European Security Culture

European Security Culture

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European Security Culture Language, Theory, Policy

Monica Gariup Zayed University, UAE

© Monica Gariup 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Monica Gariup has asserted her moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Gariup, Monica European security culture : language, theory, policy 1. European Security and Defence Policy 2. National security - European Union countries 3. Military policy 4. European Union countries - Military policy 5. Europe Defenses I. Title 327.1’16’094 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gariup, Monica. European security culture : language, theory, policy / by Monica Gariup. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7555-6 1. European Union countries--Foreign relations 2. National security--European Union countries. 3. Rhetoric--Political aspects--European Union countries. 4. European Union countries--Military policy. I. Title. JZ1570.A5G37 2008 355’.03304--dc22 2008031806 ISBN 978-0-7546-7555-6

Contents

List of Tables List of Figures Preface   Abbreviations   Acknowledgements  

vii ix xi xiii xv

1 Introduction  

1

PART I The Grammar of Security: Cultural Assumptions, Preferences, and Policies 2

The Framework of Analysis: Security, Grand Strategy, and Culture  19

3

Is Talk Really Cheap? Language as an Interface between Culture and Behavior   

4 Analyzing Security Discourses and Practices: A Typology  

47 69

PART II The Discourse and Practice of the Esdp: Between Auto-communication, and Power Projection 5 Contextualizing the Discourse on the European Security and Defence Policy or the Elements of the Activity-Performativity-Connectivity Dynamics   97 6

7

“A Secure Europe in a Better World”: Syntax and Semantics of the ESDP  

121

Grand Strategy in Practice: Testing Coherence between Discourse and Action  

187

8 Conclusion  

239

Bibliography   Index

245 331

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List of Tables

1.1 Central Themes of the Book and Literature Clusters   6 1.2 Levels of Analysis and Units   10 2.1 Paradigms in Security Studies 28 3.1 Components of Discursive Syntax and Grammar   54 3.2 Simplified Syntax of Security   58 4.1 Traditional and Human Security Discourses    83 4.2 Security and Defense: Traditional Bureaucratic Division of Labor   85 6.1 Analysis of Referent Objects Devised for Public Opinion Use (EB 54.1 2000)   136 6.2 Vital and Value Interests (based on Gnesotto 2004b:13)   137 6.3 Threats to European Interests (EOS Gallup Report 1996)   146 6.4 Threats (IPSOS 2001)   147 6.5 Threats in the Eurobarometer of Autumn 2002 (EB 58)    147 6.6 EU Priority Actions 2004 (EB 61)   157 6.7 Role of a European Army (EB 54.1 2000: 18)   157 6.8 Summary of the Syntactical Structure and Meaning of the EU Security Discourse   183 6.9 EU-ISS Taskforce Scenarios 2004   184 7.1 Synopsis of ESDP Missions (including aims and means)   226 7.2 Discourse-Action Coherence   229 7.3 Comparison between Grand StrategyAims (ESS) and Missions Aims 232

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List of Figures

1.1 Outline of the Book 2.1 The Disciplinary Relationship between IR and Security/Strategic Studies 3.1 The Reality-Action Path in Policy-Making   3.2 Securitization or Security Discourse as Strategic Resource for Action   6.1 The Geographical Reach of the ESDP in Discourse   7.1 The Institutional Organizational Chart (with 2004 constitutional changes)   7.2 ESDP Geographical Stretch as of March 2007  

14 26 63 67 174 196 231

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Preface

The core idea behind this study was initially conceived in the summer of 2000 when the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was still in its “ad interim” phase, and when detractors would not bet on the future of what appeared to be a very fragile, ambiguous, and ill-fated experiment. Since then, a myriad of events have disrupted international life and, accordingly, the development of this research. The cataclysmatic changes induced by 9/11, the US-led war on terror, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Madrid and London bombings have prompted the European Union (EU) to quickly react and reflect on its position in a radically different international environment. In an amazingly fast pace, specialized institutions have been installed, missions have been deployed, and an ongoing discussion on the strategic requirements and implications of the EU’s role in the world has been kept alive through the production of forward-looking documents and guidelines. The release of the “European Security Strategy” (ESS) in June 2003, the results of the Convention on the Future of Europe, the 2004 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), the “Constitution for Europe”, the Lisbon Treaty, and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements represent the major landmarks of this incredibly quick progress. This state of affairs demands constant analytical attention to world events and begs the academic question of how research that tries to tackle very contemporary and highly politicized issues can survive the ambition of being “scientific” in any sense. Indeed, the greatest challenge encountered in the course of this endeavor has been one of control of the data set. Testifying for the importance of contextual environmental factors, events have triggered a constant re-assessment of the central hypotheses of this book, and they have been fuelling a condition of “insecurity” and anxiety, which a political researcher can hardly escape. Time is a very sensitive variable in this regard. One of the toughest decisions is to set a time limit for the intake of new empirical material in order to avoid the risk of being dangerously out-of-date or fatally disconfirmed. After an attentive observation of the magnitude of the developments in the field, the time frame for this research has been closed on September 2004, and thus covers a period of 5 years (since 1999). On the one hand, the EU enlargements and the ground-breaking approval of the “constitutional treaty” (despite the ratification hurdles haunting that text but also the following Lisbon Treaty rejected by the Irish referendum in June 2008), and on the other the investiture of a new Commission signalling a change in the leadership – the Italian President Romano Prodi has been substituted by Spanish Jose Manuel Barroso, British RELEX Commissioner Christopher Patten by Austrian Benita FerreroWaldner, while Javier Solana has remained as a symbol of continuity – have been interpreted as the signposts for the artificial conclusion of a phase. However, since

xii

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politics is in constant movement – and international politics even more so – this book should be considered as a preliminary exercise elucidating tendencies and theoretical underpinnings rather than establishing definite a-temporal and absolute results. The discussions presented in this work offer a comprehensive background to the ESDP and the issues at stake in view of the publication by Mr Solana of a review of the European Security Strategy by December 2008.

Abbreviations

ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CHODs Chiefs of Defense CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Civilian Management CIVPOL Civilian Police CJTF Combined Joint Task Force CME Civil Military Exercise Conops Concept of Operation CONV European Convention CONST European Constitutional Treaty COREPER Permanent Representatives Committee CPN Conflict Prevention Network CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DG Directorate General DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EADS European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company EC European Community ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office ECMM European Community Monitoring Mission (in former Yu) ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defense Community EIHR European Initiative for Human Rights EP European Parliament EPC European Political Cooperation EPF European Police Force ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force ERRM European Rapid Reaction Mechanism ESDC European Security and Defence College ESDI European Security and Defence Identity ESDP European Security and Defence Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union EU-ISS European Union Institute of Security Studies EUMC European Union Military Committee EUMS European Union Military Staff EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission EUPM European Union Police Mission

xiv

European Security Culture

EUROFOR European (Rapid Deployment) Force EUROMARFOR European Maritime Force Europol European Police Office EU15 European Union 15 members as of 1995 EU25 European Union 25 members as of 1 May 2004 EU27 European Union 27 members as of 1 January 2007 GAC General Affairs Council HFC Helsinki Force Catalogue HR/SG High Representative/Secretary General (see also SG/HR) IGC Intergovernmental Conference IGO Intergovernmental Organization IPTF International Police Task Force (UN) ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) JHA Judicial and Home Affairs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-governmental Organization NSS National Security Strategy OPLAN Operation Plan OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PfP Partnership for Peace PKO Peacekeeping Operation PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PSC Political and Security Committee PSO Peace Support Operations QMV Qualified Majority Voting RELEX External Relations Directorate General RRF Rapid Reaction Force RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism SEA Single European Act SG/HR Secretary General/High Representative (see also HR/SG) SHAPE Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe (NATO) SITCEN Situation Centre TEU Treaty on European Union UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council USA or US United States WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Acknowledgements Writing a book is often a very intensive and solitary endeavor. However, a number of institutions and people have supported me in these last years, and I am most grateful to all of them. In particular, I wish to thank the “Europa Fellows I” Program at Collegium Polonicum (Slubice, Poland) and the Europa Universität Viadrina of Frankfurt Oder (Germany), and Prof. Michael Minkenberg for his continuing support. As a rather “exotic” element in a predominantly German-Polish interdisciplinary group – both because of my passport and my training as an IR political scientist – I have been exposed to fruitful discussions and stimulating interactions with many colleagues and faculties working under the all-inclusive hat of the so-called “cultural sciences”. I am indebted to them for opening up to me a new universe of ideas, some of which I decided to explore more in depth and integrate into my research. Caught in the midst of very exciting but contradictory intellectual inputs and projects, I still managed to learn a lot from a variety of experiences and people. I would like to mention in particular Prof. Richard Betts (Columbia University Institute of War and Peace), who gave me the opportunity to participate at the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS 2002) at Cornell University. The intensive course and wonderful insights brought me back on track when I was lost in a fog of theoretical Pindaric flights. I am also indebted to the many commentators at several conferences and workshops where I presented my ideas and was challenged into very fertile debates. I always went home with precious suggestions and new perspectives. By the same token, I would like to thank those individuals in Brussels – both civilian and military – who sacrificed some of their time in order to provide me with important information and interesting points of view. Finally, I should not forget everybody who, especially in the final phase of this research, encouraged and convinced me not to despair and to give up. The friends at the European Public Law Centre (Athens, Greece) and the colleagues at Zayed University (Abu Dhabi, UAE) have offered me a shoulder in moments of desperation and disillusionment. Last but not least, my most sincere gratitude goes to my Italian and German families whose distant but incessant patience and tolerance contributed to remind me of my final goals, and to my husband whose continuing support and affection have proven invaluable.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

When I was talking about the European army, I was not joking. If you do not want to call it a European army, don’t call it a European army. You can call it ‘Margaret’, you can call it ‘Mary Ann’, and you can call it any name. (Prodi in The Independent, 4 February 2000). We have to move towards a more active and less declaratory foreign policy. Our words have to be matched by deeds. (Solana Nn01/99) We are trying to move from a foreign policy of communiqués and declarations full of strong nouns and weak verbs to something more substantive, more muscular, more focused, that can have more impact. (Patten SPEECH/02/134, SPEECH/02/76)

State of Affairs Security and defense have been critical – although rarely central – issues for the European Community (EC) before and for the European Union (EU) now. At the beginning of the European experiment in the 1950s security concerns counted among the primary considerations for integration. It was clear in the minds and consciousness of European elites that peace had to be cemented in a durable way and that, for what concerned the cocoon of the Western part of the old continent, the until-then-usual means of military supremacy and confrontation were not the solution to cope with the “anarchy” of interstate relations (Mitrany 1943; De Rougemont 1965). Nevertheless, the still warm memory of the disastrous Second World War, the division of the continent in two “enemy” blocs, and the need to reaffirm traditional forms of national power and sovereignty made it impossible to explicitly and successfully include security and defense on the agenda of the organization. The reference to the use and management of military force was exiled from the Community scope of responsibility and developed into a sort of taboo (Manners 2002a; Rummel 2002; Biscop 2002; etc.). The self-proclaimed normative identity of the EC/EU based on the values of peace, cooperation, multilateralism, and democracy led some analysts to define “the nature of the beast” in terms of “civilian” or “soft” power, whereby a positive connotation was evinced from the unfortunate – because incommensurable – analogy with the “evil” self-interested



European Security Culture

powers prone to use violence in order to enforce their will on the international or regional arena (Galtung 1973; Bull 1982; Whitman 1998; Rotfeld 2001). The development from Community to Union has not only been nominal or monetary. The often criticized neo-functionalist prophecies of spill-over from low politics to high politics appear to be in the advanced process of fulfilling themselves (or better to be fulfilled by the actors involved) and constitute l’ordre du jour in discussions about the political-constitutional future and the role of the EU in the world. The subject has cyclically caught the attention of policymakers throughout the history of European integration but has acquired particular resonance in connection with the international events of the last decade of the 21st century. The end of the Cold War and the re-discovery of old and new problems and threats have generated a debate concerning the availability, usefulness, efficacy and quality of the instruments the Community and the Union possess in dealing with external crises. The terms “security”, “defense”, and “military” have entered the discussions: the inability to efficiently cope with the situation in the Balkans and the realization of the need to re-conceptualize objectives and ambitions have contributed to the dissolution of the taboo. The invention of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been welcome not only as a step forward towards further political integration but also as the sign that the taboo concerning the use of force seems to be finally overcome. The setting up of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), with all the political, institutional, and bureaucratic implications that this new instrument entails is considered as the breaking point, the symptomatic indication of the final acceptance of the military in the EU-ropean forum. By 2008 a full institutional structure is in place with a force of the size of an army corps (50,000 to 60,000 troops) which has been deployed on the ground in a variety of formats in Macedonia, Bosnia and Congo among others. Despite internal disagreements among the Member States about a variety of foreign policy issues – first and foremost related to the war in Iraq and the U.S. government’s general approach to international relations – the Union managed to incorporate and expand the ESDP as a full component of the constitutional setup of the organization. Sensibly extending the range of the famous “Petersberg tasks” from traditional peacekeeping to a fully-fledged “peacemaking”, and opening the   Community and Union are not synonymous. The European Community has legal personality and is often identified with the competencies stemming from the so-called first pillar. The European Union should be the ‘temple’ comprising the Communities (Including ECSC and EURATOM), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Judicial and Home Affairs (JHA).   There is an abundance of acronyms. Initially the ESDP was also known as Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), and it should not be confused with the European Security and Defence Identity (a NATO initiative) or the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP).

Introduction



way to the possibility of a “mutual defense” clause among willing Member States, the controversial 2004 Constitutional Treaty and the successive Lisbon Treaty successfully brokered the integration of a military security dimension into the aims and means of the Union.

Questions and Aims What is the meaning of the terms “security” and “defense” in the same name European policy? Has the supposed taboo concerning military force really been broken or has it been reinterpreted because of a change in the identity or in the interests of the EU (or both)? What are the implications of rhetorical declarations for public policy and identity construction? This study attempts to enhance the understanding of the impact of ideas, norms, and values on the construction of security concepts in general and the EU security grand strategy in particular. The driving theoretical question is summarized by Ronnie Lipschutz in his book “On Security”: How do ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually, become institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles and practices? (Lipschutz 1995: 1).

Three different but interrelated levels and clusters of questions can be individuated at the basis of the current debate epitomized by Lipschutz’ query (see also Howorth 2004a): a. on the “philosophy of security”, or the source, importance, and weight of ideational variables (culture) in the construction of security issues (compared to the incidence of material determinants); b. on the “language of security”, or the role of language and discourse in the formulation of security concepts; and finally c. on the “politics of security”, or the impact of security discourses on institutionalization and action on the one hand and on identity and actorness on the other. This book has theoretical and empirical ambitions. The theoretical aim is, in the words of Barry Buzan, “to map the domain of security as an essentially contested concept (…) to define the conceptual sub-structures on which the mass of empirical studies by strategists and others rest” (Buzan 1997: 14) by providing a comprehensive framework of analysis against which the philosophy, language, and politics of the ESDP can be tested. Empirically this means to analyze the language of the ESDP in order to individuate a dominant logic and shed light on the cultural assumptions and the behavioral expectations which originate from rhetorical and policy formulations. In particular, the aim is to engage the debate



European Security Culture

on the nature of the EU as a security and strategic actor and to understand the dynamics of identity construction and self-conceptualization.

State of Research The literature on the ESDP is enormous but theoretically non-rigorous. The phenomenon is relatively recent and very young in terms of operational capacity and actual deployments. In addition, it is often downplayed for what concerns the width and depth of the overall policy aims and means or exploited as the banner of broader hidden political agendas of both scholars and policy-makers. As a matter of fact, much of the literature is purely descriptive, with a particular focus upon EU institutions and capabilities and factual policy-analysis. A number of works are dedicated to the repetitive narration of the historical developments of the ESDP and the successive institutional changes in declarations, decisions, and treaty implementations. Among other issues treated are also armaments and defense budgets, Member States’ attitudes and policies towards the ESDP, and technical operational details (Brenner 1998; Sjursen 1998; Croft 2000; Deighton 2000; Duke 2000; Giessman 2000; Groves 2000; Menon 2000; Stavidris 2001; Tanner 2001 Terriff 2001; Hunter 2002; Mueller 2002; Rynning 2002; Balis 2003; Gaertner 2003; Quille 2003; Sjursen 2003; Menon 2004; Peters 2004; Pilegaard 2004; Giegerich and Wallace 2004; Howorth 2007; Merlinger 2007b; Biscop and Andersson 2007; Engelbrecht and Hallenberg 2007; Giegerich 2007; and many others). Not surprisingly the EU is among the major producers – in the form of information sheets published on its website – and sponsors of this type of publications (Gambles 1991; Gnesotto 2000; Heisbourg 2000; Howorth 2000; Missiroli 2000; Missiroli 2001; Erhardt 2002; Lindley-French 2002; Faria 2004). A great deal of the literature is prescriptive or normative in nature and is centred around the debate over whether the EU should develop a security and defense dimension at all, and how it should develop it (what should the ESDP be like?) (Heisbourg 2000a; Naumann 2000; Guttman 2000; Biscop 2002; Howorth 2002; Becher 2004; Algieri and Bauer and Brummer 2005; Anderson and Seizt 2006). The policy-analytical approach is supplemented by discussions of visions, proposals, and implications not only for the development of the policy per se but also for the very character of the European Union as an actor or a power (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Smith K. E. 2000; Stavidris 2001; Whitman 2002; Manners 2002; Hill 2003; Treacher 2004; Haine 2004; Hyde-Price 2006; Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006). The camp is generally divided into two broad factions: one cautioning against the development of an independent military capability because of the need to capitalize on “civilian power” strength (Rosecrance 1998; Smith 1998) or because of the need to cooperate with the United States and NATO (Glaser 1993; Greco 1996; Art 1996; Behnke 2000; Croft 2000; Kupchan 2000; Cornish and Edwards 2001; van Ham 2001; O’Sullivan 2001; Hunter 2002), while the other sees the ESDP as the litmus test of EU international actorness (Sjursen

Introduction



1998; Ginsberg 1999; Bertelsmann Foundation 2000; Ginsberg 2001; Cameron 2002) or even full-fledged federal integration (Hill 1993b; Koslowsky 1999; Von Bogdandy 1999). A smaller percentage of the literature provides a theoretical contribution to the study of EU external security (Waever 1995; Huysman 1996; Ginsberg 1999; Pollack 2000; Kelstrup/Williams 2000; Waever 2000; Geyer 2003; Sjursen 2004b; Hyde-Price 2006). Explanations of the ESDP are however in most cases included in liberal-institutionalist accounts where the EU member states are taken as central levels of analysis (Jakobsen 1997, 1998b; Regelsberger et al. 1997; Howorth 2001; Meyer 2004), or internal institutional mechanisms and their implications for the organization are analyzed at length (Van Staden 1994; Smith KE 1998; Andreani et al. 2000; Nuttal 2000; Win and Lord 2001; Smith ME 2003; Wagner 2003; Dietrichs and Jopp 2003). Exactly because of the continuing importance of traditional realist and liberal notions of state sovereignty – despite a number of attempts to challenge the orthodoxy (Caporaso 1995; King T. 1999; Cooper 2000; Smith ME 2003) – the EU is rarely taken seriously by mainstream International Relations (IR): it is underestimated or at a maximum considered as a case sui generis not useful in theoretical testing or development (Risse-Kappen 1996; but see Bronstone 2000 and Christiansen et al. 2000). In particular, security studies as a sub-discipline of IR only peripherically engage the theoretical challenges that the ESDP represents (Posen 2004), and strategic studies seem to be interested only in technical military accounts of a descriptive nature (Wolf and Zycher 2001; Andreani et al. 2001; McGinn and Liston 2001). An original effort to explain and conceptualize the ESDP by using existing theoretical paradigms and the idea of a strategic culture was however initiated by Cornish and Edwards 2001 and developed further by Howorth 2002, Rynning 2003, Martinsen 2003, Heiselberg 2003, Williams 2005, Meyer 2004 and 2007, and these in particular represent the background against which this book is set.

Theoretical Approach and Central Concepts Before engaging in an introduction to the theoretical approach adopted here, it is important to point out that this book is the result of a multi-/interdisciplinary and holistic approach. As a matter of fact, one of the fundamental objectives is to try to transgress the artificial compartmentalization between academic disciplines and to bridge the gap between Political Science, Sociology, International Relations, Security/Strategic Studies and European Integration Studies (with digressions into Linguistics, Anthropology, Philosophy and Psychology) by extrapolating and using “unorthodox” instruments in order to better understand security as a social condition on the one hand and as a political dynamic on the other. This is why this research can be situated in the context of the so-called “New European Security Theories” (NEST): a new generation of research moving among and across different schools of thought (Waever and Buzan 2007: 399).

European Security Culture



While efforts have certainly been made to theorize around aspects of the European security culture and policy, there are few systematic attempts to join together relevant theories and concepts. The background literature which inspired research and constitutes the backbone of this book can be classified according to its thematic central focus: The dominant approach is predicated on a number of general principles drawn from the theory of social action, and in particular, on tenets which can partially be reconducted to the meta-theory of social constructivism, since the security identity and interests of the EU are problematized (Jepperson et al. 1996: 67; McSweeney

Table 1.1 Themes Security

Culture

Central Themes of the Book and Literature Clusters Literature Critical security studies: Brown C. 1992; Krause and Williams 1997; Wyn Jones 1999; Weldes et al. 1999; CASE Collective 2006; and others; Copenhagen School and securitization: Buzan 1991; Waever 1995a, 1997 etc.; Buzan and Waever and DeWilde 1999; McSweeney 1999; and others Social constructivism: Kratochwil 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996b; Ruggie 1998; Risse and Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Christiansen 2001; Hopf 2002; Zehfuss 2002 Strategic culture: Booth 1979, 1990; Gray 1984, 1999a, 1999b; Duffield 1998; Snyder 1990; Klein Y. 1991; Johnston 1995a, 1995b; Lantis 2002a, 2005; Poor 2003; Glenn 2004

Discourse

International Actorness

European strategic culture: Cornish and Edwards 2001, 2005; Heiselberg 2003; Rynning 2003a, 2003b; Hyde-Price 2004; Meyer 2004 and 2007; Williams 2005; Matlary 2006 Linguistics in general: Connolly 1983; Fairclough 1992; Potter 1996; van Dijk 1997a and 1997b; Barker and Galanski 2001 Discourse and foreign policy: Thornborrow 1993; Chilton 1996b; Dalby 1997; Donahue and Prosser 1997; Larsen 1997 and 2000b; Huysmans 1998; Waever 1998b and 2000a; Diez 1999 and 2001; Milliken 1999; Nicloaidis and Howse 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Howorth 2004b; Howarth and Torfing 2005; Hansen 2006 European IR: Hill 1990, 1993a, 2003; Hill and Wallace 1996; Rosecrance 1998; Cameron 1998; Ginsberg 1999; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Smith KE 2003; Treacher 2004 Powerness: Galtung 1973; Gastgeyer 1996; Guttman 2000; Lauren 2001; Rotfeld 2001; Manners 2002b, 2006; Hill 2003; Salmon and Shepherd 2003 Giegerich and Wallace 2004; Haine 2004b; Maull 2005; Caseey 2006; Aggestam 2008; Hyde-Price 2008; Bailes 2008

Introduction



1999) and ideational factors (such as intersubjective meanings, norms, discourse, and epistemic communities) are seen to concur in the perception and definition of security (Ruggie 1998: 33). In addition, this research can be situated in the strands of “constructive realism” (as opposed to “constructive idealism”) whereby the agent is deemed to have an epistemic but not an ontological influence on the existence of the world (Ben Zeev 1995: 50) and “organizational constructivism” according to which interests and identities are originated by consensual knowledge (Haas EB 2001: 26). It is assumed that international reality is not merely the result of material and physical forces, but that it is a phenomenon socially constructed through discursive power, that is, the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language (Adler 1997a; Hopf 1998). Fundamental to this thesis is also the claim that the concept of culture is critical to understand many of the important issues underlying security as a value and as a policy. The general focus of this book is roughly sketched in the phrasing of the title which retakes the words of Peter Katzenstein’s “The Culture of National Security” (1996). All three terms – taken singularly or collectively – are essentially problematic and are particularly tricky when associated to the European Union. “National security” refers to a clearly delimited state-centered condition, while “culture” awakens nightmares of never-ending intellectual discussions related to the definition and boundaries of identity: an anathema for students of mainstream international relations and strategic studies who are not supposed to leave the safe ground of “scientific” analysis and “high politics” and cede to the corruption of less positivist and popular methods of inquiry (Booth 1997). In order to be theoretically tenable, this approach requires a definition of culture that on the one hand is material enough to make it observable, while on the other is both dynamic and non-deterministic, so that it is possible to establish a methodological relationship between security cultural assumptions (strategic culture) on the one hand and policy preferences (grand strategy) and behavior (security policy) on the other. The instruments of language and discourse intervene in the relationship between structure and agency (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Adler 1997b; Checkel 1998) and to solve the dilemma between culture as context and culture as behavior (Gray 1999; Johnston 1995a, 1995b). Using words as “thick signifiers” (Huysmans 1998b) and the concept of a dominant discourse as the constraining and enabling interface between ideas/culture/identity and policy/action/behavior, language is seen as a strategic resource for communication (or auto-communication) and the construction of identity and actorness (George 1994: 172–3; Buzan and Waever and de Wilde 1998; see also on communication: Diez 2001: 85; Habermas 1990). As a matter of fact, the analysis of discourse intended as a linguistic social product prompts on the one hand the drawing of inferences about the cultural assumptions existing at the input level and, on the other, the making of positive or negative predictions about the range of possible actions in terms of outputs and outcomes. A dominant discourse is indicative of dominant cultural assumptions – in this case, about security and the use of force – and it is constraining and enabling



European Security Culture

a particular set of policy options. Moreover, discourse and policy are interrelated in a dynamic and mutually constitutive process. If the actions are consistent with the dominant discursive “promises”, then the theoretical dilemma between culture as context or culture as behavior is solved in favor of the hypothesis that a circular relationship culture-behavior (via discourse) exists and that, for the sake of the analysis, it is possible to separate the two variables. By introducing discourse as an intervening variable and by bracketing the relationship culture-discourse, it is possible to complete the circle by looking at the relationship discourse-behavior (see Giddens 1994 and structuration theory). Simplifying, by syllogism, if culture (C) equals discourse (D) and discourse (D) equals behavior (B), then culture (C) equals behavior (B). The action made by the discourse (as a speech act) is one of delimiting, that is, setting boundaries to the meaning of the concepts implied. In this sense the discourse of the ESDP specifies the contours and scope of the policy by offering a context against which the terms should be interpreted. The question is not to assess whether the issues defined as threats to security are objectively dangerous for the referent object involved; rather, the aim is to highlight the components of intersubjective security: a social construct acquiring a precise meaning only within a specific social context and as a result of discourses and discursive actions (Doty 1996: 239). Finally, it should be stressed that the theoretical aim is not to demonstrate that a cultural explanation is superior to structural theories, but to highlight how cultural variables may complement the understanding of social phenomena in general and security in particular (Desch 1998). More than disaggregating the concept of culture as Meyer tries to do (2004), this research attempts to identify criteria to operationalize culture as a variable and transform it into a more “material” product (texts) that can be empirically studied. As a matter of fact, culture is merely used to support the neo-realist argument that by interacting in the international system, actors “will display characteristics common to competitors: namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system” (Waltz 1979: 128). This means in the EU case that the experience of the Union in international security will bounce back to influence the culture of the Union and the formation or consolidation of ambitions of statehood.

Level of Analysis and Empirical Assumptions The problem of the levels of analysis is directly connected to the choice and the relative weighting of explanatory variables. A clear-cut separation between the levels is not always the solution since the same variable can operate in a similar way on different levels (Jervis 1976). The internal/external dimensions and the dilemma concerning where to draw the lines between inside and outside constitute a central theme in the current debate about the future of security studies in particular and international relations in general, and considering the EU as the primary object of analysis does not facilitate the task. How far the Union is external to the

Introduction



member-states is a matter of perspective, whereby the traditional domestic/foreign dichotomy is being revised in all sectors of policy-making (see in particular the effects of globalization in Walker 1993; Sil and Dougherty 2000). In general, there are two ways to approach the security culture of the EU. On the one hand, one could consider the EU culture as the result of an addition of all the national strategic cultures. This presumes either convergence and/or uniformization: conflicting elements must be levelled and eliminated so that it is possible to identify a common strategy. In a bluntly simple algebraic equation, if you add different variables (x+y+n), you can obtain a result only if the terms of reference (measures) are the same, otherwise they have to be transformed (find a common denominator, calculated on the basis of a common variable – for instance x) in order to be summed. This process implies a “reduction”, a change in the perspective on how the elements are defined (see comparative approach: Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2004 and 2005; Hyde-Price 2004; Merand 2006). On the other hand, the EU security culture can be considered as the product of a multiplication (see multiplier effect): the product is represented by the common position/policy/culture. Differences are not levelled (x*y*n), so that it is not possible to distinguish the inputs anymore. As shown in the Table 1.2, two different types of representations are possible: a traditional model whereby the EU is seen as an international organization; and a “federal” or unitary one (the ambition of the fore-fathers), according to which the European Union is considered as an entity in itself, as a product more than a sum. The most obvious criticism to this last approach is that the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy-area and that it is unsound to consider the Union as a unit in this field. However, as it will be argued, from an external point of view, the decisions and the operations on the ground, as well as the discourses about it, can be re-conducted in terms of legitimacy and responsibility to the Union as an entity as such, physically present through the symbol of the “starry-blue” flag. This is particularly true if one considers self-perception and discursive projections besides external recognition (Castano and Sacchi and Hayes Gries 2003). As a consequence, the border checkpoint is situated between the Union and the rest of the world. This means that, although in some cases inevitable, the policies of the individual member-states – the internal level – will not be problematized. More interesting in this context is the impact of the security construction on the development of a genuine overall EU-ropean identity (Delanty 1995; Whitman 1998; Morten 1999; Andrew and Crook and Waller 2000). In this sense, the external environment is populated by non-Member States (US, Russia, NATO and so on), member-states in their function as international actors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom…) and other governmental and non-governmental players; while the “domestic” level refers mainly to the EU institutions. For analytical simplification, the Union is considered as a proto-state: “literally” and functionally it possesses attributes which are comparable to characteristic federal-state features (Risse-Kappen 1996). This is in line with what has been called “methodological

European Security Culture

10

Table 1.2

Levels of Analysis and Units

Levels

Units – Traditional Model

Units – Federal Model

International

Other States and global IGOs, NGOS Council of Europe, NATO, NAFTA, ASEAN etc.

State Meso-Regional Micro-Regional

Other States and global IGOs (ex. UN), NGOS European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, NAFTA, ASEAN etc. Member States Sub-state regions Communities

Individuals

Citizens

Macro Regional

European Union Member States Sub-state Regions and communities Citizens

nationalism” or the fact that, independently from the theoretical color, the concept of state plays a pivotal role in studies of security (Beck 1997: 44). The analytical focus is thus on the particular construction of EU security as expressed in EU documents and speeches and in the associated discursive/ epistemic community. It is assumed that the EU security discourse has a relative autonomy and does influence the sub and supra level (Member States and the international level) (see for instance neo-institutionalism March and Olsen 1989).

Methodology One of the ambitions of this book is not only to contribute to better understanding the security narrative and identity of the European Union, but to develop a model for the analysis of security discourses in general and advance general knowledge of complex social and political phenomena. Critics may question the use of only one case-study in theory testing. In particular, within the positivist approach to science, single case-studies are seen as problematic because they do not provide sufficient bases for generalizations. However, this method allows the researcher to study a phenomenon intensively, interpret how theoretical elements are related to each other, and thereby arrive at a better understanding of complex problems and dynamic processes (Yin 1984: 23). It offers an illustration that gives a provisional indication of the relevance of the analytical framework proposed. In this sense, the analysis of the ESDP is not only useful for the policy implications that might derive, but it enhances the comprehension of the logic of the security dynamic in general. The EU discourse of security is here intended as the totality of texts (spoken or written) produced by the EU as an institution (or by its representatives), which reflect and reproduce a determined approach to security and where the EU speaks

Introduction

11

with a unique voice in the period 1998–2004. Different types of texts belong to this discourse, among others, the statements, declarations, speeches, lectures, and articles of CFSP/ESDP High Representative Solana, Commission President Prodi, and RELEX Commissioner’s Patten. Moreover, legislative instruments like treaties, common strategies, and joint actions enshrine the dominant discourse and are to be considered already part of the action. As a matter of facts, these texts are the final result of long diplomatic negotiations between Member States (with different historical, political, or social backgrounds), and they reflect the achieved consensus (for good or for worse). A central role is played by the European Security Strategy (ESS) as the point of arrival of a relatively long internal debate. However, this key document is in no way considered as the only text of reference since, as Milliken points out, “if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (…) to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse” (Milliken 1999: 233). It should be noted that the aim is not to analyze the personal worldviews of the individuals, but to highlight the “official” problem representations that result from the policymaking process. In addition, 32 off-the-record interviews conducted with EU officials, foreign ministry officials and diplomats, military personnel seconded to the EU, academic specialists and journalists in Brussels, Berlin, London, Rome, and Paris provide important qualitative inputs for the interpretation of the above-mentioned texts. The concept of EU-ropean security and defense can thus be constructed through the analysis of the discourse of the EU as a formal organization (the statements and declarations of its organs) and as expressed in informal communities of political decision-makers and military officers (see also Burgess and Tunander 2000). The use of primary resources – documentary evidence and interviews – however, is severely hindered by the regime of confidentiality which limits the public access to the decisions or reports related to the most sensitive issues connected to the ESDP. This lack of transparency is partially compensated by the recourse to secondary literature and, specifically, to the knowledge of the security epistemic community. For reasons which are explained at length in Chapter 5, the use of opinion polls or other statistical sources is very limited and referred to only as a tertiary tool for supporting evidence. A note on the language is important. The common technical jargon is the diplomatic language informed by “statal” notions and symbols which constitute the basic terms of reference and facilitate communication and common understanding of the terms used, independently of the particular language spoken. However, English, and at a lower degree French and German, is the language used in the business of CFSP and ESDP, that is, for communication to the external world, (what is obviously normal since the major receivers are located outside the Union).  ������������������������������������������������������������������������ See art. 4(1), Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (Official Journal L 145/43 of 31.05.2001).

12

European Security Culture

Although official declarations and statements as well as legislative documents are published in the pre-2004 11 official languages, the speeches – inside and outside the Union – are generally performed in English. The local language of the venue is used only in the case the speaker can speak it, and in any case, the personal rhetorical attributes of the speaker play quite an important role. The fact that the final texts are often the product of ghost-writers and/or team-work fortifies the hypothesis of a common linguistic system. Most interestingly, the websites of the CFSP High Representative as well as of the External Relations’ Commissioner are only in English, while for instance other websites of the Commission can be found in all the official languages. The use of English as a lingua franca is important because, as it will be discussed later, the speaking of a particular language may entail important conceptual differences in the respective political culture (Chilton 1996a: 29). The problem of understanding and meaning between mother-tongues and second language speakers as well as the differences among cultural contexts are in a way overcome by the assumption of the existence of an epistemic discursive community sharing and understanding a standard technical jargon. In the case of translations, apart from the fact that in general official translations are carefully drafted and must be finally approved for release, original texts in French, German, Italian and Spanish are compared for consistency with the official English version. The working assumption, confirmed in the analysis of the empirical material, is that there is a common language (the political-diplomatic jargon) across institutions (Council, Commission, and EP) and across sectors or pillars. For what concerns the method for the analysis of the actual texts and of the discourse in general, two observations are relevant here. In general, discourse analysis includes a variety of methods ranging from pure structural linguistics to semantics and pragmatics. One of the aims of this book is however to contribute to the development of empirical methods to study security discourses. After a selection of most important texts in terms of legitimacy and authority (legislative or official source), topic, and resonance in the public, texts are analyzed on the basis of a syntactical model. In particular, at the macro-level texts are contextualized, while at the micro level the elements of the texts are classified on the basis of the function played in the sentence. Inescapably, the researcher plays a determinant role in the selection and interpretation of the texts to analyze. From a quantitative content analysis perspective at the micro level, the frequency in which certain words and formulations appear in the texts is assessed and then evaluated according to the model (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 36–38). Since the aim is to highlight the common logic behind the dominant discourse, the analysis is synchronic, that is, materials from different contexts, actors, and years are fitted into a “syntactical structure” like fragments fitted together in a puzzle, so that it is possible to individuate recurrent patterns, structural arrangements, and chains  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Interestingly, in particular in the Commission, the ghost-writers in this field were until 2004 all English mother-tongues.

Introduction

13

of equivalence (Skinner 2002). The time of production is relatively unimportant in this research because it is assumed that displayed beliefs tend to be consistent across the period of analysis: in fact, even an event of the proportions of 9/11 did not essentially change the dominant pre-existing assumptions and vocabulary, thus testifying for relative stability of focal concepts. In practice this means that texts are initially filtered through the use of boundary markers and Boolean combinations. In particular, the following key-words have been used: ESDP, security, defense, threat, challenge, danger, risk, military, force, civilian, war, peace, strategy, values, interests, global, territory, human, conflict, crisis. As it will be discussed more in length in the following, these terms are considered to be “classifier languages” of security or nouns which reveal the structure of conceptual categories (Lakoff 1987: 92). It is important to stress that discourse analysis works on public texts, and it does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors. The weakness of linking discourse to culture lies however in the fact that it is not possible to assess whether the texts do really represent ingrained meanings or beliefs, since they can be manipulated for rhetorical reasons. In order to avoid the complexity of referring to psychological and cognitive approaches, the dominant discourse is considered as a structure produced by social interactions that create public beliefs. At the same time, bias in the speeches and statements is controlled through cross-tabulation with writings intended for a variety of different audiences, triangulation of public sources, and confidential interviewing (see also Berger 1996).

Outline Since the main contribution of this study is the elaboration of a theoretical analytical model, the structure follows a deductive logic proceeding from the general to the particular, from the theory to the practice. Chapter 1 has introduced in brief the rationale, the aims, the research problematique, and the arguments that will be touched upon in the development of this work. The rest of the book is sub-divided in two parts of three chapters each. Figure 1.1 summarizes the organization of the narrative. Chapter 2 introduces the framework of analysis and discusses the basic analytical tools of this research (the philosophy of security). It traces the main lines of discussion in Strategic/Security Studies and International Relations Theory and assesses the validity of new approaches to the subject of international security. In particular, it establishes the relationship between culture (political and strategic) and grand strategy (policy preferences). Chapter 3 is dedicated to the presentation of the role of language and discourse in the construction of a security concept (the language and politics of security). Discourse is intended as both structure and behavior but the two conceptions are kept separated: on the one hand the elaboration of a discursive syntax is introduced as a model for the analysis of security (micro and macro), and on the

European Security Culture

14

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Introduction

15

other discourse is positioned as an interface between culture and action (beliefslanguage-action) in an attempt to answer the question of how ideational variables can be empirically tested in the analysis of the policy making process and of agenda setting in particular. On the basis of the ongoing debate and applying the analytical framework developed in the previous chapter, Chapter 4 proposes an ideal-typology of security discourses: the “Westphalian traditional security” discourse and the “Human Security” discourse. An overview of the terms of reference for current discourses and practices of security (including defense and crisis-management) sets the backstage for the comparative analysis of the ESDP. The second part is dedicated to the EU case study and the application of the model to the EU security discourse and practice. The objective of Chapter 5 is to discuss the situational, cultural, cognitive, and co-textual contexts of the discourse in order to then locate in Chapter 6 the grammar of EU security through the analysis of texts on the basis of the syntax constructed (subject, referent object, predicate, and prepositional phrases). The grammar used suggests the dominance of a “traditional-plus” security discourse in line with the majority of contemporary Western security grand strategies. In addition, particular attention is devoted to the self-referential construction and projection of the Union as a power. Finally, Chapter 7 turns to the practice of EU security in terms of policy outputs (institutions) and behavioural outcomes (missions): the aim is to establish a relationship between the preferences expressed in the discourse and policy action, and to test the coherence between the two variables. In conclusion, Chapter 8 assesses the relevance of the model for the study of the ESDP, discusses limitations, and suggests avenues for further research.

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PART I The Grammar of Security: Cultural Assumptions, Preferences, and Policies

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Chapter 2

The Framework of Analysis: Security, Grand Strategy, and Culture

What is security? Where is it coming from? Is there a relationship between security and the use of military force? The aim of this chapter is to introduce and discuss the key concepts and causal relationships building the analytical framework of this book. Most importantly, three central questions are considered: a) what are the determinants of security as a concept?; b) what are the determinants of security as a policy or practice?; and finally c) what is the relationship between concept and policy (or what is the mechanism behind the translation of an idea/assumption into action/behavior?). After a review of the various meanings of security and of the associated disciplinary and theoretical approaches, it will be argued that culture affects grand strategy, although security outputs and outcomes (practice) might not necessarily reflect the cultural input.

What is Security? Concept, System, and Theoretical Battleground Security as a Concept “Security” is one of the most recurrent and fashionable, albeit highly contested and ambiguous concepts in International Relations (IR). This is not surprising since the majority if not all of the fundamental notions developed and/or used by the social sciences in general and by political science in particular – like power and freedom for instance – are ephemeral and opaque: they often lack “agreed” elements, basic definitions, and simple mechanisms and relations that are convincing enough to elicit universal acceptance and support (De Jouvenel 2000: xvi). Before entering the specific discussion of the various “meanings” which may be attributed to security as a theoretical concept, it is important here to digress first and foremost on the function of a “concept” in the theory of knowledge in order to highlight the role of “ideas” in many of the academic debates on security. In scientific enquiries, concepts, principles, theories and laws together with a variety of scientific processes and values constitute the preliminary assumptions about reality that are used to construct new explanations concerning objects and events. The assumptions presuppose an underlying order (natural or artificial) whereby a concept is a “basic unit of thinking” that controls and makes understanding possible (Sartori 1994: 27).����������������������������� ���������������������������� But what is a concept? What does the term mean and suggest? In academic and everyday usage there is a clear

20

European Security Culture

inflation in the use of the word. Everything can be “conceptualized”, what implies that the object of reference is elevated to a somewhat higher level of intellectual importance. This often means as well that the object is enveloped in an aura of vagueness and ambiguity. Democracy in state X does not necessarily correspond to the general and philosophical concept of democracy: the concept enshrines a priori conventional characteristics and qualities that make the idea of democracy immortal and universal. Security as a material phenomenon might indicate the individual status of being safe from the danger of physical harm or pain, while the concept of security goes beyond the contingency of the single situation and entails a variety of cognitive elements that can be hardly separated and independently pinpointed as concrete facts. In this sense a concept is an abstraction, an idea, a construct intended as a sum or a complex of interrelated and intersubjective meanings. It is a box, a container of categories that are bound together by precise links and elaborated and negotiated through social interaction (Sartori 1994: 49; Chilton 1996a: 50). As a matter of fact, “conceptualization” refers to the articulation of thoughts, ideas, or hunches and the representation of these in some objective, internally coherent and consistent form; while “conception” pertains to the interpretation and application of the core concept and its meaning clusters (references and properties) (Flathman 1973; Collier and Brady 2000).  Such a description implies several epistemological claims: a. that a concept is a product, an artifact manufactured consciously or unconsciously for the sake of regrouping complex categories and simplifying reality, and it is thus central to knowledge; b. that it involves an action, the organization of contents and the definition of the direction of the relationship between singular components; c. that its “mapping” and formation are dependent on the existence of actors and their interaction; and finally d. that a concept is not immobile, but that it is constantly renegotiated through the interplay of actors, observers, reality and other concepts. As Stefano Guzzini points out in his article on power, the problem with treating concepts as variables for the scope of rigorous scientific reasoning is that their content has to be severely fixed and “mathematized” so that most scholars, aware of the difficulties to pin down a concept, prefer to concentrate on elements easier to manipulate, thereby risking to neglect the most significant aspects of the concept (Guzzini 2002: 5). For the sake of investigation then, concepts-variables are often subsumed and taken for granted, although it is recognized that their actual meaning is ambiguous and controversial. Concept analysis comes then to help and plays the function of facilitating communication and understanding by supplying an array of answers concerning concept formation and its internal mapping. Approaches vary and depend on the level of analysis: at the micro/internal level concepts are linguistically considered as a means of explanation and sentences are built as mathematical formulas (what the concept means); at the macro level concepts

The Framework of Analysis: Security, Grand Strategy, and Culture

21

are analyzed as constitutive elements of particular theories and contexts, and the focus is centered on their functions (what the concept does). The medium level is constituted by conceptual history whereby linguistic pragmatics and sociology come together in order to identify the nature and reasons of crystallization and stability or change and transformation in meaning over time (Guzzini 2002: 3). Although the reference to Gallie’s seminal work on “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie 1962) seems to be one of the few undisputed allegations in the huge literature on security of the last two decades, no scholars – as Jef Huysman claims – have ventured in a comprehensive analysis of security using all the three levels identified above in order to try to delve enough into the question concerning the “real” meaning of security (Huysmans 1998: 227). Huysman goes further and suggests that security should be interpreted as a “thick signifier” which “brings us to an understanding of how the category ‘security’ articulates a particular way of organizing forms of life” (Huysman 1998b: 231). The problem is heightened by the fact that understanding and explaining are often considered as synonymous, and that the role of interpretation is often overlooked (Hirschman 1970; Hollis and Smith 1990). Given this background, it is not surprising that there still is “no common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what its most relevant research questions are” (Haftendorn 1991: 5): it is exactly because the concept of security does not float freely “out there”; it is a product of the interpretation or manipulation done by researchers and practitioners. The dilemma is thus whether it is possible to objectively identify the components of the concept paying tribute to the ambition of maintaining neutrality/universality without falling into the trap of value-dependency inherent in concept analysis (Lakoff 1987: 302; Weldes 1996). As it will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 4, it is here argued that a unique and uncontested concept of security is illusory because it is subjected to different interpretations depending on the perceptions of the viewer (Wolfers 1962: 147). Security as a System The Oxford English Dictionary defines security primarily as: “the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety (…) freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger” (The Oxford English Dictionary 1987: 853–4; Rothschild 1995: 61). Apart from a very neutral description which refers to the classical Latin term securitas, the authors of the dictionary intermingle in the definition “the safeguarding or safeguarding of (the interests of) the state against danger”, whereby a specific use of the word in the political context of the state system is suggested. The aim of this paragraph is however to try to reproduce the basic constitutive elements of the concept of security and to delimitate its borders of order by de-contextualizing and extrapolating them from the specific connotations attributed in discourses of politics and International Relations.

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The system approach allows for the identification of the elements or components which should organically come together to form a coherent entity. The components of the security system encompass a referent object and a threat, and they are linked together in a relational network which may account for the concept’s ambiguity. Security is both a technical term and a word of common usage. General images connected with security hint to immobilization, stability, and balance (“to be secured to the ground” for instance). In the financial world, securities are bonds, a commodity. The presupposition here is that security is measurable and thus divisible and quantifiable (Chilton 1996a: 60–62). It should be noted that these formulations refer to “existential” security intended as the survival of a referent object rather than to “ontological” security as “the confidence that the natural world is as it appears to be” (Manners 2002a: 12). This distinction is important because the common use of the term of security in IR is generally related to existence rather than ontology. Arnold Wolfers, in an article from 1952 entitled “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol” identified threats and values as essential components of the security system: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers 1962: 150). He went on to define security in negative terms: “security after all is nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity, a negative value so to speak” (Wolfers 1962: 151). Another way is to approach it from a positive point of view: a narrow perspective sees security as the ability to deal with a specific threat by somehow neutralizing it, while a broader one refers to relative freedoms from constraints or in other words various kinds of dangers and risks. Wolfers’ definition is important because it highlights the fact that there is a cognitive and psychological dimension inherent in a security system. Security is thus an attitude of mind, which depends heavily upon the perceived nature of the environment one is in (Salmon 1996). Perceptions are influenced by cognition or how people perceive data: “My perceptions of the dark streets I pass walking home from the movies will be different if the film I saw had dealt with spies than if it had been a comedy” (Jervis 1970: 250). This state of affairs represents a problem for the unambiguous definition of both the values to be secured or referent objects and the threats to those very values. In addition, since threats are by definition of a hypothetical nature, they are not directly measurable but based on estimates and the assumed probability of highly undesirable potential eventualities (Rousseau et al. 2000). In order to escape this conundrum, Lodgaard suggests to exclude threats from the definition of what constitutes security, thus eliminating a potential source of dissent (Lodgaard 2000: 10). He however does not explain how it is then possible to understand security without using the concept of threat. As a matter of fact, the problem of measuring perception and hypothetical events is often positively solved by translating these aleatory variables into estimation or a security equation expressed in mathematical terms which take into consideration probability calculations: “Threat perception = Estimated Capability x Estimated Intent” (David Singer quoted in Salmon 1996: 10).

The Framework of Analysis: Security, Grand Strategy, and Culture

23

It should be noted that in a security system, different degrees of threats are usually individuated. These degrees are expressed with the use of specific vocabulary like “risk”, “danger”, and “vulnerability”. The use of these other terms obviously further complicates the understanding of not only what security is, but also of what security should do. While a threat is usually considered to be “identifiable, often immediate”, and requiring “an understandable response”, a vulnerability is deemed to be “an indicator, often not clearly identifiable, often linked to a complex interdependence among related issues, and does not always suggest a correct or even adequate response” (Liotta 2005: 51). Another way to look at the definition of the source of insecurity is to look at the subject of insecurity or the responsibility of action: for Daase, threats and risks are insecurity caused by the decision of an actor, the difference being that in the case of threats the actor is clearly identifiable while behind risks there are unidentifiable agents; dangers on the other hand are out there and do not stem by human decisions (Daase 2002: 12). The accent on threats and risks in the social scientific definition of security is thus explained by the fact that human action is the cause. But how are risks determined if they cannot be conduced to a clear source? Actually risk avoidance and management is a business sector: risk is there calculated as [Threat (T) x Vulnerability (V)] x Consequence (C), whereby threat is a measure of the likelihood that a specific type of attack will be initiated against a specific target (a scenario); vulnerability is a measure of the likelihood that various types of safeguards against a scenario will fail; and consequence is the magnitude of the negative effects if the attack is successful (ABS Consulting n.d). The issue of the responsibility of the source of the threat complicates the task of delimiting what security is (a passive, state-of-the-art definition), because it introduces the component of activity, thus transforming a condition into a dynamic action (what makes security/insecurity). Lipschutz maintains that “’[s]ecurity’ as it is practiced can be understood (…) as a product of empirical factors, perceptions, and social constructions” (Lipschutz 1995:5). However, as it will be shown, the concept rather than the practice of security is determined by the interplay of these variables. The confusion between concept and practice is coupled with confusion between determinants and components. As a matter of fact, security may be aggregate or disaggregate depending on the size and complexity of the unit of reference; or even instrumental as the means to achieve something else, or normative as the aim in itself (to secure security). In addition, a plethora of descriptors (adjectives and qualifications) are usually added to the basic concept of security like for instance national or international, internal or external, hard or soft, economic, cultural, environmental, ethnic, political, psychological, ontotheological, social, societal, human security etc.: the problem is that it is unclear whether these specifications indicate dimensions of the same referent object or whether they are separate and clearly distinguishable categories responding to different systems of object-threat interaction (Liotta 2002).

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Finally, the fundamental system of security is formed by the interrelationship between referent objects and threats (whether subjective or objective) bound together by an action-reaction mechanism. The definition of the nature and identity of these objects and threats, as well as the qualification of the actions required to break this system, depend on the identity of the subject who perceives or observes insecurity (Lipschutz 1995; Baldwin 1997; Bajpai 2000). It should be noted that the two positions of “observer” and “perceiver” are not necessarily coincidental, and this dissonance may explain why there are a number of concurrent definitions and explanations. Security as a Theoretical Battleground Because of the ambiguity of the components discussed above and in particular the co-existence of objective and subjective elements in the definition of a security system, theoretical debates about the meaning of security (ontology) and the way to study it (epistemology) have been the source of an abysmal amount of paper, which indicates that the field is in a state of flux. A review of the state of research and of the major approaches developed in the discipline of International Relations should reveal the extent of the discord in the academic community. The impact of these theoretical discussions on security discourse and policy will be assessed in Chapter 4. It is however important here to delineate the different conceptualizations of security to start introducing the borders of orders of ensuing discourses and practices. Wolfers, cited above, discussing the problem of individuating the meaning of security, did not only spell out the subjective component of security but went so far to argue that the concept “could even be devoid of exact meaning” (Wolfers 1962: 165). Similarly, Buzan stressed that the ideological aspect entailed in the concept cannot be verified or falsified by empiricism (Buzan 1991: 7), while Der Derian speaks of an “ontotheology of security” as an “a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread metaphysical belief in it” (Der Derian 1995: 25). This trend tends to problematize what was practically considered as axiomatic in mainstream IR: security as exogenously determined and an integral part of the structure of international relations and the model of state power. The “underdevelopment” of the concept claimed by Buzan in 1991 is passé (Buzan 1991: 7–10): since then both IR and its subdisciplines of security and strategic studies have come to grip with foundational questions and their implications for praxis, so that the “symbolic ambiguity” said to be useful to the practitioners of national policy to cover-up power games has been laid bare. It should be stressed that the debate about security is not however isolated from a wider theoretical discussion on the crucial terms in the conceptual repertoire of the discipline, and that it is part of a network of other key notions and political concepts which are also inherently problematic (Oppenheim 1981: 10).

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As discussed above about concepts in general, paradigms and analytical perspectives – like ideology – affect the “questions one asks about the word, the type of information and evidence sought, the type of answer that emerges and – perhaps most crucially – the explanation with which one conclude” (Salmon 1996: 9). This means that theory choices and their underlying conceptual assumptions play a pivotal role for the outcomes of research, and that as a consequence, there can be many “truths”, depending on the concept definitions and theoretical approach used (Ojanen 1998: 346). Unlike photographic pictures of reality, but more like a painted portrait where the author’s interpretation plays a central role (Morgenthau 1960: 6–7), theories are not only instrumental for the specific purpose of individuals, but their perspectives come from a position in social, material, and political time and space (Cox 1986: 206; Acharya 2000), so that it is possible to describe the meso-level or the historical development of a concept, and draw inferences about the circumstances which prompted its particular characterization. Most importantly, theories do not only define explanatory possibilities, but they also enable or constrain the ethical and practical boundaries of human action (Smith S. 1996), and from a mere academic exercise they become intertwined with the interests of the policy-community. This connection between theory and practice is particularly evident in the field of security, because practitioners often look up at academia for justifications of action, while the academia finds prestige and financial support in the policy arena. Testifying for this link with political practice, International Relations as an academic discipline with an institutionalized professional infrastructure was born as a sub-discipline of political science after WW1, with the declared aim of studying ways to prevent another war conflict. Despite an alleged American hegemony (Smith S. 1993; Waever 1998a; Jorgensen 2000), the discipline has been constantly redefining and reconfirming itself through a series of grand debates and the emergence of different paradigms on both sides of the Atlantic: a) realism vs. idealism; b) traditionalism vs. behavioralism (or structure vs. actors); and c) positivism vs. post-positivism (Lijphart 1974; Wendt 1987; Lapid 1989; Carlsnaes 1992; Ashworth 2002). Objects of these debates are not only the definition of politics per se, but also the role of conflict (Krause and Williams 1997), power and the “allocation of values for a society” (Salmon 1996: 2), the relationship between war and peace, and the definition of the borders of order in the domesticforeign, inclusion-exclusion, internal-external, self-other, inside-outside, identitydifference, particular-universal dichotomies (or the Schmittian friends/enemies in Schmitt C. 1985). The level of analysis and the centrality of the unit of the state is often matter of contestation (Waltz 1959). Of relevance in this discussion is in particular the so-called “cultural turn” in the social sciences, and as a corollary, in IR. The dominant schools of neorealism and liberalism have found themselves attacked from different directions, suffering internal coups and external aggressions. More so in the field of security studies where for decades strategic issues – concerning the use of military power – played a hegemonic role in the definition and orientation of the discipline. The

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hibernation mode set up during the Cold War and represented by a predilection for rationalism, scientific objectivism, and hard facts has been shattered by a horde of critical and “constructivist” dissenters, who doubt the validity and relevance of focusing predominantly on material economic and military capabilities and on “bean-counting” procedures. Under fire are epistemological as well as ontological assumptions about the nature of the international system, causal variables, and research methodologies. It is not surprising thus that traditional “strategic studies” once considered as the predilected house where to study security have been subjected to a gradual “IR-ification” (Waever and Buzan 2007: 390), through which the focus on military issues and the disinterest for theoretical development (Betts 1997) have been complemented by a broader and more “political” disciplinary context for theorizing, and have been enlarged through the cross-pollination with other social sciences like sociology and anthropology (Wyn Jones 1999: 127). The table below shows the relationship between the various sub-disciplines: Strategic Studies is here pictured as a sub-sub-discipline of the sub-discipline International Relations (Collins 2007), while for most of the Cold War Security Studies have suffered of a complex of inferiority, because of the importance given by policymakers to matters of military capabilities and balance of power. In order for Security Studies to regain self-confidence, its main exponents have been engaging in a series of semantical exercises aimed at re-conceptualizing what until then was taken for granted by widening, broadening, and deepening the understanding of what security is, and by expanding the array of alternative methodological positions. Indeed, movement characterizes different “new” paradigms in security studies which engage in: a) horizontally broadening the dimensions of security beyond the military to include economic, environmental and

3ROLWLFDO6FLHQFH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV 6HFXULW\6WXGLHV 6WUDWHJLF6WXGLHV

Figure 2.1

The Disciplinary Relationship between IR and Security/Strategic Studies

The Framework of Analysis: Security, Grand Strategy, and Culture

27

societal issues; b) vertically deepening the security agenda by enlarging the units of reference to include the individual, the regional or the global levels of analysis moving away from the state as unique referent and subject (Buzan et al. 1998: 5–6; Krause and Williams 1995); c) thickening by enriching the methodology of analysis and transforming security “from definition to concept to thick signifier” (Huysmans 1998b: 229); and finally d) vectoring security by indicating the relative position of power of the actors in the construction of security as a concept and as a practice (Manners 2002a: 9). This mushrooming of approaches and paradigms, criticized by some as causing a growing discrepancy between theory and practice (Brown N. 1992: 5), is however nothing new: the fact that events are the triggers of theorizing explains the seasonality of security thinking and principles (Rothschild 1995: 52–54). Indeed, Baldwin (1995), Krause and Williams (1996), McSweeney (1999), Arnold and Beier (2000), and many other scholars after them, have tried to categorize different dominant waves in security studies and to construct a narrative history of the sub-discipline. For example McSweeney identifies four dominant periods in the history of security studies: political theory, political science, political economy and sociology, each of them associated to a particular prevailing epistemological and ontological approach (McSweeney 1999: 28–31). Independently from judgments about whether this categorization is accurate or not, what is important in this context is the fluidity of the turns and returns of keywords in a circular rather than linear manner. The contemporary debate about the levels of analysis, the dimensions, and the depth which should be considered in security studies is thus nothing else than a return to the early stages of the discussions about the nature, source, meaning and scope of power in political science. Although dominance is not necessarily historically determined but more dependent on specific geographical and cultural interest-groups (Booth 1979; Acharya 2000), the categorization of different approaches is useful to understand when and how certain terminology and its theoretical underpinnings are appropriated by the policy-makers (see idealtypical discourses in Chapter 4). In order to facilitate comparison, sub-currents are excluded from the analysis. Dominance is intended in terms of academic products, consulting power, and financing received. The Political Theory approach (associated by McSweeney 1999: 31–32 to the period 1918–1955) is characterized by a consideration of security as multidisciplinary and multi-dimensional, with a particular focus on political and psychological aspects, whereby military force tends to be neglected exactly because politics is viewed as a unique and integral field of study populated by different variables with equal weight (Baldwin 1995: 120). Security is thus only one of several values to be considered along with economic interests, ideas, and culture for instance. Wolfers (1962) and Morgenthau (1960, 1966) are among the major representatives of this approach. With a non-extremist rationalist epistemology allowing for limited intersubjectivity, this approach is paradigmatically associated with classical realism, which stresses the importance of the state as the unique actor in an anarchical, hostile, and “self-help” international environment and of

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Table 2.1

Paradigms in Security Studies

Disciplinary focus

Traditionalists Political Theory

Political Science

Innovators Political Economy

Paradigms

Realism

Self-Labelling

National Strategic Security Studies Studies

Liberalism, Copenhagen School, Social Constructivism International Security studies

Epistemology

Objective Positivist

Objective Positivist

Neo-Realism

Objective Positivist

Sociology

Postmodernism, Critical Theory Critical Security Studies, Radical Security Studies, Peace research Subjective Reflectivist

power (hard and soft) as the primary instrument for state survival and international order. It is interesting to note that the assumptions behind classical realism are not necessarily materialist: human beliefs, values, hopes and fear are seen as important variables to understand social action, so much so that the already cited Wolfers considered an objective measure of security as politically impossible (Wolfers 1962). Despite individual cultural differences, states are assumed to be rational unitary actors pursuing the same national interest of survival through the accumulation and maximization of power. However, it should be noted that for classical realists security comprises a variety of dimensions beyond military power. The so-called “Golden Age” of Political Science is characterized by the emergence of strategic studies as an independent sub-discipline (McSweeney 1999: 25–44; Walt 1991). Security is primarily seen as a military issue because of the Cold War with its geo-political rivalry, the armaments race, and the need for theories of deterrence. As a matter of fact, Stephen Walt defined security studies as “the study of the threat, use and control of military force (…) the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the way that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies and the specific policies that the states adopt in order to prepare, prevent or engage in war” (Walt 1991: 212). Neo-realism or structural realism is the paradigm of reference (Gray 1982), where the state maintains its centrality in an anarchical international structure and can survive only on the basis of material power and the defense of its physical and territorial sovereignty. Material and quantifiable factors are essential given the positivist scientific method claimed by this political “scientific” methodology: this is why states are considered as unproblematic and uniform objects; rigorous objective causal laws are identified; and even human variables are materialized in mathematical models for the sake

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of military planning. Threats are material and foreseeable because they are represented by other states and can be counteracted by an increase of military and economic power. Since states are deemed to behave in the same way because they all want to maximize their national interest and balance the power of the others, a security dilemma is inevitable because the acquisition of means of power to improve one’s security provokes others to follow suit so that the initiating state is as insecure as before (Glaser 1997). This realpolitik is dictated by the anarchical nature of the international structure (defined by the distribution of capabilities) and not necessarily by the individual choices of states (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1990). The Political Economy approach calls for a wider concept of security that includes not only state territorial survival but also and more importantly economic and normative components. Initially developed in the period of détente in the 70s when economic and in particular energy issues were seen as threats to the acquired life-style (Nye 1989; Keohane and Nye 1989; Sorensen 1996), it comprises now a variety of paradigms or schools of thought. In general, the security agenda is said to be dominated by economic and environmental (Ullmann 1983; Mathews 1989) rather than military issues because “complex interdependence” inhibits the use of force in the relationships between states and impacts the definition and hierarchization of interests (Keohane and Nye 1989: 24–28). As a consequence of interdependence, for the liberal paradigm, “common”, “co-operative”, “collective”, or “comprehensive” security transcends the security dilemma: neo-liberal institutionalism in particular stresses how multilateral regimes and institutions, rather than self-help, are the rational response to anarchy. Critics suggest however that this liberal approach is based on key realist terms of reference and foundational categories, and that the only contribution to the discussion is limited to the application of the structural concept of security to an enlarged agenda (Bull 1966; Buzan 1991: 373) so broad that it actually endangers the intellectual coherence of the concept, devoiding it of its essential meaning (Walt 1991). Despite the fact that social constructivism contains a variety of different strands and escapes univocal paradigmatic definition, from the perspective of security its moderate form can be included into this “Political Economy” approach (Adler 1997a; Checkel 1998; Hopf 1998; Price and Reus-Smith 1998; Guzzini 2000; Haas EB 2001; Zehfuss 2002). An important difference between moderate constructivism and liberalism in security studies is that the widening is not limited to the dimensions of security issues, but it extends to the inclusion of different levels of analysis, actors, and referent objects (Finel 1998: 8). From an ontological perspective, while liberalism maintains the same suppositions about state structure and anarchy as realism, constructivism in general considers state interests as not pre-given but subject to change and redefinition as a result of mutual constitution between agents (states) and structures (norms). Threats are thus the product of an intersubjective dynamics, and they do not necessarily exist “out there”. Ideas, beliefs, and perceptions play a determinant role in the definition of the structure or environment, and define the realm of the cognitive possible

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(Katzenstein 1996; Yee 1996). It is assumed that ideas and interests of actors are socially constructed by collective understandings and interpretations about the world (Adler 1998). This does not mean that moderate social constructivists reject the objectivist methodology of realism and liberalism: they still assume that states are rational actors and that their interests are constructed by the structure of the international system, which in their view is the product of both material and social or cognitive relationships (Wendt 1992). The Copenhagen School is one of the leading representatives of this approach in security studies: Buzan and Waever and De Wilde 1998 and a number of other contributions did not only expand the understanding of the concept of security, but they introduced a ground-breaking explanation of the mechanisms of security processes through the introduction of the idea of “securitization” (Waever 1995a; Albert 1998; Aradau 2001 etc.) with its central focus on the role of the actor’s identity in shaping the structure (more in Chapter 3). Finally, the Sociology approach encompasses more radical strands of social constructivism and what is called “Critical Security Studies”: based on a subjectivist epistemology this approach draws from critical theory, post-structuralism, and postmodernism. The accent is on the cognitive dimension of structural constraints: applied to security this means that the referent objects as well as the threats are problematized and re-conceptualized to include a variety of dimensions and “communities”, and that the individual level is given predominance in the analysis (Williams and Krause 1997; Krause 1998; Weldes and Laffey et al. 1999; CASE Collective 2006). A number of different schools of thought are included in this approach: from the Aberystwyth school of Wyn Jones 1999 and Booth 2005 to post-structuralism of Klein BS 1994; Dillon 1996; Campbell 1998; Der Derian 1987; Walker 1993, Dalby 1997 and 2000, and Peace Research (see COPRI; SIPRI etc.). For the sake of the analysis and simplification, these four broad groups can be sub-divided into two camps labelled “traditionalist” and “innovator”. Traditionalists favor the maintenance of a military and state-centric conception of security, and argue that widening and deepening only add confusion to policymaking; innovators claim that attention should be focused on both the state and individual level (with a predominance of the second for many) and that security is not only military but has also important environmental, social and, economic dimensions (Tarry 1999). Both sides contain variations and are criticized by the one or the other: traditionalitsts are accused of being too narrow-minded, while innovators are deemed to water down the concept (Moeller 2000a). What is of relevance in this discussion is that these theoretical controversies are translated and adopted at the political discourse level, and the allegiance to the one or the other approach on the part of the policy communities profoundly shapes discourses and policy choices.

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Grand Strategy, Policy Preferences, and Action Security is not only a concept, but it is also a practice. Abstract and theoretical discussions have an impact on policy action (what is done) and behavior (how it is done). In the security policy realm, concepts are an integral part of “grand strategy”, and constitute operational tools for policy formulation and implementation. The components of the concept of security (the definition of the threats and the referent objects) directly influence the policy and the instruments chosen. Before discussing the determinants of the policy, it is necessary to define the level of analysis we are using. It should be noted that the following discussion draws from traditional conceptualizations of “national” security policy, where military force plays a dominant role. Since however force is considered as one of many instruments of how to do security also in “innovative” approaches, and grand strategy represents an overall tool of action, it is important here to digress on its utility for the definition of the practice of security. Of particular relevance is also the fact that the EU has been often called to develop a strategic concept (Van Staden et al. 2000; Biscop 2002), and it also eventually issued a “strategy” (see Chapter 6), but the level at which this document operates has not been defined or analyzed in depth, so that it is unclear what role the document plays in the development of the ESDP or of the EU security identity in general. Grand Strategy and Security Concept Grand strategy is “not merely a military but a social science” (Saregaunt and West 1941: 7). Although the most recurrent use of the term is in the context of national security, the meaning of strategy varies on the basis of the discipline in which it is applied. Interestingly however, the etymology of the word has a military connotation since the Greek word strategos, from which strategy stems, means in Greek “General”. The fact that the military is nothing else than the bureaucratic organization of the use of force explains why strategy is common currency in organizational theory. Mintzberg (1995: 13–14) has created a 4 Ps model for the definition of strategy: for him strategy can be a) a plan for a consciously intended course of action, or a guideline for dealing with a certain set of situations; b) a ploy or a plan with a more narrow and specific scope; c) a pattern of emerging actions and behavior, which, not preconceived, show consistency in the reactions towards inputs coming from the environment; and d) a perspective which defines the way the organization’s members view the organization’s environment, the organization’s identity and themselves as members of the organization. This definition however confounds different levels of analysis, and does not really qualify strategy given that plan, ploy, pattern, and perspective are not synonymous. The application in the context of national security and military policy in particular is much more precise because levels of analysis and of action are organized hierarchically: grand strategy provides perspective; strategy is the plan; operations are the ploy; and tactics can be assimilated to a sort of “patterned

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ploy”. National security strategy or grand strategy thus contains the underlying and guiding concepts which encapsulate perceptions of the environment, aspirations, and in particular the definition of referent objects and threats as formulated by the national leaders and policy-makers. Military force is only one of the means available to achieve foreign policy goals and in particular security and defense. As a matter of fact, grand strategy can be described as “the art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives” (US Department of Defense 2001: 358) or as “that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries (Trager and Simonie 1973: 36). Grand strategy as the “collection of military, economic and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security” (Rosecrance and Stein 1993: 4) is thus the guiding instrument of foreign policy and encompasses security and defense. Foreign policy is not only about a state’s relationship with the outside world: it is an inside-out process whereby the values, norms, and principles constituting a political community internally (the identity) are projected into the global system (Campbell 1998). Most importantly for the future discussion of the EU Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy it should be noted that there is a dialectical relationship between foreign policy and sovereignty because the institution of foreign policy strengthens the territorial delimitation of the unit by setting the terms of inclusion (internal/domestic) and exclusion (external/foreign) and by claiming independent power of action and representation for a central authority. Grand strategy includes policy choices about: how (way or concept) the leadership will use the power available (means or resources) to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state security interests and values. Ends indicate “what” is to be accomplished in terms of the interests or the referent object that should be defended or promoted (answering the question in order to do what?). Ways explain “how” the ends are to be achieved by the employment of resources. Means finally determine what specific tangible or intangible resources are to be used. Grand strategy, at the highest political level, is thus a “document” which should assure the coherence, consistence, and coordination of the whole complex (Foster 1992: 72). As mentioned above, it should be stressed that grand strategy and strategy are not synonymous, although they are often confused. In particular, following Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart, strategy is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy” (Liddell-Hart 1967: 335–336) or “the use and threat of use of organized force for political purpose” (Gray 1999:1), that is, strategy refers to the modality and use of a determinate type of means prescribed in a grand strategy, at a higher hierarchical level. In this sense war is a means and not an end in itself. In fact, in partial implementation of grand strategy, security policy can be defined as the choice of the strategy, the establishment of structures, and the creation and maintenance of instruments for the protection of state and alliance targets from

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external dangers (Wellershoff 1999: 18), which “may comprehend the use of an extensive variety of means to address actual or potential external military threats” (Duffield 1998:14), and which defines the conditions and limitations of the way force should be used (Lange 1992). Interestingly this conception of security is very much linked to defense rather than security per se. National security is concerned first and foremost with values and with the political conditions in which those values can flourish. Because of its potentially destructive consequences, military power is used only when failure to do so would result in an intolerable sacri.ce of some vital national value. The obvious criterion is the relative weight of endangered values and risks involved in deciding for war. This is the most critical decision any policymaker in the national security system of any country will ever have to make (my emphasis) (Trager and Simonie 1973: 36).

This means that military force is only one of the means to preserve and enhance values and interests (aims). Other instruments include a full array of foreign policy measures ranging from diplomacy (persuasion and rewards) and economic aid to coercive diplomacy (threats, sanctions, limited force) (Kennedy 1991: 5; Holsti KJ 1995: 125–126) as well as what is called “soft power” or the power of attraction/ emulation deriving from the level of prosperity and openness that the country or unit has achieved (Nye 2004: 5). The decision about what specific means to use is usually assumed to stem from a rational cost-benefit calculation, but as it will be discussed, this rationality contains normative variables which influence the weighting of values. For what concerns the ends (goals or objectives), it should be noted that security is not the end in itself but it is one of the means to achieve the end identified usually in terms of values and interests. Wolfers for instance distinguishes between milieu goals and possession goals: the first ones refer to the interests of shaping the international environment to one’s favour like peace, stability, or international law; while the second ones indicate the willingness to preserve or enhance more measurable values or material interests like territory and resources. Interestingly, milieu goals may also be means towards the attainment of possession goals. Wolfers’ distinction between ideological and traditional goals is blurrier because it is not clear whether ideological aims are also milieu aims or whether they can constitute possession goals of some sort (Wolfers 1962: 73–75).

 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In particular where the aim is to manage or resolve a conflict the means can be: official diplomacy (track-one) including mediation, coercive diplomacy, and peacemaking (UN understanding); non-official diplomacy; education; military measures like threat/ projection/use of force, arms embargoes and blockades, peacekeeping, peacemaking (state and EU understanding), etc; economic and social measures like sanctions and aid; and political measures and governance (Creative Associates International 1996).

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Problematic in the discussion of aims and means is their relationship: do capabilities (means) influence functionally and geographically the ends (priorities and political goals?); or is there an instrumental link between ends and means and objectives come before the means? The Machiavellian adage that the ends justify the means – ethically and morally controversial – is not always applied in practice, since there seems to be a certain automatism which tends to define the ends and the values to be protected on the basis of what means are available. The issue is complicated by the fact that a grand strategy contains a set of priorities and preferences and not policy decisions concerning the actual implementation of aims, means, and ways. In the EU context, the term security concept is intended in the sense of grand strategy: A European security concept is an essential policy tool that, starting from our interests and values, outlines the long-term overall objectives that we want to achieve and the basic categories of instruments that we will apply to that end. It is a strategy that serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving complex international environment (Coolsaet and Biscop 2003: 2).

Grand strategy is thus a theory about how a unit can best produce security for itself (Posen 1984: 25). This theory is built on three building blocs: determination of vital security interests and political goals (possession and milieu goals), identification of threats and challenges to those very aims, and outline of the line of action to address those threats. As a set of preferences and priorities however, this theory is not practice. For the sake of this study, practice subsumes both behavior and action. In particular, it is defined in terms of “outputs” and “outcomes”. “Outputs” are the products of the policy choices made by the decision-makers, that is, the setting up of the hardware of the EU crisis management machinery (institutional and material). “Outcomes” refer to the practical applications of the policy measures on the ground (Almond and Powell 1978). So what is the role of a theory for practice? A grand strategy contains regulative and constitutive norms which constrain and enable action – as for instance rules of engagement do at the operational level – directly impact the policy agenda, and determine the functional dimensions of security policy in institutional and operational terms (Keatinge 1996: 3). Externally, grand strategy is seen as the identity card of the unit or organization, since it performs a communicative act and informs the other actors of the broad intentions of the subject. Determinants of Security Preferences and Choices Preferences are however not choices. Preferences are rhetorical priorities which define the realm of the possible, while a choice is an action which entails a final decision among different and competitive possible courses of action.

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How are these preferences determined? Where do they come from? What is the independent variable, the crucial factor which causes decisions? Or better, what is guiding the choice of one end or one means rather than the other and the definition of a particular security concept? What are the sources of security policy and grand strategy in general? Obviously there are as many answers as there are paradigms and different approaches. In general, laundry lists abound: geography, history, culture, economics, and governmental systems are all seen as important factors (Williamson et al. 1994: 23). For instance Duffield lists and explains all the possible factors which, in a way or another, influence and determine the security policy of a state. On the one side, there are external variables such as the international setting, the international structure, and the international institutions; on the other, he proposes a menu of internal elements: national capacity, national predispositions (ideas/political culture, national institutions), and policy process (Duffield 1998: 15). The problem of working with a framework of analysis which merely identifies and describes the full variety of factors possibly determining or even only influencing the dependent variable – in this case security policy – is that no important causal relationships are highlighted. There is no relative weighting of the variables. This means that the list does not help to explain or even understand what elements are crucial in the definition of a determinate security policy. There are no theoretical underpinnings of sort. For a theory to be falsifiable, one source should be chosen as the determinant (otherwise, if all the listed sources contribute to the output, then the cause is undecided). What is the relative value of these sources? Theories link in a coherent framework otherwise separate elements. On the basis of different levels of analysis, three basic approaches can be singled out in explaining the sources of security policy (Duffield 1998). On the one hand, realism argues that the external environment dictates the preferences of the actor, and since the structure of the international system is anarchic and states are considered to react in the same way to this context, preferences and behaviors of different states are treated as similar and in competition. On the other hand, liberalism stresses the importance of domestic sources and explains how states who find themselves in similar environmental situations may behave in different ways. Rosecrance and Stein (1993) claim that, since “grand strategy is public policy and reflects a nation’s mechanisms for arriving at social choices (…) [which] require the commitment, extraction, and mobilization of societal resources (...) domestic groups, social ideas, the character of constitutions, economic constraints (sometimes expressed through international interdependence), historical social tendencies, and domestic political pressures play an important, indeed, a pivotal role in the selection of grand strategy” (Rosecrance and Stein 1993: 13). Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” intended as the internal domestic order is also assumed to affect, directly or indirectly, the behavior of a security actor (Foucault  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� These �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� approaches or theories or discourses will be retaken in Chapter 4 to show how they are incorporated into actual political discourses and action.

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1991b). Finally, a third approach operates at the individual level and considers unit (or state) behavior as flowing from the individual decision makers’ ideas and perceptions of the situation. This “cultural” approach is the one chosen for this book. As a matter of fact, in order to be coherent, accepted as the projection of the unit’s identity and perspective, and implementable, a grand strategy needs to be based on a common set of assumptions and a shared conceptual framework, which organically explain how to relate means to ends, how to achieve objectives and promote valued and interests, and how to protect against threats in the most efficacious way. What ultimately matters is what exists in the minds of policymakers and, even more importantly, how this translates into an approach to security. The choice of referents, means, and ways characterizes the quality of the deriving security and defense policy and, in particular, it determines whether power is used in a coercive or persuasive way. As it will be argued in the following, the selection and combination of the resources as well as the process of identifying ends and interests arise from assumptions about self identity, culture, quality of life priorities, and the definition of the rights worth defending. Grand strategy represents thus the purview of the elites and cascades from the comprehensive political Weltanschauung of the state or organization under examination.

Assumptions, Ideas, and Values Since Walker’s complaint that culture had been until then relatively neglected in IR (Walker 1990), an impressive proliferation of culture-based research has generated many different ways and methodologies of studying cultural and ideational variables as causal or at least intervening variables in relationship to behavior and action at the international level. Central in anthropology and psychology in the 1930s and 1940s, introduced in political science in the 1940s and 1950s under the connotation of political culture, since the 1970s culture had indeed fallen into disrepute or was used as a mere explanation of last resort (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 129–137; Desch 1998). Not surprising culture as any other abstract concept was and is accused of being fluffy and ambiguous, and in a period dominated by positivist “scientific” aspirations, untestable. The importance of perceptions in the formation of a security concept calls however for a re-evaluation of the so-called “soft” variables: the central question is why different actors often perceive the same problem in radically different ways as well as why certain threat images take on societal salience and others do not. Security and perception are theory-driven: decision-makers tend to see what they expect to see, and these expectations are often driven by stereotyped lessons of history, analogies, or routine scripts that provide shortcuts for making assessments under uncertainty (Jervis 1976). These group-taught or learned perceptions are the result of a process of filtering through decoding mechanisms inherent in a culture (Singer MR 1998). As mentioned above, since theories are made out of ideas, it is interesting to question how and in what form, if at all, ideas influence the

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construction of a security concept and, as a corollary, of a security grand strategy. How important is the intersubjective component of security? How does culture affect the choice of means and values/aims (Swindler 1986)? How does culture lead to action? This section aims at reviewing the role of ideational variables in the construction of a security concept and in influencing the formation of a grand security strategy and their impact on behavior and action. It will be argued that preferences and interests are not exogenous, but are “the joint results of sociological as well as psychological forces acting upon the individual” (Rokeach 1973: 20) and constitute a value-system intended as an “enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance” (Rokeach 1973:5). Taken collectively, these preferences are based on a system of shared meanings and understandings (assumptions) on how the world works, which contribute to create a sense of common social identity (Laitin 1988: 589). This identity of beliefs, values, and preferences, embedded in the language and reshaped by the interpretation of external and internal developments, is essential for the construction of an effective foreign and security policy (Hill and Wallace 1996: 8). Ideology, Culture, and Identity: Between Context and Behavior Concepts and ideas do not float freely, but they are anchored to a context, and they react upon changes occurring in the ideal and material environment. The relationship between values, beliefs, and identity on the one side, and concept mapping and meaning on the other is thus of central importance for cognitive consistence and coherence (Jervis 1976). As it has been discussed earlier, the fact that security is very often described as the absence of threats to acquired or scarce values indicates the fundamental role played by the subjective (at the individual or collective level) attribution of appreciation and desirability to objects in the form either of material interests (like physical survival) or ideal principles (like for instance democracy). The specific ideology or Weltanschauung of the leaders (or speakers) has a direct impact on how the culture and the identity of the organization are externally represented and perceived. Security intended as a system or an organized and coherent structure can thus be seen as the product of a particular ideology: a form of social cognition fostering order in meaning by providing templates as filters for the purpose of information gathering and classification around “core constructs” of truth, normality, and knowledge (Balkin 1998) or even a political agenda at times compromising objectivity (Geertz 1994: 279). As it will be argued in the discussion about language as action, the Marxist connection between power and manipulation of meaning performed through ideology as a way to shape cognitive and affective interpretations of values, conceptions of the world, and symbol systems, in order to legitimize the existing hegemonic order may be of particular relevance in the formulation of security concepts and utterances (on different variations about the theme, see

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Adorno, Althusser, Gramsci, Foucault, Hall and others in Bianchi et al. 2002), especially when the ideological system of beliefs and representations is shared and accepted by the members of a group as a cultural common ground that is non-controversial and commonsensical (Van Dijk 1998). Moreover, ideology does not only help in the interpretation and rationalization of behavior, but it may also have ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� normative implications for behavior itself (Hinich and Munger 1994). ������� In the case of the concept of security in the European Union for instance, the ideology, either professional or socio-political, of the political elite and of the epistemic community plays a determinant role in the determination and distribution of a specific significance and, as a consequence, of the substance of the policy program associated to it. Ideology in its neutral sense hence works when it is developed in a consistent culture. Obviously, as it is the case for a variety of “thick signifiers” (Huysmans 1998b), there is much disagreement about the word and concept of “culture”. Der Derian convincingly claimed that security and culture can be considered as “sponge” words “in the sense that they can soak up a variety of operational meanings but at some saturation point they begin to leave a logical and functional mess behind” (Der Derian 1987: 31). Culture is considered to act as a template, a guide, a model shaping consciousness and behavior from generation to generation in a reflexive way: the pattern is not fixed but it adapts to changes in the society (Geertz 1973:216). Developed at first as an anthropological tool of analysis, a variety of definitions and conceptual systems exists (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1963). For Samuel Barnes, it is useful to distinguish three levels of analysis of culture: a) what can be directly observed, including�������������������������������������������������� artifacts���������������������������������������� , symbols, and behavior; b) beliefs and values; and c) shared assumptions and meanings (Barnes 1988: 2). ������������ Focusing in particular on this last point, Geertz argues that culture should be considered as a “web of significance”, a system of meanings, of negotiated agreements on the set of relationships between one group of variables (a word, behavior, or other symbol) and its corresponding significance or meaning (Geertz 1973: 4–5), or a cognitive system defined and accepted by a group to simplify the environment through a series of mental constructs including beliefs and assumptions (Fischer 1997: 23). The accent is on the sociality of the meaning, on the fact that it has to be shared and common in order to be understood. The construction of the meaning of security, like behavior and language, rests on a backbone of cultural and ideological elements: the identification of the values to be secured is directly dependent on their relative position in a scale of importance and priority. Of course, culture is a holistic term: it can and it should be broken down in levels and dimensions. For this research, emphasis will be devoted to the organizational/institutional level (the political, administrative and academic community) and to the political-strategic dimension (the place of war and peace and the use of force). Finally, it is important to highlight that culture and ideology are directly connected to the identity of the leaders or the unit at large. As a matter of fact,

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the cultural template does not only provide the ordering pattern for thoughts, ideas, and norms (regulative effects); it constitutes them and, as a corollary, it is internalized and integrated into roles and identities (constitutive effects) (Wendt 1987; Katzenstein 1996). Identity is here understood as a basic unit of belonging, multi-level and multi-dimensional, arbitrating between the self and the rest: a claim of distinctiveness and uniqueness, either internally or externally defined. The development of a specific identity and its modification and recognition is a product of social interaction and communication and it is embedded in a cultural and ideological context through the mediation of significant symbols. The definition of an identity (who you are) on the basis of categories such as for instance race, gender or nationality at the individual level or political, economic or social system at the collective one implies the reference to a classification that is conventionally accepted, cognitively internalized, and emotionally charged. It also means to establish relatively sharp and stable boundaries between inside and outside, between what or who you are and what or who you are not. The answer to the question: are you a state, are you a democracy, are you peace-loving, are you a superpower, depends on how the others define you on the basis of the common description of the symbols of “state”, “democracy”, “peace” but also on the subjective self-perception and the strength of the social values and roles acquired through the processes of “acculturalization” or social learning of symbols (see for instance Bretherton and Vogler 1999 on actorness and Chapter 6 and 7 for the empirical evidence). Is culture only a context for behavior, does it constitute behavior itself, or does it cause it? In the first case, it merely influences behavior in a way which is not directly predictable or measurable; in the second case, if culture is behavior, it means that values and ideas are constitutive and not only regulative. This is one of the fundamental puzzles not only in IR but in the social sciences in general. Directly linked to the actor-structure debate, the scholarly dilemma is organized around the question of whether culture is an independent or dependent variable. At the very least, culture influences how people perceive their goals and the range of alternative actions considered (Barnes 1988). But in which way? Goldstein and Keohane (1993) considered three types of beliefs which define the universe of possibilities for action in the form of worldviews, principled beliefs, and norms about cause-effect relationships (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 8). It should be noted that worldviews in particular not only include assumptions about the environment, but they encompass prescriptions about the appropriate courses of action (Young 1998: 215), while beliefs set up expectations which form the basis of interpretation (Voss and Dorsey 1992: 11). On the one hand culture provides the categories of understanding enabling an actor to behave, and on the other it provides rules of action constraining that same behavior (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 15–16). The same does identity: “In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors” (Hopf 1998: 175).

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This is related to the central question of constructivism, or how norms shape the behavior of states (for a distinction between culturalism and constructivism see Farrell 2002; Desch 1998). For Katzenstein, norms are both constitutive of an actor’s identity and regulative of its behavior (Katzenstein 1996: 18–19). Structures constitute actors through meaning, while actors shape the structure through practices (Wendt 1987). Giddens’ structuration theory closes the circle by claiming that there is a recursive relationship between actors and structures (Giddens 1984: 8). Cultures are “grand theories” or paradigms which organize perceptions by selecting relevant information which is the basis for the formation of preferences (Wildawsky 1987: 16–17), and which at the moment of action provide “the elements of grammar that define the situation, that reveal the motives, and that set forth a strategy for success” (Hudson 1997: 28–29). In our discussion, the interpretation and choice of the values to be secured, and ceteri paribus, of the means to be used in defense is closely linked to assumptions about culture and identity. The role that culture plays in shaping the interests and behavior of the actors, their normative arguments and expectations, is hence of paramount importance in the determination of a security identity (Katzenstein 1996: 2). Whether the EU is labeled as a “human” or territorial, a civilian or military power depends not only on the “objective” state of affairs, that is, the effective capabilities and actions: the categorization encompasses a discursive and prescriptive dimension (the projection of expectations) anchored to the original normative aims of the Union in general and “expressed” in terms of common values and interests. The stress on peace, human rights, and democracy is thus more than a banner: it defines who the Union is or wants to be and who it is not or does not want to be, at least at the declaratory level. The link between “expression”, meaning, and reference passes through the interrelationship between identity and culture (and/or ideology) and is mediated by language and discourse in a constant struggle for legitimation and recognition (Kramsch 1998: 10). Political, Security, and Strategic Culture Culture is a broad notion. Like an onion, it can be qualified both horizontally (its dimensions) and vertically (in relation to the levels or units of belonging). In the context of security, political culture plays a role in defining the precepts and preferences of security: it includes assumptions about the political system and its constituting values widely shared within the society or by its political elites. Political culture is defined as the internalized attitudes – cognitive, affective, and evaluative – towards the political system, and towards the role of the individual in that system (Almond and Verba 1966: 13–17) that reflexively interact with the political structure (Almond and Powell 1978: 25–26). Political assumptions can be seen as taken-for-granted “mind-sets” or dispositions towards a particular set of behaviors, enabling or constraining the range of acceptable possible alternatives: as such, they are limited to “setting the agenda” or “ordering political priorities” through the influence of particular elites or “hegemonic blocs” (Laitin 1986: 171),

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but they do not determine in an exclusive way which actions will be chosen (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 128–131). As a matter of fact, what is interesting in the context of security is in particular the political and diplomatic culture of the elites, that is, the complex of values and perceptions (intellectual and moral) possessed by the official representatives of states or international organizations (Bull 1987: 316). The existence of a determinate political culture thus influences the perception of security and the determination of aims, means, and ways in a grand strategy. By the same token, security actions do hit back and go to shape culture. Howorth argues that political culture is the product of culture and politics: culture is a relatively static and essentialist component created by a society with a common identity, while politics entails a functionalist organization of institutions and structures set up with a common purpose (Howorth 2000a: 87). This conceptualization is important because it explains how both context and behavior are contained in the notion of “political culture”. In the EU case, these assumptions about the general political system influence both the identity of the Union and its actions. When analysing the sources of a security concept and policy, general political assumptions constitute the overall context in which the grand strategy is developed, and they frame the identification of the content of values and interests for a unit: however, they do not generally directly focus on security. Security and strategic culture, as sub-cultures of political culture, offer more specific indications of the preferences of the subject. Security culture can be defined as a set of enduring and shared assumptions, beliefs and attitudes about threats and referent objects, while strategic culture refers to the means deemed appropriate to make security. Krause’s distinction between security culture as referring to perception of interests, and strategic culture as possessing both a domestic and an international dimension does not really help in understanding what the functions of the two types of culture are (Krause 1999: 12–14). At the bottom of the search for explanations of state behavior in the international system and in particular of the emergence of war or the endurance of peace, together with history, geography, decision-making structures etc. normative constraints to the use of force have been recognized to play a decisive role (Kegley and Raymond 1986). It should be noted that the majority of the literature considers only strategic and not security culture as important in the formulation of security policies. In the following the two will be considered as a coherent whole. Security/strategic culture intervenes in directing the orientation of the grand strategy. Although other variables play a central role in the determination of the planning, that is for instance environmental, economic, logistical and opportunity factors, culture influences the predisposition and inclination toward the selection of the one or the other end, means, or way. Again the debate is on whether culture is a context for action or constitutes behavior (Poor 2003). Following the recount of Colin Gray (Gray 1999b: 1), there are three generations or groups of strategic culture scholarship, and the variations on the meaning and causal functions of the variable differ accordingly. Although Gray and others categorize scholarship in terms of time-bound generations in order to delineate the history of the concept

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– as it was the case for security – the distinction into groups or approaches which continue across time and are contemporary seems to be a more appropriate way of presenting the discussion. Moreover, in general, all the following approaches refer to “national” culture, and it is not clear whether their conceptualizations can be easily transferred to states or other entities. It is assumed here that similar mechanisms affect organizations dealing with security, whether private or public, or in Gray’s terms, “a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience” (Gray 1999b: 131; see also Tsakoloyannis 1996; Adler 1997b). For the first generation of classical realists, strategic culture is “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy”, and which have acquired a state of semi-permanence as a result of a socialization process (Snyder 1977: 4, 8). Booth adds that these “traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment” refer in particular to problems related to the threat or use of force (Booth 1979: 121). Devised in order to understand and explain the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, these definitions are part of anthropological models used for drawing the connections between culture and state behavior in so called “national character studies” (Elkins and Simeon 1979). Political and strategic culture is considered as one in a range of variables that constrain strategic choice: it represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns of behavior of the political and military elites, in short, the approach of a nation or group or organization on issues of war and peace. This means that, contrary to neo-realist rational determinism, cultural differences are relevant in explaining behavior in the international environment. For Gray, behavior is a constituent part of culture and cannot be studied separately: these assumptions with respect to force derive from the “perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms” (Gray 1981: 36). Culture incorporates both patterns of behavior and ideas, values, attitudes and expectations, and it is thus a product of both what is thought and said, and what is done. The problem arises when patterns of behavior do not reflect the stated ideas and expectations: where can one empirically find culture if not in behavior? This is in fact the major criticism towards this first generation: that including behavior in the definition suggests a deterministic relation between culture and behavior and fails to identify a causal connection (Johnston AI 1995a: 37–38). The second group studies how culture is used as a discursive tool to legitimize strategic doctrines, and how elites as hegemonic actors are able to manipulate culture in their interests. This observation is generally based on the fact that what decision makers say is often different from what they do (Klein BS 1988: 139): some ideas and rhetorical statements remain just that and fail to have any influence on strategic decision making. This means that behavior is different from culture. The problem is however how then to assess culture per se.

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Finally, the third group represented by the social constructivist approach has been trying to devise a rigorous and positively falsifiable scientific method to the study of strategic culture (Johnston AI 1995a: 48). In this “cultural realist” approach, culture is treated as an independent variable detached from behavior (the dependent variable). For Johnston strategic culture is: an integrated system of symbols (i.e. causal axioms, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious (Johnston AI 1996: 223).

These ranked grand strategic preferences are derived from central paradigmatic assumptions about the nature of conflict and the enemy, and they are collectively shared by decision makers (Johnston AI 1995b: ix). In particular, according to Johnston’s model, strategic culture is characterized by beliefs about: a) the orderliness of the strategic environment and the role and frequency of war in human affairs; b) the nature of the conflict, adversary and threat posed (zero-sum or variable sum, the value of unilateralism or cooperation); and c) the efficacy of the use of violence in eliminating threats and achieving the prescribed ends. These assumptions should then directly affect behavior at the operational level, since some option will simply not be imagined as appropriate and effective (Johnston AI 1995b: 223–224; see also Duffield 1998:4; Archer et al. 1998). For the sake of this research, strategic cultural postulates influence grand strategic preferences, that is, the preliminary choice of diplomacy, economic or military resources and their coordination for the attainment of determined ends. It should be stressed again, however, that cultural assumptions – both political and strategic – do not absolutely determine behavior, and there is no direct and univocal causal relationship between culture and strategy. Rather, culture functions as a variable influencing the hierarchical order of preferences, that is, for instance whether official diplomacy or economic sanctions are believed to be more efficacious than military measures. A strategic culture displaying high values in the variables considered is thus a sign of a tendentious predisposition towards hard realpolitik. Still, the final output, that is, the security strategy and policy that follow, is only facilitated, enabled or constrained by the existence of determinate institutions, cultural norms, moral and ethics. External constraints, convenience, opportunity or other case-related factors may play a more determinant role in practice. The poles hard realpolitik and idealpolitik are only ideal-types in a continuum of strategic outputs (Johnston AI 1996: 224). The existence of determinate assumptions enable the construction of informed expectations about the course of action that will be taken by the decisionmaking elites. Culture, building upon fears and perceived threats consistent with

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internalized worldviews, operates as restriction of options and thus delimitation of behavior (Johnston AI 1995b: 162). As already mentioned about all the models related to strategic culture, also Johnston’s units of reference are states, in particular China. However, the model can be easily applied to any other actor operating in the international security arena, given certain “universal” rules of the game that the single actor cannot change (only try to influence). The analysis of the strategic culture of the elites, thus, coupled with the consideration of their particular security situation may lead to cautious predictions about future orientations. At the same time, their strategic beliefs contribute to define their identity either in terms of self-perception or projection (Whitman 1998; Kocs 1994). Unsurprisingly, Gray answered to Johnston’s critique of his own approach by denouncing Johnston’s model, because the latter’s view of strategic culture as contingently prescriptive does not explain change. He maintains that there is no direct relationship between cultural preferences and operational choice because strategic culture is shaping context for behavior and constituting behavior at the same time, thus creating a reflexive circuit between cause and effect (Gray 1999b: 128–136). It is possible to combine Johnston’s and Gray’s approaches using Gidden’s bracketing technique as context defining behavior at time zero and as behavior becoming context at time one (Giddens 1984). The assumption is that actors are strategic in that they take into consideration the context before engaging in an action: this does not mean that their preferences are exogenously given, but that their interpretation of the environment is mediated through a system of meaning or “policy paradigms” that provide “cognitive templates” (Sprout and Sprout 1965; Hay 2002: 209–210). To escape the tautological trap of deriving culture from behavior Berger (TU 1996: 328–329) has suggested to analytically disaggregate policy behaviors and meanings attached by the political actors to those policies (as reflected in public opinion polls, debates, books, and articles written by opinion leaders, that is, discourse – see Chapter 3) and to judge the consistency of behavior and expressed beliefs and values over time: if culture or behavior change without a respective change in the other, then there is no relationship. This consistency would thus falsify the relationship between culture and policy. The problem in Berger’s hypothesis is that he does not specify what he considers behavior, and he seems to assume that discourse is not behavior but something else. How to Apprehend and Measure Culture? Culture is not an easy variable to apprehend and measure. The problem with cultural and ideational variables is that they are hardly quantitative. Moreover, the existence of sub- and counter-cultures begs the question of whether culture is divisible, and if so, how to weigh different beliefs and measure dominance (Jones and Smith 2001). Apart from the endless challenge of definition, criticisms of using culture as an independent variable are very articulated and hit important

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weak points: the problem is not only one of operationalization and tautology, since ideas, values, and norms are enshrined in a physical container of one sort or the other and cannot easily disentangled. Their explanatory function is also questioned, because since they are often anthropologically unique to the case-study and they are “semi-permanent” or slow to change by assumption, they do not lend themselves to cross-national usage and generalization (Desch 1998; Price 1999; Jones and Smith 2001; Glenn 2004). Desch for instance sees strategic culture as a supplementary explanation to structural analyses (Desch 1998: 169). The same challenges are faced by both culturalists and social constructivists (Farrell 2002): how can beliefs be observed if not in social practices? How can one know whether these shared beliefs really exist? It is assumed that beliefs must be expressed and codified, that is, leave physical residues (in public statements and confidential papers of policy and political elites), in order to be considered shared. Yet, the greatest challenge in these theoretical models centered on culture is the methodological question of capturing, identifying, and studying perceptions and assumptions. The choice of the method obviously depends on the paradigm (Wendt 1987: 353–355): if culture is intended as context then expressed preferences are the key, while if culture is intended as behavior then the actual actions and behavior (the preferences in practice) are considered the empirical evidence in support of the theory. The problem with this last approach is that not always there are products to analyze. Preferences expressed are not always transformed into policy and practices: what is their meaning then? Young (1998) and Young and Schafer (2002) comprehensively reviewed the methods used to assess cognition. They identify in particular four dominant methods centered on content analysis: a) operational code based on preferences of goals and means; b) cognitive mapping based on encoding concepts in a subject-verb-object construction; c) image theory based on inferences drawn from verbal descriptions and expressed policy preferences; and d) psychological content analysis and conceptual complexity based on information processing. Constructivists tend to rely on process tracing or historical analysis in order to show the impact of norms on behavioral outcomes through a focus on change and the impact of external shocks causing dissonance (Lantis 2005). In particular and of relevance in this discussion, Johnston and other scholars before him used a cognitive mapping approach. Introduced at first by Robert Axelrod in his seminal “Structures of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites”, this method is informed by mathematics and psycho-logic, statistics, graph theory, evaluation assertion analysis and decision theory and defines a cognitive map as “a pictorial representation of the causal assertions of a person as a graph of points and arrows” (Axelrod 1976: 5–7). Perceptions are thus filtered through a cluster of beliefs and cognitive factors (Holsti 1969; Jervis 1976; George AL 1979a; Larson 1994). Although very promising and innovative, by admission of the very initiators and supporters of this approach, cognitive mapping suffers of several limitations, which compromise the successful conduct of empirical research. The major problem lies in the fact that assertions, documents, and interview material

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have to be evaluated by the researcher, that is, the meaning must be “inferred” or “interpreted”. This also calls in the so-called projection problem, whereby one’s on mindset or expectations are projected onto the object of analysis (Fischer G 1997: 30). In the 1970s, when this method was first presented, interpretation was considered to be an unreliable technique, too impure to conform to the positivist canons of science. This is why Axelrod and friends tried to propose a structural model that could enshrine and translate ideas and beliefs in quantifiable almost material sets of data, points, signed graphs and numbers. As said, the problems were evident from the beginning: the difficulty to access data (the minds of the elites?) and to code it, the necessity to take into consideration the context in order to draw informed inferences as well as the flexibility and magnitude of causation were and still are insurmountable mountains on the road toward explaining the role ideas play in decision-making and action (Axelrod 1976: 251–265). The introduction of computer aided content analysis techniques, quantitative survey analysis, or qualitative analysis of the content of schemas did not solve the epistemological challenge (Mowle 2003). Surprisingly, neither Axelrod nor his younger followers – and Johnston declares to use cognitive mapping without really discussing the merits of his method – consider “assertions” for what they are in practice, that is, declarations, statements, texts, oral or written verbal expressions. Despite frequent references to context and content analysis, no author of this school engaged in a serious assessment of the role of language, and in particular, of the contribution which different strands of linguistic research could supply to the study of policy formation and cognitive analysis. If one considers the organizing and structural role of language – the fact that incoming information are sensed, perceived, catalogued and categorized in a schema of pre-ordained labels, pigeon holes, and words – as well as its deeply social and interactive nature, it makes sense to turn to a detailed analysis of the main tool of communication in order to try to establish a relationship between cultural assumptions on the one hand and predispositions for action on the other. The following chapter proposes to look more in detail at what assertions are, by using language as the litmus test of cognition. European strategic culture is thus intended as ideas, beliefs, expectations that are shared across the actors involved in the processes surrounding European security and defense politics, expressed in a dominant discourse, and consistent with patterns of behavior and action (the ESDP and its implementation).

Chapter 3

Is Talk Really Cheap? Language as an Interface between Culture and Behavior

An important component of the security concept is its intersubjective and ideational construction, which implies an active role of the agent on the structure. Where are security concepts to be found empirically? How can one search the minds of the elites? Whether hard facts or soft variables like norms, values, and ideas can better explain reality and how to empirically detect and prove their respective causal or explanatory power are fundamental questions inflaming never-ending debates and guerres de plume. Implicit in these discussions and exchange of writings is the role of words, language, and communication. Is language a mere mirror of reality, or is it a constitutive component of its construction? Is it a connecting pipe, a functional means, or does it deserve to be treated as an end in itself, as an integral and essential element of the “world out there”? Despite the fierce defense of disciplinary boundaries by some (Linklater 1992: 88), there is a tendency for disciplines in the humanities and social sciences to come closer together or to at least converse with one another and transgress the restrictions of artificial academic compartmentalization. The most evident example is the experiment of bringing together domains such as philosophy, anthropology, history, linguistics, sociology and political science under the common hat of “cultural studies”. Despite facile accusations of superficiality, fuzziness and scientific unsoundness, the exploration and employment of different and unorthodox instruments of analysis – like language and discourse in politics – may contribute to shed light on angles often ignored or subsumed by more traditional approaches, quantitative and qualitative alike. As a matter of fact, theoretical assumptions about language are frequent in political science and IR. Various schools of thought have approached, to different degrees of success, problems of concepts and meaning extrapolating tools from the philosophy of language and cognitive science and applying them to the study of political phenomena, and this does not only concern post-structuralists and post-modernists, but also classical realists like Jervis and his colleagues studying cognitive mapping (see Chapter 2). Prominent strains in foreign policy analysis and comparative politics stress the role of rhetoric in diplomacy and negotiations and the importance of the attribution of conventional or non-conventional meaning to terms of reference for the sake of successful understanding in communication. In this context, the general aim of this chapter is to propose an analytical framework for the study of the concept of security taking language seriously. By scratching off political and ontological qualifications, this section tries to

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explore the cognitive sources of security and the conceptual model associated to it (by English-speakers in this case). The development is based on three major assumptions. First, the epistemological foundations of concept analysis provide the background against which variables such as ideas and culture can be integrated into the model as affecting the way individuals and groups know the world and decide about competing beliefs. Concepts and ideas become axioms which constrain and enable the construction of a determinate ontology (or specification of a conceptualization – see Chapter 4). Vocabulary and categories are reified and become more than just conventions (March and Simon 1958: 165). It is thus crucial to understand where concepts and ideas come from, and how they influence the perception of reality. Second, language is presented as a transmission belt that channels meaning from the realm of ideas to the world of “things” and the other way round. Language is the intervening variable – necessary but not sufficient – in the relationship between ideas and social action. Finally, security is considered, among other things, as a result of linguistic (discursive) practices. Security actions and policies depend upon determinate concepts and systems of ideas (ideology and culture) that are communicated through discourses. The embedded idea of how the world should be – worldview – cognitively influences the perception of how the world is and its discursive construction, that is, the terms used to describe it. In particular, discourse is seen as a set of ideas constituting an identity and a community and as an interactive process of policy construction: context and action however will be kept artificially separated�������������������������������������������� , for the sake of the analysis, in order to avoid tautology�������������������������������������������������������������������� . ������������������������������������������������������������������ Discourse is used as a method, as an interface between culture as context and culture as behavior��. Using syntactical analysis and conventional linguistic categorizations, this research attempts to advance a complementary model for considering the effects of security discourse on security practice. A successful dominant discourse thus structures policy opportunities, policy agenda, and the resulting behavior. This does not mean that more traditional explanations are ruled out, but simply that a more holistic approach is needed in order to understand and explain security processes and policy dynamics (Hollis and Smith 1990: 71–72).

The Instrumental Role of Language: The Transmitting Belt The so-called “cultural turn” in the social sciences did not come alone. It was accompanied by a “linguistic” turn, a renewed interest for the role of language in affecting social processes (Fierke 2002). It is an interdisciplinary response to the traditional approach in political science, which, despite using textual evidence in the form of negotiation records, historical narratives, journalistic and historical accounts of events, policy statements, interviews etc., considers language as transparent, secondary, and empirically weak for political analysis (Milliken 1999; Larsen 1997: 4–10; Mowle 2003).

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In order to further clarify how language is appraised in this study, one major theoretical question has to be addressed: does language construct or represent reality? Does it constitute or simply mirror the world out there? On the one hand post-modernists and reflectivists generally acknowledge that language is central not only from the epistemological but also from the ontological point of view: reality does not exist independently of human agency who, through discourse, literally creates the world. Modernists and rationalists, on the other, claim that material facts are independent variables capable alone of explaining complex social and political relationships. This research is based on a via media, a two-step reasoning that tries to combine, but that inevitably re-elaborates and modifies the above-described assumptions. The first presumption is that there is an independent reality out there: a table is a material object even if it is called a chair. However, and this is the second element, access to reality is mediated by a linguistic and conceptual grid (Hermann 1988: 180). Language can be regarded as a phenomenology: you cannot see, touch, smell, hear and taste ideas, concepts, and beliefs, but you can physically perceive words. In this case, words are “signs” (signifiers), the channel, the connecting pipe, the medium through which ideas are translated into the material world. The word “security” with its qualifying adjectives and its relative phraseology indicates the content of the concept and its relationship with other ideas. When considering language in this research, the focus is more on the production of symbolic meaning, on connotation (meanings are generated by connecting signifiers to wider cultural codes of meaning, syntax and pragmatics) rather than denotation (descriptive and literal, semantics) (Barker and Galanski 2001: 5). The use of language allows for categorization and simplification of the environment (Fischer G. 1997: 29). According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, “the structure of the language one habitually uses influences the manner in which one thinks and behaves” (cited in Kramsch 1998: 11): apart from the association of different perspectives and worldviews to different tongues, this means that language filters perceptions and channels cognitive structures. For example, the appellation of somebody as terrorist or freedom fighter suggests a whole mental and causal structure, as does the qualification of power as civilian or military. Symbols or words are thus the vehicles through which meaning is given to experience, and political symbols/words are particularly poignant as communicators and solidificators of cultural assumptions (Dittmer 1977; Kramsch 1998). In particular, language in politics reinforces and establishes ideology as common sense: it enables the expression of a specific worldview, but it also constrains any other diverging modes of thought (Orwell 1962). However, to study language per se is not enough: it does not directly help understanding the relationship between ideas and actions, theory and practice. As already hinted at, meaning lies in the use of words and is expounded in pragmatic narratives and social practice. Against structuralism and its mainstream assertion that “signifying practices generate meaning as an outcome of structures or predictable regularities that lie outside of any given person” (Barker and Galanski

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2001: 4) and also against post-structuralists and their claim for the primacy of language and deconstruction above and beyond the actor (Larsen 1997: 11), the main contentions here are that linguistic structures – such as grammar and syntax – are important at a micro level: they are part of an organizational order, an instrument of categorization useful to identify the nature and function of words, and as a reflection, of things. However, at the macro level they are inserted in a broader context requiring not only punctual linguistic analysis (as a status), but a deeper understanding of how the language users, both active and passive participants (speakers and audience), continuously re-negotiate previously acquired subject/ object positions and meanings and connotations (as a process) (Van Dijk 1997b). Karin Fierke in her study on the impact of Wittgenstein for the social sciences refers to these two functions of language: as a static picture providing a “logical scaffolding for how things stand in relation to one another”, and as a dynamic game played by the language users on the bases of shared rules (Fierke 2002: 335). The use of language implies a choice of lexicon and grammatical structures, which is not necessarily conscious, but which is deeply normative: the syntax indicates a way of ordering the world and defining the situation, while uses of grammar reflect intentions and goals (Halliday 1973: 50–52; Hudson 1997: 28–29). Security is hence not only a word or a definition. It is a concept that is communicated in a discourse made up of a complex of interconnected elements. In the field of security studies, this approach is best epitomized by the Copenhagen School and their reference to a “grammar of security” with different dialects according to the specific sector or dimension of security (Buzan and Weaver and De Wilde 1998: 33).

Language: An Object of Study or a Methodology? As grand strategy entails prioritization and ranking of preferences, so the use of language consists of a choice of words and grammar on the basis of a context of performance. Grand strategy is intended as a text; the end product or the higher expression of a discourse, or a range of statements promoting meaning (Milliken 1999; Larsen 2000b). What is the difference between “language” and “discourse”? In general, it is possible to distinguish between discourse with a big D intended as language in use mixed with non-language, and discourse with a little d referring to applied linguistics (Gee 1999: 6–7). In political science, discourse refers to a set of ideas and categories through which meaning is given to objects and events, and it does not necessarily build upon either the big D or little d concepts of discourse in language studies. Discourse does not only entail objects in the form of texts and speeches, but also and most importantly, contexts. Meaning is produced and reproduced through social and situated practices, and it is framed by norms or rules of behavior: this is the thesis of the supporters of “discursive institutionalism” (rather than rational choice, historical, or sociological), for whom discursive practices are the products

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or epiphenomena of cultural assumptions and values. Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, as Fierke 2002 and others have done for language, argue that discourse is constituted by an ideational dimension (cognitive and normative aspects of meaning) and an interactive dimension (elite processes of policy formulation and mass communication) (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 197). On the one hand, discourse is thus a structure which provides a context for action, and it is itself action: it contains both linguistic and pragmatic aspects of action. The functions of discourse in politics are varied: apart from providing meaning, explanation, and legitimation for political actions, it contributes to the development of an identity (Connolly 1983; Chadwick 2000; Wodak and De Cillia and Reisingl 2005). In particular, discourse includes not only “positioned representations” of how things are, but more importantly “imaginaries” of how things could be (Fairclough 2003: 23): this means that it is a reliable instrument to assess considered preferences. As it has been pointed out in the discussion about ideology, elites play an important role in the formulation of discourses and the success of a dominant system of meaning. In this book, language and discourse in particular are considered as the physical residues of beliefs and culture; it represents an actor’s self-perception of its identity; and it is deemed as a tool to bridge the gap between institutional and actor-centered analysis, that is, between structure and agency because “social structures have an inherently discursive dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from the reasons and self-understandings that agents bring to their actions (…)” (Wendt 1987: 359). By the same token, if the actions are consistent with the dominant discursive “promises”, then the theoretical dilemma between culture as context or culture as behavior is solved in favor of the hypothesis that a circular relationship culture-behavior (via discourse) exists and that, for the sake of the analysis, it is possible to separate the two variables. As a matter of fact, by introducing discourse as an intervening variable and by bracketing the relationship culture-discourse, it is now possible to complete the circle by looking at the relationship discourse-behavior. By syllogism, if culture (C) equals discourse (D) and discourse (D) equals behavior (B), then culture (C) equals behavior (B) (If C = D and D=B then C=B). If the discourse determines a specific pattern of action, then the cultural attitudes expressed in the dominant discourse finally determine or cause the action/behavior which in turn contributes to the change in the discourse and thus in the cultural assumptions. If we want to prove the effect of culture on behavior and if we assume that a dominant discourse is a mirror of cultural attitudes at a given time, then coherence between discourse and action proves the existence of a determinate security/strategic culture. Discourse is not the object of study of this research, but it is merely used as a heuristic instrument for the analysis of texts (i.e. records of discourse) to explain the relationship between culture and behavior in general, and for what concerns the ESDP in particular. One of the major empirical problem in using discourse as a methodology is to elaborate a model according to which texts can be analyzed in context but kept separated from interpretation. The challenge is to set the boundaries and to decide

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what to include and what to exclude from discourse. For instance, for the sake of this study, policy is considered as “observable” behavior (output), while grand strategy pertains to discourse because it is not directly implementable, or it does not have any legal implications. Discourse is thus the aggregate of public statements on security and its associated policy. Texts are produced by individuals and often by ghost-writers: how can they be representative of the cultural assumptions of an organization? Moreover, individual utterances may be both strategic and normative, and depending on the context, they may be incoherent and contradictory at points. Again, identified consistencies across utterances by different speakers across time and space suggest the adoption of “a common representation despite their privately held views” (Billings and Hermann 1988: 56), and as it will be argued in the section on discourse as action, this consensus at the cognitive level is the basis for the formation of a discursive or epistemic community and the product of social learning: an abrupt change in the dominant discourse because of an endogenous (like a change in leadership) or exogenous event would thus be an indicator of change in assumptions and preferences. From a methodological perspective, discourse analysis here is intended as applied in international law for verifying correct interpretation of a legal text, and it comprises three elements: an objective component centered on the actual text and the analysis of its words and their common sense; a subjective component based on the analysis of the intentions of the speakers which might give a particular connotation to the meaning of the words; a teleological dimension concerning the general object and purpose of the utterance; and in addition a contextual element whereby other texts or circumstances are taken into consideration (Shaw MN 1997: 656–660). This means that discourse has to be considered as a structure in terms of statistical aggregate of texts, and as a product of dynamic interaction between speakers and audience at the level of the policy formulation process.

Language as Structure Typical modern linguistics is chiefly concerned with the study of grammar or of smaller bits of language like sounds (phonetics), parts of words (morphology), meaning (semantics), and the order of words in sentences (syntax). However, in order to understand what role language plays in social and political relationships, it is important to shift the focus to the analysis of the “contextualized use of language”, that is, discourse. In this paragraph we will try to define what the components of discourse are, and how they are ordered (discourse syntax or how the constituent elements are ordered and structured). Why discourse as a structure? Discourse regulates the way information are organized (Barker and Galanski 2001: 12; Foucault 1984). This regulative function is particularly important in a discussion about concept construction: discourse in this sense is a mechanism delimitating borders of orders. Borrowing from Giddens’ structuration theory, these enabling and constraining performances are

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the major cognitive features of discourse (Giddens 1984): the concept of security is manifested, externalized, and delimited in discursive formations and through discursive practices (Foucault 1991a). Discourse as a field of study is considered to be “fuzzy” because it feeds a variety of approaches encompassing different disciplines: traditional linguistics (language use: semiotic, discourse rhetoric, semantics, grammar); cognitive and social psychology (communication and cognition: construction of mental models, processes and representations – social knowledge production); and the social sciences (interaction, speech act and conversational analysis, link with society) (Van Dijk 1997: 1–34). In general, two approaches can be distinguished: a descriptive one interested in studying the evolution of meaning per se, and a critical one (Critical Discourse Analysis) which aims at exploring the relationships of causality between “(i) discursive practices, events and texts, and (ii) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes” (Fairclough 1995: 132), and in particular at studying how changes in the use of language can be seen as a sign of general and social cultural changes in a society. As already emphasized earlier, this is also the endeavor of this book: to identify a connection between security discourse, culture, and identity. The abundance of approaches dealing with discourse is explained by the existence of different dimensions or levels at which analysis can be conducted: a. the immediate language or text co-text; b. the intertextual relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses (allusions, references, inferences, links with other discourses and concepts); c. extra-linguistic variables forming the local context of the situation (aims, intentions, roles of the participants, setting of discourse in time, space, modality); d. the broader socio-political and historical context (global context, fields of action) (Van Dijk 1997a: 19). For the sake of this research this ranking can be summarized and simplified under two headings and scales: “discursive syntax and grammar” (a+c) or micro-level, and material and ideological context or macro-level (b+d). Syntax in linguistic terms refers to the structure of the sentence or how the components object, subject, predicate etc. are organized and spatially located in a relationship, while grammar identifies the internal characteristics of the components, their qualities as nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs and so on. Extrapolating from language to discourse, “discursive syntax” indicates the positioning (ordering) and the relative relationship between speakers or subjects, concept or topic of discussion or referent objects, audiences, and discursive actions; while “discursive grammar” specifies who the subjects and objects are and what type of actions are performed. Discourse can thus be considered as the production of concepts,

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Table 3.1

Components of Discursive Syntax and Grammar

Syntax (a) Subject

Grammar or Part of Speech (c) Noun or pronoun (singular or plural, feminine or masculine, personal identity of the subject) + relative adjectives

Predicate

Verb (type of action, mode: passive or active, tense: past, present, future)

Referent Object

Noun or pronoun + relative adjectives

Prepositional Phrases

Adverbs and propositions. References to time (when), space (where), modality (how) etc.

objects, and subject positions which shape the way in which we make sense of the world (Hardy and Palmer 1998; Fairclough 1992). The discursive construction of a concept implies the definition and qualification of a subject, the position of speaker, actor or concept (idea) entrepreneur on the one hand, and the indication of an object which can be intended either as the direct object of the discourse (the topic) or as the receiving target, the audience. The substantial difference against the corresponding traditional linguistic categories lies in the impact of intertextual/interdiscursive connections (b) and the global context (d) for meaning construction and interpretation: these two variables determine the respective content (positioning and qualification) of syntax and semantics. For example, as it will be discussed later, the particular classification of a state or an individual as a referent object, of a government or the international community as a subject, of military defense or humanitarian intervention as a predicate, or of a region or the world as the space of action, depends on the interrelation between previous discourses and ideologies (socio-cultural knowledge: the value of peace or democracy) on the one side, and material and cultural facts on the other (the international system and self-identity). This relationship explains the relative instability of meaning because of context-dependency: change in the context affects discourse and vice versa (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 277). The macro dimensions of discourse are of special interest here because they support the initial hypothesis of a direct link between meaning/concept and culture/ideology via perception of the external reality. The interface between social or cultural beliefs and discursive practices can be explained with the help of communication theory. According to Habermas, a precondition for successful communicative action, and in the first place for understanding, is the existence of a “common lifeworld” (gemeinsame Lebenswelt) provided by among other things a common language (Habermas quoted in Risse 2000: 14, 10). This neutral “ideal speech situation”, however, should be integrated by a more dynamic view of the relationship between concepts and discourse components: communication

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from this perspective is not only a system for information exchange but represents a discursive struggle (negotiation) over meanings, whereby the winner is the dominant or hegemonic discourse (Risse 2000: 16), which naturalizes a particular state of affairs and enables and constrains the practices of the subjects (����� Doty 1993: 314). Hence, ��������������������������������������������������������������������� as highlighted in the discussion about concepts, it should be reiterated that discourse, as a structuring system, is only a layer, an intermediate means for understanding in no case independent from cultural and ideological superstructures. Elements of a Security “Discursive Grammar” A grammar defines how the matrix of variables is organized and functions as a structure for the definition of the relationships (causal or intervening) between its components. The term “discursive grammar” has been coined for the sake of the analysis of security as a discursive field: this model is useful to identify the elements which constitute security utterances, and which contribute to the formation of a discourse. Linguistic analysis and in particular grammatical structures provide the basic framework of analysis in order to start simplifying the complexity of an abstract notion. It is important to highlight that this brief account does not pretend to be exhaustive, but it serves to underline the elements which should be taken into consideration in the construction of a strategic concept. As Huysmans convincingly argues, security is a signifier with a strong performative component through which social relations are organized into security relations (Huysmans 1998b: 232): the allocation of grammatical roles plays an important function in the definition of the concept of security (see for instance Butt et al. 2004 on 9/11). Despite the reference to grammar in many writings on the topic (Fierke 1997; Doty 1993 for example, but many others using discourse), no serious systematic grammatical models have been developed in an attempt to understand how political knowledge is structured beyond the study of metaphors and language games (for instance Thornborrow 1993; Chilton and Lakoff 1995; Bobrow 1996; Chilton 1996a; Larsen 2000b; Huellse 2006). Contexts Before looking into the variables contained in the text, it is important to define the borders of context, intended as everything which is surrounding the text, and which ultimately gives meaning to the utterance. Drawing from anthropology and in particular from the pioneering work of Malinowski, the environment in which a text is situated is both intrinsic (cognitive, affective, and conative) and extrinsic (social, cultural, and interactive) (Halliday 1973), and can be considered as mental models constructed by the participants of or about the situation (Van Dijk 1997b). In particular four dimensions of contexts can be applied to the analysis of security discourses:

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a. the context of situation (situational) defines who is speaking to whom (the role and status of the participants as speakers or receivers), when, where and for what purpose, and the physical setting and conditions of the utterance; b. the context of culture (cultural) contains the institutional norms and rules shaping the mode of interaction and the choice of topics and acts performed in a particular speech community; defines the limits of possibility and normalcy; and sets a common frame of reference. This includes political rules of conduct as well as the structures of political relations and the values purported by the collectivity; c. the co-text is the aggregation of prior or upcoming texts: because of intertextuality, any text is “infected” by the meanings of all the other texts in which the same words have been used (Gee 1999: 55); d. the context of cognition (cognitive) refers to the knowledge (information, intelligence, but also schemata or dominant interpretation of typical situations) available intended as a set of recognizable conventions, rules, norms, and shared assumptions, which inform a process of inferencing (Georgakopoulos and Goutsos 1997: 18; van Dijk 2004). This is connected to the selection of information performed by the speakers. The individuation of these four contexts in the analysis of security discourses should lead to the understanding of how the environment affects not only the specific utterance of the speakers, but also and most importantly their existence and contingent properties altogether (identities, interests, and capabilities) (Jepperson et al. 1996: 41). Security Syntax and Semantics As already pointed out, syntax is the structure or the container, while semantics is the particular meaning or attributes which colors the container. Security is a word with different meanings in different contexts, and the semantics might be contested when embedded in different discourses exactly because it is produced and used in different social, political, and cultural contexts: however, the basic dynamic inherent in the concept is similar across domains (military, financial, computer etc.). The cognitive structures that guide thinking about security are independent of specific and technical conceptualizations, so that it is easy to assume a communicative/syntactical continuity between common language and specialized discourse (Chilton 1996a: 58). As we have seen in the previous chapter, academic and political debates stress that the concept of security is controversial and that it lends itself to a multiplicity of interpretations and contextualization (Gallie 1962; Baldwin 1997; Dalby 1997 and many others). This is true only for what concerns the contents of the concept, or better, the qualifying meaning attributed to the single variables of the discourse (semantics). All the same, when talking about this very sensitive set of ideas and images, a specific and generally accepted vocabulary has been developed and allows

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for the formal delimitation of the border of order (Chilton 1996a: 24; McSweeney 1999: 32). General “syntactical rules” of security are not contested, although their specific content may be object of debate. Referent object and threats for instance are only neutral categories to be filled in with a determined qualification on the basis of the situational, cultural, cognitive contexts and the co-text. For example in a common syntactical analysis of the sentence “Tom is reading a book”, Tom is the subject whereby “subject” denotes only the position of Tom in relation to the book (according to the rules of the sentence), but it does not qualify whether for example Tom is a man, an alien, a cat and so on. Syntax simply structures and categorizes the elements of the concept by providing a map of the functions of the single elements [S(subject)+V(verb)+O(object)]: the subject refers to who or what is doing security (or insecurity – in this case, threat); the predicate is the type of action done to implement security; the referent object is the direct object which complements a transitive verb; and finally the prepositional phrases do not only qualify the action, the subject, and the object in terms of time, location, and modality, but also specify the threat. The subject – not to be confused with the theme or the speaker (see contexts) – is the doer of the action or responsible actor. Most importantly, the subject positioning produces actors through the allocation of identity slots (Howarth et al. 2000: 7–15). As it will be discussed in the next chapter, the qualification of the subject includes assumptions about its identity, interests, and values, which directly impact the delimitation of the aims, means, and ways of the whole sentence on the basis of the cultural and cognitive models applied (whether it is a state or another type of entity). The referent object is the answer to the question “what is threatened” or “what should be secured” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36). Central in the discussions about the supposedly widening of the security concept beyond the state, the object may be in terms of material and physical objects or as an abstract idea. Indeed, security is often considered as a referent object in itself: for example, the Anglo-American discourse of security privileges the noun (security) instead of the verb (to secure), because it makes it possible to avoid reference to predication (who is doing security for whom), so that the specific referent objects and subjects do not need to be named, but are subsumed under “security” (what adds to the ambiguity of the concept) (Chilton 1996a: 22). Interestingly, the object and the subject may be coincident, as it is the case for self-defense. Etymologically speaking, the subject is inferior to the object (from the Latin sub which means beneath); however the attribute of sovereignty (from super or above) associated to the subject (a state for instance) inverts the relationship (McSweeny 1999: 23). The tense of the predicate has a central function in security syntax. First of all, it is here assumed that in an ideal-typical security discursive syntax, the verb is transitive, because an intransitive clause would delete any reference to an affected entity, and it would thus hint at grammatical subjects as mere abstractions without conveying any sense of human agency. The fact that in some cases security discourses are built on the intransitive (ex. “there is insecurity”) indicates that

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the speaker tends to avoid attributing responsibility for action and to obfuscate the actual political processes, and this results in rhetorical indeterminacy and no concrete policy actions (the discourse remains a discourse; there is no ensuing behavior). In addition, the use of the active or passive tense is an important indicator of the role of the subject and the object: for example, the sentences “A secures/defends B” and “B is secured by A” are different in the sense that the positioning of A and B respectively defines their scope of action, and indicates whether there is reaction or proaction. The “securitization” action, or the action of framing a problem by using security syntax, will be considered as a pre-condition for the success of the discourse in the next paragraph (see Waever 1995a). Finally, the prepositional phrases are important to define the circumstantial elements of security, and they include indications about the extent of the action (distance, duration), the location (place, time), the manner (means, quality), the cause (reason, purpose), and the contingency (condition) (Halliday 1973: 151). The cause of the action is identified as the threat: as it has been argued in the previous chapter, and as it will be then discussed in the context of securitization, the qualification of this particular prepositional phrase (defend from) in terms of threat, danger, risk, vulnerability, or problem has an important impact on the qualification of all the other prepositional phrases (especially time and ways) and the predicate (proaction or reaction) (see Daase 1991; Liotta 2002). In grammatical sense, that the threat may be material and objective or only subjective indicates two different perspectives: an objective threat is related to the referent object and may be considered as external to the subject (in case of no coincidence between subject and object), while a subjective threat requires an active intervention of the subject, which perceives to have a direct stake in the preservation of the object (subject and object may not be coincidental, but they are closely related). Table 3.2 shows the functions of the elements of the security syntax together with their relative role in grand strategic discourses: the referent object and threat Table 3.2

Simplified Syntax of Security

Syntactical Structure Subject

Security

who or what is securing (defensive actor) Predicate the action (to securitize, to secure, to defend) Direct Object (Referent) who or what has to be secured Prepositional Phrase with (means) Prepositional Phrase (threat) against (what threat) (cause) Prepositional Phrase in (where) Prepositional Phrase (when) Prepositional Phrase how

Grand Strategy Means (Aims/Ways) Means Aims Means Aims Ways Ways Ways

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define the aims; the subject, the predicate, and the instrumental prepositional phrase the means; while the other prepositional phrases specify the ways in which the aim should be achieved. The most important implications that should be drawn from the application of this model to the study of the concept of security are: a) the concept is constructed on a relationship: it is thus both a relational and relative notion; b) referent objects and subjects (the positions in the relationship) have to be clearly identified; and c) the predicates – the actions – depend both on the identity of the object and subject (agency) and on the context (structure and the prepositional phrases). It should be highlighted that this model applies to discourses of security and not insecurity. In discourses of insecurity, threats are usually the subjects (A threatens B), and all the other functions are inverted.

Language as Action: The Strategic Circuit of Policy Entrepreneurship Language is not only a structuring tool: on the one hand, it is a cognitive and normative structure through which ideas are uttered or formalized, and on the other, it can be seen as behavior, as a conscious action conducted by agents in order to institutionalize preferences and produce changes in the structure. After bracketing the first, this section will now discuss the components of language as behavior, and in particular, the implications of dominance for concepts and policies in the security domain. Scholars of communication theory applied to the social sciences, and especially of speech act analysis, claim that language does not merely describe, it does things. Language acquires a dynamic connotation that goes beyond the constraining/enabling movement: to say something is to do something (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). The problem of the application of this approach to policymaking – as some constructivists do (see later and Christiansen and Jorgensen and Wiener 2001) – is the delimitation of the borders of order: is language already part of the policy or only part of the process to arrive to policy? What is the relationship between security discourse (rhetoric) and security policy (practice)? Does language produce or constitute policy? In the following it will be argued that language produces policy and should be considered as a separate product in relation to policy outputs and outcomes: it is a system, which reflects ideas (through coordination and communication), and which structures and limits the policy options that policy-makers and their audiences find acceptable and legitimate. In contrast, Vivienne Schmidt and others (see argumentation theorists) distinguish between two functions of discourse in policy-making: a coordinative one through the provision of common language and framework, and a communicative one where discourse is intended as a means to persuade the audience of the necessity and appropriateness of the policy (Schmitt quoted in Howorth 2001: 783; Risse 2000). Discourse is not considered as a representation of preferences, but as a way to construct and influence assumptions and preferences by altering the perceptions

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of the issue (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 186). Policy is then not the expression of sedimented understanding as argued by Laclau and Mouffe 1985, but the result of a discourse which may or may not be linked to a cultural and normative context. As a consequence, the final text is the result of discursive practices (production, distribution, and consumption of ideas) rather than the mere translation of assumptions (Fairclough 1993: 73). This conceptualization however does not take into consideration the fact that there is a circular relationship between culture, discourse, and policy, according to which discourse does not exist independently from culture. The “Activity-Performativity-Connectivity” Model A text is a pragmatic product: it responds to or interacts with societal issues or problems on the basis of discursive practices and it may produce policy actions (Fairclough 1992: 73; Gill and Whedbee 1997: 161). In particular political discourse may be seen as: the verbal equivalent of political action: the set of all political verbalization, and expressible forms adopted by political organizations and political individuals. It generates response which may range from indifference, through hostility, to enthusiasm and which may or may not lead to political action. It is as complex in its interrelations as political action is. The significance of any instance of political discourse will be affected by its overall relation to political action. And together discourse and action constitute political practice (Gaffney 1999: 200).

Accordingly, discourse is itself an action or is a facilitator for further actions. Once again, the role of context is essential: discursive practices are dialectically related to the specific fields of action in which they are embedded, that is, the situational, institutional, and social settings shape discourses (intended as text, speaker, and audience), and discourses influence social and political processes and actions. This circular and reflexive exercise continuously moulds and reshapes the relationship between concept, discourse, and action. In the model of discourse as a strategic resource for political action, discourse is intended as the means through which a cognitive representation is channeled and filtered in order to reach a goal, in this case, a policy outcome. The mechanism is built upon the interconnection of three circuits, which activate the discursive syntax mentioned above and explain how speakers/writers (the subjects of the action), audience (the object) and context intermingle and contribute to the transfer of a concept into policy practice (Hardy and Palmer 1998). Activity, performativity, and connectivity are essential steps for the success of discourse as a strategic resource. In the activity field, individuals attempt to introduce new discursive statements that will connect objects to particular concepts. Using symbols, stories, and metaphors (discourse as structure) – the pure rhetorical aspect of the action – the speaker tries to draw attention and to

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establish a link between an idea and his/her audience. The performativity circle highlights the importance of sociality for the success of a discourse. Unless it is grounded in time and space – anchored to common linguistic, cultural, and ideological predispositions (or manipulation) – and it is understood and received by other relevant actors, discursive activity will remain simply what it is: words and talks. Finally, through connectivity, concepts do not only resonate in the public, but they are acknowledged as pertinent and compatible with the receivers’ belief system: discourse becomes in this way sedimented into taken-for-granted practice and rhetoric, so that discursive moves facilitate mobilization and the consideration of the issue as an item of the policy agenda, thus transforming a preference into a choice (Kingdon 1995: 3). As a matter of fact, a policy process is made of three steps: problem recognition and agenda setting; alternatives and policy proposals; and politics and choices made (Burstein 1991: 331). The circularity of the model is representative of the interplay between broad societal discourse, specific discursive acts, and consequential practices, and it explains how these elements taken together contribute to the formation of policy through innovation, selection, and diffusion. Innovation refers to the introduction of new symbols and meanings for the redefinition of the issue; selection determines which intersubjective meanings are chosen and validated on the basis of their receptivity; and diffusion indicates how these selected symbols go to influence new cognitive structures (Adler 1991: 55–60; Bernstein 2000: 482). Culture and identity intervene at all levels of analysis (choice of words, symbols, time, frame etc.), but they are particularly powerful in the receptivity circuit when a certain assumption made by the speaker, if validated, acquires ideological solidity. Discourse is thus translating “the world in their minds” – assumptions based on the personal history and cultural background of the speaker (Vertzberger 1990: 319) – into socially accepted worldviews (Doty 1993: 305). The success of the discourse is related to the existence of certain background meanings (structures) which are raised to dominance (Doty 1993: 228). The speaker does not have control of the final outcome, and this is what makes discourse a social interactive practice, which is not only emanating from ideas in people’s heads, but which is “firmly rooted in and oriented to real, material social structures” (Fairclough 1992: 66): the speaker has to consider the whole range of independent variables (the contexts) that may influence the success of his/her discourse. In a discussion of discourse and action, as in ideology, power or the speaker’s position plays an important role for performativity. By the same token, discourse hegemony or dominance, once one full round of the activity-performativityconnectivity circuits is successfully completed, strongly influences practice and policy outcome. As determinants of what can and cannot be thought, discourses limit the range of policy options, thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes…The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of thought – an attribute

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Through internalization and institutionalization on the one hand, and through the reification in policy practices on the other, the dominant discourse becomes crystallized, and it is subsumed and incorporated into the cultural assumptions and preferences so that this circuit model is not as dynamic as it might appear at first sight. Even in the case of an abrupt revolutionary change in external conditions (like 9/11 for example), at the beginning the old dominant discourse generally goes to supplement and not completely substitute the new emerging one: the old discourse is modified in order to integrate the new one. Coherence in discourse despite an important change might suggest the existence of thick culture (Geertz 1973). As it will be discussed later, the use of traditional state symbols (territorial frontiers, integrity) when talking about national security maintains its strength despite the supposed change in the discourse of what a state is or should be: as a consequence, national security policies adapt only slowly not only to change in reality per se (the emergence or dissolution of actors for instance) but also to new discursive statements that pretend to represent and interpret material changes (Larsen 2000b). A dominant discourse is an indicator of a tendency or attitudes and does not determine a policy output or outcome. However, in general, it could be said that attitudes and behavior tend towards consistency (Haas 1964: 112). It should be stressed that dominance is not so much a quantitative or qualitative measure, but it is the product of receptivity and connectivity. For the sake of our argument then, the acceptance of a coherent dominant grand strategy at the declaratory and discursive level indicates the existence of a common language, common understanding, and at the very top common strategic culture. This does not mean that the actors do not engage in persuasion, argumentation, negotiation, coercion, manipulation, silencing or socialization through discourse (Risse 2000; on silence see Jaworski 1997). It is not the scope of this research to digress on these social tactics of dominance or consensus-formation. The lesson to be drawn in our context is that a grand strategy, intended as a dominant discourse, is an indication of the dominant strategic culture of the elites participating in the process. The purpose of using symbols and language may not be only for the sake of policy-making per se. Johnston (AI 1995b: 156–161) mentions in particular three different purposes: a) a self-directed (among the elites) in the form of “auto-communication” designed to construct or reinforce the internal sense of identity and legitimacy, whereby implementation into policy is seen as secondary (�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� declaratory strategic policy not necessarily coincident with action policy); b) directed to the non-elites inside the organization in order to reinforce the internal legitimacy and credibility of the authority and its power structures; and c) directed to the outside of the organization in order to create a sense of in group solidarity embedded into a rhetorical and political community (external-internal dichotomy) (see also Charaudeau 2002: 314–315). This means that even if dominant discourse

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is not operationalized into policy outputs (Milliken 1999: 240), the activityperformativity-receptivity model is still valid to explain the existence of cultural attitudes and the success of other processes like identity and actorness construction and strengthening. A Macro Theory of Discursive Action Figure 3.���������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 shows the role of discursive action in the relationship between the material and “objective” state of affairs and policy action. This simplified model sketches the explanatory framework underlying the theoretical assumptions discussed until now. The subject of the policy-making circuit is constituted by the elites who, officially or unofficially, contribute to the formation of the policy. These elites perceive and interpret reality, internal or external to their group or institution, through individual and social cognitive processes. Culture intervenes in the form of a lens that translates and organizes the information received. These beliefs influence then the choice of a determinate discursive action or grand strategy by limiting or enlarging the preferences and options available. By the same token, the deriving strategy directs and constrains the resulting action. In practice, the elites take notice of the international and domestic situation: the news of a conflict, its economic impact, the causes and the respective positioning of other actors. The “reality” facts are perceived and interpreted thanks to pre-existing cognitive maps. These cognitive maps are a result of experience, previous knowledge, learning and

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cultural paradigms (individual or social): they are organized and communicated through language and discourse and they end up in a grand strategy text. What is important to underline at this point is that interests and ideas may be part of the cultural assumptions that steer the attitudes towards policy. Although there exist different conceptualizations and uses of “discourse”, its relevance as an analytical instrument in this framework is not only to be conducted to the structuring function it fulfils in the “context of the situation” (direct relationship discourse → action): the study of language allows to draw implications concerning the “context of culture” as well (inverse relationship culture ← discourse), thus offering a solution to the epistemological problem of apprehending culture (see Chapter 2). The Speakers or Idea-Entrepreneurs and the Audience Before discussing how this model applies to the security domain, it is important to digress on the central role of the speakers or idea-entrepreneurs and their relationship with the audience, because discourse is essentially a social interactive process (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 195) and the success of a dominant discourse depends not only on the identity and the role of the agents performing the act but also on the receivers. In general, it is possible to distinguish between different types of agents who take part in the discourse. On the production side, there may be a) a public animator or the person who makes the sounds; the author or the person who selected the words and the phrasing (also ghost writer); and the principal or the person who is responsible for the opinions expressed. For simplicity, the figures of animator, author, and principal will be integrated under the label of “speaker”. On the receiving side, the categories are: a) the primary addressee (a ratified hearer); and b) the overhearer (a non-ratified hearer, for instance, an accidental bystander) (Goffman 1981: 325–326). The identification of the speakers and the audience is important because it may suggest the purpose of the discourse: whether it is policy oriented, or whether it has “simply” legitimating functions (Johnstone 2002). As a matter of fact, leaders or elites (individuals or institutions) can be defined as strategic “users of culture” who redefine the descriptive and prescriptive limits of possible by using language for a determinate political agenda (Swindler 1986; Cameron D. 1994: 23, 29): speakers may be considered as “idea-entrepreneurs” who have the power given by their particular authoritative role and position (Le Pestre 1997: 4) to strategically choose and code cognitive categories and references and use rhetorical means in the communication of their perceptions, and thus to predispose (some would say: manipulate) the audience to desired conclusions and fabricate or encourage expectations (Payne 2001). In fact, speakers usually design their speech style on the basis of whom they are addressing. For what concerns the security domain, the speakers are restricted elites of decision-makers and “specialists”, and the coordination among these agents

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usually happens behind close doors. Given the nature of this policy area, the primary addressees of security discourses are generally other elites, either internal or external, while the overhearer is the general public. By elites are intended both political (from other domains or other levels) and academic elites, who are deemed to share a common cognitive context (Oren 2000: 556). Even in democracies, public opinion has a limited effect on the scope and timing of security policy because of the fact that it can be manipulated very easily (Lantis 2002a: 109) especially if it is moderately aware, what is generally the case in situations of insecurity (Zaller 1992: 7). Since resonance and connectivity are essential components for the success of the discourse, it is not surprising that the main interlocutors of security utterances are so-called discursive or epistemic communities (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 11). An epistemic community is the aggregate of “knowledge-based experts who share both cause-effect conceptions and sets of normative and principled beliefs” (Haas PM 1992: 3; Adler and Haas 1992), who may tend to form a discursive community because they use the same linguistic code or jargon, frames of reference, and social space and history, which altogether affect how they perceive the world and their attitudes towards determinate courses of action and preferences (Kramsch 1998: 6–10; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). The vocabulary and the syntactical structures used are indicators of the membership in one or the other social group. Particularly striking in this context is the different and sometimes interchangeable roles of the members of the same epistemic/discursive community: security scholars and practitioners, because of similar educational background, share the same jargon which may be used both in theoretical and political discourses (for instance the ghost-writer of Mr. Patten as well as the Director of CFSP at the EU Commission combine the two roles) (see for instance Erikkson 1999a). In a relatively small and closed community of practitioners and scholars, these elites are thus the primary bearers, users, and purveyors of strategic and security discourses and policies, and consequently of strategic culture (Lantis 2002: 106). Their role as audience is an active one: when for instance the U.S. Secretary of State listens to what the German Foreign Minister is saying, the response is not limited to a passive acceptance or refusal of the terms of discourse: both speaker and audience possess the necessary knowledge, legitimacy, and capacity of immediate reaction, what is lacking to the general public or overhearer. Hence, the activity-receptivity circuits may acquire a dynamics of their own because of continuous negotiations between different concept-entrepreneurs: connectivity and the relative crystallization into a policy practice is possible then only when agreement is reached, independently of the method applied (persuasion or coercion) at the level of the epistemic community of reference. In particular, for the scope of this analysis, an accent on activity is interesting because it sheds light on the relationship between culture and ideology on the one side and language and policy on the other, and it allows for the identification of the source of determinate concepts (where they come from) and the rationale of a specific policy agenda. The figure of idea/discourse/policy entrepreneurs broadly

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used by social constructivist scholars is therefore attractive because it incorporates elements of cognitive psychology (both at the individual and organizational level), anthropology, and economics in decision-making studies. Through the analysis of discursive activity it is thus possible to advance hypotheses and draw inferences about the philosophical and instrumental “operational codes” of the speakers, that is, the particular concepts of politics and values, and the beliefs about options for viable actions, which influence the image of the external world that they have in their minds and consequently, the actions that they undertake (Chilton 1996a: 27). The belief system, mental maps and determinate causal assertions – the political and strategic culture – constrain and enable the introduction of particular discursive statements, the condition sine qua non for a strategic circle to start. The fact that an organization may be identified with what its representatives say or do is a commonsense: by the same token, in a closed community of “specialists”, their utterances are the only ones that “count” in the discourse-action process. In the case of the European Union it thus makes sense to suppose that the discursive practices of its representatives, if not contested, are taken by the other participants in the system (that is, external and internal security actors) as the legitimate and authoritative embodiment of a broader “institutional” political and strategic culture. The Security Discourse Dynamics: From Securitization to Defense The utility of the model of language as action or as a resource for action in the field of security has been articulated by radical social constructivism and in particular by the Copenhagen School: security is understood as the product of a set of discourses and practices built upon institutionally shared meanings rather than an objective and exogenous state of affairs. A central role is played by agency who engages in “securitization” (see also desecuritization or asecuratization), that is, an act of definition (or speech act) which transforms an issue from nonpoliticized to politicized to securitized (Huysmans 1996: 127; Buzan et al. 1998: 23): in fact “securitization studies aim to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions” (Buzan et al. 1998: 32), in order to emphasize the subjective and intersubjective nature of security. The labelling of an issue as a “threat” by the elites is not only a rhetorical practice, but it has deep cognitive implications since it suggests a way to categorize information and consequently act upon them: the conceptual classification and framing shapes competence delimitation and the set of rules which should be applied to the specific case (means and ways) (Waever 1995a). Despite recognizing that securitization – the linguistic transformation of an issue into an urgent and extraordinary security threat – may be considered successful only if the performance or the utterance is accepted by the audience (Buzan et al. 1998: 25) and it is included in the policy agenda (Eriksson 1999b), the Copenhagen School and its acolytes have mainly focused on the micro-level

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of securitization as a speech act or the “innovation effect” in the activity circuit of the model presented here. The ������������������������������������������������������� mere enunciation of a problem as a security threat is however not sufficient for a successful securitization or the establishment of a dominant security discourse. ������������������������������������������������� Figure 3.2 shows the application of the activityperformativity-connectivity model to securitization. In the activity circle, the speaker utters a statement in the name of the referent object or of the subject (or both when they are coincident) and denounces problems as security threats (existentiality): he/she introduces new stories and symbols about the danger and identifies the threat by associating the object with existing cognitive structures. In order to do that, in the performativity circle, security is periodized and contextualized using references to specific events (ex. Balkan wars, September 11, numbers of deaths, destruction). If the stories make sense to the audience on the basis of their existing cultural framework, then the discursive statements “take”, connecting object and concept in a specific frame, and enable the creation of new institutions and organs or new tasks for existing institutions for the implementation of the discourse-action connection. As it will be shown in the next chapter, if security is successfully connected to peacekeeping and crisis management rather than traditional territorial defense, this means that new subject positions and practices emerge. This in turn leads to a re-conceptualization of security in terms of the new ideas encapsulated in the practice. The success of

Figure 3.2

Securitization or Security Discourse as Strategic Resource for Action

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securitization thus depends on the receptivity of the audience; on the situational, cognitive, and cultural contexts; and on the authority and performative power of the speakers (see also Balzacq 2005). In conclusion, to consider grand strategy or whatever major political document as a dominant discourse or as a text where the observer can “read” or “interpret” the assumptions, the attitudes, the preferences and the expectations of the elites may be necessary but not sufficient for inferring cultural generalizations on the one hand and predicting behavior on the other. The contexts play a pivotal role in the determination of the syntax and semantics of security as well as social and political relations.

Chapter 4

Analyzing Security Discourses and Practices: A Typology

It is common to read in accounts of the state of security studies and practice that a paradigmatic shift has occurred, that is, that new security thinking has become the dominant cognitive framework in the field (Baehr 2003; see Chapter 2). Is this really true? Are these simply cognitive responses to a variable strategic environment, or do they represent normative attempts to put new ideals into practice? The “essentialist” discussion in the previous chapter aimed at delineating an abstract and general methodology for considering how the concept is constructed and works at the epistemological level. Although security is a common word in human language and it can be applied in a variety of different contexts, what is of interest in this research is its use and concretization in institutional discourses initiated and developed by International Relations’ scholars and policy-makers (Chilton 1996a: 23). Its ontological color and characterization is dependent on the specific articulation of a complex network of interlinked key-concepts which constitute the fundamental terms of reference and the pivotal repertoire of the discipline: state, power, and sovereignty (Linklater 2000). Security is then not only a philosophical state or a theoretical abstraction: it becomes a tool that defines the “political”, sets priorities and justifies the use of “extraordinary means”, or in plain language, the use of force. The way security is understood and formulated in a political discourse profoundly affects the way political life is conducted. By applying the framework of analysis elaborated above, the aim of this chapter is to systematically break down the narratives employed by both the academia and the practitioners’ circles in the contemporary debate about the meaning of security. The ontological, “semantic”, or symbolic qualification of the syntactical elements of the discourse – referent objects, subjects, predicates and so on – as states, individuals, peace and stability for instance, influences, constrains, and enables the relative formulation of determinate security and defense policies. For heuristic purposes, the dominant discourses will be simplified and categorized in an idealtypology. The location of the period (context or structure) and the identity of the “speakers” (agency) play a significant function for the success of the discourse in terms of dominance and connectivity. A survey of the wider theoretical background of the controversy is thus of paramount importance in order to situate the debate and understand the origin, path, and endpoint of different security logics. The analysis in particular individuates two ideal-typical discourses, associated to different paradigms, assumptions, preferences, and behavior and reflecting a particular interpretation of the international system. For analytical simplification

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and generalization, these discourses are labelled “Traditional (Westphalian)” and “Human”, and a via media is individuated in the form of “Traditional Plus” security (see also Kaul 1995; Moeller 2000a; Bain 2001). The main function of ideal-types is to offer benchmarks to study a trend and organize expectations. By searching for dominance in examples of discourses, the aim is to try to understand whether there is generally consistency between discourse and behavior, and if so, what cultural implications may be inferred. This does not mean that a multiplicity of alternative and concurrent discourses does not exist. Dominance is judged on the basis of the authority and performativity of the speakers (number of speakers and quality) as well as the spread and the importance of the texts produced in the policy-making hierarchy (which assumes acceptance by an epistemic community); their solidification for a certain amount of time; and the eventual implementation in policy. The case studies mentioned here are only used as examples: they have been filtered from existing studies and sources, and they should in no sense be considered original empirical material. The major assumptions advanced in this section frame the structure of the following analysis of the ESDP discourse and practice. First, there is a strong correspondence between scholar and political discourses: they aliment each other in a fluid way, whereby the one discourse is co-opted into the other either as objective evidence or as political justification. It is thus possible to classify both academic schools of thought or paradigms and individual or organizational practices according to the same grammatical and syntactical grid. Although it is normal and scientifically sound that studies and analyses should refer to the socalled “hard facts” of reality and actually build their postulates upon them, the inverse phenomenon seeing the political actors orienting their discursive behavior on the line of “theoretical constructs” mystifies the traditional objectivity claim. If the documents – official and non – issued by political actors and considered as facts by students of international relations and international law are actually the boomerang result of ideas and beliefs formulated and expressed by those very same scholars – through the channels of formal education, information and knowledge creation and distribution as well as persuasion and social learning among members of the same epistemic community – the distinction between observer and observed ceases to be clear and meaningful. Consequently, when the “theory” informs the “practice”, or better, when the theory offers the common language and the interpretation instruments to the practice, the borders of order of these two distinct epistemological levels become confused and artificial. Without engaging in foundationalist research – that is, without going back to the detailed history of IR discourses, trying to establish who was the entrepreneur of a prevailing security conceptualisation and to draw its successive evolution – it is possible to identify, with the help of the discursive syntax model, determinate trends of dominance which overlap and transgress contexts and sector of reference. This means that the two ideal-types of security discourses, the “Westphalian” and the “human”, correspond respectively to a realist/rationalist paradigm and a state practice on

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the one side and to a post-modern/reflectivist approach and a non-state practice on the other. Second, security discourses are not only important at the declamatory or rhetorical level. They constitute the frame of meaning of the policies that directly follow from them. Policies are here intended as practices or sets of instruments designed to materialize a concept and directly linked to their field of discursive action. Observing a Westphalian discourse, it is legitimate to expect a correspondent type of policy measures including but not limited to the use of military force. The same is true in reversal for the human counterpart. Again, this categorization highlights a tendency, not an absolute and exclusive division of labor. Independently of reasons of material capabilities and supremacy, which maintain their causal explanatory power, the fact that a state decides to make of the military the central means of its security apparatus implies a determinate image and perception of the international system which, in turn, is reflected in the articulation of the dominant security discourse. In this sense for instance the term “peacemaking”, a general label for a specific type of security mission, assumes a different connotation depending on how the syntax is applied, whether the referent object is the local civilian population, the receiving state or the donor state; whether at stake is global peace in the name of universal human rights or local stability in the interest of a particular subject. Accordingly, the use of the military in peacemaking, its acceptance and legitimation, is qualified by the discourse in which it is inserted and, as a corollary, by the strategic culture that informs this discourse. Finally, the application of the model to academic and practical security discourses brings to the fore hypotheses concerning the identity of the speakers/subjects and the receptivity of the audience, that is, their ideological and cultural “lifeworld”. The typologies proposed are developed as analytical testing ground against which the EU’s discourses will be then assessed. The use of a thin comparative methodology, and the fact that the EU fits the model proposed, suggests that the EU discourse follows – willingly or forcefully – certain mainstream syntactical and semantical rules essential for communication with other actors, and that from a discursive perspective (and consequently from the policy point of view too) the EU cannot be considered as a sui generis entity in international security affairs.

The Academia-Practice Connection For social constructivists like Alexander Wendt (1992) security is what states/ people make of it. Security is also what theorists or analysts make of it. As a matter of fact, in the discipline and field of security, analysts and commentators play a particularly intrusive political role. Theories play the function of cognitive frameworks for the organization of perceptions and expectations, and moral, ideological, and normative elements influence the description of security (Huysmans 1998b; Buzan et al. 1998: 8).

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Despite the gap acknowledged by some between academic scholarship and policy concerns (Finel 1998: 11–12), and the recognition that policy has usually “enriched academic research more than the reverse” (Betts 1997: 32) (while policymakers frequently dismiss the academia as too abstract and irrelevant for the real world because unaccountable, Jentelson 2002), theory tends to inform discourses and practices of politicians and decision-makers, who consciously or unconsciously and implicitly or explicitly use theoretical organizing principles, assumptions, and expectations about what forces shape the international environment and add a distinct “bureaucratic flavor” to the academic discourses (Keohane 1986: 4; Walt 1998: 29; Fischer 1997: 15–17; Wing 2000). The theory is providing not only the tools of analysis but more importantly the language used to describe a security phenomenon. Language is here intended as the jargon or the technical code in use in order to give meaning to things: Wolfers’ reference to security as a label with “an attractive and possibly deceiving name” which “may not mean the same thing to different people” (Wolfers 1962: 147) suggests that behind the use of a common term the “real” significance is linked to the specific theoretical apparatus of reference. Security analysts set the borders of orders for discussions of security (Erikkson 1999a; Behnke 2000b), whereby “knowledge produced in the academy is fused with that of policy-makers to make up a ‘dominant intellectual/policy perspective’” (George J. 1994: 34) in which the two parties, in some cases indistinguishable because they assume interchangeable roles, cooperate to create a dominant common sense (Milliken 1999: 238). Epistemologically but also ethically problematic, this creates a mutual recursive relationship between the academia and policy practitioners who often “rub shoulders and blur the boundary line” (Dalby 1997: 10): policies are used as evidence in the legitimation of the theories, while theories are used as tools for the legitimation of the policies (on this last point see Booth 1997: 87; Radaelli 1999: 759–760). Since the origin of the foreign and security policy-makers’ worldviews is in the academia because of their formal training in universities (or the training of their advisors and consultants), they can easily understand their logic of appropriateness attached to the paradigms and at will exploit the models developed at the theoretical level and then pick and choose or adapt them to the contingencies of actual policy practice (Mowle 2003: 563; Tetlock 1993: 323–326; George AL 1993). As already pointed out in the discussion about speakers and audience in the previous chapter, security “experts” and “intellectuals” – the first ones considered to be more rationalists and oriented to problem solving, while the second ones are deemed to be more critical and reflectivist (Waever and Buzan 2007: 393) – go to form an epistemic and discursive community, which, despite the fact that it contains different interests because it is constituted by different actors, tends to use knowledge in order to frame common objectives and strategies especially in situations of radical insecurity or uncertainty (Haas P. 1992: 3). From being simply a loosely connected policy network of professionals, scholars, officials, politicians whose meetings are defined by distinct rules and organizational imperative but with only consultative functions (Marsch and Smith 2000: 5), experts and intellectuals

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may reach positions of “bureaucratic power” through the institutionalization of their role in “advisory committees” that have preferential access to the decisionmakers and may facilitate their learning (Levy 1994) (see in particular the EU case in Chapter 5). Hence, policy innovation, diffusion, selection, persistence, and evolution are directly facilitated by this interrelationship and by the fact that this community is not only the “speaker” but also acts as one of the audience legitimating performativity, so that the policy-makers are in reality not only the officials but the whole specialized community altogether (for policy stages see Adler and Haas 1992: 375–387). Interesting in the context of this book is the so-called “ethnocentricity” of security discourses (Booth 1979; Acharya 2000) which pertains to both experts and intellectuals on the one side, and decision-makers on the other. In particular, the purported difference between Europe and the US in terms of academic and policy products is reconducted to a difference in worldviews and culturalinstitutional contexts, whereby the American hegemony in IR and strategic studies is often attributed as a reflection of the US power in the international system (Jorgensen 2000; Waever 1998a; Smith S. 1993; Klein BS 1988; see the discussion on actorness and identity in Chapter 6 and 7). In addition, Waever and Buzan (2007: 393) argue that the US and European arenas of theoretical discussion have developed a different form of knowledge because of a different conception of the relationship of the academia to policy. In the US, academia and policy are clearly separated: while universities are responsible for theory development, policy analysis is generally conducted in think-tanks, which tend to draw upon theory to popularize and simplify academic constructs for decision-makers and whose major objective is to influence policy (Parmar 2004). In Europe, because of the structure of the intellectual market, this distinction between academia and policyanalysis is less straightforward and people tend to move between these categories. As it will be shown in the discussion of the contexts of the ESDP discourse, the fact that some EU decision-makers often engage in scholarly discussions, while academics are called upon to advise and draft policy papers seems to confirm this hypothesis at least for what concerns the European case. Apart from these transatlantic differences in dominant approaches, the real problem for the security “epistemic community” is that, although it is struggling to remain a delimited and closed professional clan as it is the case for the military strategic sector, the various broadening and deepening movements described in Chapter 2 are jeopardizing the clear borders of this once exclusive club. This means that the shift from monopoly to a free market of ideas enshrined in an amazing amount of publications on anything from atoms and germs to space technology passing through philosophy and ethics transforms the “expert” or “specialist” in an “all-knower”, or somebody who pretends to have an answer for the whole variety of security problems. If on the one hand this reflects the increasing complexity of security issues, on the other, the risk is that the decision-makers are exposed to such a cacophony of divergent voices that it makes their task – of taking a decision and standing for it in a limited period of time (given the institutional length of office) – a particularly

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challenging one. The fact that a dominant approach towards human security for instance emerges in the epistemic community may not be reflected in the priorities individuated by their constituencies, and this decollage between theory and reality could explain inconsistencies between discourse and practice.

The Traditional “Westphalian” Discourse Associated to classical realism and neo-realism, the so-called traditional “Westphalian” security discourse ideal-type is qualified by concerns about national security, whereby state, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (indivisibility) play a crucial role. The state is seen as a rational actor the goal of which is to maximize national interest intended as survival and power accumulation in an anarchical world. It is denoted as “traditional” because it refers to an historicallybased model grounded on sovereignty norms which were instituted at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (the Treaty of Münster and the Treaty of Osnabrück): the principles of sovereignty and equality between states as well as the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states (Krasner 1999: 20; Osiander 2001). Necessary condition for state sovereignty in both international and internal affairs is the effective monopoly on the use or licensing of violence within a given territory, which should insure both independence from external threats and internal control (Weber cited in Osiander 2001: 255). At the international level order is thus maintained by the diffusion and equilibrium of power. Also termed “conservative”, a dominance in this type of discouse tends to result in forms of Realpolitik: power and in particular coercion are essential instruments in the definition of a security strategy. What Texts? Case Studies The following discussion should be considered as preliminary and a rough simplification of how the security syntax could be applied for the analysis of security discourses. Because of space constraints and because the subject is huge, it is impossible here to present in depth specific case-studies displaying a dominance of the traditional discourse. Instead, trends and tendencies will be hinted at. It should be noted that in practice ideal-types do not necessarily exist, but they represent only benchmarks according to which it makes sense to analyze and compare case-studies. The texts that are relevant in this regard are official documents and speeches, letters (particularly interesting are the letters in the Foreign offices), memories from leaders, memoranda, and military doctrines and commentaries. Since this discourse is historically bound, it requires archival research (see for instance Paret 1986). One important caveat to this type of analysis is the fact that discourse has been already interpreted through behavior in historical accounts, and this might distort interpretation.

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In general, a dominant Westphalian discourse is to be found in texts stemming from the period after 1648 until now. In particular, research has focused on balance of power and the Great Powers (France, Great Britain, and Prussian Germany) in the 19th century, causes of war in the 20th century, and the Cold War. Interestingly, the study of a dominant discourse requires to open the blackbox of the state and to analyze the internal political dynamics in order to understand why a particular type of dominance has emerged at all. Contemporary examples are to be found for instance in the US National Security Strategy 2002, the grand strategies of the Arab states, China and South-Eastern Asia, Latin America and in neo-conservative circles both in the US and in Europe (Kagan 2001; Ikenberry 2004). Interestingly, international law (and in particular the law of war) is the codification of the Westphalian discourse and order. Contexts The contexts obviously vary depending on the specific case-study: they are unique and cannot be generalized. However, common features exist that explain the emergence of this particular discourse. The situational context refers to the geopolitical condition of the time under consideration. It should be noted that this discourse appears to be dominant when situations of conflict are the norms rather than the exception. It is not surprising to find this discourse when states perceive themselves under threat for what concerns one or several of their existential values (territory, government, people, or recognition). The cultural context reflects the ideas pervasive in the ruling elites. With experience, education is an important factor in the formation and perpetuation of assumptions and normative predispositions. For example, the study and absorption of Hobbes and Clausewitz does enable and constrain a particular view of the world, which does not only contain a pessimist philosophical approach to human nature, but it also sees war as inevitable and actually necessary to maintain the balance of power (Jervis 1978; Van Creveld 1991). Despite research on the influence of democratic political culture in international relations (Maoz and Russett 1989), this does not seem to influence strategic postures. Linked to the cultural context is the cognitive context: again, similar types of education based on “realist” texts contribute to the perseverance of a structural organization of information centered on rationalist assumptions about state behavior. The co-text refers for instance to national constitutions but also to historical accounts and other products of intellectuals of the time, who might have been part of the policy or epistemic community. Finally, speakers in this idealtype are exclusively state-leaders, while the audience depends on the particular political system: in general however, the major addressees are other states. The Discursive Syntax and Semantics In a traditional security discourse, the state is the only referent object or unit of reference. In general, there are no sub-levels. “National security must be defined

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as integrity of the national territory and its institutions” (Morgenthau 1960: 563). Nation and state are seen as coterminous (the existence of nation-states is a cultural assumption): Morgenthau in 1971 writes of the “the survival of a political unit in its identity” (Morgenthau 1971: 219) rather than a state or a nation, but it is clear what he refers to. The state is seen as the expression of the identity of the collectivity. The referent object is thus qualified in terms of values: national interests and values, and above everything stability (status quo, balance, and equilibrium). Territory and natural resources represent the most important values for physical survival and they are also seen as crucial indicators of power. This explains the insistence on geographical borders and concerns about geographical distribution of power. Sovereignty and the independence of domestic political institutions is also a possible object of security. It is important to highlight that the reduction to security as state survival is a consequence of the fact that it is assumed that there exists homogeneity of interests between the state or the political community and its citizens: this implies that citizens or individuals per se are not referent objects, but they are subsumed in an anthropomorphic concept of the state or the geo-political community (Reus-Smith 1992). In such a discourse, possession goals characterize the national interest, since competition in the international arena is seen as a zero-sum game (Wolfers 1966: 73). Threats are generally not only located in other states (see fear of attack and aggression), but also internally in the form of intergovernmental or antigovernmental violence�������������������������������������������������������������������������� (Huntington 1962). What is important here is that there is a tendency to clearly individuate the source of the threats in terms of enemies or adversaries (see for instance the need to identify a state supporting terrorism in order to react to 9/11). Since the monopoly of the use of force rests with the sovereign, the subject of security is exclusively the state either as independent actor or as a member of an alliance system. In particular, the government and the army play a pivotal role in the provision of both internal and external security. Defense is the dominant predicate. The means include diplomacy but are centered on the threat or use of force in its different formats: ����������������������� defensive (to fend off attacks and/or reduce damage of an attack), deterrent (prevention), compellent (get adversary to do or stop doing something) or swaggering (to enhance prestige) (Art 1989). Offensive uses of force or of war as the legitimate continuation of foreign policy are also included in the means of a traditional security strategy. The military instrument is seen as prioritarian because war is considered as “the ultima ratio of power in international relations” (Carr EH 1966:109). This explains and justifies the subsequent prepositional phrases: military means are given preference as well as deterrence and coercion. The location of the security action is generally specified in geopolitical terms, and the sovereignty of another state does not constitute an obstacle when the aim is the elimination of an existential threat situated on its territory (in disrespect of the principle of non-interference). The internal and external dimensions are clearly demarcated. Time is also a sensitive variable: when should the security action take place? Before or after an attack? Self-defense as per

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art. 51 UN Charter has to be necessary, proportional, and instantaneous after the attack. As it is the case for the definition of aggression however, this delimitation is controversial. In general thus, depending on the defensive or offensive postures (indicating reaction or proaction), time references are short-termed in the sense that action is mobilitated either just before the attack is struck or just afterwards. The debate is linked to the preventive or pre-emptive use of force (Mueller KP 2006). This extract of the US National Security Strategy can be seen as an example of the application of the syntactical analysis: We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: (…) defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country (US NSS 2002: 6).

Here the referent objects are the United States (state), the American people, and interests; the subject is the United States; the threat is terrorism; the predicate is to destroy, to defend, to prevent; the means are unspecified but suggested by the verb “to destroy” (force); the location is both at home and abroad; the way does not exclude unilateralism; and finally the time includes action both before and after the attack (not only reaction but pro-action). Implications for Policy and Behavior A dominant traditional security discourse justifies policies and behavior, in which deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and the use of force have priority. This translates into defense spending for the military and armaments (including an interest for the WMD disarmament) and a preference for enforcement missions and combat operations (see later in the chapter Binnendijk 2002).

The Human Security Discourse The alternative and concurrent security discourse is centered on “human security”. It should be noted that this discourse is not necessarily subsequent or new in relation to the Westphalian discourse: it has been only recently considered “new” because in the past the dominance of the traditional discourse was so widespread and uncontested that competitive discourses were either not taken seriously or simply “silenced” in certain policy and intellectual circles. Associated to critical approaches to security, the central hypothesis in this discourse is that international politics is superseded by “domestic politics of a global scale” (Lugo 1996; Lyons

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and Mastanduno 1995): the very state system is negated while the existence of a pre-ordinate higher authority reified. The human security discourse does not only imply an enlargement of the dimensions of security, but it assumes a different conceptualization in terms of level of analysis and structure of the system. Human rights rather than state sovereignty are the leading principles, and security is not seen in terms of exclusionary physical state power but more in terms of the absence of structural violence intended as “indirect violence done to individuals when unjust economic and political structures reduce their life expectancy through lack of access to basic material needs” (Tickner 1994: 187). Geographical borders thus lose their meaning, and society rather than the state becomes the most important term of reference for an “all-inclusive all-pervasive” concept of security (Blatz 1966: 112–116), where the final aim is the achievement of “positive peace” and the elimination of structural violence both in the domestic and the international settings (Stephenson 1992; Galtung 1998; King and Murray 2002). What Texts? “Case Studies” It is much easier to identify the basic texts through which this discourse is performed. The human security discourse dates back to the 1970s (or the period of détente during the Cold War), when the Helsinki agreements at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) introduced the idea of “comprehensive security” to highlight the fact that security does not only include military issues, but that it is the product of political, economic, societal, environmental, and communal factors. In the 1980s, independent commissions chaired by Willy Brandt and Olaf Palme respectively also stressed how “common security” is indivisible and involves issues of economic justice, while the 1995 UN Commission on Global governance refers to “global security” as including the security of the people and of the planet (see Bajpai 2000; Dalby 2000; Hampson and Daudlin 2001). The 1990 Paris Charter of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) talks of giving “a human face to security”, that is, to move towards “a civilianisation of security” (quoted in Lodge 1993: 233–234). After the Cold War, the term “human security” is coined for the first time in the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) produced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and used in a variety of contexts by both international organizations like the UN (see the final report of the UN Commission on Human Security, published in May of 2003, “Human Security Now”) or states like Canada. In this respect, two schools of thought or discourse can be distinguished: one based on the UN including a large conceptualization of human security to encompass development issues, and a more state-centric one based on the Canadian approach that separates security from development and is centered on the elimination of violent threats against the individual.

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Contexts The situational context for the emergence of this discourse is the end of the Cold War, despite the fact that signs of the increasing relevance of non-military issues go back to the 70s. The international environment is mostly dominated by intra-state conflicts, which leads to question the essentials of sovereignty and the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of a state for the sake of conflict prevention and management. Moreover, globalization seems to pose challenges which go beyond military survival. The major speakers of this discourse are on the one hand International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations (Secretary General and General Assembly in particular) with several of its agencies (UNDP, UNHCR for instance), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the World Bank; and on the other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) like the Society for International Development, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and others related to development and human rights (Bajpai 2000; Baehr 2003: 12). It should be noted that IGOs speak in the name of the organization per se and not in their intergovernmental format. In addition, states like Canada, Japan, and Norway also integrate this discourse in their foreign policy (Kaul 1995; Zambelli 2000; McRae and Hubert 2001). The audience is not only composed of states, but the international civil society (communities and individuals beyond the state) also becomes an addressee of this discourse. The cultural and cognitive contexts are imbued with universalist liberal, emancipatory, and peace-oriented ideologies that place people and the individual at the center of the attention. Linked to peace and human rights movements of the 1970s, the basic assumptions go back to Rousseau and the idea of contract in order to protect the rights of the citizens, and preference is given to non-violence. Individual rather than state sovereignty is the principle which should guide international relations (Kilgour 2000). The dominant level of analysis is thus the individual sub-state level or the global level: for international civil servants this appears natural since they have to give their allegiance to their organization of reference rather than to a state, while for the state speakers such an approach might be explained by the peculiar perception of their state’s position in the international system (Bajpai 2000). Finally, the co-text includes for example the UN Charter and in particular art. 55 on economic, social, and human rights (although the majority of the principles contained in the UN Charter are based on traditional concepts of state sovereignty), and documents like the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. Other co-texts can be found in a number of publications which indirectly tackle issues of development, humanitarian assistance, and human rights at large.

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The Discursive Syntax and Semantics The referent objects in the human security discourse are individuals and sub-state communities on the one level, and the international community (or society) on the other. The reference to individuals or “ordinary people” is not necessarily in terms of citizens but more in terms of human beings (UNDP 1994: 3). The UN Commission on Human Security 2003 specifies “people suffering through violent conflict, migrants and refugees, people in post-conflict situations”, but other documents do not contain such a connotation. This implies a universalist approach where no significant geographical distinction is made. Well-being, quality of life, peace, human rights, development, freedom, and human dignity are normative referent objects rather than specific “interests” (UNDP 1994). The term interest does not seem to appear in the formulations of this type of discourse. Interestingly, these values are turned into referent objects not only in the case they are directly threatened, but they are also used as moral banners independently from the existence of an insecurity situation (which would not then justify the use of security syntax). Threats are interchangeably defined as problems, risks, vulnerabilities or challenges. Fear and want are seen as threats since the aim is to achieve “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. In particular, threats are subdivided into two categories: chronic threats including “disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political oppression and environmental hazards” and “unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, resource depletion, drug production and trafficking, international terrorism”; and sudden threats intended as humanitarian emergencies and violent conflicts or in general hurtful disruptions of the pattern of daily life (UNDP 1994: 22, 34). The first type of threats is of a structural nature and refers to the challenge of development, while the second type is more contingent and is similar to the idea of crisis (Suhrke 1999). It should be reminded that the state discourse of human security concerns only the second type of threats (Canada for example), and even if there are references to development, there is a clear distinction and development is not necessarily considered a security issue in policy terms. In addition, the HDR 1994 lists seven main categories of threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Interestingly, there is no idea of enemy or adversary, and the source of these threats is generally dispersed, although the implication for most of these threats is that the state is in final analysis the responsible and the source of insecurity. By the same token, the very same state is then the subject inasmuch as it is considered responsible for the well-being of its citizens and of whoever is under its jurisdiction. Individuals are also empowered and seen as subjects of security. Despite the fact that tasks may be delegated to individual Member States, the international community intended as the whole of its members (the United Nations)

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sees itself as not only the legitimated speaker but also as the ultimate decision- and action-maker. For what concerns the predicate, structural and operational prevention of violent conflicts are the dominant types of actions: the first one includes longterm engagement for the elimitation of deep-rooted sources of conflicts such as economic inequalities and poverty and includes institution-building, while the second one refers to short-term crisis management in order to prevent vertical or horizontal escalation of a conflict (see 1992 UN Agenda for Peace in Lodgaard 2002 and the “Responsibility to Protect” published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty quoted in Biscop 2004a; Liotta and Owen 2006). In a sense, another type of predicate includes the promotion of peace or the values associated to it through a number of public relations campaigns (McRae and Hubert 2001). The prepositional phrases indicate a preference for a comprehensive multilateral and coordinated approach where priority is given to non-military means in missions which encompass peacekeeping, peacebuilding, disarmament, and economic development. By the same token, there is no geographical or time limitation, although long term engagement is deemed to be more effective. Implications for Policy and Behavior This “all-inclusive all-encompassing” discourse presents a number of challenges from the point of view of operationalization, exactly because most of the threats are diffused and do not necessarily entail an immediate existential danger. On the one hand, this discourse calls for long-term development policies of economic and financial assistance, peace-building, and institution-building which usually encompass different policy sectors (economy, finance, justice, and foreign policy for instance), while on the other it calls for short/medium-term missions such as fact-finding or observer missions, special envoys, the use of sanctions, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and assistance (Lodgaard 2000). From the action point of view, despite the emphasis on long-term development, the focus is on the protection of the civilian population in armed conflicts rather than on a comprehensive concept. The major problem is that at the end of the day it is not possible to meaningfully de-territorialize international action, and that the main subjects of action are the states and their logic tends to dominate. As a matter of fact, from a human security discourse different and sometimes opposite agendas and policies may be simultaneously justified: apart from developmentalist policies tackling basic human needs, social welfare, and non-traditional security issues like diseases, terrorism, and inhumane weapons, more interventionist policies which include the use of force in an attempt to protect civilians from state-sponsored violence (violating state sovereignty in the name of individual sovereignty) may also be reconducted to this discourse (Newman 2001: 243–247; see also Regehr 1999; Kerr and Tow and Hanson 2003), despite the fact that military intervention often aggravates rather than solves human security issues (Liotta 2002: 480). This

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problem does not only refer to cases like the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, when force was used in the name of human rights, but human security justification might also be called upon in case of defense of other values that are considered by an actor as being of universal validity like democracy (Peceny 1999).

“Traditional Plus”: A Via Media? Comprehensive Security and Confusion As already stressed, the ideal-types discussed above are very theoretical and do not necessarily represent current security discourses and practices. This means that contemporary security discourses tend to simultaneously incorporate both approaches with variations depending on the specific situational, cultural, and cognitive contexts (Newman 2001). Particularly in reference to the post-Cold War order and to the threat of international terrorism, Westphalian and human security may converge blurring the distinction between internal/external hard/soft security and opening up new scopes of action in the economic, environmental, cultural, and social realms (Liotta 2002: 475). Associated to the approach represented by liberalism and the Copenhagen School, this “traditional plus” discourse maintains the same syntax and semantics of the Westphalian discourse while adding new qualifications drawn from the human concept: referent objects, potential threats, predicates, means and ways are expanded to accomodate changes in the the international system (the end of the Cold War and globalization). Contrary to the human security discourse, the state is still the central subject of action: however, it now perceives its survival and autonomy threatened not only by other states and military power, but also by other actors (multinational companies and terrorist groups for example) on a variety of different fronts (economic, environmental, demographic, cultural etc.) (�������� Mathews 1989: 162; Nye 1989: 24–25; Buzan et al. 1998). This discourse encompasses common, collective, cooperative and comprehensive security: interdependence and a multi-dimensional view of security calls for cooperation in tackling domestic sources of conflict and non-traditional issues (Butfoy 1997). The result is a “human realist” or “contingent realist” discourse that combines sovereignty, order, and stability, with references to values especially human rights, democracy, the market economy, and cooperation (Tow and Trood 2000: 22–24; Glaser 1994). The speakers are mainly the states, the UN in the format of the Security Council (that is, the collectivity of the states rather than a supposedly independent organ), or as it will be discussed in the second part, the EU, addressing in particular other states or the inter-state community at large. The referent object is still the state intended however in its divisible components: its citizens (their health and well-being), institutions (democracy), and values (Florini and Simmons 1998: 29). Value interests are in particular the maintenance of the existing territorial framework, the legality of the international system, and the reduction of overt violence and the maintenance of peace in areas of the world prone to conflict. Peace and stability are seen as instrumental not only for political-

Analyzing Security Discourses and Practices: A Typology

Table 4.1

Traditional and Human Security Discourses

Syntactical Forms Subjects (who)

Semantics A. Westphalian Discourse

B. Human Discourse

State, International

Global, Sub-regional, Individual (+ state and international) - governance Individual, Sub-regional (community) and global - universal values and norms (inclusive, humanitarian), personal safety and individual freedom

- government Referent Object (whom) (what)

Predicate

Prepositional Phrase (vertical where) Prepositional Phrase (horizontal where) Prepositional Phrase (when) Prepositional Phrase (with what instrument)

State - Territory, government, citizens (sovereignty) and relative values and interests (exclusive). Order and stability. Independence and national sovereignty To defend, to secure, to stabilize, to keep the peace (as order) State, International System Political-military sphere Short/Medium term Political-military (diplomacy and use of force), balance of power, limited values of norms and institutions

Threats

Other States (politicalmilitary). Direct threats

Speakers

State representatives (civilian and military) States (public)

Audience

83

To prevent and manage conflict, to keep the peace (as value) Global, Sub-regional, Individual Politics, Economics, Society, Environmental Long-term Political, Economic, Social, Societal, Environmental. Human development and humane governance Force as a secondary instrument to be used primarily for cosmopolitan ends and collectively. Cooperation, norms and institutions States, Global, Subregional, International, Individual – direct and indirect IGOs, NGOs, individuals States, International, Global, Sub-regional, Individual (public and private)

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military security but for a wider form of security which is, at least discursively, constructed to focus on the citizen (and not the individual per se as it is the case in the human discourse: see for instance rescue operations of citizens abroad). Other value-interests may be less specific and based on human ethics and morality, what however complicates operationalization of the discourse (Brown C. 2001: 26). Despite the acknowledgement of the existence of new multidimensional threats (often described as challenges such as climate change, resource scarcity, declining productivity, or transnational issues of migration, criminality, and terrorism), territorial rationalization is applied, and threats are clearly categorized and kept distinct from challenges and risks for the sake of policy making: the search for an objective or subjective (in terms of responsibility) link between terrorist groups and states is a case in point. Given the centrality of state sovereignty, the subjects of action are of course state authorities, although multilateral fora are accepted as important legitimizers (Bellamy 2003). For what concerns the type of actions or the predicates, traditional defense is still important, but conflict prevention, peacemaking, and more general crisis management are introduced into the carnet exactly because it is recognized that instability abroad may be a direct threat to the internal stability of the state. Use of force is not renounced per se, and it is simply one of the available instruments: most importantly force is re-conceptualized and adapted to the challenges of the new tasks. Actions’ Discourse: The Business of Crisis Management and the Centrality of Peace The theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 2 represent the backstage of policy development. The power struggle between exponents of different paradigms is replicated at the policy level (Bigo 1995). Actor-centric or trend-centric wideners challenge the traditional or Westphalian security discourse (Finel 1998: 8; see also Ullman 1983; Booth 1991a and 1991b; Klare and Thomas; Clarke 1993; Fischer 1993) with normative and prescriptive argumentations, and create new discourses of security, which co-exist and, depending on the contexts, may or may not become dominant and legitimized in the policy arena. But what is the impact of discourse on policy practice? As already argued, both at the grand strategic and at the operational level, a dominant discourse influences the choice of means and actions which are deemed appropriate in the practice of security or of “statecraft” (Doty 1997). In general, security policy is that part of government policy which has as its objective the creation of internal and external political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital values (and interests) against existing and potential threats (adapted from Trager and Simonie 1973: 36). Although there are new understandings of security, and as we have seen, concurrent discourses calling for a wider approach, the policy means chosen continue, to a large extent, to be military ones. The consequence is a gap between the way in which the security context is described and interpreted, and the kind

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of security policy means actually adopted. As it will be briefly shown in the discussion of some examples of national security discourses, the development at the discursive level has two major implications for security policy: a) the definition of the main task of the military in terms of crisis management rather than territorial defense; and b) an increased focus on a more holistic approach which highlights the role of civilians and cooperation, and the link between security, defense, and foreign policy on the one hand and other internal policy fields on the other (Cohen and Mihalka 2001). In particular, as it is shown in Table 4.2, the administrative and bureaucratic boundaries between public security and external security and defense are increasingly challenged, although they are formally kept for a variety of reasons (such as interest groups and domestic power distribution) (Pastore 2001). If on the one hand it becomes more and more complicated to disentangle internal from external issues, on the other the modality of the use of force and the associated doctrines have been progressively updated to accommodate the changes in the environment acknowledged by the new discourse. In particular, a dominant traditional-plus discourse enables changes in the doctrines about the use of force to incorporate missions like peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, whereby defensive rather than offensive use of force is the rule (Reichberg and Syse 2003). This is in line with an ethical approach to international affairs and in particular Just War theory (encapsulated in international law), according to which the resort to armed force is legitimated if it is a reaction against offences in cases for instance of self-defense (individual or collective), protection of other peoples (humanitarian), or punishment for illegal behavior, provided that the response is limited, proportionate, and immediately following the attack in the case of self-defense (as per art. 51 UN Charter), and in addition mandated by the UN Security Council in all the others (Reichberg and Syse 2003:316). It should be noted that the fact that self-defense does not require authorization is a matter of controversy in practice (see for instance the US concept of preemption), as it is third party intervention in the event of UN inaction (for example NATO in Kosovo). Table 4.2

Security and Defense: Traditional Bureaucratic Division of Labor Public Security

Defense (or external security)

Focus Political Responsibility

Domestic (internal) Ministry of Interior

Interstate (external) Min. of Foreign Affairs – Defense

Means

Civilian police, judiciary

EU correspondence

EU: 3rd pillar Justice and Home Affairs

Diplomatic, military (+gendarmeries) EU: 2nd pillar Common Foreign and Security Policy

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In addition, grand strategies and doctrines are not the only indicators of the role and qualification of the use of force: at the operational level, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) also reflect the “politically acceptable means” dictated by the law of armed conflict, domestic law, operational factors, political factors, diplomatic factors and the values of the unit, and give guidelines concerning when the use of force is authorized and to what extent according to the situation in order to assure coherence. Usually, the right of self-defense can never be denied regardless of the type of operation (Roach 1983: 43). This is particularly challenging in case of missions other than war like peacekeeping and crisis management when escalation caused by operational self-defense may threaten to transform the rationale and the expected consequences of the action (Stedman 1997). In this context and in order to highlight the challenges inherent to the application of old instruments to new challenges, it is necessary to articulate with more details the catalogue of actions or means (in operative terms) integrated into the “traditional plus” discourse and constituting now the majority of international security practices. Security policy is increasingly seen as an “instrument to uphold the law” (Sjursen 2000: 17) and to promote and defend peace. Heavily influenced by international law and the discourses developed in the UN context, and in particular Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which define in broader terms what actions can be allowed in order to protect international security, crisis is defined as a breach to peace, and it is considered as a major source of international insecurity and by corollary of national insecurity (Findley 2002). The problem in this conceptualization is that crisis does not necessarily or automatically mean conflict (or outbreak of violence), and that peace is reified to justify any type of action intrusive or not of other states’ sovereignty, long or short-termed, structural or operational, coercive or not. The actions/measures can be categorized on the basis of the final aim or predicate of building, maintaining, restoring, or enforcing peace (ICG 2001), and range from conflict prevention to conflict management. Conflict and war (as the opposite of peace) are the major threats in this discourse. The use of force is legitimized in order to prevent or “preempt” or eliminate this threat. Ironically, although basically built upon the same means (coercive and non), this type of operations assume a different value only because they are motivated and justified in the name of a supposed higher and universal referent object, that is peace (in the application of the Machiavellian adage that the aims justify the means). As a matter of fact, in the UN jargon these “peace-support operations” (PSO) range from war-fighting (coercion through the use of military force), stabilization (ability to gain monopoly on use of force, coercive power), to observation and separation, while conflict prevention and peacemaking (after a dispute has become violent) include classical diplomatic instruments or preventive diplomacy as set out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Preventive deployment refers to the deployment of military or civilian personnel with the intention to prevent the escalation of a dispute into an armed conflict, while traditional peacekeeping involves the impartial deployment of military forces pursuant to a cease-fire or peace settlement

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in order to monitor the implementation of the agreement with consent of the parties involved (see UN Chapter “6 and ½”). Multi-dimensional or “peacekeeping plus” involves military, police, and civilian components: the military monitors and if necessary enforces the respect of the agreements, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, and provides for security for international activities; the tasks of the police are to provide for the public order “like establishment and maintenance of a judicial system, law enforcement, monitoring, training and advising local law enforcement authorities on organisational, administrative and human rights issues”; and the civilian component is responsible for political assistance and institutionbuilding, election coordination and monitoring, education and promotion of human rights, and delivery and implementation of humanitarian aid programs among many other things (Hansen and Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2001: 4–5). This type of missions clearly includes elements of peace-building or societal reengineering and of peace-enforcement. In fact, peace-enforcement refers to the threat or use of force undertaken by the international community under chapter VII of the UN Charter with the intention of attaining peace in response to conflicts or other major security crises in order to force the parties to a dispute into compliance with international law (which prohibits the use of force as a settlement of disputes): in the case of peacekeeping, the forces on the ground might be called upon to use force in order to enforce the respect of the agreement or in case of internal security breakdown situation (ICG 2001: 15–16). This means that despite the fact that the referent object is peace, force still plays an important role in providing the conditions for its security. Another important point has to be made in consideration of the adjective “humanitarian”: humanitarian operations and intervention, often used interchangeably, are substantially different. Humanitarian operations refer to the provision of aid in case of human distress, while humanitarian intervention means the use of force in order to protect human rights violations in a third country (Wheeler 2000). The problem is that these notions are integrated without further qualifications in national security discourses giving way to ambiguity and inconsistencies, because they are used in different situational contexts. A case in point is the confusion between peacemaking and peace-enforcement: while the two are clearly separated in the UN jargon with peacemaking pertaining to diplomacy and foreign policy rather than defense policy, state discourses and practices (including the EU) adopt peacemaking as synonymous of peace-enforcement, whereby the use of force is explicitly contemplated (see Binnendik 2002: 30; and below). The Means: Changing Role of the Armed Forces? If the major predicates are constructed around peace, the use of military means – which are heavily qualified by the traditional discourse – has to be in a way reformulated in order to be adapted to the supposedly changed context or better to the new discourse.

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Military power, albeit used in more circumscribed ways, is still considered the ultimate weapon perceived by states for protecting and promoting their vital national interests (Salmon 1996: 12). Because of its existentiality (in terms of life or death), the military dimension tends to dominate in final considerations of security policy (Buzan 1991b: 35). This does not mean that civilian means are not important: however, force is seen as the necessary instrument of last resort (although the chronological connotation of “last” varies), and in many cases its mere existence is the decisive factor in brokering security (for deterrence for instance, see Garnett 1970: 28). Central to military power are the armed forces as a bureaucratic organization. Traditionally, the fundamental tasks of the armed forces of a state are to defend sovereign territory and interests, or attack the territory and interests of other sovereign states, and to participate in the drawing of state borders and statebuilding (Janowitz 1964). In times of peace, the armed forces are obviously required to perform non-war-fighting tasks, and this is where the changing theoretical meaning and the new discourse intervene. The range of tasks the armed forces are called to perform now include non-traditional areas such as “non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, demining, peacekeeping or peace-enforcement, resolving serious urban unrest, addressing conflicts over resources, addressing problems of law enforcement like smuggling” (Wing 2000: 2). This broadening to accommodate new referent objects is particularly interesting because force is here interpreted as potentially positive, an assumption rejected by extremist human security supporters. In this conceptualization, the army is seen as “protector of civilization” (Keegan 1993: 391–392) or “Ambassador, Teacher, Soldier, Peacekeeper” (Moskos and Burk 1998) rather than an aggressive warmongering institution. The blurred separation between the military management of violence and other tasks which were usually responsibility of civilian public security has favored the introduction of the idea of a “post-modern military (…) likely to focus primarily on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions; to be a smaller, all-volunteer force of professionals, with officers who see themselves as soldier-statesmen rather than as combat leaders or managers of violence; and to enjoy only tepid public support” (Moskos and Burk 1998). This transition from being a realist territorial institution (Moeller 2000b) to becoming a sort of “constabulary force” seeking “viable international relations rather than victory” with minimum use of force (Huntington 1964) is one of the major result of the ‘traditional plus” security discourse (see also the role of gendarmeries in Lutterbeck 2004). Contrary to the allegation that the defense of the state is now a secondary function of the military (Buzan and Waever and De Wilde 1998: 21–22) however, the point is that traditional defense has not lost its primacy, but it has been temporarily side-lined because of a different international context. Particularly interesting and challenging is the attribution of “policing” or public security functions to an institution which has been traditionally seen as the repository and the physical perpetrator of state violence: this change can be interpreted as the result of successful discursive legitimation initiated by the

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United Nations and then integrated in national discourses and practices (see on international public security and the military: Slim 1995; Harbottle 1995; Kent 1996; Oakley and Dziedzik and Godberg 1998; Smith and Stohl 2000; Moeller 2000b; Hansen and Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2001; Viggo 2002). The consequence is that the distinction between civilian and military traditionally based on whether armed forces are used or not needs to be revised, and that military intervention is increasingly justified in the name of internationally-sanctioned universal values. Examples of Mixed Security Discourses and Policies The defense and national security policies of several advanced countries reflect this traditional plus discourse and the broadening security agenda. The removal of the threats posed by Soviet communism and the Cold War has created a “conceptual vacuum” that called for a redefinition of the national interest in terms of promotion of democracy and stable economic development (Sorensen 1990). Obviously, different countries have different discourses of security, and even within the same country, there may be different concurrent discourses (Haftendorn 1991: 5). The following brief excursus on the basic components of different security policies (at the grand strategic level) shows however that, despite contextual discrepancies, national security discourses of selected Western states and organizations tend to evolve in the same direction and display similarities which confirm the dominance of a “traditional plus security” discourse. Unfortunately, it is here not possible to digress on security discourses of other states in other regions or “security complexes”: more research on dominance in other case-studies might be helpful to disconfirm the neo-realist expectation that states tend to use similar concepts and discourses despite national cultural differences because the structure of the international system forces them to. Either national security cultures are different and they do not have a big impact on discourse and policy, or national security cultures tend to get closer and closer to the same middle-way model (traditional plus). The hypothesis here is that these assumptions are ingrained into the particular culture of the unit, so that the convergence in discourses can be seen as a convergence in cognitive and cultural assumptions as well. In addition, it should be noted that the European Union’s discourse and practice is not dissimilar from those of states and follows statist practices rather than an idealist human security approach. The United States’ grand strategy is based on the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). Objectives and missions are distinguished on the basis of survival, vital, and value interests: despite the focus on force, the agenda is broad and does not only include homeland defense and protection of the territory, but also economic, democratic, and peace concerns. The engagement in the humanitarian operation in Somalia and peacekeeping in Bosnia in the context of NATO exemplify the fact that the US, if not always in practice but more importantly discursively, engage in overseas activities in support of values which are considered to be universal (Binnendijk 2002: 28). The use of the democratic and freedom

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argument both in the NSS and speeches about the justification of the intervention in Iraq support this assumption. The mission in Somalia and the participation in peacekeeping operations in the NATO framework in Bosnia for instance can be seen as the implementation of this approach. The US is also leading the war in Iraq, and contributes massively to the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In particular, and interesting because of the similarities with the analysis proposed by Gnesotto 2004b (see infra Chapter 6), in which she identifies the vital and value interests of the European Union, Binnendijk 2002 lists as US survival interests the survival of the nation, territorial integrity, and economic security (associated with missions/means such as nuclear deterrence, national missile defense, strategic reconnaissance, critical infrastructure protection, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, freedom of seas and space, access to raw materials, integrity of financial operations against foreign threat, counter-drug and counter-international crime operations); as vital interests the defense of Treaty allies, the defense of democratic and pivot states, the deterrence or victory in regional conflicts (missions/means include overseas and forward presence; power projection and conventional rapid response, ������������������������������������� conventional and expeditionary C4ISR – command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – counter-antiaccess ������������������������������������������������������������� operations including countermine warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, suppression of enemy coastal defenses, amphibious and airborne; long- and intermediate- range strikes etc.); and finally as value interests the prevention of internal conflicts or peace-making and peace operations (means: non-combatant evacuation; low-intensity conflict; special operations; peace enforcement; psychological operations; civil-military affairs; foreign military training; multinational peacekeeping; peacetime military engagement; humanitarian assistance). A comparable categorization, with the due differences in terms of means rather than aims, could be applied to any of the following security grand strategies. As already mentioned, Canada is one of the major state promoters of the human security discourse. The 1994 White Paper adds to the traditional concept of defense tasks like: support to law and order, fisheries protection, drug interdiction, environmental protection, humanitarian and disaster relief, search and rescue, counter-terrorism, aid to the civil power, support to multilateral security, peacekeeping and confidence building, and emergency evacuation (Canada White Paper 1994). Canada is particularly active in peacekeeping operations from the Balkans to Rwanda and Afghanistan. The United Kingdom in its 1998 Strategic Defense Review (SDR) sees security, prosperity, and quality of life as its national interest, while traditional as well as new threats are mentioned: weapons proliferation, environmental damage, terrorism and drug-related crime, technological attack, ethnic tensions, population pressures, failure of state structures. Tasks for the armed forces may include: peacetime security, security of overseas territory, defense diplomacy, support to wider UK interests, peace support and humanitarian operations, regional conflicts outside NATO area, regional conflict inside NATO area and defense of NATO

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(UK SDR 1998). Conventional and nuclear capabilities are explicitly counted on. It should be noted that of the 28 military tasks listed, 21 are non warfighting. For what concerns the operations, the UK heavily contributes to EU and NATO peacekeeping operations and autonomously led a humanitarian operation in Sierra Leone, besides participating in the Iraq war and Afghanistan. According to the German Ministry of the Defense, the guiding principle of the German foreign and security policy consists of the values enshrined in the German Constitution and the obligation to assure the human dignity, the freedom, the security and the welfare of the citizens of Germany as well as the integrity of the territory of the German state (Germany VPR 2003)�������������������� . ������������������ Based on the 1994 ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court) establishing the constitutionality of deployment of German forces for intervention outside the German territory, peace policy (Friedenspolitik) plays a central role and includes objectives like: the maintenance and enlargement of the EU peace and welfare community; the increase in the international role of the EU; the consolidation of the transatlantic partnership; the creation of a cooperation security order including all the states of Europe; and finally the structuring of the international order in a way to include human rights, respect of international law, economic progress and social development. The defense guidelines explicitly refer to a broadened concept of security and in particular to common, preventive, and comprehensive security. “Stability can be established only where there is democracy and respect for human rights, economic welfare and social justice, and where neighboring states cooperate in peace”. Despite the acknowledgement of the need to rely on civilian means, it is also recognized that it is not possible to renounce to military force. Germany has been or is involved in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. The first aim of the French security strategy is to preserve the vital interests of France against every form of aggression, including the guarantee of the integrity of the national territory, the freedom of the citizens, the sovereignty and the means of development of the nation, by maintaining the credibility of deterrence through the combined use of nuclear and conventional means. Threats are seen as diversified, and terrorism is specifically mentioned (France, Livre Blanc de la Defense 1994). The second aim is to cooperate for the security of the European and Mediterranean space in the perspective of a common European defense policy, in particular by preventing the emergence of threats to stability in Europe, Mediterranean and Middle East, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution in particular via military actions. Finally, the third objective is to contribute to the action in favor of peace and respect of international law, by assuring the participation of France in international peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Fundamental are the respect of its sovereignty, the protections of citizens and interests, and in particular its resources, and the reinforcement of public service and the civil protection of French territory. It is interesting to note how this discourse is dominantly traditional, and considerably more conservative than the American or the British one. ���������� France is� engaged���������������������������������������������������������������������� in missions in Kosovo and Bosnia, has�������������������������������� conducted���������������������� an������������������� autonomous rescue�

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mission in Sierra Leone, has���������������������������������������������������� led������������������������������������������������ the EU mission in Congo, and it is now leading the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. The 2002 Italian White Paper on Defense discusses the role of the armed forces in the fulfilment of international responsibilities for the global attainment of freedom, law, and justice in a world profoundly transformed by the events of September, 11. The risks rather than threats of terrorism, organized crime, and weapons proliferation receive special attention, and require the military not only to defend national security and political integrity but also civilizational values, welfare, and economic and social development. There is an explicit reference to a broader concept of security which is not limited to the defense of national sovereignty but which encompasses contributions towards the maintenance of international stability, the prevention of old and new risks, as well as the opposition to violations of international law and peace. Italy has deployed troops in the Balkans, Lebanon, and Afghanistan under UN, EU, or NATO leadership and has participated from 2003 to 2006 to the war in Iraq. Spain in its 2000 Libro Blanco de la Defensa and the 2003 strategic revision (Spain 2000, 2003) expressly renounces the use of force as a means of settling any political differences, gives priority to diplomacy over military solutions in resolving the crises in which it could be involved, and expresses its firm will to defend its legitimate interests wherever they lie. Conflict prevention and an active contribution to maintaining peace and stability through crisis management are seen as priorities and tasks of the armed forces. Defense diplomacy in particular is highlighted as the principal instrument of national defense and includes measures designed to foster confidence between nations, dialogue and mutual knowledge, the verification of arms control measures and mutual transparency in military activities. Currently Spain is participating in missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Also the EU neutral countries Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland highlight the need for traditional defense of territory but also their participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, in particular in the NATO framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement. As a matter of fact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been revising its raison d’etre after the end of the Cold War and through the publication of two strategic concepts (in 1991 and 1999), it has progressively enlarged its mandate from purely territorial collective defense (art. 5 of the Washington Treaty) to so-called non-art.5 out-of-area operations in support of international peace and security. Of particular importance is the introduction of a political character to the alliance and its partnerships (which go beyond actual membership): objectives are now the “protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy” which are recognized as shared values fundamental to the Partnership (NATO Partnership for Peace 1994). The 1999 Strategic Concept identifies complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic and religious conflict, territorial disputes, economic distress, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, the collapse of

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political order, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, uncontrolled refugee flows, and the disruption of the flow of vital resources. “The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension” (NATO 1999). Force and military-civilian cooperation are the preferred means. Among other things, NATO has been involved in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in Bosnia and in Kosovo (here without UN authorization), and leads the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) focuses on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation: in particular it deals with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and economic and environmental security (OSCE Charter for European Security 1999). With a soft security approach, OSCE missions are mainly civilian and have been deployed in the Balkans and in Caucasus. Finally, the Western European Union (WEU) after the integration into the EU is limited to territorial defense tasks. However, as antecedent of the ESDP, it was involved in humanitarian and crisis management military operations in the Balkans (Croatia, Kosovo, Albania) and Northern Iraq in protection of Kurdish refugees. In conclusion, despite attempts of analysts and some policy-makers alike to translate the human security discourse in policy and actions, for the most part, states and security organizations continue to concentrate on what they view as their primary mission: pursuing national security interests and state survival. The positivist and competitive orientations of traditional security are thus reinforced through the new instrument of crisis-management, and broader concerns about the quality of life, community-building, and peace-building are not directly acted upon as explicit issues concerning security and defense. This does not mean that they are ignored, rather they may be integrated as objectives of other policy sectors (foreign policy or development aid for instance), but they do not receive primary and existential importance in grand security strategies. The dominance of a “traditional plus security” discourse does not indicate a change in the paradigm but simply a re-interpretation of the connotations attributed to major security components such as the state, national interests, and the sources of threats. The human security approach is based on the assumption of the change in the role of the state, the blurring of internal and external security, and a new and unprecedented character of the contemporary global security challenges (Baehr 2003: 5): however, states and security organizations alike tend to face these new challenges using and in some cases simply adapting traditional aims and means based on an enlarged albeit very territorial and state sovereignty-centric threat-defense logic.

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PART II The Discourse and Practice of the Esdp: Between Auto-Communication and Power Projection

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Chapter 5

Contextualizing the Discourse on the European Security and Defence Policy or the Elements of the Activity-PerformativityConnectivity Dynamics

Contexts are important qualifiers for the understanding of texts and utterances. Although the information contained in the contexts does not necessarily appear explicitly in the discourse, it directly influences the construction of meaning. The re-elaboration and interpretation of the contexts (situation, cognitive, and cultural) in texts is particularly indicative of pre-existing assumptions and preferences. In addition, change in contexts may explain change in discourses not so much in terms of the uttered text, but more in the sense of a change in the meaning. Even if the words are the same, a change in context may suggest a totally different meaning. As it has been pointed out in Chapter 3, the definition of context is problematic. Berger defines context as: a) the common set of historical experiences, b) the actual political process through which security policy should be made, and c) the evolution of both the EC/EU security culture over time (like the response to historical events such as the end of the Cold War) (Berger TU 1996: 328). The problem with such a conceptualization is that it is impossible to meaningfully disentangle context from text, since it is not clear what the borders of order are. In order to avoid this analytical and methodological challenge, the ESDP discourse is located in a specific space and time, so that all the other utterances or facts (whether structural or agent-produced) are considered as contexts informing the ESDP. As a matter of fact, the aim of this chapter is to give a short and simplified overview of the contexts of situation, cognition, culture and the co-text of the ESDP discourse, which should help to understand the meaning and situate and determinate the coordinates of the ESDP discursive syntax. This means answering to the question of where, when, why and by whom the discourse is formulated (independently here on what the discourse says), and what the conditions for dominance are (such as the relation speaker-audience). In explanations of EU security, the context of situation is often presented as the independent variable. However, it is not assumed here that the one or the other type of context is more causally determinant than the other.

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Context of Situation The context of situation includes the definition of the setting in which the discourse develops, that is, the political-historical environment entailing structures and other actors. One of the major problems in considering the situational context is the determination of the unit of analysis in order to identify whether the context is or is perceived as internal or external. This is particularly important for the identification of speakers and audience, but also to understand the impact of systemic conditions like the end of the Cold War and the dynamics of the integration process in general on the development of the EU security discourse (Haine 2004b). It is interesting to note that particular events or structural references (both external and internal) are used as discursive trademarks in the ESDP formulations. External Environmental Factors The ESDP discourse is situated in the broader framework of international political relations of the post-Cold War period. The end of bipolarity and the search for a new equilibrium has shaken structural assumptions on the global distribution of power and caused political uncertainty and strategic confusion. The hypotheses of the “end of history” (Fukuyama) and of the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington) profoundly shaped the debates about the nature and the future of the contemporary international system. Neo-realist Mearsheimer predicted in 1990 that, “without a common Soviet threat and without the American night watchman”, Europeans would go back to the 19th century tradition of balance of power and live in fear and suspicion of aggression (Mearsheimer 1990: 47). On the other camp, liberals foresaw the apotheosis of globalization and the end of power politics thanks to the emergence of a multipolar order championed by international institutions like the United Nations (Lotter and Peters 1996; Baylis 1997; Dower 1998). The need for a re-positioning of Europe’s role in the world was however triggered more by events than theoretical debates: the traditional territorial 1991 Gulf war and the emergence of new threats in the form of ethnic and civil wars in the Balkans prompted a reflection on the geo-political responsibilities of Europe particularly in view of the diminishing military role of the United States on the continent. The delayed NATO intervention in Bosnia and the incapability of the Europeans to effectively act for the security of neighboring populations is often referred to as the external condition which pushed for the development of the ESDP. In particular, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 is deemed to be the proverbial last drop in an already full glass: “Kosovo could be our military euro, creating a political and defense identity for the European Union in the same way as the euro is the expression of economic and financial integration” (Ulrich Beck quoted in Dale 2001:41). The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States have also contributed to the formation of a new security awareness in the world at large and specifically in the European Union especially after the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq as well as the critical

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situation in the Middle East have also shaped the EU security discourse and its evolution towards the inclusion of more traditional security and defense. Historical events alone however cannot be accounted for the development of a distinct EU security discourse. The international structure is populated by a wide array of actors, which do concur in the molding of the European security environment. In particular, the United States have been playing a considerable role in determining the international environment in which the EU is now performing its security discourse since before the end of the second World War. The US physical military presence in a number of Western European countries during the Cold War had provided a “comfortable” security guarantee the reliance on which generally meant limited spending in military and defense and the fostering of a so-called “culture of irresponsibility” among the Europeans (Delpeche 2002: 12; see also Art 1996). However, the economic, political and strategic changes in the 1980s signaled by trade conflicts, pipeline dispute, détente, and Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative; the end of the Cold War and the re-deployment of US forces away from the Western European theatre; and 9/11 and the Bush Jr. doctrine of interventionism and unilateralism are all factors which have had important implications for European security (Wyatt-Walker 1997:69–97; Nye 2000; Peters 2004). As it will be discussed when considering the different attitudes of EU member-states towards transatlantic cooperation and the specific content of the ESDP discourse, the United States is a deciding factor in the development of the Union’s approach to security as a term of comparison and eventually competition (Hunter 2002; Lindley-French 2002b; Posen 2004). Russia, the threat par excellence during the Cold War, has been declassed to a simple regional factor, but it is still important – as it was the case for the NATO and EU enlargement to the East – in particular because now the Union is directly bordering with the CIS (Community of Independent States). It should be noted that Russia and the Ukraine are the object of two EU “common strategies” (the third one is on the Mediterranean). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is another important variable affecting the perception of security in Europe. This is not only because most of the EU members are also NATO members, but most importantly because of the military capabilities (mostly in command and control) made available to EU missions. It should be remembered that NATO’s operational activities have begun only after the end of the Cold War (until then the organization acted only as deterrent) and only thanks to a redefinition of its tasks. Article 5 and collective defense was invoked only once in the history of NATO and in particular after the terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, while the core of its activities are in the area of “out-of-area” peacekeeping and crisis management rather than defense strictu sensu (see Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan). The new role conception described in Chapter 4 attributing to the organization a sort of political identity in addition to its military function can be seen in competition with the ESDP and the construction of an EU security identity distinct from the transatlantic partnership. As a matter of fact, the concept of European Security and Defence Identity was

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developed by NATO (NATO Handbook 2001) in order to promote consultation and cooperation with the WEU (Western European Union) before and the EU now. Of particular importance for the situational context of the ESDP is the dominance of the United States in the NATO structures, which, depending on US foreign and military priority, might heavily influence European security. It should be recalled that although NATO’s decision-making is based on unanimity, the military contributions are voluntary, and they consequently determine the political power distribution inside the organization. The United States and Turkey are the major contributors and decisions to act are directly dependent on their approval, although it is also true that the US or any other member needs the consent of all the others in order to be able to use the organization for its own aims. This means for the EU that they cannot use the capabilities of NATO or count upon its help without the US approval. As it will be shown in the chapter on activity, this state of affairs is one of the major incentives for the development of an independent EU military capability (see for instance the role of the newly created European Defense Agency) (for a discussion of NATO and the EU see: Glaser 1993; O’Hanlon 1997; Williams and Neumann 2000; van Ham 2000 and 2001a; Howorth and Keeler 2001; Fishpool 2002; Dufourq and Ponsard 2005). Originally set-up in 1948 for collective defense in Europe, the WEU has also been revising its mandate during the 1990s until its integration, without the defense component, into the EU in 1999. Until then, with the progressive enlargement of the membership from 7 to 28 with different types of status (members, associate members, associate partners, and observers), the WEU had been developing into an instrument for crisis management particularly through the deployment of the Eurocorps (a multinational corps) for missions of limited nature in the Gulf and in the Balkans (Deighton 1997). However, the failure to elicit consensus for a more active intervention in Bosnia has been interpreted as the sign that a stronger authoritative policy formula (the ESDP) was needed to incorporate and supplement an obsolete organization. Other European institutions like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) complete the European security architecture, although their respective role is mainly political and diplomatic. Overlooking all these regional organizations are the United Nations, which have been partially revitalized after the end of the Cold War with the Gulf War in 1991. The EU interaction with the UN and its unconditional support for the organization strongly shapes its own definition of security. Finally, the external landscape is completed by the European non-EU members and by the members in their function as independent sovereign units. As a matter of fact, EU member states have deployed their forces in a variety of missions (Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Gulf, Africa, etc.) in support of NATO and UN operations, as “coalitions of the willing” in Iraq, or even in totally autonomous missions (France and the UK in particular) (McGinn and Liston 2001). In partial support of the hypothesis of re-nationalization of defense after the end of the Cold War (Honig 1992), the EU member-states have shown to have distinct security interests and preferences, which, even if converging in many

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respects, still dictate the direction of the ESDP and its field of action or inaction (as it was the case over the differences about the war in Iraq, see Menon 2004). The EU discourse is thus not only informed by the perception of the international structure but it has to consider, act upon, and react adequately to the words and movements of other actors in its environment. The Internal Landscape: Member States and Institutions All these external factors taken together, however, are not sufficient to understand the situational context in which the EU’s security discourse is performed. Most importantly, the internal development of the organization and the economic success of integration – a borderless market, a single currency, and worldwide trade relations – have sparked the desire to adopt a commensurate political role in international affairs and to explore the possibility of further integration in the security sphere in order to enhance its credibility and authority. Under conditions of increasing prosperity, it is not surprising that the Union, once it has deepened and widened its integration, would look outward and try to project the internal political value of peace through cooperation and dialogue to the regional and even global level. As a matter of fact, the maintenance of peace has been one of the most important motors since the inception of the European project: By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority…this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace (The Schuman Declaration May 9, 1950). There will be no peace in Europe if states re-establish themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with all that this implies by way of prestige policies and economic protectionism. If the countries once more protect themselves against each other, it will once more be necessary to build up vast armies . . . Europe will be reborn yet again under the shadow of fear (Jean Monnet quoted in Waever 1998c: 83).

This “liberal peace argument” does not only define the contours of the EC/EU existence and the aims of this special “amalgamated security community (Deutsch et al. 1957; see also Williams MC 2001), but it also provides for the elimination of power interests and the formation of a larger international actor (Buzan and Waever and De Wilde 1998: 12). The successful demilitarization of intraEuropean security relations, the eastward enlargements, the continuous strive to reform existing institutions, and economic integration epitomized by the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Euro – that is, low politics winning over high politics (see the functionalist approach infra) – constitute the internal conditions upon which the project of a European political union comprehensive of external security and defense components stand.

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The EU security discourse and policy are thus influenced by concomitant initiatives in other sectors and by the role and willingness of its member states and institutions in pushing the project forward. As a matter of fact, states are either the motors or the barricades behind integration, which is and remains a strictly intergovernmental affair as the difficulties to ratify the constitutional treaty and the Lisbon treaty attest (see Chapter 7). In this book however, members are seen as part of the environment in which the EU discourse develops and is alimented from rather than active producers of the discourse. Given a sheer heterogeneity of security cultures and heritages ranging from neutrality (Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland) to great nuclear powers with world influence (France and the United Kingdom), it is indeed an achievement that they could agree at least on common minimum principles defining a basic European security concept despite evident fractures in particular for what concerns preferences regarding the independence of the EU security and defense capacity and the relationship with the United States (Heiselberg 2003: 3; Sedivy and Zaborowski 2004). The persistence of differences in perceptions and attitudes is not in contrast with gradual but continuous Europeanization of national foreign and security policies: socialization and adaptation at the European level have shown the tendency for dominant ideas and practices established in central Brussels to diffuse and consolidate at the national level in other sectors including foreign policy, so it is to be expected that a similar coordination and coherence might eventually develop in the security sector as well (Croft 2000; Olsen 2002 about Europeanization). Rumsfeld’s famous distinction between old and new Europe in reference to the willingness to support the United States in the war in Iraq reflects the historical debate between Atlanticists and Europeanists: the specific stand of the member states and their relative power in the European and global constellation play an important role in the determination of the EU discourse and policy. Traditional champions of a strengthened transatlantic partnership are for instance the United Kingdom, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and the Baltic States: for them collective defense should remain responsibility of NATO, while the EU should become a capable political entity in the business of crisis management. Among the Europeanists are France, Germany, Italy (apart from Berlusconi’s parenthesis), Benelux, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Although this categorization is very crude and it may change depending on the political color of the national government in power (as it was the case for Spain in 2004 and Italy in 2006 and their withdrawal of troops from Iraq), what is important in this context is the fact that these different and in some cases opposite attitudes have to be taken into account when considering the end-product of the EU Security Strategy. It should be noted however that an Atlanticist or an Europeanist preference is in no way related to a particular traditional or human security discourse and cultural assumptions about the use of force and the nature of national interests. For example, France speaks a very traditional security discourse implemented into an active military and power policy in competition with the US rather than representing an alternative interpretation of security (see for instance investments

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for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier which “will not be dropping copies of the collected works of Immanuel Kant on their targets”, Brown B. 2002: 487). By the same token, despite its pacifist and civilian power claim (Maull 1990 and 2000; Harnisch and Maull 2001; Stine 2003), Germany strongly supports a European defense (military) component, and, together with France, is the initiator of the idea of structured cooperation. The picture of the environment in which the EU security discourse has been developing would not be exhaustive if one did not include the key institutional actors which concur to forge the politics and policies of the Union. Although a discussion of the specific ESDP role of each institution will be presented in Chapter 7, it is important here to shortly overview the general position of each organ in the structure of the organization. The respective role of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament (EP) has been changing considerably in the course of the integration. In particular, the policy-making power of the Commission and the EP, the “Community” institutions par excellence, has been increasing so much in the context of the first pillar (common market) that ramifications in security sensitive policy areas are inevitable (especially for what concerns a common armaments market and a broad conception of internal security, including health, the environment, and citizens rights). The European Council is the highest intergovernmental political body of the EU and sets the political guidelines on all the matters of concern of the Union, while the Council of Ministers is the organ which represents the Member States and their interests and which possess both legislative and executive powers. The Commission is made up of 27 “independent” Commissioners and a complex administrative machinery. It is one of the major protagonists in the preparation, formulation, implementation and monitoring of EU legislation, particularly for what concerns the first pillar. Although its right of initiative is not exclusive in the field of foreign policy and, as it will be pointed out, it does not have important powers in this area, it strongly contributes – through its financial capacity and through the availability of expert knowledge particularly in the area of development, conflict prevention and humanitarian aid – to the elaboration of the EU security discourse. Its general approach and focus to security is however limited to “soft” aspects. On a similar lever, the European Parliament with its directly elected 700 members has very limited institutional powers in the ESDP (and this is why the EU is often accused of suffering of a democratic deficit), although it has been gradually but significantly increasing its influence in decisionmaking particularly through the assent, cooperation and co-decision procedures in the areas covered by the first pillar. However, its commitment for human rights exemplified in the annual reports and discussions produced by its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy does in a way influence the overall EU approach to security.

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Co-Text The co-text includes other important “texts” which are not directly part of the current ESDP discourse, but which can be useful to understand and interpret it. Also, the co-text may be represented by other discourses developed along different thematic lines – like foreign policy, human rights, development – but criss-crossing and influencing the formation of a proper security discourse. The texts produced internally by the EC/EU in the general field of external affairs are important means of inter-discourse qualification and are at times subsumed in policy-specific documents and utterances in the form of aquis communautaire or aquis politique. Two dimensions will be highlighted: a) an historical one which maps the development of the security discourse in time and comprises the texts that are antecedent to the current dominant security discourse of the ESDP but that already contain the seeds of the current conceptualization and discussion; and b) a spatial one that highlights the sectorial spill-over of concepts and assumptions from other policy areas. The Historical Co-Text of the ESDP The “hidden constitutional” development of the EU (Wessels 2002) as well as the progressive integration of external affairs in the institutional framework of the organization play an important role as co-text of the ESDP. Security and defense have been generally considered taboo issues until after the end of the Cold War. However, discussions about the inclusion of these sensitive themes in the Community framework have been recurrent in the history of European integration and a positive attitude in this regard has become dominant only during the last decade (for summaries of the history preceding the ESDP see Buzan et al. 1990; Gambles 1991; Nuttall 1992; Delors 1994; Krupnick 1996; Bredow and Jaeger and Kuemmel 1997; Regelsberger et al.1997; Wyatt-Walter 1997; Duke 2000). The very proof that security and defense were at the heart of the rationale behind the European integration is enshrined in the fact that already in 1952 the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany, Italy, and France), well before the establishment of the European Community in 1957, created a European Defense Community (EDC) accompanied by a “federal” European Political Community. The Soviet threat was the incentive for this extremely progressive initiative which aimed at creating a common supranational European army but which died in the French Parliament in 1954 (Furdson 1980: 164). For example, Solana, the main speaker of the ESDP, refers to these primordial political intentions as a background for the contextualization of the ESDP: The willingness to engage in a military dimension of the European integration was not born from a pure intellectual speculation or from an abstract ambition concerning a particular model about the future of Europe. It emanates from

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practice and responds to the strategic realities. It is also inscribed in the project of the founding fathers, which is political. The ambition of the European construction has never been to stop at the constitution of a big market of free exchange and at a closer economic and commercial cooperation among the Member States (Solana S0147/02 in French).

The second text which is important in this regard is the 1961 French Fouchet Plan. De Gaulle’s idea was to create an intergovernmental “Union of States”, a “political union” whereby foreign and defense policies would be coordinated but remained independent and separate. The project collapsed because the members could not reach an agreement about the possible participation of the U.K. at the time still outside the Community. However, the Luxembourg or Davignon Report of 1970 managed to broker the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism, an intergovernmental extra-EC non-binding and non-obligatory consultative process to coordinate Member States’ foreign policies motivated by the necessity and ambition of Europe to assume and exercise its global responsibilities “on account of its greater cohesion and its increasingly important role” (Luxembourg Report 1970 in Hill 1992: 125). The 1973 Copenhagen Report strengthened the political commitment to define a common European position in international affairs and resulted in the creation of the European Council in 1974, an organ which should speak with a common voice at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the predecessor of the OSCE, and in other fora and participate in the then contemporary discussions on security, disarmament, and arms control but also issues of self-determination and human rights. The rejected 1981 London Report proposed the setting up of a crisis mechanism for military security to reinforce the EPC; the Genscher-Colombo proposal called for “the co-ordination of security policy and the adoption of common European positions in this sphere in order to safeguard Europe’s independence, protect its vital interests and strengthen its security” (cited in Nuttall 1992); and the 1984 Dooge Report highlighted the link between the EC and the WEU for the definition of the Commission’s external identity. The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) explicitly stated that security policy remained a matter of national sovereignty, but it formalized the EPC and included the obligations for the member states to refrain from national decisions “which impair their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations” in view of contributing “to the development of a European identity in external policy matters” (art 30 SEA cited in Wyatt-Walter 1997: 140). An explicit debate about the potential security and defense role of the Community was prompted by the end of the Cold War: for example, the then Commission Vice-President Leon Brittan expressed support for a common defense strategy, while the then Italian Defense Minister De Michelis proposed to merge WEU and EC, and France and Germany in the Dumas-Genscher declaration supported the idea of a common European defense system (Salmon 1992; Luoma-Aho 2004). As a matter of fact, the Commission proposed that:

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The 1992 Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU) – also known as the Maastricht Treaty – substituted the EPC with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which, based upon intergovernmental decision-making, constitutes the second pillar of the European Union, and officially and legally introduced security and eventually a common defense policy or common defense in its art. 17. Finally, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty introduces the office of a High Representative for the CFSP, the possibility of constructive abstention, the new instruments of common strategies, and incorporates the WEU’s Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping, crisis management including peace making and combat forces). The specific ESDP institutional development starting from the 2000 Nice Treaty will be discussed in Chapter 7 because they represent the product of the dominant discourse uttered by the major speakers of EU security and above all by the CFSP High Representative. Texts from the CFSP and External Relations: Co-text or Text? The ESDP and its associated discourse draw inferences and meaning from more general texts produced in the area of external relations and foreign policy. As it has been pointed out in the short discussion about the historical development of this policy area, common foreign policy has always been seen as a pre-condition for security. What is important in this regard is that the institutional linkage between the ESDP and the CFSP qualifies the spatial contents of security: if “security” in the CFSP is intended as to encompass means such as diplomacy and general foreign policy tools (including economic incentives and so on), “security” in the ESDP assumes a more technical (and military) connotation because of the combination with “defense”. It is clear that, despite claims of linkages and intermixing between internal and external security, the EU security discourse is mainly projected to the outside, and this contributes to the definition of the external borders of an EU international identity. Indeed, it is difficult to keep the CFSP separated from the ESDP, and some of the CFSP texts are directly included as texts of the ESDP discourse because of the explicit reference to defense: for instance art. 11 TEU  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The Union is thus given a tripartite pillar structure: the first pillar contains the European Community (EC) and its competencies (common market, trade, development, humanitarian aid etc.); the second pillar is devoted to ��������������������������������������� the CFSP; while the third pillar deals with questions related to justice and home affairs (public security).

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outlining the fundamental objectives for external policy action by the EU as well as other documents delineating the finalité politique of the EU are important instruments which add to the interpretation of the ESDP. Examples are for example the following excerpts: The choice is clear: do we want to be left out, all of us, from the management of world affairs? Or do we want to play a part, on an equal footing with our allies, in building a new world order? (Prodi SPEECH/03/156); A just, humane, inclusive Europe. An exciting, energetic, enterprising Europe. A Europe for everyone (Prodi SPEECH/02/51); ‘A voice for Europe?’ might be thought to be an unexciting title. ‘The Coming War with America’ or ‘Romano Prodi’s Finger on the Nuclear Trigger’ might have guaranteed an even larger and more expectant audience. Yet Europe’s role in external relations is a more lively and controversial subject than it might appear. In other words, the CFSP is not a sign that the EU is developing delusions of grandeur or moving beyond its remit. Nor is it an attempt, as some have suggested, to compete with the United States for attention and influence on the world stage. Foreign policy is not a beauty contest. No, the CFSP is about projecting stability (Patten SPEECH/01/111).

The fact that coherence between the various vertical and horizontal aspects of external relations (coherence between member states’ actions and the Union on the hand, and between different policies and pillars on the other – see Chapter 7 for more on this) is recognized as a necessity, and that ad hoc instruments have been set up to guarantee consistency and indivisibility of the Union’s foreign policy suggests that it is possible to use other texts to comprehensively understand the EU security discourse (Missiroli 2001a and 2001b). In particular, these co-texts include: the common strategies towards Russia, the Ukraine, and the Mediterranean area; the European Neighborhood Policy; common positions, joint actions, and political declarations (for instance decisions such as sanctions and embargos; humanitarian assistance and development; or speeches about specific situations like the Middle East); Commission strategy papers; and a growing number of key policy statements in areas such as education, health, infrastructure, trade and social policy, conflict prevention, as well as initiatives touching upon issues of international terrorism, criminality, and border control in the context of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In addition, actions in all these areas represent also the co-text of the ESDP: for example the study of how aid is distributed, how counterterrorism is organized, or how conditionality is used in practice may offer important insights on the qualification of the dominance in the EU security discourse. It is obviously impossible here to punctually study all of these documents and actions. The point is that they need to be taken into consideration in order to individuate what the general trend of thought is.

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Who Are the Speakers? Although speakers and audience are elements of the situational context, because of their importance, they deserve a dedicated space. The famous anecdote from the 1970s about Kissinger looking for a single European interlocutor to phone up in case of emergencies fostered the EC/EU ambition of individuating a central figure that could epitomize and respond to the need of “speaking with one voice”. In the analysis of discursive dominance, the speakers or performers of the discursive utterances play a pivotal role in the formulation and channeling of pre-ordained dominant or consensual assumptions at the elite or epistemic community level and are essential for the success of connectivity with the audience in the activity-performativity-connectivity dynamic. Institutional legitimation and authoritativeness trump the fact that the speakers might not be the original authors of the speeches/declarations/documents (the actual authors might be official speech writers or ghost writers, but the final responsibility rests with the speaker). In the EU security discourse, the High Representative for CFSP and Secretary General of the Council (and Secretary General of the WEU) Javier Solana is the main speaker. It is interesting to note that he brings to the EU experience gained in NATO, and that speculations see him as the most likely candidate for the post of the future EU Minister of Foreign Affairs (see discussions of institutions in Chapter 7). As a matter of fact, Solana was the one who presented the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and who is called to represent the Union in meetings and occasions touching upon foreign, security, and defense matters inside and outside Europe. Together with him, the President of the Commission and the Commissioner for External Relations (RELEX) contribute to the authoritative performance of the discourse: in particular for the period under examination Romano Prodi and Christopher Patten respectively are the individuals who with their rhetorical activities concurred to the emergence of a common concept of security. Although the rotating President of the European Council is also part of the “external representation” troika, his contribution to the discourse will not be taken into account because it is deemed to be too linked to the national interests of his/her state of provenience. A particular role is played in the elaboration of the content of the actual utterances by other non-institutional speakers and opinion-makers, writing at different universities and think-tanks across Europe and at times working in close relationship with the institutions. For example scholars working at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS – now a EU agency) routinely contribute to discussions at the EP, at the WEU Assembly (ad interim ESDP Assembly) and have lectured the members of the Working Group on Defense at the Convention on the ESDP (one-day seminar including state of affairs and perspectives). By the same token, it is interesting to note how the existing European epistemic strategic community is being progressively formalized through the institution of more or less tight policy networks (see Börzel 1997). The platform “New Defense Agenda” (NDA) (recently renamed “Security and Defense Agenda” SDA), organized by

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Forum Europe under the patronage of Solana, Patten, and Robertson (now former General Secretary of NATO), brings together “political leaders, officials, industry executives and policy analysts” who, meeting in working groups, quarterly discuss and produce working papers on subjects like “Europe’s security aims and global defense role”, “European force projection and capabilities”; “conflict prevention and anti-terrorism policies”; “the trans-atlantic relationship: military, political and industrial”; and “defense-led R&D and industrial innovation”. According to Solana, “this is the sort of platform for new thinking and ideas that we need in Brussels to help forge consensus in common policies” (official publication, see website of the NDA). The aim of this “platforms” is to orchestrate a dominant discourse including other formal or informal working groups with privileged access to the decision-makers: a case in point is represented by the seminars organized by the EU ISS with the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRIKIIB), the Aspen Institute Italia, and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs to discuss and amend the first draft of the European Security Strategy in the Fall of 2003 (a number of the proposed amendments were introduced in the final draft of the ESS according to Sven Biscop, a representative for the IRRI-KIIB, Biscop 2004: 1). Other networks that have been developed to study and support the ESDP are for instance: the so-called Group of Personalities including politicians, administrators (among others: national representative like Marrti Ahtissari Former President of Finland and Carl Bildt Former Prime Minister of Sweden, European representative like Solana, Philippe Busquin EU Commissioner for Research, Christian Rosving and Karl von Wogau MEPs), CEOs of a number of companies (Finmeccanica, EADS, Ericcson, OCCAR, BAE Systems, Thales etc.), academic researchers (Francois Heisbourg, Burkhard Schmitt); the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities composed by Mary Kaldor, Ulrich Albrecht, Anthony Giddens, Nicole Gnesotto (EU ISS) and others who produced and presented to Solana the Barcelona Report “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”; and the ESDP Democracy Network (2000–2004), a European Commission-funded research training network project dedicated to various aspects of the ESDP and in particular the problem of the democratic deficit. Interestingly, this web of relationships (also including business interests: the beginning of a EU military-industrial complex?) goes to reinforce a common elite socialization, the solidification of shared assumptions and expectations at  ������������������������������������������������������������������������� The 200 participants at the launch event on 17 May 2002 included senior representatives from NATO, the European Commission’s Directorates-General of External Relations and Research & Development, the European Council of Ministers, Finmeccanica, Elsag, EADS, Northrop Grumman, Eurofighter International, Lockheed Martin, Cranfield University, Alcatel, Agusta Westland, Dassault Aviation, Blohm + Voss, EDIG, the European Institute for Security Studies in Paris, the Rand Corporation, the Institute for Politics and International Studies in Munich and both Member States and third country diplomatic missions to NATO and the EU. http://www.newdefenceagenda.org.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Recently renamed “������������������������������������������������������ Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations”.

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the center, and the emergence of “we-feeling” and of a common “role identity” among the policy-makers, a precondition for the formation of a political security community (Deutsch 1957: 5–7). This is not only the product of a mere “concertation reflex” (Nuttall 1992: 308): in fact, the majority of the personnel in the Council, the decision-maker and speaker of the ESDP, is seconded from the Member States, but they tend to develop common worldviews because of the interaction with one another and with these networks, a form of socialization that is facilitated by the fact that they work in close proximity in central Brussels. The result is a “Brusselization” of the diplomatic and administrative apparatus and the development of common normative preferences (Youngs 2004). This community does not only encompass individuals working at the EU institutions but also correspondents of national foreign and defense ministries and political counselors in the permanent representations of the Member States who interact in the expert network. Increasingly, also military staff seconded to the EU institutions, because of but not limited to their previous international experience especially in the NATO context, display convergence in their approach towards the ESDP. This happens without the necessary active participation of national decision-makers particularly at the parliamentary level (Pierson 1998): central institutions, also in the field of security, are cultivating spillovers and exploiting gaps in Member States’ control through the creation of posts and the employment of specific individuals so that, as it is the case for other sectors of EU activities in Brussels, the agents are increasingly becoming independent from their principals. The emergence of a EU dominant security discourse is thus the product of the interaction of legitimate representatives with a wider epistemic community: the specific task of the speakers is to make the discourse credible to the rest of world and in particular to sell the ESDP in a sort of “public relations” or propaganda campaign through the use of normative slogans and other communication strategies, in order to enhance attractiveness and allegiance, and to elicit not only consensus but active approval from the audience.

The Audience: What Kind of Public? As it has been highlighted in Chapter 3, in order for a specific discourse to become dominant, it has to “connect” with the audience and/or public, which in turn sends back its feedback to the speakers in the form of explicit or tacit approval (receptivity) or dismissal. The challenge is thus for the policy-making speakers to cultivate a supportive elite public that could sustain debate outside policy-making circles. One of the major criticisms of the ESDP is that, if possibly, it even aggravates the so-called “democratic deficit”, making the Union even more opaque to the public. The fact that all the decisions on such sensitive matters are also “taken away” from the legitimately elected representatives of the European peoples is also a matter of concern, as well as the lack of a real public debate on security and

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defense issues (Born and Hanggi 2004). In any case, for the sake of this analysis, by audience or public or discourse beneficiaries it is not intended the civil society or the “peoples” at large. Audiences in this context are mainly the intellectual and political elites inside and outside the Union. Internally, their acceptance of the discourse confers authority to the dominance and allows the speaker to speak with one voice. Externally, the audience plays the function of a resonance box providing confirmation and international legitimation. The fact that there are several audiences with different expectations and preferences elicits the question of how the discourse can be coherent and at the same time accommodate all these markets: the assumption here is that the EU leadership, using the international relations traditional jargon coupled with a high degree of rhetorical ambiguity, strategically uses utterances depending on the audience; but that it still manages to maintain a high level of control in terms of horizontal consistency between what is said across different micro situational contexts. Primary Receivers: Other Actors The EU security discourse is mainly directed to other security actors inside and outside the Union with the aim of creating support, reinforce, and project a dominant view and perception of EU security. Internal “resonance structures” (Risse 2002) in the case of the ESDP are in particular those very policy networks and epistemic community, which also contribute to the formulation of the utterances. As already argued, this mutually interdependent relationship is important to foster consensus, receptivity, and connectivity. Significant is in this regard the identification of the venue in which the texts composing the discourse are performed: quantitatively the discourse is mostly performed at academic institutions like research centers and universities, and policy think tanks. In addition, Member States and other EU institutions can be considered as the target audiences of the security discourse: given the fact that the creation of the discourse is cast in epistemic terms and it elicits the support of the dominant expert community, it is easier for the speaker to persuade other internal actors to adopt a common security concept or to at least initiate a re-evaluation of the way in which Member States may individually perceive and act upon security, thus facilitating a progressive re-definition of their national interests. This does not mean that national strategic preferences need to converge as a result of the discourse: Member States do maintain their own national approaches as the short revision on national security strategies and the case of Iraq has demonstrated (see for instance the comparison between Sweden, Germany, and the UK in Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2004 and 2005; Hyde-Price 2004). However, the fact that the EU discourse including the ESS is not directly challenged may be an indicator of the tacit acceptance of an independent EU approach to security, and at the bottom, of a minimum common denominator.

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Externally, the major addressees are other states and in particular, indirectly or explicitly, the United States, whose consent and approval are perceived as determinant (Heisbourg 2000b: 36). This reflects the need to be taken seriously in international relations and to convince and re-assure other actors that the ESDP is a credible but also peaceful project (towards Russia for instance). Despite the artificial separation of audiences and constituencies in internal and external however, the analysis of the texts has demonstrated a high degree of consistency across venues and time (and in some cases the same speeches have been used with only minor changes in different occasions). This may suggest the existence of a unitary public relations strategy with the aim of affirming the EU identity and willingness to act independently of the particular sensitivities of determinate audiences exactly because the EU leadership assumes that the direction taken by the ESDP is non-controversial and is based on a basic normative consensus built upon the widespread acceptance of traditional-plus security discourses developed by a number of other actors. Lack of a European Public Opinion Despite the fact that this research focuses on elites for the reasons outlined elsewhere, it is important to highlight here the main factors that explain why public resonance plays such a minimal role for the connectivity and success of the EU security discourse. First of all, it should be stressed that the minimal incidence of public opinion on the development of a EU security discourse is in no way a European peculiarity. Because of the sensitivity of the type of information involved, foreign policy and security have traditionally been policy fields which have hardly been object of public discussions, and when they have been brought to the attention of the general public, it was mainly in an ex-post attempt to sanction decisions or discourses (Nacos et al. 2000). Two types of “manipulations” or exploitations of public opinion are in particular relevant in this context. The first manipulation applies directly to the formation and development of the public opinion, and it operates through the work of the media or political and civil society elites. Since in the EU there is no relevant common or unique media system and political and civil society elites remain anchored to national concerns and interests, the EU speakers cannot directly count on a specific supporting platform for reaching the public. At the end, despite nice declarations of support for transparency and accountability, the EU speakers know that the audience they have to win is not the public at large. This is why the discourse is constructed in a way to accommodate and resonate with the national elites in power who will be then responsible for dealing with their respective publics. The second way to use the public is more instrumental and does not include a direct action of the speakers on opinion formation and or manipulation. Rather, data and results of opinion polls are selectively incorporated in order to give the discourse a more “popular” support. As a matter of fact, the EU speakers and Solana

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in particular, often refer to the “will” of the European citizens, their definitions of threats and security, and present numbers from Eurobarometer’s polls as supporting evidence for their discourse (see infra Chapter 6). However, the major problem of using opinion polls as evidence, and the Eurobarometer in particular, lies in the fact that the way in which questions are formulated – questionnaires are usually structured, and surveys are conducted by telephone – plays the function of confirming the dominant discourse and not so much of neutrally testing what the public really thinks. They might be useful to detect general national variations but from a “Union” point of view, the aggregated results can hardly be considered as unbiased indications of what the “European public opinion” really thinks. This is not only true for polls about the support for a common foreign policy or a common defense and security policy – which are conducted in terms of priority of EU action but also as simple yes or no question – but also for what concerns the creation of the threats or the identification of the referent objects. A list of threats or general aims is presented and the interviewee should order it on the basis of importance. It is obvious that a pre-ordinate choice of the threats – based on the existing agenda – and the specific formulation of the question directly constrain the answers. In addition, the aggregation method is superficial because it implies that the same question can be exactly translated in different languages and the results can simply be summed up, while important issues of linguistic and cultural systems of meaning as well as unequal information distribution are minimized or ignored (on this issue see Foyle 1997; Sinnott 1997; Eichenberg 1998a and 1998b; Kernick 2002; Carrubba and Singh 2004; and also Assembly of the WEU A/1781 2002; Eurobarometer 54.1).

Cognitive Context: The Theoretical Discourses of European Integration and Security The third type of context influencing the construction and dominance of the EU security discourse is cognitive, and it is directly linked with the speakers and the audience. It refers in particular to the use of the same language, a technical jargon, and the reference to shared information and common ideas on the one hand, and explanatory frameworks on the other. The link and at times mutual relationship between political discourse and academic discourse discussed in the context of Security Studies is valid also for what concerns European integration studies and theories. These texts are important because the positions of the major academic exponents and schools of  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Eurobarometer Public Opinion Surveys (“Standard Eurobarometer Surveys”) have been conducted each spring and autumn since autumn 1973. From autumn 2001, they have been conducted on behalf of the Directorate-General Press and Communication (Opinion Polls) of the European Commission. Carried out by national opinion poll institutes, the aim is to compare ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ attitudes on a variety of issues across Member States and across time.

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thought flow into institutional texts in a direct or indirect way. This is not only the case when decision-makers happen to also be scholars, but more in particular, when the epistemic community is so tightly bound that theoretical assumptions are easily adopted and taken for granted in policy circles. So it is not uncommon that in an interview with a Commission official (one of the speech-writers of RELEX Commissioner Patten!) Christiansen et al.’s 2001 book titled the The Social Construction of Europe, a very theoretical and academic text not generally accessible to the non-specialist wider public, is being recommended and praised by the very interviewee. This interdependent relationship in the EU context was already highlighted in the section about the speakers. Here it suffices to broadly summarize the major theoretical discourses that have been developed to analyze and explain the ESDP. It should be noted that these approaches do include variable normative and prescriptive components, which once “learned” and integrated into the policy-maker’s view, deeply affect his/her worldview, utterances, and actions (see for instance the role of Monnet, Hallstein, Spinelli, Delors, and many others in the construction of the EC practice and theory). In accounts and analyses of the scope, rationale, and future of European Integration, security has always played a minor role. Only since the inception of the ESDP, scholars and experts have been trying to explain the innovation from a theoretical perspective. Different theoretical assumptions about the EU inevitably lead to different expectations as to the meaning of security and thus to different assessments. For a long time separated from mainstream IR because the latter had not been taking the EC/EU seriously (Pollack 2001), theories of European integration have been more than “post-hoc rationalization of the process itself” (Wyatt-Walter 1997: 39) translating to the EC/EU case traditional IR debate between realism and liberalism through the lens of the intergovernmentalism/ supranationalism contest. From an intergovernmentalist (neo-realist) point of view, the ESDP is nothing else than the result of the political process driven and tightly controlled by the national interests of the Member States and by their careful calculation of relative power, which result in different exogenously driven preferences and pragmatism (Moravcsik 2000). The international environment is thus forcing Member States to increasingly cooperate and speak with one voice, but at the end of the day national governments are still the repositories of the sovereign control on their “high politics” (foreign, security, and defense) because “the integration of foreign and military policies, in a world in which security and leadership are the scarcest of values, means what it has always meant: the acceptance by some of the predominance of others” (see Hoffman 1964: 1275; and 1966; Bertram 1991). This means that national sovereignty is the primary value and that the goal is not to create a single policy to replace national foreign policies, but, as Solana pointed out speaking to a Danish public (traditionally wearied of EU threats to national sovereignty), “to identify what is common to these national foreign policies, and to find ways to pursue shared aims in a way that gives real added value” (Solana S0101/02).

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From a neo-functionalist and supranationalist (liberal) perspective, the ESDP is the result of the logical and inevitable spill-over of economic integration as a function of necessity created by interdependence (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; see also on interdependence Keohane and Nye 1989). Based on Mitrany’s argument that a peace system can be generated through the application of a-political and technical rational efficiency (Mitrany 1943), incremental spillover from low to high politics will bring about the pooling of sovereignty which will in turn results into comprehensive political integration or “fusion” and the creation of a federal supranational entity (or state) superimposed over the pre-existing units (Haas 1958: 16; see also Wessels 1998). In particular, bureaucratic interpenetration, the central role of supranational institutions, and the process of Europeanization will gradually change the interest perception of the states and form a system of multi-level governance, in which authorities are amalgamated and loyalties are overlapping to such an extent that federation becomes inevitable (see also institutionalism, for example Checkel 2001; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). In this way, pressures for joint decision-making in the field of international affairs (security and defense included) will arise because of “externalization” or the fact that external actors increasingly perceive the EC/EU as a unitary actor and build their expectations accordingly (Ginsberg 1999). This particular point is important in the context of this book because the use and manipulation of communication by the EU representatives may be interpreted as a conscious strategy to forge expectations in external actors in the hope that these then bounce back and contribute to the formation of the EU international identity in a mutually constitutive fashion. These simplified analytical approaches influence the way the actor EU is conceptualized in the form of either a supranational state, or federal union, federation of states, concordance system, a network involving pooling and sharing sovereignty, a form of vertical joint decision-making, multi-level polity, postHobbesian order, system of governance (Schmitter 1991 and 1996; Hix 1994 and 1998; Risse-Kappen 1996; Cooper 2000) or in terms of international actorness and power (see infra Chapter 6 and 7). How do these theoretical approaches influence the formation of a EU security discourse? It is assumed that a common cognitive context exists at the elite level: this means that the elites and the speakers in particular are tendentially aware of the different theoretical explanations and models and they are inclined to prefer determinate analytical frameworks on the basis of their national, international, educational, and experiential backgrounds. The impact can be seen not only in terms of the ideas that are extrapolated from theoretical discourses into political texts but also in the form of direct references, as is the case for RELEX Commissioner Patten who constantly refers to Churchill, Thucydides, Kissinger, Paul Kennedy, Fukuyama, and Joseph Nye (see for instance Patten SPEECH/02/191). The relationship with the epistemic community is paramount: the existence of those very dense networks, institutions, and organizations reflecting tight military coordination and cooperation, leads to the establishment of cognitive structures promoting both a common understanding and a willingness to act together, and

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thereby a deepening of mutual trust and the emergence of a collective identity at the political, administrative, and intellectual elites level. Although critics argue that the high frequency of interaction does not necessarily provide the ground for cognitive modifications (Bøås 2000: 311), the routinization of information processing, consultation, collaboration as well as processes of social learning in situ together with the impact of international experience (common experience of being extrapolated from the context of origin) and the working environment create a similar cognitive base that influences perceptions and “linguistic expression”. This leads to the creation of a EU specific organizational culture despite the existence of different administrative sub-cultures and working methods not only on national lines but also on sectorial lines, between political, military, diplomatic, intelligence and administrative personnel associated to different institutions with at times conflicting perspectives such as the Commission, the Council, or the Member States (see diplomatic representations). In particular, within the Council structures, the Kortenberg/Corthenberg building (150 avenue de Kortenberg) represents the physical pre-condition for the formation of a specific EU cognitive (and as a consequence cultural) context. Military and civilian personnel work together in the same place, thus facilitating the building of interpersonal relations and the flow of communication and sharing of classified and politically sensitive information. The languages of communication are English and French with a preference for English. A lot of German is used among officials, simply because some of the key individuals are German, but German is never used in official ESDP documents. For what concerns the military personnel, this is probably due to the fact that the majority shares experiences in multinational and multi-service environments, and especially in NATO, WEU, or other multinational structures, so that imprints and modes of work are already standardized and harmonized. The proposals enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty to create a EU diplomatic service and to establish a EU military school may also be seen as tentatives to foster a common cognitive framework for the analysis of European security. As a matter of fact, on 18 July 2005, Council Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP established a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) as a network of other institutes, colleges, academies and national institutions dealing with security and defence policy issues, including the European Union Institute for Security Studies, offerring training with the aim of “enhancing the European security culture within ESDP; promoting a better understanding of ESDP; providing EU bodies and Member States’ staff with personnel qualified in the field; and helping promote professional relations and contacts among training participants” (Council Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP). This cognitive socialization of the elites is also important for the further popularization of methods and worldviews at the national level: as a matter of fact, the rotation mechanism implicit in secondment arrangements makes sure that different individuals are exposed to the EU process and become part of an enlarging network, which will continue to operate and grow once the officials re-enter their national administrations (via a multiplier effect). All these processes

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may support the thesis that at the elite level in Brussels a tight, and not necessarily amalgamated, “security community” is in the process of being institutionalized and consolidated: The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration…turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feelings”, trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it – in short, a matter of perpetual process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making (Deutsch et al. 1957: 37).

Cultural Context As we have been discussing in Chapter 3, culture can be analytically considered both as context and as behavior. Based on the assumption that culture is dynamic, on the one hand it provides the framework in which an action acquires meaning and on the other, the same action contributes retroactively to the framework. Culture is implicitly incorporated in the discursive action. The challenge is to empirically separate it from discourse. Two options are possible: it is possible to consider culture in the form of co-text, that is, as expressed in other texts not directly related to security; or to apprehend it through the analysis of behavior, that is, to filter it from the actions performed. In both cases, teleological explanations are inevitable, since texts usually already include interpretations of facts and actions. An additional difficulty in considering the EU cultural context is directly linked to the problem of identifying the nature of the EU. Although this subject is very controversial, the EU is here considered as a political organization or entity and not as a sum of its members. The aim of this section is not to empirically assess whether a wider political culture at the EU level exists, rather, to point out that the elites tend to believe in its existence. This means that beliefs in a common culture as context in which the discourse is performed recursively shape and mould the actual existence of Europe’s “imagined community” in a process of identity construction. In the words of Prodi for example: Our models of coexistence, freedom, solidarity and human dignity serve as our passport in the rest of the world. And our distinguishing feature is our sense of responsibility. The truly great Europeans have always been recognized not only for their knowledge or power, but also for their ability and desire to serve others, to dedicate themselves to a particular vision of society. It is our culture that has inspired us to overcome absolutism, to reject the sanctification of the State and to develop models of balance and mutual respect between the various powers that characterize the political entity. And above all, our historical experience

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A plethora of other statements (see for instance on the referent object and subject in Chapter 6) refer to this cultural model which should represent the backstage for the development of a distinct EU security concept. The EU leadership seems to have appropriated theoretical assumptions on political integration (see supranational functionalism and Haas 1948, 1958, and 1964 for instance) and the determinants of a security community (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1997: 56–67). The desecuritization of issues inside the Union and the securitization of external threats help define the boundaries of a community which supposedly has shared understanding and transnational values. Again, this does not need to be true in practice: it suffices that this representation is dominant in the imagination of the leaders in order to constitute the context for the development of the EU security discourse and the establishment of expectations concerning the norms which constrain and enable security policy (Adler 1997b: 250). The very values which are referred to as under threat (see infra) are considered embedded in the political culture and institutionalized in the EU political system, so that a threat to these values is seen as an existential threat to the very existence of the Union. In this sense, the values and norms constituting the wider self-perceived political culture of the Union are “externalized through communication devices” in order to protect and reinforce them but also to project them to the outside as comprehensive instruments of a normative “holistic” security strategy (Risse-Kappen 1995b: 499; Pastore 2001: 20). The so-called EU political culture is thus explicitly or implicitly used as a context of discourse and a context of action to qualify and justify the determinate meaning of security concepts and policies. It is indeed not easy to define the distinctive elements of a supposedly unitary EU political culture. A number of EU officials tend to define it by defect through the comparison with other actors. As a matter of fact, this is a particularly controversial and hot subject that goes to the heart of the constitutional debates about the cultural and civilizations roots of the Union as well as the establishment of inclusion and exclusion criteria on the basis of the sharing of determinate values (whether Christian or liberal or socialist etc.). A compromise was reached with the wording in the preamble of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty: Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, democracy, equality, freedom and the rule of law, Believing that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilization, progress and prosperity, for the good

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of all its inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world (my emphasis) (Preamble, Constitutional Treaty 2004).

It should be once more stressed that these are “flag-values” or ideals heralded for outside consumption and do not necessarily represent the state-of-the-art implementation in practice by the EU or its members inside their own borders. Art 6(1) TEU states: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” (art 6(1) TEU). Article I-2 CONST adds the respect for human dignity, equality, and the rights of persons belonging to minorities and qualifies the European society as characterized by the prevalence of pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men. Obviously, as it will be discussed later, these values are also the guiding principles for international action. A faith in liberaldemocratic principles embedded in the aquis politique thus characterizes the selfdefined political culture and identity of the Union. As in the case of NATO, the rearticulation of the accomplishments of the Union thanks to liberal-democratic structures of cooperation are perfomative acts which do not only contain elements of self-admiration, but which contribute to the self-constitution of the identity of the Union. This moral interpretation of its own history becomes a source of power because it self-legitimizes the Union to set standards for other actors under the assumption that the very principles that stand at the basis of the European success have universal character and should be adopted as global norms regulating international relations (Risse-Kappen 1995b: 541–542; Adler and Barnett 1998: 34). Speaking at a French military school in July 2002, Solana stressed how: “If our model of society prevailed in the Cold War, this is because of the superiority of our values of democracy and liberty which we defend together. These common values have always guided the mission of our armed forces beyond national borders, and in particular inside the Atlantic Alliance. These are the same values which inspire the project of European defense. Thanks to the habits of working together which have allowed to forge common responses for the defense of our continent, the European military are well placed to play a distinguished role in the rapprochement of the points of view and in the concretization of the means, in order to face together the new tasks of security and defense. Their contribution is indispensable to anchor our choices to reality: the risk and the manner to face it are not theoretical notions for the men and the women who are ready to put their lives to risk in order to assure the defense of our countries and the security of our co-citizens” (my emphasis) (Solana S0147/02).

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Apart from the confusion generated by the fact that at times European and Western values seem to be synonymous, the belief in the superiority of the European culture characterized by “dialogue, solidarity, multilateralism and an ethical dimension to politics” (Prodi SPEECH/03/156) represents the self-referential beacon of the EU cultural context both at the political and at the military level. As a matter of fact, despite major differences in the past, the national military cultures of the EU members are also deemed to share basic principles at least for what concerns the political values which guide the armed forces, because it is assumed that international law and in particular humanitarian law has been integrated into national doctrines and in the cultural re-elaboration of historical memories (Merand 2003). Again, this is part of the cultural brand the EU leaders are trying to project and what the declaratory statements and the national documents seem to suggest. However, a more detailed comparative study of contemporary European national military doctrines might reveal the existence of important fallacies in this line of thought. In particular, the relatively late socialization of the new members into the institutional and cultural structures of the Union, but also of NATO, and the varying level of participation in international missions can be considered as important obstacles in the assessment of a veritable common political-military culture, especially for what concerns the conditions of the use of force (and the differences concerning the war in Iraq are a case in point). Finally, if one looks at culture as behavior, the way in which external relations have been conducted in practice also constitute the cultural context of the EU security discourse. This means that the direct implementation of rhetorically acclaimed norms lends credibility to the existence of a veritable liberal-democratic culture: examples encompass not only the practice of separation of powers, popular participation, institutional accountability, and the justice system but also and more importantly the coherence of actions like the punctual application of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for accession in the case of enlargement, the importance of elections, and the use of political conditionality among others. It is not the scope of this book to delve into these issues: what is important to note at this point is that, together with rhetorical and legal statements, specific actions in the history of the Union’s internal and external relations do constitute the cultural context for the development of a specific EU security discourse and go to inform the backbone of the EU strategic culture.

Chapter 6

“A Secure Europe in a Better World”: Syntax and Semantics of the ESDP

Since the end of the Cold War and the change in the context of existence and action of the European Community first and the European Union then, European elites have been talking about the need to provide the Union with a common foreign, security, and defense policy. This urge has been gushing from the realization that Europe cannot escape its responsibilities and that, divided, Europeans are “powerless” (ESS). Essentially an events-driven reflection, of which the Iraq crisis and enlargement are only the latest examples, the definition of a grand strategy for Europe is one of the most ambitious discursive enterprise of the EU leadership, because it has direct implications on the affirmation – internally but also and especially externally – of the political identity and the international subjectivity of the Union. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate what type of security discourse – traditional, traditional-plus, or human – is dominant in the EU. By using the syntactical grid developed in Chapter 3, the semantic elements of the EU security discourse will be defined and analyzed. Empirically, this translates into looking for recurrent themes, phrases, and words used in a similar syntactical position (that is, having a similar function of subject, object, or predicate for instance) and evaluating the weight of these elements in terms of dominance (both quantitatively and qualitatively). For the sake of this analysis, the EU security discourse is here intended as the sum of the texts – speeches and written documents – produced by the EU leadership in the course of the development of the ESDP. Particular attention will be devoted to the European Security Strategy (ESS), because it is considered the first – and latest for the moment – master document in the series. It is interesting to note that, despite occasional discrepancies and contradictions as well as ambiguous silencing of themes and issues due mainly to the specific venue and audience, antecedent discursive products show considerable consistency with the ESS, so that they all can be read as a unique uninterrupted discourse. Moreover, this coherence across time, space, and speakers testifies for a unitary approach at the EU elite level and disconfirms the hypothesis that major external events cause important changes not only in the discourse but also in the policy of the EU. In this sense, a grand security strategy has been developing much before the official publication of the ESS and events like 9/11 and the Iraq war. While concurrent formulations have been lost on the way or have simply become residual, the ESS represents the crystallization of the dominant discourse and hence of the grand strategic preferences of the Union. It does also respond to the call from the epistemic community and the interested

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public to clarify and streamline the European approach to security affairs in a unique document in order to dissolve the nebulous ambiguity surrounding the question of the strategic aims, means, and ways of the EU’s security policy. The semantic analysis does not only allow for the individuation of discursive dominance – including statements and ranking of attitudes, preferences, ambitions, and expectations – but it is useful in order to single out important elements of the fundamental “cultural” assumptions that inform the language chosen and used. It should be noted as well that this dominance is the product of the activity and the performativity of the speakers whose utterances connect with the audience and help cristallize shared and accepted security meanings (securitization).

The Demand for a Discourse on European Security Since the very moment the EU has proclaimed its willingness to enter the “business” of security, policy-makers and commentators have been calling for a coherent security concept and strategy. Interestingly enough, the word “strategy”, generally associated in IR collective imagery to military and war, has been accepted as a legitimate term of reference in both the academia and the political realm without much disagreement. As a matter of fact, the most common criticism of the ESDP, repeated ad nauseam, is that behind the institutional construction as well as the many talks about it, “there is neither strategy, nor policy. Or, put in another way, there are too many strategies and policies based upon contending strategic concepts” (Lindley-French 2002a: 809). On the same line, the “rapid reaction force” is deemed to be “without any explicit purpose, ready for deployment to undeclared lands, in response to undefined threats” (Wallace 2003: 3). The demand for a security concept is motivated not only by “technical” concerns; it is a question of credibility. Although indications of intents were already evident before the inception of the ESS, the fact that there was a cacophony of different voices and discourses was seen as problematic. The function of a security concept is not only to provide for general guidelines for action. It is also essential as a component of an identity self-definition and as an instrument of communication with external actors. Although mistrust is a constant in international relations, confusion and ambiguity in the definition of aims and means contribute to misperception and insecurity, since statements of preferences and attitudes have the cognitive function of re-assuring the counterparts. Another problem is the so-called “ad-hocery”, or proceeding on a case by case basis. It does not foster unity and coherence: “without a conceptual mechanism to sort out the contingencies that may or may not require the application of appropriate military and non-military crisis management tools by the European Union, the Union will be carried along by events and incidents” (Van Staden et al. 2000: 6). It is not that there have not been tentatives to develop conceptual mechanisms so far. The problem is that there has not been an agreement about a common, i.e. dominant, concept. It should be noted however that the issue is

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complicated by the fact that crisis management – as one of the major goals of the ESDP as it will be discussed later – is by definition reactive and does not lend itself to specific and detailed bureaucratic planning, since crises may develop from very dissimilar situations and bear different localized characteristics. The demand for a EU security concept is based on a series of questions, formulated in different contexts from scholars, policy-analysts, politicians, or policy-makers. A comprehensive list of points which a security concept or grand security strategy should entail has been representatively elaborated in a recommendation of the WEU Assembly to its Council (now interim ESDP Assembly) calling for the definition of a common European security concept including the following elements: A redefinition of “security” in a broad sense; An explanation of the relationship between the concept of cooperative, undivided and comprehensive security and that of security guaranteed by collective defence; A comprehensive analysis of the different types and location of risks and threats likely to affect European security in the near, medium- and long-term future; Formulation of appropriate responses to the relevant risks and challenges, in particular identification of the measures needed to contribute to conflict prevention; Drawing-up of criteria for a reasonable division of tasks between the relevant international organisations responsible for security and defence matters; Drawing-up of criteria which could be used as practical guidelines for developing a European operational component for crisis management within and outside Europe, for the prevention of non-military risks and for decisions on intervention by military means both within and outside Europe; Determination of the possible right or obligation to intervene in crisis situations, in particular on humanitarian grounds; Establishment of guidelines to determine to what extent the EU should be prepared to enter into a commitment vis-à-vis the United Nations and OSCE to intervene at their request in crisis situations and how far such intervention should depend on a specific mandate from either of those two bodies; Determination of the consequences in terms of the size of the capabilities that are required; Definition of the consequences in terms of improving European armaments cooperation and enhancing the European defence industrial base; Definition of the consequences in terms of adjusting defence budgets; Provision of guidelines to make the EU’s concept involving the use of political, civil, economic and military means (“holistic approach”) for conflict prevention and crisis management workable;

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The entire text referring to the contents of a European security concept has been reproduced here, because it is already indicative of the delimitation of the borders of orders and of the ambitions entailed in the framing of the concept. It should be also pointed out that the recommendation has been adopted by the Assembly as the final result of a series of discussions and debates, and it indicates the existence of a common approach at least from a methodological perspective. The 19 points set a very clear, definite, and comprehensive agenda, and emphasize how the definition of security and the relative threat assessment is indissolubly linked to a coherent foreign policy (Wallace 2003: 3). As a matter of fact, a security concept is more comprehensive and considers all aspects of security, as opposed to a strategic concept which refers in particular to the definition of the conditions for the use of determinate means, that is, when, where, and how to apply military force instead of other civilian instruments. Prodi, in more political language, also refers to the basic questions to be addressed by the Union: If it is to exercise true leadership in the field of security, the Union will not be able, in the long term, to avoid a number of questions which have not hitherto been discussed: what cause would we all be willing to die for? How far can the efforts of technocrats “export stability”; when should human lives be put at risk? Can an entity with no political unity take action in the long term primarily by

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the allocation of funds? Does the Union have the financial and technological resources to guarantee its security? (Prodi SPEECH/01/244).

Interestingly, questions can also be analysed as pointers of assumptions, which answers (policy choices) are called to confirm or disconfirm. Apart from clearly referring to the Union as the subject of action, Prodi’s framing of the question of security as being one of life and death already suggests a very defined meaning of security, that is, one that has strong existential connotates and involves some forms of violence or force. On the same line, Pascal Lamy, trade Commissioner until 2004 asks: “How far will Europeans go to defend their rule-based systems? Will we take risks, lose lives, and pay more? That is the real question, which we Europeans have carefully organized ourselves not to ask” (quoted in Brown B. 2002: 482). The importance of the ESDP for the delineation of the Union as a credible actor in international affairs is also a matter of concern for the EU leadership. The decision demands far-sightedness and great political courage, but the choice is clear: do we want to be left out, all of us, from the management of world affairs? Or do we want to play a part, on an equal footing with our allies, in building a new world order? (Prodi SPEECH/03/156).

This aut-aut stand is particularly meaningful for the further development of the discourse and the policy. The reference to an “equal footing” is also striking if one considers the fact of who “our allies” are: mainly states and most importantly the United States and organizations like NATO. To a Chinese audience, like in many other occasions, Prodi hints at the expectations of other actors which the Union should hold true to: “the world community expects the EU to play a rôle commensurate with its importance, not only in the economic area, but also on issues of global security and other concerns” (Prodi SPEECH/04/176). Moreover, a security concept is deemed essential for the further effective development of the ESDP. In Solana’s words, “a political discourse adequate to this purpose [to explain to the Europeans what resources and commitments are necessary in order to establish a common defense] will open the way to concrete mechanisms and, we should hope it, transparent for the implementation of this ambition” (Solana S0128/02). However, ambiguities created by the interchangeable use of “security” and “defense” in the discourse affect the transparency of the ESDP.

The Supply of Texts and Answers The themes of European security, and at a lower extent, of defense had been circulating in the EU arena much before Solana’s and others’ call. The answers to some of the questions presented above can be found in a variety of EU documents

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or speeches. This means that, although the European Security Strategy will be considered here as the central text of reference, other sources provide substantial interpretation and indications of direction. These texts enshrine the preferences and the ambitions of the EU leadership, and not necessarily the reality of the ESDP implementation (which will be evaluated in the next chapter). A note on the temporal sequence is also important. Although the ESS has been published only in late 2003, that is, once the ESDP was already in place, it is to be considered as the result of previous con- and co-texts (see Chapter 5), and a reflection on – or a discursive re-interpretation of – practices. The Master Text: The European Security Strategy (ESS) In June 2003, at the European Council in Thessaloniki, the High Representative Javier Solana presented to the Heads of State and Government of the then 25 EU members (the 2004 new members had also been invited) a draft version of the security strategy for Europe. The final text “A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy” was approved by the Council in Rome on 12–13 December 2003. This document comprehensively and formally addresses the issues of the foreign policy objectives of the Union (the aims), identifies the major threats and challenges, and suggests the means and ways through which Brussels intends to “defend its security” (ESS). A number of commentators see the ESS as a response to the US National Security Strategy (US NSS) published in November 2002: indeed, Christopher Heusgen, EU Policy Unit, admitted that they wanted to write a document comparable to the US NSS (quoted in Toje 2005: 120), while academics and journalists have been prolific in systematically comparing the two (for example Berenskoetter 2005; Fossum 2006). Interesting in this regard is again the commensurability of comparison: the two documents could only be comparable if they stemmed from entities with equipollent characteristics. If it is true that the Union decided to issue such a document as a response to the US, this can be considered as further evidence for its ambition to be treated or act as a state. As it will be shown in the discussion on identity projection in this chapter and on actorness in the next, the implicit or explicit reference to the US is a recurrent theme (see also Posen 2004). The fact that for the first time the EU officially spells out a list of threats very similar to the ones highlighted by the US – international terrorism, WMD, and failed states – has also been considered atypical for the EU (Everts and Keohane 2003: 167; Biscop 2004a), and as an attempt to match the US (Quille 2003) or at least to bridge the gap with Washington and to re-affirm transatlantic cooperation after the crisis over Iraq (Haines 2004a: 39).   The US National Security Strategy, a clear response to 9/11, poses a) clear accent on the protection and projection of the individual values founded on freedom; b) establishes the link between international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; c) includes the eventuality of a preventive strike among its strategic options.

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Written for public consumption, the final document is the result of negotiations and revisions that reflect diplomatic compromises and sensitivities in an athmosphere profoundly affected by the divisions among the EU Member States concerning their position towards the Iraq war. Curiously, it has also been subjected to“specialist” review at seminars in which different think-tanks representatives have contributed with amendments to the initial draft (Biscop 2004a: 16). Indeed, Solana faced several challenges in drafting the ESS: on the one hand he had to use language flexible (and ambiguous) enough to elicit agreement from the Member States, while on the other he had to produce a document powerful enough to become the most important component of a EU grand strategy and to credibly address major international actors (Haine 2004b: 73). The ambiguity of the language is thus a consequence of the negotiating process, and more importantly, of the different systems of meaning of the EU Members. For example, the concept of “pre-emptive” engagement in the draft was replaced by “preventive” engagement, because the original wording was regarded as too controversial for some Member States. Also, differences in the assessment of the importance of some threats and means to tackle them were reflected in a different order in which the final ESS was organized. In contrast to this however, Solana stated that “[t]he preparation of the European Security Strategy has helped us to discover a remarkable convergence of view on security issues between EU Member States – and to uncover an authentic and uniquely European voice on security issues” (Solana S0005/04). Solana’s optimistic belief in a common vision can be sustained only of one considers that a common security strategy does not automatically lead to a common strategic concept on the use of force, but it is a mere indication of preferences. How these preferences and attitudes are then implemented in practice is a completely different matter, also because the ESS has no legal value whatsoever. As it is obvious, the artist praises its product. Solana is proud to sell his strategy as “a short document (…) free of jargon, clear and – I hope – accessible to all. This is how it should be. Security is everybody’s business. I hope that it is widely disseminated and read” (Solana S0005/04), or as others have defined it, as an “inspirational sketch” (Duke 2004: 460). In reality, however, the fact that both the producer(s) and the receivers of the ESS share a common jargon – and it is unclear how and why they should refrain from using it – implies two opposed considerations: either the ESS is really devoided of jargon for reasons of accessibility but this would also mean that it is meaningless for the “specialists”; or it is based on jargon and it is not as easily accessible as it is claimed. In both cases, this situation created problems of interpretation, which Solana tends to minimize. Although it has been dismissed by commentators as yet another ineffectual document for the reasons mentioned above (Becher 2004; Duke 2004; Heisbourg 2004), the ESS is important in our analysis, because it represents the crystallization of a specific discourse that has been entertained by some elites for some years. If one reads the fifteen pages in the context of the development of the EU security discourse, it is possible to highlight discrepancies and contradictions with different concurrent discourses and to single out a dominant one. By the same token,

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documents like the EU Strategy on Proliferation of WMD – also presented and approved in Rome – and the EU Strategy on Terrorism also contain indications of the development or in the latter case the emergence of an institutionally adopted and approved official discourse. The European Convention for the Future of Europe Another forum for discourse production or confirmation was the European Convention for the Future of Europe, which, called upon by the Laeken Council, was launched in 2002 and lasted one year. Composed of representatives from the European Parliament, national parliaments, national governments, and some NGOs, the aim of the Convention was to conjure up a “constitutional” text which would prepare the Union for the entry of the new 10 members in 2004. The draft, which was planned to be approved under the Italian presidency in December 2003, has been object of longer discussions and has finally been approved, not without essential modifications, by the European Council in June 2004. In the framework of this research, the work of the Convention and the final texts produced by its members are considered as being part of the dominant discourse. It is important to highlight that the constitutional text, once modified and approved by the Intergovernmental Conference and ratified by the Member States, becomes part of the policy and has direct implications for action and will thus be discussed in the next chapter. The Convention was presented with the challenge to adequately “modernize” the ESDP in order to reflect the changing security environment (Zilmer-Johns 2004). The questions the Convention Secretariat addressed to the Working Group on Defense (WG VII) paved the way to the direction of the discussion and are important insofar as they indicate how the context of the debate has been somewhat already limited: a. About the type of missions (and as a consequence the aims and means of the ESDP): “Are the Petersberg tasks as set out in the treaty still relevant? Should they be adapted/modernized/made more flexible to take into account the new security environment?”; b. About the scope of the use of force: “Should explicit provision be made for the use of military capabilities and structures foreseen for ESDP inside the EU in the event of a security threat such as terrorist attack?” or is it to retain its focus on projecting stability in the neighbourhood? c. About traditional collective defense: “Should a solidarity commitment be introduced into the Treaty providing for mutual assistance? What form might this take (voluntary opt-in)?”; d. And finally, about the general approach to security: “How can the Union develop a comprehensive and coherent security concept, drawing on the range of civilian/military capabilities at its disposal? What should be the role of the High Representative in the area of defense?” (Conv. WG VII-WD 10).

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As noted above, also these questions are to be considered already part of the discourse, because they constrain and direct the line of discussion, and they already contain suggestions for answer. Except for the last one, they all required a yes or no answer, what implies the existence of precedent discussions and formulations. Speeches and Other Documents The material for analysis also includes all the speeches and relevant documents produced by the EU representatives since 1999. A trend can be detected as an indicator of the dominant thought as expressed in inherently consistent 120 speeches delivered to a variety of audiences by Solana, Prodi, and Patten. Other texts developed in the context of the CFSP are included in the discourse: for instance the Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, adopted at the EU summit in Gothenburg (June 2001) in which the most important medium-term goals for EU crisis management are outlined, i.e. setting clear political priorities for future actions, improving early warning and policy coherence among the EU institutions and the Member States, enhancing the instruments for long- and shortterm conflict prevention and building effective partnerships with other actors, most notably with other international organizations. By the same token, documents not produced but endorsed by the EU leadership as the Human Security Doctrine for Europe (2004) drafted by the the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities are considered in this analysis.

The Referent Objects: Values, Interests, and Integrity? Who or what is to be secured? Who or what is threatened? The referent object is the most important position and function in security syntax because it indicates the very nature of security, and because it is directly linked to the individuation of the final aim of a security action. The EU alludes to a multitude of referent objects and utilizes different levels of abstraction. It should be highlighted that, discursively and formally, the ESDP is a brainchild of the CFSP. The objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as defined in the Treaty, include the safeguarding of the Union’s common values, its interests and integrity, the strengthening of peace and security both within the Union and on the international stage; and the promotion of international co-operation, democracy, the rule of law and human rights (TEU, art. 11). Art III193(2) CONST goes so far as to state that the objectives of the CFSP policies and instruments are to: a. safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity of the Union; b. consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international law;

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c. preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; d. foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; e. encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; f. help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; g. assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; h. promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. Although these are not necessarily the final objectives or referent objects of the ESDP, they do influence the way the Union understands security. Two perspectives on the referent object can be distinguished: one related to the unit or level of analysis or the identification of a physical referent (vital and existential interest) or paragraph (a) in the article above; and one concerning qualities attributed to the object per se (value interests). What unit has been identified as the referent object? A number of formulations concur: Europe, Union, Member States, EU citizens or the “peoples of Europe” are interchangeably used in speeches and documents. The ESS refers to a “safer Europe” while the article cited above clearly defines the object as the Union as a separate entity from the Member States, which opens up questions of international personality and sovereignty. The EU does not include all of Europe, and the Member States still retain independent foreign, security, and defense policies. This aggregative move can be interpreted as double-edged: on the one hand threats against the security, independence, and integrity of the Union should be seen as indirect threats against its constituent entities (states or individuals); on the other, threats to one of its components should be regarded as a threat to the whole Union. Prodi is supposed to have said when speaking to a Latvian audience: “any attack or aggression against an EU member nation would be an attack or aggression against the whole EU, this is the highest guarantee” (quoted in Groves 2000: 20). If true, this is a serious claim that suggests an implicit assumption of collective defense. As it will be shown later, the designation of the Union as a referent object has obvious implications also for the determination of the subject of action. On a related matter, the ambiguity expressed in the delimitation of the referent unit muddles the definition of what is internal and what is external not only in the conceptualization but also in the operationalization of security: if threats come from outside the Union, then these are responsibility of the CFSP/ESDP, but if they come from Europe, how are these to be intended? Are the Balkans considered as external or internal affairs? How can we determine who is inside the “home” that needs to be protected? (Chilton 1996a).

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The attributes of the referent object are not clearer. As the title of the ESS explicitly indicates, the overall aim of the EU grand strategy is “a safer Europe in a better world”. The use of the comparatives implies that Europe is not safe enough and that the world is not good enough, thus suggesting a relativism which negates mere survival of Europe or the Union for that sake. Interestingly, possession goals and milieu goals are often intermixed, and this is one important source of ambiguity: on the one hand the EU should protect the values it already has, and on the other, its task is to project, promote, and export its very values in order to protect them (see Wolfers 1967: 73). But what are these values? How are values framed as interests in the EU discourse? First of all, security, not better specified, is objectified and reified in the formulation “to defend its security” (ESS; para (a) art. III-193(2) CONST). The common values and interests are also objects to be safeguarded: By developing military capabilities, and enhancing its existing civilian capabilities, the European Union will be in a unique situation to draw on a comprehensive range of instruments to support its interests world-wide. We are not in the business of doing this for our own sake. But in support of the values and principles for which the EU is respected world-wide (my emphasis) (Solana Nn02/00, Nn06/00). The Balkans have shown that the European Union can no longer remain a force for peace simply through example. It has also to be forthright in defending the basic values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which it is founded (my emphasis) (Solana Nn03/00).

The values are those written in art 6(1)TEU: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. Title I, Art. 4 CONST also states that: In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children’s rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter (my emphasis).

It is however not so clear which particular values are enshrined in these vague definitions and where they should come from. As a matter of fact, they remain a question of interpretation, as for instance the debates about the sources of European civilization and the inclusion to a reference to Christianity have shown. Solana in

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June 2003 in a speech in French mentions the values of democracy, tolerance, and law that are at the basis of the historical success of the Union: Centuries of European history have taught to all of our people that there is a century-long and too often tragic tension between force and law, order and freedom, stability and international justice (...). But these centuries of history have also taught us that democracy represents at the moment the optimal synthesis between these contradictory exigencies (…). There is a vital link between the defense of democracy inside the state and the respect of international norms in the relations among the states (my emphasis)” (Solana S0141/03).

The Charter of Fundamenal Rights of the European Union approved in December 2000 also defines what these common values are: The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values. Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice (The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000).

The Copenhagen criteria laid down at the 1993 European Council in the Danish capital and developed to assess the performance of candidate countries seeking accession to the Union may help in the interpretation of the common values: political values are stability, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; while economic values include a functioning market economy (European Council, Presidency Conclusions 180/1/93). The Union in a sense represents a social model which also should be protected and projected: The Union’s overall goal, surely, must be to promote the well being of all its citizens, without discrimination or exclusion, and to defend and promote its fundamental values around the world. I want a strong, prosperous Union that can do just that” (my emphasis) (Prodi SPEECH/02/51); Our common foreign policy cannot just be interest-based. Protecting and promoting values, which are part of our history and very dear to the hearts of our citizens, must continue to be a priority. The values of solidarity, of tolerance, of inclusiveness, of compassion are an integral part of European integration. We cannot give up on them, especially now that ugly racist pulsions are surfacing again; and that fighting against poverty is becoming critically important to

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prevent whole societies falling prey to radical and terrorist tensions (my emphasis) (Solana S0101/02).

Internal social cohesion is also thrown into the refent object category: “crises at the frontiers of the European Union have a direct impact on our own security, our economic interests, and our social cohesion” (Solana Nn05/00 �������������������� in French).� The value of peace is clearly linked to liberty and democracy. The preamble of the TEU reads: “RESOLVED by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty” (TEU, Preamble, para 8). As the history of European integration demonstrates, peace is considered a value to be protected, because it directly conditions economic development and prosperity. Prodi in one of his speeches explicitly refers to Kant and his perpetual peace project that should stem from citizens’ interests in peace as well-being and from the fact that they are organized in a peaceful federation of states sharing basic values. He even goes on to praise the rule of law and democracy as the means to achieve that peace: Like Kant, we believe the rule of law should apply within states just as it should between states. Kant may have been pleased to see what we have done in the European Union -- a form of supranational democracy in a Union of sovereign Member States. In some ways, our Union enshrines the essence of Kant’s federation of sovereign democracies (Prodi SPEECH/04/153).

Democracy, human rights, and the rule law as principles on which the Union is based are also deemed to be universal values or “not private property”, which the Union intends to defend across the world: This is a major project for the Union. If we have the capacity and commitment, we can act as a strong catalyst for stability and peace beyond our own frontiers. A more stable world means a safer more prosperous Europe. It is also a means of ensuring that the values and principles on which the Union is based are not private property. Once we have made our changes we shall be in a stronger position to support democracy and the rule of law, and to defend human rights throughout the world. That alone is good enough reason for working to ensure that ESDP is a success (my emphasis) (Solana Nn04/00).

Closely linked to the definitions of specific values under threat is the notion of interests. It is assumed that specific EU values constitute also EU interests. Although in theory the distinction between the two categories is controversial, the EU tends to keep them separate for discursive use. This distinction may suggest cognitive assumptions: interests are material and clearly definable in space and time, while values are abstract, geographically indivisible, and potentially universal, as the aim of contributing to a better world through the promotion of those very values suggests:

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The ESS also defines three priority objectives for EU foreign policy that can be seen as interests: a) stability of directly neighboring countries and their respective governments; b) effective global multilateralism; c) security from threats. The problem with such formulations and the ones cited in the speeches is that interests and values, although linguistically kept separated, are then confused in meaning, thus leaving open a wide space for discussions and interpretations that could be easily used to explain either inactivity or hyperactivity. At a seminar organised by the then WEU Institute for Security Studies in 2001, a number of criteria were mentioned, such as the assessment of the threat, the interests at stake, or geographic aspects. Some participants endeavored to identify three concentric circles of European interests: a first circle encompassing economic interests (in particular in the Middle East and Maghreb region); a second circle concerning so-called “essential” interests in regions where “risks of war exist” (for instance in South-East Asia and some regions of Africa); and a third circle concerning situations in which universal values are at stake, requiring, for example, rescue operations (WEU Assembly A/1741 2001). Obviously, it is difficult for the Union to concretely define specific material interests because the Member States, due to their geographical and economic position, have different national interests. So can the Union have autonomous interests which are not a sum total of the Member States’ interests and which can assume the character of a EU own “national interest”? As Ortega puts it, the EU interests should be conceived as “common interests ‘lying midway between Member States’ national interests and global interests” (Ortega 2001: 103). The definition of the interests as common or collective – adjectives that are sometimes used as synonymous – is however very important: common interests suggest a coherent minimum common denominator Member States can agree on, while collective interests as a sum do not need to be coherent in any form and can lead to internal competition. Until now, the issue has not been successfully resolved, and this might be the reason why ambiguity is the chosen strategy. A number of “interests” are however individuated in the discourse. Stability as an interest takes different meanings. First and foremost, the stability of the EU integration is considered as something to protect. In a way, this can be classified as a survival interest of the Union per se, and not necessarily of all its member states, because the Union’s success and very existence is based on the level of integration achieved and potentially on future deepening. Disintegration

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is of course a threat to the existence of the Union. It should be noted that this type of stability is not new for the Union. Already before the invention of the ESDP, stability of integration was called for especially when the dilemma between deepening and widening surfaced at each new enlargement wave (see for instance Larsen 2000b: 225). Integration and enlargement as a consequence are thus securitized: the progressive coming closer of regions where instability and conflict reign prevent the Europeans from ignoring the potential menaces which could weight on the continuation if not on the survival of the European integration (Solana S0147/02 in French)��.

The failure to proceed with integration and enlargement are constructed as a threat: an example is the poll conducted by the Eurobarometer 60 asking about the feelings of the interviewees in the event that the EU ceased to exist (EB 60). Another important form of stability is stability in the near-abroad, that is, in Central and Eastern Europe. In this case the Union attaches a normative flavor to stability in the sense that it does not intend stability as mere status quo, but as the creation of democratic institutions and their maintenance. Stability is also envisaged at the global level: the aim is incorporated in the value of the respect of international law for instance. Obviously the material implications of such interest formulations weaken the more the geographical distance from the centre increases. Interestingly, a poll organized by the Eurobarometer in December 2000 can be used as part of the discourse, not so much because of its value in assessing trends in public opinions, but because, since it presented closed-ended options, it is indicative of what the designers at the European Commission cognitively conceived as referent objects of security (and it is not to be excluded that they purposedly used the results to formulate subsequent speeches and documents). The question asked was: “The European Union has decided to institute a Common Security and Defence Policy. Among the following possible functions of a European army, for what, in your opinion, should it be used?” (EB 54.1 2001). The specific results will be discussed in the section on the predicate; however, it is important here to analyze the options offered and what they entail. The table below presents the statements (listed in order of preference) the interviewees had to agree or disagree with, the referent objects individuated and whether these were made explicit, and the inward or outward nature of these objects (described as IN or OUT in the table). Direct “vital” and traditional interests like EU territory, citizens, and internal peace and stability are thrown together with external “value” interests. The respondends seem to prefer more material referent objects associated to a clearly delimited unit of reference. On a similar line, an “independent” task force in the EU Institute for Security Studies (official but “autonomous” agency of the EU since 2001) chaired by Nicole Gnesotto, the Director of the Institute, has

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Table 6.1

Analysis of Referent Objects Devised for Public Opinion Use (EB 54.1 2000)

Options included Defending the territory of the EU Guaranteeing peace in the EU Intervening in case of a disaster in Europe Defending human rights Carrying out humanitarian missions Intervening in conflicts on the EU borders Repatriating Europeans who are in conflict areas Intervening in other parts of the world in case of disaster Taking part in UN peacekeeping missions Defending the economic interests of the EU Symbolizing a European identity Intervening in conflicts in other parts of the world Taking part in non-UN approved peacekeeping missions

Explicit or Implicit Referent Objects Explicit: EU Territory Explicit: EU Peace Implicit: Territory (EU?)

IN/OUT

Explicit: Human rights (unspecified for whom) Implicit: Human rights, stability Implicit: Peace, stability

IN/OUT?

Explicit: EU citizens

IN

Implicit: Non-EU Territory

OUT

Implicit: Non-EU Peace

OUT

Explicit: EU Economic interests

OUT

Explicit: EU Identity Implicit: Non-EU Peace

IN/OUT OUT

Implicit: Non-EU Peace

OUT

IN OUT Unit unclear

IN/OUT? OUT

individuated interests or referent objects of the ESDP and the relative missions or actions associated to it (Gnesotto 2004b). Stability again plays a pivotal role in the protection and projection not only of norms and values but also of economic interests. In both formulations however, other referents or interests have been singled out as important for the ESDP. Territory, as mentioned in Art III-193(2) CONST cited above, as well as integrity and independence are recurrent themes. As a matter of fact, the reference to the concept of integrity is controversial. It is actually surprising that such a concept, traditionally intended as territorial, be included in the list of objectives of the CFSP, and as derivation, in the ESDP (in view of a future common defense of the common territory). Moreover, it should be highlighted that the wording specifically refers to the integrity of the Union as such and not of the single Member States. This ��������������������������������������������������������������� implies that the Member States’ territories are summed up and form, as prescribed in federalist theory and practice, a new territorial unit. In this sense then, collective defense, that is alliance-type agreements according to which Member States are asked to intervene in help of other members in case of

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Table 6.2

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Vital and Value Interests (based on Gnesotto 2004b:13)

Vital Interest Integrity of member states Economic survival Social and political stability

Value Interest International peace and security Universally accepted norms and values

Mission Homeland defense and management Projecting stability to protect trade routes and the free flow of raw materials Combating organised crime and projecting stability to prevent a massive influx of refugees Projecting stability to protect and enforce the international rule of law Projecting stability to protect and enforce fundamental norms and freedoms; humanitarian aid; peacekeeping; peacebuilding

attack, would only be a phase towards common defense. It is then suggested that defense comes from a central authority and encompasses the entire territory. Also, territorial integrity is used in other contexts, always in the external relations sphere, to indicate principles of legitimation or action. In this sense, territorial integrity refers to a determinant component of state sovereignty, and the breach thereof is considered as a “justified” cause of conflict or war. The continuous importance of territory runs against the globalization-deterritorialization thesis (Moeller 2000b). Closely linked to integrity is the idea of protected borders, which still resonates deep in the European psyche (Delpeche 2002). EU borders are constantly referred to by the EU speakers and the ESDP missions deployed until now show how the fortification of external borders (especially in view of defense against external threats) plays a growing role in the Union’s scope of activities. It is however unclear how the Union would react in case of breach of its integrity due to the withdrawal or opting out of a Member State from the Union as a whole. Although there are provisions legally regulating this matter, the eventuality is not regarded as likely and certainly not immanent. Most importantly, “independence and integrity” are two important components of state sovereignty. From the international legal point of view, and looking in particular to the definition contained in Art.1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) which lays down the most widely accepted formulation of the criteria for statehood, a state is an international person characterized by: permanent population, a defined territory (with a stable community, although change of frontiers are possible), government control of the territory including coherent political structures and society and an apparatus of executive and legislative organs; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states as well as the recognition by other states (Shaw MN  ��������������������������������������������������������������������� For instance, FRONTEX is a program to create a common border police.

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1997: 140). On the other end of the spectrum, the major duty of a state is not to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. The fact the new Constitutional Treaty confers to the Union international personality only confirms that the EU possesses all the statehood requirements and seem to assume them in its own definition of the referent objects of its security. Particularly puzzling is also the reference to independence of the Union. Generally, state independence is intended as the capacity of a state to conduct its own affairs free from the control and domination of other states. How far this claim can be legitimately made by the EU is a matter of debate, especially because there are contrasting views among the Member States concerning the very nature of the organization (see section on subject). Citizens also appear in the discourse, and again, the concept is not consistently used or defined. The confusion is created by the fact that EU citizenship (ex Art. 8 TEU) and Member States’ citizenship are used interchangeably. Although the two identifications are coincident, the reference to the one or the other is important because it suggests a different subjectivity and the existence of a commonality: EU citizens are all equal, while the expression “citizens of the Member States” implies an inherent difference between them depending on their state of appartenance. Solana refers to “our” citizens: “Our internal and external security are indissolubly connected. If we want to protect our citizens at home, we have to be prepared to act effectively abroad” (Solana S0005/04)�������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� , or even to people in general: Because foreign policy nowadays is, ultimately, about people, not just about States. About people who are the target of ominous conflicts; about people in need, for which Europe provides the main lifeline through humanitarian relief; about people out there – our citizens – who unreservedly support this solidarity, and value the achievements of European integration also on these grounds (Solana Nn06/00).

Terms like “population”, “individuals”, or “community” do not score high in the formulations about security and defense, if not when considered potential victims of “challenges” rather than “threats”. The Centre for Global Governance at the London School of Economics published A Human Security Doctrine for Europe (in September 2004) with the CFSP Secretariat’s support, where it is envisaged that Europe should supply the “protection of every individual human being”. Although some of the speeches of Solana and Prodi also play with this meaning, it is unclear how the ESDP could enforce the deed. In reference to possible terrorist threats, the discourse becomes more specific. The Final Report of the Convention Working Group on Defense states: The events of 11th September prompt consideration not only of the need to project stability outside the Union but also the need to ensure security within the European Union, particularly for the protection of the civilian population and democratic institutions. A purely national framework is no longer enough. At the

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same time, public opinion is calling more than ever for security and protection and appears to be very much in favour of European defence. It is therefore for the Convention to consider how the gap between expectations and reality could be overcome (my emphasis) (CONV 461/02)

Another category of interests is resources. References to EU natural resources and the environment as referent objects are minimal. The relationship between energy supply and security is only mentioned as a challenge in the ESS: “Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa” (ESS). The resources of the EU in its own territory are not in danger rather is the supply of external resources. However, in a Commission paper on the implementation of the ESS in the area of the fight against terrorism, it is stated: Achieving this implies action, together with partner countries, to eliminate or reduce the threat of terrorist attack whether to citizens themselves, to essential services (such as water supplies, energy, transport and communications) or production systems (agro-food and process industries) as well as to establish mechanisms (surveillance, early warning, alert and response systems and procedures) to deal effectively and efficiently with the consequences of any attacks (My emphasis) (Commission SEC ���������������� (2004)332)��.

By the same token, “economic interests” are not further specified. Solana refers often to prosperity as a referent as “in a globalized and chaotic world, it is no longer possible to separate artificially prosperity and security” (cited in Gnesotto 2004c: 5–6). All in all, the referent objects identified by the Union are not dissimilar from the ones one would expect to find in national security discourses. An important peculiarity can be recognized in the excessive weight laid on values, which gives the impression that the EU needs to promote its values in order to defend its own security. Interestingly enough, and unlike the US NSS where a strong focus on freedom dominates the discourse, the EU does not consider freedom in danger. This is important because it indicates that the fundamental liberal link between peace and freedom (and democracy) is not directly established at the cognitive level, and that the primary objective of EU’s security is stability, which may be interpreted by some as the maintenance and management of the status quo.

The Threats Directly connected to the identification of the referent objects, the construction and definitions of threats is an essential component of security discourses. It has

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been the opinion of some commentators that the EU and its associated epistemic community – contrary to what happens for instance in the United States – have been focusing too much on institutions and capabilities, without paying enough attention to the questions of threats and the security environment. “Europeans tend to assess threats in the light of their capabilities and defense budgets instead of adapting capabilities and budgets to the threats” (Delpeche 2002:12). As a matter of fact, until recently, and in particular before the institutionalization of the ESDP, the dominant discourse was one of problems, challenges, risks, and vulnerability, and few direct references to threats in the classical sense of the term could be found. The change in the definition of an issue from problem to threat is one of the characteristics of securitization, and this is the field in which the ESS represents a breakthrough. The problem with the definition of the content of threats is that they are linked to perception, perspective, and construction of fear, and it is not easy to pinpoint a common meaning or grade of importance for the defined threats: for example the definition of what constitutes aggression is a matter of never-ending discussion in the international community. Solana however stressed how the ESS is a product of common perception: The Security Strategy was born when Europeans acknowledged that we are stronger when we have a common perception of the threats we face and how to deal with them. Threats are never more dangerous than when we are divided (Solana S0005/04).

Before analyzing the threats identified by the EU leadership, it is interesting to note how Solana is perfectly conscious of his role as a “securitizer”, that is, of how the politicians’ role is also to “create the atmosphere of risk”, which resonates with the public: [f]rom Lisbon to Moscow you cannot conceive a potential war. It is very difficult to tell a European that they are in a risky world, it is the time in our history that probably we are in a better and more secure environment, that is the sentiment that we have and that is the sentiment that the average citizen of Europe has today. We don’t have any possibility of conflict in the continent, the Balkans was an exception, but there is not a sentiment of risk at this point in time, therefore I don’t know if it is the intelligent community that has to create the atmosphere of risk, but it seems to me that it is very difficult, even for the people around here, to create a climate that is a climate of difficulty, and of risk, and therefore politicians like me, I am a politician and I want to win election, like any other politician, it is very difficult to say things that are not very well understood by the citizens, or … as to what the average citizen thinks. Therefore a common effort by the leaders of the European Union and the people who think in a more long lasting term, longer term, we have to begin to have a debate about threats,

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risks and challenges, and that is something that we have not done and probably we have to do it and do it rapidly (Solana S0187/02).

The fundamental question highlighted by Solana in this rather confused speech is that the task of the politicians, and for that matter of the policy-makers, is to “tell” the Europeans about the threats that await them in the future. In this particular excerpt, he hints to the fact that the average European has got so used to live in peace (a secured environment), that he/she cannot conceive a potential war: the tone suggests that this perception of the citizens might be misplaced. The concept of threats and challenges, in fact, constitutes a refrain in communications from the High Representative, and other instruments like opinion polls – and in particular the precise and at times manipulative formulation of questions in the questionnaire – follow a similar pattern: In an age of increasing globalization, many are insecure, feeling threatened by events over which they consider they have little if any control. We cannot respond to this by pretending these problems do not exist. Transnational problems require transnational solutions. The development of an effective ESDP is an important contribution. It will give us the ability, where appropriate and whenever necessary, to show that the Union is not prepared to stand idly by in the faces of crisis. Nor always to let others shoulder responsibilities. It will be sign that the European integration dreamed by Europe’s founding fathers has come of age (my emphasis) (Solana Nn02/99).

Following the US example, the ESS is more specific in the definition of the threats and singles out the end of the Cold War as the source of most of them. For what concerns their general nature, the ESS recognizes that the distinction between internal and external threats is irrelevant because of a process of transbordering of threats: “The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (ESS:2). In general these threats are also: farther away (“the first line of defense is abroad”); dynamic (“to play with time or inaction is not a response”); and more complex (“none is only of military nature”) (Solana S0141/03): Large-scale aggression against any Member States is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable (ESS).

Before tackling the threats in a direct way however, the ESS first defines the challenges of extreme poverty, hunger and the new pandemics, breaking the cycles of insecurity and tackling bad governance, corruption and disregard of rule of law. They describe the context or security environment in which threats develop. It should be highlighted that there is a conceptual difference between “challenge” and “threat”, and that the first is semantically not necessarily negative.

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In this context, security is seen “as a precondition of development” and specific factors afflicting this “insecurity” environment also include hunger, malnutrition, AIDS, economic failure as a cause of political problems and violent conflicts, global warming, competition for natural resources (especially water), migration, and energy dependence. Again the link between internal and external security is stressed in a variety of occasions: External security must be achieved by reducing unrest and tension on our borders. Internal security must be achieved by combating crime, including organised crime. Crime needs to be tackled at its source which often lies in institutional disorder, poor education, social injustice and the soullessness of inner cities and suburbs. Security should also mean a safe environment and safe consumer products, in particular safe food (Prodi SPEECH/00/19).

The cause of this interconnection between internal and external is individuated in the porosity of borders created by globalization, and interdependence itself is seen as a challenge. Solana speaking at a conference of the “Economist” stated: The primary security task for European nations is no longer territorial defence and our survival is not threatened as it was in the era of the Cold War. What we must defend today are our values, interests and stability – and these do not end at our borders. An increasingly globalised world is an increasingly interdependent world. This inter-dependence offers great opportunities in terms of global economic growth and integration, but it brings with it risks of fragility and vulnerability. The greatest security challenge in the twenty-first century will be how to manage this inter-dependence (my emphasis) (Solana S0072/02).

Patten, speaking to an American audience in Chicago, also refers in one of his speeches to a catalogue of “more complex and dispersed modern threats”: in particular, the “revolt of the alienated” (urbanization and modern science constituting a threat to existing beliefs, Western culture, cultural imperialism, religious fundamentalism), “revolt of the disposed” (poverty, globalisation), environmental (climate change); and failed states (Patten SPEECH/02/452). The reference to this type of “structural violence” as a threat may suggest an inclination towards normative activism and interference in the internal affairs of other states. In the definition of scenarios, the WEU Assembly in its already cited report, identifies groups of challenges: a. existential threats, including the very unlikely possibility of a new Cold War or a development which could cause Russia to adopt a hostile attitude vis-à-vis Europe and/or the United States. Such threats could also stem from nuclear terrorism or a major nuclear accident;

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b. threats to “vital” interests; c. threats arising from global or regional economic or environmental crises; d. crises where intervention is seen as a moral imperative (WEU Assemby A/1741 2001: 19). These “more diverse, less visible, and less predictable” threats are very different from earlier types of threats. The Convention Working Group on Defense states: The ESDP was defined and developed on the basis of the challenges and threats as evaluated in the 1990s. There can be no doubt that this definition of threat has been overtaken by international events. After September 11th, the threat is no longer defined solely by the risk of conflict between States and ethnic groups. The situation is more one of a global insecurity characterised by less clear-cut risks, including those linked to international terrorist organisations or the use of weapons of mass destruction, which elude the provision made for conflict management in the traditional sense”. (my emphasis) (European Convention CONV 461/02: 14).

Aa matter of fact, the ESS includes a very detailed catalogue of more direct threats. Terrorism had already been recognized in the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council of June 2002 as being of a global nature and often linked to violent religious extremism (EU Council 13463/02): The European Council reaffirms that terrorism is a real challenge for Europe and the world and poses a threat to our security and our stability. To this end, the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September 2001 decided to step up the action of the Union against terrorism through a coordinated and interdisciplinary approach embracing all Union policies, including development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational. (European Council 13463/02).

Obviously 9/11 played an important role in the decision of the EU to explicitly include terrorism as one of the major threats to EU security. The Union however highlights the need to tackle terrorism’s political, economic, and social roots rather than focusing primarily on its military component, as the United States does: We have to get realistic about solving the problem of terrorism. It is a dangerous illusion to think it can be defeated without tackling the root causes. Force alone is not enough to defeat terrorism. Both force and brainpower must be used. Alongside the military option and repression, political avenues need to be explored with equal determination. And for both options the multilateral  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� It is also stated in the document that “some members of the Group do not share this view”.

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European Security Culture approach needs following: unilateral approaches are no longer enough (Prodi SPEECH/04/153).

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is another direct threat to EU security, and “potentially the greatest” (ESS), especially given the link with terrorism. Although the EC before and the EU now has been engaged with the issue of armaments regulation, for the first time, this is identified as a threat. The Iraq crisis and subsequent war can be considered as motors of this choice. Note that in the draft WMD are defined as “the single most important threat”. The importance of this threat is also evinced by the fact that it is object of a separate document on non-proliferation (equiparable to the ESS). Of particular concern is the WMD arms race especially in the Middle East. “Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe” (ESS). The issue of nuclear weapons as threats is particularly controversial given the fact that France and the United Kingdom are among the possessor states. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction: On both sides of the Atlantic there is consensus that, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the most immediate and potent threat to Western security and values comes in the form of a cocktail of fanaticism and weapons of mass destruction. The immediacy and potency are felt more keenly in the United States after the attacks on New York and Washington and the subsequent anthrax attacks, but the analysis in Europe is broadly similar (Solana, International Herald Tribune 2002).

Regional conflicts are another threat. By the term “regional” the Union implies the European region or near-abroad and not necessarily conflicts in other regions of the world. The experience of the Balkans is a refrain in most of the speeches and documents, and it has obviously left a mark on the perception of what could threaten European stability. State Failure intended as bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict are other direct threats individuated as a potential cause of the threat of regional conflicts. Finally, organized crime (drugs, human trafficking, and maritime piracy for example) and the generalized privatization of violence are seen as internal threats with an external dimension especially because of globalization and the interdependence created also in these illegal activity sectors. Non-conventional security threats have the priority. Solana goes so far as to detail some of the potential new threats and even includes email hacking:

 ������������������������������ US terminology: rogue states.

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Conventional war continues to be a threat but I would suggest that in the age we are living in it is no longer the most frequent or necessarily the greatest threat to our security. Today, non-conventional security threats come in a variety of packages: nerve gas released in the underground, anthrax through the post, suicide terrorist bombers, and the constant menace of penetration of secret intelligence by email hacking. We need to look at how we can deal with these new threats. Accordingly, we must be alert to the consequences of poverty for security, and be prepared to consider the alleviation of poverty as an investment in security (my emphasis) (Solana S0072/02).

The problem with such comprehensive catalogue of threats, where the root causes are often not kept separated from the actual imminent threat, is that it is difficult to elaborate an operational concept which can give its fruits in the short period: Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to a maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, the weakening of the state system, and the privatization of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed (my emphasis) (ESS).

The risk of such general categories of threats is that they finally end up being all-encompassing. Either they create an environment of constant risk where any exceptional measures are justified, or they make security impossible to attain. Generally however, in the conceptual framework of EU security beyond the ESS, the major threat is a crisis. As the International Crisis Group points out: “[t]he terminology employed in both official and public discussions of the security issues addressed (…) is notoriously confusing. ‘Crisis’ and ‘conflict’ tend to be used almost interchangeably, as do ‘prevention’, ‘management’ and ‘response’” (ICG 2001: 6). The focus on crisis-manegement is obviously linked to the referent object of stability. Interestingly, public opinion or “ordinary people” are used (some would say manipulated) in support of securitization. Solana in 2000, before 9/11 and all the ensuing developments on the world scene, said: Ordinary people are not so interested in the processes of treaties. They want Europe to be able to deliver on tackling such issues as terrorism and drugtrafficking. They want us to be able to support democratic government, to defend human rights and the rule of law. They want Europe to play a role in ensuring that the world is more secure and stable (Solana Nn03/00). ���������

How does he know what people want? As already highlighted in the previous discussion, the way questionnaires are formulated is not totally innocent. Again, the important element in this regard is not so much the result of public opinion polls, rather, the specific questions that are asked. They already limit and direct choices. It is important to note that in European security discourse the concept

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of threat and its particular manifestations well ante-date the most recent events, which are deemed to be the immediate cause for the current definition of threats. This can be interpreted as a sign that the definition of threats is not necessarily externally driven, as it is claimed in some speeches (see above on 9/11), thus revealing a consistency in the discourse that might suggest deeper preferences and ambitions. In an opinion poll conducted by EOS Gallup Europe in 1996, top EU decision makers (elected politicians, civil servants, industry, media, and cultural intellectuals) were asked to score in a scale from 1 to 10 the threats to the vital interests of Europe for the next ten years (EOS Gallup Report 1996). Apart from the fact that interests are not clearly defined, terrorism does not appear as an option. Noteworthy to consider is that religious fundamentalism – now closely associated to international terrorism – was in 1996 the major source of concern along with the nuclear issue. Regional conflicts and immigration were also considered as a threat, and this is not surprising because the poll was conducted in the period of the war in Bosnia, when EC countries were hit by massive refugee flows. The reference to the power of other states (China, Japan, US, and Russia) as a potential threat to European interests is particularly interesting, since in no other formulations individual states have been individuated as threats.

Table 6.3

Threats to European Interests (EOS Gallup Report 1996)

Threats to European Interests in the Next 10 Years

Scores

A possible progression of religious fundamentalism 6.2 The possible development into nuclear powers of 6.2 countries other than China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the USA Heavy immigration from non-EU countries 5.9 The outbreak of violent nationalist movements outside the 5.9 borders of the EU countries A possible nuclear accident like that of Chernobyl 5.8 Increase in ethnic and/or territorial conflicts inside European 5.8 countries (like former Yugoslavia) The development of China to a world power 5.4 The outbreak of extreme nationalist movements within the EU 5.4 The economic power of Japan 5.1 The economic power of the USA 5.1 The remaining military might of Russia 4.8  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Question: “I am going to read out some possible threats to the vital interests of Europe for the next ten years. Could you please tell me on a scale from 1 to 10 to what degree you view the respective points as threats”. In the table: the questions are ordered on the basis of the score obtained. The interview order was different.

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Table 6.4

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Threats (IPSOS 2001) Much

International Terrorism 71 Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Weapons 70 Increase of Extremisms Rich/poor unbalance Conflicts for natural resources

Fair Poor No NA

62 54 40

23 22 28 32 37

4 4 6 9 15

1 2 1 3 4

1 1 3 2 4

Another example is the poll conducted by IPSOS in November 2001, that is, just few months after 9/11 (IPSOS 2001). The questions asked to assign a degree of importance to a list of threats. From the perspective of official sources of data related to European public opinion, the Eurobarometer has conducted a special survey on defense in 2000 (EB 54.1) addressing the role of a European army, while other annual surveys routinely ask questions related to challenges. Noteworthy is the fact that the last Eurobarometer polling for threats was conducted in Autumn 2002 (EB 58). In subsequent polls for EB 60 (Autumn 2003) and EB 61 there are no mentions of threats or fears: the formulation reads as “important issues your country is facing at the moment” and results include unemployment (42%), and crime (28%), while terrorism scores only 12%.

Table 6.5

Threats in the Eurobarometer of Autumn 2002 (EB 58)

Threat Afraid % International Terrorism 82 Organized Crime 76 Spread of Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction Accident in Nuclear Power Stations Ethnic Conflicts in Europe Accidental Launch of a Nuclear Missile World War Epidemics Nuclear Conflict in Europe Conventional War in Europe

72 71 60 58 57 53 52 49

 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� The standard Eurobarometer was established in 1973. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State (except Germany: 2000, Luxembourg: 600, United Kingdom 1300 including 300 in Northern Ireland). Reports are published twice yearly. 

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It is evident that the ESS is built upon these categories of threats. Interestingly, 49% of the interviewees, that is 1 every 2, is afraid of conventional war in Europe. Concerning the relevance of a nuclear conflict in Europe, a plausible explanation lies in the memories of the Cold War and the instability that could come now from Russia (and some of its regions in particular). In general however the specific form of the threat (where it comes from and who/what it is) and the event/s which might elicit reaction are not defined. For instance, the mutual (optional) solidarity clause introduced in the constitutional treaty at art. I-40(7) CONST mentions in general “an armed aggression” without however specifying it further: If a Member State is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

It is important to note that there is no concept of enemy or adversary in the EU security discourse, rather, Solana talks of “recalcitrant parties and aggressors” without necessarily pointing the finger to some actors in specific (Solana, Financial Times 29.09.2000). Summing up, the EU dominant discourse on threats is so comprehensive that it risks being useless. Only lately, the major threats have been singled out to answer to a constant demand from the strategic community. However, threats, challenges, and problems are thrown together, without clear analytical distinctions, and root causes and effects are confused. Moreover, there is no straightforward relationship between threats and referent objects.

The Subject of Action – The Union as Power? The question asked here is: who is the subject of action formulated in the security syntax? Who should secure the referent objects from these threats? In a sense, the issue of delimiting the subject of action is related to an appraisal of responsibility, which Europe is supposed to have delegated to the US for a long time (Delpeche 2002: 12). Of particular importance here is the way in which the dominant official discourse constructs the EU as a subject of action, including its form and internal characteristics. The broader debate is related to whether the Union is an actor or just a framework of reference, according to which the Member States intend to act (Haine 2004c: 50). As it will be argued in the next chapter, despite the fact that the final actors

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of the ESDP – in terms of decision-making and operational performance – are the Member States, in the official EU discourse the subject is always identified as “Europe” or the “Union”. This formulation suggests an identity between the referent object and the subject: the Union is threatened and it has to defend itself. Even though in practice this happens through the means of some of the Member States, they act in the collective name of the Union, so that the final actor is considered to be the EU. The problem of the inconsistency between the speaker (representing everybody) and the actor (for instance coalitions of the willing) will be discussed in Chapter 7. The way in which an entity constructs itself as an international actor (what Harnisch ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� and Maull 2001b: 129–130 call “ego-part”) is important because it highlights identity self-perception, preferences, and aspirations, but also because it is the backbone of a conscious strategy of image projection, and in the long run it structures an actor’s policies (Larsen 1997: 9; Larsen 2002: 287). Rhetorical selfrepresentation is indeed a powerful tool to project images and values. Solana clearly poses the question of what type of subject “Europe” (intended as the EU) should be: The necessity of protecting the civilian population, the progressive disappearance of the distinction between internal and external security, the new operational concepts, which demand answers for the current and future challenges, the fast evolution of strategic relationships between the United States and Russia compel the Europeans to position themselves: do they want to be actors or passive spectators? Do they want to leave again to others the task of defining the strategic agenda? (…). If Europe intends to affirm its political identity and be actor instead of spectator, it has to invent the mechanisms to bring into line (harmonize) the doctrines of its Member States for what concerns external intervention and the use of force (my emphasis) (Solana S0147/02, ��������������������� in French).

The Declaration of Laeken, setting the scene for the work of the Convention also asks: Does Europe not, now that [it] is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? (…) a power wanting to change the course of world affairs (my emphasis) (European Council 300/1/01).

As a reply, the opening premise of the ESS is a basic recognition that “the European Union is inevitably a global actor (…) Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (my emphasis) (ESS 1). What role should this actor have? Role is here intended as “expected behaviour based on certain rules, written or unwritten, prescribed or achieved” (Le Pestre 1997, 4):

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European Security Culture the capability to deploy and sustain a significant force (…) allowing the Union to play a proper role in preserving international peace and security: a role consistent with the EU’s perception of its place in the world and of its responsibilities (my emphasis) (Solana Nn05/00). ���������

First of all, Solana sees Europe as a model and an example, which only because of its own existence is in the position to spread stability: Our role is also linked to the perception of the European success story. In the eyes of the world, we are not just a giant in terms of economic wealth but also a unique example in terms of political stability, co-operation and integration. Let us not be afraid to admit that, in the eyes of many, Europe is a model, a reason for hope (my emphasis) (Solana S0025/02).

Capitalizing on the “clean” and peaceful image of the EU in the world, especially in comparison to the states – the units the EU seems always to refer to as terms of comparison – other terms are used to define the aspirations of the Union in the field of security: We do not start in a vacuum. The European Union is already a global player on the world stage. Europe is crucial in the formulation of the major trade policies, financial trends and monetary decisions. It is high time for Europe to become a more active and influential global power” (Solana Nn01/99)� ���������; We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security (Prodi SPEECH/00/19); We are an emerging power, dare I say ‘a potential power’, and this is the paradox of the situation of Europe in the world today. We should not be satisfied with that: the Union of tomorrow, the Union which will stretch from the Mediterranean to the North Pole, from the Atlantic to the great plains of Eastern Europe, will have to learn to speak with one voice on the world stage. If we do, and only if we do, we will be able to make our voice heard, to make our actions count (Prodi SPEECH/01/244); To aspire to be recognised as a player with an influential role in maintaining world stability and security, it is not enough to be a world economic power, with a single currency. Europe must also, and most importantly, carry political weight, and be seen to do so. Until it is perceived as a power with a shared vision in terms of foreign policy and defence, Europe will not make its voice heard as a major player. This, however, means the sacrifice of diplomatic action that is strictly national and not coordinated within a European framework. Power and foreign and defence policy are closely and indissociably linked. And the last

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two cannot exist apart. (…) The exercise of power, through credible political and military instruments, can only effectively defend our common interests if undertaken in a genuinely autonomous decision-making framework (WEU Assembly A/1798 03.12.2002: 4); [i]t is time for the Union to shoulder its responsibilities as a world power; it must propound its own values, stand up and be counted as a player in globalisation (Commission COM(2002)247); The European Union is a force for peace and prosperity in Europe and abroad (Prodi SPEECH/02/499); In this new geo-political landscape the European Union is an attractive pole of stability, democracy and prosperity. We have maximised our status as a ‘net exporter of stability’ by acknowledging legitimate aspirations to join our Union; while emphasising that this is dependent on a commitment to our common values (Solana S0101/02); Now it offers the potential for transforming the EU into a leading strategic actor on the world scene (Solana S0141/03); Our ambition is a Europe more active and more capable; an articulate and persuasive champion of effective multilateralism; a regional actor and a global ally (Solana S0005/04); Now … Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the new governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development (Solana S0005/04); So I am not surprised to see from a survey -- albeit not a terribly recent one -- that ‘a majority of Americans want to see the European Union become a superpower capable of sharing global responsibilities with the US (TransAtlantic Trends survey of the German Marshall Fund, September 2000) (quoted in Prodi SPEECH/04/90) (my emphasis).

As these quotations demonstrate, the Union does not only want to play a role according to its “growing responsibilities” (Prodi SPEECH/03/517), but it sees itself as an actor, a player, and finally a power (and potentially a superpower? See Blair quoted in Hill 2003). Since 1999, the concept of power has become

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central in the rhetorical self-representation of the Union. Of particular relevance is the ambition of the EU to be a “structural power”, that is, an actor who has the ability to shape the environment and the rules of the game, more than a power in the traditional military sense, and to use its beliefs as principles of action. The specific connotations of power and actorness in the literature will be discussed in the next chapter. However it is important to highlight here how the EU speakers appropriate the role of “civilian” power attributed to them by analysts and scholars. Interestingly Solana does not accept the limits inherent in the classification as civilian power: The EU has no ambition to compete with the US in the military field. Does this mean that the EU should be confined to the role of civilian power? My short answer is no. We have the declared ambition to contribute to peace and stability worldwide through the complementary deployment of a wide array of instruments (trade; aid; technical assistance; police training, etc) including, where appropriate, military assets. Our credibility, as a crisis management actor, depends at this stage essentially on the political resolve to fill the gaps in capabilities already identified.The EU does exist on the international scene. It is already a powerful actor, and a major pole of stability (my emphasis) (Solana S0135/02; see also Solana S0128/02).

The tendency of the EU speakers is to compare the Union, implicitly or explicitly, to the United States and other states in the international arena. This is not done only by adopting a similar vocabulary, but it is in several cases an intentional strategy to differentiate themselves from others and to build up their own identity. Prodi for instance addresses the concept of “soft power” – discussed in the literature by Nye 1990 and 2004 and associated with a negative connotation by Kagan 2002 – and defends the idea that soft power (normative: “democratic principles” and structural: “building nations”) is actually superior to hard power intended as military force: Let me tell you the hard facts about ‘soft’ power. ‘Soft’ power is not about wearing kid gloves. There is no easy way to peace. It is easy to see how states fail. Building nations is the real tough job. And that is only done when you no longer need occupying troops. It cannot be achieved overnight. And it may not hit the headlines. But it gets the job done in the long term. Preventing is better than pre-empting. Good examples are fostering our democratic principles through  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ On the normative component of power: “Powers ���������������������������������������� have qualitative differences as well as quantitative, and their attraction and influence is not exactly correlated to mass and weight. For men possess not only territories, raw materials and weapons but also beliefs and opinions. It is true that beliefs do not prevail in international politics unless they are associated with power…But it is equally true that power varies very much in effectiveness according to the strength of the beliefs that inspire its use” (Wight 1979: 81).

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development assistance to bolster peace and security internationally. And I am proud to say the European Union’s role is second to none here. The Union is by far the world’s foremost donor of overseas development assistance. We are also an active promoter of sustainable development. Because development is a key factor in building peace. The Union is addressing certain major root causes of conflicts -- such as poverty, demographic pressure and competition for scarce natural resources, like water and land (Prodi SPEECH/04/153).

Directly related to the EU’s self-reflection as power is the attempt to use the ESDP and the discourse on security in general as a “strategic identity card” (Solana in Gnesotto 2004c: 6). As a matter of fact, Art 2(2) TEU also states that the CFSP and the ESDP have the aim of asserting “its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17”. More generally and not only at the international level, Solana sees the ESDP as a “part of the wider project of building Europe’s political identity” (Solana, The European Voice 2001). A security identity is in general the image states (or other actors) have of themselves and their distinctiveness vis-à-vis other states. Again, this is not so much about the theoretical question of the “nature of the beast”, rather, about how the beast presents itself. David Campbell has suggested that foreign policy is a process “concerned with the ethical boundaries of identity rather than the territorial borders of the state” (Campbell 1998: 156), and this applies also for the Union. In the construction of a discourse on security, the Union is forced to spell out the questions of “What is the European integration process all about?” and “Who are we?” (Van Ham 2001a), and the terms of references used are obviously state-centric since the business of security and defense has primarily been the business of the states. The EU leadership, on the defensive in a process against intentions, has repeatedly stressed that the EU is not a state and does not intend to become one. The Union is not a State and it is not our goal to transform it into one. It is and should remain a Union of States and Peoples (Prodi SPEECH/02/166).

By the same token, the dominant academic and political discourses are quick to stress, when trying to define the nature of the EU, that it is not, and it should not be considered as a state or a superstate or a traditional state in the Westphalian sense of the term (Schmitter 1991: 1; Hill 2003; and many others). Globalization and the heralded death of the nation-state as we know it contribute to shed confusion when the Union is analyzed in terms if its nature, institutions, and aims. Despite this renounciation of state-like characteristics and the fact that in reality many of the components of the traditional state definition are present as shown in the discussions about the referent object, the comparison with the United States is

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alluring, particularly after 9/11 when the United States demonstrated its willingess to act even without the support of the international community. This comparison reinforces the construction of an exclusive external identity, as the European leadership on the one hand underlines the similarities to assure the continuation of traditional friendship and cooperation, and on the other, it highlights the differences in the worldview, security perceptions, and interests (and the rift over Iraq has clearly demonstrated that) as a process of negative othering (Waever 2004): When the EU and the US are happily pelting each other with genetically-modified tomatoes as they do from day to day or laying into one another with steel bars or bananas, politicians often take a break from the fun to remind people that ‘there is so much more that unites than divides us’. It is a truism: the stuff of a thousand unread communiques. But like many truisms, it also happens to be true (Patten SPEECH/02/452).

The ESDP is seen as a way to disenfranchise Europe from dependency and the Cold War security guarantee provided by the United States. It is significant to note that in this as in many other occasions, Prodi and others feel the need to assure the United States that the ESDP will not be in competition with them or NATO, assuming that the introduction of a military component in the sphere of action of the Union might be seen as a threat by other actors: And the place to start is defence. Talking about a European defence policy does not mean going into competition with the United States, or wanting to see the end of NATO. Talking about European defence means devising a grown-up role for Europe, which is now in a position to make a much more significant contribution to world peace, security and stability than in the past. It means strengthening the European column of an arch of security that until now has rested only on American support (Prodi SPEECH/03/303).

The discussion about the differences between the EU and the US as international actors is also re-elaborated by Solana speaking to an audience in the US: Consider too the contrasts of geography. You have distance: we have proximity. You have few neighbours: we have many. You are set between two shining seas: we share one of those seas, but are bound also by vast continents. We are and will remain many countries: you are one (…). Recognising differences is one thing; exaggerating them or distorting them is quite another. So let us avoid false labels. It is as false to label Americans as inveterate unilateralists as it is to label Europeans as soft-headed pacifists. (…) Europeans may insist that force is used within the framework of law, but they also understand that sometimes force must be used to uphold law. So we want to add some muscle to our civil power (Solana S0103/03).

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The question of labels’ attribution is especially daunting, since the Union uses and abuses different labels.The reference to “civil power” in this context is puzzling. The term “civil” has a normative meaning: derived from the Latin word civilis, from civis (citizen), it conjures up values of individual liberty and expectations of appropriate behavior in a society of peers. The other associated term is “civilian” which in the common usage refers to the distinction between citizens and the military. The speakers use the two terms interchangeably: on the one hand this confusion could be the result of genuine confusion in the EU itself, or on the other it could be the product of a deliberate strategy to blur the image projected. On a similar line, others like Robert Cooper, Director for CFSP at the Council, claim a “civilizing” role for the EU (Cooper 2000): For many years there was a fashionable debate on the options facing the Union: should it aim to be a ‘civil power’ or a ‘political player’? That has become a false dilemma. Recent crises, from the end of the Cold War up to the emergence of global terrorism, have shown to what extent the distinctions between internal security and external security, between police and military tasks, between crisis prevention and crisis management have become blurred and artificial (Solana S0128/02).

The central question in terms of discourse is what image of the subject is created and transmitted. Interestingly, the Eurobarometer (EB59 – EB60) tested this question by polling opinions about the role of the US and the role of the EU in the world in terms of five issues (peace in the world, fight against terrorism, protection of the environment, growth of the world economy, fight against poverty in the world) and compared them (EB 60 2004: 79). Not surprisingly, the result was that the overall role of the EU is seen much more positively than that of the United States: pacifism is opposed to aggression, principles to pragmatism, consensual to conflictual action (Manners and Whitman 2003: 400). By defining the referent object in terms of “European” values and by insisting on the commonality of experiences as a background for integration, the EU defines itself as a value-based community with a progressive “common European soul” (Prodi quoted in Shrimsley 1999). By referring to the EU as an “island of peace” (Solana S0310/04) and by assuming that armed conflicts between members are impossible and that threats come from abroad, the EU speakers consider the EU as a “security community” in which integration has made conflict redundant (Deutsch 1978: 246–47), and on the basis of which it is possible to distinguish the borders of order of a specific political community: We are more than a marketplace. We are a Union of shared values and interests. The pooling of sovereignty makes the process we call ‘European integration’ more than just regional economic integration. We are a political Union also (Solana S0310/04).

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However, as it has been argued in the section on referent objects, the ambiguity about the unit of reference is carried on at the level of the subject. In discussions about what Europe is, and where it does or should end (and the issue of the membership of Turkey is a case in point) two basic approaches are contrapposed: one is strictly territorial, it draws from geographical limitation, and it is exclusionary (as the reference to borders and territory suggests); the other is based on values and civilization, it goes beyond territorial boundaries, and it is potentially allincluding. The first more “traditional” one facilitates the identification of threats thanks to a clear delimitation of the internal/external dichotomy – it should be noticed that the ESDP is in the EXTERNAL or foreign policy pillar – while the second more normative and “post-modern” one mixes up categories and does not clearly distinguish between object, subject, and threat. Solana and Prodi, in their references to Europe, seem to conveniently pick and choose from these two broad approaches depending on the venue and the audience (see for instance Prodi SPEECH/02/499, SPEECH/02/465 or Solana S0242/03, S0141/03).

The Predicate: Types of Actions A very important component of the syntax is the predicate or verb. It indicates what type of actions is preferred; what the subject does or should do. It contributes to identify and connote the subject. For instance, the attribute of “civilian” associated with the EU does not depend on the subject per se but on the actions and the means the subject uses. The definition of the verb is obviously strictly connected with the subject and object described above, and clarifies the grand strategic aims. Actorness at the discursive level can be evinced from the use of the passive or active tense, and the “substantivation” of the verb (ex: to do into doing; keep the peace into peacekeeping) suggests the delimitation of a field of activity rather than an immediate action per se. In the analysis of the EU security discourse, two levels can be discerned. The first one, predominantly rhetorical and with no clear policy implications, spells out the general and abstract aims of the EU and its priority actions, whereby sectors of action (whether the action pertains to foreign, development, economic aid, trade, security etc. policy responsibilities) are not separated. The second level also contains several rhetorical underpinnings, but it is more related to the type of actions envisaged as security making, and it is in particular linked to the famous Petersberg Tasks (art. 17 TEU; see next chapter for discussion): to manage crises, to prevent conflict, to keep and to make peace. In the dominant discourse created and developed through the elaboration of opinion polls, for instance, the two levels are interrelated. For a number of years, EU citizens have been asked to evaluate a certain number of actions undertaken by the Union, in order to see whether they consider these should or should not be priority actions.

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It should be noted that the actions individuated are not necessarily linked to external actions: unemployment for instance is not seen as a threat from a ESDP perspective, and this type of social security falls under the Community pillar. The use of the verbs “to fight“ and “to maintain“ is suggestive of the degree of activity included in the performance of the action: to fight indicates that considerable efforts are necessary in order to combat the threat and that change is likely (victory will bring about the disappearance of the threat), while to maintain assumes that there are no imminent threats and that the status quo must be preserved with a vigilant but less pro-active stance. Of the respondends, 73% supported the ESDP (EB60). What does this mean? What do they really support? An earlier poll on the role of an “EU army” more specifically defined the predicate (EB 54.1 2000: 18). Interestingly, the reference to a European “army” is usually avoided or expressly rejected by the EU speakers.

Table 6.6

EU Priority Actions 2004 (EB 61)

Priority Actions Degree of Preference (%) Fighting unemployment 90 Maintaining Peace and Security in Europe 89 Fighting Terrorism 89 Fighting organized crime and Drug Trafficking 88 Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU around the world

Table 6.7

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Role of a European Army (EB 54.1 2000: 18) (my emphasis)

Role of the Army Percentage of YES Defending the territory of 71 the EU Guaranteeing peace in the EU 63 Intervening in case of a disaster in Europe 58 51 Defending human rights Carrying out humanitarian missions 48 Intervening in conflicts on the EU borders 44 Repatriating Europeans who are in conflict areas 41 Intervening in other parts of the world in case of disaster 37 Taking part in UN peacekeeping missions 34 Defending the economic interests of the EU Symbolizing a European identity Intervening in conflicts in other parts of the world Taking part in non-UN approved peacekeeping missions Don’t Know/Not Answered There should not be a European army (SPONTANEOUS)

23 19 18 15 5 4

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“Defending” appears three times and is associated to the referent objects of territory, human rights, and economic interests, while “intervening” in case of disaster or conflict appears four times. Although both verbs suggest reaction rather than action, defense is more inward-looking while intervention implies the interference in circumstances external to the unit or its own responsibility. Guaranteeing is a synonymous of safeguarding (art. 11 TEU), and it again refers to the fact that peace is secured, but it needs to be maintained. Generally thus, the ESDP is called to: a) defend the territory and the economic interests of the EU as well as human rights (of undeterminate referents); b) intervene in disasters and conflicts beyond the EU borders; c) provide stability in Europe. In order to achieve these, reactive protection is not enough: the pro-active promotion and the projection of values play also an important role: We must fight terrorists, we must protect our citizens and we must defend our way of life. We must safeguard our values of democracy, openness and tolerance. We must ensure our minorities and our legal immigrants continue to enjoy the benefits of our open societies (Prodi SPEECH/04/170); That is why promoting our values internationally is so important for our own long-term security (Prodi SPEECH/04/70); With its growing responsibilities on the world stage, the Union must have the means to cope with its new tasks and to project its values internationally (Prodi SPEECH/03/517) (my emphasis).

The problem is that defense is intended in the dominant discourse to encompass promotion, protection, preservation, and projection. This confusion complicates the construction of a viable concept of security which can be operationalized in defined policy actions. (…) underpinning these priorities has to be the defense and promotion of the values which lie at the heart of European history and civilisation. (…) They are key also to our citizens, for whom the defence of such basic values lies at the heart of calls for action. It is seeking to promote the values worldwide, which we inside the Union so often take for granted. There should be nothing distant about the action we take to uphold democratic values, the rule of law and human rights. Our foreign policy should be nothing less then the projection of those values to which we all as individuals attach so much importance. If we do that, we shall be playing a small part in making the world a better place for our children and grandchildren of the European family (Solana 0073/01); [j]oining a Union committed to the defence and promotion of those same values of freedom and human rights (my emphasis) (Solana S0025/02).

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A recurrent theme in this line of talk is the ambition of making the world a better place. This is actually also the title of the European Security Strategy. Our common mission is to defend and expand the boundaries of a stable, durable and peaceful liberal democracy; to share with others the rights and opportunities that we enjoy (Solana S0103/03); Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority (Prodi SPEECH/00/19) (my emphasis).

The promotion of the EU model is thus seen as a strategy of defense as well. However, this abstract and all-encompassing meaning of defense is in competition with a more traditional and territorial one. The connotation of defense is traditionally dependent on the means used: in state practices, defense implies some sort of military action and use of force. As a matter of fact, this meaning appears to become dominant, although “the idea of a European defense if fairly well known in most countries, [it] remains a somewhat vague concept and support for it is superficial” (Dehouck quoted in WEU Assembly A/1781 2002). Speaking at a military school in France, Solana does however specify more what defense means: It is a matter of equipping Europe with suitable means for the defense of its common interests in the world, here included the capacity to act militarily in managing crisises (Solana S0147/02)�� �����������.

Some commentators stress that “European defense policy is not about defense” (Heisbourg quoted in Rotfeld 2001: 194). However, defense has progressively been accepted in the EU discourse in its more direct and traditional meaning of military protection of territory. It should be recalled that defense in itself is a neutral term, and it is qualified by the definition of the threats, referent objects, and types of actions required to counteract them. In common state jargon and bureaucratic practice, defense – like strategy for that matter – has a distinct military component. Exactly because defense directly impinges on the very heart of state sovereignty, that is the monopoly of the use of force, the setting up of a common defense within the European Union is an issue that has been on the table since the Treaty of Maastricht and remains one of the most hotly disputed by Member States. This explains the ambiguity of the wording of Article 17.1 TEU retaken in art. I-41(2) CONST which states that “[t]he common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This

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will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”. It is unclear what the difference between common defense policy and common defense should entail in practice. The Constitutional Treaty however goes beyond the rhetorical and political meaning of defense, despite the fact that Solana and other EU leaders seem to stress, in the ESS and elsewhere, that traditional defense is obsolete nowadays not only for the Union but in international relations in general. As a matter of fact, the term “defense” in the Constitutional Treaty is used predominantly in the traditional political-military sense, and this should be considered an important development in the construction of the EU security discourse and identity. This development was not surprising. The Convention was tasked to come out with a proposal in relation to the possibility of the introduction of a security guarantee considering the eventuality of a terrorist attack of the dimensions of 9/11, or in general to tackle the question of whether collective defense had to be included in the new treaty. In the report on “The role of Europe in a new world order for peace and security – a contribution to the Convention” submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Eyskens to the WEU Assembly (ad interim ESDP Assembly A/1799, 02.12.2002), two scenarios are taken into consideration: the one sees an EU-led military crisis-management operation involving deployment of military forces in external theatres degenerating to the point where one or several participant countries are the object of an armed attack in Europe; while the other considers the eventuality of an attack similar to the one that took place on 11 September 2001 in Europe where one or a number of countries are the object of an attack from biological, chemical, or other weapons of mass destruction. The options presented are symptomatic and suggest that the meaning attributed to defense in the EU talk is far from being non-traditional. The first option foresees the setting up of a true “common defense”, under the assumption that the EU does possess its own territory and that any aggression affecting that territory engages the activation of defense mechanisms. The second option refers to “collective defense”. The assumption here is that the EU is composed of Member States retaining full competence and responsibility for the inviolability of their territories and their citizens’ security. As in traditional military alliances, it would then be necessary to incorporate a mutual assistance clause, either in the Treaty itself or in another protocol annexed to the Treaty. “In this connection, the provisions of current Article 11 TEU must be strengthened so that all the Member States are bound without reservation by mutual solidarity to safeguard, protect and defend the independence and territorial integrity of the European Union and its Member States” (CONTRIB 82 CONV234/02). Reinforcing this idea, General Hägglund, then chairman of the EU Military Committee, maintained in January 2004 that in a not so far away time, each pillar of NATO (American and European) will be responsible for its own territorial defense, while cooperation will play a role only for the missions “out of area” (Reuters 18.01.2004). The same implication is suggested by Prodi in the already cited report according to which he is supposed to have said speaking in Latvia

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“any attack or aggression against an EU member nation would be an attack or aggression against the whole EU, this is the highest guarantee” (stratfor.com 2000). No official file of this statement could however be found. The challenge is not only potential competition with the collective defense mandate of NATO, but also and more importantly, with the sovereign prerogatives of the states. Prodi tries to clarify: But let me be clear: the EU does not see itself as competing with NATO, and it does not seek to duplicate NATO’s structure and capabilities. Our defence policy calls for Europe to make a greater contribution to our own defence. And with 25 Member States we must develop a more coherent, pro-active and effective policy. The new European Security Strategy has taken us a long way toward meeting US concerns and sharing the same perception of threats. We have recognised that our security has worldwide implications and is not simply a matter of defending a limited geographical area. We have also accepted that force can be an appropriate response in some circumstances (Prodi SPEECH/04/90).

Again speeches tend to avoid the territorial defense issue. The constitutional treaty solved the ambiguity by officially introducing the concept of mutual defense and an explicit solidarity clause. Art I-41(7) and art. I-43 CONST clearly state that: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation” (Art I-41(7) CONST). Solidarity clause 1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; – protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; – assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

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The legal importance of these articles supersedes ambiguous expressions in the speeches, and it is a clear statement of the development of the security discourse of the Union. In fact, when the ESDP was initially launched, the focus was mainly on security of an all-encompassing type, while the defense component – always comprised in the name – was overlooked or silenced. By 2004, defense is rejoined to its dominant traditional territorial meaning in a very clear and powerful way. Still, a number of other predicates concur with defense. Article III-309 CONST enlarges the Petersberg tasks and lists the sector of activity of the Union: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-making and postconflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

This is indeed a broader scope of activity compared to the initial 1997 WEU Petersberg tasks, for which the scenarios considered in 1998 where limited to: a) evacuation of Europeans trapped in an area of crisis far away from Brussels; b) conflict prevention situation on borders of 2 conflicting parties, 3) imposition of demilitarized zone between two warring parties somewhere in South-Eastern Europe (Ortega 2001). Nevertheless, the underlying concept is still crisismanagement. In this sense the meaning of EU security is enshrined in the action of managing crises, that is, “to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts, and to consolidate peace and internal stability in a period of transition” (European Council 200/1/00). By the same token, the broad aim of the ESDP in particular and of the EU in general is to prevent conflicts, including actions undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. As a matter of fact, recurring in the dominant discourse is the idea of conflict prevention. Conflicts or at a lower end crises are seen as a threat to peace and to the stability of the world order and, as a consequence, of the EU. Since peace is deemed to be the highest value the EU stands for, and it is at times identified as the referent object of its security, it is not surprising that actions in this field are encouraged and supported. In this context of meaning, peacekeeping is complemented with peacemaking, which assumes a more active role in the brokering of the solution to the crisis. Interestingly, peacemaking in the EU usage denotes a link to combat or use of more forceful means, while for instance UN peacemaking is limited to

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the use of diplomatic means (which in the EU case would pertain to the sphere of competence of the CFSP and not to the ESDP) (see ICG 2001).

The Prepositional Phrases The prepositional phrases further contribute to define the elements of the discourse, and are essential components in the specification of not only what types of action the Union says it will initiate and perform, but they are also important indicators of the nature of the subject and define its “actorness” (whether military or civilian, regional or global for instance). Moreover, the qualification of where, when, and how security predicates will take place has significant grand strategic implications and should guide the development of the policy. How? The Means What instruments are set out to achieve security, to defend values and interests, to manage crises, and to keep and make peace? Obviously, such a wide array of complex and different tasks cannot be tackled with a unique and fit-all approach. The Union speaks of both civilian and military means, and although the importance of the first ones is stressed, military instruments seem to attract most publicity probably because the inclusion of force in the EU carnet of options appears to be revolutionary given the image of peace it had been projecting all along the integration process. As a matter of fact, means and capabilities have made the headlines and are often misinterpreted as the primary political goals of the ESDP. Lindley-French accuses the ESDP to be “product-led more than market-led” (Lindley-French 2002c), suggesting that the means available define the aims (and missions), rather than the other way round. The centrality of capabilities in policy-analytical discussions confirms this approach (for example see Whitman 1999; McGinn and Liston 2001). Means are hereby not only intended as “capabilities” or static availability of instruments, but more importantly, as “employabilities” or the willingness to use them in a variety of situations. The EU general framework of understanding is an integrated conflict resolution approach where economic and political elements are crucial both in the analysis of conflicts and in the means to be used. The European Security Strategy outlines this approach by giving some examples of how the Union could tackle the threats: In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed

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The focus is intentionally on indirect long-term comprehensive civilian means, which go beyond the ESDP. Security is in this sense achieved through the application of the whole gamut of foreign policy assets and instruments: trade and association agreements, development aid, diplomatic recognition, political dialogue, diplomatic initiatives, use of envoys, early warning, prospects for membership, and political conditionality including both positive incentives and sanctions. According to the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001), development co-operation provides one of the most powerful instruments at the Community’s disposal for treating root causes of conflict over the longer term: But ‘security’ is a wider concept. The EU, with its Member States, is a massive provider of development assistance. We provide about 55 per cent of total international assistance and as much as two-thirds of all grant aid. That too is a contribution to international security (Patten, Financial Times 14.02.2002).

Enlargement is for instance often referred to as a successful security strategy: The most successful security strategy ever pursued by the EU has been the enlargement process. It is the only process which transforms societies. In a relatively short space of time, it has transformed a potential source of instability on our continent into a comprehensive partnership (Solana S0113/03).

EU security is seen as directly connected to the stability of the international order. The ESS specifies how the Union can achieve that aim. It should be noted however that what the ESS defines as means are in reality ways in grand strategic terms, and this confusion does contribute to the ambiguity of the discourse. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and

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protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order (ESS: 10).

As expected, coercion does not have a predominant role in the EU Security Strategy. Nevertheless, the reference to “a price to be paid” in case of breach of the rules maintaining international stability suggests an unidentified and possibly unpleasant reaction on the part of the EU, but it does not go as far as threatening the use of forceful means: A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union (ESS).

The use of military force is seen as complementary, but secondary and as “a matter of last resort” (Commission, Official Publication 2000): If crises can be defused through non-military means; so much the better. We will never be looking for an excuse to deploy military forces. But recent experience has shown that there will be situations where they will be necessary. Situations where the European public will expect us to back up our words with actions, where NGOs cannot carry out their humanitarian tasks without adequate protection, where we will be called to fulfil a peacekeeping role. In these cases, we have to have the capacity to act militarily, either with or independent of any civilian action (Solana Nn02/99); First, we require the capacity to exert influence, whether through diplomacy, aid programs, trade measures or other means – including the provision of security assistance in crisis situations. Second, we need both the political will and the practical ability to apply force in the last resort if other options fail (Patten SPEECH/00/51); An intelligent multilateral approach involves both ‘hard’ security and ‘soft’ security. We all know what ‘hard’ security means: the credible threat -- or the use -- of force. And it is perfectly legitimate where it complies with the rules of international law. We built our Union for peace. We would have liked to do away with all weapons. But we know the world is still a dangerous place (Prodi SPEECH/04/153).

Interestingly, there is no explicit mention in the ESS that force is considered as a last resort. Addressing an American audience in reference to Kagan’s classification

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of modern Martian America versus post-modern Venusian Europe (2002 and 2003), Solana clearly qualifies the role of force in the EU security concept: Dominance through force? We must be prepared to use sticks sometimes, but do we want a wholesale return to the politics of the caveman, where the guy with the biggest stick carries the argument (until he turns the next corner)? (Solana S0087/03).

The dominant understanding presents the use of military means in instrumental terms, that is, as instruments that might be necessary in relation to particular international conflicts. The focus is problem-oriented. Military means are presented as an integral part of the Union’s instruments of conflict resolution and crisis management. This tentative to normalize military instruments as just an addition to all the other means available can be seen as a rhetorical strategy to re-assure everybody about the scope of the ESDP. As a matter of fact, since the inception of the ESDP, Solana, Prodi, and Patten have tried to reject the accusation that the EU was or is about to create its own army. Although this was not so much a public European concern as the poll on the European Army showed, the EU leadership seems to address worries expressed by some Member States and projected onto other international actors such as the United States and Russia. In a world of states, it is not surprising that the idea of “army” associated to the EU be controversial at the least. Apart from a statement released by Prodi in an interview for The Independent on 4 February 2000, when he suggested that the army he was talking about had to be intended in its traditional sense: When I was talking about the European army, I was not joking. If you do not want to call it a European army, don’t call it a European army. You can call it ‘Margaret’, you can call it ‘Mary Ann’, and you can call it any name (quoted in Castle and Grice 2000);

Solana in several instances tries to dissipate the fears that may be associated with the introduction of military force as an instrument available to the ESDP: This does not mean fighting wars or creating a European Army. The military tasks are the ‘Petersberg tasks’. We are not talking about collective defence. Nor are we talking about building a European army or ‘militarising’ the EU. But we cannot continue to publicly espouse values and principles while calling on others to defend them.… In the final analysis, as a last resort, after all possible instruments had been tried, the Union has to have the capacity to back up its policies by the use of military means (Solana Nn07/00).

Speaking in Russia in 2001, he specifies that collective defense (opinion now superseded by the solidarity clause in the constitutional treaty) and a standing EU army are not among the objectives of the ESDP:

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We all have an interest in security. And we all have an interest in how it is provided. Security can only ever be fully effective if it is based on mutual agreement. We are convinced of the need to adopt an inclusive approach. We must continue to place reliance, wherever possible, on security frameworks which are based on consensus. Collective defence is not on the European Union’s agenda. Secondly, we are not creating a standing army. There will be no single European force marching under the European flag. Instead we are creating the opportunity to pool resources as and when required for specific operations. This means that there is a guarantee of a given number of troops, and access to an agreed level of capabilities for use in the types of situations I have just outlined. But each Member State retains full control over its own armed forces, and is free to take the decision as to whether or not to participate in any operation (Solana 0023/01).

On the other hand, paying tribute to classical realism, the EU’s access to military means is considered central for the EU’s international prestige and rank. Although Solana tries to communicate that the emphasis on military means should not be understood as a major change in the nature of the EU, and that it should just be seen as an enhancement of the EU’s ability and willingness to take over more responsibility in solving conflicts, the access to military power becomes a crucial part of the EU’s definition of itself as an important international actor (see also the quotations on the subject): The capability to deploy and sustain a significant force … allowing the Union to play a proper role in preserving international peace and security: a role consistent with the EU’s perception of its place in the world and of its responsibilities (Solana Nn05/00)�� ����������.

Finally, the dominant discourse constructs civilian means intended as broad economic, political, and cultural policies as central in the identification of the means at the disposal of the EU. Military instruments and in particular the use of force are explicitly downplayed and normalized as only one of the possible means. Lacking is a clear definition of the meaning of force, and this ambiguity is one of the main sources of concern: for instance force is usually only identified as military (as stemming from defense apparati), while it can assume other important forms in terms of police or judicial enforcement. Solana is aware of this challenge as this article demonstrates: A new security doctrine must combine prevention, protection and repression strategies to meet the international terrorist menace. Europe, with its specific culture of security based on conflict prevention, political management and sensitivity to the economic and social roots of violence has an important contribution to make. The frontiers between internal and external security, between the police and the military, between crisis prevention and crisis

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management, combating serious crime and financial crime, detecting terrorism and managing failed states have become blurred and artificial. Failed states and complex regional crises are the natural breeding ground for international criminal and terrorist activities. Remedy requires a holistic response that the EU is well placed to provide (Solana International Herald Tribune 10.09.2002) (my emphasis).

How? The Ways The confusion created by the use of values as referents comes from the fact that the very same values are presented as ways to achieve security, so that it is difficult to meaningfully distinguish the two categories. The constant reference to norms as dictating the conduct of the CFSP and the ESDP can be another example of “ethical foreign policy” as devised by the former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook or the so-called “Clinton doctrine” (Chandler 2003): the externalization of internal norms is seen as a strategy to assure security exactly because security is based on those norms (Risse-Kappen 1997: 368). One option is to continue to put our trust in a system of international relations based on the balance of power and rely on the sovereignty and national interests of individual nation-states. But that would be like ‘tackling the challenges of the 21st Century with the instruments and policies of the 19th’. And it would be contrary to the very nature of the Union, which is based on dialogue, solidarity, multilateralism and an ethical dimension to politics. (Prodi SPEECH/04/176); Our defense of democracy, of international law, of the rules of the multilateral game is alimented above all from the fidelity to our principles. It is also inspired on the realism facing the deep transformations in thus globalized world (Solana S0141/03�� ).

Article III-193(1) CONST goes further and states: The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and for international law in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

This normative approach acquires moral undertones in several occasions. The way the EU intends to do security is characterized by a kind of missionary “generosity”:

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The right way for the European Union is the way of compassion and of engagement. It is recognising that when others suffer, we all lose a little of our own humanity. It is accepting that dialogue is preferable to force (Solana 0119/01); Behind the policy of enlargement lies the principle of inclusiveness, not exclusiveness. We are not interested in being a club for the wealthy, and small, poor countries, and even large poor countries, have benefited greatly from membership.We cannot limit our generosity to the countries on our doorstep. The European Union is the world’s largest provider of development assistance and we are active in almost every part of the globe (Solana S0072/02); Our models of coexistence, freedom, solidarity and human dignity serve as our passport in the rest of the world. And our distinguishing feature is our sense of responsibility. The truly great Europeans have always been recognised not only for their knowledge or power, but also for their ability and desire to serve others, to dedicate themselves to a particular vision of society (Prodi SPEECH/03/303).

The ESS spells out the ways in which the EU intends to defend its security and promote its values: by addressing the threats; by building security in the neighbourhood; and by developing an international order based on effective multilateralism. In particular, Prodi specifies the distinctive EU approach: Our experience shows that there is only one way to tackle instability and the insecurity it breeds -- by attacking the root causes, developing good governance and vigorous civil society and giving people hope (Prodi SPEECH/03/517).

The respect of the rule of law, one of the basic principles of the EU, is also considered as the method par excellence: Some people pretend that there is some kind of opposition between power, the US method, and law, which is the European method. In fact law and power are two sides of the same coin. Power is needed to establish law and law is the legitimate face of power (Solana S0087/03)��� ������������.

A dominant and recurrent theme is cooperation and multilateralism as a method to do security: the experience of European integration has taught the EU leaders that cooperation was and is the secret of the success of the Union. To understand our particular approach, you need to look at our past experience. Over the last century at least, our problems have chiefly involved relations with our neighbours. In Europe’s crowded, complex environment, you cannot move without colliding with someone. So it is no surprise that we have become experts

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European Security Culture in finding sustainable, long-term solutions to complex situations involving a multitude of players. We are born multilateralists (Prodi SPEECH/03/322); We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors (ESS: 13); Working with partners, cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors, to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support (ESS: 13); Multilateralism is not an instrument of the weak. It is an instrument of the wise (Solana S0005/04).

Interestingly, effective multilateralism is not only considered as the preferred approach to security, but it is also the very objective of EU foreign policy. Apart from “upholding and developing international law”, “strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats” (ESS). Afraid of being considered weak because multilateral, the EU speakers try to capitalize on the strength of a cooperative approach for the success of security: You can propose a system of shared values. You can offer your partners and neighbours the benefit of your soft power. But no system of values -- however commendable -- can be imposed unilaterally.And new walls cannot bring any real security. The way we see it, building peace and security means tearing down the walls.It means fostering new types of dialogue and cooperation that heal the scars of the past and end the divisions between States and peoples. Fighting terrorism calls for firmness, because we must defend our values. But it also demands exemplary behaviour in keeping with the values of our democracies (Prodi SPEECH/04/264); We have to get realistic about solving the problem of terrorism. It is a dangerous illusion to think it can be defeated without tackling the root causes. Force alone is not enough to defeat terrorism. Both force and brainpower must be used. Alongside the military option and repression, political avenues need to be explored with equal determination. And for both options the multilateral approach needs following: unilateral approaches are no longer enough (Prodi SPEECH/04/153); For us, multilateralism means: taking the rules of international politics seriously, helping other countries to implement and abide by these rules, engaging actively

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in existing and new multilateral bodies, promoting an agenda for peace and stability that goes beyond the defence of narrow national interests. All this is now inscribed in Europe’s DNA (Prodi SPEECH/04/90).

Multilateralism is contrapposed to unilateralism: once again the comparison with the United States is tempting. The references to strength and weakness can also be deemed to be in the same category of comparison and are a direct answer to Kagan’s allegations of Europe’s “inferiority” (Kagan 2002). Solana here tries to explain the difference between the European and the US approach: when he says Europeans, he obviously means the EU, since a number of Europeans (UK, Italy, Poland and others) do share the US perspective as the participation in the international coalition in Iraq has shown: Identifying and pursuing appropriate responses to threats has been the source of some trans-Atlantic tension. Europeans supported and participated in the use of military force in Afghanistan, but in doing so they stressed three points. The first was that a military response alone will not solve the problem of terrorism. Europeans have learned this lesson. The second was that even the strongest country in the world needs partners and allies, not simple followers. And the third was that in responding to threats, care must be taken not to damage the very values that we act to defend (Solana, International Herald Tribune 10.09.2002).

It should be stressed that this accent on multilateralism is not ��������������� necessarily in contrast with the drive to be more autonomous from the capabilities’ (military in particular) point of view. Generally, multilateralism means here the duty to inform and coordinate with other partners, and not forming integral alliances or working together. This distinction is important because in the discourse cooperation and multilateralism are often used as synonymous: in reality cooperation indicates a more active and participatory stance, whereby multilateralism simply means that several parties are consulted and accounted for. Finally, coherence and coordination are terms that are often connected to the way the means should be used: A more effective foreign and security policy begins with the political will to use all the available instruments in a coordinated and coherent way. (…) We can use our diplomatic, economic, and financial muscle to influence the behaviour of recalcitrant parties and aggressors (Solana, Financial Times 29.09.2000).

The EU Security Strategy directly retakes this refrain and promises more capable militaries, more resources for defense, and more effective and coherent use of resources (military and civilians as well as any other economic, political etc. instruments).

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Where? The Construction of a European Security Area Locative prepositional phrases are useful to situate security and to clarify the geographical or territorial dimensions of both subject and predicate. They can be more or less precise, ranging from the definition of a very distinct place (for instance a city) to the reference of the globe at large. The indication of the location in a security discourse has two components, which are not necessarily coincident: the first one is static and refers to an acknowledgement of where insecurity is located (including the geographical source of the threat or the location of the referent object), while the second refers to the place in which the security predicate or action is performed. The ESS recognizes the importance of geography: Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflicts, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on our borders all pose problems for Europe (ESS).

First of all, the ESS states that “[t]he first line of defense is abroad”. This could mean that the actions have to be implemented “abroad”, and that the threats are actually situated “abroad”. The central question is to define what is meant by “abroad”, since this is a relative and relational term implying the existence of an inside/outside dichotomy and clear borders. This is not only important from a strategic perspective, but it may also bear substantial implications regarding the construction of the EU as a territorial actor. In fact, as it has been mentioned earlier, the EU speakers tend to contrappose inner peace to external turmoil. Although internal and external security are deemed to be interrelated (see Solana, International Herald Tribune 10.09.2002), the Union cannot escape the necessity to define its borders of order. In an inter-connected, inter-dependent world chaos cannot easily be contained. Containing chaos is difficult, but ignoring it is impossible. The power of television means that even the most distant crisis finds its way into our living rooms. The borders between domestic and foreign policy are breaking down. The linkage between internal and external security is becoming stronger (Solana S0310/04).

One of the most recurrent references is the globe as both the locus of action as well as the geographical source of insecurity. Solana stressed the global vocation of the EU in several occasions: If there is one thread which runs through all security challenges which face Europe in the 21st century, it is their truly global dimension…Europe cannot ringfence its own security. We must have 21st century answers to 21st century

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challenges. In short we have to engage at a global level if we are to provide any assurance for our own future stability and prosperity (Solana S0112/01).

The source of the threats is located at the global level, and this is why a global engagement is required. “No corner of the world can be too far off” (Solana Nn07/00). We do not want the benefits of the Union to end abruptly at its external borders. Nor do we want the benefits of the Union to be reserved solely to those countries that are current or future members. Why not? Because, the Union cannot exist as an island of peace, prosperity and stability within a wider sea of turmoil. That is why, whether our neighbours will one day be members or not, we are working to ensure that they can share in a wider zone of comfort (Solana S0310/04).

Apart from these very broad rhetorical statements, further and more specific qualifications suggest the definition, as a Clingendael report hints to, of circles and layers of interests and of preferred areas of security actions (Van Staden et al. 2000). As a matter of fact, the primary focus is on the so-called “near abroad” or “ring of well-governed country” (sic, ESS), intended as a group of neighbour states whose political and economic situation, because of their proximity, is inextricably linked to the interests of the unit of reference (Page 1994: 789). Although this is not clearly geographically delimited, this ring is meant to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe (including the Balkans), the Mediterranean, the former Soviet Union (mainly Russia and the Ukraine; the Caucasus is further abroad), Turkey, and the Middle East (Larsen 2002: 285). They are identified as of central importance to the EU exactly because regional stability is one of the central connotations of its security. The problem is that inside this classification are included other circles which have no geographical character, but which are determined on the basis of the policy-regimes applied: for example, different trade standards are applied on a case-by-case basis and the “inside” and “outside” are not clearly designed (Christiansen et al. 2000; Smith KE 2005). Enlargement and specific bilateral regimes make the definition of this area difficult to apprehend. As Christiansen et al. (2000) argue, these “fuzzy borders” can be thought in the same class as imperial frontiers, and the normative character of the Union as well as the objective of value projection may be used in support of this thesis. For what concerns the more specific identification of the geographical sources of the threats, the ESS names places: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability.We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus,

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which will in due course also be a neighbouring region. Middle East: Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts (ESS) (my emphasis).

Remarkably, Afghanistan and Central Asia, although increasingly unstable, are not explicitly included (contrary to Delpeche 2002: 13). The reference to Korea is also particularly puzzling because it is unclear what direct European interests are present there. It is interesting to note that in strategic planning, two different diameters of action have been and are still considered. Figure 6.1 graphically shows the 2001 planning assumptions which envisage a virtual maximum geographical radius for EU military crisis management of approximately 4,000 km from Brussels. With an enlarged Union, the potential radius for purely humanitarian operations stretches as far as 10,000 km from Brussels (Ortega 2001) (reduced to 6,000 km in current strategic calculations for battlegroups’ deployment). Although these numbers are unofficial and not politically binding, they actually indicate the geographical range of actions also dominant in the discourse. As it can be noted, Brussels is taken as the central point of the radius. This is symbolically very important because it testifies for the centralizing ambition of the NP NP

Figure 6.1

The Geographical Reach of the ESDP in Discourse

 �������������������������������������������������������������������� Image taken from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook at https://www. cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html. The diameters have been inserted by the author.

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ESDP or, as the ESS puts it, for the need of a “unity of command” in times of crisis (ESS: 13). These concentric cicles define the geographical space reserved for the different categories of military operations: the first circle includes essential or vital interests; the second circle is general or subsidiary; and the third circle (Asia and Latin America) is open without geographical limitations (see also Van Staden et al. 2001: 28). Despite the continuing references to the internal/external connection, the question related to a sort of “homeland defense”, especially after 9/11, is not envisaged in the discourse. Where to do defense is never touched upon in direct terms, because, as already pointed out, defense does not represent a dominant element of the EU leadership discourse. It is however important to note that the Convention was confronted with the issue of whether the ESDP can be used “to ensure security within the European Union, particularly for the protection of the civilian population and democratic institutions”: the result was the inclusion of the solidarity clause in the constitutional treaty, but the reiteration that the ESDP and its instruments (including military and civil protection) can be used to assist civilian population outside the Union but not EU citizens in a case of attack on the EU territory (CONV 461/02: 14). The dominant discourse reveals a tension between the EU as a regional stabilizer and the EU as a global actor: the operational focus is regional and clearly territorial, however, the aim of promotion of values and interests is projected at the global level. When? The Time Component The time prepositional phrase indicates when the predicate is activated, or at what stage the subject should act, and how long the action should last. This is of course a specific issue depending on the particular case; nevertheless there are certain broad tendencies which characterize the EU security discourse in this category. For what concerns the time point of intervention, there are several signs that the EU focuses first and foremost on prevention. This would entail activities before a crisis happens or before a threat strikes. Solana in the ESS states: We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention (ESS); We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future (ESS) (my emphasis).

It should be highlighted that the term “preventive” was only added in the final version of the ESS, and that in the first draft the text read “pre-emptive” engagement. When asked, some EU officials said that the reason why the term was substituted

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was that many European languages lack a direct translation of pre-emption (Everts 2003), while others acknowledged the political sensitivity of the term, as it is used by the United States to mean intervention in order to anticipate the threat before it strikes (using as a legal justification Art. 51 of the UN Charter and the right to self-defense when danger is immanent). The refusal of some Member States to accept the usage of the term in the ESS was explicitly motivated by the refusal to accept the American meaning and application of pre-emption. Patten qualifies the debate by saying: First, promoting human rights, democratisation and the rule of law promotes peace and stability. This is a doctrine of pre-emption to which the EU can happily subscribe (Patten SPEECH/03/364).

This clearly does not indicate a time or a worrisome condition when the Union should start acting, or when a crisis is considered as such. By the same token, early-warning requires the ability to analyze and detect a crisis situation before this becomes a crisis. We should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early (ESS)

This formulation suggests pro-action rather than reaction: For many years we were reactive to developments around us. We responded, but often our response was too little or too late. Recently, we have been more proactive. It signals a new – strategic – approach to our external action (Solana S0005/04).

However, despite the ambitions expressed by Solana, it should be noted that inherent to the very concepts of crisis management, peacekeeping, and peacemaking – especially from a military perspective – an ex-post action is implied, that is, an action reactive to the crisis and the violence. Also in the case of the solidarity clause introduced by the constitutional treaty, the obligation to assist is intended as after the attack has taken place, and does not imply any type of preventive action to be conducted outside of the territory of the EU. On the duration side, the EU discourse shows a clear preference for longterm action and commitment. Consistent with the general aims of the EU and its experiences, the focus is on tackling the root causes, with a special attention to the history of the problems and an interest in changing the future, rather than the present. I think the tradition of the European has been in that sense probably better understood that the problems are not solved in 24 hours, but that the problems need a long time to be matured, to be understood in order to be resolved, and that

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is the nature of the world and that is what it is. (…) that we need to get involved early in the problems and we have to maintain and stay with the same course for a long period of time (Solana S0187/02).

The problem with such an approach is that the objective is to avoid rather than manage crises, and it is then unclear when the ESDP should be activated, or if at all. In theory, if comprehensive prevention is successful, no crisis should emerge. The emergency of particularly critical situations is thus considered as an exception rather than the rule. “Reading” Strategic Assumptions in Discourse: A Simplification According to Johnston (1995a, 1995b), strategic assumptions on the environment, conflict, and the use of force are indicators of a determinate type of strategic culture and lead to a particular grand strategy or security policy. It has been assumed in the course of this book that assumptions can be “bracketed” from behavior and “read” in the dominant discourse. The analysis above has highlighted the elements of the EU security syntax. Interesting now is the exercise to find in the categories analyzed above indications for the strategic assumptions of the EU, and thus, for the existence of a specific EU security culture or at least the culture the EU wants to communicate and project. Whether this image is true in terms of behavior is a totally different question. A number of scholars have been trying to define the EU security culture. For example, for Cornish and Edwards, the EU strategic culture is “the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments” (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 587), while Rynning argues that “[t]he EU is likely to develop a coherent and strong strategic culture” (Rynning 2003: 479) without however determining how attitudes can be apprehended and differentiated from behavior. The dominant discourse shows that at the level of the EU leadership – and in particular as expressed by their legitimate “speakers” – there is a fundamental agreement about how the world is perceived and how the EU should act upon this perception. On the Environment Is the international environment perceived as anarchic? Assumptions on the environment directly influence the way in which security is formulated, and in particular, the identification of the threats and the referent objects. The constant reference to the UN and to the exemplary cooperation among Member States, which is considered the hallmark of the European experience and the central factor leading to the current state of integration, peace, and prosperity in Europe should be an indicator that the general perception is of a world where there are rules and

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the power of the strongest is not so important. However, at a closer analysis, the reference to rules and to a regulated environment is part of the EU strategy in terms of aims and ways. It does not necessarily mean that they see the world as being not anarchic: they believe and prefer it not to be so, but they are “realist” enough to see the problems associated with the disrespect of international law and freeriding. Instability is the consequence and a major threat to the EU. This implies that the discourse recognizes that the world outside of the Union is anarchic: the role of the EU is to make it a better place by bringing order through its example of cooperation and multilateralism or with more direct means. In particular, it is interesting to note that a clear separation between the ordered Europe (as an ideal) and the disordered rest of the world is used for the construction of borders of order. Jacques Delors, then President of the EC Commission, aptly represented this world: We cannot limit our horizons to the new Europe. All around us, naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and underdevelopment are combining to create potentially dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization and conflict, aggravated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Community must face this challenge. If it is to be worthy of the European ideal it must square up to the challenges of history and shoulder its share of the political and military responsibilities of our old nations, which have always left their mark on history (Delors 1991: 100).

As a matter of fact, the ESS presents the external environment as full of challenges and threats. The constant reference to a preference for law, rather than power, implies that power is considered as negative, interpreted as hard military force. We Europeans are not from Venus, as some would have us believe. The peoples of this old Europe have a long and bloodthirsty past behind us. A past that has taught us to base our Union in law and to work for an international order founded on right, not on might (Prodi SPEECH/03/156).

The external environment is contrapposed to the stability of an internal security community: Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies (ESS: 1).

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The assumptions about the environment include state-of-the-art statements about how the international structure is (anarchic) and prescriptive statements about how it should be, and consequentially, EU’s role in its change. Europe’s approach to international relations is taking shape. We have chosen the path of multilateralism, not unilateralism. We want to use the force of ideas and persuasion, not coercion. We have moved a long way from the ‘reasons of State’ and from the realpolitik that we ourselves invented. Our concept of power is the power of rules. We reject the idea of going it alone or the absence of any framework of reference. (…) Europe can only play a leading role on the world stage if it is able to offer a robust political proposal for a more effective and democratic international ‘architecture’ (Prodi SPEECH/02/621).

Multilateralism is inherently linked to a preference for a multipolar world: as a matter of fact the ESDP is interpreted by some as a counter-vailing movement to re-establish a sort of balance of power (Posen 2004). Although the ESS stresses that multilateralism is a necessity because “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own” (ESS), it is clear that the approach is not only contingent to the current situation, but it is deeply ingrained in the beliefs of the EU leaders. For what concerns the assumptions on who populates the international environment, the EU recognizes the roles played by international organizations, NGOS, and to a lesser extent the civil society. Nevertheless, states are seen as central actors, and this is testified by the stress on the respect of sovereignty, although in some cases this trumps other humanitarian values considered important (as it is the case in Darfur, Sudan). Finally, the EU position on human nature is not clearly expressed, but it can be evinced from the importance given to politics and law in creating peace and not only maintaining it. On Conflict Conflict, intended as violence and the absence of peace, is generally perceived as negative, not as a zero sum. Along with crisis, it is one of the major threats. The experiences of the two world wars have generated a radical change in the perceptions. It should be recalled that until the middle of the 20th century, Europeans in general considered war to be normal, natural, and legal. War was normal in the sense that it constituted the rule and not the exception. As a matter of fact, international humanitarian law, a European invention, regulates all the phases of conflict. Despite the fact that conflict is seen as catastrophic for the Union, the assumption is that conflict cannot be eliminated: Against this new geo-political background, an assessment of the threats to European security, conventional and unconventional, requires an understanding

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of what triggers conflict, its root causes, and its nature in the modern world. The nature of modern conflict obliges us to have an acute interest in preventing or ending it, even when its origins are geographically distant. Integration has generated many benefits, but at the price of vulnerability. Consequently, when conflict threatens we are rarely completely neutral observers. And acting – even for the best of motives – to end or avert conflict brings with it the risk of reprisals. We should be prepared to take the lead in working for peace and stability, without being under any illusion that we can ever banish conflict completely. Pacifism unfortunately is not an option. But neither is militarism. That is why alongside our tools for conflict prevention we in Europe need to be able to play our part in managing crises. We must be ready to deploy all the instruments we have both to maintain peace and, when necessary, to try to bring an end to conflict (Solana S0072/02) (my emphasis).

The accent on prevention and on peaceful settlement of disputes is an indication of the opinion the EU has of conflict. Despite our differences, we Europeans share an aversion to our past of conflicts and national rivalries and we want to build a future of peace based on dialogue and shared values. Europeans know that war is the worst of all solutions and must always be the very last resort. And because they have always lived in close contact with other cultures and civilisations, isolation has never been an option for Europe. We know that the open societies and tolerant cultures we cherish are always the first victims of any conflict. Ensuring international stability and security, keeping the world economy on an even keel, safeguarding the environment for a sustainable future are beyond the capacity of any State on its own, however powerful and however limitless its resources may seem (Prodi SPEECH/03/517).

Interestingly, the dominant approach suggests that conflict can be avoided through change in the values of the “aggressor”, thus assuming a malleable human nature and positive trust in the role of institutions for the “redemption” of the criminal. On the Use of Force The last category of strategic assumptions refers to the use of force, and it is directly linked to the previous assumptions. Completely “silenced” in previous EC/EU political discourses, since St. Malo the reference to force, and in particular to military force, has increasingly been incorporated into the discourse. As we have seen in the discussion of the means, it has a secondary function. However, it is interesting to note that it is accepted, as a last resort, but the important fact is that it is not excluded in principle.

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No one can predict the consequences of a conflict. Armed intervention, even under the United Nations – the only legitimate framework for any action to counter threats to world peace and security – can only be a last resort, to be used only after all other options have been found not to work (Prodi SPEECH/03/70).

The question then is not so much whether force is accepted as a legitimate means in absolute terms, because it obviously is, but what the conditions for its use are. Although the ESS states that the “UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”, there is no explicit reference for the need of a UN mandate in case of a coercive military action. Moreover, force is always mentioned in connection with peacemaking rather than crude enforcement of interests. This can be said to follow the principles of liberal rationalism, according to which the use of force can only be justified if it is guided by law, and if it is decided upon by the “proper authorities” (Owen 1994). The preferred means of action are multi-dimensional long-termed political and economic measures which foster a positive-sum solution to crises and conflicts, despite the fact that some threats, like terrorism, might not be “redeemed” through re-education and actually might need to be eliminated (see Rynning 2003b: 489). Assumptions about the use of force directly influence and constrain the range of means which can be used to attain security. Kagan’s hypothesis is that “Europe’s relative weakness”, rather than cultural assumptions and beliefs, “has produced an aversion to force as a tool of international relations” (Kagan 2002). Even in that case, the point here is that the alleged material weakness may be discursively re-interpreted and filtered to become a substantive component of the dominant narrative with its cultural underpinnings.

The Dominant Discourse: Traditional Plus? The EU has proclaimed itself as a “force for good” (ESS). Nowhere the expression “human security” appears in the ESS, but some of its principles are said to be omnipresent (Liotta and Owen 2006: 96). Robert Cooper, Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs in the European Council, in a book on “The Post-Modern State and the World Order” warns: “We should beware of transferring the vocabulary of the modern world into the post-modern” (Cooper 2000: 28), and maintains that the individual occupies a central role in the postmodern state (Cooper 2000: 31). The European Union is for Cooper a positive example of this post-modern system, while Kagan (2003) agrees but sees in this new “moral consciousness” based on the rejection of force a sign of weakness rather than of strength. But did the EU really follow Cooper’s suggestion? What security discourse is dominant? What type of security culture does the discourse suggest? How sui generis is the EU? What type of behavior should be expected? Is the EU security discourse a post-modern one? The following excerpt might be mistaken to confirm

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an accent on post-modernism, because it offers a security agenda very similar to the one advocated by supporters of human security: But I do not believe that security is solely or even principally a matter of imposing military solutions on those who might threaten us. I do not believe we can protect our citizens solely by stepping up checks at borders and airports, or with ever-more intrusive scrutiny of personal data. So I will continue to fight for a stronger EU commitment to ‘soft security’. Security that promotes good governance, encourages economic development, and combats poverty. Security that fosters intercultural dialogue, fights the spread of infectious diseases, and tackles the consequences of climate change (Prodi SPEECH/04/90).

Delors, already in 1990 much before the ESDP, had expressed the same point saying that “[t]he idea of security is not solely a military concept. It involves ideology, values, socio-economic systems, and the environment” (Delors 1990: 18). However, an important difference should be highlighted: despite the expansion of the dimensions to include economic, environmental, and societal security, the referent objects are clearly “us” or “our citizens”, and military solutions are not excluded in principle. The fact that the EU shows a preference for “soft politik” does not make it less modern than states like Germany or Japan, which can be defined as everything except post-modern. This intervention by Solana summarizes the main points of the dominant discourse: The EU has already at its disposal all the components of an effective foreign policy: a massive presence in international trade and investment, huge financial resources and know-how in development and humanitarian assistance; extensive (cumulative) diplomatic networks and connections; and, since this year, a developing crisis management capability, including the possibility to deploy military assets. Ladies and gentleman, it is through the construction of this distinctive and efficient foreign policy that Europe will take its place in the world. We are of course not alone in promoting democracy and human rights. Nor are we alone in fostering the rule of law and an open trading system. But we are unique in combining our commitment to these goals with the unparalleled degree of aid and assistance that we collectively give and with our attachment to a genuine and comprehensive multilateralism in international relations.Our vision, the European vision, is one that combines globalisation with multilateralism in all respects so that every state – however big or small – every individual – however rich or poor – has a stake in his or her own future. That is the route to a fair and just world, but also to a secure world. That is not “soft security” – it is “smart security”. That is not a romantic foreign policy, it’s a realistic, rational, enlightened foreign policy. Realising this vision is the challenge for the years ahead (Solana S0078/02).

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The heralded “uniqueness” of the Union is in reality less exceptional than purported: the trend in the security policies of a number of states – from small to middle but also some great powers – follows a similar path of “smart security” at least at the discursive level. The most important difference is that states do tend to indicate interests in a more concrete form, while the Union tends to predominantly use normative language, which is often considered a source of ambiguity and misinterpretation exactly because of its vague and abstract character. Table 6.8 recapitulates the major semantic components of the EU discourse. The slogan “we are pro-peace, pro-security, pro-justice” (Solana S0096/02) as well as the self-representation as a “civilian power” is indicative of the attempt done by the EU leadership to project a positive image and defuse fears arisen by the introduction of the military instrument into the ESDP: however, both the ESS and the speakers remain indeterminate with regard to the functional and geographical conditions of the use of the means and to the specification of both the subject and the referent objects (Heisbourg 2004). How did the European policy community interpret the ESS and the accompanying discourse? If before the publication of the ESS, scholars and analysts competed to publish recommendations about how a grand strategy for Europe should look like with the implicit or explicit intent to influence Brussels, after December 2003, the analytical exercise has changed and apart from including a wide range of criticism of the existing policy, it includes now more positive and propositive implementation plans. Among these, a Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities convened through the Centre for the Study of Global Governance of the London School of Economics in September 2003 (before the publication of the ESS!) published and officially presented to Javier Solana a report entitled “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, where it argues that human rights violations represent the major threat to individual security, and that it is in the “enlightened self-interest” of Europe to provide for the security of any individual in the world. Table 6.8

Summary of the Syntactical Structure and Meaning of the EU Security Discourse

Referent Object

Threat

Subject Predicate Means Ways Space Time

The EU (territory, citizens, values) Preference for milieu goals (but possession goals are not excluded) Terrorism, WMD, organised crime, failed states crisis, conflict, instability armed attack The EU (as actor, player, but also power) To defend, to prevent, to manage Civilian and military (as last resort): but under what conditions? Multilateralism, Comprehensiveness Regional (global?: no clear limits) Long-term engagement, prevention, early and rapid intervention

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Table 6.9 Scenarios

EU-ISS Taskforce Scenarios 2004 Benchmark

Aim

1 Large scale East Timor, peace support Bosnia after operation 1995

Peace support peacekeeping No geographical limits

2 High intensity ex. Rwanda humanitarian 1994, Bosnia intervention 1992–95

Stop emerging genocide. No severe geographical limitations

3 Regional warfare in the defense of strategic European interests

4 Counterterrorism (WMD)

5 Homeland Defense

1990–91 Gulf (Regional wars war EU security and prosperity threatened through disruption of supplies/ increased costs, forced migration) Afghanistan Stop WMD 2001 proliferation “Enduring of a nonFreedom”/ state actor British (terrorism). Falklands Reduce threat expedition of terrorism to 1982 the West Protection from WMD terrorist attack

Contingency -Planning Assumptions 2000 km from Brussels! – ex. Bosnia SFOR

5000 km from Brussels as planning assumption – see central Africa Middle East (pro-Western/ anti-Western regimes and energy)

Asia, 5,000 km+

Operational Details

Shortfalls

UN mandate but EU independent. 30,000 for 3 yrs, deployment within 60 days UN mandate but EU independent 10,000

None

Art. 51 UN Charter (invasion). US leader, 60,000 EU troops

Only possible with US framework provision. EU without logistical capabilities

Independent EU. 1,500 + 1 brigade of 4 battalions in 15 days

Problem of Sustaining. Needs coordination With US

Homeland Independent biological EU. Light terrorist attack infantry (before and after)

High risk but history of low casualties

Needed more counterterrorism unit and specific US-style homeland defense

According to the group, a “Human Security Response Force” composed of 15,000 military and civilian personnel led by a “politician” should be deployed in cases of gross violations of human rights on the basis of seven principles: 1) primacy of human rights; 2) clear political authority; 3) multilateralism; 4) a bottom-up approach (communication, consultation, dialogue); 5) regional focus; 6) use of legal instruments; 7) appropriate use of force (Human Security Doctrine 2004).

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Despite the problems related to the credibility of such an approach (important questions are left unanswered like: what should be considered as gross violations of human rights, and what are the direct connections with EU security), this proposed doctrine seems to read in the dominant EU discourse a preference for allencompassing and non-territorial security, and accordingly, it also remains vague and strategically and operationally doubtful. On the other end of the spectrum, the types of missions singled out by the Group of Personalities (2004) as well as the scenarios proposed by a Taskforce of the EU Institute for Security Studies – an agency of the EU – on the basis of current ESDP capabilities and Petersberg’s tasks demonstrate a more realist and traditional understanding of the discourse (Gnesotto 2004b: 71–98). Designed to counteract the threats envisaged in the ESS, scenarios are interesting because they are not behavior or policy per se, but they represent the options on the plate and the practical translation of the terms expounded in political rhetoric: the fact that these scenarios are formulated by an EU agency, albeit without decision-making powers, adds credibility and importance to the exercise. Particularly striking are the use of traditional military jargon, the unequivocal identification of European strategic interests in terms of energy supplies among others, and the inclusion of counter-terrorism and homeland defense with the specification that the EU might not need a UN mandate or a multilateral action for the conduct of this type of operations. How post-modern or human securityoriented is this operational planning? One could easily substitute any state to the EU acronym in the table (and US in particular), and the result would be a modern soft and “smart“ security policy characterized by a “traditional-plus“ conception of security. Despite the rhetorics of normative and ethical aspirations, the image projected by the Union in its security discourse is indeed nothing unique and full in trend with current developments in national security discourses.

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Chapter 7

Grand Strategy in Practice: Testing Coherence between Discourse and Action

The EU Secretary General Javier Solana in an intervention at the Bertelsmann Foundation in Berlin in July 2002 and in a variety of other occasions tried to address the “perception that Europe offers too much talk and too little action” by stressing how “Europe delivered action as well as words” in Afghanistan, in the Balkans and in the fight against terrorism (���������������� Solana S0135/02). By interchangeably referring to “Europe”, “Europeans” and the “EU” in the same context, he created the impression that, at the end of the day, it does not make any difference under what hat decisions for action are taken since in any case they are to be re-conducted to a kind of abstractly and unclearly defined entity also known under the name of “Europe”. For the credibility of the European Union as an international actor in general and of the ESDP in particular, it makes however a huge difference if a mission is successfully conducted under the starry blue insignia, or if it is merely the intervention of one or many of its Member States acting outside the EU framework and Solana, as it will be showed in the following, is well aware of this discrepancy and seems to exploit the confusion for his own rhetorical aims. By the same token, the words pronounced by the EU leadership in foreign affairs should be matched in deeds by the European Union acting as an “independent” institution with own personality, since they emanate from “speakers” institutionally representing the organization as such and not from its members taken individually or, per absurdum, from its geographical neighbors or “civilizational” friends. The aim of this chapter is to show and test the impact of discourse (D) on policy behavior (B), or simply put, of words on action. The central question is thus: do they (the EU) do what they say they would do given the environmental and institutional context? Do they keep the “promises” and stand up to the expectations they contributed to manipulate? As discussed extensively before, if we assume that a dominant discourse is: a) the result of receptivity-connectivity in a given context; b) it is enshrined and manifests itself in the official documents and speeches about a grand strategy; and c) it directly influences policy decisions and actions, then it can be expected that the preferences merely expressed in the  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Solana refers to 6,000 Europeans engaged in Afghanistan and 38,000 in the Balkans and to the EU as the “largest financial donor”. It should be noted however that although EU member-states collectively supply 8.8% of all civilian and military peacekeepers to UN peace operations around the globe, these contributions should be considered as individual and not coordinated through the EU (UN Jan. 2003).

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discourse about a “European Security Strategy” be reflected in and consistent with the ensuing policy choices and actions taken in practice (D=B). The first part of the equation (C=D) has been tested in the previous chapter. Only if behavior is now proved to be consistent with the dominant discourse, a relationship between culture and behavior (C=B) can be established, and it can be thus demonstrated that a specific security culture influences policy and actions. As outlined in Chapter 2, for the sake of this study, “behavior” has been intended as a synonymous for action or decision for action. In particular, it is defined in terms of “outputs” and “outcomes”. “Outputs” are the products of the policy choices made by the decision-makers, that is, the setting up of the institutional and material hardware of the policy machinery. “Outcomes” refer to the practical application of the policy measures on the ground. After a preliminary introduction to the concept of consistency, this chapter addresses these two issues by critically reviewing, first, the components of the ESDP and specifically the organizational framework including the definition of responsible organs, decisionmaking mechanisms and capabilities; and second, the operations conducted until 2004 under the aegis of the EU. In addition, in the course of the narration, a special attention will be devoted to the proposals for institutional reform and/or integration advanced by the Convention and accepted, with the due changes incorporated by the ICG 2003–2004, by the European Council on 18 June 2004 in Rome (where the treaty was signed and deposited on 29 October 2004) as well as to the most recent developments in the field. It should be stressed that, although discussions at the level of the Convention and in particular the final documents produced by the caucus in the form of a draft constitutional treaty actually pertain to the sphere of discourse – and they have been considered as such in the previous Chapter – they are appraised in the following only if they suggest important structural changes, which will unmistakably lead to defined and specific outputs (like the setting up of a defense agency or of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs). By the same token, it has to be noted that the new treaty substituting all the precedent ones will enter into force only when all the Member States have completed their ratification procedures (see Howorth 2004 for a history of the development of the constitutional treaty). The public refusal of the treaty in France and the Netherlands was clearly an obstacle to the process, and makes the treaty in practice an even more unsettled draft subject to future revisions and changes (Algieri and Bauer and Brummer 2005). The subsequent Treaty of Lisbon was in fact signed on 13 December 2007 in order to overcome the ratification stalemate. For what concerns the CFSP and the ESDP however, it does not contain major alterations compared to the Constitutional Treaty. This most recent treaty is also not yet legally binding: it was planned to come into effect before the June 2009 European Parliament elections, but the rejection at the Irish referendum in Spring 2008 may delay the ratification instrument necessary for the treaty to come into force.

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Consistency and Coherence Christopher Hill’s “capability-expectations gap” is a recurrent theme in the literature on the CFSP and on the ESDP, and has become a buzzword in European integration studies (Hill 1993a). The legitimate EU “speakers”, Solana, Patten and Prodi, are aware of the quandary and repeatedly address the problem in their speeches. For instance, Solana, taking up office on 18 October 1999 stated: “We have to move towards a more active and less declaratory foreign policy. Our words have to be matched by deeds” (Solana Nn01/99). Romano Prodi uses the same refrain when he incites: “is it not time we spoke out for our values and matched words with action?” (SPEECH/02/600). “The greatest threat to popular support for Europe is to continue multiplying unfulfilled promises. We have to close the gap between rhetoric and reality in Europe” (Prodi SPEECH/02/51). Finally, RELEX Commissioner Patten in several occasions and in particular during a speech given in China (!) reiterated the exhortation: “We are trying to move from a foreign policy of communiqués and declarations full of strong nouns and weak verbs to something more substantive, more muscular, more focused, that can have more impact” (Patten SPEECH/02/134, SPEECH/02/76). All these references hint, explicitly or indirectly, to the problem of “coherence”, “consistency” and “cohesion” in the field of the EU external actions. The Convention on the Future of Europe was explicitly tasked to find answers to the question of how to make European Union’s actions more coherent (European Council, Laeken 300/1/01). Yet, the concept of coherence is not univocal and needs to be defined before the notion can be meaningfully used as an analytical tool. In general, “consistency”, and coherence as a synonymous, indicates a state of affairs whereby two separate objects or conditions are related and display a certain continuity or logical unity of meaning. For example, the relationship between cause and effect under a rationalist assumption is determined by an expectation of consistency (Missiroli 2001a, 2001b). It is important to stress that the concept presumes a relationship between two or more poles of reference, and that it can be either measured in absolute (whether a relationship exists or not) or relative terms (if a relationship exists, what is the extent and the degree). The question is then to identify something like a “consistency system”, that is, to define the nature of the poles of reference, to design a method to weight and compare the sets of variables, and to establish the criteria according to which the relationship acquires logical meaning. Because of the complexity of the policy sector and the existence of multiple dimensions of analysis, a variety of different binary “consistency systems” are evoked and constructed by either the decision-makers or external analysts in discussions about the European foreign and security policy. The poles of reference vary on the basis of the level of analysis considered. Accordingly, concerns about coherence, or so-called “gaps” in the literature can be mainly arranged in three classes:

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a. System Level or Vertical Coherence refers to the relationship between the EU and the Member States. Despite the fact that the Member States are bound by the Treaty to support the Union’s CFSP actively and without reserve, to enhance mutual political solidarity, and to abstain from any action that runs against the interests of the Union or that undermines its efficiency on the international scene (������������������������������������������������� Art. I-15(2) CONST, Art. I-39(5), Art I-40, Art. III-195(2����������������������������������������������������������� ), there have been cases where Member States have followed their own national interests and disregarded the common EU platform (Luif 2003). By the same token, the EU has impacted national policies in terms of “Europeanization” (Risse 2000; Schimmelfennig 2000; Olsen 2002) or “Brusselization” (Howorth 2001) and fostered “convergence” or uniformization. b. Unit Level or Horizontal Coherence can refer to the relationship among pillars and policy areas on the one hand, and the relationship between units of the system, that is, between Member States on the other. Security as it has been formulated in the dominant discourse is a broad and comprehensive concept, which touches upon several dimensions. In the institutional setup of the EU, however, dimensions are functionally and bureaucratically distinct, and competencies are distributed accordingly. This means that relevant issues may be treated differently if they are considered to fit into either the first pillar (EC, common market), the second (CFSP and ESDP) or the third (JHA). In particular, the internal-external dichotomy also plays a role in the attribution of responsibilities (Pastore 2001). The Union addresses this type of policy consistency in art. III-1 Const. On the other hand, coherence and coordination among Member States can be considered as “convergence” towards a common position independently and outside the common EU framework in areas in which the Members retain their full sovereignty. EU inaction may be attributed to the lack of such a convergence, as it was the case in the Balkans in the early 1990s or Iraq more recently (Jakobsen 1997; Meier 2004; Menon 2004; Sheperd 2006). c. Sub-Unit Level Coherence refers to the relationship between civilian (mainly diplomatic, political, economic, and administrative) and military means, in particular in connection with the deeper political and strategic dichotomy of aims (finalities) and means. Beyond and above these levels, however, this book is addressing the already-cited overarching “expectations-capability” or “promises-performance” gap, interpreted here as a rhetoric-reality gap, a hiatus between the expressed preferences, rhetorical aims and ambitions on the one hand, and the selected material means and policy actions on the other (see also Wolf and Zycher 2001; Pilegaard 2004).

 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� Note that these pillars have been eliminated in the Treaty of Lisbon.

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Coherence is thus checked in a “correlation system” constituted by the dominant security discourse and the ESDP actions. The latter will be examined on the basis of the aims declared by the EU in the ESS, that is: a) to extend the areas of security around Europe; b) to reaffirm an efficient multilateralism based on the cornerstone of the UN while underlying the necessity to engage in a preventive manner and to act when and where the rules are not respected; c) to answer to the global threats of terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and organized criminality, d) to make use of several means, of which force is only one of many and will be used only as a last resort. Before entering the heart of the analysis, however, it is essential to address three methodological caveats. The first criticism that could be advanced is that, given the bureaucratic constraints and hierarchical control systems of modern organizations, and even though a certain risk of internal free-riding is calculated, it is normal to expect that strategic directions are followed to the letter, that is, that a decided plan is scrupulously implemented in all its details. Such an assumption would make the need to account for consistency between a grand strategic discourse and the supposedly deriving actions irrelevant. This is generally the case when expressions of preferences and guidelines are so clear-cut and technical that they do not leave any space for interpretation and/or exceptions. In the case of a very political text, the opportunities for diverging and contradictory interpretations and hence for a radical transformation of the original meaning in action are countless and make the search for coherence significant. Second, one could argue that it is manipulative to look retrospectively for consistency in decisions and actions that were conducted before the emanation and general acceptance of the master document, in this case the ESS, since the text could be the result of changed conditions and of a new, radically different, dominant discourse. It has been argued above though, that the 2003 European Security Strategy represents only the most authoritative and comprehensive text produced by the EU: similar conceptualizations, references, and statements were already present in much older texts, so that it is possible to consider the ESS and the whole gamut of antecedent EU texts (starting from 1999) as a unique discourse, displaying only few contradictions and at most lacunae due to strategic “silencing”. Finally, there is the question of the level of analysis in reference to the operations on the ground. Commonly and according to the planning ranking, grand strategy as a general set of guidelines is directly reflected in the practice at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels. Ideally, an analysis at all these levels could reveal important elements supporting or disconfirming the consistency hypothesis. For instance, one would be confronted with a dubious case if at the grand strategic level the use of force is banned or limited, while the employment of determinate “aggressive” weapons and tactics are then explicitly defined and commanded in the operation plan or the rules of engagement. Although these types of concerns represent a very interesting strand of research, the focus of this book remains at

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the strategic level, and the author is conscious of the limits of such a choice. The already mentioned problems of accessing relevant information because of the “confidentiality” clause, the synchronicity of the missions as well as the difficulty to conduct field research have considerably limited the comprehensiveness of the following argument. Lastly, the factor of pragmatism in a rapidly and unexpectedly changing environment should be kept in mind because it potentially undermines any execution of a grand strategic vision. As Solana representatively argues: Just as the creation of the European venture as a whole depended on a sense of vision, so too does the development of Europe’s foreign policy. It too has to respond to new challenges and developments. As such it will never be static. Events beyond Europe are playing a vital role in creating a policy which is becoming more coherent and better able to respond. (…) Foreign Policy is not the Single Market. The legal framework of CFSP has tended to flow and develop from experience. Not the other way round. CFSP can never be prescriptive. It is essentially a pragmatic exercise (Solana S0073/01).

Evidently, there is an inherent contradiction in the search for rhetoric-practice coherence. However, in policy – and foreign policy and security are no exceptions – guidelines and indications for action are essential for the expression and realization of a strategic vision in terms of aims and means to codify a realm of possibilities.

The ESDP’s Outputs: Organs, Instruments, and Capabilities This section aims at reviewing and commenting on the institutional instruments, and accordingly, the political choices, which have been implemented so far in the framework of the ESDP. After a short introduction to the chronological development of the policy, the entire palette of security “means” is surveyed: the institutional actors, the decision making mechanisms, the legal instruments, and finally, the civilian and military capabilities available to the EU for the conduction of operations on the ground. ESDP: A New Pillar? History of Policy Decisions As it has been pointed out previously in the discussion of the institutional context of the ESDP, security and defense issues are legally included in the framework of the CFSP. Art 17 TEU in fact states that: “the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense” (see also I-15 CONST). In this sense then the ESDP should be considered as a sub-product completely integrated in the conceptual

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and organizational framework of the pillar. The wording of the treaty – and it is important to remember that it was drafted and approved already in Maastricht in 1992, well before the idea of a ESDP was launched in 1998 – implies that defense, intended in its military sense, will be an integral part of the security machinery of the Union, provided that the European Council and thus the Member States so decide. However, it has been suggested that the connotation of the word “security” in the CFSP is radically different from “security” in the ESDP (Interview with RELEX Commission Official, Brussels, April 2002) and – although in the Constitution it has been restated that “the common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy” (art. I-40(1) CONST) – the developments described below indicate that a new and considerably different pillar may be under construction, as recognized by the European Convention (CONV 369/02). The external incentives for a substantial revision of the institutional setting for security management in and by the European Union have always been crises, or better, wars: first the Kosovo conflict in February 1998 and then the 9/11 terrorist attack and the consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is interesting to note that, despite the “human security” approach displayed in the discourse on European security, it has always been events involving large-scale violence and the use of military force, which rallied the Europeans and encouraged them to take important steps and decisions towards the formation of a EU “security” machinery, including the introduction in the policy arena of issues such as defense postures, armies, armaments, aircrafts, space, intelligence and so on. The landmark for this change, always trumpeted in accounts of the ESDP, was the convergence of the British and French positions on military and defense matters. Conscious of the inability of the Europeans to effectively provide for the security of their neighborhood without the decisive help of the United States, in their joint St.Malo Declaration (3–4 December 1998), both governments acknowledged the need for the EU “to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces” (Forster and Wallace 1998; Howorth 2000b). This sentence has actually become the slogan and catchphrase of the ESDP and has been paving the way to the subsequent evolutions of the policy. At the EU Summit in Cologne (June 1999), the Member States reiterated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO” (European Council 150/99). As a matter of fact, the Fifteen of the time agreed to integrate the WEU functions and stated that by the end of 2000 “the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose”. The issue of a possible inclusion of Chapter V of the WEU Brussels Treaty, that is, of a mutual automatic obligation for collective defense, however, was scratched from the agreement and the question of what else the full integration of the WEU would entail – since the Petersberg tasks had already been incorporated in Art. 17 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty – left unanswered.

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At the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal was established. By 2003, the Member States, cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, had to be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of tasks stated in Article 17 TEU (Petersberg Tasks) (European Council 00300/1/99)��������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������������������� . In addition, it was decided – and later at the Nice European Council in December 2000 approved – that new political and military bodies and structures within the Council be established in order to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to crisis management operations, while respecting the single institutional framework. The first Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000 set out the individual Member States commitments in a Helsinki Forces Catalogue (HFC), while the Capabilities Improvement Conference in November 2001 highlighted the qualitative and quantitative shortcomings and designed a capability strategy for action. Finally, the European Council at Laeken declared in December 2001 that “through the continuing development of ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, the creation of the appropriate structures, the Union is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop” (European Council 300/1/01). The Convention on the Future of Europe, the 2003–2004 ICG, and the resulting Constitutional Treaty as well as the 2010 Headline Goal and the 2007 Lisbon Treaty are further steps in this surprisingly fast growth. The legitimate question is then about the direction of this progress, and how the new structures fit into the existing political and institutional framework on the one hand, and the dominant discourse on the other. Actors and Decision Making: How Far is the EU the Real Subject? From a discursive point of view, the subject, or better the actor, is individuated in the European Union as a coherent and compact entity, capable of “talking” but also of “doing” security. Symbolically too, the starry blue flag is an indication of the physical presence and of the visibility of the Union, and the Korthenberg building in Brussels the designated home. Behind words and symbols, though, a complex intergovernmental decisionmaking and implementation structure has been bureaucratically designed to defuse the reality that, at the end of the day, the Member States are not only the driving force of the ESDP through bilateral or multilateral declarations and initiatives, but they are also the ones taking the final decisions about whether, when, how and why to act, and they are the actual performers of the operations on the ground. It would be indeed naïve to suggest the contrary, given the very political nature of security and defense as the direct expression of national sovereignty. Nonetheless, as it is shown in Figure 7.1, a “hybrid” structure has been created (Howorth 2002: 3). The very fact that the agencies directly involved in the ESDP are located in Brussels,

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and in particular in immediate physical vicinity, does not only support the already mentioned hypothesis of Brusselization and “supranational intergovernmentalism” at the discursive level, but hints at a more cohesive, coordinate, and common political decision-making and military command structure, which overruns and concurs with Member States’ institutions taken separately (Howorth 2000b). In short, we assist at an attempt to construct institutional facilities which, although mainly composed by state representatives, contain in their nature the potential to develop into more autonomous players. The organizational chart of the ESDP could be easily compared to the internal structure of a “conventional”, albeit very complex, national political system. The existence of clearly defined hierarchical relationships of authority contradicts the hypothesis of the ESDP as a sort of “governance” system (Webber et al. 2004). Figure 7.1 shows the institutional organizational chart of the ESDP. Highlighted are the novelties incorporated by the 2004 Constitutional Treaty and retaken by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty and in particular the institution of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and of a European Defense Agency. The following sections will try to explain the function and role of each of the organs and agencies displayed. The Pivotal Role of the European Council and of the Foreign Affairs Council  The TEU, as well as the Constitutional Treaty, stresses that the “Union shall be served by a single institutional framework” (art. I-18(1) CONST). This means that the same institutions serve both the European Community (the first pillar – supranational) and the CFSP/ESDP. Yet, the respective roles of the Member States, the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament differ. The intergovernmentalism of this policy area is displayed in the fact that the Member States – as participants in the institutions – have the absolute power to decide the courses of action and to implement and execute them. This results in a limited role of the Commission and of the Parliament in the decision-making. The European Council, composed by the Heads of State or Government meeting every three months, is the highest and most important organ. Acting unanimously, it defines the general principles and orientations of the CFSP/ESDP and identifies the strategic interests and objectives of the Union – albeit without legislative capacity (art. 13 TEU; art. I-20 and III-196 CONST). The decisions produced at the end of each regular or extraordinary meeting and the “common strategies” (three so far on Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean) can be considered as indications of directions that in theory cannot be overruled or disconfirmed by subsequent acts of other organs. The vagueness of the language in most of these documents however leaves ample space for interpretation. The Council Presidency represents the Union in all the foreign and security policy questions. The problem of discontinuity  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� It is interesting to note that, according to the Constitutional Treaty, the Union acquires legal personality and substitutes in all its rights and functions the Community, which by the entering into force of the new treaty will cease to exist. See final provisions of the CONST.

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epitomized by the 6-months rotating Presidency has been partially solved in the new constitutional treaty. The President will be, if the treaty is ratified, elected by

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the European Council by qualified majority voting – and may be dismissed in case of impediment or serious misconduct – for a renewable term of two years and a half (art. I-21(1) CONST), thus ensuring a certain stability in the direction of the Council and a new form of accountability to the Council rather than to his/her government and parliament. His/her major task is to identify common ground and to facilitate cohesion and consensus among the Member States. The introduction of the election method and the extension of the term of office will contribute to make the European Council more “communitarized” than it has been until now by limiting the space of action of the presiding Member State in determining the semester agenda on the basis of its national priorities. The General Affairs Council (also known as simply the Council or GAC) consists of ministerial representatives of the Member States meeting in Brussels every month in different configurations depending on the policy area. In its Foreign Affairs Council formation – including, if needed, the Ministers of Defense – it is politically responsible for a common, coherent, and efficient formulation of the foreign, security and defense policy, and it is the supreme decision-maker in the field of the CFSP/ESDP (art. 13 TUE; art. I-22(2) and I-39(2) CONST): it develops common policies on the basis of the European Council’s guidelines, orientations and common strategies, and it adopts joint actions, common positions, decisions, conclusions, declarations etc. In matters touching upon security and defense, unanimity of the Council members is the rule and the provision of art. 23 TEU contemplating the possibility of recurring to qualified majority voting (QMV) for the adoption and implementation of joint actions – like for instance the launching of a military intervention or of a civilian crisis-management operation – does not apply (art. 27b TEU). The rationale for this absolute power of the Member States in the Council lies in the fact that only national authorities, in respect of their sovereignty, are legitimated  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Art. I-24(1)CONST defines qualified majority as “at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union. A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained. 2.By derogation from paragraph 1, when the Council is not acting on a proposal from the Commission or from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the qualified majority shall be defined as 72% of the members of the Council, representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union”. Qualified majority can be applied according to art. III-211(2)CONST: “(a) when adopting European decisions on Union actions and positions on the basis of a European decision of the European Council relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article III-194(1); (b) when adopting a decision on a Union action or position, on a proposal which the Minister has put to it following a specific request to him or her from the European Council made on its own initiative or that of the Minister; (c) when adopting any European decision implementing a Union action or position; (d) when adopting a European decision concerning the appointment of a special representative”. Art. III-203 CONST also states that a member state can oppose the use of qualified majority “for vital and stated reasons of national policy”.

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to send out soldiers and/or other civilian personnel running the risk to be killed. This provision has thus a big impact in the definition of the conditions and the implementation of ESDP interventions. The instrument of abstention however does allow for a group of Member States, a so-called “coalition of the willing”, to mobilize engaging the whole Union, provided that at least 2/3 of the members agree to the measure. Conceptually linked to this is the formula of “enhanced cooperation” which allows a group of Member States to deepen their cooperation and to act without necessarily achieving a consensus among all Member States. In responding to crisis situations, this mechanism can foster quick decision-making, since a group of EU states may go ahead without being blocked by others who are unwilling or undecided to act. However, this also raises major doubts about the cohesion and “commonality” of the whole policy and the political and diplomatic liability for the outside world. By the same token, the two new devices introduced in the constitutional treaty, “structured cooperation” in military matters (art. III213 CONST) and “closer cooperation on mutual defense” (art. III-214 CONST) allow on the one hand a high degree of flexibility in order to accommodate different national security and defense preferences, but on the other, they jeopardize exactly that unity of action which should be at the basis of a coherent foreign and security policy and the landmark of a EU security identity and subjectivity. It is in fact not clear what implications these mechanisms entail for the projection of the image of the EU in the international arena. At the very bottom, they contribute to reinforce the opinions of those commentators who see in the formation of “concentric circles”, “variable geometry”, “2 speeds”, “a la carte coalitions” or an “avant-

 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� See Art. III-213 CONST: “1. The Member States listed in the Protocol (…) which fulfil higher military capability criteria and wish to enter into more binding commitments in this matter with a view to the most demanding tasks, hereby establish structured cooperation between themselves within the meaning of Article I-40(6). The military capability criteria and commitments which those Member States have defined are set out in that Protocol. 2. If a Member State wishes to participate in such cooperation at a later stage, and thus subscribe to the obligations it imposes, it shall inform the European Council of its intention. The Council of Ministers shall deliberate at the request of that Member State. Only the members of the Council of Ministers that represent the Member States taking part in structured cooperation shall participate in the vote. 3. When the Council of Ministers adopts European decisions relating to matters covered by structured cooperation, only the members of the Council of Ministers that represent the Member States taking part in structured cooperation shall participate in the deliberations and the adoption of such decisions. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall attend the deliberations. The representatives of the other Member States shall be duly and regularly informed by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs of developments in structured cooperation. 4. The Council of Ministers may ask the Member States participating in such cooperation to carry out at Union level a task referred to in Article III-210. 5. Notwithstanding the previous paragraphs, the appropriate provisions relating to enhanced cooperation shall apply to the structured cooperation governed by this Article”.

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garde” group not only a question of methods, but a more fundamental discrepancy in values, objectives, and visions (Wyatt-Walter 1997: 99). Until now, the Council has been working in cooperation with the High Representative/Secretary General and the Commissioner for External Affairs (see below). A clear innovation in the constitutional treaty is the creation of the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (art. I-27 Const), who will be at the same time president of the Foreign Affairs Council and one of the vice-presidents of the Commission. The posts of High Representative and of Commission for External Affairs will be suppressed and the functions incorporated into the new position: he or she will be representing the Union in all matters concerning external relations and, as it is normally the case for each member state, will possess a right of initiative in the field of the CFSP and ESDP. The introduction of this new post should assure a more coherent and consistent conduction of the EU’s foreign and security policy and eliminate the problem of institutional competition between the Council and the Commission. In short, the new EU Minister will be the sooften cited interlocutor Kissinger had been looking for in the seventies. Again, this innovation can be interpreted as the institutionalization of a state-like bureaucratic organization with the constitution of a veritable Foreign Ministry composed by the foreseen European External Action Service which “shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States” (art. I-197(3) CONST). Because the Council meets only once a month and it is busy with a long agenda, it is supported by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Political Committee – meeting at the ambassadorial level – the General Secretariat and three recently created new agencies, notably the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS). A detailed overview of these instruments follows in a separate section because of their importance for the development and implementation of the ESDP. General Secretariat: SG/HR, PPEWU, and SITCEN  Since October 1999 and until the entering into force of the constitutional treaty or now the Lisbon Treaty, the Council Secretary General (SG) is also the High Representative (HR) for the CFSP and the ESDP, and in this function, he assists the Council in formulating and undertaking foreign policy initiatives, can be mandated to act on behalf of the Union and represents the Union in political dialogue meeting with third parties (art. 18 and 26 TEU). Through the personality and engagement of Mr. Solana, the current holder of the post, the HR/SG has become a key figure for EU crisis management in general and the ESDP in particular. Formally, he is appointed by the Council and receives thus his orders from the Member States’ foreign ministers. In practice, however, he can influence the decisions of the Council by his suggestions and has considerable freedom of action. As a matter of fact, as already extensively pointed out, he is the main “speaker” of the Union in foreign, security, and defense

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affairs. According to the constitutional treaty, though, as mentioned above, his functions will be incorporated in the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (art. 5, Title 4, Protocol to the CONST). In his daily work, the SC/HR is supported by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit or PPEWU), established on the basis of a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, with the wide-ranging tasks of: “monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; providing assessments of the Union’s foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future; providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations (...) including potential political crises; producing (...) argued policy options papers (...) as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council (...)” (Amsterdam Declaration n.6 TEU). If one considers the ambitious goals set up in the treaty, and in particular the delicate issue of early warning, the unit is very small: it is composed of about 30 officials – 25 diplomats, one from each Member States (now 27 after the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the Union) – and it is even subdivided into various task forces reflecting the SG/HR priority agenda (mainly along regional lines like for instance the Middle East, Caucasus etc.). In reality thus the main role played by the unit is one of liaison with the national foreign ministries, which obviously “use” this relationship to influence the work of the SG/HR, as it is evident in the contents of several Policy Option Papers (POPs) produced by the Unit but which clearly reflect a merger of Member States’ approaches to the issues treated (POPs are confidential: this is the opinion of an interviewed official). The Unit prides itself of a degree of autonomy in the conduct of its analyses, but it is unclear how far national interests and interpretations can be distinguished from common EU objectives. Due to the limited personnel capacities of the Policy Unit, other early warning tools have been designed. The background work of “intelligence” is conducted by the joint civil military Situation Centre (SITCEN), established in early 2000 by the Policy Unit together with the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and charged to collect and analyse various sources of information, including media reports, public materials, governmental resources as well as intelligence services. An ad hoc Crisis Cell may be set up in cases of a particular crisis in order to assure a better flow of information not only among the Council and the Commission but also with other security actors like the UN, NATO, or the OSCE. In addition, the EU Satellite Centre in Terrejon/Spain and the already mentioned EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris) – both established by the WEU and integrated in the EU framework – support the Policy Unit and the SG in their early warning tasks (Council 10733/01).

 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The work of the Conflict Prevention Network, an independent institute providing early warning services to the Commission, has been discontinued in 2003. For an overview on intelligence, please see Müller-Wille 2004.

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Political and Security Committee (PSC)   In accordance with the innovative provisions of the 2000 Treaty of Nice and after an “ad interim” phase, the Political and Security Committee (PSC, also known under the French acronym COPS) has been set up in January 2001 as the key player of the CFSP and ESDP (Council 5380/01). Composed by the representatives of Member States at senior ambassadorial level (often at the Political Directors level) meeting at least weekly, it is chaired by the SG/HR (and in the future by a representative of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs). Its main functions are: to monitor international developments in the areas falling within the CFSP; to draft opinions for the Council and to monitor implementation of policies; to provide guidelines to the Military Committee; to consult with NATO; and finally and most importantly, under the auspices of the Council, to take responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities (art. 25 TEU). During a crisis in particular, the PSC exercises “political and strategic control” of a EU response to a crisis by proposing political objectives and recommending options for action, by supervising the implementation of the measures adopted and by assessing their effects. On the basis of the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee, it evaluates in particular the essential elements (strategic military options including the chain of command, operation concept, operation plan) to be submitted to the Council. It is also important to stress that the PSC does not replicate the Secretariat’s Policy Unit. Although both of them are composed by state representatives – thus reinforcing the “political and strategic control” exercised by the Member States on the ESDP in particular – the function of the PSC is more executive and authoritative than the essentially analytical and consultative one carried out by the Policy Unit. European Union Military Committee (EUMC)  Also established by the Nice Treaty, the European Military Committee is the highest military body of the EU and supports and advises the PSC in all the military issues related to the ESDP. It consists of the national Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) or their military representatives (MilReps) and serves as “the forum for military consultation and cooperation between the EU Member States”. Among its tasks are: the development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects; the military aspects relating to the political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and situations; the risk assessment of potential crises; the military dimension of a crisis situation and its implications; the elaboration, the assessment and the review of capability objectives; and finally, the maintenance of military relations with non-EU NATO members, other states and organizations, including NATO. In addition, it advises on the Concept of Operations (Conops) and the draft Operation Plan (OPLAN) drawn up by the Operation Commander and monitors the proper execution of the military operations. Given its composition and modus operandi, it should be noted that the EUMC is heavily dependent on MemberStates and is at most a technical coordinative organ, since the CHODs respond to the national chain of accountability and command, and is not tailored to the development of a genuine EU military doctrine.

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European Union Military Staff (EUMS) The EUMC is supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS), consisting of approximately 120 officers seconded from the Member States. “Seconded” means that the military personnel, although paid by their own national Ministry of Defense, are “lent” to another organization/ institution for a definite period of time. From a military point of view, the seconded personnel is liable to respect the new multinational chain of command, that is, they cannot take direct orders from their national superiors (see interview with German lieutenant-colonel assistant of British General Messervy-Whiting, now former EU Chief of Staff; May 2002). In routine situations the tasks of the EUMS include: early warning, situation assessment, strategic planning; identification of European national and multinational forces, implementation of policies and decisions, elaboration, assessment and review of capability goals. By the same token, it functions as liaison to national headquarters and to NATO. As a matter of fact, in the context of the NATO-EU Cooperation – discussed at length in the section on military capabilities – the European Council on 17–18 June 2004 not only provided to establish a civil-military cell within the EUMS, but, in accordance with NATO, it decided to create a small EUMS cell inside NATO’s SHAPE. The cooperation with NATO and national military headquarters is particularly important during crises and the conduction of operations: the EUMS is in fact responsible for requesting and processing specific information and supporting the EUMC in planning and developing strategic options. The missions Artemis and Concordia, as it will be discussed later, represented the first operations in which both the EUMC and the EUMS could perform their task in a non-simulated environment. Committee on Civilian Crisis Management  Since however a crisis is not only understood in military terms, the PSC is also supported by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Once again, experts from national ministries come together in this agency in order to advise the PSC, and thus the Council, on issues concerning international policing, strengthening the rule of law, civilian administration as well as civil protection. Their main task is to analyse country-specific information, identify possible missions, define the capabilities needed and call for contributions from both non- and EU Member States.

 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� On the problem of EU-NATO communication before the establishment of the cell, see ������� Solana S0096/02: “������������������������������������������������������������� Now the problem I have and the problem that George Robertson has, is a very dramatic one when we talk – probably you do not know it but I have to discover a secret between the military of the European Union and the military of NATO is forbidden that they talk – forbidden. I do not know the faces by now, the military staff from the European Union and somebody from SHAPE cannot speak to each other. They can go to lunch but they cannot formally speak to each other”. Solana has also been NATO Secretary General from 1995 to 1999.

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This Committee liases in particular with the Commission’s RELEX and the Directorate for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and contributes in this way to a better inter-institutional coordination. The Commission  Judging from the amount of space and attention hereby devoted to the Council agencies, it should be evident that the other EU institutions – the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice – play only a secondary role in the ESDP. It should be noted however, that, in the course of the development of the CFSP and especially in matters concerning civilian crisis management, these institutions, and in particular the Commission, have been gaining in importance and authority. In fact, the Commission is co-responsible for a coherent approach in foreign policy (art. 3 TEU), and it is fully associated and shares with the Member States the right to raise questions related to the CFSP and to non-military aspects of the ESDP and to submit proposals to the Council (Article 27 and 22 TEU). The Commission President and the Commissioner for External Relations (RELEX) are also associated in representing the Union (art. 18 TEU). For what concerns the ESDP, the Directorate General for External Relations has been focusing on issues of conflict prevention and civilian crisis management; it works with the support of the Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and Europaid; and liases with the Council Secretariat and in particular with the Policy Unit in order to coordinate their respective policies. Most importantly, because of its budgetary availability – the Council is bound by ad hoc voluntary commitments by the Member States – the Commission is a major actor in the EU comprehensive approach to security. Although the deployment of forces on the ground is the most visible manifestation of the ESDP, the activities financed and led by the Commission often not only complement the operations but represent the key to long-term success, principally because of its engagement in conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, as it will be discussed at length later, the Commission has widened its commitment to act quickly in cases of emergency situations through the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), a legal and financial framework by which civilian measures for crisis management can be financed at a very short notice. The Parliament and the Court of Justice The European Parliament (EP), the organ which should represent the European demos and assure that the democratic principles are correctly enacted and implemented, does play the most important role in the approval of the budget, and in particular, of the voices related to civilian crisis management, but for what concerns the ESDP, it only enjoys a right to be  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� However, this task will be reduced to representation in matters relating to external affairs but excluding the CFSP after the Constitutional Treaty enters into force (art. I-25 CONST).

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informed and consulted. Art. 21 TEU states clearly that the views of the Parliament should be duly taken into account, and art. III-205(1) CONST goes so far as to include not only matters related to the common foreign and security policy but also security and defense. In practice, however, the relationship between Council and Parliament is rather difficult. In a resolution on the ESS in 2004 and more in specific on the ESDP operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia (Althea), the EP complained that it had not been informed in advance about the mandate, the capabilities needed, and the financial implications for the EU budget, and called for greater transparency not only on the mandate and objectives of missions conducted as part of the ESDP but also on operational details like the security situation for the troops deployed, the size of the forces, their composition and their equipment, the relationship between forces under EU control and those under NATO control in the area concerned, as well as the command structures and civil-military cooperation of the mission (EP 2004/2167(INI). Due to the sensitivity of the information demanded, the Council may comply with the request under however the limitation of the confidentiality clause. In this instance, the EP would be bound to compliance and would not be able to publicize the information received. The problem of transparency and democratic accountability of the ESDP and the political and theoretical implications of such a state are routinely addressed by researchers and commentators gravitating around a European Commission-funded research training network project on the “ESDP Democracy: Bridging the Accountability Gap” (2000–2004) and/or studying the infamous “democratic deficit” at the EU and national levels (see Chapter 5 and the speakers). Another institution should be taken into account in this context, although its role has still to be clearly defined. The WEU Assembly, also recently known as the interim ESDP Assembly, is an external body attached to the WEU and composed of national members of parliament. Since all the functions of the Western European Union – except Chapter V of the Modified Brussels Treaty on mutual defense – have been integrated by the Amsterdam Treaty into the ESDP, the institution is now “informally” responsible for discussing and making recommendations to the WEU Council on military issues pertaining to the ESDP. The problem of noncoincidence in the EU-WEU membership may be now solved through the already mentioned instrument of “structured cooperation”, thus opening the way for a more official integration of the Assembly in the EU structure. Finally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has no jurisdiction in the CFSP and, as a consequence, in the ESDP. It is interesting to note though, that the Court has the power to review the legality of European decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council under Chapter II or Title V, and this is particularly important in cases of terrorist suspects or in operations that include the search for criminals in crisis zones. In practice, thus, operations of the type of the ISAF in Afghanistan or smaller scale peacekeeping or police operations may require specific roles played by the ECJ in the future. By the same token, the Court retains all its powers concerning the common

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market, and this might affect the formulation of a common armaments policy. The intermeshing of external and internal security is of particular relevance for the ECJ and a demarcation of responsibilities and legal competencies in the area is currently still developing. Material Capabilities The question of the capabilities of the Union in the field of crisis management, and in particular of military assets, is maybe the major issue in the development of an effective and efficient security structure, and it is definitely the central focus of many of the accounts on the ESDP. Analysts, using a system of assessment based on national military systems and referring often to the United States as a term of comparison, have been particularly keen in drawing a variety of pessimist scenarios and in pointing out the deficiencies of the current state of the ESDP resources (Whitman 1999; Wolf and Zycher 2001; McGinn and Liston 2002; Rynning 2002; Salmon and Shepherd 2003; Biscop 2004b). The most common fallacies in commentaries about EU capabilities can be summarized as follows: a. Definitional: capabilities are mainly conceptualized in terms of military assets, including armaments, defense postures and expenditures. Civilian tools are often overlooked or minimized. b. Situational: linked to the above, capabilities are assessed on the basis of their aims, which are in many accounts supposed to be of traditional military defense confrontation and combat. Short, they mainly refer to the hottest phase of the conflict, while the pre-conflict and post-conflict aspects of crisis management are largely disregarded. c. Comparative: in general, because of the clearly dominant US-American approach in security matters (see Chapter 4) and because of the high standards of US military resources, the US tend to be taken as a benchmark in order to assess the quantity and quality of the ESDP capabilities. As it will be discussed later, such a comparison may also suggest a distinct perception of the EU as a security actor or at least a projection or expectation thereof. As stressed in many occasions in the decisions taken at the EU level and as displayed in the development of the policy though, the capabilities available to the ESDP should be considered in their totality, including both civilian and military tools, for the performance of the wider range of Petersberg tasks, that is, not only traditional combat but first and foremost peacekeeping, crisis management, and peacebuilding. The question is of course one of interpretation and pertains to the definition of these tasks in broader or more restricted terms, or also, in a more “traditional” or “human” way. It is important to emphasize that the ESDP capabilities set up via the Helsinki Headline Goals 2003 and 2010 and the various Capability Conferences are a clear novelty and distinguish themselves from the

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existing political, economic, and diplomatic devices – including both incentives and sanctions – not only because of the introduction of the military format in the gamut, but also because they are deemed to be applied in a quick and robust way in situations characterized by emergency and urgency, and most importantly, by the widespread use of physical violence or the risk thereof. By the same token, although “pooled” under the EU insignias and political direction, the capabilities are and remain dependent on national contributions and are thus “property” of the participating Member State. Civilian Capabilities  The European Community, the major contributor to humanitarian and development aid in the world, has been engaged in the broader context of long-term crisis management and conflict prevention for years by now. Although under different denominations, the Community – especially through the active work of the Commission, ECHO, Europaid, and the European Initiative for Human Rights (EIHR) and the development and implementation of generously funded specific regional aid and stabilization programs like TACIS, MEDA, the Lomé/Cotonou Agreements (African Caribbean Pacific countries), and explicit institution-building policies towards the candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe – has been successfully linking political and financial/economic instruments and has acquired an extensive experience in the field. It should be noted however that even though experts’ missions have been at times deployed for short periods of time in order to monitor the local implementation of the programs, the Community had never been physically present on the ground in situations of imminent or evolving crisis. This is mainly due to the institutional and political constraints which did slow down the decision-making process and did not allow so far for a rapid allocation of resources and capacities. In addition, since the Community did not possess permanent structures and personnel the Commission could autonomously dispose of, the sensitivity of the decision of deploying “national” civilian personnel in potentially dangerous situations as well as the political and diplomatic implications of such an act did and does require the direct willingness, engagement, and support of the Member States (Cox and Chapman 1999). The acknowledgement in the 1990s that, especially in the short term, 1) the Community’s instruments were not sufficient to cope with the crises in the Balkans, that 2) it was vital for the security of the Union to be able to stabilize crises in  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Please note here the reference to the Community and not to the Union. Until the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty (now the Lisbon Treaty), the Community is still the only organization having legal personality and responsible for the affairs included in the first pillar, that is, the economic and monetary policy, trade, transport and so, the major fields in which civilian capabilities can be situated. The European Union on the contrary is defined as the overall complex of the three pillars and has a more political stand. According to the new constitution, the Community will be fully absorbed by the Union, which acquires legal personality and becomes the legal successor of the Community.

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the immediate neighborhood in order to avoid internal problems like refugee and migratory fluxes and criminality, as well as 3) the determination to endow the ESDP with civilian rapid reaction capabilities in the name of a comprehensive approach to crisis management (following the UN example), led to the European Council’s decisions in Helsinki and Feira to single out four priority areas within which targets in terms of structural and operational resources had to be met through Member States voluntary contributions by 2003: a. in the field of policing and maintenance of public order: a commitment of up to 5,000 police officers to be deployable – 1,500 of them within 30 days – in international police operations with the task of advising, assisting, training and even substituting local police forces; b. with the aim of strengthening the rule of law: a commitment of around 300 officers in the judicial and penitentiary area – experts including prosecutors, judges and prison officers – to work with the police; c. for the support of civil administration: a commitment to set up a pool of experts (number unspecified); d. and finally, in the area of civil protection: a commitment to set up 2 or 3 assessment and/or coordination teams, capable of being mobilized around the clock, and consisting of 10 experts, who could be dispatched within 3 to 7 hours; and intervention teams of up to 2000 persons for deployment at short notice, that is, within 2 to 7 days depending on the particular needs of each crisis, which could be deployed for tasks like search and rescue construction of refugee camps, logistical support, establishing communication systems (European Council 00300/1/99). Already at the Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference held on 19 November 2002, these targets were declared attained and even exceeded. Although one could debate the width of the civilian resources made available to the ESDP and highlight the potential coordination problems (language and communication, codes of conduct etc.) of the different national teams on the ground – a problem which is in any case present in every multinational action, be it at the EU, OSCE or UN level – the fact that they could be already used, albeit in a limited form, in missions in Bosnia and Macedonia attests the initial success of the endeavor. By the same token, the functions of the already cited Committee on Civilian Capabilities as well as the Commission’s role and experience in the field enhance the coherence of this type of tool. At the Brussels European Council in June 2004 (10679/2/04), a new Civilian Headline Goal 2008 has been endorsed. It foresees the deployment of civilian ESDP capabilities within thirty days of the decision to launch a mission (either civilian or joint civilian and military). In particular, the November 2004 Civilian Capability Commitment Conference identified the need of rapidly deployable Civilian Response Teams and registered voluntary EU Member State contributions of 5,761 police personnel, 631 rule of

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law experts, 562 civilian administration experts, and 4,988 individuals for civil protection (Novak 2006). For what concerns the Commission, the most important innovation is the creation in 2001 of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), a legal and financial framework which enables the Commission to decide quickly on urgent interventions, and which is endowed with a separate budget line (20–25 Mio. EUR) to provide initial financing of short-term actions in worldwide situations of high tension, in the form of funding for a mix of measures like supporting local NGOs or grassroots groups, assisting peace-building efforts, fact-finding missions, mediation activities or the dispatch of EU experts at short notice and similar. The annex to the Regulation lists the instruments which can be funded under this framework: human rights work, election monitoring, institution building, media support, border management, humanitarian missions, police training and the provision of police equipment, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation, reconstruction, pacification, resettlement and mediation (Council 381/2001). The obvious added value of the RRM is its speed and flexibility: the major features characterizing the “ways” to manage a crisis in the EU’s strategic approach (for a good overview see: European Commission 2003, n.n.). Military Capabilities: Between NATO and Autonomy Although there have been and still are talks about a “European army”, the EU does not possess its own military forces, nor does it dispose of its own armaments’ stock. The institutions described above have been set up to coordinate what, at present, are nothing more than multinational forces joining together for ad hoc operations. It is important to stress this point because it is often cause of misperception and concerns on the part of the external world, especially if one considers the ambition of including traditional common defense in the objectives of the ESDP. In a material power analysis, it is often argued that, while the sum of all the military resources of the Member States amounts to far more than the capacities of the US military, armaments and nuclear assets included – a combined defense budget of 160 million EUR and 1.6 million troops – the product is much less positive, due to obvious problems of integration or even interoperability, communication and coordination among different military establishments with distinctive national experiences, doctrines, and strategic cultures (Rynning 2002; Salmon and Sheperd 2003). This type of approaches reveal at the bottom the distress that the EU may militarily develop into a credible competitor – and who knows, a potential military threat and enemy – to the United States and/or NATO (Hunter 2002). Although this scenario cannot be excluded in principle, the reality of the military capabilities available to the EU to perform ESDP missions are still relatively harmless and are limited to the execution of strictly defined tasks, the political and strategic direction of which is still in the firm hands of the Member States. The major issues on the military agenda since the inception of the ESDP deal with the quality and quantity of the capabilities on stock and the necessity of

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increasing defense spending, and strictly related to this, with the question of the relationship with NATO and with other defense organizations and structures. The 2003 Headline Goal, decided upon in Helsinki in 1999, called for the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) consisting of a minimum of 60,000 personnel (100,000 with rotation) to be deployed in 60 days, for the accomplishment of missions falling under the Petersberg tasks’ range (European Council 00300/1/99)��� ��������������. As a matter of fact, thanks to the commitments of the Member States, the ESDP has been declared operational in occasion of the European Council at Laeken and shortly afterwards the RRF has been deployed in Macedonia. However, conscious of the deficiencies characterizing the force structures of European armies, which are generally judged to be old-fashioned, over-sized, and too focused on ground forces and territorial defense postures, and with the final vision of creating a EU “expeditionary” force composed of elite units that can be “deployed to areas of crisis or instability abroad within a short time frame and, once on the ground, is mobile enough to maintain a fast tempo of operations while remaining relatively self-sufficient” (McGinn and Liston 2001: 91; see also Dorman 2002), the Council set up to monitor the development of EU military capabilities in order to encourage rationalization and to foster synergies among the European militaries. Capabilities’ Conferences as well as the so-called European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) launched in 2001 have been active in identifying shortfalls, suggesting remedies, and underpinning Member States’ progress in attending to the weaknesses. In addition, in accordance with the “Capability Development Mechanism” established in March 2003, every six months a progress report on EU military capabilities is submitted to the Council for the follow-up and evaluation of military capabilities objectives and commitments by the Member States. As part of this assessment and improvement process, the attainment of the 2003 Headline Goal, the approval of the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology as well as the lessons learned from the EU-led operations have been calling for the need to set up new long-term goals for further development of the EU’s crisis-management capabilities. The 2010 Headline Goal recognizes that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed, in particular the issues of interoperability, deployability, and sustainability, and introduces the so-called “battlegroup concept”, a specific form of rapid response, which should speed up the decision-making and the deployment of forces. Based on a British/French/German initiative, the ambition is that the decision to launch an operation should be taken within five days of the approval of a Crisis Management Concept by the Council, while the implementation of the mission on the ground should start within ten days from the date in which the decision has been taken (Council 9013/04). In this regard, it should be noted that this concept is directly linked to the already discussed instrument of “structured cooperation”, according to which Member States “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria” and who are prepared for “the most demanding missions” are to commit themselves to develop military capabilities and to provide, by 2007, targeted combat units with support elements, including transport and logistics, capable of deployment within

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a period of 5–30 days in response to a UN request, and sustainable for an initial period of 30 days (extendable up to 120 days), for high-intensity tasks anywhere in the world (EU Convention, Protocol on Structured Cooperation). As a matter of fact, on January, 1 2007 the EU Battlegroup concept was declared fully operational. Based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements, the multinational battlegroups are composed of about 1500 personnel deployable for missions including conflict prevention, separation of parties by force, stabilization, reconstruction and military advice to third countries, evacuation operations and assistance to humanitarian operations10. The 2010 Headline Goal takes as a starting point the May 2004’s Capabilities Improvement Chart and provides for a detailed calendar of actions and milestones in view of, among others, the establishment of a defense agency, the achievement of full efficiency in strategic lift including the availability of an aircraft carrier – the most important feature of rapid deployment – the improvement of communication and network facilities as well as multinational training. As a proof of the seriousness of the commitments taken, the constitutional treaty foresees the creation of the “European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency”, also simply referred to as the EU Defense Agency. According to art III212 Const the agency, with a staff of 25 and a start-up budget of 2 million EUR and under the authority of the Council of Ministers, will promote joint procurement, research, and development11. The creation of such an agency is obviously a very important step in the development of a military identity. However, the specific focus on armaments and the connection with the various national military-industrial complexes in view of an integration of the export-oriented market hides the risk that the ESDP become more product-led that it is already now, and that the real aim behind this new creation is for the Member States to pool only the expensive costs of defense research (Delpeche 2002; Howorth 2000b; Howorth 2004). Given the sensitive national nature of their products, it should be noted that armaments’ 10 10���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Concerning the multinationality of these battlegroups, it is interesting to note that multinational brigades already exist and have been integrated on a case by case basis in operations conducted by NATO or the WEU: for instance EUROFOR; EUROMAFOR, multinational brigades, EUROCORPS. 11 11������������������������������������������������������������������������������ The European Defense Agency is tasked to: “(a) contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States; (b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; (c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes; (d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; (e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure”.

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related industries have been broadly excluded from the provisions of the common market (apart from external sale interdiction related to the implementation of international sanctions), and thus from the authority of the Commission. The new Agency is a step forward in the communitarization and liberalization of this market sector (Cameron and Quille 2004). For what concerns the second element of the discussion, namely, the question of the relationship with NATO, three options were initially on the plate: a) the European Union should rely exclusively on its own forces and command structures; b) military cooperation arrangements between the European Union and NATO should allow the Union to use NATO assets in case the latter decides not to act; c) security and defense should be exclusively dealt with in the NATO or WEU framework as it had been the case until the inception of the ESDP. The issue was and is directly connected with the role of the United States in NATO and the already mentioned Atlanticist-Europeanist divide among the Member States. After years of debate, and although as it has been shown all along the EU is trying to develop its own autonomous capabilities, a preference for the second alternative was formalized in the Berlin Plus Agreement and in the initiation of a strategic partnership, which includes regular meetings between the military representatives of the two organizations, communication, and coordination12. Moreover, in exchange for the EU access to NATO operational planning and capabilities, NATO maintains a sort of control through the provision that the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (always a European) be also commander of any EUled operations and there are rumors that NATO could have a kind of “right of first refusal”, meaning that, before deciding on whether to launch a mission, the EU should first consult and ask for a kind of “approval” to NATO (O’Hanlon 1997; Croft 2000; Howorth and Keeler 2001; van Ham 2001b; Fishpool 2002; Hunter 2002)13. Despite this agreement and as a sign that the issue has not been settled yet, the dilemma on whether the EU defense structures should or should not rely on NATO gained renewed momentum in April 2003 because of the efforts of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg to set up a wholly separate EU headquarters and planning structure (in Tervuren, east of Brussels) without using NATO assets

12 12��������������������������������������������������������������������� The Berlin Agreement was signed in 1996 between NATO and the WEU to provide the latter with the access to NATO capabilities. As an extension of that, the Berlin Plus agreement was signed in December 2002 between NATO and the EU. 13 13�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� It should be recalled that NATO in the mid-90s had launched two initiatives in order to set up a European pillar inside its structures: the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) to ������������������������������������������������������������������������� allow EU forces to be separated out from the NATO force pool in order to undertake missions that the rest of the Alliance as a whole did not wish to be involved in; and the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), whereby appropriate forces should be drawn from different services and different countries depending on the requirements of the operation. However, in 2004, these projects have been cast aside, and NATO has also been planning to set up a Rapid Reaction Force.

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and capabilities. The proposal was not welcome by the United Stated and the United Kingdom. A compromise was reached at the European Council in June 2004 where it was agreed that there will be no standing Headquarters, that a EUMS cell will be placed in SHAPE (see above), and that in case of an autonomous EU mission where a joint civil/military response is required and no national headquarters can be identified, an operations centre to be set up under the EUMS and to be available by 1 January 2006 the latest, will be responsible for generating the capacity to plan and run an EU-led operation (Biscop 2004b). The complexity of the question of the military capabilities of the EU is not only linked to whether material resources are available or not. More fundamentally, the dilemma is what military force should be used for, what are the limits of it, and what type of control should be set up, short, what doctrine should be followed. The Question of Financing What is the difference between CFSP and ESDP financing? Is this an indicator for the subjectivity of the Union in security and defense, that is, does the Union as a collective actor pay from its own budget? The answer is negative, although developments towards an inclusion of certain, even if limited, operational costs in the EC budget – as it is the case for the RRM – are under way. While CFSP operational activities are financed through Chapter B8 of the EC budget and amount to an average of 30–40 million EUR (less than 1% of the total external relations budget per year), ESDP operations are funded by national contributions on a case by case basis and may include also non-EU participants. Although CFSP and ESDP administrative expenditure is charged to the EC budget for the institution to which such expenditure falls (including costs related to the EUMC and EUMS), the operational financial burden – especially military – is carried by the Member States on the basis of a GDP-based “key” of contributions for the common costs, direct individual contributions in terms of personnel and other resources, and a “costs fall where the lie” principle (Missiroli 2003a). This state of affairs has as a consequence that the bigger Member States are often not only the initiators and main actors in ESDP operations, but they also carry most of the costs, what once more begs the question of who is really the subject of the ESDP on the ground. With the introduction of the flexibility clause in the constitutional treaty, it is once more restated that who is paying for what depends on who is participating, thus highlighting the discrepancy between the wording of unity and the behavior of separateness.

The Activities: Operations on the Ground The European Rapid Reaction Force was declared operational on the 19th of May 2003. Since then, a record of seventeen operations has been conducted using the ESDP institutional and material framework. Although still deficient from many

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points of view and object of continuous criticism and proposals for reform, the “young” security machinery of the European Union has had its “baptism of fire” and seems to have survived it. In a rush to show to the world that the ESDP is not only a rhetoric exercise or another example of empty bureaucratic institutionalism because, in Solana’s words, “the world is not waiting while we get our own house in order” (HR/SG 0300/00), military and civilian personnel wearing the EU colors have already been deployed in the Balkans, in Congo, and as far as Indonesia. The urgency and the number of interventions planned and effectively launched by the EU have surprised many observers and commentators, who, conscious of the historical difficulties to efficaciously and promptly mobilize political support and willingness in the context of the CFSP and aware of the political sensitivity of security and defense issues, had prognosticated the inability of the Union to abide by the 2003 Headline Goal and had relegated the whole policy area in the corner of “wishful thinking” (Shepherd 2000; McGinn and Liston 2001) . Seen from this perspective, it is thus interesting to approach the central question of this book and test whether the dominant discourse is reflected in real action on the ground, that is, whether grand strategic assumptions and preferences directly constrain and enable strategic, operational, and tactical choice in practice, or if they are only “fried air”. In particular, the coherence between grand strategy in terms of aims, ways, and means is checked against the objectives of the operations (the question about who or what is the referent object of the intervention), the means used (and the definition of the predicate), and the way in which the operation has been implemented. Ideally, one should proceed with a detailed and informed description and assessment of the case-studies at hand in order to test the hypothesis and draw the necessary conclusions. Unfortunately, due to the limited access to first-hand information on operation plans and rules of engagement as well as the fact that no data collection or direct interviews have been conducted in the field – a bias which plagues most of the accounts on EU operations to date – the following discussion should be considered as an initial and abridged version full of lacunae and open questions. Range of Missions: Petersberg Tasks and Rule of Law Before discussing the details of each single operation launched until 2004 (and beyond), it is useful to point out that there is a “defined” set of missions which the EU can, at this time, decide upon and deploy. The issue is treated here because it is directly related to the “framework-limits” of EU action, and because it allows for categorizing the type of operations which can be and are conducted. Classification under the one or the other label is an intrinsic characteristic of planning, that is, the generalization of rules and norms of conduct under a specific heading aims at providing practical ready-to-use guidelines for action to be applied in similar cases. In the case of the ESDP, two broad categories of missions can be distinguished on the basis of the means used for crisis management: military and civilian. It should

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be noted that, despite the efforts of policy-makers and analysts to encourage civilmilitary cooperation and to design operations in which a mix of the two instruments can successfully be applied, there have not been to date concrete manifestations of this endeavor, apart from simulations and headquarters’ exercises. This state of affairs represents another discontinuity between the “way” identified in the dominant discourse and the actual implementation in action. Although this is probably a matter of time and of material and institutional constraints, the fact that the military and the civilian dimensions are kept somewhat separated in practice could be seen as a demonstration of the replication of the traditional state-like division of labor exported to the EU level. While the use of military capabilities is not explicitly constrained by the EU legal framework, the range of military missions that the EU is institutionally “authorized” to engage in are delimited by the scope of the so-called Petersberg tasks. Originally a WEU “invention”, they have been incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty and have become an integral and decisive component of the ESDP. The generality of the aims described in the tasks and the very ambiguity of the terms used in current international relations’ jargon – bias already highlighted in Chapter 4 – open the doors to the existence of a variety of interpretations as to the meaning of Art. 17 TEU. By listing UN-type operations “humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping”, the first component reinforces the humanitarian character of the ESDP, while the second part talks of “combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking”14. Although put together in the same sentence, these definitions imply two essentially very different types of actions: the “low end” constructed around the verb “to keep” is more status-quo oriented and relatively passive and reactive; the “high end” on the contrary containing the verb “to make” indicates a pro-active posture, whereby it is implicitly suggested that this type of actions may require more robust military commitments than the other one. As a matter of fact, however, the Petersberg tasks are generally defined in terms of function rather than in terms of the level of military force required in relation to each specific task. In practice, humanitarian and rescue tasks may involve more military resources and the situation could degenerate abruptly and transform the nature of the mission on the ground, as it was for instance the case in the US-led UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia (Lindley French 2002c)15. In addition, these two types of tasks do not elicit the same support from the Member States, with 14 14�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� It is also interesting to note that there are huge differences between humanitarian, rescue or peacekeeping missions in terms of the objectives and referent objects. In humanitarian mission the referent object is usually the local population, in rescue missions are usually foreign nationals and in the case of the EU, EU citizens; in peacekeeping the referent object is peace, that is, not so much the protection of one or the other part, but the stability of an agreement to cease fire and stop the conflict. 15 15���������������������������������������������������������������������������� This eventuality is exemplified by NATO STRFLT Atlantic CMEX “Joint Spirit 99” conducted at the Headquarters level at the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Nova Scotia, Canada (the author participated as a civilian)

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the neutral countries preferring the first more “human” component and the major EU military players being for a more robust engagement. It should also be noted that even among the members who support a more active military role, there are nuanced differences in interpretation: for instance for Sweden and Germany, the upper limit of an Article 17 operations coincides with peacekeeping operations of the IFOR/SFOR or KFOR type; for France and Italy, with operations to restore order like Desert Storm 1991; for the UK and the Netherlands with crisis management proper as in Allied Force 1999 (Centre for Defense Studies 2001). The problem of an open and flexible interpretation of the width and scope of the tasks as well as the weight of the military means is thus a central question in the definition not only of the range of actions “allowed” according to the existing European Security Strategy but, as a corollary, of the conditions for the use of military force. Moreover, the fact that these tasks are also abstrusely and inconsistently defined in international practice in order to accommodate different interests and objectives does not help in shedding light on either the finality or the modality of the EU actions. As a corroboration of this flexibility is the comment of Lyndley-French, a specialist of the subject and Senior Research Fellow at the EUISS, who, addressing the WEU Assembly, claimed that the Petersberg tasks “were never envisaged as static entities in a static world, but as a dynamic mechanism for the progressive preparation of a strong and just Europe to play a full role not only in its security, not even ‘in and around Europe’, but in the world beyond” (Lindley-French 2002c). Although the reason for such terminological elasticity is obvious – an exact definition could limit the possibilities for internal agreement and compromise – the practical implications are that there are potentially no limits to the definition of the scope of EU actions both in terms of mandate and amount of force used. In this context, the reformulation and expansion of the Petersberg tasks – initially suggested by the Convention and by Solana in his ESS – included in the constitutional treaty has already provided to upgrade the range of ESDP actions. Art. III-210 (1) CONST in fact states that: The tasks referred to in Article I-40(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories (my emphasis).

If on the one hand this provision can be seen as merely an attempt to clarify the official EU interpretation of what the Petersberg tasks entail, on the other, it virtually opens up to the EU the possibility to engage in any type of military action abroad. For what concerns the civilian side of crisis management, the most elaborated mission concept was introduced at the Göteborg European Council and further

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developed by the PSC in the field of the rule of law. Two types of missions are in particular contemplated: one with the aim of strengthening the rule of law and the other with the mandate of substituting the local authorities (European Council 200/1/01). In the first case of “strengthening” missions, personnel in the field of rule of law are deployed essentially to educate, train, monitor and advice with the aim of bringing the local legal system up to international standards, in particular in the field of human rights. Activities encompass technical assistance including advice on reform, drafting and implementation of legislation and administrative procedures; on the organization of the police, judiciary and penitentiary system; and on the building of public confidence in these local institutions. The main mandate is thus an advisory one. It is important to underline that this type of mission can be launched only before or after the apices of a crisis have been reached, only once security has been re-established and the benefiting authorities in the country expressly ask and welcome external aid. In the second case of “substitution” for local judiciary/legal system, the personnel are deployed to carry out executive functions, notably where local structures are failing (or not existing), to consolidate rule of law in a crisis situation and thereby restoring public order and security. This includes taking on wholly or partly judicial functions (judges, magistrates, legal experts, court officers and support staff including administrative staff), prosecution functions (prosecutors, legal experts and support staff including administrative staff) and/or penitentiary functions (governor, prison officers, correctional and custodial officers and support staff including administrative staff). In addition to these two categories of rule of law missions, the Council Secretary General has at its disposal the instrument of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) composed of civilian observers grouped in small and flexible teams, who can be deployed to monitor for instance cease-fires or the return of refugees. Once more it should be however stressed that this type of missions also require that the security situation be stabilized or under control of “friendly” and/or international military forces. To summarize, the archetypes of EU crisis management actions are still underdeveloped and do not provide clear directions inasmuch the scope and the width of EU security activity are concerned. Although the efforts of writing off an efficient strategic concept are under way, important questions like the specific limits to the use of military force and the concrete scenarios of deployment including geographical and temporal stipulations are so political that, in case of actual operations, pragmatism still trumps strategic planning. From a certain point of view, it cannot be otherwise, since the experience of the Union in the field is, despite growing, still limited in scope. EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) The first-ever EU crisis management mission was officially launched on the 1st of January 2003 and is currently still running. The operation had been authorized by

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the General Affairs Council already on 11 March 2002 (Joint Action 2002/210/ CFSP) in order to take over police duties from the United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina’s (UNMIBH) International Police Task Force (IPTF) which, established by the 1995 Dayton Accords, was scheduled to depart by the end of 200216. In the context of the EU’s broad approach to the Rule of Law reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina17, the overall goal of the mission is to strengthen the rule of law by establishing an effective independent police structure, which respects human rights and can protect the safety and security of its society. As a matter of fact, the 3 years mandate of the EU Police Mission (EUPM), endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1396 (March 5, 2002) and renewed then year by year, does not confer executive powers18. The aims are to monitor and train the local Bosnian police force in all aspects of law enforcement, as well as help reform and build up sustainable institutional structures according to the highest EU and international standards by mission end in December 2005. Although the fight against organized crime and returnee security have been singled out as priorities, specific objectives of the EUPM also include training in investigating and countering the full range of criminal activities such as terrorism, corruption, drug and human trafficking as well as in border control management and customs regulations. With an annual budget of EUR 38 million – of which EUR 20 million are covered by the EU – the EUPM involves around 900 staff including 500 police officers, 50 international civilian experts and more than 300 local personnel, with the task of overseeing around 16,000 police officers in 43 districts of Bosnia’s two autonomous regions - the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic - plus the state border service and the novel Security Ministry and Information Agency. The majority of the personnel have been seconded by the 15 EU Member States, although 18 “third” countries also participate in the mission (EU, http://ue.eu. int/eupm/pdf/EUPMoverview.pdf). The largest EU contingent is from Germany 16 16���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The 1995 Dayton Accords formalized the end of hostilities in Bosnia and designed the constitution of the new independent federation of BiH. It is interesting to note that the peace agreement was reached in the U.S. through the mediation of Richard Holbrooke in particular and only after the NATO intervention. The EU has been widely criticized for its inaction. As a matter of fact, Bosnia and the whole Balkan region have become a “question of honor” for the EU, which tries now to re-establish its credibility in the region. 17 17����������������������������������������������������������������������������� The so-called “������������������������������������������������������������� Stabilisation and Association Process” includes a variety of institution-building programmes supported by the European Commission and aimed at, on the one hand, pacifying and stabilizing Bosnia and the whole Balkan region, and on the other, facilitating the harmonization of regulations and legislations in view of a future integration in the EU. About the prospect of integration see also the letter of Solana to Amnesty International, 03.12.2002�. 18 18�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The only executive power, if it can be considered as such, is the authority of the EUPM Head of Mission to recommend the removal from office non-compliant police officers, whose behavior and performance does not fit the agreed standards. Law enforcement remains under BiH ownership.

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with 85 officers comprising 15% of the force. Communication and coordination of these multinational personnel is assured by English as the operational language. It should also be stressed that the EUPM has been cooperating with NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) which, apart from providing military advice to the Bosnian Ministry of Defense, has been responsible for the security of the international personnel in the area, including obviously EUPM staff, until 2004 when its mandate was taken over by the EU using NATO assets (see below). Despite its long term commitment, the EUPM is rather limited in scope and could in reality be considered as a “re-hatting” of participants from the preceding UN operation. In addition, the fact that the mission has no executive powers and that its security is still at the end assured by NATO assets makes the first ESDP experiment on the ground more like an institution-building exercise rather than a real crisis-management performance. One of the major functions of the mission, though, is one of public relations for the EU. As stated by Solana at the opening ceremony of the EUPM in Sarajevo, one of the goals represented by the mission is “the continuing development of the EU’s external identity”, and in particular, “the fact that the Union’s first operation is a police mission – a civilian mission – demonstrates our commitment to a comprehensive crisis management approach that brings real added value” (Solana S0004/03). Concordia – EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Concordia is the name-code for the first military mission conducted under the EU insignia. It was launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31 March 2003 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1371 and upon request by the President of FYROM Trajkovski. The mandate for EUFOR was initially granted until 30 September 2003 but after a request from Macedonian authorities the mandate was extended until 15 December 2003. It should be recalled that between February and August 2001 an armed conflict between ethnic Albanian extremists and the Macedonian army escalated from small-scale local violence in the Macedonian-Kosovo border region up to the brink of a full-fledged civil war. As a consequence of the Ohrid Framework peace agreement, three different NATO operations were deployed to pacify the region. As a matter of fact, the newly created Rapid Reaction Force (EUFOR) took over from Operation Amber Fox, a NATO-run mission under German command19. 19 19�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The 2001 Ohrid Peace Agreement signed on 13 August 2001 has been the basis for the deployment of 3 NATO missions in FYROM: Operation Essential Harvest (15.6.2001– 27.9.2001) for the collection of weapons belonging to ethnic Albanian guerillas������������ , Operation Amber Fox (27.9.2001–15.12.2002) for the protection and security to the EU and OSCE observers, and finally Operation Allied Harmony (16.12.2002–31.3.2003) for confidencebuilding and general security. ����������������� See www.nato.int.

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With a budget of around six millions EUR, the aims of the mission were to contribute to a stable secure environment for the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, and in particular, to provide for the security of the EU and OSCE peace plan monitors on the one side20, and “to the strengthening of the democratic processes and to enhancing economic development” on the other (Council 6916/03). By showing a visible international presence, the EUFOR was to promote a general atmosphere of security, to build confidence within the population and to deter the resurgence of ethnically motivated violence and instability (EC Delegation in Macedonia website). In addition, one of the tasks of the mission was not only to liaise with the local authorities but also to facilitate the work of other international organizations present in the field. As a matter of fact, the international community has been involved in the area since 1992, and in particular the EU has been assisting FYROM with substantial financial as well as humanitarian aid21. In this context, “the EU’s take-over of the international security presence (...) is a further step in the Union’s growing, long-term commitment to stability as well as to economic growth and prosperity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the region. The military engagement supports and reinforces the EU’s policy and the already substantial EC assistance to the country (...) The EU-led operation complements and supports these measures” (Council 6916/1/03). At the operational level, the mission engaged some 400 personnel (320 military and 80 civilian), and while the majority of the troops stemmed from France (188), Germany (70) and Belgium (40), a total of 27 countries – the EU15 except Denmark and Ireland plus 7 non-EU NATO allies and 7 new NATO members – contributed to the operation. Applying the Berlin Plus formula, the EU for the first time was able to use NATO assets and capabilities. Although under the advice of the European Council, the EU PSC exercised overall political and strategic direction for the operation, and the mission was closely co-ordinated at the political and military levels with NATO, which provided planning, logistics, and communications (Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP). Interesting enough, the operation commander was German Admiral Rainer Feist, who was NATO’s deputy commander for Europe, and who had already directed the antecedent NATO mission; and the Operation Headquarters were placed at SHAPE, NATO’s military headquarters outside Brussels. 20 20������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The Ohrid Framework Agreement includes constitutional amendments, legislative modifications (to assure equal treatment and protection of the Albanian ethnic group) as well as measures for implementation and confidence-building. 21 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������� From 1992 to 1998, the UN dispatched a peacekeeping force to Macedonia as a measure of “preventive deployment” (UNPROFOR, since 1995 called UNPREDEP), while the OSCE undertook various initiatives to improve interethnic relations through its long-term mission in Skopje. The support instruments put in place by the EU have been funding under the EU Phare Programme; the 1998 Cooperation Agreement by which this former Yugoslav republic received asymmetric trade preferences with the EU; CARDS; the Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed by FYROM in the spring of 2001.

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At an official ceremony for the launching of Operation Concordia, the at the time in office NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, stated that “as NATO hands over the mission to the European Union, a new chapter in European security has opened. By taking on its first military mission, the EU is demonstrating that its project of a European Security and Defence Policy has come to an age” (NATO 31.03.2003). By the same token, Commission President Prodi acclaimed it as a “significant step forward in the long process of European integration” (Prodi SPEECH/03/167). High in symbolic value and “historical” significance, the operation was the first testing ground not only for the military component of the ESDP but also for the cooperation with NATO. The success of the operation is however a contested issue. It is true that the operation completed its mandate without problems, yet the major criticism is that Concordia cannot be considered as a “genuine” EU operation since it has been conducted under the umbrella of NATO, which not only provided most of the capabilities but influenced the strategic direction with its distinctive political and military thinking. Actually it is contended that NATO in reality retained its mandate to carry out “peace-enforcement” in case the situation deteriorated, while low-end peacekeeping tasks were left to EU responsibility (Bono 2003). In addition, most analysts have stressed the modest scale of the EU’s involvement in terms of size, aims, as well as concerning its allegedly no-risk character and semi-independent functioning mechanisms. EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima) The second EU civilian operation followed operation Concordia in FYROM and replaced the OSCE police mission, which had been in place since 2001. Again after invitation of the Macedonian President, who assured full cooperation from its government, the EU launched on 15 December 2003 the mission Proxima for an initial period of one year. Similarly to the mandate of the EUPM in Bosnia, the operation’s main aim, as stated in Council Decision 2003/681/CFSP, was to consolidate law and order and in particular to monitor, mentor and advise the country’s police in the exercise of all its functions and most importantly in their fight against organized crime as well as to promote European policing standards. Specific tasks include assistance in the practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the Minister of Interior and the creation of a border police. Moreover, as the code-name already suggests, the fundamental rationale of the mission is to work with the local police in order to restore confidence and trust in the population. As a matter of fact, the majority of the ca. 200 personnel – uniformed police officers and international civilians – who make up the mission, are deployed at various border crossings and in local police stations all over Macedonia. It is interesting to note that the EU police are not expected to intervene directly, should ethnic violence break out. In fact only

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some 30 officers are armed and their primary duty is not so much to assist the local police, rather, to ensure the security of the mission. Once more a low level mission, the mandate of Proxima is limited both in scope and size. As it was the case for the other two missions, the EU took over from other international organizations – NATO and OSCE – and found an already pacified and relatively stabilized situation. With a broader and long-termed definition of “crisis”, the tasks foreseen for the operation could better fit a peace-building or developmental framework. Even if one considered the operation as an opportunity for “training on the job” for allegedly common EU police forces, the participation of external contributors as well as the fact that the personnel involved had already been taking part in similar missions under the aegis of the UN or of OSCE, would weaken this argument. The lack of urgency in deciding and implementing the action further supports the thesis that this is a relatively safe and non-controversial mission, which can hardly be considered as a major test for EU actions in the sphere of security and defense. Finally, the success of Proxima can be ascertained more in the wider context of the EU strategy towards enhancing its visibility on the ground and diffusing its normative standards, certainly also for reasons of regional stability but, most importantly, in view of a future integration of FYROM into the EU. Artemis – EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) As it is normal for a very young institution with only limited experience, there are many “first” times to report. With the adoption by the Council of the Joint Action 9957/03 on 5 June 2003, the EU launched its first operation outside Europe – actually even outside its “near abroad”. The legal foundation is to be found in UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003), which authorized the deployment of an interim emergency multinational force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (and in particular in the region around Bunia) and set out the framework conditions for the conduction of the operation. Since 1999, the area has been ransacked by ethnic clashes, chiefly between the Lendu and Hema communities, which have left some 50,000 dead and 500,000 displaced. Despite the presence of the UN mission “MONUC”, whose main mandate was and is to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the belligerent parties, the situation heightened up at the beginning of 2003 and the UN called for a renewed ceasefire and the deployment of a peaceenforcement mission (under Chapter VII) 22. 22 22�������������������������������������������������������������������������� The UN Operation (MONUC) was initially launched on 30 November 1999. The mandate was mainly to supervise the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe for a cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces in DRC. The two Congolese rebel groups Movement for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) were also signing

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Under the initiative of France, which also acted as “Framework Nation” providing the majority of the troops as well as the Operation Commander and the Force Commander, and using the ESDP framework, a multi-national peaceenforcement mission made up of about 1,850 soldiers from 9 countries – France, Belgium and Canada were the key contributors – was deployed to secure the capital and its immediate surroundings with the final aim of stabilizing the security conditions and contribute to the humanitarian improvement in the area. The military objective in particular was to separate the militias operating in Bunia and to compel them to leave the city before the expiration of an ultimatum. Worth noting is also the pace with which the operation was decided upon and conducted: only five days after the UN Security Council took the decision to deploy a French-led multinational force charged with using military force to restore security in Bunia (30 May), the EU announced the mission and on 6 June the first advance team had already reached Bunia to secure the airport while until 11 June the majority of the troops had arrived in the headquarters in Uganda. On 12 June, the Security Council formally launched Operation Artemis and on the same day the EU Council adopted the Operation Plan. By the end of June, with a total of 7 militants dead – actually the first casualties in the history of the ESDP – the troops had already managed to secure the city so that a number of civilians could return. As a consequence, the mission was considered successfully accomplished – although attacks and massacres continued in the Ituri province, 80 kilometres north of Bunia – and ended as planned on 1 September 2003 when a 3,800–strong UN mission (MONUC II) took over with a Security Council mandate to police the entire Ituri region. Placed entirely under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the new MONUC has a robust mandate and it is allowed to take the necessary action, including to use force, “to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”(������ UN SC resolution 1493, www.un.int)��������������������������������������������������� . However, the resurgence of violence in June 2004 in particular has shown that the UN mission dis not prove to be efficient enough. The EU has been eager to trumpet its success and to stress its “coming of age” in the military arena, since for the first the EU has managed to conduct a full operation by autonomous means, without even concerting with NATO. Although the experience can be considered as a test-case for the decision-making mechanisms set up in Nice – which worked indeed very quickly – and in particular for the “coalition of the willing” option, fundamental questions cast doubts on the very nature of the EU “participation” in the operation. As a matter of fact, it was France which the UN had commissioned to lead the multinational force, and not parties. The Agreement included provisions on the normalization of the situation along the DRC border; the control of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups; the holding of a national dialogue; the need to address security concerns; and the establishment of a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups (www.un.org/dpko).

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the EU. Only the French resolution and commitment to the ESDP brought the EU in. Both from the point of view of political legitimacy – already assured by the UN mandate – and of material support, the EU involvement was not necessary and minor in practice. The initiative for action, the implementation and the financial burden was left to few of the Member States, while the others contented themselves with sealing the decision with the EU stamp. The fact that the UN after only 3 months had been able to put up a much stronger peacekeeping force can also be regarded as a further proof of the limited practical impact of the EU-led mission. It should also be remembered in this context that individual Member States are not new at this type of interventions. Actually, without committing the EU and in accordance with their respective post-colonial notion of “spheres of influence or responsibility”, the United Kingdom led the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 while France successfully intervened in the Ivory Coast in 2002 (Ortega 2001). Once more the major result for the EU as a security actor was more in terms of political visibility and public relations, as the starry-blue flag flew beside the UN and French one, rather than for what concerns the efficient deployment and utilization of the ESDP assets. It was also again evident that it is not so much early warning or genuine EU-wide humanitarian concerns which motivate an action, but that the willingness of at least one major Member State is essential for initiative and decision-making. EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) On 16 July 2004 the EU launched its first “real” Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) (Council 2004/523/CFSP). Approximately 10 international civilian experts have been sent to “support, mentor and advise” for an initial period of 12 months the Georgian governmental authorities in reforming their criminal justice system as a way to complement the already existing EU assistance activities in the country. Although inserted in the framework of the ESDP, this mission is in reality not dissimilar from missions “outsourced” and allocated by a variety of international organizations or states (the OSCE or USAID for instance) to developmental NGOs. As a matter of fact, projects with analogous rationale and scope are routinely awarded to external civilian expertise by the Commission under the hat of EUROPAID or the Justice and Home Affairs Directorate. The inclusion of EUJUST THEMIS as a ESDP-type mission is thus doubtful, not only because of the limited extent of the terms of reference, but above all because of the very thin link between the ESDP strategic objectives and the overall aims of the mission. Extending the ESDP to include operations which do not pertain to the field of direct security and defense risks to water down the general purpose of the policy and to create confusion between institutional competencies and responsibilities. However, such an engagement in the field of medium-term institution-building follows the much heralded rhetorical deeds that the Union is fostering a durable security area based on normative assumptions and characterized by diffuse “human” security

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concerns. It should be also noted that the interest in improving the judicial system in a country like Georgia is directly linked to the perceived threat of incoming criminality from the area. The strategy sees an eradication of the phenomenon locally and preventively, that is, before it spreads into the Union. EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR – ALTHEA) In temporal order, the Council decided on 12 July 2004 to launch in early December 2004 – after the departure of NATO – a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina code-named ALTHEA (Council 2004/570/CFSP). The EU Force (EUFOR) took over responsibility from NATO-led SFOR and hereditated a similar Chapter VII mandate (including the use of force for self-defense and/or security reasons). As it was the case for Artemis, the new mission resorted to the “Berlin Plus” agreement, thus making use of NATO assets and capabilities. Interestingly, the 7,000 troops stem from the same constributing countries which manned the NATO mission. Once again, in practice, there was simply a change of political hat and responsibility, whereby on the ground – for what concerns the lower level chains of command and the capabilities as well as the terms of engagement – no major variation can be detected. By the same token, it should be noted that all along the Council document, it is stressed how the medium and long term objectives are closely related to the future integration of BiH in the EU, the first step of which has been the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Judged as militarily stabilized after the relatively long deployment of NATO, the mission has more a political rather than purely security scope. The promise of membership and the EU regional commitment testify on the one side for the practical engagement of the Union in the creation of a broad European security space (of the kind of an enlarged security community), but on the other, it could be seen as just another element in the framework of accession conditionality. The long period of discussions antecedent the decision to deploy a EU mission as well as the improved situation on the ground cast doubts on the EU definition of the term “crisis” and on the utilization of the mission as a test-case for the strategy at large. Overview of Missions until 2007 and Analysis After 2004, the EU has been very active in and outside Europe. The following is a brief account of the actions undertaken in the framework of the ESDP until March 2007. Although they do not fit into the time limit of this research, the aims, means, and ways in which the missions have been or are conducted can add important insights into the further direction of ESDP implementation. A number of civilian and few military missions characterize the record of ESDP activities. In Europe, the EU BAM Ukraine/Moldova (since December 2005) aims at providing assistance and job training to border control personnel, while EUPAT Macedonia (FYROM) supports the development of an efficient

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reform of the criminal justice system according to European standards by assisting and mentoring the police and border police in the fight against corruption and organized crime. Moreover, the EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo), consisting of 25 members based in Pristina, is tasked to study and prepare for a future EU mission taking over the mandate of UNMIK (the UN mission in Kosovo) in the field of rule of law. In Africa, EUPOL Kinshasa, including 30 staff of which 19 police officers, was deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from January to December 2005 upon UN request to implement a police training project and set up an Integrated Police Unit. Always in Congo, EUSEC-DR, launched in June 2005 and still ongoing, deployed 8 experts seconded by the Member States and by EU institutions to provide advice and assistance to the Congolese administration in charge of security and integration of the army, while EUFOR Congo, initiated in July and concluded in November 2006, was a 1,200 troops-strong military operation in support of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to supervise the conduction of elections. In addition, a EU support mission for AMIS II Darfur (Sudan), headquartered in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia) and including 8 military experts, 1 senior police officer, and other Member States police officers as trainers, were established in July 2005 to support the African Union (AU) in the training of AU military observers and civilian police and to provide planning and technical assistance In the Middle East, since April 2005, the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS), composed of four police experts, was set up at the premises of the Palestinian Interior Ministry in Ramallah in order to coordinate EU support for Palestinian police reform. On the basis of their Police Development Programme, 33 unarmed personnel without executive powers operate through EUPOL COPPS, launched in January 2006, to advise and mentor Palestinian Civil police in the implementation of the programme, and to coordinate international assistance to the Palestinian police. A similar aim is targeted by EU-JUST LEX IRAQ, based at the Council Secretariat in Brussels with a liaison office at the British Embassy in Baghdad and made up of 20 personnel, which has been offering training courses (located within the EU or in the Gulf) in senior management and criminal investigation to some 770 high and mid-level officials from the judiciary, police, and the prison administration with the aim to facilitate the creation of a common criminal justice culture. Finally, EU BAM Rafah on the border between Egypt and Gaza to monitor the procedures of border crossing according to the November 2005 Israeli-Palestinian agreement on movement and access, and to train Palestinian border personnel. In Asia, the AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia was set up in March 2006 with the aim of monitoring the peace agreement achieved by the combatants in August 2005. Together with 91 personnel from 5 ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), 128 unarmed military and police officers (seconded from EU Member States but also from Norway and Switzerland), are tasked to monitor the demobilization of the rebels, the destruction of their weapons, the human rights situation, and the process of legislation change,

Table 7.1

Synopsis of ESDP Missions (including aims and means)

1

Date Jan. 2003 – ongoing

Name EUPM BiH

Location Bosnia-Herzeg.

Aims Monitor/advise police

2

March – Dec. 2003

Concordia

FYROM

3

June – Sept. 2003

ARTEMIS

DRC Ituri

Monitor peaceagreement Peace-making

4

Dec. 2003 – Dec. 2005 EUPOL PROXIMA

FYROM

5 6

July 2004 – July 2005 Dec. 2004 – ongoing

EUJUST THEMIS EUFOR ALTHEA

Georgia BiH

7 8 9 10

April 2005 – ongoing May 2005 – ongoing July 2005 – ongoing July 2005 – ongoing

EUPOLKINSHASA EUSEC CONGO EUJUST LEX Support AU AMISII

DRC DRC Iraq Darfur (Sudan)

11 Sept. 2005 – Dec.2006 AMM Monitoring Mission 12 Nov. 2005 – ongoing EU BAM Rafah

Ways Integrated but autonomous Integrated, NATO assets

Military (1500) Police (200)

Short term, Member States Integrated, autonomous

Civilian (9) Military (7000)

independent Integrated, NATO assets

Police (30) Military (8) Civilian (20) + police (?) Military (19)+civilian(16 Civilian + military (193)

Integrated, autonomous Integrated, autonomous independent independent

Police/civilian (70)

independent independent

Ukraine/Moldova

14 Jan. 2006 15 Jan. – June 2006 16 July – Nov. 2006

EU BAM Ukraine/ Moldova EUPOL COPPS EUPAT EUFOR Congo

Monitor peaceagreement Monitor border agreement, train Train border officers

Palestine FYROM DRC

Advise/train police Monitor/advise police Monitor elections

Police/Custom (69) + local civilian (50) Police (33) + civilian (1) Police experts (30) Military (1200)

17 April 2006–

EUPT Kosovo

Kosovo

Planning

Civilian (25)

13 Dec. 2005 – ongoing

Aceh/Indonesia

Monitor/advise police reform Advise criminal justice Monitor peace agreement Monitor/advise police Advice security Train police Train military and police

Means (Type) Police (440)/civilian (60) Military (400)

Gaza/Egypt

With ASEAN

independent independent Integrated (UN), but autonomous ?(UN)

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and to investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the peace agreement. As Table 7.1 illustrates, in the span of less than 7 years since its inception as a new policy area, the ESDP has not only produced new institutional and bureaucratic structures, but it has also been operational with approx. 1,200 police/civilian and around 10,200 military personnel on the ground for missions of a variety of length and scope. If one considers the ambitions set out in the Petersberg tasks, the EU has now gained experience, albeit limited, in all the sectors of reference: “joint disarmament operations” in Indonesia, “humanitarian and rescue tasks” in Congo, “military advice and assistance tasks” in Darfur, “conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks” in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Indonesia, as well as “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation” in Congo with operation Artemis (where the role of the ESDP is questionable). Civilian Rule of Law operations constitute however the majority of the missions undertaken until now. It has been emphasized in several occasions and in particular in connection with the decisions about the deployment of a number of these missions how the internal security of the countries concerned is ineluctably linked with the internal security of the EU: this rationale in the justification of the interventions is significative for what concerns the long-term multidimensional perspective of the Union. All the same, the width and depth of the operations’ mandates remain limited, and their primarily advisory, monitoring, and training nature – functions which the Commission has been routinely outsourcing through development, aid, and JHA programmes – begs the question on how effective the impact of this type of mission may be on the structural development (they all deal with reforms at the police and criminal justice level) of the receiving countries on the one hand, and on the overall security of the Union on the other. In short, although under now the aegis of the ESDP, these civilian crisis management operations do not represent anything new and do not tackle the apices of the “crisis”, but they work towards the prevention of future events and the extension of specifically European norms and practices both in the near abroad and globally. This is of course one of the recognized strength of the Union: its capacity to attract, to operate by setting standards and benchmarks, and to induce change through the use of soft methods. The EU can draw from long-standing experience in the sector by pooling pre-existing capacities at the civilian level. Success is much trumpeted, but it is hardly surprising. Where the ESDP has not yet delivered what it promises to, however, is in the military field. The few military missions deployed under the ESDP hat have shown high dependability in terms of both material and political capabilities (leadership, interest, and commitment) from NATO or individual member states. The dominant practice attributable to autonomous ESDP missions is of civilian peace-building, rather than real crisis management, peacekeeping, or even peacemaking. The explicit intentions of a) giving a tangibly operational dimension to ESDP, b) putting to test the arrangements adopted so far, and c) creating precedents

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and learning lessons with a view to future missions have been achieved (Biscop 2004). Above all, the operations have been an important visibility tool and a kind of public relations’ device used to boost the image of the EU as a credible and effective international security actor in the making.

In Search for Discourse-Action Coherence: Analysis The review of the institutional mechanisms and of the actions conducted until now under the authority of the EU and in particular in the ESDP framework reveals weaknesses and inconsistencies with what the dominant discourse promises. In March 2003, Prodi speaking about Iraq and the immobility of the Europeans said: “Despite dozens of high-sounding speeches announcing the birth of a European power or ‘superpower’, after so much waffle about the pros and cons of a ‘common foreign and security policy’, plainly those mechanisms are not sufficient” (SPEECH/03/126). Apart from the evident awareness of a “power” ambition, which will be discussed in the next section, it is important to highlight that the evaluation of whether the mechanisms are sufficient or efficient depends on the benchmark constructed in the dominant discourse preceding and surrounding the actions. A comparison between dominant discourse and behavior in terms of outputs and outcomes may explain Prodi’s negative stance and a number of other ambiguities which the ESDP is so often accused of. Table 7.2 simplifies the argument. First of all, the subjects of the action, both in decision-making and operational terms, are the Member States. This obviously comes as no surprise. It is however interesting to note how the dominant discourse tends to construct the Union as the final actor, meaning that it seems to acquire its own identity in the collectivity. Yet, the reality of the facts is that, though high in symbolism, the only real signs of EU security actorness are the blue-starry flag and the existence of physical central institutions in Brussels which are said to foster the creation of an infant esprit de corps, which in turn does not manage to trump national material (in terms of retribution paid) or emotional allegiance particularly at the military level. Without the commitment and engagement of national assets and capabilities by major EU members, there would be no ESDP or EU action in general. The fact that some Member States have preferred in the past to act autonomously for example in the Ivory Coast or Sierra Leone – France and Britain respectively (Olsen 2002b), and the issues related to the subjectivity or “ownership” of the missions when “coalitions of the willing” or external contributors participate (including the use of NATO’s assets) cast important doubts on the assertion that the EU be the actor on the ground. The Seville European Council of June 2002 has looked into the high degree of third party participations, but, as observed by Missiroli, a number of unresolved questions remain: “how many troops are acceptable from third States in an EU-mandated operation? How involved may third States become in the development of a concept for operations? How heavy may a third party’s role be

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Table 7.2

Discourse-Action Coherence Discourse (ch. 6)

Behavior (Outputs and Outcomes) (ch.7) Subject The EU Member States (coalition of the willing) both in institutions and operations management Referent EU citizens Mainly Value interests Object highlighted both Vital (integrity, independence, defense in institutions and operations’ mandates. type) and Value Interests (peace and Referent objects stability) individuated in the countries of operations Predicate Defend, keep peace, Mainly crisis make peace, manage management intended crisis, prevent conflict as peace-building (peace-building) (low end), limited peacekeeping Means Mixed. Prevalence of Mixed military and civilian. Military as last civilian. Actions for resort. Recognized need improving capabilities to improve capabilities Ways Integral with other Integral with other measures and/or measures, multilateral partners Location Global Global Time Quick deployment Quick deployment

Coherence (D=B?) Questionable EU autonomous personality

No direct relationship

No defense, no peacemaking

OK

OK

OK OK

in daily command and control” in order for these actions to be considered ESDP missions (Missiroli 2003b: 501–502). The EU provides a “legal” framework for action, but beyond that, Member-states continue to bear the responsibility of delivery. Symbolically the EU is however represented as the subject of the actions through flags and insignias: the personnel on the ground, whether civilian or military, wear their own national emblem as well as the EU blue (not dissimilarly from UN operations). Interestingly enough, even if not citizens of Member States, also troops from other countries wear badges with European colors as it was the case for the 320 soldiers from 27 countries engaged in EUFOR in Macedonia (Vince 2003). The referent object of security is similarly blurred in practice. Ultimately, stability in Europe in terms of internal security (spill-over of political crises) seems to be the dominant objective the missions are deployed to secure. However, this is only a secondary fall-out of the operations. In general, the operations have as clear referent objects, or mission objectives, institution-building or stabilization of the situation in the receiving countries. There have been no operations to date for the

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rescue of EU citizens abroad, reinforced territorial control of direct EU borders, or other forms of civilian or military cooperation among Members for the prevention or defense against direct threats to the EU. There is no “defense” component whatsoever in the institutional strategic planning or in the action on the ground which could justify the inclusion of the word “defense” into the title of the policy. Actually the fight against terrorism, discursively included into the realm of the ESDP, is institutionally attributed to the second pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, and even for what concerns the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the ESDP has no mechanisms in place to tackle the threat. The predicate is thus centered on crisis prevention and peace-building rather than the full range of crisis management including peacemaking and peace-enforcement. Coherently with this and with the dominant discourse, the means set up and used confirm a predilection for civilian rather than military means. As stated by Prodi talking about ESDP operations: “These examples show that, where this is needed, the Union is capable of a modulated response that takes account of each individual situation and can include aspects of hard security. However, I am convinced that wars are not won by weapons alone” (Prodi SPEECH/04/170). Yet, the Union has not been involved in any “war” and there are no prospects of such a peace-enforcement role in the near future: rumors of an involvement of the EU in Afghanistan, a more robust intervention in Sudan, or a joint peacekeeping mission with Russia in Moldova are at the moment not credible (Reid 2001). The “modulated response” Prodi refers to in his speech is of limited scope and its efficacy and efficiency are difficult to assess, especially because the specific missions are included in a set of other measures outside the ESDP area of responsibility. Critics denounce the incoherence in terms of the use of mixed means and highlight a number of problems related to the availability and readiness of financial and operational resources, long-term sustainability, and burden-sharing. The flexibility and adaptability heralded in discourses is thus in strategic practice considered a limitation and not a strength (van Oudenaren 2001; Missiroli 2001a; De Schoutheete 2004). On a different but related matter, the ways in which the means have been designed and employed respect the principle of integration with a multiplicity of measures of different nature (economic aid and development for instance) and multilateralism. Operations involving the use of military force have been legitimated by the United Nations Security Council and conducted together with other partners be it NATO or individual states. Yet, the EU seems to be reluctant to place its operations under UN command and seeks mere legitimation rather than full-fledged cooperation: a case in point was ARTEMIS where the EU mission differentiated itself from the UN mission, or ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EU preferred to conduct autonomous (albeit with NATO substantial support) rather than integrate in a broader UN framework (Wolf 2002). For what concerns the location of the action (Where), there is a non-specified coincidence between words and deeds. The institutional outlook and the operational stretching confirm a global commitment. Yet, the majority of the operations are in the near abroad and involve low intensity situations as foreseen in the planning

Grand Strategy in Practice: Testing Coherence between Discourse and Action 231

(see Chapter 5). The natural loci of intervention are the Balkans, where the impetus for the ESDP originated: “For years, European economic and political success was unmatched by our ability to project a common foreign policy. We talked a lot. We issued hand-wringing declarations. (...) But only with the Balkan crisis have we begun to engage directly in conflict prevention and crisis management” (Patten SPEECH/99/215, see also Solana Nn02/00���������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� , Nn03/00, Nn04/00). Although the European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force has no boundaries in principle, capabilities and individual Member State’s interests dictate the geographical stretching. Figure 7.2 graphically summarizes the geographical reach of the ESDP until March 2007. Pessimist commentators at the beginning of the ESDP could not imagine such a global exposure. Interestingly this map can be compared with the map in Figure 6.1 where a clear correspondence between discourse and action exist. However, the definition of “global” is subject to case-by-case interpretation. A direct and autonomous ESDP engagement in places like Latin America, the Middle East (apart very small peacebuilding missions), or Asia is deemed unlikely for the time being. The institutional set-up and operational management suggest that the timing (when) of the reactions is relatively, and for some, surprisingly, speedy. It should be stressed that the functioning of the ESDP mechanisms is mainly geared towards prevention rather than proper management: it has proven easier for the Union to decide on actions when the heat is off the crises, rather than to respond promptly to situation in which violence is imminent or already occurring. The ESDP “early warning” system set up in Brussels is limited in terms of resources and may duplicate the efforts of other institutions like the Commission

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(which has a conflict prevention unit) or national intelligence agencies. Since the ESDP is considered as an integral part of larger and more comprehensive “security” initiatives including aid and development, it is particularly difficult to define what a crisis consists of and when it unleashes. Finally, the assessment of the EU behavior in the field of the ESDP should be checked against the stated aims in the European Security Strategy.

Table 7.3

Comparison between Grand Strategy Aims (ESS) and Missions Aims ESS Aims

a) to extend the areas of security around Europe b) to reaffirm an efficient multilateralism based on the cornerstone of the UN while underlying the necessity to engage in a preventive manner and to act when and where the rules are not respected c) to answer to the global threats of terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and organized criminality d) to make use of several means, of which force is only one of many and will be used only as a last resort

Missions Aims Rule of Law and reform of internal structures Rule of Law

Rule of Law Rule of Law

All the ESS aims can be achieved through “Rule of Law” missions and focus more on an enlarged conception of security than “defense”. This means that the creation of the ESDP, apart from the introduction of a military component (“as a last resort”), can be considered as an additional tool in an already over-bureaucratized institution rather than a complete change in the direction followed until now by other EU policies. Actually the only real addition, understated in the dominant official discourse, is precisely the military component.

Implications for Actorness and Power Perceptions: An Assessment What do the above-described institutional outputs and mission outcomes suggest about the EU as a security actor? How can they be assessed in terms of actorness? Although on the one hand there seems to be a partial coincidence between the discourse and the actions, on the other, there is a certain tension between grand aspirations and practical limitations. That the EU aspires at becoming an important international and security actor is no secret. The previous chapter has shown how the concept of power and actorness is used by the EU leadership for rhetorical autocommunication and projection and for the construction of international identity.

Grand Strategy in Practice: Testing Coherence between Discourse and Action 233

The question here asks whether this rhetorical construction finds application in the Union’s actions. The access to a particular set of means (military) does not necessarily transform the Union automatically into a particular kind of actor or power, although capabilities generally do tend to suggest a certain inclination toward a particular posture or strategic culture (like the possession of nuclear weapons for instance). The literature on EU power and actorness has been increasing exponentially after the creation of the ESDP. In particular, discussions about whether and if so, in which way the Union can be considered as an international actor (Jorgensen 1995; Hill and Wallace 1996; Rosecrance 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Cameron 1998; Ginsberg 1998; Waever 2000b; Bertelsmann 2000; Telo 2001; Cannizzaro 2002; Larsen 2002; Smith KE 2003a) have been integrated with analyses where the concept of power has been retaken and expanded to explain the new EU’s ambitions (Smith KE 2000; Guttman 2000; Stavidris 2001; Tanner 2001; Rotfeld 2001; Rummell 2002; Moravcsik 2002; Whitman 2002; Manners 2002b and 2006; Matlary 2002 and 2006; Hill 2003; Salmon and Shepherd 2003; Giegerich and Wallace 2004; Haine 2004a and 2004b; Treacher 2004; Maull 2005; Caseey 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Sjursen 2006). The academic discourse thus feeds and reinforces the EU official discourse, but it generally does not methodologically differentiate between prescriptive assertions and identity self-definitions expressed by the EU leadership, analytical accounts, or behavior. The separation of identity statements of the “to be”-type pertaining to discourse, analyzed in Chapter 6, from the “to do”-type behavior should allow for a more systematic assessment of whether words are then translated into practice, and thus confirm or negate the existence of a fully fledged correspondence between the self-defined identity and the externally perceived one (international personality). Short, even if the EU, its acolytes, or academic observers declare that the Union is an international actor or power (whether civil, civilian, normative, etc.), the lack of consequent and appropriate behaviors will disconfirm the rhetorical exercise to the eyes – and ears – of the international community, thus damaging credibility and status among its peers (mainly other states), and ultimately initiate an existential crisis which might have deep and long-lasting consequences for the success of the European federal project as a whole. Actorness as a concept denotes the centrality of “action” or, in other words, behavior. What you do is ultimately more important than what you are, what you would like to be or do, or what you say you would like to do. As it has been pointed out previously, there is a clear link between action and identity, and the actions determine how an entity is perceived in the outside world: the perception of actions and behaviors not only contributes to the recognition of a group as an entity by the perceivers, but it also informs the ensuing expectations of future behaviors (Castano and Sacchi and Hays Gries 2003). The discussions on EU actorness have been initiated by the ambiguous “presence” of the Community/ Union particularly with reference to non-CFSP/ESDP actions (Allen and Smith 1998: 49). As a matter of fact, presence is only one component of actorness: an

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actor is defined by Bretherton and Vogler as “an entity that exhibits a degree of autonomy from its external environment, and indeed from its internal constituents, and which is capable of volition or purpose” (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 5), and it is constituted by presence, opportunity, and capability. Presence is a static condition stemming from the mere relationship between internal structures and external expectations or the mere impact upon international relations (Hill 1993a; Ginsberg 2001b); opportunity refers to the existence of external contexts enabling or constraining action on which the entity has no control whatsoever; and capability is framed as the capacity to respond effectively to external expectations and opportunities (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). This definition is problematic from different perspectives, but in particular it does not analytically differentiate between “conditions” external to the entity (and this is an incoherence in Bretherton and Vogler, since they assume that the actor can “exhibit a degree of autonomy from the environment) and internal reformulations of the identity or presence (which does not involve any type of action). Christopher Hill has individuated as essential requirements of actorness the delimited and autonomous possession of certain structural prerequisites (Hill 1993a: 309). As in classical realist and neorealist IR theory, actorness is thus linked not only to state sovereignty but also to the presence of certain capabilities such as military, political, and diplomatic capacities as well as a strong economy (Waltz 1979: 131). In this sense, actorness is inevitably related to power as the ability to influence others’ actions using different “capabilities”: expert power and the use of knowledge to influence; reward power (positive or negative conditionality); legitimate power (granted by others); referent power by affiliation; or coercive power related to the use or threat of use of force (French and Raven 1959). How does the EU score in terms of actorness and power so defined thanks to the ESDP? Does the acquisition of military means – capabilities essential for the exercise of coercion – suffice in the transformation of the nature of the Union as an actor? It is argued here that the existence of outcomes rather than outputs is an important indicator of the perception of the EU as a power. The fact that institutions are created but not put into full use as the dominant policy discourse would demand severely affect the definition of power. Assuming however that the EU as an autonomous entity does perform a role in international politics, how can this role be qualitatively assessed? First of all, it is interesting to note that discussions about the role of the EU in international affairs have predominantly, explicitly or implicitly, used “states” as benchmarks, thus confirming the assumption, at least for what concerns dominant academic discourses, that the EU can be somewhat compared to a state and hence be considered as one. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the 70s when the ESDP was yet unthinkable, one of the central questions of debate related to the final aim of European integration, was whether the EC would eventually become a “predatory, militarized European state” (Galtung 1973 cited in Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 197), or whether it will develop into an undefined “civilian” power (Duchene 1973). Although at the time and until the 1990s at least, the subject of consideration was the European Community, a

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considerably different entity than the current EU, a number of reflections have been made departing from those initial rather prescriptive hypotheses, despite Gnesotto’s relegation of the debate on Europe’s nature and form of power to an issue of the past (Gnesotto 2004c: 1). In particular, two opposed arguments have been advanced and developed. On the one hand, Duchene and his contemporary friends focus on stressing civilian components and “soft power” rather than the need of military capabilities for the successful definition of actorness. Taking Japan and Germany as examples of success – and again implicitly referring to states, albeit with at the time limited political and military independence, as terms of reference – Duchene saw as defining conditions of a “civilian power” economic power, absence of military, and willingness to diffuse civilian and democratic standards: “The EC will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner characteristics. They are primarily: civilian ends and means and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance (Duchêne 1973: 20). Such a normative stance is maintained even after the introduction of the ESDP by Stavidris who argues that the new military component is actually reinforcing the civilian concept because it is only by wielding military power that civilian ends can be pursued (Stavidris 2001a); Manners (2002) who introduces the concept of “normative power”; Maull (2005) who implicitly refers and compares the EU to Germany. For them means are not enough: grand strategic aims and priorities and the strategic use of the means to achieve value more than material interests are more significant in the characterization of the Union as an actor. More explicitly, Manners unclearly muddles actorness and identity and argues that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 2002: 251). Unless he is referring to the physical or institutional structures created by the EU, which without power to speak or act are by the way useless in political sense, Manners fails to broker a convincing explanation of the EU as a “normative” power because deemed “civil” and “civilian” in its nature. Similarly superficial are a number of other attention-catching definitions developed on the false line of this approach such as “strange superpower” (Buchan 1993: 4), a “gentle power” (Smith K.E. 2002: 2), a “post-modern power” and “ambiguous power” (Müller-BrandeckBoucquet, in K.E. Smith, 2002: 2), a rhetorical “civilian power” (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002: 770), a “silent global player” (Knodt and Princen 2003: 1) and many more. They all share a direct or indirect reference to Nye’s liberal concept of “soft (or persuasive) power”, which argues that civilian powers are committed to multilateral cooperation, institution-building, the strengthening the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes and human rights rather than national pride, unilateralism, and the unrestrained defense of sovereignty with the use of military force (Nye 1990 and 2004), because it is essentially in their best economic interest to act in this way (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 36). It is however clear how the normative connotation of such formulations sees the EU as a “good” actor whereby military force is deemed to be “evil” or at least “less good”. EU policy-

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makers have been particularly prone to adopt these views in order to reinforce their project of identity construction as it is evident in the dominant discourse discussed in the previous chapter, and as it is aptly illustrated by the scholarly work of Robert Cooper (Director General for CFSP in the EU Council) who believes in the EU mission of “civilizing” international relations (Cooper 2000). This mission of creating a “civilian global order”, according to Maull, might require military means – in a sort of Machiavellian “the aims justify the means” argument – although civilian powers will “impose significant constraints on themselves as regards their ability to project military power, and they will generally be rather skeptical about the utilization of military power” (Maull 2005: 791). On the other camp, Bull and subsequent acolytes counter-argue that it is essential to have a credible military component in order to become a successful international actor, and that the terms “power” and “civilian” are in contradiction. According to Bull, the EC as a pure intergovernmental organization, even without military capabilities of its own, does benefit indirectly from the fact that its member states do have military power (Bull 1982), but he concludes that “the European Community is not an actor in international politics and does not seem likely to become one” (Bull 1982: 151; see also Waltz 1979: 152). On the same line, Hill holds that the EU might “reach the position of being able to act purposefully and as one while eschewing a military capability”, but that “defence is the key to the development of the Community’s place in the world” (Hill 1993a: 318). Accordingly, the ESDP is seen as “internal state building and domestic European affairs rather than external defense” (Lindley-French 2002: 809). The difficulty of reaching agreements between Member States in essential foreign policy matters (from the Palestine issue to Iraq), the inadequacy of the military capabilities of the Union and the limited scope of the missions deployed until now are deemed to be the major obstacles for a fully fledged assumption of the responsibilities and functions of a veritable international actor. Kagan (2002 and 2003), a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, brings the debate to the fore of not only academic but also political discourse thus epitomizing the direct but intricate relationship between the two. The fact that Kagan’s hypotheses have been so intensely integrated into speeches of politicians on both sides of the Atlantic (see Chapter 6 on self-identity, and the debate on old and new Europe) is a case in point. In a famous essay and the ensuing monograph, Kagan opposes the Martian United States as “mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of the liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might” to the Venusian Europe as “turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation” and “entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’” (Kagan 2002). Contradicting his assumption of Europe as a “non-power”, he however goes on to define it as a “weak power” in military terms. The privilege given by Europe to negotiation, diplomacy, and international law

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as well as a certain tolerance of “new threats” are seen as a sign of its weakness (Kagan 2002: 27–36). From this lengthy theoretical discussion it can be evinced that the nature and direction of the relationship between means and aims is fundamental in the definition of actorness and power as well as the ideological perspective of the perceiver or beholder. Given the same empirical facts – institutions, capabilities, and missions – the interpretation of the analysts differs conspicuously. The same military attributes are a reinforcement of the civilian nature of the Union for some, while they are the litmus test of traditional state power prerogatives for others. The two views are however not mutually exclusive. The predominance of the use of civilian means for “civil” (or civilizing) missions of a rule-of-law type does not preclude the potential development of the very use of existing military means for the defense or projection not only of values but also of more material interests. The policy initiatives enacted until now show that the Union possesses both hard and soft (coercive and structural) power capabilities which may bestow strategic actorness intended as the ability to define AND pursue its own strategic interests. The EU leadership is not naïve and knows that although soft power is good, without some sort of hard power (whether military or civilian, whether economic or political conditionality), it does not suffice to influence the behavior of other actors. Larsen, following the strain of the “civilian power” approach, argues that since the EU has so far predominantly had a regional focus and has downplayed the use of military means even when the EU had the possibility of drawing on the same, there is no break with the presupposed dominant “civilian power” or “human security” discourse because the military addition does not impact the construction of the EU identity (Larsen 2002: 284, 292). He forgets however, as many others in the same camp do, that an important role the EU has been discursively appropriating, albeit in a very ambiguous way, is the defense of territorial integrity and the protection of unclearly defined interests, which at the bottom are very traditional aims still considered by states as priorities of their national security. It is exactly these references (inherent in the federalist dreams) rather than the military innovation per se which represent a cause of concern for detractors of the ESDP, be they inside or outside the EU. For the time being the Union is not acting upon them, and due to internal and external political and material constraints, it is limiting its sphere of activities to low-level tasks. The fact that the EU – as it is and was the case for Germany and Japan, the role-models of civilian powerness – has not been called to autonomously respond to immanent serious threats may alter the judgement passed on its behavior.

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Chapter 8

Conclusion

Overly reliance on a single strategy leads only to different versions of utopia: the utopia of liberty spread from the barrel of a gun, or one of international rules and institutions based on goodwill alone. Both are equally illusory and equally dangerous (Solana 2004; Foreign Policy 2/3: 74–75). European defense policy is not only in constant progression: it has now reached its threshold of irreversibility. (…) But there must be no mistake: the ESDP is not a process of militarization of European construction (Solana in Gnesotto 2004c: 6). A convincing political language is needed to free Europe of shallow populism, insistence on corporatist harmony and ‘protest’ foreign policy (IISS 2003: 115).

In a scenario entitled “Turbulent Neighborhoods” published in 1999, the European Union Forward Studies Unit (a research service of the European Commission until 2001, then integrated into the Bureau of European Policy Advisers) disturbingly imagined terrorist attacks on the European territory and told the story of the unveiling of a white stone monument at the Gdansk European Council to commemorate ten thousand soldiers killed in action for Europe since the turn of the century (2000–2010) (Bertrand and Michalski and Pench 1999). The scenario is unsettling because, like in a self-fulfilling prophecy, Europe has in fact been hit by terrorist attacks first in Madrid in 2004 and then in London in 2005. To date, no soldiers have died for the EU, but the pace of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and the normative discourse associated to justify it might suggest that the other “predictions” of this scenario might not be far from becoming true. By 2007 11 civilian and military crisis management operations (8,000 troops and 500 civilians) have been deployed using the ESDP framework, while some 80,000 European troops are engaged in other frameworks in places like Lebanon, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As Deighton and others point out, the ESDP “ends the age of ‘innocence’ of civilian power Europe” (Deighton 2002: 728), and opens the way not only to the international establishment of what Herriot called a European “moral personality” (see Haas 1948) but also and more importantly to the final stage of a political integration which has been since the beginning colored by federal ambitions. The meaning and scope of the ESDP have been object of a variety of discussions both at the academic and at the policy level. Security in general and the ESDP in particular have been accused of ambiguity because of incoherence

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between rhetorical declarations and behavior. It has been argued in this study that in the definition of security, philosophy, language, and politics play a central role. In particular, the “philosophy of security” refers to the source, importance, and weight of ideational variables (ideology and culture) in the construction of security issues; the “language of security” to the role of language and discourse in the formulation of security concepts; and finally the “politics of security” to the impact of security discourses on institutionalization and action on the one hand, and on identity and actorness on the other. Using a structurationist approach and a “theoretical mix” stretching from cultural realism to social constructivism, this book’s central hypothesis maintains that cultural and normative assumptions – security and strategic culture – both enable and constrain policy preferences (grand strategy) and behavior (in terms of outputs and outcomes) through the transmission belt of a dominant discourse. The language used by the EU elites speaking and writing about security (speeches, interviews, articles, and other texts) suggests the existence of a jargon referring to common meanings and interpretations that constitute the ideological Weltanschauung or the culture of the Union as an entity as perceived and projected by its own representatives (not necessarily as it really is). The EU concept of security is thus constructed through linguistic structures that are anchored to specific cognitive assumptions shared by the leaders (on the nature of the international environment and the use of force for example) and that go to shape the policy options and actions of the Union as a security actor. The contribution of this book to the analysis of security as a concept and as a practice is theoretical and methodological: the systematic and comprehensive analytical framework developed in this work facilitates the study of the politics of security by singling out the relationship between variables and by establishing the role of language as an important element in the empirical appraisal of ideas and preferences. It is also a testing tool for the assessment of the consistency between words and actions, between ideal aspirations and behavioral outcomes. At the micro level, security discourses are studied using the “grammar of security” model, which includes a discursive syntax (subject, predicate, referent object, prepositional phrases) and context analysis (situational – including speakers and audiences, cultural, cognitive, and co-textual). On the basis of this grammar, it is then possible to design an ideal-typology of security discourses grounded in distinct pre-existent cultural and linguistic contexts and policy-making structures: Westphalian, Human Security, and Traditional Plus. The majority of the discourses of modern contemporary international actors can be classified as “Traditional Plus” (whereby territorial considerations are still of paramount importance). The EU security discourse also falls into this category. As a matter of fact, despite a plethora of different formulations and references, the subject of EU security is predominantly the Union intended as a unitary actor, while the referent objects are both vital interests – territorial integrity and independence of the Union – and the value interests of peace and stability. At the macro level, a security discourse becomes dominant only if it has successfully gone through the stages of activity, performativity, and connectivity.

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This means that discourse is a strategic resource for political action. The rhetorical activities of the speakers (Solana, Patten, and Prodi) for the period under analysis and the resonance that these performances have had in the associated epistemic community testify for the validity of this theoretical model. In all the linguistic products analyzed here, and in particular in the ESS, the legitimate speakers introduce definitions, symbols, and metaphors (for instance the EU as a common house), and associate and contextualize threats with the concept of security. The audience – other speakers, scholars, specialists – in turn accept and integrate in their own assumptions these statements, thus making securitization successful and opening the way for the emergence of new security institutions and tasks. For instance, the definition of terrorism as a threat to the EU security in a rhetorical activity performed by a legitimate speaker like Solana, when grounded on widely shared perceptions and preferences and uttered in a language understood and accepted by the audience, leads to the introduction of specific mechanisms and further down the road to ad hoc actions and missions centered on the newly identified threat (see for example the EU strategy against terrorism or nuclear proliferation for that matter). Other evidences of the purposeful construction or manipulation of securitization are for instance the formulations contained in public opinion surveys testing issues about perceived threats and the role of a future European army. A dominant discourse is an indicator of a tendency or attitudes and does not determine a policy output or outcome, although in general attitudes and behavior tend to consistency. The analysis of consistency between discourse and action sheds light on whether rhetorical statements do possess the quality of cultural signifiers or whether they are simply used for political convenience. The practice of the ESDP shows an increasing coherence with the discourse of the ESDP but also important shortcomings. While the identification of the means (prevalently civilian but mixed in nature), the ways (comprehensive and multilateral), and the location and timing of the actions (global and speedy) tend to maintain their validity when tested in the institutional outputs and operational outcomes, the definitions of subject, referent objects, and predicates – important components for the delimitation of aims in a grand strategy – fail to leave the rhetorical ground. On the discursive end, the Union is presented as the subject of the security policy and action aimed at protecting EU citizens, EU integrity and independence, as well as world peace and stability through traditional territorial defense, peacekeeping, peacemaking, crisis management, and conflict prevention. Behavior however shows that, despite these rhetorical ambitions, Member States are the subjects of action, and value interests motivate most of the missions that are limited to the low-end of crisis management and peace-building. Most importantly, the dominant security discourse as expressed by the EU leadership is not dissimilar from contemporary state discourses: they all contain a mix of traditional Westphalian and human security elements. What is important in the assessment of the meaning of the ESDP for the development of a veritable EU international identity and actorness is that, contrary to the prescriptive analyses of

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a number of commentators who see the Union becoming a post-national and postmodern security actor, the vocabulary and formulae adopted by the EU rhetoric do not deviate from traditional national security formulations. This is not surprising given the fact that the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy area in which states and, as a corollary, military organizations (for what concerns security and defense) play the deciding role. What is puzzling is the existence of common understanding at the level of central institutions, which by definition or ambition see themselves as the beacons of a supra-national liberal-democratic and potentially universalistic European culture. The mainstream ideology of the epistemic/discursive community, composed of policy-makers and other elites with special access to the center and using a common political-military language, permeates the EU security culture as it is expressed and projected by the speakers. The link between policy-makers and academics is particularly striking and can be seen as an indication of a tight security community (more and more institutionalized) in Brussels at the elite level. For this and other heuristic reasons, the level of analysis is the Union as an entity rather than its different components and levels. The EU security discourse has a relative autonomy and does influence the sub and supra level (Member States and the international level). Obviously, the security cultures and policies of the Member States do enable and constrain the formation of a veritable EU approach to security, and a number of scholars have been working on the identification of the specific weight of each single national influence on the construction of the EU security concept and discourse (in particular taking into consideration the power in the Union of the UK, France, and Germany; the effect of the neutrality of some members on the elaboration of the ESDP; or the impact of the entry of Central and Eastern European countries in the Union on the reformulation of security aims and means). The methodological complexity of these analytical exercises however fails to acknowledge the importance and the relatively independent role of individual speakers and their audiences at the EU level. EU’s elites, in the name of internal and external credibility, tend to purposively use and sometimes abuse a jargon charged of settled meanings in order to be accepted and recognized as a legitimate security actor by an audience of peers composed primarily of states. The discourse of the ESDP is used as a self-referential exercise to construct or reinforce myths about an imagined unitary identity and at the same time to project a credible image to the outside (see for instance all the references to the EU in terms of power or the very use of the concept of defense). Contrary to the wide-spread common sense, the EU does not represent an exceptional type of international actor and a sort of “civil civilian normative revolutionary soft power”. In this process of engaging with the international structure, despite the normative aspiration to change the system through the projection of “superior values”, the Union succumbs to the dominant logic of statehood and security imaginary by absorbing territorial conceptions of exclusive sovereignty and national interests intended as both possession and value goals, and this supports the neorealist assumption that any state or proto-state will behave in a certain way no matter what

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its internal composition because of the constraining influence and socialization of the international system and the existing rules of the game (not necessarily anarchy) (Waltz 1979: 128). This means in the EU case that the experience of the Union in international security will bounce back to influence the culture of the Union and the formation or consolidation of ambitions of statehood. By the same token, the use of statist bureaucratic rules and procedures affect the way in which policies are set up and implemented, and isomorphism is one of the most evident consequences. The set-up of the ESDP institutions testifies for the duplication of state structures at the central level in Brussels. This however does not exclude the existence of a strategic culture characterized by a preference for non-military means and multilateral ways, but it stresses how this type of preferences is in no way exceptional and distinctive for the Union’s security identity and culture as assumed by many. The fact that the use of force for the achievement of territorial or self-interested material concerns is regarded as out of fashion or immoral at worst and despised as the most visible, traumatic, and evil manifestation of war, whereby peace is assumed to be the norm, is a rhetorical trend many states and organizations tend to adopt paying lip-service to international legal principles: in fact, since the inception of the so-called “just war theory”, force has been clothed with a new normatively legitimate and acceptable rationale in international relations (Chesterman 2001). The Union’s approach to security thus follows the mainstream trend in rhetorical international relations, and it does not necessarily embody an exceptional form of “force for good” as suggested by many and in particular by a recent special issue of International Affairs on Europe as an ethical power (see Aggestam 2008). Further evidences of this “normalizing” trend are the frequent self-references to power (global or world) in characterizing the subject of action, the explicit or implicit comparison with other international actors like the United States, or the traditional military defense clause included in the most recent Lisbon Treaty. From the policy and practice perspective, institutional constraints limit for the time being the translation of words into deeds. However, a trend can be recognized at least at the programmatic level to extend the scope of the ESDP to collective security and defense and to more demanding tasks. The much awaited White Book on Security and Defense which should follow the European Security Strategy is deemed to be the point of no return in which a project will be turned into policy (Pilegaard 2004: 8), and to answer the dilemma perceived in the international community between: a Europe shrinking from global responsibilities, assuming the status of a miniUnited Nations and delivering moral homilies while concentrating on economic competition with the United States; or, alternatively, there could emerge a Europe challenging the United States and constructing a foreign policy of mediating between America and the rest of the world, rather like what India attempted during the Cold War (Kissinger 2001: 51–52).

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As a matter of fact, at the initiative of France and Sweden among others, the European Council meeting in Brussels on 14 December 2007 tasked the Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP to present a revision of the European Security and Defence Policy in order to “to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, […] to complement it” for adoption by the European Council in December 2008” (European Council 16616/1/07). In this regard, the European Security and Defense Assembly (WEU Assembly) in its recommendation 816 on the revision of the European Security Strategy stresses how the ESS has led to the “establishing a collective and distinctively European strategic culture, increasingly perceived as the hallmark of Europe’s foreign policy approach, inspiring international organizations such as NATO, the African Union and others to adopt parts of its discourse, methods, and structures” (Assembly of the WEU A/2000, my emphasis). Interestingly, this sentence summarizes and highlights the importance of “perception” rather than acknowledgement based on facts and actions, and stresses the role of the ESS – and other rhetorical exercises analyzed here – in “establishing” or constructing a European approach to security characterized as “strategic culture” in this particular document. Such a statement supports the hypothesis defended in this work that the rhetorical exercises performed by the EU leadership do contribute to the creation of common and distinctive assumptions, beliefs, and preferences associated to a particular security identity, and that even in case of inconsistency with behavior, they are valuable because they indicate aspirations and ambitions on the one hand and reinforce the purposedly designed image of the actor on the other. By using the EU as a case-study (or for the ESDP Assembly as an example or an “inspiration”), this book has developed a model for understanding how security concepts are constructed and how they flow into practice. The major problem has been the control of the data-set and the digestion of an amazing amount of literature on the topic. A number of issues have not been dealt with in detail, while some debates have been simply ignored for the sake of the analysis. Further research is required to comparatively test the model against other security discourses and practices and to refine the “discursive syntax” by taking into consideration other levels of analysis (operational and tactical for instance). In particular, this approach could be used to empirically demonstrate convergence or divergence between the national (political, security, and strategic) cultures of the Member States, and to explain why, contrary to the recommendation cited above, other regional organizations do not develop into the kind of international actor (or “power”) the EU’s rhetoric is ambitiously projecting in its own formulation of security, interests, and identity.

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254

Speeches Patten, Christopher (RELEX) (1999–2004) Ref. No. Subject SPEECH/03/364 Current and future trends of the human rights’ agenda

L EN

Date 14.07.2003

SPEECH/03/123

EN

12.03.2003

EN

03.10.2002

EN

28.05.2002

EN

30.04.2002

EN

04.04.2002

EN

21.02.2002

EN

08.03.2001

EN

10.10.2000

EN

15.06.2000

SPEECH/02/452

SPEECH/02/235    

SPEECH/02/191    

SPEECH/02/134    

SPEECH/02/76

SPEECH/01/111

SPEECH/00/369

SPEECH/00/219

 

Venue Special Seminar with NGOs, Brussels Iraq European Parliament Debate in Plenary Strasbourg America and Europe: an Chicago Council on essential partnership Foreign Relations Chicago EU-Russia relations European Business Club (EBC) Conference on ‘Shaping Russian-European Integration in the 21st Century’ Moscow How National is the National English-Speaking Interest ? Union – Churchill Lecture Guildhall, London Developing Europe’s Central Party External Policy in the Age of School Beijing, Globalisation China Sovereignty and the National The Newman Interest Old Concepts, New Lecture University Meanings College Dublin A voice for Europe? The future Brian Lenihan of the CFSP Memorial Lecture IEA, Dublin Towards a common European Winston Churchill foreign policy: how are we Memorial Lecture, doing? Luxembourg European Foreign policy: Institut Francais Ambition and Reality des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris

Legend: 11L=11 Languages, L=Language.

Bibliography Ref. No. SPEECH/00/51

Subject The EU’s evolving Foreign Policy dimension – the CESDP after Helsinki

SPEECH/99/215 The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the role of the European Commission

SPEECH/99/165     European Security and Defence Policy Articles

Democracy doesn’t flow from the barrel of a gun Jaw-jaw, not war-war Auch ein Gulliver braucht die Hilfe der Lilliputaner Projecting Stability ��������������������

Venue Joint meeting European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee with Members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Brussels Conference on the Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy – The Integration of the New Decade – Berlin European Parliament Strasbourg International Herald Tribune Financial Times Süddeutsche Zeitung, (translated) The World Today 56(7)17–9

255 L EN

Date 22.02.2000

EN

16.12.1999

EN

17.11.1999

EN

16.09.2003

EN DE

14.02.2002 29.09.2001

EN

July 2000

Prodi, Romano: President of the European Commission (1999–2004) Ref. No. Subject SPEECH/04/463 A shared destiny in the new Europe SPEECH/04/264 Dialogue and shared values

SPEECH/04/176 The Role of the EU in a changing world SPEECH/04/170 Europe and Peace SPEECH/04/129 Transatlantic Relations

SPEECH/04/90

A stronger alliance in a changing world

Venue Catholic University Lublin (Poland) Conference on dialogue between people and cultures, Brussels CASS European Institute Beijing (China) University of Ulster International Advisory Board, Citigroup, Paris ISPI Milan

L EN

Date 18.10.2004

EN FR DE IT EN

25.05.2004

EN

01.04.2004

EN

12.03.2004

EN IT

20.02.2004

14.04.2004

256

European Security Culture

Ref. No. Subject SPEECH/03/610 Europe with passion and convinction

Venue European Parliament Strasbourg

New York University Law School (NYC, USA) Looking ahead in transatlantic Dinner at Rayburn relations House with German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington DC Fondazione Don The European project in the world: between values and Tonino Bello politics Alessano (Lecce) Brussels Statement on the commencement of operation Concordia Report on the Spring European European Council Parliament, Brussels (Convention and future of Hearing before the Europe) French National Assembly – Delegation for the European Union French National Assembly Paris Education, tolerance and Saints Cyril vision: Europe’s way forward and Methodius University Skopje,

SPEECH/03/517 Cultural diversity and shared values

SPEECH/03/322

SPEECH/03/303

SPEECH/03/137

SPEECH/03/156

SPEECH/03/126    

SPEECH/03/94    

SPEECH/03/83

SPEECH/03/76

(speaking points, Iraq, press conference)

Informal Extraordinary European Council, Brussels Meeting with mayors of capitals of Member States and candidate countries Committee of the Regions, Brussels

L EN FR IT ES DE FI EL EN IT

Date 16.12.2003

EN IT

24.06.2003

EN IT

13.06.2003

EN 11L

31.03.2003

EN IT

26.03.2003

FR EN IT

12.03.2003

FR EN DE EL EN

21.02.2003

FR EN DE DA ES IT

13.02.2003

04.11.2003

17.02.2003

Bibliography Ref. No. Subject SPEECH/03/70     Growing and thriving in a knowledge society

L 11L

Date 12.02.2003

SPEECH/02/621   

EN IT

09.12.2002

11L

06.12.2002

FR EN DE IT

03.12.2002

SPEECH/02/619    

SPEECH/02/600   

SPEECH/02/499

Venue European Parliament Strasbourg Europe and ethics Conference on Politics and Morality Vienna A Wider Europe – A Proximity ‘Peace, Security Policy as the key to stability And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU’, Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean ����� Monnet Project. Brussels Europe in transition: hopes Fifth Europa and fears Forum ‘Europe facing the decision -- EU Enlargement and Global Challenges’ Brussels Europe’s challenges and Sorbonne, Paris prospects

257

SPEECH/02/465 A stronger foreign and security policy for Europe

European Parliament Brussels SPEECH/02/377 First anniversary of 11 European September Parliament Brussels SPEECH/02/343 A constitution for the future of FONDAZIONE Europe CARIPLO Milan

SPEECH/02/345 The EU, dialogue with religions and peace

FR 20.10.2002 EN IT EN IT 09.10.2002

11L

11.09.2002

FR EN DE IT FR EN DE IT

15.07.2002

‘Build Europe, build peace’ Christianity and Democracy in the Future of Europe Camaldoli, SPEECH/02/166  Challenges for European Osnabrück Savings EN integration at the beginning of Bank Osnabrück DE the 21st Century IT SPEECH/02/51 The past and future of Instituto de Espana FR European integration Madrid EN ES IT

14.07.2002

19.04.2002

07.02.2002

258

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Ref. No. Subject SPEECH/02/3     Three challenges facing Europe SPEECH/01/573 Drawing the world together

SPEECH/01/528     An enlarged and more united Europe, a global player – challenges and opportunities in the new century

Venue Council on Foreign Relations New York Jawarlal Nehru University – Conference on ‘Global Challenges’ – New Delhi College of Europe, Bruges

L EN

Date 11.01.2002

EN

23.11.2001

FR EN DE NL IT IT

12.11.2001

EN

22.06.2001

FR EN DE IT Florence European FR University Institute EN Florence DE IT European Parliament Norman Paterson EN School of International Affairs, Carleton University Ottawa EN The Independent

29.05.2001

SPEECH/01/384     Dichiarazione sull’aggressione Conferenza dei agli Stati Uniti presidenti dei gruppi politici del parlamento europeo Bruxelles SPEECH/01/305     Our common future University College, Cork SPEECH/01/244     For a strong Europe, with a Institut d’Etudes grand design and the means Politiques Paris of action SPEECH/01/204     The New Europe in the Transatlantic Partnership

SPEECH/00/19

Shaping the New Europe

SPEECH/99/216     My vision of Europe

Article

12.09.2001

09.05.2001

15.02.2000 16.12.1999

1998

Bibliography

259

Javier Solana, High Representative (HR/SG) + WEU Secretary General Ref. No. S0310/04

S0266/04

S0246/04

Subject The Limits of Integration: Where does the European Union End?’ Remarks: ‘Terrorism in Europe: How does the Union respond to this phenomenon’ Summary of intervention (civilian crisis management)

S0097/04

Summary of remarks

S0005/04

Address

S0242/03

Summary of address: ‘The Voice of Europe on Security Matters’

S0230/03

The EU Security Strategy Implications for Europe’s role in a changing world CFSP: Speech on the State of the Union

S0141/03

S0113/03

Address

S0103/03

Europe and America: Partners of choice

S0087/03

Mars and Venus Reconciled. A New Era for Transatlantic Relations

S0015/03

(on Iraq, Middle East and the Balkans)

Venue European Forum, Vienna

L EN

Date 10.11.2004

Berlin

EN

07.10.2004

UN Security Council Debate on Civilian Crisis Management Informal Meeting of Defense Ministries National Forum on Europe, Dublin Castle Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRIKIIB), Brussels Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, Paris Institute for European Affairs, Dublin Speech to the annual dinner of the Foreign Policy Association, New York Albert H. Gordon Lecture, Kennedy School Of Governement, Harvard University European Parliament

EN

23.09.2004

EN FR

06.04.2004

EN

08.01.2004

EN

26.11.2003

EN

12.11.2003

FR EN

30.06.2003

EN

21.05.2003

EN

07.05.2003

EN

07.04.2003

ES

29.01.2003

260 Ref. No. S0004/03

S0187/02

S0186/02

S0181/02

S0178/02

S0171/02

S0153/02

S0147/02

European Security Culture Subject (EU Police Mission)

Venue Opening ceremony of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM) Sarajevo Global challenges for the Inauguration of European Union’s Common the Diplomatic Foreign and Security Policy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw (role of the HR) Convention Working Group on External Action, Bruxelles ECAP and the improvement of Informal Meeting European Military Capabilities of EU Defence and the EU’s role in the Ministries Balkans Rethymnon (Greece) What can the EU contribute ‘Prague 2000. to a revitalizes transatlantic Challenge and security partnership? Change for NATO’. NATO, Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. Brussels The EU and the OSCE: the Permanent Council shape of future cooperation of the OSCE, Vienna Regional EU Conference on conflict prevention, Helsingborg Sweden La dimension militaire de Conférence de l’Union Européenne élèves officiers des Ecoles et des Académies militaires de l’Union Européenne. École de St-Cyr Coëtquidan, France,

L EN

Date 15.01.2003

EN

16.10.2002

EN

15.10.2002

EN

04.10.2002

EN

03.10.2002

EN

25.09.2002

EN

30.08.2002

FR

16.07.2002

Bibliography Ref. No. S0141/02

S0135/02

S0128/02 S0108/02

S0101/02

S0096/02

S0078/02

S0072/02

S0025/02

S0166/01

Subject Address

Venue Inaugural session of the 2002 Conference of Ambassadors, Palazzo della Farnesina, Rome (Italy) The intertwining of security Transatlantic and economics in transatlantic Strategic Group, politics Bertelsmann Foundation, Berlin CFSP : The State of the Union Annual conference of the EUISS- Paris Address Colloque international sur la gestion de crise par l’Union européenne, faculté Jean Monnet à Sceaux de l’Université ParisSud (XI) Europe’s place in the world Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen A Partnership with many German Marshall missions Fund Peter Weitz Awards Dinner, Washington DC Swedish EU Europe’s place in the world: The Role of the High 2004 Committee, representative Parliament, Stockholm Leadership strategy in the The Economist security arena: Changing Conference: 6th parameters for global recovery Government Roundtable Athens Intervention Launch of CER Publication by Steven Everts ‘Shaping an effective EU foreign policy’ Intervention Conference ‘The fire and the crystal’. Rimini, �������� Italy

261 L EN

Date 24.07.2002

EN

11.07.2002

FR EN FR

01.07.2002

EN

23.05.2002

EN

20.05.2002

EN

25.04.2002

EN

19.04.2002

EN

19.02.2002

EN

21.10.2001

31.05.2002

262 Ref. No. 0121/01 0119/01

0112/01

European Security Culture Subject Europa en el siglo XXI European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its social basis Europe’s Security in the XXI Century

0073/01

EU Foreign Policy

0056/01

Leadership strategy in the security area. The Political Perspective Intervention

0023/01

004/01

002/01

032/00

028/00

Nn07/00

Nn06/00 Nn05/00

Venue L Madrid, El Escorial ES Berlin EN

Date 02.07.2001 29.06.2001

Olaf de Palme Memorial Lecture, Stockholm Henrik Brugmans Memorial, Bruges Town Hall The Economist Conference, Athen

EN

20.06.2001

EN

27.04.2001

EN

03.04.2001

EN

15.02.2001

EN

22.01.2001

EN

18.01.2001

EN FR

05.12.2000

EN

14.11.2000

ES

07.07.2000

FR

01.07.2000

EN

17.05.2000

EU-Russia Forum for Foreign and Security Policy, Moscow Intervention Open Debate on Conflict prevention, General Affairs Council, Bruxelles ESDP after Nice, Where do we Austrian Institute stand? Where do we go? for European Security Studies, Vienna (in the function of WEU 2nd part of the 46th Secretary General) WEU Assembly, Paris Forschungsinstitut Where does the EU stand on Common Foreign and Security der deutschen Gesellschaft für Policy? Auswärtige Politik, Berlin Address Inaugural conference of the course ‘Towards a new international morality: humanitarian interventions’. University of Alcala de Renares, Madrid Address Seminar, Europe de la defense, Paris Address European Policy Centre, Brussels

Bibliography Ref. No. Nn04/00

Nn03/00

Nn02/00

Nn01/00

Nn02/99

Nn01/99

Articles

Subject Addrss

Venue Bundesakademie fuer Sicherheitspolitik The Development of a Institute of Common Foreign and Security European Affairs, Policy and the Role of the Dublin High Representative Colloque sur la défense européenne – (Bruxelles – Palais d´Egmont) Foreign Policy Association, New York Conference ‘The Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy – The Integration Project of the Next Decade’. Berlin ������ On the occasion of taking up office, Brussels ‘Rules with Teeth’ Foreign Policy, Sept./Oct. 2004 : 74–75 Joining Forces against International common threats Herald Tribune Interview Le Monde Letter to Amnesty International (made public on website of the Council) Sympathy, cooperation and International concern  Herald Tribune ‘A stronger Europe able Irish Independent to project stability and prosperity’. ‘A broad consensus against Financial Times terrorism’ ‘European Defense: The Task The European Ahead’ Voice ‘Destined to cooperate’ Financial Times ‘Why Europe needs the Financial Times military option’

263 L EN

Date 11.05.2000

EN

30.03.2000

FR

29.03.2000

EN

25.01.2000

EN

17.12.1999

11L

18.10.1999

EN

01.09.2004

EN

12.12.2003

FR EN

29.03.2003 03.12.2002

EN

10.09.2002

EN

30.03.2002

EN

13.09.2001

EN

24.10.2001

EN EN

14.06.2001 29.09.2000

264

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Secondary Literature ---- n.n. (1987), The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Abiew, F.K. (1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: Kluwer Law International). ABS Consulting (n.d.). ���������������������������� ‘Modelling Security Risks’, ��������������������� , accessed 12 December 2001. Acharya, A. (2000), ‘Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory’, in S. Arnold and M. J. Beier (eds), (Dis)Placing Security: Critical Re-evaluations of the Boundaries of Security Studies (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies). Ackermann, A. (2003), ‘The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention’, Journal of Peace Research 40:3, 339–47. Adcock, R. (2005), ‘What is a Concept’, Working Paper 1, The Committee on Concepts and Methods (CCM), International Political Science Association (IPSA), April. Adler, E. (1991), ‘Cognitive Evolution: a Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress’, in E. Adler and B. Crawford (eds), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press), 43–88. ----- (1997a), ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal of International Relations 3:September, 319–64. ----- (1997b), ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 26:2, 249–277. Adler, E. and Haas, P. (1992), ‘Conclusions: Epistemic Communities, World Order and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program’, International Organization 46:1, 367–90. Adler E. and Barnett, M. (eds) (1998), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Aggestam, L. (2000), ‘A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU’, in L. Aggestam and A. Hyde-Price (eds), New Perspectives on Security and Identity in Europe (London: Macmillan), 86–115. ----- (2008), ‘Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?’, International Affairs 84: 1, 1–11. Albert, M. (1998), ‘Security as Boundary Function: Changing Identities and ‘Securitization’ in World Politics’, International Journal of Peace Studies 3:1, 23–46. Algieri, F. and Bauer, T. (2003), ‘Defining and Securing the EU’s Strategic Defense Interests’, Convention Spotlight 04, Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) (München: Bertelsmann Foundation).

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Index Activity-Performativity-Connectivity Model: 60–63, 97, 108, Actorness; 3, 4, 6, 7, 39, 63, 73, 115, 152, 156, 163, 228, 232–237, 240 Afghanistan: 89, 90, 98, 99, 171, 174, 184, 187, 193, 204, 230, 239 Amstersdam Treaty: 106, 193, 200, 204, 214 Army (see also armed forces): 1, 2, 32, 76, 87–88, 90–91, 104, 119–120, 135, 147, 157, 166–167, 208, 241 Atlanticists vs. Europeanists: 102, 211 Balkans: 91, 98, 100, 130, 131, 140, 144, 173, 187, 190, 206, 213, 217, 231 Battlegroup concept: 209–210 BerlinPlus Agreement: 211, 219, 224 Bosnia: 89, 90, 91, 92, 98, 100, 146, 184, 204, 207, 216–218, 220, 224, 226, 227, 230 Brusselization: 110, 190, 195 Canada: 78, 79, 80, 89, 170, 222, Classical Realism: 27–28, 35, 42, 74, 167 Coalitions of the Willing: 1100, 108, 149, 198, 222, 228 Commissioner for External Relations (RELEX): xi, 11, 114, 193, 203 Committee on Civilian Crisis Management: 202 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): 2, 84, 106, 129, 143, 153, 192, 203, 204, 228 Communication Theory: 54, 59 Conference for Security and Cooperation inEurope (CSCE): 78, 105 Conflict Prevention: 79, 83, 85, 86, 91, 109, 123, 129, 162, 164, 167, 176, 180, 203, 206, 210, 215, 223, 232, 241 Congo: 2, 91, 213, 221–223, 225, 226, 227

Constitutional Treaty: xi, 3, 102, 116, 118, 138, 148, 161, 166, 175, 188, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203, 206, 210, 215 Constructivism: 6, 7, 28, 29, 30, 39, 42, 45, 66, 240 Copenhagen criteria: 120, 132 Copenhagen School: 6, 28, 30, 50, 66, 82 Council of Ministers: 103, 109, 198, 210 Crisis: 80, 85, 123, 133, 141, 145, 164, 176, 179, 183, 200, 202, 221, 215, 227, 232; Crisis-management: 67, 81, 83, 91, 92, 99, 100, 102, 106, 122, 123, 129, 152, 155, 160, 162, 166, 175, 182, 194, 201–209, 213–214, 215, 229, 230, 239, 241 Cultural turn: 25, 36, 48 Culture: 3, 6–9, 13, 36–40, 44, 51, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 117; political culture: 12, 40, 117–120; security culture: 9, 41–42, 88, 97, 102, 116; strategic culture: 4, 5, 6, 41–44, 62, 65, 71, 175, 177, 240, 243, 244 Defense: 2, 4, 15, 28, 32, 33, 40, 54, 66, 67, 76, 77, 83–84, 88, 89–92, 99, 100, 105, 106, 108–109, 119, 158–161, 193, 205, 208, 210, 230, 232, 242, 243; collective defense: 99, 100, 102, 128, 130, 136, 162, 193; mutual defense: 3, 161, 198, 204; self-defense: 57, 76–77, 84–85, 176; homeland defense 89, 175, 184, 185 Democratic Deficit: 103, 109, 110, 204 Development: 78, 79, 80–81, 88, 90, 92, 103, 106, 107, 130, 131, 133, 142, 151, 153, 156, 159, 164, 169, 182, 206, 227 Discourse: 3, 6–8, 10–11, 40, 44, 47–48, 50–65, 69, 72, 97, 121 ; discourse analysis 12–13, 52–53; discourse

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dominance: 48, 61–62, 64, 75, 110, 187–188, 241 Discursive Syntax and Grammar: 13, 52–59, 240, 244 Epistemic (discursive) community: 10, 12, 38, 52, 65, 70, 72–73, 108, 110–111, 115, 241–242 Eurobarometer: 113, 135, 147, 155 Eurocorps: 100, 210 Europaid: 203, 206, 223 European (or EU) identity: 9, 105, 112, 115, 119, 136, 157, 237 European Commission: xi, 12, 103, 105, 108, 109, 135, 139, 151, 164, 195, 199, 203, 206–207, 217, 223, 227, European Community (or EC): 2, 104, 105, 190, 195, 206, 212, 234, 235, 236 European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO): 203, 206 European Convention for the Future of Europe: xi, 128–129, 138, 143, 149, 160, 175, 188, 189, 193, 194, 215 European Council: 103, 105, 143, 149, 160, 195–196, 197, 244 European Defense Agency: 100, 188, 195, 210 European Defense Community (EDC): 104 European External Action Service: 199 European Initiative for Human Rights: 206 European Neighborhood Policy: 107 European Parliament: 103, 128, 188, 203 European Political Community: 104 European Political Cooperation: 105 European Rapid Reaction Force: 2, 122, 209, 211, 212, 218, 231, European Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM): 202, 203, 208 European Security and Defense College: 116 European Security and Defense Identity: 2, 99 European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) Assembly: 108, 123, 160, 204, 244 European Security Strategy (ESS): xi, 11, 108, 109, 111, 121, 122, 126–127, 130, 131, 134, 139–149, 159, 161,

163, 164–165, 169–170, 172–176, 179, 181, 183, 185, 191, 204, 209, 215, 232, 241, 243, 244 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS or ISS): 108, 109, 116, 134, 135, 185, 200 European Union Military Committee: 160, 199, 201 European Union Military Staff: 199, 200, 202 European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs: 108, 195, 197, 199, 201 European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM): 216 Europeanization: 102, 115, 190 Force, use of: 2, 7, 19, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38, 41, 42, 71, 76, 77, 83, 84–86, 87, 89, 120, 125, 128, 143, 149, 152, 159, 163–168, 177–178, 180–181, 191, 216, 234, 235, 243 Foreign Affairs Council: 195, 197, 199 Fouchet Plan: 105 France: 90–91, 100, 102–103, 105, 144, 159, 188, 211, 215, 219, 222, 244 Functionalism (also neo-functionalism): 2, 41, 115 101, 118 Georgia: 223–224, 226 Germany: 75, 90, 102–103, 105, 182, 211, 215, 235, 242 Grand Strategy: 7, 31–36, 41, 50, 62, 89, 127, 131, 183, 192 Helsinki Headline Goal: 194, 205, 209, 213 High Representative (CFSP)/Secretary General (Council): 12, 106, 108, 128, 199, 244 Human security: 70, 74, 77–82, 88, 89, 92, 109, 129, 138, 181–184, 193, 223–224, 237, 240 Humanitarian Operations: 86, 90, 174; humanitarian intervention: 54, 84, 86, 91 Identity: 3, 24, 30, 31, 36, 37–40, 48, 51, 76, 154 ; European (EU) identity: 9, 99, 105, 106, 112, 115, 117,

Index 119, 136, 149, 153, 157, 198, 218, 233–137, 240, 244 Ideology: 37–38, 49, 51, 182 Indonesia: 213, 225, 226, 227 Institutionalism: bureaucratic: 213; discursive: 50; neo-liberal 29 Integrity: 62, 74, 76, 89, 90, 129, 136–137, 160, 229, 237, 240, 241 Intergovernmentalism: 9, 79, 102, 103, 105, 114, 194, 195, 236, 242 Iraq: 2, 89, 91, 99, 100, 101, 102, 111, 121, 126, 144, 171, 225, 228 Italy: 91, 102, 171, 215 Just War Theory: 84, 243 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA): 2, 84, 106, 107, 190, 203, 223, 227, 230 Kosovo: 82, 85, 90, 91, 98, 193, 218, 225 Language: 3, 7, 11–12, 40, 46–56, 59, 62, 66, 69, 72, 124, 127, 183, 239, 240 Lebanon: 91, 239 Liberalism: 25, 28, 29, 35, 82, 114 Linguistics: 5, 6, 12, 50, 52, 53 Lisbon Treaty: xi, 3, 102, 188, 190, 194, 195, 199, 206, 243 Luxembourg Report: 105 Maastricht Treaty: 106, 159, 193 Macedonia: 2, 100, 207, 209, 218–221, 224, 229 Middle East: 91, 99, 107, 134, 144, 173, 174, 184, 225, 231 Military (see also armed forces, army): 2, 26–27, 28–29, 30–33, 43, 71, 76, 84, 87–88, 91, 98, 100, 104, 105, 110, 119, 120, 123, 128, 131, 141, 143, 152, 159, 161, 163–167, 182, 198, 201–202, 205–206, 208–212, 214–216, 226, 234–237 Neo-realism: 8, 28, 74, 88 New Defense Agenda (Security and Defense Agenda): 108 New European Security Theories: 5 Nice Treaty: 106, 194, 200, 201, 222

333

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 2, 4, 10, 82, 89–92, 99–100, 109, 124, 148, 154, 160, 161, 193, 202–202, 204, 208, 210, 211, 214–222, 224, 230 Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE): 79, 92, 100, 123, 200, 218, 220–221 Palestine: 225, 226, 236 Partnership for Peace (PfP): 91, 92 Patten, Christopher: xi, 1, 11, 65, 107, 108, 114, 115, 142, 154, 164, 165, 176, 189, 231 Peace: 13, 33, 40, 54, 78, 80, 83–87, 101, 119, 130, 131, 133, 136, 150–155, 157, 162, 163, 165, 167, 170, 180, 240; peace support operations 86; peacekeeping: 33, 81, 84, 86, 87–92, 136, 156–157, 162, 165, 167, 184, 214, 215, 220, 229; peacemaking: 2, 33, 71, 86, 89, 162, 176, 181, 214, 215; peaceenforcement: 77, 86, 220, 230 Petersberg tasks, 2, 106, 128, 156, 162, 166, 193, 194 204, 209, 213–215, 227 Police: 84, 86, 87, 88, 155, 167, 207–208, 216–218, 220–221, 225, 227 Policy-academia connection: 25, 65, 70–72, 108, 113–114, 236, 242 Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU): 200 Political and Security Committee (PSC): 200, 201, 202, 216, 219 Power: 28, 49, 74, 76, 78, 87, 98, 100, 115, 119, 146, 148–151, 153, 169, 178, 179, 228, 232–237; civilian power: 1, 4, 103, 152, 154, 155, 183, 234, 235, 237; soft power: 33, 152, 170, 235; normative power: 235 Prodi, Romano: xi, 1, 11, 107, 108, 117, 118, 120, 124–125, 130, 132, 133, 142, 143–144, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160–161, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 178,

334

European Security Culture 180, 181, 182, 189, 220, 228, 230, 241

Russia: 99, 107, 124, 139, 142, 146, 148, 149, 166, 230 Securitization: 6, 30, 58, 66–68, 118, 122, 140, 145, 241 Security: national 7, 22, 31–33, 62, 74, 75, 84, 88, 185, 237; security studies: 5, 8, 25–30; security concept: 19–20, 34; security system: 22–23; security grammar 50; security community: 101, 110, 117, 118, 155, 178, 179, 242 September, 11 (9/11): xi, 13, 55, 76, 91, 98, 121, 126, 138, 143, 154, 160, 193 Sierra Leone: 90, 91, 223, 228 Single European Act (SEA): 105 Situation Centre: 200 Solana, Javier: xi, 1, 11, 104, 105, 108, 109, 112, 114, 119, 125, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 180, 182, 183, 187, 189, 192, 199, 202, 213, 215, 217, 218, 231, 239 Solidarity clause (mutual assistance): 128, 148, 160, 161, 175, 176 Somalia: 89, 214 Spain: 91, 102 Stability: 22, 76, 83, 90–91, 107, 124, 128, 132, 134–136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 144, 150, 151, 152, 154, 162, 164, 165, 171, 173, 176, 180, 229 Statehood (see also state): 8, 9, 10, 21, 25, 27–30, 71, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82–83, 87, 126, 137–138, 153, 242 Strategic studies: 5, 26, 28, 73

Structured cooperation: 103, 198, 204, 209 Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities: 109 Sudan (see also Darfur): 179, 225, 230 Supranationalism: 114, 115, 118, 195, 242 Terrorism: 77, 80, 81, 83, 90, 91, 107, 126, 139, 143, 145–147, 155, 157, 162, 170, 171, 181, 183, 191, 215, 230, 239, 241 Threats: 8, 22–23, 29, 30, 43, 57–58, 66, 77, 80, 82–83, 90–93, 118, 122, 123, 126, 128, 130, 134, 137–148, 158, 161, 169, 170, 173, 176, 179–183, 191 Traditional-plus security: 15, 70, 82–88, 92, 112, 121, 185, 240 Ukraine: 99, 107, 173, 195, 224 United Kingdom (UK): 90, 100, 102, 111, 144, 171, 212, 215, 223, 242 United Nations (UN): 33, 78–79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 100, 130, 131, 162, 170, 176, 177, 184, 185, 187, 207, 214, 217, 219, 221, 222, 230, 243 United States (US): 4, 73, 77, 85, 89, 98–100, 102, 107, 112, 126, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 152, 153–154, 155, 166, 169, 171, 176, 184, 193, 205, 208, 211, 214, 236 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): 77, 92, 126, 128, 143, 144, 145, 147, 160, 165, 178, 183, 184, 191, 230, 232 Western European Union (WEU): 92, 100, 105, 106, 108, 116, 124, 142, 143, 151, 160, 162, 193, 200, 204, 210, 211, 214, 244 Westphalian traditional security: 70, 71, 74–77, 82, 83, 92, 102, 240