Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather

Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather

VS RESEARCH

Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher

Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather The Case of Lebanon

With a foreword by Prof. Dr. Theodor Hanf

VS RESEARCH

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Dissertation Universität Freiburg, 2007 Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienstes

1st Edition 2009 All rights reserved © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2009 Editorial Office: Dorothee Koch / Anita Wilke VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is part of the specialist publishing group Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Registered and/or industrial names, trade names, trade descriptions etc. cited in this publication are part of the law for trade-mark protection and may not be used free in any form or by any means even if this is not specifically marked. Cover design: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany ISBN 978-3-531-16529-5

To the memory of Riad Fakhoury

Foreword

Is democracy possible only in homogeneous societies? Does heterogeneity exclude a stable democracy? Throughout history, ethnic, linguistic, or religious homogeneity whether by circumstance, coercion, or choice, has seemingly been conducive to democracy. In France, democracy was established after the imposition of religious uniformity and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The United States pulled in immigrants who renounced their original affiliations to forge a new identity in a newly born state. Still, defying assumptions, democracies have emerged in heterogeneous states such as the Swiss Confederation, the Successor States of the Holy Roman Empire and, later, those carved out of the previous colonial empires. One common feature is the failure of – often violent – attempts to enforce homogeneity, or the lack of any such attempt in the first place. In the course of time, these divided societies have learned to live in diversity, to pacify their differences, and to find a path towards peace or at least accommodation. In sum, they went beyond forms of separating powers to sharing power. Whether defined by ethnicity, language, religion, or even ideology, communities agreed to a pact on participating in a joint government based on proportional or even equal representation. It is noteworthy that political systems based on power-sharing were long marginal in mainstream political science which laid an emphasis on democratic transitions in homogeneous societies and on socio-economic or cultural prerequisites that facilitate the rise of democracy. However, this changed in the 1960s with the emergence of a new “consociationalist” school which proposed treating power-sharing systems as a distinct type of democracy capable of overcoming divisive cleavages and of securing coexistence. Since then, the power-sharing model in divided societies has inspired a plethora of writings. Numerous studies elaborated theoretical frameworks that outlined the features of this model and pondered the conditions facilitating or thwarting its applicability. With time, the model acquired normative and prescriptive functions and was even recommended for pacifying conflict-ridden societies in which forceful attempts of homogenization had aggravated dissension. Nowadays, in the wake of the colonial empires’ collapse and later the break up of the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of so many non-homogeneous states, modes of governance based on power-sharing seem to become the rule rather than the exception. Still, the relevance of power-sharing systems needs to be analyzed with caution. Cyprus’ unstable consociational experience, Lebanon’s power-sharing breakdown

8

Foreword

in 1975 and the fragility of its post-war predicament, recent constitutional paralysis in Belgium, doubts pertaining to the effectiveness of the power-sharing model in Switzerland after the country’s largest political party was no longer represented in government prompt daunting questions about the sustainability of power-sharing models as well as about their effectiveness in times of polarization. Hence, it seems of paramount importance to reassess the concept of power-sharing, to re-explore its limitations and reexamine its prescriptive value. This book is to be viewed as an eminent contribution to this undertaking. Tamirace Fakhoury proposes to refocus attention on the power-sharing model of governance by identifying its potentialities and its limitations as well as by substantiating suggestions for further theoretical study. She then proceeds to testing the applicability of the model to a major case study which has provided an empirical benchmark to Arend Lijphart’s concept of consociational democracy: Lebanon. After examining Lebanon’s pre-war power-sharing model as well as the factors behind its collapse in 1975, the study focuses on Lebanon’s post-war order by depicting on the one hand its democratic/autocratic components and its power-sharing traits on the other hand. With the ratification of the Ta’if Treaty in 1991, Lebanon’s consociational democracy turned into an ambiguous system, characterized by a complex mix of democratic, authoritarian, and power-sharing pressures. The emergence of a consociation heavily influenced by external factors impaired power-sharing devices, and disfigured the politics of accommodation. The book proposes a contextual framework for analysing the internal and exogenous factors that affect Lebanon’s consociational system. It shows how, beyond the variable of the “self-negating prophecy”, the small republic’s fate remains interwoven with its regional environment and heavily influenced by various institutional, communal and elite conditions. The interplay of internal and external factors in the Lebanese case conditions the resilience of the power-sharing model of governance and reveals its dependence on an auspicious configuration without which consociational settlements are prone to instability. A further merit of this study is its attempt to link the theory of consociationalism with the more recent works on transitology and democratic transition, bringing to the fore the necessity of studying the democratic or un-democratic components of the system as a major variable that impacts power-sharing dynamics. Beyond the implications the study has on the Lebanese case, it reveals broader insights that transcend the Lebanese experience as such and tell much about the shortcomings and benefits of consociational settlements in deeply divided societies. Theodor Hanf

Acknowledgments

The idea of writing a dissertation on Lebanon’s political transition, initially inspired by a discussion with Lebanese academics in 2001 in Beit Chabab (Mount Lebanon), had several underlying motives. The most important one was an earnest desire to understand the overlapping external and internal mechanisms that contribute to Lebanon’s unstable predicament. Yet, this would not have been possible without the precious help of my advisor, Professor Dr. Theodor Hanf, who helped me evaluate Lebanon’s complex situation with an objective eye. I thank him for his immense assistance and mostly for his confidence in me. I also thank him for offering me the opportunity to conduct research at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in Freiburg. I would also like to thank my co-adviser, Professor Dr. Jürgen Rüland who offered valuable guidance. A special thanks goes to Professor Heribert Weiland who provided me with significant intellectual support during my stay at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute. I also wish to thank the German Service for Academic Exchange (DAAD) that funded my research project at the Albert-Ludwigs University in Freiburg. Furthermore, I extend many thanks to my friends, especially Coralie Hindawi, and Ulrike Ostertag, for their support during the writing phase, and to my colleagues at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, especially to Margret Rae, Leslie Tramontini, and Matthias Seifert, who assisted me with the correction. Many thanks go also to my colleagues Martin Adelman, Petra Bauerle, Marcel Baumann, Hannelore Fladerer, Angela Hermann, Clemens Juergenmeyer, Beatrice Schlee, Jan Voelkel, and many others who have made my stay at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute pleasant and enriching. I would particularly like to thank my family in Lebanon. I am mostly grateful to my mother Amal and to my sister Tala for their encouragement and valuable advice. I am also thankful to my brothers, Omar and Wael, for their inspirational remarks. A special note of gratitude goes to Jörg Muehlbacher who offered valuable help during the writing and editing phases. Finally, I hope that this study of Lebanon’s power-sharing and democratization since 1943 will shed some light on Lebanon’s conundrum and prospects for stability. Tamirace Fakhoury

Contents

Introductory Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A general review of the literature on Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statement of the problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypotheses and study structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Long-term implications and contributions of the study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The method of research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Further methods of inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 21 27 28 31 32 33

1. Review and Critique of the Literature on Consociational Democracy Theorizing consociationalism: The evolution of the theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consociational democracy as a prescriptive model in deeply fragmented societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The other side of the medal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A criticism of the consociational model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A criticism of the consociational theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lijphart’s reaction: A struggle against all odds? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The survivability of consociational democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The consociational model and its relation to our case study . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35 40

2. Pre-War Lebanon:A Dance into the Abyss of Consociationalism . . . . Consociational democracy in pre-war Lebanon: The characteristics of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The factors conducive to consociational democracy: Why are they problematic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Performance of the pre-war consociational model (1943–1975) . . . . . . . . . . The strengths of the pre-war consociational model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The defects of the pre-war consociational model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An inevitable collapse? An inquiry into the reasons behind consociational failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A zone of turbulences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The elite factor in the consociational breakdown (1967–1976) . . . . . . . . . . . The economic factor in the consociational breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Synthesis: The status of the favorable factors revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45 47 48 54 70 73 75 77 77 79 85 86 93 102 114 126 130 135

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Contents

3. Post-War Lebanon: The Lost Republic’s Peregrinations . . . . . . . . . . . The rise of a competitive semi-authoritarian regime (1990–2005) . . . . . . . . The deconstruction of the democratic myth in the Second Republic . . . . . . . The transition paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hybrid regimes, types and characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lebanon in the transition paradigm: A peculiar tale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The architecture of semi-authoritarianism: The indicators (1990–2004) . . . The Ta’if setting, background and aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The truncated implementation of the Ta’if agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Syrian predominance and the Lebanese-Syrian riddle of semi-authoritarianism (1976–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Post-war elections: A tool of semi-authoritarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Points of elite authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The triumph of authoritarian pressures in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Synthesis: The games that Lebanese semi-authoritarianism played . . . . . . .

137 137 139 143 145 157 158 159 164

4. Post-War Lebanon’s Long and Perilous Road to Democracy . . . . . . . Lebanese democracy: A question of relativity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Democratic pressures in the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The endurance of the Lebanese civil society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The role of religious elites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2000 opening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A gust of political liberty after 2000? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The limitations and aftermath of the 2000 opening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lebanon’s 2005 transition: the end of the competitive authoritarian regime? The 2005 awakening and its underlying motives: The first signs of transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Second phase of the democratic awakening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The backstory of the Beirut Spring: A critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Third phase of the transition: Augurs of institutional revival . . . . . . . . . . . . Fourth phase of the transition: Syria’s departure or the ‘end of the affair’ . . . Fifth phase of the transition: Lebanon’s summer parliamentary elections . . . The first post-Syrian coalition cabinet and its difficult birth . . . . . . . . . . . . The international probe into Hariri’s Killing: Towards more transparency? . The opposite side of the coin or the persistence of authoritarian waves . . . . Residues of the Lebanese-Syrian constellation and surviving loyalties . . . . An evaluation of Lebanon’s transition to a low-intensity democracy . . . . . . Analysis of Lebanon’s path to system transition in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rethinking Lebanon’s minimal democracy: A looming backlash? . . . . . . . . A long road ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

245 246 249 249 251 253 254 256 258 261

176 195 207 225 243

262 279 285 290 292 294 302 305 309 309 317 318 323 324

Contents

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5. What about Post-War Consociationalism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 The rise of a ‘chaperoned’ power-sharing model: The failure of grand coalitions under Syrian tutelage (1990–2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Troika or the oligarchic elite cartel: Its effects on coalition-building and institutions (1992–1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The emergence of a shadow government: A case of “coercive consociationalism” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The gradual breakdown of the security state and the rise of a bipolar model of consociationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The national political schism: A study of prevailing political cleavages . . . . The implications of political cleavages on power-sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coalition building during the phase of bipolarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Synthesis: Prerequisites and devices of consociational democracy at peril . . Augurs of a power-sharing reawakening? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The resilience of Lebanese consociationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2005 Beirut Spring: Low-intensity power-sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The partial revival of consociational devices in the post-Syrian era . . . . . . . Demystifying the 2005 power-sharing revival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consociation in difficulty: Shaky patterns of elite accommodation . . . . . . . Lebanon’s shackled foreign policy: The impossible condition of non-alignment and the increase of external burdens on the porous republic after 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communal segmentation in post-war Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dark clouds over Lebanon’s consociationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

328 330 336 344 345 357 358 360 361 362 363 368 371 371 391 409 419

6. Final Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 Crafting a Consociational Democracy: The Limits of the ‘Self-Negating Prophecy’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The prospects for Lebanon’s consociational democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reinventing consociationalism: For a gradualist path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consociational challenges: How to turn a low-intensity model of power-sharing into a viable democracy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Institutional engineering: Synchronizing democracy and power-sharing . . . Institutionalized deadlock-breaking mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A solution to communal desegmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reformulating the problem of national identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An external or internal solution to Lebanon’s oppressive alignment?: The making of a cautious foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An ill-timed reform for an agonizing consociation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

425 429 430 432 432 433 435 442 447 452

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Contents

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 Consociational theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Democracy and democratic transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pre- and post-war Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Country review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Politics and system transition in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

455 459 462 475 476

List of Figures

Figure 3.1: Figure 3.2: Figure 3.3: Figure 3.4: Figure 3.5: Figure 3.6: Figure 4.1: Figure 4.2: Figure 5.1: Figure 5.2: Figure 6.1: Figure 6.2: Figure 6.3: Figure 6.4:

System transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . System transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Subtypes of pseudo-democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Subtypes of electoral authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pattern of gradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pattern of degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 2005 legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The path to Lebanon’s 2005 system transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The bipolar rift between the 8 and the 14 March Coalitions . . . . The rise of a bipolar system in the post-1559 era . . . . . . . . . . . . Lebanon’s chronological system transition since 1943 . . . . . . . . From a fragmented to a concordant culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consolidating the Lebanese identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The stability pyramid (from bottom to top) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

150 150 150 151 152 152 300 320 353 358 427 442 447 451

Introductory Overview

“This time, they should agree on Lebanon’s meaning: do external powers want to make out of it a battlefield where old scores are settled or a success story for Arab democracy?”1 By the middle of that decade, a fleeting wind of democracy blew in the Arab world. Political theories tackling the region’s “democratic resistance”2 were increasingly examined with a sceptical eye as competitive elections in Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon heralded a new Middle Eastern era.3 This array of political events prompted worldwide attention, and inspired naïve visions of Arab democratization stemming from the ‘Iraq effect.’ However, no sooner did it become obvious that this stream of democracy was largely an elusive consequence of externally monitored democracy assistance,4 and partly an instrument of survival in closed regimes5 than strong disbeliefs resurfaced: the robust authoritarian constructs of Arab regimes6 cannot be altered in a short period of time, and “the democratic elixir”7 cannot be instilled overnight.

1 2

3

4 5

6

7

Anonymous, interview with the author, 16 July 2006. Peter Pawelka, “Der Staat im Vorderen Orient: Über die Demokratieresistenz in einer globalisierten Welt,” Leviathan 30 (2002): 431-454. Richard Beeston and Rana Sabbagh-Gargour, “Democracy Dawns in Arab world,” Times, March 3, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-1508354,00.html. Partly a consequence of the US plan to restructure the region after the September 11 attacks. For example, the Egyptian polls that took place end of 2005 and that were characterized by an increasing degree of liberalization were interpreted as a premeditated attempt by the regime to create an illusion of freedom. For strategies and patterns of “liberalized” autocracies in the Middle East, see Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 56-68. See Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 139-153. To explain why the Arab states cannot democratize so easily, Bellin invokes the factors of the solidity of the authoritarian apparatus and failed institutionalism. Augustus Richard Norton, and Farhad Kazemi, “The Limits of Shock and Awe: America in the Middle East,” Current History (January 2005): 3-9, 3.

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Introductory Overview

The Arab Spring’s shallow hull and its incapacity to bring about genuine political change came into sharper focus as analysts questioned the US plan to reinstitute the fabric of the Middle East,8 and to unleash through a domino effect, seismic waves of fragile liberalization.9 The democratic spell was broken, and the wind of change subsided. A reverse wave of liberal erosion seemed even to lurk on the horizon as excessive external pressure provoked fears of regional destabilization. Thus, in the wake of an anarchic post-Saddam Iraq, disenchantment with the ambitious US Middle Eastern agenda, and fear of system change caused authoritarian elites to apprehend all the more the increase of internal freedoms, and to hide behind the regime’s autocratic armor waiting for the international whirlwind to pass by.10 Amidst this confusion, Lebanon, with its “dissonant politics,”11 seemed to have escaped the region’s authoritarian lot. Faring well after the 2005 Beirut Spring and the ensuing Syrian withdrawal, the small Arab Republic reconfirmed its predisposition to democracy in a troubled region. Considered by system analysts as a singular “political field” entailing competition and power-sharing,12 it appeared to validate the claim that – despite a wrecking war – democratic structures could re-emerge and stand firm under the strangest circumstances. Yet, Lebanon’s story of system change does not depict a linear transition to 8

9

10

11

12

For more details on the limits of the US democratizing initiative in the Middle East, see Marina Ottoway and Thomas Carothers, “The Greater Middle East Initative: Off to a False Start,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 2004), http://www.wiamep.org/resources/ CarnegiePolicybrief29.pdf. The authors argue that introducing political transformations in the region is bound to fail if the initial problem of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not tackled. According to some analysts, the Arab Spring was stimulated by the shock wave following the invasion of Iraq. Events signalling the rise of a democratic era in the Arab world, such as the announcement of liberalization measures in Egypt and Saudia Arabia, and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, were interpreted as “promising but fragile” augurs. See Ran Halevi, “Fragile printemps arabe,” Le Figaro, April 18, 2005, http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/20050418.FIG0305 .html. The excessive international pressure on authoritarian regimes in the Middle East has led authoritarian elites to be more cautious and frightened of losing their power. In spring 2006, for instance, the Egyptian and Syrian governments staged crackdowns on internal oppositionists. These crackdowns coincided with the escalation of US pressure on Syria, the US-Iranian altercation over the nuclear file, and with the increase of riots in Iraq. See for example “Egypt: Amnesty International Concerned about the Egyptian Security Repression against Peaceful Protesters in Cairo,” Amnesty International, May 11, 2006 http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ ENGMDE120092006?open&of=ENG-2MD, and “Syria: Another Wave of Arrests of Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Activists,” Amnesty International, May 17, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/ library/Index/ENGMDE240382006?open&of=ENG-2MD. Daniel Brumberg, “Islamists and the Politics of Consensus,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002):109-115, 112. Ibid., 112.

Introductory Overview

19

democracy. In fact, its soul-searching could be more described as a series of stopovers in inconclusive gateways of political change. Described as “the only Arab country to sustain a form of democracy [...] for a significant period of time”13 and endowed with a pre-democratic history dating back to Ottoman Mount Lebanon, Lebanon has indeed strayed far from its neighbors. Hence, after its independence from French rule in 1943, a powersharing national pact gave substantial shape to the communal aspirations of living in one nation-state. This accord was based on the vision of a Lebanese entity built on the basis of coexistence, and dependent on a state of intercommunal equilibrium.14 In this project of coexistence, the exclusion of any community or the monopoly of any other would lead to fragmentation and destabilization of political order. 15 After the materialization of the 1943 pact, Lebanon’s politics of concordance seemed to constitute a shield against centrifugalism and the penetration of regional authoritarianism. In fact, scholars were long puzzled by this republic which constituted an example of a paradoxical yet happy phenomenon. What made the Lebanese formula even more astounding was its viability in spite of 17 different confessions.16 It was even suggested that this confessional pluralism need not be a disintegrative tool, but could be efficiently channelled to fit evolving political patterns.17 Nevertheless, as time went by, Lebanon’s political structure revealed many underlying schisms. The moment regional upheavals loomed large, the powersharing apparatus unveiled deep contradictions that exacerbated internal cleavages and gave fuel to the fire. Following the intensification of regional conflicts in the aftermath of the Israeli-Arab Six-Day War, the consociational arrangement was no longer able to mend fractures that tore apart the political fabric, and communalism degenerated into a formula for antagonisms: A 15-year war with domestic, regional and international dimensions, was more than sufficient to shatter the precarious foundations of consociational democracy upon which the Lebanese polity was built. During the vicissitudes of a long and exhausting war, Lebanon’s previous politics of concordance came to stand for a utopia which cannot triumph over the restrictive political reality in turbulent regions. 13 14 15 16

17

Samuel Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 2 (1991):12-34, 28. Michel Chiha, Politique intérieure (Beirut: Fondation Michel Chiha, 1964), 54-55. Ibid. Brenda Seaver, “The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon,” Political Science Quarterly 115 (2000): 247-271. Samir Khalaf, “Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon,” Middle Eastern Studies 4 (1968): 243269

20

Introductory Overview

Still, as armed conflicts were drawing to an end in 1989, a new powersharing agreement referred to as the Ta’if covenant and facilitated by international and regional powers, re-enlivened and institutionalized the informal 1943 national pact in a new modus vivendi. It seemed that despite the misfortunes of warfare, Lebanon was set to embark on a new post-conflict trip to peace and stability. However, with the internal dissidence caused by lingering hostilities, the biased implementation of the Ta'if agreement, and the preponderant role that Syria acquired in Lebanon after the ratification of the pact, analysts asked whether the reborn Lebanon did not in fact resemble more “a floating country with no identifiable center of gravity.”18 Throughout the postwar period, it was even suggested that, under Syrian guardianship, Lebanon was acquiring the traits of a closed system and that its power-sharing distinctiveness was dissolving into a disfigured consociational oligarchy. In 2005, in spite of its nebulous post-war predicament, Lebanon again neared the democratic shore after a kind of opposition-led movement in unison with international pressure broke the chains of the post-Ta’if legacy. The international community hailed the dawn of Lebanon’s 2005 ‘white revolution’ as a success story which proved that democracy could be infused in the Arab world despite the festering Middle Eastern conflict. Surprisingly enough, the Lebanese tale took yet another unexpected turn as two successive “Summers of Rage”19 dealt a heavy blow to the fragments of hope that were in full bloom on March 14, 2005, considered to be the epitome of Lebanon’s Democratic Spring. After Syrian withdrawal and the free 2005 parliamentary elections, a series of upheavals thrust Lebanon’s Janus face back into the limelight. First, a string of political assassinations called to mind the country’s defective state structures and porousness. Second, the previously called ‘pearl of the Mediterranean’ had to face a 34-day war which turned its Southern part into ‘a no man’s land’, and deferred political stability to better days. Israel’s largest offensive in Lebanon since the 1982 invasion overshadowed the memory of the Beirut Spring, and confirmed that Lebanon remained an arena for the unsettled regional strife. Comparatively speaking, whereas 2005 was considered to be the springtime of liberalization not only for Lebanon but also for the Middle East, the years 2006 and 2007 tolled the delusive chant of democracy and stability. On a regional level, Lebanon’s descending dance into the abyss of violence was 18

19

See Farid El Khazen, “Lebanon’s Communal Elite-Mass Politics: The Institutionalization of Disintegration,” The Beirut Review (1992): 53-82, 78. I refer to summer 2005 in which political assassinations were perpetrated and the subsequent Hezbollah-Israeli war in July 2006.

Introductory Overview

21

accompanied by foreboding disturbance namely the growing internal upheavals in Iraq after the US-led offensive, the Western war on terror, the US-Iranian altercation over Teheran’s nuclear program, and the derailment of the Middle East process after Israel’s two- front war in Lebanon and Gaza. In addition, by bringing to the fore dreaded partners in the Middle Eastern arena, the rhetoric of political reform ended up producing a boomerang effect and backfiring on its ‘orchestrators.’ The radicalization of non-state actors,20 the strengthening of fundamentalist actors, as well as the emergence of a “Shiite Crescent” of resistance from Lebanon to Iran21 signalled an impending regional unsteadiness, and a dangerous Sunni-Shiite polarization slicing the region. It became obvious that ‘the new Middle East’ which has emerged – after the democratic wind abated – was closer to a battlefield than to the US vision of an Arab world living in “democratic peace.”22 It is within this double-barrelled setting of regional authoritarianism and turmoil, reform and relapse that Lebanon has been struggling since its formation. Torn between its regional calling and its internal vocation of communal coexistence, overburdened with the heavy load on its political system, consociational Lebanon does not seem to enjoy favorable factors for political stability. First, easily drawn into the regional cyclone, the small porous polity has become a barometer for the troublesome state of affairs in the Middle East. Moreover, lost in a constellation of contradictory loyalties, its own internal confessional structure seems to stand in the way of further development. More importantly, its power-sharing politics pivots more around interplay of extrinsic factors than around the magic formula of deliberative democracy.

A general review of the literature on Lebanon Since Lebanon’s creation in 1943, its power-sharing model and democratic apparatus have inspired a plethora of writings. Many studies particularly focused on the study of the Lebanese divided society as well as its communal

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The international community has been dealing with caution and reluctance with non-state actors – such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine – which have consolidated their power in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. For more information on the rise of the Shiite crescent, see Ashar Susser, “Aufgang des schiitischen Halbmonds,” Internationale Politik (September 2006): 68-73. The theory of democratic peace claims that democracies do not fight against each other. It is noted that this theory inspired the US-led initiative of democratization in the Middle East. See Norton and Kazemi, “The Limits of Shock,” 3.

22

Introductory Overview

cleavages,23 and attempted to retrace the patterns of coexistence as well as the segments’ antagonistic perceptions in a historical perspective.24 The Lebanese consociational system has notably constituted a major area of scholarly interest. Integrated in major international works on consociational democracy,25 the Lebanese power-sharing model has been subsequently reassessed against the backdrop of the consociational theory. 26 Consociational Lebanon has recently inspired comparative approaches which examine its powersharing evolution in an international perspective.27 In addition to the consociational approach, various studies assessed Lebanon’s communalism by analyzing the intricacies of Lebanon’s state formation, the 1943 power-sharing pact and the circumstances that led to its adoption in the 1940s.28 This alternative approach enabled the study of background and historical factors which shaped the power-sharing trajectory, and allowed a better understanding of the conflicting communal perceptions and the clashing visions of Lebanese identity. A general inspection of the literature written on Lebanon’s power-sharing model and political institutions has allowed me to draw noteworthy remarks 23

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Eminent works which analyze Lebanon’s segmental cleavages and communal structure in a comparative perspective are: Latif Abul Husn, The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward (Boulder, Rienner, 1998); Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: a History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon (London: The Center for Lebanese Studies & I.B. Tauris, 1993). Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System,” European Journal of Political Research 3 (1975): 377-391; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Richard Hrair Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon,” Comparative Politics 10 (1978): 251-266; Antoine Messarra, Théorie générale du système politique libanais (Paris: Cariscript, 1994); Andrew Rigby, “Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics,” Parliamentary Affairs 53 (2000): 169-180. Sanaa Ashour, Ethnic politics and Policymaking in Lebanon and Malaysia (Göttingen: Cuvillier, 2004); Arfi Badredine, International Change and the Stability of Multiethnic Societies: Yugoslavia, Lebanon, and Crises of Governance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Nothern Ireland and Lebanon (Ireland: Irish Academic Press, 2005). For an analysis of colonial times and the historical factors that paved the way for the Lebanese state formation and the adoption of the 1943 National Pact, see for example Kais M. Firro, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003); Edmond Rabbath, La formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel (Beirut: Libraire Orientale, 1973); Raghid el Solh, Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation (London: Tauris, 2004); Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).

Introductory Overview

23

pertinent to my topic. These inferences revolve first around the intellectual debate on Lebanon’s consociationalism, second around the ‘regime question’ of the Lebanese polity, and third around the shifting scholarly interests concerning the Lebanese state. First, upon reviewing the literature on pre-war consociationalism, one notices that a major subject of academic disagreement is the nature of the system itself. Whereas some analysts portray the pre-war power-sharing model as a source for many ills, and detect causation between the system and the outbreak of the war in 1975,29 others regard the power-sharing formula as a framework which allowed Lebanon to cope with its dividing cleavages.30 The nature of the 1975 consociational breakdown has notably fuelled much controversy. Whilst some analysts attribute the inauspicious collapse to an intrinsic error inherent to the power-sharing system,31 others assert that regional and international factors played an overriding role.32 In fact, conspicuous disagreement on the reasons behind the consociational crash prevails up to now.33 On the other hand, the democratic components of pre-war institutions have also been examined from various perspectives. Remarkable analytical studies tackled the institutional structures and their functional attributes before the outbreak of the war.34 Whereas some works attracted attention to the resilience and endurance of the Lebanese democracy in a turbulent environment,35 other critical writings questioned the sustainability of the precarious Lebanese

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Michael Hudson, “The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy,” Journal of Palestine Studies 5 (1976):109-122. David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana, (New York: Elsevier, 1975). Hudson, “The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed,” in Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus, eds Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (London: The Center of Lebanese Studies & I.B. Tauris, 1988), 224-239; Joseph G. Jabbra and Nancy W. Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy in Lebanon: A Flawed System of Governance,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 17 (2001), 71-89. Farid El Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Brenda M. Seaver, “The Regional Sources.” For a detailed literary review of the literature on Lebanon’s consociational collapse, see chapter 2, section 2.3. Leonard Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: Wiley, 1966); Hudson, The Precarious Republic (New York: Random House, 1968). Ralph Crow, “Parliament in the Lebanese Political System,” in Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, eds Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (North Carolina: Duke, 1970), 273-302.

24

Introductory Overview

democratic apparatus, its low degrees of institutionalization,36 and put into question its degree of democratization.37 In the aftermath of the 15-year war, one notices a shift of scholarly interest from the consociational framework to the exploration of prospects for stability in a post-conflict society. While less academic works devote pure attention to an analysis of the post-war consociational dynamics and their relation to the theory of power-sharing,38 many writings concentrate on the specific dynamics of the political landscape inherited from the war39 and on the perspectives of sustainable conflict-regulation.40 Whereas fewer studies praise Lebanon’s surviving democratic institutions and political pluralism,41 major emphasis is laid on the deficient structures of a “derailed” democracy,42 and on emergent political institutions heavily influenced by Syrian guardianship.43 In addition to the scholarly interest in deformed post-war institutions, various studies explicitly deal with the mechanisms and impact of the post-war Pax Syriana on a subordinated republic.44 Contrary to pre-war literature which 36 37 38

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44

See Hudson, Precarious Republic. David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country (Oxford: Robertson, 1983), 3. There are of course notable exceptions which tackled Lebanon’s consensual politics since 1990 by relying on the consociational model. See for example Antoine Messarra, La gouvernance d'un système consensuel: le Liban après les amendements constitutionnels de 1990 (Beyrouth, Librairie Orientale, 2003). Notable works which analyze the post-war landscape are: Kail C. Ellis, ed., Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002); Theodor Hanf and Nawaf Salam, ed., Lebanon in Limbo: Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag Gesellschaft, 2003); Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon, A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon (New York: Holmes and Meier, 2002); Nawaf Salam, ed., Options for Lebanon (London: Center for Lebanese Studies in association with IB Tauris, 2004). Volker Perthes, “Lebanon: Ripeness for Regulation and Post-Civil War Conflicts,” in Civil Wars: Consequences and Possibilities for Regulation, eds Heinrich Krumwiede and Peter Waldmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000),153-165. Notable exceptions are: Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, “Lebanon,” in Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 79-109; Illiya Harik, “Pluralism in the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 43-56, 51. See Hassan A.G. Al-Khatib, The General Factors for the Collapse of Democracy in Lebanon (London: Hassan Al-Khatib,1994); Judith Palmer Harik, “Democray (again) Derailed: Lebanon’s Ta’if Paradox,” in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, eds Rex Brynen, Baghat Korany and Paul Noble, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Paul Salem, “Framing Post-War Lebanon: Perspectives on the Constitution and the Structure of Power,” Mediterranean Politics 3 (1998): 13-26. See for example El Khazen, “The Postwar Political Process: Authoritarianism by Diffusion,” in Lebanon in Limbo, 53-74; Hilal Khashan, “Lebanon’s 1996 Controversial Parliamentary Elections,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 20 (1997): 24-49. Habib C. Malik, Between Damascus and Jerusalem: Lebanon and Middle East Peace (The

Introductory Overview

25

exhibits in a general manner great interest in the resilience of the power-sharing formula, post-war literature examines with great circumspection the powersharing patterns of politics transmitted by the consociational Ta’if pact.45 Many scholars question to what extent the post-war inter-communal agreement can be considered as an instrument for conflict-regulation as its implementation has been impaired by various intrinsic and extrinsic factors.46 An additional plethora of work evaluates post-war communal relations against the background of the Lebanese conflict and its ramifications. Whereas some works portray the perspectives of consociational coexistence in a positive light,47 a large number of studies highlight the disintegrative effect of confessionalism,48 and the patterns of communal marginalization in the post-war patchwork.49 More recently, in light of the stalling Middle Eastern peace process, increasing attention has been riveted on Lebanon’s status in regional politics. Prominent works and articles have shed light on the regional dimension of Lebanon’s internal politics and on Lebanon’s dilemma in interaction with its troubled surroundings.50 Despite this diversification of analytical approaches which do not only concentrate on Lebanon’s political and communal dynamics but also depict the polity’s status in the Middle East, fewer studies attempted to reconcile Lebanon’s consociational and democratic system trends in one analytical mold and in regard to transitional politics. More particularly, not much attention has been paid to the correlations and interactions between Lebanon’s consociational and democratic

45

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47 48

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Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997); Fida Nasrallah, “The Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-Ordination,” in State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1993),103-111. Michael Hudson, “Lebanon After Ta’if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost,” Arab Studies Quarterly 21 (1999): 27-40; Augustus Richard Norton, “Lebanon After Ta’if: Is the Civil War Over?” The Middle East Journal 45 (1991): 457-473. For an evaluation of the post-war consociational pact or the Ta’if agreement, see Joseph Maila, “The Ta’if Accord: An Evaluation” in Peace for Lebanon?: From War to Reconstruction, ed. Deirdre Collings (Boulder: Rienner, 1994), 31-44. See Abul Husn, The Lebanese Conflict. Elizabeth Picard, “Les habits neufs du communautarisme libanais,” Cultures & Conflits 16 (1994): 49-70; Sami Ofeish, “Lebanon’s Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application,” Arab Studies Quarterly 21, (1999): 97-116. Carole Dagher, “Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon’s Postwar Challenge (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000); Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence; Elizabeth Picard, The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1999). See for example Marius Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process (London: Palgrave Macmillan: 2003); Robert G. Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ: 2003).

26

Introductory Overview

patterns on the one hand, and the Lebanese regime’s mutations from a transitologist perspective.51 Hence, on a broader scale, Lebanon’s pre-war and post-war patterns of evolution have not been seriously integrated in the mainstream literature on democratic transitions. Whilst the democratic transition paradigm has inspired innumerable comparative works worldwide,52 Lebanon’s patterns of system change which do not fit in the linear trajectory of democratization,53 have been made little of.54 Moreover, in most of the comparative literature on political systems in the Middle East, the “limited” case of Lebanon’s exceptionalism,55 which is not compatible with the complex features of Arab authoritarianism, is not thoroughly examined.56 51

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Transitology stands for the study of democratic transitions or the study of system transformation from autocracy to democracy. For a review of research studies on democratic transitions, see Gerardo L. Munck, “The Regime Question, Theory Building in Democracy Studies,” World Politics 54 (2001): 119-144. Although a transition towards democracy tends to differ from on case to the other, it has been generally defined as the dissolution of an authoritarian regime and the installation of some kind of democracy. The second phase comprises the consolidation of the emergent democracy. For a theoretical analysis of democratic transitions, see Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation Issues: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, eds Scott Mainwaring, J. Samuel Valenzuela and Guillermo O’Donnell (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1992), 294- 341. In Journal of Democracy, for example, whereas various previous issues tackled the prospects for Arab democratization, it was only in the wake of premier Hariri’s slaying that the Lebanese political scene has been reviewed. See Oussama Safa, “Lebanon Springs Forward,” Journal of Democracy 17 (2006): 22-37. Farhad Kazemi and Augustus Richard Norton, “Harliners and Softliners in the Middle East: Problems of Governance and the Prospects for Liberalization in Authoritarian Political Systems,” in Democracy and its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, eds Howard Handelman and Mark Tessler (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 69-89, 76. Upon assessing system change and prospects for democratization in the Middle East, major focus is laid on authoritarian systems, their strategies of subsistence, and their dynamics. Though present, the study of the Lebanese democratic structures in comparative and dynamic perspective remains marginal. For an analysis of political regimes in the Middle East which includes Lebanon albeit marginally, see Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); David Garnham and Mark Tessler, eds, Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1995); Rex Brynen, Baghat Korany and Paul Noble, eds, Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, eds, Democratization in

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27

What complicates the problem even more is that even Middle Eastern countries which followed their own pathway of political transition57 have nearly been – until recently – absent from mainstream works on system transition.58 In the final analysis, whereas the traditional democratic paradigm fails to address Lebanon’s peculiar evolution, the theoretical approaches and transition studies tackling the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East and the behavior of authoritarian elites do not devote much space to the Lebanese polity, for the mere fact that they are unable to frame the uncommon system transition in the small republic. Furthermore, in spite of the abundant literature on Lebanon’s power-sharing, few studies detected structural factors accountable not only for the collapse of the consociational system in 1975 but also for the changing pre-war and post-war consociational trends in a comparative perspective. Thus, great controversy still hovers whether structural determinants related to the societal structure and to the circumstances of state formation, political leadership or exogenous factors can help explain Lebanon’s erratic power-sharing paterns. Statement of the problem Against the backdrop of regional and international disturbances, this book attempts to decode Lebanon’s singular democratic and power-sharing transition from 1943 up to 2006 by drawing upon the theories of consociational democracy and system transition. It proposes to integrate Lebanon’s system change into the

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the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003). Whereas the number of democracies nearly became double since 1972, “the number in this region has registered an absolute decline.” See Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism,” 139. It has even been noted that Middle Eastern cases have been conspicuously absent from “canonical books,” and “leading journals” on democratization. See Jason M. Brownlee, “Review Article: Low Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism,” Comparative Politics (July 2002): 477-499, 478. See also Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory,” Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 127-138. It is only since September 11 and with the failings of democracy promotion in the region after the invasion of Iraq, and more recently with the exacerbation of conflicts in the Middle East, that a greater interest in studying the reasons behind the endurance and persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world has been noted. For a comprehensive work on authoritarianism in the Middle East, see for example Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, eds, Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

28

Introductory Overview

literature on transitology,59 and explains the contingencies of consociational engineering in the small republic by solving the uneasy relationship between elite voluntarism and deterministic factors in the Lebanese consociational case, and by delimiting structural conditions which shape its power-sharing parameters. It traces thus the principal exogenous and endogenous conditions that have impacted system dynamics, and answers the question whether a powersharing democracy, whose fate is interwoven with the regional quagmire and whose fallacies are magnified by external cleavages, could ever function and sustain itself. Furthermore, the book portrays how trends of consociationalism as well as the interplay of democratic and authoritarian pressures impact the question of democratization in post-war Lebanon. In order to understand how Lebanon’s power-sharing democracy has fared and will fare, I developed a general analytical and structural framework appropriate to the Lebanese case. The overarching hypothesis is that Lebanon’s consociational democracy is stringently determined by constrictive variables, namely the institutional and democratic design of the system, the dynamics that shape elite coalescence, the communities’ identification with the power-sharing formula, and the regional impact on the formula. These contextually based conditions help measure the fluctuations of the model against specific yardsticks, and, in addition, improve the predictive potential of the consociational theory in relation to the Lebanese case.

Hypotheses and study structure Divided into six chapters, the book is organized into two main parts revolving around pre- and post-war Lebanon. The two chapters which form the first part mainly deal with consociational democracy in general and the consociational model in pre-war Lebanon in particular. The first chapter highlights the distinctive features of consociational democracy and analyzes its major shortcomings. This background on consociational theory is essential for an assessment of the pre-war political system since it provides the main analytical framework upon which I build my hypotheses. Serving as a point of departure, the theoretical part enables me to compare and contrast the pre- and post-war systems as well as to evaluate the mutations of the Lebanese political regime.

59

See Chapter 3 on post-war Lebanon.

Introductory Overview

29

The second chapter tackles the pre-war consociational model, the factors that led to its emergence, its strengths and defects, and finally the reasons for its collapse. This part is considered as the principal benchmark against which postwar power-sharing developments will be measured. The findings made at the end of the pre-war chapter concerning the collapse of the political system show that Lebanon’s consociational democracy is tied to restrictive conditions, more particularly elite accommodation, communal segmentation, and non-alignment in external conflicts. These conditions are necessary for the development and maintenance of the system. In the second part of the book, against the background of the transitologist literature, I examine Lebanon’s post-war political evolution up to 2006 by analyzing first the nature of the regime before the 2005 democratic Intifada, and then Lebanon’s transition to a ‘low-intensity’ consociational democracy after this turning point. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters adopt a comparative analysis which examine Lebanon’s double-edged democratic and power-sharing transitions. Thus, sections in these chapters are so organized that they enable me to contrast the favorable and unfavorable aspects of post-war developments. This approach, which has the disadvantage of dispersing chronological events, nonetheless avoids a passive approach to the matters discussed, and deals with various levels of analysis. In chapter 3, after a short theoretical overview on democratic transitions and hybrid regimes, I discuss the relevance of the theories on system transitions in the Lebanese case, and then I argue that Lebanon has not followed the regular path of democratization. Hence, before the 2005 political turnabout, post-war Lebanon was a semi-authoritarian regime with both democratic and autocratic features. To prove this statement, I separately analyze the intertwined autocratic and democratic components that make up the nature of this hybrid. In the second section of the chapter, I extrapolate from various case studies the salient authoritarian characteristics of the post-war hybrid regime and tackle the factors and mechanisms that made the emergence of such a system possible. In Chapter 4, the first section depicts the main democratic pressures that remained alive despite the emergence of semi-authoritarianism. It also sheds light on the 2000 transitory opening that took place in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. This section also shows how the regional conjuncture overshadowed competitive pressures in the Lebanese system and in the Lebanese civil society. The second section of the chapter traces Lebanon’s unexpected political transition from a semi-authoritarian system with a competitive façade to a controversial ‘electoral democracy’ in the light of the 2005 ‘Democratic

30

Introductory Overview

Uprising.’ The underlying international and internal factors that led to such a transition as well as the various phases that paved the way for this transition are analyzed in detail. After closely assessing the emergent political scene, I argue why the precarious electoral democracy is acutely threatened by relapse. I allude mainly to the persistence of ‘points of authority’ which will undoubtely hinder a democratic transition. Since the identity of the Lebanese model does not only revolve around its authoritarian/democratic components, but also on its derailed power-sharing elements, I choose to analyze distinctly in Chapter 5 the power-sharing devices of post-war Lebanon. This chapter which is divided into four sections examines the disfigured consociational traits of the hybrid regime up to 2005, then the power-sharing renewal heralded by the 2005 Intifada. In the first section, I principally show how consociational devices up to 2005 were heavily impaired, as power-sharing has revolved within the closed orbit of semi-authoritarianism. The main deviancies of this “perverted consociational model”60 can be traced back to the development of adversarial and unrepresentative elite cartels and to a model of subjugated governance under Syrian hegemony. In this section, I show how during this phase, primordial consociational elements, mainly the wilful politics of accommodation, a multiple balance of power, and communal veto-powers, have been severely disrupted. In the second section, I analyze the nature of political cleavages which led to the rise of a bipolar model of power-sharing before Syrian withdrawal. Light is mainly shed on the deep disagreements between the loyalist and opposition camps on the Syrian role and on international assistance after the adoption of Resolution 1559. The third section which focuses on the consociational revival that accompanied Lebanon’s 2005 transition traces the reactivation of important power-sharing mechanisms. This part examines under which circumstances and to what extent consociationalism has been restored in the wake of Lebanon’s 2005 free polls. Its main finding is that under favorable conditions, communal and elite divisions can be harnessed in such a way that a more stable consociational entity might re-emerge. The fourth section deals with the incomplete aspects of Lebanon’s consociational transition since 2005 and confirms that the sustaining conditions for a power-sharing democracy, namely elite coalescence, communal 60

Christophe Dubois, La survie libanaise, ou, l’expérience de la différence: un nécessaire élan vers l'harmonie multiconfessionnelle (Bruxelles: P.I.E.-Lang, 2002), 141.

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segmentation and non-alignment, remain adversely affected by intrinsic and extrinsic variables. Hence, the 2005 power-sharing revival notwithstanding, Lebanon’s consociational model still suffers from worrisome flaws: unstable grand coalitions, a lame national consensus, political polarization, and an extremely high external load on the system. Although the section does not tackle in detail the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war, it alludes to its possible negative aftereffects on Lebanon’s political configuration. The last part of this section draws attention to more intricate reservations about Lebanon’s consociationalism, particularly the danger behind encapsulating communal identities in confessional molds, Lebanon’s hazy confessional formula between change and perpetuity, and the inarticulate meaning of Lebanon’s Arabism. Although the study comes to the conclusion that a consociational democracy in a troubled environment is subject to deterministic conditions, the closing proposal devises a prescriptive model for the evolution of Lebanon’s consociational democracy into a more stable system. The proposal argues that it is possible to demagnify the influence of negative factors by synchronizing the democratic and consociational constituents of the system, by altering the institutional design, and by reinventing a new consociational identity based on the conciliation of cleavages as well as on the promotion of overarching loyalties. Contrary to regional analysts who advocate Lebanon’s immediate disengagement from regional turmoil, the conclusion proves that a positive non-alignment that does not backfire on the small republic could only take shape after the maturation of several consociational factors.

Long-term implications and contributions of the study This study has both long-term theoretical as well as concrete implications. Its main achievement is that it establishes linkages between the theoretical constructs on consociationalism and transitology on the one hand and Lebanon’s transition on the other hand. By bridging the gap between the theory of power-sharing and the theory of system change in the Lebanese case, I drew attention to the necessity of addressing several theoretical aspects related to the configuration of powersharing democracies which have not heretofore been tackled. On a broader scale, I attract attention to the necessity of spanning the gulf between a static consociational theory and a dynamic theory of regime trends so as to explain system evolution in consociations.

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Moreover, I hope that I have contributed to developing insight on the variables and circumstances that make consociational democracies function survive or lose momentum in turbulent regions. In this regard, I drew attention to the necessity of detecting which sustaining conditions help fragmented societies maintain stability when the load on the system increases. On a more concrete level, studying the Lebanese case in relation to transitional politics and system transformation can be of great relevance to understanding the different trajectories that democracy travels in post-conflict and fragmented societies. Lebanon’s complex political journey inductively reveals that the transition paradigm is a largely fortuitous and non-linear process that cannot be restricted to a specific pattern or a series of causal chains but which develops its own peculiar trajectory in time and space. These political transformations that escape the constants of traditional transition theory leave enough room for scientific curiosity, and bring teleological claims in democratization theories into question. On the one hand, the lessons of Lebanon’s democratic transition within the framework of power-sharing could serve as a yardstick for other plural societies embarking on a post-conflict institutional and system reform. On the other hand, the Lebanese example, with its successes and shortcomings, is of primary importance to Arab societies that have embarked on some sort of liberalization or that might embark on a democratic trip after an eventual collapse of the regime. Although profound societal and cultural differences exist among Arab societies, the fact that the latter share many common points – such as their regional position in a turbulent environment, their propensity towards internal fragmentation, and their religious cleavages – could inspire possibilities for future research. It might be worthwhile, for example, embarking on a comparative study of whether power-sharing systems could possibly be the solution to a post-authoritarian Arab world. Such an analytical study would deal with possible democratic models for Arab societies against the backdrop of various consociational designs.

The method of research The steps undertaken to address my hypotheses revolve first around a data analysis of primary and secondary literature on the theories of consociational democracy as well as system transitions. I have drawn insights and a dense research material mainly from the classical literature on consociationalism and democratization as well as from the most recent debates on unending democratic

Introductory Overview

33

journeys, and on democracy assistance and promotion in the Middle East. This review has allowed me to determine a conceptual framework for Lebanon’s twofolded development: along the continuum of democratization and the continuum of consociationalism. To address the intricacies of my case study, I first selected the most prominent studies on pre-war Lebanon, and tried to synthesize important arguments concerning the system and its final collapse. At this stage, I established common links between my theoretical construct and the pre-war scene to derive some results regarding the sustainability of power-sharing democracy in Lebanon, and come up with a precise selection of the factors that were liable for its downfall. Assessing the evolution of post-war Lebanon was a more sophisticated process as I did not only concentrate on a review of a vast and complex literature but also on a daily analysis of the international as well as the Lebanese press especially after 2004 to determine the trends of democratic/authoritarian pressures and the evolvement of power-sharing tendencies and structures. This press analysis also encompassed key international and regional developments since 2001 and their repercussions on Lebanon’s communities and powersharing system. In short, the analysis of the post-war system transition revolves notably around a descriptive account of the main political events enriched by a critical analysis against the backdrop of theoretical frameworks related to system transition and power-sharing. Further methods of inquiry In order to assess the increasingly complex situation since the adoption of Resolution 1559 in 2004, I have conducted expert interviews with Lebanese politicians from different communities and backgrounds, with Lebanese civil society activists as well as with international and Lebanese political scientists who have written much on Lebanon and on multi-confessional societies.61 These interviews, mostly audiotaped, were not conducted in order to reach specific empirical results but to gain insight into the politicians’ rhetoric, and to gain enriching perceptions on how Lebanese and Western experts conceive Lebanon’s power-sharing and system transition.

61

The names of interviewed Lebanese politicians and political scientists remain in this study anonymous so as to protect the privacy of individuals who do not wish to make some statements public because of the sensitive connotations these statements might call forth.

34

Introductory Overview

In order to evaluate these interviews, I have synthesized long transcripts so as to come up with a coherent pattern that allows me to compare different political discourses and analytical outlooks. These interviews were particularly helpful for filling in analytical gaps especially after the 2004 turnabout, for critical literature on Lebanon’s evolution after this point is limited. Second, they allowed me to evaluate the complicated regional and international conjuncture since September 2001 from different perspectives so as to assess how external conflicts exacerbated Lebanon’s internal dividing lines. More importantly, the interviews with Lebanese politicians helped me study the nature of cleavages after the extension of President Emile Lahoud’s mandate, and find out which national divides have particularly destabilized Lebanon. During my trips to Lebanon in fall 2004, September 2005, April and November 2006, I conducted informal interviews with Lebanese from different confessions in order to come to grips with several communal standpoints concerning national dividing lines, such as international pressure, Resolution 1559, the Syrian withdrawal, and Lebanese-Syrian relations. In sum, these interviews were solely made for the sake of getting a better understanding of Lebanese public opinion during the recent turbulent period.

1. Review and Critique of the Literature on Consociational Democracy Democracy

It has always been rather assumed that socio-cultural homogeneity and majoritarian consensus are the main pillars upon which democracy1 could develop and consolidate its foundations. Yet, in the 1960s, political scientists strongly challenged these views and elaborated comparable types that helped explain stability in fragmented cultures. There was a growing concern that classical Western-style models with their relatively stable party-systems and coalitions have proven to be inapplicable to a specific category of societies which lacked homogeneity.2 Thus, pluralistic and segmented societies characterized by economic, religious, social, and ideological cleavages have persistently escaped the theoretical frame of familiar typologies. Furthermore, the Western model of democracy was unable to account for the record of stability in the smaller European countries which enjoyed considerable equilibrium despite their segmentation. In Almond’s analysis, for example, these societies were seen as oscillating between the “Anglo-American type” and the “continental European System,” yet they were never assigned a category of their own.3 Defying prior typologies and the assumption that democracy goes only with majority rule, scholars sought for a particular model that safeguards the essence of democracy and helps reconcile fragmentation with stability.4 Attention has been shifted to actor-related models and elite behavior. Different terminologies were developed to qualify or describe this multi-faceted approach, which was hailed as a major breakthrough in comparative political literature, and which

1

2

3

4

In this study, democracy is equated with Dahl’s concept of “polyarchy” defined as an inclusive and highly competitive regime characterized by political participation, a high level of civil and political liberties, and a tolerated opposition. For more details, see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 120. See for example Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21(1969): 207-225; Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, (Cambridge, MA: Cent. Int. Aff. Harward University, 1972). For an account of these typologies, see Gabriel Almond, “Comparative Political Systems,” Journal of Politics 18, (1956): 391-409. In this regard, Nordlinger called for “an additional democratic model” to study fragmented societies. See Conflict Regulation, 3.

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even brought analysts in the 1960s to allude to it as a school. 5 While Lorwin used the term segmented pluralism to describe this phenomenon, Lehmbruch called this particular form of democracy “proportional” or “concordant” democracy or Konkordanzdemokratie.6 The most widely known expression is consociational democracy that Lijphart developed as an alternative model to centripetal and centrifugal democracies.7 Revived in the 20th century, the term ‘consociational’ goes back to Johannes Althusius’ concept of Consociatio in his work Politica Methodice Digesta in 1603 and as suggested by Daalder designs “a certain pattern of political life in which the political elites of distinct social groups succeed in establishing a viable, pluralistic state by a process of mutual forbearance and accommodation.”8 Consociational democracy is, according to Dahl, nearly synonymous with “centralized national bargaining.”9 The smaller European countries which were first regarded as “deviant cases”10 – since they did not fit usual typologies – constituted the core of studies on consociationalism. There was a growing realization that a new theoretical mold was needed to grasp the seemingly unconventional and complex political realities of these countries. With time, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria were no longer seen as unexplored territories but as successful examples of concordant or consociational democracy. This new democratic model, with a high theoretical and empirical potential, has also been considered to be applicable to plural societies of the Third World. Amidst this large spectrum of terminological variations, how to define the patterns of this particular democratic model that defies earlier typologies and affirms that stability can be reached in fragmented, plural or segmented cultures?

5

6

7

8

9

10

See Hans Daalder, “On the Origins of the Consociational Democracy Model,” Acta Politica 19 (1984): 97-116, 99. See Val R. Lorwin, “Segmented pluralism,” Comparative Politics (1971): 141- 175; Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie: politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Oesterreich (Tübingen, Ger.: Mohr, 1967); Lehmbruch, “A Non-competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon” in Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, ed. Kenneth McRae (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974) 90-97. See Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy.” One should bear in mind that these terminological variations have distinctive implications. Daalder, “On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland,” in Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, 107-124, 107. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 74. Kenneth McRae, Introduction to Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, ed. Kenneth McRae, 2-27, 2

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37

In this theoretical introduction, I will first briefly mention how the consociational democracy school developed, and then I will outline the different approaches that revolve around this model. Light will be shed on Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy, and the conditions conducive to its establishment and sustenance. I do not pretend to contrast the different theories of power-sharing developed by political scientists, for the bulk of my study does not center on this issue. Furthermore, I will summarize the most important critiques that question the plausibility of consociational theory. Last, I will show the main relational aspects between the theory and my case study. The consociational democracy model which inspired many thinkers from the late 1960s on was tackled from different perspectives. Although Lijphart is considered to be the father of the consociational democracy11 and “the most productive and imaginative author on consociationalism,”12 he is by no means the only author who has written on this theme. Many Dutch sociologists have published earlier studies on pillarization and pluralism.13 Furthermore, whereas some authors concentrated on specific countries in Europe such as Huyse’s work on Belgium and Stiefbold’s analysis of Austrian pillarization,14 other analysts wrote abundantly cross-national and comparative analyses on the smaller European democracies.15 No sooner were studies on the European plural societies published than attention shifted to other plural countries in the world such as Lebanon, Cyprus, Malaysia, South Africa, Ghana, and India. Acquiring a rather universal touch, consociational theory has been even applied to very small European countries such as Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, and transferred to the colossal European

11

12

13

14

15

Lijphart acknowledges though that Sir Arthur Lewis is the first one to have analyzed consociationalism in Politics in West Africa in 1965. See Lijphart, “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy,” in The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict management and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford University Press, 2002), 37-54. M.P. C. M. van Schendelen, “The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms,” Acta Politica 19 (1974): 19-55, 28 For an account of the origins of the consociational model in Dutch sociology, read Daalder, “On the Origins,” 99-102. Luc Huyse, Passiviteit, pacificatie en verzuiling in de Belgische politiek: een sociologische studie (Antwerp: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1970); Rodney Stiefbold, Segmented Pluralism, Consociational Democracy and Austrian Electoral Politics (Ann Arbor: Michigan University, 1973) Since an exhaustive list is not possible, I cite mainly Daadler, “On Building Consociational Nations”; Lehmbruch, “A Non-Competitive Pattern”; Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism”; Jürg Steiner, “The Consociational Theory and beyond,” Comparative Politics 13 (1974): 339-354; M.J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977).

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Union. Consociational elements have been depicted in former Yugoslavia, former Soviet Union, Germany, and Canada.16 Through the channel of consociationalism, scholars attempted to transfer their knowledge to other countries “in a way that could expand prospects for democratic stability in the Third World and elsewhere.”17 Lijphart’s extensive work on plural countries, Rabuschka and Shepsle’s analysis of democracy in multi-ethnic societies, and Nordlinger’s work on conflict regulation in fragmented societies are notable examples in this field.18 In an effort to synthesize different perspectives and outlooks, analysts such as, Daalder, McRae and later Kaiser demonstrated that three main currents or variants mark the developmental history of consociational theory. 19 First, consociationalism is seen as a pattern directly linked to the nature of the cleavages and the aspects of segmentation in a society. This concept is best reflected in Lorwin’s theory of segmental pluralism. According to Lorwin, a society is best appropriate for hosting consociationalism when it is segmented around one cleavage line.20 The cleavage line should be sufficiently strong to give the different groups, which he generally refers to as ‘familles spirituelles’ or ‘Weltanschauungsgruppen,’ a separate identity. To clarify the concept of vertical pluralism, he borrows the metaphors of ‘verzuiling’ or pillarization and ‘ontzuiling’ or dismantling of pillars from the Dutch sociologists; two suggestive metaphors that help link two extremes: Division and integration. In his model of vertical pluralism, a segment in the nation is compared to a separate pillar which merges at the top with other pillars. Second, consociationalism has been directly associated with elite behavior. This approach is closely linked to Lijphart’s work and to a lesser extent to Lehmbruch’s. The originality of this theory lies in its belief in political engineering: Elites can overcome centrifugal tendencies of a fragmented society 16

17

18

19

20

For a new assessment of the consociational theory, see Acta Politica 37 (2002) in which the application of the model is reexamined in different countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and even extended to the European Union. See Ian Lustick, “Lijphart, Lakatos and, Consociationalism,” World Politics 50 (1997): 88-117, 98. See Lijphart in Democracy in Plural Societies; Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies), 83-117; “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 258-68; Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Oh: Merrill, 1972). Daalder, “The Consociational Democracy Theme,” World Politics 26 (1974): 604-621; André Kaiser, “Types of Democracy: From Classical to New Institutionalism,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 9 (1997): 419-444; McRae, Introduction to Consociational Democracy. Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism,” 141-142.

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39

and create links of cooperation that subdue destabilizing drives inherent to the structure of the society. Whereas Lorwin would like to “leave open the question of elite cooperation and outcomes,”21 Lijphart stresses that there should be “a certain degree of willingness to make an effort to halt and reverse the disintegrative tendencies of the system.”22 Similarly, Lehmbruch alludes to the “cooperative strategies internalized by the elites” to resolve conflicts.23 In addition, Lijphart and Lehmbruch both agree that the persistence of cleavages is not an absolute requirement for the establishment and consolidation of consociational democracy.24 The third approach links the consociational model with political tradition and prior patterns of elite cooperation. Thus, pre-existent modes of cooperative behavior condition, shape and facilitate the emergence of consociationalism. This theory strongly advocated by Daalder contrasts with Lijphart’s claim that elite cooperation springs from a deliberate effort.25 It also confers to the consociational democracy model a more deterministic touch and ties it to the historical political development of a country. Basing himself on the Swiss and Dutch experiences, Daalder asks to what extent consociationalism is a matter of free choice for political elites. Considering elite culture as an independent variable which necessitates “a long developmental perspective” linking the future of the state to prior elite behavior, he demonstrates that in Netherlands and Switzerland, the traditions of elite cooperation emerged long before the processes of political modernization.26 Now that I identified the three basic orientations that mark consociational theory, I will shed light on Lijphart’s specific model of consociational democracy for the following reasons. First, Lijphart’s theory inspired originally from empirical observations on smaller European countries as well as on Lebanon will serve throughout my study as the main theoretical benchmark for Lebanon’s consociational development. Second, Lijphart is considered to be the most prolific writer on this model and on its application to deeply fragmented societies. Although I will frequently refer to other authors – particularly to Lehmbruch who also tackled the Lebanese case and who is to a certain extent “the only one author” who travelled a parallel road – 27 my main area of concern 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism,” 144. Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems,” Comparative Political Studies 1(1968) :3-44, 28. Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System,” 381. See Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”; Lehmbruch, “A Non-competitive Pattern of Conflict-management.” See Daalder, “On Building Consociational Nations.” Ibid., 121-22. Van Schendelen, “The Views of Arend Lijphart,” 29.

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will be Lijphart’s publications on consociational model from 1968 till the present day.

Theorizing consociationalism: the evolution of the theory Departing from Almond’s typologies which he considers incomplete,28 Lijphart formulates four typologies of democratic systems. Whereas a centrifugal democracy is characterized by instability, fragmentation and a competitive elite behavior, a centripetal democracy combines stability, a homogeneous political culture as well as a competitive pattern of elite behavior. The third type is a depoliticized democracy with a homogeneous political culture and a coalescent elite behavior. Last, consociational democracy refers to a deviant case of fragmented but stable democracy.29 In Lijphart’s view, the most unstable type is the model centrifugal democracy whereas the centripetal or the Anglo-American type and the consociational types are the most stable. Depoliticized democracy is given a middle rank since the lack of competitive elite behavior may pave the way for a “democratic Leviathan.”30 At the heart of consociational democracy, lies the necessity of elite accommodation. Political stability in fragmented cultures is thus a resultant of different subcultures’ representatives who make “deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation.”31 In other words, disruptive tendencies lurking beneath the social structure are balanced by the deliberate politics of accommodation. Here, the additional variable of elite coalescence replaces the variable of political culture. Defining this kind of democracy as “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political cultural into a stable democracy,” 32 Lijphart was praised to transcend static and deterministic conditions of political development. By introducing the magic ‘self-negating prophecy’ which holds 28

29 30

31 32

In “Comparative Political Systems,” Almond presents four system typologies: Anglo-American, Continental European, pre-industrial and totalitarian. He refers to the smaller European countries as oscillating between the continental and the Anglo-American types, yet Lijphart is convinced that these countries present an independent system typology. See Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems.” For a comment on Lijphart’s different typologies, see Nils A. Butenschon, “Conflict Management in Plural Societies: The Consociational Democracy Formula,” Scandinavian Political Studies 8 (1985):85-103. See Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” 75. Ibid., 79.

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that elites can willingly and deliberately change the course of events, he succeeded in presenting “elite behavior as the missing link between a plural society and political stability.”33 According to Lijphart, best examples of consociational democracy in Europe are Switzerland since 1943, Austria from 1945 to 1966, Belgium since 1970, and the Netherlands from 1917 to approximately 1967. In Latin America and Asia, he considers Colombia from 1958 to 1974, Malaysia from 1955 on and Lebanon from 1943 to 1975 as successful examples of consociational democracy.34 A comparative analysis of consociational cases has led Lijphart to formulate a series of prerequisites and factors that are favorable to establishing and maintaining consociational democracy. In 1968, he formulated first the four following prerequisites that have to be present “if consociational democracy is to succeed”: Leaders should be aware of the dangers inherent to the system, they should be committed to maintaining the system, they should be able to transcend subcultural cleavages at the top, and they should also be able to find convenient solutions for the different subcultures’ demands.35 Basing his examination on five cases of successful consociational democracy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Lebanon, Lijphart comes up with a list of favorable conditions to consociational democracy which he considers as tentative:36 • Distinct lines of cleavage between segments or distinct boundaries between subcultures reduce the impact of conflict and antagonism. Different groups have different interests and can coexist without conflict. Antagonism emerges if contact is close. It is thus better to reduce contact among antagonistic subcultures to a minimum; • A multiple balance of power among different segments instead of a dual or hegemonial balance favors consociational practices and prevents the domination of one group; • Popular attitudes should be favorable to the grand coalition; • External threats play a major role in reinforcing ties among elites on the one hand and within subcultures on the other hand. Lijphart notes that the five consociational countries mentioned above resorted to consociational practices as a reaction to external threat;

33

34 35 36

Matthjis Bogaards, “The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review,” European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 475-96, 475. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems,” 22-23. See Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems”; Lijphart “Consociational Democracy.”

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Moderate nationalism promotes stability in a fragmented culture while strong nationalism may cause divisiveness; A relatively low total load on the system plays an important role in the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. Hence, excessive pressure on the system may destabilize it since subcultural cleavages constitute already heavy burdens.

In 1968, Lijphart observes that the last three factors are more likely in small countries, yet at this stage, it is not clear whether he considers size as a favorable factor, for he notes that the element of size is indirectly linked to the success of consociationalism. Furthermore, he stresses that continued success of an already established consociational democracy is assessed by examining institutional arrangements and the degree of elite cooperation. He adds that the more internalized elite accommodation becomes, the deeper are the roots of consociationalism.37 In 1977, in Democracy in Plural Societies, consociational democracy becomes an empirical, normative, and prescriptive type defined in terms of four characteristics or four consociational devices:38 A grand coalition which represents different segments of the society and which may take on different forms such as a parliamentary cabinet or a coalition of the president with other officeholders in a presidential system.39 In a grand coalition, the politics of accommodation lays the foundations for political security; •

•

37 38 39

Mutual veto, defined as a ‘negative minority rule’ or concurrent majority, allows groups to defy decisions detrimental to their interests. Lijphart argues that a grand coalition is not sufficient to protect minorities’ rights, for decisions in grand coalitions are taken by majority vote. This supplementary guarantee which can be an informal agreement or a clause integrated in the constitution reinforces the sense of communal integration; Proportionality rules should be the governing principle in political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds. The principle of proportionality overrules the possibility of a tyrannical majority inasmuch as it allows minorities to be overrepresented. Parity and

Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” 79-80. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 25-52. Lijphart argues that although presidentialism does not rule out consociationalism, a presidential regime is less suitable for a consociational government than a parliamentary arrangement.

1. Review and Critique of the Literature on Consociational Democracy

•

43

overrepresentation serve to protect small segments and give them a sense of security; Segmental autonomy or the subculture’s right of independent rule in the area of the segment’s exclusive matters enables each group to run its own affairs.

Lijphart emphasizes that consociational democracy does not aim at reducing pluralism and lessening cleavages but at recognizing them so that they evolve into useful frames for a stable democracy. Furthermore, he strongly defies deterministic approaches that refute the possibility of building a stable pattern of democracy in deeply divided societies. Taking a cautious stand, he defines democracy as a synonym of what Dahl calls polyarchy, and insists that it is by no means an ideal but a notion that conforms reasonably to the ideals.40 He is also keen on distinguishing consociational democracy from Lorwin’s vertical pluralism and Lehmbruch’s concordant democracy. Thus, Lorwin does not focus on the question of elite behavior and the results of cleavages. He also tends to tackle cleavages only in terms of religion and ideology. On the other hand, Lehmbruch’s concept of concordant democracy focuses on managing conflicts by cooperation rather than competition, a main feature of consociational democracy.41 In 1977, we notice slight changes in Lijphart’s formulation of the favorable factors. Arguing that the predictive capacity of the consociational model could indeed be improved if variables promoting elite cooperation and non-elite support are identified, he introduces five main favorable conditions which are somehow different from the previous ones:42 • Combining the sizes and numbers of segments in a society in descending order of conduciveness to consociational democracy, Lijphart argues that the ideal situation would be a multiple balance of power among three or four segments; • Small size has both direct and indirect effects on consociational democracy, its establishment and consolidation. It directly increases the chances of cooperation and indirectly facilitates the establishment of the consociational model, because it minimizes the burdens of decision-making and makes the country more easily governable. The direct internal effect is that elites know each other better and can frequently meet. Chances are that they will adopt cooperative attitudes. In addition, the direct external effect is that small

40 41 42

Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 3-4. Ibid., 5. Ibid., 54-102.

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•

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countries feel more threatened by other powers than large countries. These feelings of threat promote internal cohesion, and leaders are more inclined to cooperate to face an external danger. However, in order to act as a unifying factor, this threat should be perceived as a common danger by all segments. Other indirect effects are associated with decision-making. Thus, on the domestic level, smaller countries are less complex. The indirect external effect is related to the limited power of a small state in the international arena. A small state will refrain from adopting an active foreign policy and will avoid thereby compromising choices; The presence of overarching loyalties among segments or a sense of common belonging helps reduce internal predisposition towards conflict. These loyalties act as cohesive forces, and mitigate the intensities of cleavages. Nationalism may play the role of a unifying factor when it does not operate as an additional divisive cleavage; Segmental isolation or the presence of clear-cut boundaries between subcultures reduces chances of antagonism and hostility. Segmental organizations in a plural society generate segmental isolation, and reduce inter-segmental friction; Traditions of elite accommodation promote elite cooperation and increase the chances for consociational democracy. Yet, Lijphart is keen on emphasizing that the tradition of coalescent and conciliatory attitudes cannot entirely replace the ‘self-negating prophecy’ or the deliberate effort to cooperate.

In 1985, his book Power-Sharing in South Africa is seen as “the culmination of consociationalism as a normative approach”43 inasmuch as his vision of consociational democracy reaches a decisive phase of maturation. Aware of the criticism directed against him, Lijphart tries to be more precise in his formulation of the favorable conditions. In his proposal of consociationalism as a realistic option for South Africa, he mentions the following nine conditions which he will more or less stick to up to the present day:44 • The presence of a solid majority is a clear obstacle to power-sharing; • When groups are about the same size, negotiations among the elites are easier; • The presence of too many groups in a divided society makes negotiations more difficult; 43

44

Bogaards, “The Uneasy Relationship between Empirical and Normative Types in Consociational Democracy,” Journal of Theoretical politics 12 (2000): 395-423, 402. Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 119-128.

1. Review and Critique of the Literature on Consociational Democracy

• • • • • •

45

External dangers promote internal cohesion ; Overarching loyalties such as nationalism reduce tensions related to group allegiances; Large socio-economic differences among segments heighten hostilities; If the population is relatively small, then the decision-making process is less complex; The geographical concentration of segments reduces hostilities; Traditions of compromise foster power-sharing.

In his recent writings,45 Lijphart reiterates mainly the four previous characteristics of consociational democracy and reviews the factors that facilitate power-sharing. It is worth mentioning that he also replaces in some of his latest publications the expression of consociational democracy with “power sharing democracy,” for the term “power-sharing” is less “esoteric” and more accessible to policy-makers.46 Another novelty is that he divides the four elements of consociational democracy into primary and secondary characteristics. The two key ingredients of consociational democracy are executive power sharing and segmental autonomy. Proportionality and mutual veto act as secondary characteristics that mainly strengthen inter-segmental cooperation and group autonomy. 47

Consociational democracy as a prescriptive model in deeply fragmented societies Although Lijphart was initially preoccupied with the Dutch case, 48 he later moved to cross-national analyses of different countries, and advocated the application of this model in divided societies of the Third World. 45

46

47

48

See Lijphart, “The Power-sharing Approach,” in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph v. Montville (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), 491-509; “Multiethnic Democracy,” in The Encyclopedia of Democracy 3, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (London: Routledge: London, 1995) 853-865; Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy”; Lijphart, “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy,”; Lijphart “The Evolution of Consociational Theory and Consociational Practices, 1965-2000,”Acta Politica 37 (2002): 11-22; Lijphart “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 96-109. Lijphart, “Definitions, Evidence, and Policy: A response to Matthijs Bogaards’ Critique,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (2000): 425-431, 427. Lijphart, “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy”; Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.” Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975).

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In 1977, he maintains that this model is a serious alternative in fragmented societies to the Westminster model or majoritarian democracy, which, in contrast to consociational democracy, is characterized by one-party governments, centralized power, a disproportional electoral system and majority rule. Taking Lebanon’s and Malaysia’s consociational model as a benchmark against which conditions in other plural societies could be measured, he examines conditions that favor the emergence of consociationalism in the Third World.49 Both examples, in his opinion, reveal that the model can be transposed to other societies even if many conditions are unfavorable. In addition, Lijphart remarks that some favorable factors, such as prior traditions of accommodation, segmental autonomy, segmental isolation, a moderate sense of nationalism and internal unity after the struggle for independence, were already present in some plural societies of the Third World. He warns, however, against the danger of socio-economic modernization along segmental lines, and the destructive antagonisms engendered by socio-economic disparities. Defying drawbacks that may undermine the success of the model, Lijphart seeks to confer to the consociational pattern of democracy a prescriptive value. So he raises the issue of “consociational engineering”50 in which he urges elites in plural societies to become political engineers and adopt consociational devices in their quest of stable democracy. This proposal according to which the segments’ leaders, conscious of the potential dangers, may alter the course of events, is at odds with the deterministic approach which ties democratization to the necessary pre-existence of conditions. According to Lijphart, economic development and national integration should not necessarily precede democracy.51 Moreover, the presence of strong cleavages in a plural society is no impediment, for one should not focus on the different kinds of cleavages, but rather on the presence or absence of overarching loyalties.52 In this respect, Lijphart echoes the abundant literature of transitology which emphasizes voluntaristic aspects of democratic crafting rather than structural determinants.53 Although the chances for establishing a consociational democracy diminish with the increasing degree of pluralism and with an uneven numerical balance among segments, they still remain higher than the prospects for a majoritarian democracy. In extreme cases of pluralism, the consociational method becomes necessary since no other alternative can be considered: 49

50 51 52 53

For an analysis of power-sharing in deeply divided societies, see Democracy in Plural Societies, 164-175. Democracy in Plural Societies, 231. Ibid., 229. Ibid., 234. See for example O’Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.

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“The realistic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all.”54 Consociational democracy as a normative, prescriptive, and empirical model in plural societies of the Third World is best exemplified in 1985, 1996, and 2004. Lijphart advocates in 1985 the application of the model to South Africa, and tries to demonstrate in 1996 that India is “an impressive confirming case” of consociational democracy.55 In 2004, he strongly recommends a consociational constitutional design to post-Saddam Iraq. With the rise of ethnic divisions which have threatened and weakened the third wave of democratization, he reaffirms in his recent publications that powersharing is “the only feasible solution,”56 and “the only democratic model that appears to have much chance of being adopted in divided societies...”57

The other side of the medal Though regarded as a major breakthrough and a challenging prescriptive tool that could be used by the elites to face subcultural conflicts, the consociational theory in general and Lijphart’s views have been fiercely criticized and rebutted. I will outline in the following paragraphs the most important critiques directed against the theory in general and Lijphart in particular, for they undoubtedly affect the value of consociational democracy as a normative and prescriptive model. These critiques draw notably our attention to possible dangers linked to an arbitrary application of the model in deeply segmented societies. In this study, they help unveil various flaws related to the implementation of the model in preand post-war Lebanon. First, I will highlight the general flaws depicted in the consociational model and theory, discuss the disputed scientific dimension of the theory, the confusion and inconsistency that lurk beneath the favorable factors, and draw attention to the missing link between the consociational theory and the dynamics of system transition. Then, I will shed light on some controversial aspects in Lijphart’s views especially after his elaboration of the ‘consensus democracy’ model in 1984. Finally, I will mention Lijphart’s reaction to these criticisms, and the most

54 55 56 57

Democracy in Plural Societies, 238. “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy,” 262-263. “The Wave of Power-sharing Democracy,” 37. “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” 99.

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important amendments and clarifications that he was keen on adding in order to rescue the theory. A criticism of the consociational model Lijphart himself acknowledges that consociational democracy has several disadvantages. First, he raises some doubts as to the democratic quality of the model and argues that it is “the best kind of democracy that can realistically be expected” in divided societies.58 Second, consociational democracy may impede efficiency in decision-making and bring about stagnation and instability. In a grand coalition, decision-making is slower, and mutual veto may lead to immobilism and deadlock. Recruitment on the basis of proportionality also undermines individual merit. Furthermore, segmental autonomy demands the establishment of many agencies and units.59 These concerns and many others have been analyzed in detail by numerous scholars who intended to put firmly the consociational theory to the test. A subject of controversy often raised relates to the extent to which consociational democracy can be considered as a normative and prescriptive model when so much confusion hovers around its applicability and potential failure or success. An important drawback that undermines the model is that the connection between consociational democracy, stability, and success has not been sufficiently proven. Consociational experiences have not all been successful.60 For instance, Dahl highlights that successful power-sharing democracies are indeed rare.61 Barry reduces the number of successful consociational democracies to two classical examples.62 O’Leary remarks that consociational democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient to stabilize fragmented societies.63 Andeweg comments that “for a model that is designed to explain political stability, such discontinuations and interruptions raise serious questions.”64 58

59 60

61 62

63

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Democracy in Plural Societies, 48. Ironically enough, Lijphart declares in Power-Sharing in South Africa to be fully convinced of the democratic nature of consociational democracy: “There is nothing in consociationalism that true democrats have to be ashamed of,” 109. Democracy in Plural Societies, 40-52. See Pierre L. van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (North Holland: Elsevier, 1981), 89. The author lists unfortunate power-sharing experiences in Nigeria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Guiana, Canada, Zaire, and others. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven and London: Yale University press, 1998), 192. Brian Barry, “Review Article: Political Accomodation and Consociational Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 5 (1975): 477-505. Brendan O’Leary, “The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 37 (1989): 562-588, 572-573. Rudy A. Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000):

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In contrast to Lijphart’s assumption, it is also held that the adoption of consociational devices may reinforce inter-communal tensions and friction instead of mitigating them. Many scholars express great concern over the flaws embedded in consociational practices, the fragility of the consociational pact, and whether these practices reinforce cleavages. Barry, for instance, warns against the consociational model which may be “accepted too uncritically as a model for the resolution of divisions within a society.”65 He further argues that introducing the consociational model in countries such as Canada and Northern Ireland may only exacerbate underlying conflicts. According to van den Berghe, “the consociational model is the most difficult, unstable, and controversial set of policy” that can ever be followed. He argues that once consociationalism is adopted, “then one is compelled to embark on an infinite path of negotiations and conflicts.” In addition, once changes occur, “the whole deal is called into question” especially in consociational models based on “quota systems.”66 Moreover, Lijphart’s independent variable of elite crafting upon which the whole model rests has been seriously questioned as a sufficient factor that can by itself explain and guarantee political stability.67 His self-denying prophecy has fomented an interesting wave of protest calling for the consideration of historical factors in the theory, the impact of cleavages or the intensity of the conflict. Hence, is it really the sudden awakening of the elites at a certain point of time and their decision to turn the tide, the past tradition of elite cooperation or the low intensity of the conflict that enable the existence of consociationalism? Is elite behavior really the decisive factor that conditions structures and induces stability? Horowitz, for instance, questions the assumption that groups in a plural society act cohesively and have a unitary leadership. Hence, a grand coalition may only exacerbate intra-ethnic competition, and it is indeed rare that a coalition of leaders speaks for the entire community. Expressing strong doubts against the so-called serendipitous decision of the elites to unite, he argues that leadership has often“limited freedom to choose its own path,” and might be restricted, despite good intentions, by external restrictive conditions.68 Criticizing the consociational pattern which does not present any specific mechanism, he further argues that various unexpected variables may drive leaders not to abide by the initial power-sharing agreement. In other words, consociational theory entails a certain prescription that cannot be easily applied

65

66 67 68

509-536, 515. Barry, “The Consociational Model and its Dangers,” European Journal of Political Research 3(1975): 393-412, 393. Pierre van den Berghe, interview with the author, Byblos, November 11, 2006. Butenschon, “Conflict Management in Plural Societies,” 93-94. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University California Oress, 1985), 574.

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by the elites. Although leaders may endorse initially the consociational plan, centrifugal forces arising from followers or from electoral competitors weaken and endanger the agreement.69 In a similar manner, Daalder refers to the potential antagonistic relations that may arise between the leaders and their followers or what Lorwin calls Lumpenelites.70 Van den Berghe warns in a parallel manner against the uprising of counter-elites who might disrupt the system. In this case, ethnicity becomes stigmatizing and conflict might escalate into civil war.71 Barry further equates “a situation in which conflicting ethnic groups are mobilized behind monolithic organizations” – one of the main characteristics of consociational democracy – to a situation of civil war.72 Second, scholars have introduced other variables to explain the prerequisites that initiate or facilitate consociational engineering. Marxist scholars such as Kieve introduce the class variable as the basic explanatory variable that influences elite behavior and divisions in a society.73 Daalder stresses that consociationalism might be the consequence of prior rather than instantaneous elite behavior. In other words, “one might argue that earlier consociational practices facilitate the accommodation of new emerging cleavages.”74 Others question whether the degree of conflict intensity dictates consociationalism. Horowitz, for instance, emphasizes that European conflicts are less intense than conflicts in Asia and Africa, and asks whether the moderation that characterizes European cleavages has produced consociational devices or if the latter have mitigated the intensity of cleavages.75 In a similar manner, Nordlinger expresses some doubts as to whether the conflict in the Netherlands was strong enough to represent an illustrative conflict-regulating case of consociationalism.76 Furthermore, challenging Lijphart’s call that consociational democracy can work even when the favorable conditions are not present, van den Berghe rules out the possibility of a successful consociational democracy when distinctions are racial.77 Similarly, Barry suggests that differences based on ethnicity are less

69

70 71 72 73

74 75 76 77

Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley, C.A: University of California Press, 1991),139-142. See Daalder, “The Consociational Democracy Theme”; Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism.” Van den Berghe, Ethnic Phenomenon, 191. Barry, “Review Article,” 504-505. R. A. Kieve, “Pillars of Sand: A Marxist Critique of Consociational Democracy in the Netherlands,” Comparative Politics 13 (1981): 313-337. Daalder, “On Building Consociational Nations,” 615. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 573. See Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation. Van den Berghe, Ethnic Phenomenon, 189.

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inclined to consociational solutions.78 Horowitz warns against generalization from European models to Asian and African societies: “There are supra segmental sentiments that tie group members to the Swiss or the Dutch nation in a way that group members are not tied to an inclusive conception of the Lebanese, Malaysian or Ugandan nation.”79 Not only does the self-denying prophecy deny the role of decisive structural determinants, such as cleavages or historical patterns, but is also built on “critical junctures” of history when conflicts have reached a certain paroxysm, and elites are confronted with adopting either a “constructive or destructive behavior.”80 The arising question is whether conflicts in a segmented society need to ripen and attain an ultimate degree of intensity before consociational devices are adopted? Furthermore, it is noteworthy that certain consociational democracies such as Switzerland were never confronted with the kind of “subcultural hostility” that Lijphart refers to. This leads us to ask whether “the first self-denying prophecy” really holds and whether there are real discrepancies between the cases and the model itself.81 In the light of these critical analyses that show the importance of social and structural determinants, one is tempted to investigate whether some cultures are inherently resistant to consociational engineering and others are more predisposed, because they are either characterized by more moderate cleavages or because attitudes of accommodation predate solemn moments of elite coalescence. Thus, enforcing consociational arrangements and imposing the ‘self-negating prophecy’ might be doomed to failure in certain resistant societies, and it is only a matter of time before consociational foundations collapse. Not to forget Horowitz’ judicious remark that counting on “enlightened leadership” dispenses from consociational devices.82 Consociational democracy has also been criticized for its atrophied or lessened democratic quality and character. Along with Huntington who dubs consociational democracy as “consociational oligarchy” and van Schendelen who calls it an “elitist democracy,” van den Berghe refers to the model as a diminished kind of democracy or a “bourgeois democracy” which legitimizes its 78 79 80 81

82

Barry, “Review Article,” 502. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 572. Butenschon, “Conflict Management,” 194. Sue M. Halpern, “The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy,” West European Politics 9 (1986) 181-197, 185-186. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?, 142-143.

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existence through proportionality.83 Other critics do not go that far, but express reservations about the repercussions of “consociational decision making” on “important criteria of democratic quality.”84 Consociational democracy is said to weaken the presence of the opposition, a fundamental feature of the democratic process.85 Another problem that afflicts consociational democracy is whether the latter is a classical subtype or a diminished subtype of democracy. Although consociational democracy is generally considered as a democratic type,86 one is tempted to argue that the adjective ‘consociational’ does not only describe or clarify what consociational democracy is, but also alludes to the missing characteristics that make it less democratic.87 An additional concern revolves around the lasting value of consociational democracy as a distinctive typology. In many illustrative cases, consociational elements have withered. For example, in the Netherlands and Austria, the model was only a transitional phase. Presently, only Switzerland and Belgium remain largely consociational. To what extent is consociational democracy then a distinctive model if it is only a temporary arrangement? Lehmbruch raises the question “whether consociationalism is not bound to disappear by rendering itself superfluous.” Since the 1990s, the European countries, he argues, have experienced “a gradual erosion of the organizational cohesion of minority subcultures,” and “consociational democracy appears to lose its raison d’être, namely, the balancing of organized minority groups.”88 One should examine, he adds, whether consociational theory is able to face the challenges posed by modernity.89 Commenting upon Lehmbruch’s statement, Andeweg deduces that “consociational democracy itself is not a stable regime.”90 83

84

85 86

87

88

89 90

See respectively Samuel Huntington, “Reform and Stability in a Modernizing, Multi-ethnic Society,” Politikon 8 (1981): 8-26, 14; van Schendelen, “The Views of Arend Lijphart,” 45; van den Berghe, Ethnic Phenomenon, 82, 188. Steiner, “Consociational Democracy as a Policy Recommendation: The Case of South Africa,” Comparative Politics 19 (1987): 361-372, 367. Dahl, On Democracy, 194. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996). In their analysis of democracy with adjectives, Collier and Levitsky talk about diminished subtypes of democracy in which adjectives used to describe a democratic model allude to the attributes that lack in the latter. See David Collier and Stephen Levitsky, “Democracy With Adjectives. Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49 (1997): 430451. See Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland,” Publius 23 (1993): 43-60, 53. Ibid., 59. Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” 516.

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Another issue that also needs to be addressed is whether consociational democracy as a distinctive typology is “against the nature of history.”91 By stiffening divisions and keeping them alive despite the world trends towards more unity, isn’t this model forcing its way against the tides of historical progress? Therefore, the tenacious struggle of consociationalism to preserve divisions and crystallize them can be regarded as a questionable attempt to freeze old structures. This critique is mostly applicable to Lebanon and Iraq where scholars warn against the intentional preservation of confessionalism. In addition, Lijphart’s claim that consociational democracy is the only solution for deeply divided societies has been seriously questioned. Scholars doubt whether a static political model should be designed for all plural societies, and advocate rather specific solutions tailored to the country itself.92 Moreover, it is even held that approaches compatible with majoritarian democracy can also effectively deal with ethnic divisions. Lustick holds, for instance, that an alternative approach based on ‘control’ – whereby one dominant group could bring about stability in the system – could be applied.93 Whereas Lipset argues that the presence of cross-cutting affiliations in a fragmented society moderates ethnic divisions, and acts therefore as a palliative for cooperation,94 Horowitz recommends vote-pooling to promote communal cooperation.95 In light of these reservations, one thinks over the relevance of the model as an independent typology and is inclined to argue that consociational devices embedded in democracy can be considered at times as mere conflict-regulating practices that do not justify why consociationalism and democracy should be associated to form an independent typology.96 Questions are also raised whether consociational democracy can meet the test of perennity as many democracies are increasingly displaying various traits of consensus without being real consociational democracies. Thus, while there are many full-fledged democracies that are characterized by power-sharing traits, such as Germany, Canada, and even the supranational institution of the European Union, there are fewer examples of pure power-sharing democracies in the 91 92 93

94

95

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Butenschon, “Conflict Management,” 98. Dahl, On Democracy, 194-195. Ian Lustick, “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control,” World Politics 31 (1979): 325-344. See Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960). See Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Both approaches have been criticized by Lijphart in “Multiethnic Democracy.” Van Schendelen argues that if consociational democracy in the Netherlands is less than an ideal type of democracy, then it should not be be a typology but a variable. See “The Views of Arend Lijphart,” 40.

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world. This is why Lehmbruch prefers to replace the expression ‘consociational democracy’ with ‘negotiated democracy’ mainly because there are increasingly majoritarian systems in which power-sharing mechanisms are adopted: “Whereas consociational democracy has been a forerunner in the field of power-sharing, there are presently other forms of consensual democracy which need to be taken in consideration.”97 A criticism of the consociational theory The flaws that are linked to the applicability of the model notwithstanding, many gaps and omissions have been depicted in the construction of the theory itself. Although the theory is an innovation in itself, some aspects and considerations are left unanswered. For example, as Daalder pertinently comments, the theory does not really explain how consociational systems emerge.98 He also asks whether consociationalism is only the privilege of small states and underlines some ambiguous points in the literature: Do crosscutting cleavages operate on the elite or on the mass level? Are certain cleavages more likely to create conflict than others? What about the intensity of cleavages? In this respect, Daalder calls for a more careful definition of the word ‘cleavages’ applied irrespectively to all divisions in a fragmented society and a more careful examination of social divisions and their impact on political conflicts.99 Another relevant issue that Daalder highlights is that properties of consociationalism should be separated from those of democracy. In most studies on consociationalism, democracy is taken for granted as an accompanying feature, yet it is well known that there are democracies which are not consociational and there are also consociational elements in non-democratic regimes. In fact, Lijphart has never discussed the relation between consociationalism and democracy and whether consociationalism could exist without democracy.100 Moreover, various imperfections linked to the semantic field and to the content of the consociational theory have been highlighted. To start with, it is not clear how to differentiate between a plural and non-plural society. The theory is

97 98 99 100

Gerhard Lehmbruch, interview with the author, Kirchzarten, October 25, 2005. See Daalder, “The Consociational Democracy Theme.” Ibid. This critique is of paramount importance to the post-war Lebanese model where a certain form of oligarchic consociationalism developed at the expense of democracy.

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in need of a more “refined typology,” and the hypotheses provided are “not sufficiently interrelated.”101 Furthermore, consociational literature has been attacked for its excessive reliance on normative notions, and for its impressionistic assertions that ought to be tested more scientifically. For example, van den Berghe condemns Lijphart’s exaggerated emphasis “on the normative values of political culture.” He views the prerequisites of consociational democracy as mere “descriptive epiphenomena.”102 In a sharp criticism of Lijphart’s views, van Schendelen is keen on testing the scientific status of the consociational theory. First, he argues that Lijphart’s definitions of certain basic terms such as pluralism, stability, accommodation, and conditions are inconsistent. He also blames Lijphart for having left all empirical research to other specialists. According to the analyst, Lijphart’s use of the “impressionistic method” calls into question the assertions he reaches and undermines the reliability of his method.103 Van Schendelen specifically casts doubt on the largely inductive and selective character of the theory, its potential of verifiability, its rather limited predictive power,104 and finally the unrealistic dimension of its applicative potential. Halpern goes as far as maintaining that the theory is based on “faulty and imprecise concepts.”105 In a rigorous examination, Barry calls attention to the tautologies in Lijphart’s definitions of “accommodation” and “consociational democracy.”106 First, Lijphart’s definition of accommodation implies at the same time the settlement of divisive disputes and the explanation for stable relations among the blocs. Second, Lijphart’s definition of consociational democracy as “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”107 contains serious gaps. The argument that Barry advances is that by equating in his definition ‘a fragmented but stable society’ with ‘government by elite cartel,’ Lijphart revokes the existence of a ‘fragmented but stable’ society in which ‘government by elite cartel’ does not prevail. Furthermore, to refine the meaning of consociational 101

102 103

104 105 106 107

See Steiner, “The Consociational Theory and Beyond,” 339-340. Lijphart defines what a plural society means only after Steiner’s criticism. See Lijphart, “Consociational Theory: Problems and Prospects,” Comparative Politics 13: (1981): 355-59. Van den Berghe, Ethnic Phenomenon, 187. Van Schendelen, “The Views of Arend Lijphart.” The expression “impressionistic method” was first used by Jürg Steiner in 1981. According to van Schendelen, Lijphart was unable to capture the reality of Dutch politics. Halpern, “The Disorderly Universe,” 181. Barry, “Review Article,” 478-481. Echoing Barry, Lustick comments that the definition is “too overloaded to do any substantial explanatory work.” See “Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism,”101.

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democracy, Lijphart adds four requirements that are already part of the concept and the definition. Reflecting on Barry’s argument, Andeweg considers this criticism to be “the potentially most damaging,” as Lijphart packs in the definition “both the problem and its solution.” Consequently, the theory is stripped of the capacity to relate cause and effects, and becomes “a descriptive category defined by a problem, the reaction to the problem by political elites, and the consequence of that reaction.”108 Moreover, inconsistencies and hesitations have been depicted in the formulation of the four major characteristics of consociational democracy: Grand coalition, proportionality, segmental autonomy, and mutual veto. In 1989, Lijphart suggests adding a fifth characteristic to the former ones: A plural society. Yet, in more recent works,109 he sticks to the four earlier characteristics, and declares that he is in favor of dropping the fifth characteristic. Although Lijphart defended zealously the theory and tried to incorporate it in an increasingly hostile and competitive academic environment, his method was merely seen as a political struggle, “a political weapon,” or a stubborn attempt to prove its validity “regardless of its scientific status.”110 His use of an ‘impressionistic method’ was perceived as dangerous, for it allows flexible rules and definitions that can be easily stretched out to every case and manipulated to fit several different situations. This conceptual inconclusiveness or broadness which hampers precision becomes the source of comparability in consociational theory, and this is where the danger lies. We are never sure whether we found the model or not.111 Furthermore, the original empirical foundations upon which the consociational theory essentially rests have also been strongly attacked. Barry deconstructs two famous illustrative examples of consociational democracy: Switzerland and Austria. He argues that Switzerland is by no means an example of consociational democracy because of the majoritarian techniques that are utilized. 112 Second, he holds that the Austrian example does not really prove that consociational devices were the only explanation for stability in the Second Republic, for other factors could have induced it. Third, having only two

108 109 110 111 112

Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” 520 See Lijphart, “Definitions, Evidence and Policy.” Lustick, “Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism,” 111-113. Halpern, “The Disorderly Universe,” 188-194. In “Consociational Democracy as a Policy Recommendation,” Steiner also raised the question whether the decision making process in Switzerland could be really described as consociational.

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classical cases of consociational democracy i.e. Belgium and the Netherlands seriously weakens the theory’s potential applicability to other plural societies.113 In this sense, Barry’s critiques do not only center on Lijphart’s approach but are also directed against the adherents of the consociational school who claim that the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland are the main classical examples of consociational democracy. Let us not forget that van Schendelen even doubted whether the Netherlands is a representative example of consociational democracy. Just like Barry does with the Swiss classical example, van Schendelen dissects the Dutch case and shows the inherent contradictions in Lijphart’s analysis. He maintains that Lijphart extracted selectively evidence from the Dutch political scene from 1917 to 1967 in order to make the political system fit the model.114 In other cases related to the Third World, Hanf doubts whether South Africa remained a consociational case after the adoption of the 1996 constitution as Lijphart would have liked it to be,115 and Jürgenmeyer deconstructs Lijphart’s belief that India is a consociational democracy.116 The obscure status of the favorable factors One of the major inconsistencies that further weakens the consociational theory is the fortuitous character of the favorable factors. In this passage, I would like to focus on four major gaps that highlight the obscure status of the favorable factors. First, Lijphart’s formulation of the helpful conditions makes this aspect of the consociational theory overfilled with incongruities. Second, the clear lack of consensus among scholars on what the favorable factors conducive to consociational democracy are makes the status of these variables even harder to fathom. Third, these conditions fail to distinguish between the initiating and sustaining phases in the consociational venture. Last, they entertain an extremely ambiguous relationship with consociational engineering. The controversial character of Lijphart’s conditions lies in two aspects: The terminology used to describe the factors and the factors themselves. In his major publications, upon allusion to the favorable factors, Lijphart uses four different 113 114 115

116

See Barry, “Review Article.” Van Schendelen, “The Views of Arend Lijphart,” 42. See Hanf, “De la dite concordance en Afrique du Sud et de son utilisation à des fins utiles,” Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée 4 (1997): 657-678. See Clemens Jürgenmeyer, “India: A Westminster Model of Democracy?” in The Indian Parliament: A Comparative Perspective, eds Ajay K. Mehra, and Gert W. Kueck (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2003), 42-55.

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expressions.117 Not to mention that in the same publication, for example in Power-sharing in South Africa, he refers to the variable sometimes as a factor and sometimes as a condition. It is ironical that Lijphart calls them conditions, and then says that they are “neither indispensable nor sufficient,” and that in their presence or absence, consociational engineering might work.118 The problem lies in this hesitant and even antithetical semantic lexicon that Lijphart uses: Are the conditions merely favorable factors or real conditions? If he calls them at times conditions, how can they be not binding as he claims? By doing so, he constructs inadvertently a non-conditional character for a so-called condition, de-evaluates his own claims, and weakens the predictive power of the theory. Van Schendelen refers to these factors as “empty,” for “the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all.”119 An additional point is Lijphart’s use of the expression: “Conditions favorable to consociational democracy.” How can a condition be called favorable or not, since its mere existence as a binding determinant discards the consideration whether it is favorable or not? Furthermore, Lijphart came up within nearly three decades with various lists of favorable factors which were not really consistent and systematic.120 The latter have been criticized for their “ad hoc character,” and the lack of interrelation among them.121 For example, size was not detected as a separate favorable factor in 1968. While Lijphart mentions external threats as an independent favorable factor in 1968 and 1985, he alludes to it in 1977 only in relation to the direct external effect of the size factor.122 Lijphart does not consider crosscutting cleavages as a favorable factor in 1969, but refers to it once again in 1977.123 In 1985 and 1996, the factor of cross-cutting cleavages is finally replaced by socioeconomic equality.124 117

118 119 120

121 122 123 124

Lijphart refers to the variables in “Typologies of Democratic Systems” (p. 25) as “conditions favorable to consociational democracy,“ in “Consociational Democracy” (p. 79) as “factors conducive to consociational democracy,” in Democracy in Plural Societies (p. 53) as “favorable conditions for consociational democracy,” and in Power-sharing in South Africa (p.119) as “favorable and unfavorable factors.” Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 54. Van Schendelen, “The Views of Arend Lijphart,” 34. Since 1985, Lijphart has made sure that his list of favorable factors remains coherent. In “The Evolution of Consociational Theory and Consociational Practices,” he argues that the improvements and changes he made before 1985 are “efforts to refine and improve the theory of consociationalism.” See p.16. Steiner, “The Consociational Theory and Beyond,” 351. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 66-67. See Lustick, “Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism,”107. Bogaards provides a clear review of Lijphart’s list of favorable factors and shows that the four

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The purpose of this critique is not to focus literally on Lijphart’s use or choice of words, but to emphasize that these incongruities undermine the binding character or the seriousness of the favorable factors. In addition, in explaining why a factor is considered favorable, Lijphart always attenuates at the end the degree or the extent of its favorable impact. This even accentuates the evasive character of these variables. For instance, small size is a favorable factor only to a certain extent, for it also entails a limited political reservoir in the country.125 Cross-cutting cleavages are a favorable factor, yet “may or may not be favorable to consociationalism.”126 Finally, Lijphart was not able to test in which way and to what extent the presence of cross-cutting cleavages influences consociational practices. After all, mentioning cross-cutting cleavages as a favorable factor “seems to contradict the essence of consociationalism,” since the aim of the latter is to produce stability even in the absence of these cleavages.127 Another unresolved issue hinges on the ambiguous relation between segmental isolation and cross-cutting divisions as well as overarching links. If segmental isolation highly favors consociationalism, to which extent does the intensity of cross-cutting cleavages or overarching loyalties harm the spirit of consociationalism? This issue deserves to be tackled more closely especially that even in societies characterized by segmental isolation; cross-cutting links are still evident.128 Although Lijphart considers overarching loyalties as a favorable factor, he does not really deliver on this variable. He simply mentions that nationalism could have negative and positive effects. An arising question is how to create overarching loyalties that favor consociational arrangements when a unified national identity does not exist?129 What makes the status of the helpful factors in the consociational theory even more controversial is that various scholars developed independently different conditions that do not intersect and even contradict Lijphart’s conditions. I will cite several cases to prove my point.

125 126 127 128 129

different lists elaborated by Lijphart in his different writings have only four variables in common: Segmental isolation, external threats, a balance of power, and a small size with a low decision load. See “The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy,” 478. For a discussion of the size factor, see also Bogaards, “The Favourable Factors,” 479-480. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 81. Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” 521-522. See also Halpern in “The Disorderly Universe.” This remark is particularly relevant to multiethnic societies in the Middle East such as Iraq or Lebanon where segments still share a hazy feeling of national ‘we-ness.’

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Van den Berghe specifies the following conditions as prerequisites for a consociational democracy: permanent cultural pluralism, some degree of territorial, genetic and functional interpenetration of the ethnies, approximate equal size of groups and socio-economic equality.130 For him, “the more institutions the ethnies share,” the better the chances of consociational democracy are.131 Yet, this statement clearly contradicts Lijphart’s condition of segment isolation: “A plural society tends to be organized along segmental cleavages, and these separate organizations entail a degree of segmental isolation that is conducive to consociational democracy.”132 Upon pondering whether consociational democracy is more likely to develop and consolidate when segments interpenetrate or remain isolated from each other, one is easily led astray by the multitude of contradicting variables. Confusion is further created by the choice of expressions and terms used in formulating favorable factors. Could van den Berghe’s functional interpenetration of segments replace Lijphart’s condition of overarching loyalties or does it plainly refer to the existence of cross-cutting cleavages? Furthermore, unlike Lijphart who considers cross-cutting cleavages in some cases to be a favorable factor, Nordlinger denies that the latter plays an important part in regulating conflicts.133 Furthermore, while Huyse and Pappalardo found a strong link between deference and consociationalism, Lijphart elaborates only on this issue in his study of the Netherlands.134 In sum, the lack of consensus among scholars and the different terminologies used make the list of favorable factors a highly selective and subjective matter. For every case, additional factors may arise:

130 131 132

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Van den Berghe, Ethnic Phenomenon, 185-193. Ibid., 192. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 89. In Conflict Regulation, Nordlinger also criticizes Lijphart’s condition of segmental isolation. He claims that voluntary inter-segmental contacts encourage mutual understanding, and argues that segmental isolation does not promote conflict regulation. See respectively, van den Berghe, Ethnic Phenomenon; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation. See respectively Huyse, Passiviteit, Pacificatie en Verzuiling; Adriano Pappalardo, “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique,” European Journal of Political Research 9 (1981): 365-390; Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation.

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“The inductive character of the favorable factors impairs a selection of relevant favorable factors on a theoretical basis. Their relevance has to be reassessed for every specific case.”135 Another problem related to the favorable factors is the confusion between genetic and sustaining conditions. In his forerunning article on democratic transitions, Rustow strictly warned against mixing the conditions that bring democracy into existence and those that keep it stable, and called for separating function and genesis.136 However, this differentiation has not really been tackled in the consociational theory. Lijphart namely does not separate between genesis and function, and argues that the favorable factors account for “the establishment and maintenance of a consociational democracy.”137 Yet, this statement is also problematic. If the same conditions that make democracy possible also make it stable, then the potential absence of one of these favorable factors during the consolidating phase might easily destabilize the process of consolidation. This means that consociational democracy that claims to bring about stability finally defeats its own purpose. For example, if the low load on the system is both a genetic and sustaining factor, does this mean that a consociational democracy is always threatened by collapse when the load on the system increases? What about the necessity of elite habituation through which elites internalize the rules of the democratic game and shield the system against external agents?138 Lehmbruch tries to avert this problem and distinguishes genetic and sustaining conditions of consociational democracy. The only sustaining condition that he delivers on is a low load on the system through non-alignment. 139 An additional unresolved controversy lies in the ambiguous standing of the favorable factors between determinism and voluntarism.140 Some scholars attach 135 136

137 138

139 140

Bogaards, “The Favourable Factors,” 482. Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy,” Comparative Politics 2 (1970): 337-365, 346. Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 115. Considered as a precondition for democratic consolidation, elite habituation is defined as the process through which elites internalize the democratic rules and accept them as the only legitimate means. Through formal and informal rules, elites cooperate to increase the confidence in the system, and bring about outcomes that are not predetermined. See for example Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy”; Carrie Manning, “Conflict Management and Elite Habituation in Postwar Democracy: The Case of Mozambique,” Comparative Politics 35 (2002): 63-84. See Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System.” Bogaards alludes to the “unresolved conflict between determinism and voluntarism in consociational theory.” While the ‘orthodox’ such as van den Berghe and Pappalardo refer to the factors as necessary, the ‘latitudinarians’, such as Lijphart and to a certain extent Lehmbruch consider them as merely helpful. See “The Favourable Factors,” 486-487.

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more importance to the subcultures’ structures in a divided society and the presence or absence of necessary conditions in determining the elites’ success, while others emphasize the elites’ motives and free will. Whereas van den Berghe, for instance, downplays the elite variable in the formulation of his conditions, Lijphart and Nordlinger consider it as the main axis around which all other factors revolve. Other scholars combine the favorable factors and the elite variable in order to improve the predictive dimension of consociational democracy. In an effort to reconcile contingency with structural determinants, Pappalardo, for instance, considers the conditions as the only way “to determine the reasons for the success of elite cooperation, the chances of its persistence or collapse, and how far it can be considered suitable for adoption outside the countries of origin.”141 He selects the following favorable factors for a successful consociational democracy: Equilibrium among segments, size, crosscutting divisions, leader-follower relationships, segmental isolation, overarching loyalties, and traditions of elite accommodation. Then, after a rigorous and methodological examination of all factors, he says that only two of the above conditions are necessary and sufficient to account for cooperation: Stability among subcultures and elite predominance, factors that Lijphart does not really emphasize. As a matter of fact, Lijphart refers ambiguously to elite predominance as a favorable factor in 1968 and 1969, and drops it in his later works.142 It goes without saying that Lijphart’s theory departs from determinism and takes a voluntaristic stance. What we expect, however, is an emphasis on “leadership autonomy” and “a theory about what motivates leaders in their choices.”143 But, Lijphart ignores this issue, and elaborates instead on the favorable factors. Another controversial point is that if the favorable factors are ultimately dependent upon the elites’ will, then they become variables contingent upon the elites’ decisions and not on consociational democracy.144 These remarks lead us to question not only the status of favorable factors, but also the four requirements that Lijphart formulates and that mainly center upon the elites’ ability and willingness to cooperate. The four requirements are also to 141

142

143 144

See Pappalardo, “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy,” 365. Pappalardo finds Lijphart’s self-negating prophecy too ungraspable, warns against “blind predictions,” and confirms that the favorable conditions are the only reliable tools for assessing the elites’ chances of success. See p. 387. Nordlinger considers structured elite predominance as a crucial variable in explaining why and how elites cooperate and regulate conflicts. See Conflict Regulation, 73-78. See Bogaards, “The Favourable Factors,” 489. Ibid., 488.

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a certain extent empty, for Lijphart never explains how they come into being or how they impinge on the favorable factors. To state the matter differently, Lijphart does not take the pains to clarify the differences or shared characteristics between the requirements for a consociational democracy and the favorable conditions. How do the four requirements for consociational democracy based on elite behavior interact with his list of the favorable conditions? Disconcerted by the breach between the favorable factors and the elite variable, critics emphasize that Lijphart’s stagnant favorable conditions are unable to account for the elites’ behavior and the multifaceted motives that might condition a certain behavioral mode. In his analysis of the consociational democracy model in Columbia, Dix, for example, remarks that Lijphart’s factors do not really apply to the Colombian case. While all other factors mentioned by Lijphart are either absent or hardly present, only the favorable condition of prior traditions of elite accommodation has some relevance.145 Yet, this condition cannot explain why accommodation only succeeded in 1958. Dix argues that “most of Lijphart’s conditions are essentially static over time.” Furthermore, he gives an alternative explanation focusing on the “particularistic incentives” of the elites and the “coalescence of class interest at the elite level” that predisposed the political elites to act in 1958 and form the National Front.146 In his plea for coercive consociationalism in Northern Ireland, O’Leary attempts at reconciling the highly disputed character of the favorable factors with the elites’ free will.147 He discusses the possibility of engineering consociational democracy by creating the favorable conditions artificially even if they do not exist. Yet, what makes these favorable factors even more controversial is that even if they exist or do not exist, consociational engineering depends ultimately on the elites.148 Besides, is it possible to engineer favorable factors? O’Leary refers to the difficulty of creating, for instance, factitious overarching loyalties: “Manufacturing a shared national or Christian identity is beyond the grasp of policy-makers.”149 Aware of the missing link between the variables conducive to consociational democracy and the elite behavior, Nordlinger tries to complete the lacunas in Lijphart’s four requirements. He first decodes the motives that explain why elites engage in a conflict-regulating behavior, and analyzes the conditions under which conciliatory attitudes emerge. In other words, he tries to explain how the 145

146 147 148 149

See Robert H. Dix, “Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia,” Comparative Politics 12 (1980): 303-321. Dix, “Consociational Democracy,” 311-314. See O’Leary, “The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism.” Bogaards, “The Favourable Factors,” 486. O’Leary, “Limits to Coercive Consociationalism,” 575.

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requirements of consociational democracy that Lijphart formulates on a blank slate come into being. The presence of motives, conciliatory attitudes, and political security can help explain why elites are ready to cooperate, transcend cleavages, or bring about solutions.150 Lost in the continuum between determinism and voluntarism, the consociational model seems to be mostly contingent upon an inexorable condition, which cannot be dismissed as merely favorable, and which is the impact of the regional environment. Hence, one of the most damaging critiques which detracts from the applicability of the model is whether consociational democracy operates well only when the external weather is not turbid, and whether consociations are able to navigate in stormy waters. In some divided societies, the model’s predicament appears to hinge to a great extent on the regional and international environment. Examples are Lebanon’s and Northern Ireland’s dependability on “positive exogenous variables.”151 This will also undoubtedly apply to Iraq in the future if the deeply torn country makes it to a power-sharing democracy. In sum, the incongruent aspects and omissions that weaken the status of the favorable factors as well as the enormous hollow cavity between the latter and the elite variable undermine strongly the use of the theory for policy makers. In engineering consociationalism, one is unable to rely on a firm and clear starting point. Do the four requirements for consociational democracy, the favorable factors or the ‘self-negating prophecy’ constitute the point of departure for the consociational journey and for its maintenance? This inconclusive conflict between consociational prerequisites and the elite dimension weakens additionally the predictive power of the consociational theory. If favorable factors are not more than circumstantial variables, and if their absence can be replaced by the elite variable, how can we then predict elite behavior to assess the chances of success in a consociational democracy? If on the other hand, the favorable factors are determinants, then there will be no more room for flexibility or political engineering. Consociational democracy ceases to be the best solution to manage conflicts in deeply divided societies – as claims Lijphart – and only applies to cases where prior existence of favorable factors facilitate the emergence of consociational devices. Since Lijphart considers political engineering to be the core of the consociational theory, he should have elaborated more on the possibility of crafting certain favorable factors. Instead, he deals superficially with the political actors’ motivations that are subject to change from one individual and situation 150 151

See Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation. Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing, 200.

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to the other. 152 Even if we examine the possibility of engineering favorable factors, we are undeniably confronted with the highly volatile elite variable that becomes ironically in this case a ruthless determinant. Another arising question is whether the elites’ will to cooperate or craft favorable conditions remains a highly subjective act tied to transcendental inexorable conditions such as the regional and international environment. It is obvious that the lack of distinct clues that help us measure the odds of elite cooperation and delimit the boundaries between the elite variable and the favorable factors makes the voluntaristic aspect of the consociational theory very nebulous if not impractical. The missing link between transitology and consociational democracy The schism between the elite variable and the favorable factors as well as the chaotic status of the genetic and sustaining requisites leads us to one of the most important gaps that undermine the applicability of the consociational theory: The missing link between democratic transition and consociational theory. This breach would particularly pose a real problem upon tackling the political transition in post-war hybrid Lebanon. The silence of the consociational theory on the democratic element of consociationalism, and on the dynamics of consociational trends makes it rather stagnant and inapplicable to cases where a political system experiences change. To state the matter differently, this theory that is characterized by conceptual vastness frustrates our efforts when we try to explain the metamorphoses of a certain power-sharing political system. In fact, using only consociational theory to explain how a consociational system consolidates or de-consolidates, we cannot go that far. Indeed, system trends in consociational democracies have not been sufficiently tackled. Except for Ljphart’s “index of consensus democracy” which measures consociational trends in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Switzerland,153 no theoretical tools have been developed to explain the variables under which consociational models consolidate, become less consociational or collapse. The theme of democratic transition which constitutes the core of transitology has inspired a plethora of political writings. Scholars attempted to come up with a transition paradigm or model which explains how countries first democratize,

152 153

Steiner, “The Consociational Theory and Beyond,”352. Lijphart, “The Evolution of Consociational Theory,” 18.

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and then consolidate their democracy. The pathway towards a full-fledged democracy includes different gradations.154 Unlike the literature on democratic transition which focuses on different modes in the transition paradigm such as democratization,155 democratic erosion,156 and possible pathways towards re-democratization,157 the literature on consociational democracy remains silent on this issue and takes democracy as a fait accompli. No thorough separation is made, for example, between a consociational democratic model and a consociational hybrid or undemocratic model.158 What is even more fundamental is that the dynamics of democracy in relation to consociationalism have not been seriously analyzed. When does a consociational model cease to be democratic? Can it evolve into a hybrid system? Can it collapse and re-democratize? To what extent do power-sharing traits impact on the democratic element of the system? For example, in explaining the post-war political changes in Lebanon (1990-2004), we are faced with a consociational system which has experienced a backlash although the characteristics of a power-sharing model are still there. Upon brooding on the lacking bond between transitology and power-sharing, one important issue to ponder is how post-authoritarian regimes can evolve into consociational democracies. This question is mainly applicable to systems in the Middle East where communalism is thought to be the most suitable model in the future.159 For example, upon pondering a consociational take-off in authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes, what is the departure point? Should favorable factors be engineered or should elites lead the consociational democratic transition? Relying merely on the elite variable in this region remains however an unrealistic assumption.

154

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156 157

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While in “Transitions to Democracy,” Rustow, for instance, distinguishes the preparatory, decision and habituation phases, O’Donnell and Schmitter focus in Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies on the two main phases of liberalization and democratization. Although the two proposed models of democratic transition are not alike, both agree that abortive transitions do happen. See for example Munck, “Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective: Review Article,” Comparative Politics 26 (1994): 355-375. See for example Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave.” See for example Alfred Stepan, “Paths towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, eds Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1986), 64-84. For an analysis of hybrid regimes, See for example Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002):51-65. See Barry Rubin, “Getting to Arab Democracy: Dealing with Communalism,” Journal of Democracy 17 (2006): 51-62.

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One last observation is how favorable conditions for democracy, and favorable conditions as well as prerequisites for consociational democracy complement and affect each other. Upon analyzing the prospects for consolidation of a power-sharing democracy, should one take in consideration the conditions developed by the consociationalists or the ones developed by the transitologists? Indeed, consociational democracy does not say much on system or consociational changes, and it is actually imperative that the large abyss separating the literature on democratic transition consociational theory be bridged. Otherwise the prescriptive potential of the model remains extremely weak. Consociational democracy and consensus democracy: a controversial relationship The last criticism I would like to target is not directly related to consociational democracy, but to Lijphart’s shift from the latter to consensus democracy and the rather negative repercussions that this shift casts on the consociational theory and on its application to divided societies. In 1984, Lijphart publishes Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, in which he compares two basic models of democracy: Majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy, terms that he borrowed from Robert G. Dixon. Jr. In the preface, he says that his concept of consensus democracy is inspired from his previous work on consociational democracy and that the four characteristics of consociational democracy are “clearly recognizable in, but not coincident with” the characteristics of consensus democracy. Simultaneously, he acknowledges that there are “crucial differences between their meanings.” While, in his earlier work, he introduces first the model of consociational democracy, formulates its characteristics, then contrasts it with majority rule, he adopts in this book the opposite approach. Thus, he first deals with majoritarian democracy, and derives the characteristics of consensus democracy as the “the logical opposite” of the majoritarian model.160 Using Switzerland and Belgium as illustrative examples, he describes consensus democracy in terms of eight elements which aim at limiting majority rule: Executive power-sharing, formal and informal separation of powers, balanced bicameralism, multiparty system, multidimensional party system, proportional representation, territorial and non-territorial federalism and 160

Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty One Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), xiv.

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decentralization, written constitution and minority veto.161 Arguing that the consensual model is rational, prescriptive and empirical, he recommends it “wherever problems of deep differences and tensions between groups in society form a challenge to stable and effective democracy.”162 In 1999, Lijphart adds to the model two new institutional features: Corporatist interest group system and central bank independence. In this publication on consensus democracy, he mainly concentrates on government forms and the performance of the consensus and Westminster models in thirtysix countries.163 One could easily interpret this transition from consociational democracy to consensus democracy as an evolutionary step in Lijphart’s theory. It is obvious that consensus democracy, seen as an empirical type, mainly deals with institutional devices, while consociational democracy remains linked to the variable of elite behavior.164 Yet, one notices that the shift has also problematic connotations. First, Lijphart did not carefully address the problem of concept formation and the various implications linked to the use of different typologies and types in his theory. First, the relation between consensus democracy and consociational democracy is hard to define.165 Second, the normative and empirical typologies used to describe both models are somehow controversial: The two typologies cannot be easily related and it is also impossible to separate them.166 The ambiguous dual relation that exists between the normative and empirical typologies in consociational theory is further exacerbated by the unclear relation between consociational democracy and consensus democracy. While Sartori follows “the initial Lijphart,” he is unable to “follow him that far.” He mainly criticizes Lijphart’s misleading semantic field or arbitrary use of concepts and words. Whereas consociational democracy is defined in relation to a segmented 161 162 163

164 165 166

Ibid., 22-23. Ibid., 209. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). Kaiser, “Types of Democracy,” 436. See Bogaards, “The Uneasy Relationship”; Kaiser, “Types of Democracy.” Bogaards argues that consociational theory uses two polar typologies each containing two types: Consociational democracy as opposed to majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy as opposed to majoritarian democracy, and one empirical typology with four types: Consociational democracy, centripetal democracy, centrifugal democracy, and depoliticized democracy. Yet, the polar and empirical typologies do not overlap. The opposite of consociational democracy as a polar type is majoritarian while its opposite as an empirical type is centrifugal. These two types do not coincide and possess different properties. Furthermore, consociational and consensus democracies have the same opposite polar type: Majoritarian democracy, yet they are not identical. See “The Uneasy Relationship,” 398.

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society, consensus democracy presupposes a plural society. Since all societies have a certain degree of pluralism, one could assume that consensus democracy applies to all societies. Furthermore, while Lijphart presents consociational democracy as a type, consensus democracy is described as a model. Sartori condemns Lijphart’s attempt to transform consensus democracy into “a superior ‘consensus model’” for virtually all societies.”167 What are the reasons that motivated Lijphart to shift from consociational democracy to consensus democracy without really abandoning the former? When does Lijphart recommend consensus democracy and when does he recommend consociational democracy? It is difficult to come up with a categorical and clear-cut answer to these questions, since the dilemma lies in the unclear applicability of both models. This obscure divorce between consensus and consociational democracy allowed Lijphart to have it both ways. He was able to tackle empirical cases and institutional variants through consensus democracy and to elevate consociational democracy to the status of an undisputed normative typology that can be applied to segmented societies without being vulnerable to criticism. In 1996, Lijphart was even able to position the Indian deviant case in the category of consociational democracy through “an impressionistic methodological posture, flexible rules for coding data, and an indefatigable, rhetorically seductive commitment to promoting consociationalism as a widely applicable principle of political engineering.”168 What makes Lijphart’s semantic field even more controversial is his decision to use the term power-sharing rather than consociational in his recent writings.169 Lijphart’s claim that the latter is too esoteric and that the former is more accessible to policy makers is interpreted by Bogaards as “a waste of terms.” Furthermore, power-sharing is generally understood in a broader sense than consociational democracy.170 Indeed, we notice that Lijphart’s choice of terms in some of his recent writings is too abstract. Employing expressions such as the “power-sharing theory”171 has general connotations and does not necessarily implicate

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168 169 170 171

In addition, Sartori argues that Lijphart’s definition of a plural society in 1984 as a society sharply divided into separate subsocieties is too strong for the word ‘plural’ which appears to be a ‘misnomer.’ See Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 70. Lustick, “Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism,” 117. See Lijphart in “Multiethnic Democracy”; “Definitions, Evidence, and Policy.” See Bogaards, “The Uneasy Relationship,” 416. See Lijphart, “Multiethnic Democracy.”

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consociational democracy, for as I have already pointed out; power-sharing and democracy are not interchangeable. Yet, if Lijphart is really aiming at using less complicated words in an effort to facilitate communication, why does he re-employ in 1996 the adjective ‘consociational’ upon tackling the Indian case? Which articles are supposed to be read by political scientists and which are supposed to be read by policy-makers? Lijphart’s reaction: a struggle against all odds?172 How does Lijphart respond to these critiques and how does he clarify these ambiguities and contradictions?173 These sharp criticisms led Lijphart to engage into a valiant struggle against all critics, and to adopt as well a more prudent approach. On the one hand, in almost all his writings, Lijphart vehemently challenges the numerous arguments that aim at invalidating the theory. In his plea for the application of the consociational model to South Africa,174 Lijphart’s rebuttal becomes synonymous with an ardent defence of the model and of its unblemished and incontestable value. Over three decades, Lijphart was keen on conveying the conviction that consociational democracy was indeed a lasting normative and prescriptive model that can be extended to nearly all divided societies.175 Rejecting the need to differentiate between normative and empirical types, he considers consociational democracy as both an “ideal type,” “a polar type,” and an “empirical category.”176 Lijphart devotes much space to refute the most important objections that question the scientific method of the theory and the status of the favorable 172

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Lijphart’s retrospective comments and reactions to the critiques have important implications on the analysis of the consociational model in Lebanon. As I have already pointed out, Lijphart came up with many statements which were not identical throughout his analysis of the consociational model. Which statements should we take into account in our examination of the post-war model in Lebanon? Since it is impossible to mention all the counterarguments that Lijphart elaborated to defend the theory, I will only allude to the most important ones. Not only Lijphart but also many consociational theorists defended the theory and its validity. See for example, Pierre Du Toit, “Consociational Democracy and Bargaining Power,” Comparative Politics 19 (1987): 419-430; Conway Henderson, “Comment: Consociational Democracy and the Case of Switzerland,” Journal of Politics 43 (1981): 1232-1235; Steiner, “Concluding Remarks: Responses to Critiques of Consociational Theory,” Acta Politica 37 (2002): 228-239. See Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa. See for example Lijphart in Democracy in Plural Societies; Power-Sharing in South Africa; “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.” See “Definitions, Evidence and Policy,” 427.

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conditions. He also deconstructs many damaging critiques namely the claims that consociational democracy is not sufficiently democratic, does not provide sufficient incentives for compromise, fails to establish stability and encourages secession in some cases.177 A detailed recapitulation of Lijphart’s rebuttal is not the goal of the chapter. I will limit myself to a succinct summary of his main counterarguments. In his publications, Lijphart argues that the criticism derives its legitimacy from one conception of democracy i.e. the majoritarian model and does not take into consideration the existence of other “democratic possibilities.”178 Second, the problems of immobilism and eventual breakdown in cases such as Lebanon and Cyprus do not necessarily condemn the model, since in these difficult cases; power-sharing remains the optimal solution. One proof is that consociational practices have been revived in post-war Lebanon.179 He further argues that political power in itself constitutes a strong incentive for compromise in a power-sharing democracy, and that denying group autonomy and imposing a centralized democratic model cannot rule out separatist tendencies if they already exist.180 Just like his critics warned against conceptual stretching, Lijphart warns his critics against “conceptual rigidity and conceptual timidity.”181 Arguing that no better alternatives have been presented, he dissects the fallacies behind Horowitz’ proposal of using alternative electoral mechanisms and Barry’s recommendation of a control model in North Ireland in which a majority and a minority would both promise to behave moderately.182 Moreover, the fact that consociational democracies have changed, withered, or evolved into other trends does not indicate the transience of the model, but only proves its flexibility. Thus, consociational democracies are not “ossified systems that are incapable of substantial change.” Different evolutionary trends, according to him, suggest that consociationalism lasts more when divisions are ethnic and linguistic rather than religious and ideological.183 On the other hand, Lijphart’s optimistic and unrestrained praise of the consociational model was tempered by a more cautious stance. These sharp critiques have also led Lijphart to reconsider some of his statements, and introduce some amendments and clarifications. Let me cite some examples. 177

178 179 180 181 182 183

See for example Lijphart in Power-sharing in South Africa; “Multiethnic Democracy”; “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy.” “The Wave of Power-sharing Democracy,” 41. See Lijphart in “Multiethnic Democracy”; “Definitions, Evidence, and Policy.” See “The Wave of Power-sharing Democracy.” Ibid., 47. See “Constitutional Design in Deeply Divided Societies.” “The Evolution of Consociational Theory,” 20.

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In a response to Steiner who criticizes the vague notion of a plural society, Lijphart defines what is meant by a complete plural society.184 He also concedes that if he were to rewrite The Politics of Accommodation, he would certainly make “many major changes.”185 Moreover, we notice that after 1985, Lijphart becomes more consistent in his formulation of the favorable factors. In his new writings, he is keen on distinguishing between the normative and empirical dimensions of the consociational theory. Whereas the empirical theory explains, predicts where the consociational model developed or is likely to develop, and assesses the chances of power-sharing in the future, the normative theory recommends the application of the model as the only optimal solution.186 To the claim that his views are marked with inconsistent statements, Lijphart considers the latter as an attempt to improve “earlier formulations.” To wipe out ambiguities, he stresses that he endorses the recent statements and rejects the previous ones.187 How does Lijphart explain the relation and at the same time the differences between consociational democracy and consensus democracy? The political theorist is keen on highlighting that the two democracies are not similar although they complement each other. 188 Their relatedness and distinction are typified as follows: despite the fact that they are both non-majoritarian models, they differ in the way they were initially derived. The first distinction lies in the different number of characteristics that describe each model. Yet, the four characteristics of consociational democracy are indirectly embedded in the attributes of consensus democracy. Second, the four characteristics of consociational democracy are ‘broader’ than the corresponding features of the consensus type. A third difference is that consociational democracy is based on “informal practices,” while consensus democracy mainly relies on institutional features. Moreover, whilst both democracies are designed for fragmented societies, consociational democracy is the “stronger medicine.” Thus, for deeply divided societies, consociational democracy is to be recommended. Lijphart remarks additionally that consensus democracy and consociational democracy can be easily reconciled, and Switzerland is an illustrative example of this 184

185

186 187

188

See Lijphart, “Consociational Theory: Problems and Prospects”; Steiner, “The Consociational Theory and Beyond.” See Lijphart, “Time Politics of Accommodation: Reflections-Fifteen Years Later,” Acta Politica 19 (1984): 9-18. See Lijphart, “The Power-sharing Approach,” 499. Lijphart, “Definitions, Evidence, and Policy,” 425. Yet, this statement is in itself problematic, because it is in the first publications that consociational democracy is at best described. The recent writings on consociation are namely extensions of the earlier ones. See Lijphart in “Definitions, Evidence, and Policy”; “Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (1989): 33-48.

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combination.189 In sum, consensus democracy can be considered as the result of a more precise and refined approach, still it is by no means an extension of consociational democracy, and is by itself a “new concept.”190 Whether Lijphart’s reactions to the scholars’ critical analysis are convincing or whether they resemble more an attempt similar to that of “Cyrano de Bergerac, sword in hand, killing off all comers”191 is a highly debatable issue which is not the aim of this study.

The survivability of consociational democracy In sum, if the consociational theory is to survive the whirlwind of political theories in the 21st century and remain as a separate typology, it has to recreate and redefine itself namely in relation to the new political theories focusing on democratization, regime change, and democracy promotion. Hence, it should undoubtedly address the issue of democratic transition, separate as well as relate the components of consociationalism from those of democracy. An alternative solution would be to find the missing link between the literature on consociational theory and system transition.192 In the light of the profuse literature focusing on political regimes lost in the twilight zone, the theory has to deal with different political morphologies that have neither white nor black shades but which are of a hybrid nature.193 To state the matter differently, consociational democracy has to address its relation to non-democratic systems that have consociational attributes or hybrid systems possessing consociational features and how these systems can evolve into full-fledged consociational democracies.194 Second, consociational theory has to clarify the relationship between initiating as well as sustaining favorable factors and consociational crafting in order to make the theory accessible to policy makers and political theorists. Scholars have abundantly written on the initiating factors, yet the issue of

189 190 191

192

193 194

Lijphart, “Democratic Political Systems,” 39-41. Lijphart, “Definitions, Evidence, and Policy,” 427 David Laitin, “South Africa: Violence, Myths and Democratic Reform,” World Politics 39 (1987): 258-279, 263. I will apply this approach to explain why consociational democracy did not reemerge after the war. Systems that are neither fully autocratic nor democratic. This issue is of paramount importance when it comes to prescribing a consociational model to segmented societies in the Arab world where political systems remain largely authoritarian or semi-authoritarian.

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consolidating195 a consociational theory has been dismissed to a lower position. I suggest that elaborating on the initiating factors that lead elites to cooperate and on the sustaining motives that drive them to consolidate consociational democracy is a necessity. Otherwise, explaining why consociational democracies break down after their establishment in cases such as Cyprus or Lebanon in 1975 remains a highly arbitrary task. In analyzing why consociational democracy deconsolidates, should we adopt an elite-centered approach or shall we only rely on the absence of the genetic favorable factors? Third, it has to tackle more seriously the variable of elite behavior, and the intricate interrelationships between the elite variable and structural determinants.196 More scientific effort should be invested in the uneasy relationship between the elite self-denying prophecy and the determinism of given factors: To what extent can the magic formula of elite accommodation dispense and relieve fragmented societies from their endogenous hindrances? Thus, elaborating more on the elites’ motives in consociational democracy, and relating the requirements dependent upon the elites’ behavior to the favorable factors in Lijphart’s writings may help dissolve many contradictions. Before these issues are seriously addressed, recommending consociational democracy as a prescriptive model to all deeply fragmented societies should be toned down in favor of a contextually based approach developed in relation to the case study at hand. In other words, consociational democracy’s prescriptive value should be confined to its applicability to precise models, and should not aim at a universal value before filling intrinsic gaps lurking beneath the fabric of the theory. In the final analysis, it is advisable to limit the model’s prescriptive potential, and talk rather about “the realism of power-sharing,”197 than about the universality of power-sharing. Hence, more emphasis should be laid on when and how to recommend consociation rather than on the model’s unconditionality. More precisely, the model should be considered as a rational and reflected recipe which is more in need of complex institutionalized forms than of the sole elite ‘self-negating prophecy.’ In this regard, more academic work should be invested

195

196

197

Democratic consolidation is defined as the route through which elites internalize the rules of the democratic game and perceive this process as the only legitimate way to power. See Manning, “Conflict-Management,” 66. More particularly the nature and intensity of cleavages as well as the effects of the regional and international environment on internal cleavages and elite behavior. For more details on the realism of the power-sharing approach, see O’Leary, “Foreward: The Realism of Power-Sharing,” in Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon by Michael Kerr (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005), xvii-xxxv.

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in the appropriateness, feasibility, and desirability of the model198 rather than on its universal suitability. Still, as the model seems to have many unparalleled merits – more particularly the pacification of societies that otherwise do not have any chance for stability or steadfastness, and the fact that its design based on elite crafting allows much room for constitutional design or rectification in case of collapse, rebound or stalemate – it is perhaps more appropriate to talk about maximizing the chances for the model’s survivability than to plead in favor of its extinction.

The consociational model and its relation to our case study This review of the literature, which provides a context for the proposed study and which I consider as the spinal cord of the study, has allowed me to survey the most relevant as well as the background literature on the model. It also sheds light upon the main weaknesses of the model and the analytical problems consociational theory poses in assessing changes in the political system. In fact, the limitations of the consociational model are of paramount importance when it comes to understanding and evaluating the pre- and post-war political processes in Lebanon for the following reasons: First, we are unable to understand the distinguishing traits of the Lebanese system without relating them to the characteristics of the consociational model. Second, we cannot explain the pre-war consociational phase and its final collapse without relating it to the status of the favorable factors and their contribution to the emergence and maintenance of the model. Third, the critiques of the consociational theory constitute an important benchmark in my assessment of the consociational model in Lebanon and its future prospects. They also help me grasp the potentialities as well as the shortcomings of the model in relation to my case study. Fourth, whereas the consociational model proves more or less sufficient to grasp the dynamics of the pre-war period, one is faced with the dilemma of juxtaposing the consociational theory with the literature on democratic transition in order to come to grips with the nature of the post-war system and its deviations. One of the main aims of this study is, therefore, to integrate consociational theory with the paradigm of democratic transition in the Lebanese case and to

198

Ibid., xviii.

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test to what extent consociational democracy remains the best model for a conflict-free Lebanon despite the 1975 consociational failure.199

199

See Lijphart, “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy.”

2. Pre-War Pre-warLebanon: Lebanon: a Dance into the Consociationalism a Dance into the Abyss of Consociationalism

Abyss

of

Consociational Democracy democracy in in Pre-War pre-war Lebanon: Lebanon: The The Characteristics characteristics of the Consociational of the model Model The Lebanese consociational model from 1943 till 1975 has been considered as a successful case of consociational democracy.1 The formula of power-sharing based on the 1943 national pact and inspired from the 1926 constitution has allowed a deeply divided society composed of many religious communities to regulate its conflicts, and counteract to a certain extent the centrifugal drives that threaten to destabilize it.2 This pact concluded between the Maronite President Bechara El Khoury and the Sunnite Prime Minister Riad El Solh constituted a turning point in the Lebanese history and a concretization of what Lijphart calls ‘the self-denying prophecy.’ It was foremost a “bulwark against the disruptive potential of irrational confessionalism.”3 This unwritten pact whose aim was to dampen communal hostilities defined Lebanon’s identity as a country with an Arab face, and stipulated that the Maronite Christians should acknowledge the Arab character of Lebanon, and the Sunni Muslims would give up aspirations of unification with greater Syria. In other words, the arrangement based on reciprocal concessions established common grounds for coexistence.4 It is undoubted that conflict-regulating motives affected the elites’ cooperative behavior at that time, namely the presence of an external danger – the French threat – and the realization of “the country’s explosive potential.”5 1

2 3

4

5

See for example Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon”; El Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976; Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Seaver, “The Regional Sources of Powersharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon.” See Lehmbruch, “A Non-competitive Pattern”; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. Clovis Maksoud, “Lebanon and Arab Nationalism,” in Politics in Lebanon, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley, 1966), 239-254, 241. See El Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1991). Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, 51.

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The four essential characteristics of consociational democracy constituted the main regulators for political practices in pre-war Lebanon. Considered as the cornerstone of the consociational pact, the unwritten agreement drew the premises of a grand coalition government between a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister and a Shiite speaker of the chamber. The different religious groups were to be proportionally represented in the cabinet, regarded as a representative power-sharing body, and a ratio of six Christians to five Muslims was adopted in the parliament. Proportionality was also observed in the appointment of civil servants. In addition, each communal group had its own autonomous organizations. The matters related to personal status such as marriage and divorce were regulated by communal courts. Each religious community had its own educational institutions. Segmental autonomy and limited state interference allowed each segment to administer its own affairs.6 Segments were to a large extent “autonomous power centers.”7 Although mutual or minority veto was informal and unwritten, it was present in the Lebanese system. The two major communities, Maronite and Sunni enjoyed a concurrent majority which made them deliberate jointly.8 The pre-war consociational model seemed to fulfil the four main characteristics of consociational democracy. Yet, despite the presence of these basic elements, consociational democracy could not survive. To complete the picture and grasp all the variables that intervened in the making and un-making of pre-war power-sharing, I will discuss in the next paragraphs the background factors that paved the way to consociational democracy in Lebanon, the performance of the model and finally the reasons for its collapse.

6

7

8

See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy”; Hanf, The Political Secularization Isssue in Lebanon (Freiburg: Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 1981); Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. Michael Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics,” Comparative Politics 2 (1969): 245-263, 247. See Hanf, Political Secularization; Hudson, “The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics”; Michael Suleiman, “Elections in a Confessional Democracy,” The Journal of Politics 29 (1967): 109-128.

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The factors conducive to consociational democracy: factors conducive to consociational democracy: Why are they problematic? Why are they problematic? The double status of the favorable factors in the consociational theory makes it difficult to evaluate to what extent they contributed to shaping consociational democracy in pre-war Lebanon. The task is rendered even more difficult by the inconsistencies that already weaken the binding character of the factors. As it has been argued, the latter are inconstant variables that tend to vary from one theorist to the other and one situation to the other. Before proceeding to a critical assessment of the role of these conditions, I will first quickly review which factors were applicable or inapplicable to the pre-war political landscape. It is true that many favorable factors stated in consociational literature and more specifically in Lijphart’s writings were more or less present in pre-war Lebanon, and might have paved the way for power-sharing. First, Lebanon has a plural and heterogeneous society which is characterized by distinct lines of cleavages.9 Lebanon’s major communities, Christian and Muslim, are divided into smaller confessional groupings which are very different from each other.10 Religious and cultural boundaries, which separate segments in Lebanon and limit inter-segmental relations, are therefore supposed to decrease the intensity of conflicts.11 Communal groups in Lebanon have even been compared to separate nationalities.12 Second, the situation in pre-war Lebanon was close to a moderately multiple balance of power: Lebanon’s largest communities, the Maronite, the Shiite, the Sunni and the Druze, made up approximately 80 % of the population.13 In addition, none of these segments was very large.14 The approximate balance in size of the Christian and Muslim communities prevented the potential domination of one grouping over the other. 15 Another important favorable condition was the presence of an external threat which promoted internal solidarity among the elites. The French threat acted as a catalyser which grouped the leaders together in strife for independence, and 9

10

11 12 13 14 15

See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy”; Hudson, “The Problem of Authoritative Politics”; Jabbra and Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy in Lebanon.” While Lebanon’s Muslims consist of the Sunni, Shiite and Druze communities, the Christians are Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox and Armenian Catholics. Protestants are found in small numbers. See Lijphart, “Types of Democratic Systems.” See Hanf, Political Secularization. See Lijphart in Democracy in Plural Societies; Power-Sharing in South Africa. See Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon ; Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa. See Smock and Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana. However, it should be mentioned that there has always been a strong reluctance to carry out and update demographic studies. In fact, the last census dates back to 1932.

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reinforced their conciliatory attitudes. The 1943 national pact was a powersharing strategy mainly designed “to resist a disintegrating “penetration” of the system.16 At this stage, the external factor had a unifying effect on the Lebanese elites, and did not divide them. Ironically enough, this condition of external threat was to become a “lasting negative condition” at the outbreak of the war.17 Structured elite predominance18 in the form of a patron-client relation characterized to a certain extent pre-war Lebanese politics. Traditional notables who settled communal crises and decided for their clientele helped unify their community.19 A supplementary favorable factor is directly linked to the size of the country and to the relatively low load on the system. Lebanon’s small size is said to have influenced positively the establishment of consociational democracy.20 Smallness is supposed to be a positive factor inasmuch as it imposes the necessity of a neutral foreign policy, and thereby reduces the burdens on the political system. In pre-war Lebanon, maintaining internal equilibrium meant reducing external demands. In addition, small size allowed informal communications among elites.21 Before the rise of Arab nationalism and the exacerbation of the Palestinian conflict, the government’s main burden was to maintain equilibrium among communal groups and make sure that dormant discontent would not arise. According to Schils, “the government of Lebanon, by not claiming to accomplish a great deal” did not bring about “a revolution of rising expectations.”22 What also helped maintain a low load on the government, according to some analysts, was Lebanon’s prosperous economy.23 However, the favorable factor of a low load on the system could only be transitorily maintained. The inability to insulate political boundaries from internal and external destabilizing forces would prove to be fatal, for “the boundaries” of the Lebanese system turned out to be “as porous as the boundaries of its territory.”24

16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24

Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System,” 382. Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 124. Considered by Pappalardo in “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy” as a necessary condition for consociational democracy and by Nordlinger in Conflict Regulation as a necessary condition for conflict-regulation. See Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation ; Hudson, The Precarious Republic. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. Ibid. See also Lehmbruch, “A Non-competitive Pattern.” Edward Schils, “The Prospect for Lebanese Civility,” in Politics in Lebanon, 1-11, 5. Ibid. See also Jabbra and Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy.” Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 94.

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Lebanon had also a pre-democratic history. Traditions of elite accommodation go back to the Millet system under the Ottoman rule, which gave religious communities the right to administer affairs pertaining to personal status, to the 1861 Règlement Organique, and to the proportional system of representation during the French mandate.25 Lebanon’s democracy is thus “the outcome of a long historical communal development, which began during the Imara of Mount Lebanon.”26 Central consociational practices already ingrained in the political culture did not emerge suddenly or forcefully. Apart from doing away with the authority of the French High Commissioner, the 1943 national pact was not really innovative. By reconfirming the political practices under the Millet system, it did not really alter the political institutions that were at work before independence.27 Another factor which influenced consociational practices, and contributed to deepening traditions of elite accommodation was foreign intervention or external elites. Proportional representation of different communal groups in Lebanon was partly the result of foreign interference, namely the Ottoman Empire, France and Great Britain.28 Three specific favorable factors, according to Lijphart’s five-point scale,29 seem to have played a particularly positive role in paving the way for powersharing in pre-war Lebanon: the absence of a majority segment, small population size, and traditions of accommodation. Despite the existence of positive background factors, other conditions lacked. The presence of overarching loyalties was particularly weak. Efforts at creating a national identity were constantly undermined by particularistic and communal tendencies. People identified more with their community than with a Lebanese nation. In addition, the concept of national identity, which lent itself to multiple definitions and connotations, remained unfathomable. According to Hourani, “all might speak of a Lebanese nation, and of equality between the sects, but they

25

26 27

28

29

Following the strong upheavals in nineteenth-century Lebanon (1840-1860), the Ottoman powers appointed a Christian governor or Mutassarif assisted by an administrative council of 12 members who were elected while taking into consideration the ratio of various religious communities. During the French Mandate and after the 1926 constitution, proportionality and segmental autonomy regulated to a great extent the distribution of power and offices in pre-war Lebanon. El Khazen, The Breakdown, 389. Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy,” in Politics in Lebanon, 187-212. See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics”; Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System.” See Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa.

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meant different things.”30 Furthermore, while Lebanese nationalism was said to unite the Christians, Muslims identified with Arab nationalism.31 It is true that the 1943 national pact is an attempt to create a national identity delimiting what Lebanese national consciousness is: An amalgam of “Arabist and Lebanist ideas.”32 Nevertheless, doubt persists that the pact may have only come to existence “thanks to the confessional and factional dimension of the game played out under the French and the British colonial regime between the elites of Lebanon’s different communities among themselves and between them and the Mandatory powers.”33 Furthermore, as subsequent events proved, the overwhelming interplay of external and internal factors easily destroyed the fragile crust surrounding this identity. The presence of socio-economic disparities among communal groups was another negative factor. Many analysts advanced the thesis that economic and religious cleavages in Lebanon coincided and did not cross-cut. Christians were generally richer than the Muslims.34 Strong class cleavages were said to reinforce communal divisions, and “the communal conflict often took the trappings of a class war.”35 Economic cleavages were also reinforced by flagrant regional disparities. Beirut and Mount Lebanon were the core areas of development, while South Lebanon and the Beqa’a remained neglected and underdeveloped peripheries. Still, what makes the status of the socio-economic factor very shaky is that it lends itself to multiple interpretations in the Lebanese case.36 Thus, denying that economic and religious cleavages really overlapped, other scholars argued that it was rather religious and political cleavages which tended to coincide and reinforce each other. Each community, whether Christian or Muslim, contained internal levels of stratification which corresponded with those of other groups.37 According to Hanf, “Lebanese society is divided less by economic contradictions

30

31 32 33 34

35 36

37

Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (Berkeley: California University, 1981), 140. See Hanf, Political Secularization. Firro, Inventing Lebanon, 209. Ibid. See for example David Gordon, Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Helm, 1980); N. Kliot, “The Collapse of the Lebanese State,” Middle Eastern Studies 23 (1987): 54-74; Meir Zamir, “The Lebanese Presidential Elections of 1970 and their Impact on the Civil War of 1975-1976,” Middle Eastern Studies 16 (1980): 49-70. See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy.” In the last section on consociational failure, special attention will riveted on the socio-economic condition and to what extent it influenced Lebanon’s consociational democracy. See Shils, “The Prospect.”

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than along the lines of religious communities and of opposing concepts of cultural and national identity.”38 Another negative factor is the high index of fragmentation among Lebanese communities.39 The two principal communities in Lebanon, Christian and Muslim, are thus not “monolithic” but “fractured.”40 In relation to its population, Lebanon has a rather high number of communities.41 Furthermore, pre-war Lebanon did not really satisfy the condition of segmental isolation which entails that geographical isolation of the segments promotes peaceful inter-group relations. Segments were socially and not geographically separated.42 It is true that certain communities tended to predominate in certain areas, yet the Lebanese population was generally mixed. The condition of segmental isolation in pre-war Lebanon was also perceived from another perspective. The general concentration of the major communities in two different regions, the coast and the mountains, was thought to instigate drives of secession, and accentuate regional and communal rivalries. Thus, the Sunnis on the coast expressed at many instances their wish to join Syria, and the Maronites mainly located in Mount Lebanon communicated their wish to establish an independent Republic.43 This brief review allows us to deduce that the favorable factors and their relevance to the pre-war consociational Lebanese case are problematic in three particular ways: First, they are only helpful and not binding, for despite the fact “the conditions were by no means overwhelmingly favorable,” consociational democracy emerged.44 The pre-war Lebanese case suggests that democracy may emerge without the presence of preconditions and more specifically “without a prior legitimacy or an integrated political culture.”45 It is thus hard to assess to which extent these conditions or their lack contributed to emergence, maintenance, or even failure of the consociational model, for the absence of certain favorable factors was no obstacle to consociational democracy. Second, the main problem lies in the twofold nature of the favorable factors. It is considered that prior traditions of elite accommodation facilitate the rise of 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45

Hanf, Political Secularization, 228. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. J.C. Hurewitz, “Lebanese Democracy in its International Setting,” in Politics in Lebanon, 213238, 215. See El Khazen, The Breakdown. See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy”; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. See Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 157. Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization,” 246.

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power-sharing democracy, yet just as Lebanon was regarded as a country with a pre-democratic history, it was also considered as “a jigsaw of religious-ethnic communities which share a long history of continuous conflict.”46 Besides, while some favorable factors can be introduced to facilitate consociational engineering and maintenance, others cannot be forcefully engineered. For example, while socio-economic inequities can be intentionally reduced, instilling overarching loyalties cannot be enforced.47 In pre-war Lebanon, shaping common national loyalties on the basis of the 1943 agreement did not succeed. Furthermore, the analysts’ disagreement on the role of these variables which cannot be forcefully engineered in a fragmented society – namely the impact of cross-cutting cleavages as well as national identity on democracy and conflictregulation – makes us hesitant to adopt such variables as factors explicative of the pre-war consociational mode. While Rustow, for example, considers national unity as a background condition for the genesis of democracy, Nordlinger questions whether nationalism in deeply divided societies could be considered as a conflict-regulating variable, for the simple fact that “a strong national identity” is not present in such societies.48 He also denies that cross-cutting cleavages help to manage conflicts in those fragmented societies, since the former are rare at the non-elite level. Third, some favorable conditions in the Lebanese case were not constant, but tended rather to fluctuate with the pre-war consociational experience. For example, the factor of non-alignment in Lebanon was more or less present before the Arab-Israeli war, but disappeared afterwards. In 1943, external threat united the elites, but divided them later on. The volatility of these conditions makes them rather inappropriate to be used as sole explanatory variables of the pre-war experience. In fact, the key to solving this controversy is the necessity to dissociate the initiating factors from the consolidating ones in the pre-war model. While Lijphart remarks that the favorable factors apply for the emergence as well as for the consolidation of power-sharing,49 I will show that this does not apply to the Lebanese case. In the next paragraphs, I will assess the performance of the pre-war consociational model, and then analyze the factors behind its collapse in 1975. Next, to resolve the ambiguity around the status of the favorable conditions and 46 47

48 49

Kliot, “The Collapse,” 54. In Conflict Regulation, for instance, Nordlinger argues that forging national identity overnight is dangerous, and can only lead to an exacerbation of the problem. See Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy”; Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, 92. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies.

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their relevance to the Lebanese case, I will infer which conditions lacked in the consolidating phase, and contributed to a great extent to the disruption of the consociational experience. I will mainly prove that the favorable initiating factors might have been helpful only in the consociational take-off. Paradoxically, the maintenance of consociational democracy in pre-war Lebanon was linked to other necessary requisites.50

Performance of the pre-war consociational model (1943-1975) Consociational democracy, considered to be the best solution,51 and the “least costly option”52 for a deeply fragmented Lebanon, had a satisfactory performance for at least three decades.53 Despite its presence in a highly turbulent environment and its deep divisions, Lebanon was able to enjoy a “remarkable – although obviously far from perfect – record of democratic stability.” It also survived several instances of civil conflict such as the 1958 crisis.54 In addition to this crisis, the consociational system was even able to surpass the strains related to the influx of the Palestinians to Lebanon after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the sixth-day war of 1967 and the PLO expulsion from Jordan in 1970-1971.55 It was thus capable of maintaining for a period of time “a balance of power among its heterogeneous, confessional, ethnic, kinship and communal groups,” and to display “a remarkable resilience” in facing the inexorable wave of ideology that hit the Arab world.56 Pre-war Lebanon was even considered as an example that confirms the applicability of consociational democracy in the plural societies of the third world.57 Yet, the same model which has been praised for its relative success has also been criticized for its precariousness. How can we explain this dichotomy that 50

51 52 53

54

55 56 57

According to Rustow, “the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence.” See Transitions, 346. See Lijphart, “Multiethnic Democracy.” See El Khazen, Breakdown, 390. See for example, El Khazen, idem; Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization”; Jabbra and Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy”; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. Lijphart, Democracy, 149-150. The 1958 crisis considered as one of the most difficult phases before the outbreak of the war, had both external and internal causes. The soaring ideology of Pan Arabism at the time infiltrated the Lebanese scene, which was subsequently torn between pro-Western and pro-Arab tendencies. Adding fuel to the fire, president Camille Chamoun’s campaign of reelection exacerbated Lebanon’s political cleavages. This crisis brought to the daylight the deep Muslim community’s discontent with the confessional system. See Seaver, “The Regional Sources.” Khalaf, “Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon,” 243-244. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation.

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makes pre-war Lebanon a confirming case of consociational democracy and at the same time a defective example? In other words, is it possible to elucidate how “one of the most fragile” system is also “one of the most enduring among Arab governments”58 ? I will assess the operation of the consociational model around two main axes. First, I will describe the strengths of the system, and then contrast them with the defects that make the pre-war model a mixed success. The strengths of the pre-war consociational model The major strength of the pre-war model lies in its propensity towards consensus politics. Lebanon’s power sharing institutions were the main foundations of stability. Its pluralistic composition gave rise to a multiple balance of power which necessitated accommodation to perpetuate stability.59 The main ingenious aspect of the system was that it emphasized interethnic or inter-confessional cooperation by shifting attention to intra-ethnic competition.60 The major offices were thus reserved for specific communities, and the identity of each seat in the parliament was prescribed by law and that of the cabinet by custom. The different cabinets tried to mirror the pluralistic structure of the country by assigning half of the seats to Christians and the other half to Muslims. With time, to maximize representativeness, certain ministerial posts became even reserved to specific communal groups. Electoral arrangements, a power-sharing compromise, promoted to a great extent the politics of moderation and conciliation. These provisions encouraged aspirants to a certain office to collaborate together, instead of competing against each other. Prescribed seats and mixed electoral lists designed under the tutelage of strong leaders played a major role in promoting interethnic cooperation and elite predominance. A Christian deputy relies on Muslim votes and vice versa. Hence, the adoption of the plurality rule in the districts during elections with the emphasis that elections had to respect the ethnic composition of the district were all provisions that guaranteed proportionality, representation, and communal cooperation.61 The fact that a successful candidate had to rely on the votes of the other communities also produced a moderate parliament.62 Moreover, electoral lists, in 58 59 60 61 62

Ralph Crow, “Parliament in the Lebanese Political System,” 273. See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization.” See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups; Smock and Smock, The Politics of Pluralism. See Lijphart, “Multiethnic Democracy.” See Crowe, “Parliament in the Lebanese Political System”; Samir Khalaf, Lebanon’s Predicament (New York: Columbia University, 1987); Smock and Smock, The Politics of

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the absence of a party system, acted as an incentive for a certain political organization. The candidates’ affiliation with a powerful leader in the community created a structural network of client groups.63 The necessity of a passive electorate-private bargaining in a successful consociational model was also a feature that characterized the pre-war system. After the frenetic elections, elites always deliberated behind the scenes.64 Power-sharing was basically present in the legislative and executive and among the communities themselves. While the president enjoyed more privileges than the prime minister, decisions were finally taken on the basis of consensus. After the 1958 crisis, some even maintained that the relationship between the president and the prime minister improved.65 Besides, in order to make sure that the president would not try to perpetuate his power, the constitution demanded that he would only be re-eligible after an interval of six years. Visible were also the efforts of accommodation in the distribution of offices in the executive and legislative. It is true that the Maronites controlled the seat of the presidency as well as military and security offices, yet they had a lower representation in the cabinet. The fact that the speaker of the Chamber had to be a Shiite and the head of ministers a Sunni was said to compensate to a great extent the general feeling of Muslim underrepresentation in the Chamber.66 The legislative branch was meant to check the executive, and act as a harmonizing arena where different communal outlooks were mirrored. Although the parliament remained relatively weak, it had one particular strength. The president had to satisfy the deputies’ demands in order to gain the necessary support for the maintenance of his regime.67 The parliament was even considered as the main center of political leadership as competing parliamentary blocs were viewed as possible instigators of “future innovation.”68 In the absence of political parties, parliamentary blocs were seen as “important structural units of the Lebanese political system.”69 Prescribed power-sharing arrangements were not the only foundations for the consociational model. An essential factor that accounted for the success and

63 64 65 66 67 68

69

Pluralism. See Hudson, The Precarious Republic. See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy.” See Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism. See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy.” See Crowe, “Parliament in the Lebanese Political System.” Illiya Harik, “Political Elite of Lebanon,” in Political Elites in the Middle East, ed. George Lenczowski (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), 201-220, 220. Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism, 220.

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relative stability of consociational democracy was the elites’ predominance over followers, elites’ continuity and relative commitment to maintaining the system. The presence of strong communal and kinship ties in the Lebanese society had a strong impact on political tradition and on shaping elite predominance and integration. The prominence of leading families70 who inherited political power provided a basis of “political continuity” that dated back to the Mutesarrifate, and even prepared the emergence of a new elite structure.71 These leading families predominated on the political scene and played a major role in stabilizing the political process. The carry-over of ministers and deputies from one government to the other, and from one parliament to the other, were seeds of political stability. Second, the tie that linked the powerful leader of the community or Za’im to his follower maintained political cohesion and reinforced elite predominance.72 Rooted in the feudal period, the phenomenon of Za’imship did not disappear, but took on modern dimensions, because it continued to fulfil important functions in the Lebanese political, economic, and communal spheres. Pre-war politics was highly organized around these networks that tied the Za’im to his followers. The deputy was seen as the direct representative of his community, and one of his basic tasks was to perform personal favors to his electorate. Similarly, if a Za’im became a minister, he was supposed to bestow upon his community manifold favors such as launching new projects or finding jobs to his clientele. In return, the latter would show him gratitude and support. These ties between politicians and citizens contributed to reinforcing national cohesiveness.73 Elite predominance was also present in the political structure itself. A lower status leader who did not have enough influence to obtain a parliamentary seat had to cooperate with a higher level leader. In the final result, parliamentary blocs were essentially alliances in which a bloc leader predominated over other deputies. This leader-follower relation contained unquestionably the destructive potential of societal fragmentation. It also provided on a temporary basis the kind of strong leadership that a consociational democracy requires to achieve 70

71 72

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Leading families such as the Arslans and the Jumblatts in the Shuf, the Franjiehs in the North, the Haidars in the Beqa’a region, the Karamis in Tripoli, and the Assads in the South. Khalaf, “Primordial Ties,” 250. The Za’im is defined as a communal and political lord who maintains his power over his community by satisfying his clientele and responding to their demands. For a historical review of the Zu’ama, their influence on Lebanese politics, and the reasons for the survival of the phenomenon even after the abolition of feudalism, see Arnold Hottinger, “Zu’ama’ in Historical Perspective,” in Politics in Lebanon, 85-105 See Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism.

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stability.74 The Za’im was “the unquestioned leader of a tightly knit local community,” and his power was even “uncontested in certain regions.”75 It was mainly by fulfilling the demands of their communities and by preserving segmental isolation on a social level that elites were mainly able to assert their predominance.76 Another trait that conferred stability to the consociational formula across the decades was the elites’ adoption of conflict-regulating practices and cooperative behavior. Conciliatory attitudes were shaped by common social and economic interests who contributed to forging a relatively cohesive political structure.77 Throughout the pre-war period, political elites were inspired by many conflict-regulating motivations such as the desire to acquire and retain political power, the belief that conflict would detract from the benefits of the system, and the realization that upsetting the confessional balance would have disastrous consequences.78 In other words, they were aware that “confessional goals – order, stability, equilibrium, and system maintenance – will be achieved to the degree that the intensity and scope of conflict are controlled.”79 It is generally held that, except for intermittent crises, “the elites’ record of conflict management has been relatively good.”80 Thus, they acted as arbitrators who made sure that the balance of power would not constantly swing to and fro. Their ingeniousness can mainly be traced to their “pragmatism in attending to the problems of creating and maintaining a political order in a turbulent environment.”81 Keen on downplaying religious issues in elections in order to avoid conflicts, elites adopted, for instance, the practice of “purposive depoliticization.” The Lebanese system was described then as a “night watchman state”82 whose vigilance contributed to the maintenance of the system. On the local level, the Za’im played an important role in “reconciling tribal and communal conflict.”83 74

75 76

77 78 79 80

81 82 83

Pappalardo argues that in a stable consociation, the strength of the elites depends to a great extent on the acquiescence of the followers. See “The Conditions,” 381. Khalaf, “Primordial Ties,” 254, 258. Enver M. Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 14. See Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism. See Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation. Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System, 17. Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy,” 258. According to Jabbra and Jabbra, the elites fulfilled to a great extent before the outbreak of the war the four prerequisites of consociational democracy. See “Consociational Democracy.” Harik, “Political Elite of Lebanon,” 220. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, 26. Khalaf, “Primordial Ties,” 259.

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Religious authorities were considered as mediators between the people and the system.84 Despite its numerous negative connotations, the 1958 crisis was seen as a stimulator which urged the elites to react and remedy to certain flagrant system deficits.85 Leaders realized that the policy of non-alignment should not be transgressed, and that confessional inequities should be dealt with. There were hence concrete attempts to mitigate ascending Muslim discontent. An example was the improvement of the recruitment law after 1958.86 A continuous effort to keep an approximate balance between Muslims and Christians in the armed forces, for instance, was also the direct consequence of this crisis. In sum, by respecting the power-sharing formula and improving some of its shortcomings, the Lebanese elites showed that they were dedicated to preserving the system. A major figure in pre-war Lebanon who acted as a political engineer and an arbitrator was the president. Despite the claim that the presidential system is less compatible with consociational democracy, the former seemed to have a strong stabilizing effect on pre-war Lebanon. While the Maronite president was accused of monopolizing power and prerogatives, he was also considered as the principal figure of arbitration that helped prevent and resolve inter-communal conflicts. Had it not been for the president, analysts suggested that the balance of power might have collapsed.87 Although the end of their mandates was marked with difficulties and power abuses, presidents such as Bechara El Khoury (1943-1952) and Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) collaborated closely in difficult times with their prime ministers, and tried to use their prerogatives to build an efficient hierarchical administration. Keen on cabinet longevity, president Fuad Chehab (1958-1964) helped settle ministers’ disputes,88 and insisted on forming a representative council of ministers from all clans and regions.89 He was mainly credited for launching a series of administrative, governmental and economic reforms which signalled that the political system could respond to the pressing needs of modernization.

84 85 86

87 88 89

See Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System. See Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism. Civil service posts were attributed on the basis of five Muslims for every six Christians. After 1958, the law was amended in favor of equal proportions of recruitment between Muslims and Christians. See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization”; Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism. See Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making.” See Pierre Rondot, “The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy,” in Politics in Lebanon, 127-141.

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In addition to the elites’ fundamental role in the consociational formula, the consociational democratic system displayed signs of consolidation and improvement in three main areas: Institutionalization at the executive and to a lesser extent at the legislative levels, improvement of the electoral process, and increased political liberalization. Institutionalization was mainly obvious in the executive branch through “the growth in the effectiveness of the presidential office and the resilience of the system as a whole.”90 Through institutionalized practices and processes, the system was able to surpass occasional crises that threatened to cripple it. 91 After the 1952 crisis92 which resulted in President El Khoury’s resignation, an orderly presidential election was held. In 1958, President Chehab’s election ended the six-month conflict, and revealed that the executive could transcend feudal and partisan disputes.93 The 1969 crisis which was mainly provoked by the Palestinian commando activities on the Lebanese territory, and which led to the resignation of prime minister Rachid Karami and his cabinet, did not escalate into bitter fighting and did not lead to the formation of polarized camps.94 Elites succeeded in dampening confessional divisions, and a new government was formed in spite of a seven-month hiatus. Moreover, the cabinet displayed an increasing capacity at tackling delicate confessional issues which could not be dealt with in the parliament. There were clear signs that the life span of cabinets was gradually increasing. For example, cabinets under President Chehab averaged 9.3 months; elites’ circulation from one cabinet to the other also fostered a certain sense of continuity.95 Recruitment rules in the cabinet, another sign of stability and concern for representativeness, became with time institutionalized. In forming a cabinet, confessional, regional, and ideological considerations were taken into account. The electoral process reflected also indicators of improvement in the increasing voting participation and electoral competitiveness.96 Voting participation, for instance, increased impressively between 1943 and 1964. Despite sporadic crises which undermined the credibility of the system, the 90 91 92

93 94 95 96

Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization,” 260. See El Khazen, The Breakdown. Bechara El Khoury, elected in 1943 for a six-year term was reelected in 1949 for a second term. In 1952, dissatisfied with the corruption lurking beneath the political system, the opposition threatened the regime with insurgency in case the president did not resign. Finally, the president resigned in September 1952. See Rondot, “Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy.” See Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism. See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization.” See El Khazen, “The Postwar Political Process: Authoritarianism by Diffusion”; Hudson, The Precarious Republic; Khalaf, Lebanon’s Predicament.

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voting behavior was not affected.97 Parliamentary elections became more representative and competitive – mainly since 1960 – and reflected a clear concern for inter-confessional cooperation. The 1972 parliament marked an unprecedented degree of electoral competitiveness.98 In this parliament, political parties and parliamentary blocs were mostly keen on mirroring inter-communal ties.99 Besides, notwithstanding previous attempts of gerrymandering, the electoral law became more or less stable after 1960. There were obvious indicators that the opposition was becoming more effective, and that the intervention of governments in elections was decreasing. In addition, elite recruitment in the parliament showed the decline of feudal landlords and notables, and the increased participation of a more skilled and professional elite.100 Analysts alluded to the growing rate of elite turnover in the legislature,101 and to the increasing participation of political parties in the parliament.102 This arising electoral competitiveness and concern for electoral representativeness in the legislative body were signs of an improved institutionalization. Similarly, the competitiveness of presidential elections improved after 1960. In the last presidential election in 1970 before the outbreak of the war, the opposition gained the upper hand. From 1972 to 1975, Freedom House103 gave Lebanon a second ranking on a seven-point scale for its respect of political rights.104 Interestingly enough, Lebanon was the only Arab country that enjoyed “three consecutive years of relatively strong political rights” before the outbreak of the war, and its elections were considered to be more or less “free and fair.”105 These indicators revealed that consociational democracy showed some early aspects of consolidation and that elite habituation to democratic rules was gradually developing in producing outcomes that were not already fixed, for 97 98 99 100 101

102 103

104

105

Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 225. See El Khazen, “Postwar Political Process.” See Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism. See Harik, “Political Elite of Lebanon”; Hudson, The Precarious Republic. See Harik, “The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (1973): 303-323. See El Khazen, “Postwar Political Process”; Hudson, The Precarious Republic.” Freedom House is an independent non-governmental organization which analyzes worldwide democratic trends by measuring political and civil liberties. Considered as a serious index for democratic trends, the Freedom House scores are taken into account by various regime analysts and journals. See www.freedomhouse.org. See Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “An ‘Arab’ more than a ‘Muslim’ Electoral Gap,” Journal of Democracy 14 (2003): 30-44. Ibid., 32, 38.

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instance in elections.106 Formal processes seemed to be more anchored in the system through the growing strength of the executive branch and the improvement of electoral competitiveness. Informal rules, namely elites’ efforts to cooperate and accommodate, were also present. The defects of the pre-war consociational model Despite these positive augurs that indicated that consociational democracy was in the process of evolution, the system was intrinsically plagued with many weaknesses to the extent that many critics referred to the Lebanese democracy as fragile, “vaguely democratic,” or “democratic only in a limited sense.”107 Some even expressed their bewilderment “to the fact that Lebanon’s confessional, capitalist democracy functions at all.”108 Lebanon’s power-sharing system which provided a basis for its strength and stability was in a self-contradictory manner at the same time a tool of disintegration. The same motives that provided for elites’ cooperation were also motives for elites’ divisions. An inherent dichotomy rooted in the system made out of the consociational pact a double-edged sword: a power-sharing agreement and an instrument of disintegration. One main weakness that kept the democratic process in pre-war Lebanon at an embryonic stage was that pre-war consociational democracy remained basically an act of adjudication, mainly designed to settle conflicts, and satisfy the different communal groups.109 In this sense, consociational democracy was prisoner to the Lebanese deterministic structure of confessionalism, and was bound to falter whenever the power equation was severely challenged. The functions performed by the executive were not essentially political, but rather administrative and judicial inasmuch as the political organ was mainly concerned with dealing with issues and services pertaining to the different segments.110 Similarly, the aim of the parliament was not to enhance democracy but to satisfy different groups.111 106

107

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The system was able to challenge predetermined outcomes and react. The elections that were state-controlled fomented crises that produced regime change. In 1952, president El Khoury had to resign, and in 1958, president Chamoun could not get reelected. See respectively Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies; Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country, 3; Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization,” 245. See Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership: Lebanon, Israel, Egypt (New York: State University of New York, 1975), 11 See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization”; Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making”; Schils, “The Prospect of Civility.” See Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making.” Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization,” 251.

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One is tempted to argue that the consociational democratic procedures in prewar Lebanon were an end in themselves, for they were initially a preventive strategy so as to preserve equilibrium and provide a minimum edge of coexistence. Their archaic nature could not set Lebanon on the ambitious track of the democratic transition process. Two crises were sufficient to demonstrate Lebanon’s schizophrenia: a seemingly working system was easily made unsteady. The 1952 crisis indicated that despite the system’s capacity to manage “routine politics,” “clique politics” managed the system. The latter remained unable to absorb a strong opposition, or deal with mounting problems on the national level.112 Similarly, the 1958 crisis foreshadowed the system’s vulnerability vis-à-vis confessional imbalances and destabilizing external influences. In sum, consociational democracy in pre-war Lebanon remained trapped at a starting phase and was unable to embark on the road of consolidation because of two main features: elites’ divisiveness and the rigidity of the power-sharing formula. Elites’ divisiveness: adversarial politics Notwithstanding the adoption of manifold conflict-management strategies, elite discord could not be avoided. To start with, the nature of patrimonial and political networks deeply ingrained in the Lebanese society undermined significantly the elites’ commitment to the system and ability to transcend communal barriers. It is true that the patron-client relation is essential for elite predominance and that the reward of political offices acts normally as a stimulus for conciliatory behavior,113 but this feature was not sufficient to create the kind of elite commitment likely to reverse internal centrifugal tendencies and shield the system from external turbulences. Political alliances between leaders and followers reflected to a great extent self-interest and nepotism, and proved to be unable to foster steady institutional processes that could consolidate the democratic and consociational games. Political alliances had thus personalistic and not ideological roots.114 Even if the Zu’ama formed their own parties, the underlying motive remained personal. Additionally, leading families which provided the basis for political continuity in Lebanon were themselves torn by

112 113

114

Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 107. For an analysis of conflict-regulating motives that influence elite behavior, see Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation. See Crow, “Parliament in the Lebanese Political System”; Khalaf, Lebanon’s Predicament.

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political rivalries and continuous competition for power. Generally speaking, in spite of a remarkable improvement, elections were rarely unbiased, and reflected to a great extent personal hostilities and traditional feuds. It is important to note that Lijphart’s idealistic image of a leadership, aware of divisive tendencies and committed to maintaining the system, broke down at several occasions in pre-war Lebanon. Thus, the same leaders, who were supposedly committed to preserving the power-sharing formula, tried to perpetuate their power by resorting to means which could only destabilize the system and escalate the conflict.115 It was even proposed that the ‘self-negating prophecy’ in 1943 leading to the National Pact was part of the president’s attempt “to mobilize enough supporters among the deputies of the new Parliament for his presidential candidacy.”116 Although a perfect state of elite solidarity is inconceivable, the pre-war Lebanese case shows that at the slightest crisis, leaders would stir up segmental divisions. Hence, the same phenomenon of Za’imship – which allowed elite predominance, and favored consociational politics – crystallized confessional loyalties and reinforced political cleavages.117 More alarming were intra-communal elite divisions and continuous squabbling which weakened subcultural ties and made pre-war Lebanon more vulnerable to external threats. Thus, a continuous struggle for power affected the top leaders’ relations with the lower-level elites within the same community. 118 These internal divisions crystallized mostly at times of crisis.119 Personal and family antagonisms notwithstanding, deep tensions also existed between intraethnic organizations.120 Retrospective analysis shows that conflict-regulating motives remained rudimentary and were unable to foster the necessary conciliatory attitudes that 115

116 117

118 119 120

Examples are President El Khoury’s insistence to continue his second mandate despite deep dissatisfaction with the regime in 1952 and president Chamoun’s persistence on getting reelected in 1958. Firro, Inventing Lebanon, 208. The 1958 crisis revealed to what extent the Za’im was able to mobilize his community to engage into fighting and defeat his rival. Foreign powers were even able to infiltrate the internal political scene by coordinating with the Zu’ama. See Hottinger, “Zu’ama.” Wary of the mounting antiChamoun and pro-Arab feelings, president Chamoun asked for the direct interference of Western powers, and even invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, calling the US to interfere militarily in Lebanon. For a deep analysis of the 1952 and the 1958 crises, see Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 105-116. See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy.” By means of illustration, the 1952 crisis displayed deep elite rifts in the Maronite community. For instance, hostilities broke out between the Maronite Phalange or Kata’ib Party and the National Bloc whose respective leaders Pierre Gemayel and Raymond Edde engaged in a relentless competition of power. See Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making.”

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would push the system forward. As Hudson comments, “modes of conflict regulation that were adequate for a thin stratum of notables in the early postindependence era” were no longer suitable.121 In a nutshell, elite discord and the strong particularistic motives that affected political alliances, frequently led to political standstill one the one hand, and hampered the growth of political institutions on the other hand. In the following paragraphs, I will try to prove these claims by referring to the political performance of the executive and legislative branches. To be more specific, I will show how the president’s dominating role, the fragmented cabinet, and the ineffective parliament weakened the consociational arrangement. The power of the Maronite president had a significant negative impact on the consociational democratic arrangement.122 Although Lebanon has by definition a parliamentary system, unwritten rules mainly inspired from the French mandate bestowed upon the president in the pre-war period many prerogatives. The president had the power to promulgate laws and veto bills. With the consent of the cabinet, he could dissolve the parliament or call the legislative body to a special session. He had also the right to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet, and dismiss them. Unlike the cabinet, he was not accountable to the parliament unless he violated the constitution.123 Yet, restraint was not characteristic of the president’s rule in the pre-war period. The danger was less present in the constitutional role given to the president than in his unbridled attempts to trespass the constitution and mobilize unofficial privileges. Hence, some presidents tried to build their own political machinery in order to ensure the perpetuation of their power.124 Furthermore, the Maronite president was frequently accused of being a communal and not a national figure.125 He also contributed to the survival of the patron-client brokerage.126 121 122 123 124

125 126

Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 88. See Lijphart, “Multiethnic Democracy.” See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization”; Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making.” The two main crises before the outbreak of the civil war were partly provoked by the president’s will to succeed himself, extend his mandate through unconstitutional means, as well as affect the electoral outcome by manipulating the electoral law and the electoral lists. The rigged parliamentary elections of 1947 were followed by president El Khoury’s reelection in 1949. Violating the constitution was sufficient to provoke a crisis in 1952. President Chamoun’s forceful attempt in mid-1957 to amend the constitution and secure the two-thirds majority necessary to succeed himself largely contributed to the acute 1958 crisis. Not to forget that by violating the pact of non-alignment and soliciting help from the outside, he rekindled dormant hostilities among communities. In 1957, president Chamoun represented himself as the heralding figure of Christian Lebanon. Despite his contempt for partisan politics, General Fuad Chehab gave many offices to military figures and his Deuxième Bureau, the military intelligence service he set up, perpetuated the

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The pre-war consociational arrangement was further weakened by the factionalism present in the cabinet and the recurrent patterns of instability produced by cabinet changes. Cabinet members had the tendency to define their role in terms of confessional affiliations.127 While two cabinets lasted for a longer period of time, the general average between 1926 and 1964 was less than eight months per cabinet.128 One main reason behind the short life span of the cabinets was the loss of trust among ministers mainly over “personal irritations,”129 and the rotating coalitions among the same elites.130 The inability to overcome quarrels transformed the cabinet into a group of factions preoccupied with bickering rather than with the elaboration of a coherent program of public policy. Vital issues such as socio-economic disparities or foreign policy were sacrificed at the altar of political feuding and bitter fights. 131 These disputes accelerated the self-induced disintegration of the cabinets. It is noteworthy that cabinet changes were paradoxically a reflection of the stagnant political life, for they indicated shift patterns in routine alliances, and did not lead to political change. In other words, it is true that new collegial bodies were formed, but the number of newcomers into the cabinets was low and declining.132 The carry-over of ministers from one cabinet to the other, an apparent sign of political continuity, was another way to perpetuate factions and deepen immobilism. Another feature of political life was the tendency to appoint ministers from the parliament. Hence, changing parliamentary coalitions heightened the divisions already existing in the cabinet. Moreover, the parliament depicted as a caricaturized “small landed gentry [...] with leading businessmen,”133 was left powerless for several reasons. First, the chamber was the core of clientelism and patronage in pre-war Lebanon.134 Candidates gathered votes on the basis of the services they provided their clientele, and the Zu’ama perpetuated their power by monopolizing

127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

tradition of clientelistic ties. See Smock and Smock, The Politics of Pluralism. See Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making.” Ibid., 166. See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization.” On pre-war political feuding, see Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country. See Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization.” Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies, 189. For instance, Kliot writes: “Power in Lebanon does not necessarily lie within the Chamber of Deputies or in the parties, but in some 50 prominent clans of clerics, semi-feudal lords, political bosses, and some bankers, businessmen and professionals, the Zuama as they are called.” See “The Collapse of the Lebanese State,” 65.

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parliamentary blocs. Personal interests shaped the parliamentary spectrum of changing political alliances rather than coherent political parties.135 Despite the fact that political parties started proliferating since 1960, they remained strongly impregnated by confessional considerations and clan loyalties.136 In addition, they were unable to secure a majority in the parliament, reflect cross-national interests or contain the influence of communal lords. 137 Although elections became more competitive, the list of notables remained the predominant organization, and non-traditional groups were unable to challenge the deeply embedded primordial forms of representation.138 Second, danger subsisted that the parliament would never evolve to become a legislative body, and that it would remain “a formal setting for clashes between communities.”139 Despite the signs that the recruitment process in the parliament reflected a shift from landlords to professionals,140 this change was only a reflection of the changing generational occupation of ruling notables. The facade of high elite turnover rates was thus deceptive. In fact, the parliament remained a closed arena, and a group of perennial notables always returned safely to their haven.141 Patronage networks based on the exchange of favors and distribution of offices contributed highly to eroding the effectiveness of the parliament, and made it a subservient body to the executive. Hence, the same leader-follower relation that existed in the encapsulated communities characterized elite structure. This legislative-executive state of vassalage accentuated the impotence of political organs as the deputies constantly sought protection from the ministers and the president. This parliamentary dependence on the executive weakened considerably the principle of separation of powers. Never in the history of independent pre-war Lebanon was a parliament able to bring down a cabinet by a vote of no confidence. The deputies feared the ministers’ disapproval and cultivated the secret ambition of becoming ministers 135 136 137

138 139 140

141

See Khalaf, “Primordial Ties”; Suleiman, “Elections in a Confessional Democracy.” See Kliot, “The Collapse of the Lebanese State.” See respectively Crow, “Parliament in the Lebanese Political System”; Suleiman, “Elections in a confessional Democracy.” See Hudson, The Precarious Republic. See Rondot, “Political Institutions.” See Harik, “Political Elite of Lebanon”; Hudson, “The Electoral Process and Political Development in Lebanon,” The Middle East Journal 20 (1966): 173-186. For an analysis of the Lebanese parliament, see Crow, “Parliament in the Lebanese Political System”; Khalaf, Lebanon’s Predicament; 121-134. In his study on the parliamentary elite, Khalaf demonstrates, for example, that 35 % of parliamentary seats between 1920 and 1972 were the lot of 26 families. He argues that the rise of professional elites did not cause a change in the elites’ political behavior. On the contrary, patronage networks persisted, and clientelism was not really challenged. The rapid elite turnover in the parliament, although it indicated apparent fluidity, was an indicator of stagnation and inconsistency in the legislature.

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themselves.142 In addition, changing a president required an “extraparliamentary” force since the parliament itself was too subservient to the president.143 Deputies’ stances were moreover subject to change as soon as presidents changed. In 1952, following President El Khoury’s resignation, the same chamber that was loyal to him elected his opponent, President Chamoun. Those weaknesses considerably detracted from the parliament’s prerogatives. With time, the council of ministers became a surrogate parliament with the advantage that it could deliberate secretly. This also facilitated the emergence of external congresses which could also act informally as surrogate parliaments. In many instances, the elites’ adversarial politics brought about deadlock on the decision-making level. The seven-month cabinet paralysis in 1969 was an illustrative case of this power-sharing schizophrenia. Although the crisis was contained, the fact remains that power sharing was easily replaced by sharing inaction in crisis situation.144 As a result of the elites’ tendency towards discord, the executive and legislative branches were left with distorted functions. Thus, “instead of being a figurehead, the president is a participating umpire; instead of being a government, the cabinet is the battleground of notables; and instead of being a legislative body, the parliament is a sounding board for local leaders.”145 Some go as far as depicting the political process as “one of squabbles over patronage rights and boundaries.”146 Another important factor that contributed to the weakening of the consociational formula was the gradual corrosion of elite predominance before the war. Thus, long before the Lebanese conflict escalated, the gap had started widening between the leaders and their masses. For instance, the Shiite community, bit by bit alienated from its representatives, resorted to radicalized means to fulfil its goals. The erosion of Sunni elite predominance was already apparent in the 1950s as the political establishment could no longer control the Sunni masses once the wave of Arab nationalism had invaded the region. Paralyzed by internal elite rifts, the Maronite community also started losing its leader-follower cohesiveness.147

142 143 144 145 146 147

See Malcom Kerr, “Political Decision Making.” See Hottinger, “Zu’ama.” See El Khazen, The Breakdown. Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization,” 250. Khalaf, Lebanon’s Predicament, 100. For more details, see Marius Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War (New York, Praeger, 1980); El Khazen, “Lebanon’s Communal Elite-Mass Politics.”

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The rigid design of the power-sharing formula In addition to the elite variable, the rigid design of the consociational formula hampered the growth of the system. Intrinsic flaws within the power-sharing design were not rectified, and the pre-war consociational model remained asymmetric inasmuch as it could not establish a real balance of power among the communities. First, one could easily argue that the characteristics of consociational democracy were not full-fledged. To start with, a truly grand coalition which represented the segments in the Lebanese society was dubbed as a deceptive power-sharing oligarchy with a Sunni and Maronite flavour. The Shiite and Druze communities were unhappy with the Sunni monopoly of power, and the Greek Orthodox community was not content either with the Maronite predominance.148 In addition, the mutual veto was not effective. While Sunnis could challenge a decision, it was not clear whether the Shiite or Druze communities were able to.149 The proportionality principle was present, but did not reflect the demographic changing reality of the country. Indeed, the last official census taken in 1932 was no longer up to date, and subsequent statistics were all estimates that could not be objectively grounded. It was strongly suspected that the Muslims became the majority, and that the Maronites had been outranked by the Shiites who became the largest segment.150 In fact, dissatisfaction within Muslim communities regarding civil service appointments and high level offices was gradually building up,151 and the 1958 crisis was a strong indicator of the latent discontent. Although the ratio of civil service appointments was rectified in the Chehab era, this power-sharing adjustment was not sufficient to contain the feelings of Muslim and namely Shiite dissatisfaction. Second, the static power-sharing design reinforced the archaic character of the political apparatus.152 One telling example was the electoral system. Electoral arrangements necessitated reform, yet apart from slight modifications, they remained unchallenged. Insistence on using a list system in legislative elections

148 149 150

151 152

See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy.” See Hudson, “The Problem of Authoritative Politics.” Arnon Soffer, “Lebanon where Demography is the Core of Politics and Life,” Middle Eastern Studies 22, (1986): 197-205. See Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy.” It is noteworthy that using confessional identity as the criterion for recruitment and allocation of posts strongly impeded meritocracy, and even created immobilism in the sense that if no qualified person from the required confession were found to fill in the post, the latter would remain vacant.

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strengthened particularly the power of the Zu’ama and prevented to a certain extent the organization of political parties.153 This resulted in the empowerment of patrimonial and confessional networks. Not to forget that the vacuum created by the absence of coherent national parties contributed later to the emergence of militias and warlords.154 Moreover, by shifting attention from inter-ethnic competition, electoral arrangements exacerbated intra-ethnic divisiveness. The fact that deputies had to rely on the votes of other communities undermined the principle of representation. Thus, the elected person was not necessarily the representative of his own communal group.155 Furthermore, electoral arrangements played a role in weakening the functions of the parliament. The effort to elect moderate candidates who are accepted by other communities allowed the election of “tamer individuals” rather than “the typical champions” of each group.156 Not only did this impair communal representativeness, but also contributed to the genesis of parliaments which acted as hesitating forums in which vital issues were discarded in order not to awaken dormant hostilities. In a way, the electoral process was in itself a reflection of Lebanon’s dilemma: the inability to bring about substantial change in order not to disrupt the fragile status quo. In the final analysis, this resistance to change ended up reinforcing the negative connotations of embedded confessional and clannish cleavages. Despite the president’s attempts to improve the electoral law and raise the membership of the Chamber, the electoral process remained the guardian of a rigid confessional formula. In conclusion, it is of paramount importance to highlight that the main danger did not lie in the power-sharing arrangements themselves, but in the fact that they remained unchanged. Hence, a major weak spot in the pre-war Lebanese power-sharing model is that it remained a system of pre-determination,157 which suffered from the “the frozen quota pitfall.”158 Freezing parliamentary seats to a specific ratio, for instance, institutionalized rigidity in the political process. One could also argue that the consociational pact’s most alarming flaw was that it resisted modification although “it was reformable and adaptable” and “not necessarily conducive to immobilism.”159 While a retrospective evaluation of the

153 154 155

156 157 158 159

See Hudson, The Precarious Republic. See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups. See Lijphart, “The Power-sharing Approach”; Rondot, “Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy.” Rondot, idem, 133. See Lijphart, “The Wave of Power-sharing.” Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 588. El Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities, 65.

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1943 agreement could have spared many problems,160 “patchwork readjustment” failed, and the inalterable ethnic proportions in the system could not be challenged unless the whole regime was challenged.161

An inevitable collapse? An inquiry into the reasons behind consociational failure “The Lebanese consociational democracy was a delicately balanced complex mechanism of governance. For a long time, it was remarkably resilient, but it eventually gave way to a combination of internal and external strains.”162 “The war happened because Lebanon was not shielded from external interferences, and it had an incomplete national pact.”163 The pre-war model, once considered as “the best examples of consociational democracy,”164 collapsed only to produce a ‘stateless’ state and an anarchic model of governance for fifteen years. One wonders how a society that largely met the requisites of consociational democracy could inevitably head for war.165 After having exposed the strengths and limitations of the pre-war system, I propose to investigate which decisive factors were responsible for the breakdown of consociational democracy. Analyzing the causes of the consociational collapse is impossible without briefly reviewing the changes in the regional landscape and their repercussions on the Lebanese scene. Scholars are divided as to whether the fragmented Lebanese society and the consociational formula contained the seeds of their own destruction or whether the interplay of internal and external factors precipitated the fall of a system that endured for three decades and that could have continued to function despite its fragility. Would the system have survived despite its precariousness without the ruthless condition of external threat or was it ill-fated from its very inception?

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For more details on the necessity of reassessing the pact, See Rabbath, La formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel, 518. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 588. Jabbra and Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy,” 7 Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 8, 2004. Hanf, Political Secularization, 247 See Hudson, “The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits.”

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In this section, I will divide the arguments that deal with Lebanon’s collapse into two categories. While some scholars claim that the 1975 tragedy was mainly caused by immanent or internal factors, a different approach links the collapse to the triggering mechanism of transcendental factors which once coupled with internal strains led ultimately to the collapse of the system.166 It was held that major factors of collapse were inherent to the Lebanese system and to the conflict-laden communal schisms lurking beneath Lebanon’s pluralistic structure.167 A confessional crisis that was simmering came to the forefront with the Palestinian catalyst. Lebanon’s predicament was the inevitable consequence of immanent forces, and the consociational formula was irreversibly heading for self-destruction. The collapse can thus be traced back to Lebanon’s formation and development as a nation-state: “Lebanon has been [...] a malintegrated state from its very beginning, and has failed in the development of a viable state-idea and the establishment of common socio-cultural values.”168 Special emphasis was laid on explaining the occurrences of crises as instances of “an ethno-religious conflict.”169 According to some analysts, the Maronites’ fear of extinction caused a protracted ethnic conflict in the Lebanese society. In order to guarantee the perpetuity of its political supremacy, the community formed institutions that guaranteed this hegemony and challenged every countervailing force.170 The 1975 war was also depicted as a Christian-

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Although many scholars hold that the factors of collapse are mainly external or transcendental, they also deal with internal problems. This is why I prefer not to treat transcendental factors as a separate category, for analysts always intertwine both internal and external aspects of the crisis. For analyses that shed light on the subversive effect of regional disturbances on the Lebanon’s system collapse, see Marwan Buheiry, “External Interventions and Internal Wars in Lebanon: 1770- 1982,” in The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World, ed. Laurence I. Conard (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1987), 129-139; El Khazen, The Breakdown; Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris: Lattès, 1985). See Halim Barakat. “Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic,” Middle East Journal 27 (1973): 301-318; Kliot, “The Collapse of the Lebanese State”; Tabitha Petran, The Struggle over Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review press), 1987. Kliot, “The Collapse of the Lebanese State,” 54. Ibid., 61. See for example Elisabeth Crighton and Martha Abele Mac Iver, “The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon,” Comparative Politics 23 (1991): 127-142.

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Muslim clash,171 and the Palestinian forces were pictured as engulfed by Lebanon’s chaotic confessionalism.172 To the analysts who adhere to this view, before Lebanon became a state, its history had been shaped by inter-communal dissension. The Nasserist ideology in 1958 and the Arab conflict in 1975 were thus able to agitate the Lebanese waters, and many external actors could infiltrate the Lebanese scene only because of Lebanon’s malintegration. Every time a crisis loomed, the fragile idea of a nation-state was torn apart. In other words, Lebanon’s intrinsic cultural, socio-economic and political divisions made it fragile and fallible to foreign intervention. Crystallized religious divisions, in particular, are thought to have reinforced political dissent and to have impeded the rise of a party government based on common rather than communal interests.173 Other analysts associated the flawed consociational system itself with Lebanon’s collapse in 1975.174 The pre-war model was only successful when conflicts had a low salience and when the environment was more or less stable. Yet, as soon as socio-political turbulence increased, the model proved its inefficiency and incapacity to confront the destructive forces emanating from the outside and from the inside. Revising the logic behind consociationalism, Hudson argues, for instance, that the mere existence of consociational elements during a period of stability is not sufficient to prove that they caused it.175 He attributes temporary peace to a lack of communal hostilities, and claims that the static power-sharing arrangements prohibited the state from tackling rising pressures. In the end, the model became “a cause of breakdown and chaos.”176 He also expresses great doubt as to whether consociational democracy “in the sense of prescriptive constitutional engineering” can prove to be salutary to Lebanon.177 Horowitz goes as far as arguing that the political predetermined rules in the consociational formula allowed two alternatives: “Moderation or civil war.” While moderation was more “common,” the bell of civil war, when it tolled, was “deadly.”178 171 172

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175 176 177 178

See Bernard Lewis,“Right and Left in Lebanon,” New Republic, September 10, 1977, 20-23. See Hudson, “The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War,” Middle East Journal 32 (1978): 261-278. See Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies. See for example Hudson, “The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits”; Elie Salem, “Lebanon’s Political Maze,” Middle East Journal 33 (1979): 444-463. In “The Lebanese Crisis,” Hudson notes that it was “the embodiment of a consociational model” which drove Lebanon to the 1975 war. See p. 114. See Hudson, “The Problem of Authoritative Politics.” Ibid., 229. Ibid., 233. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 635.

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It was also maintained that the consociational formula had in itself impeded the development of overarching loyalties and common allegiances by acknowledging confessional loyalties and giving “existing cleavages binding force.”179 Seen from this angle, communal cleavages, overemphasized by the power-sharing formula, made external challenges facing the system more acute. However, a retrospective look at the fifteen-year old war enables us to deduce that it could not have been confessional divisions, the lack of a national identity, or the confessional political system by themselves that caused the numerous post-1975 multidimensional conflicts. Indeed, these variables are no sufficient explanations for the collapse. The claims that Lebanon’s tragedy is the making of its internal structure and political system are problematic for several reasons. First, constructing an interpretation based on the premises that Lebanon is a country at odds with its past and history is surely no starting point, for it implies that the country’s recovery is at any time inconceivable. In addition, attributing the democratic breakdown solely to the lack of common allegiances, overlapping cleavages or to heightened confessional divisions is not an explicative variable for the collapse, for we already know that “deep ethnic and other societal divisions pose a grave problem for democracy,” and that it is easier to reach consensus in homogeneous societies rather than in divided ones.180 Also, we cannot justify Lebanon’s fall in 1975 by invoking a condition which is not part of its social structure. A strong national identity or crosscutting cleavages are not usual features of a divided society.181 Moreover, confessionalism was viewed by many scholars as a constructive attempt to contain internal divisions in Lebanon.182 It was thus argued that recognizing confessional divisions rather than repressing them has promoted harmony in the country.183 In this respect, it is important to mention that “a closing of the attitudinal gap between the two communities,”184 as well as trends of “interconfessional convergence on political outlooks and values” were observed before 179 180 181 182

183 184

Hanf, Political Secularization, 247. Lijphart, “The Wave of Power-sharing,” 38. See Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation. See for example John P. Entelis. Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al Kata’ib, 1936-1970 (Leiden: Netherlands,1974). See El Khazen, The Breakdown; Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism. Harik argues further that the emergence of sectarian rivalries during the war after the detected rapprochement among communities was caused by “political challenges” which reversed “the integration gains made in the past.” If this hypothesis is correct, many other variables such as fear and insecurity could have interfered in widening communal gaps during the war. Mere sectarian opposition appears as a remote explanation. See Harik, “Voting and Political Integration in Lebanon,” Middle Eastern Studies 16 (1980): 27- 44.

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the outbreak of the war. Thus, Christians were progressively coming to terms with their Arab identity, and Arab nationalists were becoming more receptive to the idea of a Lebanese state.185 The sectarian approach of Christian-Muslim rivalry in explaining the 1958 and 1975 wars was judged as a misconception.186 It was even questioned how the 1975 conflict could be seen in terms of inter-communal clashes when each community disintegrated and “intra-communal power struggles [...] overshadowed most inter-communal rivalries.”187 In addition, had the struggle been mainly confessional, the conflict would have ended shortly after the victory of one group. Despite the fact that their fighting resources were exhausted, both camps continued to fight.188 Arguments explaining Lebanon’s collapse as a result of conflict of social classes were also rejected.189 In addition, relating consociational failure to the lack of overarching loyalties or absence of national identity is no convincing argument. Although national identity was weak in 1943 Lebanon, and communities had external allegiances, consociational democracy emerged. The condition of overarching loyalties was not by itself a sufficient explanation to justify why consociational democracy persists or collapses, for it did not vary with Lebanon’s consociational experience.190 Recent works emphasize the necessity of separating the concept of nationstate and that of democratization. It is indeed impossible to craft simultaneously homogeneous nation states and democracies. Denying causal links between the two variables, analysts warn against instilling homogenizing measures that might be detrimental to the development of democracy.191 Hence, one could argue that multiculturalism in Lebanon and the weakness of national sentiments may make democratic crafting more difficult yet not impossible. 185 186 187

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Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism, 156-165. See Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country. Oren Barak, “Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions of Conflict and Peace in Lebanon,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34 (2002): 619-644, 623. See Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System. See Antoine Hokayem, “Emergence et affermissement de l’entité libanaise dans les tourmentes du Proche-Orient: 1841-1991,” in Cahiers de La Méditerranée 44 (1992): 7-53. See Pappalardo, “The Conditions.” For a condition to be binding to the development of consociational democracy, it has to be concomitant with the consociational path and its sequences. In addition, several empirical cases show that national identity does not prevent the rise of consociational democracy. Nationalism was weak in the two European countries, Belgium and Austria. Yet, consociational arrangements were not jeopardized by the lack of a strong national sentiment. Furthermore, in Austria, half of the population identified with the German nation. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.

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It seems also inaccurate to ascribe merely all ills to the power-sharing equation. According to Jabbra and Jabbra, “the body politics” in Lebanon was “not altogether healthy” but doubt hovers whether the “the confessional aspect of the political system is the sole or even the major source of difficulty.”192 The system ostensibly presented many deviations from the normative consociational model: the elite cartel was not representative, and elite accommodation broke down in many instances. Relating the collapse, however, solely to the nature of the political systems ignores many aspects of the problem.193 Interpreting the pre-war Lebanese experience as a “consociational failure” has been perceived as “erroneous,” for the drawbacks in the consociational arrangement are not a sufficient reason to condemn it, since these weak spots could be improved.194 A similar argument purports that the 1975 conflict could not have resulted from the collapse of the political devices of power-sharing for adjusting the distribution of power could have taken place without such a war.195 Furthermore, it is hard to see how the large-scale collapse could have been caused by the nature of the political system itself especially that the political discourses keen on the eradication of the system at the eve of the war were few.196 It is by no means evident that Lebanon would have been able to face the regional tempest, had it had another system, or had it also been more homogeneous. In that connection, dealing with counterfactuals is no sound analysis.197 El Khazen argues, for instance, that it was rather Lebanon’s open system in a region of closed regimes that made it more vulnerable to regional interference.198 Likewise, Salibi holds that external parties “took liberties” with Lebanon’s system and manipulated it for “political blackmail.”199 192 193

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Smock and Smock, Politics of Pluralism, 171. Many critics condemn the pre-war power-sharing system by hinting to the elites’ inadequate practices and the deviancy of the turbulent environment. The absence of favorable conditions, such as elite accommodation and a propitious external environment, does not condemn the power-sharing system as a normative model in Lebanon, but means that certain requisites lacked. It is imperative to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the power-sharing design in pre-war Lebanon, and consociational democracy as a normative or prescriptive model are different. While the Lebanese power-sharing formula remained static, consociational democracy could take on various constitutional and institutional forms. Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 92. See Harik, “Voting and Political Integration.” The only serious attempt to topple the regime was led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt’s National Movement. The Sunni establishment was aiming at improving the Muslim condition, and not changing the formula. Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon, 178. See El Khazen, The Breakdown. Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976 (New York: Caravan Books,

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In short, analysts who mainly blamed power-sharing or political institutions for the collapse overlooked the fact that Lebanon’s political system was dictated by its pluralistic reality and was the outcome of a long historical and communal development. Second, it is highly improbable that the country could have developed the intended strong democratic political institutions in a short period of time marked by strong regional unrest since the late 1950s. Lebanon’s conundrum is much more complex. An analysis which singles out one dimension of this multi-layered conflict remains effectively inaccurate. Furthermore, an approach that tries to explain the collapse of Lebanon’s democracy by relying on the lack of preconditions for democratization such as a weak political culture, or a problematic national identity would not reap much result, for the mere fact that efforts to produce “a general law of democratization” on the basis of cultural and social prerequisites have generally failed.200 Democracy still emerged when preconditions were absent. It might indeed be more helpful to develop a contextually-based approach related to the country itself to understand the development of democracy or its collapse. In the Lebanese case, I argue that it was rather the overlapping of transcendental and immanent factors that led to the 1975 democratic breakdown.201 Lebanon’s consociational failure can only be explained by correlating the instability of the internal regime to regional turbulences.202 One major cause for the breakdown of consociational democracy was the highly unstable international environment.203 Palestinian flux involvements on Lebanese territory followed by Syrian and Israeli interventions have only reinforced internal divisions.204 Three main external catalysts, which were beyond Lebanon’s control and which contributed enormously to the final collapse in 1975, were the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, the Jordan war in 1971, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.205 “The internal dimension” of the conflict has thus been “secondary to the foreign struggles” on Lebanese territory, and “sectarian hostilities appeared only after years of war and even have been relatively limited.”206 In fact, “there is little doubt that the war” was primarily “a substitute

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1976), 160. Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23 (1990):1-21, 5. See also Harik, “Voting and Political Integration in Lebanon.” Seaver, “The Regional Sources.” See El Khazen, The Breakdown; Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon; Lijphart in Democracy in Plural Societies and “Multiethnic Democracy.” See Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa. See El Khazen, The Breakdown. Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 226.

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war over Palestine, involving regional and international powers fighting each other on Lebanese soil, directly or by proxy.”207 Still, relegating all causes of collapse to external factors is also no persuasive explanation. Indeed, why was Lebanon so vulnerable to external threats? Was there no possibility of minimizing the danger of external threat and prohibiting this strong and uncontrollable clash between external and internal factors? What was the main missing link that destabilized the equation and made the political boundaries so porous? Indeed, the war of others on Lebanese territory would not have materialized had the Lebanese parties not possessed a latent readiness.208 A closer scrutiny enables us to deduce that complex interrelationships between internal and external factors aggravated by an erosion of cultural segmentation, elite cooperation and predominance made the collapse irreversible. In an attempt to refine further this rather general claim, I will argue that consociational failure occurred, because the sustaining conditions for consociational democracy in pre-war Lebanon disappeared. In other words, the collapse was the outcome of the simultaneous combination of three factors: external threat combined with subcultural desegmentation209 and inability of the elites to predominate over their masses and follow a unified policy towards external and internal upheavals. To prove the soundness of my argument, I will refer to two rigorous analyses of the conditions for consociational democracy and will apply them to pre-war Lebanon: Pappalardo’s article “The Conditions for Consociational democracy: A Logical and Empirical critique,” and Lehmbruch’s article “Consociational Democracy in the International system.”210

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Hanf, Political Secularization, 227. Perthes, “Libanon: Stabilisierung durch Rekonstruktion des Staates,” in Den Frieden gewinnen: zur Konsolidierung von Friedensprozessen in Nachkriegsgesellschaften, eds Mir A. Ferdowsi and Volker Matthies (Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2003), 94-117. Subcultural desegmentation is defined as the loss of stability among subcultures within the power-sharing equation. This happens when subcultures are no longer satisfied with the current balance of power, and leader-follower relationships are destabilized. One should be careful not to equate it with mere sectarian hostilities. It is important to adopt a logical and empirical framework in order to avoid citing multiple factors without being able to assess to what extent these factors really contributed to consociational failure. Otherwise, explaining the collapse would remain a hazardous task. Many writings on pre-war Lebanon mentioned several internal and external issues, yet how can we really tell if these factors were all decisive or subsidiary? These two articles provide a starting point to deal with possible conditions responsible for the maintenance and breakdown of a consociational system. Drawing upon the impact of sustaining conditions on the consociational formula, I will try to combine contingent and structural determinants to explain the 1975 collapse.

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Pappalardo’s main thesis is that an analysis of the binding conditions can only determine why, on the one hand, elite cooperation succeeds or collapses, and can, on the other hand, improve the predictive power of the consociational model. Denying Lijphart’s claim that conditions are merely helpful, he examines which conditions serve as unambiguous requisites for consociational democracy and therefore also requisites for its persistence. He argues that for a condition to explain why consociational democracy emerges, persists or collapses, it should be present when consociational democracy started and/or during its development. In case consociational democracy breaks down, the condition should cease to exist.211 Pappalardo comes to the conclusion that among all other factors cited by Lijphart, only two conditions respond to this criteria, and are thereby necessary to explain why consociational democracy develops or collapses: Stability among subcultures and elite predominance. Applying this hypothesis to Lebanon’s situation, we find that the conditions which indeed varied concomitantly with the pre-war consociational experience and which could be held accountable for the collapse are stability among Lebanese cultures and elite predominance. These two independent variables first degraded then disappeared as regional conflicts replicated themselves internally on the Lebanese scene.212 In a consociational model, a multiple balance of power is not sufficient for the maintenance of equilibrium. More importantly, this multiple balance should incarnate “a pact among minorities who do not want and are not in a position to change the existing distribution of power.”213 There can be no viability for coexistence if one of the communities tries to undermine the role of the other. Without these guarantees, “even an all-minority situation would not suffice.”214 Thus, for power-sharing to consolidate, stable requisites of segmentation are necessary. While this condition was relatively present in pre-war Lebanon in 1943 as both major communities at the time showed readiness to cooperate, satisfaction with the pact of coexistence gradually degraded. El Khazen argues, for instance, that “by the mid-1970s, almost every community and/or political party” had a different vision of a “truly integrated Lebanon.”215 Lebanese 211

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In addition, the cited condition should be “unambiguous” i.e. it should be irrefutable and should not coexist with other possible explanations, “non-reversible” i.e. it should allow “reliable predictions,” and it should be able to explain the dependent variable (in this case consociational establishment and persistence) without “being explained by the latter.” See Pappalardo, “Conditions for Consociational Democracy,” 366-367. For more details on the replication of conflicts on the internal scene, see Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System.” Pappalardo, “Conditions,” 369. Ibid., 370. El Khazen, “Lebanon’s Communal Elite-Mass Politics,” 63.

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subcultures were unable to see each other as an integral part of an unchanging reality, and could no longer identity with the same national vision. While the Maronites wanted to stick to their prerogatives, Muslim communities aimed at altering the equation. Gradual cultural de-segmentation was caused by an agglomeration of various factors namely the expansionist politics of the Maronites, the Sunni-Maronite disagreement on the degree of Lebanon’s Arabism and the Palestinian issue, demographic changes,216 and the fixed ratio in the national pact. Another important factor which greatly contributed to the erosion of stability among cultures was the fluctuating communal consciousness of Lebanese subcultures. More particularly, the Shiite feeling of deprivation led to a drastic change of their national agenda in the 1970s. Dissatisfied with Sunni predominance on the political scene and with their own representatives as well as eager to shape a communal political identity after a prolonged stay in the dark, they experienced a kind of awakening. Affected by external stimuli, they no longer identified with their projected role in the Lebanese framework, and questioned the process of their own integration. Their mobilization under Immam Musa Al Sadr would substantially destabilize the cultural equation.217 Besides, the Sunni street also questioned the Lebanese pact of coexistence and its viability in the course of regional events especially after the rise of Arab nationalism and the exacerbation of the Palestinian problem. Hence, the “rising expectations” of discontented segments already obvious in 1958 reached a peak in 1975.218 An undoubted correlation can thus be traced between “the degradation /collapse of the politics of accommodation” and “the degradation/collapse of stability and segmentation and the concomitant appearance of a more or less lively competition.”219 At the eve of the war, it seemed that the Lebanese pact of 216

217 218 219

In the absence of accurate statistics, it is very hard to determine to what extent the demographic factor played a role in the war. Indeed, this subject remains very controversial. Basing himself on the available estimates, Hanf, for instance, argues that “whichever majorities existed in pre-war Lebanon, be they Christian or Muslim, they appear always to have been a bare majority.” Whether the Maronites or the Shiites became the largest segment, they did not even constitute one-third of the population. See Hanf, Coexistence, 88. If these estimates are more or less reliable, we can argue that even on the eve of the war, the multiple balance among the segments (in terms of demography) was not overwhelmingly disrupted, for none of the segments became so large that it completely altered the balance. Indeed, the approximate equilibrium among the groups was still present. Another remarkable point is that the Druze leader Jumblatt who challenged the system in 1976 was only the leader of a communal minority. See El Khazen, “Lebanon’s Communal Elite-Mass Politics,” 73-74. Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System, 8. Pappalardo, “Conditions,” 375.

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coexistence no longer conformed to the subcultures’ projected scheme of coexistence which took divergent dimensions ranging from Syrian nationalism to Arab nationalism, Maronite nationalism, secularism or socialism… In Pappalardo’s article, elite predominance in the form of a leader-follower relationship is depicted as the other condition for the maintenance of consociational democracy. This condition entails that weak elites cannot “carry on the consociational venture.”220 In other words, highest level elites should be strong as well as secure, and should not use their power to foment conflicts. In the 1970s, the erosion of elite predominance and the ensuing erosion of encapsulated leader-follower relations had catastrophic results on consociational politics. Elite preeminence in form of a patron-client network gradually degenerated and finally collapsed into mass protest, counter-elites’ uprisings and a wide elite-mass gap. As I have pinpointed earlier, leaders’ commitment to the system was already fragile: they failed in reforming the system or their own behavior,221 and hastened the final collapse in three ways. They could not respond to the growing demands for economic development and more social justice.222 In other words, they were unable to halt the process of cultural desegmentation or provide lasting subcultural solutions to dissatisfied communities. Second, mainly because of elite discord, they failed to predominate over the masses and the counter-elites in face of regional challenges. Most importantly, as the external load increased on the system, they failed to “exercise restraint” and lured “unprecedented foreign involvement in Lebanon.”223 Although one could argue that the events were beyond their control, the fact remains that in a consociational democracy, the elite factor is a fundamental and decisive factor.224 It is also noteworthy that the rate at which cultural desegmentation occurred in pre-war Lebanon could not be matched by the elites’ ability to remedy to the problems. In fact, elite accommodation lagged behind. Social mobilization and discontent surpassed by far the elites’ meagre capacities to deal with it.225 To state it differently, there was a growing abyss between the subcultures’ demands and the elites’ achievements. 220 221 222

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Ibid., 381. See Jabbra and Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy.” See Boutros Labaki, “Exploring the Limits of Power-Sharing Systems: Did the Pre-War Lebanese System Fail? in Ethno-Religious Conflict and Modes of its Regulation compiled by Tamirace Fakhoury (Byblos: Center International des Sciences de l’Homme, 2004), 41- 43. Barak, “Lebanon: Failure,” 316. See Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System.” For a critique of the elite behavior and how elite rivalries contributed to exacerbating the problems, see also Barak, “Intra-Communal and inter-Communal Dimensions.”

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Still, even though these two conditions explain to a great extent the process of consociational degradation, they do not explain the final collapse. Decisive was a third necessary condition which pre-war Lebanon after 1967 did not satisfy and which was accountable for the timing and intensity of the breakdown: non-alignment in regional conflicts. External threat served as the catalytic factor that unleashed the potentially destructive forces of internal divisions in a divided society. It is of paramount importance to mention that cultural desegmentation that manifested itself through discontent vis-à-vis the power-sharing formula and through socio-economic grievances as well as the gradual loss of elite predominance could not have caused by themselves this utter consociational failure. It has been argued that without the regional crisis, the Lebanese political system could have endured, and there would have been other opportunities for stronger elites to appear and rectify the defective aspects of the system.226 Indeed, “change through non-violent means was possible.” Furthermore, “communal leaders were not in a position to mobilize supporters and drive them to war either to change the system or to maintain the status quo.”227 Hence, it is highly disputable whether pure domestic issues and confessional divergences could have caused this unprecedented scale of mass mobilization before the war. Total cultural de-segmentation and loss of elite predominance needed the flame of external threat to materialize. The absence of these two binding conditions in other countries could have led to a leadership crisis, but combined with the refraction of external conflicts unto the internal scene, they were sufficient to provoke in Lebanon a large-scale collapse. In “Consociational Democracy in the International System,” Lehmbruch argues that while consociational democracy may arise under many internal and external genetic conditions, its continuation is linked to a small external load made possible by non-alignment. It is thereby the role of the internal elites to “prevent an intensification of internal conflicts from outside by choosing nonalignment in international disputes.”228 One is tempted to argue that a non-alignment policy was impossible after 1967 especially that Lebanon found itself in the eye of the storm; however, what could have been achieved was “consensus on international action,” or a uniform foreign policy conditioned by “elite cooperation.”229 The 1958 crisis was already 226 227 228 229

See Seaver, “Regional Sources.” El Khazen, Breakdown, 238-239. Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System,” 386-387. Pappalardo, “Conditions,” 379.

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a strong indictor of Lebanon’s syndrome or its inability to safeguard intercommunal consensus in times of regional crisis.230 Although Pappalardo does not consider external threat as a sufficient condition for consociational democracy, he concedes that external threats can be highly disadvantageous if internal conflicts have not been earlier resolved in a way as to “make international affiliations secondary to identification with the national community.” He mainly argues that an external danger can have a unifying effect in a fragmented society only if “a consociational structure” is already in progress.231 In pre-war Lebanon, all of these requisites did not exist. Consociational democracy was still at a starting phase, and many communal and internal problems were still pending. In the following passage, I will try to show – both analytically and empirically – how the interdependence of these factors, the breakdown of nonalignment in regional disputes namely after 1967, the degradation of elite consensus and predominance as well as the gradual loss of stability among subcultures brought about the consociational collapse.232 Once the external and internal dimensions of the crisis collided in time, it became difficult to determine the direct causes for the collapse. However, it is safe to say that the explosive mixture of these factors and their intersection have allowed the magnitude of external threat to reach its destructive zenith, and resound so dramatically on the internal scene. The pre-war consociational test reveals that regional turmoil can only exacerbate internal conflicts when the factor of non-alignment is absent, and when elite accommodation as well cultural segmentation are shallow. A zone of turbulences A faltering elites’ predominance and minimal accommodation were maybe able to propel the country when external conflicts had a low salience, yet disastrous 230

231 232

Lehmbruch even refers to the Lebanese 1958 crisis to prove that non-alignment is a necessary consolidating condition for power-sharing. As president Chamoun supported the American Eisenhower doctrine, he provoked Muslim discontent. His successor, president Chehab, had to abide by a strict non-alignment policy in order to safeguard internal cohesion. Pappalardo, “Conditions,” 377. Since the scope of this study is not to retrace chronological events before and during the war, I will confine myself to a succinct recapitulation of the main events that led to the final collapse. For a detailed account of the pre-war scene at the end of the sixties till the mid-seventies, see El Khazen, Breakdown; Hanf, Coexistence; Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War. For a detailed account of the Lebanese war, see Hanf Coexistence; William Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton: Markus Weiner, 1997); Edgar O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

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as Lebanon entered the tornado of ideological challenges and mass mobilization in the Arab world. After 1967, it was not only the Eisenhower doctrine and the Nasserist ideology that threatened the Lebanese inter-communal alliance, but voices of conflicting ideological battles, inter-Arab rivalries and Palestinian activities roared mercilessly. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War also known as the Six-Day War233 marked a watershed in Lebanese history. After this date, the intermittent crises that Lebanon had faced earlier on were replaced by intense conflicts on the internal and regional scenes. The Palestinians’ fleeing to the South of the country “opened Lebanon to the destabilizing influences emanating from inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli politics.”234 Thus, the escalating Arab-Israeli conflict, the intensification of Palestinian activities on Lebanese soil,235 and the beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 1970s would undoubtedly have negative repercussions on the Lebanese elites’ coalescence and on inter-communal cohesiveness.236 The Six-Day War and its sequels in Lebanon In 1967, Israel’s victory was disgracing for the Arab world. The Six-Day War inflamed Arab nationalism and mobilized the Palestinians. After this stigmatizing episode, Arab malaise grew, and new radical movements supporting the Palestinian cause, emerged across the Middle East in response to the Israeli threat. Lebanon became subsequently a central arena for the Arab-Israeli conflict and a battleground for the Palestinian Movement. No sooner was South Lebanon transformed into a territory for Palestinian Commando bases than heavy confrontations between the Palestinian Resistance and Israel escalated along the Israeli-Lebanese borders. These clashes threatened mostly the Lebanese Shiite population in Southern villages and towns. In addition to that, the presence of

233

234 235

236

This war was fought between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria. At the end of the six-day battles, Israel took control of the Gaza strips, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. El Khazen, Breakdown, 108. The Palestinians were themselves divided into many groups. There was a strong schism between the more moderate PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) and the Rejectionnists. Whereas the PLO was keen on negotiations, the Rejection Front insisted on liberating Palestine through radical means. In addition, the PLO itself consisted of several groups. The largest and strongest one was Fatah. These splits within the Palestinian Movement had strong destabilizing effects on Lebanon’s politics. See Seaver, “Regional Sources.”

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approximately 400.000 Palestinians in the country awakened in the Christian community feelings of threat. As a result of these geopolitical changes on Lebanese soil, the ruling coalition found itself as divided as ever on the Palestinian issue and on the political line of action: while the Sunni leaders supported the Palestinians’ military operations, the Maronite communal leaders refused to.237 The erosion of the ruling elite consensus was accompanied by a pronounced trend of mass mobilization in Lebanon. In the wake of the unprecedented growth of Pan-Arab and nationalist leftist parties in the region, various movements advocating the Palestinian cause and Arab nationalism mobilized Lebanese masses. Demonstrations led by radical leftist movements, namely the Communist and Baath parties that cooperated with Druze Leader Kamal Jumblatt, called for a total support of the Palestinian cause, and sought simultaneously to undermine the regime. Labor Unions were turned into socio-political platforms for dissatisfied workers and citizens. Affected by the wind of revolution, university students espoused different conflicting ideologies, and took to the streets. In no time, the once quasi-dormant demands for social and political change resurged with the Palestinian cause. Mass politics even permeated Christian church-based movements whose activists embraced the Palestinian cause.238 As commando attacks on Lebanese soil increased in 1968, Israeli reprisals added fuel to the fire. Israel’s attack on the Lebanese airport was followed by a general student strike backed by radical parties, and waged mainly against the Lebanese regime and its inability to curb military Israeli power. The government under Premier Abdallah al-Yafi had to resign. In January 1969, Rashid Karami formed a new government which also broke down few months later. In an effort to restrain Palestinian activities on Lebanese soil, the Lebanese army attacked subsequently Palestinian militants. Yet, no sooner did Arab regimes condemn the Lebanese Army’s initiative than the Lebanese ruling coalition was caught in an unsolvable dilemma: curbing the Palestinian militants’ activities and protecting Lebanese sovereignty, or endorsing their activities and giving them room for maneuver. While President Charles Helou advocated a limited support of the Palestinians as long as Lebanese sovereignty was not jeopardized, Prime Minister Rashid Karami could not identify with this proChristian policy. His resignation in April 1969 left the country in a state of governmental paralysis that lasted for seven months. 237

238

See Simon Karam, “Lebanon, Collapse and Revival: Society and the Nation-State in the Arab World,” Middle East Policy 2 (1993): 15-24. Such as the Social Movement, the Christian Student Youth, the Movement of Orthodox Youth….

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The 1969 Cairo Agreement and the end of non-alignment The 1969 Cairo agreement signed between PLO leader Yasser Arafat and the Lebanese Army’s leader, General Emile Bustany, facilitated Palestinian activities on Lebanese soil. This agreement was interpreted by the Christian elites and more specifically by the Kata’ib Party239 as an act of betrayal. Although the agreement brought the seven-month crisis of governmental deadlock to an end, it legitimized the presence of Palestinian commandos. With this pact, the state lost command over the Palestinian issue, and chose voluntary alignment. Whereas the country had committed itself to “a decidedly pacifist security policy,”240 and was able to a certain extent until 1969 to exert control over the Palestinian issue,241 subsequent events would tell the saga of a country that heralded “the end of neutrality by consent.”242 In 1970, Black September in Jordan resulted in the expulsion of the Palestinians from the Jordanian territory. As Syria ruled out any Palestinian attack from its territory, and the 1970 violent clashes put an end to Palestinian activities in Jordan, Lebanon became the last haven for the PLO. After this turning point, the number of Palestinian civilians and militants increased in Lebanon. Empowered by the Cairo agreement and the declining might of the Lebanese army, Palestinian militants waged fiercer raids against Israel. On the other side, dissatisfied with the status quo, Christian militias sought to fill the place of the state which had grown incompetent in their eyes, and started setting up their own small armed factions. As the Karami government was unwilling to curb the Palestinian activities, the Phalangist Party took itself the initiative, and confronted the commandos in the suburbs of Beirut. The breakdown of the balance of power and the increase of the external load on the political system Lebanese leadership was expected to deal more efficiently with the crisis provoked by Palestinian attacks from Lebanese territory, but the newly elected President Suleiman Franjieh in September 1970 could not fare well. In fact, the political establishment’s dilemma could be summarized as follows: taking radical steps against the Palestinian Commandos signified fomenting a ChristianMuslim crisis. It also meant the breakdown of the power-sharing Sunni-Maronite 239

240 241 242

The Phalangist or Kata’ib Party was considered during this period as a pro-Christian rightist faction. Hanf, Coexistence, 161. See Salibi, Crossroads. See Hanf, Coexistence.

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alliance as Muslim leaders – seen as “prisoners of the Palestinian cause,” and “politically caged by the masses” 243 – refused to adopt a hard line approach to Palestinian attacks. The next government under Saeb Salam was equally unable to deal with the worsening security situation as well as with the pressing issues of reforms and grievances that found in the Palestinian cause a convenient outlet. This provided an additional cause for the radical Left led by Druze leader Jumblatt – who had tightened his alliance with the Palestinian Movement – to intensify its critique of the regime. In fact, while the Palestinian guerrillas saw in this policy of alliance an opportunity to strengthen their position, the Lebanese Left perceived the alliance strategy as an occasion to challenge the Lebanese political structure. An additional burden to the system was Israel’s insistence by mid-1972 that the Lebanese regime curbed the Palestinian Resistance. Commando operations were rapidly followed by Israeli reprisals that targeted Southern Lebanon and other parts of the country where Palestinian armed groups resided. In 1973, Israeli attacks in Beirut and Sidon precipitated the premier’s resignation as Lebanese Army failed to counterattack Israeli raiders.244 With Premier Saeb Salam’s resignation, another governmental crisis loomed. The pillars of the Lebanese regime and elite coalition were slowly breaking. While Sunni veto destabilized the politics of consensus, President Franjieh’s regime was perceived as weak and unable to shield Lebanon from impending challenges.245 In May 1973, the first heavy clashes since 1969 broke out between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians. Syria accused the Lebanese government of conspiring against the Palestinians and closed its border with its neighbor. Signed under increased Syrian pressure, the Melkart protocol, another attempt to resolve the crisis, proved to be as inefficient as the Cairo agreement. Restoring Lebanese control over political and security matters had in fact become elusive, for the political establishment was incapacitated, and small antagonistic fiefdoms were emerging in stateless Lebanon. While the Palestinian Movement formed a de facto state within the Lebanese borders, the Muslim and the Christian elites were pulling the sails of the ship in different directions. The two-week 1973 clashes in Lebanon led to a greater polarization of the warring factions. Each actor had come to perceive the other as a potential threat:

243 244

245

Salibi, Crossroads, 54. The Franjieh-Salam coalition broke down as the prime minister’s call for the army commander’s resignation was refused by the president. See Zamir, “Lebanese Presidential Elections.”

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“The Christian parties’ nightmare was the Palestinians and the Lebanese Left taking power; the Palestinians’ nightmare was a Lebanese ‘Black September’ ”.246 Christian groups – namely the Phalangist Party, Camille Chamoun’s National Liberal Party, and the Franjieh faction in Zgharta – were more than determined to empower and arm themselves. In their eyes, restoring Lebanese sovereignty had become their own duty. The polarization of warring factions notwithstanding, political institutions turned into increasingly frail and inefficient structures. Cabinet breakdowns became routine activities, and President Franjieh’s tendency to appoint weak Sunni leaders was conspicuously alarming. The newly appointed premier Amin el Hafiz was forced to resign in June 1973 as dissatisfied voices insisted on appointing a strong Sunni leader. Still, under the new government led by premier Taqi al Din al Sulh, the country witnessed a domestic crisis as resentment increased, and Israeli raids did not subside. The National Pact at stake After the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, Lebanon embarked on a new phase of restlessness and instability. More and more on the defensive, the Palestinians started coordinating even more closely with Jumblatt’s National Movement which grouped several leftist factions. The Movement’s prominent role at this stage, and Kamal Jumblatt’s emergence as the undisputed leader of the Leftist front, weakened to a great extent the traditional Muslim establishment’s popularity. Other important events in 1974 were the rise of Shiite leader Musa Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived, and the mobilization of the Shiite community against governmental neglect and Israeli attacks in Southern Lebanon. The Shiites’ exodus from the South to the outskirts of Beirut since 1970 and ascending grievances had gradually led to a broad abyss between the community and the state as well as between community and the traditional Shiite establishment. Indeed, the inability of the mainstream Shiite leaders to defend the Southern population against Israeli raids had undermined their credibility and political power. On top of that, different voices calling for the revision of the coexistence pact and the reduction of Maronite power became more and more pressing. While the 246

Hanf, Coexistence, 172.

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Muslim traditional establishment such as Saeb Salam, Rashid Karami, and Mufti Hassan Khaled called for amendments of the National pact and an increased Muslim participation, the National Movement led by Jumblatt, demanded a radical reform of the system, an abolition of confessionalism, and a total revision of the National pact. These demands alienated the Christian political establishment, and namely the Phalangist Party determined to safeguard Christian prerogatives. At this point of time, it was no longer clear whether calls for political changes stemmed from pure domestic issues or whether grievances had found with the Palestinian crisis a means of relief. It was yet certain that “the issue underlying the conflict was no longer merely the Palestinian prerogative in Lebanon but by this time included the credibility of the national pact.”247 The failing government under premier Taqi al-Din was followed by another incompetent government led by Premier Rashid el Sulh who was also perceived as a Sunni leader of lesser ranking. His appointment alienated once again the Sunni elites who became increasingly critical of the Franjieh Regime. The Arab-Israeli peace process and its repercussions on the Lebanese crisis Another factor that added fuel to the fire on the Lebanese scene was the launching of the unsuccessful Arab-Israeli peace process. Far from providing a settlement to the crisis, the process worsened the Palestinian problem in Lebanon for several reasons. One the one hand, Arab strains, and inconsistent approaches towards the Palestinian crisis exacerbated internal quagmires in Lebanon. On the other hand, the news of disengagement agreements following the Arab-Israeli October war in 1973 resonated as funeral tolls in Lebanon: partial agreements which included Israel, Egypt, and Syria implied that the Palestinian war could only be sustained along the Lebanese-Israeli border.248 Thus, after the Sinai I and the Golan agreements, the moving sands of regional war settled in Lebanon. By 1975, the efforts of American diplomacy were far from producing positive results on the regional level. With the normalization of Israeli-Egyptian relations in 1975, the Arab-Israeli peace seemed to be compromised, and Palestinian fears of insecurity grew. Syrian-Israeli negotiations led to an impasse as a separate Syrian-Israeli peace remained impossible without the resolution of the Palestinian issue. The truncated peace process was one of the most important factors that led Syria to interfere and seek dominance on the Lebanese scene since 1976. Under 247 248

Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System, 78. See Hanf, Coexistence.

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the guise of a tutelary power, Syria aimed mostly at safeguarding its regional and strategic interests. Thus, by maintaining control over the Lebanese crisis, it could keep an eye one the Palestinian movement, and gain more influence in the ArabIsraeli peace settlement. Indeed, its successive mediations were the first indicators of a large-scale Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs. Far from mitigating the conflict or restoring the balance as it pretended to do, Syrian intervention exacerbated “confessional dysfunction,”249 and its shifting interests had destabilizing effects on Lebanese communities and the elites. Its multifaceted aims, which extended from supporting the Palestinian front in Lebanon to acting as a mediator between the Christian and Muslim Lebanese elites as well as preventing the partition of the country, ended up alienating the Left-Palestinian front in 1976. The escalation of the crisis: consociational breakdown and politicization of the Palestinian issue along confessional lines Deeply entangled in the regional whirlwind, Lebanon had failed by the time to defuse simmering conflicts. The transfer of the Palestinian issue from the realm of state politics to the heart of the communities dealt a final blow to the state’s fragile equilibrium. Subsequent events demonstrated how regional and internal disturbances would converge to destroy the last remnants of state authority, how the incumbents and the counter-elites would willingly relinquish consociational strategies, and how finally the turmoil would permeate confessional lines. On February 26, 1975, the fishermen’s demonstration in Sidon during which the deputy Ma’ruf Saad was shot, degenerated into complete chaos. This incident was followed by violent clashes between the Lebanese army and radical militants. The army’s suspicious intervention fomented a wave of unrest and agitation. Radical parties along with the Sunni front attacked the regime and denounced the army’s interference. Perceived as a pro-Christian manipulated tool, the military institution no longer represented, according to the Muslim segments, impartiality. As Muslim leaders insisted on its reorganization, intransigent Christian leaders refused any reform. Another incident of bad omen took place on April 13 as Kata’ib members were shot in Ayn al Rummana by presumably Palestinian commandos. These obscure killings were followed by another tragedy in Tal el Za’atar during which a group of Palestinians in a bus were killed by Kata’ib militiamen. As a result, bitter fighting broke out between the Christian party and the Palestinians in Beirut.

249

Koury, The Crisis, 47.

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These clashes led to the polarization of the conflict along communal lines, and widened the inter-elite gulf. Lebanese masses were divided between Kata’ib and Palestinian supporters, and communal misperceptions and hostilities came to the forefront. With the disintegration of the Sulh government, a political deadlock threatened the country. Jumblatt’s National Movement declared its unwillingness to cooperate with any government that would support the Kata’ib Party. Meanwhile, Christian elites continued backing the party and opposing Jumblatt’s veto. Political deadlock ended on May 23, 1975 with the formation of a military cabinet under premier Nur al Din al Rifai. Muslim and Leftist leaders united forthwith to demand the immediate dissolution of this new cabinet which indeed had to resign two days later under Syrian pressure. As violence and acts of terror increased, the new government headed by Rachid Karami was called upon once again to halt a deteriorating situation. However, it was hard to imagine how a coalition government could possibly restore stability. The Maronite-Sunni coalition was shattered as communication between the President and the premier had been reduced to a minimum, and the Kata’ib-National Movement antagonism had sharpened. Muslim doubts were further aroused by potential schemes of partition promoted by the Maronite leadership. In the background, intense military preparations undertaken by various factions foreshadowed an intensification of the crisis. It was suggested that the Arab-Israeli negotiations during this period might have been a propitious occasion for a Lebanese-Palestinian agreement. 250 Yet, the Palestinian entanglement in Lebanese affairs and the deep intra-elite discord hampered this potential move. Insecure warring parties with deep feelings of hostility and distrust undermined any effort of compromise. In the summer of 1975, fierce fighting gained momentum. Confrontations between the Maronites factions in Zgharta and Muslim factions in Tripoli came to a halt only after the army had intervened. Troubles spread to Beirut as the Kata’ib destroyed central parts of the downtown area. It seemed as if the Maronite militias wanted to force the Lebanese army to intervene. Yet, the call for another army deployment in Beirut was opposed by the Muslim front which feared a possible conspiracy against Palestinian commandos. An attempt of Syrian mediation in September 1975 which brought Leftist, Muslim and Christian representatives together was aborted as the radical

250

See Salibi, Crossroads.

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National Movement’s demands251 were rejected by the Christian elites. On the other side, premier Karami’s attempts to mitigate the conflict were thwarted. As Lebanon turned into “militia and Palestinian fiefdoms,”252 the power of the state and the ruling elites was dwindling. Disparate acts of plunder, destruction, and ransacking reinforced anarchy and lawlessness. Beirut was divided into a Christian Eastern sector and a Muslim Western sector. By the end of 1975, confessional divisions had deeply crystallized, and the power-sharing formula had disastrously crumbled. In a nutshell, this period marked the complete degradation of cultural segmentation and elite accommodation as the Palestinian issue overlapped with the power-sharing formula. Internal divisions transcended controversies over Lebanon’s degree of Arabism or socio-economic grievances, and became strongly politicized. For the Lebanese elites, consensual politics had become hostage to a relentless competition for state control. For the Lebanese communities, external threat became a dividing cultural and political tool. The politicization of the Palestinian issue along confessional lines resulted into consolidating two positions. On the one hand, Muslim leaders used the Palestinian issue “to whittle down Christian prerogatives.”253 On the other hand, the Maronites did not want to tamper with the 1943 coexistence pact. Partitioning the country seemed a better alternative, for challenging the political system at this stage implied challenging their very existence. By resisting concessions and adhering to their rigid positions, Lebanese elites lost their commitment to system maintenance and shut their eyes to underlying dangers. A total loss of insight and conflict mismanagement replaced the needed elite enlightenment that would have been necessary to save the last ruins of power-sharing. By the end of 1975, all Palestinian-Christian talks, non-Arab, Syrian and inter-Lebanese mediations had proven to be vain. The corrosion of Lebanon’s state apparatus and the deployment of the Syrian army Confrontations reached a new stage of ferocity in 1976 as brutal killings and random battles of vengeance between warring parties became pervasive. On January 4, the Maronite militias attacked the Palestinian camps of Tal el Za’atar 251

252 253

The National Movement presented in August 1975 a document calling for deconfessionalizing the political system, and abolishing all confessional considerations at the governmental, judicial, and military levels. Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 161. Abbas Kelidar and Michael Burell, Lebanon: The Collapse of a State: Regional Dimensions of the Struggle (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976), 6.

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and Jisr el Basha. This siege brought about heavy confrontations between the Maronite factions and the Leftist-Palestinian forces on various fronts. The attack of the Karantina area by Maronite militias was followed by large-scale leftistPalestinian operations in Maronite towns. Backed by Syrian brigades, LeftistPalestinian forces took over major Christian strongholds in the Beqa’a, Zahleh and South Lebanon.254 Unable to enforce a cease-fire, premier Karami resigned. The helpless Lebanese state could not even raise a finger; battling factions had replaced the state apparatus. In addition, the parliament and Leftist groups started asking for President Franjieh’s resignation. By the end of January, except for a Christian enclave from East Beirut to Mount Lebanon, nearly two thirds of the country fell under Palestinian siege and Syrian control.255 Threats of partition peaked, and the war assumed a truly confessional character. The Lebanese army disintegrated as internal factions revolted against the Maronite order.256 President Franjieh’s contact with Syrian President Hafiz el Assad was followed by a Syrian-imposed truce. Syria proposed a reinterpretation of the Cairo agreement, a revision of the constitution, and a revival of the deadlocked political institutions. Premier Karami was called upon to resume his functions. The Damascus constitutional document signed on the 14 January 1976 under Syrian auspices proposed institutional and political reforms without altering the confessional structure of the political system.257 The Syrian initiative was rejected by the Muslims and mainly by the leftist front whose ambitions went beyond minor rectifications. In fact, the pact attracted the wrath of Jumblatt who was now determined to topple the Lebanese regime. It was at this stage that Syria turned against the Jumblatt-PLO front, and a Syrian-Christian rapprochement was made possible. A new cycle of confrontations started in March 1976; the Leftist-Palestinian forces were pitted against the Syrians and the Christians. Endorsed by his Palestinian allies, Jumblatt waged a fierce attack against the Lebanese Christian front, and took over major towns in the Upper Metn area. Jumblatt’s military attack was followed by the deployment of the Syrian army in April 1976. At this stage, it became clear that the Jumblatt-PLO alliance and Syria had definitely parted company: the National Movement’s offensive 254

255 256

257

The fall of the Christian towns, Jiyeh, Damour, and Saadiyat in South Lebanon, was followed by the exodus of the Christian population. The Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army joined the fighting against Christian militias. Officer Ahmad Khatib established the Arab Army of Lebanon in which Muslim officers turned against Maronite leadership. The document proposed equal representation between Christians and Muslims in the parliament, an improvement of the premier’s prerogatives, and an abolition of confessionalism in civil service appointments.

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and cooperation with the PLO was deemed detrimental to the Assad regime. A Palestinian take over of Lebanon, a possible partition of the country, and an escalation of the crisis with Israel, were not on the Syrian agenda. On the other side, the PLO leadership had become increasingly suspicious of the new Syrian hegemonic role in Lebanon. A new dimension was thereby added to the Lebanese conflict: the Syrian challenge to the PLO, and the PLO challenge to the Syrian policy. The war debuts in 1976 trace a tale of split elites who did not only relinquish non-alignment by consent but also the privilege of sovereignty. The Syrian military deployment in Lebanon was approved by the government and the Christian front. President Assad even referred to the pleas of assistance that it received from various Lebanese groups to justify its large-scale military intervention.258 Determined to subdue the Palestinian forces, Syrian troops advanced on the Beqa’a, Tripoli, Sidon, and Beirut. Heavy Syrian-Palestinian clashes on various fronts were accompanied by Palestinian-Christian confrontations. By August, the Christian front was able to defeat major Palestinian strongholds. Syrian troops continued their military marches until the PLO power-bases were finally overpowered. The balance of power had been titled; the Syrian-Christian front rose as the military winner. An Arab peace initiative ended the fighting in October 1976; a cease-fire was declared on the 18th. Two days later, the Arab Summit in Riyadh including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, the PLO, and Egypt stipulated the formation of an Arab deterrent Force (ADF) 259 which would maintain peace within the Lebanese territory, and ensure the re-implementation of the Cairo agreement. Nevertheless, the war did not draw to a close here. This new agreement signed under Arab auspices was only another short-lived solution. The force of deterrence broke down few months later as meetings of the Arab committee with the new Lebanese President Elias Sarkis260 led to an impasse. No sooner was the Palestinian-Syrian war over than new episodes of confrontations including various actors, changing allies and enemies resumed in

258 259

260

See Al-Khatib, The General Factors for the Collapse of Democracy in Lebanon. The ADF was composed of troops from Syria, Sudan, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. The majority of the troops were Syrian. Elias Sarkis was elected president on May 8, 1976. He had to wait till Franjieh’s mandate expired in September to assume his functions. Sarkis was Syria’s candidate for presidency. Previously challenged by Christian leaders, he gained in 1976 their support. His presidency was mainly disapproved by Kamal Jumblatt.

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1978.261 Syria’s military intervention, by now legalized, inaugurated a thirty-year presence on Lebanese soil. It is in against this background of dissent and state breakdown that the penetrated Lebanese state would embark on a 15-year trip of aimlessness, a trip whose protagonists were mainly external parties. The elite factor in the consociational breakdown (1967-1976) Political leadership “In a country such as Lebanon which has not yet become a consolidated political community, nor enjoys a deeply-rooted political tradition, the quality of its leaders is of utmost importance.”262 The impact of political leadership on democratic transition and democratic breakdown is anything but negligible. Unfavorable structural conditions require “skillful, innovative, courageous, and democratically committed” elites. In the presence of great obstacles, the breakdown of democracy, although not unavoidable, is “accelerated by poor leadership and bad choices.”263 The pre-war defective elite cohesiveness and predominance over encapsulated communities finally collapsed in face of internal and external strains. A deeper examination of the Lebanese scene at the brink of the 1975 war has enabled us to see that Lebanon’s political fragility did not only reside in the choice of its political system, but in the absence of internalized democratic rules, and lack of elite habituation. Thus, it is only when cooperative strategies are deeply anchored in the system, that the penetration of the system could be avoided.264 The split elite cartel failed to adopt in times of crisis consociational strategies that would “resist a disintegrating “penetration” of the system.”265 As a result, Lebanon’s trip to democracy since 1943 remained unconsolidated and frail: democracy was unable to “become the only game in town” especially “in the face of severe political and economic crises,”266 for actors did not believe that 261

262 263

264 265 266

For a brief account on this period, see El Khazen, “Ending Conflict in Wartime Lebanon: Reform, Sovereignty, and Power, 1976-88,” Middle Eastern Studies 40 (2004): 65-84. Zamir, “Lebanese Presidential Elections,” 67. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Introduction to Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, eds Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1995), 1-37, 15. Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System,” 382. Ibid. Juan Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7

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political change could only occur within democratic rules. Lebanese policymakers did not always uphold the consociational tools they adopted, and failed to endorse consistent democratic habits that could facilitate the rise of stable political culture capable of preventing a state failure.267 In other words, incumbents adopted minimal doses of democratic norms that enabled them to resolve elementary conflicts, and divide spoils. Yet, they did not strive to create spaces of mutual communal bonds which promote national cohesiveness in critical times. As a result of unconsolidated democratic structures, it did not take much for regional strains to divide the elites,268 and erode further the organizational structures of Lebanese subcultures as the imperfections of the National pact resurfaced with external threat. Elite discord and loss of predominance Growing cultural desegmentation269 in the 1970s undermined the traditional elites’ political security, an essential component for elite predominance. Challenged by their supposedly quiescent followers, Lebanon’s insecure leaders

267

268

269

(1996):14-33, 15. See Barak, “Lebanon: Failure, Collapse, and Resuscitation,” in State Failure and State Weakness in Time of Terror, ed. Robert Rotberg (Cambridge, Mass.: World Peace Foundation, 2003), 305340. For a detailed analysis of the elites’ gradual loss of cohesiveness and predominance, see Deeb, Lebanese Civil War; El Khazen, “Lebanon’s Communal Elite-Mass Politics”; Khalaf and Guilain Deneoux, “Urban Networks and Political Conflict in Lebanon,” in Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus, 181-200. One should be careful not to view cultural desegmentation before and during the Lebanese war only in terms of a Muslim-Christian dichotomy. It is commonly argued that while the Muslim elites used the external factor to revive Lebanon’s contested Arabism, the Christian politicians used the external factor to affirm their quasi-isolation from the Arab world. See Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War. It is true that the Muslim elites got too embroiled in the Arab strife, and that the Maronite elites insisted on a particularist vision of Lebanon. However, one cannot disregard the fact that intra-communal divisions were so strong that it was impossible in the 1970s and during the entire war to speak of a unified Muslim or Christian position. Relying on these simplifications has in fact concealed many aspects of the Lebanese Conflict. See Barak, “Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions of the Conflict.” The loss of stability among subcultures was due to the rejection of the existing power distribution as subcultures could not longer identify with the structural interrelationships that link them together. These horizontal and vertical organizational ties that make up the stability of subcultures in the Lebanese consociational mold are not only defined in terms of confessional considerations, but also in relation to political and social factors. Consequently, viewing the crisis in terms of dualistic contending camps is to a great extent an oversimplification.

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were no longer able to deal with the conflict “in a manner commensurate with the actual level of the conflict.”270 Elite discord took outwardly the general shape of a bipolar confrontation between the Rightists or the Christian political establishment and the Leftists or the Muslim political establishment. But, this picture is far from being explanatory. Each pole was in itself fragmented, and different centers of power undermined unity. A general state of inter-elite discord resulted mainly from the breakdown of the Sunni-Maronite ruling coalition, the strong schism between the Radical left and the Maronite front, and the volatile Sunni-Left and Shiite-Left coalitions. Although the Sunni, Shiite, and leftist leaders all supported the Palestinian cause, their so-called coalition reflected different interests. The Sunni conservative elites wanted to gain more power in the executive and to compensate their dwindling power over the masses, the Druze leader Jumblatt waged a destructive campaign against the regime, and the Shiite leader al-Sadr aimed at improving the socio-political status of his community. Hence, different communal elites saw in regional disturbances a chance to promote their interests and those of their community at a time when elite cooperative strategies should have been cross-cutting. Furthermore, both SunniLeft coalition and Shiite-Left coalition broke down as soon as Syria shuffled the cards in spring 1976 and turned against the PLO. Leader-follower relations in the four major Lebanese communities This general state of discord was aggravated by intra-communal elite splits as communal leaders, heavily challenged by counter-elites, fell prey to resistance from below. To understand the loss of elite power at this period, one should pay particular attention to the variable of elite-mass politics. The 1975 war saw the vertiginous decline of traditional Muslim leaders who lost their appeal to the mobilized masses. The traditional establishment, already weakened by the rise of the Jumblatt’s National Movement was subsequently discredited by Al Sadr’s “Movement of the Deprived.”271 While traditional Maronite and Druze elites retained to a certain extent structural predominance over their respective communities, the Sunni and Shiite communities experienced a phase of divorce between the elites and the masses.272 270 271 272

Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, 68. See Deeb, Lebanese Civil War. El Khazen, “Lebanon’s Communal Elite-Mass Politics”; Khalaf and Denoeux, “Urban

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In fact, the Sunni leaders were unable to extricate themselves from the Leftist-Palestinian popular wave after 1967. Furthermore, the traditional Sunni establishment did not dispose of “mediating structures” such as cohesive political parties to prevent the de-segmentation of the community.273 An internal chasm grew between the moderate Sunni establishment caught between the preservation of the Lebanese formula and Pan-Arab allegiances, and the more radical Sunni intelligentsia and factions who were keen on undermining the power-sharing equation.274 In the Shiite community, the loss of elite predominance was the result of an immense elite-mass gap. This divorce between the masses and their leaders was apparent at the social, political and economic levels.275 It manifested itself through the growing grievances of the displaced population who rebelled against their marginalization. The elite-mass gap facilitated the erosion of subcultural stability on the one hand, and the rise of counter-elites on the other hand. Traditional Shiite politicians such as Kamil Al Assad and Sabri Hamadeh were supplanted by new rising actors.276 Although the Druze community remained relatively coherent, it also witnessed the decline of its traditional leaders. The Druze Arslan group yielded its power to Kamal Jumblatt who rallied the Leftist forces around the National Movement and mobilized his community. The Maronite front tells a different story. Intra-communal elite dissension was less the outcome of an elite-mass gap than the result of the elites’ hostilities.277 While the external Palestinian threat unified at first the Maronite front whose aim was mainly to curtail Palestinian activities, the 1975-1976 war altered this situation. Maronite consensus was weakened by internal power struggles as well as divergences of opinion over Syrian and Palestinian issues. 278 273 274 275 276

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Networks.” Khalaf and Deneoux, idem, 187. Barak, “Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions”; Salibi, Crossroads. El Khazen, “Lebanon’s Communal Elite-Mass Politics.” In the mid-seventies, Kamel Al Asaad had to relinquish his power to Immam Musa al-Sadr who demanded protection for the Shiites in the South. In the 1980s, the traditional Shiite establishment was undermined by new rising actors, namely the secular Amal and Hezbollah parties. Formed in 1968, the Maronite Tripartite Alliance whose aim was to prepare the coming presidential elections was already a precursory sign of elite splits and presidential power struggles in the community. For more details, see Zamir, “Lebanese Presidential Elections.” Competition for the presidency after 1974 undermined the seeming Maronite concordance. Actors such as Raymond Eddi parted company with the ruling Maronite coalition, and sought to discredit the ruling Franjieh regime. In the 1980s, power struggles within the Maronite community became even more alarming. Examples are clashes between the Phalangists and the

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Counter-elites in the form of militias and parties challenged the traditional Maronite establishment. Paramilitary factions, namely the Phalangist Party and Chamoun’s National Bloc, sought to have the upper hand in the decision-making process, and to pull the strings of the presidency. The absence of predominant and coalescent elites opened up hazardous cracks in the Lebanese political system. Had this factor been present, grievances would have been considerably defused, and a more coherent political course of action would have been adopted to stir the Lebanese ship on troubled waters.279 This review of the 1967-1976 events enables us conclude that the elite factor significantly contributed to the collapse of the consociational democracy. The leaders’ insecurity, fear of resistance from below, purposeful use of strength to aggravate conflicts, and imprudent manipulation of Lebanon’s ‘sovereignty’ made the consociational formula fall prey to their own internal contradictions.280 At a time when elite coalescence was greatly needed, leaders demonstrated “irresponsibility,” and lack of “enlightened self-interest.”281 In fact, “all of them underestimated the external threats […] and undermined the already limited powers of the state at a perilous time.”282 The economic factor in the consociational breakdown One of the polemical issues hovering around the pre-war collapse is the relation between the socio-economic condition and the power-sharing breakdown in 1975. It is commonly assumed that socio-economic factors impeded the consolidation of the consociational democracy, and were largely responsible for the 1975 collapse.283 Lebanon’s poor industrialization and inequalities of income

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National Liberal Party in 1980, and the bitter conflict between the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea and General Michel Aoun in 1989. Whether the factor of elite coalescence would have prevented the consociational breakdown is not evident, but it would have minimized the effects of the collapse. Zamir argues that president Franjieh was a key actor responsible for the 1975-1976 conflict, for he failed to initiate the needed socio-economic reforms, and preserve the internal confessional equilibrium. Also, he failed to adopt a foreign policy, which would strike a balance between Lebanon’s commitment to the Arab cause and the country’s unique status. See “Lebanese Presidential Elections,” pp. 59-68. Thus, the incumbents’ refusal of reform, inability to exercise restraint vis-à-vis external involvement were decisive factors in the breakdown, for they encouraged militias to profit from the porous public sphere and low degree of stateness, and to build fiefs of domination supported by external actors so as to establish quasi-autarchic confessional cantons. See respectively Hanf, Coexistence, 177; Salibi, Crossroads, 96. See Hanf, idem, 177-179. In some studies, a total gloomy image of the pre-war economic scene was depicted. Lebanon’s

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distribution have thus hindered the achievement of “a stable democratic regime.”284 Some analysts even perceive a close link between economic conditions and stable consociationalism in Lebanon.285 A causal link was even depicted between the socio-economic factor and the power-sharing collapse.286 The Lebanese economic competitive system created class rivalries which pitted “the privileged” against “the deprived,”287 and class cleavages overlapped with communal divisions.288 The Christians were generally represented as the richer class and the Muslims as the underprivileged.289 Christian-Muslim relationships were even depicted as part of the Marxist bourgeois-proletariat struggle during the 1975-1976 war. Still, to what extent is this picture real? Can the economic factor be considered as a necessary condition for the maintenance of consociational democracy? What is the relation between socio-economic conditions and consociational failure in pre-war Lebanon? It is beyond doubt that many ills plagued the pre-war Lebanese economic system and that a social crisis lurked indeed beneath the deceptive facade of prosperity.290 Uneven communal development and discriminating state policies contributed to creating communal discontent at the eve of the war. Income and regional disparities were obvious; the tax structure was in bad need of reform. Several initiatives of development such as the Chehabist measures after 1959 or the 1972 Government Six-Year Plan in the face of rising inflation did not reap the expected results.

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laissez faire and capitalist system led to sharpening class cleavages, increasing rich-poor and urban-rural discrepancies as well as fomenting successive social crises. See for example, Al Khatib, The General Factors; B.J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict (London: Zed Books, 1985); Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon; Mina Toköz, The Lebanon Conflict: Political Shifts, Regional Impact and Economic Outlook (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986). What complicates the matter is that reliable statistics on socio-economic inequities are not present. Many analyses have thus reached contradictory results on socio-economic communal inequities. Al-Khatib, The General Factors, 116. Hudson, “The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War”; Jabbra and Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy”; Tawfic Elias, Aspects of Consociationalism and Modernization: Lebanon as an Exploratory Test Case (University of Nebraska: MERG, 1975). See Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict. Barakat, “The Social Context,” in Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues, eds Edward Haley and Lewis Snider (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 3-20, 15-16. Odeh argues that recognizing confessional divisions in the Lebanese political system was an attempt “to conceal class conflict. See Lebanon, Dynamics of Conflict,” 53. See Gordon, Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation. For an analysis of the pre-war Lebanese economy, its areas of strength and weaknesses, see Charles Issawi, “Economic Development and Political Liberalism in Lebanon,” in Politics in Lebanon, 69-81; Samir Makdisi, Financial Policy and Economic Growth: The Lebanese Experience (New York: Columbia University, 1979).

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Despite the shortcomings of Lebanon’s open economy, the mismanagement of resources, and their misdistribution among communities, the socio-economic condition did not act as a sustaining factor for consociational democracy, and was not a decisive factor for the 1975 breakdown in the Lebanese case. Why? First, detecting a strong causality or elements of correlation between democracy and economic factors has been highly contested. Whereas some scholars see a very strong relationship between economic development and democracy,291 others have reservations about the impact of economy on democratic development. For instance, Mainwaring notes that “economic conditions are dismal, and if they were determining factors, few of the news democracies would have survived this long.”292 Despite strong economic inequities, certain regions such as Latin America and Southern Europe democratized. Sub-Saharan countries plagued with poverty and stark socioeconomic disparities have also managed to catch the wave of democratization.293 Additionally, detecting a direct causal link between consociational democracy and the socio-economic factor remains a difficult task. Empirical evidence collected by scholars is not clear on this subject.294 In consociational literature, the absence of large socio-economic is considered as a mere helpful factor which may facilitate the rise of consociational democracy, but does not hinder its establishment.295 It is thus possible to remedy to economic inequities by “deliberate political action,” and by a “strong commitment” to consociationalism.296 In addition, by giving prominence to “ethnic or religious segments,” consociational democracy tends to de-emphasize “class interests.”297 In the Lebanese case, the socio-economic factor did not vary concomitantly with the emergence, persistence or failure of the consociational experience in the pre-war period.298 Despite the presence of socio-economic disparities among 291 292 293 294

295 296 297 298

See for example Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave.” Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation,” 311. See Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” Political analysts warn generally against depicting causal links between socio-economic and political factors. See for example Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy,” 346. In addition, mutual connections between socio-economic factors and consociationalism are very much debatable. Although Belgium received, for instance, a negative score on socio-economic equality in Lijphart’s five-point scale found in his book Power-Sharing in South Africa, consociational devices have not ceased to evolve and consolidate ever since. For an account of the refinement of consociational devices in Belgium, see Tamara Kvoridizke, “Alternatives to Power-Sharing Systems: Belgium’s experience of Combining Power-Sharing with Federalism,” in EthnoReligious Conflict and Modes of its Regulation, 49-51. See Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa. Ibid., 125. Ibid., 98. In “Democracy and Social Mobilization,” Hudson denied any relation between the pre-war

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communities, consociational democracy emerged, and persisted for three decades only to collapse in 1975. In fact, “the ills associated with Lebanon’s socioeconomic development since independence in the 1940s did not suddenly emerge in the mid-1970s.”299 Moreover, the socio-economic approach does not explain the nature, phases, and timing of the conflict. Many catalytic incidents for the war bore no relation to socio-economic grievances.300 Furthermore, remedying to class inequities and socio-economic imbalances was indeed foreseeable through peaceful and gradual means.301 The so-called class cleavage separating the Muslim and Christian communities has also been contested. As both major communities were internally stratified, class and communal cleavages did not directly overlap or reinforce each other.302 Since class differences remained diffuse among Christian and Muslim groups,303 it is hard to see how these aggregate class disparities could have been a direct cause for the collapse, for the class struggle did not materialize into a bourgeois-proletariat conflicting discourse. On top of that, before the outbreak of the war, demonstrations organized by the teachers’ association, trade unions and student movements drew members from all segments.304 It is thereby hard to distinguish clear-cut class rifts along confessional lines.305

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Lebanese economy and the degree of democracy. He argued that Lebanon seemed to defy the causality that binds high economic indices and democracy. According to him, wealth did not alter the pluralistic structure of the country, its balance of power or the legitimacy given to the state. El Khazen, Breakdown, 260. Ibid. See also Harik “The Economic and Social Factors in the Lebanese Crisis,” Journal of Arab Affairs 1 (1982): 209-244. In this article, the author argues that pre-war economic conditions in Lebanon were much better than in other developing countries. The question that arises is why war erupted in Lebanon and not in countries where social and economical problems were more acute. See Issawi, “Economic Development”; Hanf, Coexistence; Makdisi, Financial Policy; Elie A. Salem, Modernization without Revolution: Lebanon’s Experience (London: Indiana University Press, 1973). In a study of the social composition of the East sector of Beirut, Marlène and Salim Nasr deconstructed this common assumption which claims that the Christians mainly belong to the bourgeoisie and to the middle class, and that the majority of the working classes are Muslims. Their findings demonstrate that the industrial working class in this sector of the country was multi-communal, and that the Christian proportion did not really differ from the Muslim proportion. See Marlène and Samir Nasr, “Morphologie Sociale de la Banlieue-Est de Beyrouth,” Maghreb-Machrek 73 (1976): 78-88. See Hanf, Coexistence; Shils, “Prospect of Civility.” El Khazen, Breakdown; Hanf, Coexistence. On the eve of the war, the different Muslim communities did not voice out the same socioeconomic grievances. It is indeed fallacious to equate the Shiite community’s socio-economic demands with those voiced out by the Sunni establishment or the Leftist National movement led

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Noteworthy is that after 1960, socio-economic disparities were even declining.306 Evidence shows that gaps related to professional and commercial occupation between Christians and Muslims had started decreasing since 1943. Educational discrepancies among communities diminished as well, so did illiteracy rates. In addition, declining discrepancies in income distribution between high income and low income groups were noticeable in 1974. In rural areas, a pattern of growth in standards of living since 1960 has also been detected.307 Although socio-economic equality was never achieved, it is an exaggeration to speak of static economic inter-communal disparities. Finally, after a retrospective analysis of the “conflict process” and its regulation through the Ta’if agreement in 1990, in which political rather than economic reforms were the key issues, one can safely argue that “the civil war was not a class struggle prompted by economic determinants” but rather “a power struggle between and within communities.”308 If there is no concomitant link between political breakdown and the socioeconomic factor, how can we relate the latter to consociational collapse? A more plausible explanation is that the perceived socio-economic disparities fomented communal discontent and a sense of relative deprivation309 which contributed to amplifying the impact of regional disturbances. In addition, this discontent weakened subcultural segmentation by creating a schism between the communities and the ruling establishment which, in the eyes of the masses, had come to represent the embodiment of the power-sharing system. 310

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by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt. One should also draw attention to the fact that these grievances were in some cases instrumentalized for political reasons. Hanf, Coexistence; Boutros Labaki, “Exploring the Limits of Power-Sharing Systems: Did the Pre-war Lebanese System Fail?” in Ethnic-Religious Conflict and Modes of its Regulation, 4143. These statistical findings are reproduced and adapted by El Khazen in his work, The Breakdown, 59-68. They mainly borrow from Raymond Delpart,“Liban: L’évolution du niveau de vie en milieu rural 1960-1970,” Ministère du Plan (Beyrouth: Doc Ronéoté, 1970); Boutros Labaki, Education et Mobilité Sociale dans la Société multicommunautaire du Liban (Frankfurt: Deutsches Institut für Internationale Pädagogishe Forschung, 1988) ; Yves Shemeil, sociologie du système politique libanais (Grenoble: University of Grenoble, 1976). Abul Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, 122. See Labaki, “Exploring the Limits of Power-Sharing Systems.” For more information on the theory of relative deprivation, see Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 1970). According to Lijphart, one of the shortcomings of consociational democracy is that dissatisfaction with the government automatically turns into dissatisfaction with the regime. See Democracy in Plural Societies, 52.

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Synthesis of the first part: the status of the favorable factors revisited The pre-war Lebanese case rather proves that consociational democracy can emerge even if certain prerequisites are not present or conditions are not highly favorable. The emergence and establishment of consociational democracy were thereby not bound to cross-cutting cleavages, a strong national cohesion or to the absence of socio-economic disparities. Democracy was able to produce stability even “under conditions of political disintegration.”311 Political engineering, elite commitment to the system and awareness of the inherent dangers remain in that connection the prime elements for a consociational start in the Lebanese case. However, whereas the ‘self-negating prophecy’ is essential to consociational genesis, it is not enough for its consolidation. Indeed, “the function of insight” of pre-war Lebanese elites was “over-valued.”312 This analysis of consociational failure shows that the maintenance of consociational democracy in Lebanon is linked to the following sustaining conditions: A good mixture of elite accommodation and predominance, stability among subcultures, and non-alignment. If these conditions are satisfied, external and internal challenges can be softened in force and severity.

311 312

Hudson, “Democracy and Social Mobilization,” 247. Hanf, Political Secularization, 248.

3. Post-War Lebanon: The Lost Republic’s Peregrinations

The regime (1990–2005) The rise Riseof ofaacompetitive Competitivesemi-authoritarian Semi-Authoritarian Regime (1990-2005) “Just because a country has competitive parties and elections, and multiple parties in parliament, does not make it a democracy. Lebanon fits with a growing range of countries we call “electoral authoritarian” or […] “semi-authoritarian” regimes.”1 “The system has become a complex process endowed with levels of autonomy and authoritarianism. Lebanon is not settled in either one of these models.”2 In 1989, the resurrection of the consociational buried pact with the Ta’if agreement proved that power-sharing could possibly reemerge despite its previous collapse.3 The political and institutional revival brought about by the pact was hailed as an indicator signalling the resurgence of the Lebanese democratic miracle. Still, speaking of a democratic renewal heralded by the signing of a new power-sharing agreement proved to be hasty as the post-war Republic diverted ostensibly from a democratic model, and took rather the shape of a power-sharing hybrid. This part will trace Lebanon’s complex system transition since the end of the war. It will mainly depict the mutational aspects of the political system and its various fluctuations along the ‘spectrum of regime change’ up to 2006. In this chapter, I will argue that post-war Lebanon until the ‘Democratic Uprising’ in 2005 was a semi-authoritarian regime4 hinging on the competitive or democratic 1 2 3 4

Larry Diamond, email message to author, March 11, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Ashrafieh, November 26, 2004. See Lijphart “Multiethnic Democracy”; “The Wave of Power-Sharing.” In 2004, in a survey conducted by Freedom House on civil and political liberties in 192 countries, Lebanon ranked 144th while other Middle Eastern states seemed to have achieved some gains. See “Lebanon Ranks 144th Globally in Political Freedoms,” The Daily Star, January

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side. In order to prove this hypothesis, the interactions between the main authoritarian pressures and democratic openings will be thoroughly analyzed. To pinpoint authoritarian pressures, I will resort to the following indicators: • The Ta’if pact, the circumstances under which it took place, and the controversy lurking beneath its implementation; • The Syrian impact on the Lebanese regime; • A survey of the elections; • Authoritarian elite practices and their repercussions on the legislative, executive and judicial arenas; • The violation of civil and political liberties.5 After identifying “authoritarian situations” in Lebanon, I will demonstrate in the second section how these situations were accompanied by “weak democratic pressures” till 2000 then with stronger – though irregular – democratic pressures after the 2000 opening.6 Indicators used to measure democratic impulses are: • The power-sharing structural givens; • The unabated struggle of civil society; • The role of the opposition and its empowerment of the opposition after 2000. In the third section, light will be shed on Lebanon’s uncertain transformation into an electoral democracy after the collapse of the Second Republic.7 In this section, the causes paving the way for the transition as well as the transitional phases up to the 2005 parliamentary elections and the formation of the first postSyrian government will be thoroughly analysed.

5

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13, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article. asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=11791 &categ_id=2. These criteria are based on the variables detected by various political analysts to depict the nature of a semi-authoritarian regime. See Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 21-35; Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”; Andreas Schedler, “Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 36-50; Marina Ottoway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). For more details on this terminological lexicon, see Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Introduction to Politics in Developing Countries, 8. In this study, I consider Lebanon’s Second Republic to extend to the ‘Democratic Uprising’ and Syrian withdrawal in 2005, and I propose to call the post-Syrian phase the Third Republic (2005-)

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The deconstruction of the democratic myth in the Second Republic Defining a democratic model is an arduous task since the conceptualization of the term fluctuates between a set of minimal standards, midrange conceptions, and ambitious expectations. Democracy’s multiple connotations in different peoples’ mind make a clear-cut definition prone to definitional stretching and ambiguity. This is why scholars tend to explain democracy using different criteria. Still, this proliferation of definition s has only led to excessive confusion in the conceptualization of the term,8 and to an unchecked scholarly power to apply selectively interpretations of democracy. At first, it is necessary to pinpoint that democracy is not made up of “a single unique set of institutions,” but that there are various democratic types that need to be adapted to the country’s conditions.9 Moreover, democratic models can be understood as open-ended processes constantly evolving and changing.10 Whereas some political scientists rely on a minimalist definition of democracy that bases itself on the conduction of free and fair elections,11 others are keen on refining and precising the concept by taking into consideration other features extending beyond the electoral arena. In this study, I propose to equate democracy with Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy as the real world system closest to ideal democracy. Depicted as “a substantially popularized and liberalized” regime, a polyarchy is “highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation.”12 The criteria used to measure whether a country approximates a polyarchy or not can be summarized as follows:13 • Elected officials have the constitutional right of controlling government decisions; • Elections should be free and fair and devoid of coercion; • All adults have the right to vote and to run for an elective office; 8 9

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See Munck, “The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies.” See Philippe Schmitter and Terry L. Karl, “What Democracy is… and is not,” Journal of Democracy 2 (1991): 75-88. See Eric Hershberg, “Democracy and its Discontents: Constraints on Political Citizenship in Latin America,” in Democracy and Its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, eds Howard Handelman and Mark Tessler (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1999), 290-321. While Joseph Schumpeter was the first to advocate a minimalist model of democracy based on free and fair elections, other scholars have also adopted this definition. See respectively Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1942); Adam Przeworski et al, “What Makes Democracies Endure?” Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 39-55. Dahl, Polyarchy, 8. See Dahl, On Democracy.

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Citizens have the freedom of expression on political issues without facing the risk of punishment; Alternatives sources of information which are not controlled by the government are available to citizens; Citizens have the right to form independent organizations such as political parties.

These criteria can be summarized into three main conditions: competitiveness among individuals and groups, inclusiveness in political participation, and a significant level of civil and political liberties.14 Taking as a point of departure these variables upon which innumerable scholars built their assumptions,15 and even added supplementary components to develop a more demanding concept of liberal democracy,16 one infers that the post-war political system was not on democratic ground. First, elections up to the year 2005 have not responded at all to criteria of fairness and freedom.17 Governmental decision-making capacities up to Syrian withdrawal in 2005 remained beyond the control of elected officials as important decisions were “made in Damascus and implemented in Beirut.”18 Furthermore, freedom of expression has experienced a substantial decline in the Second Republic, and coercion was used at times to repress dissident views. Different sources of information, mainly the media, were manipulated by the government, and sometimes even prohibited.19 Independent organizations were allowed to participate and influence the political spectrum only if they did not contradict the regime’s schemes. Other associations deemed dangerous to the maintenance of the status quo were denied access to politics.20 Political participation and competition were strongly constrained, and the opposition was often ostracized. Post-war leadership has been known for violating the principle of

14 15 16

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18 19

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Diamond, Linz and Lispet, Introduction to Politics in Developing Countries, 6. Ibid. See Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University, 1999); Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, “Formal Institutions and Informal Rules of Defective Democracies,” Central European Political Science Review 2 (2000): 31-47; Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 1 (1996): 34-51. Nicolas Nassif, “Les élections de l’été 2000,” Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek 169: 116-127; Thomas Scheffler, “Religious Communalism and Democratization: The Development of Electoral Law in Lebanon,” Orient 44 (2003): 15-37. El Khazen, “Postwar Political Process,” 613. See Scheffler, “Von der Anarchie zum Oligopol: die audiovisuellen Massenmedien im Libanon,” Inamo 14/15 (1998): 62-65. See El Khazen, “Postwar Political Process.”

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constitutionalism21 and the rule of law, two vital elements for a democratic state. Moreover, the judiciary, that had lost its impartiality in the course of the years, was heavily affected by exogenous political entities.22 Even if one adopts the minimalist or Schumpeterian definition of democracy or what scholars generally designate as “electoral democracy,”23 one finds that Lebanon’s Second Republic failed to meet the minimal requirements for a democracy. Taking into consideration that free and fair elections are generally considered as the minimal threshold for measuring democracy, and that a regime is considered to step out of the democratic edge “the moment it violates at least one of the constitutive norms that make elections democratic,”24 one cannot even label the post-war system within the mentioned time frames as a defective democracy or as any other subtype derived from the root concept of democracy. In spite of the non-democratic elements that characterized the post-war system, the latter can neither be classified as a full authoritarian regime25 that allowed only one ruling party, banned all kinds of political competition, and repressed civil and political freedoms. Thus, the Lebanese parliament remained all along an arena where various pluralistic outlooks clashed and where several competitive parties took shelter. Though constrained, political competition, mobilization, and opposition existed even at the bleakest hours. A significant margin of freedom left to civil society and to the media was also always detectable.26 Still, this limited pluralism conformed to the regime’s designs. Lost between two conditions, post-war Lebanon seemed rather to possess hybrid attributes of both an authoritarian and a democratic regime27:

21

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23 24 25

26 27

A constitutional state is usually defined as a state which follows institutionalized laws and in which incumbents who violate rules are accountable to the courts. Ghassan Moukheiber, “La justice, instrument du pouvoir politique, ” Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek 169, 80-86. See Diamond, Developing Democracy. Schedler, “Elections without Democracy,” 38. Authoritarian systems are defined as “political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.” See Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 2000), 159. See Baaklini, Denoeux and Springborg, “Lebanon,” in Legislative Politics in the Arab World. Mohammad Raad describes the Second Republic as an intricate model oscillating between democracy and autocracy. Although the Lebanese pluralist system gives the citizen much room for freedom, authoritarian pressures detract from substantial civil rights. Yet these pressures remain temporary, relative, and sporadic. Interview with the author, Beirut, December 16, 2004.

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“The mix of reforms and developments that shaped the post-war period has rendered it difficult to define the Lebanese polity between its attributes as a democracy, an oligarchy, and a protectorate…”28 Yet, important violations of constitutional rules and consistent flaws in the electoral process since 1992 made the post-war regime rather an instance of incomplete authoritarianism because “the accompanying” characteristics of the main type of authoritarianism rather than democracy were preponderant up to 2005.29 In other words, infringements of democratic criteria have been so serious and systematic that the authoritarian elements in the post-war system could not be made little of. Proving that the post-war Republic up to 2005 was a semi-authoritarian regime of a competitive nature is a complex task for three main reasons. First, the post-war Lebanese system is an intermixture of many overlapping elements. After the collapse of the pre-war consociational democracy, the resurrection of the Second Republic under Syrian hegemony signalled the rise of an ambiguous political mix with consociational features. While the system remained based on a power-sharing alliance, “it was nonetheless dominated by a strong authoritarian element.”30 The presence of power-sharing elements coexisting with authoritarian pressures makes the system even harder to pin down. In this case, the theory of consociational democracy, which does not elaborate much on structural conditions and regime dynamics, cannot by itself explain the post-war transformations or the semi-authoritarian nature of the system. Therefore, resorting to an additional framework to explain the post-war mutations becomes a necessity. Additionally, the post-war regime obeys more informal than formal rules since it is the nature of the ruling class and not the nature of constitutional rules which determines structures of governance.31 For this reason, relying on a mere analysis of formal institutions and rules to explain Lebanon’s system transformation does not produce much result. The third problem is directly related to the normative debate around hybrid regimes and their categorization. Since conceptualizations vary from one author to the other and from one perspective to the other, classifying hybrid regimes and detecting whether they hinge on the authoritarian or democratic end of the system transition continuum remains a tedious endeavour mostly dependent on the case at hand. 28 29 30 31

Salem, “Framing Post-War Lebanon,”18. For more details, see Merkel and Croissant, “Formal Institutions.” Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Freiburg, November 29, 2003. Salam, “Ta'if Revisited,” in Lebanon in Limbo, 39-51.

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In consequence, before moving to a comprehensive analysis of the post-war regime and its particularities, I will first provide the reader with a compact introduction on the theory of transitology, and discuss its relevance to the Lebanese case. Certain aspects of the system transition theory namely literature on hybrid regimes will enable me to draw the missing link between the consociational aspects of the Lebanese model on the one hand, and the post-war dynamics of regime change on the other. The transition paradigm Democracy was thought to occur historically in waves.32 The first wave that began in the 1820s was followed by a second wave which spread democracy to various countries from the 1940s to the 1960s after the triumph of the allies in World War II. The third wave, which reached its zenith in the 1980s, spread democracy to areas such as Latin America, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Interestingly enough, each wave of democratization was followed by a reversal wave or a tide of democratic erosion and resurgence of authoritarianism. A vast literature has tackled the contributing and obstructing factors which may facilitate or hinder democratic transition. Perspectives oscillated between a strict determinism focusing on socio-cultural as well as economic preconditions and a voluntaristic approach mainly linked to institutionalism and political actors’ behavior. While early works emphasized the impact of economic and socio-cultural prerequisites on the path of democratic transition,33 subsequent writings concentrated more on the voluntary or contingent aspect of democratic transition and the importance of political crafting, and elite behavior.34 Despite sociocultural or economic impediments, democracy could take shape as long as a favorable institutional design was crafted.35 Breaking away with deterministic theories, various analysts argued that the multifaceted road to democracy could not be tied to a strictly linear, temporal or 32 33

34

35

See Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave.” See for example Dahl, Polyarchy; Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave”; Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.” See for example Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkely: University of California, 1990); Schmitter and O’Donnell, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Fore more details on the debate related to democratic crafting, see Aurel Croissant, “Einleitung: Demokratische Grauzonen-Konturen und Konzepte eines Forschungszweigs,” in Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: zur Konzeption und Empirie demokratischer Grauzonen, eds Petra Bendel, Aurel Croissant and Friedbert W. Rüb (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2002), 9-45.

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rational process.36 They warned against reducing the concept of democratic transition to a static equation. Some other scholars attempted to reconcile contingency with structuralism so as to find a golden mean between structural conditions and voluntary aspects of democratic transition.37 Still, with the stagnation of the third wave during the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century, analysts started reconsidering the impact of determinant factors.38 Problems faced by countries during the consolidation of the democratic experience have given rise to a plethora of works which encompasses posttransitional politics namely consolidology and democratic quality.39 Although democracy removes the ghost of authoritarianism, it brings about new dangers that hinder the completion of the process and erode democratic quality.40 These concerns led analysts to investigate the conditions under which democracies were likely to endure, consolidate and remain stable.41 A period of stasis for democratic transitions in the world? As many countries ended up stuck in a grey zone which unites traits of democracy and authoritarianism in the 1990s,42 the optimistic and straightforward transition paradigm of democratization appeared to have reached somehow an impasse. A third reverse or inconclusive wave seemed to lurk in the horizon,43 and difficulties of consolidating democratic trips became more pronounced. The miracle of democratization did not bring about full-fledged democracies, but fragile political systems and stalled processes doomed to 36

37 38

39

40

41 42

43

For more details, see Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy”; Schmitter and O’Donnell, Tentative Conclusions. See Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America.” See for example Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 5-21; Ottoway, Democracy Challenged. For more details on problems of consolidation, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition; Mainwaring ed., Issues in Democratic Consolidation; O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation”; Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9 (1998): 91-107, and on democratic quality, see Herbert Kitschelt et al., Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). According to Huntington, these dangers encompass communal conflicts, “executive arrogation,” deterioration of civil and political liberties and so on. See “Democracy for the Long Haul,” Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 3-13. See for example Przeworski et al. “What Makes Democracies Endure." See Merkel and Croissant, “Formal Institutions”; O’Donnell, “Illusions about Democratic Consolidation.” For more details, see Huntington, “Democracy for the Long Haul.”

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struggle in the twilight zone or somewhere “on the democratic-nondemocratic continuum.”44 Indeed, the transition paradigm seemed to lack the predictive power of teleology.45 Degrees of liberalization could occur without leading to a genuine democracy. The democratic euphoria was soon replaced by a feeling of disillusionment or disencanto as democratic gains did not materialize but other hybridized forms of pluralism cast anchor. Along the vast continuum of system transition, the frontier between democratic and undemocratic regimes seemed blurred and imprecise, and “a much broader range of variation in political systems” could be found between the black and white shades.46 Analysts questioned whether the transition paradigm was only a naive simplification of a much more complex reality whereby systems embarked to other unexpected political landscapes and not necessarily towards democracy.47 Some even talked about the death of this paradigm and its incapacity to grasp the patterns of crystallized as well amorphous transitional modes which escaped the usual model of system transition.48 Hybrid regimes, types and characteristics49 The scholarly preoccupation with system transformation from authoritarianism to polyarchy is not new. Basing himself on the criteria of participation and inclusiveness, Dahl, for instance, had already depicted in the 1970s a variety of regimes that range between closed hegemonies and polyarchies.50 The debate on these ambiguous systems reached a peak at the end of the 20th century as the third wave of democracy seemed to be threatened by stagnation, shallowness or what is referred to as a period of stasis.51 Other systems qualified 44 45

46 47 48

49

50

51

Ibid., 6. For a critique of a teleological vision of democratic trips, see Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”; O’Donnell, “Illusions.” See Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Introduction to Politics in Developing Countries, 7. See Ottoway, Democracy Challenged. See Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”; Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Karl defines a hybrid regime as “a certain functional and territorial political mix” combining authoritarian and democratic elements. See “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” Journal of Democracy 6 (July 1995): 72-86, 73, 80. Used to designate the regimes of Central America, this mixed system became a general prototype to describe lost systems as the wave of democratization seemed to lose ground. In Polyarchy, Dahl alludes to near-hegemonies and near-polyarchies. When closed hegemonies, for example, become more liberal and more open to political contestation, they become competitive oligarchies. Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” 31.

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as defective democracies in which the democratic quality was considerably eroded, or even systems closer to the authoritarian than to the democratic brink seemed to drop an anchor. More and more reticent to qualify a regime as democratic just because multiparty elections with some degree of competitiveness are held, scholars diverted their attention from the general transition paradigm to study more closely the nature of these obscure systems. Hence, two other alternatives stood in the way of a teleologically triumphant democratic transition or blunt degeneration into the authoritarian abyss: hybrid regimes which group democratic and autocratic components as well as unconsolidated democratic systems or what analysts commonly call defective democracies.52 Just as new forms of incomplete democracies took shape, new forms of authoritarianism also proliferated. A kaleidoscope of expressions, in which two general categories of hybrid regimes can be distinguished, depicts this broad spectrum between liberal democracy and outright authoritarianism.53 Classifications of political regimes rely mainly on the use of various adjectives, which show the different nuances between systems closer to the authoritarian edge, to the procedural minimum of democracy or to the other end of a liberal democracy. On the one hand, one finds incomplete or defective democracies that manage free and fair elections but do not meet the conditions of a full-fledged polyarchy.54 On the other hand, one comes across other regime types that fall short of an electoral democracy and possess more pronounced attributes of an authoritarian regime. 52 53

54

Schmitter, “Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 57-74, 59. Acknowledging that many subcategories could be delineated within the “grey-zone politics,” Carothers avoids pinpointing subtypes, yet chooses to group these hybrid systems into two broad political phenomena: Feckless pluralism, and dominant-power politics. The first syndrome plagues countries in which political freedom is relatively developed, elections take place regularly and fairly, and power alternates among different groups. Yet, democracy has superficial roots, and elites are largely corrupt and not accountable to the public. Countries with dominant-power politics are those that possess the democratic outfit only symbolically. Although opposition groups do exist, alternation of power happens in such a way that only one ruling group dominates the political scene. See “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 10-14. Defective democracies have been closely identified by referring to precise adjectives which capture the main component detracting from the democratic nature of the regime. An exclusive democracy is thus a defective democracy in which voting rights are not inclusive. See Merkel and Croissant, “Formal Institutions.” For more examples on types of defective democracies, see Croissant, Von der Transition zur defekten Demokratie: demokratische Entwicklung in den Philippinen, Südkorea und Thailand (Wiesbaden: Westdt. Verlag, 2002); O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracies,” The Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 55-70; Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 26 (1997): 22-43.

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These regime types, which differ from defective democracies, might possess democratic traits such as multiparty regular elections, a democratic constitutional framework, and a space for opposition, but all these attributes are so atrophied that they end up revealing flagrant democratic deficits such as political abuses, repression of civil society, and low degrees of political mobilization as well as competitiveness. Since the case study at hand belonged up to 2005 to the second category, I will deal extensively with hybrid regimes that fall short of an electoral democracy and in which authoritarian attributes are patent. The problem of conceptualization: pseudo-democracies or semi-authoritarian hybrids? What makes the task of conceptualizing these political systems located below the minimal democratic edge rather difficult is that the semantic field and the set of criteria used to depict these political genres vary from one perspective to the other. Although no widely accepted definitions exist to label these hybridized regimes erring towards the autocratic edge, two semantic trends are noticeable. Analysts tend to classify them as inferior genres of democracy or instances or gradations of authoritarianism. Thus, depending on whether one sees the glass as half full or half empty, it is possible to draw a spectrum, in which instances of pseudo-democracies or semi-authoritarian regimes – below the minimal edge of democracy – extend to non-democracies or autocracies. While some regime analysts called at one point these hybrid systems erring on the autocratic side as pseudo-democratic inasmuch as factitious democratic traits cover up the rotten authoritarian carcass,55 others favor the use adjectives derived from the root concept of authoritarianism. Schmitter and O’Donnell, for example, define regimes where leaders promote a certain degree of liberalization only to relieve certain pressures without altering the structure of the system as “liberalized authoritarianism” or Dictablandas.56 What makes things more complicated is that a wide variation of subtypes can be distinguished within the range of pseudo-democracies or semi-authoritarian regimes. Thus, some systems may be more competitive or more closed. 55 56

See Diamond, Linz, Lispet, Introduction to Politics in Developing Countries. See O’Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions. Terms used to describe these systems that lie below the minimal edge of an electoral democracy are numerous. I cite, for instance, “electoral authoritarianism,” “competitive authoritarianism,” and “semi-authoritarianism.” See respectively, Schedler, “Elections without Democracy”; Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”; Ottoway, Democracy Challenged.

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As one is faced with the dilemma whether these diminished subtypes should be considered as partial democracies or partial autocracies, I will first expose two major trends that portray the characteristics of those lesser kinds of electoral democracy, and then explain the motives that led me to take as a point of departure the authoritarian end. My aim is mainly to devise a consistent pattern for hybrid subtypes below the minimal edge of democracy, and a consistent terminology that will be applied to the case study. 57 The objective is to prevent terminological confusion and limit the proliferation of terms and adjectives that rely either on the root concept of democracy or that of authoritarianism. Pseudo-democracies and their derivatives Hybrids defined as pseudo-democracies or fake democracies, do not overlap with authoritarian regimes, tolerate some form of opposition, and allow more pluralism and some competitiveness in civil society. In such regime types, opposition parties exist and many other traits of an electoral democracy are embodied in the constitution, but what lacks is “an arena of contestation sufficiently fair that the ruling party can be turned out of power.”58 Pseudo-democracies have been generally subdivided into semi-democracies and hegemonic party systems. While a semi-democracy features a system in which the power of elected incumbents and political competition are limited, and civil as well as political freedoms restricted, a hegemonic party system depicts a more closed regime in which the ruling party marginalizes uses to a greater extent repressive measures to maintain its rule. 59 Thus, a semi-democracy is closer to an electoral democracy than a hegemonic party system. Beyond a semidemocracy, there are also many sorts of multiparty electoral systems or ambiguous regimes, in which the ruling party is slowly losing its grip.60

57

58 59

60

I will draw upon the following works: Diamond, Linz, Stepan eds, Politics in Developing Countries; Diamond, “Is the Third Wave over?”; Diamond, Developing Democracy; Diamond “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”; Levitsky and Way,” The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”; Ottoway, Democracy Challenged. Diamond, Developing Democracy, 15. For more details on a semi-democratic system, see Diamond, Linz, Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries. Fore more details on a hegemonic party system, see Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). See Diamond in “Is the Third Wave Over?”; “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.”

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Electoral or semi- authoritarian regimes The other scholarly trend, which adopts the opposite approach, replaces the term of pseudodemocracies with adjectives derived from the root concept of authoritarianism. Analysts labelling those regimes as electoral authoritarian distinguish between more closed hegemonic or uncompetitive systems on the one hand and competitive authoritarian regimes endowed with more democratic pressures on the other hand.61 These hybrids have also been typified as semi-authoritarian systems. The closest regimes to autocracies are the semi-authoritarian systems in decay where authoritarian tendencies become more invasive with time. In the middle of the continuum, a midrange type called semi-authoritarian regimes in equilibrium depict countries which have succeeded in erecting stable system foundations and in neutralizing competing entities. Systems closer to the democratic edge are labelled as semi-authoritarian regimes experiencing a dynamic transition.62 Representation of concepts In an effort to make these concepts more understandable, I designed a series of figures that help represent the different terminologies discussed above. Hence, the spectrum picturing gradations between autocracies and liberal democracies looks like in figure 3.1. Electoral democracy is considered as the minimal democratic edge, or the cut-off-point between democratic and authoritarian regimes, while autocracies or closed political systems are the outer authoritarian edge of the spectrum. I consider liberal democracy as the open-ended horizon of the spectrum which leaves enough room for gradation and refinement of democratic quality.

61

62

See Diamond, “Thinking about”; Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”; Schedler, “Elections without Democracy.” This semantic typology of semi-authoritarian regimes is developed by Ottoway in Democracy Challenged.

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Figure 3.1

System transition

Source: Fakhoury Figure 3.2 depicts gradations or midrange regimes that separate the two ends of the continuum and fall short an electoral democracy. Figure 3.2

System transition

Source: Fakhoury Pseudo-democracies or semi-authoritarian regimes as well as their subtypes can be classified as follows: 63 Figure 3.3

Subtypes of pseudo-democracies

Source: Fakhoury 63

Figure 1.3 is inspired by terminologies of hybrid regimes developed by Diamond, Linz, Lipset in Politics in Developing Countries and by Sartori in Party Systems. Figure 1.4 is inspired by terminologies used by Schedler in “Elections without Democracy,” by Levistky and Way in “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” and by Ottoway in Democracy Challenged.

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Figure 3.4

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Subtypes of electoral authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes

Source: Fakhoury Synthesizing these graphics, one comes up with two different spectrums depending on whether we see these midrange systems as lesser types of democracy or gradations of authoritarianism. Figure 3.5 depicts a pattern of system gradation in which authoritarian and hybrid regimes democratize and gradate. The figure uses the root of authoritarianism to represent system change:

152 Figure 3.5

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Pattern of gradation

Source: Fakhoury Figure 3.6 depicts a pattern of system degradation in which a regime is in a process of demotion, and uses the root concept of democracy to describe hybrid regimes: Figure 3.6

Source: Fakhoury

Pattern of degradation

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Why is it safer to adopt the root concept of authoritarianism to define these hybrids? In this study, I choose to attribute the root concept of authoritarianism to hybrid subtypes that do not achieve the standards of a minimal democracy. For this, I will adopt the pattern that focuses on gradations of authoritarian regimes till reaching the democratic edge for the following reasons: Because of the excessive proliferation of terms designating regime types, scholars drew attention to the necessity of precising concepts and avoiding general conceptualizations. According to Collier and Levitsky, adding adjectives to democracy serves to pinpoint the attributes of democracy that are lacking.64 For example, in an electoral democracy, civil liberties are not guaranteed. Hence, framing diminished types of democracy allows analysts to distinguish between the intact root concept of democracy and its less perfect subtypes. However, narrowing down definitions has also led to a plethora of lessened forms democracy which are not necessarily consistent together. In that connection, strong controversy hovers around the definition of these subtypes of democracies. While Diamond, Linz and Lipset, for instance, consider a semidemocracy to fall short of the minimal edge of an electoral democracy, Schedler defines a semi-democracy as a type of democracy in which free and fair elections take place, but other criteria for a full-fledged democracy lack.65 Hence, insisting on using the word of democracy to typify these regimes can only exacerbate their ambiguity. In fact, to what extent can the meaning of democracy be stretched? In addition, when political regimes lack various democratic attributes, can they still be considered as secondary types of democracy or isn’t it more accurate to devise in that case subtypes of autocracies? In more recent works, analysts do not advocate typifying systems far from the procedural minimum of democracy as lower subtypes of democracy. Instead, they consider these systems to be distinct forms of authoritarianism,66 and call upon abandoning “misleading labels,” as well as “taking” the “nondemocratic nature” of these regimes seriously.67 Indeed, these adjectives that include the

64 65

66

67

See “Democracy with Adjectives.” See respectively Diamond, Linz, and Lispet, Politics in Developing Countries; Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” See Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”; Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Autho-ritarianism.” Even Diamond, and Lipset who talked about “pseudodemocracies” in Politics in Developing Countries suggest now adding adjectives to authoritarianism to depict these hybrids that fall short of the procedural minimal. See Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”; Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Schedler,“Elections without Democracy,” 36.

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word of democracy do not really “capture” the main trait of these regimes which are “not failed democracies or democracies in transition” but “carefully constructed and maintained alternative systems.”68 For this, it seems important to put a clear-cut edge to democracies since hybrid regimes in certain cases remain frozen and do not necessarily advance towards the democratic brink. By delimiting borderlines, one aims thereby at more conceptual clarity; The tendency to call such regimes subtypes of democracy reveals “a democratizing bias”69 and a scholarly eagerness to apply the transition paradigm even “to the very countries whose political evolution is calling that paradigm into question.”70 This does not rule out the fact that these systems might democratize or change their trajectory. However, classifying them as instances of authoritarianism helps us avoid the trap of teleology in system transformation as well as the conceptualization of democracy as the end product of the circuit; Since the objective of the study is to adopt a positive notion of democratic transition focusing on democratic advances or the possibility of democratic progress in Lebanon, rather than a negative notion of democratic consolidation which focuses more on system stability, maintenance, and the avoidance of erosion,71 an ascending pattern starting from the authoritarian edge is definitely more pertinent. General characteristics of electoral or semi-authoritarian regimes Before coming to the post-war regime, I will first depict the most important characteristics that help grasp the confusing nature of semi-authoritarian regimes, volatile hybrids that find themselves “in a nebulous zone of structural ambivalence” inasmuch as they apply neither democratic rules nor “outright repressive methods.”72 This structural ambivalence can be analyzed as follows: These hybrids do have formal democratic institutions, and a certain limited space for political and civil liberties. Opposition parties are allowed to exist, and the media has a certain degree of freedom and independence. They also hold regular 68 69 70 71

72

Ottoway, Democracy Challenged, 7. Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 51. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 10. In “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Schedler alludes to the positive and negative concepts of democratic consolidation. Looking at democratic transition from the angle of the positive notion of democratic consolidation is, for example, envisaging progress from an electoral democracy to a liberal democracy. The negative notion is more concerned with avoiding a democratic regression or a slip from an advanced democracy to an electoral democracy. It is important to add that positive and negative notions of democratic consolidation become only valid when a country reached the procedural minumum of a democracy. Schedler, “Elections without Democracy,” 37.

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elections, but these elections do not comply with minimal democratic rules. In other words, electoral violations are not scattered but meaningful. Even if elections are in some cases competitive, the opposition does not truly endanger the stability of the incumbent government; Behind this democratic façade, the incumbents’ authority is deeply enshrined and cannot be easily challenged. The rulers’ legitimacy does not stem from their popularity “but because they know how to play the democracy game and still retain control.”73 Different strategies, whether subtle, mildly repressive or repressive, are used to alter electoral outcomes, isolate the opposition, control the media as well as the sources of information available to the citizens, and keep political mobilization at a low level. More particularly, civil society and the press might be allowed to breathe and express grievances as long as they do not endanger the incumbents’ rule. The link between the civil society and the political society stays extremely weak, and civil society organizations, though numerous and active, remain isolated from the center of power; Institutions in a semi-authoritarian government remain weak. Horizontal accountability is poorly developed or quasi-nonexistent, and the executive can manage easily to shield itself from parliamentary pressure or from public accountability. Mechanisms are developed with time to prevent transfer of power from the ruling elites to other oppositional parties; Constitutionalism and the strict rule of law are mostly overshadowed by clientelistic and patrimonial networks empowering individuals rather than institutions. Constitutions are often infringed, and a certain arbitrariness in applying formal political rules can be observed; These hybrids create an aura of legitimacy, which does not arise from democratic institutions but rather from the belief that these systems are engendering some kind of regime stability indispensable to the reign of order and security in the country. In these systems, liberal games may be an end in themselves or a tactic to alleviate popular discontent; These hybrids’ development does not necessarily obey clear transitional patterns. Thus, they may remain ambiguous mixes, become less or more competitive even without nearing the democratic edge. In other words, they may solidify or become loose. To understand the logic of these hybrids, one should be cautious not to apply to them usual mechanisms applicable to democratizing countries or purely authoritarian regimes.

73

Ottoway, Democracy Challenged, 6.

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How to distinguish between more and less competitive semi-authoritarian regimes? Possessing different degrees of competitiveness, hybrids erring on the authoritarian side are not alike. Certain are more resilient and institutionalized than others which tend to be looser and more unstable. Closed hybrids usually portrayed as hegemonic systems have strong authoritarian pressures that might substantially increase to the extent that the system is threatened to slide into pure autocracy. More open hybrids in dynamic change possess generally more pronounced democratic pressures and have more open political space. Although rulers transgress democratic rules in competitive semi-authoritarian regimes, they are unable to “reduce them to a mere façade.”74 Instead of using bluntly repressive methods as in closed hybrids, incumbents rely on finer methods to ostracize opposition and alienate competitors. In these more liberalized hybrids, opposition groups do have a certain role and may relatively challenge the status quo. The democratic institutional mold provides thereby a vent allowing opposition forces to acquire a stronger grip than in hegemonic semi-autocracies. These fine distinctions among hybrids make the task of classifying systems very difficult: how to find the exact threshold between a competitive authoritarian regime and a more closed hegemonic system? How can one differentiate between different types of competitive regimes in dynamic change with multiparty elections? At one point, can one confirm that a competitive system has democratized? Surely, the frontiers between regime types are a matter of “difficult and disputable judgement,”75 and can vary subjectively among scholars depending on their assumptions and the tools they use to measure the degrees of system competitiveness. Nevertheless, one way to find out is to study and observe in these regimes the interplay of democratic and authoritarian pressures as well as their intensity and frequencies. In addition, certain fixed criteria can be used to delimit the edge between democracy and instances of authoritarianism. To start with, elections which are considered as the minimal requirement for a democracy could be used to determine whether the regime can be categorized as an electoral democracy or whether it has descended into the abyss of electoral authoritarianism.76 The degrees of electoral inclusiveness, freedom, fairness, and the pattern of electoral violations could be used to refine judgement.

74 75 76

Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 53. Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” 27. See Schedler, “Elections without Democracy.”

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Other criteria such as the freedom house scores, the percentage of seats the ruling party has in the parliament, the percentage of voices that the presidential candidate of the ruling coalition has, and the number of years during which the rulers have uninterruptedly reigned have been, for instance, used as specific variables to depict the degree of “authoritarian competitiveness.”77 Lebanon in the transition paradigm: a peculiar tale The objective of this section is not to elaborate on democratic transitions, and on the debate hovering around measuring hybrid regimes but rather to integrate Lebanon’s political transition in this framework. Hence, on the international level, this “second wave backslider”78 has been almost completely omitted from the most influential and recent works on transitology.79 At times, it has been dismissed as a case of “dissonant politics” in the Middle East.80 Belonging to the second wave of democratization, pre-war democracy in Lebanon experienced considerable erosion, and missed out on the third wave of democratization which penetrated even authoritarian regimes, but failed to infiltrate the country’s supposedly open political system. Noteworthy is that trends of political liberalization in some Arab countries in the 1990s81 were accompanied by a trend of political illiberalization in Lebanon. Since the end of the war, Lebanon resisted redemocratization for approximately 15 years. Although it enjoyed in 1972/3 the highest composite score among all Middle Eastern and North African countries according to the Freedom House ranking, it was classified since the end of the war up to 2005 as not free.82 No other Middle Eastern country has experienced this drastic decline. In other words, while other countries in the region have had more or less stable Freedom House scores, Lebanon is the only country whose downfall from a score of 2 to a score of 5.5 leaves enough room for speculation.83 Lebanon’s transition away from democracy could be traced back at least to three important factors. These can be summarized as follows: the stark collapse of the law and the state during fifteen years of war, the emergence of militia 77 78 79

80 81 82 83

Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” 29. Huntington, “ Democracy’s Third Wave,” 21. For more information, see the section on general review of the literature on Lebanon in the introduction. Brumberg, “Islamists and the Politics of Consensus,” 112. For instance Morocco, Bahrain,Yemen, Jordan. See Bellin, “Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” See Freedom House reports on Lebanon available from http://www.freedomhouse.org.

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fiefdoms that eroded state institutions,84 and most importantly the hegemony of an external authoritarian power since 1976. Indeed, one of the major background conditions favorable to democratic crafting remained absent in post-war Lebanon. Hence, democracy fails to develop when the country is subject to a strong foreign control inimical to democracy,85 when the country is not “self-governing,” and its sovereignty is overwhelmed by “some other overarching political system,” and the officials cannot take decisions “without the approval of actors outside their territorial domain.”86 With Syrian hegemony over Lebanese affairs, it was hard to envisage the development of democratic institutions in the Second Republic, as long as Lebanon’s political and territorial stateness remained blurred.87 Indeed, when state sovereignty is shaky, the “regime-type” is stripped “much of its underlying significance.”88 The effects of a 15-year authoritarian penetration into the Lebanese system created a paradoxical effect of reverse snowballing whereby the expanding nondemocratic power stimulated a kind of authoritarian wave in the country. In addition to these reasons, the realization that the pre-war precarious democracy could not breed a strong state was another motive that convinced Lebanese incumbents of the necessity to shift towards a more authoritarian style of governance in order to impose order and law.89

The architecture of semi-authoritarianism: the indicators (1990-2004) What made the nature of Lebanon’s post-war hybrid system particularly unstable were the changing interactions between authoritarian/democratic pressures and their fluctuating intensity levels. Whereas the increase of authoritarian pressures in the 1990s hinted that post-war Lebanon might be seriously dragged into the authoritarian abyss, democratic pressures – rather sporadic – ended up taking the lead till they became salient features of a potentially liberalizing system. The

84

85 86 87

88 89

See for example Georges Corm, “Liban: hégémonie milicienne et problème du rétablissement de l’Etat,” Maghreb-Machrek 131 (1991):13-25. See Dahl, On Democracy; Huntington “Democracy’s Third Wave.” See also Karl and Schmitter, “What democracy is,” 81-82. Hezbollah’s role as a paramilitary organization which is not amenable to the state has cast additional doubt on Lebanon’s state authority. Hershberg, “Democracy and its Discontents,” 299. See Perthes, “Libanon: Stabilisierung durch Rekonstruktion des Staates.”

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presence of ascending democratic pressures reveals retrospectively that the semiauthoritarian regime that has prevailed up to 2005 was of a competitive nature. The Ta’if setting, background and aftermath The last turbulent war episodes The Ta’if peace agreement marked the end of the war and announced the rebuilding of war-torn social and material structures. It also halted a deteriorating situation in which internal warring parties had opted for the annihilation of the other. Indeed, before the war drew to a close, communal hostilities had exacerbated the situation, and the last ghostly remnants of the Lebanese state were further weakened by internecine conflicts. As President Amin Gemayel’s90 term was about to expire on September 22, 1998, no successor had been elected. The chamber failed twice to secure a quorum for a new presidential election, mainly because militias and parties could not agree on a candidate. In addition, it was clear that Syria was working on imposing its own protégé. However, it failed in nominating its own candidate, Deputy Michel Daher, as the majority of Christian elites and mainly the commander in chief of the Lebanese army Michel Aoun blatantly denounced Syria’s manipulative moves and intrusion in Lebanon’s domestic affairs. The day his mandate drew to a close, President Gemayel dismissed the government headed by Salim el Huss, and appointed a new interim government presided by Aoun, the Maronite commander of the army. No sooner was Aoun appointed than Muslim politicians refused to recognize him as prime minister and reaffirmed their allegiance to the Huss government in West Beirut. The two antagonistic governments, denying each other’s existence, reflected to a great extent a polarized country fragmented by this point of time along confessional lines. While the Huss government enjoyed international and mainly Syrian support, the Aoun government established in Christian East Beirut was able to attract the sympathy of the Iraqi regime, and that of the Lebanese population. In an attempt to impose order, General Michel Aoun rushed to launch a first attack against the Lebanese Forces,91 and its Maronite leader Samir Geagea. This 90

91

After President Bachir Gemayel, the son of the Phalangist Party’s founder Pierre Gemayel, was assassinated in 1982, his brother Amin was elected as his successor. The right wing Lebanese Forces Party (LF) was founded by the late president Bachir Gemayel in 1977. During the war, it drew exclusive support from the Christian community, and took part in the heavy military confrontations that ravaged the country at the time. Attempting to impose its supremacy in the Christian fief, it fought smaller Christian militias, and tried to co-opt them.

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first episode was mainly interpreted as a struggle for the control of the Christian fiefdom. Aoun urged the Lebanese Forces to abdicate their ports to the state, and renounce their surrogate duties. Severe fighting broke out in February 1989 only to cease once the militia had bowed to Aoun’s government and relinquished power bases. Although General Aoun lacked international assistance and internal political support, he started a war of liberation against Syria, a war whose goal was to ensure the Syrian forces’ withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Using his admirable verbal rhetoric, and insisting on the demise of Syrian hegemony, he reached out for the Lebanese masses and mainly to the Christian community who granted him unconditional popular support. Despite his awareness of his inferior military standing vis-à-vis Syria, Aoun was hopeful that a confrontation would bring about the intervention of the international community. Indeed, the escalation of the fighting between anti- and pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon had sparked the attention of the Arab League which hurried to organize an urgent summit meeting in Casablanca in May 1989. Still, the Troika Committee composed of the Kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco, as well as the president of Algeria, did neither succeed in implementing a cease-fire nor in proposing a solution for peace as the projected plan that would allow Lebanon to regain its sovereignty clashed with intransigent Syrian views. It was crystal clear that the US administration, whose hegemonial role in the international system had become unquestionable especially after the end of the cold war, would support the Syrian government, and would not side with Aoun’s adventure dubbed by many commentators as short-sighted and reckless. Once Arab and international demands to resolve the Lebanese crisis became more pressing, the Arab league resumed its efforts on September 7, 1989. A meeting was convened in Saudi Arabia in the neutral resort of Ta’if on September 30th. The Lebanese parliament was asked to approve a new covenant prepared by the Troika Committee and revised by Syrian authorities. It is noteworthy that the resumption of the Arab league’s efforts was made possible only when the Arab Troika “had gone a long way towards accommodating Syrian views.” 92 Only then, fighting subsided in Lebanon, and port blockades were lifted. Sixty-two out of the 70 surviving members of the 1972 Lebanese parliament attended the Ta’if meeting. Despite Aoun’s warning against “any treason,” 93 58 deputies voted in its favor. After some amendments to the original text, the Ta’if 92 93

Hanf, Coexistence, 158. Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 261.

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covenant known as the Document of National Reconciliation was finally adopted on October, 22; the clauses related to Syrian interests were left untouched and surrounded with a great deal of secrecy. Although Christian deputies had agreed with Aoun before their departure to Ta’if that they would make some concessions in the political realm in exchange of a precise schedule for Syrian withdrawal, it was claimed that they facilitated the adoption of the document.94 Acclaimed by the international community, the Ta’if document was first received in Lebanon with considerable resentment. The Druze and Shiite communities denounced the unchanged Ta’if sectarian content. Adamant opposition was mainly expressed by Aoun who, backed by the Christian masses at the Baabda presidential palace, denounced the imposed Pax Syriana. Other more moderate Christian and Sunni leaders argued that the Ta’if pact was the only practical solution that could stop war. On November 5, 1989, deputies gathered in Qulay’at, in the Northern Syriancontrolled Metn area, and elected Rene Muawad, a deputy from Zghorta, as president. The Ta’if document was also ratified. Persistent in his refusal to collaborate with what he considered as the Ta’if conspiracy, Aoun refused to acknowledge Muawad’s presidency, which was limited to 17 short days. The president’s efforts to form a new government came to a halt with the tragic news of his assassination on the November 22, the Day of Lebanese Independence. The following day, deputies elected Deputy Elias Hrawi from the Beqa’a area, the unique presidential candidate. Unlike the late President Muawad who was reluctant to coerce Aoun, the new president gave the army commander a two-day ultimatum to leave the Baabda presidential palace, and categorically refused to negotiate with him. Hrawi’s defiant move provoked a wave of protest among Christian masses who considered Aoun as a national heroic figure. As soon as the Lebanese Forces’ leader, Samir Geagea, announced in December his support for the Ta’if agreement, and revealed his intentions to participate eventually in the new government, Aoun hurried to condemn Geagea’s stance as an act of treachery. At this point, the schism between the two main political authorities in the Christian community had become insurmountable. In January 1990, in a last showdown before his demise, Aoun attempted to reestablish his authority and defeat the Lebanese Forces. Following a period of heavy fighting between the Aoun-controlled army and the Maronite militia, a

94

See Abul Husn, The Lebanese Conflict.

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cease-fire was announced in May after the two parties’ exhaustion. Fears mounted that an eventual ‘cantonization’ of the country was drawing near.95 In the summer of 1990, regional changes caused yet a significant turnabout. The lingering chaos gave way to the firm reign of Syria throughout Lebanon’s Second Republic. After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, various regional factors converged against Aoun’s quixotic battle. As a reward for joining the anti-Iraqi coalition led by the US, Syria was given a green light to act in Lebanon. “In the shadow of the Iraqi-American confrontation,” “adroitly exploited by Damascus,”96 the Ta’if process was hastened. End of August, the Lebanese parliament amended the constitution in accordance with the Document of National Reconciliation. Thirty-one amendments were signed by President Hrawi on September 21. The following month, the Syrian army along with a section of the Lebanese army led by Commander Emile Lahoud attacked Aoun’s army units. For the first time, the Syrian Air force flew over Lebanese territory and bombed Baabda. Aoun had no choice but to surrender and ask for political asylum at the French embassy. His ouster was a great humiliation to the Christian community, and an irrefutable proof of Syrian ascendancy. With the collapse of the last bastion of resistance, the new regime was finally able to spread its wings and assert its authority. A swift exit out of the war Lebanon’s exit from the war was marked by a somehow rash and precipitated return to political and social normality. Diverse political, socio-cultural, and economic processes were rapidly launched to patch the injuries of a war-torn society. After the reign of anarchy, establishing order and security as well as reviving the battered economy were the government’s priorities. Dissolving militias, reactivating political institutions, and reviving the electoral process were perceived as urgent measures that would bring a halo of normality to the country. No sooner were demarcation lines between East and West Beirut removed than the talks on reconstruction became one of the first items on the socio-economic agenda. A new government of national entente headed by Premier Omar Karami was formed in December 1990. Perceived as a highly syrianized cabinet, it failed to

95

96

In the South, intra-communal adversity between the Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah was another indicator of the degree of anarchy and fragmentation that Lebanon had reached at the beginning of the 1990s. Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 278.

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represent all political factions, and attracted therefore much criticism from deputies, political parties, and the press.97 A ministerial decision in March 1991 ordered militias to disband and militiamen to reintegrate into military and civilian organizations. However, the process of demilitarization excluded the armed Palestinian camps,98 and the Shiite party, Hezbollah, keen on maintaining its resistance military wing in the Israeli-occupied South. The militiamen’s reintegration in the Lebanese army or in civil life was assessed as a dubious process whose success was partial and biased.99 In addition to these measures, the amendment of the electoral law in May permitted the appointment of 40 new deputies to the 1972 parliament in order to revive the legislature. These appointments did not take in consideration the communal composition of the Lebanese society. Moreover, the judicial branch and the courts of laws were gradually reactivated, and a constitutional council, supposed to watch over the constitution, was created in 1993. Reestablishing the authority of the state required additionally the revival of military institutions and the strengthening of army units. Under Commander Emile Lahoud, the army underwent a total reshuffle. New enrolled recruits received periods of training during which the spirit of national unity rather than confessionalism was promoted. Additionally, the reorganized security and intelligence services were endowed with enhanced privileges to enforce order and discipline. Directly after the ratification of the Ta’if agreement, Syria began to assist the Lebanese authorities in reestablishing state unity and control over the Lebanese territory. The normalization of post-war political life meant also co-opting warlords and militia leaders who played an important role during the war. However, this process remained selective as the 1991 amnesty law, which intended to seal the page of war crimes and seek a new phase of communal coexistence, excluded the two main Maronite leaders. Whereas the LF leader Samir Geagea went to jail,100 Aoun was granted a pardon and was allowed to leave to France. 97

98

99

100

The Kata’ib, the Lebanese Forces, and the Druze bloc led by Walid Jumblatt complained that they were underrepresented. Other parties such as Hezbollah and the Lebanese Communist Party did not even participate. The PLO concluded nonetheless with the Lebanese government an agreement which stipulated that the Lebanese army had the right to spread the state authority around the camps. See Elizabeth Picard, The Demobilisation of the Lebanese Militias (Beirut: Lebanese Studies Center, 1999). Samir Geagea received a life imprisonment indictment. Cleared of the attack against the Christian Church, Mar Mikhail, he was later tried for the political assassinations of the National Liberal Party’s leader, Dany Chamoun, and of the Prime Minister Rachid Karami in 1987. In the post-war period, marginalized by the prevailing regime and banned in 1994, the Lebanese Forces

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These measures made sure that the state resurrected after a long clinical death. Its institutions managed somehow to resume their functions, and the Lebanese army, with the help of the Syrian troops, began deploying its units on Lebanese territory, except in the occupied South. The Second Republic has thus mainly been credited for its satisfactory record on political stability, and for its ability to recover from war, launch an ambitious program of reconstruction, attract investments and restore Lebanon’s role as a touristy center in the Arab world.101 Still, this apparent stability could not ensure the comeback of national reconciliation and the reemergence of democracy as beneath the formal renewal, numerous setbacks lurked. The truncated implementation of the Ta’if agreement The essen ntial features of the Ta’if document The Ta’if pact constitutes by no means a breakthrough from the previous powersharing mode, and is deeply ingrained in the tradition of consociationalism and consensus.102 It begins by affirming the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, and rejects any attempt of fragmentation, partition or resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. Unlike the 1943 National pact which did not establish a Lebanese distinct national identity, Ta’if declares Lebanon as an Arab country “in belonging and identity.”103 By emphasizing the democratic character of the political system and affirming that no entity that violates communal coexistence is considered legitimate, it revives the Lebanese power-sharing model, and announces, at least on paper, the resurrection of consociational democracy after its collapse. Subsequent 1990 constitutional amendments inspired from the Ta’if pact reconfirmed the principles of communal power-sharing and segmental autonomy.104 While confessionalism remains the main regulating factor in politics, Ta’if introduces various political reforms in the legislative and executive branches. In the parliament, parity replaces the former superiority of six to five between

101

102 103

104

Party was unable to reorganize itself as a legitimate political party. It only resumed political activity after its leader’s release from prison in 2005. See for example Richard Seymour, “Getting Back on Track: After some Serious Setbacks Lebanon is Picking up the Pieces,” The Middle East, 1 June, 2004, 18-19. See Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon; Maila, “The Ta’if Accord: An Evaluation.” For an online version of the Ta’if document, see “The Ta’if Accord,” Al Bab, last updated on September, 27, 2006, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm. For more information on communal power-sharing and segmental autonomy in the 1991 Lebanese constitution, see respectively articles 9, 22, 24, and articles 9 and 19.

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Christians and Muslims, and a new parliamentary electoral law is devised on the basis of large provinces or Mohafazats. The number of deputies is increased from 99 to 108 (later to 128), and the parliament is endowed with more powers. The cabinet may not, for instance, exercise its functions before gaining the parliamentary vote of confidence. Additionally, the constitution stipulates that the chamber can only be dissolved in three cases specified in articles 65 and 77. The speaker of the chamber, whose term of office is extended to four years, gains more power in controlling governmental activity. More specifically, he plays an active role in electing the president and forming the cabinet. His powers in the legislature also increase. On the executive level, the president’s prerogatives are undermined. He is no longer the absolute arbiter, and cannot, for example, appoint the prime minister on his own, but has to consult with the deputies. He also cannot refuse to promulgate laws. Despite these limitations, his powers remain considerable.105 The president can thus ask for reconsidering a law passed by the parliament within the grace period indicated by the constitution. Although he does not vote in the council of ministers, he may preside the session if he wishes. He may also ask the council to reconsider any decision it makes within 15 days of its deposition. The Ta’if pact grants real executive power to the cabinet supposed to be a power-sharing coalition which represents fairly the Lebanese communities. This collegial body controls the implementation of laws and supervises all state agencies. Furthermore, the prime minister’s role is strengthened. He sets the agenda of the cabinet sessions, signs decrees that issue laws, and requests the reconsideration of laws if he deems necessary. He also makes sure that the decisions taken by the council are implemented. In addition to these changes, Ta’if proposes the elimination of confessionalism in stages, but does not set a clear procedure or timetable. It only proposes the creation of a national council whose task is to phase out sectarianism. In this respect, the agreement only reiterates previous promises and calls for deconfessionalization.106 Still, the document decrees the abolition of confessionalism in the recruitment of public servants at the lower level, but retains sectarian criteria in high level offices which are supposed to be shared equally between Christians and Muslims.

105 106

See Salam, “Ta’if Revisited.” For an account of previous talks of deconfessionalization, see El Khazen, “Ending Conflict in Wartime Lebanon.”

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The pact stresses additionally the importance of administrative decentralization, and the necessity of a balanced social and economic development in all Lebanese provinces. For this purpose, a socio-economic council for development is supposed to be created to remedy to inequities. Ta’if also calls upon the creation of a constitutional council whose objectives are to respect the constitution, make sure that laws are justly applied, and solve disputes pertaining to elections. This measure aims at strengthening the judiciary branch, and improving political and electoral accountability. The last sections which revolve around Lebanon’s sovereignty, the Israeli occupation and Lebanon’s links to Syria remain the most problematic and ambiguous parts of the whole document. According to the pact, the state should assume control over the Lebanese territory according to a one-year plan which revolved around disbanding militias, strengthening the internal security and armed forces as well as settling the issue of the displaced during the war. The Syrian army would assist the Lebanese government for a two-year period in order to restore state authority once the agreement entered into force. After this date, the decision to redeploy Syrian troops to the Beqa’a is left to the discretion of a Lebanese-Syrian committee. The document additionally calls for the unconditional retreat of the Israeli forces from the South. The last part on Lebanese-Syrian relations highlights the privileged and special ties that unite the two countries. These bonds stem from common interests and from a common historical background. Special attention is paid to cooperation between the two countries on all levels, particularly in the security domain. Thus, the two countries would not threaten each other’s security, and Lebanon would not allow the use of its territory by any entity which endangers Syrian interests. The last sentence which specifies that Syria should not allow any act which endangers Lebanon’s security and independence implicitly legalizes Syrian intervention in all matters relating to Lebanon that Damascus deems necessary. Interpreting Ta’if: its main merits Ta’if is praised for silencing the guns, bringing all warring parties to the table of negotiations, and initiating the long journey towards national understanding. It succeeded in establishing some kind of consensus around the fundamentals of politics, and namely the burning issue of national identity. Whereas the pre-war national pact rejected allegiance either to the West or to the Arab world, Ta’if irrevocably settles the dispute around Lebanon’s degree of Arabness. It unfolds the premises of a new project for building an Arab nation based on communal

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coexistence, and does away with all other myths related to Maronitism107 or annexation with Greater Syria. Moreover, it justifies the necessity of Lebanon’s existence by referring to its particularity and distinctiveness as a haven for coexistent cultures. Instead of a blurred entity torn between the West and the Arab world, a nation whose contours are well-delineated is envisioned by the pact. One of the most important merits of the pact is that it revives the Lebanese formula of pluralism and power-sharing despite its deterioration. This return to consociation was interpreted by many as a new dawn in Lebanon’s political history especially that the written pact rectifies some injustices in the confessional realm and contains many promissory comments. Although it was no ideal arrangement at the time,108 it has nonetheless brought about stability, and was perhaps the best that could have been realistically achieved. It can be considered as “a second-best solution which none of the actors wanted or identified with completely but which all of them argue to and share in.”109 By transferring executive authority from the president to the council of ministers, the document aims at eradicating former Maronite hegemony. Its intention is to dilute executive power into the collegial body of the ministers that represents all communities and operates on the basis of dialogue. This transfer of power to the cabinet is meant to prevent any eventual schemes of communal hegemony and at the same time safeguard the power-sharing formula irrespective of demographic changes. By envisaging an eventual deconfessionalization of the system, and by eliminating confessional affiliation from identity cards, the pact attempts to reduce the subversive effects of sectarianism. In sum, the very fact that the document emphasizes the stateness of Lebanon, its unity and the pact of coexistence among its communities, after a practical loss of territorial sovereignty during the war, should not be overlooked. Whereas other prior initiatives had failed,110 Ta’if was credited for providing “social engineers and decision-makers with an instrument for nation building.”111 All

107

108

109 110

111

Maronitism is an ideology which focuses on the distinct cultural identity of the Maronites and their precursory as well as enlightening role in the Lebanese nation. Late Shiite clergyman Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Chamseddine, former president of the Shiite Superior Council, described Ta’if as an “accord of pure necessity” that should be “temporal and temporary.” See Emile Khoury, “Taêf, un prétexte commode, exhumé des cendres,” L’Orient Le Jour, May 9, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/hier/politique/polsujetw12.htm. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, 38. Namely the 1976 Constitutional Document and the 1985 Tripartite Agreement signed by the Lebanese Forces, Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party. Abul Husn, Lebanese Conflict, 91.

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these positive notes notwithstanding, could Ta’if be regarded as a democratic pact? To what extent did it usher in a transition to re-democratization? Its main defects: why Ta’if was unable to inaugurate a pacted transition towards democracy Although an important strategy of democratic transition revolves around compromise or the genesis of a foundational pact which defines the rules of the democratic game,112 Ta’if failed to inaugurate such a transition. Despite the fact that the power-sharing document cannot be analyzed from a purely legal or theoretical point of view, and its contents cannot be insulated from the Lebanese confessional structure and the external situation that gave rise to the accord,113 many indicators concomitant to the Ta’if birth show that the document failed to meet the criteria of democratic pacts.114 First, the document was the result of highly constraining regional and internal factors, and saw the light amidst atrocities.115 In the first place, it did not spring from within: some of its sections were imposed and were resistant to discussion. It is indeed unlikely that a document heavily influenced by outside actors, and which does not consider the bargaining interests of all internal actors, would pave the way for redemocratization.116 Under international and Syrian pressure, the deputies who voted in favor of the document “could not venture far from the original text.”117 The sections dealing with Lebanon’s foreign policy, sovereignty, and stateness remained beyond the Lebanese elites’ reach. In this respect, unlike the 1943 pact which was the fruit of internal consensus, Ta’if was not crafted from within as the most influential pact architects were external parties active behind the scenes.118 In addition, it is highly contestable whether the deputies belonging to the 1972 parliament –although they were elected officials and not war belligerents – could claim to represent the Lebanese people at that time. 112 113 114

115

116 117 118

For more details, see Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization.” See Salam, “Ta’if Revisited.” For more details on how pacts can range from democratic to undemocratic, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 56; Stepan,“Paths Towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations,” 79-81. For example, Aoun’s violent ouster, the assassinations of president Rene Muawad, and Dany Chamoun, former secretary of the National Liberal Party as well as Aoun’s ally at the time. See Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization.” Maila, “The Ta’if Accord,” 40. For more details, see Waddah Charara, “Deux ans de Réunification nationale: une libanisation Gigogne,” Cahiers de la Méditerranée 44 (June 1992): 165-174; Nasrallah, “The Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-Ordination.”

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The sections that were within the Lebanese representatives’ sphere of influence dealt mainly with internal political reforms, but were by no means a complete innovation.119 It was rather the untouchable external dimension of the agreement which played the decisive role in shaping Lebanon’s destiny throughout the Second Republic. What is even more dubious is that had the external factors not become suddenly favorable in 1989,120 Ta’if would have maybe never seen the light. Some even suggested that it was not the content of Ta’if that ended the conflict, but the fact that the Lebanese conflict itself and the constellation of regional events had become ripe.121 As a result, various ‘indispensable requirements’ of a democratic party pact lack in the Ta’if agreement. First, atrophied by a disheartening conflict, the Lebanese leaders did not possess “the organizational and ideological capacity to negotiate a grand coalition among themselves,” and were unable to win “the allegiance of their political followers to the terms of the pact.”122 Most importantly, if a pact is to be considered a democratic covenant enabling a safe transition towards democracy, the pact itself should end the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime.123 Although Ta’if allegedly launched a pacted transition originating from the Lebanese elites, it disguised a strong case of imposition, symbolised by the Syrian tutelage. While the democratic transition of the Lebanese First Republic facilitated by the National Pact ended French colonization and resulted mainly from internal crafting,124 the birth of the Second Republic happened after the defeat of the internal opposition, and allowed the infiltration of external authoritarian enclaves into the Lebanese system. In other words, the Ta’if pact was the main tool which legalized the intervention of an external authoritarian regime instead of eroding its bases. By paving the way for the establishment of a regime endowed with 119

120

121 122

123 124

These internal reforms were an extension of the 1943 pact, and resembled many aspects in the 1976 Constitutional Document accepted by president Franjieh, and in the 1985 Tripartite Agreement negotiated by three militia leaders at the time, Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, and Elie Hubeyka. The favorable international and regional factors that led to the cessation of hostilities were the end of the cold war and the American triumph, the wane of Palestinian and Israeli influence in Lebanon counterbalanced by an unforeseen rise of Syrian influence in the country, and the American endorsement of Syrian policy in Lebanon. For more details, see Salam, “Ta’if Revisited,” 40. See Perthes, “Lebanon: Ripeness for Regulation.” The general conditions for a democratic pact are outlined by Stepan in “Paths towards Redemocratization,” 80. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition. It is true that the National Pact drew upon the 1926 Lebanese constitution, which was heavily inspired by the French authorities, but the making and implementation of the 1943 agreement did not happen under circumstances of coercion.

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Syrian legitimacy and impregnated with autocratic elements, it internalized ‘external authoritarianism.’ The pact also provided the background for other Lebanese-Syrian treaties which reinforced Syria’s predominance in Lebanon. Besides, it is noteworthy that a set of non-democratic practices marked the beginning of the Ta’if process. In June 1991, the first national reconciliation government, led by former premier Omar Karami, nominated 40 deputies. This measure described in Ta’if as a measure that would happen “only once on an emergency basis”125 was in clear contradiction with the spirit of parliamentary democracy that the pact highlights. Supposed to craft a well-ordered transition towards democracy, the Ta’if order began with shady rules that cast doubt on the credibility of the process itself. In spite of the opposition that these appointments encountered, the procedure went on unaltered.126 Moreover, the Ta’if order failed to depart from the war system, and gave legitimacy to the warlords who had nurtured inter-communal hostilities during the war. Although the military leaders’ inclusion into the new order had contributed to the pacification of the post-war Lebanese society, this measure has also impeded the rise of new political actors. As most of the outgoing elites of the previous war order are the successors, reforming and breaking off ties with past practices cannot be achieved without great difficulty. Ta’if and power-sharing In the consociational realm, even though the document’s aim was to revive power-sharing democracy, it indirectly became a pact of “exclusionary consociational authoritarianism”127 as it isolated certain political groups, and prohibited their inclusion into the new multiple balance of power. The groups who accepted the Syrian-brokered peace were allowed to join the post-war government, while those who opposed it were precluded from participation. Hence, the only relevant criterion for partaking was the approval of the Ta’if process.128 In sum, the covenant failed to meet the test of a democratic treaty whose circumstances aim at the “internal construction of a grand oppositional

125 126 127

128

See “The Ta’if Accord,” Al Bab, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm. See Norton, “Lebanon after Ta’if: Is the Civil War Over?” This expression was initially used by Jonathan Hartlyn. See The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Fadia Kiwan, “Forces politiques nouvelles, système politique ancien, ” in Le Liban d’aujourd’hui, ed. Fadia Kiwan (Paris: Cermoc, 1994), 57-72, 59.

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pact,” and pave the way for “a successor democratic regime in which power is open to most opposition forces.”129 Also, the treaty fell short of “fulfilling the great political ambitions” of the majority.130 On the one hand, many resentful parties, who disdained confessionalism, did not welcome the document wholeheartedly.131 By replacing the strong pre-war Shiite sense of deprivation with a new sentiment of Maronite disenchantment, the pact reinforced communal breaches. The Ta’if amendments pertaining to communal power-sharing have also been severely criticized. Although Ta’if adjusts confessional imbalances and aims at eradicating sectarian inequities, the document as such has rendered the consociational game not so easily governable, and has made the political system prone to deadlock. By strengthening the roles of the prime minister and the speaker of the chamber, and weakening the role of the president, it sets up a political system quasi dominated by three leaders, who at the same time represent three different communities and three different institutions, and who can veto each other’s decisions. Thus, Ta’if transforms the Second Republic into a three-headed institution in which the spoils are shared by a triumvirate. In fact, political paralysis looms every time the Troika figures disagree or when two figures ally against the third.132 Furthermore, the document institutes asymmetrical relations between the legislative and the executive. By empowering the legislative branch and weakening presidential authority, institutional imbalances are likely to occur. Endowed with new prerogatives, the speaker of the chamber, for instance, is tempted to seek more power. Tensions between the legislative and executive may thereby undermine institutional stability by hindering the creation of smooth mechanisms of cooperation between the two branches. These subtle yet present imbalances, within the executive branch and between the executive and legislative, are likely to generate power-struggles. They also render the powersharing formula more dependent on the incumbents’ willingness to solve problems rather than on embedded institutionalized rules. More importantly, the pact does not attach much importance to promoting citizens’ rights even though it envisages the phasing out of confessional powersharing in the long run. Whereas the religious heads of the different 129 130 131

132

Stepan, “Paths to Redemocratization,” 79. See Salam, Aba’ad Mina el Ta’if (Beirut: Dar al Jadid, 1998). The pact was criticized by the Shiite political parties, Amal and Hezbollah, by the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, and by the Maronite community. In chapter 5, many examples, which describe how disagreement among the three official figures paralyzed the consociational game, will be discussed.

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communities, for instance, have the right to revise the constitutional council in matters of personal status, religious issues and freedom of religious education, this right is denied to the individual or to civil institutions.133 In other words, instead of lessening gradually the political and religious authority of the community upon the individual to pave the way for deconfessionalization, Ta’if reinforces it. Is Ta’if a final peace treaty for Lebanese communities? One important question that I will address in this section is whether the Ta’if agreement can be considered as a peace treaty capable of restoring subcultural segmentation and stability in the long run as well as regulating Lebanon’s relations with its neighbouring countries. I argue that the covenant falls short of a peace treaty134 which is not considered as a mere cessation of hostilities but an instrument of peacemaking eliminating the conflicts that could lead to future upheavals.135 Normally, the functions of a peace treaty are to achieve reconciliation, amnesty and build a new political order. Its main goal is to stop war “on a settlement of matters arising out of war.”136 Whereas Ta’if lays the foundations for a new political order, it leaves many contentious issues lying in wait, and does not deal decisively with the roots the problems.137 First, the issue of foreign intervention remains particularly nebulous. For example, no clear reasons were given why Syria’s presence in the country was legal. Second, it fails to deal soundly with the conflicts inherited from Lebanon’s heavy alignment in the past. Although external interference was one of the main reasons that led to the 1975 collapse, Ta’if does not address this issue firmly. For instance, the document does not say much on the Palestinian issue. Apart from the fact that it rejects Palestinian implantation, the accord does not include any provisions for the regulation of Lebanese-Palestinian and the future of the Palestinians in Lebanon.138 This procrastination and deliberate avoidance of 133 134

135

136 137

138

See Ofeish, “Lebanon’s Second Republic: Secular Talk.” Ta’if cannot be regarded as a pure domestic treaty, because it also regulates Lebanon’s relations with other neighboring states, mainly Syria and Israel, and tackles external dimensions of the conflict and its regulation. This is why I will draw upon characteristics of peace treaties in the realm of international law. See The Encyclopedia of Public International Law published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law and directed by Rudolph Bernhardt. See the chapter on peace treaties notably p. 109. Ibid., 104. See El Khazen, “Ta'if ma baadal harb chajara juzuruha akhsanuha,” Annahar, December 31, 1997, 13-14; Perthes, “Libanon: Stabilisierung.” See Walid Moubarak, The Position of a Weak State in an Unstable Region (Abu Dhabi: The

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litigious issues reveal that Ta’if is only a temporary measure waiting for a larger compromise. Third, in a contradictory manner, the issue of national identity, despite the covenant’s clarity on the matter, remains contentious as the pact does not explain what the connotations of an Arab Lebanon mean. Indeed, “the affiliation of the population, shaped over the centuries, could scarcely be changed by an elite decision within an overall package deal.”139 In the final analysis, if Ta’if is a conflict-regulating pact, it fails to address the main causes liable to re-awaken conflicts. Over and above, the pact contains many elements of escapism that might slow and even hinder national integration. Unlike other conventional peace treaties, the pact does not even contain a peace clause which acknowledges that there was a state of war, or terminates the state of war. The evasive approach of the document towards the war phenomenon140 and its inability to come to terms with the past in order to let go of it, have undermined the regulation of pending conflicts. First, failing to reach a national agreement on the real causes of the war has undermined the process of national building.141 By downplaying the dilemma around the identity of the Lebanese war, Ta’if becomes an ill-fated attempt to build a post-war nation upon forgetfulness. Second, whereas the Lebanese war undoubtedly led to the triumph of certain communities and the defeat of others,142 the Ta’if accord wears a false mask of neutrality, and gives birth to the fictional myth of ‘no victor and no vanquished.’ The agreement is also devoid of any safeguards, clarifications, or guarantees that are usually part of a peace treaty. Unlike peace treaties which deal with

139 140

141

142

Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2003). Abul Husn, Lebanese Conflict, 116. The document talks about disbanding militias, solving the Lebanese evacuees’ problem since 1975 and restoring sovereignty, but there are no clear allusions to the past happenings as if the Second Republic were to emerge out of a vacuum. The debate whether the Lebanese war was due to internal disruptive factors or whether it was a war of others on Lebanese territory has not been solved at the national and inter-communal levels. On one hand, relegating all causes of war to the internal Lebanese scene has exacerbated inter-communal intolerance, and has ignored important external variables that shaped the conflict. On the other hand, relegating all causes to extrinsic factors has contributed to developing an image of Lebanon as a victimized and feeble nation. It has also led to the aggravation of xenophobic tendencies against the Palestinian minority living on Lebanese territory. Most importantly, the obstinate belief that the Lebanese war was a war of others does not help much in building a Lebanese nation. See Perthes, “Myths and Money: Four Years of Hariri and Lebanon’s Preparation for a New Middle East,” Middle East Report 203 (1997): 1621. For more details on the post-Ta’if national identity in Lebanon, see Perthes, “Wie definiert man eine Nation? Identitätssuche und Staatsaufbau im Libanon,” Inamo 2 (1995): 9-12.

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amnesty, war crimes, exchange of prisoners of war, material compensation for war damages to the civilian population, the pact ignores all these issues. The subsequent amnesty law decreed in 1991 is not even mentioned in this document supposed to promote national understanding. The text does not envisage either instituting truce or reconciliation committees to facilitate the process of national reconciliation, and does not even mention how the displaced populations’ problem should be “solved fundamentally.”143 In a peace treaty, a section on restoring friendly relations with outer belligerent parties in light of international law is usually included. While the Ta’if parts related to the restoration of friendly relations – which in this case concern Syria – are supposed to deal with the establishment of diplomatic relations, the pact errs in a totally different direction. Next, the negotiation of the treaty happened in an atmosphere which was not propitious to peace. Thus, the negotiating procedures in Ta’if were highly discriminatory. Syria had the status of the winner, and Lebanon received the status of the looser in its negotiating position.144 Noteworthy is that the third nonbelligerent party i.e. the Arab Tripartite Committee involved in the negotiating procedures and entrusted with the supervision of the treaty clauses withdrew.145 Other intrinsic flaws in the Ta’if pact The pact also suffers from basic inherent flaws which undermine its applicability.146 By delaying indefinitely the Syrian troops’ retreat, the document falls into the trap of incommensurability. This problem, which denies the materialization of expected gains to certain negotiating parties, has contributed to exacerbating post-war divisions.147 After several sporadic redeployments, Syrian withdrawal has only come about after a series of tragic events. The constant procrastination of the issue of Syrian departure, and the obscurity that surrounded it, has aggravated to a great extent inter-communal cleavages, especially after 2000.

143 144 145 146 147

See “The Ta’if Accord,” Al Bab, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm. Maila, “The Ta’if Accord,” 42. See part III entitled “Other Reforms” in the Ta’if agreement. These flaws are discussed by Horowitz in Ethnic Groups, 584-588. The “problem of the incommensurables” is especially aggravated when one party obtains quick benefits, and the other negotiating party obtains a gain that does not easily materialize, and which cannot be measured either. See Pierre Du Toit, “Why Post-Settlement Settlements?” Journal of Democracy 14 (2003):104-118, 109.

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Second, by fixing dates which have not been respected, Ta’if suffers from ‘the firm target pitfall.’148 The two-year period mentioned for Syrian redeployment to the Beqa’a, and the six-month period for disbanding all militias were not observed. The fact that Hezbollah’s military wing and Palestinian camps have escaped these temporal targets undermines to a great extent the credibility of the pact. Just like its predecessor, Ta’if also suffers from the frozen quota flaw. Indeed, by embodying a static power-sharing equation, it does not provide consociational strategies to deal with future threats arising from communal disagreements on demographic and socio-political issues. Furthermore, the agreement has resisted retrospective evaluation. Certain elusive clauses, such as the necessity of spreading the state’s sovereignty over all the Lebanese territory “with the state’s own forces”149 or the national objective of deconfessionalization have escaped scrutiny. Even an evaluation of the pact’s achievements and setbacks has not been so far subject to a national appraisal where all communal parties have taken part on an equal standing.150 In addition to these inherent defects, analysts also found fault with Ta’if’s nebulous terminological content which may easily lead to different inconclusive interpretations.151 Full of lofty expressions regarding national sovereignty, and the rule of the law, it shies away from essential and procedural matters. For instance, Ta’if stipulates that the militias have to be disbanded, but it does not say “how this is to be done, or how to reabsorb the tens of thousands of trained fighters into the institutions and agencies of civil society.”152 The pact’s textual imprecision can also be easily distorted to fit antidemocratic practices. For instance, the paragraph dealing with restructuring the media after the war remains very vague. The document does not precise what is meant by the reorganization of the media “within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.”153 This clause has given implicitly a free hand to the Lebanese and Syrian authorities to restrict freedoms in the media, namely after 1995. One last controversial point relates to the binding character of the pact. Thus, the accord fell apart the moment it was supposed to be implemented. Some

148 149 150

151 152 153

See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups. See “The Ta’if Accord.” The national dialogue launched in 2006 after the establishment of the first post-Syrian government has not led to any tangible results on several litigious matters. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, November 26, 2004. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 295. See “The Ta’if Accord.”

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critics even talk about the death of Ta’if after its inauspicious birth.154 Its implementation was left to the politicians’ whims and to the caprices of the regional situation as events confirmed that “without significant progress in the Middle East peace process,” the suggested reforms in the covenant cannot be carried out.155 How seriously should Ta’if be considered then when its implementation was and remains related to regional factors? Syrian predominance and the Lebanese-Syrian riddle of semi-authoritarianism (1976-2004) Syrian influence on the Lebanese regime constituted the most important political parameter that shaped semi-authoritarianism in the post-war. For this reason, Syrian omnipresence on the Lebanese scene – mainly since 1990 – needs to be studied carefully, for it was not a classical case of occupation, but rather “a recent phenomenon” dependent on a mix of global, regional, and internal variables.156 With the ratification of the Ta’if agreement, Syria succeeded in extending its influence after the 1976 and the 1985 unhappy trials. It received the guardianship of post-war Lebanon and was entrusted with the implementation of a supposedly “internationally and regionally sponsored” treaty.157 Moreover, it succeeded in bestowing upon its interferences a legal character. The numerous post-Ta’if treaties concluded between the Lebanese and Syrian governments conferred to the Syrian role a regional and international aura of legitimacy. In May 1991, Syria reached new heights of influence on the Lebanese scene with the conclusion of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between the Syrian and Lebanese authorities followed a few months later by the Pact of Defence and Security. These treaties devised high levels of coordination in various economic, military, and political fields between the two countries. More importantly, the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination called for a complete coordination and harmonization of the two countries’ foreign policies particularly in the Middle East peace process. The agreement also called upon the establishment of a Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council that would coordinate these bilateral relations. To a legal analyst, these treaties may seem fair if the two states were placed on equal footing during the negotiations procedures, yet “considering Lebanon’s

154 155 156 157

See Albert Mansour, Al-Inqilab ‘ala al-Ta’if (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1992). Salam, “Ta’if Revisited,” 41. Barak, “Lebanon: Failure,” 327. Nasrallah, “Treaty of Brotherhood.”

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weakness and Syria’s preponderance,” cooperation on the domestic and foreign policy levels was a “euphemism for governance of Lebanon from Damascus.”158 The May 1991 treaty has been interpreted as a bold attempt to export Lebanon’s national policies and decision-making apparatus to Damascus.159 The formation of a supranational council, whose decisions should be obligatorily executed, hijacked the Lebanese national institutional organs, and led to their subordination to a greater transcendental authority. In this case, ‘supranationality’ overrules ‘constitutionality,’ and the process of coordination becomes more an attempt of ‘uniformization’ rather than one of harmonization.160 Indeed, this superior council which has resumed its functions after the mounting international pressure at the end of 2004 following a two-year period of paralysis has never acquired the character of a formal channel regulating bilateral relations on an equal basis. The concept of privileged relations with Syria without the establishment of official diplomatic relations has become throughout the years tantamount to Lebanon’s vassalage to its Damascene patron. Different Syrian political and military figures161 in charge of the Lebanese file used informal means of mediation, and bypassed state institutions to interfere in Lebanese politics or dictate Syria’s wishes. This led certain observers to comment that Lebanon was governed from Anjar.162 In addition to political and military treaties, a series of economic, agricultural, cultural, and educational agreements followed throughout the years. Attempts at deepening cultural and educational links between the two countries have been criticized for threatening Lebanon’s free educational system and distinct cultural features163 as well as endangering the consociational device of segmental autonomy in educational affairs.

158 159 160

161

162

163

Harik, “Democracy (Again) Derailed: Lebanon’s Ta’if Paradox,”141. See Nasrallah, “Treaty of Brotherhood.” For a careful analysis of the Syrian hijacking of the Lebanese decision-making process, see Daad Abou Malhab Atallah, “Le traité libano-syrien: acte de coopération ou d’intégration?” Cahiers de la Méditerrranée 44 (June 1992): 175-195. The most prominent Syrian personalities who were in charge of the Lebanese file were former vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam, former intelligence service chiefs in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan and Rustom Ghazali, and the minister of foreign affairs Farouk al-Chareh. The Syrian intelligence service chief in Lebanon resided in a Lebanese city called Anjar next to the Lebanese-Syrian frontier. See for example Malik in Between Damascus and Jerusalem, and “Is There Still a Lebanon?,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 2 (1998), http://meria.biu.ac.il/journal/1998/issue1/ jv2n1a1.html.

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Syria’s motives Lebanon as the strategic horizon Syria’s attempt to establish a Pax Syriana since 1976 in Lebanon has different political and security motives. First, Lebanon has always been considered by the Syrian leadership as an entity that previously belonged to Greater Syria.164 Based on historical considerations, the Syrian quest to establish ‘special relations’ with Lebanon has thus been interpreted as a justifiable move. Yet, Syria’s insistent determination to have a preponderant political role on the Lebanese scene has only come into view once Lebanon turned into a battleground for the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1967. Its keenness on establishing a Syrian-brokered peace in Lebanon has to be thereby closely analyzed in relation to its political fears and uncertainties in the Middle East peace process. Its decision to play a prominent political and military role in Lebanon is first shaped by the fear that “its enemies could use Lebanon as a base to undermine the Syrian regime” or “weaken its negotiation position vis-à-vis Israel.”165 Its military presence in Lebanon up to 2005 has had a double-faced objective. Though Syria officially declared that the troops came upon the government’s invitation in 1976 and that its military presence was intended to help the Lebanese state extend its authority, it was certain that Syria wanted foremost to safeguard its interests, and conceal the vulnerable breaches that Israel could have possibly exploited. In addition to the fact that Syrian leadership feared a direct Israeli attack from the Beqa’a valley, it also apprehended the loss of the Lebanese card as a potential blackmailing asset in the peace process negotiations. In Syria’s perspective, Lebanon is the “the strategic depth” that substitutes for the Golan Heights’ loss,166 and a playground through which it can orchestrate, mitigate or escalate its confrontations with Israel. By using the party of Hezbollah167 as a bargaining tool in the regional game, it exerts pressure on 164

165 166

167

See Raymond Hinnebusch, “Pax-Syriana? The Origins, Causes and Consequences of Syria’s role in Lebanon,” Mediterranean Politics 3 (1998): 137-160. Moubarak, The Position of a Weak State, 11, 21 Eric Santoni, “Un environnement régional turbulent,” Les Cahiers de l’Orient, (Summer-Fall 2001): 89-106. Hezbollah has served as the official Lebanese resistance force against Israeli occupation throughout the 1990s. Despite Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in 2000, the Lebanese state endorsed by the Syrian government has refused to disarm Hezbollah, and to deploy its army along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Claiming that Israel did not totally withdraw from Lebanon, the Lebanese Resistance continued to launch sporadic attacks against Israel. Hezbollah’s strategy and the Lebanese government’s fear to pressure the militarized party have to be analyzed in a larger regional perspective. Speculation is rife that Lebanon’s border with Israel will always remain restless unless Syria regains the Golan Heights. Hence, despite Syria’s withdrawal from

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Israel to give back the Golan Heights, and attempts to steer – through its surrogate – the ship of the Syrian-Israeli conflict. In the wake of the rash Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and Syrian President Hafez Al Assad’s death in 2000, many hoped that Syria’s grip was about to loosen. Yet, new political realities altered the rules of the game. The Syrian and Lebanese governments unanimously proclaimed that the Israeli withdrawal was incomplete since it did not include the Shebaa farms.168 By making the conflict in South Lebanon inseparable from the regional conflict, Syria has thus succeeded in keeping Lebanon as “a buffer, ally, and proxy combatant” to further its interests.169 The uncertainty that Syria has been facing – especially after the shattered peace process following the Madrid conference, and the mounting tensions on the Syrian internal scene – convinced the new Syrian President Bashar el Assad and his followers that a closer eye needed to be kept on Lebanese politics. Eager to consolidate his father’s legacy and Syria’s regional role, Bashar was more than determined to keep the Lebanese card as leverage. What primarily gave more impetus to this decision was Syria’s conviction that its regional power was intricately linked to its capacity to maintain its dominion in Lebanon.170 Lebanon as a an outlet for domestic and economic problems Syria’s hold on Lebanon made up for several setbacks that threatened the Syrian authoritarian regime on the domestic level. For instance, as turmoil in Syria was on the rise, Lebanon was used by Syrian authorities as a corner of freedom in which Syrian civil society including intellectuals vented out their resentment and complaints.171 Patronage and clientelistic networks in Lebanon also served as avenues to reward Syrian officials who were loyal to the Baathist regime.

168

169

170 171

Lebanon, the Lebanese and Syrian fates remain intertwined in the Middle East peace process. In 1997, former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to apply the plan of “Lebanon first.” This attempt was turned down by the late Syrian president Hafiz el Assad who affirmed that Lebanon and Syria shared a united pathway. The territory of the Shebaa farms is a small farm land situated Southwest of the Lebanese village Shebaa. Doubt hovers as to whether this strip of land belongs to the occupied Golan Heights or to Lebanon. Many analysts argue that this strip of land is used as a leverage by Hezbollah and Syria. See for example Asher Kaufman, “Who Owns the Shebaa Farms? Chronicle of a Territorial Dispute,” The Middle East Journal 56 (2002): 576-595. See Martha Neff Kessler, George Emile Irani, Peter Gubser, and Augustus Richard Norton, “Lebanon and Syria: Internal and Regional Dimensions,” Middle East Policy 8 (2001):1-22. See Kassir, “A Polity in an Uncertain Regional Environment,“ in Lebanon in Limbo, 87-106. Caroline Donati, “Relations syro-libanaises: quel avenir ?” Les Cahiers de L’Orient (Summer-

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To these strategic and political interests, it is noteworthy mentioning economic motives that led to deepening Syria’s grip. There is reason to believe that Syrian officials used Lebanon as a hinterland for Syria’s surplus labor, need for water, and for other illegal border activities. They also relied on Lebanon’s free banking system and liberalized economy to compensate for stalled economic measures of liberalization in Syria.172 Studies revealed that Syria pumped annually enormous benefits from the Lebanese economy amounting to 2 billion dollars. According to these reports, an estimated sum of 750 million dollars went directly to Syrian officials’ pockets to nurture patrimonial and patronage webs. 173 Since 1992, it is reported that Lebanon has lost to the Syrians approximately 20 billion dollars.174 These gains were the result of piracy in the domains of telephone, electricity, and other sources. In sum, Syria’s interests have been thus protected at best when the Lebanese regime enjoyed a certain degree of stability under Syrian tutelage.175 This is why relinquishing the Lebanese card has been perceived by Syria throughout all these years as a threat to the Syrian regime itself which was succumbing to the burdens of transition, to calls for reform, and to the Damoclean sword of international pressure since 2001. The Lebanese card has mainly helped the Syrian regime find some pathways of inner stability, some outlets for its unaccomplished economic and political reforms, and a golden opportunity to monitor simultaneously from afar and from within the peace process. After the forced withdrawal of Syrian military and intelligence forces, the Baathist regime probably would have to invent new astute avenues in order to win the regime dissenters’ acquiescence in Syria.

172 173

174 175

Fall 2001): 113-124. See Hinnebusch, “Pax-Syriana? ” See Henri Mamarbachi, “How much is Syrian hold over Lebanon?” The Middle East Online, March 21, 2005, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=13039=13039&fprmat=0. In this article, he alludes to the studies done by the Agence France-Presse and to economist Joe Faddoul, head of a consultant think tank called ‘Istisharat’ as well as to a study conducted by the Lebanese publishing house Dar-An-Nahar which concluded that Lebanon had lost in the last 12 years 20 billion dollars to Syria. See also “Piratage téléphonique, Casino du Liban, pillage de l’Electricité du Liban: comment la nomenklatura syrienne vole le Liban,” Proche Orient Info, March 21, 2005, available from http://www.proche-orient.info; “Que veut la Syrie du Liban? L’inimitié fraternelle,” L’Hebdo Magazine, August 5, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex= 0& Hid=&HIssueNum=2491&Category=1&DescId=4995&DescFlag=1. Idem. See Eyal Zisser, Assad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition (London: Hurst, 2001).

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Syrian triumph: The reasons behind it Legitimization and infiltration Syria ensured the triumph of its Pax Syriana in Lebanon first through legitimate means. In other words, it succeeded in building a dimension of “international legitimacy” to its hegemony. This legitimacy dates back to 1976 and to Syria’s operation under the umbrella of the Arab Deterrent force.176 Subsequent Lebanese-Syrian treaties signed in the wake of the war served principally to anchor this legitimacy, and institutionalize the presence of Syrian forces. Nonetheless, the legitimization was only part of a whole process of infiltration which did not only revolve around written documents, but which corresponded to a matrix of factors dating back to 1976: “Syrian takeover has been legalized by long years of war. Within 30 years of assiduous intervention, Syria has gradually infiltrated the core of the Lebanese state. This long-term meddling has slowly corroded the Lebanese immunity and will of resistance through cycles of coercion and corruption.”177 During the Lebanese war, Syria marginalized all influential external actors that could have hindered its hegemony. It played astutely the role of a mediator among different warring camps, shifted alliances to manipulate the cards, and managed to tilt the balance in its favor whenever an external actor entered the scene.178 It succeeded in downplaying the role of the PLO and Israel, and made sure that no Lebanese faction would strike any agreement with its enemy. It also did not hesitate to use force when necessary to tame dissenters in the Lebanese community.179 After its successful attempt to curb the PLO on the Lebanese scene in 1976, Syria was keen on establishing a new power equation favorable to its interests in Lebanon. However, its two major attempts to broker an agreement revolving around the reform of the political system and the establishment of special Lebanese-Syrian relations did not bear fruit until regional and international conditions had become propitious.

176

177 178 179

Eric Thompson, “Will Syria have to Withdraw from Lebanon?” Middle East Journal 56 (2002):72-93, 72. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 13, 2004 For more details, see El Khazen, “Ending Conflict.” Speculation is rife that Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt was killed by the Syrian regime in 1977.

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First, in 1976, the Constitutional Document negotiated with President Franjieh was rejected by the Lebanese Leftist opposition. A new hope seemed to materialize as the May 17 Agreement in 1983, supposed to negotiate the demarcation of secure Lebanese-Israeli frontiers after the Israeli invasion in 1982, was abrogated. American forces dispatched in Lebanon to help restore order withdrew in 1984 after they had succumbed to heavy attacks. In sum, the order that Israel was striving to establish in Lebanon failed as the last Israeli troops withdrew at the end of 1985, leaving a security zone in South Lebanon. Syria remained hence as “the major winner in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion,”180 and was eager to use this opportunity to legitimize its presence as a power broker. A second trial, the 1985 Tripartite Agreement, in coordination with Lebanese militia leaders, was also doomed to failure. This agreement encountered bitter opposition from Lebanese political actors and failed to see the light.181 Once turmoil had subsided and the international order had become more favorable to a Syrian-brokered peace in 1989, Syria’s endeavour yielded finally profit. The Ta’if agreement and the ensuing 1991 written treaties facilitated the new role that Syria had been striving to achieve during the 1980s. Ta’if specifically made the issue of Syrian withdrawal incommensurable, and dependent on an eventual joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee.182 The 1991 treaties afterwards reiterated the right of Syrian military presence pending an unclear settlement. Furthermore, the provisions of these treaties made sure that Lebanon would not constitute any threat to Syrian strategic interests, and would not impede Syria’s role and maneuvers in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At first, the stationing of Syrian troops for a two-year period in Beirut and other Lebanese areas up to 1992, was justified as an assistance to establish a new Lebanese new order. However, Syria was able to trespass easily the two-year deadline. First, it managed for 13 years after this date to postpone its troops’ redeployment and withdrawal without any reference to the limitations of their stay, size or spread. Second, it managed to convince the international community for more than a 180 181

182

El Khazen, “Ending Conflict,” 69. Sponsored by Syria, the Tripartite Agreement, which tackled political reforms, special ties with Syria, and aimed at ending the Lebanese conflict, was approved by Elie Hubeyka, the late leader of the Lebanese Forces, Nabih Berri, leader of the Shiite Amal Party, and Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party. However, this agreement, which did not win other parties’ consent, was later nullified as a result of power struggles within the Christian camp. Backed by former president Amine Gemayel and other Christian leaders, Samir Geagea, who was then the LF intelligence chief, ousted Elie Hubeyka. See the part on Syrian military presence in the “The Ta’if Accord,” Al Bab, http://www.albab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm.

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decade of the advantages of its presence in Lebanon. How did Syria manage to sustain its supremacy in Lebanon beyond issues of legitimacy? The alibi of the Middle Eastern peace process After the end of the war, Syria managed to convince the Arab and international community that its presence in Lebanon was indispensable first to a settlement of the Middle Eastern process and to the stability of Lebanon itself. Faithful to its image as the leader of the Arab Nation and keen on preserving its key role in the Arab-Israeli negotiations, Syria acquired the prerogative of manipulating Lebanese politics under the pretext that this interference serves the ‘final Arab cause’ and the Arab strife against Israel, an undisputed claim which goes beyond issues of sovereignty or issues related to ‘the here and now.’ The control of the Lebanese scene became a pillar of President Hafez Al Assad’s political philosophy in the name of Pan-Arabism.183 By linking its presence to the settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis, Syria rendered its military and political presence not subject to a timetable or to changing circumstances but to the immutable principles of land for peace. This unity of Lebanese-Syrian destinies in the shadow of the Arab-Israeli process has gradually permitted the shifting of Lebanon’s foreign policy to Damascus. Furthermore, the Syrian leadership had on numerous occasions insisted that this presence derived its legitimacy from “indigenous Lebanese support,”184 and represented in no way a case of transgression. Syria also persuaded the international community of its role as a regional balancer that should gain more freedom in the Middle Eastern settlement in order to safeguard a certain regional equilibrium.185 This free hand first bestowed by the US administration after the Second Gulf war was in one way or another the first international pillar that legalized Syria’s intervention in Lebanese politics. Hence, during the 1990s, the United States and Europe had not exerted pressure upon Syria to re-deploy according to the Ta’if agreement, but gave indirect clues that they did not oppose this involvement as long as the peace process was on track.186 In 1994, for example, the US secretary of state, Warren Christopher, did not visit Lebanon during his diplomatic missions in the Middle East. Talks held with the late President Al Assad were considered to be applicable for Lebanon as well.187

183 184 185

186 187

See Santoni, “Un environnement régional.” Thompson, “Will Syria have to Withdraw,” 83 See Donati, “Relations syro-libanaises.” Of course this argument is valid until the turnabout of US Middle Eastern policy following the September 11attacks. See Zisser, Assad’s Legacy. William Harris, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East Contemporary Survey 1994, ed. Amy Ayalon

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In the name of the peace process, Lebanon had to redefine its regional role after 1990 and to trade the cessation of hostilities for a diminished sovereignty waiting for an eventual solution. The concept of a Lebanese nation, whose survival hinges upon its non-alignment, was overshadowed by the pragmatic politics dictated by Syria in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Lebanese entity was perceived as no end in itself but as a polity serving “a goal transcending both Syria and Lebanon.”188 Freezing Lebanon’s path – until a substantial progress on the Syrian-Israeli peace track would occur – has been criticized as an attempt to leave the Lebanese polity in a state of ‘satellization’ and chronic crisis. Many Lebanese opposition figures share the conviction that the party of Hezbollah is used by Syria as a regional weapon to weaken Israel’s position 189 and make sure that Lebanon would not sign any peace treaty on its own.190 It is noteworthy that Damascus’ subjugation of Lebanon’s foreign policy was paradoxically an expression of Syria’s ambivalent stances in the Middle Eastern process and isolation on the Arab scene. In a self-contradictory manner, the Syrian regime, which has pledged to protect the last residues of the ‘Arab Nation,’ has not acted in unison with other Arab states. Choosing a singular trajectory in the peace process, Damascus shied away from direct confrontation with Israel, and preferred to use trump cards and proxies to pursue its battle in the Golan Heights. Its strategy of dominion in Lebanon should thus be analysed in relation to its political insecureness as well as its incertitude. Subtle ways of control Before the mounting of international pressure at the end of 2004, Syria used various astute ways of infiltration in the Lebanese polity in order to escape being taxed as an ‘occupier’ in the classical sense. Every time its military presence was contested, it created new pretexts to justify the necessity of the Syrian troops’ stay. One early pretext was the assertion that the two-year period of redeployment would begin once all political reforms namely abolition of confessionalism would be implemented.191 After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Syria had on many instances conveyed the message that its withdrawal would be

188 189 190

191

and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 1996), 467-494, 488. See Atallah Bou Malhab, “Le traité libano-syrien.” Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 25, 2004. Syria made sure that late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s attempt to strike a peace deal with Israel in 1993 went down the drain. See former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam’s statement in 1992 in Dagher, Bring down the Walls, 181.

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linked to an eventual regional settlement. With the adoption of the UN Resolution 1559 in 2004 calling upon Syrian forces to withdraw and Hezbollah to demilitarize, Syria connected first the issue of its military pullout to the necessary implementation of other forgotten UN resolutions requesting Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories. Other astute methods of control were used in times of pressure to delude public opinion. Whenever internal tensions in the Lebanese arena arose, the Syrian regime sent ambiguous signals of openness which created the illusion that Syria was about to loosen its grip. Conscious of the growing dissent over the Syrian role in Lebanon, especially after the Israeli withdrawal, Damascus shifted gear in 2000, and tried to initiate dialogue with Lebanese actors.192 President Bashar described, for instance, the Lebanese-Syrian relationship as “a model” in need of “completion,”193 and announced that year the release of Lebanese political prisoners. Syria’s spaced redeployments in 2001, 2002, and 2003 gave the illusion that a settlement was on the way, and helped convey the impression that Syria was prepared for further conciliatory measures. Syrian redeployment in April 2002 stressed particularly the necessity of implementing Ta’if clauses. After the adoption of Resolution 1559, the redeployment of 3000 Syrian soldiers on September 20, 2004, and the subsequent shut down of Syrian intelligence offices in Beirut and Batroun in December were also perceived as time buying strategies that helped Damascus pursue its tactic. Threatened of isolation by the international community after the extension of Lahoud’s mandate, the Syrian government started sending direct cooperative signals to the Lebanese opposition. First, it imparted its readiness to rectify asymmetric relations with its neigbour. The issue of reactivating the LebaneseSyrian Superior Council after its paralysis since 2002 was brought to the table. Beginning 2005, Syrian deputy foreign minister Walid al-Moallem’s diplomatic visits to numerous political representatives including members of the opposition aimed at conferring to the Lebanese-Syrian relations a new dimension. Yet, Moallem’s visits to Lebanon could not reap any positive result as opposing factions declared overtly that they no longer trusted Syria’s friendly moves perceived as mere maneuvers.194 192

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In 2001, Syria tried through the mediation of Lebanese former foreign minister Fouad Boutros to launch a dialogue with the Christian opposition and to co-opt some dissident actors. Harris, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East Contemporary Survey 2000, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 2002), 365-393, 383. On February 2, 2005 the Lebanese opposition issued a statement expressing its doubts regarding Moallem’s visit to Lebanon and its impact on a Lebanese-Syrian rapprochement.

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Aware that the rules in the South of Lebanon after Israeli withdrawal had been altered, the Syrian regime exercised more restraint on Hezbollah whose attacks had become – at least up to the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 – more intermittent, and limited to the Shebaa farms. This tactic of containment was destined at re-assuring the international community. At the same time, it helped Syria continue pulling the strings of the Lebanese regime. In addition, it conveyed to the US and to Israel the message that since Hezbollah’s fate is in its hands, the necessity to deal with Syria as a regional power remained unavoidable.195 Another astute method of control that Syria used was to soften its grip at intervals only to pave the way for a fiercer meddling in Lebanese politics. Shortly before the appointment of President Lahoud known for his pro-Syrian loyalties in 1998, Syria started establishing links with the Christian opposition.196 It also began praising the stability of the Lebanese regime, and insisted as well on the necessity of holding municipal elections as an avenue of reform.197 In 2004, Syria carried out a last-minute intervention in which it secured the extension of Lahoud’s mandate after it had continuously assured that the matter was purely Lebanese. Indeed, President Bashar declared on June 6, 2004 that Syria would support any Lebanese President without direct intervention.198 This double-edged tactic primarily served to mislead international and internal attitudes. An additional strategy consisted in relinquishing direct intervention in favor of a quieter and stealthier meddling. By endorsing the appointment of trustworthy pro-Syrian incumbents in Lebanon, the Syrian regime gave the impression that its interferences in Lebanese affairs had become spaced out. President Lahoud’s accession to power and the appointment of security chiefs loyal to Syrian interests helped Damascus build particularly an invisible system of trust. The Lebanese institutions became increasingly controlled by Lebanese 195

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See Hilal Khashan and Simon Haddad, “Lebanon’s Dramatic 2000 Parliamentary Elections: The Swooping Return of Rafik Hariri,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 26 (2003): 1-22. Syria tried to establish dialogue with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir in 1997, but failed. In an effort to establish links with the Christian opposition in exile, it persuaded late premier Hariri to drop its ban on General Aoun’s interview. In March 1998, it reduced its presence in Christian regions. That month, it also established links with members of the Maronite league, a pressure group whose aim is to promote the Maronites’ role and interests in Lebanon. For more details on Syrian efforts of rapprochement and co-optation, see Harris, “Lebanon,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey 1998, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 2000), 407-434, 409-411. Ibid. See “Retro Liban,” L’Hebdo Magazine 2460, December 31, 2004, 25.

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security chiefs and military officers working closely with Syrian intelligence services. The Lebanese security branch acted thereby as a monitoring police or a tool of self-censorship, making sure that Syrian hegemony permeated Lebanese politics in the right doses. The somehow hidden presence of the Syrian intelligence branch, especially after 1998, helps explain the depth of Syrian infiltration and its far-reaching effects.199 Relying on those anchored apparatuses of control, Syria could thus afford in times of turmoil, especially after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, to send false signals of a delusive ‘political relaxation’. The real objectives behind these ‘relief of pressure’ strategies were to create confusion as to Syria’s real intentions, appease ascending discontent as well as defer as long as possible the controversial issue of military withdrawal. Indeed, what seemed a hasty withdrawal in April 2005 was in fact the result of a long and hesitant process. Although the pullout of Syrian troops had become a peremptory matter, the Syrian establishment hoped to defer the matter as soon as possible. First, President Bashar anticipated in 2004 that by cooperating with the US on the Iraqi-Syrian border and dealing with issues concerning Iraqi insurgency, he would be granted more time to ponder his withdrawal from Lebanon. By relying on loyal Lebanese actors who underlined that Syria’s presence was still necessary,200 the Syrian establishment also hoped to bestow on its presence a legitimate veneer. Until mid-March 2005, it was still not clear whether Syria had opted for a full withdrawal or fore a mere redeployment of its troops to the Eastern borders. Wary that “Lebanon’s liberation may take years,”201 the Lebanese opposition deplored Syrian authorities’ lack of transparency regarding the troops’ pullout. Indeed, President Bashar’s announcement on March 5 of a last sixth redeployment of the remaining 14.000 soldiers to the Beqa’a left the anti-Syrian coalition in a state of dismay. Until the last minute, unable to accept that the autocratic dream in Lebanon was no longer possible, the Syrian establishment tried to obtain concessions on a regional level in return for the withdrawal.202 199 200

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Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 13, 2004. On February 25, 2005, former premier Omar Karami announced that if Syria withdrew its troops, Lebanon would be again divided along confessional lines as it was in the civil war. See Majdoline Hatoum, “Jumblatt Slams Karami over Syria Remarks,” The Daily Star, February 26, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=12999&categ_id=2. See “L’opposition marque des points au Liban contre le pouvoir pro-syrien,” L’Express, February 22, 2005, http://www.lexpress.fr/infojour/infos.asp?id=1530&1606. In March 2005, it was reported that the Syrian establishment declared that it would only

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Manipulating power-sharing and creating patronage networks Syria was able to make believe that Lebanon’s post-war equilibrium hinged to a great extent on its presence. For this purpose, it used the Lebanese consociational model to broaden as well as justify its interferences, and succeeded through its politics of ‘sticks and carrots’ in manipulating the power-sharing components of the system and communal discourses. To achieve this aim, Syria acted mainly as a crisis manager that dampened inter-communal hostilities and solved inter-elite quid pro quos. The Ta’if amendments that led to the diminution of presidential prerogatives pre-necessitated a coalition cabinet, and a three-headed Republic whose leaders should theoretically act in coalescence. Still, erratic elite practices and asymmetric divisions of power in the Second Republic required Syrian centralism. On the one hand, Syria took advantage of the indecisions and deadlocks caused by the dispersal of power among three poles to appear as the mediator that prevented the system from political paralysis.203 On the other hand, it profited from inter- and intra-communal rifts to make believe that it was helping mend segmental fractures. The Syrian establishment managed to play with the Lebanese communities’ loyalties, and redefine their post-war role in relation to Syria’s own regional and domestic interests. For instance, Syria was able to co-opt part of the Maronite community, and to marginalize other opposing hardliners by curtailing their political participation. Moreover, it backed the Shiite community, and empowered its communal representatives who became major pro-Syrian players in the post-Ta’if order. In other words, it mastered the Lebanese communal board game, by maintaining a perpetual state of inter-communal and intracommunal tensions in Lebanon to sustain its presence. In addition, Syria managed to convince the international community, especially in the 1990s, that its presence embodied a ‘dove’ that helped with a magic wand stabilize the Lebanese fragmented society. Syrian interference, first accompanied by American blessing, had then been equated to a peacekeeping mission, and perceived as a pacifying alternative to the Lebanese inter-

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withdraw its troops from Lebanon in exchange for the resumption of peace negotiations with Israel and the return of the Golan Heights. Syria also hoped to maintain 3000 soldiers indefinitely in Eastern Lebanon. Yet the attempt to strike a broad political arrangement at this stage was deemed unfeasible by the Arab League. See, “Syrer bleiben noch im Libanon,” Hamburger Abendblatt, March 4, 2005, http://www.abendblatt.de/daten/ 2005/03/04 /406192.html?prx=1. For more details, see Hinnebusch, “Pax-Syriana?”

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communal chaos. Even after the hesitant redeployment of military troops in preparation for a complete Syrian withdrawal in March 2005, Syrian newspapers still defended the claim that “Syria did not enter Lebanon as an occupation force, or as a supporter of a Lebanese faction or party against others. Syrian soldiers entered to help stop a bloody civil war between Lebanese ...”204 Syrian hegemony and ability to penetrate the Lebanese state was also facilitated by its creation of deeply ingrained patronage networks that permeate communities. These networks based on clientelist profits made sure that proSyrian loyalties extended to the grassroots. The result was the genesis of a dependent consociational system born to the benefit of an external power that could exploit the imbalances of the Lebanese system or praise its stability when it deemed necessary. These manipulations made power-sharing games equivalent to sharing, distributing, and provoking divisions. In the final analysis, Syria succeeded in impairing the variable of elite coalescence in the Lebanese consociational model by becoming “the center of power and decision-making,”205 and was capable of creating a state of artificial stability in the Lebanese post-war polity. Cultivating the culture of sacrifice and of fear The Syrian regime used additionally the rhetoric of sacrifice and fear to implant its hegemony at the heart of Lebanese communities, and convince the latter that it was indeed an agent of stability.206 In October 2004, President Bashar’s speech at the Congress of Emigrants, for example, raised the specter of civil war, and emphasized the sacrifices that Syria had to undergo for Lebanon’s sake especially during the Israeli 1982 invasion. He also resuscitated the haunting memory of inter-communal Lebanese conflicts, and emphasized that if Syria withdrew its troops, Lebanon would fall prey to anarchy and internal struggles once again.207 These negative allusions to the past were interpreted by diverse Lebanese politicians as an attempt to weaken Lebanon’s endeavors towards reconciliation.208 The same rhetoric was also used by Lebanese officials who 204 205 206 207

208

See “Editorial,” Tischrin, March 14, 2005. Kassir, “A Polity in an Uncertain Regional Environment,” 87. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Kfar Hazir, November 14, 2004. President Bashar argued that it was thanks to Syria that not all Christians were massacred during the Mountain battle with the Druze. This comment was interpreted as an attempt to prevent the Christians’ rapprochement with the Druze community after the extension of president Lahoud’s mandate. See Nayla Assaf, “Syria’s Mention of Lebanese Civil War Draws Criticism,” The Daily Star,

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alluded to the phantom of civil war every time the opposition called for Syrian withdrawal.209 Even though no conclusive evidence is available, Syria is linked to the numerous political assassinations that had rocked Lebanon since 1976.210 Since Premier Hariri’s slaying, Lebanese opposition figures have assertively argued that Syria has interest in destabilizing Lebanon, and intimidating regime dissenters. Whether these statements are justified or not and whether the Syrian regime is really behind these assassinations has not been confirmed from a legal point of view.211 The dynamics of Syrian hegemony or the Lebanese-Syrian game: Why was Syria indispensable to Lebanon according to the Lebanese elites? It is naive to assert that Syria had the absolute power to influence the Lebanese decision-making process, and that the Lebanese elites were unable to raise a finger to stop these infringements: “Various Lebanese players act like partners to the Syrian regime, and support this external interference.”212 Indeed, Syrian predominance was not only the result of a Syrian initiative but was also sustained by the Lebanese elites themselves who have concluded a ‘clientelist pact’ with Damascus: “Politicians in Lebanon and Syria are mutually benefiting from each other. Many divulged scandals such as the cellular affair and diverse organized Lebanese-Syrian networks prove that.”213 To grasp fully this complex Lebanese-Syrian game and its interplays, one should take into consideration two important variables: the Lebanese incumbents’ motives, and how they indirectly facilitated this hegemony.

209

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October 11, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ ID=9152&categ_id=2. In his public comments and speeches, former premier Karami has at many instances invoked the spectre of civil war since November 2004 whenever he discussed Syrian withdrawal. Syria has been connected to various political killings, more particularly to the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt’s and President Rene Muawad’s assassinations as well as to the political murders that rocked the country in 2005 and 2006. Premier Hariri’s slaying, its repercussions, and the results of the international investigation committee will be analyzed in detail in chapter 4. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, December 12, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 8, 2004.

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Shared networks of clientelism Not only was the Syrian regime encouraging the building of patronage networks in Lebanon, but Lebanese politicians were also profiting from these new forms of clientelism in order to guarantee primarily their perpetuity. The post-Ta’if Syrian order had thus been perceived by some Lebanese politicians as a powerful axis around which political life could be re-organized,214 and around which obedience to a higher patron would be the reward for perpetual offices or for bigger shares in the pie. During the Second Republic, the pre-war pattern of Lebanese client-Lebanese patron network has evolved into an aggrandized complex model of Lebanese client-Syrian patron, whereby many Lebanese politicians owed to some extent their office to Syrian benediction. Lack of elite cohesiveness In addition to the motive of shared clientelism and desire of perpetuating power, the lack of elite solidarity in Lebanon facilitated to a great extent Syrian meddling and made it look, at times, as a tool of propitious relief in times of deadlock. For instance, under President Elias Hrawi’s mandate (1990-1998), the Troika discourses fell often prey to stalemate. The remaining solution was taking the road to Damascus to seek a way out. On top of that, Syrian hegemony was facilitated by the inability of Lebanese communities to have a harmonious agenda in the post-Ta’if order. Whereas the Christian communities, for instance, stayed torn between pro- and anti-Syrian allegiances, 215 Muslim communities, mainly the Sunni and the Shiite segments, were competing for political power. Up to 2005, Lebanon remained a peculiar instance of a “protectorate” ruled by government officials who were happily ruled, and who did not seek decisional autonomy unless this served political bickering.216 Indeed, government officials were aware that Lebanese-Syrian relations had been distorted and twisted since the end of the war.217 They also acknowledge that Lebanese politicians have used 214 215

216 217

See Donati, “Relations syro-libanaises.” A striking example was the temporary split in the Kata’ib Party in 2002 between a pro-Syrian branch headed by Karim Pakradouni, a former Armenian leading actor in the Lebanese Forces, and an anti-Syrian reformist branch headed by former president Amin Gemayel. Kassir, “A Polity in an Uncertain Regional Environment,” 102. Shortly before Premier Hariri’s slaying, I interviewed political actors who did not belong to the anti-Syrian opposition, but who still maintained that reshaping the Lebanese-Syrian relationship and implementing Ta’if at this stage had become important. Interviews with three Lebanese politicians in Beirut on the following dates: November 8, 2004; November 10, 2004; November

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Syrian power to further their interests.218 Yet no serious attempts to rectify malfunctions in the relationship had been initiated during the Second Republic. An insecure state in an unfriendly environment Another factor that contributed to deepening Syrian hegemony in the post-war period was the weakness of the Lebanese state itself which was enfeebled by years of war. Government officials encouraged Syrian involvement by claiming that they are Kassirin or still unpracticed,219 and by consciously and voluntarily relinquishing decision-making to Syria perceived as the main Marja’iyya or reference.220 One must not overlook the fact that Lebanon’s gradual political breakdown after the Six-Day War in 1967 made it incapable of determining its own independent policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict.221 Its alliance with Syria in the Middle Eastern settlement was thus partly a conscious choice of the weakened Lebanese political groups, and a preventive measure against a potential rekindling of the conflict. In other words, as the combatant Lebanese factions emerged exhausted after the war, a strategic alignment with Syria seemed an inescapable reality for some, and a golden opportunity for others. Even after the mounting of internal and international pressure following the extension of President Lahoud’s mandate, the greatest defender of Syria’s role in Lebanon was the Lebanese incumbent government itself, at least until the appointment of the first somehow independent Lebanese cabinet in July 2005. Pro-Syrian loyalists vehemently continued to defend the presence of Syria in Lebanon and the necessity of Lebanon’s privileged relations with Syria.222 The most common pretexts used by Lebanese incumbents to justify their reliance on Syria were the fear that if Syria left and loosened its grip, the Palestinians’

218 219

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24, 2004. Defending Lebanon’s special ties with Syria, another pro-Syrian Lebanese politician argued though that Syrian troops should have redeployed to the Beqa’a area in 1992. Interview with the author, Beirut, December 16, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 12, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese journalist, Hazmieh, April 23, 2004. To prove his point, the journalist alluded to former President Elias Hrawi’s statement in which he publicly declared that the Lebanese were still unable to run their own affairs. Kassir, “Dix ans après, comment ne pas réconcilier une société divisée?” Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek 169 (2000): 6-22, 8. See Moubarak, The Position of a Weak State. See, for example, Nayla Assaf, “Loyalists Defend Lebanon’s Relations with Syria,” The Daily Star, February 8, 2005. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ ID=12481&categ_id=2.

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implantation might be imposed upon the Lebanese government,223 confessional chaos and civil war might resurge,224 and the feeble Lebanese entity would be left alone to confront Israel. Lebanese incumbents have also spread out the conviction that Syria had helped maintain stability in Lebanon, and that the two countries’ pathways should remain uniform pending a settlement. Shortly before the Syrian pullout in April 2005, partly brought about by international pressure, many Lebanese politicians were still convinced that “a forced Syrian withdrawal without general consensus on the matter would backfire on the internal stability of the country.”225 Despite ascending pressure at the time, some politicians still perceived Syrian presence and preponderance as a ‘guarantor’ of internal and regional stability: “Because of various unsettled problems in post-war Lebanon – mainly the troubled South which requires Hezbollah’s military presence, the contentious issue of armed Palestinian groups, the dissolution of Christian militias after the war and the security vacuum that has ensued – certain political, military, and security imbalances have become striking. When the ‘Syrian umbrella’ is no longer there, this disequilibrium will become even more protruding. Internal confrontations might also arise. Hence, pending a global Middle Eastern settlement, we prefer to hide out instead of waiting in ‘the cemetery or in a bomb shelter’ if a settlement does not happen [...] Of course, we could have isolated Lebanon from the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967. Had the 1969 Cairo agreement not been concluded and had the elites at the time adopted a more careful political course, Lebanon could have maybe evaded these strong disturbances. But now that we are part of the dilemma and that the region is in flame […] it is safer to seek a hideout under Syrian guardianship […] Lebanon should no longer be in the laboratory of experiments.”226 Such a statement suffices to reveal that Syria’s preponderant role during the Second Republic as well as the exportation of Lebanon’s foreign policy to Damascus were not only dictated by Syria but were also perceived by the Lebanese elites as a prudent and reasonable decision. 223 224

225 226

See Kassir, “A Polity in an Uncertain Regional Environment.” For more information, see Rola el Husseini, “Geschlossene Gesellschaft: Libanons Nachkriegselite,” in Elitenwandel in der arabischen Welt und Iran, ed. Volker Perthes (Berlin: SWP Studie, 2002), 138-155. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 16, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 12, 2004.

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A quick glimpse at pre-war history in Lebanon reveals telling episodes227 during which communities sought external help to consolidate their internal position instead of promoting communal and elite solidarity. By asking for Syria’s, Israel’s, or the Western community’s assistance, Lebanese factions failed to develop political autarchy. It is not surprising that Syria profited from this Achilles’ heel to advance its interests. The reverberations of Syrian guardianship: a synthesis In sum, Syrian hegemony has had a two-fold consequence on the Lebanese political system since 1990. On the one hand, the preponderant Syrian influence infected the democratic components of the system, and distorted the powersharing model. Syria contributed to the diffusion of authoritarian tendencies that became so internalized in the inner layers of the regime that it was no longer clear, to an onlooker, whether the process of derailing democracy should be solely imputed to Syrian meddling into Lebanese affairs or whether it was the consequence of a shared Lebanese-Syrian responsibility. The institutionalization of Syrian authoritarianism in Lebanon has first operated through legal avenues that placed the element of supranationality above Lebanese sovereignty. Second, Syrian authoritarianism succeeded in gradually invading post-war institutions by contaminating the elites’ style of governance and political practices. The cabinet, the parliament, and the judiciary as well as labor unions and political parties have acted during the Second Republic as passageways for external authoritarian leakages. To facilitate this contamination, Syria did not hesitate to reward Lebanese government officials who espoused its policies.228 In time, the once threatening and bold Syrian military presence had become more discrete after redeployment. Direct control was replaced by delegating authority to invisible webs of Lebanese and Syrian intelligence officers acting behind the scene.229 Even after the withdrawal of Syrian troops, it is questionable whether these interiorized norms would vanish in the near future, for they have become a way of political life sustaining the survival of interests and clientelist ties.

227 228

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For instance, the 1958 crisis. Syria was behind the extension of presidents Elias Hrawi’s and Emile Lahoud’s mandates, two presidents who unconditionally endorsed the Syrian course of action in Lebanon. Lebanese military officials in charge of security and intelligence services such as former security services chiefs Ali Hajj and Jamil el Sayyed particularly reinforced their ties with the Syrian regime, and closely cooperated with the Syrian intelligence apparatus in Lebanon.

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Post-war elections: A tool of semi-authoritarianism The second indicator that helps explain the nature and trends of authoritarian pressures in the post-war regime is the electoral process.230 Post-war elections have been regularly held since 1992, and a certain competitive atmosphere has characterised the making of elections: major post-war political actors and factions participated in the polls; pro-government and opposition figures confronted each other. Despite these competitive signs, the electoral arena has contributed to consolidating Lebanon’s semi-authoritarian legacy during the Second Republic. For elections to be termed as free and fair, there must be no coercive use of power. Electoral outcomes must remain uncertain, and elections should allow alternation of power. It should be taken for granted that fair and inclusive elections take place and that elected officials will not have their mandates interrupted. Moreover, the authority supervising the elections should remain neutral; military and judicial institutions should not discriminate among participants. Electoral districts should not disfavor opposition parties.231 In a semi-authoritarian system, although elections are more than a masquerade, the electoral game involves a set of complicated and subtle maneuvers that incumbents develop to subvert existing democratic channels and undermine criteria for free and fair elections. It is noteworthy that these elections differ from those that take place in a full authoritarian state insofar as they are not mere farces, but are rather received as “arenas of contestation” through which the opposition attempts to undermine the government.232 These elections can be characterized by varying degrees of competitiveness and pluralism, and regime dissenters may win. In certain cases, crude attempts of repression, which do not go unnoticed by the opposition and the public, may be costly to governmental officials. Nonetheless, abuses and subtle tools of state manipulation do permeate the whole electoral process. Incumbents may resort to soft methods such as banning certain parties or devising legal instruments to ostracize the opposition. Voter rolls may be falsified; voting requirements and procedures may be tempered with. Some voters may also be hindered to access the polls. In addition, rulers use usually the state apparatus, and their easy media and public exposure to

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For more information on imperfections of the electoral process in Lebanon, see Scheffler “Religious Communalism.” See for example Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”; O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation.” Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 54.

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curtail opposition and influence public opinion. They may even harass and try to control media institutions to consolidate their position.233 The elections that took place throughout the Second Republic respond to this description inasmuch as they were not mere shams that legitimized the incumbents’ indefinite stay, but were used as legitimate channels by different opposition actors who attempted to seek power. The post-war Lebanese regime has in fact tolerated pluralism as well as various political actors’ participation; however, elections have involved so many irregularities and recurrent patterns of manipulation that it is impossible to label them as fair. They have been paradoxically a tool of freedom and a tool of repression, a tool for contestation and a tool for strengthening the new post-war order. It is noteworthy that “the electoral laws and procedures” have been repeatedly manipulated “apparently in order to serve the ruling elites’ preconceived preferences or policy options.”234 The two main overarching strategies which detracted from the fairness and transparency of these polls were: • Governmental tactics used to engineer the opposition’s defeat; • The omnipresent role that Syria played during the elections as a mediator striking alliances that guaranteed the perpetuity and continuity of the postwar regime. As these polls have not been seriously monitored,235 it is difficult to pinpoint the specific tools of vote fraud used during election day and claim to which extent fraud was used systematically. Nonetheless, diverse subtle techniques of manipulation and gerrymandering have been utilized to alter electoral outcomes and manipulate the elections’ course during the Second Republic:236 233 234 235

236

See Schedler, “Elections without Democracy.” Khashan, “Lebanon’s 1996 Controversial Parliamentary Elections,” 38. The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), a non-governmental organization established in 1996 by volunteers, proposed to monitor elections after this date. Still up to the year 2005, the electoral process has never been officially supervised either by international or local observers. Most of the reports on electoral fraud have been collected by civil society activists, reporters, journalists, and writers. In an interview with the author, on November 23, 2004 in Beirut, a Lebanese politician, remarks that “detecting electoral manipulation in Lebanon does not consist in monitoring election days.” In fact, “the period that precedes the polls is rather the most crucial phase” affecting the electoral course. The main method of electoral fraud in Lebanon, he remarks, centers around “the adoption of erroneous laws that are based on simple majority rules used in big constituencies” and “that are tailored to fit specific interests.” Other salient electoral flaws are the biased process of electoral campaigning where “channels become all politicized and do not give equal chances for candidates,” “the arbitrary money spending which gives advantages to wealthy candidates at the expense of others,” and “the bias against the participation of women, minorities and the youth.”

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Engineering an electoral law that favors governmental incumbents, weakens and fragments opposition figures. These electoral laws in conflict with constitutional provisions have in a way or another led to predetermined electoral outcomes; • Making the electoral law public a short time before the elections in order to disorganize the opposition; • Striking pre-arranged alliances that disregard communal representation and political affinities but safeguard existing order; • Using Syrian influence to influence electoral alliances and choices; • Undermining constitutionality to prevent rotation of power (e.g. prolonging presidential mandates); • Making pressure on constitutional and judicial organs to pass controversial electoral laws, or to prevent elected officers from taking office; • Restricting equal access to media coverage and hindering some opposition figures from conveying their electoral campaign in an efficient manner; • Using arbitrarily Article 68 of the media laws237 to discredit opposition participants and influence public opinion; • Not setting any financial limit to electoral campaigns. Political money becomes a criterion to buy voters’ allegiance; • Instances of vote buying and bribery; • Instances of vote intimidation whereby citizens were not totally free to express their electoral choices; • Instances of vote manipulation and fraudulent practices during Election Day. This semi-authoritarian electoral legacy did not become entrenched during the Election Day but was the result of previous preparations. Thus, the Lebanese list system leaves room for a sophisticated menu of manipulation which is not only “a matter of registering the dead to vote and other predictable techniques” but involves the “process of building electoral lists, a process that takes place out of view and before the actual balloting.”238 Instead of setting up a neutral organ that supervises the electoral process and guarantees its impartiality, the Lebanese incumbents themselves have monitored elections during the Second Republic, and have run as potential candidates using state resources as well as influencing the judiciary and parliamentary arenas to promote their own ends. 237

238

This article states that non-political media cannot promote electoral campaigns under penalty of suspension and closure. However, this article had been controversially invoked to shun opposition candidates. Violations of its content went unnoticed in other cases. Augustus Richard Norton and Julian Schwedler, “Swiss Soldiers, Ta’if Clocks and Early Elections: Toward a Happy Ending?” in Peace for Lebanon, 45-65, 53.

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The 1992 parliamentary elections: fabricating semi-authoritarianism The first parliamentary elections, which took place under great internal and Syrian pressure, were described as elections with “an imposed choice.”239 They revealed serious democratic deficits and established behavioral patterns upon which the incumbents aimed at consolidating their reign. During these polls, voter participation at 30 % was at its lowest ebb in Lebanese history since independence. Although elections at the time were deemed by opposition figures as ill-timed – especially that the Syrian forces had not yet re-deployed as stipulated by the Ta’if agreement – they still took place. The reason behind the determination of holding elections was Syria’s will “to buttress complete flexibility about the timing of the redeployment”240 and the Lebanese government’s determination to create an impression of relative normality. A short time before elections, the number of parliamentary seats was elevated from 108 to 128, a decision that was not even mentioned in the Ta’if agreement. The hastily elaborated electoral law underlined heavy communal inequities, and helped promote incumbents’ interests, and curb the opposition. This law adopted the Mohafaza or big constituency in the North, in the South,241 and in Beirut, and the Qada or small constituency in the Beqa’a region to serve pro-Syrian actors’ interests, and in Mount Lebanon to weaken Christian opposition. After heavy discussions targeting mainly the unsuitable political circumstances and electoral timing, the gravity of Christian grievances,242 and the nature of the electoral law, major Christian opposition figures243 decided not to participate making it easy for unpopular and weak incumbents to win. Other political parties such as Amal and Hezbollah, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party considered the elections as a gateway to the post-Ta’if order. To ensure the certainty of electoral outcomes and even hinder the defeat of one pro-government party in favor of the other, lists were pre-designed and 239

240

241 242

243

See El Khazen, Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election: An Imposed Choice (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1998). William Harris, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, ed. Ami Ayalon (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 1995), 587-624, 598. The Southern region and Nabatiyeh were joined in one single constituency Christian leaders targeted several critical issues: The clauses of the Ta’if agreement which debate Lebanese-Syrian relations, the return of the displaced, the selective process of disbanding militias… See El Khazen, Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Election. Maronite leaders, such as Aoun who called for boycotting the elections from Paris, the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, and parties such as the Kata’ib and the Lebanese Forces, opted for nonparticipation.

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careful alliances were forged, namely in the South between the party of Amal and Hezbollah under Syrian auspices, and in the North between Christian leader Suleiman Franjieh and Sunni leader Omar Karami, actors who under different circumstances would not necessarily form one unified electoral list. The architecture of pro-governmental coalitions and geographical gerrymandering engineered a patchwork that guaranteed pro-Syrian actors’ interests. During Election Day, tampering in different constituencies was also detected.244 For instance, in the Beqa’a and North areas, incidents such as stealing ballot boxes and falsifying voter registration lists were signalled.245 These polls introduced new controversial realities. On the one hand, observers perceived these elections as a disguised attempt to manufacture the militia leaders’ safe comeback,246 and pro-Syrian players’ easy triumph. Whereas Christian hardliners were marginalized, partly as a result of their own decision to boycott the elections, pro-Syrian Christian actors accessed the parliament. In the Metn area in Mount Lebanon, for example, the pro-Syrian list of former Interior Minister Michel el Murr was almost unchallenged. On the other hand, these elections signalled the traditional notables’ decline, and paved the way for the rise of new post-war players most of all the Islamic organizations. While Hezbollah obtained 13 seats, the Sunni organization Al Jama’a al Islamiyya managed to have 3 deputies in the new parliament. The number of elites belonging to the category of business elites, a category later personified by the ‘Hariri phenomenon,’247 was also on the rise. In sum, the 1992 first electoral battle could have acted as a real impetus for a sound democratic transition, but it only highlighted the imperfections of a fragile post-Ta’if order. Not only did a big gap separate tired and disengaged post-war generations from the regime, but also communities from each other. This communal estrangement was first embodied by the Christian segment’s feelings of marginalization. These polls were also premonitory of the problems that the post-war republic would suffer from: inability to manage domestic politics, multiplicity of political divides, almost irreconcilable national discourses ranging from total loyalty to the pro-Syrian order, pragmatism, to blunt opposition. They tolled furthermore the bells of declining Maronite hegemony, and revealed the first difficulties of a scattered opposition unable to turn the tide or mobilize the population.

244 245 246 247

See Norton and Schwedler, “Swiss Soldiers.” See El Khazen, Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election. Warlords such as Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt rejoined easily the post-war political process. The late entrepreneur and self-made billionnaire Rafik Hariri was appointed as prime minister after the 1992 elections.

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By boycotting the elections, the opposition248 wanted to highlight the illegitimacy of the elections, but facilitated indirectly the incumbents’ victory and revealed its own limitations and insecurity. It also saved the rising LebaneseSyrian regime from resorting to more radical methods of fraud and coercion.249 The 1996 parliamentary elections: pervasive authoritarian pressures Before the 1996 polls, a new hybrid electoral law that also highlighted communal and district inequities was adopted.250 Challenged by deputies in the parliament, it was sent to the constitutional council that judged the law to be unconstitutional. Yet, despite severe criticism,251 the law was later passed on the basis ‘for one time only’. The realization that the boycott did not really reap its intended fruits drove the opposition to participate in the elections. In spite of boycott appeals from Paris, Christian opposition players such as Albert Moukhaiber, Pierre Daccache, Nassib Lahoud, and Boutros Harb decided to join the process. Voter participation reached officially 44%. Electoral results were influenced to a great extent by the government and its Syrian ally.252 Electoral alliances in the Beqa’a, the South and the North were gracefully manufactured to facilitate the incumbents’ victory. Loyalist coalitions, which presented several oddities, and whose members would not display affinities at normal times, were made. In Mount Lebanon, the electoral law was made public three weeks before Election Day. This made it more difficult for citizens to seek out information on the candidates and electoral lists, and destabilized the candidates who were unable to form stable coalitions until the government announced the law related to the region.

248

249 250

251

252

The opposition in this context means the boycott pole. It goes without saying that other opposition actors such as former premier Salim el Huss joined the electoral battle. See Harris, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, 605. Elections were carried out at the level of the Mohafaza in the North, the Beqa’a and Beirut. The South district and the region of Nabatieh were united in one constituency, and Mount Lebanon was divided in six smaller districts. This division in Mount Lebanon aimed at ensuring once again Jumblatt’s victory, fragmenting the Christian opposition, and permitting the rise of proSyrian players. See Bernard Rougier, “Liban: les élections législatives de l’été 1996,” Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek 155 (1997): 119-130. Religious and political actors such as patriarch Sfeir and former premier el Huss declared that the electoral law violated the spirit of the Ta’if accord. In 1997, the Constitutional Council annulled four deputies’ mandate once fraudulent practices were confirmed. By-elections – after which all except one candidate recuperated their seats – took place later throughout the year.

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Instances of vote rigging and fraudulent practices such as creating voters’ identification papers for dead persons, were reported during election days. Low administrative and organizational efficiency or presumable vote fraud hindered citizens in a town in Beqa’a to vote because of errors in the registration lists.253 At the end of the day, in the Beqa’a district, within two hours, the boxes were stuffed with at least 60.000 voices after the government had announced the decision to close the ballot boxes at 7:00 P.M., two hours after the official closing time. Observers reported the circulation of frequent shuttles between Syria to the ballot boxes in Michel El Murr’s town in the Metn. In Beirut, voters found out at their arrival that others had voted for them.254 In addition to vote tampering, money, as a decisive criterion enhancing the candidates’ power and chances of success, played an important role in the 1996 elections.255 Furthermore, the government did not hesitate to use subtle or apparent coercive measures to pressure opposition candidates and influence electoral results.256 As a result, governmental impartiality and accountability were highly questioned. By banning demonstrations and restricting the freedom of the media before the polls, the government succeeded in curtailing the opposition.257 The citizen was also denied the right to seek for alternative sources of information independent from the governmentally controlled media channels. Pro-governmental lists were finally able to fill around 90 % of parliamentary seats. Although some oppositionists won,258 the opposition remained scattered and weak. In addition, these polls witnessed the curbing of Islamist actors such as Hezbollah and Al Jama’a al Islamiyya organization in parliamentary life. For instance, in spite of its refusal to coalesce with the Amal Party, Hezbollah was compelled at the last minute, under Syrian influence, to strike an alliance with Nabih Berri’s movement in the South. 253 254

255

256

257

258

See Khashan, “Lebanon’s 1996 Controversial Parliamentary Elections.” Examples of fraudulent practices are discussed in detail in Olaf Köndgen’s article, “Der Libanon zwischen syrischer Einflussnahme und Selbstbehauptung,” KAS Auslands-Informationen 1 (1997): 42-73. It was reported that former premier Hariri spent incredible sums to finance his campaign and buy votes. See Rougier, “Liban: Les élections législatives.” Several incidents of governmental coercion and intimidation were reported in several districts. In the Metn area, for instance, former minister el Murr did not hesitate to monopolize the state apparatus and use security forces to pressure his rivals, and intimate the voters. See Salem, “Skirting Democracy: Lebanon’s Parliamentary Elections of 1996 and Beyond,” Middle East Report 203 (1997): 26-29. Examples are the unexpected triumph of opposition actors such as Nassib Lahoud in the Metn area, Najah Wakim as well as Salim el Huss in Beirut, and Boutros Harb in the North. Thanks to his coalition with Hezbollah, Pierre Daccache was also able to get himself elected in the South. These victories signalled that elections were still an area of political contestation.

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It goes without saying that the Christian vote played an important role in downplaying the Islamists’ electoral score. Yet, a governmental will to secure the success of pro-establishment Amal movement in the South also had a hand in the process. Syria also disclosed its ability to check Hezbollah’s power when it deems necessary,259 and control the far-reaching repercussions of policy making in Lebanon. Moreover, elections signalled the ascendancy of the Shiite political power under Nabih Berri’s banner, and the restoration of Beirut’s central role after Rafik Hariri’s victory. The latter succeeded in forming the largest bloc in the parliament, and downplayed considerably the role of traditional Sunni politicians. Business elites who were either entrepreneurs or company owners invaded at least half of the parliamentary seats.260 Candidates affiliated to the war militias made similarly a notorious entry.261 Although the traditional families Franjieh and Karami were able to safeguard their supremacy in the North, the constituency was quasi eclipsed by the glorious entry of Hariri’s parliamentary bloc. Christian bitterness became even more acute as dissected Maronite Mount Lebanon was marginalized,262 and Christian opposition’s wings were clipped by the Syrian veto and internal schisms.263 The 2000 parliamentary elections: Tolerance gaps as a regime strategy? These elections reflected an incremental progress, and signaled, in a way or another, the victory of the opposition. Yet, lurking beneath these apparent liberal openings, authoritarian pressures remained anchored. Thus, the government did not hesitate to resort to usual subtle measures of control such as impeding the right of the opposition to adequate media coverage. A new law passed by the cabinet before the elections forbade all television and radio stations, except pro259

260 261

262 263

For some analysts, Syria’s role in curbing Hezbollah’s parliamentary power was an indirect message to the international community: A progress in the peace process negotiations would lead to curbing fundamentalist actors in Lebanese politics. See Khashan, “Lebanon’s 1996 Controversial Parliamentary Elections.” For example, Rafik Hariri, Issam Fares, Michel Pharaon. Such as Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, and Elie Hubeyka. See Scheffler, “Abschied vom Konfessionalismus? Die Parlamentswahlen im Libanon,” Inamo No. 8 (1996): 31- 34. The Kata’ib Party, for instance, was not represented in the new parliament. In his analysis of the 1996 polls, Rougier alludes to two divided Maronite opposition fronts in 1996: internal and external opposition fronts that struggle for the hegemony of opposition, whereas in the past they had struggled for the hegemony of power. See “Liban: Les elections législatives,” 120.

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government Tele Liban and Radio Liban, from broadcasting news related to parliamentary elections. Despite Premier Salim el Huss’ efforts at the time to adopt a fair electoral law, a hybrid electoral design remanufactured unevenly Lebanese constituencies. Mount Lebanon, the Beqa’a region, and Beirut were divided in small districts. The fragmentation of Beirut in three sections was allegedly due to the governmental will to curtail the influence of Rafik Hariri, who had been replaced by el Huss in 1998.264 The North was divided in two medium districts, while the South formed one big constituency. This time as Druze leader Jumblatt was at odds with the regime, the electoral law tried to limit his influence in the BaabdaAley constituency by encouraging a coalition between his Druze rival Talal Arslan, the late Lebanese Forces’ leader Elie Hubeyka and Hezbollah. Deputy Najah Wakim’s265 attempt to challenge the electoral law by submitting a petition to the constitutional council failed as only two deputies were willing to sign. Notwithstanding the regime’s broad menu of manipulation, several surprises occurred, confirming that the electoral game had reached an unprecedented degree of competitiveness since 1992. Although three main Christian parties – the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by Michel Aoun, the Lebanese Forces and Dory Chamoun’s National Liberal Party – boycotted the elections, almost all opposition players prepared themselves for an arduous electoral struggle. Voter turnout reached 40.51 %, and results clearly showed popular disaffection with the balance of power represented by President Lahoud and Premier el Huss. The popular yearning for change after two years of economic stagnation was symbolized by Hariri’s sweeping return in Beirut. In spite of the government’s attempt to fragment Beirut and the anti-Hariri battle led by the incumbent administration, Hariri made a glorious comeback. In the North, opposition candidates such as Nayla Muawad and Misbah el Ahdab made it despite the coherent pro-establishment blocks. The battle of Mount Lebanon disclosed the first seeds of a Druze-Christian opposition which condemned Syrian hegemonial politics in Lebanon. This coalition crystallized around the Maronite opposition and Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party266 that was increasingly critical of the pro-Syrian regime. 264

265

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Hariri resigned in 1998. His successor Salim el Huss inaugurated a campaign against corruption and pledged to rectify Lebanon’s political pathway. Two years later, the government failed to accomplish these pledges, and Rafik Hariri was again perceived as the incontestable Sunni leader. Wakim withdrew from the elections in August asserting that Lebanon had become a Syrian province and that elections were predetermined. Christian votes and Hariri’s backing helped the Druze leader confront the pro-government machinery and register a respectable victory.

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In spite of Michel el Murr’s determined efforts to use state resources to shun antagonists, his opponent Nassib Lahoud was able to thrust the wall. The failure of pro-Syrian Christian candidates on Murr’s electoral list signalled “the limitations of a strategy” that consisted “in reintegrating Christians in a proSyrian regime.”267 After former President Amin Gemayel’s return from Paris, his son Pierre attracted considerable popular support and independently managed to win a seat in parliament. These elections thus paved the way for a nascent debate on the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and drew the first premises of a blurred yet new opposition. They also confirmed the further decline of traditional figures, and the disenchantment with the regime. Nevertheless, in the South and in the Beqa’a, the Syrian role in forging alliances and supervising elections was still a major determining factor. Because of Syrian pressure, for example, the coalition between Amal and Hezbollah had become an accomplished fact. In Western Beqa’a, the pro-establishment list uniting the entire district’s candidates was reported to be the fruit of discussions with Syria.268 In Zahleh, elections, marked by incidents of vote rigging, also reflected the dominance of pro-Syrian actors. Although fraudulent practices were less obvious on Election Day than in previous post-war elections, the role of money in financing campaigns, monopolizing resources and buying voices was mainly obvious in Beirut where popular rumours reported that 100 dollars were given per vote. Another feature that characterized the 2000 elections was the metamorphosis of the media into an arena for defamation. While the regime used the state television to defame Hariri and accuse him of bribery and cronyism, Hariri used his own channel, Future TV to demonstrate his opponent Huss’ economic incompetence. In spite of the surprising opposition’s victory, the fact remained that Syria – omnipresent behind the scenes – was the main creator of the 2000 electoral law.269 A statement released by the Maronite bishops in September 2000 denounced the incidents of manipulation, gerrymandering, and the presence of security forces during election days to enforce the triumph of some fabricated lists. The arising question is whether these electoral openings in 2000 were just a margin of freedom accorded by the Syrian regime as a subtle measure to make its 267 268

269

Nassif, “Les élections de l’été,” 119. See Gary C. Gambill and Daniel Nassif, “Lebanon’s Parliamentary Elections: Manufacturing Dissent,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 2, September 5, 2000, http://www.meib.org/articles/ 0009_l1.htm. See El Khazen, “Postwar Political Process”; Nassif, “Les élections de l’été.”

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hegemony more bearable and to relieve authoritarian pressures on the rise since Lahoud’s accession to power.270 In sum, the 2000 elections showed that opposition candidates might win, but they were still unable to alter significantly the balance of power and the locus of decision-making.271 Though these elections illustrated the genesis of a Druze-Christian opposition axis, they also demonstrated that the concept of opposition in Lebanon remained inarticulate. Incumbents were able to play the role of pro-Syrian players, then become oppositionists the moment shifting alliances disfavored their political standing. In other words, a government official could easily become an opposition candidate, then again an incumbent. The 2002 by-elections in the Metn area: an anomalous electoral case An unexpected event in spring 2002 revealed the deep ramifications of autocratic pressures in the post-war Lebanese system. Deputy Albert Moukhaiber’s death was followed by a call for by-election in the Christian Metn area. The electoral battle turned out to be a family vendetta reflecting the depth of clientelist ties, and the crude authoritarian practices of the regime. Interior minister Michel el Murr’s rival brother, Gabriel el Murr, owner of the Murr Television Station (MTV), ran against Michel’s own daughter Mirna in the by-elections. Considering the Metn area to be his fiefdom, Michel el Murr did not hesitate to use and abuse state resources to prepare for the ‘duel.’ No sooner did the family contest begin than it became a pure struggle and a test of strength between the opposition and the regime.272 Gabriel Murr’s victory heralded a new hope for the opposition in the Metn area. However, the triumph did not last long as Michel el Murr challenged the result of the election by filing complaints against his brother. The ruling of the constitutional council annulled Gabriel el Murr’s mandate, and gave the seat to Ghassan Moukhaiber, the deceased deputy’s nephew, the third candidate who had only gathered 2.3% of the votes.

270

271 272

Let us not forget that after Hafez el Assad’s death in June 2000, his son Bashar was confronted with the challenge of co-opting and domesticating Lebanese opposition, and making Syrian role acceptable to the international community. See Kassir, “Dix ans après.” Michel el Murr supposedly benefited from president Lahoud’s support as Michel’s son, Elias el Murr, was married to the president’s daughter. On the other hand, Gabriel el Murr was backed by former president Amine Gemayel, and FPM leader Michel Aoun in Paris.

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The last straw was the closure of the Murr Television by the National Media board under the pretext that the station had violated media laws of electoral campaigning and harmed relations with Syrian neighbour. This by-election reflected the blatant capacity of authorities to reverse selectively the results of elections, and banish opposition candidates. It also showed that democratic procedures could easily be manipulated to fit the incumbents’ whims. After this incident, the judiciary branch was accused of politicization and subservience to the ruling order. Presidential elections Whereas post-war parliamentary elections were characterized by a certain margin of freedom, and have portrayed to some extent an incremental improvement since 1992,273 presidential elections, which constituted unprecedented cases of constitutional tinkering, were engineered by an authoritarian hand. The post-war regime, aided by its Syrian tutor, did not hesitate to transgress article 49 of the constitution to prevent transfer of power in both presidential elections. In 1995, under the pretext that the post-war regime needed stable actors that helped consolidate political continuity so that Lebanon could steadily navigate in the troubled waters of the stalled peace process, President Hrawi was awarded three more years. This decision was made public by President Hafez el Assad in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram.274 Although the Lebanese deputies feared an eventual degradation of the parliament’s power, they still renewed President Hrawi’s mandate for “only one and exceptional time.” After this anticonstitutional incident, Lebanon slipped, according to the Freedom House index in 1995, from a “partly free” to a “not free” country. In 1998, the Syrian regime directly interfered to facilitate the election of former army commander Emile Lahoud, a staunch Syrian ally who helped reunite and reorganize the army. For this aim, the constitution was amended.275 Once again, in 2004, despite domestic and international opposition, Syria intervened stealthily to facilitate another unconstitutional transition, and President Lahoud’s mandate was extended for three years. Invoked alibis were the shaky regional situation in the light of the inconclusive Middle Eastern process and the war in Iraq as well as the necessity of guaranteeing order in 273 274 275

Interview with a Lebanese politician, November 26, 2004 See El Khazen, “Postwar Political Process.” A senior civil servant was not constitutionally eligible to run for presidency unless two years had passed after his resignation. However, the parliament amended this clause of the constitution in order to elect army commander Lahoud as president on October 15, 1998.

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Lebanon. In both cases, the pretext of security politics undermined rotation of power. Points of elite authority Authoritarian elite practices: the oligarchic Troika (1992-1998) After the failed Omar Karami (1990-1992) and Rashid el Sulh governments (1992) whose representativeness and capacity to bring about national entente were greatly questioned, Rafik Hariri’s appointment in October 1992 was heralded as the beginning of the new era of dynamism and reconstruction of wartorn Beirut. Hariri was mainly credited for launching the reconstruction plan “Horizon 2000” for rebuilding central Beirut. Entrusted in 1993 to the real estate company, SOLIDERE, this ambitious 10-year plan ignited various positive and negative reactions. On the one hand, the two years of economic mismanagement after the end of the war (1990-1992) indicated that Lebanon was in dire need of a socioeconomic overhaul. Infrastructure repair, the necessity of rebuilding Beirut, attracting investments, and reactivating normal services were estimated to be a priority after 15 years of war. Hariri’s vision was based on the premises that Lebanon had to regain its role as the Middle Eastern center for finance, services, tourism and had to become once again a tax paradise. After the Madrid conference in 1991 and the secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Oslo, he was hopeful that peace in the region would happen and that his reconstruction plan would bring back Lebanon’s pivotal role into life. Although peace did not happen, Hariri’s project attracted swiftly foreign investments, established an atmosphere of credibility and reassurance in a wartorn country, and stabilized the Lebanese pound. On the other hand, Hariri’s project attracted harsh criticism and discontent. Many considered reconstruction strategies to be devoid of urban planning and harmful to the environment. The popular class feared that Hariri’s plan was a conspiracy to sell Beirut to foreign and Arab investors. Schemes of land clearance in the inner city provoked reactions of hostility, and bitterness as residents and owners of shops accused the government of wanting to strip them of their properties and rights. In the eyes of many commentators, focusing on Down Town Beirut meant disregarding a whole intricate web of socio-economic problems lingering in the country, erasing the middle-class character of Beirut and permitting a handful of investors to monopolize the city. In spite of popular reservations as well as communal apprehensions of Hariri’s rise, it was clear that a new government was needed to rescue Lebanon

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from stagnation after the Karami government’s incompetence to tackle the 1992 economic crisis. Damascus also recognized that Hariri was “probably the only man whose very ascent to power would produce a psychological turnaround, and who might sustain the Ta’if regime.”276 In the wake of this promising era of reconstruction, a somehow solid semiauthoritarian discourse began to crystallize with the ascent of a ruling Troika composed of the president of the Republic Elias Hrawi, prime minister Rafik Hariri, and speaker of the parliament Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal movement in the South, appointed to this position after Hussein el Husseini’s resignation. This semi-authoritarian discourse had to do with a new post-war understanding of Lebanese state authority and statehood. The political establishment was convinced that the post-Ta’if order could only be imposed by tightening the grip of the regime, and safeguarding security in close coordination with the Syrian neighbour. Under the pretext of preventing new socio-political conflicts, and containing post-war lingering problems, the establishment chose an authoritarian rhetoric that enabled it to govern unchallenged, concealing at times its latent weakness by resorting to its Syrian ally. Thus, in the Second Republic, democratic norms were sacrificed for the purpose of ensuring a quick prevailing security built on a deficit of political and civil liberties and on a mixture of authoritarian tendencies and pluralism.277 High level elites were entrusted with the task of consolidating this new concept of stability aimed at suppressing possible anarchist elements that might perturb the post-war order. In compliance with Syrian interests, the ruling Troika created a political system closer to an “oligarchy”278 where patronage networks and strong Syrian loyalties made the parliament subservient to the executive, and the executive dependent on its Syrian tutor. Weak institutions and contempt for formal rules The reign of the Troika was characterized by a disregard of the constitution and institutions. The three members of the triumvirate transcended the institutional channels of decision-making, and resorted to methods of governance based on informal consensus.

276 277

278

Harris, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, 592. Perthes, “Wege zum zivilen Frieden: Nachbürgerkriegssituationen im Vergleich,” Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik 4 (2000): 445-449. See Khashan, “Lebanon’s 1996 Controversial Parliamentary Elections,” 28.

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It was only rarely – and more specifically at times of disagreement – that one pole of the Troika decided to resort to institutions in order to undercut his opponent. Hence, the power factors which led one Troika member to weaken the two others were not related to the constitution but rather to implicit parameters: favorable relations to Syria, clientelist parliamentary and ministerial relations…279 The two most important features that empowered the semi-authoritarian rhetoric and facilitated Syrian infiltration were the perennial reign of unchangeable incumbents and the permeability of post-war institutions. First, untouchable politicians280 constituted constants in the Lebanese-Syrian political line, and made sure that the political discourse did neither sway nor fluctuate. In this phase of Troika rule, Hariri distinguished himself by developing a kind of “functional authoritarianism” that made him bypass the cabinet and the opposition to safeguard a quick “reconstruction of the state and economy.”281 Endless discussions and infighting in 1994 around a possible reshuffle of the cabinet did not result from the conviction that the flawed cabinet representation ought to be improved, but rather reflected Hariri’s will to consolidate his authority by appointing a more homogeneous team, so that he could sack his opponents who were trying to undercut his reconstruction projects. In May 1995, after negotiations that secured Syrian approval, Hariri finally got the chance to form a pliant cabinet friendly to his policies. Almost half of this new cabinet belonged to his camp. This homogeneous cabinet which got a very low confidence vote in parliament was not only an indicator of Hariri's pragmatic authoritarianism but also hinted at increased trends of institutional uniformization. Not only did Hariri sustain the discourse of “functional authoritarianism,” but the other Troika poles also had a hand in the matter. President Hrawi’s reign constituted an excellent medium that helped transfer Syrian policies to Lebanon. Known for his pliability to Syrian orders, he did not hesitate to rise above the constitution to have his term extended. Furthermore, accused of “summarizing by himself the legislative power,”282 speaker Berri took advantage of his entrenched authority to intervene in executive decision-making. It seemed that each pole of the Troika was trying to promote an authoritarian discourse at the expense of the other. 279 280

281 282

See Perthes, “Libanon: Stabilisierung.” The presence of ‘unmovable’ figures during the Troika rule, such as Interior Minister Michel el Murr, President Elias Hrawi, and Speaker of the parliament Nabih Berri who were great supporters of Syrian policy in Lebanon conferred a steadfast character to the political order. Perthes, “Lebanon: Ripeness for Regulation,” 159-161. Kassir, “Dix ans après,” 11.

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In addition to that, weak institutionalism was a distinctive trait of this period: parliaments and coalition cabinets managed the ruling class’ interests, and obeyed the prevailing ‘authority code’ rather than formal rules of democratic representation. The most flagrant example, illustrating the penetrability of institutions, was the submissiveness of parliament under the Troika. This institution, which should normally synthesise a plurality of post-war discourses, ended up reflecting an increasingly stagnant political panorama. Although the 1992 elections were characterized by a high elite turnover and by the emergence of new political actors, these indicators did not reflect the increase of democratic trends in the parliament, but were rather premonitory of the changing political conjuncture after 15 years of war. The proof is that the 1996 parliament, in which elite turnover became lower, confirmed the stabilization of a new political landscape which obeyed rotation laws spinning within the Troika’s orbit.283 The parliament’s seemingly multifaceted coalitions did not mirror democratic pressures but were rather a looking glass of “the Troika’s alliances, divisions, dilemmas and compromises,”284 as well as attempts of elites’ manufacturing.285 By means of illustration, the 1996 elections led to a depoliticized parliament composed of loose coalitions mostly acquiescent to the emerging pro-Syrian order.286 With time, the parliament became more of a mere façade inasmuch as crucial conflicts were debated and resolved informally within the Troika and outside the parliamentary arena. Moreover, parliamentary options were increasingly confined to the new post-war authoritarian logic. The 1995 coup against the constitution, which paved the way for further institutional subversions, was a glaringly demonstrative example which brought the weakness of the parliament during this period into daylight.287 While the Troika was busy institutionalizing its authoritarian discourse in post-war Lebanon, a higher authority was keeping it under control. Thus, through its divide-and-rule strategies, Syria maintained an extrinsic authoritarian power which dominated the three-headed oligarchy. 283

284 285

286 287

For a detailed analysis of the 1992 and 1996 parliaments, see Joseph Bahout and Chawqi Douayhi, “Les Elites parlementaires libanaises de 1996: étude de composition,” in Vie Publique au Liban: expressions et recompositions politiques, eds Joseph Bahout and Chawqi Douayhi (Beirut: Cermoc, 1997), 13-34. Idem, 34. El Khazen, “The Making and Unmaking of Lebanon’s Political Elites from Independence to Taif,” Beirut Review 6 (1993): 53-67. See Khashan, “Lebanon’s 1996 Controversial Parliamentary Elections.” Only 10 deputies among 128 refused to vote for the amendment.

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Vectors of semi-authoritarianism during the Troika rule (1992-1998) Main authoritarian pressures under the Troika consisted in blurring boundaries between elites’ and state finances, controlling the media, subduing the civil society and trade unions, banning demonstrations, and politicizing the judiciary.288 In particular, the year 1996 is considered to be a culminating point of authoritarian pressures. Hence, during the period which preceded parliamentary elections, the second Hariri government used, to an increasing degree, repressive methods which aimed at taming syndicates, opposition figures, and civil society organizations.289 The main political barometers as well as examples that enable us to measure democratic deficiencies under the Troika are discussed in the following paragraphs. Blurring boundaries between elites’ and governmental finances An important indicator of post-war semi-authoritarianism was the vanishing limit between elites’ finances and government’s finances.290 The Troika was accused of instituting a state of pie-sharing in which the triumvirate divided material goods among themselves and their followers through the establishment of an opaque clientelistic network. Bestowing upon his followers senior official and ministerial positions, Premier Hariri, for instance, was criticized for administering the country “as if it were one of his many businesses.”291 Privatization plans were also ironically dominated and managed by the state’s incumbents themselves. It was heavily suspected that funds were diverted for the purpose of personal enrichment or for political ends. Another dubious practice was the monopoly of citizens’ funds by the ruling class. One illustrative case was the shady administration of allocation funds supposed to be attributed to the displaced populations in order to facilitate their return to their initial territories.292

288

289 290 291 292

For more details on the decrease of freedom in the Second Republic, see Picard, Lebanon, a Shattered Country, 165-166. See Kassir, “Dix ans après.” For more information, see Ottoway, Democracy Challenged, 147-148. Hudson, “Lebanon after Ta’if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost? ” 35. Jumblatt, who was from 1992 to 1998 the minister for the displaced, was accused of administering funds disproportionally in favor of the Druze population. Although 800 million dollars were given to facilitate the return, only 25% of the displaced were said to have returned home. See Andreas Rieck, “Libanon 1999,” Nahost-Jahrbuch 1999, eds Thomas Koszinowski and Hanspeter Mattes (Opladen: Leske + Budrich), 1999, 108-113.

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Post-war incumbents’ management of state finances and squandering of resources has instigated responses of discontent, 293 and has also confirmed that post-war economy could not rise from the ashes as long as it was prisoner to corrupt factional networks. After the formation of the third Hariri government in 1996, a pessimistic mood started prevailing throughout the country as a handful of politicians seemed to have reaped the fruits of a partial economic boom whereas the Middle Class was in danger of extinction. Moreover, the attempt to transform Lebanon into a rentier activist state in which economic resources were managed by incumbents unaccountable to the citizens proved to be at odds with Lebanese pluralism. The failure of Hariri’s economic endeavours – primarily due to elite discord in the cabinet, regional factors, and lack of resources – indicated the impossibility of reconciling powersharing and democratic impulses when the incumbents’ and the state’s finances overlap in a sort of Saudi-style management.294 Controlling the Media under the Troika: a review It is true that the post-war Lebanese media needed restructuring after the proliferation of various radio and television stations that served militias’ interests during the war. 295 However, media regulation in the post-Ta’if period became tantamount to muzzling freedom of opinion and expression in order to subdue opposition, manage information and secure a political order amenable to Syria. Practices were as subtle as buying stakes in the press and as crude as libelling laws that curtailed information or using coercive force in order to shut down belligerent stations.296 The decision to restructure the media landscape was justified by the government as a necessary measure that would help sustain order and security, as well as safeguard Lebanon’s friendly relations with Syria and the Arab world. In 1992, the Karami government alluded to an eventual law that might prohibit private radio and television stations from diffusing news and dealing with parliamentary elections. As this debate was met with protest, the regime prompted stations not to disturb public order or harm relations with sisterly Syria. 293

294 295 296

For example, Najah Wakim, who was then a deputy in the opposition bloc, published in 1998 a controversial book entitled Al ayadi al sud (The black hands) in which he denounced the corrupt politics under the Hariri governments. Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, 201. For instance, 150 to 300 illegal radio stations operated between 1975 and 1990. Some unlicensed stations that defied the governmental ban after 1994, such as the radio station Sawt el Haq, were forcefully closed down by security forces.

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Under the Hariri governments, serious steps, which led to the decrease of media liberties and to the marginalization of the opposition, were finally taken. In April 1993, the regime closed the daily Nida al-Watan because it had made interviews with Michel Aoun who was exiled at the time. That same year, a television channel, the Independent Communication Network (ICN) that also supported the exiled politician had to close for 31 weeks. In March 1994, following the bomb attack on a church in Zuq Mikhail, the regime forbade all private radio and television channels from diffusing political news and programs until the making of a new media law. It also increased the fines that newspapers had to pay in case of offences. Due to mounting public outcry, the government ban on broadcasting news was overthrown in July 1994. But the regime resumed its action with undiminished strength in October, and decided to give licenses only to some television stations. The 1994 reorganization media law increased censorship measures, and emphasized the fact that programs should protect public order and should not promote ‘Zionist’ interests. Media corporations at odds with the law would be harshly penalized. Media control reached a peak in 1996 as the second Hariri government decreed two days after the polls that only four private television channels and three radio stations in addition to the state channels would retain the right to broadcast political programs. All other unlicensed stations would have to close after 30 November. Granting licenses selectively to media organizations reflected the governmental will to manage confessional and political considerations. Thus, all private channels that obtained licenses belonged to regime officials.297 Bowing to Syrian demands, the government made an exception, and allowed Hezbollah’s resistance news station Al Manar to continue broadcasting. Still, pressured by opposition figures, the government postponed the final shutdown of unlicensed stations to 27 November under the pretext that more time should be given to broadcasters in order to submit applications for a governmental license. Finally, in September 1996, stations that were not lucky enough to obtain licenses within the assigned period were closed down. 297

Main licensed Television stations were: Rafik Hariri’s Future TV, Murr TV (MTV) owned by Gabriel el Murr, brother of the former interior minister Michel el Murr, the National Broadcasting Network (NBN) owned by speaker of the parliament Nabih Berri, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC). Among LBC Television’s major shareholders were former Deputy Premier Issam Fares as well as other major Christian politicians. Berri admitted himself that the leaders distributed among themselves the media shares. See Scheffler, “Von der Anarchie zum Oligopol.”

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Three months later, an interview featuring Aoun on Murr TV was banned. The ban provoked an outrage in the country as well as multiple student demonstrations. Conscious of the mounting turmoil, the government declared that supplementary channels could eventually be licensed, but re-announced a ban on all political programs and news on private channels. The latter would only be able to diffuse news already prepared by state owned Tele Liban. Another alarming trait was the metamorphosis of the post-war media scene into what was commonly called “a one-man show”298 as the ramifications of Hariri’s “functional authoritarianism” extended to the written and visual media. Money became an influential criterion that did not only help media organizations survive stringent economic conditions, but which also bred and sustained deference to the ruling establishment.299 Subduing civil society associations: the case of the GCLW Subduing civil society associations considered to pose a potential threat to the post-war regime was done through the direct intervention and infiltration of the state apparatus in an attempt to co-opt the institution, fragment it or prevent its establishment. In the pre-war period, the Lebanese constitution as well as the 1909 law gave a large margin of freedom to civil society associations. Yet, under the Troika, the incumbents’ whims as well as informal rules defined – at times arbitrarily – whether a new association were to be recognized or not. If a civil society organization, which was not complying with the regime’s plans, had already been established, it would experience substantial governmental pressure.300 Various techniques ranging from slight intimidation to outright repression would then be applied by the ruling establishment. The most demonstrative case of repression was the blatant attempt to split the General Confederation of Lebanese workers (GCLW), one of the rare institutions that remained unscathed after the war and which was still able to portray Lebanon’s transcommunal face despite the exacerbation of post-war confessionalism.

298

299

300

See Michel Bounajem and Fadlo Hadaya, “Liban: les médias en mauvaise posture,” Arabies, January 2002, 50-51. In addition to owning a television station (Future TV) and a newspaper Al Mustaqbal, Hariri had for several years significant shares in the most influential daily in Lebanon An Nahar, and owned the two branches of the station Radio Orient in Paris and in Beirut. See Michael Young, “Two Faces of Janus: Post-war Lebanon and its Reconstruction,” Middle East Journal 7 (1998): 4-7.

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As the confederation threatened in 1993 to organize a strike – because the regime failed to honour an agreement concerning adjusting wages and lowering transport and educational fees – the Ministry of Labor succeeded in fragmenting the movement by giving 25 licenses to other new unions. In 1997, the government was finally able to weaken the GCLW by splitting it between an opposition movement critical of the Hariri policies, and another pro-Syrian faction buttressed by the regime. Additional subtler methods were used to co-opt and take over the union. In 1998, speaker Berri started negotiations with Elias Abu Risq, the leader of the opposition movement who had launched a virulent campaign against Hariri. The terms of the agreement were that the GCLW could be reunited provided that Abu Risq accepted the integration of unions controlled by the Shiite party Amal. Indeed, Abu Risq won the GCLW’s elections, but the price for reunification of split factions was the emergence of a deeply politicized GCLW. This case illustrates how the state used its authoritarian strength to infiltrate an association by fragmenting, and confessionalizing it. Not only did the Haririst touch try to tame the trade union that dared at many instances to criticize the Premier’s economic policies, but also the Minister of Labor controlled by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party played a prominent role in subduing some of its units so as to make it allegiant to the regime.301 The fragmented CGLW ended up reflecting enormous political rifts separating the discourses of the pro-Syrian Labor Ministry and that of the syndicate led by pro-opposition actor Abu Risq. It was in fact a miniature of a nation torn between authoritarian and democratic pulses. Banning demonstrations and using the army to disperse and repress protests A new tool of coercion under the Troika, not common in pre-war Lebanon, was the use of the military force to control, frighten and repress demonstrators.302 In September 1993, as Hezbollah organized a demonstration in Beirut in protest to the PLO-Israeli agreement, the army fired on the crowd and killed nine persons. Upon the GCLW’s call for demonstrations on July 19, 1995, the government banned all public gatherings. In coordination with the Syrian intelligence services, the Lebanese army was deployed on the streets to frighten protesters in Beirut and Saida. The same scenario was repeated in 1996 at two 301 302

Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December, 14, 2004. The army did not only control the civil society, but also rebellious political factions. In 1998, the army successfully repressed Sheikh Subhi Tufayli’s ‘revolt of the hungry’ which rejected the government’s legitimacy, criticized Hariri’s reconstruction projects, and declared a campaign of civil disobedience as well as a categorical refusal to pay taxes.

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instances as confrontations between the trade union and the third Hariri government reached a peak in February and November. Demonstrators protesting against the increase of wages and the government’s attempt to muzzle freedom of expression clashed with the army placed to uphold national security and disperse rioters. Detaining protesters and persons accused of threatening public order Under the Troika rule, many incidents involving arrests of pro-opposition members and instances of physical friction between demonstrators and security services were reported.303 In the first half of the 1990s, security organs took the habit of arresting the Free Patriotic Movement’s supporters perceived as instigators of chaos and internal trouble. In December 1996, for example, after mysterious attacks on Syrian citizens in Lebanon, Lebanese authorities cracked down on opposition sympathizers and arrested at least 60 individuals from East Beirut and Tripoli including a journalist from An Nahar Daily.304 One year later, at least 60 persons were arrested during a mass protest that denounced the governmental ban on the diffusion of Aoun’s interview on MTV. Although the ban on demonstration was lifted in the wake of these arrests and Aoun’s interview was re-diffused in January 1998, these measures showed the regime's intentions to emasculate popular opposition and most of all university students’ associations. Shortly before the 1998 presidential elections, the military intelligence arrested several members of the disbanded Lebanese Forces Party accused of preparing attacks against Syrians in Lebanon, schemes of political assassinations, and cooperating with Israel. Politicizing the judiciary During this period, the administration of justice became suspiciously politicized and pliant to external influences. The subjugation of the judicial branch was the result of two factors: the Lebanese executive’s flagrant intervention in judicial matters through the appointment or co-option of judges, and Syrian interferences into prosecutions and indictments.

303

304

These arrests targeted mainly Christian individuals who belonged to the proscribed Lebanese Forces, to Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement or to Chamoun’s National Liberal Party. For more information on these arrests, see William Harris, “Lebanon,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey 1996, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 1998), 472-509, 501.

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A striking example was the inability of the Constitutional Council, the judicial organ supposed to enhance transparency and accountability, to shield itself from the regime. In 1996, the council was blatantly overshadowed by the government. Even though the former had declared the electoral law to be unlawful, the regime interfered to pass the law on an exceptional basis. In 1997, as 17 candidates who lost the elections raised appeals demanding the investigation of electoral malpractices, the Council President Wajdi Mallat resigned after asserting that the government had been undermining the autonomy of the council, and that the magistrates close to the regime were not independent. Magistrates declared also to be subject to political pressure and intimidation to modify verdicts. Another demonstrative case was the arbitrary use of the judiciary to squash opposition movements. Under the Troika rule, the military tribunal arrogated itself the right to condemn demonstrators or protesters on the grounds that the latter had harmed state interests and public order as well as damaged Lebanon’s relations with neighboring countries. In many cases, these arrests and condemnations to prison violated human rights and were exaggerated or unjustified.305 In other cases, arrest warrants were issued, but legal measures did not ensue. For instance, after the army had repressed the ‘Revolt of the Hungry’ in 1998, Tufayli’s warrant for arrest has never entered into force.306 The rise of a security regime (1998-2004) Troika infighting and political wrangling eroded Hariri’s authority mainly in 1997 as factional quarrels among the three poles reached a climax. In addition, elite lobbying, in Hariri’s third post-1996 elections government, undermined remarkably the premier’s sphere of influence and constrained his activities. With the rise of public debt and signs of recession, Hariri’s projects started also losing ground and legitimacy. While reconstruction plans aimed at resurrecting the myth of Beirut as a haven for investments and tourism, economic conditions were deteriorating and many inhabitants remained povertystricken.307 As President Hrawi’s mandate drew to a close, Syria made its intentions clear. This time, the choice fell upon the army commander Lahoud who was known for his discipline, unblemished reputation and loyalty to Syria. As Hariri 305 306

307

See Moukheiber, “La Justice, instrument du pouvoir.” El Khazen, “Lebanon: Independent no more: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East,” The Middle East Quarterly 8 (2001): 43-50. See for example the country report written by Adel Theodor Khoury,“Der Libanon am Ende des Jahres 1995: ein Lagebericht,” KAS-Auslands-Informationen 4 (1995): 17-35.

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refused to form the upcoming government,308 Lahoud turned to Salim el Huss to constitute a new reformist crew of ministers. Lahoud’s election309 to the presidency in fall 1998 introduced a new balance of power in the Lebanese system and temporarily gave back to the presidential office the luster it had lost under Hrawi who did not succeed in earning Maronite admiration. As only Berri remained in power, the previous Troika as a system of governance disintegrated. Although Hariri had introduced in the system a kind of practical authoritarianism which aimed at stifling opposition that hindered its economic programme, the new era under President Lahoud was characterized by the increase of raw autocratic features in the system.310 It was commented that “the regime, like its neighbors, became hard-line and militarized, embarking on brutal round-ups of political opponents, an authoritarian tightening of the Penal Code and the repression of all opposition of the Syrian occupation.”311 It was even maintained that the president’s accession to power marked the metamorphosis from a system characterized by some authoritarian features to a security regime advancing quickly towards a full-fledged Baathist regime.312 These new creeping authoritarian traits materialized first through the empowerment of the military intelligence and security services who became influential actors capable of controlling the main executive organ, the cabinet. It is beyond doubt that under the Troika reign a vertiginous democratic downfall occurred, but points of authority were still checked by struggles among the three poles. Yet, under the Lahoud era, these disaggregated authoritarian pressures were internalized by a sophisticated intelligence team allegiant to the Syrian suzerain. As military institutions started acquiring more privileges and interfering in civil and governmental institutions,313 the political system gradually escaped the Troika’s sphere to embark on a new phase of semi-authoritarianism. Throughout the course of Lahoud’s reign, democratic erosion became worrisome, and the 308

309

310 311

312

313

It was no secret that Hariri and Lahoud were at odds even before Lahoud’s accession to the presidency. It is noteworthy that two popular leaders in the Maronite community, patriarch Sfeir and FPM leader Aoun, had reservations about Lahoud’s election. Druze leader Jumblatt was not happy with the choice either. See Perthes, “Libanon: Stabilisierung.” Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, The New A-Z of the Middle East (London: Tauris, 2004), 198. Kassir, “Die Intifada der Unabhängigkeit: Es geht um ein Libanon ohne konfessionnelles Korsett,” Internationale Politik 60 (2005): 96-100. For more details on the increasing power of the military intelligence in Lebanon, see for example Kassir, “Dix ans après”; Picard, Lebanon, A Shattered Country, 161-163.

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authoritarian mentality more penetrating: security politics and the constant state of turmoil with Israel were used as pretexts to justify violations of civil and political freedoms. For instance, parliamentary law dealing with punitive litigation, amended and signed in Summer 2004, against many parliamentarians’ will, gave increased privileges to the security apparatus. The Lahoud era was mainly characterized by the strengthening of LebaneseSyrian ties, and a total dedication to the unity of Lebanese-Syrian tracks.314 Thus, from the very onset, the president’s investiture speech emphasized the need to harmonize more closely Lebanese and Syrian pathways. Throughout his entire reign, Lahoud adamantly projected the image of the Syrian presence in Lebanon as a stabilizing factor, and insisted resolutely that the close Lebanese-Syrian relation remained the most important stable political parameter. Despite its ambitious goals of reform, the rising Lahoud-Huss establishment failed to fulfil its promises. Hariri’s triumphant return during the 2000 polls tells much about the popular disillusionment with the stagnant Huss government. Still, the tycoon’s return was not followed by the return of the Hariri era. The center of attention had definitely shifted to Lahoud’s politics of security and coordination with Syria. As the militarized presidential regime took the lead, constant power struggles between the president and the premier eroded further Hariri’s political authority. The premier had to accept new constraints on his autonomy, and deal with the economic file whereas the president, in compliance with Syria, acquired more freedom to administer security and foreign affairs matters. In the following paragraphs, I will examine more closely the Lahoud era, divided in three main phases: the Lahoud-Huss administration, the unhappy Lahoud-Hariri affair, and the Lahoud-Karami establishment. The Lahoud-Huss phase (1998-2000): the shattered reform and the rise of military presidentialism No sooner were President Lahoud and Premier Huss in power than talks about administrative restructuring became almost a daily theme on the political agenda. Speeches concentrated on reform, the freedom of the press, equal communal development, and eradication of corruption. Keen on addressing the debt and economic crisis as well as proceeding with the reconstruction and privatization plans, the cabinet, a small team of sixteen 314

For more details on the characteristics of the Lahoud era, read Perthes, “Libanon: Konfliktarena oder Finanzplatz? Ein Land versucht, seine Rolle zu finden,” in Geheime Gärten: die neue arabische Welt (Berlin: Siedler, 2002), 217-240, 227-228.

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technocrats who were either known for their distinguished portfolios or close ties to the present regime, issued an ambitious statement of reform. Moreover, the new establishment launched anti-corruption campaigns and investigations into cases of waste and embezzlement. These measures targeted Hariri’s close allies, and were perceived as maneuvres to prune the former premier’s influence and reputation. Nevertheless, promises of radical change did not reap their intended fruits. First, Lebanon’s economy plagued with recession, in spite of Hariri’s previous austerity measures, did not show any dynamic improvement. Premier Huss who harshly criticized Hariri's policies had no choice but to re-introduce the same measures. Soaring economic problems – namely public debt, budget deficits, high unemployment rate, and aborted administrative reform – remained unsolved. Additional discontent with the economic state soared as the Huss government’s determination to raise taxes and fees, was followed by an increase of public debt and budget deficit in the year 2000. More importantly, the years 1998/1999 constituted a watershed in Lebanese history as the regime openly began to integrate traits derived from the Syrian regime. With President’s Lahoud ascent, the cabinet and its inexperienced technocrats were sidelined. It became evident that “the main source of influence was a group of military and security service personnel…” behind the scenes.315 This first phase of military presidentialism was characterized by the shift of the epicenter of power from the head of the government to the president, and from the coalition cabinet to the security and intelligence services. Lahoud’s security crew that had more in common with the Syrian regime than with the Lebanese ministers, and that was more like “a shadow government above the government” undermined continuously the authority of the Huss team.316 The president, for example, sent regularly intelligence officers to check the different departments of the government and report to him personally. It was told that in each ministry an officer made sure that things were running smoothly.317 In 1999, despite economic stagnation, the state budget stipulated a grant of supplements to the Lebanese security forces. In addition to that, Premier Huss’ calls for integrity, and institutional overhaul were no longer credible as partial judicial sackings were only undertaken, and as administrative reform in 1999 appeared to defeat its own

315

316 317

William Harris, “Lebanon,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey 1999, ed. Bruce MaddyWeitzman (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 2001), 379-405, 379. Paul Salem, Remaking Lebanon, unpublished manuscript, 2004, 72. See Kassir, “Dix ans après.”

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purpose: the process of reshuffling top officials revealed the build-up of strong clientelist ties between Lebanese incumbents and their Syrian associates. In the end, reform plans turned out to be not more than half-hearted measures, and the partisan administrative reform and anti-corruption campaigns launched by the government deteriorated into a series of political infighting among politicians, caused administrative paralysis, and threatened to scare off investments. An emerging opposition line grouping Premier Hariri and Druze leader Jumblatt blatantly attacked the establishment’s maneuvers to promote a biased reform.318 Signs of popular disenchantment with Lahoud’s style of governance and the Christian camp’s sense of alienation increased as Patriarch Sfeir and FPM leader Aoun intensified their critiques against the state of vassalage. Lahoud’s and Hariri’s forced cohabitation (2000-2004): mounting regional tensions and increased authoritarian impulses The 2000 elections were Hariri’s golden opportunity to reassert his power and prove that he was irreplaceable. Premier Huss’ denigrating campaign during the electoral season against Hariri aroused paradoxically feelings of public sympathy towards the latter. In spite of his tempestuous relations with the president, Hariri managed to arrange a meeting of reconciliation with Lahoud, and displayed signs of flexibility. The president had no choice but to appoint him as the new premier on October, 23, 2000, and Hariri formed his fourth cabinet composed of 30 members in order to accommodate different loyalties reflecting the JumblattHariri rapprochement and the Syria-Lahoud alignment. This cabinet, however, marginalized the Maronite opposition who dubbed it as a disaster.319 In the year 2000, domestic and regional events conveyed the illusion of an eventual change: Hariri’s return and adoption of liberal economic reforms after two years of stagnation, Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, and the subsequent rise of an anti-Syrian Christian-Druze opposition. However, these modifying factors were not enough to alter the semi-authoritarian climate. In fact, Hariri’s comeback, which initiated hope at first, was followed by a period of popular resentment. First, the awaited economic relief did not happen. Hariri’s massive efforts to rebuild the Beirut Central District were impressive, and his dynamic liberal policies contrasted with the Huss government’s 318

319

Speculation was rife that this biased reform aimed at destituting officials close to the Hariri establishment, while it managed to leave speaker Berri’s clientele untouched. The Maronite opposition claimed that it was the first time since independence that the politics of Christian exclusion attained such a threatening dimension. See Khashan and Haddad, “Lebanon’s Dramatic 2000 Parliamentary Elections.”

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irresolute initiatives, but the country still suffered from an enormous public debt, widespread poverty,320 and most importantly enormous socio-economic discrepancies that cast a shadow on the opulence of Down Town Beirut. Hariri’s fourth cabinet in 2000 inherited thereby a series of economic setbacks that could not be miraculously resolved. Despite the introduction of austerity measures and a series of reforms which aimed at invigorating economic investment and raising money, foreign debts remained on the rise, and signs of recovery were hardly visible. Furthermore, Lahoud und Hariri’s stormy relations made cohabitation difficult. The two men’s divergent perceptions on several matters rendered their coexistence a potential mine of explosives. On top of that, their political wrangling undermined Hariri’s plans for economic improvement. Although the first year of Hariri’s comeback was relatively devoid of substantial clashes with the president, the Lahoud-Hariri ménage proved soon to be conflict-laden. Whereas Hariri was advocating a neo-liberal economy with a trace of authoritarianism, Lahoud was determined to transform Lebanon into a state with clear authoritarian features in which the military plays a central role.321 Regional Tensions Not only were incumbents’ practices and political feuding responsible for the increase of authority points in the system but new regional developments after 2000 equally impeded the inflow of democratic pressures set in motion by the political opposition and the Lebanese civil society. The liberation of the Lebanese South and the genesis of a more coherent Lebanese opposition conveyed the hope that changes were in view, but subsequent events proved that the promised change had to wait. In fact, the unilateral Israeli withdrawal destabilized both the Lebanese and Syrian regimes, which started looking for a new pretext to justify the oneness of the two states’ tracks. The alibi of the Shebaa farms, contested by the United Nations, provided an umbrella for Hezbollah’s continued military activities, and for Syria’s continuous control over Lebanese foreign policy. Even though opposition parties argued that it was high time that Lebanon recovered entire territorial sovereignty after the Israeli pullout, the regime insisted that internal stability could not be guaranteed by the Lebanese army and that Lebanon would adopt no independent path.322 In the wake of growing 320 321 322

In 1999, it was estimated that 28% of the Lebanese population was below the poverty line. See Rola El Husseini, “Geschlossene Gesellschaft.” Norton, “Hezbollah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine

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internal demands for a Syrian pullout after the liberation of the South, the Syrian regime lapsed into a phase of silence interrupted by statements that a withdrawal would only take place after the denouement of the peace process. Syrian redeployments in June 2001, April 2002, and February 2003 aimed at mitigating mounting criticism, yet beyond these maneuvers no change seemed imminent. The September 11 attacks and the US ‘war on terrorism’ heightened additionally the insecurity of the Lebanese and Syrian regimes.323 In Lebanon, the incumbents’ fears that the international war on terror might destabilize the country and sharpen inter-communal hostilities, made them reinforce coordination with the Syrian neighbor, and sacrifice political emancipation for the sake of security and national unity. The end of 2001 was thus marked by a strange mood of muteness in Lebanon after democratic pressures had been squashed by the regime’s security wing. It was maintained that President Lahoud preferred to transform Lebanon into “a land of confrontation”324 in which politics of order prevailed over democratic freedoms. In the wake of these overriding international and regional circumstances, the regime sent several signs that domestic opposition would not be tolerated. The methods that the government adopted to keep the opposition at bay was the technique of political isolation on the one hand and confinement of political discourse to domestic inter-elite issues on the other hand. The opposition was accused by members of the government of reviving sectarianism in the country, and making Lebanon vulnerable to Israeli-American conspiracies. In 2002, the regime intensified its efforts to isolate the most active opposition front, the Christian Qornet Shehwan Grouping that was calling for a restructuring of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship and the application of Ta’if. President Lahoud conveyed to the grouping the strict message that the LebaneseSyrian relation was one of the most important ‘immutable constants’ that would not be tampered with.325 Furthermore, the ruling class seemed intent on discarding the discussion on Syrian tutelage from the scope of the media and opposition groups as if it wanted

323

324 325

Studies 30 (2000): 22-35. In the post-September 11 era, the US State of Department labelled Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and asked the Lebanese government to freeze its assets. But the government responded that the party was a tool of resistance, and rejected the American request. Perthes, “Libanon: Stabilisierung,” 108. See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Analysis,” Emerging Lebanon 2003 (London: Oxford Business Group, 2003): 9-22, 14.

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“to bring back the debate to its pre-2000 ceiling.” The political agenda focused rather on matters of domestic nature related to political bickering.326 In 2003, premature hopes that Syria might soften its grip over Lebanon substantially waned after the toppling of the Baathist regime in Iraq. The offensive in Iraq vehemently alarmed the Syrian leadership, and produced a general state of vigilance and apprehension in the region. The Lebanese government argued that the US-led war in Iraq was an additional reason why internal calls for change had to be minimized so as to avert internal destabilization. Furthermore, the passing of the Syria Accountability Act (SAA) and the Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (LSRA) by the US congress created a wave of sympathy towards the Syrian government in Lebanon. Although some Lebanese opposition figures had reason to believe that the Syrian era in Lebanon was about to end, the ruling class rejected the documents as schemes serving Israeli interests, and insisted more on the legal and stabilizing presence of Syria in Lebanon.327 During this period of international and regional unrest, Syria was convinced that its interests would be best protected by tightening control over the Lebanese province and preserving the status quo. Thus, in April 2003, Syrian showed more interest in managing the affairs of its neighbour. Steering winds of change in Lebanon was best illustrated by a sudden government change. Premier Hariri and his cabinet resigned presumably under the pressure of the political stalemate and the growing debt crisis threatening Lebanese economy. Two days later, President Lahoud asked the premier to constitute a new 30-member government. Taxed as undemocratic, the new cabinet displayed strong renewed pro-Syrian tendencies, and was largely unrepresentative of the Lebanese political spectrum since the Christian opposition and Hezbollah were absent. Present behind the scenes, Syria had once again engineered the formation of a more submissive Lebanese cabinet that would deal appropriately with the present regional tensions. In addition to regional turmoil, internal power struggles made the Lebanese system prisoner to a static political configuration. At the executive level, President Lahoud and Premier Hariri were ultimately drifting apart. The premier’s plans of economic reform were fettered by internal feuding as both leaders had irreconcilable perspectives on the issue of privatization. Hariri’s vision of an enlivened Lebanese economy collided with geo-strategic and 326

327

El Khazen, “Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans,” The Middle East Journal 57 (2003): 605-624, 623. These acts were perceived more as machinations aimed at weakening Syria and obliging it to subdue to US policies than a real US interest in Lebanon’s independence.

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political considerations as well as regional constraints. While Hariri sought after September 11 to project the image of a liberal Lebanon which acted as a bridge between the West and the East and as a secure place for financial investment, he had to grapple with the Lebanese regime’s closed frame of mind and with President Lahoud’s overemphasis on security and Lebanese-Syrian unity.328 Accused in 2003 of displaying friendliness to the US329 and undermining Hezbollah, he received a macabre warning as two rockets were fired at his Future Television channel building in Beirut. The triumph of authoritarian pressures in 2004 To a political analyst, the year 2004 in Lebanon ushered in a new decisive phase supposed to confirm whether authoritarian pressures or hopes for a democratic opening would take the lead. Indeed, the moment the bell of presidential elections started tolling, the media as well as political circles got engaged into intense discussions revolving around a possible extension of President Lahoud’s mandate and its consequences. In case Lahoud’s mandate were renewed, hopes for an eventual decline of Syrian grip and a democratic rotation of power would prove to be elusive. The year 2004 also announced the final break up of the ruling MaroniteSunni coalition. By the time, it had become crystal clear that Hariri and Lahoud could no longer rule together peacefully. Their political bickering not only created a general atmosphere of irritability but also smashed early hopes for an economic overhaul initiated by the Paris II conference and by schemes of privatization and administrative reform. Premier Hariri did not conceal his displeasure at the perspective of an extended mandate, and hoped for the election of a new president who neither undermined his economic reforms nor circumscribed his influence. However, there were clear augurs that Lahoud’s reign was more solid than Hariri’s. While Lahoud had proven to be more pliant to Syrian policies in the post-9/11 era,

328

329

Hariri imparted many times his doubts that Hezbollah’s attacks could undermine investments and hinder the evolution of Lebanon’s economic role. For more details, see Khashan and Haddad, “Lebanon’s Dramatic 2000 Parliamentary Election”; Perthes; “Libanon: Stabilisierung.” Hariri was accused of playing the US card by advocating a rapprochement with the American administration in the wake of the Palestinian-Israeli Road Map promoted by the Bush establishment and after the US had overthrown the Saddam regime in Iraq. On a trip to Brazil, it was reported that he advocated dialogue between Arabs and Israelis, and that he spoke of trusting the US. See Oxford Business Group “Politics: Analysis,” in Emerging Lebanon 2003, 19.

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Hariri’s behavior awakened Syria’s suspicion, and his international openness made the Syrian administration vigilant. Indeed, Lahoud’s visit to Damascus in 2003, during which the 1991 Lebanese-Syrian treaty was re-emphasized, was interpreted as a sign of clear Syrian support. Syrian minister of foreign affairs Farouk al-Chareh’s unexpected visit to the Lebanese presidential palace in August 2004 was also perceived as a hint for a forthcoming renewal of Lahoud’s mandate. In addition to the innumerable episodes of political bickering, the year 2004 was characterized by the erosion of political accountability, by parliamentary inoperativeness, and by dissension within coalition cabinets – features that empowered the operating security regime. First, the inability of the parliament to make the executive accountable or “the connivance in sheltering the executive from parliamentary accountability”330 helped explain the prevalence of authority mechanisms over disparate democratic pressures. Parliamentary interpellations by opposition figures on basic issues relating to politics and economy were said to be purposefully derailed by the head of the parliament, and neutralized by political feuding. In March 2004, for instance, opposition deputies called for a no confidence vote to bring down the cabinet over the dubious cell phone affair.331 The interpellation degenerated into political disputes and was finally brought to an abrupt end by parliament speaker without any substantial outcome.332 Shattering hopes for change, President Lahoud announced on August 24 that he would not mind an extension of his mandate in case a majority in the parliament endorsed it. Although the international community issued statements emphasizing that presidential elections represented a propitious occasion for Lebanon to re-affirm its sovereignty, the cabinet approved a draft for the amendment of the constitution. One day after the adoption of the UN Resolution 1559, the parliamentary vote confirmed the renewal of Lahoud’s mandate. 96 deputies voted for the extension. Once again, unable to impose democratic mechanisms of accountability, the parliament fell prey to executive and external pressures.

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Mohammed Mattar, “On Corruption,” in Options for Lebanon, 173-208, 188. The former lucrative LibanCell and Cellis companies responsible for the telecom sector were known to be beleaguered by corruption, patronage networks, and economic misconduct. After prolonged political disputes which started in 2001, mainly between Hariri and Lahoud, over the privatization of the cellular networks, an international auction was launched by the Lebanese Ministry of Communications. The management of the mobile phone sector was finally handed in May 2004 to the Saudi-German Detecon and the Kuwaiti MTC companies. Mattar, “On Corruption,” 187-188.

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The extension of President Lahoud’s mandate and its aftermath The 2004 amendment of the constitution constituted the strongest point of authority in post-war Lebanon.333 This event illustrated to what extent the ramifications of Syrian tutelage had gone deep into the porous Lebanese system. The outspoken Patriarch Sfeir, who had filled the power vacuum in the post-war Maronite landscape, declared that “the Lebanese have become strangers in their own land, having no say or opinion in their own national policies.”334 Violating the constitution led some opposition prominent actors to talk about the definite death of Lebanese democracy and conclude that “the Lebanese system has become a Presidential system relying on the security services at the expense of democratic institutions.”335 Concerns that authoritarian changes in Lebanon under the pretext of strategic politics would become more frequent soared.336 At an international level, Lebanon was depicted as a subordinate state which chose to defy the international community in order to satisfy its Syrian suzerain.337Indeed, endorsed by its Syrian tutor, the Lebanese government disregarded at the beginning joint calls sent by the international community. Choosing international isolation to sustain its pro-Syrian political line, it rejected right away Resolution 1559 which it qualified as a tool of division. The Syrian regime tried at first to overlook the resolution and trivialize its impact. Once the Security Council adopted the final draft of the resolution but omitted to mention Syria by name in the final official document,338 Syria announced that the resolution had not called explicitly for the withdrawal of Syrian troops. 339 Speculations arose concerning the reasons that pushed Syria to renew Lahoud’s mandate amidst international and internal indignation although other Lebanese politicians could have displayed the same loyalty to the Syrian regime. One plausible explanation was that the Syrian leadership was able to rely on 333

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See Nada Raad, “Lebanese Democracy Failed in 2004 with Lahoud Extension,” The Daily Star, January 1, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=11517 &categ_id=1. See “Looking Back,” The Executive 26, December 2004-January 2005, 24. Nassib Lahoud, interview on Al Arabiyya Television, October 26, 2004. See for example “Boueiz redoute une série d’atteintes sous le prétexte des impératifs stratégiques,” L’Orient Le Jour, September 9, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/ politique. See for example “Le Liban défie la communauté internationale,” Radio-Canada, September 3, 2004, http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles, accessed September 3, 2004. The initial US-French draft that preceded Resolution 1559 explicitly called upon the Syrian troops to end their occupation of Lebanon. By shedding light on the final document’s ambiguous language and emphasizing that the original draft had to be rectified to be adopted by the UN Security Council, Syria tried to weaken the impact of the resolution and adopt time-buying strategies to extend its military stay.

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Lahoud without constant interference. Second, Lahoud has proven that he was able to confront the opposition’s surge against Syria in 2000, and in the Syrian administration’s eyes, he would probably be able to keep the opposition at bay in case future challenges loomed.340 Renewing Lahoud’s mandate and defying the international community were also interpreted as a Syrian message to the United States and Israel: as long as regional peace and the Golan Heights remained out of hands, Damascus would hang on tightly to its Lebanese card.341 Syria had made, however, a major miscalculation. Trustful that its hold on Lebanon would squash internal voices calling for change, it risked even confinement on the international level to secure the renewal of the Lahoud’s mandate. It was also willing to alienate the Lebanese opposition actors even though it had tried hard to co-opt it. Reappointing Lahoud showed that Syria did not want at any cost to loose its bargaining card, and that it expected to get away with this operation just like it had done several times before. Syria’s decision was endorsed in Lebanon by strong political actors, such as Hezbollah, Amal, the Syrian Socialist National Party, and many influential parliamentarians and ministers. It was even reported that Speaker Berri, considered to be the “main constitutional stage manager” behind the extension, had advanced the date of the parliamentary session supposed to vote for the renewal of Lahoud’s term.342 In the eyes of the Lebanese ruling class, the pretext that justified this extension was that during the difficult times of regional insecurity caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the unstable situation in Iraq, President Lahoud was the best candidate to steer the Lebanese boat in troubled waters and confer a sense of continuity to Lebanese politics and foreign policy. It is needless to add that deeply implanted interests were also behind this decision. For instance, Hezbollah feared that the weakening of Syrian influence in Lebanon might also weaken the party’s regional role. Many pro-Syrian politicians, who owed their position to Damascus, were keen on preserving their status. At this stage, it became clear that the game of semi-authoritarianism in Lebanon was a game of 340

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According to former information minister, Elie Ferzli, president Lahoud’s mandate was extended because the regional factor overruled other considerations. Nonetheless, he remarked that had inter-Lebanese dialogue between loyalists and opposition taken place before the prolongation, the extension of Lahoud’s mandate could have constituted a rare opportunity that should have been seized upon to rectify amicably Lebanese-Syrian relations. Interview with the author, Beirut, December 12, 2004. Philippe Akl, “Soulagement relatif après l’atténuation de la 1559,” L’Orient le Jour, September 4, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourd’hui/politique. See Ziad Makhoul, “L’implication française pour la souveraineté du Liban dynamise la synergie internationale,” L’Orient Le Jour, Septembre 2, 2004, http://lorientlejour.com/aujourd’hui/ politique.

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interests: points of authority remained vibrant mainly because Syria forged deep alliances with Lebanese actors who were keen on maintaining these networks alive even to the detriment of democracy. Hariri’s farewell and the return of instability As soon as President Lahoud was reelected, he declared that his second term should be considered as an opening, and called for turning over a new leaf in political life. Moreover, in an effort to dampen rising hostilities, Syria redeployed 3000 soldiers in September to the Beqa’a in order to ensure to the international community and to the Lebanese opposition that the extension of Lahoud’s term did not contradict the Ta’if spirit. This fifth redeployment since June 2001 took place two days before the publication of the UN secretary general’s report.343 Still, opening a new page was no conceivable alternative to the opposition. On September 6, denouncing the arbitrary amendment, four ministers, Marwan Hamade, Ghazi Aridi, Abdallah Farhat, and Fares Boueiz resigned. This small interlude of defiance marked the beginning of a retaliation campaign which consisted in intimidating regime opponents. On October 1, the attempt to assassinate exiting Druze minister Marwan Hamade was interpreted as an implicit threat to all opposition actors who would dare to defy the regime. Sporadic events of violence after the renewal of Lahoud’s term, and a looming electricity crisis plunging the country into the dark during the month of October foreshadowed, in one way or another, the return of instability to Lebanon.344 Fears intensified that a forced Syrian withdrawal and external pressure would lead to the degradation of security in the country. In June 2004, Hariri declared that he intended to leave office in case President Lahoud was reappointed. But his resignation on October 20 – one day after the Security Council had decided to implement Resolution 1559 – was to some extent a general surprise, for many expected a last minute session of reconciliation between the President and the resigning Premier. Nevertheless, intense fighting over the makeup of a new government during the weekly cabinet meetings revealed that the two politicians’ divorce had reached a point of no return. Hariri proposed either the formation of a government of technocrats 343

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The report which denounced the non-compliance of Lebanese and Syrian parties with Resolution 1559 was jointly condemned by the Lebanese and Syrian authorities. On September 20, an Amal-Hezbollah flare-up took place in the South. Two days later, the government announced that it dismantled a terrorist chain planning to attack the Italian Embassy in Beirut. Moreover, speculation was rife that the electricity crisis in October had to do with political bickering in the country, and not with the rise of fuel prices.

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because of the opposition’s refusal to participate or the maintenance of the current government with some changes, but Lahoud insisted on the formation of a government of national unity – quite a utopian perspective under the prevailing circumstances.345 Other important divergences between the two leaders had also become irreversible. While the President had unconditionally embraced the Syrian political course, the Premier was willing to distance himself from this doubleedged sword. There were implicit hints that Hariri was getting closer to the opposition, and that he could no longer bear a new episode of forced cohabitation especially that his power had been significantly eroded.346 Rumours that France’s major role in the resolution was linked to the good ties between the French President Jacques Chirac and Premier Hariri had already begun to circulate in various political circles. The Lahoud-Karami coalition: disintegrating authority and looming challenges The appointment of pliable Omar Karami as the new prime minister was followed by the formation of a short-lived government favorable to Syria and to Lahoud’s security politics.347 Dubbed as a “democratic comedy,”348 the appointment of the new cabinet heralded the sinking of Lebanon into a greater political rift separating the regime from the opposition, and the eventual rise of a presidential system that bypassed the Ta’if spirit of representativeness and consensus.349 To describe the rising regime after the renewal of Lahoud’s term, the Lebanese opposition350 did not hesitate to adopt a very aggressive antiregime rhetoric. Allusions to the rule of a single party, to the empowerment of

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See Zeina Abou Risk, “Hariri Chances as Head of New Cabinet Slimmer,” The Daily Star, October 11, 2004, 3. On August 26, 2005, Hariri was convoked to Damascus, where president Bashar communicated to him the decision that president Lahoud would remain in power. It was reported that Hariri was threatened on that day by the Syrian president. The anti-Syrian opposition and most precisely the Jumblatt’s camp, the Qornet Shehwan Grouping, and Hariri’s Future Movement were not represented in the Karami government. It is noteworthy that for the first time Hezbollah gave a vote of confidence to a post-war Lebanese cabinet. See “Ghassan Tueni: 10 Days in the Life of a Democracy,” Naharnet, October 26, 2004, http:// www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/Newsdesk.nsf/Story/5EDDD006DF7AF2A0C22. Ziad Makhoul, “ Les dangereuses innovations du Lahoud II: système présidentiel de facto et vengeance politique,” L’Orient Le Jour, October 27, 2004, 2. The opposition including Jumblatt’s parliamentary bloc also called the Democratic Gathering, the Qornet Shehwan Grouping, the Democratic Renewal Movement, and several other independent deputies boycotted cabinet consultations.

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mono-colored institutions, or to the consolidation of a security and a police state became frequent.351 Eager to win popular confidence, the 30-member cabinet appointed for the first time in Lebanese history two female ministers. It also made public a governmental program which intended to tackle urgent problems related to the electricity shortage, the military service and administrative nominations. Despite its promises to design a fairer electoral law guaranteeing equality, to address the economical crisis, fight corruption, and respect civil liberties and the freedom of the press, the cabinet received the lowest confidence vote ever: only 59 deputies against 49 voted in its favor. The new cabinet, a homogeneous team with a clear pro-Syrian orientation, proved the unabated effort of the Lebanese regime to preserve the post-war authoritarian heritage, and cut ties with the Hariri legacy. No sooner was the cabinet appointed than foreign minister Mahmoud Hammoud asserted the government’s absolute commitment to the Lebanese-Syrian concomitant pathways, and rejection of any intervention in Lebanese affairs that threatened the invariant parameters of security, national unity and stability.352 Appointing general prosecutor Adnane Addoum as Minister of Justice indicated the regime’s intention to monopolize the judiciary, and was an indirect threat to the opposition that new inquisitory files might see the light. The nomination of economy minister, Elias Saba, known to disapprove of Hariri’s political economy, proved to be an earnest effort to break with previous economic policies. The Lahoud-Karami coalition was marked by the rise of severe authoritarian pressures that tried to quell nascent democratic pulses. The new coalition attracted fierce criticism because of its subservience and determination to justify Syrian hegemony despite internal and external dissent. It was also suspected that the new cabinet intended to tamper with democratic gains, and manufacture an authoritarian climate. A striking example was the government’s announcement, as soon as it started exercising its functions that the preparations for a new electoral law would only start in the year 2005. This comment awakened the opposition’s and population’s mistrust especially that the cabinet had promised to place the electoral issue on top of the political agenda. On top of that, to the surprise of the opposition, the new government planned right after its appointment a large demonstration to oppose Resolution 1559 and defend Syria’s role. Aiming at stifling the opposition’s rise, this large-scale 351

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See for example “Jumblatt s’élève contre ‘le pouvoir du parti unique’,” L’Orient Le Jour, November 27/28, 2004, 1. See “Déclaration ministérielle trop ambitieuse pour un cabinet éphémère,” L’Orient Le Jour, November 2, 2004, 2.

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protest, on December 1, which grouped several loyalist movements, was described by the government as the largest protest in Lebanon’s history ever and dubbed by premier Karami as the “demonstration of the one million people.” Although denouncing international meddling and criticizing the opposition’s stances as such were no reprovable acts, the regimes’ goals in planning and orchestrating a demonstration as well as its willingness to resort to the streets “to arbitrate conflicts” were questionable.353 Patriarch Sfeir remarked ironically: “It is not usual that incumbents demonstrate.”354 In addition to ascending authoritarian pressures, looming challenges augured that Lebanon’s newly appointed cabinet, born under a bad star, would drive the country into the pitfall of international quarantine, and into a dangerous economic impasse. First, the Security Council had placed Lebanon and Syria under a six-month period of surveillance after which the party of Hezbollah would have to demilitarize and Syrian military pullout ought to be complete. However, the new government kept on seeking new ways to evade the application of the resolution. Second, Hariri’s resignation threatened to freeze privatisation plans. 355 Moreover, it was maintained that the Central Bank had to spend 2.2 billion dollars to prevent the fall of the Lebanese pound during the crisis of Lahoud’s reelection. Economic concerns cast additional shadow on the new cabinet’s eventual performance especially since Hariri scored little but meaningful victories in 2004 as public deficit sank, government revenues augmented, and GDP growth reached 5%.

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The media reported that the state had rented buses to transport demonstrators and that the Lebanese army even transported protesters in helicopters. Some opposition figures also claimed that Syrian workers were assembled to march in the demonstration. In addition to that, it was reported that the internal security forces organized the demonstration’s itinerary and made sure that cars did not circulate from noon until the end of the protest in some areas. See Nada Raad, “Tens of Thousands to March in Support of Lebanon’s Links with Syria,” The Daily Star, November 30, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=10542 &categ_id=2. The Maronite Council of Bishops’ issued a statement in which it denounced the pro-Syrian demonstration that was sponsored by the government, and alluded to the dangers of such strategies. See “ Bkerké: ‘il n’est pas de coutume que les gouvernants manifestent’,” L’Orient Le Jour, December 12, 2004, 3. Hopes of privatization and administrative reforms heralded by premier Hariri under the umbrella of the Paris II conference were somehow destroyed. His successor Karami was deemed unable to follow up on Paris II reforms.

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The cabinet’s aggressive rhetoric A distinguishing trait of the new cabinet was the confrontational and polarizing rhetoric filled with undertones of threats that the incumbents adopted to marginalize the rising Opposition on the one hand and stand up to the international community on the other. Withstanding the calls of the international community and mainly the United States for cooperation, the cabinet rejected outright the resolution at the beginning of November. Ambassadors residing in Lebanon were asked not to interfere in Lebanon’s domestic affairs. President Lahoud’s rare speeches at this period underlined mainly security politics and the necessity of coordinating more closely with Syria.356 On the eve of Independence Day, he reasserted his commitment to maintaining the regime stances: Unity of track with Syria, and rejection of the UN resolution. The motif of security politics was additionally invoked by Premier Karami who warned the opposition against transgressing the red line of security.357 Although these statements should not be overvalued, they reveal the ruling class’ resoluteness to maintain a regime built on the central theme of security politics. At this time period, it seemed that Lebanon was heading towards a deeper authoritarian downward slant. Vectors of semi-authoritarianism under Lahoud’s security regime (1998-2004) After this detailed description of the political landscape up to 2004, I will briefly extract the barometers that help us measure the decline of liberties during this period: Empowering security services to arrest pro-opposition activists The Lahoud era was marked with a worrisome authoritarian backlash and an acute degradation of political and civil liberties as repressive detentions became more and more regular.358 During this period, criticism condemning the 356

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Deputy Prime Minister at the time, Issam Fares, went as far as declaring that the Syrian army was no foreign army in Lebanon, and highlighted the unity of the Syrian and Lebanese people. See Elie Hourani, “Fares: Syrian Army Isn’t ‘Foreign’,” The Daily Star, November 29, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=10506&categ_id=2. See “Karamé à Joumblatt: La sécurité est une ligne rouge,” L’Orient Le Jour, January 4, 2005, 12. For a summary of the regime’s attempts of intimidation, see Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” Emerging Lebanon 2002, 13-36; W.B. Fisher, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East and North Africa 2004, ed. Richard I. Lawless (London: Europa Publications, 2003), 707-773, 738-

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government’s inability to ensure constitutionally guaranteed rights and public liberties vehemently soared up.359 It became common to arrest activists suspected of cooperating with Islamist groups, with Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement or with the banned Lebanese Forces Party.360 For example, security organs pursued fiercely through 1999 Aoun’s supporters. In 2000, the arbitrary detentions of nearly 200 FPM activists in April provoked indignation and numerous protests. In addition, after a commemoration of Bachir Gemayel’s death in September, the founder of the Lebanese Forces, at least 90 activists were temporarily arrested. In 2001, a great blow to civil liberties demonstrated that the strings of the regime were mainly pulled by the military presidential crew. After the daring calls of the opposition for a Syrian withdrawal in 2000, a military crackdown demonstrated the regime’s unwavering will to suppress pro-opposition groups. In August, apparently without the knowledge of the ministerial council,361 an orchestrated assault against Christian activists took place. The army intelligence arrested approximately 140 members of the Aounist movement, 40 adherents to the Lebanese Forces, and ten members of Chamoun’s National Liberal Party on charges of striving to divide the country, organizing illegal gatherings, and destabilizing public order by preparing anti-Syrian protests.362 Once the wave of the August arrests had subsided, the parliament re-adopted a law that gave privileges to the security forces. Sporadic arrests mainly targeting pro-opposition groups and journalists accused of denigrating the image of the army continued through the month of September 2000.363

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740. For more details on the decline of liberties during this period, see for example, “Liban rapport annuel 2002,” Reporters Sans Frontières, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=1408. See also Ara Alain Arzoumanian, “Amnesty Targets Beirut’s Rights Record,” The Daily Star, May 29, 2003, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=70222&categ_ id=1. See for example the reports written by Amnesty International on Lebanon from 1999 through 2004 available from http://www.amnesty.org. It was reported that Premier Hariri, who was at the time in Pakistan, was unaware of the military crackdown. Some government members, such as Ghazi Aridi, Marwan Hamade and Fouad Saad, even alluded to a shadow authority taking decisions without their knowledge. Few days later, most of the detained persons were released. Yet, a former senior official in the Lebanese Forces active in the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, Tawfic Hindi, the leader of Aoun’s movement, Nadim Lteif, and two journalists were detained and accused of having taken part in an Israeli operation. Although Hindi was released at the end of 2002, his arrest was perceived as a measure to stifle the Christian opposition. After these incidents, opposition actors resentfully alluded to the rise of a police state that wanted to repress Christian right wing movements, and quell their political agenda. These events also proved that the shadow crew of security officials was able to sideline the council of ministers. Whereas under the Troika, Hariri was accused of promoting a brand of authoritarianism, the cards were shuffled after Lahoud’s ascent to power, and the roles of the bad and the good were

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The fact that these arrests were scheduled right after Patriarch Sfeir’s historical visit of reconciliation to the Druze Shuf area,364 cast an additional shadow on the regime’s willingness to promote communal entente.365 In the wake of these detentions, former Foreign Minister Fuad Bustros, who had been acting for the past nine months as an intermediary between Syria and the Maronite Church, decided to interrupt his mission on the grounds that the prevailing political climate made efforts of mediation worthless. Arrests of students and young activists allegedly affiliated to pro-opposition and Islamist groups continued in the following years. Security forces mainly targeted activists distributing leaflets and participating in rallies against Syrian presence or governmental policies. Right after Lahoud’s reelection and despite growing external and internal dissent, the regime did not hesitate to arrest in November 2004 opposition activists affiliated to the Free Patriotic Movement in Zgharta under the pretext that they had harmed sisterly relations with Syria.366 Repressing demonstrations After the rise of popular anti-Syrian feelings in 2000, the regime took an increased interest in repressing protests organized by the opposition or other civil society movements. Intrusive military interferences during demonstrations coupled at times with repressions aimed mainly at silencing student gatherings.367 On various occasions, security services have stormed university campuses to stop anti-Syrian demonstrations.368

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inverted. For example, in January 2001, Hariri called for Aoun’s return and gave him guarantees that he would not be sent to trial; however, Lahoud refuted Hariri’s claims, and asserted that the Maronite leader would be arrested upon his return. Patriarch Sfeir’s visit on August 4 to the Druze Shuf area – the first in over two centuries – marked the formal reconciliation of the two communities after the violent massacres in 1860 and 1983. After the crackdown which provoked a general political uproar, the Christian opposition issued a statement in which it described the military operations as a premeditated attempt to stifle national reconciliation. For more details, see Garry. C. Gambill, “Lebanon’s Shadow Government Takes Charge,” The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August 2001, http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_l1.htm. FPM activists distributed flyers endorsing the text of Resolution 1559 in the North of Lebanon. In April 2000, for instance, student protests against the Syrian occupation degenerated into violent confrontations between security forces and activists. Security troops used water hoses, and beat brutally some demonstrators. A striking example was the repression of an anti-Syrian student demonstration at the Saint Joseph University in November 2001 as security services stormed the campus, forced the protesters to disperse, and prevented other students from reaching another anti-Syrian rally

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In 2004, growing concerns arose that the government’s repressive conduct as well as the army’s increased meddling might unleash an uncontrolled wave of domestic unrest.369 In addition to forceful methods used by the regime to squash demonstrations, other subtle strategies were occasionally used to ban demonstrations as well as to hinder protesters from participating in rallies. These milder strategies of repression were used mostly at times of internal and international pressure. For example, although the ban on demonstration was officially overturned in 1999, inconsistent governmental policies on the matter after this date served to delude public opinion and increase the regime’s room of maneuver at times of internal dissent. Thus, the Ministry of the Interior arrogated itself the right to grant selectively authorizations for demonstrations that were deemed to be inoffensive.370 Following the renewal of Lahoud’s term, the Karami government practiced implicit methods to stifle the opposition’s demonstrations in order not to attract the international community’s wrath. For example, the large-scale demonstration organized by the anti-Syrian opposition, on November 19, 2004, was preceded by the deployment of the army on the streets and the increase of security checkpoints that induced endless traffic jams, and prevented protesters from accessing the Martyrs’ Square in Beirut. These coercive measures weakened mainly the student movement that has been on the rise since the end of the war. Indeed, before the dramatic events that led to a transcommunal democratic opening in 2005, the student movement, incapable of reinventing a new mobilizing discourse, seemed to be short of breath.371

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organized at the Lebanese University campus. Directing water jets and gun barrels at protesters became quite widespread techniques used by the internal security divisions to disperse unwanted assemblies. An example was the protest organized by students in Down Town Beirut on September 7, 2002, during which protesters were assailed with repeated blows of water jets, sticks and gun grips. In May 2004, a strike organized by the CGTL in Hay el-Sellom to denounce the Hariri government’s economic policies and the raise of petrol prices, degenerated into violent riots between the protesters who were angrily burning tyres and throwing stones, and the Lebanese army who did not refrain from firing on the crowds. Five were shot and more than thirty were injured. Baptized as the “Bloody Thursday,” this day aroused fears of internal instability. Unlicensed gatherings which did not receive a governmental authorization, even if they were quite peaceful, came to a halt after the deployment of the army and intelligence services. On March 10, 2004, for instance, violent confrontations occurred between the security forces and the students at the Saint Joseph University, who organized a demonstration against youth emigration. Two days later, during another demonstration organized by Aoun’s movement, violent struggles between the army and the protesters erupted. In both cases, the government justified its interferences by invoking the illegal character of the protests. See Samir Ghamroun, “En 2004, les étudiants n’ont pas réussi à renouveler leur discours,” in

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Controlling the Media Unlike the previous Hariri governments, the Huss cabinet, pledging at its inception to safeguard media freedoms, displayed some signs of political relaxation towards the various channels of mass communication. Before the year 1999 came to a close, it had even granted licenses to two televisions and four radio stations. Yet, suspicions were rife that this openness was due to the incumbents’ wish to curb Hariri’s influence in the country. Shut down in 1994, the ICN station, for instance, known to be very critical of Hariri’s policies, was granted a new licence. After his comeback to the political scene, Hariri also promised to watch over the freedom of the media. Still, although no serious attempts to re-organize the media landscape were undertaken after 2000, curtailing disobedient organizations remained a priority. In 2002, the closure of Gabriel’s Murr Television and Radio Mont Liban, on the grounds that the two stations had violated article 68 of the electoral law, did not only inflict a severe humiliation to the opposition, but constituted one of the heaviest assaults on post-war media freedoms. The following year saw another controversial attack. The owner of the New Television (NTV), Tahsin Khayat, an outspoken critic of Hariri, was accused of collaborating with Israel and of damaging Lebanese-Saudi relations.372 After his arrest in December 2003, the government decided to ban the station from broadcasting news for 48 hours.373 The MTV and NTV cases proved that muzzling media freedoms in post-war Lebanon was a well-liked strategy mostly used to subdue the changing opposition scene which had taken changing shapes throughout the years: the Christian opposition under the Troika and Lahoud’s rules, the Hariri opposition under the Huss premiership, Hariri’s critics as soon as the premier returned to the political arena. In addition to that, it became quite usual to initiate legal proceedings against television stations on the grounds that they had fomented divisions and encouraged dissension.374 Intimidating, detaining and pressing

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“Rétrospective 2004,” L’Orient Le Jour, available from http://www.lorientlejour.com, accessed on January, 25, 2005. On January 1, 2003, the station was banned from diffusing a program in which opposition figures criticized the regime in Saudi Arabia. The government and the judiciary justified these interferences on the grounds that attempts at damaging Lebanese-Saudi relations should be at all cost prevented. On December 12, the station criticized Lebanese and Syrian authorities because they refused to grant legal permits to the NTV Sudanese presenter, Dalia Ahmad. In May 2004, Hariri declared his intention to accuse the station’s owner for slander. In August 2002, for example, charges were directed against the LBC television station for encouraging confessional discord.

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charges against journalists accused of offending public order, became also customary practices revealing the low tolerance threshold of the regime.375 Subjugating the judiciary In the Lahoud era, the wane of civil liberties was accompanied by a considerable erosion of judicial transparency.376 Judicial proceedings were perceived more as theatrical measures utilized to reduce some political actors’ sphere of influence, and stifle the opposition rather than restore real justice.377 A dubious wave of trials, which targeted mainly supporters of the Christian opposition, members of so-called extremist groups, as well as alleged collaborators with Israel have cast severe doubt on judicial impartiality.378 375

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In 2001, Samir Kassir, the late outspoken journalist and opposition actor, was arrested by the Lebanese security services few days after he had accused their head Jamil el Sayyed of orchestrating acts of repression during demonstrations. Later that year, in August, an editor and a journalist in the daily An Nahar, Joseph Nasr and Rafi Madayen, were both charged with defaming the Lebanese army’s reputation. Another journalist in the daily Assafir, Saada Alao, was referred to court after having denounced the malfunctions in the Lebanese judicial system. In 2003, the regime set up a legal enquiry against a journalist in Al-Liwaa newspaper, Amer Mashmushi, on the grounds that he defamed president Lahoud’s reputation. It became also rather common to indict journalists under the charge that they cooperated with Israel. In 2000 and 2001, journalists in Al Hayat newspaper, Habib Younes and Raghida Dargham, were arrested and intimidated by security forces for this reason. For a detailed account of these violations, see the censorship reports issued in 2003 by the Lebanese NGO Nouveaux Droits de l’Homme. Nasri Lahoud, the former President of the Superior Judicial Council, asserted in 2002 that the judicial branch had been functioning as “a government department.” See report on Human rights practices in Lebanon issued by the NGO Nouveaux Droits de l’Homme in 2002. For more details on the politicization of the judicial branch, see Mattar, “On Corruption,” 189-194; Nadia Raad, “Lebanon Still Lagging in Civil Liberties, Human Rights and Democracy,” The Daily Star, January 31, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID =1&article_ID=3845 &categ_id=1. The anti-corruption judicial campaign of the Lahoud-Huss establishment mainly pursued individuals close to the Hariri camp, such as Shahe Barsoumian and Fouad Saniora, who were accused of dilapidating public funds. Unable to pressure political actors enjoying Syrian protection, and even retracting at times its claims, the judiciary was pictured as a partisan institution. One example was the opening of investigations against Robert Muawad, a rich emigrant close to Hariri. The moment Muawad threatened not to invest in Lebanon anymore, accusations were pulled back. Throughout 1999, prominent journalists were called to the tribunal, and many political prisoners were tried by the military court. Students supporting the Free Patriotic Movement also faced trials in April 2000, after which they were imprisoned for a period ranging from two weeks to one month. Following the August 2001 crackdown, 20 opposition activists were put on trial by the military court. Some were sentenced to a short period of prison because of distributing leaflets, harming the reputation of the Syrian army and the Lebanese president. Trials against activists and journalists accused of establishing contacts with Israel or spying for Israel

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Aiming at curbing major opposition leaders’ power, the judiciary seemed to act as a coercive pole in conjunction with military institutions.379 After it had invalidated Gabriel el Murr’s mandate in 2002, the Constitutional Council, that proved incapable during the second half of the 1990s of checking the executive’s immoderate practices, was criticized for having been co-opted by the authoritarian machinery.380 In need of a structural overhaul,381 it was deemed unable to prioritize constitutionality over political circumstances. More alarmingly, the politicization and biasedness of the judicial system have incapacitated it to deal with the hideous strings of political assassinations that happened in the post-war period and particularly under Lahoud’s reign. 382 Its extreme dependence on the executive and incapacity to intervene righteously have also heavily contributed to the escalation of rampant corruption after 2000. Many suspicious files such as the debt crisis at the state-owned Electricite du Liban (EDL) in 2003,383 the shady cell phone affair, or the Al Madina Bank scandal 384 remain shrouded in mystery until now. Prosecutions have not been 379

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continued through 2002. In September 2002, after the Murr TV closure, it was reported that prosecutor Adnane Addoum asked security services to gather information on opposition members who supported the Syrian Accountability Act, and who harmed communal harmony or Lebanese relations with Arab states. Two months later, the prosecutor threatened to file legal charges against former president Amin Gemayel on the grounds that the latter was cooperating with Israel, and against the Liberal National Party leader Dory Chamoun for launching anti-Syrian campaigns. Each time Aoun hinted at a possible return to Lebanon, Addoum threatened to sue the Christian leader for rebellion and dilapidation of funds. In October 2004, he even declared that the general could be charged of treason in absentia. Before the Maronite leader returned to Beirut in May 2005, his trial was set for February 2, 2005 by the Beirut Criminal Court under the allegation of undermining Lebanon’s relations with Syria. The council’s decision was severely condemned by eminent religious and political actors belonging to all confessions as a horrendous act stifling public liberties. See Gary C. Gambill, “Objectives of the MTV Closure and Ensuing Crackdown,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2002, http://www.meib.org/ articles/0210_l2.htm. Five members of the council remained in office for some time despite the expiration of their sixyear term. The Lebanese judicial branch has been deemed unable to conduct fair enquiries to unmask the perpetrators behind the political assassinations that rocked the country since the extension of Lahoud’s mandate. After the mysterious attempt to assassinate exiting minister Marwan Hamade on October 1, 2004, squabbles between the opposition and general prosecutor Addoum over the regime’s presumed role in hiding and destroying as well as procrastinating legal proceedings, alerted public opinion. Hamade even accused the security apparatus of interfering in legal proceedings. See Karine Raad, “Berri Criticizes Addoum on Claims of Questioning Hamade,” The Daily Star, December 6, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID= 1&article_ID=10720&categ_id=2. Behind the EDL crisis lurk networks of corruption and embezzlement. Political elites are believed to have immensely benefited from the Lebanese energy sector. In 2003, following the collapse of the Al Madina Bank, it was reported that more than one billion

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fully carried out, and the political intricacies behind the different crises and scandals stay largely undisclosed.385 General consequences of the rise of semi-authoritarianism on freedom of expression in post-war Lebanon (1990-2004) A weary post-war civil society The post-war regime partially succeeded in curbing the momentum of one of the most vibrant civil societies in the Middle East by using a series of subtle machinations and forceful measures. Widespread arrests and repressions have tremendously affected the freedoms of association and expression in post-war Lebanon. These measures weakened the momentum of civil society activists, and caused a profound social disillusionment. One important strategy that has considerably weakened civil society was the pervasive control exercised by the state on associations. Since 1990, the government had tried hard to check syndicates and organizations by fragmenting or co-opting them. In case it failed to subjugate decision-making in old syndicates, the regime resorted to an unanticipated method: granting licences to new loyal syndicates. This decision made associations inefficient, loose, and unable to exert political pressure.386 Authorizations given to civil society organizations have been perceived as a capricious move depending on whether the state perceived the organization as dangerous or not.387 At times, the state did not even have to resort to repressive methods to weaken civil society networks that were themselves keen on staying aloof from politics. It was sufficient to encourage organizations now and then that served its interests and disregard others in order to marginalize their impact.388

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dollars have disappeared, and that the organization had been involved in operations of money laundering. The judicial probe in the matter, suddenly discontinued in September that year, raised serious misgivings that political actors had intervened to divert the track of justice. This particular case has shown that the Lebanese judicial branch remains unable to carry out transparent investigations and to distance itself from political pressures. See Mattar, “On Corruption.” See Kiwan, “Consolidation ou recomposition de la société civile d’après-guerre,” Travaux et Jours no. 72 (2003): 137-158, 144-147. Interview with the secretary general of a civil society association, Beirut, October 14, 2004. The secretary general narrates how one clause calling for “the encouragement and practice of democracy” in the objectives of the association was about to thwart the ministry’s grant of a licence had the team not accepted to erase it. Interview with the director of a civil society association, Beirut, October 14, 2004 .

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An additional shrewd method used to control civil society was the intentional eradication of boundaries between society and state in order to make some societal sectors dependent on the government and controlled by political elites. Whereas civil society normally aims at making the state accountable for power abuses, many associations in the post-war flourished thanks to the state. These associations, legitimized and endorsed by politicians in order to promote their interests, used the state framework to act, and highlighted the image of a civil society pliant to the regime. It is noteworthy that the proliferation of organizations in post-war Lebanon was no indication of the strength and efficiency of civil society as this arena was in many ways an extension of political and sectarian networks.389 Indeed, what retracted from the democratic impulses of civil society associations was not only the incumbents’ influence but also the heavy incrustation of confessional identities in the post-war period, which led to what a civil society activist calls the “atomization of fragmentation.”390 For instance, unable to develop an overarching agenda, active student movements remained segmented and loyal to confessional and regional allegiances.391 Even popular movements and community-based organizations lost some of their impetus, for the very fact that they reflected the thick patchwork of politicized communal cleavages, and strengthened indirectly the political order that was feeding upon Lebanon’s divides to survive. The post-war media, confessional share pies and red lines: the case of the press Under the post-Ta’if regime, while the audiovisual media scene became a platform reflecting confessional authoritarian discourses,392 the press suffered from an unprecedented political pressure. A regime strategy, known as the ‘red lines policy’, whose objective was to control the print media, consisted in imposing boundaries that journalists were forbidden to bypass. Under the Second 389

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Interview with a civil society activist, Beirut, October 25, 2004; Interview with the director of a civil society association, Beirut, October 14, 2004. Interview with the director of a civil society association, Ashrafieh, November 9, 2004. A striking example was the extreme segmentation of the Lebanese University campuses. Thus, each campus reflected a political or a confessional discourse. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, December 12, 2004. The political scientist explains how the repartition of the post-war media landscape, which mirrored confessional share pies, was mainly an attempt to consolidate the segments’ monopoly. In general terms, the LBC television station was supposed to portray the post-war political plight of the Maronite community, the Future TV represented the Sunni segment loyal to Rafik Hariri, the Manar Television portrayed the Shiite discourse affiliated to Hezbollah, and the NBN television channel spoke for the Shiite segment closely connected to parliament speaker Berri.

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Republic, it was reprehensible, for example, to criticize directly political regimes in Arab states, Syrian politicians, or Syrian politics in the press. In the Lahoud era particularly, the press was no longer able to perform one of its most important functions which lies in making the regime accountable to the people. The main hindrance was the coercive control applied by the security and intelligence services.393 Thus, it became dangerous to question the government’s ‘stable paradigms’ connected to Lebanon’s relation with Syria, or to debate directly Lebanon’s foreign policy. Discussing controversies related to the Shebaa farms, the Golan Heights, Lebanon’s relations to Israel, or the implications of the Israeli withdrawal, had to be avoided as much as possible.394 It became also rebukable to discredit President Lahoud in an article or a caricature or denigrate the army and the intelligence services. These red lines became more stringent each time pressure on the political establishment increased. Hence, it was in times of regional turmoil provoked by the derailment of the Middle Eastern Peace Process, and mainly in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks that the press was forced to become more submissive to the political order. Invoked pretexts were the need to maintain security and order in states of emergency and under difficult regional conditions.395 As a result of the ‘red lines policy’, the press developed after years of pressure a certain discipline of self-censorship which helped it to survive,396 and which allowed the Lebanese regime to use frugally oppressive measures.397 This self-censorship, which became a daily inevitable exercise, corroded to an important extent the freedom and independence of the press. Imposing inviolable boundaries was not the only method used by the regime to curtail the press. Other implicit measures related to the secrecy of information or the unwillingness of state institutions to make information accessible have 393 394 395

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Interview with a Lebanese journalist, Hazmieh, April, 23, 2004. Ibid. Interview with a Lebanese journalist, Qornet el Hamra, November 21, 2004. Asked about the means of pressure that the state had been exercizing on the print media, the journalist argued that the pressure consisted in sending implicit threats: phone calls made by the Ministry of Interior or by internal security forces or indirect messages delivered to the editor of the journal. Methods used by journalists in Lebanese newspapers published in Arabic in order to tackle implicitly ‘stable paradigms’ consisted in lapsing into generalities, and making subtle suggestions. In Francophone and Anglophone print media, a wider margin of freedom was noticeable. Methods used to bypass red lines were the use of foreign slang, humour, and complicated metaphors. Interviews with two Lebanese journalists, April 23 and November 21, 2004. After the dramatic closure of the Murr TV, the regime relied on the subtle enforcement of the red lines policy to avoid blatant acts of oppression.

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reduced the journalists’ room of maneuver. An additional important factor that stifled the post-war freedom of the press as well as the independence of the audiovisual media was the worsening economic situation. General economic deficits in the country obliged newspapers and media organizations to search for financial outlets in order to subsist. This has increased the dependence of the media on political elites, and has made the Lebanese press particularly submissive to external and mainly Arab sources of financing which limited its autarchy and increased its vulnerability to the regional configuration.398 Synthesis: The games that Lebanese semi-authoritarianism played The main factors and strategies that helped the political system remain relatively stable under the Second Republic, despite mounting domestic pressures after 2000, could be summarized as follows: The Syrian regime managed to diffuse a sufficient degree of authoritarian tendencies into the Lebanese political system so that the latter could stand on its own, and control inherent democratic pressures. The rationale for these authoritarian interplays was the necessity of a Lebanese-Syrian concurrent pathway; The Lebanese ruling elites had no interest in promoting democracy. As their power mainly emanated from a carefully constructed Lebanese-Syrian clientelist structure, allowing democratic impulses to burst forth would have implied the wane of their own influence;399 The regime’s consistent efforts to keep the opposition at bay made sure that the latter remained incoherent. Hence, under the Second Republic, slack political pluralism was unable to endanger the status quo. The parliament, which constituted in the pre-war period the main platform for democratic pressures, remained bridled by the executive. The fact that many deputies were at the same time ministers increased the level of parliamentary subservience; The emergence and maintenance of authoritarian practices were greatly facilitated by the economic recession since the end of the war.400 Economic policies adopted by the political establishment, pervasive networks of corruption as well as the political elites’ monopoly of state finances have reduced the government’s accountability and responsiveness towards its own citizens. The 398 399

400

Interview with a Lebanese journalist, Beirut, April 23, 2004. Many incumbents, who did not have a strong communal popular base such as presidents Elias Hrawi and Emile Lahoud as well as traditional notables whose influence was overshadowed by the rise of new political actors were mostly keen on safeguarding the Syrian guardianship. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, August 13, 2003.

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battered economy has also created a state of transition fatigue after the war which made the population too tired to place substantial pressure on the government; At perilous times, sustaining semi-authoritarianism meant the careful adoption of sporadic liberal strategies to alleviate pressure, dampen turmoil, and co-opt the opposition; In spite of confusing domestic and regional developments heralded by the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and the new parameters introduced by the toppling of the Saddam regime and the US politics in the Middle East, the Lebanese regime in close coordination with Syria was able for some time to preserve a certain aura of lawfulness by playing on the population’s and the opposition’s fears of instability. The fact that the post-war regime had achieved a relatively steady order endowed it with a legitimacy which prevailed over the democratic discourse. This concept of political stability built its substructure on the rationale that only a centralized model of governance could help the Lebanese state keep centrifugal forces under control as well as face external challenges. Still, as soon as the authoritarian carcass started disintegrating by the end of 2004, subsequent events proved that the post-war system – based on a kind of authoritarian pluralism – has only frozen temporarily internal conflicts, and was unable to overpower intrinsic democratic pressures. The next chapter will shed light on the points of democracy that coexisted with authoritarian pressures under the Second Republic, then outline Lebanon’s questionable liberalization in 2005.

4. Post-War Lebanon’s Long and Perilous Road to Democracy

“Lebanon is a best wounded democracy.”1 “If there is a conclusion to draw from post-war Lebanon, it is that the Lebanese democracy, as shaky as it is sometimes, absorbs, shapes, lebanonizes, and molds those who decide to join the parliamentary game.”2 Since the beginning of the post-Ta’if order, points of authority were checked either by mild or intense democratic pressures. This cohabitation of authoritarian and democratic pressures has made up the identity and peculiarity of the Lebanese regime. It is worthy of notice that the magnitude of these democratic impetuses have varied in accordance to several internal and external variables, making the act of quantifying Lebanon’s semi-authoritarian system rather difficult. Nonetheless, one remarks that main democratic pressures remained, at least during the 1990s, restricted to the civil society and to a loose opposition. These intermittent and feeble democratic impulses have become more pervasive in 2000 as the civil society and the opposition began to challenge openly the Lebanese-Syrian constructed regime, and the Syrian presence. Though interrupted by firm authority points, the 2000 democratic opening would lay the foundations for the subsequent 2005 transition or Lebanon’s Independence Intifada. After depicting the democratic pressures during the 1990s, I will concentrate on the 2000 opening and Lebanon’s 2005 Independence Intifada which promised to reawaken the country’s democratic heritage.

1 2

Interview with an American diplomat, Awkar, December 28, 2004. Carole Dagher, Ces hommes qui font la paix, (Lebanon: FMA, 1994), 326.

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Lebanese democracy: A question of relativity? It has been argued that the term ‘democracy’ in the Arab world cannot be equated with the model of democracy in Western societies, and that the process of democratization in Arab countries cannot be contrasted with the Western path of democratic transition. Because of inherent structural and societal factors, criteria for measuring democratic components and prospects for development in this part of the world vary. For example, whereas in Western societies, the constitution and institutionalism are enshrined democratic constituents, “the personalization of power” in the Arab world has outweighed other variables.3 Second, whereas societies in the Western world are preoccupied with democratic consolidation and refinement, Middle Eastern societies are rather struggling to find a stable zone between a stable authoritarian regime and a more liberal system that brings about stability. Lingering unsolved issues in the Arab world, namely the threats of communal conflicts, the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the unchecked rise of fundamentalism have obstructed liberalization. Used as pretexts by the authoritarian elites who are not keen on relinquishing their power, these lingering problems have nonetheless made concerns with stability prevail over concerns with liberalization. Encouraging the democratic discourse and promoting civil and political liberties have been interpreted as elusive Pandora’s boxes that allow political divisions and anarchy to emerge. This overriding concern with stability in a turbulent environment has particularly preoccupied the Lebanese state after a fifteen-year protracted conflict which shattered societal and political structures. In the quest for a postwar democratic revival, Lebanon has thus striven to rediscover a political formula that guaranteed national unity and stability. These considerations have led some scholars as well as political elites to argue that classifying Lebanon’s political system does not hinge on generally applicable or Western standards,4 and that the Lebanese model has never wandered away from the democratic zone, which differs from one region to the other. The gist of the argument is that Lebanon’s degree of democracy has to be ‘rationalized,’5 interpreted as part of a broader experiment,6 and relativized to its 3

4

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For more information, see Kamal S. Abu Jaber, “The Democratic Process in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan,” in Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges, eds Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2003): 127-141, 128 Harik argues that considering the Lebanese system as “nondemocratic simply because it does not correspond to or mimic Western forms of democracy would be both intellectually indefensible and shortsighted.” See “Pluralism in the Arab World,” 52. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, October 8, 2004. A Lebanese politician cautions scholars against limiting their analysis to a narrow timetable in

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Arab context and to the limitations of Middle Eastern politics.7 Thus, the Lebanese notion of democracy remains a comparative idea that has to be analyzed while taking into account the environment’s intransigent structural factors. Observers have also maintained that Lebanon’s system under the Second Republic has to be seen as a temporarily “handicapped democracy”8 and that the natural process of post-war democratization has only stagnated because of “Syria’s complete control over the country,”9 and by the Arab-Israeli conflict.10 This hypothesis implies that once these hindering factors no longer prevail, Lebanon could follow a natural course of redemocratization. Thought has also been given to the constant democratic parameters deeply anchored in the Lebanese system. In spite of the overbearing Syrian hegemony, the persistence of liberal pressures – more particularly a more or less free press, a vibrant civil society, and a functioning parliament – implied that democracy could be hiding out and waiting for the propitious political environment to blossom again. Slow incremental improvement in electoral practices since 1992, and a set of sequential changes, symbolized by the 2000 opening and the 2005 uprising, showed that democratic pressures were rising up.11

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analyzing Lebanon’s democratic transition. He argues that the Lebanese democratic experience should be seen as part of a broader sequence that dates back to decades, and emphasizes the normative role of the Lebanese experiment as a model of democratization for the Arab world despite its highs and lows. Interview with the author, Beirut, November 8, 2004. A Lebanese politician argues that definining whether Lebanon is a democracy or not is a relative notion that has to be measured in relation to the surrounding environment. Hence, although the Lebanese system includes some imperfections, it remains “the freest and most democratic system in the Arab region.” Interview with the author, Beirut, December 12, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese religious figure, Ashrafieh, October 12, 2004. See Etel Solingen, “Toward a Democratic Peace in the Middle East,” in Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges, 42-62, 46. During my field research, some observers argued that the identity of the Lebanese system under the Second Republic could not be determined that easily as it was hostage to the Syrian factor. An American diplomat maintained that the Lebanese democratic process had been kidnapped by Syria, but the democratic components remained embedded in the political structure. Interview with the author, Awkar, December 28, 2004. A Lebanese politician held that Lebanon’s degree of democracy was contingent upon the Syrian influence on the regime. Thus, the less hegemonic the Syrian impact is, the more democracy one observes. He advised thereby to analyze the system in terms of contextual sequences and warned against general categorizations. Interview with the author, Ashrafieh, November 26, 2004. It was maintained that democracy in Lebanon has stagnated because of problems of ‘stateness’ aggravated by the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. See Stepan and Robertson, “An “Arab” more than “Muslim” Electoral Gap,” 38. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Ashrafieh, November 26, 2004.

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Special attention has been paid to the post-war Lebanese legislature that performed several positive functions in spite of its submissiveness to the executive.12 The mere presence of a pluralist parliamentary platform has enabled the integration of actors operating outside the system.13 Though the parliament was rarely able to bring about changes in policy-making, it denounced flagrantly many lurking malfunctions, and scored little victories against the government.14 After the extension of Lahoud’s mandate, the opposition branch in the legislature constituted the sole effective political organ which was able to exert pressure on the government, and request accountability.15 Furthermore, the consociational apparatus, mainly the coalition cabinet as well as the multicommunal parliament in addition to the principles of proportionality and segmental autonomy, have acted as given factors that ensured pervasive pluralism. Notwithstanding that the coalition cabinets have reflected throughout the years predominant colorings, and that the legislature has been considerably weakened, the inter-communal politics of accommodation prenecessitated democratic practices that despite their ebb and flow remained intractable. Enthroned in the political system, communalism has thus mitigated autocratic pressures, and has functioned as a structural guarantee against fullscale authoritarianism.16

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On the viability of the Lebanese legislature, see Baaklini, Deneoux and Springborg, “Lebanon,” in Legislative Politics, 102-104. The Lebanese parliament has shown that by improving the inclusiveness of legislatures, dissident organizations could evolve into more moderate actors. The integration of the Shiite political party Hezbollah in the political system – first through the parliament – remains a telling example. Between 1992 and 1996, for instance, the parliament refused on various occasions to grant to the Hariri government the prerogative to examine urgent matters by itself. At times when the Troika cartel and the coalition government were lamed by political feuding, the parliament had not refrained from criticizing harshly the government’s reconstruction and economic policies. In 1995, although this refusal has been interpreted as a strategy to consolidate his position, parliament speaker Berri opposed at first the renewal of president Hrawi’s term. A number of deputies also denounced this constitutional tampering. Parliamentarians, who refused to participate in the Karami government, were determined to bring down the cabinet in March 2005 by a no-confidence vote. Interview with the director of Lebanese civil society association, Ashrafieh, November 9, 2004.

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Democratic pressures in the 1990s The endurance of the Lebanese civil society Even at the lowest ebb of liberalization that the post-war regime had reached, the Lebanese civil society remained pulsating with energy.17 In the 1990s, it succeeded in assembling dispersed factions that, despite their fragmentation and vulnerability to economic and political pressures, monitored and watched over the democratic discourse.18 Civil society’s first throbbing signs of life after the war go back to May 6, 1992 as street riots and popular demonstrations led to the downfall of the Karami government accused of being responsible for the prevailing economic recession. Two years later, it scored another victory after civic organizations had forced the Hariri government to reconsider its media policy.19 In September 1996, as the government set about once again to restructure media channels, fragment associations, and intimidate opposition activists, a cross-national movement which combined various organizations and pro-opposition factions denounced staunchly the autocratic machinery.20 This large-scale front seemed to gain ground, yet its different constituents soon parted company as their programs and goals diverged. In the second half of the 1990s, the most important actors who managed to exert pressure on the political establishment, in spite of its regular use of coercive measures, were the Labor Union, non-governmental organizations, the Student Movement, various intellectual and opposition movements as well as media institutions. 17

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Civil society in Lebanon has never collapsed even during the war. Its survival during the 15-year conflict could be traced back to the disintegration of the state, and to the government’s incapacity to provide services to Lebanese citizens. Although civil society resembled a patchwork of mini-authoritarian and fragmented militia spaces during the war, it succeeded in transmuting its identity in the 1990s. Some even argue that this richest democratic reservoir is stronger than the Lebanese government. For more details on the strengths of the Lebanese civil society, see Harik, “Pluralism in the Arab World.” A Lebanese civil society activist emphasizes that whereas political parties have generally lost their impetus during this period, civil society movements have shown a remarkable endurance, and have kept the discourse of democracy alive and kicking. Interview with the author, Beirut, December 14, 2004. As soon as the Hariri cabinet decided to prohibit certain radio and television news programs, and imparted its intention to ban all publications harming the politicians’ reputation and public order, civic organizations obliged the government to reconsider its policy, and forced it to lift the ban on political news in July 1994. This coalition provoked a national wave of sympathy and was backed by various transcommunal political groups critical of Hariri’s policies.

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Although the government had tried hard to split the labor union headed by opposition actor Elias Abou Risq, the association did not abstain from exerting pressure on the government to adjust wages, alter its economic policies, and stop curtailing the rights of association and expression.21 In addition to that, civic organizations22 – which started particularly thriving in the second half of the 1990s – constituted in the absence of coherent party systems a positive counterweight which helped sustain the seeds of a democratic culture. Owing their rapid growth partly to the fact that political parties and syndicates had lost their attractiveness as well as their autonomy, they preserved democratic enclaves resistant to the state’s compelling discourse. In general, they sought to create a transversal Lebanese identity and to reconstitute new public spheres of dialogue and interaction.23 Rising above confessional considerations, they were known for shifting the discourse to other public and overarching issues such as social development, environmental awareness, good governance, or democracy promotion.24 The Student Movement constituted another strong foundation of the post-war civil society. In 1997, following the government’s decision to prevent the Murr TV from screening an interview with General Aoun, multicommunal student movements organized protests decrying the political establishment’s practices. 25 These stormy rallies forced the government to cancel the ban, and to allow the diffusion of the interview in January 1998. With the symbolic liberation of the village of Arnun, the Student Movement recorded another triumph in 1997.26

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Defying the demonstration ban announced by the Ministry of Interior, the unabated Labor Union organized several strikes in 1995 and 1996 in defense of media freedoms and adequate living standards. I refer in this case to the non-government, non-profit as well as voluntary associations that were keen on reinforcing Lebanon’s public sphere and that were not mere extensions of patronage networks co-opted by the establishment. See Karam Karam, “Les associations au Liban: entre caritatif et politique,” in pouvoirs et associations dans le monde arabe, ed. Sarah bin Nefissa (Paris: CNRS, 2002), 8-27. For instance, the Laure Moghaizel Foundation which developed in coordination with the Lebanese Association for Permanent Civil Peace in 1999 a theoretical and empirical framework for measuring democracy in Lebanon, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections which has been monitoring elections since 1996, and the Grouping for Municipal Elections which has monitored municipal elections in the post-war period. A first demonstration organized on the premises of the Murr Television was followed by protests that lasted for several days after security services had detained many protesters. For the first time, posters and banners denouncing the Syrian presence were displayed. After the Israeli troops had isolated the village of Arnun during a confrontation with Hezbollah with a wire fence in February 1997, 1.500 students made their way to the village, tore down the barbed wire and freed the village from the Israeli siege. Arnun’s liberation has a widely allegorical connotation which stands now for the Lebanese civil society’s unabating momentum.

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Other movements such as the Free Patriotic Movement and the post-war intellectual elite have also contributed to sustaining the democratic discourse. Aoun’s largely multi-confessional movement, which has acted in coordination with student movements and civic organizations, was considered to be one of the few factions that dared to decry the state’s politics of subservience to Syria at the time. Lebanese intellectuals and academics have not refrained either from voicing discontent and demanding political reform.27 In addition to these groups, the audiovisual and written media was largely responsible for the survival of the democratic rhetoric. Notwithstanding increasing governmental censorship, all channels of mass communication remained critical of the political order. It is noteworthy that the mere existence of a wide spectrum of television channels, and multilingual journals safeguarded the spirit of pluralism. In the audiovisual media, for example, though the government made sure that major political news were dictated by the state television, the political and social talk shows helped keep the civic discourse alive. Focusing on controversial political and social subjects, they shed light on the deficiencies of the political order, and provided a platform several sociopolitical outlooks clashed and where even the red lines imposed by the government were openly discussed.28 In the written media, editorials and opinion articles remained the most important journalistic avenues that uncovered the government’s ills, and condemned Syrian tutelage.29 Political opposition During the 1990s, political opposition contributed to constraining executive power and mitigating the autocratic components of the regime. However, it is worth mentioning that this opposition remained until 2000 loose and uncoordinated. One should rather speak of multiple opposition fronts rather than a unified opposition bloc. In the 1990s, the most popular opposition fronts could be divided in three broad categories. First, the Paris opposition, which grouped Michel Aoun and 27

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In 1994, for example, 55 intellectuals issued a manifesto condemning corruption. The following year, a petition protesting against the extension of Hrawi’s mandate and calling for the preservation of the constitution was submitted to the parliament. Marwan Kraidy, “Television and Civic Discourse in Postwar Lebanon,” in Civil Discourse and Digital Age Communications in the Middle East, eds Leo A. Gher and Hussein Amin (Stamford, C.T.: Abtex Publishing Corporation, 2000), 3-17. See for example the editorials published in the dailies An-Nahar and L’Orient Le Jour during the 1990s.

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Raymond Edde, cast doubt upon the Syrian-backed regime. Other Christian and Muslim actors such as the Lebanese Forces banned in 1994, the Kata’ib Party as well as Muslim moderate politicians30 criticized the government, but accepted the Ta’if legacy. Hezbollah formed a third opposition front critical of Hariri’s policies, but pleased with the Syrian hegemony on Lebanese affairs. The Shiite party, which had become highly organized and structured, targeted primarily the government’s corruption networks, indifference towards the plight of the poor, and the unjust judicial system. Encompassing different goals and interests, these factions remained unable to establish an overarching national platform. Some opposition groups even carved confessional niches largely ingrained in communal affinities.31 In 1997, for the first time, a significant parliamentary coalition, critical of Hariri’s method of action, gathered Muslim and Christian actors. Yet no sooner were the cards shuffled than the alliance disintegrated.32 It was only in the wake of Lahoud’s accession to the presidential office that a new Druze-SunniChristian opposition front began to emerge. The Huss government’s biased anti-corruption campaign as well as President Lahoud’s style of governance prompted various actors to form transcommunal opposition fronts. For example, after accusing the government of turning political reform into a spiteful purge, Hariri strove to establish friendly relations with the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir and other Christian actors excluded from the Huss government. Vehemently critical of President Lahoud’s style, Druze leader and Hariri’s ally, Walid Jumblatt, began criticizing the regime for curtailing the media, tapping phone lines, and stifling the opposition. He was the first to allude to the rise of a military regime.33 Still, this embryonic alliance remained slack. In October 1999, Hariri and Jumblatt reconciled with the president as political and utilitarian interests prevailed in the pre-electoral period. Speculation was rife that Hariri’s and Jumblatt’s efforts to strike an alliance with Christian opposition actors were part of an electoral campaign aimed at paving the way for their political return. 30

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In 1995, Sunni politicians such as Salim el Huss and Tamam Salam denounced the illegal tampering with the constitution, and warned against the danger of blocking rotation of power. For instance, in 1996, Christian opposition leaders Michel Aoun, Dory Chamoun, and Amin Gemayel set up the Lebanese National Opposition Coalition. This front, which had a monoconfessional coloring, failed to encompass a broader play of interests. As premier Hariri imparted his intention to postpone muncipal elections until 1999, the grouping headed by Salim el Huss in coordination with other opposition deputies, denounced the anticonstitutional move, and appealed to the Constitutional Council. The latter ruled out Hariri’s request, and insisted on the timely holding of municipal elections. For more information, see Harris, “Lebanon,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey 1999, 384388.

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Anyhow, these first blurred lines of a transcommunal opposition would sow the first seeds leading to the 2000 opening. The role of religious elites Keeping a watchful eye on the political establishment, the religious order helped check incumbents’ authoritarian practices. Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, who first accepted the Ta’if legacy, turned into a staunch critic of the Syrian presence and of the government during the 1990s. The marginalized Christian community, at this time leaderless and aloof from the regime’s practices, perceived him as a surrogate political leader. As early as 1993, he denounced the Syrian guardianship, and the government’s subordinate behavior. Emphasizing that Lebanon’s sovereignty prevails over the stable paradigms of security and public order, he has denounced – in his Sunday sermons, meetings with politicians, and public speeches – constitutional violations, excessive Syrian interventions, the politicization of the judicial system, and electoral malpractices.34 Another religious personality, who condemned the wane of liberties in the post-war era and echoed the Maronite patriarch’s disapproval of constitutional tampering, was the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Ignatius IV. In the second half of the 1990s, the convening of the Catholic Synod for Lebanon in Rome, and the pope’s visit provided for the Lebanese population, and mainly the Christian community, new avenues to vent discontent with the Lebanese-Syrian regime. In 1995, the Catholic Synod for Lebanon reaffirmed – despite the anticonstitutional extension of President Hrawi’s mandate – the predisposition of the Lebanese system to democracy, and laid special emphasis on the particularity of the system’s power-sharing attributes and the roots of communal consensus implanted in the Lebanon society. Furthermore, the visit of the late Pope John Paul II to Beirut in 1997 empowered the political discourse of the Lebanese civil society and the opposition. This visit, whose aim was to consolidate the Christians’ role in Lebanon and in the Middle East, reverberated as a warning against damaging the essence of Lebanon’s consensual system and role in the Arab world. The Pope’s apostolic exhortation, “A New Hope for Lebanon,” denounced the presence of 34

His confrontations became more daring with time. In 1994, for instance, he imparted to the late pope John Paul II his refusal to visit Syria before Lebanon recovered his freedom. In 1997, he reinforced his alliance with Maronite opposition leaders, criticized the selective post-war amnesty, and met for the first time, since the end of the war, Aoun in Paris. In 1998, in a meeting with late Premier Hariri, he decried political actors’ inability to restructure relations with Syria and their reliance on external actors to fortify their internal position.

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foreign troops without naming either Syria or Israel, and stressed that the Lebanese nation was capable of upholding its own national project. Less critical of Syria’s presence in Lebanon, considered as a factor of stability that helped the country achieve internal cohesion, Muslim religious actors have not refrained from decrying the ruling elites’ style of governance and lurking corruption networks. One exceptionally daring critic of the Second Republic is the Shiite religious leader Mohammed Hussein Fadlullah who did not refrain from describing Lebanon’s independence as a delusion after the renewal of Hrawi’s term.35 The 2000 opening At the dawn of the new millennium, a constellation of events slowly began to erode the authoritarian crust of the Lebanese system. The withdrawal of Israel from the South of Lebanon in May 2000, the hopes of a Syrian change of course after President Hafez el Assad’s death in June, and the Lebanese parliamentary elections in the summer, paved the way for considerable modifications on the political scene. One of the most important outcomes was the removal of the veil of secrecy surrounding the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The liberation of the South led to the inevitable questions whether Lebanon should remain hostage to Syria in its proxy war against Israel, and whether the time had come to restructure Lebanese-Syrian relations and start implementing the Ta’if agreement, particularly the clauses connected to Syrian redeployment. Still, Lebanese and Syrian incumbents hurried to circumvent these controversial matters by maintaining that Hezbollah would continue its resistance activities against Israel until the Shebaa farms were liberated, and that Lebanon’s pathway remained subordinated to Syria’s until the implementation of a comprehensive Middle Eastern accord. In addition, the failure of the US-Syrian Geneva summit in March 2000 and the stalled Israeli-Palestinian negotiations indicated that change was still remote.36 Following Premier Ehud Barak’s announcement of an imminent unilateral Israeli withdrawal, the late editor of Lebanon’s influential daily An Nahar, Gibrane Tueni, wrote an open letter to President Bashar demanding the 35

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For more information on the role of Christian and Muslim religious personalities in the post-war period, see Dagher, Ces hommes qui font la paix, 323-326. The failure of the US-Syrian Geneva summit was interpreted on the one hand as an indicator of declining US support for Syria and on the other hand as an augur that Syria would not give up its Lebanese card. Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations had come to a standstill after the Camp David initiative in July 2000.

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rectification of Lebanese-Syrian relations and drawing attention to Lebanon’s status as a ‘Syrian province.’37 This daring editorial was followed by other similar articles which displayed discontent with Syrian policy in Lebanon.38 Whereas resentment in the 1990s was limited to some opposing factions, particularly to Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, and to some parliamentarians like Greek Orthodox deputy Najah Wakim who overtly asked in 1997 for an adjustment of bilateral relations, the 2000 breakthrough brought about a new reality: discontent in Christian and Druze communities with Syrian hegemony threatened to spill over. A burgeoning opposition axis led by Druze leader Jumblatt as well as by Christian critical spokesmen revealed that a first post-war common platform was about to take shape. In mid-April 2000, Jumblatt started showing increasing concern with the evolvement of Lebanese-Syrian relations, and with the intelligence apparatus endorsed by President Lahoud. Criticizing the arbitrary inflow of Syrian workers to Lebanon and the worrisome Lebanese emigration waves, he called for the initiation of a genuine debate on the Lebanese-Syrian relations and for a Christian-Druze dialogue.39 Other Christian opposition actors such as Nassib Lahoud proposed a radical revision of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship on all levels. In no time, misgivings about the Syrian role in Lebanon spread out even to some Sunni and Shi’ite political actors.40 During the 2000 elections, outspoken opposition figures managed to make a victorious entry, and alter the subservient parliamentarian discourse.41 In September, emboldened by the Christian opposition’s victory, the Maronite Bishops’ Council issued a declaration which condemned Syrian hegemony, and even called for Syrian departure. Rebutting the claim that Syrian withdrawal would lead to internal struggles, the declaration maintained that “Lebanese infighting” had been sustained by foreign incitement.”42 Although loyalist actors 37 38

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See An-Nahar, 23 March 2000. Opposition actor Samir Franjieh published in the French daily L’Orient Le Jour another editorial asking if Lebanon had to pay the price for Syria’s peace with Israel. See L’Orient Le Jour, 27 March 2000. See Harris, “Lebanon,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey 2000, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 2002), 365-393. For instance, former Premier in the 2005 interim cabinet, Najib Mikati, called in 2000 for a revision of Lebanese-Syrian relations. Shiite leftist opposition actors such as Habib Sadeq expressed displeasure with Syrian role in Lebanon. Christian parliamentarians such as Boutros Harb, Nayla Muawad, Albert Moukheiber, and Pierre Gemayel did not refrain from criticizing Syria’s excessive interferences. See “Declaration of the Maronite Bishops 20 September 2000,” Cederland, available from http://www. geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/2587/declaration.html, accessed October 26, 2006; Mona Ziade, “Bkirki Has Ruffled Lots of Feathers,” The Daily Star, September 23, 2000, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=29866&categ_id=2.

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hurried to condemn the statement as an attempt to stir up sectarian enmities, and encourage pro-Israeli schemes, the debate did not abate.43 In November that year, Jumblatt went as far as calling for a redeployment of the Syrian troops in accordance with the Ta’if agreement. Alarmed by this affront, the Syrian government declared Jumblatt persona non grata in Damascus, and pulled back all privileges that the Druze leader had enjoyed in Syria. The following year, the newly developed political alignments seemed to yield fruit as two political gatherings calling for a democratic Lebanon free of Syrian influence emerged in the spring and in the summer. The first grouping, the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, which assembled Christian political actors highly critical of the Syrian role,44 was first criticized for its mono-confessional coloring. Still, the gathering succeeded in reviving the discourse on national reconciliation, and focused on the urgency of implementing the Ta’if accord, and organizing a planned Syrian withdrawal. The second gathering, the Democratic Forum,45 which grouped Muslim and Christian political actors, called for redefining relations with Syria and strengthening the democratic parameters in the Lebanese political system.46 A gust of political liberty after 2000?47 After this political breakthrough, it was clear that Syrian predominance was “less likely to be taken for granted than it was not too long ago,” and that social hush had come to an end as the Lebanese started discussing publicly issues “that they would never have said in the past, except to their most trustworthy friends.”48 Indeed, heartened by the rising opposition, civil society activists and student movements did not hesitate during demonstrations to bring about quite unusual

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Greek Orthodox patriarch Ignatius IV condemned the politicians’ attempt to silence the opposition’s voice, and endorsed indirectly the statement of the Maronite Church. The Qornet Shehwan grouping gathered Christian independent politicians as well as members affiliated to the National Liberal Party, to the Lebanese Forces, and to the reformist section of the Kata’ib Party led by Amin Gemayel. Led by Shiite opposition actor Habibi Sadeq. A more moderate gathering led by Salim el Huss, the National Action Front, called for the establishment of healthy relations between Syria and Lebanon built on equity. For a summary of the Lebanese civil society’s and opposing factions’ emancipation, see James Bruces, “Lebanese Factions Begin to Challenge Syrian Domination,” Janes Intelligence Review 13 (June 2001): 39-42. Norton, “Lebanon’s Malaise,” Survival 42 (Winter 2000-01): 35-51, 47

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themes considered as taboos in the 1990s such as Syrian withdrawal, the marginalization of Christian leaders, and the violation of civil liberties.49 On April 13, 2000, for instance, after the arrests of students allied to the Free Patriotic Movement, demonstrations embracing more than 800 protesters spread to most university campuses, to the premises of the Ministry of Justice, as well as to other symbolic areas such as Beirut Central Park, and Bkerki, the Maronite Patriarch’s seat. Despite the security officials’ invasive interference, unabated rallies that continued through the month of April, shouted the departure of foreign troops, and called for the cessation of arbitrary arrests. Activists’ and students’ grievances were restated by Christian clerics and various opposing groups across the political spectrum.50 In the following months, large-scale demonstrations increasingly focused on themes that were previously camouflaged. The so-called unimpeachable ‘Syrian role’ and ‘stable paradigms’ became more and more questionable.51 Although the state’s authoritarian apparatus became more coercive in 2001, protests did not subside.52 Two major large-scale rallies, in which controversial topics were put under scrutiny, took place in March 2001. During the protests organized by the Free Patriotic Movement, Syria’s role as a factor of stability in Lebanon was decried.53 Later that month, upon Patriarch Sfeir’s return from North America where he met with the Lebanese Diaspora and reiterated his call for Syrian pullout, more than 100.000 Christians welcomed him displaying 49

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A Lebanese politician comments that civil society remains “one of the most precious Lebanese democratic ressources that can confront the regime […] and put an end to the state of pie sharing.” Interview with the author, Beirut, November 9, 2004. Describing Lebanon as a “country that buries democracy,” the normally reticent Greek Orthodox archbishop Elias Aoudi joined the chorus. For more information, see Gary C.Gambill, “Special Report: Lebanon’s Intifada,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, April 2000, http://www.meib. org/articles/0004_l1.htm. In September 2000, for example, the banned Lebanese Forces staged rallies calling for Samir Geagea’s release and for the departure of Syrian troops. Two months later, on the Independence Commemoration Day, the Free Patriotic Movement joined by university students denounced Syrian hegemony in front of the Lebanese National Museum. In February 2001, more than 100 intellectuals signed a petition demanding the readjustment of the two countries’ relations and the recovery of Lebanon’s full sovereignty. In March 2001, in order to commemorate Aoun’s war of liberation against Syria, FPM activists staged demonstrations in the Lebanese capital and at university campuses. Security services were deployed to prevent protesters from reaching a Syrian military base outside Beirut, blockades obstructed the entrances to university campuses, and checkpoints paralyzed the traffic in Beirut. In defiance of deployed security services hindering the activists’ access to the Saint Joseph University in Beirut, former dean, Father Selim Abou, made an alarming speech in which he vehemently denounced Syria’s prolonged stay and refuted the claim that Syria maintained stability and shielded the country from the breakout of sectarian flare-ups. Abou also maintained that Christians as well as Muslims shared the same national strife.

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slogans of freedom, brandishing photos of marginalized Christian leaders, and calling for Syrian departure.

The limitations and aftermath of the 2000 opening A spiral of conflicting democratic and autocratic pressures In the wake of the 2000 interlude, the opposition’s discourse and the awakening of the civil society increased the incumbents’ cautiousness and determination to control the nascent dissent. Following the uprising, a complex alternance of democratic impulses and authoritarian pressures sustained by the ruling elites showed that Lebanon’s political system followed at the time the patterns of a semi-authoritarian configuration “deliberately created and maintained […] through skilful game playing and maneuvering.”54 In order to neutralize blossoming democratic trends, the regime retaliated with subtle as well as coercive measures. Regular allusions to instability and sectarian discord served to counterpoise the opposition’s endeavors, to refute the necessity of Syrian withdrawal, and obstruct further liberalism. An illustrative case was the pro-Syrian actors’ attempt to reduce the 2000 awakening to an antiSyrian campaign instigated by Israel which serves to enliven turmoil in the country.55 Right after its publication, the Maronite Bishops’ declaration in September 2000 was portrayed by loyalist actors as part of a scheme destined to leave Lebanon’s door open to the demons of instability and confessionalism.56 Beginning 2001, dismissing hopes for more liberal Lebanese-Syrian relations, the Syrian president emphasized in an interview with the Londonbased daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, that a Syrian withdrawal would not occur unless a comprehensive peace agreement was signed with Israel and unless civil peace in Lebanon became unshakeable.57 Following suit, Lebanese authorities announced that a Syrian withdrawal would rock the foundations of the precarious inter-confessional peace.58 54 55

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See Ottoway, Democracy Challenged, 159-160. For an account of pro-Syrian versus anti-Syrian tendencies during this period, see W. B. Fisher, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East and North Africa 2004, ed. Richard I. Lawless (London: Europa Publications, 2003), 707-773, 738-739. See Norton, “Lebanon’s Malaise.” See “All Quiet on the Eastern Front, Almost... Bashar Assad’s First Interview,” Memri Inquiry and Analysis Series, February 16, 2001, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?page_archives&Area =ia&ID=IA4901. In the spring, during the annual Ashura commemoration, Hezbollah’s Secretary General and

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By August 2001, the short-lived democratic opening was brought to a halt. Interpreted as an attempt to muffle this episode of liberalism, a large-scale military crackdown on activists provoked a passing wave of political lethargy. 59 Indeed, the second statement of the Maronite Bishops’ Council, released in September right after the staged onslaught, did not arouse much commotion. Reluctant to provoke Syria further after its redeployment in June 2001, opposing factions chose to relapse in a temporary phase of quietness.60 Despite the incumbents’ wish to dismiss this awakening as a transient phase, the 2000 opening did not go unnoticed, and had many repercussions on Lebanon’s transition. First, it provided the first foundation upon which the subsequent 2005 uprising was built, and sketched the first hazy lines of the opposition’s political agenda. Indeed, opposing factions, which had kept an aftertaste of this uprising, would await the next propitious opportunity to take back their activities. Second, this opening revealed to the Syrian and Lebanese incumbents that the civil society’s unabated impetus and the birth of a more coherent opposition could not be ignored. After the 2000 interlude, for example, Syria started making more concessions to the Lebanese opposition.61 The mere existence of a more consistent opposition bloc made the Lahoud presidential crew realize that it could no longer afford an onslaught similar to the August 11 crackdown each time activists contested the regime’s authority. Attempts at subduing opposing groups became thus more spaced, but still aimed at narrowing the civil society’s leeway.62 The opposition’s weak spots The incumbents’ efforts to curtail the opposition notwithstanding, the 2000 opening was unable to acquire an overarching character. Reduced to various Christian parties, to the Druze segment, and to some disparate voices in the Sunni and Shiite communities, it failed to give birth to a transcommunal current.

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staunch pro-Syrian ally, Hassan Nasrallah, announced that a Syrian withdrawal would shake the foundations of the Lebanese precarious inter-confessional peace. Following suit, speaker Berri affirmed that a Syrian withdrawal was inimaginable under the prevailing conditions. The arrest of Toufic Hindi, a member of the Qornet Shehwan grouping, was an attempt to prune and intimidate the Christian opposition. See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2002 (London: Oxford Business Group, 2002), 13-39, 25. In Spring 2002, the opposition greeted Bashar’s visit to Lebanon and the further redeployment of 20.000 troops to the Beqa’a with cautious enthusiasm. By alluding to the implementation of the Ta’if agreement after the redeployment, the Syrian establishment was trying to co-opt the Lebanese opposition. For instance, the shutdown of the Murr TV in September 2002.

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Furthermore, the newly born Christian-Druze axis remained unable to develop a common political agenda after its electoral triumph in 2000 for two main reasons: Druze and Christian opposition groups remained divided on the course of action,63 and the Christian opposition remained loose. Whereas the Free Patriotic Movement rejected the government’s legitimacy, other moderate voices such as the Qornet Shehwan grouping and the Maronite bishops opposed the Syrian presence, but favored the establishment of dialogue with the government. Furthermore, Christian opposition gatherings were weakened by inner rifts that highlighted their brittleness. In 2002, a member of the Qornet Shehwan grouping, Carlos Edde,64 left the gathering in order to strike an alliance with loyalist actors. Other parties such as the banned Lebanese Forces and the Kata’ib Party experienced a process of inner fragmentation that undermined the Maronite community’s coherence.65 Taking advantage of these slack arrangements, the ruling elites made sure that democratic pressures remained restricted to certain opposition enclaves. Within a short time, it became evident that changing the political trajectory of the Lebanese system needed more than scattered uprisings. The 2000 opening sidelined by regional troubles In addition to these internal cracks, the opposition’s strife in 2003 was overshadowed by regional uncertainties related to the US-led war in Iraq and to the increasing Middle Eastern turmoil.66 Saddam’s demise raised the question whether the Baathist regime in Syria would be next and whether political turmoil would threaten the precarious regional balance. Upon the Maronite Patriarch’s recommendation, the Lebanese opposition mitigated its criticism of Syria, and declared that an eventual Syrian destabilization was not in Lebanon’s interest.67 Still, despite mounting regional tension, the Lebanese opposition managed to publish a document entitled “the Beirut Declaration” condemning Syrian interference and calling for the Syrian troops’ withdrawal in June 2003. The main factor that stirred the opposition to action was the realization that a new 63

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While Druze leader Jumblatt called for a Syrian redeployment to the Beqa’a, Christian politicians like Nassib Lahoud, the Democratic Renewal Movement’s leader, called for a final Syrian withdrawal. After his uncle’s death, Carlos Edde became the National Bloc’s leader. In addition to the temporary split of the Kata’ib Party into a loyalist and a reformist section, the Lebanese Forces Party also experienced internal power struggles. A loyal branch discredited by the party’s leader Samir Geagea was founded by Fouad Malek in 2001. For an account of the anti-Syrian wave and how it was sidelined in the aftermath of September 11, see Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2002, 25-27. See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Analysis,” Emerging Lebanon 2003, 14.

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regional conjuncture might bring about a pathbreaking change in Lebanon. Indeed, few months later, the Syrian Accountability Act calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian troops was signed by President Bush in December 2003.68 In addition, the US-backed road map for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement and the Greater Middle East Initiative69 augured an era of regional transformation that affected the Lebanese-Syrian pathway. Indeed, the nebulous regional landscape provoked after 2003 a great deal of intrigue and cautiousness in Lebanon. Whether loyalists or regime critics, politicians started pondering the possible impact of an American change of heart concerning Damascus, and its effects on Lebanon.

Lebanon’s 2005 transition: the end of the competitive authoritarian regime? Lebanon’s post-war pathway indicates that semi-authoritarian features reached a climax between 1998 and 2004. Despite the persistence of authority points, an extraordinary transition was able to force its way. The main triggering event that set democratic change in motion was remarkably an authoritarian act: the renewal of President Lahoud’s term in September 2004. This event was followed by a series of unexpected political changes. A propitious intersection of endogenous and exogenous factors led to “the most intense period of street marches in the history of modern Lebanon.”70 Many post-war authoritarian practices were dismantled by a kind of precarious path to redemocratization both externally monitored and originating from within.71 The 2005 system transition showed that the resilience of the Lebanese semi-authoritarian regime hinged mainly on the survival of Syrian guardianship. The moment the latter declines, the system is more likely to adopt a new political complexion.72 In the following paragraphs, I will analyze the main internal, regional, and international parameters that propelled this system transition. First, I will lay emphasis on the change in the international conjuncture marked by the rise of a new world order after the September 11 attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. This 68

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Aoun overtly supported the legislation, but other Lebanese opposition figures were wary of its content and possible implications. Launched by the Bush administration in June 2004, the Greater Middle East Initiative called for a regional transformation on the political and economic levels. It was maintained that this plan heralded the era of democratization in the region. Safa, “Lebanon Springs Forward,” 31. See Stepan, “Paths to Redemocratization.” Paul Salem, Interview with the author, December 12, 2004, Beirut.

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new international configuration has impacted the Lebanese scene through the reshaping of the US-Syrian relationship and the adoption of UN Resolution 1559 which placed Lebanon under the aegis of the international community. After showing how external intervention gave momentum to the already existent but frail opposing factions, I will shed light on the internal parameters of change, particularly on the maturation of a nearly overarching opposition and on the feverish uprising of the civil society after Hariri’s death.73 Then, I will extrapolate the main phases that led to a system breakthrough which, despite its culmination into the election of the freest legislature since 1972, remains doubleedged and fallible to authoritarian reversal. The 2005 awakening and its underlying motives (September 2004-January 2005): the first signs of transition External factors: an international change of heart Syria’s military stay in Lebanon lasted almost thirty years until its departure became an imperative matter. What turned the tide was an array of international and regional events converging with the American plan to redesign a broader Middle East especially after the 11 September attacks. The post-2001 world policies that affected the region – specifically the change of the US agenda in the region, its commitment to a full-scale war on terror, the end of its support for the Syrian role in Lebanon, and the war on Iraq – have had long-term consequences on the Lebanese-Syrian relationship. Indeed, for some, it seemed that “the war on terror came to Lebanon’s rescue.”74 As the political landscape had been significantly altered, Syria had to bow to new regional imperatives: eager to enforce its new agenda, the Bush administration was no longer ready to strike compromises with dissenting Arab regimes. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Palestinian reform, and the fight against terrorism became interwoven files that required a necessary regional overhaul and a change of Arab elites’ mentalities. According to the Bush establishment, Syria had to keep up with the pace of change.

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According to some analysts, the Lebanese Diaspora’s plight to re-internationalize the Lebanese file also contributed to attracting international attention. See Walid Phares. “The Road to UNSCR 1559 Calling on Syria to Pull out from Lebanon,” Lebanon Wire, November 29, 2004, available from http://www.defenddemocracy.org//in_the_media/in_the_media_show.htm? doc_id=250905. Fouad Ajami, “The Autumn of the Autocrats,” Foreign Affairs 84 (2005): 20-35, 27.

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The Syrian-American relationship At the moment when US calls for Syrian pullout from Lebanon started increasing in 2001, Syria claimed that these calls transcended the Lebanese issue as such and aimed at extorting Syrian concessions on other regional matters. Thus, if Syria appeared to use Lebanon as a proxy in its war against Israel, the US seemed to take advantage of the Lebanese card in its aggressive diplomacy against Syria. At last, the green light granted initially by the US to Syria in Lebanon turned red, and the international community’s pragmatic silence during the 1990s awaiting a possible Israeli-Palestinian settlement changed into an escalating uproar. Threatened of isolation, Syria started facing internal and external pressures that undermined the robustness of its regime as well as its position as a regional power. Since September 11, fighting terrorism has become the driving force behind the US international agenda. The American administration shifted attention towards Damascus, and condemned its suspicious support for organizations dubbed as ‘terrorist’. Syria’s support for groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine was interpreted by the US as an obstacle hindering a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace. First signs of threat sent by the US were the Syrian Accountability Act and the Restoration of the Lebanese Sovereignty75 proposed in 2002. In fact, these first acts of pressure which aimed at a gradual destabilization of the Syrian regime should be interpreted within the framework of the US new initiatives: the Middle Eastern Road Map designed to thrust Israeli-Palestinian negotiations back into the limelight, and the US plan to remodel politically and territorially the Middle East. Both plans required a pliant Syria. Highly doubtful of these new schemes, Damascus was convinced that these plans aimed at undermining Syria’s own calculations in the peace process and regional standing.76 In March 2003, Bashar denounced in an interview with the Lebanese daily Assafir the US-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq. It is worthy mentioning that Syria had started opening up to the Iraqi Baathist regime since 75

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These acts did not only call upon Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, but also insisted that Syria should support its support for ‘terrorist’ factions, and refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction. Syria expressed its suspicions towards the resumption of negotiations under US auspices, and feared that prior UN Resolutions 242 and 338 calling for Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories would be overshadowed. It also resented US attempts to undermine the political foundation upon which the Assad regime was working on since the 1970s, and which aims at transforming Damascus into the cornerstone of the Arab nation.

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1997, and had severely condemned the sanctions imposed on Baghdad especially after Bashar’s accession to power. According to some analysts, the Syrian regime’s pro-Iraqi stances served to consolidate Syria’s regional power and enhance its image as the protector of the Arab world.77 Yet, ensuing events were about to breed the opposite effect as Syria’s alignment with the Iraqi regime attracted US wrath. After the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, apprehensive voices in Damascus and Beirut started pondering whether the next target for the US tanks after Baghdad would be Syria. No sooner did the Iraqi conflict intensify than the American administration intensified its aggressive rhetoric against Damascus. The Syrian establishment was accused of fuelling the Iraqi conflict by supplying weapons to Iraqi insurgents, sheltering Iraqi Baathist members, allowing ‘terrorist’ groups to cross Syrian borders to reach Baghdad, harboring weapons of mass destruction, and controlling Lebanon.78 The US additionally called upon Damascus to embark on unconditional peace talks with Israel, and to consider itself liable for all attacks launched by Hezbollah or other insurgent factions operating in Syria or in Lebanese areas controlled by Syria. It also sharply condemned Syria’s manipulation of the Lebanese Hezbollah in its silent war against Israel, and called for the deployment of the Lebanese army to all Lebanese areas. As the post-Saddam Iraq did not prove to be as easily manageable as expected, the Bush administration intended to create a malleable regional environment and to close all worrisome passageways. Syria had to reckon with increasing US pressure as it was deemed capable of inflaming the Iraqi conflict, and disturbing the course of the US Roadmap.79 It is noteworthy that Syria’s vulnerable standing after its support for the Iraqi resistance against the US-led offensive was exacerbated by the failure of Bashar’s plans for internal reforms. It seemed that the loose regime apparatus under the inexperienced president was more fallible to destabilization under external pressure.80 Conscious of the escalating danger, Damascus sent first responsive signs of cooperation such as its proposal to the United Nations in April 2003 to create a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction. It also announced its desire to reembark on the peace process. Palestinian factions stopped their 77

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Abigail Fielding-Smith, “Long Road to Reform in Damascus,” Guardian, March 21, 2005, http://www. guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1442576,00.html. See Paul-Marie de la Gorge, “La Syrie sous pression,” Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2004, http://www. monde-diplomatique.fr/2004/07/LA_GORCE/11341. Claude Salhani, “Syria at the Crossroads,” Middle East Policy 10 (2003): 136-143. See Kassir, “Intifada der Unabhängigkeit.”

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political activities in Damascus, and many leaders in the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations departed from Syria in May 2003. The Syrian government anticipated that these concessions would ease the tension. It also hoped that adopting time-buying strategies until the new US presidential election in November 2004 would help eventually mitigate the mounting pressure without necessarily imposing a drastic change of the Syrian agenda.81 In fact, Damascus was not prepared to relinquish so easily the regional balance of power that it had carefully built to face Israel after the loss of the Golan Heights in 1967. Dismissing US accusations as merely humiliating schemes aiming at dragging a weakened Damascus into an uneven peace with Israel, it was hopeful that an auspicious regional configuration would dawn soon.82 Syria was also not ready to release its Lebanese protectorate and loosen its grip on Hezbollah. To face US accusations concerning its long stay in Lebanon, Syria hoped that tactical and incremental spaced withdrawals would mitigate pressure. In addition to these tactics of deferment, Syria sent from time indirect messages that it would not so easily yield to unconditional peace talks. Indeed, each time that Israeli-Syrian negotiations seemed to come to a halt, renewed tensions along the Lebanese-Israeli border erupted to remind the international community that Syria possessed the key to the solution. Yet, after 2003, these tactics seemed to lose some of their effectiveness as heightened pressure on Syria threatened to deprive it of its most precious pawns in the Middle Eastern peace process. First, Israel’s air strike in October 2003 on Ein Sabeh in Syria indicated the eventuality of a direct or proxy confrontation between the two countries. Israel’s warnings that Syria would bear responsibility for any attack launched by a Palestinian organization operating in Damascus or by Hezbollah on the Lebanese Southern border were no longer cheap talk.83 Second, the American Senate passed in November the two acts that condemned 81

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Syria hoped that US president Bush’s possible defeat in the upcoming elections, the complex post-Saddam quagmire, and the luring proposal that it had made to Israel to re-start negotiations could de-escalate international pressure. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 13, 2004. For more details on Syria’s relationship to Washington after the increase of US threats, see Anders Strindberg, “Syria Shifts Policy as Sanctions Loom,” Janes Intelligence Review (May 2004): 34-37. Still, after the Israeli raid in Syria, Hezbollah retaliated with an operation along the IsraeliLebanese frontier. This reminds us of president Bashar’s comment: “We are not a superpower, but we are not a weak state either. We are not a country without cards.” See Hinnebusch, “Syria after the Iraq War: Between the Neo-Con Offensive and Internal Reform,” DOI-Focus (March 2004): 1-23, 19.

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Syrian presence in Lebanon, and allowed the US to take action in case Syria did not close its borders with Iraq and did not suspend its support for Hezbollah and other armed groups. Implemented in May 2004, the passed bill imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria.84 In Damascus, it became common to debate possible scenarios how the US was planning to destabilize the Baathist regime and isolate Bashar. Some even feared an eventual US offensive and apprehended the exportation of the Iraqi model to Damascus. What accentuated Syria’s isolation on the regional scene was the Arab regimes’ reluctance to defy the US after the fall of the regime in Iraq. At this stage, it seemed that Damascus was the only Arab state determined to tilt with windmills in order to fight an eventual US-led Arab order. Moreover, not only had Syria to confront the American threat but it also had to deal with Tel Aviv’s accusations and threats.85 Whereas Israeli premier Ariel Sharon accused Syria of sponsoring terrorism and giving orders to Hezbollah to provoke feuds at the Lebanese-Israeli frontier, Syria in return accused Tel Aviv of planning to impose its hegemony on Lebanon once the Lebanese-Syrian concomitant pathways were forcefully separated as a result of Resolution 1559.86 In September 2004, Syria’s obstinate refusal to read the signs led it to extend President Lahoud’s mandate. This unfortunate decision presented to the US a golden opportunity to weaken Damascus. As Syria was suspected of ‘stepping out of line,’ the natural course, in the eyes of the Bush administration, was to strike the Damascene regime at its most vulnerable spot: Lebanon, its dearest bargaining card and economic hinterland. Indeed, Syria’s leeway seemed to have expired: the Damascene regime which was supposed to facilitate the peace settlement, and control extremist factions in Lebanon, Iraq and on Palestinian territories, had failed according to the Bush administration.87 Now that it had almost nothing to offer on the international agenda, the US would no longer court Damascus.88

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Syrian assets were frozen in the US, American exports to Syria were prohibited, diplomatic contacts with Syria were reduced, and the Syrian aircraft was prevented from entering the US airspace. Israel threatened to attack Damascus in September 2004 after the latter had been accused of being embroiled in the Beer Sheva incident. On August 31, 16 Israelis died in a suicide attack in the South of Israel. See “Israel veut imposer son hégémonie sur le Liban, selon Radio Damas,” L’Orient Le Jour, September 9, 2004. http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet9htm. Gebrane Tueni, interview on the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation Television (LBC), September 29, 2005. Idem.

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What differed yet this time was that Lahoud’s reelection had also attracted the attention of the international community concerned by the heavy-handed Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs.89 In September 2004, in a bid to assuage American pressures and hopeful that courting the US administration would divert attention from the Lebanese file, Syria communicated to the US its desire to fully cooperate along the border with Iraq.90 Yet, no sooner had few months elapsed than it realized that its strategy of delay had failed 91 and that yielding – at least temporarily – to pressures was the only way out. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss how international and more particularly US pressure on Syria led to a political turnabout in Lebanon. The truth behind Resolution 1559: the motives and role of the international community Resolution 1559 cosponsored by the US and France and later adopted by the UN Security Council in September 2004 focuses on three main points: after reiterating its support for Lebanese territorial integrity and sovereignty, the resolution demands the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Lebanese territory, calls upon the dismantling of all armed militias which impede the Lebanese government from exercising full sovereignty on its territory, and expresses the necessity of conducting free and fair elections devoid of manipulation or foreign intervention. Made public on October 1, 2004, the subsequent UN report specifically called for the pullout of the Syrian army and intelligence operatives, confirmed that Lahoud’s reelection took place under explicit Syrian pressure. It also declared that the Shebaa farms belonged to Syria, and that Hezbollah’s insistence to pursue military operations was not justified. The report explicitly condemned Syria’s non-compliance with the resolution as well. The resolution and the UN report became right away a contentious topic which incited dissension in Lebanon. Still these documents encouraged the Lebanese opposition actors: both reports bestowed a certain international legality

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Unlike the American administration, the European Union had adopted an attitude of constructive engagement towards Syria. Whereas the US brandished more sticks than carrots, the European Union thought that negotiations on trade agreements with the Syrian regime were better ways to promote political and economic change in the country. See Neil Ford, “US Sanctions on Syria,” The Middle East, July 2004, 16-17. Zeina Abou Risk, “Damascus May Hold off on Cabinet Reshuffle,” The Daily Star, September 9, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=8213&categ_id=2. Jean Pierre Perrin, “Liban: Quand Damas va trop loin, ”Politique Internationale no. 106 (June 2005): 37-53.

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to the opposition’s claims and its plan to overthrow the pro-Syrian puppet regime. Slammed first by President Bashar in Syria who declared in a speech on October 992 that the resolution had been prepared before the renewal of President Lahoud’s term and constituted a clear case of foreign intervention, and an attempt to internationalize the Lebanese situation,93 it was also discredited by Lahoud who considered it as a tool serving Israeli interests. Other Lebanese incumbents regarded it as a flagrant meddling in Lebanese affairs, and highlighted that the driving force behind it was US hostility against the Syrian regime. To many observers, the alliance between France and the US under the banner of Resolution 1559 was startling. Indeed, this sudden rapprochement between the two countries after a profound disagreement over the Iraqi war has been regarded with suspicion and mistrust. Yet, the US- French cosponsoring of the resolution and involvement in Lebanese affairs are far from being surprising at this point in time. 1559 is undoubtedly not designed solely for Lebanon’s sake, but has farreaching regional causes. Its roots can be traced back to the changing international order after September 11, to the Bush administration’s determination “to rethink” the “complicated Orient,”94 and to the determination of removing the obstacles inherited after the US-led offensive against Iraq. More specifically, the resolution aims at transforming the Syrian regime into a cooperative actor, weakening its alliance with Iran,95 and compelling Damascus to stop endorsing Hezbollah. Indeed, the US intentions are far from being altruistic. Many US politicians who endorsed Resolution 1559 have discouraged the adoption of such similar resolutions against Israel. Were a country challenging democratic rules in

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For a complete text of president Bashar’s speech, See An Nahar, October 10, 2004, 6. During his speech on the occasion of the Syrian expatriates’ conference in Damascus, Bashar maintained that the resolution that he compared to “a mistake” was neither related to the protection of Lebanese sovereignty nor to the renewal of Lahoud’s term but had other farreaching goals aiming at bringing Lebanon back to the cauldron of the 1980s. During this speech, the president also alluded to the Syrian role in protecting the Lebanese Christians from the communal carnage and to the possibility of civil war in case Syria withdrew. See “Assad’s Speech Questions 1559,” The Daily Star, October 11, 2004, 1-2. See Elie Fayad, “La résolution 1559, véritable pierre angulaire pour le devenir du Liban: 2004, l’année du tournant,” L’Orient le Jour, January 6, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ aujourdhui/politique. Iran has been accused by the US establishment of nurturing terrorism and of developing a nuclear arsenal that endangers world peace.

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Lebanon a US ally, it is more likely that the US would not have sponsored Resolution 1559.96 The French support of the resolution and alliance with the US in this regard stemmed from other motives. France’s role should be perceived in the broader context of regime change in the Middle East, and more specifically as a means to influence the US policy in the region, and limit the use of force in bringing about political changes in the Arab world. Hence, the resolution which transcends the renewal of Lahoud’s term has “deeper implications linked to changing regimes in the Middle East through softer means.”97 As democracy promotion in Iraq through forceful intervention has turned out to be costly and painful, the US-French pressure on Syria should be interpreted as an attempt to bring forth change in the Lebanese-Syrian constellation through soft power.98 In addition to that, the resolution should be regarded “in relation to international peace and security”99 as it emphasized the imperative of disarming armed factions that did not obey governmental authority but external entities. These goals notwithstanding, France’s involvement in the resolution should also be understood as an attempt to safeguard its economic and strategic interests in the Middle East especially that in the latest years America seemed to be the main profiting party from investment projects in Lebanon and Syria.100 Why did the US endorse this new softer ‘logic’ of democracy promotion after its support for a military offensive in Afghanistan and Iraq? Stuck in the Iraqi quagmire, the American establishment was keen on “the internalization of the South” to prevent a spill over of the Iraqi problem101 and a further exacerbation of the conflict.102 In addition, its cooperation with France on the resolution has disburdened it from the charges of unilateralism after the Iraqi

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Stephan Zunes, “The Dangerous Implications of the Hariri Assassination and the U.S. Response,” Foreign Policy in Focus, February 25, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/papers/0502hariri. html. Interview with an Italian diplomat, Beirut, October 13, 2004. Interview with an American diplomat, Awkar, December 28, 2004. Comment of an English diplomat in Beirut to the author, Beirut, November 19, 2004. See Manal Cha’aia, “13 October 1990-13 October 2004: min takriss ‘al-wissaya’ ila baad’a ‘istiaadat al siyada’,” An-Nahar, October 13, 2004, 13, 25. Interview with an Italian diplomat, Beirut, October 13, 2004. After the official withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, the US pressure on Syria to prevent militants from crossing the Syrian border into Iraq has not abated. In summer 2005, for instance, the US froze the assets of late Syrian interior minister Ghazi Kanaan and former military intelligence chief in Lebanon, Rustum Ghazali, accusing them of supporting terrorist activities.

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war,103 and has allowed it to mend transatlantic relations after the French-US disagreement on regime change in Baghdad.104 More importantly, the resulting difficulties with which the US has to grapple after toppling the Saddam regime made the American establishment realize that redesigning the Middle East and bringing about more cooperative or ‘democratic’ Arab regimes could not only stem from imposition. Adopting a slower pace and endorsing a subtler change in the Arab authoritarian regimes’ apparatus might be a more realistic path in the long run. In short, the sudden US interest in Lebanon’s democratization has to do more with a change of heart regarding the state of affairs in the region than a real commitment to the recovery of a homegrown consensus democracy in Lebanon.105 Lahoud’s reelection gave the American establishment the chance to test this new ‘logic’ as well as the successes and limitations of zealous diplomacy under multilateralism in regime change. Noteworthy was that the US administration in Lebanon denied that the resolution was a result of the US involvement in Iraq or other regional factors but insisted that the resolution, “a result of the Ta’if agreement and a recapitulation of its content” was tailored for Lebanese needs. Its implementation had become more pressing after the extension of Lahoud’s mandate especially that “the Ta’if clock had started ticking a long time ago.”106 An externally-monitored transition The aftermath of Lahoud’s reelection was no usual tale as to the astonishment of many, the Lebanese and Syrian governments set about running away from the international community in order to pursue their ‘contested romance’.The Lebanese government’s constant apology and defence of the Syrian presence as a guarantee for stability107 revealed to what extent the Syrian role had become an indigenous game entrenched in political structures. 103 104

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See Ajami, “The Autumn of the Autocrats.” Habibi C. Malik, “The Future of Lebanon,” Sappho, February 2006, http://www.sappho.dk/ Nr.%202% 20februar%202006/HabibMalik_english.htm. Many previous indicators show that the US was not eager to upset the Lebanese-Syrian relationship. As patriarch Sfeir visited North America in early 2001, President Bush did not receive him. In a meeting with the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, former US ambassador to Lebanon, David Satterfield, declared America’s unwillingness at this stage to challenge the Syrian role. See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2002, 16. Interview with an American diplomat, Awkar, December 28, 2004. President Lahoud declared that Resolution 1559 was a dangerous US instrument used to undermine Syria through Lebanon. See Mayssam Zaaroura and Khalil Fleihane, “Lahoud Accuses US of Using Lebanese to ‘Stab Syria’,” The Daily Star, February 2, 2005,

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In addition to that, omissions in the resolution have given leeway to free and contradictory interpretations on the part of the Lebanese and Syrian authorities. While the original US-French draft mentioned explicitly the imperative departure of Syrian troops, the ratified resolution refrained from citing names and alluded vaguely to the necessary pullout of foreign troops. The text did not mention either that supplementary measures could ensue in case concerned parties did not abide by the resolution. These intentional elisions108 led Syrian and Lebanese authorities to qualify the resolution at first as unbinding,109 and vague. For example, according to the Lebanese parties who supported the claim that the Shebaa farms were occupied by Israel, the resolution did not only call for Syrian but also for an Israeli withdrawal. Damascus even proclaimed that the difficulties that the resolution encountered before its adoption and the fact that only nine states voted and six abstained proved that 1559 was no real danger.110 Yet, unprecedented joint pressure exerted by the US, the European Union, and the Arab world led Lebanon and Syria to reconsider their confrontational strategy. The Syrian establishment which dubbed the resolution as a ‘failure’111 was advised by Arab states such as Jordan and Egypt to rethink its stance, and to ponder the consequences of confrontation.112 Refuting the Lebanese incumbents’ arguments that Resolution 1559 would lead to destabilization, the United Nations and some member states of the European Union such as France and Germany earnestly advised Lebanese authorities to establish a firm schedule for the Syrian withdrawal, proceed to

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http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID =1&article _ID=12637&categ_id=2. Had these clauses not been modified, the resolution would have met strong opposition from some Security Council members and would have probably not seen the light. Hence, though applauded by the international community, the resolution did not only elicit negative reactions on the part of the Lebanese and Syrian governments but also at an international level. Two permanent Security Council members, China and Russia, refused to vote on the grounds that the resolution touched upon Lebanon’s domestic politics. Algeria, a rotating member, wished that the Security Council condemned Israel instead. Cilina Nasser, and Khalil Fleihan, “Syria Dismisses Heavily UN Resolution as a ‘Failure’,” The Daily Star, September 4, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=8056&categ_id=2. Syrian information minister Ahmad el Hassane’s declaration. See “Pour Damas, la 1559 est une victoire,” L’Orient Le Jour, September 4, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/ politique/polsujet11.htm. See Nasser and Fleihan, “Syria Dismisses Heavily UN Resolution as a ‘Failure’.” The Jordanian and Egyptian governments maintained that Resolution 1559 should not be reduced to a case of US-French interference into Lebanon’s domestic affairs.

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demilitarize the militias, control the Palestinian camps, and deploy the army to the blue line.113 Even Lebanese newspapers started criticizing the Lebanese incumbents’ rhetoric of defiance and warned that “if the Lebanese and Syrians do not upgrade their approach to 1559, then it appears inevitable that both countries will find themselves caught into a tight corner by an international coalition ...”114 Before the close of the year 2004, the US and France initiated a series of intensive diplomatic contacts with opposition key actors in Lebanon to discuss the application of the resolution.115 Right before Hariri’s slaying, US envoys threatened Syria with an imminent deterioration of US-Syrian relations in case Damascus would not implement the resolution. In addition to the mounting pressure to see Syrian armed troops pull out of the country, the international community exhorted as well the urgent withdrawal of Syrian intelligence operatives so as to ensure the convening of free elections devoid of coercion. In some Lebanese circles, it became common to greet Resolution 1559 as the first step towards a democratic transition in Lebanon. Resolution 1559: a chance before the international wind changes direction Despite its unassertive language, the resolution empowered the Lebanese awakening in 2005 for multiple reasons. First, the opposition regarded the resolution as a logical continuation of the Ta’if agreement. Thus, “Resolution 1559 has only internationalized Ta’if after the content of the treaty had been largely ignored.”116 Second, its adoption implied that Lebanon should seize the golden opportunity to ensure Syrian withdrawal and the demilitarization of Hezbollah under the auspices of a legal and peaceful agreement sponsored by the international community. In other words, the resolution provided the chance for a non-violent outcome to the Lebanese-Syrian controversy, an issue that would have normally backfired on the Lebanese party had Lebanon alone embarked on this initiative.117 Moreover, the resolution also provides the Lebanese state with a ‘safe haven.’ In case the Syrian regime refused to cooperate, it would have to

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Khalil Fleyhane, “La 1559 projette son ombre sur la reconduction de la FINUL,” L’Orient Le Jour, Decembre 12, 2004, 2. See “UN 1559: Beirut, Damascus Court Danger in Missing the Context,” The Daily Star, November 19, 2004, 10. For instance, Druze leader Jumblatt and Patriarch Sfeir were invited to meet French president Chirac in Paris. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 1, 2004. Ibid.

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deal with the international community and not only with the Lebanese state.118 One after-effect of the resolution is that the Lebanese-Syrian ménage will no longer be left unattended, but will be critically supervised by international powers.119 According to many prominent voices in the anti-Syrian opposition, the intervention of the international community – far from solely representing a dividing tool – could be considered as “an opportune moment that would serve Lebanon temporarily” to regain its political independence.120 Irrespective of the coded messages behind the resolution, this “international chance”121 happened in a regional framework concurring with the Lebanese strife towards independence. Indeed, according to opposition actors, “although the Lebanese opposition itself does not count on the United Nations and is highly critical of the American unconditional support of Israel, it is willing to benefit from international pressures.”122 It was even maintained that this resolution could have positive reverberations on the future of the Syrian regime and could act as a catalyst for political liberalization in Damascus.123 In addition to all these arguments, respecting international legality at this difficult juncture has been perceived by some politicians as a necessary step that guaranteed Lebanese protection in a dangerous environment: “if the Lebanese government does not want to abide by Resolution 1559, then it will not be able to resort to the United Nations in case of eventual Israeli reprisals.”124 If Lebanon chooses the course of isolation, its only resort, in the case of an Israeli offensive, would be Damascus.125 Despite these optimistic notes, it was cautioned that international interference had to be regarded as a force that had to “complement but not stimulate” the Lebanese awakening.126

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Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 13, 2004. See Emile Khoury, “La controverse sur la résolution de l’ONU bat son plein à Beyrouth,” L’Orient Le Jour, September 6, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique polsujet9.htm. Interview with the director of a civil society association in Lebanon, Beirut, October 25, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, November 30, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese civil society activist, Beirut, December 14, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, November 30, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Kfar Hazir, November 14, 2004. Elie Fayad, “Analyse-Washington et Paris n’ont jamais été aussi loin dans leurs positions sur la question libanaise,” September 6, 2004, L’Orient Le Jour, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ aujourdhui/politique/ polsujet6.htm. Interview with the director of a civil society association in Lebanon, Beirut, October 25, 2004.

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Inner underlying factors: genesis of a transcommunal opposition The change in the international conjuncture notwithstanding, the most important factor that materialized this transition on Lebanese ground was the formation of an overarching political opposition that was able to conciliate its disparate elements and undermine the cohesiveness of the pro-Syrian regime. Additional inherent factors that provided a stable substructure for the transition were the presence of an energetic civil society as well as the democratic traditions deeply ingrained in the Lebanese political culture. These inner factors that had counterbalanced authoritarian pressures in the post-war period were able to take the lead once international pressure empowered them. The early signs of the Independence Intifada The renewal of Lahoud’s term was indeed a miscalculation. Betting on the lethargic mood that the semi-authoritarian regime had tried to impose, Syrian and Lebanese incumbents underestimated the snowball effect that the extension would unleash. Indeed, this act marked the end of political indifference in Lebanon.127 The nascent Druze-Christian coalition that emerged in 2000 needed a catalyst to mobilize its forces: the anti-constitutional return of the president, a figure that has throughout the years alienated opposition figures. On August 28, 2004, a few hours before the parliament amended the constitution, the US and France had presented the draft resolution to the UN Security Council. The draft was adopted one day before the official reelection. As soon as it became clear that Lahoud was going to be reelected, the Qornet Shehwan Gathering endorsed by patriarch Sfeir decried the political masquerade. The fifth statement of the Maronite bishops’ Council – released on September 1, 2004 and considered as one of the most virulent tirades against Syrian hegemony in Lebanon – insisted that Damascus had transformed Lebanon into a Syrian province. The document urged the Lebanese not to give in to hopelessness in order to counteract “repugnant authoritarian acts.”128 On September 3, although the majority of the parliamentarians voted obediently in favor of the reelection, Druze leader Jumblatt announced that his parliamentary bloc, the Democratic Gathering, would oppose the amendment.

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Kassir, “Die Intifada der Unabhängigkeit,” 93. See “Fifth Call: We Urge the Lebanese not to Surrender to Despair and Hopelesseness,” The Daily Star, September 2, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=7986&categ_id=2.

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Encouraged by the tolling bell of international pressure, the broadest opposition since the end of the war took shape right after the extension. The new coalition called the Bristol opposition129 led by Jumblatt encompassed mainly a large segment of the Christian community under Patriarch Sfeir’s auspices, Christian groupings namely the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, the opposition branch of the Kata’ib Party, and the National Liberal Party. It also enclosed the Druze community loyal to the Jumblatt clan, multicommunal movements particularly the Democratic Left Party led by Elias Atallah,130 the Democratic Renewal movement led by Nassib Lahoud, the Democratic Forum lead by Shiite opposition actor Habib Sadeq as well as several independent figures. 131 Bringing together different ideologies, confessions as well as politicians previously close to the regime,132 this broad opposition spectrum was described as an unprecedented phenomenon that had not seen the light for decades in Lebanon. Its main driving incentive was the belief that, after the heavy legacy of Syrian guardianship, the Lebanese communities were able to coexist as well as manage their own affairs.133 Despite the large array of actors joining the plural alliance, the opposition by and large remained in this first phase confined to the Druze and Christian communities, and included only few actors in the Shiite and Sunni communities.134 It was argued that many Muslim leaders were still afraid, not ready or either not convinced of the necessity to restructure Lebanese-Syrian relations and join the anti-Syrian coalition.135 Declaring its unconditional support to Lahoud’s politics and to the Lebanese-Syrian unity of tracks, for example, Hezbollah, one of the most powerful post-war political actors, categorically refused to take sides with the emerging Bristol Coalition.

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Bristol is the name of the hotel where the plural opposition held its regular meetings. This multi-confessional party entered the Lebanese political arena on October 17, 2004. It is noteworthy that Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement did not join the Bristol opposition. Some members were only present during the meetings as observers. Many politicians who belonged earlier to the political establishment such as former minister of foreign affairs Fares Boueiz, pro-Hariri figures such as Ahmad Fatfat and Ghattas Khoury and of course the late premier Hariri who was believed to finance the Bristol opposition. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 1, 2004. For example, deputies Mosbah Ahdab and Bassem Fleihane in the Sunni community, and some Shiite independent figures such as Ahmad Kamel who opposed the Amal supremacy. See Nicholas Blanford, “Unbowed, Jumblatt Looks to Enlarge his Opposition,” The Daily Star, October, 25, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=9565&categ_id=2.

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The Intifada mechanisms set in motion On October 19, the Security Council unanimously approved the implementation of the resolution, and asked the UN secretary general to submit each six months a report on the state of affairs. The Hariri cabinet resigned the following day, and a new pro-Syrian cabinet headed by Premier Omar Karami was appointed. Right away, the opposition adamantly announced its refusal to join the new government. Three days before the commemoration of Lebanese Independence Day, student demonstrations and sit-in protests where several opposition parties were represented denounced external Syrian hegemony and called for real Lebanese sovereignty.136 Although some groups called for the endorsement of Resolution 1559 and others rejected it,137 they all agreed on the triad of ‘freedom, sovereignty and independence.’ Amidst continuing internal and international pressure, Damascus closed two security services posts in Beirut and in Batroun. Speculation in Lebanese circles was rife at this stage that Syrian troops might withdraw before the next UN report had been issued.138 It is worthy of notice that the Bristol opposition was able to become popular in no time because of a history of previous governmental deadlocks and power abuses which ended up discrediting the regime in the eyes of the Lebanese population. One important reason which empowered the opposition was the inconsistent post-1559 politics of the ruling establishment139 in contrast with the determination of the Bristol grouping. Conscious of their internal divergences, opposition actors focused on spotlighting the points they had already in common and on elaborating a clear political program. They additionally stressed the importance of a pacific and democratic Lebanese opposition. In December, they succeeded in publishing a text with common national goals. This document aimed at dismissing accusations that the Bristol opposition was no more than a platform for

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The protesting parties were the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Democratic Left, the Kata’ib Reformist movement, the National Lebanese Party, and the Progressive Social Party. Mainly the Progressive Socialist Party and Leftist movements. Before the year 2004 drew to a close, Lebanese incumbents such as Nasser Kandil and Elie Ferzli spoke of an imminent and sudden Syrian withdrawal. The incumbents’s versatile annoucements ranging from declarations stressing the necessity of respecting international law to a bold rejection of the resolution displayed the fragility of the apparently solid pro-Syrian government.

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splintered groups.140 It also constituted a basis for dialogue with the Lebanese and Syrian ruling establishments. Called the Bristol Declaration, the document emphasized the following points:141 • Restructuring Lebanese-Syrian relations by restoring healthy state-to-state relations based on equality; • Applying the Ta’if treaty; • Relaunching Lebanon’s democratic process, appointing a new cabinet, and organizing free and fair elections on the basis of a fair electoral law; • Dismantling the security apparatus in Lebanon and putting an end to the reign of intelligence operatives; • Restoring national reconciliation, releasing the Lebanese Forces’ leader, Samir Geagea, and facilitating Michel Aoun’s return from exile; • In foreign politics, restituting Lebanon’s right to decide on war and peace, elevating Lebanon to an equal partner in the Arab-Israeli peace process and departing from a political line that could embroil the Lebanese nation into further conflicts; • Respecting international law and legality. The Bristol Coalition escalates its campaign After the publication of the Bristol Declaration, the opposition’s enthusiasm started spreading to more reserved factions.142 Moderate Sunni actors, who rarely criticized Syria, joined the chorus.143 In February 2005, in a solemn meeting, the Bristol alliance went as far as demanding a total Syrian withdrawal, and rejected a mere redeployment of the

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Main political divergences in the opposition centered around the military Syrian presence (redeployment or total withdrawal), the Palestinian camps, the demilitarization of Hezbollah, and the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South. While Jumblatt argued that the redeployment of the Syrian army in the Beqa’a is acceptable for strategic and security purposes, the Qornet Shehwan grouping and Aoun’s FPM called for a total pullout, and rejected the fact that a Syrian redeployment to the Beqa’a would protect Damascus from a possible Israeli attack. See “Le document fondateur de l’opposition nationale plurielle,” L’Orient Le Jour, December 8, 2004, 4. It is noteworthy that on December 14, empowering the opposition’s impetus, the United Nations appointed the UN peace process coordinator, Terje Road-Larsen, as a special delegate to supervise the implementation of the resolution. Sunni leader Salim el Huss asked for the cessation of the intelligence operatives’ interferences and for the Syrian army’s redeployment. Former premier Najib Mikati, known to be a close friend to president Bashar, doubted the establishment of a new state in the wake of president Lahoud’s reelection.

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troops to the borders.144 This strong request, perceived by the anti-Syrian coalition as a step towards more cohesion, was meant to bridge divergences pertaining to the interpretation of the Ta’if agreement and of Resolution 1559. 145 After the February meeting, it became widely known that FPM leader Aoun and the late premier Hariri were on the opposition’s side.146 After proclaiming his full support to the Bristol opposition, Aoun prompted Hariri to declare publicly his rapprochement to the coalition.147 Indeed, one day before his assassination, Hariri’s words to the Lebanese Daily Assafir were interpreted as an indelible alignment with the opposition.148 The Bristol Coalition’s daring call for Syrian withdrawal was followed by an outspoken declaration by Patriarch Sfeir in which he affirmed that Resolution 1559 and the Ta’if accord had ultimately the same objective.149 A new letter addressed to President Bashar by Gebrane Tueni overtly accused the Syrian regime of hindering national reconciliation and peace in Lebanon as well as impeding the rise of democracy and the state of laws and institutions.150 Despite the escalation of internal pressures, what had been achieved so far did not meet the opposition’s expectations: the Syrian troops were slowly redeploying, and Damascus had made no more than half-hearted moves towards the Bristol opposition.151 Moreover, the national rift between the opposition, 144

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Nada Raad, “Opposition Demands Total Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon,” The Daily Star, February 3, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID= 12347&categ_id=2. The Bristol opposition agreed finally on an intepretation of the Ta’if clauses related to Syria: A necessary withdrawal of all Syrian forces had to ensue in order to avoid a clash with the international community. This declaration was also meant to bridge the gap with Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement that was keen on a final Syrian departure. Pro-Hariri politicians such as Ahmad Fatfat, Ghattas Khoury, and Bassel Fleyhane attented the Feburary meeting. See “Michel Aoun: ‘La bataille pour la souveraineté, nous l’avons remportée’,” L’Orient Le Jour, February, 4, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet13.htm. On February 13, Hariri declared to the Lebanese daily Assafir: “The Syrian presence does not guarantee the concomitance of the Lebanese and Syrian tracks, and the ceiling of my demands is the Ta’if agreement.” Although this statement indicated Hariri’s alignment with the Bristol Coalition, it also connoted a certain reluctance to go as far as other Bristol members did. Thus, despite his determination to distance himself from the Lebanese-Syrian regime, Hariri remained keen on preserving good ties with Damascus. See “Qala Hariri lil Assafir: “al wujud al suri la yadmun al masareyn wa mu ‘araditi saqfuha al Ta’if,” Assafir, February 14, 2005, http://www.assafir.com/iso/today/front/137.html. Karine Raad, “Sfeir: 1559 and Taif Accord have Same Goals,” The Daily Star, February 19, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=12804&categ_id=2. Gebrane Tueni, “An Open-Hearted Letter to President Assad,” Naharnet, updated on February 4, 2005, available from http://www.naharnet.com. After Lahoud’s reelection, the Syrian regime tried in vain to institutionalize Lebanese-Syrian relations by entrusting Syrian governmental official Walid Moallem with establishing contact

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which had vowed to embark on an irreversible journey of change, and the loyalists who were determined to preserve the Lebanese-Syrian constants seemed to delay the Bristol Coalition’s dream. Sadly enough, the direct catalyst of the promised metamorphosis was the “Saint Valentine’s Day Assassination”152 as a car bomb killed Hariri in the heart of Beirut after he had left parliament.153 Second phase of the democratic awakening (February-March 2005) The Independence Intifada: a revolutionary Beirut Spring? Right after Hariri’s assassination, a communiqué endorsed by the Bristol opposition and Hariri’s parliamentary bloc, accused the mandatory Lebanese and Syrian regimes to be responsible for the crime,154 called out loud for the resignation of the Lebanese government, and urged the international community to shed light on the crime. Many Lebanese also believed that the assassination was a Syrian attempt to “halt the snowballing challenge of its hegemony.”155 Without directly pointing the finger at Syria, France and the US referred right after the murder to a possible entanglement of the Syrian regime. Syria however rejected all accusations at once and denied any involvement. The assumed motives behind Hariri’s killing Although Hariri had never openly criticized the Syrian regime, he was not only suspected of getting closer and financing the Bristol Opposition but also of having prepared behind the scenes with his personal friend, French President Chirac, Resolution 1559.156 Indeed, speculation was rife that Hariri’s role in

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with Lebanese politicians. It was reported that intelligence services chief Rustom Ghazali had decreased his meddling in Lebanese affairs. Yet, all these moves were taxed as mere maneuvers. See Safa, “Lebanon Springs Forward,” 30. Twenty other people died in the explosion that caused an enormous crater next to the Saint Georges beach resort in Beirut. Deputy Bassel Fleyhane who was in Hariri’s car was heavily wounded. He passed away in spring 2005 in a hospital in France. Although no tangible proof existed at this stage, opposition key figures maintained that the Lebanese and Syrian governments were at least juridically and morally responsible since they managed the Lebanese security. Johanna McGeary, “The Trouble with Syria,” Time, February 28, 2005, http://www.time.com/ time/archive /preview/0,10987,1029852,00.html. Druze leader Jumblatt stated in an interview with Lebanese TV channel Al Mustaqbal that it was Hariri’s support for the resolution that precipitated the murder. See, Linda Dahdad, “Jumblatt Escalates War of Words with Damascus,” The Daily Star, February 18, 2005,

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instigating the resolution and his decision to turn against the Syrian regime were the main motives that precipitated the crime.157 According to this same version of facts, Hariri’s resignation in October was a sign that he was not longer ready to bend to Syrian authority.158 Although these conjectures have not been confirmed by the reports delivered by the UN fact-finding mission, certitude prevails that the crime had political motivations. A different account of the facts denies Syria’s role in the crime, and alludes instead to a conspiracy theory devised carefully to precipitate the fall of the Syrian regime. This second version argues that although Hariri’s relations with Syria had been strained by a confidence crisis, the late premier remained a moderate key figure who always encouraged dialogue with Syria and who never turned against the Ta’if agreement.159 Secondly, already engulfed in a threatening international storm, Damascus would not endorse “an act of political suicide” that would weaken the Syrian regime itself.160 Thus, Damascus had not much to gain “by uniting the Lebanese opposition” against it, or “provoking the United States and other Western nations” to isolate it.161 In addition, there were other parties who might have benefited from Hariri’s assassination.162 The second version has been discarded right way by the Bristol opposition which traced a clear connection between the slaying and the Lebanese-Syrian security regime.163

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http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=12781&categ_id=2. Christophe Ayad, Christophe Boltanski, José Garçon and Jean-Pierre Perrin, “Quand la Syrie monte au nez de Chirac, ” La Libération, March, 22, 2005, http://www.liberation.fr/ page.php?Article=284087. Walid Phares, “Hariri’s Resignation, a Step toward Syrian Isolation in Lebanon,” Lebanon Wire, October 22, 2004, available from http://www.defenddemocracy.org/in_the_media/in_the_media_ show.htm?doc_id=2 446 91. See “Le séisme après le choc,” L’Hebdo Magazine, February 18, 2005, http://www.magazine. com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=O&Hid=&HissueNum=2467&Category=1&DescId=4628&Desc Flag=1. Patrick Seale, “Who Killed Rafik Hariri?” Guardian, February 23, 2005, http://www.guardian. co.uk/comment/ story/0,3604,1423210,00.html. Zunes, “The Dangerous Implications of the Hariri Assassination and the U.S. Response,” Foreign Policy in Focus, February 25, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/papers/0502hariri.html. See “Who Benefits from the Crime?” Monday Morning, February 25, 2005, 3. Moreover, Premier Hariri’s family overtly accused the regime of being behind the blast, and spurned the Lebanese establishment’s offer to hold a state funeral. It also discouraged Lebanese officials’ participation in the popular independent march. Jumblatt commented ironically: “I advise regime members not to come to the funeral because eggs, not to say stones, would be thrown at them.” See “Je conseille aux membres du régime…” L’Orient Le Jour, February 16, 2005, http://www.l’orientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique /polsujetw12.htm.

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The international whirlwind blows stronger No sooner did the first moments of deep mourning elapse than a series of events at the international level galvanized the anti-Syrian coalition into action. Immediately after Hariri’s slaying, escalating his anti-Syrian campaign, US President Bush called for a complete withdrawal of the Syrian army and intelligence operatives. He warned that in case Damascus did not stop its support for extremist factions and failed to cooperate with the resolution, the result would be a concerted international isolation of the Syrian regime. In case of noncompliance, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice even alluded to the possibility of a military strike. Keen on enforcing diplomatic sanctions, Washington recalled its ambassador to Damascus Margaret Scobey. Upon the request of the UN Security Council, an investigation team was sent after Lebanon’s half-hearted approval on February 20 in order to investigate the circumstances of the crime.164 Peter Fitzgerald, a high-ranked Irish policeman, was appointed as head of the UN investigation committee. On February 21, at the Brussels Summit which marked the US and France’s reconciliation after the controversy over the Iraqi offensive, Bush and Chirac jointly called for an immediate Syrian withdrawal before the 2005 elections. This common USFrench declaration implied that pressure had surpassed mere American menaces. It seemed that while the European Union and the US disagreed on more than one file in the Middle East, Lebanon was the converging point that facilitated a possible US-European rapprochement in the region. Additional pressure also came from various Arab poles. It was even reported that disquiet had even emerged on the Syrian scene. A letter addressed to President Bashar by Syrian intellectuals demanded the Syrian troops’ withdrawal.165 Empowered by this escalating pressure against the Syrian regime which seemed at this stage more like a frail ship exposed to all winds, the Bristol opposition declared on February 18 the official commencement of the Independence Intifada against Syrian tutelage. Insisting on a white revolution that resembled a freedom march, it called for the establishment of a transitional government which could ensure the pullout of Syrian forces and supervise the upcoming polls. 164

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Released on February 15, a harsh UN statement called on the Lebanese government to bring to justice the perpetrators and organizers of the crime. Reluctant first to accept external aid, Lebanese authorities argued that the international investigation could trespass on the government’s sovereignty. See “Des intellectuels syriens appellent au retrait du Liban dans une lettre ouverte,” Romandie, February 23, 2005, available from http://www.romandie.com.

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The popular march towards freedom In the wake of Monday’s assassination, decrying the Syrian presence and the possible implication of the Lebanese-Syrian intelligence operatives in Hariri’s killing, protestors belonging mainly to the Christian, Sunni and Druze communities took to the streets in Beirut. After Hariri’s funerals on the February 16, in which nearly 250.000 mourners expressed their shared grief and antiSyrian sentiments, more than 100.000 protesters wearing red and white scarves, symbols of the peaceful Intifada, started on February 21 with a sort of ‘permanent uprising’ which reached its peak on March 14. A collective mobilization of the population, student unions, youth movements, opposition parties, civil society groups led gradually to gigantic mass demonstrations engulfed by a sea wave of red and white Lebanese flags. During the uprising, intonating anti-Syrian slogans, protesters called for the termination of the post-war Syrian era in Lebanon.166 For about two months, the international, Arab, and Lebanese media reported tales of massive gatherings, sit-ins, ‘candle sticks and lit torches’ marches as well as anti-Syrian chants. These rallies – a mixed expression of anger, resentment, and frustration with the post-war order – brought up symbolic values which denoted the likely beginning of a new phase in Lebanon’s national development: an intercommunal attachment to the Lebanese entity,167 a joint refusal of violence, and a common desire to build a peaceful new order through non-violent means. For some observers, what mostly distinguished these protests was that feelings of confessional hostilities were set aside.168 Throughout this period, it was noteworthy that the Lebanese media reached an unprecedented degree of openness. At once, red lines were transgressed, and taboos were lifted. Celebrating the Lebanese sense of fortitude and alluding to the possible emergence of a strengthened Lebanese identity, the anti-Syrian press openly criticized the Syrian role in hindering post-war reconciliation and deforming the political process.

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Rym Ghazal, “Anti-Syrian Chorus Echoes through Beirut,” The Daily Star, February 22, 2005, http://www. dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=12862&categ_id=2. Wettig Hannah, “Wir sind die Libanesen,” Jungle World, February 8-23, 2005, http://www.jungleworld.com /seiten/2005/08/4967.php. According to Robert Fisk, a remarkable phenomenon was that Druze and Christians who had fought bitterly during the Mountain War in 1983 had bypassed their differences. See “Under the Shadow of Death: In Death, Hariri Unites the Lebanese,” The Independent, February 17, 2005, available from http://www.counter punch.org/fisk02172005.html.

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The Intifada’s increasing pace towards the 14 March pinnacle On February 28, after it had insisted on a parliamentary plenary session to discuss Hariri’s assassination,169 the opposition scored “the first success of the peaceful Intifada’s.”170 In the middle of a stormy and edgy session, while mass protesters were calling out loud for the demise of the government and for the end of the Syrian era, Premier Karami surprisingly announced the resignation of the cabinet: “out of concern that the government does not become an obstacle to the good of the country, I announce the resignation of the government ...”171 It was in fact the first time in Lebanese history that a government stepped down in the legislature.172 Emboldened by Karami’s resignation, the opposition called for the security forces and military intelligence chiefs’ abdication.173 In the Martyrs’ Square in Beirut, spontaneous protesters asked for Lahoud’s demise. It is noteworthy that a few days before the cabinet’s resignation, industrial and banking associations as well as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Lebanon had also requested the resignation the government.174 Exhibiting solidarity with the Street, these associations called for a general strike in the private sector the same day Karami announced his resignation. Despite this springlike effervescence, a transcommunal dialogue had not materialized. It was evident that the Shiite community’s representatives were keen on remaining aloof from the staged demonstrations. Hezbollah formally announced that it would not join the fray and that it was not ready to forsake its Syrian ally as long as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was not settled.175 Other 169

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During a meeting at Jumblatt’s residence in the Shuf area, opposition members declared their support for an international investigation into Hariri’s slaying, and affirmed their intention to seek for a no-confidence vote aimed at toppling the cabinet during the upcoming parliamentary session. See Michael Glackin, Nada Raad and Nayla Assaf, “People Power Brings down Karami’s Cabinet,” The Daily Star, March 1, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=13066&categ_id=2. Ibid. On February 23, Karami announced that he might resign in case an agreement on a new government was reached. Yet, the timing of his resignation during the parliamentary session came unexpected, for he did not wait for an eventual vote of no-confidence, and did not pay a visit beforehand, as the protocol states, to the president. According to the opposition, the security chiefs were the real power poles in the country pulling the strings of Karami’s government. This decision stemmed mainly from a growing dissatisfaction with the stagnant economic situation suffering dearly from political feuding. See “Manifestation contre la présence syrienne au Liban,” Radio Canada News, February 2, 2005, http://radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/nouvelles/200502/19/007-Beyrouth-ma.

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pro-Syrian factions such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, the Amal Party, and various pro-Syrian partisans were also averse to the Intifada wave. On March 8, organized by Hezbollah and various pro-Syrian groups, a staged demonstration which drew 500.000 people to the streets, confirmed the presence of a resistant national force disinclined to join the transcommunal uprising. Yet, no sooner did the elation of the pro-Syrian protest vanish than a counterdemonstration organized by the opposition on March 14 – described as the quintessence of Lebanon’s Independence Intifada – united an estimated number of 900.000 protesters. On that day, in a show of solidarity, schools, banks, and private enterprises closed around noon. In an exultant atmosphere, demonstrators declared their attachment to the Lebanese nation, their refusal of Syrian guardianship and their contempt of the present regime.176 It was reported that this demonstration demarcated itself from all previous pro-opposition rallies insofar as it brought together nearly all Lebanese confessions and social classes, whether rich, middle-class or poor.177 Observers emphasized the presence of Shiite demonstrators who came to prove that Hezbollah did not mobilize all Shiite loyalties.178 Romanticized images of the Intifada were propagated by the media all over the world. Some wrote about the likely dawning of “new wave of real democratization in Lebanon: one in which even deep differences can be resolved through peaceful means.”179 For some, this uprising dubbed as the Cedar Revolution announced the hope for an Arab Spring for democracy.180 Optimist observers noted that Lebanon’s contagious transition might indirectly lead to the liberalization of Syria.181

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During the 14 March rallies, no incident of violence or coercion was reported. Demonstrators even welcomed soldiers with flowers and singing. See “La déferlante libanaise le rouge et le blanc,” L’Hebdo Magazine, March 18, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HID=&HIssueNum=2471&Category=1 &DescId=4677&DescFlag=1. See “Pari gagné par l’opposition,” L’Humanité, March 16, 2005, http://www.humanite.presse. fr/journal/2005-03-16/2005-03-16-458541. Helena Cobban, “Lebanon’s Fine Example-so Far,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0317/p09s01-coop.htm. Abbas Beydoun, “Eine Mauer ist gefallen,” Die Zeit, April 15, 2005, http://www.zeit.de/ 2005/12/ Libanon_2fSyrien. See “Syria’s Opportunity in Lebanon,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 25, 2004, http://www.cs monitor.com/2005/0425/p08s01-comv.html.

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The backstory of the Beirut Spring: a critique Not all Lebanese and international commentators were moved with Lebanon’s democratic upsurge. Interpreted as a golden age for the perennial Lebanese democracy, this liberal uprising was decried on the other side as an artificial phenomenon induced by the US administration. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the different interpretations of the Beirut Spring. Another perspective: America’s plans With the adoption of Resolution 1559 in October and Bush’s reelection in November 2004, Syria had to face an unavoidable Damoclean sword which outwardly focused on Syria’s interferences in Lebanon but which had a hidden agenda: the regional emasculation of the Damascene regime and the designing of a pliant regional order. Regional analysts strongly suspected that US desire to resurrect Lebanon’s democracy could be not more than an attempt to bolster its reform plan.182 Thus, heightened US pressure on Syria to evacuate Lebanon should be analyzed in relation to the vision of a new Middle East183 more amenable to an accelerated peace with Israel184 and committed to fighting terrorism. After the rash Iraqi elections following Saddam’s demise, the revival of the Palestinian-Israeli peace track as well as the induced reforms in the Palestinian Organization, Lebanon’s transition from one pathway to the other – under the attractive emblem of spreading democracy in the Greater Middle East – was interpreted as an item in a series of premeditated events.185 According to this version, Lebanon’s uprising had to serve as an example to impose democratic reforms on unruly regimes in the region and more specifically on Syria. Downplaying the US attempt to picture Syria as a rogue state and a danger to Middle Eastern equilibrium after Damascus had opposed the US-led offensive in Iraq, some argued that Syria had only been trying to defend its interests “as any state would do” against the US onslaught on “a friendly neigboring state,” and against the schemes to deprive Damascus “of its regional stature and of its cards 182 183

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See Ajami, “The Autumn of the Autocrats.” Joseph Samaha, “Takrir ‘aan sayr el a’amal,” Assafir, March 1, 2005, http://www.assafir.com /iso/ oldissues/20050225/front/122.html. End of February 2005, US president Bush announced his full support for an accelerated peace process in the Middle East, and declared that a settlement was an “immediate goal.” See “Bush Insists Middle East Peace is ‘Immediate Goal,” The Daily Star, February 22, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID= 10&article_ID=12874&categ_id=2. See Samaha, “Takrir ‘aan sayr,” Assafir.

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in the contest with Israel.”186 Indeed, the sequences of the hypothesized storyline go as follows: as soon as Syria lost its Lebanese bargaining chip and Hezbollah’s military wing ceased to exist, then Syria would not be able to link the issue of Hezbollah’s demilitarization with the issue of the Golan Heights, and would be forced under American auspices to sign a defeating peace with Israel. By manipulating the Syrian and Lebanese dice, the US could reach a threefold goal: weaken extremist groups perceived as dangerous to US interests, promote US friendly regimes in the region, and implement a Palestinian-Israeli Roadmap based on an easy capitulation of the Palestinians after Israeli former Premier Ariel Sharon had returned to the Palestinians the Gaza bands and consolidated his hold on East Jerusalem, Cisjordan, and the Golan Heights.187 Of course, these speculations, whether unfounded or not, attract attention the fact that externally-monitored changes could happen at the expense of real reform in the Middle East, and could lead to the exacerbation of lingering conflicts.188 Other interpretations emphasize that US pressure on Syria and Hariri’s slaying in February 2005 are part of a conspiracy theory aiming at promoting the neoconservative US version which conjectured in advance the rise of a strong Israeli state in a subdued Middle East.189 Indeed, just like many analysts pointed the finger at Syria after Hariri’s murder, others referred to an American-Israeli plan to model an obedient Lebanon.190 Outlined in a document entitled A Clean Break: a New Strategy for Securing the Realm,191 the plan allegedly intends to instrumentalize the Lebanese opposition by the US after the Iraqi autocracy had been toppled. According to the same viewpoint, the US had chosen a Lebanese national figure as a target for political assassination to start the neo-conservative

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Hinnebusch, “Syria after the Iraq War,” 23. Pierre Beaudet, “La Syrie doit se retirer du Liban,” Alternatives, March 3, 2005, http://www.alternatives. ca/article1699.html. For a critique of the US policy in the Middle East, see Stephan Zunes, “The Dangerous Implications of the Hariri Assassination and the U.S. Response,” Foreign Policy in Focus, February 2005, http://www.fpif. org/papers/0502 hariri.html. “American neo-conservatives and Israel still believe that by disturbing Lebanon, they can help reconstruct the Middle East and to make it more pro-American and pro-Israeli...” See statement originally published in “Editorial” in Syrian daily Tishrin on March 14, 2005 and quoted in “Freedom is Like Riding a Bicycle,” Guardian, March 16, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ syria/story/0,,1438403,00.html. For another point of view, see Ramzy Baroud, “Hariri’s Murder only the Beginning,” Antiwar.com, February 25, 2005, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/baroud.php?articleid=4961. See “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, retrieved on October 31, 2005, http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm.

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venture in Lebanon,192 and to legitimize through this assassination any future attack against non-compliant Damascus.193 By bending Syria’s influence in Lebanon, the US would pave the way for an untainted era of American influence in Beirut, and would reestablish in the longer run a ‘Greater’ but more confused Middle East swimming in “calculated chaos.”194 Deconstructing the Cedar Revolution: the Dobriansky’s formula The Beirut Spring as a ‘story of stardom’ for the US Administration The episode of the Cedar Revolution was also seen as an orchestrated event set up by the US to provide the Arab world with a success story.195 What made in the eyes of some Arab observers the whole process more dubious was that Israel welcomed the Lebanese events as a beginning of a democratic transition and joined the US-European chorus in calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the demilitarization of Hezbollah.196 It was questioned whether Lebanon’s democratic outburst was another imitative copy of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or the Pink Revolution in Georgia.197 In fact, these staged protests decrying the Syrian role in Lebanon and calling for the Lebanese government’s demise were marked by recurrent symbols which seemed to remind the observer – in a less magnificent way – of similar leitmotifs that characterized Western uprisings. One reported and caricaturized climax of this revolution was the moment the pro-Syrian Karami government fell after a roaring popular uprising, a simplification of the great historical event after 192

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For more details on this venture, See “Après le retrait syrian: dialogue ou rupture,” L’Hebdo Magazine, March 11, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HID =&HIssueNum=2470&Category=1& DescId=4660&DescFlag=1. Elias Akleh, “Hariri’s Assassination: A Step towards “Greater Middle East”,” Arabic Media Internet Network, February 27, 2005, http://www.amin.org/eng/uncat/2005/feb/feb27/.html. See “Lebanon: Another Country in the U.S. Domino Line,” Aljazeera, March 9, 2005, http://www.aljazeera. com/cgi-bin/conspiracy_theory/fullstory.asp?id=195. The expression ‘Cedar Revolution’ was chosen by Paula Dobriansky, US state secretary in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In the wake of the Syrian redeployment in March 2005, the US asked Israel to stop making comments about the situation in Lebanon. According to the American administration, these comments would detract from the US credibility in the Middle East and encourage extremist movements. See Akiva Eldar, “U.S. Blasts Israel over Lebanon Remarks,” Haaretz, March 9, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/ PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=549602. Heiko Wimmen and Kirsten Maas, “Der Libanon zwischen “Zedernrevolution” und Staatskrise,” Heinrich Böll Foundation, March 4, 2005, http://www.boell.de/downloads/nahost/ zedernrevolution_wimmen_maas.pdf.

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which an authoritarian regime usually collapses. The opposition’s frequent allusions to Western events such as “the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of totalitarian regimes” also raised some speculations.198 The Intifada as a transient spring? Additional doubt was cast on the transcommunal character of the uprising. Some referred to this popular revival as an “occidental,” “rich” and mainly “Maronite” Intifada: “One has to see the images of a crowded, generally young, occidental looking population to infer that the majority of people who participated came from rich quarters of the capital, where Maronites live [...] It is not accidental that the orchestrators of this movement are principally Maronite leaders [...] with the notable exception of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s participation [...] Populations generally isolated from the Lebanese political system are not present ...”199 According to sceptical observers, behind lofty slogans calling for the end of Syrian hegemony and invoking the wind of democratic change, malignant confessional feelings lurked. Analysts doubted whether the seemingly transcommunal opposition movement was “non-sectarian” and asked whether it was just “an amalgam” of traditional Christian, Sunni, and Druze political forces.200 It was also argued that this artificial revolution which brought together the Christian and the Muslim citizens as well as the Christian and Muslim opposition blocks had only one common denominator: hostility towards Syria.201 As soon as this external ‘other’ ceased to play a significant role, the superficial reconciliation would falter. Observers warned against the installation of some sort of a naïve American “fast-food democracy”202 through a simplified transfer that consists of populist 198

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See “La révolution pacifiste, version libanaise, Le modèle ukrainien est en marche,” L’Hebdo Magazine, March 4, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HID= &HIssueNum=2469& Cate gory=1&DescId=4647&DescFlag=1. Pierre Beaudet, “La Syrie doit se retirer du Liban,” Alternatives, March 3, 2005, http://www.alternatives. ca/article1699.html. Tony Karon, “Lebanon after the Syrians,” Time, March 3, 2005, http://www.time.com/time/ world/article/ 0,8599,1036010,00.html. Laleh Khalili, “A Landscape of Uncertainty, Palestinians in Lebanon,” Middle East Report 236 (2005): 34-39, 35. Serge Najjar, “Démocratie au Liban envers et contre tous, ” Café Babel, October 18, 2005, http://www.cafe babel.com/en/article.asp?T=A&Id=1144.

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uprisings, elections, and new power equations. A linear process that disregards the Lebanese complex realities would only bring about a shallow pseudodemocratic veneer. Last but not least, the ‘miniaturization’ of all opposition groups as well as social and confessional segments to one unique red and white-colored block brandishing slogans of freedom and sovereignty in the presence of international and Arab media was, according to some observers, not more than “a Media Hype.”203 An unusual interest to internationalize these rallies and bring them into the Arab states’ focus was reported. Despite these criticisms, it was emphasized that the analogies of the uprising with the Ukrainian experience do not necessarily detract from the value and experience of the Beirut Spring and do not make it artificial. According to some Lebanese newspapers, the opposition purposefully resurrected symbols of correspondence with Western uprisings – such as waving flags and organizing marches with candles – to attract international public opinion and foreign media as well as to bring the Lebanese experience closer to the Western collective conscience.204 Hence, according to the opposition, this uprising did not alienate Lebanon from its surroundings but was an attempt to redefine Arabness as a concept based on “freedom and democracy” and able to reinvent itself.205 Yet, as harsh as it may sound, once the Independence Intifada abated, the democratic process in Lebanon was still at its beginning. Many expressed doubt whether the after-effects of the Intifada would be short-lived as inter-communal fusion in the wake of Hariri’s slaying amounted to a collection of “important moments of national unity” that were nonetheless “transient.” 206 Several months after the 14 March rallies, people were no closer to discovering the truth behind Hariri’s assassination.

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Justin Raimondo, “Lebanon’s Hollow ‘Cedar Revolution’,” Ether Zone, March 14, 2005, available from http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=5039. See “Lebanese Opposition Has Learned much from Ukraine,” The Daily Star, March 2, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=13088&categ_id=2. Walid Jumblatt’s comment in “Cinquième assemblée plénière du Bristol aujourd’hui à Moukhtara,” L’Orient Le Jour, March 2, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/ politique/polsujet7.htm. Joseph Bahout, interview with Stéphane Mazzorato et Guillaume Pélissier-Combescure in “Liban: Les enjeux de la crise,” Le Monde, March 4, 2005, http://www-org.lemonde. fr/web/chat/0,46-0@2-3218,55-1296@45-2,0.html.

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Third phase of the transition: augurs of institutional revival The appointment of a neutral cabinet and the security chiefs’ demise As the wind of the Intifada was blowing stronger, the breach between the opposition and the loyalist camp was growing deeper. Fearing a power vacuum, Lahoud reappointed– to the amazement of many – outgoing Premier Karami on March 9 to head once again a coalition cabinet.207 Aware of his declining popularity, Karami announced, however, that he would only stay if he were able to form a cabinet of national unity. The following day, he started a desperate campaign of dialogue with the opposition, which resulted, as expected, in failure. Patriarch’s Sfeir visit to the US – during which President Bush maintained that once a peaceful transition in Lebanon had taken place, disarming Hezbollah should be dealt with as a domestic matter – alleviated for a while the tensions prevailing between the loyalists and the opposition. The latter also declared that dismantling Hezbollah’s military wing remained at this stage an internal matter which should be tackled after Syrian pullout.208 Postponing the issue of Hezbollah’s demilitarization promised thus a temporary internal truce. Jumblatt’s virulent insistence on Lahoud’s resignation209 toned down as the anti-Syrian coalition realized that escalation could only exacerbate political tensions and jeopardize the convening of parliamentary polls. In spite of these signs of relaxation, concerns prevailed that the reigning political deadlock was purposefully sustained by the government. In fact, Karami’s reappointment was interpreted as a last desperate attempt to safeguard the residues of the waning Lebanese-Syrian regime. As the promised new electoral law was still not ready, the opposition feared that the road to transition remained sinuous and far.

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Speculation was rife that Lahoud’s step was bolstered by the mass demonstration organized by Hezbollah March, 8, 2005. Adnane El-Ghoul, “Lebanese Opposition Leader Softens Stance against Lahoud,” The Daily Star, March 22, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID =13640&categ_id=2. On March 17, Jumblatt asked president Bashar daringly to “rid the Lebanese of Lahoud,” and maintained that the opposition would refuse to participate in any government as long as the president was in power. See Maher Zeineddine, “Jumblatt: No Unity Government with Lahoud,” The Daily Star, March 18, 2005, http://www. dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID =1&article_ID=13534&categ_id=2.

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The Ain el Tineh Gathering’s decline After the failure of the negotiations’ round, Karami resigned for the second time on March 29 leaving the country in an ambivalent state of helplessness and relief: this time, the resulting institutional void could either delay the heralded political transition or pave the way for a rapid appointment of a neutral cabinet. To the surprise of the opposition, Karami’s decision to resign for the second time was rejected by the loyalist camp, commonly dubbed as the Ain El Tineh grouping.210 Speaker Berri who presided over the gathering insisted that the premier re-launched consultations. In response to Ain el Tineh’s decision, the opposition multiplied its calls for a neutral cabinet that would organize the elections. On April 6, it even threatened to resort to street demonstrations if political crisis persisted. A wave of disappointment prevailed as the reappointed Premier hinted by April 15 to the possible formation of a pro-Syrian cabinet. Yet, as predicted, his second round of consultations was brought to a halt on April 11. It was reported that serious differences such as political disputes over key cabinet portfolios and over the nature of the electoral law had thwarted the formation of a pro-Syrian government. Following Karami’s definitive resignation and retreat to his hometown in Tripoli,211 pro-Syrian groups declared their disappointment with the Ain el Tineh gathering.212 The intensive pace of political wrangling and emerging internal fissures in the pro-Syrian camp had finally eroded the loyalist grouping’s cohesiveness. A shimmer of hope By mid-April 2005, President Lahoud accepted Karami’s resignation, and announced his readiness to consult with the parliament in order to choose a new premier. The opposition’s proposed candidate, Najib Mikati, a moderate Sunni politician, was appointed to head a transitional cabinet expected, according to the Bristol Coalition, to endorse an international inquiry into Hariri’s assassination, supervise the electoral process, and confirm the security officials’ demise. It was 210 211

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The loyalist establishment was meeting regularly in Ain el Tineh where speaker Berri resides. Nayla Assaf and Nafez Kawas, “Karami Suspends Cabinet Talks and Retreats to Tripoli,” The Daily Star, April 13, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=14244&categ_id=2. In the wake of Karami’s decision to suspend talks, outgoing interior minister Suleiman Franjieh and Hezbollah declared that they had been deceived by the Ain el Tineh Grouping.

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only after the appointment of a temporary government, emphasized the opposition, that a national consensus cabinet, earning its legitimacy from the elections, could take shape. Mikati’s nomination promised to restart the lagging democratic transition as the new premier pledged to fulfil the opposition’s demands. Indeed, the twomonth transitional government adopted new measures which added a remarkable degree of transparency to Lebanon’s post-war political process. First, vowing neutrality, all interim cabinet ministers imparted their intention not to participate in the upcoming elections. Second, the new premier pledged to organize elections by May 29. Third, as anticipated, security chiefs stepped aside 213 before the start of the international investigation into Hariri’s slaying. Although these measures fell short of a necessary overhaul of the security apparatus, they foreshadowed the slow disintegration of the old Lebanese-Syrian regime. As soon as the interim cabinet won an overwhelming vote of confidence and the UN investigative team arrived in Beirut, it appeared that the democratic venture had finally taken off. The cabinet started sketching a plan aiming at restructuring the security and judiciary apparatuses.214 The promise to amend the Amnesty Law bestowed an additional impetus to the democratic process. Popular hopes soared that Geagea’s release and Aoun’s political comeback by May 7 would mark a political turning point. Fourth phase of the transition: Syria’s departure or the ‘end of the affair’ During the first week of March 2005, Syrian soldiers started leaving their posts in North and Mount Lebanon, and withdrew to Eastern parts of the country along Syrian borders. In spite of several phases of military retrieval to the Beqa’a, it was reported that six offices belonging to Syrian intelligence operatives had not yet been evacuated.215 213

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Beginning April, security chief Raymond Azar took a temporary administrative leave. On April 22, Jamil el Sayyed, head of the General Security Apparatus and Ali Hajj, Internal Security Forces’ commander, announced their willingness to step aside before the international investigation started. Three days later, Sayyed submitted his final resignation, which coincided with Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. In May, the government asked another top security chief, Ghassan Tufeili, to step down. Perceived by the opposition as a symbol of a biased judiciary, and a supporter of the old security system, prosecutor, Adnane Addoum was replaced by judge Said Mirza. President Assad declared on March 5 that total Syrian redeployment to Eastern Lebanon would take place according to a two-phased plan: A part of the Syrian military troops would return home; others would pull back first to the Beqa’a then along the Lebanese-Syrian borders. The Lebanese-Syrian Superior Council would decide afterwards how long Syrian troops would stay along the Lebanese-Syrian borders.

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This ambiguous redeployment fell short of the international community’s expectations. Undertones of threat and diplomatic pressure converged to force about a quicker pullout.216 Suspicious contacts of the American administration with Syrian opposition actors raised fears that the US might be concocting a plan of regime change in Syria.217 Damascus finally announced that all Syrian troops would have withdrawn by April 30.218 Yet no sooner did the Syrian regime impart its decision than a series of bomb explosions in Lebanese Christian areas tolled the bell of unrest.219 Syrian withdrawal would not take place without disquiet. In spite of a general atmosphere of disquiet, the Lebanese were impatiently waiting for the end of a 29-year old guardianship. In fact, as Syrian soldiers were departing and as intelligence headquarters were being deserted and Syrian leaders’ effigies dismantled, it seemed that a new page was turned. Under pouring rain, the last Syrian soldier crossed the Lebanese frontier on April 25. The following day, Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazali, left Anjar, the Syrian intelligence headquarters in Lebanon, after a farewell ceremony in Beqa’a. That day, Syrian minister of foreign affairs Farouk alChareh sent a formal letter to the United Nations confirming that all military 216

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On March 8, in Pittsburgh, President Bush hurried to dismiss Syria’s willingness to re-deploy its troops as unsatisfactory and ‘half-hearted.’ On the other side, the United Nations and the European Parliament welcomed the Syrian troops’ redeployment as a positive step, but insisted on an ensuing withdrawal. On March 18, 2005, a common declaration by France, Russia, Germany, and Spain called on Syria to pull out its troops and intelligence services in accordance with the resolution. It was reported that Arab countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well as the Arab League earnestly advised Damascus to withdraw its troops as soon as possible in order to escape the ambush of international isolation. Although the American State Department denied any intention to dislodge the regime and declared that these encounters aimed at exploring avenues options for future reform in Syria, misgivings were on the rise. See “Washington continue à accentuer sa pression sur Damas,” Le Monde, March 31, 2005, 4. Right after President Bush’s speech on March 8, in which he pressed for an imminent withdrawal, the Syrian ambassador to Washington, Imad Mustapha, announced that the Syrian soldiers would leave Lebanon before May. On May 12, president Bashar communicated to the UN envoy Road-Larsen a new plan: The Syrian troops would finish re-deploying to the Beqa’a by March 31. A second phase would lead to the complete pullout of all Syrian soldiers and intelligence operatives. However, the second phase specified no precise timetable. In a subsequent meeting with UN secretary general Annan during the Arab League Summit in Algiers, the Syrian president agreed to submit a detailed timetable at the beginning of April. Indeed, during the first week of April, the United Nations announced Syria’s official withdrawal before April 30. US officials announced that they believed Syria to be in one way or another responsible for the bombings. See Robin Wright, “U.S. Sees Syria Shoring up its Influence in Lebanon,” Washington Post, available from Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/ pp/05093/481537.stm.

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troops and intelligence operatives had withdrawn in compliance with Resolution 1559. Fifth phase of the transition: Lebanon’s summer parliamentary elections Lebanon’s 2005 parliamentary elections were the first elections since 1972 that took place without outright Syrian interference. These polls, generally depicted as free and fair, signalled the rise of a liberalizing system in the country. 220 What made these elections tantamount to a breakthrough in Lebanon’s post-war history was that they provided an example of how governmental offices could be filled as a result of contestation and competition. As the international community was pressing Lebanon to hold the polls on time in the presence of electoral monitors, doubt prevailed whether free and fair elections could take place in a period of agitation.221 Yet, the opposition believed that deferring elections at such a juncture would undermine Lebanon’s ‘Democratic Uprising,’ and would allow the old regime to obstruct change. In the following paragraphs, I will thoroughly analyze the circumstances under which the polls took place, the electoral process, and its outcomes The 2005 pre-electoral period: disputes and inconsistencies The controversial 2000 law The new Mikati cabinet had succeeded in no time to organize hasty elections, which – to the deception of many – took place on the basis of the 2000 electoral law. Although dozens of projects aiming at reforming the electoral law were submitted in the pre-electoral period to the parliament, the final choice fell upon the Syrian-brokered law. One common explanation was that the necessity of holding elections by the end of May had impeded the careful preparation of another law. Thus, whereas an electoral law based on small districts would inflame sectarian rivalries, privileging large districts would disfavor minorities. This is why a hybrid law, according to speaker Berri, was under the prevailing circumstances the best solution.222 220

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If one adopts the minimalist definition of democracy based on the convening of contested elections, Lebanon has crossed in summer 2005 the boundary from a competitive authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy. Sporadic explosions in the Christian areas signalled the lack of internal security. Adnan El-Ghoul, “Lebanon’s Parliamentary Polls Kick off with Three Uncontested Seats in Beirut,” The Daily Star, April 16, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_

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It was also noted that the opposition failed to press for the adoption of an electoral law based on small constituencies because of differences of opinion and confessional interests.223 On April 27, during the parliamentary session convened for the adoption of the electoral law, it was reported that the deputies had to choose between the law based on small districts or the 2000 law.224 As the divided parliament failed to rally for the first alternative, the opposition had either to defer the polls or settle for the less attractive option. In the final analysis, one cannot certify whether the primary cause for adopting the 2000 law was the lack of consensus among different communal groups, the inability of the opposition to agree on a common course of action, the loyalists/opposition cleavage, the lack of time, or whether it was a deliberate attempt to maintain some residues of the old regime. Probably, all these factors played a role.225 The transcommunal opposition splits An important event that marked the pre-electoral period was Aoun’s return on May 7 as it was anticipated. His comeback indicated the increase of political liberties after Syria’s departure as well as the dawn of a fragile communal reconciliation.226 According to many Christians, this return hailed the end of Maronite ostracism. Yet, Aoun’s arrival ignited major cracks within opposition ranks.

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ID=1&article_ID=15116&categ_id=2. The press alluded to implicit pre-electoral compromises under the auspices of the 2000 law, which aimed at promoting communal interests between the Shiite main establishment, Amal and Hezbollah, and Druze leader Jumblatt. See Philippe Abi-Akl, “Les opposants, minés de l’intérieur, tombent dans une embuscade de prétoir,” L’Orient Le Jour, April 29, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhi/politique/polsujet3.htm. It was believed that the main reason why Jumblatt seemed to be in favor of the 2000 electoral law was his fear of gathering insufficient votes provided that Mount Lebanon were divided into smaller constituencies in which Christian voices predominated. Ziyad Makhoul, “Eclairage-Le deal en faveur d’élections à la date prévue chorégraphié mieux qu’un Béjart,”. L’Orient Le Jour, April 28, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui /politique/polsujet25.htm. It was argued that before Syrian withdrawal pro-Syrian incumbents had half-heartedly accepted the opposition’s project of an electoral law based on small districts in order to co-opt opposition ranks. Yet, after the failure of dialogue, there was no need to seek accommodation. In the eyes of some loyalist politicians eager to retain their stronghold, the 2000 electoral law was a last option for survival. See “La bataille pour les législatives a commencé, la dernière ligne de défense syrienne,” L’Hebdo Magazine, April 1, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp? ArrowIndex=0&HID=&HIssueNum=2473&Category=1&DescId=4698&DescFlag=1. Upon his return, Aoun received Sethrida Geagea, his old Maronite foe’s wife. Both agreed to forget the past.

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Political feuding between the Maronite leader and the Bristol Coalition announced the recurrence of confessional bickering, and the splintering of the Intifada’s transcommunal opposition once the Syrian threat had subsided. After the failure of negotiations on joint electoral lists with the Bristol Coalition, dubbed by this time as the 14 March Alliance, Aoun had to strike alliances with pro-Syrian actors such as Greek Orthodox politician Michel el Murr, Jumblatt’s rival Talal Arslane, and the loyalist Armenian Tachnag Party. With this electoral divorce,227 the initial large opposition bloc, which engineered the uprising, split into two groups: the 14 March Coalition – led by Jumblatt and the late premier’s son, Saad Hariri, who took up the leadership of his father’s Future Current – and the Free Patriotic Movement.228 Anti-Syrian journalist Samir Kassir’s assassination a few days after the first electoral round plunged the country in a state of deep sadness. It also foreshadowed the disenchantment with the Beirut Spring as the uprising seemed to have brought with it the Janus face of liberation and vengeance, unity and fragmentation.229 The course of the elections In spite of these bleak perspectives and the ghostly slaying that overshadowed the electoral start off, the 2005 polls staggered over three consecutive Sundays brought about significant changes. For the first time in Lebanon’s history, international as well as national electoral monitoring was allowed.230 Fearing the ferocity of the battle, several political veterans decided to back out. 227

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The Maronite Council of Bishops issued a statement criticizing electoral deal making as well as unnatural political alliances. It also deplored discord among Christian politicians running for elections. Aoun accused Jumblatt and Hariri of attempting to monopolize power. According to him, they represented two symbols that had previously cooperated with the Syrian regime only to turn later on against it. Conversely, the Bristol opposition accused Aoun of having “sold his soul to the Syrians in exchange for his return to the Lebanese political scene.” See Cécile Hennion, “L’opposition libanaise se divise alors que le troisième tour des élections s’annonce disputé,” Le Monde, June 11, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_element/ 0,40-0Q2-3218,50660982,0.html. On June 2, the day Kassir was assassinated, a general meeting of all opposition poles took place. During the meeting, the Free Patriotic Movement’s representatives left in the middle of a stormy session after the Bristol Coalition had accused them of sustaining the old Lebanese-Syrian apparatus. See “Al Jarima tukaress khilaf lika’al Bristol ma’a Aoun,” Assafir, June 3, 2005, http://www.assafir.com/iso/today/front/143.html. The European Union deployed some 100 long-term and short-term observers to monitor the polls as well as ensure that all participants had equal access to the media. A UN team assisted the government’s work with the European Union. For the first time, the Lebanese Association for

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On the first electoral round dated May 29 in Beirut, Saad Hariri’s “List of Loyalty to the Memory of Martyr Rafik Hariri” scored an absolute victory. It was reported that nine out of 19 candidates on the list had ensured their triumph before the polls had even started, since many traditional politicians such as Tammam Salam and Salim el Huss stood aside. Some ascribed the low voter turnout in Beirut which amounted to 28 % to the absence of real opposition to Hariri’s list and to the fact that electoral outcomes were somehow pre-determined: voting for Saad Hariri’s list was a kind of appraisal for his father’s legacy. On the following Sunday, June 5, the usual alliance between Amal and Hezbollah in South Lebanon swept all 23 seats. The electoral outcomes, a kind of plebiscite in favor of the Shiite establishment’s political line as well as a stance against American pressure, confirmed the support for the armed Resistance. During this electoral round, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) noted several attempts of intimidation whereas international observers argued that no major irregularities took place. The most competitive electoral battle took place on June 12 in Mount Lebanon and in the Beqa’a valley as Aoun’s comeback had twisted the Bristol opposition’s cards.231 Since outcomes were highly uncertain in the Mount Lebanon area, constituents hurried to the polling booth to cast a ballot that would hopefully make a difference. Indeed, that day, voter turnout reached 50%. To the surprise of many, Aoun’s list won 21 parliamentary seats; other well-known Christian opposition actors who played an important role during the Beirut Spring, like Fares Suheid and Nassib Lahoud, were left behind. The FPM leader’s stunning success proved that he was an uncontested representative of the Christian community. It also revealed the voters’ longing for change, and disillusionment with Christian opposition poles such as the Qornet Shehwan Gathering.232 Moreover, Aoun’s victory challenged the Bristol

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Democratic Elections was given free room to observe the polls. Whereas it was expected that Jumblatt’s list would sweep the board in the Druze fief, electoral outcomes were highly uncertain in Christian areas namely Jbeil-Kesrwan and in the Metn area Aoun announced an ambitious political program in which he pledged to promote political reforms, fight corruption, and overturn sectarianism in the country. Moreover, after 15 years of marginalization, the Christian community was yearning for a strong and uncompromising leader able to mobilize dispersed communal allegiances. His triumph in Mount Lebanon was tantamount to a popular revolt against old post-war power symbols. Indeed, the Qornet Shehwan Grouping had proven incapable of healing the Christian community’s frustrations. The coalition’s popularity and credibility had been shaken after it had failed to press for the adoption of a new electoral law. There was a general feeling that the Christian grouping was kept hostage to Patriarch Sfeir’s and to Druze leader Jumblatt’s decisions. Two weeks before the elections, a

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Coalition’s initial plan to wrest control of the parliament by winning a total of 94 seats.233 In the Shuf area, polls confirmed the deeply anchored Druze loyalties; Jumblatt secured a seat as uncontested winner in the parliament. The less competitive battle in the Beqa’a valley ended with the triumph of Hezbollah in the Baalbeck-Hermel constituency, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Current in Zahleh, and Saad Hariri’s list in West Beqa’a-Rachaya. The last electoral round, which took place in Northern Lebanon on June 19, confirmed the 14 March Alliance’s victory. Saad Hariri’s list, which brought together the Future Current, the Lebanese Forces, and the Qornet Shehwan Grouping, won all 28 seats, whereas Aoun’s coalition with loyalist politician Suleiman Franjieh failed. The victory of the anti-Syrian coalition under the title of “National Unity” enhanced the spirit of inter-communal cohesiveness based on the Beirut Spring, and certified the wane of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.234 Furthermore, the comeback of some marginalized factions such as the Lebanese Forces to the political arena was a sign of improved and fairer communal representation. Considered as the new benchmarks upon which Lebanon, freed of Syrian shackles, would consolidate a new political era, the 2005 polls were acclaimed by the international community and the Lebanese interim government as generally free and fair.235 Lebanese incumbents hardly intervened during the polls; Syria did not significantly influence electoral lists and coalitions.236 International observers emphasized, however, the urgent necessity of reforming the electoral framework and imposing regulations on campaign finances.

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key member, Simon Karam, resigned putting into question the coherence and survival of the Qornet Shehwan gathering after Syrian departure. His resignation was followed by the retreat of other prominent figures. See “Pourquoi le peuple a choisi Aoun,” L’Hebdo Magazine, June 17, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HId=&HIssueNum=2484&Cate gory=1&DescId=4864&DescFlag=1. This plan could have allowed the 14 March Alliance to bring about President Lahoud’s destitution. Hariri’s list in the North had namely emphasized the necessity of fighting the residues of the Lebanese-Syrian police state. See Majdoline Hatoum, “U.S. and Europe Praise Lebanon’s Elections,” The Daily Star, June 21, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=16108&categ_id=2. See also “ Mikati: une élection démocratique et transparente,” L’Orient Le Jour, June 22, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ hier/politique/polsujet8.htm. For an analysis of the 2005 elections, see Farid El Khazen, “Continuity and Change,” Media Monitors Network, August 6, 2005, http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/17480.

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The new parliament: breakthrough and deceptions Elections paved the way for the emergence of a parliament dominated by the anti-Syrian pluralist coalition, which swept 72 out of 128 seats. The press alluded for the first time in post-war history to the genesis of a fairly representative parliament which included most communal and political groups.237 Elite turnover was quite significant: 61 new entries were registered. Upon analyzing the makeup of the legislature, four major parliamentary alliances stand out: Hariri’s Future Current (36 seats) and Jumblatt’s Democratic Meeting (16 seats) form the largest blocks belonging to the 14 March Alliance, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (21 seats) constitutes a new opposition that broke out of the Bristol Coalition’s hold, and finally, Amal and Hezbollah’s coalition (29 seats) symbolizes the survival of the loyalist Ain el Tineh Gathering and its political line. Whilst loyalist parties such as the Baath Party (1 seat), the Syrian Socialist National Party (2 seats) and the pro-government Kata’ib (1 seat) were marginalized, the Lebanese Forces, formerly banned, won six seats. Independent Pro-Syrian actors who played a major role under Syrian tutelage, like Suleiman Franjieh, Assem Kanso, and Nasser Kandil, were either ousted or did not participate. Figure 4.1 illustrates the composition of the new 2005 parliament and the partitioning of parliamentary blocs.

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See Michel Touma, “Perspectives-La concertation préalable et le consensus dans l’esprit du 14 mars... ” L’Orient Le Jour, retrieved on July, 10, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ aujourdhui/politique/polsujet1. htm.

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Figure 4.1

The 2005 legislature

Loyalist establishment

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Hezbollah

Hariri's Future Current Anti-Syrian coalition

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Free Patriotic Movement and allies

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Lebanese Forces

Source: Fakhoury

Still, a closer scrutiny reveals that various aspects cast shadow on these electoral outcomes as well as on the makeup of the new legislature. First, the abortion of the electoral law advocated by the Bristol Coalition undermined the promised changes alleged by the opposition. Despite the March

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14 Alliance’s victory, it was crystal clear that its ambitious political program had been toned down. Second, the polls, which were based on the 2000 law, were criticized by the Christian and the Armenian communities.238 In Beirut, in the North and in the South, several politicians and groupings argued that giant lists made it impossible to win.239 Particularly in the South, the Amal-Hezbollah coalition’s triumph heightened feelings of marginalisation.240 While the voter turnout in the South was relatively high in Shiite districts, it remained low in Christian and Sunni areas. Furthermore, the Mount Lebanon battle highlighted intra-communal rifts within the Christian and the Druze communities. In the Maronite community, divergences between Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and the Qornet Shehwan Grouping grew deeper. In addition, power struggles between Walid Jumblatt’s supporters and chief rival Talal Arslan, who stroke an unlikely alliance with Aoun, came to the forefront.241 Most importantly, the 2005 electoral battle emphasized the precariousness of electoral alliances: Jumblatt’s electoral alliance with the Lebanese Forces and previous rival Samir Geagea, portrayed as one of the positive effects of the Independence Intifada,242 caused many speculations: did the two Lebanese currents, rival factions during the war, surmount their political differences or was this rapprochement designed for electoral ends? Moreover, Jumblatt’s electoral alliance with Hezbollah in the Alley-Baabda constituency was perceived as temporary and superficial. Indeed, the truce broke down once enormous divergences over the Shiite party’s military role resurfaced.243

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See Majdoline Hatoum “Christian Opposition to Run in Elections despite ‘Unfair Law’,”The Daily Star, May 18, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID =1&article_ID=15187&categ_id=2; “Les Arméniens du Liban se mobilisent contre la loi 2000,” L’Orient Le Jour, May 18, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour. com/aujourdhui/politique/ polsujet5.htm. Sunni independent politicians and organizations such as the Islamic group Al Jamaa al Islamiyya also criticized the electoral law. See Nicolas Tohme and Samer Wehbe, “MPs Boycott Elections and Condemn Foreign Meddling,” The Daily Star, May 21, 2005, http://www.dailystar. com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=15269&categ_id=2. For example, in Beirut, unable to keep up with the overarching Future Current despite a respectful score, politicians such as Najah Wakim had to exit the electoral race. In the North, traditional politicians like Issam Fares and Omar Karami decided to boycott the polls, for they knew beforehand that chances to combat the wide anti-Syrian alliance were null. Some Christian politicians in the region called for an electoral boycott after they had complained that the electoral law made their struggle against the Amal-Hezbollah list vain. After the polls, riots and clashes were reported between Jumblatt’s and Arslane’s supporters in the Druze community. In villages such as Kfarmatta where sectarian Druze-Christian fighting in 1983 had left deep scars, constituents voted for lists grouping Druze and Christian candidates. In January 2006, for example, Jumblatt questioned fiercely Hezbollah’s refusal to demilitarize, and declared that the Shebaa farms were not Lebanese.

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Though the legislature was not orchestrated by the Syrian tutor, its composition suggested a return to the same political balances and coalitions that predominated under Syrian influence: the same major political actors who marked Lebanon’s Syrian-brokered exit from the war impacted Lebanon’s liberation from the Syrian grip.244 Sceptics asked whether these elections brought about genuine rotations in power structures or not more than displacements of political weights.245 In addition, the 35 seats won by the loyalist establishment suggested that an absolute Lebanese emancipation from the Syrian track was unthinkable. An important question was whether the pluralist coalitions in the new legislature were a formula for divisiveness or whether the parliamentary blocs, despite their divergent affiliations, could reach understanding on core issues in order to consolidate nascent democratic structures. Considered as one of the oldest symbols of the pro-Syrian regime, Nabih Berri was reelected for the fourth time to head the parliament.246 It was reported that his reappointment was made possible once he pledged to fulfil the opposition’s demands: facilitating international investigations into Hariri’s slaying, and promulgating a new amnesty law permitting Samir Geagea’s release before July 2005.247 For the first time since 1992, Berri did not mention the concomitance of the Lebanese-Syrian tracks in his official speech.

The first post-Syrian coalition cabinet and its difficult birth President Lahoud’s consultations with the parliament resulted in the appointment of former minister of finance, Fuad Saniora, a close political ally to the slain premier, to head a new cabinet of national union. The new premier vowed to form a broad cabinet in which all communal and political groupings would be represented. He also emphasized the necessity of dialogue and consensus, and pledged to reform state institutions, promote transparency and good governance in the post-Syrian era. 244

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See Ghassan Rubeiz, “Lebanon’s Ready to Vote but Obstacles to Change Remain,” The Daily Star, May 26, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=10&article_ID=15382 &categ_id=5. See “Wahlsieg der Opposition in Libanon Machtwechsel oder nur Gewichtsverschiebungen?” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 21, 2005, http://www.nzz.ch/2005/06/21/al/articleCWZRL.print.html. Thirty-seven deputies who belonged to Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, to the Lebanese Forces and the Qornet Shehwan Grouping, abstained from voting. See “4ème mandat consécutif pour le chef d’Amal, victoire sans gloire pour Berry,” L’Hebdo Magazine, July 3,2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HId=&Hissue Num=2486&Category=1& Des cID=4905&DescFlag=1.

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Still, forming a representative cabinet devoid of Syrian influence and based on consensus was no easy task. Controversial issues related to the allocation of portfolios, to the participation of Hezbollah and of the Free Patriotic Movement for the first time in post-war cabinets – retarded the promised birth of the government. As Hezbollah claimed the Foreign Affairs portfolio and the Free Patriotic Movement affirmed that it would participate in the new government only if it held the Justice portfolio and if it were fairly represented, 248 consensus seemed at first beyond the political players’ reach. The row between Saad Hariri’s Future Current and Aoun’s movement over the Ministry of Justice ultimately led the FPM leader to withdraw from the fray.249 In addition to the controversies connected with the attribution of portfolios, serious problems related to political weights and communal representation retarded the cabinet formation. The winning anti-Syrian coalition claimed at first a two-third majority in the new government in order to prevent the veto power of the loyalist establishment, and avert political deadlock. Yet, the Shiite coalition refused to be under-represented and opposed any proposition which would not take into consideration its political weight. Discussions soared whether a powersharing cabinet should be a platform where all factions would be equally represented or whether the cabinet should reflect the parliamentary power configurations. Characteristics and composition of the Saniora cabinet Mid-July, it seemed as if Lebanon were heading for another governmental crisis as four propositions submitted by the designated premier were met with disagreement.250 At last, after strenuous negotiations, major political actors 248

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Attributing the portfolio of foreign affairs to Hezbollah awakened the fear that this step might lead to an impasse with the international community as well as with the 14 March Alliance regarding the implementation of Resolution 1559, namely the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military wing. Besides, bestowing the portfolio of justice to the Free Patriotic Movement led by Aoun, who proclaimed a ferocious struggle against corruption, frightened many political actors. Deputy Saad Hariri argued in addition that the justice portfolio should be attributed to the Future Current on the grounds that that this portfolio played a crucial role in the international investigation into Hariri’s assassination. Despite intense negotiations between MP Hariri and FPM leader Aoun, the latter decided not to join the cabinet. According to Aoun, this would allow the Free Patriotic Movement to play the role of the new opposition. After announcing his decision, Aoun accused Druze leader Jumblatt of striving to isolate him. The proposals were rejected by President Lahoud and certain parliamentary blocs on the grounds that some parties were excluded, not well represented or that certain communities were disfavored.

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agreed on a 24-member ministerial team in which all factions except the Free Patriotic Movement were represented. Formed on July 19, the new government based on consensus rather than on the principle of majority rule, was generally described as balanced and representative. Contrary to previous ‘Syrianised’ ministerial teams, the Saniora Cabinet resembled a multipolar forum in which the dominating anti-Syrian alliance and loyalist establishment were given a chance to sort out their differences through dialogue. For the first time the Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces were represented respectively by the Energy portfolio allocated to Shiite Mohammad Fnaish and the portfolio of Tourism attributed to Maronite Joe Sarkis. The polemic of the Foreign Affairs portfolio was resolved by assigning the post to Fawzi Salloukh, a Shiite politician who was not affiliated to the Resistance, and the justice portfolio was given to Maronite Charles Risk, known for his close ties to President Lahoud. The 24-member cabinet which included 13 newcomers was credited for appointing 14 ministers who were not represented in the parliament. Although the ministerial team included eight pro-Syrian ministers,251 radical pro-Syrian parties such as the Baath and the Syrian Nationalist Party, which had markedly interfered in the post-war process, were for the first time since 1992 left out. The new government and Resolution 1559 The Saniora cabinet was immediately praised by the international community and notably by the US establishment that expressed by the end of July 2005 its readiness to support Lebanon politically and economically in its strife towards reform and political transition provided that Lebanon honored its international commitments. As the ministerial team started drafting its statement, US reminders to implement fully Resolution 1559 cast a shadow on the cabinet’s momentous start and foreshadowed the reemergence of contentious issues.252 Indeed, the ministerial statement failed to mention the resolution, but emphasized the necessity of respecting international legitimacy. It pledged to protect Lebanon’s 251

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Unless the loyalist establishment allies with another independent figure, this number does not bestow upon the pro-Syrian coalition the minority right to block decision-making. End of July 2005, during her unexpected visit to Lebanon after the formation of the cabinet, US Secretary of State Rice reminded Premier Saniora of the new government’s obligation towards the international community. The new premier vowed to launch serious negotiations among Lebanese factions regarding the issue. A bomb blast in Beirut after Rice’s visit was interpreted as a a political warning slamming the US politician’s reference to the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military wing.

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Resistance as a national force shielding the state from Israeli threats, and vowed to pursue balanced ties with neighboring Syria. It also affirmed Lebanon’s attachment to the path of democracy and to the Independence Intifada, and set as major goals the reform of institutions and the building of a strong state endowed with accountable security and judicial apparatuses.253 On July 30, the government won the support of 92 members in a 128-seat legislature. After criticizing its evasive attitude towards Resolution 1559, the Free Patriotic Movement decided to withhold confidence from the cabinet. The international probe into Hariri’s Killing: towards more transparency? The Fitzgerald fact-finding mission Another factor that helped push Lebanon’s political transition forward was the international probe into Hariri’s killing. The inquiry that took place under the auspices of international legitimacy conferred a touch of transparency on ensuing reforms, and helped the country “cast off – at least for temporarily – its Syrian shackles.”254 Endowed with wide-reaching powers, the UN international commission assisted the new Lebanese government in discrediting and partially sacking the old Lebanese security apparatus. It also provided some kind of immunity against an overt manipulation of Hariri’s inquiry by the old judiciary apparatus and by shadow entities. After a fact-finding mission which investigated the circumstances of the crime, Deputy Police Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald issued a first interim report that shed some light on the mysterious circumstances of the killing. Released on March 24, 2005, the Fitzgerald’s report declared that excessive Syrian influence in Lebanon had set the climate for the slaying, and that both Syrian and Lebanese authorities bore the primary responsibility for political tensions surrounding the killing.255 The fact-finding mission also highlighted the outgoing Lebanese government’s reluctance to shed light on the circumstances of the crime, and alluded to possible evidence tampering after Hariri’s assassination.256 Still, the 253

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It was not until October 2005 that the government, paralyzed by political wrangling, was able to fill key security and judiciary positions. Rory McCarthy “The Road from Damascus,” Guardian, October 17, 2005, http://www.guardian. co.uk/ elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,1594311,00.html. The report also included a testimony that President Bashar had threatened the slain premier with physical harm. The team which ended its mission on March 15 maintained that Lebanese authorities had tampered with important evidence by pulling away Hariri’s motorcade from the crime scene,

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report could not unveil who the real perpetrators of the crime were, and asked for a more in-depth inquiry. The Mehlis Reports On April 7, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1595, which called for a more extensive probe into the matter. Appointed to head the new enquiry, German Prosecutor Detlev Mehlis embarked on an ambitious mission which reaped its first fruits by the end of summer 2005. On August 30, the Lebanese police arrested, at the request of the UN commission, three former Lebanese security top officials, Jamil el Sayyed, Ali Hajj, and Raymond Azar. Later in the day, the Republican Guard’s chief, Mustafa Hamdane and pro-Syrian former deputy Nasser Qandil were summoned to appear before the UN investigation team. Overnight, Qandil was released while the other four suspects, accused of preparing the crime, were handed over to the Lebanese authorities and later charged with murder by the judiciary.257 Arrests of prominent former security top officials in dawn raids implied that the unbridled security apparatus had finally been weakened. After calling upon the Syrian regime – blamed for slowing down the probe into the murder– to cooperate fully with the investigation, Prosecutor Mehlis set out between September 20 and 23 to interview high-ranking officials in Syria. 258 His first report handed to the Security Council on October 21, 2005 released deeply troubling information about Hariri’s slaying, and asserted that highranking Syrian and Lebanese officials as well as intelligence services had plotted the assassination. The 54-page report argued that the decision to kill Hariri could not have happened without the approval of high-level Syrian officials who controlled the decision-making process in Lebanon, and could not have been carried out without the partaking of the Lebanese security apparatus. 259 The detailed account denounced Syria’s tactics to mislead and obstruct the probe, and deplored its lack of substantial cooperation with the commission. It also confirmed that major

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cleaning the road, and hiding indices found in the crater. End of November 2005, former high-ranking official in the military intelligence operatives, Ghassan Tufeili, was arrested at the request of the UN commission. Among the Syrian officials who were interviewed, I cite deputy minister of foreign affairs Walid Moallem and former Syrian intelligence chiefs in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan and Rustom Ghazali. On October 19, Ghazi Kanaan was found dead in his office. The alleged suicide provoked serious misgivings. In an uncensored first copy of the report circulated by the British UN delegation, it was written that key figures in the Syrian regime such as Maher el Assad and Assef Chawkat had concocted with Lebanese security officials the scheme of Hariri’s assassination.

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evidence was removed from the scene of the crime, and raised questions about President Lahoud’s extent of entanglement in the assassination.260 After the release of the alarming report, the international community intensified its pressure on the beleaguered Syrian regime. Resolution 1636 passed by the Security Council on October 31 called on Syria to cooperate unconditionally with the probe.261 Although the resolution fell short of imposing sanctions on Damascus as it intended to do, speculation was rife that the pressured Syrian regime was on the brink of international isolation. Still, no sooner was the mandate of the probe extended until mid-December than complications regarding the interrogation of high-ranking Syrian officers, such as President Bashar’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, threatened to retard the investigation for a while.262 Before stepping down from his post, Investigator Mehlis handed over his second and final report denouncing Syria’s foul play as well as political and diversionary maneuvering to hamper the probe. The report reaffirmed that Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services had sponsored and organized the killing to the last detail.263 Still, overshadowed by anti-Syrian journalist and Deputy Gebrane Tueni’s slaying, the report did not cause the desired impact. By mid-December, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1644 which extended the mandate of the international commission into Hariri’s slaying for six months after Mehlis’ resignation. This resolution, which deplored Syria’s hesitant cooperation, failed to extend the probe into other politically motivated killings that rocked Lebanon since October 1, 2004, but promised to give technical assistance to the Saniora government.264 It also called for the 260

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The report mentioned that one suspect in the crime, Mahmud Abdel Aal, made a phone call to Lahoud’s mobile phone two minutes before Hariri’s slaying. But the president denied any contact with Abdel Aaal. This resolution was initially supposed to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions on Syria in case the latter refused to comply with the enquiry into Hariri’s murder, but Russia, China and Algeria blocked the move. Prosecutor Mehlis sought to question the Syrian officials first in Beirut, but Damascus refused. Both parties agreed later that interrogations would take place in Vienna. At last, the Mehlis team met with five Syrian officials in the Austrian capital in December. Among the interrogated officials was the last Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazali. The report accused the Syrian regime of burning all Syrian intelligence operatives’ documents related to Lebanon. New evidence uncovered by the commission indicated that the Syrian and Lebanese security apparatuses were coordinating closely to monitor late premier Hariri’s activities before the killing. Suspicions were advanced that the assassination was financed by illegal funds raised by former security chief Jamil el Sayyed. Expecting a firmer resolution, many Lebanese parties expressed their disappointment. Yet, apprehensions related to a possible collapse of the Syrian regime as a result of international pressure led Western powers to adopt a more cautious stance in order to avert further Middle

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establishment of a tribunal with an international character to try Hariri’s murderers. As the year 2005 was drawing to a close, former Syrian vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam’s declaration that President Bashar had a direct bearing on Hariri’s slaying added fuel to the fire, and provoked a wave of unrest in Beirut and Damascus.265 Khaddam’s explosive revelations suggested at the time that the Hariri case might become a political instrument used by the Syrian opposition to provoke the fall of the regime and destabilize Bashar’s shaky authoritarian system.266 The Brammertz mission: a slow inquiry After Prosecutor Mehlis’ resignation, Belgian judge Serge Brammertz was appointed to head the international probe. Brammertz released his first report in March 2006. The document contained much more discrete statements than the two previous Mehlis Reports. Maintaining that Hariri’s slaying had multiple political motives, it alluded to further intricate dynamics and multiple tracks beneath the surface that need to be examined carefully. The report also discerned unclear linkages between Hariri’s killing and other assassination cases since October 2004. 267 In mid-June 2006, Resolution 1686 adopted by the UN Security Council agreed on a one-year extension of the international probe into Hariri’s slaying and widened its mandate to cover other assassination cases.

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Eastern disturbances. See “Pression maintenue sur Damas, ” Le Monde Diplomatique, December 18, 2005, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/carnet/2005-12-18-Pression-maintenue-sur-Damas. For more details on Khaddam’s interview with Al-Arabiyya television channel, see Karen Mneimme and Hanan Nasser, “Khaddam: Assad Threatened Hariri over Extension,” The Daily Star, December 31, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=10&article _ID=21158&categ_id=2. Khaddam declared later that the Syrian regime decided to kill Hariri because of the latter’s opposition to Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. Leveling strong criticism against the Syrian regime, Khaddam stated that he was working on a regime change in Damascus. See Mouna Naim, “Abdel Halim Khaddam veut “oeuvrer à la chute du régime” syrien, ” Le Monde, January 8, 2006, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_element/ 0,40-0Q2-3218,50-728414,0.html. To many observers’ dismay, it seemed that the inquiry had gone back to a former stage. Yet, some suggested that Brammertz was keen on conducting a methodological and slower inquiry to see if the collected evidence so far were leak proof. See Michael Young, “How Do You Say ‘Ominous’ in Belgian?” The Daily Star, March 16, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=22978.

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The opposite side of the coin or the persistence of authoritarian waves Seriously undermined by worrisome points of authority and intervals of terror, Lebanon’s democratic recovery was not smoothly unravelled. During the Beirut Spring, loyalist incumbents had tried hard to retard political change as much as possible. The most important survival strategies used by the semi-authoritarian regime consisted in blocking reform, buying time, trying to curtail the opposition, and adopting an equivocal attitude towards the international community. After Hariri’s slaying, for instance, incumbents attempted to thwart the setup of an international investigation committee as well as to defer Syrian withdrawal. Right after the transatlantic call for Syrian pullout in the Brussels Summit in February 2005, the Lebanese government dismissed international pleas for Syrian departure, and refuted the necessity of an international enquiry into Hariri’s slaying by arguing that Lebanese judicial authorities were competent enough to launch an investigation.268 During the Arab leaders’ Summit in Algiers in March 2005,269 Lahoud urged Arab personalities to back Lebanon’s proSyrian political line. A big blow to the ‘Democratic Uprising’ was Premier Karami’s reappointment by Lahoud in April 2005 in the wake of his resignation during unprecedented popular protests. His reappointment was interpreted as a ‘caricaturization’ of the whole democratic process. In this section, I propose to analyze the negative indicators which draw attention to the brittleness lurking beneath Lebanon’s transition. These indicators hinge mainly on lingering authority impulses, on eroded liberties, and on Lebanon’s questionable stability. Residues of the Lebanese-Syrian constellation and surviving loyalties Although Syrian pullout from Lebanon weakened the Baathist legacy in Damascus and in the Middle East, Syrian influence in Lebanon has not died out with the departure of Syrian soldiers and with the disappearance of Syrian tanks.

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See Linda Dahdah “Lebanese Government Dismisses U.S. and EU Calls for Prompt Syrian Pullout,” The Daily Star, February 25, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=10&article_ID=12912 &categ_id=2. In March 2005, Arab leaders met to discuss opportunities of dialogue with Israel, the Iraqi case, and mainly the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

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This has led observers to ask to what extent a full “Lebanonization of Lebanon” was possible.270 Indeed, the strength of surviving loyalist ties and Syria’s indirect grip should not be underestimated. In spite of its troops’ formal withdrawal, Syria maintains its stranglehold on Lebanon through the allies it left behind, and through the strategy of threat and the ‘divide and rule’ game across confessional lines. Hence, the Syrians need not be present to safeguard their influence; they can rely on pro-Syrian Lebanese actors in the government, the army or in the security services.271 Political parties with strong pro-Syrian affinities, such as Hezbollah, Amal, the Baath Party, and the Socialist Nationalist Party, would definitely safeguard the Syrian legacy. By the end of April 2005, the United Nations Report on Syria’s implementation of Resolution 1559 noted that Syrian intelligence operatives had taken up new invisible posts in Lebanon – more particularly in South Beirut and possibly in the headquarters of pro-Syrian Lebanese political parties or in rented apartments.272 During the 2005 parliamentary elections, speculation prevailed that Syrian intelligence services had exerted some influence in the Beqa’a and in the Northern districts.273 In October, the second semi-annual report to the UN Security Council condemned the influx of infiltrators and weapons to militant groups from Syria across the Lebanese-Syrian borders. It also stated the United Nations’ incapacity to determine whether the entire Syrian apparatus had withdrawn, because an international border between Syria and Lebanon had not been agreed upon. Even though these reports should not be regarded as a decisive substantiation, they still attract attention to Lebanon’s indistinct postSyrian status. Even after the formation of the Saniora government, Syria has kept Lebanon’s foreign policy linked to Damascus via its Lebanese allies and more particularly via Hezbollah. Indeed, long after its troops’ departure, the concomitant Lebanese-Syrian pathway in the Middle Eastern settlement still takes precedence over Lebanon’s autonomous course. Hezbollah’s war with

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See for example Rosana Bou Monsef, “Will the Lebanonization of Lebanon be too Much of an Undertaking?” The Daily Star, April 27, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp? art_ID=14628&cat_ID=2. See Georges Malbrunot, “Damas a gardé les moyens de nuire,” Le Figaro, March 24, 2005, http://www.lefig aro.fr/cgi/edition/genimprime?cle=20050324.FIG0036. See Leila Hatoum, “UN Report Slams ‘Heavy Handed’ Syrian Meddling,” The Daily Star, April 27, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=14632&cat_ID=2. See “Syrian Intelligence Officers Make Swift Return for Elections,” The Daily Star, May 1, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.,asp?art_ID=15555&cat_ID=2.

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Israel in summer 2006 has raised serious doubts whether Lebanon would indefinitely fight other nations’ wars. Sustaining the rhetoric of fear: an authoritarian stratagem Throughout 2005, in order to withstand the international storm of pressure and in order to stand up to the Lebanese opposition, Syrian incumbents have on many instances alluded to a looming inter-confessional crisis in Lebanon, and have depicted international assistance as part of a plan contrived against Lebanese interests.274 Syria has also sent veiled messages to the international community that pressure against the Syrian regime could have negative effects on Lebanon’s stability,275 and that any attempt to dislodge the Damascene regime would lead to regional chaos and to the empowerment of Islamist networks in the Middle East.276 Part of the Syrian regime’s strategy of survival, these warnings have entertained apprehensions of an enfeebled Lebanon dependent on its neighbor’s good will. Backing this discourse, Syria’s allies in Lebanon have stressed – on several occasions since the renewal of Lahoud’s term – the possibility of resurgent internal upheavals. They have also alluded to past episodes in the Lebanese conflict to prove that their pro-Syrian political line helped shield Lebanon from recurring conflicts. Although concerned Lebanese parties would argue that these warnings have been solely made for precautionary measures, these remarks have helped maintain the element of fear in post-war Lebanese society. Liberties at stake In the wake of the Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon’s Christian heartland was rocked by a frightening series of car bombs.277 Multiple assassinations of key political actors who participated in the 14 March Uprising suggested that Lebanon’s 274

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For instance, on March, 5, 2005, in a speech which announced the Syrian troops’ redeployment, president Bashar argued that the hidden objective of Resolution 1559 was the Palestinians’ implantation in Lebanon. See for example the warning made by Syrian Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid al-Moallem in “‘Les provocations’ auront des conséquences négatives, surtout pour le Liban, menace Moallem,” L’Orient Le Jour, February 25, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/ politique/polsujet5.htm. See “Syria and Lebanon: The Winds of Change” The Daily Star, April 19, 2005, http://www.daily star.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=143673&cat_UD=2. President Lahoud’s vain pledges in March 2005 to end unrest in the wake of the third explosion that happened within eight consecutive days proved that the old security empire upon which the regime had built its legacy had become powerless.

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security was still controlled by a shadow force, and that traces of the Syrian security apparatus might still be lingering. In summer 2005, the two assassinations278 that marked Lebanon’s polls portended other killings.279 Indeed, no sooner did two months elapse than another spate of slaying started.280 Fears mounted that the price to pay for Lebanon’s transition would be too high, and that even after the formation of the new government, a worrisome security vacuum would persist. Indeed, the Saniora government’s vain pledge to break the vicious circle of terror reflected the fragility of the Lebanese state, and the serious security gaps lurking beneath Lebanon’s post-electoral reform. Although the heads of the old security apparatus had been sacked and the Syrian intelligence operatives had withdrawn, terror networks were still deeply anchored.281 The anti-Syrian opposition in Lebanon as well as the international community strongly suspected that the explosions282 and assassinations that happened since the extension of Lahoud’s mandate were planned and executed by the Syrian security apparatus, and perhaps in collaboration with Lebanese agents.283 Following opposition actor Tueni’s assassination in December 2005, the majority in the Lebanese parliament accused Damascus to be behind the crime.284

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I refer to journalist Samir Kassir’s assassination three days after the electoral take off and former leader of the Communist Party Georges Hawi’s killing one day after the anti-Syrian coalition had gained a majority in the parliament in June 2005. Interior minister Elias el Murr miraculously survived a car bomb in July 2005. In June 2005, the international community warned opposition actors of possible assassination attempts. In September 2005, staunch anti-Syrian critic and daring journalist May Chidiac was severely injured in an explosion that almost took her life. Three months later, shortly before prosecutor Mehlis submitted his second report, anti-Syrian journalist as well as one of the main organizers of the Independence Intifada, Gebrane Tueni was killed by a car bomb one day after he returned from Paris. After the bomb blast that targeted journalist May Chidiac, minister of interior affairs Hassan Sabeh intimated that Lebanon was dealing with an unfathomable terrorist ghost. This statement emphasized the government’s helplessness. Following a car bomb explosion in Eastern Beirut on March 19, 2005, the opposition formally accused Syria and its allies in Lebanon of being behind the blast. See Adnan El-Ghoul, “Lebanon’s Opposition Says Syria behind Car Bomb,” The Daily Star March 21, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1 &article_ID=13594&categ_id=2. See for example Mayssam Zaaroura and Nayla Assaf, “Hawi Murder Intensifies U.S. Pressure on Syria,” The Daily Star, June 23, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID =1&article_ID=16174& categ _id=2. See “ Liban: le chef druze Walid Joumblatt appelle à la chute du régime syrien,” Le Monde, December 14, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/depeches/texte/o,14-0,39-26251364,0.html.

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According to some, it made sense that Lebanon’s unhappy neighbor would seek revenge for many reasons.285 Syria’s loss of hegemony and great fear that Lebanon might betray the cause of concordant pathways in the peace process makes it insecure. According to some opposition actors, Marwan Hamade’s assassination attempt in October 2004 had already suggested that the nervous Syrian regime might tamper with stability to reinforce its hegemony. 286 Moreover, as most slain political actors belonged to the Christian camp and to the anti-Syrian Opposition, assumptions prevailed that these assassinations aimed at sustaining confessional strife as well as reinforcing the cleavage between the anti-Syrian and the loyalist establishments. The series of assassinations were also interpreted as an indirect message to the international community: provided that the latter tried to destabilize the regime in Syria, Syria would strike back in Lebanon. Syria has denied all accusations so far. Apart from the two Mehlis Reports whose credibility has been questioned, only widespread conjecture and disparate indicators insinuate that the Syrian regime might have orchestrated these assassinations. An argument pleading for Syria’s innocence is that Lebanon’s fragility in the post-Syrian era makes it similar to a Pandora’s Box open to all destabilizing foreign influences. Indeed, despite the appointment of new security chiefs and the substantial institutional overhaul that occurred after the 2005 elections, Lebanon seems open to all winds. Following the controversy over the Danish caricatures in the Arab world in winter 2006, the riots in Beirut against the Danish embassy, which were followed by Interior Minister Hassan Sabeh’s resignation, proved that the new government was still unable to fill in substantial security gaps in the country. In addition, since the renewal of Lahoud’s term, even if the Lebanese media has adopted an increasingly critical stance, and has dismantled previous red lines imposed by the Lebanese-Syrian security regime, the dying regime still attempted to prune pro-opposition journalists’ influence.287 More importantly, the spate of killings which have targeted outspoken journalists after June 2005 proved that an invisible force was intent on crippling 285 286 287

Interviews with Lebanese citizens in September 2005 and April 2006. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 25, 2004. In March 2005, for example, the press syndicate criticized the Karami government for seeking to weaken the press freedom by calling journalists ‘pro-Israeli mouthpieces.’ The press syndicate specifically alluded to the late An Nahar editor, Gebrane Tueni, whose daring remarks had been interpreted as a proof of collaboration with Israel. The following month, the Lebanese judiciary laid charges against Al-Diyar newspaper editor Charles Ayoub under the charge that he had written an editorial discrediting president Lahoud. The article called upon Lahoud to resign in order to save the country from a major crisis.

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the rising freedom of speech and curtailing the media. Since Kassir’s assassination, journalists and television moderators have been subject to increasing pressure and threat.288 Interferences in the international probe: Syria takes the hard line The probe into Hariri’s slaying and the Saniora government’s determination to solve the riddle behind the spate of murders were hampered by various factors. Following Hariri’s slaying, President Bashar’s strategy of resistance against the international community – namely his adamant assertion that Syria had no hand in the killing despite the release of the compromising UN reports289 – raised questions whether Damascus was seeking a showdown with the international community.290 After the release of the Fitzgerald Report, President Bashar rushed to dismiss the implications of the documents. In an interview in the Spanish Daily El Mundo, he announced that Lebanon’s security had never been Syria’s task in the last thirty years.291 He also argued that it was not Syria that created the climate of tension but Resolution 1559. Echoing the Syrian regime, the outgoing Lebanese government refuted the document’s findings,292 and hesitatingly accepted the formation of an Investigation Committee under UN auspices to shed light on the circumstances of the killing. Despite the Syrian regime’s pledge to cooperate with prosecutor Mehlis, it still utilized many tools to postpone the probe and undermine the credibility of the mission. The mysterious suicide of Ghazi Kanaan, former Syrian intelligence

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Interview on September 28, 2005 with a Lebanese journalist who affirms to have received threats. On December 5, 2005, President Bashar even declared in an interview on French Television Channel, France 3, that he expected the UN commission to correct judgement errors after the Syrian officials’ interrogation. In a speech to the international community on November 10, 2005, Bashar made it clear that Syria would not be cowed. He reiterated Syria’s innocence in Hariri’s murder, and stated that he would not allow the Syrian cooperation with the UN commission to undermine Syria’s internal stability. He also affirmed that Syria had done its best in order to fulfill US demands and secure its border with Iraq. See Inal Ersan, “Assad Expects Showdown with UN despite Cooperation,” Reuters, November 11, 2005, available from http://today.reuters .co.uk. See “Assad. La sécurité du Liban n’a jamais été notre affaire,” L’Orient Le Jour, March 29, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet15.htm. The outgoing government stated that the report remained “descriptive” and not founded on “documented evidence.” See Hussein Dakroub “Lebanon Criticizes U.N Report on Hariri,” Newsday, March 27, 2005, http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-aplebanon.uni-hariri,0.25.

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chief in Lebanon,293 some time after his meeting with the International Investigation Team in October 2005, raised questions on Syria’s intentions to deviate the course of the inquiry. After the release of the first Mehlis report, the Syrian regime, for instance, declared that the document was not reliable as it counted on the testimonies of witnesses who had little credibility.294 It also decried the report as a politicized tool that had been instrumentalized to isolate Syria. Indeed, the Syrian regime was not the only party to criticize the two Mehlis Reports. The latter had been criticized for their presumptions, and generalizations.295 According to some observers, this damoclean sword imposed upon Syria, had defined beforehand the rules of the game. Thus, according to some analysts the reports’ real objectives were to weaken the regime in Damascus and punish it “for its excesses in Lebanon, opposition against the US war in Iraq, and its support to the insurrection and Resistance in Palestine.”296 By reacting quite slowly to the commission’s demands, Syria has been able to slow down the inquiry. Its unhurried reactions were part of a well-studied tactic aimed at buying time hoping that the course of the investigation would be deviated by divisions within the international community on the course of action. Awaiting the end of the international storm, Syria has expected US pressure to lose its momentum not only because of the US involvement in Iraq but also as a result of other powers’ increasing reticence to provoke radical changes in the region. Indeed, the adoption of the more moderate resolution 1644 in December 2005, after the second Mehlis Report, revealed the international community’s reluctance to aggravate the situation, and soothed some of Syria’s fears.

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Lebanese newspapers doubted that Kanaan had committed suicide and referred to a conspiracy by the Syrian regime to prevent the former intelligence chief from disclosing information about the Hariri case. In a televised news conference, one of the main Syrian witnesses interviewed by the commission, Houssam Taher Houssam recanted his testimony against Syria and declared that he had been bribed by former premier Hariri’s son Saad. Speculation was rife that the news conference was part of a Syrian campaign to discredit the investigation. The main Syrian witness, Zuheir Mohammad Siddiq, whose testimonies were used by prosecutor Mehlis as supporting evidence, turned to be a suspect in Hariri’s slaying. Yet, Siddiq was released in February 2006 by a French court, for no sufficient evidence was available to try him. The Syrian independent journalist Sami Moubayed exposed the flaws and hidden intentions of the Mehlis Report. This critique is summarized by Alain Gresh in “Offensive concertée contre le régime syrien,” Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2005, http://www.mondediplomatique. fr/2005/12/GRESH/12995?va_reche rche=Liban.

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The international probe at risk? Although the international probe had brought a handful of Lebanese security chiefs to court and discredited the Syrian regime’s practices in Lebanon, it has failed so far to reach those who commanded the crime. In addition, no conclusive light has been shed on the other assassinations perpetrated after Hariri’s killing. Nearly one year after the ominous Mehlis Reports, it became clear that Bashar’s regime depended less on the international probe than on the international conjuncture of interests.297 In 2006, despite reassurance that the international probe would not be derailed, and continuous pressure on Syria to cooperate with the UN probe,298 misgivings prevailed that the US was less committed to the probe than to Syria’s cooperation with the American strategy in the new Middle East. Speculation was rife that an eventual US-Syrian deal might trade away Lebanon’s unfinished inquiry in return for Syria’s responsiveness,299 and the battle for the truth behind Hariri’s killing might be ‘bartered’ in exchange for Syria’s compliance to US demands.300 Speculation was also rife that overriding regional issues, which came into focus in 2006, such as the Iranian nuclear enrichment plan, and the IsraeliHezbollah war, had overshadowed the probe. Still, the release of the third Brammertz Report by the end of September 2006 proved that the Hariri case was on track. In his cautious account, the UN investigator did not identify suspects, but disclosed many technical details related to the scheme of Hariri’s slaying, and stated that the 14 cases of assassinations since October 2004 were connected. According to analysts, although the report did not point the finger, it did not deflect attention from “the

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Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2006 (London: Oxford Business Group, 2006), 13-36, 25-26. US ambassador Feltman in Lebanon rejected speculations about a US-Syrian deal. See Majdoline Hatoum, Saudi and Egyptian Mediation Efforts Fall on Stony Ground,” The Daily Star, January 12, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=21386&categ_id=2. See Philip Abi Akl, “Concern over Compromise Deal between Syria and US,” The Daily Star, December 12, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID =1&article_ID=20948&categ_id=2. By the end of December 2005, for example, speculation was rife in Lebanese circles that such a deal facilitated by a joint initiative launched by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, would permit Syria’s regime to escape international pressure in return for a series of concessions, mainly a crackdown on insurgents making their way to Iraq and an end of support to Hezbollah and Palestinian radical groups.

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old Lebanese-Syrian security machine” which “remains the chief object of interest.”301 Today, the probe into Hariri’s killing and into the subsequent political killings perpetrated since 2005 is still on track. In 2008, the Canadian Prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, the new head of UN Investigation Commission issued a report containing new evidence on the crime. Furthermore, with the pledge to establish an international tribunal, the UN Commission committs itself to an unravelling of the Hariri maze. Indeed, the international tribunal set to try those involved in the political killings is to start operating in March 2009. An evaluation of Lebanon’s transition to a low-intensity democracy At first appearance, Lebanon’s transition was ensured as the old semiauthoritarian regime dissolved, and some form of a minimalist democracy was installed.302 The indicators which suggested the rise of an electoral democracy are the following: the convening of contested elections generally appraised as free and fair,303 the formation of a new parliament different from its predecessors, the formation of a representative coalition cabinet, the relative recovery of the government’s political autonomy, and the empowerment of basic liberties.304 After these elections, the new government, freed from Syrian guardianship, acquired the invested authority to generate its own policies. Formally, the executive, legislative and judicial power do no longer share power with another overbearing political organism.305 The legitimacy of Syrian interventions in 301

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See William Harris, “A Cautious Report, but Lots between the Line,” The Daily Star, September 27, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=75719. I remind the reader that transitions, defined as the interval between one regime and the other, are characterized by the dissolution of the old regime and the establishment of some kind of democratic rule. See O’Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. It is noteworthy that although the electoral law was not fair to all communities, it cannot be considered as a major setback, because the atmosphere of polarization, restlessness, and rash political transformations throughout 2005 could not have permitted better outcomes. For more details on electoral democracies, see Diamond, Developing Democracy, 7-10; Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 5; Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, 47-63. A transition is considered to be complete when “sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.” See Linz and Stepan,

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executive decision-making had been eroded, and the Lebanese-Syrian security system that was controlling institutions was discredited. By inaugurating a general cleansing of the formerly unbridled security and judiciary apparatuses,306 ingoing incumbents have paved the way for a possible institutional overhaul. This pledge for reform has also been accompanied by an increase of freedoms. LF leader Geagea’s release and political comeback end of July 2005 as well as the decisions to re-open the shut down MTV station307 augured an increase of political and civil liberties contrasting with the wave of killings in the country. Even if Lebanon’s arising political system remained close to an imperfect democratic variant, hope prevailed throughout 2005 that this nebulous revival could project Lebanon along the continuum of democratization.308 Moreover, generally speaking, this minimalist version of democracy, also labelled a lowintensity democracy, can possibly enable democratization in fragile states by empowering electoral and institutional aspects of the system even if more inclusive aspects of democracy remain underdeveloped. 309 Analysis of Lebanon’s path to system transition in 2005 Lebanon’s path of system transition at first glance represents a case of a societyled termination of the non-democratic regime whereby a transcommunal political opposition played a crucial role in dismantling old aspects of the system. Yet, this termination would not have been possible without “an externally monitored installation” which has empowered the existing internal democratic forces. 310

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Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 3. The government has pledged to make the security apparatus accountable to the government and has appointed new security chiefs. Moreover, the parliament’s administration and justice committee has been working on reforming the Constitutional Council by establishing new criteria that make appointments as well as deliberations immune to political interventions. See “Constitutional Council Must be Objective,” The Daily Star, August 23, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=17880&cat_ID=2. The parliament voted in August 2005 to amend Article 68 of the electoral law. This vote enabled the re-opening of the television station shut down on September 4, 2002 for violating allegedly the electoral law and harming Lebanon’s relations with Syria. See Paul Salem, “Lebanon at the Crossroads: Rebuilding an Arab Democracy,” Saban Center East Memo, May 31, 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/salemmemo20050531.htm. See for example Barry Gills, Joel Rocomora, and Richard Wilson, eds, Low Intensity Democracy: political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993). Two paths outlined by Stepan seem to depict Lebanon’s precarious path to redemocratization in 2005: An “externally monitored installation” illustrated by the foreign agents’ democratic assistance and pressure on the non-democratic Syrian regime, and a “society-led regime

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Through this external democratic assistance, Lebanon’s transition was ensured via two methods: democracy by diffusion and democracy by trespassing. 311 Foreign actors’ mediation has helped re-diffuse elements of liberalism in the country as domestic political actors took advantage of this external assistance to bring about the fall of the regime. Had the international community not helped remove the veto set by Syria – through a process of ‘dehegemonization’– on regime change in Lebanon,312 this change would have not been possible. In concrete terms, Lebanon’s transition – simmering since 2000 with the formation of an anti-Syrian internal opposition – was initiated by the expiration of the Syrian licence in Lebanon, and the empowerment of the anti-Syrian alliance by the international community. It materialized with the first free elections and with the formation of a coalition cabinet which demarcated itself from preceding Syrian-brokered ministerial coalitions. The main yardstick against which we can measure Lebanon’s leap beyond the semi-authoritarian zone is that “an open contestation over the right to win control of the government”313 succeeded in dismantling major carriers of the outgoing regime. The following figure recapitulates main phases to Lebanon’s transition in 2005:

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termination” illustrated by the mobilization of the opposition and the communities against the regime and the ensuing delegitimization of the old system. Although Stepan argues that a society-led termination cannot by itself lead to a full redemocratization, it remains a crucial pathbreaking factor. See Stepan, “Paths towards Redemocratization,” 71-72, 78-79. Installing democracy by diffusion happens when foreign actors promote democracy not necessarily through direct imposition or military occupation but through direct political or economic intervention and use of soft power. This intervention can remove an obstacle impeding democracy from developing in the country. Democracy by trespassing refers to the removal of vetoes impeding democratic transition. By withdrawing from Lebanon, Syria has removed the main veto that had thwarted a possible postwar democratic transition. See Di Palma, To Craft Democracies, 183-199. Removing Syria’s veto against change in Lebanon was the result of a process of ‘dehegemonization’ whereby the international community pressured Syria into relinquishing its hegemonic meddling in the Arab republic. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 3.

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Figure 4.2

The path to Lebanon’s 2005 system transition

Adoption of Resolution 1559 after the extension of president Lahoud’s mandate

Formation of a transcommunal opposition front

Democratic Uprising Fall of the pro-Syrian Karami cabinet Beginning of an international probe into Hariri’s killing Appointment of a neutral Lebanese government Stepping aside of Lebanese security chiefs Withdrawal of Syrian intelligence operatives and military troops Free and relatively fair elections Formation of a representative parliament Appointment of a cabinet deriving legitimacy from elections Arresting Lebanese security chiefs at the request of the UN commission The Melhis Report: Decrying the Syrian-Lebanese regime Black Box Italic

Source: Fakhoury

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Some lessons The Lebanese model of post-war transition shows that a change from within and a change from the outside were necessary to start a democratic trajectory. Whereas Lebanon after 2000 could be classified as a political hybrid in change, events after 2004 indicated that this hybrid has indeed the capacity of leaving the spectrum of semi-authoritarian regime to join the range of electoral democracies. In other terms, unlike other stalled or solid semi-authoritarian regimes, post-war Lebanon is not a final product of semi-authoritarianism. If certain conditions are fulfilled, it could revert to the prior pre-war stage of an embryonic consociational democracy. This model of democratic transition in Lebanon can be of interest to the Arab world because it shows that it is more likely for a system transition in the Middle East to take place when empowerment of the political opposition, popular mobilization, and foreign support overlap. Due to the robust apparatuses of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in the Arab states, it is indeed unlikely that a democratic transition would result from a mere society-led termination of the ruling regime which could only lead to the change of the government without altering the nature of the regime, or from a state-led transition which would also lead to a farcical outcome. Middle Eastern transitions would more likely be a mixture of an opposition-led termination given power by external pressure under the auspices of international legitimacy.314 This example of a resurgent democracy could also inspire models for redemocratization in multi-ethnic countries that have faced a stalled democratic transition or that have experienced a downfall into authoritarian meanders. It shows mainly that a more or less successful path to democratization should arise from within but needs a propitious international framework to complement internal changes. Still, despite its numerous positive implications, the Lebanese example also attracts attention to the shallowness of political transitions and to their incompletion. Trapped in its minimalist liberalism, Lebanon remains incapable of refining substantive rights or even consolidating the democratic process.

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I leave out the model of democratization through external military force since I believe that an externally imposed democracy entrenched by coercion in Arab societies is more likely to falter. The example of Iraq is more than sufficient to illustrate this claim.

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Rethinking Lebanon’s minimal democracy: A looming backlash? Classifying Lebanon as a minimalist democracy as a result of the 2005 political watershed overlooks however numerous aspects which have impeded and could further impede the continuation of the political transition after Syrian departure or even cause an authoritarian rebound. The benchmarks which help assess Lebanon’s development – notably elections, the formation of representative parliament and cabinet as well as the sacking of the old Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus – remain important criteria for measuring Lebanon’s passage into a more liberal zone. Yet, they cannot overrule the fact that signals of liberalization still coexist with negative indicators. The main factors that have delayed Lebanon’s progress and that even brought about degradation along the continuum of democratic transition since 2005 are the following: Elections as a double-edged sword Scholars have expressed strong reservations when it comes to regarding free elections as a sufficient landmark for a rising democracy. Thus, some argue that free and fair polls are rudimentary constituents of democratic governance, and that more is required – namely the rule of law as well as guaranteed political and civil liberties – to call the system democratic, otherwise one would be dealing with a sort of advanced liberalism.315 These misgivings notwithstanding, an electoral democracy demands regular free and fair multiparty and competitive elections. Lebanon has so far stood only one test. Furthermore, unless a new representative electoral law is adopted, Lebanese polls will remain a two-sided knife connoting democracy and autocracy of ‘bulldozer lists.’ The fact that elections happened at a time when major assassinations were perpetrated indicates a schizophrenic democratic advancement whereby competitive polls have lead to the formation of a representative parliament, but substantive liberties remained at stake. The problem of Lebanon’s statehood: a threat towards rebounding into the authoritarian zone One important factor that has also obstructed Lebanon’s transition after 2005 is the slackness of Lebanon’s statehood. The fact that the newly elected parliament and formed coalition cabinet have been unable to draw final conclusions 315

Abu Jaber, “The Democratic Process in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan,” 127.

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concerning crucial matters – mainly foreign policy issues – demonstrates that decision-making in some areas remains beyond the new incumbents’ control, and that it is hostage to internal and regional knotty networks. In the aftermath of the Beirut Spring, Hezbollah’s disputed status and the controversy around the Shebaa farms ─ let alone Lebanon’s unclear frontiers ─ with Syria have constituted restrictive political enclaves which have undermined the government’s autonomy. In fall 2005, for example, the UN report on the implementation of Resolution 1559 affirmed that Lebanon’s sovereignty would not be fully restored unless the border between Syria and Lebanon were demarcated and the Lebanese-Syrian relations formalized.316 More importantly, after the 2006 July War, Lebanon remains threatened with a serious rebounding into the semi-authoritarian zone as an array of regional factors over which Lebanon has no control may subjugate its democratic endeavors.317 Regardless of the reasons that might have driven Hezbollah to entangle Lebanon in a confrontation with Israel, the party’s capacity to decide on issues of peace and war,318 as well as Israel’s smiting readiness to inflict a large-scale destruction on its adjacent neighbour have emphasized Lebanon’s low degree of stateness. The war has also drawn attention to the fact that Lebanon’s democratic pursuit cannot be disentangled from the regional context at the present stage. International democratic assistance: a cautionary tale In addition to entrenched enclaves curbing Lebanon’s low-intensity democracy, the country’s cheered externally-assisted transition should be regarded as a cautionary tale. Indeed, following the ‘pastel-shaded’ Independence Uprising, a sort of general popular disenchantment with international assistance has replaced the Beirut Spring elation.319 316

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See Robert Rabil, “Reinforcing Lebanon’s Sovereignty,” The Washington Institute for Near Policy, November 8, 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2395. The regional context will be discussed in the section tackling Lebanon’s non-alignment and external load on the system. See chapter 5. It is noteworthy that the first event, which according to the Israeli authorities, started the July War was Hezbollah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers. The Saniora government denied being aware of the Resistance’s plan. The moment the euphoric Beirut Spring gave way to a long season of instability, disappointment has been expressed with the international community’s support. Some Lebanese entertained the suspicion that once Syria had been driven out of Lebanon, the latter had been left alone to lead its own anti-heroic battle against invisible plots of destabilization. For an account on popular disillusionment even in intellectual and artistic milieux, see Isabelle Regnier, “Le malaise libanais au festival né à Beyrouth,” Le Monde, August 26, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/

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This disenchantment with international assistance and more particularly with the US role in monitoring Lebanon’s transition was voiced out even more strongly during and after the 2006 Summer of Rage.320 Whereas the Bush administration has unyieldingly called for Lebanon’s emancipation from Syrian shackles, it has put on a dubious and “heartless” mask during Israel’s deadly strikes on Lebanon.321 Divergences within the international community concerning the July War before Resolution 1701322 was adopted in August 2006 hinted at the limitations of international assistance. The unavoidable connection between democracy and power-sharing Unfortunately, Lebanon’s political transition does not only hinge on democratic criteria but on other complex variables related to its consociational nature. In other words, Lebanon’s democratic refinement is dependent on a power-sharing revival and more specifically on the sustaining requisites of elite coalescence, communal identification with the present political formula, and the external load on the system. Once the energy of the Intifada dissipated, pressing issues hinging on internal consensus have obstructed Lebanon’s precarious transition. Major contention have revolved throughout 2006 and 2007 around President Lahoud’s presidential office, the perspective of an international tribunal to try Hariri’s assassins, the internationalization versus the regionalization of the Lebanese file, and Lebanon’s degree of embroilment in regional turmoil. A long road ahead Democratization remains incomplete and fallible to reversal if disagreements over core issues lead to a “deep and continuous confrontation and ambivalence about democratic institutions ...”323 In the Lebanese case, the build-up of reformed governmental, security, and judicial institutions as well as an economic recovery are still marred by serious political divergences over Lebanon’s institutional overhaul. In the final analysis, it is safer to apprehend Lebanon’s

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web/imprimer_element/0,40-0@2-3476,50-682833,0.html. Kamal Dib, “Lebanon’s Middle Class is Disillusioned with America,” The Daily Star, August 14, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=74716&categ_id=2. Ibid. This resolution, which asked for the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, called upon the Lebanese government to deploy troops to the South of the country and stated that Israeli forces would withdraw once the Lebanese army deployed. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 4

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entry into the democratic zone as a precarious process whose further consolidation could be tested in the course of time on the basis of these criteria: • The adoption of a fair electoral law, and the regular recurrence of multiparty elections in which electoral outcomes are uncertain; • The existence of substantial civil and political liberties; • Decision-making fully in the hands of elected officials; • A gradual reform of state institutions as well as the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers whose functions were intricately interwoven in the post-war period; • The elites’ habituation to democratic norms as the only game in town;324 • The accession of young and new elites to the political process and the waning of the old incumbents’ influence. These indicators in the coming years would help draw more precise conclusions whether Lebanon would escape the danger zone in the democratic continuum, and move to a midrange stable democratic system in which “reserved domains of power” vanish and in which free elections and basic liberties are guaranteed.325 Under more favorable circumstances, Lebanon’s precarious liberalism should advance towards a stage in which incumbents are no longer preoccupied with the “problem of how to avoid democratic breakdown,” and in which contentious issues are resolved by resorting to established norms of democracy.326 However, negative regional and internal factors do not presently encourage advancement along the democratic transition continuum. In the internal realm, Lebanon's greatest challenge lies in synchronizing its democratic and consociational faces, and more precisely clearing up lingering internal disagreements. In order to complete the picture and show how Lebanon’s democratization cannot be dissociated from inter-communal consensus, I will discuss Lebanon’s post-war consociationalism in the fifth chapter, and then show the vital connection between the democratic and power-sharing components.

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This mainly implies the respect of consitutionalism and rule of law especially when it comes to rotation of power. See Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, 13. Linz and Stepan, Problems, 5

5. What about Post-War Consociationalism?

“There can, of course, be non-democratic consociations when political leaders co-operate and conduct themselves according to consociational but not democratic practices.”1 “Consociational failure is a product of inauspicious regional factors and turbulent regional systems.”2 As the post-war system started acquiring heavy authoritarian features, consociational traits were simultaneously derailed. Power-sharing – whose maintenance and success, particularly in the Lebanese case – closely depends on elite cooperation, balanced inter-communal relations, and non-alignment, was adversely affected by intrinsic and extrinsic agents. Despite the 1989 deliberate decision to return to consociationalism, these three crucial conditions have not been met. Consequently, power-sharing elements described in the Ta’if agreement have taken arbitrary shapes. This consociational distortion was accentuated by the general democratic deficit in the country and mainly by the Syrian hegemony that thwarted consociational fundamentals, particularly inter-communal balance of power and mutual veto. This chapter, which focuses on the consociational aspects of the post-war regime, is divided along the following themes. The first two segments depict the principal failings of the ‘power-sharing hybrid’ before the 2005 transition. More precisely, they closely examine how after the collapse of the pre-war consociational democracy and in the wake of a 15-year war, a model of discord based on pseudo-consociationalism emerged.3 The third section examines which consociational features and devices have been revived after the Independence Uprising and the pullout of Syrian troops in 2005.

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O’Leary, “Foreword: The Realism of Power-Sharing,” xxiv. Quoted in Seaver, “The Regional Sources,” 2. Lebanese political scientists refer to it as “savage consociationalism” (Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, November 26, 2004) or “deviant power-sharing” (Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, November 30, 2004).

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The fourth section examines the aftereffects of the so-called 2005 powersharing revival and the contingency of Lebanon’s consociational democracy upon certain inexorable requisites. It also draws attention to major shortcomings lurking behind Lebanon’s consociational formula. It is worth mentioning that analysis of Lebanon’s post-war consociationalism will revolve around the following variables: elite cartels, dividing communal cleavages, and Lebanon’s regional predicament. Although most political happenings have been described in former parts, I will refer in this chapter to major post-war intervals and breaking points so as to analyze their implications on power-sharing. In order to minimize the risk of redundancy, I tried to avert repetition as much as possible.

The rise of a ‘chaperoned’ power-sharing model: The failure of grand coalitions under Syrian tutelage (1990-2005) Although the Ta’if agreement resurrected at least in its blueprint the consociational formula and introduced reforms in the realm of power-sharing,4 the fact remains that “Ta’if in theory is more impressive than Ta’if in practice.”5 Right after its ratification, serious power-sharing deformations highlighted the political elites’ inability to craft a balanced system able to change centrifugal drives into constructive elements of diversity. These distortions have drawn attention to the Lebanese system’s tendency to deviate from a sane political course to models of governance akin to oligarchic power-sharing. One fundamental consociational device, coalition building6 particularly failed to materialize throughout the Second Republic. As soon as the war came to a close, the ensuing political order tried to patch up hurriedly lingering cracks by resurrecting an approximate power-sharing model. Failing to safeguard a multiple balance of power, elite representativeness obeyed other criteria: allegiance to the rising regime and to the Syrian tutor, and acquiescence to a deviant understanding of consensus.7 Maintaining a façade of power-sharing implied designing political arrangements that sustained the rising Lebanese-Syrian constellation. By uniting wantonly political elites who accepted the new rules of the game, the Ta’if order

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Those changes are parity between Muslims and Christians in the parliament, diffusion of power in the coalition cabinet, and a reduction of excessive presidential traits in the system. Hudson, “Lebanon after Ta’if,”103 See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. Dagher, Bring Down the Walls, 141-144.

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engineered disfigured elite cartels that did not reflect the multiplicity of the different communities’ orientations. This problem was mostly apparent in the executive balance of power which took on various discordant forms, and in the integration of political actors and parties in political institutions on the basis of selective power-sharing.8 Politicians who opposed the regime were either discarded or willingly withdrew from the political establishment. Other less prominent actors owed their newly elevated status to patronage networks and to pro-Syrian loyalties.9 Whereas “loyal parties” were allowed to expand, “targeted” or opposition parties were monitored and marginalized in post-war legislatures.10 This impaired concept of representativeness also led to the rise of disfigured coalition cabinets. In order to appoint the required number of ministers, and respect an apparent communal parity, the state’s rather than the communities’ allegiances were managed. Most importantly, this disfigured spirit of political collegiality has led to the emergence of an artificial inter-elite consensus, which has put the natural drives of Lebanon’s plural society as well as looming conflicts on hold in favor of a deceitfully stable order. Hence, a sane consociational model was traded for an artificial security salvaged by the Syrian arbitrator. During this period, grand elite cartels have taken various marred shapes: a Troika heading a cabinet characterized by political feuding (1992-1998), a shadow government hijacking the coalition cabinet (1998-2004), and an adversarial Sunni-Maronite ruling cartel (2000-2004). After the renewal of

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The 1992 parliament was a striking example of derailed power-sharing and an early indicator of the flawed post-war communal representation. While new actors such as the party of Hezbollah, Al Jamaa al Islamiyya and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) won many seats, the previously popular Christian parties such as the Kata’ib, the Lebanese Forces, the National Bloc, and the Liberal National Party were marginalized. New Christian actors like President Hrawi owed their position more to Syrian backing than to communal respectability. In the Sunni community, some prominent figures such the Karamis in the North were not happy with the Hariris’ ascendancy. In the Shiite community, speaker Berri’s growing influence provoked contradictory reactions. While some looked forward to strengthening the post-war Shiite role, others argued that a former warlord co-opted by the Syrian establishment could not represent the whole Shiite segment. In the 1990s, parties close to the regime such as the Syrian Socialist Party, the Baath Party, Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, the pro-Syrian Armenian party Taschnag gained much influence. Other controversial factions particularly the Communist Party, the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal Party, and General Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement were cast aside. Although the pro-governmental Kata’ib faction supported at first the Ta’if order in 1992, it was hardly represented in the post-war political institutions. See El Khazen, “Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon,” 615.

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Lahoud’s term, the power-sharing model changed into a very unstable bipolar model designed along political conflict lines (October 2004-April 2005). The Troika or the oligarchic elite cartel: its effects on coalition-building and institutions (1992-1998) To prevent the political monopoly of one community, the Ta’if agreement envisaged the diffusion of power into the cabinet and the transformation of the latter into a collegial council in which all communities would be equitably represented. The treaty slightly deflated the presidential status, and empowered the prime minister and the parliament speaker. It also aimed at breaking the former exclusive Maronite-Sunni bipolarity by giving more prerogatives to the previously relegated Shiite community. In sum, it envisioned on paper an idealistic elite cartel based on coalescence. Yet, the materialization of the new national pact depended on a far-fetched and unrealistic capacity of elite commitment to concordant models of behavior. In reality, equalizing the three leaderships had unleashed the demons of discord, and had given place to an adversarial elite behavior.11 As expected by the Ta’if pact’s critics,12 elite cartels degenerated from 1992 until 1998 into oligarchic hybrids in the shape of a Troika. Represented by the Maronite president, the Sunni prime minister, and the Shiite speaker of the parliament, this triumvirate – mostly characterized by an obvious lack of elite accommodation – had negative implications on post-war political institutions and on communal cleavages. The Troika’s impact on power-sharing One of the most dangerous facets of the Troika rule was its deformation of political plurality, and its transformation of the Lebanese system into a threelayered authoritarian center of power. The ruling triumvirate made little of the prescribed power-sharing functions of the parliament and the cabinet. For instance, at times of harmony, the three

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Some deformations in the Ta’if document foreshadowed the subsequent power-sharing deviations. It is argued that the Ta’if treaty which called for diluting power in the coalition cabinet, reducing the presidential authority, and strengthening the parliament led in fact to a system of “floating powers” prone to deadlock and instability. See Charara, “Deux ans de réunification nationale,” 167.

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leaders did not give much weight to parliamentary and ministerial consultations. But if the Troika leaders were divided, institutions were given precedence. 13 More importantly, the Troika transferred its disagreements to the heart of the cabinet and the parliament, which as a result broke down into little fiefdoms either loyal to the president, to the prime minister or to the speaker.14 This divisiveness necessitated of course a last-minute intervention brokered by the Syrian mediator. Instead of acting as collegial councils, the cabinets have increasingly mirrored the incumbents’ conflicts, and confessional interests. Thus, post-war ministers were regarded more as “guardians” of their confessions’ interests15 than policy-makers. The superimposition of the Troika/confessional interests over the principles of fair communal representation and collegiality within the cabinet led to its division into antagonistic segments. These incoherent ministerial blocs accentuated divisions within the ruling establishment itself. In short, the enfeebled council was overridden by an informal Troika that assumed its functions. Likewise, in crisis situations, the parliament became more an “extension of the centers of power” than an arena which serves to control excesses and enforce checks and balances.16 Prey to the logic of “communal privatization,” it resembled more “a fief than a forum.”17 The Hrawi-Karami-Husseini Troika Despite its short duration, the first Troika (December 1990-February 1992) represented by President Elias Hrawi, Premier Omar Karami, and parliament speaker Hussein Husseini unveiled the dangers of an elite cartel united by the threads of political wrangling. Unpopular President Hrawi tried to restore the eroded status of the Maronite President at the expense of the two other leaders. After the formation of a government which fell short of representing different communal currents, Hrawi negotiated with the Syrian regime a possible reshuffle of the cabinet without 13

14 15 16 17

For instance, in case Speaker Berri wanted to sway the balance in his favor, he would invest then much energy to mobilize the parliament so as to undermine the two other leaders. Fighting over constitutional prerogatives made power-sharing look more like a race for preeminence. See Salem, “Framing Post-war Lebanon.” Salam, “Taif Revisited,” 49. Rougier, “Les élections législatives, ” 127. Maila, “La République de Taêf ou l’esprit des institutions,” in Le Liban à l’heure des négociations de paix au Proche-Orient: Actes du colloque (Paris: CAIL, 1995), 9-20, 17.

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informing the prime minister.18 Moreover, it was reported that Hrawi was unable to cooperate with speaker Husseini whom he accused of undercutting the presidency. During this period, the continuous quarrelling and muscle flexing to confirm that each ‘troikist’ was “a defender of the constitutional rights of his own community” blocked decision-making and deferred important issues such as the appointment of higher civil servants.19 The Hrawi-Hariri-Berri Troika In 1992, the appointment of two new political players, Premier Hariri and Speaker Berri, raised hopes that the run-down post-Ta’if order had perhaps a chance to stand on its feet. However, the new triumvirate offered a vivid example of how grand coalitions could easily stray from their prescribed path. Rafik Hariri’s rapid ascension aroused factional jealousies. No sooner did Shiite, traditional Sunni and Christian politicians express their wariness of the Premier’s plans and management attitudes than clans were formed in the cabinet and in the legislature either to support or undermine the Premier’s projects. These factions played with time the role of trump cards used by the three leaders to score points. Hopeful of Syrian continuous backing, Hrawi did not accept a deflated presidential image, and tried at various instances to undermine the premiership. On the other hand, eager to implement his reconstruction plans, Hariri wanted to clone obedient cabinets that did not include ministers critical of his plans. At political turning points, he did not hesitate to push for a cabinet reshuffle to get rid of his antagonists. With time, the polemic of reconstruction as well as severe Troika infighting threatened to transform coalition cabinets into forums of discord divided into pro-Hariri and anti-Hariri camps.20 In addition, Berri was criticized for using the parliament as an instrument to keep the two other leaders in check. By influencing parliamentary legislation, he hoped to tip the powersharing balance in his favor.

18

19

20

For details on political wrangling between Hrawi and the two members of the Troika, see Harris, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992. Perthes, “Problems with Peace: Post-War Politics and Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon,” Orient 33 (1992): 409-432, 415. In 1993, the President’s and Premier’s struggle for preeminence exacerbated political wrangling within the cabinet, and led to civil service and public administration appointments which mirrored patronage networks.

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The disintegration of the triumvirate As Hrawi’s presidential mandate was about to expire, Berri and Hariri – who had increasingly displayed divergent opinions on various issues such as the restructuring of the media landscape – considered the presidential deadline as a golden opportunity to bolster their respective positions. Whereas Berri opposed a renewal of Hrawi’s term, Hariri endorsed an eventual constitutional amendment. It was reported that this difference of opinion had less to do with constitutional concerns than with struggle for preeminence. The Syrian President’s final decision to prolong Hrawi’s term for three years put a temporary end to political feuding. However, no sooner did Hrawi inaugurate his second mandate than wrangling resumed. While Hariri and Berri’s squabbling over nominations gained prominence, the President’s proposals for constitutional rectifications led to additional clashes with the Speaker of the parliament. With the intensification of political altercations in 1997, the Troika started to disintegrate slowly. Speculation was rife that Berri’s resentment towards Hariri had led him to encourage deputies to undercut the Premier’s economic plans. Whereas Berri condemned Hariri’s dominant style of governance, the Premier accused the speaker of building a dense web of clientelism.21 Another heavy dispute occurred in mid-1998 after President Hrawi had proposed a draft law for optional civil marriage. This proposal turned into a test of strength among the three leaders. As Hrawi and Berri attempted to mobilize the ministers in favor of the law, Hariri refused to sign the draft that threatened to ignite sectarian enmities. After the Troika’s visit to Syria before the 1998 presidential election, the draft law was dropped, and Troika differences were outwardly patched up. Yet, this temporary truce was soon interrupted by Berri’s and Hariri’s fight over pay scales for civil servants in summer 1998.22 As Hrawi’s controversial mandate drew to a close, Hariri declined to form a new government. With Hrawi’s departure and Hariri’s temporary absence, the Troika crumbled only to give place to another marred power-sharing arrangement.

21

22

Harris, “Lebanon,” in The Middle East Contemporary Survey 1997, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 2000), 509-542. While Hariri wanted to postpone this issue, Berri tried to circumscribe the premier’s prerogatives, and to convene a parliamentary session that would adopt the new pay scales. Once the matter threatened to escalate into a dispute between Hariri’s and Berri’s allies, the Troika leaders agreed to defuse the conflict and adjourn the matter.

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The Troika’s impact on Lebanese communities: from units of power-sharing to authoritarian tools. A major setback in the Ta’if agreement was the design of a grand coalition in which the Troika figures are simultaneously communal and institutional leaders. This model has subverted the role of the institutions,23 and transformed the parliament and the cabinet into arenas where inter-communal cleavages were politicized. Moreover, the empowerment of individuals instead of institutions has facilitated the replacement of the principle of separation of powers by an informal consensus dependent on the three communal leaders. A more in-depth analysis of the Ta’if pact allows one to deduce that the superposition of the communities with the institutions dramatically reduces the autonomy that the state is supposed to have vis-à-vis different communal groups. This distortion, which blends the state with the community, eradicates necessary margins serving to differentiate the communities’ role as socio-cultural entities and their function as political actors in the power-sharing formula. While the consociational game should allow the expression of communal diversity, the Ta’if agreement devised “strategies of monopolization of the symbolic communal authority.”24 For example, by claiming to represent the three Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite communities, the Troika turned communal discourse into a falsely centralized one. Concurrently state delegates and communal leaders, the troika’s representatives struggled hard for the preeminence of their own confession and for the monopoly of informal power-sharing games. This has deformed to a great extent the quintessence of consociationalism, and has transformed Lebanon’s segments from power-sharing pillars into tools of authoritarianism. Although the Troika leaders represented the three largest Lebanese communities, they failed to safeguard intra-communal diversity, and silenced the voices of internal opposition.25 Also, the triumvirate awakened the hostilities of minor confessions which yearned for a bigger share in the confessional system, and which felt discarded from the ruling coalition.26

23 24 25

26

See, for example, Salam, Ab ‘ad mina el Ta’if. Maila, “La république de Taêf, ” 13. One doubts whether president Hrawi represented at the time the Maronite community that felt marginalized and leaderless, or whether speaker Berri and Premier Hariri exclusively represented their respective communities. The Druze community has been calling for the creation of a Senate in which it holds the presidency.

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The weather maker and the Troika At times of political instability or the moment a member of the Troika threatened to get out of his political orbit, the Syrian tutor hurried to restore order. On the one hand, the three leaders’ feuding necessitated an external balancer which helped resolve disputes.27 On the other hand, this infighting was welcomed by Syria as a means to achieve supremacy by manipulating power-sharing playoffs. In particular, Damascus exploited the elites’ divisions, and benefited from political wrangling so as to downplay specific actors striving for political autarchy. After the 1996 polls, for instance, although the third Hariri cabinet contained a majority of ministers favorable to the Premier’s projects, Syria made sure to include in the council less amenable colleagues who restrained Hariri’s autonomy, and kept an eye on his political trajectory.28 Wary of Hariri’s plans to expand his power base and suspicious that he might be willing to strike a peace deal with Israel in order to sustain his economic project, Syria empowered President Hrawi and Speaker Berri to challenge him and undermine his executive authorities. These power-sharing games led some observers to remark: “Three is no love lost among these three presidents: none want to be dominated by the others. This has made it all the easier for Syria to play them off against each other.”29

27

28

29

For instance, in 1994, as Hariri called for a cabinet reshuffle, ensuing Troika infighting was halted by a last-minute Syrian intervention mending leadership schisms. Through its method of sticks and carrots, the Syrian regime made sure that the premier’s main responsibility was to take care of the economic sector in Lebanon, and to leave general policies and broad security matters to Damascus. Whenever Hariri displayed signs of autonomy, highranked Syrian officials reminded him of the necessity of restraint especially during his highprofile international visits. At other times, Syria sent him positive signals of support. In 1994, facing opposition to his reconstruction projects, and having to put up constantly with internal struggles in the executive and within the Troika, Hariri tried to resign for the second time. However, Syria convinced him to stay. The following year, it gave him a free hand to restructure the cabinet. Hudson, “Lebanon after Ta'if,” 31.

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The emergence of a shadow government: A case of “coercive consociationalism”30 Grand coalitions and communal spheres overshadowed (1998-2004) With Lahoud’s accession to the presidency in 1998, and the ensuing consolidation of the Lebanese-Syrian security system, consociational characteristics were further eroded. In particular, basic elements of a power-sharing democracy, namely grand coalitions and mutual veto right, became even more dysfunctional than during the Troika’s reign. The empowerment of intelligence operatives unaccountable to governmental institutions unveiled new patterns of a rising stealthy regime that hijacked the coalition cabinet. While the latter was stripped of its functions under the Troika rule mainly because of the transfer of power to the triumvirate arrangement, its powers during the Lahoud era were further belittled. Shortly after the appointment of a technocrat cabinet headed by Premier Salim el Huss, it became clear that the real cartel pulling the strings of the regime was a shadow government impersonated by a joint Lebanese-Syrian intelligence apparatus. Although the formal features of the power-sharing system had not been altered, the existence of an invisible ruling coalition threatened to transform the regime into a peculiar instance of ‘consociational authoritarianism’. The rise of a security regime characterized by overriding coercive features also threatened to derail segmental diversity. Hence, in case a communal current was at odds with the prevailing state parameters, it was considered as a threat to the political order. By deforming more severely the democratic aspects of the system, the regime truncated the vital function of communities as active units of the system, and even menaced to substitute for them. On a more abstract level, one could speak during this period of an invasive state which ceased to be the synthesis of different communal structures, and which jeopardized the political distinctiveness of the communal segments.

30

This term was used by Brendan O’Leary in his article “The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland,”Political Studies 37(1989): 562-588. I would like to use it in this context to depict the forced consociational arrangement under Lahoud’s reign which was artificially modelled by external manipulations.

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The unhappy Lahoud-Hariri tale of power-sharing: a case study in elite adversarial behavior. Consociationalism rests primarily on the pillars of cooperation amongst political elites. In fact, this pillar is seen as prerequisite to the success of power-sharing devices.31 With Premier Hariri’s triumphant comeback after the 2000 elections, many hoped that the restoration of a strong Sunni-Maronite balance would readjust Lebanon’s impaired power-sharing features and tone down the informal features of presidentialism that have been creeping into the system since Lahoud’s accession to the presidency. Yet, Lahoud and Hariri’s inability to rule together led the country to new impasses. Their coalition could be described as a case of constrained coexistence or an adversarial ménage that accentuated fragmentation. In fact, the two leaders shared more differences than common points and their constant political bickering over essential issues crippled political life and drove the country to a stalemate in critical situations. While Hariri commanded more authority under the Troika, his power started to wane considerably under Lahoud’s reign. Why and what were the main divergences? Syria’s unconditional support for Lahoud and fear of Hariri’s autonomy provoked a shift in the balance of power between the two leaders. However, while Syria considered Lahoud to be a more faithful ally who could ensure the concomitance of the Lebanese-Syrian path, it still did not want to give up Hariri. In fact, Syria apprehended Hariri’s absence from the political scene, a perspective which might have precipitated Lebanon into a new period of economic instability and endangered Syria’s political and economic interests. In moments of political turmoil, Syria convinced both leaders to work out an arrangement despite their antagonisms. In this strange case of forced coalition, power-sharing did stem from the elites’ genuine coalescence but from an external agent. Lahoud and Hariri’s bickering was mainly a race to redefine the concept of authority and political prerogatives in executive power-sharing. The president’s regular attendance of cabinet sessions and insistence to preside the meetings revealed a clear absence of trust between the leaders and obvious patterns of political rivalry. It was reported, for instance, that President Lahoud even interfered in setting the agenda of the cabinet meeting, a prerogative usually reserved to the Premier.

31

See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies.

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The gradual deterioration of the grand coalition After the August 2001 crackdown on civil and political liberties, the fragility of the Lahoud-Hariri alliance and the president’s supremacy in the power-sharing arrangement came into broad daylight. As the security services arrested more than 200 opposition activists during Hariri’s trip to Pakistan, it seemed that Lahoud was giving the Premier an implicit ultimatum: Hariri had either to accept the state of affairs or choose a showdown.32 Hariri’s decision to maintain a low profile and avoid confrontation was apparently motivated by the Premier’s desire to prevent a crisis. However, interpreted as a sign of resignation, it signified the decisive shift towards a hegemonic balance of power. After this incident, the two leaders went about displaying an air of affected unity. They figured out an odd agreement which enabled the President to control domestic and foreign politics whereas the Premier managed the economical file.33 Yet to all shrewd observers, it was obvious that this forced consociational marriage would not work out. Indeed, the temporary gentlemen’s agreement did not last long. President Lahoud’s meddling in economic affairs, which were supposedly Hariri’s domain, became conspicuous after 2002. As years went by, the two leaders’ divergent views on political and economic matters led to a struggle of preeminence in many situations. While Lahoud was eager to strengthen the security apparatus, Hariri was convinced that Lebanon’s economic recovery required cuts in military spending. In addition, the Premier was worried that Hezbollah’s operations in the Shebaa farms would influence negatively the economic situation, but Lahoud supported the organization unconditionally without sharing Hariri’s fears. The two leaders’ unbridgeable differences additionally threatened to stall privatization and fiscal reform. The project of privatizing cellular networks generated a long and troublesome episode of political feuding. Whereas Hariri endorsed a full privatization enabling the administration of cellular networks by private companies, Lahoud insisted that the Ministry of Telecommunications controlled the process. In 2003, the project of building public schools degenerated into a virulent dispute between the Premier and the President.34 32 33

34

See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2002, 15. The Premier focused on reviving a battered economy, embarked on a series of economic reforms, and intensified his international contacts. His most notable economic achievements were the Paris Summits in February 2001 and November 2002 during which significant loans and grants were promised to assist the Lebanese economy. In 2001, Hariri also managed to cut public spending and introduce austerity measures by restructuring the state television Télé Liban and reducing the staff of the Middle East Airlines. Hariri’s plan to build public schools was blocked by Lahoud on the grounds that the plan

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In 2004, a fight over swapping and the debt crisis35 further disrupted the superficial coalition. Analysts started warning against the decline of the country’s credibility as a result of constant political wrangling.36 Angered by the President’s constant interferences, Hariri asked Lahoud in March 2004 to recognize his share of responsibility for Lebanon’s debt. Three months later, he stated that political feuding with the President had impeded reconstruction and development. In the domain of foreign politics, while Lahoud held on more and more to the sacredness of the Lebanese-Syrian track, Hariri started diverting slowly from the constants. As some commentators argue, he had already begun to work behind the scenes to restructure the Lebanese-Syrian relations.37 Divisions not only paralyzed the Lahoud-Hariri coalition and the ministerial council but also poisoned Hariri’s and Berri’s alliance. Although the model of the Troika had collapsed, Berri was still able to affect executive decisionmaking. By manipulating the legislative agenda on matters related to economic reforms, and by steering parliamentary sessions as well as outcomes, he hoped to influence executive policies, and accelerate or postpone Hariri’s privatization efforts.38 His entente with Premier Hariri was at various instances spoiled by a ruthless competition over patronage networks. As heads of institutions and communities’ lords, both leaders were keen on appointing their own followers and clientele in public administration. At the end of 2001, for example, Berri and Hariri seriously clashed over civil service appointments. Furthermore, in the bargain over privatization and reforms with Berri, Hariri had to make several political and economic concessions to earn the speaker’s and parliament’s support.

35

36 37

38

benefited the capital and neglected other regions. To deal with the debt issue, Lahoud suggested that the Ministry of Finance swapped eurobonds, yet Hariri argued that this measure would compromise Lebanon’s commitment to the agreement reached in the Paris II conference. Swapping eurobonds was later carried out, and president Lahoud scored another victory. See “Special Report: Lebanon,” Middle East Economic Digest, 5-11 March 2004, 27-33. Hariri’s divergent views on Lebanese foreign policy and his progressive detachment from the Lebanese-Syrian track were already evident in 2001 as his newspaper Al Mustaqbal condemned Hezbollah’s operation in Shebaa farms in April. As a result of this critique, Syrian president Bashar called off a meeting with the premier, and refused to see him fro an entire month. See Andreas Pflitsch and Stephan Rosiny, “Libanon 2001,” in Nahost-Jahrbuch 2001, ed. Hanspeter Mattes, (Opladen: Leske +Budrich, 2002), 117-122, 118. See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2002, 14.

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Closing the curtains: The Lahoud-Hariri final act As the presidential election became imminent, Hariri did not hide his discontent in case Lahoud’s mandate was extended. A trivial fight over the Martyr’s statue in August 2004 during heated discussions over the presidency revealed that differences between the two leaders had become insurmountable.39 After the President’s term had been renewed, Hariri declared grudgingly that he was willing to form a new government by the end of September. But divisions between the two leaders over the makeup of a new cabinet had gone beyond repair. During a last fourth “cordial weekend meeting” in October, Lahoud and Hariri discussed in vain the perspective of a government change. 40 The Premier’s resignation highlighted the power-sharing coalition’s proneness to deadlock as soon as the external load increased on the system. Indeed, during this period of political squabbling, it seemed that the “state had entered a kind of coma” or “a clinical death that made the government incapable of fulfilling its mission...”41 Implications of political wrangling for Lebanon’s consociationalism: forceful versus voluntary consensus Was this long episode of political feuding between Lahoud and Hariri just a result of opinions’ clash as many politicians close to the two leaders tended to say? Of course not. The Hariri-Lahoud case shows the difficulty of reaching voluntary inter-elite consensus when the country’s own lines of conflict are strained by external intervention. With Syria’s stubborn hold on the small republic on the one hand and mounting international pressure after the renewal of Lahoud’s term, Lebanon’s consociational apparatus became vulnerable to the regional configuration, to external mediation, and to the acuity of inter-elite divisions. This case of antagonistic elite behavior has had negative repercussions on the cabinet and its power-sharing dynamics. It has also shown the flaws lurking beneath the Ta’if recipe. The mistrust between the two leaders and their political quarrels drew steep conflict lines in the coalition council. Ceasing to be a collegial body, the latter 39

40

41

While Premier Hariri insisted that the Martyr’s Statue should be located in Downtown Beirut, Lahoud ordered to move it tro the Karantina area in North Beirut. Adnan El-Ghoul, “Lahoud, Hariri Seek Consensus on New Cabinet,” The Daily Star, October 11, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=9141&categ_id=2. Arlette Kassas, “L’année des cartes mélangées,” L’Hebdo Magazine, December 31, 2004, 19.

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took the shape of a bipolar arena divided between ‘Haririst’ and ‘Lahoudist’ allies. In 2000, for example, as Hariri hurried to appoint his allies in the government, Lahoud did not hesitate to impose his own loyal crew. Once power-sharing struggles intensified, the former Hariri-Lahoud bipolarity started withering away in favor of a quasi-monolithic body upholding Syria’s policy in Lebanon. For instance, the cabinet formed in April 2003 – dubbed as one of the major power-sharing failures in post-war Lebanon – epitomized Lahoud and Hariri’s unfortunate alliance,42 and foreshadowed Hariri’s waning of power for the benefit of Lahoud’s politics of security. In the end, feuding and disunity circumscribed the Premier’s power in his own cabinet: this led some commentators to remark: “only eight ministers report directly to him; most others receive their instructions either from Syria or Lebanese sectarian leaders.”43 The Hariri-Lahoud coalition has also shed light on the problematic Ta’if power-sharing components. The near equalization of the presidency and the premiership under the Ta’if order provoked unhealthy struggles of predominance, and paved the way for an era of a dual executive balance tending to political immobility. Indeed, as blurred boundaries of authority overlapped between the President and the Premier, it seemed that the cabinet – initially empowered by the Ta’if treaty – had been reduced to an assembly waiting for a deliberative power from above. Although the Ta’if covenant designs strategies to limit presidential power and empower the Premier,44 the two leaders’ tempestuous relations had easily shaken those demarcation lines. Lahoud’s ambiguous role in composing the cabinet and influencing its deliberations had proven to be – in times of crisis – a recipe for political impasse, and had shown how easily the President’s prerogatives could converge with the Premier’s privileges. Whereas the Ta’if constitutional amendments originally aim at replacing the “concurrent competences” of the President and the Premier by “parallel competences” that do not overlap,45 Lahoud and Hariri’s disastrous coalition

42

43 44

45

The spat over the cellular affair throughout 2003 and 2004 was more than enough to disable the council’s decision-making capacity. Parliamentarians hurried to call for a vote of no confidence to make the cabinet accountable for its failure. Khashan and Haddad, “Lebanon’s Dramatic 2000 Parliamentary Elections,” 15. Under the Ta’if agreement, the Prime Minister is no longer the President’s follower. The Premier’s designation which depends more on the parliament for his designation and less on the President for his survival becomes a more emancipated figure. See Charaf, “Dialectique de l’évolution de l’exécutif au Liban: 1966-1992,” Cahiers de la Méditerranée 44 (Juin 1992): 91131, 113. Charaf, idem, 128.

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reveals that elite accommodation in post-war Lebanon needs more than the Ta’if prescription.46 The weather maker under Lahoud’s era (1998-2004) During the Lahoud era, power-sharing devices were heavily influenced by Syria’s interferences. The main strategies that affected Lebanon’s consociational network revolved around manipulating communal allegiances, and downplaying communal veto powers. Designing communal and overarching loyalties One striking strategy used by the Syrian tutor was the artificial manipulation of overarching and segmental ties. For instance, Syria took care of forging artificial alliances before the elections or bringing about a rapprochement between political actors who would not ally under normal circumstances. By setting a fixed margin to electoral alliances, it manufactured artificial results which did not reflect the communities’ genuine choices. This manipulative method blocked natural communal alignments, and contributed to the emergence of powersharing configurations which were not truly representative of the Lebanese society. Furthermore, Syrian and Lebanese incumbents’ attempts at keeping opposition actors at bay led to power-sharing coalitions that did not reflect the various subcultural currents. Authoritarian impulses did therefore not only detract from the democratic quality of the system but also marred consociational components. Syria’s opening up to the Christian community after Lahoud’s appointment in 1998 and its multiple efforts to establish dialogue with opposition figures not only aimed at highlighting its role as an inter-communal peacemaker, but could also be perceived as an attempt to co-opt communities so as to manipulate divisions. In addition, by rewarding actors in the Christian and Muslim communities who showed allegiance to its political line and by discarding those who rejected its hegemony, Syria indirectly sustained intra-communal rifts within the same community.

46

For more details on how the post-war Ta’if order could be reformed, see the final appraisal or chapter 6.

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Disempowering communal veto powers These interferences in shaping segmental loyalties resulted in the invalidation of the communities’ mutual veto.47 As soon as strong pro-Syrian allegiances permeated the subcultures, the Syrian factor became an artificial cross-cutting cleavage which manipulated the distinct communal divisions,48 and weakened mutual vetos. For instance, by redrawing the communities’ political boundaries and dominating political institutions, Syria made it extremely difficult for a divided community to demarcate itself or plead for guarantees of political protection in case it refused to be co-opted by the system. In other words, communal groups which refused to be assimilated by the rising Lebanese-Syrian constellation were no longer able to protect their political particularities. What contributed to weakening the communities’ mutual veto was the increase of intra-communal rifts as a result of the Syrian cleavage. Consequently, divided blocs within the same community were no longer coherent ensembles able to claim their veto rights.49 In conclusion, deregulating the mutual veto in post-war Lebanon was the result of two simultaneous processes: manufacturing grand coalitions that did not reflect all segmental orientations, and the presence of the overarching Syrian factor of loyalty which divided the community into dominating pro-Syrian and marginalized anti-Syrian factions. An important lesson to be drawn from the post-war period is that once Lebanese communities fail to safeguard their cohesiveness and intra-segmental cleavages intensify, communal veto powers automatically lose their efficiency. Manipulating consociationalism: a rationale to prevent anarchy In the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and in light of the post-2001 regional configuration, Lebanon’s communalism was further contained. The perspective that Lebanon might escape the Syrian orbit made Damascus even keener on tightening its grip. Its firmer control over Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangements significantly hollowed the consociational apparatus. 47 48 49

Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, November 30, 2004. Ibid. The Maronite community, for example, was divided into loyalist figures close to the government and to an opposition shunned by the incumbents. This fragmentation has undermined the community’s power and its ability to secure its distinctiveness. In the Shiite community, the Amal and Hezbollah parties built an opaque wall of pro-Syrian allegiances. In the Druze community, the Arslane’s clan had outspoken pro-Syrian sympathies while Jumblatt’s clan started diverting from the pro-Syrian political line after 2000.

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No sooner did President Lahoud acquire supplementary informal prerogatives which allowed him to coordinate even more closely with Syria than the balance of power started swaying in Lahoud’s favor. This time, encouraging divisiveness and supporting a Troika at loggerheads was not in Syria’s interest. To safeguard the Lebanese card – especially after the increase of international pressure – Syria needed an acquiescent elite cartel that it could easily co-opt in case external events threatened to fling the Lebanese-Syrian order into turbulent waters. Engineering pro-Syrian coalition cabinets devoid of disruptive elements was the only guarantee that Damascus could steer peacefully the Lebanese communal chaos particularly after the empowerment of the Druze-Christian opposition in 2000. Another negative drawback of the Syrian hegemony during the Lahoud era was its impact on the erosion of leader-follower relationships in post-war Lebanon. The variable of elite predominance over the communities was thus partially replaced by Syrian preeminence. Instead of “a strong and authoritative” leadership guiding the consociational venture,50 an external power was steering the power-sharing wheel. Syrian hegemony over power-sharing networks led to a singular arrangement in which the Lebanese political elites – endowed with an artificial air of selfgovernance – were concurrently lords and vassals. The fact that their margin of power was granted by the Syrian mediator detracted from their own ability to direct the power-sharing game.

The gradual breakdown of the security state and the rise of a bipolar model of consociationalism (October 2004-April 2005) “Lebanon found itself on a brink hovering between Syrian imposition and occidental pressures. Lebanon will look like a second Berlin.”51 After the renewal of Lahoud’s term and the adoption of Resolution 1559, Lebanon increasingly displayed the features of an unstable bipolar system in which a deep political cleavage divided the political elites into two opposite camps: the loyalist establishment and the opposition. It became thus usual to talk about pro-Syrian factions who supported Lahoud’s reelection and Syria’s role in Lebanon, and opposing groups in favor of Lebanon’s emancipation from the Syrian orbit. It was also common to classify political actors according to those 50 51

Pappalardo, “Conditions for Consociational Democracy,” 381. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 13, 2004.

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who rejected Resolution 1559 as a dividing tool and those who welcomed international assistance. Little by little, it became quite usual to allude to the bipolar configuration as the March 8/March 14 cleavage,52 or the Bristol/Ain el Tineh divide.53 As the variable of elite cooperation was impaired, inter-elite conflicts also detracted from the communities’ cohesiveness. During the so-called symbiotic Independence Intifada, salient lines of dichotomy became conspicuous at the mass level. Bipolar lines were evident through the rift between the masses and the ruling Karami government,54 and between the Sunni-Christian-Druze segments, and the aloof Shiites.55 Thus, although this period witnessed the rise of a transcommunal opposition, it was not until new elections took place that consociational devices, such as the multiple balance of power and mutual veto, were partly readjusted. To understand the dynamics of this bipolar configuration that threatened to weaken Lebanon’s pluralism and to grasp which divisions tended to derail Lebanon’s consociationalism, it is fundamental to study the nature and acuity of political cleavages that marked this period. In the following section, I will analyze in detail the main dividing lines which endangered modes of elite accommodation on the one hand, and destabilized communal segmentation on the other hand. These cleavages which bisected the political arena revolved around the renewal of Lahoud’s term, the dividing Resolution 1559 and its call for Syrian withdrawal and for Hezbollah’s demilitarization. The national political schism: a study of prevailing political cleavages During Lebanon’s democratic awakening, the national split between loyalist and opposing factions manifested itself in a reciprocal campaign of denigration. After 52

53

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I remind the reader that the March 8 demonstration was regarded as the most significant loyalist national show in 2005 whereas March 14 was depicted as the climax of the opposition’s Intifada. By the end of March 2005, two firm political blocs had emerged. On the one hand, the 14 March Alliance grouped Hariri’s Future Current, Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, the Qornet Shehwan Grouping, the Democratic Left Party, the Lebanese Forces, and many other opposition actors. On the other hand, the 8 March Alliance assembled various loyalist factions, such as Hezbollah, Amal, the Baath Party, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party and independent politicians. For an alarming commentary on the breakdown of communication at the elite and mass levels, See Joseph Samaha “Lahzat al inkitah,” Assafir, February, 16, 2005, http:www.assafir.com/ iso/today/front/124.html. Yet, it is difficult to speak of coherent communal blocs in this case as intra-communal cleavages even in the Shiite community came into broad daylight during this period.

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Lahoud’s term had been renewed, a series of political spats depicted by the press illustrated the depth of the rift separating the two camps.56 On the one hand, pro-Syrian groups publicly accused the opposition of siding with foreign actors and serving external actors’ interests.57 On the other hand, opposing actors described the loyalist factions as “Syrian intelligence puppets,”58 and accused them of thwarting Lebanon’s opportune moment for political emancipation.59 One fundamental cleavage separating the opposition and the loyalist establishment was their disagreement over the Syrian role. Whereas many opposition actors regarded Syria as a trouble-maker that could “deliberately ignite the war,”60 the loyalists were keen on highlighting Syria’s image as a peacemaker. Still, it is noteworthy that the bipolar model was less well-delineated than it seemed to be. Although a clear loyalist/opposition divide existed, both blocs were internally fragmented. Whilst the opposition’s factions had some disagreements over the requirements of Resolution 1559, the loyalists engaged

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For instance, a spat between former Labor Minister Assem Qanso from the Baath Party and Druze leader Jumblatt broke out by the end of October 2004 as Qanso declared that Jumblatt was encouraging foreign intervention and was acting as an agent against the interests of his own country. Another row between Jumblatt and former prosecutor Addoum over the role of the Lebanese security services in Minister Mrawan Hamade’s case threatened to extend to other political actors. See Karine Raad, “Franjieh, Qanso Atttack Jumblatt,” The Daily Star, December 8, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=10791& categ_id=2. In February 2005, a lawsuit was filed by the Baath Party against Jumblatt under the pretext that the Druze leader was inciting sectarian strife. The Baath Party also accused Maronite Patriarch of being “a western agent.” See Leila Hatoum and Majdoline Hatoum, “Lebanon’s Baathists Call Patriarch Western Agent,” The Daily Star, February 5, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID= 12415&categ_id=2. In the ongoing row between bipolar factions over Resolution 1559, the Lebanese-Syrian track, and the nature of the electoral law, the opposition was overtly accused in February by premier Karami of “treason” and by former minister of interior Suleiman Franjieh of promoting Israeli interests. See “Vives réactions aux critiques adressées par Karamé à l’opposition, ” L’Orient Le Jour, February, 14, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujetw4.htm. See also Majdoline Hatoum, “Franjieh: Opposition Supports Israeli Demands,” The Daily Star, February 2, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=12478&categ_id=2. See Leila Hatoum and Majdoline Hatoum, “Lebanon’s Baathists Call Patriarch Western Agent,” The Daily Star, February 5, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ ID=12415&categ_id=2. These examples of intense bickering show how consociationalism could inadvertently turn into a formula of fragmentation. They also help explain the high degree of political polarization that surrounded Hariri’s slaying. Furthermore, the ruling elites’ preoccupation with squabbling rather than policy-making could explain to some extent Lebanon’s security and authority gaps during this phase. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 1, 2004.

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into a self-destructive battle over the electoral law61 and the distribution of offices before Lebanon’s elections in summer 2005. The loyalist camp’s viewpoint The loyalist factions interpreted Lahoud’s reelection, the issue of Syria’s withdrawal, and Resolution 1559 as three interwoven variables in a chain reaction: “I was initially against the extension of President Hrawi’s mandate in 1995, yet the renewal of President Lahoud’s term is an exceptional situation in which the parliament approved the vote to counteract the American-Israeli initiative embodied by Resolution 1559.”62 In other words, according to various Lebanese political actors, the US instrumentalized the contentious issue of the Lebanese presidency to pressure the Syrian regime, render Beirut and Damascus more vulnerable to Israeli machinations and redesign a docile Middle East. Hence, voting for the renewal of Lahoud’s term was perceived as an attempt to confront the American project in the Arab region: “backing Lahoud means standing up to America.” 63 The loyalists’ reactions to Resolution 1559 ranged from outright statements of confrontation to more moderate stances. Ministers close to the regime went as far as stating that preserving civil peace, inter-Arab solidarity as well as maintaining Lebanese-Syrian national constants to counteract the Israeli threat were more important than preserving the constitution.64 Warnings against re-defining the Lebanese-Syrian relations in an atmosphere of pressure and imposing a forced Syrian withdrawal, which could destabilize Lebanon and harm the bilateral entente, soared.65 61

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In the lead up to the 2005 elections, political wrangling among the incumbents threatened to thwart the project of a new electoral law. While Speaker Berri favored the adoption of big constituencies, Christian ministers favored the small district. Former Premier Karami gave precedence to constituencies which are intermediate in size. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 8, 2004. Former Deputy Nasser Qandil’s statement. See Karine Raad, “Politicians Weigh in on UN Resolution,” The Daily Star, September 2, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=7976& categ_id=2. See “Réactions-Karam Karam: ‘A quoi sert de préserver la constitution si c’est au prix de la paix civile’,”L’Orient Le Jour, September 2, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourd’hui/ politique/polsujet12. htm. See Elie Hourani and Samar Wehbe, “US Call for Syrian Pullout Draws Mixed Reaction,” The Daily Star, September 13, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID =1&article_ID=8321&categ_id=2.

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Resolution 1559: a ‘Trojan Horse’ in the peace process 66 The resolution was interpreted by the loyalist camp as a strategy to derail the Lebanese-Syrian common pathway in the Middle Eastern peace process. Hence, endorsing the 1559 project in the loyalists’ eyes meant surrendering to the American and Israeli schemes that aim at subduing Arab resistance, and forcing upon a defeating peace.67 For example, Hezbollah announced that approving Lahoud’s reelection and rejecting the resolution equated to rejecting the US plan in the Middle East roadmap: “Resolution 1559 is trying to blackmail Lebanon because of its strategic choices which had been dictated by the Arab-Israeli struggle. It is also a threat to exchange internal security with chaos if Lebanon did not agree to break its ‘destiny knot’ with Syria.”68 Similarly Lahoud hurried to affirm that US-French pressures “would not make Lebanon decline its rights and the solutions it finds best for solving the Middle East crisis through implementing […] permanent peace, based on the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab occupied lands in each of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, the return of Palestinians to their territories and the prevention of their nationalization.”69 In September 2004, he also insisted that the Lebanese army would not deploy its troops to Southern Lebanon unless the Arab-Israeli conflict was solved,70 and linked Syrian pullout to the application of other forgotten UN resolutions pertaining to the regional conflict.71 66

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Speaker Berri called the resolution a ‘Trojan Horse’ because it implicitly aims, according to him, at destabilizing Lebanon and derailing the Lebanese-Syrian peace tracks. See “Présidence-une délégation parlementaire britannique reçue à Baabda, ” L’Orient Le Jour, September 14, 2004, http://www.lorient lejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet10.htm. See Majdoline Hatoum and Nicholas Blanford, “Franjieh: Election Has Become an International Issue,” The Daily Star, September 4, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1 &article_ID=8053& categ_id=2. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 16, 2004. According to the Shiite religious authority Sayyed Hussein Fadlallah, Lebanon should refrain from becoming a bargaining card in the hands of nations that try to dissolve “the Arab common destiny.” See Hatoum and Blanford, “Franjieh: Election has become an International Issue.” See Nada Raad, “Talks Rage across Arab Region on UN Security Council Resolution 1559,” The Daily Star, September 9, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ ID=8214&categ_id=2. See Nada Raad and Khalil Fleihan, “Lahoud: Syrian Troop Presence ‘Legitimate’,” The Daily Star, September 14, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID= 1&article_ID=8358&categ_id=2. See “Présidence-une délégation parlementaire britannique reçue à Baabda,” L’Orient Le Jour, September 14, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet10.htm.

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An illegal resolution In addition to these reservations, Lebanese authorities dismissed the resolution at first as illegitimate for the following reasons: Resolution 1559 is in contradiction with the UN Charter that emphasizes that the Security Council does not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of a member state. International pressure also bypassed Lebanon’s legislature which formally voted for the extension of Lahoud’s mandate. No sooner was the resolution passed than loyalist parties – mainly the Baath Party, the Syrian Socialist Party, the pro-Syrian Kata’ib faction, the Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah as well as pro-Syrian Armenian parties – issued a document in which they criticized the Security Council’s interference in Lebanese affairs, and stated that Lahoud’s reelection was purely an internal matter dictated by national interests;72 Resolution 1559 particularly ignores the legality of the Ta’if settlement which places Lebanese-Syrian relations within the frame of a bilateral dialogue and a state to state relationship;73 The Syrian presence whose legitimacy stems from multiple bilateral treaties cannot be overruled by the international resolution; Resolution 1559 is a biased case of international law because it bypasses many previous UN Resolutions linked to Lebanon and to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These resolutions remain not implemented;74 Resolution 1559 represents a tool of inter-communal division rather than a legal instance of international conflict regulation. Hence, had there been unanimity on the Syrian issue in Lebanon, the resolution would not have been rejected by the authorities.75 The unrealistic dimension of Resolution 1559 As soon as loyalist groups became conscious that the resolution had become inescapable, they departed from the rhetoric of confrontation, and used a more 72

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For example, politician Robert Ghanem issued a statement to explain his last-minute change of decision in favor of the extension. He explained that “pressures on Lebanon and Syria had stripped the presidential issue of its Lebanese character and made it a more like a scapegoat at the mercy of regional and international interests.” See Tilda Abou Risk, “Par 96 voix contre 29, les députés votent la prorogation du mandat Lahoud,” L’Orient Le Jour, September, 9, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourd’hui/politique/polsujet12.htm. Hezbollah’s secretary general Nasrallah indicated that any approval of Resolution 1559 would be tantamount to betraying the Ta’if agreement. Interview with Lebanese politicians, Beirut, November 8, and November 10, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, November 10, 2004.

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moderate strategy in which they tried to explain to the international community why the resolution presented a threat to the Lebanese situation. According to them, the resolution imperils Lebanon’s security and stability by accelerating Syrian withdrawal.76 Second, Resolution 1559 contains impractical and unrealistic demands which cannot be fulfilled by the Lebanese state itself.77 In fact, “who is going to implement the remaining clauses of Resolution 1559 if the Syrian army withdraws?”78 Government officials were hopeful that a diplomatic exchange with the international community on the particularities of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship and on Lebanon’s need for a Syrian-sponsored stability would eventually slacken pressure and delay the implementation of the resolution.79 The opposition’s viewpoint: divided over international meddling and over the contents of Resolution 1559 Whereas the loyalist camp heavily decried international meddling, the transcommunal opposition took a more careful standing. Without blatantly endorsing Resolution 1559, opposition actors such as the Qornet Shehwan grouping, moderate deputies80 and religious figures considered the resolution as an international chance that should be tailored to fit Lebanon’s interests,81 and “a recapitulation of the Ta’if agreement and other UN resolutions.”82 However, in order to avoid the controversies resulting from the conflict-laden resolution, they shied away from recognizing it publicly, and focused foremost on the immediate

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See interview with former Deputy Premier under the last Hariri cabinet, Issam Fares, in L’Hebdo Magazine, October 8, 2004, 26. A Lebanese politician explains that Syria remains reluctant to play an active role in demilitarizing Hezbollah and the Palestinian armed forces in Lebanon as long as the Middle East process is derailed. In addition, the Lebanese state is not strong enough to enforce disarmament of armed groups by itself. An ill-fated adventure may inaugurate a new phase of instability as attempts of forced demilitarization would irrevocably lead to communal struggles. Interview with the author, Beirut, December 12, 2004. Former Premier Karami’s statement in Rosanna Bou Monsef, “Muwajahat al karar 1559 turbiku alsulta mata tadakhalat fil tafassil,” An Nahar, November 2, 2004, 2. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 24, 2004. See for instance Deputy Antoine Ghanem’s interview with Mounir Hajjar in Assayad, October 22, 2004, 14-16. Late deputy Pierre Gemayel argued that the distinctive resolution demarcated itself from other UN resolutions inasmuch as it focused on Lebanon and its sovereignty. See “Beyrouth-Damas: les législatives prouveront que la ligne politique syrienne est la plus forte au Liban, affirme Frangié,” L’Orient Le Jour, September, 9, 2004, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/ politique/polsujet7.htm. Anti-Syrian politician Gemayel was assassinated in November 2006. Interview with a Lebanese religious figure, Qornet Shehwan, November 5, 2004

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implementation of the distorted Ta’if covenant. Thus, “irrespective of Resolution 1559, the Lebanese-Syrian deformed relations should be corrected.”83 Still, not all opposition actors displayed moderate attitudes toward the resolution. Others regarded the resolution as a direct case of imposition. Examples are the Democratic Forum84 and the Progressive Socialist Party85 which denounced attempts at internationalizing the Lebanese-Syrian file, and called for a bilateral adjustment of relations based on dialogue and not on international interference. While the Democratic Forum regarded the resolution as an imposed outcome resulting from the inopportune renewal of Lahoud’s term “which provided the international community with “an internal cause to justify its meddling,”86 the Progressive Socialist Party’s hostility to the resolution stemmed from the fact that “Resolution 1559 imposed conditions that cannot be easily fulfilled.” In fact, “Lebanon cannot afford to launch a war of isolation against Hezbollah.”87 In spite of these divergences, the opposition managed in the first period to patch up differences of opinion concerning foreign meddling. At the Bristol meeting in December 2004, it agreed to adopt the Ta’if document as its main point of reference. Yet, no sooner did time elapse than divisions over the demands of the resolution and US stances resurged. Shortly before the 2005 elections, doubt prevailed whether rifts provoked by the contents of the UN document had weakened the anti-Syrian alliance’s cohesion.88 The issue of Hezbollah’s demilitarization remained notably a distinct issue of dissent not only between the government and the opposition but between opposition groups themselves. Some factions in the plural opposition – such as Jumblatt’s parliamentary bloc, the Democratic Gathering – rejected the idea that the Resistance should be disarmed before the liberation of the Shebaa farms,89 while others – like the Free Patriotic Movement – encouraged at first the integration of Hezbollah’s military wing in the army.90 Moreover, before Hariri’s slaying, the opposition was divided over the process leading to the Syrian pullout. Whereas some demanded the total withdrawal of Syrian forces, others judged it wiser to call only for their redeployment to the Beqa’a for strategic 83 84 85

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Interview with a Lebanese politician, Ashrafieh, November 26, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 9, 2004. Interview with a high-ranked party member, interview with the author, Beirut, November 2, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 9, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 25, 2004. See Adnan El-Ghoul, “Jumblatt Denies Rifts over Opposition Policy,” The Daily Star, April 11, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=14188&categ_id=2. For instance Druze deputy Akram Chehayeb affiliated to the Progressive Socialist Party. It is noteworthy that Jumblatt’s and Aoun’s stances over Hezbollah’s military role changed after the 2005 elections.

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purposes.91 Thus, more cautious actors argued that Syria should only leave after it had helped Lebanon within a fixed timetable control elements which could destabilize its security. The extension of Lahoud’s mandate, Syria, and the regional factor Despite various internal divergences, the plural opposition was keen on deconstructing two fundamental claims advanced by the loyalist camp: • President Lahoud’s reelection is a reaction to regional instability and to strategic imperatives; • Lebanon is unable to assume full autonomous powers on the political level. In its campaign against the loyal establishment, the Bristol Coalition focused at first on displaying the bad repercussions of the anti-constitutional act by showing how a police state under Syrian tutelage in Lebanon could thwart Lebanon’s development. Although all opposition groups were keen on restructuring the Lebanese-Syrian relations in a radical manner, one should note that while some called for a complete divorce in the Lebanese and Syrian files, others favored the separation of the political and economic Lebanese-Syrian tracks, but insisted on the concomitance of the Lebanese-Syrian pathways in the Middle Eastern process. 92 Some opposition groups additionally pleaded for the dissociation of Lebanon’s own political fate from intersecting regional matters and for “an end to Lebanon’s status as a bargaining chip in the peace process.”93 The post-war regime’s attempt to link the country’s political autonomy to the troubled regional configuration was particularly described by some opposition actors as a dangerous trap: “If the logic is that Palestine and Iraq are in danger, then we cannot keep extending and renewing mandates until those conflicts, some of which are more than half a century old, are resolved.”94

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While the Qornet Shehwan Grouping called for a complete Syrian withdrawal and for the separation of Lebanon’s fate from the Arab-Israeli conflict, Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party declared that the troops’ redeployment to the Beqa’a in protection of Syria’s interests would be acceptable. FPM leader Aoun argued, however, that 15.000 Syrian soldiers could never prevent an Israeli attack in case this happened. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 25, 200. See also former deputy Ghattas Khoury’s interview with Mounir Najjar in Assayad, October 22, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Ashrafieh, November 26, 2004. See Nayla Assaf, “Lebanese MPs Give Lahoud 3 more Years,” The Daily Star, September 4, 2004, http://ww w.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=8055&categ_id=2.

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The following figure underlines the general divergences between the loyalist camp (commonly called the 8 March Coalition) and the plural opposition (commonly called the 14 March Coalition): Figure 5.1 Figure 5.1

The bipolar rift between the 8 and the 14 March Coalitions The bipolar rift between the 8 and the 14 March Coalitions

Source: Fakhoury Source: Fakhoury

Cleavages at the mass level and discordant demonstrations: a reflection of interelite rifts It is significant to analyze additionally how elites’ polarization along a proSyrian/anti-Syrian divide has had undesired results on communal segmentation during this phase. Whereas the Bristol gathering lacked a considerable Shiite

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support, the Ain el Tineh grouping was composed of the main Shiite key players. Yet, the Druze, Christian and Sunni political participants in the loyalist camp did not reflect the aspirations of their respective communities.95 These divisions, which undoubtedly affected the communities’ allegiances, manifested themselves in bipolar demonstrations. Thus, before the Independence Intifada had reached its pinnacle, demonstrations in November 2004 after the renewal of Lahoud’s term, foreshadowed a growing national fracture. It was as though the plural and confessional complexity of the country had been reduced to a simple bipolarity: those who supported Syrian presence and rejected Resolution 1559, and those who called for the withdrawal of the Syrian troops and welcomed international assistance.96 After Hariri’s slaying, the pro-Syrian/anti-Syrian cleavage culminated with the loyalist protest on March 8 and the pro-opposition uprising on March 14. During these demonstrations, while the majority of the Shiite community was portrayed as a fervent defender of the pro-Syrian political line, it was commonly reported that the majority in Christian, Druze, and Sunni segments participated in the protests organized by the anti-Syrian coalition. At first glance, rival demonstrations could be interpreted as a telling evidence of the fragility of inter-segmental cohesiveness in crisis situations, and of the destructive impact of external pressures. Yet to what extent these protests were purely divided along communal lines is highly contestable. In fact, these dichotomous representations of communal allegiances were not indicative of overlapping political/communal cleavages, but were mostly suggestive of how inter-elite power struggles could easily affect communal subdivisions. Whilst these mass cleavages could have been perceived as normal outbursts of subcultural differences in times of crisis, it was mostly the politicization of these differences that helped deepen inter-communal gaps. In short, demonstrations became vectors of the elites’ clashing visions. Hence, it was not “the mere fact of demonstrating or counter-demonstrating that provoked this strong malaise felt by the Lebanese, but the interpretations

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The participation of Speaker Nabih Berri, former speaker Hussein el Husseini, and Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah endowed the Ain el Tineh gathering with a strong Shiite base. However, the other loyalist participants such as Christian politicians Michel Murr and Sleiman Franjieh, Sunni leaders like Omar Karami, and Druze politicians like Talal Arslane were not major representatives of their communities. Whereas the loyalist demonstration on November 30, 2005, displayed slogans rejecting Resolution 1559, praising the constructive role of Syria, and denouncing American intervention, the pro-opposition demonstration called for Syrian withdrawal, and was somewhat favorable to foreign intervention. The Free Patriotic Movement distributed flyers equating Resolution 1559 with freedom and sovereignty.

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given to these mass movements.”97 Those who supported the opposition were seen as the allies of the pro-American Occident, and those who allied with the loyalist establishment were perceived as traitors in their own nation. It seemed for a while that demonstrations mirrored the conflict over the political meaning of ‘Lebanonism’ and the two-faced Lebanese pact. A polarizing discourse During the period of protests (November 2004-March 2005), frequent references to the lexicon of majoritarian referendums98 and to the logic of numerical superiority in demonstrations99 seemed more like dangerous attempts to reduce a consensual political culture into a numerical pluralism based on binary poles: winner versus loser, pro-Syrian versus anti-Syrian, pro-Arab versus proAmerican. Besides, frequent allusions to civil war episodes have in one way or another brought the phantom of fragmentation back to the Lebanese ethos.100 In a staged demonstration organized by Hezbollah on February 19, 2005, leader Nasrallah hinted at the possible break out of another civil war if the country fell prey to Resolution 1559.101 On the other hand, condemning pro-Syrian demonstrations, the opposition reproached the government of empowering “a loyalist mob” to sustain cleavages and unrest in the country and to attempt

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See Paul Khalifeh, “Editorial: Repères brouillés,” L’Hebdo Magazine, November 26, 2004, 7. In November 2004, former premier Karami’s allusion to the upcoming elections as a referendum over Resolution 1559 was interpreted as a conscious attempt to divide the country and create artificial Christian and Muslim rifts. The proposal of Hezbollah’s leader Nasrallah to conduct a referendum over the Syrian presence in January 2005 equally threatened to heighten communal hostilities. For instance, Karami’s reference to the loyalist demonstration on November 30, 2004 as the ‘March of the Million.’ In response to Syrian president’s speech on March 5, 2005, in which he announced the redeployment of Syrian troops, president Lahoud hurried to thank Syria for its efforts to put an end to Lebanon’s partition during the war. See “Entre réserves et encouragements de la communauté internationale après le discours de Bachar Al-Assad sur le Liban,” Le Monde, March 6, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/web./imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3218,36-400559,0.html. The Lebanese president warned on several occasions that demonstrations might reignite civil war: “If they want to continue demonstrating, a little firecracker will lead to catastrophe […]We are not in Georgia and nor are we in Ukraine. We have lived through 17 years of war and this could happen again…” See “Lebanon President Warns of Catastrophe if Protests Continue,” Tehran Times, March 13, 2005, http://ww.tehrantimes.com/Description.asp?DA=3/14 /2005&Cat=4&Num=005 See for example Jean Pierre Perrin, “Au Liban, le Hezbollah menace de relancer la guerre civile, ” Libération, February 21, 2005, http://www.liberation.fr/imprimer.php?Article=277207.

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through a polarizing rhetoric to slow down the transition and frighten protesters.102 It was also reported that antagonistic protests were used as instances of political muscles’ flexing by respective parties. For example, the 8 March demonstration was on the one hand a warning by Hezbollah to all international actors planning to fill the power vacuum in Lebanon after Syrian departure, and a message that the party would probably insist on keeping its weapons even if Syrians withdrew.103 The subsequent demonstration organized by the anti-Syrian coalition aimed at overpowering the loyalist establishment, and proving that antiSyrian allegiances were stronger. The intense political divide in the country as well as the conflicting proSyrian/Western influences led the regional and international media to speculate whether Lebanon was once again on the verge of a civil war. For example, an Egyptian newspaper noted that “civil wars are generally preceded by a political polarization around an important question, followed by a violent act targeting a certain symbol stemming from this polarization, then an act of reprisals” which provokes a mechanism leading “to the breakdown of the central power.”104 Although the reemergence of an eventual civil war was denied by Lebanese political scientists,105 newspapers in the Arab world frequently referred to the spectre of instability hovering over Lebanon, the destabilizing effects of foreign intervention and of Syrian withdrawal: “Has anymore thought of the danger of a precipitous pullout? […] How do you ensure sustained stability in Lebanon after the departure of the Syrians, avoiding the potential disintegration of Lebanese society into the kind of civil war that devastated the country ...?”106 102

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Adnan El Ghoul, “Beirut on Knife Edge as Parliament Meets,” The Daily Star, February 28, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=13045&categ_id=2. See Tony Karon, “Lebanon after the Syrians,” Time, March 10, 2004, http://www.time.com/ time/world/ article/0,8599,1036010,00.html. Quotation taken from an editorial in the Egyptian daily Al-Masry Al-Youm quoted in “La presse arabe inquiète sur l’avenir du Liban après l’assassinat de Hariri,” Courrier International, February, 16, 2005, available from http://www.courrierinternational.com. In one of its articles, the Egyptian daily went as far as comparing Hariri’s slaying to Saad Marouf’s assassination in February 1975 shortly before the civil war broke out. See “Des personnalités arabes et occidentales mettent en garde contre une “irakisation” du pays,” L’Orient Le Jour, February 18, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/ polsujetw8.htm. See Fawaz Turki’s statement originally published in Arab News and quoted in “Make them Part of the Solution,” Guardian, March 10, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/syria/story/0,13031, 1433974,00.html. Even Syria’s external ally Iran, warned that Lebanon was vulnerable to

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The implications of political cleavages on power-sharing This study of political cleavages that exposed the main disagreements between the loyalist camp and the opposition as well as the description of the dangerous polarization that followed the adoption of Resolution 1559 and Hariri’s slaying shows mainly that exogenous conflicting influences and their overlapping with internal divisions heighten the centrifugalism of the system. The analysis reveals more specifically that the most significant conflict lines which backfired on the variables of elite accommodation and communal stability were the differences of opinion on the Syrian role, and the disagreement over Lebanon’s degree of involvement in regional as well as international arenas. While both camps were more or less cautious about international intervention and its effects, they were mostly divided over Lebanon’s political line and over its policy track in the Middle East. Not only does this description shed light on the frailty of inter-elite consensus but it once again shows that the Lebanese system cannot bear much foreign policy overload. Still, although political cleavages reached in March 2005 a dangerous degree of acuity, they have not at any point completely overlapped with communal cleavages. The fact that the anti-Syrian coalition and the loyalist establishment were, on the one hand, internally divided, and on the other hand, more or less represented – in different intensities – within different communities helped mitigate tensions. As soon as the neutral Mikati government was appointed in April 2005, and Syrian troops withdrew, cleavages softened temporarily. This leads one speculate whether Lebanon’s internal cleavages intensify or de-escalate according to the degree and acuteness of external threat and intervention. In a stable consociation, whereas inter-elite and leader-follower relations are supposed to be in a state of equilibrium, figure 5.2 illustrates the emergence of a distorted consociational model, in which elites are divided into two polarized blocs and communal and leader-follower relations are disfigured. The figure also shows how extreme external pressures heighten internal fissions:

another civil war, and that instability in Syria could spill over to the Lebanese frontiers. See Mayssam Zaaroura, “Iran Gives Civil War Warning to Lebanon Opposition,” The Daily Star, April 25, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp? art_ID=14561&cat_ID=2.

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Figure 5.2

The rise of a bipolar system in the post-1559 era

Source: Fakhoury Coalition building during the phase of bipolarity The post-Hariri cabinet or ‘Syrianized’ power-sharing After Hariri’s departure, a mono-colored council headed by premier Karami gave precedence to an absolute pro-Syrian political line at the detriment of communal representativeness.107 The short-lived cabinet typified an obvious case of consociational tampering whereby diversity was relegated for the benefit of a 107

“When I felt I would be a Prime Minister in name only and that ministers’ names would be proposed to me, I apologized,” said Hariri as he resigned. See Walid Choucair, “How Much Leeway Will Karami Actually Have?” The Daily Star, October 23, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID= 9523&categ_id=2.

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pliant balance of power supposed to face the rising international pressure.108 The cabinet facilitated the domination of a monolithic executive power, and impaired to a great extent the communities’ effective mutual veto in the government.109 It is significant that the deputies who agreed to vote in favor of Lahoud’s reelection refused to give a vote of confidence to the new cabinet. Even factions known for their pro-Syrian allegiances, namely Hezbollah, expressed serious reservations about curtailing so drastically political pluralism.110 Coalition building at an impasse: lessons for Lebanon’s consociationalism In the aftermath of the protests that led to the resignation of the pro-Syrian government by the end of February 2005, a six-week standstill demonstrated how precarious power-sharing engineering could be in times of crisis and political polarity. Once consociational mechanisms are paralyzed, it is difficult to detect the real actors responsible for the stalemate especially in the case of bipolarity. Both opposition and loyalist camps have been in fact criticized for exacerbating the prevailing deadlock. On the one hand, the outgoing premier’s reappointment in March reflected most of all the incumbents’ reluctance to change the rules of executive power-sharing.111 On the other hand, it was argued that the 108

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It was reported that the following criteria were taken into consideration upon appointing the ministers: curtailing Hariri’s power without provoking him, isolating Druze leader Jumblatt by appointing his opponents, and confining Christian representation to “an appropriate” level without “pleasing” the opposition which has boycotted the new government. See Choucair, “How Much Leeway Will Karami Actually Have?” During an interview at the LBC television, Sunni deputy Mosbah Ahdab noted that the impaired variable of representativeness in the cabinet and the pro-Syrian executive coalition had exacerbated “communal and geographical cleavages,” and had disfigured communal representativeness in both Christian and Muslim segments by appointing representatives closely linked to the regime. For a summary of the interview, see “Ahdab: les SR gouvernent le pays,” L’Orient Le Jour, December, 28, 2004, 2. See Walid Choucair, “MPs Criticize Karami after Broken Promises,” The Daily Star, November 6, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=9930&categ_id=2. The opposition and the loyalists blamed one another for the political standstill. Even though Karami insisted after his reappointment in March 2005 on the formation of a national union cabinet, and displayed readiness to negotiate with the opposition on all controversial issues, the Bristol Gathering qualified Karami’s return as an extension of the prevailing crisis, and refused to negotiate with the old regime. Some argued that the political crisis, which threatened to hold back Lebanon’s transition, could have been a strategy endorsed by the Lebanese and Syrian regimes to prove that Lebanon would be unable to surpass internal divisions on its own. See the interview with the Lebanese political scientist Joseph Bahout moderated by Stephane Mazzorato and Guillaume Pelissierr-Combescure, “Le Liban: les enjeux de la crise,” Le Monde, March 4, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3232,36-400394,0.html.

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opposition’s insistence on “self-righteousness” also contributed to worsening the situation.112 Furthermore, political wrangling between the loyalists and the opposition led to a power vacuum which was exploited by ruling officials to impose an outcome that did not take into account the changing political scene.113 This episode reveals that the forced necessity to agree on a coalition cabinet – even it was not representative – could lead to consociational arrangements which subverts democracy. In other words, there exists a very thin borderline between Lebanon’s democratic consociationalism and the moment this same consociationalism could throw back the country below the democratic edge. At the same time, Karami’s final failure in April 2005 to appoint a coalition cabinet composed of loyalist figures showed that a strained consociationalism – as soon as the Syrian regime had loosened its grip – could no longer succeed. The ensuing appointment of a neutral cabinet, the disintegration of the LahoudKarami grand coalition, and the withdrawal of Syrian intelligence operatives marked the slackening of Lebanon’s coercive power-sharing. Synthesis: Prerequisites and devices of consociational democracy at peril The Second Republic was marred with serious power-sharing deviations that it would be more accurate to label Lebanon’s model of concordance during this period as an oligarchic consociation managed from above. Troika deviations, the emergence of a shadow government as well as the breakdown of the MaroniteSunni coalition under President Lahoud’s reign, and the rise of an unstable bipolar model unquestionably impaired the prerequisites of consociational democracy. If one fundamental prerequisite in the consociational model is the elites’ commitment to accommodating diverse communal interests and orientations,114 the post-war elites were mostly keen on engineering political homogenization, empowering ‘political majorities’ in Lebanese communities, and maintaining an artificial stability in coordination with the Syrian tutor. On the other hand, opposition figures were mostly involved in carving a political niche to reinvent their presence on the Lebanese scene. One might induce that the variable of elite coalescence as a concept of deliberate behavior aiming at devising constructive strategies to surmount 112

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See Editorial “It’s High time Lebanon’s Needs Were Placed Ahead of Old and Tired Tactics,”The Daily Star, March 11, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID =13324&cat_ID=17. I allude in this respect to Lahoud’s and Karami’s attempt to form in April 2005 a pro-Syrian coalition cabinet after the opposition had refused to negotiate with them. See Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy.”

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subcultural gaps115 was replaced by a clientelist elite behavior whereby inter-elite affinities were regulated by political/economic interests and the degree of closeness to the Syrian neighbor. A relevant question is whether the national pact of power-sharing was reduced to an inter-elite pact for managing sympathies, confessionalizing positions, and distributing spoils amicably?116 Deformed models of power-sharing also derailed main devices for managing diversity, and more particularly coalition building, and the veto right of the subcultures. Regarding the device of proportionality, while parity was respected, it is highly debatable whether this numerical relativeness in institutions really mirrored different segmental loyalties. This has impinged on the communities’ satisfaction with the power-sharing pact. The ‘Lahoud era’ experience particularly shows that sane consociationalism cannot survive in a semi-authoritarian abyss. Thus, keeping the opposition at bay has substantially impaired the power-sharing model as the latter does not only rest on sharing power but also on a competition for power.117 Furthermore, once the politics of security supersedes consensus and downplays the necessity of building institutions embedded in consociational strategies, the state paradoxically becomes more vulnerable to crystallized cleavages insofar as the slightest seism can shatter this artificially constructed order. Augurs of a power-sharing reawakening? (October 2004- March 2006) “We witness the evolution of a consociational system whose ideologies proclaim its death, but which does not stop dying.” 118 In spite of the strong rifts that have derailed the consociational model up to the 2005 elections, many parallel features paved the way for a power-sharing renewal. It is in fact this schizophrenic nature of consociationalism after the renewal of Lahoud’s term that makes the model during this period worth studying: the temporal intersection of a bipolar opposition/loyalist rift with the 115 116

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Ibid. Clientelism and patronage networks were mainly consolidated by some incumbents who deftly bestowed civil posts and governmental positions upon their followers. See O’Leary, “Foreword: The Realism of Power-Sharing.” Antoine Messarra, “ La Consociation rationalisée,” in La société de concordance: Approche comparative, eds Theodor Hanf, Antoine N. Messarra, and Hinrich R. Reinstrom (Beirut: Université Libanaise, 1986), 105-148, 108.

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genesis of cross-cutting links attracts one’s attention to how complex consociational outcomes in fragmented societies are. In the following sections, I will thoroughly analyze the indicators that hint at such a revival. It goes without saying that the partial restoration of power-sharing devices is still marred by important deviations. The latter will also be discussed. The resilience of Lebanese consociationalism The return to consociationalism in 1989 has enabled the enhancement of “traditional pluralism” which spared Lebanon “from the heavy-handed dictatorial regimes common elsewhere in the region.”119 The pact of coexistence enabled Lebanon’s confessional groups to evolve not only as religious communities but as coexisting entities in the same homeland. More importantly, the recognition of pluralism meant the resilience of the consociational thinking in the Lebanese society despite protracted conflicts. Even during the war, the written contents of the constitution and the general principles of power-sharing remained intact. In fact, most state institutions continued functioning, and the residues of a frail grand coalition and communal segmental autonomy were still there. The sustainability of operating institutions and the preservation of preliminary power-sharing, despite the predominance of war cantons and militia enclaves, have been regarded as substantial indicators of the resilience of the model. Whilst it was possible to engineer a new constitution which had nothing to do with consociationalism and to redefine the rules of the game, this did not take place.120 The fact that the war ended with a new power-sharing settlement which partially rectified imbalanced power relations demonstrated the depth of the vision of concordance in the perception of Lebanon as a final nation for all its citizens, and the deep conviction that religious groups remain the vertical structures or pillars that cement the society. Also, the fact that the power-sharing solution, regardless of its mixed success, remained the only acceptable formula till an eventual phasing out of political confessionalism, indirectly hinted at the difficulties of designing another political model for Lebanon’s divided society. Although the model had bred disappointments, post-war Lebanese elites agreed that a Lebanese unitary state based on communal power-sharing was preferable to all other alternatives.

119 120

Hudson, “Lebanon after Ta’if,” 104. Cordelia Koch, “Das Ende der Koexistenz im Libanon? Wahlgesetz und Senat würden die Konkordanzdemokratie Vielheit verfestigen, doch die Vielfalt beschränken,” Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 1 (2004): 105-132, 110-112.

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Reviving the formula in Ta’if obliged each community “to ensure its share in the shaping of the future.”121 The co-optation of warlords in the power-sharing system – its disadvantageous aspects notwithstanding – allowed conflict regulation and social pacification to a certain extent. Requests to partition the state or design a secular system were also anathema to the Syrian mediator. In fact, Syria did not want either a partitioned or a secular Lebanon, but was waiting for the ripe moment where international and national factors coincide for the resurrection of a central Lebanese authority favorable to Syrian interests. Interestingly enough, the Syrian tutor has acted as an ambivalent mediator that prevented Lebanese partition, but managed to manipulate confessional divisions in order to keep the conflict going until the right time for a Syrian-brokered peace came along. Therefore, Syria’s dualistic role during and after the war has surprisingly contributed to the resilience of the power-sharing model albeit in a disfigured form. Regardless of its numerous shortcomings, the consociational formula has constituted throughout all these years a barometer which measured democratic advances or erosions in post-war Lebanon. For example, the elites’ divided discourses constituted important vectors, which helped analyze democratic pressures and authoritarian impulses. Studying communal discourses calling for Syrian departure or endorsing Syrian presence after 2000 tells a lot about the interplay between authoritarian trends and drives towards more liberalism during this period. More importantly, the precarious power-sharing revival in the aftermath of the Intifada Uprising substantiates that the consociational formula is apt to refinement. The 2005 Beirut Spring: Low-intensity power-sharing Cross-cutting links and resemblance in dissemblance Despite the alarming state of polarization, the creation of a transcommunal opposition, which gradually enclosed all segmental parties including a fraction of the Shiite confession, proved that it was possible to readjust the path of a lost consociation if certain conditions were fulfilled. It is beyond doubt that the rapprochement among communities was encouraged by international pressure, and failed to be overarching at a national level. But it corroborated that political cleavages in the country were not permanent and could be bridged. In fact, cross-cutting links at the elite level during this period are worthy of consideration. Wary of the national divide, various communal representatives 121

Dagher, Bring down the Walls, 175.

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still advocated national dialogue, and denounced the sectarian content of the political discourse after Lahoud’s reelection.122 Besides, important axes of rapprochement took shape across intra- and inter-communal as well as across ideological lines.123 Although these alliances could be dismissed as pre-electoral schemes, nebulous signs of an emerging cross-communal consensus were unmistakably alive and kicking. Furthermore, noticeable attempts at bridging the gap between the opposition and the aloof Shiite political leadership were reported.124 After the pro-Syrian protest on March 8, 2005, opposition leaders asked the party several times to join the Lebanese strife.125 They also invited Hezbollah on various occasions to engage into a national dialogue on its military role and integration in political life.126 Similarly, Hezbollah has urged different factions on several occasions to resort to national dialogue in order to avoid dissension.127 122

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Religious elites such as senior Shiite cleric Fadlallah and the Maronite Council of Bishops emphasized the necessity of national consensus and moderation to confront regional and international challenges. See for example “Condamnations en série de la sectarisation du discours politique,” L’Orient Le jour, October 18, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ aujourdhui/politique/polsujet10.htm. See also “Fadlallah Condemns Political Bickering, Calls for Openness,” The Daily Star, December 11, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb /article.asp? edition_ID=1&article_ID=10911&categ_id=2. During this period, the Free Patriotic Current met with various Lebanese political actors, including pro-Syrian factions. From his exile in France, Aoun insisted on the necessity of convening a national dialogue conference to solve all pending issues. See Majdoline Hatoum, “FPM Seeks Dialogue across Political Spectrum,” The Daily Star, December 12, 2004, http://www.dailystar. com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID= 10721&categ_id=2. The transcommunal opposition tried to reach out to other key actors in order to encompass different segmental currents. For instance, before their electoral squirmishes, FPM leader Aoun and Druze leader Jumblatt had agreed several times on a fruitful dialogue. Aoun’s possible entry to the Bristol Coalition was even discussed. See for example Michel Hajji Georgiou, “Eclairagel’ancien premier ministre souhaite rencontrer Sfeir à Paris, Aoun et Joumblatt d’accord pour un dialogue franc, sincère et fructueux,” L’Orient Le Jour, October, 17, 2005, http://www.lorient lejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet5.htm. In December 2004, Jumblatt’s visit to Sethrida Geagea, LF leader Geagea’s spouse, was considered as a step aiming at consolidating the Maronite-Druze reconciliation initiated by Patriarch Sfeir in 2001. Leader of the pro-opposition Democratic Renewal Party, Nassib Lahoud also visited Geagea’s spouse in January 2005. This visit was interpreted as an effort to reinforce the Maronite community’s cohesiveness. Leading opposition actors such deputies Ghazi Aridi and Marwan Hamade met with Hezbollah’s and Amal’s respective leaders, Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri, in order to work out a deal after premier Karami’s first resignation. For instance, Patriarch Sfeir, argued that Hezbollah should join “Lebanese political life.” See “Sfeir: Hezbollah Should Stop Rallies and Join Political Life,” The Daily Star, March 14, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=13406&categ_id=2. Jumblatt launched a public call for dialogue with Hezbollah during his visit to Berlin in March 2005. See for example, Adnan El-Ghoul, “Nasrallah Urges National Dialogue,” The Daily Star,

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Although the Party of God’s aloofness during the Intifada has raised much criticism, the picture is much more complex than it seems. Hence, while it is correct to qualify Hezbollah as a pro-Syrian actor, it is inaccurate to dismiss it as a Syrian puppet during the phase of the so-called ‘Democratic Uprising.’ It is noteworthy that before Hariri’s slaying, the Shiite party attempted to rise above the bipolar cleavage by adopting a careful standpoint and by “treading carefully between political groupings.”128 At this stage, the party seemed particularly keen on maintaining good relations with the loyalist and opposition camps, and on forging an image of national dimension. After Hariri’s slaying, the Shiite party also sent explicit signs of openness to the Sunni segment. Leader Nasrallah’s surprise visit to the Sunni Dar el Fatwa in March 2005, and the visits paid by Hezbollah delegations to the late premier’s grave were depicted as modest attempts to bridge the gap between the two communities.129 Nonetheless, Hezbollah supporters’ visit took place only once the Independence Uprising had subsided, and indicated the Shiite establishment’s intention to stay at a distance from the Beirut Spring. On top of that, the moment political polarization threatened to fling the country into unruly waters, the loyalist camp called for the resumption of dialogue with the opposition. Two noteworthy pleas were Ain el Tineh’s frequent requests130 to launch a national dialogue with the anti-Syrian coalition, and President Lahoud’s proposal to begin immediate talks in March 2005 with the opposition in the wake of the bomb blasts.131 These examples mitigate the image of an absolutely bipolar system based on adversarial behavior. Even though the Independence Intifada failed to eradicate the dividing elite hiatus, its main accomplishment was the development of a political consensus that divisive issues should be solved through dialogue. The parties’ respective rejection of violence indicated that a forthcoming return to

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February, 21, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=12840&cat_ID=2 . See El-Ghoul, “Hezbollah Treads Carefully between Political Groupings,” The Daily Star, November, 2, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=9799 &categ_id=2. For more details, see “Au Liban, le Hezbollah multiplie les signes d’ouverture en direction des Sunnites…” Proche -Orient.Info, March 21, 2005, available from http://www.proche-orient.info. During a gathering of the loyalist camp, speaker Berri, premier Karami, Hezbollah’s secretary general Nasrallah as well as other loyalist politicians and representatives of pro-Syrian political parties, such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party and the Armenian Tachnag, called for a campaign of unconditional dialogue based on the Ta’if agreement with the opposition. See for example Lin Nouheid, “Lebanon’s President Urges Talks after Bombing,” Reuters, March 19, 2005, available from http://www.alernet.org. It is worth mentioning that president Lahoud’s offer was turned down on the grounds that he was somehow responsible for the political crisis.

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sectarian violence was not envisageable. Even at the highest tide of polarization, Resolution 1559 and the Syrian withdrawal did not bring about a final inter-elite rupture. The emergence of a nebulous communal consensus (February-March 2005) Despite the large Shiite establishment’s reluctance to join the crowd, Hariri’s slaying had united most Lebanese currents against Syrian interference and against the Lebanese regime itself. The demonstration that took place on March 14 and in which more than 800.000 people protested against the Syrian presence showed that Lebanon’s inter-communal schism on the Syrian issue was no longer as broad as it was depicted.132 After the Intifada’s zenith, some observers even hailed the dawn of a “new pact of fraternity and adhesion to national identity.”133 Whether these fits of unity were evanescent or not, collective protests had helped shape new myths of communal concordance: the quest for the truth, and the refusal to return to war. Striving for the truth behind Hariri’s assassination has thus laid the foundation for a more cohesive Lebanese merger throughout 2005. Images of multicommunal crowds wearing the blue ribbon, and chanting slogans calling for an unravelling of the Hariri case134 denoted that the emblem of the truth had become – at least temporarily – a unifying link.135 Moreover, a new national consensus based on the refusal to go back to war and on a genuine desire to consolidate inter-communal peace seemed to emerge out of the Beirut Spring. On April 13, 2005, the Commemoration Day of the 1975 war, large-scale events which took place under the motto “no more war” signalled the communities’ commitment to preserving national unity and civil peace. Baptized as the day of “national unity,” this commemoration, which happened as Syrian soldiers were leaving the country, was, in one way or another, a cathartic confrontation with the memory of war, and a purposeful substitution of war memories by memories of peace.

132 133

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See Kassir, “Die Intifada der Unabhängigkeit.” See Farès Louis, “Un Liban uni, pont entre l’Orient et l’Occident,” Le Figaro, April 27, 2005, http://www.lefigaro.fr/cgi/edition/genimprim,e?cle=20050427.FIG0256. See for instance Mouna Naîm, “Au Liban, la contestation antisyrienne se radicalise,” Le Monde, February, 28, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3218,36-39974 7,0.html. On March 13, 2005, nearly ten thousand persons gathered in the Martyrs’ Square, and produced by assembling candles the shape of the word ‘truth’ in English and in Arabic.

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It was also suggested that even though contraposed demonstrations threatened the communities’ entente, the pro-Syrian protest on March 8, 2005, had common denominators with the pro-opposition uprising on March 14.136 For instance, the Shiite establishment did not brandish Hezbollah’s yellow flag, but rather the national flag waved by anti-Syrian protesters. During his speech on March 8, the party’s secretary general Nasrallah stressed the need to unveil the truth behind Hariri’s slaying, the main theme that constituted the crux of the opposition’s protests. The permanency of the ‘Democratic Uprising’ Although the euphoria of the first Beirut Spring has considerably abated since February 2005, the spirit of the mass uprising has been revived on several occasions. All politically motivated killings were followed by mass protests which invigorated the 14 March spirit.137 One year after the 2005 uprising, the second 2006 Intifada under the motto “Lebanon first” which commemorated the Saint Valentine’s slaying, demonstrators across different communities and regions streamed to Down Town Beirut to revive overarching loyalties.138 These moments of national solidarity suggested that cross-cutting cleavages might have ebbed, but they did not die out. Still, it is still too soon to judge whether cross-communal bonds could forge a lasting national unity and whether this new national consciousness would prove to be solid or not. It suffices to describe this period as a temporary multicommunal awakening.

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See “A‘zam tazahura fi tarikh lubnan: fal natawahad,” Assafir, March 9, 2005, http://assafir.com/ iso/today/front/138.html. Renewed protests after Kassir’s and Tueni’s assassinations have reenergized the Intifada. For instance, after Kassir’s slaying, journalists and protesters gathered in the Center of Beirut and reiterated their vows that the murder had only reinvigorated their desire to unmask the perpetrators of the crimes. Tueni’s assassination was followed by numerous protests which stressed the necessity of safeguarding Lebanon’s freedom and independence. Ten of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets denouncing the murder and chanting anti-Syrian slogans. It was reported that Sunni, Christian, and Druze demonstrators as well as a Shiite minority joined the rally. See Patricia Khodr, “Des centaines de milliers de personnes place des Martyrs pour rééditer le 14 Mars,” L’Orient Le Jour, February, 15, 2006, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page. aspx?page=article&id=305998.

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The partial revival of consociational devices in the post-Syrian era Two variables that foreshadowed a consociational revival were the 2005 more or less representative elections and the formation of a first coalition cabinet emancipated from Syrian hegemony. These turnabouts have reactivated to a certain extent the devices of coalition building, proportional representation, and communal veto-powers. Indeed, before the 2005 electoral breaking point, it is vain to speak of a power-sharing revival even at the peak of the Independence Uprising, for consociational democracy needed foremost institutional devices to take shape.139 While distinct consociational traits existed during the post-war period, they remained loosely institutionalized and mostly debilitated.140 The impact of Lebanon’s free elections on the power-sharing formula After the standstill which threatened to defer elections, the formation of an interim cabinet, which promised to implement the opposition’s wishes, contributed to appeasing bipolar tensions. The cabinet first provided a platform where loyal and opposition figures were able to redefine their alliances and launch a dialogue on contentious issues.141 What mostly softened the prevailing polarity was the new government’s neutrality,142 and both groupings’ realization that their unwavering determination was about to degenerate into a timeconsuming stalemate. The 2005 polls and the formation of a post-war parliament relatively free of Syrian clutches should be perceived as introductory steps towards restoring the precarious stability among Lebanese political groupings. In fact, satisfactory representation in power-sharing organs and identification with the power-sharing 139 140

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Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 25. I remind the reader that although segmental autonomy had been more or less preserved in the post-war period, major deformations occurred at the level of grand coalitions and mutual vetopowers. In addition, whereas numerical proportionality was preserved in parliaments and cabinets, this power-sharing device failed to represent the diversity of communal orientations. See Zeina Abu Risk “Political Forces Face Possible ‘Redeployment’,” The Daily Star, April, 22, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=14483&cat_ID=2. Still, the interim cabinet was caught in the trap of political squabbling. Although bomb blasts had not abated, the government was, for instance, unable to reach a consensus on the nomination of a new successor to outgoing security chief Jamil el Sayyed, namely because of disputes over confessional identity. While president Lahoud demanded that the successor of outgoing security chief be either Maronite or Greek Orthodox, Hezbollah argued that the post should be given to a Shiite. See “La nomination d’un successeur à Jamil Sayyed se heurte à l’écueil confessionnel,” L’Orient Le Jour, April 29, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour. com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet2. htm.

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formula constitute major requisites for communal segmentation under a consociational umbrella.143 The electoral victory of a multi-confessional coalition – in which the Sunni, Christian and Druze communities jointly deliberated – indicated the revival of Lebanon’s wilful politics of accommodation. The return of the Christian community to the political landscape with the inclusion of Aoun’s Free Patriotic Current, the Qornet Shehwan Gathering and the Lebanese Forces in the parliament, might additionally play a positive role in restructuring the leader-follower relations in the Christian community.144 Aoun’s victory in Mount Lebanon, for example, was interpreted as a proof of the Maronite community’s determination to regain a strong leadership just like other segments which had enjoyed more or less satisfactory leader-follower relations during the post-war period.145 Moreover, their doubtful character notwithstanding, the transcommunal electoral alliances that rival politicians stroke before the polls146 denoted the decrease of animosities bred by the war. These alliances albeit transitory have contributed to softening mutual hostility before the elections and to creating preliminary crosscutting pressures.147 The declining influence of pro-Syrian parties, such as the Syrian Socialist National Party and the Baath Party, which played an important political function in the 1990s, revealed that Syria’s influence was decreasing, and that alternative power-sharing lineages were emerging.

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For more information on the importance of communal segmentation in the power-sharing system, see Pappalardo, “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy,” 369. For example, the Maronite League praised Aoun’s return and Geagea’s release as fundamental steps towards national reconciliation. See “Pas de retour en arrière, avertit la ligue maronite,” L’Orient Le Jour, May 20, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com.lb/aujourdhui/politique/ Polsujet10. While the Sunni community gained a distinct leadership with Hariri’s accession to power in 1992, the Druze community has identified during the post-war period with Jumblatt’s clan. The Shiite community was to some extent satisfied with the rising power of the Hezbollah-Amal establishment since 1992. A deep void was mostly evident in the Christian community. An example is the Lebanese Forces’ alliance with Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party and Hariri’s Future Movement. Patching up a substantial rift within the Christian community, the Lebanese Forces attended for the first time in May 2005 the meetings of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering. For instance, the pre-electoral visit made by Aoun to war foe Geagea in prison, after which the Free Patriotic Movement’s leader called for the release of his former rival, was an important symbol of post-war reconciliation. This visit has helped promote temporarily a more coherent image of the Maronite community accused of falling prey to inner fractures. See “les ennemis d’hier se rencontrent pendant plus d’une heure à Yarzé...” L’Orient Le Jour, May 20, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com.lb/hier/politique/polsujet1.htm.

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The Saniora cabinet and the politics of dialogue Although the Saniora cabinet has not performed well in terms of elite coalescence, it has allowed the partial reestablishment of some key traits of Lebanese consociationalism, namely collegiality and bargaining at the executive level, and to a certain degree the negative minority rule. Hence, in spite of its troublesome birth, the cabinet accomplished three main breakthroughs. First, it was able to rise above the debate of a ‘transitional majoritarian cabinet’ endorsed at first by the anti-Syrian cabinet.148 By encompassing major segments and almost all significant political currents at the risk of political standstill, it paved the way for a collegial forum of bargaining. The cabinet’s second major achievement was Hezbollah’s integration in post-war coalition cabinets for the first time. Third, ensuing disputes between the anti-Syrian coalition and the Shiite ministers in the cabinet – concerning the demilitarization of Hezbollah, and the convening of an international tribunal to try Hariri’s assassins – suggested on the one hand the shortcomings of consensual politics, but signalled on the other hand the communities’ recuperation of their veto-powers at the executive level. Hence, in winter 2005, the four-week withdrawal of Shiite ministers from the cabinet indicated a clear discontent with the power-sharing game, but it also evoked the segment’s regaining of its concurrent majority rule. The Shiites’ use of their “mutual negative”149 was tantamount to a political shelter which allowed them to place their interests under their own guardianship far from the political majority’s grip. An additional significant project which saw the light after the formation of the Saniora cabinet was the launching in March 2006 of a long-term national dialogue conference in order to patch up the 8 March/14 March rifts. This crosssegmental dialogue, in which 14 communal representatives participated, has allowed political groupings to tackle peacefully hotbed issues. In order to limit bickering, participating parties have agreed to a ‘pact of honor’ which forbids the use of offensive political rhetoric. In spite of various drawbacks, the national

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Before its establishment, an important debate arose as to whether a cabinet with majority rule, able to transcend the tyranny of the minority, would not be more efficient in dealing with Lebanon’s problems during the transitional phase. Although such an alternative could have facilitated decision-making, its application would have substantially endangered inter-communal cooperation, and would have alienated the dissatisfied pro-Syrian coalition. On a more technical level, it would have replaced the variable of consensus with a seemingly harmonious concordance, and would have downplayed the principle of competition, a vital trait in powersharing democracies. For more details on dangers of a majority rule in the grand coalition, see Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 51. This term has been used by John C. Calhoun. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 37.

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dialogue conference has enabled the pact of consensus to keep going the moment the external load on the system critically increased.150 Demystifying the 2005 power-sharing revival Despite these indicators of consociational revival, it is ambitious to affirm that Lebanon has re-entered a stable phase of deliberative consociationalism. The new complex power-sharing arrangements are still flawed and threatened by eventual dangers. The most important drawbacks that hinder power-sharing from ripening at this stage can be traced back to a weak power-sharing institutionalism, to lingering elite discord, and to a fragile consensus around the fundamentals of the ‘post-Syrian Republic.’ Moreover, the sustaining conditions for power-sharing remain by and large impaired: non-alignment, and the communities’ satisfaction with the national formula. A volatile elite coalescence, a fragile communal segmentation, and Lebanon’s fragile standing in the Middle Eastern arena are thus set to influence momentously the small republic’s power-sharing future. In addition to these constrictive factors, several reservations hover over the Lebanese vision of consociationalism. These reservations are linked to the association of power-sharing with political confessionalism, and to the uneasy relationship of Lebanon’s consociational vision with deconfessionalization and with Arabness. Consociation in difficulty: shaky patterns of elite accommodation Pre-electoral period: Political wrangling and erosion of the broad opposition “The end of tutelage has disoriented certain politicians who, habituated to receive orders, have dislearned how to act autonomously and independently ...”151 150

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Even at the darkest hours of the July War, Hezbollah and the Lebanese government clashed only mildly at the political level. As soon as fighting between the Israeli army and Hezbollah came to a halt in mid-August 2006, the government reiterated its call for internal dialogue with the Shiite party. The determination to stick to consensus has helped the government not to collapse under its own weight in the face of external aggressions. For more information on Patriarch Sfeir’s commentary on the loyalist/opposition cracks and the political feuds within the opposition as well as within the Christian factions before the elections, see “Réunion extraordinaire, ce matin, de l’Assemblée des évêques maronites... ” L’Orient Le

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In the run-up to the 2005 elections, a general feeling of disenchantment with the broad opposition and a bitter conviction that confessionalism has outdistanced overarching loyalties prevailed. The protruding fissures within the opposition that came to the forefront right before the polls denoted the fragility of national agreements once particularistic interests were at stake. The Bristol Alliance’s solidarity was mainly undermined by feuds over the division of seats in the upcoming legislature, and the redesigning of the sectarian landscape after Syria’s departure. A flagrant case of pre-electoral dissonance was the political divorce between the Free Patriotic Current and the Bristol Alliance, which led to the partial disintegration of the broad transcommunal opposition. Although the two blocs sealed a harmonious union at the climax of the Independence Intifada, they parted right before the polls.152 This has led groupings – formerly coalescent in the broad anti-Syrian coalition – to compete against each other in one of the key electoral battles in Mount Lebanon.153 The fractionalization of the broad alliance as well as the presumed pragmatic dealmaking between some opposition and loyalist blocs before election day154 did not only prevent in one way or another the adoption of a new electoral law, but also foreshadowed the crack-up of the Bristol Coalition’s ambitious program of national reform.155 The failure of the Bristol Coalition to implement its ambitious program has had many negative repercussions on the alliance’s cohesiveness, one of which was the withdrawal of many disappointed personalities from the Qornet

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Jour, May 11, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour. com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujet7.htm. In spite of intensified meetings between FPM leader Aoun, Future Current’s head Hariri, and Druze leader Jumblatt, electoral alliances did not concretize. Spats increased particulalry between Aoun and Jumblatt. It was reported that the main cause behind this political wrangling was the fight over sectarian nominations in joint electoral lists. Whilst Jumblatt wanted Aoun to name only Christian candidates in joint lists, the FPM leader was keen on designating nominees from other confessions. These divergent viewpoints on the formation of electoral lists foreshadow future dividing lines between actors who want to maintain the confessional system and others who want to reform it. For more information on the opposition’s fragmentation before elections, See for example Majdoline Hatoum, “Lebanon’s Opposition Remain Divided over Election Alliances,” The Daily Star, May 24, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=15344 &categ_id=2. The fissures in the Christian camp drew sharp criticism from the Maronite bishops who condemned the transformation of the electoral platform into an arena for personal rivalries. I refer particularly to the suspected electoral deal that some members of the Bristol Coalition stroke with the Shiite establishment under the aegis of the 2000 electoral law in order to preserve their confessional power. A new and fair electoral law was one of the main demands of the December Declaration elaborated by the Bristol Coalition in 2004.

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Shehwan Gathering.156 The break-up of the Christian grouping in mid-May 2005 suggested that as soon as the unifying Syrian threat was no longer there, alliances tended to loosen.157 The 2005 electoral battle and its results: the Janus face of division The 2005 elections were filled with momentous hours of national cohesion. Paradoxically, these moments simultaneously carried the Janus face of division, and confirmed that Lebanon’s tomorrow would not be less sectarian. Thus, if the Lebanese elections were praised for restoring somewhat the power-sharing balance, they strengthened the stealthy influence of confessionalism. First, it is noteworthy that electoral discourses were impregnated with an insidious sectarian rhetoric.158 For instance, the discourse of the Future Current’s leader Hariri, in which he warned the Sunni community of upcoming dangers during his electoral campaign in the North, was criticized for its confessional undertones.159 It was also noted that Sunni religious leaders in the Northern battle relied very strongly on the power of denominational symbols to attract supporters for Hariri’s list.160 More generally, the electoral chessboard, which sought to consecrate national unity, called to mind the creeping Sunni-Shiite cleavage in post-Syrian Lebanon, the intra-Christian divergences, and confirmed that Lebanon’s polls remained a confrontation among religious groups rather than a competition of political programs. Highlighting the brittleness of cross-cutting links in the post-electoral landscape, less enthusiastic commentators on Lebanon’s polls warned that “sectarian cantonization could end wiping out common spaces among Lebanese.”161 Furthermore, fleeting electoral deals raised serious questions whether the politics of accommodation went further and deeper than electoral horse-trading. While Aoun’s surprising alliance with some pro-Syrian figures such as Michel 156

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After stating their deception with the gathering’s political performance, political actors Simon Karam, Dory Chamoun, Elias Abou Assi, Elie Karamé, Toufic Hindi, and Jean Aziz withdrew. See Nayla Assaf, “Key Qornet Shehwan Member Resigns,” The Daily Star, May 13, 2005, http://www. dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=15051&cat_ID=2. See for example Rita Boustani, “Politicians Divided over ‘Unifying’ Elections,” The Daily Star, June 21, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=16101&cat_ID=2. See “Zghorta, Batroun, Koura l’amertume des chrétiens,“ L’Hebdo Magazine, June 25, 2005, http://www. magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HId=&HIssueNum=2485&C. See Farid El Khazen, “Continuity and Change,” Media Monitors Network, August 6, 2005, http://usa.media monitors.net/content/view/full/17480. See for example Joseph Samaha, “Georges Hawi: al hayawiya al fayida,” Assafir, June 22, 2005, http://www. assafir.com/iso/today/front/160.html.

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Murr and Talal Arslane was decried as an attempt to revive Syrian tutelage, Jumblatt’s alliance and reconciliation with the Lebanese Forces in the Shuf as well as the Future Current’s reconciliation with the Christian party were taxed as unnatural and shallow.162 Another “bizarre alliance” was Hezbollah’s coalition on the electoral list in Baabda-Aley, one of the most contested constituencies, with a member of the Lebanese Forces, a party which was accused of cooperating with the Resistance’s fiercest enemy, Israel, during the civil war.163 In fact, no sooner did the shimmer of elections fade than electoral alliances faltered, and contention reemerged.164 A telling case was the breakdown of the ephemerical electoral alliance between the Progressive Socialist Party, the Future Current, and Hezbollah. Few months after the formation of the Saniora cabinet, a fierce row erupted between Jumblatt’s bloc and Hezbollah over the unfinished application of Resolution 1559 and the Party of God’s regional allegiances. The 2005 parliamentary alliances: fragmentation and discord The new legislature’s makeup and more specifically the division of the parliament into antagonistic political groupings contained the seeds of fragmentation, and were premonitory of elite discord. Even though the transcommunal opposition had gathered the majority of parliamentary seats, one should not overlook the fact that this majoritarian coalition was in fact monopolized by Hariri’s Future Current (36 seats) and Jumblatt’s Democratic Meeting (16 seats). To what extent the majoritarian alliance reflected the communities’ repartition in the power-sharing formula was disputable. At the risk of belittling these overarching alliances, the anti-Syrian coalition, which won the lion’s share, was a ‘Sunni-Druze-Christian’ alliance unable to forge cross-cutting links with the Shiite establishment and the dissident Aoun’s bloc. More importantly, the Sunni-Shiite cleavage was strengthened by the fault line crossing the parliament between the anti-Syrian coalition dominated by the Sunni-led Future Current, and the pro-Syrian bloc led by the Shiite establishment.

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See for example Suleiman Franjieh’s criticism in Leila Hatoum’s article, “Hezbollah Supports Lahoud’s Desire to Complete Remainder of his Mandate,” The Daily Star, June 16, 2005, http://www.dailystar. com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=15971&cat_ID=2. Many observers doubted whether genuine reconciliation could happen in such a short time and especially during the electoral period. See Paul Khalife, “L’opposition se déchire aux législatives,” Radio France Internationale, May 28, 2005, available from http://www.rfi.fr. See Adnan El-Ghoul, “Inevitable Disputes Postponed until after the Elections,” The Daily Star, June 7, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=15709&cat_ID=2.

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Besides, the anti-Syrian opposition’s dominance did not imply that decisionmaking would be devoid of challenges. Electoral outcomes confirmed ‘the 8-14 March cleavage,’ and made the parliament hostage to the bipolar conflict line separating the anti-Syrian coalition and the loyalists. In the final analysis, although the presence of three major parliamentary blocs with different political trajectories – namely the anti-Syrian coalition, the Free Patriotic movement, and the loyalist faction – indicated diversity, it was nonetheless an augur of contention for the following reasons: The anti-Syrian opposition which occupied more than half of the seats (72 seats) and the loyalist establishment which also played a pivotal role (35 seats) had on some substantial matters – namely nation-building after Syrian departure – divergent views. The fact that the Free Patriotic Movement (21 seats) remained first at a distance from the 14 March and the 8 March alliances prevented, one the one hand, the balance from tipping in favor of one group, but on the other hand increased chances of discord and confrontation. Provided that the main groupings in the anti-Syrian opposition, namely the Future Current and Jumblatt’s parliamentary bloc, do not strike harmonious links with the loyalist establishment, the threat of rupture lurks on the horizon;165 The Free Patriotic Movement’s political options and alignments have impacted in various ways the electoral outcomes. In particular, as Aoun has reinforced his alliance after February 2006 with the loyalist establishment, the Christian establishment has splintered even more drastically; The division of the legislature into three asymmetric coalitions has thwarted political change. As agreement on core national issues failed, the parliamentary alliances blocked each other’s political programs. For example, as the Free Patriotic Current and the Shiite establishment questioned the opposition’s call for President Lahoud’s resignation, the anti-Syrian coalition’s plea for a radical cleansing of the old system could not be implemented; An analysis of the anti-Syrian coalition’s electoral lists allows one to deduce that the 14 March Alliance led by Saad Hariri constructed the concept of ‘transcommunalism’ on the basis of multi-confessional pooling. To state it otherwise, whereas Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement proposed to go beyond confessional cleavages and attract supporters irrespective of confessional affiliations, the 14 March Front remained in one way or another a loose

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See “61 nouveaux venus, 11 blocs, 15 formations, nouvelle donne place de l’Etoile,” L’Hebdo Magazine, June 25, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex= 0&HId=&HIssueNum=2485C.

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agglomeration of breakable confessional groups which failed to cross sectarian lines.166 Executive power-sharing at risk: sharing political spaces through coercive consensus The difficult genesis of the Saniora cabinet, disputes over ministerial portfolios as well as squabbles revolving around its composition167 suggested that consensus among the different governmental factions would be conflict-laden. Eager to impose its political agenda, the winning alliance found itself at odds with other major reluctant political players, particularly the Amal-Hezbollah coalition in the cabinet, the Free Patriotic Movement in the new opposition, and President Lahoud. First, the Free Patriotic Movement’s decision not to participate in the Saniora government detracted from the cabinet’s representative character.168 In addition, minorities, such as the Armenian and Greek Catholic communities, expressed their resentment towards the new government which did not embody all segments’ aspirations.169 In short, returning to a balanced consociationalism, in which all political and communal parties are satisfactorily and fairly represented, turned out to be a troublesome process: the challenge was how to create a national union cabinet that was neither monolithic nor prone to polarization, a perspective that remained out of reach. Although the new coalition cabinet was much more comprehensive than any other previous post-war ministerial team, many problems loomed. First, no sooner did the cabinet assume its functions than political squabbling reemerged. Bickering in the executive over the appointment of top security and justice officials, despite continued bomb blasts in 2005, revealed that

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The fact that the Democratic Left and the Democratic Renewal Party led by Maronite politician Nassib Lahoud got each only one seat in the new parliament demonstrated the weakness of parties based on secular links. Whether or not the anti-Syrian majoritarian alliance should have two-thirds of the ministerial seats in the cabinet. Aoun argued that the new ministerial team did not represent the majority, and warned that Lebanon should not be ruled as “a joint stock company.” See “A ‘Homogeneous Team’ Saniora: A Cabinet to Confront the Challenges,” Monday Morning, July 27, 2005, available from http://www.mmorning.com. The loyalist Tachnag Party that did not participate in the Saniora government expressed its disappointment with the new cabinet. Moreover, the Orthodox Armenians’ executive council issued a communiqué in which it deplored the underrepresentation of the Armenian community in the cabinet. On the other hand, the Superior Melkite Council in presence of the Greek Catholic patriarch Gregory III expressed its reservations about the allocation of ministerial portfolios.

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immobilism at the decision-making level had deepened national security breaches.170 More importantly, the quadripartite cabinet alliance between Hariri’s Future Current, Jumblatt’s Democratic Gathering and the two loyalist parties Amal and Hezbollah looked like a forced ‘marriage of convenience’ as the governmental factions had ostensibly no common political vision for Lebanon’s future. The mere presence of eight pro-Syrian ministers known to be close to President Lahoud and to the Amal-Shiite establishment called to mind that national lines of division would sooner or later polarize the ministerial body. The lack of allusion to Resolution 1559 and to the problem of the Palestinian refugees in the ministerial declaration revealed that the unlikely allies had agreed to postpone temporarily inevitable disagreements. Indeed, once external pressure on the system increased, latent divisive issues which had been brushed aside for the sake of the elections were restimulated. 171 Main contentious issues revolved around the international community’s role in national politics, Hezbollah’s disarmament, the strained relations with Syria as well as the controversial international probe into Hariri’s slaying. Early October 2005, the first signs of discontent were sent by the Shiite ministers after the cabinet had approved in its weekly meeting a plan to seek foreign assistance so as to help Lebanon’s security apparatus deal with the series of blasts. The dissident ministers warned against America’s dubious role in the country and against the procedure of majority vote when it comes to dealing with strategic and national choices.172

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Premier Saniora and president Lahoud had sharp divergences about the appointment of security officials. The politicians’s delaying of appointments to accommodate confessions at a time when Lebanon was in dire need of a new security crew reflects the system’s inability to react to new situations. Finally, beginning October 2005, the government filled key security positions after it came under increasing pressure for failing to deal with the strings of bombings. US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice’s visit right after the formation of the cabinet – an apparently harmless diplomatic visit during which she praised the new ministerial team and its policy – was premonitory of the upcoming power-sharing struggle between the loyalist establishment and the anti-Syrian alliance eager to respect its commitments to the international community. During her short stay, Rice reminded Saniora of the necessity of implementing the unfinished clauses of Resolution 1559. Hezbollah minister Mohammad Fnaish argued that certain conflicts could not be regulated by majority voting in the cabinet, since the country rested on a precarious equilibrium that required consensus among all factions. See Michel Touma, “Pris à son propre piège du principe consensuel,” L’Orient Le Jour, October 3, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page.,aspx?page= article&id=295642&pf=1.

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A major event that foreshadowed the mounting political crisis was the Shiite ministers’ walkout in the middle of a stormy session in protest of the government’s reactions to Syrian President’s explosive speech in November.173 The Shiite ministers’ walkout On December 12, 2005, objecting to the decision taken by majority vote rather than consensus on establishing an international court to deal with Hariri’s case and on expanding the UN probe to other assassinations, five Shiite ministers suspended their participation in the cabinet for six weeks. The Amal-Hezbollah coalition that remained deeply aligned with Damascus’ strategic options argued that the Saniora cabinet was seeking to place Lebanon under Western tutelage. This dramatic walkout has thrust many dormant issues regarding powersharing practices and national stances into the limelight. First, the Shiite ministers’ insistence on a guarantee that consensus should only be used in the future rather than majority vote to decide on contentious issues was met with disapproval by other groupings, which argued that the cabinet should resort to majority rule when crucial issues relating to Lebanon’s security and to the citizens’ safety were at stake. The Shiite establishment mainly resented the winning alliance’s plan to impose its political program to the detriment of minority factions in the cabinet. What added fuel to the fire were Hezbollah’s rising suspicions that the antiSyrian alliance was not committed enough to defend the Resistance’s military wing. Wary of the Saniora government’s hazy statement concerning the party’s military wing,174 the Shiite faction needed reassurance that even if foreign pressure to apply the resolution increased, the cabinet would not relinquish solidarity with the Shiite faction.175 Hence, in order to quell the Shiite establishment’s fears, the government was asked to restate the ministerial declaration on Resolution 1559. Other sources argued that the main source of conflict behind the ministerial crisis was neither the controversy around consensus nor disarmament but the

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The anti-Syrian majoritarian alliance fiercely criticized president Bashar’s speech in which he called premier Saniora “the slave of his masters,” and accused Lebanon of becoming a passageway for conspiracies against Syria. Concerning Hezbollah’s demilitarization, the government declared that Lebanon could not afford to confront international community, and called for disarmament through an internal national dialogue. See Zeina Abu Risk, “Hezbollah’s Crisis of Confidence,” The Daily Star, November 25, 2005, http://www. dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=20296&cat_ID=2.

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Shiite ministers’ attempt to restrict the scope of the UN mission regarding the Hariri case in Syria and Lebanon.176 As the year 2005 was drawing to a close, the reinforcing ‘8-14 March cleavage’ threatened to polarize further the two contending blocs despite regional and Lebanese mediation efforts. President Lahoud’s decision not to attend any cabinet meeting as long as Shiite ministers did not rejoin the government additionally exacerbated the crisis. By the end of December, speculation prevailed that the new cabinet might dissolve in case stalemate lingered. Indeed, as the Saniora government rejected a proposal submitted by the Shiite establishment to legalize the Party of God’s military wing,177 attempts to reunite the fragmented cabinet faltered. Whereas the 14 March factions interpreted the undisguised legalization of Hezbollah’s military status as another “Cairo pact” which could lead to the establishment of a state within a state, the Party of God – which insisted on the legal character of the Resistance as long as the South was not entirely free – accused the new premier of concocting a Lebanese “Camp David” by bowing to the international community’s demands.178 This spat clearly shows that Lebanon’s inability to disentangle itself from external interferences and particularly from the Middle Eastern conflict has a negative bearing on elite coalescence, and on the communities’ identification with the power-sharing formula. As the unlikely allies started drifting apart in the cabinet, the anti-Syrian coalition expressed concerns whether the Shiite leadership had decided to relegate its national consciousness in favor of broader regional loyalties and more specifically pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian allegiances.179 In response to these accusations, Hezbollah argued that as long as irrefutable evidence on Syria’s involvement in Hariri’s slaying was not

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See Walid Choucair, “Shiite Boycott Has Nothing to Do with Demand for Consensus,” The Daily Star, January 3, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=20296&cat_ ID=2. The anti-Syrian majoritarian alliance turned down a project submitted by the Shiite establishment to regulate the conflict. In this document, Hezbollah demanded the legalization of its military wing in the South, and officially asked for the cabinet’s pledge to decline any international sanctions against Syria. After the failure of negotiations, Hezbollah threatened to withdraw from the cabinet. See “La crise des ministres chiites dans l’impasse,” L’Orient Le Jour, December 12, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page.aspx?page=article&id= 302388&pf=1. See “Le Hezbollah accuse le premier ministre de vouloir conclure un ‘camp David Libanais’,” L’Orient Le Jour, December 30, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page.aspx?page=article &id=302641&pf=1. See Michel Touma, “Le leadership chiite face à un choix stratégique: La Libanisation ou la SyroIranisation,” L’Orient Le Jour, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page.aspx?page=article&id =299097&pf=1.

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submitted by the UN probe, pro-Syrian stances were not detrimental to Lebanon’s status. Beginning 2006, Speaker Berri and Future Current leader Hariri set about regional talks in Saudi Arabia to defuse the crisis.180 For a while, it seemed that the ministerial deadlock had come to an end as Shiite ministers declared their willingness to suspend the boycott in January. Yet, disrupting the fragile truce, Druze leader Jumblatt launched a scorching attack against the Shiite coalition. Insisting that the departing ministers needed to justify the reason for their boycott before they returned to the cabinet, he also demanded justifications regarding the reasons why Hezbollah wanted to retain its arms and requested that the party defined its loyalties: “to those who hold the rifle today we say, ‘thank you, the South is free,’ to whom is your allegiance now, Lebanon or other countries?”181 Advancing that the Shebaa farms were not Lebanese, Jumblatt underlined that the Shiite political agenda was keeping Lebanon hostage to the Syrian-Iranian objectives, objectives that went far beyond Lebanon. This confrontational stance degenerated into a political dispute between the former electoral allies, the Progressive Socialist Party and Hezbollah, over the role of the Resistance and its presumable intention to implicate Lebanon in the so-called Syrian-Iranian axis. Finally, in the wake of Saudi mediation and conciliatory talks facilitated by speaker Berri and the Free Patriotic Movement, the Shiite ministers announced that they would return to the cabinet if the government officially agreed not to refer to the Resistance as a ‘militia.’ Beginning February 2006, in a parliamentary session set to unwind tensions, premier Saniora solemnly declared that Hezbollah’s military wing was and would never be called anything but a ‘Resistance.’ It was reported that this acknowledgment, which remained within the scope of state policy and which did not involve any confrontation with the international community, had temporarily soothed the Shiite establishment’s fears.182 180

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Both leaders informally agreed on the necessity of holding a round-table national dialogue to discuss pending contentious issues. Second, they alluded to the necessity of demarcating the borders between Syria and Lebanon to prove that the Shebaa farms were Lebanese and to legalize the Resistance’s status. Majdoline Hatoum, “Jumblatt Questions Hezbollah’s Allegiance,” The Daily Star, January 10, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=21345&cat_ID=2. There was a widespread belief, however, that the real reason behind their comeback was not premier Saniora’s acknowledgment, which fell short of an official legalization of their status, but rather their willingness to participate in the decision-making progress as the government started discussing the form and scope of the court designed to try the perpetrators of the crime. See Walid Choucair, “The Shiites’ Return to Cabinet Ends a Period of Political Deterioration,” The Daily Star, February 4, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable. asp?art_ID=21954&cat

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This happy end to a seven-week battling has proven to be misleading as the cabinet once again agreed to procrastinate a final showdown with dissenting internal factions and with the international community. The cabinet also failed to tackle decisively a basic question at the heart of power-sharing mechanisms: if fundamental issues in the cabinet arise in the future, will a two-thirds majority be required to evade the grid of deadlock or has consensus become the rule?183 President Lahoud’s isolation and its repercussions on the power-sharing arrangement (2005-2006) An important factor that has negatively influenced Lebanon’s coalitional politics is President Lahoud’s domestic and international confinement since his reelection in September 2004. Whereas the country’s balance of power should theoretically derive from a symbiotic pact between a president, a premier, and a parliament speaker respectively from the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite communities, the presidential quarantine in the wake of the Independence Uprising has undermined this consociational practice. Lahoud’s isolation is best illustrated by the breakdown of communication between the president himself and the parliamentarian majority, segments of the population, and the international community.184 Since February 2005, popular calls for the president’s resignation and the anti-Syrian coalition’s insistence that Lahoud should step down,185 had not borne any fruits. Although the president’s legitimacy was clearly at stake, especially after the anti-Syrian opposition had overtly accused him of being part of the lingering political crisis after Hariri’s slaying, Lahoud insisted that he would carry out his mandate to the very end.186 Despite increasing signs of isolation,187

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_ID=2. After the July War, the same disputes hinging on decision-making within the cabinet, the international court set to try the perpetrators, international meddling and the Saniora cabinet’s so-called ‘pro-Western’ political line, reemerged in Fall 2006 leading to the withdrawal of the Shiite ministers from the government, and to the paralysis of political life. Major Western diplomats who visited Lebanon met with premier Saniora and with other Lebanese leaders, but ignored president Lahoud. A notable example was Romania’s refusal to invite Lahoud to the Francophone Summit in 2006. In spring 2005, for instance, Jumblatt called for Lahoud’s resignation in an interview on Al Jazeera television, and emphasized that the president was no longer indispensable to the country. See Nada Raad and Nayla Assaf “Opposition Will Accept ‘Neutral’ Cabinet,” The Daily Star, March, 2, 2005, http://www.dailystar. com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=3091&cat_ID=2. See Nada Raad, “Opposition Insists Lahoud Is an Obstacle to Change,” The Daily Star, March 14, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=13412&cat_ID=2. Before the 2005 polls, the parliament rejected a letter that president Lahoud sent in order to condemn the 2000 electoral law, and in which he called for the elaboration of a new law which

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Lahoud hoped that once the new 2005 parliament was formed, loyalist blocks would impede any amendment to his mandate.188 Right after the 2005 polls that were overshadowed by two politically motivated slayings, a majoritarian parliamentary coalition, asked in an unprecedented show of solidarity for the president’s destitution, and affirmed that his reelection in September 2004 was the starting point of all political massacres. Yet, the Free Patriotic Current and the loyalist establishment blocked the initiative. The president came under intensifying pressure to abdicate after the release of the first Mehlis Report, which referred to Lahoud’s shady involvement in Hariri’s slaying.189 Yet, once again, denying any wrongdoing, the president pledged to remain in office till his term expired. By the end of 2005, in spite of the Maronite Bishops’ plea that the controversy shrouding the presidential issue should be solved,190 political factions agreed to postpone temporarily the contention over Lahoud’s presidency as the UN probe had not reached any final conclusions, and as consensus on the matter ostensibly lacked. This has, however, not prevented some segments of the Lebanese population and the anti-Syrian opposition from calling on various occasions for the president’s resignation. For example, in the second Intifada for Independence in 2006, which commemorated Hariri’s slaying, it was reported that more than one million demonstrators demanded the president’s abdication. The 14 March poles affirmed that Lebanon’s independence would not be fully recovered unless the president stepped down.191 Yet, the anti-Syrian alliance’s insistence to dislodge the president “through legal and pacific methods” fell on deaf ears.192

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did not truncate communal representation. The deputies argued that Lahoud was protesting against a law which he contributed to its adoption in 2000. The presidential letter was finally sent back to its sender. See “Le parlement renvoie la lettre d’Emile Lahoud à son expéditeur,” L’Orient Le Jour, May 9, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ hier/politique/polsujetw2.htm. See “Eviction-même la pression de la rue n’y suffirait pas... ” L’Orient Le Jour, June 9, 2005, http://www. lorientlejour.com/aujourdhui/politique/polsujetw2.htm. Parliamentarians criticized Lahoud for seeking to influence the judiciary by defending suspect Mustafa Hamdane, the chief of the presidential guard. Lahoud argued that Hamdane was one of his best army officers. Formerly close, the Maronite Bishops distanced themselves from the President. Their council issued a statement calling for ending confusion on the subject. See Rym Ghazal, “Demonstrators Throng Beirut, Calling for Lahoud’s Resignation,” The Daily Star, February 15, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=22220&cat_ID=2. The anti-Syrian coalition (76 seats) was in need of at least 86 seats to reamend the constitution and force the demise of the president. Loyalist factions refused to respond to the winning coalition’s plea to force Lahoud’s destitution, and accused the anti-Syrian alliance of lacking a political vision and a future plan to fill in the political void that might ensue.

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This complete divorce between one of the executive poles and other pillars of the power-sharing balance opened significant breaches in the consociational formula. It mainly impaired the primary device of consociationalism described as “power-sharing of executive power,”193 and undermined the principle of a coalescent leadership. Lahoud’s second mandate has also thrust the state of polarity in post-Syrian political institutions and the incompatibility of the 14 March Alliance’s vision with other factions into the limelight. Throughout 2006, political impasse has reigned between the president and the anti-Syrian alliance as well as with premier Saniora. Although Lahoud has declared on various occasions his readiness to dialogue with other parties, the winning alliance, which considered him as an old vestige of the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus, was keen on snubbing him. The issue of the presidency additionally highlighted deep intra-Maronite cracks, which had intensified since the renewal of the president’s term. While Maronite groups, such as Patriarch Sfeir and the Qornet Shehwan Grouping advocated the President’s demise through pacifist means, Maronite leader Aoun refused to ally with other poles to press for Lahoud’s destitution. The faltering national dialogue: a wavering consociation “If the cleavages and mutual antagonisms are insurmountable not only at the mass level but also at the elite level, attempts at consociational democracy are likely to founder.”194 In the post-Syrian era, an important landmark that characterized Lebanon’s consociationalism was the elites’ historical decision to resort to a national dialogue in order to defuse inter-elite tensions on Hezbollah’s disarmament, Resolution 1559, the nature of new relations with Syria, and the future prospects for the Lebanese system. However, whilst the national conference bred many expectations at the beginning, it has failed to reach any tangible results. An illustrative example, which showed that the political dream of ‘transcommunalism’ has withered, was the second Intifada for Independence in February 2006. Reflecting protruding rather than decreasing political divisions, the second commemoration of Hariri’s slaying proved that the 2005 intercommunal opening had lost ground, and had been downsized primarily because of political squabbling. Thus, the main organizers of the national demonstration 193 194

Expression used by Lijphart in “The Wave of Power-Sharing,” 39. Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems,” 23.

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were reduced to the Future Current, the Lebanese Forces, and the Progressive Socialist Party, whereas other parties such as Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Current refused to join the rally under the pretext that Hariri’s slaying had been politicized. These political divides and realignments have strongly impacted the national dialogue’s course and outcomes. In the first round-table discussions that started in March 2006 and ended in July 2006 with the outbreak of the 34-day war, political groupings were unable to reach any agreement on contentious matters. On May 16, for instance, in spite of several reservations, the file of the Lahoud’s presidency was declared as closed. Regarding Hezbollah’s military wing, actors agreed on the elaboration of a ‘national defence strategy’ against Israel that would specify the party’s military mission, objectives, and scope, yet the extremely slow negotiations remained prey to internal divisions. Whereas some political factions described Hezbollah’s military wing as a legal resistance, other actors close to the 14 March Movement blamed the party for its doubtful alliances.195 After five months of national bargaining, the scant results of the dialogue show that the national conference could be labelled more as low-intensity conflict-regulation than a real example of elite accommodation. The incapacity of the national dialogue to reach settlements in an optimal timing has attracted attention to the tediousness of consensual discussions, and has proven the fears that Lebanon’s model of concordance could stagnate into a state of selfperpetuating dialogue without arbitrative mechanisms. Fear was also voiced that a permanent national dialogue would overshadow power-sharing institutions such as the cabinet.196 The first phase of national dialogue has also demonstrated that the necessity to reach consensus in round-table discussions bestows upon every negotiating broker the luxury of an unchecked veto. For instance, it was noted that Hezbollah has used its veto powers during spring 2006 to obstruct settlement concerning its military wing and the demarcation of borders with Syria.197 Because of political and regional concerns, the party fears that the 14 March Alliance would succumb 195

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The 14 March Alliance suspects that Hezbollah’s determination to keep its weapons makes of the Lebanese South a double-edged sword which could be exploited on the one hand as an arena to sustain the Palestinian plight and on the other hand as a trump card used by Syria to regain the Golan Heights. Nada Bakri, “‘Permanent National Dialogue Can Eclipse Cabinet, Parliament’,” The Daily Star, July 5, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=73702 &categ_id=2. For more details, see Reinoud Leenders, “How UN Pressure on Hizballah Impedes Lebanese Reform,” Middle East Report Online, May 23, 2006, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052306. html.

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to the international community’s demands, undercut the goals of the Resistance, and draw Lebanon into the Western orbit of guardianship. The July War and its effects on the national politics of consensus On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers along the Lebanese-Israeli border led to the outbreak of a large-scale war in Southern Lebanon which resulted in the destruction of the Lebanese infrastructure and the death of 1500 Lebanese civilians and 160 Israelis. Israel’s asymmetric retaliation to Hezbollah’s seizure of the two soldiers, 198 commonly described as the method of collective punishment, had the visible objectives of enforcing a rash application of Resolution 1559, and bringing about a Lebanese consensus around the dismantling of Hezbollah’s armed wing by causing nationwide destructions even in Christian areas. Violent confrontations which ended with an UN-brokered cease fire preceded by the adoption of Resolution 1701199 had numerous repercussions on Lebanon’s national dialogue and politics of accommodation. Even though political groupings chose not to display openly their divergences during the 34-day war in fear of internal strife, no sooner did the fighting abate than Lebanon’s consociational formula of endurance turned into a formula of division. First, the large-scale escalation brutally interrupted the first-phased process of internal dialogue which, despite its slowness, has been utterly superseded by regional violence. Although the groupings agreed to resume dialogue once hostilities on Lebanese ground had come to a halt, the bipolar rift between the ‘14 March’ and the ‘8 March’ groups became deeper in the wake of the episode. The end of the Summer of Rage has been overshadowed with rising political confrontations between the 14 March Alliance and Hezbollah joined by the Free Patriotic Current. Pending questions revolved around possible changes in the national balance of power.200

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For more details on Israel’s assymetric retaliation, see for example Georges Corm, “Erkennt die wahren Zusammenhänge,” Internationale Politik (September 2006): 75-81, 79; Pat Lancaster “Editorial Comment,” The Middle East, August/September 2006, 5. Resolution 1701 – approved on August 11 after a long international silence – called for a ceasefire, for the disarming of Hezbollah, for the withdrawal of Israel, for the deployment of Lebanese forces to the South and for the formation of a large United Nations Interim Force to guarantee a truce in the region. See “Affrontements politiques au Liban sur l’issue de la guerre,” Le Monde, September 12, 2006, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-734511,36-812116@51-759824,0.html.

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Strengthened in the internal and regional realms after the July war, Hezbollah, which was able to withstand the deadly Israeli offensive, claimed during a victory rally in September to have achieved a historical and divine triumph. During this event which gathered tens of thousands, the party overtly called for the resignation of the Saniora government and for the formation of a more solid national unity government able to confront external threats.201 Hezbollah’s call for a restructuring of political alignments in ‘post-Syrian Lebanon’ indicated that the party would sooner or later claim supplementary political gains for its regional triumph.202 Two days after Hezbollah’s gathering, the Lebanese Forces staged a counterrally in the Maronite area of Harissa in which they called for Hezbollah’s demilitarization, and revoked the party’s calls for a government change. This confrontation – reminiscent of the 8 and 14 March protests in 2005 – has shown that Hezbollah’s arsenal was about to become a major political fault line. Hence, whereas Hezbollah affirmed that it had not expected such a reprisal after the two soldiers’ kidnapping,203 the March 14 Alliance has expressed reservations about Hezbollah’s unilateral foreign policy and its right to decide on issues of war and peace in Lebanon. In fact, the inability of the Lebanese government to raise a finger in the course of the military conflict led to the prevalent assumption that an authoritative center of gravity in Lebanon was nonexistent,204 and that sharing fragmentation rather than power described at best Lebanon’s politics. From a retrospective angle, the July War shows that the process of national discussion between Hezbollah and the majoritarian alliance could be better described as a case of incommunicability than a case of genuine dialogue.205 201

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See Nada Bakri, “Hundred of Thousands Show up for ‘Victory Rally’,” September 23, 2005, The Daily Star, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=75664&categ_id=2. See “Post-War Lebanese Politics-The Perils of Breaking the Deadlock,” Strategic Comments 12, September 26, 2006, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume12---2006/volume-12--issue-7/post-war-lebanese-politics. On August 27, 2006, leader Nasrallah admitted that the party did not anticipate such a response. See “Post-War Lebanese Politics-The Perils of Breaking the Deadlock,” Strategic Comments. It is reported that some foreign diplomats have also certified Hezbollah’s claim. See for example “An Era of International Supervision,” Monday Morning, September 9, 2006, available from http://www.mmorning.com. During the 2006 July War, it was popular to depict the absence of the Lebanese state by describing Hezbollah as a state within a larger Iranian state. Right after the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers, the Lebanese government declared that it had not been informed of Hezbollah’s plan. Although the Saniora cabinet intended to assure Israel through this declaration that the Lebanese state was not waging an act of aggression against its neighbor, the governmental statement indicated the breakdown of communication between Hezbollah and the government.

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While the Party of God considers its arsenal as the only guarantee against the assailment of the frail Lebanese Republic, the 14 March Alliance regards the party’s military wing as a source of dissension and internal weakness. In fact, a statement released by the March 14 Movement claimed that Hezbollah’s artillery transformed Lebanon into “a battleground used by Iran to improve its bargaining position with the international community and by the Syrian regime to exercise its hegemony over Lebanon.”206 Doubtful of the party’s regional and political agenda, the 14 March Alliance has questioned Hezbollah’s confrontational methods, intransigence on the subject of its arms, as well as its attempt to hijack the national dialogue process. Anti-Syrian actors have also cast doubt upon the building of a post-Syrian Lebanese state with “a statelet within its midst,”207 the nature of the party’s relations with Syria, and its belief in a victory against Israel.208 While Hezbollah considers itself to be the winner against Israel, opposing factions have themselves claimed victory because the Summer of Rage has been followed by the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South and the UN peacekeeping mission.209 These political clashes disclosed a deeper national fission on how post-Syrian Lebanon would look like, and confirmed that the national consensus bred by the 2005 elections remained flimsy. On a national level, confrontations between the Shiite establishment allied to the Free Patriotic Movement and to President Lahoud on the one hand, and the Future Current allied to Jumblatt’s Progressive Party and to the anti-Syrian Christian opposition on the other hand, foretold that the bipolar model would not imminently fade away. Since the end of the Hezbollah-Israel war, the ailing Saniora government has faced the task of relaunching dialogue and patching up differences on Hezbollah’s demilitarization, the causes and consequences of the July War, and the rebuilding of a war-torn economy. Although the government has decreed the deployment of 15.000 Lebanese soldiers to the South, Hezbollah’s announcement that it will not disarm and that the war did not greatly harm its

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See “Lebanon after the War: Hezbollah’s New Offensive,” The Economist, September 16, 2006, 49-50, 49. Taken from LF leader Geagea’s speech after Nasrallah had declared victory against Israel in a rally on September 22, 2006. See “Geagea Scoffs at Hezbollah’s Claims of ‘Victory’,” The Daily Star, September 25, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id =2&article_id=75687. See “Le fossé se creuse rapidement entre le Hezbollah et les forces du 14 mars,” L’Orient Le Jour, September 25, 2006, http://www.lorientlejour.com.lb/page.aspx?page=article&id=322455. See “Geagea Scoffs at Hezbollah’s Claims of ‘Victory,” The Daily Star.

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military arsenal210 has raised many questions on Lebanon’s politics of elite accommodation. The increasing uncertainty over ways of sharing power – between the Shiite establishment, and the 14 March Alliance dominated by Hariri’s Future Current at this stage – augured not only a deep Shiite-Sunni cleavage, but the rise of an embattled consociation. From a theoretical point of view, the impasse reached by the national dialogue and the elites’ inability to agree on common perceptions hint at the inherent limitations of consociational models when foreign encumbrances and challenges become overriding. The question is how much one can expect from an overburdened consociation. How resilient are such systems on stormy seas?

Circumstantial political cleavages? The picture is nonetheless not that bleak. Political groupings’ attachment to dialogue in order to mend strenuous cleavages indicates a gradual – albeit extremely slow – conversion of divergent loyalties. Since the Syrian withdrawal, the different factions’ recourse to bargaining suggested that the ‘8-14 March’ cleavage might after all be transitory and of “external origin.”211 It might therefore – under more auspicious circumstances – subside without putting into question Lebanon’s national pact. The emergence of cross-cutting – albeit occasional – links shows that bipolar cleavages might be more circumstantial than perpetual, and that their salience might be dictated by changing contingencies. For instance, at the beginning of the year 2006, a transient rapprochement between former electoral rivals, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Free Patriotic Movement, was noted after Jumblatt had called upon Aoun to join the 14 March Alliance.212 In February, without repudiating dialogue with the 14 March poles, the Free Patriotic

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See Nada Bakri, “Hundred of Thousands Show up for ‘Victory Rally’,” September 23, 2005, The Daily Star, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=75664&categ_id=2. One could argue that the external load on the system has tremendously increased after Syrian withdrawal, and that an exacerbation of inner cleavages should be expected. Theodor Hanf, for instance, argues that Lebanon’s politicized cleavages have mainly revolved around external matters in the post-Syrian era. When the salience of external cleavages is reduced, then intercommunal divides tend also to de-escalate. Interview with the author, February 9, 2006, Freiburg. Aoun sent a representative to meet with Jumblatt, and commented that political rupture between the two leaders had come to an end. See “Jumblatt et Aoun: Nous avons le devoir de nous entraider pour sortir de la crise,” L’Orient Le Jour, January 12, 2006, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ page.aspx?page=article&id=303413&pf=1.

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Movement sealed an accord with Hezbollah.213 Despite its unclear objectives, this unexpected Maronite-Shiite alliance indicated that the originally Maronite hardliner might intend to play a mediating political role in order to mitigate reinforcing divides. Redrawing a multiple balance of power which does not revolve around the restrictive ‘8-14 March’ cleavage in future coalitions, and creating openings for other groups which do not define themselves within this bipolar spectrum could help Lebanon consolidate its nascent consensus, and disentangle itself from the web of polarized politics. While the cleavage on Hezbollah’s armed wing has become salient in the wake of the July war, chances that the issue of Hezbollah’s demilitarization leads to a violent Lebanese conflict remain presently minimal, because this divisive topic has not overlapped with communal differences. Despite elite dissension on the matter,214 both Muslim and Christian elites reject the method of confrontation with the party.215 There is a transcommunal consensus that cornering and emasculating Hezbollah on the domestic level would foment tensions rather than force about a solution. Indeed, stressing that the process of disarmament would remain a domestic issue, the Saniora-led government made sure that this contentious issue did not degenerate into a violent national dividing line. 216 213

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On February 6, 2006, Nasrallah and Aoun agreed on a joint written statement which called for national dialogue on contentious issues. Both denied that this alliance represented a MaroniteShiite front which excluded rapprochement with other parties. See Nada Bakri “Nasrallah, Aoun Produce Joint Statement on Key Issues, Call for National Dialogue,” The Daily Star, February 7, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ printable.asp?art_ID=22028&cat_ID=2. The issue of Hezbollah’s demilitarization has divided the Lebanese into three main groups: Those who totally reject the idea of the Resistance’s disarmament, and link the issue with a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement, those who consider Hezbollah as a symbol of national liberation but who are aware that Lebanon cannot afford to confront the international community, and those who argue that Hezbollah should let go of its military wing after the liberation of the South in compliance with Resolution 1559. See for example “The Resistance: Between the Victory of May 2000 and the Challenges of May 2005,” Monday Morning, June 1, 2005, available from http://www.mmorning.com. Lebanon would probably have to engage into an assiduous campaign of diplomacy with the international community to solve the contentious issue. In the event that Lebanon presents an official document to the UN stating that the Shebaa farms are Lebanese, the international organization could then press Israel to comply with Resolution 425 and to withdraw from the disputed territory. In case the international community does not press for the implementation of the resolution and for a new demarcation of the Blue Line, the Lebanese government could then opt for the preservation of Hezbollah’s military wing. Such a step would, however, imply a close coordination with Syrian authorities who would have to confirm the Lebanese identity of the Shebaa farms. What would happen after clearing out the Shebaa farms’ vague status depends on how far the Middle Eastern peace process would have advanced. In October 2005, the Lebanese government rejected the UN plea to disband Hezbollah, and insisted that the issue remained contingent on national dialogue. After the July War, the government has acknowledged and praised Hezbollah’s victory in various statements.

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How the Lebanese political factions would deliberate together and whether they would succeed in launching a campaign of diplomacy to convince the international community of the necessity of a far-reaching internal dialogue concerning Hezbollah’s disarmament would highly determine the impact of this prickly issue on elite accommodation. Moreover, despite the Party of God’s radicalization in the wake of the Independence Intifada, analysts speculate that the new power configuration in Lebanon would inevitably lead Hezbollah to the Lebanese mainstream,217 for the Shiite group is aware that its participation in the power-sharing game guarantees its political perpetuity and influence on national decision-making. It has also been argued that the party’s distaste to national conflict displays its desire to evolve into an autonomous Lebanese political power whose strings are not constantly pulled by neighboring states.218 Besides, some observers claim that Hariri’s slaying has thrust Hezbollah’s regional alliances back into the limelight and has proven their precariousness.219 After this juncture, the party’s alignment with Syria could no longer provide the mere foundations for a successful future strategy. Following this watershed, the party finds itself at the crossroads, obliged to reinvent a new political line that reconciles its image as a regional, pro-Syrian, and national actor. In this regard, strengthening Hezbollah’s political status as well as alliances with other communities would more probably reinforce the party’s emotional bond to the national stream. For instance, the Free Patriotic Current’s unexpected alliance with Hezbollah in February 2006 was explained as an attempt to co-opt the party and reinforce its commitment to the Lebanese state, a step that might persuade Hezbollah to forego its regional agenda and turn to its Lebanese allies to secure in the long run a political survival. 220

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See Ajami, “The Autumn of Autocrats”; Kassir, “Intifada der Unabhängigkeit.” See Tony Karon, “Lebanon after the Syrians,” Time, March 10, 2005, http://www.time.com/ time/world/article/0,8599,1036010,00.html. See Joseph Samaha, “Lahsat al inkitah,” Assafir, February 16, 2005, http://www.assafir.com/ iso/today /front/124.html. Previously a firm advocate of Hezbollah’s disarmament, Aoun agreed in this ‘document of understanding’ that Hezbollah should bear arms as long as the Shebaa farms remained occupied. Yet, both parties pledged to discuss the fate of the party’s arms within the framework of a national dialogue. For some, it was surprising that the document did not emphasize the necessity of sustaining pro-Syrian allegiances, but rather alluded to the construction of sane diplomatic ties with Damascus. For more information on Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah, see Aoun’s interview with Jeanine Jalkh in “Aoun à “L’Orient-Le Jour” : Nous voulons détourner le Hezbollah de la Syrie,” L’Orient Le Jour, retrieved on February 13, 2006, available from http://www.lorientlejour.com.

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Although this analysis of Lebanon’s domestic politics is to a great extent indicative of Lebanon’s consociational dynamics, examining elite cartels and patterns of coalescence is not sufficient to assess Lebanon’s power-sharing sustainability, future consociational patterns, and to find out why elites are still unable to agree on common perceptions of external threat. To explore determining factors which affect elite consensus, one should thoroughly examine the other sustaining conditions for consociational democracy: non-alignment and communal segmentation. Lebanon’s shackled foreign policy: The impossible condition of non- alignment and the increase of external burdens on the porous republic after 2005 “Consociationalism is a solution for domestic divisions, not for international conflicts that reinforce domestic divisions.”221 Due to the constraining interplay of external and internal cleavages on Lebanese soil, the porous republic remained unable to extricate itself from its agitated environment. As a result, attempts to restore the factor of inter-elite accommodation remained constrained and adversely affected by external factors. While non-alignment has been replaced by an artificial stability in the era of Syrian guardianship, Lebanon’s foreign politics has hovered between emancipation and subordination in the post-Syrian era. After 2005, exogenous causes have played a more salient role in determining the acuity of internal divides than domestic factors themselves. The mere fact that regional and international alignments in Lebanon have taken precedence over the possibility of non-alignment has rendered the power-sharing formula more precarious than ever. Non-alignment replaced by artificial stability (1990-2004) “We did not prove that we are independent.”222 Under Syrian tutelage, an independent Lebanese foreign policy has been overshadowed – for at least one and a half decades – by the coupling of Lebanese-Syrian tracks and the stance of ‘privileged relations’ with Damascus.223 Post-war security and political arrangements with the Syrian tutor 221 222 223

Rudy B. Andeweg, email communication to the author, August 24, 2006. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, November 8, 2004. See Kassir, “A Polity in an Uncertain Regional Environment,” 104-105; Ghassan Tueni,

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have thus concealed underlying conflicts plaguing the Lebanese landscape. During this period, Lebanon’s foreign policy and national strategies were beyond the reach of the establishment, the parliament and the public,224 and the emerging post-war stability was misleading. It is worthy to note that Lebanon’s instrumentalization during the 15-year war by Western and Arab forces has been facilitated by the republic’s porousness and permanent readiness to absorb influences which directly overlap with internal fault lines. The Pax Syriana in 1990 has temporarily decreased this perviousness, but has made Lebanon’s equilibrium contingent on its dependence to Syria. Since then, the strategy of subordination has temporarily relieved the small polity from external load, yet the country was still prisoner to disruptive influences in a state of latency. Children of the war legacy and the Middle Eastern conflict,225 several dilemmas – artificially regulated by Lebanon’s dependency on its neighbor – lurked beneath the surface. This absent foreign policy resulted from the Ta’if clauses pertaining to Syrian presence on Lebanese territory and from the ensuing 1991 Lebanese-Syrian treaties. It was also the outcome of the Syrian regime’s stealthy authoritarian infiltration into the system and its co-optation of post-war Lebanese incumbents. Thus, the Ta’if Republic was perceived by Syria less as an independent polity with an autonomous foreign policy than as “a medium of political and military leverage against Israel, as a patronage system to reward the regime’s loyalists, or as an outlet to relieve internal politico-economic pressures.”226 Lebanon’s absent foreign policy during the Second Republic is illustrated by the country’s passive role in the Middle East process and in the Arab league. In regional negotiations, the Lebanese government has refrained from adopting any regional policy that was not sanctioned by Syria.227 However, as time went by, the incapacity of the Lebanese state to adopt an independent foreign policy reinforced inner divisions, and created new political cleavages around the Syrian question that were not previously there. The Syrian factor regarded by the majority of political actors in Lebanon as a political regulator for Lebanon’s conflicts became in the course of the years and mainly after 2000 a source of communal dissidence and a divisive foreign threat.

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Anatomie d’une politique étrangère otage (Beirut: An Nahar Editions, 2001). See Maila, “La république de Taêf.” Despite the end of the war in 1990, Lebanon could not distance itself from the causes that led to the system collapse in 1975: Namely the Arab-Israeli conflict and the republic’s degree of involvement in regional conflicts. Robert G. Rabil. “The Maronites and Syrian Withdrawal: From “Isolationists” to “Traitors”?” Middle East Policy 8 (2001): 23-43, 27 See Picard, Lebanon, A Shattered Country, 186-192.

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The moment communal disagreements over the Syrian presence increased after 2000, the ruling establishment insisted on linking Lebanon’s emancipation from Syria to the denouement of the Middle Eastern process.228 Superimposing security politics and the concomitance of the Lebanese-Syrian path over the necessity of de-politicizing internal cleavages has had a particularly negative effect on national integration. The post-Syrian era or the increase of burdens on the system In 2005, the Syrian pullout has “lifted the lid off a political pressure cooker brimming with a heady brew of parties […] capable of spilling over into violence or being stirred up by foreign powers…”229 Having become the midpoint of regional and international influences in the post-1559 era, Lebanon faces the dilemma of constructing a foreign policy that ironically remains more contingent on the outside than on domestic actors’ choices. As elites are unable to agree on common perceptions around Lebanon’s involvement in external arenas, any small disturbance causes a political tornado in Beirut. The evasive ministerial declaration of the Saniora government, which vacillated between the pledge to respect Lebanon’s commitments to the international community and its commitments to Hezbollah’s role in the region, reflects in fact the polity’s dilemma. How Lebanon will honor its international obligations seems more like “a task representing the tip of the iceberg”230 than a reasonable mission depending on its national protagonists. The fate of Lebanese-Syrian relations, Hezbollah’s military plight in the light of the Middle Eastern conflict, the Palestinian issue, and the destabilizing role of Western interference remain the main focal points that dictate the country’s status and policy track.

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Once the two-year period after which the Syrians were supposed to redeploy was past, the Syrian establishment argued that the withdrawal was linked to the end of political confessionalism and to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the South. In 2000, the ‘Shebaa farms’ pretext and the continuing Middle Eastern conflict were invoked to justify the concomitance of the LebaneseSyrian pathways. As soon as Resolution 1559 was adopted, the Lebanese authorities linked the implementation of its controversial clauses with the implementation of other UN resolutions pertaining to the Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands in the Middle East. See Emile Khoury “Khilaf ala doukhoul al kiwat alsouriya wa khilaf ala khouroujiha,” An-Nahar, September 27, 2004, 3, See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2006, 16. See Nizar Abdel-Kader, “Lebanon’s Ills and Security Breaches Are Untenable,” The Daily Star, August 22, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id =5&article_Id=17617.

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The deterioration of Lebanese-Syrian relations Since the adoption of Resolution 1559, and the increase of international pressure on Damascus and Lebanon, the small polity has been swaying to and fro between pro-Syrian and international affinities. Furthermore, right after Syria’s humiliating withdrawal, the new government was not only confronted with the challenge of demarcating Lebanese-Syrian borders but also with mending worsening relations with Damascus.231 These sour relations have manifested themselves on various levels. First, a sort of psychological Lebanese-Syrian war threatened to worsen ties between the two countries. Throughout 2005, anti-Syrian sentiment reached unprecedented heights in Lebanon. It seemed as if many Lebanese were fed up with years of Syrian domination, and were eager to vent out feelings of dissatisfaction. Moreover, the assumption that Syria could be behind the numerous assassinations was sufficient to nurture feelings of displeasure towards Damascus. On the other hand, the Syrian population has claimed to have been victimized and insulted by the anti-Syrian propaganda launched in Lebanon.232 It was reported that growing anti-Syrian Lebanese resentment has backfired on Syrian workers in the Lebanese region,233 and has scared off Syrian investors in the country.234 Displeased with this anti-Damascene wave after Hariri’s slaying, the Syrian government has asked the new Lebanese government to present its official excuses for the tarnishment of Syria’s reputation by claiming that Syria’s intelligence chiefs were behind Hariri’s assassination. According to the Syrian Baath Party, these excuses would provide the political prerequisite for an eventual Lebanese-Syrian dialogue.235

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See for example, Bassel Salloukh, “Syria and Lebanon, A Brotherhood Transformed,” Middle East Report 236 (Fall 2005): 14-21. Interview with Syrian student studying at the American University of Beirut, Byblos, September 14, 2005. In a press conference, Syrian labor minister Diala Haje-Aref said that 37 Syrians were killed and 280 wounded in Lebanon since February 2005. See for example “Syria: 37 Workers killed in Lebanon since February,” Middle East Online, July 21, 2005, http://www.middle-eastonline.com/english/?id=14075. See Donna Abu Nasr, “Threats Alienate Syrians from Lebanon,” March, 19, 2005, Associated Press Breaking News, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/03/19/international/ i095545S55.DTL. See “Syrien: Entschuldigung für Hariri-Mord,” Vorarlberg Online, July 25, 2005, http://www. vol.at/engine.aspx/page/vol-article-detail-page/cn/vol-news-hach7-200507.

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In summer 2005, a Lebanese-Syrian border crisis revealed that unpleasant relations had taken a turn for the worse. Hundreds of vehicles and trucks transporting goods out of Lebanon via the Syrian borders were stopped for six weeks. Although the Syrian establishment argued that this incident was the result of necessary border security measures, Damascus’ embargo was interpreted by large segments of the Lebanese population as a reprisal or a sort of punishment following Lebanon’s emancipation from the Syrian orbit.236 Lebanese politicians’ pledges to seek best relations with Syria after its pullout did not help much as a mutual political campaign of denigration threatened to deepen the chasm. A scathing war of words between Syrian and Lebanese leaders fomented deep distrust and undermined chances of dialogue. 237 It was also noted that Lebanese and Syrian media have contributed to fuelling resentment and deepening the prevailing suspicion. In Damascus, the Lebanese media was blamed for fomenting anti-Syrian sentiments and campaigning against Syria.238 On the other hand, Syrian newspapers denigrated Lebanese leaders’ position which bred “hatred” against Syria and ingratitude towards everything Damascus had done in the past to save Lebanon from partition.239 236

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The delays imposed on Lebanon’s agricultural and industrial sectors important losses that amounted to 400.000 dollars per day. It was not until premier Saniora visited Damascus early August that the blockade was lifted. During this summer, it was also reported that Syria was keen on changing many industrial and touristic agreements with its neigbor, and to revise the Lebanese-Syrian treaties which amounted to more than 40 treaties and 80 protocols. Other incidents revolve around the arrest of Lebanese fishermen by Syrian authorities in Syrian territorial waters and the expulsion of hundreds of Lebanese managers in Syria. For a description of Syrian reprisals in the Lebanese press, See “Que veut la Syrie du Liban? L’inimitié fraternelle,” L’Hebdo Magazine, August 5, 2005, http://www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp? ArrowIndex=0&HId=&Hissue Num=2491&Category=1&DescId=4995&DescFlag=1. In his speech in November 2006, for example, President Bashar accused Lebanon’s leaders of transforming their country into a passageway of conspiracies against Syria and accused late Premier Hariri’s supporters of being “blood merchants” who used the politician’s death for political goals. This speech was interpreted by the Lebanese press as an attempt to provoke strife and deepen enmities between the two countries. See “Assad: Une grande partie de l’État libanais veut faire du Liban le lieu de passage de tous les complots contre la Syrie,” L’Orient Le Jour, November 11, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour. com/page.aspx?page=article&id=298896&pf=1. Conversely, Lebanese politicians did not refrain on various occasions from attacking the Syrian regime. After Deputy Tueni’s assassination, for example, Druze leader Jumblatt overtly called for the fall of the Syrian regime and even asked publicly the international community to sanction Damascus and bring about a change leading to President Bashar’s sacking. See Cilina Nasser, “Al-Hariri Killing Widens Lebanon-Syria Rift,” Al Jazeera, October 26, 2005, http://www.english.aljazeera.net/NS/exeres/EFCDC47E-CADB-4CF6-9A14-7B9B2783 C4A8.htm. See H. Avraham, “Increasing Tension between Syria and Lebanon,” Memri Inquiry and Analysis Series 246, October 9, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=IA24605. Examples of mutual denigration in the Lebanese and Syrian media are many. By mid-October

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At the close of the year 2005, the deterioration of Lebanese-Syrian relations led to the Arab league’s mediation and to the so-called ‘Arabization’ of the Lebanese-Syrian file. The first initiative of the Arab league was suspended by the end of December after it was accused of concocting an agreement in which the international investigation into Hariri’s slaying would be suspended in exchange for the termination of assassinations in Lebanon.240 Subsequent Saudi and Egyptian interventions in January 2006 to defuse the Lebanese-Syrian crisis also faltered. After a Saudi Summit with Syrian President Bashar – dubbed later as ‘the Riyadh compromise’ – the winning parliamentary coalition in Lebanon refused to adopt the agreement suggested by the Saudi authorities. It interpreted these ‘behind the curtain’ negotiations, which did not include Lebanese authorities, as “an initiative not made for Lebanon’s benefit,” and a Syrian-orchestrated attempt to stage a comeback in Lebanese politics.241 Despite the failure of the so-called Riyadh initiative, other Arab talks were launched right after to help mend deteriorating relations.242 The arising question is whether regional mediators will be able to find a solution that does not tie Lebanon again to the Syrian bondage.

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2005, for instance, Syrian Minister of Foreign affairs, Farouk al-Chareh held the Lebanese media responsible for Ghazi Kanaan’s suicide on the grounds that it leaked unjust information about his meeting with the international probe into Hariri’s slaying. Lebanese parties also decried the Syrian state-owned newspaper Tishrin’s attempt to incite divisions by calling upon the Lebanese to overthrow the new Saniora Cabinet and to hold a strike in Beirut under the motto of “coldness and hunger.” See Nada Bakri, “Lebanese Parties Slam Calls for Dissent by Syria’s Tishrin,” The Daily Star, November 16, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp? art_ID=20080&cat_DU=2. By the end of November 2005, a Sudanese envoy, Omar Hassam el-Bachir, commented in a visit to Beirut that Arab mediation could help defuse Lebanese-Syrian tensions, but he argued that the precondition to normalizing relations hinged on calming Syrian fears regarding the international commission into Hariri’s slaying. Major actors in the winning parliamentary coalition in addition to the Free Patriotic Current rejected this compromise. It was argued that Lebanon could not endorse a dubious initiative which asked for the delineation of borders in exchange for coordination in the security domain. It was feared that such a step could pave the way for the revival of Syrian tutelage in Lebanon via the channel of security politics. See Majdoline Hatoum, “Saudi and Egyptian Mediation Efforts Fall on Stony Ground” The Daily Star, January 12, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ printable.asp?art_ID=21386cat_ID=2. Since fall 2005, the Egyptian and Saudi regimes have on various occasions exerted pressure on Syria to respond to the UN international probe. See “L’Arabie Saoudite et l’Egypte au chevet des relations Libano-Syriennes,” L’Orient Le Jour, January 9, 2006, http://www.lorientlejour.com/ page.aspx?page=article&id= 303314&pf=1.

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Lebanon caught in the Syrian orbit: between deliverance and restraint The worrisome degradation of Lebanese-Syrian relations throughout 2005 has cast a shadow on the circumstances of turmoil and pressure under which Syrian withdrawal took place. Indeed, prior to this pullout, various commentators explicitly warned against a precipitated and sudden Syrian departure not based on dialogue: “A sudden Syrian withdrawal is dangerous. Syria’s withdrawal should be accompanied by intergovernmental deals and agreements. If Syria pulls out suddenly, instability might prevail in Lebanon. The prerequisites for Syrian withdrawal are national unity on the matter, and the establishment of a strong Lebanese government.”243 Some politicians additionally outlined the necessity of an intrinsic LebaneseSyrian restructuring of relations that is not imposed by a foreign power: “The rectification of Lebanese-Syrian relations cannot be the outcome of a foreign power’s forceful interference or wagering.”244 Few months before the pullout, dim scenarios were anticipated by Lebanese political scientists: “There are two scenarios for the post1559 Lebanese era. The first positive scenario revolves around a gradual stabilization of the Lebanese entity and the establishment of diplomatic Lebanese-Syrian relations. In the negative scenario, there is a high risk that Lebanon becomes victim to the US-Syrian confrontation. Most probably, Syria would foment troubles in Lebanon so as to prevent any other power from taking over Lebanon’s decision-making mechanisms. Although imminent concerns in the region will revolve around who is going to set Lebanon’s foreign policy, the Syrians will not allow anyone to inherit Lebanon.”245 One of Lebanon’s burdensome challenges is presently how to improve bilateral relations with Syria while liberating Lebanese politics from the Syrian circuit. On the eve of Lebanon’s Independence Day, on November 21, 2005, premier Saniora solemnly declared that it was high time that Syria recognized Lebanon’s independence.246 In May 2006, calling for the demarcation of Lebanese-Syrian 243 244 245 246

Interview with a Lebanese journalist, Hazmieh, April 23, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 16, 2004. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, December 12, 2004. Fuad Saniora’s statement upon calling on the demarcation of frontiers and establishment of diplomatic relations with Syria, see “Siniora: Avoir une politique étrangère, c’est être hostile à la

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borders, he asked whether having a homemade foreign policy meant being hostile to the Syrian republic. These statements contrasted with post-war speeches in which the concordance of Lebanese-Syrian pathways was always given precedence. Nevertheless, this brand new regained ‘independence’ claimed by the 14 March Alliance remains caught between impulses of liberation and impulses of subjugation. Signs sent by the Syrian government that Damascus had finally accepted its small neighbor’s emancipation were evasive. For instance, before the year 2005 had drawn to a close, speculation was prevalent that Syria was ready to work on the delineation of Lebanese-Syrian borders, 247 and that the Shebaa farms riddle was about to be unravelled. In a so called ‘reconciliation meeting’ between premier Saniora and Syrian minister Farouk al-Chareh, the latter affirmed that the disputed territory was Lebanese, and declared that the two countries were about to open a new constructive page.248 However, until now, no serious efforts to demarcate borders have been undertaken as Damascus considers that soothing its regional fears and improving bilateral relations are prerequisites to settling contentious issues. It is worth notino, however, that Syria and Lebanon agreed in 2008 on establishing diplomatic relations and opening embassies in Damascus and Beirut. Pending a Middle Eastern settlement, the fate of Lebanese-Syrian relations remains for the years to come hostage to an array of international, regional, and domestic variables: On the international level, the most important variables hinge on: • Syria’s cooperation with the UN probe into Hariri’s assassination. A burning question is whether the improvement of Lebanese-Syrian relations would entail a compromise on unveiling the truth behind Hariri’s slaying; • The question of the court of international character which would try the Syrian and Lebanese officials allegedly implicated in Hariri’s slaying; • The degree of international pressure on Syria. In fact, US pressure on Syria does not seem beneficial to a healthy rapprochement with its Lebanese neighbor;

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Syrie,” L’Orient Le Jour, May 11, 2006, http://www.lorientlejourcom/page.aspx?page= article&id=312694&pf=1.. See “La glace est rompue, mais elle risque encore de se briser…” L’Orient Le Jour, November 24, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page.aspx?page=article&id=299802&pf=1. See “Sharaa Claims Lebanon and Syria Turned a ‘New Page’,” The Daily Star, November 29, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=20379&cat_ID=2.

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The role international powers will play in launching and endorsing a diplomatic process between Lebanon, Syria, and Israel on the fate of the Shebaa farms and the Golan Heights.

On the regional level, important factors revolve around the hesitant negotiations in the Middle East process, and whether the interrupted Syrian-Israeli dialogue would resume. If the process continues stalling,249 Syria will secure in various ways its bargaining positions in the Middle East through ‘regional mortgages.’ This will have a direct influence on Lebanese-Syrian deliberations over the Shebaa farms, and the demarcation of Lebanese-Syrian borders.250 Analysts anticipate that the Syrian regime will not give up Lebanon – and more specifically Hezbollah as a regional pawn – in its war of liberation in the Golan Heights,251 and that the Baathist regime can still cause inner upheavals despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops.252 Thus, Damascus would not only rely on Hezbollah to provoke internal seisms, but could possibly use armed Palestinian groups residing in Lebanon to provoke clashes with Israel to undermine Lebanon’s stability.253 This tactic might reconvince the international community that the key to stability in Lebanon is not the direct implementation of Resolution 1559 but rather direct negotiations with the Syrian regime. In Lebanon, the politics of liberation from the Syrian course could only succeed if future leaderships give priority to an independent foreign policy over security politics, and if various communal elites agree on a common version of foreign politics. One thing is however certain: Lebanon will never fully unshackle its foreign policy from Syria’s. It is more likely that in the peace process, Lebanon would commit itself to the coupling of Lebanese-Syrian tracks.254 249

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In September 2006, Israeli premier Ehud Olmert declared that the Golan Heights were Israeli property. After this announcement, Damascus declared that more confrontation was likely if peace process remained jammed. See “Damascus Warns Diplomatic Impasse Means more Conflict,” The Daily Star, September 27, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp? edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=75738. The status of Lebanese political prisoners in Syrian jails will also have to be dealt with – at the latest when diplomatic relations are resumed. See Rhonda Roumani, “Hezbollah and Syria Enjoy an Open Marriage of Convenience,” The Daily Star, October, 11, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=9130 &cat_ID=5. See “Syria and Lebanon: the Winds of Change” The Daily Star, April 19, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ printable.asp?art_ID=143673&cat_ID=2. Ibid. Breaking the concomitance of the Lebanese-Syrian pathways in the Middle East peace process is risky not only on the regional level but also because of the highly inflammable internal cleavages in Lebanon. The 1982 precedent, during which Lebanese authorities stroke a rapprochement with

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Hezbollah’s dilemma between integration and aloofness: the thorny issue of its demilitarization Lebanon’s entanglement in the Syrian orbit cannot be fully understood without shedding light on Hezbollah’s two-faced role on the internal and regional levels. Indeed, since Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon’s political dynamics have increasingly focused on Hezbollah’s status. More specifically, the party has had a strong bearing on setting Lebanon’s political agenda and foreign policies – especially after the formation of the Saniora cabinet. It is believed that Hezbollah’s insistence on holding for the first time a ministerial seat in the new cabinet is intricately linked with its need for “political protection” after Syrian pullout.255 Subject to international and internal constraints to dismantle its military wing since the passage of Resolution 1559, the party has refused to yield to pressure. During an organized massive rally on February 19, 2005, for instance, Hezbollah confirmed that it would not demilitarize, and that its military wing remained a “strategic choice “not only for Lebanon but also for other parties in the Middle East striving to restore their freedom. 256 Upon the formation of the Saniora government, the new Shiite minister of foreign affairs, Fawzi Salloukh, ruled out a dismantling of the party’s armed wing, and gave precedence to Lebanese national interests over the application of Resolution 1559.257 Throughout the years, Hezbollah has justified its refusal to relinquish arms on the basis of various reasons: • The party has not used its weapons against a Lebanese faction; • It has helped fill many security voids that the Lebanese army cannot attend to; • The Shebaa farms are still occupied by Israel despite Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the South. Indeed, since 2000, ongoing tensions along the Lebanese-Israeli border and military confrontations in the Shebaa farms have given the party more momentum especially after the Syrian withdrawal;258

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the Israeli state, had disastrous consequences. Interviews with Lebanese politicians, Beirut November 24, and December 1, 2004. Joseph Alagha, “Hizballah after the Syrian Withdrawal,” Middle East Report 237 (Winter 2005): 34-39, 36. See Adnan El-Ghoul, “Nasrallah Urges National Dialogue,” The Daily Star, February 21, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=12840&categ_id=2. See “Außenminister schließt Hisbollah-Entwaffnung aus,” Der Standard, July 21, 2005, http://wwwderstand ard.at?id=2118623. Skirmishes across the border had not abated since the withdrawal of the Israeli army in 2000. As

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The party embodies a concept of strategic deterrence and derives its legitimacy from the immutable parameters of security politics. According to Hezbollah, in the absence of international and regional assurance, there are no guarantees that once Hezbollah disarmed, Israel would not try to impose its interests or even attack Lebanon; The organization’s military wing derives its perennial character from the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, the Lebanese Resistance has linked its disarmament to a regional solution especially after the failure of the second Palestinian Intifada; 259 More recently, after the July war, the party has linked its eventual disarmament to the emergence of a strong Lebanese state; 260 In addition to Hezbollah’s reluctance to disarm, there is reason to believe that Syria considers the party’s demilitarization not only as a loss in its regional battle, but also as a threat to its own national security. According to the Syrian regime, the party’s disarmament may transform Lebanon into a showplace for Israeli intelligence.261

Throughout 2005, the controversy over the status of the Shebaa farms has notably come under increasing scrutiny.262 The Lebanese anti-Syrian opposition

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Hezbollah came under escalating pressure to disband, violent flare-ups in the Shebaa farms after May 2005 increased. Fierce clashes between Israel and Hezbollah overshadowed Lebanon’s Independence Day anniversary in November 2005, and clouded the beginning of 2006. These titfor-tat retaliations have shown that the situation along the frontier zone was liable to blow up any time, and that international action remained highly ineffective when it came to dealing with Israeli incursions and frequent violations of the Lebanese airspace as well as Hezbollah’s provocative moves. See Adnan El Ghoul, “Nasrallah Urges National Dialogue,” The Daily Star, February 21, 2005, http://www. dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=12840&categ_id=2. It is reported that Hezbollah supplies the Palestinian Hamas Party with ammunitions in its operational activities against Israel. See “Le Hamas reconnaît avoir bénéficié de l’aide du Hezbollah,” L’Orient Le Jour, February 16, 2006, http://www.lorient lejour.com/page.aspx?page =article&id=306089&pf=1. See Nada Bakri, “Hundred of Thousands Show up for ‘Victory Rally’,” The Daily Star, September 23, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID= 75664&categ_id=2. Syrian Premier Naji Otari argued in an interview with the Kuwaiti daily Al-Anbaa that demilitarizing Hezbollah’s posed a danger to Syria’s national security as Lebanon would become prey to Israeli interventions. See Adnan El-Ghoul, “Obstacles Emerge before Lebanon’s New Cabinet,” The Daily Star, July 21, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp? art_ID=16955&cat_ID=2. With the increase of international pressure in 2005, Hezbollah has conveyed on various occasions the message that it could envisage demilitarization after Israel’s pullout from Shebaa farms and the liberation of its prisoners. For example, Hezbollah deputy Mohammad Raad

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has criticized Hezbollah’s insistence on holding Lebanon hostage to the ArabIsraeli conflict through the alibi of the Shebaa farms.263 Some politicians have argued that the occupied territory could be liberated through public diplomacy with Israel and with the international community, and not necessarily through military operations.264 After the passage of Resolution 1559, many internal proposals targeting Hezbollah’s disarmament and scenarios for liberating the Shebaa farms have been presented for discussion. 265 Attention has also been riveted on Syria’s so-called instrumentalization of the Shebaa farms game piece and Hezbollah’s abidance by the rules. Considered as an insignificant 15-square mile strip of land, the Shebaa territory has become – according to the March 14 Alliance – a ‘symbolical and strategic fence’ that obstructs Lebanese dialogue on the weapons of the Resistance, and Lebanon’s dialogue with the international community regarding the struggle with Israel. Equivocal signals sent by Damascus concerning the demarcation of borders hint that the Syrian regime intends to keep its declaration on the Lebanese identity of the Shebaa farms contingent on Lebanon’s pliability to Damascus’ wishes. By deferring an official declaration and by delaying the stalemate over Hezbollah’s

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evasively alluded to the possibility of annexing the party’s fighters to the Lebanese Army in case the Shebaa farms were liberated. See “UN Security Council: An International Commission to investigate Hariri’s Death,” Monday Morning, April 15, 2005, available from http://www.mmorning.com. In September 2, 2005, leader Nasrallah affirmed in an interview on al-Arabiyya Television that demilitarization would be conceivable after Israel’s retreat from the Shebaa farms, yet this would only happen if the party received international and regional guarantees that Israel would not attack Lebanon. See Alagha, “Hizballah after the Syrian Withdrawal,” 37. Hezbollah’s determination to retain its arms against all odds has been questioned by various Lebanese factions. For example, before striking an alliance with Hezbollah in 2006, Aoun defiantly asked, in the parliamentary session set to debate the Saniora cabinet’s policy by the end of July 2005, which Arab countries were still fighting against Israel, and whether Lebanon was keen on conducting the battle alone. See Majdoline Hatoum, “Lebanese Cabinet faces House Debate.” The Daily Star, July 29, 2005, http://www.dailystar. com.lb/printable.asp?art _ID=17196&cat_ID=2. In addition to Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party which questioned many times Hezbollah’s intention to drag Lebanon into the Syrian-Iranian axis, the Lebanese Forces Party has vehemently expressed its disapproval of Hezbollah’s armed wing. See Adnan El-Ghoul, “Diplomacy Can Liberate Shebaa farms,” The Daily Star, November 11, 2004, http:// www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=20404&cat_ID=2. Political factions suggested the integration of Hezbollah’s military wing into the army or the creation of a semi-independent aiding brigade within the Lebanese Army. See “La Transition ‘démocratique et pacifique’: La vision de l’opposition, les cartes du pouvoir,” L’Hebdo Magazine, March 25, 2005, http://www.magazinme.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HID =&HIssueNum=2472&Category=1&DescId=4684&DescFlag=1. See also Clancy Chassay “Lebanese Leaders Search for Solution to Disarmament Dilemma,” The Daily Star, November 1, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=19747&cat _ID=2.

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options,266 the Syrian regime is believed to add an additional encumbrance to the Lebanese national dialogue. Hence, by perpetuating the impasse over the status of the Shebaa farms, Damascus might be aiming at deepening divisions between the Shiite faction on the one hand, and the winning coalition on the other hand, as well as buying time to preserve its trump card as long as possible. This is why some observers suggest that taking the road to Damascus might be the right shortcut in order to deal with Hezbollah’s dilemma: healing Syria’s increasing confinement and soothing its fears in the frozen peace process precede the road to the Lebanese South.267 The 2006 July War and Lebanon’s regional entanglement In December 2005, mysterious missiles launched from South Lebanon toward Israeli settlements showed that the porous frontier zone remained a Pandora’s Box open to uncontrolled interferences.268 Ensuing violent skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israel along the border, and the dismantling of an Israeli spy ring in South Lebanon in June 2006 suggested that foreboding events were about to happen. Indeed, the resumption of violence on July 12 confirmed that Lebanon was still the playground of a sweeping regional and international twister. The Hezbollah-Israeli 34-day war has been commonly described as a microphenomenon reflecting a much broader battle played on Lebanese ground by international players. Thus, while the Western world was fighting through this war the “arc of extremism stretching from the Gaza strop to Iraq,”269 Hezbollah backed by Iran and Syria was trying to rein in ‘imperialist’ and obtrusive powers trying to redesign a docile Middle East. 270 266

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In January 2006, president Bashar’s statement that demarcating the Lebanese-Syrian border would harm the Lebanese Resistance and benefit Israel indirectly suggests that Damascus has a lot at stake in the matter. See “Syria’s Stance on the Shebaa farms Reflects its Disregard for Lebanon,” The Daily Star, January 24, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID =216567&cat_ID=2. See for example Fouad Naīm, “Soigner la Syrie pour épargner le Liban,” Le Figaro, April 15, 2005, http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/20050415.FIG0190.html. Al Qaeda organization hurried to announce that it perpetrated the attack, but the Lebanese government refuted the claim. Druze leader Jumblatt accused Syria in a press conference to have orchestrated this dubious incident to prove that Lebanon had become an arena for terrorist activities and to undermine the country`s security. However, these suspicions remain pure conjecture. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s description of the so-called extremist network in the Middle East. See Adel Darwish, “Flashpoint Lebanon,” The Middle East, August/September 2006, 1213, 12. Ibid.

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Although this study does not aim at analyzing the causes and broad repercussions of the July War, it suffices to say that this ill-timed confrontation has had a negative bearing on Lebanon’s vacillating foreign policy. Whereas Hezbollah seems intent on building a “strong and just state”271 through confrontational foreign politics, the anti-Syrian alliance has been trying in vain to extricate Lebanon from the regional moving sands. More seriously, the war has thrust the regional fragility of the Lebanese state back into the limelight, and has shown that Lebanon’s equilibrium hinges more than ever on regional parameters. By drawing Lebanon directly in the eye of the Middle Eastern storm once again, the episode has dispelled hopes associated with the aggrandized Beirut Spring of independence. By the end of 2006, while the Lebanese have been dreading a long period of political incertitude, Hezbollah has found itself at the center stage of domestic and foreign politics after a period of muffled ambiguity since Israel’s withdrawal. In the wake of the July War, Lebanon’s future will most probably be obscured by inter-Lebanese conflicts on the republic’s external policy, and its degree of alignment in the regional strife. Immediate challenges hinge on to what extent Hezbollah will comply with Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and to what extent the Lebanese government will be able to extend its full control over the South. The destabilizing international intervention “Why should it work now if it has not worked before? The long history of Western intervention in Lebanon suggests that it can create more problems than it solves.”272 This analysis of Hezbollah’s status and impact on Lebanon’s foreign policy remains however incomplete if one does not shed light on the destabilizing foreign intervention in Lebanon since 2004, and on the role it has played in exacerbating inter-Lebanese cleavages, and radicalizing Hezbollah. In fact, if Lebanon’s alignment with the Syrian path has caused problems, Lebanon’s alignment with the West has also engendered more difficulties than solutions.273

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Taken from leader Nasrallah’s speech in Hezbollah’s victory rally in September 2006. See Nada Bakri, “Hundred of Thousands Show up for ‘Victory Rally’,” September 23, 2005, The Daily Star, http://www. dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=75664&categ_id=2 See Nadim Shehadi, “Whose Country is it Anyway?” The World Today 61 (April 2005): 7-9. Shehadi mainly refers to the failed intervention of the multinational force in 1983, and to the 15year war in which Lebanon became a fighting arena for foreign powers. Ibid.

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The far-reaching international politics of interventionism since the renewal of Lahoud’s term has mainly contributed to restimulating internal fault lines. Although the anti-Syrian opposition, for instance, the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, interpreted this intervention as a propitious chance that should be seized upon, loyalist politicians aligned with Syria fiercely denounced the internationalization of the Lebanese-Syrian file. One of the most vehement opponents of the international policy was the Shiite community, which has expressed its categorical disapprobation of foreign help and of the US-European interference in domestic affairs. Senior Shiite clerics and political parties – particularly Hezbollah and Amal – warned right after Hariri’s slaying against the destabilizing effects of this “meddling” which primarily serves US-European core interests.274 By the end of March 2005, for example, after Patriarch Sfeir’s visit to the US, Hezbollah overtly accused the American administration of trying to stir divisions in the country by using the pretexts of democratization and sovereignty.275 After the Syrian pullout, external meddling has particularly upset Lebanon’s communal and political equilibrium insofar as some segments interpreted this continuing outright interference as an attempt to replace one tutelage by another. The Saniora government’s acceptance of foreign assistance and its readiness to collaborate with the international community and with the US administration have caused much discord between the winning coalition and the vigilant Shiite leadership.276 In January 2006, for instance, the government’s decision to reject the Arab initiative to defuse the Lebanese-Syrian crisis was interpreted as an “error” by the Shiite establishment as it implied the victory of Western hegemony on Lebanon.277 Particularly destabilizing effects of foreign intervention manifested themselves in the July War, during which Lebanon was caught into the Israeli whirlwind, Hezbollah’s regional machinery, and stranded by an embarrassing international silence. The equivocal US silence during the military conflict, in spite of Lebanon’s full-scale destruction, has highly contrasted with the Bush administration’s stances during the Beirut Spring 2005. This has confirmed 274

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See Therese Sfeir, “Fadlallah Issues Warning on U.S.-European Alliance,” The Daily Star, February, 24, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID12935&cat_ID=2. See Nada Raad, “Nasrallah to Discuss Future of Hezbollah with Sfeir,” The Daily Star, March, 23, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=13671&cat_ID=2. After its formation, the government accepted an economic and institutional plan for foreign help, endorsed the establishment of a tribunal of international character to try Hariri’s assassins, and has been preparing for the convening of a donors’ conference that would promote reforms on various levels. See “MP of the BDL Abdelmajid Saleh: ‘Resolution 1559, a Mine to Be Defused through Dialogue’,” Monday Morning, February 6, 2006, available from http://www.mmorning.com.

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prevalent misgivings that the US was more interested in subduing the Syrian regime than in democratizing Lebanon. Furthermore, international divisions on the course of action during the crisis278 increased Lebanon’s disenchantment with international assistance. During the July War in 2006, the escalation of violence against the backdrop of international divergences has also shown the limitations of the international strategy to bring forth peaceful transition in Lebanon after Hariri’s slaying. More particularly, the 1559 Resolution’s initial purpose to bring about political transformations in Lebanon and in Syria through diplomacy279 has partly failed. On the one hand, continuous foreign pressure on Hezbollah has failed to reduce the controversy over Hezbollah’s arms to a low-intensity conflict. On the other hand, excessive US pressure on Syria280 has led the Syrian regime to prepare itself more for a stand-off than for capitulation.281 Apprehensions that confrontational pressure on Damascus would eventually backfire on Lebanon’s costly path of emancipation, and that Syria’s battle for survival would heighten regional turmoil282 have somewhat been verified. From an evaluative perspective, foreign pressures have massively impinged on Lebanon’s internal dynamics of national dialogue since March 2006, and will probably continue doing so. First, constant international interferences prevented

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While the US, England, and Germany called for tackling the roots of the problem before enforcing a volatile truce, France called for the instant imposition of an immediate ceasefire. Interview with an Italian diplomat, Beirut, October 13, 2004. Although its aggressive mode of pressure has been mildened due to regional and international considerations, the Bush administration has not abandoned its confrontational strategy against Syria. Beginning 2006, US statement that Syria remained “a negative power” that has to change its regional behavior hints at the unremitting US determination to keep an eye on the Damascene regime. See “Rice kritisiert Syrien als negative Kraft,” Espace, February 16, 2006, http://www.espace.ch/artikel_179615.html. More recently, after the release of the UN technical report on Hariri’s slaying in September 2006, State Secretary Rice stated that the US administration hoped to convince its allies to impose sanctions on Damascus over its dubious role in Lebanon, Iraq, and its support of the Hamas Party. See “Damascus Warns Diplomatic Impasse Means more Conflict,” The Daily Star, September 27, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=75738. The Syrian president’s threat that a collapsing Damascene regime might have destabilizing repercussions in the Arab world has become a new deterrent weapon when it comes to dealing with the international community and the Arab regimes which fear the radical Islamists’ rising power. In addition, Syria’s rapprochement with Iran has enabled it to break somehow the circle of confinement and consolidate its waning power. Analysts argue that an angry and agonizing Syrian regime “could affect Lebanon in very terrible ways,” and bring about regional instability. See Interview with Gilbert Achcar by Phil Butland, “Lebanon: the Dangerous Effects of US interference,” Mideast, available from http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm? itemID=9251§ionID=1. See also Alain Gresh, “Offensive concertée contre le régime Syrien, Le Monde Diplomatique,” December 2005, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2005/12/GRESH/12995?var_recherche= Liban.

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dissenting Lebanese factions from solving their differences quietly and forbearingly. Second, they have contributed to the Party of God’s radicalization and national estrangement,283 and increased the Shiite establishment’s aloofness during the negotiations. After the adoption of Resolution 1701 – although it is too soon to analyze the reverberations of the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon – oppressive international supervision might heighten internal divisions. If Hezbollah is excessively cornered by the multinational force,284 the party’s alienation might increase, and its regional alignments might even become steadier. In sum, international pressure since 2004 has shown that Lebanon’s foreign policy does not only have to fear its Arab neighbors, but has to avert as much as possible cumbrous Western interventions susceptible to reawaken the old proArab/pro-Western clash. Thus, although the US played a major role in dismantling the semi-authoritarian Lebanese apparatus, it is questionable to what extent the hegemonial actor grasps the power-sharing realities in Lebanon and the complexity of the Middle East.285 In addition, France’s change of heart in 2004 – after President Chirac had declared in 2002 his implicit support for the Lebanese-Syrian coupling of pathways – suggests that imperative regional factors after the invasion of Iraq286 as well as issues related to the international configuration of the world system – notably the transatlantic relations – have prompted Western intervention in Lebanon. Western intervention would be more fruitful and less destabilizing in case the international community turned away from the politics of assertive interventionism, and adopted a soft and gradualist path to stimulate reform in the Lebanon. Future US involvement should be particularly cautious and pondered, and should operate under a multilateral umbrella.287 In this case, foreign interference would less likely upset the communal balance in the country, and would rather help Lebanon extricate itself slowly from the regional swamp.

283 284 285 286

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See Leenders, “How UN Pressure on Hizballah.” One of the international forces’ tasks is to control whether ammunitions reach Hezbollah. Gerhard Lehmbruch, interview with the author, Kirchzarten, October 25, 2005. In 2002, at the Francophone Summit that took place in Beirut, president Chirac acknowledged that progress in the Middle East process would not be global until it encompassed Lebanon and Syria. Awaiting this progress towards a just peace, the two countries would harmonize their relations. See Georges Corm, “Crise libanaise dans un contexte regional houleux,” Le Monde Diplomatique, Avril 2004, http://www.monde-diplomati que.fr/2005/04/CORM/12053. An aggressive policy towards Syria would undoubtedly exacerbate Lebanese cleavages. However, there is reason to believe that the US entanglement in Iraq, and the veto power placed by international powers in order to prevent a forceful anti-Syrian policy would drive the US to operate carefully and not unilaterally.

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Armed Palestinian camps “There will not be stability in the region as long as the Palestinian problem is not tackled”288 Lebanon’s regional status remains additionally contingent on the unresolved status of the armed Palestinian camps. Autonomous islands of security, the 12 armed camps have escaped the state’s control since the end of the war, and have been generally considered as a source of threat to Lebanon’s security. Since the adoption of Resolution 1559 and the Syrian pullout, the issue of the Palestinian weapons has been however high on the agenda.289 Even though a solution remains remote, there is a nascent widespread Lebanese consensus that a solution to the Palestinian weapons should come about as a result of peaceful bilateral negotiations. In October 2005, after emphasizing that the Palestinian groups should keep their weapons within the confines of the camps, the Lebanese government agreed with the main Palestinian factions that the issue of disarmament should be hammered out through dialogue and not confrontation. Yet, whereas bigger Palestinian factions affiliated to the Palestinian Authority have exhibited more flexibility in dealing with the Lebanese government, smaller militant groups conceive the very issue of disarmament as a threat to their self-preservation as long as security arrangements with Israel remain inexistent.290 Fears that the Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue on Palestinian weapons would remain hostage to exogenous factors are justified. Realistically, Lebanon cannot afford to separate the issue of Palestinian weapons from the fate of 400.000 Palestinian refugees on Lebanese soil. Some go as far as affirming that Lebanon’s deliverance from the heavy burden of security politics and regional

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Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 16, 2005. Fears that Syria might use armed Palestinian factions to destabilize the country have increased the ruling anti-Syrian alliance’s circumspection. In October 2005, the UN follow-up report on Resolution 1559 asserted that Syria was infiltrating weapons to the factions. Militant Palestinian factions consider Resolution 1559 as a conspiracy leading to the Palestinians’ forced implantation in Lebanon, and a prelude to the revocation of their right to return to Palestine. In fact, one of the main drawbacks of this resolution is its partial approach to the regional problem, and its attempt to separate security issues from political ones. See “Les factions palestiniennes au Liban toujours divisées sur la question du désarmement,” L’Orient Le Jour, November 1, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page.aspx?page= article&id=298243 &pf=1.

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dependence depends on a final solution to the Palestinian issue and a global Middle Eastern settlement.291 Communal segmentation in post-war Lebanon The picture of the restrictive conditions affecting Lebanon’s politics of accommodation and regional status becomes even clearer upon examining the postwar dynamics of communal segmentation. The objective of this section is to examine to what extent communities have identified with the power-sharing formula in the post-war period, and whether they were keen on preserving the pillars of national integration. Although the condition of communal segmentation – considered as a sustaining condition for consociational democracy – has been derailed after the 15-year war, it has not faltered. Lebanon’s communities are still separated by distinct cleavages which contribute to their segmentation and endow them with clear subcultural orientations. Furthermore, although their motives for identification with the Lebanese state have fluctuated, there are some indications that these motives have grown stronger since the Syrian pullout. These positive notes notwithstanding, the process has experienced several drawbacks and is threatened with considerable challenges. In the following paragraphs, I will examine the general trends of communal segmentation during the post-war phase and after Syrian pullout. The Lebanese communities’ estrangement (1990-2004) In the post-war period, Lebanon’s communities have experienced many political grievances which affected their attachment to the national formula. This has contributed to the emergence of an adversarial political culture which nurtured inter-communal feelings of defiance, and impeded the growth of national unity. This communal culture of caution and vigilance slowed down the process of post-war reconciliation, and led to the creation of antagonistic and monoconfessional coalitions. From a general point of view, the post-war communal landscape was reduced to a hierarchization of segments oscillating between partial or total inclusion in the system to partial or total exclusion from the system. The decisive factor determining communal pillarization under the national umbrella was no longer

291

Interviews with Lebanese politicians, Beirut, October 8, and December 16, 2004; Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, November 30, 2004.

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elite predominance292 but rather elite acceptance of Syrian guardianship. In other words, segmental pillarization was based on the communities’ political loyalties and not on the principle of communal equilibrium that the Ta’if pact was supposed to safeguard. This perverted model demystified the Ta’if claim that communities were neither political winners nor losers. Unstable segmental hierarchies – whose preeminence was contingent on their degree of acceptance of the post-war order – were the result of three main factors: • Syrian domination which affected communal loyalties as the Syrian regime played communities against each other to preserve its hegemony; • Disfigured communal representation in power-sharing arrangements; • Intra-segmental rifts accentuated by the war.293 In the next paragraph, I will describe more closely the phenomenon of communal estrangement in the post-war period up to 2004. For this purpose, I will specifically refer to the leading communities which play a major political role in the power-sharing formula: the Maronites, the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Druze community. The major communities’ perceptions of the political order Shaping communal allegiances and manipulating leader-follower relations to consolidate the Lebanese-Syrian patronage system have profoundly impacted the subcultures’ perceptions of themselves and of the political system. The Maronite community has particularly experienced a process of disaffection from the national formula during the Second Republic. The absence of a strong communal leadership as well as the Maronites’ resulting political emasculation accentuated the segment’s feeling of disenchantment or what was commonly referred to as Ihbat. Since criteria for political participation closely hinged on the degree of loyalty to the regime, Maronite leaders who were critical of the system had to exit the political scene.294 Politicians who acceded to power – notably the presidents of the Republic – were restricted to those who had

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See Pappalardo, “Conditions for Consociational Democracy.” Internal splits especially in the Maronite community impaired communal coherence and its ability to protect itself from external intrusions. In the 1990s, Christian leaders who possessed a power base were either jailed, forced to stay in exile or deemed unwelcome. It is however important to mention that the Maronite community’s marginalization was also the result of internecine conflicts, mainly the Aoun-Geagea war, which weakened the power base of the segment.

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strong ties to the Syrian tutor. This rift between the Maronites and the political formula became wider after President Lahoud’s accession to the presidency. Political isolation has generally heightened the Christians’ collective fears, and has also awakened apprehensions in respect to demographic considerations.295 The September 11 watershed and the Western fight against terrorism, which had a snowball effect on Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, has also reinforced the Christians’ feelings of insecurity in Lebanon.296 Despite this deep discontent, a gradual shift in the Lebanese Maronites’ socio-political identity has taken shape. Maronite political and religious elites have come to realize that communal survival does not lie in encapsulating the Maronite subculture and sustaining the spirit of group isolation but rather in forging alliances with other communities. These links could be the best bulwarks against communal decline.297 On the other hand, the Sunnis were more or less pleased with the Ta’if reforms which enhanced their community’s position and helped them achieve greater political visibility. Unlike the pre-war period in which their pro-Arab allegiances outdistanced their attachment to the Lebanese entity, the post-war period gradually consolidated their loyalty to the Lebanese homeland.298 Considered to be the Ta’if winners, they were however unable to establish deeply rooted political parties. What compensated for the absence of Sunni

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During interviews made in Fall 2004 with four Christian religious representatives belonging to the Maronite and Greek Catholic confessions, a general feeling of embitterment, and a common conviction that Muslim-Christian coexistence remained fragile and that Lebanese communities were more like detached fragments than cooperative subcultures were noted. One insisted on the fact that Christian-Muslim relations were far more harmonious in the pre-war period, and that the philosophy of coexistence advanced by the Ta’if pact had not materialized. “The rise of Muslim fundamentalism does not reassure the Maronite community, which is after all a Christian minority in the Middle East.” Interview with a Lebanese politician, Beirut, December 1, 2004. In the post-war period, Maronite political elites did not only forego rigid views centered on ‘political Maronitism’ but the religious establishment also worked on promoting a change of communal identity. After the Papal visit in 1997, the community became aware that it had to relinquish its previous role as an isolated segment and redefine itself as part of the whole. In the wake of the September 11 events, the Maronite church has been going through a process of revival in order to meet the challenges of the new international order, and to deconstruct the stereotype of the ‘Maronite ghetto.’ The Synod is part of this initiative that intends to bestow upon the Maronite community a new socio-cultural role, which is neither restricted to politics nor to the Lebanese entity. Interviews with Lebanese religious figures, Qornet Shehwan and Rabyeh, October 21, and November 5, 2004. Whereas the Maronite community had to experience a process of opening to the region and to the world, Muslim self-perceptions, which centered in the pre-war period on the image of the Arab ‘Umma’ or nation, refocused on the community.

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political parties was the segment’s contentment with its leadership in the Golden Hariri era (1992-1998). Increasing communal discontent started looming once the Lebanese-Syrian regime became increasingly wary of the late premier Hariri’s designs, and tried to control Sunni loyalties by giving power to political actors of a lesser stature, such as former Prime Ministers el Huss (1998-2000) and Karami (November 2004-March 2005). As for the Shiite community, by gaining more influence in Lebanon’s powersharing system, the segment has come to terms with some of its pre-war grievances. Hezbollah’s gradual integration in the political system and its acceptance of the formula of coexistence have greatly contributed to shaping a new nascent Shiite national consciousness. For some analysts, this process of integration denoted the possibility of reconciling Hezbollah’s ideology with the parameters of consensus politics.299 In spite of these optimistic augurs, the Shiite segment has resented the frozen consociational formula which takes only modest consideration of the community’s demographic weight. In addition, although the segment – united by the external Israeli threat – has rallied around the two major Shiite players, Amal and Hezbollah, minor Shiite voices have been sidelined in post-war elections and institutions. Moreover, the uneasy relationship between Islamist and various secular tendencies in the Shiite community made the segment less cohesive than it seemed to be.300 The Druze community tells the tale of political survival in an uncertain environment. Unified under Walid Jumblatt’s leadership, the community had basically to worry about the continuation of its political power. Jumblatt’s shifting alliances during the post-war period and rapprochement to the Maronite community in 2000 were partly motivated by the necessity of preserving power and preeminence. It is significant to mention that the Druze community’s call for a bigger share in the power-sharing arrangement, and more particularly for the establishment of a Senate presided by the Druze, has not been satisfied. Notwithstanding political fears and grievances, this community remained the most cohesive among Lebanese segments. Its location in the Shuf Mountains, its small size, and its segmentation under Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party have made it more immune to internal haggling.

299 300

See Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (London : Pluto Press, 2002). In the post-war period, for example, competition and rivalries between Hezbollah and the Shiite Supreme Council intensified.

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A Muslim-Christian Chasm? At first glance, it seems that post-war political practices contributed to the emergence of an inter-communal chasm between Muslim and Christian segments.301 Thus, whereas the Shiite and Sunni communities had gathered political gains in the post-Ta’if order, the Christian community emerged as the main loser as its political prerogatives were curtailed.302 In addition to the political dimension, one cannot disregard the impact of the war and its socio-cultural realities on exacerbating inter-communal defiance. Literature tackling communal relations in the wake of the war tends to be generally critical of Muslim-Christian cooperation.303 Writers mainly argue that the residues of fear, distrust, and shallow reconciliation disturbed the communities’ integration in the same national mold. These factors have also led to a general sense of disengagement, and to a feeling of disempowerment vis-àvis political events.304 Important demographic and social factors – such as population displacements resulting from the redrawing of segmental boundaries as well as a growing trend toward the formation of mono-confessional localities – contributed to widening this inter-cultural chasm.305 Upon studying trends of communal segmentation, one should not however exaggerate the impact of Muslim-Christian fault lines. Commenting on post-war communal relations, analysts commonly describe a grim landscape characterized by “a confessional bipolarity” opposing Lebanese subcultures at a time when the 301

302 303

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Numerous surveys emphasized the exacerbation of inter-communal tensions in post-war Lebanon, the lack of inter-communal cooperation, and the divergences in political attitudes and behavior between Christian and Muslim groups. See for instance Christine Asmar, Maroun Kisirwani and Robert Springborg, “Clash of Politics or Civilizations? Sectarianism among Youth in Lebanon,” Arab Studies Quarterly 21 (1999) 35- 61; Simon Haddad, “Christian-Muslim Relations and Attitudes towards the Lebanese State,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 21 (2001):131-148. For more details on the political rift between Christian and Muslim representatives, see also Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, 300-301. See Perthes, “Libanon: Stabilisierung,” 100. See Dagher, Bring down the Walls, 79-89 and 127-130; Judith Harik, “The Return of the Displaced and Christian-Muslim Integration in Post-War Lebanon,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10, (1999):159-175; Elizabeth Picard, “The Dynamics of the Lebanese Christians: From the Paradigm of the ‘Ammiyyat to the Paradigm of Hwayyek’s,” in Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The Challenge of the Future, ed. Andrea Pacini (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 200-221. For more details on post-war communal fears, see Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 273-303; Kassir, “Dix ans après.” For more details on Christian grievances, see El Khazen, “LebanonIndependent no more.” Middle East Quarterly 8 (Winter 2001): 43-50. See Salim Nasr, “The New Social Map,” in Lebanon in Limbo, 143-157. For more details on the fragmentation of communal cantons during the war, See Kamal Dib, Warlords and Merchants: The Lebanese Business and Political Establishment (UK: Garnet Publishing, 2004), 243-263.

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consociational Ta’if model was supposed to lead to a “harmonious transcommunal system.”306 Yet, this bipolarity was not the result of confessional differences but of their politicization. In other words, focusing on communal differences for political purposes has produced artificial cleavages that ran deeper into the communal skeleton than initial socio-cultural differences. Furthermore, various considerations temper the assumption that a ChristianMuslim gap was the main characteristic of the post-war communal landscape. First, special attention is riveted on the exacerbation of intra-segmental cleavages. Thus, power struggles in almost every community threatened the process of subcultural segmentation.307 This has led political scientists to question the presence of a coherent post-war consociational model as confessions were not cohesive.308 The exacerbation of inter- as well and intra-segmental rifts proved that communal differences were not stimulated by purely confessional causes but by socio-political struggles and power play under Syrian hegemony. 309 Main polarizing communal cleavages after 2000 were thus fomented by political conflict lines, such as the debate over Syria’s role and Lebanon’s degree of entanglement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is noteworthy that political discontent with the post-Ta’if order was not only strictly confined to the Christian community but also to the Muslim poor

306 307

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Dubois, La survie libanaise, 143. While the Maronite community was the least cohesive, other communities were also factionalized. I refer, for example, to the Sunnis who experienced in the post-war period power struggles between the traditional Sunni leadership and the Hariris, and to the Druze segment’s power play between the Jumblatt and the Arslan clans as well as the struggle over the Druze spiritual leadership between the Jumblatt and the Yazbaki factions. It is also important to take into account dissident Shiite and Sunni Islamist movements which highlighted internal rifts within the Muslim communities. Special attention is riveted on Shaykh Subhi al Tufayli’s Revolt of the Hungry in 1997. A former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Shaykh Tufayli’s “civil disobedience” rally reflected the internal struggles within the Shiite segment. One should also take into consideration the challenges posed by Sunni religious movements, such as the Ahbash and Al Jama’a al-Islamiyya movements, to the Hariris or to the traditional Sunni leadership throughout the 1990s. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, December 12, 2004 Muslim-Christian integration has suffered throughout the post-war period not only because of confessional dividing lines and animosities, but also because the political system had been greatly deformed under Syrian hegemony. Interview with a Lebanese religious figure, Qornet Shehwan, November 5, 2004. In their study on sectarianism among Muslim and Christian youth in post-war Lebanon, Asmar, Kisirwani, and Springborg noted that while divergences around political perceptions and attitudes seem to divide the Muslim and Christian communities, economic and socio-cultural cross-cutting pressures detract from the severity of sectarianism. See “Sectarianism among Lebanese Youth,” 61.

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classes.310 In addition, almost all communities at a certain phase suffered from the misapplication of the Ta’if pact. Also, cross-cutting pressures between Muslim and Christian segments have never disappeared during the post-war period.311 From this perspective, one should downplay the hypothesis of a MuslimChristian schism, and speak rather of a threatened and loosely organized process of communal segmentation. Upon studying post-war communal cleavages, emphasis should be especially laid on the deformed application of the Lebanese consociational model, which has contributed to feeding divisions and politicizing communal solidarities. Communal segmentation after the 2005 watershed During Lebanon’s 2005 uprising, communities have united in “an unprecedented outpouring in favor of independence and democratization.”312 An unexampled rapprochement between the Christian, Druze, and Sunni segments suggested that communal affinities were not static. Unexpected inter-communal alliances have also shown that confessional identities were not immured but ready to evolve. The 2005 uprising has left an aftertaste of a new national consciousness based on the dramatic upheavals that the country has gone through. The active role played by transcommunal movements such as the Future Current or political parties such as the Democratic Left and the Free Patriotic Movement pointed out to the likely decline of mono-confessional coalitions and emergence of crosscommunal parties. However, this image is much more optimistic than recent events have shown. In post-Syrian Lebanon, many hindrances threaten national integration, and suggest that the danger of communal desegmentation in Lebanon is still acute. First, the 2005 transcommunal alliance has weakened the moment the national divide in the post-Syrian era widened. Second, lingering intracommunal rifts and divergences have undermined national cohesiveness. Despite the return of its marginalized leaders, the Maronite community, for instance, 310 311

312

Harris, “Lebanon,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey 1997, 518. Various socio-cultural and political initiatives were launched to promote inter-communal dialogue. I refer to the Maronite-Druze “Reconciliation of the Mountain” during Maronite patriarch’s visit to the Shuf in 2001, and to the late premier Hariri’s consultations with Muslim and Christian religious leaders in 1998 on his cabinet’s policy. According to some analysts, Muslim-Christian dialogue constituted one of the most important characteristics of post-war Lebanon. See Dagher, Ces hommes qui font la paix, 321-326. See Paul Salem, “Lebanon at the Crossroads: Rebuilding an Arab Democracy,” Saban Center Middle East Memo #7, May 31, 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page=/fp/saban/ salemmemo20050531.htm.

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remains strongly factionalized313 and located in the shadow of the rising Sunni and Shiite powers. Moreover, in the wake of the Syrian withdrawal, all communities are still in the process of redefining their political dynamics and allegiances within the ‘148 March spectrum.’ Their satisfaction with Lebanon’s consociational dynamics is contingent on a very delicate political remodelling and on the sharing of confessional spoils.314 Two additional major challenges hinge on the Shiite community’s ambiguous political status, and on the Palestinian community’s vague social condition.315 The Shiite community’s status and looming schisms Arising areas of concern are the Shiite segment’s radicalization after the Independence Intifada and its aloofness from the Christian-Druze-Sunni majoritarian coalition. In fact, the role that the Shiite community intends to play in the power-sharing formula and whether it will strive to maintain the system remain unclear. The polarization of the Shiite establishment around Resolution 1559 and Hezbollah’s military status discloses communal worries and fears that run deeper than visions over foreign intervention. According to some analysts, the Shiite establishment’s walkout of the cabinet in November 2005 results mainly from the fear that “the emasculation of Hezbollah will lead to the marginalization of the community faced 30 years ago.”316 After the July War, Hezbollah’s call for a new national unity government reveals the party’s dissatisfaction with the static national formula, and its desire to strengthen the Shiite community’s prerogatives.

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The Maronite community is presently divided into various camps: The pro-Syrian independent group e.g. Samir Franjieh’s followers, president Lahoud’s supporters, the 14 March groupings such as the Lebanese Forces, and finally Aoun’s followers. After its leader’s death, the Sunni community is slowly rebuilding its power base under the Future Current. It is still uncertain whether future power struggles between Hariri’s sympathizers and the traditional Sunni leadership will ensue. Furthermore, an important factor at play behind the Druze alignment with the Christian and Sunni segments stems ouf of the Druze community’s fear of political emasculation. Thus, a durable Druze-Christian alignment remains conditional on the frailties of the confessional pact. An empowerment of the Maronite community would, for instance, reawaken the Druze leadership’s suspicions regarding political representation in Mount Lebanon. Gerhard Lehmbruch, interview with the author, Kirchzarten, October 25, 2005. See Michael Young, “Accept the Headlock of Consensus Politics,” The Daily Star, December 22, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=20933&cat_ID=5.

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More seriously, after the departure of the Syrian tutor, the post-Syrian era has been characterized by a rising bipolar distrust. On the one hand, the Shiite establishment – pressured by the new government and by the international community – fears the plot of “a Sunni-and Christian-dominated Lebanon.” On the other hand, Christian and Sunni segments fear that the Shiite groupings are more loyal to regional superpowers than to Lebanon.317 Analysts also draw attention to the risk of a deepening Sunni-Shiite political cleavage in the post-Syrian era.318 Thus, the Shiite establishment which has been distrustful of ascending Sunni power in post-war Lebanon is highly suspicious of Hariri’s Future current.319 This internal Sunni-Shiite cleavage has also been depicted as the ramification of a wider regional Sunni-Shiite divide extending from Lebanon to Iran.320 This tale of Shiite aloofness from the Intifada fanfare suggests that the political gains accumulated by the Shiite establishment in the post-war period were not sufficient to erase feelings of political alienation. The segment’s pro-Syrian stances and alliance with the Syrian-Iranian axis could serve as bulwarks enhancing Shiite security and political preponderance. Furthermore, the segment’s firm decision to stay aloof from the 2005 uprising means that the external incentives that the establishment gets by aligning with regional powers outweigh the incentives that the Lebanese political system offers the Shiite political elites. An arising question is whether the Shiite community has enough endogenous incentives for commitment to the confessional formula. Thus, Lebanon’s limited and static consociationalism has proven so far unable to satisfy dissenting factions. This is why adjusting mutual security arrangements and enhancing Shiite representation in the power-sharing formula might induce the establishment to give up its external agenda. Other factors also play a role in shaping the Shiite community’s feeling of distinctness in the national mold. Thus, the Shiites feel that they have suffered 317 318

319

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See Oxford Business Group, “Politics: Overview,” in Emerging Lebanon 2006, 17. See “Post-War Lebanese Politics-The Perils of Breaking the Deadlock,” Strategic Comments 12, September 26, 2006, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume12---2006/volume-12--issue-7/post-war-lebanese-politics. See Salem, “Lebanon at the Crossroads: Rebuilding an Arab Democracy,” Saban Center Middle East Memo #7, May 31, 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page=/fp/saban/ salemmemo20050531.htm. Power struggles between the Shiite and Sunni communities in Iraq, Iran’s rising power and endorsement of the Shiite community in Lebanon on the one hand, and Jordan’s and Egypt’s fear of the emerging “Shiite Crescent” on the other side, denote the dawn of a bipolar SunniShiite fission in the Middle East. See Susser, “Aufgang des schiitischen Halbmonds. ”

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more than other Lebanese communities with respect to the Israeli aggressions in the South.321 The 2006 July War – during which Southern Lebanon, the Shiite heartland, was destroyed – has increased the Shiites’ feeling of hardship, and reinforced their allegiances to Hezbollah. The increasing attachment to the party’s military wing could be seen as an exaggerated form of segmental autonomy in the shadow of a weak state. Still, there is reason to believe that the Shiites’ national consciousness is still in a process of gestation, and that a clear feeling of national consciousness is underway. Although the Shiites did not embrace the feverish national tumult that blazed across confessional lines during the Beirut Spring, observers predict that it would not take long before the community responded to the “call of home and patriotism” and affiliated to “the emerging national consensus.”322 Moreover, the community’s segmentation under the Amal-Hezbollah leadership has not erased other Shiite voices who are not content with the prevailing hegemony.323 On the Shiite National Meeting Day in 2005, for example, several Shiite personalities met to discuss the community’s new political course in the post-Syrian era. They underlined the necessity of emancipating the community from Syrian influence and forging an autonomous political space.324 Lebanon’s forgotten community Another challenge undermining the process of communal segmentation is the obscure social status of 400.000 Palestinians that have become an integral part in the Lebanese society without being yet recognized.

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Interview with a Lebanese citizen, Freiburg, December 12, 2005. See Ajami, “Autumn of the Autocrats,” 29. In the post-Syrian era, intra-Shiite rifts have emerged between the traditional Shiite clerics and Hezbollah after the 2006 July War. See “Post-War Lebanese Politics- The Perils of Breaking the Deadlock,” Strategic Comments 12, September 26, 2006. The fact that the Party of God has become an extremely autonomous organization that commands strong loyalties in the Shiite community would most likely awaken the hostilities of other Shiite secular or religious currents that feel discarded from the center. During this meeting, Shiite religious figure Sayyed Mohammad al-Amine spoke of the pressure used by Syria on the Shiites to demonstrate their loyalty, and stressed the necessity of political diversity within the community. He also criticized those who “try to summarize the entire Shiite sect in them.” See Leila Hatoum, “Shiites Meet to Forge New Political Direction,” The Daily Star, April 22, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=14479& categ_id=2.

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It is noteworthy that the Ta’if pact, which laid the foundations for communal segmentation after the war, has totally omitted the Lebanese state’s and communities’ relations with the Palestinians. Furthermore, the 2005 uprising – during which the themes of Muslim-Christian unity and inter-communal reconciliation in Lebanon were stressed – has been criticized for wiping out the Palestinian ingredient from the Lebanese saga.325 Despite a political consensus that the Palestinians should not permanently resettle in Lebanon, the segment’s uncertain role in the Lebanese society entails that Lebanon’s power-sharing democracy has been unable to deal with important enclaves that affect communal segmentation. Dark clouds over Lebanon’s consociationalism After this thorough analysis of Lebanon’s consociational soul-searching since 1990, I will discuss below lingering theoretical reservations which detract from Lebanon’s consociational value as well as other lingering dangers which might retard Lebanon’s consociational recovery. Theoretical reservations about consociationalism According to some analysts, post-war Lebanon’s consociational experience has detracted from the value of the envisioned Lebanese system, and has highlighted its incompatibility with the development of a common public sphere. Hence, sceptics have warned against the perverse character of Lebanese consociationalism, and more particularly against its adjacency to what is commonly described as sectarianism or insidious confessionalism.326 More importantly, this straight divorce between consociational practices and democracy in the post-war period led some observers to label Lebanon’s consociational democracy as an ‘oxymoron’.327 Furthermore, Lebanon’s consociationalism has been interpreted as a forced and premeditated arrangement to preserve old confessional structures. In this regard, it has failed to reflect the evolving nature of the Lebanese entity, and has become “the outcome of a 325

326

327

See Laleh Khalili, “A Landscape of Uncertainty: Palestinians in Lebanon,” Middle East Report 236 (Fall 2006): 34-39, 35. During my field research in winter 2004, I noticed that as soon as I referred to consociational democracy, most of the interviewees associated it with confessionalism and sectarianism. Warning against the dangerous impact of confessionalism in people’s lives, one civil activist ironically commented: “In Lebanon, there is a certain pleasure to live in confessionalism and to be buried in confessional cemeteries.” Interview with the director of a civil society association in Lebanon, Beirut, October 25, 2004.

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socialization process which weakens or strengthens” according to the political elites’ capacity to sustain encapsulated leader-follower relations. A proof is that this feeling of confessional belonging has undergone several fluctuations in the last 40 years, and that Lebanese communities do not have the same confessional self-perception. An arising question is whether the Lebanese are genuinely inclined towards confessional arrangements or whether it has been the elites’ interest since 1943 to maintain the system and its imbalances.328 Thus, crystallized confessional disunity has become, according to critics, “the condition for the survival of the country” insofar as the porous Lebanese public sphere has been compensated by communal “zones of influence” or “strongholds” guaranteeing its functioning.329 These reservations attract one’s attention to the danger of freezing primordial ties within condensed structures, and blocking the emancipation of subcultural identities. By compelling the latter to remain immutable and definable only in terms of a confessional terminology, the Lebanese model raises the question whether it is sound to petrify communal structures in an everchanging international order. Major flaws in the post-war consociational vision If Ta’if solves Lebanon’s ambivalent position between the Arab world and the Western world, it introduces two new ambivalent concepts: Lebanon’s predicament between a consociational system and a non-confessional finality, and between a subservient Arab status and a sovereign Arab identity. In other words, the post-war power-sharing pact fails to address the missing links between confessional representation and deconfessionalization, and between communal particularities and Lebanon’s duties as an Arab state. The puzzle of Lebanese consociationalism: between transitoriness and perpetuity Lebanon’s post war ‘pacted’ system ignores the point of transition between power-sharing built on confessional representation and the dismantlement of 328

329

Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, December 14, 2004. The political scientist argues that confessionalism is rather an artificial arrangement which is not truly embedded in Lebanon’s political culture. To prove his claim, he alludes to the waning of confessional feelings before the war in 1975. He also holds that communities in Lebanon have different confessional perceptions of the community. For example, within the Christian communities, whereas degrees of confessionalism tend to fluctuate in the Maronite segment, the Greek Orthodox community’s confessional awareness is rather low. Ahmad Beydoun, “A Note on Confessionalism,” in Lebanon in Limbo, 75-86, 75-76.

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421

confessionalism. In fact, the Ta’if pact aims at building a solid power-sharing system in which communities are solid partners in a Junktim. But Ta’if also aims at drawing a vision of a deconfessionalized nation. Still, the treaty only mentions that a committee responsible for the abolition of political sectarianism would be established without giving any further concise directives on the propitious timing. A fundamental question is whether power-sharing based on the crystallization of religious cleavages is to be considered as a transitional or a final stage in the Ta’if nation. It is surely confusing how the Ta’if agreement at the same time legitimizes and institutionalizes the pact of coexistence on the basis of confessionalism, and declares that the latter should be eventually abolished. Ideologically, there is an enormous abyss between “sectarian thought” and “the democratic aspiration” for a secularized Lebanon.330 It is indeed illogical to build and strengthen consociational institutions on a confessional basis and then brutally ‘un-make’ them. Thus, whilst Michel Chiha’s vision of an eternal Lebanese nation based on a confessional equilibrium331 is implicitly declared as transient in Ta’if, no clear trajectory is redrawn. In addition, if this model of governance is ever to be abolished, the document does not even mention which type of democracy is to accompany the process of deconfessionalization, but leaves the question open. In this sense, present Lebanon remains a power-sharing hybrid lost between the pact of a final confessional nation and the vision of a promised secular democracy. The ambivalent commitment to confessionalism has it roots in Article 95 of the constitution which decrees political confessionalism on a transitory basis, but paradoxically legitimizes the perennial character of confessionalism as long as confessional representation is not challenged.332 This absent connection between the crystallization of political confessionalism in state institutions and the necessity to find a communal consensus that enables the passage toward deconfessionalization has rendered the transitory article more solid than ever. If one of the main sustaining conditions of a stable power-sharing system is communal commitment to the existing distribution of power,333 it remains unclear to which power equation the national communities should commit after the Syrian departure. Should Lebanese communities strive to consolidate a

330

331 332 333

Hassan Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement,” Al Mashriq and American University of Beirut, http://almashriq.hiof.no/ddc/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html, accessed October, 2, 2006. See Chiha, Politique intérieure. See Dubois, La survie libanaise. See Pappalardo, “Conditions for Consociational Democracy.”

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power-sharing democracy based on religious communities or work on a phased plan of deconfessionalization? If the Ta’if pact is an interlude towards a less confessionalized system, it is also not clear which conditions have to be fulfilled before such a project is deemed applicable to the Lebanese society. Which role would communities play in determining whether the right time for such a transformation has come? Until now, neither a political nor an overarching popular consensus has been achieved on the identity of the final power-sharing formula.334 In addition, Lebanese communities seem to have different perceptions of what a consociational democracy means.335 In that respect, contention over the meaning, permanence or the transience of the Lebanese formula has impeded the development of a stable political culture and a stable national consciousness. It is conceivable that if elites do not work on forging a consensus over the vision of Lebanon’s political pathway in the near future, the “confessionalize or de-confessionalize” cleavage may polarize communities in the decades to come. An additional consideration is that the uncertainty hovering around the identity of the Lebanese system weakens the quest for a corresponding and stable form of institutionalized democracy. The puzzle of Lebanon’s Arabism “The Lebanese choice is not between being a pro-American agent or a Syrian vassal.”336 After a war which has declared the death of partition, federation, Maronitism and other ideological debates on Arab nationalism, it seemed that the Ta’if pact had concretized Lebanon’s shift from a French bastion and a country with an “Arab face” to a final Arab homeland. Nevertheless, the Ta’if treaty was followed by a cascade of Lebanese-Syrian treaties which tied Lebanon’s political path to that of Damascus. It seemed as if the contours of this new Arab national identity and Lebanon’s new obligations as an Arab nation could only be comprehended in respect to Lebanon’s distinctive 334

335

336

In my field research in Lebanon during winter 2004, whereas some politicians affirmed their commitment to a power-sharing democracy based on religious affiliation, others advocated deconfessionalization in the long run. For example, as the Catholic Synod under the auspices of Pope John Paul II referred in its final statement to the Lebanese system as a consensual democracy, Sunni and Shiite clerics criticized this concept which, in their eyes, denoted fragmentation, and downplayed unity. Boutros Harb’s statement in “Harb: al khayar layss bayna amil li America aw abd li Suriya,” Assafir, December 28, 2004, 3.

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relationship with Syria. In fact, while the 1943 pact relinquished belonging to Syria and to the Western world, and insisted on an absolute independence, the national identity introduced by Ta’if, though it solves the dilemma of national belonging, raises the question of a problematic independence.337 Also, the post-war Syrian guardianship has contributed to politicizing the meaning of Lebanon’s Arabness, and has made it contingent on pragmatic politics in the region.338 The artificiality of post-war Lebanon’s Arabism led to engendering artificial societal cleavages which did not exist before. During the Second Republic, for example, the definition of being Lebanese or not, Arab or non-Arab has been measured in terms of loyalty to the pro-Syrian order.339 On top of these reservations, the issue of Lebanon’s Arab identity was only decided at the elite level, but communities still have a different perception of what, for example, Arab belonging and national sovereignty mean.340 Since Lebanon’s 2005 transition, different Lebanese factions have been reinventing their local, regional, and ‘Arab’ loyalties. The ideological debate on Lebanon’s Arabism has acutely manifested itself in the political elites’ divergences about Lebanon’s foreign policy and alignment with the region and the West. Indeed, reconciling Lebanon’s Arabism, independence and stability will probably be one of the most difficult tasks in the coming decade. It is more likely that the conceptualization of Lebanon as a sovereign Arab homeland, whose durability does not hinge on its subordination to its regional neighbors, will take time to implant its roots. The arising question is how to forge a unified elite and communal consensus on a Lebanese nation that is enough Arab to be harmonious with its surroundings, but which is neither subservient to pro-Syrian nor to Western allegiances. Despite all these reservations on Lebanon’s pacted power-sharing, I will outline in the final chapter a vision for Lebanon’s change into a stable state. This proposal will show how it is possible to transform Lebanon’s low-intensity democratic power-sharing into a more stable and more democratic consociationalism. This political walkway is in fact a prerequisite to a secular and democratic Lebanese state. 337 338

339

340

See Maila “La république de Taêf.” See el Solh, Lebanon and Arabism, 351-353. The author argues that the definition of an Arab nation in post-war Lebanon had nothing to do with Arab nationalism but rather with pragmatic politics. Opposition activists, who demarcated themselves from the loyalist establishment, were accused of being pro-Israeli or pro-American agents. In addition, politicians, who called for Syrian withdrawal or for the application of Resolution 1559, were accused by the ruling establishment of ‘betraying’ the Lebanese nation. In short, at the elite level, Lebanon’s national identity has been used as a political weapon to create steep rifts between contending blocs, and to ensure the survival of the political order. Abul Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, 117.

6. Final Appraisal Crafting Democracy: Craftinga Consociational a Consociational Democracy: The Limits of the ‘Self-Negating Prophecy’ Negating Prophecy’

The Limits of the ‘Self-

“In Lebanon, conditions for consociationalism have become too difficult even under the best of circumstances.”1 “Freedom from Syrian occupation has prompted a poignant acknowledgement of the continued constraints on Lebanon’s quest to define itself.”2 In his posthumous book, Lebanon: the Unachieved Dream, Samir Kassir writes of the dream of a Lebanon “enriched by its differences, freed from confessional and clannish constraints, a state devoted to its citizens […], a free and democratic society…” In this sense, he says: “It is not about resurrecting the old Lebanon […] but about reinventing another.”3 Whether the 2005 Independence Intifada has brought the Lebanese closer to their dream of a unified nation remains highly uncertain. At first glance, Lebanon’s post-war painful and unending transition indicates that a consociational and democratic start-off in a turbulent region and in a deeply fragmented society is more likely to be constrained in the future by inexorable conditions. Particularly, if Lebanon remains trapped in the dilemma of the

1 2

3

Pierre van den Berghe, interview with the author, Byblos, November 11, 2006. Sateh Noureddine and Laurie King-Irani “Elections Pose Lebanon’s Old Questions Anew,” Middle East Report Online, May 31, 2005, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero053105.html. Excerpts from Samir Kassir’s editorials in An Nahar written in 2004 and 2005, and reproduced by Christophe Boltanski in La Libération, February, 14, 2006, http://www.liberation.fr/page. php?Article=359150. These passages are published in Kassir’s posthumous book Liban, le rêve inachevé (Paris: Actes Sud, 2006).

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Middle East process, “then a true Lebanese pact of consociation will remain a thing of the past.”4 From an evaluative perspective, in the wake of a fleeting Beirut Spring, conditions for consociationalism do not seem particularly favorable.5 Although a multiple balance of power among segments and traditions of compromise are still inherent to the Lebanese society, adverse factors related to the ambiguous role that communities will play in the national formula, and to growing socioeconomic disturbances in the aftermath of the July War6 might add countless burdens to the frail system. In addition, the variable of external threat, which – instead of promoting transcommunal cohesion – acts sometimes as a unitary and at other times as a divisive factor, is detrimental to Lebanon’s voluntary politics of accommodation. Moreover, as the international and regional systems have become extremely unstable since 2001, external factors are likely to impact the porous republic more adversely. In the ultimate analysis, Lebanon’s consociational democracy remains closely dictated by the exclusive factors of elite coalescence, subcultural segmentation, and alignment in conflicts. To make things more complicated, the survival of Lebanon’s consociationalism will not only be connected to these three restrictive conditions but also to the consolidation of the country’s fragile democratic apparatus, and its low sovereignty which hinges on both regional and international guardianship. This dependency on restrictive conditions means that consociational democracy would more likely remain a low-intensity model of governance which could at any time slide below the democratic threshold. Figure 6.1 depicts Lebanon’s system changes since 1943 and points out to the uncertainty as well as precariousness of Lebanon’s transition to an electoral democracy in 2005:

4 5

6

Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing, 200. Review of the conditions stated by Lijphart in Power-Sharing; Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy in the International System”; Pappalardo “Conditions for Consociational Democracy.” Fear prevails that Lebanon’s faltering economy after the Summer of Rage would lead to acute internal problems and encourage foreign destabilizing intervention. See Economist Kamal Hamdan’s statement in “Lebanon Economy Reels under Hardships,” The Australian, October 3, 2006, http://www.theaustralian. news.com.au/story/0,20867,20516006-23109,00.html.

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Figure 6.1

Lebanon’s chronological system transition since 1943

Source: Fakhoury Whereas the promising 2005 elections demonstrated the state’s potential for progress along the continuum of transition, Lebanon’s “diminished sovereignty”7 remains one of the main obstacles thwarting system advancement. The 2006 July War and subsequent episodes of domestic confrontations which have on various occasions degenerated into sectarian violence8 confirm on the one hand Lebanon’s nebulous territorial and political margins of self-rule and reveal on the other hand that the 2005 system transition is threatened on a constant basis by fluctuating authoritarian pressures. Although the redeployment of the Lebanese army to the South of Lebanon is said to have been completed by October 2006, Lebanon’s decisional selfgovernance is still curbed by several enclaves and by a complicated interplay of extrinsic factors.9 As the republic embarks on a trip of international monitoring 7

8

9

See Grugel, Democratization, 80. A lessened territorial and political sovereignty remains an essential obstacle to democratization. See for instance, Anthony Shadid, “Along Beirut’s Line of Confrontation: Emerging Border in Capital Evokes Old and New Sectarian Crises in Lebanon,” Washington Post, January 27, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/26/AR2007012601496.html. The main restrictions are Hezbollah’s permissive autonomy, the coexistence of Hezbollah with the Lebanese army in the South and with the international peacekeeping force that imposes an

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after the 2006 July War, fear prevails that external interferences would thwart internal consensus and constrict the political actors’ array of options. On the other hand, Lebanon’s power-sharing remains limited to sharing power without arbitration or institutionalization. This makes the system inclined to deviate into unhealthy modes of consociationalism. It is against this backdrop of consociational and democratic uncertainty that Lebanon’s struggle to escape from its lot of regional and domestic hardships should be understood. These findings not only confirm the narrow margins of political maneuvering in Lebanon, but also raise overall serious reservations about the performance and feasibility of consociational models in extremely troubled environments. On a broader scale, Lebanon’s constricted power-sharing model casts a dark cloud on the theory of consociational democracy, and suggests that consociationalism is not a self-contained typology since its existence is dictated by stringent and mostly external factors without which the system might not even come into place. By projecting a shadow of uncertainty on the self-sufficiency of the consociational typology or on its ability to stand as a sui generis political system without complimentary exogenous components, it also puts into question Lijphart’s consociational prerequisites which rest on the elite variable. Thus, Lebanon’s difficult consociationalism spotlights the limitations of deliberate consociational crafting, and raises the query whether it is possible to have extremely prudent and vigilant elites continuously committed to maintaining the system. The particular question that consociational theory fails to tackle in this respect is how to sustain consociational devices in times of intense polarization and extreme overload on the political system. Whereas one could maintain that Lebanon’s balanced consociationalism remains closely linked to a mix of difficult circumstances, I will show in the following paragraphs how spanning the bridge between power-sharing, institutional engineering, and democratization might improve Lebanon’s current formula and prospects for political stability. Whereas consociational theory could be autonomously used to explain Lebanon’s endurance and decisionmaking mechanisms, it fails to illustrate the Lebanese system’s potential evolution into a more refined model of governance.

international sea and air embargo on Hezbollah’s arms. Other restrictions hinge on Syria’s dubious influence in the country, and Israel’s threats of renewed attack if it is provoked by Hezbollah. Although the Israeli army has largely withdrawn from the South, Resolution 1701 remains an interim solution to the Israeli-Hezbollah problem pending a comprehensive settlement.

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The prospects for Lebanon’s consociational democracy “Consociations may be the most benign political forms possible after serious internal identity-based wars, and the best formats to prevent serious or recurrent wars.”10 Be “In deeply divided societies, political settlements based on powersharing die hard, and […] even when understandings between the sectors of society fall apart, power-sharing may still be the best political option.”11 Lebanon’s double-barrelled consociational democracy has been regarded as a source of destabilization and paralysis, but also as a permanent and inevitable solution for the Lebanese state.12 For some analysts, the strong relation between power-sharing and the Lebanese polity transforms Lebanon into one of the “inescapable” states “however disordered” they might be.13 Indeed, the experience of the 15-year war has shown that Lebanon’s menu of political systems is restricted. Alternatives to consensus involving an abrupt termination of the consociational system, such as ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation, imposition of majority models, or partition, were bound to fail. In the end, Lebanese remain paradoxically tied together by their confessional conflicts and hostilities.14 Furthermore, Lebanon’s power-sharing democracy has been inherently linked to the vision of the Lebanese polity as a prescriptive model in the Arab world, and as a haven for minorities. Equating Arabism with plurality, and depicted as a symbol for religious coexistence and a bridge between the Occident and Orient, the Lebanese model deconstructs widespread concepts of an authoritarian

10 11 12

13 14

O’Leary, “Foreward: The Realism of Power-Sharing,” xxxiv. Barak, “Lebanon: Failure,” 331. For more details on the debate between those who favor the refinement of the Lebanese consensual system and those who favor its eradication, see Raghid el Solh, “Religious Identity and Citizenship: An Overview of Perspectives,” in Peace for Lebanon: From War to Reconstruction, ed. Deidre Collings (Boulder: Lynne Rienner publishers,1994) 231-240. Barak, “Lebanon, Failure, Collapse” 332. See Dagher, Bring Down the Walls, 50; Abul Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, 119-123.

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Arabness.15 Lebanon has also been portrayed as a normative “experiment in multicultural interdependence.”16 Yet, whereas some analysts tend to cling to the inevitability and indispensability of the Lebanese model,17 others emphasize either the necessity of a transient consociational experience which paves the way for a “public common sphere,”18 or the necessity of secularization to put an end to the machinery of “confessional appetites” in the small republic.19 However, between the two endpoints or between inevitable power-sharing and the realization of a secular state, there are other intermediary passageways that the Lebanese state has yet to embark on. In fact, despite its rather dim prospects, Lebanon’s consociational democracy is no ‘slippery slope’ to despair. Reinventing consociationalism: for a gradualist path “The big problem is not so much how to eliminate sectarian loyalties, but how to depoliticize such aspects of identity, so that a civil consciousness can emerge based on a shared Lebanese identity…”20 Transcending the determinism of constraining factors in the Lebanese case, this conclusion argues that it is possible to improve the present model by synchronizing the consociational and democratic components of the national formula. This alternative strategy constitutes the first step towards a long-term national overhaul. In the following sections, I will demonstrate how by refining the institutional and constitutional design,21 fostering a communal culture of concordance, 15

16

17

18

19

20 21

Lebanon’s political system is perceived by some as a mission in the Arab world. Interview with a Lebanese religious figure, Ashrafieh, October 8, 2004; interview with a Lebanese politician with the author, Beirut, November 8, 2004. See Hefeez Malik, “Overview: Lebanon as an Experiment in Multicultural Interdependence,” in Lebanon’s Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Kail. C. Ellis (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2002), 14-22. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, August 13, 2003. See also Dagher, Bring down the Walls, 213-214; Khaled Kabbani, “Conflicts intercommunautaires au Liban: Problèmes et solutions,” in La société de concordance: Approche comparative, eds Theodor Hanf, Antoine N. Messarra, Hinrich R. Reinstrom (Beirut: Université Libanaise,1986), 93-102, 100. Hudson, “From Consociationalism to the Public Sphere: Recent Evidence from Lebanon,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East, ed. Leonard Binder (Florida: University Press of Florida,1999), 92-109, 107-108. Interviews with two Lebanese political scientists, Beirut, December 12, 2004; Kirchzarten, October 12, 2006. Rigby, “Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics,” 178. Consolidating and institutionalizing the democratic apparatus, altering the existing distributional

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prioritizing national integration over entanglement in regional crises, the Lebanese system could improve along the democratic and power-sharing continuum. My proposal rests on the assumption that Lebanon’s current model is not the perennial end-state, and that its consociationalism can be remodelled in order to minimize to a certain extent the disintegrative impact of exogenous and endogenous factors. It is also grounded on the premise that the Lebanese society cannot be abruptly secularized under the present circumstances,22 and that deconfessionalization should be the natural result of a consociational remodelling. Until lately, free impulses of post-war consociationalism were frozen by the obtrusive Lebanese-Syrian system, which has managed to maintain an artificial façade of stability. After Syrian withdrawal, upcoming challenges are how postwar Lebanon will reinvent its consociational formula, and whether a new powersharing experience allows ‘indigenous’ conflict-regulation and voluntary communal reconciliation without external manipulation. Only then can Lebanon experience whether the consociational ties are transient or lasting modes of coexistence. For this reason, I opt for a gradualist approach which aims at tackling the missing link between the stagnant Lebanese consensual system and the rise of a healthier consociational democracy. The purpose of such a model is to forge “unity out of diversity”23 by enabling a socio-political transformation at the end of which segmental fragmentation gives way to a segmental plurality. Attaining unity out of diversity does not entail a forceful depersonalization or homogenization of Lebanese communities, but rather implies a state of communal coexistence in stable and democratic state structures till subcultures naturally forge overarching alliances among themselves and vis-à-vis the state. Throughout this phase, segmental autonomy and mutual veto principles remain important guarantees against attempts at coercive unification. In this sense, the study argues that designing a dynamic consociational model could pave the way for a common public sphere only if power-sharing is regarded as a structure to contain centrifugal drives and not as an end in itself. The projected model should notably depart from the rigid system of political confessionalism. Whereas the latter strives to ensure communal representation by safeguarding a rigid distribution of power, a more flexible version of 22

23

components of power-sharing, and doing away with system ridigity. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Beirut, August 13, 2003. Moreover, analysts warn against an instant secularization which may lead to the emergence of authoritarianism. See Picard, Lebanon, a Shattered Country, 169. See Koch, “Das Ende der Koexistenz im Libanon,” 112-113.

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consociationalism could mitigate institutional stiffness, and slowly alter confessional mentalities by setting in place the right conditions for a more cooperative cross-communal culture.24 Ultimately, whether the end of Lebanon’s paradigm will be a secular or a lasting segmented democracy remains to see. Chances are, however, that a gradual shift from stagnant confessionalism to a dynamic and coherent power-sharing mold – in which communities have learned to perceive themselves as organizational units of a concordant culture and not as adversarial segments – might enable a natural passage to secularization. Consociational challenges: how to turn a low-intensity model of powersharing into a viable democracy? Institutional engineering: Synchronizing democracy and power-sharing “Well-structured democratic institutions allow conflicts to formulate, find expression and be managed in a sustainable way […] the design of political institutions is thus of paramount importance to the management of conflict in any democracy.”25 Lebanon’s first and major challenge after the 2005 transition is how to harmonize and refine the democratic and power-sharing institutions in order to disentangle the system from the negative causation which makes Lebanon’s destructive consociational face detract from the quest towards more democracy. In fact, if pluralism and democracy remain discordant, consociationalism is likely to become another version of oligarchic elite cartels. That is why Lebanese consociationalism has to be reconciled with a democratic institutional design and with the rule of law. This democratic mold would ‘discipline’ power-sharing and make it bound by constitutional rules. Whilst Lebanon’s democratic advancement remains presently contingent on its diminished sovereignty and its regional entanglement, a first realistic step would be to agree on arbitrative mechanisms to prevent standstill and authoritarian vetoes. Still, in the long run, new institutional arrangements that ensure further democratization26 and “elite habituation”27 to formal democratic 24

25

26

Fore more details on this visualized cross-communal culture, see Dubois, La survie libanaise, 148. Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5. For how institutional arrangements could impact democratization and prospects for political stability, see Di Palma, Crafting Democracy; Grugel, Democratization, 70-77; Reilly,

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433

rules remain the main vectors that prevent Lebanese power-sharing from slipping into dangerous hybrid systems.28 Ideally, the Lebanese brand of democracy should strive towards achieving a consolidated model of power-sharing in which cooperative political elites not only divide political prerogatives, but regulate their power and expose it to competition and uncertain outcomes. Institutionalized deadlock-breaking mechanisms Lebanon’s post-war history has demonstrated that unchecked consensus might be more of a barricade thwarting the system’s evolution than a method of careful consociational pooling. The absence of mechanisms to regulate unending negotiations during the national dialogue conference in 2006, for example, as well as the unrestrained “built-in defacto veto” that political actors commonly abuse29 reveal that Lebanon’s national bargaining has become a formula for stalemate, and that the system is badly in need of arbitration and institutional mechanisms facilitating decision-making. Whereas in the 1990s, Syria’s heavy handedness filled the place of an umpire, the present balance of power seems sentenced to an ungovernable elite coalescence. This problem has mainly hampered policy-making in the cabinet and in executive elite cartels. In times of polarization and external threat, paralysis in the ruling executive coalition and in the collegial cabinet has proven that amicability is not sufficient on stormy seas. The condemnation of political factions in the Lebanese system to unarbitrated consensual dialogue is in fact a double-edged sword. Thus, Lebanese communities are, on the one hand, invited to adopt conflict-regulating practices through agreement, and are on the other hand, forced to a static consociationalism based on unbridled compromise. To solve the problem of political immobilism, groups have first to consent to deal with arising disagreements democratically, and subject their interests to uncertainty in the

27

28

29

Democracy in Divided Societies, 5-7. For more details on issues of elite habituation to democratic rules, see Manning, “Conflict Management and Elite Habituation.” The objective of this study is not to come up with a prescriptive model of how Lebanon could consolidate its democracy; however, it would be useful if future studies focus on the interactions between Lebanon’s institutions and its prospects for democratization. These studies could also examine how restructured relationships between the executive and the legislative, a new design of the legislature, a reformed electoral system, and a reshuffle of its party system could improve Lebanon’s democratic perspectives. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Kirchzarten, October 12, 2006.

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democratic game as well as agree that the outcomes of conflicts remain indeterminate and related to “a contingent institutional promise.”30 An equally important step is to devise new institutional methods that would allow political groupings to reach compromises on a democratic basis.31 In the aftermath of the 2006 July War, elite bickering mainly sustained by contradictory allegiances should be checked by an institutional design that helps control uninhibited powers. These institutionalized practices would make sure that elite conflictregulating practices operate within democratic institutions and that the margins of veto powers would be rule-bound. In fact, deadlock-breaking compromises dictated by institutions would dampen adversarial elite behavior, fix regulated boundaries for uncontrolled bargaining, and improve the democratic components of the system. Some initial suggestions could be to empower parliament to take a final decision in event of political standstill or to agree on the application of a twothirds qualified majority in the cabinet in times of dissension.32 However, agreeing on two-thirds qualified majority in the cabinet when critical issues arise has been very problematic “since it has proven impossible to reach agreement on what issues are ‘fundamental’.” 33 This has given every member of the cabinet a potential infinite veto.34 This is why it might be extremely helpful to define through a pacted agreement the character of fundamental issues to be solved by resorting to a qualified majority rather than by consensus.

30

31

32 33 34

Przeworski argues that “democratic compromise cannot be a substantive compromise, but only “a contingent institutional compromise.” See Przeworski, “Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 58-59. Whereas consociational democracies such as Switzerland and Belgium have their own institutional devices to unblock immobilism, Lebanon’s consociationalism remains prey to the variable of volatile elite consensus. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Kirchzarten, October 12, 2006. See Leenders, “How UN Pressure on Hizballah.” Ibid.

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A solution to communal desegmentation The problem of confessional and institutional rigidity More important than the impact of transitory political cleavages on communal segmentation is the communities’ identification with the pact of coexistence and its dynamics. The segments’ dissatisfaction with socio-political arrangements not only places a severe strain on communal segmentation but also on the democratic character of the system itself.35 A platform for conflicting interests and unfulfilled hopes, a stagnant national formula might implode. As the system is founded on confessional powersharing, communities that strive to enhance their political power would undoubtedly challenge the static institutional arrangements. Indeed, in Lebanon “the end of confessional struggles will not happen tomorrow.”36 One of the greatest limitations of the Lebanese formula has been its inability to rise above its role as a rudimentary balance for keeping communal grievances and expectations in check. The main hindrance thwarting its change can be traced back to “institutional conservatism,”37 and to the frozen pitfalls of quota and distributions. For this reason, guaranteeing an equitable representation within a flexible national formula able to accommodate the evolving political consciousness of Lebanese segments is a crucial step towards ensuring the communities’ identification with the realities of power-sharing. Transcending “institutional conservatism” To overcome the problem of institutional rigidity, it is important to craft a more equitable power-sharing institutional design open to changes. In fact, the consociational design lends itself to many variants that are not necessarily prisoner to religious structures. Moreover, if national integration is a “fluctuating” and “multilinear” process which is not pre-determined by a set of

35

36

37

Dahl argues that in a highly fragmented country, polyarchy is less likely to develop anyhow because polarization impedes “tolerance and mutual security” required for the development of the democratic regime. See Polyarchy, 108. Joseph Samaha’s statement on the destructive impact of confessionalism in Alain Gresh, “Les vieux parrains du nouveau Liban,” Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2005, http://www.mondediplomatique.fr/2005/06/ Gresh/12500. Arend Lijphart, email communication to the author, October 13, 2003.

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fixed variables,38 then Lebanon has been given a golden opportunity after Syrian withdrawal to improve its power-sharing arrangements. A potential solution would be to mitigate the grip of confessional allegiances over institutions. First, pending a phasing out of confessionalism, the rigid executive grand coalition could be, for instance, replaced by a rotational system of power-sharing where the three communities alternate in political offices. The alternance model has two main benefits: the rotation system helps create a distance between the institution and the community, and impedes the superimposition of confessional over political cleavages.39 Creating a bicameral parliament would also help defuse many political tensions, and prepare the system for a gradual deconfessionalization. The Upper House or the Senate40 composed of all communal segments would be referred to in period of crises so as to avoid a political impasse and safeguard the spirit of inter-communal dialogue. The Lower House would be composed on a national rather than on a confessional basis.41 A proposal would be to craft an electoral law based on proportional representation which allows candidates to be elected on an equal basis. This electoral system would not only improve electoral outcomes, but also reduce the frustration of minorities which perceive the system as an apparatus for confessional dominion. By shifting attention to the national rather than the communal platform, it would entice political actors to seek for cross-national cooperative strategies, and would solve the problem of confessional “bulldozer lists.”42 38

39

40

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42

In some academic works, integration – defined as “the process that determines whether group members regard the sociopolitical arrangements regulating the group’s affairs as worth preserving or not” – is not depicted as a stagnant state but as a changing process. See Stephanie G. Neuman, “Integration: Conceptual tool or Academic Jargon,” in Small States and Segmented Societies, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (United States: Praeger Publishers, 1976), 1-43, 18-19. In order to escape the trap of the Troika in executive elite cartels, it is possible to increase the prerogatives of the presidency. In this case, there would be no danger of an overlapping of the Maronite authority with the presidency, since the presidential office would be no longer assigned to one community. Yet, the danger persists that a rotational system of executive power-sharing would destabilize Lebanon’s internal and external policy, which would swing to and fro every couple of years. Giving the leadership of the Senate to the Druze community could rectify consociational imbalances at the level of executive power-sharing. See Emile Khoury “Le changement devrait devenir tangible après les élections,” L’Orient Le Jour, April 5, 2005, http://www.lorientlejour.com.lb/hier/politique/polsujet8.htm. Fore more details on electoral reform and the benefits of a proportional representation system, see Julia Choucair, “Finding a Path from Deadlock to Democracy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP64.Choucair. FINAL1.pdf, 14.

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In addition to these amendments, serious reforms should be undertaken to appoint civil servants on the basis of public competition rather than on a confessional basis.43 At this phase, an improved coalition cabinet which does not represent communal strongholds, but which takes into consideration the diverse regional and political affiliations of each segment, may play a major role in improving defective aspects of the power-sharing formula.44 Institutional changes notwithstanding, it is necessary that the problematic relationship between demography and political representation be tackled at the elite and communal levels in order to break the taboo hovering around demographic censuses. One alternative is ponder deliberatively whether national stability –irrespective of demographic changes – in which all important communities are fairly represented, is the aim or whether risking stability to embark on new political ventures based on a strict accountability to demographics is worthier. In the Lebanese case, pending the elimination of the confessional system, the benefits of a concordant political culture could by far outweigh the benefits of accurate numerical representations based on demography. A “Post-Settlement Settlement”?45 Overcoming institutional rigidity requires also overcoming the pitfalls of rigid power-sharing pacts. Drawing the Ta’if ‘balance sheet’ many years after its ratification shows that the settlement was an interim solution that has mainly served to keep Lebanon going, but that has left several conflicts and grievances in a state of dormancy. Retrospectively, Ta’if has also failed to meet the test of a pact of concordance and “a peace-making venture”46 capable of achieving “a more balanced and harmonious communal existence”47 as feelings of communal marginalization have not come to rest.48 If a system overhaul is to be undertaken, it is necessary to rethink and rewrite the Ta’if sections pertaining to the power-sharing institutional design and to 43

44

45

46 47 48

For a plan of political reform, see Ahmad Beydoun, “Confessionalism: Outline of an Announced Reform,” in Options for Lebanon, 75-96, 90-93. According to Kassir, improving representation in the coalition cabinet might be a decisive step leading to the refinement of the power-sharing formula. See “Intifada der Unabhängigkeit.” See Pierre Du Toit, “Why Post-Settlement Settlements?”; Howard Raiffa, “Post Settlement Settlements,” Negotiation Journal 1 (1985): 9-12. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 299. Ibid. El Khazen, “ Ta’if ma baadal harb shajara juzuruha akhsanuha,” Annahar, December 31, 1997, 13-14

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external relations49 in light of the post-war experience.50 Preventing national pacts from falling behind political and national development is of prime importance in establishing a resilient Lebanese entity immune to internal and external tremors. Unity out of diversity: creating a communal culture of concordance “If and when these […] groups begin to grasp that they will need to make deals among themselves in order for each to have the best chance of securing its own interests, the temptation to grasp after total power will become less intense...”51 Parallels made with other conflict-ridden multi-religious societies in the past enable one to deduce that it was only when inter-segmental conflicts lost their confessional and political threatening power that social pacification occurred. Before this stage of communal peace – in which segments have learned to enjoy the benefits of coexistence – cleavages should be depoliticized and pacified.52 In the Lebanese case, to make sure that communalism does not thwart the growth of a common national realm, a crucial step is to de-emphasize confessional cleavages, and depoliticize their meanings. Once communal solidarities are depoliticized, pacified segments could gradually rise above encapsulated self-perceptions and adopt integrative feelings of national togetherness.53

49

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51 52

53

For example, as clauses pertaining to the Syrian presence and role in Lebanon are no longer valid, it is necessary to update the section on Lebanese-Syrian relations in order to prevent some parts of the accord from falling into a state of nonuse or from being used against Lebanon’s interests. A study on the Ta’if achievements in the Lebanese daily An-Nahar came to the conclusion that the treaty should be reassessed mainly because of its intrinsic fallacies – which are related to the distribution of power and the political stalemate this distribution has led to – and as a result of the subversive effect of Syrian guardianship on its content. See Abbas al Sabbagh, “Ba ‘ada 15 aman ala ikrarihi: maza bakia min itifak’ el Ta’if?” An-Nahar, October 20, 2004, 13. Barry Rubin, “Dealing with Communalism,” 52. In his interview with the author on October 25, 2005, Lehmbruch draws parallels between past experiences of war-ravaged Germany in which religious cleavages were acute, and the situation in present Lebanon. He explains how Germany had to deconfessionalize and depoliticize its conflicts before pacification ensued. According to him, the final pacification of a fragmented society takes place when different segments learn how to rise above their divides. For more details on pacified communal solidarities, see Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 319328.

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Forging cross-cutting links A crucial step to strengthen communal integration is the creation of cross-cutting links which maximize the reciprocal benefits of consociationalism. Thus, communal living can go beyond sharing confessional pies, and can revolve around partaking in common responsibilities based on shared national perspectives. In this case, religious groups could grow out of their role as static political ‘majorities’ fighting for preeminence and evolve into societal pillars. To nurture this communal spirit of concordance, it is necessary to extend this culture of consensus which has hitherto been restricted to the elite and intellectual levels to inner societal layers. An important step is to deconstruct analogies between consociationalism and sectarianism at the grassroots.54 In order to break these negative parallelisms, it is essential to create new consociational lines, which are not solely based on confessionalism, but which act as transversal features structuring the social tissue.55 This could be achieved by downplaying political issues and focusing on new intersecting societal links hinging on socio-economic matters, civil society issues, syndicalism, notions of human rights, as well as cultural and environmental values.56 Paving the way for cross-cutting interests and socio-cultural bonds would help shift attention from political cleavages, and would help transmute Lebanese communities from pillars of conflict to pillars of coalescence. In fact, the psychology of transferring, redefining cleavages, and channelling the confessional quest towards cross-cultural areas of cooperation is essential in shaping a perennial culture of peace. In times of inter-communal crisis, these apolitical links could themselves dampen arising political dividing lines. It is noteworthy that this projected culture of consensus cannot only stem from depoliticizing internal cleavages, but also hinges closely on reformulating the Lebanese subcultures’ perceptions of foreign influence. In order to decrease the intensity of dividing lines over exogenous factors, the goal of national education would be to “rationalize the Lebanese subcultural unconscious” at the grassroots.57 54

55 56

57

In his interview with the author on November 26, 2004, a Lebanese political scientist argues that Lebanese communities do not only have a religious but also a socio-cultural belonging. This makes it possible to deconfessionalize religious cleavages and separate them from political lines of conflict. Interview with a Lebanese political scientist, Ashrafieh, November 26, 2004. Interviews with two Lebanese political scientists, Ashrafieh, November 26 and November 30, 2004. For more details, see also Dagher, Bring Down the Walls, 56-57. This requires primarily the rewriting and unanimous adoption by schools of a common history book based on consensus. Second, cultivating a culture of communal peace in confessional schools, universities and media channels could help transform segmental autonomy into an

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This national education could help different Lebanese groups identify inherited communal stereotypes and prejudices and the way the latter influence national behavior in times of external pressure. Inter-communal ‘mutual empathy’ could then override external allegiances.58 Furthermore, the elite variable could play a major role in shaping a concordant culture. Political actors should namely refrain from creating artificial reinforcing cleavages and from inviting corrosive foreign intrusion to perpetuate their power. By representing their community not as communal lords (Zu’ama) but as representatives of organizational units of a collective structure, they would enable the consolidation of a national sphere. In fact, “Lebanon needs strong executive leadership legitimized on national, civic basis and not just on sectarian and patronage-based constituencies.”59 These elites should strive to establish convergent interests, and act through democratic institutions which are not used as conduits of clientelism. Elite habituation to democratic rules seems in fact essential to transmute a shallow inter-elite accommodation nurtured by clientelist interests to a genuine elite coalescence. To prevent the intersection of religious with political cleavages, political elites should also encourage the formation of party systems which not only unite multiple confessions but which cross confessional barriers by attracting supporters from all confessions. In fact, when party system cleavages in Lebanon coincide with communal cleavages and accommodate the logic of confessionalism, it is more likely that sectarianism remains the main driving force preventing cross-cutting pressures from materializing at the national level.60 The dissatisfying experience of the Bristol Opposition in 2005, which assembled various communities, shows that forging a transcommunal current is not sufficient to bring about overarching national loyalties.61 Other important prerequisites for resolving the problem of communal fragmentation and for paving the way for a more cohesive pluralism are to remedy segmental segregation and encourage equal regional and communal socio-economic development. Contrary to consociationalists who maintain that

58 59 60 61

organizing tool for coexistence. An important achievement would be the restructuring of the Lebanese University as a tool for national integration. For more details on “teaching consociation,” see Hanf, “The Political Function of the Educational System in Culturally Segmented Societies,” Bildung und Erziehung 33 (October 1980): 281-299. Interview with a Lebanese religious figure, Ashrafieh, October 8, 2004. Hudson, “Lebanon after Ta’if,” 38 See for example Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 75-81. A telling example is the division of the political establishment into the loyalist camp and the anti-Syrian pluralist coalition after the extension of president Lahoud’s mandate in September 2004. Both alliances were more or less multi-confessional, yet this has not prevented fractionalization.

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geographical separation of groups reduces the opportunities of conflict,62 the landscape of mono-confessional ghettos in post-war Lebanon has bred communal defiance, sustained latent conflicts, and hindered an inter-communal understanding. This is why it is of paramount importance to bridge the gap between social geography and communal spaces,63 and avert broad regional socio-economic discrepancies. Reinventing the state’s authority With the emergence of cross-cutting links among Lebanon’s subcultures, the concept of the state’s authority should also be recast. Instead of striving to become a dominating structure which engulfs Lebanese segments, the state should be the harmonizing mold of heterogeneous impulses and interests that “embraces and transcends the communities”64 This does not mean that the state should remain a weak actor, but that its strength should stem from its coherent and strong institutions based on the rule of law and on constitutionality. Functioning as a legitimate conflict-regulating entity empowered with internalized democratic and consociational strategies, the Lebanese state could develop higher degrees of stateness without being necessarily coercive. The following figure sums up the main phases towards a Lebanese culture of concordance:

62

63

64

In Democracy in Plural Societies, Lijphart argues that segmental isolation is more appropriate to a consociational system, yet the Lebanese experience has proven the contrary. In fact, forced communal isolation has led to a culture of hostility. Special attention is riveted on the formation of communal ghettos in post-war Lebanon, and the protracted and selective process of the displaced population’s return after the 15-year war. Although it should be kept in mind that a return to the pre-war social geography is impossible, facilitating the emergence of a mixed communal geography and the integration of communities in their evironment would help shape cross-cutting pressures. On the negative repercussions of post-war geographic dismantling and the politicization of the return of the displaced, see Dagher, Bring Down the Walls, 83-90; Picard, Lebanon, A Shattered Country, 169. See Charaf, “Dialectique de l’évolution de l’exécutif au Liban: 1926-1992,” 91-94; Salam, “La question de l’état dans le Liban contemporain,” in Le Liban à l’heure des négociations de Paix au Proche-Orient, 21-29, 29.

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Figure 6.2

From a fragmented to a concordant culture.

Source: Fakhoury Reformulating the problem of national identity It has almost become a common assumption that Lebanon lacks a national identity, a mentality or a myth that binds communities together.65 This problem, which dates back to the sharp antagonisms that accompanied the state formation until the mid-thirties,66 has mostly revealed its destructive aspect in the disparate and irreconcilable Lebanese loyalties.67 In many academic works, Lebanon is perceived as an artificial nation-state whose geographical location in the Arab world is at odds with its particularism, or as an unnatural entity constructed upon conflicting loyalties that prevent the Lebanese state from developing a public sphere of citizenship.68 65

66

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68

See for example Nisan Mordechai, “Maronites: Sophistication and Missed Opportunities,” in Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression (McFarland: North Carolina, 2002), 195-222, 210. It is commonly argued that conflicts between Lebanese nationalists and Arab nationalists until the mid-thirties undermined the formation of the Lebanese nation-state. While Lebanese nationalists – mainly Maronites – considered Lebanon as a Christian homeland insulated from its surroundings, Arab nationalists objected to these separatist tendencies and promoted a discourse of unity with the Arab world. For more information, see el Solh, Lebanon and Arabism: National identity and State formation, 1-9. For a critical appraisal of the various concepts revolving around Lebanese nationalism, see Maurus Reinkowski, “National Identity in Lebanon since 1990,” Orient 38 (1997): 493-515. See Hilal Khashan, Inside the Confessional Mind (Lanham: Maryland, 1992), 1-4.

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A collective identity “If these people cannot live their multiple belongings, if they constantly have to choose between one side or the other […] we have the right to be worried about the basic way the world functions.” 69 Whereas a solid national identity based on the concept of the Western nationstate seems incompatible with the Lebanese entity, it is possible to craft a more durable Lebanese identity by shifting the focus from a unitary national identity to a collective identity in the making. The concept of a nation-state based on a synthesis of collective identities might very well contradict traditional views based on the necessity of a clearly defined and unidimensional ‘likeness’ that holds the nation together. Still, it indicates the necessity of relinquishing old conceptualizations in order to better grasp the complex layers and constructs of cultural belonging in a multicultural state. I argue in this regard that a full-fledged national identity is not the prerequisite for the survival of Lebanon as a state, but is rather a variable contingent on its development. Thus, a collective identity based on “a shared and interactive sense of “we-ness” ”70 binding fragmented national pieces might be more appropriate to the Lebanese case. Building a Lebanese collective identity should be visualized as the outcome of a social process which entails foremost the replacement of a fragmented political culture by “a new consociational political culture” endorsed by a harmonizing feeling of transcommunality”71 and consolidated by “convivialistic” tendencies.72 The objective of such a collective identity is not the achievement of an ultimate national fusion but the natural development of a perennial Lebanese shared project which embodies the synthesis as well as the materialization of multiple identities in a general feeling of oneness.73 69

70

71 72

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This passage is excerpted from Amin Maalouf’s Les identités meurtrières (Paris: Grasset, 1998). It appeared in Al Jadid 4 (Fall 1998) and was translated by Brigitte Caland. Collective identity is defined as a process in which individuals define themselves in an interdependent space of “we-ness.” See David Snow, “Collective Identity and Expressive Forms,” paper published at the Center for the Study of Democracy, October 1, 2001, 1-14, http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/01-07, 2. Dubois, La survie libanaise, 145. Hanf argues that the political culture of coexistence and consensus which has survived the war lays the main foundation for an encompassing Lebanese identity. See Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon, 540. In his interview with the author on November 25, 2004, a Lebanese politician argues that it is possible to nurture a new formula for the Lebanese identity based on the writings of the Lebanese thinkers, such as Michel Chiha, Gebran Khalil Gebran, Mikhail Nheime, and Amin el

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An identity in the making The frail collective ethos, which has not equally permeated all communities still insisting on insularity as a defence mechanism, does not preclude the possibility of a Lebanese identity in gestation. In fact, why not consider the Lebanese nation as a project in the making?74 From this angle, it is helpful to drop traditional assumptions that a national identity materializes and matures the moment a nation-state exists. In fact, the concept of a shifting and unfinished identity – which is not instantly accomplished, and which is not concomitant to the formation of the state – might describe more accurately the realities of many nations still struggling to recollect their fragments. Over and above, despite the common assumption that Lebanon’s national identity is synonymous with cultural fragmentation, there are “significant indications that the Lebanese, despite their wars and cleavages, may be on their way to becoming a nation.”75 In comparison to other Arab states in which modes of identities are still in a state of somnolence kept at bay by the coercive authoritarian apparatus, Lebanon has achieved a considerable “sense of nationhood” based on a shared feeling of belonging that has been nurtured by the country’s active civil society, its democratic history76 and its power-sharing apparatus.77 This identity has however remained problematic because it excludes “an agreement about what Lebanon is and what its socio-cultural characteristics should be.” Most importantly, it fails to answer the question whether a Lebanese identity entails a “feeling of responsibility” and “solidarity” with the whole country.78 Even though these contradictory allegiances were kept alive and even reinforced by Lebanese institutions – such as the educational system which failed to promote national values,79 also by the media which accentuated national disintegration by feeding distinct streams of consciousness – recent events show

74

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78 79

Rihani. These writers acknowledge that Lebanon’s peculiarity and specificity lie in its diversity. See Ahmad Beydoun “L’identité des libanais,” in Le Liban d’aujourd’hui, ed. Fadia Kiwan (Paris : Cermoc-CNRC,1994), 13-30, 30 See Perthes, “Problems with Peace: Post-War Politics,” 417 See Abu Jaber, “The Democratic Process in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan,” 136. In his interview with the author on November 5, 2004, a Lebanese religious figure argues that Lebanon’s national identity is dictated by its power-sharing political system. This identity is based on the respect of diversity. Perthes, “Problems with Peace,” 417. See Kamal Abou Chedid, Ramzi Nasser, and Jeremy Van Blommestein, “The Limitations of Inter-Group Learning in Confessional School Systems: The Case of Lebanon,” Arab Studies Quarterly 24 (2002): 61-82.

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that Lebanese segments share many small communal myths that lay durable foundations for a nation. These myths revolve around a common belief in Lebanon’s particularism, the survival of primordial loyalties, and a collective sense of togetherness. A common myth that strengthens Lebanon’s national ethos lies in the shared belief in the Lebanese nation’s particularity as a bridge between the West and the Arab world.80 Even though the attempt to build a nation on a dual reconciliation has kindled inter-communal animosities, a forceful neutralization of this twofold national settlement has also led to disastrous consequences. Moreover, Lebanese communities share various material interests based on the client-patron relationship. These interests ensure that compromise and conflict prevention are adopted in daily life, and that economic and political aspects of communal lives are interrelated. In addition, overarching primordial and familial links have undoubtedly had a stabilizing effect in a deeply fragmented society,81 and have proven to be pervasive characteristics which survived the war. Additional bedrocks for a nascent Lebanese national ethos revolve around the common rejection of war and the call for solidarity in times of crisis. 82 Although this is unlikely for the moment, the striving to maintain peace after common purgative experiences of suffering could evolve into the future into an incentive for an enduring Lebanese identity: “The memory of war prevents the resumption of violence in Lebanon, and the oppressiveness of war reminiscences will most probably act as a major factor for the consolidation of peace and common identity.”83 Although many analysts warn against confessionalism as a major impediment against the construction of a national identity, the former can potentially evolve into a virtuous circle, and most importantly act as a deterrent against fragmentation. Thus, after the war experience, the mere awareness of the potential of destructiveness of confessionalism could deter violent confrontation, and increase communal vigilance: 80

81 82

83

For an account of Lebanon’s role as “a laboratory” striving towards “a better understanding between the West and the Islamic world,” see Simon Karam, “Lebanon, Collapse and Revival,” 24. See Khalaf, “Primordial Ties and Politics.” On April 13, 2005, in a national celebration commemorating the outbreak of the 1975 war, thousands of hundreds of Lebanese expressed their attachment to inter-communal peace. This symbolic memorial shortly before Syrian pullout points out the possible emergence of a collective will to preserve peace. Interview with an Iraqi expert, Beirut, October 7, 2004.

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“What prevents confessional problems from exacerbation is the awareness of their destructiveness or the feeling that violent confrontation will result in devastation.”84 The lessons of coexistence based on the shared realities of the Lebanese Civil War, the Beirut Spring, the July War, and other episodes of strife and unity remain nebulous but unmistakable signals of a rising collective construct. These episodes indicate that Lebanon’s perennial ethos lies in the awareness of coexistence at critical junctures.85In addition to all these considerations, Lebanon’s national soul-searching does not exclude a potential consolidation of its precarious democratic structures.86 In the final analysis, a refined democratic system of power-sharing as well as an improved process of “state-building” rather than “nation-building”87 might provide sufficient incentives for national adhesiveness. The mutual benefits that different communities would gain from adhering to an equitable national formula might cement the insoluble drives of a fragmented nation. This is why an adjustment of Lebanon’s power-sharing design and institutions might indirectly consolidate national identity. Figure 6.3 summarizes the mentioned steps towards empowering a coherent Lebanese identity:

84 85

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Interview with a Lebanese intellectual, October 19, 2004. It is important to draw attention to the fact that the evolution of confessionalism into a virtuous circle is a longstanding process. Recent political antagonisms in Lebanon which have generated into sectarian street fights throughout 2007 and 2008 indicate that this possibility is still remote. Some scholars challenged the linkages between democratization and homogeneous cultures as well as the claim that a fragmented society is resistant to democracy. Although crafting a democracy in multi-ethnic societies might be more difficult, it is not impossible. In this case, more effort should be invested in political crafting. See Linz and Stepan, Problems in Democratic Transition, 35-37; Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 1-3. Hanf argues that upon evaluating prospects for conflict-regulation in multi-ethnic societies, dealing with existing state frameworks and focusing on “state-building” rather than “nationbuilding” are worthwile alternatives. See “Epilogue” in Ethno-Religious Conflict and Modes of its Regulation: A Conference Report, 59-60, 60.

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Figure 6.3

Consolidating the Lebanese identity

Source: Fakhoury An external or internal solution to Lebanon’s oppressive alignment? The making of a cautious foreign policy After surveying the heavy burdens placed by external variables on the Lebanese polity, it is simplistic to draw the conclusion that a final solution to the dilemma of Lebanon’s difficult alignment depends solely on improving the Lebanese magic formula of consensus and coexistence. For example, in the light of the changing regional circumstances, disbanding Hezbollah and soothing its fears has become contingent on several thorny regional files, namely Iran’s nuclear struggle against the West, Syria’s strategic interests, and the quagmires in Palestine and Iraq.88 At first glance, it seems thus plausible to plead for an “alternative exit strategy” for Lebanon’s regional and domestic ‘marshland’. This strategy consists in tackling “the wider political problems” by relaunching the agonizing Middle Eastern Peace Process and involving the main players.89 Israel’s latest two-front offensive in Gaza and Lebanon shows that there can be no new Middle East without solving the problems of the old Middle East.90 However, this external approach to addressing Lebanon’s problems by pacifying 88

89

90

Jean-Pierre Perrin, “Liban: L’épineux cas du Hezbollah,” Libération, May 8, 2005, http://www.liberation.fr/ imprimer.php?Article=302079. See “Post-War Lebanese Politics- The Perils of Breaking the Deadlock,” Strategic Comments 12, September 26, 2006, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume12---2006/volume-12--issue-7/post-war-lebanese-politics. Perthes, “Gebt dem Nationalstaat eine Chance!” Internationale Politik (September 2006): 62-67, 62.

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its surrounding is not sufficient to propel the republic’s shaky power-sharing. Lebanon’s inability to trace an independent stable foreign politics path has not only been contingent on the increase of external loads on the Lebanese polity but also on the elites’ inability to strike a national consensus that would prevent internal fault lines from overlapping with external conflicts. This has stemmed from contradictory perceptions of external meddling. Still, even if elites prioritize coalescence, much depends on the regional balance of power and the willingness of regional and international actors to maintain or disrupt this balance.91 This vicious circle makes Lebanon’s equilibrium contingent on a complex process of incoming and outgoing variables. Hence, in the course of Lebanese history, foreign intervention has not only consolidated the confessional foundation of the system, but has also deepened sources of contention92 to the extent that “the unsettling consequences of this precarious inside-outside dialectics were becoming more unmanageable.”93 Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to envisage the come-back of a sane and non-aligned consociationalism. The latter would demand almost unearthly capacities of enlightened Lebanese elites, who would consciously and perpetually make sure that outer cleavages do not intensify inner cleavages. Yet, past experience revealed the shortcomings of political engineering and the limitations of the 1943 ‘self-negating prophecy.’ Should one conclude that Lebanon is bound to remain a permeable state and that a low load on the system is contingent on the regional landscape and on the international order? The link between national cohesiveness and foreign policy Tying Lebanon’s fate indefinitely to the uncertainties of the Middle Eastern dilemma would seriously prevent the emergence of a sovereign Lebanese polity that could cooperate deliberately and constructively in regional matters as deemed necessary. It would also prevent the pacification of a divided society constantly drawn into the external turmoil. On the other hand, separating the Lebanese path from the Middle Eastern crisis remains an unreal scheme. Although a policy of neutrality will be impossible during Lebanon’s transitional path, the Lebanese state could adopt a two-phased plan to construct a cautious foreign policy. The first phase entails dealing constructively with the latent regional conflicts which have a direct impact on Lebanon’s status, namely 91 92 93

Moubarak, The Position of a Weak State, 2-3. Lijphart, “Multiethnic Democracy, 859. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 274.

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by containing Hezbollah’s dilemma through an internal dialogue, striving to establish balanced relations with Syria, and – pending a regional settlement – engaging in dialogue with Palestinian militant groups in Lebanon. During this phase, communal elites have to work on forging at least a unified foreign policy so as to minimize the effect of external threat on the internal scene. By striving to reconcile their perceptions of external factors, political actors would benefit from various common benefits resulting from endogenous power-sharing. These benefits might entice them into forsaking foreign alliances. In this case, special attention should be paid to the intricate interactions between the internal crafting of political institutions and cross-communal loyalties on the one hand, and foreign policy on the other. Consolidating national cohesiveness – through the institutionalization of Lebanon’s power-sharing democracy and through the enhancement of communal identification with the national formula – will automatically impact Lebanon’s handling of external threat. While national adhesiveness permits the transformation of foreign threats into common and non-confessional threats, cross-cutting loyalties could help the Lebanese state shield itself from exogenous factors of destabilization. Equally, in a well-institutionalized system in which consociational strategies and democratic rules are internalized, chances are that external threat would be counteracted by ingrained strategies of elite consensus. The benefits of careful non-alignment in a precarious consociation The second phase entails prioritizing in the long term national integration over encroachment in regional tensions. A solution could be the adoption of a stance of “positive neutrality” which reconciles Lebanon’s Arab face and obligations to its Arab entourage with its weak status.94 This stance of “positive neutrality” would not insulate Lebanon from its Arab environment, but would confer to it the status of a “specific entity” which makes it a distinctive part of the Arab world.95 Positive neutrality” would enable the Lebanese polity to avert conflicts that might exacerbate internal cleavages, and that reduce its sovereignty to a ramification of the Middle Eastern question.96

94 95

96

Maurus Reinkowski, interview with the author, Freiburg, July 13, 2006. In his interview with the author, Reinkowski explains how, due to its precarious standing, Lebanon cannot embark on regional adventures in which it strives to “settle conflicts independently.” The 1943 pact had already mentioned that Lebanon should cooperate with all Arab states on the condition that the latter respected its sovereignty.

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Furthermore, according to some analysts, it has become easier for Lebanon to distance itself from the regional quagmire than it was in the 1970s, for the mere fact that Lebanese polarization around the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer acute as it was.97 Unlike the pre-war phase, there is widespread consensus that “the Palestinian problem should not be settled at Lebanon’s expense.”98 Still, in the long run, the problem of Lebanon’s explosive fragmentation could only be solved through “a definitive emancipation” from the republic’s status of an absorbent state which soaks up external influences. This could only be ensured provided the principles of non-alignment and neutrality are respected.99 Although this sustaining condition not only depends on its acceptance by the various Lebanese communities but also on its neighbors and the international community, its adoption would undoubtedly have numerous positive repercussions on communalism. More particularly, this policy is salutary to the equilibrium of internal segments. Through a stance of non-entanglement, conflicting communal cleavages hovering between regional and Western loyalties could come to rest. Confessionalism could also decrease as external forces would stop nurturing it. As soon as the clash of incoming and outgoing cleavages lessens, the Lebanese political system would be relieved from multilayered encumbrances, and could thus embark on a self-healing process. The ensuing pacification of communal fault lines might help Lebanon’s consociationalism evolve gradually into a secular system built on an overarching loyalty to the nation rather than on disparate affiliations. In addition, national identity would not be the fruit of double and compulsory renunciations or reconciliations, but a conscious emergence of a collective Lebanese consciousness. The steps towards crafting a viable consociational democracy are depicted in the ‘Stability Pyramid’ (Fig. 6.4).

97 98

99

Gerhard Lehmbruch, interview with the author, Kirchzarten, October 25, 2005. See Kail C. Ellis, “The Regional Struggle for Lebanon,” in Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Kail C. Ellis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 25-51, 48. See Georges Corm, “Le Liban doit s’émanciper,” Le Monde, November 23, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/ imprimer_element/0,40-0@3232,50-713337,0.html; Farid El Khazen, “Disengage Lebanon from Regional Turmoil,” The Daily Star, August 14, 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID= 10&articl e_ID=74710&categ_id=5.

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Figure 6.46.4 Figure

The stability pyramid (from bottom to top) The Stability Pyramid (from bottom to top)

Source: Fakhoury

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An ill-timed reform for an agonizing consociation? This concluding proposal has argued that through institutional and communal engineering, it is possible to improve the prospects for democracy and stability in Lebanon. Yet, the present political constellation does not seem particularly auspicious. After all, the elation of the Beirut Spring has given way to a general climate of disillusionment,100 and the aftertaste of the Intifada has become a foretaste of the upcoming Herculean challenge: how to reform a faltering Lebanese model? In the absence of legitimate regional and internal crafters, which ‘reformists’101 will undertake the venture? Most of all, how to make sure that regional conflict lines do not interest with internal sectarian cleavages and that internal political antagonisms do not degenerate into confessional flare-ups? Whilst the revolutionary flame of the 2005 uprising has flickered, Lebanese political actors are contemplating how to revive a country reeling under various afflictions, and how to sort out their deepening differences rather than how to embark on a trip of institutional reform. Indeed, the increasing turbulence of “Lebanon’s never still political waters” heralds an era of internal social and economic hardships for the unsteady republic.102 Moreover, as Lebanon still exhibits salient features of dependency on regional and international powers, it seems as if it may take quite sometime for its escape door to open. The porous republic has still to confront dormant conflicts before prioritizing national integration over entanglement in the regional swamp. More importantly, without a genuine inter-communal reconciliation, non-alignment in regional conflicts remains a remote goal.103 Still, whereas the heavy legacy of Lebanon’s past cannot be altered, it is worthwhile contemplating a way out of the abyss through engineering better political conditions regardless of the regional quagmire. As crafting a “stable democracy” is not just “fair-weather sailing” but also implies “sailing sometimes in foul and dangerous weather,”104 Lebanon’s potential salvation hinges more on the probability of an internal overhaul than on the unpredictable changes of the external landscape. It might thus be more rewarding for political statesmanship to endeavor to improve power-sharing practices and update the institutional

100

101 102

103 104

See for example Bachir el-Khoury, “Sauver le printemps de Beyrouth,” L’Orient Le Jour, June 30, 2006, http://www. lorientlejour.com/page.aspx?page=article&id=314879. Beydoun, “Confessionalism: Outline,” 93. See Oxford Business Group, “A Repositioned Return,” Latest Economic Briefings, October 24, 2006, http:// www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/weekly01.asp?id=2357. Augustus Richard Norton, interview with the author, Byblos, November 11, 2006. Dahl, On Democracy, 156.

6. Final Appraisal

453

design of the consociational formula105 – so as to harness overlapping cleavages and tame their intractability – than to stay on the lookout for more opportune external perspectives. Just like almost two decades ago, national bargaining seems once again to be the least costly solution to Lebanon’s festering ills.106 Condemned to the consociational wheel of fortune, the small Arab Republic has yet to find a way out of its regional encroachment and internal aberrations. To loosen the grip of its environment on its political fate, it has first to become initiated in a more constructive art of power-sharing even when “the wild winds weep and the night is a-cold.”107

105

106

107

The limitations of institutional reform in Lebanon are manifold as various internal and external obstacles might hijack an overhaul, but this option remains in the long run the least painful one. After the second walkout of the Shiite ministers from the Saniora government in November 2006, massive demonstrations staged by Hezbollah and its allies have called for the formation of a new unity government. Still, despite the deepening political chasm between Hezbollah and its allies on the one hand, and the ruling anti-Syrian alliance on the other hand, contending blocs have called on various occasions for the resumption of inter-elite dialogue so as to avert a general political collapse. Quote taken from William Blake’s poem “Mad Song,” in Selected Poems of William Blake (Great Britain: Wordsworth Poetry Collection, 2000), 11.

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