WORLDMARK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS
UNITED NATIONS
i
ISSN 1531-1635
WORLDMARK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS
Volume 1
UNITED NATIONS
iii
Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, Eleventh Edition Timothy L. Gall, Editor in Chief
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CONTENTS
Staff of the United Nations System ............................ 196 Bibliography ............................................................. 197
Contributors ................................................................. vi Acknowledgments ....................................................... xii Foreword ..................................................................... xv Preface to the Seventh Edition .................................... xvi Foreword to the First Edition ....................................... xvi Introduction to the First Edition ..................................xvii Notes to the Eleventh Edition....................................... xx
THE UNITED NATIONS RELATED AGENCIES Agencies of the United Nations System .................... 203 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ........ 204 The International Labour Organization (ILO) ............ 212 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) ................................... 224 The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ........................... 236 The World Health Organization (WHO) .................... 246 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) .............................................. 261 The Universal Postal Union (UPU) ............................. 267 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ... 271 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) ...... 276 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) ........ 281 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) ............................................. 286 The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) .............................................. 290 The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) ........................................... 293 The World Trade Organization (WTO) ...................... 297 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) .................... 302 The World Bank Group ............................................. 311
THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM The United Nations Family of Organizations .................2 Structure of the United Nations System ........................3 Comparison with the League of Nations .......................6 The Making of the United Nations ................................8 Purposes and Principles ...............................................10 Membership ...............................................................11 United Nations Headquarters ......................................15 The United Nations Budget .........................................19 The General Assembly .................................................23 The Security Council ...................................................27 The Economic and Social Council ...............................35 The Trusteeship Council ..............................................39 The International Court of Justice ................................42 The Secretariat ............................................................46 The Secretary-General .................................................50 International Peace and Security .................................64 Arms Regulation and Disarmament .............................83 Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ......................................99 Law of the Sea ..........................................................102 Economic and Social Development ...........................105 Technical Cooperation Programs ..............................119 Social and Humanitarian Assistance ...........................134 Human Rights ...........................................................157 Independence of Colonial Peoples ............................167 International Law ......................................................176 Universal Declaration of Human Rights .....................181 Addresses of the Principal United Nations Organizations .................................184 United Nations Online Databases ..............................193 United Nations Depository Libraries ..........................194
SUPPLEMENTS Polar Regions............................................................. 327 World Tables ............................................................. 334 Conversion Tables ..................................................... 363 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................... 364 Glossary of Religious Holidays .................................... 367 Glossary of Special Terms .......................................... 370 General Bibliography ................................................ 372 Index to Countries and Territories.............................. 378 Index to the United Nations and Related Agencies ... 382
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Editorial Staff Editor in Chief: Timothy L. Gall Senior Editors: Jeneen M. Hobby, Jennie B. Watson Associate Editors: Karen Ellicott, Susan Bevan Gall, Patricia Hale, James Henry, Paulette Kurzer, Daniel M. Lucas, Maura E. Malone, Edith T. Mirante, Patricio Navia, Michael A. Parris, Ayad Rahim, Seth E. Rosenberg, Susan Stern, Jeanne Marie Stumpf, Rosalie Wieder, Daiva Ziedonis Cartographers: Maryland Cartographics, Inc.; Scott B. Edmonds, President: Stephanie K. Clark, Deborah G. Freer, Tracy R. Morrill, Justin E. Morrill, Judith G. Nielsen, John P. Radziszewski
Contributors Shown below are contributors to the present and previous editions, in most cases followed by their affiliation or status at the time the contribution was made. AHMED, BASHIR. Researcher/Writer. ALBA, VICTOR. Author, Transition in Spain: From Franco to Democracy. ALISKY, MARVIN. Director of Center for Latin American Studies and Professor of Political Science, Arizona State University. ANTHONY, JOHN. Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. ARNADE, CHARLES W. Chairman, The American Idea, and Professor of History, University of South Florida. ASHFORD, DOUGLAS E. Department of Political Science, Cornell University. AUMANN, MOSHE. Counselor, Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C. AYTAR, VOLKAN. Binghamton University. BARBER, WILLIAM J. Associate Professor of Economics, Wesleyan University. BARRON, MURIEL T. BASS, ELIZABETH M. Economist-Editor, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, New York. BENITEZ, ALBERTO. Department of Economics, Florida International University. BENNETT, NORMAN. Professor of History, Boston University. BERG, ELLIOT J. Professor of Economics, University of Michigan. BERG, NANCY GUINLOCK. BERNELL, DAVID. Johns Hopkins University. BERNSTEIN, MARVIN. Professor of History, State University of New York at Buffalo. BIRNS, LAURENCE R. Director, Council on Hemispheric Affairs. BONGIORNO, JOSEPH A. St. John’s University. BOSTON UNIVERSITY, AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER. John Harris, Professor of Economics and Director of African Studies Center; James C. Armstrong, Head, African Studies Library, Editors; Norman Bennett, Professor of History, Boston University; Valerie Plave Bennett, Energy Resources Co.; Heinz A. Bertsch; Edouard Bustin, Professor of Political Science, Boston University; Sid A. Chabawe; Tobias Chizengeni; William D. Coale; Leon Cort; Bernardo P. Ferraz, Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Kathleen Langley, Associate Professor of Economics, Boston University; Jay I. Mann; Sandra Mann; Marcos G. Namashulua, Instructor, Political Science, Brandeis University; Jeanne Penvenne; Stella Silverstein; Henry Steady; Dominique Western. vi
BOUCHAER, TOUFIC. Second Secretary, Embassy of Syria, Washington, D.C. BOXILL, IAN and BOXILL, RACHAEL. University of the West Indies. BRADBURY, R. W. Professor of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Florida. BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, JACQUELINE ANNE. City University of New York. BROCK, LIZA. Researcher/Writer. BRODY, ALAN J. Department of Political Science, Cleveland State University. BUTWELL, RICHARD. Dean for Arts and Science, State University of New York at Fredonia. CARPADIS, CHRISTINA. Researcher/Writer, Cleveland, Ohio. CARTER, GWENDOLEN M. Director, Program of African Studies, Northwestern University. CASTAGNO, ALPHONSO A. Director, African Research and Studies Program, Boston University. CASTAGNO, MARGARET. Author, Historical Dictionary of Somalia. CELIK, AYSE BETUL. Binghamton University. CHANG, A. S. Hong Kong Correspondent, Institute of Foreign Studies, Tokyo; formerly Professor of Economics, National Chi-nan University, Shanghai. CHEN, NANCY. Population Division, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Information. COLEMAN, JAMES S. Director, African Studies Program, and Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles. COLLINS, ROBERT O. Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara. COMPTON, ROBERT W., JR. Western Kentucky University. CORBIN, PETER B. Interregional Adviser, UN Department of Technical Cooperation and Development. CORDERAS, DESCÁRREGA, JOSÉ. Royal Geographical Society, Valverde (Spain). COUFOUDAKIS, VAN. Indiana Univeristy-Purdue University. COWAN, L. GRAY. Dean, School of International Affairs, State University of New York, Albany. CUMINGS, BRUCE G. Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College. CZIRJAK, LASZLO. Associate, Columbia University. DALL, CHRISTOPHER. College of William and Mary. DE GALE, SIR LEO. G.C.M.G., C.B.E., Governor-General, Government of Grenada. DOCKING, TIMOTHY W. Boston University. DUNBAR, CHARLES F. President, Cleveland Council on World Affairs. DUNKLE, JOHN R. Associate Professor of Geography and Physical Science, University of Florida. EINHORN, ERIC. University of Massachusetts at Amherst. ENGEL, DAVID. New York University. EVANS, LAURENCE. Professor of History, Harpur College. EYEK, F. GUNTHER. Professorial Lecturer in History and International Relations, American University. EZRA, MARKOS. Population Studies and Training Center, Brown University. FALL, BERNARD B. Professor of Government, Howard University. FERETTI, EVELYN. Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University. FINLAND, GOVERNMENT OF. Statistical Office, Helsinki. FLETCHER, N.E.W. Personal Assistant to the Governor-General, Government of Grenada. FLETCHER, WILLARD ALLEN. Professor and Chairman, Department of History, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Delaware. FONER, PHILIP S. Professor of History, Lincoln University. FRY, GERALD W. University of Oregon. FULLER, BENNET, Jr. Researcher/Writer. GALLIS, PAUL E. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. GAGNON, V. P., JR. Ithaca College. GANJI, MOHAMMAD H. Chancellor, Amir Showkatul-Mulk University, Birjand, Iran. GILBERT, ERIK O. Arkansas State University. GITTELMAN, ELIZABETH. Researcher/Writer. vii
GOBLE, PAUL A. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. GOUTTIERRE, THOMAS E. Dean, International Studies and Programs; Director, Center for Afghanistan, University of Nebraska at Omaha. GOVEA, RODGER M. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Cleveland State University. GRAYBEAL, N. LYNN. Researcher/Writer. GREEN, KATHRYN L. California State University, San Bernardino. GREENHOUSE, RALPH. US Information Agency. GROELSEMA, ROBERT. Civil Society Analyst, Africa Bureau, US Agency for International Development, US Department of Agriculture GRUNDY, KENNETH W. Marcus A. Hanna Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. GUENDELSBERGER, JOHN W. Professor of Law, The Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University. GUENDELSBERGER, NESE. Attorney at Law, Ada, Ohio. HAGERTY, HERBERT G. Foreign Service Officer (ret.), US Department of State. HALE, PATRICIA. Researcher/Writer, West Hartford, Connecticut. HEANEY, JAMES J. Managing Editor, Webster’s New World Dictionary. HEILMAN, BRUCE. University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. HEINTZEN, HARRY. African Department, Voice of America. HIDALGO-NUNEZ, Claudio. Researcher/Writer. HISPANIC AMERICAN REPORT. Ronald Hilton, Editor; Donald W. Bray, Ronald H. Chilcote, James Cockcroft, Timothy F. Harding, Sir Harold Mitchell, Assistant Editors; Ann Hartfiel, Andrew I. Rematore, Editorial Assistants; Eugene R. Braun, Marjorie Woodford Bray, Lee Ann Campbell, Jorge Caprista, Manuel Carlos, Frances Chilcote, Nancy Clark, Richard L. Cummings, Carlos Darquen, Anthony Dauphinot, Nicholas H. Davis, Joan E. Dowdell, Jerome Durlak, Pan Eimon, Peter L. Eisenberg, Richard Eisman, Claire E. Flaherty, Charles Gauld, Hugh Hamilton, Timothy Harding, Paul Helms, Raymond D. Higgins, Saul Landau, Wendy Lang, Joyce Lobree, Thomas Marks, Marilyn Morrison, Frank Odd, Molly Older, D. Wingeate Pike, Gabriel Pinheiro, Luis Ponce de León, Kenneth Posey, James Purks, Lawrence L. Smith, Maud Maria Straub, Linda Striem, David F. Thompson, Pamela Throop, Alice Wexler, Ann Wyckoff, Allen Young, Michael J. Zimmerman, Contributors. HOFFMAN, GEORGE W. Professor of Geography, University of Texas at Austin. HUNSBERGER, WARREN S. Professor of Economics, American University (with the assistance of Alan D. Smith, Information Officer, Consulate-General of Japan, New York). HVIZDOS, SCOTT. Researcher/Writer. HWANG, S. MARTIN. Binghamton University. INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER. Washington, D.C., D. Gareth Porter, Director. INGHAM, KENNETH. Director of Studies, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. INGRAMS, HAROLD. Adviser on Overseas Information, Colonial Office, London. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR AERIAL SURVEY AND EARTH SCIENCES. F. J. Ormeling, Head of Cartography Department; C. A. de Bruijn, P. Hofstee, A. B. M. Hijl, Department of Urban Surveys. ITZKOWITZ, NORMAN. Associate Professor of Oriental Studies, Princeton University. JUDD, KAREN. Researcher/Writer, New York, New York. JUNION-METZ, GAIL. President, Information Age Consultants. KALIPENI, EZEKIEL. Department of Geography, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. KANTOR, HARRY. Professor of Political Science, Marquette University. KAPLAN, FREDRIC M. KARCH, JOHN J. Professorial Lecturer, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University. KATZ, MARK N. Associate Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University. KATZMAN, KENNETH. KIM, JULIE. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. KING, MAE C. Harvard University. KINGSBURY, ROBERT C. Assistant Professor of Geography, Indiana University. KIRLI, CENGIZ. Binghamton University. viii
KIROS, TEODROS. Boston University. KISH, GEORGE. Professor of Geography, University of Michigan. KITIGWA, MIRAJI. University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. KOLEHMAINEN, JOHN I. Chairman, Department of Political Science, Heidelberg College. KOLINSKI, CHARLES J. Professor of History, Florida Atlantic University. KOPECKY, DEAN. Researcher/Writer. KOSTANICK, HUEY LOUIS. Professor of Geography, University of Southern California. KRANZ, WALTER. Press and Information Officer, Principality of Liechtenstein. KURZER, PAULETTE. Department of Political Science, University of Arizona. KYLE, DAVID. Texas A&M University. LAATIKAINEN, KATIE VERLIN. Wilkes University. LAYACHI, AZZEDINE. St. John’s University. LAZERSON, JOSHUA. Researcher/Writer. LEE, ROBERT H.G. Assistant Professor of History, State University of New York at Stony Brook. LEMARCHAND, RENE. Director, African Studies Center, University of Florida. LENGYEL, EMIL. Professor of History, Fairleigh Dickinson University (in collaboration with Catherine Logan Camhy). LEWIS, H. A. G.O.B.E., Fellow, Royal Geographical Society (United Kingdom). LEWIS, STEVE. Researcher/Writer. LEWIS, WILLIAM H. Department of Anthropology and Sociology, American University. LICHTENSTADTER, ILSE. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. LINDO, WILLIAM. Government Information Services, Government of Belize. LOBBAN, RICHARD A., JR. Department of Anthropology, Rhode Island College. LOBOS, IGNACIO A. Journalist, Honolulu, Hawaii. LODRICK, DERYCK O. Visiting Scholar, Center for South Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. LONGMAN, TIMOTHY. Vassar College. LUX, WILLIAM R. Assistant Professor of History, University of Alabama. LYNCH, CATHERINE. Assistant Professor, Department of History, Case Western Reserve University. MA, JUNLING. Researcher/Writer. MARCUS, LAWRENCE. Washington University. MARKS, HENRY S. Professor of History, Northeast Alabama State Junior College. MATHEWS, THOMAS G. Secretary-General, Association of Caribbean Universities and Research Institutes, Puerto Rico. McCANN, JAMES C. Boston University. McDONALD, JAMES L. Senior International Policy Analyst, Bread for the World. McGUIRE, CARL. Professor of Economics, University of Colorado. McHALE, VINCENT. Chairman, Department of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. McINTIRE, ROBERT C. Associate Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Millikin University. McLELLAN, ROBERT S. US Information Agency. MacLEOD, MURDO. University of Florida. McLOUGHLIN, GLENN. Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. MENDELL, MARCIA EIGEN. METZ, RAYMOND E. Interim Director, University Libraries, Case Western Reserve University. MILLER, NATHAN. Associate Professor of History, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. MILLETT, ALLAN R. Mason Professor of Military History, The Mershon Center, The Ohio State University. MILNE, R. S. Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia. MIRANTE, EDITH. Project Maje, Portland, Oregon. MONCARZ, RAUL. Professor, Department of Economics, Florida International University. ix
MORTIMER, MOLLY. Former Commonwealth Correspondent, The Spectator, London. MOSELEY, EDWARD. Assistant Professor of History, University of Alabama. MUNRO, ALLISON DOHERTY. NAVIA, PATRICIO. Department of Politics and Center for Latin American Studies, New York University. NETOS, ELEFTHERIOS. Candidate, Kent State University. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS. I. William Zartman, Editor; John Entelis, Oladipo Coles, Jeffrey Knorr, Marie-Daniele Harmel, Contributors. NICHOL, JAMES. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. NICHOLSON, NORMAN L. Professor of Geography, University of Western Ontario. NOROOZI, TOURAJ. University of Utah. O’DELL, ANDREW C. Professor of Geography, University of Aberdeen. OH, JOHN K. C. Professor of Political Science, Marquette University. OLCOTT, MARTHA BRILL. Professor, Department of Political Science, Colgate University. OLIVER, ROBERT T. Head, Department of Speech, Pennsylvania State University. PANORAMA DDR. Berlin. PAPP, TIBOR. Columbia University. PATAI, RAPHAEL. Editor, The Herzl Press. PAYNE, WALTER A. Professor of History, University of the Pacific. PENIKIS, ANDREJS. Columbia University. PETROV, VICTOR P. Professor of Geography, California State College. POLAND, EMBASSY OF. Washington, D.C. POLK, WILLIAM R. Director, Adlai E. Stevenson Institute, University of Chicago. PRAGOPRESS. Prague. PRECHT, HENRY. Adjunct Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. PRICE, GEORGE. Premier, Belize. RANAHAN, JOHN. Lake Ridge Academy. RASHID, TAUFIQ. Indiana University. RASHIDUZZAMAN, M. Professor of Political Science, Glassboro State College. REINES, BERNARD. Researcher/Writer. REYNOLDS, JONATHAN T. Livingstone College. RIEDINGER, JEFFREY M. Michigan State University. RITTERBUSH, DEACON. Researcher/Writer. ROBINSON, KENNETH E. Director, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, and Professor of Commonwealth Affairs, University of London. ROBINSON, RICHARD D. Lecturer on Middle Eastern Studies, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. ROSBERG, CARL G., JR. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California. ROSEWATER, GAIL. Researcher/Writer, Cleveland, Ohio. ROTBERG, ROBERT I. Professor of Political Science and History, MIT. RUPEN, ROBERT A. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina. RUS, VLADIMIR. Department of Slavic Literature (ret.), Case Western Reserve University. SANDS, WILLIAM. Editor, The Middle East Journal. SANTOS, MARIA J. Senior Evaluator, United States General Accounting Office. SCHULTZ, CRAIG. Researcher/Writer. SEBUHARARA, R. CHARLES. Binghamton University. SHABAD, THEODORE. Correspondent, New York Times. SHAMBAYATI, HOOTAN. Middle East Center, University of Utah. SHEIKHZADEH, AHMAD. Columbia University. SHEPHERD, GEORGE. Professor of Political Science, University of Denver. SIRACUSA, CHRISTINA. Researcher/Writer. SMITH, ALAN HEPBURN. Associate Professor of Finance, Marquette University; formerly Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Ghana. SORICH, RICHARD. East Asian Institute, Columbia University. SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA PUBLISHING HOUSE. x
STEVENS, RICHARD P. Director, African Language and Area Center, Lincoln University. STOLL, JOSEPH W. Supervisor, Cartography Laboratory, University of Akron. STUMPF, JEANNE MARIE. Department of Sociology, John Carroll University; Department of Anthropology, Kent State University–Geauga Campus. SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES PROGRAM. Peter Dalleo; Thomas C. N. Evans; Robert G. Gregory, Professor of History; Elisabeth Hunt; Roderick J. Macdonald, Professor of History; Thomas F. Taylor. SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, PROGRAM OF EAST AFRICAN STUDIES. Fred G. Burke, Director; John R. Nellis, Administrative Assistant; and Gary Gappert, Nikos Georgulas, Richard Kornbluth. URDANETA, CARMEN. Researcher/Writer, Boston, Massachusetts. UTHUP, THOMAS. Binghamton University. VANDENBOSCH, AMRY. Director Emeritus, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky. VIVIANI, NANCY. Department of Economics, Australian National University. WAGNER, EDWARD W. Associate Professor of Korean Studies, Harvard University. WALKER, WENDY. Researcher/Writer. WALLACE, JENNIFER. Researcher/Writer. WARFEL, DOUGLAS. Researcher/Writer. WEBB, RAYMOND P. Milton Academy. WENNER, MANFRED W. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Northern Illinois. WERNSTEDT, FREDERICK L. Associate Professor of Geography, Pennsylvania State University. WESTNEAT, ARTHUR S. School for Public and Environmental Affairs, African Studies Program, Indiana University. WIEDNER, DONALD L. Chairman, Department of History, Temple University. WILBER, DONALD N. Author, Iran Past and Present. WILMINGTON, MARTIN W. Professor of Economics, Pace College. WINDER, R. BAYLY. Chairman, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, New York University. WISE, RENATE. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Texas at Austin. WOEHREL, STEVEN. Specialist in European Affairs. WOLFE, GREGORY D. Portland State University. WRIGHT, WINTHROP R. Professor of History, University of Maryland. YUGOSLAV FEDERAL COMMITTEE FOR INFORMATION. ZULU, LEO. Department of Geography, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A basic part of the editorial preparation of the Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations consists of keeping continuously abreast of the work of governments. The editors wish to express their gratitude to the many government officials the world over who so kindly gave their cooperation. Grateful acknowledgment is made for the invaluable material, used throughout the encyclopedia, drawn from the mass of documents issued by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Gratitude is expressed for the assistance given by numerous officials of the UN, the specialized agencies, and the intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The editors would like to specifically thank the staffs of the United Nations Public Inquiry Unit (headed by Ms. M. Hosali) and the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (headed by Ms. Rima Bordcosh) for the many hours they spent tracking down answers to particularly obscure questions. Special thanks is extended to the following individuals and units for substantive contributions on the work of their organizations: Jackie Aidenbaum and Mary Lou Murphy, DHA; Marie Paul Aristy, Chief Information, Communication and Documentation Unit, INSTRAW; Vera Azar and Lina Arafat, ESCWA, United Nations; Nassrine Azimi, UNITAR; Max Bond, UN University; Sabine Bauer and Sylvie Bryant, UNDCP; Borjana Bulajic, Social Affairs Officer, INSTRAW; Michael Cassandra, Centre for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations; Mary Covington, ILO; Padraig Czajkowski, Centre for Human Rights, United Nations; Jacqueline Dauchy, Director, Codification Division, Secretariat of the Commission on International Law, United Nations; Shalini Dewan, Chief, Editorial and Publications Section, Division of Communications, UNICEF; Allen Dorsey, ICRC Delegation to the UN; Fred Eckhard, Rolando Gomez, and Jane Gaffney, Office of Spokesman for the Secretary-General; Lynn Failing, Deputy Chief, Public Information Office, UNRWA; Donald E. Fitzpatrick, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary General for Administration and Management, United Nations; Hirut Gebre-Egziabher, Project Officer, Division of Information, UNICEF; Christine Graves, FAO; Marilla B. Guptil, United Nations Archives; H. J. Frick, Chief, Official Relations Branch, ILO; Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, Director, Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations; Maurice Jorgens, DOALOS; Mary Lynn Hanley, Chief, Editorial and Audio Visual Branch, Division of Public Affairs, UNDP; James T. Hill, Senior Economist, and Marva Coates, FAO; Margaret A. Kelly, Secretary, ECOSOC, United Nations; George Kell and Nina Weckstrom, UNCTAD; Julie A. Kimbrough, Media and NGO Liaison Officer, IFAD; Roger Kohn, Head of Information Office, IMO; Pamela Maponga, Secretariat of the Special Committee on Apartheid, United Nations; Luciana Marulli-Koenig, Chief Information Support Unit, Dept. of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, United Nations; William Lee, UNRWA; Ian McDonald, Chief Editor, IMF; Mehri Madarshahi, Department of Administration and Management, UN; Isabelle Marsalles, Electoral Assistance Division; Alex Marshall and Stirling Scruggs, UNFPA; Allegra Morelli, Director, Information Division, IFAD; Ozdinch Mustafa, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Trusteeship Council, United Nations; Marie Okabe, Senior Liaison Officer, UNHCR; Lisa Pachter, International Relations Officer, Office of the Vice President, United Nations Affairs, World Bank Group; Sarah Parkes, ITU; Carrie Power, UNIFEM; Andrew Radolf, UNESCO; Aurora Rodriguez, UNIDO; Ann Rogers, Senior Economist, Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, United Nations (for information on the World Food Council); Simeon Sahaydachny, Legal Officer, International Trade Law Branch, Office of Legal Affairs, UNCITRAL; Sunil Saigal, Acting Chief, Division of Resources Mobilization, Bureau for Resources and External Affairs, UNDP; Samir Sanbar, Under Secretary General, Department of Public Information, United Nations; Wesley Scholz, United States Department of State xii
(for information on the Law of the Sea Convention); Jim Snissen, UNEP; Maria-Sabina Yeterian-Parisi, Economic Affairs Officer, Policy Coordination and External Relations Service, UNCTAD; Dorothy Thibodeau, Public Affairs Division, IMF; Celinda Verano, WHO Office at the UN; D. Williams, WMO; David J. Woods, Director, Information Division, GATT; External Relations Division, UNIDO; Communications and External Relations Section, UNIFEM; Division of External Relations, UNHCR; Adrienne Cruz, Publications, Dissemination and Reference Centre, UNRISD; Department of Public Information, UPU; Department of Public Relations and Information, WIPO; and the Secretariat of the World Meteorological Organization. This encyclopedia greatly benefited from statistics and information requested of the governments of the nations profiled in these volumes. The following persons, personally or through the auspices of their offices, graciously responded to our request for information: Mr. Arben Tashko, Embassy of the Republic of Albania; Mr. Hamid Belhadj, Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria; Ms. Debbie O. Profper, Embassy of Antigua and Barbuda; Mr. Garnik Ashotovich Nanagulian, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia; Mr. Christopher Sweeney, Embassy of Australia; Mr. Martin G. Eichtinger, Embassy of Austria; Mr. Djeikhoun Nazim Molla Zade, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan; Mrs. Diane A. Dean, Embassy of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas; Mr. Othman Abdulla Mohammed Rashed, Embassy of the State of Bahrain; Mr. K. M. Ejazul Huq, Embassy of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; Mr. Charles Chesterfield Burnett, Embassy of Barbados; Mrs. Gisele Louise Eggermont, Embassy of Belgium; Mrs. Yvonne Sharman Hyde, Embassy of Belize; Mr. Augustine Moipolai Pone, Embassy of the Republic of Botswana; Mr. Eduardo Botelho Barbosa, Brazilian Embassy; Mr. Ahmad Hajijukin, Embassy of the State of Brunei Darussalam; Ms. Djeneba Yasmine Traore, Embassy of Burkina Faso; Mr. Pierre Ndzengue, Embassy of the Republic of Cameroon; Mr. L. Ian MacDonald, Embassy of Canada; Mrs. Maria I. M. Correa Reynolds, Embassy of Chile; Mr. Antonia F. Copello, Embassy of Colombia; Mr. Kresimir Cosic, Embassy of the Republic of Croatia; Mr. Miltos Miltiadou, Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus; Mr. Joergen Grunnet, Royal Danish Embassy; Mr. Issa Daher Bopuraleh, Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti; Dr. Dario Suro, Embassy of the Dominican Republic; Mr. Kamel Abdel Hamid Mohamed Ahmed, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt; Mr. Eerik Niiles Kross, Embassy of Estonia; Mr. Demissie Segu Segu, Embassy of Ethiopia; His Excellency Pita Kewa Nacuva, Embassy of the Republic of Fiji; Mrs. Pirkko Liisa O’Rourke, Embassy of Finland; Mr. Jean Mendelson, Embassy of France; Mr. Gottfried Haas, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany; Miss Mara Marinaki, Embassy of Greece; His Excellency Kenneth Modeste, Embassy of Grenada; His Excellency The Most Reverend Agostino Cacciavillan, Apostolic Nunciature; Mr. Rosny Montoya Flores, Embassy of Honduras; Miss Klara Breuer, Embassy of the Republic of Hungary; Mr. Jon Egill Egilsson, Embassy of Iceland; Mr. Sanjay Bhatnagar, Embassy of India; Mr. Subekti Dhirdjosaputro, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia; Mr. Nimrod Barkan, Embassy of Israel; Mr. Alessandro Vaciago, Embassy of Italy; Mr. Seiichi Kondo, Embassy of Japan; Mr. Marwan J. Muasher, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Mr. Byong Suh Lee, Embassy of Korea; Dr. Ali Ahmad Al Tarrah, Embassy of the State of Kuwait; Mr. Ints Upmacis, Embassy of Latvia; Mr. Tsepiso Jeffrey Malefane, Embassy of the Kingdom of Lesotho; Dr. Alfonse Eidintas, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania; Miss Colette Kinnen, Embassy of Luxembourg; Mr. Robert B. Mbaya, Embassy of Malawi; Mr. Alfred M. Falzon, Embassy of Malta; Mr. Banny DeBrum, Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands; Mr. Amadou Diaw, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania; Mr. Joaquin Gonzalez Casanova, Embassy of Mexico; Mr. Kodaro M. Gallen, Embassy of the Federated States of Micronesia; Mr. Nadmidyn Bavuu, Embassy of Mongolia; Mr. Antonio Paulo Elias Matonse Jr., Embassy of the Republic of Mozambique; Mr. Japhet Isaack, Embassy of the Republic of Namibia; Mr. Frans L.E. Hulsman, Embassy of the Netherlands; Mr. Robert Carey Moore Jones, Embassy of New Zealand; Mr. Enrique Vanegas, Embassy of Nicaragua; Mr. Adamou Abdou, Embassy of the Republic of Niger; Mr. Tore xiii
Tanum, Royal Norwegian Embassy; Mr. Salim Al Mahrooqy, Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman; Mr. Malik Zahoor Ahmad, Embassy of Pakistan; Miss Lerna L. Llerena, Embassy of the Republic of Panama; Mr. Christopher Mero, Embassy of Papua New Guinea; Mr. Jose M. Boza, Embassy of Peru; Mr. Boguslaw M. Majewski, Embassy of the Republic of Poland; Professor Maria Graca S. Almeida Rodrigues, Embassy of Portugal; Mrs. Natal’ya P. Semenikhina, Embassy of the Russian Federation; Mr. John P. Irish, Embassy of St. Kitts and Nevis; Ms. Undine George, Embassy of Saint Lucia; Ms. Cecily A. Norris, Embassy of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Dr. Hamad Ibrahim Al Salloom, Embassy of Saudi Arabia; Mr. Marc R. Marengo, Embassy of the the Republic of Seychelles; Miss Siong Fun Lim, Embassy of the Republic of Singapore; Mr. Jaroslav Smiesny, Embassy of the Slovak Republic; Mr. Gregor S. Zore, Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia; Mr. Atukoralalage A. Wijetunga, Embassy of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka; Mr. Abdalla Khidir Bashir, Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan; Mrs. Lindiwe Audrey Nhlabatsi, Embassy of the Kingdom of Swaziland; Mr. Ingmar J. Bjorksten, Embassy of Sweden; Mr. Francois Barras, Embassy of Switzerland; Ms. Souad Mourazen Al Ayoubi, Embassy of the Syrain Arab Republic; Mr. Ally O. Mjenga, Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania; Mr. Oussama Romdhani, Embassy of Tunisia; Mr. Ahmet Mahfi Egilmez, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey; Mr. Dmitro Y. Markov, Embassy of Ukraine; Mr. Atiq Mubarak Marzoog Khamis, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates; Mr. Nicholas W. Browne, British Embassy; Mr. Carlos Maria Irigaray, Embassy of Uruguay; Mr. Ramon Hernandez, Embassy of the Republic of Venezuela; Mr. Lazarous Kapambwe, Embassy of the Republic of Zambia; Mr. Mark Grey Marongwe, Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Special acknowledgment goes to Margaret Hunter, Embassy of Turkmenistan and Veronica Rentmeesters, Embassy of Eritrea for their help in providing current information on their respective countries. The following individuals and agencies deserve special acknowledgment for their generous assistance: Ernest Carter, USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service; Orlando D. Martino, Chief, Branch of Latin America and Canada, US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Division of International Minerals; Bernadette Michalski, Energy Analyst, US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Division of International Minerals; Hendrik G. van Oss, Economic Geologist, US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Division of International Minerals; Lowell Feld, Energy Information Administration, Energy Markets and Contingency Information Division; Matthew E. Brosius, Deputy Head of Center, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; Rosario Benevides, Salomon Brothers; Sarah Baker, BP America, Reference Center.
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FOREWORD Although the United Nations is often in the news, its basic nature, its possibilities and its limitations are not widely understood. In its first fifty years the organization has enormously expanded, both in membership and in the scope of its work. During that period, both governments and the public have made it responsible for a variety of dangerous and complex problems, usually without providing adequate means to tackle them. This has meant that the United Nations is mostly better known for its shortcomings than for its achievements. At its foundation the main functions of the UN were the maintenance of international peace and security, disarmament, and various forms of post-war reconstruction. The founders, however, recalling that the part which economic and social disorder had played in creating the conditions for the second world war, provided, in the Charter, a resounding mandate for the promotion of “the economic and social advancement of all peoples” as well as of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The shortcomings of this side of the UN’s work, by far the largest part in terms of staff and programs, is perhaps the most serious disappointment of the organization’s first fifty years. The UN itself is only the instrument of its member governments. Apart from the leadership, and the limited powers of initiative, of the Secretary General, the organization depends for its effectiveness and for its development on the support and the political will of the governments. Peacekeeping operations and the intermediary role of the Secretary General have spasmodically enjoyed such support, although there is now a serious controversy as to how much the UN ought to become involved in human disasters which are not threats to international peace. On the economic and social side there has been a far greater reluctance to give the UN a leading role. The UN is now going through the most important transition of its history. Virtually all of its recent peace and humanitarian operations are concerned with violent situations within the boundaries of a single state, rather than with conflicts between states as in the past. The media and the public seem increasingly to see the organization as the police and rescue organization of a world community that does not yet exist. However reluctant governments may be to authorize and to provide the necessary resources for such a role, there can be little doubt that if the UN fails to carry it out, along with a far more effective lead in economic and social matters, the organization will become increasingly irrelevant to the great global problems which will determine the future of the human race. We already have many problems of “one world.” If the UN does not begin to deal with them effectively, it will cease to be useful, and the future will be correspondingly more hazardous. The so-called UN system covers, in theory at any rate, virtually the entire range of human activity. After fifty years it needs reorganization, reform and renewal. However, its Charter and its fundamental institutions are sound. If the world organization is to be strengthened to meet the enormous challenges of coming years, it is essential that the public understand it, so that it can be both intelligently criticized and strongly supported. This Encyclopedia provides a comprehensive and accessible basis for such understanding. BRIAN URQUHART Scholar-in-Residence, The Ford Foundation August 1994 xv
FROM THE
PREFACE T O T H E S E V E N T H E D IT I O N
Carved in stone, opposite the home of the United Nations, is an inscription taken from Isaiah: “. . . and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” The Prophets’ sense of moral justice, which was the foundation of their vision of peace as expressed in this inscription, has not yet been accepted as a basis for political behavior. Indeed, developments in recent years have cast a dark shadow over the United Nations. The passage of resolutions and the toleration of practices inconsistent with the spirit of the Charter have not only instilled doubt about the effectiveness of the organization as a political instrument but have also undermined the spirit of fairness and cooperation that once characterized the work of the specialized agencies. In the 1930s, the world witnessed the loss of moral force and then the political decline of the League of Nations. No friend of peace could wish its successor a similar fate. It is the fervent hope of the editors of this encyclopedia that political influences will not further undermine the substantive achievements of the United Nations. The problems of peace preoccupy the minds of people everywhere. The ever-intensifying complexities of our times, while serving to increase the responsibility of a larger number of persons, often also augment the individual’s feeling of helplessness. Yet, knowledge of other lands and ability to see their people as fellow human beings can enable the individual to overcome this feeling of helplessness and to act for himself and others. In this spirit this work was conceived and is offered, with the hope that it may not only find many specific uses, but may bring into focus a broader world view for the reader, and thus contribute to international understanding. MOSHE Y. SACHS Editor and Publisher, First through Seventh Editions
FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION
This encyclopedia is different from all others produced in recent years. It is not simply a collection of miscellaneous facts for ready reference. It resembles more the pioneer work of those encyclopedists who ushered in the era of enlightenment in 18th-century France, in that it mirrors the life of men and nations at a great turning point in history, when the national state system of absolute sovereignties has to find new adjustments under the sovereignty of science. The old safeguards for security—mountains and oceans—no longer hold against the impact of an atomic age. The United Nations is the mirror of this new world in which international life becomes more and more interdependent. The political framework is therefore filled in by a comprehensive survey of the major interests of people everywhere. Such an encyclopedia should prove a valuable guide to the understanding not only of the United Nations but of our time. JAMES T. SHOTWELL 6 August 1874–17 July 1965 Chairman, Editorial Advisory Board First Edition xvi
F RO M T H E
INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION
The swift course of domestic and world events, part of a hastened process of change, requires an enormous increase of basic understanding by peoples of the multiple factors influencing the tempo and direction of national developments. The pattern of intercultural penetration and cross-fertilizing exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge rests upon a concept of fundamental unity of diverse approaches to the central objective of all human endeavors: the creation of a better world, with general equality of opportunity to all individuals, everywhere. Within a planet shrunk into community bounds by the progress of communications there are no substantial sectors of mankind still completely isolated from the main currents of 20th-century thought and action. A growing sense of identification among men is fostered by the adoption of certain basic standards of human rights and the slow growth of supranational law rooted in the fundamental principles that are common to all juridical systems. No period in history has witnessed such accelerated search for adequate answers to the riddles that have so long beset humanity. Metaphysical explanations of the universe and of the individual’s place within it vie with each other in the vast and only superficially explored realm of emotions; rationalized conceptions of economic and social philosophies contend in the marketplace of personal loyalties with a violence that frequently threatens to rend asunder the fabric of overall unity; and the march forward of freedoms and improvements in the status of people throughout our earth is largely clouded by the supercharged treatment of political affairs in the media of mass communication. At a time when people everywhere are truly eager for accurate, comprehensive, and timely information about themselves and their neighbors in the closely related various geographic areas, the vastness and multiplicity of the field to be covered promotes reporting that serves little the needs of the average person: it is either too detailed in breadth and depth, so that only specialists can profit from its availability, or sketchy and fragmentary, to the point where it contributes more to confusion than enlightenment of the users. A specific reason has made necessary a new approach to analytical and basic data on each country, as a separate political unit, and as a member of the vast family of nations all constitute together: the universality of their interest in the maintenance of international peace and security through the joint exercise of agreed-upon powers to restrain violence; to police disturbed areas where peaceful relations are endangered; to promote the application of legal procedures to the adjudication of their differences; and to strike at the very sources of controversy, which are rooted in the deep chasms among their economic and social standards and their consequent basic inequalities of status. So-called realists may continue to voice their belief that conflict among nations is an outgrowth of their dynamic development, and that only practical arrangements which create “balances” of power can establish an equilibrium within the diverse segments of the world; and theorists of the biological inevitability of war still proclaim the materialistic concept that only a concentration of authority in the hands of some overwhelmingly strong state can eliminate actual armed conflict and bring to subjected peoples the “benefits” of a freedomless “pax romana.” But mankind has made great strides since the days of empires, the conquest of colonial dependencies, the plagues and misery that fixed the general expectation of human life under thirty years, and the spiritual darkness of illiteracy and isolation from the mainstreams of culture of variegated philosophical, religious, and scientific concepts. Under principles of ethics the peoples and the nations emerged as possessors of rights and bearers of responsibilities, and morality took its place in the councils of power. The advancement toward a universal rule of law has been too slow for the idealists and yet xvii
most encouraging to those who believe that peaceful evolutionary progress achieves more durable results than violent revolutionary change. The steady process of codification of generally recognized juridical principles and the formulation of new ones through general consensus constitute one of the most hopeful signs of this restless era of change. International compacts such as the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations incorporate moral concepts side by side with legal standards. They recognize that there are both ethical and juridical duties and rights that must be observed by states in their reciprocal relations and in respect of their inhabitants, subjects, and citizens. So far-reaching are the changes already wrought within the world community, particularly for its less developed segments, that the normal processes of history have lost considerable significance in the face of new realities recently created. Feeling that none of the encyclopedias and specialized sources of information do sufficient justice to these accomplishments in political freedom, economic development, social progress, and the practice of international cooperation, Worldmark Press, Inc., decided to publish a basically new encyclopedia devoted to the nations. After identifying the outward symbols of each state: the capital, a map, the flag, the national anthem, the monetary unit, the system of weights and measures, holidays, and time, each article proceeds to cover, as thoroughly as available data permit, 50 individual phases of the country’s life, so as to furnish an overall picture of its present as rooted in the past evolution of its institutions, customs, and traditions. A precise definition of location, size, and extent of the individual territory is given, so that the reader can visualize, as a living reality, that which the map depicts graphically. Topography, climate, and flora and fauna supplement the other natural physical features of the respective nation. More than by any other factor, countries are what they are because of man’s exertions to create his own environment, so population, ethnic groups, and language are the next items covered. Together with the section devoted to religion, they give a basic understanding of the demographic phenomena that determine the basic institutions, political, economic, and social, of each sovereign unit. Transportation and communications follow in the description of the positive factors working for the consolidation of each country’s internal unity and of the reconstruction of the wider oneness of mankind. Next there is a historical survey, in most cases kept brief because of the availability of comprehensive ones in other sources of general information. As a result of the individual national experience various types of governmental authority have been either adopted from the similar experience of other peoples or created to meet different requirements. In the operation of governments, there are diverse types of machinery which correspond to particular political philosophies and which the citizens control through political parties. Local governmental structures supplement the system of deliberative and executive authorities in charge of public interests. Knowledge of the organizational pattern of the judiciary acquires considerable importance for all kinds of individual and corporate activities within a particular nation, so information is furnished thereon. The internal stability of a country and its international security are made clear by adequate data on the organization and potential of the armed forces. Because the pattern of migrations has undergone great changes, information on their effect upon demographic developments in each state is of deep significance for any evaluation of manpower prospects and consumer potentials. No nation is an isolated unit itself. The extent to which each government engages in international cooperation is a useful indicator of its concern with the peaceful handling of potential sources of tensions and conflicts. One of the phases of internal development with an international impact relates to the wide range of the economy. This encyclopedia deals comprehensively with income, labor, agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, forestry, mining, energy and power, industry, domestic trade, foreign trade, balance of payments, banking, insurance, securities, xviii
public finance, taxation, customs and duties, foreign investment, and economic policy. It also gives information on health, social welfare, and housing, important in the economically less developed nations as a mainspring of economic activity and financial investment for what is called the infrastructure, vital as a prerequisite of other actions to promote production, employment, higher standards of living and, in general, a broader enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. The domestic activities mentioned in the two previous paragraphs aim to help in the struggle against illiteracy which, even in more advanced countries, reduces the number of citizens actively engaged in political life and is instrumental in the growth and maintenance of discriminatory practices and arbitrary stereotypes within each nation and between many nations. It is of the utmost importance to know the educational facilities available for supplying trained political leaders, administrators, economists, social workers, medical personnel, and technicians. And to data on teaching establishments is added information on libraries and museums and on the organizations set up by the people of each country to promote their collective interests and welfare. The press and other media of information and enlightenment constitute an important index of the cultural standing of the people; the degree of their freedom is the best evidence of the intellectual maturity of government and governed, and a significant indicator of the degree to which essential human rights in the field of opinion are truly respected. Perhaps the most effective way to advance reciprocal understanding is by contacts among peoples of different countries and with each other’s natural environment. The conditions which must be met for the purposes of tourism are fully explained. Dependencies for which each individual state assumes international responsibilities are described in detail. Finally a brief roll of famous persons is a biographical listing of national figures. An up-to-date bibliography closes each nation’s description. But in our day and era nations are not islands unto themselves, busy solely with internal problems of varying magnitude. The field of exclusively domestic concern is shrinking under the tremendous impact of easy communications among nations. While the United Nations and regional organizations of states, directly or through their subsidiary or associated organs, may and do deal with practically every field of human interest, other organizations restrict their jurisdiction to the more specific areas of economic or social matters. They handle issues at the universal and at the close neighborhood levels and, large or small, they each play a part in the process of international cooperation to improve and give constructive meaning to the relations among peoples. Even military pacts have gradually broadened the scope of their concern as a result of the finding that merely negative aims do not afford by themselves the stability and coherence for which they were brought into being. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, has repeatedly stated his views that any collective action conducted outside the United Nations, but consonant with the spirit of its charter, can be considered as cooperation toward the fundamental objectives of the world organization. Because we live under the impact of global issues that affect every individual, for good or for ill, and because also of the advance of democratic processes domestically and internationally, more and more people are now actively concerned with the course of world affairs. The best channels to voice their hopes are the governments democratically elected and responsible to the wishes of the citizenry. When the people disagree with their authorities, whose judgment must necessarily take into account factors not always of public knowledge, the people then can use their nongovernmental bodies to express their prevailing views. The Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations is a pioneer effort. It is our earnest hope that this first edition may prove a truly useful tool to everyone.
BENJAMIN A. COHEN 18 March 1896–12 March 1960 Editor in Chief, First Edition xix
N O T ES T O T H E E L E V E N T H E D I T IO N
GENERAL NOTE: The Eleventh Edition of Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (WEN) is comprised of six volumes. Volume 1 is dedicated to the United Nations and its related agencies. Volumes 2 through 5, “Africa,” “Americas,” “Asia and Oceania,” and “Europe,” contain entries on the countries of the world. Volume 6, “World Leaders,” was added with the Tenth Edition. Reflecting the ever-changing status of the world geopolitical situation, the Eleventh Edition includes entries for 193 countries—including the world’s newest nation, East Timor (Timor Leste) and Serbia and Montenegro, known until February 2003 as Yugoslavia. Seven entries describe dependencies. In this Eleventh Edition, East Timor’s entry includes all fifty headings. The aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the nations of the world, their economies, and heightened international tensions are recorded in nearly every country’s entry. The economic slowdown that began in early 2001 had repercussion around the globe that persisted well into 2003. The Eleventh Edition records the planned expansions of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the economies of the world’s nations become more integrated. Some notable changes in previous editions include the Tenth Edition’s recording of the change in status for Macau; as of December 1999 Macau came under Chinese authority, and thus Macau was incorporated into the China entry (previously it was described under Portuguese Asian Dependency). Similarly, the entry for United Kingdom Asian Dependency (Hong Kong) was eliminated with the Ninth Edition; as of 1997 Hong Kong came under Chinese authority and, like Macau, is described in that country’s entry. With the Tenth Edition, the introduction of the euro as currency in the nations of the European Union was noted. The Eighth Edition of this encyclopedia (1995) reported on the dramatic changes in the world in the early 1990s, including the dissolution of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia; the unification of Germany; the unification of Yemen; and the independence of Eritrea. These changes resulted in twenty-five new country articles. Whereas the First Edition of the Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, in one volume, contained 119 articles, the present Tenth Edition, in six volumes, now contains 200. The 193 entries in “World Leaders” provide biographical profiles of the person who is the head of the nation’s government, and who bears primary responsibility for the country’s policy. The profiles are arranged alphabetically by country, and begin with the leader’s name (with guide to pronunciation) and title, accompanied by a recent photo. The introductory sections provide a brief summary of the nation’s status, including location, geography, and characteristics of society. (Researchers seeking more detailed information on any aspect of the country and its people may refer to the full country entry in the appropriate volume of WEN.) Sections profile the leader’s personal background, rise to power, leadership, and outline his or her domestic and foreign policy positions. Finally, the leader’s official mailing address is provided, along with a list of sources used in preparing the profile. The profiles (of the leader in office as of 31 March 2003) were researched and written by knowledgeable experts, whose names and institutional affiliations appear at the end of each entry. In compiling data for incorporation into the Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, substantial efforts were made to enlist the assistance of the government of every nation in the world, as well as of all pertinent UN agencies, who cooperated by supplying data and by revising and updating materials relevant to their sphere of interest. Material received from official sources was reviewed and critically assessed by the editors as part of the process of incorporation. Materials and publications of the UN family and of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world provided a major fund of geographic, demographic, economic, and social data. xx
In compiling historical, economic, and political data, primary materials generated by governments and international agencies were supplemented by data gathered from numerous other sources including newspapers (most notably The European, the Financial Times, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal); periodicals (most notably Current History, Elections Today, The Economist, the Far Eastern Economic Review, Foreign Affairs, and World Press Review); and thousands of World Wide Web sites hosted by government agencies and embassies. The reader’s attention is directed to the Glossary of Special Terms for explanations of key terms and concepts essential to a fuller understanding of the text. COUNTRY NAMES: Country names are reported (as appropriate) in three forms: the short-form name (generally conformed to the US Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook), as commonly used in the text; the English version of the official name (generally conformed to the United Nations list of country names); and the official name in the national language(s). When necessary, textual usages of some shortform names have been rectified, usually through the substitution of an acronym for the official name, in order to strike a better balance between official usages and universal terminology. Thus the following short-form names have been adopted throughout (except in historical context to preserve accuracy): DROC (Democratic Republic of the Congo—known as Zaire prior to the Ninth Edition); ROC (Republic of the Congo); FRG (Federal Republic of Germany); North Korea: DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); and South Korea: ROK (Republic of Korea). In addition, Vietnam has replaced Viet Nam to reflect common usage. MAPS: Spellings on the individual country maps reflect national usages and recognized transliteration practice. To clarify national boundaries and landforms, dark shading has been applied to waters, and lighter shading to lands not within that nation’s jurisdiction. Cross-hatching has been used to designate certain disputed areas. Rivers that run dry during certain times of the year are indicated by dashed instead of solid lines. FLAGS AND NATIONAL EMBLEMS: All depictions of flags, flag designations, and national emblems have been reviewed and, where necessary, corrected or changed to reflect their official usage as of 2003. In most cases the flags and emblems were drawn in an electronic format by One Mile Up, Inc., and are used with their permission. In general, the term “national flag” denotes the civil flag of the nation. CURRENCY: In most cases, currency conversion factors cited in the Eleventh Edition are as of the first quarter of 2003. New with the Tenth Edition were currency conversions for the euro, foreign exchange for which was initiated on 1 January 1999. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES: The general world trend toward adoption of the metric system is acknowledged through the use of metric units and their nonmetric (customary or imperial) equivalents throughout the text. The two exceptions to this practice involve territorial sea limits, which are reported in nautical miles, and various production data, for which (unless otherwise stated) units of measure reflect the system in use by the country in question. All tons are metric tons (again, unless otherwise indicated), reflecting the practice of the UN in its statistical reporting. For a complete listing of conversion factors and an explanation of symbols used in the text, see p. 363 of this volume. HOLIDAYS: Except where noted, all holidays listed are official public holidays, on which government offices are closed that would normally be open. Transliterations of names of Muslim holidays have been standardized. For a fuller discussion on these points, and for a description of religious holidays and their origins and meanings, see the Glossary of Religious Holidays in this volume. ARMED FORCES: Statistical data on armed forces was compiled from the The World Factbook (US Central Intelligence Agency), The Military Balance 2002•2003 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies), the SIPRI Yearbook (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), and other print and online sources including Current World Nuclear Arsenals maintained by the Center for Defense Information. xxi
ECONOMY: In addition to numerous official online sources, data on the economies of the world was compiled from the most recent editions of the following US government publications: National Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers, Country Commercial Guides, and Economic Policy and Trade Practices. INCOME: Statistics on national income were obtained from sources published by the United Nations, The World Bank, and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA figures are for gross domestic product (GDP), defined as the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year. In most cases, CIA figures are given in purchasing power parity terms. LABOR: Sources consulted include Statistics on Occupational Wages and Hours of Work and on Food Prices 2002 (International Labour Organization), Yearbook of Labour Statistics 2002 (International Labour Organization), World Development Indicators 2002 (The World Bank), Report on International Labor Practices (US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs), Human Rights Reports (US Department of State), and The World Factbook (US Central Intelligence Agency.) AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY, FISHING, FORESTRY: In addition to government sources, statistical data for these sections was compiled from the following yearbooks published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Trade; Fishery Statistics: Commodities; Fisheries; Production; Agriculture; and Forest Products. MINING: Information on mining was compiled from Minerals Yearbook, Volume III, Area Reports: International (US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey, Minerals Information) and the US Geological Survey’s Web site, International Minerals Statistics and Information. ENERGY AND POWER: Sources consulted include Country Analysis Briefs (US Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy), Key World Energy Statistics (International Energy Agency), and World Development Indicators (The World Bank). SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: The following sources were consulted: The Nature Yearbook of Science and Technology 2002 (Palgrave Macmillan Publishers Ltd.); NIRA’s World Directory of Think Tanks 2002 (National Institute for Research Advancement); and the following Web sites: International Science and Technology Activity (maintained by Industry Canada, Government of Canada); Economics Departments, Institutes, and Research Centers in the World (maintained by the Department of Economics, University of Connecticut); Science and Technology Statistics (maintained by UNESCO Institute for Statistics); World Development Indicators (maintained by The World Bank); and Annual Statistics (patent and trademark information, maintained by the World Intellectual Property Organization). FOREIGN TRADE: Sources consulted include 2000 International Trade Statistics Yearbook (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, United Nations), and Direction of Trade Statistics 2002 (Real Sector Division, IMF Statistics Department, International Monetary Fund.) BANKING AND SECURITIES: Statistical data on securities listings and market activity was compiled in part from Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, 2002 (Standard and Poor’s.) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: Balance of payments tables were computed from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Yearbook. In some cases, totals are provided even though not all components of those totals have been reported by the government of the country. Accordingly, in some instances numbers in the columns may not add to the total. PUBLIC FINANCE: In addition to official Web sites, analytical reports from the US Department of Commerce, and news reports, the following publications were consulted for standardized statistical data: The World Factbook (US Central Intelligence Agency, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2002 (International Monetary Fund), Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2002 (International Monetary Fund). HEALTH: Statistical sources consulted include Country Health Briefing Papers (a series of reports produced by IHSD Limited and DFID Health Systems Resource Cenxxii
tre for the United Kingdom Department for International Development); Health Care Systems in Transition (European Observatory on Health Care Systems, World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe); Health in the Americas, 2002 Edition, Volume II (Pan American Health Organization, World Health Organization). EDUCATION: Statistical sources consulted include EFA Global Monitoring Report 2002 (UNESCO); Summary Education Profiles (Edstats, The World Bank); World Data on Education 2000 (International Bureau of Education, UNESCO); World Development Indicators (The World Bank); and the Web site Education Systems Around the World (maintained by the European Council of International Schools). MEDIA: Sources consulted include the 2002 Editor and Publisher International Year Book (The Editor and Publisher Company) and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002 (US Department of State). TOURISM: Statistical sources consulted include Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, 2002 Edition and Compendium of Tourism Statistics, 2002 Edition, both published by The World Tourism Organization. FAMOUS PERSONS: Entries are based on information available through March 2003. Where a person noted in one country is known to have been born in another, the country (or, in some cases, city) of birth follows the personal name, in parentheses. BIBLIOGRAPHY: Bibliographical listings at the end of country articles are provided as a guide to further reading on the country in question and are not intended as a comprehensive listing of references used in research for the article. Effort was made to provide a broad sampling of works on major subjects and topics as covered by the article; the bibliographies provide, wherever possible, introductory and general works for use by students and general readers, as well as classical studies, recent contributions, and other works regarded as seminal by area specialists. The country article bibliographies were supplemented with information obtained from a search conducted in July 2003. An extensive bibliography listing key references related to the facts in this encyclopedia appears on page 372 of this volume. However, it is not a complete listing since many fact sheets, brochures, World Wide Web sites, and other informational materials were not included due to space limitations.
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THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
T H E U N I T E D N AT I O N S F A M I L Y O F O R G A N I Z AT I O N S INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Main committees Other sessional committees Standing committees and ad hoc bodies Other subsidiary organs PROGRAMMES AND FUNDS UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development ITC International Trade Center (UNCTAD/WTO) UNDCP UN Drug Control Programme UNEP UN Environment Programme UNHSP UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) UNDP UN Development Programme UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women UNV UN Volunteers UNFPA UN Population Fund UNHCR Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF UN Children’s Fund WFP World Food Programme UNRWA** UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East OTHER UN ENTITIES OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights UNOPS UN Office for Project Services UNU UN University UNSSC UN System Staff College UNAIDS Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES INSTRAW International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women UNICRI UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute UNITAR UN Institute for Training and Research UNRISD UN Research Institute for Social Development UNIDIR** UN Institute for Disarmament Research
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)
SECURITY COUNCIL
FUNCTIONAL COMMISSIONS Commission for Social Development Commission on Human Rights Commission on Narcotic Drugs Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Commission on Science and Technology for Development Commission on Sustainable Development Commission on the Status of Women Commission on Population and Development Statistical Commission
SECRETARIAT
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES* ILO International Labor Organization FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization WHO World Health Organization WORLD BANK GROUP IBRD (World Bank) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IFC International Finance Corporation MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
REGIONAL COMMISSIONS Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) United Nation Forum on Forests Sessional and Standing Committees Expert, ad hoc and related bodies
IMF International Monetary Fund ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IMO International Maritime Organization ITU International Telecommunication Union UPU Universal Postal Union
RELATED ORGANIZATIONS IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency WTO (trade) World Trade Organization WTO (tourism) World Tourism Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
CTCBTO Prep.com PrepCom for the Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty Organization
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
*Autonomous organizations working with the United Nations and each other through the coordinating machinery of the Economic and Social Council. **Report only to the General Assembly
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TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL (SUSPENDED)
Military Staff Committee Standing Committee and ad hoc bodies International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Iraq) United Nations Compensation Commission Peacekeeping Operations and Missions OSG Office of the Secretary-General OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services OLA Office of Legal Affairs DPA Department of Political Affairs DDA Department of Disarmament Affairs DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs DGAACS Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services DPI Department of Public Information DM Department of Management OIP Office of the Iraq Programme UNSECOORD Office of the UN Security Coordinator OHRLLS Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States ODC Office on Drugs and Crime UNOG UN Office of Geneva UNOV UN Office at Vienna UNON UN Office at Nairobi
STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED N AT I O N S S Y S T E M administering powers. After 1975, it was composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, the sole remaining administering power, and the four permanent nonadministering powers. The last trust territory, the Pacific island of Palau, voted for affiliation with the United States in late 1993. The Trusteeship Council voted in 1994 to suspend operation, convening only at the request of its President, a majority of its member states, the General Assembly, or the Security Council. 5. The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It consists of 15 judges elected to nine-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council voting independently. It may not include more than one judge of any nationality. The Members of the Court do not represent their governments but are independent magistrates. 6. The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the organization. It is headed by a Secretary-General appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term.
The UN system is often referred to as a “family” of organizations. The charter of the UN, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, defined six main organs of the new world body, each with specific tasks and functions. However, because it was impossible to foresee all the demands that might be made on the organization, provision was made for extending its capacities as the need arose. Thus, three of the main organs are specifically empowered to establish “such subsidiary organs” as may be considered necessary for the performance of their functions. In addition, Article 57 of the charter provides that the various specialized agencies established by intergovernmental agreement and having international responsibilities in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields “shall be brought into relationship” with the UN. Since the signing of the charter, the UN has established numerous subsidiary organs and has entered into relationship with various independent organizations. Reproduced opposite is a chart showing the various organs and bodies within the UN system. For assistance in interpreting the chart, a brief survey of the UN’s main organs, the different categories of subsidiary organs, and the related agencies is given below. A detailed description of the functioning of each of the main organs and an account of the work of selected subsidiary organs are contained in later chapters of the first section of this volume. The structure and work of the UN specialized and technical agencies are described in the second section.
S U B S I D I A RY O R G A N S O F T H E U N The UN Charter specifically confers the right to create subsidiary organs upon the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. The subsidiary bodies fluctuate in number from year to year, according to the changing requirements of the main organ concerned. Both the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, for instance, often create subsidiary bodies to assist them in new fields of concern and dissolve others that have completed their work. Some of the subsidiary organs in turn set up their own subsidiary units—working groups, subcommittees, and the like.
M A I N OR G A N S O F T H E U N 1. The General Assembly, composed of representatives of all member states, is the UN’s central deliberative body, empowered to discuss and make recommendations on any subject falling within the scope of the charter itself. It also approves the UN’s budget and determines—alone or with the Security Council—part of the composition of the other main organs, including the Security Council. 2. The Security Council, a 15-member body, has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In times of crisis, it is empowered to act on behalf of all member states and to decide on a course of collective action that is mandatory for the entire membership. The charter names five states as permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, the United Kingdom, Russian Federation, and the United States (those that were chiefly responsible for the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945). The remaining Security Council members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. 3. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is assigned the task of organizing the UN’s work on economic and social matters and the promotion of human rights. It consists of 54 members elected for overlapping three-year terms by the General Assembly. 4. The Trusteeship Council operated the UN trusteeship system established under the charter. It was originally composed of member nations administering trust territories, the permanent members of the Security Council, and a sufficient number of other members, elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms, to ensure an equal division of administering and non-
Subsidiary Organs of the General Assembly The General Assembly’s subsidiary organs range in complexity and status from temporary committees to semiautonomous institutions that maintain their own secretariats or administrative departments. The names of the institutions or programs in existence in 2002, most of which were set up under the joint aegis of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and operate through ECOSOC, appear in the lower left-hand column of the UN Family of Organizations chart. The remaining subsidiary organs are too numerous to list; the chart merely indicates their principal types: main and other sessional committees, standing committees and ad hoc bodies, and other subsidiary organs and related bodies. The main and sessional committees comprise representatives of all member states and are formally reconstituted at each regular General Assembly session to discuss the various items on the agenda for that year. Two sessional committees are not committees of the whole—the 28-member General Committee, which reviews the General Assembly’s agenda prior to its adoption at each session, and the nine-member Credentials Committee, which examines the credentials of delegations sent to each General Assembly session. There are many standing committees, ad hoc bodies, and other subsidiary organs and related bodies. Some of the more important of these are:
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Structure of the United Nations System
• the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), a 16-member expert committee which reviews the budgets submitted by the Secretary-General; • the Committee for Programme and Coordination, a 34-member committee, that reviews the programmatic aspects of the Secretary-General’s budget; • the 18-member Committee on Contributions, which recommends the scale of assessments that nations are required to pay as their share of the United Nations budget; • the Chief Executives Board (CEB) for Coordination, formerly the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), established by ECOSOC in 1946. It is composed of the SecretaryGeneral and the executive heads of 26 member organizations and is assisted by two high-level committees, the High Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) and the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM). Its purpose is to promote cooperation on all of the substantive and management issues facing the UN system. Substantive committees have been set up by General Assembly resolutions to study specific subjects of interest—for example, the peaceful uses of outer space, South Africa’s former system of apartheid, and independence for colonial territories. Such committees, whose members are elected by the General Assembly or appointed by its president, usually meet several times a year. At each regular session, they report on their deliberations. They continue as long as is considered necessary. Even when their mandate seems completed, they are not necessarily formally disbanded but may be adjourned indefinitely and reactivated when the need arises. It is through these committees that the General Assembly accomplishes most of its work outside the spheres of responsibility that are specifically entrusted to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, or the various semiautonomous bodies referred to above. Subsidiary Organs of the Security Council The Military Staff Committee was established by the charter to advise the Security Council on the military aspects of maintaining international peace. However, the Military Staff Committee secretariat, though it holds regular formal meetings, has never been consulted on any of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. The other subsidiary bodies shown on the chart in the lower right-hand column were set up, as their names suggest, to conduct the council’s peacekeeping operations in the areas specified. Between June 1948 and September 2002, there were 55 peacekeeping operations, of which 40 were complete. (For further information on the work of these bodies, see the chapter on International Peace and Security.) The Security Council, as of late 2002, maintained two standing committees, each including representatives of all Security Council member states: Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure (studies and advises on rules of procedure and other technical matters); and Committee on Admission of New Members. Additionally, there are various ad hoc committees, established as needed; these comprise all council members and meet in closed session. In late 2002, the following ad hoc committees had been formed: Security Council Committee on Council meeting away from Headquarters; Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission established by Security Council resolution 692 (1991); and Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the charter, which deals with “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” may set up committees to monitor compliance by member states with its resolutions. As of November 2002, the following committees had been set up: in 1966, when it imposed mandatory economic sanctions against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia; in 1977, when it
imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa; in 1991, after Iraq’s unsuccessful invasion of Kuwait, to supervise the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction; in 1992, concerning the situations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Somalia; in 1993, concerning Angola; in 1994, concerning the volatile situation created by Hutu rebels in Rwanda; in 1995, concerning Liberia; in 1997, in the wake of years of civil war in Sierra Leone; in 1998, concerning an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, including Kosovo; in 1999, concerning Afghanistan; in 2000, concerning the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia; and in 2001, again concerning Liberia. Subsidiary Organs of the Economic and Social Council As indicated on the chart, there are four types of subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council: 1. the semiautonomous bodies (organizations, programs, and funds); 2. regional commissions; 3. functional commissions; and 4. sessional, standing, and ad hoc committees.
U N S P E C IA L I Z E D A N D T E C H N I C A L A G E N C I E S The specialized and technical agencies are separate autonomous organizations with their own policy-making and executive organs, secretariats, and budgets. The precise nature of their relationship with the UN is defined by the terms of special agreements that were established with the Economic and Social Council and subsequently approved by the General Assembly, as provided for in Article 63 of the charter. Since Article 63 also empowers the Economic and Social Council to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation and recommendations, they are required to report annually to it. Mention should be made here of the special status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was succeeded by the World Trade Organization. At its inception in 1948, GATT was a treaty establishing a code of conduct in international trade and providing machinery for reducing and stabilizing tariffs. The treaty was concluded pending the creation of a specialized agency to be known as the International Trade Organization, whose draft charter was completed in 1948 but was never ratified by the important trading powers. With the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT, a new body, the World Trade Organization, supplanted it in 1995. (For further details, see the chapter on the World Trade Organization.) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is distinguished from the other agencies in that it was specifically established under the aegis of the UN and is therefore considered in a category by itself. The IAEA reports annually to the General Assembly and only “as appropriate” to the Economic and Social Council. Because of the nature of its work, the IAEA also reports to the Security Council, again only “as appropriate.”
THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS These institutions were created before the United Nations itself, at a conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the United States in 1944. In the UN Charter, however, they were considered to be an integral part of the system of UN agencies. However, their agreements with the UN bind them only loosely to the rest of the system. The nature of these organizations is very different from the one country, one vote basis of the UN and the other specialized agencies (see World Bank and International Monetary Fund [IMF] in the second part of this volume). Membership in the Bretton Woods institutions is subject to financial subscription, and voting is weighted according to members’ shares, effectively
Structure of the United Nations System giving wealthy countries more control than poorer countries. When the World Bank became affiliated with the United Nations, it maintained its complete independence as far as coordination, refused to provide regular information to the UN, limited UN attendance at its meetings, and insisted on a clause eliminating any UN involvement in its budgets. While there is growing cooperation between the World Bank and some UN technical cooperation funds, like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a 1993 study by the Joint Inspection Unit found that there was not much operational cooperation between the UN system organizations and the World Bank organizations.
THE SIZE AND COST OF THE UN SYSTEM Since the early 1980s, the United Nations has been criticized for being a “vast, sprawling bureaucracy,” and politicians have not hesitated to call it “bloated” or “swollen.” This perception led to
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a drive for reform in the mid-1980s during which major contributing countries initiated a 13 percent staff cut. Another round of “rationalization” of the system and its secretariats was initiated in 1991. Tightening the budget remained a focus throughout the 1990s. The proposed UN budget for the 2002–03 biennium was us$2,519 million. This represented a 0.5% real resource reduction from the 2000–2001 biennium. During the previous six years, the UN had no budgetary growth. Even in dollar terms, the UN’s total budget was lower in 2002 than it was in 19941995. For the 2002–2003 budget, small increases were made in areas such as: international peace and security; the promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development; the development of Africa; the promotion of human rights; the coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts; the promotion of justice and international law; disarmament; drug control; crime prevention; and combating international terrorism.
C O M PA R I S O N W I T H T H E L E A G U E O F N AT I O N S the permanent members. (See the section on Voting in the chapter on the Security Council.)
The League of Nations grew out of the catastrophe of World War I (1914–18). Though the idea of the establishment of a body in which the nations of the world could settle their disagreements had been put forth periodically since antiquity, the League, created at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, was the first organization of sovereign states designed to be universal and devoted to the settlement of disputes and the prevention of war. The League’s failure to prevent the outbreak of World War II in 1939 did not destroy the belief in the need for a universal organization. On the contrary, it bred a determination to learn from the mistakes of the past and to build a new world body more adequately equipped to maintain international peace in the future. The differences between the League of Nations and the UN begin with the circumstances of their creation. First, whereas the Covenant of the League was formulated after hostilities were ended, the main features of the UN were devised while war was still in progress. The more comprehensive powers assigned to the UN for the preservation of peace may owe something to the urgent conditions in which it was conceived. Second, the Covenant was drawn up in an atmosphere of divided attention at the Paris Peace Conference and was incorporated as part of the peace treaty with Germany. Although countries were permitted to ratify the Covenant and the treaty separately, the link between them was not good psychology and contributed, for example, to the unwillingness of the US Senate to ratify the Covenant. In contrast, the UN Charter was drafted as an independent legal instrument at a conference especially convened for the purpose. Third, the Covenant was hammered out behind closed doors, first by the five major powers of the era—France, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US—and eventually in conjunction with nine other allied nations. The final text of the UN Charter, on the other hand, was the product of combined efforts of 50 nations represented at the 1945 San Francisco Conference and therefore took into account the views of the smaller nations, especially their concern to give the new organization far-reaching responsibilities in promoting economic and social cooperation and the independence of colonial peoples.
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P O W E R S T O P R E V EN T WA R A N D E N D A G G R E S S IO N The Charter was designed to remedy certain constitutional defects and omissions in the Covenant that the founders of the UN believed had been partly responsible for the League’s inability to halt the drift toward a second world war in the 1930s. These defects and omissions included the absence of any provision imposing a total ban on war, the provision of an overly rigid procedure for negotiating disputes between states, and the failure to vest the League’s Council with sufficient powers to prevent the outbreak of hostilities or to terminate hostilities that had already begun. The Covenant forbade military aggression but did not reject the limited right of a state to start a war, provided that it had first submitted the dispute to arbitration, judicial decision, or the Council of the League. If one party accepted the findings of the negotiating body and the second did not, the first might then resort to war legally after a “cooling-off” period. The Charter recognizes no circumstances under which a nation may legally start a war. Article 51 does guarantee the right to individual or collective self-defense, which is a right to respond to an illegal armed attack but not to initiate one. If the Security Council decides that a “threat to the peace” exists, it has the power to order collective enforcement measures. These are mandatory for all member states and may include economic sanctions or military measures, but the power rarely has been invoked. (See the chapter on International Peace and Security.)
M EM B E RS H I P The League never became the universal organization that had been envisaged. Moreover, it failed to secure or retain the membership of certain major powers whose participation and cooperation were essential to make it an effective instrument for preserving the peace. Despite President Wilson’s advocacy, the US did not join, and the USSR joined only in 1934, when the League had already shown itself unable to contain the aggressive policies of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The three aggressor states themselves withdrew their membership during the 1930s to pursue their expansionist aims. The UN, on the other hand, is approaching the goal of universality, with only a few smaller countries still unrepresented. By November 2002, its membership had reached 191.
VOTING Under the Covenant, decisions of the League could be made only by unanimous vote. This rule applied both to the League’s Council, which had special responsibilities for maintaining peace (the equivalent of the UN’s Security Council), and to the allmember Assembly (the equivalent of the UN’s General Assembly). In effect, each member state of the League had the power of the veto, and, except for procedural matters and a few specified topics, a single “nay” killed any resolution. Learning from this mistake, the founders of the UN decided that all its organs and subsidiary bodies should make decisions by some type of majority vote (though, on occasion, committees dealing with a particularly controversial issue have been known to proceed by consensus). The rule of unanimity applies only to five major powers—France, China, the UK, the US, and the Russian Federation—and then only when they are acting in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council. The Security Council also proceeds by majority vote, but on substantive (though not on procedural) matters, it must include the concurring votes of all
P R O M O T I ON O F H U M A N W E L FAR E The UN Charter not only lays down specific injunctions for international economic and social cooperation, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, but also has established a special organ—the Economic and Social Council—to conduct the organization’s activities in this sphere. Throughout its existence, the UN, together with its specialized agencies, has gradually assumed primary responsibility for assisting the economic and social development of nonindustrialized member nations, most of them former colonial territories that joined the world body long after it was founded.
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Comparison with the League of Nations The UN’s many projects have become the cornerstone of the development policies adopted by almost all these countries. Since the Covenant of the League contained no provisions for a coordinated program of economic and social cooperation, there can be no comparison between the respective achievements of the two organizations in this respect. Nevertheless, the League performed valuable work in several fields: notably, working to eliminate the illegal sale of women and children, the “white slave” trade; providing assistance for refugees; reducing traffic in opium and other dangerous narcotics; and getting nations to lessen trade restrictions.
A D M I N I S T R AT I O N O F C O L O N I A L T E R R I T O R I ES Instead of sharing the colonial possessions of their defeated enemies as the traditional spoils of victory, the founding members of the League, with admirable foresight and restraint, regarded these territories as international mandates, and certain member states were designated to administer them on behalf of the world organization. This mandate system in a modified form was continued in the trusteeship system evolved by the founders of the UN. However, unlike the Covenant, the Charter expressly stipulates that the administering countries have an obligation to promote the progressive development of the territories placed in their charge toward self-government or independence.
BALANCE SHEET OF THE LEAGUE OF N AT I O N S The League failed in its supreme test. It failed to contain the aggressive action of the Axis powers—Japan, Germany, and Italy—and thus failed to halt the drift toward a new world war. Beginning in 1931, Japan, a permanent member of the League’s Council, waged a war of aggression against China, in defiance of both the Council and the Assembly. Although the League did impose economic sanctions against Italy, another permanent member of the Council, when it wantonly invaded Ethiopia in 1935, support was halfhearted and the action unsuccessful. The League was unable to do anything against the illegal reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 by Germany, still another permanent member of the Council; nor could it offer more than verbal protests against German and Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War or the forcible incorporation of Austria into Germany in March 1938 and of Czechoslovakia into Germany the following year. The cumulative effect of these failures strengthened Hitler’s belief in the impotence not only of the League itself but also of its principal remaining members. During the summer of 1939, when the world moved ever closer toward war, and even when Hitler’s armies marched into Poland on 1 September 1939, not a single member called for a meeting of the League’s Council or Assembly. The League’s balance sheet in political matters was not wholly negative, however. It was able, for example, to settle the dispute between Finland and Sweden over the Aland Islands, strategically located in the Gulf of Bothnia; the frontier controversy between Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia; the potentially explosive border situation between Greece and Bulgaria; and the dangerous conflicts between Poland and Germany over Upper Silesia and between Germany, Poland, and Lithuania over Memel. Through the League’s Permanent Court of International Justice, a border controversy between Czechoslovakia and Poland was settled, as were the disputes between Great Britain and Turkey over the Mosul area and between France and Great Britain over the
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nationality of Maltese residents in the French protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. The League also stopped the incipient war between Peru and Colombia over territorial claims in the upper Amazon basin. In addition to these successful peacekeeping activities, the League financially assisted the reconstruction of certain states, notably Austria, and was responsible for administering the Free City of Danzig and the Saar Territory. (The latter was transferred to Germany following a plebiscite in 1935.) It also carried out important humanitarian work. Some of its nonpolitical activities continued throughout World War II, and its secretariat did valuable preparatory work for the emerging UN. The League of Nations was not officially dissolved until April 1946, five months after the new world body came into being.
T H E U N ’ S G R E AT E R S C O P E The field of activity and the responsibilities of the UN are considerably more extensive than those of the League. Of the specialized agencies in the UN system, only three—the ILO, the ITU, and the UPU—antedate the UN. The League, furthermore, never sponsored any such enterprises as those undertaken by, for example, the UN Development Program, the UN Environment Program, or the World Food Program. Membership in the League did not oblige a nation to join the Permanent Court of Justice, whereas all members of the UN are automatically parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is an integral part of the Charter. Like the League, the UN has recorded several important successes in halting local armed conflicts and the spread of disputes: for example, in the Congo, Kashmir, and, over long periods, Cyprus. However, it has often proved unable to take effective action in any situation where the interests of either the US or the former USSR are closely involved or where the two giant powers seem committed to opposite sides of disputes involving smaller nations. Thus, it was unable to check the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968; it was unable to take any action to halt the fighting that raged in Indochina during most of its existence; and, though progress has been made, it has not succeeded in finding a permanent solution to the prolonged crisis that has periodically erupted in ArabIsraeli wars in the Middle East. The UN’s ineffectuality in such situations caused a loss of confidence in its relevance in international political relations. Nor was it a source of consolation that there was no discernible drift toward a world war, for in most cases where the US and the former USSR found themselves almost at the point of actual confrontation, as in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, they tended to resolve their differences bilaterally, not under the aegis of the UN. On the other hand, if the two great powers did not always find it convenient to allow the UN to play too decisive a role in political matters, they found it equally impractical to bypass the world organization altogether. Unlike the League, the UN is the center of a network of organizations whose activities reach into many aspects of the national life of every member state. As such, it has come to be regarded as an indispensable part of the machinery for conducting multi-level international relations. In a world transformed by the collapse of the former Soviet bloc, the UN is coming of age and may begin to fulfill the dreams of its founders. While its authority continues to be challenged by countries that remain on the fringe of the world community, the United Nations may be seen as an embryonic world government.
THE MAKING OF THE U N I T E D N AT I O N S ble date a general international organization based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.” 5. Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Washington, 21 August–7 October 1944. The Dumbarton Oaks conference was the first big-power meeting convoked specifically to discuss the establishment of a new world organization. At the beginning of the conference, the delegations offered widely differing proposals. On some of these divergent views they eventually reached agreement. For example, the British and Soviet delegations accepted an American position that favored a strong role for the General Assembly, in which all member states would be represented and which, therefore, would be the most “democratic” of the UN organs. There was agreement that a small Security Council should be “primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security” and that the big powers should have the right of veto in that body. However, a deadlock developed over a Soviet proposal that a big power might exercise this right in disputes in which it was itself involved. This the US and the British refused to accept. 6. Yalta Conference, February 1945. The resultant deadlock was resolved at a meeting in Yalta attended by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin. The “Yalta formula,” actually a compromise proposed by the US and rejected by the USSR at Dumbarton Oaks, provided that if any of the Big Five powers was involved in a dispute, it would not have the right to veto Security Council recommendations for peaceful settlement of the issue but would be able to veto a Security Council decision to invoke sanctions against it. After some initial objections from Churchill, the three leaders at Yalta also managed to agree on the basic principles of a trusteeship system for the administration of certain dependent territories under the aegis of the projected world body. On 11 February 1945, the three leaders announced that a conference would be convened in San Francisco on 25 April 1945 for the “earliest possible establishment of a general international organization” along the lines proposed at Dumbarton Oaks.
The creation of the UN at the San Francisco Conference in June 1945 was the culmination of four years of concentrated preparation. During these years, the idea of a world organization to replace the League of Nations was first debated and then fleshed out. Many of the important principles of the UN adopted at San Francisco were derived from earlier conferences.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 1. The Inter-Allied Declaration (London Declaration) of 12 June 1941. In a dark hour of World War II, representatives of the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa and of the governments-in-exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia assembled at St. James’s Palace in London. It was there that each pledged not to sign a separate peace document and declared: “The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security. . . . ” Ten days later, Hitler launched his attack against the Soviet Union. 2. The Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941. British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt met aboard the cruiser USS Atlanta off the coast of Newfoundland and signed a declaration giving the first indication that the two powers would strive for the creation of a new world organization once peace was restored. In it, they announced “certain common principles . . . of their respective countries . . . for a better future for the world: the need for a secure peace; the abandonment by all nations of the use of force; the disarmament of aggressors; and the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security.” 3. The Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and the entry of the US into the war, the conflict assumed even wider dimensions. Japan’s initial successes were staggering, and it was clear that the coalition against the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Japan, and their allies) would need to be strengthened. On New Year’s Day 1942 in Washington, DC, representatives of 26 states signed a declaration whose preamble called for subscription “to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the . . . Atlantic Charter” and explicitly referred to the need for promoting respect for human rights on an international basis. In that declaration, the phrase “united nations” was first used. It had been coined by President Roosevelt to express the unity of the signatory nations in their determination to withstand the onslaught of the Axis powers. The declaration was subsequently signed by the governments of 21 additional states. 4. The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943. This declaration laid the foundation for the establishment of a new world body to replace the League of Nations. Meeting at a time when victory seemed in sight, the US, British, and Soviet foreign ministers and an ambassador from China drew up the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, which recognized “the necessity of establishing at the earliest practica-
T H E S A N F R A N C IS C O C O N F E R E N C E , 2 5 A P R IL – 2 6 J U N E 1 9 4 5 Despite the sudden death of President Roosevelt in early April, the United Nations Conference on International Organization convened as scheduled. President Roosevelt had been working on his speech to the conference before he died. That never-delivered address contains the often-quoted words: “The work, my friends, is peace; more than an end of this war—an end to the beginning of all wars; . . . as we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation of human beings can make in this world—the contribution of lasting peace—I ask you to keep up your faith. . . .” China, the USSR, the UK, and the US acted as the sponsoring powers, and 46 other states participated, comprising all those that had signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942 or had declared war on the Axis powers by March 1945.
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The Making of the United Nations The huge conference was attended by 282 delegates and 1,444 other officially accredited persons from those 50 countries and by representatives of scores of private organizations interested in world affairs (50 from the US alone). The daily output of documents averaged half a million pages. Major Modifications in the Dumbarton Oaks Draft for the UN Charter After much debate, the smaller and medium-sized nations succeeded in restricting the Big Five’s use of the veto in the Security Council. Herbert V. Evatt, then deputy prime minister of Australia, who was in the forefront of that fight, declared: “In the end our persistence had some good effect. The Great Powers came to realize that the smaller powers would not accept a Charter unless certain minimum demands for restriction of the veto were accepted, viz., that there should be no veto upon the placing of items on the [Security Council] agenda and no veto on discussion [in the Security Council] . . . . If this vital concession had not been won, it is likely that discussion of matters in the open forum of the Security Council would have been rendered impossible: If so, the United Nations might well have broken up.” Another major change resulted from the desire of the smaller nations to give the world organization more responsibilities in social and economic matters and in colonial problems. Accordingly, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council were given wider authority than was provided for in the Dumbarton Oaks draft, and they were made principal organs of the UN. Creation of a New World Court The San Francisco Conference also unanimously adopted a constitution—called the Statute—for an International Court of Justice to be incorporated as a main organ of the UN and to succeed the Permanent Court of International Justice established by the League of Nations. The Statute, which had originally been drafted by jurists from 44 nations meeting in Washington in April 1945, became part of the Charter of the UN. Unanimous Acceptance of the Charter The UN Charter touches on so many delicate and complex matters that its unanimous acceptance has often been ascribed to the particularly auspicious circumstances prevailing in the spring of 1945. In spite of some dissonance, the San Francisco Conference was imbued with a spirit of high mission. The Charter was worked out within two months. It was signed by 50 nations in all its official languages in an impressive ceremony on 26 June 1945. The five official languages at that time were Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. The sixth official UN language, Arabic, was not adopted until 1973.
E S TA B L I S H M E N T O F T H E U N , 24 OCTOBER 1945 The new world body officially came into being on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been duly ratified by all permanent members of the Security Council and a majority of the other original signatory powers. This date is universally celebrated as United Nations Day.
SUBSEQUENT CHARTER AMENDMENT Like other political constitutions, the UN Charter contains provisions for its own amendment. Amendments to the Charter come into force when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by twothirds of the UN member states, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. The amendments that have been adopted are essentially adjustments made to take account of the huge increase in UN
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membership, which has almost quadrupled since 1945. As originally constituted, the 11-member Security Council and the 18member Economic and Social Council were considered adequate to reflect the different interests of the various geographical groupings of states within the organization. However, the admission to the UN during the late 1950s and early 1960s of large numbers of newly independent African, Asian, and Caribbean countries created additional groupings. To accommodate their interests without jeopardizing those of the older groups, the General Assembly, in 1963, adopted amendments to Articles 23, 27, and 61 of the Charter. The first amendment enlarged the membership of the Security Council to 15; the second required that decisions of the Security Council be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven); the third enlarged the membership of the Economic and Social Council to 27. All three amendments officially came into force on 31 August 1965. The Economic and Social Council was enlarged to 54 by an amendment to Article 61 of the Charter, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1971 and became operative on 24 September 1973. Charter Review. Under the Charter, a general conference of UN members “for the purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and a vote of any seven members [amended to nine, as of 1965] of the Security Council.” In addition, the Charter provided that if such a conference was not held by the tenth regular assembly session (in 1955), the proposal to call such a conference should be placed on the agenda. Accordingly, the 1955 General Assembly considered the matter and decided that a general review conference should be held at an “appropriate” but unspecified date in the future. A committee consisting of the full UN membership was established to consider the time and place at which the conference should be held. The Security Council concurred in the General Assembly’s decision by a vote of 9 to 1, with 1 abstention. The committee met every two years until September 1967 without recommending a conference. It then became inactive, recommending that any member state might request it to meet. At its 1974 session, the General Assembly established a 42member Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter to consider specific proposals from governments for “enhancing the ability of the United Nations to achieve its purposes.” The committee reported to the 1975 Assembly session that there was a fundamental divergence of opinion on the necessity for carrying out a review of the Charter and made no recommendations for action. The General Assembly decided, however, to continue the committee as a Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization and increased its membership to 47. In pursuit of its mandate, the committee has met every year since 1975 and has reported to each session of the General Assembly. For example, in 1988 the Special Committee recommended, and the General Assembly adopted, a “Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Impisonment”; in 1990 it proposed the rationalization of existing UN procedures, which were adopted by the General Assembly; and in 1991, the Special Committee considered the final text of the Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States. That same year the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General publish and disseminate the handbook. The Special Committee also considers proposals concerning cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, conciliation rules of the United Nations, and assistance to other states affected by the imposition of sanctions by the decision of the Security Council, pursuant to Article 50 of the Charter.
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
tlement of international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3. to achieve international cooperation in solving international economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian problems and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends.
The main aims of the UN are set forth in the Preamble to the Charter, in which “the peoples of the United Nations,” assembled in San Francisco in June 1945, expressed their determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, . . . “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, . . . “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. . . .”
PRINCIPLES
In pursuit of these purposes, the Charter stipulates that the UN and its members are to act in accordance with the following principles:
To accomplish these goals, they agreed “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, . . . “to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security, . . . “to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples . . . .”
1. that the organization is based on the sovereign equality of all its members; 2. that all members are to fulfill in good faith their Charter obligations; 3. that they are to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and without endangering peace, security, and justice; 4. that they are to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against other states; 5. that they are to give the UN every assistance in any action that it takes in accordance with the Charter and shall not assist states against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action; 6. that the UN shall also ensure that states that are not members act in accordance with these principles insofar as is necessary to maintain international peace and security; and 7. that nothing in the Charter is to authorize the UN to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, though this principle is not to prejudice the application of enforcement measures made necessary in the event of a threat to or breach of the peace.
P U R PO S E S
The aims of the UN are embodied in a set of purposes and principles contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, summarized as follows: 1. to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or set-
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MEMBERSHIP
In 1993, the proposed admission of a part of the former Yugoslavia, which had been known as the Republic of Macedonia, formed the subject of protest from the government of Greece, which considers the name “Macedonia” to pertain to one of its internal states. Now bearing the unwieldy name of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” the new country became a member on 8 April 1993. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an original member of the UN until its dissolution following the establishment and subsequent admission as new members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was admitted on 1 November 2000; in February 2003, the country changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro.
As of November 2002, the UN had 191 member states, including 51 charter members (the 50 countries that sent representatives to the San Francisco conference, plus Poland, which ratified the charter shortly afterward) and 140 states that have joined the organization since 1945, the great majority of them former colonial territories that have achieved independence. The table in this chapter shows the growth of UN membership, the roster lists the members of the UN in alphabetical order and gives the dates of their admission to the UN. The roster does not take account of the several federations or unions of states that were created or dissolved during membership. Thus, Syria, an original member, ceased independent membership on joining with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. On resuming its separate status in 1961, Syria also resumed separate membership, which is still officially dated from the country’s original day of entry. Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined the UN as separate states in 1961 and 1963, respectively, but in 1964 merged to form the United Republic of Tanzania, with a single membership officially dated from Tanganyika’s day of entry. Similarly, The Federation of Malaya joined the United Nations on 17 September 1957. On 16 September 1963, its name was changed to Malaysia, following the admission to the new federation of Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo), and Sarawak. Singapore became an independent state on 9 August 1965 and a member of the United Nations on 21 September 1965. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted to membership in the United Nations on 18 September 1973. Through accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, effective from 3 October 1990, the two German states have united to form one sovereign state. The unification of the two Germanys began a process of realignment of nations that intensified as communist governments collapsed throughout Eastern Europe. In only two years 15 separate states from the former USSR were admitted to membership. As a result of this sweeping change, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (an original member of the United Nations) became the Russian Federation. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, then president of the Russian Federation, informed the Secretary-General that the membership of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and all other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Czechoslovakia also was an original member of the United Nations. On 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, as successor states, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the receipt of their applications, the Security Council, on 8 January 1993, recommended to the General Assembly that both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic be admitted to United Nations membership. Both were admitted on 19 January 1993.
ADMISSION OF MEMBERS In the words of Article 4 of the Charter, membership in the UN is open to all “peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” The original members are the states that participated in the San Francisco Conference, or that had previously signed the Declaration by United Nations, of 1 January 1942, and subsequently signed and ratified the Charter. The procedure of admission is as follows. A state wishing to join submits an application to the Secretary-General, in which it formally states its acceptance of the Charter obligations. The application is forwarded to the Security Council. If the Security Council, by a vote of at least nine members (formerly seven), including all the permanent members, recommends the application, membership becomes effective on the day that it is approved by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. In other words, if any one of the Security Council’s permanent members vetoes it, or if it fails to obtain a sufficient majority in the Security Council, the application does not reach the General Assembly at all. Up to 1955 there were bitter controversies and years of stalemate in the Security Council over the applications of some countries. Usually one or more of the Big Five was on bad terms with the applying state, or it would choose to withhold consent as a bargaining point against the other big powers. Finally, on 14 December 1955, by a compromise, 16 countries were admitted together. Since then, new applications rarely caused controversy. Most of the applicants have been newly independent states that applied for membership immediately after attaining independence. In most cases they have been admitted by unanimous vote. The outstanding exceptions were the applications of the Republic of Korea (ROK), which applied in January 1949; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which applied in February 1949; South Vietnam, which applied in December 1951; and North Vietnam, which applied in December 1951. The two Vietnams and the ROK sought action on their applications in 1975. The Security Council, by a narrow vote, decided not to take up the ROK’s application, and the US subsequently vetoed membership for the Vietnams, citing as a reason the Security Council’s earlier refusal to consider the membership application
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Membership
of the ROK. In response to a General Assembly recommendation, however, the Security Council in 1977 recommended the admission of the newly established Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and that country became a member in September 1977. The DPRK and the ROK maintained observer status at the General Assembly until September 1991, when both were admitted to membership simultaneously.
W I TH D RAWA L F RO M M E M BE R S H I P While the Covenant of the League of Nations contained provisions for the legal withdrawal of members, the UN Charter deliberately omits all reference to the subject. The majority feeling at the San Francisco Conference was that provisions for withdrawal would be contrary to the principle of universality and might provide a loophole for members seeking to evade their obligations under the Charter. Thus, when the first—and so far the only—case of withdrawal arose, the procedure had to be improvised. On 1 January 1965, Indonesia, which then was pursuing a policy of confrontation against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia, announced that it would withdraw from the UN and its related agencies if Malaysia were to take its elected seat on the Security Council. Three weeks later, Indonesia’s foreign minister officially confirmed withdrawal in a letter to the Secretary-General, who, after consultations with the Indonesian mission to the UN, merely noted the decision and expressed hope that Indonesia would in due time “resume full cooperation” with the world body. Following a coup later in 1965, Indonesia sent a telegram to the Secretary-General, just before the opening of the 1966 General Assembly session, announcing its decision to “resume full cooperation with the UN and to resume participation in its activities.” Arrangements were made to ensure that Indonesia’s reentry would take place with minimum formality. Hence, it was decided that Indonesia need not make a formal reapplication via the Security Council but that the matter could be handled directly by the General Assembly. Citing the telegram as evidence that Indonesia regarded its absence from the UN as a “cessation of cooperation” rather than an actual withdrawal, the General Assembly’s president recommended that the administrative procedure for reinstating Indonesia could be taken. No objections were raised, and Indonesia was immediately invited to resume its seat in the General Assembly. In short, the problems raised by the first case of withdrawal from the UN were solved by treating it as if it had not been a matter of withdrawal at all. Although South Africa withdrew from three of the UN’s related agencies—UNESCO, FAO, and the ILO—because of the antiapartheid sentiments of their members, it did not withdraw from the UN itself, despite numerous General Assembly resolutions condemning apartheid and recommending stringent sanctions. South Africa rejoined UNESCO and the ILO in the late 1990s.
SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION The Charter provides that a member against which the Security Council has taken preventive or enforcement action may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. However, only the Security Council, not the General Assembly, has the power to restore these rights. Any member that “has persistently violated the Principles” of the Charter may be expelled from the UN by the same procedure. Up to the end of 2002, no cases of suspension of rights or expulsion had been recommended by the Security Council. Many states called for the expulsion of South Africa because of its apartheid policies, but no formal proposal to this effect was made. In 1974, the General Assembly called upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the UN and South
Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Security Council considered a draft resolution submitted by Cameroon, Iraq, Kenya, and Mauritania that would have recommended to the General Assembly the immediate expulsion of South Africa under Article 6 of the Charter. Owing to the negative votes of three permanent members (France, UK, US), the draft resolution was not adopted. After the council had reported back to the General Assembly on its failure to adopt a resolution, the president of the General Assembly, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, ruled that the delegation of South Africa should be refused participation in the work of the General Assembly. His ruling was upheld by 91 votes to 22, with 19 abstentions. Although remaining a member of the UN, South Africa was not represented at subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. Following South Africa’s successful democratic elections of May 1994, after 24 years of refusing to accept the credentials of the South African delegation, the General Assembly unanimously welcomed South Africa back to full participation in the United Nations on 23 June 1994. It also deleted its agenda item on “the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.”
R E P R E S E N TAT I O N O F N AT I O N S IN T H E U N The members of the UN are nations, not governments. Whereas the UN may concern itself with the character of a government at the time that a nation applies for admission and may occasionally defer admission on these grounds (Spain under the Franco government, for example, applied for membership in 1945–46 but was not admitted until 1955), once a nation becomes a member, any governmental changes thereafter do not affect continuance of membership—provided, of course, that the nation continues to fulfill its Charter obligations. Nor, under the Charter, is the admission of a new nation dependent upon whether other nations individually recognize and have diplomatic relations with the government concerned. Though the relations of individual members with a nation applying for membership will affect the voting in the Security Council and the General Assembly, strictly speaking, the only consideration enjoined by the Charter is the judgment by the members that the applying nation as represented by its government is “willing and able” to carry out its UN obligations. As a result, there are several nations in the UN that do not recognize or have diplomatic relations with each other. Nations have to be represented at UN proceedings by delegations that are specifically authorized by their governments to speak on their behalf. Thus, when a new ambassador appears, or when a new session of a UN organ convenes, it is necessary to examine the credentials of persons claiming to represent member states. The nine-member Credentials Committee, appointed by the General Assembly at the beginning of each session, must be satisfied that the person was duly appointed by his or her government and that that government is the official government of the respective member nation. The matter can become controversial at the UN if, for example, two rival governments both claim to be the only legitimate government of a member state and each demands that its own representative be seated. A case in point was China. The long unresolved issue of its representation in the UN had been one of the most important and controversial items on the General Assembly’s agenda. In 1971, however, the General Assembly decided “to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.”
Membership
13
United Nations Member States
(as of 1 April 2003) member state date of admission Afghanistan ................................................................ 19 November 1946 Albania ....................................................................... 14 December 1955 Algeria .............................................................................8 October 1962 Andorra ............................................................................... 28 July 1993 Angola .......................................................................... 1 December 1976 Antigua and Barbuda ................................................. 11 November 1981 Argentina .......................................................................24 October 1945 Armenia ............................................................................. 2 March 1992 Australia ...................................................................... 1 November 1945 Austria ........................................................................ 14 December 1955 Azerbaijan.......................................................................... 2 March 1992 Bahamas..................................................................... 18 September 1973 Bahrain ...................................................................... 21 September 1971 Bangladesh ................................................................. 17 September 1974 Barbados ....................................................................... 9 December 1966 Belarus ...........................................................................24 October 1945 Belgium ....................................................................... 27 December 1945 Belize.......................................................................... 25 September 1981 Benin.......................................................................... 20 September 1960 Bhutan ....................................................................... 21 September 1971 Bolivia ........................................................................ 14 November 1945 Bosnia and Herzegovina ...................................................... 22 May 1992 Botswana .......................................................................17 October 1966 Brazil..............................................................................24 October 1945 Brunei Darussalam ..................................................... 21 September 1984 Bulgaria....................................................................... 14 December 1955 Burkina Faso .............................................................. 20 September 1960 Burundi ...................................................................... 18 September 1962 Cambodia ................................................................... 14 December 1955 Cameroon .................................................................. 20 September 1960 Canada......................................................................... 9 November 1945 Cape Verde................................................................. 16 September 1975 Central African Republic............................................ 20 September 1960 Chad .......................................................................... 20 September 1960 Chile ..............................................................................24 October 1945 China .............................................................................24 October 1945 Colombia ..................................................................... 5 November 1945 Comoros .................................................................... 12 November 1975 Congo, Democratic Republic of the ........................... 20 September 1960 Congo, Republic of the .............................................. 20 September 1960 Costa Rica.................................................................... 2 November 1945 Côte d’Ivoire .............................................................. 20 September 1960 Croatia ................................................................................ 22 May 1992 Cuba ..............................................................................24 October 1945 Cyprus ....................................................................... 20 September 1960 Czech Republic .............................................................. 19 January 1993 Denmark ........................................................................24 October 1945 Djibouti...................................................................... 20 September 1977 Dominica .................................................................... 18 December 1978 Dominican Republic.......................................................24 October 1945 East Timor (admitted as Timor-Leste) ........................ 27 September 2002 Ecuador....................................................................... 21 December 1945 Egypt..............................................................................24 October 1945 El Salvador .....................................................................24 October 1945 Equatorial Guinea ...................................................... 12 November 1968 Eritrea ................................................................................. 28 May 1993 Estonia ....................................................................... 17 September 1991 Ethiopia ..................................................................... 13 November 1945 Fiji..................................................................................13 October 1970 Finland........................................................................ 14 December 1955 France ............................................................................24 October 1945 Gabon ........................................................................ 20 September 1960 Gambia ...................................................................... 21 September 1965 Georgia ................................................................................ 31 July 1992 Germany .................................................................... 18 September 1973 Ghana ................................................................................ 8 March 1957 Greece ............................................................................25 October 1945 Grenada ..................................................................... 17 September 1974 Guatemala.................................................................. 21 November 1945 Guinea ........................................................................ 12 December 1958 Guinea-Bissau ............................................................ 17 September 1974
member state date of admission Guyana....................................................................... 20 September 1966 Haiti .............................................................................. 24 October 1945 Honduras ....................................................................17 December 1945 Hungary ......................................................................14 December 1955 Iceland........................................................................ 19 November 1946 India .............................................................................. 30 October 1945 Indonesia .................................................................... 28 September 1950 Iran ............................................................................... 24 October 1945 Iraq .............................................................................21 December 1945 Ireland .........................................................................14 December 1955 Israel ................................................................................... 11 May 1949 Italy .............................................................................14 December 1955 Jamaica ...................................................................... 18 September 1962 Japan ...........................................................................18 December 1956 Jordan .........................................................................14 December 1955 Kazakhstan......................................................................... 2 March 1992 Kenya ..........................................................................16 December 1963 Kiribati ........................................................................14 December 1999 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of .................... 17 September 1991 Korea, Republic of ..................................................... 17 September 1991 Kuwait ................................................................................ 14 May 1963 Kyrgyzstan ......................................................................... 2 March 1992 Lao People’s Democratic Republic ..............................14 December 1955 Latvia ......................................................................... 17 September 1991 Lebanon ........................................................................ 24 October 1945 Lesotho ......................................................................... 17 October 1966 Liberia .......................................................................... 2 November 1945 Libya ...........................................................................14 December 1955 Liechtenstein .............................................................. 18 September 1990 Lithuania .................................................................... 17 September 1991 Luxembourg .................................................................. 24 October 1945 Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of .................... 8 April 1993 Madagascar................................................................ 20 September 1960 Malawi ..........................................................................1 December 1964 Malaysia..................................................................... 17 September 1957 Maldives..................................................................... 21 September 1965 Mali ........................................................................... 28 September 1960 Malta ............................................................................1 December 1964 Marshall Islands ......................................................... 17 September 1991 Mauritania .................................................................... 27 October 1961 Mauritius ........................................................................... 24 April 1968 Mexico ......................................................................... 7 November 1945 Micronesia, Federated States of .................................. 17 September 1991 Moldova, Republic of......................................................... 2 March 1992 Monaco ............................................................................... 28 May 1993 Mongolia....................................................................... 27 October 1961 Morocco..................................................................... 12 November 1956 Mozambique .............................................................. 16 September 1975 Myanmar ........................................................................... 19 April 1948 Namibia ............................................................................. 23 April 1990 Nauru......................................................................... 14 September 1999 Nepal ..........................................................................14 December 1955 Netherlands.................................................................10 December 1945 New Zealand................................................................. 24 October 1945 Nicaragua...................................................................... 24 October 1945 Niger .......................................................................... 20 September 1960 Nigeria ............................................................................ 7 October 1960 Norway ...................................................................... 27 November 1945 Oman .............................................................................. 7 October 1971 Pakistan...................................................................... 30 September 1947 Palau ...........................................................................15 December 1994 Panama ...................................................................... 13 November 1945 Papua New Guinea........................................................ 10 October 1975 Paraguay ....................................................................... 24 October 1945 Peru ............................................................................... 31 October 1945 Philippines..................................................................... 24 October 1945 Poland ........................................................................... 24 October 1945 Portugal.......................................................................14 December 1955 Qatar.......................................................................... 21 September 1971 Romania......................................................................14 December 1955 Russian Federation ........................................................ 24 October 1945
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Membership United Nations Member States
(as of 1 April 2003) member state date of admission Rwanda...................................................................... 18 September 1962 St. Kitts and Nevis...................................................... 23 September 1983 St. Lucia ..................................................................... 18 September 1979 St. Vincent and the Grenadines................................... 16 September 1980 Samoa ......................................................................... 15 December 1976 San Marino ........................................................................ 2 March 1992 São Tomé and Príncipe ............................................... 16 September 1975 Saudi Arabia ..................................................................24 October 1945 Senegal ....................................................................... 28 September 1960 Serbia and Montenegro ............................................... 1 November 2000 Seychelles ................................................................... 21 September 1976 Sierra Leone ............................................................... 27 September 1961 Singapore ................................................................... 21 September 1965 Slovakia ......................................................................... 19 January 1993 Slovenia............................................................................... 22 May 1992 Solomon Islands ......................................................... 19 September 1978 Somalia ...................................................................... 20 September 1960 South Africa ................................................................. 7 November 1945 Spain ........................................................................... 14 December 1955 Sri Lanka..................................................................... 14 December 1955 Sudan ......................................................................... 12 November 1956 Suriname ....................................................................... 4 December 1975 Swaziland................................................................... 24 September 1968 Sweden....................................................................... 19 November 1946 Switzerland ................................................................ 10 September 2002
member state date of admission Syria .............................................................................. 24 October 1945 Tajikistan............................................................................ 2 March 1992 Tanzania......................................................................14 December 1961 Thailand ......................................................................16 December 1946 Togo ........................................................................... 20 September 1960 Tonga ......................................................................... 14 September 1999 Trinidad and Tobago .................................................. 18 September 1962 Tunisia........................................................................ 12 November 1956 Turkey ........................................................................... 24 October 1945 Turkmenistan .....................................................................2 March 1992 Tuvalu .......................................................................... 5 September 2000 Uganda .......................................................................... 25 October 1962 Ukraine ......................................................................... 24 October 1945 United Arab Emirates ....................................................9 December 1971 United Kingdom ............................................................ 24 October 1945 United States of America ............................................... 24 October 1945 Uruguay ......................................................................18 December 1945 Uzbekistan.......................................................................... 2 March 1992 Vanuatu...................................................................... 15 September 1981 Venezuela ................................................................... 15 November 1945 Vietnam...................................................................... 20 September 1977 Yemen ........................................................................ 30 September 1947 Zambia..........................................................................1 December 1964 Zimbabwe ....................................................................... 25 August 1980
Growth of United Nations Membership
year of admission members 1945
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1955
1956 1957 1958 1960
1961 1962
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Belarus (formerly Byelorussia), Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia (readmitted in 1993 as two separate states, the Czech and Slovak Republics), Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation (formerly the USSR), Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, Thailand Pakistan, Yemen (formerly Yemen Arab Republic) Myanmar (formerly Burma) Israel Indonesia Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia (formerly Kampuchea), Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (formerly Laos), Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka Japan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia Ghana, Malaysia Guinea Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Zaire Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda
year of admission 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1970 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1999 2000 2002
members Kenya, Kuwait Malawi, Malta, Zambia Gambia, Maldives, Singapore Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (since 1990, merged with Yemen) Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Swaziland Fiji Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates Bahamas, Germany (formerly the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany) Bangladesh, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Suriname Angola, Samoa, Seychelles Djibouti, Vietnam Dominica, Solomon Islands St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Zimbabwe Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Vanuatu St. Kitts and Nevis Brunei Darussalam Liechtenstein, Namibia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krgyz Republic, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, Andorra, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Monaco, Slovak Republic, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Palau Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga Tuvalu, Serbia and Montenegro Switzerland, East Timor (Timor Leste)
U N I T E D N AT I O N S HEADQUARTERS For a small fee, visitors may join one of the Secretariat’s tours of the headquarters buildings, conducted daily in 20 languages by some 50 guides from around 30 countries.
THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDINGS When the UN came into being on 24 October 1945, it had no home. On 11 December 1945, the US Congress unanimously invited the UN to make its headquarters in the US. In February 1946, the General Assembly, meeting for its first session in London, voted for the general vicinity of Fairfield and Westchester counties, near New York City, but sites near Philadelphia, Boston, and San Francisco also were considered during 1946. Then came the dramatic offer by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to donate $8.5 million toward the purchase of properties along the East River in midtown Manhattan. The City of New York rounded out the zone and granted rights along the river frontage. By November 1947, the General Assembly approved the architectural plans, and nine months later, the UN concluded a $65 million interest-free loan agreement with the US government. The director of planning for UN headquarters was Wallace K. Harrison of the US. The international board of design consultants included G. A. Soilleux, Australia; Gaston Brunfaut, Belgium; Oscar Niemeyer, Brazil; Ernest Cormier, Canada; Ssu-ch’eng Liang, China; Charles le Corbusier, Switzerland; Sven Markelius, Sweden; Nikolai D. Bassow, USSR; Howard Robertson, United Kingdom; and Julio Vilamajo, Uruguay. The first structure to be completed, in the spring of 1951, was the 39-story marble and glass Secretariat building. In 1952, the conference building (with the three council halls and a number of conference rooms) and the General Assembly building were ready. Thus, it was five or six years before the UN was permanently housed. In the interim, the Secretariat was established provisionally at Hunter College in the Bronx, New York, and in August 1946, the UN moved to the Sperry Gyroscope plant at Lake Success, Long Island. Several General Assembly sessions took place in the New York City Building at Flushing Meadow, and in 1948 and 1951, the body met at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris. A library building at the headquarters site, erected and equipped through a $6.6 million donation by the Ford Foundation, was dedicated in 1961 to the memory of former SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld. Various furnishings and works of art for the conference and General Assembly buildings and the library have been donated by member governments. Adjoining the public lobby in the General Assembly building is the Meditation Room, dedicated to those who have given their lives in service to the UN. It includes a stained glass window by Marc Chagall on the theme of “Peace and Man.” The public gardens north of the General Assembly building contain sculpture and plantings donated by governments and individuals. The United Nations headquarters was designed to serve four major groups: delegations, who now represent 191 member states and who send more than 3,000 persons to New York each year for the annual sessions of the General Assembly; the Secretariat, numbering nearly 15,000 throughout the world; visitors, who average 1,500 a day; and journalists, of whom more than 450 are permanently accredited while twice that number are present during major meetings.
Capacity Because of the increase in the number of member states, the seating capacity of the conference rooms and the General Assembly Hall has been enlarged. A major expansion of office and meeting facilities at UN headquarters was undertaken in the 1980s. About 61,000 men and women from some 170 countries work for the UN and its related organs and agencies—about one-third of them at UN headquarters and the other two-thirds at offices and centers around the globe. (See also the chapter on the Secretariat.) Conference Services UN headquarters, together with the organization’s offices in Geneva and Vienna, provide the interpreters, translators, writers, editors, and conference personnel required for the many UN meetings throughout the world, as well as for other meetings held under UN auspices. Telecommunications System The UN has its own telecommunications system. UN headquarters is linked by radio with the offices in Geneva and Vienna, which, in turn, provide liaison with UN organs and offices in different parts of the world. Computer System As part of the fundamental modernization and reorganization of the United Nations, the organization’s bank of IBM mainframes was replaced in stages by an Integrated Management Information System (IMIS). The first phase of the replacement, completed in early 1994, implemented a personnel system covering recruiting, hiring, promotions, and moving. Four hundred users at the headquarters were connected to Unix servers with personal computers using Windows software. Eventually all administrative applications were transferred to four Unix systems organized in clientserver architecture. The phased installation of this multi-milliondollar system at various UN offices and agencies around the world continued in 2002. Other users, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Labor Organization (ILO), had progressively adapted the software to their special requirements. In late 1998, a report of independent experts, initiated at the General Assembly’s request, favorably evaluated IMIS from both the technical and cost perspectives. Their recommendations, as well as those of the General Assembly and the Board of Auditors, were subsequently addressed. UN Postal Administration UN stamps are issued under separate agreements with the postal authorities of the US, Switzerland, and Austria and are valid for postage only on mail deposited at UN headquarters in New York and at the UN offices in Geneva and Vienna. UN stamps may be obtained by mail, over the counter, or automatically through the Customer Deposit Service in New York, Geneva, or Vienna. Only revenue from the sale of stamps for philatelic pur-
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United Nations Headquarters
poses is retained by the UN. In addition to producing revenue, UN stamp designs publicize the work of the organization and its related agencies.
RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS Library The Dag Hammarskjöld Library contains approximately 400,000 books, 14,500 maps, over 80,000 periodicals and newspapers, and several hundred thousand documents and microfiches. The collection includes not only UN materials but also League of Nations records in its Woodrow Wilson Reading Room, as well as a general reference library on subjects related to the work of the UN. The library is for use by delegations, permanent missions, and the Secretariat and by scholars engaged in advanced research. Archives The United Nations Archives, located at 345 Park Avenue South in New York, dates from the establishment of the United Nations. Its 35 linear feet of holdings include both inactive administrative records created by Secretariat offices, as well as archival records that constitute the organization’s institutional memory. Each year, approximately 50 researchers cull its archives for information about the UN’s predecessors, the Secretary-General’s “good offices” role, and the organization’s mediating and peacekeeping activities. The earliest records emanate from predecessor organizations, including the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (1893–1951); United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (1943–48), which assisted liberated areas devastated by World War II; United Nations War Crimes Commission (1943– 49) whose 17 Allied members together developed procedures for apprehending and punishing war criminals; and the United Nations Conference on International Organization (1945), at which the United Nations was chartered. From its very beginning, a number of regional conflicts required that the new organization assume the role of peacekeeper. Consequently, the UN Archives maintains records associated with a wide variety of peacekeeping missions, ranging from the UN Special Committee on Palestine (1947), to the organization’s electoral mission in Cambodia. Issues arising from colonialism also required early UN involvement. Archival holdings document the establishment of trusteeships for supervising elections and the transition to independence. The organization’s technical assistance function in international social and economic development is, likewise, reflected among the archives’ records. Records are generally open for research at the end of 20 years. Strictly confidential records, or those with special restrictions (such as the War Crimes Commission records), require express authorization for access. Those wishing to research UN Archives records should submit the Archives Researcher Application form to the Archives and Records Centre, 304 East 45th Street, Ground Floor, New York, New York 10017. Fax: (212) 9634414. Telephone: (212) 963-8683; (212) 963-8612. E-mail:
[email protected]. Documents Services UN headquarters houses one of the world’s largest photocopying and printing plants. Most UN documents are produced in photocopy form for the use of members and the Secretariat. Some documents, as well as many reports and studies, are issued as UN publications for sale to the public. They are available in the bookshop at UN headquarters and from distributors worldwide. In the United States and Canada, Bernan Associates (formerly UNIPUB) distributes UN publications and publishes scholarly books by the United Nations University Press. It also distributes
the publications of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Bernan is located in Lanham, Maryland, and can be reached from the United States at (800) 274-4888 or via email at
[email protected]. The Bernan Associates web site can also be accessed at www.bernan.com. Other UN publications are available from the United Nations Publications Sales Section at UN Headquarters, (212) 963-8302 or (800) 253-9646 (for North America, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific); and from the Publications des Nations Unies (in Geneva), (41 22) 917 2600 or (41 22) 917 2614 (for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East). The UN Publications office also has a web site at http://www.un.org/Pubs/ sales.htm, where the searchable catalog of UN publications may be accessed and orders placed.
P U B L I C I N F O R M ATI O N S E RV I C E S At its first session, in 1946, the General Assembly decided to create a special Department of Public Information (DPI) in the Secretariat. Recognizing that the UN’s aims cannot be achieved unless the world is fully informed of its objectives and activities, the General Assembly directed that DPI should work to promote the fullest possible informed understanding of UN affairs. Accordingly, the UN provides a steady stream of information on its activities, covering virtually all media—press, publications, radio, television, films, photographs, and exhibits. Press, Publications, and Photographic Services DPI provides information to news correspondents and facilitates their access to meetings, documents, and other news sources. In any given year, several thousand press releases are issued at UN headquarters, including accounts of meetings, texts of speeches, announcements of special programs, and background or reference papers. DPI holds daily briefings and helps to arrange press conferences for members of delegations and senior members of the Secretariat and the specialized agencies. Booklets, pamphlets, and leaflets covering the work of the UN are published in many languages. The UN Chronicle, issued quarterly in the six offical languages of the UN, reports on UN activities. The Chronicle now has its own web site at www.un.org/ Pubs/chronicle, which includes information on the contents of individual issues as well as links to selected articles and cover images from the magazine. DPI also issues a Yearbook of the United Nations. To illustrate UN activities in the field, photo missions are periodically undertaken throughout the world. The photographs obtained, together with extensive coverage of events at UN headquarters and other principal conference centers, are widely used by newspapers, periodicals, book publishers, and government information agencies. Posters and photo display sets are prepared for exhibition at UN headquarters and for worldwide distribution. DPI press releases, background information releases, and other public information documents are available on the Internet by accessing http://www.un.org/news/. United Nations documents (major reports, and resolutions of the General Assembly, Security Council, and ECOSOC) can be accessed by Internet users. In the United States, many large libraries provide a free window onto the Internet, allowing access to some of the UN documents. Radio, TV, and Film Services A major responsibility of DPI is to assist the accredited correspondents of national and commercial broadcasting organizations in their coverage of the UN’s work. In radio, correspondents may use studios and recording equipment at UN headquarters, and New York is linked with distant capitals by shortwave or radiotelephone. Film and television correspondents may receive
United Nations Headquarters visual coverage of principal meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as of press conferences and briefings. Satellite transmissions carry this material around the world. DPI broadcasts meetings of principal UN organs by shortwave and produces its own radio programs in the six official UN languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish), reaching listeners in more than 100 countries. UN films and programs are produced not only for television but also for groups in schools, universities, and nongovernmental organizations. Public Inquiries Unit The Public Inquiries Unit handles individual inquiries from researchers and the general public seeking specific information about the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations. The unit can refer callers to the appropriate UN department or organization, and send by mail UN documents such as reports by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly or Security Council. UN Information Centers The network of United Nations Information Centers (UNICs), Services (UNISs) and Offices (UNOs) links Headquarters with the people of the world. Located in 77 countries, these branch offices of the United Nations Department of Public Information help local communities obtain up-to-date information on the United Nations and its activities. As of November 2002, 48 UNICs had created their own web sites, in local languages. The list of UNIC web sites follows: Algiers, Algeria (French) www.unic.org.dz; Ankara, Turkey (English/Turkish) www.un.org.tr/unic.html; Antananarivo, Madagascar (French/Malagasy) www.onu.dts.mg; Athens, Greece (Greek) www.unic.gr; Baku, Azerbaijan (English) www.un-az.org/dpi; Bangkok, Thailand (English) www.unescap.org/unis; Beirut, Lebanon (English/Arabic) www.escwa.org.lb; Bogota, Colombia (Spanish) www.onucolombia.org; Bonn, Germany (German) www.uno.de; Brussels, Belgium (English/French/Dutch) www.unbenelux.org; Buenos Aires, Argentina (Spanish) www.unic.org.ar; Cairo, Egypt (English) www.unic-eg.org; Copenhagen, Denmark (English/Nordic languages) www.un.dk; Dakar, Senegal (French) www.cinudakar.org; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (English/Kiswahili) www.unic.undp.org; Dhaka, Bangladesh (English/Bangla) www.unicdhaka.org; Geneva, Switzerland (English/French) www.unog.ch/unis/unis1.htm; Harare, Zimbabwe (English) www.samara.co.zw/unic; Islamabad, Pakistan (English/Urdu) www.un.org.pk/unic/; Kiev, Ukraine (English/Ukrainian) www.un.kiev.ua; La Paz, Bolivia (Spanish) www.nu.org.bo/cinu/; Lisbon, Portugal (Portuguese) www.onuportugal.pt; London, United Kingdom (English) www.unitednations.org.uk; Madrid, Spain (Spanish) www.onu.org; Mexico City, Mexico (Spanish) www.cinu.org.mx; Minsk, Belarus (Russian) www.un.minsk.by/ dpi/dpi_r.html; Moscow, Russian Federation (Russian) www.unic.ru; New Delhi, India (English) www.unic.org.in; Nairobi, Kenya (English/Kiswahili) www.unicnairobi.org; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (French) www.cinu-burkina.org; Panama City, Panama (Spanish) www.cinup.org; Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago (English) www.unicpos.org.tt; Paris, France (French) www.onu.fr; Prague, Czech Republic (Czech) www.unicprague.cz; Rabat, Morocco (French) www.cinu.org.ma; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Portuguese) www.unicrio.org.br; Rome, Italy (Italian) www.onuitalia.it; Sydney, Australia (English) www.un.org.au; Tashkent, Uzbekistan (English/Uzbek) www.undp.uz; Tehran, Iran (English/Farsi) www.unic-ir.org; Tokyo, Japan (Japanese) www.unic.or.jp; Tunis, Tunisia (French) www.unic-tunis.intl.tn; Vienna, Austria (English/German/Hungarian/Slovenian) www.unis.unvienna.org; Warsaw, Poland (English/Polish) www.unic.un.org.pl; Washington, D.C., United States of America (English) www.unicwash.org; Windhoek, Namibia (English) www.un.na/unic.htm;
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Yaounde, Cameroon (English) www.un.cm/cinu; and Yerevan, Armenia (English/Armenian) www.undpi.am. These sites post calendars of events sponsored by the Centers along with information on major UN activities, such as the General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem and the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The centers maintain up-to-date reference libraries of UN publications and documentation and answer public inquiries. DPI material is translated into local languages by the centers, which work closely with local media, information agencies, educational authorities, and nongovernmental organizations in their area. The centers also inform UN headquarters about local UN activities, which, in turn, are publicized by DPI. In 1996, the UN began integrating the functions of its information centers into the office of the UN representative/resident coordinator in the respective host country.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES The charter provides that in all territory of its member states, the UN shall hold whatever legal capacity, privileges, and immunities are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes and that representatives of member states and officials of the UN shall have a status allowing them independent exercise of their functions. On 13 February 1946, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. As of November 2002, 191 countries, including the US, had acceded to this convention. UN staff on official business can travel on a laissez-passer issued by the UN. Countries that have acceded to the convention exempt the salaries of UN officials from taxation, except for the US and several other countries, where special reservations apply. These salaries, however, are subject to a “staff assessment,” an internal UN taxation. The UN itself is exempt from all direct taxes, customs duties, and export and import restrictions on articles for official use. Virtually all member states have established permanent missions to the UN in New York. Their personnel enjoy privileges and immunities similar to those of diplomatic missions.
HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UN AND THE US A special headquarters agreement, signed by Secretary-General Trygve Lie and US secretary of state George C. Marshall at Lake Success on 26 June 1947, has been in force since 21 November 1947. It defines the 18 acres of land in New York City located between 42nd and 48th Streets and First Avenue and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Drive as the Headquarters District of the United Nations. Subsequently, by supplemental agreements between the UN and the US, additional office space located in buildings in the vicinity has been included in the Headquarters District. The Headquarters District is “under the control and authority of the United Nations as provided in this agreement.” It is the seat of the UN, and the agreement stipulates that the district “shall be inviolable.” Federal, state, and local personnel on official duty may enter it only with the consent of the Secretary-General. The UN may make regulations for the area. US federal, state, and local law, insofar as it is inconsistent with UN regulations, does not apply here; otherwise, the US courts would have jurisdiction over actions and transactions taking place in the Headquarters District. The UN may expel persons from the district for violations of regulations. In such cases, and generally for the preservation of law and order, US authorities have to provide a sufficient number of police if requested by the Secretary-General. “No form of racial or religious discrimination shall be permitted within the Headquarters District.” Other detailed provisions in the agreement between the UN and the US deal with the important matter of the accessibility of the seat of the UN to non-US citizens.
18 EMBLEM AND FLAG OF THE UN
United Nations Headquarters
The General Assembly adopted an official seal and emblem for the organization. The UN emblem depicts in silver against a light blue background a map of the earth, projected from the North Pole, and encircled by two symmetrical olive branches. It is a slight modification of a design selected by the US Office of Strategic Services for buttons used at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. The particular shade of blue is now officially called United Nations blue. The emblem is used only for UN publications and conferences and other officially approved purposes.
The first UN flag was used in Greece in 1947 in a region where there was fighting. The flag has the UN emblem in white against a background of United Nations blue. The flag may be displayed not only by the UN and the specialized agencies and by governments but also by “organizations and individuals to demonstrate support of the United Nations and to further its principles and purposes.” It is considered “especially appropriate” to display the UN flag on national and official holidays; on UN Day, 24 October; and at official events in honor of the UN or related to the UN.
T H E U N I T E D N AT I O N S B U D G E T troops, thus placing an unfair burden on them. United Nations activities that are financed mainly by voluntary contributions outside the regular budget include: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The member states of the specialized agencies decide on each agency’s budget and scale of assessments separately from the United Nations itself.
Under the Charter, it is the task of the General Assembly to “consider and approve the budget of the Organization” and to apportion the expenses of the UN among the member nations. From an administrative standpoint, the expenditures of the UN may be said to fall into two categories: expenditures that are included in what is termed the “regular budget,” to which all members are obliged to contribute; and expenditures for certain high-cost items or programs, for which are established separate, or “extrabudgetary,” accounts or funds financed by special arrangements that do not necessarily involve obligatory payments by UN members. Included in the regular budget are the costs of services and programs carried out at UN headquarters and all overseas UN offices; the expenses of the International Court of Justice; and debt services charges, which are also listed as “special expenses.” Outside the regular budget, member states also are assessed, in accordance with a modified version of the basic scale, for the costs of peacekeeping operations. The number and cost of these operations has been aggravated in recent years, in large part due to political instability in Eastern Europe, Western Asia, and Africa. In the period 1992–93, the Secretary-General estimated the cost for these operations increased sixfold. In a report to the Economic and Social Council, he stated, “It would be mistaken to try to attach an order of importance or priority between peace and security on the one hand, and economic and social development on the other. The two are so closely interlinked as to be indivisible.” This underlying philosophy provides the rationale for the growth in the number of peacekeeping operations and the expansion of their mandates beyond the previously traditional observer status, to activities such as disarming and demobilization of forces, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, electoral verification, and civilian police support. Each peacekeeping operation is approved and budgeted separately. Following is a list of 15 UN observation or peacekeeping operations under way as of November 2002, along with the original starting date: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), June 1948; United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), January 1949; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), March 1964; United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Golan Heights, June 1974; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), March 1978; United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), April 1991; United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), April 1991; United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), August 1993; United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), December 1995; United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) in Croatia, January 1996; United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), June 1999; United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), October 1999; United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), November 1999; United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000; and United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), May 2002. As of 31 May 1999, unpaid contributions for the peacekeeping operations with separate assessed budgets amounted to us$1.5 billion. Shortfalls in the receipt of assessed contributions were met by delaying reimbursements to states that contributed
C O M M IT T E E S A S S I S T I N G T H E G E N E R A L A S S E M B LY I N F I N A N C I A L M AT T E R S In 1946, the General Assembly established two permanent subsidiary organs concerned with administrative and budgetary affairs. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions is responsible for expert examination of the UN budget and the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies. The committee’s 16 members, elected by the General Assembly for staggered three-year terms, serve as individuals, not as government representatives. The Committee on Contributions advises the General Assembly on the apportionment of the expenses of the UN among the member nations. Its 18 members are elected for three-year terms and also serve as individuals.
P R O C E D U R E F O R D E T E R M I N IN G T H E REGULAR BUDGET Every other year, the Secretary-General presents detailed budget and appropriations estimates for the following biennium. (Until 1974 there were annual budgets.) These estimates are reviewed and sometimes revised by the Advisory Committee. The programmatic aspects are reviewed by the 34-member Committee for Program and Coordination. Appropriations (Gross) 1946–2003 (in us$)
year 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
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appropriation $19,390,000 28,616,568 39,285,736 43,204,080 44,520,773 48,925,500 50,547,660 49,869,450 48,528,980 50,228,000 50,683,350 53,174,700 61,121,900 61,657,100 65,734,900 71,649,300 85,818,220 92,876,550 101,327,600 108,472,800 121,080,530
year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974–75 1976–77 1978–79 1980–81 1982–83 1984–85 1986–87 1988–89 1990–91 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1998–99 2000–01 2002–03
appropriation 133,084,000 141,787,750 156,967,300 168,956,950 194,627,800 208,650,200 233,820,374 606,033,000 745,813,800 996,372,900 1,339,151,200 1,472,961,700 1,611,551,200 1,711,801,200 1,748,681,800 2,134,072,100 2,362,977,700 2,580,200,200 2,608,274,000 2,488,302,000 2,535,689,200 2,625,178,700
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The United Nations Budget BUDGET FOR THE 2002–03 BIENNIUM
area of expenditure purpose of expenditure
amount (us$)
OVERALL POLICY-MAKING, DIRECTION AND COORDINATION Overall policy-making, direction and coordination 49,365,800 General Assembly affairs and conference services 449,775,300 TOTAL 499,141,100 POLITICAL AFFAIRS Political affairs Disarmament Peacekeeping operations Peaceful uses of outer space TOTAL
155,016,300 15,432,300 73,600,700 4,044,800 248,094,100
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND LAW International Court of Justice Legal affairs TOTAL
23,837,300 35,265,800 59,103,100
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT Economic and social affairs 121,043,400 Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States 3,055,600 Africa: New Agenda for Development 5,932,700 Trade and development 84,858,400 International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO 18,022,600 Environment 7,660,200 Human settlements 11,541,800 Crime prevention and criminal justice 5,733,800 International drug control 15,289,100 TOTAL 273,137,600 REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT Economic and social development in Africa Economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific Economic development in Europe Economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean Economic and social development in Western Asia Regular programme of technical cooperation TOTAL
69,167,400 49,095,200 42,749,600 355,182,700
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS Human rights Protection of and assistance to refugees Palestine refugees Humanitarian assistance TOTAL
44,727,100 42,890,400 24,828,400 20,011,600 132,457,500
PUBLIC INFORMATION Public information
80,760,100 52,804,500 40,605,900
TOTAL
144,719,200 144,719,200
COMMON SUPPORT SERVICES Management and central support services TOTAL
428,530,500 428,530,500
INTERNAL OVERSIGHT Internal oversight TOTAL
20,296,900 20,296,900
JOINTLY FINANCED ACTIVITIES AND SPECIAL EXPENSES Jointly financed administrative activities 8,436,600 Special expenses 69,340,500 TOTAL 77,777,100 CAPITAL EXPENDITURES Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance TOTAL STAFF ASSESSMENT Staff assessment TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT Development Account
45,423,600 45,423,600 348,250,300 348,250,300 13,065,000
TOTAL
13,065,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2,625,178,700
Aside from the regular budget, the General Assembly also allots a certain amount of money for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses and determines the level of the UN’s Working Capital Fund, to which member nations advance sums in proportion to their assessed contributions to the regular budget. The fund is used to finance appropriations pending receipt of contributions and may also be drawn upon by the Secretary-General for other purposes determined by the General Assembly. Since the expenses of the organization can never be precisely predicted, the Secretary-General reviews actual expenditures for the current year at each regular session of the General Assembly and proposes adjustments in the original appropriations. Usually, a supplemental budget is voted, but occasionally the General Assembly votes reductions. Income Estimates It was estimated that expenditures for 2002–03 would be offset in the amount of us$484,295,400, to be derived as follows: 1. income from staff assessment: us$352,537,800; 2. general income: us$47,283,200 3. services to public: us$4,474,400. Under UN regulations, a percentage of the earnings of the entire UN staff is deducted in lieu of taxes and credited to “income.” In order to avoid double taxation of staff members of US nationality, they are reimbursed by the UN for the taxes (federal, state, and city) levied on their UN earnings. The withholdings from the salaries of UN personnel of all other nationalities are credited to the member states’ accounts against their assessed contributions. After taking into account staff assessments and other items of income, the net estimated amount remaining must be raised through assessed contributions from member states.
ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBER S TAT E S T O T H E R E GU L A R B U D G E T The scale of contributions of member states is established by the General Assembly on the recommendation of its Committee on Contributions. The basic original criterion for the apportionment of UN expenses was the ability to pay, with comparative estimates of national income taken as the fairest guide. Other factors, such as the comparative income per capita, the ability of contributors to obtain foreign exchange, and, until 1974, the dislocation of national economies arising out of World War II, also were taken into account. In this way, the US share was at first 39.89 percent, gradually declining to 31.52 percent for 1971–73. In 1972, the General Assembly established a ceiling on the rate of assessment of the highest contributor, set at 25 percent. At the same time, it lowered the minimum rate of assessment to 0.02 percent (later lowered to 0.01 percent and in 1997 lowered again, to 0.001 percent) and requested the Committee on Contributions to give attention to the special economic and financial problems of developing countries. In 2000, the General Assembly adopted a new scale of assessments, lowering the ceiling of the amount to be paid by any single country from 25 to 22 percent. In an effort to introduce what it termed greater fairness and equity in the scale of assessments, the General Assembly, in 1981, requested the Committee on Contributions to prepare a set of guidelines for the collection of more uniform and comparable data and statistics from member states and to study alternative methods of assessing “the real capacity of member states to pay.” The top ten contributors for 2003 would be assessed at the following rates (percentages):
The United Nations Budget United States Japan Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada Spain Brazil Republic of Korea
22.0% 19.5% 9.8% 6.5% 5.5% 5.1% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 1.8%
PROPOSALS TO EASE THE UN’S FINANCIAL D I F F I C ULTI E S By and large, the regular budget has never created major disputes among the member states, and most governments have usually paid their dues relatively punctually. However, beginning in 1963, the USSR refused as a matter of principle to contribute to certain items in the regular budget, such as the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea until its dissolution by a consensus vote of the 1973 Assembly, or to those parts of the regular budget devoted to the redemption of UN bonds (a method of raising funds for certain UN peacekeeping operations). France has taken a similar stand in connection with the redemption of the bonds. In addition, a number of countries have refused to contribute to the special accounts for peacekeeping operations. It was chiefly these controversial expenditures which precipitated the UN’s financial emergency in the mid-1960s. In July 1962, the International Court of Justice, at the request of the General Assembly, issued an advisory opinion in which it declared that the expenses of the first UN Emergency Force in the Middle East and the UN Force in the Congo constituted expenses of the organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter and should thus be borne by member states as apportioned by the General Assembly. The Assembly accepted the court’s opinion in December 1962, but debate over peacekeeping operations and the financial difficulties continued. A number of other factors, moreover, contributed to the precariousness of the financial position of the organization, notably the lateness of many member states in paying their assessed contributions, the currency fluctuations of the 1970s (marked by two devaluations of the US dollar, on which the UN budget is based), and inflation. A Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the UN, appointed by the General Assembly in 1985, submitted to the General Assembly in the following year its recommendations for enhancing the efficiency and reducing the expenditures of the organization. Implementation of the group’s recommendations was the condition which a number of states, including the US, placed on further payment of their assessments. Among the solutions proposed in 1985 were an increase in the Working Capital Fund to us$200 million, the issue of certificates of indebtedness in the amount of the arrears—in effect, borrowing from member states—and borrowing on the open market. In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested that the Ford Foundation assemble an independent advisory group to recommend ways to create a secure, long-term financial base for the organization. The group, co-chaired by Shijuro Ogata, former Deputy Governer of the Japan Development Bank, and Paul Volcker, former Board of Governors’ Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Bank, issued its report in February 1993. Entitled “Financing an Effective United Nations,” it suggested the following measures: • Dividing UN expenditures into three categories: a regular budget financed by assessed contributions; peacekeeping financed by a separate assessment; and humanitarian and development activities financed largely by voluntary contributions.
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• Requiring UN member states to pay dues in four quarterly installments, instead of a single lump sum at the beginning of the year; and granting the organization authority to charge interest on late payments. • Appropriation by some nations of their UN contribution earlier in the year. • Acceptance by member states of significantly increased peacekeeping costs over the next few years, and financing future cost from national defense budgets. • Creation by the UN of a $400 million revolving reserve fund for peacekeeping; and consideration of a unified peacekeeping budget, financed by a single annual assessment. The report concluded that proposals for additional, nongovernmental sources of financing the UN were “neither practical nor desirable.” Also in 1993, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) of the Secretariat issued a report declaring: “The old financial malaise is emerging with renewed evidence. What was a chronic illness is becoming a critical one.” Among JIU proposals: • Governments should adjust their national legislations to avoid obstacles to paying their UN contributions in full and on time. • Replenishment of the proposed UN Peace Endowment Fund could take advantage of initiatives, such as the issuance of special stamps by member states, with revenues turned over to the organization. • Countries could turn over to peacekeeping operations funds earmarked for aid to developing countries in which the existing critical situation is an impediment to using those funds. • In parallel with financing, cost saving is indispensable to solving the financial crisis. Fighting waste and reducing expenses must take place in all areas of the organization. The fundamental requirement for the essential financial stability of the UN, however, remained the full and timely payment by all member states of their assessments, in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which states that: “The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.” In 1994, the UN General Assembly created the Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS) as a department within the Secretariat to independently monitor reports of waste, fraud, and mismanagement within the UN. OIOS focuses on high-risk activities, such as peace-keeping operations, humanitarian activities, and procurement while simultaneously providing oversight to all activities of the UN. OIOS provides oversight through internal auditing, management consulting, investigations, monitoring, inspection, and evaluation. In 1996, efforts at managerial reform targeted five areas of management: cost structure, human resources, information, tech nology, and work programs. This approach has required reductions and redeployment of staff. Between 1984–95 and 1996–97, the UN eliminated 2,046 positions, and about 1,000 of the budgeted posts that exist now are kept vacant. Travel was reduced by 26% in 1996, and printing costs were reduced by 27% in early 1996, as more than 270,000 UN documents have become available electronically. On 23 March 2000, Under-Secretary-General for Management Joseph E. Connor told the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) that in 1999 the United Nations “took a step back from the financial brink.” While regular budget and tribunals assessments were as expected, there was an increase in peacekeeping assessments in 1999, he added. Even with that increase, the obligatory cost to member states for all UN activities in 1999 was the lowest in six years: the actual assessment for 1999 came to just over us$2 billion. The UN had
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The United Nations Budget Scale of Assessments
( for calendar year 2003) member state percent Afghanistan 0.001 Albania 0.003 Algeria 0.070 Andorra 0.004 Angola 0.002 Antigua and Barbuda 0.002 Argentina 0.969 Armenia 0.002 Australia 1.627 Austria 0.947 Azerbaijan 0.004 Bahamas 0.012 Bahrain 0.018 Bangladesh 0.010 Barbados 0.009 Belarus 0.019 Belgium 1.129 Belize 0.001 Benin 0.002 Bhutan 0.001 Bolivia 0.008 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.004 Botswana 0.010 Brazil 2.390 Brunei Darussalam 0.033 Bulgaria 0.013 Burkina Faso 0.002 Burundi 0.001 Cambodia 0.002 Cameroon 0.009 Canada 2.558 Cape Verde 0.001 Central African Republic 0.001 Chad 0.001 Chile 0.212 China 1.532 Colombia 0.201 Comoros 0.001 Congo 0.001 Costa Rica 0.020 Côte d’Ivoire 0.009 Croatia 0.039 Cuba 0.030 Cyprus 0.038 Czech Republic 0.203 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 0.009 Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.004 Denmark 0.749
member state percent Djibouti 0.001 Dominica 0.001 Dominican Republic 0.023 Ecuador 0.025 Egypt 0.081 El Salvador 0.018 Equatorial Guinea 0.001 Eritrea 0.001 Estonia 0.010 Ethiopia 0.004 Fiji 0.004 Finland 0.522 France 6.466 Gabon 0.014 Gambia 0.001 Georgia 0.005 Germany 9.769 Ghana 0.005 Greece 0.539 Grenada 0.001 Guatemala 0.027 Guinea 0.003 Guinea-Bissau 0.001 Guyana 0.001 Haiti 0.002 Honduras 0.005 Hungary 0.120 Iceland 0.033 India 0.341 Indonesia 0.200 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.272 Iraq 0.136 Ireland 0.294 Israel 0.415 Italy 5.064 Jamaica 0.004 Japan 19.515 Jordan 0.008 Kazakhstan 0.028 Kenya 0.008 Kiribati 0.001 Kuwait 0.147 Kyrgyzstan 0.001 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.001 Latvia 0.010 Lebanon 0.012 Lesotho 0.001 Liberia 0.001 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.067
more cash than the previous year largely because of payments made by the United States to avoid losing its vote in the General Assembly. Total available cash at the end of 1999 jumped to some us$1.093 billion, from us$736 million in 1998. Amounts
member state Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia Monaco Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Naura Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Republic of Korea Republic of Moldova Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino
percent 0.006 0.017 0.080 0.003 0.002 0.235 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.011 1.086 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.044 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.001 0.004 1.738 0.241 0.001 0.001 0.068 0.646 0.061 0.061 0.001 0.018 0.006 0.016 0.118 0.100 0.196 0.462 0.034 1.851 0.002 0.058 1.200 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
member state percent São Tomé and Príncipe 0.001 Saudi Arabia 0.554 Senegal 0.005 Seychelles 0.002 Sierra Leone 0.001 Singapore 0.393 Slovakia 0.043 Slovenia 0.081 Solomon Islands 0.001 Somalia 0.001 South Africa 0.408 Spain 2.518 Sri Lanka 0.016 Sudan 0.006 Suriname 0.002 Swaziland 0.002 Sweden 1.026 Switzerland 1.274 Syrian Arab Republic 0.008 Tajikistan 0.001 Thailand 0.294 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 0.006 Timor-Leste 0.001 Togo 0.001 Tongo 0.001 Trinidad and Tobago 0.016 Tunisia 0.030 Turkey 0.440 Turkmenistan 0.003 Tuvalu 0.001 Uganda 0.053 Ukraine 0.190 United Arab Emirates 0.202 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 5.536 United Republic of Tanzania 0.004 United States of America 22.000 Uruguay 0.080 Uzbekistan 0.011 Vanuatu 0.001 Venezuela 0.208 Vietnam 0.016 Yemen 0.006 Yugoslavia 0.020 Zambia 0.002 Zimbabwe 0.008 Total 101.087
owed to the United Nations were also lower, at us$1.758 billion, down from us$2.031 billion a year earlier. And the level of the United Nations debt to its member states—some us$800 million—was also significantly lower than the previous three years.
T H E G E N E R A L A S S E M B LY
with governmental powers. Except insofar as the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat are bound to carry out its requests, the General Assembly has no power to legislate and cannot enforce its decisions upon individual member nations. The only sanctions that the General Assembly can wield against an uncooperative member are the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership and expulsion from the organization, but even these sanctions can be invoked only on the recommendation of the Security Council. In effect, then, all General Assembly decisions are purely recommendations that reflect world public opinion; they have moral, though not legal, force. At the end of this chapter, an attempt is made to assess their effectiveness on this score.
The first of the UN organs established by the charter, the General Assembly is the pivot of the organization. All member states are represented. Each country, large or small, has one vote, and each country chooses its own representatives.
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS The central position of the General Assembly is firmly established in a series of charter provisions encompassing a wide range of functions and powers. First are the provisions setting forth its powers as the major deliberative body of the UN. With two exceptions (described below), the General Assembly has the right to discuss and make recommendations on any subject that falls within the scope of the charter itself, including the functions and powers of the other organs. Hence, it is in the General Assembly that all of the UN’s important projects (except for the Security Council’s peacekeeping operations) originate—those dealing with political questions, disarmament, economic and social development, human rights, decolonization of dependent territories, and development of international law. The second group of charter provisions defining the pivotal position of the General Assembly concerns the financing of the UN. The General Assembly is empowered to “consider and approve” the budget of the organization (which includes that of the International Court of Justice at The Hague), and it also has the right to determine how the expenses shall be apportioned among the member nations. Lastly, the General Assembly’s position is secured by provisions that give it specific powers in relation to the other organs. Thus, both the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council are constituted under the direct authority of the General Assembly to carry out designated tasks in their respective spheres. The administrative arm of the UN, the Secretariat, is also at the disposition of the General Assembly. The General Assembly’s powers, however, are much more limited where the Security Council and the International Court of Justice are concerned. Designed in some respects to be more powerful than the General Assembly, the Security Council is in no way answerable to the body for its activities—although it is required to make an annual report and, when necessary, special reports. Also, whereas the General Assembly is empowered to make recommendations to the council concerning the maintenance of international peace, it cannot give the council instructions. In the case of the International Court of Justice, any attempt to render its activities answerable to the General Assembly would have prejudiced the independent status that is normally accorded to judiciary bodies throughout the world. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the General Assembly not only has budgetary power but also elects the nonpermanent members of the Security Council and, concurrently with the Security Council, all the judges of the International Court, it can be said to exercise an appreciable degree of indirect control over both these bodies. Thus, the one UN organ on which all member states have the constitutional right to be represented is able to make its will felt throughout the organization, and indeed the entire UN system. Because its powers closely resemble those of a national parliament, the General Assembly has been described as a “world parliament.” Parliamentary powers are not to be confused, though,
Charter Restrictions on the Assembly’s Power to Discuss and Recommend The charter imposes two major restrictions on the General Assembly’s powers to discuss and make recommendations. The first is embodied in the principle set out in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the charter, which states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement. . . .” This principle is not so restrictive as it might seem, for whether a given issue is or is not of a domestic character is decided by the General Assembly itself. It can and often does override by majority vote the attempt of a member nation to bar a particular topic from debate by invoking Article 2, paragraph 7 of the charter. The most notable case in point was the General Assembly’s annual discussion of South Africa’s apartheid policy (before it was abolished) despite South Africa’s contention that the matter was within its domestic jurisdiction. (See section on “Apartheid in South Africa” in the chapter on Human Rights.) The second restriction is to be found in Article 12 of the Charter, which states that while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect to any international dispute or situation, “the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.” This stipulation, then, clearly establishes the absolute primacy of the Security Council over the General Assembly in times of crisis. Here, the main object of the founders of the UN was to ensure against the possibility of the smaller nations forming a majority bloc to interfere with any decisions that might be made by the Big Five acting in concert as permanent members of the Security Council, where each possesses the right of veto. (For a discussion of the veto right, see the chapter on the Security Council.) Extension of the Assembly’s Power to Discuss and Recommend through the Uniting for Peace Resolution Designed to secure maximum unity of action in moments of acute danger, Article 12, in fact, proved to be the chief obstacle to action of any kind during successive crises in the years just after World War II. The effectiveness of the entire system presupposed a spirit of unanimity among the great powers in their determination to end a particular dispute that appeared to threaten international peace and security. However, on each postwar occasion
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The General Assembly
when the great powers might have been expected to display unanimity, the USSR and the four other permanent members of the Security Council took opposite sides in the dispute. As a result, precisely because each of them possessed the veto, all council action was deadlocked. Meanwhile, the General Assembly, prevented from taking action of its own accord because of Article 12, was forced to stand by helplessly. It was the seriousness of the Korean crisis that finally impelled the General Assembly to take steps to break through its constitutional straitjacket. Following a deadlock in the council in 1950, when the USSR vetoed a United States-sponsored resolution in connection with the entry of the People’s Republic of China into the Korean conflict on the side of North Korea, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that enabled it to circumvent the restrictions imposed by Article 12. This act, which came to be known as the “Uniting for Peace Resolution,” provides that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity among its permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility in the maintenance of peace, in a case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to members for collective measures, including if necessary the use of armed force. Although the Uniting for Peace Resolution thus considerably extends the General Assembly’s powers with respect to maintenance of international peace and security, it in no way represents an attempt to usurp the Security Council’s prerogatives. Nor does it attempt to arrogate to the General Assembly the enforcement powers that the charter accorded to the Security Council alone. Even under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the General Assembly can only recommend that members undertake collective peacekeeping measures; it cannot oblige them to do so. Nor can it impose peacekeeping action against the will of the parties to a dispute. It must obtain their explicit consent to the presence of UN personnel—observer commissions, mediators, troops—in their territories. The Uniting for Peace Resolution has been invoked in several major crises: the Middle East (1958, 1967), Hungary (1956), Suez (1956), the Congo (1960), Afghanistan (1980), Palestine (1980, 1982), Namibia (1981), the occupied Arab territories (1982) and illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied Palestinian Territory (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). In all cases, the emergency special sessions addressed situations in which the Security Council found itself deadlocked. (See the discussion of peacekeeping operations in the chapter on International Peace and Security.)
O R G A N I Z AT I O N Sessions The General Assembly meets once a year in regular sessions that begin on the third Tuesday in September. Usually these sessions last about three months, ending before Christmas, but there is no fixed time limit, and many times the General Assembly has adjourned, continuing the session after the holidays. Special sessions on a particular topic may be held at the request of the Security Council, or of a majority of UN members, or of one member if the majority of members concur. An emergency special session may be called within 24 hours by the Security Council on the vote of any nine members, or by a majority of UN members, or by one member if the majority concur. Through 2001, the Assembly convened 27 special sessions on issues that demanded attention over the years, including problems of Palestine, UN finances, Namibia, disarmament, international economic cooperation, apartheid, drugs, the environment, population, children, the advancement of women, and sustainable development of small island developing states.
Sessional Committees Most of the substantive work during regular session is conducted through seven “Main Committees,” which are reconstituted at every session. Each is composed of representatives of all member nations. • The First Committee deals with disarmament and related international security matters. • The Second Committee deals with economic and financial matters. • The Third Committee is concerned with social, humanitarian, and cultural matters and human rights. • The Fourth Committee handles special political questions and questions concerning the granting of independence to colonial territories. • The Fifth Committee deals with the administrative and budgetary matters of the organization. • The Sixth Committee debates legal questions, including the general development and codification of international law. • The Special Political Committee, was created in 1948 as an ad hoc committee of the whole to discuss the Palestine question. It was subsequently absorbed by the Fourth Committee. The General Assembly maintains two other sessional committees, both of which deal with General Assembly procedure. However, neither is a committee of the whole. The 28-member General Committee, composed of the General Assembly president, the 21 vice presidents, and the chairmen of the six main committees (see Election of Officers, below), examines the provisional agenda of each session and makes recommendations on the inclusion or exclusion of items and on their assignment to the appropriate main committee. The Credentials Committee is a nine-member body appointed by the General Assembly at the beginning of the session to examine the credentials of representatives and to work out any problems that might arise in this connection. Plenary Meetings Since all the main committees are committees of the whole, the distinction between the General Assembly meeting in committee and meeting in plenum is largely one of protocol. Always conducted by the president or a vice president, plenary meetings are much more formal affairs. Normally, no one below the rank of head of delegation may actively participate in the proceedings, and no one is allowed to speak from his or her chair but must go to the speaker’s rostrum. (None of the conference rooms in which the committees meet is provided with a speaker’s rostrum.) The Assembly Hall itself is reserved for plenary meetings and is rarely used by the committees. It is in plenary meetings that all formal or ceremonial functions occur: opening and closing of the General Assembly session, election of officers and members of other organs, adoption of resolutions and decisions on all agenda items, and addresses by heads of state or government or by other high national officials who visit the UN while the General Assembly is in session. Plenary meetings also constitute the forum for the statements of general policy that the head of each member delegation is entitled to make as part of what is known as the “general debate,” which takes place during the first three weeks or so of the regular session. Because of the great number of questions which the General Assembly is called upon to consider (over 170 agenda items at the 2001–02 session) it allocates most questions to its six main committees. Voting Procedure Each member of the General Assembly and its committees has one vote. Article 18 of the charter decrees that decisions on “important” questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. Among the important questions
The General Assembly specified are recommendations with regard to maintenance of peace and security; election of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council and of the members of the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council; admission of new UN members, suspension of rights and privileges of membership, and expulsion of members; questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system; and budgetary questions. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of important questions requiring a two-thirds majority vote, are made by a simple majority of the members present and voting. The phrase “members present and voting” means members casting either affirmative or negative votes; members who abstain are considered as not voting. Thus, although the number of abstentions is usually listed for information purposes, it does not count in the final tally as to whether a resolution has received the requisite majority—provided that the rules of quorum have been observed. A quorum is constituted when a majority of the members are present; no decision may be taken without one. The president of the General Assembly, however, may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one-third of the members are present. The chairman of a main committee may open a meeting when one-quarter of the members are present. Voting may be by a show of hands, by roll call, or, in certain instances such as elections, by secret ballot. The normal method was intended to be by a show of hands, but any member can request a roll call. There has been an increasing tendency to do so, especially on the more contentious issues. Before a roll-call vote is taken, a lot is drawn to determine the country that is to vote first. Starting with that country, voting proceeds according to the alphabetical order of the official names of states in English. Mechanical voting equipment was installed in the Assembly Hall and first used at the 1965 session. Similar equipment is used in some conference rooms. Seating Arrangements The charter allows each member state a maximum of five representatives in the General Assembly. Most members, in addition to their five representatives, send five alternative representatives and a number of advisers to each session. Six seats are assigned to every delegation in the Assembly Hall. Both in the hall and in conference rooms, delegations are seated in alphabetical order according to the official names of the countries in English. The seating is rearranged before each session by drawing lots to select the country with which the alphabetical seating will start. Election of Officers At each regular session, the General Assembly constitutes itself anew. During the opening meetings, the main officers are elected, who serve until the end of the session. If a special or emergency session is called, it is normally presided over by officers elected in the previous September. The first officer to be elected is the president. Delegates vote by secret ballot, and a simple majority suffices. In choosing the president, regard has to be paid to the equitable geographical rotation of the office among the following groups of states: African, Asian, Eastern European, Latin American, and Western European and other states. By tacit agreement, no representative of a permanent member of the Security Council ever is elected president of the General Assembly or chairman of a committee. General Assembly Presidents
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Paul-Henri Spaak Oswaldo Aranha Herbert V. Evatt Carlos P. Romulo Nasrollah Entezam Luís Padilla Nervo Lester B. Pearson Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit
Belgium Brazil Australia Philippines Iran Mexico Canada India
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9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Eelco N. van Kleffens José Maza Prince Wan Waithayakon Sir Leslie Munro Charles Malik Víctor Andrés Belaúnde Frederick H. Boland Mongi Slim Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan Carlos Sosa Rodríguez Alex Quaison-Sackey Amintore Fanfani Abdul Rahman Pazhwak Corneliu Manescu Emilio Arenales Catalán Angie E. Brooks Edvard Hambro Adam Malik Stanislaw Trepczynski Leopoldo Benites Abdelaziz Bouteflika Gaston Thorn Hamilton S. Amerasinghe Lazar Mojsov Indalecio Liévano Salim A. Salim Rüdiger von Wechmar
36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Ismat T. Kittani Imre Hollai Jorge E. Illueca Paul J. F. Lusaka Jaime de Piniés Humayun Rasheed Choudhury Peter Florin
43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Dante M. Caputa Joseph Nanven Garba Guido de Marco Samir S. Shihabi Stoyan Ganev Samuel R. Insanally Amara Essy Diogo Freitas do Amaral Razali Ismail Hennadiy Udovenko Didier Opertti Theo-Ben Gurirab Harri Holkeri Han Seung-soo Jan Kavan
Netherlands Chile Thailand New Zealand Lebanon Peru Ireland Tunisia Pakistan Venezuela Ghana Italy Afghanistan Romania Guatemala Liberia Norway Indonesia Poland Ecuador Algeria Luxembourg Sri Lanka Yugoslavia Colombia Tanzania Federal Republic of Germany Iraq Hungary Panama Zambia Spain Bangladesh German Democratic Republic Argentina Nigeria Malta Saudi Arabia Bulgaria Guyana Côte d’Ivoire Portugal Malaysia Ukraine Uruguay Namibia Finland Republic of Korea Czech Republic
Note: General Assembly presidents normally preside over special and emergency special sessions of the world body during their tenure. The exceptions were: José Arce of Argentina, who presided over the second special session in 1948, and Rudecindo Ortega of Chile, who presided over the first and second emergency special sessions held in 1956. Following the election of the president, the main committees are officially constituted and retire to elect their own officers. Here again the matter of equitable geographical representation arises, and it is precisely regulated by a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1963. Of the six committee chairmen, one must be chosen from African, Asian, Eastern European, Latin American or Caribbean, and Western European or other states. The sixth chairmanship rotates over a period of twenty sessions between African, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean states. The final officers to be elected are the 21 vice presidents. Of these, 16 are elected in accordance with a geographical pattern: six from African states, four from Asian states, three from Latin American and Caribbean states, two from Western European and other states, and one from an Eastern European state. (The election of the president of the General Assembly has the effect, how-
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The General Assembly
ever, of reducing by one the number of vice presidencies allocated to the region from which the president is elected.) The remaining five vice presidents represent the permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
A GE N D A O F T H E A S S E M B LY Under the General Assembly’s rules of procedure, the provisional agenda for a regular session must be issued no later than 60 days before the opening. However, up to 30 days before the opening, the Secretary-General, any of the other principal organs of the UN, or any member of the UN may request the inclusion of supplementary items. Additional items may also be included at any time if a majority of the General Assembly agrees. Normally, the agenda includes well over 100 items. The great majority of substantive (that is to say, nonprocedural) items arise out of decisions made by previous sessions, and their inclusion in the agenda is automatic. Thus, the General Assembly frequently requests the Secretary-General, a special committee, or another UN organ to submit a special report on a given topic. The report, at the time that it is due, automatically becomes part of the agenda item on the topic. There also are several items that the General Assembly is obliged to consider at each session under the Charter—for example, the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the UN and the reports of the three councils. Adoption of the Agenda The adoption of the agenda is not a mere formality. The General Assembly has to approve the entire agenda and may amend or delete any item by majority vote. A decision to reject a particular member’s request to have an item placed on the agenda could have considerable political significance. It is the function of the General Committee (which could be described as the steering committee) to make recommendations to the General Assembly on the inclusion of requested items in the agenda. Most of the pros and cons of including a controversial item in the agenda are thrashed out in this committee rather than in plenary, and the committee’s proceedings sometimes afford a preview of the positions that countries will take on certain questions when they come up for substantive debate. Another important function of the General Committee is to recommend the assignment of agenda items to the various main committees for debate. It may also recommend that an important item be debated in plenary without being referred to a committee.
E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F T H E A S S E M B LY Depending on the nature of the question and on the views of the majority, General Assembly debates may lead to one or a combination of the following: recommendations, phrased in varying degrees of urgency, to individual countries or to all countries; initiation of studies and reports; creation of new UN organs, committees of inquiry, and permanent special bodies that are assigned specific tasks; and adoption of international covenants, treaties, and agreements. Significance of the Enlarged Membership and Changing Voting Patterns Since 1960, when the impact of the number of newly independent African and Asian nations first began to make itself felt in the UN, the General Assembly’s voting patterns have undergone a marked alteration. Until then, the majority of controversial resolutions had tended essentially to reflect a simple East-West division of opinion. In the resulting lineup of votes, the Western view, marshaled under the leadership of the United States, easily attained comfortable majorities on most issues, since it was supported not only by the countries of Western Europe but by the Latin American states as well. The formation of what has come to
be known as the “Afro-Asian group,” coupled with the general detente in East-West relations, introduced a new element into the voting equation. Interested in wielding influence within the world body and preoccupied with the problems of development and decolonization rather than with cold war issues as such, African and Asian countries sought to unite themselves into an independent or “nonaligned” voting bloc. On occasion, the unity of the group is split by divided interests. This division occurs most frequently in major political issues of special importance to the big powers, when some small countries may find it expedient to associate themselves with the big power on which they are dependent for financial aid. At other times, notably on items connected with economic development, African and Asian nations may join the developing countries of the Latin American group in order to create a formidable voting bloc that can force through requests to which the highly developed nations, from East and West alike, may be reluctant to accede. Then again, the emergence of what is in effect a floating third voting force in the General Assembly has resulted in the creation of special alliances as occasion demands. For example, the former Soviet bloc and the nonaligned groups often combined to defeat or harry the West on colonial issues. This development also opened up possibilities for striking voting bargains on individual draft resolutions. Accordingly, one group might support an initiative taken by a second group in exchange for the latter’s support on a different item. The indiscriminate wielding of voting strength by small nations is subject to the law of diminishing returns. Indeed, many small nations have shown indications of growing restraint, realizing that there is little point in pushing through resolutions requiring, for example, increased expenditure on economic development if the big powers, which make the largest financial contributions, are not prepared to implement them. Similarly, these nations have recognized that there is little to be gained from trying to compel the big powers to go beyond their own pace in agreeing upon measures for disarmament or for resolving their differences on peacekeeping issues. One important outcome of the growing recognition by the small nations of the practical limitations of their voting strength, coupled with the realization by the Western powers that they no longer can be certain of majority support, even on items of particular importance to them, has been a general recourse wherever possible to compromise resolutions that command unanimous or nearly unanimous support. However, notwithstanding this partial solution to the problems created by the emergence of a floating third voting force in the General Assembly, the big powers, especially those from the West, have become increasingly dissatisfied with this situation, and some of their leaders have come to question the principle of “one country, one vote.” While the decisions of the General Assembly have no legally binding force for governments, they carry the weight of world opinion on major international issues, as well as the moral authority of the world community. Even so, the fact that a resolution receives an overwhelming majority vote does not guarantee its effectiveness. Nor does the fact that a resolution was adopted by a slender margin necessarily mean that it will serve no purpose. In general, it may be said that a resolution will be effective insofar as its adoption is not regarded by any country as inimical to its national interests. The most effective resolutions, then, are those that concern matters on which all members are prepared to accept a degree of compromise (though this acceptance may not necessarily be reflected in the actual voting) and that establish goals all members are eager to achieve or to which they have no objection. Like the UN itself, resolutions can be only as effective as the membership wants them to be.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
are ineligible for immediate reelection upon retirement. In electing the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, the General Assembly is required to pay due regard to the past and potential contribution of nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as to equitable geographical distribution. In view of the power of the council, nations attach great importance to the choice of the nonpermanent members. The problem of ensuring equitable geographical distribution of members elected to the Security Council has not been easy to resolve. Prior to the council’s enlargement, there had been a longstanding difference of views on a “gentlemen’s agreement” reached in the early days of the UN that was intended to guarantee that the six nonpermanent seats would be so distributed that one of the seats would always be held by a Soviet bloc country. However, until 1960, only Poland and the Ukraine were elected, and each served for only one two-year term. In the 1959 election, Poland and Turkey competed for the nonpermanent council seat for the two-year term 1960–61. After 52 ballots, the General Assembly gave the seat to Poland on the basis of the following compromise: though elected for two years, Poland would resign its seat at the end of the first year and Turkey would be the sole candidate to fill the unexpired term. Under a similar arrangement, Romania held a seat for 1962, resigning it for 1963 to the Philippines. To avoid the recurrence of such situations after the enlargement of the council, the General Assembly established a fixed pattern for the geographical distribution of the 10 nonpermanent seats: five from African and Asian nations, one from East European nations, two from Latin American and Caribbean nations, and two from West European and other nations. The accession of the Russian Federation, a vastly less powerful state than the former USSR, to a permanent seat on the Security Council set off a discussion among the UN membership about the need to make changes to the structure of the Security Council to better reflect the radical changes in the world and the organization’s overall membership. The 48th General Assembly established an Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, which held its first meeting in New York on 19 January 1994. The Working Group submitted an informal report to the Secretary-General summarizing the results of its survey of the membership. It found that virtually all member states of the UN favored an increase in the membership of the Security Council. There was little unanimity, however, on the criteria for revising the council’s composition. Responses received by the Working Group proposed increasing membership by as few as four (to 19) or more than doubling its size (to 31). Some members suggested the number of permanent members be increased at least by one (to six), or perhaps as much as seven (to 12). Most states responding to the survey agreed that an increase in membership should not diminish the council’s efficiency. While most members favored continuing the categories of permanent and nonpermanent memberships, new categories were suggested: permanent seats without power of veto; rotating permanent seats, with or without power of veto; and semipermanent seats or extended membership. Some of the possible criteria put forward for new Security Council permanent membership included size of peacekeeping and financial contributions, the size of population and
Under the charter, the members of the UN vest in the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. To facilitate its work and to ensure quick and effective action when required, the council has certain powers and attributes not accorded the other organs of the UN. Thus, the council is empowered by the charter to enforce its decisions and prescribe them as a course of action legally binding upon all UN members. However, these prerogatives can be invoked only in times of gravest crisis and under explicit conditions laid down in the charter. Otherwise, the Security Council, like the General Assembly, can only recommend and advise. Another distinctive feature of the council is the membership and voting privileges accorded to the five countries that were chiefly responsible for the defeat of the Axis nations in World War II and, at the time of the San Francisco Conference, were regarded as militarily the most powerful countries in the world. By the terms of these privileges, China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States were each accorded permanent membership on the Security Council and the right to veto any substantive decision adopted by the majority of the other members. The underlying consideration here was the desire to preserve the unanimity of the Big Five—that is, to ensure that no peacekeeping action would be taken against the will of a country considered sufficiently powerful to oppose the council’s decision with military force and so open up the possibility of a third major international war. Since all five countries were actually specified by name in the relevant charter provisions, an amendment or revision of the charter would be required to name different nations as permanent Security Council members. In turn, a charter amendment requires ratification by all five permanent members of the Security Council before it can come into force. In 1971, a major change was brought about without altering the names of permanent members. The General Assembly voted that the right to represent China belonged to a delegation that the People’s Republic of China would name and expelled the delegation from the Republic of China (Taiwan). On 24 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, president of the new Russian Federation, sent a letter to the SecretaryGeneral informing him that the Russian Federation, as the “continuing state” of the former USSR, would occupy the seat of the former USSR on the Security Council. The letter stated that the Russian Federation had the support of the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, most of whom subsequently became members of the United Nations. The precedent for this switch was cited as the 1947 accession of the newly independent India to the UN membership held by the former British India.
MEM B ERS H IP To expedite decision and action, the membership of the Security Council was deliberately restricted to a small number. Originally an 11-member body, it was subsequently enlarged to 15 members by a charter amendment that came into effect on 31 August 1965. With five seats permanently assigned, the remaining 10 are filled by other UN members elected by secret ballot in the General Assembly for two-year terms. Five seats on the Security Council become vacant each year. Nonpermanent members of the council
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The Security Council
territory, economic potential, regional importance, geopolitical situation, and military capability. In 2002, the Security Council consisted of the five permanent members: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the 10 nonpermanent members, elected for a two-year period, were Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Guinea, Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, and the Syrian Arab Republic.
O R G A N I Z AT I O N O F T H E C O U N C I L The Security Council is organized to function continuously and to meet as often as necessary. Hence, a representative from each member state must always be available so that in an emergency the council can convene at once. Chairmanship rotates among the council’s member states according to their English alphabetical order, a new president (as the chairman is called) presiding every month. It is up to the president to decide whether to preside during the discussion of a question that directly concerns his own country. Council members normally are represented by the heads of their permanent missions to the UN, who have the rank of ambassador. Any state that is not currently a council member but is a party to a dispute under consideration by the council must be invited to send representatives to participate in the proceedings, though without the right to vote. (In these circumstances, the disputing states concerned usually send a high government official, very often the foreign minister.) When the council is discussing a matter other than an actual dispute, the decision to invite the participation of any UN member states whose interests are directly affected is left to its discretion. The council has usually acceded to requests for such invitations. It has also granted representatives of national liberation organizations the opportunity to speak at a number of meetings. The Security Council has held sessions away from its New York headquarters on two occasions, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, to consider questions relating to Africa, and in Panama City, Panama, in 1973, to consider questions relating to Latin America.
VOTING Each member of the Security Council has one vote. On questions of procedure, a motion is carried if it obtains an affirmative vote of any nine members. On substantive matters, a resolution requires the affirmative votes of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. However, any member, whether permanent or nonpermanent, must abstain from voting in any decision concerning the peaceful settlement of a dispute to which it is a party. The Veto The veto power and its exercise by permanent members remains a central characteristic of the mechanism of the Security Council, although, since the end of the cold war, a new climate of collegiality has made its use rare. Though the word “veto” does not occur in the charter, it is the common-usage term for the power of any of the five permanent members to defeat a resolution by voting “nay.” Negative votes cast in the council by its permanent members constitute an exercise of their veto power only on substantive questions, not on procedural matters. Moreover, by long-standing practice, the charter provision stipulating that all substantive resolutions must obtain the concurring votes of the permanent members has been interpreted to mean that, provided a permanent member does not actually vote “nay,” a resolution may still be carried. The veto power, then, is the constitutional instrument for giving expression to the requirement—discussed at the opening of
this chapter—that before the Security Council invokes its authority in peacekeeping action, the big powers should first resolve their differences on how a particular crisis should be handled. However, although the principle of ensuring unanimity among the big powers was the major consideration underlying the institution of the veto, it was not the only one. A complementary consideration was the need of the major powers to ensure that their decisions would not be overridden by a majority vote of the smaller nations. In effect, conferring the right of veto upon a few powerful countries was tacit acknowledgment of the natural conflict that exists between their interests and those of the less powerful nations. It was a recognition of the fact that, despite differing social systems and power rivalry, the large countries often share more interests with each other than they do with smaller nations having social systems and tenets similar to their own. And it was for exactly this reason that the smaller countries represented at the San Francisco Conference made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to prevent the institution of the veto power in the charter.
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS The functions and powers assigned to the Security Council under the charter are the following: • to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN; • to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to international friction and to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; • to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken; • to call on members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force in order to prevent or stop aggression; • to take military action against an aggressor; and • to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments. The Security council also is empowered to exercise the trusteeship functions of the UN in areas designated as “strategic” (only the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was so designated). Finally, the Council recommends to the General Assembly the admission of new members and the appointment of the SecretaryGeneral and, together with the General Assembly, elects the judges of the International Court of Justice.
M A I N TAI N I N G IN T E R N ATI O N A L P E A C E AND SECURITY By the very act of joining the UN, all members “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (italics added). They also consent “to accept and carry out” the decisions of the council on any peacekeeping action that may be required. Under Article 39 of the charter, the Security Council’s powers to take such enforceable decisions come into effect only when a definite “threat to the peace,” an actual “breach of the peace,” or a particular “act of aggression” has occurred. Only if the council decides that one of these circumstances prevails may it invoke its power to take a course of enforcement action that constitutes a legally binding commitment on all UN members. With regard to disputes between states that, in the opinion of the council, have not yet led to a definite threat to the peace or do not constitute an actual breach of the peace or an act of aggression, it may simply recommend measures for a peaceful settlement.
The Security Council The extreme caution with which the founders of the UN assigned governmental prerogatives to the Security Council is reflected in the fact that its peacekeeping powers are set out in two quite separate chapters of the charter. Chapter VI establishes the council’s advisory functions in assisting the peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter VII defines the kind of action that it may take in the event of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Under Chapter VI of the charter, the parties to any dispute “the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” are enjoined to seek a settlement of their own accord by peaceful means, including “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or resort to regional agencies or arrangements. . . .” When can the Security Council itself intervene? On this point, the charter is as unrestrictive as possible. By no means does every “situation” of conflicting interests lead to an actual dispute. Yet the council need not wait until a situation has given rise to friction before taking action. It may take the initiative of investigating any dispute, or any situation that might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, any nation, whether a member of the UN or not, has the right to bring any dispute or threatening situation before the Security Council (or before the General Assembly). Should the parties to a dispute fail to settle their differences by peaceful means of their own choice, they are bound under the terms of the charter to refer the problem to the council. Once the council has decided to intervene in a dispute, it can take several courses of action. It may recommend one of the methods of settlement listed in the charter; it may itself determine and recommend other “procedures or methods of adjustment” that it deems appropriate; or, if it considers that the continuance of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security, it can decide to recommend substantive terms of settlement. Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression If, in its opinion, there is a threat to the peace, the Security Council has the duty to maintain peace and security by preventing the outbreak of actual hostilities. If there has been a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, its duty is to restore international peace and security. The Security Council is empowered by the charter to call upon the parties to comply with any provisional measures that it deems necessary or desirable. Such immediate instructions to the quarreling states are intended, without prejudice to the rights of the parties, to prevent an aggravation of the conflict. For example, the council may demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the forces from the invaded territory. If either or both parties do not comply with these demands, the council “shall duly take account” of the failure to comply. In this event, the farthest-reaching prerogative of the Security Council can come into play—namely, its right to institute sanctions against the recalcitrant state or states. Here again, the discretion of the Security Council is very wide. When the council finds that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression exists, it is authorized, though not compelled, by the charter to invoke sanctions. Even if its first provisional demands are not heeded, it may continue to press for peaceful settlement or take various other actions, such as the dispatch of a commission of inquiry, short of sanctions. On the other hand, the Security Council is free to invoke whatever enforcement measures it may consider necessary under the circumstances. It need not begin with the mildest but may, as in the
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Korean conflict, immediately start with the severest type of sanction—namely, the use of military force—if it considers that less drastic measures would be inadequate. Types of Sanctions. The charter does not provide an exhaustive list of sanctions that the Security Council may invoke, but it mentions two types: sanctions not involving the use of armed forces, and military sanctions. Sanctions not involving the use of armed forces may be of two kinds. One is the severance of diplomatic relations with one or more of the belligerent states. The other is economic sanctions, including partial or complete interruption of economic relations and communications, such as rail, sea, and air traffic, postal and telegraphic services, and radio. The purpose is to isolate the country or countries against which they are directed, physically, economically, and morally. For example, a would-be aggressor that is denied certain strategic materials may be compelled to cease hostilities. If successful, such measures have great advantages over military sanctions. They impose fewer burdens on the participating countries and fewer hardships on the population of the areas of conflict. They also avoid the danger that once military action on behalf of the UN has been taken, war may spread. Military sanctions, the charter stipulates, may include demonstrations by air, sea, or land forces; blockade; or “other operations by air, sea, and land forces,” the latter including actual military action against the offending country or countries. Once the Security Council has decided on specific sanctions, all members of the UN are under legal obligation to carry them out. The council may, however, at its discretion, decide that only certain member states shall take an active part, or it may demand that even nonmember states participate in economic sanctions to make them effective. The charter also stipulates that before any member state not represented on the Security Council is called upon to provide armed forces, that country must, upon its request, be invited to participate in the council’s deliberations, with a right to vote on the employment of its own contingents. The Security Council has invoked its powers to impose sanctions judiciously. In December 1966, the council imposed mandatory economic sanctions against the illegal Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The council instituted a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa in 1963 on the grounds that arms supplied to that country were being used to enforce its policy of apartheid. In November 1977, it imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Although the General Assembly requested the Security Council to consider mandatory economic sanctions (in 1977) and a mandatory embargo on oil and oil products (in 1979), the council did not act. (The General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a mandatory oil embargo and economic sanctions against South Africa at its 44th session in 1989.) On 6 August 1990, in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council, in its Resolution 661, imposed tight sanctions: a full trade embargo barring all imports from and exports to Iraq, excepting only medical supplies and humanitarian food aid. The Security Council further indicated its resolve by passing Resolution 665 on 25 August 1990, authorizing member states to use force to block shipments of goods to Iraq. Finally, on 25 September, it passed Resolution 670 mandating a complete air transport blockade of Iraq. In 1991, at the request of the foreign minister of Yugoslavia, the Security Council imposed its first mandatory arms embargo in Europe in an effort to quell the rising tide of insurrection between ethnic groups in that country. By 30 May 1992, Yugoslavia had dissolved into four states: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). At that time, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were admitted to UN membership. The Security Council, in Resolution
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The Security Council
757, imposed mandatory trade sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, excepting only shipments of food and medicine for humanitarian purposes. On 31 March 1992, the Security Council adopted an arms and air traffic embargo on Libya (Resolution 748) in response to requests by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Those countries sought to force Libya to extradite two Libyan nationals indicted in those countries for the 21 December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which 270 persons died, and the bombing of UTA Flight 772 on 19 September 1989 in Niger, in which 171 persons died. On 11 November 1993, the Security Council voted to widen those sanctions (Resolution 883) to include freezing Libyan bank accounts, closing the offices of Libyan Arab Airlines, and prohibiting the supply of materials for construction and maintenance of airports. The sanctions also banned the supply of pumps, turbines, and motors used at export terminals and oil refineries. On 16 June 1993, the Security Council adopted wide-ranging economic and trade sanctions (Resolution 841) against the military regime in Haiti which had unseated Haitian president JeanBertrand Aristide in 1991. President Aristide had been elected to office in a UN-supervised election. The council acted in conjunction with similar sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States. In brief, the Security Council directed members not to sell oil, weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, military equipment, and spare parts to Haiti. In addition, it authorized members to blockade the country to prevent those items from being delivered to Haiti. It also authorized member countries to freeze Haitian funds. The sanctions were briefly lifted when negotiations produced the Governors Island agreement of 3 July 1993, in which the military regime agreed to restore President Aristide with the assistance of a UN peacekeeping mission (called the UN Mission in Haiti or UNMIH). On 11 October 1993 the first deployment of UNMIH was prevented from landing at Port au Prince and the sanctions were reinstated three days later. On 6 May 1994, the Security Council adopted an expansion of sanctions (Resolution 917) against Haiti. Multinational forces were peacefully deployed in Haiti on 19 September 1994, and President Aristide returned shortly thereafter. On 29 September 1994, the Security Council suspended the sanctions (Resolution 944). On 30 May 1993, in its Resolution 918, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. It imposed the embargo in an effort to protect its UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and other international humanitarian relief workers, as well as the civilian population, from the rampant lawlessness and violence that had broken out in connection with the resumption of that country’s civil war between ethnic Hutu and Tutsi factions. In May 1994, violence broke out between the factions, and killings were widespread. In July 1994, the Security Council established a commission of experts to investigate violations of international humanitarian law (Resolution 935), and an International Tribunal was established on 8 November 1994 (Resolution 955) to prosecute persons responsible for the genocide. On 8 October 1997, in its Resolution 1132, the Security Council imposed a petroleum and arms embargo on Sierra Leone. It did this following the military coup of 25 May 1997 led by the army in conjunction with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), to address the violence and loss of life that surrounded the coup, and to demand the military junta relinquish power, restore the democratically elected government, and return to constitutional order. In June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), after the democratically elected president, Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, was returned to power in March of that year. Fighting continued, however, and the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) on 22 October 1999, a new and larger mission with a maximum of 6000 mili-
tary personnel. In 2000 and 2001, the numbers of military personnel involved in the mission increased to 11,100 and 17,500 respectively. In order to stop the flow of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone other than those controlled by the government, the Security Council passed Resolution 1306 on 5 July 2000, extended by Resolution 1385 on 19 December 2001. This action was undertaken due to the link between the diamond trade and human rights abuses, in particular in the case of the RUF, which committed killings, amputations, abductions, and torture of civilians. On 31 March 1998, the Security Council placed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Resolution 1160), to resolve the crisis in Kosovo, between Serbian forces and ethnic Albanian Kosovars. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched air strikes against Serbian targets beginning on 24 March 1999, and lasting until 10 June of that year, to stop the practice of ethnic cleansing of the Albanian Kosovars by the Serbs. On 10 June, the Security Council established an international civil and security presence in Kosovo (Resolution 1244). In October 2000, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was voted out of office. On 10 September 2001, the Security Council terminated the prohibitions preventing the sale of arms and related material to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by adopting Resolution 1367. On 15 October 1999, the Security Council imposed a limited air embargo and funds and financial assets embargo on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Resolution 1267). With Resolution 1333 passed on 19 December 2000, it placed an air and arms embargo on the country, placed restricted travel sanctions on it, and froze funds of Osama bin Laden and his associates in Afghanistan. Following the defeat of the Taliban by the US-led coaltion in November 2001, the Security Council lifted restrictions imposed upon Ariana Afghan Airlines (Resolution 1388) on 15 January 2002. And on 16 January (Resolution 1390), the Security Council modified its sanctions on the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden, holding that all states should freeze the economic resources of these this individual, organization, and former regime, prevent their entry into or transit throught their territories, and prevent the supply, sale, and transfer of arms and related material to them. In response to the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea that began in 1998 as a border dispute in the region around Badme claimed by both countries, the Security Council on 17 May 2000 placed an arms embargo on the two countries, and established a sanctions committee to address the situation (Resolution 1298). Once there was a cessation of hostilities in June 2000, the Security Council established the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), sending 4,200 military personnel to monitor the ceasefire and assist in ensuring observance of security commitments. With Resolution 1343, the Security Council on 7 March 2001 applied an arms embargo on Liberia, blocked Liberian diamond sales, and restricted international travel by top Liberian officials, in response to fighting between the Liberian government and armed insurgents, which began in the remote northern Lofa County in 1998 and intensified during 2000. The sanctions were applied due to international condemnation of Liberian President Charles Taylor’s trafficking in illicit diamonds from mines in Sierra Leone, for destabilizing neighboring countries, and for widespread human rights abuses against local populations. With Resolution 1408 on 6 May 2002, the Security Council extended the sanctions on Liberia for another 12 months and established a panel of experts to address the situation. The Security Council’s previous reluctance to invoke its ultimate prerogatives is attributable to two main factors. There is a very strong argument that in most cases punitive measures are ineffective and may even harm chances for a peaceful settlement.
The Security Council The provisions on the UN security system make it clear that peace is to be preserved whenever possible without recourse to force. The second major factor is that, before the end of the cold war, one or two of the permanent members would take different positions from the other three or four, so that in most cases the council’s sympathies were divided between the opposing parties. Not only did division between the permanent members preclude punitive measures against one side, but it also seriously inhibited definitive action of any kind. For example, the initial action of sending a UN command into Korea was made possible only by the absence of the USSR from the council at the time (in protest against the council’s decision on Chinese representation). Had the Soviet Union been there, it would presumably have vetoed the necessary resolutions. An example of the reverse situation is the issue of South Africa’s apartheid policies. Beginning in 1960, the African nations appealed regularly to the Security Council to institute mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa in the hope of forcing it to terminate the apartheid system. The former USSR frequently expressed itself in favor of such a move, but the Western permanent members—in particular, South Africa’s major trading partners, the United Kingdom and the United States—were reluctant to impose economic sanctions. In the post-cold war era of collegiality in the Security Council, the Russian Federation and the United States rarely found themselves on opposite poles of an argument, and imposing sanctions as a method to force other member states to comply with Security Council directives was much easier to accomplish. Armed Forces for the UN Although the charter contains provisions to equip the Security Council with armed forces in case of need (the Covenant of the League of Nations contained no such provisions), these requirements have not been implemented. Under the charter, all UN members “undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” These agreements were to determine the number and types of military forces to be provided by the nations, their degree of readiness, their location, and so on, and they were to come into effect only after ratification by the countries concerned according to their respective constitutional requirements. (With this provision in mind, the United States Congress in December 1945 passed the “UN Participation Act,” authorizing the president of the United States to negotiate a special agreement with the Security Council on the detailed provision of United States forces; the agreement would then require approval by legislative enactment or joint resolution of the United States Congress.) The troops and weapons would remain part of each country’s national military establishment. They would not become international forces, but they would be pledged to the UN and, at the request of the Security Council, would be placed at its disposal. However, the plan to place armed forces at the disposition of the Security Council required wide international agreement on a number of steps before it could be put into operation. The charter provides for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee composed of the chiefs of staff (or their representatives) of the five permanent members to advise and assist the council on all questions relating to its military requirements. The first task that the council assigned the Military Staff Committee was to recommend the military arrangements to be negotiated with member states. The committee was never able to reach agreed positions that could serve as the basis for negotiation and at an early date took on the characteristics of a vestigial organ.
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Peacekeeping Peacekeeping operations are not mentioned in the charter, yet they, as opposed to enforcement measures, are the means that the Security Council has most frequently used to maintain the peace. It has dispatched observer missions and troops in several crises. (The council’s major peacekeeping operations and those undertaken by the General Assembly are described in the chapter on International Peace and Security.) Although the arrangements for the provision of armed forces foreseen in the charter have not been realized, the UN has nevertheless been able to establish peacekeeping forces on the basis of voluntary contributions of troops by member states. Until the end of the cold war, the formula had always been that the disputants themselves must expressly invite the council to take peacekeeping measures (the special situation of Korea being the only exception—see the chapter on International Peace and Security.) With the eruption of ethnic and nationalistic conflicts in Eastern Europe and Africa after the end of the cold war, the Security Council recognized that the increasing number and complexity of peacekeeping operations warranted review. In May 1993, it requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing specific new proposals to improve the capacity of the UN in peacekeeping. The Secretary-General submitted his report on “Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peacekeeping” in March 1994. In response to this analysis, on 3 May 1994, the Security Council issued a statement setting forth factors to be considered in establishing UN peacekeeping operations. The factors to be considered in the establishment of new peacekeeping operations included: • whether a situation exists that presents a threat to international peace and security; • whether regional or subregional organizations already exist and can assist in resolving the situation; • whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement; • whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate; • whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated; and • whether the safety and security of UN personnel can be reasonably insured; in particular, whether the parties to a dispute offer reasonable guarantees of safety to UN personnel. The council also required an estimate of projected costs for the initial 90 days of a new peacekeeping operation, and for its first six months, and an estimate of the total annual cost, before authorizing any new missions. In the case of mission extensions, it also required estimates of the financial implications. In both “An Agenda for Peace” (1992) and his March 1994 report, the Secretary-General proposed that a new mechanism had to be developed to enable a quick response to international crises. Under normal circumstances, the process of designing a mission, obtaining commitments for troops and equipment, establishing a budget, and obtaining approval for new peacekeeping missions could take as long as three months. The Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s proposal to devise stand-by arrangements under which member states would maintain an agreed number of troops and equipment ready for quick deployment. A Stand-by Arrangements Management Unit was established to keep track of units and resources available for this purpose.
S U B S I D I A RY O R G A N S Besides supervising peacekeeping operations (listed in the chapter on International Peace and Security), the Security Council also has established various standing committees and ad hoc bodies.
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The Security Council
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) After the UN-sanctioned multinational force repulsed Iraq from Kuwait in April 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 687 setting forth the terms for an official cease-fire. This resolution led the UN into previously uncharted waters. It required Iraq to “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of . . . all chemical and biological weapons and stocks of agents and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers....” Iraq also was forced to agree to place all its nuclear weapons materials under the custody of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The resolution gave Iraq 15 days to submit a complete inventory of all its weapons of mass destruction. To verify and implement this condition, the Security Council created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Its mandate is to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq’s biological, chemical, and missile capabilities; to take possession for destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all materials for research, development, support, and manufacture of such weapons; to supervise the destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, including major parts, repair, and production facilities; and to monitor and verify Iraq’s compliance with its undertaking not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items specified above. UNSCOM also works with inspectors of the IAEA, who are charged with similar tasks in the area of nuclear armaments. In October 1991, UNSCOM reported to the Security Council that Iraq at first adopted an attitude of noncooperation, concealment, and outright falsification. The Security Council responded with Resolution 707 (1991) condemning Iraq’s violation of Resolution 687 and making nine specific demands. In March 1992, Iraq declared that it was no longer in possession of any of the weapons described in Resolution 687, but the Security Council did not accept this. In June 1992, Iraq again supplied what it said were “full, final and complete reports,” on the weapons programs covered by Resolution 687. These reports also were considered to be suspect. Using aggressive surprise inspection techniques, UNSCOM and IAEA were able to compile significant information on Iraq’s weapons capabilities. UNSCOM’s investigations revealed that Iraq had acquired a massive stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The international community was horrified to learn that Iraq had established a military research program to develop biological weapons that had long been banned by international disarmament agreements (to which Iraq was ostensibly a party). UNSCOM discovered that the microorganisms involved in this research program included anthrax, botulin toxin, and gas gangrene. Although no facilities for the production of these biological weapons were found, UNSCOM did discover huge stockpiles of deadly chemical weapons, including warheads, aerial bombs, and artillery shells meant to deliver a variety of nerve gas agents, tear gas, and mustard gas. IAEA/UNSCOM inspections also revealed three clandestine uranium enrichment programs and found conclusive evidence of a nuclear weapons development program aimed at an implosiontype weapon. The secret development of these materials, bypassing regular inspections by the IAEA, put Iraq in violation of its undertakings as a member of IAEA. The IAEA also found that Iraq had violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. By mid-1992 the IAEA had removed and destroyed most of the materials and facilities and forced Iraq to destroy its nuclear complex at al-Athir, where most of the nuclear weapons research had taken place. The IAEA transported Iraq’s nuclear fuel to Russia, where it was diluted from weapons grade to civilian reactor quality. In 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. No monitoring, inspection, or verification of weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missiles took place as of December of 1998. In December 1999, the phase-out of UNSCOM was announced: The Security Council adopted Resolution 1284, establishing the new United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to assume the responsibilities of monitoring the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. UNMOVIC took over UNSCOM’s assets, liabilities, and archives and was mandated to “establish and operate a reinforced, ongoing monitoring and verification system, address unresolved disarmament issues, and identify additional sites to be covered by the new monitoring system.” On 8 November 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, deploring the absence of weapons inspectors since 1998 in Iraq and its refusal to cooperate with the IAEA and UNMOVIC, decided that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations under previous relevant Security Council resolutions. The Security Council accorded Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations, and set up an enhanced inspections regime to operate in the country. Iraq was given 30 days to submit a detailed report of all of its programs of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and ballistic missile and other delivery system development, reports of weapons and agents stocks, and locations and work of research, development, and production facilities. Any false statements or omissions from this report would constitute a further material breach of its obligations. Iraq was to allow unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to UNMOVIC and the IAEA of its weapons facilities. Any interference by Iraq to comply with the weapons inspections, or false reports of its stockpiles and programs that it might make, would cause the Security Council to convene immediately to “consider” the situation and the need for full compliance with the previous resolutions, “in order to secure international peace and security.” War Crimes International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law in the bloody conflict among the states of the former Yugoslavia led the Security Council to establish a Commission of Experts in October 1992. The commission was established to investigate the reports and submit its findings to the Security Council. In January 1993 the commission sent a first report describing the discovery of a mass grave in Croatia, and thousands of allegations of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. In February 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 808, establishing an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for the crimes discovered by the Commission, the first such tribunal since the war crimes trials conducted after World War II. By May 1993, the Secretary-General had submitted a detailed report to the Security Council setting forth the tribunal’s legal basis, method of proceeding, and its statute. It was established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the charter. Its headquarters would be at The Hague, Netherlands. On 25 May 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 827, approving the report and establishing the tribunal “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for the serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon restoration of peace....” The General Assembly elected 11 judges to the tribunal in September 1993. However, it was not until 7 July 1994 that South African judge Richard Goldstone was chosen to lead the prosecution team and he served until 30 September 1996, after which Louise Arbour of Canada became chief prosecutor. As of November 2002, the ICTY president was Claude Jorda (France) and the vice-president was Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana);
The Security Council presiding judges were Richard George May (United Kingdom), Wolfgang Schomburg (Germany), and Liu Daqun (China); and judges were Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba (Zambia), David Anthony Hunt (Australia), Patrick Lipton Robinson (Jamaica), Mehmet Güney (Turkey), Asoka de Zoysa Gunawardana (Sri Lanka), Fausto Pocar (Italy), Theodor Meron (United States of America), Amin El Mahdi (Egypt), Carmel A. Agius (Malta), Alphonsus Martinus Maria Orie (Netherlands), and Ogon Kwon (Korea). As of October 2002, 44 of the accused were in custody; 11 were released; state arrest warrents had been issued against all accused and were outstanding on 24 people; 2 of the accused had been acquitted; 3 found not guilty; 7 of the accused were transferred to serve sentence; 4 sentences had been served; 20 indictments had been withdrawn; and 10 of the accused had died, including 3 after the commencement of proceedings. Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was standing trial for violating the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and 2 counts of genocide and complicity in genocide, for acts committed in BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. Prison terms for those found guilty ranged from several years to 46 years. The heaviest sentence to date had been handed on 2 August 2001 to Radislav Krstic, who was found guilty “by virtue of his individual criminal responsibility” on one count of genocide, one count of crimes against humanity, and one count of violations of the laws or customs of war. Updates on the proceedings were being posted regularly on the UN’s web site at http://www.un.org/icty/index.html. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). On 1 July 1994, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General establish a three-member Commission of Experts to investigate allegations of mass killings of civilians and genocide in Rwanda, during the re-eruption of civil war in that country in April 1994. It had been reported that as many as 250,000 civilians may have died in ethnic violence. On 8 August 1994, the new government of Rwanda, led by members of the Tutsi ethnic group, notified the Secretary-General that it would cooperate with an international war crimes tribunal. The new government hoped that the promise of an international tribunal under the auspices of the UN would allay the fears of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hutu citizens who were refusing to return to Rwanda from refugee camps in neighboring countries due to fear of reprisals and prosecution by the new government. On 8 November 1994 the Security Council passed Resolution 955, establishing the tribunal and empowering it to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in neighboring states during 1994. Following the election of the first judges, the tribunal began its work in November 1995. Progress was initially slow and the tribunal was criticized for incompetence. In 1998 Judge Lennart Aspegren (of Sweden) announced his resignation, protesting bad management and inadequate working conditions. Meanwhile, Rwanda had begun to hold trials of its own. In a press conference held 5 March 1999, Louise Arbour, then chief prosecutor of the UN tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, told
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correspondents that the contrast was becoming increasingly dramatic between the remarkable willingness to endorse and support the work of the tribunals on the African continent and the tolerated non-compliance in the case of the states of the former Yugoslavia: Of the more than 70 suspects who were indicted by the Rwanda Tribunal, more than 60 were arrested and transferred to a detention unit at Arusha, Tanzania. This was in dramatic contrast to the lack of cooperation that the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was experiencing, in which numerous arrest warrants remained outstanding. As the Rwandan death toll mounted (approaching one million dead), the tribunal pressed on with its work. In 1999 the Security Council appointed Carla Del Ponte (Switzerland) as the tribunal’s chief prosecutor; she began work 11 August of that year. In the late fall of 2002, the judges were Navanethem Pillay (Republic of South Africa; president of the ICTR), Erik Møse (Norway; vicepresident of the ICTR), Andrésia Vaz (Senegal), William Hussein Sekule (United Republic of Tanzania), Winston C. M. Maqutu (Lesotho), Arlette Ramaroson (Madagascar), Lloyd G. Williams (St. Kitts and Nevis), Yakov Arkadievich Ostrovsky (Russian Federation), Pavel Dolenc (Slovenia), Claude Jorda (France), Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana), David Hunt (Australia), Mehmet Güney (Turkey), Asoka de Zoysa Gunawardana (SriLanka), Fausto Pocar (Italy), and Theodor Meron (United States of America). As of November 2002, a total of 61 individuals were detained under the authority of the tribunal. The tribunal had handed down several judgements, including that of Jean Kambanda, the former prime minister of Rwanda, who pleaded guilty to and was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes of genocide, and Jean Paul Akayesu, Georges Anderson Ndrubumwe Rutaganda, Clement Kayishema, and Alfred Musema, who were sentenced to life imprisonment. The Akayesu judgement and the Kambanda sentencing were the first ever by an international court for the crime of genocide. Tribunal updates were being posted on the ICTR’s web site at http://www.ictr.org/. Terrorism Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the Security Council established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) pursuant to its Resolution 1373 adopted 28 September 2001 concerning counter-terrorism. Resolution 1373 called upon states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; to refrain from providing any support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts; to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts; to bring those individuals or entities to justice; and to exchange information on the actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist networks. The CTC is composed of all 15 members of the Security Council. Subsequent Security Council resolutions were adopted regarding threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including Resolution 1377 adopted 12 November 2001, Resolution 1438 adopted 14 October 2002, and Resolution 1440 adopted 24 October 2002. Press releases and updates on the work of the CTC were posted at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/.
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL niques, since efficient statistics are essential to economic and social development. Work in this field includes techniques to improve world statistics in specific economic branches, such as industry and finance; standards of national statistical services; and methods of comparing statistics from different countries. Problems Dealt with by the UN Related Agencies. The specialized agencies, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) undertake a wide range of activities in the economic and social fields. It is a function of the council to coordinate these activities. Accounts of each of the related agencies are given in the separate chapters devoted to them.
Many of the most outstanding accomplishments of the UN to date are in the economic and social fields. Under Article 55 of the charter, the organization is committed to promote the following goals: “(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; “(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and “(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS Under the charter, the council is authorized to make or initiate studies, reports, and recommendations on economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters; to make recommendations to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights; to prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly on matters within its competence; to call international conferences on matters within its competence and in accordance with rules prescribed by the UN; to enter into agreements, subject to the approval of the General Assembly, with specialized agencies; to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies and obtain regular reports from them; to perform, with the approval of the General Assembly, services at the request of member nations or the specialized agencies; to consult with nongovernmental agencies whose work is related to matters dealt with by the council; to set up subsidiary organs to assist its work; and to perform any other functions that may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.
The responsibility for UN activities aimed at the achievement of these goals is vested in the General Assembly and, under its authority, the Economic and Social Council.
FIELDS OF ACTIVITY The activities of the Economic and Social Council, carried out through its subsidiary bodies in cooperation with the specialized agencies, have touched on all aspects of human well-being and affected the lives of people everywhere. A list of the major spheres of activity supervised by the council is given below; the chapters on Economic and Social Development, Technical Cooperation Programs, Social and Humanitarian Assistance, and Human Rights contain further information on matters directly under its purview. Economic Development. Although this field encompasses both developed and developing nations, emphasis is on the problems of the latter group. The activities of the council include evaluating long-term projections for the world economy; fostering international trade, particularly in commodities, between industrialized and nonindustrialized countries; improving the international flow of private and public capital; promoting industrialization and the development of natural resources; resolving related political and legal issues, such as permanent sovereignty over natural resources and land reform; developing programs of technical cooperation for developing nations; and applying the latest innovations of science and technology to improve the industrialization of developing countries. Social Progress. Among the social problems handled under the aegis of the council are housing, population, international traffic in narcotic drugs, the welfare of children in the developing countries, and the status of the world’s refugees, the aging, and the disabled. Particular attention is paid to the role of women in development. Human Rights. The council and its subsidiary organs have elaborated a series of important principles for the promotion of fundamental freedoms. Measures include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a number of declarations and recommendations on specific rights—for example, the rights of women, freedom of information and the press, and racial equality. The most recent declaration was adopted in Vienna in June 1993, namely, the “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.” Related Special Problems. An example of a special problem of interest to the council is the improvement of statistical tech-
C O M PO S I T I O N Originally, the Economic and Social Council consisted of 18 members, but the amendments to the charter that came into force on 31 August 1965 raised the number to 27. Another amendment that came into force on 24 September 1973 increased the membership to 54. When the council was constituted in January 1946, the General Assembly elected the council’s first 18 members for staggered terms: 6 members each for one, two, and three years, respectively. Subsequently, all terms were changed to three years, so that each year one-third of the membership is elected by the General Assembly. The General Assembly resolutions adopting the amendments to the charter that increased the membership of the council also laid down an equitable pattern for the geographical distribution of the additional seats. The 54 members are elected with respect to geographic representation (i.e., to include members from African states, Asian states, Latin American states, Middle Eastern States, and European and other states). Elections are by a two-thirds majority vote on a secret ballot in the General Assembly, and immediate reelection of members is permissible. Although the permanent members of the Security Council have no privileged position on the Economic and Social Council and the charter does not guarantee them membership in the council, it has been the custom to reelect them continuously. In general,
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the General Assembly has less difficulty in agreeing on its Economic and Social Council selections than in filling Security Council vacancies. Moreover, if, in the opinion of the council, a matter on its agenda is of particular concern to a UN member not represented on the council, it may invite that state to participate in its discussions but without a vote. In 2002, ECOSOC had the following members: Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe.
PROCEDURE In 1993, the Economic and Social Council undertook a major restructuring. Whereas it used to hold two sessions each year, one at UN headquarters in the spring and one in Geneva in the summer, it now holds only one substantive (4-week long) meeting per year in summer, rotating each year between Geneva and New York. A president and four vice-presidents are elected by the council for each year. The council also holds an organizational session in January to plan its program of work for the year. Each of the 54 members of the council has one vote. The big powers possess no veto or other special voting privilege. A proposal or motion before the council may be adopted without a vote unless a member requests one. When a vote is taken, decisions are carried by a simple majority of the members present.
S U B S I D I A RY O R G A N S The council accomplishes its substantive work through numerous subsidiary organs in the form of commissions, committees, and ad hoc and special bodies. In Article 68, the charter specifically states that the council “shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights. . . .” Several types of commissions and other organs have been set up within this provision, including the regional commissions, to deal with economic and social problems in the different geographical areas of the world, and the functional commissions, to handle social, human rights, and environmental questions. Regional Commissions There are five regional commissions: the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE); the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). Each has its own staff members, who are considered part of the regular staff of the UN. Regional commission expenditures come out of the regular UN budget. The regional commissions are discussed in the chapter on Economic and Social Development. Functional Commissions Since 1946, the council established functional commissions and subcommissions to advise and assist it in its work. The Statistical Commission, with 24 members, assists in developing international statistical services, promoting the development of national statistics and improving their comparability, coordinating the statistical work of the specialized agencies and the central statistical services of the UN Secretariat, and advising the UN organs on general questions relating to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of statistical information. The Commission on Population and Development, with 47
members, studies population changes, including migration, and their effect on economic and social conditions and advises on policies to influence the size and structure of populations and on any other demographic questions on which the UN or its specialized agencies may seek advice. The Commission for Social Development, with 46 members, advises the council on social policies in general and on all matters in the social field not covered by the specialized agencies; it gives priority to the establishment of objectives and programs and to social research in areas affecting social and economic development. The Commission on Human Rights, with 53 members, makes recommendations and prepares reports to the council on human rights questions, including the status of women, the protection of minorities, the prevention of all forms of discrimination, and the implementation of international conventions on human rights. Its various working groups are composed of experts nominated by members to explore problems such as arbitrary detention, involuntary disappearances, and the rights of indigenous peoples. The Commission on Human Rights has also established working groups on specific human rights questions, including slavery, indigenous populations, minorities, enforced or involuntary disappearances, and mental health detainees. It also encompasses a Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Commission on the Status of Women, with 45 members, prepares reports on matters concerning the promotion of women’s rights in the political, economic, social, and educational fields and makes recommendations to the council on matters requiring immediate attention in the field of women’s rights. The commission has established a working group on communications concerning the status of women. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, with 53 members, advises the council and prepares draft international agreements on all matters relating to the control of narcotic drugs. Over the years, the commission has established five subsidiary bodies. The Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East and the Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA), Asia and the Pacific, were the first subsidiary bodies to be established; both were convened for the first time in 1974. The need for similar coordination in other regions of the world led to a global network of HONLEA meetings: the Meeting of HONLEA, Africa, was established in 1985; the Meeting of HONLEA, Latin America and the Caribbean, in 1987; and the Meeting of HONLEA, Europe, in 1990. The Commission on Science and Technology for Development. The United Nations has been concerned with the effects of advances in science and technology to world peace and social development since its inception in 1945 at the dawn of the nuclear era. In 1963 the first United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Countries met in Geneva and began to form an agenda for international action. This was followed in 1979 by the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, held in Vienna, which produced the Vienna Programme of Action. In affirmation of the conference’s program, the General Assembly established an Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development, open to all states, to draw up policy guidelines, monitor activities within the United Nations system, promote implementation of the Vienna Programme, identify priorities, and mobilize resources. In 1989, on the tenth anniversary of the 1979 Conference, the General Assembly expressed its disappointment with the implementation of the Vienna Programme of Action and eventually decided to transform the Intergovernmental Committee and its subsidiary body, the Advisory Committee on Science and Tech-
Economic and Social Council nology for Development, into a functional commission of ECOSOC (General Assembly Resolution 46/235). The Commission on Science and Technology for Development met for the first time in May 1993. It has 33 members elected by ECOSOC for a term of four years on the principle of equitable geographic distribution. At its first session, the commission recommended to ECOSOC that it be charged with the following tasks: (a) assisting the council in providing science and technology policy guidelines and recommendations to member states, in particular developing countries; (b) providing innovative approaches to improving the quality of coordination and cooperation in the area of science and technology within the United Nations system, with a view to ensuring optimum mobilization of resources; (c) providing expert advice to other parts of the United Nations systems. The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice was established in December 1991 by General Assembly Resolution 46/152. An existing ECOSOC Committee on Crime Prevention and Control was dissolved, and its funds were made available to the new commission, which met for the first time in April 1992. The new commission is charged with developing, managing, monitoring, and reviewing implementation of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme created at a Ministerial Meeting held in Versailles, France, in 1991. In addition, it will consult member states on the drafting of a convention on crime prevention and criminal justice. Priority areas of the commission include: national and transnational crime; organized crime; economic crime, including money laundering; the role of criminal law in the protection of the environment; crime prevention in urban areas; and juvenile and violent criminality. The main difference between the former committee and the new commission is that the decisions of the commission will be decisions of the governments, rather than of independent experts. Decisions at this level were considered essential to tackle the problems of drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, terrorism, dumping of industrial waste, and criminal negligence resulting in environmental degradation, corruption, and financial offences. The commission has 40 members. The Commission on Sustainable Development. As a result of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the council established a new functional commission in February 1993: the Commission on Sustainable Development. The new, 53-member commission began its work of monitoring the implementation of UNCED’s Agenda 21 action plan with its first session in New York in June 1993. The commission’s mandate includes: monitoring progress towards the UN target of providing 0.7 percent of gross national product of industrialized countries for official development assistance; considering information on the implementation of environmental conventions; and recommending action to the General Assembly. The commission will interact with other UN intergovernmental bodies, regional commissions, and development and financial institutions. A high-level Advisory Board, consisting of eminent persons from all regions of the world, will provide input to the commission and the council through the Secretary-General. Other Subsidiary Organs Article 68 of the charter provides that, in addition to the commissions specifically mentioned in the charter, the council should establish “such other commissions as may be required for its functions.” With three exceptions, however, the other subsidiary organs created have not been given the name
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“commission.” Instead, they are called “standing committees” or “expert bodies.” In 2002, ECOSOC had the following standing committees and expert bodies: Committee for Programme and Coordination, Commission on Human Settlements, Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, Committee on Negotiations with Intergovernmental Agencies, Ad hoc Open-ended Working Group on Informatics, Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals, United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names, Committee for Development Policy, Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance, Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources for Development, and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Semiautonomous bodies, which generally report both to the council and to the General Assembly, include the following: Committee for Programme and Coordination, High-level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Development Fund for Women, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the World Food Programme (WFP).
RE L AT IO N S W IT H N O N GO V ER N M E N TA L O R G A N I Z AT I O N S The charter empowers ECOSOC to make arrangements to consult with international organizations of private citizens, known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and distinguished from intergovernmental organizations. Consultations with NGOs bring informed opinion other than that of governments and their officials before the council and provide it with a source of special experience and technical knowledge. NGOs granted consultative status are divided into two categories. Those in Category I are organizations with a general interest in the work of the council, and their activities are particularly germane to it and to the UN as a whole. Those in Category II are organizations with an interest in some particular aspect of the work of the council. In May 1987, 35 NGOs were listed in Category I and 299 in Category II. Another 490 were listed on the NGO roster for consultation as the occasion arises. By the late 1990s, more than 100 NGOs were listed in Category I, more than 600 in Category II, and more than 800 were listed on the roster for occasional consultation, for a total of more than 1,500 NGOs in consultative status. In 2002 there were 2,143 NGOs in consultative status with the ECOSOC. All such officially recognized organizations may send observers to the public meetings of the council and its commissions and may submit memoranda for circulation. Representatives of Category I organizations are entitled to participate in council debates and propose items for the agenda. Representatives of Category II organizations may, with the permission of the chair, make oral statements at council meetings. Consultative status in Category II has been granted to nearly all important international business associations, cooperative societies, farmers’ organizations, trade unions, and veterans’ organizations; to leading professional groups, such as associations of architects, engineers, lawyers, newspaper publishers and editors, social welfare workers, tax experts, and many others; and to various women’s and youth associations. Many associations formed along denominational lines—Greek Orthodox, Jewish,
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Muslim, Protestant, and Roman Catholic—also have consultative status. Most organizations that enjoy such official UN standing are international, in that they have members in more than one country. An organization whose membership is restricted to one particular country may obtain consultative status in the council only with the consent of the country’s government. The participation of NGOs in the work of the council took a historic turn during preparations for the Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. More than 1,400 NGOs participated in UNCED, and their contributions to the historic conference were acknowledged to be invaluable. In view of this remarkable participation, the Secretary-General recommended that relevant and competent NGOs be accorded unusual participation in and access to ECOSOC’s new functional commission, the Commission on Sustainable Development, which will monitor the progress of implementation of UNCED’s Agenda 21 action plan. Since many delegations expressed the need to transform the United Nations into a forum that was more accessible to NGOs, ECOSOC established a Working Group on the Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations in 1993. The Working Group held its first session in June 1994 with a mandate to review the arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations, arrangements which had not been revised since they were first adopted by the council in 1968. In his 1994 Agenda for Development Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali noted that NGOs undertake development projects valued at more than us$7 billion annually. He stated: “The time has arrived to bring NGO and United Nations activities into an increasingly productive relationship of consultation and cooperation.” In 1996 ECOSOC adopted a resolution regarding consultation with NGOs that recognized the growth of national and regional NGOs, the broadening role of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, and the adoption of standard rules for the participation of NGOs in UN international conferences. ECOSOC recommended that the General Assembly examine the question of participation of NGOs in all areas of work in the UN.
O R G A N I Z AT I O N O F I N T E R N AT I O N AL CONFERENCES In accordance with a charter provision, the council from time to time calls for international conferences on special world problems falling within its sphere of competence. Thus, in the 1990s, the UN held conferences on such subjects as the environment, population, food, housing, and the status of women. In 2001 and 2002, the UN held conferences against racism, xenophobia, and related forms of intolerance, on the problem of HIV/AIDS, and a world summit on sustainable development. These conferences led to the establishment of the UN Environment Program, the World Food Council, the Center for Human Settlements (Habitat), and other programs and to the adoption of world plans of action for the environment, clean water, population, the aging, the disabled, and other subjects of international concern.
P R O P O S E D R E S T R U C TU R I N G In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a wide-ranging strategy for the future of the United Nations system, including proposals for changes in ECOSOC. It was suggested that those would reflect changes in the very definition of economic and social progress that had naturally resulted from the dissolution of the former USSR. In addition, a wealth of information now existed on successful and unsuccessful efforts at development, information that in itself called for a fundamental change in the structure of the United Nations so that it could respond more effectively to its members’ needs in the area of economic and social development.
In his Agenda, the Secretary-General proposed that ECOSOC report to the Security Council on economic and social developments that might pose threats to international peace and security. He also urged the creation of a high-level, intersessional mechanism to enable ECOSOC to react in a timely way to new developments. He also called for lines of communication between the General Assembly and ECOSOC to be clarified and streamlined. In addition, the Secretary-General urged that the relationship between ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies be redefined. For example, he reported to the General Assembly in 1992 (A/47/ 434) that members of ECOSOC were frustrated by discussing the same issues four times in the same calendar year: in the council’s subsidiary body, in the committee session, in the council plenary, and in the General Assembly. Intense negotiations occurred during a resumed session of the 47th session of the General Assembly in June 1993. A draft package of reforms was proposed that had as its main aim eliminating duplication of work in the General Assembly and ECOSOC and providing guidelines for a division of labor. For example, it was suggested that the governing bodies of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) be transformed into smaller executive boards under the overall authority of ECOSOC. Other proposals would have affected the procedures of ECOSOC and would have subsumed the council’s two subcommittees (on economic and social issues) into the plenary body. Although there was clearly a consensus on the need for reform and rationalization, the developing countries (in particular those countries that make up the Group of 77) blocked passage of the package because of concerns over the numerical and regional composition of governing bodies of the different funds and programs of the United Nations. The smallest countries felt that the drastic reduction in representation would exclude them from participation in the decision-making processes of these bodies. In March 1996 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali emphasized ministerial participation and increasing involvement of the new global leaders for the revitalization of ECOSOC. In July 1996 he noted that ongoing reform efforts produced significant improvements but that ECOSOC’s capacity to monitor and coordinate the work of the UN system needed to increase. In his acceptance speech on 17 December 1996, SecretaryGeneral-designate Kofi Annan outlined certain goals for UN reform under his tenure. He pledged to make the UN leaner, more efficient and more effective, more responsive to the wishes and needs of its members and more realistic in its goals and commitments. One of his first reforms was the creation of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) on 17 March 1997. DESA was created as the result of the consolidation of the Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, the Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis and the Department for Development Support and Management Services. DESA’s program is to provide substantive support to the Second and the Third Committees of the General Assembly and to ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies. As well, as part of continuing reform, ECOSOC initiated in 1998 a tradition of meeting each April with finance ministers heading key committees of the Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These consultations initiated inter-institutional cooperation that paved the way for the holding of an International Conference on Financing for Development, held in March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico. At that conference, ECOSOC was assigned a primary role in monitoring and assessing follow-up to the Monterrey Consensus.
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL
Unlike the other main organs of the UN, the Trusteeship Council was established for the purpose of executing a closely defined system of operations. This is the trusteeship system, which was devised to adapt the League of Nations mandate system to meet the requirements of a new era. The 1990s witnessed the graduation of the last of the Trusteeship Territories to independence or free association status. This historic achievement represents the official end of colonization as an official political system. In only 50 years the Trusteeship Council presided over the orderly, democratic transfer of power from developed nations to their former colonies. The Trusteeship Council voted in 1994 to convene only at the request of its President, a majority of its member states, the General Assembly or the Security Council.
THE UN TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM Although the Covenant of the League forbade wars of aggression—that is, wars of conquest—the League’s founding members did not see the need to underwrite this provision in a positive assertion of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The UN Charter embodies an implicit recognition of the belief that denial of equal rights and the right of peoples to selfdetermination is a potential cause of war. Thus, Article 1 of the Charter sets forth as a basic purpose of the UN “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” (italics added). Article 76, which sets out the main objectives of the international trusteeship system that was to replace the mandate system of the League, leaves no doubt of the value attached to its role as a means of helping the UN, in the words of the Preamble to the Charter, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” The article reads as follows: “The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be: “(a) to further international peace and security; “(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; “(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and “(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice. . . . ” Thus, in addition to emphasizing the importance of the trusteeship system as an instrument for peace, Article 76 defines the framework for the elaboration of obligations that the countries designated to administer the territories placed under UN trusteeship must undertake toward the peoples concerned. In essence, these obligations amount to a pledge on the part of the administering authorities to work toward the liquidation of the trusteeship system itself by preparing the peoples in trust territories for independence, or at least self-government.
T H E M A N D ATE S Y S T E M O F T H E L E A G U E O F N AT I O N S In its political aspect, the history of the world could be read as the history of the creation and disintegration of successive empires, a chain of vicious cause and effect that has brought much bloodshed and wretchedness. After World War I, however, a concerted effort was made for the first time, in a limited way, to break the chain. Recognizing that colonies are a source of friction and jealousy among wealthy nations, the victorious Allies decided not to appropriate for themselves the colonies of their defeated enemies. Instead, those territories belonging to imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire that were considered unable to function as independent states were placed under international administration supervised by the League of Nations. The founders of the League created three types of mandates for the administration of these territories by nations acting as “Mandatories of the League of Nations.” Class A mandates covered territories that were considered to be ready to receive independence within a relatively short period of time. These territories were all in the Middle East: Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, administered by the UK; and Lebanon and Syria, administered by France. Class B mandates covered territories for which the granting of independence was a distant prospect. These territories were all in Africa: the Cameroons and Togoland, each of which was divided between British and French administration; Tanganyika, under British administration; and Ruanda-Urundi, under Belgian administration. To the territories classified under Class C mandates virtually no prospect of self-government, let alone independence, was held out. These territories included South West Africa, administered by the Union of South Africa; New Guinea, administered by Australia; Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand; Nauru, administered by Australia under mandate of the British Empire; and certain Pacific islands, administered by Japan. The terms of the mandate system implied an acknowledgment of the right of the peoples of the colonial territories belonging to states defeated in war to be granted independence if they were thought to have reached a sufficiently advanced stage of development. However, no provision was made in the League Covenant specifying that the countries designated to administer the mandated territories should take steps to prepare these peoples for eventual self-determination.
The Trust Territories and Their Administering Authorities The Charter does not specify the actual territories to be placed under UN trusteeship. Article 77 merely states that the system shall apply to three categories: (1) territories still under mandate, (2) territories “detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War,” and (3) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. On the question of designating the administrators of trust territories, the Charter is equally nonspecific. It states simply that
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the individual trusteeship agreements shall designate the authority in each case, which may be “one or more states or the Organization itself.” The provision that the UN itself may serve as an administering authority is a compromise solution that was adopted when it was decided at the San Francisco Conference to abandon an ambitious plan, originally proposed by China and initially supported by the US, to make the UN directly responsible for the administration of all trust territories. It was decided that the powers that had administered mandates on behalf of the League of Nations were to conclude agreements with the new world organization and administer the same territories that were still dependent. There was one exception. The Pacific islands, which after World War I had been given to Japan as Class C mandates, were, by a special arrangement embodied in the Charter, classified as a strategic area to be administered by the US under a modified trusteeship. As a result of agreements worked out by the General Assembly, 11 trust territories were placed under UN trusteeship, and seven countries were designated as administering authorities. These figures exclude the former German colony of South West Africa, which after World War I had been mandated to the Union of South Africa, because South Africa refused to place the territory under UN trusteeship. The distribution of the territories and their respective administering authorities was as follows: in East Africa: Ruanda-Urundi administered by Belgium, Somaliland by Italy, and Tanganyika by the UK; in West Africa: Cameroons administered by the UK, Cameroons by France, Togoland by the UK, and Togoland by France; in the Pacific: Nauru, administered by Australia and on behalf of New Zealand and the UK, New Guinea by Australia, Western Samoa by New Zealand, and the Pacific islands of the Marianas, Marshalls, and Carolines by the US. In September 1975, when New Guinea acceded to independence, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands became the only Territory on the agenda of the Trusteeship Council. By virtue of a Trusteeship Agreement approved by the Security Council in 1947, the Territory was placed under United States administration as a strategic area under the terms of Article 83 of the Charter. In compliance with the provisions of that Article, the Trusteeship Council reported to the Security Council on all matters concerning the Territory, which was comprised of four entities (Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau). Negotiations on the future political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands began in 1969. In 1975, the Northern Mariana Islands, in a referendum observed by the Trusteeship Council, chose to become a Commonwealth of the United States. In a series of referendums held in 1983 and duly observed by the Trusteeship Council’s Visiting Missions, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands opted for a status of Free Association with the United States, while in Palau, the 75% majority required under its Constitution for the approval of the compact of Free Association with the United States could not be obtained in that and six later referendums. In 1986, the Trusteeship Council, noting that the “peoples of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands and Palau have established constitutions and democratic political institutions providing the instruments of self governments,” recommended an early termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. In December 1990, the Security Council considered the status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and adopted, by 14 votes to 1, resolution 683 (1990). By that resolution, the Council determined the objectives of the Trusteeship Agreement had been fully attained with respect to those three entities and that therefore the applicability of the Trusteeship Agreement to them had been terminated. Palau, therefore, remained the only entity under
the 1947 Trusteeship Agreement. The Trusteeship Council at its annual regular sessions continued to review the situation in Palau. In November, 1993, the Pacific island of Palau, the last of the islands remaining under the Trusteeship Agreement, succeeded in passing a referendum for the approval of the compact of Free Association with the United States. In January 1994, the Council requested the United States and Palau to agree on a date on or about 1 October 1994 for the full entry into force of the Compact of Free Association, and expressed the hope that, in the near future, the Trusteeship Agreement would be terminated by the Security Council (see chapter on Independence of Colonial Peoples).
T H E T R U S T EE S H I P C O U N C I L The fact that the Trusteeship Council was made a main organ of the UN is evidence of the importance attached to the role of the trusteeship system. The Council’s functions, however, are decidedly more limited than those of the other main organs, for it acts, as the case may be, under the direct responsibility of the General Assembly in respect to trusteeships not involving areas designated as strategic or of the Security Council in respect to trusteeships relating to areas designated as strategic. The Charter provisions make it clear that the Trusteeship Council only “assists” the General Assembly and the Security Council in implementing the trusteeship system. It had a purely executive capacity in supervising the day-to-day operations of the system. Composition The Charter provides that the Council is to be composed of three groups of members: the countries administering trust territories, permanent members of the Security Council that do not administer trust territories, and a number of other UN members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly to ensure an equal division between administering and nonadministering countries in the Council. Until 1960, the Council consisted of 14 members: 7 administering members; 2 permanent nonadministering members; and 5 other nonadministering countries elected for three-year terms by the Assembly. As the various trust territories gained independence, the size and composition of the Council changed. The Assembly decided that after 1968, the Council would be composed only of administering powers and the nonadministering permanent members of the Security Council. On 16 September 1975, when Papua New Guinea, which includes the former trust territory of New Guinea, achieved independence, Australia ceased to be a member of the Council. This change left a membership of five: one administering power, the US, and four nonadministering permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, the USSR (today, the Russian Federation), and the UK. Procedure Each member of the Trusteeship Council has one vote. Decisions are made by a simple majority vote. The permanent members of the Security Council have no veto or other special voting privileges. Before 1968, the Council held two regular sessions a year, and afterwards, one. Special sessions may be called on the decision of the majority of the members or at the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The president and vicepresident are elected at the beginning of each regular session and serve for one year. Powers In carrying out its supervisory and administrative functions, the Council was specifically authorized under the Charter to consider reports submitted by the administering authority; to accept petitions and examine thin consultation with the administering
The Trusteeship Council authority; to provide for periodic visits to the trust territories at times agreeable to the respective administering authorities; and to formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational progress in each trust territory, which the administering authorities were required to answer.
O P E R AT IO N O F T H E T R US T E E S H I P S Y S T E M Trusteeship and Strategic Area Agreements Since trusteeship territories were merely entrusted to the administering authorities, the precise terms of the agreement had to be carefully prescribed for each territory and approved by a twothirds vote of the General Assembly, or by the Security Council in the case of a strategic area. Article 82 of the Charter provided that there may be designated in any trusteeship agreement a strategic area or areas, which may include part or all of the trust territory concerned. In such cases, all trusteeship functions of the UN were to be exercised by the Security Council. In fact, there exists only one strategic area agreement—that concluded between the UN and the US government on the Pacific islands mandated to Japan after World War I. Most of the general provisions of the other trusteeship agreements are included in it, but the right of accessibility to the area is curtailed, and supervision by the UN is made dependent on US security requirements. The US is also authorized to close certain areas for security reasons. The Role of the Administering Authorities Administering countries were given full legislative, administrative, and judicial powers over the territories entrusted to them. If they so desired, they could administer the trust territory in conjunction with one of their own colonies. Thus, the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi was united administratively with the Belgian Congo, and Australia established an administrative union between the trust territory of New Guinea and its own dependency, Papua. However, UN trusteeship territories were never considered to be under the sovereignty of the administering authorities, which governed them only on behalf of the UN.
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The Work of the Trusteeship Council In essence, the work of the Council consists in the exercise of the powers specifically granted to it by the Charter for the purpose of supervising the operation of the trusteeship system and ensuring that the administering authority is carrying out its obligations as laid down by the trusteeship agreement. The work of the Trusteeship Council has diminished progressively as, one by one, the 11 trust territories either achieved independence or, on being granted self-determination, chose to unite with another independent state. In November 1993, Palau, the last remaining Trusteeship Territory succeeded in passing a referendum approving a Compact of Free Association with the United States. In January, 1994, at its sixty-first session, the Council requested the United States, in consultation with the Government of Palau, the last remaining Trusteeship Territory, to agree on a date on or about October 1, 1994 for the full entry into force of the Compact of Free Association. The council considered that the United States had satisfactorily discharged its obligations under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and that it was appropriate for that Agreement to be terminated with effect from the date referred to above, as agreed upon by the two Governments. At that session the Trusteeship Council also amended its rules of procedure 1 and 2, which were replaced by the following: “The Trusteeship Council shall meet as and where occasion may require, by decision of the Trusteeship Council, or by decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members, or at the request of the General Assembly, or at the request of the Security Council acting in pursuance of the relevant provisions of the Charter.” The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994 after Palau became independent. The Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required—by its decision or the decision of its president, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council. As of fall 2002, the Council remained suspended but there had been no decision by the General Assembly to dissolve it.
T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L COURT OF JUSTICE person to sit as judge on that case if there is not already a judge of its nationality on the court. If there are “several parties in the same interest,” they may add only one judge to the bench. Such ad hoc judges are chosen by the respective states themselves and may, or may not, be nationals of the states choosing them.
The International Court of Justice was established at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. It is a successor to and resembles the Permanent Court of International Justice created at the time of the League of Nations, but its competence is wider, because membership in the League did not automatically require a nation to join the Permanent Court. The International Court, however, is a principal organ of the UN, so that all UN members automatically become parties to its statute, which, modeled on that of the Permanent Court, was adopted as an integral part of the Charter. By joining the UN, each country binds itself, in the words of the Charter, “to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.” If any party to a case violates this obligation, the other party “may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.” The Charter further provides that nonmembers of the UN may become parties to the statute of the court “on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” Two such countries—Nauru and Switzerland—became parties to the statute in this way. The rules under which the court is constituted and by which it functions are laid down in the statute and detailed in rules adopted by the court itself. The seat of the court is the Peace Palace at The Hague in the Netherlands, but it can meet elsewhere if it so desires. The judges are bound “to hold themselves permanently at the disposal of the Court.” The court is funded from the regular budget of the UN, to whose members its services are otherwise free of charge.
N O M IN A T I ON A N D E L E C T I O N O F J U D G E S Two international conferences at The Hague, in 1899 and 1907, contemplated the establishment of a permanent international court, but the conferees were unable to agree on a system for electing judges. They did agree, however, on a convention establishing a Permanent Court of Arbitration. That convention provides that each country that is a party to it shall name four jurists as arbitrators who will be available to consider a concrete matter for international arbitration. When the Permanent Court of International Justice was established after World War I, a solution was found for the difficult problem of electing judges. The legal experts named as potential arbitrators under the Hague convention were given the right to nominate candidates, and the League of Nations elected the judges from among these nominees. This system has in essence been preserved by the UN. To ensure that candidates are not mere government nominees, they are proposed by the groups of jurists already established in the Permanent Court of Arbitration or by similar groups specially constituted in countries not members of that court; no national group may nominate more than four persons, and only two of those may bear the nationality of the group. The list of candidates so nominated then goes to the UN. To be elected to a judgeship on the court, a candidate must obtain an absolute majority in the Security Council and the General Assembly, both bodies voting independently and simultaneously. If more than one candidate of the same nationality obtains the required votes, the eldest is elected. In electing judges to the court, delegates are requested to bear in mind that “the main forms of civilization” and “the principal legal systems of the world” should be represented at all times on the international tribunal.
JUDGES OF THE COURT The court consists of 15 independent judges, known as “members” of the court. They are elected “from among persons of high moral character” without consideration of nationality, except that no two judges of the same nationality may serve concurrently. They must be persons possessing the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices or be jurists of recognized competence in international law. No judge of the International Court of Justice may exercise any political or administrative function or engage in any professional occupation. When engaged in the business of the court, judges enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. A newly elected judge must “make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously.” A judge cannot be dismissed except by a unanimous decision of the other judges that “he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions.” No such dismissal has ever occurred. As in any court, a judge may disqualify himself from sitting on a particular case. The statute enumerates certain conditions under which this disqualification is obligatory—for example, if a judge was previously involved in the case as a member of a commission of inquiry.
TE R M S O F J U D G E S H I P S Judges are elected for nine years. To stagger the expiration of terms, the terms of five of the judges named in the first election (1946) expired at the end of three years, and the terms of five others at the end of six years, as determined by lot. Hence, five judges are now elected every three years. Reelection is permissible and frequently occurs. Every three years, the court elects its president and vice-president from among the judges. Unless reelected, judges chosen to fill a casual vacancy serve only for the remainder of their predecessor’s term. The composition of the court as of 6 February 2002 was as follows (terms expire on 5 February of the year given in parentheses): Nabil Elaraby, Egypt (2006) Carl-August Fleischhaur, Germany (2003) Gilbert Guillaume, France (2009) Géza Herczegh, Hungary (2003) Rosalyn Higgins, United Kingdom (2009) Shi Jiuyong, China (2003)
SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONALITY OF JUDGES The statute declares specifically that a judge has the right to sit on a case in which his own country is a party. Furthermore, any country that is a party to a case before the court may add a
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The International Court of Justice Pieter H. Kooijmans, Netherlands (2006) Abdul G. Koroma, Sierra Leone (2003) Shigeru Oda, Japan (2003) Gonzalo Parru-Aranguren, Venezuela (2009) Raymond Ranjeva, Madagascar (2009) José Francisco Rezek, Brazil (2006) Thomas Buergenthal, United States (2006) Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh, Jordan, (2009) Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, Russian Federation (2006) Normally, all judges sit to hear a case, but nine judges (not counting an ad hoc judge) constitute a quorum. The statute of the court makes provision for the formation of chambers for summary procedure, for particular categories of cases, or for an individual case. A Chamber for Environmental Matters were established by the court in July 1993. Since 1945, four cases were referred to a chamber—in 1982, 1985, 1987, and 1993. A judgment delivered by a chamber is considered as rendered by the court.
PROCEDURE OF THE COURT All questions are decided by a majority vote of the judges present. If the votes are equal, the president has the casting, or deciding, vote. The judgments have to be read in open court and are required to state the reasons on which they are based and the names of the judges constituting the majority. Any judge is entitled to append to the judgment a personal opinion explaining his or her concurrence or dissent. All hearings are public unless the court decides, whether at the request of the parties or otherwise, that the public should not be admitted. Judgments are final and without appeal. An application for revision will be considered by the court only if it is based on the discovery of some decisive fact that at the time of the judgment was unknown to both the court and the party seeking revision. Should a dispute arise concerning the meaning or scope of a judgment, the court shall interpret it at the request of any party. In order to simplify and expedite recourse to it, the court amended its Rules of Court in 1972. A completely overhauled set of rules, incorporating those amendments, was adopted in 1978. The latest version of the rules dates from 5 December 2000.
COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION O F T H E C O U RT Only states can be parties in cases before the court. Hence, proceedings may not be instituted by or against an individual, corporation, or other entity that is not a state under international law. However, if certain rules are satisfied, a state may take up a case involving one of its nationals. Thus, the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), in which a judgment was rendered on 6 April 1955, involved a claim by Liechtenstein in regard to injuries sustained by a German-born, naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein as a result of certain measures that Guatemala had taken during World War II. All countries that are parties to the statute have automatic access to the court and can refer any case they wish to the court. In addition, the Security Council may recommend that a legal dispute be referred to the court. Under the Charter, nations are not automatically obliged to submit their legal disputes for judgment. At the San Francisco Conference, it was argued by some that the court should be given compulsory jurisdiction and that UN members should bind themselves to accept the court’s right to consider legal disputes between them. This proposal would have meant that if one member filed a case against another member, the court would automatically, and without reference to the second member concerned, have the right to try the case. The proposal was
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rejected because some delegates feared that such a provision might make the statute unacceptable to their countries. Moreover, it was generally felt that since the disputants in an international court are sovereign states, they should not be summoned against their will to submit to the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the court cannot proceed to adjudicate a case unless all parties to the dispute have consented that it should do so. Such consent comes about mainly in one of the following three ways. 1. There can be a specific agreement between the parties to submit a dispute to the court. This is the simplest method and the one employed in several recent cases. Since the creation of the court, 14 cases have been brought before it in this way. 2. There can be specific clauses contained in treaties and conventions. Many treaties and conventions expressly stipulate that disputes that may arise under them, such as a claim by one country that a treaty has been violated by another country, will be submitted to the court for decision. More than 430 treaties and conventions, including peace treaties concluded after World War II, contain clauses to this effect, a fact which attests to the readiness of countries to agree in advance to accept judicial settlement. 3. There can be voluntary recognition in advance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court in specified types of disputes. Article 36 of the statute states that all parties to the statute “may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.” Such declarations may be made for only a limited period if desired and with or without any conditions, or they may state that they will become operative only when a particular country or number of countries accept the same obligation. The most farreaching reservation that has been attached to a declaration is the condition that the court must not adjudicate any dispute that the country itself determines to be an essentially domestic matter. In effect, this reservation leaves the country free to deny the court’s jurisdiction in most cases in which it might become involved. In general, the practical significance of many of the declarations is severely limited by the right to make conditions. As of November 2002, declarations recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the court had been made by 64 states, with a number of them excluding certain categories of dispute. The jurisdiction of the court therefore comprises all legal disputes which the parties to the statute refer to it and all matters specifically provided for in the UN Charter or in treaties and conventions in force. In the event of a dispute as to whether the court has jurisdiction, the statute provides that the matter shall be decided by the court. Article 38 of the statute requires that in deciding the disputes submitted to it, the court shall apply the following: (1) international conventions establishing rules recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as a subsidiary means for determining the rules of law. In certain cases, however, if the parties concerned agree, the court may decide a case ex aequo et bono—that is, by a judgment in equity taken simply on the basis of what the court considers is right and good.
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The International Court of Justice
A D V I S O R Y O P I N IO N S
A D V I S O R Y OP I N I O N S
The Charter provides that the General Assembly and the Security Council may request the court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question and that other UN organs and specialized agencies, when authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. In such cases, the court does not render a judgment but provides guidance for the international body concerned. Thus, advisory opinions by their nature are not enforceable, and, although the bodies may receive them with respect, they may not necessarily find it politic to act on them. In some cases, however, the requesting body will be committed to abide by the court’s decision.
The 24 advisory opinions requested by the General Assembly, Security Council, or authorized specialized agencies likewise have dealt with a variety of matters. The court, on 16 October 1975, rendered an opinion in response to a request made by the General Assembly at its 1974 session. The question concerned Western Sahara, which was passing from Spanish administration. Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria, all bordering states, took conflicting positions on ties of sovereignty that might have existed before the territory came under Spanish administration. The court concluded that no ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity had existed. In the decolonization of the territory, therefore, the principle of self-determination through the free expression of the will of its people should apply in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolution. Another opinion concerned the question of whether the costs of the peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo could, within the scope of Article 17 of the Charter, be regarded as expenses of the organization to be financed by contributions of member states, as assessed by the General Assembly. In its opinion, issued on 20 July 1962, the court concluded that the expenses of both operations could be regarded as expenses of the UN within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. Recent advisory opinions were rendered in July 1996 in response to a request made by the World Health Organization on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict; and a request made by the UN General Assembly on the Legality or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
E X T R A J U D I C I A L F U N C T IO N S O F T H E C O U R T Many international conventions, treaties, and other instruments confer upon the International Court of Justice or its president the function of appointing umpires or arbitrators in certain eventualities. Furthermore, even when no treaty provision to this effect exists, the court or individual judges may be requested to carry out functions of this nature. Review of the Role of the Court In 1970, citing the relative lack of activity of the court, nine member states sponsored a General Assembly agenda item on a review of the role of the court. In an explanatory memorandum, they noted that the situation at that time was “not commensurate with either the distinction of the judges or the needs of the international community.” Proposals for remedying the situation included a revision of the court’s statute and rules of procedure, the appointment of younger judges and/or shorter terms of office, and wider acceptance of the court’s compulsory jurisdiction. The subject was debated at four subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, culminating in the adoption in 1974 of a resolution designed to strengthen the role of the court. The recommendations included the possible insertion of clauses in treaties that would provide for submission to the court of disputes arising from differences in their interpretation or application; acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court with as few reservations as possible; and greater recourse to the court by UN organs and specialized agencies for advisory opinions.
S U RV E Y O F C O U RT PR A C T IC E Since the court’s inauguration in 1946, states have submitted more than 100 legal disputes to it, and international organizations have requested 24 advisory opinions.
LEGAL DISPUTES Of the cases submitted to the court by states, some were withdrawn by the parties or removed from the list for some other reason. In still others, the court found that, under its statute, it lacked jurisdiction. The remaining 75 cases on which the court has rendered judgment encompassed a wide range of topics, including sovereignty over disputed territory or territorial possessions, the international law of the sea, and commercial interests or property rights either of states or of private corporations and persons. (Examples of these types of disputes are given in the case histories below.) Many of the cases, including some that fall into the three categories just described, involve differences in interpretations of specific bilateral or multilateral treaties and other legal instruments. Thus, in the case of the rights of US citizens in Morocco (France v. US), the court found, on 27 August 1952, that the prohibition of certain imports into Morocco had violated US treaty rights. However, it rejected the US claim that its citizens were not subject in principle to the application of Moroccan laws unless they had received the US’s prior assent.
CASES PENDING As of November 2002, 24 cases were pending: 1-2. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) 3. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) 4. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) 5. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 6. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malasia) 7. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo) 8–15. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium; Yugoslavia v. Canada; Yugoslavia v. France; Yugoslavia v. Germany; Yugoslavia v. Italy; Yugoslavia v. Netherlands; Yugoslavia v. Portugal; Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom) 16. Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) 17. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Yugoslavia) 18. Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) 19. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina) 20. Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany) 21. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) 22. Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger)
The International Court of Justice 23. 24.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras)
SOME CASE HISTORIES OF DISPUTES SUBMITTED TO THE COURT Disputes over Territorial Claims and Territorial Possessions In the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands), the court traced developments that had begun before the 1839 separation of the Netherlands from Belgium, and in its judgment, on 20 June 1959, it decided that sovereignty over the disputed plots belonged to Belgium. In a dispute regarding sovereignty over certain islets and rocks lying between the British Channel island of Jersey and the French coast, the Minquier and Ecrehos Islands Case, the UK and France invoked historical facts going back to the 11th century. The UK started its argument by claiming title from the conquest of England in 1066 by William, Duke of Normandy. France started its argument by pointing out that the dukes of Normandy were vassals of the king of France and that the kings of England after 1066, in their capacity as dukes of Normandy, held the duchy in fee from the French kings. The court decided, on 17 November 1953, that “the sovereignty over the islets and rocks of the Ecrehos and Minquier groups, insofar as these islets and rocks are capable of appropriation, belongs to the United Kingdom.” In 1980, in a case brought by the United States concerning the seizure of its embassy in Teheran and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff, the court held that Iran must release the hostages, hand back the embassy and make reparations. However, before the court fixed the amount of reparation, the case was withdrawn following agreement reached between the parties. In the first frontier dispute between two African states, by a special agreement Burkina Faso and Mali submitted to a chamber of the court in October 1983 the question of the delimitation of part of the land frontier between them. In January 1986, the court ordered interim measures of protection in order to restore peace between the two states following armed hostilities at the end of 1985. The court gave its final judgment in December 1986, establishing the coordinates for the delimitation of the frontier. In 1984, Nicaragua alleged that the United States was using military force against it and intervening in its internal affairs. The United States denied that the court had jurisdiction. After written and oral proceedings, the court found, however, that it had jurisdiction and that Nicaragua’s application was admissible. The United States refused to recognize either this ruling or the subsequent 1986 judgment in which the court determined that the United States had acted in breach of its obligations toward Nicaragua, must desist from the actions in question, and should make reparation. The request by Nicaragua that the court determine the form and amount of reparation was withdrawn in 1991. In a case between Libya and Chad, the two countries submitted to the court a territorial dispute relating to the Aozou Strip in the Sahara. Libya’s claim as made in the case extended far to the south of that strip of land. The court, in a judgment of 3 February 1994, found wholly in favor of Chad. After an agreement on the implementation of the judgment had been concluded between the two parties, Libyan forces, monitored by an observer force deployed by the Security Council, withdrew from the Aozou strip by 31 May 1994. Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), the first case decided by the court, was brought before it at the suggestion of the Security Council. On 22 October 1946, two UK destroyers passing through the Corfu channel off the Albanian coast struck mines whose explosion caused the death of 46 seamen and dam-
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age to the ships. The British thereupon mineswept the channel. Albania claimed that it had not laid the mines. The court found Albania “responsible under international law for the explosions . . . and for the damage and loss of human life that resulted therefrom” and determined the compensation due to the UK at £843,947, equivalent to approximately us$2.4 million at that time. The court also found that the British mine-sweeping activities in Albanian territorial waters had violated international law. The unanimous rejection by the court of the British claim that the action was justified under the principle of “self-protection” constituted the first judicial finding that the use of force for self-help is in certain circumstances contrary to international law. In 1981, Canada and the US submitted to a chamber of the court a question as to the course of the maritime boundary dividing the continental shelf and fisheries zones of the two countries in the Gulf of Maine area. In its judgment of 12 October 1984, the chamber of the court established the coordinates of that boundary. On 3 June 1985, the court delivered a judgment in a dispute relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Libya and Malta that had been referred to the court in 1982 by means of a special agreement specifically concluded for that purpose. On 14 June 1993, the court delivered a judgment in a maritime delimitation dispute between Denmark and Norway. On 16 March 2001, the court delivered a judgment in a maritime and land dispute between Bahrain and Qatar. On 10 October 2002, the court decided a case between Cameroon and Nigeria over the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula, over the maritime boundary between the two states, and over sovereignty over part of Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad. Disputes Involving Commercial Interests and Property Rights The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case grew out of a law passed by Iran on 1 May 1951, terminating the concessions of the AngloIranian Oil Co. and expropriating the company’s refinery at Abadan, the largest in the world. On 5 July, the court ordered important “interim measures” enjoining the two governments to refrain from any action that might aggravate the dispute or hinder the operation of the company. The company was to continue under the same management as before nationalization, subject to such modification as agreed to by a special supervisory board, which the court requested the two governments to set up. A year later, however, on 22 July 1952, the court, in its final judgment, ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and lifted the “interim measures.” The court found that the 1933 agreement, which gave the Iranian concession to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and which the UK claimed had been violated by the act of nationalization, was merely a concessionary contract between Iran and a foreign corporation. The court ruled that the interpretation of such a contract was not one of the matters in regard to which Iran had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. The controversy was settled by negotiations in 1953, after the Mossadegh regime in Iran had been replaced by another government. The Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain) arose out of a 1948 adjudication by a provincial Spanish law court of the bankruptcy of a company incorporated in Canada with subsidiaries operating in Barcelona. Belgium was seeking reparation for damages alleged to have been sustained by Belgian shareholders in the company as a result of the Spanish court’s adjudication, which Belgium claimed was contrary to international law. The court, on 5 February 1970, found that the Belgian government lacked the standing to exercise diplomatic protection of Belgian shareholders in a Canadian company with respect to measures taken against that company in Spain. (The complete text of all of the Court’s decisions—from 1946 up to the present date—can be accessed at the ICJ’s web site at www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.)
T H E S E C R E TA R I AT
open debate on the qualifications of the candidate. The General Assembly also decided that the term of office would be five years (the Secretary-General of the League of Nations was elected for 10 years) and that the Secretary-General would be eligible for reappointment. The permanent members of the Security Council have tacitly agreed that the Secretary-General should not be a national of one of their own countries.
CHARTER REQUIREMENTS
The charter lays down very few requirements governing the establishment of the sixth main organ of the UN—the Secretariat. Such requirements as are specified, in Chapter XV, may be conveniently listed under the following headings. Composition. The charter states simply: “The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require.” Appointment of Staff. With regard to the Secretary-General, the charter stipulates that the person to hold the position “shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” In other words, the Security Council first must agree on a candidate, who then must be endorsed by a majority vote in the General Assembly. The other members of the Secretariat are to be appointed by the Secretary-General “under regulations established by the General Assembly.” The charter stipulates that the “paramount consideration” in the employment of staff “shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.” However, to this consideration is added an important rider—namely, that “due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.” Functions of the Secretariat. The duties of the general staff are not specified beyond an instruction that an appropriate number shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council and, “as required, to other organs of the United Nations.” With respect to the functions of the Secretary-General, the charter states only that he shall be “the chief administrative officer of the Organization,” shall “act in that capacity” at all meetings of the General Assembly and the three councils, and shall also perform “such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs.” Apart from these general requirements, the charter accords the Secretary-General one specific duty and one specific power: to make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organization, and he has the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that “in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” The single restriction on the Secretariat is that “in the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization,” and that “they shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.” As a corollary to this injunction, the charter puts member nations under the obligation to “respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.”
STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF TH E SE C RE TA R IAT
The Secretariat services the other organs of the UN and administers the programs and policies laid down by them. As the scope and range of UN activities have widened, the staff of the Secretariat has increased in number and its organizational pattern has increased in complexity. The major elements of the Secretariat, variously designated as offices, departments, programs, conferences, and the like, are headed by officials of the rank, but not necessarily the title, of undersecretary-general or assistant secretary-general. In 1987 there were 48 officials at those two levels in the Secretariat. As the United Nations grew from its original 51 members in 1945 to 191 members in 2002, the Secretariat necessarily changed and evolved. Between 1945 and 1994 major reform of the Secretariat’s structure was undertaken five times: 1953–56; 1964–66; 1974–77; 1985–86; and 1992–94. The latest round of restructuring was requested by the General Assembly in numerous resolutions beginning in 1988 (41/213; 44/200; 45/254; 46/ 232, and 47/212A). Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali began the restructuring process upon his entry into office in January 1992. In 1991 there were 48 high-level posts (1 director general, 26 undersecretary-generals, 20 assistant secretary-generals) reporting directly to the Secretary-General, by the 1996–1997 biennium that number had been reduced to 21 undersecretarygenerals and 15 assistant secretary-generals for a total of 36. In November 2002, the activities of the Secretariat were organized in the following departments: The Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The functions of five previous offices and units were integrated into the DPA. The department oversees the organization’s efforts in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, collects and analyzes information to alert the General Assembly and Security Council of impending crises, and carries out mandates handed down by the General Assembly and Security Council. DPA provides secretariat services to both bodies. It also provides electoral assistance to countries requesting help in strengthening the democratic process. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This department supervises the operations of the United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. The work of the United Nations in this area has grown exponentially in size and complexity since the end of the cold war. In December 1991, peacekeeping missions involved approximately 11,000 troops and 4,000 civilian personnel with a combined budget of us$500 million. At its peak in 1995 (when UN peacekeeping personnel were heavily deployed in the former Yugoslavia), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was supervising approximately 70,000 military and civilian personnel, whose annualized budgets
A P P O I N T M E N T O F T H E S E C R E TA RY- G E N E R A L
Since the charter does not specify the qualifications for SecretaryGeneral and the term of office, these decisions had to be made by the first General Assembly, in January 1946. It was agreed that, in making its recommendations to the General Assembly, the Security Council should conduct its discussions in private and vote in secret, for the dignity of the office required avoidance of
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The Secretariat approached us$3 billion. In the reorganization, the Field Operations Division, which had been part of the Department for Administration and Management, was transferred to its main client, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The annual budget was subsequently reduced to about us$1 billion. The Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA). This department was originally established in 1982, and continued until 1992. It was reestablished in January 1998. The DDA furthers the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and disarmament of chemical and biological weapons. It promotes disarmament efforts for conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms. It has five branches: the Conference on Disarmament Secretariat and Conference Support Branch; the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch; the Conventional Arms Branch; the Regional Disarmament Branch; and the Monitoring, Database and Information Branch. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). From September 1992 to April 1996, the UN launched 64 consolidated inter-agency appeals for humanitarian assistance seeking some us$11 billion in relief programs. To handle the increasing number of emergencies the organization’s membership requested it to manage, the Secretary-General created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), incorporating the functions of the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) and 11 other units of the Secretariat. Two new units were created: the Complex Emergencies Branch and the Inter-Agency Support Unit. In January 1998, the DHA was renamed the OCHA, as part of the Secretary-General’s reform program at the time. The new body took steps to encourage more active inter-agency cooperation, and streamlined procedures for support of field coordination. The OCHA works to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance to victims of disasters and other emergencies. It also acts as an advocate for humanitarian activities being considered by intergovernmental bodies. It was designed to provide quick needs assessments, field situation analyses, and early negotiations on access to emergency situations. A major feature of this department is interagency coordination that allows all the organizations of the UN system to make consolidated appeals for humanitarian assistance and to better track contributions from donor governments, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). This department was a consolidation of the Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, the Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis and the Department for Development Support and Management Services. The DESA aims to promote broad-based and sustainable development through an integrated approach to economic, social, environmental, population, and gender-related aspects of development. It has the following divisions: Advancement of Women; Africa and the Least Developed Countries; Development Policy Analysis; Economic and Social Council Support and Coordination; Population; Public Economics and Public Administration; Social Policy and Development; Statistics; Sustainable Development; and Financing for Development. The Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services. This department consists of three divisions and one service. The Central Planning and Coordination Service provides central planning services for meetings and documentation, and coordinates conference services worldwide. The General Assembly and ECOSOC Affairs Division provides secretariat services and assistance to the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Trusteeship Council. The Interpretation, Meetings and Publishing Division provides interpretation services for all of the six official languages of the UN from and into each other. It also prepares verbatim records of meetings of the General Assembly, Security Council, and other bodies, and prepares and prints documents and other publications. The
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Translation and Editorial Division is responsible for translating all official United Nations documents, meeting records, publications and correspondence, from and into the six official langugaes. It also provides reference services and terminology services for authors, editors, interpreters, translators, and verbatim reporters. The Department of Public Information (DPI). Under the reorganization, the Dag Hammarskjöld Library and the publishing services of the organization were transferred from the Office of Conference Services to DPI. The department, which creates press releases, publications, and radio and video programs publicizing the work of the organization, also took on the activities that had been handled by the former Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General. Many of DPI’s field offices were integrated into the field offices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for substantial savings. DPI’s work was facilitated by the installation of an electronic mail system connecting peacekeeping missions, information centers and UNDP offices— increasing headquarters’ contact with its far-flung staff. The Department of Management (DM). This department has a number of offices and divisions, including: the Treasury; the Office of Human Resources Management; the Integrated Management Information System Project; the Procurement Division; and the Archives and Records Management Section. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). In August 1993, the Secretary-General announced the creation of a new Office of Inspections and Investigations, headed by an assistant secretary-general, which would incorporate various former units of the DAM dealing with audit, management advisory services, evaluation, and monitoring. In July 1994, the General Assembly strengthened the office, and changed its name to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (resolution A/218B [29 July 1994]). The General Assembly stipulated that the head of the new office, at the level of undersecretary-general, should be an expert in the fields of accounting, auditing, financial analysis and investigations, management, law, or public administration. It further stipulated that the individual should serve only one five-year term, and that the post would not be subject to geographical distribution limits. The watchdog office was given wider independence to investigate possible fraud and abuse within the organization. It is assisted in its task by the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), a major hardware and software upgrade that allows greater monitoring and audit capabilities through electronic audit trails. The creation of this office had long been sought by industrialized countries concerned that their contributions to the United Nations were being wasted by fraud and abuse. The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). This office advises the organization and the Secretary-General on legal matters. For example, the OLA has provided advice on numerous activities related to the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Under the 1992 reorganization, it also assumed responsibility for the Office for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea. The OLA also provides a range of advice and assistance on issues relating to treaty law and technical aspects of treaties. Besides the above departments, the Centre for Human Rights, formerly a division, had its activities greatly expanded by a series of new mandates by the General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Commission on Human Rights, and expert groups in the human rights field. It is the principal entity of the UN Secretariat dealing with human rights issues, and is responsible for supervising the ratification and implementation of the international human rights agreements. The Secretary-General, in his 1993 report (A/48/ 428), stated that the activities of the Centre for Human Rights were evolving from standard-setting to furthering the implementation of a universal culture of human rights. The center is
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The Secretariat
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT
SECRETARY-GENERAL
OIOS
OSG
OLA
DPA
DDA
DPKO
OCHA
DESA
DGAACS
DPI
DM
UNHCR
OIP
OHRLLS
ODC
UNOG
UNOV
UNON
UNHSP
UNAIDS
ECA
ECE
ECLAC
ESCAP
ESCWA
L I S T I N G O F K E Y O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L U N IT S OSG OIOS OLA DPA DDA DPKO OCHA DESA DGAACS DPI DM UNHCR OIP
Office of the Secretary-General Office of Internal Oversight Services Office of Legal Affairs Department of Political Affairs Department of Disarmament Affairs Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Department of Economic and Social Affairs Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services Department of Public Information Department of Management Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
OHRLLS
Office of the Iraq Programme
ESCWA
ODC UNOG UNOV UNON UNHSP UNAIDS ECA ECE ECLAC ESCAP
Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Office at Geneva United Nations Office at Vienna United Nations Office at Nairobi UN Human Settlements Programme Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS Economic Commission for Africa Economic Commission for Europe Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
The Secretariat responsible for following up the recommendations of the Second World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June 1993. Recognizing this, the 47th session of the General Assembly authorized additional financial resources for the center. The center is headed by an assistant secretary-general who reports directly to the Secretary-General. Directly below the ranks of undersecretary-general and assistant secretary-general are directors of main subdepartments and chiefs of specific bureaus within the major organizational units. Below them is the professional staff: personnel with qualifications as administrators, specialists, technical experts, statisticians, translators, editors, interpreters, and so on. Staff in the category of general services include administrative assistants, clerical workers, secretaries, typists, and the like. Manual workers, such as building maintenance staff, are separately classified. Personnel at the professional level and above are recruited in the various member countries of the UN and, when serving outside their own country, are entitled to home-leave travel, repatriation grants, and related benefits. General service personnel include a number of nationalities, but they are recruited locally and are not selected according to any principle of geographical representation. The majority of general service staff employed at UN headquarters are US citizens. Organizational Distribution of Staff In 2002, the global work force stood at 8,900 posts, down from 12,205 in 1984–85. Some posts currently are being kept vacant as a result of the General Assembly’s decision to increase vacancy rates. Problems of Staff Appointment According to Equitable Geographical Distribution All UN senior staff members are appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. Some of the appointments, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, are subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. Staff recruitment, in general, is handled by the Office of Personnel, salary scales and other conditions of employment being determined by the General Assembly. UN member governments attach great importance to having a fair proportion of their nationals employed in the Secretariat. The 1962 General Assembly recommended that in applying the principle of equitable geographical distribution, the Secretary-General should take into account members’ financial contributions to the UN, the respective populations of the member countries, the relative importance of posts at different levels, and the need for a more balanced regional composition of the staff at the director level. It further recommended that in confirming permanent contracts (UN staff are initially hired on the basis of one-year contracts), particular account should be taken of the need to reduce underrepresentation of some member states. The 1975 General Assembly reaffirmed previously defined aims for UN recruitment policy and mentioned the following specifically: development of an international civil service based on the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity; equitable geographic distribution, with no post, department, or unit to be regarded as the exclusive preserve of any member state or region; the recruitment of a greater number of qualified women for professional and senior-level posts; and the correction of imbalances in the age structure of the Secretariat. One of the United Nations’ most disturbing lapses relates to the status of women within the organization’s own secretariat. The equality of men and women is a principle enshrined in the UN charter. However, while more than half of the Secretariat’s general service (nonprofessional) posts are filled by women, until the 1990s, few women were appointed to the highest levels of management. No woman has even been seriously considered for
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the position of Secretary-General. The General Assembly called in 1978 for an increase in the number of women in posts at the professional level to 25% of total staff. The Secretary-General reported in 1987 that the number of women in the professional and higher categories had increased to 25.7% of the total, compared to 17.9% in 1977. In 1985, at the end of the United Nations Decade for Women, the number of women in professional posts (designated as P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5, D-1 and D-2) had risen to 29%. However, women held only 8% of the highest administrative posts (director level, including assistant secretarygeneral and undersecretary-general; designated D-1 and D-2). In response, the General Assembly raised its goal for women to 35% of all professional level posts, with 25% in the senior, Dlevel posts by 1995. Some of the United Nations’ semiautonomous subsidiary bodies already achieved progress in equitable gender representation in their own secretariats. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) reported in 1992 that 43% of its professional posts were occupied by women and set a goal of 50% of professional posts to be filled by women by the year 2000. UNICEF, which had women in 24.6% of its professional posts in 1986, increased that level to 35% in 1992. By June 1996, women accounted for 17.9% of the high level posts, and had received 40.3% of promotions within the last year. In 1992, in an effort to further strengthen the position of all women in the Secretariat, the first guidelines on sexual harassment were issued. The International Civil Service Commission, established by the General Assembly in 1972, is responsible for making recommendations to that body for the regulation and coordination of service within the UN, the specialized agencies, and other international organizations that are part of the UN system. The commission is composed of 15 independent experts, appointed in their individual capacities for four-year staggered terms.
T H E E V O LV IN G R O L E O F T H E S E C R E TA R I AT
The UN’s administrative arm has developed largely in accordance with the demands made upon it. In the process, it has evolved a distinctive character of its own, in keeping with its status as a constitutionally defined organ of the world body. The Secretary-General has played the main role in shaping the character of the Secretariat. As chief administrative officer, the Secretary-General has wide discretionary powers to administer as he thinks fit. As Eleanor Roosevelt, a former chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights, noted in 1953, the SecretaryGeneral, “partly because of the relative permanence of his position (unlike the president of the General Assembly who changes every year) and partly because of his widely ramified authority over the whole UN organization, tends to become its chief personality, its embodiment and its spokesman to the world.” Each Secretary-General tries to develop the positive functions of the Secretariat. Although each has had his own views on the role of the office, all have shared the belief that the Secretariat is the backbone of the UN system. The most eloquent statement of that belief was probably made by Dag Hammarskjöld in a 1955 address at the University of California: “. . . the United Nations is what member nations made it, but within the limits set by government action and government cooperation, much depends on what the Secretariat makes it.” In addition to the Secretariat’s function of providing services and facilities for governments in their capacity as members of the UN, he said, the Secretariat also “has creative capacity. It can introduce new ideas. It can, in proper forms, take initiatives. It can put before member governments findings which will influence their actions.” Stressing the fact that members of the Secretariat serve as international officials rather than as government representatives, Hammarskjöld concluded that “the Secretariat in its independence represents an organ, not only necessary for the life and proper functioning of the body, but of importance also for its growth.”
T H E S E C R E TA R Y- G E N E R A L
aspirations which inspire a people or a state to take the position they do.” He delineated four priority areas for attention by the world body: (1) disarmament, and particularly, nuclear disarmament; (2) human rights; (3) “the shaming disparity of living standards between those who live in the developed world—the North—and their less fortunate brethren in the developing world—the South”; and (4) the world response to natural and man-made disasters. In closing, Pérez de Cuéllar set forth his own essential requirements for a secretary-general: The Secretary-General is constantly subjected to many and diverse pressures. But in the last analysis, his office is a lonely one. He cannot stand idle. Yet helplessness is often his lot. The idealism and hope of which the Charter is a luminous expression have to confront the narrow dictates of national policies. The Secretary-General’s efforts must be based on reason but, behind many a government’s allegedly logical position, there are myths and silent fears. The voice of the Charter is often drowned by clashes and conflicts between states. If the Secretary-General is to rise above these contradictions in international life, two qualities are essential. One is faith that humanity can move—and indeed is moving—towards a less irrational, less violent, more compassionate, and more generous international order . . . . The other essential quality is to feel that he is a citizen of the world. This sounds [like] a cliché, but the SecretaryGeneral would not deserve his mandate if he did not develop a sense of belonging to every nation or culture, reaching out as best he can to the impulse for peace and good that exists in all of them. He is a world citizen because all world problems are his problems; the Charter is his home and his ideology, and its principles are his moral creed. The role of the secretary-general has varied with the individual and with the time and circumstances. This chapter contains an outline account of the initiatives taken by the seven secretariesgeneral in various international crises and areas of conflict. Additional discussion of some of the main areas of conflict may be found in the chapter on International Peace and Security.
From the outset, the secretary-general of the UN has played an important role in helping to settle crises that have troubled nations since the end of World War II. In practice, the role has gone far beyond what might be anticipated from a reading of the terse Charter provisions for the office. Yet the role has been developed precisely through a skillful exploitation of the potentialities inherent in those provisions. The deliberative organs of the UN are political bodies intended to function as forums where the interests of governments can be represented and reconciled. The secretary-general and the Secretariat embody the other aspect of the UN: the organization is also intended to be a place where people may speak not for the interests of governments or blocs but as impartial third parties. The secretary-general is consistently working in a political medium but doing so as a catalytic agent who, in person or through special missions, observers, and mediators, uses his influence to promote compromise and conciliation. Under the Charter, the secretary-general has the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that, in his opinion, might threaten international peace and security. This right goes beyond any power granted the head of an international organization before the founding of the UN. The Charter requires that he submit to the General Assembly an annual report on the work of the organization. In this report, he can state his views and convey his voice to the world’s governments. The secretarygeneral’s role has also been considerably enhanced by exploiting the Charter provision that he shall perform “such other functions” as are entrusted to him by the main organizational units of the United Nations.
THE ROLE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL In 1986, then Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar was invited to give the Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University. His thoughts on the institution of the secretary-general in an era of international evolution deserve attention. First, he suggested that a secretary-general must avoid two extremes: “On one side is the Scylla of trying to inflate the role through too liberal a reading of the text [of the Charter]: of succumbing, that is, to vanity and wishful thinking. On the other is the Charybdis of trying to limit the role to only those responsibilities which are explicitly conferred by the Charter and are impossible to escape: that is, succumbing to modesty, to the instinct of self-effacement, and to the desire to avoid controversy. Both are equally damaging to the vitality of the institution. I submit that no secretary-general should give way to either of them.” Pérez de Cuéllar stated that he used the annual report to the General Assembly as a way to initiate action and galvanize efforts in other parts of the UN system. He pointed out that the secretary-general sometimes remains the only channel of communication between parties in conflict, and therefore must be able to improvise in the context of “good offices” missions. A disciple of “quiet diplomacy,” Pérez de Cuéllar said that the secretary-general must not only be impartial, but must be perceived to be so. He observed that a secretary-general needs enormous patience; he does not have the option of being frustrated or discouraged. He suggested that the secretary-general must “try to understand the roots of insecurity, the fears and resentments and the legitimate
TH E SE C RE TA R IE S G E N E RA L The first secretary-general, Trygve Lie of Norway, was appointed for a five-year term on 1 February 1946. On 1 November 1950, he was reappointed for three years. He resigned on 10 November 1952 and was succeeded by Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden on 10 April 1953. On 26 September 1957, Hammarskjöld was appointed for a further five-year term beginning on 10 April 1958. After Hammarskjöld’s death in a plane crash in Africa on 17 September 1961, U Thant of Burma was appointed secretarygeneral on 3 November 1961, to complete the unexpired term. In November 1962, U Thant was appointed secretary-general for a five-year term beginning with his assumption of office on 3 November 1961. On 2 December 1966, his mandate was unanimously renewed for another five years. At the end of his second term, U Thant declined to be considered for a third. In December
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The Secretary-General 1971, the General Assembly appointed Kurt Waldheim of Austria for a five-year term beginning on 1 January 1972. In December 1976, Waldheim was reappointed for a second five-year term, which ended on 31 December 1981. He was succeeded by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, who was appointed by the Assembly in December 1981 for a five-year term beginning on 1 January 1982. He was reappointed for a second five-year term beginning on 1 January 1987. In late 1991, Pérez de Cuéllar expressed his wish not to be considered for a third term. On 3 December 1991, the General Assembly appointed Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt to a five-year term beginning on 1 January 1992. On 17 December 1996, Kofi Annan of Ghana was appointed to a five-year term that began on 1 January 1997. Trygve Lie Born in Oslo, Norway, 1896; died in Geilo, Norway, 30 December 1968. Law degree from Oslo University. Active in his country’s trade union movement from the age of 15, when he joined the Norwegian Trade Union Youth Organization. At 23, became assistant to the secretary of the Norwegian Labor Party. Legal adviser to the Norwegian Trade Union Federation (1922–35). Elected to the Norwegian Parliament (1935). Minister of justice (1935–39). Minister of trade, industry, shipping, and fishing (1939–40). After the German occupation of Norway in 1940 and until the liberation of Norway in 1945, he was, successively, acting foreign minister and foreign minister of the Norwegian government in exile in London. A prominent anti-Nazi, he rendered many services in the Allied cause during World War II. For example, he was instrumental in preventing the Norwegian merchant marine, one of the world’s largest, from falling into German hands. Reelected to Parliament in 1945. Headed the Norwegian delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Secretary-General, 1946–1952. Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld Born in Jönkönpirg, Sweden, 1905; died in a plane accident while on a peace mission near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), 17 September 1961. Studied at Uppsala and Stockholm universities; Ph.D., Stockholm, 1934. Secretary of Commission on Unemployment (1930–34). Assistant professor of political economy, Stockholm University (1933). Secretary of the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden, 1935–36); chairman of the board (1941–45). Undersecretary of state in the Swedish ministry of finance (1936–45). Envoy extraordinary and financial adviser to the ministry of foreign affairs (1946–49). Undersecretary of state (1949). Deputy foreign minister (1951–53). Delegate to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC; 1948–53). Vice-chairman of the Executive Committee of the OEEC (1948– 49). Swedish delegate to the Commission of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1951–52). Hammarskjöld was a member of the Swedish Academy, which grants the Nobel prizes, and vice-president of the Swedish Tourist and Mountaineers’ Association. Secretary-General, 1953–1961. U Thant Born in Pantanaw, near Rangoon, Burma (now Myanmar), 1909; died in New York, 25 November 1974. Educated at University College, Rangoon. Started career as teacher of English and modern history at Pantanaw High School; later headmaster. Active in development and modernization of Burma’s educational system. Author and free-lance journalist. Books include a work on the League of Nations (1932), Democracy in Schools (1952), and History of Post-War Burma (1961). After Burma’s independence, became Burma’s press director (1947), director of broadcasting (1948), and secretary in the ministry of information (1949–53). Chief adviser to his government at many international conferences. Member of Burma’s delegation to the 1952 General Assembly. In 1957, moved to New York as head of Burma’s per-
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manent delegation to the UN. Secretary-General, 1961–1971. Kurt Waldheim Born in Sankt Andrä-Wördern, Austria, 21 December 1918. Studied at the Consular Academy of Vienna and took an LL.D. at the University of Vienna. Member of the delegation of Austria in negotiations for Austrian State Treaty, London, Paris, and Moscow (1945–47). First secretary of Austria’s legation to France (1948–51). Counselor and head of personnel division, ministry of foreign affairs, Vienna (1951–55). Permanent observer of Austria to the UN (1955–56). Minister, embassy to Canada, Ottawa (1956–58), and ambassador (1958–60). Director-general, political affairs, ministry of foreign affairs, Vienna (1960–64). Ambassador and permanent representative of Austria to the UN (1964– 68 and 1970–71). Austrian minister of foreign affairs (1968–70). Unsuccessful candidate for the presidency of Austria in 1971. UN Secretary-General, 1972–1981. Guest Professor of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1982–84. Author of The Austrian Example, on Austria’s foreign policy in 1973; Building the Future Order, in 1980; In the Eye of the Storm, 1985. In 1986, during his second campaign for the Austrian presidency, information about Waldheim’s record as a German Army lieutenant in World War II was reported for the first time in the international press. Despite his previous assertions that he had been wounded at the Russian front in 1941 and then returned to Vienna to study law, it was discovered he had served as a lieutenant in the high command of Army Group E, whose commander, General Alexander Loehr, was later hanged for atrocities. The reports indicated that Waldheim had served in Yugoslavia and Greece, a fact that he had hitherto concealed, at a time when reprisals, deportations, and other war crimes were being carried out by the German Army. In 1987, the US Justice Department, on the basis of an examination of US files and of the records of the War Crimes Commission in the UN archives, placed Waldheim on a watch list, which is used to bar entry to the US for people linked to war crimes. An international commission of historians appointed by Waldheim, after his election to the presidency of Austria in 1986, reported in February 1988 that it had found evidence that Waldheim was aware of war crimes during his service in the Balkans and had concealed his record but had found no evidence that he himself had committed any crime. The commission’s report created a national crisis in the government of Austria and deeply divided the Austrian people. A national poll showed that, while the majority of people did not wish him to resign (as many prominent intellectuals and politicians were loudly insisting), most indicated that they would not vote for him again. Waldheim himself insisted that the commission cleared him of the charge of committing war crimes. However, the debate over which countries did (or did not) know the facts about Waldheim’s war service before or during his tenure as secretary-general continued to surface in the press periodically. There was general agreement that public knowledge of the real nature of Waldheim’s war service would have disqualified him for consideration for the post of secretary-general. In August 1994, Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Democrat of Manhattan, introduced the War Crimes Disclosure Act, H.R. 4995, with the intention of forcing the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose parts of the Waldheim dossier which it has withheld, citing national security interests. Waldheim served as president of Austria for one term, from 1986 to 1992. In July 1994, Pope John Paul II, a long-time friend of Waldheim’s, awarded him the Knighthood of the Order of Pius “for outstanding service as secretary-general of the United Nations.” The honor is awarded to Catholics or non-Catholics for outstanding services to the church or society, and is largely symbolic.
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The Secretary-General
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Born in Lima, Peru, 19 January 1920. Graduated from the law school of Catholic University, Lima (1943). Joined Peruvian ministry of foreign affairs (1940) and the diplomatic service (1944). Served as secretary at Peruvian embassies in France, the United Kingdom, Bolivia, and Brazil. Returned to Lima (1961) as director of legal and personnel departments, ministry of foreign affairs. Served as ambassador to Venezuela, USSR, Poland, and Switzerland. Member of Peruvian delegation to the 1st General Assembly (1946) and of delegations to the 25th through 30th sessions (1970–75). Permanent representative of Peru to the UN (1971–75). Served as UN secretary-general’s special representative in Cyprus (1975–77); UN undersecretary-general for special political affairs (1979–81); and secretary-general’s personal representative in Afghanistan (1981). After resigning from the UN, he returned to the ministry of foreign affairs and voluntarily separated from the service of his government on 7 October 1981. UN Secretary-General, 1982–1991. In 1992 UNESCO named him chairman of its World Commission on Culture and Development. The lawyer and career diplomat retired in the late 1990s. He is a former professor of diplomatic law at the Academia de Guerra Aérea del Peru. Author of Manual de derecho diplomático (Manual of International Law), 1964. Boutros Boutros-Ghali Born in Cairo, Egypt, 14 November 1922. Graduated from Cairo University in 1946 with a Bachelor of Law. Received his Ph.D. in international law in 1949 from Paris University. From 1949–77 he was Professor of International Law and International Relations and head of the Department of Political Science at Cairo University. Boutros-Ghali was a Fulbright Research Scholar at Columbia University in 1954–55. He served as director of the Centre of Research of The Hague Academy of International Law from 1963–1964, and was a visiting professor at the Faculty of Law of Paris University from 1967–68. In 1977 he became Egypt’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and was present at the Camp David Summit Conference during the negotiations that led to the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978. He continued as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until 1991, when he became Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs. He became a member of the Egyptian parliament in 1987 and was part of the secretariat of the National Democratic Party since 1980. From 1980–92 he was a member of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the Arab Socialist Union. From 1970–91 he was a member of the UN’s International Law Commission. His professional affiliations include membership in the Institute of International Law, the International Institute of Human Rights, the African Society of Political Studies and the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques (Académie Française, Paris). He founded the publication Al Ahram Iktisadi and was its editor from 1960 to 1975. Boutros-Ghali has authored more than 30 books and over 100 articles on international affairs, international law, foreign policy, diplomacy, human rights, and economic and social development. UN Secretary-General, 1992–1996. Kofi Annan Born in Kumasi, Ghana, on 8 April 1938. Studied at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana, and in 1961 completed his undergraduate work in economics at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota. During 1961–62, he undertook graduate studies in economics at the Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales in Geneva. Having worked with the UN for over 30 years in various capacities, he is considered the first Secretary-General to rise from within the organization. His first assignment with the United Nations was in 1962 as an Administrative Officer and Budget Officer at the World Health
Organization (WHO) in Geneva. As a Sloan Fellow in 1971–72 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he received a Master of Science in Management. He returned to Ghana from 1974 to 1976 and was the Managing Director of the Ghana Tourist Development Company, serving on both its board and on the Ghana Tourist Control Board. In the UN, he held the position of Deputy Director of Administration and Head of Personnel in the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees during 1980–83, Director of the Budget in the Office of Financial Services during 1984–87, and then as Assistant Secretary-General in the Office of Human Resources Management and Security Coordinator for the UN system during 1987–90. From 1990 to 1992 he served as Assistant Secretary-General for Program Planning, Budget and Finance and Controller of the UN. After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, he was sent to Iraq to facilitate the repatriation of over 900 international staff, and became engaged in negotiations for the release of Western hostages. He also helped bring attention to the situation of the 500,000 Asians stranded in Kuwait and Iraq. He also headed the UN team that negotiated the possible sale of Iraqi oil to buy humanitarian aid. In 1992 he was appointed Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and became UnderSecretary-General in the same department in March 1993. He also served as a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the former Yugoslavia and as Special Envoy to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the transitional period that followed the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Began term as UN Secretary-General, January 1997, and was reappointed on 29 June 2001 for a second term beginning on 1 January 2002.
D E V E L O P M E N T S U N D E R T RY G V E L IE , 1 9 4 6 –1 9 5 2 Trygve Lie had not yet been in office three months when he took the initiative of advising the Security Council on the Secretariat’s interpretation of the Charter. The Council was considering its first case, the Iranian complaint against the USSR. The secretarygeneral delivered a legal opinion that differed sharply from that of the Security Council. The Council did not accept his interpretation, but it upheld his right to present his views. After setting this precedent, Lie submitted legal opinions on other matters. During Lie’s first term as secretary-general, East-West tension charged the UN atmosphere. As the world situation became increasingly threatening, the political role of the secretary-general expanded. Lie took definite stands on three issues, each of which earned him the dislike of some permanent members of the Security Council. The issues were Chinese representation, a plan for the general settlement of the cold war, and UN military action in the Korean War. Chinese Representation. By the end of 1949, a number of states, including the USSR and the United Kingdom—permanent members of the Security Council—had recognized the mainland government, the People’s Republic of China. In January 1950, the USSR representatives, having failed to obtain the seating of the representatives of the People’s Republic, began boycotting UN meetings at which China was represented by delegates of the Republic of China, based on Taiwan. In private meetings with delegations, Lie tried to solve the impasse. He adduced various reasons, including a ruling of the International Court of Justice, for the thesis that nonrecognition of a government by other governments should not determine its representation in the UN. Trygve Lie's Twenty-Year Peace Plan. Lie developed an extraordinary initiative during the first half of 1950. In a letter to the Security Council dated 6 June 1950, approximately two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, he said: “I felt it my duty to suggest a fresh start to be made towards eventual peaceful solution of outstanding problems.” In his Twenty-Year
The Secretary-General Program for Achieving Peace Through the United Nations, Lie proposed new international machinery to control atomic energy and check the competitive production of armaments and also proposed the establishment of a UN force to prevent or stop localized outbreaks of violence. Armed with these proposals and other memoranda, including the one on Chinese representation, Lie journeyed first to Washington, then to London, to Paris, and finally to Moscow. He held conversations not only with foreign ministers and high-ranking diplomats but also with US President Harry S Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, French President Vincent Auriol, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Lie’s reception was cordial in Moscow, warm in Paris, and friendly in London, but cool in Washington. The international picture changed abruptly, however, with the outbreak of the Korean War. The attitude of a number of governments toward Lie changed dramatically as well. The Korean War. An outstanding example of a secretary-general taking a stand on an issue was Lie’s intervention in the emergency meeting of the Security Council on 24 June 1950. He unequivocally labeled the North Korean forces aggressors because they had crossed the 38th parallel, declared that the conflict constituted a threat to international peace, and urged that the Security Council had a “clear duty” to act. After the Council (in the absence of the Soviet delegate) had set in motion military sanctions against North Korea, Lie endorsed this course of action and rallied support from member governments for UN military action in Korea. These moves brought him into sharp conflict with the USSR, which accused him of “slavish obedience to Western imperialism” and to the “aggression” that, in the Soviet view, the US had committed in Korea. As the Korean conflict grew more ominous with the intervention of the People’s Republic of China, Lie played an active role in getting cease-fire negotiations underway in the field. At the same time, he fully identified himself with military intervention in Korea on behalf of the UN. Extension of Lie's Term as Secretary-General. Lie’s first term as secretary-general was to expire on 31 January 1951. In the Security Council, the USSR vetoed a resolution recommending him for a second term and subsequently announced that it would accept anyone other than Lie who was acceptable to the other members of the Council. The US announced that it would veto anyone but Lie. The Council was unable to recommend a candidate for the office of secretary-general to the General Assembly, a situation unforeseen in the Charter. A resolution in the Assembly to extend Lie’s term by three years, beginning on 1 February 1951, was carried by 46 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions. The negative votes were cast by the Soviet bloc. The USSR maintained normal relations with Lie until the expiration of his original term on 31 January 1951. Thereafter, it stood by its previous announcement that the extension of the term was illegal and that it would “not consider him as secretarygeneral.” By the fall of 1951, however, its nonrecognition policy toward Lie subsided. However, other complications were facing Lie, and on 10 November 1952, he tendered his resignation to the General Assembly.
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER DAG H A M M A R S K J Ö L D , 1 9 5 3 –1 9 6 1 Hammarskjöld’s activities in the political field were more numerous and far-reaching than Lie’s had been. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council repeatedly relied on his initiative and advice and entrusted important tasks to him. The 1954 General Assembly set a precedent when it asked the secretary-general to seek the release of 11 US fliers held prisoner by mainland China. The Assembly resolution left the course of action entirely to his judgment. After various preparations, Ham-
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marskjöld flew to Peking (now Beijing) for personal negotiations with that government, and the 11 fliers were released. This success greatly increased the readiness of the Assembly to rely on the secretary-general as a troubleshooter. The Suez Crisis. Grave responsibilities were entrusted to the secretary-general by the General Assembly in connection with the establishment and operation of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). On 4 November 1956, at the height of the crisis resulting from British, French, and Israeli intervention in Egypt, the secretary-general was requested to submit a plan within 48 hours for the establishment of a force “to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.” The Assembly approved his plan and, at his suggestion, appointed Major-General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, as the chief of UNEF. The Assembly authorized the secretary-general to take appropriate measures to carry out his plan, and an advisory committee of seven UN members was appointed to assist him. Hammarskjöld flew to Egypt to arrange for the Egyptian government’s consent for UNEF to be stationed and to operate in Egyptian territory. He was given the task of arranging with Egypt, France, Israel, and the United Kingdom the implementation of the ceasefire and an end to the dispatch of troops and arms into the area and was authorized to issue regulations and instructions for the effective functioning of UNEF. Hammarskjöld's Views on Developing the Role of SecretaryGeneral. Even before the Middle East crisis of 1956, Hammarskjöld had pointed to the need for the secretary-general to assume a new role in world affairs. On his reelection to a second term, Hammarskjöld told the General Assembly that he considered it to be the duty of the secretary-general, guided by the Charter and by the decisions of the main UN organs, to use his office and the machinery of the organization to the full extent permitted by practical circumstances. But he then declared: “I believe it is in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that the secretarygeneral be expected to act also without such guidance, should this appear to him necessary in order to help in filling a vacuum that may appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provide for the safeguarding of peace and security.” (Italics added.) In other words, inaction or a stalemate either at the UN or outside of it may be justification for the secretary-general to act on his own. Thus, in 1958, Hammarskjöld took an active hand in the Jordan-Lebanon crisis. After a resolution for stronger UN action failed to carry in the Security Council, he announced that he would nevertheless strengthen UN action in Lebanon and “accept the consequences” if members of the Security Council were to disapprove; none did. In the fall of 1959, the USSR made it known that it did not favor a visit by the secretary-general to Laos and, in particular, the assignment of a special temporary “UN ambassador” there. Yet Hammarskjöld did go to Laos to orient himself on the situation in that corner of Southeast Asia, and he assigned a high UN official as the head of a special mission to Laos. In March 1959, Hammarskjöld sent a special representative to help Thailand and Cambodia settle a border dispute. He acted at their invitation without specific authorization by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The dispute was settled. In his report to the 1959 Assembly, he said: “The main significance of the evolution of the Office of the Secretary-General . . . lies in the fact that it has provided means for smooth and fast action . . . of special value in situations in which prior public debate on a proposed course of action might increase the difficulties . . . or in which . . . members may prove hesitant. . . .” The Congo Crisis. By far the greatest responsibilities Hammarskjöld had to shoulder were in connection with the UN Operation in the Congo (now Zaire). On 12 and 13 July 1960, respectively, President Joseph Kasa-
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vubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba of the newly independent Congo each cabled the secretary-general, asking for UN military assistance because of the arrival of Belgian troops and the impending secession of Katanga. At Hammarskjöld’s request, the Security Council met on the night of 13 July. He gave his full support to the Congo’s appeal and recommended that the Council authorize him to “take the necessary steps” to set up a UN military assistance force for the Congo, in consultation with the Congolese government and on the basis of the experience gained in connection with the UNEF in the Middle East. The Security Council so decided. Since the Congo operation thus initiated was of much greater dimensions than the UNEF operation, the responsibilities imposed upon the secretary-general were correspondingly heavier, for, although the Security Council and the General Assembly guided Hammarskjöld, he himself had to make extraordinarily difficult decisions almost daily, often on highly explosive matters that arose as a result of serious rifts within the Congolese government and many other factors. Various member governments, including the USSR and certain African and Western countries, criticized Hammarskjöld for some actions that the UN took or failed to take in the Congo. At times, he had to face the possibility that some country that had contributed military contingents to the UN force would withdraw them. When it became known in February 1961 that Lumumba, who had been deposed by Kasavubu early in September 1960 and later detained by the Léopoldville authorities, had been handed over by them to the Katanga authorities and subsequently murdered, Hammarskjöld declared that the UN was not to blame for the “revolting crime.” However, several delegates claimed that he should have taken stronger measures to protect Lumumba. The “Troika” Proposal. The USSR had asked for Hammarskjöld’s dismissal long before the assassination of Lumumba. Premier Khrushchev, as head of the Soviet delegation to the 1960 General Assembly, accused Hammarskjöld of lacking impartiality and of violating instructions of the Security Council in his conduct of the UN operation in the Congo. He also proposed a basic change in the very institution of the secretary-general, arguing that since the secretary-general had become “the interpreter and executor of decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council,” this one-man office should be replaced by a “collective executive organ consisting of three persons, each of whom would represent a certain group of states”—namely, the West, the socialist states, and the neutralist countries; the institution of a “troika,” he declared, would guarantee that the UN executive organ would not act to the detriment of any of these groups of states. Hammarskjöld rejected the accusations against his impartiality, declared that he would not resign unless the member states for which the organization was of decisive importance or the uncommitted nations wished him to do so, and received an ovation from the overwhelming majority of the delegations. He also stated that to replace the one-man secretary-general by a threeman body would greatly alter the character and limit the scope of the UN. Outside the Soviet bloc there had been little support for the “troika” proposal, but some “subtroika” proposals were advanced. Hammarskjöld in turn suggested that his five top aides, including a US and a Soviet citizen, advise the secretarygeneral on political problems. Discussions of the question were interrupted by his death. Death of Dag Hammarskjöld. Because of dangerous developments in the Congo, Hammarskjöld flew there in September 1961. On the night of 17 September, the plane carrying him from Léopoldville to a meeting with the Katanga secessionist leader at Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, crashed in a wooded area about 16 km (10 mi) west of Ndola airport. Hammarskjöld and all 15 UN
civilian and military personnel traveling with him, including the crew, were killed. The exact cause of the tragedy has not been determined. An investigation commission appointed by the General Assembly reported several possibilities: inadequate technical and security preparations for the flight, an attack on the plane from the air or the ground, sabotage, or human failure by the pilot.
D E V E L O P M E N T S U N D E R U T H A N T, 1 9 6 1 –1 9 7 1 U Thant’s approach to his office was different from that of Hammarskjöld, whose dynamic conception of the secretary-general’s political role had aroused such opposition in the Soviet bloc. Thant did not take the same initiatives as his predecessor, but he consistently sought to use the prestige of his office to help settle disputes. Moreover, both the General Assembly and the Security Council assigned him to mediate extremely delicate situations. In his annual reports, he put forth proposals on basic issues, such as disarmament and economic and social cooperation and many of his suggestions were adopted. An early example of a successful initiative taken by U Thant was in connection with the long-standing dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the status of West Irian. The territory, formerly known as West New Guinea, had belonged to the Dutch East Indies, and Indonesia now claimed it as its own. In December 1961, fighting broke out between Dutch and Indonesian troops. Appealing to both governments to seek a peaceful solution, the secretary-general helped them arrive at a settlement. That settlement, moreover, brought new responsibilities to the office of the secretary-general: for the first time in UN history, a non-self-governing territory was, for a limited period, administered directly by the world organization. The Cyprus Operation. Intercommunal clashes broke out in Cyprus on Christmas Eve 1963 and were followed by the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots into their enclaves, leaving the central government wholly under Greek Cypriot control. A “peace-making force” established under British command was unable to put an end to the fighting, and a conference on Cyprus held in London in January 1964 ended in disagreement. In the face of the danger of broader hostilities in the area, the Security Council on 4 March 1964 decided unanimously to authorize U Thant to establish a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with a limited three-month mandate to prevent the recurrence of fighting, to help maintain law and order, and to aid in the return to normal conditions. The force was to be financed on the basis of voluntary contributions. The Council also asked the secretary-general to appoint a mediator to seek a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. The report of U Thant’s mediator, Galo Plaza Lasso, was transmitted to the Security Council in March 1965 but was rejected by Turkey. Plaza resigned in December 1965, and the function of mediator lapsed. Another crisis occurred in November 1967, but threatened military intervention by Turkey was averted, largely as a result of US opposition. Negotiations conducted by Cyrus Vance for the US and José Rolz-Bennett on behalf of the secretary-general led to a settlement. Intercommunal talks were begun in June 1968, through the good offices of the secretary-general, as part of the settlement. The talks bogged down, but U Thant proposed a formula for their reactivation under the auspices of his special representative, B. F. Osorio-Tafall, and they were resumed in 1972, after Thant had left office. The India-Pakistan War of 1965 and Conflict of 1971. Hostilities between India and Pakistan broke out in Kashmir in early August 1965 and soon spread along the entire length of the international border from the Lahore area to the sea. At the behest of the Security Council, whose calls on 4 and 6 September for a cease-fire had gone unheeded, U Thant visited the subcontinent from 9 to 15 September. In his report to the Council, the secre-
The Secretary-General tary-general proposed certain procedures, including a possible meeting between President Ayub of Pakistan and Prime Minister Shastri of India, to resolve the problem and restore the peace. The Council, on 20 September, demanded a cease-fire and authorized the secretary-general to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel. For this purpose, U Thant strengthened the existing UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), stationed in Kashmir, and established the UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops along the border outside Kashmir. At a meeting organized by Soviet Premier Kosygin in January 1966 in Tashkent, USSR, the leaders of India and Pakistan agreed on the withdrawal of all troops; this withdrawal was successfully implemented under the supervision of the two UN military observer missions in the area. UNIPOM was disbanded in March 1966, having completed its work. Following the outbreak of civil strife in East Pakistan in March 1971 and the deterioration of the situation in the subcontinent that summer, U Thant offered his good offices to India and Pakistan and kept the Security Council informed under the broad terms of Article 99 of the Charter. When overt warfare broke out in December, the Security Council appealed to all parties to spare the lives of innocent civilians. Pursuant to a decision by the Council, U Thant appointed a special representative to lend his good offices for the solution of humanitarian problems after the ceasefire of 18 December 1971, which was followed by the independence of Bangladesh. U Thant's Stand on the Vietnam War. Throughout his tenure, U Thant was deeply concerned with the question of Vietnam. By tacit consent, the question was never formally debated in the General Assembly and only cursorily touched upon in the Security Council. Until the opening of the Paris peace talks in 1968, the secretary-general was unremitting in his efforts to persuade the parties in the conflict to initiate negotiations on their own. In 1966, he put forward a three-stage proposal to create the conditions necessary for discussion, but it was ignored by the US. After the Paris talks began, U Thant deliberately refrained from making any public statements on Vietnam “in order to avoid creating unnecessary difficulties” for the parties. He broke this silence only once, on 5 May 1970, when he expressed his deep concern “regarding the recent involvement of Cambodia in the war.” U Thant's Second Term. U Thant’s second term of office was dominated by the protracted Middle East crisis that arose in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in 1967. His quick action in removing UNEF troops from the Suez area at the request of the United Arab Republic just before that war began occasioned much criticism and some misunderstanding. Of the two other major political conflicts during the period 1967–70, the civil war in Nigeria and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August 1968, only the latter was debated at the UN. The political aspects of the Nigerian situation were never raised in either the General Assembly or the Security Council out of deference to the African countries themselves, whose main objective was to keep external intervention to a minimum. However, as the troops of the Federal Republic of Nigeria began to penetrate more deeply into the eastern region (which had announced its secession from Nigeria and proclaimed itself an independent state under the name of Biafra), the various humanitarian organs of the UN became increasingly concerned about the plight of the people there. Accordingly, in August 1968, the secretary-general took the initiative of sending a personal representative to Nigeria to help facilitate the distribution of food and medicine. At the request of its six Western members, the Security Council
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decided to debate the situation in Czechoslovakia, despite the protests of the USSR. On 23 August 1968, 10 members voted for a resolution condemning the Soviet action, which the USSR vetoed. Another resolution, requesting the secretary-general to send a representative to Prague to seek the release of imprisoned Czechoslovak leaders, was not put to a vote. In view—as one UN text puts it—of the “agreement reached on the substance of the problem during the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks held in Moscow from August 23 to 26,” no further action was taken by the Council. However, it is worth noting that U Thant was among the first world figures to denounce the invasion publicly. At a press briefing on 21 August at UN headquarters, he expressed unequivocal dismay, characterizing the invasion as “yet another serious blow to the concepts of international order and morality which form the basis of the Charter of the United Nations . . . and a grave setback to the East-West détente which seemed to be re-emerging in recent months.”
D E V E L O P M E N T S U N D E R K U R T WA L D H E I M , 1 9 7 2 –1 9 8 1 Two overriding concerns shaped Waldheim’s secretary-generalship: concern for the preservation of the peace and concern for the evolution of world economic arrangements that would effect a more equitable distribution of the world’s wealth. Two other issues were also of special concern to Waldheim: the financial position of the UN and terrorism. The financial position of the UN had been rendered precarious by the practice of some member states, including the USSR, France, and the US, of withholding or threatening to withhold their share of UN funds for activities that they questioned. When Waldheim took office, the crisis had become an emergency, and he dealt with it vigorously throughout his tenure. In September 1972, he placed the question of terrorism on the agenda of the General Assembly against the wishes of many member states. It was the first time a secretarygeneral had ever placed a substantive item on the Assembly’s agenda. Peacemaking. In 1972, on his own authority, Waldheim undertook a number of missions on behalf of peace. Visiting Cyprus, he temporarily calmed the Turkish community’s concern over reported arms shipments to the Greek-dominated government. He visited the island again in 1973 in pursuit of reconciliation. After the hostilities in 1974, he was able to bring Greek and Turkish leaders together for negotiations, and he presided over the Geneva talks regarding Cyprus. Waldheim’s efforts to conciliate in the Vietnam War were rebuffed by both sides in 1972. He then tried, without success, to end the war through action by the Security Council. He visited the two Yemens to try to mediate a border dispute in 1972, and in the same year, he tried to mediate between India and Pakistan. In the long-standing Arab-Israeli dispute, Waldheim made many efforts toward a satisfactory settlement and organized the UN Emergency Force as a buffer between the armies of Egypt and Israel at the request of the Security Council in October 1973. Striving for a New International Economic Order. The sixth special session of the Assembly, in the spring of 1974, and the seventh special session, in September 1975, resulted in a number of decisions and proposals for bridging the gap between the rich and the poor nations and building a “new international economic order.” The seventh special session was, in Waldheim’s words, “a major event, even a turning point, in the history of the United Nations and showed a new and highly promising capacity of the organization to achieve practical results through consensus and through negotiation.” Financial Status of the UN. Waldheim acted both to reduce the costs of running the UN and to bring in contributions from member nations.
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The US contribution to the UN, historically the highest single assessment, by the early 1970s stood at 31.5% of the budget. In October 1973, the US Congress reduced the US share to 25% of the UN budget; 116 other nations also had their contributions reduced by the UN. The difference was made up by increasing the assessments of Japan, China, and 10 other members and by admitting to membership the two Germanys. Waldheim helped to bring these changes about, fostering the notion that any country paying more than 25% of the UN’s expenses could wield excessive influence. Terrorism. Incidents of terrorism increased in the early 1970s. In September 1972, during the XXth Olympiad in Munich, 11 Israeli athletes were killed by Palestinians of the Black September group. Waldheim expressed himself strongly about the event and put the question of terrorism on the agenda of the 1972 General Assembly. A number of Arab and African countries took exception to his initiative, arguing that attention should be focused on the causes of terrorism. Although the Assembly had earlier condemned aerial hijacking, the resolution that it adopted on terrorism did not condemn the practice but called for a study of its causes. After OPEC officials were attacked by terrorists in 1975, the sentiment for more ample UN action against terrorism grew among third-world countries. Waldheim's Second Term. Waldheim entered his second term of office in January 1977 with few illusions about the United Nations. To some extent, he wrote, it was still in search of its identity and its true role: “It tends to react rather than foresee, to deal with the effects of a crisis rather than anticipate and forestall that crisis.” The history of the UN since its founding, he wrote, “has essentially been the story of the search for a working balance between national sovereignty and national interests on the one hand and international order and the long-term interests of the world community on the other.” He said he was not discouraged, however, and he urged governments—particularly the major powers—to turn away from the age-old struggle for spheres of influence and to honor and respect their obligations and responsibilities under the Charter. In 1978, Waldheim called for an effort to improve and streamline the workings of the UN, beginning with the General Assembly, the agenda of which should be reviewed, he said, and items of lesser interest removed. He noted that the Assembly had grown in three decades from a body of 50 members with an agenda of 20 items to a gathering of some 150 members and an agenda of more than 130 items. Waldheim traveled extensively in East Asia in early 1979 and again in 1980 to get a firsthand view of developments in that area, particularly Indo-China, where, in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, there was an exodus of refugees, by land and sea, from that country. With the tide of these and other refugees from Laos and Kampuchea rising daily, Waldheim convened a meeting in Geneva in June 1979 to help alleviate the problem. In May 1979, pursuing a “good offices” mission in Cyprus, Waldheim convened a high-level meeting calling for a resumption of intercommunal talks. The talks were subsequently resumed but broke down shortly thereafter. Waldheim again exerted his best efforts beginning in late 1979, as did the UN itself, in search of solutions to unexpected crises touched off by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the taking of US diplomatic personnel as hostages in Iran. From the outset, his efforts were directed at freeing the hostages and settling relations between Iran and the US, and, for this purpose, he went to Tehran himself, as did a UN commission of inquiry. Waldheim noted that the war between Iran and Iraq, which began in September 1980, had resisted all efforts, both within and outside the UN, at finding a peaceful solution. He offered his own good offices for this purpose and appointed Olof Palme, former Swedish prime minister, as his special repre-
sentative. In regard to the Afghanistan crisis, he appointed Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru as his personal representative.
D E V E L O P M E N T S U N D E R J AV I E R P É R E Z D E C U É L L AR , 1 9 8 2 –1 9 9 1 Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar presided over the United Nations during one of the most remarkable decades in the political history of the world. During his tenure, the stalemate imposed on the United Nations by the rivalries of the Cold War came to an end. The political map of Europe, which had remained stable for more than 40 years since the end of WWII, was completely redrawn when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989. East and West Germany were united and the Berlin Wall was reduced to rubble. Historic achievements in bilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations lowered the level of confrontation between the West and the East for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear era. A new atmosphere of consensus enabled the Security Council to begin providing the kind of leadership envisioned for it by the founders of the organization, as enshrined in the UN Charter. Long-standing political problems in Namibia, Cambodia, and Latin America were resolved with success by United Nations peacekeeping missions, and the evolution of the organization’s activities in helping organize and monitor free and fair elections in new democracies began. The winds of change were also blowing strongly in South Africa, where the apartheid system was beginning to crumble after more than 30 years of condemnation by the United Nations. The story of Pérez de Cuéllar’s 10-year term as secretary-general straddles this historic evolution of the world scene at the fin de siécle. Upon leaving office in December 1991, in his report on the work of the United Nations, he set forth his own feelings about his experience as secretary-general: “Peace has won victories on several fronts. . . . New vistas are opening for States to work together in a manner they did not do before. The earlier posture of aloofness and reserve towards the Organization has been replaced by more ardent participation in its endeavors. An era of law and justice may not be around the corner but the United Nations has defined the direction. . . . Today there are far more solid grounds for hope than there are reasons for frustration and fear. The hope arises both from the enduring relevance of the philosophy of the Charter and from the vastly strengthened credentials of the Organization. My credo is anchored in that philosophy and it will remain so. With its return from the doldrums, and with its role no longer peripheral, the United Nations has come nearer to the vision of its Charter. Everyone who contributed to the process is entitled to a measure of exultation and I, for my part, to a feeling of fulfillment. I profoundly appreciate the confidence placed in me through this testing phase of international affairs. I close on that note of faith and gratitude.” The situation had been very different when Pérez de Cuéllar first took office, in 1982. In his first report to the General Assembly, in September 1982, on the work of the organization, Pérez de Cuéllar commented on the inability of the UN to play an effective and decisive role in its capacity to keep the peace and serve as a forum for negotiations. The Falkland Islands crisis and the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, both major events of 1982, were clear examples of the failure of the international community, and its organization, to use the mechanisms of diplomacy to prevent international conflict. Countries seemed unwilling or reluctant to use the United Nations’ peacekeeping mechanisms to help them resolve their difficulties without resorting to violence. Time after time, he said, “we have seen the Organization set aside or rebuffed, for this reason or for that, in situations in which it should and could have played an important and constructive role.” He saw this trend as dangerous for the world community
The Secretary-General and for the future and criticized the tendency of governments to resort to confrontation, violence, and even war in pursuit of what were perceived as vital interests. Another clear indication of the organization’s lack of stature was the crippling budgetary problems caused by some member states’ continuing practice of withholding part or all of their assessed contributions, placing the work of the entire organization in a constant state of uncertainty. Clearly, at the beginning of his term, the United Nations stood in need of a rebirth. The Middle East The Iran-Iraq War. In regard to the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq, which had started in 1980 and taken an enormous toll in human lives, Pérez de Cuéllar considered it to be his overriding responsibility under the Charter not only to seek an end to the conflict but also, until that goal was achieved, to try, under international humanitarian rules, to mitigate its effects in such areas as attacks on civilian population centers, use of chemical weapons, treatment of prisoners of war, and safety of navigation and civil aviation. On four occasions between 1984 and 1986, he dispatched specialists to investigate charges of the use of chemical weapons, initially against Iranian forces but later injuring Iranian civilians and Iraqi forces as well. In 1984 and 1985, two UN teams investigated allegations of violations of promises by the two countries to cease deliberate attacks on purely civilian population centers, and in January 1985, the secretary-general dispatched a fact-finding mission to Iran and Iraq to investigate the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian detainees. He himself visited Tehran and Baghdad in April 1985 to discuss proposals he had drawn up to initiate movement toward a comprehensive settlement of the war, and he continued to search for new approaches to this goal. In July 1987, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution (598/1987) asking the secretary-general to send UN observers to verify and supervise a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and withdrawal to internationally recognized boundaries. Pérez de Cuéllar was also asked by the Council to explore the question of entrusting to an impartial body the task of inquiring into responsibility for the conflict. Subsequent discussions with the two governments in their capitals reaffirmed his conviction that his good offices could be used to facilitate the restoration of peace and stability in the region. On 20 August 1988, the fighting stopped and UN military observers took up the challenge of monitoring compliance with the cease-fire. The secretary-general and his representative continued a “good offices” mission to build confidence and lay the basis for a lasting peace in the region. The Gulf War. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait with 100,000 troops and took complete control of the small, underdefended country within 48-hours. In the four months following the invasion the Security Council responded with historic speed and unanimity. It passed 12 resolutions condemning the invasion, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter to impose economic sanctions on Iraq, and addressing aid to refugees and Iraq’s taking of hostages. Pérez de Cuéllar remarked in his 1990 annual report that the council “has established that such actions, which are in direct contravention of the principles of the Charter and international law, cannot be committed with impunity.” On 29 November 1990, after three weeks of debate, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 “authorizing Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991, fully implements . . . the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions to restore international peace and security in the area.” With the phrase “all necessary means,” a new chapter in the history of the UN began. A 680,000-strong multi-national military force, led by 410,000 United States troops, was authorized
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by this resolution to impose the Security Council’s will upon Iraq and restore the national sovereignty of Kuwait. On 16 January 1991, the allies began a six-week aerial bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait in preparation for a land attack on Kuwait. On 25 February, the ground attack began. Twelve days later the allied forces had decisively defeated Iraq’s army of occupation, decimating it and pushing surviving units back into Iraq. Iraqi casualties were estimated in the hundreds of thousands. The United States lost 309 lives, some in pre-combat incidents. On 6 April, Iraq’s parliament officially accepted the terms of Resolution 687, which it characterized as “unjust.” Resolution 687 had established a 200-kilometer-long demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border, extending 10 kilometers into Iraq and five kilometers into Kuwait, to be patrolled by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). The secretarygeneral reported that UNIKOM’s 1,400 troops from 36 countries had been fully deployed on 9 May 1991. In his 1991 report on the work of the organization, Pérez de Cuéllar pointed out that the experience of the Gulf action, moving as it did into areas undefined by the charter, suggested the need for “collective reflection on questions relating to the future use of the powers vested in the Security Council under Chapter VII. In order to preclude controversy, these questions should include the mechanisms required for the Council to satisfy itself that the rule of proportionality in the employment of armed force is observed and the rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts are complied with.” He also warned that the use of Chapter VII measure should not be “overextended,” since the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions necessarily created hardships for third-party nations (nations not party to the conflict, but who have important economic partnerships with the sanctioned state). The Arab-Israeli Conflict. In mid-1982, Israeli forces moved into Lebanese territory, bypassing the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In August of that year, at the request of Lebanon and with the authorization of the Security Council, Pérez de Cuéllar deployed military observers to monitor the violence in and around Beirut. He also put forward proposals for expanding the role of UNIFIL—deploying the force, with elements of the Lebanese army and internal security forces, in areas vacated by Israeli forces as they withdrew from Lebanon, and working out arrangements to ensure that southern Lebanon became a zone of peace under the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government. These proposals were not accepted by Israel. Pérez de Cuéllar also attempted to pursue the long-standing goal of convening a peace conference on the Middle East, holding numerous consultations with the parties involved. In December 1987, the diplomatic stalemate was shaken by a massive Palestinian uprising, the intifadah, in the Israeli-occupied territories that forced the Palestine National Council (the PLO’s parliament in exile) to formally recognize Israel. However, the Israeli government declined to reciprocate. Yasser Arafat, the head of the PLO, was asked to address an emergency session of the Security Council, which had to be held in Geneva, since it was feared the United States would deny him an entry-visa. At that session, the United States vetoed the dispatch of a UN mission to the occupied territories to monitor the treatment of Palestinians by Israeli security forces. In 1990 and 1991, the United States took the lead in trying to reconvene a peace conference. In October 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker made history by convening in Madrid the firstever direct negotiations between all parties to the conflict. A key group interested in the talks were the former Palestinians, who since 1967 had been residing in territories under the control of Israels and were represented by the PLO. Since the Israelis had insisted on their exclusion from the Madrid talks, little progress was made. In December 1991, the General Assembly repealed its
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Resolution 3379 (1975) which had equated Zionism with racism. This was only the second time in the history of the UN that the General Assembly had voted to rescind a resolution. Afghanistan The secretary-general and his personal representative, Diego Cordovez, acting as mediator, were continuously involved, until early 1988, in discussions and consultations aimed at negotiating a settlement of the situation in Afghanistan that had been brought about by Soviet military intervention in that country in late 1979 and had affected neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan, to which many Afghan refugees had fled. The negotiations revolved around four points: agreement on noninterference and nonintervention; the voluntary return of refugees; international guarantees on the settlement, to be given by the US and the USSR; and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The General Assembly supported these efforts and appealed to all states and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance to alleviate the hardships of the Afghan refugees, in coordination with the UN high commissioner for refugees. The negotiation efforts met with success in early April 1988, when agreement was reached on a treaty under which the USSR would withdraw its 115,000 troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan would cease all interference in each other’s internal affairs, Afghan refugees would be given a safe return to their country, and Afghanistan would become a neutral and nonaligned state guaranteed by the USSR and the US. A small UN military observer team (UNGOMAP) was to be sent to Afghanistan to monitor compliance with the treaty, which was signed in Geneva on 14 April by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR, and the US. The USSR withdrew its troops in February 1989, however fighting continued, and rebel forces continued to receive aid from the United States and Pakistan. The USSR, for its part, continued to prop up the Marxist government in Kabul. UNGOMAP’s mandate ran out in March 1990 and the secretary-general replaced it with a smaller high-level Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan, funded out of the UN’s regular budget. This office’s purpose was to advise the secretary-general on the military and political situation in order to assist him in finding a settlement. Central America In Central America, Pérez de Cuéllar and the secretary-general of the Organization of American States extended, in November 1985, a joint offer of services to the five Central American countries concerned—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua—as well as to those of the Contadora Group, bringing to their attention the resources that the two organizations could provide, separately and together, to facilitate resolution of the region’s problems and complement the Contadora process. The two leaders visited the area in January 1986 in an effort to reactivate the negotiating process. Pérez de Cuéllar welcomed the proposal of President Oscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica for a peace plan, put forward in February 1987 and agreed to that August in Guatemala City by the five Central American countries. He agreed to serve as a member of the International Committee for Verification and Follow-up created by the Guatemala agreement and offered to extend any additional assistance that would be appropriate under the UN Charter. As a result of this initiative, the countries concerned joined in a framework agreement, Esquipulas II, which gave the UN a mandate to verify the commitments made by the parties to each other. In 1989, the secretary-general established the UN Observer Mission (ONUVEN) to supervise the electoral process in Nicaragua. It was the first time the UN had been directly involved in electoral supervision. The UN Observer Group in Central America
(ONUCA) was charged with overseeing the demobilization of the Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua. In December 1989, the secretarygeneral brought together the five Central American presidents in order to resume a dialogue between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN guerrillas. By July 1990, the San José Human Rights Accord was concluded, in which the government of El Salvador agreed to have its compliance monitored by a UN mission (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador—ONUSAL). After 20 months of negotiations, on his very last day in office, Pérez de Cuéllar witnessed the signing of a cease-fire agreement in the 12year civil war in El Salvador, on 31 December 1991. The success of the United Nations in monitoring the elections in Nicaragua encouraged Haiti to request the organization to monitor its elections in December 1990. The General Assembly granted the request, and created the UN Observer Group for Verification of Elections in Haiti, known by its French acronym, ONUVEH. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in elections declared by the United Nations to be free and fair. However, in September 1991, President Aristide was overthrown by a military coup, creating an intransigent problem for Pérez de Cuéllar’s successor. Cambodia Hostilities between Cambodia (at that time Kampuchea) and Vietnam had broken out in 1978. The United Nations became deeply involved in a humanitarian mission to assist refugees in the conflict along the border of Thailand and Cambodia. In January 1989, the revitalized Security Council began to take a more active role in the 11-year-old civil war. The secretary-general’s special representative, Under Secretary Rafeeuddin Ahmed, played an essential role in the negotiating the framework for a settlement leading to a specific blueprint for the restoration of peace. In August 1989 the Paris Conference on Cambodia was convened, but was suspended within a month. Meetings in New York and Paris in 1990 finally secured the agreement of all the parties to the framework agreement developed by the Security Council. The agreement was signed on 23 October 1991, and two more UN missions were created: the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). The scale and cost of the mandate for these missions was unprecedented. It included repatriation of refugees from the Thai border camps, cantonment of all military forces and demobilization of 70% of these troops, registration of voters, supervision of elections for a Constituent Assembly, and supervision of the process of drafting and ratifying a new constitution. Namibia The change in the players on the world stage led to the resolution of this long-standing issue, nearly twenty-five years after the General Assembly first denounced South Africa’s attempted annexation of South West Africa (now Namibia), and a dozen years after the Security Council laid out the settlement plan for its independence. The Security Council’s resolution 435 of 1978 had called for a cease-fire in Namibia, the abolition of apartheid laws, the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia, the election of a constituent assembly, and the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) to oversee free and fair elections. However, the presence of Cuban troops in Namibia in support of the liberation movement, the South West Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO), created another stalemate between East and West. In 1988, the change in the political climate between the two superpowers produced an agreement that led to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops and the implementation of UNTAG. The transition began in April 1989 and 97% of the registered voters participated in elections in November. On 21 March 1990, Namibia became an independent state,
The Secretary-General with SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma as its president. UNTAG withdrew from Nambia in March 1990. As Pérez de Cuéllar reported in 1990, “UNTAG turned out to be something far more than its somewhat pedestrian name implied. It established the workability of democratic procedures even in a terrain which at first looked most unpromising. It also proved the executive ability of the United Nations in successfully managing a complex operation which brought together 8,000 men and women from more than 100 nations . . . .” Apartheid The dramatic events that led to the dismantling of the apartheid system and the birth of a new South African nation are chronicled in the chapter on International Peace and Security. However, it was during Pérez de Cuéllar’s tenure as secretary-general that the General Assembly held its 16th Special Session (12–14 December 1989) devoted to the question of apartheid. On 11 February 1990, South African President F.W. de Klerk released Nelson Mandela after 27 years of imprisonment. In response to the assembly’s Resolution S-16/1, the secretary-general sent a highlevel mission to South Africa in June 1990 to investigate the progress that had been made toward dismantling apartheid. By the end of his tenure, the process of change that would bear fruit in 1994, was firmly established. Other Major Developments Besides the problems of international peace and security listed above, the secretary-general’s reports to the General Assembly made it clear he observed a growing appreciation in the international community of the need for cooperative action on a number of problems that transcend country borders and defy the ability of states to solve them independently. The recognition of the HIV/ AIDS pandemic, its link to the plague of drug abuse and drug trafficking, and the concomitant links to international terrorism and organized crime all urgently required the attention of the world organization. It was in the final years of Pérez de Cuéllar’s tenure that the stage was set for what he called a new evolution in global society, in which humankind would make international covenants, not only between individuals and nations, but also between humankind and the environment: the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer came into force in 1989; the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal was adopted in March 1989; the Second World Climate Conference was held in late 1990; and in February 1991, the first negotiations by the International Negotiating Committee on a framework convention on climate change began. Those negotiations would lead to the historic UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and dubbed the “Earth Summit.” It was during the final years of the 1980s that an entirely new concept for the UN’s work was developed: sustainable development.
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER BOUTROS BOUTROSG H A L I 1 9 9 2 –1 9 9 6 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office in an air of general euphoria over the accomplishments of the United Nations in the post-Cold War era. However, his first two years in office witnessed the proliferation of intractable and appalling regional conflicts in Haiti, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, among others. The multiplicity and savagery of these conflicts cast a pall on the much hoped-for “new world order” which the end of the Cold War had inspired. Soon after Boutros-Ghali’s inauguration, in January 1992, the Security Council met in its first-ever summit session, at which the heads of states of all the members of the council convened in New York, in person. On 31 January 1992, they requested that the sec-
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retary-general submit to the Security Council “an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping.” Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace set forth an analysis of the world organization’s new situation at a time of global transition with respect to international peace and security. This document is more fully explained in the chapter on International Peace and Security. In May 1994, Boutros-Ghali responded to a 1992 request of the General Assembly to submit a similar report on development under the agenda item “Development and International Economic Cooperation.” He declared that development was not only a fundamental human right, but also the most secure basis for peace. Although the UN had accomplished remarkable achievements in many areas, it was undeniable that after decades of efforts to assist the developing world, the poorest nations were falling even further behind, strangled by debt and social upheaval. Boutros-Ghali said that, although concerns had been expressed that the United Nations put greater emphasis on peacekeeping than development, the numbers of staff and the regular budgetary allocations did not support this fear. He posited that development could not proceed without a fundamental basis in peace, and went on to describe the ideal evolution of a peacekeeping/humanitarian aid operation into a situation of sustainable development. Boutros-Ghali further maintained that protection of the environment was another fundamental concept for development. “In the developing world, ecological pressure threatens to undermine long-term development. Among many countries in transition, decades of disregard for the environment have left large areas poisoned and unable to sustain economic activity in the long term. Among the wealthiest nations, consumption patterns are depleting world resources in ways that jeopardize the future of world development,” observed Boutros-Ghali. The concept of “sustainable development,” as elaborated by UNCED in 1992, had to be strengthened as a guiding principle of development. Social justice and democracy were posited as the other pillars of a successfully developing country. Haiti Elected in UN-supervised elections in December 1990 and deposed by a military coup in September 1991, Haiti’s President Jean-Bertrand Aristide turned to the United Nations and the Organization of American States for assistance. In its Resolution 46/7 (September 1991), the General Assembly strongly condemned the “attempted illegal replacement of the Constitutional President of Haiti” and demanded that President Aristide be restored to power. It requested that the secretary-general cooperate with the Organization of American States (OAS) to restore the legally elected government in Haiti. A trade embargo and a halt to bilateral assistance were imposed on the illegal government, but there was little progress in negotiations. In December 1992, the secretary-general appointed Dante Caputo as Special Envoy for Haiti. The OAS also endorsed Caputo in January 1993. In its Resolution 47/20B (20 April 1993), the General Assembly mandated a joint UN/OAS International Civilian Mission to Haiti (known by its French acronym, MICIVIH) to be deployed throughout Haiti to report on the human rights situation there. On 16 June 1993, the Security Council imposed sanctions on Haiti. In July, talks were held on Governors Island, New York, and an agreement reached on specific measures relating to the return of President Aristide. In August 1993, the Security Council passed a resolution (862/1993) approving the dispatch of an advance team to prepare the way for the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) which would supervise the transition. On 25 August 1993, the Haitian parliament ratified President Aristide’s appointment of Robert Malval as prime minister-delegate during the transition period, as
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provided by the Governors Island Agreement. The Security Council then suspended the sanctions against Haiti. On 27 September, the Security Council approved the deployment of UNMIH. However, on 11 October, armed civilians (known as “attachés”) prevented the mission from debarking upon its arrival in Haiti. The attachés were known to be terrorizing the population through assassinations, attacks on the offices of the prime minister, and a general strike against UNMIH. It was also reported that police had facilitated, and in some cases participated in, these actions. It became apparent that the military government was reneging on its promises under the Governors Island Agreement. On 13 October 1993, the Security Council reimposed its oil and arms embargo. That same month, most of the personnel of MICIVIH were evacuated, leaving a small administrative team to report on the alarming violence and violations of human rights being perpetuated, particularly against supporters of President Aristide. In May 1994, the Security Council imposed expanded sanctions on Haiti, including a ban on commercial air travel. On 31 August 1994, the Security Council, in its resolution 940 (1994), authorized the use of a multinational force similar to the one used to repel Iraq from Kuwait. Specifically, the Security Council authorized UN members to: “form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States.” By the same resolution, the Security Council approved the eventual deployment of the 6,000-strong UNMIH force to assist with the restoration of democracy in Haiti. The multinational force succeeded in landing in Haiti without significant bloodshed, pursuant to a last-minute negotiation headed by former United States President Jimmy Carter at the request of current President Bill Clinton. By October 1994 President Aristide was able to safely return to Haiti. On 16 November 1995 the Security Council commended UNMIH on the substantial progress it had made towards fulfilling its mandate as set out in Resolution 940 in 1994. After a phased reduction of the military and civilian police personnel, 4,000 military and 300 civilian police remained in the mission area by February 1996. Somalia The downfall of Somalia’s President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan warfare in many parts of Somalia. In November 1991, the fighting intensified causing widespread death and destruction, and forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes. Almost 4.5 million people in Somalia—over half the estimated population—were threatened by severe malnutrition. It was estimated that as many as 300,000 people had died since November and at least 1.5 million were at immediate risk. The United Nations had instituted humanitarian operations in Somalia, but due to the deteriorating situation, it had been obliged to withdraw its personnel from the country. In early 1992, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, James O.C. Jonah led a team to Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. During that visit, unanimous support was expressed by all faction leaders for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation. On 23 January 1992, the Security Council (Resolution 733/1992) urged all parties to cease hostilities, called for an embargo on military equipment, and requested the secretary-gen-
eral to contact all parties involved in the conflict. In February, the secretary-general obtained the agreement of the two main factions in Mogadishu to an immediate cease-fire and on 3 March 1992, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aidid signed an “Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire.” The agreement also included acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance and deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992) and established a UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The total strength of UNOSOM was eventually established at 4,219 troops to protect the representatives of the six main UN organizations at work in Somalia coordinating humanitarian efforts (FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO). In addition, more than 30 non-governmental organizations were working in Somalia as “implementing partners” of the UN. However, in October the security situation deteriorated, as some factions refused to agree to the deployment of UN troops to assure delivery of humanitarian aid to people in great need. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation, while warehouses remained stocked with food supplied by the humanitarian agencies. On 3 December 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794 (1992) authorizing the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” A Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by United States troops, was deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. On 3 March 1993, the secretary-general recommended the Security Council establish a new force, UNOSOM II, to take over from UNITAF, which had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia. The secretary-general appointed Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Ret.) of the United States as his new Special Representative for Somalia to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. A Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was attended by the leaders of 15 Somali political movements and representatives of regional organizations. After two weeks of intensive negotiations, the 15 Somali leaders signed an Agreement for disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms. UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF on 4 May 1993, and proceeded to fulfill its mandate to disarm the Somali factions who were terrorizing the people and obstructing humanitarian activities. This provoked the hostility of a few clan leaders. On 5 June, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were missing and 54 were wounded in a series of ambushes and armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops throughout Mogadishu. The Security Council reaffirmed that the secretary-general was authorized to take all necessary measures against those responsible for armed attacks, and on 12 June 1993, UNOSOM II initiated decisive military action in south Mogadishu. On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers, deployed in support of UNOSOM II, but not under UN command, launched an operation in south Mogadishu aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack, as well as subsequent attacks on UN personnel and facilities. Two US helicopters were shot down by Somali militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. While evacuating the detainees, the Rangers came under concentrated fire, and 18 US soldiers were killed and 75 wounded. The bodies of the US soldiers were subjected to humiliating treatment. Following these events, the US both reinforced its Quick Reaction Force in Somalia and announced its intention to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994.
The Secretary-General On 9 October 1993, General Aidid’s faction declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II, but the situation remained tense. It was reported that the major factions were rearming in anticipation of renewed fighting. UNOSOM II’s mandate to force the factions to disarm was unenforceable. The leaders of the two main Somali factions signed a Declaration of National Reconciliation on 24 March, committing themselves to repudiate any form of violence. A National Reconciliation Conference was scheduled for 15 May 1994; however, this conference was postponed. By March 1995, UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia. In August 1995 a wide range of Somali factions held consultations at Nairobi, Kenya and agreed to work out a common political platform and to start a process of national reconciliation. General Aidid rejected the calls for national reconciliation, and intense fighting broke out against the militia of Ali Mahdi. Aidid’s forces occupied Baidoa and Hoddur, and a stalemate between faction leaders continued into 1996. The Former Yugoslavia In June 1991, the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves independent from Yugoslavia. Fighting broke out when Serbs living in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslavian Army, opposed this move. European Community efforts to end hostilities were unsuccessful. On 25 September 1992, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 713 (1991) calling on all states to implement an arms embargo to Yugoslavia. Then Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar appointed former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his personal envoy for Yugoslavia. Vance undertook several missions to Yugoslavia and discussed with the parties the feasibility of deploying a UN peacekeeping operation. An unconditional cease-fire was signed on 2 January 1992, and the Security Council approved the dispatch of a group of 50 military liaison officers to Yugoslavia to use their good offices to promote maintenance of the cease-fire. However, some political groups in Yugoslavia objected to the UN plan for a peacekeeping mission. Nevertheless, on 21 February 1992, the Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as an interim arrangement to create conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. On 30 April 1992, the secretary-general deployed 40 military observers to the Mostar region of Bosnia and Herzegovina in response to the deteriorating security situation there. However, fighting between Bosnian Muslims and Croats on one side, and Bosnian Serbs on the other, intensified. UNPROFOR, which had established its headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital, was obliged to relocate to Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. A situation tragically similar to that in Somalia quickly developed. UN humanitarian convoys could not reach civilians trapped in the conflict. The Security Council, in its resolution 770 (1992) once again invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and called on states to “take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary” to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The situation continued to deteriorate and the Security Council declared a “no-fly zone” to prevent the bombing of Sarajevo and other villages. On 13 March 1993 three unidentified aircraft dropped bombs on two villages, the first time that the “no-fly zone” had been violated since its declaration. On 31 March the Security Council extended its ban on flights, and authorized NATO to enforce the no-fly zone. Between the establishment of the no-fly zone and April 1994, 1,620 violations of the ban on flights over Bosnian airspace were registered. On 28 February 1994, NATO fighters in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina shot down four of six jets which had defied the international ban on military flights and ignored two warnings. On 27 April 1994, the Security Council increased the strength of UNPROFOR to 33,891. Negotiations for a resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia continued in July 1994.
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The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Dayton Agreement) Following a mortar attack on Sarajevo’s Makale commercial district on 28 August 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions near Sarajevo. The air strikes were authorized by the United Nations Peace Forces, and deterred any further attacks on safe areas. By October 1995, a country-wide cease-fire was in place, arranged by a delegation from the United States. The cease-fire included civilian provisions, such as humane treatment of detained persons, freedom of movement, and the right of displaced persons to return to their homes. On 21 November 1995, a series of agreements to restore peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded in Dayton, Ohio. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (known as the Dayton Agreement) was initialed by the governments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the talks, several non-NATO countries, such as the Russian Federation, agreed to participate in the implementation of the Bosnian peace plan. The United Nations was not officially represented during the talks. The economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb party were suspended following the signing of the Dayton Agreement. In his 1996 annual report, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali indicated that “the value of sanctions as a means of conflict resolution was amply demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia, where the conclusion of peace accords has been facilitated by the effective implementation of a sanctions regime.” After the signing of the Dayton Agreement, it seemed possible to solve the problem of repatriation for the estimated two million Bosnian refugees and displaced persons. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was designated as the agency in charge of planning and carrying out the repatriation of the Bosnians who wanted to return. However, by June 1996, only 70,000–80,000 refugees and internally displaced persons had returned to their homes. Cambodia The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) successfully undertook its mission to conduct elections and repatriate more than 360,000 refugees. Its 21,000 military, police, and civilian personnel were fully deployed by mid-1992. Elections were held in May 1993, and 96% of the eligible population, nearly 4.7 million people, registered to vote. Despite concerns about disruption by the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, which had withdrawn from the process, a six-week election campaign in which 20 political parties took part was successfully held. On 10 June, the secretary-general’s special representative declared his view that the elections had been free and fair. The newly elected Constituent Assembly held its inaugural meeting on 4 June 1993 to begin its task of drafting and adopting a new constitution. The four Cambodian political parties that won seats in the election agreed to join in an interim administration for the remainder of the transitional period. UNTAC’s mandate terminated in November 1993. A small Military Liaison Team remained in the country for six months as observers. The liaison team’s mandate expired on 15 May 1994, and they were replaced by three military officers assisting the secretary-general’s special representative in Cambodia.
D E V E L O P M E N T S U N D E R K O F I A N N AN , 1 9 9 7 –
Secretary-General Kofi Annan came to power at a time of differences between the UN and the US government concerning financial matters. At the end of 1996, the US was us$376.8 million in arrears, but the government was reluctant to pay the debt because of the belief that the UN had not been thrifty with its budget. The
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US held the position that the UN should be reduced in size, but Annan took a strong stand against further budget and staff cuts. Nevertheless, Annan took action to reform the UN. In 1998, the organization announced it stood “poised, finally, to undertake sweeping structural change.” The then 185 member states gave strong backing to a plan to overhaul the organization, making it more efficient and responsive to the world scene in the post–cold war era. The secretary-general was credited with mobilizing the General Assembly behind the “ambitious program” while member states were lauded for not allowing individual concerns to “override their common recognition that strategic changes were essential to ensure the relevance and vibrancy of the organization in meeting current global challenges.” Reforms included consolidation of some offices and revisions to the charter to allow for further streamlining. The Annan-led reform efforts helped strengthen relations between the UN and its headquarters host country, the United States, which by the time the reorganization was announced was more than us$1 billion in arrears to the international body. President Clinton praised the reform and issued strong statements of support for the new secretary-general. Further, the US President promised to work out a plan with Congress to pay the nation’s debt to the UN. Faced with losing its vote and influence in the organization (at the end of 1999), the US later made good on the promise, which, combined with initiatives to ensure zero-growth budgets, relieved the international body’s long-standing financial crisis. However, relations between the US and the UN were strained over US military action (including the Clinton administration’s attacks on suspected terrorist bases in Afghanistan in August 1998, and US-British bombings of Iraqi targets in May 2000) and inaction: Faced with wars on several fronts in Africa, in mid-May 2000, Kofi Annan said that the UN peacekeeping efforts needed the kind of military help that the United States was unwilling to provide. The US had offered only to transport troops from other countries to confront the crisis in Sierra Leone, where hundreds of UN peacekeepers were being held hostage. Indeed, Sierra Leone was one of four peacekeeping missions added in 1999 alone. The others were in Kosovo, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire). In a press statement about the emerging situation in Africa, Annan called for a “new style of peacekeeping force for a different age.” The secretary-general described it as one needing “rapid-reaction contingents” who would be on-call from countries with welltrained and well-equipped troops, ready to move fast to pave the way for peacekeeping forces. He also cited the need for better intelligence and more intelligence sharing, admitting the UN was “completely sleeping on the issue of intelligence.” While world health, the environment, the status of women, and nuclear nonproliferation were the emphasis of the UN’s program at the turn of the 21st century, the peacekeeping initiatives continued to take center stage—posing formidable hurdles for the UN leadership. The Global Compact. In an address to the World Economic Forum on 31 January 1999, Kofi Annan proposed an international initiative called the “Global Compact,” that would bring companies together with UN agencies, labor, non-governmental organizations and other actors to pursue good corporate citizenship or responsibility. The focus of the initiative is to allow companies to develop and promote “values-based management,” rooted in internationally accepted principles. The Global Compact was launched at a meeting in New York on 26 July 2000, which brought together senior executives from abour 50 major corporations and the leaders of labor, human rights, environment, and development organizations. Hundreds of companies and organizations have participated in the initiative, and the private-sector participants represent virtually all industry sectors on every continent. The Global Compact is supported by four UN
agencies: the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); the International Labour Organization (ILO); and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Millennium Declaration. In September 2000, at the UN Millennium Summit, world leaders, led by the secretary-general, agreed to set a timetable for achieving eight major goals by 2015. The first is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, by reducing by half the proportion of people living on less than one dollar a day, and by reducing by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. The second goal is to ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary education. The third goal is to promote gender equality and empower women, by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education. The fourth goal is to reduce the child mortality rate by 2/3 for children under five. The fifth goal is to reduce by 3/4 the maternal mortality ratio. The sixth goal is to stop and reduce the spread of HIV/ AIDS, and to stop and reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. The seventh goal is to ensure the sustainability of the environment, by reducing the loss of environmental resources, by reducing by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water, and to achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020. The eighth and final goal is to develop a global partnership for development, by first developing a rule-based and non-discriminatory open trading and financial system; by addressing the least developed countries’ special needs, including tariff- and quotafree access for their exports, enhanced debt-relief for heavily indebted poor countries, the cancellation of bilateral debt, and more generous assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction; by addressing the special needs of landlocked and small island developing states; by developing decent and productive work for youth; by providing access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries, in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies; and by making available, with the cooperation of the private sector, the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies. Kofi Annan’s report on the project was entitled “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.” Nobel Peace Prize. On 10 December 2001, the secretary-general and the United Nations received the Nobel Peace Prize. In conferring the Prize, the Nobel Committee said Mr. Annan “had been pre-eminent in bringing new life to the Organization”. The Committee noted the secretary-general’s attention to peace and security, and his regard for human rights. It also praised his work in combatting HIV/AIDS and international terrorism, and his efficient handling of the UN’s modest resources. The Committee also stated that Mr. Annan “has made clear that sovereignty can not be a shield behind which member states conceal their violations.” Peace and Security Nigeria. The secretary-general was supportive of Nigeria’s peaceful transition from military rule under General Sani Abacha to a democratic government in 1999. President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president of Nigeria in February 1999 as the first civilian leader in 15 years. East Timor. On 25 October 1999, the UN established UNTAET, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, following an independence referendum voted upon by the people of East Timor. Ninety-eight percent of East Timorese voted for independence. UNTAET was established to administer the territory, to exercise legislative and executive authority during the period of transition to independence and to support the move to self-government. Violence led by militias in favor of integration with Indonesia, with the support of Indonesian security forces, had erupted in East Timor following the independence
The Secretary-General vote; many East Timorese were killed, and as many as 500,000 were displaced from their homes. The secretary-general and the Security Council undertook strong diplomatic efforts to halt the violence. A large-scale humanitarian relief effort was launched by UN agencies. With Security Council Resolution 1272, UNTAET was established as a peacekeeping operation to administer the terrority in its transition to independence. When East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002, UNTAET’s mandate expired, and a sucessor mission, known as the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was installed to support East Timorese authorities in the post-independence era, while undertaking the gradual withdrawal of UN forces. Middle East. On 24 May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon and redeployed them south of the international border, or the “blue line” designated by the UN as separating the two countries. This line was fixed in 1923 by colonial France and Great Britain, and is the one UN cartographers have drawn as the border. The secretary-general issued a report on 16 June concluding that Israel had fufilled its obligations under Security Council Resolution 425 regarding withdrawal. The border was controlled by Hezbollah guerrillas, however, who did not surrender their arms. According to Resolution 425, the U.N. would take action to fill the vacuum created following the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and deploy appropriate armed forces to restore effective authority in the area. UNIFIL forces (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), in place since 1978, were reconfigured periodically, and the UNIFIL mandate has been extended every six months. After Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO leader Yasser Arafat met in July 2000 at the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, with the guidance of President Bill Clinton, to discuss peace. For two weeks the leaders attempted to come up with acceptable solutions to questions such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, security, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and borders. No agreement was reached, and the talks failed. On 28 September, Ariel Sharon, leader of the Likud Party, toured the al-Aqsa/Temple Mount complex in Jerusalem, one of the holiest sites to both Jews and Muslims. Sharon’s critics saw it as a highly provocative move. Palestinian demonstrations followed, and developed into what became known as the al-Aqsa intifada. The conflict escalated over the course of 2001, with an increasing number of Palestinian suicide bombings directed at Israeli civilians, and harsh reprisals by Israel. In the early months of 2002, the situation came to a head. Israel reoccupied major parts of the West Bank held by the Palestinian Authority, surrounded Yasser Arafat’s compound in Gaza, and eventually attacked it. In March 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan criticized Israel for its actions, and sent a letter to Ariel Sharon (who had become Israeli Prime Minister in February 2001), stating that Israeli forces had been waging what appeared to be an all-out conventional war on Palestinian civilians. "Judging by the means and methods employed by the [Israeli Defense Forces]—F-16 fighter bombers, helicopter and naval gunships, missiles and bombs of heavy tonnage—the fighting has come to resemble all-
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out conventional warfare," Annan wrote Sharon. "Israel is fully entitled to defend itself against terror," Annan wrote. "But this right does not discharge it of its obligation to respect the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict with respect to the treatment and protection of civilians in occupied territories." Iraq. Since the expulsion of UN weapons inspectors (the UN Monitoring and Verification Mission or UNMOVIC) from Iraq in November 1998, the status of Iraq’s development programs, facilities for, and stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were unknown. Following the lead of the United States, which was determined to see Iraq either removed of its potential chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, or to see a regime change in Iraq, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002, deciding Iraq was in material breach of its obligations under previous relevant Security Council resolutions concerning disarmament. Iraq was to comply with its disarmament obligations, and to set up an enhanced inspections regime to operate in the country, allowing unimpeded access to UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to its weapons facilities. Any interference by Iraq to comply with the weapons inspections, or false reports of stockpiles and programs that it might make, would cause the Security Council to convene immediately to “consider” the situation. Secretary-General Annan, in praising the unanimous resolution, stated: “I urge President Saddam Hussein to comply fully with the Council's demands, for the sake of his people, regional security and world order.” Terrorism. In the wake of the terrorist attacks carried out by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network on the United States on 11 September 2001, the UN Security Council established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) pursuant to its Resolution adopted 28 September concerning counter-terrorism. Resolution 1373 called upon states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; to refrain from providing any support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts; to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts; to bring those individuals or entities to justice; and to exchange information on the actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist networks. Subsequent Security Council resolutions were adopted regarding threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including Resolution 1377 adopted 12 November 2001, Resolution 1438 adopted 14 October 2002, and Resolution 1440 adopted 24 October 2002. In November 2002, in speaking with President George Bush, the secretary-general stated: “[E]very region and people of every faith have also been victims of terrorists. This is a scourge that affects all of us, regardless of region or religion. And we need to stand together to defeat terrorism. And this is where the work of the United Nations and effective implementation of this Resolution 1373 is absolutely crucial. We need to work to deprive terrorists of the opportunities by not giving them haven, by not giving them financial and logistical support. And I think the counterterrorism committee of the Security Council is doing a good job in trying to make sure we all work together on it.”
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E AND SECURITY a dispute at its own discretion; or any UN member, whether or not it is involved in the dispute, may propose the matter for discussion by the General Assembly; or a non-UN member that is a party to the dispute may—under certain conditions—bring it to the attention of the General Assembly; or the Security Council may ask the General Assembly to discuss the matter. Despite these liberal provisions, the charter does not stipulate that all political disputes between states should be brought before the UN. Article 33, for example, enjoins UN members “first of all” to seek a solution to their differences on their own initiative (though if they fail to take this initiative, the Security Council is empowered to call upon them to do so). Only after their efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement have proved fruitless are the disputing parties obliged by the charter to refer the matter to the Security Council. Again, the UN was never intended by its founders to be regarded as the sole international agency for dealing with political disputes. Thus, Article 52 states that nothing in the charter “precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action” and that members participating in such regional arrangements or agencies “shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.”
The first purpose of the UN, as stated in Article 1 of its charter, is the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end, the organization is required “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means . . . adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” The UN has undertaken this heavy responsibility with varying levels of success over the years. However, in the nuclear era, international security in the absence of an organization like the United Nations is unimaginable. More than 1,780 UN peacekeepers died in the service of international peace and security between 1945 and 2002. In recognition of their invaluable contribution to world peace, the United Nations peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.
B A S I C C H A R T E R P R O V IS IO N S The basic provisions of the charter defining the functions of the Security Council and the General Assembly are summarized here, but fuller accounts will be found in the chapters on those bodies, which complement the present chapter. 1. Relative Powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Under Article 24 of the charter, the Security Council has “primary responsibility” in questions of peace and security. It is invested with special powers enabling it to decide, on behalf of the entire UN membership, to take collective action when peace is threatened (Articles 39–42) and is empowered to negotiate agreements with individual members of the UN for the provision of armed forces necessary to maintain international security and to determine how many members shall participate in any collective action undertaken (Articles 43–48). The General Assembly, on the other hand, is empowered only to consider and make recommendations, either to the Security Council or to particular states, on matters pertaining to peace and security. Moreover, under Articles 11 and 12, it may discuss but may not make actual recommendations on any special dispute between nations that is currently under consideration by the Security Council. However, though the Assembly is not expressly empowered to take action, neither is it expressly prohibited from doing so. In the only charter provision touching on the subject, paragraph 2 of Article 11—which is the focus of conflicting interpretation in the long-standing constitutional controversy on the financing of certain General Assembly-sponsored peacekeeping operations—the actual wording is as follows: “Any such question [of international peace and security] on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.” 2. Bringing a Dispute or Serious Situation Before the UN. Although the charter firmly establishes the primacy of the Security Council over the General Assembly in matters of peace and security, it does not stipulate that disputes or serious situations must be discussed in the Security Council before they are discussed by the General Assembly. A dispute may be brought before the UN in a variety of ways specified in the charter without order of preference. One or more of the disputing parties may bring the matter before the Security Council voluntarily, or the council itself may choose to exercise its constitutional right to investigate
P O L I T I C A L B A C KG R O U N D T O T H E U N ’ S P E A C E K E E P IN G A C T I O N The UN’s efforts to preserve international peace and security are the most contentious aspect of its entire work, because of the inherently political nature of its role and the fact that both the Security Council and the General Assembly are essentially political bodies, not courts of law that apportion blame and impartially hand down judgments drawn from a set of established legal codes. Their task in disputes brought before them is to find a compromise solution that is at once satisfactory to all parties, based on the political realities of the world situation and consistent with the principles of the charter. In this way, each local dispute brought before the UN automatically becomes a dispute involving the entire membership, as nations express differing views on the appropriate action to be taken by consensus of the membership. The involvement of the general membership in all disputes is precisely what the founders of the UN intended—as a means of ensuring collective international responsibility for political solutions that are both just and realistic. However, in order to provide a counterweight to the unavoidable taking of sides, they established the principle of unanimity among the great powers by bestowing the right of veto on the permanent members of the Security Council. The workability of this principle in practice presupposed a basic measure of cooperation among the great powers. As events turned out, however, unanimity among the great powers proved to be a chimera. Within a year of the signing of the charter, the world was in the throes of the cold war, and the United States and USSR were engaged in a power struggle. The effects of this unexpected political development on the UN’s work in maintaining international peace and security were
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International Peace and Security immediate and devastating. Each dispute between the smaller nations that came before the UN was subsumed under the developing power struggle between the giants. As a result, between 1945 and 1990, the Security Council was deadlocked again and again by 279 vetoes. Furthermore, the charter requirements for agreement on the provision of armed forces for the UN could not be met. Whereas the USSR looked to the Security Council and the veto as its power instrument in the UN, the United States looked to the support of the majority vote in the General Assembly. In order to circumvent the Soviet veto in the Security Council, and being at that time confident of majority support for most of its substantive policy objectives, the United States spearheaded a drive to turn the General Assembly into a body for action in periods of international crisis. This drive culminated in the adoption in 1950 of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which empowered the General Assembly to undertake collective measures for maintaining or restoring peace when the Security Council found itself unable to act in times of emergency (for the terms of the resolution, see the chapter on the General Assembly). It was the United States, represented by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that originated the proposal for the resolution. Although some of the small nations expressed reservations about certain clauses, most of them were eager to participate more fully in the UN’s peace and security responsibilities. Only India and Argentina abstained in the vote, and only the Soviet bloc voted against the resolution, branding it as illegal and contrary to the charter. The Uniting for Peace Resolution has been invoked in three major crises: the Korean War, the Suez crisis, and the Congo crisis (discussed under Case Histories below). In all three instances, the Security Council found itself deadlocked, and General Assembly action was deemed essential by the majority of members. Nevertheless, despite its proven usefulness as an instrument of restoring peace in these instances, the resolution seems unlikely to be invoked in future disputes. Certain countries questioned the legality of the resolution and of the General Assembly’s action taken under it, and they felt justified on these grounds in refusing to contribute to the costs of the Suez and Congo peacekeeping operations. At the end of the 1980s, the demise of the Soviet Union and the cold war dramatically changed this state of affairs. Within a few short years the entire Soviet bloc was dissolved and a new era of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation raised hopes that the Security Council would begin to fulfill the function foreseen for it by the organization’s founders. However, the political vacuum created by the collapse of the East-West stalemate was followed by an eruption of intransigent, deadly regional conflicts and civil wars, particularly in Africa and Eastern Europe. While 13 operations were established between 1948 and 1988, more than 40 new operations have been authorized since 1988. At its peak in 1995, total deployment of UN military and civilian personnel reached almost 70,000 from 77 countries. By the end of 1996, 16 peacekeeping operations were severely taxing the ability and political will of member states to respond with personnel and financial contributions. And in 2002, the number of current peacekeeping missions was holding steady at 15.
T Y P E S O F A C T I O N TA K E N B Y T H E U N The UN has two main responsibilities with respect to the political disputes that are brought before it by states: helping the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the issue that caused the dispute, and maintaining the peace if animosities threaten to erupt into violence or restoring the peace if hostilities have already broken out.
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An Agenda for Peace In response to the profoundly altered global political situation, on 31 January 1992, the Security Council met in a historic summit session attended by 13 heads of state and two foreign ministers. At that session, the Security Council requested Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to prepare an analysis and recommendations on ways to strengthen UN peacekeeping efforts. In June 1992 the Secretary-General submitted An Agenda for Peace. This important document challenged member states to adapt their world organization to the new international situation with more effective and rational peacekeeping procedures. The document began by defining four types of peace-related activities: Preventive Diplomacy. Defined as action to prevent disputes from arising and to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts. The Secretary-General listed a number of different actions that constituted preventive diplomacy: confidence building (exchange of military missions, opening channels for the exchange of information, and providing monitoring for regional arms reduction agreements), fact-finding missions, early warning from regional organizations with observer status at the United Nations, preventive deployment of a UN force before hostilities occur, and the establishment of demilitarized zones. Peacemaking. Action to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means like those outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, namely: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or appealing to regional organizations. The Secretary-General suggested that the International Court of Justice remained an underused resource for peaceful settlement of international disputes. He recommended that member states that had not accepted the general jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, do so before the end of the UN Decade of International Law in the year 2000. Another tool for peacemaking was the imposition of economic sanctions under Article 41 of the charter. The main difficulty with this tool was compensating member states that would find their own economies crippled by the imposition of sanctions on an offending state. Peacekeeping. Defined as the deployment of a UN force to the field, usually with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping could involve military, police, and civilian personnel. The UN pioneered this new form of military deployment during the early conflicts in the Middle East and the Congo. Peacekeeping troops serve at the request of all the parties to a conflict, for example, to monitor implementation of a cease-fire, or to prevent shipments of weapons across borders. They may also serve to monitor a demilitarized zone and provide a buffer between combatants. Peacekeeping forces, however, are only lightly armed and authorized to use force only in self-defense. By its very nature, peacekeeping implies an even-handed treatment of all the parties in a conflict. Peace Enforcement. Although not officially defined as a separate concept in An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General did propose the creation, under Article 43 of the charter, of forces which could respond quickly and forcefully to imminent or outright aggression. In fact, the UN had sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore a cease-fire. In the Secretary-General’s proposal, these troops would be maintained and specially trained by the armed forces of member states. When called upon, they would be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and authorized to use deadly force to stop combatants. The SecretaryGeneral proposed that these special units would be on call for quick response to the early stages of an international crisis. In the post–cold war era, peace enforcement had already found expression in the Security Council’s authorization of a multinational force (sanctioned by the UN but not, however, under UN administration) led by the United States to suppress Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait.
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However, the concept of peace enforcement remains controversial, as some experts and member countries maintain that there is no basis in the UN charter for an organization dedicated to international peace to settle disputes with military force. Under the charter, member states are meant to settle their disputes by peaceful means. On the other hand, Article 43 of the charter provides for member states to make military forces available to the Security Council. In fact, it was originally envisioned that the United States alone would provide twenty divisions (over 300,000 troops), a very large naval force, 1,250 bombers, and 2,250 fighters. These provisions were never implemented due to lack of consensus. In 1993, former Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart, who participated in the management of 15 peacekeeping operations during his 40-year tenure at the United Nations, proposed the creation of an elite UN-trained military force made up of international volunteers, not soldiers seconded from national forces. Urquhart suggested that such a volunteer force would give the Security Council the ability to back up preventive diplomacy with immediate peace enforcement. “Clearly, a timely intervention by a relatively small but highly trained force, willing and authorized to take combat risks and representing the will of the international community, could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis,” said Urquhart in the journal “Foreign Policy.” Urquhart suggested that such a force might have been used effectively, for example, during the attempted deployment of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). When the United States naval ship carrying the first deployment of troops arrived at Port au Prince in October 1993, the ship was prevented from landing by a disorganized and violent demonstration of armed civilians at the port. By August 1994, the escalating crisis in Haiti had led the Security Council to authorize a multinational force, similar to that used in the IraqKuwait crisis, to restore the democratically elected government of Haiti. The escalation might have been prevented if UNMIH had been enabled to carry out its mandate. Peace Building. Defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” The UN had already begun to develop the concept of “peace building” as early as 1990, when the UN Observer Group in Central America supervised Nicaraguan elections which were certified to be “free and fair” by the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN). Since then the demand for UN electoral assistance has grown enormously. Before 1992, the UN supervised elections in Haiti, Namibia, and Nicaragua. However, between January 1992 and June 1994, the United Nations received 56 requests for electoral assistance. The organization’s Electoral Assistance Unit was established in 1992 and operates within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Following is a list of member states requesting and receiving assistance from 1989 to 1999: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte D’Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East Timor, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Western Sahara, Yemen, and Zambia. The Electoral Assistance Unit is supported by the UN Trust Fund for Electoral Observation, which is a voluntary fund.
Besides building peace by strengthening a country’s democratic infrastructure, the Secretary-General also included the following activities under the concept of peace building: clearing land-mines so that agriculture and transportation may be resumed safely; disarming the warring parties; taking custody of and destroying weapons; repatriating refugees; training security personnel; educational and cultural exchanges; and joint projects to develop agriculture, improve transportation, or utilize shared natural resources. The Cost of Waging Peace In Renewing the United Nations System (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994), co-authors Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers (former senior adviser to the UN Director General for Development and International Cooperation) cite the following figures: “By early 1993 the UN was deploying four times the number of troops, 70 times more police and over 100 times the number of civilian personnel as in 1987, at nearly 10 times the annual cost. As of 30 April 1994 the UN had contributions from 66 countries of 65,838 troops, 2,400 military observers, and 1,307 civilian and police personnel, with possible further deployments (and costs) evolving almost weekly relative to situations like those in Haiti, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The projected costs of peace-keeping rose from some us$600 million in 1991 to an estimated us$2.3 billion for 1993.” In fact, in May 1994, the Secretary-General was unable to obtain 5,500 troops from African nations to protect refugees and international aid workers caught in the bloody Rwandan civil war. He attributed this to donor fatigue among the countries that frequently assign troops to UN operations. As the world has increasingly turned to the UN to deal with conflicts, the cost of peacekeeping has risen accordingly. The annual cost of all peacekeeping operations in 2002 amounted to about us$2.6 billion. However, global military expenditures in the 1990s amounted to around us$1 trillion per year. Of course, these monetary figures do not adequately take into account the tragic price paid in human death and suffering during war. Most UN peacekeeping operations are not financed from the organization’s regular budget, but from special accounts established by the organization to fund each particular operation. Each member is then assessed for a share of the mission’s estimated cost. Special assessments for peacekeeping are divided into three categories. The five permanent members of the Security Council pay about 22 percent more than the regular scale of assessments because of their greater influence over Security Council decisions (by virtue of holding the power of veto). Other developed industrial states pay the same share for peacekeeping as they pay for the regular budget. Wealthier developing countries pay one-fifth of their regular budget share for peacekeeping. The poorest nations (least developed countries, or LDCs) pay one-tenth of their regular share. There are certain inequities to this arrangement. For example, 15 “developing” states with per capita GNPs of $5,000 or more still are assessed only one-fifth of their regular budget assessment for peacekeeping (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Brunei, Singapore, Bahamas, Israel, Cyprus, Barbados, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Malta, Greece, Libya, and Oman). A recurrent and critical problem for UN peacekeeping has been the consistent shortfall in the payment of members’ assessed contributions. As of October 2000, member states owed the UN a total of us$2.1 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues. Since 1945, 123 nations have contributed personnel at various times; 89 were providing peacekeepers in October 2000. In 2000, the top contributors of personnel to ongoing peacekeeping missions were India, Nigeria, Jordan, Bangladesh, and Ghana. The small island nation of Fiji has taken part in virtually every UN peacekeeping operation, as has Canada.
International Peace and Security For the above reasons, the Secretary-General suggested in his Agenda for Peace that contributions to UN peacekeeping operations be financed from defense budgets, rather than from foreign affairs budgets. Other innovative proposals in the agenda included obtaining standing commitments from member states as to the numbers and kinds of skilled personnel they can offer the United Nations as new operations arise; new arrangements for training peacekeeping personnel, including indispensable civilian and police staff; stockpiling basic peacekeeping equipment (vehicles, communications equipment, generators, etc.); and air and sea lift capacity to be provided by member states either free of cost or at lower than commercial rates. Genesis of a Peacekeeping Mission Many missions are planned in response to a crisis, so the steps in mounting them happen more or less simultaneously. When more time is available, the following sequence of events is usually adhered to: • Mediation. The Secretary-General may be instructed to dispatch field survey missions, or may choose to send his own special representative to help achieve a political settlement. • Initial Design. The mission concept is presented to the Security Council for its preliminary approval. • Security Council Directive. The Security Council directs the Secretary-General to report back within a specified amount of time with a plan for the mission that includes its size, structure, duties, and timeline. • Mission Design. Units of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations put together a plan for the mission. • Security Council approval obtained. • Creation and verification of the mission budget. • Submission of the budget to the Fifth Committee (Financial). • Fifth Committee submits the budget to the General Assembly for approval. • Assessment letters are sent to the member states. Until approved by the General Assembly, the SecretaryGeneral cannot make contractual commitments for equipment, transport, or other services in excess of a us$10 million annual spending authority for special circumstances. The length of the approval process creates a devastating time lag when an international crisis develops that requires a timely response. Chronology of Peacekeeping Operations Between 1945 and 2002, there were 55 UN peacekeeping or observer missions. The following is a list of the UN peacekeeping operations, arranged in chronological order. Unless otherwise noted, figures are accurate as of September 2002. UNTSO-United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Duration: June 1948 to present. Headquarters: Government House, Jerusalem. Strength: 154 military observers. Fatalities: 38. Mandate: Initially to supervise the original truce of 1948; in 1949, following the conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), its responsibility became to assist the parties in supervising the application and observance of those agreements. However, over the years, its activities and responsibilities have expanded to cover a number of UN-supervised emergency situations in Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. Composition: UNTSO’s military observers come from 23 contributing countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland,
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Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States. Annual cost: approximately us$23 million. UNMOGIP-United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan Duration: January 1949 to present. Location: The cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Strength: 44 military observers. Fatalities: 9. Mandate: To observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 and report to the Secretary-General. Composition: UNMOGIP’s military observers come from nine countries: Belgium, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Sweden, and Uruguay. Annual cost: approximately us$6.2 million. UNEF I-First United Nations Emergency Force Duration: November 1956 to June 1967. Location: Initially the Suez Canal sector and the Sinai peninsula; later, along the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and the Egyptian side of the international frontier in the Sinai peninsula. Strength: At peak: 6,073; at end: 3,400. Fatalities: 107. Mandate: To secure and to supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel, and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory, and to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. Composition: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Total cost: approximately us$214 million. UNOGIL-United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon Duration: June 1958 to December 1958. Location: Beirut, Lebanon. Strength: 591 military observers (maximum). Fatalities: None. Mandate: To ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms across the Lebanese border. Composition: Forces from 21 countries. Total cost: approximately us$3.7 million. UNOC-United Nations Operation in the Congo Duration: July 1960 to June 1964. Location: Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), Republic of Congo (now Zaire). Strength: Peak: 19,828. Fatalities: 250. Mandate: Initially, to ensure withdrawal of Belgian forces and assist the government in maintaining law and order; later, to maintain territorial integrity and independence of the Congo and to prevent the occurrence of civil war. Composition: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Yugoslavia. Total cost: approximately us$400 million. UNSF-United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) Duration: October 1962 to April 1963. Location: Hollandia, West Irian (now Jayaphra, Indonesia). Strength: 1,576.
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Fatalities: None. Mandate: To maintain peace and security in the territory under the UN Temporary Executive Authority established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands while the administration of the territory was transferred to Indonesia. Composition: Canada, Pakistan, United States. Total cost: approximately us$26.4 million (cost borne by Netherlands and Indonesia). UNYOM-United Nations Yemen Observations Mission Duration: July 1963 to September 1964. Location: Sana’a, Yemen. Strength: 25 military observers; 114 members of a reconnaissance unit; 50 members of an air unit. Fatalities: None. Mandate: To observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (now Egypt and Syria). Composition: Canada, Yugoslavia. Total cost: approximately us$1.8 million (cost borne by Saudi Arabia and Egypt). UNFICYP-United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Duration: March 1964 to present. Location: Cyprus. Strength: 1,245 troops and civilian police, and 147 international civilian personnel and local civilian staff. Fatalities: 170. Mandate: To prevent a recurrence of fighting between Turkishbacked Cypriots and Greek-backed Cypriots; to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order. Composition: The operational elements of UNFICYP are provided by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. The Argentinian contingent included soldiers from Bolivia (2), Brazil (2), Chile (1), Paraguay (1) Peru (2) and Uruguay (3). Annual cost: approximately us$45.6 million. DOMREP-Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic Duration: May 1965 to October 1966. Location: Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. Strength: Two military observers. Fatalities: None. Mandate: To observe the situation and to report on breaches of the cease-fire between the two de facto authorities. Composition: None. Total cost: us$275,831 (through UN regular budget). UNIPOM-United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission Duration: September 1965 to March 1966. Location: Lahore, Pakistan, and Amritsar, India (deployed along the India/Pakistan border between Kashmir and the Arabian Sea). Strength: 96 military observers (maximum). Fatalities: None. Mandate: To supervise the cease-fire along the India/Pakistan border (except the State of Jammu and Kashmir where UNMOGIP operates) and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held before 5 August 1965. Composition: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Venezuela. Total cost: us$1,713,280.
UNEF II-Second United Nations Emergency Force Duration: October 1973 to July 1979. Location: Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula. Strength: Peak: 6,973; end: 4,000. Fatalities: 55. Mandate: To supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces; later, to supervise the redeployment of those forces and act as a buffer between them. Composition: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden. Total cost: approximately us$446.5 million. UNDOF-United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Duration: June 1974 to present. Location: Syrian Golan Heights. Strength: 1,029 troops, assisted by approximately 80 military observers. Fatalities: 40. Mandate: To maintain the cease-fire between Israel and Syria; supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces; supervise the areas of separation and limitation. Composition: Originally composed of Austrian and Peruvian infantry units and Canadian and Polish logistic elements. Currently composed of contingents from Austria, Canada, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden. Annual cost: approximately us$40.8 million. UNIFIL-United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon Duration: March 1978 to present. Location: Southern Lebanon. Strength: 3,310 troops and approximately 50 military observers; 442 local and international civilian staff. Fatalities: 245. Mandate: To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security; assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. Composition: Troops provided by Fiji, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine. Annual cost: approximately us$117.1 million. UNGOMAP-United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan Duration: April 1988 to March 1990. Location: Kabul, Afghanistan, and Islamabad, Pakistan. Strength: 50 military observers. Fatalities: None. Mandate: To assist in monitoring the implementation of the 1988 peace settlement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Composition: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland, and Sweden. Total cost: approximately us$14 million. UNIIMOG-United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group Duration: August 1988 to February 1991. Location: The 740-mile border between Iran and Iraq (headquarters in both Baghdad, Iraq, and Teheran, Iran). Strength: 400 military personnel; 93 local staff. Fatalities: 1. Mandate: To verify, confirm, and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. Composition: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zambia. Total cost: approximately us$178 million.
International Peace and Security UNAVEM I-United Nations Angola Verification Mission I Duration: January 1989 to June 1991. Location: Luanda, Angola. Strength: Peak: 70 military observers; 22 international staff; 15 local staff. Fatalities: None. Mandate: To monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Composition: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain, Yugoslavia. Total cost: approximately us$16.4 million. UNTAG-United Nations Transition Assistance Group Duration: April 1989 to March 1990. Location: Windhoek, Namibia. Maximum strength: Approximately 4,500 military personnel; 1,500 police; 2,000 civilian personnel; 1,000 election observers. Fatalities: 19. Mandate: To monitor and supervise the Namibia independence plan, including supervision of elections to a Constituent Assembly. Composition: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zambia. Total cost: approximately us$368.5 million. ONUCA-United Nations Observer Group in Central America Duration: November 1989 to January 1992. Location: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (headquarters in Tegucigalpa). Strength: Peak: 1,195; end: 338. Fatalities: None. Mandate: Initially, to verify the compliance of the five Central American countries with their security undertakings (the Esquipulas II Agreement, 1987) to cease aid to insurrectionist movements in the region and not to allow their territory to be used for attacks on other states; later, to monitor the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance (the “Contras”). Composition: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela. Total cost: approximately us$89 million. UNIKOM-United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission Duration: April 1991 to present. Location: The demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. Strength: 194 military observers and 905 support personnel, and 227 international and local civilian staff. Due to repeated Iraqi incursions, in 1993 UNIKOM’s mandate was expanded to include taking action against such incursions. Fatalities: 17. Mandate: To monitor the Khawr ’Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait and the demilitarized zone; deter violations of the boundary; observe any hostile action; and, as expanded by Security Council resolution 806 (1993), to resist attempts to prevent it by force from discharging its duties. Composition: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Annual cost: approximately us$54 million.
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UNAVEM II-United Nations Angola Verification Mission II Duration: June 1991 to February 1995. Location: Angola. Strength: 350 military observers, 126 police observers, 400 electoral observers, 80 international civilian staff and 155 local staff. Fatalities: 3. Mandate: Initially, monitor the cease-fire between the Angolan Government and UNITA, until general elections were held in 1992; observe the elections scheduled for September 1992. When fighting broke out again after the elections, UNAVEM II’s mandate was expanded to include monitoring the new cease-fire between the government and UNITA. However, the political situation continued to deteriorate, until in 1993 UNAVEM II had to evacuate 45 of its 67 monitoring locations. Its mandate was extended three months at a time, as it had become an essential factor in a continuous UN effort to facilitate the resumption of negotiations and support humanitarian activities in the country. Following the signing of 20 November 1994 by the Government of Angola and UNITA of the Lusaka Protocol, UNAVEM II verified the initial stages of the peace agreement. Composition: Military and police personnel are contributed by Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and Zimbabwe. Total cost: us$175.8 million. ONUSAL-United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Duration: July 1991 to April 1995. Location: El Salvador. Strength: Approximately 380 military observers, 8 medical officers, 631 police observers; there was also a provision for some 140 civilian international staff and 180 local staff. Fatalities: 5. Mandate: Initially, to verify compliance with the San José Agreement on Human Rights by the government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN); monitor the human rights situation in El Salvador; investigate specific cases of alleged human rights violations; promote human rights in the country; make recommendations for the elimination of violations; and report on these matters to the Secretary-General. Subsequent to final peace agreements which were signed in 1992, ONUSAL’s mandate was expanded to include verification of the cease-fire and separation of forces; and monitoring the maintenance of public order while a new National Civil Police force was set up. Finally, ONUSAL’s mandate was expanded to observe national elections for the presidency, the legislative assembly, mayors, and municipal councils in March 1994. Composition: ONUSAL military observers are provided by Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and Venezuela. Police observers come from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and Sweden. Total cost: approximately us$107 million. MINURSO-United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Duration: April 1991 to present. Location: Western Sahara. Strength: 193 military observers, 24 military support personnel, 25 civilian police officers, supported by291 international and local staff. Fatalities: 10. Mandate: To verify a cease-fire between the government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia elHamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente Polisario); monitor the confine-
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ment of Moroccan and Frente Polisario troops to designated locations; ensure release of all political prisoners or detainees; oversee exchange of prisoners of war; implement a repatriation program; identify and register qualified voters; organize and ensure a free referendum to enable the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination, to choose between independence and integration with Morocco. In 2002, MINURSO’s mandate was extended to 31 January 2003. Composition: Military observers and support personnel are provided by Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United States, and Uruguay. Annual cost: approximately us$43.4 million. UNAMIC-United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia Duration: October 1991 to March 1992. Location: Cambodia. Strength: 1,504 military and civilian personnel. Fatalities: None. Mandate: To immediately deploy a small advance mission to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain a cease-fire while preparations were made for the larger UNTAC force. UNAMIC consisted of civilian and military liaison staff, a military mineawareness unit, and logistics and support personnel. Its mandate was expanded in January 1992 to include training Cambodians in mine-clearing. Composition: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, And Uruguay. Total cost: See UNTAC, below. UNPROFOR-United Nations Protection Force Duration: March 1992 to December 1995. Location: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Strength: 38,599 military personnel, 684 UN military observers, 803 civilian police, 2,017 international civilian staff, and 2,615 local staff. Fatalities: 167. Mandate: In the wake of the end of the cold war, fighting broke out among ethnic and religious factions in the former Yugoslavia. In January 1992, Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali sent 50 military liaison officers to Yugoslavia to promote maintenance of cease-fire by facilitating communication. In February, although some political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to a UN plan for a peace-keeping operation, the Security Council established UNPROFOR for an initial period of 12 months to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. UNPROFOR’s operational mandate extends to five republics of the former Yugoslavia, as indicated above. In the rapidly deteriorating situation, its mandate has been enlarged in all five republics to include such things as security at Sarajevo airport; protection of humanitarian convoys; monitoring of a “nofly zone” banning all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina; border control; the creation of “safe areas” to protect civilians from armed attack. UNPROFOR monitored the implementation of a cease-fire agreement signed by the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces in February 1994. UNPROFOR also monitored the arrangements for a cease-fire negotiated between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb forces which became effective on 1 January 1995.
Composition: Military and/or civilian police personnel are provided by Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. Total cost: Approximately us$4.6 billion. UNTAC-United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Duration: March 1992 to September 1993. Location: Cambodia. Strength: (Peak) 22,000 military and civilian personnel. Fatalities: 78. Mandate: To monitor and help implement the Paris Agreements signed in 1991 between the various political entities in Cambodia. The mandate included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees, and rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure. During its mission the Security Council requested UNTAC to play many roles, including human rights oversight and investigation of allegations of human rights abuses during the transitional period; implementing a legal framework for the electoral process; stabilizing the security situation; and ensuring a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections. After elections were held in May 1993 and a newly elected Constituent Assembly began work on 14 June 1993, a withdrawal schedule for UNPROFOR was established, leaving a smaller contingent of military police officers and medical units to continue the work of mine clearance and training. Composition: UNTAC military and/or civilian police personnel were provided by Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. Total cost: The total cost of both UNAMIC and UNTAC for the period was approximately us$1,621 million. ONUMOZ-United Nations Operation in Mozambique Duration: December 1992 to December 1994. Location: Mozambique. Strength: 6,625 troops and military personnel, 354 military observers and 1,144 civilian police; there were also some 355 international staff and 506 local staff; in addition, during the polling, ONUMOZ sent out about 900 electoral observers. Fatalities: 24. Mandate: To help implement the General Peace Agreement signed in 1992 in Rome, after 14 years of devastating civil war between the Republic of Mozambique and the Resisténcia Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). ONUMOZ’s mandate included four important elements: political, military, electoral, and humanitarian. ONUMOZ military wing would monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation of forces of the two parties, their demobilization and the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons. It would authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures and provide security for United Nations and other international activities. ONUMOZ’s Electoral Division would monitor and verify all aspects and stages of the electoral process. ONUMOZ’s humanitarian component would function as an integrated component of ONUMOZ to make available food and
International Peace and Security other relief for distribution to soldiers in the assembly area. After successful presidential and legislative elections in October 1994, and the installation of Mozambique’s new Parliament and President, ONUMOZ’s mandate ended on 9 December 1994. Composition: The military component includes 302 military observers and some 6,250 infantry and support personnel from Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, and Zambia. Total cost: Approximately us$471 million. UNOSOM I-United Nations Operation in Somalia I Duration: April 1992 to March 1993. Location: Somalia. Strength: Originally 50 military observers; expanded to include 3,500 security personnel, and further expanded to include 719 personnel in logistical units; there were also some 200 international staff. Fatalities: 8. Mandate: To monitor a cease-fire in the capital, Mogadishu; provide protection for UN personnel, equipment, and supplies at the seaports and airports; escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate environs. Composition: Observers were sent from Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe. Total cost: Approximately us$42.9 million. UNOSOM II-United Nations Operation in Somalia II Duration: March 1993 to March 1995. Location: Somalia. Strength: 28,000 military personnel and 2,800 civilian staff. Fatalities: 147. Mandate: To establish a secure environment throughout the whole of Somalia; provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life; help reestablish the country’s institutional structure; monitor that all factions continued to respect the various agreements; prevent resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction that violated the cessation of hostilities; maintain control of heavy weapons; seize small arms of all unauthorized elements; secure and maintain security at all ports, airports, and lines of communications; protect personnel, installations, and equipment belonging to the UN and other international organizations; take forceful action to neutralize armed elements that attacked or threatened to attack such facilities; assist in repatriation of refugees; continue the program of mine clearance begun under UNISOM I. UNISOM II also sought to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and society, based on a democratic government. In February 1994, after several violent incidents and attacks on UN soldiers, the Security Council revised the mandate to exclude use of coercive methods. UNISOM II was withdrawn in March 1995. Composition: Military personnel are provided by Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe. Note: The United States forces deployed in Mogadishu to support UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II were not under United Nations command or authority. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) spearheaded by the United States was deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992 and included military units from
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Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. Total cost: Approximately us$1,643 million. UNOMUR-United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda Duration: June 1993 to September 1994 Location: Uganda side of the Uganda-Rwanda border. Strength: 81 military observers, 17 international staff, and 7 locally recruited personnel. Fatalities: None. Mandate: To verify that no lethal weapons and ammunitions are transported across the border from Uganda into northern Rwanda. The tragic slaughter in Rwanda in April 1994 prevented UNOMUR from fully implementing its mandate. However, the Observer Mission played a useful role immediately after the conclusion of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Composition: Military observers were provided by Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. Total cost: (From inception to December 1993): us$2.3 million; us$8 million net. UNOMIG-United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia Duration: August 1993 to present. Location: Georgia. Strength: Authorized: 107 military observers supported by 265 international and local civilian staff. Mandate: To verify compliance with a cease-fire agreed to on 27 July 1993 between the government of Georgia and separatists in its northwestern region, Abkhazia. It would also investigate reports of cease-fire violations and attempt to resolve such incidents; and report to the Secretary-General about such violations. Before UNOMIG could be fully deployed, the cease-fire broke down, and, in accordance with the instructions of the Security Council resolution 858 (1993), deployment was halted. In May 1994, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides agreed to a cease-fire and separation of forces. UNOMIG then was to monitor the implementation of that agreement, and to verify the exit of troops and military equipment from the security zone. In December 1996, a human rights office was opened in Abkhazia to investigate reported or alleged violations. Composition: Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. Annual cost: us$33.1 million. UNOMIL-United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia Duration: September 1993 to September 1997. Location: Liberia. Strength: 92 military personnel during electoral period (July 1997). Mandate: To verify the Cotonou Peace Agreement signed in Cotonou, Benin, between the parties to the Liberian conflict that broke out in 1990 when the Liberian president, Samuel Doe, was overthrown, causing a complete breakdown of law and order. The UNOMIL was created at the invitation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has taken various initiatives to peacefully settle the conflict, including the establishment of its own military observer group, ECOMOG. UNOMIL was to work with ECOMOG in implementing the Cotoneau Peace Agreement. ECOMOG has primary responsibility for the implementation of the agreement’s provisions, and
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UNOMIL’s role is to monitor the implementation procedures to verify their impartial application. Composition: The military component was composed of personnel from Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, Congo, Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, and Uruguay. Total cost: Approximately us$81.4 million. UNMIH-United Nations Mission in Haiti Duration: September 1993 to June 1996. Location: Haiti. Strength: 1,200 troops and military support personnel, and 300 civilian police; there was also a provision for about 160 international staff, 180 local staff, and 18 UN volunteers. Fatalities: 6. Mandate: Pending the creation of a new police force, assist the government in monitoring the activities of those members of the armed forces involved in carrying out police functions; provide guidance and advice; monitor the conduct of police operations; ensure that legal requirements are fully met. However, the advance unit of UNMIH was prevented from landing at Port au Prince on 11 October 1993. After the Haitian Constitutional government was restored in October 1994, UNMIH assisted the democratic Haitian government in securing stability, training the Haitian armed forces, and creating a separate police force. UNMIH also helped the legitimate constitutional government to organize free and fair elections for the summer of 1995. Composition: Djibouti, France, Mali, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and United States. Total cost: Estimated at us$315.8 million. UNAMIR-United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda Duration: October 1993 to March 1996. Location: Rwanda. Strength: 2,548 military personnel, 60 police officers, 110 international civilian staff, and 61 locally recruited civilian staff. Fatalities: 26. Mandate: In the context of the Arusha peace agreement concluded in August 1993 between the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), UNAMIR originally was to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional government; assure the security of the capital city, Kigali; monitor a cease-fire agreement, including establishing an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation leading up to elections; assist with mine clearance. UNAMIR would also investigate alleged noncompliance with provisions of the peace agreement and provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees. It would also escort and protect humanitarian activities. After renewed fighting in April 1994, UNAMIR’s mandate was altered to permit intermediary action between warring parties, and to provide security for refugees and civilians at risk. After the cease-fire and installation of the new government, UNAMIR was adjusted to ensure stability and security in the northwestern and southwestern regions of Rwanda, to monitor and encourage the return of displaced persons, and support humanitarian aid, and national reconciliation. Composition: At its peak strength UNAMIR was to be composed of 2,217 formed troops and 331 military observers provided by Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. Total cost: Estimated at us$437.4 million.
UNASOG-United Nations Aozou Strip Observer Group Duration: May 1994 to June 1994. Location: Aozou Strip, Republic of Chad. Strength: 9 military observers and 6 international staff. Fatalities: None. Mandate: Established to verify the departure of the Libyan administration and forces from the Aozou Strip in accordance with the decision of the International Court of Justice. UNASOG accomplished its mandate after both Chad and Libya declared the withdrawal complete. Total cost: us$67,471. UNMOT-United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan Duration: December 1994 to May 2000. Location: Tajikistan. Strength: 81 military observers, (as of June 1998), supported by international and local civilian staff. Fatalities: 7. Mandate: Established to monitor the implementation of the agreement between the Tajik government and the opposition on a temporary cease-fire along the Tajik-Afghan border, and to investigate reports of violations and report them to the UN and to the Joint Commission. UNMOT also served as a political liaison and coordinate services that help the efficient deployment of humanitarian assistance by the international community. Composition: Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Poland, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Uruguay. Total cost: Approximately us$50 million. UNAVEM III-United Nations Angola Verification Mission III Duration: February 1995 to June 1997. Location: Angola. Strength: 283 military observers, 7,869 troops and other military personnel, and 288 civilian police as of 30 June 1997. Mandate: On 1 February 1995 the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that UNAVEM III take over from UNAVEM II to help adversarial parties in Angola restore peace and achieve national reconciliation. UNAVEM III was to provide mediation between the government and the UNITA party, to monitor and confirm the provision of legitimate government administration throughout Angola, and promote national reconciliation. UNAVEM III also was to control and verify the elimination of forces, monitor the cease-fire, and ensure the neutrality of the Angolan National Police. Composition: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Congo, Egypt, France, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia. Fatalities: 32. Total cost: More than us$800 million. UNCRO-United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation Duration: March 1995 to January 1996. Location: Croatia. Strength: 6,581 troops, 194 military observers and 296 civilian police, supported by international and locally recruited staff. Fatalities: 16. Mandate: UNCRO replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia, and was established to carry out the functions planned in the cease-fire agreement of March 1994 and the economic agreement of December 1994. UNCRO also monitored and reported the crossing of military personnel, supplies, equipment, and weapons over international borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
International Peace and Security and Montenegro) at the border crossings. The mandate also facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of Croatia, and monitored the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula. Cost: See UNPROFOR, above. UNPREDEP-United Nations Preventive Deployment Force Duration: March 1995 to February 1999. Location: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Strength: 1,040 troops, 35 military observers, and 26 civilian police, 203 local and civilian staff. Mandate: UNPREDEP was established on 31 March 1995 to replace UNPROFOR, but the mandate was basically the same: to monitor and report any developments in the border areas that could affect confidence and stability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Composition: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States. Fatalities: 4. Total cost: Approximately us$200 million. UNMIBH-United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Duration: December 1995 to present. Location: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Strength: 1,414 civilian police and 5 military support personnel; 1,569 international and local civilian staff. Fatalities: 17. Mandate: The Security Council established the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in December 1995 in accordance with the peace agreement signed by the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The IPTF monitors law enforcement facilities and activities, advises and trains law enforcement personnel, assesses threats to public order, advises authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on operating effective civilian law enforcement agencies, and accompanies law enforcement personnel in some responsibilities. Composition: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. Annual cost: us$82.1 million. UNMOP-United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka Duration: January 1996 to present. Location: Prevlaka peninsula, Croatia. Strength: 27 military observers, supported by 9 international and local civilian staff. Mandate: With the termination of UNCRO’s mandate in January 1996, UNMOP became a continuation of the mission to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula. Composition: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Annual cost: Included in UNMIBH, above. UNTAES-United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia Duration: January 1996 to January 1998. Location: Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, Croatia.
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Strength: A total of 2,847 personnel, consisting of 2,346 troops, 97 military observers, and 404 civilian police as of 21 October 1997. Mandate: UNTAES was set up with both military and civilian components. The military part supervised and assisted in the demilitarization of the region, monitored the return of refugees in cooperation with the UNHCR, and contributed to maintaining the peace by its continuing presence. The civilian part was to set up a temporary police force, monitor the prison system, promote the return of refugees, and to organize and verify elections. Composition: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, and United States. Annual cost: us$285.8 million. Total cost: Not available. UNSMIH-United Nations Support Mission in Haiti Duration: July 1996 to July 1997. Location: Haiti. Strength: 225 civilian police and 1,300 military personnel funded for a total of some 1,525 military personnel on 10 July 1997. The mission was supported by international and local civilian staff. A number of UN Volunteers also participated in the mission. Mandate: UNSMIH was established to help the government of Haiti in the professionalization of the police and to assist in the creation and training of an effective national police force. Composition: Civilian police personnel: Algeria, Canada, France, India, Mali, Togo, United States. Military personnel: Canada, Pakistan. Total cost: us$57.2 million (estimate). MINUGUA-United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala Duration: January to May 1997. Location: Guatemala. Strength: Mission total of 188 uniformed personnel, comprising145 military observers and 43 civilian police. Mandate: The peacekeeping mission within the larger civilian and humanitarian MINUGUA mission was established by the Security Council in resolution 1094 (1997) on 20 January 1997 for a three-month period to verify agreement on the cease-fire between the government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Naciónal Guatemalteca (URNG), which was signed at Oslo on 4 December 1996. Total cost: us$4.6 million (estimated). MONUA-United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola Duration: July 1997 to February 1999. Location: Angola. Strength: 240 personnel all ranks; consisting of 222 troops, 12 military observers, and 6 civilian police monitors; and supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff as of May 1999. Fatalities: 14 (as of 31 December 1998). Mandate: MONUA was set up to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to longterm stability, democratic development, and rehabilitation of the country. Composition: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Total cost: Approximately us$225.6 million.
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UNTMIH-United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti Duration: August to November 1997. Location: Haiti. Strength: 250 civilian police personnel and 50 military personnel. Mandate: To assist the government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Composition: Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and United States. Total cost: us$20.6 million. MIPONUH-United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Duration: December 1997 to March 2000. Location: Haiti. Strength: 300 civilian police personnel, including a special police unit, supported by a civilian establishment of some 72 international and 133 local personnel and 17 United Nations Volunteers. Mandate: MIPONUH’s main task was to assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police. MIPONUH, which succeeded the previous United Nations Missions in Haiti in December 1997, placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Composition: Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and United States. Total cost: Not available.
UNOMSIL-United Nations Mission of Observers in Sierra Leone Duration: July 1998 to October 1999. Location: Sierra Leone. Strength: Military component as of 30 July 1999: 51, consisting of 49 military observers and 2 troops, supported by a 2-person medical team. Civilian component as of 4 June 1999: 53, consisting of 29 international civilian personnel and 24 locally recruited staff. Mandate: UNOMSIL’s military element was to monitor the military and security situation; monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country. UNOMSIL’s civilian element was to advise, in coordination with other international efforts, the government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment; advise on the reform and restructuring of Sierra Leone’s police force and monitor progress; report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone and assist the government in its efforts to address the country’s human rights needs. Composition: Bangladesh, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sweden, Thailand, the United Republic of Tanzania, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zambia. Annual cost: us$40.7 million.
UNPSG-United Nations Civilian Police Support Group Duration: January 1998 to October 1998. Location: Croatia’s Danube region (Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium). Strength: As of 30 September 1998, mission total: 114 police, supported by about 200 international and local civilian staff. Mandate: UNPSG took over policing tasks on 16 January 1998 from UNTAES after that mission’s mandate expired. The function of UNPSG was to continue monitoring the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly with respect to the return of displaced persons, for a single nine-month period. Composition: Argentina, Austria, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United States. Total cost: Approximately us$30 million.
UNMIK-United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Duration: June 1999 to present. Location: Kosovo province of Yugoslavia. Strength: About 1,957 personnel of UN and partner organizations on the ground, including about 1,297 UN civilian staff. Plus 3,159 civilian police deployed in all five regions of the province and at four border crossings as of 27 April 2000. Mandate: In the wake of the Kosovar conflict, in which the Yugoslav government used hard-handed tactics to control an independence movement in the southern province, the UN Security Council set up UNMIK. Unprecedented in its scope, UNMIK encompasses the activities of three non-UN organizations under the UN’s overall jurisdiction. UNMIK’s mandate is to provide police and justice functions, and an interim civil administration (UN-led), spearhead reconstruction, including rebuilding the infrastructure (EU-led), and reestablish institutions (OSCE-led). A NATO-led force is to provide an international security presence. Annual cost: us$456.4 million as of 2000.
MINURCA-United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic Duration: April 1998 to February 2000. Location: Central African Republic. Strength: Maximum authorization: 1,350 troops; 25 civilian police. Mandate: Assisted in maintaining and enhancing security and stability in Bangui and immediate vicinity and in maintaining law and order there; supervised and controlled storage, and monitored the final disposition of weapons retrieved in disarmament exercise; ensured security and freedom of movement of UN personnel; assisted in capacity-building efforts of the national police; provided advice and technical support regarding conduct of legislative elections. Composition: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, France, Gabon, Mali, Portugal, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia. Annual cost: us$33.3 million.
UNTAET-United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Duration: October 1999 to May 2002. Location: East Timor. Strength: Maximum military component, 9,150; civilian police component, 1,640. Fatalities: 17. Mandate: As Portugal gave up its claim to East Timor in 1975, Indonesian troops moved in; the half-island territory was ruled by Indonesia from then until it became the independent state of East Timor on 20 May 2002. At elections on 30 August 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence. UNTAET was established to administer the territory and exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period. UNTAET consulted and worked in close cooperation with the East Timorese people. Composition: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Gambia,
International Peace and Security Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (Republic of), Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Annual cost: us$476.8 million. UNAMSIL-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Duration: October 1999 to present. Location: Sierra Leone. Strength: As of September 2002, 17,410 military personnel, including 226 military observers. Other personnel include some 62 civilian police, and 303 international and 551 local civilian personnel. Fatalities: 90. Mandate: UNAMSIL is to cooperate with the government and the other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan. On 7 February 2000, the Council revised the mandate of the Mission and expanded its size, as it did once again on 19 May 2000 and 30 March 2001. Composition: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Annual cost: us$699.8 million. MONUC-United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Duration: 30 November 1999 to present. Location: Democratic Republic of the Congo and the subregion, including Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Strength: 4,309 total uniformed personnel, including 455 mil tary observers; supported by 549 international and 636 local civilian personnel. Fatalities: 11. Mandate: After Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional states signed the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement in July 1999, the UN Security Council (in November 1999) set up MONUC to maintain liaison with the parties and carry out other tasks, incorporating UN personnel authorized in earlier resolutions. On 24 February 2000, the Council expanded the mission’s mandate and size. Composition: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zambia. Annual cost: us$608.3 million. UNMEE-United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritriea Duration: 31 July 2000 to present. Location: Eritrea and Ethiopia. Strength: 4,129 military personnel, including 212 military observers; supported by 225 international and 257 local civilians. Fatalities: 3. Mandate: UMEE was established following the cessation of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia in June 2000, to maintain
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liaison with the parties and establish the mechanism for verifying the cease-fire. In September, UNMEE’s role was expanded to monitor the cessation of hostilities and assist in ensuring observance of security commitments. In August 2002, UNMEE eganged in demining in key areas to suport demarcation, and provided administrative and logistical suport for the Field Offices of the Boundary Commission. Composition: Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay and Zambia. Annual cost: us $230.9 million. UNMISET-United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor Duration: 20 May 2002 to present. Location: East Timor. Strength: 122 military observers, 4,478 troops and 754 civilian police, supported by 469 international and 826 local civilians. Fatalities: 1. Mandate: East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002. UNMISET was established by the Security Council to provide assistance to East Timor over a period of two years until all operational responsibilities are fully devolved to the East Timor authorities, including law enforcement and security. Composition: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, Samoa, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Annual cost: us$305.2 million.
S O M E C AS E H I S T O R I E S O F U N A C T IO N The cases are arranged in order of the dates when the disputes were first brought before the UN. The Middle East Establishment of Israel. In April 1947, the General Assembly, at a special session, established a Special Committee on Palestine to make recommendations for the future status of the British mandate. The resulting partition plan, which divided Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, with an international regime for the city of Jerusalem, was adopted by the General Assembly in November of the same year. A UN Palestine Commission was established to carry out the recommendations, and the Security Council was requested to implement the plan. The date for termination of the British mandate and withdrawal of British troops was 1 August 1948. However, violent fighting broke out between the Arab nations and the Jewish community in Palestine. The Security Council thereupon established a Truce Commission consisting of Belgium, France, and the United States, while the General Assembly authorized a UN Mediator for Palestine to replace the Palestine Commission. On 14 May 1948, the Jewish state of Israel was proclaimed. Almost immediately, the Arab nations instituted full-scale armed action. Following a four-week truce at the request of the Security Council, hostilities were renewed on 8 July. This time, the Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the charter, ordered the governments concerned to desist from further military action and proclaimed a cease-fire. Through the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, the Secu-
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rity Council then established a UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) of military observers from different countries, with headquarters in Jerusalem, and assigned it the task of patrolling the frontiers. Fighting continued, however, and Count Bernadotte was assassinated in September 1948. During its regular session in the fall of 1948, the General Assembly established a three-member Conciliation Commission (France, Turkey, and the US) to negotiate a settlement and also established the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees (later replaced by UNRWA). Following negotiations with the acting UN mediator, Ralph Bunche, in the first half of 1949, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria signed armistice agreements. The agreements provided for mixed armistice commissions to check on their implementation. UNTSO continued in operation to observe the cease-fire and is still in existence, investigating complaints of armistice violations and reporting to the Security Council. The Conciliation Commission also continues to function, still trying to fulfill its mandate from the General Assembly to assist the parties concerned to negotiate a final settlement of all issues. The Suez Crisis. In July 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. In September, after Egypt’s rejection of the London Conference plan for international control of the canal, France and the United Kingdom informed the Security Council that Egypt’s attitude was endangering the peace. Israel invaded Egypt’s Gaza Strip the following month, and a Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops was vetoed by France and the United Kingdom. France and the United Kingdom began armed intervention in the area, and thereafter the situation was handled exclusively by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. In November 1956, the General Assembly established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and supervise cessation of hostilities. Since Israel would not permit UNEF contingents on territory under its control, the force was stationed on the Egyptian side of the demarcation line. Withdrawal of British and French forces was completed by December 1956 and of Israeli forces by March 1957. The canal was cleared by April of the same year, and Egypt declared it open to international traffic (Israeli ships were barred, however). The Six-Day War, 1967. By the mid-1960s, the tension between Israel and the Arab countries had begun to manifest itself in frequent and sometimes major hostilities across the various armistice borders. On 18 May 1967, the United Arab Republic (UAR), which two days earlier had begun deploying troops to the armistice demarcation line in the Sinai peninsula, officially requested Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw all UNEF units from the area. After consultations with the UNEF Advisory Committee, U Thant ordered the withdrawal of the force that evening. U Thant’s prompt compliance with the UAR’s request aroused severe criticism in Israel and other quarters. His view was that both legal and practical considerations required him to act without delay. In subsequent reports, he pointed out that UNEF was not an enforcement operation ordered by the Security Council but a peacekeeping operation dependent on the consent of the host country. His unilateral decision to disband the force was, however, probably the most controversial of his career as Secretary-General. Some of his critics challenged the legal validity of his stand, while many others believed that he could have used his office to try to persuade the UAR at least to agree to a postponement of its request for UNEF’s withdrawal, which they felt only helped pave the way for the crisis that followed. The UAR occupied the fortress Sharm el-Sheikh, which commands the Strait of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. On 22 May 1967, it declared the gulf closed to Israeli ships and to other ships bound for Israel with strategic goods. Israel found its sole direct access to the Red Sea blockaded and considered the blockade, together with the military agreement that the UAR had recently signed with Jordan, a justified casus belli. Regarding the
assurances of help that it had received from Western countries in the course of concentrated diplomatic activity intended to avert the impending war as insufficient, it simultaneously attacked the UAR, Jordan, and Syria on 5 June. Within three days, it had deeply penetrated the territory of each country. The Security Council, in emergency session, demanded a ceasefire on 6 June 1967. Israel announced that it would accept a cease-fire provided that the other parties accepted it. Jordan announced acceptance on 7 June, the UAR on 8 June, and Syria on 9 June, and a cease-fire accordingly took effect on 10 June. Violations of the cease-fire, especially along the Israel-Syria border, continued until 13 June, when Secretary-General U Thant was able to report the “virtual cessation” of all military activity. By then, Israel had voluntarily withdrawn its forces from much of the territory that it had occupied but had retained control of several areas regarded as essential to its security—namely, the whole of the UAR’s Sinai peninsula up to the Suez Canal, including Sharm el-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip; the Jordanian part of the city of Jerusalem and the West Bank area of the Jordan River; and the Golan Heights, in Syrian territory overlooking the Sea of Galilee. On 14 June, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon Israel to ensure the “safety, welfare and security” of the inhabitants of the occupied areas and upon the “governments concerned” scrupulously to respect the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention. An emergency special session of the General Assembly, held from 19 June to 21 July 1967, failed to produce a resolution that might serve as the frame of reference for a settlement. The division of opinion between the supporters of the Arabs, including the Soviet bloc and several African and Asian countries, and the supporters of the Israeli position, including the United States and several Western countries, was too deep to be bridged. However, the General Assembly did adopt, by a vote of 99 in favor with 20 abstentions, a resolution declaring invalid Israel’s proclamation on 28 June that Jerusalem would thenceforward be a unified city under Israeli administration. Resolution 242. For many months, the Security Council was equally unsuccessful in the attempt to devise an acceptable formula for establishing permanent peace in the area. Finally, on 22 November 1967, after weeks of quiet diplomacy and closed discussions, it adopted Resolution 242, which provided the basis of UN efforts to achieve a definitive settlement. The resolution, based on a British draft, establishes certain principles for a peaceful settlement without going into contentious specifics or prescribing priorities. The principles include withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied areas (the text deliberately avoided requesting withdrawal from “all” occupied areas, in view of Israel’s declaration that it would not give up certain strategic places, including Jordanian Jerusalem); an end to states of belligerency; respect for the rights of all states in the area to peaceful existence; and an affirmation of the need to guarantee free navigation through international waterways, settle the long-standing Palestine refugee problem, and guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of the countries involved. All parties— except, initially, Syria—accepted the formula. The October War, 1973. Full-scale hostilities broke out again in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors on 6 October 1973. The Security Council met four times without considering any draft resolutions and on 12 October decided to reconvene at a later date after consultations. It did so on 21 October at the request of the United States and the USSR and the next day adopted Resolution 338, which called for the immediate cessation of all military activities. It also decided that negotiations between the concerned parties for a just and durable peace should begin at once. China did not participate in this or other votes on the question. Israel, Syria, and Egypt agreed to comply, each stating conditions.
International Peace and Security A second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) was established by the Security Council on 25 October 1973. Its personnel were to be drawn from member states, with the exception of the permanent members of the council, and its eventual strength was to be 7,000. As the force was assembled, it took up stations in zones of disengagement between Israel and Egypt. A peace conference on the Middle East was convened in December 1973 in Geneva under the auspices of the UN and the co-chairmanship of the United States and the USSR. The work of the conference came to fruition at kilometer 101 on the CairoSuez road on 18 January 1974, when the chief of staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces and the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces signed an Agreement on Disengagement of Forces, with the UNEF commander as witness. The agreement came into effect on 25 January 1974. It was not until 31 May 1974, in Geneva, that Syria and Israel signed an Agreement on Disengagement, which called for the creation of a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and specified that it did not represent a peace agreement but a step toward peace. On the same day, after the signing, the Security Council adopted a resolution jointly sponsored by the United States and the USSR that set up UNDOF. China and Iraq did not participate in the vote. The strength of UNDOF was to be 1,250, its components to be drawn from members of the UN that were not permanent members of the Security Council. In 2002, UNDOF comprised some 1,000 troops, provided by Austria, Canada, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden, deployed between the Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. Developments in Lebanon. On 15 March 1978, following a Palestinian commando raid in Israel, Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon. On 19 March, the Security Council called on Israel to cease its military action against Lebanese territory and decided to establish a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces and assist the Lebanese government in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The mandate of the 6,000-man UNIFIL has been extended by the Security Council since then. Perhaps its greatest crisis occurred on the morning of 6 June 1982, when Israeli forces, comprising two mechanized divisions with air and naval support, moved into Lebanese territory, bypassing positions occupied by UNIFIL. The Israeli invasion was followed by a few days of intensive exchanges of fire with PLO and Syrian forces and by Israeli air attacks on targets in the Beirut area. In subsequent days and weeks, the Security Council met numerous times to demand a cease-fire, withdrawal of Israeli forces, and respect for the rights of the civilian population. UNIFIL’s mandate was enlarged to extend protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area; an international survey mission was established to assess the situation on the spot; a UN observer group was deployed in and around Beirut to ensure that a cease-fire was fully observed by all concerned; and, at Lebanon’s request, a 4,000-man multinational force, composed of contingents from France, Italy, and the United States (and later the United Kingdom), was deployed in the Beirut area. The force was withdrawn in 1984. In September 2002, UNIFIL comprised some 3,310 troops, provided by Fiji, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine. It has continued to assist the Lebanese government in ensuring the return of its effective authority in southern Lebanon. The Question of Palestinian Rights. Concurrently with its consideration of the situation in the Middle East and of the role of peacekeeping forces in the region, the UN has been concerned with the question of Palestinian rights. In 1968, the General Assembly established the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, which reports annually to it, and in 1974, it reaffirmed “the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people” to
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unhindered self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty. The General Assembly recognized the Palestinian people as a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East, and it invited the PLO to participate as an observer in its work and in UN conferences. In 1975, the General Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and asked it to recommend a program for the implementation of those rights. The committee recommended that a timetable be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the areas occupied in 1967. The evacuated areas, with all properties and services intact, would be taken over by the UN, which, with the cooperation of the League of Arab States, would subsequently hand them over to the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The General Assembly has endorsed the committee’s recommendations at successive sessions since 1976, but the Security Council has not acted on them. An International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held in Geneva in the summer of 1983, adopted a declaration on Palestine and a program of action for the achievement of Palestinian rights, which was later endorsed by the General Assembly. The conference also called for the convening of an international conference on the Middle East, a proposal which the General Assembly endorsed. At its 1987 session, the General Assembly reaffirmed its conviction that “the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East and that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region will be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights and the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from all the Palestinian and other Arab occupied territories.” The General Assembly again called for the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the UN and at the invitation of the Secretary-General, with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO. Korea At the end of World War II, the Allied powers agreed that Soviet troops would accept the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel in Korea and that United States forces would accept it south of that line. The two occupying powers established a joint commission to set up a provisional government for the country, but the commission could not come to an agreement, and the United States brought the matter to the General Assembly in September 1947. In November, the General Assembly created a Temporary Commission on Korea to facilitate nationwide elections. However, since the commission was denied access to northern Korea, it was only able to supervise elections in the southern half of the country. These elections took place in May 1948, and in August, the United States transferred governmental and military functions to the duly elected government of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Meanwhile, a separate government was established in the north. In December 1948, the General Assembly, over the objection of the USSR, established a seven-member UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to replace the Temporary Commission and to seek reunification. On 25 June 1950, both UNCOK and the United States informed the Security Council that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had attacked the ROK that morning. The council met on the same day and (the USSR being absent at the time in protest against a council decision on Chinese representation) declared the attack to be a breach of the peace. It called for a cease-fire, withdrawal of DPRK forces to the 38th parallel, and the assistance of member states to the ROK. As the fighting continued, the Security Council, on 27 June, recommended that UN members furnish assistance to the ROK to repel the attack
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and restore peace and security. On the same day, the United States announced that it had ordered its own air and sea forces to give cover and support to the South Korean troops. On July 7, the Security Council voted to recommend that states make forces available to a UN Unified Command under the United States. (It should be noted that although the council had used the language of Chapter VII of the charter—“breach of the peace,” etc.—it did not specifically invoke the chapter itself or use its constitutional power thereunder to order all states to comply with its decision.) In all, 16 nations supplied troops: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the US; the ROK also placed its troops under the UN Command. On 1 August 1950, the USSR returned to the Security Council (having by then been absent for six months) and declared that all the actions and decisions that had previously been taken by the council were illegal. On 6 November, the USSR vetoed a resolution proposed by the United States. As a result of the ensuing deadlock, the General Assembly virtually took over the handling of the entire situation (the Security Council even agreeing unanimously, on 31 January 1951, to remove the item from its agenda). The legalistic device by which the General Assembly voted itself competent to continue with collective measures that under the charter are the exclusive preserve of the Security Council was the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Even before the Security Council became deadlocked, the General Assembly had considered an agenda item entitled “The Problem of the Independence of Korea.” Under this item, it established the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to replace UNCOK. Then, on 6 November 1950, events were given a new twist when the People’s Republic of China entered the war on the side of the DPRK. The General Assembly promptly added the agenda item entitled “Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea.” Under this item, the General Assembly established the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and a three-member Cease-fire Group that included the president of the General Assembly to determine a basis for ending hostilities. Following China’s refusal to cooperate, the General Assembly, in February 1951, adopted a resolution that that government had engaged in aggression. It also established a Good Offices Committee and an Additional Measures Committee to supplement the Cease-fire Group. Truce negotiations began in July 1951, but fighting continued until 1953, when an armistice agreement was signed on 27 July. A year later, the General Assembly called for the political conference that had been provided for in the armistice agreement. The conference was held between April and June 1954, but it failed to resolve problems and negotiate reunification of the country. UNKRA ceased operations in 1960, and UNCURK was dissolved by a consensus vote of the 1973 General Assembly. On 18 November 1975, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions—one with Western support, the other with that of the Communist states—which were to some extent conflicting but which both favored dissolution of the UN Command at an early date. The first resolution called for negotiations among the DPRK, the ROK, China, and the United States. The second called for negotiations between the DPRK and the United States. The DPRK declared that it would not participate in negotiations with the ROK. As of mid-1987, the following countries were still represented on the UN Command: Australia, Canada, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States. Kashmir Kashmir (officially, Jammu and Kashmir) was originally one of
the princely states of British India. Under the partition plan and the Indian Independence Act of 1947, it became free to accede to either India or Pakistan, on both of which it borders. On 1 January 1948, India reported to the Security Council that tribesmen were invading Kashmir with the active assistance of Pakistan. After the invasion had begun, the maharajah of Kashmir had requested accession to India and India had accepted on the understanding that, once normal conditions were restored, the question of accession would be settled by a plebiscite. Pakistan declared that Kashmir’s accession to India was illegal. The Security Council, after asking the parties to mediate, called for withdrawal of Pakistani nationals, reduction of Indian forces, and arrangement of a plebiscite on Kashmir’s accession to India. A UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was sent to mediate in July 1948. By 1949, UNCIP had effected a cease-fire and was able to state that principles on a plebiscite had been accepted by both governments. In July 1949, agreement was reached on a cease-fire line, and UNCIP appointed a group of military observers to watch for violations. However, it was unable to reach agreement on terms for the demilitarization of Kashmir prior to a plebiscite. In March 1951, after several attempts at further negotiation had failed, the Security Council decided to continue the observer group—now called the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)—to supervise the cease-fire within Kashmir itself. Despite continued mediation, the differences between the parties remained. The Security Council repeatedly considered the matter without achieving appreciable progress. In August 1965 there was a sudden outbreak of serious hostilities. UNMOGIP reported clashes between the regular armed forces of both India and Pakistan, and fighting continued into September, although the Security Council had twice called for a cease-fire. Following a report that fighting had spread to the international border between India and West Pakistan, the council, on September 20, requested that both sides issue orders for a cease-fire within two days and withdraw their forces to their previously held positions. The cease-fire was accepted by both states, but continuous complaints of violations were made by each side. Accordingly, the Council requested Secretary-General U Thant to increase the size of UNMOGIP and to establish the UN IndiaPakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) on the India-West Pakistan border. On 5 November 1965, the Security Council urged that a meeting between the parties be held as soon as possible and that a plan for withdrawal containing a time limit for execution be developed. U Thant appointed a representative to meet with authorities of both countries on the question. On 17 February 1966, he informed the council that a plan and rules for withdrawals had been worked out. He also stated that, on 10 January, the prime minister of India and the president of Pakistan had agreed at Tashkent, where they had met at the initiative of the USSR, that their respective forces would be withdrawn to their original positions by 25 February. Thus, though the crisis remains quiescent, the conflict itself is unresolved, and UNMOGIP is still in operation, with some 40 military observers stationed in the area. In 1971, another conflict between the two countries broke out, this time in connection with the civil strife in East Pakistan, which later became the independent state of Bangladesh. As nearly 10 million refugees streamed into neighboring India, tension increased in the subcontinent. U Thant conveyed his serious concern to the president of Pakistan and the prime minister of India and, with the consent of the host governments, set up two largescale humanitarian programs. One of these, with the UN high commissioner for refugees as the focal point, was for the relief of the refugees in India. The other was for assistance to the distressed population in East Pakistan. U Thant’s actions were subsequently unanimously approved by the General Assembly.
International Peace and Security On 20 July 1971, the Secretary-General drew the attention of the president of the Security Council to the steady deterioration of the situation in the region, which he described as a potential threat to peace and security. He noted that humanitarian, economic, and political problems were involved, and he indicated that the UN should play a more forthright role to avert further deterioration. In October of that year, he offered his good offices to the governments of India and Pakistan, but India declined. Clashes broke out between the two countries, and on 3 December, U Thant notified the Security Council under Article 99 of the charter that the situation in the region constituted a threat to international peace and security. After a cease-fire had put an end to the fighting on 17 December 1971, the Security Council adopted a resolution demanding the strict observance of the cease-fire until withdrawal of all armed forces to their previous positions should take place. The council also called for international assistance to relieve the suffering and for the appointment of a special UN representative to lend his good offices for the solution of humanitarian problems. During 1972, the refugees, with UN assistance, returned to their homeland. The UN relief operation helped pave the way for the rehabilitation of the shattered economy of Bangladesh, which became a member of the UN in 1974. In 2002 UNMOGIP consisted of 44 military observers from nine countries: Belgium, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, and Uruguay. The Congo (Zaire) One week after the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), a former Belgian colony, had become independent on 30 June 1960, troops of the Force Publique mutinied against the Belgian officers, demanding higher pay and promotions. As violence and general disorder spread rapidly throughout the country, Belgium rushed troops to the area to protect its extensive mining interests. On 11 July, Katanga, the richest province of the country by virtue of its Belgian-controlled copper mines, proclaimed its secession from the new state. On the following day, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba appealed for UN military assistance “to protect the national territory against acts of aggression committed by Belgian metropolitan troops.” In a series of meetings, the Security Council called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorized Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to provide the Congolese government with such military and technical assistance as might be necessary until the national security forces, through the efforts of the government with UN assistance, might be able, in the government’s opinion, to meet their tasks fully. Within two days, contingents of a UN force provided by a number of countries, including Asian and African states, began to arrive in the Congo, followed by UN civilian experts to help ensure the continued operation of essential services. Over the next four years, the task of the UN Operation in the Congo (UNOC) was to help the Congolese government restore and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the country, maintain law and order, and to put into effect a wide and long-term program of training and technical assistance. At its peak strength, the UN force totaled nearly 20,000 officers and men. The instructions of the Security Council to the force were strengthened early in 1961 after the assassination of Lumumba in Katanga. The force was to protect the Congo from outside interference, particularly by evacuating foreign mercenaries and advisers from Katanga and preventing clashes and civil strife, by force if necessary as a last resort. Following the reconvening of the Congolese parliament in August 1961 under UN auspices, the main problem was the attempted secession, led and financed by foreign elements, of the province of Katanga, where secessionist gendarmes under the
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command of foreign mercenaries clashed with UN forces. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld died on 17 September 1961, when his plane crashed on the way to Ndola (in what is now Zambia), where talks were to be held for the cessation of hostilities. In February 1963, after Katanga had been reintegrated into the national territory of the Congo, a phasing out of the force was begun, aimed at its termination by the end of that year. At the request of the Congolese government, however, the General Assembly authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The force was completely withdrawn by 30 June 1964. Civilian aid continued in the largest single program of assistance undertaken by the UN up to that time, with some 2,000 experts at work in the nation. Cyprus Cyprus was granted independence from British rule in 1960 through agreements signed by the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. Under these agreements, Cyprus was given a constitution containing certain unamendable provisions guaranteeing specified political rights to the Turkish minority community. The three signatory powers were constituted guarantors of Cyprus’s independence, each with the right to station troops permanently on the island. The granting of independence had been preceded by a prolonged conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities on the future status of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, comprising 80 percent of the total population, originally had wanted some form of union with Greece, thereby provoking a hostile reaction among the Turkish Cypriots, who countered by demanding partition. Each side was supported in its aims by the country of its ethnic origin. Independence did nothing to alleviate dissension on the island. Both sides were dissatisfied with the constitution that had been granted them, but their aims were diametrically opposed. The Turks wanted partition or a type of federal government, whereas the Greeks wanted a constitution free of outside controls and of provisions perpetuating the division between the two communities. After three years of continuous tension, the Cyprus government, under Greek Cypriot president Makarios, complained to the Security Council on 27 December 1963 that Turkey was interfering in its internal affairs and committing acts of aggression. Against a background of mounting violence on the island, the council considered the matter but did not immediately take any peacekeeping action. With the consent of Cyprus, British troops had been trying to restore order during the crisis. However, in mid-February 1964, the United Kingdom informed the Security Council that its efforts to keep the peace would have to be augmented. Accordingly, on 4 March 1964, the council unanimously authorized the establishment of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a three-month period and at the same time requested SecretaryGeneral U Thant to designate a UN mediator to promote a substantive settlement. UNFICYP became operational on 27 March 1964, with a mandate to prevent the recurrence of fighting, help maintain law and order, and promote a return to normal conditions. A coup d’état on 15 July 1974 by Greek Cypriot and Greek elements opposed to President Makarios forced him to flee the country. This was quickly followed by military intervention by Turkey, whose troops subsequently established Turkish Cypriot control over the northern part of Cyprus. Four days after a ceasefire went into effect on 16 August 1974, the UN high commissioner for refugees was asked to coordinate humanitarian assistance in Cyprus, where more than 200,000 persons had been dislocated as a result of the hostilities. Concurrently with the functioning of UNFICYP, the UN has been active in promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settle-
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ment of the Cyprus problem. This task, first entrusted to a mediator, has been carried out since 1968 through the good offices of the Secretary-General. Within that framework, a series of intercommunal talks between representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well as high-level meetings, were held, beginning in 1974, in an effort to reach a just and lasting solution. The intercommunal talks were discontinued after the Turkish Cypriot authorities, on 15 November 1983, proclaimed a “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” a step which the Security Council called legally invalid. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar met separately with representatives of the two sides in an effort to resume the negotiating process. Settlement talks headed by the UN continued in the 1990s. UNFICYP has continued its task of supervising the cease-fire and maintaining surveillance over the buffer zone between the cease-fire lines. In 2002, the force numbered 1,210 troops and 35 civilian police, supported by 43 international civilian personnel and 104 local civilian staff. Apartheid in South Africa The racial policy of apartheid practiced by the South African government not only violated the political and human rights of its African citizens, it also destablized the entire southern African region. The government of South Africa’s policies towards the independence of surrounding African nations, the flight of South African freedom fighters to those countries, and the possibility that the technologically advanced government of South Africa might acquire nuclear capabilities, led the United Nations to consider apartheid in South Africa as a real threat to international peace and security. More than four decades of effort by the United Nations bore fruit in April 1994, when Nelson Mandela was elected president of South Africa in democratic elections open to South African citizens of all races. The racial policies of the government of South Africa were a major concern of the UN since its earliest years. Over more than four decades, the General Assembly and the Security Council called for measures by the international community aimed at bringing about the end of apartheid, an Afrikaans word meaning “separateness,” and at enabling the Africans of South Africa, who outnumber the whites by more than 4 to 1, to exercise political, economic, and all other rights in their country. In the words of a 1982 General Assembly resolution, the goal of the UN with regard to South Africa was “the total eradication of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic society in which all the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of race, color, sex or creed, will enjoy equal and full human rights and fundamental freedoms and participate freely in the determination of their destiny.” The question of South Africa’s racial policies was first raised in the General Assembly in 1946, when India complained that the South African government had enacted legislation discriminating against South Africans of Indian origin. The General Assembly expressed the view that the treatment of Indians in South Africa should conform with South Africa’s obligations under agreements concluded between that country and India and its obligations under the UN Charter. The wider question of racial conflict in South Africa arising from that government’s apartheid policies was placed on the General Assembly’s agenda in 1952. On that question and on India’s original complaint, the South African government maintained that the matter was essentially within its domestic jurisdiction and that, under the charter, the UN was barred from considering it. The Security Council took up the question for the first time in 1960, following an incident at Sharpeville on 21 March in which South African police fired on peaceful demonstrators protesting the requirement that all Africans carry “passes”; 69 people were killed and 180 wounded. The council stated that the situation in
South Africa had led to international friction and, if continued, might endanger international peace and security. The council called on the South African government to abandon its policy of apartheid, which it termed “a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind.” In order to keep the racial policies of South Africa under review, the General Assembly decided, in 1962, to establish the Special Committee Against Apartheid. The committee, composed of 18 members, was subsequently given a wider mandate to review all aspects of South Africa’s policies of apartheid and the international repercussions of those policies. The committee’s work included the following activities: holding of meetings and hearings; the sending of missions to member states to gain support for the struggle against apartheid; the organization of international conferences, special sessions, and seminars; and the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly by promoting sports, cultural, consumer, and other boycotts and, with the UN Center Against Apartheid, cooperating with governments, intergovernmental organizations, trade unions, women’s organizations, religious leaders, student and youth movements, and antiapartheid groups in mobilizing international public opinion in support of action against apartheid. The General Assembly also established, in 1965, the UN Trust Fund for South Africa, which, through voluntary contributions, made grants to organizations for legal aid to persons persecuted under South Africa’s apartheid laws, relief to such persons and their families, and relief for refugees from South Africa. In 1967, the General Assembly established the UN Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa, which granted scholarships to students from South Africa and Namibia for study and training abroad. Arms Embargo and Other Sanctions. A voluntary arms embargo against South Africa was instituted by the Security Council in 1963. Noting that some of the arms supplied to South Africa were being used to further its racial policies and repress the African people, the council called on all states to stop the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types, and military vehicles to South Africa. Subsequently, in 1970, the Security Council condemned violations of the arms embargo and called on all states to strengthen and implement it unconditionally; withhold the supply of all vehicles, equipment, and spare parts for use by South African military and paramilitary forces; revoke all licenses and patents granted for South African manufacture of arms, aircraft, or military vehicles; prohibit investment or technical assistance for arms manufacture; and cease military cooperation with South Africa. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly condemned the shooting, on 26 June 1976, of Africans, including schoolchildren, demonstrating in the township of Soweto. The following year, the Security Council made the arms embargo against South Africa mandatory, the first time that such action had been taken against a member state under Chapter VII of the charter, which provides for enforcement action in the face of threats to international peace and security. Concerned that South Africa was at the threshold of producing nuclear weapons, the Security Council also decided that states should refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of such weapons. It established a committee to keep under constant review the implementation by states of the mandatory arms embargo. Meanwhile, the General Assembly, in 1970, urged states to terminate diplomatic and other official relations with South Africa, as well as economic and all other types of cooperation, as an expression of international rejection of South Africa’s policy of apartheid, which the General Assembly called “a crime against humanity.” In 1973, the General Assembly adopted the Interna-
International Peace and Security tional Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (see the section on Racial Discrimination in the chapter on Human Rights). In 1974, the General Assembly rejected South Africa’s credentials and recommended that South Africa be totally excluded from participation in all international organizations and conferences held under UN auspices until it abandoned its policies of apartheid. The International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, held in Paris in May 1981, called for further international action to isolate South Africa, including the imposition, under Chapter VII of the charter, of sanctions “as the most appropriate and effective means to ensure South Africa’s compliance with the decisions of the United Nations.” The need for sanctions, including disengagement of transnational corporations operating in South Africa and disinvestment in companies doing business with South Africa, remained the focal point of UN efforts to end that country’s policies of apartheid. Other measures included a sports boycott, embodied in the International Declaration Against Apartheid in Sports, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1977, and the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, which was adopted in 1985 and came into force on 4 April 1988. Other Action. Other action taken by the UN in support of the African majority of South Africa and against that country’s policies of apartheid included: • condemnation of South Africa’s policy of destabilization in southern Africa through its armed incursions into neighboring independent African states that support and assist the efforts of the African majority of South Africa; • rejection of South Africa’s policy of establishing “homelands” as “independent” entities within South Africa where Africans are forced to resettle; • recognition of the African liberation movements of South Africa—the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), both banned by South Africa—as “the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people”; and support for persons imprisoned or detained in South Africa for their opposition to apartheid. The Final Stages. In April 1989, the Special Committee against Apartheid and the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply of Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa met in New York and recommended that the Security Council impose a mandatory oil embargo. It also recommended that pending action by the Security Council, all oil-producing, shipping, and handling states should enact legislation to stop the flow of oil to South Africa. On 12–14 December 1989, the General Assembly held a Special Session on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in South Africa. It adopted by consensus a historic declaration which listed the steps that the South African regime should take to restore political and human rights in that country. It suggested guidelines for negotiations and for drawing up a new constitution based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. The declaration called upon all South Africans, as a matter of urgency, to join together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures necessary to transform their country into a nonracial democracy. In February 1990, in a dramatic development, most political prisoners in South Africa, including Nelson Mandela, deputy president of the ANC, were released, and the ANC, PAC, and the South African Communist Party were recognized by the government. On 22 June 1990, Nelson Mandela addressed the General Assembly, thanking the United Nations for its efforts to secure his release and that of other South African political prisoners. He
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urged the UN and individual governments to continue the sanctions which they had imposed on South Africa. In May 1990, the government of South Africa and the ANC adopted the Groote Schurr Minute, which granted indemnity to political exiles and refugees, and paved the way for their return to South Africa. In August 1990, both parties agreed to the Pretoria Minute under which the government undertook to review emergency and security matters, while the ANC suspended armed actions. On 1 February 1991, South African president F.W. de Klerk announced that the basic laws of apartheid would be repealed during that session of Parliament. He also issued a Manifesto for the New South Africa, stating that the new nation should be based on justice. The basic laws of apartheid were repealed on 5 June 1991, and later that month a peace summit was held by religious and business leaders, and some of the major parties to political violence. As a result, a preparatory committee, including the government and the ANC, was established and became known as the National Peace Initiative. In August 1991, the National Peace Initiative released a draft national peace accord. Also in August, the government and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agreed on a plan for the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 40,000 South African refugees and political exiles. In spite of the commencement of formal negotiations on constitutional reforms in December 1991, not all political parties participated and violence in the townships continued to escalate. In June 1992, 50 people died in the Boipatong massacre and the ANC suspended its participation in the talks until the government took more decisive action to put an end to the violence. In July 1992, several political players in South Africa were invited to come and apprise the Security Council of the situation in their country. Subsequently, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative to go to South Africa to find out first hand what was going on in the country, so that it could be determined how the international community could assist in bringing an end to the violence and create conditions for a peaceful transition in South Africa. As a result of this mission, the Security Council adopted Resolution 772 (1992) authorizing the Secretary-General to deploy the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), charged with the task of assisting with strengthening the structures set up under the 1991 peace accords. The resolution also invited other international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Union to consider deploying their own observers in coordination with the United Nations. The first group of 50 UNOMSA observers was deployed in September 1992. It was widely agreed by all parties in South Africa that the presence of international observers greatly helped to reduce political tension, limit violence, and improve the climate for the negotiation process. In April 1993, a new negotiating framework, the Multiparty Negotiating Council (MPNC) brought together 26 parties and was the most representative gathering in the history of South Africa. After several months of protracted negotiations, in November 1993, the MPNC adopted a number of constitutional principles and institutions to guide the country during a transitional period lasting until 27 April 1999. This interim constitution set forth plans for elections of a Constitutional Assembly that would draft a new national constitution. In response to all the positive developments, on 8 October 1993, in its Resolution 48/1 (1993), the 184-member General Assembly unanimously ended its 31-year ban on economic and other ties with South Africa in the areas of trade, investment, finance, travel, and transportation. Member states were asked to lift the sanctions they had imposed over the years under numerous UN resolutions and decisions. On 15 October 1993, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to South African president F.W. de Klerk and ANC president Nelson Mandela.
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Although incidents of violence continued, and some parties to the negotiations threatened to withdraw from the election process, the elections were held successfully from 26–28 April 1994. At the request of the South African Transitional Executive Committee, the Security Council increased the UNOMSA contingent to approximately 1,800 during the election period. Another approximately 900 international observers from foreign governments and international organizations also were deployed across the country to observe the balloting. The UNOMSA observers determined whether voters enjoyed free access to voting stations, whether the secrecy of the vote had been guaranteed, and that ballot boxes had been properly sealed, protected, and transported. It also witnessed the counting of the ballots and the communication of the results to South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission, the body responsible for organizing, administering,
and monitoring all aspects of the elections to verify that they were free and fair. A New Era Dawns. On 27 April 1994 the new six-color flag of a South Africa liberated from apartheid was unfurled at United Nations headquarters in New York. On 10 May 1994, Nelson Rolihlala Mandela was inaugurated as the new president of the Republic of South Africa. On 25 May 1994, the Security Council lifted the mandatory arms embargo it had imposed on South Africa in 1977. On 21 June 1994, the General Assembly, in its Resolution 48/258 (1994), declared that the mandate of the Special Committee against Apartheid had been successfully concluded, and terminated its existence. By the same resolution, it removed the agenda item on the elimination of apartheid from the agenda of its next (49th) session. On 23 June 1994, South Africa was welcomed back to full participation in the work of the General Assembly, after 20 years of banishment.
A R M S R E G U L AT I O N A N D DISARMAMENT inconclusively in October 1952. In November, the first hydrogen bomb, with a force that dwarfed that of the Hiroshima-type atomic bomb, was tested by the United States at Eniwetok (now Enewetak), in the Pacific. The following August, a hydrogen bomb was exploded by the USSR. A subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, set up by the General Assembly in 1953 and consisting of representatives of Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the US, held a number of meetings, but by the autumn of 1955, efforts aimed at drawing up a comprehensive disarmament plan ended in deadlock. The subcommittee’s efforts to consider partial disarmament measures also came to a stalemate over the next two years. In 1957, the General Assembly enlarged the Disarmament Commission from 11 to 25 nations. It was again enlarged, in 1959, to comprise all members of the UN, but it convened only one further time, in 1965. In 1959, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the first resolution ever to be sponsored by all member states. In it, the General Assembly declared that it was “striving to put an end completely and forever to the armaments race,” and it stated that “the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important facing the world today.” The resolution aimed at having all proposals and suggestions made during the General Assembly debate transmitted to the Disarmament Commission “for thorough consideration.” Substantive differences in the approach taken to disarmament by the Western powers and the USSR emerged during the subsequent period. A Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, based on equal East-West representation, was set up in 1960 outside the framework of the UN to discuss general and complete disarmament but became deadlocked on issues of partial or general measures. As a result, the UN began to pursue disarmament efforts in two ways. While the ultimate goal remained, as it has ever since, “general and complete disarmament under effective international control,” measures that would bring about partial disarmament were viewed as integral to that goal and not as hindrances to its achievement. It was felt that devoting parallel, and at times even primary, attention to “collateral” measures designed to reduce tension and build confidence would facilitate the complex task of achieving general and complete disarmament. The immediate hopes and expectations of the majority of nations centered on two such measures: the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. By the mid1960s, the elaboration of partial disarmament measures within the UN began to overshadow all-embracing, long-range efforts. In 1961, John I. McCloy of the United States and Valerian A. Zorin of the USSR, representing their respective nations in formal disarmament talks, submitted to the General Assembly a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of Disarmament Negotiations. These eight principles, which were unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly, dealt with: (1) the stated goal of negotiations—a program ensuring that disarmament was to be “general and complete” and was to be accompanied by reliable procedures for the maintenance of peace; (2) the reduction of non-nuclear weapons and facilities to such levels as might be agreed to be necessary for the maintenance of internal order and the provision of personnel for a UN peacekeeping force; (3) an
Only days after the signing of the Charter, the world entered the nuclear age. On 6 and 9 August, 1945, respectively, atomic bombs destroyed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The newly formed UN was thus confronted with unprecedented military and political problems. The Charter had envisaged arms limitation and disarmament elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system. It empowered the General Assembly to consider “principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and assigned to the Security Council the task of formulating plans to establish an appropriate system of controls for the “regulation of armaments,” to be submitted to the members of the UN. However, the revolutionary changes brought about by the discovery of atomic power gave the need for disarmament greater immediacy and an enhanced place in the sphere of international politics and security. The UN has reacted progressively to this unfolding of events while the peoples of the world have begun to live under the threat of nuclear annihilation. Fifty years after the founding of the organization, the tensions that dominated the international political situation during the Cold War period eased, significant progress was achieved in the field of disarmament, and new opportunities opened for the international community to achieve security at lower levels of arms. At the same time, new challenges confronted the members of the UN as the focus of tensions among nations turned from the international to the regional and local level. In the course of the past five decades, the UN has used a variety of methods, techniques, and approaches in the search for disarmament.
I N IT I A L E F F O R T S Under Article II of the UN Charter, the General Assembly is empowered to consider “principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and to recommend action to be taken by member states or the Security Council or both. The General Assembly has undertaken this kind of consideration at every one of its regular sessions since it first met in 1946. The General Assembly’s very first resolution, adopted on 24 January 1946, addressed the question of disarmament. It sought the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the assurance that, from then on, atomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes, and it established the Atomic Energy Commission. In a resolution adopted in December 1946, the General Assembly recognized the connection between the questions of disarmament and of international peace and security. In 1947, the Security Council set up the Commission for Conventional Armaments in order to regulate armaments and armed forces under an international system of control and inspection, and it called upon the two commissions to take immediate action. Despite the urgency of the matter, the two commissions did not make much progress. In 1952, the General Assembly, in an attempt to break the impasse, consolidated them into a single 11member Disarmament Commission, which was entrusted with the task of preparing proposals for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, by stages, in a coordinated, comprehensive program. The early debates in the Disarmament Commission ended
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agreed elaboration of the main elements of the disarmament program; (4) implementation of the program in agreed stages, which were to have specified time limits; (5) balance so that at no stage could any state or group maintain an advantage; (6) the need for international control under an international disarmament organization to be created within the framework of the UN; (7) the need during and after disarmament to strengthen institutions for maintaining world peace; and (8) the need to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement in the shortest possible time. At the same time, the General Assembly also endorsed an agreement to set up, in place of the Ten-Nation Committee, an Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. When the committee first met in Geneva in early 1962, one member, France, decided not to participate, explaining that it hoped that it might be possible later for the disarmament problem to be discussed among the powers that could contribute effectively to its solution. At the outset, the committee decided to organize so as to permit simultaneous work on general and complete disarmament, confidence-building (collateral) measures, and the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests. In 1969, the committee’s membership was enlarged to 26, and its name changed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The General Assembly requested the CCD, as the multilateral negotiating body, to work out, while continuing its negotiations on collateral measures, a comprehensive program to deal with the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In 1975, the CCD was further enlarged, to 31 members, with France still declining to take its seat. The scant results and continuing difficulties in disarmament negotiations, among other things, led, also in 1969, to the General Assembly’s adoption of a resolution declaring the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. The 1980s and 1990s were also later declared as disarmament decades.
S P EC I A L S E S S I O N S O F T H E G E N E R A L A S S E M B LY O N D I S A R M A M E N T First Special Session, 1978 By 1976 it was clear that no real progress had been made to halt the arms race. World military expenditure was estimated at many times more than the amount spent globally on health, education, and economic development. While the nuclear-weapon powers were the major competitors in the arms race, military spending by countries outside the two main military alliances was also rising. Since the end of the Second World War, many millions of people have been killed by conventional weapons in more than 100 wars, most of them fought in the developing areas of the world. In 1976, the General Assembly, deploring the “meagre achievements” up to that time of the first Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective agreements, decided, primarily at the initiative of developing countries, to hold a special session in 1978 devoted entirely to disarmament. The aim of the session was to set a new course in international affairs, turn states away from the nuclear and conventional arms race, and obtain agreement on a global strategy for disarmament. The first special session on disarmament, held at UN headquarters from 23 May to 1 July 1978, was the largest, most representative meeting of nations ever convened to consider the question of disarmament. For the first time in the history of disarmament endeavors, the international community of states as a whole achieved a consensus on a comprehensive disarmament strategy, which was embodied in the Final Document adopted at the session. The Final Document stressed the central role and primary responsibility of the UN in the field of disarmament and placed
disarmament issues in a more comprehensive perspective than had ever been done before. It reaffirmed the fundamental importance of disarmament to international peace and security and stated that “disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties.” It contained specific measures intended to strengthen the machinery dealing with disarmament within the UN system. Composed of four parts—an introduction, a declaration, a program of action, and a section on machinery—the Final Document set out goals, principles, and priorities in the field of disarmament. The Introduction stated that while the final objective should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal was the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race. The Declaration stated that “the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it, . . . heightens the sense of insecurity among all states, including the non-nuclear-weapon states, and increases the threat of nuclear war.” It further stated that “genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces.” It emphasized that, in the adoption of disarmament measures, the right of each state to security should be kept in mind and that, at each stage of the disarmament process, “the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.” The Program of Action listed priorities and measures that states should undertake as a matter of urgency in the field of disarmament. Priorities included nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; and conventional weapons, including any that might be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. The program called for agreements or other measures to be “resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security,” and it recommended that measures be taken and policies pursued to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among states. The urgency of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of halting nuclear tests was stressed. The program called for full implementation of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, and recommended steps to put into effect the proposals for the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. Other measures included prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons; limits on the international transfer of conventional weapons; agreed reduction of military budgets; and further study of the question of verification. The program also listed measures to be undertaken to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. The final section, on Machinery, noted the urgency of revitalizing the disarmament machinery and outlined the consensus reached on the strengthening or establishment of appropriate forums, of suitably representative character, for disarmament deliberations and negotiations, as well as for other activities to be undertaken, including research. Acting on the recommendations of the special session, the General Assembly established, as a specialized, subsidiary deliberative body, a revitalized Disarmament Commission composed of all UN members. It was assigned the mandate of making recommendations on disarmament problems as requested by the General Assembly, and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session on disarmament. The special session recognized the continued need for a single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament and recognized
Arms Regulation and Disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva should continue to fulfil this role and to carry on the work of its predecessors— the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1959–60), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962–69) and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969–78). Known as the Conference on Disarmament since 1979, it has a membership of 66 countries, including the five nuclear-weapon states and most of the militarily powerful states of the world’s regions. Other results of the General Assembly’s first special session included the establishment of a program of fellowships on disarmament; an increased flow of information on disarmament to governments, nongovernmental organizations, the media, and the general public; and the designation of the week beginning 24 October (UN Day) to be observed each year as Disarmament Week (see also under Studies, Research, Information, and Training below). In order to enable the UN to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the tasks assigned to it, the special session took steps to strengthen the role of the section of the UN Secretariat handling disarmament affairs, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. The centre’s main tasks include maintaining a database on conventional armaments transfers, supporting ongoing deliberations and negotiations in New York, Geneva, and elsewhere, fostering regional confidence and security building initiatives, and disseminating information to sources outside the UN. In 1979, the General Assembly declared the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, stating that its goals should remain consistent with the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. The basic goals of the Second Disarmament Decade were set out as follows: halting and reversing the arms race; conclusion of agreements on disarmament according to the objectives and priorities of the 1978 Final Document; strengthening international peace and security in keeping with the UN Charter; and reallocating resources from military to development purposes, particularly in favor of developing countries. In the four years following the first special session, the international situation in fact deteriorated: numerous events beyond effective UN influence evolved in such a way as to hinder international arms-limitation efforts, particularly in the early 1980s, when military expenditures increased and a lack of confidence permeated disarmament discussions and affected negotiations. After some initial progress, negotiations stalled on virtually every important disarmament issue, and the 1978 Program of Action remained substantially unimplemented. Second Special Session, 1982 The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was held at UN headquarters from 7 June to 10 July 1982. Given the international tension and armed conflicts prevailing at that time, the atmosphere did not bode well for the reaching of further accords on sensitive, substantive issues then relating to the perceived national security interests of states. At the time of the first special session in 1978, the General Assembly had reaffirmed the goal of general and complete disarmament, a concept that had received considerable attention even before that in the framework of the UN. The emphasis placed on general and complete disarmament slowly gave way to another approach, known as the comprehensive program of disarmament. The intent of the approach was to elaborate a program which would place partial measures of disarmament into a carefully considered plan, setting out objectives, priorities, and timeframes, with a view to the achievement of disarmament on a progressive basis. A main agenda item of the session—to elaborate the strategy of the 1978 Program of Action into a Comprehensive Program of
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Disarmament—was not achieved. Thus, the General Assembly did not agree, as it had in 1978, on a formula for specific action. In the Concluding Document of the session, however, the General Assembly unanimously reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. It expressed its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, and urged member states to consider as soon as possible proposals for ensuring prevention of such a war. The General Assembly also stressed again the need for strengthening the central role of the UN in the field of disarmament, for implementing the security system provided for in the Charter of the UN, and for enhancing the effectiveness of the multilateral negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. The committee and then the Conference on Disarmament continued to negotiate the draft comprehensive program of disarmament until 1989. At the end of the conference’s session that year, it was agreed to suspend work on the program until the circumstances were more propitious for progress. Among the other decisions of the second special session was the launching of a World Disarmament Campaign to increase public awareness of disarmament issues (see also under Studies, Research, Information, and Training below). The General Assembly also decided to convene a third special session on disarmament (subsequently scheduled to be held in 1988 at UN headquarters). Third Special Session, 1988 The third special session took place in 1988 against the background of a considerably improved international climate. The progress that had been recorded in some important fields of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, was welcomed throughout the debates during the session. The 1987 Treaty between the former Soviet Union and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty); the achievements of the 1986 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe; and the 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) were indicative of the favorable trends in arms control and disarmament. The progress reported on the negotiations that had begun before the commencement of the special session, between the former Soviet Union and the United States, on a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START) (see below), as well as progress made in the Conference on Disarmament on the complete elimination of chemical weapons, also were highly welcomed. All this notwithstanding, member states were unable to adopt by consensus a final document setting the pace and direction for future negotiations. In December 1995, the General Assembly decided to convene a Fourth Special Session devoted to disarmament in 1997. However, as the Disarmament Commission completed its 1998 session, it had not come to agreement on the objectives and agenda of the proposed fourth special session, then pushed back to 1999. In December 1999, the General Assembly decided anew to convene the fourth session on disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of the member states on the objectives, agenda, and timing. A fourth session on disarmament had not taken place as of November 2002.
D I S A R M A M E N T M A C H I N E RY General Assembly The General Assembly, as the main deliberative body of the UN, takes up questions concerning disarmament and related international security matters at each of its annual sessions, through its First Committee, and makes recommendations. In the late
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1980s and into the 1990s, some 25–30% of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly have been concerned with disarmament and related international security matters; many of these resolutions give mandates to the Disarmament Commission or make requests to the Conference on Disarmament (formerly the Committee on Disarmament) to take into consideration various ideas or questions under negotiation. Both the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament report to the General Assembly each year. Disarmament Commission The revitalized Disarmament Commission established after the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is composed of all members of the UN. It provides a deliberative forum for consideration of specific disarmament issues when the General Assembly is not in session. A subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, it meets annually at UN headquarters for approximately four weeks, usually in spring, to make recommendations to the General Assembly on specific disarmament problems and to follow up mandates given to it. Conference on Disarmament As a result of its first special session on disarmament, the General Assembly mandated the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil the role of a single multilateral negotiating forum and to carry on the work of earlier committees. It enlarged the membership of the committee to 40 countries, including all five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the US). Redesignated the Conference on Disarmament at the end of 1983, it meets in Geneva for approximately six months each year, usually when the General Assembly is not in session. Its Secretary-General is appointed, upon consultation, by the Secretary-General of the UN and also serves as that individual’s personal representative. In 2000, the Conference on Disarmament was composed of 66 member states. The Conference on Disarmament has a unique relationship with the UN. It defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly. It agreed on a permanent agenda of 10 items in 1979, and from those items it chooses an annual agenda and fixes its program of work for the year. Its work in plenary meetings and also in subsidiary bodies dealing with specific items is conducted by consensus, since international agreements, if they are to be effective, must be generally acceptable. Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) As a result of the General Assembly’s second session on disarmament, the Department for Disarmament Affairs was established in 1982, and it continued until 1992. The Department was reestablished in 1998. It provides substantive and organizational support for norm-setting in the area of disarmament through the work of the General Assembly’s First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. It is structured in five branches. The CD Secretariat and Conference Support Branch provides organizational and substantive servicing to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch (WMD) supports and participates in multilateral efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Conventional Arms Branch (CAB) focuses on all weapons not considered WMD, to curb the flow of small arms in regions of tension, and to develop measures of practical disarmament. The Regional Disarmament Branch (RDB) provides support and advisory services to member states and regional and subregional organizations on disarmament and security matters. It oversees and coordinates the activities of three regional centers: one in Africa, one in Asia and the Pacific, and one in Latin America and the Caribbean. And the Monitor-
ing, Database and Information Branch (MDI) organizes a wide variety of special events and programs in the field of disarmament, produces DDA publications such as the Disarmament Yearbook, and maintains the database for specialized areas.
MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS Multilateral Agreements After World War I, intense efforts were made to translate the 1874 Brussels Declaration and the subsequent Hague Conventions into a ban on chemical weapons and “the use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.” Although a total ban is still to be attained, one of the first achievements, in 1925, was the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, generally referred to as the Geneva Protocol. It bans “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices,” as well as “the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.” The Geneva Protocol, with 133 states parties in 2000, is the point of departure in current efforts toward a ban on the production, possession, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and helped establish the convention banning bacteriological weapons in 1972 (see below). Concerted efforts by the UN and by governments since 1945 at both the multilateral and bilateral levels, as well as on a regional basis, have led to a body of important agreements, treaties, and conventions committing their parties to various arms limitation and disarmament measures. The multilateral instruments concluded so far are given below (the number of states parties is shown in parentheses after each title). • The 1959 Antarctic Treaty (44) provides for the demilitarization of Antarctica and is the first treaty to put into practice the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, later applied to Latin America and the South Pacific, as well as to the seabed and outer space. It prohibits any military maneuvers, weapon tests, building of installations, or disposal of radioactive wastes in the Antarctic region. • The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty) (124) bans all nuclear weapon tests in the three environments designated but does not ban underground tests. Since 1963, the General Assembly has repeatedly urged conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests, including those conducted underground. • The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer-Space Treaty) (96) bans nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from the earth’s orbit and prohibits the military use of celestial bodies and the placing of such weapons on those bodies. • The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (38) creates the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area and is the first arms-limitation agreement to provide for control and verification by an international organization, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, as well as through the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). • The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) (187) aims at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states, at guaranteeing all countries access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and at promoting the process of nuclear disarmament. The treaty defines a nuclear-weapon state as one that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
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other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. With the broadest adherence of all treaties, it has helped so far to maintain the number of nuclear-weapon states at five. The 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty) (92) bans the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and facilities for such weapons on or under the seabed outside a 12-mile coastal zone. The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (144) is the first international agreement providing for actual disarmament, that is, the destruction of existing weapons. The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (68) prohibits the use of techniques that would have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects in causing such phenomena as earthquakes, tidal waves, and changes in weather and climate patterns. The 1979 Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (9) goes further than the 1967 Outer-Space Treaty in prohibiting the use of the moon and other celestial bodies for military purposes. The 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (90) restricts or prohibits the use of mines and booby traps, incendiary weapons, and fragments not readily detectable in the human body. These rules range from a complete ban on the use of such weapons to restrictions on their use in conditions that would cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. The 1985 South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Raratonga) (16), exemplifies a positive regional limitation measure. Its geographical limits are contiguous with those of the two other major zonal treaties, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Antarctic Treaty, the three instruments covering a significant portion of the earth’s surface. The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) (30), was a considerable post-Cold War breakthrough achieved at a summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was adopted in Paris in November 1990. The treaty entered into force on 9 November 1992, after it was signed by the original 22 participating states, joined by seven of the new republics formed from the former Soviet Union. It established limits for five categories of weapons within its area of application, which stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals. Chosen for limitation were those categories of weapons systems that would eliminate disparities in force levels and the capability of launching surprise attack or large-scale offensives. The treaty was the first in Europe to provide for the actual reduction of conventional weapons. As called for in the treaty, negotiations among the states party to the CFE Treaty soon began, aimed at limiting the personnel strength of armed forces. Known as the CFE-1A Agreement, it was signed in July 1992 at the summit meeting of the CSCE at Helsinki. The 1992 Treaty on Open Skies (23) establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its participants. The Open Sky Treaty is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities. The treaty entered into force in 2002. The 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) (147), is the first disarmament agreement that would eliminate an entire category of weapons. Such chemical weapons exist in large quanti-
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ties, are possessed by many countries, and have been used in combat even in recent years. The convention was ratified by 65 countries and entered into force on 29 April 1997. The 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) (9) bans the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession or control over any nuclear explosive device by any means in Southeast Asia. The 1996 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) (13) establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the continent of Africa and all island states considered by the former Organization of African Unity to be part of Africa. The 1996 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT Treaty) (96) goes further than the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty in that it prohibits any nuclear explosion whether for weapons or peaceful purposes. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention) (130) bans the use and development of anti-personnel mines, and commits states to destroy them. The 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (Inter-American Convention) (10) was spearheaded by the member states of the Organization of American States to address the problem of illicit firearms trafficking, including ammunition, bombs, grenades, rockets, rocket launchers, missiles, and missile systems.
Bilateral Agreements Over the same period, bilateral negotiations between the USSR/ Russian Federation and the United States have produced a number of agreements between the two powers, including those described below. • The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty and part of the SALT I agreements) restricts in general the development of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and specifically limits development of ABM systems to two sites with no more than 100 launchers each. By a protocol of 1974, the deployment of ABM systems is further limited to a single area, with no more than 100 launchers. On 13 June 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in order to pursue the development of missile defenses that would have been banned by the agreement. • The 1972 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly regarded as SALT I) establishes limitations for a fiveyear period—with a provision for extension—on the number of launchers of strategic weapons. • Under the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, the two parties agree to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons an objective of their policies and to make all efforts toward guaranteeing stability and peace. • The 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground NuclearWeapon Tests (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty) establishes a nuclear threshold by prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. • The 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes prohibits the carrying out of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons or any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons, and it includes on-site verification procedures. • The 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) establishes limits on the number and types of strate-
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gic nuclear-delivery vehicles (launchers and bombers) to 2,400 on each side. The treaty also set limits on the numbers of MIRVed launchers. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the SALT II limits because of Soviet violations of its arms control commitments. The 1987 Treaty between the Two States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) provides for the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons with a range between 55 and 5,500 kilometers (3,410 miles). The treaty entered into force on 1 June 1988 and its provisions were implemented before the 1 June 1991 date set by the treaty. The 1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) places limits on the two sides’ strategic nuclear forces, i.e., inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This treaty established an unprecedented reduction of 35% to 40% of the states’ overall nuclear forces at the time and created an elaborate system for verification of compliance. Through the Lisbon Protocol signed in 1992, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia became parties to START I as successor states to the Soviet Union. The 1993 Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), once implemented, was to bring about deep reductions in the overall levels of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), nuclear armed heavy bombers and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ACLMs). The United States and Russia ratified START II in 1996 and 2000, respectively, although Russia made entry into force conditional on U.S. Senate consent to ratification of the 1997 protocol and approval of two Agreed Statements outlining limits on the testing of theater missile defense (TMD) systems. On 14 June 2002, one day after the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it would no longer consider itself to be bound by START II provisions. The 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Moscow) states that both the United States and Russia will reduce their numbers of operationally deployed nuclear warheads to between 1,700– 2,200 within ten years. It establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, scheduled to meet at least twice a year, to discuss and review the treaty's implementation. The document does not require the destruction of strategic delivery systems, specify what is to be done with the warheads once they have been removed from launchers, or constrain the development of ballistic missile defenses.
MAJOR ISSUES AND DISARMAMENT N E G O T I ATI O N E F F O R T S The Threat of Nuclear Weapons When the first atomic bombs were exploded on 6 and 9 August 1945, their immense destructive power confronted the world with military and political problems of unprecedented magnitude. The catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons would not be confined to the nuclear adversaries but would threaten civilization on a global scale. According to a 1984 World Health Organization (WHO) report on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services, as many as 10,000 megatons of nuclear bombs could be exploded globally in an allout nuclear war—90% of them in Europe, Asia, and North America and 10% in Africa, Latin America, and Oceania. As a result, half of the world’s population could instantly become war victims. About 1.5 billion people could die and 1.1 billion could be injured. In addition, millions of immediate survivors of an attack would die of radiation effects, disease, cold temperatures, and starvation over the following few years. Thus, the greatest
threat to humanity comes from nuclear arsenals, whose total destructive power has reached a level equivalent to more than 1 million Hiroshima bombs. Yet, each of the nuclear powers, albeit with expressed reluctance, considers it essential, either as a strategy or a necessary policy of credible deterrence of war, to possess operational nuclear weapons as long as the others have them. A 1988 UN study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war concluded that a major nuclear war would entail the high risk of a global environmental disruption. A 1990 UN report captured the sense of the turning point in history brought about by the development of nuclear weapons. According to that report, nuclear weapons represented a historically new form of weaponry, which, by their multiple and far-reaching effects, provided a means of warfare whose mass destructive potential was unparalleled in human experience. Nuclear technology had made it possible to release more energy in one microsecond from a single nuclear weapon than all the energy released by conventional weapons used in all wars throughout history. The same expert group estimated that, by 1990, the arms race had led to the gradual deployment on land and on the high seas of some 50,000 nuclear warheads. They also estimated that the world stockpile of nuclear weapons was equivalent to some 13,000 million tons of TNT, and that its explosive capacity was 1 million times the explosive energy of the Hiroshima atomic bomb. In 1945, only the United States had developed the technology to produce nuclear weapons, but by 1949, the USSR had also developed a nuclear-weapon capability, followed by the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964. Throughout the Cold War era, the United States and the former Soviet Union, among the five nuclear-weapon states, held the vast majority of nuclear weapons and the most advanced delivery systems. Indeed, the UN, in a consensus document adopted at the first special session of disarmament in 1978, recognized the special responsibility that these two states bore with respect to nuclear disarmament. Over the years, concerns have been expressed in UN forums that some non-nuclear-weapon states might develop nuclearweapon programs (the issue of so-called “threshold” states). After the end of the war in the Persian Gulf in April 1991, it came to light that some of the concerns expressed, at least in the case of Iraq, were warranted. In November 2002, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441 calling for immediate and unconditional disarmament on the part of Iraq, including the possible existence of nuclear weapons development programs. In 1993–94 the defiance of the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) touched off an international crisis. The DPRK refused to allow access to IAEA inspectors charged with monitoring peaceful nuclear facilities (see chapter on IAEA). Since 1994 the IAEA activities were largely limited to monitoring the "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities as requested by the United Nations Security Council and as foreseen in the "Agreed Framework" of October 1994 between the DPRK and the United States. Under the so-called Agreed Framework, the DPRK promised to abandon its nuclear program, and disavow similar nuclear activity, in return for the U.S.-led construction of two modern, light-water reactors and 500,000 tons of fuel oil a year until the reactors are completed. In October 2002, the DPRK announced that it was undertaking a uranium-enrichment program. These developments challenged the UN, especially its Security Council, and the IAEA to unprecedented action. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, its nuclear weapons were left on the territories of four of the newly independent states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. This state of affairs created a new set of challenges to the international community in the control of nuclear weapons. Over the years, many measures have been proposed in the UN and other multilateral forums to limit, reduce, and eliminate
Arms Regulation and Disarmament nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; to assure nonnuclear-weapons states that nuclear weapons will not be used or even threatened to be used against them; to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapons states; to bring about a halt to all nuclear testing; to ensure the non-use of nuclear weapons; to bring about the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons as well as the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; to restrict the deployment of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states, and to foster cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With the close of the Cold War era, a turning point in international political history had been reached and the dramatic international events that occurred had direct repercussions in the area of nuclear disarmament. Bilateral negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States led to several agreements which, when fully implemented, will result in unprecedented reductions in the nuclear forces of both sides. These developments served to codify the end of the Cold War and helped to pave the way for further control over the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon states, as well as to encourage the other three declared nuclear-weapon states towards further efforts in the field of nuclear weapons. Bilateral Nuclear Arms Reduction Agreements Although the United Nations did not take part in the historic bilateral negotiations between the former USSR and the United States from 1969 to 2002, member states of the UN have responded with encouragement to the initiatives of the two major powers and have appealed to them to conduct their negotiations with the utmost determination to prevent nuclear war, reduce nuclear arsenals, prevent an arms race in outer space—a longstanding UN objective—and halt the arms race. Other nuclearweapon states have declared that they would join the process of reducing nuclear weapons once the major powers have reduced theirs. In this context, it is appropriate to review here the sequence of events that brought these negotiations to such a salutary conclusion and their far-reaching implications for global security. The SALT Treaties
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which the former Soviet Union and the United States initiated in 1969, led in their first phase to the signing on 26 May 1972 in Moscow of two agreements: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), subsequently amended by a protocol of 3 July 1974, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a protocol attached. Both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement entered into force on 3 October 1972. By signing the ABM Treaty, the United States and the former Soviet Union undertook not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems. They also agreed to limit ABM systems to two sites with no more than 100 launchers at each site. In that way, they would not build nationwide ABM systems, which each side viewed as destabilizing. In 1974, the treaty was amended by a protocol which limited each side to one ABM deployment area only. The former Soviet Union chose to maintain its ABM system in the area centered on its capital, Moscow, and the United States chose to maintain its system in an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment area in North Dakota. On 13 June 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in order to pursue the development of missile defenses that would have been banned by the agreement. The second phase of the talks (SALT II) began in November 1972 and ended in June 1979 with the signing in Vienna of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a protocol which was an integral part of the treaty, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on
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the Limitation of Strategic Arms. The treaty, designed to remain in force to the end of 1985, defined and identified specific weapons and included numerous detailed limitations on the testing, deployment, modernization and replacement, and conversion of particular weapons systems. A Standing Consultative Commission was set up by the two countries in 1972 to deal with any questions or doubts about compliance with SALT II. Although SALT II was not ratified by either party, each side declared its intention to abide by the provisions of the treaty as long as the other did. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the SALT II limits because of Soviet violations of its arms control commitments. The INF Treaty
Early in the 1980s, the United States and the former Soviet Union opened two new sets of negotiations, one on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and one on the reduction of strategic arms (START). After their discontinuation in December 1983, owing to the strained political situation between the two sides on the question of intermediate forces in Europe, the two powers agreed in January 1985 to hold negotiations on the complex questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate range—in order to work out an agreement for preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. This process led first to the signing in December 1987 in Washington of the Treaty between the Two States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). It provided for the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, namely, those nuclear forces with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. (Nuclear weapons with a range of more than 5,500 kilometres were considered to be strategic, while those with a range of less than 500 kilometres belonged to the category of tactical nuclear weapons.) The treaty entered into force on 1 June 1988. The INF Treaty is considered the first nuclear disarmament treaty, as it brought about the first actual reductions in the nuclear weapons of the two major powers. It also was considered an important turning point with respect to the strict verification schedule that it established, which included mutual arrangements for on-site inspections. Its provisions were fully implemented before June 1991, the date set by the treaty. The START Treaties
In parallel to the negotiations being conducted on intermediate nuclear force, a complex series of talks were also held on reducing significantly the two sides’ strategic nuclear weapons, in particular inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These negotiations were finalized by the signing, at a summit meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev in Moscow on 31 July 1991, of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty). The main objective of the treaty was to increase stability in the nuclear relationship between the former USSR and the United States. The interrelated limits and sublimits on the two sides’ strategic nuclear forces established by the treaty amounted to an unprecedented reduction of 35% to 40% of their overall nuclear forces at the time. Furthermore, an elaborate system, including a full range of notifications, inspections, and permanent monitoring, was adopted for the verification of compliance with the terms of the treaty. At the same time as efforts were being carried forward to ratify the START Treaty and to deal with the problems raised by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and the United States intensified their negotiations on their strategic nuclear weapons. As a result, on 3 January 1993, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). The treaty, once implemented, was to bring about deep reductions in the overall number of nuclear warheads of the two sides includ-
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ing in their levels of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), nuclear armed heavy bombers and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ACLMs). Entry into force of the START I Treaty was complicated by the breakup of the USSR in 1989. The Russian Federation ratified the treaty on condition that the new republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also ratify the treaty and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The START I Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate (1 October 1992), the Russian parliament (4 November 1992), the Belarus parliament (4 February 1993), the Kazakhstan parliament (2 July 1992), and the Ukrainian parliament (3 February 1994). Belarus joined the NPT on 22 July 1993. Kazakhstan joined the NPT on 14 February 1994. Ukraine joined the NPT on 5 December 1994. On that date, START I entered into force. On 5 December 2001, the United States and the Russian Federation successfully reached the START I levels of 6,000 deployed warheads. The START II treaty provided that, in a two-phased process, the Russian Federation would reduce the number of its strategic nuclear weapons to 3,000 and the United States to 3,500, by the year 2003. START II was ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996, and by the Russian parliament in April 2000. On 14 June 2002, one day after the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it would no longer consider itself to be bound by START II provisions. Unilateral Initiatives
In addition to the joint efforts of the two major powers to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation between them, a broad set of unilateral nuclear initiatives was announced by President Bush on 27 September and by President Gorbachev on 5 October 1991, which affected the entire spectrum of nuclear weapons of the United States and the former Soviet Union. The broad unilateral initiatives announced the destruction by both sides of their tactical nuclear weapons throughout the world, as well as other significant moves with respect to their nuclear forces. At the same time, President Gorbachev declared a one-year moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Upon the dissolution of the former Soviet Union at the end of 1991, its nuclear arsenal, which was subject to the reductions and limitations agreed under the START Treaty, passed into the jurisdiction of four newly formed states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. To address the questions raised by the new situation, the four states, together with the United States, signed on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon, a protocol to the 1991 START Treaty. In the document, the four states, as successor states of the former USSR, agreed to assume the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the treaty, including working out arrangements among themselves to comply with the limits and restrictions contained in the treaty. While the Russian Federation assumed the status of nuclear-weapon state inherited from the former USSR, Belarus, Kazakhastan, and Ukraine committed themselves to adhere to the non-proliferation treaty as nonnuclear-weapon states in the shortest possible time. They did so in 1993 and 1994. In 1996, Belarus joined Ukraine and Kazakhstan in removing and transferring to the Russian Federation the last of the remaining former Soviet nuclear weapons located within their territories. Cessation of Nuclear Testing It is widely considered that a comprehensive test ban would inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the nuclear-weapon states to develop new weapon designs and would place constraints on the refinement of existing ones. On the other hand, nuclear-weapon states, including the US, tend to regard at least some form of testing as necessary so long as their security is at all dependent on a strategy of nuclear deterrence.
The question of the discontinuance of nuclear testing has been discussed in the General Assembly since 1945. An estimated 1,622 nuclear-test explosions were detonated between 16 July 1945 and 31 December 1986—815 by the US, 597 by the USSR, 140 by France, 40 by the United Kingdom, 29 by China, and 1 by India, which stated that its nuclear test was an experiment strictly for peaceful purposes. Despite ongoing unilateral and international efforts to ban nuclear testing, it continued in the 1990s. Notably, in early October 1995, France (despite its assurances that it would not) conducted a nuclear test on Fangataufa Atoll in the Pacific. The blast triggered a wave of protest throughout the region. Ongoing tests by nuclear-weapons states prompted the General Assembly on 12 December 1995 to issue a statement saying it “strongly deplored all current nuclear testing and strongly urged the immediate cessation of all such testing” and had adopted a resolution by a vote of 85 in favor to 18 against, with 43 abstentions, commending those nuclear-weapon states observing testing moratoriums and urging them to continue the moratoriums pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. In spring 1998, India and Pakistan, whose dispute over the Kashmir region continued, each conducted underground nuclear tests, causing scientists to move the hands of the infamous Doomsday Clock closer to midnight (the point of annihilation). These events highlighted the urgency of reaching consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and testing and underscored the role of the UN in bringing the parties to the table. Partial Test Ban Treaty
Late in 1958, the nuclear powers (then the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the US) began negotiations in Geneva on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests. Although they accomplished nothing definitive, related and subsequent efforts in the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and, finally, further negotiations led to the signing in Moscow on 5 August 1963 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outerspace and under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty). The treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions for weapons testing or for any other purpose in the atmosphere or beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas. Its prohibitions also extend to nuclear explosions in any other environment if such an explosion produces radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted. Further to the main provisions of the treaty, which did not prohibit the testing of nuclear devices underground, the parties to the treaty also confirmed their intention to seek an end to all testing of nuclear weapons and to continue negotiations towards that end, and declared their desire to end radioactive contamination of the environment. The treaty was the first international agreement to regulate nuclear arms worldwide, and it has been recognized as an important instrument in reducing international tensions and decreasing radioactive pollution. It also helped to create a climate in which negotiations on other nuclear-arms limitation agreements, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, were able to take place. France and China did not become parties to the treaty, but France announced in 1974 that it would not conduct any further atmospheric tests. Bilateral Agreements on Nuclear Testing
In 1963, the nonaligned states in particular made strenuous efforts to persuade the USSR and the United States to extend the Partial Test Ban Treaty to include a ban on underground tests. Disagreement about verification prevented such an extension. Even after the Partial Test Ban Treaty came into effect, extensive underground testing continued, particularly by the USSR and the United States.
Arms Regulation and Disarmament Two bilateral treaties, between the former Soviet Union and the United States, placed limits on their underground nuclear tests. These were the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (known as the threshold test-ban treaty) and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Each party agreed not to test explosives yielding more than the 150-kiloton limit. Because of difficulties with the verification provisions and technology associated with the two treaties, they remained unratified for many years, although the two powers complied with their provisions. Following three years of bilateral negotiations from November 1987 to 1 December 1990 on nuclear testing verification and yield measurement methodology, the two powers exchanged instruments of ratification of the two treaties. The verification arrangements set out in conjunction with those two treaties were unprecedented in their openness and transparency, and helped to set the stage for even greater cooperation between the two major powers in agreements on the reduction of their nuclear-weapon arsenals. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The question of the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests or of all nuclear explosive tests has been considered as a separate issue in UN bodies since 1963 and is the subject of many General Assembly resolutions. Between 1977 and 1980, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States also undertook trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty but again did not succeed in completing one. Questions of how to verify compliance with a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, how to treat nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the conditions of a ban, and whether to seek to ban all nuclear explosions presented difficulties both in the Conference on Disarmament, which was the main focus of efforts since 1980, and in the bilateral discussions that commenced in July 1986 between the USSR and the US. In an effort to add impetus to the ongoing efforts, the USSR halted all nuclear explosions for an 18-month period, from August 1985 to February 1987. The United States did not reciprocate because it believed that such an unverifiable measure was not a substitute for a negotiated, binding treaty. At the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, the first measure agreed to was the completion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996. On 24 September 1996, the CTBT was opened for signature. As of November 2002, it had been signed by 166 states, including all five nuclear-weapon states, and ratified by 96 states. However, the treaty had not yet entered into force since not all the states whose ratification is required for its entry into force had done so, including the United States, which rejected ratification in fall 1999. Unilateral Actions Towards an End to Nuclear Testing
With the end of the Cold War and the improvement in international political climate, important political strides towards the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban were registered. In the early 1990s the number of underground nuclear tests being conducted by the nuclear-weapon states began to decrease considerably. In October 1991, the former Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, which was extended by the Russian Federation indefinitely. In April 1992 France suspended its nuclear testing. In October 1992 the United States enacted a law which not only declared a unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests, but also directed that after September 1996, the United States government could no longer conduct nuclear tests. However, although the United States in January 2002 stated that it had no plans to resume nuclear testing, the U.S. Defense Department made a decision to "try and upgrade our testing infrastructure," especially "if the strategic circumstances in the world changed dramatically." The United Kingdom, which has conducted for several decades its nuclear-weapon tests at the
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nuclear testing site in the United States, has respected the declared moratorium of the United States and has not conducted any nuclear tests since November 1991. However, China conducted nuclear tests in June and October 1994. France resumed its nuclear testing program in the Pacific by conducting six underground tests during a five month period that began in September of 1995. Nuclear weapons tests broke out on the South Asian subcontinent in 1998. India announced that it conducted five underground nuclear explosions on 11 and 13 May 1998, its first nuclear tests since 1974. In response, Pakistan announced that it conducted five underground nuclear explosions on 28 May and another on 30 May 1998. These events undermined the progress that had been made to halt all nuclear weapons testing. Prevention of Nuclear Proliferation In the early years of the atomic era, it was widely assumed that only a few highly industrialized nations would be able to afford to manufacture nuclear weapons. However, by the mid-1960s, advancing technology and simplification of nuclear production processes, particularly for electric-power generation, had led to the categorization of some 20 nations, including relatively small ones, as countries possessing a nuclear capability; there are now some 30 so-called “threshold” states. The fear of horizontal nuclear proliferation has thus spawned much discussion in the General Assembly. During 1965 and 1966, the greater part of the General Assembly’s debates on disarmament was devoted to this issue, especially with the emergence of China as a nuclear-weapon power. In 1967, the United States and the USSR, after prolonged negotiations, put forward identical draft non-proliferation treaties in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and in 1968, after further negotiation, a final joint draft was commended overwhelmingly by the General Assembly as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty came into force in March 1970. By November 2002, it had been ratified by 187 countries, including the five declared nuclear-weapon states: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Though the treaty had received a great deal of support as reflected by the number of ratifications to it, challenges to its objectives remained. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits the spread of nuclear weapons, employing the safeguards system of the IAEA to provide assurance against any diversion or misuse of nuclear materials by non-nuclear-weapon states. It also contains provisions for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; for making nuclear equipment, materials, and information available on a nondiscriminatory basis to non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful purposes; and for the pursuit of negotiations relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear and general disarmament. All the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty must accept safeguards, through separate agreements, with the IAEA. The safeguards system provides for international inspection of all their nuclear installations. Several states that are not parties to the treaty have also signed safeguards agreements with the IAEA covering all or most of their installations. Following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the nuclear weapons left on its former territory had fallen under the jurisdiction of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. While the Russian Federation assumed the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union, in a special agreement, the Lisbon Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to become non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. They did so in 1993 and 1994. In 1996, Belarus joined Ukraine and Kazakhstan in removing and transferring to the Russian Federation the last of the remaining former Soviet nuclear weapons located within their territories. Only India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba remain outside the NPT regime. In the wake of the war in the Persian Gulf, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), appointed to eliminate Iraq’s capability
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to use weapons of mass destruction, uncovered the existence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in that country. This revelation further challenged the NPT regime and in particular the inspection procedures employed by the IAEA. Six conferences have been held to review the operation of the treaty—in 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, a conference is to be held 25 years after its entry into force to decide whether it shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Since the treaty’s entry into force, the parties and the General Assembly have called in various contexts for universal adherence to the treaty as the best means of further strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Some of the aspects that are of crucial importance to the extension of the NPT and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime revolve around the issue of efforts being made towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In that connection, the question of the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has taken on paramount importance for many non-nuclear-weapon states. In addition, the issue of the granting of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states that nuclear weapons will not be used against them would make an important contribution to the reinforcement of the NPT structure. Many states have for years supported the call for the nuclear-weapon states to cease production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, which they consider would contribute significantly in a qualitative manner to the ending of the nuclear arms race. Notwithstanding the above caveats, the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains effective as the cornerstone of an international non-proliferation structure that has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries of the world. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world has long been considered a possible means for curbing horizontal nuclear proliferation and enhancing peace and security for non-nuclear-weapon states on a regional basis. Outer Space
The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, while not strictly belonging to that body of law which bans nuclear weapons from a particular area, is relevant nonetheless to the concept of nuclear-free zones. Among other things, it provides that states parties will not place any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any weapon of mass destruction in orbit around the earth, install these weapons on celestial bodies, or station them in outer space. The Seabed
The 1972 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof provides that states parties undertake not to place on or under the seabed, beyond the outer limit of a 12-mile coastal zone, any nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction or any facilities for such weapons. Antarctica
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty was the first international agreement to provide for the absence of nuclear weapons in a specified area by having established a demilitarized zone in the Antarctic. Under the terms of the treaty, Antarctica is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. All military activity, nuclear explosions, or disposal of radioactive waste in the area are prohibited. The provisions of this treaty appear to have been scrupulously observed. Latin America and the Caribbean
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), signed on 14
February 1967 at Tlatelolco, Mexico, was the first treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area. It is also the first regional agreement to establish its own system of international verification and a permanent supervisory organ, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL), which was set up in June 1969. States parties to the treaty agree to use any nuclear material or facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes and to prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons in their territories, under any circumstances. They also agree not to engage in, encourage, authorize, directly or indirectly, or in any way participate in, the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession, or control of any nuclear weapon. The treaty’s verification system includes the requirement that safeguards agreements be concluded with IAEA in respect of all the nuclear activities undertaken by the parties. Annexed to the treaty are two Additional Protocols. Under Additional Protocol I, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States agree to guarantee nuclear-weapon-free status to those territories for which they are, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible. In August 1972, the protocol was signed by France, thus giving it full force as all four countries had now signed. Under Additional Protocol II, nuclear-weapon states pledge to respect fully the denuclearization of Latin America and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty. By 1979, all five nuclear-weapon states had become parties to it. The South Pacific
The states party to the 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) have undertaken not to manufacture or acquire any nuclear explosive device; to control the export of fissionable material; to ensure that their nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful and nonexplosive purposes and are conducted under strict safeguards; to ban the testing of nuclear explosive devices in the South Pacific; to prohibit the stationing of nuclear explosive devices in their territories; and to prevent the dumping at sea, in the region, of nuclear waste. The treaty has three protocols, which are integral to its purposes. Protocol 1 obliges France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to apply the terms of the treaty in respect of the territories for which they are responsible in the region, especially with regard to prohibitions on the manufacture, stationing, and testing of any nuclear explosive device. Protocol 2 commits the five nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against parties to the treaty. Protocol 3 commits the five nuclear-weapon states not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the zone covered by the treaty. The United States, along with the United Kingdom and France, signed all three protocols on 25 March 1996. Russia (with understandings) and China signed and ratified Protocols II and III; neither has zonal territories that would require adherence to Protocol I. France ratified the protocols on 20 September 1996, and the United Kingdom ratified the protocols on 19 September 1997. Southeast Asia
The 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) bans the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession or control over any nuclear explosive device by any means in Southeast Asia. The area designated as a nuclear free zone comprises the territories of all states in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and their respective continental shelves and exclusive economic zones. Each state party also agrees not to dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere any radioactive material or wastes in the region. The Treaty of Bangkok has one protocol, specifying that all five
Arms Regulation and Disarmament nuclear weapons states undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty, nor to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. As of 2001, none of the nuclear weapons states had signed the protocol, largely due to U.S. and French objections regarding the unequivocal nature of security assurances and over the definitions of territory, including exclusive economic zones. Africa
The 1996 African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ) (commonly known as the Treaty of Pelindaba) establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the continent of Africa and all island states considered by the former Organization of African Unity to be part of Africa. The treaty has three protocols. Under Protocol I, the five nuclear powers are to agree not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against any treaty party or against any territory of a Protocol III party within the African zone. Under Protocol II, those five powers are to agree not to test or assist or encourage the testing of a nuclear explosive device anywhere with the African zone. Protocol III is open to states with dependent territories in the zone and obligates them to observe certain provisions of the treaty with respect to these territories; only Spain and France may become parties to it. All five nuclear weapons states signed the the three protocols in 1996, but as of 2001, only China and France had ratified Protocols I and II. France ratified Protocol III in 1997, but Spain has neither signed nor ratified Protocol III. Proposals for Nuclear-weapon-free Zones
In addition to those areas and zones mentioned above, where there has been success in elaborating treaties prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly has also discussed, with varying degrees of success, proposals for creating nuclearweapon-free zones in many other regions of the world. These discussions have covered a number of geographic zones, including the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Northern Europe, Central Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Security Assurances to Non-nuclear-weapon States
Since the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, the non-nuclear-weapon states have repeatedly insisted that their promise not to acquire nuclear weapons should be met with an assurance that nuclear weapons would not, under any circumstances, be used against them. On 19 June 1968, the Security Council recognized that aggression using nuclear weapons, or the threat of doing so, against a non-nuclear-weapon state would warrant immediate action by the Security Council, above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members. The Security Council also reaffirmed the provision of the UN Charter that declares that a state, if the victim of an armed attack, has a right to act in individual or collective self-defense until such time as the Security Council could take action to maintain peace and security. At the 1978 special session on disarmament, four of the five nuclear-weapon states individually declared their intention not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclearweapon states, which met the conditions outlined in their respective declarations. At that session also, China reiterated the declaration it made when it conducted its first nuclear test—that it would never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state. The nuclear-weapon states have refined and reasserted their respective security guarantees several times since then. Since 1979, the Conference on Disarmament has considered proposals for effective international arrangements that would assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear-weapon states have expressed the view that further assurances, in legally binding form, are necessary in order to effectively guarantee their security against nuclear attack. The Western nuclear-weapon states and their allies have been of the view that, in order to receive such negative security assurances, states must have demonstrated a
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commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, by forming part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or by adhering to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. Those non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT considered the issue of pivotal importance to the outcome of the 1995 NPT Conference. Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material An approach to nuclear disarmament which has received much international attention over the years has been to stop the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The United States submitted proposals on this subject to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly during the 1960s, which included plans for inspection of certain types of nuclear reactors and separation plants; the dismantling of a number of nuclear weapons by both the United States and the former Soviet Union, to be carried out in the presence of observers; and the transfer or conversion of fissionable material to industries or forms in which it could be used for peaceful purposes. In 1992 the United States announced a unilateral cessation of its national production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Among the nuclear-weapon states, both the Russian Federation and the United States have expressed support for reaching an international agreement to halt the production of weapons-grade fissionable material in the interests of non-proliferation. In 1993, the General Assembly adopted without a vote a resolution recommending negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In 1995, the UN Conference on Disarmament agreed to establish a mandate for an ad hoc committee based on the 1993 General Assembly resolution. The mandate was included in the "Shannon Report," named after then-Canadian Ambassador to the UN Gerald Shannon who led consultations on this issue. Because several countries resisted limiting the treaty to a ban only on the future production of fissile material, the Shannon Report explicitly states that the mandate to negotiate a halt to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons does not preclude any country from including the past production of fissile material. The Conference on Disarmament also agreed in 1998 to convene an ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials.
OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION In 1946, the General Assembly envisaged not only the elimination of atomic weapons, but also of all other major weapons of mass destruction. The dangers of such weapons to humanity cannot be underestimated. Even in World War I, “first-generation” chemical agents caused some 1.3 million casualties, of which over 100,000 were fatal. In 1948, the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in setting out the limits of its jurisdiction, also defined weapons of mass destruction as including, besides atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future with comparable destructive effects. Chemical and Biological Weapons As mentioned earlier, the powerful sense of outrage generated by the use of chemical weapons during the First World War resulted in the signing of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use, but not the production, possession, or stockpiling, of chemical or bacteriological weapons. As a consequence, possession and acquisition, particularly of chemical weapons, has continued and, indeed, in recent years has proliferated. Many parties to the Geneva Protocol have included reservations or statements with their signatures that open the door to the possible retaliatory use of such weapons.
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The protocol also did not provide for mechanisms to verify compliance or for procedures to deal with violations. Recognizing the shortcomings of the protocol, the international community continued its quest for a complete ban on chemical and biological weapons. Although treated as a single issue previously, it was agreed in 1971 to separate consideration of chemical and biological weapons in the hope that an early ban on biological weapons could be achieved. Biological Weapons
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction entered into force on 26 March 1975 and was hailed as a first step towards a comprehensive ban on biological weapons. The convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or methods of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It also prohibits weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery held by states that became party to the convention should be destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes not later than nine months after the entry into force of the convention for that state. Furthermore, any state party that finds that any other state party is not complying with the provisions of the convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council. In 1986, states parties decided to initiate a set of confidencebuilding measures in the form of a voluntary exchange of information and data. The information to be exchanged included data on high-risk research centers and laboratories; outbreaks of infectious diseases; publication of results of biological research; and the promotion of contacts among scientists in biological research. In 1991, the states parties established an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. A majority of states parties have requested a special conference to review the results of the expert group. In December 1996, the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention held a two-week session. The conference supported intensified work by an ad hoc group to design a verification protocol for the international treaty. The conference expressed hope that the group would reach agreement on a draft protocol to be considered by a special conference of states parties to the convention as soon as possible and before the Fifth Review Conference. The Fifth Review Conference was convened from 19 November to 7 December 2001. Due to persisting divergent views and positions on certain key issues, however, the conference decided to adjourn its proceedings and resume its work in November 2002. The conference was reconvened from 11 to 15 November 2002 in Geneva. States parties adopted a final report that included a decision to hold annual meetings in the next three years leading up to a Review Conference in 2006. The Fifth Review Conference was held against a background of heightened global concern about the threat of biological agents such as anthrax being used as weapons. Extensive negotiations and drafting sessions were held as the international treaty's states parties sought to respond to recent developments and demands that the Biological Weapons Convention be vigorously and thoroughly enforced. Ninety-one of 144 States parties attended the session. Chemical Weapons
In 1966, with the adoption of its first resolution on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare, the General Assembly commenced a long process of international discussions
and negotiations on issues relevant to the question. The adoption of the resolution reflected growing international awareness of the dangers involved with the possible use of such weapons of mass destruction. The question of chemical and biological weapons was treated as a single issue requiring a unified approach before 1971. After agreement had been reached on the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, attention turned more to the chemical weapons aspect and numerous proposals were put forward in the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, including the complete texts of drafts conventions. In 1980, the Conference on Disarmament began working toward a convention on chemical weapons, but progress was evident only late in the decade. The former Soviet Union and the United States, the only states that had admitted to possessing stockpiles of chemical weapons, began a series of bilateral contacts that led to agreement between them on sensitive issues of verification of implementation of a convention, including the question of challenge and on-site inspection. The actual use of chemical weapons during the war between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1980s, confirmed by an investigative team appointed by the Secretary-General, focused greater international attention on the need to reach early agreement on the prohibition of these weapons. In 1991, the war in the Persian Gulf and the possibility that chemical weapons might again be used added even greater urgency to the efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons as soon as possible. On 8 November 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 calling on Iraq to immediately disarm itself of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was regarded by the UN as great, and the resolution included language that did not preclude the use of force against Iraq for noncompliance. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was opened for signature on 13 January 1993 in Paris, France. The required number of ratifications (65) was completed in October 1996 and the treaty entered into force 29 April 1997, by which time a total of 87 countries had ratified it, including the US (which ratified it 24 April 1997). One year later, a total of 108 states were party to the convention. By that time the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands, had already worked with nine cooperating states that provided the OPCW with information on past or existing chemical weapons programs. The OPCW had completed almost 200 inspections and witnessed the destruction of approximately 1,000 tons of nerve agents in its first year. By November 2002, 147 countries had ratified the chemical weapons convention. The convention is considered a genuine disarmament measure in that it provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Its importance lies in the fact that these weapons exist in large quantities, have been used in combat in the past, and are believed to be possessed by a large number of countries. Further, the verification system provided for under the convention is the most comprehensive to have been formulated for a multilateral agreement in the field of disarmament. By the terms of the convention, states parties undertake never, under any circumstances, to use chemical weapons, nor to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer them, directly or indirectly, to anyone. They also commit themselves never to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons nor to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under the convention. Within a period of 10 years, each state party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons and production facilities that it may own or possess, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as all chemical weapons it has abandoned on the territory of another state party. The conven-
Arms Regulation and Disarmament tion also bans the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. The states parties are required to submit detailed declarations on any chemical weapons they might possess, on old and abandoned chemical weapons they might have on their territory, and on any related chemical weapons production facilities, as well as on the plans and implementation of the destruction of such. They have agreed to a comprehensive and graduated system of routine inspections for international monitoring of the implementation of their obligations under the convention. Also provided for is a system of short-notice, challenge inspections, by which each state party may request an international inspection team to monitor any facility or location in the territory of another state party, which is obliged to allow the inspection, for the purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance. An inspected state party may protect activities and installations that it considers unrelated to the inspection request. New Weapons of Mass Destruction The question of new weapons of mass destruction has been under consideration since the mid-1970s in the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, which have stated that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of such weapons. The former USSR and other nations supported a general agreement precluding laboratory development of weapons of mass destruction, as well as specific agreements as relevant possibilities are identified; other states feel that meaningful, verifiable agreements are practical only for specific, emergent weapons or systems. A list of specific types of potential weapons of mass destruction presented by the former USSR in 1979 included the following: radiological weapons, using radiological materials, a possibility already foreseen in 1948; particle-beam weapons, using charged or neutral particles to affect biological targets; and infrasonic “acoustic radiation” weapons and electromagnetic weapons operating at certain radio frequencies, either of which could have injurious effects on human organs. Radiological Weapons
At the 1976 session of the General Assembly, the United States proposed an instrument prohibiting radioactive weapons. This proposal led to bilateral negotiations with the USSR and the submission in 1979 of an agreed joint initiative for consideration by the then Committee on Disarmament. Since 1980, the multilateral negotiating body has considered proposals for reaching agreement on a convention to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, or use of radiological weapons. Some nonaligned and neutral states of the Conference on Disarmament, while recognizing the potential danger of the development of radiological weapons, considered that a military attack on a civilian nuclear power installation represented a more dangerous risk of mass destruction caused by the release of radiological substances. The former Soviet Union and the United States felt this idea altered the basic concept and content of the joint initiative. Finding an acceptable way to cover both a ban on radiological weapons in the traditional sense and a prohibition of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities has since been the main problem in efforts to negotiate a radiological weapons convention. This question has remained on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, but differences of view concerning the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities have persisted. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Conference on Disarmament put more attention on the problem of radiological weapons. The possibility of terrorists obtaining possession of radiological material and constructing a radiation dispersion
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weapon or "dirty bomb" was one taken seriously by the Conference. The IAEA and other bodies were working on ways of improving the physical control of such material in 2002.
P R O T E C T I N G T H E E N V IR O N M E N T F R O M M I L I TA RY A C T I V I T Y In recent history, the world has viewed with mounting concern the specter of deliberate destruction of the environment as a method of warfare. The damage inflicted on the environment during the war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and 1992 led to the inclusion of a new item on the agenda of the General Assembly, entitled “Exploitation of the environment as a weapon in times of armed conflict and the taking of practical measures to prevent such exploitation.” Prohibition of Environmental Modification In July 1974, following a summit meeting between the United States and the USSR, the two powers advocated measures to preclude the use of environmental modification techniques for hostile military purposes. This proposal led to consideration of the question in the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the opening for signature on 18 May 1977 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The convention entered into force in 1978. In essence, the convention bolsters existing provisions in international law protecting the environment by outlawing environmental modification techniques that would cause widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects to another state. During the process that led to the convention, many states decided it too narrowly defined the scope of the techniques to be banned. By 2002, the convention had acquired only 68 signatures. The convening of the UN conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the specter of oil wells set ablaze and a massive oil spill in the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War of 1991–92 intensified the debate over the environmental consequences of war. Some of the states parties to the convention made it known that they would ask the Secretary-General of the UN, as depositary (the holder of the legal, certified copies of the treaty), to convene a consultative committee of experts to provide views on the scope and application of the provisions of the convention. The states parties also have confirmed that the use of herbicides as an environmental modification technique was a method of warfare that fell within the scope of the prohibition of the convention if such use upset the ecological balance of a region, thus causing widespread, longlasting, and severe effects.
C O N V EN T I O N A L W E AP O N S It is a painful reality that, throughout the nuclear era and the cold war, and now in the post-cold war world, all armed conflicts— almost every one of them in developing countries—have been fought with conventional weapons. More than 20 million people have died in those wars. Every year, armed conflicts are waged in some 30 locations on the planet, all fought with conventional weapons. Conventional weapons and armed forces account for some four-fifths of global military expenditures and for approximately 80% of the world arms trade. Thus, while consideration of nuclear questions has dominated disarmament debates in the UN and other forums, the problems posed by the conventional arms race and arms transfers have come increasingly to the fore, particularly in the 1980s. In the disarmament forums at the UN, discussions of the issue of conventional disarmament have focused on four main elements: (a) limitations on conventional weapons themselves; (b) transparency in international arms transfers and the establishment of a UN Register on Conventional Arms; (c) the regional approach and the building of military confidence and security among states;
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and (d) the strengthening of international humanitarian and disarmament law with respect to inhumane weapons, including the question of land mines. In 1986, “conventional disarmament” was considered as a separate item on the agenda of the General Assembly for the first time, and, as a result, in 1987 it appeared on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission, indicating an increasing acceptance of the view that nuclear and conventional disarmament should proceed simultaneously. When the question of prohibiting the use of certain conventional weapons, such as napalm and other incendiaries, was first raised in the General Assembly in the late 1960s, there were numerous proposals for banning various weapons, such as mines and booby traps, that also were deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. Considerable work, including some under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of diplomatic conferences on protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to humanitarian law in armed conflicts, was done in the late 1960s and the 1970s. As noted above, in 1980, a UN conference at Geneva adopted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; the convention was opened for signature in 1981 and came into force in December 1983. UN Register of Conventional Arms On 1 January 1992 the UN Register of Conventional Arms was officially established and the first reports on arms transfers during 1992 were due to be received by the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs by 30 April 1993. In October of 1993, the SecretaryGeneral presented a consolidated report on the first year of operation of the register to the General Assembly, which brought the information presented by states into the public domain. Information was received from 87 states, including most of the major supplier countries, on arms imports and exports in seven categories of heavy conventional weapons—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. Submissions to the register, which are on a voluntary basis, are to be made by 30 April of each year. Upon the request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General convened a group of experts in 1994 to examine the continuing operation of the register and its further development. In that connection, many states asserted that the information shared should include information on military holdings, on procurement through national production, and on weapons of mass destruction. They believed that these additions to the register would help to attract wider universality in reporting. The establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms by the UN was a ground-breaking endeavor. The exchange of information enacted by means of the register has the potential to foster confidence among states and create an atmosphere more conducive to self-restraint and real measures of disarmament. The successful further development and operation of the register could provide the member states of the UN with an effective instrument of preventive diplomacy. Also in relation to openness and transparency in military matters, the Disarmament Commission completed its work on guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, which were endorsed by the General Assembly. Also in 1992, the Conference on Disarmament took up for the first time an item dealing with conventional weapons under a new agenda item entitled “Transparency in armaments.” It continued consideration of the item in 1993 and 1994 in the framework of a subsidiary body of the conference, and presented a report to the General Assembly on its work in 1993.
In October 2002, the UN held a symposium to mark the 10th anniversary of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. As of that year, more than 160 governments had reported to the Register at least once. Submissions by governments for the years 2000 and 2001 recorded sharp increases over all the preceding years. Inhumane Weapons Early international humanitarian laws dealt with the effects of inhumane conventional weapons. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 recognized that the object of warfare would not be served by the use of weapons that uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled soldiers. The “dum-dum” bullet, developed a few years later, was banned by the 1899 Hague Conference as contrary to the St. Petersburg Declaration. Principles enunciated in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were repeated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, prohibiting the employment of weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Between 1974 and 1977, two protocols were negotiated to the Geneva Conventions, but were not considered effective at adopting any prohibitions or restrictions on conventional weapons. In 1977, the General Assembly decided to convene a UN conference with the aim of reaching an agreement on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons. The UN Conference, held at Geneva in 1979 and 1980, adopted the convention, which entered into force on 2 December 1983. Annexed Protocol I prohibits the use of any weapons that injure with fragments that are not detectable by X-rays. Protocol II prohibits or sets out restrictions on the use of mines (excluding anti-ship mines), booby-traps, and other delayed action devices. Protocol III prohibits or outlines restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons, that is, weapons designed with the primary purpose of setting fire to objects or causing injury by means of fire. Among other items of discussion with respect to the review of the convention, the vast toll in civilian life and bodily injury, together with the devastation of societies and economies in postconflict situations caused by the massive and indiscriminate use of land mines, has been receiving greater international attention. In 1993, the General Assembly called upon all states to adopt a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel land mines. In a related resolution, the General Assembly requested the SecretaryGeneral to prepare a report on the problems caused by the increasing presence of mines and other unexploded devices resulting from armed conflicts and on the manner in which the United Nations’ contribution to the solution of problems relating to mine clearance could be strengthened. As part of Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s reform, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was created to coordinate the mine-related activities of 11 UN departments and agencies. Wholly funded by the Voluntary Trust for Assistance in Mine Action, UNMAS spearheaded the development of the Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy, a document that serves as the basis for the coordinated, systemwide approach to mine action. While UNMAS focused its efforts on removing existing land-mines, the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction aimed to eliminate, or at least reduce the number of, new land-mines. The convention entered into force March 1999.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES Regional Confidence-Building The objective of confidence-building measures is to contribute toward reducing or eliminating the causes for mistrust, fear, tensions, and hostilities, which are significant factors behind the
Arms Regulation and Disarmament international arms buildup. A UN study on confidence-building measures, issued in 1981, represented an attempt to clarify and develop the concept of confidence-building and to provide guidelines to governments for introducing and implementing confidence-building measures and promoting public awareness of the concept so as to advance negotiations and enhance peace and security. In that same year, the General Assembly invited all states to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate among themselves in keeping with conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective regions. In fact, multilateral negotiations on these issues had been under way since the early 1970s. The Vienna Talks on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, which commenced in 1973 among the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were aimed at enhancing stability in the central region of the two alliances and in Europe as a whole while reducing armed forces and equipment but maintaining undiminished security. After decades of unsuccessful efforts in that framework, the two sides agreed to close down the talks in 1989 to pursue efforts in the context of a new set of talks on conventional force reductions within the security pillar of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), ongoing since the adoption of the 1975 Helsinki Act. The CSCE, held in Geneva and Helsinki from 1972 to 1975 and involving 33 European countries, as well as Canada and the US, further developed the concept of confidence-building measures on a non-UN regional basis; its Final Act, issued at Helsinki in August 1975, included provisions on security, human rights, and scientific cooperation. The final Stockholm Document, adopted in September 1986, constituted the first security agreement for Europe among the 35 states participating in the conference that adopts militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable confidence-building measures. Under its terms, the CSCE states agreed to a new set of standards on the notification and observation of certain military activities, and, most important, they agreed upon verification of compliance by means of mandatory on-site inspection arrangements. Reviewed during 1977–78 in Belgrade and again from 1980 to 1983 in Madrid, the conference led to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, held from 1984 to 1986, with the same states participating. In Vienna in 1989, at the same time that negotiations between the two military alliances were initiated on conventional armed forces in Europe, a new set of negotiations began on confidenceand security-building measures (CSBMs) among all the CSCE participating states. The talks led to the adoption of the Vienna Document of 1990, which incorporated and expanded the provisions of the Stockholm Document. Among its provisions are an exchange of military information among its parties on the command structure of their military forces, plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems, and the military budplans for the forthcoming year. The CSCE held a summit meeting in Paris immediately following the adoption of the Vienna CSBM document and adopted the Charter of Paris. Among other results, the participating CSCE states decided to establish a Crisis Prevention Centre in Vienna, which became essentially the operational component of the CSBM document. In order to consolidate further the achievements of the 1990 Charter of Paris, the CSCE held a summit meeting in 1992. It issued an important document relating to confidence-building entitled the Helsinki Document–1992–The Challenges of Change, adopted unanimously by its full membership. In Helsinki, the states parties decided inter alia to start a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament, and confidence- and securitybuilding; established a new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation; and strengthened the Conflict Prevention Centre set up in Vienna.
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In the interest of improving openness and transparency, and facilitating monitoring and compliance with existing or future arms control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict resolution and crisis management in the CSCE, a Treaty on Open Skies was signed in March 1992 by 24 of the CSCE participating states. Covering an area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the treaty allows observation flights by a state party over the territory of other state parties. The UN has contributed to the process of confidence-building in a number of ways. The Secretary-General has assisted states parties to arms limitation agreements, at their request, in exchanges of information. This is the case for the newly formed Register of Conventional Arms, for the maintenance of an international system for standardized reporting of military expenditures, for the biological weapons convention as well as for the seabed treaty. The Secretary-General also has contributed to confidencebuilding within regions by stimulating informal discussions of regional and global disarmament issues at seminars and conferences organized under the auspices of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. Further, in order to promote cooperation among regional states towards arms limitation and disarmament, the UN has established three regional centers as follows: UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (Lomé, Togo); UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (Kathmandu, Nepal), and the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and the Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (Lima, Peru). The centers focus their activities on dissemination of information, training, and regional meetings. Zones of Peace The 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace is considered annually by an ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which has proposed the convening of a conference of the regional states. There also have been proposals for zones of peace and cooperation in various other regions, including the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE Since the 1950s, the General Assembly has appealed for the reduction of military spending and has suggested that the money thus saved be redeployed for economic and social development activities. A 1981 UN expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development saw a triangular relationship between disarmament, security, and development and concluded that the world could either continue to pursue the arms race or move toward a more sustainable international and political order; it could not do both. A 1982 expert study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures concluded that UN mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes should be strengthened, that the use of the world’s finite resources for military ends should be discouraged, and that there should be extensive diversion of these resources from military applications to socioeconomic development. Conference on Disarmament and Development In 1984, the General Assembly decided to convene an International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. The conference, which took place at UN headquarters in August–September 1987, considered ways and means of enhancing security and of releasing additional resources for development purposes through disarmament measures. In particular, the conference called upon the UN to make greater efforts to promote collective knowledge of the nonmilitary threats to international security; to establish an improved and comprehensive database on global and national military expenditures; to continue to analyze the impact of global military expenditures on the world economy and the international eco-
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nomic system; to monitor trends in military spending, and to facilitate an international exchange of views and experience in the field of conversion from military to civilian production. To carry out the above work, a high-level task force was set up within the UN Secretariat. The Secretary-General reports each year to the General Assembly on the efforts carried out in this regard. The improvement in the East-West relations in the late 1980s and the beginning of significant reductions in armed forces and armaments in the 1990s drew considerable attention to the issue of conversion of weapons, weapons testing and production facilities, and redeployment of armed forces. At its 44th session in 1989, the General Assembly, for the first time, adopted a resolution dealing with the subject of conversion of military resources. Beginning with the 1990 international conference in Moscow on Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Era of Arms Reduction, a number of similar conferences on different aspects of conversion of military resources to civilian production have been organized by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and other interested UN bodies in cooperation with various host countries. The conference in Moscow was followed by an international conference on International Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Military Industrial Technology in Beijing, China, in 1991. This was followed by yet another international conference on aerospace complex conversion held in Moscow in 1992. The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) submitted to the General Assembly at its 47th session in 1992, through the Secretary-General, a study entitled Economic aspects of disarmament: disarmament as an investment. It found that on the cost side disarmament required a fundamental reallocation of resources from military to civilian production, which could result in major problems of unemployment or underemployment of labor, capital, and other resources. Economic dividends of disarmament were likely to be small in the short term, it concluded. In the long term, however, disarmament would lead to significant benefits in the civilian sector through the production of goods and services made possible through the reallocation of resources from the military sector. Thus, in its economic aspects, the report said, disarmament was like an investment process involving short-run costs and long-run benefits. Reduction of Military Budgets Proposals for the reduction of military budgets, based on the conviction that such measures would facilitate the disarmament process and help release resources for economic and social development, were made in the General Assembly during the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the General Assembly pursued this question on two tracks. There were those states that pressed for the identification and elaboration of principles for freezing and reducing military budgets, while other states favored an effort by the General Assembly to broaden participation in the standardized reporting system. During the same period, the General Assembly initiated a series of expert studies and established an Ad Hoc Panel on Military Budgeting, aimed at arriving at a generally acceptable conceptual definition of military budgets and the development of a standardized system of measuring and reporting the military expenditures of states. An international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures was introduced in pursuance of resolution 35/142 B of 17 December 1980. A 1982 study reaffirmed that the reporting instrument was a practical method for monitoring and reporting on military expenditures and strongly recommended its continuous use. On the basis of national reports on military expenditures received, the Secretary-General has submitted annually to the General Assembly a document on the operation of the reporting system. The General Assembly also has continued to recommend that member states use the reporting instrument to
forward annually to the Secretary-General military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available. The Disarmament Commission also considered the reduction of the military budgets from 1979 until 1989. Despite the progress and refinement made on the reporting system, basic differences in approach to the problem of reducing military budgets remained. In the 1986 session of the Disarmament Commission, provisional agreement was achieved on a text embodying a set of principles to govern the action of states in freezing and reducing military budgets. However, there was disagreement on the use of the standardized reporting instrument. The item has not been on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission since 1990. In 1992, the General Assembly endorsed a set of guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters as adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1992 session. The “Guidelines” are intended inter alia to encourage openness and transparency on military matters, to facilitate the process of arms limitation, reduction, and elimination, as well as to assist verification of compliance with obligations undertaken by states in these fields.
S T U D I ES , R E S E A R C H , I N F O R M ATI O N , AND TRAINING Studies and Research Since the early 1960s, the UN has prepared studies on disarmament issues mandated by the General Assembly, usually with the assistance of experts and consultants. The purpose of these studies is to assist the negotiating process through analysis of specific questions, as well as to provide information in order to facilitate better understanding of the issues. The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which was established in October 1980 as an autonomous institution within the UN framework, conducts independent research on disarmament problems, aimed at encouraging disarmament by expanding accessible information on proposals and concepts. Located in Geneva, UNIDIR is funded principally by voluntary contributions from governments and public and private organizations. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters functions as the board of trustees of UNIDIR. Its other major functions include advising on programs for disarmament studies and research and on implementation of the UN Disarmament Information Programme. It may also advise the Secretary-General of the UN on specific disarmament and related questions. Information The Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) was created during the UN’s late 1990s reform efforts to coordinate the UN’s activities in this area. As part of this effort, the DDA issues the UN Disarmament Yearbook and a variety of other publications. The web site www.disarmament.un.org keeps track of news and developments in disarmament, including the latest treaty ratifications as well as pertinent UN resolutions and decisions. Training A disarmament fellowships program for young diplomats and public officials from various countries, particularly developing countries, was established by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament. The program is aimed at preparing students for work with their governments in the field of disarmament and at enhancing and broadening diplomatic expertise. Disarmament fellows are trained each year under the auspices of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.
P E A C E F U L U S E S O F O U T E R S PA C E
the General Assembly decided unanimously that the UN “should provide a focal point” for such information and requested the Secretary-General to open a public registry for this purpose. The information is transmitted to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for review and is then placed in the registry. The Russian Federation and the US regularly supply appropriate data, as do Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the European Space Agency (ESA). Cooperation with Specialized Agencies and Other International Organizations. By the terms of its 1961 resolution on outer space, the General Assembly requested the WMO to submit reports to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on the international cooperation required in weather research. In the following year, it endorsed steps taken under WMO auspices that resulted in the establishment of the World Weather Watch, incorporating meteorological satellites into its operational system. The same resolution also requested the ITU to submit reports on cooperation required to develop effective space communications. In the ensuing years, this cooperative effort embraced other agencies and international organizations having special interests in matters related to outer space, including UNEP, FAO, UNESCO, ESA, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), and the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT). Education and Training. The General Assembly has emphasized the need to train personnel from countries not yet advanced in space activities. The secretariat distributes a periodically revised directory of information taken from UN documents and carries out an educational program on space applications. The program creates an awareness of the potential of space applications for development, especially in developing countries, through technical advisory services, seminars, and workshops and the administration of fellowships offered by member states and international organizations for education and training. Under the United Nations Programme on Space Applications, the latest efforts are being directed towards the development and enhancement of knowledge and skills in the discipline through the establishment and operation of centers for space science and technology education at the regional level.
In October 1957, the USSR launched the first Sputnik into orbit around the earth. In the following year, the General Assembly for the first time debated the question of outer space. Two items were proposed for inclusion on the agenda: “The Banning of the Use of Cosmic Space for Military Purposes, the Elimination of Foreign Bases on the Territories of Other Countries, and International Cooperation on the Study of Cosmic Space,” proposed by the USSR; and a “Program for International Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space,” proposed by the US. The very titles of these items indicate the differences that initially existed between the two powers in regard to an international accord on the uses of outer space. The USSR proposed that the first order of business should be a ban on armaments in space but wished to link this goal with the dismantling of US overseas military bases. The US preferred to avoid the disarmament issue altogether in this connection and wished merely to emphasize that it was the common aim of mankind to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. This disagreement provoked a series of disputes over the composition and terms of reference of the special UN body that should be established to deal with outer space problems. The USSR wanted a body with East-West parity, while the US preferred a body more broadly geographical in representation. Owing to these differences, the 1958 General Assembly merely set up an 18-member ad hoc committee to deal with questions of outer space. It included only three member states from the Soviet bloc, which, because of the composition of the committee, declared that they would not take part in its work. The committee eventually was reduced to 13 participants. After intensive negotiations, the 1959 General Assembly set up the permanent 24-nation Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). Its membership was increased to 28 in 1962, 37 in 1973, 47 in 1977, and 53 in 1980. In 2002, membership was expanded to 64. In 1962, the committee organized itself into two subcommittees of the whole, one to deal with scientific and technical cooperation and the other with the task of evolving outer space law. The committee has also set up working groups of the whole to deal with navigation satellites, direct broadcasting satellites, remote sensing satellites, and the use of nuclear power sources in outer space. The UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) is the office that serves as the secretariat for UNCOPUOS.
I N T E R N AT I O N A L S PA C E Y E A R A N D T H E U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N ENVIRONMENT
D E V E L O P M E N T S I N S C I E N T IF I C A N D TE C H N I C A L C O O PE R AT IO N
In 1989, the General Assembly recommended that more attention be paid to all aspects related to the protection and preservation of the outer space environment, especially those potentially affecting the earth’s environment. In the same year, the General Assembly also endorsed the designation of the year 1992 as International Space Year and its use as a vehicle for promotion of international cooperation, which should be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all states, with particular emphasis on the needs of developing countries. Numerous programs were carried out in support of International Space Year and culminated in 1992. “Mission to Planet Earth,” which was a central focus of the International Space Year, saw scientists worldwide using space technologies to assess such threats to the earth’s environment as global warming, deforesta-
Scientific and technical cooperation within the framework of the UN grew out of General Assembly action on the basis of recommendations of the committee and has increased over the years. It covers various fields of activity, including the following. Exchange of Information. The UN Secretariat produces annual reports on national and cooperative international projects. Since 1961, a growing number of countries and international organizations have provided the committee with information on space activities and programs. Public Registry of Launchings of Space Vehicles. An essential requirement for international cooperation in outer space development is that launchings of space vehicles, together with scientific data on the results of such launchings, be made public. In 1961,
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tion, and ozone depletion. Subsequently, the General Assembly recommended that the United Nations should actively encourage the continuation of activities initiated for International Space Year and promote broader involvement in those activities by more nations. Reflecting the growing concern of the international community on environmental security, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development took place also in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro. Such concern for the protection of environment also was a focus of the activities for International Space Year. The following year, the Secretary-General suggested in his report that it might also be time to examine ways to formalize international cooperation in the utilization of space systems and space technology for environmental purposes, particularly the implementation of the programs recommended in Agenda 21. The product of the Rio conference, Agenda 21 lays out a detailed program of action to be taken by the United Nations, other international organizations, national governments, and intergovernmental organizations. In response to the request by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General prepared an analytical report on the role that the committee could play in view of the decisions and recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
III plenary meeting, the Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development and its related Action Plan were adopted. The Declaration and Plan were the outcome of the coordinated work of attendees, including representatives of governments, intergovernmental bodies, civil society, and, for the first time, the private sector, to create a practical framework for cooperation and action to protect the planet and prepare for the “space millennium.” The program involves using space applications for human security, protecting the outer space environment, increasing developing countries’ access to space science and its related benefits, raising public awareness of the importance of the peaceful use of outer space, strengthening the UN’s space activities, and promoting international cooperation. Recommendations included creating a voluntary United Nations fund for UNISPACE III implementation; proclaiming a World Space Week, which is now held annually from 4 to 10 October; encouraging improved access by states to the International Space Station; supporting regional centers for space science and technology education set up under the auspices of the UN; and exploring the legal aspects of space debris, the use of nuclear power sources in space, intellectual property rights for spacerelated technologies, and ownership and access to the resources of celestial bodies.
U N C O N F E R E N C E S O N O U T E R S PA C E
D E V E L O P M E N T O F I N T E R N AT I ON AL L AW O N O U T E R S PA C E
Originally recommended by the General Assembly in 1959, the first UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in August 1968 in Vienna, with 78 states and a large number of international organizations attending. The conference examined the practical benefits to be derived from space research and the opportunities for international cooperation available to nations without space capability, with special reference to the needs of the developing countries. The participants submitted some 200 papers dealing primarily with space applications. They reviewed 10 years of space research in practical applications—in communications, meteorology, navigation, and education—and practical benefits, as well as economic and legal questions pertaining to international cooperation. In August 1982, the Second UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (called UNISPACE 82) was held in Vienna, with 94 state participants and 45 observers representing intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The conference dealt with the entire gamut of space sciences, technologies, and applications from scientific, technical, political, economic, social, and organizational points of view. It also considered the legal implications of issues on the agenda and discussed growing international concern relating to military activities in outer space. The report of the conference, adopted by consensus, dealt with questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in space, the needs and possibilities for technology transfer, coordination in the use of the geostationary orbit, remote sensing of earth resources from space, the use of direct-broadcasting satellites, space transportation and space platform technologies, protection of the near-earth environment, the role of the UN, and other matters. The recommendations of the conference were seen as an agenda for nations and organizations to follow in carrying out space activities. The Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) was held in Vienna, Austria (headquarters of OOSA since 1993), on 19–30 July 1999. The program included technical and space generation forums as well as a space exhibition and global conferences. The key objective was to create a blueprint for the peaceful uses of outer space in the 21st century. At the time of the conference there were five UN treaties covering a range of space activities. At a UNISPACE
The early work of the legal subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was marked by disputes that delayed progress on the development of outer space law. The majority of members stressed the dangers of spectacular scientific advances without corresponding legal obligations and safeguards. In originally proposing the formulation of an international legal code on outer space, the General Assembly had recommended that such a code be based, insofar as possible, on the existing body of international law (including the UN Charter) and the principle of freedom of space exploration for all states. But the USSR and the US differed on certain fundamental issues from the time that the question was first debated in the General Assembly in 1959. The most important difference was on the relation between the prevention of armaments in space and disarmament on earth. The breakthrough in this quasi-procedural deadlock first came as part of the general East-West détente that followed the partial nuclear test-ban treaty signed in August 1963. During its 1963 session, the General Assembly was able to adopt by acclamation two important measures relating to restricting the use of outer space to peaceful purposes. The first was a resolution calling upon all states to refrain from placing in orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. The second was a resolution embodying a Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Though not an agreement with binding force, as the USSR had wished, it was regarded as the forerunner to a full legal treaty. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which the General Assembly unanimously acclaimed in 1966 and which came into force on 10 October 1967, was based on drafts submitted individually by both the US and the USSR. The 17 articles of the treaty state that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind, that outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty or any other means, and that exploration shall be carried on in accordance with international law. Parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons, install such weapons on celestial bod-
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ies, or otherwise station them in outer space. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all parties exclusively for peaceful purposes, and military bases or maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render them all possible assistance in case of accident, distress, or emergency landing. Parties launching objects into outer space are internationally liable for damage caused by such objects or their component parts. The principle of cooperation and mutual assistance shall be followed in space exploration. Harmful contamination of the moon and other celestial bodies shall be avoided. All stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open for inspection to representatives of other states on a reciprocal basis. Under the 1967 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, which came into force on 3 December 1968, contracting parties agree to procedures for assistance to spacecraft personnel in the event of an accident or emergency landing and for the return of space objects. The 1971 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, which came into force on 1 September 1972, provides a procedure for the presentation and settlement of claims. Under the 1974 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, which came into force on 15 September 1976, a central register of objects launched into space was established and is maintained by the UN Secretary-General, with mandatory registration, as well as notification to the SecretaryGeneral of voluntary markings of such objects. Assistance is provided to states requesting help in the identification of hazardous objects or those causing damage. The Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 1979, describes the moon and its natural resources as the common heritage of mankind, and it reserves the moon for exclusively peaceful purposes. It bars the emplacement of nuclear
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or other weapons of mass destruction on the moon and also prohibits the placing in orbit, or in any other trajectory to or around the moon, of objects carrying such weapons and the establishment of military bases, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct of military activities on the moon. The General Assembly has adopted three more sets of principles based on the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, adopted in 1982, condition the establishment of directbroadcasting satellite services on the prior consent of receiving states. The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, adopted in 1986, provide for international cooperation and participation in remote sensing; they specify that such activities will be permitted without the consent of the states being sensed but that the latter will have the right to receive data and information concerning their resources. Finally, after many years of difficult debate and negotiation within the Committee, the General Assembly adopted in 1992 the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space. They provide guidelines and criteria for safe use of nuclear power sources in outer space, including the requirement that a safety review be made prior to launching of any nuclear power source and that results of such review be made public through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should also be notified of any re-entry of radioactive materials to the earth. Reflecting the changes in the international political and security environment, which provide new possibilities for the utilization of space technology to promote international peace, there were more constructive discussions within the committee in the 1990s on the enhancement of international cooperation in various aspects. The committee and its Legal Subcommittee continued their considerations on the matters relating to the definition and delimitation of outer space and to the character and utilization of the geostationary orbit and on legal framework for sharing the benefits of space exploration by all states.
LAW OF THE SEA
The earth is essentially a liquid planet, with more than 70% of its surface covered by water. Although geographically divided and labeled as continents, islands, seas, and oceans, the earth, when viewed from outer space, appears as one large body of water interspersed with lesser land masses. The world’s oceans thus provide a common link for the more than 110 nations whose shorelines are washed by their waters. Despite these universal characteristics, however, this last earthly frontier had become an arena for disputes over such matters as fishing rights and varying claims of national jurisdiction, exploitation of deep sea mineral resources, responsibility for the protection of the environment, the right of innocent passage of ships, and free access to the sea for landlocked countries. For centuries the doctrine that governed ocean space and resources was “freedom of the seas”; coastal state claims were restricted within narrow limits. The first change in this regime came with the emergence of the doctrine of the continental shelf, spurred by the development of offshore oil and gas fields. The US, in 1945, was the first to proclaim jurisdiction over the natural resources of its continental shelf “beneath the high seas” (that is, beyond US territorial limits). Other nations were quick to follow suit, many of them seeking to extend their jurisdiction over fisheries. In order to clarify accepted norms and codify state practice, the UN, in 1958, convened the First Conference on the Law of the Sea. Working on the basis of drafts prepared by the International Law Commission (see the chapter on International Law), the conference adopted the Convention on the Continental Shelf, thus establishing the new doctrine in international law. The conference adopted three other conventions—on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, the high seas, and fishing and conservation of living resources. A further attempt made in 1960, at the Second Conference on the Law of the Sea, failed to define the limits of the territorial sea. A sense of urgency was again given to problems connected with the deep seas in 1967, when Malta warned the General Assembly that there was a danger that advanced, industrialized countries who were so equipped might wish to appropriate the ocean floor for their national use, not only to develop its immense resources but also for defense and other purposes. Malta’s delegate, Arvid Pardo, remarked that the “dark oceans” were “the womb” of life: life had emerged from the protecting oceans. Man was now returning to the ocean depths, and his penetration “could mark the beginning of the end for man, and indeed for life as we know it . . . it could also be a unique opportunity to lay solid foundations for a peaceful and increasingly prosperous future for all peoples.” Reacting to the Maltese call for international solutions, the General Assembly set up the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, called the Seabed Committee, to study various aspects of the problem and to indicate practical means to promote international cooperation. The principal results of the committee’s work were embodied in a Declaration of Principles, adopted by the General Assembly in 1970, proclaiming that the seabed and ocean floor and its resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction “are the common heritage of mankind” and that no nation should exercise sovereignty or rights over any part
of the area. The declaration also called for the establishment of an international regime to govern the exploration and exploitation of the sea’s resources for the benefit of mankind. Recognizing that the problems of ocean space are interrelated and need to be considered as a whole, the General Assembly also decided, in 1970, to convene a new UN Conference on the Law of the Sea to prepare a single comprehensive treaty. The Seabed Committee, in preparation for the conference, thus had to deal not only with the international seabed area but also with such issues as the regime of the high seas, the continental shelf and territorial sea (including the question of limits), fishing rights, preservation of the marine environment, scientific research, and access to the sea by landlocked states.
T H IR D L AW O F T H E S E A C O N F E R E N C E
The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea opened at UN headquarters in New York in December 1973 with a brief organizational session. Its real work commenced the following year in Caracas, Venezuela, with the important decision to proceed on the basis of a negotiated “package deal”—meaning no one provision or section would be formally approved until all others were in place. This informal approach was dictated not only by the interdependence of the issues involved but also by the need to produce ultimately an overall balance that could command the widest support. The first informal text, as the agreed basis for negotiations, was prepared in 1975. It was followed by a series of revisions.
U N C O N V E N T IO N O N T H E L AW O F T H E S E A
The final text of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was approved by the conference at UN headquarters on 30 April 1982, by a vote of 130 in favor, with 4 against (Israel, Turkey, US, and Venezuela) and 17 abstentions. Following the signing of the Final Act of the conference in Jamaica on 10 December 1982, the UNCLOS entered into force on 16 November 1994. As of October 2002, 157 nations were keeping parties while 19 other states had signed the treaty and were completing the ratification process. The UNCLOS created three international institutions dealing with specific areas of the Law of the Sea: the International Seabed Authority (ISBA), the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).
T H E C O N T E N T I O U S I S S U E OF D E E P S E A M IN I N G
Although the United States had been a leader in the international community’s effort to develop an overall legal framework for the oceans in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, deep divisions arose between developing and developed nations over the establishment of an international organization to regulate the exploration of deep sea mining in international waters (Part XI of the Treaty). These divisions were so deep that the United States and other industrialized countries declined to formally sign the treaty, although endorsing the consensus that had been reached by the conference on other areas covered by the treaty.
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Law of the Sea On the economic and commercial front, the industrialized nations sought a more market-oriented regime. They objected to provisions for mandatory technology transfer, production limitations from the seabed, what they perceived as onerous financial obligations on miners, and the establishment of a subsidized international public enterprise that, it was postulated, would compete unfairly with other commercial enterprises. In July 1990, the Secretary-General of the UN undertook informal consultations aimed at achieving universal participation in UNCLOS. Fifteen meetings were convened in the period 1990 to 1994, resulting in major amendments to the seabed mining portion of UNCLOS. In early 1993, the Clinton administration in the US decided to take a more active role in the reform effort, deciding that the merit of actively participating would not be to find an answer to every future question regarding the uses of the oceans, but to create a framework and channel discussions of new issues along lines more acceptable to the industrialized nations. The Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as the “agreement”) concluded on 3 June 1994. The agreement avoids establishing a detailed regime anticipating all phases of activity associated with mining of the deep seabed. However, it sets forth economic and commercial principles consistent with a free market philosophy to form the basis for developing rules and regulations at such time as commercial mining develops in international waters. The agreement retains the institutional outlines of Part XI of the treaty, but scales back the structure and links the activation and operation of institutions to the actual development of concrete interest in seabed mining. The agreement limits assistance to land-based producers of minerals to adjustment assistance financed out of a portion of royalties from future seabed mining. It also replaces the production control regime of Part XI by the application of GATT principles on subsidization. The agreement further replaces the detailed financial obligations imposed on miners by a future system for recovering economic rents based on systems applicable to landbased mining, and provides that it be designed to avoid competitive incentives or disincentives for seabed mining. At the conclusion of the informal consultations, only the Russian Federation made a statement reserving its position, since some of its proposals had not been incorporated into the agreement. It was then decided to convene a resumed 48th session of the General Assembly from 27–29 July 1994 for the purpose of adopting and opening for signature the agreement, at which time most of the abstaining industrialized nations signed the treaty. It entered into force on 28 July 1996 having received 40 ratifications. Provisions of UNCLOS The convention covers almost all human uses of the seas—navigation and overflight, resource exploration and exploitation, conservation and pollution, fishing, and shipping. Its 321 articles and nine annexes constitute a guide for behavior by nations in the world’s oceans, defining maritime zones, laying down rules for drawing boundaries, assigning legal duties and responsibilities, and providing machinery for settlement of disputes. Some of the main provisions of the convention are the following. Territorial Sea. Coastal states would exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea of up to 22.2 km (12 naut mi) in breadth, but foreign vessels would be allowed “innocent passage” through those waters for purposes of peaceful navigation. Straits Used for International Navigation. Ships and aircraft of all countries would be allowed “transit passage” through straits used for international navigation, as long as they proceeded without delay and without threatening the bordering states; states
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alongside the straits would be able to regulate navigation and other aspects of passage. Archipelagic States. Archipelagic states, consisting of a group or groups of closely related islands and interconnecting waters, would have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn between the outermost points of the islands; all other states would enjoy the right of passage through sea lanes designated by the archipelagic states. Exclusive Economic Zone. Coastal states would have sovereign rights in a 370-km (200-naut mi) exclusive economic zone with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities and would also have certain types of jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection; all other states would have freedom of navigation and overflight in the zone, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. Landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states would have the opportunity to participate in exploiting part of the zone’s fisheries when the coastal state could not harvest them all. Highly migratory species of fish and marine mammals would be accorded special protection. Continental Shelf. Coastal states would have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area of the seabed) for the purpose of exploring and exploiting it; the shelf would extend at least 370 km (200 naut mi) from shore and 648 km (350 naut mi) or more under specified circumstances. Coastal states would share with the international community part of the revenue that they would derive from exploiting oil and other resources from any part of their shelf beyond 370 km (200 naut mi). A Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf would make recommendations to states on the shelf’s outer boundaries. High Seas. All states would enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, scientific research, and fishing on the high seas; they would be obliged to adopt, or cooperate with other states in adopting, measures to conserve living resources. Islands. The territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf of islands would be determined in accordance with rules applicable to land territory, but rocks that could not sustain human habitation or economic life would have no economic zone or continental shelf. Enclosed or Semienclosed Seas. States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas would be expected to cooperate on management of living resources and on environmental and research policies and activities. Landlocked States. Landlocked states would have the right of access to and from the sea and would enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit states. International Seabed Area. A “parallel system” would be established for exploring and exploiting the international seabed area. All activities in this area would be under the control of an International Seabed Authority, to be established under the convention. The authority would conduct its own mining operations through its operating arm, called the “Enterprise,” and would also contract with private and state ventures to give them mining rights in the area, so that they could operate in parallel with the authority. The first generation of seabed prospectors, called “pioneer investors,” would have guarantees of production once mining was authorized. Marine Pollution. States would be bound to prevent and control marine pollution from any source and would be liable for damage caused by violation of their international obligations to combat marine pollution. Marine Scientific Research. All marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf would be subject to the consent of the coastal state, but coastal states would in most cases be obliged to grant consent to foreign states when the research was to be conducted for peaceful purposes.
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Development and Transfer of Marine Technology. States would be bound to promote the development and transfer of marine technology “on fair and reasonable terms and conditions,” with proper regard for all legitimate interests, including the rights and duties of holders, suppliers, and recipients of technology. States would be obliged to settle their disputes over the interpretation or application of the convention by peaceful means. They would have to submit most types of disputes to a compulsory procedure entailing decisions that would be binding on all parties. Disputes could be submitted to an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, to be established under the convention; to the International Court of Justice; or to arbitration. Conciliation
also would be available, and, in certain circumstances, submission to conciliation might be compulsory. International Acceptance The new legal regime for the seas is now firmly established throughout the world: by September 1998, 133 states had established 12-nautical-mile territorial limits and 106 states had declared exclusive economic zones. Nineteen states had declared fishing zones of 200 nautical miles. Most such national legislation is derived directly from the provisions of the convention. The General Assembly is concerned with ensuring maximum conformity in state practice and each year examines the status of the convention and reviews developments relating to its application.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Article 55 of the charter, on international economic and social cooperation, calls on the UN to promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. The fostering of economic and social development, however, was only one of several objectives specified in the charter, and no special emphasis was accorded to it. The League of Nations and the early ILO were concerned primarily with defensive or protective action, such as the protection of countries against diseases that might cross international frontiers, prevention of international traffic in women and children and in illicit drugs, and protection of workers against unfair and inhumane conditions of labor. Such early action in the economic and social fields was taken in a climate of thought that hardly recognized the concept of economic and social development. Toward the middle of this century, however, the concept took root as a major objective of international cooperation, and the primary goal of the UN and the specialized agencies in the economic and social fields came to be promoting the development of the less developed countries.
TH E RI C H A N D T H E P O O R N AT I O N S The UN’s preoccupation with development is tied to the division of its membership between rich and poor nations, a division that the Secretary-General has frequently characterized as a leading long-term threat to world peace and security. In 1945, when the UN was established, this sharp dichotomy could not be drawn. The wealth of Europe had been wasted by the ravages of war. Only the US could claim to be rich, and even the US, with the depression of the 1930s still a fresh memory, could not be confident of lasting prosperity. What made the challenge of development central to the thinking of every aspiring country was the rapidity with which the countries of Western Europe recovered their prosperity and went on to attain higher levels of economic and social well-being than they had ever experienced. Meanwhile, economic expansion continued apace in the more prosperous countries that had not been directly hurt by the war—the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. And within a few years, in Asia, the miracle of Japan’s recovery and growth was matching Europe’s postwar record. Nothing comparable occurred among the colonial peoples and former colonial peoples. Tropical Asia, Africa, and Latin America had been cultivated in preceding generations largely as appendages to industrial Europe and North America—on the one hand, supplying essential primary commodities not commonly found in the temperate regions and, on the other hand, serving as profitable markets for consumer goods produced in the temperate regions. The peoples of these economically underdeveloped areas made rapid political progress in the postwar era. Significant economic progress also was recorded in a number of these countries, so that by the late 1950s, it was considered not only tactful but also proper to refer to them as “developing” rather than “underdeveloped” nations. As a group, however, the developing countries were far outdistanced in economic growth by the temperate zone industrialized countries, which were finding the postwar era the most propitious in history for their development. Before the UN had completed its first 15 years, it was abundantly evident that a very disturbing gap had opened up between the industrial-
ized and the developing nations and that, despite very substantial foreign aid efforts, the gap was growing broader year by year.
S C O P E O F T H E U N ’S WOR K The international community was not slow to recognize the political and economic dangers inherent in such an imbalance of national wealth. As early as 1946, when “recovery” rather than “development” dominated UN thinking on economic matters, the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council to study ways and means of furnishing advice to nations desiring help in developing their resources. As a result, the UN, in cooperation with the specialized agencies of the UN system, began its first programs of technical assistance. This chapter describes the principles and goals of the UN development effort. It also discusses some of the factors influencing development, such as science and technology, the role of transnational corporations, and the use of natural resources, and it summarizes the work of the regional commissions. Programs of technical cooperation undertaken by the UN and its related organizations are described in the chapter on Technical Cooperation Programs, and social and humanitarian programs in the chapter on Social and Humanitarian Assistance. The work of the specialized agencies in supporting economic and social development is described in the separate chapters on those agencies.
F I R S T U N D E V E L O P M E N T D EC A D E The first UN Development Decade was launched by the General Assembly in December 1961. It called on all member states to intensify their efforts to mobilize support for measures required to accelerate progress toward self-sustaining economic growth and social advancement in the developing countries. With each developing country setting its own target, the objective would be a minimum annual growth rate of 5% in aggregate national income by the end of the decade. The economically advanced states were asked to pursue policies designed to enable the developing countries to sell more of their products at stable and remunerative prices in expanding markets in order to finance more of their economic development, and to follow policies designed to ensure developing countries an equitable share of earnings from extraction and marketing of their natural resources by foreign capital. Industrialized states were also called on to pursue policies that would lead to an increase in the flow of developmental resources and stimulate the flow of private capital to developing countries on mutually acceptable terms. The General Assembly recommended that the flow of international capital and assistance to developing countries should be about 1% of the combined national incomes of the economically advanced countries. Throughout the decade of the 1960s, however, the growth rate in the economically advanced market economies accelerated, and the gap between the per capita incomes of the developing countries and those of the developed countries widened. Two-thirds of the world’s population living in the less developed regions of the world still had less than one-sixth of the world’s income. In 1962, annual per capita income in those regions averaged $136, while that of the economically advanced market economies in North America and Western Europe averaged $2,845 and $1,033, respectively.
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In a report issued in 1969, Secretary-General U Thant noted that the slower progress in development had been accompanied by the emergence or aggravation of major imbalances that imperiled future growth. Without greater progress in food production and the more effective control of communicable diseases, the necessary conditions for steady economic and social development could hardly be said to have been created. At the same time, the Secretary-General pointed out, the experience of a few countries had demonstrated that “given a favorable constellation of circumstances and policies, an adequate and sustained pace of development can be achieved,” and acceptance of development as a fundamental objective had gradually wrought a desirable change in attitudes and modes of action on the part of developing countries. Public decisions were no longer made solely in response to expediency, and policies and programs previously decided upon in relative isolation were gradually being integrated and harnessed to a common purpose. At the international level, the Secretary-General noted, the institutional machinery for the review and advancement of international policies had been considerably strengthened by the creation of such bodies as the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the Committee for Development Planning. The first UN Development Decade ended in December 1970 with one of its major goals, the attainment of a 5% growth rate, unattained in the developing countries. During the period 1960– 67, those countries achieved an annual rate of increase in their total domestic product of about 4.6%, but, because of the population increase, the increase in their per capita gross product was only about 2%. The General Assembly concluded that one of the reasons for the slow progress was the absence of a framework of international development strategy.
SECOND UN DEVELOPMENT DECADE At its 25th session, in 1970, the General Assembly adopted a resolution outlining an international development strategy for the second UN Development Decade—the 1970s. The main objectives of the plan were to promote sustained economic growth, particularly in the developing countries; ensure a higher standard of living, and facilitate the process of narrowing the gap between the developed and developing countries. The General Assembly declared that the developing countries bore primary responsibility for their development but that their efforts would be insufficient without increased financial assistance and more favorable economic and commercial policies on the part of the developed countries. Under the goals and objectives of the second decade, the General Assembly stated that the average annual rate of growth in the gross product of the developing countries as a whole should be at least 6%, with the possibility of attaining a higher rate in the second half of the decade. Such a rate of growth would imply an average annual expansion of 4% in agricultural output and 8% in manufacturing output. The General Assembly also stated that it was essential to bring about a more equitable distribution of income and wealth in order to promote social justice and efficiency of production; to raise the level of employment substantially; to achieve a greater degree of income security; to expand and improve facilities for education, health, nutrition, housing, and social welfare; and to safeguard the environment. Thus, qualitative and structural changes in society should go hand in hand with rapid economic growth, and existing disparities—regional, sectoral, and social— should be substantially reduced. The General Assembly believed that developing countries must bear the main responsibility for financing their development. To this end, they were asked to pursue sound fiscal and monetary policies and to remove institutional obstacles through the adoption of appropriate legislative and administrative reforms. At the same time, each economically
advanced country was called upon to endeavor to provide annually to developing countries financial resource transfers of a minimum net amount of 1% of its gross national product (GNP). A major part of financial resource transfers to the developing countries should be provided in the form of official development assistance. Progress achieved during the first half of the decade was reviewed by the General Assembly in 1975. It noted that the gap between the developed and the developing countries had increased alarmingly during the first half of the decade, but it found the generally gloomy picture lightened by one element— the developing countries had emerged “as a more powerful factor, as a necessary consequence of the new and growing perception of the reality of interdependence.” The General Assembly also found that some of the aggregate targets set in the strategy for the decade had been met or exceeded, “owing mainly to the developing countries’ own efforts and, to a certain extent, to external factors such as the commodity boom” (a short-lived rise in commodity prices between 1972 and 1974). Those aggregates, however, did not reflect the variation in achievement among developing countries, for many countries did much worse than the average. A major area of shortfall was in agriculture, where less than half the target rate of 4% annual growth was realized by the developing countries as a whole. The General Assembly further noted that the net flow of financial resources from developed countries in the form of official development assistance had decreased in real terms and as a percentage of GNP. At the same time, the burden of debt-service payments of developing countries had continued to increase in relation to their export earnings.
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER In September 1973, in Algiers, the Arab petroleum-exporting countries discussed the possible uses of oil as a political weapon. When a new Arab-Israeli conflict broke out on 6 October, the Arab countries reduced the flow of oil to Europe and Japan and suspended exports to the US, the Netherlands, and Portugal. The embargo against the US was lifted in March 1974, that against the Netherlands in July 1974, and that against Portugal after a new regime instituted a policy leading to independence for African territories under Portuguese administration in 1974 and 1975. However, the measures taken by the petroleum-exporting countries marked a turning point for the world economy. Members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) undertook a long-term study of the collective fixing of oil prices and increased them periodically thereafter. On 31 January 1974, President Boumedienne of Algeria requested a special session of the General Assembly to consider the question of all raw materials and relations between developed industrial and developing states. Within two weeks, 70 nations endorsed his proposal. Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly. The special session, held in April–May 1974, adopted a declaration and program of action on the establishment of a new international economic order. The declaration and program of action called for a fundamental change in the international economic order, in the absence of which the gap between developing and developed countries would only continue to widen. Such a change would require the industrial countries to make adjustments in their policies and economies for the benefit of the poorer countries, which in turn were determined to control their own resources. The program of action called for efforts to link the prices of exports of developing countries to the prices of their imports from developed countries. It suggested the formation of producers’ associations, orderly commodity trading, increased export income for producing developing countries, and improvement in their terms of trade. It also looked to the evolution of an equita-
Economic and Social Development ble relationship between the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, and semimanufactured goods exported by developing countries and the raw materials, primary commodities, food, manufactured and semimanufactured goods, and capital equipment imported by them. In the declaration, UN member states proclaimed their determination to work urgently for “the establishment of a new international economic order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems, which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development in peace and justice for present and future generations.” Though the program and declaration were adopted without a vote and enthusiastically supported by almost all developing and socialist countries, most Western European and other industrialized states with market economies entered reservations, often very far-reaching. They warned against constraints to the flow of trade that might result from the establishment of producers’ associations and argued that nationalization should be carried out in accordance with the existing rules of international law. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. At its regular session in 1974, the General Assembly adopted a charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The charter affirmed that every state has the right to exercise freely full permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, to regulate foreign investment within its national jurisdiction, and to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer the ownership of foreign property. The charter provided that appropriate compensation should be paid in cases of nationalization and that any controversies should be settled under the domestic laws of the nationalizing states unless all states concerned agree to other peaceful means. It also set forth the right of states to associate in organizations of primary producers in order to develop their national economies. Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly held a seventh special session devoted to development and international cooperation in September 1975. The polemical atmosphere in which the program and declaration on the new international economic order and the charter on the economic rights and duties of states had been adopted was replaced by a pragmatic approach. Negotiations were carried on chiefly in private meetings between “contact groups” representing the developing countries and the Western European and other states with market economies. Since the market economy states were the buyers of approximately three-quarters of the exports of the developing countries, agreement between the two groups was essential to significant progress. At the close of the session, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim declared that it had been “about change rather than the smoother management of the status quo.” The results of the special session were embodied in a resolution that proposed a large number of initiatives and was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. It reaffirmed the target, originally defined in the strategy for the second Development Decade, of 1% of the GNP of developed countries to be devoted to official assistance to the developing countries, and it called for the accumulation of buffer stocks of commodities in order to offset market fluctuations, combat inflationary tendencies, and ensure grain and food security. In 1979, the General Assembly called for the launching, at the third special session on development in 1980, of a round of global and sustained negotiations on international economic cooperation for development. The negotiations, however, failed to achieve the hoped-for progress at the special session held in September 1980, but at the regular session that year, an international development strategy for the third UN Development Decade was adopted.
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T H IR D U N D E V E L O P M E N T D E C A D E In the new international development strategy adopted by the General Assembly for the third UN Development Decade, beginning on 1 January 1981, governments pledged themselves, individually and collectively, to fulfill their commitment to establish a new international economic order based on justice and equity. They agreed to subscribe to the goals and objectives of the strategy and to translate them into reality by adopting a coherent set of interrelated, concrete, and effective policy measures in all sectors of development. The strategy set forth goals and objectives for an accelerated development of the developing countries in the period 1981–90, including the following: (1) a 7% average annual rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP); (2) a 7.5% annual rate of expansion of exports and an 8% annual rate of expansion of imports of goods and services; (3) an increase in gross domestic savings to reach about 24% of GDP by 1990; (4) a rapid and substantial increase in official development assistance by all developed countries, to reach or surpass the target of 0.7% of GNP of developed countries; (5) a 4% average annual rate of expansion of agricultural production; and (6) a 9% annual rate of expansion of manufacturing output. Other goals and objectives of the strategy included the attainment, by the year 2000, of full employment, of universal primary school enrollment, and of life expectancy of 60 years as a minimum, with infant mortality rates no higher than 50 per 1,000 live births. The strategy also set out a series of policy measures—in international trade, industrialization, food and agriculture, financial resources for development, international monetary and financial issues, science and technology for development, energy, transportation, environment, human settlements, disaster relief, and social development, as well as in technical cooperation, including cooperation among developing countries themselves, and special measures for the least-developed countries and for geographically disadvantaged countries, such as island and landlocked developing countries. In fact, the 1980s was a terrible decade for the economies of developing countries. By 1990 only five donor countries had met the UN’s target of donating 0.7% of their GNP to development: Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and France. Canada and Germany had achieved a level of 0.4% of their GNP. The United States, which had never agreed to the UN target, had given 0.2% of its GNP. Intransigent recession in the industrialized world, declining commodity prices, rising interest rates, trade barriers, and crippling international debt meant human suffering for the vast majority of the world’s population. By 1990 4.2 billion of the world’s 5.3 billion people lived in developing countries. Overall growth in these nations shrank to about 3% annually, and per capita growth to 1%, compared to averages of 5.5% in the 1960s and 3% in the 1970s. Lending by the IMF and World Bank group of institutions often came with requirements for “restructuring” that carried a heavy price in terms of human sacrifice. Debt-laden developing countries found themselves spending vastly more on debt service than on social services. This dismal result was illustrated by the fact that the number of countries designated by the General Assembly as “least developed” had grown from 24 in 1972 to 47 in 1991.
FOURTH UN DEVELOPMENT DECADE In 1990, the General Assembly concluded that its goals for the Third UN Development Decade had not been attained. It set new priorities and goals for the growth of the developing member nations with its International Development Strategy (IDS) for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade (1991–2000). Within one year of its passage, however, the former USSR had dissolved, forever changing the landscape of international economic relations. Many of the assumptions on which the IDS had
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been based were upset by the historic forces that were thus set in motion. In September 1990, the Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries set targets for official development assistance (ODA) to those nations. The General Assembly, through the new IDS, urged industrialized countries to reach or surpass those targets. It also recommended that developing countries try to raise their rate of industrialization by 8–10% and increase their annual food production by 4%. The General Assembly set forth six goals for the new IDS that amounted to an early manifestation of a new philosophy of “sustainable” development that would be vigorously developed at the historic UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), two years later. The goals of the IDS were: 1. To speed up the pace of economic growth in the developing countries; 2. To devise a development process that meets social needs, reduces extreme poverty significantly, develops and uses people’s capacity and skills, and is environmentally sound and sustainable; 3. To improve the international systems of money, finance, and trade; 4. To strengthen and stabilize the world economy and establish sound macroeconomic management practices, nationally and internationally; 5. To strengthen international cooperation for development; 6. To make a special effort to deal with the particular problems of the least developed countries. The philosophy for the new IDS was based on the principle that, because the developed countries have the greatest influence on the international economic environment, they have a special responsibility for the success of development efforts. It also recognized that speeding up development would require strenuous efforts by developing countries to increase domestic savings, raise investment and investment returns, hold down inflation, exercise monetary and fiscal discipline, maintain realistic exchange rates, and allocate resources more efficiently. Improving the state of international trade was paramount for any development plan. The Uruguay Round of the GATT talks were stalled and protectionism was on the rise in the developed nations. The strategy proposed that the following actions be taken to accelerate international trade in the 1990s: 1. Stand by the commitment made in 1986 to halt and reverse protectionism; 2. Liberalize trade and improve developing countries’ access to all markets by reducing or removing tariff barriers; 3. Free up trade in tropical products and products based on natural resources; 4. Bring trade in textiles under the normal rules of GATT; 5. Substantially reduce agricultural subsidies and other protective policies; 6. Implement and improve the generalized system of preferences under which some developing countries’ exports are admitted to industrialized countries at reduced rates or duty-free; 7. Ensure that regional economic arrangements and trade blocs conform with GATT rules; 8. Make sure that GATT contracting parties adhere strictly to the agreement’s rules and principles. Other provisions of the IDS included establishing more stable commodity markets, obtaining concessional terms for the transfer of technology to developing countries, and finding agreement on a way that the intellectual property system (which protects ownership of copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, and patents)
can promote development while protecting intellectual property. It also recommended that work on international rules and standards to govern the exchange of technological information (the code of conduct on the transfer of technology), which had come to a halt at the end of the 1980s, should be completed. The underlying causes of economic stagnation also were decried. The IDS called for the eradication of poverty, hunger, adult illiteracy, lack of basic education for women, and runaway population growth in developing countries, and noted the catastrophic deterioration of the environment by shortsighted development projects. In 1992, the Secretary-General gave the General Assembly a guardedly optimistic report on the progress of the IDS to that point. The developed market economies themselves had grown by only about 1% in 1991. Although a recovery had begun in 1992, it was considered to be weak. There was concern that the urgent needs of the newly independent countries of the former USSR, often referred to as “economies in transition,” would divert assistance from developing countries. Per capita incomes remained stagnant or declined in all the developing regions, except South and East Asia and China. The debt crisis of the developing countries had not worsened, but little progress had been made in terms of debt relief and forgiveness. However, some of the Latin American countries had again become creditworthy. The 1993 Report on the World Social Situation, commissioned by the General Assembly to review the implementation of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development made 20 years earlier, also was cautiously optimistic. It noted the positive direction of reform in the United Nations system towards coordination between various UN agencies with operations in the same countries. “Although the major development goals, proclaimed more than 20 years ago in the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, have not changed significantly, the priorities, approaches and emphases have been reviewed and renewed, as the understanding of the forces behind development have deepened. Thus, emphasis is now on assisting the recipient countries to strengthen their institutional capacity to sustain the development process” the report said. In other words: helping them learn how to help themselves. In October 1999, as the Second Committee began consideration of sustainable development and economic cooperation in the year 2000, it reviewed a report evaluating the implementation of the commitments and policies agreed on in the IDS. The report concluded that though there were improvements in the 1990s, economic growth had not accelerated in all developing countries. The Uruguay Round had led to progress being made with the betterment of the global trading system, but the international financial system had not been stabilized. Nor had there been a marked improvement in international development cooperation. The world’s least developed countries had seen “negligible” economic and social advancement during the decade. For future purposes, the report went on to differentiate between growth, which may carry with it negative social consequences, and development, which means more than simply increased purchasing power (as reflected in gross domestic product per capita). According to the report, development also pertains to education, health, and environmental standards, as well as to social (including gender) equity. For this reason, “the spotlight is now shifting from a focus on macroeconomic challenges to a number of institutional preconditions, including good governance, transparency and accountability, decentralization and participation and social security,” said the UN report. Acceptable and viable development strategies in the new millennium would have to take into account the prevailing circumstances in developing countries, which could not be expected to keep pace with industrialized, developed societies in the North.
Economic and Social Development The economic and social initiatives of the 1990s had highlighted that neither growth nor development necessarily eliminates poverty, which was one of the key objectives of IDS. The UN concluded that sustainable development, of both urban and rural human settlements, was directly linked to the alleviation of poverty, which became the focus of economic and social development at the dawn of the 2000s. At the October 1999 meeting of the Second Committee, the Group of 77 developing countries and China presented draft resolutions for the first United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (which technically began in 1997 and extended through 2006). On 9 December 1999 the General Assembly voted to implement the Decade and called on all nations to formulate and implement “outcome-oriented national strategies and programs” and set time-bound targets for poverty reduction. The Assembly further called on developed countries to strengthen their efforts to achieve the agreed target of 0.7% of their gross national product for overall official development assistance, and within that target to “earmark 0.15% to 0.20% of their gross national product for the least developed countries.” Acknowledging the information age, the Assembly resolution highlighted the importance of strengthening the cooperation between developed and developing nations in order to “promote capacity-building and facilitate access to and transfer of technologies and corresponding knowledge.”
THE EARTH SUMMIT—AGENDA 21 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), popularly dubbed the “Earth Summit,” brought together 117 heads of state and government in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 3–14 June 1992. The product of this historic meeting, an 800-page document called “Agenda 21,” set forth global measures to protect the planet’s environment while guaranteeing sustainable economic growth. An important statement of the basic principles of sustainable development, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, was adopted by acclamation. The conference also spawned a new functional commission of ECOSOC, the Commission on Sustainable Development, which has a mandate to monitor international treaties on the environment, provide policy direction, and coordinate action within the United Nations system to achieve the goals of Agenda 21. In addition to Agenda 21, two important conventions on the environment were opened for signature and received widespread endorsement: the Global Warming Convention, which set guidelines for regulating emissions of gases believed to cause global warming, was signed by 153 nations; and the Biodiversity Convention, which committed signatory nations to protection of endangered species and cooperation on genetic and biological technology, was signed by representatives of 150 countries. The Biodiversity Convention became legally binding in December 1993, after 30 countries had ratified it. Two important documents setting forth the principles behind the concept of sustainable development also were widely adopted at the Earth Summit: the Statement on Forest Principles, recommending preservation of world forests and monitoring of development impact on timberlands; and the Declaration on Environment and Development, a statement of principles that emphasized the coordination of economic and environmental concerns. More than two years were spent preparing for the Earth Summit and drafting the documents that would achieve widespread international acceptance. However, many controversial propositions had to be deleted or scaled down in the final documents to achieve the final consensus. For example, negotiators removed or excluded specific targets on pollution controls, resource protection, and financial aid to developing countries that restrain their economic development in order to protect their natural resources. Developing countries had sought to establish a “green fund” to support their efforts to implement environmentally sustainable
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development. However, the G-7 group of industrialized countries succeeded in specifying that such development funds would be channeled through the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility (GEF), effectively retaining control of funding in the hands of the industrialized world. The European Community had recommended a tax on fossil fuels in industrialized nations, but, opposition from oil-producing countries killed this provision. Also deemphasized in the final documents were references to population control. Passages referring to contraception were completely deleted at the insistence of an odd coalition that included the Holy See (Vatican), Roman Catholic countries, and Moslem countries. The sense of urgency that brought 35,000 accredited participants and 117 heads of state to Rio de Janeiro for the Earth Summit is perhaps well summed up by the UNCED secretary-general, Canadian Maurice Strong: “The Earth Summit must establish a whole new basis for relations between rich and poor, North and South, including a concerted attack on poverty as a central priority for the 21st Century. We owe at least this much to future generations, from whom we have borrowed a fragile planet called Earth.” At the Earth Summit+5 meeting held in June 1997 in New York City, the objectives were to revitalize and energize commitments to sustainable development, to recognize failures and identify their causes, to recognize achievements (there were many Agenda 21 success stories that were highlighted during the event), to define priorities for the post-97 period, and to raise the profile of issues addressed insufficiently by Rio. In addition to assessing progress since the last meeting and outlining areas requiring urgent action, attendees called for greater cooperation and adherence among intergovernmental organizations and developed a program of work for the Commission on Sustainable Development for the years 1998–2002. The program included a comprehensive review of the program of action for the sustainable development of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), developing integrated management and planning of land resources, and developing strategic approaches to freshwater management.
THE 1994 AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT
The 47th General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consult with member states and prepare an “agenda for development.” After obtaining submissions from member states, agencies of the UN system and public and private sources worldwide, he presented his report to the 49th General Assembly in 1994. Entitled Development and International Economic Cooperation: An Agenda for Development, this wide-ranging document summarized the basic tenets of the experience gained during the UN’s 50 years of development work. The agenda was intended to offer guidelines for thought and action by member states. One reason put forward for creating such a document was that with the end of the cold war, funding development projects as a mechanism for establishing spheres of influence also had ended. The fundamental social, political, and economic changes that had altered the map of Europe and provided a new atmosphere of consensus at the United Nations, also threatened to bewilder and exhaust the potential donors to UN programs for development. Some quarters had even suggested that the UN was expending more for its many new peacekeeping operations than for development. The Secretary-General produced statistics in an annex to the agenda that demonstrated that this was not the case, even exempting the funds expended by the specialized agencies. Several major themes of the agenda set forth a new underlying philosophy regarding international development programs. 1. National governments bear the major responsibility for development. However, the United Nations’ vast experience and global reach made it a unique resource for the developing nations. The United Nations could act as facilitator and communicator, but it could not substitute for the commit-
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ment of individual states and their domestic and international partners. 2. However, national governments could no longer be assumed to be paramount economic agents. The internationalization of trade and the ascendance of the market system worldwide meant that governments must, however, provide a regulatory framework for effective operation of a competitive market system. They must also invest in human capital by ensuring that social safety nets are in place. 3. Economic growth should promote full employment and poverty reduction, not just economic growth as an end in itself. If, despite national economic improvement, great poverty continued in a nation, no development effort could be sustainable. 4. No mechanism exists by which the major economies could be induced to make globally beneficial structural change in their own economies, or to adopt more globally responsible economic, fiscal, and monetary policies. This single point represents a sea change in philosophy from the “new international economic order” of the 1970s. 5. UNCED’s historic Agenda 21 demonstrated that the environment had finally been recognized by the international community as a resource for development that must be nurtured and protected. Governments had the responsibility to provide the leadership and regulatory structure to protect their natural environment. Successful development required policies that incorporate environmental considerations. The Secretary-General pointed out that pioneering efforts were being made to make local inhabitants incentive partners rather than simply collateral beneficiaries of sustainable development programs. As the keyword and rallying cry of the Earth Summit, “sustainability” must be the guiding principle of development, to be achieved by a true partnership of governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations; a true partnership between humanity and nature. 6. No development could be considered sustainable in the presence of poverty, disease, illiteracy, great unemployment, discrimination against women, armed conflict, or lack of social integration; the manifestations of social integration being discrimination, fanaticism, intolerance, and persecution. 7. Democracy and development are processes (not events) that are fundamentally linked because people’s participation in the decision-making processes that affect their lives gives legitimacy to governments and their development programs. In his conclusions, the Secretary-General admitted that, over the years, absence of clear policy guidance from the General Assembly and the lack of effective policy coordination by ECOSOC had resulted in an overall lack of focus in the UN development system. The fundamental changes under way included the restructuring of development efforts to be channeled through UNDP resident coordinators, by means of the development of one comprehensive “country strategy note.” This alone would bring about better (if not perfect) coordination and more rational use of available funds. However, the Secretary-General also noted the growth of other obstructions to the urgent need for social and economic development in the developing countries: “At present the UN mechanism is caught in a confining cycle. There is a resistance to multilateralism from those who fear a loss of national control. There is a reluctance to provide financial means to achieve agreed ends from those who lack conviction that assessments will benefit their own interests. And there is an unwillingness to engage in difficult operations by those who seek guarantees of perfect clarity and limited duration. Without a new and compelling collective vision, the international community will be unable to break out of this cycle.”
JOHANNESBURG SUMMIT From 26 August to 4 September 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa, the UN held the Johannesburg Summit 2002, or the World Summit on Sustainable Development, to continue the efforts begun by the 1992 Earth Summit, and to adopt concrete steps and identify quantifiable targets for better implementing Agenda 21. The Summit also pledged to further implement the Millennium Goals set forth by the UN in 2000, including: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development. It was recognized that progress on sustainable development since the Earth Summit had been disappointing, with poverty deepening and environmental degradation worsening. No agreements that would lead to new treaties were established, but new targets were set, such as: • to halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015 • to halve the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day by 2015 • to use and produce chemicals by 2020 in ways that do not lead to significant adverse effects on human health and the environment • to maintain or restore depleted fish stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield on an urgent basis and where possible by 2015 • to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction in the current rate of loss of biological diversity. Over 300 voluntary initiatives were launched by governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and businesses. One hundred eight heads of state addressed the Summit and more than 22,000 people participated in it, including more than 10,000 delegates, 8,000 NGOs and representatives of civil society, and 4,000 members of the press.
D E V E L O P M E N T P L AN N IN G Almost all the organizations in the UN family contribute in one way or another to development planning—by helping to evolve and introduce new planning methods, by assisting governments in establishing realistic growth targets, and by trying to ensure that overall plans take account of the needs of the different sectors of society. Within the UN, problems relating to development planning are the concern of the Economic and Social Council’s Committee for Development Planning. The 24-member committee, established in 1966, is a consultative body that meets annually to consider problems encountered in implementing development plans. The UN Secretariat provides an account of the state of the world economy through its annual publication of the World Economic and Social Survey, which has appeared every year since 1948. Since 1990 UNDP has stimulated debate about the concept of human-centered development through the publication of the annual Human Development Report, written by an independent team of development specialists and published by Oxford University Press. Statistical data, considered indispensable for economic and social development planning, also appears in a number of UN publications, including the Statistical Yearbook, Demographic Yearbook, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, World Energy Supplies, Commodity Trade Statistics, Population and Vital Statistics Report, and Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
Economic and Social Development WOR L D F O O D C O U N C I L ( W F C ) The world food situation in the early 1970s was marked by extreme food shortages in many developing countries in Africa and parts of Southeast Asia, by a general lack of progress in the world fight against hunger and malnutrition, and by very slow progress in the creation of a system of internationally coordinated cereal reserves to meet crop shortfalls and other abnormal situations. It was against this background that the General Assembly decided, in 1973, to convene a conference to deal with global food problems. The UN World Food Conference, held in Rome in November 1974, called for the creation of a 36-member ministerial-level World Food Council to review annually major problems and policy issues affecting the world food situation and to bring its political influence to bear on governments and UN bodies and agencies alike. Each year up through 1992 the WFC met in plenary session at the invitation of one of its member states. The council, as a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly, reports annually to it through the Economic and Social Council. At first, the WFC’s approach to solving world food problems was to encourage the adoption of national food strategies by developing countries. Under this plan, each country would assess its present food situation, including needs, supply, potential for increasing food production, storage, processing, transport, distribution, marketing, and the ability to meet food emergencies. In the early 1980s, this concept was taken over by the World Bank. In 1989, at its 15th session held in Cairo, Egypt, the WFC delineated a Programme of Co-operative Action with four main goals for UN member countries within the next decade: the elimination of starvation and death caused by famine; a substantial reduction of malnutrition and mortality among young children; a tangible reduction in chronic hunger; and the elimination of major nutritional-deficiency diseases. The Programme of CoOperative Action contained proposals for immediate action to be taken on food-for-work programs in rural areas where employment opportunities are not available and measures to make specific food items affordable to the poor. Over the longer term, the WFC recommended projects to create production and employment opportunities in rural and urban areas; community initiative projects designed to enable the communities themselves to identify and implement projects; vocational training schemes; retraining schemes; food stamp schemes. In the area of nutrition, the WFC recommended the implementation on an emergency basis of supplementary feeding programs for children; primary health care programs, including programs to improve sanitation and drinking water; family planning programs; nutritional education programs; and support to food and nutrition programs undertaken by WHO, UNICEF, and other international agencies. At its 16th session in 1990, held in Bangkok, Thailand, the council observed that most countries had not yet set specific goals and targets to implement its call to action. However, by 1991 those goals had been adopted by all UN member states as part of the International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade. The WFC also considered the coordination of the activities of some 35 international agencies that have programs significantly related to hunger problems. The WFC observed that its own role was that of providing a central, undivided focus on hunger and recommended the creation of an inter-secretariat consultative mechanism among the four Rome-based food organizations (FAO, IFAD, WFC, and WFP). In 1991, meeting in Helsingor, Denmark, it reiterated this support. It noted with concern the great financial difficulties facing these international organizations. The 18th session of the WFC met in 1992 in Nairobi, Kenya. Its report to the General Assembly noted that although most
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developing regions made some headway during the 1980s in reducing hunger and malnutrition, this was not the case for the peoples of Africa where disastrous droughts and civil disturbances had caused widespread starvation in recent years. The council praised the IFAD Special Programme for Sub-Saharan African Countries Affected by Drought and Desertification. In response to the disastrous problems of Africa, the WFC called for a “New Green Revolution,” and the intensified transfer of technology to accomplish such a revolution. It recommended that substantial increases in investments in research, extension, and training were needed, particularly in Africa. In 1992 the WFC also noted the problems of millions of people in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (formerly the USSR) in gaining access to adequate food as a result of the dislocation of their economies. In the context of the efforts of the General Assembly to streamline the activities of the United Nations, the WFC considered its future role within the framework of the restructuring process. With disarming frankness, the council stated: “We agree that the council has fallen short of achieving the political leadership and coordination role expected from its founders at the 1974 World Food Conference.” It concluded that, in a rapidly changing world, the continuation of the status quo for the World Food Council and the United Nations as a whole was not possible. It established an ad hoc committee to review the mandate and future role of the WFC, which met in New York on 14–15 September 1992 and submitted its report to the 47th Session of the General Assembly (1992). However, the committee could not reach agreement on what the council’s future role should be. Views ranged from abolishing it to strengthening it and integrating its mandate with another intergovernmental body. With this the committee referred the matter to the General Assembly, which requested the council members to continue attempts to agree on appropriate measures to be taken. After informal meetings from January to May 1993, the council reported to the General Assembly that “Council members are agreed on a set of principles to guide the United Nations response to global food and hunger problems, but disagreements continue to exist concerning the most effective institutional response to these principles.” In 1993 no formal WFC session was held, nor were any substantive documents prepared by the WFC secretariat. In fact, in December 1993, the secretariat in Rome was abolished as a result of the restructuring of the United Nations. Responsibility for servicing any future meetings of the WFC was given to the newly formed Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD) in New York. In November 1993 the president of the World Food Council held informal consultations with other WFC ministers of agriculture during the biennial FAO Conference in Rome about the possibility of scheduling the next (19th) session of the council. The consultations were inconclusive and the future of the WFC was not taken up at the General Assembly’s 48th regular session in light of these ongoing discussions. At a General Assembly plenary meeting on 26 May 1996 it was recommended that the World Food Council be discontinued and its functions absorbed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Program (WFP). To eliminate duplicative and overlapping efforts, this recommendation was heeded and the WFC was dissolved. The move was generally hailed as a sign that the Assembly was rededicating itself to better use of its resources. As the FAO and WFP became heirs to the World Food Council’s initiatives, the restructuring was also viewed as a reinforcement of ECOSOC’s development-related activities. (For more information on the UN’s ongoing work to combat hunger around the globe, please see the chapter on the Food and Agriculture Organization.)
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S C IE N C E A N D TE C H N O L O G Y F O R DEVELOPMENT A major event of the first UN Development Decade was the UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Countries, held in Geneva in 1963. The conference focused world attention on the practical possibilities of accelerating development through the application of advances in science and technology and on the need for reorienting research toward the requirements of the developing countries. A second conference, the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development, held in Vienna in 1979, adopted a program of action (the Vienna Programme) designed to put science and technology to work for the economic development of all countries, particularly the developing countries. It recommended the creation by the General Assembly of a high-level intergovernmental committee on science and technology for development, open to all member states, and the establishment of a voluntary fund to be administered by UNDP. The Geneva Conference was a predominantly technical or pragmatic conference at which developed countries provided developing countries with state-of-the-art reports on developedcountry technologies. By contrast, the Vienna Conference reflected the 1970s discussions between developed and developing countries over a more equal access of the latter to the world’s science and technology. Thus science and technology were placed within the context of international diplomacy. The result, the Vienna Programme of Action was a compromise that did not fully meet the expectations of the developing countries. The Vienna Programme of Action was divided into three target areas: strengthening the science and technology capacities of developing countries; restructuring the existing pattern of international scientific and technological relations; and strengthening the role of the UN system in the field of science and technology and the provision of increased financial resources. Endorsing the recommendations of the Vienna conference, the General Assembly decided to establish an Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development (ISTD), to be open to all states, and to create within the UN Secretariat a Center for Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) to provide substantive support to the committee and to coordinate activities within the UN system. In 1982, the General Assembly established the UN Financing System for Science and Technology for Development to finance a broad range of activities intended to strengthen the endogenous scientific and technological capacities of developing countries. In 1986, it transferred the responsibilities and resources of the financing system to a newly created UN Fund for Science and Technology for Development, administered by UNDP. In 1992, this new voluntary fund amounted to us$1.56 million and had funded six policy meetings in Cape Verde, Jamaica, Pakistan, Togo, Uganda, and Vietnam. In 1989, on the tenth anniversary of the Vienna Conference, the General Assembly expressed its disappointment with the implementation of the Vienna Programme. As part of the effort to rationalize and reform the entire United Nations system, in April 1992, the General Assembly decided to transform the ISTD into a functional commission of ECOSOC, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development. The activities of the Centre for Science and Technology for Development were incorporated into the new Department of Economic and Social Development, within its Division of Science, Technology, Energy, Environment and Natural Resources. Major objectives of the commission, which held its first session in April 1993, included: (a) Assisting ECOSOC in providing science and technology policy guidelines and recommendations to member states, in par-
ticular developing countries; (b) Providing innovative approaches to improving the quality of coordination and cooperation in the area of science and technology within the United Nations system, with a view to ensuring optimum mobilization of resources; (c) Providing expert advice to other parts of the UN system. The commission also requested that the Secretary-General prepare proposals to improve the coordination of the different bodies in the UN system, including the World Bank, which are involved in science and technology activities. Developments, such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992—which had substantial science and technology components—and changing attitudes within intergovernmental bodies regarding the role of government and the private sector in view of the end of the cold war, led to the need for a major restructuring of the United Nations in the economic and social sector (including science and technology). While the General Assembly confirmed the continued validity of the Vienna Programme of Action in its resolution on science and technology for development in December 1993, its objectives were merged with the Technology Programme of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD thus became responsible for science and technology within the United Nations system. Major program elements of the revised work program include: (a) Endogenous capacity-building and resource mobilization in the area of science and technology for development; (b) Technology assessment and information services; (c) Issues related to investment and technology transfer. The Commission on Science and Technology also decided to adopt themes for study by working groups during the two-year periods between its sessions. For 1993–95, these included technology for small-scale economic activities to address the basic needs of low-income populations, the gender implications of science and technology for developing countries, and the science and technology aspects of work being considered by the Commission on Sustainable Development. The commission also considered studying a variety of other issues, including the role of technology in military conversion, the effect of new and emerging technologies on industrialization, and the role of information technologies in developing countries. In October 1998, it was recommended that the membership of the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, along with three other subsidiaries of the Economic and Social Council, be reconstituted. The commission’s membership was subsequently reduced from 53 to 33, with the following geographic distribution: eight members from African states; seven from Asian states; six from Latin America and the Caribbean; four from Eastern Europe; and eight from Western European and other states. The body remains a functional commission of the Council, with members holding office for four years. At its Fourth Session, held in May 1999 in Geneva, the focus was on science and technology partnerships and networking for national capacity-building; particular attention was paid to biotechnology and energy. During the meeting, the commission discussed the concept of global entitlement to knowledge, the changing role of the state in the development of science and technology, and the role of networking and partnership in a multi-disciplinary approach to science and technology. In summarizing the proceedings, the moderator concluded that since sustainable development can be thought of as composed of economic growth, social equity, and an adequate use of the environment, and since government is viewed as a “key articulator” of these, the role of science and technology in the near future should be to establish
Economic and Social Development reliable frameworks for consistent communication, effective forecasting, and the dissemination of knowledge. Transnational Corporations Since the end of World War II, the role of multinational or transnational corporations in international commerce has been growing, but information on their activities has been fragmentary and often closely held. Many of these corporations are household names. They conduct a large portion of their business outside their host country, often recruiting management from their overseas subsidiaries and recruiting shareholders around the world. Some of these corporations command resources greater than those of most governments represented at the UN. In 1989, estimated sales by foreign affiliates of transnationals worldwide were us$4.5 trillion. In comparison, world exports were only us$3 trillion. In 2000, the top 200 transnational corporations’ combined sales were larger than the combined economies of all 191 countries in the world minus the largest nine (the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, and China). The combined GDPs of the other 182 countries was $6.9 trillion, and the combined sales of the top 200 transnational corporations was $7.1 trillion. The relationship of transnational corporations with developing countries frequently has been troubled, but they can provide capital, managerial expertise, and technology that are all urgently required for development and often would be hard to come by in any other way. In 1972, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint a group of eminent persons to study the impact of transnational corporations on development and international relations. The group of 20 economists, government officials, and corporation executives from all parts of the world met in 1973 and heard testimony from 50 witnesses in public hearings—a procedure new to the UN. Its report, issued in 1974, recommended the creation of a permanent commission on transnational corporations under the Economic and Social Council and an information and research center in the UN Secretariat. In December 1974, the council established an intergovernmental Commission on Transnational Corporations as a standing committee (not a functional commission) to furnish a forum within the UN system regarding such corporations; promote an exchange of views about them among governments, intergovernmental organizations, business, labor, and consumers; assist the council in developing the basis for a code of conduct on the activities of transnational corporations; and develop a comprehensive information system on their activities. The 48-member commission meets annually. At its second session, held in Lima in March 1976, it gave priority to the elaboration of a code of conduct and recommended that the Economic and Social Council establish an Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct. The code was to be the first multilaterally agreed framework governing all aspects of the relations between states and transnational corporations, with standards to protect the interests of both the host countries and investors in those countries. The working group held a number of negotiating sessions between 1977 and 1982. Negotiations continued in meetings of a special session of the commission, open to all states. In April 1991, the commission approved a text authorizing the preparation of recommendations on encouraging TNCs to cooperate in efforts to protect and enhance the environment in all countries for submission to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. The commission agreed that the following issues should be addressed: internationally agreed standards; improving management and regulation of industrial processes; transferring environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favorable terms; using environment and development accounting and reporting methods; international environmental management; preventive measures to
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minimize risks to human life, property, and the environment; and the question of reparations for damage. It directed its secretariat, the Center on Transnational Corporations, to prepare its submission to UNCED. However, in early 1992, the center’s functions were absorbed into a new department of the Secretariat and eventually transferred altogether to UNCTAD (see below). At its 1994 Substantive Session, the commission recommended to ECOSOC that it be integrated into the institutional machinery of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). ECOSOC decided to transmit this recommendation to the General Assembly for action. An Intergovernmental Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting, established by the Economic and Social Council in 1982, reviews issues that give rise to divergent accounting and reporting practices of transnational corporations and identifies areas where efforts at harmonization appear necessary. The four other priorities for the commission’s program of work were: establishment of an information system to advance understanding of the nature of transnational corporations and their effects on home and host countries; research into the effects of their operations; technical assistance; and work leading to a more precise definition of the term transnational corporations. The UN Center on Transnational Corporations was established by the Economic and Social Council in 1974 as part of the UN Secretariat. The functions of the center were to develop a comprehensive information system on the activities of transnational corporations, using data from governmental, corporate, and other sources; to analyze and disseminate the information to all governments; to provide technical assistance and strengthen the capacity of host countries (especially developing countries) in their dealings with transnational corporations; and to carry out political, legal, economic, and social research, particularly research to help in devising a code of conduct. By 1985, the center had established that the 350 largest transnational corporations (half of which were based in the United States) had combined sales of us$2.7 trillion, a sum which was larger than the combined GNP of all the developing countries, including China. In 1990 ECOSOC requested the Center on Transnational Corporations to undertake a survey of corporate environmental management to document the most advanced practices as models for companies that had not yet created environmental programs and to submit the results to UNCED. The “Benchmark Corporate Environmental Survey,” was submitted to the UNCED preparatory meeting in August 1991. Twenty percent of the 163 firms surveyed responded. The center recommended UNCED consider the following recommendations in preparing its Agenda 21: increased international cooperation to better inform TNCs of the impact of their operations on the greenhouse phenomenon; include TNCs in the consultative process surrounding climate change studies; treat dioxins and PCBs as international, not just local, pollution problems; transnational affiliates in developing countries should handle toxic wastes according to the same rules as in developed countries; TNCs should create safety zones around their facilities to lessen the potential impact of accidents; the oceans should be protected from land-based pollution; TNCs should sponsor programs to save wetlands and rainforests and protect biodiversity; TNCs should help develop a code of conduct on biotechnology. The center also pointed out that environmental rules and regulations differed from country to country. The companies that responded to the survey were interested in the UN setting international guidelines, although many of them were unaware of the existence of current international guidelines. In 1992, as part of the comprehensive restructuring of the UN secretariat, the functions of the center were incorporated into a new unit: the Transnational Corporations and Management Divi-
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sion of the Department of Economic and Social Development. In May 1993, the General Assembly transferred responsibility for the transnational program again to the secretariat of UNCTAD. In 2000, the UNCTAD Advisory Service on Investment and Technology, based on the joint work of the secretariat Divisions on Transnational Corporations and Investment and on Science and Technology, was working to help developing countries expand “their enterprise sector in conjunction with wider national trade, technology, and investment strategies.” UNCTAD provided analysis of the role of the largest transnational corporations (TNCs) in foreign direct investment (viewed as critical to development) and emphasized that TNCs must exercise social responsibility in order to support sustainable development.
N A T U R A L R E S OU RC E S A N D E N E R G Y The importance of natural resources for economic development was emphasized in 1970 when the Economic and Social Council established the Committee on Natural Resources. The committee develops guidelines for advisory services to governments, reviews arrangements to coordinate UN activities in natural resources development, and evaluates trends and issues concerning natural resources exploration and development, as well as prospects for selected energy, water, and mineral resources. During the 1970s, the Committee on Natural Resources played an important role in focusing world attention on the status of the global stock of water resources to meet human, commercial, and agricultural needs. As a result of an initiative of the committee, the UN Water Conference was convened in 1977 in Mar del Plata, Argentina. The conference adopted an action plan to guide international efforts to effectively manage, develop, and use water resources. To give impetus to the Mar del Plata Action Plan, the General Assembly, in 1980, launched the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981–90). In 1973, the General Assembly established the UN Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, which began operation in 1975. The fund, financed from voluntary contributions, is intended to provide additional risk capital for mineral exploration in developing countries. In 1981, the fund was authorized to extend its exploration activities to geothermal energy. During the 1970s, with the rise in and volatility of costs for petroleum, affecting the economies of all countries, particularly those of the poorer countries, and the growing awareness that known supplies of petroleum would, in the long run, be unable to meet global requirements, more attention was focussed on new and renewable sources of energy. This led to the General Assembly’s decision to convene, in Nairobi in August 1981, the UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy. The conference examined alternative forms of energy, including solar, biomass, geothermal, and ocean energy; wind power; hydropower; fuelwood and charcoal; peat; and the use of draft animals for energy purposes. It adopted the Nairobi Program of Action for the Development and Utilization of New and Renewable Sources of Energy as a blueprint for national and international action. The Nairobi Program identified five broad areas for concentrated action: energy assessment and planning; research, development, and demonstration; transfer, adaptation, and application of mature technologies; information flows; and education and training. Endorsing the Nairobi Program later that year, the General Assembly set up an interim committee to launch immediate implementation and, in 1992, established the Committee on the Development and Utilization of New and Renewable Sources of Energy, open to the participation of all states as full members. Later in 1992, in response to the requirements of implementing UNCED’s Agenda 21, this committee was combined with the energy portion of the Committee on Natural Resources and Energy, and became a new standing committee of ECOSOC: the
Committee on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and on Energy for Development. The Committee on Natural Resources now concentrates mainly on water and mineral resources. Each committee has a membership of 24 government-nominated experts who are elected by ECOSOC. The first session of the new Committee on New and Renewable Resources and Energy met in New York from 7–18 February 1994. The Secretary-General reported to the committee that in 1990 new and renewable energy sources accounted for 17.7% of the total energy consumption. The drop in oil prices during the 1980s had led to a decline in investment in renewable energy resources, but growing concern for the fragile state of the world’s environment lent urgency to efforts to find alternatives to burning fossil fuels and wood, which were contributing to the threat of global warning. At its first session, the committee noted that the Nairobi Program had led to progress in the application of large-scale technologies, such as hydropower and geothermal energy, and had helped bring to maturity solar energy and wind technologies. However, the overall impact of these new technologies remained insignificant. The committee identified four domains for action by member states: more efficient use of energy and energy-intensive material; increased use of renewable sources of energy; more efficient production and use of fossil fuels; and fuel substitution from high carbon to low carbon-based fuels. It also called for integrated national action programs for developing energy systems; for removing subsidies on conventional sources of energy; establishing support for new, environmentally sound technologies; and finding ways to use wasted energy, such as waste heat from industrial processes. Its report to ECOSOC also recommended the establishment of regional “centers of excellence” to provide training, technology support, and resource data. Another positive development in this field in the 1990s was the increasing recognition by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that energy conservation makes good economic and environmental sense. Public outcry over displacement of local populations by big dams and destruction of rain forests for grazing projects funded by the World Bank had led it to institute an environmental assessment on every project it undertook. In 1992 the IMF also began to study the impact of its policies on its member nations’ environment. The bank also branched out into supporting new sources of energy, for example by lending Mauritius us$15 million to support a program to generate 10–20% of that nation’s future energy needs by burning sugar-cane waste product readily available in that country. Addressing another important area in the energy field—the use of nuclear energy for the economic and social development of developing countries—the General Assembly, in 1977, set in motion arrangements for an international conference on the subject. The first global effort in this field, the UN Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, was held in Geneva in 1987. Although unable to reach agreement on principles acceptable to all, the participants at the conference exchanged views and experience on topics ranging from the production of electricity to the various applications of nuclear techniques in food and agriculture, medicine, hydrology, research, and industry. The first session of the newly reconstituted Committee on Natural Resources was held in early 1993. Its second session met in New York in early 1994. In the 1990s the focus of the Committee on Natural Resources became the implementation of the recommendations of Agenda 21, particularly measures to promote the more rational and sustainable use of natural resources. In the chairman’s summary of the meeting, he noted that mineral and water resources had to be seen as finite and valuable resources, and that their production and consumption affected other constituents of the environment. Therefore, a holistic approach was
Economic and Social Development required to the planning and management of natural resources within the geographical boundaries of each country and also in the consideration of the global impact of national policies or measures. A continued call was made for integrated approaches to water and land management. The committee emphasized the need to consider natural resources as a whole, rather than by individual sectors, such as agriculture and industry. The committee also noted that the fundamental importance of mineral resources to economic development and quality of life had not been adequately reflected in Agenda 21. It recommended that the need to ensure the sustainable supply of minerals should be a key issue for deliberations on Agenda 21. The committee’s discussion on mineral resources was influenced by the impact of privatization of state mineral enterprises on people in the developing countries and economies in transition. While there seemed to be a new trend toward closer understanding between these countries and transnational corporations, the committee stated that governments should promote measures to reduce destruction of the environment from private mining operations. It also recommended that governments promote measures to encourage better use of existing resources through recycling and substitution. In 1998 the Committee on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and on Energy for Development and the Committee on Natural Resources were merged into one expert body—the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources for Development, which serves as a subsidiary body of ECOSOC. The new committee, which meets biennially for two weeks, is made up of two subgroups of 12 experts each; one sub-group deals with energy and the other with water resources. The geographical distribution of the 24 members is: six members from African States; five from Asia; four from Latin American and the Caribbean; three from Eastern Europe; and six from Western European and other states. The term of office is four years. The reconstituted committee met for the first time in April 1999, during which it worked to prepare a draft paper for the next, eighth, session of the Commission on Sustainable Development. The committee had before it various reports from the Secretary-General, including: a report on environmentally sound and efficient fossil energy technologies, which highlighted the need to increase efficiency of fossil energy use, improve environmental compatibility of fossil technologies, and shift to fossil fuels with lower environmental impacts, such as natural gas; the report on renewable sources of energy, which emphasized wind energy and stressed the importance of continued research and development in this area; the report on rural energy policies, which stated that service to rural areas remains inadequate (of the estimated 3.1 billion people in rural areas, approximately 2 billion had no access to electricity); the report on energy and transportation, which reviewed global transportation trends in both developed and developing nations; and the report on spatial planning of land (including minerals) and water resources, which identified emerging issues and highlighted the finite nature of the earth’s resources.
REGIONAL COMMISSIONS The five regional commissions—serving Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Western Asia—have been established by the Economic and Social Council in recognition of the fact that many economic and social problems are best approached at the regional level. The commissions work to raise the level of economic and social development activity in their respective regions, as well as to maintain and strengthen relations among countries within and outside regions. All actions taken by the commissions are intended to fit within the framework of overall UN economic and social policies. The commissions also are empowered, with the agreement of the gov-
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ernments concerned, to make recommendations directly to member governments and to the specialized agencies. The commissions are subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council, to which they report annually. The secretariats of the commissions—each headed by an executive secretary with the rank of undersecretary-general—are integral parts of the UN staff, and their budgets form part of the regular UN budget. An important part of the work of all the regional commissions is the preparation of regional studies and surveys, particularly annual economic and social surveys that are published at the headquarters of each commission. Supplementing these are bulletins and periodicals covering a wide range of subjects—such as agriculture, population, transportation and communications, energy, industry, and housing and construction—that are widely used as sources of information by governments, business and industry, educational institutions, other UN organs, and the press. In the early 1990s, under pressure from both developing and industrialized countries to reform and rationalize the scattered development activities of the United Nations system, SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed that the activities of all United Nations organs be coordinated. In December 1992, the General Assembly adopted his proposal with its historic Resolution A/47/199 that stressed the need for development activities to “be streamlined and rationalized, especially in the interrelated areas of programming, execution, decentralization, monitoring and evaluation, thus making the UN system more relevant and responsive to the national plans, priorities and objectives of developing countries, and more efficient in its delivery systems.” Under this plan, many of the functions carried out by various committees and boards of the specialized agencies and UN funds were transferred away from headquarters (in New York, or, in the case of the specialized agencies, Geneva or Vienna), to the regional commissions (headquartered in major cities of each region) and the office of the UNDP resident coordinator in the specific countries that were to be served by development programs. As this strategy developed, the role of the regional commissions became more and more central to the work of the United Nations system. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), with headquarters in Geneva, was established in 1947 to help mobilize concerted action for the economic reconstruction of postwar Europe and to increase European economic activity among countries both within and outside the region. To these goals was added that of providing governments with economic, technological, and statistical information. Begun as an experiment at a time when severe postwar shortages of some commodities and surpluses of others made economic cooperation in Europe a necessity, ECE soon became the only multilateral forum to deal with cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe. The ECE provides a systematic means of intergovernmental cooperation among the countries of Europe, the United States, Canada, Israel, and the republics of the former Soviet Union. ECE priority objectives include the development of trade, scientific and technical cooperation, improvement of the environment, and long-term planning and projections as a basis for formulation of economic policy. Through meetings of policymakers and experts, publication of economic analyses and statistics, and study tours and exchanges of technical information, the commission provides a link between governments having different economic and social systems and belonging to different subregional organizations. Plenary meetings of the commission are held annually; its subsidiary organs meet throughout the year.
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ECE works closely with a number of specialized agencies, particularly the ILO and FAO; with other intergovernmental organizations; and with nongovernmental organizations, which ECE has consulted frequently for their expertise in particular subjects. The analytical work of the ECE provides both a macro- and micro-economic picture of the state of the region. It publishes statistical bulletins and special reports on the state of markets in industry, timber, and human settlements. It has also published guides for the management of joint ventures, privatization and conditions for foreign direct investment. The network of committees and working parties mentioned above carries on the ECE’s technical cooperation work. The ECE has formulated regionwide strategies and legal instruments in the fields of environment and transportation. One of its most significant accomplishments is the establishment of a standard for electronic data interchange (the UN/EDIFACT or United Nations Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport). This international standard for communication between networks of computers paves the way for the development of paperless international trade in the twenty-first century. The events of 1989–91, during which the entire face of Europe changed beyond recognition, provided enormous challenges for the ECE. War in the former Yugoslavia and the resulting economic sanctions and displacement of 3 million people made a somber picture. The ECE provided technical cooperation to the countries of Eastern Europe in transition to a market economy. By 1994, these countries made up fully one-half of its expanded membership. Hundreds of workshops on transition issues were conducted by the ECE in these countries (1994–95). The program of workshops was supplemented by the introduction of regional advisory services in each of the ECE’s major fields of activity. Membership. As of March 2002, the following countries were members of ECE: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia. (Note: The UN recognized the country’s name change—from Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro—in February 2003). Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), with headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, and a Pacific Operations Center based in Port Vila, Vanuatu, serves a region that contains more than half the world’s population. It was established in 1947 as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East to promote reconstruction and economic development of the region. Its name was changed in 1974 to reflect equal concern with economic growth and social progress and to clarify its geographic scope. The commission meets annually. ESCAP’s activities help identify common problems and facilitate cooperation for economic and social development at the regional level. It provides technical assistance and advisory services to governments on request, carries out research on regional issues, and acts as a clearinghouse of information. One of ESCAP’s most significant meetings in the 1990s was the Fourth Asian and Pacific Population Conference (Bali, August 1992). The conference was cosponsored by ESCAP and UNFPA, in recognition of the fact that population issues were inextricably linked to the cycles of poverty and the struggle for development. The conference adopted the Declaration on Population and
Development (known as the “Bali Declaration”). By this declaration, ESCAP’s member countries set goals for themselves to adopt strategies to attain replacement-level fertility (around 2.2 children per woman) by the year 2010 or sooner. They also agreed to reduce the level of infant mortality to 40 per thousand live births or lower by the same time. In the late 1990s, with more than 50 years of experience, ESCAP described itself as a regional think tank and acknowledged that its ultimate challenge lay in bringing some 830 million of the region’s poor into the economic mainstream, “enabling everybody to achieve a better standard of life as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.” Membership. As of 2002, the 52 member states of ESCAP were: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, France, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. It also had nine associate members: American Samoa, Guam, New Caledonia, Cook Islands, Hong Kong (China), Niue, French Polynesia, Macao (China), and Northern Mariana Islands. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with headquarters in Santiago, Chile, was established in 1948 as the Economic Commission for Latin America. In 1983, it formally incorporated the Caribbean region into its name. ECLAC’s aim is to help the governments of the region promote the economic development of their countries and improve living standards. To this end, it collaborates with the governments of the region in the investigation and analysis of regional and national economic problems, and provides assistance in the formulation of development plans. It organizes and convenes regional intergovernmental meetings on topics in the field of economic and social development. ECLAC conducts research, executes studies, disseminates information, provides technical assistance, participates in seminars and conferences, and gives training courses. ECLAC’s initial stress on economic growth and trade was later complemented with emphasis on employment, income distribution, and other social aspects of development. In recent years, the commission has expanded its activities to include research in such areas as the environment, the development and transfer of technology, and the role of transnational corporations. In 1999, ECLAC had divisions and units dealing with the following: planning and operations; economic development; social development; international trade and finance development; production, productivity, and management; statistics and economic projections; environment and human settlements; and natural resources and infrastructure. It also had a documents and publications division. ECLAC also has two sub-regional headquarters (in Mexico and Port of Spain), and offices in Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Washington, D.C. ECLAC meets biennially; a committee of the whole carries on intersessional work. Two other organizations are part of the ECLAC system: the Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) in Santiago, Chile; and the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE), also in Santiago. ILPES was established in 1962 and undertakes research and provides training and advisory services, as well as furthering cooperation
Economic and Social Development among the planning services of the region. CELADE was established in 1957, but became an integral part of the commission in 1975. It collaborates with governments in formulating population policies and provides demographic estimates and projections, documentation, data processing, and training facilities. The commission carries out its work in close cooperation with UNDP, the International Trade Center (UNCTAD/GATT), UNESCO, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), UNICEF, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Membership. As of 2002, ECLAC had 41 members: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Spain, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It also had seven associate members: Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, and United States Virgin Islands. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) The Economic Commission for Africa, with headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was established in 1958. It was the first intergovernmental organization in Africa whose geographical scope covered the whole of a continent in which economic and social conditions differed widely and where many countries and dependent territories were among the poorest in the world. ECA’s chief objective is the modernization of Africa, with emphasis on both rural development and industrialization. Its work has been marked by a sense of urgency and a determination to match the rapid pace of African political progress with economic and social progress. In carrying out its functions, ECA works closely with the Organization of African Unity and various organizations of the UN system. The commission’s sessions are held annually at the ministerial level and are known as the Conference of Ministers. The approach of ECA is primarily at the level of its five subregions: North Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa. ECA members have made it clear that the subregional approach is to be regarded as a necessary first step and that pan-African economic integration remains the goal. For that reason, five multinational programming and operational centers have been established: in Tangier, Morroco, for North Africa; in Niamey, Niger, for West Africa; in Lusaka, Zambia, for Southern Africa; in Yaounde, Cameroon, for Central Africa; and in Kigali, Rwanda, for Eastern Africa. Work priorities for the 1990s and beyond included the broadened concept of food security and poverty alleviation through sustainable development with emphasis on capacity building; the promotion of economic cooperation among African countries and between African and other developing countries; the physical integration of the continent in line with the goals of the UN Transport and Communications Decade for Africa (1991–2000); and greater control and sovereignty over natural resources and environment. In the field of industrial development, ECA implemented the UN Second Industrial Development Decade in Africa (IDDA) by strengthening the technological and entrepreneurial capabilities of African countries. Special attention was paid to subregional and regional cooperation in small-scale cottage and rural industries and to highly advanced technology. In 1992 ECA issued a technical publication evaluating the impact of the 1992 European economic integration measures on African agriculture. The publication discussed the various factors underlying the European single market. The publication under-
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scored the need for galvanizing the cooperation of African nations in the face of moves to strengthen economic integration in other regions, notably Europe and North America. ECA also consulted with the OAU and the African Development Bank on the establishment and functioning of an African Economic Community (AEC). ECA supervised the African Training and Research Centre for Women, which assisted ECA member states in improving the socioeconomic conditions of African women and enhancing their participation in development. ECA pursued its efforts to establish a regional Federation of African Women Entrepreneurs and a Bank for African Women to support women’s entrepreneurial activities. ECA developed a Pan-African Development Information System that provides training, advisory services, data base development, and network-building, and produces studies and publications for ECA member states, institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Beginning in July 1995, ECA embarked on major institutional and managerial reforms, resulting in a new strategic focus, which it defined by five core programs and two cross-cutting themes. The core programs were facilitating economic and social policy analysis; ensuring food security and sustainable development; strengthening development management; harnessing information for development; and promoting regional cooperation and integration. The themes were: fostering leadership and empowerment for women in Africa and enhancement of ECA capacities (with regard to information and technology, staff training, communication, and public awareness of programs through the mass media). Membership. As of 2002, the following countries were members of ECA: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comores, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) A regional economic commission for the Middle East was first proposed in 1947–48. A commission that would include the Arab nations and Israel proved to be out of the question, however, and in 1963, the UN Economic and Social Office in Beirut (UNESOB) was set up. For 11 years, UNESOB assisted governments in economic and social development and provided them with consultants in such fields as community development, demography, industrial development planning, and statistics. In 1972, Lebanon revived the issue of a regional commission for the area, and in August 1973, the Economic and Social Council established the Economic Commission for Western Asia to supersede UNESOB. In 1984, it was renamed the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) to reflect the importance of the social aspect of its activities. The commission began operations on 1 January 1974, with provisional headquarters in Beirut. As defined by the resolution establishing the commission, its task is to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction and development of Western Asia, for raising the region’s level of economic activity, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of countries of the region both among themselves and with other countries of the world. ESCWA undertakes or sponsors studies of economic and social issues in the region, collects and disseminates information, and provides advisory services at the request of countries of the region
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on ESCWA’s fields of activities. Much of ESCWA’s work is carried out in cooperation with other UN bodies. The commissions conducts industrial studies for individual countries in conjunction with UNIDO. It cooperates with FAO in regional planning, food security, and management of agricultural resources. UNDP supports ESCWA’s work on household surveys in Western Asia and the Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait. Work is also undertaken with UNFPA and UNIFEM in population and women’s programs, with ILO in statistical surveys on labor, with AGFUND in rural development, with UNCTAD in development planning and maritime transport training, with UNEP in integrating environmental aspects (particularly control of desertification) into development programs, and with OIC in natural resources, industry, and trade issues. The sessions of the commission (held every two years) are attended by representatives of member states and bodies, UN bodies and specialized agencies, regional and intergovernmental organizations, and other states attending as observers. In 1992, the commission called for the establishment of an Arab and international interagency coordinating committee on environment and development to promote the goals of the UN Conference on Environment and Development’s (UNCED) Agenda 21.
In May 1994, during the Commission’s seventeenth ministerial session in Amman, ESCWA member states voted to move the permanent headquarters to Beirut. The 8-story UN house was built in the Beirut Central District for this purpose. ESCWA maintains close liaison with other UN organs and specialized agencies and with intergovernmental organizations in the region, such as the League of Arab States and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. In 1976, ESCWA decided to move its operations to Amman, Jordan, for one year because of the conflict in Lebanon. Later the same year, it decided to accept the offer of the government of Iraq for Baghdad to be the site of its permanent headquarters. It moved to Baghdad in 1982, only to relocate to Amman during the Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. ESCWA had established six working committees by the late 1990s; they were: statistical, social development, energy, water resources, transport, and liberalization of foreign trade and economic globalization. Membership. As of 2002, there were 13 members of ESCWA: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine (Palestine Liberation Organization), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
T E C H N I C A L C O O P E R AT I O N PROGRAMS The International Development Strategy for the third UN Development Decade called for a renewed emphasis on technical cooperation and a significant increase in the resources provided for this purpose. It recognized that technical cooperation contributes to the efforts of developing countries to achieve self-reliance by facilitating and supporting investment, research, and training, among other things. UN programs of technical cooperation may be grouped in three categories: (1) the UN regular program, financed under the portion of the UN regular budget set aside for technical cooperation activities; (2) activities funded by the UN Development Programme (UNDP); and (3) extrabudgetary activities financed by contributions provided directly to the executing agencies by multilateral funding organizations within or outside the UN system, other than UNDP, and by contributions from governments and nongovernmental organizations. To consolidate the responsibilities and resources within the UN Secretariat in support of technical cooperation activities, the UN General Assembly in March 1978 set up the Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (DTCD). In 1993, under further restructuring of the United Nations, this became the Department for Development Support and Management Services (DDSMS). DDSMS provided technical and managerial support and advisory services to member states of the UN, relevant research, and parliamentary services to expert groups and intergovernmental bodies. It had a twofold mandate: (i) to act as an executing agency for programs and projects relating to institution-building and human resource development in areas such as development policies and planning, natural resources and energy planning, governance and public management, and financial management and accounting; (ii) to act as a focal point for the provision of management services and implementation functions for technical cooperation. In 1997 DDSMS was merged with the Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development and the Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis to form the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). DESA provides policy analysis and facilitates international dialogue on development issues in the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and the specialized inter-governmental bodies reporting to them. It also provides technical assistance to member states at the national and sub-regional level. DESA's staff researches and analyses a broad range of economic and social data and information on development issues and trends. It also advises and supports countries in implementing their development strategies, with the aim being to help build national capacities as well as to strengthen economic and technical links among developing countries.
U N I T E D N AT I O N S D E V EL O P M E N T PROGRAMME (UNDP) Since its earliest days, the UN system has been engaged in a growing effort that has two main thrusts. The first, and most important, is supporting the vigorous drive of the world’s developing countries to provide their own people with the essentials of a decent life—including adequate nutrition, housing, employment,
income, education, health care, consumer goods, and public services. The second aim, which is closely related, is to help these countries increase their output of commodities, raw materials, and manufactured items, which the world increasingly needs, as well as to ensure them a fair return. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN’s major arm—and the world’s largest channel—for international technical cooperation for development provided on a grant basis. Working with the government of nearly every country—and with more than 30 international agencies—UNDP supports the development efforts of 175 countries and territories in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Arab states, and Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Under the overall framework of “sustainable human development,” the programs it supports focus primarily on building national capacities to eliminate poverty, protect and regenerate the environment, create employment, and empower women. The ultimate goal is to improve the quality of human life. Evolution of UNDP Although UNDP came into formal existence only in January 1966, it really began 20 years earlier, for it grew out of two longestablished UN institutions. In 1948, the UN General Assembly (GA) had decided to appropriate funds under its regular budget to enable the UN Secretary-General to supply teams of experts, offer fellowships, and organize seminars to assist national development projects at the request of governments. About the same time, many of the specialized agencies had begun to undertake similar projects. However, no sooner had the Regular Programs of Technical Assistance, as they were called, begun to operate than it became apparent that the money that could be spared from the regular budget would not meet demand. In 1949, the General Assembly set up a separate account for voluntary contributions toward technical assistance and decided to make it a central account to finance the activities not only of the UN itself but also of the specialized agencies. Machinery was established for distributing financial resources and coordinating projects, and the whole enterprise was called the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), to distinguish it from the UN’s technical assistance financed under the regular budget. The venture proved remarkably successful. Ten years after it had begun operations, EPTA was financing technical assistance in some 140 countries and territories. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of governments contributing funds had grown from 54 to 85, and the total annual contributions had risen from $10 million to $33.8 million. In 1958, the General Assembly felt that it would be desirable to broaden the scope of UN technical assistance to include largescale preinvestment surveys and feasibility studies on major national development projects that would lay the groundwork for subsequent investment of capital. These surveys and studies involved a much greater financial outlay than the kind of technical assistance then being undertaken, and the General Assembly decided to set up a new institution that would be run along lines similar to those of EPTA. Thus, the Special Fund was established to act as a multilateral channel for voluntary contributions to
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preinvestment projects, and as a coordinating center for the work of the various UN agencies. The Special Fund began operations in 1959; within three years, 86 governments had pledged over $110 million. In January 1964, the Secretary-General formally proposed to the Economic and Social Council that EPTA and the Special Fund be merged into a single enterprise. The advantages to be derived from the merger were a pooling of resources, a simplification of procedures, improvement in overall planning, elimination of duplication, reduction in administrative costs, and a general strengthening of UN development aid. By August 1964, the Council had adopted recommendations for the merger, but because of the stalemate at the 1964 General Assembly, no action could be taken until the following year. On 22 November 1965, the General Assembly unanimously voted to consolidate the two operations, effective 1 January 1966, as the United Nations Development Programme. Structure and Organization Administrator and Executive Board. UNDP is headed by an administrator, appointed by the UN Secretary-General and confirmed by the General Assembly, who is responsible to a 36nation Executive Board for all aspects of program operations. The board—representing every geographical region and both contributor and program countries—reports to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council. In addition to setting overall policy guidelines, the Executive Board examines and approves the volume of assistance allocated to each country over successive five-year cycles and must similarly approve all country programs. (The Executive Board began its work in 1994, replacing the 48-nation UNDP/UNFPA Governing Council, which had a similar composition and function. The Governing Council’s decision-making almost always took place by “consensus” rather than by recorded voting.) Regional Bureaus. Regional bureaus, located at UN headquarters, cover Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Arab states. There is also a Division for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. These offices serve as the administrator’s principal links with the program countries. Together with bureaus or divisions for strategic planning, program policy and evaluation, program development and support, and finance and administration, they furnish UNDP’s country-based Resident Representatives with day-to-day operational support. Resident Representatives. Resident Representatives heading 131 program country offices function as field-level leaders of the UN development system. They are responsible for seeing that UNDP-assisted country programs are carried out effectively and efficiently. They act as chief liaison officers between government planning authorities and the executing agencies, help blueprint all activities from formulation to follow-up, and are responsible for ensuring that personnel, equipment, and facilities are utilized to best advantage. Resident Representatives and other staff in UNDP’s country offices also perform a variety of non-project-related development activities that make a significant contribution to UNDP’s goals, and to the needs of its national partners. These include engaging in policy dialogue with national officials and providing them with development planning advice; furnishing technical advisory and general problem-solving services, often at the request of concerned sectoral ministries; assisting in mobilizing investment from both internal and external sources, as well as with follow-up investment advice and services; acting as a focal point for government needs in emergencies caused by natural or man-made disasters; assisting in the formulation, management, and evaluation of UNDP country programs; and, upon request, participating in the coordination of external assistance from other sources and in the
preparation of well-balanced, effective national development programs. Training and other support is offered on issues of special concern: UNDP’s Division for Gender in Development helps to ensure that programs consider women’s needs and interests; the Division for Nongovernmental Organizations promotes increased participation of NGOs and community groups in development activities; the Environment and Natural Resources Group ensures that the environmental impact of all programs is weighed; the Short-Term Advisory Services program sends skilled advisers to provide top-level technical and managerial advice in such sectors as agriculture, transportation, and industry. Functions and Guiding Principles The nature of UNDP and its activities has changed over the years. In part, this has been in response to the evolving requirements and interests of the program countries. The changes also have reflected global concerns for particular development problems and issues. In the early 1970s, UNDP had to demonstrate its ability to replace a basic structure, which had served it well in its formative stages, with a “second generation” mechanism designed to determine the nature of UNDP’s market with greater discrimination, and to deliver the required product with more efficiency. The cumulative impact of a number of intensive inquiries into development and development assistance—by the Pearson Commission, the UN Committee for Development Planning, Sir Robert Jackson’s study of the capacity of the UN development system, and by some of the major donor countries individually—helped to fashion a new look for UNDP. The various studies agreed on needs for more deliberate matching of country requests for assistance with available resources; the introduction of forward and coordinated planning and programming; more careful and appropriate project design; and greater quality, timeliness, and efficiency of implementation. The consideration of these matters by the UNDP Governing Council in 1970 produced a consensus on the future of UNDP that was endorsed by the General Assembly in the same year, translated into organizational and procedural changes in 1971, and brought substantially into effect during the next few years. The pivotal change was the introduction of “country programming.” This involved the forward programming of UNDP assistance at the country level for periods of up to five years, identification of the role UNDP inputs would play in specified areas related to a country’s development objectives, and the phasing of these inputs. Country programming, together with a similar approach to regional, interregional, and global activities, is designed to achieve the most rational and efficient utilization of resources. A necessary counterpart to the introduction of UNDP country programming was administrative reform. The most important change involved decentralization—a substantial shift of power and responsibility for effective UNDP technical cooperation at all stages away from headquarters and into the program countries, where the UNDP Resident Representatives often play a lead role in UN development system activities within a country. Guidelines for the selection of these officials imply that, first and foremost, they should be effective managers, for it is they who cooperate directly with the governments to ensure the smooth functioning of development programs. In addition, they must intervene to help ensure more efficient implementation and more effective use of the results of project assistance. Upon request, they must be ready to play a vital part in the coordination of assistance from other sources with that provided by UNDP. In fact, under the restructuring of the UN development system mandated by the General Assembly, most UNDP Resident Representatives also are designated by the UN Secretary-General as Resident Coordina-
Technical Cooperation Programs tors of all UN operational assistance for development. In 1975, UNDP further revised its programming principles to include “new dimensions” in technical cooperation, designed primarily to foster greater self-sufficiency among developing countries by relying more heavily on their own skills and expertise for development activities. Accordingly, UNDP redefined its role in technical cooperation to stress results achieved, rather than inputs required from the industrialized nations. Seen from this perspective, the purpose of technical cooperation is to promote increasing autonomy with regard to the managerial, technical, administrative, and research capabilities required to formulate and implement development plans in the light of options available. In the 1990s, UNDP made other changes that had a substantial impact on its programming, as well as on development thinking in general. In 1990 the Governing Council directed UNDP to focus its activities on six themes: poverty eradication and grass roots participation; environment and natural resources management; technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC); management development; transfer and adaptation of technology; and women in development. UNDP has also adopted a “program approach,” whereby funding is provided for comprehensive programs with integrated components rather than distinct, separate projects. This enables UNDP to deliver assistance that is more focused and has greater impact and sustainability. Another change has been UNDP’s promotion of “human development,” which puts people at the center of development, enlarging their choices and creating opportunities through which they can realize their potential and express their creativity. Human development does not measure a country’s progress solely by its Gross National Product, but takes into account such factors as its people’s access to health services, level of education, and purchasing power. Since 1990 UNDP has stimulated debate about this concept through the publication of an annual Human Development Report, written by an independent team of development specialists and published by Oxford University Press. Since then, a growing number of countries have received UNDP assistance in incorporating human development concerns into planning and the allocation of budgets. Linking human development with its traditional emphasis on building self-reliance, UNDP has now embraced the concept of “sustainable human development” as the guiding principle underlying all its work. As defined by UNDP’s administrator, James Gustave Speth, who took office in July 1993: “Sustainable human development is development that not only generates economic growth but distributes its benefits equitably; that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it; that empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities and providing for their participation in decisions affecting them. It is development that is pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-jobs and pro-women. In sum, sustainable human development stresses growth, but growth with employment, environment, empowerment and equity.” Within this framework, UNDP has identified three priority goals: (1) strengthening international cooperation for sustainable human development and serving as a substantive resource on how to achieve it; (2) building developing countries’ capacities for sustainable human development; and (3) helping the United Nations become a powerful, unified force for sustainable human development. From its inception, UNDP has been called upon to make its assistance available to all countries where it can be effective in helping to meet priority needs, provided that those countries are members of the UN or one of its affiliated agencies. This broad frame of reference is essential for protecting two of UNDP’s most
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valuable assets—its universality and its large measure of freedom from political problems and pressures. Planning and Programming In the planning and programming of UNDP assistance, the largest role is played by the developing countries themselves. The process involves three basic steps. First, an estimate is made of the core financial resources expected to be available to UNDP over a five-year period. This estimate is then divided up into Indicative Planning Figures (IPFs) for each country assisted, and for regional, interregional, and global programs. The IPFs are approved, and adjusted from time to time, by UNDP’s Executive Board. Second, with its IPF as a guide, each government draws up a “country program,” outlining its priorities for UNDP assistance and allocating its share of UNDP resources among those priorities. Country program formulation—in which the UNDP’s Resident Representative and locally based officials of other UN agencies usually participate—takes a number of factors into account. Among these are a country’s overall development plans, the domestic resources that it can call upon for carrying out those plans, and the assistance expected from external sources other than UNDP. Each country program is then submitted to the Executive Board for approval. The third step involves preparation of individual project requests—again usually in consultation with advisers from the UN system. These requests delineate each project’s main objectives, its duration, its cost, and the respective responsibilities of the government and the UN system. Allocation of Funds UNDP IPFs for 1972–76, the first programming cycle, were largely determined by applying the same percentage of total UNDP resources actually committed to each country from 1967 through 1971 to the total of projected UNDP resources for the years 1972 through 1976. Completely new criteria were established by the Governing Council for the 1977–81 “second cycle.” Of the country programming resources expected to be available during those years, 92.5% was allocated largely on the basis of a formula involving each country’s population and its per capita gross national product (GNP)—with this second factor being given somewhat greater weight in calculating each country’s allocation. Under the new criteria, about 13% of total resources was devoted to regional programs aimed at fostering development cooperation among neighboring countries or at achieving economies by making expertise available to several governments from a single regional base. There was also a separate IPF for global and interregional programs, such as “breakthrough” research on high-yielding strains of staple food grains. On an overall basis, during the third cycle (1982–86), countries with per capita GNPs of $500 a year or less received 80% of total UNDP funding, as compared with 52% in the 1977–81 period and 40% in the 1971–76 period. In 1985, the Governing Council decided that for the fourth programming cycle (1987–91), countries with 1983 per capita GNPs of $750 or less a year were to receive 80% of IPF resources, reflecting UNDP’s emphasis on assisting the poorer countries. In the fifth programming cycle (1992–96) countries with yearly per capita GNPs of $750 or less received 87% of national IPF resources. For the period 2001–03, 12% of IPF resources went to 74 middle-income countries, and 88% of IPF resources were distributed to 70 low-income countries, with yearly per capita GNPs of $900 or less.
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Implementation in the Field UNDP is primarily a funding, programming, monitoring, and coordinating organization. Over the years, the bulk of the field work it has supported has been carried out by UN agencies and regional commissions, and by regional development banks and funds. Increasingly, UNDP is also calling upon national institutions and nongovernmental organizations for project execution. The executing agencies, as they are called, perform three major functions. They serve as “data banks” of development knowledge and techniques in their respective specialties. They help governments plan the individual sectors in their country programs for UNDP assistance. As a rule, they recruit the international experts, purchase the equipment, and procure the specialized contract services needed for project execution. The choice of a particular agency to implement any given project is made by UNDP in consultation with the government of the developing country. Though a single agency is always in charge of a particular project, often two or more collaborate in providing the services required. Through its Office for Project Services, UNDP directly implements those activities that are not carried out by other executing agencies, providing a full range of management services, including procurement and finance. The progress of field work is monitored through periodic reviews, involving UNDP country office staffs, government officials, and experts of the executing agencies. A modern computerbased management information system provides a continuous flow of operational data from the field. When required, special missions are sent to program countries to evaluate project work. Systematic efforts are made to stimulate follow-up investments on surveys, feasibility studies, and other appropriate projects. These activities—which often begin at very early stages of project implementation—involve cooperation with all likely and acceptable sources of development finance—internal and external, public and private. In a larger sense, however, most projects have a “built-in” follow-up component because they are deliberately planned to create permanent institutions or facilities that will be taken over by national personnel. Thus, many projects—particularly in training, applied research, and development planning—not only continue but also significantly expand their work after UNDP support ends. Typically, some 5,000 projects, ranging from two to five years in duration, have been under way in any given year. Since 1993, however, UNDP has been making a deliberate attempt to sharpen its focus. It became more selective in what it would finance, concentrating in particular on capacity-building initiatives that gave priority to the poor, to creating employment, to advancing women, and to regenerating the environment. The largest share of UNDP core resources in both 1994 and 1995 went to Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by Asia and the Pacific, Africa, the Arab states, and Europe. Total expenditures for technical cooperation activities by UNDP in 1994 were us$1,036.5 million, covering not only direct country programs but also the costs of UNDP program planning, management, and coordination by 133 offices worldwide and at UNDP headquarters in New York, and project implementation services by 31 executing agencies. Voluntary contributions between 1994 and 1997 were distributed as follows: good governance, 28%; public resource management for sustainable human development, 25%; poverty eradication and livelihoods for the poor, 23%; environmental resources and food security, 22%. The remaining 2% was allocated to other programs. Financing and Expenditures UNDP is financed in several ways. First, the developing countries
themselves pay a large share of the costs of their UNDP-assisted projects. Their funds are used for the salaries of local personnel, construction and maintenance of project buildings and facilities, and the purchase of locally available supplies and services. Second, almost every member of the UN and its associated agencies makes a yearly voluntary contribution to UNDP’s core resources. Third, cost-sharing contributions make up a growing portion of UNDP’s income. These are resources provided in convertible currency by program country governments, or by another country or organization to share in the costs of particular programs. In 1994 it became clear that the biennial budget would have to be reduced further to keep administrative costs in line with declining core program resources. Between 1992 to 1995 us$53.6 million was cut from the administrative budget, primarily through a 26% staff reduction at headquarters and 8% at the country level. Between 1992 and 1997, UNDP reduced its administrative budget by 19% in real terms and decreased total regular staff by nearly 15%. Regular staffing at headquarters was decreased by 31%. As of the late 1990s, a zero-growth budget policy was in effect and resources were being deployed from headquarters to the country offices. According to provisional data for 2000, total net income for the year was $634 million, some $47 million below the net income figure of $681 million recorded for 1999. Major contributors to UNDP’s core resources in 2000
(us$ millions) country Japan United States Netherlands Norway Sweden United Kingdom Denmark Switzerland Canada Germany France Italy Belgium Finland Austria Ireland Australia Spain
voluntary contribution $100.00 71.69 65.91 65.81 58.47 53.14 50.16 31.51 28.58 20.05 14.76 12.41 11.56 11.46 5.43 4.14 4.00 1.96
Total government in-kind contributions for 2000 for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Arab States, and Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States totaled $9,188,100. UNDP Total Government In-Kind Contributions in 2000 by region
(us$ thousands) region Africa Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean Arab states Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States total
contribution $1,562.3 1,157.9 1,108.8 1,536.0 3,823.1 ———— $9.188.1
Associated Programs The UNDP administrator also is responsible for several associated funds and programs: United Nations Capital Development Fund provides limited
Technical Cooperation Programs amounts of “seed financing” for such social infrastructure as low cost housing, water supply systems, rural schools, and hospitals; and for such “grass roots” productive facilities as agricultural workshops, cottage industry centers, cooperatives, and credit programs. United Nations Sudano Sahelian Office works with 22 countries across the Sudano Sahelian belt of Africa, from Senegal to Somalia, designing projects in such areas as deforestation control, sand dune stabilization, and rangeland management; mobilizing resources to carry them out; and implementing them in cooperation with other UN agencies. United Nations Development Fund for Women provides direct assistance to innovative and potentially replicable projects involving women, including those to reduce workload and increase income; helps to raise women’s status in society; and works to ensure their involvement in mainstream development activities. (see UNIFEM). UN Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration helps underwrite searches for economically useful mineral deposits that developing countries could not otherwise carry out because of the high risk factor involved. United Nations Volunteers program, established by the General Assembly in 1971, is administered by UNDP from its Geneva, Switzerland, office. Volunteers from 115 professions serve in both UNDP and UN-assisted projects, as well as in development programs carried out directly by host governments. Recruited globally, they are sent to a country only at the request, and with the approval, of the host government. Volunteers serve for two years and receive a monthly allowance to cover necessities. The average age of UNV specialists is 39, with an average of 10 years’ experience in their field of specialization. The actual age ranges from the mid-20s to the 60s and 70s, as retirees are welcomed for their experience. In the first 20 years of the UNV’s existence, its specialists completed 6,000 assignments. The skills most in demand for UNV specialists are: agriculture, agronomy, animal husbandry, appropriate technology, audiovisual arts, business management, cartography, community development, computer programming, construction trades, data processing, demography, development administration, disaster preparedness, economics, education, electronics, employment for the disabled, engineering, environment, export promotion, fisheries, forestry, handicrafts, HIV/AIDS prevention, home economics, horticulture, logistics, marketing/trade promotion, medicine, nursing/midwifery, printing/bookbinding, public administration, public health, social work, statistics, teacher training, teaching English language, teaching math/science, technical trades/skills, urban/regional planning, vehicle/fleet maintenance, veterinary science, vocational training, women in development, and youth work. In 2002, 4,844 men and women of more than 150 nationalities were serving in developing countries as vounteer specialists and field workers. UNV professionals work alongside their host country peers in four main areas: technical cooperation; community-based initiatives for self-reliance; humanitarian relief and rehabilitation; and support to electoral and peace-building processes.
UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND D E V E L O P M E N T ( U N C TA D ) The first UN Conference on Trade and Development, which met in Geneva in the spring of 1964, recommended the establishment of a permanent UN body to deal with trade in relation to development. The General Assembly, noting that international trade was an important instrument for economic development and that there was a widespread desire among developing countries for a comprehensive trade organization, decided to establish UNCTAD as one of its permanent organs in December 1964.
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The main purpose of UNCTAD is to promote international trade, particularly that of developing countries, with a view to accelerating economic development. UNCTAD is one of the principal instruments of the General Assembly for deliberation and negotiation in respect to international trade and international economic cooperation. It formulates principles and policies on international trade, initiates action for the adoption of multilateral trade agreements, and acts as a center for harmonizing trade and development policies of governments and regional economic groups. The 1992 conference reaffirmed UNCTAD’s functions to be policy analysis, intergovernmental deliberation, consensus building, negotiation of international agreements, monitoring, implementation, follow-up, and technical cooperation. UNCTAD has 191 member states and has granted observer status to a number of organizations. There have been 10 sessions of UNCTAD at approximately four-year intervals: Geneva (1964); New Delhi (1968); Santiago (1972); Nairobi (1976); Manila (1979); Belgrade (1983); Geneva (1987); Cartagena de Indias, Colombia (1992); Midrand, South Africa (1996); and Bangkok, Thailand (2000). At the ninth session of UNCTAD, in May 1996, UNCTAD’s new mandate sought to deal with: • the interests of developing countries; • competition and its relation to the law and the environment in developing countries; • support for small and medium-sized enterprises; • and to consolidate the Trade Point Network. The outcome of the ninth session was a comprehensive agreement by the member governments of UNCTAD on the treatment of development and a concrete program of work, to be implemented by UNCTAD before the next general session in 2000. In his closing statement of UNCTAD-X, Secretary-General Rubens Ricupero concluded that to date global integration had affected only a dozen developing countries. He called for “real reciprocity,” a new international order that would remove massive barriers to trade in agriculture, textiles and clothing; give developing countries recognition for their efforts in promoting economic solidarity—to “strengthen the move towards positive economic integration”; and transform existing international economic institutions so that they can “bridge the interests of both developed and developing countries.” Early in 2002, two years after the adoption of the Bangkok Declaration and Plan of Action, the Trade and Development Board carried out a detailed mid-term review of UNCTAD-X. At the mid-term review, Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, stated that at UNCTAD-X the “risks and challenges of globalization” were deliberated on, affirming that globalization presends opportunities as well as risks and challenges. “Rapid economic globalization, as a result of technological advancement and liberalization of international trade, finance and investment, has led to an expansion of global economic growth and development. The imbalances of the globalization process, however, also produced severe adverse effects on the development process of many less developed countries, which are unable to adjust themselves to the fast pace of globalization," he said. Structure The continuing work of the organization is carried out between sessions by the Trade and Development Board (TDB), UNCTAD’s executive body, established by the General Assembly. The TDB implements conference decisions and initiates studies and reports on trade and related development problems. The TDB reports annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council. It also serves as the preparatory body for sessions of the conference.
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The Trade and Development Board has several standing committees that review trends and make recommendations in specific areas, including the Commission on Trade in Goods, Services, and Commodities; the Commission on Investment, Technology and Related Financial Issues; and the Commission on Enterprise, Business Facilitation and Development.
1999, operating programs gave preferential treatment to more than us$70 billion worth of exports a year from more than 100 developing countries. However, the conference recognized that the more advanced developing countries benefited most from the system, and in 1992 efforts were undertaken to include more agricultural products and some “sensitive” industrial products.
Secretariat The UNCTAD secretariat is located at Geneva. It provides service to the conference, the TDB, and its subsidiary bodies. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD is appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN and confirmed by the General Assembly. In May 1993 the UN General Assembly assigned the UNCTAD secretariat responsibility for servicing two subsidiary bodies of the Economic and Social Council: the Commission on Transnational Corporations and the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (see the section on “Economic and Social Development”). The UNCTAD secretariat also provided technical assistance to developing countries in connection with the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations which took place under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It continues to provide such services for Doha Round of trade negotiations in connection with the World Trade Organization, the successor body to GATT.
Shipping UNCTAD initiated the development of the 1978 UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (called the Hamburg Rules). By July 1993, the Hamburg Rules had received 21 ratifications and entered into force on 1 November 1993. The Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (1974) provides for the national shipping lines of developing countries to participate on an equal basis with the shipping lines of developed countries. This convention became effective in 1983. In 1991 the conference reviewed this convention and adopted guidelines towards its more effective implementation. Technical and structural changes in liner shipping since 1974 were taken into account. By December 1995 there were 78 contracting parties to the convention. The UN Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods (1980) establishes a single liability organizational structure for the international carriage of given consignments of goods entailing use of more than one mode of transport. By July 1993 it had received seven ratifications (entry into force requires 30 contracting parties). As of 2000, the convention was not yet in force. The UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships (1986) introduces new standards of responsibility and accountability for the world shipping industry and defines the elements of the genuine link that should exist between a ship and the state whose flag it flies. By July 1993 nine ratifications had been received (entry into force requires 40 contracting parties accounting for 25% of the world’s tonnage). As of 2000, the convention was not yet in force. UNCTAD also provides technical cooperation and specialized training projects financed in part by UNDP. Training courses cover multimodal transport, improving port performance, and the use of the Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS) to enable shipping lines and railway companies to track the movement of cargo.
Export Promotion and Marketing Export promotion and marketing are the responsibility of the International Trade Center in Geneva, which is operated jointly by UNCTAD and GATT. The center focuses attention on export market opportunities and helps developing countries to train personnel in marketing and export-promotion techniques and to set up the institutions and programs necessary to build up modern export-promotion services. Commodities In 1980, the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities was adopted by the UN Negotiating Conference on a Common Fund. International agreements also have been concluded for nine commodities—cocoa, coffee, tin, olive oil, sugar, natural rubber, wheat, jute and jute products, and tropical timbers. The fund came into operation in September 1989. At its 1976 session in Nairobi, UNCTAD adopted an Integrated Program for Commodities aimed at setting prices for the primary commodities of developing countries that would take into account world inflation, monetary changes, and the cost of manufactured imports. As part of the program, the Nairobi session agreed that steps would be taken to negotiate a common fund for the financing of buffer stocks that would be held or sold as conditions required, thus helping to end the wide fluctuation in commodity prices that has plagued developing countries dependent on these products as exports. The eighth session of UNCTAD in 1992 recognized the need to formulate an effective international commodity policy for the 1990s. Commodity markets remained extremely depressed and most of the commodity agreements achieved by UNCTAD in the 1980s had lapsed. In 1993 UNCTAD began to develop a microcomputer-based commodity analysis and information system (MICAS), which provides comprehensive, up-to-date information on all aspects of commodity use, production, trade, and consumption. The system assists developing countries in managing their economies and competing more effectively in world markets. Preferential Tariffs for Developing Countries UNCTAD adopted the General System of Preferences (GSP) in 1968, giving preferential tariff treatment in developed countries to manufactured goods exported by developing countries. By
Other Multilateral Agreements and Conventions The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (1980) establishes international means for the control of restrictive business practices, including those of transnational corporations, adversely affecting international trade, in particular the trade and economic development of developing countries. Negotiations were begun in 1978 on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. The provisions of the proposed code fall into two broad groups: those concerning the regulation of the transfer of technology transactions and of the conduct of parties to them, and those relating to steps to be taken by governments to meet their commitments to the code. In 1991 consultations were held on setting up an intergovernmental group of experts to prepare ground for the resumption of negotiations on the code of conduct. As a result of these consultations, the Trade and Development Board acknowledged that it was impossible at that time to obtain consensus on the outstanding issues for a draft code of conduct. In 1993 the Trade and Development Board established an Ad Hoc Working Group on Interrelationship between Investment and Technology Transfer to examine and encourage new initiatives on investment and technology policies that would facilitate technology transfer. This group adopted a work program
Technical Cooperation Programs aimed at examining issues of investment flows, transfer of technology and competitiveness, technological capacity-building in developing countries, and transfer and development of environmentally sound technologies. In light of the ongoing work of this group, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD recommended to the General Assembly in 1993 that further consultations on the code of conduct take place after the completion of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group. UNCTAD also elaborated the Modes Clauses on Marine Hull and Cargo Insurance, which assists the insurance markets in developing countries to produce their own insurance policy clauses and conditions. UNCTAD also has prepared minimum standards for shipping agents that serve as guidelines for national authorities and professional associations establishing standards. Debt Relief In the area of money and finance, UNCTAD devotes particular attention to the debt problems of developing countries and has negotiated measures of debt relief for the poorer among those countries, as well as a set of agreed guidelines for dealing with future debt problems. At its 1987 session in Geneva, UNCTAD recommended a number of policy approaches and measures to deal with debt problems, resources for development, and related monetary issues; commodities; international trade; and the problems of the least developed countries—all aimed at revitalizing development, growth, and international trade in a more predictable and supportive environment through multilateral cooperation. UNCTAD and the World Bank developed a joint program to extend technical cooperation to developing countries in the field of debt management. UNCTAD is responsible for the software component of the project. The assistance is based on the development and distribution of the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS), software designed to enable debtor countries to analyze data, make projections, and plan strategies for debt repayment. UNCTAD trains operators to use the software. It also provides training for senior officials in raising their awareness of institutional reforms that might be necessary for effective debt management. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) In 2002 49 countries were classified as least developed countries (LDCs). UNCTAD has taken a lead role in mobilizing support for LDCs by organizing two UN conferences on LDCs. The first, held in Paris in 1980, adopted the Substantial New Program of Action (SNPA), which defined measures to be taken by LDCs to promote their own development. The second, also held in Paris, in 1990, reviewed the implementation of the SNPA and strengthened the program. UNCTAD has given political impetus to the setting of official development assistance at 0.7% of the GNP of donor countries. It also has recommended improvement of International Monetary Fund’s compensatory financing facility for export earnings shortfalls of developing countries and the creation of special drawing rights for LDCs. The eighth session of UNCTAD in 1992 requested that detailed analyses be made of the socioeconomic situations and domestic policies of the LDCs, their resource needs, and external factors affecting their economies. The ninth session of UNCTAD in 1996 adopted the Midrand Declaration, which called for greater partnership between developed, developing, and the least developed countries. From 14–20 May 2001, the UN held the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries—LDC III. The eradication of poverty was the main agenda on the program. In 2002, UNCTAD released a report on poverty in LDCs, “Escaping the Poverty Trap,” which was the first international comparative analysis of poverty in the LDCs. It is based on a new set of pov-
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erty estimates, which enable empirically based analysis of the relationship between poverty, development and globalization. Trade in the 21st Century The 1992 conference identified four priority areas to be analyzed. 1. New International Partnership for Development. To assist developing countries and countries in transition to market economies increase their participation in the world economy. 2. Global Interdependence. Emphasis to be placed on the international implications of macroeconomic policies, the evolution of international trading, monetary and financial systems, effective management at the international level, and the consequences of enlarged economic spaces and regional integration processes. 3. Paths to Development. The conference called for studies of national development experiences with a view to deriving useful lessons to inform future action. The studies would include consideration of general economic management and the relationships between economic progress and market orientation. 4. Sustainable Development. The interaction between trade and environmental policies was to be considered. The promotion and implementation of environmentally sound technologies as elaborated at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 were stressed. The 1992 conference also discussed trade efficiency and the use of electronic data interchange to reduce the cost of transactions. In July 1995, UNCTAD organized a World Symposium on Trade Efficiency in Columbus, Ohio. The symposium was subtitled “New Technologies for Efficient Global Trade; UNCTAD’s Tradepoint Network.” The symposium united trade ministers, chief executives, and senior officials in focusing on new technologies in the fields of banking, insurance, transport, telecommunications, and information for trade. The promotion of international standards for electronic commerce was a key component of the symposium. The symposium also launched a worldwide process of alleviating technical and procedural barriers that prevent poorer countries from fully participating in world trade. UNCTAD is developing a Trade Point Network of 100 operational trading points to facilitate this process. At the end of 1999, 114 countries were participating in UNCTAD’s Trade Point Program. In November 2002, UNCTAD handed over its Trade Point Program to the program’s beneficiaries, represented by the World Trade Point Federation (WTPF). The WTPF was established in November 2000, with its objectives being to open international markets to new participants and to make them more competitive by giving them access to the most advanced e-commerce technologies and information networks. The WTPF aims to develop the Trade Point network in close cooperation with member states while adhering to its developmental goals and assistance to weaker players in international trade.
WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) The World Food Program, which the UN sponsors jointly with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), began operations in 1963. It has since grown from a small experimental program to become the largest multilateral food distributor in the world. In 2001, more than 77 million people in 82 countries received direct assistance through WFP emergency operations and development projects. Between 1946 and 1960, several attempts were made to establish an international body to regulate international trade and to deal with surpluses produced by food exporting countries. None
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of these attempts were successful, mainly because some countries objected to interference in their trade relations. In 1955, a study called, “Uses of Agricultural Surpluses to Finance Economic Development in Under-developed Countries,” provided the breakthrough. The report posited that agricultural surpluses could finance additional investment in developing countries without competing with the sales of domestic products or with imports from other countries. At the 1961 FAO Conference, George McGovern, the head of the US delegation, formally proposed establishing a multilateral program with a fund of us$100 million in commodities and cash, to which the US was willing to contribute us$40 million. This initiative led the FAO and the UN to establish the World Food Program on a three-year experimental basis (January 1963 to December 1965). WFP uses food commodities, cash, and services contributed by UN member states to back programs of social and economic development, as well as for emergency relief. At the request of governments, WFP provides food aid for development projects to increase agricultural production, rehabilitate roads and other vital infrastructure, protect the environment and improve health and education. WFP food assistance also provides basic sustenance for refugees and other victims of disasters. The aim of the WFP is to apply food aid in ways that will eventually make the recipients self-sufficient in obtaining or producing food. The success of the program’s work should ultimately be judged by the number of people who, over time, are able to feed themselves. In the first three decades of its existence, the program invested approximately us$14 billion (43 million tons of food aid) to combat hunger and to promote economic and social development in the developing world. More than 1,600 development projects and 1,200 emergency operations were assisted by the WFP during that period. However, in the mid-1990s, emergency operations dominated the WFP’s work. In 2001 alone, WFP delivered 2.7 million metric tons of emergency food aid to nearly 77 million people in 82 countries. WFP supplies for development purposes are used in a variety of ways. Early projects included a land-settlement project in Bolivia, the development of nomadic sheep husbandry in Syria, resettling nomads in Egypt, land reclamation and development in Morocco, and land settlement in Tanzania. Other projects contributed directly to the development of human resources by providing food for school children, expectant and nursing mothers, hospital patients, and adults attending education centers. The program gave special attention to creating employment and income through food-for-work programs. In Bangladesh, a vulnerable-group development project, begun in 1975, continues to provide training in health, literacy, and income-generation for women. Similar projects were started in Bolivia and Mexico, while major land-development programs commenced in Egypt, Sudan, Korea, and China. The largest single dairy project ever undertaken, “Operation Flood,” in India, increased milk production by 50% and benefited 30 million people. Early in its operations, recipient governments had a major problem in covering the non-food costs of a project, including transport storage and other expenses. The early success of the program (28 formal requests for aid in May 1963 rose to 193 requests by November 1964) led donor countries to increase their contributions to cover these costs. Indeed, the WFP’s ability to quickly transport large quantities of food, at short notice, to remote areas of the world, is one of its most important areas of expertise.
In 1973 a worldwide food shortage created a serious lack of resources, and the WFP governing body was unable to approve any new projects that year. The number of existing recipients and the size of their rations also were cut. Despite these measures there was a shortfall of 160,000 tons of commodities. A concerted effort was made to find new funds, and in 1974 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia offered us$50 million, the largest cash donation ever made. This marked a turning point because the donation came from a nonindustrial developing country that was, and still is, a net importer of food commodities. It also marked an important change in the nature of donations, away from the idea of surplus disposal and toward a wider sharing of responsibility for those in need. In 1975 the UN General Assembly established the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR), to be placed at the disposal of WFP. This reserve, which receives contributions from all governments, has a minimum annual target of 500,000 tons, enabling WFP to quickly respond to emergency situations. In 1988 donor commitments for development activities reached a high point of us$778 million, which represented twothirds of WFP resources. By 1993 this trend had reversed and emergency situations were consuming more than 60% of WFP’s resources. Part of this increase is directly attributable to the program’s new relationship with the UN body that supervises refugee relief. In January 1992, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) worked out an agreement giving the WFP the responsibility to procure and deliver food commodities to UNHCRmanaged refugee feeding operations. In the last 30 years, WFP has witnessed the graduation of former food-aid recipients to the status of potential donors. The Republic of Korea, Singapore, Venezuela, Greece, Hungary, and Mexico are all former recipients who now boast growing economies. The program has also developed ways to use its cash contributions creatively. For example, by buying more food in developing countries for relief and development activities it has encouraged and expanded trade between developing countries. In 1993 the WFP was the largest UN purchaser of goods in developing countries. WFP has its headquarters in Rome and development projects in 82 countries worldwide; the WFP staff numbers more than 5,000, over half of whom are employed on a temporary basis. Permanent staff members (numbering 2,567 in 2001) were employed at headquarters (586 people) and in the field (1,981 people). It is administered by an executive director. Its governing body is the 36-member Bureau of the Executive Board. Half of the members of the board are elected by ECOSOC, the other half by the FAO Council. In 2002, the members of the executive board elected by ECOSOC were: Algeria, Australia, Cameroon, Cuba, Denmark, France, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, United Kingdom. Executive board members elected by the FAO Council were Bangladesh, Canada, China, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Germany, Haiti, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Romania, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, and United States of America. In 2001, WFP had us$1.74 billion in expenditures. Of that amount, 87% was spent on relief aid, and 13% on development aid. Of the 4.2 million metric tons of food distributed, 2.7 million tons went for emergency operations, while 660,600 tons went for development projects.
Technical Cooperation Programs U N I T E D N AT I O N S P O P U L AT I O N F U N D ( U N F PA ) The UN has been concerned with population questions since its earliest years, establishing the Population Commission in 1947 as one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council. The early work of the UN on population questions concentrated on the improvement of demographic statistics, which were lacking for many areas of the world, and then began to focus on the application of statistical data in analytical studies and in the preparation of worldwide population estimates and projections. The first Demographic Yearbook was published by the UN Statistical Office in 1948. In the 1960s, however, the extraordinarily rapid rate at which the world’s population was growing became an urgent concern (between 1950 and 1960, the world population increased from 2.5 billion to over 3 billion, and by 2000 it had doubled—reaching 6 billion). In a resolution adopted in 1966, the General Assembly authorized the UN to provide technical assistance in population matters, and the following year, the General Assembly established a Trust Fund for Population Activities, renamed in 1969 the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), to provide additional resources to the UN system for technical cooperation activities in the population field. In 1972, the fund was placed under the authority of the General Assembly, which designated the Governing Council of UNDP as its administering body. By its resolution number 1763(LIV) of 18 May 1973, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations defined the mandate of UNFPA, and, in 1979, the General Assembly affirmed that the UNFPA was a subsidiary organ. In 1987, the fund’s name was changed to the United Nations Population Fund, but the acronym UNFPA was retained. In 1993, the General Assembly transformed the Governing Council of UNDP into the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board, which provides intergovernmental support to and supervision of the UNFPA in accordance with overall policy guidance of the General Assembly and ECOSOC of the United Nations. The first World Population Conference, held in Bucharest in 1974, adopted a World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) that stressed the relationship between population factors and overall economic and social development. The General Assembly affirmed that the plan was “an instrument of the international community for the promotion of economic development” and urged that assistance in the population field should be expanded, particularly to UNFPA, for the proper implementation of the plan. The International Conference on Population, held in Mexico City in August 1984, reaffirmed the validity of the WPPA and adopted recommendations for its further implementation. Target mortality rates were adjusted, and emerging issues, such as migration, urbanization, computerized data processing, and aging of populations, were addressed. Also considered was the need for an intersectoral approach to population and development, for policies that respect individual and family rights, and for improvement in the status of women, including their increased participation in all aspects of development. The third decennial conference, the International Conference on Population and Development, was held in Cairo, 5–13 September 1994. The Programme of Action adopted at the Cairo conference recommended that population concerns be fully integrated into development planning, in order to meet the needs and improve the quality of life of present and future generations. The program builds upon the considerable international awareness and knowledge that has developed since the Bucharest and Mexico City conferences regarding the linkages among population issues, sustained economic growth, and sustainable development. The program also addresses the reproductive health and educational needs of individuals, especially of girls and women, and
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calls for increased investment in the social sectors, from donor agencies and recipient governments alike. UNFPA supports a broad range of population activities. Nearly half of the fund’s assistance is used for maternal and child health care and family planning programs. Another 20% is used for population and family planning communication and education. UNFPA also supports developing countries in their efforts to collect and analyze population data, conduct population censuses, formulate population policies, and undertake research on fertility, mortality, and migration and their relationship to development, as well as on linkages between population and sustainable development. The fund supports special programs concerning women, youth, the aged, AIDS, and population and development. UNFPA is the leading source of population assistance within the United Nations system. The fund’s resources come from voluntary contributions from governments. UNFPA’s Work A major component of UNFPA’s work is disseminating information based on its data and analysis of population trends. In the State of the World Population 1999 report, UNFPA called the dawn of the 21st century a time of choices and it urged governments to action. With global population quadrupling during the 20th century, surpassing 6 billion in 1999, UNFPA stated that how fast the next billion people are added, what the effect will be on natural resources and the environment, and the quality of life will depend on policy and funding decisions that are made over the next 5 to 10 years. The population report pointed to the issue of below replacement-level reproduction in some 60 countries, which, UNFPA predicted, would put pressures on these developed nations to provide support and medical care for the elderly. Meanwhile, HIV/AIDS is taking a higher toll in some parts of the world (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) than it is elsewhere, lowering life expectancy and “erasing decades of progress in child mortality” in these regions. Finally, the report highlighted unbalanced consumption patterns around the globe, concluding that it will combine with continued population growth to cause environmental damage—including the collapse of fisheries, shrinking forests, rising temperatures, and the extinction of numerous plant and animal species. In summary, UNFPA warned that unless nations rededicate themselves to combating issues of overpopulation, continuing poverty, gender discrimination, threats such as HIV/AIDS, environmental changes, and shrinking (relative to the population) resources, the benefits of lower fertility that were realized in the second half of the 20th century would be wiped out. UNFPA urged governments to commit action and funding to the 20-year Programme of Action endorsed by the world’s governments in 1994 at the International Conference on Population and Development. In its World Population 1999 report, UNFPA focused on global women’s issues and youth at risk. In both areas the organization called for stepped-up educational and health programs. UNFPA stated that despite progress, far too many women are denied education, contraception, and decent health care, and that violence against women is “endemic in all countries.” The report went on to say that hundreds of millions of women continue to suffer needlessly from gender-based violence, unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, and poor health. Similarly, UNFPA stated that “today’s young people are frequently at risk of unwanted pregnancy, HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, and alienation from parents and communities.” The organization warned that ignoring the issues confronting women and youth incurs high costs—“in ill health, wasted opportunities, and social disruption.” According to UNFPA, studies have shown that family life education should begin early to help young people through the years when they are beginning to be interested in sex. Further, the benefits of education for girls
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and women had been well-documented during the 1900s, yet in 1999 in developing countries, girls comprised two-thirds of the 130 million children not attending school. The call for schooling was seen to have the double benefit of educating young women and postponing childbirth. While UNFPA releases the report annually, the 1999 document was expected to have far-reaching influence in that it was issued as the world turned its attention to considering the next millennium, in a year when a critical population threshold (6 billion) was crossed, and it was followed, in 2000, by several conferences that used the 1999 report as the basis for discussion and program development. Among the major conferences that took place in 2000 were Beijing+5 Review (New York, 5–9 June 2000), the World Summit for Social Development and Beyond (Geneva, Switzerland, 26–30 June 2000), and Millennium Summit: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York, 6–8 September 2000). Budget and Organization Regular income in 2000 totaled us$366.1 million, compared to $287.7 million in 1999. Pledges to UNFPA’s general resources in 2000 totaled us$262.5 million, an increase of 5% from 1999. By far the largest increase, 173%, was seen in contributions to supplementary resources, up from $37.9 million in 1999 to $103.6 million in 2000. Fund-raising during the year increased both income and the total number of donors, up from 69 in 1999 to 100 in 2000. In 2000, UNFPA total expenditures amounted to $255.6 million, compared with $316.6 million in 1999. Of these expenditures, $134.2 million was for country and regional programs, $19.7 million was for management and administration of the organization, $64.5 million was for program support, and $37.2 million was for trust fund activities. Also in 2000, UNFPA used an additional $26 million to replenish its operational reserve. In 1999, UNFPA spent $187.1 million on country and intercountry activities, $23.3 million on management and administration, $70.5 million on program support, and $35.7 million on trust fund activities. In 2000, UNFPA provided support to 142 countries: 45 in sub-Saharan Africa; 39 in the Arab States and Eastern Europe, 33 in Asia and the Pacific, and 25 in Latin America and the Caribbean. The region of sub-Saharan Africa received the largest percentage of UNFPA assistance, followed by Asia and the Pacific, the Arab States and Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. UNFPA publishes a range of products in a variety of media. Public service announcements are broadcast on national and international television networks around the world. The definitive publication is the annual The State of World Population, a comprehensive demographic study of patterns in population growth and distribution. UNFPA also publishes the annual AIDS Update, which highlights assistance provided by UNFPA for HIV/ AIDS prevention and control activities undertaken in line with national AIDS policies and programs and within the global strategy of the Joint and Co-sponsored UN Program on HIV/AIDS.
UN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM (UNEP) In the course of the twentieth century, and especially after World War II, the increase in the earth’s population and the advance of technology, with concomitant changes in patterns of production and consumption, led to pressure on the environment and threats to its stability that were new in human history. For a long time, the implications of these phenomena were largely ignored. In the decade of the 1960s, however, problems such as soil erosion; air, water, and marine pollution; the need for conservation of limited resources; and desiccation of once-fertile zones became acute enough to awaken the consciousness of governments and people in all parts of the world, but especially in the industrialized countries, to the urgency of the situation. The UN responded with the decision of the 1968 General Assembly to convene a world conference on the human environment.
The first UN Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm in June 1972. The conference was a focus for, rather than the start of, action on environmental problems. At its conclusion, the participants, representing over 90% of the world’s population, adopted a declaration and a 109-point plan of action for the human environment that became the blueprint for a wide range of national and international programs. The broad intent of the action plan was to define and mobilize “common effort for the preservation and improvement of the human environment.” The preamble to the declaration conveys the urgency, magnitude, and complexity of that task. Later in 1972, on the basis of the conference’s recommendations, the General Assembly created the UN Environment Program (UNEP), to monitor significant changes in the environment and to encourage and coordinate sound environmental practices. With headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, UNEP is the first global UN agency to be headquartered in a developing country. Its mission is to provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations. Twenty years after its inception, UNEP’s mandate was reaffirmed and strengthened in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Out of that conference came an ambitious plan of action—Agenda 21—with an emphasis on integrating development and environment into all United Nations program areas. The UNEP secretariat is headed by an executive director who is elected by the UN General Assembly for a four-year term, upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General. UNEP’s professional staff in 1997 numbered around 250. Besides its Nairobi headquarters, UNEP maintains regional offices in Africa, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, West Asia, and North America. UNEP’s Governing Council is composed of 58 states elected by the General Assembly for four-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic representation (16 African seats, 13 Asian seats, 10 Latin American and Caribbean seats, 6 seats for Eastern European states, 13 seats for Western European and other states). The Governing Council generally meets every two years. In 2002, the following states had representatives on the Governing Council: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, The Gambia, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, Sudan, Suriname, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The Council’s functions and responsibilities include promoting international cooperation in the field of environment and recommending policies to that end, providing general policy guidance for environmental programs within the UN system, keeping the world environmental situation under review so as to ensure that emerging problems requiring international assistance receive adequate consideration by governments, promoting the contribution by international scientific and other professional communities to knowledge about the environment and the technical aspects of UN environmental programs, keeping under review the impact of national and international development policies, and reviewing and approving the utilization of the resources of the Environment Fund. The Environment Fund was set up under the authority of the Governing Council to finance wholly or partly the costs of new
Technical Cooperation Programs environmental initiatives within the UN system. It is made up of voluntary contributions. Altogether 143 countries made at least one voluntary contribution to the Environment Fund over the period 1973–2001. Eleven countries maintained their regular annual contributions over the whole period, thus ensuring continuous support and implementation of the UNEP program. Still, 95% of the total contributions to the fund came from just 20 countries. UNEP’s budget for 2000–01 was $119.2 million. In 2001 the number of donor countries increased to 79, contributing approximately US$44 million to the Environment Fund. For its first 20 years, UNEP’s policy, as set by the Governing Council, has been focused on the three broad areas of environmental assessment, environmental management, and international environmental law. Many parts to the program evolved under these three themes. There was the environmental monitoring capacity built up in the Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS), and the establishment of a computerbased store of data in the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC). More computer-based capability was developed to show how both natural and human resources are distributed in the Global Resource Information Database (GRID). In addition, UNEP.net, a web-based interactive catalogue and multifaceted portal, offers access to environmentally relevant geographic, textual, and pictorial information. Another key information system is INFOTERRA, UNEP’s international network for the retrieval of global environmental information. It is a worldwide network with national focal points in 177 countries, providing governments, industry, and researchers with access to a vast reservoir of environmental data and information gathered from about 6,800 institutions and experts in more than 1,000 priority subject areas. Environmental management and legal instruments were developed. The most successful example of international environmental law can be seen in the instruments used to protect the ozone layer: the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol. Expert groups convened by UNEP, with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the scientific community, and industry, led to the development of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which was adopted in March 1985. In September 1987 the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was signed, setting limits for the production and consumption of chloro-fluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons. The Montreal Protocol came into force on 1 January 1989 and was amended in London in June 1990, in Copenhagen in 1992, and in Vienna in 1995 after research showed that ozone depletion was even more severe than previously feared. Industrialized countries succeeded in phasing out the production and consumption of halons by 1 January 1994, and were well on the way to the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons by the end of 1995. The consumption of CFCs in industrialized countries decreased from about 1,000,000 tons in 1987 (when the Protocol was signed) to about 13,000 tons in 1996. Developing countries, although mandated to begin phase-out only in 1999, began making progress before that time. A multilateral fund, involving UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank, was established to help developing countries meet the costs of complying with the revised protocol and to provide for the necessary transfer of technology. By 2001, the fund had already disbursed us$1.2 billion to developing countries for transition to ozone-safe technology. The Mediterranean Action Plan has been the model as UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme has spread. Today, nearly 140 countries take part in Regional Seas Programmes catalyzed and coordinated by UNEP. Action Plans cover the Mediterranean, the Kuwait region, the Red Sea, the Caribbean, the Atlantic coast of West and Central Africa, the Eastern African seaboard, the Pacific coast of South America, the islands of the South Pacific, the East-Asian region, the South Asian region, the Black Sea, the
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North-West Pacific and the South-West Atlantic. An Action Plan for the Caspian Sea is being developed. Coordination is provided through the UNEP Water Branch. UNEP provides the secretariat for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which entered into force in 1975 and prohibits or regulates trade in some 30,000 endangered species. The protection of endangered species under the CITES Convention has seen successful international cooperation to stamp out trade in rare plants and animals. UNEP also provides the secretariat for the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), which came into force in 1983. UNEP supports the World Conservation Monitoring Center (WCMC), which assesses the distribution and abundance of the world’s species. Action plans for African elephants and rhinos, Asian elephants and rhinos, primates, cats, and polar bears have been published by UNEP and IUCN. UNEP also has contributed to the drawing up of global conventions on hazardous waste, climate change, biodiversity, and desertification and of international guidelines, including those on international trade in chemicals, protection of marine environment from land-based activities, environmental impact assessment and shared natural resources. In March 1989, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, drafted by UNEP, was adopted by 116 governments and the European Community. The convention entered into force on 5 May 1992. Its immediate target is to impose strict controls on the international movement of hazardous wastes and eventually to reduce their production. As of November 2002, 152 countries acceded or had signaled their intention to accede to the convention. In June 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity was signed during the UN Conference on Environmental and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The convention was prepared by an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, set up by UNEP’s Governing Council and assisted by UNEP, FAO, UNESCO, and IUCN. Its main aims are to conserve biological diversity and to ensure that its benefits to mankind are shared equitably. UNEP also supports the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), which has established a network of gene banks in 30 countries to house the world’s 40 base collections. More than 100 countries collaborate and more than 500,000 plant species have been collected, evaluated, and deposited. A joint venture between UNEP, UNDP, and the UN SudanoSahelian Office is assisting 22 Sudano-Sahelian countries to fight desertification. In spite of these efforts, implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification has been slow. UNEP’s Plan of Action to Combat Desertification has been succeeded by the Convention to Combat Desertification, wich entered into force in 1996. UNEP’s activities in desertification control now focus on achieving strong support and effective implementation of the convention. UNEP, along with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to provide scientific assessments on the magnitude, timing, and potential environmental and socioeconomic consequences of climate change and realistic response strategies. Negotiations begun in early 1991 led to the formulation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was signed by 154 governments in Rio de Janeiro during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. It entered into force on 21 March 1994. The organization also is responsible for UN activities involving freshwater. Among regional initiatives are the Action Plan for
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Latin America and the Caribbean and the program for environmentally sound management of inland waters in the Zambezi Basin. UNEP, along with UNDP and the World Bank, administers the us$2 billion Global Environment Facility (GEF), and is responsible for GEF’s Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP). GEF was established as a three-year pilot in 1991 to oversee funding for global environment protection in the areas of climate change, biodiversity, international waters, and ozone depletion. In 1992, a restructuring process began that resulted in agreement on fundamentally altered institutional arrangements for the facility, now known as GEFF II. UNEP will play the primary role in catalyzing the development of scientific and technical analysis and in advancing environmental management in GEF-financed activities. It also will be responsible for establishing and supporting the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel as an advisory body to the GEF. The UNDP is responsible for technical assistance activities and capacity building. The World Bank, the GEF Trust Fund’s repository, plays the primary role in ensuring the development and management of investment projects while also mobilizing private sector resources that are consistent with GEF objectives and national sustainable development strategies. The GEF provides the interim funding mechanism for the conventions on climate change and biological diversity, until parties to those conventions agree on a permanent arrangement. UNCED and Agenda 21 marked a new beginning for the world community as a whole. Agenda 21 reaffirmed UNEP’s role as the principal environment body in the UN system and expanded UNEP’s role to encompass a vast range of world environmental needs and problems, with an emphasis on regional delivery. Five years later, at the nineteenth session of the Governing Council of UNEP in 1997, as part of the ongoing reform process of the United Nations system, UNEP’s Governing Council adopted the Nairobi Declaration, again asserting the role and mandate of UNEP as the leading global environmental authority and calling for assurances of financial stability for the implementation of its agenda. Specifically, the Nairobi Declaration set out the following as core elements of the focused mandate of a revitalized UNEP: • To analyze the state of the global environment and assess global and regional environmental trends; • To further the development of its international environmental law aiming at sustainable development; • To advance the implementation of agreed international norms and policies; • To strengthen its role in the coordination of environmental activities in the United Nations system in the field of environment; • To promote greater awareness and facilitate effective cooperation among all sectors of society and actors involved in the implementation of the international environmental agenda; • To provide policy and advisory services in key areas of institution building to Governments and other relevant institutions. UNEP’s integrated work program emphasizes relationships between socio-economic driving forces, environmental changes, and impacts on human well-being. Equipped with a stronger regional presence and marked by a process of continuous monitoring and assessment of its implementation, UNEP’s program of work focuses on the following areas: sustainable management and use of natural resources; sustainable production and consumption; a better environment for human health and well-being; and globalization of the economy and the environment. In 2000, the fifth special session of the UNEP Governing Council and the subsequent 20th session of the Governing Council elaborated UNEP’s areas of concentration, which included environmental monitoring, assessment, information, and research
(including early warning); enhanced coordination of environmental conventions and development of environment policy instruments; freshwater; technology transfer and industry; and support to Africa. To support these initiatives, UNEP initiated a restructuring that was expected to trim administration costs while developing the Nairobi facility as a critical UN administrative office.
U N C E N T E R F O R H UM A N S E T T L E M E N T S ( H A B I TAT) UN concern with the problems of human settlements, particularly with the deteriorating quality of living conditions in developing countries and the need to link urban and regional development programs with national development plans, led to the convening of the first international conference on the question in Vancouver, Canada, in May–June 1976. The declaration and plan of action adopted by Habitat: UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat I) represented an important commitment on the part of governments and the international community to improve the quality of life for all people through human settlements development. The plan of action contained 64 recommendations for national action concerning settlement policies and planning; provision of shelter, infrastructure, and services; land use and land tenure; the role of popular participation; and effective institutions and management. Habitat I also recommended the strengthening and consolidation of UN activities in a single organization concerned exclusively with human settlements. Acting on this recommendation, the General Assembly established in 1978 the UN Center for Human Settlements (Habitat, also UNCHS), with headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, to serve as a focal point for human settlements action and to coordinate human settlements activities within the UN system. The center provides technical assistance to governments; organizes expert meetings, workshops, and training seminars; issues print, audio visual, and electronic publications; and disseminates information worldwide. In 1993 the center had under execution 257 technical cooperation programs and projects in over 90 countries, with an overall budget in excess of us$42 million for the year. In 1982, the General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless. The objectives were to improve the shelter situation of the poor and disadvantaged at both individual and community levels, particularly in developing countries, and to demonstrate means of continuing those efforts as ongoing national programs beyond 1987. Beginning in 1986, the tenth anniversary of Habitat I, World Habitat Day has been observed each year on the first Monday in October. As lead agency in the UN system for coordinating activities related to the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, the center continues to work toward its goal of facilitating adequate shelter for all by that date. The Habitat II Conference met in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1996, 20 years after Habitat I. Subtitled “A Summit for Cities,” the UN Conference on the Future of Cities has as its goal making the world’s cities, towns, and villages healthy, safe, just, and sustainable. The two central themes were “sustainable human settlements in an urbanizing world” and “adequate shelter for all.” The follow-up conference took place from 6–8 June 2001; “Istanbul+5: Reviewing and Appraising Progress Five Years after Habitat II” was a special session of the UN General Assembly. At the special session, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements in the New Millennium, which reaffirmed the Istanbul declaration, undertook a review and assessment of the Habitat Agenda, and proposed further actions for attaining the goals of adequate shelter for all and sustainable development of human settlements.
Technical Cooperation Programs U N R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E F O R S O C IA L DEVELOPMENT (UNRISD) The UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) was created in 1963 as an autonomous agency within the UN system. It engages in multidisciplinary research on the social dimensions of contemporary problems affecting development. Its work is guided by the conviction that, for effective development policies to be formulated, an understanding of the social and political context is crucial. The institute attempts to provide governments, development agencies, grass roots organizations, and scholars with a better understanding of how development policies and processes of economic, social, and environmental change affect different social groups. Working through an extensive network of national research centers, UNRISD aims to promote original research and strengthen research capacity in developing countries. The UNRISD program for the 2000–03 period included work in the following areas: social policy and development; democracy and human rights; identities, conflict and cohesion; civil society and social movements; technology and society. In 1996, UNRISD conducted the War-Torn Societies Project, which focused on post-conflict rebuilding and rehabilitation. The project sought to identify novel and integrated policy responses to the complex interactions between peacekeeping, relief, rehabilitation, and development activities. The UNRISD Internship Program provides a limited number of graduate students from around the world the opportunity to gain valuable experience in an international research institute setting. Interns are selected on the basis of their academic experience and interests. Students selected for the unpaid internships spend a minimum of two months at UNRISD assisting project coordinators in developing project proposals, compiling annotated bibliographies, organizing research seminars, translating correspondence, and carrying out various tasks in the Reference Centre. As part of its mandate, UNRISD issues newsletters, books, and other publications, some of which are available online at http://www.unrisd.org/. By 2002, the institute had approximately 35 staff members at its headquarters in Geneva, and is financed entirely by voluntary contributions.
UN INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND R E S E A R C H ( U N I TA R ) In 1963, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a UN Institute for Training and Research as an autonomous body within the framework of the UN. UNITAR commenced functioning in March 1965. It is headed by an executive director and has a board of trustees appointed by the UN Secretary-General in consultation with the president of the General Assembly and the president of the Economic and Social Council. UNITAR originally had its headquarters in New York and a European office in Geneva. In 1993 UNITAR’s headquarters was transferred to Geneva. It maintains a liaison office in New York to coordinate training activities. The mandate of UNITAR is to enhance the effectiveness of the UN in attaining its major objectives—particularly the maintenance of peace and the promotion of economic and social development—through training and research. Its functions include ensuring liaison with UN organizations and strengthening cooperation with academic institutions; conducting training programs in multilateral diplomacy and international cooperation for diplomats accredited to the United Nations and national officials; and carrying out a wide range of training programs in social and economic development. In addition, UNITAR responds to ad hoc requests for training. For example, in 1993 UNITAR received requests for programs from UNDP, UNEP, and other UN bodies. In the late 1990s, UNITAR offered courses in the following
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areas: debt, economic, and financial management; foreign economic relations; international affairs management; international migration policy; peacemaking and preventive diplomacy; applications of environmental law; chemicals and waste management; climate change; decentralized cooperation; and information and communication technologies. In a typical year, UNITAR designs and conducts some 70 different training programs on five continents for the benefit of more than 3,000 national staff and government officials. In the early 1990s training programs in diplomacy, negotiation, foreign affairs management, and debt and financial management were developed for newly independent countries in Europe and Central Asia; countries in transition in Africa, Asia, and Europe; and for the Palestinian negotiating team. The institute’s research program originally concentrated on three main areas: UN institutional issues, peace and security issues, and economic and social issues. After restructuring in 1992, basic research on training was conducted only if extrabudgetary funds were provided. UNITAR is supported by voluntary contributions from governments, intergovernmental organizations, foundations, and other nongovernmental organizations.
U N U N IV E R S I T Y ( U N U ) In 1969, Secretary-General U Thant proposed that a UN university be established. The Founding Committee was set up two years later, and in December 1973, the General Assembly approved a charter for the university. The following spring, the UNU Council, composed of academic leaders and prominent persons from 24 countries, was appointed. Members of the university council serve in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of governments. UNU commenced operations in September 1975. For 17 years the university maintained its headquarters in a high-rise office building in Tokyo. In 1992 it moved to a new building in the Shibuya district of Tokyo constructed and made available by the government of Japan. The university maintains a liaison office in New York. UNU is an autonomous organ of the General Assembly. It is jointly sponsored by the UN and UNESCO, whose SecretaryGeneral and Director General, respectively, together appoint the rector and members of the university council. Its charter guarantees academic freedom and emphasizes the primacy of scholarly excellence over any other considerations—for example, choices of programs and personnel—in determining its activities. Like traditional universities, UNU is concerned with the advancement of knowledge. Unlike traditional universities, however, it has no students of its own, no faculty, and no campus. It is a completely new institution: an international community of scholars engaged in research, postgraduate training, and the dissemination of knowledge to help solve, in the words of its charter, “pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare.” It operates through worldwide networks of academic and research institutions and individual scholars who work together on projects concerned with such problems as peace, development, the environment, science, and technology. The UNU’s areas of concentration are: peace and governance; environment; science and technology; and development. The academic activities of the university are carried out primarily through a network of its research and training centers: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/ WIDER), Helsinki, Finland; UNU Institute for New Technologies (UNU/Intech), Maastricht, the Netherlands; UNU International Institute for Software Technology (UNU/IIST), Macau; UNU Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (UNU/INRA), Accra, Ghana; UNU Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU/IAS) in Tokyo; UNU Programme for Biotechnology in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNU/BIOLAC) in Caracas, Venezuela; UNU Leader-
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ship Academy (UNU/LA) in Amman, Jordan; UNU International Network on Water, Environment and Health (UNU/INWEH) in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada; UNU Food and Nutrition Programme for Human and Social Development at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York (US); UNU Fisheries Training Programme (UNU/FTP), Iceland; UNU Programme on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU/CRIS), Bruges, Belgium; UNU Geothermal Training Programme (UNU/GTP) in Reykjavik, Iceland; and The Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, UK. Between 1976 and 1996, some 1,450 UNU fellows received postgraduate training through the university’s network. Fellows are selected after recommendation from their home institutions, which must be working in an area of concern to the university, and must be committed to returning to work at those institutions. The UNU Press publishes scholarly works on the United Nations system in the areas of peace studies, regional studies, technology and development, human and social development, international law, food and nutrition, energy technology, and natural resources and environment. The UNU Press publishes one periodical, The Food and Nutrition Bulletin, issued quarterly. UNU publications are distributed in North America by UNIPUB based in Lanham, Maryland. UNU is supported by voluntary contributions from governments, foundations, and individuals. Its principal source of support is investment income from an endowment fund that ensures academic freedom and financial independence. The annual budget in 2000 was approximately us$36 million.
UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE The University for Peace was established in 1980 in San Jose, Costa Rica, to promote postgraduate studies and research on peace. A General Assembly resolution called on member states, NGOs, and intergovernmental bodies, as well as interested individuals and organizations, to contribute to the university’s Trust Fund. In 2000, the University for Peace (nicknamed UPAZ) was in the process of major change and transition in which its programs, priorities, and administrative practices were being reviewed and a new strategy and program was being developed. At the time, its programs included Culture for Peace and Democracy in Central America; Natural Resources and Peace; Communications for Peace; Human Rights and Education for Peace; International World Center of Research and Information for Peace (in Montevideo, Uruguay); Gandhi Television Center for Communication and Peace; Radio for Peace International; and CEDIPAZ, a center for documentation and information for peace as well as the UPAZ library.
I N T E R N AT I ON AL R E S E A R C H A N D T R A I N I N G I N S T I T U T E F O R T H E A D VAN C E M E N T O F W O M E N ( I N S T R AW ) The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) was established by the Economic and Social Council in conformity with an earlier decision of the General Assembly, which was based on a recommendation made by the World Conference of the International Women’s Year held in Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975. In 1984, INSTRAW’s statute, submitted by INSTRAW’s Board of Trustees, its governing body, was approved by Economic and Social Council resolution 1984/124 and then by General Assembly resolution No. 39/249. INSTRAW is the only autonomous research and training vehicle at the international level in order to contribute to the advancement and mobilization of women in development, to raise awareness of women’s issues worldwide, and to better assist women to meet new challenges and directions. INSTRAW has been based in Santo Domingo since 1983, at the invitation of the Government of the Dominican Republic.
INSTRAW and its work are governed by the Board of Trustees, which is composed of eleven members nominated by Member States and appointed by the Economic and Social Council, based on their personal capacity and the principle of equitable geographical distribution. A representative of the Secretary-General, the Director of the Institute, a representative of each of the Regional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council, and a representative of the Host Country are ex officio members of the Board of Trustees. The Institute and its work are funded by voluntary contributions received from States, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private sources. The main responsibilities and tasks of the Board of Trustees are: to formulate principles, policies, and guidelines for the activities of the Institute; to consider and approve the work program and budget proposals of the Institute on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Director of the Institute; to make necessary or desirable recommendations for the operation of the Institute; and to report periodically to the Economic and Social Council and to the General Assembly. INSTRAW’s research and training programs are aimed at placing issues relevant to the advancement of women into the economic and political decision-making process. It does this by holding national training workshops and conducting joint research and training programs and projects in collaboration with specialized United Nations agencies, the Commission on the Status of Women, United Nations Focal Points for Women, and especially, regarding data and statistics, with the Statistical Division of the United States Secretariat. INSTRAW’s training program, supported by data and its research findings, aims at developing training materials that will include women in the development process, especially in developing countries. Two billion people in remote rural areas and urban slums of the developing world—half of whom are women—lack safe drinking water and even rudimentary sanitation facilities. Because of the critical need to address the question of water for human survival, INSTRAW produced in 1986, and updated in 1991, a training package on “Women, Water Supply and Sanitation,” which has been the focus of ten national, regional, and international training seminars organized by the Institute from 1987 to 1994 in some African, Asian, and Latin American countries. The package illustrates the importance of women’s participation on all aspects of water resources, including agriculture, human resources development and water resources management. INSTRAW’s modular training program is crucial due to negative effects that water and sanitation problems have on a large number of the world’s population. Considering the importance of waste disposal for reasons of health and environmental sanitation, INSTRAW prepared an additional module to include in the “Women, Water Supply and Sanitation” package, aimed at sensitizing the decision makers on the needs and ways of including women in waste management schemes. Produced in 1994, the new training module of “Women and Waste Management” has been used in Namibia (first ever training seminar ever conducted in Namibia), Guyana, and Ecuador (where five national follow-up seminars were conducted with a total of 159 participants), with an average of 40 participants in each country. This training module presents an integrated approach to environmental sanitation and provides practical guidelines and checklists for integrating women at the designing, implementation, operation and maintenance, monitoring, and evaluation phases. The module provides numerous examples of successful community waste management and other initiatives in the area of environmental sanitation around the world. The multimedia training package, “Women and New and Renewable Sources of Energy” (NRSE), was first developed by INSTRAW in 1989 (and updated in 1995). The main objective is
Technical Cooperation Programs to contribute with a new approach in the organization of NRSE systems by including women’s needs as well as their participation in the planning, technical operations, maintenance, assessment, and implementation of environmentally sound NRSE programs and projects. INSTRAW produced in 1995 a modular training package in “Women, Environmental Management and Sustainable Development.” It was developed for senior officials of Ministries of Environment, Natural Resources, Planning, Women’s Affairs, Education, Health; development planners and provincial or local authorities in charge of environmental programs and projects; engineers in charge of designing new technologies; university professors, trainers and managers of national training institutes and educational institutions training staff on various aspects of women, environmental management, and sustainable development, and representatives of nongovernmental and women’s organizations involved in environmental projects. In 1995, INSTRAW produced a training package on “Gender Statistics and Policy.” The most important feature of this training package is that it is designed to provide statisticians and development planners with hands-on exercises on the actual use of existing data in policy designs. This package contains a pre-workshop module, which is designed to familiarize the users with gender issues and their relevance to National policy goals, better preparing them for the actual training; illustration of how gender-specific statistics and indicators affect policy goals/targets; computerized statistical policy models which visually describe direct impact of certain variables on target policy indicators. This module includes statistical models that can be adapted at the national level. During 1993, INSTRAW adapted existing computer models in order to assist policy makers in understanding the relationship between certain sectoral policies and the advancement of women. This was completed in collaboration with the Population Division of the former Department of Economic and Social Development. The two models, entitled “Urban Women in Development Model” and “Rural Women in Development Model” are designed as teaching tools and conceptual framework that can serve as a basis for recognizing the multisectoral approach needed to ensure equitable participation of women and men in development. The models come with an instruction manual, sample exercises, and a computer diskette containing the program information. The United Nations leadership in recognizing women’s equal rights as prerequisite for their full participation in sustainable development is not as well known as it deserves to be. INSTRAW attempted to address this situation in the first module of the “Gender Training Portfolio,” published in 1993. This Portfolio is designed to describe and disseminate information on women/gender and development for use in a variety of situations. As the world works toward the goal of sustainable development, people become more aware of the interaction of gender relations in development planning and its effect on the status of women worldwide. INSTRAW’s aim is to promote the sharing and effective utilization of such knowledge to positively influence development policies nd help make them more responsive to the needs of both women and men.
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U N I T E D N AT I O N S D E V E L O P M E N T F U N D F O R WOMEN (UNIFEM) In 1976, the UN General Assembly established the Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women. The fund was created to provide direct support for women’s projects and to promote the inclusion of women in the decision-making processes of mainstream development programs. In 1985 the New Yorkbased organization formally joined the UN family of agencies as UNIFEM. UNIFEM reports directly to the administrator of UNDP. It is overseen by a five-member Consultative Committee representing UN member states from the world’s five principal regional groups. The committee approves large projects and advises on the use of the fund’s resources. UNIFEM is administered by a director. In order to support efforts of the women of the developing world to achieve their objective for economic and social development and for equality, and by so doing to improve the quality of life for women and men alike, the fund supports microprograms run by women in developing countries. For example, UNIFEM estimates that although women grow, process, and market between 50% and 80% of the food consumed in developing countries, governments rarely record these inputs or support them with financial credit. UNIFEM’s programs include: training women in improved agricultural techniques; transfer of appropriate food technologies such as grinding mills, graters, oil presses, solar driers, and fish smokers; obtaining for women increased access to credit for seeds, fertilizers, and equipment; and support for microenterprises. UNIFEM works with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting African refugees. At any one time it manages a portfolio of approximately 150 projects and has supported over 750 projects in 100 developing countries. In 1991 UNIFEM collaborated on the publication of The World’s Women 1970–90: The Trends and Statistics. Coauthored by the UN Statistical Office, UNICEF, and UNFPA, this publication gathered statistics and interpreted trends on women, families, and households; women in public life and leadership; the status of education and training for women; health and childbearing; housing, human settlements, and the environment; and women’s work and the economy. In 2000, UNIFEM published a report tracking actions of the governments of the world in support of women’s rights entitled Progress of the World's Women in 2000. In 2001, UNIFEM contributed analysis to frameworks UN agencies will use in evaluating gender equality. A new edition of Progress of the World’s Women, entitled Progress 2002: Volume 2, was released in May 2003. Progress 2002 acknowledges the difficulty in analyzing international progress in the area of women’s rights, and discusses the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (set at the September 2000 Millennium Summit) in relation to gender equality. Financing is provided by the governments of both industrialized and developing countries, by nongovernmental organizations, foundations, corporations, private individuals, and from UNIFEM’s growing number of national committees.
S O C I A L A N D H U M A N I TA R I A N A S S I S TA N C E International disaster relief, the special problems of children, refugees, the elderly, youth, the disabled, and families are all subjects for which member states have directed the UN to provide international leadership and expert guidance. The global nature of trade in illicit narcotic drugs and the internationalization of criminal activities were social ills that became so destabilizing at the end of the twentieth century that member states requested their international organization to implement innovative global programs to maintain security and social justice.
I N T E R N AT I ON AL D I S A S T E R R E L I E F Background The international community is faced with the growing challenge of preventing, mitigating the effects of, and providing humanitarian assistance to affected populations in crises that require rapid and effective response. The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in “complex emergencies” that often involved ethnic and civil strife. In mid-1994 more than 30 million people in 29 countries were in dire need of emergency assistance. Severe drought threatening over 20 million people in sub-Saharan Africa added an additional element of suffering to that already faced by millions in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, southern Sudan, and Zaire. A study released at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, convened by the General Assembly in May 1994, showed that the previous three decades had seen a steady and rapid increase in the number of significant natural disasters—and in the numbers of people affected. Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) Beginning in 1965, proposals were put forward in the General Assembly to increase the UN’s ability to help people stricken by disasters, but it was the disasters of 1970 that brought international concern for emergency relief to a head. In 1971, the General Assembly established the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), with headquarters in Geneva. UNDRO was not designed to assume all the responsibilities of meeting disasters from its own resources. Its principal function is that of catalyst and coordinator of donors of aid and services. Its data bank and independent telecommunications system, supplemented by the worldwide UN system, give it the capacity to define the specific needs arising from a disaster and to respond rapidly by identifying potential sources of relief. It directs and mobilizes aid emanating from the UN system and coordinates aid from other sources. UNDRO’s mandate also includes assisting governments in preventing disasters or mitigating their effects by contingency planning, in association with similarly concerned voluntary organizations. It promotes the study, prevention, control, and prediction of natural disasters and gathers and disseminates information relevant to disaster relief. Between its inception in 1972 and 1987, UNDRO helped coordinate relief and raise money for emergency aid in more than 380 major disasters.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affaris (OCHA) In December 1991, the General Assembly, by its Resolution 46/ 182, recognized the need to strengthen coordination for rapid response to humanitarian emergencies. Over the years ad hoc arrangements had sprung up in many of the UN departments and specialized agencies to deal with emergency relief. Sometimes these arrangements were found to be working at cross-purposes or competing for financial support from the same potential donors. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to designate an emergency relief coordinator, supported by a secretariat, to ensure that the entire UN system was better prepared for, and more capable of rapid and coherent response to national disasters and other humanitarian emergencies. The resolution also stipulated guiding principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality for the provision of humanitarian assistance. It also stressed respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states. In April 1992, the Secretary-General established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), incorporating UNDRO, various UN units that had been dealing with specific emergency programs, and the secretariat for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. The Secretary-General appointed an Emergency Relief Coordinator to head the new department. The DHA has its headquarters in New York and an office in Geneva. Resolution 46/182 gave the DHA three tools to speed up the response of the international community to emergencies: the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to formulate and coordinate policy; the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) as a quick source of emergency funding; and the Consolidated InterAgency Appeals Process (CAP), which assesses the needs of a critical situations and prepares a comprehensive interagency response strategy. With UN reforms in the late 1990s, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was established to manage complex emergencies (through the Consolidated Appeals Process), natural disasters, and other humanitarian crises. OCHA replaced the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). For the biennium 2002–03, the New York and Geneva offices of OCHA were to be staffed by 60 regular budget posts and 87 extra-budgetary posts. In 2001, OCHA maintained 23 field offices in Africa, Asia and Europe as well as the offices of three regional disaster response advisors, three regional coordinators and the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), bringing its total number of field offices to 32. These offices are run by 151 international and 360 national staff. By comparison, in 1997 only 18 field offices were in existence. OCHA’s 2001 budget was approximately us$71.5 million. As the successor organization to DHA, OCHA took over management and coordination of DHA’s programs including IASC, CERF, and CAP. The IASC is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and is composed of the executive heads of the following UN organizations: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF); the World Food Program (WFP); the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food
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Social and Humanitarian Assistance and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO). Other humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) also take part in the IASC. Representatives of relevant nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are invited to participate. In addition to coordinating overall policy on humanitarian assistance, the IASC addresses issues such as: access to victims, security of personnel and relief supplies, ensuring humanitarian imperatives in conflict situations, examining special needs arising from application of UN sanctions, demobilization of combatants, de-mining, resource mobilization, assistance to internally displaced persons, field coordination of international humanitarian responses, and ensuring transition from relief to development. The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) of us$50 million was created under the terms of Resolution 46/182 as a cashflow mechanism for use by operational organizations, especially during the critical initial stages of emergencies. The CERF is financed by voluntary contributions and managed by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Agencies draw on the CERF and repay the advances they receive as donors respond to their own fundraising efforts. From its establishment in 1992 until 1998, the CERF was utilized on 51 occasions, providing operational humanitarian organizations with a total of about us$128 million. The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), coordinated and monitored by OCHA, is an interagency exercise by which UN system organizations and other humanitarian organizations assess the full range of requirements for responding to emergencies. The CAP helps the international community to identify the most critical needs of affected people and to determine the most appropriate ways to provide assistance. This process enables donors and agencies to concentrate their efforts where they are needed most and eliminates wasteful competition among agencies for donor funds. From 1995 through 2002, appeals were launched for countries including Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Kenya, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Occupied Palestinian territory, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. Appeals are often made by region as well—including for the Caucasus, Great Lakes Region of Africa, and Southeastern Europe (including the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia). OCHA’s work takes place where the fields of international security, political affairs, and humanitarian concerns converge. An important responsibility entrusted to OCHA involves humanitarian diplomacy in efforts to prevent emergencies and in negotiation with parties to conflicts aimed at ensuring access to those in need. OCHA’s staff is involved in policy planning and early warning functions, emergency operational support and relief coordination, and disaster mitigation. The OCHA maintains close contact with the UN Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations in order to coordinate the security, political, and humanitarian aspects of complex emergencies. New Initiatives To help manage its efforts, OCHA set up Relief Web, available at http://www.reliefweb.int. The Internet site provides up-to-date information on complex emergencies and natural disasters collected from over 170 sources. Users from over 150 countries access an average of 200,000 documents each month. In addition, OCHA runs the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS), which identifies crises with humanitarian implications. Through
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analysis of field-based information and the evaluation of trends, HEWS informs decision-makers at headquarters about the likelihood and extent of crises. An extensive database of information for more than 100 countries supports this activity. The Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), at Nairobi, was set up in 1995 to analyze and synthesize data on developments in Africa’s Great Lakes region. It issues daily reports and thematic studies for over 2,000 primary subscribers in more than 50 countries. IRIN at Abidjan was set up in 1997 and began providing similar reports covering West Africa. IRIN coverage was expected to be expanded in the late 1990s to cover southern Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus region, as well as the Balkans. International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction Between 1960 and 1990 deaths from natural disasters rose by a factor of 10, with 90% of casualties occurring in developing countries ill prepared to respond to natural disasters. Although the World Meteorological Organization has shown that each dollar spent on disaster preparedness is equivalent to 100 dollars spent after a disaster, no mechanisms existed to transfer the huge body of knowledge on disaster preparedness and prevention from the industrialized countries to developing countries. For example, an earthquake of 6.6 magnitude on the Richter scale in California in January 1994 caused fewer than 100 deaths. An earthquake of 6.4 magnitude in India’s Maharashtra State in September 1993 caused 10,000 deaths. Most of the deaths in the Indian tragedy were caused by the collapse of homes while people slept. By contrast, California has long been a proving ground for earthquakeresistant architectural innovations. In 1989, the General Assembly declared the 1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction to reduce loss of life and property damage resulting from natural disasters. It established a high-level council of 10 internationally renowned personalities, a scientific and technical committee of 24 scientists from around the world, and approximately 120 national committees to promote the decade and the formulation of disaster preparedness programs. 13 October was declared “International Day for Natural Disaster Reduction,” and observed by public gatherings and publicity to raise awareness of the need to implement disaster preparedness. In May 1994, the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was convened in Yokohama, Japan. Representatives from 147 countries and 37 nongovernmental organizations and observers from UN specialized agencies participated in the conference, which both reviewed implementation of the General Assembly’s recommendations during the first half of the decade and adopted the “Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation,” also called the “Yokohama Strategy.” It noted that the first half of the decade had seen some improvement in the field of disaster response, but that the goals for disaster prevention and preparedness had not received wide publicity. The conference document stated that, while natural phenomena that cause disasters are outside human control, vulnerability of populations was a result of human activity (or nonactivity). In its “Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond,” the conference called for a global culture of prevention and a policy of self-reliance in each vulnerable country and community. Other elements of the strategy included education and training in disaster prevention, strengthening research and development for disaster reduction and mitigation, and improving awareness in vulnerable communities through more active use of media. Finally the conference called on all countries to express the political commitment to reduce their vulnerability by means of legislation and policy decisions at the highest levels to mobilize domestic resources, develop risk assessment programs, and emergency plans and to design projects for subregional, regional, and inter-
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national cooperation. It also recommended an improvement in communications capabilities on natural disasters among countries for preparedness and early warning systems. Man-made Humanitarian Disasters Perhaps the thorniest problem for OCHA (then the DHA) was the increase in and complexity of humanitarian disasters caused by internal civil strife in places like Angola, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. In the largest exodus ever known, 2 million people in Rwanda abandoned their homes in one week during the resumption of a civil war and the organized slaughter of thousands of civilians in that country in the summer of 1994. The exodus overwhelmed the capacity of international aid organizations to deal with the crisis, and thousands of people died of cholera, dysentery, and other diseases in makeshift camps hurriedly set up along Rwanda’s border with other countries. In August 1994, the UN agencies appealed to member states for us$470 million to respond to the disaster. The initial response to the appeal yielded us$137 million. In his report to the 49th General Assembly on “Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance” (A/49/177), the Secretary-General stated: “Complex emergencies are presenting serious new challenges to humanitarian organizations and others involved in providing relief assistance. Disregard for fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of humanitarian law and threats to the safety and protection of relief personnel have underscored the need for enhancing awareness of all involved in complex emergencies— including the Security Council—of humanitarian concerns and objectives and for appropriate measures to protect humanitarian mandates in conflict situations. While the new generation of multifaceted United Nations operations require close interaction between the political, military and humanitarian dimensions, it is important, at the same time, to ensure that the humanitarian component can preserve its unique identity by maintaining neutrality and impartiality.” (emphasis added). In this connection, the IASC established a set of guidelines for humanitarian missions in conflict situations: (a) The need for humanitarian relief assistance to be undertaken in accordance with the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and humanity; (b) Reaffirmation of free, safe, and unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance and the role of humanitarian diplomacy in that regard; (c) The need for greater collaboration with nongovernmental organizations engaged in humanitarian relief; (d) The need to ensure security and protection of all relief personnel; (e) The need to apprise the Security Council fully on relevant humanitarian issues that should be appropriately reflected in its decisions on complex emergencies; (f) The importance of shielding humanitarian assistance against the effects of sanctions, particularly in relation to vulnerable groups. United Nations Sahelian Office (UNSO) Another UN undertaking in disaster relief developed in response to the desiccation of the Sudano-Sahelian zone of West Africa. Many years of drought in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal had, by 1973, resulted in a crisis and the threat of mass starvation in the region. In May, the SecretaryGeneral, acting under resolutions of the General Assembly and
the Economic and Social Council, designated FAO as the “focal point” of an emergency operation of the UN system to provide and transport rations, seeds for sowing, animal feed, and vaccines to victims in the six countries. The following month, the UN Sahelian Office (UNSO) was created to promote medium- and long-term recovery in cooperation with the Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel, known by its French acronym CILSS and composed of nine affected states—Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. In 1977, UNSO’s mandate was expanded to assist the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in implementing the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification in the Sudano-Sahelian Region. From 1995 to 2002, UNSO managed US$18 million to support 29 countries in Africa, 22 in Asia and 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean to develop national action plans to combat desertification and drought. UNSO mobilizes general and earmarked contributions to promote sustainable management of the natural resources in arid and semi-arid lands. It helps governments plan and coordinate natural resource management and implement field projects on soil and water conservation and integrated land management.
U N C H I L D R E N ’ S F U N D ( U N IC E F ) The UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) was established by the General Assembly on 11 December 1946 to provide emergency relief assistance in the form of food, medicine, and clothing to the children of postwar Europe and China. In December 1950, the General Assembly extended the life of the fund for three years, changing its mandate to emphasize health and nutrition programs of long-range benefit to children of developing countries. In October 1953, the General Assembly decided that UNICEF should continue its work as a permanent arm of the UN system, and charged the organization to emphasize programs giving long-term benefit to children everywhere, particularly those in developing countries who are in the greatest need. The organization’s name was changed to the UN Children’s Fund, but the acronym “UNICEF” was retained. The UNICEF Executive Board reaffirmed its mandate in January 1996, when it adopted a statement on the mission of UNICEF saying that UNICEF “is guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and strives to establish children’s rights as enduring ethical principles and international standards of behaviour towards children.” In 1959 the General Assembly unanimously adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, affirming the right of children to special protection and opportunities and facilities for healthy, normal development. Following a global study of the needs of children in 1961, UNICEF increased the scope and flexibility of its approach to children to include projects that promote the role of children as an invaluable “human resource” in national development, thus making it possible to provide aid for education. UNICEF was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1965. In November 1989, the General Assembly voted to transform the rights and obligations under the 1959 Declaration into the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the most comprehensive treaty ever to address the individual rights of children and set universally accepted standards for their children. The convention entered into force as international law in September 1990. In 2002, UNICEF reported that the convention had been ratified by every country in the world except two (the United States and Somalia), and “therefore uniquely places children center-stage in the quest for the universal application of human rights.” As the only United Nations agency devoted exclusively to the needs of children, UNICEF promotes the full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by 1995. UNICEF also participated in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna
Social and Humanitarian Assistance in June 1993, speaking out forcefully on behalf of children and against violation of their rights. UNICEF also participated in the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, Egypt, in September 1994; the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, Denmark, in March 1995; the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China, in Septemer 1995; the Habitat II World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities in Istanbul, Turkey, in June 1996; and the World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Stockholm, Sweden, in August 1996, strongly promoting measures for child survival, protection, and development. UNICEF was one of the host organizations and core participants of Beijing+5, the first follow-up meeting to the watershed Fourth World Conference on Women (1995). Convened in June 2000 in New York City, Beijing+5 (also called Women 2000) was set up to review progress and establish action plans for
