Transnational Activism in Asia: Problems of Power and Democracy (Transnationalism, 13)

Transnational Activism in Asia

In an era of intensified globalization, social and political activists operate increasingly beyond and across state borders. This book provides new perspectives on transnational activism with a specific regional focus on Asia. This book connects the literature on social movements and NGOs operating in a transnational context. It contributes to the establishment of transnational activism as a multidisciplinary field of research and suggests new ways of analysing problems of power and democracy. Chapters include thoroughly grounded empirical case studies from countries like China, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, covering a wide variety of issue areas such as the environment, AIDS and human rights. The innovative theoretical chapters explore concepts like state power, discursive power, governance regimes and world citizenship. Transnational Activism in Asia should be of interest to not only scholars and activists specializing in transnational activisms, but also general students of globalization and transnational relations, civil society, social movements, NGOs, democratization and Asian politics. Nicola Piper is Research Fellow at the Australian National University in Canberra. Anders Uhlin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Södertörn University College, Stockholm.

Routledge Studies in Transnationalism Series editor: Steven Vertovec University of Oxford

‘Transnationalism’ broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states. Today myriad systems of relationship, exchange and mobility function intensively and in real time while being spread across the world. New technologies, especially involving telecommunications, serve to connect such networks. Despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent), many forms of association have been globally intensified and now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common arena of activity. In some instances transnational forms and processes serve to speed up or exacerbate historical patterns of activity, in others they represent arguably new forms of human interaction. Transnational practices and their consequent configurations of power are shaping the world of the twenty-first century. This book forms part of a series of volumes concerned with describing and analysing a range of phenomena surrounding this field. Serving to ground theory and research on ‘globalization’, the Routledge book series on ‘Transnationalism’ offers the latest empirical studies and ground-breaking theoretical works on contemporary socio-economic, political and cultural processes which span international boundaries. Contributions to the series are drawn from Sociology, Economics, Anthropology, Politics, Geography, International Relations, Business Studies and Cultural Studies. The series is associated with the Transnational Communities Research Programme of the Economic and Social Research Council (see http://www.transcomm. ox.ac.uk). The series consists of two strands: Transnationalism aims to address the needs of students and teachers and these titles will be published in hardback and paperback. Titles include: Culture and Politics in the Information Age A new politics? Edited by Frank Webster

Transnational Democracy Political spaces and border crossings Edited by James Anderson Routledge Research in Transnationalism is a forum for innovative new research intended for a high-level specialist readership, and the titles will be available in hardback only. Titles include: 1 New Transnational Social Spaces International migration and transnational companies in the early 21st century Edited by Ludger Pries 2 Transnational Muslim Politics* Reimagining the Umma Peter G. Mandaville 3 New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home Edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser 4 Work and Migration Life and livelihoods in a globalizing world Edited by Ninna Nyberg Sorensen and Karen Fog Olwig 5 Communities Across Borders New immigrants and transnational cultures Edited by Paul Kennedy and Victor Roudometof 6 Transnational Spaces Edited by Peter Jackson, Phil Crang and Claire Dwyer 7 The Media of Diaspora Edited by Karim H. Karim 8 Transnational Politics Turks and Kurds in Germany Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 9 Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora Edited by Bhikhu Parekh, Gurharpal Singh and Steven Vertovec 10 International Migration and Globalization Edited by Rey Koslowski *Also available in paperback

11 Gender in Transnationalism Home, longing and belonging among Moroccan migrant women Ruba Salih 12 Transnational Communities in the Asia-Pacific Edited by Brenda Yeoh, Katie Willis and S. M. A. K. Fakhri 13 Transnational Activism in Asia Problems of power and democracy Edited by Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin 14 Diaspora, Identity and Religion Edited by Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Toloyan and Carolin Alfonso 15 Cross-Border Governance in the European Union Edited by Olivier Kramsch and Barbara Hooper

Transnational Activism in Asia Problems of power and democracy

Edited by Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin

First published 2004 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2004 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Transnational activism in Asia: problems of power and democracy / edited by Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Social movements–International cooperation. 2. Protest movements–International cooperation. 3. Social movements–Asia. 4. Anti-globalization movement–Asia. 5. Non-governmental organizations–Asia. 6. Asia–Politics and government. 7. Asia–Foreign relations. I. Piper, Nicola. II. Uhlin, Anders. HM881.T73 2003 303.48⬘4⬘095–dc21 ISBN 0-203-56324-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-34494-4 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-31513-1 (Print Edition)

2003005207

Contents

List of contributors Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1

New perspectives on transnational activism

ix xiii xv 1

NICOLA PIPER AND ANDERS UHLIN

2

State power and transnational activism

26

JEAN GRUGEL

3

Governance regimes and the politics of discursive representation

43

MARGARET E. KECK

4

Transnational activism, institutions and global democratization

61

JACKIE SMITH

5

World citizenship and transnational activism

78

BAOGANG HE

6

Transnational activism and electronic communication: cyber-rainbow warriors in action

94

ON-KWOK LAI

7

Putting transnational activism in its place: HIV/AIDS in the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore growth triangle and beyond

109

JOHAN LINDQUIST

8

Transnational activism by Malaysians: foci, tradeoffs and implications MEREDITH WEISS

129

viii

Contents

9 Transnational activism and the pursuit of democratization in Indonesia: national, regional and global networks

149

ALEKSIUS JEMADU

10 ‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents: transnational activism as a critique

168

SHU-FEN LIN

Index

189

Contributors

Jean Grugel is Professor in the Department of Politics, University of Sheffield. She has published widely on democratization as well as on Latin American politics and international relations. Her books include Democratization: A Critical Introduction (2002), Democracy without Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies (1999) and Regionalism Across the North–South Divide: State Strategies and Globalization (1999, edited with W. Hout). She is presently working on two projects, namely citizenship and new regionalism and children in global politics. Baogang He (BA, Hangzhou University, 1981; MA, People’s University of China, Beijing, 1986; Ph.D., ANU, Australia, 1993) is currently Senior Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore; and Reader at the School of Government, the University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia. Dr He is the author of The Democratization of China (1996, 1998, 2000), The Democratic Implication of Civil Society in China (1997), Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China (2000, with Yingjie Guo), Between Democracy and Authority: An Empirical Study of Village Elections in Zhejiang (2002, with Lang Youxing). He has also published 15 book chapters and more than 26 refereed journal articles. Aleksius Jemadu is a Lecturer of International Relations at the Department of International Relations of Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, Indonesia. He got his Ph.D. in social sciences from Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, in 1996. His field of interests include international political economy, democratization in developing countries and international politics in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently he is Director of the Parahyangan Centre for International Studies (PACIS), Bandung, Indonesia. Margaret E. Keck is Professor of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD. She previously taught at Yale University (1986–95). She has a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. She is the author of The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil (1992), winner of the Best Book award from the New England Council on Latin American Studies, and author of articles on environment, labour, and politics in Brazil. Since 1990 her research has focused on environmental politics, also mainly in Brazil. She and Kathryn Sikkink of the University of Minnesota co-authored Activists Beyond Borders:

x Contributors Advocacy Networks in International Politics, published by Cornell University Press in 1998, which won the 1999 Chadwick Alger Award for the best book on International Organizations from the International Studies Association, and the 2000 Grawemeyer Prize for ideas contributing to world order. Currently she is completing a book, tentatively called Politicizing the Environment, co-authored with Kathryn Hochstetler, and articles on human rights, on state–society networks, and on governance regimes. In 2000 she initiated the Watermark Project, a multiyear, interdisciplinary study of the creation of decentralized river-basin management institutions in Brazil, which currently involves a network of around 35 Brazilian and foreign scholars and practitioners. On-Kwok Lai is Professor in the School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan. He is Honorary Professor in Social Work and Social Administration and Honorary Research Fellow of the Centre of Urban Planning and Environmental Management, both at the University of Hong Kong. He gained his Dr.rer.pol. from the University of Bremen, with DAAD Fellowship. He has taught and/or researched at the University of Bielefeld, the University of Hong Kong, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the University of Waikato, New Zealand. His research interests are on socio-political comparative studies of environmental, social and urban issues. More specifically, his recent research has focused on ecological modernization, the socio-political impact of ICT, and the transformation of health and welfare systems. Shu-fen Lin received her Ph.D. at the University of Essex, where she wrote her dissertation on the political transformation in Taiwan since the mid-1980s. She is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Soochow University, Taiwan. Her current research includes democratic theory, poststructuralist discourse theory and feminism. Johan Lindquist defended his Ph.D. dissertation, The Anxieties of Mobility: Development, Migration, and Tourism in the Indonesian Borderlands, at the Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, in January 2002. The dissertation dealt with the Indonesian island of Batam, which, together with Singapore and the Malaysian province of Johor, forms part of a quasi-official transnational growth triangle. Johan is currently a post-doctoral fellow under the auspices of the newly formed Swedish School of Advanced Asia Pacific Studies (SSAAPS). Recent publications include, ‘Batam: Recreating the Kampung that Never Was’ (Latitudes, 2001, vol. 2) and ‘Modern Spaces, Wild Places, and International Hinterlands: The Cultural Economy of Decoupling and Misrecognition’ (Anthropology Today, 2000, vol. 16, no. 3). Nicola Piper is Research Fellow at the Australian National University in Canberra. She holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Sheffield in the UK. Her research has revolved around various aspects of international labour migration. She is the author of the book Racism, Nationalism and Citizenship (1998), the co-editor of the volumes Women and Work in Globalising Asia (2002), and Wife or Worker? Asian Marriage and Migration (2003) as well as various journal articles. Her current

Contributors xi project focuses on the intersection of international law (human rights and labour rights) and activism from the perspective of foreign migrant workers. Jackie Smith is Associate Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. She is co-editor of Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements (2002) and of Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (1997) as well as the author of numerous articles on social movements and globalization. Her current research focuses on transnational social movements against global trade liberalization. Anders Uhlin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Södertörn University College, Stockholm. His current research focuses on transnational activism, civil society and problems of democratization. He is the author of a number of recent articles and chapters on transnational civil society in Southeast Asia and the book Indonesia and the ‘Third Wave’ of Democratization (1997). Meredith Weiss is Assistant Professor of International Studies at DePaul University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University. She is the co-editor (with Saliha Hassan) of the volume, Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGOs (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) and has also written on NGOs and social protest in Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysian electoral politics, and the changing nature of ethnicity and communalism in Malaysia.

Acknowledgements

We owe a huge debt of gratitude to a number of institutions or organizations and individuals who have all contributed to this volume. This project was conceived during a visit to Södertörns högskola – Anders Uhlin’s ‘home’ institution – by Nicola Piper in 2001 when she was still at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen. We would like to thank the Department of Political Science at Södertörn for having made this visit possible. The starting point of this project was the organization of a workshop in Stockholm which took place between 13 and 15 September 2001. We are extremely grateful for having received generous funding from three Swedish funding agencies without which the workshop would have never happened: the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the Swedish Research Council, and the Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education. The workshop was overshadowed by the 11 September events in 2001. As a result, the three participants from the US could not attend, but they have nonetheless maintained a keen interest in this book project and kept in touch with us throughout the publication process, for which we would like to thank them. Routledge’s three anonymous reviewers of our book proposal provided us with very constructive and encouraging comments and suggestions. We also acknowledge the input of our colleagues who took the time to read some chapters and make constructive comments. In particular we are indebted to Professor Clifford Shearing (RegNet, ANU) and Dr Joerg Wischermann (Free University, Berlin). Routledge’s Politics and International Studies Editor, Heidi Bagtazo, and Editorial Assistant, Grace McInnes, have been very professional and efficient in guiding us through the publication process. Patrick Booz did a great job in improving the language of the chapters written by non-native English speakers. Last, but not least, an anthology cannot be produced without willing contributors and we thank all of the individual authors for submitting their chapters on time, responding to the editors’ comments so promptly, and for their good nature during the editing process. We are very grateful for the original and high-quality research they have contributed to this volume. Finally, we thank all those activists interviewed for many of the chapters in this book; thank you all for your time and your kindness in sharing your experience with us.

xiv Acknowledgements The successful completion of a co-edited book also depends on a good working relationship between the editors. The experience with this book has been particularly rewarding, where both editors learnt a lot from each other’s previous expertise, and an equally high level of enthusiasm and commitment ensured a swift progress at all times. At the very final stage of completion of this manuscript Anders had more important things to care about. He has become the father of Alva. Anders would like to express his sincere gratitude to Ameli for her love and support and for putting up with her husband’s busy schedule despite having a packed life herself. From now on Alva will decide their schedule and that will be wonderful. Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin Canberra and Stockholm

Abbreviations

ABIM ADB AFA AHRC AI AIDS AJI Aliran ALTSEAN AMN ANDI ANFREL ANGOC APCASO APCET II APEC APN+ APPEN ASEAN AsiaDHRRA AusAID BIDA BN BULOG CAP CENPEACE CHRA CNB DPP DPR

Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) Asian Development Bank Action for AIDS Asian Human Rights Commission Amnesty International Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Alliance of Independent Journalists Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National Consciousness Movement) Alternative Southeast Asian Network for Burma Asian Monitoring Network Asian Network for Democracy in Indonesia Asian Network for Free Elections Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Asia-Pacific Council of AIDS Service Organizations Second Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Asia-Pacific Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS Asia-Pacific People’s Environment Network Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas Australian Agency for International Development Batam Industrial Development Authority Barisan Nasional (National Front) State Logistics Body Consumers’ Association of Penang Centre for Peace Initiatives Chinese Human Rights Association Central Narcotics Bureau Democratic Progressive Party People’s House of Representatives

xvi

Abbreviations

ELSAM EU EZLN FHI GAM HIV ICAAP ICG ICJ ICT ICW IFES IGO IIRR IMF InDHRRA INFID INGO IPE IR IRI ISAI IT JUST K3S KKN KMT KPU LSM MAF MERCY Malaysia MKS MPR NDI NGO OECD ORNOP PACIS PACT PATH

Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy European Union Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army) Family Health International Free Aceh Movement Human Immunodeficiency Virus International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific International Crisis Group International Commission of Jurists information and communication technology Indonesian Corruption Watch International Foundation for Election Systems intergovernmental organization International Institute for Rural Reconstruction International Monetary Fund Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas International NGO Forum on Indonesia international non-governmental organization international political economy international relations International Republican Institute Institute for Studies on Free Flow of Information information technology International Movement for a Just World Ketua Koordinasi Kesejahteran Sosial (Coordinator for Social Welfare) corruption, collusion and nepotism Kuomintang National Election Committee Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Self-Supporting People’s Organization (NGO)) Malaysian Action Front Malaysian Medical Relief Society Misi Keamanan Sejagat (Global Peace Mission) People’s Consultative Assembly National Democratic Institute non-governmental organization Organization for Economic Development Organisasi Non-Pemerintah (non-governmental organization) Parahyangan Centre for International Studies People Acting Together Programme for Appropriate Technology in Health

Abbreviations PBHI POS SAM SEAPA Sijori SMO Suaram TAN THRA TNC TRC TSM TSMO TWN UN UNAIDS UNCTAD UNHCR UNRISD USAID WALHI WHO WHO/GPA WTO YAPPIKA YLBHI YMK

xvii

Indonesian Association of Legal Aid political opportunity structure Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth Malaysia) Southeast Asian Press Alliance Singapore, Johor, Riau Social Movement Organization Suara Rakyat Malaysia (Voice of the Malaysian People) transnational advocacy network Taiwan Human Rights Association transnational corporation Truth and Reconciliation Commission transnational social movement transnational social movement organization Third World Network United Nations Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations Research Institute for Social Development United States Agency for International Development Indonesian Environmental Forum World Health Organization WHO Global Programme on AIDS World Trade Organization Indonesian Foundation to Strengthen Civil Society’s Participation, Partnerships and Initiatives Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation Yayasan Mitra Kesehatan

1

New perspectives on transnational activism Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin

Introduction This book attempts to contribute to the growing literature on social movements and other civil society groups operating across state borders. Building on recent research in this field, our aim is to fill a significant gap by contextualizing transnational activism within broader power structures between state and civil society organizations as well as between non-state organizations, and by providing an analysis of how this is related to problems of democracy. By including a balanced selection of theoretical chapters as well as theoretically informed empirical case studies based on recent data, this book provides new insights into the problematic of political activism in a transnational context. The specific regional focus in the case studies is East and Southeast Asia, which constitutes an understudied geographical area in the transnational social movement/civil society literature (as opposed to Europe, North America and Latin America). The chapters in this volume address various questions: What kind of actors are involved in transnational activism? What types of activism do they employ? Whom do the networks/activists target? What kinds of obstacles and/or opportunities do state power and other power structures constitute for transnational activism? How can we understand the power of transnational activist networks in terms of discursive or communicative power? To what extent is democratization an enabling condition and/or a consequence of transnational activism? How can we differentiate between different levels and aspects of democracy in this respect? To what extent can transnational activism promote transnational democracy? What about internal democracy and problems of inequality within transnational activist networks? We start this introductory chapter by providing a brief overview of the existing literature and then move on to elaborate the concept of ‘activism’ in a transnational context. We define our understanding of the ‘transnational’ in its multiple forms and argue in favour of using the concept of ‘transnational’ instead of ‘global’. We also clarify the different types of actors involved in transnational activism. Drawing on the chapters in the present book and previous research, we offer an elaboration of what a power perspective and a focus on problems of democracy can contribute to our understanding of transnational activism. Finally, we contextualize the conceptual discussion with the situation in East and Southeast Asia.

2 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin

Recent approaches to the study of transnational activism The emerging research area of transnational activism has generated important studies within several different scholarly disciplines. First, International Relations (IR) scholars, opposing the state-centred paradigm of an anarchical international political system, have analysed non-state actors in international politics. RisseKappen (1995), drawing on Keohane and Nye’s writings in the 1970s, has helped to reintroduce this perspective. Other scholars following this tradition have made use of social movement theory and focused explicitly on transnational activism. Keck and Sikkink (1998) provided a path-breaking study in this respect, which was followed by others (e.g. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Scholte 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002b). Second, studies of transnational activism from an International Political Economy (IPE) perspective have stressed issues of power and authority in the international system (Higgott et al. 2000) and tend to treat transnational activism mainly as resistance to neo-liberal globalization (Mittelman 1999; Gills 2000). Third, writing from a different perspective, sociologists and political scientists interested in social movements have analysed the extension of social movements to a transnational or global level (Markoff 1996; Smith et al. 1997; Smith and Johnston 2002: Rucht 1999; Rucht 2001; Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 2002; Tarrow 1998; 2001; 2002; della Porta et al. 1999; Cohen and Rai 2000; Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000b; Hamel et al. 2001). Fourth, within the fields of politics and development studies there are also a number of studies on transnational nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities, which seldom draw explicitly on the social movement literature (e.g. Princen and Finger 1994; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999; Jordan and van Tuijl 2000; Uvin 2000).1 This category of research is based mainly on empirical case studies of NGOs operating within different issue areas. This is also the character of recent publications on transnational or global civil society (Florini 2000b; Warkentin 2001) and ‘global citizen action’ (Edwards and Gaventa 2001). Parts of the ‘Global Civil Society Yearbook’ (Anheier et al. 2001) also have this empirical aim to map ‘global civil society’ activities. Fifth, several anthropological micro-studies of transnational activism offer interesting and viable insights from the grass-roots level (Braman and Sreberny-Mohammadi 1996; Smith and Guranizo 1998; Riles 2000; Fortun 2001; Burawoy et al. 2000). Sixth, within the field of political theory, there have been a number of attempts to theorize the empirical patterns uncovered in other studies in a more elaborate way. Theories of transnational/global/international civil society have been put forward in both liberal (Kaldor 1999) and neo-Marxist (Colás 2002) versions. This area of inquiry is also related to the notion of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Held 1995) and transnational/global citizenship (Delanty 2000). Seventh, there is research on transnational activism from the perspective of international law (Cullen and Morrow 2001). Finally, there are texts written from an explicit activist perspective and meant as a contribution to the self-understanding of the emerging global social movement against ‘globalization from above’ (Brecher, Costello and Smith 2002). While there is certainly some overlapping between these categories of research on transnational activism, and fruitful cross-fertilization has taken place (particularly

New perspectives on transnational activism 3 between IR studies of non-state actors and social movement theory), we argue that transnational activism has yet to emerge as a coherent multidisciplinary field of research. An overall aim of this volume is to make a modest contribution to the integration of these diverse perspectives. Furthermore, while breaking new ground in this emerging field of research, none of these existing studies offer a clear and coherent contextualization of transnational activism within broader structures of power or the micro-politics of communicative power. By underestimating the continued significance of state power and other national and international power structures, much research has been too optimistic about what transnational activists can achieve. In addition, many studies tend to depict the ‘state-versus-civil society’ dynamics in a dichotomous, oppositional manner, whereas our view is complementary. We would argue for a ‘synergy’ between state and civil society (along with Grugel and Keck, this volume). Also lacking in previous research is an elaborate analysis of problems of democracy, both in relation to political opportunities for transnational activism and activists being part of a broader struggle for democracy, as well as problems of democracy and inequality within transnational networks and prospects for some form of transnational democracy. The best way to further the research field of transnational activism, we argue, is therefore to offer a more comprehensive analysis of transnational activism in the context of power and in relation to problems of democracy. First of all, however, we have to define the concept of ‘transnational activism’ – we feel this offers the best point of departure for research on social movements, NGOs and other civil society actors operating across state borders.

Transnational activism: identifying actors and defining the topic Processes of globalization do not only involve purely economic aspects and elite politics. Cross-border interaction between civil society actors – ‘globalization from below’ (Falk 1999; Appadurai 2000) – is another feature of contemporary world politics to receive increasing attention by the media and academics. When NGOs and social movements not only focus on the domestic or local arena but also act beyond state borders, transnational activist networks emerge. Transnational political activism challenges conventional understandings of civil society and social movements as well as international relations. Transnational activism as such is historically not a new phenomenon. Civil society actors concerned with a broad range of issues have been involved in activities reaching across state borders at least since the nineteenth century (Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, the patterns and scale of today’s transnational activism have changed. The ideological tendencies of contemporary transnational activist networks include radical anti-systemic left-wing movements, xenophobic and fascist movements on the extreme right, various religious activist networks, and more or less moderate issue-specific NGOs working partly within the limits of the existing system and often in close interaction and even cooperation with states and international institutions. Instead of dealing exclusively with one kind of transnational group (like transnational advocacy networks, transnational social movements, international

4 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin non-governmental organizations, etc.), as much of the previous research in this field has done, we focus on transnational activism, including many different types of actors. By ‘activism’ we mean political activities that are: (1) based on a conflict of interests and thus are of a contentious nature; (2) challenging or supporting certain power structures; (3) involving non-state actors; and (4) taking place (at least partly) outside formal political arenas. These criteria require some elaboration. We see a conflict of interests as a basic defining characteristic of activism. It is hard to imagine any form of activism without an underlying conflict. There would simply be no reason for activism if there were complete agreement between all actors involved. This, however, does not imply that there is always a conflict between activists and state actors. Many cases of transnational activism may involve cooperation between certain activists and certain state actors, but there is always a conflict with another actor, for instance a transnational corporation or another state authority. Concerning the second criterion, we maintain that activism is not only about challenging the status quo, as is sometimes assumed. Much activism has been carried out in support of ruling elites and structures of power that are perceived as being under threat from other activists. It is important to note that activism is concerned with power structures, which also implies a focus on public (as opposed to private) goals. Activity that only aims at promoting one’s own private interests is not activism (cf. Colás 2002: 66). On the third criterion we have to admit that what constitutes a non-state actor is not always obvious. Few (if any) NGOs can truthfully claim to be completely autonomous in relation to the state. Autonomy is a relative concept and hence we do not see non-state actors as completely free of state interference or control. The final criterion points to the significance of extraparliamentary political activities for the phenomenon of activism. This, however, is not to claim that all activism has this character. In fact, much political activism (on national as well as transnational levels) aims at targeting formal political institutions, and activists do enter formal political arenas, though they typically complement this with protest activities outside the sphere of formal politics. An advantage of this conceptualization of activism is that it covers many different activities carried out by NGOs as well as social movement actors. Tarrow (1998: 207–8) has pointed out that the form of activism has changed over time. Social movement organizations in North America and Western Europe generally declined in both number and militancy after the early 1970s. To a large extent they were replaced by public interest groups and parties with a movement vocation. During recent decades so-called ‘new social movements’ have emerged in most parts of the world. What is new about them, according to Tarrow, is neither their less formalized organization nor their focus on ‘identity politics’, nor the use of unconventional forms of action (they mainly use conventional petitions and peaceful demonstrations), but their greater access to the media, mobility and cultural interaction, as well as the increasing use of IT. The important point for this book, however, is that the term ‘activism’ covers the activities of all these different actors. By applying the concept of activism we hope to bridge the unfortunate divide between research on social movements and studies of NGOs. We hope the studies in this volume will demonstrate the many similarities between what is usually referred

New perspectives on transnational activism 5 to as transnational social movement organizations and transnationally active NGOs. Both types of actors are involved in transnational activism and the distinction between them is often blurred. Research on social movements and NGOs in a comprehensive, holistic manner could certainly enrich existing studies, which tend to treat the two forms of ‘collective’ activism as different phenomena. At the same time, we acknowledge the vast array of NGOs, realizing that many ‘development’oriented or service-providing NGOs might not be as politically active as, for example, NGOs focusing on human rights, women’s rights or the environment. The focus on activism also draws attention to the actual activists involved in the daily business of social movement organizations or NGOs. Activists are people who care enough about an issue to take action to achieve their goals despite the sometimes significant costs involved (material resources, time, personal risks). They have been described as the ‘political entrepreneurs’ who create transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 14). Comparatively little has been written about these individuals and their motivations. Meredith Weiss (in this volume) provides an intriguing account of Malaysian activists and their reasoning concerning tradeoffs between domestically oriented and transnational activism. This focus on people and their motivations is a useful contribution to the growing research on transnational activism. By ‘transnational’ we refer to interactions across state borders involving at least one non-state actor (Risse-Kappen 1995). In the literature, one often sees the concepts of ‘global civil society’ (e.g. Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001) and ‘global social movements’ (e.g. Cohen and Rai 2000). We prefer the term ‘transnational’, as many cross-border interactions do not extend across the world but are much more geographically limited (cf. Hannerz 1996: 6; Anderson 2002: 15–16). Influenced by discourses on globalization, many scholars have neglected the regional – not global – scope of much transnational activism. There has also been a conceptual confusion between the actors’ framing of an activity as global and the actual empirical scope of the activity (Tarrow 2001: 10). The term ‘transnational’ is broader and includes truly global interactions (involving several continents) as well as cross-border networks limited to one particular region of the world. Activism can be transnational in several respects. First, it may focus on transnational issues, related, for instance, to the environment or health problems. Second, the actors themselves may be transnational, either in the strong sense of having an organizational structure that is not territorially bounded and including citizens of more than one state (like transnational advocacy networks), or in the weaker sense of being concerned with issues in a country other than where the activists are citizens (such as solidarity groups supporting an independence movement in a foreign country). Third, transnational methods and strategies may be applied (e.g. emobilization and other net-based activities). Fourth, the targets of activism may be based in one or several countries other than where the activists themselves are located, thus requiring cross-border interaction. Finally, the activists may hold transnational world views and consider themselves as ‘global citizens’ (see He, this volume). We refer to activism as transnational when it has a transnational character in at least one of these respects. Most of the activism analysed in our case studies, however, is transnational in several (if not all) of the respects outlined above.

6 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin The intensity and velocity of transnational links among activists vary. It is possible to distinguish between groups with (1) no formal transnational ties; (2) diffuse transnational ties; (3) routine transnational ties; and (4) formal transnational organizations (Smith 2001: 7–8). Khagram et al. (2002a: 7–9) identify three forms of transnational collective action: a transnational advocacy network (which only exchanges information between participants), a transnational coalition (which applies coordinated tactics) and a transnational social movement (which is involved in joint mobilization). A transnational social movement (TSM) can be defined as ‘socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interaction with powerholders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor’ (Tarrow 2001: 11). International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) should not be confused with TSMs (although they might be part of a TSM). INGOs are involved in ‘routine transactions with states, private actors, and international institutions’ (Tarrow 2001: 12). The social movement concept has been used to cover ‘activities that would be more recognizable as lobbying, communication, and educational and service activity if they were observed at home’ (Tarrow 2001: 10). Hence, we should take care to differentiate between TSMs and NGOs operating in a transnational context. Both types of actors may be involved in transnational activism, but they typically use different forms of activism. The distinction, however, is not clear-cut and, as pointed out by O’Brien et al. (2000: 16), NGOs may be seen as key organizational nodes within global social movements. Such groups might be labelled transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) (Smith et al. 1997). Following Keck and Sikkink’s seminal work (1998), much attention has been paid to transnational advocacy networks (TANs), i.e. networks of activists motivated by principled ideas and values. Such networks are characterized by a shared belief that individuals can make a difference, make creative use of information and make sophisticated political strategies in campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). International and domestic NGOs are important actors in transnational advocacy networks, but they also include local social movements, foundations, media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals, parts of intergovernmental organizations, or parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9). The concept of networks used here is similar to Manuel Castells’ (1996) famous analysis of the ‘network society’. The network as a new social form is based on repetitive types of exchange – most notably of information – between actors who are not located in the same physical space. This network is the organizing form for these exchanges, and the economic, political or social relevance of particular actors depends upon their involvement in a powerful network.2 TANs are characterized by their advocacy work. Advocacy is commonly understood as an act to influence policy. Jordan and van Tuijl (2000: 2052) suggest a more specific definition of NGO advocacy as ‘an act of organizing the strategic use of information to democratise unequal power relations’. Though the focus on the strategic use of information is useful, this definition seems to overstate the unity in

New perspectives on transnational activism 7 goals and values of NGO activists. We maintain that not all NGOs involved in advocacy work aim at democratization. NGO advocacy may in fact cover the whole spectrum from democratic to anti-democratic goals and strategies and we should not presume a homogeneous pro-democratic NGO agenda. Neither should we – as Jordan and van Tuijl (2000: 2053) do – assume that NGOs challenge the status quo. In addition to advocacy, transnational activists may be involved in monitoring activities (common, for instance, in relation to human rights) and in providing services (Florini 2000a: 213). The roles of NGOs are highly contested. The World Bank and many governments promote the service delivery function of NGOs as part of a neo-liberal agenda for limiting the role of the state. By contrast, many NGOs prefer to be engaged in advocacy, often targeting the same governments and international institutions (Jordan and van Tuijl 2000: 2052). Our focus on activism leads us to emphasize advocacy and monitoring activities – not service delivery – although we acknowledge that some NGOs may simultaneously be engaged in advocacy and providing services. The protest repertoire of transnational activists includes education and mobilization and framing and symbolic mobilization, as well as disruption (Smith 2001: 11). The strategic use of information, in particular, seems to be central in transnational activism. The development of new communication and information technology has reshaped the ‘repertoire of contention’, adding activities like ‘emobilization’ and ‘cyber-activism’, as analysed by Lai (in this volume). Such new communication networks may be conceived as forming a ‘transnational public sphere’ (Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000b), which is related to a transnational (or global) civil society, a phenomenon that has received much attention during the last few years. This book is not primarily concerned with the issue of whether or not the transnational activists make up or inhabit a transnational civil society, but it may be useful briefly to discuss this concept and its use in studies of transnational activism. Transnational civil society is sometimes conceived as a political project, not a descriptive or analytical term. According to Kaldor (1999: 195), transnational civil society constitutes a ‘demand for a radical extension of democracy across national and social boundaries’. To be part of civil society implies a commitment to common human values and a global human rights culture (Kaldor 1999: 210). However, we find it problematic and misleading to define civil society as something inherently good. Following O’Brien et al. (2000: 15), we find it more appropriate to see it as ‘an arena for conflict that interacts with both the interstate system and the global economy’. A purely descriptive definition would be ‘the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities and economies’ (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001: 17). To what extent civil society is autonomous in relation to the state is a persistent debate in political theory, and the same questions can be raised concerning transnational civil society. We agree with Sharp et al. (2000: 10–11) that ‘there are no completely autonomous spaces from which, and within which, collective action takes place’. Hence, there cannot be any civil society (transnational or domestic)

8 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin that is completely autonomous from the influence of state power (cf. Grugel, this volume). The existence of a transnational (or global) civil society also raises the question of transnational (or global) citizenship (Delanty 2000; He, this volume). If citizenship is seen as rights and entitlements in relation to a state, the lack of a global government makes the concept ‘global citizenship’ impossible. However, if citizenship is understood as participation, something that is realized through responsible action, we can conceive of global citizenship (Gaventa 2001: 277–8). All this raises intriguing questions about power and democracy – questions that have not yet been adequately dealt with in the literature on transnational activism, but on which this book focuses.

Power and transnational activism Power, obviously, is a multidimensional and highly complex concept. Following Lukes (1986), it has become common to distinguish between (1) conventional approaches to power as domination and control, (2) power as ‘non-decision-making’ (Bachrach and Baratz) and (3) ideological hegemony and the power of ideas (Lukes). The latter is further elaborated by Foucauldian understandings of power, not as belonging to a particular actor but inherent in all social activity and the complex entanglements of power (Sharp et al. 2000). Following Sharp et al. (2000), we want to emphasize the dialectical nature of power not only as dominating, but also in its more positive form of enabling power, or ‘power to resist’, which is linked to ‘communicative’ or ‘discursive’ power exercised by transnational activist networks using information strategically in a persuasive manner. Hence we need to uncover the ‘myriad entanglements that are integral to the working of power’ (Sharp et al. 2000: 1) and acknowledge the ‘ubiquity and contradictoriness of power and resistance’ (Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000a: 17). And yet, as rightly remarked by Massey (2000: 280), recognizing that power is everywhere and paying attention to the ‘micro-politics’ of power should not make us ignore the ‘real’ structural inequalities of power. We contend that the issue of power has not been taken seriously enough in most research of transnational activism. The best way to fill this gap is to combine (1) a thorough investigation of how the structural power of the state system and the capitalist economy shape transnational activism and (2) a nuanced analysis of discursive power and the complex entanglements of power on a micro level. We shall here first briefly outline a conventional macro-level approach to power, highlighting both the structural power of states and global capitalism and the (potential and/or real) power of resistance held by transnational activists in this context. Our second major focus will be discursive or communicative power, highlighting not only macro aspects, but also (and particularly) the complex webs of power within transnational activist networks. Power as dominance and structural inequalities There is a need for a more comprehensive power perspective analysing how state power and international institutions condition transnational activism. It is our belief

New perspectives on transnational activism 9 that the power of the state has been underestimated in much research on transnational activism. This book examines how transnational activists are linked to states and international institutions, something that has not received sufficient attention in previous research (cf. Tarrow 2001). In the light of much of the globalization literature’s claim of the state’s loss of sovereignty, Jean Grugel (this volume) points to the need to take state power seriously by discussing structural state–civil society power relations. Furthermore, Lin’s case study (this volume) shows how specific power imbalances between states on the international arena condition transnational activism. The transnational endeavours of Taiwanese activists have been severely limited by Taiwan’s problematic diplomatic status. Activists from Taiwan have, for instance, been excluded from UN-related conferences because the Taiwanese state is not accepted as a member of the UN. The non-recognition of Taiwan as a state in the international system hampers the transnational activities of activists based in Taiwan (Chen Jie 2001). Although this is a unique case, it underlines the fact that the state not only shapes the forms of transnational activism, but also indicates that a diplomatically fully recognized sovereign state might be a precondition for many forms of transnational activism. We agree with the strand of globalization literature which has argued that processes of globalization have changed – but not necessarily weakened – state power (e.g. Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000). This relates to Colás’s observation that ‘the structures of the international system still oblige [social] movements to pursue their socio-political goals through the different organs of the sovereign state’ (Colás 2002: 79). It can, hence, be said that international social movements reinforce as much as they undermine state sovereignty (Colás 2002: 80). On the global level, this means that states still hold dominant power positions (O’Brien et al. 2000: 224), whereby transnational activists have not been able to significantly influence the policies of multilateral economic institutions. It is also of vital importance to acknowledge that ‘both the state and civil society exist and develop in the historical context of capitalism’ (Comor 2001: 400). Görg and Hirsch (1998: 586) have pointed to the contradiction between the state’s regulation of capitalist society and its democratic formation, whereby the ‘power’ of the state (which they define as its relative autonomous decision-making and implementation competencies) typically depends on specific class relations domestically and the international structure of the capitalist power bloc. Their relevant point here is that ‘this decisive contradiction does not emanate directly from the supposed opposition between the market and the state/democracy; instead, the market and the state/democracy are not only highly compatible with each other, but they also precondition each other’ (Görg and Hirsch 1998: 592–3). In the light of the above discussion, one might think that the tremendous power of state and capital would make transnational activism fruitless or even impossible. However, elements of structural power can also provide opportunities to resist. This is related to the concept of political opportunity structures, as elaborated by McAdam (1996) and Tarrow (1998).3 This concept is of a dialectical nature in that transnational activism, on the one hand, is shaped by political opportunity structures in the formal political sphere, but, on the other hand, transnational activists may also try to create new

10 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin political opportunity structures. Despite remaining scepticism, there is evidence that international institutions do provide clear political opportunity structures for transnational activism. As argued by Keck (this volume), the existence of transnational governance regimes provides political opportunities for states and societal actors alike. Actors relatively powerless within their society may be transnationally empowered when they are recognized as relevant actors within a governance regime. The more open a transnational governance regime – in the sense of being open to local knowledge – the easier it is for activists to gain influence (Keck, this volume). The extent to which transnational activism is influential, if not powerful, is related to the issue of place, as highlighted by Johan Lindquist (this volume). For instance, activist groups able to operate in Washington and Geneva obviously have better opportunities to influence the World Bank, IMF and WTO (O’Brien et al. 2000: 224). The relative distance from such power centres may, as pointed out by Smith (this volume), make Asian NGOs more dependent upon transnational networks in order to have a chance to influence global policies. UN conferences also constitute an important location for transnational activism (Meyer and Pruegl 1999), although the mega-conferences of the 1990s do not seem to have been repeated. Furthermore, many transnational activists have become increasingly sceptical towards the UN, following what is perceived as a neo-liberal shift within the organization (see Smith, this volume). Understanding the context of power relations external to transnational activist networks and the power of activists themselves, however, is not enough. We also need to analyse structures of power within the networks. Transnational activism, like all forms of human interaction, is structured along lines of ethnic, class and gender differences. Asymmetries and power inequality within transnational activist networks are not only based on North–South differences, although this is often a major division. The structure of international funding of civil society groups tends to strengthen existing resource inequality. This rather conventional view of power outlined above provides important insights into the functioning of transnational activism. In order to understand how the power of dominance and resistance operates in relation to transnational activist networks, this kind of contextualizing analysis is necessary. Past studies, however, have tended to create a binary of opposing forces: the rulers wielding dominating power versus the ruled resisting it (Sharp et al. 2000: 9). Micro-studies of power within transnational activist networks are showing more intricate ways in which power operates in and through activist networks and it is to such aspects of power we now turn. Discursive and communicative power From a conventional power perspective it is often concluded that the overall influence of transnational actors remains relatively weak (Khagram et al. 2002a: 11). Lacking conventional power capabilities like military force and economic resources (although some INGOs and NGOs are quite well funded), transnational activists

New perspectives on transnational activism 11 have to rely upon other forms of power. It has been argued that the greatest advantage of TANs compared to TNCs is that they need not compete with each other (Appadurai 2000: 17); however, this view totally neglects the issue of competition for funding and keeping up the general public’s interest. Social movement activists and transnational advocates are usually seen as having ‘soft power’ or ‘communicative power’ (Sikkink 2002: 303–6). Important here is the strategic use of information and its persuasiveness and the framing of issues by asserting moral pressure. Florini (2000a: 214) argues that the low level of power transnational networks do have can only be maintained as long as they retain their credibility. The concept of ‘soft power’, however, may be misleading concerning the form of power in transnational activism and may underestimate the real power of activist networks. More useful are some complex theories of social movements inspired by research on resistance within cultural studies (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000b). Here, power in and around movements is conceived in multiple and potentially contradictory formations. In this respect, it is useful to introduce discourse as an additional site of power. ‘A discourse is a shared set of assumptions and capabilities embedded in language that enables its adherents to assemble bits of sensory information that come their way into coherent wholes’ (Dryzek 1999: 34). According to Dryzek (1999: 35), it is possible to reflect and even reconstruct discourses, rather than simply reject them. If we see formal rules as ‘institutional hardware’, discourses can be described as ‘institutional software’. ‘Institutional hardware’ is not well developed in the international system, so ‘institutional software’ becomes more important and it might be less resistant to democratization than ‘institutional hardware’ (Dryzek 1999: 35). Hence, a discursive analysis highlights ‘the real power of transnational civil society, which is communicative power’ (Dryzek 1999: 45). This points to an ‘all-pervasive’ power perspective, as developed by Foucault, according to whom power is not only the preserve of the dominant, it is ‘insinuated throughout all social activity’ (Sharp et al. 2000: 11). The emphasis here is placed on discourse and the way in which subject matters can be created by human beings, helping them to establish ‘a framework with which to make sense of the world and their lives in it’ (Dryzek, 1999: 34). In this volume, the discourse analytical approach is primarily applied by Lin, but see also Lindquist and Keck. We argue along with Sharp et al. and Dryzek for the possibility of discourses having an empowering and resisting function. Using Beck’s notion of reflexive modernity, Dryzek conceives of certain discourses as being conducive to democracy. Furthermore, transnational activism can change the terms of discourse and the balance between competing discourses. A minimum of conventional political resources is needed (money, personnel, access to media, credibility), but most important is an awareness of the importance of the discursive realm (Dryzek 1999: 44–5). By gaining seats at institutions for global/transnational governance through ‘discursive representation’, activists are empowered and gain influence (Keck, this volume). This also is probably what Sikkink (2002: 302) has in mind when she claims that transnational activism contributes to the ‘restructuring of world politics’ by ‘altering the norm structure of global governance’.

12 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin What emerges, therefore, is a perspective on power as an entangled bundle of exchanges dispersed everywhere and which is not exclusively in the service of any particular people, institution or movement (Sharp et al. 2000: 20). Power can thus be positive and negative, repressive and progressive, constraining and facilitative (Sharp et al. 2000: 2). This, however, should not lead to an overly optimistic view of the progressive and transforming potential in transnational activism. Transnational civil society might be a realm of relatively unconstrained communication, but it is also hierarchical (Dryzek 1999: 46). There is nothing inherently emancipatory about communication and information. Studies of ‘global civil society’ have tended to simplify the process through which information becomes knowledge (Comor 2001). This focus on discursive or communicative power, according to our view, does not on its own provide a comprehensive understanding of the power context of transnational activism. It has to be combined with an analysis of more conventional material power structures, as outlined above. We should not forget that state power is highly significant in shaping discourses, as in the case of the global human rights discourse, in which, due to the power of Western states, ‘human rights are understood principally as liberal freedoms, not collective rights’ (Grugel, this volume, p. 31). Furthermore, market liberalism imposes both material and discursive constraints. An understanding of how material as well as discursive aspects of power constitute both constraints and opportunities for transnational activism is a necessary base for the analysis of another gap in previous research – how transnational activism is related to democracy.

Transnational activism and democracy The relationship between transnational activism and democracy has received surprisingly little attention. Transnational activism is often assumed to have a positive impact on democracy – in specific countries targeted by transnational activists, as well as on a global scale – related to the assumed emergence of a global civil society. There are, however, few systematic accounts of how this prodemocratic impact of transnational activism operates. In addition, there has been recent interest in democratic problems within transnational activist networks, but here too there is a relative lack of detailed studies. In order to contextualize transnational activism in relation to issues of democracy we first need to discuss what is actually meant by the term democracy. As most research on democratization uses a narrow definition of democracy, the main focus has been on the democratization of formal political institutions. If a broader definition of democracy is applied, informal political activism by civil society actors becomes important to study. Democratization can, for example, be seen as ‘the creation, extension and practice of social citizenship throughout a particular national territory’ (Grugel 1999: 11). The concept of citizenship implies a power struggle concerning who is entitled to take part in decision-making. The main advantage of this definition is that it introduces a power perspective and a focus on social relationships. According to this view, the existence of formally democratic institutions, while necessary, is not enough for democracy to exist. Democracy also

New perspectives on transnational activism 13 requires ‘popular consent, popular participation, accountability and a practice of rights, tolerance and pluralism’ (Grugel 1999: 11–12). Like narrower institutional conceptualizations of democracy, however, such a broader societal understanding of democracy has to be rethought in an era of increased global and transnational interaction. If we agree that developments within civil society are closely related to processes of democratization, a transnational understanding of civil society has important implications for theories of democratization too. This book investigates how processes of democratization are related to the increase in transnational civil society activism. Processes of democratization may provide new political opportunities for civil society in general, and transnational activism seems to be an increasingly significant aspect of national struggles for democracy. Furthermore, we analyse the implications of transnational activism for problems of democracy on local, national and transnational levels. A transnationalization of politics questions the assumed close connection between democracy and a sovereign nation-state and raises issues of citizenship and democracy on a transnational level – perhaps a model of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Held 1995). Finally, we pay attention to problems of democracy within transnational networks and discuss the issues of representativeness, accountability and political responsibility. The degree of democracy in a country influences the capacity of activists in that country to engage in transnational activism Within democratization studies it is typically acknowledged that the growth of a civil society is closely related to the process of democratization. Civil society groups are important actors in the struggle for democracy and when a transition to a formal democratic regime has taken place, there is generally more space for civil society activities. A more open institutionalized political system, less state repression and the possibility to form alliances with elite actors (cf. McAdam 1996) associated with a democratic system constitute political opportunities for civil society activism. We should expect such domestic political opportunities to enhance not only local or national, but also transnational activism. A process of democratization may also lead to an increased involvement in transnational activism because activists see domestic problems as less pressing than external problems. Following the transition to a formal democratic regime, the pro-democracy movement is typically demobilized and activists turn to other issues, often including foreign and/or transnational problems. Hence, it is not surprising that most transnational activists come from formally democratic countries (see Smith, this volume). Nevertheless, a more authoritarian political system may also stimulate transnational activism. When there is a relative lack of domestic political opportunities, activists try to take advantage of transnational political opportunities (Uhlin 2001), thus initiating what Keck and Sikkink (1998) called a ‘boomerang pattern’. A very closed and repressive authoritarian regime (like North Korea or Burma), however, gives little space for any form of civil society activism, be it local, national or transnational. A semi-authoritarian regime like Malaysia (as analysed by Weiss in this volume) seems to be linked to a relatively high degree of transnational activism.

14 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin The political system in Malaysia is sufficiently open to allow civil society groups to function (although more radical groups are subject to many forms of harassment and sometimes outright repression), but the Malaysian government is hardly responsive to demands from civil society and this has led many Malaysian activists to seek allies abroad. The specific combination of authoritarian and democratic structures and practices in Malaysia seems to go a long way in explaining the relatively high number of transnational endeavours among Malaysian activists. A comparatively high level of economic development and education and access to modern information technology, of course, also help Malaysians getting involved in transnational activism. Semi-democratic Malaysia notwithstanding, it is the capital cities of the formally more democratic countries of Southeast Asia that Lindquist (this volume) identifies as ‘nodes of transnational activism’. Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta provide not only the practical infrastructure required by transnational NGO networks, but also a political climate that is not too hostile towards civil society activism. In Singapore, by contrast, a strong state controls a weak civil society and provides few opportunities for transnational activism, not even linked to the neighbouring Indonesian island of Batam, as shown by Lindquist. Also, in the case of Taiwan, it is clear that the transnationalization of civil society groups there is related to the process of democratization. Under the authoritarian regime there were few transnational linkages (see Lin, this volume). In sum, the case studies in this book show that the degree of democracy in a state shapes the extent and form of transnational activism that its citizens are involved in. Hence, students of transnational activism are well advised to pay more attention to democratization studies. Likewise, integrating insights from studies of transnational activism could enrich the field of democratization studies. Transnational activism may contribute to the democratization process in a particular country Although the ‘international dimension’ of democratization processes is perhaps no longer as neglected as it used to be, few conventional democratization studies pay much attention to the role of transnational actors. This is unfortunate, as processes of globalization blur the rigid division between internal and external factors, making transnational processes increasingly significant. Research on transnational activism, to some extent, has analysed how transnational activists (in cooperation with local democracy activists) have tried to promote the process of democratization in several countries, especially in Latin America (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). Much of this research, however, has focused more on the related issue of human rights than democratization per se (e.g. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Democracy not only involves the issue of human rights, but also that of citizenship, which historically is a concept non-existent in much of Asia (see He, this volume). However, through activism ‘from below’, a new type of citizenship is evolving, particularly in the specific context of countries that have experienced colonialism, independence movements and authoritarian regimes.

New perspectives on transnational activism 15 Jemadu (this volume) offers a detailed analysis of the efforts by transnational activists to promote democratization in Indonesia. By focusing specifically on aspects of democracy like general elections, ‘good governance’ and human rights, he explicitly situates the study of transnational activism within conventional democratization research. Jemadu shows that transnational activists have had an impact on the recent regime transition in Indonesia, but he also concludes that they have ‘failed to prevent the politicians and the military from transforming the process of democratization into an endless game of bureaucratic bargaining’ (p. 163). Generally, it has been suggested that factors favouring transnational civil society’s influence on national democratization include the existence of regional norms on democracy, diasporas that can help mobilize transnational activists and access to information technology (Kumar 2000: 139–40). We would like to add a fourth basic factor, namely, the existence of a reasonably strong democracy movement within the country. Without local activists to link up with, transnational activist networks cannot be influential. If the development of a civil society should help sustain democratization, it has to be rooted at the local and national levels. A mainly foreignpromoted (and funded) civil society sector makes an insufficient contribution to democracy in the long run. Foreign NGOs might even undermine democratization because they can weaken or even replace local groups and the state, leading to weaker local civil society and a delegitimized state (Freres 1999). Kumar (2000: 137) claims that transnational activism promoting national democratization can only be efficient in Europe and Latin America, where there are regional norms concerning democracy. This is a claim that we find questionable for at least two reasons. First, it seems to overestimate the importance of international norms. While such norms, without any doubt, constitute important political opportunities for transnational activism, transnational activism can clearly be effective even where these norms do not exist or are weak, as the case of Indonesia in this volume shows. Second, the existence or non-existence of regional norms is not that clear-cut. Whereas no established norm on democracy and human rights exists in Southeast Asia, civil society groups in this region have agreed to common principles of democracy and human rights, often in opposition to their governments. Hence, students of democratization (in Asia as well as in other parts of the world) should pay more attention to the way transnational activists influence democratization processes on the national (and local) level. Transnational activism may contribute to democratization concerning transnational issues and transnational decision-making It is often noted that a major democratic problem is that structures of power and major social and political issues are firmly rooted in a global context, whereas participation, representation and legitimacy are fixed at the state level (O’Brien et al. 2000: 21–2). How to extend democracy beyond the level of the territorially based state has become a pressing issue. Theories of ‘global civil society’ and ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ often assume that transnational activism supports democratization on a transnational or global level (e.g. Falk 1995, Ch. 4). The dispersed nature of political

16 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin decision-making in a time of globalization, it is argued, creates a democratic deficit. By organizing campaigns simultaneously targeting several arenas on different levels, transnational activists try to address this democracy deficit, either implicitly or explicitly ( Jordan and van Tuijl 2000: 2053). Transnational activists ‘enhance deliberation and representation in international institutions by providing voices and ideas that were previously absent’ (Sikkink 2002: 301). They are particularly good at getting neglected issues onto the political agenda (Florini 2000a: 211). Furthermore, they add checks and balances to the international system (Edwards 2001: 7). According to Scholte (1999), transnational civil society can strengthen democracy: for instance, by civic education, by giving voice to politically weak and marginalized actors, by fuelling debate, by increasing transparency and accountability and by providing legitimacy for supra-state governance. In other words, the emergence of a transnational civil society is redefining the boundaries of democratic political space (cf. McGrew 1997: 13). This is related to the development of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, as outlined by Held (1995). Held’s vision of a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ is mainly an extension of liberal democracy to the global level, although he does draw on themes in republican and participatory democratic theory too (Dryzek 1999: 32). Although his main focus is on more formalized institutions for world government, Held (1995: 237, 281) acknowledges that transnational grass-roots movements are creating political space for the development of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. While this is still the most elaborate account of problems and prospects for global democracy, Held’s theory of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ can be criticized for being utopian, as it does not pay sufficient attention to questions of economic and social power and inequality. It underestimates the resilience of state power (Grugel, this volume). Using an approach to transnational democracy that is of even greater interest to the study of transnational activism than Held’s ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, Dryzek (1999) focuses on possibilities for democratization of the system of global governance that already exists, instead of a non-existent future global government. He argues that the sources of governance are discursive (Dryzek 1999: 33). As argued in the previous section, discourses (or the ‘institutional software’) become more important on a transnational level, and such ‘software’ might be less resistant to democratization than is the ‘institutional hardware’ of formal rules (Dryzek 1999: 35). A focus on discourses might, therefore, give a less pessimistic account of prospects for transnational democracy through transnational activism. Furthermore, extending democracy to a transnational or global level might be easier if we see democracy as deliberation rather than related to voting and representation. An outcome might be considered to have democratic legitimacy if it has involved ‘authentic deliberation on the part of the people subject to it’ (Dryzek 1999: 44). Such a ‘discursive or communicative model of democracy’, unlike older models of democracy, can easily operate across territorial boundaries (Dryzek 1999: 44). The network is the most promising institutional form for deliberative democracy (Dryzek 1999: 46). Taking a more critical position, Colás (2002: 158) argues that theories linking agents of transnational civil society to democracy are flawed because (1) they

New perspectives on transnational activism 17 underestimate the need for democracy to be based in ‘communities of fate’, and (2) by separating the state from its broader socio-economic context they risk reifying civil society as the exclusive sphere of democratic deliberation. This is very much in line with Grugel’s argument (in this volume). She points out (citing Kymlicka) that there is little evidence that people would actually prefer transnational to national forms of governance. ‘For activists . . . bypassing the state is simply not feasible’ (Grugel p. 39). However, the problem does not have to be posed as a choice between national and transnational democracy. On the contrary, democratization processes on different levels are likely to be mutually reinforcing and pro-democracy activists are well advised to be concerned with all levels, from the local to the global. Democracy within transnational activist networks is often problematic Analysing the relationship between transnational activism and democracy is not only a matter of examining how this kind of activism influences democracy on a national or transnational level. Recently, several scholars and practitioners have also raised concerns about the lack of internal democracy within transnational activist networks and their use of alleged undemocratic methods. As argued by Colás (2002: 163), the celebration of a transnational civil society raises questions about the constituents, mandate, representative status and accountability of transnational civil society actors. It is generally acknowledged that ‘global civil society’ is heavily concentrated in north-western Europe (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001: 7). Northern dominance within transnational activist networks, however, is not complete. Florini (2000a: 234) claims that there is an increasing participation from the ‘Global South’ in transnational civil society, but this is contradicted by data presented by Smith (in this volume). The dominance of Northern-based activists in many transnational networks highlights the problem of representativeness. This is certainly not only a matter of geographic distribution. A large number of the transnational activists tend to be well-educated, middle-class people. Therefore, rather than being a form of ‘globalization from below’, contemporary transnational activism can perhaps be better described as ‘globalization from the middle’ (Waterman 2001: 136). Inadequate representation can reproduce or even enlarge structural inequalities based on class, gender, nationality, race, religion, etc. (Scholte 1999: 30) and may cause conflicts within networks (cf. Nelson 2002). The network structure, as such, also contains its inherent inequalities. Instead of the hierarchical power structures of formal organizations, networks may be characterized by an inequality in the distribution of power on a centre–periphery dimension (Thörn 2002: 175). These democratic problems might be less severe in social movement organizations and social change oriented transnational networks, which, compared to other transnational NGOs, typically have smaller budgets and whose goals are likely to make them strive for better global representation (Smith 2000: 73). Despite these democratic problems, transnational activists claim a moral authority based on impartiality or independence, reliability, representativeness, accountability and transparency (Sikkink 2002: 313–15). According to Nelson (2002: 141), transnational

18 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin NGOs claim legitimacy based on representation (of Southern views or otherwise excluded groups), expertise, a domestic political constituency and designation or government approval (cf. Florini 2000a: 233). Edwards (2001: 7) limits the bases of legitimacy for civil society groups (in general) to two: representation (which gives a right to participate in decision-making) and effectiveness (which gives a right to be heard). It is hard for most transnational activists to claim that they have a genuine right to speak for anyone but themselves. The problem of representation can only be solved by the creation of genuinely representative institutions in global society, but until this goal has been achieved, transnational activists must try to represent the needs and interests of their constituencies and thus get public support for their activities even though they have not been formally authorized to act in a certain way (Brecher, Costello and Smith 2002: 88). This is similar to the argument about ‘discursive representation’ put forward by Keck (this volume). Activists represented in global governance institutions represent ‘positions rather than populations, ideas rather than constituencies’. This kind of ‘discursive representation’ does not constitute a mandate in the normal sense of the concept representation. Accountability is an inappropriate term to use when dealing with transnational activist networks, as there are no formal mechanisms to enforce obligations. Neither is the concept of representation fully applicable, although activists do represent interests. Hence, Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) introduce the concept of ‘political responsibility’ to clarify problems of representation and accountability within transnational NGO networks. They suggest that political responsibility in NGO advocacy has seven dimensions: (1) dividing political arenas according to expertise and respecting boundaries; (2) agenda-setting and formulation of strategy that takes account of the risks involved for all participants; (3) a fair allocation of available financial resources (separating financial accountability from political responsibility); (4) equal access to information; (5) sensitivity to the format and frequency of information; (6) articulating information into useful forms; and (7) the formalization of relationships. Based on these dimensions of political responsibility, Jordan and van Tuijl go on to present four types of transnational advocacy campaigns: (1) cooperative campaigns with high political responsibility; (2) concurrent campaigns characterized by a medium level of political responsibility; (3) disassociated campaigns having low political responsibility; and (4) competitive campaigns with no political responsibility at all. Jordan and van Tuijl’s analysis is particularly useful as it highlights that those who participate in a transnational activist campaign have a political responsibility towards others who are engaged in the campaign but operate in a different political arena. Activists operating in international or transnational arenas must be aware of the possible consequences of their activities for activists working in local and national arenas. In this respect it is worth stressing that an exclusive focus on global advocacy is problematic. Transnational activists generally need to focus more on the local level and build networks from below (Edwards 2001: 8). Some specific methods used by transnational activists have also been criticized for being undemocratic. One example is the use of civil disobedience, which is often criticized for being anti-democratic (unless it is conducted against an authoritarian regime). But it can also be defended as a practice of direct democracy as an alter-

New perspectives on transnational activism 19 native to representative democracy. Furthermore, historically, civil disobedience was essential in the struggle for representative democracy, and today it can be seen as an effort to vitalize and expand democracy. This argument is valid unless we consider the specific contemporary form of democracy as complete and in no further need for improvement (cf. Thörn 2002: 166). Civil disobedience can thus be seen primarily as a form for the expansion of societal democracy and a politicization of civil society (Thörn 2002: 169). Hence, while remaining critically engaged with problems of democracy within transnational activism, we should not dismiss these forms of collective action as inherently undemocratic. Democracy of and/or within transnational activism should be measured against the existing degree of democracy in international governance (Sikkink 2002: 315). In comparison with global governance institutions, the international state system and global capitalism, transnational activist networks score very well when it comes to democracy. It is worth repeating, however, that a democratic civil society requires the legitimate regulation of the state (Colás 2002: 165), a point also stressed by Grugel (in this volume). So far, we have argued for a new conceptual contextualization combining two analytical approaches (power and democracy) to further our understanding of transnational activism. In the final section, we shall turn to our geographical context of East and Southeast Asia.

Contextualizing transnational activism in East and Southeast Asia In addition to filling a theoretical gap, this volume also intends to fill an empirical gap by providing case studies from East and Southeast Asia, a region that has rarely been covered in literature on transnational activism. A few important exceptions deal with some aspects of transnational activism in this geographical area, including articles by Aviel (2000), Gurowitz (2000), He (1999), Lizee (2000), Mittelman (1999), Piper (2001), Piper and Uhlin (2002), Price (1998) and Uhlin (2001, 2002, 2003). But, on the whole, more attention has been paid to Europe and North and South America. Considering fairly recent and ongoing changes towards democratization in this region, it is not surprising also to find rising civil society activism in general and increasing numbers of NGOs in particular. Transnational linkages within the region are part and parcel of these developments – although numerically maybe not yet as developed as in other parts of the world (see Smith, this volume). Particularly noteworthy in this respect are efforts to set up regional human rights mechanisms (Timmermann 2001), election monitoring and ‘watchdog’ initiatives ( Jemadu, this volume), and regional networking on environmental issues (Lai, this volume). The fairly new activities, including the creation of a working group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism in 1996, were triggered by the UN conference on human rights in Vienna in 1993, which produced a final declaration demanding the establishment of such mechanisms. The increasing involvement of civil society organizations in the debate around human rights has qualitatively changed, and challenged, the ‘first round’ of the ‘Asian values debate’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Timmermann 2001).

20 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin These regional initiatives on human rights are not the only ones rooted in global initiatives that came out of UN conferences and the signing of declarations by at least some Asian countries. There are also initiatives on environmental issues, such as the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes, as mentioned by Lai (this volume). Other cross-border network activities have their roots in clearly regionally confined issues, such as sex tourism (Japanese businessmen in East and Southeast Asia, and more recently other East and Northeast Asians as well) and Japan’s colonial past, which have mainly triggered women’s groups to organize transnationally within the region (Piper 2001). As shown in the case of Malaysia (Weiss, this volume), activists coming from countries whose human rights records are far from good are nonetheless actively engaged in regional networking activities or in support of issues occurring in other Asian countries (such as Burma). This is underpinned by Uhlin (2001, 2002, 2003), who has shown that there are increasing transnational links between civil society groups in the Southeast Asian region. His case studies indicate the relative weakness of transnational activist networks compared to the power of states and capitalist interests. The dependence on international funding agencies is also restricting the autonomy of transnational civil society groups in Southeast Asia – and this is an area where East and Southeast Asia differ somewhat, with East Asia depending less on foreign donor agencies. Another region-specific issue is that of labour migration, or at least certain forms of labour migration (such as domestic work, sex and entertainment, and the high incidences of illegality), which have triggered cross-border collaboration between NGOs that support migrant workers. Also taken up by INGOs in their links with local NGOs is the issue of trafficking (Piper and Uhlin 2002). Following the more general and theoretical chapters by Grugel and Keck, the chapters of this book offer new perspectives on transnational activism in the East and Southeast Asian context. Smith provides a useful overview of transnational social movement organizations worldwide, but with interesting data on Asian dimensions. He’s theoretical analysis of world citizenship is particularly rooted in the East and Southeast Asian context. The rest of the chapters have a specific focus on the East and Southeast Asian regions. Lai’s ‘cyber-activism’ focuses on China and Japan. Lindquist explores (the lack of) transnational activism in the border zone between Indonesia and Singapore. Weiss inquires into the transnational endeavours of Malaysian activists. Jemadu takes the opposite perspective and analyses transnational activists dealing with Indonesia. Lin, finally, focuses on transnational activism related to Taiwan. Each of these original research efforts provides essential new insights into the emergent research field of transnational activism. Together they also contribute to a contextualization of transnational activism in East and Southeast Asia.

Notes 1 One notable exception is provided by Franz and Zimmer (2002) who attempt to bridge research on ‘social movements’ and NGOs under the umbrella of ‘international civil society’.

New perspectives on transnational activism 21 2 An interesting and empirically rich contribution to the issue of NGOs’ integration and their transnational networks in the issue area of ‘environmental politics’ is provided by Walk and Brunnengraeber (2000). 3 See Lin’s chapter for a more elaborate discussion of political opportunities.

References Alvarez, S.E., Dagnino, E. and Escobar, A. (eds) (1998) Cultures of Politics – Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements. Boulder: Westview Press. Anderson, J. (2002) ‘Questions of Democracy, Territoriality and Globalisation’, in J. Anderson (ed.), Transnational Democracy – Political Spaces and Border Crossings, London: Routledge. Anheier, H., Glasius, M. and Kaldor, M. (2001) ‘Introducing Global Civil Society’, in H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds) Global Civil Society 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Appadurai, A. (2000) ‘Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination’, Public Culture 12(1): 1–19. Aviel, J.F. (2000) ‘Placing Human Rights and Environmental Issues on ASEAN’s Agenda: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations’, Asian Journal of Political Science 8(2): 17– 34. Boli, J. and Thomas, G.M. (eds) (1999) Constructing World Culture. International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Braman, S. and Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. (eds) (1996) Globalization, Communication and Transnational Civil Society, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Brecher, J., Costello, T. and Smith, B. (2002) Globalization from Below. The Power of Solidarity, Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Burawoy, M., George, S., Gille, Z., Gowen, T., Haney, L., Klawitter, M., Lopez, S.H., Riain, S. and Thayer, M. (2000) Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Chen, Jie (2001) ‘Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan’s Social Movement NGOs’, Journal of Contemporary China 10(29): 613–44. Cohen, R. and Rai, S.M. (eds) (2000) Global Social Movements, London: Athlone Press. Colás, A. (2002) International Civil Society. Social Movements in World Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press. Comor, E. (2001) ‘The Role of Communication in Global Civil Society: Forces, Processes, Prospects’, International Studies Quarterly 45: 389–408. Cullen, H. and Morrow, K. (2001) ‘International Civil Society in International Law: The Growth of NGO Participation’, Non-State Actors and International Law 1: 7–39. Delanty, G. (2000) Citizenship in a Global Age, Buckingham: Open University Press. Dryzek, J. S. (1999) ‘Transnational Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 7(1): 30–51. Edwards, M. (2001) ‘Introduction’, in M. Edwards and J. Gaventa (eds) Global Citizen Action, London: Earthscan Publications. Edwards, M. and Gaventa, J. (eds) (2001) Global Citizen Action, London: Earthscan Publications. Escobar, A. and Alvarez, S.E. (eds) (1992) The Making of Social Movements in Latin America – Identity, Strategy, and Democracy, Boulder: Westview Press. Falk, R. (1995) On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press. ——(1999) Predatory Globalization – A Critique, Cambridge: Polity Press. Florini, A. M. (2000a) ‘Lessons Learned’, in A. M. Florini (ed.) The Third Force. The Rise of

22 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Florini, A. M. (ed.) (2000b) The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 1 (2002) ‘Transnationale Aktionsnetzwerke. Chancen für eine neue Protestkultur?’, special issue, vol. 15, issue 1 (Lucius & Lucius Verlagsgesellschaft, Stuttgart). Fortun, K. (2001) Advocacy after Bhopal. Environmentalism, Disaster, New Global Orders, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Franz, C. and Zimmer, A. (eds) (2002) Zivilgesellschaft international. Alte und neue NGOs, Opladen: Leske & Bude. Freres, C. L. (1999) ‘European Actors in Global Change. The Role of European Civil Societies in Democratization’, in J. Grugel (ed.) Democracy Without Borders. Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies, London and New York: Routledge. Gaventa, J. (2001) ‘Global Citizen Action: Lessons and Challenges’, in M. Edwards and J. Gaventa (eds) Global Citizen Action, London: Earthscan Publications. Gills, B.K. (ed.) (2000) Globalization and the Politics of Resistance, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Görg, C. and Hirsch, J. (1998). ‘Is International Democracy Possible?’, Review of International Political Economy 5(4): 585–615. Grugel, J. (1999) ‘Contextualizing Democratisation: The Changing Significance of Transnational Factors and Non-State Actors’, in J. Grugel (ed.) Democracy Without Borders. Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies, London and New York: Routledge. Guidry, J. A., Kennedy, M.D. and Zald, M.N. (2000a) ‘Globalizations and Social Movements’, in J.A. Guidry, M.D. Kennedy and M.N. Zald (eds) Globalizations and Social Movements. Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Guidry, J. A., Kennedy, M.D. and Zald, M.N. (eds) (2000b) Globalizations and Social Movements. Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Gurowitz, A. (2000) ‘Migrant Rights and Activism in Malaysia: Opportunities and Constraints’, Journal of Asian Studies 59(4): 863–88. Hamel, P., Lustiger-Thaler, H., Nederveen Pieterse, J. and Roseneil, S. (eds) (2001) Globalization and Social Movements, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Hannerz, U. (1996) Transnational Connections. Culture, People, Places, London and New York: Routledge. He, B. (1999) ‘The Role of Civil Society in Defining the Boundary of a Political Community: The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan’, Asian Studies Review 23(1): 27–48. Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture, Oxford: Polity Press. Higgott, R.A., Underhill, G.R.D. and Bieler, A. (eds) (2000) Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System, London and New York: Routledge. Hulme, D. and Edwards, M. (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors. Too Close for Comfort?, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan (in association with Save the Children Fund). Jordan, L. and van Tuijl, P. (2000) ‘Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy’, World Development 28(1)2: 2051–65. Kaldor, M. (1999) ‘Transnational Civil Society’, in T. Dunne and N.J. Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

New perspectives on transnational activism 23 Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Khagram, S., Riker, J.V. and Sikkink, K. (2002a) ‘From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics’, in S. Khagram, J.V. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds) Restructuring World Politics. Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Khagram, S., Riker, J.V. and. Sikkink, K. (eds) (2002b) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kumar, C. (2000) ‘Transnational Networks and Campaigns for Democracy’, in A. M. Florini (ed.) The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Lizee, P.P. (2000) ‘Civil Society and Regional Security: Tensions and Potentials in Post-Crisis Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22(3): 550–69. Lukes, S. (1986) ‘Introduction’, in S. Lukes (ed.) Power, New York: New York University Press. McAdam, D, (1996) ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions’, in D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (eds) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McGrew, A. (1997) ‘Globalization and Territorial Democracy: An Introduction’, in A. McGrew (ed.) The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press; Milton Keynes: Open University. Markoff, J. (1996) Waves of Democracy. Social Movements and Political Change, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Massey, D. (2000) ‘Entanglements of Power’, in J. P. Sharp, P. Routledge, C. Philo and R. Paddison (eds) Entanglements of Power. Geographies of Domination/Resistance, London and New York: Routledge. Meyer, M.K. and Pruegl, E. (eds) (1999) Gender Politics in Global Governance, New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Mittelman, J. H. (1999) ‘Resisting Globalisation: Environmental Politics in Eastern Asia’, in K. Olds, P. Dicken, P. F. Kelly, L. Kong and H. W. Yeung. (eds) Globalization and the AsiaPacific, London: Routledge. Nelson, P. J. (2002) ‘Agendas, Accountability, and Legitimacy among Transnational Networks Lobbying the World Bank’, in S. Khagram, J. V. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds) Restructuring World Politics. Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. O’Brien, R., Williams, M., Goetz, A.M. and Scholte, J.A. (2000) Contesting Global Governance – Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piper, N. (2001) ‘Transnational Women’s Activism in Japan and Korea: The Unresolved Issue of Military Sexual Slavery’, Global Networks 1(2): 155–70. Piper, N. and Uhlin, A. (2002) ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks, Female Labour Migration and Trafficking in East and Southeast Asia. A Gendered Analysis of Opportunities and Obstacles’, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 11(2): 171–95. della Porta, D., Kriesi. H. and Rucht, D. (eds) (1999) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London: Macmillan. Price, J. (1998) ‘Shadowing APEC: Nongovernmental Organizations Build Regional Alliances’, Asian Perspective 22(2): 21–50.

24 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin Princen, T. and Finger, M. (eds) (1994) Environmental NGOs in World Politics. Linking the Local and the Global, London and New York: Routledge. Riles, A. (2000) The Network Inside Out, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Risse, T., Ropp, S.C. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (1999) The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rucht, D. (1999) ‘The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes, Problems’, in D. della Porta, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht (eds), Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London: Macmillan, pp. 206–22. ——(2001) ‘Transnationaler politischer Protest im historischen Laengsschnitt’, in A. Klein, R. Koopmans and H. Geiling (eds), Globalisierung, Partizipation, Protest. Opladen: Leske & Bude, pp. 77–96. Scholte, J.A. (1999) ‘Global Civil Society: Changing the World?’, University of Warwick, Coventry: Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 31/99. Sharp, J.P., Routledge, P., Philo, C. and Paddison, R. (2000) ‘Entanglements of Power. Geographies of Domination/Resistance’, in J. P. Sharp, P. Routledge, C. Philo and R. Paddison (eds) Entanglements of Power. Geographies of Domination/Resistance, London and New York: Routledge. Sikkink, K. (2002) ‘Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power’, in S. Khagram, J. V. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds) Restructuring World Politics. Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Smith, J. (2000) ‘Social Movements, International Institutions and Local Empowerment’, in K. Stiles (ed.) Global Institutions and Local Empowerment. Competing Theoretical Perspectives, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St Martin’s Press. ——(2001) ‘Globalizing Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements’, Mobilization 6(1): 1–19. Smith, J. and Johnston, H. (eds) (2002) Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Smith, J., Chatfield, C. and Pagnucco, R. (eds) (1997) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics. Solidarity Beyond the State, New York: Syracuse University Press. Smith, M.P. and Guarnizo, L.E. (eds) (1998) Transnationalism from Below, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Tarrow, S. (1998) Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——(2001) ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 4: 1–20. ——(2002) ‘The New Transnational Contention: Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms’, paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Boston, 31 August–1 September 2002. Thörn, Håkan (2002) Globaliseringens Dimensioner. Nationalstat, Världssamhälle, Demokrati och Sociala Rörelser (Dimensions of Globalization. Nation State, World Society, Democracy and Social Movements), Stockholm: Atlas. Timmermann, M. (2001). ‘Regionale Identitaetsbilding in Suedostasien? Auf dem Weg zu einem ASEAN-Menschenrechtsmechanismus’, Suedostasien aktuell 20(4): 388–95. Uhlin, A. (2001) ‘The Transnational Dimension of Civil Society. Migration and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia’, in B. Beckman, E. Hansson and A. Sjögren (eds) Civil Society and Authoritarianism in the Third World, Stockholm: PODSU/Stockholm University.

New perspectives on transnational activism 25 ——(2002) ‘Globalization, Democratization and Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Observations from Malaysia and Thailand’, in C. Kinnvall and K. Jönsson (eds) Globalization and Democratization in Asia, London: Routledge. ——(2003) ‘Regionalism from Below. Transnational Civil Society Links in Southeast Asia’, in E. Palmujoki (ed.) Southeast Asian Regionalism from Above and from Below (forthcoming). Uvin, P. (2000) ‘From Local Organizations to Global Governance: The Role of NGOs in International Relations’, in K. Stiles (ed.) Global Institutions and Local Empowerment. Competing Theoretical Perspectives, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St Martin’s Press. Walk, H. and Brunnengraeber, A. (2000) Die Globalisierungswaechter. NGOs und ihre transnationale Netze im Konfliktfeld Klima, Muenster: Verlag Westfaelisches Dampfboot. Warkentin, C. (2001) Reshaping World Politics. NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Waterman, P. (2001) Globalisation, Social Movements and the New Internationalism, London: Continuum.

2

State power and transnational activism Jean Grugel

Contemporary transnational activism draws on a critique of the state and an assertion of the values of mobilization and participation, inspired to an important degree by the ideological ferment set in train in the 1960s. More recently, theories of globalization have led to the notion that the state is in terminal decline. Considerable political ramifications flow from this, if it is true. One is that statist models of governance have had their day. Another is that the transnational sphere has become the most salient level for political action. However, if, as I will argue, the end of statecentrism has been exaggerated, then the state, especially the Western state, retains considerable powers and resources.1 This means that transnational activists must take into account the question of state power when designing strategies and responding to opportunities. Understanding the state, then, is a central issue, both for transnational activism, and for academic studies of activism. This chapter reviews the debate about the place of the contemporary state in the global order and analyses the assumptions made about it by the dominant theoretical approaches to transnational activism, namely, theories of global civil society, the field of transnational studies and the body of scholarship that analyses the institutional relationships developed by transnational activists. The chapter is underpinned by the view that it does not make sense to conceptualize civil society, and transnational civil society activism, as alternatives to the state. I argue that taking the state seriously is important for activists and for those who analyse activism alike.

The state: democracy, power and globalization States and democracy The meaning of democracy can be simply summarized as: a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement [is] that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly – one, that is to say, which realizes to the

State power and transnational activism 27 greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise. (Beetham 1992: 40) Debates within democratic theory have centred largely on how to bring these ideals into existence. There have been, grosso modo, two principal strands of democratic theory: direct and representative democracy. These two positions crystallized in a debate between liberal approaches to democracy, which developed around concepts of representation, social regulation and the market, and participatory theories, drawing instead on communal and direct experiences. In contrast to the liberal tradition of representation and the emphasis on individual rights, participatory democracy has principally been concerned with ensuring democratic rights for the community as a whole. Liberalism viewed the state as important but is ultimately distrustful of the state, identifying inherent overweening tendencies within it. This means that liberalism assumes democracy to be a way of limiting state power and rendering it accountable to society. In contrast, direct or participatory strands of democratic thought have embraced notions of both the strong state (communism) and of an idealized society existing without state control (anarchism). After 1945, and particularly following the onset of the Cold War, the meanings contained within the term ‘democracy’ changed. Democracy became part of the vocabulary of real politics as a way of distinguishing between ‘the free world’ and Soviet-inspired or controlled communism. As a result, democracy was more and more equated simply with liberalism and, by implication, with the political arrangements extant in the West. Despite the survival of ideas of socialist democracy, in practice democracy came to be read as a shorthand for liberalism and the political arrangements for government in the West. According to Lijphart (1984), democracy existed in ‘the real world’ – in the US and Western Europe. Democracy, in other words, ceased to be an explicitly normative concept and was presented, instead, as a descriptive one. The result was empirical democratic theory, which found its most important inspiration in the work of the economist Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter saw democracy as analogous to the market. It was a mechanism for the election of leaders through competition. Democracy was thereby reduced simply to a way of institutionalizing competition between elites for office (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon 1999: 4). Empirical democratic theory has proved especially useful to Western policymakers. Its concerns centre on the visible manifestations of state power and authority; it is behavioural in its approach. The state is composed straightforwardly of the bodies that formally rule the polity – governments, bureaucracies, judiciaries, etc. In a democratic state, it is assumed that the people, through elections, control these governing bodies and that power is diffused to socially constituted interest groups. Empirical democratic theory places the state at the core of democracy; it assumes the democratic state to be liberal; and its notion of the state is limited to what can be observed. It does not probe the social construction of power behind the formal institutions of government (see Lukes 1974). Neither is it able to draw out any

28 Jean Grugel tensions that exist between the state, as the formal embodiment of the people, and the demands of the market. The very evident intellectual flaws and simplifications contained within empirical democratic theory meant that it was subject to a range of searching intellectual critiques. At the same time, the fact that liberal democratic theory in the 1960s and 1970s was so normatively bound up with the West, the defence of capitalism and the Cold War provoked an interest in exploring (and resurrecting) alternative approaches to democracy. The result was the re-emergence of the idea of democracy as a vehicle for human emancipation and as an instrument to further the rights and interests of vulnerable and disadvantaged members of the community. New theories of democracy began to emerge in the 1960s, including feminism, associationalism and a return to participatory ideas. All consciously evoke the notion of democracy as a utopian project embodying ideas of equality and rights and draw in different ways on the idea of collective citizenship. As a result, the meaning of democracy became, once again, a terrain for rich ideological debate. This created an important space, which has expanded over the years, within which to theorize the centrality of participation for democracy. Initially, the critique of empirical democratic theory focused on the ways in which the hidden or structural power of capital and of privilege has consistently prevented outwardly democratic states from behaving democratically (Lindblom 1977; Jessop 1990). It also became obvious that empirical democratic theory draws its understanding of the state from an idealized version of how the Western state operates. As a result, it is unable to grasp or analyse the ways in which undemocratic power is embedded within the states (democratic or otherwise) of the developing world. At the same time, it promotes an electoralist or a procedural understanding of democracy. This can lead to an assumption that democracy exists because elections are relatively free and liberal principles enshrined in the constitution, even in social orders where violence, exclusion, repression and poverty constitute the daily reality for many, even the majority, of the population. These revelations of how apparently democratic states contain mechanisms for the reproduction of inequality and privilege within them were influential in shaping the ambiguity towards the state that has characterized the participatory approach to democracy. If apparently democratic states can serve as cover for the undemocratic reproduction of elite power, then, participationists argue, it makes no sense to see the state as central for democracy. Instead, as Pateman (1970) points out, participationists start from assumptions about the importance of freedom, activism and citizenship. A participatory approach implies rejecting the idea that democracy can be a form of government independent of the quality of citizenship, equity and social inclusion. For democracy without citizenship is merely a continuation of elite rule. Not surprisingly, then, theories of participatory democracy are often highly ambiguous about the state. Participationists sometimes reject the statism and welfarism of the West, which they see as stifling individual and community initiatives. For Keane (1988), the state must go beyond paternalism towards embracing social organizations in active decision-making, in order to become fully democratic. This ambiguity has fed, sometimes unconsciously, into forms of civil society activism.

State power and transnational activism 29 State power Underlying these very different ways of understanding the state in democracy lie alternative conceptualizations of state power and state capabilities. Behavioural approaches see state power in democracies as relatively benign; the state is under the control of governments that, in turn, are responsible to the people. Participationists, on the other hand, see the state as the embodiment of authority and social control. Its powers are not subject to control by citizens. Both these positions simplify the state and hide key aspects of the ways in which state power is deployed. The state is, of course, ultimately an instrument of social domination. All states have at their core developed capacities for coercion and violence. State power is, at least in part, the capacity to persuade the people who live within its frontiers to acquiesce with the goals and policies that are laid down from within the state (Goverde, Cerny, Haugaard and Lentner 2000). Logically enough, it has frequently been conceptualized as enforcement or power over citizens. For realists, for example, state power can be understood straightforwardly as the sum of material capabilities; it is the power to act, the power to do. The sociological tradition of state analysis, however, offers a more nuanced understanding of the powers of the state. Here, the state is conceptualized in the Weberian tradition of a ‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Skocpol 1985: 7). States are the expression of class interests; but their composition, policies and interests are subject to change through social or class conflict. So democratic states are possible, but only if subordinated classes and groups are strong enough to impose themselves on the pattern of policy-making and interests contained within the state (see Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). Mann (1993) draws attention to the relational element of contemporary state power: states must work with social actors in order to get things done. In particular, he distinguishes between ‘despotic power’, where states act without negotiations with civil society, and ‘infrastructural power’, which is ‘collective power, “power through” society, coordinating social life through state infrastructures’ (Mann 1993: 59). ‘Infrastructural power’, Mann notes, ‘is a two-way street: it also enables civil society to control the state’. Infrastructural power should make it possible for states to meet the basic goals that guarantee their reproduction, stability and security. According to Huber (1995: 167), these goals are to ● ● ●

●

enforce the rule of law; promote economic growth; elicit the compliance of members of the community that inhabits the territory over any given state claims control; and shape the allocation of societal resources.

If states are to be democratic, that is to deliver goods and services and support citizenship within society as a whole, then they must have at their disposal considerable infrastructural power. Infrastructural capacity can be summarized as technical capacity, policy efficiency and durable institutional structures, combined with legitimation and cooperation from civil society. Without it, the distribution of

30 Jean Grugel public goods and the creation of welfare are impossible. At the same time, infrastructural power provides civil society with the legitimate authority to monitor and challenge state action. This is the case notwithstanding the tension between some civil society actors and the state that is typical of capitalist democracies. So, while states with infrastructural powers are not necessarily democratic, infrastructural powers are necessary for democracy. The ‘third wave’ transitions have been shaped significantly by the variable infrastructural capacities of states (Grugel 2001). All of this suggests, in sum, that the view that state power is necessarily undemocratic, cannot be sustained. The state and globalization In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was an assumption of ever expanding infrastructural state capacity. The Western economies boomed and, for the developing countries, the expansion of the global economy, their incorporation into world markets and state-building policies were thought to be means through which democracy and development could be engineered. These modernist beliefs were gradually chipped away in the 1970s and 1980s, as economic difficulties in the West and crisis and economic collapse in the developing world became commonplace. At the same time, the savage dictatorships that characterized much of the developing world at this time dented the assumptions that linked state capacity with democracy. The dark side of state power once again predominated. To this has been added a more recent view that the state itself is in imminent danger of collapse or irrelevance. Globalization – the rapidly expanding processes through which societies are connected to each other through markets and new technologies – has been taken to mean that the state is increasingly defunct as a source of economic and social control and fragile as an instrument of redistribution. Crucially, globalization has been seen as undermining the infrastructural capacities of the state and therefore threatening democracy (for a review of the globalization debate, see Held et al. 1999). Initially, then, globalization was framed in ‘hard’ terms. The constraints imposed by the globalizing world economy were held responsible for the difficulties of development on the periphery of the world market, the contractions of the welfare state in the West and the limitations of processes of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s (Strange 1992). The promises inherent within modernity could no longer be fulfilled because of the imperatives of globalizing capitalism, in which market discipline is imposed without mediation due to the weakening of the state vis-à-vis transnational capital (Held 1995). According to Cox (1987; 1997), globalization stripped all states of meaningful choices and they become instead ‘conveyor belts’ for decisions taken elsewhere – by the covert structures that regulate global capitalism. This has led to the idea that the contemporary world structure requires cosmopolitan governance (Held 1995). Meanwhile insofar as the developing world is concerned, scholars have come to view globalization as the maturation of transnational capitalism, and the creation of a world integrated into a single capitalist mode of production has gained ascendancy

State power and transnational activism 31 (Robinson 1998). They are influenced in this view by the many difficulties facing state-led development and the rise of a new international political economy of development. For the periphery, globalization is the intensification of the control exerted by the West over states and societies. As a result, economic development has come to be centrally concerned with ‘global positioning’ rather than national management (McMichael 2000), while, politically, the authority of transnational capitalism over national states is taken to signify the closure of national projects of democracy and the end of the Keynesian welfare state. Framed in ‘soft’ terms, however, globalization has a more ambiguous effect on states, even developing states. Globalization processes are taking place in an already unequal global order and therefore have a differential impact on states in the North and the South, affecting the policy-making and extractive capacities of developing states far more than those of the developed core (Holm and Sorenson 1995; Hurrell and Woods 1995). Nevertheless, even most developing states remain much stronger than the hyper-globalizationists suppose (Evans 1997; Weiss 1998). Of course, the competition state (Cerny 1990), as the globalizing state has been termed, in the developing world is a less effective instrument for management – and for democracy (Grugel forthcoming). But inequalities between states, in terms of resources, effectiveness and infrastructural capacity, are hardly new. Moreover, while developing states may have reduced capacities to manage global economic integration successfully, most still retain considerable extractive and, especially, repressive capacities. While developing states have found their margin for manoeuvre reduced by debt and the demands of global integration, states in the West generally retain considerable resources to shape global outcomes and global ideas. Democratization, for example, became a global discourse in the 1990s principally because it has been incorporated into US and EU foreign policies in the post-Cold War era (Carothers 1991). The human rights approach to global governance also owes much to the strength of Western states, and to their continuing capacity to frame debates. Frequently thought to be driven by non-governmental groups, the rights debate has been managed by Western states that have successfully adopted it for their own interests. In particular, they have been able to shape the parameters of the debate, with the result that human rights are understood principally as liberal freedoms, not collective rights. At the same time, they have insisted on the subordination of rights to the requirements of state sovereignty, nationalism and economic interests. Moreover, Western states are strategic when they listen to non-governmental rights groups. The ways in which the British state has incorporated a rights discourse into its ‘ethical’ foreign policy under New Labour provides an interesting illustration of how states strategically take up rights-based issues. The British state is, for example, relatively receptive to pressure for greater liberal freedoms in Zimbabwe or Burma: cases where economic interests are not especially significant and where the United Kingdom is anxious to display global and Commonwealth leadership. The state is therefore relatively open to non-governmental groups with knowledge in these areas. But it is far more difficult for groups concerned with abuses in China to win

32 Jean Grugel the ear of the state, because of the dominance of established economic concerns and the drive to win greater market access. Meanwhile, civil society groups concerned with the rights of refugees within the United Kingdom find themselves ignored and bypassed in policy-making. On this issue, then, the state shapes policy and popular perceptions independently of, and more effectively than, civil society organizations. Migration is successfully packaged by the state as an issue area the foundations of which are the protection of national borders, the importance of domestic social peace (which immigrants are thought to threaten), respect for international law and a minimization of financial burdens. No link is allowed between migration and human rights; migrants are increasingly presented as law-breakers rather than asylumseekers. The United Kingdom, like other Western states, is able to select how it understands human rights and the issues it takes up. Abuses are presented as occurring elsewhere – mainly in developing or post-communist countries. In sum, Western states remain strong vis-à-vis civil society even in terms of important ethical issues where activism is strong, such as human rights. States retain the authority to shape attitudes and beliefs, within their societies and globally. This is considerable evidence of the continuing salience of the state, especially of the Western state. States and governance The remaking of the world in the wake of the Cold War has led to the emergence of new forms of global management through networks and global institutions – the rise of global governance (Payne forthcoming). Governance theorizes a shift away from hierarchical and territorially bounded bureaucracies as mechanisms for delivering public goods to networks of global, state and non-state actors (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), leading to the emergence of national and transnational modes of governance not dependent on, or controlled by, states. The rise of global governance should not be taken, however, to mean that states have abandoned the quest for global regulation. An examination of the ways in which international financial institutions work makes this clear. Organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank do not operate independently of the Western states that are their main funders. The World Bank’s shift in the 1980s towards supporting structural adjustment was a reflection of pressure from the United States for the Bank to move towards a focus on growth rather than on poverty alleviation. The Washington consensus on the fit between markets and democracy in the 1990s emerged from the tight nexus that has developed between the multilateral institutions and the US government. Moreover, despite increased openness on the part of the World Bank, the United States has continually succeeded in shaping its policies, raising doubts about whether the Bank can deliver in any substantive way on its much-trumpeted new poverty focus. Using the example of the controversial World Bank Report of 2000 (Attacking Poverty), Wade (2001) shows how the autonomy of the World Bank was cut back by the US Treasury after the Seattle demonstrations. Nevertheless, governance does imply a very different system of global rule and a

State power and transnational activism 33 diffusion of some powers away from states. At the domestic level, a reformulation of the relationship between state and civil society actors is taking place. NGOs are increasingly present within governance structures, nationally as well as globally. Governance involves mobilizing non-state actors to take on tasks that were previously the responsibility of central or local government. Even developing states are adopting governance strategies in order to deliver services or as part of a neo-liberal repackaging of the state. In the case of Latin America, Taylor (1999) argues that NGOs constitute the perfect vehicle for neo-liberal social policy because they are apparently efficient organizations divorced from the public sphere. More generally they make possible some minimal social provision at a time of state retrenchment, as their widespread utilization in countries such as Bolivia and the Dominican Republic indicates. Meanwhile, at the global level, states share governance with global institutions, making the contemporary structures of global governance both complex and fluid because they depend upon negotiations between states, governance organizations and internationally active NGOs, according to issue area. The question is whether these interactions between states, governance bodies and NGOs imply an opportunity for a more democratic form of global governance (see Murphy 2000) or simply a cynical engagement with civil society on the part of governance institutions in order to get their message across (Wade 2001).

Understanding state transformation It is not surprising that confusion reigns about the state, given the pace of change and the uneven impact of global transformations. It is no longer clear whether states are good or bad for democracy and welfare, weak or strong. If this were just an academic issue, of course, it would matter less. But for civil society activism, transnational or otherwise, reading the state correctly is crucial to strategy and organization. For democrats, meanwhile, understanding the place of the state in the contemporary world order is central to the democratic possibilities they imagine. Recent theories of global civil society reflect the view that new forms of governance are replacing the inter-state world and that the state is losing its capacity to regulate the market and social action. Non-governmental organizations and civil society groups claim the right to fill the space left by the state. A body of sociological literature, which can loosely be grouped together as ‘transnational studies’, makes similar assumptions. I examine these below, and contrast them, at least so far as the state is concerned, with studies of transnational advocacy movements that emphasize the interface between movements and either state or global governance bodies. In contrast, these studies point to important, if sometimes ambiguous, relationships between movements and states, and indicate a much stronger role in world politics for the state. The significance of these findings is drawn out in the conclusion. Theories of global civil society The global civil society approach assumes that globalization means an intensification of capitalism and a weakening of the state. It assumes as a result that the capacities for

34 Jean Grugel resistance from below are now greater than before. This janus-headed view of globalization has been grafted onto theories of participatory democracy to produce three foundational ideas: ●

●

●

that democracy is a system of governing the global community that rests on the extension and reproduction of social citizenship; that globalization is leading to the diminishing of the authority and effectiveness of the state; and that there is now an opportunity to effect global political change and build a system of global democracy through transnational activism.

Global civil society, for its advocates, is a project of ‘civilizing globalization’ (Kaldor 2000a). Kaldor’s notion of global civil society rests on a benign view of both the power of technology and transnational mobilization from below. For her, it is able to challenge the assumption that globalization can be understood simply as the imposition of liberalism and the market (see also Falk 1998; Ackerley and Moller Okin 1999). She draws attention to the fact that globalization has engendered strategies of resistance from an impressive number of subordinated social movements and groups marginalized by global capitalism. Recent anti-globalization movements range from the Jubilee 2000 campaign against third-world debt, mass protest against the policies and strictures imposed by the IMF, the symbol of global regulation, street protests at European Union summits and local protests against the onward march of globalizing capitalism, such as that encapsulated within the Chiapas rebellion in Mexico, led by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN). At the same time, transnational networks, many with roots as far back as the 1960s and 1970s, based around issues of justice, human rights and ecology, composed of globally active NGOs, continue to present alternative visions of globalization from below. These movements, then, are understood as part of a counter-hegemonic project of change in an era of globalization (Kenny 2001). Global civil society movements self-consciously emphasize the importance of social activism on a transnational scale through the use of mass lobbying, new technologies and the global media. In many cases, they are seen as actually privileging lobbying at the global level over national strategies of mobilization. For example, the work of Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina (2001) shows how the voices of communities extremely isolated from, and economically unimportant to, the core of the global economy and decision-making can be made to count in the decisionmaking centres of the global political economy through networking and ‘transnational exchanges of information and personnel mediated by new communication technologies’ in the 1990s. Global civil society approaches tend to adopt a strong, and open, normative tone. Civil society is talked up as an arena for the creation of regimes of tolerance, civility and pluralism and there is an assumption that activism within civil society straightforwardly promotes these values globally (Kaldor 2000b). According to Kaldor (2000b: 195) the emergence of transnational civil society ‘represents a demand for a radical extension of democracy across national and social frontiers’.

State power and transnational activism 35 Furthermore, it is the ‘political project’ of ‘those who are trying to exert a constructive influence over local life in a globalized world’. It therefore aims to effect both international action and global regulation (Kaldor 2000a: 209). The dark side of civil society is effectively ignored (see Kopecky and Mudde 2003). Instead, civil society movements are seen as offering an ideological and substantive alternative to processes of elite-led development and democracy by promoting a vision of global society regulated along principles of citizenship and rights. Global civil society, then, is understood as a tool for the creation of bottom-up democratization, suggesting that democratization itself is a counter-hegemonic project fuelled through sustained activism from below (Haynes 1997). Transnational studies Global civil society notions merge relatively easily with perspectives on the state and the role of activism developed from within transnational studies, a field which is broadly structured around the study of cross-border and global connections and which challenges state-centric views of the world (Vertovec 2001). While global civil society approaches are ‘strong’ in their endorsement of activism as a fount of democracy, however, transnational studies tend to take a more agnostic approach. Less directly interested in questions of democracy or the state, transnational studies have developed sociological and spatial analyses of transnational networks, including crime and terrorism (Hoffman 1999), sex workers (Kempadoo and Doezema 1998) and domestic workers (Anderson 2000). Few studies have addressed directly the ‘political’, narrowly understood, within transnational networks, with the exception of Sklair (1995; 2001), whose work has centred on the emergence of a transnational capitalist class. Of course, the central problem with positing transnational studies as a defined ‘field’ at all is that it implies that there can be one overarching explanation of transnational activities. In fact, as Vertovec (2001: 5) points out, ‘transnational social formations are [not] of a common type or function’. Nevertheless, there is a methodological integrity within transnational studies, which culminates in a common emphasis on networks and relationships between individuals and groups within the network. This can easily elide into a disregard for the ways in which power is displayed and exercised, especially forms of institutional or state power (Massey 1999). As Albrow (1998) comments, the field draws mainly on anthropology, history, geography, international relations and sociology; as a result, the centrality of the state and of governing institutions for the reproduction of power can easily be overlooked. So, for Sklair (1995), the dominant forces of the global system are, on the one hand, transnational capitalism and its corollary, a still-evolving transnational political class, and, on the other, transnational civil society. The state, it would appear, is unimportant. Transnational civil society is pitted not against the state, with the object of transforming it, but simply against the forces of transnational capitalism in a world of anarchy. Not surprisingly, as a result, transnational studies can easily fall into the trap of exaggerating the transformative capacities of global activism. Transnational social movements are studied within their cultural and

36 Jean Grugel social context, with considerably less emphasis on their political environment. The result is a tendency to overemphasize the imaginative capacity of the subject to shape and change her/his reality through empowerment, while the power-laden structures embedded within national institutions and states go largely unexplored. This emphasis on the movement, separated out of its structural context, is evident in the work of Cohen (1998). For Cohen (1998: 5) transnational social movements are free-floating organizations, currently in a process of moving away from ‘a primary concern with issues relating to inequalities in power, ownership and income between classes, towards a growing focus on the construction of cultural and personal identities’. Transnational social movements have thus been uncoupled from states and the domestic sphere of classes and other social and political conflicts that gave birth to them. Cohen argues that they are no longer ‘interested in gaining direct control over state power’, mainly because the state is no longer especially important. At the same time, he offers a romantic vision of transnational activism, that by its very nature, engenders ‘more democratic and participatory forms than those characteristic of earlier [state-centred protest] movements’ (Cohen 1998: 5). By talking up the ‘transnational’ in this way, Cohen ignores the site where most social activism still takes place: within the boundaries of the nation-state. Despite their increased visibility and reach – especially in developed countries – global social movements remain limited in scope, themes and geographical reach and have cyclical moments of intensity. Empirical studies of transnational activism, such as that of Fox (2000) in Mexico, suggest stronger patterns of national activism. Fox (2000) found that Mexican civil society organizations remain primarily confined to the national arena. This is despite the intense period of integration into the global political economy that Mexico has experienced since the 1990s, including integration with the United States and Canada through NAFTA, and global public support for the Chiapas uprising. This challenges the assumptions that global integration is leading rapidly to the emergence of a genuinely trans-border civil society. For Fox (2000: 1), ‘compared to the pace of binational integration among other actors – including manufacturers, investment bankers, toxic waste producers, drug dealers, TV magnates, immigrant families and national policy-makers – both the degree and impact of binational civil society collaboration has been quite limited’. If transnational activism remains limited in Mexico, where important opportunities for transnationalizing activism have been created, caution must be exercised before assumptions are made about the strength of transnational networks in other developing countries where lines of global communications and opportunities are thinner. Institutional approaches to transnational activism Both the global civil society approach and transnational studies offer considerable insights into the ways in which transnational networks operate and, in some cases, into their normative underpinnings. Transnational studies offer a way to map the operations of trans-border networks, to measure the scale of transnational activities

State power and transnational activism 37 and to analyse the kind of ‘social capital’ that networks can generate. Global civil society approaches draw attention to the utopian and counter-hegemonic nature of many contemporary transnational movements and position them within the traditions of popular struggles for democracy. Nevertheless, both fail to take either the state or global institutions seriously enough. Social movement theory, developed by Tilly (1984) and Tarrow (1998), offers an alternative approach. For Tarrow (1998) the success of social movements depends fundamentally upon the dynamic and framing of protest and the cycles of contention that develop between social movements and states. More recently, this approach has been adapted to fit transnational activism (Tarrow 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Transnational social movements, such as human rights networks, environmental movements and women’s organizations, create networks and develop mobilizing structures as before; but now they engage in cross-border collaboration in order to pressurize states and global institutions. Moreover, the dynamic of action can be transnational, as well as national. Research proceeds by separating activism into its different policy areas, identifying the particular actors from transnational, state and civil society organizations that are involved in policy-making networks and analysing the contingent and structural relationships that develop between them. (For a discussion of this methodology, see Keck and Sikkink 1998). The transnational is not understood as an alternative sphere to national politics, but rather as a complement to embeddedness in national politics. Tarrow (1995) has argued that what are taken to be transnational movements are frequently merely ‘political exchanges between fundamentally domestic communities’. Effective transnational networking, in fact, requires groups to be nationally legitimate, although issues may be framed differently within transnational exchanges. Keck (1995), for example, shows how the movement of rubber-tappers in Brazil framed their activities nationally in the context of land rights, whereas they were presented as an environmental issue outside the country in order to map onto the concerns of the transnational environmental lobby. Using a similar approach, O’Brien et al. (2000) have analysed the extent to which globalization is creating new opportunities for transnational activism and civil society networks in relation to global governance institutions. They argue that, in particular policy arenas, increased interaction between states, international institutions and civil society organizations leads to the development of ‘complex multilateralism’. These greater opportunities have not led to a power shift towards civil society groups, however. O’Brien et al. (2000) note that complex multilateralism has a ‘differential impact upon the role of the state depending upon the state’s preexisting position in the international system. It tends to reinforce the role of powerful states and weaken the role of developing states’ (O’Brien et al. 2000: 6). It offers incorporation to some civil society-based actors who become part of the governance machinery, while counter-hegemonic movements have had only ‘limited successes’. Similar conclusions were reached in a recent comparative study of the relationships between civil society and the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Casaburi, Riggirozzi, Tuozzo and Tussie (2000: 507) conclude that the impact of civil society groups is actually quite limited:

38 Jean Grugel Participation is almost exclusively limited to social assistance projects . . . [and] there remains a hard core of loans related to adjustment and specific sector reforms with little or no involvement of civil society. Participation mechanisms are applied selectively. This means that, at best, it is possible to identify only pockets of participation. They conclude that states have the capacity to block civil society participation, even in issue areas where the global governance institutions are broadly open to it. They also suggest that governments have been far more reluctant than governance institutions to encourage access to information and participation in programmes centred on structural adjustment and institutional reform – and that they are powerful enough to stop it (Casaburi, Riggirozzi, Tuozzo and Tussie 2000: 509). There is an important insight in this literature, which needs to be underlined, namely that states are able to act to obstruct and to limit civil society access. Yet elsewhere states have acted as allies to global social movements, for example in human rights networks. The role states play, then, is contingent on issue area and structural context; it also depends upon the particular mix of interests with issue area in particular states and their permeability to pressure. Moreover, while global governance is undoubtedly increasingly important (especially rhetorically), there is no evidence to support the view that global institutions are more powerful than Western states. Frequently, indeed, in many policy-making areas, governance institutions are only as effective as states allow them to be. States can frustrate initiatives, if they go against the grain of their interests. These observations are consonant with Risse-Kappen’s (1995) paradigm of transnational activity. He observed that the impact of transnational actors depends particularly on institutional factors within the domestic polity and the extent to which transnational actors operate in an environment which is densely regulated by international institutions, thereby providing arenas for transnational activities (see also Risse 2001).

Conclusion: the centrality of the state for transnational activism My point in this chapter has been to argue that states matter a great deal. National institutions are mainly vigorous, with the rare exception of failed or very underdeveloped states. States control considerable material and ideological resources despite the rising trends of transnational activism, the transformation of state powers and the movement towards global governance. Western states, in particular, have adapted to the challenges of the new global economy and show no signs of abandoning the quest for global regulation and the reproduction of a world order forged in their own interests. What does all this mean for transnational activism? First, the space for civil society activism is not neutral terrain but is shaped by, amongst other actors, states themselves. Opportunities for civil society-based organizations, furthermore, are contingent on issue area. Second, it is wrong to assume a fixed boundary between ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ forms of activism. The ‘transnational’ is not a totally separate space from the ‘national’. Transnational civil society is made up more of exchanges and actions between and by groups of

State power and transnational activism 39 domestic organizations than exchanges between fully transnationalized entities. Transnational civil society networks are composed of a range of nationally situated actors engaged in cooperation. Fox and Brown (1998: 30) capture this well when they make the analytical distinction between an ideal-type transnational social movement and real-world ‘politically contingent, tactical coalitions . . . limited to fragile fax and cyberspace communications’. Global civil society, especially as a grand project of democratization, remains a normative aspiration. Ignoring the centrality of the state, then, leads to poor analysis and possibly to lesseffective form of activism. But there are other, equally cogent, reasons to take the state into account. Despite the critique of the state contained within participatory theories of democracy and the ambiguities towards the state that many activists feel, states have an important place in citizenship struggles. States have the power to make policies that change people’s lives in immediate and meaningful ways and to enhance and protect their rights. It is difficult to imagine the establishment of democratic systems, human rights regimes, policies of economic redistribution and the organized protection of citizens without states. The task of activism must be, therefore, to make states effective and efficient instruments for their community, not to eliminate them. The state remains the central actor in the enactment and implementation of progressive policies of transformation – as well as the principal barrier to participation and equity. Activism, whether transnational or national, requires engagements with states to bring about change, especially when activism aims to promote eminently political tasks such as deepening democracy or furthering human rights. Moreover, as Kymlicka (1999) argues, there is little evidence to suggest that people actually want transnational rather than national forms of governance. For activists, in sum, bypassing the state is simply not feasible.

Note 1 This is important in light of Smith’s discussion (this volume) of most INGOs being located in the West or North.

References Ackerley, B. and Moller Okin, S. (1999) ‘Feminist Social Criticism and the International Movements for Women’s Rights as Human Rights’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Albrow, M. (1998) ‘Frames and Transformations in Transnational Studies’, paper delivered to the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme Seminar, Faculty of Anthropology and Geography, University of Oxford, 8 May. Anderson, B. (2000) Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour, London: Zed Books. Beetham, D. (1992) ‘Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization’, Political Studies XL special issue. Carothers, T. (1991) In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Casaburi, G., Riggirozzi, M.P., Tuozzo, M.F. and Tussie, D. (2000) ‘Multilateral

40 Jean Grugel Development Banks, Governments and Civil Society: Chiaroscuros in a Triangular Relationship’, Global Governance 6:25–47. Cerny, P.G. (1990) The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State, London: Sage. Cohen, R. (1998) ‘Transnational Social Movements: An Assessment’, paper presented to the Transnational Communities Programme, Seminar Series, Faculty of Anthropology and Geography, University of Oxford, 19 June. Cox, R.W. (1987) Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New York: Columbia University Press. ——(1997) ‘Democracy in Hard Times: Economic Globalization and the Limits to Liberal Democracy’, in A. McGrew (ed.) The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press. Evans, P. (1997) ‘The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization’, World Politics 50(1): 62–80. Falk, R. (1998) ‘Global Civil Society: Perspectives, Initiatives, Movements’, Oxford Development Studies 26(1): 99–110. Fox, J. (2000) ‘Assessing Binational Civil Society Coalitions: Lessons from the Mexico–US Experience’, paper presented to Latin American Studies Association (LASA), 16–18 March 2000, Miami, FL. Fox, J. and Brown, L.D. (eds) (1988) The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements, London: MIT Press. Goverde, H., Cerny, P., Haugaard, M. and Lentner, H. (2000) Power in Contemporary Politics, London: Sage. Grugel J. (2001) Democratization: A Critical Introduction, London: Palgrave. ——(forthcoming) ‘Democratization and IPE: Towards Taking the Political Seriously’, in N Phillips (ed.) Globalising IPE, London: Palgrave. Haynes, J. (1997) Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World, Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, D. (1995) Democracy and Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, A.D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press. Hoffman, B. (1999) Inside Terrorism, London: Indigo Press. Holm, H. and Sorensen, G. (1995) Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Boulder, CO: Reinner. Huber, E. (1995) ‘Assessment of State Strength’, in P. Smith (ed.) Latin America in Comparative Analysis: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hurrell, A. and Woods, N. (1995) ‘Globalization and Inequality’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 42(3): 466–72. Jessop, R. (1990) State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, Cambridge: Polity Press. Kaldor, M. (2000a) ‘Civilising Globalization? The Implications of the “Battle in Seattle”’, Millennium: Journal of International Relations 29(1): 105–21. ——(2000b) ‘Transnational Civil Society’, in T. Dunn and N. Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keane, J. (ed.) (1988) Civil Society and the State, London: Verso. Keck, M. (1995) ‘Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the Rubber Tappers of Acre’, Comparative Politics 27(4): 409–24. Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kempadoo, K. and Doezma, J. (eds) (1998) Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance and Redefinition, London: Routledge.

State power and transnational activism 41 Kenny, M. (2001) ‘Interpreting “Global Civil Society”’, paper presented to the Conference Global Civil Society: Critical Engagements, University of Aberystwyth, September 2001. Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (eds) (2003) The Uncivil Side of Civil Society, London: Routledge. Kymlicka, W. (1999) ‘Citizenship in an Era of Globalization: Commentary on Held’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds) Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lijphart, A. (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty One Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press. Lindblom, C. (1977) Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books. Lukes, S. (1974) Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan. McMichael, P. (2000) Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge. Mann, M. (1993) The Sources of Social Power, vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760– 1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Massey, D. (1999) ‘Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of Time-Space’, in A. Brah, M.J. Hickman and M. Mac an Ghaill (eds) Global Futures, Migration, Environment and Globalization, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Murphy, C. (2000) ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood’, International Affairs 76(4): 789–804. O’Brien, R., Goetz, A.M., Scholte J.A. and Williams, M. (2000) Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Payne, A. (forthcoming) ‘Governance and IPE’, in N. Phillips (ed.) Globalising IPE, London: Palgrave. Radcliffe, S., Laurie, N. and Andolina, R. (2001) ‘“We are all Indians?” Ecuadorian and Bolivian Transnational Indigenous Communities’, project funded under the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme, October 1998 – December 2000. Risse, T. (2001) ‘Transnational Actors, Networks, and Global Governance’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds) Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage. Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robinson, W. (1998) ‘Beyond Nation State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology and the Challenge of Transnational Studies’, Sociological Forum, 13(4): 397–408. Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, E.O. (eds) (1992) Governance Without Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. and Stephens, J. (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shapiro, I. and Hacker-Cordon, C. (1999) ‘Promises and Disappointments: Reconsidering Democracy’s Value’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds) Democracy’s Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sklair, L. (1995) Sociology of the Global System, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ——(2001) The Transnational Capitalist Class, Oxford: Blackwell. Skocpol, T. (1985) ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in P. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer and T. Skocpol (eds) Bringing the State Back In , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strange, S. (1992) ‘States, Firms, and Diplomacy’, International Affairs, 68(1): 10–21. Tarrow, S. (1995) ‘Fishnets, Internets and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational

42 Jean Grugel Collective Action’, Occasional Paper, Madrid: Juan March Foundation, Centre for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Winter. ——(1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, L. (1999) ‘Globalization and Civil Society – Continuities, Ambiguities and Realities in Latin America’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7(1): 189–202. Tilly, C. (1984) ‘Social Movements and National Politics’, in C. Bright and S. Harding (eds) Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Vertovec, S. (2001) ‘Transnational Social Formations: Towards Conceptual CrossFertilization’, paper presented at Workshop on ‘Transnational Migration: Comparative Perspectives’, Princeton University, 30 June – 1 July. Wade, R. (2001) ‘Making the World Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty’, World Development 29(8): 1435–42. Weiss, L. (1998) The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press.

3

Governance regimes and the politics of discursive representation1 Margaret E. Keck

Like climate change, globalization is a very broad category for a set of changes whose particular impact at any site cannot be predicted from the global average. In fact, many of the developments that over the past 20 years or so have been attributed to globalization look quite different from each other. The rhetoric of globalization seems to point towards homogenization driven by global capital flows, integration of economic policies, and constriction of policy choices (‘there is no alternative’). Global optimists see the coupling of liberal economic policies with a convergence on liberal democracy, while pessimists see the enrichment of a few and a race to the bottom for everyone else. Still others point to a parallel process of globalization in coalitions developing among civil society associations. These groups may promote sets of global norms and codes of conduct as checks on the behaviour of states and/or corporations (a positive outcome of globalization), or collaborate to resist its impact on particular groups or places. But like the notion of globalization itself, these general characterizations of its dynamics and characteristics do not help us much to evaluate shifts in the opportunities for political action in any given setting or issue area. Much of the discussion of transnational activism to date has focused on adversarial politics, centring on issue areas involving the protection of vulnerable peoples, species, or ecosystems, or the mitigation of global inequalities. Advocacy networks working on the former have incorporated social movement organizations, foundations, members of the media, and allies in governments and international organizations to strengthen the forms of international intervention taken (Keck and Sikkink 1998a). While most transnational advocacy campaigns have involved opposing abuses in less powerful countries, occasionally the lens has been reversed, as in the international campaign opposing the death penalty, in which the principal target has been the United States.2 Campaigns around global inequalities have produced a range of tactics from protest to lobbying to the creation of counterinstitutions like the World Social Forum. Significantly, these have mobilized more institutionalized civil society organizations like trade unions, as well as some thirdworld governments. Yet clearly not all instances in which activists have linked global and domestic arenas have been adversarial. Some have involved efforts to shape and participate in new institutional forms whose adoption sometimes puts an international imprimatur on the struggles of domestic actors. This is the active side of the process of diffusion

44 Margaret E. Keck that organizational sociologists refer to as isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1983, 1991). Discussions of international diffusion recognize a variety of macro-level variables that affect the spread of new ideas – such factors as geographical settings, societal culture, political conditions and global uniformity (Wejnert 2002), and the importance of certain kinds of networks of actors – advocacy networks, professional groupings, and the like – as carriers of ideas (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Haas 1992). All of these contribute to the proliferation of new kinds of formal organizations – what Jepperson and Meyer (1991: 209) call ‘a manic outburst of rationality, created under considerable competitive urgency and, for the same reason, unlikely to work as chartered’. New organizations, in turn, may change the institutional environment and network linkages of additional groups of activists, who begin to develop transnational practices as a result. In this chapter, I suggest that new kinds of associative arrangements are becoming increasingly characteristic of a set of policy issues that have in common both a technical and sectoral logic and the existence of contention over how to ensure management in the public interest. Many of these issues and debates have important transnational dimensions. Into this category fall a number of resource management, environmental and public health issues. These are issue areas where information is both dispersed and central to decision-making, there are high levels of uncertainty, problems often have more than one cause, and their resolution usually requires collaboration among public and private actors. Neither market mechanisms nor state mandates (singly or jointly) seem capable of providing comprehensive solutions. These are areas of experimentation both in patterns of relations between public and private organizations, and in the political representation of ideas and interests. Changes in international society have increasingly involved the diversification of relations between actors and structures. A variety of functional organizations have arisen to facilitate transnational exchanges about ideas and strategies for policy reform. Some of these discussions take place within multifunctional organizations – the UN regional economic commissions, the European Union, the Organization of American States – and some are more specialized. However, the diffusion of ideas internationally among purposive actors in functional areas also gives rise to changes in the domestic institutional arrangements that pertain in those areas, the actors in which become in turn de facto participants in the transnational discussion. I call these emerging structures governance regimes. The concept of governance employed here implies more than simply a flexible approach to regulation; mapping the interactions involved requires that we relax the dichotomy between public and private, and between state and civil society. Governance may imply greater flexibility in coordination of a broader range of interests than formal government structures may normally admit, but it is hardly institution-less. Seeking flexible mechanisms for brokering negotiations between private and public actors, as well as between sub-national, national, and supra-national political arenas, many policy entrepreneurs have promoted organizations of an associational type, involving greater or lesser degrees of formalization. In the sectoral governance schemes on which this discussion is based, a kind of associative stakeholders’ council has become a characteristic organizational form. In

The politics of discursive representation 45 these, ‘representatives’ of key sectors are charged with the task of pooling information, building consensus, and solving coordination problems. Their decision-making authority varies, as do the mechanisms by which representatives are chosen, and the definition of what is to be represented. Because the members tend to represent positions rather than populations, ideas rather than constituencies, I refer to this institutional process as discursive representation.3 Whose stakes are to be represented on such councils becomes a crucial, sometimes contested, issue. People who are relatively powerless in most domains of public life may be granted a respected place, within a delimited sphere. In internationalized discussions of forest policy in developing countries, for example, a place is set at the table for indigenous peoples or other groups whose livelihoods come from extraction of forest products. While sitting at the table, those groups may even have a significant impact on the formulation of policy for that sector. However, despite their having easier access to, say, the president of the World Bank, than do highly placed politicians from their countries, their participation in those discussions may very well have no impact whatsoever on their ability to accomplish anything else locally or nationally. The international diffusion of associative forms of issue governance may facilitate transnational activism on the part of a broader range of actors than those who initially promoted the establishment of a governance regime. It creates a template, a set of homologous roles that are legible to counterparts elsewhere (however deceptive that apparent legibility may be), providing incentives for exchange of information and experiences among activists. International conferences bring people together; information brokers seek out subscribers for listservers; networks of professionals give rise to parallel networks, just as UN theme conferences spawned NGO conferences alongside the official ones. The chapter represents a preliminary effort to explore these questions, and proceeds in three parts. First, I ask why we need this kind of a concept, and what it can help us examine. Second, what is a governance regime? Finally, how might we think about transnational activism in the context of these emerging institutional forms?

Diversification, dichotomies, dimensions Political agendas have diversified both vertically (with attributions migrating to both supra- and sub-national institutions and arenas) and horizontally, with increasing numbers of sectorally defined issue areas aggregating expertise, resources and practices across boundaries. Multiple co-existing and interpenetrating structures influence both allocation (control over the material world) and authority (control over the social world) (Giddens 1984: 256–62). Spatial and temporal dimensions of politics are no longer the ‘distinct, disjoint, and mutually exclusive territorial formations’ that John Ruggie identified with the modern international polity (Ruggie 1998: 172). The territorial and functional logics of these structures are not insulated from each other. They operate concurrently, and individuals – embedded in networks – employ (and simultaneously reshape) both. The contradictions generated

46 Margaret E. Keck become an important source of creativity (though not necessarily of stability) in the system. They bring new ideas, and provide the opportunity for ‘venue shopping’, a quintessential action of political entrepreneurs (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). We have to approach these phenomena with an analytical toolkit that highlights institutions and institutional rules, but which recognizes that these may be multiple and contradictory rather than congruent (Stark 1996; Suchman and Edelman 1997). Our tools must allow us to move easily between individual and organizational/ institutional levels of analysis, and the approach must be unabashedly sociological in its theorizing. The actors in these settings are neither abstract, nor interchangeable; they are situated individuals whose networks of individual and institutional linkages categorize them in others’ eyes, and are constitutive of their self-understandings, jointly with their ideas and their interests.4 Similarly, regimes and institutions have histories, change, and evolve (Ruggie 1998; Clemens and Cook 1999). Finally, the notions of space embedded in territorially based and functionally based institutional logics differ: ‘Space in itself may be primordially given, but the organization and meaning of space is a product of social translation, transformation, and experience’ (Soja 1989: 79–80). A network perspective has distinct advantages for mapping the intersections among individuals, organizations and institutional processes that political scientists often treat as discrete phenomena. Although institutions structure the relationships among individuals, they are structured by them as well. The relationships and resources in networks – social and professional networks, for example – enable or constrain action. Any individual will simultaneously belong to multiple networks (Sewell 1992; Lin 2001). Network analysis can involve relational or positional aspects; in the latter regard, formal, quantitative studies of network structures have produced important insights regarding the impact of such factors as centrality in networks, weakness or strength of ties (Granovetter 1973), and how building bridges between previously separate networks (over ‘structural holes’) may facilitate innovation, however fragile those bridges may be (Burt 1992; 2002). Networks are artefacts of human action, as well as being its enabling element (see Diani 1995; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). The dynamic tension in this duality of structures provides opportunities and resources for political action and change (Sewell 1992). To mapping the intersections between domestic and international policy arenas, and recognizing territorial and functional logics, must be added a third set of bordercrossings, this time between state and civil society. Liberal and constructivist international relations theory has widened the field of actors deemed relevant to understanding international politics. Nonetheless, because their challenge to realism questions how unitary the state is in its external face, many leave unchallenged dichotomies that are increasingly problematic in the study of domestic politics, e.g. distinctions between state and society, and between private and public (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Evans, 1997). The blurring of the boundaries between these categories is occurring simultaneously in domestic and international societies, is mutually reinforcing, and is of fundamental importance for this analysis. Let me give a brief example drawn from the area of water resource management, research on which has generated much of the reflection contained in this chapter.

The politics of discursive representation 47 For decades, specialists have debated the best ways to allocate and protect freshwater resources, such that they serve the various needs of people for drinking water, farmers for irrigation, power plants for hydroelectricity, fishers for a place for fish to swim, sailors and other leisure users for amenities, and (more recently) a wide variety of natural processes for environmental services. Hydrologists, ecologists, public health specialists, and most recently human rights activists have all developed advocacy positions on water issues. International institutions have long been involved in promoting new ideas in this area, beginning in the 1970s with the call for policies that enabled multiple use of water resources, and moving in the 1980s and 1990s to approaches that stressed property rights and decentralization. In Latin America, the CEPAL-sponsored 1978 Mar de Plata Conference and many subsequent ones promoted first multiple use, then decentralization of management to river-basin levels. At least from that time on, Brazilian specialists in the area frequented international conferences, brought these ideas back to their home institutions, and tried to influence national water policy in similar directions. For a variety of reasons their early efforts to rationalize Brazil’s rather chaotic water management systems failed. Beginning in the mid-1980s, a group of water engineers in São Paulo’s water management agency, working with social scientists and environmental planners both inside and outside the state, developed an unusual strategy for bringing about water reform. It involved the deliberate politicization of the issue, inviting pressure from societal actors inside Brazil and from international institutions, and making use of the prestige associated with foreign models. The water engineers and their allies mobilized several quite distinct networks in support of a model of water management that would meet two valued criteria. It was to be rational, that is, congruent with professional understandings of causal relations and cost-benefit optimization, and participatory, that is, responsive to the explicit inputs of a wide range of community representatives and stakeholders to the management process. The São Paulo water reform law was passed in 1991, and began to be implemented over the next decade. Subsequently, national and international networks involving some of the same individuals and institutions were involved in bringing about similar reform processes in other Brazilian states and at the federal level. The water reforms led to the creation of a variety of new decentralized formal organizations, whose composition varies from state to state but whose mandate is essentially the same: to coordinate a process of sectoral governance, in which the public interest is defined and negotiated among a mix of purportedly representative individuals chosen (in varying ways) from ‘relevant’ public and private-sector institutions and groups. This coordination process is both decentralized and continuous. It is decentralized because decisions about priority actions and investments for a particular river basin (or in a few cases another management unit) are taken in that basin or unit. It is continuous, because the governance regime in creation draws sustenance from a whole set of international ideas, institutions and practices in whose consolidation it in turn participates. In a number of Brazilian states, especially in the north-east, its creation relies almost entirely on international funding as well.

48 Margaret E. Keck

What is a governance regime? How can we identify and map the relations between relevant actors in an issue area? Where interactions across boundaries involve exchanges of ideas, influence, expertise and money, this can be a daunting task. The creation of institutional arrangements to facilitate coordination around particular problems involves substantive judgements about the definition of roles, as well as procedural choices about their occupants. If purposive action requires the collaboration of ‘stakeholders’, then there must be at least provisional agreement on what the stakes are, who holds them, and their relative weight. This, however, is not a technical determination; it is a highly political one, as any set of deliberations is likely to affect others, and the level at which deliberations occur becomes a crucial determinant of how issues are framed and stakes identified. Ideas are crucial. Blyth’s characterization (2002: 10) of the role of economic ideas is apropos here as well: Since structures do not come with an instruction sheet, economic ideas . . . [provide] . . . the authoritative diagnosis as to what a crisis actually is and when a given situation actually constitutes a crisis. They diagnose ‘what has gone wrong’, and thus ‘what is to be done’. In short, the nature of a crisis is not simply given by its effects, dislocations, or casualties, nor are the actions of agents simply determined by their ‘given’ interests. Instead, the diagnosis of a situation as a ‘crisis’ by a particular set of ideas is a construction that makes the uncertainty that agents perceive explicable, manageable, and indeed, actionable. In water management and in other policy areas with high levels of technical content, clearly ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas) of scientists and related professions are important. However, they are only part of the story. The ‘relevant’ actors in an international transaction must include everyone from a given sector whose collaboration is required for institutions and transactions to function smoothly, and everyone whose opposition might derail them. Drawing from liberal international relations theory, I call these intersections governance regimes. The idea of regime adopts the standard notion of a set of principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures that govern relationships and cause expectations to converge in an issue area. The literature on governance varies by field, with differing levels of rigour. Nonetheless, everyone who uses the word does so to refer to a more fluid set of relationships between a broader set of actors than would normally pertain in the sphere of government, engaged in some kind of purposive activity. Certainly this is the notion of governance that accompanied the early development of regime theory. Governance may describe how public officials interact with private businesses, with NGOs, with informed individuals, and with whomever else seems able to advance a particular programme. In their introduction to a recent collection that uses the term in the title, Governance in a Globalizing World, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define governance as ‘the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group’ (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 12).5 In their view,

The politics of discursive representation 49 government is a sub-set of governance. They understand it as ‘networked minimalism’ – networked to avoid the rigidities of hierarchy, and minimalist ‘because governance at the global level will only be acceptable if it does not supersede national governance and if its intrusions into the autonomy of states and communities are clearly justified in terms of cooperative results’ (14). This definition functions well if we are to understand global governance as something that stands over and above governments. When it falls down, however, is when we start to recognize that global governance relations are not necessarily mediated by national governments; they permeate society, through the structures of both private and public life. If transnational governance takes place not only ‘above’ but also within national societies, then we need something else. Students of urban politics have been pondering a similar set of questions for some time.6 The concept of urban governance allowed them to move beyond a discussion of local authorities and their relationship with the state, to consider diverse forms of vertical and horizontal coordination of public action, negotiation and legitimation. At the same time, ‘using the concept of urban governance contains within it an ambiguity as to local citizenship and forms of representation. It should be clear that use of this concept is not at all intended to minimize the problem of local democracy and local public space’ (Le Galès 1995: 63, translation mine). Le Galès associates the following developments with decentralization in France: reinforcement of efforts at agglomeration; the multiplication of public–private partnerships; an invisible process of privatization of urban services; the development of medium- to long-term strategic planning; giving priority to economic development; the multiplication of contractual relationships; the growing role of sectoral specialists; the multiplication of relationships with Brussels (the European Union) and other European cities; the increasing power of private groups (66–7). Similarly, in Britain he noted the emergence of a local, non-elected semi-public sector in a large variety of public management areas (housing associations, training enterprise councils, urban development corporations) (69). In other words, local government in Great Britain has become one organ among many that organize and manage public services for consumers. In trying to pin down the concept, Le Galès argues that the term governance is normally used either too narrowly (to refer only to its effects on political choices and public actions) or too broadly. He wants to specify the concept as follows: We should use the governance concept sociologically, defining it on the one hand, in terms of a capacity to integrate and give form to local interests, organizations, and social groups, and on the other hand, in terms of a capacity to represent these groups to the outside world, to develop more or less unified strategies vis-à-vis the market, the state, other cities, and other levels of government. (90, my translation) There is a reasonably close affinity between this characterization and the kinds of relationships that European social scientists describe as policy networks or policy

50 Margaret E. Keck communities, and that Heclo referred to as issue networks (and indeed Le Galès cites some of this work). Both sectoral agglomerations of policy networks and coalitions gathered together around urban governance are reconfiguring public–private and state–society relationships – indeed, are transforming the meanings attributed to these. A governance regime, then, is the set of rules, relations and practices that configure actor expectations and relevant relationships within an issue area, and that establish boundaries (not always successfully) between that issue area and others. Actors are powerful if they can make the rules and determine which relationships are relevant; the more ‘natural’ this process appears, the more powerful the rule-maker. Governance regimes facilitate links between international and domestic politics when internationally accepted rules and standards govern domestic practices within a particular issue area. Who are the relevant actors in a governance regime? Where such a regime is instantiated in an institution or set of institutions – the Human Rights Commissions of the United Nations and other international organizations, the World Trade Organization – the relevant actors are those whose roles are recognized in the causal story (Stone 1989) on which the institution’s actions are based. These would include human rights organizations and human rights violators, lawyers and forensic scientists – organizations and individuals selected because of their particular expertise and because of their positions in networks in which the institution also figures. These are purposive organizations; the relevant actors, in principle, are those who participate in carrying out – or undermining – the organization’s mission. The existence of a transnational governance regime makes transnational resources and opportunities available to both state and societal actors in any given nation-state, sometimes in the process altering their positions within their own societies. Within a governance regime, groups in a society may be ‘recognized’ as relevant by transnational or international actors despite the fact that outside of the issue area covered by such governance arrangements, they may remain as powerless as before. This is a crucial trait, and I will come back to it later on. The most common way for a governance regime to be assimilated into a polity is through international treaties and covenants – e.g. on human rights, on intellectual property, on trade, on weights and measures, through professional norms and ideas, or through the promotion by powerful international actors of cross-cutting policy formulas. Of the latter, by far the most important for the current discussion are decentralization and privatization. During a governance regime’s formative period, there may be considerable jockeying for power between a wide array of domestic and international actors; we can see this now in the area of genetic resources. Efforts to insert the new advances in genetics within existing governance regimes – trade, intellectual property and the never very institutionalized practices of the food regime provoked by the green revolution – have failed when these proved entirely inadequate to deal with new challenges. What are important to note are the concurrent debates taking place in both domestic and international arenas, and the very fuzzy boundaries between the two. Important as well is that recognizing that governance regimes are incapable of

The politics of discursive representation 51 regulating genetic resources not only calls into existence efforts to generate new arrangements, but provides an opportunity to raise new questions about the ones that have proved inadequate. Governance regimes may be more or less open, depending on the way that ‘expertise’ is defined within them. Where relevant knowledge is restricted (or is claimed to be restricted) to a small group of cognoscenti, we may say that the governance regime is relatively closed; where local knowledge is deemed important, we can say that it is quite open. In more open governance regimes, it is easier for social movements and other claimants to demand (and win) a place at the tables where issues are discussed. In fact, the contest over what kinds of knowledge are relevant to a particular issue area is probably the crucial political struggle in shaping the associated institutional forms. Shifts in relationships between actors, changing norms and practices, reinterpretation of old practices in new ways – all of these grant a great deal of weight to ideas. First, new ideas identify and explain the problem in a particular way consequently and point towards particular kinds of solutions, and, second, through these ideas and the narratives produced from them we understand where we fit amidst these changes. The centrality of ideas is such that in the kinds of advisory or stakeholder councils that are typical of this form of governance, the seats are defined according to ideas about what should be represented. These may be contested: the battle over who will sit at the table is waged first in the realm of ideas, and only afterwards, if then, in the realm of bodies. Why in state environmental councils might there be seats allocated to environmental organizations, but not to community development organizations? It certainly does not reflect the numbers of people involved in each. It does involve a set of ideas about what an environmental council is and what it should do, and for the community development organization to win a seat on the council, it would have to fight for a redefinition of the council’s role. Because these ideas do not necessarily rely on the numbers of their supporters for their persuasive power, the kinds of associations that represent them can as easily be expressive in nature as representative in a more traditional sense. This explains the increasingly large role played by the voluntary sector – or NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in this kind of activity. What are represented in such advisory or stakeholder councils, then, are not so much organizations as ideas or positions – the stakes, in fact. Where seats at the table are allocated to particular sectors, as they normally are, there may even be meetings of organizations and/or individuals within the sector to choose representatives to sit on the council. These representatives may well not have a mandate to make binding agreements on behalf of the agencies or organizations in whose name they speak. This is discursive representation – whose primary purpose is to make audible the multiplicity of voices whose presence at the table is recognized as appropriate or necessary for deliberation to take place. Yet in their sectoral format, and often their formally defined functions as well, these bodies look very much like neo-corporatist arrangements, which similarly bring together the relevant actors within a particular realm of activity either in a consultative or a deliberative capacity (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). In their most

52 Margaret E. Keck authoritative form, neo-corporatist arrangements have typically brought labour and management organizations together with one or more state agencies. However, unlike those organizations, these councils lack the power to make binding agreements on behalf of their members that ‘representation’ used to imply. Instead, they constitute a kind of thin corporatism, where representation is of ideas rather than bodies, is discursive rather than mandated, and the expected output of discussion or negotiation is normative consensus rather than binding agreement. We might call them idea-brokers or agenda-setters; this is the work of governance. Further, they may promote collaborative practices among the organizations represented (Oberg 2002). What is striking, however, is the degree to which political actors and even some analysts refer to these bodies as if they were able to fulfil the functions that fully corporatist representation of stakeholder interests could do.

Implications for transnational activism Theorists working the borderlands between comparative politics and international relations have adopted various terms to discuss, on the one hand, the participation of non-state actors in international politics and, on the other, the use by domestic actors of international resources to influence politics at home (Tarrow 1998). Following work in the 1970s on transnational relations, and in the 1980s on epistemic communities, recent work on transnational activism has focused on pressure groups, advocacy networks and global civil society. Increasingly, NGOs and multilateral institutions proclaim the importance of the representation of ‘civil society’ in a wide variety of international and internationally influenced policy settings. However, what is meant by that term is not always the same thing. In Activists beyond Borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998a), Kathryn Sikkink and I focused on a sub-set of transnational activists, who create networks in order to collect and use information strategically. Their goal is to influence international institutions, and through them domestic states, to change their policies and behaviour. We referred to these as transnational advocacy networks, and found characteristic patterns to their activity. Among these was what we called the boomerang pattern. This is used when the citizens of a particular country, because of repression or their own weakness, are unable to influence the government of their own country, and join with an advocacy network. Members of this network then work to convince an international organization or a third party state to put pressure on the target state, either to correct abuses or to give its own citizens a hearing. The boomerang occurs when activists reach outside their own countries to gather strength to influence domestic politics. Subsequent studies by other scholars have explored these patterns further (Risse and Sikkink 2000; Guidry et al. 2000; Khagram et al. 2002; Bob 2001). Although Sikkink and I conceived of advocacy networks as including individuals from within governments and international organizations, as well as non-state actors, we attributed a central role to non-governmental organizations. At the same time, other scholars wrote of transnational social movements, as in the case of Jackie Smith and her colleagues 1997), or of global civil society (Wapner 1996; Lipschutz 1996; Edwards and Gaventa 2001). Indeed, the very idea of a global civil society has

The politics of discursive representation 53 inspired the formation of transnational organizations like CIVICUS (De Oliveira and Tandon 1994). But although social movement theory has provided unexpectedly robust tools for understanding the actions of transnational activists, theories that draw too neat a separation between societies and their states are even more problematic in the transnational sphere than they are domestically. Much of the writing on global civil society seems to fall into this category. In both domestic and international politics, the role of activist is not reserved for actors within civil society; highly motivated, principled individuals and groups located inside state institutions frequently initiate, support and ensure the continuity of campaigns to change practices, policies or institutions. Often they do this in collaboration with partners in civil society, but they do not always do so. The simple fact that large numbers of state employees go home at night and participate, along with their fellow citizens, in a multiplicity of social and political associations that by any definition are part of civil society illustrates the complexity of the problem. Similarly, a portrayal of the international system that evokes images of layers seems to me fundamentally inaccurate. The picture of a growing layer or sphere of civil society, for example, in which citizens and their associations gradually gain power over their lives, fomenting new cultural and political possibilities and identities, counterposed to a layer involving the world of states, with the world of international organizations occupying a somewhat ambiguous position in between, is attractive, perhaps even serves to mobilize people. But from a purely descriptive standpoint, and even more from an analytical one, it is simply wrong. However important it remains for democratic theory, a dichotomous view of state and civil society does not give us analytical purchase over what we see in many transnational relationships – or even, in fact, in domestic ones. There are too many state functionaries strategizing together with NGOs, social movement organizations, professional organs, foundations, and other allies, and there are too many societal actors strategizing against them. What binds these people together – what identifies them as participants in the same process? Although differently located individuals may be linked through shared values, or by shared professional beliefs or commitments, they may also be linked through practice – through awareness of participation in related problem-solving activities. Because their goals are not always the same, the process frequently involves competition and conflict, and not just collaboration – but it is the same process, and they are engaged in the same conversation. In the case of Brazilian water-sector reformers, for example, differently motivated individuals formed a strategic alliance to advance both values and professional goals by promoting institutional change, in a context significantly enabled by international developments in the sector. This did not mean that they reached agreement on particular remedies, but they began to build a common context within which to argue about them. One source of theoretical ambiguity in the discussion of civil society is the conflation of two discourses: one in which civil society is primarily understood as a sphere of political freedom and deliberation (hence a potential sphere of democratization), and one in which it is primarily understood as a sphere of private activity.

54 Margaret E. Keck The two conceptions share a belief in the potential of civil society organizations to generate innovative solutions to problems, create more flexible and reliable information pathways, and – often for quite different reasons – to do the job better than state agencies would do. However, in one conception, the measure of success is inclusiveness; in the other, it is effectiveness. In the development of stakeholder councils in the context of new governance regimes, this discursive ambiguity has, ironically, been a resource that has enabled less powerful actors to press for inclusion. How did that happen? Many important theorists writing about civil society from the 1980s on took their cues from political actors – in the case of Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, for example, from the Polish intellectuals who developed an explicit idea of civil society as a sphere of freedom, as a location for political life apart from the state, in which the seeds of a new and democratic society could be built. Similarly, the multiple contributions by Latin Americans and Latin Americanists to writing on civil society were formed out of the so-called ‘explosion of civil society’ in the near simultaneous transitions to democracy in the region. The importance of political events in these regions, and elsewhere, catapulted what had been terminology reserved for political theory into everyday political language. During the same period, the term entered the vocabulary of what is euphemistically called the ‘development community’. It entered some parts sooner than others: the Inter-American Foundation, for example, with its stress on grass-roots development, was an early champion of civil society. By the 1990s, however, the term was adopted by development actors not traditionally focused on grass-roots development, that is, the multilateral lending institutions. Organizations like the World Bank, under fire for projects that had not dealt adequately with environmental damage and/or refugee resettlement, embraced (sometimes cynically and sometimes quite genuinely) the notion of the ‘participation’ of civil society in development initiatives. At the very least, stakeholder councils could serve as a form of early warning when other such projects were going awry; at best, they could provide valuable information and input. Increasingly, projects and programmes financed by the World Bank and other multilateral agencies needed to have mechanisms that encouraged the participation and/or representation of civil society groups. Clearly, the real weight of such associative organizations is highly variable. Some are little more than window-dressing, and others have seized the opportunity to bring new levels of deliberative practice into public management. The expectation – sometimes even a mandate – that such organs will be created says very little about the practices they will develop. The establishment of governance institutions to facilitate negotiations between state agencies, private economic actors, and other interested parties (including organizations claiming to speak in the name of a diffuse public interest) does not eliminate the huge power disparities that continue to exist among these – though by changing the setting in which these are played out, it opens opportunities for reframing issues and reshaping alliances. Nonetheless, purposive actions in functional areas do not take place in a vacuum; they are influenced by – and in turn influence – other fields of power, whether functionally or territorially based.

The politics of discursive representation 55 International organizations may play a crucial role, but it may be quite contradictory. The actions of the World Bank in water management reform in Brazil’s north-east are an excellent example of this. The bank and other international financial institutions have provided significant funding in the past for irrigation works in the drought-prone region. During the 1990s, the World Bank began to require reforms in the system of water management as a condition for continued lending in this area. It thus provided crucial backup for professionals who were pushing for rationalization, and in some cases insisted on the creation of associative river-basin governance institutions when state government officials were reluctant to implement these. However, implanting the template of associative governance institutions in this region involved very high levels of intervention from the outside: in the absence of water users’ associations which could occupy seats on a stakeholder council, for example, World Bank money was sometimes used to hire consultants to organize them. The idea that both state and civil society should – and could – be reorganized in order to make a new resource management model function in ways that were technically rational, ecologically sound, and even democratic, is a startling, but not atypical, example of a sort of technocratic optimism. Interestingly enough, it is a technocratic optimism as common among NGOs as it is among World Bank officials. The establishment of representative bodies whose function is to aggregate discursive positions rather than translate the full weight of aggregated preferences lends itself to this kind of activity, in which individuals, groups and communities are asked to become organized in order to fill pre-established roles, instead of defining those roles in the process of becoming organized. When institutional forms are imported and implanted in this way, it is not very surprising when they do not work exactly as expected. However, it does not follow that they do not work at all. In different settings, new institutional arrangements are appropriated by local actors in different ways. A great deal more work needs to be done on how and why similar forms established for similar purposes lead to quite different outcomes. For transnational activism, governance regimes and their affinity for discursive representation present an opportunity and a danger. The increasing vogue for associative organs that facilitate information-sharing and problem-solving among a wide variety of actors presents an opportunity to ‘amplify the voices’ of those groups and sectors they wish to support – be they rubber-tappers or indigenous populations, or business associations and think-tanks promoting privatization. Sharing information and experiences among individuals and organizations involved in solving similar problems in different countries enriches the debate, facilitates the spread of new ideas, and helps to empower groups that might not otherwise have access to such information. The danger is that the standardization of particular templates of roles and positions that ought to be present in such representational processes fails to recognize very significant differences between actors assumed to be homologous, their insertion in local realities, and the characteristics of the settings in which they act. Transnational activists ignore the specificity of local political realities at their peril.

56 Margaret E. Keck

Conclusions Despite our growing recognition of the importance of transnational influences of all kinds in domestic politics, our political analyses still suffer from the shortcomings in perspective imposed by disciplinary and sub-disciplinary divides. We have many very good studies of transnational networks of experts – knowledge brokers of various kinds – dedicated to the diffusion of particular policy models in specific areas. However, we tend still to be satisfied with linking international with domestic networks of experts, showing at best the existence of transnational policy communities. While an important first step, this analysis should be taken much further. To remain focused on the policy-brokers themselves is to maintain an artificial separation between the dissemination of ideas and their assimilation into institutions in new settings. What do domestic policy entrepreneurs in these new settings do with the ideas, and what happens to them in contexts that may be quite different from the ones where they originated? International relations scholars frequently see this part of the analysis as out of their purview, while for comparative politics scholars it is too often the only part of the story that matters. Both of these partial perspectives are likely to miss important elements in the story. When ideas spread by transnational knowledge-brokers enter domestic settings, the linkages between domestic and international settings do not disappear; quite often they grow stronger over time. International models are political tools for domestic actors in national political contests; quite often there are multiple, interconnected games going on in which the different interests and goals of international and domestic actors are tacitly negotiated in concrete settings. Within domestic contests, there are frequently international actors involved on all sides of a dispute. International NGOs, professional associations, multilateral lending agencies and foreign governments, as well as other international actors, are significant domestic actors in the politics of a great many countries, as Douglas Chalmers has pointed out in his work on internationalized domestic politics. But this does not mean that domestic actors are passive recipients of a variety of international inputs; on the contrary, domestic actors actively court and make use of the resources and alliance possibilities brought to them from abroad to advance their own struggles. This continuity of the international–domestic politics linkage, as part of politics within the domestic institutions and processes of specific countries (and feeding back into the international system through learning) requires a great deal more study. The water case shows quite clearly that the spread of governance regimes in policy areas is not simply the imposition of a set of ideas on a recipient setting. In Brazil, a federal system where there is significant regional variation in political, as well as socio-economic characteristics, decentralization of water management essentially means the negotiation of a more or less common set of policy ideas into a very wide range of existing policy and political practices. Participation by stakeholders, as called for by the model, means something very different in different settings, depending on local political and social organization, on the strength of existing political and social networks, and on the variety of problems to be addressed. This opens up a huge range of possible outcomes. Or take the case of neighbouring

The politics of discursive representation 57 Bolivia, where privatization of the water management concession occurred without attention to the ‘participatory’ dimensions of the international model being diffused. In 2000, civic unrest in Cochabamba actually succeeded in overturning the contract between Bechtel and the Bolivian government. Although a variety of international institutions had supported the water privatization scheme, on the side of its opponents were arrayed Global Exchange and other transnational advocacy groups; the leader of the rebellion was awarded the Letelier-Moffit Human Rights Award in 2000 and the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2001. The latter example also points to the permeability of boundaries of governance regimes. As internationalized policy arenas, they are more vulnerable than other domestic policy arenas to boomerang-style campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998a), and to the involvement of a variety of international actors. While proponents of particular policy choices generally base their arguments on technical criteria, it is rarely the technical criteria that determine the success or failure of policy implementation (except, of course, where bad technical choices are involved). Instead, it is the extent to which policy ideas become politically embedded, through the commitment of networks of significant actors in the settings where they are to be carried out, that make the most difference. Here, the consensus-building potential of associative organs is one of the most interesting aspects to investigate of this new development pattern. This chapter proposes to investigate globalization from the bottom up. To date, in the rhetoric of globalization studies, this has tended to mean a concentration on the global linkages of those without conventional sources of political power. While that is an important piece of the story, as I have argued in previous work (Keck 1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998), it is not the only part. Instead, studying the whole range of networks at work in the political organization of internationalized policy areas – in governance regimes, in fact – can help us to understand better the micro-level deployment of global power resources. This, in turn, requires another kind of theoretical labour that we have not yet done very well. We are hard pressed to understand the interactions between conventional aspects of a policy process (which remain central) and less conventional governance arrangements (which occur concurrently, often in the same policy arenas). What is the relationship between the actions of federal, state and local elected governments, in both their legislative and executive functions, and those of sectoral consultative or decision-making bodies, for example, involved in water management or local development initiatives or AIDS policy? How do government agencies ‘represent themselves’ in governance bodies? How does the fact that the same individuals occupy multiple social locations – in the state, in professional networks, in social and family networks – influence their capacity to affect policy change and mobilize support for new ideas? Policy analysis tends to fall short in examining sectoral issues in isolation from each other, something that rarely gives us enough information about the web of political and social relations in which policymakers are embedded. One important research strategy is to trace the relationship between allocation of functions and of funding. Another is to develop a better understanding of the

58 Margaret E. Keck network positions of technical personnel and of NGO activists. In most countries, technical positions of authority result from political appointments. Policy entrepreneurs in technical areas are embedded in networks of political relationships, which affects their ability to mobilize support within the state, and of social and professional relationships, which affect their ability to win allies in civil society and other state institutions. Those who study NGOs and global knowledge networks too often abstract them from the concrete settings from which they have emerged, and which continue to shape their ideas and behaviour – to say nothing of their political capacity to act. What we need, in short, is more consistent dialogue between the writers in and readers of World Politics and World Development, of journals of sociology, public administration, comparative politics, and international organization, of the kinds of books published by Cornell and by Kumerian Press. The NGOs and think-tanks, the engineering firms, World Bank consultants, development agency personnel and university professors who espouse particular kinds of policies do indeed inhabit the same political world as city council members and trade union activists and political party committees and agency secretaries occupying their positions as patronage appointments. One would never know it, from the articles that appear in either political science or development journals. Until we place them in the same world, however, our understanding of globalization is not going to scratch the surface.

Notes 1 This work was begun during a year spent as visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2000–1). For comments on earlier versions I thank Ken Conca, Daniel Deudney, Andrew Selee and Richard Stren. For their contributions to an ongoing discussion of which this is a part, I thank Rebecca Abers and other members of the research team of the Watermark Project. Research support also came from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s grant to the Watermark Project, for collaborative research in new approaches to governance in the context of rapid globalization. 2 Although the US is not the world leader in executions (China is, by far), activists consider it the most vulnerable to pressure (Grovogui and Keck 2001). 3 I am indebted to Daniel Deudney for this term, which replaces the more awkward ‘semirepresentation’ that I used in an earlier version. 4 I have replaced the term identity, used in an earlier version, with categorization and selfunderstanding, after having been convinced by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) that constructivists have been making the term identity do so much work that it has lost much of its analytical purchase. 5 Those ideas, in turn, are developed more in the third edition of their co-authored classic, Power and Interdependence. 6 I am grateful to Richard Stren for pointing out this work to me.

References Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Blyth, M. (2002) Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The politics of discursive representation 59 Bob, C. (2001) ‘Marketing Rebellion: Insurgent Groups, International Media, and NGO Support’, International Politics 38 (September): 311–34. Brubaker, R. and Cooper, F. ( 2000) ‘Beyond “Identity”’, Theory and Society 29: 1–47. Burt, R.S. (1992) Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ——(2002) ‘Bridge Decay’, Social Networks 24: 333–63. Campbell, J.L. (2002) ‘Ideas, Politics and Public Policy’, Annual Review of Sociology 28: 21–38. Clemens, E.S. and Cook, J.M. (1999) ‘Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change’, Annual Review of Sociology 25: 441–66. De Oliveira, M.D. and Tandon, R. (coordinators) (1994) Citizens: Strengthening Global Civil Society, World Assembly Edition, Washington, DC: CIVICUS. Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B.G. (1996) Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Diani, M. (1995) Green Networks – A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Edwards, M. and Gaventa, J. (eds) (2000) Global Citizen Action, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Emirbayer, M. and Goodwin, J. (1994) ‘Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency’, American Journal of Sociology, 99(6): 1411–54. Evans, P. (ed.) (1997) State–Society Synergy, Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, International and Area Studies. Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society, Berkeley: University of California Press. Gould, R. (1991) ‘Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871’, American Sociological Review 56 (December): 716–29. Granovetter, M. (1973) ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’, American Journal of Sociology 78(6) (May): 1360–80. Grovogui, S.N. and Keck, M.E. (2001) ‘Terms of Endearment, Rules of Engagement’, paper presented at Columbia University Conference on Political Uses of Human Rights, 8–9 November 2001. Guidry, J.A., Kennedy, M.D. and Zald, M.N. (eds) (2000) Globalization and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Haas, P. (1992) ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, special issue, International Organization 46 (Winter): 1–36. Hall, P. (1986) Governing the Economy, New York: Oxford University Press. Jepperson, R.L. and Meyer, J.W. (1991) ‘The Public Order and Formal Institutions’, in Walter W. Powell and P.J. DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 183–203. Keck, M. (1995) ‘Political Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the Rubber Tappers of Acre’, Comparative Politics 27 ( July). ——(2001) ‘Water, Water Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Land Use and Water Policy in São Paulo, Brazil’, In P. Evans (ed.), Livable Cities, Berkeley: University of California Press. Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1998a) Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ——(1998b) ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in a Movement Society’, in D. Meyer and S. Tarrow (eds) Towards a Movement Society? Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. (1977) Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. ——(2000) ‘Introduction’, in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (eds) Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

60 Margaret E. Keck Khagram, S., Riker, J.V. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (2002) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Le Galès, P. (1995) ‘Du gouvernement des villes à la gouvernance urbaine’, Revue Française de Science Politique 45(1) (February): 57–95. Lin, N. (2001) Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipschutz, R.D. (1996) Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: The Politics of Nature from Place to Planet, Albany: State University of New York Press. Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. (1977) ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340–63 (reprinted in Powell and DiMaggio 1991, pp. 41–63). Oberg, P. (2002) ‘Does Administrative Corporatism Promote Trust and Deliberation?’, Governance 15(4) (October): 455–75. Ostrom, E. (1999) ‘Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development’, in Michael D. McGinnis (ed.) Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 346–76. Powell, W.W. and DiMaggio, P.J. (1983) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review 48 (April): 147–60 (slightly modified version published in Powell and DiMaggio 1991, pp. 63–80). ——(eds) (1991) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Risse, T. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (2000) The Power of Human Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ruggie, J.G. (1998) Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization, London: Routledge. Sewell, W.H., Jr. (1992) ‘A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation’, American Journal of Sociology 98: 1–29. Smith, J., Chatfield, C. and Pagnucco, R. (eds) ( 1997) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Soja, E.W. (1989) Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, London: Verso. Stark, D. (1996) ‘Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism’, American Journal of Sociology 101(4) ( January): 993–1027. Stone, D.A. (1989) ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas’, Political Science Quarterly 104(2): 281–300. Streeck, W. and. Schmitter, P.C. (1985) ‘Community, Market, State – and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order’, European Sociological Review 1(2) (September): 119–38. Suchman, M. and Edelman, L. (1997) ‘Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition’, Law and Social Inquiry 21: 903–41. Tarrow, S. (1998) ‘Fishnets, Internets, and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action’, in M. Hanagan, L. Page Moch, and W. te Brake (eds) Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Ch. 15. Tendler, J. (1997) Good Government in the Tropics, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wapner, P. (1996) Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, Binghamton, NY: SUNY Press. Wejnert, B. (2002) ‘Integrating Models of Diffusion of Innovations: A Conceptual Framework’, Annual Review of Sociology 28: 297–326.

4

Transnational activism, institutions and global democratization1 Jackie Smith

Introduction Social movements have been crucial historical catalysts of democratizing processes within countries. Their work has led to the political enfranchisement of women and other excluded groups, to the legal articulation and protection of democratic rights such as free speech and assembly, and to the promotion of state structures that help ensure greater public access and accountability (Markoff 1996; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1984). Given their importance to the emergence of large-scale political democracy, we can expect that social movements and the organizations that promote them will be central to the contemporary efforts to democratize global institutions. Democratization at the global level suggests that global institutions must be more transparent, more accountable to citizens, and more open to varying forms of citizen access and participation. Indeed, a key theme in the massive protests at global trade and financial meetings has been the demand for greater transparency and accountability – that is, democracy – in these organizations. As is also true in the historic record, states have resisted social movements – often violently – and they have generally adopted only narrow reforms that serve to quell mass protests without introducing meaningful changes (Gamson 1990). This chapter takes up two important discussions in the contemporary debates about globalization and popular participation in politics. First, it examines existing evidence about the organizational foundations of transnational social movement activism and their prospects for ongoing efforts to promote democratization at a global level. Second, it asks what recent responses by authorities to global mobilizations and protests tell us about the future prospects for greater citizen involvement in global political processes.

Organizing for global action Just as national-level efforts to promote democratization required social movement challengers to expand their scales of organizing beyond their immediate locales, globalization demands that challengers organize across national boundaries (see Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997). One indicator of such organizing activity is the presence of a sub-set of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that focuses explicitly on social change goals. Such organizations have been referred

62 Jackie Smith to as transnational social movement organizations or TSMOs (Smith 1997; Kriesberg 1997). My earlier work has examined the changes in the organizational environment in which global activists operate (e.g. Sikkink and Smith, 2002; Smith 1998), and this work has shown dramatic increases in the numbers of transnational social change organizations since the mid-20th century. Although TSMOs are not the only actors involved in social movements that cross national borders, they are important in shaping such movements, because they bring activists together for the explicit purpose of coordinating social change efforts (Smith 2002a). They thereby create opportunities for activists to learn about each others’ experiences, to develop shared frames through which to interpret their grievances, and to cultivate shared commitments to certain sets of values, ideas and organizations (see, e.g., Bandy 2001; Sperling et al. 2001). By routinizing information flows between activists in disparate parts of the world, TSMOs help link global political processes with citizens working at more local levels. They thereby serve as necessary (but not sufficient) infrastructures for a more transparent and participatory global system. Trends in the transnational social movement sector show continued growth in the numbers of formal TSMOs during the 1990s. This growth, however, has slowed somewhat from earlier periods, even though we might expect that the end of the Cold War and expanding agendas of international institutions would have led to even stronger TSMO growth. It remains to be seen whether the slower growth will continue, and if it is the result of a ‘saturation effect’ in the population of transnational SMOs, or whether its cause lies elsewhere. Nevertheless, by 2000 we had identified more than 900 transnational SMOs, up from around 700 groups in the early 1990s. Table 4.1 summarizes the different issues on which TSMOs focused their efforts. We find here that human rights remains the major issue around which the largest numbers of TSMOs organize, and throughout the period a quarter of all groups have Table 4.1 Issue focus of transnational social movement organizations (%) 1983 N = 348

1993 N = 711

2000 N = 959

Groups with Asian participants (2000)

Human rights Environment Peace Women’s rights Development Global justice/ environmental sustainability Ethnic unity/liberation

26 12 11 7 4

28 18 11 9 7

26 17 10 9 10

22a 15 11 9 11

4 7

4 3

11 2

10b 3

Multi-issue organizations

12

12

17

15b

Source: Yearbook of International Associations. Notes a T-test comparison of means between TSMOs with and without Asian members significant at 0.10 level. b T-test comparison of means between TSMOs with and without Asian members significant at 0.05 level.

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 63 continued to work principally on this issue. This is not surprising, as human rights provide the foundation for all forms of political association and organizing by citizens. And human rights is by its nature transnational, since it establishes a notion that human beings have identities and rights that are independent of national laws and citizenship. The environment has attracted growing attention since the early 1970s. Also, between 1983 and 2000, development issues motivated a larger percentage of transnational SMOs. Another robust trend we see in the 1990s is a shift towards more multi-issue organizing by TSMOs. The percentage of groups organizing around a broad global justice/environment frame grew from just 4 per cent in the early 1990s to 11 per cent by 2000. And when we distinguish between groups that are clearly focused on a single issue and those that address multiple issues, we see a similar expansion from 12 to 17 per cent. An apparently declining transnational social movement industry is ethnic unity/ liberation. The most recent period again saw a decline in the absolute numbers of such TSMOs from 27 to 16. This can signal two very different trends. One is that these types of movements are adopting more militant, illicit tactics and therefore are less likely to report their activities in the Yearbook. Another possibility is that ethnic struggles are being framed in ways that allow groups to take advantage of opportunities in international institutions. For instance, groups like the Federal Union of European Nationalities or the World Council of Indigenous Peoples may help focus the efforts of multiple different ethnic groups around the aim of using global institutions to protect minority groups’ rights against infringements by states and other actors. About half of the groups working to promote indigenous peoples’ rights were formed during the 1980s, suggesting that larger numbers of new activists are attracted to this way of framing their conflicts. Another organizing frame that may be displacing the ethnic unity/liberation one is the anti-racism/minority rights frame. Half of the groups listing this as a key goal were formed after 1980, and onequarter were formed during the 1990s. Peace issues continued to be the focus of organizing for a consistent percentage of groups, despite the dramatic changes in the geopolitical situation following the Cold War. And women’s issues are also the focus of a consistent percentage of TSMOs. When we compare the issue focus of groups that have members from any Asian country with those organized wholly outside Asia, we find a few important differences, and these help shed light on the underlying political dynamics that affect transnational organizing. Among Asian countries, we find significantly lower rates of participation in transnational human rights and economic justice TSMOs. The average number of human rights TSMOs claiming members in Asian countries was 24, compared with 36 for all other countries. For economic justice groups, the averages were 12 for Asian countries and 16 for all others. These differences were statistically significant at the < 0.05 level. Participation ranged from a high of 299 (India) to a low of 15 TSMOs (Maldives). In only 5 of the 19 Asian countries for which we have data do we find at least the overall average numbers of TSMOs present, and these include India, Japan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and South Korea. These patterns were replicated for IGO participation, so countries with high rates of

64 Jackie Smith TSMO activity also tended to be more integrated into intergovernmental organizations and international human rights treaties. Asian regimes, of course, differ tremendously in their levels of political openness and in their relationships to the global economy. Some might interpret the comparatively lower Asian participation in transnational human rights activity as support for the notion that Asian cultures relate less clearly to Western-oriented human rights norms.2 However, the relatively small difference here as well as the wide variation in the relative political openness of Asian governments suggests that other factors might better explain this pattern. Moreover, the recent economic disruptions in Asian countries might lead us to expect people there to be relatively more active on economic justice matters. Also, case studies of transnational mobilizations show that Asian activists and organizers, including leaders like Walden Bello, Vandana Shiva or Martin Khor and groups like People’s Global Action (with a very strong Indian base) or Focus on the Global South (based in Bangkok), are key leaders and participants in the global movement (Smith 2002a). Social movement scholarship points to the importance of national political institutions for shaping the character and vibrancy of national social movement sectors. Thus, we should consider possible associations between levels of democratic openness and the rates of national participation in transnational social movement organizations. If citizens of a country are guaranteed few rights of political association and expression, we should expect them to be under-represented within transnational SMOs. Table 4.2 displays bivariate correlations between rates of participation in Table 4.2 Correlations of national TSMO participation: culture vs. domestic and international political opportunity structures Asian country Democracy Human rights treaty No. IGO No. TSMO Economic justice Human rights

–0.100 –0.222** –0.295** –0.132 –0.138 –0.139

Democracy

0.248** 0.358** 0.536** 0.522** 0.533**

Human rights treaty

No. of IGOs

No. of TSMOs

Economic justice

0.293** 0.366** 0.335** 0.373**

0.770** 0.724** 0.772**

0.969** 0.986**

0.947**

Notes ‘Democracy’ reflects the measures of regime type/levels of political openness from data collected by Jaggers and Gurr (1995). ‘Human rights’ indicates the number of human rights treaties ratified, as reported in the United Nations Human Development Report (2001). The variable is continuous, with a low of 1 (Oman) and a high of 6 (59 per cent of all the countries). The human rights treaties counted in this variable are the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). ‘No. of IGOs’ and ‘No. of TSMOs’ reflect the number of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations, respectively, in which a country is represented. This measure comes from the Yearbook of International Associations, as do the measures of participation in transnational SMOs of various types. **Correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 65 TSMOs and measures of democratic openness3 and national integration into the global polity, including the numbers of intergovernmental organizational memberships and the numbers of human rights treaties ratified by a country. Table 4.2 provides robust support for the argument that participation in transnational social movement organizations is conditioned by both domestic political opportunities, measured in terms of government respect for citizens’ rights of political association and expression, and by the extent to which a country is integrated into the global political arena. On the whole, Asian countries were relatively less democratic than countries of other regions, and they were also significantly less integrated into intergovernmental organizations and the international human rights treaty system. At the same time, we find very strong and significant correlations between participation in TSMOs, including the more contentious economic justice and human rights TSMOs, and democratic openness and international integration. Thus the low rate of Asian participation in TSMOs is best explained by structural rather than cultural factors. Moreover, we can expect that changes in the overall levels of transnational activism are more closely related to levels of democratization and global political integration than to cultural or regional differences. The results above, in short, show that globally we see a growing and diverse transnational social movement sector that is dramatically different from that of earlier decades. Not only are there more SMOs active in the transnational arena, but these organizations are becoming more active and integrated. We have less detailed quantitative information about the activities taking place within TSMOs, but the recent explosion in research and writing about transnational advocacy campaigns suggests that transnational cooperation and exchange has expanded along with the numbers of TSMOs (see, e.g., Clark 1995; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000; Price 1998; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997). The data available in the Yearbook allow us to measure some changes in the intensity of transnational organizing, such as the geographic scope of organizations and their connections with other actors in their environments. Table 4.3 presents these data. This table reveals consistent increases in transnational organizing activity, when measured in terms of formal and informal links with international agencies, ties to other NGOs, and the numbers of countries in TSMO memberships. While the variation across groups is substantial, overall levels of connection with other actors in their environments have increased. The most dramatic increases were in the extent to which TSMOs cultivated ties with other NGOs. In the early 1980s, the average number of NGOs with which a TSMO reported contacts was just around one, but by 2000 the average TSMO reported connections with nearly seven other NGOs. And whereas the average number of contacts with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) was just over one in the early 1980s, the average grew to more than three IGOs by 2000. TSMOs also appeared more likely to attain formal consultative status with IGOs in recent years. This trend may be the result of the numerous global conferences that the United Nations sponsored during the 1990s, which created opportunities for TSMOs and other NGOs to focus their energies around an international conference and allowed them to learn about IGO processes

66 Jackie Smith Table 4.3 Intensity of transnational organization Formal consultation status with IGOs

Mean no. of NGO links Median (s.d.)

Mean no. of IGO links Median (s.d.)

Mean no. of countries with members Median (s.d.)

1983

34%

0.98 0 (1.85)

1.26 0 (1.90)

31.02 23 (26.03)

1993

36%

4.88 2 (7.28)

2.39 1 (4.37)

33.24 23 (29.45)

2000

42%

6.85 4 (8.98)

3.15 2 (5.36)

35.58 23 (33.01)

TSMOs with Asian participants (2000)

47%a

8.25b

3.95b

N/A

Source: Yearbook of International Associations. Notes a T-test comparison of means between TSMOs with and without Asian members significant at 0.05 level. b T-test comparison of means between TSMOs with and without Asian members significant at 0.01 level. s.d. = standard deviation.

and initiate formal connections with the UN. UN conferences are also, and perhaps more importantly, sites where extensive networking among activists takes place (see, e.g., Krut 1997; Willetts 1989). Again, we compare the groups that have participation from Asian countries with those organized outside Asia to find that groups that include Asian members had significantly more ties with both non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. They were also significantly more likely to maintain consultative status with at least one international agency. These differences were sustained (though with slightly reduced significance levels) when I removed from the analysis those groups that spanned all continents.4 Explanations for this difference may be that Asia includes the world’s largest democracy, India, which is known for its strong voluntary sector. Its distance – both cultural, linguistic and geographic – from the European centre of global institutions may also make Asian activist organizations more dependent upon transnational ties in order to enhance their potential impact. One additional measure of the intensity of TSMO activity is the frequency of general membership meetings in TSMOs. We only have these data for the most recent period, so we cannot compare this measure over time. However, one would expect the frequency of meetings to increase as transportation and communication technologies reduce the costs of both remote and face-to-face group decision-making (see Lai, this volume). Given the nature of reporting procedures in the Yearbook of International Associations, we cannot tell whether the meetings a group reports are faceto-face or by video or telephone conference, although we assume most refer to direct interpersonal meetings. Of the 441 groups that reported information about their meetings for 2000, 36 per cent reported holding annual meetings, and more than 60

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 67 per cent reported holding at least bi-annual meetings. Twenty-four per cent reported either tri-annual or quadrennial meetings. An additional 15 per cent reported less frequent meetings or an irregular meeting schedule. Because they involve direct interaction among activists from numerous countries, transnational organization meetings typically involve extensive consultation and negotiation about group identities and strategies. Therefore, TSMO member meetings are important sites of transnational organizing work. Interviews with activists and observations of international meetings reveal that they serve as important learning experiences for activists, and much time is spent exchanging information about local experiences and sharing accounts of how global forces affect local conditions (Krut 1997; Reimann 2002; Caniglia 2002). Next, we look briefly at the regional distribution of TSMO activity. Table 4.4 displays the levels of TSMO organization in the major global regions, as well as the distribution of memberships and headquarters between the global North and South. Table 4.4 shows that Western Europeans and North Americans comprise the major components of TSMO memberships. This does not seem to have changed much during the 1990s and, if anything, the Northern and Western representation is increasing as a percentage of all TSMO memberships. Looking at the location of TSMO headquarters, we also find that Western Europe and North America are over-represented, with more than two-thirds of all TSMO headquarters located in those regions. This is an aspect which links up with Lindquist’s discussion of the centrality of place (this volume). The percentage of TSMO headquarters in the global South declined during the 1990s, but the absolute numbers has grown by 20 per cent since 1993, from 167 to 199 organizations. Asian countries are represented in just over one-half of all TSMO memberships, and they are home to less than 10 per cent of all TSMOs. While further analysis of country-level participation is needed, it appears that the TSMO sector has not been able to overcome the global North–South divide in terms of generating more equitable patterns of participation. Table 4.4 Regional differences in TSMO participation Region

% of TSMOs with members in region

% TSMO headquarters

1993 (N = 544)

2000 (N = 743)

1993 (N = 705)

2000 (N = 947)

Western Europe North America Latin America Asia Africa Pacific Eastern Europe Middle East

84.4 66.5 60.5 59.9 58.6 51.8 49.6 42.1

85.7 61.6 56.5 56.3 59.8 45.2 56.4 40.2

58.3 14.2 6.0 7.6 6.9 <1 3.8 2.3

55.6 18.1 5.3 6.9 6.9 1.2 3.8 2.2

Global North Global South

88.1 79.8

89.8 75.9

76.3 23.7

77.8 21.0

Source: Yearbook of International Associations.

68 Jackie Smith Nevertheless, given the self-conscious efforts by many TSMOs to work towards a restructuring of global power relations, participation from the global South is still likely to be greater than that in other sectors of the global political economy. The evidence presented here reveals that recent decades have seen the growth of a much denser network of transnational organizations. Moreover, these organizations have expanded their ties with other actors in their environments, and this suggests that we have also seen greater intensity of transnational activity. Combining these observations with a growing number of accounts of transnational campaigns and protests, we can argue that the growth of TSMOs that has accompanied other globalization processes has contributed to an emerging global civil society. Moreover, the processes and interactions that are incorporated into these organizations help participants learn about the experiences and perceptions of people from different national backgrounds as well as about the global system and the institutions that govern it. To the extent that they attempt to coordinate collective actions, they must negotiate over differences in strategic approaches and national constraints in order to do so. These processes are the same ones that are crucial to effective democratic political systems. By creating opportunities for activists to learn about global institutions, about the realities of people from different regions and cultures, and about ways to resolve differences while sharing a common organizational identity, TSMOs help foster the skills needed for democratic institution-building. The activities taking place within TSMOs, such as collective decision-making, identity formation and framing, and transnational coalition-building, promote the development of ‘social capital’, or the networks, norms and trust that enable activists to support greater openness and democracy at the global level (see Edwards, Foley and Diani 2001). By facilitating communication among activists and by generating shared goals and purposes, TSMOs foster the creation of solidarity and trust among activists. They nurture the values and skills that are essential to a shared democratic political community, albeit a transnational or even global one. They also create new possibilities for popular political participation that formal global institutions have neglected. Because no formal institutions now exist to allow regular popular participation in global politics, social movements are particularly important for the democratization of the global political arena. In the absence of a global electoral system and political parties, social movement activists must invent new ways to channel popular participation into the global system. They must cultivate constituencies that both understand and are attentive to global institutions and decision arenas. The mechanisms these organizations have developed for global education and for cross-national consultation and decision-making can serve as important foundations for a more democratic, participatory global political order. TSMO efforts help channel popular political participation towards the creation of non-violent forms, encouraging democratic innovations in formal institutions comparable to those seen with the formation of the modern democratic state (see, e.g., Markoff 1996; Clemens 1997). A wealth of case studies of transnational activism reveals important connections between civil society organizations and global institutions. While today we can point to some dramatic examples of this influence, such as the impact of transnational advocacy groups on the International Convention to Ban Land Mines (Price 1998) and on the International Criminal Court ( Johansen 2001), attempts by social change

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 69 advocates to shape global institution-building are found at the very origins of both the League of Nations and the United Nations (Chatfield 1997) as well as other international agencies (see, e.g. Smith 1995; Willetts 1982; Willetts 1996; Levering 1997; Charnovitz 1997). What appears novel is that transnational organizations have become far more numerous and geographically diverse in just the past few decades. But beyond this quantitative change, we should also expect important qualitative changes in transnational organizing. As activists have organized around global problems such as persistent poverty, violations of human rights, gender inequality, and environmental destruction, they have learned about the UN system and global negotiating processes. They have cultivated both global networks and skills that allowed them better to monitor the behaviour of governments in international negotiations. After years of attending global conferences and promoting specific treaty regimes, many have realized that broader structural factors – such as the overwhelming influence of the United States and the growing conflict between Northern and Southern governments – have reduced the possibilities for UN negotiations to very limited agreements that have done little to actually resolve the problems they addressed.5 Moreover, activists who were becoming increasingly familiar with international legal developments could see quite clearly that the growing global trade regime meant that the goal of free trade took precedence over other international agreements, by, for instance, characterizing social and environmental regulations as WTO-illegal ‘technical barriers to trade’ (Wallach and Sforza 1999). A question for scholars of transnational association and democracy is whether these institutional contradictions – e.g. discrepancies between the objectives of various international organizations and agencies – will push greater numbers of activists to work outside of global institutions. Whereas in the past we found that transnational activism for peace, human rights, and international development led activists to support the creation and expansion of multilateral institutions (e.g. Chatfield 1997; Willetts 1996), we may find that recent trends may shift global activism towards a more confrontational relationship to global institutions. Indeed, the protests of the past few years seem important indicators of this shift.

Globalization’s implications for democracy As monarchical, aristocratic and corporate powers democratized [during the 18th century], the new states aspired to the ceremonial majesty and legitimacy claims of the previous monarchical order, but now it was democratic majesty that was proclaimed . . . [E]lections are a dramatic ceremonial reminder of democratic legitimation. The emerging structures of transnational decisionmaking, however, do not have such features, and much of their activity is even hidden. The inner processes of the World Bank and IMF, to take two conspicuously significant examples, are hardly publicized, and positions taken by many national representatives to those organizations are not even made publicly available. Rather than legitimacy, it is invisibility that is sought. How such power might be democratized is the challenge of the twenty-first century. (Markoff 1999: 254)

70 Jackie Smith Scholars like Markoff remind us of the importance of taking a long historic view of the relations between states and civil society organizations. While we have seen important developments in the strengthening of transnational social movement organization that should expand opportunities for a more democratic global system, the basic political structure of the global system may be working to thwart democratization. Moreover, a number of recent developments give cause for great worry about the future of democracy amid globalization (see, e.g., Markoff 1999; Tilly 1995). Since the Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization, and especially since the World Trade Center attacks in the United States, the governments of the industrialized countries and their police forces have refined techniques for resisting such protests. Various combinations of border restrictions, surveillance, pre-emptive efforts to intimidate activists or otherwise discourage organizing activity, and the enforcement of large ‘security perimeters’ around international meetings have served to limit the size and militancy of protests as well as to criminalize and delegitimize protest activities and claims. Moreover, the ease with which small groups of militant protesters or agents provocateurs can turn largely peaceful political protests into violent confrontations between protesters and police prevent the vast majority of protesters from conveying their message in a deliberately non-violent manner. Another important response by influential governments has been to limit the frequency of international meetings and to locate them in places where protest gatherings are more risky and costly. For instance, the fourth ministerial meeting of the WTO was held in Qatar in November 2001, and the World Bank and IMF announced a reduction in their meeting schedule for the fall 2001 session after cancelling a meeting during the summer. In this way, authorities have responded to popular demands for greater transparency in international organizations by explicitly decreasing their transparency. Such moves serve to reduce possibilities for public debate about global policies and institutions. The rise of global institutions like the WTO removes some governing authority from national-level decisionmakers who are accountable to voters, transferring this authority to unaccountable international bureaucrats. The WTO website goes so far as to praise this function of that institution, arguing that it helps protect governments from the influences of ‘special interests’ that seek restrictions on trade, listing this as one of the ‘top ten benefits’ of the WTO. While such a practice might be an expedient way of making trade policy, it clearly fails to conform to the norm of democratic legitimation for political institutions. It is also likely to generate growing resistance to global policies that continue to have a broader impact on people’s everyday lives.

United Nations civil society relations in recent decades Since the mid-1980s, the United States has consistently pressured the United Nations to conform to its international neo-liberal agenda that champions market liberalization, expanding trade, and reduced government regulation and spending. The US objectives seemed largely to reduce the influence of the United Nations visà-vis the global financial institutions (see, e.g. Bennis 1997; Bello et al. 1999). The

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 71 neo-liberal shift in the UN meant that the global mega-conferences on the environment, human rights, women, and other social issues that dominated the global agenda in the early 1990s were replaced in the middle and latter part of the decade by less prominent meetings of the UN General Assembly or treaty-monitoring bodies. In addition, the United States and its allies worked to move key debates outside the United Nations altogether by encouraging more restricted meetings of trade and finance bureaucrats to negotiate binding trade agreements at the regional and global level. There was little room for a strong United Nations mandate to promote international peace, human rights and development within the emerging trade regime, which sought to limit the ability of all governments to restrict trade and investment within their borders. The political climate of much of the 1980s and 1990s favoured international trade and investment over other goals, and the United States reduced the United Nation’s capacity for providing even very limited checks on global trade and investment by, for instance, weakening the (admittedly already weak) UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and transforming the UN Center on Transnational Corporations from a corporate watchdog to a promoter of international investment (Bello 2000). The openings created by the end of the Cold War and a flowering of global conferences during the 1990s proved illusory as the trade agenda and its institutions became stronger and as governments began to fear the growing participation and impact of civil society actors in the United Nations (Gaer 1996; Charnovitz 1996; Esty 1998). Neo-liberal trends have thus advanced policies of market deregulation and contraction of government services while both weakening the United Nations and limiting public access to intergovernmental negotiations. This has created an uneasy relationship between many social change NGOs and formal intergovernmental processes (Krut 1997: 49). It also contributes to NGO suspicion about investing their already over-extended energies to support an institution that seems overly eager to develop close ties with the corporate actors that many advocacy groups criticize, and whose ability to support their goals has been limited. David Korten, a leading activist and intellectual, expressed his own disappointment at this realization: Those of us who have been studying these issues have long known of the strong alignment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the IMF to the corporate agenda. By contrast the United Nations has seemed a more open, democratic and people friendly institution. What I found so shattering was the strong evidence that the differences I have been attributing to the United Nations are largely cosmetic. (Korten 1997a) Despite reduced opportunities in intergovernmental settings, transnational social change activism has not subsided. However, there are signs that such activism may have shifted away from its past emphasis on (for the most part) supporting multilateralism and multilateral institutions, and future trends seem likely to continue this

72 Jackie Smith shift. Such a shift emerges as activists apply the skills and analyses they gained through their earlier work within the UN system. Transnational advocacy groups are using their contacts with UN agencies as well as their skills at monitoring international bureaucracies and legal developments to counter a neo-liberal shift within the United Nations. For instance, a growing number of organizations have mobilized against the ‘Global Compact’ initiative, which is designed to convince business ‘partners’ to engage in more extensive cooperative relations with the UN. The ‘Global Compact’ seeks to augment the UN budget from private sources and ostensibly to gain voluntary cooperation from corporations with UN environmental, labour, and human rights principles. In practice, however, the neo-liberal mantra of government deregulation has prevailed, and the Compact has deliberately excluded provisions for monitoring the behaviour of corporate ‘partners’. The International Chamber of Commerce and its members have made very clear that they will not accept a code of conduct (Bruno and Karliner 2002; Korten 1997a). As a result, many of the first companies to join the Global Compact – including Nike, BP Amoco, and Rio Tinto – are among those most implicated in violations of international norms (see www.unglobalcompact.org). Activists have mounted a campaign denouncing the Global Compact as a form of ‘blue washing’ that allows companies to enhance their tarnished images by wrapping themselves in the UN flag (TRAC 2000). The groups opposing the Global Compact have also struggled against efforts within specific UN agencies to cultivate ties with transnational corporations and other financial interests. Critics of these programmes suggest that they not only undermine the UN’s mandate for promoting social and humanitarian goals, but they also amount to public subsidies for private efforts to extract maximum profits from poor countries. Moreover, a growing influence of corporations in the United Nations undermines the access and influence that civil society organizations can have in international negotiations and in the UN’s day-today operations, just as corporate campaign financing distorts national democratic participation. Overall, the atmosphere at the United Nations today is less encouraging for TSMOs and other civil society actors than it was just a few years ago. Many activists are also less enthusiastic about working to support the UN and its initiatives. This is clear from the fact that recent mobilizations around global trade and financial meetings devoted very little, if any, attention to discussions of the UN’s role in advancing the aims of the protesters.6 This may lead to a crucial shift in the relationships between transnational social change advocates and the UN system from one that was traditionally supportive of the UN’s multilateralism to one that is more confrontational. As David Korten warned in a 1997 memo to Razali Ismail, then the UN General Assembly president, The credibility of the UN is seriously at stake here. Consider the implications for the UN’s public image as people wake up to the reality that the scarce UN development funds intended to benefit the poor of the world are in fact being dispensed as corporate welfare to help finance the global corporate take over of the world economy. It should not be surprising if this eventually pushes the progressive

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 73 citizen organizations that have heretofore supported the United Nations into a position of organizing against UN funding, as many of them have organized against World Bank and IMF funding. (Korten 1997b, emphasis added) There is currently no evidence of an active opposition to government support for the United Nations, and many activists still hold that, while flawed, the UN is the best hope for addressing the world’s problems.7 However, these sentiments appear to be held most strongly by the intellectual leadership of the movement (i.e. within cadre organizations like the International Forum on Globalization), and they have not yet been taken up by large numbers of grass-roots activists. For instance, among the more than 400 panels and workshops at the 2001 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, only one or two dealt explicitly with the United Nations.8 One explanation for this lack of enthusiasm for UN reform comes from surveys of the local and national affiliates of a transnational organization working to enhance multilateral cooperation through the United Nations. Responses revealed that affiliates in the global South were especially sceptical that a stronger United Nations would help them. Many respondents indicated that the UN needed to undergo substantial reforms to contain the disproportionate influence of the United States before they would support efforts to strengthen it (Smith 2002b). The predominance of neo-liberal ideology and policy in recent decades, backed by substantial pressure from the United States and its major allies, has allowed the global financial institutions to operate independently of the international laws and standards of the United Nations system. We might think of this dynamic as producing institutional contradictions between those global arrangements designed to promote international cooperation for human rights, peace and development, and those whose aim is to advance international trade and investment. Many within the UN system recognize these contradictions even if they recognize a need to rely on the private sector for both resources and legitimacy (vis-à-vis the United States and other governments). For these international civil servants, NGOs (particularly those that challenge the status quo) are the most likely to help reconcile the contradictions between the pursuit of neo-liberal economic policy and the attainment of the ideals outlined in the United Nations Charter. For instance, the Director of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) noted recently: UNRISD work on the institutional and social effects of globalization has highlighted the concern that certain international economic, finance, and trade organizations are enjoying greater freedom and power, but often without any commensurate increase in social responsibility. There are high hopes that the role of NGOs on the world stage will act to correct this potentially dangerous imbalance. (Ghai 1997: i) An important question for those concerned with democracy and the non-violent resolution of conflicts is whether sufficient numbers within the growing ranks of

74 Jackie Smith transnational activists and organizations will find it worth their while to work in support of multilateralism in the UN, given the less favourable political environment and a long history of disappointingly small and yet hard-fought achievements.

Conclusion Throughout history, social movement actors have helped to advance the values and institutions of democracy. They have created mechanisms for popular participation in political processes and have pressed authorities to enfranchise larger numbers of people into formal political processes. Most importantly, TSMOs provide opportunities for people to participate in global politics, thereby encouraging the political socialization of global activists. This role is crucial for the evolution of democratic skills and norms in a global arena that lacks formal institutions for democratic participation such as political parties and electoral institutions. Recent decades have seen an extension of this process to the transnational level as growing numbers of transnational social change organizations emerge to shape the policies and practices of global institutions. The numbers of TSMOs have continued to expand during the 1990s and during the major global conferences, and along with the rising numbers of organizations we see new depth to transnational cooperation and exchange. By participating in global political processes, activists have acquired a repertoire of important political skills that have helped shape their ongoing work in the international system. Their work has helped dramatize some fundamental institutional contradictions between the international financial institutions and the United Nations system. Governments have responded with caution to the growing presence of non-state actors in global political processes at the UN, seeking to limit NGO participation or to restrict the participation by more critical groups.9 And their more militant and repressive responses to activists’ presence at global financial meetings are well known. With this recent wave of more militant confrontations between transnational social movements and governments at global financial meetings, we must ask whether we are seeing a shift away from the more cooperative and mutually supportive TSMO–UN relations of the past towards a more conflictual relationship. The history of democracy-building suggests that the interactions between transnational movements and global institutions will be crucial in determining the future for democratic participation in global politics.

Notes 1 Support for some of this research was provided by the American Sociological Association/ National Science Foundation Funds for Advancing the Discipline Small Grants Program and from the World Society Foundation. 2 See, for instance, Samuel Huntington’s arguments about the ‘clash of civilizations’, as well as Asian governments’ responses to criticisms of their policies by the UN Human Rights Commission. 3 This score is a ten-year average based on Freedom House political openness scores between 1984 and 1994.

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 75 4 We might expect, for instance, that groups with more global scope would have substantially more ties with other actors in the environment. This analysis suggests instead that groups with Asian participants were indeed more likely to develop ties with other actors in their environments. 5 These sentiments were reflected in a number of surveys of affiliates of a transnational organization working to strengthen the United Nations and its work on environmental, peace and justice issues. Affiliates from the global South were most likely to reflect doubts about the ability of the UN to address the problems they faced (Smith 2002b). 6 Authors’ fieldnotes from rallies and teach-ins in Seattle (November 1999), Washington DC (April 2000), Prague (September 2000), Porto Alegre (January 2001), and Quebec City (April 2001). 7 See, e.g., the International Forum on Globalization report on their alternative NGO forum at the United Nations Millennium Assembly, ‘Can the United Nations be Salvaged?’ held in September of 2000 (www.ifg.org). 8 Although there was certainly an implicit assumption that the UN had a role to play in carrying out some of the proposals – e.g. the Tobin Tax on international currency transactions – being discussed by activists. 9 For instance, recent efforts by the World Bank and the WTO to demonstrate greater openness have included the credentialing of a certain number of NGOs during their official meetings. These credentials have been limited to groups adopting more moderate positions with regard to global financial institutions.

References Bandy, J. (2001) ‘Transnational Coalitions on the U.S.–Mexico Border: The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras’, unpublished manuscript. Bello, W. (2000) ‘UNCTAD: Time to Lead, Time to Challenge the WTO’, in K. Danaher and R. Burbach Monroe (eds) Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, pp. 163–74. Bello, W., Cunningham, S. and Rao, B. (1999) Dark Victory: The United States and Global Poverty, 2nd edn, London: Pluto Press. Bennis, P. (1997) Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today’s UN, New York: Olive Branch Press. Bruno, K. and Karliner, J. (2002) earthsummit.biz: The Corporate Takeover of Sustainable Development, Oakland: Foodfirst Books. Caniglia, B.S. (2002) ‘Informal Alliances vs. Institutional Ties: The Effects of Elite Alliances on Environmental TSMO Networks’, in J. Smith and H. Johnston (eds) Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 153–71. Charnovitz, S. (1996) ‘Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 17: 331–57. ——(1997) ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’, Michigan Journal of International Law 18: 183–286. Chatfield, C. (1997) ‘Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Associations to 1944’, in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) Transnational Social Movements and World Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 19–41. Clark, A.M. (1995) ‘Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society’, Journal of International Affairs 48: 507–25. Clark, A.M., Friedman, E.J. and Hochstetler, K. (1998) ‘The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women’, World Politics 51: 1–35.

76 Jackie Smith Clemens, E. (1997) The People’s Lobby, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Corporate Watch (2000) ‘UNDP Abandons Perilous Partnership’, at http://www.corpwatch. org/trac/undp/, retrieved 16 February 2001. Edwards, B., Foley, M. and Diani, M. (eds) (2001) Beyond Tocqueville: Social Capital in Comparative Perspective, Hanover, HN: University Press of New England. Esty, D.C. (1998) ‘Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion’, Journal of International Economic Law 1: 83–122. Fox, J. and Brown, L.D. (1998) The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gaer, F.D. (1996) ‘Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN’, in T. G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, pp. 51–66. Gamson, W. (1990) Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd edn, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Ghai, D. (1997) ‘Preface’, in R. Krut (ed.) Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence on International Decision Making, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, pp. i–ii. Huntington, S.P. (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’ Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22–49. Jaggers, K. and Gurr, T.R. (1995) ‘Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with Polity III Data’, Journal of Peace Research 4: 469–82. Johansen, R.C. (2001) ‘Transnational Politics and Nongovernmental Organizations: Drafting a Treaty to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court’, paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago. Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Korten, D.C. (1997a) ‘The United Nations and the Corporate Agenda’, People Centered Development Forum, at http://iisd.ca/pcdf/1997/uncorporate.htm, retrieved 16 February 2001. ——(1997b) ‘Subsidizing Corporate Takeover’, memo to Mr Razali Ismail, UN General Assembly President, follow-up to roundtable on ‘Cooperation between Governments, Private Sector and the UN Meeting Sustainable Development Objectives’ at http://iisd.ca/ pcdf/1997/uncorporate.htm, retrieved 16 February 2001. Kriesberg, L. (1997) ‘Social Movements and Global Transformation’, in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) Transnational Social Movements and World Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 3–18 Krut, R. (1997). Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence on International Decision Making, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Levering, R.A. (1997) ‘Brokering the Law of the Sea Treaty: The Neptune Group’, in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 225–42. Markoff, J. (1996) Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. ——(1999) ‘Globalization and the Future of Democracy’, Journal of World-Systems Research at http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html, 5: 242–62. O’Brien, R., Goetz, A.M., Scholte, J.A. and Williams, M. (2000) Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, New York: Cambridge University Press. Price, R. (1998) ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines’, International Organization 52: 613–44. Reimann, K.D. (2002) ‘Building Networks from the Outside In: International Movements, Japanese NGOs, and the Kyoto Climate Change Conference’, in J. Smith and H. Johnston

Transnational activism, institutions, democratization 77 (eds) Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 173–88. Sikkink, K. and Smith, J. (2002) ‘Infrastructures for Change: Transnational Organizations, 1953–1993’, in S. Khagram, J. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds) Restructuring World Politics: The Power of Transnational Agency and Norms, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Smith, J. (1995) ‘Transnational Political Processes and the Human Rights Movement’, in L. Kriesberg, M. Dobkowski and I. Walliman (eds) Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, vol. 18, Greenwood, CT: JAI, pp. 185–220. ——(1997) ‘Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector’, in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) Transnational Social Movements and World Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 42–58. ——(1998) ‘Global Civil Society? Transnational Social Movement Organizations and Social Capital’, American Behavioral Scientist, 42: 93–107. ——(2002a) ‘Globalizing Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements’, in J. Smith and H. Johnston (eds) Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 207–27. ——(2002b) ‘Bridging Global Divides?: Strategic Framing and Solidarity in Transnational Social Movement Organizations’, International Sociology 17(4): 505–28. Smith, J., Chatfield, C. and Pagnucco, R. (1997) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Sperling, V., Marx Feree, M. and Risman, B. (2001) ‘Constructing Global Feminism: Transnational Advocacy Networks and Russian Women’s Activism’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 26: 1155–86. Tarrow, S. (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 2nd edn, New York: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (1984) ‘Social Movements and National Politics’, in C. Bright and S. Harding (eds) Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 297–317. ——(1995) ‘Globalization Threatens Labor Rights’, International Labor and Working Class History 47: 1–23. TRAC (2000) Tangled Up in Blue: Corporate Partnerships at the United Nations, San Francisco: Transnational Resource and Action Center. Union of International Associations (1996) Yearbook of International Organizations, Brussels: Union of International Organizations. Wallach, L. and Sforza, M. (1999) Whose Trade Organization?: Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy, Washington, DC: Public Citizen. Willetts, P. (1982) ‘Pressure Groups in the International System’, in Pressure Groups in the International System, New York: St Martin’s. ——(1989) ‘The Pattern of Conferences’, in P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, Global Issues in the United Nations Framework, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 35–63. ——(1996) The Conscience of the World: The Influence of NGOs in the United Nations System, London: C. Hurst.

5

World citizenship and transnational activism1 Baogang He

Transnational activism and globalization call into question whether world citizenship is replacing national citizenship, and whether citizenship is necessarily tied to a bounded political community (Faulks 2000: Ch. 6). William Kymlicka, David Miller and Stephen Neff stress bounded citizenship and defend the association between citizenship and nation-states (Kymlicka 1996; Miller 1999: 60–80; Neff 1999: 105– 19), but Andrew Linklater (1999: 35–59), Gerard Delanty (2000) and Geoffrey Stokes (2000) argue that national citizenship is obsolete under globalization. This chapter joins the debate. It demonstrates the existence of world citizenship by examining the normative commitment, behaviour and organization of transnational civil society. Further, the chapter adds the idea of cultural equality to the notion of world citizenship in order to address problems associated with transnational activism. The chapter then presents a sceptical critique of world citizenship and discusses the Asian conditions that constrain the development of world citizenship.

Transnational activism challenges national citizenship Let me define basic concepts first. The idea of global, world or cosmopolitan citizenship is a critical, moral ideal of global value and justice. It involves a new type of actor whose identity is not tied to the nation-state, and who engages in a movement towards a just world.2 Because it is not a legal concept, it is able to recover ‘the notion of citizenship as an ethico-political practice’ (Stokes 2000: 237). Global citizenship is a form of cosmopolitanism that accepts strangers and refugees. It entails a cosmopolitan right for asylum-seekers, refugees and immigrants (Derrida 2001). By contrast, the idea of national citizenship implies belonging to, devotion towards, and sacrifices for one specific nation on the part of citizens. It promotes loyalty to a nation-state. Today, although most people may still hold such views, they are under challenge from globalization and transnational activism. Global citizenship is distinguished from international citizenship. International citizenship refers to sovereign ‘citizens’ of states within an international community. We often talk about whether one nation is a good citizen in the international community (Stokes 2000). Global citizenship is also distinguished from dual citizenship, whereby a citizen can belong to two political entities at once. Four theories each provide different approaches to and emphases on citizenship.

World citizenship and transnational activism 79 Put simply, liberal theory sees citizenship as a set of rights and duties, republican theory stresses civic quality and the bond of community, radical theory links citizenship and direct democracy, and cosmopolitan theory views citizenship as a new global ethics that goes beyond nation-states (Delanty 2000; Faulks 2000). This chapter addresses world citizenship along the lines of the cosmopolitan theory, but focuses on transnational activism, namely, the activities of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs).3 Transnational activities have contained not only the idea of citizenship as pointed out by Meredith Weiss’s case study of Malaysia (this volume), but have also challenged national citizenship. This is because transnational activities blur the national boundaries, both material and psychological, which have made citizenship significant in modern times. In particular, those who advocate principles of human rights question the relevance of national citizenship. Human rights must be universal and equal. Human rights imply that as long as one is human, one is entitled to a certain set of rights. Everyone in the world should enjoy basic rights and is a world citizen. For universal human rights activists, citizenship should not be located in any specific territory or nation-state. Bounded national citizenship is meaningless. Human rights have no national boundaries. To recognize that refugees are global citizens is a new form of cosmopolitanism, which entails an ethics of responsibility and hospitality. Cosmopolitanism gives priority to a concern for others and does not hold prejudices against them. Transnational activism has challenged national citizenship. Numerous INGOs have offered support – material, spiritual, cultural – to the East Timorese independence movement. These include 17 East Timorese organizations in the diaspora, 11 international non-governmental organizations, among them the International Federation for East Timor and the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor, and 14 Australian non-governmental organizations. In extreme cases they override national citizenship and go against national governments, even their own compatriots. For example, a group of East Timor supporters wrote ‘Shame Australia’ on the walls of the Australian parliament on 9 September 1999. As Connolly put it (1991: 463–84): Today a decent democrat must sometimes be disloyal to the state that seeks to own her morally and politically; she must do so in the name of allegiances to a global condition that transcends the confines of any state. However, one may feel that the above position is too radical and idealist, and that it does not fit well with normal human behaviour. One may, for example, argue that some supporters of the Aceh independence movement are motivated by a concern for human rights and the right to self-determination.4 But, on the evidence, some may come from nationalist sources. Transnational action can be encouraged and mobilized by nationalist emotion. As Carter argues, one may try to combine world citizenship with national citizenship, maintaining one’s national citizenship while at the same time developing an awareness of world citizenship (Carter 1997: 67–81). This is a challenging question for individuals who can act as multiple-situated selves in a national context

80 Baogang He and develop complex psychological mechanisms to embrace both cosmopolitan hospitality towards refugees and immigrants and nationalist myths and feelings of belonging. At the institutional level, as Held suggests, democratic institutions should be redesigned and developed to reflect the multiplicity of issues, questions and problems that affect people and bind them together, irrespective of whether they are in one nation-state or another. To bring contemporary forms of power to account, to regulate the complex issues which affect us – locally, nationally, regionally, globally – requires membership in diverse political communities (He 1997: 33–7).

Transnational activism and world citizenship David Hume’s famous thesis on limited generosity describes the common behaviour of people who care about themselves, their relatives and local communities rather than remote strangers. One may ask why some members of INGOs are concerned with the fate of people in remote countries and their boundary/identity questions. To understand the behaviour of INGOs, we need to understand the idea of ‘world citizens’ and the philosophical underpinnings and ethics of INGOs. It should be acknowledged, however, that being a world or global citizen is only one of a range of motivations, and its place and role should not be exaggerated in transnational activism. Although nearly 60 per cent of INGOs concentrate on economic or technical rationalization, only 12 per cent are involved in the development of world citizenship (Boli and Thomas 1997: 182–3; and 1999). Bertrand Russell should probably be regarded as an exemplary figure. He refused to support the British government in the First World War and organized a global campaign against nuclear weapons in the wake of the Second World War (not many people joined INGOs then). Russell showed that a world citizen has to be heroic in the sense that he/she is up against powerful nation-states that engage in ‘criminal’ acts of war or fail to protect human rights. A world citizen is one who refuses to be guided by national interests alone. He or she will not give precedence to national interests over universal values. Nation-states tend to be seen as ‘enemies’ of international justice, for governments often place national interest first and international justice last. A self-identifying world citizen is committed to a set of global values, such as green issues or human rights. Thus the commitment to global values, whatever they are, constitutes one crucial element of world citizenship. Many activists in Europe, Australia and the United States are concerned about human rights and organize campaigns against the abuse of human rights in other parts of the world, such as China and Burma. Perhaps a most important dimension of the world citizen is identity. The modernization process has smashed linear and kinship relations. In post-modern societies, there are people who no longer identify themselves as members of a nation-state. Some people in the UK, for example, are no longer interested in national heroes such as the duke of Wellington. More and more people are interested in global figures such as Mother Theresa, and global issues, so being a national citizen is not a concern for them. They identify themselves with a global cause. Certainly each

World citizenship and transnational activism 81 individual has multiple identities – gender, professional, cultural, ethnic, national – but a global citizen identifies him/herself with an imagined global community from which they are able to look down upon the notion of national citizenship and national government. They are indifferent to provincialism and go beyond locality. They are free of geographic restrictions and material considerations. To identify oneself with a global cause makes one’s life meaningful. World citizenship is both an idea and an action. Many individuals have joined various INGOs and engaged in different kinds of transnational activities in order to promote a more just international order. They participate in and influence world society and their local lifeworld. ‘NGOs represent one of the means by which individuals, with varying but particular ideas about what international politics is and should be, attempt to shape the world around them’ (Warkentin 2001: 174). The important difference between national citizenship and world citizenship is choice. One is born a national citizen, although under limited circumstances one can choose to be a citizen of other nation-states. But being a world citizen is a matter of conscious choice and not a birthright. One must work hard to be a world citizen. On the psychological level, when making the choice to be a world citizen, one feels spiritual sublimation and a certain kind of human dignity. By contrast, to be a national citizen is nothing special, for one is born into it. Global citizenship exists not only in the form of individual choice, but also in the form of ‘collective action’ by INGOs. The participation of INGOs in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Women, and Human Rights has shown the existence of, and tendency towards, global civil society (Hochstetler, Friedman and Clark, 1998: 1–35). Some INGOs are devoted to a global cause and seek global legal and institutional frameworks to give substantive rights and duties to citizens. INGOs such as the Charter for the Cities of Refugees and the International Agency for Cities of Refugees promote cosmopolitan rights for asylum-seekers, refugees and immigrants. Below is an incomplete list. ●

●

●

●

●

The Earth Island Institute, headquarters in California, USA, develops and supports projects that counteract threats to the biological and cultural diversity that sustains development. Through education and activism, these projects promote the conservation, preservation and restoration of the Earth (Warkentin 2001: 39–41). JustAct, headquarters in California, USA, aims to ‘develop life-long commitment to social and economic justice’ by linking ‘students and youth in the US to organizations and grassroots movements working for sustainable and selfreliant communities around the world’ (Warkentin 2001: 86). Oxfam believes that: ‘In a world rich in resources, poverty is an injustice which must be overcome.’ It aims to build a just and safer world in which people take control of their own lives and enjoy their basic rights (Warkentin 2001: 130). OneWorld Online is a non-profit network that aims to harness the democratic potential of the internet to promote sustainable development and human rights (Warkentin 2001: 157). In East Asia, numerous INGOs are concerned with human rights and

82 Baogang He humanitarian issues, such as Amnesty International; Caritas International; the Human Rights Fund for Indigenous Peoples; Human Rights Watch; Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign; Minority Rights Group International; the International Commission of Jurists; and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Other INGOs express their commitment to self-determination through direct and open support for independence or secessionism. Prominent among this group are the International Campaign for Tibet;5 the International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet;6 the International Federation for East Timor; and the International Forum for Aceh. It should be noted that the International Commission of Jurists and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples have a consultative or observer status which helps them gain access to the United Nations and to exercise their influence through formal international channels (He 2004). INGOs and their transnational activities have been promoting democracy and democratization in Asia. There are linkages between transnational activism, participatory politics and e-mobilization for democracy (Lai, this volume). The activities of transnational networks of NGOs cover a diversity of democratic agendas, such as democratic elections, good governance and promotion of human rights in Indonesia ( Jemadu, this volume). The idea of world citizenship constitutes a normative foundation for transnational activism and is also a source of ideological power against the ideologies of nationalism. It provides an ideal point and a moral force whereby transnational activists can assess and criticize reality in their struggle against the domination of money and power. Global citizenship invokes the image of a moral community (Stokes 2000: 241). It aims to create a global culture, the consciousness of a global village, which overrides the sense of national identity. Richard Falk (1995: 100–1) succinctly expresses this: The modernist stress on territorial sovereignty as the exclusive basis for political community and identity would be displaced both by more local and distinct groupings and by association with the reality of a global civil society without boundaries. Global civil society treated as the hopeful source of political agency needs to free the minds of persons from an acceptance of state/ sovereignty identity, and rethink the contours of community, loyalty, and citizenship. World citizenship and transnational activities constitute a material power for global governance and against nation-states. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, includes NGOs as important actors in democratizing the world polity. He stresses that since 1945 the United Nations–NGO partnership has grown into a global network, encompassing some 1,600 NGOs in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council under Article 71 of the Charter (Boutros-Ghali 2000: 105–24). The relief agency Care International, for example, has a budget of US $400 million, larger than the UN Food and Agriculture

World citizenship and transnational activism 83 Organization (FAO). The UN Commission on Human Rights has a smaller budget than Amnesty International (Perlas 1999: 80). INGOs have also attempted to transform global norms. They do not take IMF rules as given. They have made efforts to create a UN People’s Assembly that can be seen as a step towards global democracy, to reduce the domination of power by superpowers and international funding agencies (Archibugi 1995: 135–55). INGOs have the potential to shape globalization and world politics. Nevertheless, they face a challenging question of how to overcome the unequal structural problem when they attempt to manifest the idea of world citizenship fully.

World citizenship and cultural equality Here we are concerned with the questions of power and democracy discussed in the introductory chapter of this book. According to the theoretical notion of world citizenship, all people – insiders and outsiders – are equal and so are all funding agencies and receivers. There is, however, always an unequal structure in practice. Alexius Jemadu (this volume) points this out. He argues that these networks remain challenged to overcome the structural inequalities in the relationship between the Indonesian NGOs and their international partners on the one hand and the NGOs in general and the people they claim to represent on the other hand. Transnational activists may use resources and funding to exercise world citizenship in undemocratic ways. This is an internal contradiction of global citizenship. Such structural inequalities pose a challenge to transnational activists who are committed to the notion of global citizenship and who value democracy. How does one deal with this structural inequality? One may assert that an unequal relationship is a necessary step towards promoting world citizenship and global causes in Asia. There is a need for Western INGOs to come to Asia to help and to teach Asians about the working principles and mechanisms of transnational activism and world citizenship. Others may push the idea of world citizenship in the direction of democratic citizenship. If one understands democracy as a matter of equality, global citizenship has to tackle this question. Here I attempt to engage with the global perspective of cultural equality and the challenges it poses to transnational activism (Walker 1984; Chay 1990). This will point towards some of the complex theoretical difficulties that arise if the question of cultural equality is taken seriously. Global citizenship is a floating culture unrelated to any specific national identity, though it does not deny national and local cultures. Among those who support the right to self-determination, there is an alliance between global culture and local culture against certain forms of national culture. A global citizen and a transnational activist encounter different cultures and face the question of whether to treat the cultures of strangers and refugees as equal or inferior. The recognition of cultural differences raises the question of cultural world citizenship. Moreover, in the process of cultural and economic globalization, commercial culture prevails and undermines traditional culture without using force. The clash of civilizations and cultural ‘conquest’ raise the question of the survival of small

84 Baogang He cultures. The domination of one culture over others raises the question of cultural equality. To deal with the above issues, a global citizen is likely to encounter the following fundamental questions. Who has the right to define what is culture and the boundaries of cultures? Who has the right to interpret culture? Who is an actor? While a global citizen cannot settle these questions, his or her normative commitment to the equality principle is the best starting point. The idea of world citizenship takes cultural equality and cultural differences seriously. Cultural equality is integral to world citizenship. The agenda of the democratization of global culture also takes cultural equality seriously. Said’s idea of equality of civilizations, Kymlicka’s idea of the cultural equality of minorities, Charles Taylor’s idea of equal value of cultures (Taylor 1994: 42) and Iris Young’s demand that the cultures of different groups must be publicly affirmed as being of equal value, all these ideas stress the importance of cultural equality. The idea of cultural equality contains many ingredients, including the idea that each culture has equal weight in institutional design, the idea of equal rights to interpret culture, the idea of equal access to cultural production and distribution, and the idea of equal status of cultural practice and thinking. Also included is the idea that the cultural order and mutual dialogue must be established on the basis of equality. The idea of cultural equality allows no place for traditional categories of high versus low cultures.7 The idea of equality has marched heroically from political equality, such as equal rights and voting in a democratic system, to economic equality (for example, a discussion of equal ownership of the means of production), to social equality, such as equal access to jobs and social services, and to cultural equality. The idea of citizenship has been associated with the struggle for political, economic and social equality. Citizenship is now no longer exclusively about such struggle, but has become a major site of battles over cultural identity and demands for the recognition of cultural differences and equal cultural status. Cultural global citizenship goes beyond national borders and is concerned with the cultural equality between different civilizations and cultures. The idea of cultural world citizenship provides transnational activism with a normative basis to deal with the issue of structural inequalities. It challenges a form of political power in which the assumption of cultural superiority plays a part in the domination of the strong over the weak. In particular, it challenges the master concept of liberty in international trade and the cultural sphere. According to the idea of cultural equality, liberals should listen and think about non-liberal questions arising from non-liberal societies, and even make concessions to non-liberal practices that have some normative validity. Liberalism is not salient nor is it predominant in the Middle East and in East Asia. Can liberals impose their liberal mode of thinking on others? Must they recognize the legitimacy of alternative normative thinking? For example, drug policies reflect different histories, traditions and cultures. Holland adopts a liberal and lenient approach towards drugs, while Malaysia, Singapore and China adopt a very tough policy. It is difficult to say whether the liberal approach in Holland is superior to the non-liberal approach in Malaysia, Singapore and China.

World citizenship and transnational activism 85 The right to do wrong, the right to hold a gun, the liberty to be gay or have a family that is entitled to social welfare suggest lifestyles that depend on the particularity of cultural conditions and history. By contrast, survival is the priority in ‘backward’ societies where certain liberties are seen as ‘perfume’, not daily necessities like bread. The claim that to meet the basic needs of the poor in the third world requires the protection of rights is simply not enough. Liberalism promises to engage in genuine dialogue between different cultures because by nature its doctrine is open, tolerant and plural. This sort of liberalism, however, becomes closed when it views liberty as primary and equality as secondary, and when it regards liberal culture as superior to other cultures. When people hold the variant versions of liberalism mentioned above, the view from the South can be heard but is not taken seriously in the area of transnational activities, such as international conferences and publications. Occasionally, we see that the organizers of global or international conferences pick up some people from the third world or the south as ‘representative’, but seldom as serious equal discussants. An example illustrates this well. A study of ‘engagement’ in international politics, by Professor Paul M. Evans of the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Colombia, Canada, provides 39 definitions, including comprehensive, constrained, cooperation, deep, deeper, realistic, selective and conditional engagement, but the fundamental issue of equal engagement is missing.8 The justification for this neglect is that an authoritarian regime like China does not respect equality and is not entitled to be treated equally. ‘It is equally unjust to treat unequals equally as it is to treat equals unequally’ (Crick 1992: 13). As shown above, the idea of cultural equality is valuable for transnational activism. It has inherent problems, however. To take cultural equality as an integral part of world citizenship, one confronts paradoxes immediately. For example, demands for equality between different cultures and civilizations are an external cultural equality. The external equality of cultures does not necessarily ensure internal cultural equality. Rather, it entails the possibility of justifying unequal arrangements within a culture or civilization. Theoretically, one could hold the thesis that each culture has its own equal right to interpret what is equality; others can entertain the antithesis that an equal right to interpret what is equality will lead to a justification of, for example, some gender inequality. Moreover, the willingness to interfere in other countries can be justified by appealing to the defence of universal human rights, but an overriding concern with cultural equality may compromise the active interference of INGOs in other societies. Indeed, ‘multiple citizenship provides an inherent source of political conflict over citizenship claims’ (Stokes 2000: 239). Sex worker activists and some anti-trafficking activists view prostitution as legitimate labour, while others consider all prostitution to be a violation of women’s human rights. There is a further example of the paradox. One may hold the thesis that each culture should enjoy an equal right to use its language in global communication, and that each language has a cultural value that should be regarded as equal. Alternatively, one may counter that it is necessary for English to be the global language. Although global English results in unequal status for other languages, in

86 Baogang He the context of transnational activities that involve different peoples who speak different languages, it makes cultural dialogue and daily communication possible. The politics of cultural equality comes into play. The idea of ‘cultural equality’ can be used to promote the status of ‘Asian values’ in resisting human rights principles. It entertains the idea that Islamic culture should enjoy equal status in the struggle against new forms of neo-liberal ‘imperialism’. Demanding equality between Christian and Islamic civilizations downplays human rights principles, for they are seen as a product of Christian culture. We can identify a number of strategies to deal with the paradoxes of cultural equality. Drawing on the contradictions of cultural equality, one questions the value of cultural equality itself. Brian Barry argues that the idea of cultural equality is logically incompatible with the idea that cultures are incommensurable. ‘There is no impartial or universal standpoint from which the claims of all particular cultures can be rationally assessed’ (Barry 2001: 264–5). Barry also provides two arguments against the claim that cultures should be affirmed to be of equal value or presumed to be of equal value. The first one is that it shifts into the realm of public control matters which should be left to individual judgement. The second argument is that the demand for equal recognition of all cultures is not only psychologically unattainable but also logically impossible (Barry 2001: 229–71). Another strategy is to distinguish between human beings and culture. We never compromise the equality between human beings. A global citizen will never treat others as a means but always as an end. But equal respect for human beings in other cultures does not compromise our capacity to criticize some traditional practices in other cultures. Human rights principles are now widely respected in different parts of the world and by different cultural societies. This provides us with a minimal standard whereby we can engage in cultural critique. A global ethics respects different cultures but does not retreat into them and ossify them. Rather than rejecting the idea of cultural equality, a global citizen acknowledges that, although we cannot resolve or eradicate tensions or contradictions, we can negotiate between the universal and the particular, the absolute and the relative. We can negotiate over cultural difference and equality and develop a minimal overlapping consensus. This negotiation strategy is a mechanism towards greater cultural equality.9 Each culture recognizes its incompleteness, limits and weaknesses. Each engages in dialogue and learns from others. Moreover, contradictory impulses can lead to psychologically complex feelings of ambivalence towards the idea of cultural equality. One will value cultural equality on the one hand, but remain sensitive to internal inequality and the multiplicity of issues involved, and develop skills to manage multiplicity and contradiction. A global citizen takes ‘contradictions’ as a driving force to enable world citizenship to act in a dialectical way. This is a central quality that a global citizen needs to develop, and is a key feature of the politics of transnational activism. More importantly, transnational activism and world citizenship should operate within democratic traditions, values and institutions oriented towards accountability, legitimacy and participation (Stokes 2002). As Linklater argues, what is needed ‘is a transnational public sphere in which different and overlapping moral communities

World citizenship and transnational activism 87 can all have an input into the decision-making which affects them’ (Hutchings and Dannreuther 1999: 3; Heater 1996).

Scepticism about world citizenship Kymlicka is sceptical about the likelihood of globalization producing any meaningful form of transnational citizenship. He argues that although he is a member of Greenpeace and supports its efforts to gain a seat at the table of UN organizations, this does not change the fact that there is no meaningful forum for democratic deliberation and collective will-formation above the level of the nation-state. Therefore, for Kymlicka (1996: 318, 323), transnational activism by individuals or NGOs is not the same as democratic citizenship. Is the concept of world citizenship a conceptual exaggeration? One may argue that since world citizenship has no codified legal meaning, it is a mistake to use the term world citizenship, because from a legal perspective citizenship refers to entitlements, duties and obligations. Stephen Neff demonstrates that none of the four areas of international law – economic globalization, human rights, protection of the environment and the suppression of international crime – are designed so much to promote a new idea of citizenship as to make the whole idea of citizenship irrelevant (Neff 1999: 117). Some critics even say that the concept of world citizenship is misused, for citizenship always relates to the nation-state and its territories. Having a commitment to our common humanity, acting upon the idea of a universal human being or enlightened human being, and showing disloyalty to the values and views of nationstates, does not constitute something like world citizenship. By comparing national citizenship with so-called world citizenship, critics of world citizenship condemn it as containing an unbalanced relationship between obligations and rights. Under national citizenship, one has inseparable rights, duties and obligations: paying tax, abiding by the rule of law and being entitled to higher education, community service and welfare. Obligations and rights go hand in hand. In other words, the agent of national citizenship is unitary. But the agent of world citizenship is divided. ‘World citizens’ in the third world are not entitled to receive aid unless they are lucky. And they do not have clear obligations to the global society either. On the other hand, people who regard themselves as world citizens – say, workers on an Oxford farm – only have an obligation to look after others, but do not have entitlements to welfare benefits from the world governance. As a national citizen, one has the right to vote, but as a world citizen, one does not have the right to vote on international issues – there is no global democracy. In this aspect, it is easy to understand why the majority of people probably reject the idea of world citizenship, because it is idealistic and asymmetric: there are only obligations, but no rights to vote or entitlements.10 Currently, there is no formally institutionalized global opposition party or global democracy. It seems impossible to have world citizenship without global government. Without a global government, who is able to provide everyone on Earth with certain entitlements? If the United Nations cannot impose a global tax, develop a global government and distribute those taxes to those in need, the idea and practice

88 Baogang He of world citizenship is unlikely to develop. Until existing world bodies, such as the UN and the WTO, become democratic and therefore accountable to the citizens of the world, one is less likely to be persuaded that we can ever have world citizenship. The second dimension in this comparison is ‘space’. A global civil society is without borders. World citizenship does not have a specific location. National citizenship has specific territory and is territorially bounded. National citizens have grass roots. In the case of the UK, citizenship appears to be based strongly on territoriality, though with some ethnic elements. In Germany, nationality is based almost exclusively on ethnicity. France appears to combine elements of both conceptions (Smith and Blanc 1994). National citizenship can be defined within a political community where citizens share at least a commonality of traditions, and accept a polity and the coercive action by authorities in that polity. World citizens do not care about locations. They are not bounded by location. It is argued that global citizenship is empty and flat, without historical roots and lacking a strong social basis: it is merely the product of intellectuals and the middle class. Third, a world citizen has the duty to help others, but does not necessarily have responsibility for the consequence of their actions. Where is the accountability of global civil society (Fox and Brown 1998)? INGOs certainly supported the independence of East Timor morally and materially, but at the crucial moment, when the military suppressed independence activities, NGOs had no responsibility for potential war. Only the Australian government took seriously the consequence of intervention: a potential war with Indonesia. Some of the above scepticism and criticism implicitly assumes a nationalist position. While they contain some insightful views, they fail to produce convincing arguments against the idea of world citizenship, because the nationalist positions and perspectives themselves are problematic. The idea of world citizenship attempts to challenge the nationalist perception of citizenship. The legal approach to world citizenship is largely misleading because ‘Global citizenship cannot be simply a legal or administrative category; it comprises a political identity that puts great store by active citizenship’ (Stokes 2000: 241). The meaningful and constructive question is to search for innovative institutions to institutionalize and back up the idea of world citizenship.

Asian traditions and global citizenship If the idea of world citizenship attempts to be universally meaningful in the sense that Southeast and East Asian societies can accept and practise it fully, it requires a truly global civil society which Asians feel a part of and make a contribution to. Asians are often receivers and consumers of Western ideas, including, this time, the notion of world citizenship. But, as was argued before, the concept of world citizenship should take cultural difference and cultural equality seriously. Asian cultures should therefore be sources adding to and modifying the notion of world citizenship at the levels of cognition and practice. Both Confucianism and Islam should develop their notions and practices of world citizenship rather than maintaining a defensive view and asking whether the notion of world citizenship can satisfy their concerns.

World citizenship and transnational activism 89 In practice, terrorists misuse Islam to mobilize a violent form of transnational activism, rather than to promote world citizenship. In Southeast Asia, Islam mobilizes numerous transnational activities, not global citizenship. For example, Jemaah Islamiah (JI) formed a regional alliance of Islamic militant groups whose core team included leaders of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and a group from southern Thailand. The aim of JI is to create an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippine island of Mindanao, Singapore, Brunei and southern Thailand. Twenty-one Singaporeans who joined JI were arrested on 19 September 2002 (Lydia Lim 2002: 1). With the aim of an Islamic state, these peoples organized their activities across national borders. They were ‘citizens’ of an ‘idealized’ Islamic state, rather than the global citizens discussed in this chapter. By contrast, interestingly, cooperation is lacking between NGOs dealing with issues of HIV prevention in Singapore, the Malaysian province of Johor and the Indonesian province of Riau. Links have emerged between local NGOs on Batam and NGOs and INGOs in Jakarta (Lindquist, this volume). There are difficulties in building up a network among social movements in Asia (see Chapter 10, this volume). In theory, Confucian scholars have reinterpreted Confucian texts for modern relevance. But little has been done regarding the issue of world citizenship. Worse still, Confucian scholarship idealizes Confucian doctrine without engaging with contemporary issues such as global citizenship or international justice. Such an approach fails to transform Confucianism into a global doctrine. Global citizens are understood to be those who live outside their countries and who enjoy a cosmopolitan lifestyle. A journalist in Singapore describes a prototypical global citizen: ‘I will spend spring, the season of the sakura,11 in Japan; and summer till autumn, when the leaves change colour, in Paris; and winter in a tropical place like Singapore. I don’t want to be committed to one country’ (Richard Lim 2002: 4). Some Chinese emigrants who become legal citizens of other countries remain Chinese ‘citizens’ in the cultural sense. They regard China in idealized terms but have no legal duty or responsibility to China. They are floating in their host countries, uncommitted, and they only use the passports of their new countries to facilitate international travel. One scholar, who has travelled around the world with a Canadian passport and has married a Jewish wife, is willing to take arms to defend China if a war between China and Taiwan occurs. He feels he is ‘Chinese’ and identifies with Chinese culture. Ironically, he never goes to China and does not want to go, so that China’s reality will not shatter his dream, and thus he can keep his ideal of being a Chinese. One might expect that emigrants from Asia, the growing number of the middle class and material cosmopolitanism would lay a material foundation for the development of world citizens, but so far the idea of global citizenship has failed to offer new ways of thinking and new sources of identity for emigrants. Asia has at least two types of cosmopolitanism, material and normative. The former is a lifestyle associated with self-interest. Asia presents numerous examples of growing material cosmopolitanism as described above. Normative cosmopolitanism in Asia is related to the normative ideas of Islam and, to a lesser degree, of Confucianism. Pan-Islamic ideologies and their associated political movements offer

90 Baogang He a different normative structure from that of world citizenship. In the eyes of radical and non-liberal Islamic cosmopolitans, world citizenship is irrelevant to Southeast Asia. The conditions for the development of cosmopolitan democracy are absent in East Asia (He 2002: 47–68). There are a number of obstacles to world citizenship in Asia. Asian pragmatism supports the rejection of idealism, including the ideal of world citizenship. Nationstates render non-state actors meaningless in international areas. In many Asian families, education is primarily devoted to kinship, self-survival and material concerns.12 All these institutions and practices inhibit the development of world citizenship. In Southeast Asia, the history of colonization leads to a defensive position and contributes to a lack of confidence. In order to meet global challenges, people tend to defend local cultures rather than develop their own notion of global citizenship. By contrast, the idea of global citizenship has historical roots in the tradition of Christian missions. Behind this idea is the Christian desire to save the world. Global citizenship can be seen as a secular and modern form of the Jesuit mission. Imperialism, and the history and mentality of empire, could also be sources for global citizenship, in the sense that they provide an outward perspective and expanded dynamism.

Conclusion A process of the fragmentation, reconfiguration and reconceptualization of citizenship has taken place. In this process, as Habermas put it, ‘State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum whose contours, at least, have already become visible’ (Habermas 1996: 515). Transnational activism and its moral principles, beliefs, organization and behaviour demonstrate the existence of world citizenship. World citizenship provides a new code of conduct, a source of identity and a new ethics for transnational activism. It challenges and erodes the idea of national citizenship. The idea of world citizenship constitutes a normative foundation for transnational activism and a source of ideological power against the ideologies of nationalism. World citizenship and transnational activities also constitute a material power against the nation-states and for good global governance. The idea of world citizenship must take cultural equality seriously. Cultural equality, integral to world citizenship, forms an important agenda for the democratization of global culture. To become a true world citizen, transnational activists must find ways to go beyond the nation-state system and overcome the problem of structural inequalities. Nevertheless, to take cultural equality as an integral part of world citizenship one confronts a number of paradoxes immediately. A number of strategies deal with the paradoxes of cultural equality. The first strategy is to reject the value of cultural equality itself, as advocated by Brian Barry. The second strategy is to distinguish between human beings and culture, and to argue that equal respect for human beings in other cultures does not compromise our capacity to criticize some traditional practices in other cultures. Rather than rejecting the idea of cultural equality, a global citizen favours the third strategy that, although we cannot resolve or eradicate the tensions or contradictions, we can negotiate

World citizenship and transnational activism 91 between the universal and the particular, the absolute and the relative, and develop psychologically complex feelings of ambivalence towards the idea of cultural equality. Critics hold sceptical views of world citizenship: world citizenship does not have a codified legal meaning; the concept of world citizenship is misused, for citizenship always relates to the nation-state and its territories; world citizenship contains an unbalanced relationship between obligations and rights; and global citizenship is empty and flat without historical roots. While these views contain some truth and insight, they do not constitute convincing arguments against the idea of world citizenship, because the concept of global citizenship is largely political and cultural, not legal; and the nationalist position and perspective themselves are problematic. In Asia, global citizens are understood to be those who live outside their countries and who enjoy a cosmopolitan lifestyle. More importantly, pan-Islamic ideologies and their associated political movements offer a different normative structure from that of world citizenship. Most Asians are receivers and consumers of the notion of global citizenship, rather than significant contributors. Most institutions, such as nation-states and family structure, have inhibited the development of world citizenship in Asia. Asia has a long way to go to develop and contribute to the global cause of world citizenship.

Notes 1 The author thanks David Held and Robert Walker for their suggestions; Nicola Piper, Anders Uhlin and the reviewer of the edited volume for their encouragement; Wang Gungwu and Benjamin Wong for our delightful conversations; and Becky Shelley and Lang Youxing for their help. 2 Cosmopolitan citizenship, global citizenship and world citizenship are interchangeable in this chapter and in Linklater’s article. There are differences in stress and content that I will not discuss here. 3 For the discussion on differentiation between NGOs, INGOs, TSMOs, and TANs, see Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin (this volume). 4 Tapol, for example, established in London, is the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign organization to expose human rights violations in Indonesia, East Timor, West Papua and Aceh. From 15 February 1999 to August 2001 it issued 16 statements and news reports about Aceh and human rights violations there. 5 Founded in 1988, it aims at promoting human rights, democratic freedom and selfdetermination for Tibetans, and has members from 67 countries. 6 Founded in 1989, at the request of the Tibetan government-in-exile, it aims at promoting self-determination for the Tibetan people, with 1,000 members from 14 countries. 7 There is a fear of cultural equality. The equalization of different cultures means the loss of elite culture, resulting in vulgarization. 8 His talk given at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2001. 9 Derrida (2001) has advocated the negotiation strategy to handle the internal contradiction of cosmopolitanism. 10 Certainly, those who celebrate the idea of international justice may argue that the advocacy of international justice is an intellectual movement, rather than a political institution. See Baogang He (2000: 34–50). 11 The sakura is a flowering cherry tree belonging to one of the many varieties bred from various species of prunus. 12 On the role of family in nourishing global citizenship, see Myers-Walls et al. (2001).

92 Baogang He

References Archibugi, D. (1995) ‘From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy’, in D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds) Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 135–55. Barry, B. (2001) Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Boli, J. and Thomas, G.M. (1997) ‘World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization’, American Sociological Review 62: 171–90. ——(eds) (1999) Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organisations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Boutros-Ghali, B. (2000) ‘An Agenda for Democratization: Democratization at the International Level’, in Barry Holden (ed.) Global Democracy: Key Debates, London: Routledge, pp. 105–24. Carter, A. (1997) ‘Nationalism and Global Citizenship’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 43(1): 67–81. Chay, J. (ed.) (1990) Culture and International Relations, New York: Praeger. Connolly, W.E. (1991) ‘Democracy and Territoriality’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20(3): 463–84. Courchene, T.J. (ed.) (1996) The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges, Ontario: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen’s University. Crick, B. (1992) In Defense of Politics, 4th edn, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Delanty, G. (2000) Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press. Derrida, J. (2001) On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, London: Routledge. Falk, R. (1995) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press. Faulks, K. (2000) Citizenship, London: Routledge. Fox, J.A. and Brown L.D. (eds) (1998) The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press. He, B. (1997) ‘Democracy, Transnational Problems and the Boundary Question: Challenge for China – an Interview with David Held’, Social Alternative 16(4): 33–7. ——(2000) ‘The Four Notions of International Justice’, The Banaras Law Journal (India) 29(1–2): 34–50. ——(2002) ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy and the National Identity Question in Europe and East Asia’, International Relations of Asia Pacific 2: 47–68. ——(2004) ‘Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia’, Global Governance, forthcoming. Heater, D.B. (1996) World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought, New York: St Martin’s Press. Hochstetler, K., Friedman, E.J. and Clark, A.M. (1998) ‘The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Women, and Human Rights’, World Politics 51: 1–35. Hudson, W. and Kane, J. (eds) (2000) Rethinking Australian Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hutchings, K. and Dannreuther, R. (eds) (1999) Cosmopolitan Citizenship, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

World citizenship and transnational activism 93 Kymlicka, W. (1996) ‘The Prospects for Citizenship: Domestic and Global’, in Thomas J. Courchene (ed.) The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges, Ontario: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen’s University. Lim, L. (2002) ‘Government Reveals Plot to Spark Religious Violence Here’, The Straits Times, 20 September. Lim, R. (2002) ‘My Country, but not My Home?’, The Straits Times, 1 September, Sunday Life. Linklater, A. (1999) ‘Cosmopolitan Citizenship’, in K. Hutchings and R. Dannreuther (eds) Cosmopolitan Citizenship, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Miller, D. (1999) ‘Bounded Citizenship’, in K. Hutchings and R. Dannreuther (eds) Cosmopolitan Citizenship, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Myers-Walls, S., Somlai, P. and Rapoport, R.N. (eds) (2001) Families as Educators for Global Citizenship, Aldershot: Ashgate. Neff, S.C. (1999) ‘International Law and the Critique of Cosmopolitan Citizenship’, in K. Hutchings and R. Dannreuther (eds) Cosmopolitan Citizenship, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Perlas, N. (1999) Shaping Globalization: Civil Society, Cultural Power and Threefolding, Quezon City, Philippines: Center for Alternative Development Initiatives and Global Network for Social Threefolding. Smith, D.M. and Blanc, M. (1994) ‘Some Conceptual Considerations of Ethnicity and Citizenship in the European Union’, paper presented at the International Sociological Association, 1994. Stokes, G. (2000) ‘Global Citizenship’, in W. Hudson and J. Kane (eds) Rethinking Australian Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——(2002) ‘Democracy and Citizenship’, in A. Carter and G. Stokes (eds) Democratic Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press. Taylor, C. (1994) ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Walker, R.B.J. (ed.) (1984) Culture, Ideology, and World Order, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Warkentin, C. (2001) Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

6

Transnational activism and electronic communication Cyber-rainbow warriors in action1 On-Kwok Lai

Introduction The role of transnational civil society in environmental affairs has been subject to much scholarly attention (e.g. Lipschutz 1996; Wapner 1996), and it is recognized that environmental advocacy networks have evolved into truly transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) (Roots 1999; Smith et al. 1997). To indicate this subject’s global reach, Beck has developed the concept of ‘world risk society’ by focusing on environmental issues as truly global dangers or ‘world’ problems (1999: 15), which cut across territorial and class boundaries yet create new international inequalities (1992). Pointing to the power of legal and scientific experts in defining risks, Beck argues that knowledge gains a new political significance (1992: 23). This can also work for social movement actors in the form of ‘post-national risk communities’ that share risks without borders (1999: 16). In this sense, there is a link between Beck’s work and scholars who argue that the strength of transnational civil society lies in its communicative power (e.g. Dryzek 1999). The role of networks has thereby been highlighted. I will add to this view by arguing that electronic (e-) mobilization and cyber-activism may contribute to the communicative power of transnational activism and hence to democratic ways of conducting alternative participatory politics. Thanks to modern information and communication technologies (ICT), we seem to be entering a new era of digital economy, polity and society (Castells 2000; Nie and Erbring 2000; Schiller 1999; US Commerce Department 2000). Participatory politics on a global scale appears increasingly possible, allowing most forms of communication: one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-many. Some commentators claim that cyber-activism has become revolutionary in changing the mode of interaction for advocacy and empowerment, for power relationships between the state and people, and for the structure of governance (Alexander and Pal 1998; Walch 1999). The Association of Progressive Communications and its Asian partner, the South Korean Jinbo.net, for example, are international networks of civil organizations for social justice and development, active in mobilizing progressive forces for regional and global activism in labour, human rights and environmental movements alike, in both cyber and real spaces (Hick et al. 2000; Hick and McNutt 2002; http://www.apc.org/; http://www.jinbo.net). The key issue here is the growing

Transnational activism and electronic communication 95 potential for transnational activism – interactivity, timeliness, active participation, setting progressive agendas – both in virtual and real political communities. My discussion is analytically rooted in three distinct yet interrelated debates on the governance of, and participatory politics in, the global system: the globalized space thesis of James N. Rosenau (1997, 1998), the cosmopolitan democracy concept developed by David Held (1995, 1998, 1999) and the transnational advocacy networks (TAN) thesis of Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 1999). Confronting globalization and the problematic of global governance, Rosenau (1997, 1998) rightly identifies the nascent social agencies, networks and actions: NGOs, the internet and social movements, respectively. As it is widely agreed that current global governance is largely undemocratic (see also Smith, this volume), possibilities for democratizing these structures need to be discussed – an issue which Dryzek approaches discursively, arguing that ‘democratic action in the international system is rooted in reflexive control of the prevailing balance of discourses’ (1999: 43), and that deliberation or communication is the central feature of transnational democracy. These are issues I would like to discuss in the context of e-mobilization and cyberactivism. Despite regional differences regarding the interconnectedness of the internet, the creation of cyberspace through the integration of ICT locally and globally has extended forms of communications, business and policy-making, with emerging new and distinct (cyber) culture, (virtual) communities and (virtual) reality (Featherstone and Burrows 1995; Moss and Townsend 2000; Rash 1997). James N. Rosenau (1997, 1998: 46–7) refers to local, regional and global ICT as functional equivalents of democratic governance where transnational issues are beyond the control of nation-states or state-sponsored institutionalized regimes, like the United Nations: The widespread growth of the Internet, the World Wide Web and the other electronic technologies that are shrinking the world offers considerable potential as a source of democracy . . . by facilitating the continued proliferation of networks that know no boundaries, these technologies have introduced a horizontal dimension to the politics of Globalized Space. They enable like-minded people in distant places to converge, share perspectives, protest abuses, provide information and mobilize resources – dynamics that seem bound to constrain vertical structures that sustain governments, corporations and any other hierarchical organizations. (Rosenau 1998: 46) The notion of ‘electronic democracy’ (democracy aided by ICT) accords with the theory of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ of David Held (1998, 1999), in which he argues that, in a world of overlapping communities of fate, cosmopolitan democracy is the creation of new political institutions and a diversity of NGOs in global civil society, with the democratic principle and praxis of broad access to avenues of civic participation at national, regional and international levels. More specifically, edemocracy is defined here as the democratization process aided by new electronic communication technology through various forms of e-mobilization.

96 On-Kwok Lai On the ‘activism front’, e-mobilization (one form of cyber-activism) revolves around the strategic use of the new media by NGOs. E-mobilization occurs within cyberspace in the form of virtual communication between activists using various means, such as fax and short message-sending (SMS), e-mail, web pages and hyperlinks. For instance, e-mails and SMS are central tools for global social protests against capitalist globalization: just before the WTO Seattle meetings, about 1,500 NGOs signed the anti-WTO declaration using e-mail and text mail (Brecher 2000: 83). The specific context into which I shall put cosmopolitan democracy in its globalized space is transnational activism revolving around ecological issues in East Asia. In other words, I shall discuss ‘transnational ecological activism’ (TEA), coupled with practices connected to modern ICT, to promote cross-territorial and noninstitutionally based politics and the formation of alternative transnational communities (as opposed to ethnic/racial diasporas), as well as democratization, in response to challenges posed by the globalization of capital and economic processes (Held 1998, 1999; Rosenau 1997, 1998). To highlight the role of nascent social agencies (NGOs and cyber-activists) and their transnational networking on ecological issues, I shall present two examples: Greenpeace China and Greenpeace Japan.

Transnational activism in praxis: forms of cyber-activism on ecological issues The success of the ‘Asian miracle’ (rapid economic development) has had damaging and long-term impacts on the environment. In East Asia, this first surfaced in Japan during the 1960s when several infamous cases of environmental pollution occurred, which resulted in a post-war revival of civil society activism in support of the victims and their claims for compensation.2 The depletion of natural resources in countries like China has also become a serious issue, and in newly industrialized countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, this has resulted in vigorous activism responding to the extensive environmental degradation experienced over short periods of time. The bursting of Asian economic bubbles has also prompted Asian states and societies to reconsider their pro-growth development model (Drysdale 2000; Lee and So 1999; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000; Nickum 1999). The examples below give more detailed insight into more radical forms of TEA in East Asia. Example 1: transnational activism against toxic dumping in the South China Sea In July 2000, Greenpeace China exposed the fact that dredging-cum-dumping operations for the construction of Container Terminal 9 (CT9) at the new seaport in Hong Kong had been seriously polluting the marine environment near the Dangan Islands in the South China Sea. Located at the south-eastern periphery of Hong Kong, CT9 has been jointly developed by Hong Kong-based, Asian transnational companies (TNCs), the Sun Hung Kei Group and the Hutchison Whampoa Group, and constructed by a Korean TNC, Hyundai. They aim to have finished by 2004. The future CT9 will cover an area of 70 acres, providing six berthing terminals, all

Transnational activism and electronic communication 97 within the territorial governance of Hong Kong. Yet the dredging work for the terminal and the nearby channel, involving 6 million cubic metres of highly polluted sediment, affects the South China Sea, where the authority for managing the marine environment is divided between the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) in China and the Environmental Protection Department (EPD) in Hong Kong; they both issued dumping and loading permits to the contractors to dump the toxic materials into the ocean. Direct confrontational action took place on 5 September 2000, when Greenpeace activists boarded a dredging barge to protest against the irresponsible dredging and dumping of contaminated sediment for the construction of CT9 in Hong Kong. In a series of protests thereafter, Greenpeace also condemned the Environmental Protection Department for its complicity in the incident. The campaign demanded the EPD should immediately stop the dredging works to prevent further pollution of the sea (see the chronology of the CT9 case at http://www.greenpeace-china.org.hk/). Greenpeace drew public and media attention. After several rounds of confrontational action in Hong Kong, lobbying directed at the Beijing government, and protests voiced at the secretariat handling the London Convention,3 the International Maritime Organization in London, Hong Kong’s EPD subsequently stopped renewing permits for contractors to load highly contaminated dredged mud for final disposal near the Dangan Islands. Follow-up action (such as a scientific investigation to stop the issuance of the dumping permits) was taken by the Chinese government in late September 2000. The contractors then appealed against the decision, but this appeal was dismissed by higher authorities. Other international advocacy activism has taken place since then, including several protests to the London Convention and global media campaigns by Greenpeace activists and their sympathizers from China and Europe. As a result, TEA in this specific context has quite successfully shaped both public opinion and the policy decisions of the governments in the two countries directly involved. Hence it can be said that the primary goal of the campaign has been achieved. Furthermore, three major aspects of TEA can be highlighted here. First and foremost, the campaign against the pollution of oceans in general, and the CT9 case in particular, underpins the importance of TEA in the context of state failure to protect the environment. The ability to protect the ocean is geographically split between two territorial administrations. International conventions, like the London Convention, appear to exist only at a distance. Without the local and regional watchdog function performed by environmental NGOs (Greenpeace in particular), the ocean will again be subject to environmental degradation under the pro-growth development hegemony. The second aspect is related to Greenpeace’s specific form of campaigning: the use of direct action to expose environmental crimes. Aided by ICT, the whole process shows that its global networking and solidarity support,4 local public participation (indirectly supporting the protests) and high-profile protests (direct attack) can create pressure and a powerful political image, pushing governments and corporations to abandon their wrongful practices of damaging the environment. The third aspect concerns the mode of protest, addressing different political levels

98 On-Kwok Lai and domains, in most cases across defined institutional/territorial boundaries. Like the new social movements (cf. Dalton et al. 1990), transnational activism typically exposes the shortcomings of established political institutions. This TEA is new in terms of symbolism, style and political mobilization. The above example also highlights the significance of working simultaneously on several different levels. TEA can be articulated speedily in different territorial spaces at local as well as transnational or global levels by the networking of NGOs and their associated activists. The struggles for cross-border commons (the South China Sea) took place in at least four territorial (political) spaces: Hong Kong, China (Beijing), the South China Sea and London (where the secretariat of the London Convention, the International Maritime Organization, is located). These are connected to, or intertwined with, different political–legal jurisdictions of Hong Kong (part of China but with a different socio-economic, post-colonial system), China (a socialist system but signatory of the London Convention) and the wider international body which oversees the implementation and regulation of the London Convention. Such a complex configuration of protest actions against many targets (three TNCs, two governments, one international organization and the signatory states of an international convention) is only possible when making use of ICT for a combination of on-line and real-time operations. Example 2: cyber-activism on the e-platform of Greenpeace Japan In line with cyber-activism promoted by international advocacy networks, like the activities promoted by the Association of Progressive Communications, cyberaction has recently become an integral part of the activists’ repertoire on the part of the global Greenpeace movement against environmental pollution (http://www. greenpeace.org). For this, each geographically anchored cell of the Greenpeace movement (like Greenpeace China and Greenpeace Japan) has established its respective e-platform for the international exchange of information, in-house action strategies and the recruitment of volunteers for green mobilization. A cyber-activist is someone who has freely signed up to a local Greenpeace cyber-activism community. These activists receive regular e-mail updates, participate in on-line discussions and help carrying out campaigns. The TEA is thus working on all fronts, concerning local, regional and global environmental issues, and cyber-activists recruited from cyberspace are, in this sense, borderless. The e-platform is the cyber-centre (or network) where ‘green’ communications, ideas, messages and knowledge are archived and exchanged, on-line and in real time, for registered participants. They can freely ask questions, exchange views and even debate certain Greenpeace actions. Cyberspace serves as an interactive communication platform for green political and ideological formation as well. Apart from the discussion list function, it is also strategically important for global and/or regional (trans-border) protest actions against specific environmental issues (as seen in the example above). In this way, ‘information’ is at least to some extent transferred into ‘knowledge’ (Comor 2001).5 Within the limited timeframe of a year since the start of cyber-action – from mid-

Transnational activism and electronic communication 99 March 2001 to mid-March 2002 – Greenpeace Japan had organized 14 rounds of cyber-action. A synoptic view of these cyber-mobilizations is provided here in Table 6.1. For ecological issues, the action profile can be analysed in the following way for the 14 actions between 2001 and 2002. First, environmental issues range from local Table 6.1 Cyber-actions of Greenpeace Japan (15 March 2001–10 March 2002) Issue

Territory/target

Action a/actors

Urging Japanese and US governments to support Kyoto Climate Agreement

Global campaign: governments prime minister US president

3rd call: 68 Two calls e-card + 2nd call: 254 3–30 July 01 OPOL 13,300 22–30 June 01 worldwide 1,686 from Japan

Global nuclear test ban

Global campaign

NA

Saving Canadian ancient forest Saving global ancient forest

Global campaign: 100 Canada and Japan government and business

Time frame

One call 30 Aug. 01 – 13 Nov. 01

ICT and content

OPOL

Two calls OPOL 15–30 Mar. 01 6 Mar. 02~~

Stopping the death Global campaign threat to eco-activists for solidarity in the Amazon

NA

One call 10 Oct. 01 ~~

OPOL

Stopping US’s Star Wars missile plan

Global campaign US and Japan

2nd call: 60 1st call: 118

Two calls 30 June 01– 3 Aug. 01

e-card + OPOL

Protesting against nuclear power plant in the Chukok region, and Japan

National/regional 224 government power company

Two calls e-card + 27 April 01~~ OPOL 30 May 01~~

Protesting against PVC packaging/ toys

Global campaign Govt. ministry business sector

272

Two calls e-card + 8 June 01~~ OPOL 17 Dec. 01~~

Protesting against incinerator plant in Japan

National/local city governments

234

One call OPOL 23 May 01~~

Village referendum on nuclear power plant

Local leadership national and regional policy

130

One call 19 April 01 – 24 April 01

NA

One call OPOL 19 Oct. 01~~

Stopping reprocessing National/regional plant in Japan government

OPOL

Notes a Action is defined as confirmed/registered communication (of e-card/appeal letter) forwarded to the targets via the cyber-centre of Greenpeace Japan (figure update: 10 March 2002). OPOL: one person one letter (e-mail) appeal. NA: not available. ~~ ongoing campaign.

100 On-Kwok Lai to global: on Japanese soil (the protest against the nuclear plan in the Chukoku region, the village referendum on the nuclear power plant), abroad (the protests over the Canadian ancient forest and against the US ‘Star Wars’ missile plan) and global (the Kyoto Climate Protocol, the complete ban of nuclear testing). Furthermore, they range from the environmental protection of citizens in their own midst (campaigns against PVC products in general, and especially in toys for kids, and also against living in or near nuclear plants in two localities) to solidarity support for environmentalists elsewhere (e.g. the Amazon region). Despite the 14 calls for cyber-action being concerned with different issues and targets, the key mode of action is based on the direct involvement of registered participants (open to almost any ‘netizen’). The method of one-person-one-letter (OPOL) for political appeal/support has been frequently applied. The OPOL is mostly ICT enhanced with JavaScript or Shockwave Flash. The targets range from powerful political figures like US President Bush (the ‘Star Wars’ case) and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (the Kyoto Climate Protocol case), to village representatives (the anti-nuclear-power-plant case) and the sub-district representatives in Tokyo City (the anti-incinerator-plant case). There is also support for potential victims (children affected by PVC products, residents in/near the incinerator and nuclear power plants) and environmentalists (under death threat in the Amazon) with solidarity and ecological concerns. The mobilization (or call) period usually lasts for a month – so as to keep the most urgent issues on-line for action and to exploit the optimal attention span of the cyberactivists. Yet it is possible to keep many issues in action at any one time on-line and for a very long period in an off-line archive. Although one can interact with cyberspace anywhere in real time, no more than one web page, or five action calls, were on-line at any one time. The shortest period for an urgent issue was less than a week (against nuclear power, in support for the village referendum). The participants (cyber-rainbow warriors) are from any part of the real world, provided they can access cyberspace. For instance, a call for a political appeal, targeting Prime Minister Koizumi, received 13,300 responses, with 1,686 from Japan. More often than not, the calls/appeals are extended and connected to the global community through the cyber-centre(s) of Greenpeace International – this also helps the individuals in front of the computer screen to feel involved in the global environmental movement. More precisely, this can bridge the previous gap between the supporters (non-activists) and the activists in the Greenpeace movement, with important implications for enhanced participation within the transnational activist network. On- and off-line, round the clock and in real time, cyber-activists are recruited from cyberspace through the website of Greenpeace Japan (http://www.greenpeace. org.jp), to critically engage local and global environmental struggles. Cyber-visitors to the homepages of Greenpeace Japan and Greenpeace China numbered 326,700 during the first seven months of 2001 and 111,300 from August 2000 to July 2001, respectively. These figures might not seem high when compared with hit-rates in the information or entertainment sectors, but they are believed to be higher than those of traditional political institutions in both countries. What makes these websites

Transnational activism and electronic communication 101 significant is their accessibility and real-time, round the clock engagement in local, regional and global mobilization. The Greenpeace China’s web-page-visiting statistics show that visitors are more local and regional than previously expected. This points to the local and regional anchoring of Western international NGOs, although this (e-)mobilization via cyberspace is relatively new for the Asian Greenpeace movement. E-mobilization is reinforcing the predominant action strategy of Greenpeace, which emphasizes the use of direct action with a minimal number of selected activists but maximum media coverage, hoping to bring prompt responses from governments, the public and those responsible for pollution. In short, this form of civic mobilization at a cross-border and global level, enabling individuals to participate, echoes the praxis of cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1998, 1999), in which multiple civic agencies from different localities can shape transnational governance. Despite the limited successes of cyber-action, the multiplying effect and the impact of this type of mobilization in and beyond cyberspace should not be underestimated, as it has positive outcomes in a number of ways: for the affected (victims) who are struggling with powerful environmental polluters (the village against the nuclear power plant) and for threatened activists who receive solidarity and support in the form of e-cards and letters. Prominent business people whose companies pollute the environment are reminded by these letters and/or e-cards that their activities are closely monitored with the use of globally set environmental ethical standards (in the anti-PVC-products campaign). Undoubtedly, governments and political leaders have to confront the emerging ecological concerns within and outside their home country (as in the example of the appeal lodged with the Japanese Prime Minister). In a nutshell, this kind of cyber-activism may prompt timely, proactive policies and politics for greening the world. E-mobilization, e-democracy and TEA will be influential in broadening and deepening the scope and extent of democratic, participatory politics in local and regional spaces.

Borders within a borderless world: the continued relevance of location Although the activism derived from and through the internet/cyberspace can be described as borderless in many ways, the networks are sometimes geographically confined to cities of the developed world. More specifically, the locational choice of transnational advocacy network (TAN) agencies is still important, though the activism itself can shape regional affairs beyond the local base of the activists (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999). In other words, cross-border advocacy is by no means borderless or non-territorial, as the specific location or node of protest organization and social mobilization is still very much geographically specific. Cities and microregions with high concentrations of information and knowledge, as well as capital and economic activities (like London, New York, Tokyo and Hong Kong; cf. Downey and McGuigan 1999; Hick and McNutt 2002; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Sassen 1998), usually attract international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). These places, among others, also have a comparative advantage in terms of

102 On-Kwok Lai availability and function of ICT – this gives the seemingly borderless, transnational activism a geo-political location (see also Lindquist, this volume). Although the projects of environmental cyber-activists highlight the potential of the internet as a creator of non-territorial communities of like-minded people, who meet in cyberspace for political purposes – which also show the constraints on organizations in the real world (Rosenau 1998: 46) – we must remind ourselves that location does matter for the prime network organizers or organizations. For instance, the anchoring of Greenpeace China and Greenpeace Japan in Hong Kong and Tokyo respectively has a location-specific comparative advantage, which allows freedom of information and access that are related to their important geo-political positions within the region. In both cities, relatively favourable legal requirements exist for registering NGOs. Thanks to the burgeoning development of an ICT market in Asia, wired and wireless access to communication has expanded tremendously. According to recent research by a media consulting firm, internet use has been rising in Greater China (mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan): more than 15 million people aged five and above are connected to the internet in mainland China, which means that internet penetration has reached 7 per cent of the Chinese urban population. Though penetration is far higher in Hong Kong, at 34 per cent (2.2 million), and Taiwan, at 31 per cent (6.4 million), recent figures show that China is slowly catching up. During the eight months between April and December 2000, the number of internet users in China increased by 15.4 per cent, while Hong Kong recorded growth of just 9.7 per cent (see: http://www.iamasia.com, 17 January 2001). The figures indicate an ever-expanding use of cyberspace in Greater China. The number of mobile internet users in the entire Asia-Pacific region reached 34.4 million by the end of 2000, an increase of 29 per cent in three months (Dataquest, 18 April 2001). Yet there are geo-developmental differences within this region; almost all of these users were Japanese or Korean. There were 26.8 million users of mobile web services in Japan by the end of 2000, and 7 million in South Korea. This is in line with the ‘big jump’ in the use of mobile phones in this part of the world: a 52 per cent increase to 230 million in 2000, up from 151 million at the end of 1999. The region thus appears to be catching up with the United States and Europe. Much of the growth in user numbers came from within China, where the number of mobile phone owners doubled in 2000 to 85.3 million, up from 43.3 million at the end of 1999. Despite its related image of individualism, profit-seeking, self-promotion and greed, the increase of both wired and wireless communications in volume, bandwidth and frequency can help to develop the size, power base and influence of a critical mass of new alternative politicking in cyberspace. This, in turn, might challenge the traditional political establishment (IDEA 2001; Goldstein and O’Connor 2000; Hick et al. 2000; Hick and McNutt 2002; Stefik 1999). In this respect, the actual geographical location and spread of the relevant technology is vital for the potential of transnational activism. Despite the promising developments in the Asia-Pacific region, severe obstacles to cyber-activism remain.

Transnational activism and electronic communication 103

Cyber-activism and e-democracy: obstacles and opportunities Digital deficiencies and divides remain problematic in the Asia-Pacific region. The internet backbone is still controlled by developed economies: 50 per cent of internet communications between Asian countries is routed via US infrastructure. The ratio of the internet population in Southeast Asia to the total population is about 0.5 per cent, in East Asia it is 0.4 per cent and in South Asia 0.04 per cent. For the OECD countries (except the US), the figure is 6.9 per cent, and for the US it is 26.3 per cent (UNDP 1999). The gap between Asian countries is also very wide: around 20 per cent of adults in rich parts of Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc.) are on-line, but less than 1 per cent of the people in the poor parts (such as Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) use the internet (ITU 2000). These figures confirm the digital divide inside and between regions and countries in Asia. An overwhelming majority, especially poor people in poor countries, are the victims of globalization as well as being deprived of the benefits of the Internet. Therefore, the problem of a digital divide is still serious and needs to be addressed (Kenny et al. 2000). Ensuring public control over the ownership and access to airwaves and information highways is critical (Barnett 1997; Bucy and D’Angelo 1999; McChesney et al. 1998; Patterson and Wilson 2000; Wright 1995), although it does not guarantee good prospects for cyber-activism. This is particularly important for Asia, because as the size and volume of cyberspace develop at a progressive scale, so does the struggle for control. Various forms of censorship and barriers keeping people away from cyberspace constitute obstacles to the development of cyber-activism. Authoritarian regimes often try censorship by attempting to control the internet. Singapore and China are no exception. Despite the Singaporean state’s fervent promotion of the internet by attaching an ‘e’ to virtually all aspects of life – as in e-commerce, egovernment and e-politicking – e-political campaigns are strictly regulated. The government introduced a separate law (in addition to the existing Broadcasting Law) for controlling the content of ‘political’ news in August 2001. China’s rulers limit the media’s political effects by carefully circumscribing access to the internet. Furthermore, there is widespread access and content filtering, monitoring, deterrence and self-censorship going on in China. The Chinese government has been quite effective in limiting the use of the internet to challenge the ruling regime, as indicated by Beijing’s complete ban on all forms of access to the Falun Gong’s web pages (Hong 2001; Kalathil 2002; Kalathil and Boas 2001). On the other hand, the Chinese government has also been successful in making extensive use of the internet as a propaganda tool for its own purposes (to promote the party line of socialism and nationalism), and as an economic promotion tool for business, as well as tourism promotion in Shanghai and the promotion of the Olympics in Beijing in 2008. Yet censorship is not fully effective and will most likely not work in the long run – as has been witnessed in South Korea and Taiwan, where efforts to censor have succumbed to political liberalization (see Jinbo.net: http://www.jinbo.net/; Hsiao 1997). Although China shut down 2,000 internet cafés in July 2001 and ordered 6,000 to suspend operations and make changes (Reuter News, 23 July 2001), more

104 On-Kwok Lai anonymous cyber-cafés and cyber-stations were in operation than before, enabling people to evade tough content laws. What is critical is the emerging role of the net in politics. A Chinese study confirmed that users regard the internet as a political instrument in a quasi-authoritarian society. Sixty-seven per cent of adult users agreed the internet allows people the opportunity to comment on government policies and over 70 per cent agreed that the internet is better than other media for allowing people to ‘express their political views’ and to learn about politics (South China Morning Post, 23 July 2001). The figures not only suggest that the internet will play a liberalization role in China’s politics, but also that it will have a strong impact on the democratization project in Asia. On a related theme, what has been labelled e-government is not necessarily part of a general democratization process in Asia. Government efficiency cannot solve the legitimacy and participatory questions related to ICT. In other words, the utilization of ICT is not of policy-making quality, and the benefits of using ICT are mostly captured by the select few of the elitist, powerful and privileged ruling class. Again, this reflects the predominantly production/supply bias of ICT utilization in public policy governance (cf. Garson 2000; Margetts 1999). More problematic still is that the overall performance of e-initiatives is far from satisfactory. E-government cannot replace real politicking. Having e-politicking and e-mobilization at the grass-roots and local NGO levels seems to be a better alternative (Alexander and Pal 1998). Regarding the prospects for cyber-activism and e-democracy in Asia, additional issues need to be tackled. These concern the downsides of the ‘information society’ (Castells 1996; 2000; Luke 2000; Menzies 1996; Schiller 1999; US-NTIA 2000). Even advanced societies are still characterized by more or less high levels of segregation, diversity and hierarchy with regard to the level of information gained through the internet. This has largely to do with the dominance of the English language and American culture (Main 2001). For instance, of the on-line language population (totalling 529 million in December 2001), English accounts for 43 per cent. For East Asia, Japanese accounts for 8.9 per cent, Chinese 8.8 per cent and Korean 4.6 per cent (see http://www.glreach.com/globstats/). For the language of web pages, out of 313 billion web pages surveyed, English accounts for 68.4 per cent, Japanese 5.9 per cent, German 5.8 per cent, Chinese 3.9 per cent, French 3.0 per cent, Spanish 2.4 per cent, Russian 1.9 per cent, Italian 1.6 per cent, Portuguese 1.4 per cent, Korean 1.3 per cent and others 4.6 per cent (Vilaweb.com, as quoted by eMarketer, 2001). In the long term, the domination of English in global communications might bring about a crisis for the existence of minority languages. Furthermore, the US style of life, movies, comics and other visual popular culture, and ‘manufactured’ news and documentaries (the US version of the ‘war against terrorism’ represents such a case) could be seen as cultural manifestations of global imperialism. As long as the internet is based on existent power structures, it will likely reinforce cyber-imperialism (Ebo 2001; Ogura 2001; Wyatt et al. 2000). How to confront cyber-imperialism will be the challenge for transnational activists.

Transnational activism and electronic communication 105

Concluding remarks I have used a few examples here to highlight the new character of cyber-rainbow warriors in action. Concerning e-mobilization, four major issues have proven critical. First is the new mode of political lobbying. Cyberspace provides good information with hyperlinks to other sources of information and it is a relatively safe way for people to have imaginative and innovative encounters with global policy problems. Under the previous regime of environmental politics, it was not possible for a wide range of people to be actively engaged in activist campaigns. They were confined to learning about them from conventional mass media. Cyberspace (for novices as well as veteran activists) is a learning-by-doing, action-oriented medium at both individual and collective levels. People can act with just a few clicks, sending support and appeal letters or animated e-cards to their targets. Second, environmental politics is characterized by local, regional and national political processes. ICT-enhanced cyber-cum-social mobilization extends territorial relevance and enables ‘outsiders’ to have an influence in and beyond locally and regionally specific, territorially defined, environmental struggles. Hence, this form of TEA articulates the higher level of global concern into national/regional/local political spaces. Third, the multiple linkages of TEA in and beyond cyberspace stretch geographical localities, and they extend to numerous individuals who used to be passive observers (of the mass media) and call upon their participation in a less militant, yet supportive, role for the protest movement. Here individuals can make a difference in global politics, especially on those issues (refugees, the environment, animal and human rights) normally neglected by the present state system. Finally, the cases of cyber-activism analysed here point towards the emergence of a new political culture for participatory politics. Cyberspace reinforces civic forces and extends the horizon of ecological action – possibly keeping ecological issues alive even when a social movement becomes dormant at the local level. The struggles against nuclear power plants, the anti-PVC campaign, the protest against the incinerator plant and the local referendum concerning nuclear energy highlight this ICT-enhanced mode of advocacy and its multiplying effect towards a new form of democratic governance for sustainable development. Yet democratization by the information revolution is contingent upon a complex configuration of dynamic socio-economic factors (Waller et al. 2001). The prospects for democracy in Asia are further shaped by the differential state–society conflicts in the region. Various forms of undemocratic praxis need to be challenged. Democracy, political liberalization and environmentalism are as important as the economic miracle for Asian societies (Lee and So 1999; Sachs 2001). Furthering democratization is the way to go. Given the rise of Asian digital power and the expansion of cyberspace, the strategic use of the internet can thereby foster transnational activism and social capital-building across local, regional and global spaces. On the other hand, powerful forces can slow down the scope of transnational activism, Asian states/societies are deeply divided along religious lines (Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam), political ideologies (democracy, authoritarianism,

106 On-Kwok Lai market socialism), colonial heritages (British, Japanese, American), boundary disputes (between India and Pakistan) and security tensions (the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula). All this might provide the pretext for the state’s control over civil forces, exerting its hegemonic banner of nationalism and cultural-political correctness in and out of cyberspace. Furthermore, there are always supra-national institutional attempts to challenge local civic forces, like the further economic liberalization related to APEC and the WTO. Hence, while prospects for continued cyber-activism are good, it will be a rocky path towards (e-)democracy.

Notes 1 Special thanks to Lai Hung and Yunn-Ya Chen for their continual support on this project. Thanks also to Kwansei Gakuin University for the special research grants. 2 The disastrous Minamata disease caused by toxic chemical pollution affected over 4,000 people and resulted in protest movements against the polluters and the government in the 1960s and 1970s. For details see Ui (1992). 3 The full title is: Convention to the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes (1972), see: http://www.londonconvention.org/. 4 See http://www.greenpeace.org/~odump/ocean.html/ 5 Comor has actually commented upon the fact that information exchange between NGOs does not constitute the generation of knowledge and it would hence be premature to speak of a ‘global civil society’.

References Alexander, C.J and Pal, L.A. (eds) (1998) Digital Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barnett, S. (1997) ‘New Media, Old Problems: New Technology and the Political Process’, European Journal of Communication. 12(2): 193–218. Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society, London: Sage. ——(1999) World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Brecher, J. (2000) Globalization from Below: Power of Solidarity, Cambridge: South End Press. Bucy, E.P. and D’Angelo, P. (1999) ‘The Crisis of Political Communication: Normative Critique of News and Democratic Processes’, in M.E. Roloff (ed.), Communication Yearbook 22, London: Sage. Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell. ——(2000) ‘Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society’, British Journal of Sociology 51(1): 5–24. Comor, Edward. (2001) ‘The Role of Communication in Global Civil Society: Forces, Processes, Prospects’, International Studies Quarterly 45: 389–408. Dalton, R.J., Kuechler, M. and Buerken, W. (eds) (1990) Challenging the Political Order: New Social Movements in Western Democracies, Cambridge: Polity Press. Downey, J. and McGuigan, J. (eds) (1999) Technocities, London: Sage. Drysdale, P. (2000) Reform and Recovery in East Asia, London: Routledge. Dryszek, J.S. (1999) ‘Transnational Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy 7(1): 30–51. Ebo, B. (ed.) (2001) Cyberimperialism? Global Relations in the New Electronic Frontier, Westport, CT: Praeger Press. eMarketer (2001) web pages in English and other languages, e-statistics released on 9 January 2001 at www.emarketer.com/products/database.php. Featherstone, M. and Burrows, R. (eds) (1995) Cyberspace, Cyberbodies, Cyberpunk, London: Sage.

Transnational activism and electronic communication 107 Garson, D.G. (2000) Handbook of Public Information Systems, New York: Marcel Dekker. Goldstein, A. and O’Connor, D. (2000) ‘E-Commerce for Development: Prospects and Policy Issues’, OECD Development Centre Technical Paper No. 164, September 2000, Paris: OECD. Greenpeace China (2002) Ocean Dumping at http://www.greenpeace-china.org.hk/ (20 March 2002). ——(various dates) Press release at http://www.greenpeace-china.org.hk/ (20 March 2002). Greenpeace Japan (2002) Cyber-action web page (in Japanese) at http://greenpeace.org.jp (20 March 2002). Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge: Polity Press. ——(1998) ‘Democracy and Globalization’, in D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Koehler (eds) Re-imaging Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press. ——(1999) ‘The Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalization’, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Codon (eds) Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hick, S.F. and McNutt, J.G. (eds) (2002) Advocacy, Activism, and the Internet, Chicago: Lyceum. Hick, S.F., Haplin, E. and Hoskins, E. (eds) (2000) Human Rights and the Internet, London: Macmillan. Hong, J. (2001) ‘The Control of the Internet in Chinese Societies: Similarities, Differences, and Implications of Internet Policies in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore’, conference paper, Asia Internet Rights Conference, 8–10 November 2001, Seoul, Korea. Hsiao, M.H.H. (1997) ‘Social Movements and Civil Society in Taiwan’, Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 11: 7–26. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2001) ‘Democracy and the Information Revolution’, background paper for Democracy Forum, Stockholm, 27–29 June 2001. International Telecommunication Unions (ITU) (2000) Asia-Pacific Telecommunication Indicators, Hawaii: ITU. Kalathil, S. (2002) Nationalism on the Net, Asian Wall Street Journal, 22 February 2002. Kalathil, S. and Boas, T.C. (2001) ‘The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution’, working paper No. 21, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ——(1999) ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, International Social Science Journal 51(159): 89–101. Kenny, C., Navas-Sabater, J. and Qiang, C.Z. (2000) ‘Information and Communication Technologies and Poverty’, discussion paper 29, August 2000, Washington, DC: World Bank. Lee, Yok-Shiu. F. and So, Y. (eds) (1999) Asia’s Environmental Movements, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. (1997) Money Space, London: Routledge. Lipschutz, R. (1996) Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance, Albany: State University of New York. Luke, T.W. (2000) ‘The ‘Net’ Effects of E-Publicanism’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March, 2000. McChesney, R.W., Wood, E.M. and Foster, J.B. (eds) (1998) Capitalism and the Informational Age, New York: Monthly Review Press. Main, L. (2001) ‘The Global Information Infrastructure: Empowerment or Imperialism’, Third World Quarterly 22(1): 83–97.

108 On-Kwok Lai Margetts, H. (1999) Information Technology in Government, London: Routledge. Menzies, H. (1996) Whose Brave New World? The Information Highway and the New Economy, Toronto: Between the Lines. Mol, A.P.J. and Sonnenfeld, D.A. (eds) (2000) Ecological Modernization around the World, London: Frank Cass. Moss, M.L. and Townsend, A.M. (2000) ‘The Internet Backbone and the American Metropolis’, The Information Society 16: 35–47. Nickum, James (ed.) (1999) ‘Eco-Consciousness in Asia and the Pacific’, Asian Geographer 18(1&2). Nie, N. and Erbring, L. (2000) Internet and Society: A Preliminary Report, Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society, 17 February. Ogura, T. (2001) ‘General Situation of the Internet and Communication Rights Issues in Asia’, paper presented at Asia Internet Rights Conference, 8–10 November 2001, Seoul, Korea. Patterson, R. and Wilson, E.J. (2000) ‘New IT and Social Inequality: Resetting the Research and Policy Agenda’, The Information Society 16: 77–86. Rash, W. Jr. (1997) Politics on the Nets, New York: W.H. Freeman. Roots, C. (ed.) (1999) Environmental Movements: Local, National and Global, London: Frank Cass. Rosenau, J.N. (1997) ‘Material and Imagined Communities in Globalized Space’, in D.H. McMillen (ed.) Globalization and Regional Communities, Toowomba: USQ Press. ——(1998) ‘Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World’, in D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Koehler (eds) Re-imaging Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press. Sachs, J. (2001) ‘What’s Good for the Poor is Good for America’, The Economist, 14 July: 36–7. Sassen, S. (1998) Globalization and its Discontents: Essays on the Mobility of People and Money, New York: The New Press. Schiller, D. (1999) Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Smith, J., Chatfield, C. and Pagnucco, R. (eds) (1997) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics. Solidarity Beyond the State, New York: Syracuse University Press. Stefik, M. (1999) The Internet Edge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ui, J. (1992) Industrial Pollution in Japan, Tokyo: United Nations University. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1999) Human Development Report 1999, Oxford: Oxford University Press. US Commerce Department (USCD) (2000) Third Annual Report (2000) on the InformationTechnology Revolution and its Impact on the Economy, Washington, DC: US Commerce Department, June 2000 at http://www.doc.gov (20 March 2002). US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (US-NTIA) (2000) Falling Through the Net – 4th Report, Washington, DC, at http://www.digitaldivide.org and http:// www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/index.html (20 March 2002). Walch, J. (1999) In the Net: An Internet Guide for Activists, London: Zed Books. Waller, P., Livesey, P. and Karin, K. (2001) ‘e-Government in the Service of Democracy’, International Council for Information Technology in Government Administration (ICA) Information, no. 74: general issue, June. Wapner, P. (1996) Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, Albany: State University of New York. Wright, R. (1995) ‘Hyper Democracy’, The Times, 23 January 1995: 37–41. Wyatt, S., Henwoord, F., Miller, N. and Senker, P. (2000) Technology and In/equality, London: Routledge.

7

Putting transnational activism in its place HIV/AIDS in the Indonesia–Malaysia– Singapore growth triangle and beyond1 Johan Lindquist

In the last decade, Asia has increasingly become recognized as the new global epicentre for the HIV/AIDS pandemic. During the same period, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the world, which some observers understand as a sign of a new global civil society. The emergence of NGOs as a force to be reckoned with has been particularly obvious with regard to transnational activist networks in the context of HIV/AIDS prevention and care. Most of these organizations work within particular nation-states, however, and, despite the near universal recognition that HIV does not respect these borders, activism tends to take place within them. The chapter will take as its geographical starting point the emergence of HIV/ AIDS as a transnational problem in the so-called Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore growth triangle, an economic zone that ideally is supposed to bind together Singapore, the Malaysian province of Johor, and the Indonesian province of Riau.2 In the context of this chapter, I will primarily focus on the relationship between Singapore and the Indonesian island of Batam, which, with its highly mobile population and large number of prostitutes,3 has become identified by the Indonesian government and international organizations as a high-risk area for the spread of HIV. NGOs dealing with HIV prevention in this particular border region exist in all three countries, but there is virtually no communication or cooperation between them.4 In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there are very few transnational activist links at all between Batam and Singapore or Malaysia. Ironically, it would seem, in the context of a transnational economic zone that some commentators have identified as an example of a new ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1995), certain forms of cooperation and communication have not emerged. Using this case study, this chapter will elaborate upon three interrelated questions. First, why is there a lack of transnational activism between Batam and Singapore? The initial answer to this question would appear to be fairly straightforward, pointing towards the problematic relationships between state and civil society in Indonesia and Singapore. However, I argue that there is another equally important reason, namely the spatial organization of transnational advocacy networks

110 Johan Lindquist that deal with HIV/AIDS issues. More specifically, and borrowing from the work of Saskia Sassen (1991, 1998), I argue that certain places in these networks are more powerful than others and function as global nodes for transnational activism. In this particular case, Jakarta has become such a node for issues concerning HIV/AIDS in Indonesia. Most Indonesian NGOs must turn towards Jakarta in order to access funding and information from the international organizations that are based there. Despite promises to the contrary, the global distribution of funding and information concerning HIV/AIDS prevention and care continues to be organized largely along national lines. As a place of translation, Jakarta is the key node in these processes. This leads to the second and broader question: how does the organization of transnational advocacy networks affect the conditions and possibilities for transnational activism in particular places? This question suggests the need for a more critical analysis of the spatial forms and associated forms of power relations that emergent forms of global civil society produce. As Comor (2001: 389) has noted, the ‘concept of global civil society involves some extraordinary claims’. In particular, the emancipatory power of communication through new forms of technologies is often overestimated (ibid.: 390). In this context, the ‘network’ has become a globalized aesthetic form (Riles 2000), which not only transfers information, but also Western enlightenment, particularly ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ (ibid.: 173). In relation to this I argue that it is necessary to focus on how communication is organized spatially within particular global systems. Political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 1999) have recently drawn attention to how domestic NGOs in the South are increasingly connected to ‘transnational advocacy networks’, most notably through cooperation with resource-rich international NGOs (INGOs) in the North. In this chapter, I suggest points of convergence with their work and recent studies by anthropologists and sociologists dealing with issues concerning globalization. More specifically, I argue that we need to develop a topographical understanding of transnational advocacy networks within the context of uneven processes of globalization. This will offer a more nuanced model for understanding the conditions for transnational activism. This leads us to the main theme of this volume, namely the relationship between transnational activism, power and democracy. What consequences does the concentration of power and resources to particular global nodes have for the emergence of any form of cosmopolitan democratic project within, or outside, transnational activist networks (e.g. Held 1995, Dryzek 1999)?

Situating NGOs In an era of ‘global problems’ it is no exaggeration to claim that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is one of the major ones. The increasing institutionalization of transnational advocacy networks, most notably through the transformation of the WHO Global Programme on AIDS (WHO/GPA) into UNAIDS (the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS) in 1986, has led to the formalization of a global discourse on AIDS (cf. Patton 2002). Under the leadership of people such as Jonathan Mann, the former head of the WHO/GPA, AIDS was efficiently transformed into a human

Putting transnational activism in its place 111 rights issue during the late 1980s and 1990s, thereby framing it in terms of a ‘causal story’ that could more efficiently garner broad-based support (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998: 27). In other words, as part of a broader global institutionalization of a human rights regime, the right to protect oneself from becoming infected and for HIVpositive individuals to receive care, have increasingly become framed as basic human rights (cf. Poku 2002).5 Transnational advocacy networks were crucial in the formation of HIV/AIDS as a ‘global problem’. Keck and Sikkink (1999: 89) stipulate that a transnational advocacy network ‘includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’. These are ‘informal and shifting structures through which NGO members, social movement activists, government officials, and agents of international institutions can interact and help resource-poor domestic actors to gain leverage in their own societies’ (Tarrow 2001: 13). Especially important in these networks, which can be understood as ‘communicative structures’, is the transfer of information (ibid.: 3). In fact, some observers argue that communication is the main source of power for any form of transnational civil society (Dryzek 1999: 45, see also the introduction to this volume). At the centre of these networks is the rapid growth of domestic and international NGOs worldwide during the last 20 years (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1999: 9; Edwards and Hulme 1996). In the context of developing countries, this process should be understood in relation to the idealization of NGOs as ‘doing good’ in opposition to authoritarian or corrupt governments. This stance has been supported by liberals and neo-Marxists alike, who tend to view NGOs either as apolitical tools or as instruments for reshaping state and society (Fisher 1997). As Sampson (1996) has put it in a different context, the increase in NGOs is understood as a sign of increasing democracy. An important effect of these processes has been the trend for donors to bypass the state and channel significant amounts of foreign aid to organizations identified as NGOs (Edwards and Hulme 1996; O’Malley et al. 1996). In Indonesia the number of officially registered NGOs increased from 130 in 1981 to 4,000 in 1993, while other estimates suggest that there were as many as 10,000 by 1994 (Clarke 1998: 26). With the increase of multilateral funding from international organizations, it has been argued that since the mid-1990s NGOs have become increasingly autonomous in relation to state power (ibid.: 41–2). Many observers in Indonesia have therefore understood NGOs as vehicles for political and social change, both during the Suharto era and after his fall in 1998 (e.g. Eldridge 1990, 1995, Manning and Van Diermen 2001). Under Suharto, however, the Indonesian government typically attempted to control NGOs6 through co-optation or by creating parallel structures aimed at mobilizing ‘target groups’ such as ‘women’ or ‘youth’ (Eldridge 1990). Despite this generally negative relationship, some organizations were viewed as important in national development because of their ability to mobilize local communities and deal with sensitive issues (Eldridge 1995).7 In this context, HIV/AIDS NGOs, which have dramatically increased in numbers during the last decade, have often been given the role of dealing with marginalized groups identified as ‘prostitutes’, ‘homosexuals’, and more recently ‘IV-drug users’.

112 Johan Lindquist While these relationships have often been euphemistically phrased by the government in terms of a ‘partnership’ (kemitraan),8 most activists I have spoken with have generally understood this in terms of ‘control’ (e.g. Lindquist 1996). As one might expect, however, it is not possible to categorize NGOs working with HIV/AIDS in Indonesia as being either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the state (cf. Fisher 1997). The boundaries between state and civil society are highly ambiguous, and often merely rhetorical (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 330–4; Grugel, this volume; Keck, this volume). For instance, the directors of one of the most influential HIV/AIDS NGOs in the country, Yayasan Pelita Ilmu in Jakarta, also work for the government in a similar capacity. As we shall see later, this is often the rule rather than the exception. In conjunction with the broader changes outlined above, most of the funding and information that Indonesian NGOs use in their day-to-day activities have their origins outside of the country. For instance, donor agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) channel significant funds to local NGOs via INGOs such as Family Health International (FHI), who act as subcontractors. Associated with this funding are particular forms of knowledge associated with democratic ideals. For instance, with the increasing convergence of HIV and human rights discourse on a global level, the use of concepts such as ‘empowerment’ (pemberdayaan) have become increasingly evident in material that is being produced and used by NGOs. This is clearly in direct opposition to government policy, in which a discourse of blame is aimed at marginalized groups, most notably prostitutes.9 The hub for the movement of funding and knowledge concerning HIV/AIDS is the capital city Jakarta, where the most important donor agencies, NGOs, INGOs and government agencies have their main offices. The Ford Foundation, the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH), the Asia–Pacific Council of AIDS Service Organizations (APCASO), the Asia–Pacific Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (APN+), and FHI are just a few of the INGOs dealing with HIV issues based there. This is also the case for donor agencies such as AusAID (The Australian government’s overseas aid programme) and USAID. Furthermore, UNAIDS, as well as the World Bank and other UN agencies, are also located in Jakarta. It should be noted that there is a high degree of instability in the number of NGOs and INGOs that work in Jakarta, since many of them are dependent on funding that rarely lasts more than a few years. FHI, for instance, has never had a permanent office in Jakarta despite the fact that they have been working there for more than 20 years. The number of staff and the size of the office regularly expand or contract dramatically depending on available funding. NGOs or INGOs also frequently decide to turn their attention to other topics that are deemed more important. For instance, in 2002 ‘human trafficking’ became a topic that began to generate funding, leading many organizations to turn their attention in that direction. Unlike Indonesia, in Singapore there are no INGOs or donor agencies that deal directly with HIV/AIDS issues. There has, however, been a dramatic increase in civil society organizations between the 1980s and 1990s, in the wake of rapid economic and social changes (Clarke 1998: 26; Chua and Kwok 2001; Siddique 2001: 171–2). Despite this, organizations positioned outside of the state have been,

Putting transnational activism in its place 113 and continue to be, highly constrained.10 The ensuing transformation of state– society relations has arguably not led to greater openness. As Rodan (1996: 95) puts it, to date the major feature of this reworking is the expanding realm of the state through the extension and refinement of the mechanisms of political co-optation, not a more expansive civil society. Progress towards genuinely independent social organizations engaged in regular and legally enshrined political contests over the exercise of state power has been limited in Singapore, despite the emergence of a very sizeable and diverse middle class. This co-optation takes the form of new organizational structures that are used to ‘manage’ these social forces. However, other observers argue that since the 1990s the political space in which NGOs can work has expanded, in particular in areas in which they have greater technical knowledge than the government (Chua and Kwok 2001; Tanaka 2002: 217). In this context, the emergence of Action for AIDS (AFA), the only NGO in Singapore dealing with HIV/AIDS issues, constitutes an interesting example, as it deals with issues that are considered sensitive by the government. Both of the NGOs that I will be focusing attention on in this chapter, AFA in Singapore, and Yayasan Mitra Kesehatan (YMK) on Batam in Indonesia, are potentially part of the same transnational networks, i.e. they attend many of the same international conferences and are concerned with similar forms of knowledge. Despite major differences between them, which I will elaborate upon later, both must negotiate tensions between these transnational networks and the power of the particular nation-states in which they work.

The growth triangle In 1990 Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Indonesian President Suharto met on the Indonesian island of Batam. This gesture symbolized not only the emergence of an international growth triangle, but also the shift of Singapore’s economy into ‘post industrial world city mode’ (Macleod and McGee 1996). Through this agreement Batam became a site where Singaporean capital and inexpensive Indonesian labour would create ‘comparative advantages’11 in an export-processing zone in close proximity to Singapore. The transformation of Singapore into a regional ‘information hub’ depended on the relocation of low-level manufacturing and other services to places such as Batam. By all accounts, economic development ‘took off’ on Batam as a result of the abovementioned agreement. Increasing investments, migration and tourism transformed Batam almost instantaneously from a backwater into a booming frontier area with hundreds of factories. Approved foreign investment increased by five times between 1988 and 1990 and the value of exports increased by almost 50 times between 1989 and 1995 (Smith 1997). Since the advent of the growth triangle the number of tourists entering Batam has increased dramatically, from 60,000 in 1985, to 580,000 in 1990, to 1,125,000 in 1997 (BIDA 1998). The majority of them are Singaporeans who can easily take the half-hour ferry ride across the Straits of Malacca. Most of them stay only a day or two and the main goal for many is the major prostitution and

114 Johan Lindquist drug industry that has rapidly emerged. Singaporeans in search of drugs and sex have therefore played an equally conspicuous role in the ‘development’ of the island. Together with these changes, dozens of large squatter communities have been built, eventually housing up to half of the approximately 600,000 Indonesian migrants who have come to Batam in search of work in the booming economy. As I noted earlier, Kenichi Ohmae (1995) has suggested that the growth triangle is an example of a new ‘borderless world’. This refuses to acknowledge, however, that the transnational economic zone demands not only the free flow of people and capital in one direction, but also the increasing regulation of the movement of Indonesians in the other direction.12 In fact, during the last ten years, since the emergence of the growth triangle, there has been an increasing reification of the border dividing Indonesia from Malaysia and Singapore. This is especially the case on the Malaysian and Singaporean sides of the border, where passports and border controls are used to control the flow of people. As an effect of this, the smuggling of Indonesians across the border, primarily into Malaysia, has expanded dramatically. Ironically, the emergence of a transnational economic zone depended on the existence of a border that would keep Indonesian labourers on one side of the border.13 In other words, while certain forms of movement are considered crucial to its success, other types of human mobility appear to threaten the official model of the growth triangle. With the massive population movement to the area and the explosion of prostitution on the Indonesian side of the border, anxieties concerning HIV/AIDS have become increasingly evident in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, with international organizations, governments and NGOs becoming interested in creating efficient forms of prevention. Despite the realization that HIV/AIDS cases are increasing as an effect of these processes, there has been literally no attempt by governments or NGOs to create programmes or even communicate about the problems across the border. Instead, HIV/AIDS continues to be framed as a ‘national’ problem in all three countries (cf. Porter 1997), suggesting that the formation of a global civil society with regard to this particular issue faces substantial obstacles on a number of different levels.

HIV/AIDS in Singapore At the World Trade Centre ferry terminal in Singapore, near the ticket booth for Batam, the following advertisement could be seen in 1999. A man in a business suit is pictured together with a number of building blocks with pictures of his family members on them. The caption underneath read: ‘I don’t want to lose everything I’ve built. I’ll admit there are temptations when I travel or entertain, but it’s not worth risking everything for AIDS – the odds are it will catch up with you.’ As of January 2000, the Singaporean government had reported 1,500 cases of HIV to the WHO, and estimates suggested that there were a total of 3,400 cases of HIV in Singapore in July 2002.14 In recent years HIV/AIDS has become an important policy issue for the Singaporean government and advertising campaigns such as the one above have become increasingly common. Prevention is framed in terms of avoiding

Putting transnational activism in its place 115 extra-marital sex, and promoting condom use is a sensitive issue. It is, for instance, illegal to use the word ‘condom’ in advertising campaigns. In government discourse – and the official figures that they produce support this – it is primarily travelling men, infected outside Singapore, who are the major source of HIV/AIDS. While drug use is increasingly being tested at the borders,15 HIV/ AIDS can still pass through immigration without being noticed. In a decision that reinforces the government’s basic premise that HIV enters the country from the outside, the Singaporean parliament unanimously passed a law making it compulsory for all foreigners working in the country to take an HIV test (AP, 4 September 1998). Those who refuse to take the test face a fine of 2,000 Singapore dollars (approximately 1,200 US dollars), six months in prison, or deportation. Interestingly, this was legislated the same day that stiffer penalties were passed for illegally smuggling migrants into the country. However, it is still unclear how testing will take place, and most likely it will be unskilled workers who continue to be tested when applying for permits. Although there are no official figures, sources tell me that the number of foreigners who have tested positive is more than double that of Singaporean citizens, and, upon testing positive, they are deported.16 In a more sensationalist vein, men who have tested positive after giving blood have had their name and photograph published in the newspaper. For instance, in a recent case (Straits Times, 16 April 2001), an Singaporean man who was found to be HIV-positive when he donated blood was sentenced to 15 months in prison for not revealing that he had had unprotected sex with a prostitute on Batam on several occasions. In Singapore there is only one organization dealing with HIV/AIDS that is commonly identified as an NGO. Action for AIDS (AFA) was initially a Ministry of Health project that focused on outreach projects aimed at marginalized groups, before being transformed into an NGO in 1988. It offers support to people living with HIV, conducts anonymous HIV testing, offers information to the public, and continues to conduct outreach programmes, but holds a low public profile. Except for one full-time administrator, AFA relies on the work of volunteers, most of whom are young professionals. The head and founder of the organization, Dr Roy Chan, is a physician and researcher, who is also the president of the AIDS Society of Asia and the Pacific. He was one of the keynote speakers at the 1998 Fourth International Congress for AIDS in Asia and the Pacific and was on the international advisory board for the 2001 conference in Melbourne, Australia. The 1997 conference in Manila had as its theme ‘cooperation across borders’. Similarly the 2001 conference programme argued that it is crucial to ‘break down barriers’, and the first two barriers listed are those between ‘people’ and ‘nations’ (ICAAP 2001). In other words, Chan must speak two different languages – on the international scene the global AIDS discourse, which defends human rights, individual empowerment, and cooperation across borders, and in Singapore one that is not oppositional to government discourses surrounding ‘Asian values’. As other observers have pointed out, AFA has been part of the formation of a ‘medicalized’ discourse of HIV/AIDS in Singapore. The politics of sexuality and associated discussions concerning rights have, however, been avoided (Chua and Kwok 2001: 110–11).

116 Johan Lindquist In forming a discourse of ‘Asian values’ since 1990, Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) have explicitly attempted to promote ‘communitarian’ values identified as ‘Asian’, in juxtaposition to ‘Western’ liberalism and the social ills associated with it: unemployment, divorce, drug use, a weak work ethic and AIDS.17 Ong (1999: 208; see also Chua 1995) notes that the ‘structure of accountability in Singapore is predicated on the population’s trusting in the expertise and cultural authority of the political leadership and the state’s ability to deliver in terms of social stability and economic performance’. It is significant, therefore, that buzzwords such as ‘empowerment’ are never found in material produced by AFA. As HIV/AIDS has become a problem in Singapore, its solution has been identified by the government as one of control rather than rights. This creates a particular kind of tension for AFA: while the global discourse on HIV/ AIDS is linked to human rights, in Singapore there is no room for democracy in this context. Becoming infected with HIV is a sign that one has broken the social contract. While the government promises welfare, it demands a particular moral citizen. Despite AFA’s and Chan’s strong links to transnational advocacy networks, there is little or no cooperation with donor agencies, intergovernmental organizations or INGOs. None of their funding comes from foreign donors or the Singaporean government, but rather from private business, foundations and individuals. In an interview that I conducted with him, Chan claimed that he had suggested that the Ministry of Health initiate international cooperation and meetings with Indonesia and Malaysia in the context of HIV/AIDS prevention. But this was refused outright. Even Chan, however, appears to have little idea of the situation on Batam and neighbouring islands. When I explained the social complexity of Batam and other islands in the Riau Archipelago, he expressed interest and surprise, claiming that ‘I just think of Batam as one place.’18

HIV/AIDS in Indonesia During the last decade, there has been much debate in Indonesia concerning the imminent arrival of an HIV/AIDS epidemic. As of June 2001 there were officially 1,572 cases of HIV and 578 cases of AIDS, extraordinarily low figures in a country of 200 million inhabitants, and even less than the official number in Singapore. Debates surrounding the estimated number of people infected with HIV are highly contentious, but a recent report suggests 120,000 cases (UNAIDS 2002). Surveillance results continue to show low prevalence rates among prostitutes and the only part of Indonesia where an epidemic appears to have developed is Irian Jaya (West Papua). More recently, the explosive growth of IV-drug use, particularly in the Jakarta region, has been of great concern among HIV/AIDS activists. After Irian Jaya and Jakarta, the Riau Archipelago, and Batam in particular, have the highest official rates of HIV in Indonesia. Of the cumulative HIV/AIDS cases in Indonesia, Riau has slightly less than 10 per cent of the cases, the overwhelming majority of which are concentrated in Batam and neighbouring islands, which have less than 0.5 per cent of the total population of Indonesia (Indonesia AIDS Homepage 2002).

Putting transnational activism in its place 117 As in Singapore, government prevention efforts have been framed in terms of ‘family resilience’ and in particular the logistics concerning the distribution of condoms and information have been sources of conflict between NGOs and government. In the mid-1990s, when HIV/AIDS was increasingly being recognized as an emerging problem in Indonesia, large-scale prevention projects were initiated by AusAID, USAID, and the World Bank. After negotiations with the Indonesian government each agency was offered work in geographical areas that were considered to be of ‘high risk’. The primary areas for the World Bank were North Jakarta and Riau, with a particular focus on Batam. In the World Bank staff appraisal report from 1996 (World Bank 1996), the Riau Archipelago was identified as a highrisk area for an HIV epidemic, primarily because of the large number of prostitutes and the highly transient population. Unlike the funds from USAID and AusAID, the bulk of the funding from the World Bank was specified as a loan and was therefore channelled through the Department of Health to local organizations identified as NGOs. This project had major effects in the Riau area and the number of organizations dealing with HIV prevention increased dramatically, from three before the project began in 1995, to nearly 30 in 1998. Only two of these, one in Pekanbaru on the Sumatran mainland, and Yayasan Mitra Kesehatan (YMK), or the Partnership for Health Foundation,19 on Batam, could at the time be identified as NGOs. The third organization that existed before the project, K3S (Ketua Koordinasi Kesejahteran Sosial), is run by Sri Soedarsono, the younger sister of B.J. Habibie, the long-time head of the Batam Industrial Development Agency (BIDA) and a former Indonesian president. Her infamous foundations (yayasan) monopolize much of the health care and educational activities on the island. All other organizations dealing with HIV/AIDS at this time were created by various government officials. On Batam, one organization was created by one of the managers working for Soedarsono, while three others were created in more or less direct cooperation with officials working at the Department of Health. In the context of this chapter, however, I primarily want to focus my attention on the position of YMK. YMK was created in the mid-1990s in the wake of a research project dealing with sexuality on Batam. The head of the organization was a female academic from Jakarta and several of the other initial members had also been part of the research team. During 1998 to 1999, there were between five and ten full-time staff members working there. In relation to the World Bank project, it was clear that there was a great degree of ambivalence among the people working there. Most of the money was earmarked for predefined projects, primarily formal workshops aimed at particular groups: for instance, health professionals, prostitutes or housewives. This meant that extensive cooperation with government officials was necessary. Another problem was the corruption and constant delays that plagued the project, which made long-term planning difficult. During the course of the project, YMK was nearly forced to close several times when they ran out of money, as payments from the government were not arriving on a regular basis. However, in the wake of calls for reformasi after the fall of Suharto, the corruption surrounding the World Bank project was made public in an exposé by the local newspaper (Riau Pos,

118 Johan Lindquist 12, 17 and 19 June 1998). Although there were constant complaints about the project, it was difficult for YMK to refuse the funding in a context of limited resources. Despite the problems, the project was a substantial improvement, since they had earlier only received minor funding from a university and a Catholic foundation, both based in Jakarta. When the project ended in 1999, all parties involved admitted that it had been a failure, largely because of administrative difficulties, and most of the ‘NGOs’ that had been involved ceased to exist. There is, however, a different aspect of the project that could also be identified as a failure, namely the lack of any effort to formulate a model of action with regard to the particular border problems in the area. In an attempt to structure HIV as a problem, a series of ‘risk groups’20 had been identified in meetings between NGO workers and government officials. These included homosexuals, transvestites, commercial sex workers, taxi drivers and motorcycle taxi drivers (ojek).21 What is of interest in this context is that those who are considered to be ‘at risk’ were all Indonesian citizens, and there was never any suggestion to create a programme involving Singaporeans. According to government officials on Batam, the reason for this was that targeting Singaporeans would be too sensitive politically. However, this also efficiently ‘nationalizes’ HIV as a problem and creates new boundaries around the problem, something that the constant traffic of people across the border, as well as the local meaning of AIDS in Indonesian, (A)ku (I)ngin (D)ollar (S)ingapore, or literally, ‘I want Singapore dollars’, effectively denies. While HIV as a disease certainly travels, through government and NGO discourses and practices it becomes localized (e.g. Porter 1997). In this context it is also clear that the World Bank worked within a national framework and had no model for developing cross-border initiatives, much less any form of transnational democratic space. Outside of the context of the World Bank project there were constant attempts by YMK to gain access to information and funding from various sources. Most of these contacts are located in Jakarta and the head of the organization would make trips there approximately every other month to meet with NGOs and INGOs – the most important of them at the time being the Ford Foundation, mainly because of their access to substantial funds. There were also often visitors from other NGOs – again, mostly from Jakarta – who would come to Batam in order to find out more about the situation in the area. Usually these guests would be taken to one of the discos or brothels around the island to witness what were presented as ‘high-risk’ areas. On occasion, INGOs or NGOs from Jakarta would be brought in to conduct a workshop. For instance, an ‘outreach’ programme aimed at marginalized groups ‘at risk’, which were not easily reached by YMK’s own workshops, was developed together with an NGO from Jakarta. This model was then used by YMK through 1998 and 1999, when I was there. Outreach workers were sent out to nightclubs to make contact with prostitutes, who were then visited in their homes afterwards and given information about HIV/AIDS and condom use. These models differed little from the activities that I witnessed among other NGOs in Indonesia, and there were few attempts to address particular issues concerning cross-border movement and migration processes.

Putting transnational activism in its place 119 The head of YMK also frequented various conferences and network meetings. In October 1997 she visited the Fourth Annual Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific in Manila (which I also took part in), which brought together activists from all over the world, including, as I mentioned in the previous section, the head of AFA, Roy Chan. Out of 2,500 people at the conference, about 50 were from Indonesia, with the Ford Foundation sponsoring 40 of them. However, she made few attempts to network with international activists, including Action for AIDS. Instead, the most important events were a lunch for the Indonesians given by the Ford Foundation, and one meeting that was an attempt at organizing an Indonesian NGO network. Apparently, it was more important to meet Indonesians working on HIV/AIDS issues than foreigners. The reasons for this are fairly straightforward. First, language barriers limited interactions for many at a conference where English was the official language. Second, and more importantly, it is primarily INGOs and international organizations based in Jakarta that are the major sources of funding and information, and creating strong relationships with them is crucial. NGOs working in Jakarta are also generally considered to be the most professional. At this point in time it was already clear that the World Bank project was having major problems, and YMK was searching for alternative forms of funding. More importantly for my argument, although both YMK and AFA expressed interest in cooperation when I discussed the matter, in fact this did not appear to be their primary goal. During my time on Batam, people at YMK often suggested making more substantial contacts with AFA, and I even functioned as a mediator on occasions when I travelled to Singapore. Eventually a meeting did take place when the head of YMK went to Singapore to meet with AFA. YMK’s primary interest in this context was to see if there was any possibility for funding from Singaporean sources, but nothing came of this. YMK has also taken part in a number of attempts to create national networks for NGOs. In March 1998, for instance, the head of YMK took part in a meeting just outside of Jakarta, which brought together 150 NGO activists and government officials dealing with HIV/AIDS from all over Indonesia. The goal of the meeting, which had been planned in Jakarta, was to create a ‘network’ (jaringan) for NGOs that was, as one of the organizers put it, ‘loose, egalitarian, and democratic’. What is interesting in this context is not that this particular meeting did not lead to any substantial changes, but rather that the formation of this network was considered important by those involved, and that it was dominated by NGO activists from Jakarta.

Situating networks An obvious starting point for asking questions about the lack of cooperation and activism between Singapore and Batam would be to focus on the constraining political cultures of the respective countries and the sensitive political relationships between them. If any form of cooperation were to take place between Singapore and Indonesia in the context of HIV/AIDS prevention, it would also most likely have to

120 Johan Lindquist pass through Jakarta. Furthermore, if we look towards Batam, there appears to be little hope of seeing grass-roots organizations emerge. Almost everyone living on Batam is a migrant who has travelled there in search of wage labour, and there are very few institutions of higher education that could function as a potential source for the recruitment of activists. In this context, however, I would also like to suggest another framework of analysis that would allow us to conceptualize why local forms of cross-border activism do not take place. This has to do with the actual structure, or, more precisely, topography, of transnational advocacy networks and related funding channels. It can also be understood as an attempt to link the strengths of anthropology, political science and sociology in studying transnational advocacy networks. I argue that in studies of transnational advocacy networks it is crucial to pay increasing attention to ‘place’. If we avoid doing this, networks are easily imagined as homogeneous and smooth spaces. Anthropologist Anna Tsing (2000: 330), for instance, has pointed out that in much theorizing concerning globalization, ‘flow is valorized but not the carving of the channel’. By this she means that people, objects and information do not travel randomly, but rather are structured by powerful economic, political and socio-cultural forces. Information and funding dealing with HIV/AIDS travels along specific routes. Comor (2001: 391) has made a more specific point concerning the ‘relationship of what is communicated with what is known’. He argues, unlike most global civil society theorists, that it should not be assumed that information is easily transformed into knowledge. This transformation demands a reflexive engagement with information that is not always possible. These two points – the spatial structure of transnational networks and a more sceptical view of the emancipatory potential of information and related forms of new technologies – are key to the argument that I want to make. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 207), the two theorists that I am ‘writing against’ here, of course recognize that transnational advocacy networks easily reproduce structural inequalities, but without describing them in spatial terms they remain on an abstract level. Similarly, they point out that information exchange is ‘at the core’ of the same types of networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 89). The case studies that I have presented, however, suggest that they do not focus enough analytical interest on the complicated nature of information transactions, and, following Comor (2001), the transformation of information into knowledge that works in local contexts. In recent years, Saskia Sassen (1991, 1998) has repeatedly reminded us that certain kinds of places, namely global cities, are becoming increasingly important nodes in the global economy. New York, Tokyo and London, and, in this particular geographical region, Hong Kong and Singapore, are places where information technologies and high-level financial managers are increasingly being concentrated. One effect of this transformation in Hong Kong and Singapore has been the demand for new hinterlands where low-skilled labour can be relocated. The development of Batam and the growth triangle must be understood in relation to these processes. Along with the increasing importance of these nodes, Sassen also points out that there are methodological reasons for focusing attention on cities. She writes that ‘it allows us to see the multiplicity of economies and work cultures in which the global

Putting transnational activism in its place 121 information economy is embedded. It also allows us to recover the concrete, localized processes through which globalization exists’ (1998: ix–xx). Sassen’s point must be understood in relation to the excessive valorization of flow and movement within much discussion concerning globalization. In the context of this chapter, her focus on particular kinds of ‘places’ raises similar, albeit highly preliminary, questions about potentially identifying similar types of nodes for transnational advocacy networks. Although Hong Kong and Singapore are the two places in the region that have most recently reached global city status, it would appear that these are not the most likely potential global nodes for transnational advocacy networks. Singapore, in particular, is ‘too developed’,22 and because of its political culture it does not open its arms to intergovernmental organizations and INGOs. We might instead look toward the mega-cities, in what are identified as ‘developing’ countries in the region, to act as potential nodes: Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta are perhaps the most obvious candidates. The overwhelming majority of the most important donor agencies and INGOs working in Indonesia have their main offices in Jakarta. The reasons for this would appear to be fairly straightforward, proximity to centres of government power being most important – something that is particularly important in a country where political power has been extremely concentrated historically. An example of the concern with proximity to Jakarta can be taken from the network meeting for Indonesian NGOs dealing with HIV/AIDS issues, which I mentioned briefly above. A great deal of discussion was concerned with how NGOs in Irian Jaya (West Papua), located in the far eastern part of the country, were going to be able to access funding and information despite being located far away from Jakarta. But there are also other reasons that organizations are concentrated to Jakarta. For instance, there is a particular ‘transnational, activist elite’ (Tarrow 2001: 14) – Robert Reich has called them ‘symbolic analysts’ (in Hannerz 1996) – who move between different intergovernmental organizations and INGOs. These professionals, usually Westerners, or at least Western-trained, often need access to schooling for their children, suitable housing, and a particular lifestyle that a major city like Jakarta is able to offer, but which, for instance, Indonesia’s third city, Medan in North Sumatra, cannot.23 One example of the kind of circulation that I am discussing is the programme officer who was in charge of issues concerning HIV/AIDS at the Ford Foundation until 1997. After her contract ended in Jakarta she moved to the Ford Foundation in Manila, and then on to the Rockefeller Foundation in Bangkok. Bringing ‘place’ back into transnational advocacy networks, however, raises other potential questions that are important in relation to this discussion. One concerns the importance of face-to-face interaction between resource-poor NGOs, such as YMK, and those INGOs and intergovernmental organizations that control funding. In her study of stock traders in London, New York and Stockholm, Hasselström (2000) has shown how, despite having access to the most advanced forms of communication technology, face-to-face interaction remains crucial in creating trust. The frequent trips of the head of YMK to Jakarta would suggest that face-to-face interaction served some kind of function that the internet or telephones could not, and this was

122 Johan Lindquist something that officials at USAID, FHI, as well as the head of YMK herself, agreed with in discussions with me. The focus on networking at international conferences with actors working in Indonesia would seem to reinforce this point. This leads me to suggest that while the internet and e-mail are forms of technology that have certainly facilitated information-sharing and communication within transnational advocacy networks, meeting people continues to be at least as important. There is also another point to be made that is connected to the issue of information transactions. During the last four years I have been following discussions on two internet newsgroups dealing with HIV, in Southeast Asia and Indonesia, respectively. Although I do not have the exact figures, SEA-AIDS, which uses English as its language of communication, and is organized through the office of UNAIDS in Bangkok, rarely has a message from an Indonesian. On the other hand, Pandu, which is strictly in Indonesian, rarely brings foreigners into the discussion. There are foreigners on the list, but very rarely does one of them engage in discussions.24 In relation to Singapore, I have yet to see anyone from Action for AIDS enter into the discussion on SEA-AIDS, even when the topic concerned the actions of the Singaporean government. We should therefore be careful in our suggestions that the internet breaks down boundaries, rather than in certain cases merely reproducing old ones. It is also important to remind ourselves that, for Indonesian NGOs, Jakarta functions as a node in yet another sense, namely as a site of translation for materials from English into Indonesian. However, the flow of information is never free but always organized. There is always too much information. In this context, it would appear that the production, organization and distribution of information from nodes such as Jakarta to NGOs such as YMK is a central research problem. For instance, the outreach models that YMK were taught by NGOs from Jakarta were reproduced on Batam without recognizing the particular context in which they worked. At the opposite end of the spectrum, at YMK – and at many other NGOs I visited in Indonesia – there are piles of brochures and booklets lying around that are never looked at. International organizations of various kinds in Jakarta make little effort to change this structure. In fact, the current head of Family Health International – the sub-contractor for the ongoing USAID project in Riau – told me that it was important that local NGOs did not spend their time making so-called IEC (information education communication) material, since it was often of poor quality and drew their attention away from more important issues at hand. Instead, this was something FHI should produce and distribute.25 From the Singaporean perspective, it would appear that there are slightly different problems related to the processing and redistribution of information. Unlike YMK, AFA has ‘direct’ access to information that is produced on a global level (English is the primary language used in Singapore), but must show greater care in how it is organized and redistributed in relation to the gaze of the Singaporean government. I have already noted one example: concepts such as ‘empowerment’ are nowhere to be found in the material that AFA produces. These cases raise important questions concerning potential processes of creative mimesis in information transactions. What changes in the movement of information

Putting transnational activism in its place 123 and its reproduction, and what real effects does this have?26 In what scenarios can we imagine domestic NGOs located at the margins of transnational advocacy networks as becoming ‘actors’ rather than ‘enactors’ (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998: 33) in the use of information? As Comor (2001: 405) points out, the use of new information technologies and the reliance on forms of externally produced information, ‘may weaken the reflexive capabilities of collectivities, inspiring rapid mobilization but leaving little time for critical reflection.’ Local conditions demand creative initiatives, which are not readily found in global models.

Conclusion I have written this chapter in an attempt to find possible points of convergence between recent research in political science, anthropology and sociology, on the topic of transnational activism. My initial inquiry began with the question of why transnational activism concerning HIV/AIDS did not emerge in the transnational economic zone that binds together Singapore and the Indonesian island of Batam. The initial answer to this question appears to suggest that it depends on the particular political cultures of each country, which do not facilitate cross-border interaction. However, even in contexts where NGOs from Singapore and Indonesia met outside of the contexts of their respective countries, most notably at international conferences, there was little interest in cooperation or information exchange. However, despite the lack of ‘local’ forms of transnational activism, both NGOs I focused attention on were concerned with more ‘long-distance’ forms of transnational cooperation, which at times even led them to the same international conferences. This led me to ask broader questions concerning the spatial organization of transnational advocacy networks and related issues concerning transactions of funding and information. In the Indonesian context, Jakarta clearly functions as a node, and for NGOs on Batam such as YMK, travelling to Jakarta to make contacts and access information continue to be important despite access to new forms of information technology. My suggestion for future research is to concentrate greater ethnographic attention on what kinds of interactions take place in these nodes and how transactions of information that come from a ‘global’ level are organized and redistributed in these particular places. There are clearly both methodological and epistemological incentives for this. Finally, this brings us back to the main theme in this volume: the relationship between transnational activism, power and democracy. At the moment I suggest showing some restraint in celebrating the emergence of the ‘network’ as the dominant aesthetic form in discussions concerning democratization and the emergence of a global civil society (cf. Riles 2000, Tsing 2000). As I have shown in this chapter, transnational advocacy networks are structured not only by local and regional political conditions but also by particular spatial forms that are constructed around certain places. This uneven distribution of power – primarily in terms of information and funding – leads to a more sceptical view of the democratic potential of transnational advocacy networks. Just as it is possible to imagine transnational

124 Johan Lindquist activist networks in topographical terms – rather than as a smooth flow – democracy is also ‘disjunctive’ (Holston and Caldeira, in Paley 2002: 479), and demands similar forms of spatial inquiry.

Notes 1 I thank Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin for inviting me to write this paper and for their helpful comments. 2 Or, as it is called on the Indonesian side of the border, Sijori, which stands for Singapore– Johor–Riau. 3 In this chapter I will use the term ‘prostitute’ rather than ‘commercial sex worker’. For a discussion of the debates surrounding the differences between these terms, see Doezema (1998). 4 There is more direct communication between Malaysian and Singaporean NGOs than there is with Indonesian ones. 5 For the most explicit statement by the United Nations concerning the links between human rights and HIV, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and UNAIDS (1998). 6 During the Suharto era the direct translation of NGO, ORNOP (organisasi non-pemerintah), was deemed as too oppositional, and instead LSM, or Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat, meaning ‘People’s Self-Supporting Organization’, was used (e.g. Sakai 2002: 161–2). 7 NGOs in Indonesia are currently experiencing great changes, but as yet there is little research to suggest what forms of political action these changes will lead to. However, most observers appear optimistic. Manning and Van Diermen (2001: 1), for instance, state the following: ‘With the weakening of military control, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and common interest and community groups began to play a much more active role in society than at any time in the previous 30 years.’ 8 See, for instance, Abednego (1996). 9 It should be noted that the same concept is used in government discourse, but with a different meaning. 10 For a brief discussion concerning the registration of NGOs in Singapore, see Siddique (2001: 171–2). For an example of a group that has avoided registration and thereby government control, see Chua and Kwok (2001: 111–13). 11 Initially, in the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, ‘comparative advantage’ referred to the idea that ‘everyone gains if each nation specializes in the production of those goods that it produces relatively most efficiently and imports those goods that other countries produce relatively most efficiently’ (Eiteman et al. 1998: 2). This was, however, based on the idea that land, labour and capital were relatively immobile (ibid.), which is certainly not the case today. In the contemporary discourse of the growth triangle I take comparative advantage to refer to the localization of land, labour and capital in a particular space that is considered advantageous to both nations. 12 In relation to this it is important to remember that borders are not created to stop movement but rather to regulate it. 13 As late as the early 1960s, almost 20 years after Indonesian independence, Batam and other islands in the Riau Archipelago were intimately connected with the Singaporean entrepot economy and the Singapore dollar was the currency of choice throughout the area. Even Indonesian bureaucrats were paid in Singapore dollars. However, with the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and the newly created state of Malaysia in 1963, there was an increasing regulation of the border as Indonesia ‘discovered’ the borders that it had inherited from the Netherlands, thereby initiating a process of state formation in an area where only a nation had been imagined before (Mackie 1974). 14 See UNAIDS (2002).

Putting transnational activism in its place 125 15 In July 1998, the Misuse of Drugs Act was amended to allow the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) to charge Singaporeans and permanent residents if they tested positive for drug use upon returning to the country. Previously, those who tested positive could only be referred to a clinic, but after the law was passed the maximum penalty was changed to ten years in prison and a 20,000-dollar fine. By November the same year 60 people had been charged and 20 cases were pending (Straits Times, 8 November 1998). As the assistant director of the CNB put it at the time, ‘Those people who thought that they could get away with abusing drugs overseas have to think again’ (ibid.). 16 See also Straits Times, 24 May 2002. See also Ng (2000). 17 In recent years, the discourse of Asian values has appeared in international debates concerning the caning of Michael Fay (e.g. Tay 1997), in relation to political scientist Samuel Huntington’s (1996) thesis on The Clash of Civilizations, and in provocative statements by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammed and Lee Kuan Yew supporting an ‘Asian’ style of economic development and governance. While Lee denies that there is a definite distinction between ‘Asia’ and the ‘West’, he does see cultural differences, the most fundamental being the primacy of the family vis-à-vis the individual in Eastern societies (Wee 1997: 80). 18 Interview in Singapore, 10 August 1999. Chan responded in this manner when I explained that the prostitution industry in Riau was highly complicated and spread across several different islands. 19 While I was on Batam between October 1997 and August 1999 I worked closely with YMK. 20 For a discussion of the relationship between ‘risk groups’ and ‘risk behaviours’, see Watney (1996: 431–2). 21 According to the officials and activists involved in these forms of categorizations, taxi drivers, and motorcycle taxi drivers are considered to be risk groups since they frequently interact with prostitutes, once again showing how prostitutes are considered to be the source of disease. 22 In 1996 the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) reclassified Singapore from a ‘developing country’ to a ‘more advanced developing country’ (Rodan 1999: 171). 23 For a broader discussion of the variation of cultural forms in global cities, see Hannerz (1996: 127–39). 24 The one exception is a foreign citizen, who has been living and working in Indonesia for many years. 25 Interview in Jakarta, 1 August 2002. 26 To a certain degree, in the context of testimonial campaigns, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 19) acknowledge this in the following quote: ‘There is frequently a huge gap between the story’s original telling and the retellings – in its socio-cultural context, its instrumental meaning, and even in its language. Local people, in other words, sometimes lose control over their stories in a transnational campaign. How this process of mediation/translation occurs is a particularly interesting facet of network politics.’

References Abednego, H. (1996) ‘Kemitraan pemerintah-LSM dalam penangulangan HIV/AIDS’, paper presented at the Seminar Nasional Masalah Etika HIV/AIDS, Surabaya, Indonesia, 12 March 1996. BIDA (1998) Data Up To March 1998, Indonesia: Batam Industrial Development Authority. Chua, B. (1995) Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London: Routledge. Chua, B. and Kwok K. (2001) ‘Social Pluralism in Singapore’, in R.W. Hefner (ed.) The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Clarke, G. (1998) The Politics of NGOs in South-East Asia, London: Routledge.

126 Johan Lindquist Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J.L. (2000) ‘Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming’, Public Culture 12: 291–343. Comor, E. (2001) ‘The Role of Communication in Global Civil Society: Forces, Processes, Prospects’, International Studies Quarterly 45: 389–408. Doezema, J. (1998) ‘Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced Prostitution Dichotomy’, in K. Kempadoo and J. Doezema (eds) Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition, London: Routledge. Dryzek, J.S. (1999) ‘Transnational Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy 7: 30–51. Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996) ‘Introduction: NGO Performance and Accountability’, in M. Edwards and D. Hulme (eds) Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World, London: Kumarian Press. Eiteman, D.K., Stonehill, A.I. and Moffett, M.H. (1998) Multinational Business Finance, New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Eldridge, P.J. (1990) ‘NGOs and the State in Indonesia’, in A. Budiman (ed.) State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Melbourne: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. ——(1995) Non-Governmental Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia, Singapore: Oxford University Press. Fisher, W. (1997) ‘Doing Good? The Politics and Anti-Politics of NGO Practices’, Annual Review of Anthropology 26: 439–64. Hannerz, U. (1996) Transnational Connections, London: Routledge. Hasselström, A. (2000) ‘Can’t Buy Me Love’: Negotiating Ideas of Trust, Business and Friendship in Financial Markets’, Anthropology of Markets, Stockholm Working Paper Series No. 5, University of Stockholm. Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Nation State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Oxford: Polity Press. Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster. ICAAP (2001) ‘Website for the Fifth International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific’ at http://www.icaap.conf.au/welcome/default.asp (accessed 2 July 2001). Indonesia AIDS Homepage (2002) ‘Statistics on AIDS in Indonesia’ at http://www1.rad. net.id/aids (accessed 15 June 2002). Keck, M.C. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ——(1999) ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, International Social Science Journal 51: 89–101. Lindquist, J. (1996) The Politics of AIDS in Indonesia, IHCAR, Stockholm: Karolinska Institutet. Mackie, J. (1974) Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963–6, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Macleod, S. and McGee, T. (1996) ‘The Singapore–Johor–Riau Growth Triangle: An Emerging Extended Metropolitan Region’, in F. Lo and Y. Yeung (eds) Emerging World Cities in the Asia Pacific, Tokyo: United Nations Press. Manning, C. and Van Diermen, P. (2001) ‘Recent Developments and Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis: An Overview’, in C. Manning and P. Van Diermen (eds) Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, London: Zed. Ng, K. (2000) ‘Rights – Singapore: Deportation of People with HIV Stirs Row’, Inter Press Service at http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2000/IP000506.html (accessed 10 December 2002). Ohmae, K. (1995) The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, New York: Free Press.

Putting transnational activism in its place 127 O’Malley, J., Nguyen, V.K. and Lee, S. (1996) ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’, in J. Mann and D. Tarantola (eds) AIDS in the World II, New York: Oxford University Press. Ong, A. (1999) Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Paley, J. (2002) ‘Toward an Anthropology of Democracy’, Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 469–96. Patton, C. (2002) Globalizing AIDS, London: University of Minnesota Press. Poku, N.K. (2002) ‘Global Pandemics: HIV/AIDS’, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds) Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance, London: Polity Press. Porter, D. (1997) A Plague on the Borders: HIV, Development, and Travelling Identities in the Golden Triangle’, in L. Manderson and M. Jolly (eds) Sites of Desire, Economies of Pleasure, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Riles, A. (2000) The Network Inside Out, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Rodan, G. (1996) ‘State–Society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore’, in G. Rodan (ed.) Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, London: Routledge. ——(1999) ‘Singapore: Economic Diversification and Social Divisions’, in G. Rodan, K. Hewison, and R. Robison (eds) The Political Economy of Southeast Asia: An Introduction, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Sakai, Y. (2002) ‘Indonesia: Flexible NGOs vs. Inconsistent State Control’, in S. Shigetomi (ed.) The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, Singapore: ISEAS. Sampson, S. (1996) ‘The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania’, in C. Hann and E. Dunn (eds) Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, London: Routledge. Sassen, S. (1991) The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton: Princeton University Press. ——(1998) Globalization and its Discontents: Essays on the Mobility of People and Money, New York: The New Press. Siddique, S. (2001) ‘Corporate Pluralism: Singapore Inc. and the Association of Muslim Professionals’, in R.W. Hefner (ed.) The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Smith, S.L.D. (1997) ‘Batam Island and Indonesia’s High-Technology Strategy’, in H. Hill and T.K. Wie (eds) Indonesia’s Technological Challenge, Singapore: ISEAS. Tanaka, Y. (2002) Singapore: Subtle NGO Control by a Developmentalist Welfare State’, in S. Shigetomi (ed.) The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, Singapore: ISEAS. Tarrow, S. (2001) ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 4: 1–20. Tay, S. (1997) Alien Asian: a Singaporean in America, Singapore: Landmark Books. Tsing, A. (2000) ‘The Global Situation’, Cultural Anthropology 15: 327–60. UNAIDS (2002) ‘Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic – July 2002’, Geneva: United Nations. UNHCHR and UNAIDS (1998) ‘HIV/AIDS and Human Rights: International Guidelines’, Geneva: United Nations. Watney, S. (1996) ‘“Risk Groups” or “Risk Behaviors?”’, in J. Mann and D. Tarantola (eds) AIDS in the World II, New York: Oxford University Press. Wee, C.J. (1997) ‘Framing the “New” East Asia: Anti-Imperialist Discourse and Global Capitalism’, in S. Rashid (ed.) ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’: Asian Responses, Dhaka: University Press Limited. World Bank (1996) Staff Appraisal Report, Indonesia, HIV/AIDS and STDs Prevention and Management Project, Jakarta.

128 Johan Lindquist Newspaper articles and wires cited AP, 4 September 1998. Riau Pos, 12, 17 and 19 June 1998, Batam, Indonesia. Straits Times, 8 November 1998, Singapore. Straits Times, 16 April 2001, Singapore. Straits Times, 24 May 2002, Singapore.

8

Transnational activism by Malaysians Foci, tradeoffs and implications Meredith Weiss

Social activists are as tied up as anyone else with ‘globalization’ in all its forms. Activists’ strategies or discourses in a local context, for instance, may be premised upon lessons learned from abroad or funded by overseas donors. Moreover, as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) explain, activists for comparable causes may coordinate their efforts in transnational advocacy networks. These networks magnify the effect of calls for change in states in which activists are comparatively stifled, propound broadly applicable cognitive frames, collect and disseminate relevant information and organize campaigns and events. Against this implicitly transnational backdrop, activists in any setting thus face a choice of where to direct their efforts. While some choose to focus on local problems and issues, others tend to look abroad. This study explores this tradeoff for Malaysian activists.1 Despite pressing domestic concerns, many Malaysian activists opt to focus on issues or events outside the country. Such involvement may pressure the Malaysian state to maintain higher standards for human rights and related issues than the states in which Malaysian activists intervene, if it does not already do so. Along the same lines, this activism may attempt to install de facto transnational rights-related mechanisms, in the process legitimating intervention in other states’ internal affairs, contra regional diplomatic norms. Such a focus may also, however, reflect the relatively constrained democratic space available to activists in Malaysia, where a strong, centralized state discourages critical engagement. While transnational activism may thus offer an oblique and perhaps lower-risk means of increasing the scope for political participation, it could also dilute local campaigns by diverting activists’ energy. In this chapter, I will explore what Malaysians’ transnational endeavours are, why Malaysian activists pursue these campaigns and the positive and negative implications of their efforts for liberalization in Malaysia and the region more broadly.

The nature of transnational activism in Malaysia Most externally focused initiatives by Malaysian activists can be divided into two broad, overlapping categories: rights-related (generally secular) and Islam-related. Among the former category are, for instance, campaigns for sovereignty in East Timor or for human rights in Burma. In the latter category are campaigns related to

130 Meredith Weiss Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Muslim communities elsewhere.2 As a separate issue, an array of non-Malaysian activists and NGOs have been active in Malaysia over the years, whether at the invitation of local counterparts or on their own initiative. Most often, the involvement of transnational activists in Malaysian civil societal campaigns augments local efforts, including by suggesting new strategies and sharing experiences from elsewhere, rather than setting new agendas. Too much ‘foreign meddling’ tends to set the government on the defensive and leaves local groups or activists open to charges of having been manipulated.3 Still, local groups do seek international support at times, particularly to capitalize on favourable global sentiment, such as for environmental conservation or sustainable development.4 Trade unions and labour-oriented NGOs have sought international support for their campaigns, too, though the government has reacted badly to such solidarity.5 Overall, the lines between activists or groups operating on a local level or a regional or global level are anything but stark. The focus of this study is on the transnational activities of Malaysian activists, however, rather than the converse – the Malaysian efforts of transnational activists – even if both draw upon the same general inspiration and set of networks. A small number of Malaysian activists actually go overseas for the purpose of pursuing campaigns on-site or to evade control by the Malaysian state. More frequently, they operate out of Malaysia. A significant part of these initiatives, too, consists of educating the Malaysian public about developments and concerns outside Malaysia’s borders. The rise of the internet has made this task much easier. Messages about anything from the Narmada Dam in India, to the closure of cyber-cafés in China, to prison conditions in the United States have been posted to websites and listservers, raising awareness of these issues among the Malaysian public. The learning that occurs from such educative efforts may take various forms. Sometimes the process is quite transparent. For instance, in 1999, when the Malaysian regime established a National Human Rights Commission, Malaysian NGOs brought in representatives of human rights commissions in the region and studied their countries’ organizations as potential models. The NGOs hoped to use the example of human rights commissions in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia both to suggest best practices for setting up a commission and to promote the idea of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) human rights mechanism. Other times, the messages conveyed are more subtle. For instance, when Malaysian activists attend regional or international workshops or consultations, they may gain inspiration, strategy ideas, moral support and more tangible resources from their interaction with foreign counterparts. Furthermore, activists build upon pre-existing interpersonal contacts and tend to find their interest more readily piqued or to respond more efficiently when they have firsthand contacts with the individuals or organizations requesting help.6 Gauging from their campaigns and remarks, Malaysian activists on the whole seem comfortable with assuming some transnational (particularly regional) role, even if most still view themselves as Malaysians above all. For instance, Debbie Stothard describes her identity – reinforced by her activism – as that of ‘a human rights activist who is a woman and who comes from Southeast Asia’.7 Frequently, a

Transnational activism by Malaysians 131 sense of (Southeast) Asian identity complements, but does not replace or transcend, a specific national identity.8 For instance, locally and transnationally engaged academic and activist Jomo K.S. describes himself as a ‘Malaysian public intellectual’, conceived of in national rather than ethnic or religious terms.9 Muslim activists, too – at least in the more mainstream Islamist organizations – may espouse and enact a sense of shared membership in an umat, or Muslim community, yet also identify themselves strongly as Malaysians, or more narrowly, as ethnic Malays or otherwise.10 Accordingly, Malaysians’ transnational activism is about as likely to take the form of direct intervention in or support for campaigns outside Malaysia as lobbying the Malaysian government, as their acknowledged representative in the diplomatic arena, to adopt a particular stance to put pressure on a fellow state. For instance, while some Malaysian advocacy work for human rights in Burma has involved sending activists to Burma or elsewhere to stage protests, running media campaigns, extending resources to Burmese dissidents and so on, other tactics have included lobbying the Malaysian government (and, less often, Malaysian businesses) not to recognize and support the Burmese regime. All the same, as the discourse commonly used indicates, Malaysians’ targeting their government to lobby other regimes for change is significantly predicated upon the state’s inclusion in and identification with its own transnational network, ASEAN. Indeed, the case of Burma is especially revealing in this regard, since Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad seems committed to making a mark in solving Burma’s problems.11 Such pressure tactics have worked outside the regional context, however, most notably in South Africa. A campaign to expose the fact that Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong were the only ‘third world’ countries violating the sanctions against South Africa under apartheid shamed the Malaysian companies involved into disinvesting immediately and making contributions to Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress.12

Transnational campaigns An array of Malaysian NGOs participate at least tangentially in international campaigns, although fewer activists or groups have these as their primary focus. The main groups involved in these initiatives are either secular groups concerned with human rights, development and North–South issues; or religious organizations concerned with the plight of co-religionists, especially Muslims, elsewhere. A small number of groups combine the two, for instance promoting a pan-religious peace and justice agenda. Also, several transnational NGOs have offices or regional headquarters in Malaysia from whence they participate in campaigns both inside and outside the country. Secular groups Certain secular Malaysian NGOs consider various sorts of transnational endeavours an important part of their overall mission.13 Indeed, most Malaysian NGOs are involved with at least one regional or global network. Some groups, too, were

132 Meredith Weiss formed as a local response to a global trend. Only a handful of NGOs really prioritize transnational activities, however, or do much more than signing petitions and other low-cost activities. Especially obvious examples of transnationally involved secular Malaysian NGOs are human rights group Suara Rakyat Malaysia (Suaram, Voice of the Malaysian People); female and migrant workers’ group Tenaganita (Woman Power); and medical relief agency MERCY Malaysia. However, the evolution of other groups towards the incorporation of global agendas merits mention too. The chief foci of human rights group Suaram are documentation and monitoring of human rights violations in Malaysia, providing campaign support to other NGOs, international solidarity and networking. The NGO asserts in its mission statement that it ‘believes in international solidarity and actively supports democracy and human rights movement [sic] in South East Asia, especially in Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, Aceh and East Timor’ (Suaram 2000). Suaram participates in Forum Asia for Human Rights and Development; the Asian Human Rights Commission; the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Facilitating Team; the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor; and the Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development. Some of these regional networks are as likely to focus on Malaysian issues as developments elsewhere (yet by their nature, still represent ‘transnational’ endeavours for the Malaysian groups involved). Others focus especially or exclusively on issues outside Malaysia. Suaram also serves as host to local advocacy groups for international issues, such as Solidaritas Timor Timur (East Timor Solidarity). Malaysians came to be involved with activism on East Timor not only due to the proximity of Malaysia to Indonesia,14 but also because of personal ties. For instance, Suaram member Sharaad Kuttan first read about East Timor as an undergraduate in the mid-1980s, and then was drawn in further when Malaysian Kamal Ahmad Bamadhaj was killed in the Dili massacre in November 1991.15 Similarly, Jomo K.S. played a role (although he insists that the press inflated his real prominence in the movement) largely because Timorese independence leader Jose Ramos Horta was an old friend.16 The issue of East Timor became particularly significant for Malaysian activists when representatives from the youth wing of the governing Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition violently disrupted the Second Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET II), held in Kuala Lumpur in November 1996.17 Former Suaram coordinator Elizabeth Wong suggests that the East Timor campaign was particularly successful in Malaysia because, unlike many other campaigns, all the major news media covered it, including the government’s negative response to local efforts. Moreover, the press made links between events in East Timor and the broader issue of democratization.18 In addition, as Kuttan points out, events such as APCET II have a local as well as an international dimension, although Malaysian NGOs are generally reluctant to be open about the former. Just as such ventures as regional election monitoring efforts (with which Kuttan has also been involved) suggest an Asian agenda for improving electoral systems, regional conferences represent an attempt to challenge state and official determinations of who can say what, about what issues, and in what contexts. Transnational issues are core concerns for Tenaganita, too. This NGO has as its

Transnational activism by Malaysians 133 primary mission empowering and supporting sex workers and migrant and female workers in Malaysian factories and plantations, but is deeply aware of the inherent transnationalism of the issues with which it is involved. Tenaganita focuses on health, domestic violence, workers’ rights, family law and economic empowerment, and provides extra services to migrant workers, for instance to help them adapt to Malaysian life or in case of arrest and detention. In addition, Tenaganita initiated and hosts the regional secretariat of the Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility (CARAM) network and is involved with transnational migrant worker-related networks. The NGO has been critical, too, in publicizing abuses against migrant workers in Malaysia, in the process provoking an international response and heightened efforts towards enforcement of the relevant bilateral agreements. Tenaganita’s experience suggests the potential of a global response to force changes in domestic politics.19 The Malaysian Medical Relief Society, or MERCY Malaysia, represents a new sort of transnational activism for Malaysia – one premised upon Malaysia’s comparatively high level of socio-economic development.20 MERCY Malaysia was started by a female gynaecologist, Dr Jemilah Mahmood, in mid-1999. Distressed at the situation in Kosova, Jemilah felt compelled – as a professional and as a Muslim – to go there to help. No pre-existing organization would sponsor her, so with a few friends Jemilah launched MERCY Malaysia as a non-partisan, apolitical relief organization. Working with Helping Hands USA, MERCY Malaysia then sent a total of five missions to Kosova to provide mobile medical care. The organization subsequently sent teams to Turkey to help with earthquake relief in 1999 (where they collaborated with a Turkish foundation), to Maluku in Indonesia in 2000 to provide medical help for internally displaced people, to Gujarat in India in early 2001 in the wake of the earthquake there and to Cambodia beginning in 2000 to help with flood relief in cooperation with local community health services and NGOs. MERCY Malaysia has also sent teams to China and Sumatra, as well as to several sites in Malaysia (particularly impoverished, rural, often indigenous communities), including to Sabah and Sarawak at the request of local NGOs. The organization is currently engaged in medical and humanitarian relief in Afghanistan (working with the Pakistan Islamic Medical Association); these efforts have temporarily upstaged all other projects. MERCY Malaysia’s goal is to ‘be recognized as the leading regional provider of medical relief and humanitarian services’ by 2005.21 Moreover, the group aims to establish a long-term presence in critical areas, particularly by coordinating the efforts of other groups. To this end, the group is establishing the Malaysian Medical and Relief Centre in Cambodia to provide facilities through which other Malaysian NGOs can work on site and through which local skills and capacity can be developed. MERCY Malaysia is particularly intriguing for three reasons. First, although most of the group’s founding members are Muslims, inspired to some extent by Islamic precepts of compassion and charity and supported by Muslim organizations, the group is explicitly ‘Malaysian’ rather than Islamic in orientation. As its mission statement affirms, ‘MERCY Malaysia is a non-profit medical relief organization dedicated to providing services in crisis and non-crisis situations irrespective of race,

134 Meredith Weiss religion, culture and boundary’ (MERCY Malaysia brochure: n.p.). In fact, part of the reason MERCY Malaysia has chosen to focus on Cambodia instead of another hotspot is that the population is overwhelmingly Buddhist and only about 5 per cent Muslim. Along the same lines, the group hoped to work with Christian as well as Muslim communities in Maluku, although security concerns prevented their doing so. As MERCY Malaysia executive secretary Mohd. Shah Hj. Awaluddin clarifies, ‘we do not want to be a secular organization, where we would discard our religious values’, but the organization avoids rituals or rites of Islam in the context of the group as unnecessary to its functions and potentially exclusionary.22 Second, the volunteers comprising MERCY Malaysia’s relief missions see themselves as having something uniquely valuable to contribute to the region. In other words, they conceive of a philanthropic responsibility arising from Malaysia’s relative level of development and geographic location. Indeed, while MERCY Malaysia has been engaged in relief efforts outside Southeast Asia (Turkey, India, Afghanistan), its primary focus is regional. The group was initially reluctant to get involved in Afghanistan for fear of being misconstrued as having objectives beyond humanitarian relief, but felt compelled to respond in the face of massive public interest once the American bombing campaign began. Since then, MERCY Malaysia’s membership and volunteer base have expanded dramatically, with a higher proportion of non-medical personnel getting involved. Now, even Malaysia’s Foreign Minister has proudly acknowledged that MERCY Malaysia is pioneering a new sort of volunteerism, which the government has facilitated to some extent (for instance, by providing transport to Afghanistan for supplies), despite MERCY Malaysia’s apolitical stance. Finally, MERCY Malaysia is notable for its flexibility in finding partners with whom to collaborate or network in the region and beyond. The organization has conducted its missions with Western and Asian, religious and secular partners, depending on the circumstances of the case. Moreover, MERCY Malaysia has invited about ten NGOs to join as partners for the Cambodia Relief Centre and has appealed as well to universities and similar institutions to get social scientists and others involved. In contrast to MERCY Malaysia, which started with an international focus, then expanded its efforts to include domestic initiatives, a number of secular Malaysian NGOs have developed over the years from a focus just on local concerns to seeing these issues as tied in with larger agendas. For instance, the well-known Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP), formed in 1970, was inspired by Ralph Nader’s campaigns in the United States but started off by focusing on local-level ‘housewives’ kind of stuff’. Eventually, the group evolved to address issues of environment and development, and then the broader North–South debate, as Malaysians came to see local problems as a sub-set of larger global issues such as consumption and trade.23 Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National Consciousness Movement, Aliran), which formed in 1977 to focus on the promotion of social justice, political reform and multireligious, multi-ethnic dialogue, has similarly become engaged with various issues outside Malaysia. Aliran is best known for its magazine, Aliran Monthly, the pages of which frequently address transnational rather than just local concerns. For instance,

Transnational activism by Malaysians 135 Aliran has issued and published press statements or other coverage on East Timor, Burma, Aceh, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Rwanda, Iraq, Afghanistan and other hotspots, as well as issuing specific appeals to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Given that the Aliran Monthly has served as a primary vehicle for publicizing NGO networking, its pages also give some indication of how many NGOs are involved with such issues. For instance, the magazine published a 1996 letter to relevant Malaysian leaders protesting Malaysia’s acceptance of Burma’s entry into ASEAN. The letter was signed by 28 NGOs, among them both Islamic and other religious groups and secular advocacy organizations.24 Religious groups The primary religious groups involved with transnational activism are Muslim groups, although Christian and other groups have also been active in campaigns outside Malaysia.25 Islamic organizations such as Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, ABIM) have always paid some heed to concerns in the broader Islamic community, or umat. These extra-territorial concerns first came to especial prominence when a peace movement developed around the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In fact, the efforts of this movement led to one of the few all-party actions in Malaysian history. In 1991, 106 of about 120 government and opposition members of parliament signed a petition prepared by the movement. The petition condemned the Iraqi invasion and the war itself – even though the Malaysian government had initially supported the Security Council agreement giving the United States carte blanche to intervene. As the breadth of support for this initiative suggests, though, not all involved were motivated by religious sentiments or sympathies.26 Subsequently, Islamic groups in particular became increasingly vocal and active on transnational issues in the mid-1990s in protest against Serbian ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia. The groups’ positions were often congruent with those of the government, though since then their respective preferences have increasingly come to diverge.27 Recent statements or actions by ABIM have concerned the Turkish government’s policies toward the Islamic opposition, the search for peace in Mindanao in the Philippines, fundraising for Chechnya and Indonesia,28 the eversalient Palestinian cause and other issues. Still, the umat within Malaysia dominates ABIM’s agenda, however sympathetic the organization and its members may be to the plight of Muslims elsewhere. Moreover, while recent developments in Afghanistan have spurred Malaysian Islamic groups to action, non-Islamic groups have also joined humanitarian relief efforts. Most notable among these efforts is the Misi Keamanan Sejagat (Global Peace Mission, MKS), launched in late September 2001 by ABIM and 64 other NGOs; even more groups have joined since then.29 MKS is headed by ABIM and includes a panoply of Islamic organizations, but also has Christian, Buddhist and secular members. Indeed, ABIM president Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman is at pains to stress the group’s de-linking of Islam and terrorism. He explains, ‘We are campaigning for justice and not religion. This crisis has nothing to do with religion’

136 Meredith Weiss (quoted in The Star, 27 September 2001). MKS aims to provide material aid to displaced Afghans in Afghanistan and Pakistan, ranging from provision of food and blankets to promoting health care and education in refugee camps. It is too soon to tell, however, how fundamentally the question of Afghanistan will change the landscape for Islamic and non-Islamic transnational activism among Malaysians. It does seem that this consciously ecumenical approach distinguishes a range of campaigns that might otherwise be conceived of in religiously exclusive terms in Malaysia, however, probably in the interests of attracting greater public and elite support. More broadly, the linchpin of the contemporary peace movement is the Centre for Peace Initiatives (CENPEACE). While this coalition has come to assume a largely Muslim flavour, it is not specifically sectarian and may thus be seen as something of a bridge between secular and religious organizations. CENPEACE was established in 1994 to promote freedom and justice, especially in the third world; to expose political, cultural, social, economic and territorial domination; to promote socially just development; and for discussion, education and exchange of ideas on how to prevent wars and encourage peace. CENPEACE is the successor to earlier peace-oriented networks. Among these were Gerak Damai (Movement for Peace), which formed to call for a peaceful solution to the Iraq–Kuwait conflict and presented the petition described above;30 the Campaign to Save the Children of Iraq, launched in 1992 to channel funds from the Malaysian Red Crescent Society to its Iraqi counterpart; and the umbrella group, Malaysian Action Front (MAF), which was inspired by events in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, especially given perceptions of hegemonic ambitions on the part of the United States. The MAF brought together the youth wings of governing and opposition parties, ABIM, the Society for Christian Reflection, the youth section of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall and other groups. By mid-1994, the newly formed CENPEACE had begun to take over the functions of the MAF.31 Hence, non-Muslims such as Fan Yew Teng were involved alongside ABIM activists from the outset. Fan (2003) suggests that as ardour over the Gulf War cooled toward the mid1990s, the NGOs involved with the MAF, then CENPEACE, became more selective in choosing issues with which to continue to be or become engaged. He lists events in Chechnya, Korea, Palestine, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Punjab, East Timor and Burma, as well as nuclear testing, as being of particular concern for Malaysian NGOs. Since the Malaysian government either adopted ‘a neutral, non-interventionist stance’ on these issues or actively supported regimes such as Burma’s, it was less supportive of NGOs’ involvement with these issues than with earlier, less controversial peace-based initiatives. Still, activists have continued to publicize and agitate regarding these non-local issues – perhaps conditioned by the experience of local-level advocacy to expect an unfavourable response from the state.

Transnational organizations Transnational NGOs may be led by Malaysian activists or may operate in Malaysia, whether or not they were formed or maintain offices in the country. Several

Transnational activism by Malaysians 137 transnational networks are either based in Malaysia or have Malaysians as key players. For instance, the Bangkok-based Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) has as its coordinator Malaysian Debbie Stothard. This network of Southeast Asian organizations and individuals supports human rights and democracy in Burma, in the process creating ‘opportunities to further the democratizing agenda in ASEAN member states’ (World Movement for Democracy 2002). For instance, ALTSEAN coordinated a 14-person team from Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia to stage a commemoration in 1998 of the ‘8/8/88’ uprising in Burma, when thousands of pro-democratic activists were killed. These foreign protesters were arrested for handing out notes commemorating the date, causing an international incident. The involvement of Stothard – not to mention three other Malaysians detained in the 1998 campaign and the Burma Solidarity Group Malaysia (part of a wider Free Burma Coalition supportive of Aung San Suu Kyi) – has helped to publicize in Malaysia the predations of the Burmese junta and suggests that Malaysia has a real stake in Burmese political development. On another level, Malaysia’s significance to the resolution of the crisis in Burma is augmented by the fact that the United Nations Special Envoy to Burma is a prominent Malaysian with close ties to Mahathir, Razali Ismail. As a Malaysian, moreover, Razali may be well positioned to convince the Burmese junta to compromise. Burma’s leaders have confidence in Mahathir and his sincerity, including regarding his willingness to forgo penalties for their transgressions. Moreover, ‘The Burmese don’t want to be seen to be led by the noses by Westerners . . . They don’t mind sitting down and talking to Asians.’32 For his part, Razali has been a part of intensive talks with representatives of the military, the opposition National League for Democracy, secessionist minority groups and others from Asia and abroad with strong links to the issue, and appears to be making headway with the regime. Given the Malaysian administration’s apparent commitment to resolving the Burma issue – and to being able to take credit for at least part of the process – the government and police acquiesced to the holding of a function honouring Aung San Suu Kyi in December 2001, so long as the participants broke no local laws and tempered their usual ‘down with dictatorship’ messages.33 Indeed, Burmese activist Ghiyathudeen explained, ‘In many ways, we feel that the Malaysian government is sympathetic to our cause’, although its ‘policy favouring us may change any day depending on the political situation’ (quoted in Yap 2001: n.p.). In addition, Malaysia is the regional or even global home of an unusually high number of multinational NGOs, and others maintain a significant presence in the country. The island of Penang and in and around Kuala Lumpur are the most clearly apparent ‘nodes’ (see Lindquist, this volume) for transnationally oriented Malaysian NGOs and activism, even if particular campaign events are held elsewhere in Malaysia. The Asia-Pacific offices of Consumers’ International (formerly the International Organization of Consumers’ Unions), Pesticides Action Network, and Wetlands International, for instance, are all located in Malaysia. Moreover, the International Movement for a Just World ( JUST), Third World Network, and Sustainable Transport Action Network for Asia and the Pacific are Malaysian

138 Meredith Weiss initiatives. The degree to which these organizations focus on Malaysian affairs varies by group as well as over time. Moreover, groups may more or less explicitly link international events or trends with Malaysian developments. JUST is a good example. The group engages with human rights issues on the international level, but especially in Asia. JUST declares itself a ‘non-profit international citizens’ organisation which seeks to create public awareness . . . [and] develop a deeper understanding of the struggle for social justice and human rights at the global level . . . guided by universal spiritual and moral values rooted in the oneness of God’ ( JUST n.d.). Although most of its committee members are Malaysian and the bulk of its funding comes from the Malaysian public (including companies, foundations, the government and citizens) ( JUST n.d.), JUST has an international advisory panel, which includes such notables as Noam Chomsky and Tu Wei Ming, as well as international coordinators. JUST’s statements and initiatives have focused on, among other issues, the Middle East conflict, abuses involving Chechen refugees, Bosnia, nuclear proliferation, land mines, the hostagetaking Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, Burma, East Timor and the Taliban’s lack of tolerance. The organization has also pressed for a focus on the values shared across religions, cultures and civilizations, and for the recovery of marginalized histories (see JUST n.d.). At the same time, JUST is actively engaged in locally oriented activism. Its domestic focus has strengthened since the late 1990s, as social activism has come to seem more pressing to further reform processes in Malaysia.34 JUST’s relevance to Malaysia, despite its avowedly international orientation, is neither incidental nor subtle. Indeed, JUST leader Chandra Muzaffar insists that the two are linked – that the options for Malaysia are limited by global forces, so change in Malaysia requires broader shifts.35 For instance, JUST’s statements on the need explicitly to enumerate the rights and entitlements of non-Muslims in the constitution of an Islamic state (see Farish 2001) or condemning the Taliban’s excesses suggest routes to increasing inter-religious harmony in Malaysia and promoting critical thinking among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. They also situate Malaysia within various worlds: the world of the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights, of the umat, of the South, of ‘democratic’ states and so on. Malaysia’s position in the developing world in particular is stressed by the Penang-based Third World Network (TWN), probably the best-known transnational Malaysian NGO. TWN advocates for the South on issues of economic development and globalization. Although it networks with Malaysian NGOs, particularly consumers’ and environmental groups, TWN normally maintains a minimal involvement with things Malaysian. TWN is an offshoot of local NGOs CAP and Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth Malaysia, SAM), so it maintains a division of labour in which those two groups do the bulk of the work on domestic concerns. However, TWN is not aloof from local concerns – indeed, some of the individuals involved with TWN also participate in locally oriented NGOs or activities.36 For instance, the group’s leader, economist Martin Khor, has helped spur domestic debate on economic policy and related issues through his writings in local media, particularly during the economic crisis of the late 1990s. Moreover, much as

Transnational activism by Malaysians 139 the regime’s participation in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) or Islamic groupings proclaims and helps maintain Malaysia’s place in those categories, TWN’s presence and activities assert Malaysia’s position as an exemplar for the ‘third world’ and a participant in a global economic order. For instance, TWN’s writings on the WTO or links with the United Nations and World Bank suggest that it is only incidental that the NGO is based in Malaysia and not elsewhere, implicitly undercutting any notion of Malaysia as capable of autarky or as fully distinct from other developing states. Other groups are also part of transnational networks, although often on a minimal level. For instance, the environmental group SAM, formed in 1977, is the coordinator of the Asia-Pacific People’s Environment Network (APPEN), which includes over three hundred NGOs and focuses on collection and dissemination of information in the region. SAM also networks with groups such as TWN, as described above. However, the NGO is better known for its work on environmental issues in Malaysia, such as protesting deforestation in Sarawak or mobilizing against the improper disposal of radioactive wastes in Bukit Merah, Perak (a campaign which ultimately involved a cross-national effort, as it targeted a Japanese multinational corporation).37 Other environmental groups, women’s groups, indigenous rights groups and so on are similarly aligned with sympathetic networks or coordinating bodies, and various groups appeal at times to supra-national institutions such as the UN.

When activists look abroad Given the wealth of issues around which activists might organize domestically in Malaysia, it is well worth considering why so many Malaysians choose to engage in transnational activism and the types of tradeoffs they face in doing so. Activist Debbie Stothard lists five factors (in no particular order) likely to spark Malaysians’ interest in issues outside the country: ●

●

● ● ●

a ‘Malaysian connection’, if a Malaysian individual or group is involved or has expressed concern; a vicarious connection, if a non-Malaysian who is popular in Malaysia is involved or if Malaysians feel connected to the country or group in question; a government agenda reflecting that issue; a Muslim connection if Islam appears under threat; and/or proximity, if an event ‘is happening literally in one’s front yard’, especially if there is a large refugee or migrant worker community from that country in Malaysia.38

Stothard specifies as well that, ‘It is actually quite interesting to note that solidarity actions are just as likely to attract participants from the working class as the middle class, students and everyone in between’.39 What is perhaps most important in terms of understanding Malaysians’ involvement in transnational activism is that an activist’s decision to focus on an issue

140 Meredith Weiss outside Malaysia is rarely if ever exclusive or even binding. Rather, activists tend to work on more than one issue or to shift between issues as circumstances or their own interests warrant. For instance, while she has been involved with activism on East Timor, Aceh, Nepal and more, and works mostly on international issues since she feels that is where she has particular skills to offer, human rights activist Elizabeth Wong asserts the priority of domestic issues.40 Similarly, ALTSEAN coordinator Debbie Stothard primarily focuses on Burma and has been actively engaged with human rights movements in East Timor, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, China, Tibet, Singapore, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and elsewhere since 1986. Still, she complements these regional endeavours with an effort ‘to strategically support increased awareness of, and support of the Malaysian struggle in the international and regional community’, and sees ‘no tradeoff’ between these ‘interconnected’ foci.41 Moreover, the assignation of individuals to issues within organizations may in fact be rather haphazard. Suaram, for instance, has no strict criteria for selecting representatives for particular campaigns. The group determines who is available, then those individuals decide whether they are interested in that issue. Some staff members and volunteers tend to work primarily on domestic issues and others primarily on international issues, however, based on which issues they know or care most about and where they feel they can be most effective.42 Indeed, Malaysian NGOs’ specification of issues or places on which to focus seems far from systematic. MERCY Malaysia, for instance, which normally makes decisions by reaching a consensus within its executive committee, has had to redirect its primary fundraising and networking efforts from Cambodia to Afghanistan, largely because of widespread popular interest in contributing to humanitarian efforts in the latter. Unable to launch an appeal for Cambodia at the present time, the group will use its own funds and is pursuing corporate sector donations to finance its relief centre there.43 Suaram, too, tends to be drawn reactively into particular campaigns. The organization is involved with various transnational advocacy networks through which it gets information on violations elsewhere (much as described in Keck and Sikkink 1998), including urgent appeals broadcast by local or international NGOs, and responds accordingly.

The government’s response The Malaysian state maintains an ambivalent relationship with NGOs. While it appreciates being able to devolve certain social welfare tasks upon non-state bodies, it is highly sensitive to the criticism of its policies or perspectives often levied by these groups. As Sharaad Kuttan puts it, the Malaysian government opposes its citizens’ activism ‘when it gets embarrassing’ or when other governments pressure it to intervene (such as Indonesia, which urged the Malaysian state to oppose the APCET II). At the same time, the state is sensible enough to leave much activism unhindered as just NGO people ‘talking, talking, talking’.44 This dualism carries over to activism by Malaysians directed abroad. The government has taken a benign approach to some transnational campaigns but has done its best to subvert others. Civil societal initiatives regarding Bosnia and Chechnya, for instance, have largely accorded with

Transnational activism by Malaysians 141 the preferences of the regime and have simply shifted the burden of humanitarian tasks from the state to civil society, much as domestic welfare tasks may be entrusted to NGOs rather than the state. On the other hand, the state has been highly unsupportive of initiatives that support what are considered subversive movements in countries with which Malaysia has close diplomatic ties. Most notably, Malaysian activists’ support for East Timor and Burma has not been taken lightly. The most blatant expression of this disapproval was the breaking up of APCET II, the aforementioned conference on East Timor. In that case, 59 conference organizers and participants were jailed for up to six days, but the BN Youth leaders were immediately released on bail, to plaudits from government leaders.45 Stothard explains, too, that, ‘The Malaysian authorities have not been happy about my work on Malaysia, particularly since we have been successful in circumventing censorship in Malaysia by accessing Bangkok-based international media’. She and her Thai colleagues have been quizzed by Malaysian officials about their activities and even trailed. Moreover, she points out that Malaysian activists at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva have been subject to vigilant monitoring in case they ‘say anything about Malaysia’.46 Of course, the Malaysian state tends not to look very positively on activism for politically controversial issues at home either, so Malaysian activists may face no especial risks by directing their energies abroad, however sensitive the topic.

De facto democracy, at home and abroad The attention paid by Malaysian NGOs and activists to concerns outside Malaysia’s borders can be viewed from different perspectives. These efforts may have the positive externality of spurring or furthering local activism – and consequent liberalization – by consciousness-raising, education and sharing strategies. As Sharaad Kuttan explains, whether directed inside or outside Malaysia, civil societal initiatives are useful for raising awareness, bringing a wider array of issues into the public’s view and ‘advancing a kind of vocabulary, expanding a kind of discourse’.47 To capitalize upon these non-material effects, Malaysian NGOs tend to spend an inordinate amount of time on media work, although they also require grass-roots links and a level of competence if they are to claim the authority to speak. Moreover, Malaysians’ activism elsewhere is healthy for the local context, Kuttan continues, since ‘it can only add to the strength and capacity of civil society actors to contribute to state structures and the like’. He concedes that it would be deleterious for everyone to opt for international instead of domestic work, but reasons ‘that’s an unlikely scenario’.48 Alternatively, activists’ migration may just represent the increasing global mobility of activism or individuals’ disenchantment with the local activist scene, and may have only incidental positive effects for local strategists. Indeed, one academic and activist posited that the movement of groups like Suaram and Aliran away from Malaysian issues through the 1990s may have been a sign of their weak ties with the grass-roots and their rather academic nature.49 Inasmuch as there is a shared bottom

142 Meredith Weiss line to the methods and goals of activism, activists can pick their locale and set up shop there. Still, it may be a sign of civil society’s maturity for a state like Malaysia to be able to export activists, and these activists’ extra-national focus implicitly presents a very strong message about the generalizability of particular discourses and goals, even if Malaysia does not really live up to the norms being propounded. Indeed, despite its democratic structures, Malaysia’s record on human rights or civil liberties is hardly exemplary. Jonson Chong argues, for instance, that while Burma or Tibet score lower on these indicators than Malaysia, ‘because of the insidious manner in which the Malaysian government violates human rights, I believe that the impact is just as bad if not worse’.50 Kuttan suggests that Malaysians engage in activism abroad without arrogance or a posture of teaching others about democracy, but rather with the attitude that they too come from a non-democratic country. This stance is opposed to the civilizing mission of many Western activists, who bring ‘a great amount of sympathy for our situation as opposed to empathy’.51 Elizabeth Wong agrees, asserting that one’s country need not be ‘advanced’ before its citizens engage in causes elsewhere. While she would not use Malaysia as an exemplar, other states might be encouraged to adhere to international standards or look to ASEAN for positive intervention just as Malaysia might.52 All the same, particularly since so much of Malaysian activists’ transnational involvement is within the region (not least because of the platform offered by ASEAN) and related to rights of various sorts, their participation asserts a degree of ‘Asianism’. Indeed, Jomo K.S. explains that, as a Malaysian, ‘one had a certain responsibility’ to be involved with regional issues, given proximity to if not superior knowledge about neighbouring states.53 Similarly, Debbie Stothard argues that, as a Malaysian, she has legitimacy speaking out on regionally based struggles, as ‘most governments of the region tend to dismiss human right[s] and democracy concerns as a “western concern”. Having a “local” speaking out undermines the authorities’ assertion.’54 Such a posture highlights the mutual compatibility of so many domestic and international issues and undercuts the claims to exceptionalism that sustain the Malaysian and other regional governments’ authoritarian bent.55 The Malaysian state, together with some of its neighbours, tends to describe ‘Asian democracy’ as requiring substantial curbs on individual liberties – which the ‘Asian values’ purportedly held by their populaces support and encourage. The counter-discourse upheld by activists across the states in question challenges this illiberal model and proposes a more participatory, socially just model for state and society. Hence, aside from concrete policy aims and advances, transnational activism – particularly across the less-than-liberal regimes of Southeast Asia – carries substantial discursive and symbolic value. Regional human rights initiatives are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Such a revisioning of ‘Asian’ human rights is detailed in the Asian Human Rights Charter, with which Malaysian activists were involved. The Charter was drafted upon consultations coordinated by the Asian Human Rights Commission in 1995. Malaysia was surprisingly under-represented at the Southeast Asia consultation in August 1995, but Malaysian groups signed on to the completed document.56 As Seth Harris states, ‘By defining specific rights and outlining enforcement mechanisms

Transnational activism by Malaysians 143 that can be used to protect these rights, the Charter creates a strong foundation for a human rights structure’ (Harris 2000: 2). While he acknowledges that Asian states may not recognize the rights enumerated in the Charter (although he predicts that it will pressure the international community to enforce more rights), Harris (2000: 3) asserts: This does not, however, negate the Charter’s value as a tool to evoke change in the position of many Asian governments that refuse to yield to ‘Western’ principles of human rights law. The primary utility of the Charter, and unofficial documents like it, exists in its strict description of rights. This definite statement of rights can be used as a lobbying point for the peoples of Asia and as a voice to espouse their needs and concerns. Indeed, the Asian Human Rights Charter and instruments such as the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights find echoes in the Malaysian Charter on Human Rights, promulgated in 1994 after a series of consultations and amended in 1999.57 The concurrence of local and regional human rights initiatives testifies to the potency in Southeast Asia of the sort of transnational advocacy networks Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe. Moreover, Malaysian organizations are linked with the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), although no Malaysians serve on the current board. Founded in 1986 to press for civil political, economic, social and cultural rights, the AHRC functions as a sort of local Amnesty International. Based in Hong Kong, the body provides urgent alerts, informational briefings and more. It focuses on such topics as women, caste, race, religion and abuses by governments, police and military forces. A more narrowly focused, but comparable initiative is the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA). SEAPA takes the idea of freedom of the press to be universal and works to enforce it in the countries of the region. Some Malaysians are involved with SEAPA in Bangkok, some local NGOs are allied with SEAPA, and the organization follows Malaysian affairs. Moreover, SEAPA has been particularly influential in Malaysia by dint of its sponsorship of Malaysiakini (www.malaysiakini .com),58 the country’s leading internet news portal and source of independent news. SEAPA explains that its involvement with Malaysiakini since December 1999 has been ‘part of an effort to promote the development of an independent media in Southeast Asia’, efforts paralleled also in Cambodia and East Timor (SEAPA 2001). These organizations’ activities are clearly part of a conscious effort to institutionalize an idea of human rights in Asia as legitimate, binding and not exceptional.

Implications Malaysia has proved itself a party to the international activist market. Even though, with its semi-democratic regime and staunchly pro-development ethic, the country is more commonly the target of international environmental or human rights campaigns, Malaysia also exports activists and their ideas. Such involvement is no guarantee that local standards for human rights and democracy are all that much

144 Meredith Weiss higher than in the states in which Malaysians intervene, nor that advocacy campaigns in Malaysia are any less pressing than those elsewhere. All the same, as Fan Yew Teng asserts, ‘in addition to encouraging Malaysia to hold foreign regimes to a higher standard with regard to human rights and democracy, these NGOs try to hold their own government to the same standard’, even if they are often disappointed in both these regards (Fan 2003: 192). Indeed, it is important to note that, at critical moments, local issues clearly supersede transnational initiatives in Malaysia. For instance, throughout the recent Reformasi movement, groups such as Suaram and ABIM notably downplayed their emphasis on international solidarity campaigns and instead seemed to direct nearly all their energy locally. Concern for campaigns elsewhere did not dissipate altogether – a cluster of Malaysians remained involved in events in East Timor or Aceh, for instance, and attention quickly reverted to the outside world in the aftermath of the traumatic events of 11 September 2001 – but it did appear to have lessened. Such an effect suggests that transnational activism does not unduly dilute local campaigns. By engaging with events outside Malaysia, activists learn new strategies, get a better sense of how Malaysia compares with other states and stay inspired to keep protesting. Then, when they are needed back home, at least a critical mass seem willing to shift their emphasis to socio-political transformation on a local level. The net result for liberalization or policy change both locally and regionally may thus be positive, shifting foci and obstacles notwithstanding.

Notes 1 I am indebted to Anna Tsing for suggesting this line of inquiry and a research strategy (which I unfortunately could not implement fully). 2 The lines between these categories are often blurred. For instance, Malaysian Muslim organizations have been involved on behalf of Burmese Muslims with largely secular advocacy efforts regarding Burma, and both secular and Islamist groups have engaged with the issue of Acehnese independence (interview with Elizabeth Wong, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur). 3 For instance, foreign ‘interference’ (most famously by Swiss indigenous rights and environmental activist Bruno Manser) in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, where activists have been particularly dependent upon international support, has antagonized the government and made it defensive (interview with Colin Nicholas, 22 July 1997, Kuala Lumpur). 4 For example, a broad assortment of local organizations publicized an International Campaign to Stop the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam in early 2001 to oppose the Sarawakbased megaproject. See Coalition of Concerned NGOs (2001). 5 The watershed Malaysian Airlines (MAS) strike of 1978–9 is illustrative. Despite strong international support, the action, ‘showed the extent to which the government was willing to act in order to suppress industrial action, as well as the labour movement’s inability to resist government repression and the lack of significant public support for labour actions in the 1970s’ (Jomo and Todd 1994: 142). 6 Interviews with Elizabeth Wong, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur and Jomo K.S., 25 January 2002, via telephone. 7 Interview, 11 March 2002, via e-mail. 8 See He (this volume) for a deeper discussion of these levels of identity, and especially the development and practice of world citizenship. One Malaysian activist mused that when

Transnational activism by Malaysians 145

9 10

11

12 13

14

15 16 17 18 19

20

21 22 23 24 25

she was based in Australia or Nepal, she identified more as an international or Asian citizen, but when she returned home and started to work with a local NGO, she came to identify herself as Malaysian (interview with Elizabeth Wong, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur). On the other hand, another activist claims that his belief ‘that the whole world . . . is interrelated’ leads him to reject the idea ‘that an arbitrary matter such as my nationality gives me any particular legitimacy to fight for the causes that I fight for’ (interview with Jonson Chong, 16 January 2002, via e-mail). Interview, 25 January 2002, via telephone. Jomo suggests that marginalized sub-groups among Malaysian Indians (i.e. Christians and Muslims) are disproportionately represented in NGOs, including in their internationalist work. He argues that ‘the weak sense of nationhood and nationalism [and] . . . the particular alienation of the Indian Muslim’ led this sub-group to pursue regional and international activism. Interview, 25 January 2002, via telephone. Debbie Stothard, too, explains that since she is ‘of very mixed ethnic background . . . [t]he Malaysian identity discourse that focused on communalistic interests excluded me my whole life’, colouring her perceptions. Interview, 11 March 2002, via e-mail. Interview with Chandran Jeshurun, academic and East Asia Project Coordinator for the Nobel Peace Laureate Campaign for Aung San Suu Kyi and the People of Burma, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. Interview with Jomo K.S., 25 January 2002, via telephone. It bears noting that some of the activists involved with these organizations or their campaigns are actually engaged at least in part for religious reasons. Suaram’s Jonson Chong, for instance, says of his efforts on behalf of Burma and Tibet that ‘the fact that they are Buddhist countries . . . probably influenced my support for them’, although their ‘avowedly non-violent nature’ was also critical (interview, 16 January 2002, via e-mail). Geography is an issue not least because of the possibility of refugees coming to Malaysia. The Acehnese secessionist movement gained prominence in Malaysia, for instance, with the influx of refugees from Aceh (on the nearby Indonesian island of Sumatra) and a dramatic quest for refugee status waged by a group of Acehnese from Malaysia’s Semenyih detention camp in the late 1990s. Interviews with Sharaad Kuttan, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya; Elizabeth Wong, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur. In the same vein, activist Debbie Stothard urges ASEAN action on Burma since ‘it is now the source of over half a billion dollars’ worth of amphetamines smuggled annually into Southeast Asian markets’ (quoted in Yap 2001: n.p.). Interview with Sharaad Khuttan, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. Interview, 25 January 2002, via telephone. For details, see Kua (1998a or 1998b) or Fan (2003). Interview, 7 August 1997, Petaling Jaya. Most notably, Tenaganita head Irene Fernandez has been charged under the Printing Presses and Publications Act for a report issued by the NGO in 1995 on the abuse and torture of migrant workers in Malaysian detention camps. The trial has been ongoing since 1996 and has generated massive international pressure. See Tenaganita, The Real Side 4 (June 1997), Tenaganita (n.d.) or Suaram (1998: 83–4). Also, interview with Irene Fernandez, 29 July 1997, Kuala Lumpur. Information on MERCY Malaysia is drawn from an interview with Mohd. Shah Hj. Awaluddin, 20 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur; as well as its website (MERCY Malaysia 2001) and brochure. See the full vision statement in the MERCY Malaysia brochure. Interview with Mohd. Shah Hj. Awaluddin, 20 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur. Interview with Meenakshi Raman, 25 June 1997, Penang. The letter is published in issue 16:6 of the Aliran Monthly. James Wong Wing-On suggests that Christian associations have lost potency over the years. Still, many English-educated Christians are involved with activist organizations (often secular ones), inspired by liberal sentiments and liberation theology. Their

146 Meredith Weiss

26 27

28 29 30

31

32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49

50 51 52

Chinese-educated counterparts tend to be more spiritually oriented. Interview, 27 March 1999, Petaling Jaya. Interview with Jomo K.S., 25 January 2002, via telephone. These initiatives are detailed in Fan (2003). It is not so surprising, then, that Fan labels a December 1994 conference on ‘Rethinking Human Rights’ ‘perhaps the high point in cordiality between certain peace-related NGOs and the Malaysian government’ (Fan 2003: 189). ABIM’s website explains that the group has established charitable funds to assist Muslims in need of assistance in Malaysia and the world (ABIM n.d.). See Misi Keamanan Sejagat (2002) for details. This name was so informal that Jomo K.S., who was ‘effectively running the show’ since its head, poet Usman Awang, was ill, claims he did not know it was called that. Interview, 25 January 2002, via telephone. The above narrative is based Fan’s (2003) account. The secretary-general of ABIM offers a somewhat different version, claiming that CENPEACE actually developed as an ABIM initiative in the 1980s–1990s (interview with Shaharuddin Badaruddin, 7 April 1999, Wangsa Maju). Interview with Chandran Jeshurun, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. Interview with Chandran Jeshurun, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. Paralleling (and perhaps driving) this shift, JUST head Chandra Muzaffar joined the new opposition party, Keadilan, upon its formation in 1999. Still, Chandra acknowledges that the mass of Malaysians have relatively little concern for most global issues. Interview, 9 July 1998, Kuala Lumpur. Interview with T. Rajamoorthy, 11 July 1997, Penang. Though a representative of TWN, Rajamoorthy stipulated that he was speaking as an individual and not on behalf of the NGO. See CAP (1993) on the Asian Rare Earth case in Bukit Merah. Interview, 11 March 2002, via e-mail. Interview, 11 March 2002, via e-mail. Wong illustrates the happenstance nature of some transnational activism as well, in describing how she came to be based for a time in Nepal: ‘there was a vacancy and it sounded exotic, so I went’. Interview, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur. Interview, 11 March 2002, via e-mail. Interviews with Sharaad Kuttan, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya; and Elizabeth Wong, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur. Interview with Mohd. Shah Hj. Awaluddin, 20 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur. Interview, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. Thirty-six of the detainees ultimately filed suits against the police for illegal arrest and wrongful detention. See Kua (1998a). Interview, 11 March 2002, via e-mail. Interview, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. As one lawyer/activist pointed out, however, the proliferation of NGOs in Malaysia may be a sign of the increasing depoliticization and short-sightedness of society, rather than as a harbinger of more vibrant democracy. He explains that citizens may now appear to criticize the state via NGOs, an approach less likely than more direct engagement to have an impact or entail genuine politicization. Interview with T. Rajamoorthy, 11 July 1997, Penang. Interview, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. Personal communication with Saliha Hassan, 28 October 1998, Petaling Jaya. At around that time, however, these and other groups perked up their local activities, joining in the massive Reformasi movement – which does not undercut Saliha’s supposition, but suggests that the drift toward the transnational is not irreversible. Interview, 16 January 2002, via e-mail. Interview, 21 November 2001, Petaling Jaya. Interview, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur.

Transnational activism by Malaysians 147 53 54 55 56

Interview, 25 January 2002, via telephone. Interview, 11 March 2002, via e-mail. Interview with Elizabeth Wong, 23 November 2001, Kuala Lumpur. Only historian and activist Ariffin Omar is listed as having attended the consultation. On the process of drafting the Asian Charter, see Asian Human Rights Commission (2001). 57 For details see Weiss (2003). 58 A similar initiative is RadiqRadio (www.radiqradio.com), which offers both audio and print ‘independent news’ daily via the internet.

References ABIM (n.d.) Homepage at http://www.abim.org.my/ (accessed 18 August 2001). Asian Human Rights Commission (2001) ‘Process of Preparation of the Charter’ at http:// www.ahrchk.net/charter/process.html (accessed 20 October 2002). CAP (1993) Wasted Lives: Radioactive Poisoning in Bukit Merah, Penang: Consumers’ Association of Penang. Coalition of Concerned NGOs against Bakun (2001) ‘International Campaign to Stop the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam’ at http://www.suaram.org/bakun/index.htm (accessed 9 August 2001). Fan, Y.T. (2003) ‘The Peace Movement and Malaysian Foreign and Domestic Policy’, in M. Weiss and H. Saliha (eds) Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGOs, London: RoutledgeCurzon. Farish, A.N. (2001) ‘Towards a Reformation of Islam from Within: Abdullahi Ahmed AnNaim’ at http://www.jaring.my/just/bookr_farish.htm (accessed 12 August 2001). Harris, S.R. (2000) ‘Asian Human Rights: Forming a Regional Covenant’, Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 1(2) ( June), at http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/17-seth.pdf (accessed 21 October 2002). Jomo K.S. and Todd, P. (1994) Trade Unions and the State in Peninsular Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. JUST (n.d.) ‘About JUST’ at http://www.just-international.org/faq.htm (accessed 20 October 2002). Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society’, in D.S. Meyer and S. Tarrow (eds) The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Kua, K.S. (1998a) Mob Rule: The East Timor conference in Malaysia, November 9, 1996, Petaling Jaya: SUARAM Komunikasi. ——(1998b) ‘The Struggle for Human Rights in Malaysia’, paper presented at the AsiaPacific Peoples’ Assembly Human Rights Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 9 November. MERCY Malaysia (2001) Homepage at http://www.mercy.org.my/ (accessed 20 October 2002). Misi Keamanan Sejagat (2002) Homepage at http://www.keamanan.net.my (accessed 20 October 2002). SEAPA (2001) ‘SEAPA Statement on Malaysiakini Funding’ at http://www.seapa.org (accessed 18 August 2001). Suaram (1998) Malaysian Human Rights Report, Petaling Jaya: SUARAM Komunikasi. ——(2000) ‘Rights’ at http://www.suaram.org/righs.htm (accessed 9 August 2001). Tenaganita (n.d.) ‘Trial of Irene Fernandez Charged under Sec8A(1) of the Printing Presses & Publications Act’ at http://caramasia.gn.apc.org/tn_trialmainpage.html (accessed 20 October 2002).

148 Meredith Weiss Weiss, M. (2003) ‘The Malaysian Human Rights Movement’, in M. Weiss and H. Saliha (eds) Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGOs, London: RoutledgeCurzon. World Movement for Democracy (2002) ‘World Movement for Democracy in Asia: Participating Organizations – Profiles’ at http://www.wmd.org/asia/asia_participant_ profiles.html (accessed 12 August 2001). Yap, M.C. (2001) ‘The Slow Road to Freedom in Burma’, Malaysiakini, 12 December at http://www.malaysiakini.com.

9

Transnational activism and the pursuit of democratization in Indonesia National, regional and global networks Aleksius Jemadu

Introduction Indonesia has been going through a period of rapid changes since the collapse of the Suharto authoritarian regime in May 1998. In an attempt to further democratization, there is now a growing awareness that building a democratic political system involves more than just the establishment of political institutions and practices, such as representative government, political parties or general elections. Important as these institutions and practices are, they are no guarantee for a stable and sustainable democratic society. Democracy can only be advanced if it is built upon a strong and active civil society. As Stephen Macedo (2000: 53) put it, ‘the foundations of democracy lie as much in civil society as in formal political institutions’. Thus, the establishment of civil society as a countervailing force vis-à-vis the state in postSuharto Indonesia is a challenge to those who want to develop a genuine democratic political system. Although it is clear that civil society is important for the long-term growth of democracy, the political reality in newly emerging democracies, like Indonesia, indicates that it is naïve to neglect altogether the two other independent variables of democratization: economic development and the quality of political leadership and governance. It is assumed that economic development, good governance and civil society are interlinked in such a way that each may be accomplished only with the successful implementation of the other two. In fact, in the current literature on democratization, scholars tend to combine the three elements in explaining political change towards democracy (Pye 2000: 21). The main purpose of this chapter is to explore and critically analyse the role of transnational networks of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the process of democratization in Indonesia. I argue that the emergence of civil society at the national level today can no longer be separated from the same phenomenon at the global level. Various transnational networks among NGOs have played important roles in the democratization of the Indonesian political system. This chapter examines the extent to which, and how, these networks have contributed to this democratization process, and the level of networking activities – national, regional and/or global.

150 Aleksius Jemadu There are several important reasons why the emergence of an active civil society may contribute to the establishment of a stable democracy in Indonesia. First, over 32 years under Suharto’s authoritarian rule the Indonesian polity was transformed into a monolithic and subdued society through the extensive practice of state corporatism by the ruling elite. Under the new regime, the weakened system of political authoritarianism and the gradual arrival of an era of political freedom should provide ample opportunities for Indonesian civil society to grow strong. This would be a case of domestic political opportunity structures becoming the first step towards a more vibrant grass-roots activism. Second, Indonesia is one of the most ethnically diverse societies in the world. The only way for such a society to maintain the political modalities of their peaceful coexistence is through the growth of democratic citizenship. Therefore, the state may not claim itself as the only locus of people’s allegiance. At the domestic level, a democratic state should respect multiple and overlapping commitments by its citizens to different political ideologies, religions, ethnic groups and languages. At the international level there is an urgent need to accept a more flexible understanding of citizenship, because its traditional and rigid link to a nation-state has turned out to be irrelevant in an increasingly globalized world. Rochelle Ball and Nicola Piper, for instance, propose the notion of ‘citizenship “from above” and “from below”’ when they emphasize the necessity for the protection of the rights of migrant workers by both their country of origin and by the government of the receiving country. They specifically underline the important role of local and international migrant workers’ NGOs in pressuring national and multilateral institutions so that the rights of the migrant workers might be formally acknowledged and legislated (Ball and Piper forthcoming). Many believe the existence of civil society organizations could strengthen the democratic tradition of tolerance and cooperativeness in society. The cosmopolitan world view of these organizations may lead to the growth of allegiances that overlap and are pluralistic, so that absolute loyalty to a particular group, which leads to blind fanaticism, might be avoided. It is the task of the state to create a conducive atmosphere in which associational life may develop as an essential component of democracy, without structural hindrance. The future of democracy in Indonesia cannot be separated from the parallel growth of political pluralism. Today, religious, ethnic and regional identities are reasserting themselves, with the effect that national unity is increasingly jeopardized. The promotion of political pluralism by all elements of civil society can be used as a social strategy to overcome the dilemma of democratization and nation-building, which is common in new democracies. Third, the transnational networks of NGOs could add pressure against any national government which infringes the civil and political rights of its citizens. These networks of global civil society can function to ensure that the universal core principles of democracy (popular control and political equality) are respected by all national governments. For instance, close cooperation between the national and international NGOs in monitoring free elections, human rights protection and good governance has become an essential part of transnational activism; this could strengthen democratization in Indonesia. So-called ‘democratization from below’,

Transnational activism in Indonesia 151 actively promoted by national and transnational NGOs, should constitute an essential part of democratization in Indonesia in terms of pressure ‘from the outside in’.

Global civil society – theoretical perspectives For believers in the realist view of international relations, the role of transnational actors such as NGOs is insignificant. Former President Suharto seemed to hold this view when implementing his foreign policy, during which the state and its formal agencies became the main actors to pursue national interests. In this era of reformasi,1 such views can no longer be maintained because no one can deny the role of international NGOs in promoting civil society with its cosmopolitan values. Those who emphasize the significance of interactions between individuals and groups transcending state boundaries envision the emergence of a global civil society comparable to that which exists at the national level. It remains to be seen how the current government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri will deal with the issue of civil society, given her seemingly conservative political outlook and close relationship with the military. An alternative to the realist way of thinking comes from the liberal-pluralist perspective. This perspective starts from a conceptual dichotomy between the state and civil society and holds that at the global level there exists an autonomous political sphere in which transnational linkages among various non-state actors evolve independently from interstate relations. With the domination of liberal principles in the global political economy today, many people in new democracies, like Indonesia, have adopted this view and feel optimistic about the rise of global civil society. The liberal-pluralist approach to global civil society contributes significantly to theoretical frameworks for the promotion of democracy internationally. Thus, the liberal-pluralist approach opens the door to a globalization of democratic theory. This perspective will help us to describe how different social and political groups in a democratic society articulate their interests. The third perspective comes from the critical theorists. While the liberal-pluralist approach tends to ignore the conflict dimension in civil society, the critical theorists of world politics focus their attention on the structural sources of inequality in global civil society.2 This chapter applies the thought of the critical theorists to critically assess contributions of the transnational networks of NGOs for establishing a more democratic international system, as viewed from the disadvantageous position of Indonesia as a peripheral country. The critical theorists’ view of civil society enables us to see clearly the ambiguity of developed countries in promoting the role of transnational networks of NGOs. On the one hand, they endorse the rise of global civil society, but on the other they reject the structural transformation of the global political economy, which has turned out to be biased against the interests of the majority poor in developing countries. The critical theory can also be used in evaluating the nature of the relationships between international NGOs and local NGOs. The dominant position of the former in terms of resources makes their relationships structurally unequal. Thus, the egalitarian image of the global civil society they are creating is more a matter of theoretical speculation than observable

152 Aleksius Jemadu practice. Like other organizations, international and national NGOs defend their existence, with the effect that NGOs become ends in themselves rather than instruments of the public to create a viable civil society at the national and global level.

The transnational component of NGO networks: actors and issues Before exploring the activities of transnational networks of NGOs, it is necessary to define these networks. By transnational networks of NGOs, I mean functional and complementary interactions of various international and national NGOs, which aim to accomplish common objectives. There are at least four crucial points in the analysis of cross-country civil society networks. First, we need to know the background and rationale of the networks. Second, the networks have long-term and short-term agendas designed to accomplish their goals and objectives. Included here are the strategies and tactics used by the networks in accomplishing their goals. Third, members of the networks should be identified. Finally, we need to assess the impact of the networks on local societies.3 For instance, to what extent do transnational networks of NGOs enhance the process of democratization in Indonesia? For the promotion of civil society, we should bear in mind that not all NGOs play a democracy-enhancing role. Some international and national NGOs choose to promote religious and ethnic exclusivism and advocate violence as their method of attaining goals. Christian and Muslim extremists, involved in religious violence in eastern Indonesia since 1999, are good examples of such NGOs (Hefner 2001: 8–10). In this chapter I shall only deal with the transnational networks of NGOs which choose deliberately to enhance democracy and civil society. These networks are concerned with a variety of issues related to the promotion of civil society at the national and international level. From the agendas and activities of these networks we may characterize them as being part of the emergence of global civil society (Lipschutz 1992). These networks are deeply involved in transnational activity. According to M.J. Peterson (1992: 381), three broad types of transnational activity exist among societal actors. The first is concerned with the linkages and networks among social groups or movements in different countries with similar or identical goals. For instance, transnational networks of NGOs promote free and fair elections in Asia in which various NGOs from Asian countries, including Indonesia, execute a joint project in order to achieve their common goals. The second type of transnational activity is conducted by a group which is initially established in one country, but then spreads its activities to other countries. For instance, Amnesty International has extensive cross-border activities in promoting human rights worldwide. The third type is a combined transnational undertaking of different groups in promoting some common purpose. For instance, human rights groups and environmental NGOs are involved in defending the basic rights of the indigenous people in Kalimantan and Papua. It will be shown that all three types of transnational activities are relevant to the Indonesian case study. At least three kinds of actors are relevant here: international NGOs, which have extensive activities and programmes in various countries, including Indonesia;

Transnational activism in Indonesia 153 national NGOs, who get funds from international NGOs, donor countries and international organizations; and popular movements with some sort of transnational activism through their collective activities in the networks. Transnational networks of NGOs emerge when two or more NGOs (sometimes together with donor countries and international organizations) combine their resources to implement programmes or activities through which they might achieve certain policy goals. Since the context of the activities of these networks is linked to the promotion of democracy, at both the national and international level, we may start from the 1999 election in which various international and national NGOs were actively involved from the early stage of voter education to the monitoring of the election and the evaluation of the election itself. The 1999 election was special in Indonesian political history because it was conducted in accordance with the universal standards of democratic elections. The elections, however, did not result in a practice of good governance. Corruption remained a huge problem and several Indonesian NGOs started to focus on good governance, often linking up with international NGOs working in this field. Another set of transnational networks is concerned with the promotion of human rights and the empowerment of civil society in general. Such networks of NGOs in Indonesia have been active since the early 1980s, but now, under the new government, they have more flexibility to act without substantial government restrictions. Although Indonesia has entered a new era of democratic government, the promotion of human rights of the citizens remains a large international concern, especially with the reactivation of the military approach in troubled regions like Aceh and Irian Jaya and the failure of the government to stop communal violence in Maluku and Kalimantan. Transnational networks of NGOs with human rights concerns also advocate the rights of disadvantaged groups in society and promote human rights education. Network activities also aim to strengthen the role of civil society by promoting good governance, press freedom, labour rights and gender issues. Yet another type of network is concerned with socio-economic development within the context of globalization, which has tended to be biased against the poor majority in developing countries, especially during the period of economic crisis beginning in 1997. NGOs involved in these types of networks are suspicious of the promises of free trade and market-oriented economic reform. They develop critical globalism,4 which tries to build social and economic defences against the prominence of mercantile interests in the process of globalization. Special attention will be given to agricultural development and agrarian reform, which have become the concern of many farmers in Asia’s rural areas. Analysis of these types of transnational networks is crucial because, compared to other types of networks, they are more concerned with democratic movements at the grass-roots level, especially in rural areas. Transnational networks of NGOs for socio-economic development also cover other issues, such as environmental protection, gender issues, the promotion of social and economic rights of indigenous peoples, poverty alleviation, micro-credits and development infrastructures.

154 Aleksius Jemadu

The importance of regional transnational networks of NGOs in the 1999 general election A main characteristic that makes the 1999 election quite different from previous elections in Indonesia was the extensive participation by international NGOs in preparations prior to the election and also in the monitoring and counting of votes. The presence and involvement of independent bodies in monitoring the election process has become a universal indicator of the quality of the electoral process. In the past, the Indonesian government hindered international NGOs from monitoring and supervising the electoral process. After the fall of Suharto, former President B.J. Habibie attempted to build his own reputation as the first democratic leader in Indonesia’s political history. Under Habibie’s government, Indonesia for the first time introduced democratic legislation through general elections; this gave greater flexibility to national and transnational civil society organizations to participate in the preparation and supervision of the election. A major network of NGOs to play a prominent role in the 1999 election in Indonesia was the Asian Monitoring Network (AMN), founded in 1997 by regional NGOs throughout Asia with a focus on election-related activities. In 1999 the AMN established a joint project combining the resources of three prominent NGOs, namely, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI),5 the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum–Asia) and the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL).6 This joint project was directly involved in the 1999 election. In February 1999 the AMN held a round-table discussion in Jakarta for the coordination of regional efforts to support democratic elections in Asia, including Indonesia’s upcoming election in June 1999. The rationale behind this network is the importance of promoting free and fair elections in Asia as countries in this region change to democracy. Members of this NGO network want elections to be conducted in accordance with universal standards and norms for such undertakings. The presence of international monitoring groups in the election process was meant to strengthen the legitimacy and acceptability of the election. For Indonesia, the 1999 election had a strategic meaning, as the event was seen as the country’s gateway to a more democratic future. In conducting its election supervision mission, ANFREL established a close cooperation with local NGOs, such as the Independent Committee for Free Election Monitoring (KIPP), the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), Asian Network for Democracy in Indonesia (ANDI)7 and the Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI). This network of transnational and local NGOs undertook various activities, the aim of which was to strengthen the capacity of local members in the process of democratization. The activities included sending monitoring missions to view the major phases of the election process, conducting training and seminars to help build the capacity of local NGOs, and undertaking the regional-level campaign to generate international support for the democratization process in Indonesia. During the 1999 election, Forum–Asia and ANFREL organized several activities in Indonesia in collaboration with their local network members. These activities included seminars on the role of journalists in elections, a voter registration

Transnational activism in Indonesia 155 observation mission, a campaign and election monitoring mission and post-election evaluation. The seminar participants included 15 journalists from Indonesia and six journalists from ANFREL. They shared experiences in the elections and then came up with concrete recommendations to improve the role of media in elections in the Asian region. The voter registration mission attempted to get firsthand information on the process of voter registration and to see if it enhanced free and fair election in Indonesia. Experienced monitors recorded the behaviour of voters, especially their willingness to register and their attitude towards the election. They also evaluated the level of freedom the people and political parties were allowed to participate in during the election process. Interviews with the National Election Committee (KPU), political party officials, election monitoring groups, media offices, local government heads and military officials were also conducted to give a comprehensive view of the election. On election day, 7 June 1999, 50–70 monitors were deployed to see how the people went to the ballot box and cast their votes. Finally, the international and local NGOs made a report on the nature of the post-election transition of power. NDI and the Carter Center (NDI’s international election observer) also developed a transnational network of its own and conducted an extensive range of activities related to the 1999 election. In addition to its joint action with ANFREL within AMN, NDI also established close cooperation and coordination with both international governmental institutions, such as the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Australian Election Commission, and international NGOs, including the International Republican Institute (IRI), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and the Asia Foundation. Like ANFREL and its local network of NGOs, the NDI/Carter Center was actually involved throughout the entire process of the election.8 In the conclusion of its post-election statement, made on 15 July 1999, the NDI/Carter Center underlined some important points about the election. The NDI/Carter Center was particularly impressed by the very high percentage of voter turnout and the enthusiasm of the Indonesian people for the election. In addition to its vigorous monitoring of all major phases of the electoral process, the Carter Center delegation (100 observers from 23 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, led by former US President Jimmy Carter) also met government officials and Indonesian civic leaders. Through the participation of the international NGOs in the election process and their dialogues with Indonesian government officials and civic leaders, the socialization and internalization of the universal standard norms of general elections took place. Such interaction surely gives significant contributions to the current movement towards the globalization of democratic ideas and practices. Another type of activism related to the Indonesian transition to democracy was led and coordinated by UNDP. While UNDP mobilized and pooled the financial resources from contributing Western donor countries and also selected funding proposals, the Indonesian NGOs were responsible for activities such as voter education, training and election-monitoring. Twenty-one Indonesian NGOs took part in the voter education programme, valued at US$ 4.2 million. The beneficiaries of this programme included women, first-time voters and journalists. The programme

156 Aleksius Jemadu used political dialogues, training, print materials and mass media to reach over 110 million Indonesians all over the country. The key messages of the programme included democracy and the role of elections, exercising one’s right to vote and the importance of participating in the democratic process, the current political situation, political party platforms and profiles, gender issues and women’s political rights/ civic education, voter information, voting behaviour, registration and the voting process, seat allocation, etc.

Indonesian NGOs and the issue of good governance To the disappointment of many people in Indonesia, the establishment of democratic institutions after the 1999 election has not satisfactorily led to the practice of good governance. Rampant corruption, collusion and nepotism (called KKN in Indonesia) remain an intractable problem both at the central and local levels. Big political parties which have now become the new power centres (as well as powerbrokers) tend to be more concerned with a seemingly endless struggle for power and wealth. Control over the management of lucrative state enterprises has become a new battlefield of competition between political parties who need financial resources in the lead-up to the 2004 election. In his analysis of the politics of economic liberalization in Indonesia, Andrew Rosser (2002) argued that political parties served as a mechanism for the distribution of patronage to their supporters. Thus, when President Megawati appointed Laksamana Sukardi from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) as the new State Minister for State-Owned Enterprises, politicians from other political parties saw it as an effort by the PDIP to increase its economic appropriation. The dominance of the political parties in new democracies like Indonesia may lead to the reductionism of politics into an oligarchy, especially when civil society groups have no adequate mechanisms to prevent it. Many also lament the fact that the implementation of law no. 22/1999 and law no. 25/1999 on regional autonomy and fiscal balance between central and local government has created new concerns over the growth of corruption practised by local government officials. The practice of money politics in the election of local government heads (regents and governors) and the scramble for development projects increased after the enactment of the two laws. No wonder international corruption watchers continue to rate Indonesia as a country with an extremely high level of corruption. Although the IMF and the World Bank emphasize the necessity of good governance in their loan negotiations with the Indonesian government, the participation of civil society organizations in ensuring the promotion of good governance needs to be endorsed and facilitated. The promotion of good governance should be at the top of the agenda for both the government and civil society in general. In fact, since the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in May 1998, and along with the greater openness of the new government, a growing number of Indonesian NGOs have focused specifically on the promotion of good governance. Many of them establish links with international NGOs with similar idealism. For instance, the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), Government Watch (GOWA), Transparency International–

Transnational activism in Indonesia 157 Indonesia9 and the International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INFID) have actively opened public discussions of many corruption cases. In September 1998, a host of NGOs, including ICW, Gema Madani, INFID, WALHI and AJI, just to name a few, signed a document called ‘A Pledge for Corruption-Free Indonesia’. The main message of this pledge was that the NGOs would promote honesty, transparency and integrity in society. They also pledged to encourage the public in controlling government bureaucracies so that they might become more accountable and responsive to the public interests. Extensive lobbies with international financial institutions and donor countries are regularly carried out by the NGOs in order to attract their attention to the record of the government in eliminating corruption practices. The activities of these NGOs in supervising the governing practices from below and the extensive transnational networks they have are expected to become a source of pressure for the Indonesian government leaders to practice good governance at all levels. In March 2000, UNDP, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched a programme called ‘Partnership to Support Governance Reform in Indonesia’. This programme aims at combining the resources of donor countries, the Indonesian government, the UNDP, the World Bank, the ADB and national and international NGOs10 to promote good governance. This programme’s main idea is that the establishment of democratic government in Indonesia should be followed by the practice of good governance at all levels. The Partnership will focus on areas such as: justice-sector reforms, regional autonomy, legislative empowerment, electoral reform, civil service reforms, improving corporate governance and civil society strengthening. Through the endorsement of strategic thinking and research on issues of governance, dialogue in seminars, workshops and conferences, sharing of best practices and dissemination of information, it is expected that the practice of good governance will take root within government bureaucracies. The participation of civil society in promoting the practice of good governance is expected to be of particular importance to ensure that the newly obtained autonomy of the regions will not lead to the growth of corruption at the regional level. The loosening of vertical supervision by the central government authorities can easily tempt local government officials to abuse their autonomy at the expense of the people in the regions. Therefore, many suggest that international and national NGOs target corruption cases at both the central level and the regional level. The fact that the promotion of regional autonomy has preceded the strengthening of local democracy increases alienation of the people in the regions from the process of governance.

The promotion of human rights and a strong civil society There are at least three important reasons why the issue of human rights became a serious concern among Indonesian NGOs after the election of President Megawati Soekarnoputri. First, as a president from the nationalist camp, Megawati has given priority to national stability and integrity. Before she came to power, the military leaders were impressed by her nationalistic views and now wonder if their representatives in the legislative bodies supported the impeachment of former

158 Aleksius Jemadu President Abdurrahman Wahid and the election of Megawati as the new president. The increasing presence of the Indonesian army in troubled regions like Aceh is seen by many as the reactivation of the security approach in overcoming separatist movements. Unfortunately, in many cases the presence of the military in the troubled regions only provokes a new cycle of violence. Some political analysts are also suspicious about Megawati’s endorsement of the revision of law no. 22/1999 on regional autonomy, which they see as a manifestation of the centralist nature of her government.11 Second, according to Forum–Asia, a regional NGO based in Bangkok, the emphasis on economic recovery and development in Asia is detrimental to the promotion of human rights in the region.12 In addition to the support from the military, the legitimacy of Megawati’s government also capitalizes on her success to recover the crisis-stricken economy. Third, the fact that Megawati is indebted to the military for its support in her ascendancy to the presidency could hinder her from being tough in the trial of the army generals who have violated human rights in the past. Some analysts even suggest the weakness of civilian Indonesian leaders has strengthened the bargaining position of the military. The transnational networks of human rights NGOs in Asia are currently focusing on 12 issues perceived as obstacles to the enjoyment of human rights. They include: armed conflict, refugees and internally displaced people, globalization, incomplete democratization, corruption, the lack of a well-developed civil society, national security laws, political instability, militarization, violations of the rights of women, environmental degradation and caste-based discrimination. For Indonesian human rights activists, armed conflicts and communal violence in the troubled regions of Aceh, Irian Jaya, Maluku, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and West Timor have particularly drawn their attention.13 In addition, through their global network, international human rights NGOs like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Forum– Asia continue to publish reports on the violations of human rights in those regions.14 The NGOs are really concerned with the fact that up until now the Indonesian government has failed to ensure effective law enforcement in Maluku and Sulawesi. The Indonesian government seems to realize that the old practices of demonizing the NGOs can only be counterproductive in the current era of democratization. Recently, the Parahyangan Centre for International Studies (PACIS), a research institute affiliated to the Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung, conducted a study on ‘Indonesian Foreign Policy in Dealing with the New International Interventionism’ and one of its recommendations suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs establish a special section for cooperation and partnership with NGOs in conducting global diplomacy for the restoration of Indonesia’s credibility abroad. As far as the Indonesian government is concerned, such an effort could be very useful in dealing with the phenomenon of the internationalization of the independence movements in Aceh and Papua.15 Former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas also recognized the importance of partnership with NGOs in promoting Indonesian human rights diplomacy, in making such diplomacy more credible and effective. With the support of their international counterparts, some Indonesian human rights NGOs, like YLBHI, PBHI, Kontras, YAPPIKA, WALHI and ELSAM, are exerting pressure on the Indonesian government to hold an honest and fair trial of the

Transnational activism in Indonesia 159 Indonesian military officers accused of crimes against humanity (either by commission or omission), especially after the referendum in East Timor. In their view, the practice of impunity can only be detrimental to the government’s efforts to restore the nation’s credibility in the eyes of the international community. The Indonesian NGOs’ resistance to the use of military methods and means to solve conflicts in Aceh and Papua has encouraged some of them to conduct a study to find peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution in those regions. YAPPIKA and its networks of local NGOs conducted such a study recently and presented the result to former President Abdurrahman Wahid as inputs for the government to open dialogues with the rebel groups. They also submitted their report to the Genevabased NGO the Henry Dunant Centre, which has functioned as a mediator in a series of negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).16 The increased bargaining position of the military in the current configuration of political power under President Megawati means that peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution in the troubled regions, recommended by the NGOs, are unlikely win over the military approach. Unresolved problems of human rights violations by the military in the past have made reconciliation between different political groups in Indonesia ever more difficult. Some Indonesian NGOs, under the coordination of YAPPIKA, have initiated a study of South Africa’s experience to help Indonesia set up its own Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In February and May 2000, for instance, a team went to South Africa and found that, despite historical and cultural differences, Indonesia could learn much from conflict resolution models attempted by NGOs there. The results of this comparative study have been used to help draft TRC law.17 Transnational networks of NGOs operating in Indonesia also play a significant role in promoting a free flow of information, freedom of expression and press freedom. Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), for instance, promotes these goals throughout the region. Claiming itself to be the first organization established specifically to campaign for genuine press freedom in Asia, SEAPA members include five independent journalistic organization in three countries: the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism from the Philippines, the Thai Journalist Association from Thailand and the Institute for Studies on Free Flow of Information (ISAI) and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) from Indonesia. As a regional network of NGOs, SEAPA has organized seminars, workshops, advocacy and publications to strengthen press freedom throughout Southeast Asia.18

Transnational development-oriented NGO networks and the challenges of economic globalization The economic crisis which has paralysed the Indonesian economy since July 1997 can be regarded as the price Indonesia has had to pay for its integration into the global capitalist market. While the intervention by the IMF and the World Bank tends to focus on their deal with the state, the grass-roots people are virtually left alone to cope with the long-term impact of the economic crisis and globalization.

160 Aleksius Jemadu Mutually beneficial cooperation between the state and the international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) may not necessarily promote the interests of grass-roots people. On the contrary, it may worsen their structural disempowerment. As the state tries to consolidate itself through economic recovery under the supervision of the IMF, there is a fear that the neo-liberal primary focus on economic growth might damage other economic objectives, such as the equal distribution of economic resources. Thus Indonesian labourers and farmers are among the most vulnerable groups, when government investment policies promote the interests of donor countries, foreign investors and large multinational companies. Investment policies biased against Indonesian labourers provoked the outbreak of violent demonstrations in May 2001 in several cities, especially Bandung, where demonstrators damaged government buildings and other public facilities. While many Indonesian NGOs are already involved in development programmes at the grass-roots level, of particular importance for our analysis here is the role of the NGOs with extensive lobbies and networks at the regional and international level. The main force behind international and global advocacy of grass-roots interests results from the realization that development policies are increasingly tied to interlocking political and economic processes at global, national and local levels (Held 1995). Many expect that international networks of NGOs can prevail against the dominant global structures of political economy. The most extensive regional network of NGOs working on social and economic development at the grass-roots level in Asia is AsiaDHRRA (the Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas). This regional partnership of 11 social development networks and organizations from ten Asian nations is composed of country DHRRAs from Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nepal, South Korea, Taiwan (ROC) and Japan. AsiaDHRRA was established in 1974 when 120 rural development workers and practitioners gathered in Swanganiwas, Thailand, to talk about challenges and responses to rural development. Since then, AsiaDHRRA has regularly held meetings and forums to strengthen the movement, and especially to face the impact of globalization on the social and economic conditions of people in rural areas. The vision and mission of AsiaDHRRA emphasize the importance of integral human development of Asian rural people and the need to talk about living conditions in order to strengthen freedom, responsibility and self-reliance. In March 2001 AsiaDHRRA held its General Assembly in Jakarta, where participants discussed such issues as the impact of globalization on the rural sector, solidarity among Asia’s independent farmers’ organizations and matters related to network sustainability. AsiaDHRRA represents an international network that promotes community-tocommunity networks by enhancing participatory methods to encourage civil society in rural areas. For instance, part of AsiaDHRRA’s efforts in 1999–2000 strengthened alternative grass-roots initiatives through networking and capability-building. Indonesia and Vietnam benefited from this programme. Also, AsiaDHRRA conducted the Asian Farmers’ Exchange Programme, to provide a place for Asian farmers’ leaders to strengthen their advocacy role on the regional and global stage.

Transnational activism in Indonesia 161 In July 2000, 36 farmers’ leaders and NGO workers from ten Asian countries – Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam – made an exchange visit to the Philippines, where the participants studied and discussed the experiences of their Filipino counterparts in dealing with issues such as community organization, network formation and advocacy for agrarian reform and rural development.19 The Indonesian member of AsiaDHRRA is the Bina Desa Secretariat, or InDHRRA (Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas). InDHRRA has links with local NGOs and international NGOs other than AsiaDHRRA, such as Misereor (Germany), ANGOC (Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development), IIRR (International Institute for Rural Reconstruction) and PACT (People Acting Together). InDHRRA’s main activities include rural community organizing, developing the economy of rural people, training and education for rural communities, advocacy and network development, conducting research, and publication and information dissemination. InDHRRA has led other NGOs in conducting advocacy for agrarian reform in Indonesia. They held meetings with members of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR), and handed over the proposed draft of the agrarian law.20

Reaction from the state The presence of transnational networks of NGOs through different activities may not necessarily lead us to believe that they have a strong effect upon democratization in Indonesia. The state and its agencies are not simply passive recipients of external pressures, especially when it comes to the issue of power redistribution as a normal outcome people might expect from the process of democratization. An analysis of state power and how it is used should not be neglected when trying to assess the impact of transnational networks of NGOs upon the democratization process in the newly emerging democracies. As Jean Grugel correctly suggests, ‘Activism, whether transnational or national, requires engagements with states to bring about change, especially when the activism aims to promote eminently political tasks such as deepening democracy or furthering human rights’ (Grugel, this volume, page 26). In striving for democracy, one must also recognize that political society (consisting of ‘political parties and others actively engaged in seeking to control the state’)21 might function as a serious obstacle to efforts by civil society groups to affect state policies. For instance, transnational networks of NGOs failed to prevent some political parties from misusing public funds during the 1999 election campaigns. According to former President Abdurrahman Wahid, major political parties misallocated non-budgetary funds controlled by the State Logistics Body (BULOG). Although it is difficult to find evidence for such an allegation, the current trial of the Chairman of Golkar, Akbar Tanjung, over the BULOG scandal might be just the beginning of the disclosures. Clearly, the transnational networks of NGOs could do very little to cleanse the Indonesian electoral system of various forms of corruption. The amendment of the 1945 constitution is also a key element of the process of

162 Aleksius Jemadu democratization in Indonesia. The current constitution is not suitable as a reliable legal framework within which a democratic state can be built. Its support of a strong executive and the ambiguity of its articles can easily be manipulated by those in power. The political parties and a coalition of NGOs specifically formed to deal with this issue have different approaches in tackling the constitutional amendment. The NGO activists argue that an independent constitutional commission should be established so that civil society elements have equal access to the process of establishing a new constitution. The political parties, however, insist that amending the constitution remains the prerogative of the legislative members of the MPR. As Indonesia’s political parties now prepare for the 2004 election, people fear that such a fundamental issue as the constitutional amendment might become too politicized, thus dampening the aspirations of civil society groups. Indonesian NGOs and their international counterparts want to achieve at least two important goals in promoting human rights: the open trial of army generals who were involved in gross violations of human rights in East Timor, Tanjung Priok, Aceh and Papua, and the use of open dialogue with the rebel groups in Aceh and Papua. However, human rights activists now raise questions regarding the seriousness of the Indonesian government in conducting a human rights tribunal. Delays of the trial and lack of transparency in the appointment of ad hoc judges are seen as the outcome of political bargaining between President Megawati and the military elite. In fact, the US State Department expressed its disappointment with the result of Indonesia’s Human Rights Tribunal through a statement released to the public on 19 August 2002. The statement says: ‘Without commenting on the specific verdicts, which are subject to appeal, the United States is nevertheless disappointed that prosecutors in these cases did not fully use the resources and evidence available to them from the United Nations and elsewhere in documenting the atrocities that occurred in East Timor’.22 According to Munir, a well-known human rights activist, impunity remains a serious obstacle in the current practice of human rights tribunals in Indonesia. He says: ‘The establishment of human rights tribunals with the right to investigate serious human rights crimes is still fraught with problems. Apart from obvious weaknesses in terms of law, and the law enforcement apparatus (judges, National Commission on Human Rights and prosecutors), and the lack of control over the legal process, the existence of human rights tribunals lies in political hands, in particular the military and the political parties’ (Munir 2002). Prior to the signing of The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM on 9 December 2002 in Geneva, ample evidence showed that the Indonesian military had intensified its use of the military approach in Aceh. It remains to be seen how this agreement can be implemented so that a lasting peace might be established in Aceh. However, once the two sides fail to implement the agreement, it is very likely that the Indonesian army will revert to military force in order to subdue the rebel groups. At the national level, the indispensability of the military in cracking down on terrorist groups may only strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis Indonesian civilian leaders. According to a report made by the International Crisis Group (ICG) on the impact of the Bali bombings, the Indonesian army could benefit in four ways:

Transnational activism in Indonesia 163 an increased role in internal security, necessary consolidation of the territorial command structure, increased military expenditure and the necessity for military backing for any particular candidate for national leader.23 The abolition of the so-called odious debts made during Suharto’s era has also been a campaign led by the Indonesian development NGOs, especially INFID and its international partners. INFID activists have conducted extensive lobbies to donor countries asking them to abolish at least part of the Indonesian foreign debt accrued under Suharto’s regime. They argue that it is unfair to ask the Indonesian people to pay the debt which was actually used to perpetuate Suharto’s power. Apparently, the Indonesian government preferred to demand the rescheduling of the foreign debt instead of supporting INFID’s proposal. Commenting on the results of Paris Club III on Indonesia, INFID argued that the Paris Club failed to produce a fair and comprehensive solution to the Indonesian debt problem.24 At the same time, the Indonesian government continued to submit to the will of the donor countries, which seek to perpetuate Indonesia’s dependence upon their financial assistance. The government seemed to avoid conflict with the international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) and the creditors whose supporting role is essential for building government’s performance legitimacy through a successful economic recovery.

Conclusion It is apparent that transnational networks of NGOs, as part of the global civil society movement, have been active and continue to influence and shape the democratization of Indonesia’s political system. In addition, NGOs have been increasingly important in promoting democratization and human rights at the regional level. For instance, human rights NGOs in Southeast Asia have protested against human rights violations in Aceh and Papua. The activities of the networks cover a broad range of issues, such as free elections, voter education, good governance, human rights, press freedom, the environment, gender, poverty alleviation and globalization. This chapter has extensively explored the scope and actions of regional networks on these various issues. The involvement of international NGOs and their Indonesian counterparts in the entire process of the 1999 election indicated that individual nation-states must accept the reality of a transnational co-production of democracy, led by the transnational civil society organizations. In addition, the transnational networks of NGOs and the multiple issues they address have produced some elements of global civil society in Indonesia. They are the architects of the transnational public sphere, in which contestation of discourses on international development may give some hope for a more democratic global political economy (Dryzek 2000: 130). However, some critical points need to be made here. First, although the facilitating role of the transnational networks of NGOs is necessary in the process of democratization, it is by no means sufficient in establishing a genuine civil society as the social foundation of a stable democracy. On top of that, these networks have failed to prevent the politicians and the military from transforming the process of democratization into an endless game of bureaucratic bargaining. No wonder the

164 Aleksius Jemadu Thirteenth INFID Conference and First General Assembly Meeting in Yogyakarta, 29 September – 2 October 2002, concluded that Indonesia remains under the yoke of inequality, poverty and impunity25 more than four years after the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. This might be common in newly emerging democracies where those who ousted the previous authoritarian rule open up opportunities for competing political groups to control the state. Second, for newly emerging democracies there is a need to assess critically the nature of relationships between the national NGOs and their international counterparts. Is the relationship perceived and worked out on the basis of egalitarianism, or does it reflect asymmetry of power between the donors and recipients of financial aid? In addition, people question whether Indonesian NGOs can sustain themselves in the absence of financial support from donor countries and Northern NGOs. Third, like other organizations, Indonesian NGOs naturally tend to perpetuate and enlarge their operations, with the effect that they become isolated from their grass-roots constituents. Maria Pakpahan, Executive Director of Tjoet Njak Dien, an NGO based in Yogyakarta, suggested that Indonesian NGOs should let their client groups become autonomous and self-reliant instead of sticking to their own vested interests (Modina 1999: 14). Fourth, the long-term growth of democracy in an ethnically diverse society like Indonesia will depend on the success of the promotion of democratic citizenship, in which tolerance and mutual trust serve as a basis of relationships between different religious and ethnic groups. The transnational networks of NGOs should not only deal with the function of formal political structures but also the promotion of democratic citizenship in a multicultural society. After all, the future of democracy in Indonesia will be determined by a synergy of civil society and formal political structures that mutually reinforce the democratic dispositions of both (Hefner 2001: 47). Because globalization and democratization have not changed the basic characteristics of Indonesian polity, such as aliran politics (based on the politicization of the religious–cultural divisions) (Drakeley 2001: 102), it is urgent that international and national NGOs also focus on the enhancement of civic education based on an egalitarian multiculturalism. Finally, transnational networks of NGOs working for global democracy should focus their attention not only on the domestic constraints of democracy but also on the global ones, which are so embedded in the hegemony of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. As long as Western nations continue to maintain the ambiguity of strengthening the power of those global institutions on the one hand, while promoting global civil society on the other, the ideals of global democracy will remain an illusion.

Notes 1 Reformasi is an Indonesian word for ‘reform’. The word reformasi is popularly used to indicate a new democratic era in Indonesian political history. 2 For a good comparison between these contending theories see MacDonald (1994). 3 Personal communication with Don Marut, coordinator of the civil society network called SEACA (South East Asian Committee for Advocacy) based in Bangkok. 4 Roberto Papini, Antonio Pavan and Stefano Zamagni introduce three main lines of thought that are current in reflections about globalization. They include realistic globalism, which

Transnational activism in Indonesia 165

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12 13

14

15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

recognizes the primary role of the market in regulating the economy and securing social unity; critical globalism which criticizes and rejects the prominent role of mercantile interests in the process of globalization; and reformist globalization, which sees both opportunities and difficulties inherent in globalization trends. (See Papini et al. 1999: 2–3). NDI, an American-based civil society organization, defines itself as ‘a non-profit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide’. It seeks to promote citizen participation and openness and accountability in government. NDI has conducted democratic development programmes in more than 100 countries throughout the world. See http://www.ndi.org. Accessed on 25 July 2001. ANFREL, a special project of Forum–Asia, was founded in 1997. Its areas of activities include the training of monitors/volunteers and the training of trainers, monitoring elections and information dissemination. See http://www.forumasia.org/projects.html. Accessed on 25 July 2001. ANDI is a network of NGOs in Southeast Asia which aims at working on more strategic objectives for democratization in Indonesia, in a broader and more vigorous manner, with a secretariat based in Jakarta and at the Forum–Asia office in Bangkok. The NDI/Carter Center’s mandate consisted of three parts: the pre-election period (including a critical examination of the Indonesian legal framework for the election, the conduct of the election campaign and related developments; election day (the voting and counting processes); the tabulation of results to date and post-election political developments. Transparency International, with national chapters in 77 countries, including Indonesia, conducts various activities which include: building national integrity systems, creating an international framework against corruption, establishing business principles for countering bribery, the TI Integrity Pact, etc. The transnational NGOs include International IDEA, Transparency International, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the Ford Foundation, the Carter Center/National Democratic Institute and German foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and the Frederich Ebert Stiftung (FES). See Laode Ida (2001). The Jakarta Post, Saturday, 24 August 2001, p. 14. Coalitions of NGOs for Aceh and Papua are the most active in defending and advocating the human rights of the people in the two regions. The two have extensive links with other national and international NGOs. For instance, Human Rights Watch has created a special home page titled: ‘Indonesia: Transition and Regional Conflict’, in which all rights-related news from Aceh, Papua, Maluku and West Timor is made known to the international public. Parahyangan Centre for International Studies (PACIS) and Research and Development Agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001). YAPPIKA has published several books on Aceh and Papua. See http://www.yappika.org. Accessed on 25 July 2001. This information was obtained in an interview with Ms Abdi Suryaningati, Executive Director of YAPPIKA in Jakarta, 1 August 2001. See also YAPPIKA (2000). Ibid. See http://www.seapa.org.activities.html. Accessed on 8 August 2001. See AsiaDHRRA (1999). Also http://www.asiadhrra.org. Accessed on 21 August 2001. Bina Desa Secretariat/InDHRRA (2000). This information is also based on an interview with Ms. Dwi Astuti, Executive Director of InDHRRA in Jakarta, 1 August 2001. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, quoted in Peterson (1992: 381). See http://www.usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p. Accessed on 22 August 2002. International Crisis Group (2002: 3–4). ‘INFID (2002) and http://infid.or.id.temp.client.org/wm/wmview.php?ArtID=186. Accessed on 10 October 2002.

166 Aleksius Jemadu 25 See INFID’s statement of the Thirteenth INFID Conference and First General Assembly held in Yogyakarta, 29 September – 2 October 2002, ‘Inequality, Poverty and Impunity: The Challenges for Indonesia in the Era of Democratization and Globalization’.

References AsiaDHRRA (1999) Casting Circles for a Free, Just, Responsible and Self-Reliant Rural Asia, Jakarta: AsiaDHRRA. Ball, R. and Piper, N. (forthcoming) ‘Globalisation and Regulation of Citizenship – Filipino Migrant Workers in Japan’, Political Geography. Beetham, D. (1999) Democracy and Human Rights, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bina Desa Secretariat/InDHRRA (2000) 1999 Annual Report, Jakarta. Drakeley, S. (2001) ‘Globalization and the Persistence of National Political Patterns: The Indonesian Case’, in R. Starrs (ed.) Asian Nationalism in an Age of Globalization, Richmond: Japan Library (Curzon Press), pp. 96–105. Dryzek, J.S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hefner, R.W. (2001) ‘Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia’, in R.W. Hefner (ed.) The Politics of Multiculturalism, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 1–58. Held, D. (1995) Cosmopolitan Democracy: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. Laode Ida (2001) ‘Prospek Kelabu Demokrasi dan Otonomi Daerah’ [The Gloomy Prospect of Regional Autonomy], Kompas, 29 August. INFID (2002) INFID Press Release on the Results of Paris Club III on Indonesia, 13 April 2002, Jakarta. International Crisis Group (2002) Impact of the Bali Bombings, 24 October 2002, Jakarta/ Brussels. Lipschutz, R.D. (1992) ‘Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21: 389–420. Macdonald, L. (1994) ‘Globalising Civil Society: Interpreting International NGOs in Central America’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23: 267–85. Macedo, S. (2000) ‘Transitions to What? The Social Foundations of the Democratic Citizenship’, in J.S. Hollifield and C. Jillson (eds) Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, London: Routledge. Modina, R. (1999) Democratising Development: Civil Society Advocacy in South East Asia, Manila: Catholic Institute for International Relations. Munir (2002) ‘Indonesian Civil Society Strategy for Ending Impunity’, paper presented at the 13th INFID Conference and 1st General Assembly Meeting, Yogyakarta, 29 September – 2 October 2002. Papini, R., Pavan, Antonio and Zamagni, Stefano (eds) (1999) Living in the Global Society, Aldershot: Ashgate. Parahyangan Centre for International Studies (PACIS) and Research and Development Agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001) ‘Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Menghadapi Kecenderungan New International Interventionism’ [Indonesian Foreign Policy in Dealing with the Trend of New International Interventionism], Research Report, Bandung. Peterson, M.J. (1992) ‘Transnational Activity, International Society and World Politics’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21: 381–90.

Transnational activism in Indonesia 167 Pye, L.W. (2000) ‘Democracy and its Enemies’, in J.S. Hollifield and C. Jillson (eds) Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, London: Routledge. Rosser, A. (2002) The Politics of Economic Liberalization in Indonesia, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. YAPPIKA (2000) Annual Report 1999–2000, YAPPIKA: Jakarta.

Websites http://infid.or.id.temp.client.org/wm/wmview.php?ArtID=186 http://www.asiadhrra.org http://www.forumasia.org/projects.html http://www.ndi.org http://www.seapa.org.activities.html http://www.usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p http://www.yappika.org

10 ‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents Transnational activism as a critique1 Shu-fen Lin

Introduction The notions of the ‘Taiwan Miracle’ and the ‘Taiwan Experience’ that initially referred to economic performance, have, since the early 1990s, become associated with the much acclaimed ‘Quiet Revolution’, propagating the Kuomintang (KMT) regime’s adaptability and sustainability, and, above all, the relatively peaceful process of political transformation (Gold 1986; Cooper 1988; Hu 1994; Lee 1995, 1996). From the outset, in tandem with a flurry of social protests, when the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was founded in 1986 in defiance of martial law, a sense of uncertainty about possible reactions from the authoritarian party-state and the ensuing direction of political change beset society. However, when the first direct presidential election took place in March 1996, many political observers, from home and abroad, celebrated the fact that the election ‘marked the end of democratic transition’ (Higley et al. 1998), ‘democracy is taking hold in Taiwan’, and Taiwan has entered the stage of ‘democratic consolidation’ (Cooper 1995; Hood 1997; Chao and Myers 1998). Moreover, the DPP’s victory in the presidential election in March 2000 was alleged to be another decisive step in democratic consolidation since the KMT, after its rule in Taiwan for more than five decades, was replaced. Apparently the prevailing discourse of democratization in Taiwan has endorsed Huntington’s model (Huntington 1991: 7) with an exclusive focus on formal political institutions and electoral democracy (Alvarez et al. 1998: 13). While this formulation continues to reign supreme both in academic and political discourses, it has attracted increased criticisms. Daniel Levine, for instance, contends that the formulation disregards the role of average people or non-elites as if they were not involved in the political process, or passively agreed to any outcome of the political transformation (Levine 1988: 385). In a similar vein, Laurence Whitehead complains that the current comparative work on democratization has ‘contributed to the empowerment of certain types of actor and the disempowerment of others’, which may lead to the legitimation of a new hegemonic discourse. He points out that there has been a critical counter-current of studies on democratization which focus more on societal democratization than institutional reform (Whitehead 1996). In the Taiwanese

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 169 context, this counter-current can be found in studies on the history and sociopolitical role of social movements and their contribution to political transformation (Wu, 1989; Chang 1994). Yet these studies remain mostly confined to the delineation of local social movements, or to the debate on the relationship between civil society and the state (Hsiao et al. 1989; Wang 1989, 1991). Based on the ‘state versus society topology within a territorially bounded entity’ (Cheah 1999: 27), the profound impact of accelerated globalization and transnational activities on democracy remains uninvestigated territory. In an effort to fill the gap, this chapter aims to explore the ongoing political transformation in Taiwan with a specific focus on the human rights movement, the growing tendency to transnationalize activism, and the impact of such transnationalization on the formation of the democratic imaginary.2 It begins with reformulating the framework of ‘political opportunity structure’ by drawing on discourse theory which accords due importance to values, norms and identities of social movements. It then traces the way in which the human rights movement has been imbricated with the opposition movement, and positions it in the context of political transformation. Following this, it investigates the discursive dynamics of the human rights movement at the present historical conjuncture, featuring, firstly, the local NGOs’ endeavours to promote human rights norms and instruments, and to build a connection with transnational networks; and, secondly, the incorporation of human rights into the government’s diplomatic discourse. Finally, it offers some reflections on this development and its implications for further democratization.

The political opportunity structure revisited One of the typical accounts of the interrelation between regime transformation, the rise of various types of protest and the emergence of the social movement sector3 in Taiwan since the mid-1980s is offered by Chang Mau-kuei. Chang argues that the wave of social movements arising in Taiwan after the mid-1980s came about as a result of the destabilization of the KMT regime. According to this account, the KMT’s waning ability to suppress oppositional forces was reflected in the unprecedented outburst of protests and movements organized by subordinated and marginalized social groups, which was inconceivable before the lifting of martial law (Chang 1994: 42). Chang notes that, Without an authoritarian regime in transformation, the current wave of [social] movements would not emerge. Without political struggles within political institutions, there would be no need to create political opportunities from outside, nor the necessity of political mobilization directed towards local districts. Without political mobilization, so-called ‘civil society’ (or to be more precise, the ‘popular sectors’) would not come into being. Therefore, the current wave of social movements in Taiwan will not ebb away before the crises of the regime come to an end. (ibid.: 108, italics added)

170 Shu-fen Lin The central thrust of Chang’s account is that the wave of social protests was triggered by marginalized political elites who sought support from various subordinated social groups. These groups had been either de-politicized or considered as politically irrelevant when the KMT regime was still able to maintain a hegemonic order. However, when the regime became overridden with internal splits and began to crumble, these groups were easily mobilized. According to Chang, the elites’ attempt to accumulate resources, and excluded social groups’ need to empower themselves by cooperating with those with resources, have given rise to social movements after the mid-1980s. For instance, as far as the women’s movement is concerned, Chang contends that although the investment of and negotiation for political resources was not so evident as in the case of labour and farmers’ movements, the women’s movement substantially enhanced its ability to mobilize support, disseminate ideas, and proliferate issues alongside the emerging political openings after 1986 (ibid.: 67). Chang’s analysis, which focuses on the stability of the elite alignment and the accessibility of resources, is inspired by the resource mobilization model (RM) and the concept of political opportunity structure (POS). While POS has been frequently employed to study the structural factors which facilitate or impede social movements, I contend that the plausibility of the concept of POS is tainted by its entanglement in the structure/agent dichotomy, and the lack of the dimension of meaning and identity in the analysis of social movements. Moreover, most POSinspired studies of Taiwan’s social movements have tended to neglect the influence of transnational activism. To overcome these theoretical deficiencies, I propose to reformulate the theoretical framework of POS. The political The use of the concept of POS can be traced back to Peter Eisinger’s research which defines political opportunity structure as ‘the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system’ (Eisinger 1973; McAdam 1996: 23). As it evolved, according to Doug McAdam, the concept of POS has been applied indistinguishably to denote the institutional dimension and the systemic crises that ‘render the existing regime weak and vulnerable to challenge from virtually any quarter’ (McAdam 1996: 24). Consequently, ‘[a]ny environmental factor that facilitated movement activity was apt to be conceptualized as a political opportunity’ (ibid.: 25). McAdam contends that one of the repercussions of this theoretical development is that while an all-encompassing concept may have enabled researchers to incorporate as many factors as possible, it nevertheless lacks analytical precision and distinctiveness (ibid.: 26). Echoing McAdam, Gamson and Meyer claim that ‘the concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment – political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy shifts’ (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275). To avoid these conceptual flaws, McAdam suggests that ‘political opportunities’ should be conceptualized in a more specific manner so that they can be distinguished

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 171 from other ‘facilitative conditions’. He identifies four dimensions of POS: (i) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (ii) the stability of or instability of that broad set of elite alignments; (iii) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (iv) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996: 27). In this formulation, the ‘political’ is a synonym for the terrain of formal institutional politics occupied by the elite. This view, which echoes mainstream democratization theory, is not embraced without reservation by social movement theorists. Sidney Tarrow for instance, defines POS as ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure’ (Tarrow 1994: 85). Although Tarrow similarly associates the concept of POS with the accessibility to political participation, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites, his definition allows for more flexibility as far as ‘political participation’ and ‘politics’ are concerned (ibid.: 86). The feminist scholar Vicky Randall also contends that the mainstream concept of POS (especially McAdam’s version) ‘tends to accept and even reify the very demarcation of a distinct public political sphere that social movements like feminism have sought to contest’ (Randall 1998: 194). She argues that when considering women’s political participation, we have to ‘keep in view all arenas of women’s political intervention or resistance, whether in mainstream political institutions, in “civil society” or the home’. Moreover, Randall suggests that the economic restructuring (e.g. structural adjustment project) in many newly developing countries, for instance, has affected tremendously women’s lives and their political participation (ibid.: 194). In brief, the essence of Randall’s contention is not that one should shift attention away from investigating the overall impacts generated by the change in the narrowly defined political environment. Instead, she suggests that it is necessary to think and do politics beyond the confines of formal political institutions which are commonly associated with political parties, elections and governmental representative organs. Moreover, she points to the over-determination of political, economic and cultural factors, and the complexity of issues with which the women’s movement – and social movements in general – should deal (ibid.: 195). In other words, instead of confining the field of ‘the political’ to institutional politics, I propose to re-define ‘the political’ as the field of social antagonism, which requires constant reactivation of sedimentary social practices, and therefore the zone of engagement is open to articulation, dis-articulation and re-articulation. Articulation and the discursive Insofar as the nature of interaction between social movements and the external opportunity structures is concerned, Tarrow holds a more dynamic view. He argues that, opportunity structure applies not only to the formation of movement. Movements create opportunities for themselves or others. They do this by diffusing collective action through social networks and by forming coalitions of social

172 Shu-fen Lin actors; by creating political space for kindred movements and countermovements; and by creating incentives for elites to respond. (Tarrow 1994: 82) In other words, social movement organizations (SMOs) do not simply respond passively to the available opportunities. Instead, SMOs shape and create POS. In an article published earlier, Tarrow has pointed out that one of the major problems of the concept of POS is that it is unclear whether POS is construed as a set of objective or subjective factors. He argues that if the objective dimension of opportunities is emphasized, it is possible to concentrate research on the level of ‘aggregate correlations between opportunities and actions’. However, if the subjective perception of opportunities is crucial, it becomes necessary to investigate the perceptions of movement participants and the decision-making process (Tarrow 1988: 430). In his revised edition of Power in Movements, Tarrow seems to settle on a definition which highlights the relevance of ‘elements of opportunity that are perceived by insurgents’. Moreover, he adds that ‘structural changes that are not experienced can hardly be expected to affect people’s behavior, except indirectly’ (Tarrow 1998: 77, my emphasis). In other words, the dynamic interaction between social movement groups and POS does not only refer to the fact that SMOs which interact with the present POS have the potential to shape the future POS for other social movements, it also brings to the fore a more fundamental aspect of their interaction, i.e. whether and how, in the first instance, an SMO experiences structural changes and articulates new discursive practices corresponding to those changes. This echoes my contention that a more plausible application of the concept of POS is to conceive of the interaction between POS and social movements as a dynamic interplay between articulation and the discursive. Articulation here denotes ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’. ‘The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice’ is discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105). Following this, the discursive is to be defined as a horizon of intelligibility within which ‘the being of the object is constituted’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 3). Noteworthy here is that where articulation applies, the link is contingent: if there exists any immanent or necessary link between elements, articulation becomes redundant. In other words, ‘[t]hese practices are possible because systems of meaning are contingent and can never completely exhaust a field of meaning’ (ibid.). This brings out the antagonistic and political dimension of articulatory practices. Precisely because all articulations are contingent and it is impossibile to exhaust the field of meaning, the construction of meaning and identities involves a process of drawing frontiers and the exercise of power. Although social movements are undoubtedly subject to structural constraints, the way in which movement activists locate themselves vis-à-vis political institutions and decision-making processes render a context intelligible.4 In discourse-theoretical terms, although the existing discursive horizon limits the ‘discursive availability’, social movements are not, in a strict sense, determined by it. Instead, it is precisely because a given structure fails to provide the meaning or subject position with which social actors identify

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 173 themselves, that social actors are required to construct a new identity or a new subject position (Laclau: 1990: 44). Surely, much depends on the extent to which the existing structure is dislocated. Some social movements manage to traverse the existing discursive horizon and act as ‘founders of discursivity’ (Foucault 1984: 114), which in turn grants intelligibility and validity to contending discourses.5 This echoes, seemingly, the recent ‘normative turn’ in the study of transnational activism, where norms are defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996: 5). Just as John Dryzek points out, it has become increasingly possible to reflect on the discourses of democracy, therefore distinguishing more progressive discourses from others (Dryzek 1999: 35). According to Dryzek, this tendency also corresponds to the recent thinking which contends that ‘the essence of democratic legitimacy is to be found not in voting or representation of persons or interests, but rather in deliberation’(ibid.: 44). With the emphasis on procedural democracy and interactions between actors, Dryzek optimistically claims the possibility of having ‘democracy without boundaries’ (ibid.). Although from the perspective that discourse should be given centrality in the analysis, my approach seems to share some common ground with Dryzek’s, we nevertheless contend that one has to be more cautious with this ‘normative turn’. Instead of postulating an autonomous status to norms and values,6 when dealing with the interconnection between domestic and transnational activisms and the way in which it relates to democratization, one needs to explore: 1

2 3 4

the conditions of possibility for the emergence of contentious discourses i.e. the zones of engagement or the range of discursive contestability available to and created by the interaction between different types of actor at various levels; the articulating principles of contesting discourses; the dissemination, sedimentation and transformation of discourses; the impact of the configuration of competing discourses on the construction of the ‘democratic imaginary’.

Transnationalism Drawing our attention to the significance of ‘bringing transnational relations back in’ to the studies of international politics, Risse-Kappen points out that transnational relations have permeated almost every issue area of world politics (Risse-Kappen 1995). Moreover, recent studies have also indicated that the diffusion of international norms and principled ideas such as human rights have indeed affected domestic change (Risse-Kappen 1994; Katzenstein 1996; Risse et al. 1999). For instance, Risse and Sikkink (1999: 5) point out that many case studies have shown that the transnational advocacy networks (TANs)7 indeed serve to ‘put normviolating states on the international agenda’, to ‘empower and legitimate the claims of domestic opposition groups’, and to ‘challenge norm-violating governments by creating a transnational structure pressuring such regime from above and from below’. They postulate the ‘spiral model’ – beyond the old realist/non-realist debate – to incorporate the international–transnational interactions between different types

174 Shu-fen Lin of actor, the domestic society in the norm-violating state, the links between the societal opposition and the transnational networks; and the national government of the norm-violating state into their analysis (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 17–18). In other words, while retaining the relevance of states, states will no longer be considered either as unitary actors or the single most important actors in international politics (Tarrow 2001: 4). Thus, if one locates my previous discussion on POS in the context of growing transnational activism, one will have to consider transnational actors such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), TANs, and their interaction with domestic actors and institutions as an integral part of POS. In so doing, I also challenge the ‘civil society vs. state’ topography which has been based on the framework of the traditional sovereign nation-state. In short, through the analysis of the discursive formation of norms and values, one examines how the ‘entanglements of power’ arise, operate and generate effects (Sharp et al. 2000: 21). Significantly, the terrain where the lines of forces operate is no longer confined to national boundaries. Based on this and for the purpose of this chapter, it is to the delineation of different configurations of human rights discourses in Taiwan since the 1970s that I now turn.

The human rights movement, the opposition, and political transformation The organic crises and the emergence of competing discourses In the 1970s the KMT regime faced a series of devastating diplomatic setbacks,8 which reflected the shift in the China policy of the United States and the changing climate of international politics. Noting that the Carter administration was speeding up the pace of establishing full diplomatic relations with the PRC,9 the then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo initiated a ‘Human Rights Year’ on 25 December 1976 directed at Washington policy-makers. While Chiang claimed that it was necessary to maintain social order under the communist threat, he insisted that human rights conditions had been substantially improved (McBeath 1978: 20). In the meantime, an organized political opposition came into being. During the local elections of 1977, independent non-KMT candidates established an alliance called Tangwai. It is important to note that the social and political forces that gathered together to form Tangwai were far from a cohesive entity, and this manifested itself most clearly in the diverse demands stated in the manifesto. One may note that the manifesto covered not only political and civil rights, but also social and economic rights (Li 1988: 128–9). Given the diversity and heterogeneity of its demands, as subsequent political development indicated, political and civil rights were usually prioritized over economic and social rights. As a result, the opposition movement was increasingly reduced to a ‘political’ movement in the narrow sense of the term. This, as shall be discussed later, had a profound, and indeed negative, influence on the construction of a social imaginary of democracy in the process of political transformation. Nevertheless, the late 1970s witnessed the resurgence of human rights discourses after a long period of political inertia.

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 175 As the Tangwai continued to develop momentum, Taiwan suffered a further diplomatic setback – the US Carter administration’s withdrawal of diplomatic recognition. In response, the KMT sought tighter political controls under the banner of national solidarity and security. Yet the cancellation of the elections and the tense political atmosphere did not curtail the expansion of the Tangwai movement. The political development in the 1970s manifested clearly that the original conjunctural crisis was transformed into an incurable structural dislocation. Although the ‘political forces which [were] struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself, making every effort to cure them, and within certain limits, to overcome them’, a more fundamental restructuring of the state was required (Gramsci 1971: 178). This structural dislocation opened the discursive space up to allow contentious discourses to emerge and eventually compete for the construction of a new social imaginary.10 Human rights discourses In the early months of 1979 the government apparently received information that the political opposition was about to set up a human rights organization. To prevent that from happening, it was decided that the government would pre-empt the move and supervise the establishment of a human rights organization sympathetic to its own position and policy.11 Thus was created the Chinese Human Rights Association (CHRA), which, however, did not prevent confrontation between the opposition and the KMT regime (Mab Huang 2000a). In December Meilitao magazine launched a rally to celebrate International Human Rights Day, which ended in a large-scale ‘liquidation’ of political dissidents. This became known as the Kaohsiung or Meilitao (Formosa) Incident, and almost all opposition leaders were arrested. The KMT regime and government-owned media charged the rally with provocation, aimed at undermining social order and national security, and above all subverting the government. The CHRA made an attempt to explain the government’s position to the international human rights community, but to no avail. They served, however, as a liaison between the government and some Tangwai human rights activists incarcerated by the authorities. The embryonic opposition human rights movement was working in defence of political dissidents by drawing support from both local and overseas Taiwanese communities (e.g. the World Federation of Taiwanese Association, WFTA), especially those based in the United States and Japan. It also managed to draw attention away from Amnesty International (AI) and the US Congress, as well as international media (Huang 2000a; Chen 2002: 18). Although the KMT protested against the unfavourable media coverage of the Incident and declared that ROC was a sovereign state whose internal affairs shall not be interfered in, it could not but make tactical concessions. Under increased local and international pressures, the political dissidents were convicted at a public trial, and the KMT also released some dissidents and reduced the sentences of a number of opposition leaders. During the trial, it was reported that international human rights organizations observed the case closely and that they would use it as an indicator of Taiwan’s human rights conditions.12 In spite of state terrorism and authoritarian control, the values and validity of

176 Shu-fen Lin democracy and human rights were not entirely denied by the KMT regime at the rhetorical level. As an exiled and self-proclaimed ‘Free China’ vis-à-vis its CCP counterpart, the KMT regime did not cease to instrumentalize and re-articulate human rights discourse in order to secure international support and maintain its own legitimacy in the broader Cold War context. Like its Chinese communist counterpart, however, the nominal constitutional provisions of rights and freedom were not underpinned by effective legislation (Kent 1999: 31), and human rights abuses took place in everyday life. It is significant to note that the KMT regime helped passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and signed, ratified and deposited the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In addition, it drafted its own version of the Genocide Convention and incorporated it into domestic law in 1953 (Peter Huang 2001). Even so, the human rights violations and abuses in Taiwan were not submitted to international scrutiny and criticism. On the one hand, this is due to the inconsistency of the responses of the West to human rights problems in the communist bloc countries, and in other, mainly third-world, countries (Müllerson 1997: 109). Insofar as the stance of the United States was concerned, the KMT regime was one of the unpopular authoritarian governments which received US security and economic assistance. Although the US government at times put casual pressure on some of its satellite countries that violated human rights (ibid.: 110–11), the pressure did not really lead to the improvement of the human rights records of these countries. The situation was no less bleak after the KMT regime was expelled from the UN in 1971 as a result of the realignment of international politics. Since then, Taiwan has endured international isolation and exclusion from the subsequent development of the international human rights regime. On the other hand, the Taiwanese case attests to Risse and Sikkink’s proposition that the information-gathering of the norms-violating state would require at least ‘some minimal links between the domestic opposition and the transnational networks (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 22). Without the existence of a viable opposition, the activation and operation of the transnational network would not take place. Accelerated political transformation Echoing my previous discussion on POS, it is adequate to argue that the political development both domestically and internationally in the 1970s created the conditions for the possibility of the emergence of contending discourses, and the contestability of the existing discursive configuration was stretched to such a significant extent that it became increasingly difficult to maintain its discursive stability and validity. With further political transformation taking place since the mid-1980s, the political landscape was not only marked by the establishment of the first opposition party, the DPP, and subsequent institutional reforms, it was also characterized by burgeoning social protests and movements, and a proliferation of counter-discourses vis-à-vis KMT Chinese nationalist authoritarianism. The lifting of martial law in 1986 was followed by the eruption of a myriad of protests. Issues raised in these protests ranged from the environment, women and

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 177 labour, to aborigines, farmers and students. As noted earlier, even before the lifting of martial law, local human rights advocates had sought supports from transnational human rights networks such as AI after the eruption of the Kaohsiung Incident. Apart from that, some NGOs founded in the early 1980s – less contentious in nature at this stage – had either established connection with or obtained supports from transnational organizations and networks. To mention just a few, the Consumers’ Foundation, which was established in the 1980s, the Awakening magazine formed in 1982, and the development of the Women’s Research programme in the Population Studies Centre at the National Taiwan University, received subsidies from the Asia Foundation Taiwan Branch. The Women’s Rescue Foundation was founded by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan with the assistance of the National Committee on Self-Development of the People of the Presbyterian Church in the USA (Chen 2001: 618). Meanwhile, however, the plurality and dynamism of the discourses articulated by different social groups were overshadowed by the ascendancy of the issue of national identity as the rallying point of the anti-KMT struggle under the DPP’s leadership. In other words, the discourse of Taiwanese national identity which had previously functioned as a mythical space, was intended to become a collective social imaginary. Consequently, other contentious discourses were absorbed in a discursive chain of equivalence where the ‘specificity of each position should be dissolved’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 127). In a meeting with social movement groups in August 1989, some activists contended that the DPP should not ascribe all social problems to the KMT regime while failing to take initiatives in social reform. The single antagonism constructed during the course of the struggles against the KMT was thus put into question as different social movement groups began to demand the recognition of their needs that could not be fulfilled or replaced by a simple ‘identification with Taiwan’.13 One of the typical responses from the DPP could be found in its response to the founding of the Labour Party by its former member Wang Yi-hsiung. The DPP contended that the party could not survive if it bound itself to any particular stance on issues concerning, for instance, workers.14 Those activists who attended the meeting in August 1989, on the contrary, contended that, without appropriate awareness, existing social problems would not be solved, and social justice would not be obtained even if the DPP replaced the KMT in the future.15 This view not only signified the SMO’s discontent with the prevalence of nationalist discourses and the DPP’s lack of a clear agenda of social reform in the late 1980s; it also accurately foresaw the situation after the DPP took power in 2000. Since the DPP’s triumph in the presidential election in March 2000, the relationship between the DPP and social movements has become even more ambivalent. The debates on the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant and on the shortening of the working week were two cases in point. In effect, it is clearly stated in the DPP’s 1995 party manifesto that they would ‘[o]ppose the establishment of more nuclear power plants’ and ‘use new energy resources to replace nuclear power plants within ten years’. However, immediately after the election, Chen Shui-bian maintained that his policy on nuclear power plants would not be tied to the party

178 Shu-fen Lin platform. Since then, the Chen administration has remained ambivalent about this issue.16 The controversy over shortening the working week was again symptomatic of the escalating tension between the DPP and social movement organizations.17 During the campaign for the presidential election, the DPP promised a 40-hour working week; however, it failed to keep its promise after its victory.18 Ironically the KMT, which used to maintain an intimate tie with local capitalists, turned out to back-up the demands made by labour organizations. This case again exposed the fact that the seemingly close connection between the labour movement and the DPP is also under a rapid process of transformation. If one juxtaposes these two cases with the government’s pledge for human rights protection and prioritizing human rights and NGO diplomacy, one indeed gets a mixed picture.

The era of transnationalism and human rights diplomacy Undoubtedly, the initiative for getting back to the international human rights community and setting up a Human Rights National Commission came from civil society. A group of 22 NGOs had promoted the ideas for some time and formed a coalition in December 1999. During the presidential election in 2000, the coalition managed to secure the endorsement of the ideas by three candidates. It also set up a working group to draft a bill for the organization of the national commission. In his inaugural speech, the newly elected president declared that Taiwan would include international human rights in its legal codes – referring in particular to the international bill of rights – establish an independent national human rights commission, and invite the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and AI for advice with regard to the implementation of human rights instruments. For the time being, the government has ratified the International Bills of Rights and set up an advisory committee on human rights affairs under the Presidential Office, an inter-ministerial Human Rights Protection and Promotion Committee presided over by the premier, and the Human Rights Education Committee in the Ministry of Education. Moreover, a ‘Human Rights Policy White Paper’ was issued in 2002, the release of the first national human rights report19 is scheduled in 2003, and the preparation for the draft plan in accordance with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action is underway. It seems that an era of rights is arriving, but I suggest that activists should maintain vigilance and embrace a thoughtful optimism at this turning point. For precisely at this juncture where human rights discourse is to be promoted, disseminated and institutionalized, a number of problems have to be addressed carefully. This includes, first of all, the government cooptation of the human right discourse and its impact on nascent transnational activism; and second, and perhaps more importantly, the NGOization of human rights movements. Human rights diplomacy Since Taiwan was denied membership of the UN and since a return to the UN will not be achieved in the short term under the current configuration of world politics,

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 179 the government takes a rather indirect route. Following the lead of the former president Lee Teng-hui’s pragmatic diplomacy and the propagation of Taiwan’s democracy (Chen 2000: 2), the DPP government employs human rights diplomacy and promotes unofficial dialogues in addition to the long-standing ‘economic diplomacy’. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sets up a special NGO committee and appoints ‘ambassadors-at-large’ with an emphasis on gaining entry for Taiwan to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to raise the island’s ‘diplomatic image’ (China Times, 23 May 2000), and to facilitate Taiwan’s participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). This new orientation of foreign policy has been best elaborated by the former Foreign Minister Tien Hungmao (2000): In recent years, the international community has praised our country’s democratic development and achievements, and the measures that we have adopted to guarantee and protect human rights have been recognized by people all over the world . . . They constitute an important strength in preserving our national security. Any system or action that violates democracy or human rights can be seen as a threat to our survival. Democracy and human rights are the two sides of a same coin [sic], especially in this post-cold war era where civilized nations attach great importance to human life and human rights. This trend has gradually brought the international community to give human rights precedence over the concept of sovereignty, and we therefore should promote ‘human rights diplomacy’ and ‘democracy-based diplomacy’. It is noteworthy that the alleged ‘human rights diplomacy’ has concentrated on providing humanitarian aid. For instance, MOFA supervises the establishment of a mechanism to deal with Taiwan’s humanitarian relief work in the international community (Central News Agency, 5 December 2001). Both the government and NGOs in Taiwan have been working with international organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Médecins du Monde (MDM) and CARE.20 Despite the humanitarian intent, the government has a hidden agenda, i.e. to get Taiwan back into the World Health Organization (WHO). In 2002, the government and local NGOs such as the Taiwan International Medical Alliance (TIMA) and the Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan (MPAT) have joined forces again to bid for the observership of Taiwan in the WHO, and the campaign also managed to obtain some international support.21 According to Tien Hung-mao, the government has adopted a multilateral approach, which includes expanding its links with ‘international civil society’, noting its increasing participation in the world movement for democracy.22 Nevertheless, the alleged active role in contributing to democratization and human rights protection in other countries has been less evident, despite some recent attempts from the NGOs to take part in organizations such as the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) (Chen Jie 2000: 4).23 If one examines this ‘human rights turn’ in foreign policy – which understandably concentrates more on humanitarian issues than contentious movements – together with the persistent violation of human rights

180 Shu-fen Lin inside Taiwan,24 one may doubt the government’s commitment to human rights. This said, however, the government’s human rights diplomacy, though utilitarian in nature, has indeed enhanced the intelligibility and validity of human rights discourse within Taiwan. One of the most urgent tasks, thus, is that local NGOs and their efforts in building transnational network remain independent and critical of the government’s diplomatic imperatives, and oblige the government to fulfil its promises. The expansion of human rights discourses and some problems Insofar as local civil society is concerned, the past few years have witnessed the proliferation of human rights discourses, and the possibility of the emergence of a social imaginary of democracy beyond electoralism has become available. A number of trends of development and events warrant a thoughtful optimism. In June 1996 a group of 58 organizations, led by the TAHR, the Humanistic Education Foundation, the Green Party, and the Judicial Reform Foundation, came together to form the campaign to save the innocent in the Hsichih Trio case from execution.25 AI issued a series of urgent action appeals on behalf of the three men in 1995 and 1996.26 When two AI members visited the three convicted men in the Hsichih Trio case in May 2000 – shortly after the president’s inaugural speech which announced its human rights policy, TAHR, together with the other two organizations, held a press conference contending that the government shall improve domestic human rights records simultaneously. Apart from this, the flourishing women’s movement and the pluralization of feminist SMOs have brought to light the idea that ‘women’s rights are human rights’, and this has expanded the scope of human rights. Despite differences in terms of their stance on issues such as sexual liberation and the legalization of the sex industry, the women’s movement in Taiwan has started relatively early in building transnational connections: the participation in the comfort women campaign in 1992 (Piper 2001), the hosting of the International Forum on Sex Workers’ Rights and Sex Industrial Policy in 1998 and the East Asian Women’s Forum 2000,27 to name just a few. The promulgation of the ‘Equal Employment Opportunity Act’, which heralded the entry into a new stage of women’s movement, also bears the traces of the influence of global feminism.28 The recent victory of a transnational coalition29 against Taiwanese investors’ violation of labour rights in Chentex Garment in Nicaragua represents the efforts made by labour movements in this regard.30 The trade unions and NGOs in Taiwan that were involved emphasized that ‘labour’s rights are human rights’, and brought the case to the advisory committee on human rights affairs under the Presidential Office and to MOFA. The Chentex case, as well as the Hsichih Trio Case discussed above, exposed exactly the problem and limit of current human rights diplomacy. Not only are the human rights of migrant workers in Taiwan and those who work in Taiwanese factories abroad not protected (Chen Jie 2000: 6), but human rights abuses persist in both public and private life. This brings to our attention the structural problems affecting the articulation,

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 181 circulation and promotion of human rights discourses at the moment: first of all, the competing developmentalist discourses in global capitalism. As Pheng Cheah rigorously argues, more critical attention will have to be paid to the ‘constellation of forces at a given conjuncture’ which gives a particular vision of human rights ‘more normative validity and historical affectivity’ (Cheah 1999: 36). For instance, if one takes into consideration the current trend of accelerating economic globalization and the unevenness of development and redistribution, one shall not be surprised at the fact that some versions of human rights discourse are more susceptible to the cooptation of the logic of neo-liberalism. The Chentex case and the various cases concerning migrant workers in Taiwan are examples of this. Second, there is the effect of international pressures. Undoubtedly, more and more local NGOs are becoming cognisant of the importance of connecting with TANs in the context where the government engages itself in building its image as a human rights protector. Nevertheless, insofar as the effect of international pressures are concerned, one has to note that Taiwan’s enduring international isolation, as well as the lack of an effective regional mechanism for the protection of human rights in Asia, such as European Convention ( Jetschke, 1999: 134), subject the Taiwanese government to mainly moral and informal pressures. Third, there is the NGOization of the human rights movement. From the selected cases discussed above, it is apparent that the existence of alternative human rights discourses articulated by the NGOs and the autonomy as well as the legitimacy of the latter are extremely important. Here I identify two problems that I consider would affect the extent to which NGOs maintain their autonomy and legitimacy. 1

2

Revenue. At present, due to the economic recession, the public funding for NGOs is on the wane. But it is precisely at the moment when the government promotes human rights and NGO diplomacy that we need to be more alert to the pattern of the distribution of public funding and how it has contributed to the reconfiguration of local civil society. Sabine Lang’s study of the NGOization of the feminist movement in Germany has warned that overt dependence on public funding will lead to ‘too little presence [of the NGOs] in the public discourses of civil society; instead, energy is put into private lobbying strategies to secure jobs and finance’ (Lang: 1997: 113). In the context of Taiwan, although the process of NGOization is just in its first stages, the relationship between the structure of funding and the agenda-setting will have to be followed closely. Accountability. Despite the significant role played by NGOs and the transnationalization of their activism in radicalizing the political imaginary, it is important to make sure that the NGOization of activism does not lead to de-politicization (ibid.: 117). That is to say, NGOs – local or transnational – normally act as the representatives of the disadvantaged population. The process and mechanism of mobilizing public opinion and forging a consensus, as well as accountability, are problems that shall not be overlooked. The controversy in the women’s movement over licensed prostitutes and the legalization of sex work in Taiwan since the late 1990s had made it clear that there is always a gap between the NGOs – grass-roots or state-oriented – and the disadvantaged population these

182 Shu-fen Lin NGOs claim to represent. To maintain the mechanism of accountability becomes absolutely crucial.

Conclusion Since the purpose of this chapter is to address the transnationalization of social movements in Taiwan and its impact on democratization instead of the development of the human rights movements per se, it is impossible to include a detailed account of the construction of an alternative democratic imaginary based on human rights discourses. Suffice to say that, throughout my analysis, I have demonstrated that the human rights movement has played a critical role in Taiwan’s political transformation. I have also argued that local movements and their connections with international organizations and TANs have, at different historical stages and to various degrees, enabled the transformation in Taiwan to take place and contributed to the process of democratization. Indeed, against the ‘actually existing democracy’ in Taiwan, a growing tendency towards transnationalism has served increasingly to expose the boundaries and the power structure inherent in the social imaginary sustained primarily by a neo-liberal economic order, rules of political participation informed by electoralism and minimalist standards of democracy. I suggest that, as active social agents, social movements are not passively ‘determined’ by existing power structures, but respond to the structural failures as well as resist structural constraints. By deconstructing the dominant discourses and inventing their own opportunities through constructing new subject positions, at certain historical conjunctures social movements engender a radical transformation of the discursive horizon, and thus become the ‘founders of the discursivity’. At other times, the existence of social movements functions as a critical reminder of the inadequacy of any political project and mobilization that does not take into consideration the heterogeneity of society. Moreover, as my reflections on the ‘human rights turn’ in foreign policy and the NGOization of the human rights movement indicate, it is very important to scrutinize the articulating principles of different human rights discourses, and the precise practice of ‘human rights discourse’ in the current political horizon, and how it manages to link up with or exclude (wittingly or unwittingly) different social movements. In so doing, one gets a fuller picture of and engages more closely with the context which allows the prevalence of any particular version of human rights discourse, and therefore formulates multifarious strategies to ensure the protection of human rights and the expansion of the democratic imaginary.

Notes 1 This chapter draws substantially on my Ph.D. thesis (Lin 2000), and I would also like to acknowledge Professor Mab Huang and Chun-hung Chen for their useful comments and help. Research for this chapter is funded by the National Science Council in Taiwan. 2 I use the term ‘imaginary’ in the sense that has been developed by Laclau (1990). ‘Imaginary’ refers to the ‘horizon of intelligibility’, according to which systems of meaning or discourses become intelligible.

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 183 3 The concept ‘social movement sector’ denotes, in Tarrow’s words, ‘the configuration of individuals and groups willing to engage in disruptive direct action against others to achieve collective goals’. Seen in this light, the social movement sector does not only include social movement organizations but also ‘extends to those who participate only sporadically in their activities, but who participate in a movement subculture and act as an informal support structure’ (Tarrow 1988: 432). 4 See also a demonstration of this dynamic interplay and an evaluation of women’s political interventions at different levels in Gelb (1990). 5 This is close to the concept of ‘frame’ first coined by Irvine Goffman and elaborated by David Snow and Robert Benford. In effect, the frame theory has drawn increasing attention in the field of social movement theory (Snow and Benford 1992). A recent collection of essays edited by Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans represents such a trend. See especially articles by Hank Johnston, Bert Klandermans and Ann Swidler (Johnston and Klandermans 1995), and also Touraine (1988). 6 It is also because of this that I do not wish to echo his criticism of Michel Foucault. Dryzek’s argument represents a typical disagreement between ‘deliberative democracy’ and genealogical politics. 7 I adopt Keck and Sikkink’s definition of TANs: ‘A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). 8 It began with the replacement of the Republic of China (ROC) by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the UN in October 1971, which was followed by US President Nixon’s trip to the PRC in 1972 and the Japanese Tanaka administration’s recognition of the Beijing government in September of the same year (Appleton 1972; Jacobs 1973; Cheng 1980). 9 For instance, the visit to Beijing by Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State of the Carter administration, in August 1977 and a number of speeches given by Carter all revealed the US intention to withdraw its recognition from Taiwan. 10 One of the most revealing examples was that after the KMT regime loosened its grip on the press in March 1979, many Tangwai activists lost no time in founding new journals, which proved to be important sites for advocating human rights discourses vis-à-vis KMT’s rhetoric. 11 According to the regulations of martial law existing at that time, the first NGO in any field to have registered with the government would automatically exclude other similar groups from being recognized by the authorities. 12 New York Times, 3 March 1980, p. 19. 13 It is important to note that I do not argue that all forms of ‘the identification with Taiwan’ will inevitably lead to the erasure of differences and the neglect of other modes of oppression. Much depends on the precise construction of the meaning of ‘Taiwan’. This, while beyond the scope of this chapter, is a very important issue that has to be addressed – not only because of the lingering controversy over national identity, but also as a reflection on the possible reactions in the context of accelerating globalization. 14 Remarks of the then DPP chairperson Yao Chia-wen in ‘Taiwan Opposition Struggles for Unity to Challenge Government’ by Ann Scott Tyson in the Christian Science Monitor, 24 December 1987. Wang Yi-hsiung, a former member of the DPP and a long-term activist of the workers’ movement, left the DPP and founded the Workers’ Party in 1987. He claimed that ‘[w]e [workers] do not discuss the problem of independence or unification since workers are not able to solve this problem’, Independent Evening Post, 1 November 1987, p. 2. 15 See the United Daily News, 6 August 1989. The meeting of the DPP and representatives of social movement groups, including women’s groups, students’ organizations, environmental organizations and workers’ organizations, to exchange opinions about social reforms was held on 5 August 1989.

184 Shu-fen Lin 16 China Times, 7 May 2000, 17 May 2000, 2 June 2000, China Evening Post, 16 May 2000. See also information collected in http://forums.chinatimes.com.tw/special/unclear5/main. htm. Accessed on 20 June 2002. 17 Labor’s Rights Association, 15 May 2002, 18 China Times, 22 June 2000, 19 July 2000, 11 December 2000, 25 December 2000, 27 December 2000. 19 The only annual human rights reports available at present are issued by THRA. Since Taiwan is not a member of the UN, it has not submitted the report to the relevant institutions in the UN. Neither has a report by the National Human Rights Commission been published, because the latter has not yet been established. 20 http://www.taiwanheadline.org. Accessed on 18 June 2002. 21 This includes the European Parliament, the US Congress and Senate, the Nordic Medical Association and the Council of the World Medical Association: http://www.taiwan headlines.org. Accessed on 18 June 2002. CARE is an independent humanitarian organization working to end world poverty. 22 Central News Agency, 5 December 2001: http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news_id=12264. 23 In Chen Jie’s article (Chen Jie 2000: 4), he argues that no Taiwanese NGOs asked for a monitoring role in the elections in Cambodia (1998), Indonesia (1999) or East Timor (1999). In effect, I have taken part in a discussion on the possibility of participating in ANFREL and setting up a corresponding organization, such as the Taiwan Network for Free Elections. 24 One witnesses, for instance, persistent discrimination against homosexuals, the mentally challenged and migrant workers, and the number of people executed remains high. See the information complied by THRA: http://www.tahr.org.tw 25 Three men were arrested in August 1991 in Hsichih, accused of murdering a husband and wife, convicted on charges of murder, robbery and rape and sentenced to death. The three men claimed to have been tortured and forced to make false confessions and there appears to have been no direct or physical evidence to convict them, other than their confessions. See http://www.tahr.org.tw/english/sjh.html. Accessed on 15 June 2002. 26 See http://www.tahr.org.tw/english/sjh.html. Accessed on 17 June 2002. 27 This conference was organized by the Taipei Alliance of Licensed Prostitutes (TALP), the Solidarity Front of Women Workers (SFWW) and Pink Collar Solidarity (PCS). 28 According to Chen Jie, the Act was initiated by feminists who were inspired by the debate at the Nairobi conference in 1985, which called for women’s rights to education and employment. 29 The Taiwanese NGOs include the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions, the Taiwan Labor Front, the Committee for Action on Labour Legislation, and the Labor Rights Association; international organizations include the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation, the Nicaragua Network (US), the Campaign for Labor Rights (US), the National Labor Committee (US), the Center for Constitution Rights, UNITE (US), the Center for Constitutional Rights (US) and the United Steelworkers of America. 30 Ninety workers from the Chentex factory in Nicaragua’s Las Mercedes Free Trade Zone were fired one day after workers filed the documentation for the legalization of the union they had formed in January 1998 at the Ministry of Labor offices. The Chentex factory, which is Taiwanese-owned, produces pants for Buggle Boy. See http://www.sweatshop watch.org/swatch/headlines/1998/chentex_aug98.html. Accessed on 20 June 2002.

References Alvarez, S.E. (1998) ‘Latin American Feminisms “Go Global”: Trends of the 1990s and Challenges for the New Millennium’, in S.E. Alvarez, E. Dagnino and A. Escobar (eds) Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 185 Alvarez, S.E., Dagnino, E. and Escobar, A. (1998) ‘Introduction: The Cultural and Political in Latin American Social Movements’, in S.E. Alvarez, E. Dagnino and A. Escobar (eds) Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Appleton, Sheldon (1973) ‘Regime Support among Taiwan High School Students’, Asia Survey 13(8): 750–60. Chang, M. (1994) Social Movements and Political Transformation, Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research (in Chinese). Chao, L. and Myers, R.H. (1998) The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Cheah, P. (1999) ‘Posit(ion)ing Human Rights in the Current Global Conjunction’, in G.-L. Lim, L.E. Smith and W. Dissanayake (eds) Transnational Asia Pacific: Gender, Culture and the Public Sphere, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Chen, C. (2001) ‘Human Rights in the Process of Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Taiwan’, paper presented at the second International Conference of the May 18 Institute, Kwangju, South Korea. ——(2002) ‘Trans-Nationalism in a Post-Colonial World’, unpublished manuscript. Chen, J. (2000) ‘The Influence of Democracy on Taiwan’s Foreign Policy’, Issues and Studies 36(4) ( July/August): 1–32. ——(2001) ‘Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan’s Social Movement NGOs’, Journal of Contemporary China 10(29): 613–44. Cheng, T.S. Joseph (1980) ‘Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations: China’s Bargaining Position Regarding the Taiwan Question’, Asia Quarterly 4: 245–72. Cooper, J.F. (1981) ‘Taiwan’s Recent Election: Progress Toward a Democratic System’, Asian Survey XXI(10) (October): 1029–39. ——(1988) A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China, forword by Ernest W. Lefever, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. ——(1995) Words Across the Taiwan Strait: A Critique of Beijing’s ‘White Paper’ on China’s Reunification, New York: University Press of America. Dryzek, J.S. (1999) ‘Transnational Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy 7(1): 30–51. Eisinger, P.K. (1973) ‘The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities’, American Political Science Review 67: 11–28. Engstrom, R.L. and Chu, C. (1984) ‘The Impact of the 1980 Supplementary Election on Nationalist China’s Legislative Yuan’, Asian Survey XXIV(4) (April): 447–58. Falk, R. (2000) Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World, London: Routledge. Foucault, M. (1984) ‘What is an Author?’, in The Foucault Reader, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Gamson, W.A. and Meyer, D. (1996) ‘Framing Political Opportunity’, in D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (eds) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gelb, J. (1990) ‘Feminism and Political Action’, in Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (eds) Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies, Cambridge: Polity Press. Gold, T. (1986) State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, New York: M.E. Sharpe. Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Higley, J., Huang, T. and Lin, T. (1998) ‘Elite Settlement and Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan’, Working Papers in Taiwan Studies 27.

186 Shu-fen Lin Holden, B. (ed.) (2000) Global Democracy: Key Debates, London: Routledge. Hood, S. (1997) The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Howarth, D. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) ‘Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis’, in D. Howarth, A.J. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hsiao, M.H. et al. (1989) ‘How to Conceive of Civil Society?’, China Tribune 28(12) (in Chinese). Hu, J. ( ed.) (1994) Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan, Taipei: Kwang Hwa. Huang, M. (2000a) ‘Human Rights NGOs of Taiwan: Their Rise, Transformation and Prospects’, paper presented at the ‘Taiwan NGOs: Marching towards the 21st Century’ Conference, Taipei, Taiwan. ——(2000b) ‘Human Rights and Chinese Liberalism’, in Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun (eds) Human Rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. Huang, P. (2001) ‘The Paradox of Taiwan’s Human Rights Conditions’, paper presented at the International Conference on National Human Rights Commission: Promoting and Protecting Human Rights, January, Taipei, Taiwan (CD-ROM, issued by Soochow University). Huang, T.-F. (1992) The Democratic Progressive Party and Political Democratization in Taiwan, Taipei: Shihying (in Chinese). Huntington, S. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Jacobs, Bruce (1973) ‘Taiwan 1972: Political Season’, Asian Survey 13(1): 102–12. Jetschke, A. (1999) ‘Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines’, in T. Risse, S.C. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds) The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Johnston, H. and Klandermans, B. (1995) Social Movements and Culture, London: UCL Press. Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) ‘Introduction: An Alternative Perspective on National Security’, in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press. Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kent, A. (1999) China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: the Limits of Compliance, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Laclau, Ernesto (1990) New reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, London: Verso. Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack, London: Verso. Lang, S. (1997) ‘The NGOization of Feminism: Institutionalization and Institution Building within the German Women’s Movements’, in Joan Scott, Cora Kaplan and Debra Keates (eds) Transitions, Environments, Translations: Feminism in International Politics, London: Routledge. Lee, T. (1995) ‘Democracy in the ROC: Drawing New Vitality From Cultural Regeneration’, speech addressed to the International Conference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Taipei, Taiwan, 27 August. ——(1996) ‘Always in My Heart’, Olin Lecture at Cornell University, 9 June. Levine, D.H. (1988) ‘Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy’, World Politics 40(3): 377–94.

‘Democratization’ in Taiwan and its discontents 187 Li, H. (1988) Four Decades of Democratic Movement in Taiwan, Taipei: Independence Evening Post (in Chinese). Lim, G.-L., Smith, L.E. and Dissanayake, W. (eds) (1999) ‘Introduction’, to Transnational Asia Pacific: Gender, Culture and the Public Sphere, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Lin, S. (2000) ‘Democratization’, in ‘Taiwan Revisited: In Pursuit of a Radical Democracy’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Ideology and Discourse Analysis, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK. McAdam, D. (1996) ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions’, in D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy, and M.N. Zald (eds) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McBeath, G. (1978) ‘Taiwan in 1977: Holding the Reins’, Asian Survey 18(1): 17–28. Melucci, A. (1995) ‘The Process of Collective Identity’, in R. Johnston and B. Klandermans (eds) Social Movements and Culture, London: UCL Press. Müllerson, R. (1997) Human Rights Diplomacy, London: Routledge. Piper, N. (2001) ‘Transnational Women’s Activism in Japan and Korea: The Unresolved Issue of Military Sexual Slavery’, Global Networks 1(2): 155–70. Piven, F.F. and Cloward, R.A. (1992) ‘Normalizing Collective Protest’, in A.D. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller (eds) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven: Yale University Press. Randall, V. (1998) ‘Gender and Power: Women Engage the State’, in V. Randall and G. Waylen (eds) Gender, Politics, and the State, London: Routledge. Risse, T. and Sikkink, K. (1999) ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in T. Risse, S.C. Ropp and H. Sikkink (eds) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse, T., Ropp, S.C. and Sikkink, K. (1999) ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, T. (1994) ‘Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War’, International Organization 48(2): 185–214. ——(1995) ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction’, in Risse-Kappen (ed.) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sharp, J.P., Routledge, P., Philo, C. and Paddison R. (2000) Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance, London: Routledge. Snow, D.A. and Benford, R.D. (1992) ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, in A.D. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller (eds) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven: Yale University Press. Tarrow, S. (1988) ‘National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States’, Annual Review of Sociology 14: 421–40. ——(1992) ‘Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings Through Action’, in A.D. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller (eds) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven: Yale University Press. ——(1994) Power in Movements: Social Movement, Collective Action, and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——(1998) Power in Movements: Social Movement and Contentious Politics, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

188 Shu-fen Lin ——(2001) ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 4: 1–20. Tien, H. (2000) ‘The Current State of ROC Diplomacy’, an abridgment of the ‘Report to the Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, Legislative Yuan’, 5 June. Tilly, C. (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Touraine, A. (1988) Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Postindustrial Society, foreword by Stanley Aronowitz; translation by Myrna Godzich, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Wang, J. (1989) ‘The Opposition between the State and Workers’, China Tribune 28(7) (in Chinese). ——(1991) ‘The Politicization of Social Movements and its Problems’, China Tribune 32(2) (in Chinese). Whitehead, L. (1996) ‘Comparative Politics: Democratization Studies’, in R.E. Goodin and H.-D. Klingemann (eds) A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winckler, E.A. (1981) ‘National, Regional, and Local Politics’ in Emily Ahern and Hill Gates (eds) The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Wu, N. (1989) ‘Searching for the Causes of Democratization: A Review Essay’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies 2(1): 145–6 (in Chinese).

Index

Abbreviations: NGO = non-governmental organization; Tab = Table; TSMO = transnational social movement organization ABIM 135 Action for AIDS (Singapore NGO) 115–16, 119, 122; see also HIV/AIDS; Singapore activism: definition 4; transnational aspects 5; see also transnational activism activists 5; cyber-rainbow warriors 100, 105 Activists Beyond Borders (Keck and Sikkink) 52 advocacy 6–7; transnational campaigns 18; see also transnational advocacy networks AHRC 143 aim of book 3 Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National Consciousness Movement, Aliran) 134–5; see also Malaysia Aliran Monthly 134–5 Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) 137 AMN 154–5 ANFREL 154–5, 179 Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) 135; see also Malaysia anti-globalization movements 34; see also globalization APCET II (2nd Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor) 132, 140–1; see also East Timor AsiaDHRRA 160–1 Asian Development Bank, programme to support governance reform in Indonesia 157 Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum–Asia) 154–5 Asian Human Rights Charter 142–3 Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 143

Asian Monitoring Network (AMN) 154–5 Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) 154–5, 179 Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (AsiaDHRRA) 160–1 Association of Progressive Communications 94, 98 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 130–1 Attacking Poverty (World Bank Report) 32 Banks see Asian Development Bank, programme to support governance reform in Indonesia; World Bank Batam: co-operation of NGOs on HIV prevention 89; cross-border activism with Singapore 119–20, 123; economic development 113–14; HIV/AIDS rates 116; Partnership for Health Foundation 117 Beetham, D, quote 26–7 Bello, W 64 Blyth, M, quote 48 Bolivia, privatization of water management concession 57 ‘boomerang pattern’ 52; see also transnational advocacy networks Brazil, water resources management 47, 53; role of World Bank 55 Burma, Malaysian advocacy work in 131, 137 CAP 134 CARAM 133 Centre for Peace Initiatives (CENPEACE) 136

190

Index

Chan, Dr R 115–16, 119 Chang, Mau-kuei, quote 169 China: Chinese Human Rights Association (CHRA) 175; internet censorship 103–4; internet use 102; see also Greenpeace China Chinese Human Rights Association (CHRA) 175 citizenship 8, 12, 90–1; international 78; national 78–81, 88; see also world citizenship CIVICUS 53; see also global civil society civil disobedience 18–19 civil society 7–8, 53–5; emergence in Indonesia 149–51; emergence of transnational 15–16; relationship with state 70; see also democracy; global civil society Confucianism and global citizenship 88–90 Connolly, W E, quote 79 Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) 134 Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility (CARAM) 133 cosmopolitan democracy theory 16–17, 95, 101; see also democracy Crick, B, quote 85 cultural equality 83–7, 90–1 cyber-activism 94, 100–1, 105–6; cyberaction list of Greenpeace Japan 99(Tab 6.1); Greenpeace Japan 98–9; location 101–2; obstacles 103–4; prospects 104 cyber-rainbow warriors 100, 105 democracy 12–13; cosmopolitan 16–17, 95, 101; definition 26–7; democratic theories 27–8; electronic 95, 104–6; Indonesia 149–51, 161–4; influence on capacity of activists to engage in transnational activism 13–14; influence of transnational activism on 14–15; Taiwan 168–9, 182; within global institutions 70; within transnational activist networks 17–19; see also civil society Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan): foundation 168; relationship with social movements 177–8; see also Taiwan discourses 11, 16, 172–3 discursive representation 43–5, 51–2; social movements 172–3 e-government 104 e-mobilization 94–6, 101; major issues 105

Earth Island Institute 81 East Timor: APCET II (Second Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor) 132, 140–1; support from international NGOs 79; support from Suaram (Malaysia) 132 ecological activism 96, 101; in cyberspace 105; toxic dumping in South China Sea 96–8 empirical democratic theory 27–8; see also democracy environment: action profile of Greenpeace Japan 99–100; issue focus of TSMOs 62–3 ethnic unity, issue focus of TSMOs 62–3 Falk, R, quote 82 Focus on the Global South 64 Forum–Asia 154–5 France, decentralization 49 Ghai, D, quote 73 global citizenship see world citizenship global civil society 33–5; approach to transnational activism 36–7; CIVICUS 53; contribution of TSMOs 68–9; theoretical perspectives 151–2; transnational networks of NGOs 152–3; see also civil society Global Compact Initiative 72 global governance 32–3, 49, 95; see also governance globalization 43; anti-globalization movements 34; criticism of by NGOs 153; ‘from below’ (cross-border interaction) 3, 34; implications for democracy 69–70; Western state power 30–2 globalized space 95 governance: global 32–3, 49, 95; promotion of in Indonesia 156–7; urban 49–50 Governance in a Globalizing World (Keohane and Nye) 48 governance regimes 43–5, 56–8; centrality of ideas 51; definition 48–50; effect on transnational activism 55; openness 51; power struggles 50–1; relevant actors 50; stakeholder councils 51–2, 54; structures 45–6 Government Watch (GOWA) (Indonesia) 156–7 Greenpeace China 96–8; location 102; website 101; see also China Greenpeace Japan 98–101; cyber-action list 99 (Tab 6.1); location 102

Index 191 Harris, S R, quote 143 HIV/AIDS: as human rights issue 110–11; Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility (CARAM) 133; funding and knowledge base in Indonesia 112, 121; increase in NGOs concerned with 111–12; Indonesia 116–19; Indonesia/Malaysia/Singapore triangle 109–10, 114; information distribution 122–3; internet newsgroups language of choice 122; prevention in Southeast Asia 89; rates of in Batam 116; Singapore 112–13, 114–16 Hong Kong, place in global economy 120–1 human rights 19–20, 31, 79; Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum–Asia) 154–5; Asian Human Rights Charter 142–3; Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 143; Burma 131; Chinese Human Rights Association (CHRA) 175; Indonesia 153, 157–9, 162; International Movement for a Just World (JUST) 137–8; international NGOs 81–2; issue focus for TSMOs 62–3; issue focus for TSMOs with Asian members 63–4; Suaram (Malaysian NGO) 132, 140; Taiwan 175–6, 178–82

Indonesia: constitutional amendment 161–2; corruption 156–7; debt problems 163; democratization 149–51, 161–4; effect of transnational activism on democratization process 15; funding of NGOs 112; Government Watch (GOWA) 156–7; HIV prevention, lack of co-operation 89; HIV/AIDS problem 109–10, 116–19; human rights 157–9, 162; increase in number of NGOs 111; Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) 156–7; Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas 161; International NGO Forum on Indonesia 156–7; Malaysia/ Singapore growth triangle 113–14; NGO support for good governance 156–7; participation of international NGOs in 1999 election 153–6, 163; Partnership to Support Governance Reform 157; social and economic development 159–61; Transparency International–Indonesia 156–7; use of military against oppositional groups

159, 162–3; voter education programme 155–6 Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) 156–7 Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas 161 INFID 157, 163–4 information on HIV/AIDS, distribution 122–3 infrastructural power 29–30; see also state power international citizenship, definition 78; see also citizenship international meetings, reduction in number 70 International Movement for a Just World ( JUST) 137–8; see also human rights International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INFID) 157, 163–4 international non-government organizations 6; creation of People’s Assembly 83; ethics 80; examples of 81–2; face to face interaction with NGOs 121–2; Indonesia 112, 121; location 101; participation in 1999 Indonesian election 153–6, 163; relationship with NGOs 151–2; social and economic development 160–1; support for East Timor 79; see also non-government organizations; transnational nongovernment organizations internet access: as percentage of population in Asia 103; China 102; censorship 103–4; HIV discussion groups, language barriers 122; Southeast Asia 102; Islamic activism 88–9; Malaysia 131, 135–6 isomorphism 43–4; see also governance regimes Jakarta: AsiaDHRRA General Assembly (March 2001) 160; Asian Monitoring Network Discussion (February 1999) 154; knowledge/funding base for Indonesian NGOs 110, 112, 121–3 Jemaah Islamiah 89; see also Islamic activism Jomo, K S 131–2, 142 JUST 137–8 Just Act 81 Khor, M 64, 138 Korten, D, quotes 71, 72–3 Kuomintang (KMT) 168–70; diplomatic setbacks in 1970s 174–5; human rights abuses 175–6; see also Taiwan

192

Index

labour migration 20, 32; see also migrant workers liberal democratic theory 27–8; see also democracy London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 20, 97–8

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) 154–5 non-governmental organizations (NGOs): advocacy 6–7; advocacy campaigns 18; distribution of information 122–3; face to face interaction with international NGOs 121–2; HIV prevention in Indonesia/Malaysia/Singapore growth triangle 109–10; increase in number 111; Indonesia 111–12, 117–19; Indonesia, promotion of good governance 156–7; Indonesia, promotion of human rights 157–9, 162; Malaysian, state response to 140–1; political responsibility 18; presence in governance structures 33; relationship with international NGOs 151–2; relationship with United Nations 71, 73; role in transnational advocacy networks 52–3; Singapore 112–13; Taiwan 178–80; Taiwan, human rights NGOs 180–2; see also international nongovernment organizations; transnational non-government organizations

Malaysia: activists’ reasons for working outside of 141–3; advocacy work in Burma 131, 137; Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National Consciousness Movement, Aliran) 134–5; Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) 135; Centre for Peace Initiatives (CENPEACE) 136; Consumers’ Association of Penang (CAP) 134; effect of political system on activists 13–14; external focus of Malaysian activists 129–31, 139–40, 143–44; HIV prevention, lack of co-operation 89; HIV/AIDS problem 109–10; International Movement for a Just World ( JUST) 137–8; MERCY Malaysia (medical relief group) 133–4, 140; Misi Keamanan Sejagat (MKS) 135–6; Singapore/Indonesia growth triangle 113–14; state response to NGOs 140–1; Suaram (human rights group) 132; Tenaganita (female and migrant workers group) 132–3; Third World Network (TWN) 138–9; transnational NGOs located in 136–9 Mar de Plata Conference (1978) 47 Markoff, J, quote 69 medical relief agency see MERCY Malaysia Megawati Soekarnoputri 151, 156–9, 162; see also Indonesia MERCY Malaysia (medical relief agency) 133–4, 140 Mexico: Chiapas rebellion 34; study of transnational activism in 36 migrant workers: Batam 113–14, 120; protection of rights 150; Taiwan 180–1; Tenaganita (Malaysian NGO) 132–3 Misi Keamanan Sejagat (MKS) (Global Peace Mission) 135–6 Muslim activism see Islamic activism

Pandu (internet HIV newsgroup) 122 Parahyangan Centre for International Research (PACIS), study on international interventionism 158 participatory democracy 27–8; see also democracy Partnership for Health Foundation 117 peace issues as focus of TSMOs 62–3 People’s Global Action 64 political lobbying in cyberspace 105; see also cyber-activism political opportunity structures: concepts 170–1; definitions 170–1; interaction with transnational activism 9–10, 173–4; interaction with TSMOs 171–3; Taiwan 169–70 power 8; communicative 10–11; discursive 11–12; of the state see state power; within governance regimes 50–1 protest activities, attempts to limit 70, 74

national citizenship 78–9, 88; difference from world citizenship 81; see also citizenship; world citizenship

religious activist groups, Malaysia 135–6 Rosenau, J N, quote 95 Russell, B, world citizenship 80

one-person-one-letter (OPOL) 100 One World Online 81 Oxfam 81 overview of book 1, 19–20

Index 193 Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth) 138–9 Schumpeter, J 27 SEA-AIDS (internet newsgroup) 122 SEAPA 143, 159 sex tourism 20 Shiva, V 64 Singapore: cross-border activism with Batam 119–20, 123; HIV prevention, lack of co-operation 89; HIV/AIDS problem 109–10, 112–13, 114–16; internet censorship 103; Malaysia/ Indonesia growth triangle 113–14; NGOs 112–13; place in global economy 120–1 social movements: historical aspects 61; interaction with political opportunity structures 171–3; rise of in Taiwan 169–70, 182 South China Sea, dumping of toxic waste in 96–8 South Korean Jinbo, website 94 Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) 143, 159 state power 8–10, 12, 26; centrality of the state 38–9; global governance 32–3; globalization 30–2; infrastructural power 29–30; obstruction and limitation of civil society access 38; social domination 29 Stothard, D 130, 137, 139–42 Suara Rakyat Malaysia (Suaram, Voice of the Malaysian People) 132, 140; see also human rights Taiwan: Democratic Progressive Party 168, 177–8; democratization 168–9, 182; human rights abuses 175–6; human rights diplomacy 178–82; Human Rights Year 1976 174; migrant workers rights 180–1; political opportunity structure 169–70; political transformation 176–8; Tangwai 174–5; withdrawal of US diplomatic recognition 175; women’s rights 170, 180 Tangwai, formation 174–5; see also Taiwan Tarrow, S, quote 171–2 Tenaganita (Women Power: Malaysia) 132–3 Third World Network (TWN) 138–9 Tien, Hung-mao, quote 179 transnational, definition 5 transnational activism: adversarial politics 43–4; centrality of the state in 38–9;

definitions 4–5; effect of democracy on activists’ engagement in 13–14; forms of 6; governance regimes 55; influence on democratization process 14–15; institutional approaches to 36–8; political opportunity structures 9–10, 173–4; research categories 2–3; world citizenship 82–3; use of information 7 transnational activist networks: civil disobedience 18–19; communicative power 10–11; discursive power 11–12; ideological types 3; internal democracy 17–19; internal power structures 10; place of operation 10, 67–8; professional workers, location 121 transnational advocacy networks 6, 52–3, 72; campaigns 18; HIV/AIDS 110–11; location 101, 120–3 transnational non-government organizations: advocacy campaigns 18; Indonesia, effect on democratization process 161–3; Indonesia, social and economic development 159–61, 163; internal democracy 17–18; located in Malaysia 136–9; Malaysian, religious 135–6; Malaysian, secular 131–5; networks 152–3, 163–4; promotion of freedom of expression 159; see also international non-government organizations; non-government organizations transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) 36, 61–2, 74; approach to transnational activism 37; contribution to global civil society 68–9; decline in support for United Nations 72–4; definition 6; frequency of meetings 66–7; increase in activity 65–6, 66 (Tab 4.3); issue focus 62(Tab 4.1), 62–3; issue focus of groups with Asian members 63–4; participation 64 (Tab 4.2), 64–5; regional participation 67 (Tab 4.4), 67–8 transnational studies 33, 35–6; use in monitoring transnational activism 36–7 Transparency International–Indonesia 156–7 TWN 138–9 UNCTAD 71 United Kingdom: foreign policy 31–2; local government 49 United Nations: decline in support for

194

Index

72–4; People’s Assembly 83; weakening influence of 70–1 United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations 71 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 71 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 155–6; Partnership to Support Governance Reform in Indonesia 157 urban governance 49–50; see also governance voter education programme, Indonesia 155–6; see also Indonesia water resources management: Bolivia 57; Brazil 47, 53; role of World Bank 55 websites 100–1, 167; Greenpeace 98; Greenpeace Japan 100; language of 104; Malaysiakini 143; South Korean Jinbo 94 women’s issues: issue focus of TSMO 62–3;

Taiwan 170, 180; Tenaganita (Women Power: Malaysia) 132–3 Wong, E 140, 142 World Bank 32–3; HIV/AIDS prevention project in Indonesia 117–19; Programme to Support Governance Reform in Indonesia 157; report: Attacking Poverty 32; role in Brazil’s water management reform 55 world citizenship 78–80, 90–1; Asia 89–90; criticisms of 87–8; cultural equality 83–7; definition 80; difference from national citizenship 81; identity 80–1; transnational activism 82–3; see also citizenship world risk society 94 World Trade Organization, transparency 70 Yayasan Mitra Kesehatan (YMK) (Indonesia) 113, 117–19 Yearbook of International Associations 66