly would the lead nation set the tone for operational employment but it would also probably bear the immediate burden of the logistics required in execution. In East Timor any lead nation would also have to conduct most of the negotiations needed to deal with Indonesia. For each of these reasons the early designation of a lead nation was considered an imperative in the UN. The United States also emphasized the importance of designating a lead nation; however; by September 1 5 the Clinton administration had determined that it would not be the lead nation in East Timor. This decision came as a bit of a surprise to Prime Minister Howard and many senior members oft he Australian Defence Force; all of whom had expected the U nited States to serve as the lead nation. Australia had the commitment and the Howard government had the political support needed to perform as a lead nation. Australia was the closest neighbor to East Timor-closer; in fact; than Jakarta-but the critical question was whether the relati v ely small Australian military had the wherewithal to mount and conduct a UN intervention operation in the manner required of a lead nation. 6 The individual units o f the Australian D efence Force were very well trained; what was principally lacking was the transport; commu­ nications; and logistics capability required for long-term operations in East Timor. In the end; it was a combination of Australian leadership and com­ mitment backed by the unique support capabilities provided by the United States that made Australia an effective lead nation for the intervention in Timor. By the time President Habibie had agreed to the international interven­ tion; the military force list was already growing. New Zealand had contrib­ uted the frigate HMNZS Te Kahaand a C-130 Hercules aviation detachment to the Timor force that Australia had previously placed in an increased

Initial Military Operations

71

readiness status.7 New Zealand had also placed its Special Air Service Squadron and one battalion group of soldiers on heightened alert. Malaysia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Portugal had agreed to send forces, and Thailand, the Philippines, and France were also expected to contribute units. While the coalition force for intervention was being built incrementally around General Cosgrove's Joint Force Headquarters, other actions were of even more immediate concern in Timor. OPERATION 5PITF1RE

Before any intervention operation could be mounted, several of the contributing nations were preoccupied primarily with the need to evacuate their citizens from the chaos and destruction ongoing in East Timor. Both Australia and the United States had been planning for potential evacuation operations in lndonesia8 and East Timor since the early spring of 1999. With the positioning of the USS Mobile Bay and USNS Kilauea off Dili har­ bor, and the use of the imagery support and communications-monitoring systems based in Australia, both nations were receiving regular information concerning the destruction in East Timor. Although the U .S. Navy cruiser provided an excellent command and control platform for conducting surveillance of the local situation and maintaining an intelligence picture of the air and sea space around Timor, it did not provide much capacity for executing an evacuation. Either several aircraft or some passenger-capable sealift was needed to bring large numbers of personnel out of Dili and the surrounding region. Given the very dangerous environment in Timor, only military transport was appropriate for an evacuation.9 Typically, a services-assisted evacuation (or " no nco mb atant evacuation operation" in American terms) is conducted by a team that includes a command element, a ground security force, and either a naval or an air transportation gro up. The ground force normally provides security for the evacuee-processing activities, and the transport group moves the personnel from the crisis site to a safe area, while also assisting with medical and other support requirements. An operation of this type is considered permissive if no security forces are required to protect the evacuees; it is uncertain if the situation is fluid and nonpermissive if the evacuees are to be pulled out against the wishes of the local authorities. The situation in East Timor should have been permissive, but it was likely to turn u ncertain as the militia violence remained unchecked. 10 As East Timor is an island, either air or sea evacuation was possible; however, given the limited capacity of the Dili airport, the larger passenger-carrying capacity of navy ships, and the long distances from the region to safe havens, a naval evacuation appeared to be a more practical option. The Australian government formally announced concern for its citizens in East Timor as early as August 26 and began marshaling troops later

72

Triumph of Self-Determination

that day. Australian military planners had chosen the name Spitfire for their services-assisted e vacuation. According to their initial plan a small unit of the Australian army (later identified as Bravo Company, 3rd Royal Australian Regiment) would serve as the ground force. Overall command of the effort was vested in an organization known as Joint Task Force 504 UT F 50 4 ) . The lift element of the force was to be provided by 8 6 Wing of the Royal Australian Air Force, based in New South Wales, and later forward-deployed to Royal Air Force Base Tindal. Once in Tindal, the elements of the force were in a position to fly to Dili on short notice, when the need arose. Bravo Company of the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) was alerted on August 27 and pos t i ioned at Tindal. After a short period of training, the plan was changed to incorporate a sea option, and half the company was moved to nearby Royal Air Force Base Darwin o n September 7, so that it could operate onboard the HMAS Jervis Bay, the Royal Australian Navy's new, fast troop-carrying catamaran. Meanwhile, Australia had first commit­ ted military assistance in East Timor on Monday, September 6, when, at the request of the UN; it flew three C- 1 30 Hercules aircraft to Dili to evac u ate so me 2 50 members o f t he U NAMET staff in five trips. 1 1 The following day, while the world was watching the destruction in Dili, and before President Habibie had authorized the use of international forces, part of Bravo Com­ pany was embarked aboard the jervis Bay and deployed toward Indonesian waters. While it was transiting toward Timor, "orders were given; rules of engagement scenarios played out and what rehearsals were possible were conducted . " 12 Fortunately, just outside Indonesian territorial waters the mission was canceled and the troops returned to their home base. On September 1 1, this same scenario was repeated, with the Jervis Bay and its embarked paratroopers moving all the way to the coast of Timor before being turned away. Eighteen hours later, on the 1 2th, the team began its third move on East Timor, each time conducting plan refinement and rehearsals, thinking that the engagement with the Timorese militia was pos­ sible within hours. For the third time, the naval evacuation was canceled, and the troops were informed that the decision to conduct an air evacuation had been made . Unknown to the troops o f Bravo Comp any, elements o f the Australian SAS and a squadron of C-130s (including one New Zealand aircraft) had already initiated a permissive evacuation of people from Dili on September 13. In twenty-eight flights, 2,523 people, including 1 1 remaining United Nations staff members; were evacuated by C-130 to Darwin, Australia . 1 3 N o opposition to the evacuation was noted, but the situation in Dili was anything but safe. Officials must have breathed a sigh of relief that at least the majority of non-Timorese citizens were safely away from the violence. JTF 504 was disbanded on September 1 5 , but Bravo Company simply joined the rest of the Australian ground forces preparing for deployment to East

Initial Military Operations

73

Timor as part of an operation then named Warden-Australia's national effort to control the crisis in Timor. OPERATION 11ARDEN

Through late August and early September Australia had been assembling a range of military forces just in case they were needed for the crisis. These were based around General Cosgrove's 1st Australian Division and included as major elements the 1st Joint Support U nit, from Brisbane, and the 3rd Brigade of the Australian Army, based in Townsville, reinforced by Bravo Company's 3rd RAR in Sydney and the light-armored-vehicle-equipped C Squadron of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment from Darwin. While the Australian components of the force were assembling in and around Darwin under General Cosgrove's command, the initial sections of the U.S. support element were also arriving in Australia, thanks to the advance planning of the Pacific Command staff in Hawaii and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade staff in Okinawa, Japan. In addition to planning and liaison personnel, the United States also d ispatched a group of military cargo aircraft to Australia to help with any initial transport requirements. But most oft he other national forces were far from the crisis site. They all needed to assemble very quickly if the developing catastrophe in East Timor was to be contained . Following the decision of the UNAMET staff to leave East Timor on September 8, and in view of the continuing devastation wrought by the militias, a five-member UN Security Council team had been dispatched by Kofi Annan to assess the problem. Their assessment was bleak, and in response, on September 15, the UN Security Council authorized its Resolu­ tion 1264,14 which put into effect "the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure with the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. " The resolution also authorized the nations partici­ pating in the multinational force "to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate." (See Appendix C for the full text of UNSCR 1264 .) With a final, approved mandate from the United Nations Security Council, the military planning assumptions could be confirmed and the supporting nations could refine the specifics of their force contributions. Much work still remained even before operations could commence, but with the UNSCR mandate, the intervention to restore peace and security in East Timor could proceed on a legal basis-with a lead nation. Australia and its government and military were suddenly thrust into the central focus of the international effort. By luck, several national contingents of what would become the Inter­ national Force in East Timor (INTERFET) 1 5 had previously been exercising in the region. In particular, a contingent o f the 2nd Royal Gurkha Rifles was

74

Triumph of Self-Determination

conducting an exercise in Brunei accompanied by a British warship, the HMS Glasgow. They were soon joined by a detachment from the British Joint Force Headquarters under Brigadier David J . Richardson . 1 6 Because of their regional deployments, on very short notice the French also deployed to the area a ship with embarked commandoes. Other national contingents had been at least i dent ified, but few were positioned to be able to do much in the short term. This strategic development of the force composition of INTERFET was the task of Brigadier Steve Ayling at Australian Defence Force Headquarters in Canberra. Brigadier Ayling had been the director of strategic planning but soon become consumed by the duties of coordinating the identification of the support requirements of units all over the world that were potentially involved in operations in East Timor. Ayling had been the Australian contin­ gent commander in the UN peace operation in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992, so he was very familiar with the issues and requirements that various countries would have. The problem was that the situation in East Timor had deteriorated so rapidly, in a place so distant from many potential contributing countries, that the complexity of the coordination was very high. To assist, the Australian government had agreed to meet in-country logistics costs for potential UN contributors and had also agreed to underwrite the death and disability compensation provisions those nations might need . 1 7 For its pan, the United States had offered to support with strategic transport and to move contributed units and equipment to staging bases in Australia. Both nations had a vested interest in developing multinational partners for the operation. By September 1 4 , twenty-five nations had agreed to contribute some form of support for the mission in East Timor. Of these, Australia and New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom were keen to contribute military forces; others were also likely to do so; and some other nations, such as Japan, were unlikely to contribute forces but would provide funding or other nonoperational support-which in some ways was even more crucial. Most of the other twenty-five, including the United States, were undecided about the level and form oft heir support, but all were engaged diplomatically. For an operation like the one planned in East Timor, even only diplomatic supp on can be very valuable, but Ayling and his staff were primarily focused on developing the force list and rules of employment for military contingents that could make a physical difference against the rampaging militia threat on the ground in Timor. With basic funding by the UN and support from Australia identified, the other immediate concerns for multinational force contributors were force deployment, force protection, intelligence sharing, and rules of engagement . Few nations have much capability to deploy their own forces far from home, and even some nations that do operate on the very small margins of con­ tracted eap ability, 1 8 so development of a cooperative deployment scheme is

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critical for any rapid response. Most commonly, such transport is facilitated by large, contracted commercial carriers at great expense, or by the larger powers, primarily the United States, all at costs that are u nsupportable by most nations. The United Nations had no strategic deployment capability, so Ayling had to pull together means as best he could on the largess of the United States. Despite what the planners had expected at UN headquarters, in mid­ September the operation in East Timor had all the trappings of a Chapter VII comb at mission. This made force protection a big problem for many nations. Under Chapter VI, national contingents expect to defend themselves on rare occasions but can be confident that there would be no major combat opera­ tions needed in an overall relatively safe peacekeeping environment. Many nations have forces trained to execute Chapter VI tasks. On the other hand, few nations have effectively trained and strategically mobile combat forces, required by Chapter VII operations, and among those that do, very few are willing to send them into combat to secure the peace for someone else . 1 9 Australia and New Zealand accepted the price o f combat; however, as much as nations in the region hoped for an ASEAN-based international contingent in East Timor, few other ASEAN nations were able and willing to risk the cost.20 Good intelligence sharing was critical to ensuring that the multinational force could act aggressively, and cohesively, against threats in East Timor. Simply put, the opposing militia had the critical advantages of being con­ cealed throughout many areas of the countryside and even of being able to blend into the local population while moving. Without very good intelli­ gence the multinational forces would not be able to act effectively and could fall victim to a wide range of relatively unsophisticated yet very deadly attacks. Unfortunately, among the committed contributors, only the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia had a sufficiently high level of practiced intelligence sharing to act effectively in concert against the threat. Even between Australia and New Zealand certain elements of intelligence were poorly exchanged, and exchanges of human intelligence (HUMINT, or tradition spying-the most valuable aspect of information gathering in East Timor) were extremely constrained.21 Communications intelligence (COM­ MINT, or the "reading" of voice and data communications), although a very important source of insight into what the Indonesians were really doing in East Timor, was even more tightly controlled. This lack of sharing much valued intelligence would hobble any organization confronting a determined opponent. Finally Brigadier Ayling had the challenge of assisting in the development of the rules of engagement (ROE) for potential force-contributing nations. Once it was clear that the operation in East Timor would be conducted in a combat environment (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), individual nations still needed to craft specific rules of engagement (always a national

76 Triumph of Self-Determination policy matter) that would empower their forces to act appropriately during operations. Here again, even among nations that had worked together in a wide range of operations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, ROE were crafted differently. Yet it was critical that some level of concur­ rence be developed throughout any fielded force that would enable command­ ers to join together against threats. Only four years before, operations in Bosnia had shown the world how horrible mismatched threat and ROE could be when a Dutch battalion was marginalized in Srebrenica and thousands were ethnically "cleansed" by Bosnian Serb forces.22 Only very slowly did effective coalition ROE come together for operations in East Timor. Finally, though, by September 16, with the specific national forces still being assembled, sufficient coordination had been accomplished so that Australia could issue its first military instructions for Operation Warden. In them, the purpose of the operation was listed as to establish a multinational presence in East Timor and to conduct operations that provide stability, security, and protection for continued U NAMET activity. It still appeared that some assumed the simple presence of international military forces could stop the violence in East Timor. Meanwhile, the several nations involved continued to work at diplomatic initiatives and agreements that were needed to facilitate the introduction of forces.23 General Cosgrove would later remark: Each commitment to join the coalition was a victory and a relief during this phase. As the combat troops of New Zealand, Britain, Thailand, ( and the) Philippines were added to the list the spirits of politicians and planners lifted even as the military equation got more complicated-the issues of who, how, when, where and for what purpose, were thrown into a boiling pot of planning, o ver a roaring fire being stoked by intensive diplomatic effort.24 ,

On September 17, a basic timeline for the intervention was exchanged between the United States and Australia, with a joint-force reception center to be established in Darwin. The advanced party of the U .S. Marines from the 3rd MEB in Okinawa arrived there later the same day, and the first thing the following morning Generals Cosgrove and Castellaw were already at work resolving critical command and control issues, such as Cosgrove's ability to retain the Mobile Bay once the multinational forces began flowing into East Timor. The United Kingdom and Australia resolved issues in order to develop a centerline list of ROE, later to form the core of the ROE used by many forces in Timor. D-Day for the intervention was set for September 20. A bit of a surprise to some, even the name of the operation was changed after all the coordination made the effort truly international. The old planning name, Warden, being wholly Australian, was replaced by the new term Stabilise, reflecting the overall goal of INTERFET.25 On Sunday, September 19, General Cosgrove took a giant step toward ensuring that the crisis would be resolved with minimal force when he flew

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into Dili to meet with his opposite number, the Indonesian district com­ mander, General Kiki Syahnakrie.26 At the time of the meeting the Austra­ lians knew that the TNI was moving troops out of East Timor, but the exact intentions of the Indonesian military were very uncertain. Even with the agreement of the government in Jakarta, there was a strong chance that the actual TNI forces in East Timor would act to counter the efforts of the mul­ tinational forces send in to secure the peace. Cosgrove felt that a preliminary face-to-face meeting was necessary to ensure that he and Syahnakrie would be in agreement concerning the arrival of the United Nations force and the relationships between it and the TNI units still in Timor. In particular, Cosgrove needed to make certain Syahnakrie accepted continued responsi­ bility for maintaining the security of Timor for the seven to ten days it would take the UN force to deploy into the key areas of the island. Cosgrove understood how crucial setting the right tone at this initial meeting was for the success of his mission. He also understood the value of regional sentiment, so his Thai deputy, Major General Songkitti Jaggabattra, and his Singaporean component commander, Colonel Neo, both accompa­ nied him to the meeting with Syahnakrie, probably to witness the events and certainly to illustrate the international and ASEAN composition of Cosgrove's force. At the time, relations between the Indonesian and Australian milt i aries were extremely strained. Cosgrove noted afterward, "Appearances, demeanour and first impressions would be important . . . . As our pilots brought us to the appointed parking spot with great panache, I made a spur ofthe moment decision . . . . In a flash I told my [Special Air Services] protec­ tion party, 'Weapons off,' and ordered the SAS fellows, 'Stay on board . . . . ' I was very aware that even though the operation officially started the next day, in effect it was starting exactly at that moment."27 Cosgrove had been able to see the large number of Indonesian troops established all around the airport as he landed . After his greeting by General Syahnakrie, he was able to observe the systematic destruction of the Dili air­ port facilities and saw even more damage on his way into the city. " Dwellings observable from the road were largely deserted. Burnt household posses­ sions and roofing iron lay scattered and twisted throughout piles of ashes that had been family homes and businesses . . . . The roadway into town was lined every few meters with stony-faced Indonesian soldiers in field dress, with weapons at the ready. "28 He also observed prointegration militiamen and thousands of Timorese in miserable conditions, waiting to leave their homeland. The meeting with General Syahnakrie went well. Cosgrove's purpose was to ensure the effective insertion of his forces, while minimizing the risk of misunderstanding and possible conflict. Syahnakrie seemed amenable from the beginning, but he and his staff dearly had no idea how much capability Cosgrove really controlled. As the INTERFET commander described his plan to land a small fleet of helicopters, followed by thirty C-130 Hercules

78 Triumph of Self-Determination transport aircraft, at the Dili airport in the first twenty-four hours, Syahnakrie's staff, seated around the table, seemed incredulous. Cosgrove knew he needed to demonstrate that " a modern, powerful and highly tech­ nically developed force was arriving to save the East Timorese people from terror, displacement and the funher d estru etion of their ha meland. "29 The two generals agreed to the general process of the insertion the next morning, and Cosgrove returned to Darwin, confident that his measured yet forceful approach would prevent missteps. Both UN Secretary-General Annan and Australian foreign minister Downer had pub lidy stressed the volatility oft he situation; the White Ho use and 10 Downing Street had done the same. Rioters were marching on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. But based upon assurances from General Syahnakrie,3° Cosgrove made a crucial decision to modify the combat pos­ ture of his initial forces in the deployment, changing from a heliborne assault to an aircraft landing, in order to ensure no firing would occur between Indonesian and Australian forces.31 Because many units were already at sea or marshaling for insertion the next day, su eh a determination was critical. 32 He also decided to delay the landing time until first light to minimize the chances of an accidental encounter between his force and the TNI. INTERVENTION: THE CRITICAL FIRST WEEK

During his short visit with General Syahnakrie in Dili on the 1 9 , General Cosgrove had been "shocked and saddened at the huge level of destruction and almost total evacuation of the capital Dili,"33 and the noticeable presence of prointegration militia. He had traveled to Dili to coordinate force deploy­ ments with the Indonesians, but the visit had also given him his first per­ sonal look at the situation on the ground. Pressed by events, he could not dwell on the devastation, but it made a strong impression on him and certainly added much to his concern. Cosgrove had a very difficult situation to manage, while keeping in mind at all times both the requirements to protect his force from the militia threat while not pushing the Indonesians too hard and risking conflict with them as well. Though he had surprised Syahnakrie with the size and speed of his initial landing plans, Cos grove knew very well that his forces would be very weak in relation to the potential threat over the first seven days of the deployment. He also understood that their supplies and support would not mature until several days after that. Still, Cosgrove understood how powerful perceptions could be during modern military operations, and he made his confidence in the combat power of his initial forces evident to all outside his force headquarters. This approach extended to the press. The INTERFET commander had already leapt deeply into the media firestorm prior to his departure from Darwin, sending a message for both internal (Australian) and international

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(including Indonesia and East Timor) media consumption concerning the power and righteousness of his force and its United Nations mandate for peace. Information was understood to be a powerful weapon; General Cosgrove and his staff had planned for the use of informational themes, and he used his own exposure to other leaders, and the press, to advance the goals of INTERFET in every forum possible. Information and perception management were particularly important during the initial days of the operation in East Timor. INTERFET began operations just after dawn o n September 20 with an extremely delicate, yet permissive, insertion of forces. The force first began to execute General Cosgrove's concept of operations for providing security in East Timor by establishing critical bases of operations in Dili and Baucau. Fro m those locations it would later expand control over the whole of East Timor. This concept of operations later became known as the "oil spot" construct because it envisioned zones of security radiating out in circular fashion from the initial ports of debarkation. Originally, the security zones were to extend first to the eastern part of the island and then back to the western border area between East and West Timor. The concept was based upon superb intelligence preparation of the battle space (an understanding of the levels of threat in each area of Timor and the location of known militia locations), and on a corresponding match of the capabilities of the various international contingents that made up INTERFET. When they arrived in East Timor early that first morning, the soldiers of INTERFET were also struck by the tense situation in Timor. The experiences of members of Lieutenant Colonel Michael David Slater's 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2nd RAR), were particularly insightful. That battalion, along with a unit of the British Royal Marines, had been assigned the critical task of securing Dili's Comoro Airfield, the hub of the whole operation. 34 After a five-hour flight crammed into C-130 transport aircraft, the battalion landed at the airport j ust before seven in the morning. Having been given a series of pessimistic briefings prior to their departure, the troops were mentally prepared for a high level of casualties if they were opposed by rogue TNI elements or prointegration militiamen. "Some of the more vocal militia had threatened to target Australian and New Zealand soldiers, warning that many would die in East Timor with their hearts ripped out. "35 With such threats in mind, the Aussies left the aircraft with weapons at the ready. 36 The soldiers of the 2nd RAR were met instead by a dozen press personnel and a platoon of rather unhappy TNI soldiers. All the buildings at the ter­ minal had been trashed, and piles of burned and unburned garbage, rotting food, and human excrement covered the ground. C-130s continued to land at twenty-minute intervals; 3rd Brigade Headquarters soon arrived, as did addi­ tional TNI units of the 7 44 Battalion. By the end of the first day, most of the brigade's fifteen hundred soldiers were in East Timor, and one company of

80

Triumph of Self-Determination

the 2nd RAR was sent to relieve the Special Air Service troopers at the port of Dili. The devastation visible at the airport extended throughout the capital city (large portions of which were still burning out of control) and grew worse at the port, where hundreds of displaced East Timorese were huddled without sanitation facilities. As Major George O'Kane noted, "Rotting animal carcasses scattered around added to the stifling smell. Still the children were like kids anywhere, playing with whatever they could find . " 37 The following morning, as the remainder of 3rd Brigade was landing at the airport, HMAS Jervis Bay and HMAS Tobruk arrived at the port of Dili to offl.o ad the men of the 3rd RAR, the same unit that had seesawed back and forth between East Timor and Australia for Operation Spitfire . Those two ships had been escorted from Australia by HMAS Adelaide, HMAS ANZAC, HMAS Success, HMS Glasgow, and the HMNZS Te Kaha until they were joined under the protective umbrella of the USS Mobile Bay offshore. 38 In order for the 3rd RAR to land, the displaced East Timorese had to be moved away from the landing site. By the evening of the 21st nearly three thousand troops and their direct support equipment were ashore in East Timor. A similar operation was to take place twenty-four hours later at Baucau in the eastern half of East Timor. These rapid insertions required a significant air transport system to lift the troops and supplies from Darwin to East Timor. A composite Contingency Air Wing had been created by the Australians that included aircraft from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Thailand, the Philippines, and Germany. During each of the initial days of deployment a long line of transport aircraft shuttled nearly constantly from Darwin to Dili and back, often offloaded within only thirty minutes, with the propellers still turning. Royal Australian Air Force fighters provided escort and airborne deterrence.39 MANAGING INITIAL CHALLENGES

General Cosgrove and his senior contingent commanders had arrived in Comoro Airport around midday on the 20th, established the initial critical elements of command and control, and spent the first evening at the nearby heliport. But their real challenge was not just the establishment of control over their own arriving INTERFET units; it was the concurrent establish­ ment of their command process and the creation some form of coordination with the departing Indonesian forces. The management of this transition of control under the confusing circumstances in and around Dili was one of the most significant early accomplishments of the operation. Dili was a disaster area. Militia elements seemed to have free run of the streets, which were strewn with rotting debris, burning vehicles, and displaced people. Whole blocks of homes were destroyed and vandalized, as were the few businesses that were not under the direct control of the TNI forces.

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There was n o law and no order. It was easy t o blame either the TNI o r the militia for the deplorable conditions in the capital, but from the INTERFET perspective it was difficult to determine how culpable the Indonesians really were. It was only certain that what poor infrastructure had existed while UNAMET had been in the country had been largely destroyed after the pop­ ular consuhation.40 Rebuilding would be an important task after the estab­ lishment of true security but before any significant return of the displaced civilians could be accomplished. Ian Martin and several equally heroic members of his staff had flown back into Dili among the early morning flights of Aussies from Darwin. Their mandate was still technically in force, and they had also established real bonds with many Timorese and had a passionate dedication to helping them get back on their feet. UNAMET would do what it could to help until the UN could muster and deploy a full transition mission to Timor. Certainly there was far more to do than ever anticipated, since the post ballot violence had destroyed what little infrastructure had existed previously in East Timor. Like everyone else, the contingent commanders who accompanied Cos­ grove to Dili were struck by the extent of the devastation as they moved into the city in a school bus provided by the Indonesians and driven by TNI sol­ diers. Such an inauspicious mode of arrival made the senior INTERFET offi­ cers somewhat uncomfortable but reassured the local Indonesian forces that INTERFET was not an invasion force and was willing to coop erate wit h the TNI. Managing such perceptions was crucially important, as everyone­ INTERFET soldiers, TNI, militiamen and local Timorese family members­ was watching closely to see what would happen as INTERFET arrived. One accidental shot could have caused the eruption of an uncontrollable firefight among these various nervous factions during the early days of the operation. Another key issue that concerned Cosgrove was the delicate and complex business of dealing with the militias in Timor. He had to guarantee their human rights and maintain the rule of law, while still recognizing that the Indonesian government remained sovereign in Timor. Yet he could not tolerate further destruction and riotous behavior. He wrote later, "In an operation that was being broadcast to the world, our morale and ethical ascendancy was as important as our military superiority. "41 Such an approach depended greatly on the maturity of soldiers trained for war, yet capable of acting with flexibility and professionalism in an environment that was something very different from, but as dangerous as, war. To complicate matters, it was dear that the militias had no idea that circumstances had shifted significantly in the few hours since General Cosgrove first visited East Timor. General Cosgrove also knew instinctively that media relations were potentially one of his most important capabilities, and that his ongoing rela­ tionship with the TNI must be maintained. So he began on his first full day in the country a series of daily press conferences to inform the media and the

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82 Triumph of Self-Determination world about the state of affairs in Timor and the actions of INTERFET. These daily press conferences gave Cosgrove a vehicle for addressing issues and developing a pro active stance to emerging problems. He then linked the press conferences to joint meetings with General Syahnakrie and his staff (the two staffs forming together a "Joint Security Coordination Group" to address mutual points of concern). By accomplishing both events every day; he could reinforce effective coordination between INTERFET and the Indo­ nesians; as well as send the right messages to the world about activities in East Timor.42 Cosgrove's carefully crafted effort to coordinate the activities of his forces with those of the departing Indonesian troops was designed to ensure a balance of control within the area. It required restraint and calm firmness. Even as some .fighting erupted in the confusing situation around Dili on September 24 and 25 (between INTERFET troops and militia); Cosgrove still conducted his normal joint press conference on the 25th with General Syahnakrie to demonstrate that both leaders were working together to calm the situation. Cosgrove had to maintain some semblance of control while the TNI units that were supposedly maintaining security (and many of which were clearly abetting the militia cause and its operations) withdrew and INTERFET expanded; but he did not command the Indonesian forces and had little solid intelligence concerning the reaction of the militiamen. At all costs he had to prevent any "rogue" militia elements from gaining control of any gapped areas as the transfer of control proceeded. One such threat occurred during the third day of INTERFET operations in Timor. General Cosgrove had been advised that militia elements were continuing to threaten journalists in several areas of Timor. For their part; in their efforts to get useful stories; the members of the media were not using very good judgment. Two journalists went missing during September 22, and then one of them; a Dutchman named Sander Thoenes; was discovered murdered the next day.43 Cosgrove decided to view the body himself; and once on the scene, he confronted the Indonesian commander of the Dili garrison; a Colonel Geerhan; who also happened to be at the site with some of his troops. Cosgrove ensured that the Indonesian commander understood the need to preserve the crime scene, and that he, Cosgrove, was holding the TNI responsible for their security violations in Timor. Later the same day; he impressed upon the media their need for responsible behavior in such an uncertain environment and also discussed the incident with General Syahnakrie during their daily conference.44 The two generals agreed to form a joint investigation; with UN police assistance; to determine the facts in the murder. The incident showed much more than General Cosgrove's personal commitment to security in East Timor; it reinforced the responsibility of the TNI units; the rule of law; and the part journalists had to play in reestablishing a secure environment.

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Establishing some control over the chaos in East Timor was only the first step in bringing the crisis to a close. By the end of the first week of operations the primary units of INTERFET were firmly in place in the key zones of the country. The Indonesian forces had put up no resistance and were slowly but clearly moving to embark for a return to their bases. The militias did not immediately fight against INTERFET, but they did not negotiate either, so their role in the crisis remained a critical uncertainty. The people of East Timor adopted a friendly but apprehensive attitude toward the INTERFET operation. General Cosgrove had to quickly seize the initiative with his operations to make the future of East Timorese security absolutely clear.

Chapter 7 Stabilizing EastTimor

The first two phases of General Cosgrove's plan for Operation Stabilise focused on securing entry to and the lodgment of his forces in East Timor; those tasks were largely accomplished in Dili during the last week of September. Although a second lodgment site in Baucau and eventually a third in Suai would be established later, the essential sustainment port and airfield combination in Dili gave INTERFET the base of operations it needed to begin work. The third phase of Cosgrove's operation plan focused on the creation of a secure environment throughout East Timor prior to handing over control of the situation there to a United Nations peacekeeping force during the final phase of INTERFET operations. During each of the phases the security of the INTERFET forces was of paramount concern (for with­ out forces from contributing nations the mission could not be accomplished), but of nearly equal importance was the "facilitation of humanitarian aid to relieve the suffering of thousands of displaced East Timorese as quickly as possible. "1 Thus, INTERFET had to demonstrate determination and military power2 at all times while protecting its own personnel in the execution of security and humanitarian operations. From the very beginning General Cosgrove had formed a core war-fighting element of INTERFET's capability based upon the Australian, New Zealand, and British contingents. These forces he employed for initial security opera­ tions (largely formed around the Special Air Service units) and in the zones where the heaviest fighting was expected: first, in and around Dili, and then, in the western border region. In order to accomplish these actions, the INTERFET staff developed effective reconnaissance and surveillance and solid battle space awareness so that if either Indonesian or militia activities failed to match expectations, General Cosgrove had the information he needed to alter operations and move decisively. Decisive action was required if INTERFET was to gain

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and maintain the initiative and begin to take control in East Timor during October. Once the majority of the force was deployed into East Timor and stability operations began, General Cosgrove synchronized the efforts of all his multinational force contingents with deftness. It was the third phase that proved to be the most demanding. Cosgrove moved decisively on October 3, advancing into the western border region as his main effort ahead of sched­ ule in order to take advantage of an opportunity to isolate the opposing militia from its support. The other major contingents were employed to maximize their capabilities. For example, the contingents from the Philippines and Thailand were organized and trained for humanitarian assistance operations, so they were employed in the center of East Timor, where such efforts were most needed. Other contributions too small to be assigned inde­ pendent areas of operations were integrated into other forces (Canadian and Irish companies within the New Zealand battalion, for example), and capa­ bilities were centrally managed under New Zealand command to support all contingents. As special requirements were identified, individual nations applied the tools they had at hand; when General Cosgrove identified heavy-lift helicopter support as a critical requirement, for example, General Castellaw ensured that such capability was provided by elements of offshore American Marine Expeditionary Units. France, Portugal, Egypt, and Singapore provided hos­ pital support, and the Brazilians contributed a military police company. Several nations pro vided transport capability. All of these contributions were welded together to maximize the effectiveness of the whole force. Of even greater import within the imeroperability arena was the U.S. communications and intelligence support provided to General Cosgrove. The deployed Australian forces included robust communications at higher headquarters levels, but other coalition forces did not deploy such capabilities forward . This ereated a gap in eo mmand and eo ntro I eo verage that only the U.S. could fill. General Cos grove asked for and General Castellaw provided a Joint Task Force enabler communications package from the Marine Expeditionary Unit to supply immediate command and control capability for coalition forces in the eastern regions of East Timor.J Later, this immedi­ ate fix for command and control was replaced by a U.S. Army unit, Task Force Thunderbird, based o n the 86th Signal Battalion from Fort Huachuca, Arizona.4 In particular, several key assets, including Trojan Spirit, were located within the Dili command area to facilitate command and control for the American contingent of INTERFET.s OCTOBER: THE MONTH OF COHABITATION

One factor that really compounded the situation in East Timor during the early weeks of INTERFET operations was the uncertain morale of the

86 Triumph of Self-Determination Indonesian forces still assigned there. Since the invasion of 197 5 the In do ne­ sian army had been the primary link between Timor and Jakarta, and it was the TNI that had sustained what significant improvements Indonesia had brought to the province. Thousands of soldiers had served in the area, many on multiple tours of security and garrison duty. In the eyes of such soldiers, East Timor was as much a part of Indonesia as Hawaii was p art of the United States or the Falkland Islands part of Great Britain. To such soldiers the actions of the proindependence forces were rebellion and the result of the referendum was rejection of the sweat and blood they had shed over the long years since 19 75 . Many members of the Indonesian military had linle faith i n the judgment or leadership of President Habibie and viewed his decision to hold the refer­ endum as at the least a mistake and at the worst a violation of the law. For these people, the result of the referendum was likely to be rejected by the Indonesian National Assembly, which was to meet in October to review the process. Many senior Indonesian officers also expected their senior leaders, particularly General Wiranto, the defense minister, to speak out against Timorese independence. For these reasons many resident soldiers were confused about their duties in East Timor in relation to the INTERFET "invasion" force. Even more threatening to INTERFET was the fact that, even without the referendum result, the Indonesian forces in East Timor were at a very low ebb of morale. One reporter had gone so far as to label them " humbled, hesitant, embinered and eo nvu lsively violent. " 6 The TNI had o nee been the shield of the state and the source of real power in Indonesia, a country, after all, where all previous leaders had had military roots and where dwifungsi had been a way of life.In Indonesia the military had a dual role (dwifungsi) as a provider of security, and as a force for social development. Yet, by the summer of 1999, the TNI was viewed not with respect, but with suspicion, and its role in East Timor had been roundly criticized by world opinion. If the uncertain circumstances of INTERFET's arrival combined with the possibility of an Indonesian rejection of the referendum and the poor morale of the soldiers in the street, it was possible that the TNI could enter into open support for the militias and confrontation with INTERFET. General Cosgrove had secured the cooperation of the recently appointed commander in East Timor when he met with General Syahnakrie, but Syahnakrie's ability to control the individual TNI units all around the territory was far from certain. (He actually departed Timor on September 27, after a short and poorly coordinated "transfer-of-authority" ceremony with Cosgrove, leaving a TNI colonel and an Indonesian police brigadier in charge of the Indonesian forces left in East Timor, Jl Every day in September and October, until the TNI departed comp letely from the province, brought with it the potential for an explosive and highly detrimental confrontation between the armed soldiers on both sides.

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Even by the beginning of October, the United Nations force was starting, where possible, to stabilize East Timor. The reestablishment of essential security was not complete, but in limited areas UN efforts had already begun a return to more normal daily activities. The UNAMET Daily Briefing Summaries for October first recounted the commencement of large-scale distribution of food assistance, supported by water and sanitation provided by the International Committee oft he Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Doctors without Borders (MSF), OXFAM (originally Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) and ACF (Action against Hunger); eight out of the ten health facilities in Dili were fully functional, averaging between 20 and 180 p atients per day.8 Even Xanana Gusmao indicated that he would return to his native land within a few weeks. But most of East Timor was still out of the control of INTERFET, and much needed to be done before the safety and security of the local people could begin to ensured. After the arrival of the first company of the New Zealand Infantry Battalion Group in Dili, INTERFET began a large military operation on October 2 under the tactical command of Australian Brigadier Mark Evans9 designed to secure the western border region from incursions by armed militia forces based in West Timor. Militia leader Da Silva Tavares threatened to lead even more forces across the border in response, but the size and momentum of the INTERFET operation never allowed for the militia lead­ ership to develop a coordinated response and the border quickly came under INTERFET control. This effort to stabilize the western border was crucial because control of the border would significantly reduce the flow of men and supplies to the ami-INTERFET forces and would also establish the initial conditions for the return of the displaced Timorese huddled into crowded and disease-ridden camps in the western part of the island. The first UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) relief flight, loaded with seventeen metric tons of e mergency aid for displaced popula­ tions in West Timor, reached Kupang on October 4, with a second flight scheduled the following day. The supplies were intended to reduce the suffer­ ing in the makeshift camps in Kupang and Atambua. The UNHCR and the Indonesian government developed an agreement regarding the voluntary return of displaced people in West Timor to Dili, with the UN providing airlift for the first refugees back to East Timor during the first week of October. Meanwhile, the East Timorese began to move back to towns secured b y the multinational force, including Dare, Liqui�a, Baucau, Manatuto, Los Palos, and Corn-all of which were being p atrolled by INTERFET. Still, many thousands of refugees were rumored to still be hiding in the hills. On October 4, Kofi Annan formally recommended the establishment of a major UN effort to maintain law and order in East Timor and administer the territory for up to three years during its transition to independence. He proposed a UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

88 Triumph of Self-Determination that would include nearly 9,000 troops, 200 military observers, and over 1,500 police, as well as a large but unspecified number of civilian officials. This extended commitment by the United Nations was a particularly impor­ tant decision, as East Timor was almost totally dependent upon the good offices of the UN and its supporting nations if it was ever to develop the rudimentary foundation of a new nation. With the UN's extended commit­ ment, the East Timorese could at least depend on another three years of international support-critical development time to establish good governance and a semblance of economic development-once peace was restored. Symbolically, the first contingent of troops from Thailand began its transit to East Timor, using American C-1 7 transport aircraft, o n the same Monday. Although General Songkitti Jaggabatra had already visited Timor with General Cosgrove on September 19, he had left to prepare the Thai force and had made a useful stop in Jakarta on his way back. The Thai contingent of INTERFET eventually would expand to include over fifteen hundred troops, making it the second largest commitment among the supporting nations. Although the Thais deployed with restrictions limiting their military involvement to humanitarian operations (to be centered in and around the second major city of Timor, Baucau ), the force signaled important support from a major Asian neighbor and the troops added much in sheer numbers to INTERFET. 1 0 BORDER OPERATIONS AND FIRST C ONTACT WITH INDONESIA

Two days after the Thais began arriving, on October 6, two militiamen were killed and two Australian troops wounded in East Timor-the first fatal clash between the two sides since the international troops had been deployed in the territory. The militiamen were killed when they ambushed an INTERFET convoy near the town of Suai, nine miles from the border with lndonesian-controlled West Timor. The two Australian soldiers were not seriously injured and were e vacuated from the scene to Dili for stabiliza­ tion. The same day, INTERFET forces reached Maliana, where Australian soldiers were welcomed enthusiastically by several hundred locals, people who had hoped to see them a lot sooner. The refugees waved banners and flags as they lined the ruined streets to greet the troops with clenched-fist salutes and cries of " Freedom or death-viva East Timor." Though some were critical that the pace of INTERFET operations in East Timor was too slow, after only two weeks the situation in the area had clearly changed. Bishop Belo, who had fled in early September, returned on October 7, and Xanana Gusmao, who had only been freed from prison in Indonesia the month before, was on his way back as well. Refugees from West Timor began to return to their homeland, and several other nations

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added forces to the INTERFET coalition. The USS Belleau Wood sailed into Dili harbor, and INTERFET's new deputy force commander, Major General Songkitti of Thailand, arrived with the advance party of what was to become about fifteen hundred Thai troops. Those forces would bring the mission dose to its authorized strength of seventy-five hundred troops. All of these activities showed that a degree of security had certainly been restored in key parts of Timor. Still, much remained to be done. On October 8, for the first time since the intervention, the UNHCR airlifted 173 Timorese back to East Timor-the start of a program to return the estimated 230,000 displaced people from camps in West Timor. High Commissioner Sadako Ogata described the development as "an important first step, which we hope will lead tens of thousands of Timorese safely back to their homes . " 1 1 As with any conflict, the return of displaced civilians is a necessary precondition of the return to normality, for without the reestablishment of civic, tribal, and family bonds little development can take place. The same day, General Cosgrove met with the field commander of the proindependence forces, Taur Matan Ruak, known as TMR, to discuss peaceful integration of some militia forces into the INTERFET campaign. Cosgrove said, "I [discussed with him] for consideration and negotiation . . . a three-pronged approach to the overall plan that INTERFET will adopt in order to meet our mandate. " 12 Under Cosgrove's plan the first pillar would be a progressive laying down of arms, and linked to that, the second pillar would be a selective introduction into government service of those elements that demonstrated that they wished to participate in the nation­ building process. The third pillar required progress toward reconciliation between the warring parties that were at the heart of the dispute. General Cosgrove understood the important role that FALINTIL had played on the long road to Timorese independence. He also understood that FALINTIL would remain an important element of Timorese society, partic­ ularly as Xanana Gusmao was likely to play such a key role in the future governance of Timor. So, even though it was likely to be unpopular wit h the Indonesians, establishing and maintaining good working relations with TMR was another major step toward a stable foundation for the future Timorese state. 1 J Still, there remained some significant hurdles to overcome before INTER­ FET could ensure its mission in East Timor. For one thing, there were clear indications that members of the Indonesian special forces, the KOPASSUS, were still actively supporting the proindependence militia and actually conducting reconnaissance of INTERFET positions. 14 The Indonesian forces had not completed their withdrawal from East Timor, so the force ratios still indicated that Indonesia could have mounted a significant military counter to INTERFET operations in East Timor. As significant, it was clear that the militia forces still inside Timor posed an important irregular warfare

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threat-in other words, they could have mounted a significant guerrilla campaign against independence and against the UN efforts in Timor that would have really menaced INTERFET. The western border area was still not completely closed to reinforcement of the anti-UN effort in East Timor. Luckily, the newly elected Chairman of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Amien Rais, assured international officials o n Saturday, October 9, that the assembly would ratify the result of the UN-sponsored ballot: Indonesia would not fight the independence of East Timor. A summary report published by Keith B. Richburg in the Washington Post outlined the challenges quite well: The j o b is d aunting. In Dili, the ea pital, the central business district has been destroyed by fire, according to a preliminary U.N. assessment. All the banks have been b urned down, as have the restaurants. The markets are all gone. The destruction caused by militias and members of the Indonesia army angered by the independence vote was wide and severe, particularly in the western part of the territory. According to the U .N. assessment, M a liano is 80 percent destroyed, Balibo is 9 5 percent destroyed, Liq uica 60 percent destroyed, Glenois 80 percent destroyed, and Suai 90 to 95 percent destroyed, with " all major government buildings, . . . the fuel storage facility, water reservoir and marketplaces destroyed," according to the assessment. More than 80 percent of the territory's ci vi! servants, most of whom were Indonesian, have left-and that includes hospital staff, port workers, municipal employees and 87 percent of the teachers. There is no government, no co urt system, no legal system, no police. The only functioning j ustice system is that imposed by the Australian-led peacekeeping force, which has been detaining suspected militiamen and holding them for 72-hour periods . "This is no man's land now," said Ross Mountain, the U.N. humanitarian affairs coordinator, as he ticked off the problems facing the world body as it tries to shepherd East Timor toward nationhood . "This is about nation building," he said, and the incoming U.N. Transitional Authority for East Timor is "going to have to more or 1 ess run a eo untry with a ci vi! service that has been decimated. '115

Many other issues also remained for INTERFET in the coming weeks. In addition, General Cosgrove and his subordinates still had to worry about the real intentions of the Indonesians. On Sunday, October 1 0, an Indonesian policeman was killed in a border clash with INTERFET troops. As this was the first direct clash between Indonesians and INTERFET forces, it could have sparked a major confrontation between the two forces; luckily leaders from both sides maintained control.1 6 The incident occurred on the main road linking East and West Timor, one of many locations where the border was poorly marked. Officers traveling in an INTERFET convoy had exchanged fire with Indonesian forces, and in the resulting confusion over the exact location of the poorly marked border, the policeman was killed . The Indonesians were using a map dating from Dutch colonial times, which showed the border in a different place than that of the maps used by the UN,

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which dated from 1992. General Cosgrove and Indonesian Brigadier General Pol Sitorus later met to conduct an investigation at the site of the incident. Because of the incid em, TNI chief of staff, General Wiranto, visited the border area the following day and eventually added two thousand troops to the Indonesian forces in West Timor. On that same Sunday, two other critically important national contingents joined INTERFET: the New Zealanders and the Americans. The first full battalion group of New Zealand troops to join INTERFET in country (based on the 1st Royal New Zealand Infantry Battalion) poured into Suai, in southwestern East Timor, by air, land, and sea after a rapid mobilization and transit from their homeland that Sunday. By the end of the first day, the Kiwis had about 1 5 0 combat troops, four armored vehicles, and a number of trucks and other support vehicles operating on the ground. An advance party of Special Forces troops had been operating in the Suai area previ­ ously, which then moved on further west along the border with West Timor as the Kiwis arrived. The Kiwis joined the Australian 3rd Brigade commanded by Brigadier Evans and were quickly integrated into the INTERFET scheme of maneuver. Evans soon had both his Australian and New Zealand forces conducting heliborne operations throughout the western sector of INTERFET, searching for militiamen and working ever closer to securing the western border. The heliborne movements were supported by CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters of the U.S. Marne Corps off the USS Belleau Wood. INTERFET had been hampered by a shortage of heavy-lift helicopters because the Australian CH-46 medium­ lift helicopters were not available due to transport shortfalls. Australian Black Hawk helicopters had been flying nearly nonstop since the initial arrival of INTERFET, deploying troops and carrying supplies across East Timor, sup­ ported by a few early-arriving New Zealand UH-1 Huey helicopters. With the American CH-53 helicopters available to transport larger payloads of supplies and fuel, General Cosgrove was able to use his Black Hawks to deploy troops, including ready-reaction teams, to the western border. TACTICAL INTEROPERABILITY

Though most of the crucial military issues existed at the operational level of war, the operations in East Timor during this period also presented sev­ er al interoperability solutions at the tactical level that deserve mention. One of these was the functioning of the multinational battalion from New Zea­ land operating in the region around Suai. As mentioned previously, this battalion was formed around a Kiwi core unit from the 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (1st RNZIR), which had been acti­ vated for operations in East Timor on September 20, deployed to Townsville on October 12, and moved into Su ai during the third week of October. 1 7 For these Kiwis, this was a hugely significant event-the first time since the

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Korean War that a full battalion group had been deployed for operations. Once deployed, they quickly became a very capable tactical force. In East Timor the battalion operated within the Australian brigade com­ manded by Mark Evans; more interesting, the group integrated a Canadian company, a platoon of Irish Rangers, Australian communications and intel­ ligence assets, and eventually a Fijian company into its structure, finally swelling to over a thousand personnel. 1 8 Its area of operations, surrounding the devastated town of Suai, encompassed nearly seventeen hundred square kilo meters; yet even with the elements of six nations operating under a very lean tactical headquarters, the battalion group conducted operations very successfully. This battalion, along with its sister Australian battalions within the 3rd Brigade, was assigned to the region where the militia threat remained significant through the entire INTERFET operation. Within its area of oper­ ations, it encountered some two hundred armed militiamen. In addition to conducting security patrols, the unit also repatriated over thirty thousand refugees and responded to five live-fire incidents. Several keys to the successful integration of multiple nations within a tactical unit were in evidence in the Kiwi battalion group. First, the tradi­ tional working relationship and common equipment base of Australia and New Zealand made for easy integration of the Kiwi battalion within the Aussie brigade structure, and the commanders all had similar backgrounds and educational experiences. Second, the common language and similar heritage was a critical aid to successful cooperation at the company level. Third, the battalion staff had conducted thorough command post exercises with the Australians to ensure that communications and command procedures would work efficiently. Finally, the professionalism of the soldiers made development of normal operating procedures fairly easy once in East Timor. At the tactical level, technical issues can often be the root of operational problems. The equipment provided from New Zealand was functional, but a bit outdated. It was augmented by Australian resources and, in a more specialized way, by U.S. logistics support, particularly using heavy-lift heli­ copters. The multinational battalion conducted operations in a very austere environment with few, if any, technological advantages over its adversary; yet it did so effectively using all the national assets involved because of a solid common command, control, and communications foundation. In one respect, the experiences of the 1st RNZIR make a case for minimization in technology where multinational operations are to be conducted at the tactical level. INTERFET COALITION OPERATIONS

The second major contingent to arrive that weekend was the American force, under the command of Brigadier General John Castellaw. Castellaw's largely U .S. Marine command was primarily drawn from the Ill Marine

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Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa, Japan, but it would grow to include units from the U .S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Air Force (based primar­ ily in Australia). The American force was to be based on the assault ship Belleau Wood, in Dili harbor, with only a small headquarters ashore located in a former schoolhouse. 19 But the U .S. force provided mu eh more that transport helicopters and a superpower flag among the multinational colors of INTERFET. With the deployment of U .S. forces to East Timor, General Cosgrove had much more political leverage over the more numerous Indonesian forces. He could also take advantage of important aspects of U.S. technology, including command and control, and communications assets and sensors. By mid October, the international coalit ion supporting INTERFET in East Timor numbered twenty-five nations but included widely varying levels of support from the countries involved. Several nations deployed forces to add to the Australian brigade (which by then included some 4,500 troops, light helicopters, and the HMAS Jervis Bay and HMAS Tobruk). Brazil had deployed 50 military policemen, plus an infantry company and logistical support. Canada sent 600 troops, plus infrastructure and logistical support, the HMCS Protector (replenishment ship), and a C-130 aircraft. Fiji had committed 1 80 soldiers. Finland had donated $1 million in aid. The French had deployed a company of special forces troops, the frigate Vendemiaire, and an assault landing ship with some light helicopters from nearby New Caledonia. The British had contributed 270 Gurkhas and the HMS Glasgow and had donated $5 million. Malaysia had a team of military officers already in INTERFET and planned for a battalion of 800-1,000 soldiers. New Zealand had given the tanker HMNZS Endeavour, the frigate HMNZS Te Kaha, and 800 troops. Norway sent 5 officers to the INTERFET staff. Portugal had deployed a 71 -member medical team with three ambulances, three logistical support/command vehicles, and a rear-area field hospital (but no combat troops) to Darwin on September 1 7 . The Republic of Korea sent over 200 combat troops and a similar number of medical staff, engineers, and communications specialists. Singapore deployed 2 1 medical personnel plus required logistical support and some military observers, 250 military personnel, and two landing ships. The United States had over 450 servicemen supporting INTERFET, mainly to provide airlift, communications, and intelligence; additionally the USS Mobile Bay (the Aegis cruiser) and the USNS Kilauea remained, along with the helicopter carrier Belleau Wood with four CH-53 helicopters, which were also providing direct support. Four American C-130 Hercules transport aircraft were deployed in Australia for airlift support at the long end of a strategic transportation link that assisted with the arrival of several of the other international contingents. The U .S. also committed $55 million for peacekeeping support Thailand had already deployed its 33-member advance team, which was to be followed by over 1,500, soldiers, including engineers and security

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officers, medical teams, and psychological warfare experts. Argentina, Bangladesh, and Pakistan had also promised troops. The People's Republic of China had promised civilian police. Germany had promised a medical group and humanitarian aid. Italy had indicated it would deploy 600 infan­ trymen, including 200 paratroops, an amphibious naval unit, and a trans­ port aircraft, plus logistics support and two ships. Japan pledged $2 million in aid to refugees (principally through the UNHCR and the World Food Programme), as well as logistics support. The Republic of the Philippines pledged an initial team of some 200 doctors, dentists, and army engineers, to be followed by 1,200 more support troops and 120 special forces troops (provisionally to be stationed in Baucau). Sweden was to send 10 civilian police plus $ 1 .2 million in aid. Taiwan promised unspecified relief aid as well. The solicitation, coordination, and integration of differing contributions from nations around the globe became one of the key accomplishments of Australia as the lead nation of INTERFET. The management of this process was also clearly one of the key lessons learned for any future international or United Nations-sponsored operation in the future. Few people realize the complexity of the coordination task in bringing such a wide array of forces to gether, let alone the equally d ifficuit task of actually inregrating the forces on the ground, once they arrive in the area of operations. THE D EVELOPMENT OF UNTAET AND TRANSITION

The bulk of the INTERFET personnel and equipment were in East Timor by mid October, and with some effective security at the border established and the militia units cut off from their sources of support, the focus of operations changed to the development of internal security and the facilitation of humanitarian objectives. Thousands of internally displaced people had yet to return to East Timor, and its shattered infrastructure had to be restored before normal life could return to the people of the region. Still, General Cosgrove had developed the capability within the INTERFET force to plan and execute two types of maneuver simultaneously: security operations and humanitarian assistance. Both were crucial to East Timor. Humanitarian operations could be accomplished by military forces and could even be done concurrently with stability operations meant to reinforce the security in an area-but both kinds of operations put a premium on certain types of equipment and capabilities. First among these capabilities was transportation. East Timor was an underdeveloped area with harsh terrain and few modern roads. The population of the area was distributed in a variety of small towns that all required immediate resupply of basic food and essential services. INTERFET was nearly hobbled by a lack of medium trucks capable to moving soldiers and their equipment while also supplying the huge quantt i ies of supplies needed by

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the local population. That lack of transport made the helicopter support available to General Cosgrove particularly important-for with helicopters to move his men and material; he could devote every available truck and conveyance to supplying the needs of the population. Medical support and basic communications equipment were also in short supply but were impor­ tant to ensure the well-being of the East Timorese. Although nongovern­ mental organizations (NGOs) were present in East Timor to aid the people; it was the UN (and the UNHCR primarily) and INTERFET that provided the great bulk of assistance needed to restore some sense of normal life to the area. With the arrival of more multinational forces to expand INTERFET's capabilities; General Cosgrove completed plans at mid month to push to the eastern sector of East Timor and into the Oecussi enclave. Security could not yet be taken for granted; though. On Sunday; October 17; INTERFET reconnaissance forces outside Balibo; near the still-tense western border; were engaged by a group of up to twenty armed militiamen and had to fight an intense action in order to break contact. Colonel Mark Kelly;20 the very ab le INTERF ET chief of staff; commented; "In the contact; three militia men were killed and we believe three were injured; absolutely no INTERFET personnel were injured ."21 The size of the opposing force and the intensity of the action reminded everyone that the militia threat was quite real. In fact; local reporters quoted a militia commander saying; " We must be ready to fight and die for integration; it is our right to have part of East Timor and the world must acknowledge this and not just recognize the pro-independence. "22 POLITICS AND MILITARY ACTION

No military operation can be viewed in isolation from the political and diplomatic actions of the nations involved; and mid October was an impor­ tant period at the national level in ways that were clearly felt by forces in East Timor. Events in Timor and in Indonesia coincided to change the political landscape significantly. Xanana Gusmao; who traveled widely after leaving his Jakarta prison and met with many individuals involved in the Timorese independence effort; decided to reject power-sharing overtures with the militia leadership; indicating that he wanted a clean break from the ongoing strife in the area. Even more important; the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly rejected President Habibie and elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the president of Indonesia ahead of Megawati Sukarnoputri on October 20. Immediately afterward the assembly voted to approve the results of the East Timorese referendum.n Thus a n entirely new governmental structure was likely in East Timor. Indonesia's national election could not have come at a more inopportune time for President Habibie. Only in o ffice since May 1998; Habibie had

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little to do with the circumstances in East Timor but had opened the door for the referendu m in a surprise move designed only to vent the building pressure over Indonesian rule there. The assembly that ended his service had only been chosen the previous June, in the first nationwide ballot in many years. His rejection by the consultative assembly and his eventual resigna­ tion foreshadowed significant changes in the Indonesian government­ indicative of the pressure the intervention of UN forces in East Timor was exerting on the already fragile Indonesian government system.24 Habibie had always been a weak leader and the Indonesian democracy was under significant stress as Wahid took power. Wahid was a prominent Muslim cleric, so he brought an important level of religious credibility with him to office. However, he was nearly blind and in weak health, having previously suffered a stroke. His selection would turn out to be good for East Timor, but it continued the series of unpredictable decisions that had made all of 1999 so tumultuous for the Indonesian archipelago. The transfer of national power to Wahid on October 21 in Jakarta was the first true democratic transition in Indonesian history. Some limited violence in the streets of the Indonesian capital demonstrated that many Indonesians believed Megawati should have been elected, but Wahid was wise enough to assume power with her at his side and quickly moved to make Sukarno 's daughter his vice president. Wahid's victory gave Indonesia " a clean break with the past in a moderate form . . . , and gave the world's most populous Islamic nation its first cleric as a leader."25 His victory sur­ prised almost everyone, and his time in office would certainly be difficult. Prominent economist Emil Salim noted, " Now we have a newborn baby; giving birth involved some pain and some blood but now a new Indonesia is born."26 In a similarly momentous but much more energetic move, on October 22, the East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao returned to East Timor for the first time in seven years ( most of which time he had been imprisoned in Jakarta for his political activities). He was flown from Darwin, Australia, to Baucau by the Australian military, which then took him to Dili by helicopter. That first morning back in his homeland, he gave an emo­ tional address (still in uniform) in Tetum, the local language, to thousands of local supporters in downtown Dili. "All of our suffering, " he said, "we can leave behind. Today, we see our future. This land is ours." Gusmao broke into sobs and his supporters wept and cheered during his emotional homecoming.27 Xanana Gusmao was much more than a resistance leader to the Timorese and his return was an important first step in the transition of power, through a local democratic process, to indigenous Timorese.28 One of his key tasks would have to be the reintegration and reconciliation of the militias. Gusmao had said they were not welcome in government but could return if they were willing to face up to their crimes. He was the one leader widely respected by

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both sides; militia leaders often spoke to him before the referendum and he had managed to maintain contact with leaders of both sides even from his jail cell throughout the upheaval in September. The same day that Gusmao returned, INTERFET forces landed in the East Timorese enclave of Oecussi (Ambino ) to pave the way for delivery of humanitarian aid. The enclave, which was surrounded by the Indonesian territory of West Timor, was expected to have been the site of numerous killings. INTERFET detained about 40 militiamen and disarmed them of knives, swords, and pipe guns during the first day of operations there. U N forces found only 2,500 people, perhaps 6 percent o f the original population. UN sources thought some 40,000 people once lived in Oecussi, so much speculation centered on the forcible deportation of residents to West Timor. On the humanitarian front, the fust return of displaced people by boat was carried out that same day. Nearly 2,000 people, accompanied by staff members from UNHCR. completed the ten-hour journey from Kupang, West Timor, to Dili a board a boat chartered by the Internationa I Organization for Migration (IOM). In a momentous decision, the United Nations Security Council p assed its Resolution 1272 on October 25, 1999, formally establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to replace and continue the work of INTERFET. (See Appendix D for the full text of UNSCR 1272.) This was both a signal of the initial success of INTERFET and, even more important, the continued commitment of the United Nations in East Timor. U NTAET was to be led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and would comprise three main components: a governance and public administration section; a humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation section; and a military component. Civilian police would be part of the governance and public administration component with a strength of up to 1,640 officers. The military component had a planned strength of up to 8,950 troops and nearly two hundred military observers. Australia immediately indicated it would continue its participation in the military component with over two thousand troops. The last week of October was eventful in several ways. INTERFET forces conducted heliborne operations into the Oecussi enclave to secure the final major objective of the security operation and worked through the last significant pocket of resistance in the center of East Timor. Perhaps most important, Indonesian forces began their phased withdrawal back to Indonesia during the same week.29 The government of Indonesia formally recogni zed East Timor's independence on October 19, and Indonesia's twenty-four years of ruling East Timor formally ended on Thursday, October 29, through a letter informing the U nited Nations of J akarta's decision to relinquish all legal claims to the territory. Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations Makarim Wibisono presented the letter from President Wahid to Kofi Annan in New York.

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The last groups of Indonesian troops in East Timor departed on the last day of October, ending the decades-long occupation A C-130 Hercules transport plane carrying seventy-five air force and special services troops lifted off from Dili airport in the late afternoon, and a tank-landing ship left the city's harbor after dark the same night. General Cosgrove, acting Special Representative of the Secretary General ian Martin of UNTAET, and Xanana Cusmao were all three on hand to say farewell. After a short ceremony at the airport, Gusmao commented, " I feel the same as I felt on August 30, a sense of acquiring our rights to be free and to be independent. It ends the historica I errors and mistakes between two co untries turned enemies . " 30 The next day, thousands of East Timorese filled the streets of Dili to celebrate an annual Sunday religious ceremony. Crowds lined the harbor as a procession led by Bishop Belo followed behind a statue of the Virgin Mary mounted on an INTERFET vehicle. The Lady of Fatima procession of priests, young girls, and elderly men to mark the anniversary of an apparition of the Virgin Mary in Portugal began opposite the just-deserted downtown barracks formerly used by the Indonesian military. NOVEMBER: OUT OF THE YOKE

The months of November and D ecember were the first months since 1975 that the people of East Timor were free from Indonesian control. Though they remained technically under United Nations supervision and were realistically subject to the decisions made by General Cosgrove, the East Timorese were free for the first time since 1975 and were actually more capable of changing their fate than they had ever been in their history. The last weeks of 1999 laid important foundation stones for eventual East Timorese independence. During the last two months of the year INTERFET forces took control of Atauro Island, ventured into the Ambeno enclave, conducted extensive humanitarian assistance missions throughout East Timor, and still main­ tained a ctive security patrols in larger and larger segments of East Timor. Still, though, firefights with militia forces occurred in Alto Lebos, Motaain, Aid ab asala, Balibo, and Memo. Humanitarian assistance and repatriation became the early priorities for INTERFET and other U nited Nations organizations in East Timor as the month went on and security steadily improved. Still, though, thousands of displaced Timorese were held in camps in West Timor, and members of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees organization actually conducted several raids across the border to rescue and return some five thousand of the displaced. Those convoys were frequently met with rifle fire from militiamen, and the UN complained bitterIy to the Indonesian government. General Cosgrove intervened to improve the lack of coordination evident at the border, and eventually

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a technical agreement was signed with the new administration in Indonesia on November 22 outlining improved procedures for control at the border. During the first week of November; General Cosgrove committed A Company; the 2 nd Battalion of the Royal Gurkha Rifles (a reinforced com­ pany of some two hundred); to duty in the Ambeno enclave in West Timor. Along with several internally-displaced-persons (IDP) camps in Ambeno; West Timor; held thousands of people who had fled the earlier violence in their neighborhoods in East Timor. On November 8; a battalion-sized unit of six hundred Philippine soldiers arrived in Timor to reinforce the Philippine Humanitarian Support Mission to East Timor (PHILHSMET); which was deployed for civic action duties in the area south and east of Dili. The focused use of some national contingents that were not empowered with sufficient rules of engagement to conduct offensive military actions in East Timor did not in any way limit their usefulness during the mostly assistance-oriented phase of INTERFET operations. The following day Akira Takahashi of Japan received his appointment as the Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian Assistance and Emer­ gency Rehabilitation of UNTAET. Rehabilitation would require extensive efforts across the spectrum of human needs in East Timor over the following year. The normally sparse agriculture of the island had suffered greatly; infrastructures damage was significant; and the displacement of so many civilians had caused great disruptions to normal services such as education and trade. Already in early November; the UN Development Program (UNDP) had launched a new program to repair some sixty power stations that delivered electricity to the entire population of East Timor; and in an attempt to beat the onset of the rainy season; the UN World Food Programme (WFP) sponsored an aggressive effort to feed those returning from West Timor and the thousands who had been internally displaced; but much more improvement was needed to bring the region back to prerefer­ endum levels of productivity. Meanwhile; d isplaced persons continued to stream back into East Timor by air; land; and sea. Through the middle of November; the security situation in East Timor began to stabilize; and the conditions needed to facilitate the repatriation of the area's displaced inhabitants began to come together. The Gurkha mission in the Ambeno enclave was particularly effective; in p art because they were able to expand their security area more rapidly than expected due to their easy acceptance by the local people and lack of militia opposition. The Gurkhas won the confidence of the local people and reassured them that it was safe to return to their homes. The repatriation of thousands from the Ambeno enclave was eventually completed by the end of the month. Previously; IDP returns had been extremely slow due to the effectiveness of the militia intimidation and propaganda that deterred the refugees from going home. Yet reports at mid month indicated growing numbers of IDPs were returning home from areas around Kupang and Butan. This was

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a strong indication that the militia strategy designed to sow fear and lessen confidence in the UN administration in East Timor was crumbling. (The other reason returns increased was the approach of the rainy season and the need to work the fields in a primarily agricultural society.) On November 16) in the first positive act of Indonesian military cooperation with INTERFET) TNI troops arrested three militiamen after they threatened to assault members of the UNHCR who were assisting in repatriation efforts at the Noelbaki camp) some twenty kilo meters outside Kupang. Unfortunately) militia harassment directed at unprotected IDPs was still being reported and would continue out of the sight of Indonesian and INTERFET military forces for weeks. On November 1 7) the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-G eneral in East Timor and Transitional Administrator for U NTAET, Sergio Vieira de Mello) formally assumed his duties by meeting with General Cosgrove and Xanana Gusmao. Vieira de Mello was an extremely well respected senior member of the United Nations staff, having previously spent the majority of his career working for the United Nations High Com­ missioner for Refugees and having served with distinction as the Special Envoy of the High Commissioner for Cambodia, the Director of Repatriation for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the Head of Civil Affairs of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), and the United Nations Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In 1996 he had been appointed as the United Nations Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees) before being named in January 1998 as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Vieira de Mello was a Brazilian who spoke fluent English and native Portuguese) which gave him excellent relations with many influential Timorese. He was exactly the right man for the difficult task as chief UN official in East Timor.31 General Cosgrove had worked alongside Ian Martin for nearly two months before Vieira de Mello arrived in Dili. Technically, Cosgrove had a unique mandate and did not work for either Martin or Vieira de Mello, yet it was obvious to everyone that the three men had to work well together if any of them were to succeed. General Cosgrove knew that Vieira de Mello would be the person who actually established the condit ions that would allow INTERFET to hand over its mission to a follow-on military competent within his own UNAMET organization, and Vieira de Mello recognized that INTERFET's ability to keep the peace was a prerequisite for UNAMET's effectiveness. Luckily, both men got along very well and formed an extremely good team. Cosgrove admired Vieira de Mello's "clear and practical grasp of the strategic direction for UNAMET" and "his skilled diplomat's appreciation of the subtleties) nuances and dynamics of the political terrain, both within East Timor society and among the international community. " 32

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On the same day, November 17, INTERFET formally declared all roads in East Timor secure and open for unrestricted travel. Military escorts were no longer required for humanitarian aid convoys, which had expanded to include shipping grain to fields for planting and agricultural tool kits by air, land, and sea. Later, World Vision personnel traveled throughout north­ western East Timor to hand out thousands of sacks, each £.lied with five­ kilogram bags of high-yield seed corn and up to seven kinds of vegetable seeds. Along with World Vision, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), CARE (Cooperative for Relief Everywhere), and Oikos (the International Student Organization for Sustainable Economics and Management) were the five main aid agencies involved in the seed dis­ tribution effort. Returning IDPs were filling the roads as well, since thou­ sands were moving back to their homes every day. The World Health Organization and other NGOs began to combat the effects of posttraumatic stress among the East Timorese. In a turnabout illustrating the shift of power in the local areas, members of the militias who had terrorized neighborhoods in September themselves became the targets of returning refugees seeking revenge in November. Even in Dili, INTERFET soldiers rescued three sus­ pected militiamen from a local mob during an attack at a transit center. By mid month, J apanese government officials had committed to a sizable financial reconstruction package for East Timor and had decided to send three C-130 military transport planes to carry food, medicine, and other necessary supplies to Kupang, in West Timor from Surabaya on Indonesia's Java Island, for three months, to aid in the repatriation effort. The Japanese government had also agreed to host a conference designed to generate even more support for the East Timorese in mid December. Xanana Gusmao hap­ pily agreed to attend. Meanwhile Jose Ramos-Horta, still vice president of the National Council of the Timorese Resistance, and Vieira de Mello met in Lisbon in a conference where they agreed upon many of the priorities for use of the international support to East Timorese assistance. Some progress was evident by the end of November. Signs of normal life were beginning to return; schools were reopening, the local markets were trading, basic foodstuffs such as rice were being distributed, and streetlights were coming on in the major towns. Some forty nongovernmental agencies were present and operating in East Timor, most with some coordination from INTERFET, the United Nations, or Gusmao's National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT). Still, with much activity and much more needed, the inevitable squabbles over prioritization and allocation of funds began to become a more visible problem. At least security was improved and the international force levels within INTERFET were coming to com­ pletion. As a consequence, General Cosgrove was able to release some of the forces that had been pulling so hard for INTERFET since early September; he said good-bye to his contingent of Gurkhas on November 20, after sixty days of superb service in both Dili and Oecussi.33

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President Wahid promised U.S. President Clinton in November that he would order Indonesia's air force to aid in the repatriation of East Timorese refugees from West Timor, where human rights groups were alleging many Timorese were being intimidated and abused by militias. At the time some two hundred thousand East Timorese refugees were believed to still be in Indonesian-controlled West Timor, and aid organizations were lamenting the potential threat of disease and starvation from prolonged stays in camps. Although the number of displaced people was eventually proven to be lower, aid organizations were extremely concerned about their ability to care for so many people away from their own homes and community networks. As humanitarian assistance began to improve, other problems gained more visibility. After the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, brokered an agreement between the major parties to speed up repatriation of the East Timorese refugees during his visit to Indonesia and Timor, on November 22, UNTAET chief Vieira de Mello traveled to West Timor to witness the signing of the agreement between representatives of INTERFET and the Indonesian Armed Forces specifically designed to improve the return of refugees from West Timor.34 At the time, the UNHCR was reporting that despite continued threats by militia forces, more than ninety thousand refugees had returned to East Timor; yet thousands more were still thought to be held on the western side of the border. The return of displaced Timorese remained a difficult point of contention between Indonesian officials and UNTAET for weeks to come, but the agreement did stimulate a significant increase in those returning. The November creation of East Timor's first independent newspaper, Suara Timor Timur (Voice of East Timor), also served as a significant step in the country's development. Establishing an independent East Timorese press posed a daunting challenge, but it was key to building an East Timorese civil infrastructure and some degree of national consensus. The major chal­ lenges that had to be overcome included building a press corps, developing respect for a free press, and empowering a responsible readership. With so many past and present threats driving rumors, creating a democratic East Timorese political infrastructure needed a free press to assist in informing and educating the people. As a result of Holbroke's negotiated agreement and all the recent attention on the IDPs in West Timor, on November 24 UNTAET's Vieira de Mello, Xanana Gusmao, and members of his CNRT party toured the Oecussi enclave together. At the same time Indonesian vice president Megawati toured West Timor in the Atamb ua area with members of the Indonesian cabinet and senior Indonesian military leaders. International scrutiny required that both the Indonesian government and the senior officials in East Timor understand the conditions in West Timor personal involvement helped to cement the agreements that improved the flow of people back to their neighborhoods in East Timor.

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At the same time they were working to improve the plight of the IDPs, Vieira de Mello and Gusmao were £nishing work on an agreement to form an UNTAET/CNRT Transition Advisory Council comprising East Timorese leaders to work with the UN authorityY Such a council not only contributed East Timorese ideas to the development of the area, but it also helped mature the experience and judgment of some of the East Timorese who would be involved in the development of their new nation. The fostering of good gov­ ernance where there has been little such precedent is always an important step in reconstruction operations, so the work of the Transition Advisory Council was more important than most people realized. Xanana Gusmao followed up on the visit and the council's creation with an emotional appeal for East Timorese refugees in Indonesia, especially in West Timor, to return home quickly to help the " rebirth" of their nation. In late November the East Timor Human Rights Commission's general eo-coordinator, Isabel da Costa Fereira, revealed the commission had dis­ covered some 350 bodies in Dili and two other cities.36 Many reporters and some government officials were already describing evidence of systematic killing and a cover-up by the Indonesian military and police and the militias. There was strong evidence of killings beginning about September 6 and con­ tinuing well into the second and third weeks of September. Fereira noted that many of the bodies were stuffed in drains, dumped in wells, buried in shallow graves, and charred in burnt buildings. Some postulated that those bodies found had simply been missed by the TNI in their own cleanup before INTERFET arrived. A YEAR OF MOMENTOUS CHANG ES

Improvements in governance began to take a high priority in December 1999. First, No bel laureate and future prime minister Jose Ramos-Horta returned to his home in East Timor for the first time on December 1 , after nearly twenty-five years of exile. (Ramos-Horta had left East Timor only days before Indonesia invaded his homeland. ) And even more important, on December 2, Vieira de Mello established the first National Consultative Council (NCC) for East Timor. The first NCC consisted of eleven East Timorese and four UNTAET members, and it was charged with overseeing the decision­ making process cl uring the transition period leading to the amicipared natio na I independence. "The NCC was consulted on and consented to a series of urgent regulations required to estab !ish effective administration in the Terri­ tory. These included: setting up a legal system, re-establishing a judiciary, setting an official currency, creating border controls, taxation, and creating a first consolidated budget for East Timor. "37 This was the beginning of a true, representative East Timorese government, and its foundation at such an early period helped develop a baseline of credible representative govern­ ment from which the Timorese could later develop their own institutions.

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With all the good that was slowly developing in the region, there were still a host of problems that needed to be addressed before real healing could begin in Timor. The most obvious of these was placing responsibility for the terrible events that had been endured by the Timorese people during the previous summer. For many people, the Indonesian government-and most specifically the Indonesian military leadership stationed in Timor-was the easiest target of responsibility. In fact, in the fust week of December, the Sydney Morning Herald published a story wherein prointegration militia leader John Marquez admitted that he had killed unarmed civilians on the direct orders of the TNI during the August referendum.3 8 Other press accounts in both Australian and Indonesian media implicated Indonesian generals Timbul Silean and Tono Suratman in the violence. Some accusations reached as high as General Wiranto, the TNI commander. The Indonesian chairman of the Commission for the Investigation of Human Rights Ab uses in East Timor, Albert Hasibuan, made similar charges based upon the initial findings of his commissioners.39 Members of the UN tribunal looking into the same accusations also indicated they had seen evidence of " gross human rights violations. "40 At mid month Sergio Vieira de Mello traveled to Jakarta to hold a series of top-level meetings. He discussed future relations between East Timor and Indonesia with Indonesia's president, Abdurrahman Wahid, as well as the country's foreign and defense ministers, the minister overseeing East Timor, and the governor of the Central Bank. Vieira de Mello focused on the security of commercial transit routes, the return of refugees, and the protection of East Timorese savings accounts in Indonesian banks. He also invited the Indonesian president to visit East Timor in the near future. Later, on December 17, a crucial United Nations donor conference was held in Tokyo, which resulted in over $520 million pledged b y member states to help rebuild East Timor. United Nations and World Bank experts estimated that East Timor would require between $260 million and $300 million for reconstruction over the medium term; the promises of money had to be kept, but strong international economic support was crucial for a state with so little productivity of its own, and the donor conference result was more than heartwarming. Still, However, much more than funding remained to be done if Timor was to return even to prereferendum stability. Still, much had been accomplished in the few short months since August. By the end of the year, the necessary conditions for UNTAET to begin its mission had been accomplished, with the exception of some continued, but episodic, militia activity. First General Cosgrove and later Sergio Vieira de Mello had both skillfully maneuvered the militia forces out of East Timor and begun setting the foundation stones for a new nation of East Timor.

Chapter 8 Building a New Nation

Transitional administrations represent the most complex operations attempted by the United Nations. The operations in East Timer and Kosovo are commonly seen as unique in the history of the UN-perhaps never to b e repeated.1

General Cosgrove's heroic actions and the considerable accomplishments of the military forces deployed by the supporting member nations of the INTERFET coalition did much to restore order in East Timor in the fall of 1999. And Sergio Vieira de Mello's management of the early deploying portions of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (U NTAET) had established a solid framework for the critical foundation stones of peace and security there by the end of the year. But, in January 2000, mu c h more work still needed to be done before a credible national election could be held and the basis of an East Timorese state could be constructed. These activities were to be conducted with United Nations support through UNTAET, once that organization was fully fielded and military command in Timor was shifted from INTERFET to the UNTAET peacekeeping force commander. The two-year UNTAET transition period from 2000 to 2002 remains much less well known than the intervention phase of UN operations in Timor but was, in fact, the key to the successful creation of the new East Timorese nation. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR

UNTAET had been offic ially established on October 25, 1999, to administer the territory of East Timor, exercise legislative and executive authority during

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Triumph of Self-Determination

the transition period, and support capacity building for self-government. UNTAET was led by a team of international specialists similar in structure to the structures preceding it and consisted of three components: a gover­ nance and public administration component, a civilian police component, and a military component (an armed United Nations peacekeeping force, of equivalent size to INTERFET) . In addition, significant humanitarian assis­ tance and rehabilitation capabilities were incorporated within UNTAET's structure. UNTAET activities were to be financed b y the $520 million pledged by supporting nations during the Tokyo donors' meeting on East Timor the previous December. The Special Representative of the UN Secre­ tary-General was, of course, Sergio Vieira de Mello of Brazil, who had arrived the previous No vember, and the UN military commander was ini­ tially Lieutenant General Jaime de Ios Santos of the Philippines, the deputy commander of INTERFET.2 The authorized maximum strength of UNTAET was 9,150 military personnel and 1,640 civilian police.3 Still, the capabili­ ties needed to make UNTAET function were not as rapidly transported on-site as was the initial INTERFET military force, and it was to take until February 2000 for UNTAET to be fully ready to execute its mandate in East Timor. UNTAET had been granted significant power by its mandate from the United Nations. It had overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice. UNTAET's mandate specifically consisted of six elements: ( 1 ) providing security and maintaining law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; (2) establishing an effective administration; (3) assisting in the development of civil and social services; (4 ) ensuring the coordination and delivery of humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development assistance; ( 5 ) supporting capacity building for self­ government; and finally, (6) assisting in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. In simple terms, UNTAET was to act as the midwife for a new East Timorese state. As Kofi Annan later noted, "The mandate given by the Security Council . . . to establish a national civil administration, assist in the development of civil and social services and support capacity-building for self-government was unprecedented."4 UNTAET was the de jure government of East Timor. Since the referendum, the focus of effort by the United Nations in East Timor had been restoring stability. Clearly, UNTAET's mandate had much more expansive goals and would take very different skills to accomplish. In order to complete the administrative, capacity-building, and development tasks, UNTAET had been authorized a much more extensive civilian staff than had INTERFET; these civilian staffers brought valuable experi­ ence from other conflict areas, and their efforts expanded UNTAET activities into a host of economic, cultural, and civic areas unaddressed by INTERFET.

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UNTAET can be viewed structurally as having three major subcompo­ nents or pillars: a military component, a humanitarian component, and an administrative, or governance, component. 5 The humanitarian component, known within UNTAET as the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER) pillar, was directed by Akira Takahashi of Japan. Its primary function was to coordinate the efforts of the many relief organiza­ tions bringing aid to the Timorese. Initially, the primary effort in emergency relief was the delivery of food and essential commodities, which in Timor was greatly complicated by the poor infrastructure, made even worse by the August-September violence. The major work of the HAER pillar continued for well over a year, until the end of 2000. The second, and more enduring, pillar of UNTAET was the Governance and Public Administration (GPA) component, directed b y Jean-Christian Cady of France, who was also the deputy to Sergio Vieira de Mello. The primary functions of the GPA were reestablishing government institutions at the central and district levels of government, reestablishing the rule of law, regenerating public utilities (which had been devastated), and encouraging public sector development. 6 Although the roles of the military and humani­ tarian components of UNTAET are largely self-evident and common to many interventions, the crucial importance of the GPA mission is far less well understood. Ultimately, it is effective governance and economic develop­ ment that hold the keys to long-term success in any nation-building effort. These efforts are complex and often unique to the local circumstances (certainly East Timor s geography and limited resources placed strong demands on every GPA initiative), but they are fundamental if the local people are to become eventually self-reliant. The GPA was challenged to develop a budget process and a civil service corps in East Timor where nothing appropriate was available as a guide and few trained people remained. Initially the Timorese were somewhat skeptical of the GPA-as their longer-than-most colonial experience had not placed much authority in local hands and they feared much the same from the UN-but over time, the GPA staff gathered momentum for their efforts, and wisely integrating Timorese ideas with their own, they began to foster new national institutions. Though the leadership of Vieira de Mello will always be recognized as a strength of UNTAET, the hard-won efforts of the indi­ vid uals who worked within the GPA would make the largest difference over time in the future of the Timorese people? The military component of UNTAET followed d irectly on the heels of INTERFET and was based structurally o n the model created by General Cosgrove, though the selection of the commander of the UNTAET military pillar, given the crucial role that Cosgrove had played in INTERFET, was contentious. Several regional nations had indicated the desire to provide the peacekeeping force commander, but both political and military criteria seemed to limit the selection of the UNTAET military chief to one of rhe '

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major force-contributing nations already providing support within the UN coalition in East Timor. As the serving deputy of INTERFET, Lieutenant General Jaime de Ios Santos of the Philippines had both familiarity with the situation on the ground in East Timor and the commitment of a major force-supplying nation as dear attributes, and his selection would do much to ensure continuity of effort through the transition from INTERFET to U NTAET. In addition, the Philippine military was adept in the peacekeeping skills needed in East Timor. In many ways, U NTAET's peacekeeping tasks (still under Chapter Vll of the United Nations Charter) were even more challeng­ ing than the peacemaking mission that had been assigned to INTERFET. General Cosgrove had the full authority to authorize the use of deadly force to confront militia threats in East Timor from the first day of his arrival. The military forces assigned to INTERFET were employed in the specific hard skills for which they were trained by their providing nation: infantry combat, reconnaissance, dose air support, and the use of indirect fire (mortars and artillery). INTERFET had full war-fighting offensive and self-protection capabilities. U NTAET military forces were also authorized under Chapter VII authorities, so they also had full war-fighting offensive and self-protection capabilities, but they were intended to be employed in an environment that was relatively free of threats and were intended to focus more on local security and state building than conventional combat, tasks that were not considered typical for most military forces. U NTAET military forces had to extend the helping hand of humanitarian assistance but always retain the capability of employing the mailed fist of combat when necessary. In January 2000, the U N focus of effort in East Timor began changing to facilitate the transition to U NTAET's primary nation-building tasks, but episodes of combat continued and safety remained the primary concern of both General Cosgrove (who was still responsible for all aspects of security in East Timor at the time) and Vieira de Mello. Incidents near Suai, Oecussi, Mahata, and Passabe early in the year seemed to demonstrate serious, though last-ditch, efforts by the militias to exert power in East Timor. Mean­ while, humanitarian assistance efforts had succeeded in realizing the return of thousands of East Timorese to their homes, but the overall situation remained far from certain. Riots even broke out on one occasion in Dili as locals trying to enforce new rules were confronted by gangs of youths opposing the return of order. B As the new year began, there were many new faces in Dili and the other major settlements in the region-all bent on assisting with the development of Timor. Numerous relief workers and journalists had joined the soldiers of INTERFET and a wide variety of international humanitarian assistance staffers, adding more to the neediness of the area in some ways than they initially contributed. Though the amount of food and basic materials was growing, communications tools and transportation resources, for example,

Building a New Nation

109

were increasingly sparse and far insufficient for the need. Some looked despair­ ingly at the large numbers of people arriving to help and feared the region was becoming a sort of "laboratory for development and reconstruction,"9 soon to be swamped with helpers who would use more of the assistance themselves than they would provide to the Timorese. Floating hotels appeared in Dili harbor, all manner of currencies flourished, and some feared the wrong kind of economy was being developed, one that was dependent on aid, not independent and self-sustaining.1 0 One of the first new institutions required in developing a state such as East Timor, which had endured so much strife, was a new judiciary. Fully understanding this need, UNTAET's GPA established a Transitional Judicial Service Commission in the first week of January. That commission of five individuals (three Timorese and two international members) was designed to create recommendations concerning the development of a judicial system for the Timorese and the first ten judicial officials: judges, prosecutors, and public defenders . 1 1 Even as a new judicial system i n Timor was being planned, serious legal issues were already the focus of much public debate in both Timor and Indonesia. The major topic of conversation was the culpability of senior Indonesians in the violence of the preceding August. Already in late January the rumors produced by a variety of investigating bodies were fueling specu­ lation that senior Indonesian generals would be implicated in human rights abuses and on January 2 8 , Asmara Nababan, o f the National Commission on Human Rights in East Timor, revealed that General Wiranto, the former chief of the TNI and minister of defense, and serving Coordinating Minister of Defense and Security, 12 would be implicated in Timorese crimes, as would several of his subordinate officers and three Timorese men. 1 3 Given the general instability in the political situation in Indonesia, President Wahid promptly threatened to fire Wiranto, who just a quickly refused to resign his post. 1 4 Since the TNI was traditionally the single strongest support structure o f the Indonesian government, and since G eneral Wiranto had the vast majority of the army supporting him, his loyalty was a potentially devastating issue to the Jakarta central government. It was understandable that the Indonesian generals did not feel culpable for the actions taken in Timor during the vicious guerrilla operations of the late 1990s. They saw repressing internal revolt as their patriotic duty and viewed the effort to maintain order as a protection for the people-regardless of its severity. On the other hand, there could be no doubt that the violence of the conflict exceeded the normal conventions for internal strife. Some Indonesians saw their service under such harsh conditions as a badge of honor. Some individuals (both Indonesian and Timorese) had also clearly violated the rights of the Timorese they suppressed and killed. The ultimate issue was at what level excessive tactics had actually been approved by the military and civilian leaders under Indonesian rule.

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Triumph of Self-Determination

The culpability issue was of great significance because illegal actions in E ast Timor could be seen as state-sponsored if suffici ently senior officials

were proven to have directed atrocities. President Wahid was new to his government and so could distance himself from any personal responsibility in the problems that had occurred under his pred ecessors. In fact, Wahid appeared to enhance his position and that of Indonesia by quickly calling for resignations and trib unals . The truth, however, was that the incidents in E ast Timor had not been isolated , and the finding of culpability of any senior Indonesian officials in such an ethnically diverse nation would quickly result in other negative impacts within the country-particularly in Ache and other Indonesian areas of dissent. These investigations and resulting trials were conducted over the full UNTAET period in East Timor; fueled by the raging words of the international press, they served as an inflammatory backdrop to the entire process of East Timorese nation building and were frequent stumbling blocks to diplomatic initiatives intended to solve other problems. The human rights abuse issues were important, but in some ways they sometimes overshadowed the even more critical d e velopme nt of Timorese government institutions. TRANSITION TO FULL UNTAET MILITARY CONTROL

Military transition operations are always chall e nging, as any shift in responsibility creates opportunities for error. The buildup to full U NTAET administrative control became the key element of operations in February as the first, eastern region of East Timor was handed over to UNTAET respon­ sibility, to be followed two weeks later by Dili and its environs. When the western ( border ) region turnover to U NTAET was su ccessfully completed on February 2 1 , plans for the final handover two days later were executed per the timetable initially established by the INTERFET planning staf£. 1 5 INTERFET finished operations o n time and prepared to redeploy on schedule, leaving some UN contingent forces behind to be integrated into the UNTAET structure in order to ensure continuity of operations. On February 1 7 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived in East Timor for a two-day visit confirming the full establishment of UNTAET.16 The Secretary­ General had previously visited Jakarta and discussed Timorese issues there with President Wahid; while in East Timor, Annan met in Dili with Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo. On February 23, the UNTAET military contingent commander, General de Ios Santos, assumed full responsibility for the population and security of East Timor from General Cosgrove. By skillfully employing proper planning processes and successfully transitioning its efforts from establishing peace and security to maintaining the peace in East Timor in a time-driven fashion, INTERFET truly exceeded most expectations for its p eriod of service

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Triumph of Self-Determination

period, including maintaining a close working relationship with Vieira de Mello, and also pressed to shift military actions to focus more on supporting long-term development. During late February UNTAET also began the process of reorganizing itself to resemble more closely a functioning government of East Timor and to increase the level of participation of the East Timorese in the management oft heir own affairs. Eight governance portfolios were created within UNTAET: internal administration, infrastructure, economic affairs, social affairs, finance, justice, police and emergency services, and political affairs. The first four portfolios were headed by East Timorese and the remaining four were directed by UNTAET officials. "The process of transformation and institution building would later lead to the establishment, in August 2000, of the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA), headed by the Transitional Administrator," 18 which would take over the critical functions of the GPA component of UNTAET. It had been hoped that as a part of the reorganization of the UNTAET effort in February, a strategic plan for the development of the new nation in East Timor would have been written. Military leaders are conditioned to the development of long-range plans with appropriate measures to monitor effectiveness, but such a written plan proved too difficult to develop, given the competition for time and personnel resources at that point in the UNTAET effort. Still, even without a coherent overarching scheme, much had been accomplished in only a few months. UNTAET MANAGEMENT OF EAST TIMOR

With the assumption of full control in East Timor, Vieira de Mello and the UNTAET staff embarked on the focused process of developing gover­ nance in East Timor. This was a task that required cultural sensitivity as well as a significant amount of conciliation, as the differing factions in East Timor had been engaged in scaring opposition for years. The creation of a viable nation in East Timor would also require a strong development effort; other­ wise, the people were likely to see an even lower standard of living and a lesser quality of life than they had experienced under Indonesian control. With recent lessons of post-ethnic-strife nation building in mind (an area where Vieira de Mello was uniquely qualified, having had experience as Director of Repatriation for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Head of Civil Affairs of the U nited Nations Protection Force in the Balkans, Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo), the UNTAET staff knew they had much work to do. UNTAET relations with Indonesian officials had been reasonably good throughout December, and the Wahid administration appeared open to both East Timorese independence and good future international relations between

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the two states. Following the visits of Ko£. Annan and Vieira de Mello to J akarta on February 29, President Wahid visited East Timor and generally confirmed the hopes that cooperation between all parties would continue to be good. Since East Timor had no capability to secure its borders, and because Indonesia would always remain an important economic and cultural partner, healing any wounds between the two states, to include identifying and prosecuting those guilty of any complicity in East Timorese deaths, was critical for the stability of East Timor. On April 1 1 , General de Ios Santos and the commander of the Indonesian army in West Timor signed a memorandum of understanding covering secu­ Iity, boundary crossings, the passage of refugees, and the provision of human­ itarian assistance along the border between East and West Timor. This memorandum set the essential conditions to normalize local relations over the border area-an essential element of security and economic prosperity for the Timorese. Luckily, the Indonesian government honored the conditions of the memorandum, allowing a return to stab le cross-border a crivities over time. Unfortunately, even after the agreement was put into effect, on June 20, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other aid organizations had to suspend their activities in three camps in West Timor following threats and intimidation against staff by militia groups. Until the militias were brought under control, neither the Indonesian government nor the U N management in Dili could effectively bring an end to problems in the westernmost sector of East Timor. Work on Timorese governance continued apace during the late spring, and on June 2 1 , UNTAET and the National Council of East Timorese Resis­ tance reached an ag�eement on a new composition and structure for the National Consultative Council. The newly expanded NCC was to have thirty­ three members. These members included thirteen representatives from the districts, seven from CNRT, and three representatives from other political parties. Only three weeks later, on July 12, the NCC adopted a regulation establishing a Transitional Cabinet comprising four East Timorese and four UNTAET representatives. This body was the first executive organization with equ a! Timorese representation, an important step toward self-governance. These changes were a reflection of Vieira de Mello's decision to push for greater Timorese involvement in the government. July saw him even change the name of GPA to ETTA, the East Timor Transitional Administration, to signal a new emphasis. Vieira de Mello was "reversing the philosophy on how transition was managed" 1 9 and speeding up the transition pro cess by giving Timorese more experience in the upper levels of the government. The previous approach had focused on the district governments, but the leadership of UNTAET wisely understood that if national elections and a new state were to be realized soon, the officials required for such posts needed practical government experience-which they had previously been denied under Indonesian control.

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Also in mid July the first fifty graduates of East Timor's Police Training College officially took up their duties. As the first locally trained members of the new Timorese police force, their graduation was an auspicious early step in improving local security in many parts of the country. Whereas pre­ viously the police functions in the region had been assigned to the Indone­ sian military, having local o fficers who had not been trained by the Indonesians enabled a stronger bond between the police and the local popu­ lation and improved the understanding that the government in Dili was responsive to local needs. As happens frequently during the transition between major combat oper­ ations, the shift from INTERFET to the military " peacekeeping" component of U NTAET was recognized by the opposing militia forces operating from West Timor. To add to the peacekeeping challenge, the UNTAET forces had significantly less tactical mobility than had INTERFET before them and less ability to acquire additional forces when needed. Through the late spring the militias reinfiltrated East Timor-particularly in the south central districts of Ainero and Manufahi-perhaps to begin an insurgency campaign to dis­ credit UNTAET.20 This infiltration resulted in a second wave of migration out of the villages in the region. Fortunately, the military staff within UNTAET was still quite effective, and a series of countermilitia operations (Cobra and Crocodilo) were mounted by the Portuguese battalion to restore stability and push the militias back to their West Timor sanctuaries. The New Zealand and Kenyan military contingents were also active in the western sectors of East Timor in support of this effort.21 Thai Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit assumed command of UNTAET from General de Ios Santos on July 21, 2000. The transition was another of the most crucial elements of the long-term service of UNTAET, and happily the two commanders managed to turn over all the key elements of information without a reduction in force efficiency. General Boonsrang continued many of the same security policies started u nder INTERFET, yet with an eye more attuned to the increased role of the Timorese in security policy and an added emphasis on generating support from the Timorese population to isolate the opposing militias from any support base in East Timor. In effect, General Boonsrang proactively shifted the emphasis to prevent the mounting of a counterinsurgency campaign in East Timor. Unfortunately, and highlighting the danger that still confronted those serving in East Timor, only six days following General Boonsrang's assump­ tion of command on July 24, 2000, the UN suffered its first combat-related death of a U N peacekeeper in East Timor. Private Leonard William Manning, a New Zealand soldier from U NTAET's military contingent, was killed during an exchange of gunfire with an armed group near the still untamed border with West Timor.22 Only two weeks later, on August 10, a second UN peace­ keeper was killed . Private Devi Ram Jaishi, a soldier from UNTAET's Nepalese contingent, was killed during another exchange of fire with militia

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in Suai, close to the very same area near the border with West Timor where Private Manning had been killed.23 These tragic deaths showed the world that the situation in Timor, though much improved, would not be completely calm until a regular Timorese security force was capable of managing conditions along the entire western border. On September 6, 2000, three employees of the U N High Commis­ sioner for Refugees were killed by pro-Indonesian militia gangs in Atambua, West Timor. Following that attack, the UN decided to evacuate all of its staff members from West Timor and suspend all humanitarian efforts in the region. Two days later, the UN Security Council responded to the deteriorat­ ing security situation in West Timor by adopting Resolution 1 3 1 9 and call­ ing on Indonesia to take immediate steps to disarm and disband militia in the border area immediately. By the fall of 2000, Indonesia had greatly reduced its operations near the border, but militia strife and criminal violence beyond TNI control called for an increase in Indonesian diligence in the area. International pressure and UN demands continued to press for more Indo­ nesian security on the western side of the border region. On September 12, the East Timor Transit ional Cabinet approved the idea of an East Timor Defence Force (ETDF). The ETDF was to consist of some fifteen hundred troops drawn from the ranks of former FALINTIL proinde­ pendence guerrillas and supplemented by an equal number of new reserve members. External security was not much of a concern outside the border region with Indonesian West Timor, which was still more the zone of action of rhe U NTAET military component, so the formation of a defense force could have been viewed simply as a another traditional step toward self­ governance and a contribution to national pride. But the creation of the ETDF was immensely more significant to rhe Timorese, due to the impor­ tant role FALINTIL had played in the fight for independence. The profes­ sionalism it had d isp layed during the referendum balloring the previous year was also well recognized by the U NTAET leadership. Given that Xanana Gusmao and Taur Matan Ruak were FALINTIL national heroes, even though U NTAET had nor originally planned for an East Timorese army, the formation of a defense force was an important reintegration mechanism and eventually served as a valuable pillar of national unity. Gusmao turned over command of FALINTIL to Ruak on rhe twenty-fifth anniversary of rhe founding of FALINTIL, and then five months later, following a period of re-formation and retraining, in a single ceremony, FALINTIL was officially disbanded, and Brigadier Ruak took command of the newly formed ETDF on February 1, 2001. The development of the ETDF showed flexibility on the part of UNTAET, an understanding of cul­ tural sensitivities, and an appreciation of rhe roles a military force can play in a national structure. Along the way, the creation of a real Timorese military capability not only helped with national integration but also added some military capability to assist with rhe downsizing of rhe UNTAET military

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force in anticipation of independence. The ETDF was a small but important lesson learned for the UN. Throughout the fall of 2000 other Timorese national institutions slowly continued to mature, and given the renewed emphasison cooperation by Indonesia and UNTAET, overall stability increased even in the western areas of East Timor. Under the able management of Vieira de Mello and the sound perspectives of Xanana Gusmao and other CNRT leaders, local governance began to meet the needs of the Timorese p e opl e . A series of small actions showed an improving trend. A tiny contingent of East Timorese athletes participated, to cheering audiences. in the Sydney Olympics in September; ferry service was established to the Oecussi enclave; UNTAET created groups to address marine resources and d isaster response concerns; a national development agency was created;24 UNTAET began the important process of reintegrating ami-independence militia members into Timorese society; another donor conference was held in Brussels; and a taxation regimen was created to finance government operations. Perhaps most important, in October, the former NCC was expanded to include thirty-six exclusively East Timorese members (including Xanana Gusmao and thirteen women representatives) and was empowered as the first National Council-a precursor to a national assembly. Yet one burning issue still remained unresolved: the culpability for the violence that had so devastated the area in 1999. On December 1 1, the first indictment containing charges of " crimes against humanity" committed in East Timor was £.led, and two days later, the East Timor Transitional Cabinet agreed to a proposal to establish a Commission for Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation. That commission was to be an essential part of the internal healing needed before old scores could begin to be resolved and the human fabric of East Timor could be reknitted . On the final day of January 2 00 1 , seeing that overall progress was steady, but still insufficient in Timor, the U N Security Council extended the man­ date of UNTAET by resolution for another full year, until January 3 1 , 2002. The council requested that Vieira de Mello continue delegating responsibili­ ties within the East Timor Transitional Administration until authority was fully transferred to the government of an independent East Timorese nation. "The reso 1urio n called upon international financial institutions, UN funds and programs and bilateral donors which have committed resources to East Timor to ful£..1 1 their pledges and to accelerate disbursements, particularly in areas relevant to peace-building and development assistance. Financial and technical assistance will also be needed to support the creation of an East Timor Defence Force, the Council said, urging States to donate funds and encouraging U NTAET's coordinating role in that endeavour. In terms of security, the Council said U NTAET was to respond 'robustly' to militia threats in East Timor, consistent with Council resolutions, and stressed the

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need for a comprehensive solution to the problem caused by militia activity in West Timor refugee camps. "25 THE FIRST NATIONAL ELECTION

Security remained the key to initial success in Timor) so in early February) Vieira de Mello and his staff) with the support of numerous Timorese leaders) established the new East Timorese Defence Force) formally created around the former FALINTIL militia. Though many people expressed concern that former FALINTIL soldiers should control such a large part of the new Timorese military) there was actually linle other choice) as most of the expe­ rienced soldiers in the region were members of FALINTIL. There was an additional advantage in the integration of the militias) as the process did result in even stronger commitment of the militia members to the new Timorese government under development. The former rebel commander Taur Matan Ruak told seventeen hundred soldiers at the mountain town of Aileu) " We will become the East Timor Defence Force) but the seed from which this new force was germinated is Falintil. "26 On March 16) 200 1 ) Vieira de Mello announced that the first democratic election in East Timor would finally be held on August 30) 2001) after the signing of the Regulation on the Election of a Constituent Assembly. The process of elections is fundamental to the development of most new nations. Though different processes have been tried in a variety of circumstances) all methods normally involve four key factors: the completion of a census) the development of a constitutional framework) the design of a legislative process to empower the elected government) and the balloting and determination of a governing body. In the case of East Timor) by the spring of 2001 no national census had been completed) nor was there yet a national constitution) but there was already a National Council to aid the UN administration) as well as a Tran­ sitional Cabinet to begin the process of developing a national executive. So with an August election set for the new Constituent Assembly) a constitution could be written within the year) and an election to identify a new national leader could proceed soon thereafter. A balance must always be struck between the need to develop governmental systems quickly and the desire to let the institutions develop more slowly as the people feel comfortable with them. With UN guidance) the Timorese seemed to strike a useful balance in the timing for their national institutions. Security conditions) however) were always under the watchful eyes of the UN. On May 4) the North Jakarta District Court sentenced six men to between ten and twenty months in jail for their roles in the killings of three U NHCR staff in Atamb ua) West Timor) in September 2000. Kofi Annan was angered by the light sentences and called them "a wholly unacceptable

118 Triumph of Self-Determination response," but there was little the United Nations could do. In fact, many around the world were surprised that an Indonesian court would convict anyone concerning violations in East Timor-so the conviction was at least a moral victory for those who had suffered so much under Indonesian rule. Later that summer, on July 3, 200 1 , another very significant milestone was reached when representatives of U NTAET and the Australian government committed to the Timor Sea Arrangement. The agreement gave East Timor 90 percent of the revenues from the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea-its best only real hope for a strong economic base. Australia certainly benefited from the treaty as well, since it guaranteed Canberra a productive share of the wealth that was not dependent upon the Indonesian government's support. The formal election campaign period for East Timor's new Constituent Assembly began on July 15. Australian reporter Jon Land described the initial activity, writing, " Some 16 political parties and a number of indepen­ dent candidates are contesting 8 8 seats in the election set for August 30, exactly two years after the historic referendum on independence. The Inde­ pendent Electoral Commission established by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) has confirmed that 968 candidates will contest the national seats and 96 will run for district seats. Fretilin was the first to kick-off the election campaign with a rally on July 1 5 in Dili which swelled to around 5000 at its peak-a relatively small turnout given party leaders claim a support base of around 100,000. On the same day, Fretilin's traditional rival, the conservative Timorese Democratic Union ( U DT), held a press conference where party head Joao Carrascalao said UDT would 'combat' problems like poverty and ignorance which lead to 'hate, enmity, disintegration and mutual suspicions . ' "27 The overall campaign continued through the summer with a commendable lack of violence. After months of preparation, on August 30, the Timorese went again to the voting boxes to select their assembly to write the new national constitu­ tion. As a clear indication of the value the Timorese placed on their demo­ cratic freed oms, 9 1 percent of the electorate voted to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly. And in another positive sign of the development of Timorese society, 27 percent of the eighty-eight-member Constituent Assembly was made up of women. Kofi Annan congratulated the Timorese people after the election was completed, saying, "The conviction which you have shown in embracing democracy only strengthens our commitment to your cause, as you now set about drafting your first Constitution that will soon lead to independence. "28 The Constituent Assembly was charged with producing a new constitu­ tion in only ninety days-a difficult feat for any nation. But there had been a consultation completed in the month and a half prior to the election that provided some of the fundamental principles for the document. Still the Constituent Assembly would be the first truly national and completely inde­ pendent body of the new Timorese nation, and no one had a clear idea of

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how well the assembly members would work together or how efficient they would be in the actual drafting of the constitution. On September 6, in an expected result, FRETILIN was declared the win­ ning party with 57.3 percent of the vote in East Timor's Constituent Assembly elections. Two weeks later, on September 20, twenty-four members of the new East Timorese Council of Ministers of the Second Transitional Govern­ ment were sworn into office.29 The new council replaced the Transitional Cabinet, which had been formed to handle the major portfolios of the government in 2000. The fall of 2001 was consumed by deliberations on the new constitution, but progress also continued on other issues of concern in the developing Timorese government. Ex-militia members continued to return from West Timor and to be reintegrated into Timorese society; May 20, 2002, was chosen as the target date for the turnover of sovereignty to a new East Timorese government;30 the first battalion of the East Timorese Defence Force was created, and the UNTAET military component began to reduce its strength; and the first national presidential election was set for April 2002 . An initial draft of the new constitution was circulated for review i n late November 2001, and actual debate began on December 3. The first two arti­ cles were quickly accepted during the first day of deliberations; they confirmed respect for the dignity of the human being and the fact that East Timor had initially gained its independence back in 1975, prior to the Indonesian inva­ sion. The next two articles, confirming that the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of East Timor "rests in the hands of the people" and that "the State is subordinate to the constitution," were approved the following day. Work on the document continued diligently throughout the month. By January 3, 2001, 79 of the 1 5 1 articles in the constitution had been p assed, and the drafting assembly was well on its way to completing the review by the Janu­ ary 2 5 deadline established the previous fall. The final text was scheduled to be ready by March 5, and a formal promulgation vote and ceremony was planned for March 9 . In one of its final acts, the Constituent Assembly voted to transform itself into East Timor's first legislative body upon final approval of the constitution by the people. Even while the Timorese constitution and government were taking firm shape, UNTAET had not diminished its level of activity; if anything Vieira de Mello and his team had increased the pace of events as the Timorese prep ared for sovereignty. 31 U NTAET had recruited approximate! y eleven thousand East Timorese civil servants to work in government positions; produced indictments relating to thirty-five serious crime cases; created a Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor; facili­ tated the return of nearly ten thousand refugees (in 2002 alone); established a network of 64 community health centers, 88 health posts, and 1 1 7 mobile clinics; and successfully managed an education system including a new National University of East Timor, 700 primary schools, 100 junior secondary

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schools, 40 pr eschools, and 1 0 technical colleges.32 East Timor not only had a foundational government but also had a system of national support that could care for the basic needs of its people. On March 22, 2002, the East Timorese Constituent Assembly formally approved the &st East Timorese Constitution. (See Appendix E for selected portions of the Constitution of the Democratic Repu b lie of Timor-Leste. ) It was an extremely well-composed and thoughtful document, confirming the fundamental democratic principles that have been proven to be enduring in so many nations since the eighteenth century (universal suffrage, equal rights before the law, the presumption of innocence, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech), and also incorporating many new provisions reflecting the concerns of the twenty-first century. Among these more modern ideas included in the constitution were sexual equality (Section 17); rights for children born in or outside marriage (Section 1 8 ); the use of an ombudsman (Section 27); the right to life (Section 29); the right to a humane, healthy, and ecologically balanced environment (Section 61 ); and even the right to access personal data stored in a computer system or entered into mechanical or manual records ( Section 38). As a functional framework for the new nation, the Constitution identified the key elements of the Timorese govern­ ment structure, the responsibilities of major officials, government actions during a crisis, and also provisions for its own modification. Perhaps even more interesting, the new Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste addressed several cultural issues that set it apart as a unique reflection of its people. The document made Tetum a national language to be preserved (Section 13), and perhaps as a reflection of the long years of struggle, it gave all of its people the right to "honour, good name and reputation, protection of his or her public image and privacy of his or her personal and family life" (Section 36). The national colors were outlined in Section 15 as "yellow-the traces of colonialism; black-the obscurantism that needs to be overcome; red-the struggle for national liberation; [and] white-peace." And most poignantly in Section 1 1 , the Constitution gives credit to the real factors that made independence possible, confirming it " values the historical resistance of rhe Maubere People against foreign dom­ ination and the contribution of all those who fought for national indepen­ dence, . . . acknowledges and values the p articipation of the Catholic Church in the process of national liberation of East Timor, . . . [and] shall ensure special protection to the war-disabled, orphans and other dependants of those who dedicated their lives to the struggle for independence and national sovereignty, and shall protect all those who participated in the resistance against the foreign occupation." With this new Constitution that outlined the duties and responsibilities of a new president for the nation of Timor-Leste, the foundation for the first independent government was set. And on April 14, as expected, Xanana Gusmao defeated Francisco da Amaral to become the first president-elect of

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the new nation, after a landslide victory in the first presidential election. Gusmao received 82.7 percent of the 378,548 ballots cast in the election. On May 17, 2002, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolu­ tion 1 410, calling for the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET)-a successor mission-to be deployed following the end of UNTAET's mandate. According to the United Nations, UNMISET was established for an initial period of twelve months, with a mandate to provide assistance for core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor. It was also created to provide interim law enforcement and public security, as well as to assist in the further development the national police service and to contribute to the mainte­ nance of the new country's external and internal security. UNMISET was to be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Timor-Leste, Kamalesh Sharma of India.33 A NEW NATION IN EAST TIMOR Yo urs has not been an easy path to independence. You should be very proud of your achievement. That a small nation is able to inspire the world and be the focus of our attention is the highest trib ute I can pay.·34 -KofiAnnan

As scheduled, on May 20, 2002, after a twenty-five-year struggle for self­ determination, East Timor finally became an independent nation. In a cere­ mony attended by tens of thousands of East Timorese as well as high-level representatives from some ninety countries, the United Nations, which had helped to steer the nation to statehood, handed over administration to the new democratically elected government of President Xanana Gusmao. After more than four hundred years of control by others, it was fining that Timor­ Leste (as it was to be known) finally became a free and independent nation under the direction of a man who had spent most of his life devoted to its cause. Former Vice President Megawti Sukarnoputri was named President of Indonesia by the National Assembly on July 23, 2001, replacing deposed Preesidem Abdullahman Wahid. President Megawati Sukarnoputri repre­ sented Indonesia at the event, even clasping hands with Gusmao. "I've been waiting for this all of my life," said Lorenta Fernades at the ceremony. "All we have wanted is to live in freedom." 35 The important work of UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET, and the other organizations of the UN and its partners would have been unfulfilled if East Timor had floundered as a nation and the people had lost their newly found independence due to poor governance. Happily, the investment of the inter­ national community has largely been well earned by the Timorese, and the new nation of Timor-Leste has successfully formulated a government system

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providing the essential elements of modern statehood needed by its people. Only three years after the Timorese voted to begin the process of indepen­ dence from Indonesia, the United Nations General Assembly admitted Timor-Leste as the youngest and 1 9 1st member state oft he UN, only months after its independence on September 27, 2002. The creation of a new state brings a host of challenges under the best of circumstances; in 2002, Timor-Leste had even more difficult issues to deal with due to its colonial past; the difficult relationship with its neighbor, Indonesia; and its lack of natural resources. 36 Analysis of the most important issues confronted by the Timorese shows a great deal about the necessary elements of a modern nation-state and about the relationships that drive the world's now very global society. The maintenance of law and order remains one of the primary responsi­ bilities of any national government. On December 4, 2002, members of the U N military component and police were called in to restore order in Dili following a violent demonstration involving more than six hundred people. The incident illustrated the importance of local security procedures and, unfortunately, the weakness of the fledgling Timorese police forces. By September 2003, the UN Police (UNPOL) finally handed over local security responsibilities to Timor-Leste's new national police force, the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). Only Dili remained under UNPOL control, and on December 10, 2003, it finally transferred responsibility for day-to-day policing in Dili to the PNTL. At that point the PNTL had complete responsibility for police services t hrou gho ut the country. Finally, on May 19, 2 00 4, UN MISET handed over all remaining police and external security functions to the gov­ ernment of Timor-Leste. And on Au gust 23, 2004, the UN Secretary-General commended Timor-Leste on the significant progress it had made toward self-sufficiency in administration and security. Governance in Timor-Leste has also continued to progress slowly since its independence. Perhaps nowhere has this progress been better demonstrated than in the problems that have been successfully resolved through the example set and the leadership provided b y members of the Timorese government. In the most striking case, the first national prime minister, Mari Bin Amude Alkatiri, was replaced by President Gusmao after severe rioting broke out in Dili followin g Alkatiri's efforts to provide arms to a FRETILIN security force under the guise of reforming the East Timor Defence Force.37 Thirty­ seven Timorese died. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan met with the Security Council in emergency session, and the Australian government responded to Timorese requests for support by deploying forces back to Dili.38 The ETDF rose up against Alkatiri's efforts and eventually forced President Gusmao to replace him. Gusmao acted decisively, yet did not rush to judg­ ment. Jose Ramos-Horta assumed the duties of prime minister at Gusmao's request and effectively managed the government from the summer of 2006 until the second national ele ction in the spring of 2007, in which he was

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elected to succeed Gusmao. Many national governments of much greater maturity fail to survive such severe tests of national trust; yet the Gusmao government remained strong and well respected by the international com­ munity, even during crisis. Unfortunately, economic develop mem remained very weak in Timor-Leste during its first years of independence. Although the U N brought an influx of millions of dollars and many jobs to East Timor, most of both left when the UN missions departed. Some analysts criticized the UN for departing too early, but the Timorese needed eventually to be able to support themselves without disproportionate levels of U N aid.39 The World Bank and the Asia Development Bank continued to assist the new nation, but local business growth and microfinance remained underdeveloped . According to the Asia Development Bank 2005 report, "Poverty incidence in Timor-Leste has probably increased in recent years. Non-oil GDP growth turned only mar­ ginally positive in 2004, but growth will be difficult to accelerate since the main contributors-improved weather conditions for rural production, and rapid growth of local credit-are unreliable and finite. Timor-Leste's economy is uncompetitive due to small markets, high costs, low skills base, and poor physical infrastructure and incomplete legal institutions. Attracting sufficient foreign direct investment to u nd erp in broad-based, sustainable economic development will be challenging. "40 Tourism seemed to dominate the economic efforts of the new government, and the income that offshore oil deposits were to bring was slow in coming. The World Health Organization, the UN Development Programme, and the U.S. Agency for International Development continued to help the Timorese improve agricultural productivity, build clinics, improve warehousing, and increase transportation. Still, this economic issue remained the greatest shortfall in Timor-Leste governance during its fust decade and posed the greatest threat to its future. On the cultural from, the Timor-Leste government did much more of benefit. lt created new coinage and established other policies and procedures to enhance national pride. One of the most influential, yet often overlooked, issues faced by the new government was the selection of a national language. Though it had been outlawed under Indonesian rule, because Timor was a former Portuguese colony, many in Timor wanted to return to that language. Significantly, Portuguese had survived in Timor, mostly through its use by FRETILIN, so had it a patriotic function, as well as utility in keeping the Portuguese links between the small nation and a d iaspora of significant numbers in Portugal, Brazil, and all around the world. Yet Tetu m has tradi­ tionally been the unifying language of the Timorese people and had the advantage of being a unique connection that extended throughout the island (whereas Portuguese was the language of only a small, more elite, minority of Timorese). For this reason, Tetum and Portuguese were both selected as national languages, though Tetum was designated as a language of historical

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significance in the Constitution. Tetum has served its purpose and helped to unite the new nation and facilitate internal commerce, education, and health care, while the Portuguese links have also been useful internationally. After the first government of Timor-Leste met and survived the nation's initial internal challenge to legitimacy, and despite a lack of economic deve lop ­ ment, the processes developed under the new Constitution held firm for the peaceful election of a successor government and a new president in June 2007. The c amp aigns and b alloting were conducted without incident in a true, contested election, where the people decisively chose Jose Ramos-Horta as their second national executive. Having managed an internal crisis and the p eac e ful transition of power, the constitutional process of Timor-Leste has proven itself and earned the trust of the Timorese people.

Chapter 9 Lessons for a New Century

The victory of the people of East Timor is a truly stunning accomplishment. I can not think of a historical parallel. It is a remarkable testimony to what the human spirit can achieve in the face of overwhelming, indescrib­ able odds; an achievement that should inspire hope as well as humility.1 -Noam Chomsky

The United Nations effort to help bring independence to East Timor demon­ strates both the capability of the modern United Nations and the impor­ tance most citizens of the world place on freedom. East Timor's successful struggle for independence also shows how international cooperation can assist with the self-determination of an ethnic group with a strong heritage of national identity, even when that heritage is contested by other nations. Most clearly, however, the experience of the East Timorese as they moved toward independence demonstrated the need for a number of important conditions if self-determination is to be successful. Among these, a modicum of security, some level of regional d iplomatic consensus, a form of effective governance, the expectation of economic development, and, realistically, so me international economic support appear evident. These conditions should have been obvious, but they were not well understood by the vast majority of people who wanted to see the Timorese live free. These and a few other important lessons should be taken from Timorese self-determination and the United Nations operations in East Timor if future independence movements are to enjoy comparable success, as several, past UN interventions have proven less successful. PREVIOUS UN INTE RVENTIONS O F THE 1990S

Though there are many parallels, there are also significant and useful differences between the actions that took place in East Timor and the

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broadly similar United Nations interventions in Cambodia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti that took place during the 1990s. A cursory analysis of these other four interventions provides a useful perspective for the identification of the key elements of success in East Timor. These key elements can be used to guide the leaders of future operations of a similar nature. Cambodia

The intervention in Cambodia was one of the first major interventions supported by the United Nations2 in the 1990s. The UN Assistance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) resulted from "Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict" J that were signed in Paris on October 23, 1991 . The agreements invited the Security Council to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and to provide it with a strong mandate:4 The Secretary-General reiterated to the Security Council on 30 September 1991 that the United Nations could help in maintaining the ceasefire by deploying in Cambodia a small advance mission consisting mainly of military liaison officers in order to help the parties to address and resolve any violations or alleged violations of the ceasefire . . . . On that basis, the Secretary-General recommended thatthe Security Council a uthorize the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia {UNAMIC}, to become operational as soon as the Paris Agreements were signed. UNAMIC would be absorbed into UNTAC once UNTAC was established by the Security Council and its b udget adopted by the General Assembly. .s

UNAMIC became operational o n November 9, 1991, with A.H.S. Ataul Karim of Bangladesh as Chief Liaison Officer and Brigadier-General Michel Loridon of France as Senior Military Liaison Officer. At the end of December 1991, the Secretary-General expanded the mandate of UNAMIC to conduct demining for the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and other persons displaced by the fighting. One thousand ninety military personnel were added to gather information on all known minefields; develop a train­ ing program for mine d etection and clearance; begin clearing repatriation routes, reception centers, and resettlement areas; and carry out emergency repair and rehabilitation work on roads and bridges. In February 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his implementation plan for UNTAC to the Security Council, and by its Resolution 745 of February 2 8, UNTAC was established for a period not to exceed eighteen months. 6 Meanwhile, UNAMIC continued to function until U NTAC became operational, at which rime its functions were subsumed by UNTAC. The initial phase of UNTAC's deployment began on March 1 5, 1992.

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The mandate given to UNTAC included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrange­ ments, civil administration, the mai nte na nee of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period . The first eo ntinge nt of UNTAC's military cornponent arrived in March, and b y early May, some 4,000 United Nations personnel, including some 3,600 troops, were i n place? UNTAC assumed control of key sectors of the country's administrative structures, including foreign affairs, defense, security, finance, and communications, in order to build a stable environment conducive to national elections. At the same, the UNHCR oversaw the successful repa­ triation and resettlement of some 360,000 refugees and displaced persons. At its peak UNTAC numbered over 2 1 ,000 military and civilian personnel from more than 1 00 countries.8 ,

Twenty parties took part in the Cambodian elections of May 1993; UNTAC oversaw the electoral campaign and registration of voters; as well as the elections themselves. Over 4.2 million people, nearly 90 percent of the registered voters; cast their ballots to elect a Constituent Assembly. In September; the Constitution was proclaimed; and a new government; led by two prime ministers, was inaugurated. After the withdrawal of UNTAC, several United Nations agencies remained in Cambodia to support recon­ struction and development. Overall; the UN effort in Cambodia was seen to be highly successful and was a frequent positive example used during the planning of operations in East Timor; particularly in regard to the repatriation of refugees; the development of election processes; and military coalition building. Somalia

In April 1992; the Security Council established the U nited Nations Oper­ ation in Somalia (UNOSOM) as a relief effort direct against famine-induced hunger in Somalia.9 Unfortunately, the operation was hampered from the beginning by internal tribal and gang violence and a general lack of security in the capital; Mogadishu; and several other major Somali cities. ln response; the Security Council authorized the deployment of some three thousand troops to provide protection for the humanitarian aid needed. Even after the UN forces arrived; the situation continued to worsen; so in late 1992; the United States offered to organize and lead a major military operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council accepted the offer and authorized the use of "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for the relief effort under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A Unified Task Force (UNITAF); made up of contingents from twenty­ four countries under United States leadership, deployed into Somalia in November 1992 and quickly secured a number of major relief sites. By the

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year's end humanitarian aid was again flowing through Mogadishu and into the areas most affected by the famine. The Security Council decided in March to transition from UNITAF to a new United Nations peacekeeping operation known as UNOSOM ll and authorized it to use force to ensure its mandate, which continued to focus on securing a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM ll was also mandated to assist in the reconstruction of economic, social, and political life in Somalia, as there was little effective government, or at least too little government to ensure that the humanitarian aid would be used as needed. Unfortunately, UNOSOM ll was plagued by poor inter­ nal coordination and lack of cohesion, which, when combined with the con­ tinued internal strife in the country, severely limited its effectiveness. Faced with increasing levels of civil disturbance in Mogadishu in late 1993, the coalition began to lose momentum and effectiveness. Major forces were withdrawn in another American-led operation known as United Shield in early 1994. Though a great deal of aid was dispersed and some of the worst of the famine-induced suffering was relieved, the overall result of these intervention operations in Somalia was nearly imperceptible. The overall UN effort in Somalia was considered by most to be a failure. In particular, Somalia continued to suffer a near-total lack of governance and remained unstable for years to follow. Yugoslavia

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the eastern Euro­ pean region formerly known as Yugoslavia was based upon very different circumstances. It was primarily an effort to stop ethnic cleansing within the framework of a multireligious and multiethnic population.10 UNPROFOR's mandate was originally to ensure that three sectors in Croatia would be demilitarized and that all persons residing in them would be protected. Over a period of two years, that mandate was enlarged to include monitoring functions in other areas of Croatia, the implementation of a cease-fire agree­ ment signed by the Croatian government and local Serb authorities, and the monitoring of activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. After the regional conflict continued to intensify, the UNPROFOR mandate was extended again geographically to include Bosnia and Herzegovina, the proper functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance there. In September 1 992, U NPROFOR's mandate was further enlarged to enable the United Nations to deliver humanitarian relief generally throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, UNPROFOR monitored a regional "no-fly zone" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as safe areas established by the Security Council around five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo. UNPROFOR was authorized to use force only in self-defense but was able

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to coordinate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the use of supporting airpower. U NPROFOR also monitored the implementa­ tion of a variety of cease-fire agreements. After some diplomatic progress and three difficult years attempting to maintain security in the region, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate, but linked, peacekeeping operations on March 31, 19 9 5 . UNPROFOR did achieve a certain degree o f success in the execution of its mandate, though there were several incidents of continued fighting and ethnic strife throughout the period of its mandate. In particular, the Srebrenica massacre in July 1 995, which resulted in the deaths of some eight thousand Bosnians, and the U N hostages taken at the Vrbanja Bridge the previous May illustrated the weakness of dual command arrangements and showed UNPROFOR to be weak overall in the face of a continuing lack of security. In December 1995, NATO deployed forces from thirty-two nations in the same region as a part of an International Intervention Force (IFOR) of its own, with more aggressive leadership and far more success. Haiti

The most successful of the three UN intervention operations that imme­ diately preceded the UN efforts in East Timor was the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) . 1 1 Following the departure of President Jean­ Claude Duvalier in 1 986, Haiti had a series of short-lived governments. In 1990, the country's provisional government requested that the U nited Nations observe the December 1990 elections, in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president. But in 1991, a coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras ended democratic rule in Haiti, and President Aristide was forced into exile. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali appointed a special envoy for Haiti, Dante Caputo, who was also appointed separately as special envoy by the Organization of American States (OAS). ln an effort to restore constitutional rule, the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti in June 1993. General Cedras then agreed to hold talks. Those talks, con­ ducted in New York by Caputo, led in July to an agreement allowing Aristide to return to Haiti in October 1993. The Security Council suspended the embargo following the approval by the Haitian Parliament of a new cabinet, and established the UNMIH to assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and in creating a new police force. But U NMIH's mandate was undermined by the failure of the Haitian military authorities to honor the agreement. After a series of incidents, the Security Council resumed the embargo. Then in July 1994, the Security Council authorized supporting member states to form a multinational force (MNF) and use "all necessary means" to force the departure of the coup leaders and a return to democracy in Haiti. It also decided that a strengthened UNMIH would succeed the

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multinational force once a secure and stable environment was established by the MNF. The United States and Haiti's military leaders reached an agreement in September 1994, providing for the early retirement of various military leaders, the end of the embargo, and free parliamentary elections. Then, a twenty­ thousand-strong twenty-eight-nation multinational force, led by the U nited States, began deploying in Haiti, followed shortly thereafter by an UNMIH advance team. General Cedras resigned and left Haiti, and on October 15, 1994, President Aristide returned to power. As planned, UNMIH took over in early 1995 from the MNF, to assist the Haitian government in maintain­ ing a secure environment. UNMIH also helped to create, for the fll:st time in the country's history, a national civil police. The United Nations and the OAS oversaw the 199 5 parliamentary and local elections, won by a coalition associated with President Aristide. UNMIH was eventually replaced by three successive UN missions: the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), all of which were designed to improve security and, to a more limited degree, governance. Those UN efforts succeeded in making limited improvements in Haiti, but the country was challenged by more internal strife in 2003, which resulted in yet another UN intervention, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) . O verall, these multiple U N missions in Haiti provided much-needed aid and made progress in improving the national governmental structure and the effectiveness of security forces in the country. Still, Haiti remained barely viable economically and suffered continual insecurity as the new century progressed through its first decade. UN LESSONS FROM COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS INTERVENTIONS

Comparative analysis of these U N interventions reveals three important factors in UN success-three legs of a stool for successful UN interventions. The most significant among them is the absolute requirement of a strong UN mandate and sufflcient military force to enforce it in a wide range of circumstances. The UN intervention in Somalia fell apart when it could nor adapt to instability in that country, and the weakness of UNPROFOR (particularly when compared to its NATO counterpart) caused it to fail to safeguard the very people it was designed to help. Though the UN missions in Cambodia and Haiti never had to confront opposing forces with the ferocity matching the opposition groups in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, at least they did hold firm in the face of civil unrest over several years, undou bt­ edly due to their strong mandates and adequate force structure. Future UN

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interventions in the sovereign territory of a member state must be authorized to protect both the UN representatives and any local citizens placed at risk by any hazard . The UN forces that intervened in East Timor had a strong mandate, and on the appropriate occasions, they used all necessary means, as required, to enforce the rule of law. The second clear lesson of previous UN interventions in the 1990s was the importance that must be placed on improving governance in the nations of concern if improvement is to endure. What limited success UNPROFOR enjoyed over its three-year existence was linked to the Dayton Accords, which followed it, and the strength of the diplomatic process used for an eventual solution to the Yugoslav situation. Over time with UNPROFOR, governance and new institutions were slowly developed to maintain a frag­ ile framework of stability, but the mission itself was ill equipped to success­ fully execute its primary mandate. Even with the very positive example from UNTAC, which occurred just before UNOSOM and produced several national administrative improvements in Cambodia, no workable govern­ ment framework was created in Somalia, which continued to be a largely ungoverned and unsuccessful state into the first decade of the twenty-first century-long after UNISOM ll had failed to establish security outside Mogadishu or to help create any enduring institutions. Partially as a result ofthese inadequacies in Somalia, U NMIH did have the purpose of reforming the Haitian government, and whole new ministries and processes were created by the UN-sponsored force, which helped with the nation's long-term pro b­ lems with instability. Even in Haiti, however, the lack of a decent standard of living for most people and a very weak political system made the transition of power between elected governments fraught with danger. Finally, economic development efforts must also be an integral part of any UN intervention. Though none of the U N interventions that preceded the effort in East Timor included an economic development function, ideally the UN should intervene not only to provide humanitarian aid for specific problems, but also to improve the basic economic conditions of the people and increase prosperity to prevent future instability. The UN has processes in place, through the U N High Commissioner for Refugees and UN World Food Programme, to provide aid in crisis areas. The World Bank and other international organizations have also attempted to help weak states that require interventions; however, they are very reiuctant to assist financially unless security and governance are in place because they risk the loss, through theft or fraud, of any funds supplied. Thus financial donor confer­ ences have become critical to prime the pump and help in the success of UN interventions. With all three of these elements (security, governance, and economic development), nations plagued by internal strife can benefit significantly from an intervention under UN auspices. Without these three pillars (and in most cases security and good governance appear to be necessary before

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effective economic development can begin), there is only a small chance that an intervention will result in success over the long term. The UN intervention in East Timor contained all three of these elements at appropriate levels, and all three were a focus of effort by a skilled and open-minded administrator (Vieira de Mello) who understood how to weave the strands of all three elements together, even without a single strategic plan, to develop the insti­ tutions needed for a new nation. D IPLOMATIC LESSONS OF THE INTERVENTION IN EASTTIMOR

It is clear from analysis of these UN interventions that the United Nations can play an extraordinarily influential role in furthering self-determination around th e globe. Even if each national circumstance is unique, there are several important points that should be learned from the UN experience in East Timor in order to make future efforts more produ ctive. For example, the East Timor intervention indicates that the likelihood of intervention suc­ cess is greatly enhanced by a high level of international consensus and the appropriate application of regional influence on the situation. The interna­ tional media garnered a high level of support for an intervention in East Timor. When powerful member states, such as the United States, are in support and neigh boring states, such as Australia, are also involved, UN interventions appear to be more successful. Additionally, as long as the case for intervention appears to engender some degree of international support from the key nations on the United Nations Security Council, there is much the U N may accomplish . There have been several other cases of ethnic self-determination, including the case of Ache inside Indonesia, which never received the degree of support provided to East Timor and which lan guished for years with little hop e of resolution. Clearly the winning of the Nobel Prize by Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Belo gave the East Timorese cause much-needed publicity and added credi­ bility. But at its core, the reason that Timorese hop es were fulfilled was that Portugal, Australia, Great Britain, and the United States actively engaged the Security Council in support of a change in the status quo. Many Security Council resolutions have been passed that never had any real effect on the member states of the United Nations, so the significant results of UNSCR 1272 were exceptional . Clearly the strong interest of permanent member nations of the Security Council is a prerequisite for a successful U nited Nations intervention. Effective national diplomatic efforts are also increasingly important for a well - organized intervention by i nt ernational forces. In the case of East Timor, the aggressive efforts oft he ministries of foreign affairs of Australia, Indonesia, Portugal, and Great Britain and the State Department of the United States, all coordinated by Ambassador Jamsh ee d Marker of the United Nations,

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ensured that basic agreements would be developed that allowed for a coali­ tion to be formed, for sustainment of the international forces, and for the provision of ongoing resources for longer-term operations to be developed in a cooperative manner. Though it is true that military leaders have much to say about the development of the tactical aspects of any coalit ion military operation, it is just as true that the overall structure and burden-sharing agreements must be skillfully developed by diplomats from each country. Rules of engagement and force-employment considerations are unique to every nation and must be worked out in advance of operations by political leaders. Information is also a key component in any effective international inter­ vention. Citizens need to understand why their military personnel are involved in any operation that is not central to homeland defense. And as the numbers of civilians supporting intervention operations continue to swell, clear explanations of civilian requirements are also increasing! y important. At the most basic level, interventions are voluntary operations that still pose serious risk of death and damage, so the goals, mandate, and major activities of any intervention need to be well and publicly explained to all citizens of the nations involved. Information is also important to the people where an intervention is to take place-for they must fully understand the rationale for and the limitations on the use of U N force. M ILITARY LESSONS FROM T H E INTERVENTION I N EAST TIMOR

There are many military lessons from the intervention in East Timor that are of value for future crisis situations. First among these lessons is the need to maintain cooperation across the levels of war. Through the concerted and timely efforts of politicians, diplomats, and military leaders across the globe, General Cosgrove and the other key leaders of Operation Stabilise devel­ oped the right strategic conditions for military intervention without causing more bloodshed in East Timor. G eneral Cosgrove was then able to inject the proper use of force at the operational level, to avert combat with the Indo­ nesian forces during a period of significant u ncertainty and was still able to establish momentum for INTERFET's success. Tactically, forces were melded together in a variety of ways to meet mission requirements while retaining respect for the character of each national contribution. This degree of success across the levels of war is nearly unique. History shows that the coalition in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm did not transition through end­ stage; the operational coalition in Somalia cracked with the crisis of 1993; the multinational force in Haiti lacked strategic cohesion after the major intervention in 1994; and even the more recent NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo experienced a high incidence of discord at the operational and strategic levels. This was not the case in East Timor because the coalition

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was tightly bound by common objectives and maintained by national commit­ ment under the responsible leadership of a regional power: Australia. Developing responsive operational command is another key requirement driven by the uncertain nature of these international operations. International interventions are more difficult than traditional combat operations because the partner nations use military tools in ways that require more deftness and understanding than the more typical uses of combat power for destruction. Future coalitions for these types of operations will primarily remain ad hoc; national sensitivities and cultures must be accommodated if coalition integrity is to be maintained; the "enemy" will remain more situational than human b ecause the real threat will be instability, not the aggressive actions of opposi­ tion soldiers. " Measures of effectiveness" and "rules of engagement" aside, battling against insecurity and instability will always be frustrating. The only reliable response to such friction in peace operations is great flexibility in command and control and a very strong mandate that gives the force commander leverage. Good leadership is irreplaceable, and it starts with national commitment in these types of international intervention cases. Australia stepped up admi­ rably to lead the INTERFET coalition, even on short notice. And General Cosgrove commanded the coalition with even more skill. As important, the United States and other members of the Security Council strongly supported the intervention diplomatically and economically and also facilitated the right regional leadership by concerned neighboring states. The United States joined in the worthy cause and contributed, as did other members of the coalition. This was a vitally important lesson for the United States to learn: how to be simply one among the member nations in such efforts.12 General Castellaw, Brigadier Dunne, and their counterparts were professional, supportive national-component commanders, and their force contributions were each appropriate and telling in their own ways. Operation Stabilise also showed the value of training, exercising, and developing doctrine to support coalition peace operations. There is no doubt that training exchanges among the nations invo I ved, exercises su eh as Rain­ bow Serpent and Crocodile, as well as doctrine such as the AB CA Handbook (American, Britain, Canada, Australia), were immensely helpful once Oper­ ation Stabilise was launched . Most military officers interviewed commented on the increased levels of trust and " make-do " attitudes in East Timor that resulted from having worked together in the past. In an era when budgets are tight and many politicians do not understand that the real value of these activities far exceeds the immediate benefits, nations should continue to sup­ port similar multinational training opportunities to d evelop interoperability and give ad hoc coalitions the solid operational foundation they require if they are needed on short notice. Operation Stabilise also reinforced the relevance of joint approaches at the operational level. Even given that the geography of East Timor drove

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planning toward land-sea-air solutions, it is clear that joint approaches inte­ grating the capabilities of all military services from the various contributing nations contributed much to the effectiveness of the campaign. Without a joint operational perspective, General Cosgrove could not have executed his deployment under uncertain conditions as well, nor could he have adjusted as decisively from his "oil spot" strategy to quickly focus on border opera­ tions when the opportunity arose. The Use of Operational Regions

Because of the differing tactics, equipment, and national objectives of the force elements allocated to INTERFET and the military component of UNTAET, the entire force was not operationally cohesive, which is often a reality of modern multinational operations. Yet, in Timor, the commanders properly tasked every force element available to them and effectively shared scarce resources for the good of the entire command. INTERFET did this exceptionally well. Once the centers of gravity were evident, the staff man­ aged the forces available to develop a strong " Dili Command" foundation for INTERFET overall and also focused the combat power of the force in such a way as to maximize the effectiveness of each national component. Thus, the Australian multinational 3rd Brigade was placed in the west, the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment in Oecussi, and the Thai Joint Task Force, Philippine Battalion, and Republic of Korea Battalion all in the east. This assignment of Thai, Philippine, and ROK areas of operations not only satis­ fied national command concerns but also acknowledged the focus of the Thais on humanitarian assistance, which was the primary mission requirement in the areas assigned to them, and the ROK contingent's need to maximize force protection during a critical period back at homeY Not only did this regional employment concept take best advantage of the strengths of each national contingent, but it also paved the way for the eventual turnover of responsibility to UNTAET and its use of national regions within the United Nations framework. This concept is certainly not new; it had been used during previous interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. But the decision to employ it was a conscious act and deserves rec­ ognition as rhe best fir in rhe circumstances of rhe time, made operationally effective through strong leadership and effective staff work. Multinational Command Integration

Thailand's General Songkitti Jaggabatara served as both a national com­ mand element commander and General Cosgrove's first deputy commander. Under many circumstances this "dual hatting" might have been a contribu­ tion to multinational cohesiveness, but during operations in East Timor the complexity of both roles did not mesh well together-primarily due to what Alan Ryan has insightfu lly called "divergem operational cultures." 1 4

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The key issue is ensuring centralized control of the entire multinational force while facilitating the execution of assigned tasks by the national elements using their own doctrines and procedures. General Cosgrove successfully alleviated this problem by employing operational regions, a policy that was continued under U NTAET, but multinational staff effectiveness remained an issue requiring daily attention for the duration of operations in East TimorY Most security analysts and military leaders agree that this is an area that deserves improvement. The transition of command among senior regional military offic ers did work very well for U NTAET. General de Ios Santos transitioned the initial UNTAET military component command to General Boonsrang Niumpradit, who then passed his responsibilities as force commander to his fellow Thai general Winai Phattiyakul quite effectively. This ability to transition senior command through a series of effective officers, representing concerned regional states, added much to the coherence of UNTAET over the duration of its service in East Timor and forced useful linkages for the East Timor Defense Force. It was continued under UNMISET. Nations must continue to work the tactical interoperability problem to ensure cohesive forces will be able to operate together during future inter­ ventions. As the United States moves farther afield, toward ever more digitized systems, it must make the real costs of the widening communications gap with its friends and allies well known. The natural trade-off for the U nited States will be more frequent commitments as a lead nation when it can ill afford to execute such important yet militarily ponderous operations, or the maintenance of a suitable suite of coalition command, control, and com­ munications technology that can meet the requirements of lower-intensity peace operations with a variety of coalition partners. In a similar vein, other likely regional partners should continue efforts to standardize communica­ tions and command systems to at least the data interchange level. Superb military personnel will find a way to make things work on the ground if they have trust in the operational and strategic elements of the mission and the units within the coalition, but tactical interoperability of basic systems remains important for rapid and effective coalition building. The development of the East Timor Defence Force was also a visionary and flexible response to a particular cultural issue within Timorese society. It balanced the need for national integration with security and economic concerns to provide an unanticipated platform of strength for the new nation. It also developed an indigenous capability to assist in the eventual drawdown of the UN military contingent in response to national sovereignty. Good relations with host military and police forces, if not effective integration of effort, should be the goal during UN intervention operations. Finally, modern military operations will remain costly-in real human terms. Member states of the INTERFET coalition and the UNTAET military component expended huge amounts of national treasure in East Timor.

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This treasure must be measured in terms of regional stability, military operations tempo, and equipment and personnel readiness. In addition to an unknowable number of Timorese, several INTERFET and UNTAET military personnel died bringing freedom to the people of East Timor. Even in modern peace operations, pain and death exact a high price on every force committed under circumstances of instability. This fact is well recog­ nized by the families of the contributing nations, and it should not be soon forgotten. LESSONS O F G O O D G OVERNANCE

Because the goal of the United Nations in East Timor was to facilitate a referendum that led to independence, the development of effective governance was always an important consideration. In any effort to assist a partner nation, effective governance is an essential component, ensuring that funds will be directed fairly and appropriately for the task at hand, and ensuring that human rights and proper security procedures will be developed and maintained in a culturally acceptable manner. In every case where the U nited Nations has intervened in the affairs of another state, the degree of good governance achieved was directly related to the success of the venture. In the Timorese case, the people were effectively represented by at least two well-rooted organizations beginning soon after the Indonesian assump­ tion of control in 1976. Over time, FRETILIN became the primary repre­ sentative institution of the majority of Timorese. Xanana Gusmao and, to a lesser degree, Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta made sure that the interests of the Timorese people were well understood. Once the popular consultation clearly revealed that the people wanted independence from Indonesia and that these men were speaking for the majority of the local residents, the United Nations representatives in East Timor were able to assist in the cre­ ation of a FRETILIN-based government that could work toward meeting all the requirements of an effectively run state. Many other states suffer because they have no majority voice in govern­ ment, or they have multiple uncooperative voices within government, as in Somalia, or the governance that exists is skewed toward only a minority of those who need support. In all these cases, it is nearly impossible for any organization, including the United Nations, to effectively make progress in a state with a dysfunctional government. Some form of effective governance is a prerequisite for international commitment over the long term. Without a sense that a governance mechanism capable of effective management exists, no partner nation will be willing to expend its national resources in aid. With a single FRETILIN-based government under development, the United Nations was able to provide essential services for a temporary period, while truly nation institutions-such as a national police, a constitution, a legislature, and the bureaus of administration required to interact domestically

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and with other nations-were developed. The Constituent Assembly elected in August 2001 brought a clear majority of fifty-five of eighty-eight seats to FRETILIN. Fortunately, the East Timorese benefited from a multiple-year period of relative calm, during which these national institutions could gain strength and national support. Other nations, such as Haiti and Somalia were much less lucky during the immediate decades surrounding the found­ ing of Timor-Leste, and their governments were unable to gain the stability needed to provide minimum essential services to their populations. Unfortunately, there seems to be no easy external solution to the vexing problem of good governance. Without FRETILIN, and without the judg­ ment, patriotism, and skill of Xanana Gusmao, East Timor might have floundered, as have other states like Somalia, and no amount of external assistance, or influx of resources, can substitute for these essential qualities in local capability. Though the United Nations has never yet made it explicit, some assessment of the capability of a state to develop good governance in a short period of time should be a well u nderstood prerequisite for any future intervention. Appropriately, good governance in Timor-Leste included acknowledg­ ment of a few essential unifying cultural factors: the importance of the Catho­ lic Church, the value of the Tetum language, and the ethnic solidarity of the people. These factors provided a baseline for the development of an indigenous police force for security, and that security, combined with j udicious resourcing by supporting states and the United Nations, slowly developed a sufficient economy to allow the Timorese people to prosper. With some prosperity and the further development of other national institutions and ministries, the new nation survived infancy-an early period when far too many other new states have failed. IMPROVED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND E C ONOMIC D EVELOPMENT

Just as assistance for the displaced and suffering population of East Timor was a clear immediate necessity to restore calm and confidence, economic development was crucial to the longer-term stability oft he new East Timorese state. Good governance requires a significant level of local capability, and economic development also needs some fundamental level of economic viabil­ ity within the state. Of course, even that level of economic viability required for a chance at prosperity can all too often be squandered by ineffective or bad governance. Thus good governance and economic development are equally essential, and their growth is symbiotic for national survival. The immediate humanitarian assistance provide by the UN and the UNHCR and the contributions of the many benevolent supporting nations made a real difference in East Timor from 1999 to 2002. There can be no doubt that the destruction wreaked throughout the state during the summer

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of 1999 would have been impossible for the East Timorese to recover from on their own. The local economy was nearly destroyed, and much of the infrastructure was damaged beyond the means of the local people to repair. This made the contributions of the United Nations and partner states fundamental in the first years of independence. Still, the important fact is that the Timorese people were good recipients of this aid, and they did use it to rebuild the essential services of their nation, which allowed them to slowly but resolutely restore the economic foundation oft heir nation. With the foundation shored up over the first two years follow­ ing the U N intervention, the Timorese government continued to place its emphasis in the most crucial areas required to enhance economic viability and actually increase prosperity in some areas. These actions have given the government necessary credibility with the supporting donor nations and have also confirmed the trust the people have placed in their leaders. LEARNING FROM THE CREATION O F A NEW NATION

The path East Timor took in 1999 was a difficult one, but its progress was steady and relatively comprehensive. The success found by the Timorese during their movement toward freedo m was based upon four key factors: strong leadership both before and after independence by Xanana Gusmao, commonality of religion and culture giving a real feeling of national identity, relative geo gr aphic isolation that provided for external security, a nd an acceptable level of domestic resources upon which to build an economic fa u ndation. While no ne of these four factors cou Id have guaranteed success by itself, the four together, with the strong administrative and security baseline established by the United Nations, gave East Timor the foundation it needed to be successful during its most difficult, early years of independence. Though these four factors will not be present in every situation where the United Nations has an interest in intervention, they do serve as criteria for assessing the chances of success of future interventions. Clearly, if the external security of a region can be guaranteed and economic conditions are positive, an intervention with limited objectives may still succeed without a strong national identity, but it is highly unlikely that any future intervention could be successful without any of these criteria being met. In particular, the leadership demonstrated b y General Peter Cosgrove, President Xanana Gusmao and Ambassador Sergio Vieira de Mello, among others, made a significant difference in the success of Operation Stabilise and the entire effort to bring freedom to East Timor. There can be no doubt that the most important criteria in any intervention operation is the caliber and dedication of the leaders directing the effort. They do not have to be experienced or particularly well educated people, but they need to be confi­ dent, flexible, and morally correct, and they should be fully empowered to

140

Triumph of Self-Determination

make critical decisions on the scene with the full backing of a UN mandate or other empowering authority. THE FUTURE PATH FOR EAST TIMOR

Since the creation of the new Timorese government and the election of Xanana Gusmao as the nation's first elected president, Timor-Leste has continued its slow but deliberate development Support provided by member states of the UN and international organizations such as the World Bank has been solid. Yet, as is commonly the case for a new nation, progress has not been consistent or constant. The United Nations remained fully engaged with East Timor after its independence on May 20, 2002, using a model of successive UN missions similar to the process that had helped Haiti recover from its problems in the 1990s. In 2002, the Security Council initially established a U nited Nations Mission of Support in East Timor to provide assistance to the Timorese for an estimated two-year period, or until essential operational responsibilities were successfully undertaken by the Timorese government. Subsequently, in 2004, in face of weaknesses in Timorese security, the Security Council extended the UNMISET mandate for another year to permit Timor-Leste to become more self-sufficient. U NMISET successfully completed its original mandate on May 20, 2005.1 6 However, as no state is completely free of challenges, progress has not been without difficulties for the Timorese, and future crises will certainly continue to pose problems. During 2005-2006 Timor-Leste continued to refine its government after the dismissal of the original prime minister, Mari Alkatiri. The Security Council created a new UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) in August 2006 "to help restore order after deadly fighting . . . caused the deaths of at least 37 people and forced about 1 55,000 others or 15 per cent of the population to flee their homes." 1 7 UNMIT was designed to support the government of Timor-Leste in "consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion. " 1 8 Most recently, with Resolution 1745 (2007), the UN Security Council extended the U NMIT mandate again u ntil February 2008, with additional police personnel, in order to continue its support of Timor-Leste and ensure the continued development of the Timorese police and security forces. This enduring support from the international body has meant all the d ifference to the Timorese, far outweighing its value in personnel or monetary terms, for with the long-standing focus of the U N Security Council on Dili and the Timorese environs, international support and scrutiny have ensured both regular and positive progress. .

L essons for

a

New Century

141

In May 2007 Jose Ramos-Horta won the second national presidential election held in the new nation of Timor-Leste and became the successor to Xanana G usmao. 1 9 It was perhaps predictable that the second most influ en­ tial person in the nation's long struggle for independence should become its second president. However, it was even more significant that the election was held with fairness and very high voter turnout. There should be little doubt that the future of Timor-Leste will be bright. Even if instability or corruption should menace the nation in the future , the foundation established during its crucial early years in existence should serve the Timorese people and their country well. With continued United Nations support and the increasing globali zation of international interests, there is every reason to believe that the Timorese will always remain free to decide their own future.

Appendix A Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the EastTimorese through a Direct Ballot

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Agree as follows: Immediately following the conclusion of the agreement between the two Governments requesting the Secretary-General to consult the East Timorese people on whether they would accept or reject the proposed constitutional framework for autonomy, the Secretary-General will, subject to the appro­ priate legislative mandate, begin preparations for the popular consultation by deploying in East Timor such personnel as will be adequate for the pur­ pose of executing the various phases of the consultation process. Preparations for the vote outside East Timor will also begin at locations of major East Timorese concentration outside East Timor.

A. DATE FOR CONSULTATION The ballot will take place on Sunday, 8 August 1999, both inside and outside East Timor.

144

Appendix A

B. QUESTIONTO BE PUT BEFORE THE VOTERS

The question that the Secretary-General will put to the voters is: "Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?" ACCEPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OR

"Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?" REJECT The United Nations logo will appear on the ballot papers. The ballot p apers will include symbols to facilitate voting by illiterate persons.

C. ENTITLEMENT TO VOTE

The following persons, aged 1 7 years or above, shall be eligible to vote in the popular consultation: { a } persons born in East Timor, { b } persons born outside East Timor but with at least one parent having been born in East Timor, and { c} persons whose spouses fall under either of the two categories above.

D. S C HEDULE O F THE C ONSULTATION PROCESS (IN OVERLAPPING TIME PERIODS)

The schedule for the operational stages of the consultation process will be approximately as follows: Operational planning/Deployment Public information programme/ Voter education Preparation and Registration Exhibition of lists and challenges/ Decisions on challenges and complaints Political Campaign Cooling off period Polling Day

• Subject to revision

10 May-15 June 1 0 May-5 A ugust 1 3 June-1 7 July 1 8 July-23 July 20 July-5 August'" 6 August-7 August 8 August

Appendix A

145

E. OPERATIONAL PHASES

a) Information Campaign •

The United Nations will make available the text of the main Agreement and the a utonomy document to be voted on in the following languages: Tetun, Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese and English.

•

The United Nations will d isseminate and explain the content ofthe main Agree­ ment and the a utonomy document in an impartial and factual manner inside and outside East Timor.

•

The United Nations will explain to voters the process and procedure of the vote, and the implications of an "accept" or "'reject" vote.

•

The radio stations and the newspapers in East Timor as well as other Indone­ sian and Portuguese media o utlets will be utilized in the dissemination of this information. Other appropriate means of dissemination will be made use of as required.

b) Registration •

Registration inside and o utside East Timor will take place for a continuous period of20 days.

•

Two hundred registration centres will be opened in East Timor for this p urpose.

•

O utside East Timor, special registration centres will be opened in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Ujung Pandang, Sydney, Darwin, Perth, Melbourne, Lisbon, Maputo, Macau, New York with adjustments to be made as appropriate. The United Nations may utilize the services of the Australian Electoral Commission for the balloting in Australia and of the International Orga­ nization for Migration {I OM) in Portugal and elsewhere.

•

The registration lists will be exhibited for five days at the end of the registration period at the respective registration centres, regional offices and at Dili headquarters . Challenges to the lists shall b e submitted to the regional offices for a final decision by the Electoral Commission prior to polling day.

c) Campaign •

Supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal will campaign ahead of the vote in a peaceful and democratic manner during the period designated for this pur­ pose.

•

There will be a Code of Conduct for the campaign, to be proposed by the United Nations and discussed with the supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal.

•

The United Nations will devise the means to provide equal opportunity for the two sides to disseminate their views to the public.

•

Officials of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal will not participate in the campaign in support of either option.

•

East Timorese government officials may campaign in their personal capacity. All such campaigning will be carried out strictly according to the Code of Conduct without use of public funds and government resources or recourse to pressure of office.

146

Appendix A

d ) Balloting in East Timor •

Voting in East Timor will take place in approximately 700 registration/polling stations located in 200 polling centres.

e} Balloting o utside East Timor •

Voting will take place in polling stations set up in the same locations as the registration centres mentioned above.

f) 0 bs ervers •

Indonesia and Portugal shall be entitled to send a n equal number of representa­ tives to ob�erve all the operational phases of the consultation process both inside and outside East Timor.

•

International observers will be able to observe the consultation process under terms to be developed by the United Nations to regulate their presence.

F. FUNDING

The Secretary -General will seek the approval of the Security Council for the o p eration in order to ensure assessed budgetary funding. Voluntary contributions will be channeled through a Trust Fund established for this purpose. G. S ECURITY

The Indonesian authorities will ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation process and will be responsible for the security of United Nations personnel. A number of United Nations security guards will be deployed to ensure the security and safety of United Nations person­ nel and property. A number of international civilian police will be available in East Timor to advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the popular consultation and) at the time of the consultation) to super vise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from polling sites. DONE in New York on this 5th day of May) 1999. For the Government of Indonesia) Ali Alatas ) Minister for Foreign Affairs For the United Nations) Kofi A. Annan) Secretary- General For the Government of Portugal) J aime Gama) Minister for Foreign Affairs

Appendix B Code of Conduct for Participants in EastTimor Popular Consultation

PREAMBLE Whereas the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary­ General of the United Nations recognize that freedom of movement, speech and assembly and a secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation is [sic] a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor; and Bearing in mind that the Agreement between the Governments of Indo­ nesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement") provides that there will be a Code of Conduct for the campaign, and that all such campaigning will be carried out strictly according to the Code of Conduct; supporters and opponents of autonomy (hereinafter referred to as "participants") shall be bound by the following code of conduct.

COMPLIANCE WITH THE DIRECTIONS ISSUED FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE DIRECT BALLOT 1 . All participants shall actively contribute to the creation of a climate of demo­

cratic tolerance by avoiding political violence, publicly and repeatedly condemn­ ing political violence and encouraging an understanding of the importance of democratic pluralism and a culture of political tolerance. 2. All participants shall adhere to the Directions relating to the conduct of the Popular Consultation of the People of East Timor through a Direct Ballot issued by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor Popu­ lar Consultation pursuant to the Agreement and shall cooperate with the United

148

Appendix B Nations Mission in East Timer {UNAMET) and shall acknowledge the author­ ity of the United Nations to administer the consultation process in East Timer.

FREEDOM O F SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY 3. All participants shall enjoy the fundamental right to a fair ballot, including the

freedom to campaign. 4. All participants shall respect the right and freedom of all other participants to campaign and to disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear. 5. The conduct of participants shall reflect a respect for the rights of other partici­ pants, and for the rights of voters and members of the community. 6. The freedom of the press shall be respected and participants shall refrain from any harassment or obstruction of journalists i n the p ursuit of their professional activities. 7. Participants shall not in any way whatsoever disrupt, destroy or frustrate cam­ paign efforts of other participants and, in particular, marches or demonstra­ tions. 8. Participants shall not engage in, and must affirmatively discourage, the obstruction of persons from attending the political rallies, meetings, marches or demonstra­ tions of other participants. 9. Participants shall not seek to prevent the distribution of handbills and leaflets, and the display of posters of other participants. Participants shall a ffirmatively discourage the destruction of handbills, leaflets, posters and any political material of other participants. 1 0 . Participants shall observe the prohibition against campaigning two days before polling d ay.

LANCUAC E AND CAMPAIGNS 1 1 . Speakers at campaign rallies shall at all times avoid using language which is

inflammatory, defamatory, or threatens or incites violence in any form against any other person or gro up of persons. 12. Participants shall at all times, likewise, avoid using language which is inflamma­ tory, defamatory, or threatens or incites violence in any form against any other person or groups of persons in campaigns through all forms of the media includ­ ing electronic media. 1 3 . Participants shall not iss ue pamphlets, newsletters or posters, whether officially or anonymously, which contain language which threatens or incites violence, or makes wilfully false statements or allegations. INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE

1 4 . Intimidation, in any form, is unacceptable, and is expressly forbidden. 1 5 . No participant shall: { a ) Kill, torture, injure, apply violence to intimidate or

threaten any other person in connection with that person's political beliefs, words, writing or actions; {b) Carry guns or weapons of any kind to a political rally or public meeting; {c) Use language which threatens or incites violence in any form

Appendix B

149

against any other person or group of persons; ( d ) Remove, disfigure, destroy, plagiarise or otherwise misrepresent any symbol, campaign material or any other material of any other participant; (e) Interfere with obstruct or threaten any other person or group travelling to or from, or intending to attend any gathering for campaign p urposes; (f) Seek to compel, by force or threat of force or any other means, any person to join any group or organisation taking part in the campaign, attend any meeting, make any contributions, resign from any post or office, boycott any occasion or commercial activity or withhold his or her labour or fail to perform lawful obligations; (g) Obstruct or interfere with any participant's efforts to contact or address any group of people; (h) Respond to any provocation other than to bring such activity to the attention of the Indo­ nesian Police and UNAMET. ,

VOTING PROCESS, CORRUPT PRACTICES

16. Participants shall uphold and aid in maintaining the secrecy of the voting. 17. Participants shall not falsely assert or imply to voters that their votes will not be secret. 1 8 . Participants shall not coerce or offer monetary or other kinds of inducements to persons to vote for or against the proposed special autonomy within the unitary Republic of Indonesia, or to abstain from voting. 19. Participants shall not procure the support or assistance of any civil servant to promote or hinder the campaign of other participants. 20. Participants shall extend their co-operation to voting officials to ensure peaceful and orderly polling, and complete freedom for voters to exercise their franchise without being subjected to any annoyance or obstruction. 2 1 . Participants shall ensure the safety and security of voting officials before, during and after the ballot. 22. Participants shall facilitate and co-operate with Indonesian and Portuguese offi­ cial observers and other observers who are authorised under the Agreement to observe the consultation process . 23. Participants shall not procure votes by forcible occupation of polling stations or through illegal activities in the polling stations. 24. Participants shall refrain from interfering unj ustifiably or in bad faith with the duties of voting officials, which interference includes but is not limited to seizure or destruction of ballots, fraud or intimidation, so as not to disturb the process of casting or counting of votes.

ACCEPTING THE RESULTS O F T H E POPULAR CONSUlTATION 25. Bearing in mind that the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the

Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor ( hereinafter referred to as the "Main Agreement") requests the Secretary-General to put the proposed con­ stitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both inside and outside East Timor for their consideration and acceptance or rej ection through

150

Appendix B

a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, and entrusts the conduct of the consultation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; and 26. Bearing in mind that the Secretary-General is, under the Main Agreement, entrusted with the a uthority to determine on the basis of the result of the popu­ lar cons ultation and in accordance with the Main Agreement whether or not the proposed constitutional framework for special a utonomy is acceptable to the East Timorese; 2 7. All the participants agree to accept the officially validated outcome of the popular consultation, in accordance with the Main Agreement of 5 May 1999.

Issued by lan Martin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor Popular Consultation. lan Martin U NAMET Headquarters, Dili, 9 August 1999

Appendix C United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4045th meeting, on 15 September 1999 The Security Council, Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President on the situation in East Timor, Recalling also the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and security arrangements (S/1999/5 13, Annexes I to Ill), Reiterating its welcome for the successful conduct of the popular consul­ tation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999 and taking note of its outcome, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the views of the East Timorese people, Deeply concerned by the deterioration in the security situation in East Timor, and in particular by the continuing violence against and large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians, Deeply concerned also at the attacks on the staff and premises of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), on other officials and on international and national humanitarian personnel, Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

152

Appendix C

Appalled by the worsening humanitarian situation in East Timor, partic­ ularly as it affects women, children and other vulnerable groups, Reaffirming the right of refugees and displaced persons to return in safety and security to their homes, Endorsing the report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili (S/1999/976), Welcoming the statement by the President of Indonesia on 12 September 1999 in which he expressed the readiness of Indonesia to accept an interna­ tional peacekeeping force through the U nited Nations in East Timor, Welcoming the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia to the Secretary-General of 14 September 1999 (S/1999/97 5 ), Reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indo­ nesia, Expressing its concern at reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have been committed in East Timor, and stressing that persons committing such violations bear individual responsibility, Determining that the present situation in East Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the U nited Nations, 1. Condemns all acts of violence in East Timer, calls for their immediate end and demands that those resp ons i bl e for s uch acts be brought to j ustice; 2. Emphasizes the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian assistance and the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian orga­ nizations and calls upon all parties to cooperate with such organizations so as to ens ure the protection of civilians at risk, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid; 3. Authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, p ursuant to the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 12 September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace and security i n East Timer, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force ea pabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and a uthorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate; 4. Welcomes the expressed commitment of the Government of Indonesia to coop­

erate with the m ultinational force in all aspects of the implementation of its mandate and looks forward to dose coordination between the multinational force and the Government of Indonesia; 5.

Underlines the Government of Indonesia's continuing responsibility under the Agreements of 5 May 1999, taking into account the mandate of the m ultina­ tional force set out in paragraph 3 above, to maintain peace and security in East Timer in the interim phase between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of its result and to guarantee the security of the personnel and premises of UNAMET;

Appendix C

153

6. Welcomes the offers by Member States to organize, lead and contribute to the m ultinational force i n East Timor, calls on Member States to make further con­ tributions of personnel, equipment and other resources and invites Member States in a position to contribute to inform the leadership of the multinational force and the Secretary-General; 7. Stresses that it is the responsibility of the Indonesian authorities to take immedi­ ate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees to East Timor;

8. Notes that Article 6 of the Agreement of 5 May 1999 states that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations, and requests the leadership of the multinational force to cooperate closely with the United Nations to assist and support those arrangements; 9. Stresses that the expenses for the force will be borne by the partici paring

Member States concerned and req uests the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund through which contributions could be channelled to the States or operations concerned; 10. Agrees that the multinational force should collectively be deployed in East Timor until replaced as soon as possible by a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and invites the Secretary-General to make prompt recommendations on a peacekeeping operation to the Security Council; 1 1 . Invites the Secretary-General to plan and prepare for a United Nations transitio na 1

administration in East Timor, incorporating a United Nations peacekeeping operation, to be deployed in the implementation phase of the popular consulta­ tion (phase Ill) and to make recommendations as soon as possible to the Security Council; 12. Requests the leadership of the multinational force to provide periodic reports on progress towards the implementation of its mandate through the Secretary­ General to the Co unci!, the first such re port to be made within 1 4 days of the adoption of this resolution; 13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Appendix D United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4057th meeting, on 25 October 1999 The Security Council, Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President on the situation in East Timor, in particular resolutions 384 (1975) of 22 December 1975, 389 (1976) of 22 April 1976, 1236 (1999) of 7 May 1999, 1246 (1999) of 11 June 1999, 1262 (1999) of 27 August 1999 and 1264 (1999) of 15 September 1999, Recalling also the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and security arrangements (S/1999/5 13, annexes I to Ill), Reiterating its welcome for the successful conduct of the popular consul­ tation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999, and taking note of its outcome through which the East Timorese people expressed their clear wish to begin a process of transition under the authority of the United Nations towards independence, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the views of the East Timorese people, Welcoming the decision of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly on 19 October 1999 concerning East Timor, Stressing the importance of reconciliation among the East Timorese people,

156

App endix D

Commending the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) for the admirable courage and determination shown in the implementation of its mandate) Welcoming the deployment of a multinational force to East Timor pursuant to resolution 1264 ( 1 999)) and recognizing the importance of continued cooperation between the Government of Indonesia and the multinational force in this regard) Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 4 October 1999 (S/1999/1024)) Noting with satisfaction the successful outcome of the trilateral meeting held on 28 September 1999) as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General; Deeply concerned by the grave humanitarian situation resulting from violence in East Timor and the large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians) including large numbers of women and children) Reaffirming the need for all parties to ensure that the rights of refugees and displaced persons are protected) and that they are able to return volun­ tarily in safety and security to their homes) Reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia) Noting the importance of ensuring the security of the boundaries of East Timor) and noting in this regard the expressed intention of the Indonesian authorities to cooperate with the multinational force deployed pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999) and with the United Nations Transitional Adminis­ tration in East Timor) Expressing its concern at reports indicating that systematic) widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have been committed in East Timor) stressing that persons committing such violations bear individual responsibility) and calling on all parties to cooperate with investigations into these reports) Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994) Determining that the continuing situation in East Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security) Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the U nited Nations) 1. Decides to establish, in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General, a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor {UNTAET), which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive a uthority, including the administration of j ustice; 2. Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist ofthe following elements: { a ) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; { b ) To establish an effective a dministration; {c) To assist in the

Appendix D

157

development of civil and social services; { d ) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; {e) To support capacity-building for self-government; {f) To assist in the estab­ lishment of conditions for sustainable development; 3. Decides further that UNTAET will have obj ectives and a structure along the lines set out in part IV of the report of the Secretary-General, and in particular that its main components will be: {a) A governance and public admi nistration component, including an i nternational police element with a strength of up to 1,640 officers; {b) A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation com­ ponent; {c) A military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers;

4. Authorizes UNTAET to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate; 5. Recognizes that, in developing and performing its functions under its mandate, UNTAET will need to draw on the expertise and capacity of Member States, United Nations agencies and other international organizations, including the international financial institutions; 6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Represen­ tative who, as the Transitional Administrator, will be responsible for all aspects of the United Nations work i n East Timor and will have the power to enact new laws and regulations and to amend, suspend or repeal existing ones; 7.

Stresses the importance of cooperation between Indonesia, Portugal and UNTAET in the implementation of this resolution;

8. Stresses the need for UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view to the development of local democratic institutions, including an independent East Timorese human rights i nstitution, and the transfer to these institutions of its administrative and public service functions; 9. Requests UNTAET and the m ultinational force deployed p ursuant to resolution

1264 { 1999) to cooperate closely with each other, with a view also to the replace­ ment as soon as possible of the multinational force by the military component of UNTAET, as notified by the Secretary-General having consulted the leadership of the multinational force, taking into account conditions on the ground; 10. Reiterates the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and calls upon all p arties to cooperate with humanitarian and human rights organizations so as to ensure their safety, the protection of civilians, in par­ ticular children, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid; 1 1 . Welcomes the commitment of the Indonesian authorities to allow the refugees and displaced persons in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia to choose whether to return to East Timor, remain where they are or be resettled in other parts of Indonesia, and stresses the importance of allowing full, safe and unim­ peded access by humanitarian organizations in carrying out their work; 12. Stresses that it is the responsibility of the Indonesian a uthorities to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia to East Timor, the security of refugees, and the civilian

158

Appendix D and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, in particular by curbin g the violent and intimidatory activities of the militias there;

1 3 . Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund avail­ able for, inter alia, the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, including the b uilding of basic institutions, the functioning of public services and utilities, and the salaries of local civil servants; 1 4 . Enco urages Member States and international agencies and organizations to pro­ vide personnel, eq uipment and other resources to UNTAET as re q uested by the Secretary-General, including for the building of basic institutions and capacity, and stresses the need for the closest possible coordination of these efforts; 1 5 . Underlines the importance of incl uding in UNTAET personnel with appropriate training in interna tio na l humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, i ncl udi ng child and gender related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination; -

16. Condemns all violence and acts in support of violence in East Timor, calls for their immediate end, and demands that those responsible for such violence be brou ght to j ustice; 17. Decides to establish UNTAET for an initial period until 31 January 2001; 18. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely and regularly informed of progress towards the implementation of this resolution, includin g in particular, with regard to the deployment of UNTAET and possible future reductions of its military component if the situation i n East Timor improves, and to submit a report within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter; ,

1 9 . Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Appendix E Extracts from the Constitution of the Democratic Republic ofTimor-Leste

PART I, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Section 1 1. The Democratic Republic of East Timor is a democratic, sovereign, independent

and unitary State based on the rule of law, the will of the people and the respect for the dignity of the human person. 2. The 28th of November 1975 is the Day of Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

Section 2 1. Sovereignty rests with the people, who shall exercise it in the manner and form

laid down in the Constitution. 2. The State shall be subject to the Constitution and to the law. 3. The validity of the laws and other actions of the State and local Government

depends upon their compliance with the Constitution. 3. The State shall recognise and value the norms and customs of East Timor that

are not contrary to the Constitution and to any legislation dealing specifically with customary law.

Section 3 1. There shall be original citizenship and acquired citizenship in the Democratic

Republic of East Timor.

Section 4 1. The territory of the Democratic Republic of East Timor comprises the land sur­

face, the maritime zone and the air space demarcated by the national boundaries that historically comprise the eastern part ofTimor Island, the enclave of Oecussi, the island of Ataliro and the islet of Jaco.

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Appendix E

2. The extent and limits of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone, and the rights of East Timer to the adjacent sea bed and continental shelf shall be laid down in the law. 3. The State shall not alienate any part of the East Timorese territory or the rights of sovereignty over the land, without prejudice to rectification of borders.

Section 5 1 . On matters of territorial organisation, the State shall respect the principle of decentralisation of public a dministra tio n.

2 . The law shall determine and establish the characteristics of the different territorial levels and the administrative competencies of the respective organs. 3. Oecussi Ambeno and Atauro shall enjoy special administrati ve and economic treatment.

Section 6 The fundamental objectives of the State shall be: a) To defend and guaran­ tee the sovereignty of the country; b) To guarantee and promote fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens and the respect for the principles of the democratic State based on the rule of law; c) To defend and guarantee political democracy and participation of the people in the resolution of national problems; d) To guarantee the d evelopment of the economy and the progress of science and technology; e) To promote the building of a soci­ ety based on social justice, by establishing material and spiritual welfare of the citizens; f) To protect the environment and to preserve natural resources; g) To assert and value the personality and the cultural heritage of the East Timorese people; h) To promote the establishment and the development of relations of friendship and co-operation among all Peoples and States; i) To promote the harmonious and integrated development of the sectors and regions and the fair distribution of the national product; j ) To create, promote and guarantee the effective equality of opportunities between women and men. Section 7 1 . The people shall exercise the political power through universal, free, equal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage and through other forms laid down in the Constitution.

Section 8 1 . On matters of international relations, the Democratic Republic of East Timer shall govern itself by the principles of national independence, the right of the Peoples to self-determination and independence, the permanent sovereignty of the peoples over their wealth and natural resources, the protection of human rights, the mutual respect for sovereignty, territoria 1 integrity and equality among States and the non-interference in domestic affairs of other States.

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The Democratic Republic of East Timor shall establish relations of friendship and cooperation with all other peoples, aiming at the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the general, simultaneous and controlled disarmament, the establish­ ment of a system of collective security and establishment of a new international economic order capable of ensuring peace and j ustice in the relations among peoples.

Section 1 0 1 . The Democratic Republic of East Timor shall extend its solidarity to the struggle of all peoples for national liberation.

2. The Democratic Republic of EastTimor shall grant political asylum, in accordance with the law, to foreigners persecuted as a result of their struggle for national and social liberation, defence of human rights, democracy and peace.

Section 1 1 1 . The Democratic Republic of East Timor acknowledges and values the historical resistance of the Maubere People against foreign domination and the contribution of all those who fought for national independence. 2.

The State acknowledges and values the participation of the Catholic Church in the process of national liberation of East Timor.

3. The State shall ensure special protection to the war-disabled, orphans and other dependants of those who dedicated their lives to the struggle for independence and national sovereignty, and shall protect all those who participated in the resistance against the foreign occupation, in accordance with the law.

4. The law shall define the mechanisms for rendering tribute to the national heroes.

Section 1 2 1 . The State shall recognise and respect the different religious denominations, which are free in their organisation and in the exercise of their own activities, to take place in due observance of the Constitution and the law. 2. The State shall promote the cooperation with the different religious denominations that contrib ute to the well-being of the people of East Timor.

Section 1 3 1 . Tetum and Portuguese shall be the official languages i n the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

2. Tetum and the other national languages shall be valued and developed by the State.

Section 1 4 1 . The national symbols of the Democratic Republic of East Timor shall be the flag, the emblem and the national anthem.

2. The emblem and the national anthem shall be approved by law.

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Section 1 5 1 . The N ational Flag is rectangular and is formed b y two isosceles triangles, the bases of which are overlapping. One triangle is black and its height is equal to one-third of the length overlapped to the yellow triangle, whose height is equal to half the length of the Flag. In the centre of the black triangle there is a white star of five ends, meaning the light that guides. The white star has one of its ends turned towards the left side end of the flag. The remaining part of the flag is red. 2.

The colours mean: yellow-the traces of colonialism; black-the obscurantism that needs to be overcome; red-the struggle for national liberation; white-peace.

PART 11: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, FREEDOMS AND GUARANTEES Title I, General Principles

Section 1 6 1 . All citizens are equal before the law, shall exercise the same rights and shall be subject to the same d uties. 2.

No one shall be discriminated against on grounds of colour, race, marital status, gender, ethnical origin, language, social or economic status, political or ideological convictions, religion, ed ucation and physical or mental condition.

Section 1 7 Women and men shall have the same rights and duties family, political, economic, social and cultural life.

m

all areas of

Section 1 8 1 . Children shall be entitled to special protection by the family, the comm u nity and the State, particularly against all forms of abandonment, discrimination, violence, oppression, sexual abuse and exploitation. 2.

Children shall enjoy all rights that are universally recognised, as well as all those that are enshrined in international conventions commonly ratified or approved by the State.

3. Every child born inside or outside wedlock shall enjoy the same rights and social protection.

Section 2 5 1 . Suspension of the exercise o f fundamental rights, fre edoms and guarantees shall only take place if a state of siege or a state of emergency has been declared as provided for by the Constitution. 2.

A state of siege or a state of emergency shall only be declared in case of effective or impending aggression by a foreign force, of serious disturbance or threat of serious disturbance to the democratic constitutional order, or of public disaster.

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3. A declaration of a state of siege or a state of emergency shall be substantiated, specifying rights, freedoms and guarantees the exercise of which is to be suspended. 4 . A suspension shall not last for more than thirty days, without prejudice of possible j ustified renewal, when strictly necessary, for equal periods of time. 5. In no case shall a declaration of a state of siege affect the right to life, physical integrity, citizenship, non-retroactivity of the criminal law, defence in a criminal case and freedom of conscience and religion, the right not to be subjected to torture, slavery or servitude, the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the guarantee of non-d iscrimination. 6. Authorities shall restore constitutional normality as soon as possible.

Section 2 6 Access to courts is guaranteed to all for the defence of their legally pro­ tected rights and interests. Justice shall not be denied for insufficient economic means. Section 2 7 1 . The Ombudsman shall be an independent organ in charge of examining and seeking to settle citizens' complaints against public bodies, certifying the confor­ mity of the acts with the law, preventing and initiating the whole process to remedy inj ustice.

Section 2 8

1 . Every citizen has the right to disc bey and to resist illegal orders or orders that affect their fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees. 2.

The right to self-defence is guaranteed to all, in accordance with the law.

Title II, Personal Rights, Freedoms and C uarantees

Section 2 9 1 . Human life is inviolable.

2. The State shall recognise and guarantee the right to life. 3. There shall be no death penalty in the Democratic Republic of East Timer. Section 3 0 1 . Every one has the right to personal freedom, security and integrity. 2.

No one shall b e arrested or detained, except under the terms dearly provided for by applicable law, and the order of arrest or detention should always be presented for consideration by the competent j u dge within the legal timeframe.

3. Every individual who l oses his or her freedom shall be immediately informed, in a dear and precise manner, of the reasons for his or her arrest or detention as well as of his or her rights, and allowed to contact a lawyer, directly or through a relative or a trusted person.

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4. No one shall be s ubje ct ed to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

Section 3 4 Anyone charged with a n offence is presumed innocent u ntil convicted. Section 3 6 Every individual has the right t o honour, good name and reputation, pro­ tection of his or her public image and privacy of his or her personal and family life. Section 3 7 1 . Any person's home and the privacy o f his or her correspondence and other means of private communication are inviolable, except in cases provided for by law as a result of criminal proceedings. 2. A person's home shall not be entered against his or her will, except under the written order of a competent j udicial a uthority and in the cases and manner prescribed by law. 3. Entry into any person's home at night against his or her will is clearly prohibited, except in case of serious threat to life or physical integrity of somebody inside the home.

Section 3 8 1 . Every citizen has the right to access personal data stored i n a computer system or entered into mechanical or manual records regarding him or her, and he or she shall have the right to demand the p urpose of such data. 2. The law shall determine the concept of personal data, as well as the conditions applicable to the processing thereof. 3. The processing of personal data on private life, political and philosophical con­ victions, religious faith, party or trade union membership and ethnical origin, without the consent of the interested person, is prohibited.

Section 3 9 1 . The State shall protect the family a s the society's basic unit and a condition for the harmonious development of the individual. 2. Every one has the right to establish and live in a family. 3. Marriage shall be based upon fre e consent by the parties and on terms of full equality of rights between spouses, in accordance with the law. 4. Maternity shall be dignified and protected, and special protection shall be guar­ anteed to all women during pregnancy and a fter delivery and working women shall have the right to be exempted from the workplace for an adeq uate period before and after delivery, without loss of remuneration or any other benefits, i n accordance with the law.

Section 40 1. Every person has the right to freedom of speech and the right to inform and be informed impartially.

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2. The exercise of freedom of speech and information shall not be limited by any sort of censorship. 3. The exercise of rights and freedoms referred to in this Section shall be regulated by law based on the imperative of respect for the Constitution and the dignity of the human person.

Section 4 1 1 . Freedom o f the press and other mass media i s guaranteed. 2. Freedom of the press shall comprise, namely, the freedom of speech and creativ­ ity for jo urnalists, the access to information sources, editorial freedom, protec­ tion of independence and professional confidentiality, and the right to create newspapers, p ublications and other means of broadcasting. 3. The monopoly on the mass media shall be prohibited.

4. The State shall guarantee the freedom and independence of the public mass media from political and economic powers.

Section 42 1 . Everyone is guaranteed the freedom to assemble peacefully and unarmed with­ ,

out a need for prior authorisation.

2. Everyone is recognised the right to demonstrate in accordance with the law.

Section 43 1 . Everyone is guaranteed freedom of association provided that the association is not intended to promote violence and is in accordance with the law. 2.

No one shall be compelled to join an association or to remain in it against his or her will.

3, The establishment of armed, military or paramilitary associations, including organisations of a racist or xenophobic nature or that promote terrorism, shall be prohibited.

Section 44 1 . Every person has the right to move freely and to settle anywhere in the national territory. 2. Every citizen is guaranteed the right to emigrate freely and to return to the country.

Section 45 1 . Every person is guaranteed the freedom of conscience, religion and worship and the religious denominations are separated from the State.

2. No one shall be persecuted or discriminated against on the basis of his or her religious convictions. 3. The right to be a conscientious objector shall be guaranteed in accordance with the law.

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4. Freedom to teach any religion in the framework of the respective religious denomination is guaranteed.

Section 46 1 . Every citizen has the right to pa rtici p ate in the political life and in the public affairs ofthe country, either direct! y or through democratically elected represe n­ tatives. 2.

Every citizen has the right to establish and to participate in political pa rties .

Section 4 7 1 . Every citizen over the age o f seventeen has the right to vote and to be e lected. 2.

The exercise of the right to vote is personal and constitutes a civic d uty

.

Section 49 1 . Every citizen has the right and the duty to contribute towards the defence of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. 2. Serving in the army shall take place i n a ccordance with the law. Title Ill, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Duties

Section 50 1. Every citizen, regardless of gender, has the right and the duty to work and to choose freely his or her profession. 2.

The worker has the right to labour safety and hygiene, remuneration, rest and vacation.

3. Dismissal without just cause or on political, religious and ideological gro unds is prohibited.

4. Compulsory work, without prejudice to the cases provided for under penal legislation, is prohi bited. 5.

The State shall promote the establishment of co-operatives of production and shall lend support to house hold businesses as sources of employment.

Section 53 1 . Consumers have the right to goods and services of good quality, to truthful information and protection of their health, safety and economic interests, and to reparation for damages. 2. Advertising shall be regulated by law, and all forms of concealed, indirect or misleading advertising are prohibite d .

Section 54 1. Every individual has the right to private property and can transfer it during his or her lifetime or on death, in accordance with the law.

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2. Private property should not be used to the detriment of its social p urpose. 3. Requisitioning and expropriation of property for public p urposes shall only take place following fair compensation in accordance with the law.

4. Only national citizens have the right to ownership of land. Section 56 1. Every citizen is entitled to social assistance and security in accordance with the l aw. 2. The State shall promote, in accordance with its national resources, the establish­ ment of a social security system. 3. The State shall support and supervise the activity and functioning of institutions of social solidarity and other non-profit institutions of recognised public interest, in accordance with the law. Section 57 1 . Everyone has the right to health and medical care, and the duty to protect and promote them. 2.

The State shall promote the establishment of a national health service that is universal and general. The national health service shall be free of charge in accor­ dance with the possibilities of the State and in conformity with the law.

3. The national health service shall have, as much as possible, a decentralized participatory management. Section 58

Everyone has the right to a house, both for himself or herself and for his or her family, of adequate size that meets satisfactory standards of hygiene and comfort and preserves personal intimacy and family privacy. Section 59 1. The State shall recognise and guarantee that every citizen has the right to educa­ tion and culture, and it is incumbent upon it to promote the establishment of a public system of universal and compulsory basic ed ucation that is free of charge in accordance with its ability and in conformity with the law.

2. Everyone has the right to equal opportunities for education and vocational training. 3. The State shall recognise and supervise private and co-operative education.

4. The State should ensure the access of every citizen, in accordance to their a bilities, to the highest levels of ed ucation, scientific research and artistic creativity. Section 60

The State shall guarantee and protect the creation, production and com­ mercialisation of literary, scientific and artistic work, including the legal protection of copyrights.

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Appendix E

Section 6 1 1 . Everyone has the right to a humane, healthy, and ecologically b alanced environ­ ment and the duty to protect it and improve it for the benefit of the future generations. 2.

The State shall recognise the need to preserve and rationalise natural resources.

3 . The State should promote actions aimed at protecting the environment and safe­ guarding the sustainable development of the economy.

PART Ill: O RGANIZATION OF POLITICAL POWER Title I, General Principles

Section 62 Political power lies with the people and is exercised in accordance with the terms of the Constitution. Section 63 1. Direct and active participation by men and women in political life is a require­ ment of, and a fundamental instrument for consolidating, the democratic system. 2. The law shall promote eq uality in the exercise of civil and political rights and nondiscrimination on the basis of gender for access to political positions.

Section 65 1. Elected organs of sovereignty and of local government shall be chosen b y free, direct, secret, personal and regular universal suffrage. 2. Registration of voters shall be compulsory and officially initiated, single and universal, to be up-dated for each election. 3. Electoral campaigns shall be governed in a ccordance with the following princi­ ples: a} Freedom to canvass; b} Equality of opportunity and treatment for all candidacies; c} Impartiality towards candidacies on the part of public bodies; d} Transparency and supervision of electoral expenses.

4 . Conversion of the votes into mandates shall observe the principle of proportional representation; 5. The electoral process shall be regulated by law.

6. Supervision of voters' registration and electoral acts shall be incumbent upon an independent organ, the competences, composition, organization and functioning of which shall be established by law.

Section 66 1 . Voters who are registered in the national territory may be called upon to express

their opinions in a referendum on issues of relevant national interest.

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2. A referendum shall be called by the President of the Republic, following a proposal by one third, and deliberation approved by a two thirds majority, of the Members of the National Parliament, or following a well-founded proposal by the Government. Section 6 7

The organs of sovereignty shall comprise the President of the Republic, the National Parliament, the Government and the Courts. Section 69

Organs of sovereignty, in their reciprocal relationship and exercise of their functions, shall observe the principle of separation and interdependence of powers established in the Constitution. Title II, President of the Republic

Chc.pter I, Status, Election arulAppointment Section 74 1. The President of the Republic is the Head of State and the symbol and guarantor

of national inde pendence and unity of the State and of the smooth functioning of democratic institutions.

2. The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Defence Force. Section 7 5 1 . To stand as presidential candidates, East Timorese citizens should meet each of

the following requirements cumulatively: a ) original citizenship; b ) at least 35 (Thirty -five) years of age; c) to be in possession of his or her full faculties; d) to be proposed by a minimum of five thousand voters. 2. The President of the Republic has a term of office of 5 years and shall cease his or her functions with the swearing-in of the new President-elect. 3. The President of the Republic's term of office may be renewed only once. Section 76 1 . The President of the Republic shall be elected by uni versa!, free, direct, secret, and

personal suffrage. 2. The election of the President of the Republic shall be conducted through the system based on the majority of validly expressed votes, excluding blank votes. 3 . Where no candidate gets more than half of the votes, a second round shall take place on the 30th day following the first voting.

4 . Only the two candidates obtaining the highest number of votes shall be eligible to stand i n a run-oH election, provided they have not withdrawn their candidacies.

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Chr.pter lll, Council tfSto.te

Section 90 1. The Council of State is the political advisory body of the President of the Republic and shall be headed by him or herself. 2. The Council of State shall comprise: a ) Former Presidents of the Republic who were not removed from office; b ) The Speaker of the National Parliament; c) The Prime Minister; d) Five citizens e lected b y the National Parliament in accordance with the principle of proportional representation and for the period corresponding to the legislative term, provided that they are not members of the organs of sovereignty. e) Five citizens designated by the President of the Republic for the period corresponding to the term of office of the President, provided that they are not members of the organs of sovereignty.

Section 9 1 1 . It i s incumbent upon the Council of State to: a ) Express its opinion on the dissolution of the N atio na l Parliament; b ) Express its opinion on the dismissal of the Government; c) Express its opinion on the declaration of war and the making of peace; d) Express its opinion on any other cases set out in the Consti­ tution and advise the President of the Republic in the exercise of his or her func­ tions, as req uested by the President; e) To draft its Rules of Procedures;

2. The meetings o f the Council of State shall not be open to the public. 3. The organisation and functioning of the Council of State shall be established by law. Title Ill: National Parliament Chr.pter I, Sto.tus and Election

Section 92 The National Parliament is the organ of sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of East Timor that represents all Timorese citizens and is vested with legislative supervisory and political decision making powers. Section 93 1. The National Parliament shall be e leered by universal, free, direct, e q u al, secret and personal suffrage. 2. The National Parliament shall be made up of a minimum of fifty-two and a maximum of sixty-five Members. 3. The law shall establish the rules relating to constituencies, eligibility conditions, nominations and electoral procedures.

4. Members of the N ational Parliament shall have a term of office of five years.

Section 94 1 . The Members of National Parliament shall not be held liable for civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings in regard to votes and opinions expressed by them while performing their functions.

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2. Parliamentary immunities may be withdrawn in a ccordance with the Rules of Procedures of the N ational Parliament.

Title IV: C overnment Chlopter L D1finition and Structure

Section 1 03

The Government is the organ of sovereignty responsible for conducting and executing the general policy of the country and is the supreme organ of Public Administration. Section 1 04 1 . The Government shall comprise the Prime Minister, the Ministers and the Secretaries of State.

2. The Government may include one or more Dep uty Prime Ministers and Dep uty Ministers. Section 1 05 1 . The Council of Ministers shall comprise the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, i f any, and the Ministers.

2. The Council of Ministers shall be convened and chaired by the Prime Minister. Chlopter lL Formation and ReJponsihiliry

Section 1 06 1 . The Prime Minister shall be designated by the political party or alliance of political parties with parliamentary majority and shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, a fter consultation with the political parties sitting in the National Parliament.

2. The remaining members of the Government shall be appointed by the President of the Republic following proposal by the Prime Minister. Section 1 07

The Government shall be accountable to the President of the Republic and to the National Parliament for conducting and executing the domestic and foreign policy in accordance with the Constitution and the law. Section 1 1 1 1 . The Na tional Parliament may, folio wing proposal by one-quarter of the Members in full exercise of their functions, pass a vote of no confidence on the Government with respect to the implementation of its programme or any relevant matter of national interest.

2. Where a vote of no confidence is not passed, its signatories shall not move another vote of no confidence d uring the same legislative session.

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Appendix E

Section 1 1 2 1 . The dismissal of the Government shall occur when: a) A new legislative term begins; b ) The President of the Republic accepts the resignation of the Prime Minister; c) The Prime Minister dies or is suffering from a permanent physical disability; d) Its programme is rejected for the second consecutive time; e) A vote of confidence is not passed; f) A vote of no confidence is passed by a n absolute majority of the Members in full exercise of their functions. 2.

The President of the Republic shall only dismiss the Prime Minister in accor­ dance with the cases provided for in the previous item and when it is deemed necessary to ensure the regular functioning of the democratic institutions, after consultation with the Co unci! of State.

Section 1 1 4 No member of the Government may be detained or imprisoned without the permission of the National Parliament, except for a felonious crime punishable with a maximum sentence of imprisonment for more than two years and in flagrante delicto. PART IV: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ORGANISATION Title I, General Principles

Section 1 3 8 The economic organisation o f East Timor shall be based o n the combination of community forms with free initiative and business manage­ ment; as well as on the coexistence of the public sector; the private sector and the co-operative and social sector of ownership of means of production. Section 1 3 9 1 . The resources of the soil, the subsoil, the territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, which are essential to the economy, shall be owned by the State and shall be used in a fair and equitable manner in accor­ dance with national i nterests. 2. The conditions for the exploitation of the natural resources referred to in item 1 above should lend themselves to the establishment of mandatory financial reserves, in accordance with the law. 3. The exploitation of the natural reso urces shall preserve the ecological balance and prevent destruction of ecosystems.

Section 1 40 The State shall promote national investment and establish conditions to attract foreign investment, taking into consideration the national interests, in accordance with the law.

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Section 1 4 1

Ownership, use and development o f land as one o f the factors for eco­ nomi c production shall be regulated by law. Title II, Financial and Tax System

Section 1 42

The structure of the financial system shall be determined b y the law in such a way as to guarantee the formation, collection and security of savings, and that the financial resources necessary for economic and social develop­ ment are provided. Section 1 43 1 . The State shall establish a national central bank jointly responsible for the defi­ nition and implementation of the monetary and financial policy.

2. The Central Bank functions and its relationship with the National Parliament and the Government shall be established by law, safeguarding the management autonomy of the financial institution. 3. The Central Bank shall have exclusive competence for issuing the national currency. Section 1 44 1 . The State shall establish a tax system aimed at meeting the financial require­ ments of the State and the fair distribution of national income and wealth. 2. Taxes shall be established by law, which shall determine obligation, tax benefits and the guarantees of taxpayers.

PART V: NATIONAL D E FENCE AND S E CURITY

Section 1 46 1 . The East Timer Defence force, FALINTIL-ETDF, composed exclusively by national citizens, has the responsibility of providing military defence for the Democratic Republic of East Timer and shall have a single system of organisa­ tion for the whole national territory.

2. FAUNTIL-ETDF shall guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the populations against any aggression or external threat, in respect for the constitutional order. 3 . FAUNTIL-ETDF shall be non-partisan and shall owe obedience to the competent organs of sovereignty in accordance with the Constitution and the laws, and shall not intervene in political matters. Section 1 4 7 1 . The police shall defend the democratic legality and guarantee the internal security of the citizens, and shall be strictly non-partisan.

174 Appendix E 2. Prevention of crime shall be undertaken with due respect for human rights. 3. The law shall determine the rules and regulations for the police and other secu­ rity forces.

Section 1 48 1 . The Superior Council for Defence and Security is the consultative organ of the President of the Republic on matters relating to defence and sovereignty. 2.

The Superior Council for Defence and Security shall be headed by the President of the Republic and shall include civilian and military entities, the number of civilian entities being higher than the number of military entities.

3. The composition, organisation and functioning of the Superior Council for Defence and Security shall be defined by law.

PART VI: GUARANTEE AND REVISION OF T H E CONSTITUTION Title I, G uarantee of the Constitution

Section 1 49 1 . The President of the Republic may request the S upreme Court of Justice to undertake an a nticipatory review of the constitutionality of any statute submit­ ted to him or her for promulgation. 2.

The preventive review of the constitutionality may be requested within twenty days from the d ate on which the statute is received, and the S upreme Court of Justice shall hand down its ruling within twenty-five days, a time limit that may be reduced by the President of the Republic for reasons of emergency.

3. If the S upreme Court of Justice rules that the statute is u nconstitutional, the President of the Republic shall s ubmit a copy of the ruling to the Government or the N ational Parliament and request the reformulation of the statute in accor­ dance with the decision of the Supreme Co urt of Justice.

4. The veto for unconstitutionality of a statute from the National Parliament that has been submitted for promulgation can be circumvented under section 8 8, with the necessary amendments.

Section 1 50 Declaration of unconstitutionality may be requested by: a) The President of the Republic; b) The Speaker of the National Parliament; c) The Prosecu­ tor-General, based on the refusal by the courts, in three concrete cases, to apply a statute deemed unconstitutional; d) The Prime Minister; e) One fifth of the Members of the National Parliament; f) The Ombudsman. Section 1 51 The President of the Republic, the Prosecutor-General and the Ombudsman may request the Supreme Court of Justice to review the u nconstitutionality

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by o mission of any legislative measures deemed necessary to enable the implementation of the constitutional provisions. Section 1 52 1 . The Supreme Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear appeals against any of the following court decisions: a ) Decisions refusing to apply a legal rule on the grounds of unconstitutionality; b) Decisions applying a legal rule the constitu­ tionality of which was challenged d uring the proceedings.

2. An appeal under paragraph ( 1 ) (b) may be brought only by the party who raised the question of unco nstitutionali ty. 3. The regime for filing appeals shall be regulated by law.

Section 1 53

Decisions of the Supreme Court of J ustice shall not be appealable and shall be published in the official gazette. They shall have a general binding effect on processes of abstract and concrete monitoring, when dealing with unco nstitutio naliry.

Title II, Constitutional Revision

Section 1 54 1 . It is in cum bent u pen Members of Pari iament and the Parliamentary Groups to initiate constitutional revision.

2. The National Parliament may revise the Constitution a fter six years have elapsed since the last date on which a law revising the Constitution was published. 3. The period of six years for the first constitutional review shall commence on the day the present Constitution enters into force .

4. The National Parliament, regardless of any timeframe, may take on powers to revise the Constitution by a majority of fo ur-fifths of the Members of Parliament in full exercise of their functions . 5. Proposals for revision should be submitted to the National Parliament one hundred and twenty days prior to the date of commencement of debate. 6. After submission of a proposal for constitutional revision under the terms of item 5 above, any other proposal shall be s ubmitted within 30 days.

Section 1 55 1 . Amendments to the Constitution shall be approved by a majority of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament in full exercise of their functions.

2. The new text of the Constitution shall be p ublished together with the revision law. 3. The President of the Republic shall not refuse to promulgate a revision law.

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Section 1 56 1 . Laws revising the Constitution shall respect: a) National independence and the unity of the State; b) The rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens; c) The republican form of government; d ) The separation of powers; e ) The indepen­ dence of the co urts; f) The multi-party system and the right of democratic oppo­ sition; g) The free, universal, direct, secret and regular suffrage of the office holders of the organs of sovereignty, as well as the system of proportional rep­ resentation; h) The principle of administrative deconcentration and decentrali­ sation; i) The National Flag; j ) The date of proclamation of national independence. 2.

Paragraphs c) and i) may be reviewed thro ugh a national referendum, in accor­ dance with the law.

Section 1 57 No action may be taken to revise the Constitution during a state of siege or a state of emergency.

PART VII: FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL P ROVISIONS

Section 1 58 1 . Confirmation, accession and ratification of b ilateral and multilateral conventions, treaties, agreements or alliances that took place before the entry into force ofthe present Constitution shall be decided upon by the respective competent bodies on a case-by-case basis.

2. The Democratic Republic of East Timer shall not be bound b y any treaty, agreement or alliance entered i nto prior to the entry into force of the Constitu­ tion which is not confirmed or ratified or adhered to, p ursuant to item 1 above.

3. The Democratic Republic of East Timer shall not recognise any acts or contracts concerning the natural resources referred to in item 1 of Section 1 3 9 entered into or undertaken prior to the entry into force of the Constitution which are not confirmed by the competent bodies after the Constitution enters into force.

Section 1 59 Indonesian and English shall be working languages within civil service side by side with official languages as long as deemed necessary. Section 1 60 Acts committed between the 25th of April 1974 and the 31st of December 1999 that can be considered crimes against humanity of genocide or of war shall be liable to criminal proceedings with the national or international courts.

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Section 1 6 1

Illegal appropriation o f mobile and fixed assets that took place before the entry into force of the present C onstit ut i o n is considered crime and shall be resolved as provided for in the Constitution and the law. Section 1 62 1 . It is incumbent upon the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation

to discharge functions conferred to it by UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/1 0.

2. The competencies, mandate and objectives of the Commission shall be redefined by the Parliament whenever necessary. Section 1 63 1 . The collective judicial instance existing in East Timor composed of national and international j udges with competencies to judge serious crimes committed between the 1st ofJanuary and the 25th of October 1999, shall remain operational for the time deemed strictly necessary to conclude the cases under investigation. ,

2. The j udicial Organization existing in East Timer on the day the present Consti­ tution enters into force shall remain operational until such a time as the new j udicial system is established and starts its functions. Section 1 65

Laws and regulations in force in East Timor shall continue to be appli­ cable to all matters except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Constitution or the principles contained therein. Section 1 66

Until the national anthem is approved by the ordinary law pursuant to item 2 of Section 14, "Pauia, Pauia, Pauia, Timor-Leste a nossa na
­

3. The Speaker of the Constituent Assembly shall remain in office until s uch a time as the National Parliament elects its Speaker as provided for in the Constitution. Section 1 68

The G o vernment app oint ed under UNTAET Regulat io n No. 200 12/28 shall remain in office until such a time as the first constitutional Government is appointed and sworn in by the President of the Republic, as provided for in the Constitution.

178

Appendix E

Section 1 69 The President elected under UNTAET Regulation No. 2002/01 shall take on the competencies and ful£1 the mandate provided for in the Constitution. Section 1 70 The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor shall enter into force on the 20th of May of 2002.

Notes

CHAPTER !

1 . Jamsheed Marker, East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Indepen­ dence (jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2003}, 7. 2. The discovery of oil in the Timer Sea may change this situation and provide the Timorese with the basis for a viable economy for the first time in their history. See Michael Richardson, "Battle Lines Drawn in Fight for 0 il Riches off East Timer," International Herald Tribune, May 17, 2002, 1 3 . 3. For a perspective on the suffering of the Timorese, see James D unn, Timor: A People Betrayed (Sydney: ABC Books, 1996}. 4. Eric Stolen ( ed.}, Portugal: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern­ ment Printing 0 ffice, 199 4}, 31 . 5. Donald E. Weatherbee, "Portuguese Timer, an Indonesian Dilemma," Asian Survey, Vol . 6, No. 12 (December 1966}, 685. 6 . A. H. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, Vol. 1: From Lusitania to Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972}, 479. 7. Weatherbee, 6 8 5 . 8. Ibid. 9. This departure for a more secure location in Dili resulted in the Oecussi enclave, as the original capital city of the Portuguese colony was soon surrounded by Dutch Timer. Michael G. Smith, withMoreen Dee , Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003}, 22. 10. Ibid. 1 1 . Ibid. 12. John G . Taylor, Indonesian's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1 99 1 }, 1 0 . 13. Constancio Pinto and Mathew Jardine. East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance (Boston: South End Press, 1997}, 5 . 1 4 . See Katherine G. Davidson, The Portuguese Colonisation of Timor: The Final Stage, 1850-1912. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University ofNew So uth Wales, 1994, 6 .

180

Notes

1 5 . Ibid., 32, 5 1 . 1 6 . Ibid., 2 0 1 . 17. Ibid., 165-172. 1 8. Ibid., 224. 19. Ibid., 225. 20. Pinto and Jardine, 6. 21. A. H. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal. Vol. 2: From Em pire to Corporate State {New York: Columbia University Press, 1 972), 233. 22. Smith, 36. 23. Weatherbee, 685 . 24. Joshua Eliot, Jane Bickersteth, and Liz: Capaldi, Indonesia Handbook {Chicago: Passport Books, 1 996), 782; Pinto and Jardine, 9 . 2 5 . Eliot, Bickersteth, and Capaldi, 782. 26. Weatherbee, 684 . 27. Ibid. Weatherbee includes a table from the 1950 census listing only 1,541 "indigenous-civiliz:ado" out of a total population of 442,378. 2 8. Ibid., 686. 29. Ibid., 688. 30. Pinto and Jardine, 1 0 . 3 1 . Quoted in Weatherbee, 687. H e refers to United Nations document A/5160, dated August 15, 1962. 32. Pinto and Jardine, 9, quoting D unn. 3 3 . Weatherbee, 692. 34. According to the British government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, " FRETIUN's aims were considered by some as left-wing revol utionary and by others as reformist. Its domestic aims were to improve the lot of the ordinary Timorese and its external policy was non-aligned. APODETI remained the smallest of the three main groups," in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, East Timor: Historical Back­ ground {London: UK, October 1999), 2. 35. Pinto and Jardine, 1 6 . 3 6 . For example, see Frank Gaglioti, "US Approved 1975 Indonesian Invasion of East Timer, " December 1 9, 2001, found at http://www.wsws .org/articles/2001/ dec200 1/kiss-d19.shtml; Dana Milbank, " 1975 East Timer Invasion Got U.S. Go­ Ahead; Ford, Kissinger Told Indonesian Leader They Would Not Object, Documents Show," Washington Post, December 7, 2001, A 3 8 . See also Andrea Hopkins, "Aus­ tralia Let Indonesia Invade East Timer in 1975; Records Show CanberraHad 3 Days Warning but Did Nothing," The Guardian, September 13, 2000. Noam Chomsky is perhaps the most well known of those who implicate the United States; see his introd uctions to Jose Ramos-Horta, FUNU:, The Unfinished Saga of East Timor {Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press), vii-xiii, and Richard Tanter, Gerry van Klinken, and Desmond Ball, Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor {Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), xi. Don Greenlees and Robert Garran's Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom { St. Leonards, Austra lia: Alien & Unwin, 2002), outlines this view most clearly on pp. 12-13. 37. This was the impression Suharto gave to the UN Special Representative for East Timer d uring their first meeting. See Marker, 9. 3 8. Ibid.

Notes

181

39. United Nations Security Council Resolution 384. 40. The United States abstained d uring the voting for UNSCR 389, indicating at least tacit support of Indonesia's co urse in East Timor. 4 1 . Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 4. Matthew Jardine claims that "more than 200,000 East Timorese have died as a result of the Indonesian occupation," in Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise (Monroe, ME: Odonian Press, 1994}, 7. 42. Pinto and J ardine, 42. 43. For<;:as Armadas de Liberta<;:iio Nacional de Timor Leste, or Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor. The first command er was N ichola u Lob ato. 44. Jardine, p. 6, Genocide in Paradise points out that United States President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had visited with Indonesian dictator S u harto immediately prior to the invasion and must have provided at least tacit support for the invasion. 6. Pinto concurs on p. 1 8 , East Timor's Unfinished Struggle, quoting Kissinger's comment that the United States "had to be on the side of Indonesia," although as J ard ine was Pinto's coauthor in East Tim or's Unfinished Struggle, one would expect them to agree on this point. 45. Jardine, 4 5 . 46. Ibid., 4 8 . 47. ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces o f the Republic of Indonesia}, hereafter normally referred to as TNI, or Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian army's formal name after the Indonesian police became a separate service in 1999. 48. Jardine, 52. 49. Smith, 40. 50. J ard ine, 52, referred to Australian estimates of over two thousand Indonesian army casualties in the first four months of fighting in East Timor. 5 1 . FAUNTIL's operations parallel the Vi et Cong's activity d uring the preceding decade during the struggle between the United States and North Vietnam. 52. Pinto and J ardine, 59. 53. Ibid., 61-63. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid, 84-85. 56. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's report on East Timor includes an estimate of the casualties d uring this period, noting "The Indonesians themselves acknowledge that about 80,000 EastTimorese died in the late 1970s, out of a pop ulation of some 650,000. Some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs} suggest as many as 200,000, or about one third of the territory's population died. Immediately after the invasion, East Timor's misery was compounded b y a famine, exacerbated by the policy of establishing strategic hamlets and the consequent dis­ ruption of normal farming. Comparison of the last Portuguese and first Indonesian censuses, taking into account up to 40,000 East Timorese who fled abroad, suggests a minimum figure of over 100,000 deaths," 4 . 57. Ibid., 4 . 58. Pinto and J ardine, 1 1 1 . 59. "The CNRM is a nonpartisan umbrella organization that incorporates all factions of the resistance in the struggle for liberation," Pinto and Jardine, 123. Although FRETIUN was the largest of these groups, there were others, which after

182

Notes

fifteen years of conflict had developed other agendas. Gusmao wisely so ught to unify their efforts. He became East Timor's first president in 2 002. 6 0 . Ramos-Horta, an exiled resistance leader, was born in 1 949 in Dili, the capital of East Timor. His father had been deported to East Timor by the Portuguese govern­ ment for protesting its military dictatorship. Ramos-Horta was exiled to Mozambique in 1970 by the Portuguese government for his outspoken advocacy of East Timorese independence. By 197 5, he had returned to become foreign minister under the origi­ nal abortive FRETIUN government, and he fled the country only days before the Indonesian invasion. Between 1 975 and 199 5 he was the principle international spokesman for the Timorese independence movement. He later became the nation of East Timor's first foreign minister. 6 1 . Pinto and Jardine, 197. 62. He was found guilty of re bel lion, illegal possession o f firearms, and attempt­ ing to separate part of the territory of Indonesia. 63. Fred Barbash, " East Timor D issidents Win Nobel Peace Prize: Bishop and Exiled Activist Cited for Trying to Halt Violence, Seek Dialogue with Indonesia," Washington Post, October 12, 1 996, A23.

CHAPT E R 2

1 . S ukarno, the father o f modern Indonesia, was born June 6, 1 9 0 1 , and died June 21, 1970. He helped Indonesia win its independence from the Netherlands and served as its first president from 1945 to 1967. He was forced from power by Gen­ eral Suharto, who s ucceeded him as president in March 1967. Like many Javanese, he was referred to by only one name. 2 . For additional details, see Indonesia: A Country Study, at http:l/history1 900s .ab o ut.com/homework/history 19 OOs/gi/d ynamic/o ffsi te .htm ?site= http :1/lcwe b2 .lo c gov/frd/cs/idtoc html 3 . Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s ( Boulder: Colo.: Westview Press, 1994}, 4 . 4 . For a superb, detailed treatment o f the impact o f the Japanese occupation on Indonesian society, see Shigeru Sato, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994 } . 5 . W illiam H. Frederick and R obert L . Worde n ( e ds. } , Indonesia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research D ivision, Library of Congress, 1992}, 40. 6. " Indonesia: A Country Study," 42. 7 . This focus on a "Greater Indonesia" has been a ddressed by several authors. Donald Weatherbee found it obvious i n the early 1960s (see his "Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma," Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 12, 6 9 1 } , and others have found similar commentary in the decades since. 8 . Schwarz, 1 0. 9 . Frederick and Worden, 43. 10. Ibid., 45. 1 1 . Ibid., 49. 12. Ibid., 5 1 . 1 3 . Schwarz, 1 6 . 1 4 . Frederick and Worden, 54. .

.

.

Notes

183

15. For an evenhanded a nalysis of the coup's origins, see Schwarz, 1 9-20. 16. Ibid., 1 5 . 1 7 . Ibid. 18. The a nnexation of the province was confirmed through United Nations s up­ port in 1968, but elements of an indigenous independence movement continued to work against Indonesian rule through a major revolt in 1 99 8 and a third effort at freedom in 2000. 19. Frederick and Worden, 33 4. This was confirmed i n a State D ep artme nt press release on September 12, 1999. 20. The most strident demonstrations of this view are those of John Pilger {see his "We Helped Them Descend into Hell," New Statesman, September 13, 1999, 1 1-12}. But several other a uthors share the view. The United States was certainly not alone in this complicity. Desmond Ball makes Australia's knowledge of the invasion quite dear in his revealing " Silent Witness: A ustralian Intelligence and East Timor, " Pacific R eview, Vol. 14, No. 1200, 1: 36. 21. James Cotton, "Against the Grain: The East Timer Intervention," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1 {Spring 2001}, 129. 22. "Asia's Economic Flu, News Hour Transcript, January 9, 1 998, at http :J/www.p bs .orglnewsho ur/b b/as ia/j an-j une9 8/indo nes ia_1-9 a .html. 23. Alexander Downer, "East Timer: Looking Back on 1999," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No 1 {2000 }, 5 . "

CHAPTER 3

1 . From "The United Nations and East Timer: A Chronology," at www.un.org/ peace/etimor99!chrono/b ody.html. 2. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 384 { 1 975) of December 22, 1975. 3. "The United Nations and East Timer: A Chronol ogy. 4. The thirteen districts are: Lautem, Baucau, Viqueque, Manatuto, Dili, Aileu, Manufahi, Liqui�a, Ermera, Ainaro, Bobonaro, Cova-Lima, and Oecussi-Ambeno. 5. General Michael Smith, 35, found the area to be "ideal for insurgent or guerrilla activity." 6 . Several dedicated people made the plight o f the East Timorese painfully obvious to their readers. Among these writers, Mathew Jardine, Alla n Nairn, John Martinkus, John Pilger, Noam Chomsky, James D u nn, Amy Goodman, and Max Stahl, among others, should be credited with keeping a jo urnalistic focus on the situation over the long period between the Santa Cruz massacre in 1 99 1 and the e ventua 1 commitment of troops under the UN i n 199 9. 7. John Martinkus, A Dirty Little War: An Eyewitness Account of East Timor's Decent into Hell, 1997-2000 {Sydney, Austra lia: Random}, 2001. 8. Ibid. Martinkus, 3, comments on the information warfare tactics used b y the TNI to blame the FAUNTIL for any killings. He had witnessed TNI terror tactics as early as 1995 { 5-6}, d uring which rape and torture had been used to suppress support for FALINTIL. 9. Ibid., 1 3- 1 4 . 10. Ibid., 29-30. 1 1 . Smith, 39-40. "

184

Notes

12. Ibid. This new phase of operations, as described by General Smith, saw FALINTIL grow from its weakest point of only about one hundred active fighters into a protonational army. 1 3 . Ibid. 14. Ibid, 4 1 . 15. Jams heed Marker was an extremely experienced and well-respected diplomat with useful past service in the United Nations Security Council. See East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Independence. 1 6 . Annan's appointment of Marker as a Special UN Envoy was the first of this type of assignment made by a UN Secr etary General. It distinguished Annan's deep commitment to a resolution of the East Timor crisis. See Jose Ramos-Horta, "Casu­ a lties of Silence: East Timor's Struggle for Self-Determination," Harvard Inter­ national R wiew (Fall 1997}, 3 4 . 17. Marker, 30-33. 1 8. Ibid., 52, 59. 1 9 . Ibid., 63 . 20. Ibid., 66. 2 1 . Ibid., 66-67. The Indonesian capital was also covered in a pall of dark smoke due to huge forest fires in the region. 22. Ibid., 75-76. 2 3 . Ibid., 87. 24. Ibid., 87-89. 25. Ibid., 92, 99. 26. James D unn, "Crimes against Humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their Nature and Causes," Annex B (February 14, 2001}, found at http://www .etan.orglnews/200 1 a/dunnl .htm ( accessed A u gust 31, 2007.}. This independent report, commissioned by the UN and written by Australia s former consul in East Timor, James D unn, indicated that the Indonesian military tried to prevent the East Timorese movement for independence. Dunn found that senior Indonesian military officers planned deportations and killings for months prior to the independence ballot in 1999. 27. Desmond Ball, Silent Witness: Australian intelligence and East Timor," Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1200 (20 0 1 } , 1:40-4 1 . 2 8 . General Zacky Anwar, the head of Indonesian military intelligence, later a dmitted this fact to Ambassador Marker. See Marker, 1 10 . 2 9 . Dunn, Annex B . 3 0 . Marker, 1 0 4 . 3 1 . Dunn, Annex B. 32. Marker, 106. 3 3 . United Nations Press Release 6 80 5 of November 25, 1998. 34. Marker, 105. 35. Ball makes the clear case in "Silent Witness" that John Howard was fully i nformed a b o ut the actual role of the Indonesian forces in East Timor. What is far less dear is whether President Habibie was as well informed by his own military staff, under General Wiranto. 36. Marker, 1 2 8 . 3 7 . Ambassador Marker makes the case that President Habibie decided to offer East Timor special a utonomy and eventual independence to distance himself from the Suharto era and signal a new dawn for Indonesia. Ibid., 129. -

'

"

Notes

185

38. Ibid., 121-122. 39. Ibid. This was clearly in response to pressure brought by Nelson Mandela, the UN, Portugal, and the United States, among other national governments. From the Indonesian perspective, Gusmao's transfer to house detention with full access to communications may also have been viewed as a way to keep his "moderate" influence strong, as local tensions in East Timor grew more severe. 40. D unn, Annex B. 4 1 . Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. Ball, on p. 46 of "Silent Witness , " q uotes an April 8 intelligence report saying, "ABRI's exact role in the incident is unclear. But it is known that ABRI {TNI} had fired tear gas into the church and apparently did not intervene when pro­ independence activists were attacked . . . . But, ABRI is culpable whether it actively took part in the violence, or simply let it occur." 45. Ball also confirms that the Australian intelligence services had no doubt that the Indonesian Army was supporting the militia violence in "Silent Witness," 46. 46. Dana Priest, " Standing Up to State and Congress," Washington Post, September 30, 1000. 47. See Ball, 43-44. 48. Ibid., 4 6 . 49. D unn, Annex B. 50. Marker, 1 4 1 . 5 1 . "The United Nations i n East Timor: A Chronology." 52. D unn, Annex B. 53. Ibid. 54. Ball, 47. 55. Alexander Downer, "East Timor: Looking Back on 1999," Australian ]ournal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No 1 {2000}, 6. 56. D unn, Annex B. 57. "The United Nations in East Timor: A Chronology." 58. See "Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General," Document A/53/95 1 , dated May 5, 1999. Annex I includes all the details o f the agreement and shows the detailed work of those who developed it.

CHAPTER 4

1 . The mission assigned to UNAMET by the Security Council was "to organize and conduct a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal bal­ lot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia, in accordance with the General Agreement and to enable the Secretary-General to discharge his responsi bil­ ity under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement." From the UNAMET Fact Sheet at http :l/www. un .org!peace/etimor9 9/Fact_frame .htm. 2. President Ha bibie had pledged that the Timorese would have the chance to declare their desires for integration or independence prior to the convening of the

186

Notes

next Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly, which was set for September 9, 1999. 3 . "The United Nations and East Timor: A Chronology," found at www.un.or&f p eace/etimor9 9/chrono/body/html . 4 . Marker, 147. 5. Ibid., 1 59 . 6 . Born i n Britain, Ian Martin had significant previous UN and humanitarian experienee, including service as Secretary-General of Amnesty International from 1 9 8 6 to 1992, Director-General of the UN/OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti in 1993 and 1994-1995, Chief of the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda in 1 995-1996, Special Adviser to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Human Rights Field Operations in 1998, and Deputy High Representative for Human Rights in the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998-1999 . See United Nations Press ReleaseHR/4832, dated April 29, 2005, found at http://www.un.or&fNews/Press/docs/2005/hr4832. doc.htm. 7. "The United Nations and East Timor: A Chronology." 8 . Ibid. 9 . Ibid. 1 0 . Ibid. 1 1 . See John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1 998), 142-143. 12. Policemen from the following countries participated: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, and Zimbabwe. From the UNAMET Fact Sheet at http://www.un.or&fpeace/etimor99/ F act_frame .htm . 1 3 . Marker, 1 6 3 . 1 4 . Officers from Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Denmark, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Thailand, United Kingdom, USA, and Uruguay served as military liaison officers. From the UNAMET Fact Sheet at http://www. un.org/peace/etimor99/Fact_frame .htm. 1 5 . Marker, 1 6 3 . 1 6 . "The United Nations a n d East Timor: A Chronology." 17. Ibid. 1 8. It is Desmond Ball who noted that "the evidence about the Indonesian Army's plans for violent retribution, the chain of command within TNI concerning EastTimor, and the TNI's official sponsorship of the pro-Indonesian militias was incontrovertible." Ball, 47. 19. Ibid. 20. See Four Corners, "The Ties That Bind," broadcast February 14, 2000, found at http://www.abc.net.a u/4corners/sotries/s99 352.htm, accessed July 1 5, 2003. 2 1 . There is a long-standing image of Australia as the "deputy sheriff" for the United States and Great Britain in So utheast Asia. In this p articular case the image is probably a ppropriate. 22. Ibid.

Notes

187

23. The three commissioners were Patrick Bradley from Ireland, Johann Kriegler from So uth Africa, and Bong-Scuk Sohn from So uth Korea. "The United Nations and East Timor: A Chronology. " 24. Tim Fischer, Seven Days in East Timor: Ballots and Bullets (St. Leonard's, Austra lia: Allen & Unwin, 2000). 25. The UNAMET Web site, http://www.un.org/peau/etimor99/etimor.htm, accessed August 3 1 , 2007, lists 446,000 voters registered; Ambassador Marker lists 451 ,792 as the official number, with 433,576 being registered inside Timor. Marker, 183. 2 6 . A n excellent source o f information o n all UNAMET activities remains the United Nations Web site at www.un.org/pko. Daily press briefings and formal reports by Ian Martin provide all the details of the registration process. 27. This Code of Conduct is printed at Appendix B. 28. "The United Nations and East Timor: A Chronology." 29. Ibid. 30. Anthony Smith's chronicle in Damien Kingsbury (ed.), Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence (Monash, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 2000), 33. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., 3 6 . 3 3 . Ibid., 97. 34. Ibid., 72 . 35. "The United Nations and East Timor: A Chronology." 36. "Too Late to Send Peacekeepers for East Timor Vote, U.S. Says," from CNN .corn, http:J/www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapad/9 90 8/24/us .timor, accessed July 17, 2003. 37. Smith, 4 8 . 3 8 . Ibid. 39. Ibid, 49. 40. Fischer, 28, 44. 41. Ibid., 47. 42. Ibid., 6 0 . 4 3 . "The United Nations and East Timor: A Chronology." 44. Marker, 1 8 8 . 45. Kingsbury, 1-9. 46. Ibid., 8. 47. Fischer, 67. 48. "Huge Early Turnout for East Timor Referendum," from CNN.com, http:// www.cnn.com/W 0 RLD/as iap ad/99 08/30/etimor.Ol/index.html, access ed July 17, 2003. 49. Ibid. 50. Kingsbury, 38-39. 5 1 . Marker, 1 8 8 . 52. Ibid., 1 8 9 . 53. Fischer, 1 0 8 . The official U N tally was the same, p ublished in U N Press Release SG/SM/7 1 1 9 , SC/6722, "People of East Timor Reject Proposed Special Autonomy, Express Wish to Begin Transition to Independence, Secretary-General Informs Security Council," dated September 3, 1999.

188

Notes

54. Ibid., found at htt p://www. un .orglpeace/etimor9 9/res u lt_frame .htm. 5 5 . "More Deaths Feare d i n Tense, Post-Vote East Timer, " from CNN.com, http://www. cnn .corn/ASIANOW/so uthe ast/99 0 8/3 1/e .timor.04/, accessed July 1 7, 2003.

56. "World: Asia-Pacific Violence Returns to Timer, " from BBC.com at http:// news.b bc.co. uk/ 1/hi/worl d/asia -pa cific/434647 .stm.

57. Ibid. 5 8 . "World: Asia -Pacific Militia Tightens Grip on Timer, " from BBC.com at http://news .b b c.co. u k/hi/engl ish/world/as ia -pacific/newsi d_4 36000/4 36522 .stm . 59. "World: Asia-Pacific, Thousands Flee Timer Militias," from BBC.com at http ://news .b b c.co. u k/hi/e ngl ish/world/as ia -pacific/newsi d_4 3 7000/4 37257 .stm. 6 0 . "World: Asia -Pa cific Militia Tightens Grip on Timer, " from BBC.com at http ://news .b b c.co. u k/hi/e nglish/world/as ia -pacific/newsi d_4 36000/4 36522 .stm.

CHAPT E R S 1 . Press Release SG/SM/7 1 1 9, SC/6722, dated September 3, 1999.

The Australians and New Zealanders have always had a dose relationship; New Zealand mi litary officers participated in many oft he planning efforts developed 2.

by the Australians, and the general staffs of both nations worked closely with each

other through the spring and summer of 199 9. 3. I nformation operations are those psy chological and media actions focused on changing attitudes and situational awareness of the opponent and other audi ences.

In particular, information could have been used to dissuade the militias from attacking the Timorese people, to deter the TNI from support to the militias, and even to better

prepare the civil population for the challenges of conventional military operations in East Timor. 4 . The United States Pacific Command is the regional military command respon­ sible for United States military activities within the Pacific. D uring this period its commander was Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy. 5 . A political-military plan for potential operations in East Timer had been d evelo p e d by diplomatic and military planners within the Bureau of Political­ Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and passed on by the U.S. United Nations staff in New York by this time. Interview with Dr. James Schaer, U .S. Department of State, January 1 0, 2 00 0 . 6 . U.S. Forces INTERFET (USFI), O peration STABIUSE After Action Report, February 1 1 , 2000, 2. (Okinawa, Japan: USFI). 7.

I nterview with Brigad ier General John G. Castella w, U.S. Marine Corps,

Camp Smith, Hawaii, A u gust 1 8, 2000. 8. Ibid.

The act of changing the national command structure at this key juncture confusio n . 1 0 . Cosgr ove 's appointment to this command was effective March 7, 1998. His military career included a posting to the 9th Battalion, Roya l Australian Regime nt, 9.

caused some significa nt

i n South Vietnam, where he commanded a rifle platoon and was s ubsequently

awarde d the Military Cross . From 1973 to 1975 he served in the 5th Battalion, RAR, be fore in 197 6 being posted as an 0 fficer Instructor of Tactics at the Australian

Notes

189

Infantry School. In 1978 he attended the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and in 1 9 83 he became the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, RAR, and was s u bse q u ently appo inted a member of the mil itary d i vision of the Order of Australia for his service with the battalion. In 1984 he became the Australian Army Exchange Instructor at the British Army Staff College and attended the Australian Joint Services Staff College in 1 9 8 8 , and in 1992 he assumed command o f the 6th Brigade, Australian Army, based in Brisbane. In 1994, Cosgrove attended the Indian National Defence College. After his service in East Timer he was appointed to be the Chief of the Australian Army and then Chief of Defence Force (CDF). For added detail see Peter Cosgrove, My Story ( Sydney, Australia: HarperCollins, 2006). 1 1 . John Crawford and Glyn Harper, Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor 1999-2001 (Auckland: Reed Books, 2001), 2 1 . 12. Ibid, 22-24. 13. Ibid, 42. 14. Ball, 4 4 . Carvalho was later indicted for crimes against humanity; Simbolan was never formal!y aceused of crimes in East Timer and has been promoted. 15. Cosgrove, 1 5 1 . 16. The P-3C Orion is a four-engine surveillance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft known for its long loiter time over areas of interest. O utfitted with modern signals technolo gy, it makes an excellent eavesdropping platform .

17. Ball, 46, 5 1 . This included U.S. Navy wiretapping activities on TNI commu­ nications ea bles from ships in Dili harbor and the realignment of geostationary satellites. 1 8 . Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is better known as traditional spying­ placing an individual in allocation to hear or see actions that cannot be detected by other forms of intelligence collection. HUMINT is the ol dest, and still the most useful, method of o braining intelligence on a n opponent; unfortunately, it is also the most dangerous.

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 2 1 . Ibid. 22. Ibid, 47-4 8 . Damiri and S uratman were both later indicted o n charges of crimes against humanity. See http ://socrates.berkeley.edu/-warcrime/ for details. 23. Ibid, 4 8 . Sudrajat and Scares were convicted o f crimes against humanity; S udra jat was sentenced to ten years in prison and Scares to ten years and six months. 24. Ibid., 48. His name was Lansell Taudevin, later a uthor of the book East Timor: Too Little, Too Late ( Syd ney, AU: Otford Press, Miranda, Australia, 1999). 25. Ibid., 49. In discussions with Air Vice Marshal Riding in May 2000, he cleared indicated that he had expected little result from his trip to Jakarta . 26. Ball, 5 6 . It was more a destruction and deportation plan focused on ridding East Timer of pro independence elements.

27. Ball, 56, quoting Marian Wilkinson, " Exposed: Jakarta's Scorched Earth Plan," Sydney Morning Herald, January 3 1 , 2000, 1 . 28. The mission of the JTF-TSO ships was to escort commercial and military transports and be prepared to serve as " lilly pads" for transiting helicopters during an evacuation. U.S. Forces INTERFET (USFI), Operation STABIUSE After Action Report (Okinawa, Japan: USFI), February 1 1 , 2000), 3 .

190

Notes

29. For additional details concerning the military aspects of the operation, John R. Ballard, "Mastering Coalition Command and Control: Operation Stabilise i n East Timor," Small Wars and Insurgencies {London), Vol. 1 3 , N o . 1 { Spring 2002), 83-101. 30. This transportation gro up would later provide critically important strategic a irlift { under the o perational control of the U .S. Transportation Command) ensuring l arge-scale movement of coalition troops and equipment as member nations identi­ fied such requirements. The national contingents from Thailand, the Republic of Korea, and Jordan were e ventually transported to East Timor using U .S. airlift s upport. Key items of supply {to include flak jackets, although they were not used) were also lifted to Australia for its use. 3 1 . APEC was established to promote economic integration around the Pacific Rim and to s ustain economic growth. It currently has twenty-one members: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; Republic of the Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; USA; and Vietnam. 32. It was amazing good fortune that the first visit of the American president to the region occurred at just the right moment for him to participate in the stiff si debar discussions concerning East Timor. Even given the early departure of Habi bie and the strong effort by New Zealand prime minister Jenny Shipley to keep Timor off the agenda, the synergy of having all the key decision makers in the region {Robin Cook represented Great Britain) was tailor-made for results. 33. "East Timor Chooses Independence from Indonesia," from CNN.com at www.cnn.com!WORLD/meast/9909/03/east.timor.o3/index.html. 34. "Clinton Endorses Idea ofU.N. Presence in East Timor," from CNN.com at www.cnn.com/US/9909/06/ us .est.timor/ind ex. html. 35. "Albright: Time Running Out for Indonesia to Stop E. Timor Violence," from CNN .corn at www.cnn .com/US/99 09/07/us .east.timor/index.html. 36. "Grisly Accounts of Killings and 'Cleansing' in East Timor," from asiaweek .corn at www.asiawee k.com/as ia week/db/9 909/07/index.html. 37. "World: Asia-Pacific Analysis: Is President Habibie in Control?" from BBC .corn at http://news .bb c.co . u k/1/hi/world/as ia-p acific/44 306 8 .stm. 3 8 . "World: Asia-Pacific UN Delays Timor Pull-Out," from BBC.com at http:// news. b bc.co. uk/hi/e nglish/world/as ia- pacific/news id_ 441 00 0/4 4 1 52 1 .stm. 39. "U.N. Hopes to 'Thin O ut' Staff in East Timor, " from CNN.com at http:// www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/southeast/9909/08/e.timor.05/. 4 0. http://da il ynews.yaho o.com/h/nm/19 99 090 8/ts/timor_lead all_1 00 .html. 4 1 . "World: Asia-Pacific Indonesia Rejects Peace Force," from BBC.com at http ://news .b be. eo. u k/hi/e nglish/world/as ia-pacific/news id_ 441 000/4 41 723 .stm. 42. "World: Asia-Pacific Refugees Flood into West Timor, " from BBC.com at http ://news .b be. eo. u k/hi/e nglish/world/as ia pacific/newsi d_441 000/4 415 59 .stm. 4 3 . http:l/my.cnn.com/jbcl/cne ws/Go ?template=nmDetStory&art_id=44294 7 4 &sname= World&uid=9 3681259499 8&page_exclude= 1 . 44. "Intervention i n East Timor Is Gathering Backers at the U.N.," from New York Times at http:l/www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/090799timor-un.html. 45. "World: Asia-Pacific Killing Must Stop, Says UN," from BBC.com at http:// news. b be. eo. uk/hi/e nglish/world/as ia-pacific/news id_ 440 00 0/4 40 562.stm.

Notes

191

46. Peter Cole-Adams, "4 8-hour Deadline to Stop the Killing," Sydney Morning Herald, September 8, 1999, 9. 47. "World: Asia-Pacific, Australia Poised for Peace Ro l e, " from BBC.com at http :J/ news. b be .eo . uk/hi/ englis h/worl d/asia -pa cific/newsid_ 44 00 00/440 69 5 .stm. 48. Elizabeth Becker and Philip Shenon, "With Other Goals in Indonesia, U.S. Moves Gently o n East Timor, " New York Times, Se ptember 9, 1999, 1 . 49. "Mission Analysis, Political-Military Planning Tasks for Phase Ill Transition to Independence in East Timor," d ated September 9, 1999. A copy of this document was furnished to the a uthor by memb ers of the planning team at the U .S. Department of State. 50. Ibid. 5 1 . "World: Asia-Pacific: UN Team Heads for Timor," from BBC.com at http:// news.b be .eo .uk/1/hi/wor ld/asia -pa cific/4 44 432 .stm. 52. "World: Asia-Pacific: Habibie Statement: Full text," from BBC.com at http:// news.b bc.co .uk/1/hi/world/asia -pacific/445240 .stm. 53. "World: Asia-Pacific: Timor Exodus 'Run' by Indonesia," from BBC.com at http :/news .b be. eo. uk/ 1/hi/worl d/asia -pa cific/4 452 72 .stm. 54. Lindsay Murdoch, Bernard Lagan, and Peter Cole-Adams, "Knives Out for Indonesian President Habibie," Sydney Morning Herald, September 9, 1999, from http :1/ pandora. nla .gov.a u/p archi ve/199 9/S 19 99-0 ct-21/www.easttimor.com/D 0 CS/ archives/0500.htm. See also Shoeb Kagda, "Jakarta Gripped by Talk oflmminent High­ Level Purge," Business Times of Singapore, September 1 5, 1999, from http://pandora .nla .gov.a u/p archi ve/19 99/S 1 9 99-0 et-21/www.e asttimor.com/D 0 CS/ archives/05 4 7 .htm. 55. Megawati S u karnoputri, "Indonesian Military Has Embarrassed the Nation," Newsweek International, September 15, 1999, from http://pandora .nla .gov.au/ parchi ve/1999/S 19 99-0 ct-21/www.easttimor.com/D 0 CS/archives/05 44 .htm. 56. "Indonesia Is Warned It Could Lose Western Aid," from New York Times at http :l/www.nytimes.com/li brary/world/ asi a/0908 99timor- us. html.

CHAPTER 6

1 . " Clinton: U.S. Might Send 'Limited' Number of Troops to East Timor, " from CNN. corn at www.cnn.com/W0 RLD/asia pd/9909/12/us .ind onesi a/index.html . 2. These " vol unteers" included two Australian officers. They actually moved to the security of the American consulate in Dili.

3. See Yishane Lee, " Send In the Troops: Habibie Says Tes to Intervention, but Questions Remain over Who and When," Time, September 1 3, 1999, from asiaweek .corn, at www. asiawe ek.com/asia week/ db/990 9/13/. 4. The ASEAN member states include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.

However, only Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have the military capability to deploy forces for intervention operations. 5. The lessons learned by the United Nations and the participating nations d ur­ ing the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo during the 1990s clearly showed that the perseverance of the major contributing power was a significant element in operational effecti veness.

192

Notes

6 . In 1 99 9 Indonesia's army numbered about 240,000; in comparison, the Australian Army numbered only about 80,000 and the U.S. Army numbered 490,000 sol diers-not co unting 175,000 U.S. Marines. 7. The increasing of force readiness for major units had very tangible and costly implications for a force the siz:e of Australia's military. The decision, though, was crucially important to Australia's a bil ity to be a significant player in Timer, a b urd e n that it wanted to shoulder as an important regional power. See Cosgrove, 1 5 1 . 8 . The United States had long considered it might have t o evacuate Americans from Jakarta, should internal unrest or a coup against the government cause a sig­ nificant threat to its citiz:ens. 9. Under normal circumstances people are evacuated from crisis sites by normal commercial airlines, but once the situation on the gro u nd ma kes commercial trans­ portation dangerous, rising insurance rates cause airlines to discontinue service, and military transportation b ecomes the only means of large-scale movement of people

and equipment. 1 0 . There was, in fact, a concern, prior to President Habibie's decision, that the

1Nl forces might oppose an evacuation-this would have made the operation

nonpermissive-executed under combat conditions. With each increase i n potential threat, from permissive thro ugh uncertain to non permissive, the siz:e and responsi­ b ilities of the gro und security force grow significant!y. 1 1 . Australian Ministry of Defence Media Releases MIN 259/99 and MIN 2 60/99, both dated September 6, 1 999, at www.minister.d efence .gov.a u/199 9/2 59 99 .html and www.minister. defence .gov.a u/19 99/26 09 9 .html. 1 2 . The story of Bravo Company is o utlined in the 3rd RAR history at www.army.gov.a u/3rar/East_Timor.htm. 1 3 . Australian Mi ni stry of Defence Media Release MIN 271/99, dated September 14, 1999, at www.minister.defence .gov.au/1 999/27199 .html. 14. A political-military plan for East Timer had been developed by U.S. and Australian planners within the U .S. Department of Defense, and that effort was coordinated with the U.S. Department of State before being passed on the United Nations staff by both nations. Interview withJames Schaer, U.S. Department of Sta te, January 10, 2000. 15. General Cosgrove described the naming of the force during a discussion in Canberra between him and Major General Mick Keating, where they decided that

the force needed a unique non-"blue beret" identity and thus a distinctive name. Cos grove, 1 75. 1 6 . General Richardson would later command British forces in Sierra Leone in 2000 and NATO forces as the Commander, International Security Assistance Force, i n Afghanistan in 2006. 17. Steve Ayling and Sarah Guise, "UNTAC and INTERFET: A Comparative Analysis." Paper presented at the 2001 Asia Pacific Security Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, found at http://www.nd u .ed u/i nss/sym posia/pacific2 00 1/a ylingpa per.htm .

1 8. New Zealand actually had a contract in force for a transport ship, but the vessel was already in use by a higher bidder. 1 9 . Many nations have armies that are capable of combat i n their own local area, but they do not frequently have the support means to conduct combat operations in distant locations without significant help with fuel, communications, ammunition, food supplies. and other war-fighting necessities.

Notes

193

20. So uth Korea, for example, had a large number of well-trained forces but was politically unable to tolerate any cas ualties; the Philippines might have been willing to bear the cost of combat b ut had too few trained forces to make a real difference. 2 1 . Some would say that HUMINT was not even well shared inside several of the governments in vo 1ved. 22. For background, see http:l/news.bbc.co .uk/2/hi/europe/675945 .stm, last accessed i n October 2003. 23. The U .S. Pacific Command developed a draft participation agreement to help identify the support needed by other countries, and Australia had even proposed a status-of-forces agreement to Indonesia in an effort to develop a legal basis for their troops working in East Timor-the latter was rebuffed by Jakarta. 24. Peter J. Cosgrove, "Peace-Making Subcontracted: The U.N. in East Timer," Georgetown University ANZAC Lecture 2000, April 4, 2000, Arlington, Va . 25. Warden was not discarded; it simply continued execution as the Australian land component plan to secure Dili within the overall UN force construct. 26. The meeting and a preceding media conference appear to have been General Cosgrove's idea-though he was provided an executive jet from Prime Minister Howard's office for his travel, so it was certainly done with political coordination and approval at the highest levels. 2 7. Cosgrove, My Story, 1 80-1 8 1 . 2 8 . Ibid., 182. 29. Ibid., 1 8 6- 1 87. 30. Cosgrove said of Syahnakrie, "He seemed to want to avoid the same sorts of disasters that I did and I felt then and throughout that he was a man I could deal with." John R. Ballard interview with Lieutenant General Peter Cos grove, November 20, 2000, Washington, DC. 31. John R. Ballard interview with General John G. Castellaw, Camp Smith, Hawaii, August 24, 2000. 32. Cosgrove had special forces units already in East Timer when he met with Syahnakrie-they could at least have alerted Cos grove if the actions of the TNI units betrayed the assurances of their commander. The initial forces were deployed with "full kit" and loaded for any eventuality. 33. Ibid. 34. The 2nd RAR was not the "first force" into East Timer {as some of the A us­ tralian Special Air Service had already infiltrated into Timer, and their New Zealand SAS and Royal Marine counterparts had landed j ust before or with the RAR ), but it was the initial ground force and had the most important mission given to Brigadier Mark Evans's 3rd Brigade. Later, both Brigadier Evans and Lieutenant Colonel Slater were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for their service in East Timer. 35. John Crawford and Glyn Harper, Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor, 1999-2001 {Auckland, New Zealand: Reed Books, 2001), 59. 36. George O'Kane, "Operation Warden: The first 24 Hrs " Queensland Law Society Proctor On-line, Volume 20, No. 1 {2000), 21-23. 37. Ibid. 38. A protective escort at sea and a zone air p atrol overhead provided important force protectio n to the forces arr iving during the first weeks. Indonesian warships were in the local area, and Indonesian fighters did overfly the zone of operations.

194

Notes

39. Crawford and Harper, 63. 40. Michael Smith estimates that the power grid was totally destroyed and the already weak road network degraded even more by military vehicles in the after­ math of the violence. Smith, 35. 4 1 . Cosgrove, My Story, 1 9 1 . 42. Ibid., 194-195. 43. See BBC News, World: Asia-Pacific: Wednesday, September 22, 1 999, "Peace­ keepers Push into Timer," found at http:J/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/454276 .stm. 44. Cosgrove, My Story 196-20 1 . ,

CHAPT E R 7

1 . John Blaxland, "Information-Era Manoeuvre: The Australian-Led Mission to East Timer," Land Warfare Studies Center Working Paper No. 1 1 8, June 2002, 26 . 2 . General Cosgrove said on several occasions that the ability to conduct rob ust combat operations was a ke y element of INTERFET's s uccess. He was convinced that a peacekeeping force with less firepower could not have developed control i n East Timer nor executed the mandate handed to him through UNSCR 1264. John R. Ballard interview with Cosgrove, November 20, 2000, Washington, D.C. See also Cosgrove, "Peace-Making Subcontracted," 26. 3. This was actually the first operational employment of this communications capability from the Marine Expeditionary Unit {MEU). Interview with Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, U.S. Marine Corps, Camp Smith, Hawaii, August 1 8, 2000. 4. Task Force Thunderbird maintained a communications node in Baucau thro ughout the INTERFET deployment. 5 . A full, joint-capable U.S. node within the INTERFET headq uarters enabled excellent fusion of information with Australian sources and gave General Castellaw full voice, data, NIPRNET, and SIPRNET access from any of his four command locations. {NIPRNET is unclassified Internet communications, whereas SIPRNET is classified.) Due to the nature of his role within INTERFET, Castellaw had to be able to communicate from Darwin, Dili, Headquarters Australian Theatre, and at sea. Interview with Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, U.S. Marine Corps, Camp Smith, Hawaii, A ugust 1 8 , 2000. 6. Seth Mydans, "Army Pullout Shows Indonesian Fault Lines," New York Times International, September 1 9, 1999, 6. 7 . Cos grove, My Story, 2 1 1 . 8 . http:J/www. un. org/pe ace/etimor/bs/bs_frame .htm. 9 . Brigadier Evans commanded the 3rd Brigade of Cosgrove's 1st Division and had been responsible for the key western sector of East Timer since the initial landings. He was one of the strongest members of the INTERFET team and was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his performance. After his service in Timer, he was promoted to major general and assumed command of the 1st Division. 1 0 . Thailand would also continue to play an important role in future UN contri­ b utions in East Timer and would eventually provide a UN commander, Lieutenant General Boonsrang Ni umpradit, from July 2000 to September 2001. 1 1 . UN Noon Briefing Highlights, 0 ctob er 8, 199 9.

Notes

195

12. http://www.etan.org/et99c/octo ber/01-9/9cosg.htm. 13. Cosgrove, My Story, 229-231. 14. "US-Trained Indonesians Said to Infiltrate E Timer, " Associated Press , October 7, 1 99 9, found at http://www.eta n.orglet9 9c/ october/0 1-9/7 ustrain .htm. 1 5 . Keith B. Richburg, "Rebuilding East Timer: From Scratch, from Ashes of Turmoil , U.N. R eli ef Agenci es Will Try to Create a New Nation," Washington Post, October 10, 1999, found at http://www.etan.org/et99c/october/10-16/10rebuild.htm. 16. Slobodan Lekic, "Peacekeepers Exchange Gunfire with Armed Group in Timer, " Virginian Pilot, October 1 1 , 1999, A10. 17. Major Nick Nelson, RNZIR, "The 1st Battalion, RNZIR, i n East Timer." Presentation at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand, July 27, 2000. 18. Ibid. Eventually, as UNTA ET assumed control of the assigned region from INTERFET, the Canadian company departed and was replaced by a Nepalese company. 19. Basing on the Bel/eau Wood added greatly to force protectio n for the Americans and also gave them sufficient mobility to address any issue i n East Timer if required. General Castellaw cast his mission i n defensive terms, saying, "We're not at war with anybody; nobody has been declared hostile to us," and "My number one priority is taking care of my people." Philip Shenon, "U .S. Troops Begin Peacekeeping Role in East Timor, " New York Times, October 10, 1999. 20. Colonel Kelly was later awarded the Order of Australia for his service in East Timer. He was promoted to major general and assumed d uties as the land com­ mander in Australia following an assi gnment as the commander of the 1st Division

in 2004. 21. Andrew Marshal!, "U.N.-Backed Troops Kill Three Timer Militia," Reuters, October 1 7, 1999. 22. Ibid. 23. Seth Mydans, "Stung by Debate, Indonesian Leader Ends El ection Bid, " New York Times, October 20, 1999. 24. Ibid. 25. Seth Mydans, "Indonesia Chooses an Islamic Cleric as New Presi d ent, " New York Times, October 2 1 , 1999. 26. Seth Mydans, "Post-Suharto Dawn," New York Times, October 24, 1999. 27. Seth Mydans, "A Timer Leader's Emotional Return," New York Times, October 23, 1999. 28. Barbara Crossette, "Jose Gusmao: The Foe Indonesia Now Respects," New York Times, September 29, 1999. 29. For a n excellent chronology of INTERFET operations, see Alan Ryan, "Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force EastTimor." Land Warfare Study Paper No. 304 (Duntroon: Austra lian Land Warfare Studies Center, 2000}. 30. Fre deik Balfo ur, " Last Indonesian Troops Leave East Timer, " Agence France Press, October 30, 1999. 31. O n September 12, 2002, Vieira de Mello was appointed United Nations High Commiss ioner for Human R ights . In May 2003, he was asked by the Se cretary­ General to take a four-month leave of absence from his position as High Commissioner to serve in Iraq as Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It was there that he was tragically killed on A u gust 19, 2003. For the tribute to Sergio Vieira de Mello

196

Notes

written by his staff at the United Nations, see http:J/www.unhchr.ch/html/hchr/ cv.htm. 32. Cosgrove, My Story, 265. 33. Ibid., 279. 34. General Cosgrove was very surprised at the heavy-handed and overbearing a pproach used by the Americans to bring this conference abo ut, but it worked. Cosgrove, My Story, 282-2 84. 35. The Timorese members included Xanana Gusmao (President}, Taur Matan Ruak ( Falintil Commander}, Jo se Ramos-Horta ( Vi ce Pres i de nt} , Mari Alkatiri, Joao Carrascalao, Avelino Coelho, and Felicidade Guterres. 36. Paul Daley, "Evidence of Organised Kill ing Campaign Grows, " Sydney Morning Herald, November 12, 1999. 37. According to the United Nations backgro und on UNTAET. See http:J/www . un. org/pe ace/etimor!Unta etB .htm .

3 8 . Lindsay Murdoch, " Pro-J a karta Militia Leader Implicates Generals," Sydney Morning Herald, December 1, 1999. 39. Lindsay Murdoch, " General Denies Military Ties with Timor Militias: Rights Team," Sydney Morning Herald, December 1 , 1999, and " TNI Blamed for EastTimor Killings," Jakarta Post, D e cember 1, 1999, found at http://etan.org!et99c/december/ 1 - 4/01 igovt.htm . 40. Agence Prance-Press, "UN Team Wraps Up Inquiry into East Timor Atroci­ ties," December 3, 1999, found at http://etan.org!et99c/december/1 -4/02clear.htm.

CHAPT E R S

1 . Simon Chesterman, "East Timor i n Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Building," International Peace Academy Research and Policy Report, found at http://www. ipa eadem y.org/Pu bli cati ons/Reports/Research/Pu blEastTimorPrint.htm . 2 . General Jaime de Ios Santos joined the Philippine Army in 1969 after graduating from the Philippine Military Academy; he later served as a brigade commander, chief o f staff and commanding general o f an Infantry Division and superintendent of the

Philippine Military Academy. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi. Annan appointed him as the deputy commander of iNTERFET and later as commander of the military component of UNTAET. He was the first Filipino officer to lead an international peacekeeping mission on fore ign soil. Later, in 200 1 , President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed De Ios Santos as the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army; he retired from military service in April 2002 . 3 . For a thorough overview of UNTAET, see the United Nations sponsored Web page at http://www. u n.org!p ea ce/etimor/etimor.htm .

4. Kofi. Annan, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (New York, NY, October 1 8, 200 1 }, 1 1 . 5 . Smith, 62. Found at http:l/daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDO C/GEN/NO l/58 3/2 7/ IMG/No158327.pdf, accessed August 31, 2007. 6 . Ibid., 63. 7 . Michael Smith's treatment of the GPA is noteworthy and appreciate d . As he

noted, Cady's GPA team was also the slowest part of UNTAET to be fully staffed; and this greatly cornpounded the problems it faced. Real expertise in governance

Notes

197

and economic development is rare and therefore expensive and highly so ught after, particularly in the more remote and underdeveloped areas of the world like East Timer. 8. Heather Patterson, "Rioting in East Timer Injures Four," Associated Press, January 25, 2000. 9. Keith B. Richb urg, "The Business of Rebuilding: Entrepreneurs Follow Relief Workers into East Timer," Washington Post Foreign Service, January 3, 2000, A13. 10. Some signs read, "The peo p le of East Timer need food and medicine, not hotels or discotheques." Mark Dodd, "Dili Moves towards Own Judiciary," Sydney Morning Herald, January 6, 2000. 1 1 . Ibid. 12. General Wiranto was a uniquely powerful figure in Indonesia at the time. He had effectively run the government behind the scenes while Habibie was president, was a strong candidate for vice president up to the last minute d uring the election that chose Wahid, and was the most powerful minister in the government in the winter of 1999. 13. "East Timer H urnan Rights Investigators Implicate Wiranto," found at: www .excite .corn .a u/news/staory/ a a p/20 00 012 8/08/internatio na 1/timor-wira nto -asia .i np. 14. Chris McCall, "Indonesia's President to Sack Top General, Reuters, January 31, 2000; Keith B. Richb urg, "Indonesian General Refuses to Resign," Washington Post, February 2, 2000. Along with Wiranto were Generals Adam D amiri, Zacky Makarim, Tone Suratman, Noer Muis, and Timbul Silaen. The East Timorese impli­ cated ind uded Joao da Silva Tavares, Eurico G uterres, and Timer's l ast governor under Indonesian rule, Abilio Scares. 1 5 . The date was driven in part by General Cosgrove s desire to have the UN military contingent fully in control by the time Indonesian president Wahid visited East Timer on February 24. Cosgrove, My Story, 296. 16. Annan chose to visit the church in Liqui�a, the site of the massacre the previ­ ous A ugust, d uring his visit. He laid a wreath at the site and noted, "I have only begun to see for myself how extens ive the destruction was here . " See J oanne Collins, "Tearful UN Chief Annan Cheered in Timer," Reuters, February 17, 2000. 17. General Cosgrove is still cons id ere d a hero of Australia. He retired from active military s ervice in July 2005 and published his autobi o graphy, My Story, in 2006. 18. From the United Nations background material on UNTAET, found at http:!/ www.un.org/p eace/etimor/U ntaet B.htm. 19. Smith, 65. 20. Ibid, 70. 2 1 . Ibid. 22. Evelyn Leopold, "New Zealand Soldier Found Mutilated in East Timer," Reuters, July 28, 2000. 23. From the United Nations Daily Highlights, "Annan Expresses Condolences for Soldier Killed in East Timer, " dated August 1 1 , 2000, found at http://www.hri .org/news/world/u ndh/2000/00 -0 8-1 1 . u ndh .html. 24. The National Development Agency created by Vieira de Mello brought together five UNTAET units (Donor Coordination, Gender Affairs, Environment Protection, Economic Planning and Project Assessment, and Census and Statistics) and was responsible for monitoring and evaluating the national program for "

'

198

Notes

reconstruction and ea pacity building-a critically important agency for the improve­ ment of real Timorese governance. See http://www.un.orglpeace/etimor/news/ N271000.htm.

25. See the UN News Centre, http:J/www.un.orglpeace/etimor/news/01 jan31 .htm. 26. Joanna Jolly, "East Timer Makes Army of Ex-Guerri llas," Associated Press , February 1 , 20 0 1 , found at http://www. global pol icy.orgls ecurity/iss ues/etimor/ 200110201 army.htm. 2 7. http://www.greenleft.org.a u/200 114 57125 595 . 2 8 . Secretary-General Press Release SG/SM/7927, dated August 30, 2001, found at http://www.u n.org!N ews/Press/docs/2 00 1/sgsm7927 .do c.htm. 29. FRETIUN secretary- general Mari Alkatiri led the government as Chief Minister and Minister of Economy and Development, and Nobel la ureate Jose Ramos-Horta served as Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

Ana Pessoa was assigned the Justice portfolio, while Fernanda Borges was named the Minister for Finance. 3 0 . The date was chosen because on May 20, 1974, the first East Timorese political party, the Associa�ao Social-Democrata Timorense (Timorese Social Demo­ crats Association), was formed. FRETIUN eventually grew from the ASDT. 3 1 . O n January 3 1 , 2002, the Security Council unanimously ado pte d Resolution 1392, extending the mandate of UNTAET for a second time, until May 20, 2002. 32. See the UNTAET Fact Sheets for East Timer, at http://www.un.orglpeace/ etimor/fact/FS .htm, for more details of the gre at accomplishments ofVieira d e Mello and his UN team. 33. The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timer (UNMISET) was establ ished by S ecurity Council Resolution 1 4 1 0 (2002) of May 1 7, 2002. For UN details see http://www.un.org!Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/mandate.html. O n May 9, 2002, the Security Co uncil extended the mandate of UNMISET for another year, until May 20, 2004. 34. Rajiv Chandrasekan, "East Timorese Wave Their Flag as Independence Is Proc laime d ," Washington Post, May 20, 2002, A 1 6 . 35. Ibid. 36. I am indebted to Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom for their insightful study of these issues in Timer, found in Chapter 1 6 o f their excellent

book Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community ( Lanham, Md.: Rowan & Littlefield, 2001). 37. Hamish M cD onal d , "Alkatiri Will Quit within Days, Says Aide," Sydney Morning Herald, June 22, 2006; Peter Cave, "Alkatiri Agrees to UN Investigation," ABC News 0 nl ine, at http://www.a be .net .au/news/newsitems/2 00 60 6/s1 65 74 22 .htm. 3 8 . Alan Sipress and Colum lynch, "Troops Land in Restive East Timer," Washington Post, May 26, 2006, A 1 4 . 3 9 . Emily Messner and J . J . Messner, "A Lesson in How Not to Leave," Washington Post, June 10, 2006, A 1 9 . 4 0 . Asian Development Bank, Co untry Strategy And Program Update, 2 006-200 8, Democratic Republic Of Timor-Leste, dated September 2005, found at http://www . adb .org!D ocuments/CSPsmM/20 05/tim-cs pu-20 06-200 8 . pdf.

Notes

199

CHAPTER 9 1 . Richard Tanter, Desmond Ball, and Gerry Van Klinken ( eds. ) , Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor ( Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006 ), ix. 2. Three significantly smaller UN missions had begun in 1 99 1 . The UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) helped the Angolan government and Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) carry out peace agreeme nts ending sixteen years of civil war. The Angolan government and UNITA subseq uently signed the Lusaka Protocol. UNAVEM II verified the initial stages of the peace agree­ ment, corn pl eting its mandate in 1 995 . The UN 0 bserver Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) began in July 1991. ONUSAL verified agreements between the govern­ ment of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional to end a decade-long civil war. ONUSAL verified elections in March and April 1 993; it also ended its mandate in 1 995 . The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURS O ) began in September 1 99 1 , following the agreement between the government of Morocco and the Frente POUSARIO. MINURSO was deployed to monitor the cease-fire and to organize and conduct a referendum that would allow the people of Western Sahara to decide the territory's future status. As of 2007, MINURSO remains in the field- eighteen years after its creation. A forth UN mission began in Mozambique in 1992. The UN Operation in Mozam­ bique (ONUMOZ) was tasked with monitoring the peace agreement and provided humanitarian assistance, including mine clearance following the agreement between Mozambique 's government and the Resistencia Nacional Moc;;ambicana in October 1992. ONUMOZ ended in December 1994. 3. From 1 975 to 1979, Cambodia had endured a vast death and destruction under the domination of Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge. Multiple thousands were killed and people were subjected to harsh labor and political reeducation. A new government was installed by Vietnamese forces in 1978, but the country still suf­ fered civil war between multiple warring factions for over a decade. The UN spon­ sored a variety of diplomatic initiatives designed to end the fighting and permit Cambodian self-determination, with l ittle result until a tentative agreement was reached in five party talks in 1 9 9 0 . 4. The resolution a uthorized "all necessary measures t o ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel " but did not specifically invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For additional details, see the UN UNAMIC Web site at http://www. un .org!D epts/d pko/d pko/co_miss ion/unamicbackgr. html. 5. Ibid. 6. http :l/www. un. org!Depts/dp ko/d pko/co_mission/untacba ckgr1 .html. For a ddi­ tional information see the UN UNTAC Web site at http://www.un.org!Depts/dpko/ dpko/co_missio n/u nta c.htm. 7. The UN Force Commander for UNTAC was Lieutenant General John Sander­ son of Australia. 8. http :l/www.un.org/Depts/d pko/d pko/co_mission/untac ba ckgr1 . html. 9. The crisis began following the downfall of Somali President Siad Barre m 199 1 . A civil war broke out between warring factions i n Somalia. The Secretary­ General dispatched an envoy and became engaged in providing humanitarian aid for

200

Notes

famine victims in cooperation with relief organizations The Security Council also imposed an arms embargo on Somalia in 1992. The Secretary-General organized talks between the parties, which agreed on a cease-fire, to be monitored by United Nations observers, and on the protection of humanitarian convoys by United Nations security personnel; these actions set the stage for what was assumed to be a peaceful humanitarian intervention. Following the intervention, at a meeting convened by the Secretary-General in early 1993, fourteen Somali political movements agreed on a cease-fire and pledged to hand over all weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM. In March 1993, the United Nations organized a n aid conference at which donors pledged over $ 130 million. Unfortunately, this progress was continually marred by increasing tribal violence. The United States dispatched special forces to defeat the tribal leaders, but they were unsuccessful and suffered heavy casualties. The Blackhawk Down incident in October 1993 resulted in the withdrawal of U .S. and coalition forces. See Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War {New York: Penguin, 1999}. For the official UN summery, see http:J/www.un.org/ Depts/d pko/d pko/co_miss ion/unsom 1 backgr1. html. 1 0 . UNPROFOR was initially established in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. For the o fficial UN summery, see http:// www. un. org/D epts/dp ko/dp ko/co_mission/ unprof_p .htm. 1 1 . For the official UN summary, see http://www. u n.org!D epts/dpko/dpko/ co_mission/unmihbackgrl .html . For additional perspective from the UN following the last of these interventions in Haiti, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/ minustah/. See also John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1 994-1997, {Westport, CT: Praeger, 199 8). 12. It is, after all, sometimes even more difficult for more powerful nations to execute only a limited or supporting role, yet be a true partner. 1 3 . Alan Ryan, Achieving C3I Interoperability for Coalition Operations: Lessons from INTERFET {Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, May 4, 2000}. 14. Ibid., 1 0 . 1 5 . Alan Ryan has recommended integration o f the national command elements {NCE) within the main multinational headquarters, and although General Songkitti needed such integration to function fully as a deputy, integration of the NCEs within a multinational structure is probably a bridge too far in interoperability for most nations today. 1 6 . UNMISET was led by S ukehiro Hasegawa of Japan and Kamalesh Sharma oflndia. The force commanders were Lieutenant General Winai Phattiyakul of Thai­ land, Major General Huck Gim Tan of S ingapore, and Lieutenant General Khairud­ din Mat Yusof of Malaysia. At its withdrawal, UNMISET included 635 total uniformed perso nne I, i nd u di ng 4 69 troops, 4 1 military liaison o fficers, and 1 35 civilian police, supported by 264 international volunteers and, 100 UN staff volun­ teers, and 523 local civilian staff. See http://www.u n.org!D epts/d pko/missions/unmis et/ facts .html . 17. http://www.timor-leste. gov.tl/news_detai !.asp ?news_i d= 139 8. 1 8. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmit/index.html. Clearly UNMIT was a res ult of the i nstability the country s uffered during the summer of 2006. The UNMIT Special Representative of the Secretary-General was Atul Khare .

Notes

201

of India, and UNMIT included a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary­ General for Governance Support, Development, and Humanitarian Coordination, Finn Reske-Nielsen of Denmark. 19. Hannah Beech, "Win for E. Timer's Founding Fathers," Time, Thursday, May 10, 2007.

Glossary

ABRI-Angkatan Berse nj ata Rep ublik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces); later TNI ACF-Action against Hunger ADF-Australian Defence Force AIETD-All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue ANZUS-Alliance between Australia, New Zealand and United States AO-area of operations APEC-Asia-Pacifi.c Economic Conference APODETI-Associa�ao Popular Democnitica Timorense (Timorese Popular Democratic Association); pro-Indonesian integration party established in 1974 ARF-ASEAN Regional Forum ASDT-Association of Timorese Social Democrats; became FRETILIN ASEAN-Association of South East Asian Nations BAKIN-Indonesian Intelligence Service BRIMOB-Brigada Mobil (Indonesian Mobile Brigade); riot police CDTs-Clearance Diving Teams Civ-Pol-civilian police element of the United Nations Force in East Timor CNRM-National Council of Maubere Resistance CNRT-Concelho Nacional de Restisten�ia Timorense (National Council for Timorese Resistance) COM MINT-eo mmu nicatio ns intelligence CRS-Catholic Relief Services DJFHQ-Deployable Joint Force Headquarters dwifungsi-dual security and social role of the Indonesian military ETDF-East Timor Defence Force ETTA-East Timor Transitional Administration

204

Glossary

FAUNTIL-For�as Armadas de Liberta�ao N acional de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for an Independent East Timor); the armed wing of the FRETIUN-Frente Revolucionara de Timor Leste Independente ( Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), founded on August 20, 1 975 (unu-Tetum word for struggle or conflict GPA-Governance and Public Administration HAER-Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation HU MINT-human intelligence ICRC-International Committee of the Red Cross IDP-internally displaced person IFOR-International intervention Force (NATO) INTERFET-International Force in East Timor IO-information operations, activities designed to affect the popular will IOM-International Organization for Migration JTF-Joint Task Force KO DAM-regional unit of Indonesian military command; East Timor was divided into 1 7 KODAMs KOPASSUS-Indonesian Special Forces MEB-Marine Expeditionary Brigade mestizos (locally topsasses)-the mixed-race community of European and local ancestry MINUSTAH-United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MIPONUH-United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti MLO-military liaison officer MNF-multinational force MPR-Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly MSF-Doctors without Borders NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCC-National Consultative Council NCE-national command element N GO-no ngo vernmental organization NSE-National Support Element CAS-Organization of American States Permissive entry-entry without combat PHILHSMET-Philippine Humanitarian Support Mission to East Timor PNI-Indonesian Nationalist Party PNTL-Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste POLRI-Indonesian police PPLT-Pacific Command Planning Liaison Tea m PRC-People's Republic o f China RAR-Royal Australian Regiment RNZIR-Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment ROE-rules of engagement SAS-Special Air Service (special forces)

Glossary

205

SGI-Satuan Tugas Intelijen (Indonesian Combined Intelligence Task Force) Tetum-National language of the Timorese, also spelled Tetun TMR-Taur Matan Ruak TNI-Tentara Nasional indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces); pre-1997 U DT-Uniao Democratica Timorsese (Timorese Democratic Union) UNAMET-United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor UNAMIC-UN Assistance Mission in Cambodia UNDP-UN Development Program UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF-United Nations Children's Fund UNIF-United Front for East Timor Autonomy UNITAF-Unifi.ed Task Force UNMIH-United Nations Mission in Haiti UNMISET-United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor; established after independence UNMIT-UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UNOSOM-United Nations Operation in Somalia UNPOL-UN Police UNPROFOR-United Nations Protection Force UNSCR-Unired Nations Security Council Resolution UNSMIH-United Nations Support Mission in Haiti UNTAC-United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia UNTAET-United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor UNTMIH-United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti USGET-United States Group in East Timor; under UNTAET USSR-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WFP-World Food Programme

Selected Bibliography

ARTICLES AND PAPERS

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. (200 1 ). "A So utheast Asian Perspective," Australian Journal o f l nternational Affairs, Vol. 55, N o . 2, 2 1 3-223. Aspinwall, Edward, and Mark T. Berger. (2001 ). "The Break-Up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonization and the Limits of the Nation-State in Post Cold War Southeast Asia," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1003-1024. Ayling, Stephen, and Sara Guise. (2001). "UNTAC and INTERFET: A Comparative Analysis." Unpublished paper presented at the 2001 Asia-Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii. Ball, Desmond. (20 0 1 ) . "Silent Witness: Australian Intelligence and East Timer, Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1200, 35-62. Ballard,John R. (October 2000). "The View from Down Under: Coalition Command and Control d uring Operation Stabilise. Unpublished paper presented at the 4th International Command, Control, Research and Technology Symposium, Canberra, Australia . -. (June 2001 ) . "Making the Mix Work: Coalition C2 Interoperability during Recent Operations . " Unpublished paper presented at the 5th International Com­ mand, Control, Research and Technology Symposium, Annapolis, Md. -. (Spring 2002). "Mastering Coalition Command in Modern Peace Opera­ tions: Operation 'Stabilise' in East Timer," Small Wars and Insurgencies (London), Vol. 13, N o . 1, 83-1 0 1 . Bostock, Ian. (May 3, 2000). "By the Book: East Timer: An Operational Evaluation," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 033, No. 0 1 8, 23. Cosgrove, Peter J. (April 4, 2000). "Peace-Making Subcontracted: The U.N. in East Timer," the ANZAC Lecture at Georgetown University.Cotton, James. ( Spring 200 1 ) . "Against the Grain: The EastTimorlntervention," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1 , 127-1 42. ---. (20 0 1 ) . "Part of the Indo nes ian World: Lessons in East Timer Policy Making, 197 4-76, " Australian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 1, 1 1 9-1 3 1 . "

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208

Selected Bibliography

Daley, Paul. {November 1 1 , 1999). "Massacre Evidence Grows," The Age, 1 1 . D avidson, Katherine G. { 1 994). The Portuguese Colonisation of Timor: The Final Stage, 1850-1 912. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New South Wales, 1994. Dickens, David. {August 200 1 ) . "The United Nations in East Timer: Intervention at the Military O perational Level," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol . 23, No. 2, 2 13-232. Downer, Alexander. {2000). " East Timer: Lo eking Back on 1999," Australian Journal of lnternational Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 , 5-10. Haseman, John B. {August 1 995). "Catalyst for Change in Indonesia: The Dili Incident," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 8, 757-767. ---. {Spring 2000). "To Change a Military: The Indonesian Experience," Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 24, 23-30. Hunter, Ian. {O ctober 1 1 , 1 999). "Elite Forces Scouted Island from April," Sydney Morning Herald, 1 1 . Leaver, Richard. {200 1 ) . "Introduction: Australia, East Timer and Indonesia," Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1200, 1-14. Lee, Tan Chong. { 1 999). "The Role of ABRI in the Post-Suharto Era ." Unpublished thesis, U .S. Army Command and Staff College, Fort Lea venworth, Kans. Mackie, J ames. {2001 ). "Australia and Indonesia," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, No . 1, 133-143. Matebi anN ews. { 1994 ). Press clippings, speeches, messages: "Asia -Pacific Conference on East Timer {APCET), University of the Philippines, 3 1 May-4 June 1994." East Timer Information and Documentation Centre, Fairfield, Australia. McDougal, Derek. {April 2001 ). "Australia and Asia-Pacific Security Regionalism: From Hawke and Keating to Howard," Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of lnternational and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 23, Issue 1, 81-10 1 . Ramos-Horta, Jose. {Fall 1997). "Casualties o f Silence, East Timer's Struggle for Self-Determination," Harvard International Review, [AQ: vol. no.?J 3-35, 6 1 . Richardson, Michael. {May 17, 2002). "Battle Lines Drawn i n Fight for Oil Riches off East Timer," International Herald Tribune, 1 3 . Ryan, Alan. {May 4, 2000). "Achieving C3I Interoperability for Coalition Opera­ tions: Lessons from INTERFET." Paper delivered to the Technical Cooperation Program Workshop, Salisb ury, A ustralia. Schulze, Kirsten E. {200 1 ) . "The East Timer Referendum Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesian Politics, " Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 77-82. Scott, Richard. {August 30, 2000). " Learning the Maritime Lessons of East Timer," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 9, 27. Sherlock, Stephan. {September 1996). "Political Economy of the East Timer Conflict," Asian Survey, Vol . 36, No. 9, 835-85 1 . Sidwell, Thomas E . { 1995). "The Indonesian Military, Dwi Fungsi and Territorial Operations," Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Weatherbee, Donald E. {December 1966). "Portuguese Timer, an Indonesian Dilemma." Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 12, 683-695. Wheeler, Nicholas]., and Tim D unne. {2 001). "East Timer and the New Humanitari an Intervention," International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4, 8 1 6-827. Wilkinson, Marian. {August 13, 1999). "Why We Kept Timer Secrets from the US," Sydney Morning Herald, 1 .

Selected Bibliography

209

-. (January 3 1 , 200 1 } . " Exposed: Jakarta's Scorched Earth Plan," Sydney Morning Herald, 1 . Wiranatakusumah, Kisenda. {2000}. "Civil-Military Relations in the Late Suharto Era ." Unpublished thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca lif.

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BOOKS Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. { 1994}. Indonesia in ASEAN, Foreign Policy and Regional­ ism . New York: St. Martins. Ballard, John R. { 1998}. Upholding Democracy, the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Carey, Peter, and G. Carter Bentley, { eds. { 1 995}. East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation. Honol ulu: University of Hawaii. Cos grove, Peter. {2006}. My Story. Sydney, Australia: HarperCollins. Cox, Steve, and Peter Carey. { 19 9 5 } . Generations of Resistance, East Timor. London: Cassell. Crawford, John, and Glyn Harper. {2001 }. Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor, 1 9 9 9-2001. Auckland: Reed Publishing. Cribb, Robert, and Colin Brown. {1995}. Modern Indonesia: A History since 1945. London: Longman. Cristalis, Irena. {2002}. Bitter Dawn, East Timor: A People's Story. London: Zed Books . Crouch, Harold. { 1 978}. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press . Dahm, Bernhard. { 1971 } . History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, trans. P. S . Falla. London: Pall Mall Press. De Los Santos, Jaime S., and Arnulfo Marcelo B. Burgos. {2001}. Restoring Hope: The East Timor Peacekeeping Experience. Quezon City, Philippines: A. M. Cleofe Prints. Eliot, Joshua, Jane Bickersteth, and Liz Capaldi. { 1996}. Indonesia Handbook. Chicago: Passport Books. Fischer, Tim. {2000}. Ballots and Bullets: Seven Days in East Timor. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Forrester, Geoff, ed. { 1999}. Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? New York: St. Martins. Frederick, William H., and Robert L. Worden, eds. { 1 992}. Indonesia: A Country Study. Washington, D .C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Fryer, Donald W., and James C. Jacks on. { 1977}. Indonesia, Nations of the Modern World Series. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Greenlees, Don, and Robert Garran. {2002}. Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Grey, Jeffrey. { 1 999}. A Military History of Australia. New York: Cambridge Uni­ versity Press. International Commission of Jurists. { 1992}. Tragedy in East Timor: Report on the Trials in Dili and Jakarta. Geneva: International Commission of Jurists. Jackson, Karl D . , and Lucian W. Pye, eds. { 1978}. Political Power and Communica­ tions in Indonesia. Berkeley: University of California Press .

210

Selected Bibliography

James, Harold, and Denis Sheil-Small. {1971 ). The Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation, 1 962-1966. London: Leo Cooper. J ardine, Matthew. { 1999). East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, 2nd ed. Monroe, Maine: Odion Press. Jolliffe, Jill. { 1978). East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism. St. Lucia, Australia: University of Q ueensland Press. Kinsbury, Damien, ed. {2000). Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence. Victoria, Australia: Monash Asia Institute. Lowry, Robert. { 1 996). The Armed Forces of Indonesia. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Magalhaes, A. Barbedo de. { 1992). East Timor: Indonesian Occupation and Genocide. Oporto, Portugal: Oporto University Press. Marker, Jamsheed. {2003 ). East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Indepen­ dence. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland. Martinkus, John. {20 0 1 ) . A Dirty Little War: An Eyewitness Account ofEast Timor's Decent into Hell, 1 997-2000. Sydney, Australia: Random. May, Brian. {2001 ). The Indonesian Tragedy. Singapore: Graham Brash. Niumpradit, Boonsrang. {2002). 410 Days in East Timor: A Peacekeeper's Diary, ed. Simon Ewing-Jarvie. Bangkok: Darns utha Press. Oliveira Marques, A. H. de { 1 972). History of Portugal. Vol. 1: From L usitania to Empire. New York: Col umbia University Press. ---. { 1976). History of Portugal. Vol. 2: From Empire to Corporate State. New York: Columbia University Press. Pinto, Constancio, and Mathew Jardine. { 1 9 97). East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance. Boston: South End Press. Ramos -Horta, Jose. { 1996). FUNU: The Unfinished Saga ofEast Timor. La wre nceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press . Republic of Indonesia. { 1977). Decolonization in East Timor. Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs. Republic of In do nes ia. { 1 9 84 ). East Tim or after Integration. Jakarta :0 e partment of Foreign Affairs. Ricklefs, M. C. { 1993). A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Roff, Sue Rabbit, Peter Carey, and Wendy Lambourne. { 1 99 4 ) . Working Paper Number 148, East Timor: A Bibliography, 1970-1993. Canberra: Australian National University Peace Research Center. Ryan, Alan. {2000). From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia- Pacific and the "New Age" Coalition Operations, Land Warfare Study Paper No. 302. Duntroon, AU: Land Warfare Studies Centre. ---. {2000). Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor, Land Warfare Study Paper No. 304. Duntroon, AU: Land Warfare Studies Centre. Sato, Shigeru. { 1994). War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. London: M. E. Sharpe. Schwarz, Adam. { 1 994 ). A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 199 0s. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Smith, Michael G., with Moreen Dee. {2003 ). Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.

Selected Bibliography

211

Solsten, Eric, ed. { 1994). Portugal: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Tanter, Richard, ed. {200 1 ) . Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Tanter, Richard, Gerry van Klinken, and Desmond Ball, eds. {2006). Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield. Taylor, John G. { 1 999). East Timor: The Price of Freedom. Annandale, Australia: Pluto Press. Taylor, John G. { 19 9 1 ) . Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor . London: Zed Books. Vandenbosch, Amry. { 1 944). The Dutch East Indies, Its Government, Problems, and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

INTERVIEWS

Castellaw, Major General John G., interview with John R. Ballard, August 1 8, 2000, Camp Smith, Hawaii. Cosgrove, Lieutenant General Peter, November 20, 2000, interview with John R. Ballard, Washington, DC. Strong, Colonel Randolph P., February 2, 2000, interview with John R. Ballard, Fort Schafter, Hawaii .

G O VERNMENT/ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS

International Force East Timer. {2001 ). O peration STABIUSE: East Timer 1999/2000. United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. {October 1999). East Timor: Historical Background. London: HMSO. United Nations. {June 4, 1 9 9 8 ) . Press release: "Secretary-General, Senior Officials, Consider Further Steps to Advance Negotiations on East Timer" {SG/SM/685 1 ) . United N ati ens. {]u ne 30, 199 8). Press release: " Secretary-General Concerned by Violence, Urges Restraint, Tolerance and Peaceful Discourse " {SG/SM/6620 ) . United Nations. Uu l y 1 , 1 9 9 8 ) . Press release: "East Timer Petitioners Plead for Self­ Determination, Others Advocate Integration with Indonesia" {GA/COL/2983 ) . United Nations. {August 5, 1 99 8 ). Press release: " Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal Conclude Two-day Meeting on East Timer" { SG/SM/6666). United Nations. {October 13, 1 998). Press release: "Secretary-General Concerned by Rising Tensions in East Timer, Calls for Cessation of All Military Activity" {SG/SM/6744 ). United Nations. {October 29, 1998). Press release: "Fourth Intra-East Timorese Dialog Opens Near Vienna " { SG/2049). United Nations. {November 20, 199 8). Press release: "Secretary General Disturbed by Reports from East Timer, Calls for restraint by Armed Forces, Armed Resis­ tance" {SG/SM/6803).

212

Selected Bibliography

United Nations. {November 25, 1 9 9 8 ) . Press release: "Secretary General Welcomes Investigation of Reported Violence in East Timer, Eager to Continue Talks between Indonesia, Po rt u gal " {SG/SM/6805 ). United Nations. { February 3, 1999 ). Press release: "Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Portugal to Meet with Secretary-General on Plan for East Timer 8 February" { SG/SM/68 83 ). United Nations. {April 1 9, 1999 ). Press release: " Secretary General Calls for Imme­ diate End to Escalation of Violence b y All Sides i n East Timer" { SG/SM/696 1 ) . United Nations. {April 23, 1 99 9 ) . Press release: " Secretary General Says Agreement Reached on East Timer, Will Be Signed in New York on 5 May" {SG/ SM/6 9 6 8 ) . United Nations. {May 22, 1 9 9 9 ) . Report of the Secretary-General, Question of East Timor {S/1999/595 ). United Nations. {July 20, 1999 ). Report of the Secretary-General, Question of East Timor {S/1999/803 ). United Nations. {September 3, 1999). People ofEast Timor Reject Proposed Special Autonomy, Express Wish to Begin Transition to Independence, Secretary­ General Informs Security Council {SG/SM/71 1 9, SC/6722). United Nations. { September 3, 1999). Press release: "Security Council Welcomes S uccessful Popular Consultation in East Timer, Condemns Violence before and after Ballot {SC 6723). United Nations. {September 3, 1999). Secretary-General Informs Security Council People of East Timor Rejected Special Autonomy Proposed by Indonesia {SC/672 1 ) . United Nations. {September 3 , 1999). Transcript o f Press Conference by Secretary­ General Kofi Annan at United Nations Headquarters, on 3 September { SG/SM/7120 ). United Nations Security Council Resolution 8 1 4. { 1993 ). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. { 1 999). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264. { 1 999). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272. { 1 999). United Nations Security Co unci!. {November 9-17, 2000). Report of the Security Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia.Vnited States Forces, International Force in East Timer. {2000). Operation STABILISE Executive Overview. USCINCPAC Virtual Information Center. {November 24, 1999). "East Timer Primer." Camp Smith, Hawaii.

INTERNET SOURCES

British Broadcasting Corporation {BBC): http://news. bbc.co .uk/hi/english/world/ asia -pa cifi.c. Cable News Network: www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/australasia. Jakarta Post: www.thej a kartap ost .corn. The Nation: www.thenation.com. New York Times: www.nytimes.com/apoline and www.nytimes.com/library/world/ asia.

Selected Bibliography

213

Singapore Straits Times: http://straitstimes.asial .com.sg. South China Morning Post: www.scmp.com/news/Asia. Sydney Morning Herald: www.smh.eom.au/news. United Nations: www. u n.orglpea ce/etimor and www. un .org/N ews/ossg!hil ites .htm. Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com.

Index

ABRI. See 1Nl Aceh, 23 Alatas, Ali, 32-33, 36, 40-41, 62, 64, 6 7 Albright, Madeleine, 62 Alkatiri, Mari, 32, 122 All-Inclusive Intra- East Timorese Dialog {AIETD }, 28, 32 Annan, Ko:fi, UN Secretary-General, 28, 31-33, 35, 37-39, 4 1 , 44, 53; comments on UNAMET voting, 54, 63-64, 66, 69, 7 3 , 78; establishes UNTAET, 87-88, 97; visits UNTAET in Timor, 1 1 0, 1 17, 122 APEC {Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation}, 6 1 , 66-67 APODETI {Association for the Integra­ tion of Timor into Indonesia }, 7 ASDT {Association of Timorese Social Democrats, became FRETIUN}, 7 ASEAN {Association of South East Asian Nations}, 22-23, 2 5 , 56; and INTERFET, 70, 77 Assimilados, 6 Australia: concern for citizens, 72; contingent of INTERFETflJNTAET, 74-75; intelligence gathering, 34, 39; interest in Indonesia and Timor, 34; lead nation considered, 70; planning for INTERFET, 56, 58, 60, 64; supports Timorese self-determination, 36, 40

Australian Defence Force {ADP}: during World War II, 5-6; evacuation planning, 60, 72; initial deployments, 64; preparations for INTERFET, 57-59; support for INTERFET, 74-75, 84 Ayling, Brigadier Stephen, 74-75, 80 BAKIN {Indonesian Intelligence Service}, 7, 2 1 Balibo, East Timor, 3 7-38, 95 Bauca u, East Timor, 34; as initial INTERFET site, 79, 8 8, 9 4 Belo, Bishop Carlos Ximenes, 12; returns to Timor, 8 8, 98, 1 1 0, 1 32 , 1 37; wins No bel Peace prize, 1 4, 3 1-32, 35, 40, 62 Blair, Admiral Dennis, 39; orders evacuation preparations, 60, 65 Boonsrang, General Niumpradit, 1 14 , 1 36 Brazilian contingent of INTERPET/ UNTAET, 93 BRIMOB {Indonesian mobile police}, 30 Cady, Jean-Christian, 107 Canadian contingent of INTERPET/ UNTAET, 93 Carnation Revolution, 7

216

Index

Castellaw, General John, 57; establishes headquarters in Darwin, 6 1 ; first meets with Cosgrove, 76, 85, 92, 134 Catholic Church in East Timor, 6-7, 12, 40, 53, 1 3 8 Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 75, 1 0 8 CIVPOL {Civilian Police element), planning for, 6 5 Clinton, President Bill, 3 8 , 52, 61; condemns violence, 66; directs military options, 67, 69, 1 02; presses for UN action, 62, 6 5 CNRM {National Council for Maubere Resistance), 12-14 CNRT {National Council for Timorese Resistance), created, 30, 1 0 1-2 Cohen, William, 63 Cold War, 9, 1 5 Communism, 8 Constitution of Timor-Leste, 1 1 8-20, Appendix E Cosgrove, General Peter, xi, xiii; aggressive actions, 82; background, 58; commander of 1st Division and DJFHQ, 57-58; comments on force contributions, 76; gives up control and leaves Timor, 1 10-1 1 ; initial concept of operations, 79; initial relations with Syahnakri, 76-78; instincts, 8 1 ; and the media, 81-82; meets with Ruak, 89, 94-95, 98, 100-101, 1 04-5, 108; plan for Stabilise, 84; s hifts plan, 85; value of leadership, 133, 136, 139 Damiri, General Ad am, 59 D e Los Santos, General Jaime, 106, 108; assumes control in Timor, 1 1 0, 1 13 DJFHQ {Deployable Joint Force Headquarters ), 5 7-58, 8 5 Dili, East Timor, 4 0 ; destruction in 77-78, 80, 90; INTERFET arrival in, 79-80; INTERFET forces a nd, 85; refuges return to, 87; riots in 52-53, 71, 122; as a U.S. base of operations, 93, 1 0 1, 103, 108, 122

Diplomatic lessons of UN intervention, 1 32-33 Downer, Alexander, 7 8 D ut eh. See Nether! ands dwifungsi, 2 1 , 86 East Timor: constituent assembly of, 1 1 8-19, 138; displaced people in, 99; first national election in, 120-2 1 ; geography, 28; history of, 1-14; independence of, 121; reconciliation in, 1 19; refugees flee, 64, 87; transitional administration {ETIA) for, 1 12; transitio na 1 ea binet, 1 1 3 East Timor Defence Force { ETD F), 1 15-16, 122, 136 Economic crisis in Asia, 1 4, 26 Election, first Timorese national, 1 17-1 9 Evans, Brigadier Mark, 87, 92 FALINTIL {armed wing of FRETILIN), 10, 14; actions d uring popular consultation, 51; change of command for, 1 1 5; and the EDTF, 1 15; strengthening of, 31, 35, 38; and UNAMET, 50; valued by Cosgrove, 89 Fijian contingent of iNTERFET/ UNTAET, 92-93 Fischer, Jeff, 48 French contingent of iNTERFET/ UNTAET, 93 FRETIUN {Rev olutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), 8, 10, 12, 34, security force of, 122; 1 3 7-3 8 funu {struggle in Tetum), 5 de Gama, Jaime, 32, 4 1 Golkar Party, 22 GPA {Governance and Public Administration component of UNTAET), 107 Great Britain: concern for the Timorese, 36, 4 1 ; contingent of iNTERFET, 79, 93, 99, 1 0 1 ; planning for INTERFET, 57 Guided Democracy, 2 0

Index Gurkas, 73, 99, 1 0 1 Gusm a o , Jose Alexandre {Xa nana), 1 1-12; actions in crisis, 122, 137-41; capture and trial by Indo nes ia, 14; e lected first president, 120-2 1; importance of 96-97; meets with Kofi Annan, 110, 1 15-16; named leader of CNRT, 30; 31-32, 34, 36-37, 4 1 ; observes departure o f TNI, 9 8 ; 100-103; rej ects power sharing, 95; returns to Timor, 96; and UNAMET, 48-53; 88-89 Ha bibie, President Bacharuddin]., 26, 33; accepts UN forces, 66, 6 7, 69, 86; considers independence for East Timor, 36, 37-4 1, 47; rejected as president, 95, 96; rules out UN forces, 64; urges specia 1 a utonomy, 53; welcomes UNAMET vote, 54, 61-62 HAER {Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Relief component of UNTAET), 1 0 7 Haider, Brigadier Rez.agul , 4 4 , 4 8 Head q uarters, Australian Theatre, 57 Holbrooke , Ambassador Richard, 102 Howard, Prime Minister John: and APEC, 6 1 ; maintains leverage, 6 1 ; p ushes for peacekeeping force in Timor, 40, 46-47; surprised by lead nation issue, 70 Humanitarian relief, 99, 101, 104, 1 3 8-39 Human rights, 109-10, 1 16-17 Indonesia, 2; arming of militias, 60; consolidation of control, 1 2 ; economic problems, 24; evac uation plan, 60; geographic significance, 16, 24; history, 15-24; independence, 1 8 ; initial pacification campaign, 10-12; internal unrest, 1 8; invasion of East Timor, 8; relations with the U.S. 23-25; relinq uishes all claims on East Timor, 97 Intelligence , military, 34, 39, 4 7, 59-60, 75

217

INTERFET {International Force East Timor): a greements to contribute forces, 71, 74, 80; basic plan of, 84; clash with police, 90; coalition forces of, 93; composition planning, 70; first combat, 88; first week of operations, 78-85; forces in place, 73; planning for, 57; ongoing combat, 95, 98, 101, 108; transition to UNTAET, 94 Irian J aya, 23 Irish contingent of INTERFET/ UNTAET, 92 Jaishi, Private Devi Ram, 1 1 4 Japan, Japanese i n Timor during WW II, 5--{); in Indonesia d uring WW II, 1 6-17 ]ervis Bay, HMAS, 64, 72, 80 Kelly, Colonel Mark, 95 Kenyan contingent of UNTAET, 1 1 4 Komodo, 8 KOPASSUS {Indonesian Special Forces), 30, 35, 37, 59; implicated in Timorese deaths, 62, 89 Korean contingent of INTERFET/ UNTAET, 9 3 Liquica, East Timor, 39, 90 Lobato, Nicholau, 10-11, 1 81 Malacca Strait, 16 Malaysian contingent of INTERFET/ UNTAET, 93 Maliana, East Timor, 50, 8 8 Mandela, Nelson, president, 32 Manning, Private Leonard, death of, 1 14 Marine Expeditionary Brigade {3rd): first members arrive in Australia, 76; planning for INTERFET, 57, 6 1 Marker, Jamshe ed, 9 ; comments o n UNAMET voting, 54, 132; first visits, 31-35, 37, 4 1 , 46-47; named personal representative of the s ecretary-genera 1, 2 8

218

Index

Martin, lan, xii; named special representative of the secretary­ general, 44 , 46--50, 52; returns to Dili, 81, 98, 1 00 Martinkus, John, 2 8, 30 May 5 Accords, 41, 43 Military lessons from UN intervention, 133-37 Militias, {pro-integration}, oppose popular consultation, 6 1 ; destruction of Dili, 77-78, 104 Militias, {pro-independence}, support for INTERFET, 89 Mills, Commissioner Alan, 44, 54 National Consultative Council {NCC}, 103, 1 1 3, 1 16 Nepalese contingent of UNTAET, 1 1 4- 1 5 Netherlands, colonization o f Timor, 2-3, 5; colonization in Indonesia, 16-18, 20 New Zealand: arrives in D ili, 87, 9 1; co nti nge nt of INTERFETIUNTAET, 70-71 , 79, 84; death of soldier, 1 14; as an interoperable part of A ustralian brigade, 91-92; planning for INTERFET, 56, 5 8 Nobel Peace Prize, 4, Noncombatant evacuation, 57, 60, 71 Non governmental organizations {NGO}, 1 0 1 , 104 Oecussi endave, East Timor, 2, 95 , 9 7, 10 1-2, 108 Operation Spitfire, 71-73 Operation Stabilise, xi xii, replaces Warden, 76. See also INTERFET Operation Warden, 73-76; becomes Stabilise, 76 -

Pancasila, 1 7 People's Republic of China {PRC}, 1 5, 20, 94 Philippine contingent of INTERFET/ UNTA ET, 85, 99 Pinto, Constancio, 10, 12, 29 POLRI {Indonesian Police}, 9 0

Popular Consultation, 37, 44; agreement concerning, Appendix A; announcement of results, 61; Code of Conduct for, Appendix B; results, 54 Portugal, 1 ; colonization in Timor, 2-9; influence in Timor-Leste, 123; support for Timor, 40-41; 56; the UN and over Timor, 27 Portuguese contingent of INTERFET/ UNTAET, 85, 93 RAR {Royal Austra lian Regiment}, 72-73; initial arrival in Timor, 79; operations with coalition forces, 9 1-92; 135 Ramos-Horta, Jose, 1 1-13; becomes prime minister, 122; elected second president, 124, 1 4 1 , 132, 137; wins Nobel Peace Prize, 1 4, 2 9, 3 1 , 4 1 , 1 0 1 , 103 Rede Clandestina, 1 1 Richardson, Brigadier Da vid]., 74 Robinson, Mary, 47 ROE {Rules of Engagement}, considered, 65, 75-76, 134 Ruak, Taur Matan, 4 8; leadership of, 50, 8 9, 1 1 5 Santa Cruz Massacre, 1 3 Shelton, General Hugh, 6 7 Shipley, Prime Minister Jenny, 66; deploys forces, 67 S ingaporean contingent of iNTERFET/ UNTAET, 85, 93 Smith, General Michael, 10 Soares, Governor Abilio, 35, 59 Songkitti, General Jaggabatra, 77, 88-89, 135 Special Air Service {SAS}, 59-60, 72, 77, 80, 84 S uai, East Timor, 48, 50, 8 8, 9 1-92, 1 0 8 S uharto, President, 9 , 1 2 , 14, 20-25; resignation, 26, 3 0-32, 36 S ukarno, President, 16-20, 24 S ukarnoputri, President Megawati, 36, 40, 49; condemns violence,

Index 6 7, 95-96; elected president, 121; visits Timor, 62 Syahnakri, General Kiki, xi; appointed Indonesian commander in Timor, 63; first meeting with Cosgrove, 77-78, 82, 86 Takahashi, Akira, 99, 1 07 Tetum, as a national language, 123-24 Thai contingent of INTERFET/ UNTAET, 85, 8 8-89, 93 Timor-Leste: governance, 122-23; in de pen de nee of, 121; recent history, 1 39-41 ; second election in, 124; 2006 crisis in, 1 40 TNI {pre-1997 name for the Indonesian Armed Forces}, 8, 10-12, 2 1 , 35; attacks Timorese, 38, 39, 46; attitudes of soldiers, 86; considered party to devastation, 69, 77; counters independence supporters, 37; declares martial law, 62; first contact with INTERFET, 79; initial reactions to UN operations, 81; intimidation by, 50; looting by, 69; operations from West Timor, 100; passivity d uring violence, 6 1 ; plans to contest UNAMET vote, 47; training of militias, 59; transfer of authority to INTERFET, 86; withdrawal of, 9 7-98 Treloar, Air Marshal Bob, 57 UDT {Timorese Democratic Union}, 7-8 United Nations: actions in Timor, 87, 99, 106; dialog with other nations for Timor, 28, 5 1 ; extends UNTAET mission, 1 16; first self-determination resolution, 27; focus on Timor, 27; in Indonesia, 1 8 , 20; interest in Timor, 7, 9; intervention operations in: Cam­ bodia, 126-27, Haiti, 129-30, Somalia, 127-28,Yugoslavia, 128-29; lessons learned in Timor, 1 30-39; maintained support for Timor-Leste, 140; planning for

219

intervention, 65; relations with I ndonesia, 25; s ecurity council meets, 66 UNAMET {United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor}, 42-44, 46, 48-49, 52; decides to leave Timor, 63; in danger, 55; forced out of Timor by violence, 62; forced to evacuate completely, 69; 73, 76; resumes operations in Timor, 87; 100 UNHCR {United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees}, 87, 89, 97-98, 100, 1 13 , 1 17, 1 3 1 United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste {UNMIT}, 1 40 United States: decides not to be lead nation, 70; deciding how to support Timorese, 65; interest in Timor, 8, 1 0; planning for INTERFET, 56-58; specifies limited military support, 68; s up port for Indonesia, 15; support for INTERFET, 85, 91-92; support for Timor, 39, 4 1 ; support for the UN, 132; support for UNAMET, 4 8 UNMISET {United Nations Support Mission in East Timor}, 12 1-22, 136, 1 40 UNSCR 1236, 42 UNSCR 1246, 43 UNSCR 1264, authorized b y security council, 73; Appendix C UNSCR 1272, authorized by s ecurity council, 97, 1 32; Appendix D UNTAET {United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor}: build up and establishment in Timor, 1 10; designed, 65; development of 1 05-6; established, 87-8 8, 97, 107; governance development in East Timor, 1 1 9; key elements in, 106; mandate, 106; organization of, 97; relations with Indonesia, 1 1 2 U.S. Pacific Command, planning for INTERFET, 57; evacuation planning, 60 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics {USSR}, 1 5, 20 -

220

Index

Vieira de Mello, Sergio, xii; accelerates governance in Timer, 1 13 ; back­ ground, 100, 101-3; management skill, 105, 107-8, 112; meets with Wahid, 104; military operations and, 1 1 4, 1 1 6, 1 19; p ast UN experience, 112; value of leadership, 1 3 9 Volkstaad, 1 6 Wahid, President Abd urrahman, chosen as president, 95; assumes power, 96,

9 7, 102; meets with Kofi Annan, 1 1 0; meets with Vieira de Mello, 104, 1 09; vis its East Timer, 1 13, 121 Wimhurst, David, 4 6 Winai, General Phattiiyakul, 136 Wiranto, General, 3 8-40, 47; implicated in crimes, 1 09; pledges support, 62, 63, 65, 86; visits border, 91

About the Author

John R. Ball ard is Professor of Strategic Studies at the National War College in Washington, D.C. A retired Marine Colonel and combat veteran of the Iraq War, Professor Ballard has lectured worldwide on military strategy, combat command, and multinational operations.