TRA N S F O R MING E URO P EA N MIL ITA R IE S
This book addresses Europe’s ability to be a key actor in the new international security environment by assessing its capability to respond to threats in a networked manner. If the risk of a Soviet invasion of Europe has now disappeared, new security threats have emerged and the military has taken on a new range of responsibilities, including peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. As military operations are increasingly undertaken within the framework of international coalitions, their success depends largely on the degree to which national forces can work in a coordinated way in the field. Written by two experts in the field of defense technologies and European security, this book takes an in-depth look at European capabilities to conduct Network-Based Operations (NBO) and their implications for intra-European and transatlantic interoperability in the future. It examines national, NATO and EU capabilities, and analyses the three technology areas most crucial for interoperability – command and control, communications, and intelligence gathering and dissemination – as well as looking at the doctrinal and strategic commitment to NBO. The book also examines the technology and industrial bases supporting European NBO. It concludes that although there exist adequate European know-how and strong industries to supply the relevant capabilities, much remains to be done to do so more rapidly and efficiently. Finally, the book makes recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic on ways to improve interoperability in future coalition operations. This book will be of great interest to students of security studies, European politics and international relations, as well as to US and European policymakers. Gordon Adams is Professor of International Affairs and Director of Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. He has written extensively on US and European defense budgeting and planning and on transatlantic defense policy. Guy Ben-Ari is a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he researches issues related to the US and European technology and industrial bases supporting defense. He regularly serves as an expert evaluator to the European Commission’s research and technology Framework Program.
CONT E M P O R A RY S E C U RITY STUDIES
NATO ’ S S E C R E T ARM Y Operation Gladio and terrorism in western Europe Daniel Ganser TH E U S , NATO A N D M I L I TA RY BURDE N- S HARI NG Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala RU SSIA N G OV E R NA N C E I N T H E T W E NT Y- F I RS T CE NT URY Geo-strategy, geopolitics and new governance Irina Isakova TH E FOR E I G N O F F I C E A N D F I NL AND 1 9 3 8 – 1 9 4 0 Diplomatic sideshow Craig Gerrard R E T H I N K I N G T H E NAT U R E OF WAR Edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom PER C EPTIO N A N D R E A L I T Y I N T H E M ODE RN YUGOS L AV CONFLICT Myth, falsehood and deceit 1991–1995 Brendan O’Shea TH E PO L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y O F P E ACE BUI L DI NG I N P O S T- DAY TO N B O S NI A Tim Donais T H E D I S T R AC T E D E AGL E The rift between America and Old Europe Peter H. Merkl T H E I R AQ WA R European perspectives on politics, strategy, and operations Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson
S T R AT E G I C C O N T E S T Weapons proliferation and war in the greater Middle East Richard L. Russell PRO PAG A N DA , T H E P R E S S A ND CONF L I CT The Gulf War and Kosovo David R. Willcox MISSILE DEFENCE International, regional and national implications Edited by Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning G LO BA L I S I N G JU S T I C E F O R M AS S AT ROCI T I E S A revolution in accountability Chandra Lekha Sriram ETH N I C C O N F L I C T A N D T E RRORI S M The origins and dynamics of civil wars Joseph L. Soeters G LO BA LIS AT I O N A N D T H E F U T U R E OF T E RRORI S M Patterns and predictions Brynjar Lia N U C L E A R W E A P O N S A N D S T RAT E GY The evolution of American nuclear policy Stephen J. Cimbala NA SSER A ND T H E M I S S I L E AG E I N T HE M I DDL E E AS T Owen L. Sirrs WA R A S R I S K M A NAG E M E NT Strategy and conflict in an age of globalised risks Yee-Kuang Heng M I L I TA RY NA N OT E C H N OL OGY Potential applications and preventive arms control Jurgen Altmann NATO AN D W E A P O N S O F M A S S DE S T RUCT I ON Regional alliance, global threats Eric R. Terzuolo EU RO PEA N IS AT I O N O F NAT I O NA L S E CURI T Y I DE NT I T Y The EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states Pernille Rieker
IN TER NAT I O NA L C O N F L I C T P RE VE NT I ON AND P E AC E - BU I L D I NG Sustaining the peace in post conflict societies Edited by T. David Mason and James D. Meernik C O N T RO L L I N G T H E W E A P ONS OF WAR Politics, persuasion, and the prohibition of inhumanity Brian Rappert C H A N G IN G T R A N S AT L A N T I C S E C URI T Y RE L AT I ONS Do the US, the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle? Edited by Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson TH EO R E T I C A L RO OT S O F U S F ORE I GN P OL I CY Machiavelli and American unilateralism Thomas M. Kane C O R PO R AT E S O L D I E R S A N D I N T E RNAT I ONAL S E CURI T Y The rise of private military companies Christopher Kinsey TR AN S F O R M I N G E U RO P E A N M I L I TARI E S Coalition operations and the technology gap Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari G L O BA L I Z AT I O N A N D CONF L I CT National security in a ‘new’ strategic era Edited by Robert G. Patman
T RANSFORMING E URO PEAN MILITARIES Coalition operations and the technology gap
Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari
First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2006 Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN10: 0–415–39264–0 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–96910–3 (ebook) ISBN13:978–0–415–39264–8 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–96910–6 (ebk)
CO N T E N T S
List of tables Acknowledgements List of abbreviations
viii ix x
1 Introduction: networked operations and European capabilities
1
2 European strategies for network-based operations
9
3 European national capabilities for network-based operations
19
4 NATO and other multilateral network-based capabilities
84
5 The European Union and network-based capabilities
107
6 European collaboration on space assets for network-based operations
121
7 The European industrial and technology base for network-based capabilities
132
8 European network-based capabilities: policy recommendations
144
9 Conclusions
157
Glossary Bibliography Index
161 164 169
vii
TA BL E S
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8
Principal European national capabilities for network-based operations French capabilities for network-based operations United Kingdom capabilities for network-based operations German capabilities for network-based operations Italian capabilities for network-based operations Dutch capabilities for network-based operations Spanish capabilities for network-based operations Swedish capabilities for network-based operations
viii
22 34 48 59 67 71 75 80
ACK N OWL E D G E M E NT S
The authors would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of many official and private sector sources in the United States, Britain, France, and at NATO and the European Union whom we interviewed for this study. Most of them remain necessarily anonymous, but their assistance was clearly essential to the study. Several specific individuals deserve special mention and thanks: Christine Bernot, Adm. (ret.) Jean Betermier, Henri Conze, Christophe Cornu, Emmanuel Germond, Michel Iagolnitzer, Erol Levy, Xavier Pasco, Diego Ruiz Palmer, and Burkard Schmitt. Special thanks go to Professor John Logsdon and to Professor Ray Williamson of the Space Policy Institute at the George Washington University in Washington DC, who were participants in the research and writing process for the original monograph which was the starting point for this book. Their knowledge of European space policies and of the national and multinational space programs in Europe were a significant contribution to the space chapter in the book and their comments overall were very helpful. Finally, this book is based on a monograph “Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability,” published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the National Defense University in Washington, DC. The Center sponsored and funded the research on which the monograph and much of this book is based, and we are grateful for their support. We particularly want to thank the Center’s Director, Hans Binnendijk, and staff members Stuart Johnson, Elihu Zimet, Charles Barry and Richard Kugler for their assistance and excellent comments.
ix
A BBRE V I AT I ONS
ABCA
American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardization Program ACCIS Automated Command and Control Information System ACCS Air Command and Control System ACE Allied Command Europe ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic ACO Allied Command Operations ACT Allied Command Transformation ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator ADGE Air Defense Ground Environment AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency AERIS All Environment Real-Time Interoperability Simulator AEW Airborne Early Warning AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control AGS Alliance Ground Surveillance/Airborne Ground Surveillance AJCN Advanced Joint Communications Node AMS Alenia Marconi Systems APAR Active Phased Array Radar ASCC Air Standardization Coordinating Committee ASTOR Airborne Stand Off Radar ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode AUSCANNZUKUS Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States Naval C4 Organization AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System BACCS Backbone Air Command and Control System BCSS Battlefield Command Support System Bi-SCAIS Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information System BLD Battlefield Land Digitization BMS Battlefield Management System C@S Collaboration at Sea C2 Command and Control C3 Command, Control, and Communications x
AB B R E VI AT I ONS
C3I C4ISR CAESAR CCEB CCIS CEC CEPA CFIUS CFSP CIS CJTF COMINT COMSAT COTS CRONOS CSABM CSS CTAS DARPA DCI DCN DERA DGA DII DSCS EADS EC ECAP EDA EHF ERG ERRF ESA ESDP ESM EUCLID EUFOR EUROPA EUSC EW EXECOM FADR
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance Combined Communications Electronics Board Command, Control, and Information System Cooperative Engagement Capability Common European Priority Area Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Common Foreign and Security Policy Communications and Information Systems Combined Joint Task Forces Communications Intelligence Communications Satellite Commercial Off The Shelf Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems Collaborative System for Air Battlespace Management Command Support System Cooperative Transatlantic AGS System Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Defense Capabilities Initiatives Deployable COTS Network Defense Evaluation and Research Agency Délégation Générale pour l’Armement (French armament agency) Defense Information Infrastructure Defense Satellite Communications System European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company European Commission European Capabilities Action Plan European Defense Agency Extremely High Frequency European Research Grouping European Rapid Reaction Force European Space Agency European Security and Defense Policy Electronic Support Measures European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense European Union Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] European Understandings for Research Organization, Programs, and Activities EU Satellite Centre Electronic Warfare Executive Support Committee Fixed Air Defense Radar xi
AB B R E VI AT I ONS
FLIR FOCSLE FP GMES GPS HALE HF IACD IBS IEPG IFF IFOR IJMS IMINT INMARSAT INTA IP ISAF ISR ISTAR ITAR ITV JCS JFHQ JOCS JRRF JRRP JSTARS JTIDS JTRS JUEP KFOR LCS LEO LOI M3 MAJIIC MALE MASC MCCIS MCCS MIC
Forward-Looking Infrared Fleet Operational Command System Framework Program Global Monitoring for Environment and Security Global Positioning System High-Altitude, Long-Endurance High Frequency Intelligent Advisor Capability Demonstrator Integrated Broadcast Service Independent European Program Group Identification Friend or Foe [NATO] Implementation Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] Interim JTIDS Message Standard Imagery Intelligence International Maritime Satellite Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial Internet Protocol International Security Assistance Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance International Traffic in Arms Regulations Integrated Technology Vehicle Joint Command System Joint Forces Headquarters Joint Operational Command System Joint Rapid Reaction Force Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance Pod Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System Joint Service UAV Experimentation Program [NATO] Kosovo Force Littoral Combat Ship Low Earth Orbit Letter of Intent Multimode, Multi-role, Multi-band Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition Medium-Altitude, Long-Endurance Maritime Airborne Surveilllance and Control Maritime Command and Control Information System Mobile Command and Control System Multinational Interoperability Council xii
AB B R E VI AT I ONS
MIDS MILSATCOM MIP MIWG MMA MNE MP-RTIP MRS MTI NAC NACMO NACOSA NBC NBD NBO NC3A NC3B NC3O NC3TA NCOIC NCW NDP NEC NGCS NILE NMS NNEC NRF OCCAR ORFEO PASR PCC PFI PJHQ PNT PRT R&D R&T RAPTOR SACEUR SAMOC SAR SATCOM
Multifunctional Information Distribution System Military Satellite Communications Multilateral Interoperability Program Multinational Interoperability Working Group Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft Multinational Experiment Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program Multi-Role Switch Moving Target Indicator North Atlantic Council NATO ACCS Management Organization NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Network-Based Defense Network-Based Operations NATO Command, Control, and Consultation Agency NATO C3 Board NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Organization NATO C3 Technical Architecture Network-Centric Operations Industry Consortium Network-Centric Warfare National Disclosure Process Network-Enabled Capabilities NATO General Purpose Communication System NATO Improved Link Eleven NATO Messaging System NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities NATO Response Force Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere d’Armament Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation Preparatory Action on Security Research Prague Capabilities Commitments Private Finance Initiative Permanent Joint Headquarters Position, Navigation, and Timing Provisional Reconstruction Team Research and Development Research and Technology Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado Supreme Allied Commander Europe Surface-Air-Missile Operations Center Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellite Communications xiii
AB B R E VI AT I ONS
SCA SDR SFOR SHAPE SHARC SHF SIGINT SLAR SOC SOSTAR SPOT SSA STANAG TCAR TCDL TCP/IP TETRA THALES TIPS TMD TOPSAT T/R TTCP TUAV UAV UCAV UHF UUV VCCS VHF VMF VOIP WAN WASP WEAG WEAO WEU ZODIAC
Software Communications Architecture Software Defined Radio [NATO] Stabilization Force [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Swedish Highly Advanced Research Configuration Super High Frequency Signals Intelligence Side Looking Airborne Radar Statement of Cooperation Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar Système Pour l’Obeservation de la Terre Special Security Arrangement Standardization Agreement Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar Tactical Common Data Link Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol Terrestrial Trunked Radio Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science Transatlantic Industry Proposed Solution Theater Missile Defense Tactical Optical Satellite Transmit/Receive The Technical Cooperation Program Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Ultra High Frequency Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Vehicle Command and Control System Very High Frequency Variable Message Format Voice Over Internet Protocol Wide Area Network Wide Area Situation Picture Western European Armaments Group Western European Armaments Organization Western European Union Zone Digital Automated and Encrypted Communication
x iv
1 I N T RO D U CT I O N Networked operations and European capabilities
Network-based operations and the twenty-first century security environment The international security environment has changed dramatically over the past decade, for both the United States and Europe. This has meant profound changes for national security strategy and for military capabilities. Before 1990, strategy was based on the assumption that the principal tension was between an alliance of democracies, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union and its allies. For the military, this meant that both deterrence and victory on the battlefield would go to the side with the more capable land, air and sea forces, massed in formation, fielding heavy weapons produced in substantial numbers by a strong defense industrial base. Though this confrontation never occurred in Europe, wars elsewhere, such as Vietnam, tended to be fought using that model. Today, both the nature of the strategic threat and the required military capability to meet it have changed. Although the first Gulf War involved a more traditional type of threat and massed formations were critical to the response, subsequent crises and conflicts have involved more shadowy and asymmetrical opponents and a different range of security challenges. The need to fight large-scale wars has been replaced by the need to address a wide range of challenges, from international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to failed or failing states, escalating regional conflicts, and humanitarian crises. Military operations to deal with these threats demand different capabilities: strategic airlift and sealift, deployable logistics, precision-guided munitions, and force protection elements. Most important, they require deployable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities – collectively known as C4ISR – that are both networked and interoperable. National governments and coalitions need the capability to survey large areas of the globe and share and jointly analyze the intelligence they gather, in order to make informed decisions on when and where to deploy their forces. Once forces have been committed, intelligence-gathering assets and sensors are needed to provide the information for operations. They also require command and control systems capable of processing the information and providing networked forces with a real-time, digitized picture of the situation. Reliable and interoperable 1
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communication systems need to carry this information across forces and back to command centers in the field and the nation’s capital. A network of all these capabilities enables more effective and efficient operations. Even for more traditional operations, the evolution of military and dualuse technology has changed the face of combat. The first Gulf War suggested that large armies and heavy weaponry were no longer a guarantee of success; information dominance proved critical. Destroying the adversary had become less important than disrupting his lines of communication and supply. Today, it is widely accepted in the US military that advanced sensors, communications and information technologies, networked together to distribute the results, are a key ingredient of military success, especially for the high intensity operations for which they are planning. These technologies and the doctrine that accompanies them allow warfighters to see better and further, orient themselves on the battlefield, decide faster, strike more accurately, and assess the results of their actions more quickly.
Changes in US forces and doctrine lead the way US military planning has been the most responsive to the changing security conditions and the revolution in C4ISR technologies. At the strategic level, with the end of the Soviet threat, US security concerns have focused away from Europe, toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf, North Asia, and the Pacific, and toward such global security problems as failed states, terrorism, ethnic and religious conflict, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. NATO Europe became a secondary concern. As a result, the US military evolved toward a capability that could operate globally through near-continuous presence or expeditionary operations. The focus was no longer on a specific theater, but looked to reassure all friends and allies, dissuade potential military competitors anywhere on the globe, deter adversaries, and defeat any of them decisively (United States Department of Defense 2003: 4–5). US military doctrine began to move away from giving priority to major land battles of massed armies, and toward a doctrine that would ensure US ability to be “dominant across the full spectrum of military operations,” through a combination of “dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000: 2–3). This change in doctrine has begun to transform operational concepts, training, and technology. Global forces need to be able to move rapidly and their communications, command and control, and sensors need to be networked together. This requirement has come to be know as “transformation,” defined by the Defense Department as: A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world. (United States Department of Defense 2003: 8) 2
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To put such forces in place, the US relies on a technological revolution that has been taking place for at least 25 years. Rapid changes in information and communications technologies made it possible to imagine, develop, and deploy equipment that supported the process of “transformation.” Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s, the US military began to move in the direction of what it called network-centric warfare (NCW). As defined by the Department of Defense, network-centric warfare refers to “the combination of emerging tactics, techniques, and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfighting advantage.” Network-centric warfare “accelerates our ability to know, decide, and act, linking sensors, communications systems, and weapons systems in an interconnected grid” (United States Department of Defense 2003: 13). Analysts have described NCW this way: The United States … is poised to harness key information technologies – microelectronics, data networking, and software programming – to create a networked force, using weapons capable of pinpoint accuracy, launched from platforms beyond range of enemy weapons, utilizing the integrated data from all-seeing sensors, managed by intelligent command nodes. By distributing its forces, while still being able to concentrate fires, the US military is improving its mobility, speed, potency, and invulnerability to enemy attack. (Gompert et al. 1999: 8) This increasingly networked, global capability has been displayed since the first Gulf War, in the Balkans and, most recently, in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Desert Shield and Desert Storm revealed the military advantages of networking such capabilities as the Pioneer UAV, earth observation satellites and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Advanced sensors on manned and unmanned platforms provided real-time intelligence to commanders on the ground via a state-of-the-art command, control and communications network. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the US used a more advanced UAV – the Predator – that provided its operators with gigabytes of high-resolution imagery in support of missions. The “sensor-to-shooter” loop – the time between identification of a target and its destruction – was reduced from hours to minutes. This rapid change in military capabilities has far-reaching implications for the transatlantic security community. Although European militaries have participated in expeditionary operations in the last 15 years, their forces – structured to defend the European heartland – did not adjust as quickly to the expeditionary requirements and asymmetries of the post-Cold War international security environment. Throughout the 1990s, Europe’s armed forces suffered from a kind of “identity crisis.” While the task of defending the homeland remained a central focus for some of them, the new challenges were emerging in every dimension, demanding new, or transformed capabilities. European governments had not yet shaped a strategy and doctrine to deal with this emerging reality, nor was the message yet entirely clear as to how military forces were to be used or how the 3
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capabilities they need were to be created. Equally important, uneven attention was paid in the 1990s to how European forces could or should link up with the rapidly changing American military capability. For many European countries, forces shrank in the 1990s along with defense budgets, and the transformation underway in the US was not matched by a similar investment in Europe. As a result, it became increasingly difficult for US and European forces to operate in coalition, as the first Gulf War and, especially, combat operations in the Kosovo and Serbia air war demonstrated (Adams 2001a).
Is there a gap? The emerging sense in the 1990s that European forces were lagging behind the Americans, even declining, led to an atmosphere of judgment and criticism in the late 1990s. From the American perspective, this gap was technological and budgetary and had a direct, and negative, consequence for the ability of the US to operate in coalition with the Europeans, either in NATO or coalition operations, facing the new security threats of the twenty-first century. A common view in the US was that the US military had become so far advanced compared to its European counterparts that military interoperability was increasingly impossible; the Europeans would simply never “catch up.” Some of this perception was not new; the history of the NATO alliance is riddled with debates about the “gap” between the United States and European militaries. American policymakers have rarely felt that the European allies produced an adequate capability even to meet the requirements of traditional Central Front war plans. If this was true, to some degree it did not matter; NATO forces were in static positions as a defending force, not engaged in active combat testing the reality of the proposition. The new international security environment is different. The military forces of the allies have been repeatedly tested in combat and military operations, from the Gulf War, to the Balkans, to the Middle East. Combining the more active use of the forces with the presumed “gap” in technologies and capability has made the transatlantic interoperability issue a central problem for NATO, particularly with respect to C4ISR capabilities and the problem of “networking.” US defense planners have regularly expressed concern about the extent to which European forces were “interoperable” with the networked capabilities of the US. While their contribution in the Balkans and the Middle East were welcome, the inability to “connect” the forces led to operational problems. The disparity between the military capabilities of the United States and the European members of NATO came to be known as “the gap.” This “gap” became so large in the view of some analysts that it threatened the very ability of the Alliance to function as a military partnership (Gompert et al. 1999). Rising concern about this gap led American defense planners to become increasingly critical of European defense efforts. Aside from the differences in strategic outlook and expeditionary doctrine, the criticism focused on the lag in overall defense investment and especially a low European commitment to the 4
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C4ISR technologies that make network-centric operations possible. According to this view, European defense technologies have fallen significantly behind. Gompert et al. captured the essence of this critique: The use of transformation technology is far more extensive in US forces than in European forces. The quality of US precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) has improved greatly since the Gulf War, whereas European forces still remain incapable even of the type of operations that the US force conducted in 1991. (Gompert et al. 1999: 4) According to the critique, this gap is most obvious in information and communications technologies, the core of C4ISR. The United States can gather and fuse data from a wide variety of sensors and integrate them into military operations in ways Europeans cannot. Europeans lack the C4ISR capabilities that link target intelligence to shooters in a secure, real-time manner. What technologies the Europeans do possess, it is argued, cannot connect smoothly to US technologies, making coalition operations difficult or even dangerous. Some US critics have suggested that European information technologies lag behind the United States, making their application to defense needs and interoperability even more problematic (Gompert et al. 1999: 74–7, Deutch et al. 1999: 54–67). European efforts to improve on current capabilities are greeted with skepticism. The European Union “Headline Goal” process, it is argued, will not bring into being forces capable of conducting twenty-first century combat missions or being interoperable with US forces. European decisions to acquire new equipment, such as the A400M transport and Galileo satellites, are viewed as redundant, even wasteful of scarce defense resources. As a result, in this view, European forces, even in a multinational mode, will continue to rely on the United States (via NATO) for lift, logistics, and communications, and will continue to pose communications and information distribution problems. This study set out to examine the reality behind this critique. The result of a three-year research process, it examines European C4ISR capabilities, both in national settings and as they are reflected in the work of NATO and the EU (Adams et al. 2004). As such, it is the first in-depth view of the extent to which major European defense powers have begun to adapt their forces by integrating advanced C4ISR technology into their force planning and acquisition strategies. It focuses on the technologies at the heart of network-based operations: information and communications capabilities that are integrated into military systems, allowing national and coalition forces to be networked from sensor to shooter and back. In effect, the study takes a close look at the claim that European forces have fallen hopelessly behind those of the United States and cannot close the technology gap with the United States. The results are, inevitably, complex. It is clear that important European military partners of the United States are actually making significant investments 5
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in C4ISR technologies and working to integrate them into military systems. While European defense budgets, and especially European investment in military research and development (R&D), have declined over the past 15 years, many European countries are researching, developing and deploying advanced C4ISR capabilities. While efforts to develop these systems vary from country to country, there is no denying the overall trend in Europe, including activity in NATO and the European Union, towards obtaining improved capabilities for conducting network-based operations. The conventional wisdom about the “gap” is not entirely wrong, but it is not entirely right, either, as this study shows. As such, this study provides a corrective to the standard view, based on hard data, well beyond general impressions of the “gap.” If the practical realities of interoperability in networked operations is to be achieved, it will be important to move beyond the rhetoric of the gap and work with actual developments and real technology.
Overview This study has a specific focus. It is not a general examination of defense transformation in Europe, thus, does not examine force reductions or restructurings, power projection and expeditionary capabilities, or precision strike weaponry. All of these are worthy of study, and a comprehensive understanding of European military capabilities requires such an investigation. Networking and C4ISR are, however, at the heart of effective force transformation. Hence, this study focuses specifically on the investment and deployment of C4ISR within European militaries. The study provides an overview of the strategies and doctrines of major European countries with respect to network-based operations. No European country plans to create a fully networked force built around a unified command, control, and communications architecture, and few are planning for the kind of “network-centric warfare” capabilities the US seeks to create. Europe’s militaries are quite aware of the utility of C4ISR and networking, however, and see it as a way of linking their forces and equipment through more effective digital communications. European militaries and defense planners avoid such terms as “network-centric” and “warfare,” reflecting both a different view of the role of C4ISR technologies and of the purposes for which they are prepared to commit military force. For many Europeans, networking is a utility, that enhances their capability, not a goal in itself. Moreover, the purposes of their forces extend well beyond the range of warfare to encompass a wide array of military missions, including post-war stability and reconstruction. The most advanced European militaries with respect to C4ISR and network thinking are the UK, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, whose doctrines are discussed in some depth. France, Germany and Norway have yet to formulate a complete, in-depth network-based doctrine, but are clearly rethinking the ways in which they foresee their militaries operating in the future. The doctrines of two European defense powers – Italy and Spain – are not discussed, as they were 6
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found to deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations, though both possess relevant deployed technologies. There is, of course, a difference between doctrine and deployment. The study examines systematically the actual deployed and developing capabilities for networked operations of seven European countries, six of them NATO allies – France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands – and one non-NATO, Sweden. These seven were chosen as they are the NATO allies with the largest overall defense investments, the largest and most modern forces, and, in varying degrees, have the strongest commitment to deploying advanced C4ISR and being interoperable with the United States. The study explores in some depth the actual C4ISR capabilities of each country, including current deployments and programs that are being researched and developed. The focus is both on the advanced character of the technology and on the attention being paid to building in interoperability. The examination is somewhat arbitrarily divided into discussions of C2, communications and computers, and ISR. In reality, these technologies are and should be integrated as part of a networked capability. The capabilities discussion also examines the extent to which national capabilities are being contributed to coalition operations with other countries, as well as the country’s involvement in current or planned bi- and multinational expeditionary military frameworks, such as the NATO Response Force or the EU Battlegroups. To the extent possible, the discussion explores interoperability in three dimensions: interoperability across a nation’s military services, with other Europeans (NATO and EU), and with the United States. Because so much of the C4ISR and networking efforts are taking place at a level above single nations, the study examines network-based doctrine, capabilities and interoperability in multinational frameworks. NATO is the key multilateral setting in which networking issues are formally addressed and joint programs most fully developed. NATO’s networking and C4ISR efforts are significantly more advanced than those of the EU, for example. Moreover, recent initiatives in NATO – the Prague Capabilities Commitments, the NATO Response Force, and Allied Command Transformation – all give specific priority to developing interoperable, networkbased capabilities. NATO is probably the most important context for focusing on what needs to be done to close the gap with respect to C4ISR. The efforts of other multinational entities – the Multinational Interoperability Council, the Combined Communications-Electronics Board, the Multilateral Interoperability Program and the Combined Endeavor exercises – arealso important and examined here. While European Union defense planning is at an initial stage, it is also becoming an increasingly important context for C4ISR investment and networking discussions and commitments. Because the EU effort is both serious and long-term, it deserves discussion. The trend toward a more common defense capability in Europe, autonomous to some extent from the NATO alliance, will have important implications for future joint military operations. European defense planners are already well aware that such a capability will require autonomous, dedicated C4ISR capabilities. 7
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European programs and activities in the defense field are worthy of separate discussion. Space systems are increasingly important to C2, communications, and ISR. While national space capabilities are reviewed within the discussion of each country, there is also a growing network of European-level programs. Some of these capabilities are being developed outside the defense context, but have important, and recognized implications for defense planning. In addition, the attention paid to cross-European interoperability in space is even more advanced than for other C4ISR activities, and hence deserves a more in-depth analysis. The European industrial and technology base is an important part of the emerging capability in C4ISR. Europeans have chosen to rely extensively on domestic industrial and technology suppliers for their C4ISR needs and the European capability to respond to such demands is quite extensive. Many C4ISR systems are based on civilian or dual-use technologies, leading European militaries, like their American counterparts, to make use of a broad and innovative commercial sector. In the European case, this sector has been encouraged for decades through public investments in R&D activities. The recent emergence of several multinational firms – EADS, Thales and BAE Systems – has further strengthened European technological capabilities. Europeans argue that their dualuse technology sectors in information, sensoring, guidance, and communications, for example, are fully competitive with the United States, and, like American firms, draw on and participate in a truly global marketplace. At the sub-system level, it is clear that a substantial two-way street for such technologies, applied to defense needs, already exists (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998: 273). Based on this detailed analysis, the study makes a number of recommendations for policy changes, both in Europe and the United States, that would accelerate the pace at which the Europeans invest in and deploy C4ISR and networked capabilities, and would substantially enhance transatlantic interoperability. While there clearly is some truth to the “gap” argument, it is also based on a misperception. Only the United States has set for itself the twin goals of global operations and a fully network-centric military force to conduct those operations. European agendas are more modest with respect to geographic reach and the creation of a fully networked force. This does not mean, however, that American and European military forces cannot be interoperable as they function in NATO or coalition operations. There are increasingly clear ways in which they can be connected but a good deal of work remains to be done, on both sides of the Atlantic, to achieve this goal. This study suggests what the elements of a work agenda could be.
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To date, thinking and planning for network-based operations has been most advanced in the United States. Technological advances over the past 25 years have enabled the US to begin creating the network that is at the heart of this twentyfirst century requirement. Despite shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s, the US Department of Defense began to focus on the “transformation” of its forces, pushing towards network-centric warfare (NCW). NCW combined innovative tactics and technologies to give the military a decisive warfighting advantage and included linking command and control, communications, and intelligence gathering systems with weapons systems in an interconnected grid. America’s military has demonstrated this increasingly networked, global capability in the first Gulf War, the Balkans and, more recently, in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The European militaries have not moved as swiftly to create comparable capabilities. With the end of the Soviet threat, European defense strategies remained focused on regional security, which did not seem to demand advanced networked capabilities. European defense budgets declined through the 1990s and were largely focused on hardware inherited from the Cold War era – fighter aircraft, main battle tanks and large ships – and on maintaining the existing military force structure. European governments were concerned about the potential costs of pursuing a doctrine of network-centric warfare and the impact of such an investment on other defense requirements (James 2004: 167). European thinking began to evolve with the Gulf War of 1991, but especially as a result of the campaigns in the Balkans, where Europeans were struck by the disparities between their deployed capabilities and those of the United States. This stimulated greater interest in transforming European militaries to acquire similar capabilities that could be interoperable with the US. A number of European militaries have made significant progress since then. As will be discussed in the next chapter, several countries, notably France, the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, are researching, developing, procuring, and deploying significant networked capabilities and the trend is accelerating. These include unified digital communications infrastructures, cross-service command and control systems, and various ISR platforms, manned, unmanned and spacebased. Moreover, European countries are discovering that these capabilities are 9
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not as costly as initially perceived and that the European industrial and technology base is capable of providing them. The overall trend in a networked direction is clear, though progress is uneven across European countries. Programs have also been initiated in NATO and the European Union to expedite the use of networked advanced C4ISR in existing and planned forces. In NATO, the European allies agreed to the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) in 1999 and to the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) in 2002, which include substantial commitments to advanced C4ISR. NATO C4ISR programs now include SATCOM V, Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), and Air Command and Control System (ACCS). In the EU there is an effort to create expeditionary “Battlegroups” and to explore C3 jointly between the new European Defense Agency and the EU Military Staff. Only a few European countries, however, have begun to formulate doctrines for networked operations based on the uses of these technologies in warfare and their views on likely military operations over the coming decades. Countries that have begun to explore such doctrine also shy away from the use of such terms as “centric” and “warfare,” reflecting different views both on the importance of C4ISR technologies and on the purposes for which they would commit military force. There is no European country planning to create a fully networked force built around a unified command, control, and communications architecture, and few which are willing to place C4ISR technologies at the heart of warfighting capabilities in the way the United States has. Moreover, Europeans foresee a much broader range of military operations than the word “warfare” suggests. As a result, Europeans tend to use different terms to address planned capabilities, such as Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) in the UK, Networked Operational Command (Vernetzte Operationsführung, or NetOpFü) in Germany, and NetworkBased Defense in Sweden and Finland. NATO has also designated its doctrine differently, as NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC). The limitations of European military transformation are not the result of an inadequate technology base. Local and multinational suppliers are readily available and largely as technologically advanced as American suppliers. Analysts suggest that inadequate investment is the constraint. Certainly the significantly lower European defense research and technology investment limits the speed at which such technologies could be acquired and these budgets are unlikely to grow quickly. However, C4ISR systems are generally more affordable than large defense platforms and, as force multipliers, can provide a bigger “bang for the euro.” One of the most important constraints on the Europeans is the absence of a long-term strategy and doctrine on the use of force, which would integrate networked C4ISR into a strategic design. Without clear, well-defined strategic and doctrinal visions, European militaries have hesitated to commit funding to a transformation effort. Such strategies and doctrines as exist, moreover, remain largely at the national level. The United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands have all been European pioneers in formulating and implementing network thinking and capabilities into their military doctrines, but have done so largely based on specific national defense strategies and requirements. Others, including France, 10
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Germany, and Norway, are still in the process of formulating national doctrines for network-based operations, but have yet to connect this planning to national R&D and acquisition plans. Thinking and planning at the European level is still at a very early and tentative stage. This chapter first discusses the C4ISR doctrines of those European countries that have most advanced their thinking about defense transformation and networkbased operations: the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands. It then considers developments in other European countries – France, Germany and Norway – that are at a more initial stage in considering their network-enabled doctrines. Two of the larger European defense powers – Italy and Spain – are not discussed, as their defense doctrines deal little with C4ISR or network-based operations, though both possess relevant deployed technologies. While Italy is undertaking significant change in its military, based on a strategy review, C4ISR investments do not play a major role in this transformation process. There do not appear to be major efforts in Spain to integrate capabilities for network-based operations into national defense planning.
United Kingdom The British Ministry of Defense has moved the most swiftly among the Europeans to embrace the concept of integrating sensors, weapons systems, support capabilities and decision-makers, developing its own doctrine: Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC). It is not the goal of NEC to create a universal network via a single technical solution. Nor indeed is the doctrine extremely technically focused. Rather than view networks in a centric role, it prefers to see them in a more underpinning and supporting role. It perceives networks as enabling forces to better exploit the information carried on them to make better and timelier decisions on more agile and appropriate actions that result in effects more closely aligned to strategic aims and objectives. In the NEC doctrine, a network of networks is envisioned in which a number of nodes, carried by deployed operational assets, are interlinked. The NEC emphasis is on “the ability to collect, fuse and analyze relevant information in near real-time so as to allow rapid decision-making and the rapid delivery of the most appropriate military force to achieve the desired effect” (UK Ministry of Defense 2003: 11). NEC will exploit the current and future sensors that gather information, ensure that the information is better managed, fused and exploited to support decisions, and link the network to strike assets that can act upon the information collected. As an investment priority, NEC compatibility will be built into current and future military platforms. Using this network of networks concept, some parts of the battlespace will be linked through a C4ISR backbone using the Skynet satellite constellation and the Bowman, Cormorant and Falcon networks. In other parts, the network will be made up of different communications systems optimized for operating in particular environments (e.g. air to air communications, land communications). While all assets will have to possess some communications capability, only a few 11
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will need to be a permanent and integral part of the network; the rest will plug into it via specific permanent nodes. Interoperability, both technical and non-technical, is a critical element of the British NEC concept. A key challenge for NEC is to keep abreast of other transformation processes occurring within the armed forces of potential allies, most notably the United States. Through relatively frequent upgrading of C2 and communications technologies, somewhat easier procurement procedures, and constant participation in US defense R&D programs, the British armed forces today have the highest level in Europe of interoperability with American forces. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, however, have a higher level of interoperability with their American and European counterparts than does the British Army. In the near term, delivering NEC means identifying options to modify existing systems. Delivery in the medium term will require intervening in programmed equipment to ensure that delivered systems are capable of exploiting the information they collect and/or receive. Over the long term, the procurement program is to deliver platforms and systems that are net-ready. In January 2005, the British Ministry of Defense published the Network Enabled Capability Handbook, designed to introduce the concept of NEC to the larger UK defense community and to outline key programs that will be undertaken to implement the concept. The Handbook, which will be updated annually, describes how NEC will contribute to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, as well as its links with the Command and Battlespace Management program and the Joint High Level Operational Concept (Jt HLOC) being formulated by the Ministry of Defense (UK Ministry of Defense 2005). Britain restructured the Ministry of Defense to emphasize its commitment to NEC. NEC policy and coherence now falls under the Ministry of Defense’s Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management (CBM/J6), which works closely with the directorate responsible for the equipment in the Directorate for Equipment Capability – Command, Control and Information Infrastructure (DEC-CCII), headed by a one-star general. DEC-CCII is the largest equipment capability area in the Ministry of Defense (the other Core Capability DECs being DEC ISTAR responsible for Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance, DEC TA responsible for Air Enablers, and DEC CBRN responsible for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warfare). It is responsible for delivering solutions to C2 and information technology gaps in British military capability. DEC-CCII is able to balance funding across programs and between other DECs to deliver operational capability.
Sweden Urged by the Swedish parliament, the Swedish armed forces moved quickly to rethink defense strategy after the Cold War. In addition to their traditional role of territorial defense, they are now also required to collaborate with other national security elements, such as police and emergency management units, as well as 12
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with the forces of other countries within international coalitions. Sweden’s longstanding policy of neutrality and non-participation in alliances, and its defense strategy of border defense are both evolving rapidly. As its new roles and missions emerge, the Swedish military is evolving a doctrine of Network-Based Defense (NBD). NBD will facilitate joint operations in defense of the borders as well as in international coalitions at all levels of command, using information technology to create a system of systems infrastructure with different platforms linked into it. Once in place, NBD will allow the combination of different resources to provide task forces for specific operations. These task forces will be able to interoperate with other participants. The doctrine seeks to obtain the greatest possible effect by combining inputs and outputs from all systems, regardless of their organizational affiliation (Nilsson 2003: 8). The transition to NBD is expected to take twenty years or so; however, the first steps are underway, including developing and purchasing advanced C2 and communications capabilities for aircraft, ships and land vehicles and the initial design of a Network-Based Defense architecture. The Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) play a key role in shaping this vision (Rehnström 2002: 11–12). The Swedes conducted major experimental demonstrations of the key elements of the NBD doctrine between 2002–6. The experiments focused on secure information, service-oriented architectures, and the demonstration of dominant battlespace awareness and C2 elements for rapid reaction forces. They also included the demonstration of methods and techniques for effects-based operations. The demonstrations brought together units from different services, each with its own functional systems, and included simulations of a system of systems (Näsström 2004: 152–3). The demonstrations were undertaken in a special NBD Laboratory in Enköping, near Stockholm, built and operated by FMV for the Swedish armed forces. The implementation phase of the NBD doctrine is planned to begin in 2010.
Finland Since the end of the Cold War, Finland’s national security strategy has changed dramatically. The 1,000 km border with Russia remains a security issue, but the Finns are focused on participation in international security and relief operations as the central national security goal. As a result of this two-pronged defense strategy, Finland is making international defense interoperability a priority, to enhance both its ability to receive outside aid for national emergencies as well as the effectiveness of its contributions to multinational operations overseas. A key part of the new strategy is to formulate and implement a doctrine that networks all elements of the nation’s defense and security forces, using international standards. Finland decided that its various forces could be much more effective if connected via a single command, control and communications network that would enable seamless coordination and deployment of all of them. The planned network would connect all military, security, police and other emergency and first13
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responder forces. Though the Finnish doctrine is called Network-Based Defense, it implements a truly network-centric vision, plugging in all relevant users. Finland began installing this network – VIRVE (the Finnish acronym for Common Network for Authorities) – in 1999 and it became operational that same year. It was first used in live operations in 2000 and completed in 2002. Today, VIRVE is the world’s only fully operational, IP-based nationwide command, control and communications network for security and rescue forces. It is owned by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, and operated by Suomen Erillisverkot, an entity owned by the Finnish government and Sonera, Finland’s largest telecommunications service provider. It currently serves some 30,000 users from 20 different agencies and organizations, including the Finnish Defense Forces, police, border security, paramedics and firefighters, providing them with secure voice and data communications. A related system is the basis for Finland’s contribution of a deployable command, control and communications network to the European Union’s forces in the Balkans (EUFOR). Co-developed by Finnish companies and the Finnish Defense Forces and known as the Deployable COTS Network (DCN), it is a data transfer network that uses microwave links, fiber optic cables and broadband information services to transfer speech and data and provide Internet access between headquarters and troops in the field. VIRVE is an example of how a national doctrine for network-based defense is taking the first steps towards creating a common joint interoperable C4I system linking all government agencies. The architecture, structures and dataflow of this network will be operated together, allowing the sharing of information and resources according to specific needs. It will include an integrated data transfer, processing and management environment that covers all services and branches of the Finnish Defense Forces. Initial focus will be on the strategic and operational levels, but foundations will also be built for tactical level cross-service interoperability (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2004: 107). By 2012, the army, air force and navy are expected to be integrated into the national C4I network, developed and able to conduct network-based operations both in Finland and overseas. While the Finnish military strongly supports this capability (the Finnish Chief of Defense, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, has clearly prioritized integrated C4I systems as one of the military’s top development programs), other parts of the Finnish government face a challenge in developing their parts of the network. Organizational cultures and operational procedures differ significantly, and most agencies lack the capacity for long-term planning and capabilities development. However, interagency cooperation is strong, and there is significant public support for improving both homeland defense and expeditionary capabilities.
Netherlands During the Cold War, the Dutch armed forces saw one of their major roles as being able to provide C2 and communications capabilities to the theater of operations. Over several decades, they built up a C2 and communications capability, through 14
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investment in signals brigades. With the end of the Soviet threat, sustaining of a massive C3 capability became unnecessary. At the same time, the revolution in commercial information and communications technologies led to a “brain drain” away from the armed forces into the private sector. Dutch defense planners wished to maintain some C2 capacity within the armed forces and to develop the C2 requirements of the future. To this end, they created three Support Centers in 2001, one for each service, to bring together engineers and operational commanders for research, development, testing and evaluation on C2 systems that could serve the Netherlands armed forces in their new mission. Unable to match the salary levels of the private sector, the Dutch military compensated by offering the Support Center personnel a free hand in the use of their budget, included total flexibility for acquisition and program management. As the Dutch Ministry of Defense began to move toward a doctrine of expeditionary warfare, the ability of the C2 Support Centers to provide the customer with deployable and flexible systems became more important. The army’s C2 Support Center was tasked with developing C2 systems for all ground-based operations and is now the largest of the three Support Centers, employing some 200 people, half of whom are civilians. The Center also develops technologies used by the marines, the navy’s landing platform dock ships, and helicopters attached to an airmobile brigade. It is responsible for building a common, open C2 architecture allowing both old and new systems to work together. As of 1 January 2005, the Center was integrated into the newly created joint Defense Materiel Organization. This model of support centers, while not a doctrine for network-based operations per se, is an important contribution to European strategies for C4ISR. Such centers bring together expertise from industry and defense, ensuring that user needs and requirements are balanced with an understanding of what technology can support. Competitive salaries and a free hand to experiment with the latest technologies and participate in groundbreaking research draw the best and brightest employees from the private sector and the military. Finally, the technology development strategy of “plan a little, build a little, field a little, and learn a lot” (similar to the US “spiral development”) will be of interest to many European countries. Instead of setting down complex requirements packages in advance and then developing and producing a turnkey product, systems are designed in manageable parts that are then gradually developed and tested. Along each step of the way, the product is evaluated in accordance with overall specifications. Only then is a prototype built and tested with the end-user. While many European companies use this development strategy, doing so in a setting with industry, the military and endusers has the advantage of making it easier to identify and fix problems swiftly.
Other European countries Encouraged by the success of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands, other European nations are beginning to formulate strategy and doctrine for network-based operations. Rather than create distinct network-based doctrines, C4ISR or networked capabilities tend to be included in broader defense 15
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planning documents alongside plans for refocusing the military’s roles from territorial defense to expeditionary operations, downsizing forces, improving training for individual soldiers, reorganizing the military command structure, and reallocating resources from large platforms to more easily deployable capabilities. Most of these efforts are still at an early stage, however. France is a significant example of this trend. As is discussed in the next chapter, France is a European leader in researching, developing, testing and deploying state-of-the-art C4ISR technologies. The broad French technology investment does not, however, emerge from a comprehensive networking or transformational strategy and doctrine. This strategy is not yet in place, though use of the concept of network-centric operations (opérations réseaux-centrées, or ORC) is becoming more widespread within the French armed forces. Rather, the commitment to obtaining advanced C4ISR is part of an overall French desire to remain selfsufficient in military capabilities across the board. For decades, France has pursued a defense doctrine and procurement strategy that would provide its armed forces with independent, autonomous capabilities. The deployment of a broad arsenal and the avoidance of military specialization, in the view of French defense planners, make the country’s military more flexible and less dependent upon others. More recently, French strategy and doctrine have begun to emphasize military cooperation in the European context, recognizing that total autonomy is militarily and financially unachievable. Recent military planning in Germany suggests a growing focus on achieving expeditionary and network-centric capabilities. Germany is one of the few European countries to have adopted the concept of transformation in the broadest US sense, defining it as “the forming of an ongoing, forward-looking process of adaptation to a changing security environment in order to improve the Bundeswehr’s ability to operate” (Thiele 2005: 7). The German government announced in 2003 that it would downsize the armed forces to 211,000 troops, and to 392 bases by 2010, from the current 252,000 troops and 621 bases (CPM Forum 2005: 29–30). Moving away from a massive land warfare capability and toward an expeditionary capability, the German military force will be divided into three categories. The first category, some 35,000 troops, will become response forces (Eingreifkräfte) capable of participating in high-intensity combat operations. These forces will field state-of-the art C4ISR technologies for network-centric operations and interoperability with coalitions and allies. The second category, approximately 70,000 troops, will be stabilization forces (Stabilisierungskräfte) for medium- to low-intensity operations, and will be only partially networked. The third category will be support forces (Unterstützungskräfte), some 145,000 troops, which will provide support for the first two and be responsible for basic operations of the Bundeswehr. While there are no planned procurement cancellations, the funds saved by downsizing forces, and the change in defense doctrine are promising for Germany’s future C4ISR capabilities and its interoperability with allies. Germany has also formulated a network-centric doctrine that is very similar to the US strategy of Network-Centric Warfare. Named Networked Operational
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Command (Vernetzte Operationsführung, or NetOpFü, in German), the strategy calls for linking new and existing sensors and weapons platforms on a common information network. Norway, which is not in the EU, but is a NATO member, sees network-based defense as crucial for remaining relevant as a NATO partner and as a contributor to multilateral operations, and has made this strategy an important part of the broader restructuring of its armed forces. In 2001, the Norwegian parliament approved a major military reform between 2002–5. As in Sweden and in other countries, this reform was initiated by a shift in the roles assigned to the Norwegian armed forces, from primarily territorial defense to expeditionary operations. As a result of this shift, the command structure of the military was reorganized: the Headquarters Defense Command Norway was disbanded and the Chief of Defense, together with his strategic functions, was integrated with the Ministry of Defense. A new Defense Staff, consisting of representatives of the three services and an Inspector General, was established to support the Chief of Defense in his role as head of the armed forces. In addition, the size of the military reduced by approximately 5,000. The savings generated from this restructuring would be invested in advanced capabilities and systems. These investments have included upgrading the national Defense Data Network (known as FDN) and procuring locally developed advanced multi-role tactical radios (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2002). In the next cycle, 2005–8, the Norwegians plan to create a joint Information and Communications Infrastructure unit to support Norwegian forces deployed overseas and an ISTAR unit, focused primarily on reconnaissance missions using special forces and UAVs, that can operate within multinational coalitions (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2004).
Conclusion There is not yet a consistent approach in Europe to Network-Based Operations. Some countries still view territorial defense as the principal mission for their armed forces, and see stovepiped C4ISR systems as sufficient for fulfilling their current and future defense requirements. Still, a growing number of European nations have learned important lessons from studying US Network-Centric Warfare doctrine and observing such capabilities in action on the battlefield in coalition operations. Some, including Germany, France and Norway, are beginning to include language about C4ISR networks in their defense modernization plans, but have yet to create specific, detailed doctrines discussing how these networks will be linked with existing military doctrine, tactics and technologies. Other European countries, particularly the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, have developed detailed doctrines and strategies for creating advanced capabilities, based on linking communications, intelligence gathering and weapons systems into a network capable of distributing information. It is not always true that countries that have worked through doctrine in detail have also deployed the most advanced technology consistent with that doctrine. As
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the French case suggests, doctrinal leaders are not always the same as technology leaders. Over time, the two will need to develop together, if the Europeans are to obtain a network-based capability that is interoperable within Europe as well as across the Atlantic.
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Efforts are well underway in many European countries to develop and acquire national, and in some cases multinational, capabilities for network-based operations. As already noted, no country has fully embraced the concept of networkcentric operations to the extent the American military has. None are seeking to create a full, single infrastructure fusing all existing and future assets. Most have opted, at least, for some integration and upgrading of existing capabilities toward greater networking. Major procurement programs focus particular attention on cross-service C2 systems, digital communications, and ISR platforms (tactical, operational, and strategic). In all of these countries, rapid advances in commercial communication and information technology have created a wealth of products applicable to military C4ISR at a relatively low unit cost. As a result, for many of these countries, expensive weapons platforms can be improved through C4ISRrelated upgrades, thereby increasing capability at an affordable cost. This chapter focuses on actual deployed and planned C4ISR capabilities in seven European countries: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. As noted, doctrines for network-based capabilities are unevenly developed among these countries. However, these seven countries are clearly the most advanced in Europe, both in terms of overall military capability, and in the deployment of C4ISR technologies. Not surprisingly, with the exception of the Netherlands, they are also the countries with the highest defense budgets in Europe. They are also the most likely partners of the US in coalition operations, either individually or as members of NATO and the EU. An overview of the trends in C4ISR-related acquisition and R&T programs in Europe identifies developments that have been observed in several – if not the majority – of EU and NATO countries. This chapter then reviews developments relevant to network-based operations in each of the seven key countries, summarizing major national capabilities, both deployed and projected, and examining in some detail each country’s network-based systems in terms of C2, communications (including computers), and ISR.
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Overview Significant efforts are already underway in most European countries to connect existing C2 systems across services. Several countries are creating a new, crossservice C2 infrastructure, including the United Kingdom (the Joint Command System), France (SICA), and Italy (CATRIN). Interoperability among these C2 systems is significantly less advanced, especially for ground forces. The French army, for example, has three command levels, while most other European armies – including the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy – have two, which makes the creation of a common C2 architecture among them a challenge. All of the countries reviewed believe that a common digital communications backbone for their services is crucial. Several countries field tactical systems based on asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches; many others have integrated digital switches capable of interfacing with high-speed data networks and complying with European and NATO standards. Many of them are at advanced stages in upgrading their communications infrastructure, whether through terrestrial networks, satellite systems, or a combination of both, including the British Bowman and Skynet programs, the German AUTOKO-90 and BIGSTAF programs, and the French SOCRATE, RITA 2000, and Syracuse programs. Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy are also making significant progress in the military communications field. For communications in general, the civilian industry is the main driver of innovation and, therefore, the main standard setter. It is not surprising that while different companies are working on communications programs for Europe’s militaries, the systems being put in place share attributes: they are digital, increasingly based on the Internet Protocol (IP), capable of handling voice as well as data, and use ATM switching equipment and widespread transmission technologies (satellite, radio, and fiber optics). In addition to space-based military communications, many European countries are turning to space for future surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. While military communications satellites (COMSAT) usually are built and operated by individual countries, earth observation programs have become increasingly multinational. Furthermore, intra-European agreements are being put in place to link national space assets. In the not-so-distant future, data collected by satellites owned by different countries will be disseminated between partners through sharing agreements, and communications satellites will carry military transmissions from countries that lease their bandwidth from others. A growing number of militaries are acquiring the capability to link their headquarters with their expeditionary forces using broadband mobile communications. The French ARISTOTE, the German KINTOP, the British Cormorant, and the Swedish KV90 are examples of such systems already in place. Finally, the Europeans are making increased use of unmanned platforms, especially aerial ones, to fulfill the tactical and, in some cases, operational and strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements. While most European countries possess manned platforms for this purpose, particularly for 20
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aerial reconnaissance, these are either in need of upgrading or are nearing the end of their service lives. All the militaries discussed in this chapter, as well as those of several other European countries, have begun to experiment with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) – often developed by their indigenous technology and industrial base – and most have used them in military operations. They are viewed as affordable, versatile, and dependable options for future surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Several countries, notably the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, are looking to UAVs for other operational needs, including signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic warfare, airborne ground surveillance, and strike missions. However, unlike what is often the case in communications and C2, different ISR standards are set by each country, which makes interoperability a difficult challenge.
France France invests in almost all areas of defense technology relevant to network-based operations. However, as was explained in the previous chapter, the broad French investment in C4ISR capabilities does not yet grow out of a comprehensive network-centric strategy. Although the concept of network-centric operations (opérations réseaux-centrées, or ORC) is widespread within the French armed forces, only a handful of officers within the French Joint Staff are currently working on network-centric doctrines. Nevertheless, between 1991 and 1993, several new organizational frameworks were created to review and modernize French doctrine and strategy in this direction. The single joint Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du Renseignement Militaire, or DRM) replaced a variety of existing services and reports to the chief of the defense staff. A joint planning staff, the Etat-Major Interarmées (EMIA), was created to plan operations in and out of Europe, and the Centre Opérationnel Interarmées (COIA) became the joint operations center. France also put in place a joint theater C2 structure (Poste de Commandement Interarmée de Théâtre, or PCIAT) and the space bureau in the French Joint Chiefs of Staff was folded into the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) staff (Thomas 2000: 20). The initial purpose of these organizational changes was to facilitate force projection and expeditionary warfare operations. However, these new organizational structures could provide a setting for developing a military doctrine increasingly focused on transformation and coordination across services. Because force projection, expeditionary forces, and out-of-theater operations require, among other things, advanced C2 systems, communications networks, and real-time intelligence, the C4ISR systems that provide this are playing an increasingly important role in French military plans. The French defense procurement agency (Délégation Générale pour l’Armement, or DGA) has set up a task force of capability managers (architectes des systèmes de force) in charge of future issues for defense R&D and procurement and their cross-service applications. The areas covered are deterrence, C3I, force projection, deep strike, and maintaining operational capability. The task force meets regularly 21
• Across-the-board investments in C4ISR • Expeditionary forces
• Network-enabled capabilities (NEC) doctrine • Defense Information Infrastructure (DII): integration of all C4 systems • Expeditionary forces
• Networked Operational Command (NetOpFü) doctrine • Modernization of forces • Expeditionary forces
United Kingdom
Germany
Strategy
• • • •
Autoko-90 SATCOM-BW AF: MIDS Navy: Link-11 and MIDS
• Bowman • Skynet MILSATCOM system • RAF and RN equipped with Link-11/16, JTRS
• JCS cross-service system
• FüInfoSys SK cross-service system (still in initial stages)
• SOCRATE • Syracuse MILSATCOM system • AF and navy possess Link11/16
Communications
• SICA cross-service system
C2
Principal European national capabilities for network-based operations
France
Table 3.1
• Tactical, MALE, HALE UAVs • SAR-Lupe satellite system • AGS proposed via HALE (Euro Hawk) • GAST: common system for ISR data
• Phoenix TUAV; Watchkeeper MALE UAV program • ASTOR (5) AGS aircraft • AWACS (7) aircraft • Nimrods (18) • GRIFFIN info-sharing WAN
• UAVs (incl. MALE and HALE) • Helios 1 (Helios 2 underway) • Limited AGS (4 Horizon helicopters) • AWACS (4) aircraft • SAIM (data management, interoperable with JSTARS, HORIZON systems)
ISR
• Selective acquisition of C4ISR assets (UAVs, space) • Expeditionary forces
• Specialized transformation (UAVs, communications) • Expeditionary forces
• Modest investment • Expeditionary forces
• Network-Based Defense (NBD) doctrine • Expeditionary forces
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Strategy
• Link-11 and MIDS • Hispasat MILSATCOM system
• TITAAN (tactical IP network) • MIDS • Limited MILSATCOM capability
• SICRAL MILSATCOM system • Link-11/16 and MIDS
Communications
• SEWCCIS cross-service C2 • HF-2000 system
• No cross-service C2 system
• ISIS air force and army C2 system
• CATRIN
C2
• Limited AEW and AGS (6 Argus aircraft) • UAV and UCAV programs
• Limited ISR capabilities
• TUAVs
• Limited AGS (4 CRESO helicopters) • UAVs (incl. Predator) • COSMO-Skymed satellite system
ISR
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with representatives of the French defense industry to coordinate government requirements with private-sector projects and planning. In fact, several of the larger defense contractors in Europe have set up new groups to act as permanent liaison with members of the task force for this purpose, such as the Thales Think Tank (T3). In 2004 there were still more changes in France’s defense organizations. The DGA was restructured to include expanded and improved in-house technical capabilities for research, technology, and testing. The French Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry are beginning to assume responsibility for monitoring the development and demonstration of defense programs, a responsibility currently held by the DGA. These changes are seen as a way to bring industry closer to its client, the French military (Tran 2004: 4). The importance of C4ISR for current and future military capabilities has also been reflected in France’s defense budget planning. C2 systems, space technologies, and interoperability enablers have received priority for R&D investment in the 2003–8 five year defense plan (the Loi de Programmation Militaire). During the first two years, DGA planners focused on space-based SIGINT assets, a space-based early warning system demonstrator, integrated C2 systems for the army and navy, and advanced navigation technologies. For 2005– 6, UAVs and the interlinking of European space assets are the priority. By the end of the five year plan, France hopes to raise its defense R&T budget to some 1.2 billion euros (out of a total 15 billion euros), up from 800 million euros in 2004 (Boulesteix 2004). For all C4ISR requirements, DGA’s Directorate of Force Systems and Prospective Systems Analysis (Direction des Systèmes de force et de la Prospective, or DSP) has been replaced by the Directorate of Force Systems and Industrial, Technological and Cooperation Strategies or Direction des Sytèmes de Force et des Stratégies Industrielles, Technologique et de Coopération (D4S), which decides on the best and most affordable solutions, without prejudice toward any specific technology. The DGA is also working on two plans to assess the future C4ISR needs of the French armed forces. The first is a technological capabilities plan of systems, including C4ISR systems, to be acquired by the year 2015. The second is the Prospective Plan for 30 Years (Plan Prospectif à Trente Ans, or PP30), which looks specifically at longer-term needs and solutions for meeting them, mainly in the fields of telecommunications, intelligence, networking, C2, sensors, and UAV technologies. The latter, first unveiled at the 2005 Paris Air Show (although circulated within the French Ministry of Defense for several years prior to that), is groundbreaking in that it provides a 30 year draft acquisition plan for the French military, based on an analysis of expected threats, uses of force, and technology developments. Both plans are updated periodically to guide R&T investments and procurement plans, in collaboration with the European Defense Agency, other allies – most notably the UK – and with industry. Working closely with the Joint Planning Staff (EMIA) and with DGA on network-based capabilities is the French space agency, known as the Center for 24
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National Space Studies (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales) or CNES. This collaboration reflects the French government’s recognition that space has major strategic, operational and tactical advantages for networking and intelligence collection purposes. As a result, CNES has begun overseeing some military space programs on behalf of the Ministry of Defense. The French Chief of Staff chairs the space coordination group (Groupe de Coordination Espace – GCE), which includes representatives from EMIA, DGA, and other military institutions. CNES has also created a team dedicated to military space projects. Its members, who can either be CNES employees or Ministry of Defense staff seconded to CNES, report to the president of CNES as well as to the relevant program managers at the Ministry of Defense. The team works on four major areas: future planning, ongoing projects, implementation of dual-use space programs, and R&T. More broadly, recognizing the costs of an autonomous French defense strategy, France is continuing its defense cooperation with the EU and NATO. In addition to its Eurocorps commitments, France will commit a whole Battlegroup to the EU Battlegroup effort and participate in two others, one with Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the other with Belgium. France is also committed to participating in the NATO Response Force, despite viewing it as duplicative of the EU Rapid Reaction Force. It is unlikely, however, that France will periodically rotate the same forces through the NRF; it would be more interested in NRF experience for different kinds of troops drawn from various services. While the French understand that smaller countries will participate in the NRF in a specialized manner, they prefer to rotate different types of forces through and maintain autonomy. France also views the Allied Command Transformation as an important development and a target for closer cooperation, which might provide a window for the EU into US transformation. However, within the EU, the French strongly believe that there needs to be a European flag on European military capabilities. At this point, it is unclear whether the French expect EU capabilities to be able to complement US capabilities, to be oriented principally toward autonomous operations, or both. This issue has major implications for interoperability requirements and capabilities. Currently, France is very supportive of the plan to give the European Defense Agency increasingly greater R&T and procurement responsibilities. However, France also believes that the European national investments in major platforms stand in the way of greater interoperability between European C4ISR systems. In the French view, European defense budgets include a major commitment to a platform strategy, which leaves little funding for C4ISR and interoperability. At the transatlantic level, major French platforms, such as the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, have good tactical interoperability with the US Navy, using Link-16 technology. In Afghanistan, for example, French E-2C aircraft from the Charles de Gaulle guided American fighters toward their targets when US E-2C aircraft were overtaxed or unavailable. French Special Operations Forces also have good interoperability with their US counterparts. At the European level, French naval and air forces are fairly interoperable with most European forces, but French 25
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ground forces are not. The French Army still fields communications systems, for example, that are not fully interoperable with its allies. The coordination of French R&D efforts is focused, for now, totally on achieving jointness at the national level. As a European leader in space, France also seeks greater cooperation with the United States, especially for earth observation, communications, and navigation programs. France also views itself as a potential intermediary between the United States and the space-related activities of other European nations and organizations, including the European Space Agency and the European Commission (Hura et al. 2000: 64–5). France has arguably the most advanced operational battlespace digitization program in Europe, both deployed and planned. While there is not yet full interoperability between all French military services, the initial investment in cross-service systems has been made and deployment is well underway. The major building blocks are a cross-service C2 system, a digital communications infrastructure, and a network linking national HQs and expeditionary forces. In 2004–5 two laboratories for demonstrating network-based concepts were created. Bulle Opérationelle Aéroterrestre (BOA) demonstrates the ability to fuse information from UAVs and land-based sensors in real time to create a common battlespace picture for land forces and enable a coordinated engagement of targets. The second laboratory will focus on linking data collected by ISR assets from all services. Since France has also invested heavily across the board in ISR capabilities, it is important to demonstrate the ability to link UAVs, manned airand ship-borne platforms, and space-based assets. Command and control France has operational C2 systems in every service. The army has four fully operational digital C2 programs: the Force Command and Information System (Système d’Information et de Commandement des Forces, or SICF) for divisionlevel C2 (including C2 for overseas task forces), the Regimental Information System (Système d’Information Régimentaire, or SIR) originally for regimentallevel C2, but redirected to company level in 2001, the Final Information System (Système d’Information Terminal, or SIT) for tactical-level C2 and armored vehicles, and the Automated Surface-to-Surface Artillery Fire and Liaison System (Automatisation des Tirs et des Liaisons de l’Artillerie Sol-sol, or ATLAS). Some 750 SIR vehicles, 650 SIT systems, and nine ATLAS systems are deployed. Other operational digital C2 systems are the army’s Martha air defense system, the air force’s Aerial Operations Command and Control System (Système de Commandement et de Contrôle des Opérations Aériennes, or SCCOA), and the navy’s SIC21 system. The French navy also deploys several Naval Tactical Information Exploitation Systems (Système d’Exploitation Navale des Informations Tactiques, or SENIT). Ships equipped with SENIT can operate as single, distributed anti-aircraft systems. In addition, the French navy in 2004 initiated the Multi-Platform Engagement Capability (Capacité d’Engagement 26
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Multi Plate-formes, or CEMP) demonstrator as a possible locally developed counterpart to the US Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), to provide air and naval assets with additional cooperative engagement capability. France initially sought to develop CEMP as a collaborative program, offering Italy, Germany and the Netherlands participation, but the offer was not accepted. Initial operational capability is expected in 2006. These C2 systems are only partially interoperable with each other or with allied capabilities, though SICF and SIR are both compliant with NATO STANAGs. The SIR and SIT systems can both be linked to French combat and C2 helicopters, and ATLAS and SIR both interface with the French Rapsodie surveillance system. ATLAS is currently interoperable with United States, United Kingdom, Italian and German surface-to-surface firing systems as well as with SIR, and SCCOA is planned to be interoperable with the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS). The French SENIT system is also interoperable with the C2 of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy through Link-16 and Link-11, which allows interoperability in naval air defense. France is now in the final stages of deploying the next generation C2 system in the form of a strategic-level system called the Joint Information and Command System (Système d’Information et de Commandement des Armées, or SICA). This system, which will link the army’s SICF, the navy’s SIC21, and the air force’s SCCOA systems, is already installed on various weapons platforms and headquarters. It is linked to the SOCRATE and the Syracuse 3 communications systems (see below), and interoperable with the British JOCS and the German Rubin systems. Communications and computers The Operational System of Joint Telecommunications Networks (Système Opérationnel Constitué des Réseaux des Armées pour les Télécommunications, or SOCRATE) is the current communications infrastructure linking all of France’s services. Its 120 ATM switching sites in France cover all military communications, including radio, fiber optic, and satellite, and connect the system to civilian and allied communications networks. In addition, a more advanced tactical communications system for the French army will enter into service around 2004–5. It will be based on IP-networked PR4G (Programme Radio 4ème Génération, or 4th Generation Radio Program; VHF tactical radios used in man-portable, vehicle-mounted, or aircraft-mounted configurations) and the Automatic Transmission Integrated Network (Réseau Intégré de Transmissions Automatiques 2000, or RITA 2000) switching platform, both supplied by Thales. The RITA 2000 project was initiated in 1993, and has progressively upgraded the French tactical communications infrastructure to facilitate interoperability with allied networks and expeditionary forces, and increase bandwidth. Its link into the armed forces’ C2 network management is known as the Command Network Center (Centre de Commandement du Réseau, or CECOR). In August 2003, the French defense procurement agency announced a 100 million euro plan to upgrade 27
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the RITA 2000 system with new hardware and software to provide state-of-the-art tactical Internet and mobile communications services. For tactical communications, France currently uses older versions of the PR4G radios, which nevertheless include features such as frequency hopping encryption. Since 2005, however, several units have begun using newer versions that include a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) and tactical Internet capabilities. A total of 7,050 PR4G-IP radios will be delivered to the French military by 2009 at a cost of 235 million euros. In addition, the tactical Local Area System (LAS) developed by Thales provides a tactical command post in the field with digital communications capabilities through a vehicle-mounted, IP-based system. In the French navy, several platforms, including some E-2C aircraft, the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, and several anti-air frigates, possess Tactical Digital Information Link technology of the Link-11 and Link-16 types. This technology is now installed in aircraft of the French air force, as well. The Link-11 systems will be replaced by Link-22 (also known as NATO Inproved Link Eleven, or NILE) systems in the near future. France also procures MIDS terminals and is a partner in the US navy-led MIDS JTRS program to make MIDS terminals compliant with the US JTRS software defined tactical radios. French military satellite communications capabilities are also at quite an advanced stage, with the Syracuse satellite constellation. The previous operational system, Syracuse 2, used the military payloads of four Télécom 2 commercial satellites, launched between December 1991 and August 1996, and was operated jointly by France Télécom and the French armed forces. The system did not provide global coverage, but did cover all of Europe and reached the United States to the west and India to the east. Its satellites began to reach the end of their lives in 2004, and while most are still available as backup, a new system, Syracuse 3, was put in orbit to replace them. Syracuse 3A, was launched in October 2005, and the second satellite is scheduled for launch in 2006; total costs for both are estimated at around 3 billion euros, including roughly 600 airborne, terrestrial, and ship-borne terminals. A third satellite, to be launched around 2010, is under study. The satellites have both SHF and EHF channels; Syracuse 3A has nine SHF channels and six EHF channels. The Syracuse constellation belongs to the French government, though the French Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of turning management of the third satellite over to a private consortium, using the model of Britain’s Skynet 5 (De Selding 2003a: 6). The Syracuse 3 satellites will form part of the BritishFrench-Italian solution for NATO’s future satellite communication needs, and France has additional agreements with Germany, Belgium, and Spain to share Syracuse 3 capacity (Laurent 2001: 30). Since 2002, France also has a deployed system (ARISTOTE) to provide endto-end communications between operational units in external theaters of operation and their commanders in France. ARISTOTE uses the Syracuse constellation and other available allied and commercial COMSATs to provide a broadband architecture based on the latest commercial standards. The system supports voice, video teleconferencing, telegraph, fax, and data (including tactical Internet). 28
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Future communications projects include a naval intranet system (RIFAN), a secure e-mail system for the French Ministry of Defense (Universal Secure Messaging, or Messagerie Universelle Sécurisée, or MUSE), and the Airborne Laser Optical Link (Liaison Optique Laser Aéroportée, or LOLA), a 2006 test of a 50 million euro demonstrator to explore the feasibility of high-rate laser optical links between an ARTEMIS civilian communications satellite and a UAV in flight. The Airborne Communication Node (Noeud de Communication Aéroporté, or NCA), a UAV-borne high-bandwidth hub capable of linking up to 50 mobile ground or maritime gateways, is also under advanced stages of development, with a first demonstration expected in 2006. France also plans to procure additional Link-16 equipment for its Rafale aircraft and for some naval platforms. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance France is the European leader in deployed space-based ISR capabilities and the operator of Helios, the only European military earth observation system currently in orbit. Despite the cancellation of the Horus radar satellite program in 1998, France continued its earth observation efforts with the development of two Helios 1 satellites. The first was launched in July 1995 and remains operational; the second was launched in December 1999 but failed in October 2004. A joint French, Italian, and Spanish project, Helios 1 satellites carry optical imagers with approximately one-meter resolution and are capable of imaging any point on earth within 24 hours, providing a dozen images a day. They do not have infrared capability. Each participating nation can control the onboard imaging system on a pro rata basis, based on its financial contribution to the program (France 78.9 per cent, Italy 14.1 per cent, and Spain 7 per cent). The Helios 1 system allows each of the co-owners to maintain strict secrecy from each other regarding the use they make of it. However, to make optimum use of the imaging capacity, the three partner nations have agreed on certain common needs and program the satellite accordingly. More than 30 per cent of the imagery taken by Helios 1 is shared between the partners. In addition to fixed ground stations to receive Helios 1 imagery, France possesses at least one mobile ground station, built by EADS. Helios 2A, the first in the next generation of French earth observation satellites, was launched in December 2004 and began operating in April 2005. The second satellite will probably be launched in late 2008. Helios 2A carries two sensors operating in the visible and infrared spectrums. One is a medium-resolution sensor with a wide field of view, and is capable of producing images with a resolution of approximately 1 meter; the other has a narrower field of view but is capable of producing images with a 50 cm resolution. The satellite has a contractual service life of five years, during which it will produce roughly 100 images per day (Fiorenza 2005a). The ground segment of the Helios 2 system has an open architecture, allowing for interoperability with other imagery sources, including other satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and drones. Users, whether in Europe or in an overseas theater of operations, will have access to a workstation connected to the main 29
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ground segments, from which they will be able to request specific tasking, perform analysis, or access an imagery archive. Overall costs for the Helios 2 program are approximately 2 billion euros. Belgium and Spain each have a 2.5 per cent stake in the program, and Greece will join it in the future with a small ownership share. Helios 2 imagery will also be shared with other EU Member States through the EU satellite center in Torrejón. France is also working on a dual-use satellite system – Pleiades – a constellation of earth observation satellites able to cover both military and civilian requirements. The constellation, to be built by EADS Astrium of France, will include two new French high-resolution optical satellites, capable of resolutions of about 60 cm. Other satellites linked to the constellation will be the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites, designed for a resolution of less than one meter for military images, and one meter for commercial ones. The Pleiades-HR satellite is expected to be launched in 2008, with the other French contribution to the constellation being launched approximately one year later. The Italian satellites are expected to be operational by 2007. Pursuant to an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001, the Italian system will be linked to the French via Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation (ORFEO), which will ensure interoperability and information sharing between the two systems. France will also give Italy access to SPOT (Système Pour l’Observation de la Terre) 5 and to Helios 2 imagery. The Swedish National Space Board signed an agreement with the French Space Agency in April 2001 guaranteeing its participation in the civilian aspects of the program as well as providing access to some of the data. The most recent additions to the Pleiades program, in 2002 and 2003, are Spain’s defense R&D agency INTA and the civilian space agencies of Austria and Belgium, all of which secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system. The total non-French role on the Pleiades program, however, is not likely to exceed 15 per cent. An information-sharing agreement between France and Germany is also expected. France also has its own limited airborne ground surveillance capabilities. The On-Site Radar and Investigation Observation Helicopter (Helicoptre d’Observation Radar et d’Investigation sur Zone, or HORIZON) is a heliborne ground surveillance radar that operates in moving target indicator mode but not in a synthetic aperture radar mode. Operational in the French army since 2002, the system consists of four radars mounted on AS-532 Cougar helicopters and two ground stations. It provides ISR capabilities for the tactical and operational levels. A similar system was sold to the Swiss army, and Turkey has shown an interest. Maritime ISR capabilities take the form of the Breguet Atlantic manned aircraft. Additional manned aerial ISR is provided by Mirage F1-CR aircraft outfitted with the Raphael Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) pod, an infrared pod, and the Stand-Off Reconnaissance Pod (Pod de REconnaissance STand Off, or PRESTO) digital camera pod, and by the navy’s Super Etendard 4 aircraft carrying a camera and infrared and radar pods. In land ISR systems, the Rapsodie ground radar system is under development, with full operational capability expected in 2008–9. 30
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It will be interoperable with the SIR command and control system and with the ATLAS fire control system. In addition, France deploys four Boeing Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) E-3 aircraft, delivered to the French air force between 1991 and 1992. In 1998, France began upgrading these aircraft to outfit them with Boeing’s Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system and the new Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) kit. Upgrade of the first aircraft was completed in 2005, and the other three will be completed by the end of 2006. The ESM system provides the E-3 with passive listening and detection capabilities, which enable it to detect, identify, and track electronic transmissions from ground, airborne, and maritime sources. The RSIP kit will improve the aircraft’s ability to detect and track smaller targets. France has also taken the European lead with respect to surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs. Some, like the 12 Crecerelle (Kestrel) TUAVs operational with the artillery corps and the four Hunter MALE UAVs tested by the air force, have been operational for many years and are approaching the end of their lifetimes. The Hunter UAV is a version co-developed by Israeli Aircraft Industries and EADS. The Crecerelle has been deployed by the army since 1995, and has been successfully used as part of French NATO operations in the Balkans. A communications-jamming version is also in service. Each Crecerelle is outfitted with a TV camera and optical and infrared sensors, and the systems were fully operational until 2004. Other TUAVs continue to be operational. The army has 54 CL-289 UAVs for tactical reconnaissance missions at the corps and division levels. Co-developed with Germany and Canada and successfully deployed in the Balkans, it has been operational since 1993. Its payload was initially limited to black and white cameras and infrared sensors, but it has been upgraded to include a synthetic aperture radar, and its flight software and navigation system have also been improved. A separate program, known as Reconnaissance Vehicle Programming, Interpreting, and Displaying (Programmation, Interprétation, Visualisation d’Engins de Reconnaissance, or PIVER), was undertaken to develop ground stations for this program. In addition, the French army is purchasing man-portable mini-UAVs for very close range reconnaissance and surveillance. These include several Pointer hand-launched UAV systems, similar to those in use with the US army, marines, and special forces, which received an export license by the United States in 2001, and the DRAC (Drone de Reconnaissance Au Contact, or Drone for Reconnaissance Upon Contact), of which 160 systems (consisting of two UAVs each) are being procured. For its future MALE missions, the air force is field-testing the Eagle-1 system as part of the Intermediary MALE Drone System (Système Intérimaire de Drone MALE, or SIDM). This UAV system is based on the Heron UAV produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries, modified by EADS. Several of these systems are currently being tested, with air vehicles carrying synthetic aperture radar, moving target indicator radar, TV cameras, Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR), and a satellite data link. 31
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The French air force has also begun work on the next generation of MALE UAVs under project EuroMALE, planned for deployment between 2008 and 2010. In May 2002, the Netherlands air force announced that it would collaborate on EuroMALE and by 2004 Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Spain had also expressed their interest in joining. Out of an estimated cost of 300 million euros, the French Ministry of Defense will invest 75 million; the rest will be contributed by other governments and industry. The French army is planning the next generation of tactical UAVs. The army’s Intermediary Tactical Drone System project (Système de Drone Tactique Intermediaire, or SDTI) for the replacement of the Crecerelle UAVs began in February 2003 with the development of a UAV derived from the Safran Group’s Sperwer. The first trial flights were undertaken in December 2003. Eighteen vehicles, outfitted with a black-and-white camera and an infrared sensor, and four ground stations are expected and will be able to interoperate with the French ATLAS, Martha, and SICF C2 systems. The system became fully operational in 2005. For longer-term needs, the Multi-Collector, Multi-Mission program (Multi Capteurs, Multi Missions, or MCMM) has been underway since September 2002. MCMM will provide for the army’s TUAV needs beyond the year 2008, when the CL-289 and SDTI systems will go out of service. In addition, a tactical rotorwing UAV, built by ECT Industries of France, is currently under development for the French navy. The first prototype of this project, Helicopter Operated from Afar (Hélicoptère Téléopéré, or HETEL), was flown in December 2002, and trials began in 2005. Plans are also in place for the development of a long-endurance maritime UAV known as the Long Endurance On-Board Drone (Drone Embarqué Longue Endurance, or DELE). France has also begun to develop unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), with two major projects. The first outfits Sperwer B TUAVs with Israeli-made Spike ER (extended range) precision strike missiles. First unveiled in the summer of 2005, this project is similar to the US success with armed Predator UAVs, using Hellfire missiles. The second is R&D on a new UCAV, Neuron, to be operational by 2009. Led by Dassault Aviation, which holds a 50 per cent share, the program has drawn interest from several European governments and firms. Alenia Aeronautica of Italy is the second largest industrial partner with a 22 per cent stake. In addition, EADS CASA of Spain, Saab of Sweden, Greece’s Hellenic Aerospace Industry and Switzerland’s RUAG have all signed on as partners and further government-to-government agreements are likely. The French Ministry of Defense has set aside some 400 million euros for this program. The use of NATO STANAGs in choosing the datalink will ensure its interoperability with other alliance ISR systems using the same standard. To manage mission and support data from geographical and intelligence sources and databases, France has deployed the Multi-Source Interpretation Assistance System (Système d’Aide à Interprétation Multicapteur – SAIM). This imagery intelligence analysis system uses data fusion techniques to create an all-digital
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image chain for imagery from sensors (satellites, air, sea, and ground radars) and has some interoperability with national and allied intelligence systems. It is in service with the French air force, army, and navy, and was used during recent conflicts and multinational exercises, where it proved its interoperability with the Canadian observation satellite Radarsat-1, the US JSTARS system, and the French HORIZON system. A separate system, TIPI3D, exists for the exploitation of available imagery for special operations and missile targeting. TIPI3D, two of which are deployed, translates imagery into 3D graphic models. In addition, France possesses a number of collection and analysis capabilities for other types of intelligence. Airborne SIGINT gathering and analysis capabilities (for both communications and electronic intelligence) have existed since the 1980s. Two Gabriel systems, mounted on C-160 transport aircraft, are currently deployed. More recently, airborne SIGINT capabilities have been upgraded with the introduction of the Airborne Electronic Warfare Information Collection System (Système Aéroporté de Recueil d’Informations de Guerre Electronique, or SARIGUE) in 2001. Currently, one such system, carried by a DC-8 airplane, is known to be operational. The French armed forces also deploy terrestrial and naval SIGINT and electronic warfare capabilities. The French army deploys the Forward Electronic Warfare System (Système de Guerre Electronique de l’Avant, or SGEA) as well as other mobile electronic warfare and SIGINT collection systems. The French navy possesses several vessels carrying SIGINT equipment, and deployed its newest one, the Dupuy de Lôme, under the Joint Forces Electromagnetic Research program (Moyen Interarmées de Recherches Electromagnétiques, or MINREM) in 2005. France has also deployed military space SIGINT systems since the 1990s. Initially, two micro-satellites, Cerise (Cherry) and Clementine, were piggybacked on each of the two Helios 1 satellites, launched in 1995 and 1999. An additional signals interception system, Euracom, was also piggybacked on the first Helios 1 satellite. These systems, which were intended mainly as pilot projects, were complemented in late 2004 by a cluster of four Essaim (Swarm) micro-satellites specializing in COMINT. These were piggybacked on the first Helios 2 satellite and began their planned three years of operations in May 2005. Design of two satellites for the monitoring of radar communications from low orbit was initiated in early 2005 under the ELINT program. A joint DGA-CNES demonstrator with some 170 million euros in funding, the satellites will be in orbit around 2008–9, by which time France hopes to persuade other European governments to join in developing a fully operational intelligence collection capability in space. The DGA has initiated the design and production of a space based optical early warning system demonstrator: the Preparatory Infrared Alert System (Système Préparatoire Infra-Rouge pour l’Alerte, or SPIRALE). This 124 million euro demonstrator will be a complete system capable of collecting and analyzing infrared imagery against a land background in order to detect ballistic missiles as they are launched. It could also be used for other operational missions such as monitoring of weapons proliferation. SPIRALE will consist of two micro33
Système de Commandement et de Contrôle des Opérations Aériennes (SCCOA) Atlas
Système d’Information Terminal (SIT) Martha
Système d’Information Régimentaire (SIR)
Air force
Interoperable with US, United Kingdom, Italian, and German surface-tosurface firing systems and with SIR; will be interoperable with future French tactical UAV (SDTI)
Compliant with NATO STANAGs; will be interoperable with future French tactical UAV (SDTI) Compliant with NATO STANAGs
Interoperability
Artillery
Deployed after 2007
Will be interoperable with future French tactical UAV (SDTI) Will be interoperable with NATO ACCS
Deployed by 2006–7
Air defense
Army company-level (redirected from regimental-level in 2001) Army tactical-level
Army division-level (including overseas task forces)
Deployed today
French capabilities for network-based operations
C2 Système d’Information et de Commandement des Forces (SICF)
Table 3.2
ARISTOTE
SIC21 Système d’Information et de Commandement des Armées (SICA) Communications and Computers Système Opérationnel Constitué des Réseaux des Armées pour les Télécommunications (SOCRATE) Réseau Intégré de Transmissions Automatiques (RITA) 2000 Syracuse 2
Système d’Exploitation Navale des Informations Tactiques (SENIT) Project C2H
3-satellite military communications constellation End-to-end communications between operational units in external theaters of operation and their commanders in France
Army tactical communications switching platform
Communications infrastructure serving all French armed services
Deployed today Navy (installed on frigates and aircraft carriers) C2 system for air force helicopters C2 system for navy Cross-service C2 system for joint warfare
Deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007
continued…
COTS-based ATM switching
Interoperability Interoperable with US Navy and Royal Navy ships
continued
RIFAN (future naval intranet system) Messagerie Universelle Sécurisée (MUSE) (secure e-mail system for French MOD) ISR Helios 1
Liaison Optique Laser Aéroportée (LOLA)
IP networked PR4G
PR4G
Syracuse 3
Link-11, Link-16, MIDS
Table 3.2
High-resolution (approx. 1 meter) earth observation satellites; optical capabilities only
Deployed today Installed on several navy vessels and air force aircraft 2-satellite military communications constellation; a third may be launched around 2010 VHF tactical radios; used in man-portable, vehicleor aircraft-mounted configurations Next-generation VHF tactical radios with Internet Protocol interface High-rate laser optical links between a satellite and UAVs
Deployed by 2006–7
Future naval intranet system Secure e-mail system for MOD
Deployed after 2007
Imagery sharing agreements with Italy and Spain
Capacity-sharing agreements with Germany, Belgium and Spain
Interoperability Link to allied vessels and aircraft
Breguet Atlantic 1150 manned aircraft AWACS E-3D Mirage F1-CR and Super Etendard 4 Système Aéroporté de Recueil d’Informations de Guerre Electronique (SARIGUE)
HORIZON
Pointer
Crecerelle
CL-289
Four aircraft operational Carry cameras, infrared sensors and radar pods SIGINT system deployed on a DC-8 aircraft; one such aircraft deployed
Hand-launched tactical UAV system Heliborne ground surveillance radar (MTI only) for tactical and operational level Maritime S&R capabilities
Deployed today Tactical, corps- and division-level recon and target acquisition UAV Tactical, short-range UAVs deployed by army
Deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007
continued…
Used in support of coalition operations during Desert Storm and on NATO peacekeeping missions in Kosovo
Equipped with Link-16
Deployed in the Balkans in NATO operations; similar systems are deployed by Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Greece. Program is underway to make it interoperable with German KZO and TADRES UAVs Identical to system deployed by US
Interoperability
continued
Systeme de Drone Tactique Intermediare (SDTI)
Helios 2
Cerise, Clementine and Euracom
Système de Guerre Electronique de l’Avant (SGEA) Système d’Aide à Interprétation Multicapteur (SAIM)
Gabriel
Table 3.2
IMINT system able to create an all-digital image chain for imagery from sensors (satellites, air-, sea- and ground radars) Micro-satellite demonstrators for SIGINT collection Next generation earth observation satellite; IR and optical IMINT capabilities; second satellite to be launched in 2008
Intelligence and EW system for land forces
Deployed today SIGINT system deployed on C-160 transport aircraft; 2 such aircraft deployed
Next generation of tactical UAVs
Deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007
Imagery sharing agreements with Belgium and Spain; access to imagery from Italian COSMO and German SAR-Lupe systems in exchange for Helios 2 imagery Will be interoperable with Atlas, Martha and SICF C2 systems
Proven interoperability with Canadian observation satellite Radarsat-1, US JSTARS, and French HORIZON AGS
Interoperability Used in support of coalition operations during the Desert Storm and on NATO peacekeeping missions in Kosovo
Hélicoptère Téléopéré (HETEL) ELINT
Tactical rotor-wing UAV for the French Navy 2 radar monitoring microsatellites
UCAV program
Future army UAV
Multi Capteurs, Multi Missions (MCMM) Neuron
Future MALE UAV
Deployed after 2007
Two earth observation satellites with a resolution of approximately 60 cm
Deployed by 2006–7 Constellation of 4 COMINT satellites Ship-based COMINT and ELINT system
PLEIADES
Moyen Interarmées de Recherches Electromagnétiques (MINREM) EuroMALE
Essaim
Deployed today
Co-developed with Italy, Spain, Sweden, Greece and Switzerland
Co-developed with the Netherlands; other countries have expressed interest Imagery sharing with Belgium, Spain, Italy, Austria, Sweden and Germany
Interoperability
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satellites, to be launched in 2008, and a ground segment. This project will be the first space early warning system in Europe, and may pave the way for a future European early warning space program.
United Kingdom The United Kingdom also has an extensive investment in C4ISR systems and the creation of sensor networks. The UK has developed a program to integrate the British C2 and communications infrastructures into a single Defense Information Infrastructure (DII). DII will incorporate the Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) C2 system, the Bowman communications system, and other individual information systems into a single infrastructure. Following a prequalification stage during which four industry teams were invited by the Ministry of Defense to submit outline proposals, in March 2005 a team led by EDS and including Fujitsu, EADS, General Dynamics, and LogicaCMG was chosen. The contract will be worth some £3 billion over 10 years. Initially DII will provide a fully networked and managed service to around 70,000 desktops in Whitehall and in forward deployed headquarters around the world. Delivery of the DII system is expected to begin around 2007. As part of the effort to implement the NEC doctrine, the British Ministry of Defense is also making considerable investment in new sensors systems. The largest and most recent ISR R&D and acquisition programs include the Watchkeeper UAV, the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) airborne battlefield surveillance system, and the Soothsayer electronic warfare system. In addition, several sensor platforms already operational, such as the Phoenix UAVs and the Jaguar and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, are being upgraded to include more advanced and integrated ISR suites. In addition, the Ministry of Defense created the Network Integration Test and Experimentation organization (NITEworks) in partnership with industry in 2003 to provide an environment to assess and demonstrate the potential applications of the NEC concepts. In industry, the NITEworks partnership includes BAE Systems, QinetiQ, Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS), EDS UK, Thales UK, General Dynamics UK, and Raytheon UK. Key system integration and interoperability issues will be resolved through testing, experimentation, and evaluation of various NEC options. Eventually, NITEworks will identify opportunities for changes in defense R&D and procurement programs. In general, the British have paid close attention to interoperability and networking with the United States, and somewhat less with its EU partners. On the other hand, the recent British decision to participate in the EU Battlegroups, with one British and a second British-Dutch group, opens new possibilities for exploring interoperability in the EU context.
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Command and Control The Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and Army deploy separate C2 systems that are not, for the most part, interoperable. Since 1995, the Army has deployed the Joint Operations Command Systems (JOCS), designed to pass information between the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ), the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) headquarters, and other headquarters of joint and potentially joint operations. It thereby allows the PJHQ to maintain a joint operations picture of deployed forces, comprising maritime, land, and air activities within certain areas. The system is deployable, and can operate over wide area network connections provided by the Ministry of Defense as well as a range of civilian infrastructures, employing the appropriate cryptography. JOCS is also synchronized with the US Global Command and Control System. Today, JOCS has become the basis for defining and developing a more capable system, the Joint Command System (JCS). Under JCS, plans are in place to integrate the Army’s C2 system with those of the other services – most importantly, the Royal Navy’s Command Support System (CSS) and the Royal Air Force’s Command, Control, and Information System (CCIS) (described below) – using state-of-the-art commercial technologies under the Defense Information Infrastructure project. The Royal Air Force deploys the CCIS for aerial C2 and the Air Defense Ground Environment (ADGE) system for tactical control of air defense operations. A deployable system for the support of RAF missions both in the United Kingdom and overseas, the Collaborative System for Air Battlespace Management (CSABM), is currently under development; it is expected to be fielded by the year 2008. In addition, the Backbone Air Command and Control System (BACCS) is currently under development as the British air defense system of the future, although the design concept requires it to be fully interoperable with NATO air defense capabilities (the NATO Air Command and Control System will provide the core BACCS software and infrastructure on which the system capability will be based). BACCS is due to enter operational service with the RAF from 2009. The Royal Navy possesses the CSS, which replaced the more outdated Fleet Operational Command System (FOCSLE) and provides C2 information to the Command Teams of ships, submarines, and the Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade. The system supports situation awareness data, message handling, and several decision and planning aids for amphibious operations. In addition, the navy is currently working to install CEC systems on Type 45 destroyers and the Type 23 frigates. This system will allow units to exchange radar information, delivering a single composite and coherent air picture and allowing units to engage targets on the basis of information from other units. In the future, CEC may be extended to other air and land platforms, but this is not envisioned before 2010. The Royal Navy has also installed the American Collaboration at Sea (C@S) tactical maritime C2 system on several vessels. This system uses leased bandwidth on commercial satellites (mainly INMARSAT) to transmit a common battlespace picture to all vessels and the naval headquarters to which it is linked. 41
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On the international level, the United Kingdom is working with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to link their respective C2 systems via a coalition WAN and web server. This collaborative program is being carried out in the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) framework, and will most likely be broadened to include France and Germany (discussed in the NATO chapter). Communications and computers The British Army currently fields Ptarmigan, a tactical trunk network, linking all headquarters in the field. The system was upgraded in early 2003 with the introduction of 30 vehicle-mounted units providing improved data access to mobile subscribers and enabling deployment independent of main Ptarmigan trunk networks. Ptarmigan is interoperable with US and NATO forces through interfaces with specific systems. Beginning in 2008, it will be replaced by Falcon, a fully digital, air-portable Falcon battlefield communications infrastructure. Falcon will permit the transmission of data between army headquarters, including real-time video, and is planned to be interoperable with various NATO communications systems. The British began to deploy Bowman, the next-generation tactical combat HF/ VHF/UHF radio network for all British services, in July 2003. This capability is being delivered incrementally and the initial capability (secure HF/VHF voice and data) was accepted into service by the Ministry of Defense in March 2004. This new infrastructure replaces the 20-year-old Clansman system and the Headquarters infrastructure element of the Ptarmigan trunk communications system. It provides Britain with an integrated network supporting digital voice and data for radio, telephone, intercom and tactical Internet information in a single system. As part of the Command and Battlespace Management (Land) (CBM(L)) program – battlefield information systems being developed for armored fighting vehicles, artillery fire control, air, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense – Bowman will be used as a communications and C2 infrastructure from fighting platform up to divisional level. Full deployment is expected by 2006–7, when some 20,000 military vehicles, 156 ships and 276 aircraft will be outfitted with more than 47,000 radios and 26,000 computer terminals. In December 2004, some 300 Bowman radios were deployed with British forces in Iraq. However, Bowman will face bandwidth limitations, as well as the problem of being digital but lacking a software communications architecture (SCA). Since this would make it hard to interoperate with the US Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), the US program is being adapted to enable it to handle the Bowman waveform. A fully transportable United Kingdom operational-level communications network – Cormorant – exists for expeditionary forces, linking them back to headquarters in Britain. The Cormorant system is provided by EADS and is intended to meet the communications requirements of the United Kingdom’s JRRF headquarters in any theater of operations. Cormorant can interface with Ptarmigan
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and will be able to interface with its successor, Falcon. It will also be able to pass data to and from the Bowman network once Bowman is fully fielded. Military satellite communications capabilities are currently based on the Skynet 4 constellation. Two of the first three satellites launched between 1988 and 1990 remain in service. These support three newer spacecraft launched between 1998 and 2001. In October 2003, the British Ministry of Defense concluded arrangements to transfer operation of the Skynet 4 system to Paradigm Secure Communications, a subsidiary of EADS. Under this Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Paradigm was also to upgrade, by 2005, the two main Skynet 4 ground stations and to supply new ground stations and a network control center, in order to increase bandwidth and refresh technology. Paradigm will also manage the leasing of commercial SATCOM bandwidth for the Ministry of Defense. The arrangement, which is to run until 2019, assures delivery for Ministry of Defense needs, while permitting Paradigm to resell unused bandwidth to the governments and militaries of other nations under commercial terms. To maintain services to the Ministry of Defense and to its other customers, Paradigm will develop, launch, and operate two to three new satellites built by Astrium, also an EADS subsidiary (De Selding 2003b: 10). The first of the new Skynet 5 satellites is expected to enter service in 2007. Both the existing and new Skynet satellites remain accessible via the Ministry of Defense’s existing fleet of terminals. Higher bandwidths are possible with the new Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehiclemounted) mobile terminals. Some 50 new Reacher mobile land terminals will also be delivered under the Skynet 5 contract arrangements. The Royal Air Force and Navy have installed the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Link-16 communications system on most aircraft and helicopters (including Tornado F3s, Nimrods, Sea Kings, and E-3D AWACS), and on several vessels (including carriers, frigates, and destroyers), providing these and their US counterparts with a common air picture. The Royal Navy’s Sea Harriers were outfitted with Link-16 equipment in 2004. Many Royal Navy ships and RAF E-3D AWACS and Nimrods are also equipped with the Link-11 tactical data link system. Finally, since interoperability with US forces is still a major concern for British warfighters, the United Kingdom will most likely buy American JTRS radios and install them on various other aerial, maritime, and terrestrial platforms as an interim solution for current and upcoming coalition operations. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Britain has initiated a program to fill capability gaps identified in the Strategic Defense Review’s New Chapter in the area of persistent ISR collection and target acquisition deep within the battlespace. The DABINETT program will provide information to be used to gather strategic, operational and tactical intelligence, answer commanders’ requests for information, provide targeting information to systems in all environments, support Special Forces, and manage intelligence data. The initial phase of the program will address current Management, Tasking, 43
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Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (MTPED) shortfalls in the current UK system. Once completed, DABINETT will comprise a system of systems that provides access to archive data as well as the ability to collect persistently, process and disseminate near real time intelligence. This capability will offer rapid deployment, long reach, standoff, deep penetration, loiter and interoperability with coalition forces in network-based operations. It will form an integral part of the British networked-enabled capability enabling precision geo-location for targeting, including time sensitive targeting, which will be delivered via a Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) system. Initial deployment is expected by the end of 2006. British UAV capabilities consist primarily of the Phoenix tactical, shortrange UAV, in service since 1998 with the Royal Artillery, for reconnaissance and target acquisition. Though Phoenix cannot currently share the information it collects directly with other British systems, improved data modems currently being developed could make it interoperable with Skynet 4, RAF Tornados, and army Apaches. However, its performance, recently tested in Kosovo and Iraq, is somewhat limited even at the tactical level, including an inability to operate in high-temperature environments, a payload consisting solely of a thermal imaging sensor, and a slow data link. In both the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns, these limitations led to the loss of a high number of Phoenix UAVs. Twentythree were lost in Iraq, all due to technical failures – a ratio of one in six flights undertaken – and the program was restricted to nighttime operations. However, the Phoenix was involved in what was probably the first joint close air support operation coordinated by a UAV mission controller: it was able to relay imagery and geographical details on Iraqi tank movements to US fighters via its ground station (Chuter 2003a: 8). Watchkeeper, the British long-endurance, operational-level UAV program, was completed with two consortia, one led by Thales UK and the other by Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc. The initial program requirement called for an A and B vehicle, the former for battlefield surveillance, targeting, and bomb damage assessment and the latter for close-in surveillance and target identification. Following the selection of the Thales-led consortium in July 2004, it was announced that the Hermes 450 and Hermes 180 – manufactured by Elbit Systems of Israel – would be the A and B vehicles, respectively. However, during contract negotiations in 2005 the smaller Hermes 180 was removed from the requirement and broader roles were assigned to the larger Hermes 450. Its payloads will include electro-optical sensors, infrared sensors, laser target designators, synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicators. The Watchkeeper in-service date was also pushed back to 2010. The system will be operated and deployed by the Royal Artillery Corps. To complement the Watchkeeper program, the United Kingdom is collaborating with the United States to develop the Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN). Once integrated into Watchkeeper, it will provide a communications and electronic warfare system that can be reprogrammed in flight. Based on software radio technology, the AJCN will be linked to the UAV ground stations via a 44
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Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). This will create a network comprising the different types of Watchkeeper UAVs, and tactical radios – such as the American JTRS – that are also reprogrammable. In early 2004, pending Watchkeeper development, the British Ministry of Defense began discussing an Urgent Operation Requirement (UOR) for another UAV system to be fielded within a shorter timeframe and to be usable by British troops in Iraq. The Ministry of Defense reviewed purchasing or leasing the ThalesIAI Hermes systems as well as several micro-UAV systems. To date, several Desert Hawk and one Buster micro-UAV system (comprising two vehicles and one ground control station) have been acquired and are deployed with British forces in Iraq for very short-range reconnaissance missions. In addition, the success of the British cooperation with the Combined Joint Predator Task Force in Iraq has led the Ministry of Defense to examine the possibilities of purchasing Predator B UAVs for operations in Afghanistan (Chuter 2005b: 4). In addition to the Urgent Operation Requirement and Watchkeeper, the United Kingdom is exploring other future UAV initiatives. The Joint Service UAV Experimentation Program (JUEP) was the first step of this process. In 2003–5, JUEP assessed the wider operational use of UAVs in the tri-service battle environment, mainly for maritime and urban operations. JUEP involved developing viable concepts of operations for UAVs and assessing the possibilities for exploiting new types of UAV payloads, including those giving the vehicle offensive capabilities (Fiorenza 2003b: 37–9). The program included a demonstration of the Eagle MALE UAV, carrying a high definition synthetic aperture radar, electro-optic and infrared sensors, and laser target marking and designation systems. It also demonstrated the capability to control a ScanEagle maritime surveillance UAV from a British warship, to integrate a British RAPTOR ISR pod (see below) on an American Predator UAV, and the utility of several mini-UAV systems. Demonstrations of the Global Hawk HALE UAV system and of the use of UCAVs were also planned under JUEP, but were not undertaken. The United Kingdom initially envisioned an unmanned combat aerial vehicle program as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) program. However, the FOAS was terminated in 2005, and UCAV research was made part of an international collaborative program, the Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experiment), or SUAV(E). An agreement was signed in December 2004 with the United States to participate in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program, focusing on Boeing’s X-45 UCAV. However, uncertainties about technology transfer and the location of production in the UK led the Ministry of Defense to look to Europe to fulfill some of its needs in this area. The French-led Neuron program was considered, but no decisions have been made on Britain’s participation in it (Chuter 2005a: 1, 8). The United Kingdom also possesses unmanned underwater ISR capabilities with the deployment, in 2002, of the Marlin Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV), an electrically powered vehicle intended to be launched from a submarine torpedo tube. It is fitted with seabed imaging sensors, but the design is modular and allowing for alternative future payloads. 45
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Britain also currently deploys several manned aerial ISR platforms, including four Canberra PR-9 aircraft for photoreconnaissance missions and eighteen Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft. Most Nimrods are equipped with magnetic and acoustic detection equipment (three are outfitted for SIGINT collection missions) and are interoperable with US Rivet Joint aircraft. An upgrade (Nimrod MRA4) will mean some are capable of both maritime and land surveillance missions. The upgraded Nimrod aircraft are due to enter into service around 2006, at which point those that were not upgraded will be taken out of service. The Royal Air Force’s Jaguar and Tornado GR4 fighters provide additional ISR capabilities. Since 2000, the Jaguars have been outfitted with the Jaguar Replacement Reconnaissance Pod (JRRP), containing both electro-optic and infrared sensors that can record digital images onto videotape. Several of the latter have been fitted with the Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR), operational since the fall of 2002. This new technology provides an electro-optical and infrared camera system that can capture high-resolution digital imagery day or night and transmit the data to ground stations in near real time. It features on-board recording and near real time data link transmission to ground stations. The system consists of eight pods and two cabin-based ground stations, and has been in use since fall 2002. It made its operational debut during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003, and performed extremely well. The United Kingdom is developing the Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) system for air-ground surveillance. ASTOR will provide strategic long-range, all-weather theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities. Raytheon, the prime contractor for ASTOR, is producing five systems, to be deployed on modified Bombardier Global Express business jets, as well as two portable ground sites and six tactical ground stations mounted on trucks. The radar is a dual-mode system capable of operating in both synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator mode. The aircraft, known as the Sentinel R Mk 1, are also outfitted with operator workstations where the mission management and imagery can be processed and transmitted to the various brigade, divisional or joint level ASTOR ground stations. Initial deployment is expected to begin in 2006, with the delivery of the first two flight-tested aircraft and their ground stations, and full operational capability is expected in 2008. Data will be disseminated to allied forces via United Kingdom headquarters only, and few direct links to allied systems are anticipated (though an interim solution for interoperability with the US JSTARS system may be through deploying JTRS on the ASTOR platform). ASTOR was the basis for one of the two proposed NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) solutions, presented by British Aerospace and Raytheon; an option rejected by NATO. In addition, the United Kingdom deploys seven E-3D Sentry AEW-1 AWACS aircraft for air-picture management. The Sentry aircraft are all equipped with the US JTIDS, and are interoperable with US and NATO AWACS systems, with Rivet Joint and E-P3 aircraft, and with the British Nimrod aircraft. Project Eagle, currently in the assessment phase, is intended to provide an air battle management and combat ID-enabling capability for the E-3D, to coordinate air operations and 46
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to direct forces during operations. The in-service date, defined as the first platform fitted with the Eagle capability, is scheduled for June 2012. As of 2006, when the Canberra planes leave service, the United Kingdom will have no assets that can loiter over the battlefield and deliver a constant stream of data for extended timeframes; nor does the United Kingdom have a program to obtain such persistent surveillance capabilities. The Ministry of Defense is considering various options, including high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, satellites, and manned platforms. In 2004, the Tactical Optical Satellite (TOPSAT) earth observation micro-satellite, led by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, was initiated as part of a pilot program to demonstrate space-based ISR capabilities and their link to commanders on the ground via stationary as well as mobile ground stations. The one-year program involved the launching of one 120 kg satellite capable of producing 2.5 meter resolution optical imagery. The success of TOPSAT may lead to the launching of a constellation of satellites in the future. For future maritime surveillance, the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) program will provide an assured airborne surveillance and control capability. The options being considered under MASC include the continuation of the capability currently provided by the Sea King Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) system, other ship-optimized rotary wing platforms, and possible contributions from UAVs, although the latter currently form only a peripheral component of the MASC activities. The MASC program has recently moved into the assessment phase. The British intelligence analysis and dissemination systems in place include the RAF’s Lychgate system – which connects intelligence staffs at HQ RAF Strike Command, the Ministry of Defense, other services, and front-line squadrons – and the intelligence community’s web-based UKINTELWEB. Neither is interoperable with allied systems. However, the United Kingdom is part of the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) network, which uses commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware to exchange information with the intelligence dissemination systems of the United States, Canada, and Australia. In addition, the Griffin TCP/ IP-based WAN provides a classified electronic information-sharing environment for collaborative planning activities between the strategic and operational level headquarters of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. In the future, Germany and France may also be linked to Griffin.
Germany The German military is beginning to move toward an advanced, networked architecture, and deploys a variety of C4ISR systems. The German Ministry of Defense completed the formulation of its network-centric doctrine in 2005, and has begun the implementation of some of that doctrine in its acquisition and R&T programs. However, over the next decade, previously planned hardware programs ,such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, A400M transport, Tiger and NH-90 helicopters, will consume the lion’s share of German defense acquisition resources. In 47
Collaboration at Sea (C@ S) Joint Command System (JCS)
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
RAF aerial C2 system
Command Control and Information System (CCIS) Air Defense Ground Environment (ADGE) Command Support System (CSS)
Tactical control of air defense operations C2 for Command Teams of ships, submarines and the Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade Naval air-defense and fire control C2 system; deployed on several UK frigates Tactical maritime C2 system
Strategic-, operationaland tactical-level army C2 system
Deployed today
Integration of the C2 systems of all three services
Deployed by 2006–7
United Kingdom capabilities for network-based operations
Joint Operational Command System (JOCS)
C2
Table 3.3 Deployed after 2007
Enables interoperability with US vessels All 3 services at national level
Interoperable with US system
Links PJHQ, JFHQ, JRRF headquarters, and other HQs of joint and potentially joint operations; work is underway to harmonize JOCS with the US Global Command and Control System
Interoperability
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)/Link-16
Cormorant
Skynet 4
Backbone Air Command and Control System (BACCS) Communications and Computers Ptarmigan
Collaborative System for Air Battlespace Management (CSABM)
Tactical trunk communications system for army HQs in the field MILSATCOM system; Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) mobile satellite terminals Transportable, secure telecommunications network linking task force HQ with UK HQ Installed on RAF Tornado F3s, Nimrods, Sea Kings and AWACS, and on RN carriers, frigates, destroyers and Sea Harriers
Deployed today
Deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007 Deployable system to support RAF mission both in the United Kingdom and overseas; deployed by 2008 Future Air Defense C2; deployed by 2009
continued…
Enables common air picture with US aircraft and vessels
Linked to Ptarmigan and Bowman units fielded by JRFF
Interoperability with some US and NATO systems
Full interoperability with NATO air defense systems
Interoperability Will be interoperable with other UK systems
continued
Marlin
Desert Hawk/Buster
ISR Phoenix
Falcon
Skynet 5
Bowman
Table 3.3
Micro-UAV systems for Army UUV
Tactical target acquisition UAV for the army (artillery corps)
Deployed today
Deployed by 2006–7 Tactical combat radios network for all services; first units tested July 2003, full deployment by 2006–8 Future MILSATCOM system; leased capacity from 3 commercial satellites; entry into service in 2007 Future (replacing Ptarmigan) UK-tocampaign theater tactical trunk communications system; planned for deployment in 2008
Deployed after 2007
Little interoperability with other systems; possible upgrades will make it interoperable with Skynet 4 and with RAF Tornados and army Apaches Same as those deployed by US army
Interoperable with Bowman, Cormorant, Skynet 5, NATO communications systems
Interoperability Interoperable across services (any military VHF radio) only in unencrypted mode; partly interoperable with US JTRS
Web-based intelligence dissemination system at various security levels, in support of the intelligence community Intelligence data dissemination system for up to Top Secret material
UKINTELWEB
Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS)
Intelligence analysis system for RAF
Lychgate
Jaguar and Tornado fighters E-3D Sentry (AWACS)
Nimrod
Canberra aircraft
Deployed today Tactical aerial photoreconnaissance Maritime S&R and SIGINT aircraft Equipped with JRRP and RAPTOR ISR pods
Deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007
continued…
Interoperable with similar systems in US, Canada, and Australia as well as with other British intelligence systems
Interoperable with US and NATO AWACS systems, US Rivet Joint and E-P3 aircraft, and British Nimrod aircraft Connects intelligence staffs at HQ RAF Strike Command, the MOD, other services and front line squadrons British intelligence community only; not interoperable with other countries
Interoperable with USAF Rivet Joint aircraft
Interoperability
continued
Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC)
Wider operational use (including weaponization) of UAVs in the tri-service battle environment Future airborne maritime surveillance program
Deployed after 2007
Joint Service UAV Experimentation Program (JUEP)
Strategic long-range, all-weather theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities; begin deployment in 2005 S&R micro-satellite for remote sensing; launch planned for 2003–4
Deployed by 2006–7
Future operations-level UAV; to be deployed in 2006
Deployed today TCP/IP-based WAN for intelligence data sharing between strategic and operational level headquarters
Watchkeeper
Tactical Optical Satellite (TOPSAT)
Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR)
GRIFFIN
Table 3.3
A TCDL will enable interoperability between the two types of Watchkeeper UAVs May also include demonstration of Global Hawk HALE UAV
Interoperability Links United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and US; in the future, Germany and France will also be linked May be interoperable with US JSTARS; dissemination of data initially via United Kingdom only
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addition, Germany’s defense R&D spending has been declining, a trend expected to continue through 2010 (Agüera 2003: 32). Both of these budgetary realities will affect the pace at which Germany develops networked C4ISR capabilities. Nevertheless, several large-scale C4ISR expenditures are expected, the most significant being new C2 and computer networking programs, a HALE UAV, and advanced communications systems (CPM Forum 2005: 33). German forces do not have a cross-service C2 architecture, nor have broadband communications systems been widely deployed. Germany has begun embracing the use of UAVs, especially since the Balkan and Afghanistan campaigns. The German military is currently equipped with several UAVs for tactical and operational missions, and funding for a major UAV program, the HALE EuroHawk, has been approved. Once the first UAV comes into service in 2009, outdated manned platforms for ISR will gradually be scrapped and Germany will become increasingly reliant on unmanned ISR capabilities. Germany has been a member of the bi-national German-Netherlands Corps since 1995. Between 2000 and 2002, the Corps became a NATO High Response Force, under operational command of SACEUR. This Corps has more advanced C4ISR capabilities, including the German HEROS C2 system, the Dutch TITAAN communications infrastructure (VoIP WAN with SATCOM and HF radio), and French-made tactical Sperwer UAVs. Germany is also a member of the Multinational Interoperability Council and will contribute to four of the European Union’s Battlegroups: one with France, Belgium and Luxembourg, one with the Netherlands and Finland, one with Austria and the Czech Republic, and one with Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania. Command and control The Bundeswehr C2 systems serve the individual services but lack a common infrastructure. The German army is beginning to deploy the HEROS (HeeresFührungsinformationssystem für die rechnerunterstützte Operationsführung in Stäben, or Army Command and Control System for Digitally-supported Command of Operations in Staffs) system that provides C2 for corps, division and brigade levels. HEROS is an IP-network-based infrastructure for data transmission and can be fixed or mobile. It has been fielded in one army division, with a second still to be fielded. HEROS is also deployed with EUROKORPS and with the GermanNetherlands Corps. For battalion-level C2 and below, the German army operates the FAUST (Führungsausstattung taktisch, or Tactical Command Provision) system, which includes mobile modules mounted on armored personnel carriers. Initially fielded only in small numbers with German forces in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, FAUST is now being deployed across the German army (Quast 2003: 66–7). The system is mounted on various command, reconnaissance and support vehicles at the platoon, squad and section level. In addition, the army’s tanks and armored vehicles designated for overseas deployment are outfitted with the Mobile Command and Control System (MCCS). MCCS hardware is based on a 53
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COTS notebook with integrated communication interfaces, GPS, and compass unit as well as C2 software developed by STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics). Several such systems are operational with the German forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The German navy uses a C2 system called MHQ (marine headquarters). This IBM mainframe-based infrastructure links all headquarters into a single network. In addition, all ships in the German navy use the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) and the C@S tactical C2 system, purchased from the United States. This enables all German navy vessels to be fully linked between each other and with their various headquarters, as well as interoperable with many ships in the US navy. The German air force uses the Eifel C2 system, an IP-based infrastructure that has been upgraded to incorporate the whole service (the system is also known as the GAFCCIS – German Air Force Command and Control Information System). Other C2 networks that are unique to specific units of the German armed forces include the artillery corps’ ADLER (Artillerie-, Daten-, Lage- und EinsatzRechnungsverbund, or Integrated Artillery Computer System) and the air defense systems’ HflaAFüSys (Heeres-Flugabwehr-, Aufklärungs- und Führungssystem, or Army Air Defense, Surveillance andd Command System). Finally, the armed forces command is linked to the German Ministry of Defense via Rubin, an IPbased, stationary system for high-level C2. The German army is planning to deploy a more network-oriented C2 infrastructure. Known as FüInfoSys H (Führungsinformationssystem des Heeres, or Army Command System, or Army Command System), this system will integrate the FAUST and HEROS systems, which are not interoperable today. Initial testing is scheduled for 2008. Other efforts to upgrade German C2 capabilities include development of the next generation of air defense system through the SurfaceAir-Missile Operations Center (SAMOC) project, expected to be operational by the end of 2004. A C2 system integrating all services is planned through the project known as FüInfoSys der Streitkräfte, or C2 System of the Armed Forces. This project, still in its initial stages, will eventually integrate the Rubin, HEROS, FüInfoSys H, GAFCCIS, MHQ, and MCCIS systems, and connect all military staffs. In 2001, the German Ministry of Defense began to create a common C2 system for the armed forces of the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) that would be interoperable with Germany’s C2 systems and comply with NATO STANAGs. Known as BALTCCIS, the project is managed by the German air force in collaboration with BAE Systems, and is still in the development stage. Communications and computers The main tactical communications infrastructure of the German army is the digital Automated Corps Network (Automatisiertes Korpsstammnetz 90, or AUTOKO-90), built by Siemens and deployed since 2000. This network can deliver only limited bandwidth, cannot handle IP traffic, and uses EUROCOM, a 54
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communications standard developed in Western Europe in the 1970s as an effort to make all tactical military communications systems interoperable, but not widely deployed outside Germany. As a complement to AUTOKO-90, the army has added the BIGSTAF (Breitbandiges, integriertes Gefechtsstand-Fernmeldesystem, or Integrated Broadband System for Command Posts Communications) system to its communications infrastructure. Built using Thales and EADS IP and ATM technologies, BIGSTAF provides broadband communications (voice and data) for command posts at brigade, division and corps levels. However, BIGSTAF also uses EUROCOM, and is therefore not interoperable with most other systems. In an effort to move away from EUROCOM, Germany has initiated the 420 million euro MobKommSysBw (Mobiles Kommunikationssystem der Bundeswehr, or Armed Forces Mobile Communications System) project to develop the Bundeswehr’s future mobile communications network. Together with the SATCOM-BW network (see below), it will link all field radio communications systems in theaters of operations with communications bases in Germany. Service introduction will start in 2007. The German navy has deployed its own communications network, the IPbased Tactical Mobile Radio Network, on all vessels. In addition, many navy ships are outfitted with Link-11 – soon to be replaced by Link-22 systems – and other communications equipment that were a quick method to achieve interoperability with the US navy. The German air force has deployed AutoFü (Automatisches Führungsfernmeldenetz der Luftwaffe, or Air Force Automatic Command Communications Network), a communications infrastructure on all its bases. This system is also IP-based, with medium bandwidth capabilities. For tactical communications, some of the Luftwaffe’s Tornados and NH-90 helicopters carry or are being outfitted with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), which will be carried on all 180 new Eurofighters. The German navy has also equipped two Class 123 frigates with MIDS systems. As a partner in the MIDS JTRS program, Germany is helping migrate MIDS to a JTRS software communications compliant architecture. In addition, the German Ministry of Defense has awarded Rohde & Schwarz a 170 million euro contract for a joint networked family of Software Defined Radio (SDR) systems. These radios will be fully JTRS and SCA compliant, and will be introduced into service in 2009. A cross-service digital communications network, the ISDN-BW, has been deployed since the mid-1990s, carrying voice and data to all central commands. The navy and air force have both successfully integrated their own communications infrastructures with ISDN-BW, but the army integration is incomplete. To link expeditionary forces with allied forces, the local telecommunications infrastructure, and headquarters, Germany initiated a program known as Interoperability for Crisis Reaction Forces (Krisenreaktionskräfte-Interoperabilität, or KINTOP). It involved the development and acquisition of mobile communications gateways based on the TETRAPOL (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio POLice) standard. The program was discontinued, and the current communications solution for linking expeditionary forces with headquarters is the KommServer-BW, a low-tech COTS
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technology linking mobile communications systems such as tactical radios to fixed communications networks. Germany is also undertaking a satellite communications program, known as SATCOM-BW. The first phase of the project includes leasing C- and Ku-band capacity from commercial satellites and procuring 40 single- and multi-channel ground stations. Expeditionary forces can deploy several relatively large mobile ground stations and communicate with one or both fixed ground stations in Germany. The second phase, which is still in the planning stage, will build and orbit one X-band and one UHF-band satellite, both operated by the private sector. Phase 2 is expected to begin in 2005, with at least one satellite in orbit by 2008 and progressive introduction continuing until 2013. Once completed, Germany’s expeditionary forces will be able to deploy a larger number of small mobile ground stations, giving them more flexibility and agility in the field (Reder 2005: 48–9). Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Germany is reassessing its ISR capabilities, and planning future research and procurement. The major issues are the replacement of the Breguet Atlantic fleet for maritime patrol, the acquisition of land-based ISR assets, and the development of an unmanned aerial battlefield surveillance capability. Germany is making significant use of UAVs, given the expertise in this technology to be found in German industry. For tactical reconnaissance and target acquisition missions at the corps and division level, the German army uses CL289 UAVs, a tri-national project between France, Germany and Canada, equipped with a camera and infrared sensor. The system has been used successfully in the Balkans since 1993, and has been upgraded recently to improve the on-board navigation system and flight software and to enable the outfitting of the UAV with a SAR payload. The Germans use the KZO (Kleinfluggerät für Zielortung, or Small Device for Target Acquisition) for shorter-range reconnaissance, which carries infrared and SAR or laser range finder and target designator payloads. Six such systems, each consisting of ten aircraft, are in service. Rheinmetall DeTec, the manufacturers of the KZO system, are making it interoperable with the Safran Group’s Crecerelle and Sperwer UAVs, currently in use by France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Greece. The armed forces of these six countries will in the future be able to exchange tactical and battlefield intelligence and target data collected by all of their systems, and will have access to a common command and control infrastructure. The German army’s LUNA (Luftgestützte Nahaufklärungsausstattung, or Airborne Close-range Reconnaissance System) tactical UAV, initially designed for the artillery corps, has been flown over Kosovo – carrying video cameras only – and in Afghanistan – carrying infrared and video cameras as well as SAR. Eight systems have been procured. It can also be outfitted with a miniature SAR system, and used for NBC detection and electronic warfare missions. The hand-launched ALADIN (Abbildende Luftgestützte Aufklärungsdrohne im Nächstbereich, or Imaging Airborne Close-Range Reconnaissance Drone) mini-UAV, which carries 56
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television and infrared, was successfully deployed in Afghanistan, and some 155 systems, each consisting of two aircraft, have been ordered. Germany’s army and navy also deploy manned airborne ISR capabilities, including reconnaissance pods fitted onto Germany’s Tornado aircraft outfitted with a camera and infrared system. The Breguet Atlantic 1150 fleet performs maritime ISR missions, using 11 aircraft carrying MTIs, sonars and magnetic detectors, and 4 aircraft carrying SIGINT and electronic warfare suites. The fleet has been operational since 1965. Although the aircraft have experienced several upgrades, they are scheduled for replacement in 2010. A project to develop the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft, initially to be conducted with the Italian armed forces, was cancelled. Instead, Germany is moving toward long endurance unmanned platforms. For maritime missions, these may consist of UAVs deployed by the German navy on their new corvettes, with Northrop Grumman’s Fire Scout and Bell Helicopter Textron’s Eagle Eye as possible alternatives. In the interim, Germany bought eight upgraded PC-3 aircraft from the Netherlands in late 2004. For ground-based ISR, the German army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004, produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann of Germany and SP Aerospace and Vehicle Systems BV of the Netherlands. The Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera, a thermal imager, and a laser rangefinder, co-developed by EADS and Rheinmetall Defence Electronics, and the HRM7000 tactical radio produced by EADS. Maritime ISR capabilities include three OsteClass 423 ships that have been deployed since the late 1980s for SIGINT and electronic warfare missions. Germany has several future ISR programs underway. The lesson of the Kosovo air campaign was that Germany could not rely on timely sharing of imagery intelligence data from the United States, and hence needed to acquire its own intelligence-gathering capability. The most important result of this decision is the plan to buy five Global Hawk HALE UAVs from Northrop Grumman, and, working with EADS, install German synthetic aperture radar and signals intelligence collection and analysis suites. This 600 million euro project was initiated in 2000 and received the approval of the US air force and the German Ministry of Defense in 2001. A number of successful trial flights were conducted in California and Germany during 2003–4, and the first prototype delivery is scheduled for 2009. All five systems are expected to be delivered and operational by 2013. The C2 and the crypto technologies will be the same as those mounted on the Global Hawk, making the EuroHawk interoperable with its US counterpart. EuroHawk is also planned to be interoperable with other ISR capabilities of the German armed forces, as well as with NATO. EuroHawk UAVs will be the German contribution to the NATO AGS program. Germany is also investing in UCAV technology, though the program is still at an early phase. Initially known as Taifun (Typhoon) and recently re-named the Tactical Advanced Reconnaissance/Strike System (TADRES), it is being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identification and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition. Development will continue until 2009, when
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a procurement decision will be made. In addition, the German army is formulating requirements for micro-UAVs. German security space observation capabilities are also an important development, also influenced by the Kosovo data-sharing issue. The leading program is SAR-Lupe, a satellite-based synthetic aperture radar to be deployed by 2007. SAR-Lupe will consist of five Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, the first to be launched in 2006, and a ground segment. Total cost of the project is approximately 300 million euros. A European consortium, led by OHB Systems of Germany, is undertaking the project. Once SAR-Lupe is operational, Germany plans to exchange the data it provides with data collected from the French Helios 2 and Pleiades and the Italian COSMO-Skymed satellites. The German Space Agency and EADS Astrium are also working on a commercial synthetic aperture radar satellite named TerraSAR-X, which will begin providing image products with a resolution of up to one meter in mid-2006. Intelligence collected from Germany’s surveillance and reconnaissance assets is disseminated to warfighters in several ways. The German army uses is the LBAA-BW (Luftbild-Auswerteanlage der Bundeswehr, or Aerial Picture Analysis Station for the Armed Forces) system, designed for the exploitation of intelligence (still images and film) collected by manned or unmanned aerial reconnaissance systems. It can be deployed in both stationary and mobile (vehicle-mounted) stations. Originally designed for the CL-289 tactical UAV, it has been in operation since 1991. An extension program was launched in 1999 to upgrade the system to a common aerial image exploitation station. The LBAA-BW can work with imagery collected by CL-289 UAVs as well as by Tornado and Breguet Atlantic aircraft. More than 50 units have been deployed. In 2007, the GAST (Gemeinsames Auswerte-System, or Common Analysis System) project, begun in 2003, will create a common system for the dissemination of all intelligence collected via technical means through a single database.
Italy Italy is moving at a slower pace toward a network-oriented defense strategy, deployment of advanced C4ISR systems and inter-service interoperability. Much of the country’s defense budget over the next few years will be spent on weapons platforms, most notably 121 Eurofighter aircraft. Much-needed C4ISR assets, such as early warning aircraft and MIDS data links for aircraft, may not be purchased in the near term. Italian–US industrial collaboration is seen as one way of advancing the deployment of network-based capabilities and achieving interoperability with the United States. Italy is prepared to buy US technologies as interim solutions to operational problems, as seen in the recent procurement of four Predator UAV systems and several Link-16 terminals, and in the interest shown in the US Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) project. Some Italian defense policymakers have argued that American C4ISR standards will lead the way and that Italy should work toward those standards. For now, Italy intends to ensure that all 58
Marine Headquarters (MHQ)/Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS); Collaboration at Sea (C@S) German Air Force Command and Control Information System (GAFCCIS) ADLER HflaAFüSys
Mobile Command and Control System (MCCS)
Artillery corps C2 system Air defense C2 system
Air force C2 system
Regiment-level and below C2 system; includes mobile, APC vehiclebased elements C2 system for army’s tanks and armored vehicles designated for overseas deployment Tactical naval C2 systems (incl. links to HQs)
Corps-, division- and brigade-level C2 system; includes mobile elements
Deployed today
Deployed by 2006–7
German capabilities for network-based operations
C2 HeeresFührungsinformationssystem für die rechnerunterstützte Operationsführung in Stäben (HEROS) Führungsausstattung taktisch (FAUST)
Table 3.4 Deployed after 2007
continued…
C@S enables interoperability with some US ships
Also deployed with EUROKORPS and the German-Dutch Corps
Interoperability
Breitbandiges, integriertes GefechtsstandFernmeldesystem (BIGSTAF)
Communications and computers Automatisiertes Korpsstammnetz (AUTOKO-90)
FüInfoSys SK
FüInfoSys H
Surface-Air-Missile Operations Center (SAMOC)
Rubin
Table 3.4 continued
Army tactical communications digital infrastructure; in place since 2000; its limited bandwidth will require a series of upgrades in the near future Broadband command post communications network for brigade, divisional and corps command posts; integrated into AUTOKO90
Deployed today High-level C2 system linking armed forces command with MOD Next generation, mobile air defense C2 system
Deployed by 2006–7
Integration of HEROS and FAUST into single army C2 system; deployment expected in 2006 Integration of all C2 (navy, air force, army) systems
Deployed after 2007
Limited interoperability due to use of EUROCOM standard
Cannot handle IP traffic; limited interoperability due to use of EUROCOM standard
Interoperable with NATO nations’ air defense C2 systems; for use in multinational deployments
Interoperability
MobKommSysBw
SATCOM-BW Phase 2
SATCOM-BW Phase 1
KommServer-BW
ISDN-BW
Link-11/ MIDS
Tactical Mobile Radio Network AutoFü
Deployed today Navy communications system linking all vessels Communications system linking all air force bases Equipped on some navy vessels and Luftwaffe Tornados and NH-90 helicopters Cross-service digital communications network linking all central commands COTS-based communications link for expeditionary forces Leasing of commercial satellite capacity for linking expeditionary forces back to HQs
Deployed by 2006–7
2 new satellites, first one in orbit by 2008 Bundeswehr’s future mobile communications network linking all field radio communications systems in the various theaters of operations with communications bases in Germany
Deployed after 2007
continued…
Enables interoperability with other vessels and aircraft equipped with Link-11 / MIDS
Interoperability
Fennek
Breguet Atlantic 1150
LUNA
ALADIN
KZO
ISR CL-289
Table 3.4 continued
Very short-range miniUAV with color and IR cameras Medium-range UAV; payloads include color and IR camera, mini-SAR, NBC detectors and EW suite Manned aircraft for maritime S&R and SIGINT/EW missions ISR vehicle
Tactical, corps- and division-level recon and target acquisition UAV; payloads include color and IR cameras and SAR Short-range UAV with IR and SAR or laser range finder and target designator payloads
Deployed today
Deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007
Similar vehicles deployed by Royal Netherlands Army
Deployed in Balkans and Afghanistan
Program is underway to make KZO, TADRES and French Crecerelle (also used by Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Greece) interoperable Deployed in Afghanistan
Interoperability
Common system for dissemination of all intelligence collected via technical means
Gemeinsames AuswerteSystem (GAST)
UCAV program (formerly known as Taifun) with target identification and engagement capabilities; initial deployment expected in 2009 HALE UAV system; will include intelligence collecting and processing capabilities; initial deployment in 2009
Deployed after 2007
5 LEO satellites and a ground segment; initial operational capability in 2007
Deployed by 2006–7
SAR-Lupe
EuroHawk
Oste Luftbild-Auswerteanlage der Bundeswehr (LBAABW) Tactical Advanced Reconnaissance/Strike System (TADRES)
Deployed today SIGINT and EW ships Common aerial image exploitation station for all German defense forces
Exploits images from CL289, navy Tornados, and Breguet Atlantic aircraft Program is underway to make KZO, TADRES and French Crecerelle (also used by Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Greece) interoperable Interoperability with different ISR systems of the German armed forces, NATO and EU is planned, as well as with US Global Hawk Germany will have access to Italy’s COSMO and France’s Helios 2 imagery in exchange for SAR-Lupe imagery
Interoperability
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communications systems and information databases are compliant with NATO STANAGs, while purchasing additional modules from the United States when these can solve specific interoperability needs, especially for the navy and air force. Italy also seeks active participation in European R&D programs as a way to define common European requirements and standards at an early stage, as well as participation in such NATO programs as AGS and ACCS. Italy has also begun deployment of UAV-based ISR capabilities. Having developed independent capabilities in satellite communications, Italy is also committed to greater intraEuropean cooperation in the development of future space assets. Italian troops participate in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) and have good interoperability with their Spanish counterparts. In addition, Italy will create one of the European Union’s Battlegroups, and participate in two others, one with Hungary and Slovenia, the other with Spain, Greece and Portugal. It remains to be seen how interoperability issues will be addressed in the latter two Battlegroups. Command and control Each of Italy’s services has its own C2. The air force system is SICCAM (Sistema di Comando e Controllo dell’Aeronautica Militare, or C2 System for Military Aviation) and the navy’s is Leonardo. The army has the SIACCON (Systema Automatizzato di Commando e Controllo, or Automated Command and Control System), which provides automated support for military units at corps, division, brigade, and battalion level, and is compliant with NATO STANAGs. The SIACCON land system is fused with the air defense C2 system into a single network under the CATRIN (sistema CAmpale di TRasmissioni ed INformazioni, or Battlefield Information System) program as of July 2000. CATRIN is made up of three different functional subsystems. The SORAO (sottosistema di SORveglianza e Acquisizione Obiettivi, or Target Surveillance and Acquisition subsystem) subsystem controls ground surveillance and provides battlefield awareness, target acquisition, and information from meteorological and NBC sensors. The SOATCC (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate, or Integrated Transmission Subsystem) subsystem is responsible for air surveillance, and provides C2 over army air defense units and army aviation units. The third subsystem, SOTRIN (SOttosistema di Trasmissione Integrate, or Integrated Transmission Subsystem), ensures the communication flow between the various command centers. The most important future C2 system will be the Command, Control, and Navigation System (Sistemi di Comando, Controllo e Navigazione – SICCONA), a C2 system that will link all the army’s armored vehicles and provide them with access to the existing SIACCON system. Fifty units of the SICCONA system are expected to be deployed sometime in 2006–7.
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Communications and computers Most of the communications systems deployed by the Italian armed forces were designed to meet NATO STANAGs. Some Link-16 systems, purchased from the United States, have been installed on Tornado F3 aircraft, and Italy is a partner in the MIDS consortium and the MIDS JTRS program. In addition, the Italian navy has installed Link-11 systems on several of its ships, which will be replaced with Link-22. However, the tactical digital communications infrastructure of the Italian armed forces is still in its early stages. An intranet backbone for the Ministry of Defense called DIFENET, based on fiber optic links, is currently under development. A military digital information network (Rete Numerica Interforze – RNI) is also under discussion. Italy’s terrestrial communications system is reinforced by the SICRAL (Sistema Italiano per Comunicazioni Riservate ed Allarmi, or Italian System for Reserved Communications and Warning) military satellite communications system. The first satellite, SICRAL 1A, was launched in 2001, carrying the first operational EHF communications capacity produced in Europe as well as SHF and UHF. However, SICRAL does not include onboard processing and therefore cannot be fully interoperable with US systems or compatible with recently approved NATO EHF STANAGs. However, SICRAL is interoperable with the British Skynet 4 and with most of the channels of the French Syracuse and the Spanish Hispasat systems. The system includes over 100 fixed and mobile terminals, including several to be deployed on Italian fighter aircraft. SICRAL 1B is scheduled to begin service in 2006, and once operational will contribute all of Italy’s NATO SATCOM commitments as well as serving as backup for SICRAL 1A. It too has UHF, SHF and EHF capability. The constellation will have coverage from the United States to the Middle East for NATO use. The next generation of satellites in this series, SICRAL 2, is still being planned, but is scheduled for launch around 2010. It will replace SICRAL 1A and is expected to include onboard SHF processing and frequency-hopping capabilities. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Italy’s unmanned ISR capabilities are based largely on non-Italian technologies, although eight domestically developed Mirach-26 and Mirach-150 tactical UAVs were introduced to the Italian army in 2002. Italy acquired four Predator MALE UAVs, intended mainly for reconnaissance missions, which became fully operational in 2005. In addition, twenty CL-289 tactical UAVs were purchased from EADS in 2002. Italy also possesses manned ISR assets, including eighteen Breguet Atlantic aircraft for maritime reconnaissance and one Alenia G-222VS aircraft for airborne SIGINT operations (the latter was used successfully in Kosovo, but is scheduled to be replaced by two new C-130J aircraft in 2005 or 2006). A battlefield surveillance system, called CRESO (Complesso Radar Eliportato per la Sorveglianga, or Combined Heliborne Surveillance Radar), is deployed 65
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for operational and tactical missions. The system, carried onboard Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters, includes a moving target indicator and forward-looking infrared sensor. Four such systems are currently operational, all designed to meet NATO STANAGs and to link with other systems via MIDS and the Italian SICRAL system. In addition, the Italian air force flies several Tornado fighter-bombers (ECR, Electronic Combat Reconnaissance version), equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors and an infrared line scanner for reconnaissance missions. Italy’s space-based observation capabilities are in the advanced development stage. Having participated in the French Helios 1 and Franco-German Horus satellite programs (the latter was discontinued in 1998), Italy is seeking independent earth observation capabilities. Under the COSMO-Skymed project (COnstellation of Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation), Italy will deploy a constellation of four radar-imaging satellites. The X-band radar satellites would feature a SAR payload capable of less than one-meter resolution for the military, and of approximately one-meter resolution for images sold commercially. The COSMO-Skymed system is managed by the Italian Space Agency, and Alenia Spazio is the prime contractor. The Italian Ministry of Defense has committed funds to the project in exchange for 20 per cent of the satellites’ viewing time. COSMO-Skymed is expected to be fully deployed and operational by 2007. Once all satellites are in place, the constellation will be able to take images of any location on the earth’s surface with a revisit time of 6–12 hours. As a result of an agreement signed between France and Italy in January 2001, COSMO-Skymed will be linked to the French Pleiades constellation via ORFEO, a program designed to ensure interoperability and information sharing. As part of this agreement, Italy will receive access to SPOT 5 and to Helios 2 imagery from France. Italy is also negotiating with Argentina regarding the possibility of integrating two Argentinian radar satellites into the COSMO-Skymed system. Future ISR capabilities were also expected through the Italo-German maritime patrol aircraft program. This program, now canceled, would have provided Italy with 14 aircraft by the year 2010. It is currently unclear if Italy will continue with an independent program for the deployment of next-generation manned maritime ISR capabilities. There has been talk of Italy joining the US MMA project, or acquiring patrol aircraft made by ATR, as well as leasing American P-3 Orion aircraft to replace the ageing fleet of Atlantics, jointly operated by the Italian navy and air force. In addition, Italy is a partner in the French-led Neuron UCAV program.
The Netherlands The Dutch armed forces place a high priority on C4ISR interoperability with NATO; and all new Dutch equipment is required to be compatible with NATO STANAGs. The army’s C2 Support Center is also the core of a new NATO C2 Center of Excellence (see the NATO chapter). The Royal Netherlands Army, Navy and Air Force are increasingly interoperable with each other and with other European services. With recent upgrades to the ISIS and TITAAN projects, the air 66
Satellite Italiano per Comunicazione Riservate (SICRAL 1)
DIFENET
Communications and computers Link-11/16; MIDS
SICCONA
MILSATCOM system
Deployed on several aircraft and ships
Air Force C2 system Navy C2 system Army and air defense C2, communication and intelligence system
Army C2 system
Deployed today
Italian capabilities for network-based operations
C2 Systema Automatizzato di Commando e Controllo (SIACCON) SICCAM LEONARDO CATRIN
Table 3.5
MOD intranet based on fiber optic links
Deployed by 2006–7
Integration of all C2 systems, to be deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007
continued…
Partly (only SHF and UHF capabilities) meets NATO STANAGs; interoperable with Skynet 4 and with most of the channels of the Syracuse and Hispasat systems
Links to allied Link-11/16 systems
Meets NATO STANAGs
Interoperability
continued
Neuron
C-130J COSMO-Skymed
Breguet Atlantic Alenia G-222
Helios 1
Tornado ECR
Predator CL-289 CRESO
Rete Numerica Interforze (RNI) ISR Mirach-26/150
SICRAL 2
Table 3.5
SIGINT aircraft
Tactical UAVs used by army MALE UAVs Tactical UAVs Heliborne SAR system for operational and tactical ISR FLIR sensor and IR scanner for recon missions Junior partner in French optical satellite program Maritime ISR 1 SIGINT aircraft
Deployed today
Deployed by 2006–7 Onboard SHF processing capability and frequencyhopping protocols
Partner in French-led UCAV program
Constellation of four SAR satellites
Military digital information network
Deployed after 2007
Access to French Helios 2 and German SAR-Lupe imagery in exchange for COSMO imagery
Used during the Kosovo crisis
Meets NATO STANAGs; links to allied systems via MIDS and SICRAL
Purchased from US
Interoperability Compatible with NATO and Skynet 4 but not with US
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force and army will share the same C2 system and communications infrastructure, and the navy will link into it in the future. The Netherlands military cannot afford to acquire C4ISR across the full spectrum of capabilities. They have focused instead on several major high-technology programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and Patriot anti-aircraft batteries, and on ensuring that deployed C4ISR assets are built to NATO STANAGs. Defense budget cuts for 2003 and 2004 put further in doubt the ability of the Netherlands military to carry out a full transformation of the armed forces. In these two budget years, the reduction in force element size targeted traditional platforms, including the navy’s frigates, which were reduced from 14 to 10, as well as in C4ISR assets such as maritime patrol aircraft, all of which are being sold (De Wijk 2004: 124–5). The bi-national German-Netherlands Corps, created in 1995, became a NATO High Readiness Force between 2000 and 2002. It is under operational command of SACEUR, but can also carry out EU-led operations. Its C4ISR assets include the German HEROS C2 system, the Dutch ISIS battlefield awareness and TITAAN communications systems, and French Sperwer tactical UAVs. In addition, the Netherlands will participate in two European Union Battlegroups, one with Germany and the other with the United Kingdom. Following the NATO Prague summit, the Netherlands army announced that it would build an Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) battalion that will be able to operate with other NATO allies. In addition, the TITAAN and ISIS systems were successfully deployed as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4), including battalion headquarters from Germany, France, Denmark and Norway. Command and control The Netherlands has invested significantly in state-of-the-art C2 systems. For the Royal Netherlands Army and Air Force, the most important of these is the ISIS (Integrated Staff Information System) for mobile headquarters from the brigade level up. The program was initiated in 1996, and the latest version, ISIS3, became operational in early 2004. It provides commanders with an advanced PC-based situation awareness tool at the tactical level. The Royal Netherlands Air Force, the Belgian army and the German/Netherlands High Readiness Forces Headquarters also have the ISIS system, and it has been successfully deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Liberia as well as with the Dutch contingent of the NRF. Other Dutch C2 programs include the army’s OSIRIS Battlefield Management System (BMS) for lower command levels (battalion-level and below), the navy LCF frigates C2 systems, the artillery corps’ VUIST system, the army’s Advanced Fire Support Information System (AFSIS) for mortar teams at the battalion and brigade level, and the armor corps’ Target Information Command and Control System(TICCS). All are compliant with NATO STANAGs, and in a short time all of the operational stand-alone C2 applications in use by the artillery will be brought under the AFSIS program. However, it is not yet clear that a full integration 69
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of all C2 systems (navy, air force and army) is planned. Future programs currently being evaluated include C2 systems for logistics, engineering and intelligence processes and for individual soldiers and vehicles, as well as the interoperability of Dutch C2 systems with those of other nations. Communications and computers The Dutch military’s digital communications infrastructure is the Netherlands Armed Forces Integrated Network (NAFIN) supplied by Nortel Networks. Fully operational, NAFIN supersedes the previous leased public line systems with a secure, high-speed network linking more than 250 military installations in the land, sea and air services. The Dutch army deploys a mobile tactical digital communications system. Its backbone, the ZODIAC (ZOne DIgital Automated and enCrypted Communication) system supplied by Thales Netherlands, is based on the EUROCOM standard, making it interoperable with a few NATO allies, principally Germany. The radios deployed are Single Channel Radio Access units by Thales Netherlands as well as HF EZB systems. In addition, the Royal Netherlands Air Force is currently in the process of procuring some 120 MIDS terminals for its F-16s, and a few aircraft are already equipped with this technology. The new generation of military communications for the Royal Netherlands armed forces is the TITAAN (Theater Independent Tactical Army and Air Force Network) that brings together legacy and new systems into a converged network. It provides the Netherlands army and air force with voice (via IP telephony) and video, as well as network management and security. In 2002 the army began replacing the ZODIAC system with the first TITAAN modules. In 2004, the air force began deploying the TITAAN system for mobile communications. TITAAN will eventually also link to the navy’s communication network. It has been used successfully in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Liberia, and deployed at the Land Component Command level and at the brigade and below levels as part of the Dutch-led fourth NATO Response Force exercise (NRF-4). There are plans to upgrade the TITAAN system to support tactical data links such as Link-11 and Link-16. In 2002, the Dutch Ministry of Defense launched the first phase of its MILSATCOM program. The German company ND Satcom was awarded a contract to deliver a turnkey SATCOM network to the Dutch armed forces, consisting of one ground station with two C-band, one Ku-band and one X-band terminal (plans for a second X-band terminal are being drafted). To date, the project has allowed the Satellite Ground Segment at Lauwersmeer to interconnect with NAFIN, the communications backbone of the Netherlands armed forces. Two new Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) terminals should be operational by 2009. The Dutch have also offered to fill part of NATO’s future MILSATCOM needs through their system.
70
TITAAN (Theater Independent Tactical Army and Air Force Network)
Digital communications infrastructure linking all three services Army mobile tactical digital communications infrastructure Next generation, VoIPbased army and air force mobile digital network; will eventually replace ZODIAC and also be deployed by navy
Army and air force mobile headquarters C2 system Lower army command levels (battalion and below) Navy C2 system Artillery C2 system Armor C2 system
Deployed today
Dutch capabilities for network-based operations
C2 Integrated Staff Information System (ISIS) OSIRIS Battlefield Management System (BMS) LCF frigates C2 systems VUIST Target Information Command and Control System(TICCS) Communications and Computers Netherlands Armed Forces Integrated Network (NAFIN) ZODIAC
Table 3.6 Deployed by 2006–7
Deployed after 2007
continued…
Interoperable with those NATO forces using the EUROCOM standard COTS-based
Meets NATO STANAGs Meets NATO STANAGs Meets NATO STANAGs
Meets NATO STANAGs
Meets NATO STANAGs
Interoperability
continued
EuroMALE
Squire
Fennek
ISR Sperwer
MILSATCOM program
Table 3.6
Tactical UAVs used for S&R and target acquisition missions Reconnaissance vehicle with camera, a thermal imager and a laser rangefinder Man-portable surveillance radars fielded by Royal Netherlands Army and Marine Corps
Deployed today 1 ground station and 4 terminals; 2 AEHF terminals to be added by 2009
Deployed by 2006–7
Co-developed with France
Deployed after 2007
Similar systems are deployed by France, Denmark, Sweden, Greece Co-developed with Germany
Interoperability Connected to NAFIN network
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Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Dutch unmanned ISR capabilities expanded considerably with the procurement of 38 Sperwer UAVs from France. Deployed since mid-2000, they are chiefly used for tactical ISR and target acquisition missions. The Dutch are also interested in UAV systems that can perform more elaborate missions, and are collaborating with France in the development of EuroMALE (Chuter 2003b: 4). For ground-based ISR, the Royal Netherlands Army began deploying the Fennek vehicle in 2004. Produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) of Germany and Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems of the Netherlands, the Fennek is equipped with a sensor platform that includes a camera, a thermal imager, a laser rangefinder, and HRM-7000 tactical radios. For maritime reconnaissance, the Netherlands navy has relied on its fleet of thirteen Orion P-3C aircraft, ten of whose ground surveillance capabilities have recently been upgraded. The upgraded planes, delivered in November 2003, possess new electronic support measures, more advanced radar and acoustic sensors, and improved mission systems. The upgrades also make the P-3C aircraft more interoperable with those of the US navy. However, eight of these aircraft will be sold to Germany and the remainder to Portugal, thereby eliminating a critical C4ISR element of the Dutch navy. Ground ISR capabilities include 62 recently acquired and deployed Squire man-portable surveillance radars for the Royal Netherlands Army and Marine Corps. The radars provide MTI as well as bomb damage assessment capabilities.
Spain Spain has been slower to integrate cross-service C2 and communications infrastructures in its armed forces. Army and air force C2 systems were fully deployed only recently. SATCOM fills much of the military’s communications needs. There is a limited budget for ISR systems, for which Spain relies heavily on locally developed products (principally UAVs and SIGINT systems). Few of the Spanish systems are interoperable across services or internationally. Spain is, however, one of the few Western European countries to have significantly increased its defense budget in recent years. The 2004 increase of 4.5 per cent was focused on a 15-year modernization program, which principally involves acquisition of major platforms such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, A400M airlifter, Leopard tank, and Pizzaro infantry fighting vehicle. Few large C4ISR procurement or R&D programs are expected in the near future. Spain has participated in coalition expeditionary operations through its membership in the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF), created in 1997. SIAF is a bi-national amphibious force with Italy; its first exercise was in 1998. It is activated on call by common agreement and can be called on for Multinational Amphibious Task Force operations under NATO, the EU’s European Marine Force (EUROMARFOR), or for national missions. SIAF command rotates every 12 or 24 months between the two member nations. Spain is also creating one 73
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of the European Union’s Battlegroups, and will participate in another with Italy, Greece and Portugal. Command and control The main C2 system for the Spanish army is the Army Command and Control Information System (Sistema de Información para Mando y Control del Ejército de Tierra – SIMACET), which provides a common battlefield picture for all command centers. It covers all operational echelons, from army corps, division, brigade, and battalion, and independent units (e.g. expeditionary forces, groups of armored vehicles). The Aerial Command and Control System (Sistema de Mando y Control Aéreo – SIMCA) has been deployed by the Spanish air force since 2001, and is compliant with NATO standards. There is no plan for the integration of the Spanish C2 system across services. Communications and computers The Spanish tactical communications infrastructure consists of PR4G digital radios, deployed through the ARGOS project. There is little funding for further network integration of communications systems, except for the procurement of several MIDS systems for aircraft and the upgrading of Link-11 systems to Link22 on some ships. Spain is also a partner in the MIDS JTRS program that will make its MIDS systems compliant with the JTRS waveforms. Military communications are carried through Hispasat civilian telecommunications satellites and the XTAR-EUR X-band satellite. Four Hispasat satellites are currently in orbit, the most recent launched in 2002. However, only the two oldest satellites, launched in 1992 and 1993, carry military communications payloads. The Hispasat system is compatible with France’s Syracuse 2, Britain’s Skynet 4 and the NATO 4 system. The XTAR-EUR satellite, operated since April 2005 by Space Systems Loral and Hisdesat, is the world’s first satellite developed for commercial X-band services. The Spanish Ministry of Defense is its first customer. It provides Spain with coverage from Eastern Brazil and the Atlantic Ocean, across all of Europe, Africa and the Middle East to South East Asia. The satellite features on-board switching and multiple steerable beams, allowing users access to X-band capacity. The XTAR-EUR satellite will be accessible to all existing and future X-band terminals used by the United States and NATO. Future military satellite capabilities are under development through the Spainsat program (XTAR-LANT), undertaken by Hisdesat and Space Systems Loral. This satellite will operate in the X-band and possess an anti-jamming system. The Spanish Defense Ministry will lease five of Spainsat’s thirteen transponders; the rest are expected to be leased by the United States and other NATO allies. The satellite will cover the region between the Middle East and the Midwestern United States, and be fully operational in 2006. It will also be fully interoperable with all existing and future US and NATO X-band terminals.
74
ISR Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Aérea (SIVA)
Spainsat
Hispasat
MIDS
Tactical UAV for shortrange reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
Commercial SATCOMs from early 1990s with some transponders leased to Spanish military
PR4G radio-based tactical digital communications infrastructure
Common battlefield picture for all army command centers, including mobile ones Air force C2 system
Deployed today
MILSATCOM – UHF and SHF capability along with some EHF capacity and an anti-jamming system
Installed on several aircraft and navy ships
Deployed by 2006–7
Spanish capabilities for network-based operations
C2 Sistema de Información para Mando y Control del Ejército de Tierra (SIMACET) Sistema de Mando y Control Aéreo (SIMCA) Communications and computers ARGOS
Table 3.7 Deployed after 2007
continued…
Links to other MIDS systems in allied nations Partly interoperable with the Syracuse (France), Skynet (UK) and NATO 4 systems
Complies with NATO STANAGs
Interoperability
continued
Neuron
Helios 1 + 2
Falcon-20
Santiago
Orion P-3B
Table 3.7
Deployed today Upgraded in 2003 to include FITS mission system, an electronic warfare system, new radar, acoustic system, IFF, V/UHF and HF radios, data link, and satellite and inertial navigation systems Boeing 707-351C configured for COMINT/ ELINT operations 2 aircraft for COMINT missions Junior partner in French earth observation satellites; IR and optical IMINT capabilities
Deployed by 2006–7
Partner in French-led UCAV program
Deployed after 2007
Interoperability
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Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance For unmanned ISR, Spain relies on the locally manufactured SIVA (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Aérea, or Integrated System for Aerial Surveillance), a tactical UAV for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. Spain has also expressed an interest in Northrop Grumman’s Fire Scout vertical take-off and landing tactical UAV for maritime S&R capabilities. Manned ISR assets include five Orion P-3B aircraft, upgraded in 2003 by EADS to include the Fully Integrated Tactical Mission System (FITS) data fusion system, an electronic warfare system, new radar, acoustic system, ID friend-or-foe interrogator, V/UHF and HF radios, a data link, and satellite and inertial navigation systems. Spain’s space observation capabilities originally depended on the Ishtar optical earth observation satellite, but the project did not go forward. Instead, Spain became a junior partner in the French Helios 1 and Helios 2 satellite programs, of which it owns 7 and 2.5 per cent, respectively. The Spanish Ministry of Defense has recently revived its plans for an independent earth observation capability, discussing a high-resolution synthetic aperture radar satellite, possibly with civil security applications. Since March 1998, Spain has operated a single Boeing 707 (the Santiago), configured for SIGINT and ISR missions. Two Falcon-20 aircraft are also in operation for COMINT missions.
Sweden Although there has been significant progress in formulating a Swedish doctrine for Network-Based Defense (NBD), the Swedish armed forces today are still only partially interoperable across services. Infrastructure is currently being put in place for a mobile joint C2 function, since all the services are now under a single national command. This command is part of the process of transforming the Swedish military into a contingency organization, with a mobile, high-quality force able to operate in expeditionary mode. Many of the new systems procured by the Swedish military are compliant with NATO STANAGs and US military specifications (MILSPECS), giving them a good basis for interoperability. However, most of the older Swedish systems were not designed with international interoperability in mind. Each of the services has its own rapid reaction unit, created in 1998–9. The army has SWERAP (Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit), the air force has SWAFRAP (Swedish Air Force Rapid Reaction Unit) and the navy has SWENRAP (Swedish Navy Rapid Reaction Unit). Four air force C-130s provide air insertion capability for ground units. SWAFRAP is comprised of JAS-39 Gripen aircraft, which carry out airborne surveillance and combat search and rescue missions. SWENRAP missions are principally mine clearing and peacekeeping operations. Swedish rapid reaction forces have been deployed to Liberia as part of the UN force, and Swedish Special Forces have operated in the Congo and Afghanistan. By January 2008, Sweden intends for its rapid reaction units to be part of the European Union’s Nordic Battlegroup together with Finland, Norway and Estonia. 77
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The SWERAP units use a commercial satellite system to link with national headquarters, and the KV90 high frequency radio system – with two stations in the mission area and two redundant stations in Sweden – as a backup. Tactical communications in-theater rely on the army’s TS-9000 system. Based on the EUROCOM standard, this system uses a Thales tactical switchboard, an Ericsson tactical radio link system, and Cisco routers that form the backbone of a tactical Intranet. The TS-9000 also includes radio access points for VHF Ericsson Starcom radios as well as HF-radios. The C4ISR capabilities of the Swedish rapid reaction units do not use groundbreaking or unique technology solutions; instead, they rely on COTS equipment adapted for their specific requirements. The Swedish deployment to Kosovo in 1999 needed to be equipped rapidly, and, within a relatively short period, SWERAP became the first battalion in the Swedish armed forces to field advanced C2 and communications systems, relying on this COTS approach. Command and control Current C2 systems in the Swedish armed forces include the 9LV system in service with the navy and the StriC-90 system deployed since 1998 for command and control of attack aircraft and air defense systems. StriC-90 is connected to the Giraffe 3D and the Erieye radars, and includes data links with Gripen attack aircraft. Swedish air force systems are tied into a single network named Airforce 2000, which enables a tactical C2 loop for all the service’s units. The Swedish army uses the demonstrator IS-Mark information system for mobile and nonmobile ground based headquarters and the SLB (Stridsledningssystem Bataljon, or Battalion C2 System) system at the battalion level. The two are not interoperable, however, and data must be manually transferred between them. (Nilsson et al. 2004: 24–5). Sweden began to integrate all the services’ C2 systems, at all levels, in 2005 under the name of SWECCIS (SWEdish C2 Information System). In October 1995, the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters’ Department of Operations tasked the Defense Research Establishment (Försvarets Forskningsanstalt, or FOA), the Defense Materiel Administration (Försvarets Materielverk, or FMV), and the National Defense College (Försvarshögskolan, or FHS) to propose a vision for a mobile military joint C2 system for the year 2010. This project – Mobile Joint Command and Control Function for 2010 (Rörlig Operativ Lednings Funktion, or ROLF 2010) – has been expanded to include civilian C2 elements relevant to national security. The goal is a single C2 environment for Sweden’s national defense and first responder services in 10–15 years. The vision calls for the creation of an “aquarium” (Visionarium), a device to present crisis situations in a three-dimensional environment, fusing information from many sources. Once deployed, Visionarium will enable informed and timely decision-making and the dissemination of decisions to security forces.
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Communications and computers For the past ten years, the tactical communications infrastructure of the Swedish armed forces has been based on a digital network, the TS-9000. The system uses Thales switches and Ericsson radios and relay equipment and has recently been upgraded to include tactical Intranet. However, it will encounter problems of data capacity once the new information system SWECCIS is introduced. The requirement for more bandwidth will be filled through satellite communications and the procurement of the HF-2000 radio communications network, to be fully deployed by 2008. This system will provide all services with a fully automated data, text and voice communications network that can be used from fixed and mobile stations. Only a few of Sweden’s tactical communications systems are interoperable outside Sweden. All were designed and deployed under a strategy of Swedish neutrality, which ruled out coalition operations. Sweden has now participated in several of the Combined Endeavor annual exercises, which have tested and proven the interoperability of its tactical communications systems with those of other countries, at the non-secure level. In the near future, Sweden is expected to join the successor of the Tactical Communications (TACOMS) Post 2000 project, a NATO initiative to develop STANAGs for IP-based communications between different tactical communications systems. With the change in Swedish strategy, the need for interoperable communications systems has grown. As a result, Sweden expects to procure Link-16 terminals and IFF systems. Link-16 will first be introduced in the air force and navy, with an army deployment to follow. Initially, it will be installed as stand-alone terminals with limited capacity. Sweden has also recently launched a program, known as GTRS, to acquire a Software Defined Radio system, built on SCA standards. The goal is to introduce the new system to the armed forces after 2008. In 2005, Sweden also began to deploy its national radio communications infrastructure for public safety authorities, including the armed forces, police, coast guard, customs service, local crisis management and rescue services, and emergency healthcare and ambulance services. RAKEL (Radio Kommunikation för Effektiv Ledning, or Radio Communication for Efficient Command), based on the TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio) standard, will be supplied by a consortium of Saab, Nokia and Eltel Networks and will be owned by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). Deployment will start in the south of Sweden and finish in the north of the country by 2010. RAKEL is part of the Network-Based Defense doctrine, aimed at connecting the Swedish military and the first responders in one network. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance The Argus system has been Sweden’s principal manned airborne ISR capability since 1997. Argus is based on six Saab 340 aircraft, outfitted with Ericsson’s Erieye PS-890 radar, along with four ground stations. It performs mostly airborne early 79
Communications and computers TS-9000
ROLF 2010
SWECCIS
9LV CETRIS
SLB
Army tactical communications infrastructure, including tactical Intranet
Naval C2 system Army C2 system demonstrator for mobile and non-mobile headquarters
Air defense C2 system
Deployed today
Army C2 system for battalion level
Deployed by 2006–7
Swedish capabilities for network-based operations
9LV Mark 3E IS-Mark
C2 StriC
Table 3.8
Naval C2 system for nextgeneration Visby-class corvettes Integration of all C2 (navy, air force, and army) systems, at all levels Mobile Joint Command and Control Function
Deployed after 2007
Interoperability issues may be sacrificed to remain on schedule
Interoperable with the Swedish Argus airborne radar system
Interoperability
ARTHUR
FSR-890 Argus
ISR Ugglan
GTRS
HF-2000
RAKEL
KV90
Saab-340 aircraft with Erieye radar for aerial C2 and maritime surveillance Artillery and mortar location radar
Tactical UAV (based on Sagem’s Sperwer)
Deployed today Communications system for Swedish Rapid Reaction Force
Deployed by 2006–7
National mobile radio system for public safety, including armed forces, security forces and first responders Future high-frequency radio communications network (data and voice) for all services (fully deployed by 2008) Swedish equivalent to the US JTRS tactical software-based radio
Deployed after 2007
continued…
Similar systems are deployed by France, Denmark, Netherlands, Greece Fully integrated into Swedish air defense system Deployed with ISAF
SCA compliant
Meets NATO STANAGs
Based on TETRA standard
Interoperability
continued
Pleiades
Neuron
S-102B Korpen (Raven)
Giraffe/Sea Giraffe
Table 3.8
Deployed today Land-based and maritime S&R radars 2 Gulfstream IV-SP aircraft for SIGINT
Deployed by 2006–7
Partner in French-led UCAV program Access to French satellite imagery
Deployed after 2007
Have been deployed in the Adriatic in support of NATO peacekeeping operations
Interoperability
E UROP E AN NAT I ONAL C APAB I L I T I E S
warning and maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Other manned ISR assets include two Gulfstream IV-SP aircraft, deployed since 1997 for SIGINT missions. The Ericsson Giraffe radar, recently deployed, provides land-based ISR capabilities, though its principal mission is air defense. The Swedish navy also deploys a maritime version, the Sea Giraffe. The Swedish ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) system is fully operational and has been used in Afghanistan. Sweden has only a limited unmanned aerial ISR capability. Three Ugglan (Owl) tactical UAV systems were procured from France in 1999–2000, based on the Sperwer UAV modified to be able to take off in severe winter conditions. As part of the Swedish armed forces long-term vision, a number of advanced UAV concepts are currently being studied. Gladen is one candidate: a HALE UAV equipped with a SAR, electro-optic and infrared sensors, and able to carry an early warning suite. Also under discussion are two combat UAVs: the Swedish Highly Advanced Research Configuration (SHARC), and Skuadern, a stealthy MALE reconnaissance and strike UAV, both being developed by Saab, the latter in collaboration with BAE Systems. Sweden is also a partner in the French-led EuroMALE UAV and Neuron UCAV programs.
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4 NATO A N D OTHE R M U LT I L AT E R AL N E T WO RK - BA S E D CA PA BI L I T IE S NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the most important and broadreaching setting in which the transatlantic allies can address C4ISR technology and interoperability issues. Military planning in the European Union, though moving forward rapidly, is at too early a stage and insufficiently comprehensive to resolve interoperability problems today. In any case, the United States is not an EU member, making NATO the most important institutional setting in which transatlantic C4ISR issues can be discussed and resolved. During the Cold War, NATO force planning was the setting for allied discussions on C2, communications, air defense, air operations, and air-toair surveillance. Although this review of national network-based capabilities suggests that national systems are imperfectly interoperable at the national level and not always interoperable within the NATO framework, the intent to make them NATO interoperable is clear. Moreover, a number of capabilities developed in the NATO context remain important tools for coalition interoperability, even when the Alliance is not formally involved. For the purposes of this discussion, we will use the definition of interoperability common in NATO, as described by Major General Picavet, Director of the NATO HQ C3 Staff: “the ability of alliance forces, and when appropriate, forces of partner and other nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks” (Picavet 2003: 34). NATO has dedicated common C2 and communications capabilities. The MIDS upgrade of the US Link-16 system connecting allied aircraft was developed through NATO, and NATO’s naval communications are largely interoperable through Link-11 technology. The AWACS air-to-air surveillance system is a common NATO capability. As an organization, NATO defines and issues Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) for many weapons systems, including C3I, which set targets for planning national C2 and communications systems among the member nations. NATO continues to provide an important setting for future common programs that are part of the C4ISR universe, such as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) program, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program, theater missile defense (TMD) research, and the Coalition Aerial Surveillance and 84
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Reconnaissance (CAESAR) advanced concept technology demonstration. NATO will be a driving force for future transformations of European military forces and their links to the US defense as a result of three key decisions made at the November 2002 Prague Summit: the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC), the NATO Response Force (NRF), and the creation of the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT). While NATO remains the principal transatlantic context for C4ISR discussions and planning, the future evolution of the Alliance’s role is unclear. The European allies are increasingly committed to doing parallel planning in the European Union context, whose military missions and commitments are growing. In addition, the future of the US role in coalition operations under a NATO flag is somewhat uncertain. The US National Security Strategy (2002) and the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 both give preference to ad hoc coalitions over a systematic use of NATO for out-of-area operations. NATO roles and capabilities Throughout the Cold War the allies used the NATO context for common C2 capability planning. NATO strategy and force planning, and military exercises set the expectations and goals for NATO members’ military forces. Based, in part, on Alliance needs, members set goals for their own national defense investment, which, in turn, influenced the requirements for equipment, including Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). Past practices in the Alliance, however, may not be an adequate incentive for defining and meeting C4ISR requirements today. NATO force planning goals are not obligatory and have often not been met in national defense budgets and plans. Moreover, because they have been developed through negotiation, goals and targets developed in the NATO context tend to be incremental, while defense technology and mission need to move ahead more quickly. As a result, as Gompert and Nerlich note, the NATO force planning process since the end of the Cold War has become increasingly disconnected from the US national force transformation process: Adjustments in NATO’s military plans are worked out through tedious diplomatic negotiations among professionals trained to avoid abrupt change. Consequently, the United States and the lead European allies do not presently rely on the NATO planning process to guide their force planning, and they cannot count on it to organize and guide their effort to create cooperable transformed forces. (Gompert and Nerlich 2002: 64) Nevertheless, NATO has served as an important context for allied C4ISR planning. The Alliance breaks down network-based capabilities and C4ISR into three categories: Command, Control, and Consultation (C3), Communications and Information Systems (CIS), and ISR. Over time, separate NATO organizations
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have been created to deal with the first two areas (C3 and CIS) while ISR has been further broken down into specific programs and organizations. The NATO concept of C3 covers planning and architecture design of systems, while that of CIS covers the management and operation of systems. For C3, the Alliance has developed specific packages – Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters – that play a central role in planning and implementing specific Alliance operations such as IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans. Since the mid-1990s, CJTF core staffs have been established on a permanent basis within selected parent headquarters in the NATO military command structure. When the need arises for a CJTF to be deployed, the core staff is assembled and augmented as necessary, forming a CJTF headquarters specifically structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question. These CJTF headquarters receive C2 and communications capabilities both from the Alliance and from national forces. They will also provide the new NATO Response Force with the joint headquarters it requires to operate (see below). The Alliance has developed its own dedicated C2 and communications capability for military operations, involving senior levels of military and political decision making (Barry 2003) NATO hardware and software can reach across the entire NATO territory, connecting land, air, and maritime forces and political decision makers in national capitals and Brussels, including voice, data, messaging, and video teleconferencing. This capability uses wireless networks, satellites, landlines, optical fiber, and digital radio, and includes local area and wide area networks. A significant volume of the traffic is carried on the Internet and uses commercial equipment, including satellites. These C3 and CIS infrastructures are overseen by the NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Organization (NC3O). The NC3O’s mission is to develop the technical architectures, standards, protocols, and overall design for all systems, from the tactical military level to the strategic/political one. Since its reorganization in 1996, the NC3O is linked to three organizations. The NATO C3 Board (NC3B) is the senior CIS planning and policymaking body in the Alliance. It is composed of representatives of all member nations, the strategic military commands, and other relevant NATO organizations. It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Defense Planning Committee, and acts as the oversight board for all NC3O activities. The Board has subcommittees on joint requirements and concepts, frequency management, information systems, identification systems, interoperability, information security, communication networks, and navigation systems (Picavet 2003). The NATO Command, Control, and Consultation Agency (NC3A) is directly responsible for CIS issues within the Alliance. It carries out the policies of the Board, procures systems, and conducts field trials of prototypes. NC3A’s goal is to create architecture for a common operating environment, into which member states can plug in their own C3 networks. Lastly, the NATO systems are operated by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA). It manages CIS, conducts joint training, and monitors the quality of service both in static and forward deployed locations. Over time, the Board and 86
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the NC3A are pushing NATO toward a command and information system with greater mobility and interoperability, increasingly based on commercial products and systems. The Alliance goal is to create a ready-made architecture that member nations can plug into, and to provide a test bed for communications and Internet technologies (Barry 2002: 253). NATO C2 programs The current NATO C2 systems and related communications capabilities have their limitations. The systems have not been mobile, though deployability is going to be critical for future out-of-area operations. Moreover, the current capability is stovepiped. Horizontal communications between forces and between governments are not systematically possible. Thus, the current NATO systems are not yet a network-based capability that would allow all sources of data, voice, and video (including sensor data) to be brought together vertically and horizontally in real time to provide coherent, real-time awareness of the battlefield across forces. NATO has, however, been upgrading this C2 capability, with a number of major programs underway or recently completed, which will allow Alliance operations to be more network-based. The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) is intended to be a strategiclevel system providing decision support software and a combined operational picture. It is currently being given a common hardware and software baseline that will form the core of a future bi-Strategic Command (ACE and ACLANT) automated information system (Bi-SCAIS), the Alliance’s future C2 system. The core services of the Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS), an Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) strategic-level, COTS-based information system, will be implemented in the ACE ACCIS architecture. The NATO C3 Technical Architecture (NC3TA), a new open systems approach for the Alliance’s C2 infrastructure, was initiated in December 2000, and addresses the near-term interoperability requirements of NATO C2 systems, setting down technical requirements and guidelines for their implementation. There are additional NATO programs addressing future Alliance C2 requirements. More than a decade ago, the Alliance initiated a program to upgrade and expand NATO’s air defense net, the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), a commonly funded development and procurement program. ACCS is intended to be an open architecture program, using off-the-shelf components. Given the decline in the European theater air threat, the ACCS program could have been terminated. However, ACCS has been designed not only to detect and defend against air attack, but also for air tasking and carrying out the tactical planning, tasking and execution of all air defense, offensive air, and air support operations. It is intended as a multi-mission simultaneous planning capability, coordinating flight paths of various aircraft, integrating the AWACS air picture, preparing offensive operations, and coordinating a combined air operations center, along with reconnaissance squadrons and fighter wings. It will include both fixed sites and deployable components. 87
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Air operations over Kosovo revealed shortfalls in the Alliance’s capability to coordinate combined air attack and support, giving new impetus to the need for the ACCS capability. Moreover, it became clear that ACCS could provide a vehicle for communications and C2 involving air operations as part of a broader network-based system, linked to air-ground surveillance and conceivably, even to theater missile defense systems (TMD). As a result, the Alliance decided to continue the ACCS effort. In 1999, NATO signed a $500 million contract for the initial development effort with Air Command Systems International, part of the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture. Over five years, the ACCS system core software was developed and tested, concluding the first phase of the program. The next phase of the ACCS, from 2004 to roughly 2008, includes software integration, incremental testing, and the introduction of ACCS into national forces. The goal is to create ACCS sites in 18 NATO member nations. NATO members without an ACCS site will interface with the system via their national air defense and operations centers (Fiorenza 2004: 38). Theater missile defense is not generally seen as an element of C2. However, the NATO TMD effort is relevant to overall C2 capabilities, as missile defense can be closely linked to the air defense and air operations capability provided by the ACCS program. Moreover, a TMD architecture could include mobile tactical missile and air defense capabilities, which Alliance forces may require in outof-area deployments, including the NATO Respose Force (NRF). The Alliance has issued two contracts for studies of an Alliance TMD architecture and there is growing consensus that it may be appropriate to develop such a system. NATO introduced still another C2-related program in the summer of 2005, creating a new C2 Center of Excellence based on the model of the Dutch C2 Support Center (described in the previous chapter). Under the auspices of Allied Command Transformation, this joint Center is to provide the Alliance with a framework for the exchange of C2 knowledge and lessons learned, in order to improve interoperability. The initial staff is composed of 15 Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian and US exchange or liaison officers, but will expand to include other nationalities. The Center will undertake training and education activities related to C2 interoperability, including the analysis of case studies and the production of “lessons learned” reports. As part of its work, the Center will assess the value of the NRF as a stimulus for NATO network-enabled capabilities, assist member states in synchronizing their national C2 programs to make them more interoperable, and validate network-centric and C4ISR concepts and doctrines developed in other NATO organizations, such as the NC3A. The Center was also offered to the European Union as part of the Dutch contribution to the European Strategic Defense Initiative (ESDI). It will collaborate with the European Defense Agency and make its expertise and facilities available to the European Battlegroups (see Chapter 5 on EU capabilities). Though a relatively new addition to the Alliance’s C4ISR effort, the Center of Excellence could become an important arena for NATO’s efforts.
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NATO communications and information programs NATO’s communications and information networks have also been evolving toward more networked capabilities. The NATO General Purpose Communications System (NGCS) is a communications backbone tying all military C2 (data and voice) together, with semi-permanent bandwidth on demand, using secure and non-secure telephone, message, wireless, and satellite links. NGCS is being deployed to replace the obsolete NATO Integrated Communications System. The NATO Messaging System (NMS) will provide Alliance commands with e-mail and secure military message handing capability. Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS), a Windows NT-based information system initially developed for Bosnia, provides secure connectivity (up to NATO Secret) between NATO and several national and coalition systems. Increasingly, NATO platforms are also being equipped with the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), a modernized version of the US Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). The development of MIDS illustrates the increase in Alliance telecommunications interoperability. It was designed as a tactical data communications network linking NATO allies’ aircraft (fighters and bombers) and air-based, ground-based, and ship-based C2 centers (Hura et al. 2000). As it is deployed across alliance platforms, MIDS will also enable better aircraft Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) information. The United States, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain signed the project memorandum of understanding in 1991. MIDS development has been led by the United States, with France acting as deputy program leader (reflecting the cost shares of the two major program partners). MIDS, like the US JTIDS, is based on Link-16, a tactical digital network of encrypted, jam-resistant data links and terminals. Budget pressures and the desire to gain access to US military technology led the Europeans to support an international program, but almost all were unwilling to simply buy JTIDS off the shelf. For the United States, the need for international collaboration was operational: a common tactical communications network would increase interoperability with European allies and increase effectiveness in coalition warfare. A modular, open terminal architecture was developed for MIDS, followed by an affordable terminal that could be tailored to fit various military platforms. MIDS terminals were developed first for integration into a specific set of platforms, then modified to accommodate others. Finally, interoperable, jam-resistant data links between US and allied platforms were developed. The member nations participating in the program were prohibited from developing competing systems to MIDS. A US chartered, international joint venture, MIDSCO was awarded the R&D phase of the program in 1994. The JV included GEC-Marconi (UK), Hazeltine (United States), Thomson (France), Marconi Italtel Defense (Italy), Siemens (Germany), and ENOSA (Empresa Nacional de Optica SA, Spain). The R&D phase was concluded in 2000, followed by an acquisition phase that included two US vendors (Data Link Solutions and ViaSat, Inc.) and one European vendor for production and sale of the terminals. The European vendor is EuroMIDS, a 89
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consortium comprising Thales (France), Marconi Mobile (Italy), Indra (Spain), and EADS (Germany). In 2004, the US navy initiated a program within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program that would enable it to communicate with MIDS terminals. The MIDS JTRS program will transition the existing MIDS Link-16 terminal to a Software Communications Architecture (SCA) compliant with JTRS radio. The MIDS JTRS radio will provide three additional programmable channels that will be able to run any of the JTRS approved waveforms. The United States, France, Italy, Spain and Germany all participate in the program, which will enable them to receive copies of the technical data package for MIDS JTRS and produce terminals to meet their national needs. Eventually, all US, French, German, Italian and Spanish platforms outfitted with MIDS JTRS radios will be able to communicate and share a common picture of the battlefield. NATO’s Satcom V project is also underway, intended to provide global wideband video, voice, and data links to the Alliance. Satellite communications have been an important element of the Alliance’s common communications capability since 1970, when the first NATO satellite was launched. The NATO IV satellite system consisted of one active satellite, one backup satellite, 27 satellite ground terminals, and two control centers. Operational since 1991, it provided communications in both the UHF and SHF bands. NATO has retired the last remaining NATO IV satellite. Instead of purchasing and operating the next generation of satellites, the Satcom V program – previously known as NATO Satcom Post-2000 – will purchase capacity from existing European satellites and upgrade existing ground stations. The NATO C3 Agency leads the Satcom V program. The United Kingdom, France and Italy submitted a joint bid to supply SHF and UHF capacity from existing and planned national programs (Skynet in the United Kingdom, Syracuse in France, and SICRAL in Italy). The US Department of Defense also submitted a bid, offering SHF capacity on its Wideband Gapfiller satellite system and the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and UHF capacity on the UHF Follow-On system and the Mobile User Objective System. The United States also proposed selling NATO EHF capacity on its Advanced Extremely High Frequency system, while France proposed EHF capacity on one of its Syracuse 3 satellites. In May 2004, the NATO C3 Agency selected the joint British-French-Italian bid for the SHF and UHF parts of the Satcom Post-2000 program. The 15-year contract includes establishing a NATO Mission Access Center that will route all NATO satellite communications via satellites in the Skynet 5, Syracuse 3, and SICRAL systems. Beginning in 2007, the NATO system will be based on two Skynet 5, two Syracuse 3, and two SICRAL satellites. A selection for the EHF part of the program is expected soon, although EHF capacity is not expected to be needed before 2010 (Fiorenza 2005b).
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NATO intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs NATO’s current major ISR program is the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Alliance is in the process of acquiring additional ISR capabilities through the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program (AGS). The NATO AWACS fleet is composed of 17 aircraft with dedicated, common, air-to-air surveillance capability, and provides an important sensor input to understanding the battlefield. Purchased during the late 1980s, this NATO E-3A fleet is currently being improved through modernization programs managed by the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) Program Management Organization. In 2004, the upgrading of the missions systems on board the NATO aircraft was begun, and the process will be completed in 2008. The upgrades will enable the AWACS aircraft to receive mission orders and updates via satellite, allow the integration of data collected by other platforms with that gathered by the aircraft’s sensors, increase the number of targets it can track, and improve its interoperability with other platforms. The United Kingdom, France and the United States all possess the AWACS systems, giving the Alliance good interoperability in air-to-air surveillance. In 2000, NATO began a research and testing program with direct bearing on the integration of sensor data collected by various different platforms operated by member nations. The Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) program is unprecedented: an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) funded by the US Defense Department but carried out by NATO. The premise of CAESAR is that the NATO interoperability challenge is about information: what is needed, who needs it, and where it comes from. The objective of CAESAR is to test national and NATO air- and space-based ground surveillance systems, and develop ways to integrate them, ultimately leading to a new STANAG for the Alliance. To achieve this objective, the CAESAR program is testing tactics, techniques, and procedures for linking together independent national air reconnaissance and surveillance systems currently deployed on a variety of platforms, including the British ASTOR, the French Horizon, JSTARS, Global Hawk, RADARSAT (Canada), Predator, CRESO (Italian helicopter-based), and others. In the future, it could be extended to other platforms, including the British CEC network and, ultimately, ACCS and AGS. If the data emerging from CAESAR leads to investments and operational planning, it could make a valuable contribution to the NATO effort to network sensor data into its C2 and communications systems. It could also make it easier for coalition forces to rely on a variety of national air ground surveillance systems in the absence of a common NATO AGS asset. In addition, CAESAR may demonstrate the benefits of funding technology demonstrators at the international level. ACTDs, a result of acquisition reform by the US Defense Department and designed to move technology more quickly into the forces, have normally been restricted to US participants. More multinational ACTDs in the C4ISR arena could stimulate transatlantic efforts to address the 91
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interoperability dilemmas in network-based operations. For example, as a complement to the CAESAR program, the United States could increase NATO participation in the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) program. This is a 5-year technology demonstrator initiated in 2004 by US Joint Forces Command. Its objective is to enhance the interoperability of ISR systems fielded within a coalition framework via a common military website, and made available for coalition operations in near real time. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom already participate in MAJIIC. The most significant NATO program for future ISR capabilities is the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project, which has been an active R&D program for over a decade. It will provide NATO with an aerial battlefield surveillance capability using a radar suite with both MTI and SAR modes, fusing information gathered by other sensors into a combined digital picture. The United States currently fields such a capability in the JSTARS (a modified Boeing 707 carrying a communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence suite). The system is expected to cost some 4 billion euros, which will be shared by all participating nations, with initial operational capability targeted for 2010. The United Kingdom is the only NATO nation not taking part in the AGS program. The AGS program has evolved over several years, as a number of alternatives were considered and rejected. The United States proposed that the Alliance simply buy JSTARS, which few allied nations were willing to do. The United Kingdom decided to proceed independently with ASTOR, and pulled out of the NATO planning effort. Competing US and European solutions emerged: the MultiPlatform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP, an upgrade of the system deployed on JSTARS) and the Standoff Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar (SOSTAR). In 2003, NATO issued a Request for Proposals for a two-year design and development phase. This RFP called for the design and development phase to begin in late 2004 leading to a full program of six aircraft plus UAV systems by 2010. Two transatlantic strategic consortia responded to this Request for Proposals, both offering the same radar solution: the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR), which would fuse MP-RTIP and SOSTAR. One consortium was the Transatlantic Industry Proposed Solution (TIPS), led by Northrop Grumman, Thales, EADS, Galileo Avionica, General Dynamics Canada, Indra, and some 70 other companies from all 19 NATO member nations. The other was the Cooperative Transatlantic AGS System (CTAS), proposed by Raytheon and British Aerospace Systems, based on the United Kingdom ASTOR system (Fiorenza 2003b). In the spring of 2004, the NATO AGS Steering Committee and the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors selected the TIPS consortium as the winner. The AGS system was initially to be deployed solely on manned aircraft. However, in response to German urgings, the program was redesigned for both manned and unmanned aircraft. It is not yet clear which version will be deployed first. The TIPS-based mixed fleet is based on manned, medium-size aircraft – the
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Airbus A321 – and the German EuroHawk HALE UAVs, a version of Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. Developing the radar posed a problem for both consortia, since US export regulators indicated that they would forbid the export of some crucial technologies, such as the Transmit/Receive (T/R) modules. Frustrated by this problem, the European partners have spent time and resources to duplicate existing US T/R modules, creating a capability that, downstream, will compete with the American technology. The TCAR solution offered by the TIPS consortium faces other significant technology transfer issues, as the radar is to be co-developed by several European countries – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain – as well as the United States. The ultimate fate of the AGS system is unclear, given the significant additional costs required for full deployment and uncertainty that some key NATO members – France, the United Kingdom and Germany – will continue to participate over the long term. A commitment to deploy AGS would involve a considerable increase in common NATO investments and an increase in the NATO common budget ceiling. AGS spending might compete with other national defense priorities. On the other hand, a deployed AGS would give the Alliance a significantly enhanced sensoring capability for operational deployments outside the NATO area and relieve the overload on the US JSTARS, currently much in demand. As this discussion suggests, there is substantial NATO investment in the elements of common C2, communications and ISR capabilities for the Alliance. What is lacking is a clear vision of what the Alliance needs to link sensor and other information into the decision-making and command structures and down to the tactical war fighter. NC3A is working on such a vision, trying to define the linkage between the many NATO systems and standards, and achieve the incorporation of common programs such as MCCIS, ACCIS, ACCS and AGS into a joint system, and the integration of that system with the national systems of the member states. This C2 and communications architecture needs to be accompanied by a NATOwide vision of the sensor architecture to which it might be linked. NATO does not yet have clear standards for the ISR elements of network-centric operations, nor an agreed view on the way in which they should be networked with each other. NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) NATO has worked for decades to set common standards for defense equipment, including C4ISR systems. Working groups in the NATO Military Agency for Standardization, in conjunction with NATO’s Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), have negotiated more than 1,700 such STANAGs, which set out the standards members should seek to reach when acquiring new equipment. Roughly 300 of these standards relate to C4 technology (Grapin 2002: 37). The NC3TA proposes such standards for C2 and communications equipment, and information architecture. Their guidance should make it possible for nationally procured systems to link up with or plug into the C2 and communications architecture being put together by the Alliance (Barry 2003: 10). As noted in the 93
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review of national programs in this study, many C4 items in national inventories are said to be compliant with NATO STANAGs, which, in theory, enhances Alliance interoperability. The STANAG process has not, however, been fully successful in reaching this goal. STANAG compliance is not mandatory, but voluntary, and there is no institutional process in NATO for validating members’ compliance with the STANAGs. As a result, many NATO member nations, including the United States, have developed equipment that does not enhance interoperability, as was the case with the German land force communications protocol. As one analyst has noted: “Most European countries, including France, are willing to use NATO standards, but it is not a usual practice in US procurement for military services to refer (and defer) to them” (Grapin 2002: 3). Non-compliance with STANAGs is linked to the desire in some countries, notably the United States, to move forward quickly toward a network-based capability. The STANAG process tends to be long, tedious, and bureaucratic, often taking several years and resulting in a standard that is a lowest common denominator. Once a STANAG has been ratified it is often well behind the evolution of modern technology. As a result, the process does not have high-level attention and tends not to be viewed as a part of the strategic evolution of the Alliance. In the case of C2 and CIS technologies, the pace of innovation is particularly fast and heavily reliant on the commercial sector. As some countries move down the road toward networked capabilities, they are inclined to set STANAGs aside and move to the best available and most up-to-date technology. One analyst estimated that US defense technology is 80 per cent compliant with NATO STANAGs, but the remaining 20 per cent includes the technologies critical to the development of network-centric capabilities (Grapin 2002: 3). Moreover, in the critical area of ISR, there are few agreed STANAGs and none, as yet, for UAVs (Grapin 2002: 77). New NATO commitments to network-based operations The Alliance took a major step forward toward a commitment to networkcentric capabilities with the Prague summit of November 2002. First, and most important, the NATO agenda moved from a focus on Article 5 missions involving the defense of the NATO member countries, to a clear focus on Article 6, out-ofarea missions. This shift in focus had been emerging since the 50th anniversary Washington summit of 1999. Though the European allies initially resisted efforts to focus on out-of-area missions, this change emerged for three reasons. First, NATO’s experience in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo – the first war conducted by NATO as an alliance – made it clear that the European defense mission had been superseded by responsibilities for peacemaking and peacekeeping at Europe’s Balkan fringe. Balkan operations also exposed a number of weaknesses and gaps in Alliance capabilities.
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Moreover, 9/11, the war on terrorism, and the war in Afghanistan all involved a new adversary, whose transnational character made it a potential threat to all, but whose global location necessitated action outside the NATO area. While NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history the day after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the Alliance was not initially involved in the war in Afghanistan. However, NATO has been directly involved in post-war security operations around Kabul and, at the request of the UN, took complete control of the security operation around Kabul in August 2003. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been commanded by the SACEUR and conducted by Allied Command Operations (ACO) ever since and is in the process of deploying to locations outside of Kabul in the form of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT). This was a significant new out-of-area deployment for many European countries and for the Alliance. Third, the 9/11 attacks and what was presumed at the time to be a potential threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, both focused NATO attention more squarely on the risk that hostile states or terrorist organizations might acquire such weapons and the means to deliver them on NATO territory. As a result, new impetus was given to the Alliance’s planning for WMD operations and TMD programs. These major security developments brought renewed attention to defense spending and force planning in most of the major NATO allies, including the new members from the former Warsaw Pact. Persistent US and NATO pressure on allied defense budgets led to a small but important reversal of course in the trend toward declining budgets in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, and considerable soul-searching about defense budgets and plans in Germany. The new security issues have also intensified European concern about acquiring more modern defense technology, particularly transportation, logistics, and, especially relevant to this study, C4ISR. Balkans operations stimulated the Europeans to engage in more European-level planning for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, as they exposed severe European shortcomings in communications equipment, sensors for surveillance and reconnaissance, and data fusion. CRONOS, NATO’s Windows-based information-sharing network developed for IFOR in Bosnia, was infected with viruses. While the United States and the United Kingdom could connect to CRONOS digitally, the French and Germans had to use an analog interface, which meant slower data rates. Secure communications, especially at the tactical level, were also a problem, while communications between aircraft had to be transmitted in the clear. Interoperability was problematic; a number of ISR systems were used, including JSTARS, Nimrod, Breguet Atlantic, Horizon and C-160 aircraft, but they could not cross-transmit data – thus could not provide all allies with a common picture of the battlespace or transmit directly to strike aircraft. Finally, Europeans depended on intelligence derived from US surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The United States met 95 per cent of the allied intelligence requirements in Kosovo, but was slow to release data to coalition partners (Thomas 2000: 43–53). 95
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Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have intensified this need for greater European network-centric capability. The progress made by the US since the first Gulf War in agility, mobility, and information networking of its forces is increasingly clear. European C4ISR capabilities are significantly less capable. Moreover, despite having more than 2 million men and women under arms, the European allies still have only a small expeditionary capability, largely British and French forces. The military missions of the future, whether national, European, or transatlantic, depend on a high state of readiness, advanced logistics, networked C4ISR, and a high degree of flexibility and agility. Only US forces came close to meeting this test, with the British and French trailing and the other allies far behind. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was agreed on at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit, with the goal of addressing these capability shortfalls. The DCI identified 58 key capability shortfalls needing investment and multinational cooperation. The shortfalls were divided into five core areas: mobility and deployability; sustainability; effective engagement (the ability to engage an adversary in all types of operations from high to low intensity); survivability (ability to protect forces and infrastructure against future threats); and interoperable communications. However, the DCI lacked a common strategic orientation, provided few doctrinal and institutional links to the US force-transformation process, set no priorities, and failed to stimulate allied investment in force modernization (Gompert and Nerlich 2002: 10). The 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) were adopted to address the DCI’s failure. Initially, PCC goals numbered more than 450, including over 100 commitments related to C2 and information systems, far higher than the DCI number. However, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson identified eight as a priority focus, given their link to expeditionary operations including, in particular, C3I. The PCC particularly targeted the lack of deployable C2 facilities, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, common interoperable intelligence mechanisms and systems architecture, and the shortfalls in the communications arena to link them together. PCC were intended to provide a more measurable and reachable target for European force planning and acquisition. Some progress has been made, notably in strategic airlift and sealift. Survivability has been improved with the creation of a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense battalion under the leadership of the Czech Republic. However, in many areas related to network-based operations, results have been more modest. Even the highly successful Czech-led CBRN battalion is still struggling with problems related to communications and deployment. The Alliance took two other significant actions in Prague, with major implications for the future of the Alliance in the area of network-based capabilities: the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the creation of Allied Command Transformation, as part of a major restructuring of the NATO command structure. NATO’s new command structure is built around a single Strategic Command for Operations at SHAPE in Belgium and three subordinate operational-level joint commands in the Netherlands, Naples and Lisbon, which are intended to be the parent 96
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headquarters of three deployable CJTFs, two land-based and one sea-based. Both of these actions could provide significant incentive for the Europeans to move toward enhanced C4ISR capabilities and greater interoperability with the United States military. Although NATO has a number of common force packages and headquarters under the CJTF label, until Prague the Alliance lacked the capability to deploy a small, agile, and light intervention force, with the dedicated transport, logistics, and communications capabilities such a force needs to sustain itself. The NRF is intended to fill this gap. This force would be highly ready, available for out-of-area missions on short notice, capable of forcible entry and able to establish a foothold as the point of the spear for a larger NATO ground force to follow. In addition, the force could do non-combatant evacuations, support counterterrorism, and assist with post-conflict management. The NRF will consist of roughly 20,000 troops plus naval and air capabilities, drawn from the High Readiness Forces of the NATO members. With lift, logistics, and network-capable equipment, it could deploy within 5 days and be selfsustaining for 30. The NRF-designated forces would remain actively committed to this mission for a six-month period, at which time a new set of forces would become the NRF package, while the first group stood down and returned to a lower state of readiness. The force would train and exercise together during the highly ready period. Because of its high state of readiness, the Alliance could use the NRF more often than it might deploy its massive, heavier, slower capabilities (Binnendijk and Kugler 2002: 117–32). The NRF capability has a deeper significance. While it would be time-consuming and costly to overhaul all of European NATO’s current forces for more agile, network-based capabilities, the NRF rotation scheme provides an opportunity to cycle those forces through a period of training, readiness and stand-down, one unit at a time. After two years, it is hoped that the Europeans will provide the NRF with the “enablers” (lift, C4ISR, and logistics) currently supplied by the United States. Training European forces for agile, flexible operations and equipping them with the enablers they need, including networked C4ISR could, over time, convert existing European military capabilities to a more modern, networked force. For some supporters, NRF constitutes an intense European upgrade program by stealth (Becher 2003: 25). It is not clear that all the allies agree with this vision of the NRF. Not all are committed to cycle large elements of their land forces through the NRF and may choose, instead, to assign a smaller proportion of their forces to the NRF missions, and cycle them at a higher rate. Germany, for example, has decided to create three categories of forces, only the most highly ready of which will cycle through for the NRF. For some allies, this approach avoids the expense of upgrading all forces to NRF missions and capabilities over time. For some European allies, moreover, the relationship between the NRF and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is unclear. For some, NRF is seen as a “last chance” to work with the US military on global military challenges and engage the United States with European defense planning. For others, investment 97
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in the NRF is seen as competing with their commitment to the ERRF. Though the Alliance view is that the two are compatible, not all the allies agree. This tension over rapid reaction force planning reflects a broader uncertainty about the transatlantic defense planning relationship. There is also a difference of view over the role US forces will play in the NRF. Europeans have a strong desire for the United States to participate directly in NRF training and exercising and for US forces to be fully integrated into the NRF. American sources and initial exercises suggest that the US goal is for the NRF to become a predominantly European capability for rapid deployment, which could link up with a separate, interoperable, American force. However, this lack of joint US training with the NRF could ultimately impede the ability of the United States and NATO Europe to operate together on the battlefield (Binnendijk 2004: 3–8). These differing views have implications for the C4ISR elements of the NRF. In the all-European case, C2, communications, and sensoring assets could be entirely European, as long as the technology allowed them to plug and play with the United States, permitting the download of data, interoperable communications, and a common sense of the battlespace. The US-engaged model could provide greater incentive for both forces to develop common equipment and software to ensure that the force could operate seamlessly. The NRF clearly constitutes a major new NATO commitment. The first, test bed elements of the force were stood up only a year after Prague and have held several exercises. Full NRF operating capability is expected by the summer of 2006. The early training and exercises will test C4ISR requirements and reveal shortfalls that could provide incentive for European investment in the C4ISR arena, since the bulk of the C4ISR capability continues to be supplied by the US. The third Prague decision with important long-term implications for the transatlantic relationship in C4ISR is the restructuring of Alliance commands. The NATO command structure has now been substantially revised, with an Allied Command Operations in Europe and a new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA, with operations in Europe. The creation of ACT, combined with the change in NATO missions, puts a premium on upgrades to NATO’s C2 and communications infrastructure (Barry 2003: 4). ACT is directly responsible for transformation activities in NATO. It supports transformation planning, provides lessons learned to national planners, lobbies for NATO investment in network-centric programs, writes doctrine for networkcentric operations, and develops educational materials for NATO training activities, such as those conducted by the Joint Warfare Center in Norway. It could play a central role in supporting and reviewing national investments in network-based capabilities and supporting the active C4I program of NC3A. The commander of ACT is dual-hatted as the Joint Forces Commander of the United States, positioning ACT as a bridge between US transformation and network-centric thinking and experimentation, and European efforts (Forbes 2003: 4). European military sources have shown a high degree of interest in ACT programs and activities, seeking a high degree of participation. ACT is positioned to be an important player in NATO’s planning processes. It leads the Defense Planning Process, 98
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including the development of the Defense Requirements Review, a classified analytic assessment of the minimum military capabilities needed to meet the Alliance’s goal of carrying out up to three major joint operations simultaneously. ACT has also developed some 30 generic scenarios used to inventory capabilities. ACT’s focus on qualitative force goals could help member nations develop crucial capabilities or force attributes rather than merely reaching quantitative goals. ACT also assesses national contributions to NATO in coordination with national military authorities. In addition, it has developed a Strategic Vision for transformation and is developing concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations. As a part of its goal of driving transformation in the Alliance, ACT has worked to establish relationships with other NATO agencies, including the NC3A, the NATO Undersea Research Center, the Research and Technology Organization, and the NATO Standardization Agency, as well as NATO’s educational centers. ACT holds great promise, provided its activities are given priority in Washington, DC. The priority the US plans to give to ACT remains to be tested. In addition, ACT’s role in the allied and US defense planning, along with its ability to review national-level C4ISR programs is not yet clear. It remains to be seen whether this institutional reform creates incentives both for European force transformation and for more intense transatlantic commitments to interoperability, especially in C4ISR. NATO has taken steps since ACT to reinforce the commitment to network-based operations, especially the creation of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities project. In November 2002, the NC3B announced the intention of developing a NATO equivalent of the American NCW concept and the British NEC. The first step in this process will be a feasibility study examining the technical and organizational issues such a concept would involve in the NATO context. Led by the NC3A, with the support of ACT, this feasibility study takes a European view of transformation, using the terms “network enabled” and “capabilities” instead of the American “network-centric” and “warfare.” Rather than wait for a joint NATO agreement about the investment and organization of the NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) study, nine NATO nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed in November 2003 to jointly fund the study. Each nation has agreed to contribute 150,000 euros, for a total of 1,350,000 euros. The study has delivered a roadmap for NATO to guide the creation of a network-enabled capability for its 26 member nations. This roadmap takes into account interoperability issues, commercial and technology trends, and relevant national assets (both existing and planned). The study covered how network-enabled capabilities can be deployed by the NRF and how national information ownership issues can be overcome. With completion of the study in 2005, the NNEC concept was taken over by ACT and made part of the Command’s long-term capability development requirements, which, in turn, form the basis for future NATO procurement. In addition, ACT conducted two NNEC training courses in June and October of 2005, the second of which took place at the Command’s new C2 Center of Excellence in the Netherlands. 99
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The 2004 Istanbul NATO Summit further stressed the Alliance’s need to increase the deployability and usability of its forces, and for continuing the transformation process already underway. The final communiqué mentioned, in particular, the streamlined command arrangements – including the establishment of ACT – the NRF, and a commonly funded AGS program. The summit also committed to a project to provide guidance on improving various NATO capabilities, including operational planning and intelligence, specifically for interoperable and deployable forces able to carry out operations and operate jointly in a complex security environment.
Other multinational network programs Outside of the NATO context, several other international interoperability frameworks have been established with the aim of achieving better C4ISR coordination between the United States and its allies. These are working toward common military standards for equipment fielded by allied forces, including some NATO countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand. They include the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardization Program (ABCA), the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC), the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States Naval C4 Organization (AUSCANNZUKUS), the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB), the Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) and the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC). Another forum, known as The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is not a military standardization forum, but maintains close relationships with the other above-mentioned programs to coordinate the defense R&D efforts of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of all the above-mentioned interoperability entities, the MIC and the MIP are the only ones to include European countries other than the United Kingdom. The Multinational Interoperability Council In 1996, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States create the MIC to provide oversight of coalition interoperability and stimulate improvements among the countries most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions. Initially referred to as the Six Nation Council, the name was changed to the MIC in 1999. Later, the member states granted New Zealand and NATO ACT observer status, and in 2005 accepted Italy as the Council’s seventh member. The MIC is administered through the US Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Global Operations (J3 DDGO), to provide a multinational senior level forum for addressing the core issues affecting information interoperability between coalition forces. It is concerned with policies, doctrines, operational planning, and networking capabilities relevant to the information sharing capabilities of member states. It also serves as the senior coordinating body for the member nations in 100
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resolving interoperability issues and promotes dialogue between operational planners, C4ISR technology experts, and defense policy analysts involved in coalition operations. MIC membership includes senior operations, doctrine, and C4ISR experts from each of the member nations. It is divided into Multinational Interoperability Working Groups (MIWG), each of which explores specific problems in coalition interoperability and proposes solutions. There is no fixed number of MIWGs; they are created when problems have been identified and disbanded after their work is done. Each MIWG is comprised of representatives from the member nations, from various services and agencies, according to the needs of the group. An Executive Support Committee (EXECOM) assists the MIWGs in addressing actions in a timely fashion when it is not possible to convene a meeting of the entire MIWG. The Committee includes a representative of each member nation’s defense attaché staff in Washington, a member of the Working Group on National Correlation, and the MIC Executive Secretary (a member of the US Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I). Currently the MIC has MIWGs that focus on coalition warfare doctrine, collaborative planning, advanced C2 concepts, requirements for information exchange and the sharing of classified intelligence, secure video- and tele-conferencing, and the creation of a combined Wide Area Network known as GRIFFIN. The five existing MIWGs cover operations, networking, logistics, doctrines, plans and procedures, and concept development and experimentation. Additionally, there is a Capstone MIWG in charge of formulating the MIC’s strategic plan for the future. MIWGs generally meet twice a year. Once they propose a solution, it is passed on to the MIC, which meets annually to respond and passes its recommendations on to the member nations. The organization cannot do more than advise and report; its recommendations may or may not eventually be accepted by the member nations. The MIC also produces an annual report on policy, doctrine, and planning for warfighting interoperability. NATO’s doctrine on coalition operations is an important guide for the MIC on this matter. MIC reports to date have concentrated on lessons learned from coalition warfare exercises, specifically, East Timor and Afghanistan, on the need for better information sharing applications between the member countries, including secure tele-conferencing, video-conferencing and e-mail, and on a CoalitionBuilding Guide. The latter, signed by the members in 2005, identifies the notion of a coalition Lead Nation, defined as “that nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation” (Multinational Interoperability Council 2005: v). France has expressed concern about this definition, suggesting that circumstances may dictate the need for several Lead Nations in an operation. It also requested, with German support, that the Guide state that only the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions, a request that is not yet reflected in the final version presented in 2002. 101
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The MIC has also coordinated four Multinational Experiments (MNE) intended to contribute to the interoperability between member nations. The first such exercise, undertaken in 2001, examined how a combined joint force headquarters would conduct rapid, decisive operations within a distributed, collaborative information environment with coalition partners. MNE2 examined the development of a multinational operational net assessment, as well as coalition multinational information sharing. MNE3, in February 2004, explored concepts and supporting tools for effects-based operations and to assist the development of future processes, organizations, and technologies at the operational and joint task force levels of command. It also included NATO participation, and evaluated the ability of the NRF to support the planning of a coalition effects-based campaign. The fourth and final MNE addresses effects-based operations and C2 issues. While some view the MIC and its exercises as key tools for France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom to improve interoperability with the US it is not clear how other countries not involved in this forum will benefit from its lessons (Boyer 2004). The Combined Communications Electronics Board The CCEB includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It coordinates issues related to military communications raised by a member nation. Its origins date back to the Combined Communications Board created during the Second World War, which defined combined UK-US communications policies with Canada, Australia and New Zealand as observers. Canada became a full member in 1951, Australia in 1969, and New Zealand in 1972, when it was renamed CCEB. Germany and France recently sought membership in this organization, but both were denied. The CCEB’s mission is to maximize the effectiveness of combined operations by defining a common environment in which users can share and apply collective information and know-how. Although covering all C4 systems of the member nations, the CCEB does not own any of them. Rather, it seeks to define architectures, standards and operational procedures that its members will adopt when designing and modifying their national systems. As much as possible, these will be based on commercial standards and products. Over time, implementing the CCEB’s recommendations should improve interoperability and eventually create a virtual single system used by all members. Adopting these standards is voluntary, however, which means that interoperability will be advanced only if the nations make the decision to implement the CCEB-developed standards. The CCEB’s one permanent, full-time member of staff, the Permanent Secretary, coordinates the organization’s daily activities. All other personnel are drawn from national organizations on a part-time, temporary basis. Member nations contribute resources individually to specific tasks. The senior C4 officials, or Principals, appointed to the CCEB by the member nations are in charge of formulating the organization’s broader goals and of bringing them into national decision-making bodies. An Executive Group coordinates the development of policies and plans 102
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formulated by the Principals, and prioritizes tasks. In addition, the member nation’s representatives in Washington, DC may be tasked individually to work on CCEB assignments, as may staff members at national headquarters. The majority of the CCEB’s work is undertaken under the auspices of Working Groups, which consider specific issues raised by member nations. Currently, Working Groups are in place to discuss information security, frequency planning, directory services, wide area networks (specifically the GRIFFIN WAN), and communications publications. In addition, Task Forces may be established to address specific short-term issues; one currently deals with secure military messaging. In September 2001, the CCEB and the MIC signed a Statement of Cooperation (SOC), under which the CCEB is recognized as the expert technical body on C4 systems, while the MIC is recognized as responsible for providing leadership in joint and coalition warfare doctrine and requirements. Since the CCEB’s aim is to define a joint and combined C4 interoperability environment and to enhance interoperability among C4 systems, the SOC ensures that this goal is coordinated with efforts for developing doctrines and solutions brought forward by the MIC for information sharing between countries. Equally important, the SOC enables non-CCEB members of the MIC – Germany, Italy and France – to participate in those CCEB groups directly involved in MIC-directed activities, and to receive status updates on CCEB activities at MIC meetings. In addition, the SOC has also led to some technical MIC work being subcontracted to the CCEB. The Multilateral Interoperability Program In April 1998, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States created the MIP, merging two existing programs: the BIP (Battlefield Interoperability Program) and the QIP (Quadrilateral Interoperability Program), both of which were aimed at improving interoperability between land C2 systems. In 2002, the MIP merged with the Army Tactical Command and Control Information System (ATCCIS) program, which had been working since 1980 on technical standards and specifications for NATO members’ C2 systems to make them interoperable. In November 2003, 24 nations (Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States as full members and Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden as associate members) and two NATO commands (ACT and AFNORTH, which today is Joint Force Command Brunssum) signed a Statement of Intent to advance international interoperability of land C2 systems at all levels from corps to battalion to support multinational combined and joint operations. This goal is to be achieved through a technical interoperability solution, or baseline, that could be integrated into members’ existing C2 infrastructures. However, the program would not actually develop a common C2 system, leaving it to the members’ discretion to accept the technical solution. 103
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The MIP solution has two technical aspects: a common data model, known as the Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM), and a set of procedures and protocols that allow the replication of data among different C2 systems, known as the MIP Data Exchange Mechanism (MIPDEM). Countries that incorporate this solution into their C2 systems can share any information they choose with other nations’ C2 systems over any means of communication available. The British, Canadian, Danish, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, and US armies’ C2 systems have to date been certified as MIP conformant, and more are expected to follow. In 2004, NATO adopted the MIP’s C2IEDM data model, which signified the increasing importance and acceptation of the MIP as a standard-setting entity. It seems increasingly likely that the MIP solution will have a significant influence on the development and design of future national systems. These solutions, however, are not “plug-and-play” solutions. In order to ensure true semantic interoperability, far-reaching modifications to the core of national C2 information systems are necessary rather than just the addition of mapping adapters as new interfaces to the existing systems (Schmitt 2005: 2). The Combined Endeavor exercises As another multilateral effort, the Headquarters of the US European Command (EUCOM) sponsors and coordinates a multinational command, control, communications and computer (C4) exercise known as Combined Endeavor. Its aim is to develop C2 and communications interoperability in preparation for crisis response operations by testing and documenting solutions that may then be integrated into national systems. The exercise has been held every year since 1995; each builds on the capabilities demonstrated and lessons learned during the previous one. The exercises also include demonstrations of emerging C4 technologies developed by a nation or group of nations that may in the future contribute to coalition interoperability solutions. Combined Endeavor has grown from its first exercise in 1995. That exercise included some 3,300 interoperability tests conducted by 10 participating nations during a 2-week period in Germany and Austria. In 2005, the exercise included 43 partner nations and 2 multinational organizations (NATO and the South East Europe Brigade), all testing advanced systems and networks. The 2005 exercise included over 15,000 interoperability tests, including a 1-gigabyte core communications backbone between several nodes, used to transmit voice, video and data. A Combined Joint Communications Coordination Center was stood up to demonstrate the effectiveness of network management procedures for multinational networks. The 2005 exercise also put all participating nations through the US and NATO network security accreditation process prior to connecting to the network, demonstrating the capability to build a protected coalition network, a significant achievement in the field of information assurance. At the end of each exercise, the results are documented in an interoperability guide that codifies the results from all interoperability tests, down to the level 104
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of wiring diagrams for specific systems. This information is crucial to planning future multinational network-based operations. It enables forces to plug and play based on proven results. Interoperability solutions that have emerged from past Combined Endeavor exercises have been used to support military, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in the Balkans, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia and Liberia. The Combined Endeavor exercise is an important tool for highlighting the benefits of networks in modern security operations. Participants observe first-hand how advanced C4 capabilities can make them more interoperable and, thus, more effective in a multinational environment. By involving not only EU and NATO members but also allies from other regions such as South Africa and Central Asia, the importance of networking, C4 and coalition interoperability is conveyed to a wide array of potential coalition partners.
Conclusion As an organization, NATO has clearly moved strongly to advance the Alliance’s C4ISR capabilities into the twenty-first century and has taken multiple steps to incentivize its members to move in this direction. While the traditional NATO force planning methods do not yet fully support this effort, the decision to create the NRF could constitute a major step toward a transformed capability. NATO common programs for C2 and communications, including space communications, are being modernized. Several new R&T investment programs hold promise for a move toward a more integrated C2, communications, and sensor data architecture, including ACCS, AGS, TMD, and CAESAR. Finally, the Prague decisions (PCC, NRF, and ACT) all could help redefine alliance capabilities and restructure European member state investments. This is, however, a more fragile trend than it appears. Should US force planning and investment continue to be largely unilateral, conducted outside the Alliance framework, the transatlantic C4ISR gap will be harder to bridge. In 2002, for example, John Stenbit, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, suggested this might be a preferred US policy, noting that interoperability is “best thought of in bilateral and multilateral relations, not alliances.” He added that “the dynamics of how these communities of interest are going to form and un-form, and around which changing sets of parameters, are quicker than the processes that NATO considers when looking forward” (Stenbit 2002: 85–92). For NATO to continue to play a key role in the process of reshaping European C4ISR capabilities, the US will need to put interoperability at the center of its C4ISR planning process, which is not currently the case. NATO interoperability features in US equipment designs tend to be removed when programs are trimmed to meet budget constraints, and the key performance parameter now included in most American systems is interoperability within US forces, not with NATO (Barry 2003: 9). The US will need to give ACT priority as the bridge to European capabilities. US funding decisions with respect to ACCS, AGS, or TMD can either 105
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strengthen or weaken efforts to create a common European C4ISR architecture. The US staying at the margin of the NRF could also undermine European willingness to invest seriously in that effort. A US decision to delay, diminish, or cancel the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which has significant transatlantic participation, could have a major impact on the willingness of the European allies to commit to common programs. Finally, continuing US unwillingness to reform its export control and technology transfer rules will weaken the incentive European allies have to commit to transatlantic collaborative technology programs, inside or outside NATO. There could also be trends in European policies that weaken the role of NATO in enhancing transatlantic C4ISR interoperability and the move toward networked capabilities. While the European Union’s defense activities (discussed in the next chapter) are not as advanced as the changes in NATO, if the EU moves toward a vision and capabilities that are separate from NATO, it could undermine the NATO effort. There are important, positive reasons for the Europeans to create more autonomous European capabilities, but it will also be important to manage the evolution of the EU-NATO relationship so progress can continue in both frameworks. Furthermore, whether through the European Union or NATO, a failure to provide adequate European investment in C4ISR or to continue funding for PCC priorities, and ACCS, AGS and TMD programs could weaken the NATO effort and interoperability in general. Finally, national investments in Europe need to give continued priority to interoperability, within Europe and across the Atlantic, for the effort to succeed. In addition to NATO, the US and the Europeans need to be sure to rationalize and give appropriate attention to work in the other multinational frameworks that address specific areas of C4ISR interoperability. All of the frameworks discussed in this chapter involve the United States as a key participant, and place great emphasis on transatlantic interoperability issues. However, with the exception of the MIC and the MIP, none involve European partners other than the United Kingdom. The MIC analyzes policies, doctrines and procedures for coalition interoperability, and the MIP, with a much broader membership base, is limited to specific command and control solutions for land forces. Neither deals with technical solutions to broad interoperability challenges. Furthermore, the denial of membership to France and Germany could set back transatlantic collaboration on standards, architectures and protocols for interoperability between national C4ISR systems. This leaves two of the three European militaries currently capable of executing out-of-area security operations outside the interoperability loop.
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Defense and security issues have emerged as a major concern for the European Union over the past decade, stimulated and accelerated by the lessons Europeans have learned from the interoperability difficulties experienced by European forces operating in the first Gulf War, Bosnia, the Kosovo air campaign, Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of these lessons involve obstacles to achieving successful C4ISR interoperability. Increasingly, major European militaries feel the need for a common rapid deployment military capability that can operate autonomously, using its own dedicated equipment, transport and C4ISR, or borrowing NATO assets. Slowly steps are being taken to make this intention a reality, including internal developments in the European Union and the negotiation of the “Berlin Plus” agreement with NATO, which gives the European Union recourse to NATO assets to carry out crisis management operations when NATO is not involved. During 2003–4, the European Union took significant strides forward in developing operational capability and conducting strategic defense planning. It conducted independent policing operations in Bosnia, a military peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, and a small peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Operation Artemis, in the Congo, became a model for the creation of the EU Battlegroups one year later (see below). In December 2004, the European Union Force (EUFOR) replaced the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) as the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the area of strategic defense planning, the European Council decided in 2004 to focus on defense planning outside the framework of its Constitution discussion, and accelerated the establishment of a European-level agency responsible for armaments policy and oversight on the capabilities process. The European Union also announced the Headline Goal 2010, which builds on the Helsinki Headline Goal, expanding and deepening EU commitments to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities with a strong emphasis on interoperability, deployability, and sustainability. In the same year, the Council announced a plan to create 13 EU Battlegroups, at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. The failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands has not impeded progress towards these improved European defense capabilities. It seems clear the many of the EU members are seeking ways to participate more 107
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effectively in overseas military operations, including combat, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction, both autonomously and in coalition with the United States, regardless of the uncertainties of the EU constitutional process. Such operations will require new assets for rapid force deployment, and, especially, systems that will enable these forces to collect intelligence, share it amongst themselves and with headquarters, and act upon it in a coordinated manner.
EU strategic defense plans and capabilities European-level strategic thinking and defense planning have made significant strides since the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991 (Adams 2001a). Initially, European militaries and defense budgets shrank with the end of the Cold War, as they did in the United States. Several changes marked turning points for Europe. The Maastricht Treaty committed the European Union’s Members States to forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and created the Second Pillar in the European Union, involving political and security issues. The European Council – representing the Member States – would handle this on an intergovernmental basis. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, went a step further, defining the CFSP as “including the progressive framing of a common defense policy … which might lead to a common defense” (European Union 2002: Article 1-12-4). The European Rapid Reaction Force and the Battlegoups In 1999, the European Council meeting in Cologne set a European Union goal of having the capacity for independent action in the form of capable military forces and the means to use these forces in response to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. That same year in Helsinki, the European Council crafted an EU Headline Goal to create a force of 50,000–60,000 troops that could be deployed within 60 days and supported in theater for a year. The mission of this force would be what was called the Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and operations of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This range of missions was defined at a WEU declaration made in Petersberg, Germany in June 1992, and was codified in the Amsterdam Treaty. To oversee this work, the European Union created the Political and Security Committee. The PSC would consider and act on foreign policy and security issues and manage crisis interventions. The Union also created a Military Committee consisting of senior officers from the Member States, which has responsibility for military planning, and a Military Staff of roughly 150 based in Brussels to examine and shape military requirements for the Headline Goal force. The European Union then inventoried European national military capabilities relevant to the Headline Goal, and set objectives to meet inventory shortfalls, held Capability Improvement Conferences to track commitments, and created the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) with nationally-led working groups 108
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to develop strategies for meeting key shortfalls. At the Laeken, Belgium meeting in December 2002, the Council declared that the European Union had achieved the capability to conduct some crisis management operations. The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that emerged from this Headline Goal process is committed to missions that are somewhat different from those defined for the NATO Response Force. The NRF is intended to be lighter and more rapidly deployable for early arrival in out-of-area missions, while the ERRF is largely intended for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. This distinction between the Petersberg tasks and high-intensity combat has been a gray area in the European defense discussion. To some supporters, the European Union’s ERRF was distinct from a European high-intensity, networkbased military capability, while to others, the higher end of the Petersberg tasks overlapped with high intensity combat and would require a network-based capability. With respect to C4ISR and network-based operations, this distinction may not be significant. Any EU force that is intended to operate on a coalition basis will require C2 systems that cover the entire force. Whether it is heavy and slow or light and mobile, the utility of ISR systems for the total force is unarguable. The European Union’s review of capabilities and the goals being set clearly point toward more network-centric forces. Moreover, while the European Union can make use of both national (currently German, British, and French; possibly Greek and Italian in the near future) and NATO operational headquarters (the latter under the Berlin Plus agreement) for controlling its missions, these assets are not mobile. European military planners are aware that a future ERRF would need dedicated mobile C2 and communications systems to deploy in the field. The European Union’s ability to deploy small and effective response forces has been further enhanced by a separate EU decision to create smaller, mobile Battlegroups. This decision began with a 2003 Franco-British agreement, according to which they would encourage the European Union to develop a capability that could respond more rapidly than the emerging ERRF with particular attention to the readiness, deployability, interoperability, and sustainability of such a force. This goal was further elaborated in London in November 2003, the objective being a 1,500-person EU force built on the model of Operation Artemis, which could deploy in 15 days, with appropriate transportation and sustainability. Increasingly, officials working on the European Constitution realized that the Headline Goal force would only get part of the way toward the objective of rapid reaction and out-of-area operations (European Union 2003). The text of the European Union’s draft constitution pointed toward a more ambitious European security strategy. The final report of the Convention’s working group on defense called not only for the Headline Goal force, but also for “smaller rapid response elements with very high readiness,” including C2, intelligence, and reconnaissance (European Convention Working Group – Defense 2002: 5). The working group also recommended that the Petersberg tasks be updated and broadened to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilization and support for anti-terrorism operations in non109
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European Union countries. It urged Members States to implement more intense defense cooperation than that provided for in the Headline Goal force (European Convention Working Group – Defense 2002: 23–4). The 2004 Constitutional Treaty itself repeated many of these themes. It amended the Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, provision of military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, crisis management, peacemaking and postconflict stabilization. It also tasked the proposed European Armaments, Research, and Military Capabilities Agency – today’s European Defense Agency – with helping to identify the military capability objectives of the Member States and evaluate them (European Union 2004). At the November 2004 EU Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, the members moved even further, announcing the intention to create EU Battlegroups, each numbering 1,500 ground troops. These will be smaller in scope than the ERRF but are intended to correct some of its shortcomings, especially the need for more rapid deployment. The Battlegroups are planned to reach the theater of operations in 15 days and sustain an operation for 30 days (120 days with rotation). France, the UK, and Italy each pledged to have one operational Battlegroup ready by the end of 2005. Ten other Battlegroups will be developed collaboratively by different combinations of EU Member States, and one will include Norway, a non-EU member. These Battlegroups are intended to be operational by 2007, by which time the European Union should be able to undertake two concurrent Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations. The European Defense Agency The constitutional discussion focused particular attention on the need for a more focused EU capability to deal with military requirements, the evolution of capabilities to meet those requirements, and the readiness of the European defense industrial and technology base to cope with those needs. The Convention recommended the creation of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency to track progress toward the interoperability and force readiness necessary to accomplish the wider missions they were promoting (European Convention Working Group – Defense 2002: 23–4). In 2003, this particular proposal was advanced on a separate track, largely supported by French and British government policies. The EU Council of Ministers decided to ask the Council staff to plan the implementation of the European Defense Agency well ahead of the schedule for ratifying and implementing the proposals for a new EU constitutional charter. The mission of the agency was elaborated in detail in November 2003, including operational requirements, strengthening the defense industrial and technological base, defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and helping the Council evaluate the improvement of military capabilities. The Council decision created an Agency Establishment Team under High Representative Javier Solana to present proposals by April 2004 for decisions in June. Those proposals were intended to move the EDA issue onto a fast track, 110
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covering the structure and organization of the agency, its internal working methods, its working relationship with the Council and the Commission, ties with the Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere d’Armament (OCCAR) and the Western European Union (WEU) R&D programs (see below), its budget, administration and staffing. It was also to outline a first operational program for the agency in the fields of capabilities development, armaments cooperation, industrial and technology base policy, research promotion, and potential plans for creating a European defense market. The Establishment Team of 12, led by British civil servant Nick Witney, began work in February 2004. Its proposals moved toward creating a relatively small agency, directed by a steering committee of ministers of defense, and funded by joint contributions to an administrative fund. They discussed creating a second funding arrangement in the European Union for defense R&T studies, and only the gradual absorption of existing multilateral procurement activities, such as OCCAR (Tigner 2004: 4). The Agency came into existence in the summer of 2004. Despite a modest 2005 budget of 25 million euros and a staff of 78, the EDA has made important progress in the first year, particularly in areas relevant to network-based operations. Two “flagship projects” have been initiated in the C4ISR realm. The first, undertaken by the Agency’s R&T Directorate, funds projects related to long-endurance UAVs (described later in this chapter). The second, headed by the Capabilities Directorate, seeks to improve European capabilities and interoperability in command, control and communications. Initially, a joint EDA-EU Military Staff study identified a wide range of C3I capability gaps. Many were characterized as “deriving from the absence of any detailed assessment of overall C3 requirements for ESDP, or coherent architectures for satisfying them” (Council of the European Union 2005: 4). The study also highlighted the potential of software-defined radio for C3 interoperability, and submitted a detailed proposal for pursuing additional C3 work to the Capabilities Steering Board. While the overall direction of EDA’s C3I agenda is still evolving, it is likely to include specific problems in ongoing EU operations (such as Operation Althea in Bosnia) and the needs of the emerging Battlegroups. In addition, the agenda may explore improvements in EU procurement of satellite bandwidth for future operations (House of Lords 2005: 21).
Focusing on capabilities Despite these recent developments, there is not currently a joint, multinational force at the European level that can field common C4ISR assets and carry out fully network-based operations. It is not yet clear whether the Member States will commit the resources needed to upgrade and integrate the national capabilities already described. Despite the budgetary constraints that make such a capability difficult, there is an active process underway at the European level to give Member States the incentive to modernize and transform forces and equipment to make them more interoperable. 111
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The Headline Goal and the European Capabilities Action Plan have identified capability shortfalls and set priorities for meeting them. The initial Headline Goal and evaluation processes through 2001 identified 19 critical shortfalls and a process for meeting shortfalls. The ECAP panels, each chaired by a Member State, include eight capabilities relevant to network-based operations: UAVs for surveillance and target acquisition; deployable communications modules; headquarters; theater surveillance and reconnaissance air picture; strategic ISR IMINT collection; HALE/MALE UAVs; early warning; and distant detection at the strategic level. This first stage of the ECAP process led to reports submitted in March 2003, proposing changes to national contributions or new acquisitions to fill the capability gaps. The May 2003 Capabilities Conference then identified ten groups to develop strategies for filling key shortfalls through acquisition, leasing, multinational projects, or role specialization, three of which deal with C4ISR capabilities: headquarters (United Kingdom lead), UAVs (French lead), and space-based assets (French lead). The weakness of the ECAP process is that it is voluntary and not clearly linked to funding decisions or coordinated with the EU Military Staff. The ECAP groups could not design long-term procurement plans, as national planners and procurement specialists were not members. Proposed acquisitions faced major political and financial hurdles. Moreover, ECAP was designed in the context of the Headline Goal target, and was not linked to the rapid deployment Battlegroups discussed above. The European Council decided in November 2003 to tighten the process, develop a clear roadmap and begin to identify objectives, timelines, and reporting procedures for each group. Progress has been made since, with respect to headquarters, medical treatment facilities, and nuclear, chemical and biological defenses. However, the ECAP process continues to lack clear leadership and coordination. The ECAP approach leaves it up to the Member States to decide when and how additional capabilities should be acquired and makes it difficult to achieve results in areas that require significant financial investments such as strategic lift and air-to-air refueling. Pressure on the members was increased by requiring them to set goals and timelines and to publish their results in regular Capability Improvement Charts, presented during each rotating EU Presidency. Progress remains minimal, however, particularly in areas relevant for network-based operations. There are currently no new or planned projects growing out of the ECAP process and a number of the ECAP Project Groups have indicated that they have reached or are close to reaching the maximum possible results within the current framework. In May 2005, the European Council approved an EDA/EU Military Committee evaluation report on the ECAP. The report included a detailed review of the ECAP Project Groups and suggested refocusing their work in the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal. The Project Group on interoperability for humanitarian and evacuation operations will be discontinued, while those on Special Forces and helicopters will continue in their present format. All others will be incorporated into a new, more integrated process coordinated by the European Defense Agency 112
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in the framework of broader European Security and Defense Policy goals. Under newly established Integrated Development Teams, military, technological, and industrial representatives will generate specific projects to fulfill capability shortfalls. Together with the newly outlined Headline Goal 2010, this revised process may provide incentives for Member States to reaffirm their ECAP commitments.
Industrial base planning Over the past 15 years, the national governments and Commission of the European Union have taken several steps to advance the issue of a Europe-wide armaments policy, to match the emerging force requirements and to ensure a healthy industrial and technology base. The creation of the EDA’s Industry and Market Directorate is the latest such step. From the perspective of the defense industrial and technology base, the Europeans have three options for arming national or cross-national forces, with particular attention to their interoperability. They could acquire advanced defense technology from the United States, which was common during the Cold War. Buying American, however, is increasingly unattractive to European governments, given the lack of reciprocal access for European firms to the US defense market, the difficulties encountered with US export control and technology transfer regulations and processes, and the negative impact it would have on the smaller European industrial and technology base (Adams 2001b: 30–4). The second option is to develop defense systems and technologies on a transatlantic basis. US trade and technology transfer rules make this difficult, though the European industry is pursuing this option, as the strategic partnership of EADS and Northrop Grumman and the Thales Raytheon Systems joint venture suggest. However, European firms and governments have been concerned that their smaller firms could be swallowed up by larger American partners and about the risk that technology would flow only one way: from Europe to the United States. The third option is for Europeans to strengthen their own defense industrial and technology base, to be able to supply their own defense technology independently of the United States as well as to build partnerships with – and create competition for – US companies. There has been growing support in Europe for this third option. To sustain a European defense industrial and technology base, however, requires removing the intra-European barriers to industry relations, technology transfer, defense trade, and cross-national acquisition. The policy developments of the past decade at the European level are slowly defining a more trans-European defense market. The most important change has been the development of multilateral institutions and processes that facilitate a trans-European defense market and cooperative defense procurement. The creation of the European Defense Agency could be a critical breakthrough, empowering the European Union to become a player in armaments policy, a role previously constrained by the terms of the European Union treaties (Schmitt 2003a, 2003b). 113
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The emergence of a European armaments market and matching policy is likely to be critical to the prospects for success in the ECAP and in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The harmonization of military requirements, the standardization of equipment to meet those requirements, the elimination of acquisition and research redundancies, budgetary savings and greater interoperability could all flow from this development. Efforts to create a defense industrial policy at the EU level, to harmonize rules governing requirements and defense trade, to create a framework for cross-European defense acquisition programs, and to create EU-level structures that can deal with arms market policies will all contribute to reaching these goals. This industrial and technology base process has been underway for nearly a decade, but progress has been marked in recent years. In 1996, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom created a Joint Armaments Cooperation Organization (known by its French acronym: OCCAR, for Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere d’Armament) to manage specific cross-European defense programs, including the HOT, Roland, and Milan missiles, the Tiger helicopter, and, recently, the A400M transport aircraft. OCCAR is based on intergovernmental agreements and has been restricted to joint production programs, not research and development. Although OCCAR is not an EU entity, as interest has grown in an EU-level armaments policy, other European Union members have joined (Belgium) or intend to do so (Spain, Netherlands, Sweden). The organization achieved independent legal status in 2001. In 1998, the six largest arms producing countries (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Spain) signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) to address jointly a number of areas of policy that would facilitate a more trans-European defense market for European industry. The LOI process, which follows a Framework Agreement announced in 2001, covers security of defense supply, export control processes, security of information, military research and technology, technical information, and harmonization of military requirements. This process is also outside the European Union framework and clearly intergovernmental; it creates no new European-level structures or organizations. The goal is to make national rules and procedures in these areas compatible with each other, not to harmonize all standards or policies. Though the process is slow and laborious, it does put the national bureaucracies of six countries into a working process with each other in an effort to define policies that will integrate the European defense market. Interest in armaments policy has also developed inside the European Union itself. Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty provides that “any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms, munitions and war material” (European Commission 2004: 6). European Union members referred to this Article for years to protect national industrial and technology base decisions from being part of the EU agenda. In 1995, however, the EU Council of Ministers took a limited first step toward addressing these concerns, creating a working group on Armaments Policy (POLARM). POLARM
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activity remained limited until the early 2000s, when a broader interest in this policy area emerged in Europe (Schmitt 2003b: 32). The European Commission, the EU’s supranational secretariat, has also had an interest in armaments policy, despite the reluctance of the members to become more active in this area. Since 2000, the Commission has had direct authority over dual-use export controls in the European Union, though national governments continue to define the contents of the control list through negotiations, and retain authority over purely military exports. The Commission has also begun trying to shape broader armaments and defense market policies (European Commission 1997, 2003a) and has also encouraged private sector activities that would support the emergence of a stronger European Union policy in this area (European Commission 2002). The Commission also plays a more direct role in the area of dual-use space programs such as Galileo, as discussed in the next chapter. The Commission has been particularly concerned with the question of how to enhance interoperability. The STAR 21 report, sponsored by the Commission in 2002, focused on the goal of enhancing European interoperability, both in the EU and NATO contexts, and ensuring European autonomy from the United States, if needed. The report pointed out that to be interoperable with the US or act autonomously, EU military requirements needed to he harmonized and R&D shared at a European level (European Commission 2002: 29–30). The Commission’s 2003 communication on armaments policy argued strongly for a “genuine European Defense Equipment Market” to provide economies of scale, greater acquisition bargaining power and, especially, to meet the needs of interoperability. To achieve interoperability in a cost-effective way, the Commission argued, “the solution would be to equip the national units that make up these forces increasingly with the same equipment” (European Commission 2003a: 6). Progress toward a coherent EU policy on armaments and greater interoperability, and modern C4ISR across European forces will be slow at the European level. The European Defense Agency will play a critical role, defining capabilities goals more broadly than the Headline Goal, devoting attention to network-centric C4ISR capabilities, supporting research efforts to support those goals, encouraging national governments to realign their budgets to acquire key technologies and systems, coordinating national acquisitions, and providing a central point for the realignment of the European defense market. The EDA authority remains limited, but, over time, it could develop the capabilities needed to perform these tasks at the European level, as other EU-level policy institutions have done in the past. The EU process is largely an intergovernmental one, and has led to relatively slow policy change. The Member States will inevitably restrain EDA’s activity. To be fully effective, it will need greater autonomy and a larger budget. The linkages between its capabilities functions, its evaluation functions, its research support, and its procurement functions will need to be clarified. The relationship with the Commission, which manages its own armaments research policy process and has explicit responsibilities for industrial, research, competition, and trade policy, will need to be carefully defined. Harmonizing its relationship with the
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non-EU processes and organizations – OCCAR and the LOI – will be complex. But the first steps toward greater European-level responsibilities for defense and armaments policy have clearly been taken.
Defense research and technology programs The European defense research and technology investment and harmonization of national R&T investments will be key to achieving greater interoperability and networked forces, without major additional budget expenditures. The United States outspends the European NATO allies by a ratio of 5:1 on total defense R&D, a ratio that has grown with the increases in US defense budgets in the early 2000s. The United States R&T investment has also explicitly focused on networkcentric technologies, military transformation, and C4ISR. By contrast, European R&T investments remain largely national, duplicative, and poorly coordinated across national boundaries, making the total less than the sum of its parts. The general view in Europe is that most EU Member States underspend on research and development. In 2002, the European Council set a goal of spending three per cent of GDP on R&D in each Member State by 2010. At current growth rates, the EU average will reach only 2.3 per cent by that year. Only two European countries, Sweden and Finland, currently spend above the 3 per cent target, and the European Union average is still just under 2 per cent (compared to 2.7 per cent in the United States) (European Commission 2003c: 48, 52). In defense R&D, the trend is even less promising. In 2001, the Member States of the European Union spent slightly over $9 billion on defense-related R&D, or 7.5 per cent of the average defense budget (compared with almost 14 per cent of the US defense budget in the same year) (Adams et al. 2004: 122). Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty has made it difficult for the European Commission to address the R&D problem, restricting Commission action to cases where trade policies or dual-use R&D investments distorted the operations of the civilian common market. Moreover, due to the sensitivity of the issue for some Member States, the Commission intervened reluctantly and slowly. As a result, defense research and technology investments have remained a domain for the Member States, with relatively little cooperation in the EU context (James and Gummett 1998). The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) program of the WEU has been a major exception at the European-level. WEAG was created when the WEU absorbed the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), which between 1976 and 1992 had acted as an armaments procurement cooperation forum for all of the European NATO countries (except Iceland). Since its establishment, WEAG, which has 19 members, has stimulated collaborative defense R&T programs among its member countries, and has examined the harmonization of defense requirements and opening national defense markets to European-wide competition. Separately, an agreement, the System Of Cooperation for Research And Technology in Europe (SOCRATE), was created in 1998 to enable Finland and Sweden – at that time not WEAG members – to participate in WEAG R&D projects. Later, SOCRATE 116
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was amended to allow the participation of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The annual WEAG budget has averaged about 100 million euros in recent years. WEAG defense technology R&T is handled under Panel II of the organization (Panel I being concerned with cooperative equipment procurement, and Panel II with policies and procedures to enhance collaboration). Under this panel there exist several instruments for collaborative R&T. WEAG Panel II’s first instrument, formed in 1989, was European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense (EUCLID). EUCLID supports projects proposed by government representatives that are jointly funded by the participating governments and the private sector. The work is carried out by an industrial consortium including at least one company from each of the participating nations. EUCLID covers 13 Common European Priority Areas (CEPA) of technology. These include such network-oriented technologies as UAVs and robotics, military space, and advanced communications. Each CEPA has its own Lead Nation appointed by WEAG Panel II, responsible for reporting on its activities, and an industrial team of leading companies. The second WEAG instrument is the Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science (THALES). Signed in November 1996, THALES facilitates cooperation between government-owned or sponsored defense research agencies, although governments may choose to designate a private-sector entity to undertake work on specific projects. The collaborative projects in the THALES framework are Joint Programs (JP) established within the EUCLID CEPAs in a manner identical to the way EUCLID collaborations are formed. Each of the participants in the JP is responsible for placing contracts or making arrangements at the national level. A third mechanism, EUROFINDER, allows industry to propose R&D projects and receive co-funding for them. Proposals need not be associated with any particular WEAG CEPA, but since they address national defense R&T strategies, they are often aligned with government technology priorities. Once a year, the WEAG members receive and evaluate proposals from industry. Each EUROFINDER program is co-funded by the governments that wish to participate and by the industrial participants. The work is carried out by industrial consortia including at least one company from each of the nations that take part in the program. Since the start of the EUROFINDER program in 1996, 188 proposals have been received, of which about half were funded. The final WEAG mechanism, the European Understandings for Research Organization, Programs and Activities (EUROPA), was created in May 2001. It enables any two or more signatories to propose the creation of a European Research Grouping (ERG) to carry out one or more individual or collaborative R&T projects with a relatively larger degree of flexibility than that offered by the EUCLID or THALES. The first ERG was created by 14 countries in late 2001 but membership in ERGs varies. EUROPA also requires WEAG members to provide regular information on the areas of defense R&T in which they are prepared to cooperate. This information is then used by WEAG to identify opportunities for cooperation and to flag duplicative work being undertaken. 117
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WEAG has succeeded in providing a discussion forum on European armaments cooperation. Since its Member States each have an equal vote, countries with strong defense industries cannot impose their goals on the others. In terms of actual R&T projects, however, WEAG’s accomplishments are more modest. Its membership includes both producer and consumer countries with different requirements and technological capabilities, and decisions must be taken by consensus. Projects that benefit only a small number of countries, such as those related to power projection or technologies for out-of-theater operations, do not have priority (Assembly of WEU: 2002). The Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO) also operates under the WEU framework. Created in 1996, WEAO provides administrative support to the WEAO Board of Directors and WEAG Panel II and legal assistance for countries signing R&T collaboration agreements for specific WEAG projects. WEAO can implement WEAG decisions on defense R&T because it has the authority and the necessary legal power to place contracts. By 2001, it had facilitated the creation of 120 projects with a total of 500 million euros in funding (WEAG 2002). In April 2005, the Steering Board of the European Defense Agency agreed that the EDA will gradually absorb the activities of the WEAG and WEAO, in particular those covering R&T. The hope is to make defense R&T more costeffective and tie it more closely to the capabilities needed for the European Security and Defense Policy. At the same time, the EDA Steering Board approved a set of principles governing the Agency’s R&T functions, including plans to establish networks of government, research center, industry and international experts bodies to collaborate in specific areas. In July of 2005, the Agency’s R&T Directorate announced that it had selected two critical technology areas involving long-endurance UAVs for which it intends to contract out initial technology demonstration studies with 2005 budget funds. The two areas – survivability and digital data links – were chosen by national experts as covering critical gaps not addressed by ongoing European UAV programs. In addition, more than ten other critical technology areas identified by national experts may be addressed separately as ad hoc cooperation projects by Member States, by future EDA-funded studies, or under industry initiatives. Despite the limitation in Article 296, the European Commission has also begun to be a major player in European-level R&D. Since 1983, the Commission has managed its own civilian collaborative R&D program: the Framework Program (FP). The FP is now in its sixth round of 4-year funding cycles, with 17.5 billion euros committed to fund projects between 2003 and 2006. Firms, universities, or government agencies wishing to receive FP funding create R&D consortia (made up of a minimum of three partners, at least two from European Member States) and submit joint project ideas in response to Commission calls for proposals. The consortia may also include participants from various non-EU states (Associated States), such as Switzerland, Norway and Israel, which have signed collaboration agreements with the EC. The Commission funds 50 per cent of the project costs. FP projects can currently only cover civilian technologies, though these very often include research with dual-use or military 118
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applications, such as aerospace, energy (including nuclear energy), life sciences and information technologies. In the first annual work program for FP6, announced in 2002, proposals were requested in intelligent vehicles and aircraft, interoperable information and communications networks, end-to-end SATCOM systems, and data fusion, among others. It has been estimated that approximately one-third of the projects funded by FPs could be considered as dual-use projects (European Commission 1996). Thales, EADS, British Aerospace, and many other European defense firms are active participants in these FP projects. In 2003, the Commission moved more directly into the defense-related research arena, announcing the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) as its contribution to the EU goal of addressing key security challenges. Between 2004 and 2006, the PASR focused on bridging the gap between civilian research supported by the Framework Program, and national and intergovernmental defense programs. Funding for the PASR combined Commission funds, national ministerial budgets (defense and non-defense), and industry contributions. After two calls for proposals, the Commission invested approximately 30 million euros in 24 security research projects covering border and coastal surveillance, aviation security, detection of biological and chemical agents, situational awareness, securing critical infrastructures and satellite intelligence. Though relatively modest in scope and size, the PASR nevertheless represents an important first step for the Commission as it begins to initiate and oversee multinational security R&T activities and link them with its overall R&T activities. With the seventh Framework Program, starting in 2007, the Commission will include security space and homeland security research and development as parts of its portfolio for the first time. As in prior programs, every Member State will contribute to the overall budget, but the Commission will allocate funds for specific projects, following the FP guidelines. FP7 may differ from its predecessors, however, in having a proposed duration of seven years and an annual budget of over 10 billion euros. Moreover, while there have been Commission investments in defense- and security-related research through dual-use and specific civilian projects, setting aside specific funds (proposed at 570 million euros annually) for such fields as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents could be an important first step in the development of a European-wide security capability.
Conclusion The European Union is starting to emerge as an increasingly important context for European planning with regard to expeditionary operations, military capabilities, defense procurement, industrial policy, and research and technology investment, all with direct relevance to strengthening European C4ISR capabilities. While the European-level agenda does not explicitly focus on C4ISR interoperability as a priority target, the planning and investment choices being made point inexorably in that direction. 119
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The primary weaknesses of the ERRF – swift deployability and the capacity to conduct high-intensity operations – have been addressed through the creation of the Battlegroups, which are coming into existence quickly. C4ISR will be a critical element in the ability of these Battlegroups to operate, either in coalition with or autonomously from the United States. The creation and rapid institutionalization of the European Defense Agency is a key development. It reports directly to the European Council and has taken on critical functions in the emerging European defense identity. The EDA promises to give more attention to a capabilities process that had begun to lag, and is positioned to combine that process with its focus on the industrial and technology base. It has singled out two critical C4ISR shortfalls – long-endurance UAVs and C3 systems – a decision that holds promise for Europe’s future ability to carry out network-based operations. Moreover, projects can move ahead in the EDA framework without requiring the agreement of all the Member States, avoiding the problem of the “lowest common denominator” common to other European efforts. There has also been significant progress at the European level in the areas of industrial policy and security-related research and technology investment. The European Defense Agency and the European Commission have both initiated important collaborative security R&T programs involving key private sector actors. The consolidation of WEAG and WEAO programs into the EDA will allow a tighter focus on the needs of the emerging European defense capability. Within this general strengthening of European-level institutions and planning processes related to defense, C4ISR cannot help but emerge as a central issue and funding priority. It will be critical to allowing the Europeans to mount a capability that can operate both in coalition with the United States and on its own.
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From command and control through military communications and intelligence gathering to weapons targeting, space-based systems have become a key part of a nation’s military capabilities. Space systems are increasingly important for monitoring potential threats, managing military forces, and carrying out combat operations. They are being closely integrated into the military C4ISR architecture, both in Europe and the United States. Furthermore, military space capabilities are increasingly dependent on the private sector. While the Cold War years were characterized by largely military activity in space, the 1990s witnessed a surge of private sector pursuits, and commercial space launches began to exceed national security missions. Today, government agencies worldwide are contracting space programs and services out to companies and multinational consortia, and relying on multiple commercial contractors and sub-contractors for their space programs. In addition, many existing space assets and launch vehicles are now owned by private firms or international entities rather than by countries (Krepon 2003: 8– 9). US military forces are highly dependent on space assets for pre-conflict global awareness and planning, for communications, and for combat operations. Increasingly, European countries are also relying on space assets and are researching, testing, and deploying them as central ingredients of national and trans-European military capabilities. In addition, European space programs are increasingly based on cross-national cooperation, achieving a degree of interoperability through nonNATO agreements and arrangements. Space is a significant European security and dual-use investment that could, over time, enhance European autonomy from US defense operations and increase trans-European interoperability, while providing nodes for transatlantic interoperability as well. It is not clear, however, whether the trans-national European capability will be Europe-wide or be restricted to a few dominant players in the European space arena.
The role of space systems Space-based assets are able to provide unimpeded, continuous and persistent coverage of large areas of the globe. This provides a significant advantage when undertaking expeditionary warfare, combating terrorism, WMD counter121
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proliferation and disaster management. Embedding space assets in a joint and networked manner can link headquarters and units both at home and in the field without geographical limitations. The first key defense role for satellites has been communications. In the 1950s, Arthur C. Clarke was the first to recognize that three satellites in geosynchronous orbit, spaced equidistant along the equator, could provide worldwide communications coverage between the latitudes of approximately 60ºN and 60ºS while remaining relatively secure from attack. Since the first geosynchronous satellites were launched in the 1960s, communications satellites have proliferated and become a staple of the global communications industry. They provide a redundant network that is largely independent from terrestrial communications systems, and can deliver broadband communications anywhere within their area of coverage via increasingly smaller and lighter terminals and handheld phones (DalBello 2003: 217). In the 1990s, Iridium, the first fully functional polar-orbiting satellite communication system, was launched. Polar-orbiting satellites provide communications at high latitudes, but compared to geosynchronous systems, they are extremely complex and expensive to build, launch, and operate. The Iridium constellation of 66 satellites was a technical success but a commercial failure, and its major customer today is the US Department of Defense. As discussed earlier, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain operate dedicated or partially dedicated military geosynchronous satellites for military communications. Germany leases time on commercial satellites and is planning for dedicated military satellites in the future. However, no European country currently operates the necessary trio of dedicated military communications satellites to achieve full global coverage. Only the United States has such coverage, obtained through the low-earth orbit Iridium series and through its geosynchronous satellites. Many countries, including the United States, lease commercial satellite capacity for non-sensitive communications, relying on dedicated military satellite communications for secure transmissions. However, commercial systems are not as secure as the ones dedicated to military use, and commercial business practices may conflict with military objectives, making their use for military communications uncertain (Baker et al. 2001). Reconnaissance and surveillance is the second area where space offers significant advantages for military and security operations. The United States and the Soviet Union first orbited reconnaissance satellites during the height of the Cold War in the 1960s; these first “spy satellites” used panchromatic and infrared film, dropped to earth in sealed containers from satellites for processing and analysis. In the mid-1970s, digital electro-optical systems flying in polar orbits allowed operators to image any place on Earth and return the images by means of electronic transmission, thereby increasing satellite flexibility and longevity. In the civilian world, NASA led the way in the development of such satellites with the building and launching of the Landsat series of satellites, beginning in July 1972. However, clouds and dark of night hamper the highly sophisticated digital cameras placed on these satellites. Hence, more recently, synthetic aperture radar systems 122
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operating at microwave frequencies have been developed. Although synthetic aperture radar satellites provide imagery with reduced sharpness compared to the best electro-optical systems, they can pierce through cloud cover and darkness. In Europe, only France currently operates dedicated earth observation satellites, Helios 1 and 2. However, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are all developing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance satellites. The United States operates highly sophisticated reconnaissance satellite systems, the exact technological capabilities of which remain highly classified. The United States and other countries also rely on high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellites to satisfy part of their need for routine reconnaissance data. Early warning and signals intelligence are still other areas where satellites can be used for military and security purposes. The United States operates a series of surveillance satellites that monitors the globe for signs of a missile launch, as well as signals intelligence satellites for monitoring communications and electronic transmissions around the world. The latter have been reportedly put to use to detect communications from would-be terrorists. No European countries currently operate such systems, though French defense planners are in the early stages of developing their own signals intelligence and missile early warning systems, including several pilot projects already in orbit. Digital technologies have revolutionized the handling of data and information from space systems, allowing analysts to merge digital imagery maps with data from UAVs, AWACS aircraft, and other sources to create powerful information products that give field commanders improved awareness of the battlefield and enhanced capabilities for defeating the adversary. All of this information can now be sent quickly and efficiently regionally or globally via modern communications infrastructures, including communications satellites. The sophistication and quality of European space technology is very high and growing fast, driven primarily by civil and commercial needs. Ultimately, the development of space systems to support network-based operations will depend on how much funding the European countries are willing to direct toward space systems. On the European level, it will also depend on the extent to which the individual countries are willing to cooperate and share resources. As noted below, the initial signs are encouraging, particularly in satellite communications and earth observation, underscored by the robust attempt to create a resilient space policy between the European Union and the European Space Agency, along with the Member States. Nevertheless, funding constraints and the burden of legacy systems may limit investment in space systems.
Changing attitudes toward European military space systems Until recently, Europe was not expected to build or deploy systems that allowed them to use space for defense purposes, and most European militaries have been reluctant to include dedicated space systems in their budgets. Europeans have focused more on civilian uses of space, benefiting from the defense applications 123
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of civilian systems. For example, only the United Kingdom, Italy and France have launched dedicated military communications satellite systems, and France’s Helios electro-optical earth observation system is still the only dedicated military reconnaissance satellite deployed by a European country. Most of Europe’s 5 billion euro annual expenditure on space goes to civilian programs, compared to about 50 per cent of the $40 billion annual US investment. The European space industry, though employing some 40,000 people and generating a turnover of roughly 5.5 billion euros, is much more dependent on the commercial market than its US counterparts (Keohane 2004: 3). Europe’s existing and planned security space programs are generally being initiated as dual-use programs. The dual-use approach, especially if initiated as a commercial investment, has the advantage of saving defense euros for other air-, ground-, or sea-based military systems. France’s Syracuse-3 communications satellites – its first dedicated military communications satellite – and Helios satellites were both preceded by civilian programs. The same is true for the United Kingdom’s Skynet communication satellite systems as well as the Spanish Hispasat and the Italian SICRAL systems. Germany, Italy, and Spain are also developing dedicated military communications satellites after earlier investments in dual-use systems. France’s Helios system is based on technology originally developed for the civilian SPOT series of satellites. The French Pleiades electrooptical system and the Italian COSMO Skymed synthetic aperture radar system, both currently under development, are intentionally dual-purpose in nature. Both are elements of a cooperative program between France and Italy. Germany’s SAR-Lupe dedicated military radar satellite is possible in large part because of the substantial investment the European Space Agency and the German Aerospace Center have made in basic synthetic aperture radar technology. Nevertheless, some systems, such as early warning and electronic surveillance, have no clearcut civilian counterparts and need to be pursued for their own sake, though they use subsystems and technologies developed under civil budgets. More recently, European interest in the security uses of space has grown significantly, and leadership in this area has begun to shift from France toward the European Union. Events, both internal and external to Europe, have contributed to this changing perspective on the uses of space for military purposes. The recent conflicts that the US military was involved in have significantly contributed to changing Europe’s approach to military space. Policymakers and military commanders witnessed, on a daily basis, the considerable advantage the United States drew from space systems, combined with new UAVs and the ability to fuse geospatial data (satellite remote sensing, signals from GPS satellites, and digital maps) with real-time video. The US military’s ability to integrate space capabilities into its network of systems was a critical catalyst of change in European military space policy. Influential military theorists, primarily in France, began to press for greater European attention to the development of pan-European security space systems (Hancart 2003; Gavoty 2003a, 2003b). These include satellite communications, remote sensing, and military enhancements to Galileo. Europe’s
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major aerospace companies, including EADS, Alcatel, Snecma, and Thales, have been supportive of these calls to increased investments in security space. The first example of a major European space program with considerable security implications is the Galileo Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) system. Driven in its inception almost entirely by a political desire for greater commercial autonomy and reliability, Europe has pressed forward with this independent system, which will duplicate the capability of the US Global Positioning System (GPS). Galileo will be very much a dual-use and trans-European capability. Its development is led jointly by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Transportation and the European Space Agency, which is, by charter, civilian in character. The military utility of Galileo has not gone unnoticed by Europe’s defense departments, which now depend heavily on the US GPS system for positioning and navigation services. The French military, especially, has funded research on the potential military capabilities of Galileo and plans to use both Galileo and GPS in future operations. Other European countries are also considering similar policies and are likely to follow suit. The European Union is also planning to use Galileo in support of the European Security and Defense Policy. The Galileo system is currently designed to include 30 satellites and begin offering its services in 2008. The European Commission and the European Space Agency have invested a total of 1.1 billion euros in the development of initial technologies and in the building of experimental satellites. Another 2.3 billion euros will be spent on building and launching the full constellation of satellites and to prepare for commercial operations. To date, the building and launching of the first four satellites has been awarded to Galileo Industries, a company co-owned by Alcatel Space of France, Alenia Spazio of Italy, EADS Astrium of Germany, Thales and a Spanish consortium of seven companies. These four satellites are expected to be launched by the end of 2008, at which point the European Commission and the European Space Agency will award the contract for building the additional 26 satellites and for operating the complete system. Europe has also opened participation in the Galileo program to non-European countries. China, Israel, India and Ukraine have joined the program since its inception, and negotiations are underway with several other countries. The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program, which is essentially a strategy for organizing and utilizing Europe’s many already existing and planned earth observation systems, represents a second important Europe-wide space initiative with defense implications. The GMES program focuses primarily on sustainable development and environmental management, and is part of Europe’s efforts to obtain the ability to track regional as well as global environmental trends. Like Galileo, GMES was initially conceived as a civil program, with security considerations added later. Like Galileo, GMES is managed jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency, with participation from various other European organizations and firms. If successful, GMES will provide sharply improved, better-coordinated European
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capabilities to observe and analyze the environment and human activities on Earth, using both new and existing earth observation systems. The GMES program is being undertaken in two phases. The first period, completed in 2002–3, examined the current strengths and weaknesses of the European capacity for space-based environmental and security monitoring and identified the areas that required further investment and research. The second, or implementation, period runs from 2004–8 and involves the initial development of infrastructures and capabilities that were identified in the initial period. Thus, in the near term, GMES will develop new information systems and techniques to exploit Europe’s existing space-based earth observation capabilities more efficiently. In the longer term, it will serve as a guiding program for planning new earth observation systems. Although focused primarily on European environmental and security concerns, the satellite contributions to GMES will be global in scope. Most remote sensing satellites orbit in polar orbits taking them over the entire earth as it turns beneath them. Europe is still working out the detailed focus and scope of the security aspects of GMES, but discussions are tending toward a more activist interpretation of the Petersberg tasks: humanitarian relief, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management. Some of the capabilities developed in the global GMES program could be used, for example, to enhance Europe’s warfighting efforts far from its borders. In particular, the broader earth observation and analysis capabilities provided by GMES will prove extremely useful for the European military and intelligence community, especially when combined with reconnaissance information provided by both the dedicated security and the explicitly dual-use earth observation space systems currently underway. Parallel to Galileo and GMES, a European Space Policy has begun to emerge under the auspices of the European Union. Starting in the late 1990s, the European Union, particularly the European Commission, began to have increased influence in European civil space affairs. The EC supplements national space investments by funding research and operation of space systems in support of EU programs and policies, and while the European Union continues to depend on the indigenous space programs of individual Member States and on the European Space Agency to provide the technological capabilities for EU programs, it is increasingly using its political and economic authority to set the overall direction of Europe’s space efforts. In January 2003, the European Commission published a draft policy paper on space for discussion, revision, and adoption by the Member States, and the European Space Agency. After a series of formal consultations, the paper was finalized in November 2003 as a White Paper, laying out a proposed European space policy, including defense uses of space: Europe needs an extended space policy, driven by demand, able to exploit the special benefits space technologies can deliver in support of the Union’s policies and objectives: faster economic growth, job creation and industrial
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competitiveness, enlargement and cohesion, sustainable development and security and defence. (European Commission 2003b: 5 [Emphasis in original]) The White Paper refers explicitly to the uses of space systems to support the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. Further, the very existence of a successful project such as Galileo, usable by the entire world, is seen as a visible symbol both of growing strategic independence from US policies, and also of a more unified Europe, offering the prospect of future European success in space (Bescond 2003: 40–3). A successful GMES program will also strengthen the visibility and acceptability of the European commitment to space systems. In November 2003, the European Commission and the European Space Agency also signed a formal Framework Agreement on Space, intended to support “the coherent and progressive development of an overall European Space Policy” (Council of the European Union 2003: 5). This agreement further underscored the growing influence of the European Union in European space affairs and provides the framework for potential expansion of Europe’s investment in space. It focuses cooperation between the two organizations on securing Europe’s independent and cost-effective access to space so that it can continue to be self-reliant in the application and use of space technologies, and on ensuring that space activities are undertaken in line with EU policies, in particular those supporting sustainable development, economic growth and employment. The Framework Agreement on Space is intended to consolidate European knowledge of space in a network of centers of excellence, thereby achieving greater Europe-wide coherence and synergy between national efforts. Specific technology areas singled out for initial collaboration include launchers, communications satellites, earth observation and navigation. Space and space technologies were also included in the EU Constitutional Treaty. Article III-254 reads: 1. To promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies, the Union shall draw up a European space policy. To this end, it may promote joint initiatives, support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space. 2. To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, European laws or framework laws shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European space program. (European Union 2004: 117–18) Elsewhere in the Treaty, in Article I-14 covering areas of shared competence, space is called out as a shared competence between the European Union and other European entities:
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In the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out actions, in particular to define and implement programs; however, the exercise of that competence may not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs. (European Union 2004: 22) Although the Treaty does not include any reference to security space, it generally boosts the profile of space technologies in Europe, and European promotion of investment in space systems. This will assist proponents of increased emphasis on the use of space in military and security operations, and especially in networkbased ones.
The road to integrated European space systems These promising European moves toward advanced space-based assets face numerous challenges before they become integral parts of a trans-European network or fully interoperable with the United States. One challenge will be integrating space systems into existing European air, ground, and sea-based command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities. US experience suggests this will be a difficult task. However, the less developed European capability to conduct network-based operations may prove a blessing in disguise, allowing the Europeans to learn from the mistakes the United States has made. European learning, through interaction with the United States in NATO and in coalition operations, could reduce the time and expenditure for the European integration effort. A second challenge will be the competition for EU resources, especially following enlargement of the Union in May 2004 to include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The expansion will likely add complexity to advancing and coordinating European security space capabilities. The new countries will most likely wish to join the space efforts underway in the more technologically advanced partner countries, since these provide them with the opportunity to participate in space systems development without starting from scratch. The new partners may also bring additional resources to this effort, but their relatively weaker economies could slow progress. More fundamentally, EU enlargement is a costly process. Space investments at the trans-European level are likely to compete with other priorities, such as regional development and agriculture, making it difficult to fulfill the White Paper’s call for increased funding for space systems. A third challenge will be legitimizing the use of space assets for defense purposes, given the politics of space in the European context. The European Space Agency’s Convention expressly limits its participation to peaceful space efforts, though the space programs of the individual countries generally have no such prohibition. This could complicate the integration of Galileo into defense planning. Furthermore, security uses of GMES are currently still limited to supporting the Petersberg Tasks. Because of these limitations, pressure grew in 2003 and 2004 to 128
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redefine the term “peaceful.” As a result, technologies that contribute to defensive strategies and that can have supportive roles in warfighting may in the future fall under the “peaceful” category. Reshaping the definition would explicitly allow the European Space Agency to take on security-related tasks and to expand the scope of GMES into the gray areas between peacekeeping and peacemaking, allowing closer integration with national and European network-based strategies. Under the leadership of its director, Jacques Dordin, the European Space Agency recently re-evaluated its Convention, concluding that it does not restrict the agency’s ability to engage in programs aimed at defense and security for national or international security and defense institutions. The Agency also established a security clearance system that enables it to handle classified information. In addition, the neutral members of the European Space Agency have signaled that they are willing to have the Agency take on a more active space security role for Europe as a whole. Lastly, a recent study led by the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) has recommended that the European Space Agency engage in dual-use R&D for space technologies and suggested that the European Union might benefit by setting up a European Security and Defense Advanced Projects Agency with a small, non-permanent staff and flexible, mission-based activity. Like the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), this agency would provide a framework for pursuing a strategic approach to developing the applied technologies of the future, combining a well-defined vision with highly responsive structures and methods (Silvestri 2003: 6–7). Just how far Europe will go to emphasize development of dual-use space systems or to create an agency such as this remains to be seen. The European Commission’s Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) has already funded collaborative projects on using geospatial data for increased situational awareness and on uses of advanced space technologies for expeditionary and crisis management operations. It remains to be seen, however, whether this initial effort can be expanded as part of the Thematic Priority on Security and Space under the European Commission’s seventh research and technology Framework Program. A final challenge will be to coordinate the defense-related space assets currently deployed by EU Member States. In earth observation satellites, as with civilian space activities, France has taken a lead, shifting its national strategy from autonomous national systems to promoting multilateral cooperation at the European level. French leadership has brought together Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Greece in a joint program – the Common Operational Requirements (know by its French name Besoins Opérationnels Communs, or BOC) – to develop common requirements for security-related earth observation. Through the BOC, participants are developing a federation of data providers and users that will collect and distribute earth observations data among its members. Each member brings different, but largely complementary, capabilities to the table. The BOC is an expansion of cooperative arrangements already underway between France and Italy on Pleiades and COSMO-Skymed, and between France and Germany on Pleiades and SAR-Lupe. Linking electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar observation satellites will create a very powerful reconnaissance tool. 129
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The EU Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejón, Spain, has also contributed to coordinating European activities related to earth observation. It was established in 1991 as the WEU Satellite Center and transferred to the European Union in 2002. It provides the European Union with an analysis of earth observation space imagery to support decision-making in foreign and security policy issues. It currently handles space imagery received from the French SPOT, the US Landsat 4 and 5 and Indian IRS-1C and D satellites, as well as from Russian commercial satellites. Within the next few years, it will also begin collecting and analyzing data from additional space-based systems, including Helios 2 and SAR-Lupe. Some imagery from these systems will be delivered free of charge, others will have to be paid for. In any case, the Satellite Center EU officials will not be allowed to task the satellites directly. The picture of European collaboration on communications satellites is slightly less clear. Though France and the United Kingdom have previously cooperated on satellite communications programs, it remains to be seen whether or not the other main players in European space development – Germany, Italy, and Spain – will participate. In the 1990s, France sought to interest Germany and Italy in contributing to the development of Helios 2, but those arrangements fell through, in large part as a result of German reluctance to tie itself too tightly to a French initiative. In the 1990s, French planners also sought to broaden cooperation in military satellite communications through Trimilsatcom, a system that was to be co-developed with the United Kingdom and Germany. This communications satellite program was intended to meet the common military needs of the proposed partners. However, the Trimilsatcom effort failed because the partners were unable to integrate their requirements into a common program and agree on a schedule for meeting them (Nardon 2001). European cooperation on communications satellites has, however, extended to the NATO framework. As noted earlier, the Alliance selected a European solution for its next generation satellite communications capability. In May 2004, NATO announced that a Joint Consortium of France, Italy, and the United Kingdom would provide the new constellation of communications satellites, which will replace the two existing NATO-owned communications satellites and provide NATO with an improved capability. This expanded coverage will include ships at sea and NATO’s AWACS early warning aircraft. Beyond intra-European collaboration looms the challenge of transatlantic collaboration. While the emerging European security space policies hold some promise for enhanced transatlantic interoperability, strong US resistance to more flexible rules for transatlantic technology transfer is likely to make this difficult. In response to this problem, European companies have begun to use fewer US components in space systems. A recent agreement between the European Commission and the European Space Agency calls for a technology development program to assist in insulating European firms from US technology export rules and for greater cooperation in this area with such countries as China and India. However, it also calls for closer cooperation with the US Air Force. Furthermore, it is to be hoped that the United States and Europe can forge a workable agreement 130
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on the relationship between Galileo and GPS, which could spill over into other forms of space cooperation. There has been considerable progress on European space in the past decade, and a growing realization that space will play a role in European defense planning. The results remain mixed, however. While space may play a greater role in the future, there are a number of countervailing pressures and challenges, budgetary and political, which will slow the rate at which this trend emerges.
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7 THE E U RO P E A N I NDUS T R I AL AND T E CH N O L O G Y BAS E F O R N E T WO RK - BAS E D CA PA BI L I T IE S Though the pace of transformation is uneven, the major European defense powers have been developing and fielding state-of-the-art capabilities for conducting network-based operations. One important source they have been drawing on for this effort is the European defense industrial and technology base. In 2001, the total revenues for the European C4ISR market were estimated at close to $7 billion, with a compound annual growth rate of 4.7 per cent (Frost and Sullivan 2002: 1–1). Advances in technology and changes in military doctrines have contributed to the market’s growth and are expected to continue to do so in the coming years. While this chapter does not provide a comprehensive survey of this market, it discusses in some detail the industrial organizations and capabilities that have been most important to the emerging European C4ISR technologies. A broad review suggests the European industrial and technology base contains significant capacity for C4ISR work, including a number of leading companies engaged in critical development and production work in the areas of C2, communications and ISR. In addition, much of this work is collaborative, both across European countries and across the Atlantic.
Overview The term “defense industrial base” is, in reality, a misnomer in the area of European C4ISR. Several of the countries under discussion in this study are using networking technologies in areas that go beyond defense – to commercial communication, homeland security, and civilian space operations. Moreover, the technology base on which C4ISR programs draw is increasingly dual-use or entirely commercial, as is especially the case for information and communications technologies. A review of the industrial and technology base, then, requires examining not only defense suppliers, but commercial firms providing these technologies for commercial, civilian and defense applications. Communications, command and control, sensors and advanced materials are only a few of the technologies commercial firms can provide for military applications. Military sensors, for example, will integrate technologies in electrooptics and biotechnology that are commercial in origin. It remains true, however, that with the ministries of defense as the principal market for these technologies, 132
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more traditional defense suppliers may enjoy advantageous access, having experience of doing business with the defense customer and a track record of military-specific products. The firms most relevant to C4ISR technologies are, as might be expected, concentrated in the more militarily advanced members of the EU – France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – as well as in Sweden, which developed a relatively autonomous base to support its strategy of neutrality. However, given the role of commercial technology in C4ISR, there are also significant capabilities in other, smaller countries that make a contribution. Firms with strong research, development and manufacturing capacity in biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, information, and telecommunications technologies can be found throughout Europe. Finland is home to Nokia and a host of other mobile telecommunications companies with cutting-edge technologies at the core of the nation’s networking efforts. Barco, a global leader in display, visualization and simulation technologies, is Belgian. Moreover, these highly innovative commercial companies have been supported for decades by European government investment in civilian R&D, so are not newcomers when it comes to doing business with national governments and with the European Union. There are both advantages and disadvantages to having such a widespread industrial and technology base for C4ISR. The advantage is that public funds can be spent in ways that strengthen an existing, national industrial base and national technologies. The disadvantage is that developing and networking advanced C4ISR systems requires a broad range of expertise in designing, developing, integrating and operating complex systems, and expertise that is rarely available solely from the industry within one country. European governments typically spend defense resources with the goal of supporting local industry, but such a policy approach does not always provide forces with the most advanced or capable technology. In the C4ISR area, greater efficiency and deeper transformation may depend on a strategy that uses the most global industrial base, pooling technological capabilities, sharing costs, and reducing risks. The evolution of the European industrial technology base, which is becoming more networked and global, is likely to encourage such a trend, making the domestic political tradeoffs more difficult. Over the past decade, there has been a pronounced move toward consolidation of the European industrial base and extensive mergers and acquisitions involving several major defense companies. Moreover, large defense-related firms have begun to merge with, acquire or form partnerships with companies that have expertise in such areas as electro-optics and communications, often in the commercial market arena. Combining capabilities across borders can sometimes help overcome the “local buying” preference of governments, as a trans-national firm or partnership can move workshares around to accommodate local needs. Much of the expertise required for C4ISR and network-based capabilities is to be found in such trans-national companies and partnerships.
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The big three: Thales, EADS, and BAE Systems Thales Thales is one of the world’s largest defense and consumer electronics corporations and a European leader in the C4ISR market. In addition to being a lead contractor for many French C4ISR programs, it has, as a company with many nationalities, significant operations in a number of other countries. It has built and deployed a complete C4ISR system integrating US- and French-made legacy systems in the United Arab Emirates. It has provided elements of C4ISR systems in a number of other countries. Through acquisitions outside of France – Tacal, Quintec, Pilkington, Signaal – Thales has positioned itself to participate in key programs in other countries, including the UK. Thales has created a new division, Land and Joint Systems, which fuses its optronics and communications businesses as part of a strategic push into the C4ISR market. This division offers a wide variety of communications products, including the family of PR4G radios, which are sold in 25 countries around the world, including Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Poland, and Egypt, and the RITA 2000 system based on ATM/IP architecture and deployed by the French and Belgian armed forces. The most recent PR4G version – VS4-IP – has IP, frequency-hopping encryption, a built-in GPS, and advanced multiplexing features. The next generation of PR4G radios will include software radio products. The Land and Joint Systems division also has an operational analysis and architecture group that is focused on developing interoperable technologies. Thales has a strong presence in the command and control market with the Cooperative Fighting System (a tactical C2 system), the LCC mobile C2 network, and the e-CIS army-level C2 system, designed according to NATO STANAGs. As prime contractor for the Atlas, Martha, and SICF programs, the company is a key supplier of C2 systems to the French armed forces. Future developments include the RITA Local Area System for strategic C2. In naval systems, the company has made significant investments in naval C2 systems, as well. In surveillance and reconnaissance technologies, Thales produces several ground-based systems for surveillance, target acquisition, and ground-based air defense. Squire, developed most recently, is a man-portable surveillance radar system for ground surveillance and bomb damage assessment and has been deployed by the Dutch army and marines. Through its Netherlands branch, the company is a global supplier of naval surveillance, weapon control, and combat management systems. Key products include the TAVITAC naval combat management system on the French Lafayette frigates and in Belgium, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the APAR weapons control system, co-developed with EADS and Raytheon and deployed on Canadian, Dutch, and German frigates. More recently, Thales has moved into the UAV market, leading the international consortium developing the British Watchkeeper UAV system. Thales also offers a number of products in the intelligence technologies market and plays an important role in several programs, 134
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including the US Prophet program for vehicle-mounted SIGINT systems and the future British terrestrial SIGINT system, Soothsayer. In France, Thales is the supplier of the SGEA, SARIGUE, MINREM, and SAIM systems as well as of airborne ISR pods to various services of the armed forces. EADS The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company – EADS – was created in 2000 as a merger of the German DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, France’s Aerospatiale Matra and Spain’s CASA. Since then, EADS has gained a strong market presence in C4ISR technologies and become a lead contractor in many European countries, notably France and Germany. EADS is becoming a significant presence in the UAV market, through a number of collaborative R&D programs. These include the sensor package for the EuroHawk HALE UAV, co-developed with Northrop Grumman; tactical- and operations-level UAVs (the Hunter, Eagle1, and Eagle-2) with Israeli Aircraft Industries; several tactical UAVs (the CL-289 with France and Canada, the Brevel, and the LUNA); the Pointer hand-launched tactical UAV in collaboration with Aerovironment; and a maritime rotor wing reconnaissance UAV (SEAMOS, terminated in early 2002 when the German navy canceled funding). EADS is also developing a UCAV demonstrator – Barracuda – with Germany as the first potential customer. Since 2004, the company has been at the center of the two largest collaborative European UAV programs. It is the prime contractor for the EuroMALE program, and a partner in the Neuron UCAV program, both funded by the French Ministry of Defense. The company’s goal is to ultimately control some 10-15 per cent of the global UAV and UCAV market (Hegmann 2005). EADS also has strong capabilities in the C2 and in the sensor technologies fields. In C2, the company is working on the HEROS, FAUST, and FüInfoSys H systems for the German army, the SIR and SICA systems for the French army, and on systems for the Belgian army and several Persian Gulf states. In sensor technologies, EADS, with Rheinmetall Defense Electronics, has developed the ISR platform for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle, deployed by the German and Dutch armed forces. It has also developed the APAR weapons control system, jointly with Thales and Raytheon, deployed on Canadian, Dutch, and German frigates. It is also supplying the maritime sensor platform, Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS), to Mexico, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, and the US Coast Guard. In addition, the company offers a combined system of SAR and MTIs that can be placed on UAVs, marine reconnaissance and NH-90 helicopters. EADS also offers imagery analysis products to be linked to a number of platforms, including satellites, OCAPI (Optimizing, Controlling and Automating the Processing of Images) and TIPI3D products. An EADS mobile satellite ground station – Eagle Vision – collects imagery from SPOT, Landsat, IRS, RADARSAT, and QUICKBIRD satellites. Four such stations are operational with US forces, and at least one with the French army. EADS is also a lead partner in the German 135
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GAST project to develop a common system for the dissemination of technical intelligence. Several recent acquisitions have made EADS a major player in the European defense communications market. In July 2001, the company acquired Cogent Defense and Security Networks from Nortel Networks, and with it the contract for supplying the United Kingdom with a deployable communications system for expeditionary forces. In May 2003, EADS purchased BAE Systems’ share in the Astrium space joint venture, gaining full control of Paradigm Secure Communications and its Skynet 5 program for Britain’s military satellite communications. In the summer of 2005, EADS acquired the Personal Mobile Radio business of Nokia, which allows it to provide a range of mobile radio solutions for defense and homeland security. BAE Systems BAE Systems was created in 1999 through the merger of British Aerospace with Marconi Electronic Systems. BAE Systems is one of the world’s largest suppliers for the aerospace and defense markets, with prime contractor capabilities for naval platforms, aircraft, and electronics. It is also a presence in several sectors of the C4ISR market and has acquired important system engineering and integration experience. BAE Systems has a significant presence in the US defense market and has a central position as a supplier to the British and Australian armed forces. The firm was chosen by the British Ministry of Defense to lead the NITEworks partnership aimed at assessing and demonstrating the benefits of NEC and the options for its effective and timely delivery. In December 2003, BAE Systems announced it would provide the Kuwaiti military with a complete C4I suite. These two programs confirm BAE Systems’ commitment to the C4ISR market. BAE Systems has been particularly present in the market for tactical communications systems, with significant involvement in such British programs as Ptarmigan and Falcon, and a full line of Multi-Role Switch (MRS) 2000 equipment. It has also been a participant in US military communications programs, notably JTRS and the Future Combat Systems vehicles’ communications package. BAE Systems also provides the British armed forces with satellite terminals: the Talon (man-portable) and Dagger (vehicle-mounted) terminals linked to Skynet 4 satellites. BAE Systems possesses only limited capabilities in the UAV market, having produced the Phoenix and SkyEye tactical UAVs. Both proved unreliable in the operational environments, and are not competitive. It is investing in the UCAV market, however, marketing its Nightjar program. Together with the British firm QinetiQ, BAE Systems is one of the few European defense companies with expertise in Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), through the British Marlin project. Other BAE capabilities in ISR are found mainly through the company’s involvement in the now disbanded Alenia Marconi Systems venture and in Atlas Elektronik, the naval systems portion of STN-Atlas Elektronik retained by BAE when it split the company with Rheinmetall. These have given BAE Systems 136
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a dominant position in radar and sensor technology. BAE’s involvement in the ASTOR program and Nimrod upgrades have also been valuable. The company has not been deeply involved in either the intelligence or the space markets, having sold its SIGINT business in 2002. In July 2003, BAE Systems and Finmeccanica signed an agreement to collaborate on C4ISR technologies through a joint venture. BAE’s Avionics Ltd. was merged with Finmeccanica’s Galileo Avionica to form Eurosystems, an avionics company of which Finmeccanica owns 75 per cent and BAE Systems 25 per cent. Under an option, Finmeccanica can require BAE Systems to sell its 25 per cent interest in the new Avionics business to Finmeccanica at any time and BAE Systems may require Finmeccanica to purchase its 25 per cent interest after 25 months. Eurosystems has capabilities in sensor systems, airborne radars, mission systems, electro-optics, and electronic warfare systems. At the same time, Alenia Marconi Systems, a 50-50 joint venture of BAE Systems with Finmeccanica, was dissolved, with BAE Systems acquiring AMS’s UK operations and Finmeccanica acquiring all of the Italian operations of AMS. BAE Systems will merge the UK operations of AMS and BAE Systems’ C4ISR Networked Systems and Solutions business to form a wholly owned systems integration business. The Eurosystems transaction also created Selenia Communications Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Finmeccanica, whose Marconi Selenia Communications acquired BAE Systems’ UK Communications business. The Eurosystems transaction was finalized in May 2005.
Second tier defense companies There are a number of smaller second tier defense companies in Europe that are also active in the C4ISR market. Some, such as the German firm Rhode and Schwarz, have C4ISR at the core of their business strategy. Others, such as Saab, have been platform and weapons suppliers and have only recently moved into developing and producing C4ISR systems. In most cases, the smaller participants in the C4ISR market retain a largely national focus and rely on contracts from their home governments. Rheinmetall Defence Electronics is one such company. In the summer of 2003, BAE Systems and the German firm Rheinmetall Detec, joint owners of STN-Atlas Elektronik, divided the firm into two separate companies. The new companies are Rheinmetall Defense Electronics, wholly owned by Rheinmetall Detec and specializing in technologies for air and land forces, and Atlas Elektronik, wholly owned by BAE Systems and specializing in maritime technologies. Rheinmetall Defense Electronics is one of Europe’s leading developers of ISR solutions. It collaborates with EADS on the development of the ISR suite for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle, to be deployed by the German and Dutch armies. This suite includes a sensor platform with a camera, a thermal imager and a laser rangefinder for each vehicle. Rheinmetall Defense Electronics may have significant potential in unmanned aerial systems, provided it can expand beyond the German market. The company 137
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offers a wide range of reconnaissance, target acquisition, electronic warfare and combat UAVs, including the KZO/Brevel target acquisition UAV (also configurable for electronic warfare missions), co-developed with EADS. It is also working on the Tactical Advanced Reconnaissance/Strike System (TADRES) UCAV, previously known as the Taifun, for the German Ministry of Defense. The vehicle is now being designed to carry an electro-optic sensor for target identification and a synthetic aperture radar for target acquisition. A procurement for TADRES is expected before 2009. In 2003, the company signed an MoU (a Memorandum of Understanding) with France’s Safran Group to develop the technologies to make the KZO and TADRES vehicles interoperable with the French Sperwer UAV. The company also has capabilities in tactical command and control systems for land forces. It has participated in the Battlefield Command System (Gefechstfeldführungssystem, or GeFüSys) C2 program for the German army (currently upgraded to FAUST), and provided the Swedish army with the C2 system deployed on its tanks and combat vehicles. In 2003, it was awarded a contract to upgrade the C2 systems on Spain’s Leopard-2 tanks. Rhode and Schwarz is another company with a key position in the German national market for C4ISR which has yet to become a trans-national player. Rhode and Schwarz has cutting-edge technology in the military communications field, specifically in digitally reprogrammable software radios. Its family of multimode, multirole, multiband (M3) radios offers solutions for aerial, naval, and land platforms, all meeting NATO encryption STANAGs. Early in 2003, the company received a contract to supply the Brazilian army with the tactical radio version of the M3, and in 2004 the Swiss Army signed a contract to purchase the VHF/UHF version of the M3. In 2005, it received a contract to outfit the A400M aircraft with M3ARs (Airborne Radios) through 2022. The radios will feature the Second Generation of Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) frequency hopping function. The company was also awarded a sole-source contract to develop a fully JTRS- and SCA-compliant version of a Software Defined Radio (SDR) for the German military. The company is also a supplier of SIGINT technologies, specifically those for direction finding and signals monitoring and analysis. The German and Danish militaries have been customers for these products. In 2001, the British Ministry of Defense’s Defense Evaluation and Research Agency privatized part of its work into a new firm – QinetiQ – as a public-private partnership. Today, QinetiQ uses the experience gained as a government R&D agency to provide advanced defense solutions, including several in the C4ISR domain. In the command and control field, QinetiQ specializes in maritime C2, offering two major systems: the Intelligent Advisor Capability Demonstrator (IACD) and the All Environment Real-Time Interoperability Simulator (AERIS). The IACD has been demonstrated on the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Illustrious. In the ISR area, QinetiQ does work on battlespace digitization, multi-source information fusion, and innovative ISR architectures. Through its participation in the British TOPSAT program and other international efforts, QinetiQ also has expertise in space-based reconnaissance. In the UAV arena, QinetiQ focuses on man-portable UAVs for infantry sections. It is also one of the few large European 138
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defense companies to have expertise on Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, having worked for the British Ministry of Defense on the development of the Marlin UUV, intended for launch and recovery from submarines. Additionally, company projects are underway to develop new sensor suites for UAVs, particularly for thermal imaging. France’s Sagem – now part of Safran Group – has increased its involvement in the C4ISR domain. Its defense technology group, Sagem Défense Securité, has been particularly successful in the UAV market; its line of tactical UAVs is deployed by several European militaries. The Crecerelle is used by the French army, and variants are deployed by the Dutch (Sperwer), Danish (Taarnfalk), Swedish (Ugglan), and, most recently, the Greek armies. Two new versions of the Sperwer are under development, to fly at higher altitudes and faster speeds, for longer periods of time. The first, the Sperwer HV (High Velocity), is a MALE UAV featuring a real-time data link, synthetic aperture radar, day-night imager or laser target designator and possibly, at a later stage, radar-jamming payload. The second is the Sperwer LE (Long Endurance), also a MALE vehicle, whose payload may include a day-night imaging system, a Samir missile warning system, and a high-speed radio frequency (RF )data link for communications with other UAVs as well as with its ground control station. The French government has not yet given full support to these programs, though the company anticipates prototypes by the end of 2006. The next generation of Crecerelle – SDTI – is also in the final stages of development and testing for the French army, based on the Sperwer UAV. Sagem has also had some success in the tactical command and control sector and is the prime contractor for the French army’s SIT system for linking small units and armored vehicles. Sagem has also engaged in international collaboration on R&D projects. In July 2003, Sagem and STN Atlas (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) signed a memorandum of understanding to begin an R&D program that will make Sagem’s Sperwer UAV interoperable with STN Atlas’s KZO and TADRES UAVs. This program will develop a common C2 infrastructure to enable the exchange of data and intelligence gathered by these unmanned platforms. Sagem also collaborates with General Atomics (US) on the Horus-SD UAV, a European version of the Predator, and with Dassault on UAV R&D programs. Most recently, the company announced it has fitted the Sperwer B UAV with the Israeli Spike long-range precision strike missile, weaponizing an existing UAV platform with an off-theshelf missile similar to the US arming of a Predator UAV with Hellfire missiles. Though by no means a small firm, Finmeccanica in Italy is a relatively minor, largely national participant in the European C4ISR market. Recent decisions, such as the Eurosystems transaction described earlier in this chapter, may change this reality over time. For now, the company’s main business is still the construction of platforms, but some subsidiaries are beginning to gain a strong foothold in the Italian C4ISR market, especially in C2 and ISR. Restrictive bid practices of the Italian government facilitate this process, and they have provided Finmeccanica with growing expertise in most C4ISR-related technologies. The company is increasingly proficient in developing and producing low- and medium-altitude 139
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UAVs, initially through the tactical Mirach-26 and the Mirach-150 programs for the Italian armed forces. The Falco tactical UAV is a more recent addition, designed to replace the Mirach-26. A faster version of the Mirach-150, Nibbio, is also under development. In 2003, Finmeccanica signed a contract with Alenia Aeronautica to co-develop a UAV demonstrator that could become a marketable UAV or UCAV product. The Sky-X – formerly called the Integrated Technology Vehicle (ITV) – will carry different payloads, including weapons, SAR, electrooptical and infrared sensors, and electronic sensors. It will also be equipped with a broadband satellite data link 5. Trials began in 2004 (Kington 2004: 9). The newly created Eurosystems avionics company, the acquisition of BAE Systems’ military and secure communications assets, and the dissolving of Alenia Marconi Systems could give Finmeccanica a stronger position as a participant in the global C4ISR market. Saab, long a manufacturer of cars and fighter aircraft, is another platform producer that is moving into the C4ISR market. It created a new division, SaabTech, which specializes solely in C4ISR, and in July 2005 merged it with Avitronics, formerly part of the South African firm Gintek, to create Saab Avitronics. The company’s C4ISR expertise is focused largely on command and control systems for land, air, and sea. Its 9LV Mark 3E naval C3 combat system fuses data from sonar, radar, and electro-optic systems to create a complete picture of the seascape and is in service with the Royal Swedish Navy as well as with the Australian, New Zealand, and Singapore navies. Another command and control product under development is the Wide Area Situation Picture (WASP), consisting of an air force C2 system, adaptable for other services as well. Saab also produces terrestrial C2 systems, including the Vehicle Command and Control System (VCCS), which provides a single display unit for tactical information and sensor images as overlays on a background digital map, and the Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS), a land forces C2 system for brigade and lower level units. BCSS is deployed by the Australian armed forces. Saab has also moved into the UAV market, having the experience of the SHARC UCAV project, and has signed an MoU with France’s Dassault Aviation to co-develop the Neuron UCAV. Saab and Ericsson have created a joint venture, Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation, splitting ownership 60-40 respectively. In October 2003, this company was awarded a contract from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) to develop the technological foundations for the future Swedish Network-Based Defense. Initially, this will involve work on design rules and technical specifications for the future system. The firm is partnering with IBM and Boeing on this project.
Non-defense companies in the European C4ISR market As already noted, technologies for C4ISR requirements are frequently found in the commercial sector, making commercial companies an important element in building European C4ISR capabilities. Several of the more significant firms are in Scandinavia, with technologies that are useful in C4ISR systems with little 140
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modification. Ericsson has been very successful in the global ISR market with products such as air defense surveillance radars (Giraffe for both land and sea units, sold to the French air force), artillery hunting radars (ARTHUR, sold to the Danish army and the British Royal Marines) and airborne early warning systems (Erieye radar deployed by Sweden, Brazil and Greece). It is also the only major company in the Swedish C4ISR market that is still wholly Swedish-owned. With a strong civilian technology base, especially in mobile communications, Ericsson has been able to penetrate the military communications market on a global basis. In collaboration with Kongsberg-Ericsson of Norway and Crypto of Switzerland, it produces state-of-the-art tactical military communications products – EriTac – including switches, radio relays and bulk encryption units that can be fitted together according to user requirements to build tactical area networks, air defense networks, and command post communication networks. The system has been sold to five NATO countries as well as to other military customers worldwide, including Kuwait and Oman. Nokia has also applied its core competency to the military market for C4ISR technology. In 2002, Finnish forces taking part in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo were the first to be outfitted with the company’s TETRA communications equipment. A year later, the first Finnish-led KFOR brigade was outfitted with a similar system less than two months after the decision to procure it. The European Union’s forces in Kosovo (EUFOR) use a Nokia system based on the one used by Finnish forces. In Finland, a complete communications system for the country’s defense and first responder forces was built using TETRA technology. The deployable communications networks of the Danish and Swedish armies were based on a similar technology, as were the Belgian and Kuwaiti public safety networks and the communications network used by the Irish police.
Industry collaboration on C4ISR interoperability Several collaborative industry frameworks have been created to address interoperability between C4ISR systems. Companies involved in these agreements have realized that governments are demanding increasingly complex and advanced systems and systems-of-systems that require industry collaboration. The Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) is a forum for firms involved in the development of C4ISR systems. Companies in NCOIC share knowledge about customer requirements for network-centric and network-based operations and discuss strategies and approaches to enhancing system delivery to customers. In addition, the organization seeks to develop open, interoperable C4ISR systems, using common best practices and systems engineering techniques. On the technology side, this is done by analyzing the relevant C4ISR architectures defined by governments, developing a secure information management model to discuss open standards, and identifying open standards-based product types. The NCOIC is also developing educational programs on network-centric operations and developing strategies for creating collaborative engineering environments (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium 2005: 14). The consortium 141
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is made up of international aerospace, defense, information technology and professional services companies in the United States and Europe, all with experience in network-based technologies. As of 2005 there were 66 members in the NCOIC with another 68 inquiries by potential members. The Consortium’s Advisory Council includes prominent US Department of Defense officials as well as representatives from NATO’s C3 Agency, the NATO Headquarters C3 Staff, and the Swedish Defense Materiel Agency. Firms in some European countries are seeking to create similar networks. In Germany, for example, an interest group known as the Open Community has been created to coordinate the development of standards and open architectures. The member companies of the community have agreed to implement a policy of interoperability based on recognized, open commercial and military standards, adopting a full spectrum approach. Members of Open Community include Atos Origin, Diehl BGT Defense, CONET, CSC Plönzke, ESG, IBM Deutschland, Rheinmetall Defense Electronics, Thales Defense Deutschland, and Unilog Systems (Rheinmetall Defense Electronics 2005). While valuable, national collaborative initiatives such as Open Community will not necessarily address the challenges of international interoperability and cross-national acquisitions.
Conclusion The European industrial base is clearly capable of undertaking significant work on C4ISR programs and technologies, not only at the national level, but also at the transnational level. There are several transatlantic projects in the field. These include the Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project, co-developed by Thales, EADS, and Raytheon and deployed by the German, Dutch and Canadian navies (the system enables the tracking and controlling of missiles fired from various sources by a single ship); MIDS (which enables interoperability between United States, British, German, Italian, French, and Spanish ships, aircraft, and missiles); and the Raytheon-Thales jointly-owned firm, Thales-Raytheon Systems (TRS), working on C2 systems for air defense and tactical communications for Special Forces. Increasingly, European companies are initiating intra-European collaborations, as opposed to transatlantic programs. In the post-Cold War era, European defense firms have been almost twice as likely to pursue co-production and codevelopment projects with each other as with US firms, and over three times more likely than with defense firms from other regions (Jones 2005: 3). One motivation could be the sense that America’s globally dominant defense industry forces the Europeans to combine efforts in order to compete internationally, as well as to avoid excessive dependence on the United States. There is a risk in this approach, as it will add competitors in the international market and increase the challenge to ensure adequate transatlantic interoperability. For the Europeans, regional cooperation does hold many benefits. Regional collaboration in research and development, production, and procurement of C4ISR technologies and systems is clearly an important route toward developing 142
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the capabilities needed to conduct network-based operations. The European companies are likely to provide pressure from bottom-up for greater collaboration, distributing technologies and demonstrators to several European countries. They can also promote collaborative approaches to technology development. Smaller, more local companies can complement the larger ones with niche expertise and experience from national programs. Such discussions could enhance interoperability across European military capabilities. Firms in the European industrial and technology base have recognized that developing the C4ISR technologies and systems required to conduct networkbased operations will be important to their competitive position, both in defense and commercial markets. Unmanned vehicles, sensor payloads, deployable and mobile communications, network infrastructures, and data analysis technologies are all growth markets in both arenas. European firms have been quick to grasp this reality and are investing in applications for defense and security customers with cutting-edge technologies. While European C4ISR and network strategies are still being developed, the industrial and technology base on which Europe will rely to implement strategies is amply capable of supplying them.
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8 E U RO P E A N N E T WO RK - BAS E D CA PA BI L I T I E S Policy recommendations The major European defense powers clearly possess the technology capabilities to research, build and deploy modern C4ISR capabilities and move down the road toward military capabilities that are more network-based. Many of these countries, this survey reveals, have made explicit decisions to move in that direction. The Europeans face two significant challenges in reaching this goal: creating crossnational capabilities that take advantage of C4ISR to increase their ability to operate with each other in autonomous ways, and enhancing transatlantic interoperability with the United States. There are a number of policy steps the Europeans can take, and steps the United States needs to take, to realize this twofold objective. While the European allies have, in many cases, made a national commitment to enhanced networking, the commitment to the trans-European and transatlantic goals is less clear. At the trans-European level, the European countries need to do much more than they do today to develop common standards and equipment. Greater European interaction, especially in the framework of the EU, is needed for progress to be made in achieving trans-European interoperability. The new Battlegroups are an important step in the right direction, but more needs to be done. With respect to transatlantic interoperability, it is clear that the Europeans are not likely to create the extensive network of C4ISR capabilities the United States plans; nor need they do so. A “plug and play” approach makes more sense for Europe, using a US or NATO network backbone and selecting the points in that backbone where connectivity will ensure interoperability. Such interoperability is most critical with respect to the timely transmission of voice, data and images, which will enable networked operations. A plug and play strategy depends on common standards and capabilities and on ensuring that these are shared, commonly deployed and secure. Parallel to European actions, the US needs to develop a stronger grasp of European strategic perspectives, take European C4ISR technology and interoperability capabilities and intentions seriously, work through NATO to enhance the opportunities for greater connectivity, and, in particular, transform the US regime for defense trade to incentivize interoperability decisions, transatlantic technology collaboration, and industry efficiency. Network thinking and interoperability are clearly important objectives in today’s security environment. The era of large, static, armored forces that 144
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confront, deter and defeat the adversary’s massed formations, has ended. So, too, have the days when NATO forces trained and exercised together but were rarely used. Today, smaller, more agile forces are being used regularly in a wide range of coalition operations, both within and outside NATO as an organization and primarily outside Europe as a theater of operations. The question of out-of-area operations for NATO has been answered. Europeans have clearly made the decision to use their forces in regions they have stayed away from for decades. Coalition operations, too, seem more likely. Iraq may be answering the question of whether the US will deploy forces on a largely unilateral basis for contingencies in other regions. Coalition operations are now a “fact of life” in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and even in Iraq. Connectivity between coalition forces will be necessary; lack thereof is an obstacle to effective operations. This connectivity cannot be easily created at the point of deployment; its absence is likely to lead to decisions to carve out separate zones of operation, as seen in Iraq. Sustained interoperability will require sustained planning, cooperation and investment, within Europe and across the Atlantic, using military-to-military cooperation and the full panoply of institutions that connect the relevant nations. There are other reasons to push forward on greater cooperation with respect to C4ISR and network-based capabilities, within Europe and across the Atlantic. Technological efficiency is one. Unconstrained, the technologies relevant to network-based operations would flow freely between countries; many of them are drawn from a global, commercial market for information and communications technology. There are technological capabilities the Europeans bring to C4ISR from which the US military could benefit, and clear benefits to Europe from a less-constrained flow of C4ISR technology in the other direction. These same technologies are subject, however, to dual-use and military technology transfer rules, making inefficiencies and redundancies inevitable. Companies in the United States and Europe complain that even the European and American business units of the same firm cannot maximize technological synergies because the regulatory regimes get in the way. As a result, the same or similar technologies are sometimes being developed separately on both sides of the Atlantic, and technological synergies cannot be exploited. Similarly, the absence of a coordinated strategy in Europe is leading to separate investments on expensive and duplicative programs. There is an economic cost to this inefficiency. As each nation buys what it needs from its own suppliers, each is paying a higher than necessary price, and budget resources are being wasted in duplication. This is especially a problem in Europe; one slowly being responded to in such areas as UAVs and space, where crossnational investments are becoming more common. It is also a problem for the US, which fails to reap the economies that might flow from tapping into the European technology base. A more flexible transatlantic technology market has potential benefits both for US and European defense investments and defense budgets. A more open transatlantic regime for these technologies could also bring greater competition, with advantageous results both in terms of price and technological innovation. 145
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European policies and actions There has been increasingly rapid change in the European approach to C4ISR and network-based capabilities. The number of militaries and defense ministries working on formulating and implementing C4ISR doctrines has grown, as has the intensity of these efforts. There remains much to be done, however, before all major European forces are adequately transformed for coalition operations outside the NATO area. A number of actions can be suggested, some at the national level, and some within the framework of multilateral institutions. The trans-European commitment to multinational, network-based operations is still not entirely clear. This goal is not yet centrally embedded in European defense planning, for all the progress that has been made over the past decade. There remains an inadequate European commitment to joint force planning, common requirements, and coordinated R&T investment. And the European defense market is still not fully open to the benefits and efficiencies that could be realized by more flexible movement of technology and greater competition among suppliers. European defense planning At the level of defense and force planning, the European allies need to make a clear commitment to the goal of intra-European and transatlantic C4ISR connectivity, both in NATO and in the EU. European national governments have recognized the importance of connectivity in some areas. In the air (fighter communications) and at sea (naval communications and fire control and targeting), the interoperability challenge is being met and collaborative efforts have resulted in a fair degree of connectivity. The same cannot be said for land forces, even within national militaries, let alone at the trans-European or NATO levels. All nations are working on this problem, as the British Bowman, the Dutch TITAAN and the Swedish HF2000 programs indicate. Most countries are developing C4 systems to conform to NATO STANAGs, yet few are moving beyond this level, testing interoperability, or moving toward the higher standards that prevail today. Conforming to NATO STANAGs will not solve the inter-European or transatlantic interoperability problem. The pace of some countries’ C4ISR innovation goes well beyond NATO STANAGs. However, NATO remains an important context for addressing this issue systematically. European governments need to work to accelerate the NATO STANAG process and broaden its coverage to also include surveillance and reconnaissance system standards. The new Allied Command Transformation provides another important context for this effort, one in which the Europeans need to engage fully. An equally strong commitment needs to be made in the European Union, in the framework of the Headline Goal and ECAP processes and the European Defense Agency. While C4ISR interoperability issues are on the table in the EU, both in ECAP and the EDA’s Capabilities Directorate, they do not appear to have received priority attention, and they should have it. Interoperability requirements will be 146
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driven by the missions the Europeans plan to undertake and the capabilities needed to network the command and control, communications, and intelligence need for those missions. Both NATO and the EU have formulated broad defense strategies that dictate when and how the military forces made available to them can be deployed. Both have designated specific branches to integrate doctrines for network-based operations into their respective strategies: NATO through its Command, Control and Consultation Agency, the European Union through the European Defense Agency’s Capabilities Directorate. These offices can be an important focus of assistance for nations formulating national doctrines and planning the acquisition of systems. If undertaken in a coordinated manner by both NATO and the European Union, national migration towards network-based doctrines and capabilities can be achieved more swiftly and efficiently, sharing workload, avoiding redundancies and pooling resources. NATO and European Union oversight of this transition can help ensure that the goal of intra-European and transatlantic interoperability remains the focus of national planners. The Europeans do not need to adopt US global missions and goals to achieve this interoperability for networked operations. Too often, the US critique of the Europeans is that their roles, missions and forces need to look like those of the US to be interoperable or useful in coalition operations. However, the Europeans are unlikely to undertake large, high intensity combat operations at a global level, and unlikely to invest in building the resources required for these. With a different strategic ambition, but a comparable view of the important threats, the Europeans will not need forces that are carbon copies of the US. The United Kingdom has taken a different approach, developing network-enabled capabilities by testing and modifying existing equipment and evaluating new systems against this network requirement, rather than building an entire, global network-centric architecture from the ground up – evolution, as opposed to revolution. The policy challenge is how to ensure connectivity where the European and US force capabilities must meet: in coalition deployments inside or outside the NATO framework, or for the missions of the NATO Response Force outside the NATO area. Given the strategic and resource gap, it is critical for the Europeans, in cooperation with the United States and in the NATO context, to define the critical nodes in the US C4ISR system into which European capabilities need to plug in order to play. Given the difference in resources, strategic ambitions, and roles and missions, a plug and play strategy makes sense for Europe. The model would be for the United States or NATO, or both, to provide the backbone for a network and for the Europeans to select the points in the grid that are critical to ensure the needed interoperability. Interoperability will need to focus on the timely transmission of voice, data and images: the information that will enable networked operations. The plug and play strategy relies on common software standards and capabilities. Ensuring that software standards are shared, commonly deployed, and secure will facilitate the communication of voice, data, and imagery among more complex (US) and less intricate (European) networks. 147
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The Europeans will not need all the satellites the United States possesses in order to shape operations that use the intelligence those satellites deliver. They will not require all the UAVs the US deploys, though their systems will need to be able to disseminate data to and from the US. If the Europeans wish to operate autonomously from the United States or from NATO assets available through the Berlin Plus arrangements, they will have to decide how much autonomous C4ISR they require to do so. European ambitions can be tailored to European requirements and European resources, and interoperability in the Alliance can be reinforced at the same time. The NATO Response Force could provide a useful test-bed for C4ISR interoperability issues. US policy sees the NRF as a European force, to which it will provide important logistical and C4 support in the near term. Eventually, in the US view, this force is to provide such capabilities without US support. The goal, from the US perspective, is to create incentives for the Europeans to develop integral C4ISR that is interoperable with US forces. While the issue of continued US participation in the force remains on the table, it provides a useful opportunity for the Europeans to test out their own emerging C4ISR capabilities, with potential payoff for the more autonomous capabilities that might emerge in the EU context. Working through the NRF might help address the large uncertainty about the European commitment to both transatlantic and intra-European interoperability. There is not yet a clear common view in Europe about the goal of interoperability. The British tend to focus on the need for interoperability with the US, but less on the goal of interoperability with their European partners. The French are committed to greater internal interoperability among their national services, but do not focus priority attention on C4ISR interoperability with Britain or Germany. Where interoperability exists – in the air and at sea – it is largely the result of NATO requirements and the acquisition of US systems, not from addressing interoperability at the European level. The lack of clear priority attention to this issue stems, in part, from the absence of cross-European interaction on strategic, force and requirement planning among the European defense ministries. The Headline Goal and ECAP processes, both of which are important, do not constitute joint strategic, force and requirements planning. These processes focus on a particular set of forces and capabilities, not on overall defense goals. There is a gap between the discussions in Brussels and the day-to-day planning and priority setting in national capitals. These latter processes are not coordinated at the European level; leaving each nation focused largely on its own national military capabilities. A purely national process forces C4ISR and interoperability requirements to compete for funding with commitments to legacy and modernization programs. Engaging this dialogue at the level of the European Defense Agency’s Capabilities Directorate and the EU Military Staff could provide important leverage to change these priorities.
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Investment in research and technology The absence of trans-European coordination is particularly telling at the level of research and technology investments. Overall, the level of European defenserelated R&T investment is low, and R&T priorities and programs are poorly coordinated across the EU. The result is weak spending in the C4ISR arena and redundancies between the major defense countries. Low funding, moreover, combined with major commitment of limited procurement resources to legacy and modernization programs means that R&T projects that reach the prototype or demonstrator stage often do not enter into production. R&T coordination across EU countries is uncommon. While the French and British devote significant sums to defense R&T, especially in the C4ISR arena, they engage in little bilateral coordination on these programs. Others, such as Italy and Germany, which have set a goal of creating more networked forces, engage in little trans-European collaboration in these plans or investments. Given the overall limitation on defense resources, greater coordination and the elimination of duplication in effort would be an important way to obtain the resources needed for interoperability. An important contribution to the trans-European R&T effort may emerge from the European Commission’s 7th Framework Program (FP7) and the EDA’s R&T programs. The Commission’s FP7 that begins in 2007 will include security space and homeland security research and development for the first time, with proposed funding of 4–7 billion euros for such fields as earth observation and detection of chemical and biological agents. It will be critical for the Commission to maintain a wide scope for this funding, resist efforts to reduce the overall amount, and ensure that at least some of it is directed toward dual-use, network-based capabilities, including UAVs, large communications networks, and advanced sensors. The EDA R&T programs will have an even more specific focus on defense needs. The first cluster of investments, initiated in the summer of 2005, focuses on technologies for long-endurance UAVs. However, EDA’s current R&T budget of some 3 million euros is small. As the EDA experience with this program grows, so should its budget and its involvement in more complex development and demonstration programs. A truly trans-European system for strategic, force, and requirements planning is still some way ahead in the future. Ultimately, for the European Union to meet interoperability and C4ISR requirements, such a system will be needed. It is the only way to end redundancies and make the force structure changes needed to release budgetary resources for interoperability investments. A cross-European market for dual-use and defense technologies The focus on interoperability in C4ISR and greater integration of planning and investment activities will only pay off if a cross-European market for dual-use and defense technology comes into being. Policies and institutions at the European level are still not adequate to take full advantage of the widespread privatization 149
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and trans-European consolidation of defense industry and technology capabilities that has occurred over the past decade. Because requirements are defined nationally, national defense industry policies vary widely, and the rules and regulations for acquisition differ, also, the incentives for industry to collaborate or compete across borders are weak. The rules are not standardized, budgets are not coordinated, the politics of local procurement tend to weigh heavily in investment decisions, and defense technology transfer across European borders remains constrained; an increasingly global industry is not matched by a regional defense market. The Letter of Intent, OCCAR, EDA, and Commission collaborative research programs all point in the right direction, in terms of creating such a market, but progress is slow. The Commission’s communiqués – the latest of which was adopted in 2003 – to encourage industrial restructuring and greater efficiency in the European Defense Equipment Market, while praiseworthy, have had modest effect. Nor have collaborative procurements broken through this logjam. Collaborative European defense programs still focus funding on platforms, such as the A400 airlifter, Tiger helicopter and Eurofighter. When it comes to networkbased capabilities, national technology assets and producers tend to be favored and international competition or collaboration resisted. The UK is changing its approach, creating a potentially useful precedent. Overall British defense procurement policy has moved sharply away from protecting national monopolies and toward transnational competition and teaming. Despite what has been a dominant position for BAE Systems in the UK defense market, the Ministry of Defense has sent an unambiguous signal that procurements are open to European and transatlantic competitors. This has led to a growing position in the British defense market, especially that for C4ISR technologies, for such firms as Thales, Raytheon, EADS, General Dynamics and EDS. The explicit goal of this policy change was to reap the advantages of competition and international teaming and ensure that the broadest array of technology was available. In return, non-British firms are expected to bring a substantial portion of work share into the United Kingdom, strengthening and broadening the domestic defense technology industry at the same time. Overcoming the weight of the European defense industrial legacy will not be easy, but the British model may provide useful lessons for European-level market policy. A more open market could provide substantial efficiency savings, through competition, with important payoff for European and transatlantic interoperability. For these advantages to be reached, the Letter of Intent, OCCAR, EDA, and EC research processes would need to be coordinated with the development of an open-market policy, resisting efforts to protect that market from competition.
American actions The future of transatlantic interoperability for networked operations will depend on American policy changes, as well as on European actions. The US has a clear interest in advancing such interoperability, based on a history of security 150
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cooperation and the demands of coalition operations in the twenty-first century (Serfaty 2005: 87–8). Neither Europe nor the United States can meet the new security challenges alone. Addressed through the Alliance, the defense capabilities for meeting these challenges would be greatly enhanced by a more effective, networked European force. If the US wishes not to become involved in a particular situation, an effective European capability will provide a valuable policy option for the US. A US policy that encourages and incentivizes the existing trends toward more sophisticated C4ISR investments in Europe needs to focus on three dimensions: greater common understanding with respect to strategic perspectives, a serious engagement with European efforts currently underway, and reforming the US regime for transatlantic defense trade to allow a discussion of technology requirements, transatlantic technology collaboration, and greater industry efficiency. Understanding European strategic perspectives The changes in the world of global security since the end of the Cold War have forced a discussion of how institutions and national strategies need to change to reflect new international security realities. To some degree this dialogue has already led to significant changes, including the enlargement of NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact, reassuring them about the dramatic change that had taken place. The extension of NATO’s mission to restore order to the Balkans was also a major change for the Alliance, and its first involvement in actual combat in the wider European theater. These operations also created stresses in the Alliance, and played a role in the US decision to choose coalitions of the willing for the initial military operations in Afghanistan and for the war in Iraq. Growing dangers of terrorist strikes and nuclear proliferation have further altered the security agenda for the transatlantic partners. When it comes to the use of military forces, the two most recent conflicts may well represent the future trend: smaller, expeditionary forces deployed at some distance from the homeland, operating in relatively spare environments, moving with agility and focus to strike adversary targets effectively and terminate combat operations quickly. Clearly, these twenty-first century wars will rely more than ever on networked operations, integrating sensors data, communications, and the measurement of effects. These military deployments may not always operate in coalition and may not always involve NATO or all the major European powers. Disagreements over Iraq and the difficulties in the execution of Balkan operations both had the effect of giving the Europeans an incentive to accelerate the development of more autonomous capabilities, in part to reflect a different European view of strategic requirements. Similarly, these disagreements and problems convinced some in the US that the Europeans might be an unreliable partner for such operations, both because of differing strategic views and a less advanced military capability.
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Given these tensions, NATO continues to provide an important context for dialogue, at the military and technical level. European and American forces will continue to operate together, both inside and outside the Alliance, and interoperability will be an important tool in conducting such operations successfully. The NATO Prague summit of November 2002 made significant progress with respect the transformation of Alliance forces for the new missions and technologies of the twenty-first century, by reshaping the NATO command structure with a new transformation command, setting new capabilities objectives, and endorsing the NRF. NATO has provided one context for a higher level of strategic dialogue, as well. Critical changes have included the willingness of the European allies to commit the Alliance to out-of-area operations and to stand up the NRF. It has not been the only context, however. The EU has also begun to emerge as a growing player in the security dialogue, defining a broad strategy document, creating a pillar in the Council on this subject, pushing through the Headline Goal and ECAP processes, and, most recently, moving forward with the European Defense Agency and the Battlegroups. None of these developments, however, constitutes a sustained strategic dialogue between the United States and its European allies. The US government should take the initiative to begin such a dialogue, either in the NATO context or as a higher level discussion among the allied countries. This engagement should also involve bringing the European allies into an ongoing discussion in the framework of the quadrennial defense reviews in the United States, a process that has largely excluded sustained interaction with the allies. Engaging European programs and capabilities For the strategic dialogue to have meaning with respect to force and acquisition decisions, the US will need to take a serious look at the capabilities the Europeans are putting in place today. There is a tendency in the US to discount European investments in C4ISR and network solutions as inadequate. The lesson some US policymakers have drawn over the past five decades, and especially over the past ten years, is that European forces are heavy on manpower and equipment, light on new, network-centric planning and technology and, overall, inadequately transformed to reflect post-Cold War realities. In this view, the first Gulf War and the Kosovo air war indicated that European land forces lacked the real-time information and C4ISR capabilities necessary for agile expeditionary operations, and European air forces could not ensure secure real-time interoperability for air interdiction missions. This study suggests that the European commitment to C4ISR and greater networking is stronger than this view suggests. In part in reaction to the lessons of the Gulf War and the Balkans, a number of European countries are stepping up to the investments and planning required to acquire advanced C4ISR and achieve greater interoperability. In addition, there is little doubt that the industrial and technology base available in Europe is both competitive to that of the United 152
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States and adequate to deliver the capabilities a modern, more networked force requires. US policymakers, and even NATO leaders, have suggested that the way to close the “gap” is for the Europeans to increase defense spending. Clearly greater spending, focused on networking as a priority would help solve the interoperability dilemma. However, the reality is that overall defense budgets in Europe are unlikely to rise at the rate necessary to provide that capability. A more fruitful US approach would be to make a virtue of this reality, by urging a restructuring of European defense investments, with a priority on the forces and technologies needed for twenty-first century operations. This emphasis could bear fruit. While Germany, for example, may not be able to increase its defense budget overall, given domestic German commitments and problems, the focus of the German defense program is already shifting toward expeditionary capabilities incorporating modern C4ISR. A US message consistent with this internal trend could prove more productive than repeated demands that the Germans spend more overall on defense. US policymakers have argued the priorities case with respect to specific acquisitions, notably the A400M and Galileo, which are sometimes criticized as the “wrong” priorities for European defense investment. US criticism, however, has provided an incentive for both projects to move forward. Again, this policy approach may be counterproductive. Both programs are clearly intended by the Europeans to meet European defense (and civil) needs. Both provide capabilities the Americans have long sought – a more modern European air transport capability, and the ability to provide location data for precision-guided munitions. The solutions are European, and responsive to the needs of a European industrial and technology base, as well as the desire to possess some autonomous European capabilities in these areas. “Buy American” is not an answer, however much US policymakers may think it the most efficient solution. The Europeans are no more likely to satisfy their equipment and technology needs by buying exclusively in the US market than the US Department of Defense is likely to satisfy its needs entirely from European providers. Again, to make a virtue of this political-economic reality, it may make more sense for the US to explore the opportunities to combine technologies and industrial capabilities through collaboration. US concerns about the gap and about European capabilities have led to minimal US effort to involve the Europeans in US planning for network-centric capabilities or to include European technologies in the process of developing these capabilities for the US military. A general skepticism about European capabilities has been combined with a preference in the US defense establishment to work with known US processes and suppliers. Extending the research and acquisition process to include European suppliers is a step into the less-known. US suppliers, moreover, are understandably uneasy about bringing European firms into the US market as potential competitors.
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Overcoming the transatlantic C4ISR interoperability challenge and implementing a plug and play approach will require overcoming these prevailing attitudes and engaging the Europeans directly with respect to plans and technologies. Here, too, NATO could provide an important context for a multilateral dialogue through collaboration on transatlantic R&D programs, for example. The NATO-led CAESAR advanced concept technology demonstratr (ACTD) discussed earlier has already proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible. Other technology areas are ripe for collaborative initiatives. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for both surveillance and combat, and their sensor payloads are one such area. As already noted, many European countries possess substantial technological knowledge and experience in this area, including engines, airframe design and stealth technology, and have expertise in active, electronically scanned array radar, hyperspectral imaging, lightweight synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indicators relevant for sensor payloads. Multinational European programs, such as the EuroMALE UAV and the Neuron combat UAV, are already under way. Cooperation in this area would have not only military and budgetary advantages for participants, but could open opportunities for industrial cooperation. Another potentially fruitful arena for transatlantic collaboration is data-sharing of space imagery. Europe has underway several multinational efforts to link data gathered by Earth observation systems. The Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation program will link the existing France’s SPOT 5 and Helios 2 satellites with systems currently under development: the two French Pleiades high-resolution optical satellites, the four Italian COSMO-Skymed X-band radar satellites (with a resolution of less than 1 meter for military images), and possibly the five German SAR-Lupe synthetic aperture radar satellites. The first satellites in these programs will be operational between 2005 and 2007, and Sweden, Spain, Austria and Belgium have already secured their industrial cooperation on Pleiades and the sharing of data acquired by the system (Adams and Ben-Ari 2005: 21). A transatlantic discussion of how to integrate these platforms and share data, including the sensitive issue of intelligence-sharing, might be fruitful. Transforming the US defense trade regime The US regime for export controls and technology transfer may be the “long pole in the tent” for transatlantic collaboration and interoperability (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001). Policy and industry analysts have noted for some years that the US National Disclosure Process (NDP), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and Special Security Arrangements (SSA), all of which regulate the transfer and export of US defense technologies and the process of direct foreign investment in the US market, pose major obstacles to the technology transfers that will be needed to close the interoperability gap between the United States and its European allies (Adams 2001c). 154
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Transfers of defense technologies from the US to the European allies go through intensive scrutiny in the Department of Defense and an interagency discussion, before a decision is made to approve the deal. This has often led to a decision to share parts of hardware with allied collaborators, but not software codes that govern the operation of the system, leaving allies in possession of only part of the information they would need to operate, repair, overhaul, or adapt systems purchased from or built in collaboration with the United States. The US-GermanItalian Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), for example, has faced this black box problem for some time. US export control rules compound the problem. All military technology exports and transfers, including the exchange of oral or written expertise on such technology, require a license from the Office of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State, after interagency coordination (including the Department of Defense and the armed services). The slowness and complexity of the US export control process, and the large number of items on the Munitions List, have been a constant irritant in the transatlantic defense relationship. US firms wishing to collaborate with European counterparts encounter delays; European firms seeking to acquire US components for European systems find the system unpredictable. The US operations of European defense firms cannot cross-fertilize with their European branches, as such communications require an export license to take place. This system has created incentives for the Europeans to build technologies in Europe which are no longer subject to US controls, rather than buy technology from the United States. US regulations with respect to the scrutiny and structure of foreign direct investment in the US defense market have further complicated the dialogue about interoperability. Direct investments and joint ventures by Europeans (and others) in the US defense market are subject to intensive scrutiny, through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) interagency process. While very few such investments have been rejected, many are withdrawn, or not attempted, given the complexities and uncertainties in the US process. Successful investments and collaborations, such as the BAE Systems acquisition of Lockheed Martin’s electronic warfare assets in 2000 and the creation of Thales Raytheon Systems (an air defense joint venture) take years to execute and are difficult to operate efficiently. These difficulties are compounded by the complexities of the SSA requirements, which effectively separate the work and workforce of American business units from those of the European parent company. The requirements are designed and enforced to prevent the flow of sensitive technologies across the Atlantic. They also make efficient cross-corporate collaboration and economic efficiencies difficult. C4ISR interoperability is at the very heart of coalition operations and the US rules of the road are a disincentive to achieving that goal. Major reforms of the US technology transfer, export control, and investment rules would be needed for transatlantic interoperability and network issues to be solved. It will be important for Washington to realize that these rules, which seem technical and receive 155
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lower priority attention, are strategic issues for the European allies. Technical discussions that leave the current rules and processes in place will not solve the problem; they need to be addressed at the higher policy level.
Conclusion Solving the interoperability problems, particularly with respect to networked operations and C4ISR, is clearly critical to the long-term future of the transatlantic relationship. Both the Europeans and the United States will need to take major policy decisions to move this agenda forward. The issue is not a technological one; the obstacles to a solution are at the level of policy and budgets. The Europeans need to focus their priorities, clarify strategy, work to eliminate redundancies, and build institutions and policies at the European level that address C4ISR as a priority. The United States needs to engage in a more systematic strategic dialogue with Europe, engage the Europeans at the military and technical levels, and reform the regulatory regimes and processes that inhibit technology flows. Neither set of tasks is easy; completing them could make a substantial difference in strengthening transatlantic interoperability for coalition operations.
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Recognizing that the changed threats of the twenty-first century demanded a different strategic response and military capability, the United States moved relatively swiftly during the 1990s to transform its military. Over the past 15 years, this has made the US military increasingly more efficient and effective at carrying out expeditionary combat missions involving air, sea and ground forces, operating jointly. From a force largely trained and equipped for platform-intensive land battles in Western Europe versus a Soviet threat, America’s armed forces have become adept at conducting small, expeditionary operations anywhere in the world. The increased flexibility, maneuverability and lethality of the US military has included substantial investment in emerging technologies for gathering intelligence, distributing it rapidly to all relevant decision makers and users, and acting upon it. Linked together into a network that ties command to warfighting, these technologies are a critical tool for modern military operations. The conventional wisdom about the Atlantic Alliance is that the Europeans have not gone through a similar adjustment, spend far too little on defense, and are left with forces that cannot engage in similar operations, alone or in coalition with the United States. This study demonstrates that this wisdom is a vast oversimplification. As a perception of European military capabilities, especially in the arena of networked operations, this view condemns both sides of the Atlantic to an unnecessary crisis of confidence. There is, indeed, some truth to the view that a “gap” separates the US and its NATO allies in Europe, especially in the arena of networked capabilities. But there are important nuances to that gap that need to be understood for interoperability to be achieved. This study shows that a number of European allies already possess or are seriously developing important elements, even a full spectrum, of modern C4ISR doctrines and capabilities. The major European defense powers – especially the United Kingdom and France – experienced the Gulf War and the Kosovo air war as a serious wakeup call with respect to C4ISR and interoperability with the United States. Within available means, these countries, along with the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, are investing in cross-service C2, upgraded communications gear with new radio programs and IP-based capabilities; are researching, testing, or deploying UAV platforms with modern sensors; and are tackling issues of cross-service interoperability. 157
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The United Kingdom is probably the most advanced in developing network doctrine, investing in the range of capabilities required, and coordinating its activities with the United States. France invests across an even more broad range of capabilities than the United Kingdom (including space systems, for example) but has a more difficult time coordinating with the United States, and is still at the early stages of developing a network doctrine. Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands have laid out plans for achieving a networked C4ISR capability, and are moving slowly forward, though interoperability is constrained by national policy. Germany, Italy, and Spain have all made policy statements that commit them to a greater focus on C4ISR, networked capabilities, and interoperability, but actual doctrines and deployed capabilities are still thin. Although progress on C4ISR and networking is uneven in Europe, there does not appear to be a significant technology gap between the US and its major European allies. At the level of basic technological inputs – information, communications equipment, and sensor systems – Europe possesses ample and competitive technology, both in the defense and the civilian sector, and the knowhow to cooperate with the producers of US technology to develop systems and capabilities that can interoperate with US defense systems. It is also an oversimplification to argue that there is a capabilities gap between the US and European militaries. There clearly are mismatches in capabilities, but they are not at the extreme of saying that the US is moving toward a full, network-centric capability while the Europeans are irretrievably mired in the last generation of military technology. The leading European nations are developing network-based doctrines and integrating them into their broader defense strategies. Many nations are developing and deploying systems in such areas as cross-service C2, upgraded communications systems, UAV platforms with modern sensors, and cross-service interoperability. NATO has underway a number of programs to create greater interoperability between European and American forces, with promise of significant progress in the next decade. The EU is also beginning to focus on such capabilities, under the framework of the ECAP, the Battlegroups and the emerging European Defense Agency. There are clear, persuasive reasons for making investments in networkbased capabilities and transatlantic interoperability a high priority on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO, the EU and various international forums and industrial collaborations are effective mechanisms for making this happen. There clearly are differences in doctrine and deployment across the Atlantic. No NATO ally intends to build or deploy the full, global set of networked capabilities projected by the United States. Only France has invested in virtually all of the elements of such a capability, but no nation has the individual resources to build a capability comparable to that of the United States, nor does there appear to be a strategic necessity to do so. Only a handful of European allies have formulated doctrines for networked operations, however, based on their understanding of the uses of C4ISR technology in warfare and of the campaigns they foresee themselves conducting in the near future. Networking is not yet at the core of
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European military planning, nor is the role of multilateral institutions such as the EU entirely clear. This transatlantic “doctrine gap” will need to be bridged if future coalition operations are to succeed. This is less a technological issue than it is a policy problem. C4ISR technologies and expertise of comparable quality exist within companies and national forces on both sides of the Atlantic. Several joint USEuropean programs have proven that these technologies can be linked. The NATOled advanced concept technology demonstrator CAESAR has proven that sharing data between various national airborne ground surveillance capabilities is possible. The six-nation Multinational Interoperability Council program has enabled the sharing of classified information using a combined wide area network. The codevelopment of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) has resulted in an encrypted, jam-resistant, interoperable tactical data communications network. In 2005, two other advanced concept technology demonstrators were linked to demonstrate how data from various national collection systems can be posted on a common military website and made available for coalition operations in near real time, down to the brigade and platoon levels. That same year, 43 nations conducted over 15,000 interoperability tests in the eleventh consecutive Combined Endeavor exercise. These programs demonstrate that interoperability – with all of its operational advantages – can be achieved without requiring individual countries to relinquish certain military capabilities or parts of their industrial base. For the Europeans, one priority for European defense planners will be to develop doctrine that can guide the restructuring of their militaries toward a more expeditionary capability using networked systems. France, for example, develops and procures a wide range of state-of-the-art C4ISR assets, but does so without a clearly formulated doctrine for expeditionary, network-based operations. Such doctrine will make it easier to shift spending from older systems, such as main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers, into network-based systems such as airborne ground surveillance and space assets. Other European defense ministries need to follow suit, taking maximum advantage of the contribution that networked capabilities can bring to the level of expeditionary and coalition operations to which they choose to commit. The pace of such a change will have important implications for defense investments. A substantial share of European national-level investment in C4ISR and networked capabilities is still at the research, technology exploration, and development stage. The investments of the past decade are now beginning to pay off, with deployments taking place over the next ten years from now. There is a mismatch in timing with the US pace that needs to be tended to. Policy is again, on a critical part of the answer. As a common European commitment to out-of-area operations and agile and mobile forces emerges, it will create a strong incentive for a redirection of national and trans-European defense investments. A Europe uncertain about its military roles and missions will enhance the “drag effect” of legacy forces and investments at the national defense planning level. This drag is visible in some of the countries under study, notably 159
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Germany and Italy, which have substantial investments in legacy forces and the industry that provides their platforms. Resources are the other part of the equation. Given the major non-defense commitments of many of the European countries and the unclear definition of defense priorities, it is enormously difficult to redirect public resources to defense. Defense resources are unlikely to rise in the near term, but this does not mean that resources dedicated to C4ISR cannot grow. The difficult but necessary decision, which some have made and others are coming to, involves the tradeoff between legacy forces and equipment and the expeditionary, networked forces of the future. A doctrine that makes network-based forces more central to overall capability will help reshape budget priorities, providing resources for C4ISR investment. The doctrine and deployment gaps are at the heart of current interoperability shortfalls, within Europe and across the Atlantic. While many European militaries are developing or will soon deploy C2 systems that cross service lines, and common communications are the focus of some (the United Kingdom’s Bowman system is probably the most ambitious and comprehensive), the results are still uneven across countries. The question of cross-European interoperability also needs to be addressed as these changes are made. The cross-European gap needs to be closed at the same time the transatlantic gap is being bridged. US policymakers, who tend to view transformation, network-centric operations, and interoperability either solely within the US context or, at the fringe, as a NATO issue, need to keep in mind the cross-European level of activity. Recent EU developments suggest that the Europeans do not intend to remain behind, will see autonomous networked capabilities, and will want to apply their own technology to their needs. Europe possesses a technological base adequate to meet this requirement, and the European intention of developing such capabilities is becoming more clear. The emerging strategic vision in Europe, while different from that of the United States, clearly includes the desire for increased networkbased security capabilities and the ability to operate both autonomously and in coalition with the US. Policymakers in the United States need to be aware of these cross-European developments, as they are starting to shape European attitudes toward strategic missions, the development of rapid reaction capabilities, technological investments, and cooperation across the Atlantic. Over time, the rise of a defense-capable European Union will change the context within which these issues are discussed.
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Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) a radar system – mounted on an aircraft or helicopter – used for mapping friendly and enemy elements on the ground on a continuous basis and for passing information of their location to commanders for command and control, intelligence and strike purposes. The use of such a system provides strategic and tactical theater surveillance and target acquisition capabilities, and thus reduces both the time and mass required to execute operations. AGS systems consist of a radar that can operate in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode, providing broad area imaging at high resolutions, ground moving target indicator (GMTI) mode for tracking moving objects, or both. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) a range of systems, grouped for their relevance to network-centric warfare and network-based operations (see below). When these systems are interconnected, they can form a network (or a series of networks) on which operators can exchange information and coordinate activities. Galileo Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for a space-based positioning, navigation and timing system similar to the US Global Positioning System. Galileo will include 30 satellites and begin offering services in 2008. Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Joint European Commission and European Space Agency program for the development of new information systems and techniques to exploit Europe’s existing spacebased earth observation capabilities more efficiently and to plan Europe’s next-generation earth observation systems. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) a joint project of the US air force and army, providing an airborne, stand-off range, surveillance and target acquisition radar and C2 center. Sixteen such aircraft are operational, providing ground situation information through communication via secure data links with air force command posts, army mobile ground stations, and other command centers. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) a high-capacity, electronic counter measure resistant communications link designed for all 161
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services (air, surface and land) and all platform types. Operates on the UHF band and supports three message standards Link-16, the Interim JTIDS Message Standard (IJMS), and Variable Message Format (VMF). Link-11 tactical data link used by the US navy and several other allied navies. Its ability to operate on high frequency waves enables the system to communicate beyond line of sight, making it ideal for maritime communications. Link-11 can also operate in the UHF band, but is then limited to line-of-sight ranges. Link-16 tactical data link supporting the exchange of surveillance data, EW data, mission tasking, weapons assignments, and control data over MIDS and JTIDS equipment. Link-22 next-generation NATO tactical data link, also referred to as NATO Improved Link Eleven (NILE). Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) A five-nation (United States, France, Italy, Germany and Spain) cooperative program created to develop a third-generation Link-16 system. Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) multinational body providing oversight of coalition interoperability and assisting in implementing actions for its improvement. The six member countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were chosen as most likely and most capable of leading future coalitions. NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) NATO research, development and procurement program, currently in the design phase, which will provide the Alliance with an aerial battlefield surveillance capability through radar and the fusing of information gathered by other sensors. Initially, the system was to be deployed on manned aircraft only, but it has been redesigned for deployment on both manned and unmanned aircraft. Network-Based Operations (NBO) operations (military and non-military) where elements of command, control and communications systems are linked to intelligence-gathering and situation awareness systems. Unlike networkcentric warfare (see below), the term network-based operations does not imply a single, unified network into which all forces are linked. Rather, several disparate networks – possibly deployed by forces from different countries – are linked. This enables better sharing of information and utilization of forces, which in turn means that smaller forces can effectively undertake more complex missions in larger areas of operations. Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) the use of interconnected communications and information systems to create a single network that forms the core of information sharing and strategic, operational and tactical decision-making. The network gives warfighters a shared awareness of the battlespace, which in turn enables more efficient command and control of deployed assets, better decision-making for commanders, and shorter sensor-to-shooter loops. Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) also known as “smart weapons,” PGMs are a key capability in modern warfighting. They can be specifically designed or regular munitions with an added-on guidance system, but in either form maximize destruction of the target while reducing the overall amount of 162
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munitions required to hit it and minimizing collateral damage. While the older, less accurate visually-guided munitions are still in use, more modern versions are laser- or satellite-guided. These include the US Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the European Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) remotely piloted aircraft used for a variety of military and civilian tasks. Usually categorized into tactical UAV (TUAV), which are used for short-range, low-altitude missions; medium-altitude longendurance (MALE), used for longer, more elaborate missions; and highaltitude long-endurance (HALE), used for long-term missions at operational and strategic levels. In recent years, smaller, man-portable and hand-launched mini- and micro-UAVs have been developed and deployed for short-term missions, as well as combat UAVs (UCAVs) for strike purposes.
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An asterisk* following a page number refers to an entry in the Glossary
9/11 attacks 95 ACCS (Air Command and Control System, NATO) 10, 27, 64, 84, 87–8 ACT (Allied Command Transformation) 7, 25, 96–7, 98–100, 146 ACTDs (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators) 91–2, 154, 159 Afghanistan 25, 95, 96, 105, 107, 145; German forces in 54; UAVs in 56–7; US networked global capacity demonstrated in 3, 9 AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance, NATO) 64, 92–3, 161* Air Command and Control System (ACCS) 10, 27, 64, 84, 87–8 airlift see lift Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS, NATO) 64, 92–3, 161* Allied Command Transformation 7, 25, 96–7, 98–100, 146 Amsterdam, Treaty of 108 ARISTOTE broadband communications system 20, 28 armaments/defense market 114, 149–50; see also industrial technology base ASTOR (Airborne Stand Off Radar) 40, 46, 92 ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) technology 20, 27, 55, 134 Australia 100, 102 Austria 30, 117 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) 31, 43, 46, 91, 123, 130
BAE Systems 8, 83, 136–7, 155 Balkans 3, 9, 31, 94, 95, 105; NATO implementation and stabilization forces in 86; see also Bosnia; Herzegovina; Serbia Baltic States 54 Battlegroups 25, 53, 64, 74, 109–10, 120 Belgium 30, 114 BIGSTAF (German communications infrastructure) program 20, 55 BOC (Besoins Opérationnels Communs) 129 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3, 53, 89, 94, 107, 145 Bowman network 11, 20, 40, 42–3, 146, 160 broadband communications 14, 20, 28, 55, 122, 140 C4ISR (command control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance): needed in changing security environment 1–2; definition 161*; European reluctance to elevate technologies of 10; industrial technology base see industrial technology base; NATO Prague summit commitments 94–8; perceived gap between United States and Europe in 4–6, 9, 96, 157–8; see also individual countries CAESAR (Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 91, 154, 159 Canada 92, 100, 102 CATRIN (Italian C2 program) 20, 64 CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) defense 96
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CCEB (Combined Communications Electronics Board) 102–3 Central Asia 105 Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) 24–5 CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces, NATO) 86, 97 CNES (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales) 24–5 Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) 91, 154 Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) 102–3 Combined Endeavor 104–5, 159 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF, NATO) 86, 97 command and control (C2) systems: center of excellence for 88, 99; in France 26–7; in Germany 53–4; interoperability 20, 27, 103–5 see also interoperability; in Italy 64; in NATO 87–8 see also Air Command and Control System; in Netherlands 69–70 see also Netherlands, NATO C2 center of excellence; in Spain 73, 74; in Sweden 78; in United Kingdom 41–2; see also C4ISR communications and computers: broadband communications 14, 20, 28, 55, 122, 140; in France 20, 27–9; in Germany 20, 54–6; interoperability 30, 42, 104–5 see also interoperability; in Italy 20, 65; NATO communications and information programs 89–90; NEC systems 11–12; in Netherlands 20, 70; overview of European digital communications systems 20; in Spain 74; in Sweden 20, 79; in United Kingdom 11–12, 20, 42–3; see also C4ISR; satellites computers see communications and computers COMSATs (communications satellites) 20, 28, 122; see also satellites Cormorant network 11, 20, 42–3 COSMO-Skymed (Italian imagery satellite program) satellite system 30, 66, 124 COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) equipment 47, 54, 55–6, 78, 87; Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14
CRONOS (Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Sytems) 89, 95 Czech Republic 117 DABINETT program 43–4 DCI (Defense Capabilities Initiative) 10, 96 defense budgets: Dutch 69; European 4, 6, 9–10, 25, 95, 106; French 24; German defense investment 153, 159–60; Italian defense investment 159–60; R&D investment see research and development (R&D) investment; Spanish 73; United States 3; US policy recommendations regarding Europe’s investments 153 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 10, 96 defense market see armaments/defense market defense strategy: European defense planning recommendations 146–8; European focus at nation level 9, 10–11; Europe’s lack of long-term doctrinal vision on 10; EU strategic defense planning 107–11, 119–20 see also European Capabilities Action Plan; French organizational changes for 21–5 Deployable COTS Network (DCN) 14 Desert Shield 3 Desert Storm 3 DGA (Délégation Générale pour l’Armement) 21–5, 33 disaster management 122; see also relief operations dual-use technologies 8, 132, 145, 149–50; space programs 123–4, 125 EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company) 8, 29, 113, 125, 135–6; EADS Astrium 30, 43, 58, 125; EADS CASA 32; Framework Program participation 119; HRM-7000 tactical radio 57, 73; Paradigm Secure Communications 43 early warning systems 33–40, 79–83; see also AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) earth observation satellites 3, 29–30, 33, 66, 123–4; see also satellites ECAP (European Capabilities Action Plan) 108, 112, 114
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EDA (European Defense Agency) 110–11, 115–16, 118, 120, 149; Industry and Market Directorate 113; R&T Directorate 118 Ericsson: 79–83; Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140 ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) 97–8, 108–9, 120 EUCLID (European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defense) 117 Euro Hawk (German (UAV program) 36 EUROFINDER 117 EuroMALE unmanned aerial vehicles 32, 73, 83 European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) 108, 112–13, 146 European Commission 115, 120, 125, 126–7, 129, 130; encouragement of regional defense market 150; involvement in European R&D 118 European Defense Agency (EDA) 110–11, 115–16, 118, 120, 149 European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 97–8, 108–9, 120 European Space Agency 123, 126, 127, 129, 130 European Union: armaments policy 107, 110, 113–16; Battlegroups 25, 53, 64, 74, 109–10, 120; defense cooperation with France 25; defense research and technology programs 116–19; Headline Goal 5, 107, 108–9, 112, 146; industrial base planning 113–16; space policy, in Constitutional Treaty 127–8; strategic defense planning 107–11, 119–20 see also European Capabilities Action Plan European Union Force (EUFOR) 14 Falcon network 11, 43, 163* FAUST (German C2 system) (Tactical Command Provision) system 53, 54 Finland: industrial technology base 133; network-based defense (NBD) 13–14 Finmeccanica 137, 139–40 Framework Programs (FPs) 118–19, 149 France: command and control systems 26–7; communications and computers 20, 27–9; defense cooperation with EU and NATO 25; defense doctrine 16; Délégation Générale pour l’Armement (DGA) 21–5, 33; as European leader
in space 26, 29, 123, 124, 129; French air force 31, 32, 33; French army 26, 30–1, 33; French navy 25, 26–7, 33; increasing importance of C4ISR capabilities 21–6; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 29–33, 92; interoperability in French forces 25–7; NBO capability table 34–9; organizational changes for defense strategy 21–5; satellites 29, 33, 122, 123, 124; Système d’Information et de Commandement des Armées (SICA) 20 Galileo satellites 4–5, 124, 125, 128, 131 Germany: adoption of transformation policies 16–17; command and control (C2) 53–4; communications and computers 20, 54–6; defense investments 153, 159–60; development of C4ISR capabilities 47, 53; German air force 54, 55; German army 53–4, 56–7, 58; German navy 54, 55, 57; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 56–8, 92; limited cycling of forces for NRF 97; NBO capability table 59–63; satellites 122, 123, 124 Global Hawk (US UAV program) 44, 52, 57, 63, 91, 93 Global Positioning System (GPS) 125, 131 GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) 125–7, 128–9, 161* Greece 30, 32 Griffin wide area network 47, 101, 103 ground surveillance: airborne 21, 30, 91, 154, 159; Alliance Ground Surveillance, NATO 64, 92–3, 161*; earth observation satellites see earth observation satellites; see also intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; radar Gulf War, first 1, 6; military lessons of 2, 107, 152; US networked global capacity demonstrated in 9 Headline Goal 5, 107, 108–9, 112, 146 Helios (French-led imagery satellite program) earth observation system 29–30, 33, 77, 123, 124
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HEROS C2 system 53, 54 Hispasat (Spanish communications satellite program) satellite system 124 humanitarian relief 1, 13, 105, 108–10 Hungary 117 imagery intelligence (IMINT) 32–3, 57 Indonesia 105 industrial technology base: European overview 8, 132–4, 142–3; European second tier defense companies 137–40; Europe’s largest corporation systems see BAE Systems; EADS; Thales (corporation); industrial base planning 8, 113–16; Letter of Intent to facilitate trans-European defense market 114, 150; non-defense European C4ISR market 140–1; recommendations for a cross-European market 149–50; US export control 93, 106, 154–6 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR): Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrators for 91–2, 154, 159; in France 29–33, 92; in Germany 56–8, 92; imagery intelligence 32–3, 57; in Italy 65–6, 92; in NATO 91–3 see also Alliance Ground Surveillance; in Netherlands 73, 92; satellites 122–3 see also satellites; in Spain 29, 77, 92; in Sweden 79–83; in United Kingdom 43–7; see also C4ISR; sensors internet 14, 28, 42, 86, 87; see also broadband communications Internet Protocol (IP): Europe’s communication programs increasingly based on 20; IP-network-based infrastructure 53, 54; IP-networked radios 27–8, 55, 134 see also tactical radio systems; STANAGS for IP-based communications 79 interoperability: between British and American forces 12, 40, 43; Combined Endeavor exercises 104–5; of communications and computer networks 42; effects of transatlantic doctrine and deployment differences 158–60; between European C2 systems 20, 27; European R&T investment as a key to enhancing 116 see also research and technology (R&T)
programs; of French forces 25–7; of ground surveillance systems 91–3; of imagery intelligence analysis systems 32–3, 123; Multilateral Interoperability Program 103–4, 106; Multinational Interoperability Council see MIC; multinational network programs (outside NATO context) 100; Multisensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92; between NATO and United States 84, 94–9, 105–6, 154; NATO Prague summit commitments 7, 10, 94–8; through NATO STANAGS 32, 79, 84, 91, 93–4, 146; platform strategy effect on 25; ‘plug and play’ approach 144, 147, 154; road to integrated European space systems 128–31; between satellite systems 30; US concerns about European capabilities of 4–5; US export control as disincentive for 93, 106, 154–6 Iraq 3, 9, 96, 105, 107, 145; UAV performance in 44 Iridium satellite communications system 122 Italy: collaboration with Spain 64, 73; command and control systems 64; communications and computers 20, 65; defense investments 159–60; gradual deployment of networkbased capabilities 58, 64; industrial collaboration with United States 58; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 65–6, 92; NBO capability table 67–8; satellites 29, 30, 66, 122, 124 see also Helios earth observation system; Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64, 73 JOCS (UK C2 system) (Joint Operational Command System) 27, 40, 41 Joint Command System (JCS) (UK C2 system) 20, 41 JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) 3, 33, 92, 161* JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) 43, 46, 89, 161–2*; see also MIDS Kosovo 3, 94, 95, 105, 107, 145; German forces in 53, 54, 57; shortfalls revealed
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in European capability 88, 152; UAVs in 44, 56 Liberia 105 lift 1, 5, 96 Link-11 tactical data link 27, 28, 43, 55, 65, 70, 162* Link-16 tactical data link 28, 29, 65, 70, 79, 162*; with JTIDS 43; MIDS upgrade of 84 see also MIDS; transatlantic interoperability through 25, 27 Link-22 tactical data link 28, 55, 65, 74, 162* logistics 1, 5, 96 Maastricht Treaty 108 MAJIIC (Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition) 92 MIC (Multinational Interoperability Council) 42, 53, 100–2, 103, 106, 159; definition 162* MIDS (Multifunctional Information Distribution System) 28, 74, 84, 89–90, 142, 159; definition 162* MIP (Multilateral Interoperability Program) 103–4, 106 missiles: Surface-Air-Missile Operations Centre (SAMOC) 54; surveillance 123; theatre missile defense 88, 95 Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) 28, 74, 84, 89–90, 142, 159 Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP) 103–4, 106 Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) 42, 53, 100–2, 103, 106, 159 Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) 92 NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 122 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Air Command and Control System 10, 27, 64, 84, 87–8; Allied Command Transformation 7, 25, 88, 96–7, 98–100; C2 center of excellence 88, 99; Combined Joint Task Forces 86; command
and control programs 87–8 see also Air Command and Control System (ACCS); communications and information programs 89–90; General Purpose Communications System 89; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 91–3 see also AGS; interoperability 84, 94–9, 105–6, 154 see also PCC; Istanbul summit 100; NATO Air Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS) 64, 92–3, 162*; NATO NetworkEnabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99; NATO Response Force (NRF) 7, 25, 88, 96, 97–8, 148; Prague summit commitments 7, 10, 94–8, 152; as principle transatlantic context for C4ISR issues 84–5, 105–6; progress towards networked C4ISR 9–10; roles and capabilities 85–7; Satcom V project 90; standardization agreements (STANAGs) 32, 79, 84, 91, 93–4, 146; Washington summit 96 NCOIC (Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium) 141–2 NCW (network-centric warfare) 3, 9, 162* NEC (network-enabled capabilities) 11–12, 40; NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99 Netherlands: C4ISR interoperability 66, 69; command and control systems 69–70; communications and computers 20, 70; defense budget 69; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 73, 92; NATO C2 center of excellence 88, 99; NBO capability table 71–2; NBO strategy 14–15; support centres 15 network-based defense (NBD) 12–14, 17 network-based operations (NBO): in a changing security environment 1–4, 144–5, 151; definition 162*; European national capability overview 20–3 see also individual countries; European strategies 9–18; policy recommendations for Europe regarding European network-based capabilities 144–50; policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150–6 Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) 141–2
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network-centric warfare (NCW) 3, 9, 162* network-enabled capabilities (NEC) 11–12, 40; NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) project 99 Neuron (European UCAV program) 32, 39, 45, 66, 67, 76, 82–3, 135, 140, 154 New Zealand 100, 102 NGCS (NATO General Purpose Communications System) 89 Nokia 136, 141 Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc. 44, 57, 77, 92, 113, 135 Norway: network-based defense (NBD) 11, 17; participation in MAJIIC 92 NRF (NATO Response Force) 7, 25, 88, 96, 97–8, 148 nuclear proliferation 151; see also CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) defense OCCAR (Organization Conjoint pour la Cooperation en Matiere d’Armament) 111, 114, 116, 150 ORFEO (Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation) 30, 66, 154 Paradigm Secure Communications (subsidiary of EADS) 43 PASR (Preparatory Action on Security Research) 119 PCC (Prague Capabilities Commitments) 7, 10, 96 peacemaking/peacekeeping 94, 95, 105, 107, 108–10, 129 Petersberg tasks 108–10 Phoenix (UK UAV program) 40, 44, 136 Pleiades (French-led imagery satellite program) earth observation system 30, 66, 124 Poland 117 Prague summit, 2002 94–8; Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) 7, 10, 96 Predator (US UAV program) 3, 32, 45, 58, 65 Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) 119 QinetiQ 138–9 radar 30–1, 79, 92–3, 134; Active Phased Array Radar (APAR) project 142; see
also ASTOR; JSTARS; ORFEO; SARLupe radar satellite radios see tactical radio systems RAKEL (Swedish C4 infrastructure) 79, 81 reconnaissance see intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) relief operations 1, 13, 105, 108–10 research and development (R&D) investment 6, 8, 10, 26, 116, 118; German cuts in 53 research and technology (R&T) programs 24, 47, 105, 111, 116–19; recommendations for investment 149 Rheinmetall Defence Electronics 137–8 Rhode and Schwarz 138 RITA 2000 (French communications infrastructure) (Réseau Intégré de Transmissions Automatiques 2000) 20, 27, 134 Saab 32, 83, 140; Saab Ericsson Network Based Defense Innovation 140 Sagem 139 SAR-Lupe (German imagery satellite program) radar satellite 58, 124 SATCOM-BW satellite communications program 56 Satcom V (NATO communications satellite program) project 90 satellites: Common Operational Requirements (BOC) 129; for communications (COMSATs) 20, 28, 122; COSMO-Skymed 30, 66, 124; EU Satellite Center (EUSC) 130; Galileo 4–5, 124, 125, 128, 131; in geosynchronous orbit 122; Helios 29–30, 33, 77, 123, 124; Hispasat 124; interoperability 30; Iridium 122; micro-satellites 33, 40; in NEC doctrine 11; overview of European developments regarding 20; Pleiades 30, 66, 124; for reconnaissance and surveillance 122–3; SAR-Lupe radar satellite 58, 124; SATCOM-BW 56; Satcom V project 90; SICRAL 124; Skynet 11, 20, 43, 124; Spainsat program 74, 122, 124; Syracuse 20, 28, 124; see also space programs sealift see lift security environment, international 1–4, 144–5, 151
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sensors 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 33; British investment 40; dual-use technology 132 see also dual-use technologies; interoperability 91–3; Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 92 Serbia 4, 94; see also Balkans; Kosovo SIAF (Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force) 64, 73 SICA (French C2 system) (Système d’Information et de Commandement des Armées) 20 SICRAL (Italian communications satellite program) satellite system 124 signals intelligence (SIGINT) 33, 57 Skynet satellites 11, 20, 43, 124 SOCRATE (French communications infrastructure) (Système Opérationnel Constitué des Réseaux des Armées pour les Télécommunications) 20, 27, 116–17 South Africa 105 space programs: CNES 24–5; European collaboration on 121–31; France as European leader in space 26, 29, 123, 124, 129; role of space programs NBO 121–3; see also satellites Spain: command and control systems 73, 74; communications and computers 74;; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 29, 77, 92; modernization program 73; NBO capability table 75–6; satellites 74, 77, 122, 124; Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 64, 73 SPIRALE (French early warning satellite program) early warning system 33–40 STANAGs (NATO standardization agreements) 32, 79, 84, 91, 93–4, 146 support centres 15 surveillance see ground surveillance; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) Sweden: command and control systems 78; communications and computers 20, 79; industrial technology base 133; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 79–83; NBO capability table 80–2; network-based defense (NBD) 12–13, 77; rapid reaction units 77–8
Switzerland 30, 32 Syracuse (French satellite communications program) programs 20, 28, 124 tactical radio systems 17, 27–8, 42–3, 55, 56–7; Bowman network 11, 20, 40, 42–3, 146, 160; of Dutch army 70; Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 28, 42, 43, 45, 90; of Swedish services 78, 79; by Thales’ Land and Joint Systems 134 terrorism 1, 2, 95, 121, 151 Thales (corporation) 8, 79, 134–5; Framework Program participation 119; French communications and computer systems 27–8; support for increased investments in security space 125; Thales Netherlands 70; Thales Raytheon Systems 88, 113, 135, 142, 155; Think Tank 24 THALES (Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defense European Science) framework 117 theatre missile defense (TMD) 88, 95 TIPS (Transatlantic Industry Proposed Solution) 92–3 TITAAN (Dutch communications infrastructure) 23, 53, 66, 69, 70, 71, 146 TOPSAT (UK imagery satellite program) 47, 52, 138 Turkey 30 UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) 3, 31–2, 44–5, 56–7, 73, 163* United Kingdom: British Army 12, 41, 42; command and control systems 41–2; communications and computers 11–12, 20, 42–3; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 43–7, 92; interoperability with United States 12, 40, 43; investment in C4ISR systems 40; Joint Command System (JCS) 20, 41; Joint Operational Command System (JOCS) 27, 40, 41; Ministry of Defense restructuring 12, 40; NBO capability table 48–52; networkenabled capabilities (NEC) 11–12, 40; Royal Air Force 12, 41, 43, 46; Royal Navy 12, 41, 43; satellites 122, 124 United States: export control regulations 93, 106, 154–6; global satellite coverage 122, 123, 125; interoperability
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with NATO 84, 94–9, 105–6, 154 see also interoperability; interoperability with United Kingdom 12, 40, 43; noncompliance with NATO STANAGs 94; perceived gap between United States and European militaries 4–6, 9, 96, 153, 157–8; policy recommendations for United States regarding European network-based capabilities 150–6; role in NRF 98; transformation process 2–3, 9, 157; US Navy 25 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 3, 31–2, 44–5, 56–7, 73, 163*; Advanced Joint Communications Node (AJCN) 44–5; digital technology and 123; French linking with manned platforms and space-based assets 26, 29; interoperability 44–5, 56, 154; microUAVs 45, 58; mini-UAVs 31, 45, 56–7;
UCAV (combat) technology 32, 57–8, 83; versatility of 20–1, 99 unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 45, 139 VIRVE (Finnish national C4 infrastructure) 14 Watchkeeper program 40, 44–5, 134 WEAG (Western European Armaments Group) 116–18 WEAO (Western European Armaments Organization) 118, 120 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) operations 1, 2, 95, 121–2 wide area networks (WANs) 41, 47, 86, 101, 103 ZODIAC (Dutch tactical communications system) 70, 71
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