The Venetian Empire 1200–1670

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES 1210.

THE VENETIAN

..

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

THE VENETIAN EMPIRE 1200-1670

Dedication Pour h46m6rc%.

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The Enetian Empire 1200-1670

'I'hc story ofVenice is, to some extent, scparate from that ofthc rest of Europc. T h e same could Ile said of the city's military history and organisation. Early in the 0th century the I'cnetians defeated Pepin the Frank's attrmpts to overawe them, and they remai~iccl,at least in theory, suhjcct to Ryzantium. Gradually, however, Vcnice driftcd into indepcndcncc; and sul)scquently carved out its own empire at the expense of its fbrmcr Byzantinc masters. 'Their position on a series of islands set in a marshy lagoon at the head of the Adriatic made the Vcnctians virtually in\~ulnerahlcwhilc thcy steadily I~uiltup I~otlltheir commercial and naval strcngth. In this the famous Arsenal of Vcnicc played a leading r d c . Some kind of Byzantinc-style shipyard and military depot may have existed as carly as thc tjth century, though the medieval Arscnal was not erected until I 104. Its name comes from the Arabic I)nr nl Sirrn'n, 'Dockyard', and the conccpt clearly owed as much to Islamic inspiration as to the Byzantine moclel on which thc Arsenal was supposed to I)e llascd. By I 202, and thr arrival ol'the Fourth Crusade in Vcnicc, the city alrcady hrld much territory around the Adriatic. l'hc mcnacc of piracy had led Vcnctians to seize the pirate-ink sted eastern shores, where the in11al)itants of many towns still spoke a lbrm of Italian, l~cingclcsccnded from thc Latin peoples oftlic lioman Empire. 'l'hc D O ~orPDukc of Vcnicc already had, among his numerous titles, that of Dukr of Dalmatia and Dukc of Istria whilc the filmoils syml)olic ceremony ofSpo.,ali;io d f l .\lor, 'hlarriagc to the Sea', had also bcgun. Vrnctian tlomination of'nortli-castcrn Italy came much later; but Vcnicc. did control the lagoon coast and took a close interest in the military alTairs orits neighl)ours, ~):wticularly in the turbulent and only partially Italian region of 1:riuli. Venetian merchant

ventures wcrr oficn almost piratical in thcmsrl\,cs; and the city's tradr contacts, stretching lar bcyond the Adriatic, wcre well rstal)lishcd bcfore the creation of thc Crusader Statcs Icd to the founding of scmi-autonomous Vcnctiar~colonies on the coast of Syria and Palestine. 'I'hc military ancl politicill slructure which supported thcse adventures in Komnnia (the ithe Rluslim eastcrn Byzantinc zonc) and Olh.~m(lr~ Mediterranean) was itself a mixture of East and West, Byzantinc and Italian systems. 'Thrsc wcl-c The campanile or bell-tower of Koper (CapodYIstria) which, in the late 12th century, was Venice's main island stronghold in Istria and fell finally under Venetian rule in 1279.This 15th century tower also served as a lighthouse and observationpost against pirates, such tall structures becoming symbols of Venetian sovereignty along the Yugoslav coast.

Carvings on the west door of Trogir Cathedral in Dalmatia, made by Master Radovan in 1240. Though essentially Romanesque in style, Radovan's carvings include unusual costume and weaponry reflecting the Slav population of Dalmatia. This archer (left)has a composite bow and a quiver of almost Central Asian form. The 'Guards at the Holy Sepulchre' (right) wear scale or lamellar armour over their mail hauberks and, with their wide-brimmed chapel-de-fer helmets, are probably based on Serbian or Byzantine soldiers.

reflected in thc Dogc's ELvcusati or Guard as well as his ccrcmonial parasol and sword. Nevcrthelcss, the Venetian social order was strictly feudal. Though within the city no individual held land by knight tenure, various Church arid othcr propertics were tied to military scr\.icc. T h e Vcnctians were soon famous for their roving and warlike spirit, keen business acumen and pride. An almost modcrn scnsc of 'national' identity unified the city and saved Vcnicc from many of those class struggles which rent the rest of medieval Italy. Even the Serrate thc 'locking' or 'closing' of the Venetian ruling class a t the end of the 13th century did not dampen the loyalty of the Vcnetians, rich and poor, to their Screne Republic, even though it thereafter excluded all othcr families from political powcr. It is worth noting that only one Order of Chivalry, the Cnz~alieri di San illarco, was ever foundcd in Venice and no Venetian could join a foreign order without government approval. Venice remained a rcpublic throughout its independent history, while politics and the army werc kept firmly separate. Belligerent as thcy werc, thc

Venetians had a businesslikc attitudc to war which seems to have been regarded as an cxtcrision of commerce by other mcans. T h e early appearance of mercenaries, ancestors of the fiimous Italian condottieri, in 12th century Venice was a sign of this attitude and not of any lack of martial spirit. I n fact the Venetian Republic normally tried t o avoid wars, unless these were obviously going to he profitable. Nevertheless Vcnicc suffered a very wartorn history, frcqucntly clashing with the rival maritimc rcpublic of Gcnoa ovcr thc commercial domination of various regions, struggling with Hungary and later with the Ottoman Empire ovcr Dalmatia, and bcing drawn into numerous wars in defence of the Terra Firma, Venice's mainland possessions. T h e Terra Firma was takcn partly as a buffer against predatory ncighbours, partly to guarantee trade routes to the Alpinc passcs, and partly because Venice relied on mainland wheat for its survival. Later, of course, the Venetian Empire becam? locked in a life-or-death struggle with the vast Ottoman Turkish Empire. These VenetianOttoman wars look at first sight like a typical David .. and Goliath confrontation, but in military terms the Venctians were not so small as thcy might have

appeared. From the very dawn of Vcnetian history all classes were callcd upon to fight. Venice was a grrat city with a population of some 200,000 by the early 15th ccntury; was immensely wealthy, politically united, and diplomatically experienced; and had a huge navy. 'I'he people of medieval Venice were also noted {'or their brawling and their love of display. While for centuries oldcr men continucd to wear traditional long dark cloaks, in the 14th century the youngcr men adopted tight-fitting multi-coloured hose. T h e dcsigns on these leggings often indicated the C'umnpci~qnir&/la Calza or 'Trouser Club' to which the wearer bclongcd. Sumptuary laws were constantly cnactcd to curb the extravagant dress of men and womcn, hut these could lead merely to a change in fashion, as when legal but dull outel garments were slit to reveal legal but more sumptuous underclothes. This was probably the origin ol' 15th and 16th century 'slashed' fashions. Vcnetian love of display paradoxically made this maritime city a European leader when it came to jousts, tournaments and conspicuous consumption by the military dite. I n its own day Venice was seen as a paradox through its ability, as a money-minded republic, to defeat so often warlike feudal and Renaissance princcs. Venice also enjoyed uncharacteristic stability despite its turbulent politics and occasional military disasters while, by the end of the 15th ccntury, thc Vcnetian army remained the only independrnt Italian military force in Italy. Even the inexorable advance of the Ottoman Turks was at first turned to advantage, Venice snapping u p naval I~ascsand colonies at a cheap price or in return for protection. In this way the Venetian Empire rcachcd a pinnaclc ofpowcr and prosperity in the mid- I 5th century. T h e cosmopolitan character of the city itself grew ever more pronounccd through an obvious Dalmatian influence o n many aspects of life, and the large Greek, Armenian, Muslim and black populations within Vcnicc. Despite Venice's maintenance of generally good rclations with the Ottomans until the late 15th ccntury, thc Turkish expansion inevitably undermined Italian commercial domination of the eastern Mediterranean; and as soon as the Ottomans turned their attention to the sea a clash

became inevitable. Vcnicc's loss ofthe Greek island of Evvoia in 1470 marked a turning point which was rccogniscd even at the time. One year later the Venetians were sendirlg armaments to Persia in a classic effort to win allics on their enemy's eastern flank. Thcsc years also saw Venice lose domination of the scas, at least beyond thr Adriatic, and the start ofan epic na\,i~lstri~gglcsuch as had not been seen Ihr centuries.

Venice I)ecan~ca truly imperial power in the wake of the Fourth Crusade which, in 1204, scized the Byzantine capital of Constantinople (Istanbul) and, with Vcnetian aid, temporarily established a 'Latin Empire' in the Byzantine heartland. T h e success ofmany such Western military ventures into the eastern Mediterranean depended upon an ability to transport war-horses long distances by sea. This prohlcm had apparently been solved by the Venetians in the 12th century with their use of larger ships and a systcm of carrying adequate drinking water.

The Fleet Vcnicc's power depcndecl, of course, upon its fleets which, whether pcacd'ul or warlike, were commanded by an admiral advisccl by two governmentappointed ci\,ilians. Beneath the admiral were proveditori, administrators and ~oflmcomiti,galley captains. The chain of command was tightened as

the centuries passed. hut gallcy captains always had a tendency to act as fi-ec agents, despite (lie creation of a Captain General of the Sea in overall naval command. A systcm of naval patrols was also set up in the I gth ccntury to control the most sensitive scas and, where possible, to cut of'encmy supplies. T h e limitations of mcdicval shipping meant that Venice could never entirely control any part of the Mediterranean, though Venetian trade could be protected and piracy suppressed. '4 convoy systcm was nothing new, but by thc I :jth ccntury cscorts of from 15 to 30 galleys protcctcd many slow and vulnerable rncrchant 'round ships'. Thcsc convoys, their routes and destinations, were strictly rcgulatcd by the go\,crnment, but if their escorting gallcys could be lured away or defeated, thcn Venetian losses could be crippling. Such convoys wrrc, however, only seen in dangerous scas or in wartime as, for example, when Venice was locked in one of' her numerous conflicts with her arch-rival, Genoa. T h e very limited operational range of medieval galleys at first confined convoy cscorts to the chain of naval hasps which constituted the Vcnetian overseas empire, or to friendly ports. Only the building of much larger merchant-galleys, which were able to defend themselves, enahled this convoy system to bc extended beyond the hlcditcrrancan, out into the Atlantic and even to the coa\t$ of England and Flanders. T h e ahscncc of'a Vcnetian galley fleet could also influence cvents on land, as when the Byzantines took advantage of such a. situation to recapture Istanhul from the 'Latin Empire' in 1261. Furthermore, galleys had to defend their own bases, captains and crews manning the walls whenever they wcrc attacked by land. Over 3,000 Venetian merchant ships were trading by the mid- I 5th century, ancl many ofthese could be readily convrrted into warships or at least into military transports. In the Arsenal were a reserve oforiginally 25, later 50 and eventually ~ o o war-galleys. T h e defensive equipment carried by each ship was closely regulated by the government. I n 1255 a small vessel carried five assorted crossbows, a large ship at least eight, plus helmets, The port of Amasra on the Black Sea, though held by Venice's deadly rival Genoa, was a typical Italian medieval fortified outpost surrounded by potentially hostile territory and existing solely to secure the home city's trading network. Amasra finally fell to the Ottomans in 1460.

sliiclcls, jn\:clins, spears and grappling hooks. hlcclicval ships also had very large crews, particularly when 'armed' for a voyage in tlangcrous waters. Evcn a mcrchant ship would then carry a t least G o mcn, an ordinary galley from 240 to 280. Skilled sailors wcrr recruited in Vcnicc, Dalmatia and Grcccc. Thcrc were no galley-slavcs in the Middle Ages and oarsmcn came from Venice or its empire, particularly li-om Dalmatia. Venetian oarsmen were sclcctcd hy lot fiom the city's parishes, being financially supported by those who remained t~chind. From the 14th century debtors were rccordcd workinq olT their obligations at the oars. Rowing skills wcrc encouraged through races and regattas in Vcnicc, especiall) on the feast day of St Paul. Other cornpctitions includcd a sort of rough watcr polo, and watcr-tilting: hcrc joustcrs stood on the stvrn of tach boat as thcy rowcd towards each othcr, the loser I-wing pushed into the canal. At sea sailors and oarsmcn wcrc armcd with swords or spcars, but changes in weapons technology gradually Icd to a decline in the military status of the ordinary sailor. Yct all aboard wcre still expected to light wh(*n ncccssary, cvcn the mcrchant passengers. Every man had his weapon, the most important being stored beneath the captain's cabin. l'roli~ssionalsoldicrs or marines had always sailed irl,o:lrd ship, 1x11 their r6lc bccamc more important as wcaponry became more powerful and expensive. Vcnctians uscd javelins as late as the I 5th century, while othcr weapons included cooking pots filled The fortified galley-harbour at Amasra where Genoese ships could shelter, not only from the Black Sea's fearsome storms but also from rival Venetian, Ottoman and other fleets. It was a very simple structure compared to the later Venetian galleyharbour at Zadar (see page 24).

Carved ivory cantle of an early 14th century Italian saddle. Here a knight has a great helm and early forms of plate armour for his arms and legs (Louvre, Paris).

with $oap to makc the enemy's decks slippery, liregrcnadcs and blinding sulphur. Swimmcrs could cvcn attack thc roc's hull, thrcatcning to sink hirnthough in fict very few ships wrrr actually sunk in medic\.al warfidrc. C>rossl,ows wcrc now thc main long-clistancc weapon, contact and hoarditig still deciding the final outcomc. I n I 303 thc govcrnmcnt instructrd that each gallry carry 30 such cross1)owmen, who would also row on the innrr 1,cnches. Shooting practice was compulsory in \'enice, citizens training at the butts in groups of 1 2 . 'I'hey also competed in three annual competitions where the government offcrcd rich prizcs: valual~lescarlct cloth for thc winner, a shorter length of cloth plus a new crossbow and quiver for the runners up. Onc group of crossbowrncn known as thc 'noble bowmen' wcre recruited fi-om thc aristocracy and served aboard both war galley\ and armcd mcrchantmcn from thc latc 14th ccntury onwards, having the privilege of living in thc captain's cabin. Such scrvicc could also be the first stcp in a military or political carccr. Few professional mcrccnarics yet seem to have servcd at sea, and no maritimc condottieri are recorded until the mid-16th century. Another important fbundation ol'vcnctian naval might was her ability to mas\-proclucc ships in the Arscnal. 'I'hcsc now had thc Li-amc-first system which difI'crcd fiom Gracco-Roman shipping in that the ribs or fi-amc were constructed before the planking was applied, thc ancients having made a planked hull to which they then attached the ribs. This modern system was not only hstcr but used much less wood. War-galleys wcrc thcmsclves also changing. Though thc diffcrcnccs between early

mounted in the wooden rembata or castle, and to a lesser extent in thc stern. Wooden parapets or in7pazjesnti ran along each side of the ship to protect the oarsmen. Greek Fire and other pyrotechnics mcdicval Byzantine dromon~,with their two banks of werc greatly feared, some ships being swathed in oars, and the single-banked Italian war-galley arc protcctive vinegar-soaked hides or slicets of k l t in not yet entirely clear, a new systcm of grouping the time of battle. Yet battles on the open sca remained oars does seem to havc bccn invented in thc I I th or rarc. Apart from defending convoys arid suppressing piracy, the primary function of thc Venetian I ath centuries. This systcm alla .ven.de, or 'in simple fashion', was itsclf to be supcrccded early in the 16th gaileys sccms to have been in 'combined operccntury. 'Great galleys', dcsigncd specifically fbr ations', supporting a landing force either to attack long-distancc trade in dangerous waters, also an encmy base or defend thcir own. T h c Vrnctians appearcd in the mid-14th century. Heavily were noted experts when it came to attacking defended, though bulky and unwieldy, merchant harbours and sea walls. Even the catapult aboard 'round ships' also proved their' worth against the ship was, in fact, called a lifaboli or 'shorc: buster'. Ottomans whcn the latter suddenly turncd to naval Wooden towers could be erected on deck to overtop warfare latc in the 15th century. By then the land defences. Small boats could 1)e slung hlediterranean ships cmploycd the morc efficient between the mast-heads to carry crosshowmen, and stern rudder instead of thc steering oars that had spars could be swung from ropes as Inttcring rams. When battle between opposing fleets did occur it bccn uscd since antiquity. Though this invention is gcncrally hclicved to havc cntcrcd the Mediter- often began with the same ceremonious courtesy as ranean from northcrn Europc, rcccnt evidence a land battlc. A special flag, with a sword pointing shows that it was known to Muslim mariners as skywards, could be raised to signal a willingness to carly as the I I th ccntury and may also havc been fight, and enemy standards would bc trailed in the known to the Byzantines. Other technical advances water behind victorious ships whcn they returned to includcd thc compass, which was clearly of Islamic port. A commander's primary tactical considcration was to kecp his fleet togethcr. Then hc had to and ultimately Chinese origin. Ramming was no longer a n important naval make best usc both of his low but fast and tactic, the truc ram having been replaced by the manoeuvrable galleys and his slow but tall and higher and morc flimsy calcar or boarding 'beak' almost invulnerable 'round ships'. Abo\lc all he had carly in the Middle Agcs; but even a cakal- could to break the enemy formation bcfore overwhelming smash the enemy's oars and cripple his rowers. A it piecemeal by boarding. This could be achieved by gallcy's defences werc conccntrated in the bow, feigning flight, then turning on the foe; or by where a stone-throwing catapult might also be catching his gallcys with thcir sails up and oars

Carved capitals on the lowest level of the Doge's Palace, Venice, early 14th century. Among the military figures on these carvings are a head wearing a bascinet and mail aventail with loosened bretache hanging from the chin (left);and a fully armoured rider carrying an unidentified weapon (right).

stowed. Navigation was almost always within sight ol'larid, so that a concealed part of the fleet could launch an aml)ush kom behind islands, capes or I~ays.Consequently small scouting vessels also had a vital r6lc to play in naval warfare. If necessary warships could I)(> lashed together to form a static floating fi)rtrcss. They could be beached with their strongly defi.nclecl hows pointing out to sea, or be moored stern to the hrach ready to he cut loose a t a moment's notice. Evcn the appearance of the first cannon aboard ship did little to change such traditional tactics until the late 16th century. Such b0rnbard.r were recorded in the ii)rccastlcs of'a few Vcnctian gallcys in the 137os, and l~ccamcstandard armament in the 15th ccntury. Numerous small guns were by then mounted on galleys and round ships to cut down the enemy crew, whilc a single larger cannon could Ilc placed in a galley's bow to pierce the enemy's hull or topple his mast. Such weapor~rya t first proved very successful against Ottoman galleys, whose crews still mostly used composite bows.

River Warfare Vcnicc was also involved in warfare along the broad rivers, lakes and marshes of northern Italy, though not always with great succcss. Most such campaigns arose aster Vcnicc conquered wide territories on the Terra Firmu in what are now Loml,ardy, the Veneto and Friuli, where river fleets could support Venetian land armies. Full-sized galleys operated on Lake Garda and great rivers like the Po. Kckrence to the lirst galleon;, probably meant small galleys with an upper fighting deck over the oarsmen. Other vessels included sailing ships, and the little hulrhe which carried only three rowers and two crossl)owmcn. Vcnicc maintained sizcablc fleets of' such vessels until the use of accurate cannon, liring from a river's banks, put an effective end to this type of warfare at the end of the I 5th ccntury. This was, however, a form of combat in which somc of Venice's ril~alswere already skilled. Evcn the fleet of six galleys and 2 5 smaller craft which Vcnicc launched on Lake Garda in the winter of 1439-40 was almost immediately destroyed I)y Milancsc lake crafi. This had been an epic of military engineering in which, for I 5 days, the Venetians hauled their ships u p the River Adige and across a low mountain range to Lake Garda.

The castle at Trogir, Dalmatia, which still has carved Venetian coats-of-arms set into its walls.

The Army T h e Venetian army was quitc as eiTectivr as its fleet, despite jibes that the marsh-dwelling Venetians didn't know how to ride properly. 'l'lic armies of 13th century Italian states already included mcrcenarics hom other parts of the country in addition to a Seudal leader's own m(t.cnctda. hlost early rt3th century Venetian troops wcrc, however, still recruited from thc lagoon arca, plus a fclv Dalmatian and Istrian fcuclal contingcnts. In emergencies, like that of 1 q 4 , the Vetwtian parishes registered all males between 17 and 60 years of age and listed all the weapons they possessed, those callcd to fight I~cingorganiscd into groups of I 2 . Such domestic troops, conscripts and volunteers, were still prct'crrcd to mercenaries in 14th century Vcnicc. Most fi)ught on foot whilc richer mcn or aristocrats ser\,cd as a cavalry, as they did in all Italian cities. A register ol' 11338estimated that 30,000 Venetians could bear arms; nor were they a mere rabble, as in somc othcr medieval urban militias. Marly were skilled crossl)owmen, while others fought with slings and lire-grenades. Venice also had its own local prokssional soldiers, a small corps of infantry guarcling vital castles like Mestre and Treviso; but n o full-time Venetian cavalry were as yet recorclccl in the 14th century. 'I'hc Iirst truc Vcnctian standirig army emerged quitc suddenly early in the 15th century and consisted, as elscwhcrc in Italy, of condottie~z mercenary contract \oldicrs. Such a force was clearly needed to defend Venice's ricw mainland territories on the T e r ~ u 1;ilma. T h e Republic's contribution to an alliancr with Florence in 1426

Effigy of unnamed Venetian knight, midllate 14thcentury. The man wears typical armour of his period, though the crossing of the chains from his coat-of-plates to his sword and dagger, and the large buckle-cover on his sword-belt, seem to have been fashionable in Venice. (Victoria & Albert Mus., London)

forts and palisades, I);~rric:tdctl sonic c;lnals with chained ships, t)lockcd others with sunken 1):~rgc.s. ancl h;~rasscd the cncmy in I~otlismall I)oats ancl galleys. Vcnicc not only survived this threat 1)itt consisccd of no less than 8,000 ca\.alry and :3,ooo triumphed. and went on to win cstcnsi\rc Trrrn inli~ntryin time of'war, :3,ooo and I ,ooo rcspccti\~ely 1;irmn territories in 1 404-5. in peacetime. 'l'hc almost continuous warfhrc ofthc From thcn until tlic crisis of I 509 Vencti;ln land lirst half' of the I 5th century Iccl to such standing fbrccs were gcticrally o n the ofk~isivcant1 provcd to armics, thcir support systcms and associated 11c the most cfTcctivc in Italy. 'l'licy fbught not only taxation 1)ccoming an accepted fact ofVenetian life, Italians and Hungarians I)ut also Germans ;itid while the mainlancl city 01' Hrcscia hccamc thc dr French longt)owmcn who, in 1449, i~scclI
Ilcct. An ancient tradition stated that Vcrictian ~iol)lcmcncoi~ldcommand dctachmcnts of' no more than 25 men, yet an ovcrall Master of Soldiers had 1)ccn known since thc earliest days. T h e position of Captain General appcared as a n emergency measure in the rqtli century. hut overall management ol' military alI'airs still lay with a civilian commitccc of20 $Ynoiior Wise Men. Remarkable as it might seem, such constant civiliari arid political intcrfkrcncc ill military and na\.al affairs did not alliact cllicirncy; in li~ctit sa\,cd Vcnicc from the military take-overs which plagued othcr Italiar~ city-states. Long cxpcricncc of seafaring and naval warlire gave Vc~iicca supply of men ~ r c l lable to accept tlic rcsponsil)ilitics of leadership, particularly ol' i~i(iintrySorcvs. Armies wcrc normally commantlcd I)y Vcrictian noblcmcn, though profi-ssionals li-orii the T r r r ~Firmn and later even mercenary co~1(/0//i(~ri were given command. Venetian military thinking was, however, singularly cautious. Lust tin glory ran a poor second to achieving victory with the minimum cxpcnditurc of I ~ o t h I~lood and treasure. Another feature of Vcnctian military lire was the /)rozrrditorr or civilian commissioner. who accompanied an army and kept a watchful commissar-like cyc on everything, particularly o n the mcrccnarics. ,A scrics of nee\. /)ror~~di/ori r0lcs was set LIPin the latc I 5th century, including tllc combat rank of' commanding lkrocious Ralkari or Grcck ~trndiotifbrccs in Italy. By 1509 tlic~csupposedly civilian commissioners also commanded the Italian light cavalry and thc '~rtillcry.

Cavalry Despitc thrir wet>-footed reputation. the Venetians had licldcd ctkcti\.c armoured cavalry even in the Effigy of Federico Cavalli, late 14thcentury. The Cavalli were a military family, some of whom served Venice as condottieri mercenaries (in situ church of S. Anastasia, Verona).

Mid-15th century carving of unknown Venetian coat-of-arms supported by two soldiers in distinctive Venetian colonial armour. On the left, a fully equipped man-at-arms wears a helmet remarkably similar to some found in the Venetian fortress at Khalkis (see line-drawings). On the right a similarly armoured crossbowman spans his weapon using a cranequin or rack-and-pinionsystem (in situ Jurja Barakovica Street, Sibenik).

13th century, a regulation 01' 1239 assuming onc war-horse, two othcr horscs and thrcc. squires fbr each Vcnctian knight. 'I'hc I '4th ccntury poct Prtrarch dcclarcd that this 'nation of sailors' surpassed all othcrs both o n 11orscl)ack and at sca. Various Venetian aristocrats I)rcd line horses on their mainland estates, though most animals wcrc imported fiom Germany and Hungary. T h r warhorse was by far thc most expcnsivc part o f a manat-arm's equipment. By the I 5th ccntury it 1)ecamc normal to attack a n cricmy's animal rather than the rider, thus making losses higher and the pro1)lcms of' replaccmcnt cvc-n worse. Heavy cavalry wcrc. organisccl into small units 01' l n n z e this consisting 01' a man-at-arms, a lightly armed sergeant and a page or mounted scr\,ant. By the 15th ccntury many il' not most such mcn-atarms were short-term condoltirri rnrrcenarics. A more stal~lcIbrmation, the Inns(>.~/)r;;a/u or 'l)rokcn lance', was mcanwhilc csta~~lishctl, consisting of veteran or picked troops ~>crrniincntly comrnittctl to

Canal entrance to the Arsenal, Venice, looking towards the site of the Old Arsenal. The Gate of the Arsenal, on the left, was rebuilt in monumental style in 1572 following victory over the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto.

Vcnc.tiul~ scr\.icc. -1.h~man-at-arm's cbquipmcnt was now so cxpcnsivc that ;I separation began to appear I~ctwccnthe Li~llyarmourcd elnzetti and the slightly less prestigious utili. Numerous severe clcfcats sullkrctl I)y armourcd cavalry at the hands of infantry during the 14th ccntury had clearly not untlcrmincd Ihith in the man-at-arm's military potential. His armour was now so sophisticated that the lanze en.joycd a renewed lease of life well into the I 6th century. Fifteenth century Vcnctian lanri also included mounted crossl)own~cnand even mounted hand-gunners, though not the infantry component that appeared in Francc arid Burgundy. Along with the employmerit of stradioti, Venetian Lbrces now recruited a variety of other types of separate and more mol,ilc light cavalry formations. In fact, Vcnicc played a leading r d c in the dcvclopmcnt of western Iuropcan light cavalry during the late medicviil and licnaissancc periods.

Infantry Given the ancient Vcnctian tradition ol'all classes carrying arms and of the government cncouraging military training among the ordinary people, it is not surprising to find that Vcnctian intiintry were both numerous and efkctive. Among the earliest were the Militias of the Six FVards or clistricts of' Vcnice. In I 262 these se.s/ieri were increased to 500 men per parish, partly to help the Signori cli .No/ti maintain order at night. In the 14th century these men were still selected by lot. Men chosen fix the prestigious and lucrative r d c of crossl~owmcn aboard merchant ships and galleys were also selected from among the best at thc various shooting ranges in Venice. Men aged I~ctween 1 5 and 35 were enrolled as crossbowmen by their parish, then being divided into duodene (groups of 1 2 ) under a local officer who was also responsible Ibr their training at the local butts. Since all classes lived crowded together within Vcnicc, the duodene included rich and poor, noble and commoner, who trained ant1 hught together. Not a11 fi)ught as

crossl)owmcn, ol' coursc. Other infantry weapons designed specifically to combat cavalry included the long mace-like weapon5 and harhcd spcars which wrought havoc among invading Hungarians in 1373. 'I'he i'litc of' i7cnctian infantr) werc, however, drawn from the ranks of the =Ir~etm/otti,the highly skilled and well-paid craftsmen of the Arsenal. They provided guards for the Dogc.5 Palace and other government buildings, acting as a police force and even a lire-I~rigade,as well as furnishing detachments ofwcll-equipped infantry. T h e Arsenal itself was also a wcapons factory and arms store, as well as I~cing the most famous ship-building yard in Europe. In I 3 I 4 n o lcss than I , I 3 I crossbows were stored within its walls, whilc its newr rope-making hctory, dating from 1303, madc thousands of crossbow-strings. T h e Cbm/)ngni della C a l ~ n or 'Trouser Clubs', which had been created in the I 5th ccntury largely for the entcrtainmcnt of the young men, also pro\lided trained volunteers when called upon, whilc the unemployed could also find thcmsclvcs cn1istc.d. I n real emergencies Venice fell hack upon mass conscription so that Venetian infantry Ihrccs could sometimes l)c very largc-up to '~0,000iit thr start of the 16th century. By this timr militia officers wore a breastplate and a sallct hrlmct, hut the quality of their troops varied considerably. In general Venetian militia rrmaincd 1)y far the 1)est in Italy, though thosc of Venicc itscll'wcrc normally superior to thosc of the Turra Iqirma. In fact thc latter werc often used mcrcly as pioneers or lal,ourcrs. Tlic status of infhntry liitd sunk consideral>ly I)y the year goo, despite the appearance of Italian hand-gunncrs in the ~ q q o sand the division of infantry Sormations into 'ass;tult' troops with sworcls or short spcars, and f~rc'companies with crossl)ows or guns. In 1qjo efforts liad I)ccn madc to train two men fi-om each Terra 1;irtna village with handguns hut riot until the crisis of I 50:) liad passed could a full overhaul ofthe V c n c t i ; ~militia ~~ system I)c carried out. & .

Armies at home and abroad Venice's lirst serious in\lolvcment o n the Terra Firma dated from 1338, with her defeat of Padua and scizurc oL'Trc\riso. Henceforth Vcnicc was a major powcr o n tlic Italian mainland, and after 14'3 a fundamental shift in Venetian policy committed

11cr to further tcrritol-ial expansion. V c ~ ~ i went c c on to conquer a largc. part of nortlicrn and northeastern Italy. Though tlic go\.rrnment and military organisation of thrsc territories varied, it was than elsewhere in Italy. generally lcss opprcssivc .. Venice was, of course, primarily concerned with security, h o d supplies and access to the Alpine passes rather than military glory, so that hcr light hand inspired considcral)lc loyalty on ihc Turra Firma. This was even true in a backward and still essentially fcudal area like Friuli, wticrc the warlike Friulani were noted as swordsmen. Terr-a 1;irmo urban militias or Ordinan,y trained ci~chSunday, Statue of 'Orlando' by Bonino of Milan, 1413. This knight, representing Dubrovnik, wears typical early 15th century Italian armour of the kind used by the military (lite of Dalmatia ( i n situ main square, Dubrovnik).

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1stanI)ul (Constantinople)in I noq, Vcnicc carefully selected a num1)cr ofstratcgic trrritorirs as her share of the shattcrcd Byzantine Empire. She was not intcrcstccl in largc mainland territories which would he diflicult to dcfrnd and cxpcnsi\~c to govern. Rathcr the Vcncti:uis wanted domination of the lucrative trade routes, so thry took part of' Istanbul itselC a chain ofislands and most ofthc I~cst harbours around Greece. Finally they I)ought the great island of Crctc Lbr 30 Ibs of'golcl. Vcnicc had thus, at one stroke, won an cmpirc. Organisirig i t ::. was anothrr matter. T h e old Vcnctian territories in ./' the Adriatic had retained their traditional systems , 4.7 . :. , , of government. though unclcr Vcncria~ncounts or ,A+.' -' local families of pro\,r.n loyalty. 'I'hc new cmpirr in 'Romania', as i t was known, was placed under . , .,, .. ) .:,. :-7, governors sent directly ti-om Venice. C:rctr was . . 5 ,,.. : slightly difkrcnt on account of its size; a Vcnrtian - :.: -.,. :$.; duke was responsible for thr island's dcfi.nces and . .. over a new feudal class of colonists, plus j; presided those few Greek aristocrats who rctaincd their land. i Permanent military f'orccs soon appcarccl clscwhcre in this cmpirc, long 1)ch-c they did in thr . . ... . , Terra Firma. Most were enlisted from thc local

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'St Michael', wall painting by Vincent of Kastav, 1474. Part of a cycle of paintings in Istria which include typically Venetian weapons such a s the three-bladed ronco and, a s here, typical German armour. Venetian Istria was bounded by Austria while Hungary and Ottoman-ruled Bosnia lay just over the mountains (in situ church of St. Mary, Beram).

and totallctl al)out 30,ooo men. In many arcas the old country Icvic5 had rcmaincd cfli,ctivr fighting troop5 throughout thc I 3th century. Such forccs were rc\li\.ccl earl), in thc 16th century when they wcrc known ;I\ ret?ricl~. Llscwhrrr the peasantry scrvccl as rur;~lguerrillas, harassing ;In invader. O n the other halid the full-timc u r l ~ a ngarrisons of thc \;cnctian Terra Fil-ma wcrc often ofvcry low quality, consisting of' rctirrd veterans or men with no military training whatsocvrr. Venetian forccs stationed ovcrscas in the empire ' n c l 121nrc', were ofmorc consistent quality and often occupiccl isolatccl or hazardous outposts. Apart from the hugr t)ooty won with the conquest of Rear view of Verrocchio's statue (c.1485) of the famous condottiere Bartolomeo Colleoni who served Venice faithfully for many years. It shows a perfect example of late 15th century full-plate armour in the Italian style. For a front view see MAA 136,Italian Medieval Armies p.34 (in situ Campo SS. Giovanni e Paolo, Venice).

military Clitcs, though even in the 13th century Italians wcrc being recruited for servicc overseas. In 1369Venicc's Cretan lkudatories rose in revolt. T h e rising was crushed alicr hitter fighting, and thereafter ttic dcfi~ncesof Crctc wcrc stifycncd by many rncrccnarics, Italian infintry taking a major rGlc though Italian cavalry were morc rarely rccordcd. 1,ocal .dl-ccdio~iprovided the bulk of horscsoldic.rs. Each part of the Vcnctian empire difTcrrcl in the details of'its military organisation. Istria had finally l)ccn co~iclncrcd late in the I gth ccntury aftcr a scrics ofamp11il)ious operations by galley fleets. 'I'hc Ibrtifications of'thosc places, like 'I'ricstc and Kopcr which had clclicd Venetian control, were dismantlrcl. Kopcr was placed urldcr the joint rulc of' a pod(~.c/acivil govcrrior and a proz~rdilorr military admi~~istr;~tor. Zadar, the main Vcnctian naval I~asc in Dalmatia, fi-cqucntly rc\:ol tcd against Vcnctian rulc and had, in fact, hccn rcco\w-cd during the. first I~attlc of the Fourth Crusadc. Duljrovnik resisted Venetian control morc cffcctivc.ly ant1 was only ruled 11); Venicc f'rom I 205 to I 358. Elscwllcrc the Venetians left day-to-day

'Battle of Anghiari (~qqo)',painted cassone chest by school of Uccello. In this battle the Venetians and Florentines under Sforza defeated the Milanese under Piccinino. (Nat. Gall. of Ireland, Dublin)

afyairs in local hancls while firml?. controlling the ports, thosc islands with a traclition 01' piracy, and acccss to the vital h)rcsts hom which most Vcnctian ships were I)uilt. Otlicrwisc Venice had n o interest in thc blcak limestone mountains ofthe liintcrland. Some citics wcrc o1)ligccl to supply ships to the Vcnctian flcct Zadar n o Icss than 30 galleys fully manned w h i l e all hacl to supply sailors, plus militias fbr their own dcfi,ncc. 'I'hough the countryside rr:mainccl firmly Slav, the. Italian character of' thc major I);llrn;~ti:in cities was strengthc~ic.tl. 1;ully tr;~itlccl crossl)ow militias became a fkaturc. of' these c.itic,s, while D;llmati;ln peasant warriors still ;rpl)arc~itlp.used composite bows of Byzantine or almost 'I'i~rkisli 1i)rm. T h e Middle Eastern charactc,r of Vcnctian colonial troops in Crctc and ('J I ( (,ce was evcn more ob\.ious. E v ~ ~ o i aknown . to the Venetians as Ncgropontc, was almost as I)ig iln island as Crctc and was the key to Vcrirtian powrr in the .+legcan.

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I t hristlrd with Sortilications, including a tower I~uiltin the midst o f t h r Iuripos channel where up to 1 4 tides flowccl in ;I single day. Only one of the most senior Venetian administrators could hccomc Rnilip or governor of Evvoia, and the colony's own flag was Hown or1 a I)rollzc flag-stafl' outside the Catlicclral of San Marco in Vrnicc itself on ccrcmonial occasions. Othcr lcss important Aegean islands wcrc mcre \tops along the traclc routes or I~a\csfrom which to control piracy. T h e Cyclaclcs archipelago, thcorctically a lirfof the Latin I h p i r c of Constantinoplc, wa\ actually held by various Vcnctian familics who placed loyalty to Vcnicc above mcrc Scudal obligations to that \hart-lived 'cmpirc'. T h e tiny island of Kithcra, ofl' the southern tip of Grccce, pro\.idcd vital communications Ixtwccn Vcnicc and Crctc: i t c\-cntually had 110 less than thrcc castlcs and a sizcal~lcgarrison. Corfi~,at the mouth 'Venetian Stradiotti at the battle of Fornovo (1495)'from a French print made a few years later. Here a combined Italian army under Venetian leadership was narrowly defeated by the invading French, but not before the stradiotti light cavalry had caused terror on the French flank. (Nat. Gall. of Art, Washington)

of the Adriatic, had originally fi~llcnto Vcnicc during the carving-up ofthe Byzantine I m p i r r , its Seudal obligatiorl I~cingthe supply of20 knights and 40 squires. Corfu was, however, soon lost to the Kingdom of Naples and had to he purchasrd back in I 386. Other temporary Vcnctian possessions in Grcecc included Moncmvasia, Mcthoni, Argos, Corinth, Navpaktos, Nauphlia and cvcrl Athens. As the Ottomans advanced across <;rcc.cc in the 14th century thesc outposts I~ccamc Iillcd with Byzantine rcfugccs. Marly came from the old military elite and took service with Vcnicc as .rtrndioti light cavalry. Among them wcrc famous namcs like Graitzas Palacologos, From thc last Byzantinc ruling Samily, who rosc to command all Vcnctian light cavalry. At1 cllbrt to drive the Ottornans out of the Peloponncsc in I 463-4 with an army of ~trndiofi,Italian hand-gunners and cond o f t i ~ rhcavy i cavalry failed. This was the last major Vcnctian land ofl'ensive in the cast. Thcrcaftcr defensive operations were lcfi to thc naval and garrison infintry and to d~n(lzof/,who not only fought thc Ottomans on their own terms hut wcrc much cheapcr to maintain than Wcjtcrn-style mcn-

at-arms. Wielding short lances orjavclins, bows and light swords, and heinq relatively lightly armoured, such stradioti wcre recruited in Greccc, Albania and Dalmatia. 'I'heir loyalty was rarely in doubt, their ferocity provcrhial, and their habit of collccting thc heads of slain foes never seriously discouragcd. Nevertheless, signs of declining Balkan and Greck support for Vcnicc became apparent cven by the 15th century. Crete remained the prize possession and Venice had to fight for it against both local Greeks and Genoesc free-booters. T o ensure its subjcction thc island had been dillided into six sections namcd after the six districts of Vcnice. Beneath these came I 32 knights' fees and 405 infantry sergeantries mostly held hy Venetian military settlers. Fortifications sprang up all over thc island, particularly along the northcrn coast. Yet Crete proved not to be the land of opportunity as had at first been hoped. Even by I 332 many of the Venetian settler knights wcre too poor to afford proper military equipment. Many of their feudal serfs were of Arab origin, drscendrd from Muslim conquerors who had ruled Crete centuries earlier. Though unfree, they could tie summoned for military service, whilc Greck Cretans were also conscripted when nccded. T h e Cretan talent for savage guerrilla warfare first became apparent during the mid-13th century rehcllioti which was, however, equally savagely crushed. Another uprising in the mid-14th century confirmed the Venetians in their view of Cretans as untrustworthy savages, and the latter in their hatred for Venetian colonial rule. Nc\lrrthelcss Cretan infantry archers wcre soon fighting alongside Venetian crosshowmen in the Trl-1-0 I;ima. From the Fourth Crusade's conquest of Istanbul in I 204 to thc Byzantine regaining oftheir capital in I 261, Venetian merchants dominated thc Black Sea. This dangerous area spanned the rich caravan routes from Iran and China, and was also an important source of wood from which crossbows wcre made. In 1261 Venice lost her paramount position to the Gcnoese, who were close allies of a revived Byzantium. But, despite the dedicated hostility of thesr two Italian maritime rcpuhlics, Venice and Genoa frequently co-operated in the hazardous environment of the Black Sea. This was particularly apparent in the Crimca, where a number of originally Byzantine ports served as

'Portrait of an unknown Florentine knight' by Piero di Cosimo, c.1515,showing the fluted armour popular in northern Italy from the early 16th century. (Nat. Gallery, London)

termini fbr the trans-Asia11 Silk Koad ;is well as routes north into filr-rich Russia and Siberia. 'rhrrc. were, of course, bloody clashes, but Venetians and Genoese 110th feared the might o f t h r ncighbouring Mongol Golden Horde and its successor Khanates. T h e Crimca itself was a rcmarknl~lymixed area. with Armcnians forming a majority in some trading towns and Christian Goths, dcsccndants of Dark Age and perhaps suhscclucnt Anglo-Saxon rclilgcc* settlers, inhabiting the coastal mountains. At Kaflil the Genoesc even had a capi/aneu.c Cothir in charge ol Gothic troops, plus m.c/rl/ani and other li~ll-time military officials. T h e Italians lost the Clrimca to thc Ottomans in 1479, the Black Sea l~ccomingan Ottoman lake within li\.c years. alier which the only 'Western' merchant \~cssclsto sail its watcrs wcre those of Venice's old Dalmatian ri\lal, l)ul>rovnik. T h e mcrcenary elcmcnt in Venetian armie\ steadily increased over the centuries. R.lcrccnaries had long been a li.aturc ol' Italian warfarc and northcrn Italy remainetl tlic m+jor source ol'such

'Knight adoring the Virgin and Childyby Catena, early 16th century. The warrior's turban and a curved dagger on the wall suggest that he represents an 'oriental', perhaps one o f the Three Wise Men or a Venetian stradiot light cavalryman. (Nat. Gallery, London)

troops for Vcnicc. Among the first non-Italians to be hired wrrc Catalan crosshowmen late in the I ~ t ccntury. Forcigncrs I,c.camc morc common in 14th century Venice, as they wcrc clscwhcrc in Italy, though the Venetians rarncd a reputation as notably hard 1)argaincrs when i t came to drawing up thc mndotta contract. Such contracts wer? generally very dctailvd, specifying arms and equipment clown to the last detail. Foreign mercenaries were not normally permitted to livc in Vcnicc itscll' l)ut were housed in barracks or bachelor houscs within the citadels of the Terrtr Firmn. Thrrc the troops soon intcgratcd into the local communities, marrying local girls and even setting up local l~usincsscs.Yet discipline could still he harsh, with hangings or mutilations for serious ofEnscs like desertion. Condottiuri lcaders who hctraycd V c n i c ~ wcrc publicly humiliated by having thcir portraits hung upside-down in public places such as the Rialto brothel. Condotfieri infantry wcrc sent ovcrscas in the 14th ccntury, serving in Crete and elscwhcrc. T h e grcatrst succcsscs of these highly trainrd professionals wcrc, however, in dcknce of the T u r n 1;irmn. 'I'hcsc wcrc achieved not only against other I

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condoltieri but most notably against Hungarians in Friuli early in the 15th century. Among Venice's non-I talian mercenaries werc German gunners and pikemen, English archers, Gascons, Swiss, Albanian mountain infantry, Dalmatians and Crctan h archers. Condottipri infantry wcre used in great numbers during the 15th century, proving much casier to hirc and fire than thc prouder and morc expensive ca\:alry. Such mrrcenary infi~ntryforccs normally included spearmen, crossbowmen and shield-bearers in equal number. But all thcse mercenary forces had the disadvantage of short contracts, after which the men could go and hire out to another state. T h c long Venetian tradition of military training and splcndid tournaments, in which cvcn strndioti wcrc taking part by 1491, stood Venice in good stead. Archery butts for crossbow practice wcre dotted around the city and the Lido. Prizes werc generous, and in 1506 shooting ranges and competitions for handguns wcre similarly set up, indicating just how important these new wcapons had become. Other warlike pastimes included barely controlled battlcs with stave5 and fists between the three eastern and the three western iertieri parishes of Venice. Oflicially inaugurated i l l I 292, they tcnded to take place between Scptcmhc~ and Christmas. Normally focusing on the 1,ridgcs which lacked parapets in those days-they cndccl

with the losers frilling into the canal. Sham sea lights, assaults on mock castles, and bagordi or light cavalry manocuvrcs of attack and withdrawal clcarly inspired by Balkan or Islamic military practice, wcrc also a feature of I 5th century Venice. So was the clearly non-European Moresca war dance with blunted daggers. O n a more serious level twice-yearly military parades and inspections were designed to weed out incompetent troops and to chcck the quality of military equipment.

Siege, Fortification and Firearms Venrtian 4cge warfare, at least on land, followed the Fame patterns as elsewhere in Europe. By the early 16th century the defcnce of a city like Padua depended upon an exterior water-filled ditch and lnassccl artillery in raised earth bastions to cover gates and other wcak points. T h e stone city wall was strengthened Ily having earth piled against its inner litce I)chind which was another ditch backed by casemates and towers. Finally there came a high emt~ankmentwith a parapet serving as a n assembly point and additional artillery platform. Crossbows were still uscd by militiamen, but handgunners providcd the most erective answer to infantry assault. Venice first uscd, and faced, firearms in 1376 when 110th thc Venetians and Austrians employed I)oml,ards in open battle. Guns played a more signilicant r0le against the Genoese a few years latcr; and by the early 15th century the Venetian army clearly had a n artillery train while cvcn the river fleets carricd numerous small cannon. River wall and bastion (left) of the 16th century defences of Kotor. The land walls may just be seen rising from left to right up the precipitous slopes of Mount Lovcen.

Firearms: A-Barrel of Schioppo hand-gun, 14th C. (Mus. Civico Marzoli, Brescia);&Breech-loading cannon seen from beneath, of type which could be mounted on the bulwarks of a ship, 15th C. (Mus. Civico Marzoli, Brescia); C-Mid-15th C. handgun, shown on right in reconstructed wooden stock (Mus. Civico, Trieste); &Military wheellock pistol with German barrel & Brescian stock, mid-16th C. (Armoury of Doge's Palace, Venice); E-Italian caliver matchlock, length almost 1.5 metres (after Held).

Grenades werc also rccordcd, hut it was the development of the hand-gun which was to prove most dramatic. I n thc 14th century such wcapons had less armour-pcnctrating capability than crossbows, though they werc cheaper; hut improvcmcnts in the manufacture of saltpetre and the use of longer barrels rapidly incrcasccl muzzlc velocity. T h e great Venetian rondot~ier~ leader, Colleoni, was popularly credited with first using field artillery on mobile carriages, and though he might not actually have bcen the first, he certainly used thcsc new wcapons very cfTcctivcly. 'l'hc Vcnctians wcrc also enthusiastic about developing new explosivr wcapons, including gunpowder-filled mines and the longbarrelled and highly mobilc ba.rili~rksiege gun. 'I'he Arsenal obviously played a major part in thcsc developments, bur was cqually clearly unable to manufacture as many cannon as were nccdcd in the 15th ccntury. Meanwhile iron was smelted and worked for military purposes in a walled area of furnaces known as the Gctto, latcr to Ix:comc tlctter known as thc Ghetto or Jcwish quarter of Venice. T h e failure of Venetian artillery against an invading French siege train at the end of the 15th century seems not to havc rcsultcd from inSerior wcapons hut from French numerical strength and far greater mobility.

Mhice on the Dfdtz.ciue I n 1509 Venice faced the League of Cambrai, which pitted most of Europe against her alone; among thcsc foes was France, whosc armics were among the most powerful of the day. Only two

months alier a huge explosion in the Arscnal's gunpowder store, Venice was dckatcd at the disastrous hattlr of' Agnadcllo and the Turn Firmn was lost. I'hcsc tcrri~oricswere to t ~ gradually c and patiently regained; hut the most rcmarkablc aspcct of this appalling year was, in fact, the Republic's survival.

From thcn on Venice adopted a grimly defensive stance, shunning all alliances and strcngthcning her frontiers with thc most modern fortifications. T h e proportion of cavalry to infantry in her armies was drastically reduced, as in most other European states, while an ever-growing Ottoman naval threat to her overseas territories demanded cvcr more galleys, plus the marines and guns to fill them. O n the other hand, Venetian military organisation became more and more conservative and predictable. Considerable efforts wcrc devoted to avoiding war with the Ottomans and to maintaining strict neutrality in European affairs. T h e army and fleet co-opcrated more closely than ever. 'l'hc formcr concentrated on mainland threats from Hapsburg Austria and Ottoman-ruled Bosnia, the latter on naval threats not only from thc Ottomans but also from those champions of Christendom, thc Spaniards, who now ruled southcrn Italy. Venice may have shrunk to a second-class power, hut thc wisdom of these policies resulted in the remarkably long lik of her empire, which survived until Napoleon's takeover in I 797. Machiavclli's damning explanation of the Venetian dcfcat in 1509 as resulting from a 'miserable baseness of spirit caused 'The Story of St Ursula' by Carpaccio, 1493. Left--the pilgrims arrive at Cologne, showing fully armoured men equipped in Venetian style and an archer with a late Byzantine style of sword. Belo-assacre of the pilgrims by Huns, showing lightly equipped soldiers who are probably based on Venetian stradiotti. (Academia Gall., Venice)

1)y a wretched military system' was proved wrong 11y survival for almost three more centuries against all the odcls of I'uropean history. O n e result ol' Vetlice's changecl situation was a return to reliance, as far as possible, on her own men. Mercenaries werc still recruited hut such troops were now less available and Venice was also short ofcash to pay them. 'I'he Venetian aristocracy remained small, never numbering more than 2,500 adult males, in comparison to its military, naval, political and administrative responsibilities. O r dinary people wcrc now less willing to send thcir sons as soldiers, so that Venice was obligecl to pardon criminals in return fbr their enlistment. T h e city increasingly relied on men Srom the Term Firnin which, despite its problems, was tied to Venice by a grudging sense of mutual advantage. T h e Venrtians tliemselvcs rcmained a multi-cultural and even multi-racial society. Nevertheless there werc still far more renegades from Christendom to Islam, and Ii-om Venice to the Ottomans, than vice-versa. Christians also trcated their Muslim prisoner slaves IBr worse than Turks treated Christian slaves, largcly because Christian society lacked the religious-legal sanctions to deal with such matters. hlcanwhilc the control oS militarv affairs was concentrated in the hands of a college of experts much like a modern war council. Spies and inli)rnmrs played perhaps a greater r6le in Venetian military preparations than anywhere else in Europe, while in the 16th centurv Venice itself became a centre for the writing and printing of military hooks and maps. Military construction. skilled artisans, and above all the making of bronze cannon were increasingly concentrated in the Arsenal under the closest goirernment super\,ision. While the Trrra Firma generally remained loyal to Vcnice, the eastern province of Friuli was $till very backward and virtually feudal. I t was here that Venice faced serious mainland threats Srom both Hapsburg Austria and the 'I'urks. Both were, however, contained; and it would be fair to say that the Ottoman failure to conquer Italy, largely as a result of Venetian resistance, had a profound eff'ect on the course of Renaissance and European history. Venetian woodcut showing the siege of Padua. Note the besiegers' use of cannon, handguns ignited by a second man with a heated touche, and the defenders' use of incendiary grenades (from Niccolo degli Agostini, Li Successi Bellici published in 152t ) .

I n I 6 I 5- I 7 Venice 1i)ugIit her I;rst ~n;!jor lancl M';I~, again against t11(, H;ll)sl)urgs who, tlirougli Archduke Ferdinand 01' Austria, wcrc protecting the troublesome Uskok ~)iratcs 01' S(.nij in the northern i1dri;ltic. Uskok and other pir;ttcs, 11l11s;I n;l\~;llthrrat to Dalmatia Srom Spanish Naples. wcrc tlic main problems confi-onting Vcnicc in the late r(ith and I 7th centuries. 'l'he Uskoks clairnccl to t)c Crusaders fighting the Ottoman inliclcl. I ~ u in t I'act they caused more trouble to Christian Vcnicr. r\lthough thcir I~ascat Senj was nomin:tlly in Hapsl)urg territory, the Uskoks wcrc in reality liec.l)ootc~rs.Nor Lverc they the o n l ~ .pirates in t lie ;Iclri;~tic:Sp;rniartls, French, Dutch, I'nglish, Knights of hfalta ancl 'I'uscan Knights of' St Stc-l)li(.ri all ~)rc:yccl on Venetian shipping. il4uslim corsairs include-tl Ottoman Turks, r\/luslims I)ased in All):uii;r and southern Dalmatia. as wcll as tlic limous Barbary Corsairs Gom North Alrica. Yet they were not pirates in the true s c ~ ~ ssince c, thcir activities, like those oS C11risti;in corsairs attacking Ivluslim shipping, wcrc gc~icrallyliccnsccl Ily their rcspecti\.c go\.ernmcnts.

the ditc of the Venetian military cstahlishment, with their wide experience not only ofnaval wartarc but of gunnery and combat on land. Invarial~lyof 'I'hc main threat to Venice's overseas possessions noble rank, thcir battle discipline was high hut thcir naturally came from thc Ottomans. T h e Empire D a sense of responsibility could at other times l,c poor. Alarr was thus divided into Sour defensive zones: the They frequently took thcir ships 'off station' on Gulf of Venice and Istria; Dalmatia and its islands; private voyages back to Venice; decorated thcir the C;rcck islands and Crete; and, far to the east, galley's poops with unauthorised and appallingly Cyprus, which had only fallen under Venetian expensive gilded woodwork; constantly demanded control in 148!). Dalmatia scrvcd as the mainstay of new ships and generally treated thcir vessels as Venetian naval power while the rest ofthe maritime personal cruisers. In many ways these men, rmpirc retained its original strategic function as a ferocious and skilful fighters as they were, had much chain of heavily defended bases, though the in common both with medieval knights and with Ottomans had already broken through this chain in some air aces of the Great War! Altogether, however, there was a steady decline many places. There was also an increasing tendency for Vcnicc's Grcck and Balkan sul?jects to flee the in Venetian naval efficiency Srom the late 16th ever heavier hand of Venetian colonial rule for the century onwards, despite a great victory over thc relative freedom of Ottoman territory. T o some Ottoman fleet at Lepanto in I 570. T h e shortage of extent Vcnicc was surviving on her past reputation. crews became acute. Bigger warships, such as a I n fact, such was the awesomc. &me of the Arsenal 'great galley' flagship of I 601, carried 572 men, lo that riews of another devastating explosion in 1569 being oarsmen, I 32 being soldiers and thcir officers. was said to have encouraged the Ottomans to Senior men fought in full armour, marines in lighter cor.raletti of plate, while oarsmen wore light hclmrts invade, and ultimately seize Cyprus. and metal-lined corrazzini flexible body armour. The Fleet Free oarsmen still helped the gunners in unskilled Ilefencc of overseas t~ascsstill rested primarily on capacities, but Venice had already I~ecnobliged to the galley whose crrws were still used as land or lower her standards of naval recruitment in thr amphibious hrccs. bSo/~raron7i/igalley captainc were mid-16th ccntury. By the I 7th ccntury standards

'St George' by Carpaccio, c.1500. The saint is shown as a fully equipped Venetian man-at-arms, though without a helmet (in situ Scuola di S. Giorgio degle Schiavoni, Venice).

wcre sometimes abysmal. In I 539 conscription from thc parislies had been abandorlcd in favour of quotas of' oarsmcn from the guilds and Scuolp or rdigious fratcrnitics. Albanians, Dalmatians, Greeks and Jews from Corfi~included oarsmcn who had simply I)ccn press-ganged. Convict oarsmen werc brought, or c\.en bought, from ncighbouring states as filr afield as Bavaria. Chained, ill-clothed, underfed and dying in large numbers from exposure, thew. convict oarsmcn wcre nevertheless entrusted with weapons in battle. They remained much more important to the I 7th century Venetian flcet than did true galley slaves. T h e latter could gencrally be distinguished by a Tartar-style single tuft ofhair upon their heads, while the convicts were shaved Inld. Vcnicc had for long put Christian prisoners to the oars while merely slaughtering all Muslim, renegadc and Uskok prisoners, male or fcmalc. Rut the chronic shortage of oarsmen obliged Venice to follow other Christian navies by putting captured Turks on the benches. Huge numbers of Ottoman prisoners wcrc, of course, available after the battle of Lepanto; and though thc supply later dwindled, Christian fleets continued to usc more galley-slaves than did the essentially volunteer-manned Muslim galleys. Mercy was still not shown to 0ttoman officers, naval captains, skilled navigators or

craftsmen, Vcnctian captains bcing instructed to cnsurc that such men were 'killed in whatcvcr secret and discrcct manner you sce fit to use'. T h e number of fighting men aboard a ship dcpendcd on whcrc she was sailing. 'I'hough selected militia units wcre still used at sca, those who volunteered for such voyages wcrc often dcspcrate men, sea service 1)cing paid at lowcr ratcs than service on land. T h r impossibility of running away when fighting aboard ship meant that even infrrior militiamcn performed better at sea than on land. T h e scapoli were, strictly speaking, volunteer marines as distinct from the soldali who wcrc troops raised in timc of war for comlmt wherever needed, on land, sea or in amphibious campaigns. Such ~oldatiwere gcncrally raisrd t ~ ycondotlirri mercenary leaders. Aristocratic volunteers were still recorded, but it is also clear that marly such 'Nobles of'thc Quartcrdeck' took their pay . . hut ncvcr wcnt to sea. Early I 7th ccntury naval weapons included the longbow, which sccms to have had a revival, whereas crossbows wcrc gcncrallv abandoned in favour of handgum. Later 5tcc.l-armed cros\bows 'The Battle of Lepanto (1570))painted by an anonymous artist shortly after the battle, one of the most detailed representations of the victory over the Ottomans. Note the heavy bow guns, the arquebus-men massed upon the decks, and the poorly clad galley-slaves. (Ham House, Victoria & Albert Mus., London)

The galley-harbour of Zadar (see plans of fortification), !ying between the i ~ e city r (left) and the outer defences (nght). Zadar was the main Venetian naval base in Dalmatia and this harbour could contain a small fleet of warships.

were remarkably accurate and immensely powerful, with a bow tension ol'over 3 kg, but they were slow and difficult to use, whcrcas anyone could blaze away with an arquc.l~usor heavier musket at the short ranges of' tia\~;~l comt~at.Confhsingly, however, na\.al handgunncrs were still oftcn referred to as bale~tiet-ior crossbowmen. Naval gunncrs 1i)rmed the real Clitc. Graded in three ranks they ucrc trained in thc Scuola di Sta. Barbara in Vcnirc, or in other artillery companies around thr Tvrra 1;irma and overseas territories. They cnjoyccl numcrous tax concessions, had the right to bear arms, and wcrc rcsponsihlc not only for the artillery I I L I ~ also Lhr signal rockets and other incendiary dc\~iccs.1:ull y trained gunners were, however, few (only 2 I among a great galley's complemt.nt of' 572) SO 0th" mcmhcrs of the crew had to help load, shift and even fire the guns. These

numbered from as little as I I small guns on a light galley, up to q n on a great galley, including a pair of culvcrins weighing over I 0,000Ibs each. Most naval artillery seemed designed for ranges of I oo paces or more. T h e guns werc placed in a galley's bows, being aimed by manoeuvring the ship itself. Brcechloaders were preferred for the lighter artillery since these could br loaded under cover without exposing their gunners to enemy short-range fire; and bronze cannon were valued, since they did not rust a t sea. At its peak ofefficiency the Venice Arsenal could fit out, arm and provision a newly built galley with standardised parts on a production-line basis unscen anywhere else until the Industrial Revolution. Though fire-pots and other traditional incendiary devices were still being used, fundamcntal changes in naval gunnery were becoming apparent as efforts wcre made to sink or disable a foe with cannon alone. Light galleys had no part in this na\,al re\iolution, but they remained a vital element in the Venetian fleet. Their design was also steadily improved, with yet another system of rowing being introduced around 1534: known as a1 ~caloccio,it reduced the number of now larger oars, each being pulled by a team of five to seven oarsmen. Various experimental warships were built in the late 16th century, but the most dramatic newcomer was the gallea3 which, developed from the old merchant great galley, had already put in an appearance at Lepanto. Thegalleas was a huge galley which served as a floating fortress in battle. Its cannon, often The late 16th century Venetian fortress guarding Iraklion harbour, Crete. The low profile and thick walls were designed to resist artillery; above the entrance was a finely carved marble Lion of St Mark, the symbol of Venice.

1: Venetian knight, early 13th C. 2: Dalmatian urban militiaman, mid-13thC. 3: Dalmatian moldier, mid-13thC.

1: N. Italian crossbowman, c.1330 2: Italian armoured infantryman, c.1320 3: Knight, Collalto family, c.1340

1: Jacopo Cavalli, c.1380 2: Venetian infantryman, late 14th C. 3: Cavalli trumpeter, late 14th C.

1: Dalmatian crossbowman, c.1440 2: Dalmatian infantryman, c.1440 3: Dalmatian knight, mid-15th C. 4: Italian peasant levy, 15th C.

N. Italian crossbowman, late 16th C. Venetian militiaman, late 16th C. Venetian man-at-arms,late 16th C.

1: Stradiot, c.MO 2: Venetian light cavalryman,c.1500 3: Greek noble, early l6th C.

1: %mmaso Morosini, c.1647 2: Venetian arquebusier, elvly 17th C. 3: 'Scappoli' volunteer, early 17th C.

increasingly conccntratcd on the ma.jor anchorages: Zadar, Sibenik, Kotor, Corfu, Iraklion, Kyrenia, Famagusta and Nicosia. Corfu, dcscribcd as 'the heart and soul of this state', was the lynch-pin ofthe entire empirc. From hcrc anti-piracy patrols as wcll as great fleets could operate. True blockades were still impossible with available naval technology while, in turn, vessels as powerful as thcgalleas could almost always force their way through Ottoman resistance with supplies for distant Venetian outposts. Modern artillcry also enabled bigger merchant ships to defend themselves, so it was the smaller ships that suffercd most from pirates and corsairs.

Land Warfare O n land major tactical changes had altered the face of European warfare in the early 16thcentury, with great armies now seeking a decisive blow rather than indulging in the elaborate manoeuvre and attrition of previous centuries. Far higher casualties 'Augustino Barbarigo', commander of the Venetian galleys at were sun'ered than had been normal in medieval the battle of Lepanto, by the school of Titian, late 16thcentury. He wears the full uniform of a Venetian general. (Mus.Storico and early Renaissance warfarc. Yet this was a Navale, Venice) passing phase, hccause improvcmcnts in fortification techniques soon hogged down tactics once mouritcd on wheeled carriages, were now ranged again. Meanwhile the Venetians clung to their along its sides instead of being concentrated in thc traditionally cautious approach, making great use bow. Yet, despite occasional spectacular successes, of their mountainous northern frontiers against the ga1l~n.swas too slow and unwieldy to be widely both Austrians and Ottomans. Tactics varied, uscful and few were l~uilt. though Vcnctian armies sometimes marched with T h e 16th ccntury gnlleon, unlike its riverine light cavalry in thc van followcd by heavy cavalry namcsakc of an earlier century, was a slimmed- and infantry. Artillery formed a central body while down version of the merchant 'round ship' and as a second corps of infantry, heavy and light cavalry sue11 was a n armccl sailing vessel. It too could serve t~roughtup the rear, their order being the rcvcrse of as a floating fortress in a major naval confrontation, those in the van. Stradioli were naturally employed but i t was oflittlc use against small pirate galleys in as advancc and flanks guards. Many condoftieri the c o n l i ~ ~ cspaccs d of the Dalmatian coast or leaders still off'crcd considerablc loyalty to Venice, Acgcan isli~ncls.T h e superiority of northern pirate whilc the supposedly civilian prooedifori took an ships in the new warfare under sail led Venice to increasingly important r6lc in positions of comhire and cvcntually copy thcsc vcsscls which wcrc mand. At their head a Prooedi/ot General had his own known to thc Vcnctians as bertoni. Not until 1667 guard of I 2 to 2 5 halberdicrs, plus a full staff. Other dicl Vcnicc start l~uilclingits own 'ships-of-the-line', prozleditori commanded the light cavalry and using a n English warship as a niodcl, so far had sunk stradioti, while a special corps of Prorledi/ori a/le the one-time 'h4istrcss of the Seas'. for tee;^ was established in 1542 to supervise the With the consolidation of Ottoman power Republic's fixed defences. Othcrs armed and throughout the, Balkans and Middle East, and trained the peasant volunteers of the Trcviso area, Venice's policy of avoiding alliances, the Venetian controlled the liccnsed pillaging of enemy territory, cmpirc was more isolated than ever. Strategy, as thc allocation of artillery or the surveying of wcll as the cost of updating fortifications, was frontiers. T h e Arsenal was also run hy prozleditori,

though it provcd fiir easier to manufacture enough wcapons than to gct them to the troops where and when thcy were nccdcd. 'I'hc army itsclfstill included militias from Vcnicc and the Turra Iq'irma, and many mcml~crsof thc poorer aristocracy had little choice but to bccomc soldiers. Yet thc o\-crall quality of Venetian armies had dcclincd I)aclly 11): the carly 17th century. Heavy cavalry in full plate armour and riding 'barded' or armourcd horses were anachronistic in this new age of fircarms but thcy wcrc retained, though in decreasing numbers, fbr reasons of prcstigc and to give the richer aristocracy a sense of' military purpose. Such heavy cavalry were still organiscd in larr
Dogc's Palace Guard. T h e Terra Iq'irma cities sclccted gate guards from thcir own citizcns as well as militias to supplcmcnt profi.ssional garrison troops. In pcacctimc these garrisons werc themscl\res rrsponsihle for guarding gates, piazzas, food and ammunition storrs, patrolling the wi~lls,strccts and sloping glacis beyond the wall, and manning thc sitadcl. Somc citics like Brcscia also raised an indigenous force of guardaroli to take over some patrol dutirs. Militias were, however, oS very varicd quality. Most consisted of men enlisted bctwcrn the ages of I 7 and 24 who rcmained liahle Tor scrvicc fbr eight years. They were organised in sub-companies of o who trained five Sundays a ycar. around ~ o mcn These in turn formed part of a larger company o f u p

to (ioo militiamen which held annual manoeuvres. I'c.oplc joined for a variety of reasons, though ~wrmissionto I)car arms and cxcmption From labour service on the fbrtifications or in clearing canals were common motives. In somc of the wilder or nlountainoiis regions like Friuli people habitually carried arms in any case, and they coulcl Ije enlisted when necessary as rural guerrillas armed with bow and arrow. T h e crossl~owclcclincd in favour as an infantry weapon, as i t had done at sea; while the barely traincd militias were rarely competent to fight with pikes, which was a technique demanding firm cliscil>linc and much practice. Primiti\.c .,chio/)/wti handguns wcrc still employed in the 16th century though thc arqucl)us gradually supcrcc!cled thcm. Hcavicr muskets, requiring fbrks to support thcm, soon made an appearance among the militia. h4cn were trainccl to fire arqucl)uscs both running and crouching, at targcts 40 paces distant; musketeers trained with targets a t twice that range. Other training involved all thc usual advancing, retiring arid skirmishing trchniqucs of late 16th and 17th century infantry ~ ~ a r f a r Coloured c. surcoats and

sashes, agrccd war-cries and known I~anncrsall helped maintain cohesion in I>attlr, while 21 few militia units even \Yore the red and white uniform livery of thC Vcnctian Captain General. Venice's militias may havc 1)ccn more ciTcctive than those of other European nations, yct their rcal valur appears to havc hccn moral rather than military. They rostcred a scnsc of national identity and proved that the Repu1,lic trustcci its own people in arms, a rare katurc in the. 16th and r 7th cent ur~es. Mid-16th ccnturv Vcnctian cavalry sometime\ carried arquebus soldiers into 11:ittlc riding pillion. By thc early 17th ccntury ;~rquchusicrs, also carrying pistols, were operating as true mounted infantry; a small 6lite of mounted infantry armed with w~h~el1ock muskets wcrc recorded in 1Gr6. Troops of such volunteer 'dragoons' were similarly raiscd 1,); noble siiqnori, until the government rcaliscd that these men wcrc often no lnorc than mountcd brnzli or thugs in the pay of aristocratic families. Private armies ofhmz!i wcre n o ~al problem throughout Italy and sccm to havc 1)ccomc a rcal threat to public order in Vcnicc. Many wcre

Woodcuts of Venetian military costumes in Cesare Vecellio's Habiti antichi et modernii di tutti il Mondo published in 1598. A-heavy cavalry man-at-arms; b l i g h t cavalryman (lance

only partly shown); C s o l d i e r from the Sfakia region of southern Crete; D-Caleotti or Falila conscript soldier aboard war-galley.

'Unknown Venetian nobleman' by Moroni, mid-16th century, showing the arming jacket with mail panels to protect the armpits. This was worn beneath plate-armour, here lying around the man's feet. (Nat. Gall., London)

themselvcs drawn from desperate and impoverished noble families; othcrs had been mcrcenary soldiers and numbered foreigners among their ranks. A ban on the carrying of weapons within Vcnicc had little efycct. Large-scale I>rawls were frequent and even involved thc use of arquel~uses,while duels and assassinations with the slender stiletto dagger became a bravi speciality. Things got so bad that some people took to wearing light mail protection beneath their clothes. An undeserved and romantic mythology developed around thcsc Venetian hrazli,

36

who werc even crcdited with murdering thcir enemies with poison-filled glass \tilettoc. While troops from Venicc and thc Terra Firma served in the ovcrscas empire and suffercd terrible losses from diseasc and exposure, troops from the empire also fought for Venicc in Italy. T h e stradioti above all achieved some notable succesws against French heavy cavalry in I 5 I 6. In fact Venicc made great efforts to enlarge the ovcrscas army D a Mare and to improve the quality of colonial militias. T h e standard of these militia forccs rcmained low, however, and their cquipment was oftcn abysmal. In Corfu, Crete and Cyprus local troops were trained to use the arquebus, but many continued to fight with composite bows in Turkish fashion. Militias in smaller islands like Kefallinia sometimes signed up merely to avoid starvation. Elsewhere, as on the Catholic and fiercely pro-Venetian island of Tinos, strange relics of a medieval feudal system of recruitment survived. A poorly paid local castleguard of paghe cln guazzo somctimcs included Venetian troops who had settled ovcrscas on a tiny pension and with minimal duties. Above all, however, there remained the famed ~tmdioti.Fierce and outlandishly dressed, brittle on points of honour and addicted to plunder, they still fought primarily with light spears, swords and composite bows. They tended to shy away from European or Ottoman infantry with firearms, but proved highly effective against Turkish cavalry who fought in much the same style as themselvcs. By the late 16th and early I 7th centuries, however, many ~lradioti werc themselves adopting pistols and cavalry carbines. Inevitable variations in the military styles of the differing Vcnctian possessions also persisted. Thc ~tradiotiof Dalmatia wcre based in eight main centres, though they spent most of thcir time in outstations closer to the frontier. One hundred stmdioti were based at Corfu with detachments on other Ionian islands, while the stradioti of Crete wcre of poor quality, partly because of a scarcity of horses in the eastern Mediterranean. T h e fearsome m i o t i infantry archers from southern Crete sometimes fought for Venice, but were generally a source of rebels, brigands and pirates. With a growing threat ofottoman attack, the Venetian authorities tried to reform the chaotic and corrupt Crctan militia system and to erect modern fortifications. Anti-

Venetian feeling was, however, rife throughout the island and when the Ottoman assault did come many Cretans welcomed the invader. Venetian rule appears to have been even harsher in Cyprus than Crete. For Venice, Cyprus never I~ccamcanything more than a dangerous military outpost where Venetians were not only unpopular but were notahly reluctant to serve. Cyprus already had a very mixed population. T h e Venetian authorities came to a reasonable understanding with the existing Catholic military Clite which dated from the late 12th century Crusader conquest of the island, and which already included many Italians. T h e Venetians also favoured the basically Arab Maronitc Christian community whose roots went even deeper; hut they seem to have failed to win many friends among the large and warlike Armenian minority. I t is also interesting to note that many of both these minorities later converted to Islam following the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571, becoming the ancestors of at least part of the present day Turkish-Cypriot community. Mainland Greek stradioti were brought into Venetian Cyprus, and by r 51g a number ofC).priot Greeks had also been enlisted. These men served alongside the /urco/loli light cavalry retainers of the old landed aristocracy, troops whose history similarly went back at least as far as the Crusades. In addition to volunteers and militias kom Venice, the Terra Firma and the overseas possessions, 16th and 17th century Venetian armies contained a large number of mercenaries. Most condottieri troops, in other words those recruited as an entire contract unit, came from the T u r n li'rnlo or clsewhrrc in northern Italy. Other regional soldiers included Corsicans and Ligurians, while non-Italians numbered Swiss, Germans, (most Vcnctian gunners outside the navy still being German) French, Spaniards, Czechs, Dutch, Flemish and English among their ranks. T h e ma-jority served as infantry whereas most, though not all, Balkan mercenaries were cavalry. T h e latter wcrc recruited not only from Venetian territory but also from neighbouring Ottoman-ruled regions. Apart from the Catholic Croatians most wcre Orthodox Christians, but some were of unspecified religious affiliation and a few were clearly Muslims from Bosnia and Albania. This scandalised Venice's neighhours while even the Venetian diarist

Detail from 'Gypsy and Soldier' by Caravaggio, late 16th century, showing a typical Italian sword of the period. (Louvre, Paris)

Girolamo Priuli noted that, for Venice, such recruitmcnt was like a man 'cutting olThis penis to spite his wife'. T h e discrimination that these 'Turks' faced in camp soon led them to abandon Venetian service. however.

Siege and counter-siege Venetian use of parallel trench systems when besieging an enemy stronghold may themselves show Ottoman influence (scc MAA 140, A r t n i ~of~ the Ottomon Tr/rh-.\ 130(~ 1774), and the Venetians were clearly willing to learn fkom any source. Captured guns wcrc tested and the Arsenal constantly experimented with new designs. There was a gradual movc towards smaller and more mobile artillery while firld guns and siege trains were now clearly separate. T h e most dramatic

37

dcvclopn~cntswere. howc\.cr, in Ibrtilication. 'I'his was a field in which 16th century Italv influenced the rest of' I
It was the def'cnccs thcmsclvcs that, by the micl16th century. eventually solidilicd Vctiicc3
lationsliil~1)ctwccn a n I talian city and its surrounding conlodo also changed. T h e countryside was now generally abandoned to a n enemv raider while dcfkncc was concentrated in the city which was in turn swollen 1)y refugees from the villages. Fear of sedition and insurrection within the walls then led to a strcngtlienirig of'the citadel as a defence within a dckncc. 'I'llc earliest such fortilications were built in a hurry and ofrarth, so that little now remains. It is the stone defences that replaced them which now give a special character to many north Italian towns. T h e vital city of Verona, for example, waa rcfortilicd in thc 1530%being given a n immensely strong citadel on the hills above. Thereafter Verona never cndurcd another serious attack until 1797, though as early as 1 y l 8 the authorities fjced the cncroachmcnt on the artillery fire zoncSsof sheds, houses, orchards, vegetable plots, drainage ditches and bird-snaring groves (the Veronese still like their uccrllr~~i-grilled small birds-served on a bed of maize flour). Among those military engineers who designed Verona's new defences \\,as Rficlicle di Fortifications in the Tewa Firma (Mainland Territories): AVerona c.1600 showing improvements designed by Michele Sanmichele c.1530 (note that the Baluardo di Campo Marzo was added at the end of the 16th C.); H r z i n u o v i mid-16th C. (after plan c.1600); C--reconstruction of the Venetian Arsenal in the early 14th C. showing the first Corderie rope-factory designed by (after Pizzarello & Fontana); &Palmanova, Giulio Savorgnano & Vincenzo Scamozzi in 1593 (after plan c.1600); E-Malano, double-octagon bastion on an artificial island in the Venice Lagoon near Malamocco (after plan c.1600); F-Baluardo di S. Bernardino, one of Verona' bastions rebuilt to Sanmichele's design around 1530 (after Duffy).

Courtyard of the Porta di Udine (1605),the best preserved of Palmanova's three gates (see plans of fortifications). This fortress, designed by Savorgnano and Scamozzi in 1593 and built on a virgin site to protect Venetian territory from Austrian or Ottoman attack, is the most perfectly preserved example of late Renaissance military architecture in existence.

Sanmicheli. H e had studied the work of another mastrr, Antonio d a Sangallo, and was to have his own famous followers; such cnginccring 'dynasties' t~ccamea feature of Venetian and Italian military architecture in the ~ ( i t hand I 7th centuries. A classic fortification ofthis period, at I'almanova, still stands virtually unchanged not lar fi-om the Yugoslav border. I t was planned in I 593 as a supposedly self-sufficient military town within a symmetrical nine-bastioned wall, built in virgin territory as the hub of 1:riulian defence against Austrians and Ottomans. P,n 1manova was completed in the early ~Goos,but remained such a lonely and unhealthy sitr that for ycars no one wanted to live there. T h e 17th century saw another burst of fortification-building around Venice and overseas. T h e fortifications of the cmpirc I ) n Alarr had, in fact, been overlooked for years, hut though they were small and old fashioned they had generally been well maintained. Such defences heed attack from both land and sea, and i t was fbrtunate that the Ottomans had hecn relatively quiet Tor some time. O n e major problcm was that the cost of new construction had to be home largcly by the local communities and these were tiny, except in Crete and Cyprus. I n Dalmatia the Ottomans had already broken through to the sea in a number of places, while the Uskoks and Hapsburgs made uncomfortable neighhor~rs.Vcnctian fbrtifications

such as Kotor also had to keep a n eye on the wild Montcncgrans who, though fiercely anti-Ottoman, also cra\.cd a sea outlct ofthcir own. Only the main naval bases were given new and modern fortifications; hut whcn the crisis came in the 1640s Vcnicc did uncxpcctcdly well. Dalmatia was easy to reinforce from ncarl~yVcnicc and was studded with castles, whereas the Ottomans were operating far from thcir main bascs, across bleak mountains inhabited by A4orlacchi peasants who were all too eager to revolt against thcir nominal Turkish overlords. T h e Ottoman attacks were, in fact, defcatcd and Vcnicc managed to expand her territory. In Cyprus the Venetians made great efforts to strengthen their position shortly before the Ottomans attacked. At first thcir plans betrayed a

typical Renaissance preoccupation with cla1)oratc machinery, seeming to put thcir f'litli in ropes, pulleys and counter-weights, hidclcn explosive mines and multi-l~arrellcdfire prc?jcctors dcsigncd to rear u p in an attacker's lace, not to mention slowrelease poisons in ncighl~ouringwells and baited fodder for cncmy horses. In the event prcfcrrncc was given to strengthening thc 1i)rtilications of' Nicosia; this cntailcd thc virtual destruction of the old city, including the royal tombs aricl monastery of San Domenico, and the huilding ol' a scvcnbastioned five-mile-circuit wall similar to that recently erected at Iraklion in C:rctc. Yet in I 57 I Nicosia fell to the Ottomans after a sicgc, ol'lcss than five months. Venetian defences proved more cffkctivc in Crctc where Iraklion endured a 22-ye;ir Ottoman sicgc. T h e Turkish invasion was actually sparked by the piratical aggression ofthc Knights of'StJohn based on Malta, though it was Venicr that paid the price. T h e war was long and bitter, ranging from Dalmatia to the Dardanelles. T h e Ottomans e\,entually took Crete, though the Venetians fought with a h a t i c i s m excelling even that of the Turks; the commander of the fortress of St 'I'hcoclorc was said to have blown up himself; his men, and the attackers whcn the Ottomans finally ovctrran his defences. T h e Ottomans had already unsuccessfully attempted to take Corfu in 1537. Betwwn I 549 and 1570 the Venctian government paid no less than 250,000 ducats to strengthcn that island's fbrtifications, which easily repulsed a final Ottoman assault in 1716. Only one year earlier the last Venetian-held Aegean island, the lonely outpost of Tinos, had finally fallen. T h e Venetian empire was once again reduced to those possessions west of Greece that had been held since before the Fourth Crusade, plus Corfu and the Ionian islands which, early in the 19th ccntury, passcd to anothcr rising imperial a n d naval power -Britain.

Fortifications in the Imperio da Mar (Overseas Territories): A--Split, Dalmatia (after carved plan on fagade of S. Maria del Giglio, Venice); B-Zadar, Dalmatia (after carved plan on facade of S. Maria del Giglio, Venice); C-Nicosia, Cyprus (after late 16th C. plan);D-Kotor, Dalmatia (after late 17th C. plan); E-lraklion, Crete (after cawed plan on faqade of S. Maria del Giglio, Venice, & 17th C. plans).

time the Venetian Arscnal was also cxpcrimcnting with ways of improving the new handguns. Venice similarly exported swords, helmets and other pieces of armour to the Balkans and perhaps beyond. Venice herself was open to influences li-om the East, the European coat-oflplates possibly being inspired by Byzantine or Islamic lamellar armour brought to Europe via Venice arid its colonial empire. Nor were influences all from the East. T h e broad basilard dagger which hccanic a major weapon of Venetian infjntry was, in contrast, probably of Swiss or south German origin, its name indicating that the first such daggers were imported from Basel. T h e popularity of I~othhardened and 'soft' or flexiblc lcathcr armour in Venice and the rest of Italy could also betray Byzantine or Islamic influence. One of the surviving bastions of Nicosia. In 1567Venice greatly Milan rather than Venice had, however, been reduced the size of this city, and though the Venetian fortifications survive they appear to have been extensively the main centre of arms production in northern modernised during the Ottoman period. (Courtesy of Cypriot Italy since the mid-I gth century. Milan made Press & Information Office) armours designed specifically for export, including the so-called Venetian style of sallct and t~arbuta helmets. Yet there were othcr important armsmanuhcturing centres in northern Italy, and fiom the mid-14th century, some of these lay within the Venice never became one of the major arms- expanding Venetian T ~ r r aFirnla. For centuries the producing centres of Europe, but its commercial Italian arms industry was the most important in wealth and wide trade contacts ensured that Europe, though partially completed weapons were Venetian troops wcrc usually wcll equipped. imported from othcr sources to he assembled in Weapons as wcll as ships were, of course, made in northern Italy. It might also bc mentioned that the the Arsenal, and the government also standardised arms industry employed women as well as men, the design of vital itcms like crossbows so that women being recorded as 'sewing' helmets and crossbow strings and bolts or arrows would fit all armour. This probably referred to the linings or weapons. 'l'hesc had composite arms similar in decoration of helmets and to the numerous leather structure to the powerful composite bows of the straps of later medieval armour. Ry the mid-15th Muslim world. They wcrc also exported to the century Milan itself was in decline and Venice Balkans via Venetian Dalmatia at least as early as controlled all the remaining north Italian arms the I 4th century. By this time the demand for things centres. German armourers gradually seized domilike crossbow bolts was so high that in 1304 the nation of the Europcan market from the mid-16th Venetian government had to sub-contract the century, but these Venetian manufacturing centres manufacture of 20,000 iron bolt-heads needed by continued to make huge quantities of fine armours, Venetian communal forces. Experimentation with weapons and above all firearms. They certainly new weapons reflected a scientific attitude perhaps retained a special place in the market for inherited fi-om the Byzantines. A multi-shot elaborately decorated ceremonial arms. crossbow, supposedly capable of shooting I 5 bolts T h e chief such Venetian armaments centre was and comparable to one also seen in a late 12th Brescia, which took over fiom Milan as the main ccntury Islamic military treatise, was recorded in Italian producer late in the 16th and I 7th centuries. the 13th century. Such an impractical multi-shot Brescia had, in fact, been manufacturing arms since crossbow was again suggested in 141I , by which the I I th and possibly even 8th century. Venice took

Further Reading

Helmets: A-Mid-14th C. Venetian bascinet, cut down & with eye-slots added in 15th C., found a t Khalkis (Met. Mus. of Art, New York); B-typical north Italian barbuta, c.1350 (Mus. Poldi Pezzoli, Milan); (C G Venetian helmets found a t Khalkis, now in Historical Mus., Athens) C-helmet with hinged right cheek-piece missing, c.rgoo 50; &visored helmet with hinged right cheek-piece missing, c.1500 50; E-so-called 'Corinthian' salet, mid-15th C.; F-salet with hinged nasal, mid-15th C.; C small salet, mid-15th C.; H-Milanese armet, late 15th C., (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia); I-Milanese close helmet, decoration not shown, c.1570 (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia); Jburgonet, decoration not shown, late 16th C. (Mus. Civ. Marzoli); K--Great Helm from Bolzano, c.1300 (Caste1 S. Angelo Mus., Rome); M-barbuta alla venexiana covered i n red velvet & with gilded bronze ornamentation, late 15th C. (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia); N 0---pointed & crested morions, decoration not shown, late 16th C. (Armoury of Doge's Palace, Venice)

the city in 1426 and thcrcalicr cncouragcd the Brcscian industry. drawing in armourcrs from hlilan ~ v h ohoped to cscapc the hca\,y hand of Visconti rule. Not until 16-14 was the Brcscian guild of'arniourcrs dissolved, and cvcn that did not mark the end 01' line Rrcscian arms production. Apart from incrcdil)ly richly decorated I 71h century armours, Brcscian guns earned a line reputation: this was particularly true of Rrescian whccllock pistols :inti muskets. Such 'self-firing' guns, which were much more rcliitl,lc than the pre\-ious matchlocks, appcar to have been invcntcd in Germany. For ycars they wrrc considered so threatening to law and order that they were clcclarccl illegal, not being permitted even for military use until I 570. Ncvcrthelcss whccllocks had reached Venice via her eastern Terra firma province ol'Friuli early in the I 530s. and thereafter thc complicated new firing mcchanisms were irnportecl li-om Germany to hr. maclc up into guns at Brescia. T h c finished weapons were then reexported all over Europe. and thc Balkilns.

Gcncral histories of Vcnicc arc c*iisily avail;ll,lc. Listed below arc some more spccialiscd sources. Arms €3 d r n z o u ~ U . Franzoi, :lrmouyl ?fflreI)oge7.s I'alnc~ JVc~iiccn.d. ) 14. Gaibi, 'L'Artc I~rcscianc clcllc armature: contri1,uto alla storia tlclla armi clifcnsivc. italiane', Armi .4n/ichc ( I $ig), pp. I r, -50. I;. Kossi, Arnti e 01-moioli hr~.\.(.i(~ni drl 'qoo (Krcscia 797'). Heraidy : E. Del Torso, Araldicn C'izlicn d ~ Frirrli l (Udinc 15178) E. hlorando, Lihro d'Aclrmedi Ti~nr;icr (Verona I 979). E. hlorando, rlrnzorial~ T brorrrse (Verona I 976) Fortijirotion: A. Della Valle (edit.), I hnezia r i Turchi, Scontri o ronji-onti di.. due cirlilitd (Milan I 985). includes articles on fortification & military confrontatiori. G. Gerola. I morzzrrnen/i rienetr n~ll'ivolncli C'rrtn, 5 vols ( Vcnicc I 906-32 ) P. Marchesi, For/e;;r li.ne;inrrr 1:joR-17:)7 ((hlil;lri 1984). U. Pizzarcllo & V. Fontana, I'irtu~ P I,oLqni dell'ilr,sennle di I,Ptrr>,:ia (Vcnicc I 983). Alilitngj or,qnnirotiorr: J. R. Hale, 'Men and Weapons: T h e Fighting Potential of Sixteenth-Century Venetian (;:iIleys,' in Ilirr and Socie!11: '4 l"eorhook of' Alilitoy His/o?y edit. B. Bond 8: I . Roy (1,ondon 1975). PP.1-23. M. R. hiallett & J. K. Hale, TIZP~\lilitn~li Ot;qntriZn/iorz of a Krnnissa~rreStole: 170nicr 1.. 14oo to 16'17 ( Camhridgc I 984). -4.Tenenti? Pirac?, €3 the L)pcline ?/' I'rt~ice (1.ondon 1961).

il: T h c 13th centztrv rlI : l bnetian knight, m, ls 1:jt11 centucv During the early 13th century Venetian arms and armour were basically the same as those of'the rest of Italy. Earlier Byzantine influence had largely disappeared and thcrc had as yet been little oriental influence hom the Venetian overseas cmpirc. O n the other hand Italian styles themsclvcs diffcrcd from those of northern Europe. This knight wears ;I

lull mail haul)crk, though lacks the surcoat which had 1)ccomc normal in France. His legs are protected I I ~standard mail chausses but I~eneath his mail coil'is a close-fitting iron rrrvrlli?re helmet with a very large nasal t o protect his face. T h e knight's large shield \\,ould also have been unusual outside Italy and might reflect the importance that archcry had ;ilrcacly achicved in Italian warfire. (Main soul-ccs: carved friczc, latc 12th--early 1 3th C.? litcatlc o f Fidcnza Cathedral; wall paintings, latc 12th (1.. Palazzo della Ragione. Mantua; carvccl ivory throne, I 2 I ~ ~ ~ - R4us. 5 0 , Nazionale, liavcnna. I

:i~: Dalmcl~icctr 1o.b(1tt mililian~att,mid-13th rentrlry 'l'hc military styles of Dalmatia were a strange ~nixturcol' Balkan and Italian fashions. 'The large flat-l~ottornccl shield used by his unarmoured infintryman would havc been considered oldSashioncd in iYcstcrn Europe; but the buttons on his tunic wcrc ;I \cry modern idea that had hardly yet appeartbcl in the West. His soft, flat-topped hat seems to suggest a Hungarian style from the ncighl)ouring Hungarian-ruled interior. (Main sourcc: carved rclicfi, r. I 240, west door of Trogir Catlicctral. :13: I)rrlntcrtian so1dic.j-, mid- 13tit cm /u
11: T / r r J r ~,I /la(/ q/ Ihr 14th cenluy 111: . + o th ~ Jtnlictn c m , ,boulmnn, c.13y) Crossl)owrncn played an essential r6le in 14th century It;lli,ln warfare and many appear to havc I)ecn proli.\sional mercenaries. Even u r l ~ a nmilitia crossl~owmcn would gcnc.rally havc been wellequipped 11y their rich cities. This man is a typical c.xample, with his strong iron sallet helmet with a hinged na\al; thickly padded mail tippet ovcr neck and shoultlcr, and mail hauberk over a thickly qi~iltcdgnml)c\on. Hc is armed not only with a

manually-loaded crossl)ow I ~ u t with a Ilroad hasilard dagger. (Main sources: carved capitals, early 14th C., Dogc's Palace, Vrnicc; C,'rtrr~/ili\iongclr wall paintings, c.1330 50, church of Sant' ,4hbondio, Como.)

B2: Italian armourd ir~irnl,-~lmtrn. c.. 1..j;.o This man is ol>viously a prokssional, either a titlcd knight or a successful mercenary. He carries a 11road-l~rimmcdone piccc iron r / r ~ / ) ~ I - c f and ~ ~ / i has ~r an early form of coat-of-plates over his mail. T h e leg-protecting grca\,cs arc of hardcncd Icatlicr, and his sal~atons(armourcd shoes) also appear to 11c covcrcd in hardcncd Icathcr. His sword, thr slcndcr hasilard dagger at his Ijclt and long-hlnded guisarme axe arc common weapons; t ~ u the t I~arhed javelins standing rcatly f i ~ ruse would usually only be Ibr war at sea. i Main sourcc: S I ,Ilar/in ~otortrtce:, titp .\ze~o~dby Simoric Martini, r. I :j I 7, Montciiorc Chapcl, church ol' St Fl-anti\, Assisi. )

'Parade of the General di Mare in Piazza San Marcoy,early 17th century engraving by Giacomo Franco. (Mus. Civ. Correr, Venice)

By: Ti~rw/znnknr~ilto/

thr (,'oll(~l/o/ami!y, c.1340 Milan.) Hcrc a young mcml~erol'thc warlike Collalto family li-om \'enice's T P , Flrnicl ) ~ m'tinland porse\sions, is C': Tlze second hnlJ'ofthe 14/11 centzr,:y not only armourcd in the latest Italian style I ~ ualso t C'I: Jncopo Citzlalli, c. 1.780 wears a headcloth that docs not appear to have Jacopo Ca\ralli here wears a heavy, crested great 1)ccn worn outsiclc Italy. His 1)ascinct helmet has its helm that would normally havc hccn rcscrvcd fhr mail a\.ctitail dou1,lcd ovcr in another Italian parades. Only thc shouldcr defcnccs of his coat-ofI'ashion; while his li11)ric-covered coat-ol~platesand plates are now visible, the rest 1)cing ol)scurcd shouldcr flaps would pro1)al)ly havc Ixcn lined with beneath a tight-fitting surcoat. 'l'hc knight's iron iron or cuir-1)ouillihardcricd leathcr scales. T h e arm-protecting rercbraces, coutcrs and \.ambraces rerc1)raccs that protect his upper arms would only cover the outside o f t h e limbs, and the iron prol)al)ly havc metal cl(~mcntsinsidc, as would the poleyns and greaves on his legs arc of a similarly cull's of his hult'lcathcr gauntlets. T h e greaves that light type. His shield now has a notched 1ancc.-rcst protect only th(. li-ont of his legs arc now of iron. in one corner. His horse is protected by a small (Main sources: carved capitals, carly 14th C., amount of armour, consisting of an iron chamfroti Dogc's Palace, Vrnicc; cfligy of Bcrnardino dei with extra neck lames, a quilted crinct on the neck Baranzoni, c. I 345- 50 Mus. Lapidario Estense, and a small crupper ovcr the animal's rump. (Main hfodcna; supporting figures on tomb of Azzonc sources: tomb of Fedcrico Cavalli, latc 14th C., \'is(.onti. ,,.I :<:30 cl~ur(.li01' S. Got tarclo in Corte, church of S. Anastasia, Verona; tomb of Cansignor0 della Scala, r. I 35-75 outside church of S. Maria Antiqua, Verona; Battle of Val di Chiana, 'Francesco Morosini' wearing the Doge's cap and a senior wall painting 1373, Palazzo Puhlico, Sicna.) commander's cloak with shoulder decorations, by Giovanni Carboncino mid-17th century. (Mus. Civ. Correr, Venice)

0'2: l bnelian inJirn/,:yman, lace I 4th re?z/u~y Only the upper arm rerebraces are now made of hardened leather, the leg harness being all of iron, as are the splints inside his lower arm vambraccs and his fabric-covered solid hreatplate. T h e deep fluted bascinet is a typically Italian helmet, but appears to be worn over an old-fashioned mail coif. T h e large rectangular red mantlet hearing the golden Lion of St Mark was, of course, solely an infantry shield. T h e broad-bladed spear is a Balkan weapon, perhaps imported from Dalmatia. (Main sources: tomb of Manno Donati, latc 14th C., church of S. Antonio, Padua; Nova1 battle betzeleen Lbnetian nnd Imperial forces, wall painting by Spinello Aretino mid- I 4th C., Palazzo Puhlico, Sicna; Story of St Jnmes, reliefs on silver altar by Leonardo di Ser Giovanni 1 37 I . Pistoia Cathedral.)

C3: Trumpeter in service of the C'nvnlli fnmil_lj, late 14th centu LJI This trumpeter wears no armour save for a light mail hauberk, and a deep helmct which has a hinged cheek-piece, perhaps originally intended for an archer. T h e man's dagger again perhaps shows Balkan influence. (Main sources: Venetian helmet from Khalkis, late 14th-early 15th C., Historical

Mus., Athens; Batlle (?/' 1,'al di C'hiana, wall painting 1373, Palazzo Publico, Siena.)

D : C'ros~irzgthe Lrjppio Pass, 1439 D I : Dalmatian n-o rshozaman, c. 1440 By the 15th century various systems of spanning more powerful crossbows had come into use: here a cranequin is shown. This Dalmatian soldier has another deep helmet with a hinged cheek-piece on the right side. He otherwise wears full plate armour on his arms, legs and body, though the latter is covered by a quilted surcoat in somewhat Burgundian stylc. (Main sources: relief carving mid-15th C., Jurja Barakovica street, Sibenik; Vcnctian hclmet from Khalkis, first half 15th C., Historical Mus., Athens. ) 0 2 : I)a/matzan infa?dcpman, c.1440 Here a hclmet with a hinged cheek-piece also has a movcablr visor. This time the surcoat is of rich brocade imported from the Islamic world. T h e strap supporting the rondel dagger goes to a belt worn bcncath the surcoat. T h e man's armour is again of full iron plate with a minimum of mail; and the large triangular shield is a n infantry form that had been used in the Balkans for some centurics. (Main sources: relief carving mid- I 5th C., Jurja Rarakovica street, Sibenik; Venetian helmet from Khalkis, first half of 15th C., Historical hius.. Athens.)

D3: finetian colonrnl knigh(fiam Sibenik, Dalmatin. tnid15th cenhr[~~ Though hc is a Ilaln~atianand wears a form of headdress betraying Hungarian influence, this knight has the best imported Italian armour. 'Typical would be a sallet helmet in a specifically Venetian style, covered in velvet and with golden decorations riveted to the surface. Note the extra fringe of mail fiom the rim of the fauld fastened to the lower edge of his breastplate. (Main sources: statue of knight carly 15th C., Orlandov Kip, Dubrovnik; hli.\sa/ of Duke Hrvoje Vukcic Hrvatinic of Split, Topkapi Lib.. Istanbul.) Dg: Italian peasant lev_li. rgth centzir~l Longbows of simple construction were regarded as peasant weapons in late medie\,al Italy. O n the other hand some of the best yew wood for such bows

Staff weapons: A-onco, 16th-xyh C. (Armoury of Doge's Palace, Venice); E-ronco, 16th C. (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia); C-ceremonial partizan, decoration not shown, early 17th C. of broad-bladed (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia); &remains spear or partizan found in ford near Trilj, Dalmatia, undated (Archaeological Mus., Split); EF-halberd-partizans for officers, 17th C. (Armoury of Doge's Palace, Venice); Hceremonial halberd, late 16th C. (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia); I--ceremonial halberd, 16th C. (Armoury of Doge's Palace, Venice); J--pole-axe, 16th C. (Armoury of Doge's Palace, Venice); K--glaive, 15th-16th C. (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia); G c e r e m o n i a l glaive, decoration not shown, Venetian 17th C. (Mus. Civ. Marzoli, Brescia).

was grown in Italy, being exported in large quantities to England. (Main source: hronzc door by Ghiherti mid- I 5th C., Baptistery, Florence.)

E: Ttze .second half' of the 15t/r C B ? I I ~ ~ E I : .,korth~tnZtalinn cro.r,rboulmarr, /ale ~ ; j / hcentucr .4nother new method of spanning a crossbow was the 'crow's foot' shown here; though sometimes used in war, it appears to have I~ecnmore popular for hunting or target-shooting. This infantryman still has a deep sallet with a hinged nasal, but his armour is otherwise lighter than in earlier periods. T h e iron breastplate also has vcry carly fbrms of' tassels to protect his thighs. Othrrwisc thr man's legs arc only defended by light grravcs. His sword, with the vertical guard, may again rcflcct Balkan or German influence. (Main sourccs: St C1r.suka c_l~cle I)y Carpaccio 1493, Academia, Vcnicc; rlttendants of Luigi Conzaga, wall painting I>p Domcnico Morone 1496, Palazzo Ducalr, Mantua; Vcnctian hclmct from Khalkis, 15th C., Historical Mus., Athens.)

E2: Venetian militiaman ofthe OTompaCgni dolla C,'ul~a,late 15th centzr~y Handguns wcre increasingly importarit in the late 15th century. This example is a vcry simple form ignited with a separate heated iron touche. Apart from a light helmet with separate car-pieces, this young man is unarmoured, though his extra\.agant costume is in the height of Venetian fashion and shows him to bc a mcmhcr of'onc of the "Trouser

Clul3s'. Hc also carries a hroad-1)ladccl cinqtrndm chort-sword on his hip. i blain sources: S f CTr.tula gclr I)!. Carp:iccio I 49:3, Academia, Vcnicc: hand-gun, mid-I 5th C:., hlus. (:i\.ico, 'T'ricatc.)

Crnknowtl knighf by Picro di Cosimo c ~ .I y, 1 5, Nat. Gallery, London; S/ Gr07;q~l)y Carpiiccio c. I 500. Scuola di S. Giorgio dcglc Sci;i\.oni, irenicc.)

k:j: C;rerk nohl~mnmf lorn l~i~nr/inn-rlrlrd/e~.ri/o~,l, et~r!~ I 6fh cettt~r,:~ ,

E3: 1'rn~/ia11 man-a/-at m \ , /ale 1.5111 crnt~r~y In complctc colitr;i\t to the unarmourcd handgunner, this man-at-arms is equipped Tor closc comhat with the thrcc-pointed ronco, a peculiar weapon that provccl vcry popular in Italy. His armour is a magnificent example offirll plate 'white armour' madc in northern Italy and exported throughout E ~ ~ r o pTe h. e arm dcfcnces are slightly different for each arm. His large iron sallct is of an almost Sully cncloscd tyl~c,ha\,ing much in common with some ancient Greek helmets. (Main sources: S f lijs~rlaqvrlr I)y Carpaccio I 493, Academia, Vrnice: .-lf/nrdan/.\ oJ' I,rr
I;: T11r r a r ! ~16/11 cnlhtr? 1+'1:' J'tmdiot Iiqlr/ ctrrlal
4.6

T h e little that is known al)out aristocr;itic. costume in 16th-century Grcccc s h o ~ ~i t s to h;rvc I)ccti strongly influenced by Ottoman 1'~lrkishstyles. O n the other hand, this man's short tunic. is clcarly European. His sword was maclc in Italy; and his brimmed hat was a style seen t l i r o ~ ~ g l i othe ~~t Balkans and Hungary. ( Main sources: .Y/ II,:rzrla q ~ i c l ~ by Carpaccio I 493, .4cadcmia, Venice; .~ltlorn/ionof fhr .lla,qi wall painting late 15th C., Mus. Civico, Padua. i G': ..in n,~asrrtia/ronaffrm,bl ?t? l-rnicc) at orrnd ~ f i o o

(;I: h n e f i n n 'B~azlo',katr 16th crt1111ty Venice was one of the main cc-ntrc\ of LYcctcrn fashion during the 16th ccntury, ,ind rccorcl\ indicate that hired bodyguards or thug\ known a\ Brazli were among the most extra\ q a n tl) tlrc\\cd men in thr city. This individual fight\ with a rapier and left-handed dagger in a characteristic late I 6th ccntury form of fencing. (Main source\: linXnoraln 1 b n ~ l ~ nnobleman n by Moroni, mid- I 6th C., Nat. Gallery, London; 'L'cnetian Bralo', in Vcccllio's Costrlmr Book, published I 589.)

G2: Esrn,brd gallcv-slaor, earlv I 7 f h cotrl1rt~1 Venetian galley-slaves and those con\,icts who served thcir sentences at the oars tvorc similar costumes; this was totally inadequate Li)r thc rigours of life in an open war-galley and many cliccl from exposure. T h e weapons that this man hits seized include a long-hafted halbard, ;I dagger from Croatia, and a peculiar form of heavy matchlock pistol with a revolving triple barrel. (Main sources: 'Galley sla\se', in Vecellio's Co.sfrrmr Book; Vcnctian halberd, early I 7th C., Armoury ot' Doxc's l':il:lcc, Venice. ) G3: l hnetian knight, c. 1600 Most armours that survive in muscumc lack thcir original lining. This was often cstcndcd to form a decorative fi-inge around certain pieccs, as shown here. This wealthy aristocrat has a helmct of the closc helm form. His sword is vcry heavy compared

to tlir rapicr ol'his opponent. Iron shields wcrc a relatively late dcvrlopmcnt; although designed to withstand pistol and musket balls, thcy werc probably morc drcorativr than effective. (Main source: full armour, hlilane\e or Brescian r.1570. Mus. Civico Marzoli. Brcscia.

H : T h r drnth c!J Tommn\o Alorosini, 1647 H I : Tommnco i210to~~nz, c.1647 By the mid- r 7th ccntury thc great agc of armour had endrd. A few full armours were worn by heavy cavalry and by commanding off cers for prestige. At sea thcy would have bccn virtually suicidal, so here rven T'ommaso Morosini has been given a particularly linc form of half armour with a matching lobster-tail hclinet. T h e broad nasal \bows even morc clearly the oriental inspiration of all such lirlmct\. 'I'his particular suit of armour had two altcrnativc types of protection for the hips and groin; thC version worn here was ibr combat on foot, whcrcas the other was to bc worn on horseback. Note that Morosini ir armed with a basket-hilted rapicr and a fine wheellock pistol. (Main source: mid-17th C. Rrescian half armour, hlus. Civico Marzoli, Rrescia.) H2: Cbn~linnnrquebzc.rirr, ear!v 17th centrcr_)! 'The brrastplate ofthis ordinary soldier has the same dent or 'proofing mark' as the fine armour of Tommaso Morosini. Though decorated, his breast and back platcs, morion hrlmrt and iron ncckprotrcting gorgct worn I~cneaththr 1,reastplatc arc of much infirior quality. T h c man's sword is a Balkan .vrinzlo?~nwhile his arquebus has a C;crman lock I ~ u twas assrmblcd at Brescia, in Venetian tcrritory. (Main sources: 'Vcnetian infantryman', in Vecrllio's (;o.slzlmr Book: I talian infantry armour, early 17th C., Armoury of the Palace of the Knights, Malta; sciavona sword, Vcnctian early I 7th C:., ilrmoury of the Doge's Palace, Venice.)

'Apotheosis of Admiral Lorenzo Marcello', victor of a naval battle in the Dardanelles in 1656 in which he himself died. Mid17th century engraving. (Mus. Civ. Correr, Venice)

3: 'Scn,b/~oli'~ a l l z~ol~rnt~er, ~y enrlv 17th rvntliry Unarmoured rxccpt for a small iron secrctc hclmct worn bencath his typical Balkan frathcrcd cap, this volunteer is clcarly fi-om one of' Vcnicc's Halkan tcrritorics, pro1)al)ly northern Ilalmatia. ?'hc decorative h a ~ i d sacross his tunic had the same origin as the later decorations worn by hussar light cavalry. Apart from a simple daggcr captured li-om thc Ottomans, lie is armrtl with :i str;lrigr, all-iron combined war-axe and wheellock muskct. [blain sources: 'Scappoli' in Vcccllio's (~o.st~tnw Book; axegun, early I 7th C., Armoury of'thc, Dogc's I'alacc, Venice. i

Continued from back cover

160 44 43 90 106 122 199 21 1 227 88 176 181 223 152 149 192 162 172 185 189 84 114 119 253 126 I30 204 167 98 206 226 96 77 78 l I5

Nap's Guard lnfantry (2) Nap's German Allies (I) Nap's German Allies (2) Nap's German All~es(3) Nap's German All~es(4) Nap's German Allies (5) Nap's Special~stTroops Nap's Overseas Army Nap's Sea Sold~ers Nap's Italian Troops Austr~anArmy ( I): lnfantry Austr~anArmy (2): Cavalry Austrian Spec~allstTroops Pruss~anL~nelnfantry Pruss~anLight lnfantry Pruss~anReserve & Irregulars Prussian Cavalry 1792- 1807 Pruss~anCavalry 1 807- 15 Russ~anArmy (I): lnfantry Russtan Army (2): Cavalry Wellington's Generals Well~ngton'sInfantry (I) Wellingon's lnfantry (2) Wellington's H~ghlanders Wellington's Light Cavalry Wellington's Heavy Cavalry Wellington's Specialist Troops Brunswick Troops 1809- 15 Dutch-Belgian Troops Hanoverian Army 1792- 1 8 16 The' American War 18 12- 14 Artillery Equ~pments Flags of the Nap Wars (I ) Flags of the Nap Wars (2) Flags of the Nap Wars (3)

19TH C E N T U R Y 232 Bol~varand San Martin 173 Alamo & Texan War 1 835-6 56 Mexican-American War 1846-8 272 The Mexcan Adventure 186 1-67 63 American-lnd~anWars 860.90 170 American Civil War Armies: (I ): Confederate 177 (2): Un~on 179 (3): Staff. S~ecialists. ~aritime' I90 (4): State Troops, , 207 (5): Volunteer Mll~t~a 37 Army of Northern Virginia 38 Armv of the Potomac 252 ~lags'ofthe American Civil War: :rate Volunteer ains lndtans S

1850-90 Rebellion 185 1-66 iy of the 3r on Campaign: 53 nea, 1854-56 02 emles' iAfrca n Afr~ca

57 59 230 95

The Zulu War Sudan Campal ns 188 1-98 US Army 1898- 1920 The Boxer Rebellion

T H E WORLD WARS 80 The German Army 19 14- 1 8 81 The Br~t~sh Army i 9 14- 18 245 British Territorial U d s 1 9 14- 1 8 269 The Onoman Armv 19 14- 18 208 Lawrence and the Arab Revolts 182 Brit~shBattle Insienia:

1 12 120 225 70 2 16 246 120 24 266 34 229 124 21 3 139 13 1 103 147 254 238 142 169 270

Brit~sh6attledre;s 1937-61 Allled Commanders of W W 2 The Royal Air Force US ~ r 194 m 1-45 ~ The Red Army 1 94 1-45 The Romanian Armv' he SA 1 92 1 -45 The Panzer Div~s~ons The Alleeme~ne-SS The ~ 2 f f e n - s s Luftwaffe F~eldDivis~ons German Commandt-rs of W W 2 German MP Units German Airborne Troops Germany's E Front All~es Germany s Span~shVolunteers Wehrmacht Fore~gnVolunteers Wehrmacht Auxllhary Forces Allied Fore~gnVolunteers Part~sanWarfare 194 1 -45 Res~stanceWarfare 1940-45 Flags of the Third Reich (1)-~ehrmacht 274 (2) Waffen-SS 278 (3) Party & Police Units

M O D E R N WARFARE 132 Malayan Campa~gn1948-60 174 The Korean War 1950-53 116 The Special Alr Serv~ce 156 The Royal Marines 1956-84 133 Banle for the Falklands ( I ): Land Forces 134 (2j: Naval Forces 135 (3): Air Forces 250 Argentine Forces In the Falklands 127 Israeli Armv 1948-73 128 Arab ~ r m l k s(I): 1948-73 194 Arab Arm~es(2): 1973-88 165 Armies In Lebanon 1982-84 104 Vietnam War Arm~es1962-75 143 Vietnam War Armies (2) 209 War in Cambodia 1970-75 2 17 War in Laos 1960-75 183 Modern Afr~canWars: ( I ): Rhodesia 1965-80 202 (2): Angola & Mozamb~que 242 (3): South-West Afr~ca 159 Grenada 1983 178 Russia's War In Afghan~stan 22 1 Central Amer~canWars GENERAL 65 The Royal Navy 107 Brlt~shlnfantry Equipts. ( I ) 108 Br~tishlnfantw (2) , EOUID& r - ,-, 138 Br~t~sh Cavalw Eau~ots 72 The ~orthwgstF'rdntier 214 US lnfantry Equ~pts. 205 US Army Combat Equipts. 234 German Combat Equipts. 157 Flak jackets 123 Australian Army I 899- 1975 164 Canadian Army at War 16 1 Span~shForeign Legion 197 Royal Canadian Mounted Police -7

91 92 233 237 277

ampalgns 1860-70 lutiny DS In the ry 1857-59 Bengal Cavalry Reg~ments Indian lnfantry Reg~ments French Army 1870-71 (1 ) French Army 1870-71 (2) The Russo-Turk~shWar 1877

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

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An unrivalled source of information on the uniforms, insignia and appearance of the world's fighting men of past and present. The Men-at-Anns titles cover subjects as diverse as the Imperial Roman army, the Napoleonic wars and German airborne troops in a popular 48-page format including some 40 photographs and diagrams, and eight full-colour plates. COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY ELITE Detailed information on the uniforms and insignia of the world's most famous military forces. Each 64-page book contains some 50 photographs and diagrams, and 12 pages of full-colour artwork. WARRIOR Definitive analysis of the armour, weapons, tactics and motivation of the fighting men of history. Each 64-page book contains cutaways and exploded artwork of the warrior's weapons and armour.

NEW VANGUARD Comprehensive histories of the design, development and operational use of the world's armoured vehicles and artillery. Each 48-page book contains eight pages of full-colour artwork including a detailed cutaway of the vehicle's interior. CAMPAIGN Concise, authoritative accounts of decisive encounters in military history. Each 96-page book contains more than 90 illustrations including maps, orders of battle and colour plates, plus a series of three-dimensional battle maps that mark the critical stages of the campaign. THE ANCIENT WORLD 218 Anc~entChlnese Arm~es 109 Anc~entMiddle East 137 The Scythians 700-300 B.C. 69 Greek & Persian Wars 500-323 B.C. 148 Army of Alexander the Great 12 1 Carthagmian Wars 46 Roman Army:

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( I ) Caesar-Trajan 93 (2) Hadrian-Constantine I

158 I75 180 243

(I ): Germanics & Dac~ans (2): Gallic & Br~tishCelts (3): Parthians & Sassanids (4j: Spaln 2 18 B.C.- 19 B.C. (5): The Desert Frontier

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TH AND 17TH CENTURIES

E MEDIEVAL WORLD Romano-B zantine Armies 4th-9th C Arthur & Anglo-Saxon Wars Arm~esof the Muslim Conquest Armies of Islam. 7th- I I th C The Age of Charlemagne Byzantine Armies 886- 1 1 18 Saxon. Viking & Norman French Medieval Armies 1000- 1300 Arm~esof the Crusades Saladln & the Saracens 155 Knl hts of Chr~st 200 El !~d & Reconqulsta 1050- 1492 105 The Mongols 222 The Age of Tamerlane

Please note that for space reasons obbrevrated titles ore grven above; when ordermg, please quote the title number, e.g. 'MAA 109' for 'Ancrent Armres of the Middle East', etc.

Medieval Chlnese Armies Medreval European Armies Scots & Welsh Wars The SWISS1300- 1 500 Italian Armies 1300- 1500 German Armies 1300- 1500 Hun a & E Europe 1 g68 The Mamluks 1250- 15 17 Ottoman Turks 1 300- 1774 Venetian Emplre 1200-1670 Armies of Crecy and Poit~ers Medieval Burgundy 1 364- 1477 Armies of A Incourt Wars of thesoses Medieval Heraldry

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The Irish Wars 1485- 1603 Henry Vlll's Army The Landsknechts The Conquistadores Mughul India 1 504- 176 1 Gustavus Adolphus ( I ): lnfantry Gustavus Adolphus (2): Cavalry Engllsh CIVII War Arm~es New Model Army 1645-60 Louis XIV's Army The British Army 1660- 1704 Marlborough's Arm Samurai Armies 1 5l0- 16 1 5 Polish Armies 1569- 1696 (1)

Avac annotations en fran~airsur Ies lanchas .n couleurr. i t Aufzekhnungen auf Deutsch Ober den Farbtafaln.

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188 Pol~shArm~es1569- I696 (2)

18TH CENTURY 26 1 260 264 118 236 240 248 271 276 48 228 39 244 273

18th Century H~ghlanders Peter the Great's Army (I): lnfantry Peter the Great's Army (2): Cavalry Jacobite Rebell~ons Frederick the Great ( I ) Freder~ckthe Great (2) Freder~ckthe Great (3) Austrian Army 1740-80 (1) Austrian Army 1740-80 (2) Wolfe's Army American Woodland lnd~ans Brit. Armv in N . Amerlca French 1n'~mer.War Ind. General Wash~ngton'sArmy ( 1 ): 1 775- 1778

NAPOLEONIC PERIOD 257 79 87 64 55 68 76 83 141 146 153

Napoleon's Campa~gnsIn Italy Napoleon's E ptian Campaign Napoleon's Xrshals Nap's Cu~rass~ers & Carabln~ers Nap's Dragoons & Lancers Nap's Llne Chasseurs Nap's Hussars Nap's Guard Cavalry Nap's Llne lnfantry Nap's Llght lnfantry Nap's Guard Infantry (I)

Title list continued on inside back cover

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