The Rise of Japanese NGOs: Activism from Above (Routledge Contemporary Japan Series)

The Rise of Japanese NGOs

Over the past two decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have exploded in number and emerged as a new force in international and transnational politics. Why, however, do some countries nonetheless have more active NGO sectors than others? Using the case of Japan, this book uncovers patterns of convergence and divergence in levels of activism across industrialized countries and offers a twolevel political explanation for the rise of NGOs as a global phenomenon. The author argues that activism has been cultivated from “above” and shows the ways in which political structures and processes at the domestic and international levels have either encouraged or discouraged activism. Japan, a late developer in terms of its number of NGOs, provided a poor political environment for NGO activism for most of the post-war period. In the past two decades, however, as this situation has changed, NGOs have become visible players as both critics and partners of the government. Using the concepts of international political opportunity, norm socialization and transnational diffusion, Reimann traces the ways in which domestic and international politics interact and promote the rise of NGOs globally. This book will be of interest to postgraduate students and academics working in political science, international relations, sociology, policy studies, Asian studies, international development and environmental politics. Kim Reimann is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Georgia State University.

Routledge Contemporary Japan Series 1

A Japanese Company in Crisis Ideology, strategy, and narrative Fiona Graham

13

Civil Society and the Internet in Japan Isa Ducke

2

Japan’s Foreign Aid Old continuities and new directions Edited by David Arase

14

3

Japanese Apologies for World War II A rhetorical study Jane W. Yamazaki

Japan’s Contested War Memories The ‘memory rifts’ in historical consciousness of World War II Philip A. Seaton

15

Japanese Love Hotels A cultural history Sarah Chaplin

16

Population Decline and Ageing in Japan – The Social Consequences Florian Coulmas

4

5

6

Linguistic Stereotyping and Minority Groups in Japan Nanette Gottlieb Shinkansen From bullet train to symbol of modern Japan Christopher P. Hood Small Firms and Innovation Policy in Japan Edited by Cornelia Storz

17 Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity David Chapman 18

Cities, Autonomy and Decentralization in Japan Edited by Carola Hein and Philippe Pelletier

A Japanese Joint Venture in the Pacific Foreign bodies in tinned tuna Kate Barclay

19

8

The Changing Japanese Family Edited by Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka

Japanese–Russian Relations, 1907–2007 Joseph P. Ferguson

20

9

Adoption in Japan Comparing policies for children in need Peter Hayes and Toshie Habu The Ethics of Aesthetics in Japanese Cinema and Literature Polygraphic desire Nina Cornyetz

War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Post-War Japan, 1945–2007 The Japanese history textbook controversy and Ienaga Saburo’s court challenges Yoshiko Nozaki

21

Institutional and Technological Change in Japan’s Economy Past and present Edited by Janet Hunter and Cornelia Storz

A New Japan for the Twenty-First Century An inside overview of current fundamental changes and problems Edited by Rien T. Segers

22

Political Reform in Japan Leadership looming large Alisa Gaunder

A Life Adrift Soeda Azembo, popular song and modern mass culture in Japan Translated by Michael Lewis

23

The Novels of Oe Kenzaburo Yasuko Claremont

7

10

11

12

24

Perversion in Modern Japan Psychoanalysis, literature, culture Edited by Nina Cornyetz and J. Keith Vincent

25

Homosexuality and Manliness in Postwar Japan Jonathan D. Mackintosh

26

Marriage in Contemporary Japan Yoko Tokuhiro

27

Japanese Aid and the Construction of Global Development Inescapable solutions Edited by David Leheny and Carol Warren

28

The Rise of Japanese NGOs Activism from above Kim D. Reimann

The Rise of Japanese NGOs Activism from above

Kim D. Reimann

First published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2010 Kim D. Reimann All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Reimann, Kim D. The rise of Japanese NGOs : activism from above / Kim D. Reimann. p. cm. – (Routledge contemporary Japan series; 28) 1. Non-governmental organizations – Japan. 2. Civil society – Japan. I. Title. JQ1681.R43 2009 338.91′52 – dc22 2009018170 ISBN 0-203-86649-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–49802–3 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–86649–5 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–49802–9 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–86649–8 (ebk)

To my father Peter, my sister Hannah and in memory of my mother Myunghee

Contents

List of figures and tables Acknowledgements

xi xiii

1

Introduction: activism from above

1

2

States and the domestic political economy of NGOs

29

3

Political globalization, “civil society” politics and the global growth of NGOs in the 1980s–2000s

55

4

International development NGOs in Japan

83

5

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs in Japan

116

6

Conclusion: states, political globalization and the growth of NGOs

147

Notes Bibliography Index

170 176 200

Figures and tables

Figures 1.1 Number of INGO headquarters by country, 2003 and 1996 1.2 The modernization and economic globalization explanation for NGOs 1.3 Activism from above and NGO growth: international dimensions 4.1 Number of IDNGOs in selected OECD countries, 1967–98 4.2 Number of IDNGOs per million population, 1967–96/98 4.3 Japanese international development NGOs, 1870s–1990s 4.4 Japanese NGO support programs, 1991–2005 (US$ million) 4.5 Japanese IDNGO projects with official support, 1991–2000 4.6 Number of IDNGOs receiving official funding in the 1990s, by founding date 5.1 Japanese advocacy NGOs active in global environmental issues, 1890s–1990s

6 10 27 86 86 87 89 91 92 119

Tables 1.1 NGOs granted consultative status at the UN (ECOSOC) by headquarter country, 1946–2007 (Top 20) 1.2 Number of international development NGOs in selected countries, 1967–2008 1.3 Number of human rights NGOs in selected countries, 1980s–2008 1.4 Grants to developing countries by NGOs in selected OECD countries, 1972–2005 (US$ million) 1.5 Membership and volunteer work in international development and human rights organizations, 1990 and 2000 1.6 Various indicators of modernization and economic globalization in selected OECD countries, 1970–2006 1.7 Domestic political factors for INGOs in selected OECD countries

5 7 7 8 9 14 19

xii Figures and tables 2.1 Legal and fiscal regulations on nonprofit and charitable organizations in selected OECD countries 2.2 Official sector support to NGOs in selected OECD countries, 1980–2005 (US$ million) 3.1 UN funding and support programs for INGOs and NGOs 3.2 Funding of NGOs by selected American foundations, 1999–2000 3.3 Institutional access for NGOs at the UN 3.4 Excerpts mentioning “participatory development” and NGOs in the action plans of major international world conferences, 1990s 4.1 Formal and informal official bodies that include IDNGOs, 1990s–early 2000s 5.1 JFGE grants to advocacy NGOs working on sustainable development issues, 1994–2008 5.2 American foundation grants to Japanese advocacy INGOs, 1993–2001

31 43 59 63 65

73 94 124 138

Acknowledgements

Many people and several institutions contributed to the writing of this book in its various stages of conception, production, revision and completion. Started as a Ph.D. dissertation in the late 1990s, this book project has also been an important catalyst in my own life journey and steered me towards rediscovering my activist self. While the shortcomings of the book are entirely my own, I would like to acknowledge the many people who have supported me on this journey and without whom the final completion of the book would not have been possible. In the crucial stages of conceiving, researching and writing up the project as a doctoral dissertation, I am greatly indebted to my mentors and colleagues at Harvard University. Susan J. Pharr, my main advisor at Harvard, has been an invaluable advisor and friend and it would be hard for me to overstate her contribution to my professional development. Susan enthusiastically supported my decision suddenly to shift my dissertation research topic to NGOs in Japan at a moment when I was worried that no one would be interested in the topic. Her support at that critical juncture allowed me to shift gears and discover a research area that has become one of my passions in life. Steven Vogel and Iain Johnston, other key members of my dissertation committee, were also excellent mentors and good friends whose level-headed advice and methodological rigor kept me from straying too far from political science. I thank Harvey C. Mansfield for his friendship and Jorge Dominguez for sound professional advice when I needed it. Fellow graduate students whose friendship and intellectual companionship sustained me through both good and bad times include: Mala Htun, Smita Singh, Lobsang Sangay, Paul Talcott, Sankar Muthu, Libra Hilde and Jamie Jones. Special thanks to Robert Pekkanen and Apichai Shipper for our monthly dissertation study group and for their steadfast friendship and support over the years. While at Harvard, I also had several years of generous financial support that funded the research and write-up of the dissertation. The National Security Education Program (NSEP), a federal government grant, provided funding for pre-dissertation work at Harvard and my field work in Japan in 1997–1998. The Reischauer Institute for Japanese Studies at Harvard University provided one year of financial support when I returned from Japan and started writing the dissertation as well as several small travel grants for conferences and a brief trip to Japan. My thanks to the faculty and staff at the Reischauer Institute who have known me since

xiv Acknowledgements I was a Master’s student at Harvard and have supported me over the years, including Ezra Vogel, Andrew Gordon, Corky White, Akira Iriye, Margot Chamberlain, M.J. Scott and Ruiko O’Conner. I am also greatly indebted to Harvard’s Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations which provided financial, intellectual and administrative support for two years while I was a doctoral fellow there in 1999–2001. Special thanks to Anne Mathew for her friendship and to the Center faculty who introduced me to the world of nonprofit studies and influenced my intellectual development: Mark Moore, David Brown, Peter Dobkin Hall, Marty Chen, Frances Kunreuther, Sanjeev Khagram and Peter Frumkin. I am also greatly indebted to a private donor who wished to remain anonymous for helping me make ends meet in the summer of 2001 as I was finishing up the dissertation. Finally, I want to thank Frank Schwartz for his strong support and friendship while I was a postdoctoral fellow at the Program on US–Japan Relations at Harvard in 2001–2002. Scholars outside of Harvard who at one point have looked over, commented and provided suggestions on parts of this book include Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam, Thomas Havens, Miranda Schreurs, Jeffrey Broadbent, Shinju Fujihira, Stanley Michalek, Hank Johnston and Jackie Smith. I thank all of them for their encouragement and feedback. Over the past decade I have made several trips to Japan, where I did field research and interviewed more than one hundred government and NGO officials. There is a long list of people whose support and cooperation made these numerous field trips possible. First, I am grateful to the many NGO officials, government officials, foundation officials, journalists and other informants I interviewed for the project who shared their opinions and experiences with me. I especially want to thank the following members of the NGO and private foundation community in Japan who were generous with their time, connections and friendship: Ayukawa Yurika, Hamamoto Yuriko, Kuroda Kaori, Fukuoka Fumiko, Miyake Takafumi, Sumino Setsuko, Yonemoto Shohei, Faina Lucero, Andrew Horvat, Imata Katsuji and Lori Forman. Special thanks also go to Richard Forrest and Peter Riggs who read and commented on portions of the book and have been inspiring comrades in activism. Second, I would like to acknowledge my mentors and friends in the academic community in Japan who provided all sorts of intellectual, spiritual and logistical support during my longer research stays in Tokyo. I am greatly indebted to Ikei Masaru for serving as my advisor at Keio University and arranging for my position there as a visiting research fellow while I was a graduate student. Professor Ikei was a wonderful mentor who took me out to many baseball games and has remained a good friend in all my subsequent trips to Tokyo. Other Japanese academics and visiting scholars in Japan who helped me in various ways include Kokubun Ryosei, Hiwatari Nobuhiro, Tsujinaka Yutaka, Walter Hatch, Robert Uriu, Irit Averbuch and Tami Sugai. The transformation of the dissertation into a book was a lengthy one and was completed in Atlanta. Since joining the faculty at Georgia State University, I have enjoyed the support of my colleagues at the Department of Political Science and at

Acknowledgements xv the Asian Studies Center. I thank them and the graduate students who have worked with me on various research projects related to NGOs, especially Tyra Bouhamdan who helped me update some of the tables and figures for this book. With a short travel grant from the Association of Asian Studies (AAS), I was able to do followup research in Tokyo for the book in 2005. I was also able to use some material from interviews conducted in Tokyo in the summer of 2008 as an Abe Fellow with funding from the Social Science Research Council and Center for Global Partnership. I thank the editors and editorial staff at Routledge for their patience and assistance in seeing the book to completion, especially Stephanie Rogers, Sonja van Leeuwen and Leanne Hinves. Portions of the book draw upon work I have previously published elsewhere. Chapter Three has appeared in slightly different form as “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs,” International Studies Quarterly 50 (1), 2006 © Blackwell Publishers. Chapter Four builds on and further develops my chapter “Building Global Civil Society from the Outside in? Japanese International Development NGOs, the State, and International Norms,” in Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr (eds) The State of Civil Society in Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 © Cambridge University Press, reproduced with permission. Finally, none of this would have been possible without the love and continual backing of my family and friends in the United States and Japan. To my wonderful network of close friends who have always pulled through for me, I thank Rhys Gardiner, Gloria Llano, Margarita Estevez-Abe, Kazuko and Philip Rhodes, Takahashi Kuniko, Takahashi Keizo, Uebo Noriko, Wendy and Shige Kobayashi, Sara O’Malley, Richard Hylton, Oliver Karlin, Martha Greenawalt, Nina Segal, Lauren Ristvet, Judi Duffy, Junco Sato Pollack, Kelly Jordan, Anya Schoolman, and Barry Lynn. And last but far from least I thank my father Peter, my late mother Myunghee Kim and my sister Hannah for their unconditional love and belief in me. This book is dedicated to them.

1

Introduction Activism from above

Over the past three decades, NGOs have exploded in number and become influential players in world politics. Although largely ignored by scholars for many years, the academic literature has now caught up with these trends and the topic of global activism has emerged as a major new focus of research in political science and sociology. In the past five to ten years, countless studies have appeared that explore the influence of NGOs and transnational networks in many different areas of global politics, ranging from social and economic issues such as human rights, the environment, and trade, to security issues such as nuclear proliferation and humanitarian crises.1 As these studies show, NGOs through their various roles and actions – as agenda setters, policy advocates, watchdogs and providers of services – have often reshaped politics and contributed to the expansion of global governance. Despite this rapid growth of scholarly interest in NGOs, however, there have been relatively few works that have systematically examined how and why NGOs have emerged and grown in the first place. This is the central question of this book. Focusing on transnationally active NGOs based in industrialized countries, this book uses the comparative case of Japan to analyze the forces driving the emergence and recent spread of transborder citizen activism. To the extent that such questions have been examined in the international relations literature, much of the earlier work on NGOs has viewed them as actors separate from the state and has presented “bottom-up” explanations for their rise that emphasize socio-economic, technological and other mainly nonpolitical factors. As representatives of civil society at the international and transnational levels, NGOs are often portrayed as reactions to new socio-economic conditions that provide citizens the tools and motivation to organize. According to these accounts, the emergence and growth of internationally active NGOs has been spurred on by processes associated with modernization and interdependence such as rising levels of socio-economic development, economic globalization, advances in information technology and a relative decline of state power in an increasingly borderless world. (Mathews 1997; Lipschutz 1992) As countries have grown wealthier, as education levels have improved, and as travel and telecommunications technology have become cheaper and more convenient, citizens have been more able and more likely than in previous eras to cross borders, form NGOs and organize transnational activism. Interdependence and economic globalization

2 Introduction have also encouraged these developments by making borders more porous and by imposing new limits on the power of the state. (Scott 1982; Naisbit 1994; Friedman 1999 and 2005) Such bottom-up portrayals of the growth of NGOs are valid and widely accepted truisms but they are also incomplete. They are incomplete since they fail to account for the diverse patterns of NGO emergence and growth that exist globally. This book calls attention to a dichotomous pattern which has often been overlooked or downplayed. In addition to the well-known worldwide NGO “boom” since the 1980s – i.e., a pattern of convergence often emphasized by scholars – there is also a pattern of divergence in terms of the level and activeness of NGOs across countries. This has been true not only for differences found between industrialized and developing countries, but for differences among the advanced industrialized countries themselves, the countries that, according to bottom-up theories of modernization and globalization, ought to be the most fertile ground for NGO formation. In fact, even among the richest and most advanced capitalist democracies, there are significant differences in the size and scope of NGO activism. These are interesting patterns that deserve greater attention. These dual patterns are also at the center of the larger story of the emergence and global spread of NGOs. By examining both patterns and how they relate to one another, this book shall present a more comprehensive explanation for and depiction of the rise of NGOs. In contrast to the bottom-up explanations that stress socio-economic factors and technological change, this book turns to an emerging body of literature that suggests a more political and “top-down” source for NGO formation and global growth. Building on several theoretical arguments found in new work done in international relations, sociology and social movement theory, I argue that in order fully to understand patterns of NGO emergence and growth across countries and time political structure matters. Contrary to the image of NGOs as a societal force rising in opposition to the state, the top-down model presented in this book emphasizes the central role of the state and changing international political structures in enabling societal activism in the first place. Activism has not merely bubbled up from below; it has also been cultivated from above. The main focus of this book is industrialized countries and the specific case of Japan. Because NGOs first formed in the West, industrialized countries are the proper starting point for understanding how and why NGOs initially appeared and grew in number. Among advanced industrialized countries, Japan provides a good contrast case to explore patterns of NGO formation and growth due to the fact that, despite its great wealth and integration in the global economy, NGOs are a relatively recent phenomenon in Japan. As a late developer in the area of global activism, Japan is an ideal case to examine both divergence and convergence patterns and uncover the conditions that have constrained and supported the emergence and spread of NGOs. This chapter presents the main themes and arguments of the book. After providing a general definition of NGOs covered in this study, I present the two main puzzles concerning NGO emergence and growth: the varying levels of NGOs

Introduction 3 found in the advanced industrialized world and the sharp rise of NGOs in all countries since the 1980s. Using comparative data for major member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), I also highlight the case of Japan as a late developer in global civil society and an appropriate case through which to explore and better understand the phenomenon of NGO formation. After reviewing earlier theories for NGO emergence and growth, the rest of the chapter presents the activism from above explanation and the theoretical framework for the remainder of the book.

Defining NGOs in this study NGOs encompass a potentially very broad set of groups. In this study, I focus on social change NGOs based in advanced industrial democracies interested in global issues. Combining several definitions found in the literature, I define NGOs as nonprofit, voluntary organizations that are autonomous from the state and work toward social and political change at the global level. This definition includes large, international NGOs that have branches in many countries – sometimes referred to as international NGOs or INGOs – as well as smaller NGOs that do not have overseas offices, but work for some aspect of global change outside of the country in which they are headquartered. In particular, the study concentrates on two main types of social change NGOs: (1) international development and relief NGOs; and (2) international advocacy NGOs. International development and relief NGOs are nonprofit, voluntary organizations that carry out or support some kind of social, technical or welfare service abroad, typically to foster development or provide emergency relief. This broad category includes service NGOs working in the fields of poverty alleviation, health, education, environmental conservation, population and humanitarian relief. International development and relief NGOs provide financial, material, technical or personnel assistance to needy populations in developing countries. Examples of prominent international development and relief NGOs operating today include CARE, Save the Children, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières and Catholic Relief Services. International advocacy NGOs, on the other hand, focus on a global political cause and/or seek to influence state policies that have international implications. The target of their activities can be the foreign policies of their own government, the domestic policies of foreign governments, the policies of international organizations and/or the domestic policies of their home governments which are somehow related to international law. International advocacy NGOs also comprise a very broad set of groups that include NGOs active in human rights, environmental issues, corruption, disarmament and nuclear issues, women’s rights, and various economic and international development issues. Well-known advocacy NGOs include Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Most of the NGOs examined in the expanding literature on NGOs fall into the category of one or both of these two types of NGOs. Although these two categories

4 Introduction of NGOs are not mutually exclusive – some NGOs engage in both service and advocacy activities – most NGOs devote the majority of their resources to one type of activity or the other. Previous studies have often lumped these two types of NGOs together. In contrast, this book consciously includes both types as separate categories in order to analyze how different factors have tended to promote each type of NGO.

Patterns of NGO emergence and growth: divergence and convergence One of the most common observations in the literature on NGOs and transnational activism is the fact that over the past several decades NGOs have grown dramatically in practically all countries around the world. (Tarrow 2005; Edwards 2004; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mathews 1997) This pattern of convergence – that countries everywhere have experienced a growth in number, activities and influence of NGOs in recent years – is a significant one that this study seeks to understand and explain. At the same time, however, a closer look at the data shows that there is also an important pattern of divergence, with varying levels of NGOs among industrialized and developing countries. While scholars have sometimes mentioned that a dual pattern exists (Wiest and Smith 2007; Smith and Wiest 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith 1997), they have mainly focused on divergence between rich and poor countries or among developing countries (Roberts 2005). The general impression left by these studies is that although there is an “NGO gap” between the NGO-rich North and the NGO-poor South, there is not very much difference in levels of NGOs within the industrialized world. In fact, however, there are quite interesting patterns of both convergence and divergence among industrialized countries. For a first cut on general patterns of NGO growth, one good starting point is UN data on NGOs with consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). As numerous scholars have pointed out, the number of NGOs with official UN affiliation with ECOSOC has risen dramatically in the postwar period, going from 40 NGOs in 1948, to 180 in 1968, to 851 in 1990, to 1,505 in 1998, and 3,187 in 2008. (Chiang 1981; Park 1992; Gordenker and Weiss 1996; Willet 1996; www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo, accessed 5/26/06 and 3/1/09) However, as Table 1.1 shows, this growth has been taking place faster in some countries than others, with a huge majority of NGOs affiliated with the UN based in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Switzerland. For their population size and income, Italy, Germany and Japan have a surprisingly low number of NGOs active at the UN. While the trend of convergence is clearly evident, with all countries experiencing a sharp rise in their number of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, the divergence pattern is nonetheless quite stark. This is particularly true for Japan, which by the end of the 1990s had only 20 NGOs affiliated with ECOSOC – about one-third fewer NGOs than developing country India. Although Japan’s number of ECOSCO-affiliated NGOs had increased to 36 by 2007, this number still pales in comparison to the number of NGOs based in many other industrialized countries.

Introduction 5 Table 1.1 NGOs granted consultative status at the UN (ECOSOC) by headquarter country, 1946–2007 (Top 20)

USA UK Switzerland Canada France India Italy Belgium Japan Germany Netherlands Spain Russia Australia Tunisia Argentina Philippines Egypt Sweden Austria

1946–49 1950s 1960s 1970s

1980s

1990–98 Total in 1998

Total in 2007

5 8 12 3 10 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

68 17 11 14 18 2 10 10 2 5 2 6 1 3

172 48 27 35 35 25 17 17 16 15 15 4 10 6 12 6 7 6 5 8

385 92 90 65 61 60 48 39 36 32 30 27 23 19 15 10 10 15 13 9

8 2 6 0 4 1 1 7 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0

8 6 5 0 7 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

62 21 16 1 11 1 8 13 1 7 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 3 5

3 3 2 1

331 103 80 54 88 30 38 56 20 28 27 12 12 11 12 12 12 11 10 13

Source: Non-Governmental Organizations Liaison Office of the United Nations, List of NonGovernmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council, (1997/NGO Lists Parts I/II); and Non-Governmental Organizations Liaison Office of the United Nations, internal lists. For 2007 figures: UN ECOSOC, 2007 NGO datasets, advanced by-country search online, http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/, accessed November 2008.

Another commonly used data set is the Yearbook of International Organizations, which contains data on international NGOs with branches in three or more countries. According to Yearbook data, NGOs increased from 1,552 groups in 1962 to more than 26,000 groups in 2006. (Union of International Associations 2007) The upward trend over time has held for all countries, confirming the convergence pattern of NGO growth occurring in all countries. Comparing the number of NGOs across countries, however, there are some stark contrasts. Using recent data on the number of international NGOs headquartered in a country, Figure 1.1 provides an interesting profile of countries that have been the “leaders” in hosting the main branches of globally active NGOs. Once again, the United States, United Kingdom, and France, now joined by Belgium, are the clear leaders. Proportionate to their income, population size and levels of education, Germany, Italy and Japan have had a relatively low number of international NGOs. Japan, given its wealth and large population size, is particularly under-represented. While useful as a first cut for general trends, these data sets are of limited use for this study since they include all types of internationally active NGOs – not just international development NGOs and international advocacy NGOs – and since

6 Introduction

Figure 1.1 Number of INGO headquarters by country, 2003 and 1996 Source: Union of International Associations 1997 and 2004–2005.

they may be biased toward over-representing countries that host UN offices and/or branches of other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Reliable crossnational data on international development and advocacy NGOs is limited, but by several measures it is clear that both convergence and divergence patterns hold for these types of NGOs as well. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the number of international development and human rights NGOs by country listed in the major NGO directories published from 1967 through 2008. As is clear from these tables, most countries experienced a substantial increase in the number of NGOs listed in these directories in the 1990s and 2000s, confirming the generalizations in the literature that social change NGOs grew in number during this period. Divergence patterns are also clear, however, and largely confirm the patterns found in the UN and UIA Yearbook data. In the 1990s, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, joined by Canada, were the leaders of the pack with higher numbers of both development and human rights NGOs, while Germany, Japan and Italy lagged behind. At the end of the 2000s, these patterns changed slightly in the area of international development: according to a recent directory published online, there were substantially higher numbers of international development NGOs in Germany and Italy in 2008 than in 1996. In the area of human rights, however, the trends of the 1990s did not change in the 2000s. While this data is suggestive of basic patterns found in OECD member countries, the sheer number of NGOs may not be the best measure for the actual size or activeness of NGOs. Most of the earlier and recent writings on NGOs have

Introduction 7 Table 1.2 Number of international development NGOs in selected countries, 1967–2008 Country

1967

1981

1990

1996/1998

2008

USA France Netherlands United Kingdom Germany Belgium Canada Italy Switzerland Australia Sweden Japan Denmark

n.a. 115 74 120 110 74 110 35 68 12 51 13 59

429 120 78 112 111 93 150 64 69 24 85 36 50

228 289 72 154 150 141 216 36 162 69 141 174 93

1007 564 328 392 296 308 351 180 425 161 236 236 193

2881 1087 886 677 655 641 616 534 482 404 373 311 311

Sources: OECD-ICVA 1967; OECD 1981, 1990, 1996 and 1998. Figures for 2008 were obtained using the Directory of Development Organizations, available online at http://www.devdir.org/ and accessed in October 2008.

Table 1.3 Number of human rights NGOs in selected countries, 1980s–2008 Country

1979–82

1994

2008

USA Canada United Kingdom France Australia Netherlands Belgium Germany Japan Switzerland Sweden Denmark Italy

259 n.a. 188 95 25 47 48 38 18 79 40 14 29

682 251 172 141 79 69 57 58 98 115 22 21 40

1284 1177 309 175 116 105 92 84 83 47 47 42 40

Sources: Human Rights Internet 1979, 1981, 1982, and 1994. Figures for 2008 are from the Human Rights Internet on-line directory, http://www.hri.ca/organizations-databank.asp, accessed 10/20/2008.

also called attention to their rapidly growing budgets and memberships since the late 1970s. (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Morphet 1996; Smillie 1995; Princen and Finger 1994; Sikkink 1993) These studies have not examined crossnational data, however, leaving it unclear whether such growing budgets and membership were universal trends in all industrialized countries. The common tendency in the literature has been to cite examples from NGOs in the United States and a few European states and generalize from these cases.

8 Introduction Table 1.4 Grants to developing countries by NGOs in selected OECD countries, 1972–2005 (US$ million) Country

1972

1978

1982

1988

1992

1996

2005

US Germany Canada Australia UK Netherlands Switzerland Japan Italy Sweden France Norway

669 124 54 17 50 15 20 6 5 27 8 8

931 284 87 38 56 56 49 19 0.3 44 20 26

1,280 391 123 33 100 108 48 23 3 60 30 39

2,255 695 218 44 239 180 89 107 19 120 106 56

2,812 763 270 63 438 260 168 190 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

2,509 1,044 302 76 382 353 182 232 31 22 n.a. 80

8,629 1,523 973 825 726 422 332 255 94 29 n.a. n.a.

Source: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Development Cooperation, volumes for 1975, 1981, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2007.

Tables 1.4 and 1.5 indicate that while NGOs grew in size and membership over time, there was considerable variation in these factors across countries. Table 1.4 lists the amount of aid sent overseas by international development NGOs in various OECD member countries from 1972 through 2005. Once again, for the entire period, the United States is a clear leader, along with Germany and the United Kingdom, and the relatively less populated countries of the Netherlands and Canada. In the 2000s, Australian NGOs gain a sudden prominence as well. In contrast, Japan and Italy are consistent laggards, especially when one takes into account their higher populations. The relative strength of French NGOs is unclear due to lack of data in the 1990s and 2000s, but prior to the 1990s French NGOs provided less aid to developing countries relative to countries with similar and even smaller populations. Although France appears to be a leader in terms of numbers of NGOs, thus, it is not clear that these numbers are backed by strong resources and capabilities. Although there is no reliable crossnational data for total memberships for international development and advocacy NGOs, the World Values Survey data offers a proxy with its questions on membership and volunteering in organizations that work in developing countries or for human rights. Table 1.5 shows survey results for 1990 and 2000 and reveals general upward trends in most countries for both membership and levels of volunteering. Once again, there is also a considerable degree of variation among countries, with much higher levels of membership and volunteering in the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada, and to a lesser degree the United States and the United Kingdom. Italy, Japan, France and Germany are all laggards, with very low rates of participation and support. Although the data is contradictory in places, general patterns of both convergence and divergence are clear. As the literature has claimed, the number of NGOs has increased enormously among all OECD member countries in the postwar

Introduction 9 Table 1.5 Membership and volunteer work in international development and human rights organizations, 1990 and 2000 (percent belong) Country

Membership 1990

Membership 2000

Volunteer 1990

Volunteer 2000

Netherlands Sweden Canada US UK Italy France Japan Germany

14 9 5 2 2 1 3 0 1

24 15 5 6 3 3 1 2 1

3 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 0

4 5 3 3 4 2 1 0 0

World Value Survey data in Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman and Luijkx 2004.

period, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, this growth has been uneven, with some countries having much larger, stronger NGO sectors than others. NGOs from the United States and the United Kingdom have been clear and consistent “leaders” in terms of their absolute numbers, resources and the size of their memberships. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, Canada and Sweden, are impressive in the size of their NGO sectors and the active support of their citizens considering their relatively smaller populations. These countries, if population is taken into account, are in many ways the most activist countries with a high per capita number of NGOs and level of funding, as well as the highest membership and participation rates in the world. Other countries have more mixed profiles. France, while reporting large numbers of NGOs, may not be as activist as these numbers suggest given its lower levels of funding, membership and volunteering rates. Germany also presents a mixed picture, with a slightly lower number of NGOs (although increasing numbers of international development NGOs in the 2000s), strong levels of funding, and very low levels of membership and participation. Finally, there are the laggards of Japan and Italy, countries with relatively fewer NGOs, which have smaller resources and lower levels of membership and participation.

Earlier theories explaining NGO emergence and growth Although most of the literature has not systematically analyzed the sources of NGO growth, earlier international relations theories about transnational actors have mentioned several factors that have become an accepted set of explanatory variables in much of the recent work on NGOs. Since NGOs historically emerged first in Europe and North America, these earlier theories tended to adopt an evolutionary view based on the Western experience that blend factors found in modernization and globalization theories. According to these accounts, NGOs emerged first in the West due to higher levels of wealth, education and democracy, and became more prevalent in recent years as forces of economic globalization and new technology

10 Introduction

Modernization (Wealth, Democracy)

Economic Globalization and Interdependence, High Technology (International Intervening Variable)

Rising Levels of Internationally Active NGOs

Figure 1.2 The modernization and economic globalization explanation for NGOs

made it easier for citizens to cross borders. This is a two-step explanation that starts with domestic characteristics of modernization (socio-economic development, democracy) and then moves to economic globalization as an international intervening variable that stimulates rising levels of NGOs interested in global issues. Figure 1.2 depicts this explanation graphically. Modernization Modernization theory’s focus on economic development and democracy provides a common starting point for thinking about the rise of NGOs, and both early and recent studies on NGOs have emphasized domestic socio-economic conditions and democracy as key factors driving NGO emergence. (Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999; Nye and Keohane 1972; Skjelsbaek 1972) As one scholar has noted, the concept of international civil society has been modeled on the “institutional pluralism of liberal democratic capitalism at the domestic level.” (Gill 1994: 173) To start with, NGOs are products of market economies and socio-economic modernization. (Field 1972; Therien 1991) Rising wealth, higher levels of economic development, universal education, and the diffusion of media and technology in society promote the formation of NGOs in numerous ways. First, if there are greater numbers of citizens with surplus income then there will be more potential resources for philanthropy and monetary support of NGOs. (Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999) Second, the process of economic development itself encourages greater social differentiation and specialization, which then translates into the creation of a wider variety of interest groups and more actors who are likely to expand their activities to the international level. (Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999; Nye and Keohane 1972; Skjelsbaek 1972) Finally, education and media encourage these trends and also provide additional informational resources that stimulate NGO growth. Since many NGOs provide technical expertise and knowledge-based information, higher levels of education among the general population produce greater capacity and more groups. (Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999) In addition to this, increasing exposure to global problems through the media and modern information networks encourages educated citizens to get involved in international activities. In addition to socio-economic factors, political regime type also matters, and NGOs are products of democratic nations. (Jacobson 1984; Nye and Keohane 1972; Skjelsbaek 1972) In the early works on transnational actors of the 1970s

Introduction 11 and 1980s, this explanation was based on the empirical fact that most NGOs at the time were headquartered in Western democratic nations, and posited that the ideology and institutions of democratic regimes provide greater legitimacy and public space for societal groups to form. (Jacobson 1984; Nye and Keohane 1972; Skjelsbaek 1972) In more recent writings on NGOs, scholars have continued advancing this explanation when they argue that one of the main reasons for the spread of NGOs worldwide is the end of the Cold War and the waves of democratization that have taken place since then. (Gordenker and Weiss 1996) Economic globalization and interdependence theory In addition to highlighting modernization factors, international relations scholars have focused on globalization processes as an explanation for the emergence and growth of NGOs. Higher levels of global economic integration over time, the revolution in information and telecommunications technology, and cheaper and faster transportation are all common factors and themes mentioned by most scholars writing about the rise of NGOs. Interacting with the modernization factors at the domestic level, these globalization factors can be seen as an intervening variable that stimulates and activates the formation and growth of NGOs that are internationally active. Globalization and interdependence theory have emphasized the global expansion of the economic realm in stimulating the emergence of NGOs and other sorts of nonstate transnational actors. (Boli and Thomas 1999b; Cvetkovich and Kellner 1997; Albrow 1996; Deudney and Ikenberry 1994; Gill 1994; Camilleri and Falk 1992; Morse 1976; Nye and Keohane 1972) In terms of NGO formation and growth, these theories claim that higher levels of global economic integration have stimulated NGO activity in at least two basic ways. First, viewed from the perspective of globalization theory, higher levels of global economic integration have had the effect of tearing down national borders and weakening state control, thereby making it easier for nonstate actors to get involved in international politics. (Friedman 1999 and 2005; Rosenau 1990 and 1997; Ohmae 1995; Sakamoto 1994) Globalization theorists have also called attention to how these global economic processes themselves are sources of new interaction among societal actors from different countries, and how the universal spread of capitalist economies is accompanied by an intermingling of cultures as actors cross borders. (Hopper 2007; Niezen 2004; Cvetkovich and Kellner 1997; Rosenau 1997; Kofman and Youngs 1996) This process of interaction occurs not only from “above” through the exportation of production processes and culture as economically dominant actors move into new territories, but from “below” through interchanges among less advantaged members of society who are able to form transnational alliances in the more fluid global context. (Evans 2000; Brecher, Childs and Cutler 1993) Second, interdependence theory provides a functionalist explanation for how global economic processes have led to the emergence and growth of NGOs and other nonstate actors. International economic integration brings about greater

12 Introduction interdependence – i.e. greater sensitivity of nations to the policies, actions and fates of other nations and national actors. (Keohane and Nye 1977) The new tensions and conflict that arise from these processes (e.g. trade conflict, transborder environmental problems, etc.) then stimulate the growth of both intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs as states find themselves unable to solve or monitor the problem on their own. (Scott 1982; Willet 1989a; Jacobson 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977; Field 1972; Nye and Keohane 1972) NGOs, thus, are also functional responses to the emergence of new global problems caused by economic globalization. The complications of interdependence and the failure of the state at the international level have thus stimulated NGO formation.2 In addition to global economic integration, another oft-mentioned reason for the growth of NGOs in the globalization and interdependence literatures are improvements in technology and transportation. (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Qiu and Sey 2007; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Keohane and Nye 1998, Mathews 1997; Rosenau 1997; Gordenker and Weiss 1996; Naisbit 1994; Jacobson 1984; Field 1972; Nye and Keohane 1972) As products of modernization that literally connect people, telecommunication technology and transportation provide the enabling mechanism for activists to cross borders with increasing ease at lower cost. (Warkentin 2001; Kamarck and Nye 1999) By making transborder interactions easier and cheaper, modern communications and transportation facilitate higher levels of global interaction and provide the necessary resources for groups to organize and operate across vast distances. (Warkentin 2001; Brown 1995; Scott 1982) For NGOs in particular, the information revolution has aided activists’ efforts at making new contacts and building coalitions with groups in all corners of the world. (Carty and Onyett 2006; Warkentin 2001; Deibert 2000; Keohane and Nye 1998 and 2000; Mathews 1997; Ayes 1999; Rosenau 1997) Through improved information and communications technology, groups have been able to send information, expertise and technology to other parts of the world and aid groups in less advantaged positions. (Warkentin 2001; Rosenau 1997) By shortening distances, technology and greater mobility have changed people’s perception of community and allowed identities and solidarity to extend beyond national borders. (Mathews 1997) Lower transportation costs also lead to huge increases in the transnational movement of people (e.g. tourists, exchange students, businessmen, etc.), which encourages people to look beyond their own immediate environment to the problems in other countries and regions. Assessing earlier theories Based on these assumptions, one would expect most OECD member countries to have relatively developed NGO sectors since these countries possess the socioeconomic factors that promote NGO formation: high per capita GNP, literate and educated populations, a well-developed high-tech field, high levels of media and technology diffusion, integration in the global economy (high levels of trade, foreign direct investment, foreign aid, etc.) and rising levels of transborder movement of people. Among the OECD member countries, one would expect to

Introduction 13 see higher levels of NGOs in countries with high levels of these factors (either absolute or relative to population) and the increase in these factors over time leading to greater NGO formation. However, there does not appear to be a strong systematic relationship between these factors and the development of a nation’s NGO sector, and these earlier theories fall short when it comes to explaining patterns of divergence and convergence. Table 1.6 lists various measures of modernization and economic globalization for selected OECD member countries. Using Japan as the central comparison point, all bold figures in the table have values higher than Japan and all italicized figures have values lower than Japan. None of the modernization/economic globalization factors appears to account for divergence patterns and the theory’s causal relationships are not always borne out. For example, some relatively wealthy countries, such as Japan, are nonetheless notable laggards when it comes to NGOs, while countries that have become relatively less wealthy over time, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, are NGO leaders. Absolute levels of trade and foreign direct investment do not lead to consistent outcomes – the United States, Germany and Japan are the top three countries in terms of combined trade and FDI, but these countries have very different levels of NGOs. When economic integration figures are represented as trade and FDI as percentage of gross national product, there still appears to be no solid relationship between integration in the world economy and levels of NGOs. The United States and Japan both have very low levels of trade and FDI reliance, but the two countries have very different NGO levels, while the UK, France and Italy all have similar (medium) levels of reliance on trade and FDI but differing levels of NGOs. Japan’s laggard position is particularly puzzling since by the 1980s most of the figures in the table are in italics, indicating that in absolute terms Japan had very high levels of most of the modernization and globalization factors – i.e., Japan was one of the richest countries in the world with very high absolute levels of trade, foreign direct investment, foreign aid, media diffusion and numbers of students studying abroad at college level. In addition to these figures, Japan’s education levels were very high for several decades, with high school completion rates of 90 percent or more by the late 1970s (Vogel 1979) and literacy rates close to 100 percent.3 Based on all of these statistics and facts, by the mid- to late 1990s Japan should have had a relatively robust and active NGO sector. These figures also do not seem to do a good job in explaining convergence and the rise of NGOs in all countries in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In order to account for the NGO boom, one would expect steep increases in these factors in the 1980s–2000s. For most of these factors, however, this does not appear to be the case consistently. While some countries had a steady increase in trade and FDI dependence in this period (e.g. the United States), others had varying levels (e.g. the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden), and others experienced a decrease in the 1990s (e.g. Japan, Germany, France and Italy). While levels of wealth generally rose in all countries, it did so at differential rates and some countries experienced flat or negative income growth in the 1990s (e.g.

14 Introduction Table 1.6 Various indicators of modernization and economic globalization in selected OECD countries, 1970–2006 Country

1970

1976

1982

1985

1992

1996

2006

US Per capita GNP Trade and FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

4,770 88,629 .09 2,946 413 18,789

7,933 259,236 .15 4,334 602 31,190 215.1

13,269 474,930 .15 7,774 646 19,692 232.1

16,693 597,339 .15 9,403 786 20,614 239.3

23,200 1,054,037 .17 11,412 815 24,902 257.0

44, 055 28,500 1,531,181 2,617,791 .2 .2 23,532 9,377 n.a. 805 27,117 30,359 299.8 265.6

Japan Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

1,890 38,627 .19 428 219 5,507

4,917 135,036 .24 1,105 238 10,886 112.8

9,966 276,974 .26 2,865 560 15,246 118.4

11,303 325,982 .24 3,797 579 17,926 120.8

29,800 600,378 .16 10,315 614 55,145 124.5

32, 826 36,900 793,629 1,171,319 .27 .17 11,187 9,439 n.a. 684 50,952 64,284 127.8 125.9

Germany Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

3,080 64,749 .34 560 275 7,072

7,255 193,589 .43 1,384 324 12,937 61.5

12,463 337,778 .51 2,988 354 16,894 61.6

10,939 350,310 .55 2,942 — 23,114 61.0

24,200 854,321 .44 6,746 — 40,040 80.0

32, 255 28,500 994,461 1,888,061 .65 .42 10,435 7,601 n.a. 564 65,409 49,876 82.7 81.9

UK Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

2,170 41,530 .34 450 294 10,927

3,975 107,515 .49 835 327 19,370 56.9

9,580 202,242 .42 1,706 457 14,238 56.0

8,465 222,377 .48 1,530 433 14,739 56.6

18,000 433,587 .41 3,088 435 20,802 57.8

19,900 580,240 .49 3,199 516 25,085 58.8

33, 424 813,274 .32 12,459 n.a. 17,155 60.5

France Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

2,910 38,128 .25 907 217 9,205

6,551 125,107 .35 2,146 278 10,236 52.9

11,742 218,804 .4 3,823 369 10,373 54.2

9,537 216,163 .42 3,995 390 12,126 55.1

23,000 514,333 .38 7,554 408 26,924 57.4

26,300 603,952 .39 7,451 591 39,152 58.4

31, 288 929,461 .41 10,601 n.a. 40,276 61.2

Italy Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

1,700 28,256 .3 137 181 8,332

3,027 81,046 .48 226 220 13,750 56.2

6,901 161,399 .47 769 405 13,066 56.6

6,523 173,030 .41 1,098 413 17,004 57.1

20,800 374,279 .31 3,587 421 29,668 57.8

21,100 466,292 .38 2,416 524 40,663 57.5

28, 788 791,903 .43 3,641 n.a. 24,212 58.6

Introduction 15 Table 1.6 (continued) Various indicators of modernization and economic globalization in selected OECD countries, 1970–2006 Country

1970

Canada Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

3,780 32,250 .39 315 333 15,042

Netherlands Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade& FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

1976

1982

1985

1992

1996

2006

8,327 82,460 .42 887 438 14,342 23.0

11,340 130,947 .46 1,135 460 14,606 24.6

13,676 176,123 .53 1,631 541 17,205 25.4

20,000 276,935 .5 2,627 640 25,580 27.4

18,900 397,498 .7 1,795 714 29,643 30.0

36, 539 681,609 .54 3,684 n.a. 37,826 32.6

2,400 25,341 .79 183 237 2,895

6,396 82,354 .93 720 273 5,028 13.8

10,950 133,225 .96 1,395 305 5,002 14.3

9,285 137,136 1.09 1,136 462 6,642 14.5

21,000 285,402 .89 2,536 488 9,584 15.2

25,800 363,079 .9 3,246 514 13,034 15.5

37, 149 836,609 1.26 5,452 n.a. 8,542 16.3

Sweden Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

3,900 13,897 .45 109 363 1,529

9,032 37,718 .51 608 370 2,028 8.2

14,148 56,186 .57 935 387 2,130 8.3

11,889 61,130 .62 840 464 3,102 8.4

27,500 108,337 .44 2,337 469 6,279 8.7

26,900 158,167 .65 1,999 499 10,571 8.9

35, 023 249,176 .65 3,955 n.a. 10,841 9.1

Switzerland Per capita GNP Trade & FDI Trade & FDI/GNP ODA TV receivers Students abroad Population

3,240 11,642 .52 30 207 2,210

9,203 29,613 .49 112 285 3,472 6.3

16,793 54,689 .54 – — 3,842 6.5

16,369 62,718 .64

36,000 137,332 .55

42,900 169,166 .56

390 4,207 6.5

407 6,884 6.9

443 7,847 7.1

41, 226 261,835 .69 1,646 n.a. 7,253 7.5

Sources: For GNP figures: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Development Cooperation, volumes for 1972, 1978, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Paris: OECD). 2006 only is GDP from the World Development Indicators website. All figures are in US dollars. For trade flows: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, volumes for 1969–1973, 1972–1978, 1989, 1994, 1998 and 2007 (Washington, DC: IMF). These trade figures are taken from world trade tables, Part B and are in millions of US dollars. They represent each country’s total trade flows (imports plus exports). For foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, volumes for 1982, 1984, 1986, 1991, 1998 and 2007. Figures are in millions of SDRS for 1976–85 and in millions of US dollars for 1989–2007. For official development assistance (ODA) flows: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Twenty-Five Years of Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD), 1983, 1993 and 1997; and various volumes of OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Development Cooperation. Figures are net disbursements of ODA and are in millions of US dollars. Figures are for 1970–1982 are adjusted for the average change in exchange rates (base year: 1983). Figures for 1986–1992 are at 1991 prices and exchange rates. For country-specific figures, see: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode = CSP2008.

(continued)

16 Introduction Table 1.6 (continued) Various indicators of modernization and economic globalization in selected OECD countries, 1970–2006 Sources (continued) For TV: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1980 and 1997 editions (Paris and Lanham, MD: UNESCO and Bernan Press). Figures are numbers of television receivers per 1,000 inhabitants. Figures for 2007 were not available. For students abroad: Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook (Paris: UNESCO), various volumes. Figures are the number of university level students (third level) studying overseas. For population: OECD, Development Cooperation (OECD: Paris), volumes for 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1993 and1997. Population figures are millions of people. Note: Bold = values larger than Japan; italic = values less than Japan.

the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy and Sweden) and mid-2000s (Japan and Switzerland). Foreign aid also did not increase greatly in the 1990s, and in some countries (e.g. United States, France, Italy, Canada and Sweden) it decreased, although there was a general rise in the mid-2000s. Thus, while there are some cases where the figures and NGO growth levels appear to correspond somewhat to the modernization and globalization factors, there are too many discrepancies to identify a systematic relationship. This analysis is confirmed by recent statistical studies on NGO growth by sociologists that, unlike this study, include both industrialized countries and developing countries. Smith and Wiest (2005) found that, once levels of IGO membership is taken into account, global economic integration factors are not strongly associated with higher levels of NGOs. Similarly, Schofer and Longhofer ran a series of statistical regressions and also found that neither a country’s wealth nor its volume of trade had a significant effect on increasing its level of NGOs. (Schofer and Longhofer 2006)

Explaining NGO emergence and growth: a political explanation Although the socio-economic factors emphasized by modernization and globalization theory have undoubtedly aided the growth and emergence of NGOs in many ways, these theories’ lack of attention to political factors beyond regime type limits the degree to which they can explain both the varying levels of NGOs across countries and the timing of the NGO explosion of the 1980s and 1990s. For a more complete picture of how NGOs first emerged and spread globally, a more political and top-down approach that focuses on the role of the state and political institutions in shaping activism is necessary. While top-down factors are not completely absent from the international relations literature, they have not been incorporated or organized into a single theory or explanation for NGO emergence and growth. Much of the international relations literature also tends to overlook recent studies on activism and NGOs done by scholars in other subfields, such as comparative politics, sociological institutionalism, nonprofit studies and social movement theory. This book’s activism from above model turns to these other literatures and combines them to

Introduction 17 create a more comprehensive, political story that accounts for both divergence and convergence patterns. Activism from above, I argue, has taken place at the two levels of domestic and international politics, with each level providing separate layers of political institutions and dynamics that have directly shaped the rise and spread of NGOs. State activism from above and the domestic political context The first level of activism from above is at the domestic level of politics and political structures. Although earlier theories of modernization and globalization argued that regime type mattered, none of these theories or other international relations theories went very far in terms of examining specific features of democracy or regime type that have contributed to the rise of NGOs. The first part of the activism from above model explores this factor and argues that in order to understand the relative strength or weakness of the NGO sector in a country (divergence patterns), one must examine specific political institutions and state policies at the domestic level and how they either constrain or encourage NGOs. States shape activism from above through policies and institutional structures. This argument is based on several overlapping literatures in comparative politics, nonprofit studies and social movement theory that have examined how the domestic political context influences citizen activism and the formation of private citizens’ groups. In particular, I argue that three key aspects of state policies and political institutions greatly influence the size and shape of the NGO sector. State policies As strong state theorists have argued, state policies are among the key determinants for explaining how society organizes itself. (Krasner 1995; Skocpol 1984) State policies vary cross-nationally in terms of the degree to which they actively support the NGO sector. Two key state policies that have clearly affected the size of the NGO sector are examined in this book: (1) legal and fiscal codes regulating the nonprofit sector; and (2) financial support via state subsidies and funding schemes. States with more generous policies towards NGOs in these two areas have had the most visible and activist NGOs. Legal and fiscal codes regulating the nonprofit sector are a good starting point for examining a state’s basic attitude toward citizen activism since they comprise the rules for establishment and raising funds for all sorts of private groups, including NGOs. (Heinrich and Shea 2008; Fremont Smith 1965) Laws governing the establishment of nonprofit organizations can be very liberal and allow for easy formation of a legally recognized NGO, or they can be restrictive and set high bars for gaining legal recognition. (Pekkanen 2006; Salamon and Toepler 2000; Salamon 1997; Krasner 1995; McCarthy, Hodgkinson and Sumariwalla 1992; McCarthy 1984) In the comparative context, NGOs have tended to flourish in democracies with more liberal legal codes. (Heinrich and Shea 2008; Salamon and Toepler 2000) In addition to legal status, states promote or discourage NGO

18 Introduction formation through fiscal regulations governing NGOs such as tax exemption, tax deductions for charitable contributions, and bulk mail rates. (Heinrich and Shea 2008; Salamon and Toepler 2000; Hall 1999; Smillie 1999a; Salamon 1995 and 1997; McCarthy, Hodgkinson and Sumariwalla 1992; Fremont Smith 1965) These sorts of fiscal perk make it easier for NGOs to mobilize resources, and states with more favorable policies in this area have tended to have larger NGO sectors. The other state policy that has been important for NGO emergence and growth is direct financial support through subsidies and grants, usually through foreign aid-related programs. Over the course of the postwar period, states have set up foreign aid programs that often include support of NGO activities overseas and at international organizations. Such direct sponsorship of NGOs is perhaps the most obvious form of support of activism from above by states, and those with longerstanding and more generous public assistance to NGOs have more active and larger-scale NGOs. The structure of political institutions In addition to state policies, another domestic political factor that influences NGO formation is the structure of political institutions and the degree to which they are open or closed to societal actors. As social movement scholars and recent scholars of transnational actors have argued, the structure of political institutions shapes political opportunities available to societal actors and plays a role in explaining whether groups can or will organize. (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Kriesi et al. 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995) Two important dimensions of political opportunity structure (POS) for NGO formation and growth in particular are the degree of openness of the political system and the existence of elite allies: countries with more open political systems and more supportive elite allies have tended to have higher levels of NGOs. The relative openness or closeness of a political system is measured by the degree of state centralization and/or the fragmentation of political institutions. (Kriesi et al. 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995) Less centralized, more open states have more channels for participation through either politicians or advisory councils, and these more inclusive political structures provide a more facilitative environment for NGOs to form. Interrelated to the openness of the political system, the existence of elite allies also affects success levels and the ability of NGOs to form and survive. Echoing what social movement scholars have found at the national level (Jenkins 1987 and 1998), recent international relations models have analyzed how patterns of state–society relations and access to elites determine whether groups will be able to influence foreign policies. (Sikkink 2005; Risse-Kappen 1995; Cortell and Davis 2000; Checkel 1997) Access, through either open political structures or elite allies, provides an important general political context for group formation – it is very hard to form and maintain effective NGOs without it. Table 1.7 summarizes the domestic state policies and structure argument as it pertains to various advanced industrialized countries. Overall, it provides a relatively accurate account of the variation found in NGO levels across countries.

Introduction 19 Table 1.7 Domestic political factors for INGOs in selected OECD countries Country

Legal and tax structures

NGO grants and subsidies

Openness of political system to INGOs

Canada

Pro-NGO legal structure Tax deductions available

Since the 1970s, generous

Relatively Open (liberal pluralism)

France

Pro-NGO legal status Some tax deductions (since 1980s)

Since the 1970s, very modest

Relatively Closed (statist/corporatist)

Germany

Pro-NGO legal structure Some tax deductions

Since 1962, relatively generous

Mixed (corporatist)

Italy

Tricky legal structure Some tax deductions

Since the 1970s, very modest

Relatively Closed (statist)

Japan

Tough legal structure until 1998 Very limited tax deductions

Since 1989, very modest

Relatively Closed (statist)

Netherlands

Pro-NGO legal structure Some tax deductions

Since the 1960s, generous

Relatively Open (social democratic)

Sweden

Pro-NGO legal structure No tax deductions

Since 1952, generous

Relatively Open (social democratic)

Switzerland

Pro-NGO legal structure some tax deductions

Since 1961, generous

Relatively Open (corporatist)

Since 1974, modest

Relatively Open (liberal pluralism)

Since 1940s, generous

Relatively Open (liberal pluralism)

United Kingdom Pro-NGO legal structure Some tax deductions United States

Pro-NGO legal structure Tax deductions available

Sources: Smillie and Helmich 1993b; Salamon 1997; Salamon and Anheier 1997; Harris 1999.

Japan and Italy, countries with the weakest NGO sectors in terms of scale and membership, are the countries with unfavorable domestic political environments for NGOs in one or more of the three measures of state policies and institutional structures. States with relatively strong NGO sectors, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands, have most or all of the policies and institutional structures that support or encourage NGO formation. France, which has more flexible legal codes but a low level of subsidies and relatively closed

20 Introduction political system, has an NGO sector that has many groups which have fewer resources and less power, as would be predicted by these political factors. Political globalization and activism from “above” the state While domestic political structures provide a good explanation for divergence patterns, the second part of the activism from above model moves to politics and political structures at the international level to explain the recent convergence patterns of high levels of NGO growth found across all OECD countries. Domestic political factors have contributed to these convergence patterns as well, but in the wider context of an international political environment in which activism has also taken place above the state. Building on similar interactive domestic–international structure frameworks in the international relations literature that have sought to explain either policy outcomes or types of network formation (Sikkink 2005; Khagram 2004; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995), the second part of the model identifies three ways in which international politics and institutions have reshaped domestic politics and stimulated the growth of NGOs worldwide. The overarching story or image for this portion of the activism from above model is the expansion of international and transnational structures of governance, the increasing impingement of these structures on states, and the new external political opportunities they provide to nonstate actors. It is a story, thus, not of economic globalization but rather of political globalization (Modelski and Devezas 2007; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999) or what Sidney Tarrow has called processes of “internationalism.” (Tarrow 2005: 25) As Tarrow has astutely noted, economic globalization and the global spread of capitalism have taken place separately from the process of political globalization and it is the latter process that has defined the institutional framework for activism. (Tarrow 2005: 17–19) As international institutions have grown in number and reach, and as powerful states have come to champion many new global causes, politics at the global level have also become more institutionalized and inclusive in terms of the participation of nonstate actors. These processes of political globalization have been among the most important sources for NGO emergence and growth in recent decades. Precisely how has political globalization been a form of activism from above states aiding NGO growth? My model specifies three mechanisms or processes through which international-level politics have provided new resources and reshaped domestic politics in ways that have spurred the proliferation of NGOs in recent years. •

•

First, political globalization has created new international political opportunities such as international funding, political access, legitimacy and other external resources that have supported the creation and growth of NGOs from above the state. Second, since the 1980s, states have been encouraged by international institutions and democratic donor states to adopt more supportive policies

Introduction 21

•

toward NGOs. In the 1980s and 1990s, a process of state socialization from above led to shifts in state policies vis-à-vis NGOs and a greater opening of domestic political opportunity structures for NGOs in many countries. These changes, in turn, have led to the formation of more NGOs. Finally, political globalization has also led to the transnational diffusion of ideas as activists from different countries meet one another at international venues. The spread of NGOs to new parts of the world is in part a result of activists learning new forms of organization and action from other activists.

Below, I examine each of these three dimensions briefly. International political opportunities Just as state structures and politics at the domestic level can create incentives or barriers to NGO emergence and growth, the international political system has provided yet another political environment that has influenced and shaped the development of the NGO sector in many countries. Changes in this level of politics and political structure over the course of the postwar period are important reasons for the overall rise of NGOs in recent years. The two main strains in the literature that have started to examine the role of international political structures in stimulating NGO growth are social movement theory and sociological institutionalism. Social movement theorists such as Jackie Smith (2000 and 2004), Florence Passy (1999) and others have discussed the growth of transnationally active social change NGOs in terms of an international extension of two social movements concepts from the national level: the expansion of the state (Tilly 1984) and the POS (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Just as the expansion of the nation state encouraged new social movements that operated at the national level (Tilly 1984; Tarrow 1996), the expansion of new international structures of governance in the postwar period has stimulated new social movements and organizations that are active at the international level. (Smith 2000 and 2004; Tarrow 2005; Schofer and Longhofer 2006) Social movement theorists have also conceived of political globalization processes as the emergence of the POS concept at the international level, with rising numbers of IGOs and international regimes providing new international POS for activists, such as access to new arenas for political action, international elite allies, and other resources, such as international media attention (Passy 1999; Smith 2000).4 Similarly, sociological institutionalists have also associated the growth of international NGOs with the expansion of the international system and have argued that NGOs “emerged in tandem with the universalization of the state . . . [and] grew concomitantly with the incorporation of peripheral regions into the interstate system and world economy” (Boli and Thomas 1999a: 30). These scholars view NGOs as both products and agents of world culture, and their research has found correlations between IGO and NGO formation in general (Boli and Thomas 1999a: 28–29), and between the expansion of IGOs and NGO growth in specific areas of global politics, such as the environment (Meyer et al. 1997) and women’s issues.

22 Introduction (Berkovitch 1999) Using these insights, other recent work has statistically tested and found that a country’s participation in IGOs is also positively associated with NGO formation. (Schofer and Longhofer 2006; Smith and Wiest 2005) While suggestive, however, these studies have mainly concentrated on showing correlations and do not identify or theorize the mechanisms through which IGO growth has led to NGO growth. My model does this and argues that two particular dimensions of international political opportunity have greatly contributed to recent NGO growth: (1) international resources in the form of grants, contracts and other kinds of institutional support; and (2) political access to international decisionmaking bodies and agenda-setting arenas. These dimensions correspond to the two domestic-level political factors of state policies and institutional structure, and my larger argument is that in the past two decades the process of political globalization has promoted general growth of NGOs since it has involved the internationalization of two key opportunities for activists found in liberal democratic industrialized states that have tended to have strong NGO sectors. In terms of international resources, intergovernmental organizations and international donors have become the global version of what scholar Jack Walker has called in the United States the “patrons” of citizen organizing and group formation. (Walker 1991) One striking development in the past 25 years has been the enormous increase of funding available to NGO organizers in both developing and industrialized countries from IGOs and international donors such as bilateral aid agencies and private foundations. As they have grown in number and size, many international governance structures have become the new global patrons for both service and advocacy NGOs, and have funded the rise of groups all over the world. In addition to resources, the expansion of the international system of governance has provided social activists with new and alternative channels of access to decision-makers and agenda-setting arenas. This dimension corresponds roughly to institutional structure and openness to participation of societal groups found at the national level described above, and in the past 30 years there has been an opening up of avenues of participation and interaction for NGOs in nearly all IGOs as these organizations have expanded and taken on new governance tasks. As participation of NGOs has become more commonplace and institutionalized at more IGOs, IGOs have stimulated NGO growth since they have provided activists with incentives to organize and act at the international level. International norms and socialization of the state The second way that political globalization has encouraged the rise of NGOs is through socialization processes that have put top-down normative pressure on states to adopt more supportive domestic policies toward NGOs. An ideational corollary to the growing international opportunities available to NGOs described above was the emergence in the 1980s and 1990s of several international norms that called for the participation and support of civil society at all levels of politics. Norms promoted at the international level such as participatory development, good governance and democratization called on all states – if they did not do so already – to

Introduction 23 open their doors to civil society and provide a political environment more conducive to the participation and flourishing of NGOs. As these norms were institutionalized in IGO meetings and programs, states came under pressure to adopt them. This led in many countries to openings of domestic political opportunity structures, which in turn allowed for greater NGO activities and NGO growth. This component of the activism from above model draws on theories of norm diffusion and socialization found in the international relations literature. Defined as “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 54), norms are a source of both policy change and state identity that are international in origin. In recent years there has been a burst of theorizing on socialization processes and the micro-level processes and mechanisms through which norms diffuse among states. (Checkel 1997 and 2005; Johnston 2001 and 2005; Zurn and Checkel 2005; Cortell and Davis 2000; Risse and Sikkink 1999) The socialization process starts when a state adopts a new norm and can lead to deeper levels of internalization over time as the state institutionalizes the norm domestically and comes to see adherence to the norm as a “normal” state of affairs. Throughout the socialization process, IGOs and other international actors often play key roles as norm promoters, monitors, teachers and critics. A great deal of scholarly attention has been given to the norm adoption phase and the question of how and why states initially decide to accept a new norm. Scholars have identified both rationalist/materialist and constructivist/social reasons why states adopt new norms, with many of them now using an eclectic approach that combines both types of factor. (Johnston 2005; Zurn and Checkel 2005; Herrmann and Shannon 2001; Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003; Schimmelfennig 2003 and 2005; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Axelrod 1986) In many cases in international politics, there are clear material or rationalist reasons for states to adopt a norm-conforming policy. When a state decides to adopt a new norm, for example, it may be responding to material incentives such as obtaining international rewards (e.g. a state adopts international human rights laws to gain membership to the European Union and better aid packages) or avoiding threatened punishments (e.g. a state implements human rights laws to prevent a threatened withdrawal of external economic or military aid). (Schimmelfennig 2005; Kelley 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998) In other cases, the reason for norm adoption may be materialist in a coercive sense: norms are imposed from above by a powerful hegemon, such as an imperial ruler who forces new policies on to a colonial state. (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Axelrod 1986) Finally, state leaders may be motivated to adopt new norms due to anticipated gains or losses in domestic politics, such as those related to elections, bureaucratic politics or public support. States and decision-makers, however, do not always adopt norms for purely rationalist/materialist reasons and there are also often social or constructivist reasons motivating their decisions and actions. Instead of a logic of consequences, states may be following a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998) and are adopting a norm in order to be an accepted member of an international community. In such cases, incentives are social and not material in nature and states, by

24 Introduction adopting a norm, do so primarily to secure their image and standing in the international arena. The constructivist socialization literature identifies three social processes through which states come to adopt international norms: (1) persuasion or learning; (2) role playing; and (3) social influence. (Checkel 2005; Zurn and Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001) Persuasion involves a process in which an actor is non-coercively persuaded or learns to adopt a new norm, and involves the active participation of a norm promoter and a norm adopter. (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001) Role playing is a behavioral strategy in which actors adopt a socially defined role or behavior in order to cope with uncertainty when it is not clear what the best course of action is. (Checkel 2005) Mimicking, for example, is a type of role playing in which an actor initially copies the behavioral norms of a group in order to survive and stay in that group by following its most basic rules. (Johnston 2005: 1021–1022) Finally, social influence refers to rewards and punishments that encourage norm-conforming behavior through their social effects. Social rewards for norm conformity include status or prestige, a sense of belonging to a group, positive self-esteem and legitimacy. (Johnston 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Claude 1966) Social punishments, on the other hand, include shaming, exclusion from a group, loss of status and a feeling of discomfort that one’s actions do not match one’s role or identity. (Johnston 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Axelrod 1986: 1105–1106) In all of these three processes, actors behave in response to their social environment rather than material or power concerns. This book adopts the eclectic position that states adopt new norms for both material and social reasons, and that in many cases a combination of both types of incentive and a variety of social processes are at work. States often have material or strategic domestic politics concerns in mind when they adopt new norms, but they also nonetheless may want to reap international social rewards such as prestige and legitimacy. Similarly, a combination of social processes may be taking place that lead to norm adoption. State leaders, for example, may be persuaded by IGOs and other norm promoters about the validity of a norm in one arena, but also use norm adoption to gain social benefits such as prestige, a feeling of legitimacy and conformation of a particular identity in international society. States that initially adopt a norm conforming policy as a coping strategy to stay in the game or be part of a grouping (role playing) may later come to value the policy for the social rewards it provides and value the norm for those reasons. (Johnston 2005) Norms and socialization of states are important parts of the story of the convergence pattern of rising NGOs in many parts of the world in the 1980s and 1990s. As mentioned above, during this period IGOs and other international actors began promoting pro-NGO norms such as participatory development, good governance and “bottom-up” democratization. While these norms applied to all states in theory, in practice they often singled out states that failed to live up to these norms, i.e. laggard states with relatively closed political systems and restrictive state policies. According to the pro-NGO norm, to be a respectable democratic nation in the global community, states were now expected to adopt more open and liberal policies toward NGOs, and laggard states were potentially seen as illiberal or

Introduction 25 undemocratic. Although the diffusion of pro-NGO norms was not always completely successful, socialization processes in many states in the 1980s and 1990s often brought about an opening of political space for NGOs which in turn contributed to the growth of NGOs in parts of the world which previously had few. With its focus on industrialized OECD member countries, this book examines how these socialization processes and the promotion of the pro-NGO norm provided domestic openings for NGOs in laggard NGO countries, such as Japan. Japan’s changing policies toward NGOs in the late 1980s and 1990s are a good example of norm change promoted from above that led to rising numbers of NGOs as the domestic political opportunity structure improved. Before the late 1980s, state–NGO relations in Japan were practically nonexistent and Japan lagged far behind many OECD member countries in its level of official cooperation with and support of NGOs. During the 1990s, however, new funding programs for NGO projects were set up in Japan, and Japanese NGOs were given greater access to policy-makers through official dialogues, appointments on advisory councils and inclusion as members of official Japanese delegations to UN conferences. These expanding domestic political opportunities for NGOs in Japan were a source of the NGO boom of the 1990s. To understand why these changes took place, however, international norms and socialization arguments are crucial. With the rise of new pro-NGO norms, Japan found itself labeled as an NGO laggard and several of the socialization processes and mechanisms outlined above – e.g. rationalist incentives, persuasion, social influence and role playing – led Japan to adopt these policy changes. Through various socialization processes, the global promotion of NGOs made its way to Japan. Transnational diffusion of ideas among activists International socialization processes and the spread of new ideas have not only affected the state and state actors but have influenced and transformed societal actors. As international political opportunities have expanded, and as activists from various countries have started to get international funding and show up at UN conferences, societal actors have also started to adopt new identities and norms in the form of new social practices, new organizational forms and new movements themselves. Borrowing from the concept of transnational diffusion in the social movement literature, my last activism from above argument is that political globalization has strongly affected the growth of NGOs by bringing about the transborder societal spread of ideas. As international conferences increased in number in the 1990s and as Western funders began supporting the growth of NGOs in other parts of the world, diffusion of ideas among activists in different countries became an important source of the spread, training and support of new NGOs. This has been particularly the case for advocacy NGOs, which have tended to participate at UN conferences more than service NGOs. This argument builds on social movement theory that has recently examined the role of the transnational diffusion of ideas and movements in stimulating activism internationally. (Tarrow 1998 and 2005; Tarrow and McAdam 2005; della Porta

26 Introduction and Kriesi 1999; Snow and Benford 1999; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1995; McAdam and Rucht 1993) The standard transnational diffusion model is one in which social activists in one country (adopters) emulate or adopt ideas, practices, behavior or organizational forms from activists in another country (transmitters). Based on diffusion theory, this transborder transferal of ideas can be the result of direct contact between the adopter and the transmitter (relational diffusion), the mediation by a third party that connects the adopter to the transmitter (brokerage), or indirect transfers of information through the mass media or non-relational channels (non-relational diffusion). (Tarrow 2005; Tarrow and McAdam 2005; della Porta and Kriesi 1999; Snow and Benford 1999; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam and Rucht 1993) Objects of diffusion can include organizational forms, and for the purposes of this book I focus on the diffusion of ideas that support the creation of NGOs – e.g. advice on how to set up an NGO, ideas of what an NGO is, models of NGO activism and campaigning, and so forth. Political globalization has led to higher levels of transnational societal diffusion of ideas and the spread of the NGO model of activism, which in turn has led to the formation of larger numbers of NGOs by activists globally. This has come about in at least two ways. First, with the expansion of global structures of governance – more IGO bodies to lobby, more UN conferences to attend, more aid programs sending Western NGOs to developing countries, etc. – activists from all parts of the world have more opportunities to meet one another and exchange ideas at international venues. In addition to leading to the formation of new transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), these interactions have led to the transferal of ideas of how to organize activism and set up an NGO. A second way in which globalization processes have encouraged transnational diffusion of ideas is through the new funding mechanisms provided by IGOs and international donors. Donors, IGOs and their Western NGO partners have not only funded NGOs in many countries but often have had a very hands-on approach in teaching activists what an NGO is and encouraging the transnational spread of ideas. Since the 1980s, these international actors have sponsored countless workshops, seminars, training sessions, studies, publications and exchanges that have brought together donors, activists and others to exchange ideas on how to strengthen the NGO sector in many countries. These types of transnational diffusion of ideas have also been important external sources of the spread of NGOs globally. To summarize, the international component of the activism from above model presented in this book argues that to understand the general NGO boom of the 1980s and 1990s, one must look at how international political structures and opportunities changed in this period in ways that offered external resources to activists and put pressure on states to open up their domestic POS for NGOs. Figure 1.3 lays out the overlapping international and transnational processes that comprise this portion of the model and show how they relate to one another. Although the model is largely a structural one that emphasizes the importance of political structures in defining outcomes, it nonetheless also includes a role for agency by including socialization and diffusion since the outcomes of both of these processes rely on the actions taken by state and society.

Introduction 27

International Political Opportunities International Norms Ideas

Societal Actors: • Strategic use of international opportunities • Transfer of ideas, models of organization

States and Socialization: • Promotion of a pro-NGO norm

State reaction, change of policy, opening of domestic POS

New state – society interactions

New structures, greater activism, more NGOs

Change in number and activeness of international NGOs

Figure 1.3 Activism from above and NGO growth: international dimensions

Outline of the book Using this activism from above model as a basic framework, the rest of this book explores how political factors have shaped the emergence and rise of NGOs in OECD member countries and in Japan in particular. The book is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes each component of the activism from above model in greater detail and provides empirical evidence to support its arguments and claims. Chapter Two tackles the puzzle of divergence across OECD countries and explores in greater detail the domestic component of the activism from above model: state policies and state institutional structures. Variation among countries along these dimensions is presented and analyzed, focusing primarily on Japan and the United States but also including many examples from Europe and Canada. Chapter Three then examines the question of convergence patterns and shifts focus to the international level of analysis. It provides a detailed overview of changes in international political structures and politics in the 1980s and 1990s and how they provided a bonanza of new opportunities for NGOs. This chapter also documents the rise of a pro-NGO norm in the same period and how IGOs and the international donor community have heavily promoted this norm. The second part of the book turns to the case of Japan and uses the activism from above model to explore and explain interesting patterns of delayed NGO

28 Introduction emergence and growth in Japan. Chapter Four focuses on international development NGOs and examines how changing domestic political opportunities were behind the sudden growth of this type of service NGO in the late 1980s and 1990s. This chapter highlights the relevance of norm diffusion and socialization for explaining policy change, and traces how the international pro-NGO norm was adopted in Japan during this period. Chapter Five examines the growth of advocacy NGOs in Japan working in the area of global environmental issues, such as sustainable development and global warming. In addition to the socialization argument, this chapter reveals the importance of international political opportunities and diffusion of ideas in both the rise and the continued support of advocacy NGOs working in this area. Without the inspiration and help they received from outside Japan, it is unlikely many of these groups would have formed and lasted as long as they have. A final chapter brings together the findings of the book and relates them to the wider literature on NGOs and the literature on Japanese politics.

2

States and the domestic political economy of NGOs

Why do some countries have far more NGOs than others? Although NGOs first appeared in the West, the postwar emergence of NGOs has not been uniform. As the last chapter showed, Japan has tended to lag behind not only in terms of the number but in membership levels, budget size and overall capacity of its NGOs. This chapter examines the pattern of divergence and the political conditions under which NGOs first formed and grew in the democratic industrialized world, using the case of Japan in the comparative context. Among the OECD member countries, the United States and Japan represent the two extremes of NGO institutional strength and development. In the area of international development, for example, by the mid-1990s, there were hundreds of American service NGOs active in the area of international development with combined budgets worth billions of dollars, and several of them with enormous budgets of $100 million or more, such as CARE ($460 million), World Vision ($310 million), Catholic Relief Services ($266 million) and Save the Children ($109 million). (OECD 1998) Compared with this, Japanese NGOs were tiny: the total combined income of Japanese NGOs working in the area of international development in the mid-1990s was just $175 million (JANIC 1996) and no Japanese NGO had a budget that came even close to $100 million. Among advocacy groups as well, one finds considerable variation in levels of NGO activism across industrialized countries. In the area of global environmental issues, membership in advocacy NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth varies considerably. In the case of Greenpeace, by the mid-1990s membership exceeded 100,000 in Germany (520,000 members), the Netherlands (618,000), the United Kingdom (215,000) and the United States (350,000). (Doherty 2002: 124) In contrast, Greenpeace had much smaller memberships of 40,000 in Italy, 35,000 in France, and 5,000 in Japan. (Dente and Lewanksi 2002: 279; Szarka 2002: 42; Schreurs 2002: 211) To understand these patterns, this chapter employs a domestic political model for the rise and growth of NGOs in Western industrialized countries and argues that NGOs are products of particular kinds of democracies. In the course of the twentieth century, democracy and state–society relations have evolved in different ways across countries, leading to variations in political institutions and policies that have either encouraged or hindered the rise of NGOs. In the field of

30 States and the domestic political economy comparative political economy, scholars have created a typology of advanced industrialized countries based on the configuration of political institutions and major social and economic interest groups: liberal states, social democratic states, corporatist states and statist states. (Hall and Soskice 2001; Risse-Kappen 1995; Esping-Anderson 1990; Katzenstein 1978) In addition to varieties of capitalism and social policy, in recent years this typology has been used to compare the nonprofit sector and different types of citizen activism found in the West. (Salamon and Anheier 1998 and 2006; Janoski 1998) Focusing on NGOs, this chapter adopts a similar broad framework for understanding how these four different types of democratic state have influenced the development of NGOs among the advanced industrialized nations. As laid out in Chapter One, there are three specific ways through which domestic policies and political structures shape activism: (1) legal and fiscal policies regulating the nonprofit sector; (2) state support in the form of grants and subsidies; and (3) institutional access in various stages of the policy-making process. Different types of state follow different patterns in these three areas of policy and institutional structure, which in turn lead to different levels and characteristics of NGOs. At one extreme, liberal states such as the United States have policies and institutions in all three areas that are quite supportive of NGO formation, and they have produced interest-group types of activism that reflect American-style liberal pluralism. In continental Europe, social democratic and corporatist states such as the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and Germany have been more mixed than the United States in their types of support for NGOs with policies/institutions more liberal in some of the above three areas than in others. Overall, these states have provided strong support for NGO formation and growth, but in ways that have made NGOs more dependent on and intertwined with the state than NGOs in the United States. Finally, at the other extreme, policies and institutions of states such as Japan, Italy and France are the least NGO-friendly and represent a statist approach to activism that has not been conducive to NGO formation. Using this three-dimensional domestic political model and typology, this chapter examines each domestic political factor to analyze systematically why Japanese NGOs have historically lagged behind their Western counterparts. After presenting a general overview of each factor and how it affects NGO formation, I examine how organizers of NGO in different countries have been affected by these structural conditions, focusing largely on the two extremes of Japan and the United States. Reference and comparisons are also made to Canada and European states to illustrate how other OECD member countries conform to the model.

Regulating the NGO sector: the legal and fiscal policy context The first area of state policy that has had an enormous impact on the ability of activists to organize and form an NGO is the legal and fiscal regulatory framework of the nonprofit sector. How easy is it formally to set up an NGO that has legal standing? Do NGOs receive tax benefits that help activists mobilize material

States and the domestic political economy 31 resources? Is it easy for wealthy citizens or corporations to set up a foundation and have fiscal policies encouraged philanthropy and support of NGOs? All of these factors affect the ability of activists to set up an NGO; and choices made by states about how to regulate the nonprofit sector directly influence the size, scale and membership levels of the NGOs. (Salamon and Toepler 2000) Legal and fiscal regulations shaping the NGO sector States shape NGO emergence through the legal codes and regulations governing the establishment and operation of a nonprofit or charity organization. The first basic difference in regulation relates to the two separate legal traditions of common law and civil law. (Pekkanen 2006; Hodson 2000) Common or Anglo law traditions are evolutionary and normative in nature and treat NGOs and other nonprofit organizations as spontaneous phenomena that do not require government approval Table 2.1 Legal and fiscal regulations on nonprofit and charitable organizations in selected OECD countries Country

Incorporation process and regulation

Fiscal benefits

Canada

Legal incorporation of non-profit associations is regulated through the Canada Corporations Act. Laws vary across states within Canada, but most require groups to file an application with the ministry in charge. Incorporation is usually granted as a matter of right. Voluntary organizations may also apply for charitable status with the Department of Revenue.

Tax exemption: Charities are exempt from all tax on income regardless of source. Tax deductions on contributions: Tax deductions for both individuals and corporations. Since 1988, individuals get tax credits.

Since 2004: a new Not-for-Profit Corporation Act has been crafted that replaces the current Canada Corporations Act, streamlines the incorporation process and sets up more rigorous accountability measures. As of early 2009, it was still not yet passed into law. France

Easy to get legal status as a nonprofit association but there is no incorporation and therefore no clear legal or fiscal benefits. To get such benefits, groups must apply for special status as a public interest association. This is a lengthy process that requires voluminous documentation and subjects groups to greater government supervision. Groups must get official authorization or form an agreement with the government, are subject to state audits, and the president of the association may be appointed by a minister.

Tax exemptions: Nonprofit associations and public interest associations are exempt from income taxes. Exceptions: income from land and capital assets (24%), income from French obligations (10%). Tax deductions on contributions: Since the 1980s, tax deductions are available for contributions to public interest associations, but not to nonprofit associations. (continued)

32 States and the domestic political economy Table 2.1 Continued Country

Incorporation process and regulation

Fiscal benefits

France (cont.)

However, until recently, the deduction amount was quite small. Since 2002, private donations can be deducted from income tax to an amount of 60% of the donated amount, with maximum of 10% of taxable earnings. Corporate donations have similar deductions, but with a maximum of 5% of turnover.

Germany Incorporation laws for nonprofits vary by Länder, but most involve a simple registration process. The state reserves the right to check applications, but the process is generally viewed as easy.

Tax exemptions: Tax exemption on income is generally granted to groups that pursue public benefit activities broadly defined. Exempt on business activities related to nonprofit work. Exception: income from commercial activity that exceeds €30,678 a year.

Since the early 2000s, there has been an ongoing debate about revising laws governing the public benefit associations.

Italy

Japan

The registration process for charitable voluntary organizations is an approval system and acceptance is at the discretion of relevant authorities. Voluntary organizations must meet six conditions and sign on to a register in a region or autonomous province. Registering authorities monitor voluntary organizations and have the power to delete organizations from the register. Groups working in international development apply and register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Before 1998, acquiring legal status as a public interest corporation (PIC) involved a lengthy approval procedure. Groups must apply to one or more ministries depending on the scope of their activities. Groups must show they have a financially sound basis, usually

Tax deductions on contributions: Tax deductions from pretax income available to individuals and corporations (up to 5% of total income). Tax exemptions: No automatic tax exemption given to nonprofits but approved voluntary organizations are tax exempt if income is used for achieving their goals. Exceptions: income from real estate and capital assets. Tax deductions for contributions: Tax deductions for charitable contributions started in 1986 and since 1991 more broader deductions for voluntary organizations have been allowed. It is questionable, however, the degree to which these new rules have been implemented. Compared with other countries, the deductible amounts are also smaller. Tax exemptions: Before 1998, only PICs were exempt from income tax. Depending on the type of organization, various reductions on business activities were allowed. Income on capital assets were subject to taxation if linked with profit-oriented activities. After 1998, SNCs were not given tax

States and the domestic political economy 33 Table 2.1 Continued Country

Incorporation process and regulation Fiscal benefits

Japan (cont.)

3 million yen. Ministries monitor public interest corporations and have the power to revoke their legal status.

exemption on income. Since 2008, similar rules have applied to the new categories of general incorporated association and foundation.

In 1998, the NPO Law created a new legal category of specified nonprofit activities corporation (SNC). The registration procedure is a simple one and is done at the prefectural level or with the Cabinet Office if the group has offices in more than one prefecture.

Tax deductions for contributions: Before 1998, only PICs with special status could offer tax deductions to donors. Tax deductions favored corporations over individual donors. In 2001–2003, new laws were passed that created a special status for SNCs to get similar tax deductions. Very few SNCs, however, have been granted this special status. Since 2008, to get special tax benefits, nonprofit groups must become a public interest incorporated association.

In 2006, three new laws passed reforming the entire system. Under the new system, registration is simplified: ministry authorization is no longer needed for incorporation of a nonprofit organization and all groups register with either the Cabinet Office or the prefectural government. The old system of PIC is being phased out and replaced by the categories of general incorporated association and foundation. Groups wishing to get preferential tax treatment must apply with the Public Interest Corporation Commission to be given status as either a public interest incorporated association or foundation. Netherlands Execution of a notarial deed is the only requirement to establish an association and acquire legal status. Groups can register as charitable organizations.

Tax exemptions: Associations are not subject to income tax unless they are engaged in economic activities and generate a profit. Tax exemptions on such profits are permitted if they are used for public interest purposes. Tax deductions on contributions: Tax deductions are available to both individuals and companies for contributions to registered charitable organizations. For individuals, periodic donations are fully deductible, as are donations of 1–10% of taxable earnings. Corporate donations are deductible to a maximum of 6% of taxable income. (continued)

34 States and the domestic political economy Table 2.1 Continued Country

Incorporation process and regulation

Fiscal benefit

Sweden

No official registration is necessary for nonprofit associations. Charitable organizations are registered with the Post Office and submit annual audited accounts to the Foundation for Fundraising Control.

Tax exemption: In general, nonprofits are subject to taxation. Organizations serving a public interest goal are exempt from income tax if they use at least 80% of income for such goals. Tax deductions on contributions: In general, contributions are not tax deductible for either individuals or corporations. Corporate contributions are deductible as business expenses only.

Switzerland There is no federal regulation of NGOs. Groups incorporate at the canton level and regulations vary.

Tax exemptions and tax deductions on contributions: Vary by canton. Depending on the canton, donations are tax deductible.

United Kingdom

Tax exemptions: Charities are exempt from taxes on rents from land and property, interest, dividends and grants from other charities as long as income goes to charity activities. Commercial profits are tax free as long as proceeds go to charity causes.

United States

Charities are regulated by a series of parliamentary acts that place them under the supervision of the Charities Commission. Charities register with the Commission through a simple application process. In 2004, creation of a new legal business entity called the Community Interest Corporation for Socially Oriented Enterprises. In 2006: a new Charities Act is passed amending the previous act of 1993. This Act defines charity, provides measures for greater accountability, makes it easier for small charities to register and set up a new appeals body. Groups incorporate at the state level as nonprofit organizations and then can apply for tax-exempt status by registering with the Internal Revenue Service under section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code. Approval for nonprofit status is usually pro-forma. Tax-exempt status is also generally easy to obtain.

Tax deductions on contributions: There are specific types of contributions that are tax deductible for individuals and corporations: deed of covenant, single donations, payroll deduction schemes, and relief from inheritance and capital gains tax. Tax exemptions: Most nonprofits are exempt from federal and state taxes for activity-related income. Commercial activities can be taxed. Tax deductions on contributions: Tax deductions are permitted for both individuals and corporations. Depending on the type of nonprofit, limits of between 20 and 50% of adjusted gross yearly income apply.

Sources: Bater 2005; Dehne, Friedrich, Nam and Parsche 2008; Heineken and Pekkanen 2004; Kelly 2005; Ohta 2006; Salamon 1997; Satoh and Inouchi 1999; Smillie and Helmich 1993b and 1999.

States and the domestic political economy 35 or a particular legal form. Under this legal approach, laws and regulations for the nonprofit sector emerge to codify and regulate – i.e. they are meant to bring order to the sector by defining rights, clarifying law and establishing measures to prevent abuses. (Hodson 2000: 4–5) In contrast, Roman or Napoleonic civil law traditions are prescriptive in nature – i.e. law is used to define what the sector is and the requirements that must be fulfilled to be considered a nonprofit organization. According to civil law tradition, nonprofit organizations legally exist because there is a law that creates or permits them. States using this type of legal approach play a more active role as gatekeepers and usually establish a state system of supervision over nonprofit organizations to ensure that groups retain their proper character. (Anheier 2005: 42; Hodson 2000: 3–5) Of the two traditions, the common law tradition is the more liberal and less intrusive. In general, countries with common law-style regulations governing the nonprofit sector provide a more supportive regulatory environment for the emergence and growth of nonprofits and NGOs. Regulatory patterns among OECD member countries support these generalizations, with legal traditions conforming to state–society typologies. As Table 2.1 (pp. 31–34) illustrates, countries that have the more evolutionary common law approach to regulating the nonprofit sectors also have more active NGO sectors. The liberal-pluralist countries of United Kingdom, the United States and Canada most obviously follow this pattern, but several continental corporatist/social democratic European states that have active NGO sectors, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, have also followed the Anglo evolutionary legal approach toward their nonprofit sectors.1 (Hodson 2000: 6) In contrast, countries that follow the more prescriptive civil law tradition in their regulations of the nonprofit sector, such as France, Italy and Japan, are statist countries which have had less active NGO sectors. In recent years, however, some of the legal differences among countries have started to narrow as more states have adopted or are debating new laws, regulations or policies that both liberalize legal regimes and put in stronger accountability mechanisms for NGOs. In addition to legal codes, fiscal regulations are important policy tools of the state that can be used to support the emergence and growth of the nonprofit sector and NGOs. (Dehne, Friedrich, Nam and Parsche 2008) Countries that offer tax breaks, either to nonprofit organizations on their income or to private donors on their contributions to nonprofits, have chosen to forgo substantial tax revenues in order to promote and foster the growth of the sector. Tax breaks lower barriers to mobilizing resources and provide incentives for citizens to set up or support a nonprofit organization. (Salamon and Toepler 2000) Many wealthy citizens in America, for example, prefer to donate part of their income to support an NGO rather than handing it over to the state in the form of taxes. (Hall 1992) States that have liberal fiscal policies that support the funding of nonprofit organizations through tax incentives, thus, are more likely to have more active NGO sectors since it is easier for activists to mobilize resources. Table 2.1 also lists fiscal policies in various OECD member countries. Overall, countries follow similar patterns associated with legal traditions governing the

36 States and the domestic political economy nonprofit sector and state–society typologies. The more liberal/pluralist Anglo common law countries of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States have the most generous fiscal regulations in terms of tax status and incentives for donors. Corporatist/social democratic European countries that follow common law practices of regulating nonprofits show a mixed pattern, with some providing more (Germany, the Netherlands) and others less (Sweden) in terms of tax breaks and deductions on contributions. Finally, the civil law “statist” countries of France, Italy and Japan have had the least favorable tax treatment for nonprofit organizations and started to loosen or change laws in this area only in the 1980s and 1990s. Of the three countries, Japan has moved the slowest and it is unclear if recent changes will have a big effect on many NGOs. A closer examination of the cases of Japan and the United States illustrates precisely how legal and fiscal regimes shape the NGO sector by making it either easy or difficult to set up and operate an NGO. These two countries are at opposite poles of a continuum of regulatory incentives and restrictions facing NGOs, with the United States adopting laws and regulations that have promoted NGO growth and Japan using regulations in restrictive ways that have discouraged NGO emergence and growth. Through its selection of legal codes and tax policies, each country has nurtured or suppressed activism from above. One reason that Japanese NGOs were such late arrivals on the international scene is the very challenging regulatory and fiscal environment they found themselves in for many years domestically. As Robert Pekkanen’s important work on civil society organizations in Japan has definitively shown, until the passage in 1998 of the Law to Promote Specific Nonprofit Activities (the NPO Law), Japan had one of the most tightly controlled and regulated nonprofit sectors among the industrialized democracies. (Pekkanen 2006) Prior to 1998, the only form of legal incorporation available for groups with nonprofit goals was the public interest corporation (koeki hojin), as either an incorporated association (shadan hojin) or an incorporated foundation (zaidan hojin). As defined by several articles in the Japanese Civil Code of 1896 and the Japanese Constitution – articles that were based on German, French and Italian civil codes – any group wishing to incorporate required the approval of “competent authorities” which then would continue to oversee and supervise the group once it obtained legal status. (Pekkanen 2006; Yamaoka 1999; London 1991: 26, 36) As many Japanese activists and nonprofit scholars have attested, getting approval as a public interest corporation was for many years a very difficult process. (Pekkanen 2000 and 2006; London 1991) Compared with the simple registrationstyle system of incorporation in the United States, the process of incorporation as a public interest corporation in Japan was for decades highly nontransparent, lengthy and tightly controlled by government ministry bureaucrats. Groups applied to the government agency with jurisdiction over the area of activity they seeked to participate in and each ministry had its own, often unclear, criteria and approval process. According to the Civil Code, groups were required to be of “sound financial basis” and most ministries required an annual budget of at least 3 million yen ($300,000) for associations and an endowment of at least 300 million yen

States and the domestic political economy 37 ($3 million) for foundations. (Pekkanen 2000) The approval process itself was often very lengthy and usually involved making inside connections with bureaucrats, drawn-out behind-the-scenes negotiations, and including government officials as board members or executive officers. (London 1991). The application process could take up to three years, and for NGOs in particular (which typically work in several areas and were thus required to get approval from several ministries) this process could take much longer. Some NGOs in Japan have waited up to ten years to get approval (Foundation officer interview, March 1997) and Amnesty International’s Japan section waited seven years before finally gaining approval. (Asahi News, September 27, 2000)2 This tough regulatory climate prior to 1998 had a dampening effect on the emergence and growth of an active NGO sector in Japan. For most of the postwar period, small groups with annual budgets below 3 million yen were not given a chance to incorporate, and this, in turn, limited their ability to grow since without legal status they lacked the public recognition and the access to fundraising tools available to groups in many other countries. Some Japanese groups consciously chose to remain informal associations, due to the challenges involved in the incorporation process and concerns about their autonomy if they incorporated.3 JVC, one of the older and more well-known development NGOs, for example, decided to incorporate as a legal entity in Thailand but not in Japan due to the bureaucratic hassles in Tokyo and its founders’ desire for autonomy from government interference. (NGO interview, August 1998) As a result, as recently as the late 1990s, approximately 90 percent of the service and advocacy NGOs listed in the JANIC directory of NGOs were informal groups with no legal status. (JANIC 1998 and 2000) As Pekkanen (2000 and 2006) has argued, lack of legal status had serious organizational consequences: groups without legal status were unable to do very basic procedures, such as signing contracts, opening bank accounts, and obtaining a lease for office space. When asked, nearly every NGO official interviewed for this study related a strange story of how his or her group had to come up with creative ways of overcoming such basic barriers to organizing in the early days when they had no formal legal status. (Interviews with NGOs and foundation officials, February 2001, July and August 1998, March 1997) Without legal status, groups were in many ways operating in a gray zone and legally marginalized in ways unimaginable in the United States and most other industrialized countries. Japanese activists also had relatively few fiscal incentives or tools at their disposal to help them mobilize resources for their group’s activities. Since most NGOs in Japan could not easily obtain legal status until the passage of the 1998 NPO Law, until recently few of them were eligible for tax exempt status or tax deductions for contributions. Even for incorporated groups, the tax system has not actively encouraged private philanthropy in Japan. (Pekkanen 2006) Although all public interest corporations are tax-exempt organizations, they must pay taxes on income earned from profit-making activities.4 (Amemiya 1998: 82) In terms of tax deductions for donors, Japanese tax law favors corporate donors and allows only corporations to take deductions on general contributions to public interest corporations. A separate category of “designated contributions” exists which

38 States and the domestic political economy allows tax deductions on contributions for both individuals and corporations. These go to a smaller subset of public interest corporations designated by the Ministry of Finance as “special public interest promoting corporations” (tokutei koeki zoshin hojin). (Pekkanen 2006; Yamamoto and Amenomori 1989) Until the 1980s, however, this special category was restricted to institutions involved in scientific and academic research dedicated to the advance of science and technology. In the mid- to late 1980s, the category was expanded to include other activities, such as scholarships, environmental protection and development assistance (Yamamoto and Amenomori 1989; Amemiya 1998; London 1991), a change which allowed a very small handful of NGOs with legal status to offer tax deductions on contributions to individuals. In general, however, tax laws and the tax system have not been conducive to private philanthropy, making it much more challenging to mobilize resources in Japan than in countries where fiscal incentives have been generous for many years.5 Since 1998 and the passage of the NPO Law, the legal environment has improved considerably for NGOs and it is now relatively simple to set up a legally recognized nonprofit organization with relatively little bureaucratic interference. With the passage of three new laws in 2006 that reform the legal system for public interest corporations, the entire nonprofit sector is now being revamped towards a more Anglo model of simple registration procedures and less control by the ministries. Tax breaks, however, have remained a separate matter, and in this respect Japan remains a relatively tough country for NGO organizing. Although new laws were passed in 2001 and 2003 that set up procedures for groups with nonprofit status under the NPO Law to apply for tax breaks, the requirements were high and very few groups received special tax status. The current law passed in 2006 has established two new categories of groups with special tax privileges, called public interest incorporated associations and foundations. Unlike previous systems, the new system transfers regulatory authority from the ministries to a Public Interest Corporation Commission in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office that will decide whether a group is qualified to receive the “public interest” designation. Only time will tell, however, if these new procedures prove to be an opportunity or a new barrier for activists and whether this new commission is as restrictive as the Ministry of Finance and other ministries were for decades. Until now, the situation for tax breaks has not been encouraging and this has been one of the underlying causes of the poor financial situation of many NGOs in Japan. In sharp contrast to the Japan case, the regulatory environment in the United States has been highly favorable for NGOs for decades. (Walker 1991; Hall 1987; Jencks 1987) Procedures for setting up an NGO in the United States are simple, and establishing legal and tax-exempt status involves an easy two-step registration process in which a group first files for incorporation as a nonprofit organization at the state level and then applies at the federal level for 501(c)(3) status to become a tax-exempt organization. Practically all American NGOs – both service and advocacy – go through these procedures with relative ease, enjoy tax exemption on their revenues and offer their donors tax deductions on contributions. It is hard

States and the domestic political economy 39 to imagine activism in the United States without these basic legal and fiscal arrangements. In fact, historically, the rise of a professionalized nonprofit sector and NGOs in the United States has been closely associated with the evolution of legal and tax codes over the course of the twentieth century. This was especially true in the postwar period with the simultaneous advent of higher taxes and tax breaks for contributions to nonprofit organizations in the context of war. (Hall 1987 and 1992) During both World War Two and the Korean War, tax rates shot up to pay for higher military spending, and both individuals and corporations began to take advantage of the tax incentives of contributing to nonprofits or establishing foundations in order to avoid paying large amounts of tax. (Hall 1987; Andrews 1952) These tax incentives led over time to a culture of nonprofit-oriented philanthropy and has funded an explosion in the number of nonprofit organizations over the past six decades. Compared to their counterparts in Japan, American NGOs were in a resource-rich environment that encouraged their emergence and existence. Regulatory environment for grant-making foundations In addition to directly regulating the nonprofit sector, the state shapes the general environment for philanthropy, which in turn affects the types of resources available to NGOs in a given country. Private foundations are one important source of funding for the nonprofit sector and have become a major source of funding for many NGOs, especially advocacy NGOs. (Reimann 2006) Legal regulations and fiscal policies toward private foundations vary across countries, with the liberalpluralist countries of United States, Canada and the United Kingdom standing out once again as having the most conducive regulatory environment for the creation of grant-making foundations – i.e. easy establishment of legal status, tax exemptions, and generous income tax deductions on contributions. (European Foundation Center 2004; Hall 1992) Although the general patterns of civil law versus common law approach described earlier also apply to foundations (Kiger 2000: 5–19, 146–57), the situation is a little more complicated since the types of foundations found in countries vary considerably. In general, in most industrialized countries, there are more operating foundations than grant-making foundations. (Frost and Frost 1999; Iriyama 1994) The liberal-pluralist countries of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom are the exceptions to this generalization, with their much higher number of grant-making foundations. (OECD 2003: 59) If one considers foundations as a funding source for nonprofits and NGOs, therefore, the overall picture that emerges is the common law countries leading the way historically, and Japan and continental Europe lagging behind but catching up since the 1990s. For most of the postwar period, Japanese private foundations have not been an important funding resource for NGOs. Although foundations have existed in Japan since the beginning of the twentieth century, it is only in very recent years that they have funded NGOs and progressive nonprofit organizations. Historically, dating back to the inter-war and early postwar period, regulations and state policies

40 States and the domestic political economy in Japan focused primarily on promoting foundations and philanthropy related to areas seen as in the national interest, such as scientific research and development. As a result, until the early 1980s, most foundations established in Japan were research foundations started by corporations or with help from a ministry; practically none of them were concerned with social change or international issues. (Frost and Frost 1999; Baron 1997; London 1991; Yamamoto and Amenomori 1989: 6–7; Iwamoto 1984: 124) This was driven in part by state policies that provided tax breaks only in the area of science and research. In the late 1970s and 1980s, however, the allowable categories for tax deductions slowly started to expand to non-science areas, and from this time new types of foundations started to appear. The number of foundations grew rapidly and a fairly large portion of today’s grant-making foundations in Japan were founded in the 1980s and 1990s. Interestingly, it was outside ideas and pressure that helped bring about these policy changes, such as American foundations actively promoting the philanthropic sector in Japan, Japanese firms in the United States learning about corporate philanthropy as they set up subsidiaries there, and rising US–Japan trade friction encouraging Japanese officials to set up special tax relief and donation systems for international philanthropy in the late 1980s. (Yamamoto 1999; London 1991) Due to this relatively late start, Japanese foundations have only recently started to catch up with American foundations in terms of size and funding. (Pekkanen 2006) In 1986, there were only 200 grant-making foundations of significant size in Japan, and the Ford Foundation alone had an endowment three times larger than the combined endowments of the largest 171 Japanese foundations. (Yamamoto and Amenomori 1989: 13–14) Foundations’ assets and grants grew enormously in the early 1990s, although they were still much smaller than those of US foundations – in 1994, the top 20 Japanese foundations made grants worth $245 million, compared to $2.3 billion in grants disbursed by the top 20 American foundations. (Baron 1997: 16) From the mid-1990s and throughout the 2000s, however, although total foundation assets grew, the amount of grants disbursed by Japanese foundations remained level or possibly declined, reflecting Japan’s economic recession and exceedingly low interest rates. According to data put out by the Japan Foundation Center, the top 20 Japanese foundations were making grants worth about $286 million in 2007, not a significant increase over grants disbursed in 1994. (http://www.jfc.or.jp/index.html, accessed 3/11/2009) Other data collected by the Center shows a decline in foundation grant funding since the peak year of 1993 among the 111 foundations that filled out questionnaires. More importantly, however, it was not until the late 1990s and 2000s that foundations started to give grants to Japanese NGOs. Since most NGOs did not have formal legal status until 1998, foundations did not see them as attractive recipients for grants. (Greene 1999) Many foundations were corporate ones that were politically and socially conservative and not interested in funding advocacy NGOs that promoted social justice causes or service NGOs that did work in a foreign country. There have been exceptions – such as the Toyota Foundation – but, in general, despite the growth in the number of Japanese foundations and

States and the domestic political economy 41 funding available in recent years, foundations have not been a major source of funding for either service or advocacy NGOs in Japan. In contrast, it would be hard for many NGOs in the United States to fathom a world without private foundation funding and the billions of dollars that foundations disburse to support many causes, groups and institutions. In terms of grant-making foundations, the United States has the world’s largest and most welldeveloped foundation sector in the world, with America’s 68,000 grant-making private foundations disbursing $33.6 billion in 2005. (http://foundationcenter.org/ gainknowledge/research/nationaltrends.html, accessed 12/12/2007) Unlike Europe and Japan, where corporate foundations form the majority of grant-making private foundations, in America there is a relatively large number of foundations founded by wealthy individuals. (OECD 2003) In contrast to Japan and continental Europe, some of the largest and most influential American private foundations, such as the William and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation, are institutions built on the wealth of America’s super-rich. Once again, the tax system and regulations were key in shaping the development of this vast philanthropic world, and the United States is one of the few industrialized countries that have had a longstanding and generous policy of allowing wealthy individuals to set up a foundation and get tax breaks from it. Historically, an important turning point was the 1930s–1950s, when the federal government, in the context of war, simultaneously introduced new high tax rates on the wealthy and new tax breaks for donations and philanthropic purposes. As studies have shown, higher taxes combined with the new option of tax breaks in this period led to a burst in the formation of foundations as the wealthy used foundations to divert parts of their tax bills. Compared with only 591 foundations in existence before 1940, between that year and 1959 about 5,400 foundations were set up. (Boris 1987; Hall 1987; Odendahl 1987) Included in this initial burst are many of the large family foundations that are currently active in international giving and supporting NGOs.6 This was the beginning of a now standard practice for very rich individuals and families in the United States to set up private foundations, leading to new generations of foundations in later decades and an increasing amount of wealth channeled into philanthropy and private activism. In the United States, private foundations have been an important source of funding for NGOs and they have played a particularly important role in supporting the activities of American advocacy NGOs, as well as advocacy groups and networks in other parts of the world (see Chapter Three). After being important financial supporters of advocacy groups in national social movements starting in the 1960s (Jenkins 1987 and 1998; Walker 1991), private foundations started funding NGOs working on global issues such as human rights and the environment in the 1970s and 1980s. (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bosso 1995; Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap 1992) Today, US foundations remain important funding sources for many advocacy NGOs, especially research-oriented advocacy NGOs without large membership bases that rely heavily on foundation funding. Given the huge amount of funding they supply to both service and advocacy NGOs, it is hard to imagine America’s highly developed and professionalized NGO world without the

42 States and the domestic political economy existence of private foundations. This is a good example of how state policies in the United States have actively encouraged philanthropy, which in turn has promoted activism and the rise of NGOs.

State funding of the NGO sector In addition to legal institutions and fiscal incentives, the other state policy that has greatly affected the growth of NGOs has been direct and indirect funding support by the state through subsidies, grants, special mail rates, church taxes and lotteries. Although civil society and NGOs are sometimes portrayed as self-organized and self-supported citizen activism, many groups have relied on material support from the state. In recent decades, the amount of official aid available to NGOs has skyrocketed and created a multi-billion-dollar aid industry. As international development scholars have argued, the large increase in official aid channeled through NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s is one of the reasons for the enormous growth in the number and the size of NGOs. (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Dichter 1999; Edwards and Hulme 1996) By materially supporting NGOs, states are important patrons aiding their emergence and growth from above. However, not all states are generous patrons, and variation in programs across countries and across time provide another layer of explanation for why some OECD countries have larger and more active NGO sectors than others. Considering the fact that aid can substantially increase the available resources for NGOs, the relationship between state funding and NGO levels is fairly straightforward: states which provide larger amounts of aid to NGOs are more likely to have larger NGO sectors compared with states that do not provide much support to NGOs. State policy in the area of funding is one of the important factors supporting the rise and growth of NGOs; without it, one substantial source of material support is not available. Table 2.2 lists the amount of foreign aid channeled through NGOs between 1980 and 2005. The data shows interesting patterns that reinforce patterns found in the policy area of NGO legal and fiscal regulations and reveal a consistency in policies toward NGOs. In general, the states that have more open legal and fiscal regulations governing the nonprofit sector – liberal states, corporatist states, and social democratic states such as the United States, Canada, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – have most actively supported NGOs through grants, subsidies and other forms of material contributions. In contrast, the statist states of France, Italy and Japan, which for many years had the most restrictive regulatory systems for nonprofit organizations, have tended to have the smallest NGO support programs. Among the OECD countries, Japan has historically had one of the smallest NGO support programs, and until the 1990s only extremely small amounts of Japanese foreign aid were provided through NGOs. Based on separate statistics found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) annual reports on official development assistance, the figures for Japan in Table 2.2 appear to be highly inflated and exaggerate the amount disbursed through NGOs.7 Most of the current official NGO support programs in Japan were set up in 1989 and the early 1990s,

States and the domestic political economy 43 Table 2.2 Official sector support to NGOs in selected OECD countries, 1980–2005 Country

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001

2005

% of total aid in 2003–4

Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK US

60 4 198 2 27 88 49 20 4 605

129 43 163 39 41 69 33 41 13.2 803

226 26 185 n.a. 72 183 223 138* 12 n.a.

307* 24 709 11* 266 298 112 154* 66 1442

168 27 n.a. 84 179 310 85 32 189 n.a.

31 40 n.a. 53 129 674 134 47 394 n.a.

7.8 0.4 6.9 2.4 2.6 15.4 13.9 9.6 9.7 n.a.

Sources: Excel Chart, Reporting Systems Division, Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD and DAC 2006 and 2008. Note Figures are official sector support to NGOs as reported by member country to the OECD in millions of US dollars. Figures with an asterisk also include official development assistance channeled through NGOs.

and until then there was no publicly open system for NGOs to apply for grants or funding. Prior to the 1990s, a handful of NGOs with legal status as public interest corporations received a small amount of aid, which amounted to only several million dollars in total.8 Although funding has increased enormously since the 1990s with the appearance of several new NGO support programs, Japan remains one of the stingiest governments when it comes to funding NGOs. According to both the 1999 and 2004 OECD Development Assistance Committee official peer reviews of Japan’s official development assistance, official aid channeled through NGOs was 1 percent or less of total aid for the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s.9 (DAC 1999 and 2004) Although it may not be the cause of Japan’s low level of NGOs per se, this relative lack of government support does go some way to explaining why Japanese NGOs have lagged so far behind NGOs from countries where state funding of and collaboration with NGOs have been standard practice for decades. In sharp contrast to the longstanding close levels of state–NGO cooperation that exist in many non-statist countries (see below), for most of the postwar period Japan’s foreign aid and foreign policy-makers worked mainly with Japanese private industry and business and did little to promote volunteerism or private citizenlevel efforts at international cooperation. In this sense, the creation of NGO support programs in 1989 and the 1990s mark a real shift in thinking toward NGOs; and, as later chapters in this book will show, the more recent boom in the number of Japanese NGOs has been in part supported by these policy changes. As was the case in other countries, increasing state support has been part of the story of NGO growth in Japan in recent years.

44 States and the domestic political economy Similar patterns to Japan’s can be found in the other statist countries of France and Italy, where NGO programs have also been relatively modest. Although the figures in Table 2.2 understate the full amount of French foreign aid channeled through NGOs,10 France nonetheless has a comparatively underdeveloped NGO support program and, together with Japan, provides the lowest levels of support to NGOs among the OECD member countries. (Cumming 2008; Cohen 2004) It was only in the 1990s and 2000s that the French government started to view NGOs as “partners” and more proactively include NGOs in foreign aid programs. (Cumming 2008; Cohen 2004; Newman 2002) The one area in which the French state has provided substantial amounts of aid to NGOs is humanitarian relief, precisely the area where state–NGO relations are closer and NGOs have grown to become large, professionalized operations. (Randel and German 1999a: 108) Italy’s NGO support program has also been quite small since it started in the 1970s. In the 1990s, due to financial and political crises, NGO support programs were cut significantly and led to funding crises for many Italian development NGOs. (Randel and German 1999a; DAC 1996a) Relations between NGOs and the state in Italy have also been strained due to difficulties in getting approval for registration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inordinate amounts of paperwork to get funds, frequent failure of the government to deliver the funding, and the year-to-year unpredictability of the size of the Italian foreign aid budget. (Gay and Schiavoni 1999; DAC 1996a; Foch 1993) Although the Italian government has made commitments to support NGOs in the 1990s and 2000s, they have not always been able to follow through. In sharp contrast to the three statist countries of Japan, France and Italy, other advanced industrialized countries have had longer, closer and more symbiotic relationships with NGOs. The United States first started supporting and collaborating with NGOs during the major world wars of the twentieth century, before the advent of modern-day foreign aid programs.11 (Smith 1990; Curti 1963) Right after World War Two, state–NGO cooperation continued in the form of NGO contributions to war reconstruction efforts in Europe, the distribution of food aid, and relief aid during the Korean War. (Smith 1990; Curti 1963; Hoskins 1960) With the creation of new foreign aid programs in the context of the Cold War, NGOs were one of several players that became the private partners, expert advisors and subcontactors for US foreign aid. The evolution and growth of NGOs in the United States, especially among development and relief NGOs, must be understood in the context of this background of state support and collaboration. Over time, levels of state funding have increased both absolutely and as a proportion of total foreign aid, with, for example, the share of the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) budget channeled through NGOs increasing from 1.5 percent in 1972 to 13 percent in 1981 to more than 15 percent in the 1990s and 2000s. (Bolling 1984) US foreign aid has become a multi-billion-dollar funding source for American NGOs, and an estimated $5.1 billion of aid was disbursed through these NGOs in 2004. (USAID 2006: 5, 127) Clearly, American NGOs operating in this sort of political and resource-rich context have had far more opportunities to emerge, grow and scale-up than NGOs in the statist countries of Japan, France and Italy.

States and the domestic political economy 45 State policies in other liberal-pluralist countries and in the social democratic and corporatist countries have also been quite generous toward NGOs. If anything, the Canadian and European NGOs have been even more reliant on state funding than their American counterparts. (Smillie and Helmich 1993b and 1999; Lundstrom and Wijkström 1997; Steen 1996) NGO support and funding programs in these countries appeared in the 1950s and 1960s, usually in the context of establishing foreign aid programs, which was one of the requirements for joining the OECD. Thereafter, the NGO support portion of foreign aid grew considerably in the 1980s and 1990s, rising to 11 percent of Canada’s total foreign assistance, 9 percent of Germany’s foreign assistance, 11 percent of Dutch foreign assistance, 11 percent of Swiss foreign assistance and 10–25 percent of Nordic country foreign assistance.12 (Smillie and Helmich 1999) Together with the United States, these countries have the most sophisticated and diverse programs for NGOs, and NGOs have gained virtual statutory status as recipients of government aid. (Smillie and Helmich 1993b and 1999) The statistics in Table 2.2 do not always provide the full figures for the total amount of aid channeled through NGOs, which by the 1990s and 2000s had reached several billion dollars. Given the large amounts of state funding flowing to NGOs, it is an important variable in the emergence and rise of NGOs. In the comparative context, the implications are clear and go back to the starting premise of this section: countries with more generous official NGO funding programs are more likely to have larger and more active NGO sectors. The statist countries of Japan, France and Italy have lagged behind the rest in terms of the size, depth and activeness of their NGO sectors because of the relatively lower levels and the lateness of state support. This fact is clearly seen when one examines some of the “mega” NGOs found in non-statist countries – i.e. NGOs with enormous budgets, staff and capacity on the ground. Such giant NGOs are found mainly in countries that have provided large amounts of state funding to a small circle of established NGOs, a common practice among states with large NGO funding programs. For example, the average income of the top ten American NGOs in 1995–1996 was $180 million. (InterAction 1997) Half of these groups received more than 50 percent of their funds from the United States government, with some, such as Catholic Relief Services and the Academy for Educational Development, receiving more than 70 percent. (InterAction 1997; Reimann 2001b: 110–111) In Europe, several states provide substantial amounts of NGO aid through large block grants to selected NGOs and umbrella groups, which has also encouraged the rise of mega NGOs. In Switzerland, approximately 67 percent of all state funding for NGOs in the 1990s was distributed to just seven NGOs which quickly became giants in the field of development and relief. (de Goys 1993: 268) In both Germany and the Netherlands, large block grants to umbrella groups with religious affiliations have led to the dominance of several faith-based NGOs in these countries. (Randel and German 1999c and 1999d; de Goys and Helmich 1993; Helmich 1993) In contrast, most countries with small NGO programs, such as Japan, France and Italy, do not disburse huge grants and very few super NGOs exist there – of the three countries, only France has a few large

46 States and the domestic political economy multi-million-dollar budget NGOs, and most of these are smaller than the very large NGOs found in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.13 (Cohen 2004) One of the reasons, therefore, that Japan has so few mega NGOs is the relatively small amount of government funding flowing to NGOs. Service versus advocacy NGOs For the most part, the state funding programs described above have provided contracts and grants mainly to development and relief NGOs with projects in developing countries. While such service NGOs have received the bulk of funding, however, advocacy NGOs in some countries have also received some state support. This is more common in the social democratic and corporatist states, but support to advocacy groups in all countries has increased over time as funding for NGOs has increased. Until the 1990s, Japanese advocacy NGOs (like service NGOs) received no state funding and most were extremely small due to the great difficulties they faced in getting legal status and fundraising. Since the 1990s, some of the new government funding programs have provided small pockets of funding for advocacy groups working in the areas of the environment and international development. (See later chapters.) Compared with their OECD counterparts, however, Japanese advocacy NGOs are the smallest and in many ways most challenged in terms of resource mobilization. The United States has provided relatively little official aid to advocacy groups and projects, except for the area of democratization, where funds have gone to advocacy NGOs working to promote democracy, transparency, anticorruption, human rights, citizen rights, labor organization and civic engagement in transitioning countries. (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Carothers 1999) Most advocacy NGOs in the United States, however, do not receive large government contracts; it is far more common for them to rely on private foundation grants, membership fees and revenues from product sales or services. In Canada and parts of Europe, though, where funding from private foundations is more limited than in the United States, it is not unusual for advocacy NGOs to receive official funding of some kind. Canada, the Netherlands, Germany and the Nordic countries have funded advocacy NGOs working in the areas of development, HIV/AIDS, the environment, population and women’s issues, indigenous people’s rights and peace-building. (Randel and German 1999c: 121; Van Rooy 1999: 112–113; Steen 1996: 151) Well-known advocacy groups that received a substantial portion of their budget in the 1990s from state funds include NOVIB in the Netherlands, and, in Canada, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, CUSO, the North–South Institute, Oxfam Canada and the Rural Advancement Foundation.14 (Van Rooy 1999: 112–113) Nordic countries have also been quite generous financial supporters of advocacy NGOs, and compensate for the lack of tax breaks for private philanthropy by providing state subsidies. In Sweden, advocacy NGOs receive government subsidies, and attempts to change tax laws on deductions for contributions have repeatedly failed due to the fact that the government claims that public support ought to be given not by individual

States and the domestic political economy 47 contributors but by direct subsidies. (Anheier 2000; Lundstrum and Wijkström 1997: 121, 131) In Norway, advocacy NGOs involved in solidarity and development issues are heavily dependent on state support as their main source of funding. (Steen 1996: 151) As these patterns indicate, overall, NGOs are more reliant on state funding in the social democratic and corporatist states than they are in liberal states such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where NGOs have a wider set of tools for mobilizing resources. Other types of state support In addition to NGO support programs that are part of foreign aid, states sometimes provide other types of subsidy and support, such as reduced mail rates, church taxes and state lotteries. All of these programs help NGOs mobilize resources and have contributed to their development over time. Once again, these types of support are more commonly found in liberal, corporatist and social democratic states, indicating the higher level of support for NGO activism in these types of democracy. The bulk mail rate for nonprofits in the United States is a well-known postal discount that has helped many NGOs fundraise, build a membership base, and communicate their message. From the 1970s, NGOs began to use direct mail strategies more actively, including mass mailings of membership and donation appeals, and cheaper mail rates for nonprofit organizations saved them millions of dollars (Berry 1999: 27–28; Skocpol 1999: 493; Walker 1991: 33). Direct mail strategies were particularly important for advocacy groups since they were often not eligible for government funding and having a large membership base was one way for them to gain political clout. (Bosso 1995: 113) Many of the well-known American environmental and development NGOs that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s relied heavily on direct mail to get their start and/or expand into large organizations. (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 128; Bosso 1995: Smillie 1995; Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap 1992) Such strategies have also been used in Canada and some European countries (Harris 1999), but they have seldom been used by Japanese NGOs because of the very high price of mail in Japan. Having such tools clearly puts activists in countries like the United States at an organizational advantage. Other countries have helped NGOs raise funds through church taxes, state lotteries and other schemes. Germany, Italy and Sweden have a special church tax that is collected by the state and given to churches for their programs, including those run by faith-based NGOs. (Bullain 2004; Neuhoff and Haibach 1999: 146; Lundstrom and Wijkström 1997; de Goys and Helmich 1993: 143–144; Sommer 1977: 106– 107) States have also organized or allowed lotteries to raise funds for NGOs. In Sweden, the right to run lotteries has been an important source of independent fundraising for nonprofit associations, and NGOs have used lotteries to raise funds there. (Lundstrom and Wijkström 1997: 130–131) In the United Kingdom, the National Lotteries Charities Board started to give grants to NGOs in 1997 and has used lotteries to support NGOs. (Randel and German 1999e: 246) Finally, one of the new programs to support NGOs set up in Japan in the early

48 States and the domestic political economy 1990s was an innovative scheme called the Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid (POSIVA), a postal savings plan that sets aside part of a customer’s interest on his/ her savings account and puts it in a fund that provides grants to NGOs. (See Chapter Four.)

Access to political institutions and the policy-making process In addition to state policies, the institutional structures of the state and access to influential policy-makers are important. As strong state theorists and social movement scholars have argued, the political opportunities available to societal actors will influence the forms of activism and levels of organization found in a given country. Countries with more open political systems and a more favorable political opportunity structure (POS) for activism will most likely have higher levels of NGOs since they provide a better political environment for NGOs to gain influence and flourish. Formal participation in state bodies and institutions, access to state actors in various branches and levels of government, formal and informal ties to elites, media coverage and access to public information are types of political opportunity that allow NGOs to participate in the political process and provide them with the political legitimacy they need to be viable organizations. Without favorable political opportunities, it is difficult for NGOs to form and grow. This section will briefly examine how variations in POS help explain the differing levels of NGOs across OECD member countries, focusing mainly on formal and informal institutional channels of access and participation, such as formal state bodies, the executive and legislative branches, and elite networks that bring together public and private spheres. Once again, the patterns found among states related to POS are similar to those found in the area of state policies, with liberal, corporatist and social democratic states providing more avenues of access to NGOs than statist countries. Overall, NGOs face a fairly consistent political environment which either promotes or discourages their formation and growth. Statist systems in Japan, France and Italy The importance of political opportunities and POS as a variable in explaining why some countries have more or fewer NGOs than others is in some ways more apparent when examining the statist countries of Japan, France and Italy. In these countries, political opportunities were for many years limited and obstacles to political participation made it hard for activists to establish NGOs with political credibility and legitimacy. Without this access and the public legitimacy it provides, NGOs remained marginal and the NGO sector found it hard to grow. While problematic for both advocacy and service NGOs, obstacles to access and participation were especially troubling for advocacy NGOs since their goal of policy change is hard to attain through protest and non-institutional channels alone.

States and the domestic political economy 49 These challenges and problems have been particularly acute in Japan. The dimensions of institutional access that activists in other industrialized countries have long taken for granted – access to central government officials through membership of various government bodies, connections with political parties and powerful legislators, personal connections with the political elite, etc. – started in Japan only in the 1990s and 2000s. Japan’s highly centralized and statist political system has been coupled with limited legislative opportunities and until the mid1990s they presented one of the most closed POSs among the OECD member countries. Unlike most OECD member countries, until the mid-1990s there were no formal bodies in the bureaucratic structure that included NGOs, and interactions between state officials and NGOs were extremely limited. For most of the postwar period, NGOs viewed bureaucrats as paternalistic and antagonistic in their attitudes and dealings with NGOs (Yonemoto 1994) and both service and advocacy NGOs were shut out of the policy-making process. Advocacy NGOs in particular had problems gaining access to bureaucrats, and on the rare occasions when they tried to set up meetings with the Ministry of Finance or Foreign Affairs prior to the mid1990s they were usually given the cold shoulder or treated very poorly. (NGO interviews, August 1998, February 2001) NGO links with the Diet prior to the 1990s were also either ineffective or nonexistent. Although a few NGOs had ties with the Socialist Party, since the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in continuous power from 1955 until 1993, these did not usually lead to real influence on policy or access to the policy-making process. With such a closed POS, it is not surprising that NGOs have been fewer in number and scale in Japan than in other OECD member countries. The mid-1990s was the turning point for NGOs, and since then several new governmental bodies have been created and/or opened up for greater NGO participation. The POS has opened up considerably and, although access remains more limited than in many other OECD member countries, interactions between officials, NGOs and politicians have become common and institutionalized. Quarterly policy dialogues that include both service and advocacy NGOs were set up at MOFA in 1996, at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in 1997, at the Japan International Cooperation Agency in 1998 and at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation in 2001. NGOs also have been included in advisory councils at both MOFA and MOF since the late 1990s and have been included in Japan’s official delegation to UN conferences since 1994. In contrast to the pre-1990 period, therefore, the 1990s and 2000s have been a time of expanding POS and a better political environment for NGO emergence and growth. This changing political environment partly explains why NGOs were able to take root in Japan in the 1990s. In France and Italy, one sees similar POS patterns as in Japan. In France, formal structures for including development NGOs in the bureaucratic policy-making process exist on paper, but the actual level of inclusion and cooperation does not appear to be high. A DAC report in the mid-1990s noted that “by comparison with other DAC member countries, the ASI’s [NGO’s] role in the French aid program is still limited, especially as concerns the policy dialogue with French cooperation authorities.” (DAC 1997: 39) As in Japan, an opening of POS took place in the

50 States and the domestic political economy 1990s and 2000s, when many of the structures for cooperation with NGOs were created or revamped. (Cohen 2004) The one area where French NGOs have had more access has been humanitarian assistance, where ties between NGOs and the state are strong and NGO executives have been recruited to serve in the government. (Randel and German 1999b: 108) Some French NGOs have ties to trade unions and the Socialist Party, but cooperation with these actors has been more fruitful at the local level. In Italy, the main obstacle for NGOs is not access per se, but rather the Italian government’s vulnerability to chaotic political change. Although a number of consultative bodies and working groups have included NGOs in the policy process and NGOs ought to have some degree of influence, in practice these bodies have often not functioned smoothly, as was the case in the 1990s when foreign aid policy was frozen and few meetings were held due to budget and political stalemates. (Foch 1993) Italian NGOs have good political connections with progressive political parties and through them have occasionally been able to influence the legislative process. As in France, there have been movements in recent years toward decentralization and new possibilities for cooperation at the local level. (DAC 1996a: 19) Liberal pluralism and POS in the United States In contrast to the statist countries, there is a wealth of opportunity for institutional access and political participation in the United States which has encouraged NGO formation and growth. The emergence and growth of NGOs in the United States has taken place in a context of expanding POS over time and a political environment that has generally viewed societal participation in a positive light. In the context of liberal pluralism, advocacy and service NGOs have become both influential interest groups and “partners” of the state, with contacts and institutional access to multiple levels and branches of government. This more open political environment is one reason why NGOs are a large and vibrant sector in the United States. As scholars of advocacy groups in America have argued, the period of the 1960s and 1970s was transformational in the United States in terms of changing state structures and new opportunities for formal participation in politics. (Berry 1984 and 1999; Walker 1991) The rapid expansion of new federal government programs and offices in these two decades, combined with legal changes and more liberal rules for participation in and access to all three branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial), created a new and more open POS which in turn stimulated the rapid growth of citizen-led advocacy groups. (Skocpol 1999; Walker 1991: 131; Berry 1984: 31–32) Starting in this period, there was a growth in new access points for participating in the policy-making process, such as appointments on government advisory committees at the federal and local levels, representation in official hearings held by Congress, and more open access to the courts. (Berry 1984 and 1999: 29–31; Walker 1991)

States and the domestic political economy 51 This more open POS allowed both advocacy and service NGOs in the United States to organize themselves as interest groups and partners of the state. Advocacy NGOs gained access to Congress and federal officials through both formal institutional mechanisms and informal contacts. Since the 1970s, for example, environmental and human rights NGOs have often testified in Congressional hearings and have had regular meetings with officials in the State and Treasury Departments and other federal agencies, where they both lobby for their preferred policies and sometimes act as allies that supply useful data needed by the government to make policy decisions. (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wirth 1998; Brysk 1993; Martin and Sikkink 1993; Sikkink 1993) American service-oriented NGOs active in development and relief have even older ties to both Congress and the State Department, due to their longstanding involvement in the foreign aid process. Development and relief NGOs organized as a lobby in the immediate postwar period and, in addition to tactical alliances with Senator Hubert Humphrey on food aid in the 1950s, testified and successfully lobbied Congress in the 1960s and 1970s for a greater share of the foreign aid budget. (Smith 1990; Bolling 1984; Sommer 1977) Congress has generally viewed NGOs positively, as a more democratic way of providing aid, which has given NGOs leverage in their dealings with the State Department. Access at the executive level has also been very good. NGOs have formal institutional ties to the State Department and USAID through the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA), a body set up in 1946. (Roberts 1986) NGOs have also been partners of USAID in the budget process and have collaborated to lobby Congress for larger foreign aid budgets in years when support within Congress for foreign aid was weak. One measure of just how open the POS is for NGOs is the revolving door of executive officials that move from the NGO world to the government world and vice versa. Since as early as the 1960s, when William Reuter, the Executive Director of the NGO CARE, was appointed the Director for the Food for Peace program by Kennedy, there has been a two-way flow of people between government and NGOs working in the area of development and relief. (Maren 1997: 195–196; Ruttan 1996) State officials are often on the boards of service NGOs and many have also become executives of development NGOs or NGO umbrella groups. (Smith 1990) There is a similar pattern of close relations between advocacy NGOs and private foundations: foundation officers are often board members of advocacy NGOs and a revolving door exists between the two worlds with NGO staff taking jobs as program officers at foundations and foundation officials starting their own NGOs. (Keck and Sikkink 1998) In short, both service and advocacy NGOs in the United States have been able to cultivate good networks with elites, and the POS has been relatively open and supportive of NGOs. Such close relations with powerful elites is still relatively rare for NGOs in Japan.

52 States and the domestic political economy Canada and corporatist/social democratic Europe A favorable POS for NGOs also can be found in Canada and the social democratic and/or corporatist continental European states of Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, where NGOs have institutional access to state governments as well as ties to politicians and other elites. In most of these countries, generous NGO support programs have also included institutional points of access to central government offices. In Canada, development NGOs have a close relationship with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and formal government policy on NGO participation calls for consultation with both development and advocacy NGOs at various points in the decision- and policy-making processes. (DAC 1998a; Van Rooy 1997) Advocacy NGOs also have strong contacts with CIDA and government agencies dealing with such global issues as human rights and the environment, and advocacy NGOs not only receive funding for attending UN conferences but have been included in various consultation processes. (leBel 1999; Van Rooy 1997) As in the United States, a revolving door among NGOs, state officials and politicians exists, and forms the basis for strong elite contacts within government.15 (Smillie 1999b; Sommer 1977) In Germany, development NGOs and the government consult on a regular basis and NGOs are included in the policy-making process through working groups and input on country and sectoral concept papers. (Randel and German 1999c; de Goys and Helmich 1993) Policy dialogue and interaction between development NGOs and state officials in the Netherlands are regular and intensive, with many formal and informal opportunities for NGO participation. (Randel and German 1999d; Helmich 1993) Advocacy NGOs also participate formally on advisory committees related to such global issues as human rights, and both government officials and politicians are often themselves members of NGOs. (Sikkink 1993: 422) Swedish development NGOs have been officially part of the policy-making process since the 1950s, have several seats on the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) Board of Directors, and meet regularly with both SIDA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. (Randel and German 1999f; Smillie and Filewod 1993; Dahlen 1982) Sweden has one of the most inclusive institutional environments for NGOs, with considerable exchange of personnel moving between government and NGOs and the appointment of a Swedish Ambassador to NGOs as early as 1974. (Dahen 1982) In Switzerland, there have been high levels of formal and informal interaction between NGOs and state officials, with NGO representation on various consultative committees and regular meetings with officials on NGO support programs and aid policies. Dialogue between state and society has been an official part of Swiss foreign aid policy since 1974, when legislation on foreign aid required the government to hold annual conferences on international development in order to exchange views with NGOs and citizens. (Randel and German 1999g: 230; de Goys 1993) In addition to access to central government and bureaucratic structures, NGOs in these countries have ties to elites in the legislature and to other influential political actors, such as trade unions. NGOs in the Netherlands have ties to all political parties, some Canadian NGOs have had ties to the New Democratic Party,

States and the domestic political economy 53 German NGOs have contacts with the Green Party and the Social Democrats, and Swedish NGOs have many contacts in the Riksdag. (Smith 1990; Dahlen 1982) Compared with American development NGOs, those in these countries are more politically oriented and frequently work together with advocacy NGOs to lobby for particular policies. NGO ties with labor unions in the Netherlands and Canada have reinforced this tendency of politicization. In most of these countries, faithbased NGOs that are active in social justice issues also have good political connections. Overall, then, there has been a fairly good climate for participation and access to policy-making processes and elites in these countries.

Conclusion: domestic political structures matter To conclude, I now return to the original questions of this chapter: what accounts for patterns of divergence among advanced industrialized countries in the size of the NGO sector and what might this tell us about the initial emergence and rise of NGOs in the postwar period? As this chapter has shown, domestic political structures and state policies clearly matter a lot in explaining where, when and how NGOs first emerged and flourished. States shape activism from above by defining the political environment activists operate in and their opportunities for organizing and mobilizing resources. While some states have actively promoted the formation of NGOs, others have made it relatively difficult for activists to set up and sustain this type of social change organization. An initial step for understanding the rise of NGOs in any given country is to identify how domestic political structures and policies either encourage or limit different types of activism. Clearly, as examples from this chapter have shown, it has been easier for activists to set up an NGO in liberal, corporatist and social democratic states as compared to statist democracies. Across the board, these former types of state provide more incentives and support for organizing activism in the form of an NGO. First, the relatively simple procedures for incorporation in liberal, corporatist and social democratic countries make setting up a formal NGO an obvious choice for activists; setting up a legally recognized organization is easy to do, it confers legitimacy and it opens up opportunities for resource mobilization and formal participation in political processes. Second, in the liberal states, and to a lesser degree in some of the corporatist states such as Germany and the Netherlands, the encouragement of private philanthropy through tax breaks and other fiscal perks also supports NGO formation by creating a potential pool of resources and fundraising options. It is much easier for activists to mobilize resources in these types of state, where private foundations exist and private donors have financial incentives to support activism. Third, over time the state itself has become a major patron and promoter of NGOs in liberal, corporatist and social democratic countries through foreign aid and other NGO support programs. This is particularly true for the social democratic states, which have provided the largest percentages of foreign aid to NGOs and have supported both service and advocacy NGOs. Although, they do not promote private philanthropy through fiscal regulations, social democratic states such as Sweden make up for the lack of

54 States and the domestic political economy private funds with generous public funds. Finally, opportunities for political access and ties with influential elites are numerous in liberal, corporatist and social democratic countries. Activists have formal and informal channels through which to exert influence and, even if they are not always successful in achieving their goals, the fact that they have the opportunity to be players in national politics is itself an incentive to set up an NGO. Taken altogether, these are the political conditions that have led to the emergence and growth of the first wave of NGOs in the advanced industrialized world. In contrast, political conditions in statist countries such as Japan, France and Italy have been far less conducive to growth. Japan in particular has been very difficult terrain for activists. Until the 1990s, the obstacles and lack of incentives to organize formally combined to make Japan one of the worst countries to try to set up an NGO. Unable to incorporate, lacking sources of government funding as well as fiscal tools to encourage private support and unable to lobby effectively or wield political power through the legislature or the ministries, Japanese activists have had to organize in isolation, at the margins, or as part of alternative cultures outside the mainstream. Japan is a clear case of how domestic political institutions and policies can discourage or suppress NGO activism. Although these patterns for statist democracies do a fairly good job of explaining the relatively low level of NGOs in these countries, it is also the case that state policies and institutional structures have not been static, and since the 1990s openings in all three areas have contributed to the growth of NGOs. While still relatively weak, NGOs in the statist countries have become more visible players and they are arguably part of a second global wave of NGOs that has followed in the footsteps of the leader NGO countries. The rest of this book will examine this trend of convergence and the global trend of rising levels of NGOs in all states.

3

Political globalization, “civil society” politics and the global growth of NGOs in the 1980s–2000s

After initially emerging in parts of the West in the postwar period, in the past 25 years NGOs have also grown in number and taken root in many other parts of the world. As is frequently noted in the literature on NGOs, since the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, there has been an NGO “boom” in both industrialized and developing countries in all geographical regions. In this period, hundreds of thousands of NGOs have been set up in the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia. What accounts for this recent second wave and global spread of NGOs? This chapter turns to the second central question of the book and identifies some of the underlying causes behind the recent growth spurt in NGO activism and the pattern of convergence. Japan has been part of this pattern of convergence. Although Japanese NGOs have lagged behind many other industrialized countries in terms of the size and scale of their activities, the NGO world in Japan underwent enormous changes and growth in the late 1980s and 1990s – during this period a critical mass of groups and networks were set up and one can speak of a bone fide NGO sector coming into existence. While there are many reasons for these new developments, political factors have loomed large. As Chapter Two indicated, in the late 1980s and 1990s domestic political changes in Japan opened up new opportunities for NGOs and supported their emergence and growth. But domestic political changes were not the only salient political factor. Considering the timing and the convergence found in many countries, international political factors have also been key. This chapter will explore the changing international political context and the important role of three types of international political resources and processes in spurring on NGO growth globally: international political opportunities, international norms and the transnational diffusion of ideas. Using the theoretical framework presented in Chapter One, this chapter focuses on these three international political variables and empirically maps out the ways in which the international political system provided support “from above” to activists all over the world and thereby greatly contributed to the creation of many NGOs. The big story of this chapter is the story of political globalization and its effects on activism: how the expansion of politics and governance structures at the global level has encouraged the spread and growth of NGOs over time by providing new

56 The global growth of NGOs resources and opportunities to activists beyond those found within national borders. This story of political globalization takes as its analogy the rise of the nation state and processes of political development at the national level and extends it to the global level. As social movement theorists have argued, the creation of the nation state, new national institutions and new political configurations at the national level led to new forms of activism that targeted national politics and transformed local politics. (Tilly 1984) Similarly, with the creation and expansion of new international political systems and institutions in the postwar period, activism now also targets not only national and local politics but global politics. (Smith 2000) To understand properly the process of political globalization in practice and why it has encouraged the spread of NGOs, however, one must examine the political goals and ideologies that have been promoted by these new global political institutions. Although processes of political globalization have led activists to get more involved in global politics, why has this activism often taken the form of NGOs and NGO networks? As this chapter’s closer examination of international institutions and politics shall show, over time, and especially in the past 25 years, international organizations and politics have adopted neoliberal and democratic principles that include and promote NGOs in a variety of ways that have contributed to their global growth. Strikingly, the system of global governance has evolved into a set of international institutions and political processes that more and more resemble those found in the Western states that have most actively promoted NGOs. In other words, not only have politics become more global, but political globalization has occurred in a form that, over time, has increasingly favored NGOs and provided new opportunities for their spread and growth. This chapter is divided into three sections that examine the three overlapping ways in which political globalization has encouraged the emergence and growth of NGOs: international political opportunities, international norms, and the transnational diffusion of ideas. Taken together, these three routes or processes capture the main material, political and ideational forces operating at the international level that have supported the NGO boom of the 1980s–2000s. Since these international processes have affected not only Japanese activists but activists in many countries, this chapter does not specifically examine the case of Japan and instead presents the general model of global political change that will be used in the next two chapters of the book.

International political opportunities Just as the availability of political opportunities and supportive state policies at the national level (described in Chapter Two) strongly shaped the emergence and growth of the first wave of NGOs in parts of the West, in the past 25 years political globalization processes have produced many new international political opportunities for activists that have provided them with incentives to form an NGO and become politically active at the global level. Although close connections

The global growth of NGOs 57 between NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) date back to the late nineteenth century when they first simultaneously formed in Europe (Charnovitz 1997), it was not until the postwar period and the emergence of an increasingly complex and intrusive international system of governance that IGOs and other global political processes came to be major promoters of NGOs in all parts of the world. Besides providing a useful international focal point or target for activism, as they have grown over time IGOs and international regimes have also offered activists concrete incentives to set up an NGO and become globally active. The most important international political opportunities are similar to those found at the national level in Western states with large NGO sectors: (1) funding opportunities and NGO support programs; and (2) political access and formal inclusion in institutions and decision-making venues. Together with the evolution of the United Nations and other parts of the international political system, these two types of international political opportunity have increased over time and have become institutionalized at a larger number of IGOs. Importantly, much of the expansion of these opportunities took place in the 1980s and 1990s, and this expansion was an important stimulant to the formation and growth of NGOs all over the world. Below, I examine each type of opportunity. International funding and the new patrons of global civil society All NGOs need material resources to survive, and the greater availability of international resources in recent years has been an important source of NGO growth, especially for NGOs in countries with fewer resources or restrictive funding laws. IGOs and other global patrons have become an increasingly important source of funding and operational support for NGOs in many countries. From their inception in the early postwar years, UN agencies have included NGOs as “partners” and service contractors in their programs. The universe of international patrons of NGOs, however, has grown dramatically since the 1980s and now includes not only UN organizations but the European Union and an expanding collection of Western governmental, quasi-governmental and private organizations. According to my own rough estimate, by the late 1990s there was between $6 billion and $8 billion per year of funding for international projects and programs channeled through NGOs from IGOs, bilateral aid agencies and various public and private foundations. (Reimann 2006) The rise of these new international sources of funding for NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s is one important reason for the NGO boom of this period. The United Nations system Several UN agencies have had long ties with NGOs, and UN activities provided important stimuli for increased NGO activity from the mid-1940s to the 1960s. (Smith 1990) In the area of relief and refugee assistance, for example, there were close funding and working relations between NGOs and the UN Relief and

58 The global growth of NGOs Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the 1940s. Furthermore, when the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1951, its founding statute specified that it would provide assistance to refugees through private agencies, and during its early years it relied heavily on NGOs for service provision. (UNHCR 2000: 194; Smith 1990; Curti 1963) Other UN agencies that have included NGOs in their programs as project implementers since their early years are the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). (Smith 1990: 76; Curti 1963: 570–592) Compared with levels of cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s, however, UN support of NGOs since the 1980s has grown exponentially and now includes not only funding for implementation of UN projects but funding for attendance at UN conferences, NGO training and “capacity building” programs, and support for NGO networking. By the late 1990s, UN agencies were providing more than $2 billion a year on NGO programs that reached both service and advocacy NGOs all over the world. Table 3.1 documents the growth of NGO partnership programs sponsored by UN agencies in the 1980s and 1990s. A substantial amount of the new funding for NGOs has gone to service NGOs that work as subcontractors for UN projects. In terms of quantity, the largest amount of UN direct support for NGOs has been in the area of humanitarian relief and assistance. From the mid-1980s, as budgets of UN agencies specializing in this area, such as UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP), rose significantly, the amount of funds and goods channeled through NGOs also grew dramatically. By the mid- to late 1990s, $1.5–2.2 billion worth of UNHCR and WFP annual aid relief was implemented by NGOs. In addition to its heavy reliance on large Western NGOs, UNHCR also started to make conscious efforts to use Southern NGOs, at times going so far as creating local NGOs to implement its programs in the field. (Donini 1996: 94–95) WFP, with its links to over 1,100 NGOs and an operating budget of $1.8 billion in the late 1990s, has been a major multilateral source of growth in INGO/NGOs specializing in humanitarian crises. In the area of international development, in the 1980s and 1990s several UN agencies also more actively started to turn to NGOs as development “partners.” Two good examples of this sudden new official interest in NGOs are the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. After decades of more or less ignoring NGOs, both UNDP and the World Bank set up a variety of programs to support the growth of NGOs in the late 1980s and 1990s. These programs included funding of NGO projects, funding and training for NGO attendance at UN conferences, material and technical support for development of national and international NGO internet networks, training at numerous workshops and organizational support for a variety of “capacity building” programs. (See Table 3.1.) At the World Bank efforts were also made to increase NGO inclusion in Bank-financed projects, and the Bank claims that NGO participation in Bankfinanced projects increased from 6 percent of all projects from 1973–1988 to 30 percent of all projects in the early 1990s to 50 percent of all projects in the late 1990s and 72 percent of all projects in 2005. (World Bank 2006, 2001b and 1996)

The global growth of NGOs 59 Table 3.1 UN funding and support programs for INGOs and NGOs UN Agency

NGO or Civil Society Support Programs

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

• Since 1948: Funding of NGO as program implementers • Since 1989: Work with NGOs in the area of child protection, child labor, children in armed conflicts and disabled children

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

• Since 1951: Funding of NGOs as program implementers • 1993: Partnership in Action (PARinAC). Consultations, technical support and capacity building programs for NGOs. • 1989–1994: International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA). Funds for NGOs • 1997: NGO Fund for NGOs in Eastern Europe and the CIS

World Food Program (WFP)

• Inclusion of INGOs/NGOs as WPF’s main implementing partners

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

• Since 1980s: People’s Participation Program, fund for NGOs

UN Commission on Human Rights

Funds to enable NGO participation at UN meetings and human rights projects: • 1981: UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture • 1985: UN Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations • 1991: Voluntary Trust on Contemporary Forms of Slavery • 1995: Voluntary Fund for Indigenous People • 1998: Assisting Communities Together

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

• Since 1969: Funding of NGOs as program implementers

World Bank

• Since 1970s: Inclusion of NGOs in Bank-financed projects • 1983: Grant programs and special funds for NGOs (e.g. Special Grant Program, Grants for Capacity Building, Population and Reproductive Health Capacity Building Program, the Institutional Development Fund, and the Post-Conflict Trust Fund) • 1990s: NGO projects funded by Bank-financed Social Funds • 1990s: Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable Use • 1990s: Training and networking programs for NGOs

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

• Since 1979: Funding of NGOs as program implementers • Mid-1980s: Special Program for Sub-Saharan African Countries Affected by Drought and Desertification • 1987: The Extended Cooperation Program (ECP) and IFAD/NGO Fund

(continued)

60 The global growth of NGOs Table 3.1 Continued UN Agency

NGO or Civil Society Support Programs

UN Development Program (UNDP)

• Late 1980s: NGO grant and support programs (Partners in Development Program I and II; World Summit on Social Development Program; Environment and Development Program; Learning Group on Empowerment and Participation; Global Program; Environment and Social Sustainability Program; Indigenous Knowledge Program) • 1990s: Development Program for Displaced Persons, Refugees and Returnees in Central America (PRODERE) • 1992: Sustainable Development Networking Program • 1996: Civil Society for Poverty Reduction Program in SubSaharan Africa

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

• 1990s: Funding for international environmental projects • 1990s: Small Grants Program for NGOs

UN International Drug Control Program (UNDCP)

• 1990s: Inclusion of NGOs as project implementers, fundraisers, project formulators and policy advocates. • 1990s: Training and networking programs for NGOs

Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty

An inter-agency program set up at the Conference on Hunger and Poverty in 1995. Includes IFAD, FAO, WFP, the World Bank, the European Commission, and NGOs. • Community Empowerment Facility provides grants for NGOs • Networking projects

UN Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

A collaborative effort of UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, WHO, the World Bank and NGOs set up in 1996. It helps NGOs get funding, provides technical assistance and promotes NGOs in its public relations efforts.

Partnership for Poverty Reduction

An inter-agency project started in 1996 by the World Bank Institute, the Inter-American Foundation and UNDP that promotes private–public partnerships in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sources: www.fao.org (accessed 11/28/99); www.gefweb.org (accessed 3/21/01); GEF Digest, Fall 1999; www.ifad.org (accessed 4/21/01); www.ifad.org/popularcoalition/main_cef.htm (accessed 4/25/01); www.un.org/esa /coordination/ngo/other.htm (accessed 11/28/99); www.undcp.org (accessed 11/28/99); www.undp.org/csopp/CSO/NewsFiles/partners.htm (accessed 4/24/01); www.unhchr.ch (accessed 4/19/01); www.unhcr.ch (accessed 4/24/01); www.wfp.org (accessed 4/23/01); www.worldbank.org (accessed 4/24/01); www.worldbank.org/ppr/english/about.html (accessed 4/24/01); World Bank (1999) World Bank–Civil Society Relations. Fiscal 1999 Progress Report, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

These programs have benefited both service NGOs and advocacy NGOs, with hundreds of NGOs from developing and transition countries getting financial support to attend the various UN world conferences in the 1990s. In addition to programs at these older UN agencies, new UN agencies and new jointly run UN programs were set up in the 1990s that included collaboration with

The global growth of NGOs 61 NGOs. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), a jointly administered fund set up in 1991, has funded international environmental projects involving thousands of NGOs. Other new UN programs established in the 1990s that include NGO participation are the UN International Drug Control Program, the Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty, the UN Joint Program on HIV/AIDS, and the Partnership for Poverty Reduction. (See Table 3.1.) Quasi-governmental foundations and political foundations State funds have also found their way to NGOs through quasi-governmental and political foundations. Once again, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the majority of these organizations began to devote a substantial portion of their grants to NGOs and other “civil society organizations.” Since most of these foundations have supported democracy-related programs, they have provided substantial support to a variety of advocacy NGOs. Among the most well-known quasi-governmental foundations are the regionally focused foundations funded by the US government: the Asia Foundation, the InterAmerican Foundation, the African Development Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation.1 In the 1980s and 1990s, all of the regional foundations started to support civil society groups as a main element of their programming, and by the mid-1990s the combined grants budgets of these foundations exceeded $100 million, much of which went to NGOs. In 1999, for example, these foundations disbursed more than 1,000 grants for projects involving both service and advocacy NGOs for projects ranging from development to election monitoring. (Reimann 2001b: 165) These programs have continued in the 2000s and include funding for projects done by both advocacy and service NGOs in the areas of democracy promotion, governance, sustainable development and the environment, women’s issues, and conflict resolution. Political foundations in North America and Europe dedicated to promoting democracy worldwide have also supported the work of service and advocacy NGOs. Now an integral part of the larger foreign policy project of Western governments to support democracy in developing countries, most political foundations were established in the past 20 years and were modeled on older German political foundations. Centered on a major political party, German political foundations were set up in the early postwar period to encourage democracy in that country. Over time, these foundations gradually expanded their activities to promoting democracy overseas, and by the 1990s more than half of the $450 million spent by the five major German political foundations was devoted to overseas programs, including work done by NGOs in the areas of human rights and democratic development. (Phillips 1999; DAC 1998b; de Goys and Helmich 1993) In the 1980s and 1990s, political foundations that focused on democracy promotion were set up in other Western countries. In the United States, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and two party-affiliated foundations – the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republic Institute (IRI) – were set up by Congress in 1983 with the specific mandate of strengthening

62 The global growth of NGOs democracy around the world. Following the NED, new political foundations were set up in Canada and Europe, such as the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Canada, the Westminster Foundation in the United Kingdom, the Olaf Palme International Center and the Swedish International Liberal Center in Sweden, and the Karl Renner Institute in Austria. Since their establishment in the 1980s and early 1990s, these political foundations have funded thousands of advocacy and service NGO projects all over the world in the areas of human rights, democratization and civil society development. (Carothers 1999; Phillips 1999: 81; Reimann 2001b: 165) Private foundations Finally, private foundations have also become increasingly important patrons and elite allies of NGOs at the international level. Although there were several foundations that funded NGOs in the area of international development in the 1970s, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that more widespread funding of both service and advocacy NGOs by foundations began. (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 98–99) After steadily increasing in the 1980s, private foundation grants for international projects skyrocketed in the 1990s. (Foundation Center 1997 and 2000; Renz 1998; Kiger 2000) In the United States, private foundation grants for international projects rose to an estimated $996 million in 1994 and $1.6 billion in 1998, an increase of 51 percent from 1990 levels. (Foundation Center 1997 and 2000; Renz 1998) These trends continued in the 2000s, and by 2007 funding for international causes by American private foundations had increased to an estimated $5.4 billion, making it the fastest-growing area in the 2000s. (Foundation Center 2008) These grants included funds not only for American NGOs but for NGOs in Europe, Japan and developing countries. Table 3.2 lists the larger American private foundations that fund NGOs. On their own, these fourteen foundations spent more than $1.1 billion in 1999–2000 on international programs and projects, and made 2,139 grants to NGOs and transnational NGO networks for projects in the areas of international development, human rights, security, the environment, gender issues and civil society development. If one adds to this list the many other foundations around the world that have provided funding to NGOs, such as the Open Society foundations, it is clear that private foundations are now important financial sponsors of NGO activities worldwide. Foundations have been a particularly important source of funding for advocacy NGOs, especially in the United States, where many advocacy NGOs are hesitant to accept funding from the state. Historically this makes sense since private foundations were also the main financial supporters in the United States of new citizen advocacy groups that emerged and became active in national politics in the 1960s and 1970s. (Walker 1991; Jenkins 1998; Berry 1999) Recent support in the past two decades by foundations of advocacy NGOs operating transnationally or in foreign countries is therefore an international extension of a pattern of postwar American politics of elite-sponsored citizen activism. The foundations listed in

The global growth of NGOs 63 Table 3.2 Funding of NGOs by selected American foundations, 1999–2000 Foundation

Number of grants (year)

Total international funding

Alton Jones Foundation Carnegie Corporation Ford Foundation Gates Foundation Global Fund for Women Hewlett Foundation Kellogg Foundation MacArthur Foundation Mott Foundation Packard Foundation Rockefeller Brothers Fund Rockefeller Foundation Turner Foundation Wallace Global Fund

69 grants (1999) 21 grants (2000) 600 grants (2000) 51 grants (2000) 354 grants (2000) 91 grants (2000) 73 grants (2000) 112 grants (2000) 215 grants (1999) 156 grants (2000) 87 grants (2000) 195 grants (2000) 56 grants (1999) 59 grants (2000)

$16.6 million $7.3 million* n.a. $701 million* $4 million $60 million* $40 million $36 million* $27 million $42 million $9 million* $142 million $4 million $5.7 million

Total

2139 grants

$1.1 billion

Sources: www.fordfound.org, www.macfound.org, www.wkkf.org, www.carnegie.org, www.rockfound. org, www.wajones.org, www.mott.org, www.rbf.org, www.gatesfoundation.org, www.turnerfoundation. org, www.wgf.org, www.packfound.org, www.globalfundforwomen.org. All sites accessed in May 2001. Note Asterisked figures include multi-year grants.

Table 3.2 have been major financial sponsors of advocacy NGOs (both Northern and Southern) and 63 percent of the grants made by the top 12 foundations in this table were grants that funded projects involving one or more advocacy NGOs. The areas in which foundation funding is most prevalent – the environment, security and peace, human rights, development, population, health, and women’s issues – are precisely the areas where advocacy NGOs have flourished. Expanding political access at the international level In addition to material resources, international institutions and actors have provided new opportunities for nonstate actors to participate in political processes at the international level, and a second important factor behind the general growth of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s is political access and the evolution of the international system of governance as a larger, more complex and inclusive set of organizations, regimes and gatherings. Paralleling the growth in number and size of IGOs, international agreements, international conferences and collaborative international programs in the postwar period, there has been, especially since the 1980s, increasing openness in all of these global institutions and political processes to the inclusion of NGOs as observers, participants or “partners.” This

64 The global growth of NGOs simultaneous expansion of new international political arenas and access to NGOs has been an important stimulant to the growth of NGOs since it has offered activists a new path to gain political influence and promote their causes. By forming an NGO and participating in IGO meetings, for example, activists facing political obstacles at the domestic level can attempt to overcome them by participating in international venues where political opportunity structures are more open. (Sikkink 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998) Activists in countries with more favorable domestic political opportunity structures, on the other hand, may also be inspired to participate in UN and other global political arenas, either to enhance their influence domestically or as a way to promote their cause at the global level and gain influence beyond their own borders. Either way, in order to participate in international politics, activists need to set up an NGO since in most cases only organizations (not individuals) are eligible to participate. The relationship between NGOs and international governance structures is a complicated and symbiotic one that defies easy generalizations. On the one hand, the creation of IGOs and international regimes has often been influenced by NGOs and many IGOs owe their very existence to activism by NGOs. (Charnovitz 1997; Seary 1996) At the same time, however, as IGOs are established and grow they take on a life of their own which in turn stimulates NGO growth. As work by sociological institutionalists and other scholars has shown, for example, in the areas of human rights, the environment and women’s issues, the number of NGOs focusing on these issues rose rapidly only after the number of IGOs and treaties dealing with them increased. (Berkovitch 1999; Meyer et al. 1997; Sikkink 1993) In a similar fashion, over the postwar period there has also been a general trend at the international level toward greater openness of international institutions to NGOs in terms of points of access, opportunities to participate in policy-making and implementation processes, and collaborative efforts. This section examines the UN system and how an increase in the number of access points for NGOs has provided a stimulus for organizing at the international level. Fitting NGOs into the UN system: official status and formal inclusion Although NGOs were informally included in many activities and programs of the League of Nations in the inter-war period (Charnovitz 1997; Seary 1996; Chiang 1981), it was not until the postwar period and the creation of the United Nations that NGOs were formally recognized. The UN Charter formally provides for NGO participation in the form of consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Article 71 of the UN Charter allows ECOSOC to “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence” and by the late 1960s a threetiered status system was set up which categorized NGOs by their degree of relevance to ECOSOC activities. Article 71 has provided NGOs with several important political opportunities, such as formal international recognition and accreditation for participating in large UN international conferences organized by ECOSOC. And it has provided the basic model and benchmark for NGO

The global growth of NGOs 65 participation used by several other UN agencies when they were established. (Charnovitz 1997: 253) Although not all UN organizations included NGOs when they were originally set up, over time nearly all UN agencies and affiliated institutions have come to provide NGOs with formal and informal opportunities to access decision-makers and participate in policy debates. (Martens 2005) Table 3.3 lists the type of institutional access NGOs have at various UN departments and agencies. Table 3.3 Institutional access for NGOs at the UN UN body

Type of NGO access or participation

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (est. 1945)

Available since the mid-1940s, consultative status with ECOSOC allows NGOs to participate in ECOSOC meetings and those of its subsidiary bodies.

ECOSOC Commissions (est. 1947–1990s)

NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status have access to the following ECOSOC commissions: Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Population and Development, Commission for Social Development, Commission on the Status of Women, Commission on Human Settlements and Commission on Sustainable Development.

UNICEF (est. 1948)

Consultative status for NGOs available since 1950; in 1990s, observer status at meetings of UNICEF’s Executive Board.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (est. 1951)

NGOs participate as observers in UNHCR’s Executive and Standing Committees. A UNHCR/NGO consultation occurs prior to UNHCR Executive Committee meetings. In the 1990s, Partnership in Action program increases consultation.

World Health Organization (WHO) (est. 1946)

NGOs may apply for formal status with WHO, which allows them to send observers to WHO meetings and conferences.

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (est. 1945)

NGOs can apply for formal status with FAO and attend FAO executive sessions, experts’ meetings, technical conferences and seminars.

ILO (est. 1919)

The ILO set up a Special List of NGOs in 1956 to establish relations with NGOs other than workers’ organizations.

UNESCO (est. 1945)

Formal accreditation and status for NGOs was set up in 1960. UNESCO conducts regular consultations with NGOs.

World Food Program (WFP) (est. 1962)

NGOs attend WFP Executive Board meetings as observers. WFP conducts an annual WFP–NGO consultation.

Dept. of Public Information, (UN Secretariat) (est. 1946)

Formal association status with DPI available to NGOs since 1968.

(continued)

66 The global growth of NGOs Table 3.3 Continued UN body

Type of NGO access or participation

UN Population Fund (UNFPA) (est. 1969)

NGOs can apply for accreditation with UNFPA. In the 1990s, an NGO Advisory Committee and the NGO/Civil Society Theme Groups set up to include more NGO input.

UNEP (est. 1970)

Close ties exist between UNEP, the Environmental Liaison Center (an NGO network based in Nairobi) and other NGOs.

UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (est. 1975)

A joint project set up by several UN agencies to disseminate information and foster dialogue between the UN and NGOs.

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (est. 1977)

NGOs participate as observers of the IFAD Governing Council. Since 1990, IFAD has held annual consultations with NGO partners.

World Bank (est. 1944)

In 1982, the NGO Consultative Committee set up as a regular dialogue process for the World Bank and NGOs. In the early 2000s, the Committee was phased out and replaced by the Joint Facilitation Committee, as well as series of annual policy dialogues and scheduled exchanges during the Bank’s annual meeting as well as at other venues (e.g. WTO meetings). NGOs are on numerous sectoral committees that provide advice to the Bank and input into Bank policy papers. They are also consulted for Bank country assistance strategy papers and participate in Bank workshops on specific development issues.

UN Development Program (UNDP) (est. 1966)

Since the 1990s, NGOs participate in UNDP Executive Board meetings. Consultations and policy dialogues with NGOs are set up at the regional level.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN Secretariat) (est. 1991)

NGOs are core members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the central humanitarian policy-making body in the UN system.

UN General Assembly (UNGA) (est. 1945)

Since the 1990s, NGOs can apply for special accreditation as an observer for UNGA special sessions that are followups to international conferences and UN initiatives.

Global Environmental Facility (est. 1991)

NGOs are part of GEF’s system of regional “focal points” representatives. NGOs have ten representative seats at the GEF Council and there are regular consultations with NGOs.

World Trade Organization (WTO) (est. 1995)

NGOs can get observer status at plenary sessions of WTO Ministerial Conferences. There are regular briefings by WTO for NGOs and informal Secretariat–NGO dialogues.

Inter-Agency Learning Group on Participation (est. 1995)

This inter-agency group was set up to “advance the mainstreaming of participatory development” at IGOs. It includes UNDP, World Bank, UNIFEM, GEF, UNICEF, bilateral donor agencies, private foundations, and NGOs.

The global growth of NGOs 67 Table 3.3 Continued UN body

Type of NGO access or participation

Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty (est. 1995)

This UN–NGO initiative aims to mobilize resources and networks to address rural poverty. Participating IGOs include IFAD, FAO, WFP, World Bank and European Commission.

UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (est. 1996)

This was the first UN program to include NGO representatives on its governing body as full participants.

Global Urban Partnerships (est. 1997)

Launched by the World Bank, this inter-agency initiative on urban development includes IGOs, national and local governments, donor agencies, business and NGOs.

The Global Compact (est. 1999)

This inter-agency initiative targets human rights and includes: the Secretary-General, High Commissioner for Human Rights, ILO, UNEP, UNDP, business, labor and NGOs.

Other UN bodies

Consultative status is granted to NGOs by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

Sources: United Nations 1998; UNHCR 2000; World Bank 2006; www.gefweb.org/participants/ Focal_Points/ NGO/ngo.html; www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/docs96/review.htm; www.ifad.org/ popularcoalition; www.ilo.org/public/english/comp/civil/ngo/relngios.htm; www.ngosatunicef.org/ committee.html; www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/subsidiary.htm; www.un.org/esa/coordination/ ngo/other.htm; www.un.org/partners/civil_society/ngo/ngosdpi.htm; www.undp.org/csopp/igp.htm; www.undp.org/csopp/scpolicy.htm;www.unglobalcompact.org/gc/unweb.nsf; www. worldbank.org/ html/fpd/urban/ urb_part/urb_part.htm; www.wto.org/ english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm. All websites accessed in April and May 2001.

Over time, opportunities for NGOs to participate in UN politics have increased, and this expansion of access has provided incentives to organize and act at the international level. Initially, in the 1940s and 1950s NGO official participation at the UN was limited to ECOSOC, the UN Department of Public Information, and the UN agencies with close working ties with NGOs, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO and WHO. With the growth of UN bodies over time, opportunities for institutional participation at the UN also increased. In the 1970s, new UN bodies were created in the areas of environment, agriculture and population – e.g. the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) – and all of these new organizations provided formal and informal mechanisms for INGO and NGO participation. (See Table 3.3.) To foster UN–NGO relations and provide support services to NGOs working with the UN, the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service was set up as an inter-agency project in 1975.

68 The global growth of NGOs It was in the mid-1980s and 1990s, however, that NGO access to many UN bodies improved significantly. First, NGO participation at UN organizations that NGOs have had longer ties to – e.g. ECOSOC, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO, IFAD and UNFPA – continued to expand and deepen in the 1990s. In addition to these traditionally NGO-friendly bodies, NGOs gained greater access to older UN organizations that had previously been closed to them. Compared with limited contacts prior to the 1980s, institutional access for NGOs at the World Bank and UNDP improved dramatically in the 1990s. At UN headquarters, since the 1990s NGOs have found it easier to attend UN General Assembly (UNGA) meetings and they work more with UNGA’s committees and subsidiary bodies. (UN 1998) NGO–UN relations in various UN departments at headquarters also became more active with the revival of an Inter-Departmental Working Group on NGOs in 1995 and a directive in 1997 by the UN Secretary-General to all departments to designate a NGO liaison officer. (UN 1998) By one count, there were 92 NGO liaison offices in the UN system by the early 1990s. (Alger 1994) In addition to these older UN bodies, in the 1990s numerous new UN bodies and inter-agency initiatives were created that specifically provided for NGO representation. These have included: the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at the UN Secretariat, the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Global Environment Facility, the UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Inter-Agency Learning Group on Participation, the Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty, Global Urban Partnerships and the Global Compact. (See Table 3.3.) Although the WTO was initially closed off to NGO participation when it was established in 1995, it later adopted measures to include NGOs in its activities, such as granting them observer status at WTO Ministerial Conferences, holding informal WTO–NGO dialogues, allowing access to WTO documents and circulating NGO policy statements to WTO member states. (WTO 2001) Institutionally, therefore, in the twenty-first century, the mainstreaming of NGOs as participants in the international system has advanced considerably and structural incentives for organizing at the international level are now greater than they were in previous periods. UN conferences Closely interrelated with this process of expanding incorporation of NGO participation at UN bodies is the rising number of UN conferences and treaties connected to them. A growth in the number of conferences, global “Action Plans” and international treaties as well as increasingly flexible rules for NGO participation at conferences over time have also been stimuli for NGO emergence and growth. As other scholars have noted, starting in the 1970s, an increase in the number of UN international conferences and expanding access for NGOs at these conferences have offered a greater number of international opportunities for activists to organize and have encouraged the formation of new NGOs. (Friedman, Hockstetler and Clark 2005; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Willetts 1989b) Between 1976

The global growth of NGOs 69 and 1980, there were more UN conferences on global issues than there had been in the first 20 years of the UN’s history, and this trend continued in the 1980s and 1990s. (Willets 1989b) The 1990s in particular has been seen as a turning point, with the convening of eight major world summits between 1990 and 1996, all of which were attended by thousands of NGOs from all over the world. NGO participation at these conferences was actively encouraged by the UN, with the UN Secretariat often providing institutional support for conference participation and the organization of NGO “parallel forums” at which NGOs would meet among themselves. (Willetts 1989b and 1996) Rules and procedures for NGO participation at UN conferences have also become more expansive over time and allowed for more NGOs to participate. Compared with the 1970s, when the UN conference secretariats accepted applications only from NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status and from groups with “genuinely international character” that had a demonstrable interest in the conference theme (Willets 1996), by the early 1990s the rules for accreditation at UN conferences had loosened up to allow for participation of practically any NGO that applied. (Friedman, Hockstetler and Clark 2005; Van Rooy 1997) These changes have allowed for greater participation of NGOs from developing countries, whose number soared in the 1990s as more conferences were held in major cities in the developing world. The rise in number of conferences has been part of a larger growth of the UNcentered international political system of new bodies, treaties, conventions and “Action Plans” which have also provided new political opportunities for NGOs. (Smith 2000; Passy 1999) International conferences have helped create new UN bodies that have subsequently worked closely with NGOs, such as UNFPA (Willetts 1989b: 43), UNEP (Conca 1996), the International Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (Stienstra 1994), IFAD, the Commission on Sustainable Development (Conca 1996: 113–114), and the Office of the UN Commissioner on Human Rights (Gaer 1996: 60–61). Many of the international conferences have turned into ongoing processes with follow-up conferences and meetings on the conference “Action Plan” blueprints that include NGO participation. Finally, international treaties and conventions signed at international conferences are also focal points for NGO organization and potential resource tools. Although they were often excluded in the provisions of earlier conventions and treaties, by the mid- to late 1980s, NGOs were included in the text of multilateral treaties as stakeholders or participants and were given wider access to documents and general implementation processes.2 (Raustiala 1997; Smith 1999) Some treaties and conventions have also strengthened or created new working relations between UN bodies and NGOs, thereby providing NGOs with legitimacy and recognition. The Convention of the Rights of the Child, for example, has formed new alliances between child advocacy NGOs and UNICEF due to the appointed role of NGOs as monitors and implementers of the convention. (Stiles 1998: 203; Ritchie 1996: 183) In all these ways, higher levels of institutionalized politics at the international level and greater formal participation for NGOs have provided them with new opportunities and encouraged their growth.

70 The global growth of NGOs

Norm diffusion and the rise of a pro-NGO norm These expanding international political opportunities have clearly encouraged the global NGO boom of the 1980s and 1990s, but why did these particular changes come about in the first place? Why did political globalization end up taking a form that promoted NGOs? The growth over time in international opportunities for NGOs in the form of funding and political access did not occur in an ideological vacuum, and the second part of a top-down international explanation of NGO growth is the normative promotion of NGOs by IGOs, donor states and other members of the international community. In the 1980s and 1990s, a new pro-NGO norm emerged in several spheres of international politics that portrayed NGOs and civil society as critical partners of the state and advocates of the people. During this period, this pro-NGO norm was adopted and institutionalized at the UN and other IGOs, and it provides the ideational backdrop for the enormous expansion of funding opportunities and political access described above. In addition to providing the underlying rationale for the international funding and increasing participation of NGOs in international politics, the promotion of this pro-NGO norm has had much broader applications since it has also presented an idealized vision of the role of civil society in politics in general and a new international model for state–society relations that all states should adopt. As proNGO norms have been adopted in many international arenas, states – especially those that were laggards in terms of their policies vis-à-vis NGOs and their relatively low numbers of NGOs – have come under normative pressure to adopt more NGO-friendly policies at home. The international championing of the proNGO norm since the 1980s and 1990s, in other words, also represents an effort by IGOs, donor countries and other international actors to socialize states to embrace the ideal of NGOs as partners and advocates of the people. Although not all states have positively responded to such international normative pressure, this socialization story is an important one for understanding the larger causes of the general NGO boom since the 1980s. International pressure from above has opened up political space and opportunities for NGOs at the national level, which in turn has been a source of growth in the number of NGOs in recent years. In this section I present the pro-NGO norm and describe how it emerged and was institutionalized in various global political arenas and processes. While NGOs have been officially recognized as important actors in international politics since the early postwar period, when they were mentioned in the UN Charter, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the UN and other international actors actively started to promote NGOs and their participation in both international and national governance. The norm emerged first among wealthy donor countries and the international development community in the 1980s and then increasingly made its appearance at the UN and its conferences and programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After presenting this new pro-NGO norm, I provide one brief example of how members of the international donor community promoted the diffusion of the norm through a global campaign for more liberal laws regulating NGOs.

The global growth of NGOs 71 The new pro-NGO norm Although NGOs were rhetorically promoted at the national level as a more democratic form of foreign aid in the 1970s in donor countries that had NGO support programs, it was not until the 1980s that official promotion of NGOs at the international level started to gain momentum. A new celebratory official promotion of NGOs first appeared in international development circles in the early to mid1980s among bilateral aid agencies and foundations as they began considering a new model to replace the state-led model of development that had dominated for two decades. At this time, numerous official studies by both bilateral and multilateral aid agencies examining the role of NGOs in development concluded that they offered an ideal alternative channel for aid. Most of these studies pointed to a similar set of functional, economic and political advantages of using NGOs to promote development: their ability to reach poor communities directly, their costeffectiveness, their more flexible and innovative approach to problems, their ability to increase popular participation in projects and their emphasis on self-help. (Brown and Korten 1991; Cernea 1988: 17–18; OECD 1988) This new view of NGOs reflected a paradigm shift away from a state-led development model – which was increasingly viewed as a failure – toward a neoliberal hybrid model that included “people participatory” development and private sector actors (Chabbott 1999; Stiles 1998; DAC 1995). In the donor search for new methods and mechanisms that could overcome the inefficiencies and corruption of the state in foreign aid programs, NGOs appeared to be the solution. According to the new model, development would now be promoted from below, and NGOs would be the ideal vehicles for reaching and including the “people.” In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the expansion of democratization programs in most aid budgets, this general trend among donor agencies then became an all-embracing movement that glorified the importance of “civil society” and included not only service NGOs – which were the main focus of attention in the 1980s – but the more politically active advocacy NGOs (Ottaway and Carothers 2000). Dubbed by some skeptics as the “New Policy Agenda” (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Edwards 1994), NGOs were now viewed as ideal institutions for the new mix of neoliberal economics and democratic theory promoted by the industrialized nations in the post-Cold War world. (Fisher 1997; Petras 1997) On the one hand, as service providers that reached the poor, NGOs provided a safety net and an antidote to both state and market failure; on the other hand, as organizations with connections to local populations, NGOs were also seen as vehicles for democratization and components of a thriving “civil society” that needed to be nurtured (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Hulme and Edwards 1997). Behind the huge increases in funds channeled through NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s described earlier, therefore, there was a normative vision of NGOs as partners of the state and advocates of the people who would help both states and IGOs achieve the multifarious global goals of this period, such as democracy, economic development, justice, human rights, accountability, good governance and people participation. (Fowler 1999; Zaidi 1999; Maren 1997) In this new context, in order to be a properly functioning and democratic state, it now became

72 The global growth of NGOs necessary to have a flourishing “civil society” sector with many NGOs. States with low levels of NGOs were now potentially seen as undemocratic, especially in comparison with states with more active NGO sectors. On a separate but overlapping track, this new pro-NGO norm also appeared at the UN in the early 1990s, and during the course of the 1990s it was institutionalized in diplomatic rhetoric and UN programming through numerous UN world conferences. At every major international conference held by the UN in the 1990s, NGOs were formally recognized in conference documents as important participants in normatively charged terms and were repeatedly described in UN conference documents in the 1990s as partners of the UN and member states that would help them both deliver the international goods promoted at the conference (e.g. sustainable development, human rights, women’s rights, etc.) and be advocates and the voice of the people. In both senses, NGOs were designated “partners” at UNCED (1992), the World Conference on Human Rights (1993), the International Conference on Populations and Development (1994), the World Summit for Social Development (1995), the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and Habitat II (1996). Table 3.4 provides excerpts from the action plans of these major conferences that show how the new understanding of NGOs was codified and promoted in a wide range of international political and governance processes. Inclusion of NGOs as official UN partners in the various plans of action formulated at global UN conferences in the 1990s in turn led to further institutionalization and reinforcing of the pro-NGO norm at various UN agencies, many of which now had an official mandate to support and include NGOs in their programs. Following each global conference, UN agencies responsible for implementing the conference action plan embraced the pro-NGO norm by publicizing their support of NGOs, creating new forms of UN–NGO collaboration, and promoting civil society participation in their programs with developing and transitional countries. This process was also reinforced by donor state activism within specific IGOs, with certain donor states contributing special IGO funds earmarked for NGOs and using their influence as donors to get the IGO to incorporate the pro-NGO norm further into its programming and operations. By the end of the 1990s, therefore, a substantial portion of the international political system had institutionalized the notion of NGOs as partners and advocates, and was engaged in activities with member states that promoted the status of NGOs. The donor movement for more liberal NGO legislation In addition to mainstreaming NGO involvement in UN conferences, agencies and programs, the pro-NGO norm has been promoted as an international standard for states to follow. As noted above, according to the pro-NGO norm, in order to be seen as a properly functioning and democratic state, it now became necessary to have a thriving NGO sector. States were now urged to recognize NGOs as partners and advocates of the people, and through a variety of international initiatives and processes, states – especially those with weak NGO sectors and/or repressive policies vis-à-vis NGOs – came under international pressure to open up domestic

The global growth of NGOs 73 Table 3.4 Excerpts mentioning “participatory development” and NGOs in the action plans of major international world conferences, 1990s International forum and action plan

Sections mentioning participatory development, the role of NGOs and NGO participation

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992): Agenda 21

Participatory development: “One of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making. Furthermore, in the more specific context of environment and development, the need for new forms of participation has emerged. This includes the need of individuals, groups and organizations to participate in environmental impact assessment procedures and to know about and participate in decisions, particularly those which potentially affect the communities in which they live and work.” (Chapter 23, Paragraph 2 – 23.2) “Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy. Their credibility lies in the responsible and constructive role they play in society. Formal and informal organizations, as well as grass-roots movements, should be recognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21.” (27.1) The Role and participation of NGOs: “Non-governmental organizations . . . possess well-established and diverse experience, expertise and capacity in fields which will be of particular importance to the implementation and review of environmentally sound and socially responsible sustainable development, as envisaged throughout Agenda 21. The community of non-governmental organizations, therefore, offers a global network that should be tapped, enabled and strengthened in support of efforts to achieve these common goals.” (27.3) “To ensure that the full potential contribution of nongovernmental organizations is realized, the fullest possible communication and cooperation between international organizations, national and local governments and nongovernmental organizations should be promoted in institutions mandated, and programs designed to carry out Agenda 21.” (27.4)

World Conference on Human Rights (1993): Vienna Declaration and Program of Action

Link between human rights, participation and development: “Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives . . .”(1.8)

(continued)

74 The global growth of NGOs Table 3.4 Continued International forum and action plan

Sections mentioning participatory development, the role of NGOs and NGO participation The role and participation of NGOs: “The World Conference on Human Rights recognizes the important role of non-governmental organizations in the promotion of all human rights and in humanitarian activities at national, regional and international levels. The World Conference on Human Rights appreciates their contribution to increasing public awareness of human rights issues, to the conduct of education, training and research in this field, and to the promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms . . .” (1.38) “The World Conference on Human Rights recommends that non-governmental and other grass-roots organizations active in development and/or human rights should be enabled to play a major role on the national and international levels in the debate, activities and implementation relating to the right to development and, in cooperation with Governments, in all relevant aspects of development cooperation.” (1.73)

International Conference on Population and Development (1994): Program of Action

Role of NGOs as voices of the people and service providers in development: “Non-governmental organizations are important voices of the people, and their associations and networks provide an effective and efficient means of better focusing local and national initiatives and addressing pressing population, environmental, migration and economic and social development concerns.” (15.3) “Non-governmental organizations are actively involved in the provision of programme and project services in virtually every area of socio-economic development, including the population sector . . . Their strength and credibility lies in the responsible and constructive role they play in society and the support their activities engender from the community as a whole. Formal and informal organizations and networks, including grass-roots movements, merit greater recognition at local, national and international levels as valid and valuable partners for the implementation of the present Programme of Action.” (15.4) “All countries should establish appropriate national follow-up, accountability and monitoring mechanisms, in partnership with non-governmental organizations, community groups and representatives of the media and the academic community, as well as with the support of parliamentarians.” (16.10)

World Summit for Social Development (1995): Program of Action

Participatory social development: “The ultimate goal of social development is to improve and enhance the quality of life of all people. It requires democratic institutions, respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, increased and equal economic opportunities, the rule of law, the promotion of respect for cultural diversity and the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and an active

The global growth of NGOs 75 Table 3.4 Continued International forum Sections mentioning participatory development, and action plan the role of NGOs and NGO participation involvement of civil society. Empowerment and participation are essential for democracy, harmony and social development.” (1.7) The role and participation of NGOs and civil society: “It is essential for social development that all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development as an integral part of fundamental human rights, be promoted and protected through the following actions: “. . . (j) Strengthening the ability of civil society and the community to participate actively in the planning, decision-making and implementation of social development programmes, by education and access to resources . . . ” (1.15) “Effective implementation of the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and the Programme of Action of the Summit requires strengthening community organizations and non-profit non-governmental organizations in the spheres of education, health, poverty, social integration, human rights, improvement of the quality of life, and relief and rehabilitation, enabling them to participate constructively in policy-making and implementation. This will require: “(a) Encouraging and supporting the creation and development of such organizations, particularly among the disadvantaged and vulnerable people; “(b) Establishing legislative and regulatory frameworks, institutional arrangements and consultative mechanisms for involving such organizations in the design, implementation and evaluation of social development strategies and programmes; “(c) Supporting capacity-building programmes for such organizations in critical areas, such as participatory planning, programme design, implementation and evaluation, economic and financial analysis, credit management, research, information and advocacy; “(d) Providing resources through such measures as small grant programmes, and technical and other administrative support for initiatives taken and managed at the community level . . .” (5.85) Fourth World Conference on Women (1995): Beijing Platform for Action

Empowerment of women as part of people-centered development: “The Platform for Action is an agenda for women’s empowerment . . . A transformed partnership based on equality between women and men is a condition for people-centered sustainable development.” (1.1) The role and participation of NGOs: “Non-governmental organizations have played an important advocacy role in advancing legislation or mechanisms to ensure the promotion of women. They have also become catalysts for new approaches to development . . .” (2.26) (continued)

76 The global growth of NGOs Table 3.4 Continued International forum and action plan

Sections mentioning participatory development, the role of NGOs and NGO participation “Non-governmental organizations should be encouraged to contribute to the design and implementation of these strategies or national plans of action. They should also be encouraged to develop their own programmes to complement government efforts. Women’s organizations and feminist groups, in collaboration with other non-governmental organizations, should be encouraged to organize networks, as necessary, and to advocate for and support the implementation of the Platform for Action by Governments and regional and international bodies.” (5. 298) “International non-governmental organizations have an important role to play in implementing the Platform for Action. Consideration should be given to establishing a mechanism for collaborating with non-governmental organizations to promote the implementation of the Platform at various levels.” (5. 344)

Habitat II (1996): Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements

Partnerships, participation and adequate housing: “Partnerships among countries and among all actors within countries from public, private, voluntary and community-based organizations, the cooperative sector, non-governmental organizations and individuals are essential to the achievement of sustainable human settlements development and the provision of adequate shelter for all and basic services. Partnerships can integrate and mutually support objectives of broad-based participation through, inter alia, forming alliances, pooling resources, sharing knowledge, contributing skills and capitalizing on the comparative advantages of collective actions. The processes can be made more effective by strengthening civil organizations at all levels . . .” (2.33) “Empowerment and participation contribute to democracy and sustainable human settlements development. Policy formulation and implementation by Governments should be guided by the principles of accountability, transparency and broad-based public participation. (4.179) The role and participation of NGOs and civil society: “Sustainable human settlements development requires the active engagement of civil society organizations, as well as the broadbased participation of all people. It equally requires responsive, transparent and accountable government at the local level. Civic engagement and responsible government both necessitate the establishment and strengthening of participatory mechanisms . . .” (4.181) “The effective implementation of the Habitat Agenda requires strengthening local authorities, community organizations and non-governmental organizations in the spheres of education, health, poverty eradication, human rights, social integration, infrastructure and improvement of the quality of life, and relief

The global growth of NGOs 77 Table 3.4 Continued International forum and action plan

Sections mentioning participatory development, the role of NGOs and NGO participation and rehabilitation, enabling them to participate constructively in policy-making and implementation. This will require: “(a) Establishing legislative and regulatory frameworks, institutional arrangements and consultative mechanisms for involving organizations in the design, implementation and evaluation of human settlements strategies and programmes; “(b) Supporting capacity-building programmes for such organizations in critical areas such as participatory planning, programme design, implementation and evaluation, economic and financial analysis, credit management, research, information and advocacy; “(c) Providing resources through such measures as grant programmes, and technical and other administrative support for initiatives taken and managed at the community level . . .” (4.237)

Sources: The texts are available online at the following URLs. For Agenda 21: www.igc.apc.org/habitat/ agenda21/index.html. For World Conference on Human Rights: www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/ (Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument. For International Conference on Population and Development: www.iisd.ca/linkages/Cairo/program/p00000.html. For World Summit for Social Development: gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/unconfs/wssd/summit/off/a—9.en. For the Fourth World Conference on Women: gopher://gopher.undp.org: 70/00/undocs/gad/A/CONF.177/95_11/20. For Habitat II: www.undp.org/un/habitat/agenda/contents. html. Websites were accessed in May 2001. Note Quotes are from actual texts produced at each international conference.

opportunity structures and encourage the emergence and growth of NGOs. The pro-NGO norm thereby also became one of the reasons for domestic POS openings that in turn allowed for the rise and growth of the NGO sector in this period. One major example of the promotion of the pro-NGO norm can be found in efforts by international donors and UN bodies in the late 1980s and 1990s to encourage states to foster NGOs at the national level through adoption of more liberal legal and fiscal regulations. By the 1990s, donor institutions promoting the pro-NGO norm were finding that one common problem facing NGOs in many developing and transitional countries was the legal and fiscal climate for nonprofits. Difficulty to incorporate as a nonprofit, lack of tax breaks and other fiscal incentives, and tight restrictions on political activities all seemed to work against the emergence of the vibrant “civil society” promoted by the international community. In response, a movement for liberalizing laws regulating the nonprofit sector emerged in the 1990s. This movement is a good example of norm promotion since it is a clear example of donor states and IGOs attempting to “teach” states legal models from the West in order to make them more democratic and in line with international values.

78 The global growth of NGOs These efforts first started at a more informal level and behind-the-scenes manner in the mid- to late 1980s at the World Bank and other donor organizations. In the late 1980s, for example, World Bank officials urged several Asian countries during program consultations to reduce regulations hampering the growth of NGOs (Beckman 1991) and in one case made the creation of legal structures for grassroots organizations a precondition for receiving financing. (Cernea 1988: 39–40) It was in the 1990s, however, that a larger and more organized international movement for liberal NGO legislation picked up greater momentum and spread worldwide. During the 1990s, the World Bank took a more visibly proactive stance and started to present itself as a consultant to developing countries on NGO legislation. Ensuring an “enabling” environment for NGOs and civil society, the Bank argued, was part of its mandate for working with NGOs. (World Bank 2001a) In 1992, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) was established in Washington, D.C., as a nonprofit organization dedicated to “facilitate and support the development of civil society and freedom of association on a global basis.” (ICNL 2002) Funded by and working closely with bilateral and multilateral agencies, the ICNL has given advice to countless governments regarding NGO legislation and has provided the legal expertise for Western donor efforts at promoting legal reform. In 1997, in collaboration with the World Bank, the ICNL produced a Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations which was distributed widely and promoted through a series of World Bank conferences focusing on legal change in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Throughout the decade, the Ford Foundation and several other major private foundations from North America, Europe and Japan devoted a portion of their resources toward non-profit development and legal reform and were active in the global diffusion of the debate on NGO legislation through conferences, studies and publications. Since the mid-1990s, the UNHCR and the Council of Europe have worked together to promote legal reform for NGOs in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. (UNHCR 2000: 201–202) In addition to these organizations, other official promoters of this movement have included the regional development banks, USAID and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). By the late 1990s, therefore, a donor-led global movement for the adoption of more liberal NGO legislation was in full swing. From the early 1990s to the present, the ICNL and its international funders have advised and promoted NGO legislation to 14 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 12 in the Asia-Pacific region, 9 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 3 in the Middle East and North Africa, 10 in the newly independent states and 7 in Sub-Saharan Africa. (ICNL 2002; ICNL website program page: http://www.icnl.org/programs/index.htm, accessed 3/15/2009) This is just one example of the many efforts started in the 1980s and 1990s by the international community to get states to adopt the pro-NGO norm. Taken together, these efforts represent a significant change in the international political environment for NGOs that has helped bring about changes in the domestic POS in many countries.

The global growth of NGOs 79

Societal diffusion and the spread of ideas In addition to states, societal actors have been affected by the changing international political climate and the normative promotion of NGOs by international actors. During the past 25 to 30 years, activists, many of whom had previously worked in isolation at the local or national level, have been drawn into the realm of international politics and have entered into their own separate track of global socializing and transnational learning. As new international opportunities appeared and as international actors proactively sought to support “civil society” in all parts of the world, these activists came into contact with new ideas and began to adopt new organizational forms, strategies and identities. The spread of NGOs as an organizational form from the West to other parts of the world is also a product of the diffusion of ideas and practices at the societal level. This section briefly examines how political globalization processes have also enabled the diffusion and adoption of new types of activism, such as forming an NGO. One challenge for theories of transnational diffusion of social movements and ideas found in the early social movement literature has been the issue of overcoming geographical space. By providing a new sort of political space that brings together people from all corners of the world, the growth of international organizations and regimes has increased opportunities for the diffusion of movements and ideas among activists. At international conferences, for example, activists overcome spatial challenges, and the increase in numbers of conferences over time has produced more potential opportunities for transnational societal interaction and exchange of ideas. With some of the larger and more established NGOs often serving as supporters and models, new interactions and learning processes at the international level among societal actors have provided organizers with inspiration and tools for organizing at home. This sort of diffusion of ideas has been especially prominent in the case of advocacy NGOs since a large portion of the activity at UN conferences is focused on state policies. The new international networks and personal connections formed in preparation for and during international conferences have provided a two-way exchange of ideas that has supplied new organizational ideas for activists in developing countries and has given Western NGOs a better understanding of the complex reality facing activists in developing and transitional countries. (Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Chen 1996) These interactions have also been a source of the creation of new NGOs, new national networks, and the adoption of new forms of action, such as lobbying, media-targeted strategies and petitions. (Tarrow 2005; Reimann 2001a) Learning how to lobby and network at international meetings has led to attempts by activists to organize at the national level and has given organizers new ideas for forming an NGO and employing new forms of action. The Indian rights movement in Latin America was born in the transnational space of international conferences and contacts with international actors (Brysk 1994), and it provides a prominent example of how activists previously blocked at the national level learned new tactics from their international experiences, formed new NGOs and

80 The global growth of NGOs networks, and adopted new forms of action that led to greater political activism. (Passy 1999; Maiguashca 1994) UNCED and other major international conferences in the 1990s were for many activists and groups their first experience at an international event, and being part of the UNCED process was a first step in getting involved in new networks, new international campaigns, and new forms of transnational cooperation. In addition to learning how NGOs function at the UN, groups and individuals attending UN conferences have taken home with them lessons for organizing their own campaigns and have made new transnational contacts that can provide them with advice and support. (Sperling 1999) Although much of the diffusion of ideas has involved the adoption by developing country NGOs of Western NGOs’ organizational and tactical strategies, it has also been the case that Western NGOs have learned a great deal from the interactions and have sometimes changed their transnational goals and strategies as a result. (Keck and Sikkink 1998) Activists and new NGOs have not only learned from the more experienced NGOs that they have met at international conferences and campaigns but have been influenced by IGO and donor involvement in supporting NGOs and civil society. Some of the IGO programs and projects mentioned earlier in this chapter, for example, involve training and interactive learning processes that have supported NGO growth in areas where NGOs have lacked resources and public support domestically. UNDP’s Sustainable Development Networking Program of the 1990s provided systematic support for the development, use and better understanding of information technology for NGOs in developing countries. In addition to seed money for setting up national electronic networks and internet services, this UNDP program provided training, advice and other forms of assistance which encouraged groups to use new technology and organize in new ways. (www.sdnp.undp.org/services, accessed 4/24/01) UNDP also sponsored workshops, training sessions and interactive networks to prepare NGOs from developing countries to participate in the various UN international conferences of the 1990s. (www.undp.org/ csopp/csobroch.htm, accessed 11/27/99) The World Bank has also sponsored countless NGOs’ workshops, seminars and consultations at the national level that have provided learning experiences and diffusion of ideas among activists and groups. “Capacity building” programs and initiatives for NGOs run by the Bank, UNDP and other international donors have provided training to NGOs and have also sometimes involved interactive forums in which a variety of actors meet to learn from shared experiences. (World Bank 1995 and 1999) In 1998, at the initiative of NGOs in developing countries, the International Forum on Capacity Building of Southern NGOs (IFCB) was launched as an ongoing forum for the international donor community and Western NGOs to work in a more coordinated way with NGOs in developing countries to help strengthen them.3 This initiative, which involved more than 1,000 NGOs, was just one of many transnational projects set up during this period that were designed to teach, train and support leaders in developing countries in their efforts toward organizing NGOs. They are ongoing and continue to be part of the global exchange of ideas supporting organized NGO activism.

The global growth of NGOs 81 All of these examples show that IGOs and various projects sponsored by the international donor community have actively supported the diffusion of ideas among societal actors in ways that have promoted the formation and growth of NGOs. Compared with previous periods of time, there have been many more opportunities for activists to learn about new forms of organization, activism and how to become an effective NGO.

Summary and conclusion This chapter has presented the changing institutional architecture of global politics and how processes of political globalization have stimulated the spread of NGOs worldwide. The growth and evolution of an international system of governance has produced a new layer of activism from above: in the past several decades, a sharp increase in funding opportunities, new avenues for political access and the normative promotion of NGOs by IGOs and donor states have created a political and material environment ripe for NGO formation. Given the billions of dollars of international funding now available to NGOs in all corners of the globe, it is hardly surprising that there has been an explosive growth in the number of NGOs since the 1980s – if anything, it would have been more surprising if there had not been an NGO boom. Political globalization has encouraged NGO growth in both industrialized and developing countries. The impact of international funding opportunities has been particularly dramatic in developing and transitional countries that have been the targets of “people participatory” and civil society aid. Country-level studies done by scholars in the past decade have shown that the appearance of international funding, international conferences and the normative promotion of NGOs preceded the sudden increase in the number of NGOs in many countries in Asia (Stiles 2001; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Edwards and Hulme 1996), Central and South America (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Petras 1997; Sollis 1996; Macdonald 1994), Africa (Barrow and Jennings 2001; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ndegwa 1994) and Eastern and Central Europe (Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Wedel 1998; Quigley 1997; Sampson 1996). Although external support has not necessarily always succeeded in creating robust, healthy NGO sectors in all countries, it has certainly raised the total number of NGOs and in several cases helped create mega NGOs with huge service capacity. Processes of political globalization have also been an important reason for the NGO boom in industrialized countries in the past two decades. In Western countries where NGOs were already numerous, political globalization processes in the 1980s–1990s were both a source of inspiration for new NGOs and an opportunity for older, more established NGOs to expand. For NGOs in these countries, the changes in the international system during this period greatly enhanced the resources and opportunities NGOs already enjoyed within their own countries, allowing some of them to become powerful global players. In industrialized countries that entered this period with a relatively smaller number of NGOs, on the other hand, political globalization processes were, if anything, an even more

82 The global growth of NGOs important factor contributing to the NGO boom and the development of the NGO sector in general. In these countries, activists often faced domestic obstacles to organizing, and activism from above provided them not only much needed material resources but new political and ideological resources to help them overcome some of these obstacles. The next part of this book will examine one such case: Japan. As the following chapters will show, political globalization processes and the international promotion of NGOs have been crucial factors behind the sudden growth of NGOs since the 1980s, even in resource-rich countries such as Japan.

4

International development NGOs in Japan

In the early 1980s, NGOs were still so few in number in Japan that the phrase nongovernmental organization – or NGO – itself was practically unknown. Since then, however, this situation has changed dramatically. Starting from a small number of groups that appeared in the 1970s or earlier, there are now hundreds of NGOs active in global issues ranging from poverty alleviation to global warming to women’s rights. With this rapid growth, Japanese NGOs are now a clearly defined sub-sector and have become an established interest group in Japanese politics. What accounts for this sudden growth and activeness of NGOs in Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s? The next two chapters examine this pattern of delayed development in two kinds of NGO in Japan: service NGOs active in international development; and advocacy NGOs promoting sustainable development and environmental issues. Building on the theories and findings of the first part of the book, these chapters use the activism from above model to explore how changes in the political environment have supported NGO activism. Like NGOs from many other parts of the world, Japanese NGOs form part of the second wave of global NGO activism of the 1980s–1990s that has been supported by changes in both the domestic and international political landscapes. On the one hand, domestic political structures mattered. As Chapter Two showed, compared with the Western countries that produced the first wave of NGOs in the 1950s–1970s, for much of the postwar period the domestic political environment in Japan was not conducive to the flourishing of NGOs. Legal barriers, lack of fiscal incentives for fundraising, lack of government support programs, and poor or no access to important political institutions and players meant that Japan was one of the most difficult countries in the industrialized world in which to set up an NGO. (Pekkanen 2006) It was only when domestic political barriers started to break down in the late 1980s and early 1990s that NGOs in Japan started to grow and become a more visible presence. But domestic changes were gradual and are only part of the story. The other important political shift in this period was international in nature; and to understand how and why key domestic political changes came about in the first place, one needs to examine the ways in which international factors influenced activists, the state and domestic politics. As outlined in Chapter Three, in the 1980s and 1990s processes of political globalization encouraged the growth of NGOs

84 International development NGOs in Japan from above in many countries. Activists in Japan were affected by these global developments and both benefited and used them strategically to their advantage in their efforts to organize and establish NGOs domestically. This interaction of international and domestic politics is at the core of this and the following chapter, which examine how domestic politics were affected by the three types of international process associated with political globalization examined in Chapter Three: international political opportunities, socialization of the state, and the transnational diffusion of ideas. This chapter focuses on international development NGOs (IDNGOs) and the central role of international norms and socialization processes in changing state policies vis-à-vis IDNGOs in the late 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. From 1989, the Japanese government created several new programs to support Japanese IDNGOs and their overseas projects; by the mid-1990s, these NGO support programs were providing millions of dollars of much needed funding to support and nurture this sub-sector of NGOs. It was in this context of widening political opportunities in the form of expanding state funding that Japanese IDNGOs emerged and grew as a new sector. These developments are similar to the emergence of IDNGOs as a new sector in North America and parts of Europe in earlier decades (see Chapter Two), where state support programs and expanding institutional access fostered the growth of IDNGOs from above. But why did these new NGO support programs appear in Japan in this period? Why, after decades of excluding NGOs, did several Japanese government ministries suddenly start funding and promoting NGOs as “broad-based participation of the people” (MOFA 1994)? This question is all the more puzzling given that there was relatively little domestic pressure for such policy changes: when the government programs for NGOs were first set up there was no wellorganized NGO lobby pushing for such initiatives, and there was little general popular pressure for such programs, since most Japanese did not even know what an NGO was. This chapter explores this puzzle and argues that international political forces mattered. While domestic politics also contributed to policy changes over time, the larger context of international politics and international socialization processes were important in reshaping domestic politics and inspiring state officials to adopt the particular policies they chose. As this chapter will show, international ideas and norms about the importance of NGOs in the development process and foreign aid made their way to Japan and provided the rational for the new NGO support programs when they were first set up. Once these programs were in place, NGOs themselves started to use international norms strategically to strengthen their position and by the mid- to late 2000s the globally promoted ideals of partnership with and participation of NGOs had become a standard component of Japanese foreign aid and policy-making. This chapter presents this story and shows how international factors interacted with domestic processes to support the rise and growth of NGOs in Japan. In addition to international norms and socialization processes, it examines the other two factors of international political opportunity and transnational diffusion of

International development NGOs in Japan 85 ideas to show how activists and Japanese society also directly engaged in the process of change through its ties to the international arena of resources and ideas.

The delayed arrival of development NGOs in Japan Comparatively speaking, Japanese IDNGOs are a relatively recent phenomenon. In the late 1960s and 1970s, a time of rapid growth of IDNGOs in many industrialized countries (Chabbott 1999: 227; Smith 1990; Bolling 1984), Japan still had only a very small number of IDNGOs which were small-scale and practically invisible in the field. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the number of IDNGOs in selected OECD countries in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of numbers of IDNGOs adjusted for population. By either measure, Japan has trailed behind other countries. This was particularly true in the 1960s, when there were only 14 Japanese IDNGOs listed in the 1967 OECD NGO Directory. (OECD–ICVA 1967) These early Japanese IDNGOs were also often different types of organizations from the Western NGOs. Reflecting Japan’s so-called strong state and close state–business relations, many of the Japanese IDNGOs listed in the 1967 OECD NGO Directory were either parastatal organizations or groups affiliated with business or labor. While industry and labor affiliated organizations comprised only 8 percent of the entire set of IDNGOs listed in the Directory, they accounted for about 43 percent of the Japanese groups.1 (Lissner 1977: 35; OECD–ICVA 1967) In contrast to the early Japanese groups, Western IDNGOs tended to have a stronger citizen and/or religious tint with private voluntary church-affiliated groups and mission societies comprising a relatively large share of the IDNGO sector in both North America and Europe. (Lissner 1977: 35) Although the IDNGO sector in Japan remains less developed than those in many other OECD member countries, it has nonetheless grown tremendously since the late 1980s and is now comprised mainly of citizen-initiated groups. As Figure 4.1 indicates, there was a big jump in the number of listings of Japanese NGOs in the OECD directories in 1990 and 1998. Using combined data from the OECD and directories compiled by the Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), Figure 4.3 shows in greater detail the dramatic increase in the number of IDNGOs in the 1980s and 1990s in Japan. Those decades represent a quantitatively distinct phase of growth. In the 1980s and 1990s, 76 percent of all IDNGOs listed in the directories were founded and nearly half of all Japanese IDNGOs were formed after 1990. In contrast, only 5 percent of all IDNGOs were established in the 1960s and only 11 percent in the 1970s. It is only in recent years, therefore, that IDNGOs have grown into a visible sector that includes hundreds of groups. The groups found in this combined data set present an evolution of IDNGOs in Japan that generally coincides with observations found in the Japanese literature on NGOs. (Itoh 2004 and 2007; Shigeta 2005 and 2007; Hirata 2002; Menju 1995 and 2000; Tanaka 1996; Saitoh 1989; Yoshida 1997; Iwasaki 1993) In the interwar era, most of the groups were Christian-affiliated, such as the YMCA and organizations that focused on leprosy and other medical care. In the early postwar years through the mid- to late 1960s, UN-related groups, groups dedicated to

86 International development NGOs in Japan 600

500 France

Number of IDNGOs

Switzerland

400

UK Canada

300

Netherlands Germany Sweden

200

Japan Italy

100

0 1967

1981

1990

1996/98

Year

Figure 4.1 Number of IDNGOs in selected OECD countries, 1967–1998 Source: OECD–ICVA 1967, OECD 1981, 1990, 1996, 1998.

Number of IDNGOs/million population

30

25 Sweden Netherlands

20

Canada France

15

UK USA Germany

10

Italy Japan

5

0 1967

1981

1990

1996/98

Year

Figure 4.2 Number of IDNGOs per million population, 1967–1996/98 Source: OECD–ICVA 1967, OECD 1981, 1990, 1996, 1998.

International development NGOs in Japan 87 600

Number of IDNGOs

500

400 Total NGOs

300

New NGOs

200

100

0 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s

Decade

Figure 4.3 Japanese international development NGOs, 1870s–1990s Source: OECD–ICVA 1967, OECD 1981, 1990, JANIC 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004.

agricultural development and Christian and other religious-affiliated groups comprised a fairly large portion of new IDNGOs, in addition to the government-, business- and labor-affiliated groups listed in the OECD–ICVA 1967 Directory mentioned above. In the 1970s, newly established IDNGOs were more citizen-led and had a strong regional focus on development issues in Asia, mainly in the areas of child welfare, education, medical aid and agriculture. In the early 1980s, a burst of new IDNGOs formed in response to the refugee crisis in Indochina. During the 1980s, in addition to the types of groups that had already started to form in the 1970s, branches of Western IDNGOs started to appear in greater number as well as IDNGOs with operations outside of Asia and groups that specialized in “fair trade” with developing countries. In the 1990s and 2000s, the geographical scope of operations also expanded considerably and a larger number of NGOs began to provide overseas assistance in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Since the late 1980s–1990s, what had previously been a fairly small collection of IDNGOs became a full-fledged sector that was also more citizen-based.

Changing state policies and NGO growth How does one account for the sudden burst of NGOs in the late 1980s and 1990s? As Chapter One has already shown, socio-economic factors such as rising wealth, economic interdependence, media diffusion and education do not seem to have been decisive. Japan already had high levels of such socio-economic factors in the 1970s; so, if these factors were necessary and sufficient, the NGO boom should

88 International development NGOs in Japan have started earlier than it did. Similarly, although Japan experienced a burst of wealth in the mid- to late 1980s with the rise of the bubble economy, in the 1990s the country entered a long period of economic recession, which theoretically should have discouraged NGO formation. Political factors and changes in the political context provide a more consistent explanation: IDNGOs emerged as a new sector of activism in Japan as political opportunities and the domestic political environment improved for them. While domestic political structures and policies were highly unfavorable for forming an IDNGO for most of the inter- and postwar periods, important policy changes and political openings appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s that provided more resources and political space for activists interested in international development. New NGO support programs One of the most important policy changes in this period was the introduction of several new government funded and/or organized support programs for NGOs which provided grants or subsidies for overseas projects. Prior to the late 1980s, there were no official government programs supporting IDNGOs and few Japanese IDNGOs received any sort of state funding. Although a small handful of IDNGOs (fewer than 10 groups) have received state subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) since the early 1970s, most of these IDNGOs are state-sponsored organizations or groups which have close ties to either bureaucrats or politicians.2 The small amount of state funding available to IDNGOs before the late 1980s, in other words, was limited to a few insider groups and the process of obtaining funding was non-competitive and non-transparent. Compared with other OECD countries that set up far more generous NGO support programs in the 1950s–1970s (see Chapter Two), the Japanese government did not actively include NGOs in its foreign aid programs and did little to promote or nurture IDNGO activities overseas. This suddenly changed in 1989 and the early 1990s when several new funding schemes for IDNGOs appeared in several ministries. Figure 4.4 shows the growth of funds for IDNGOs among four government ministries or government-funded agencies: MOFA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and the Japan Environment Corporation (JEC). In addition to these state programs, much smaller programs for IDNGOs – training programs, joint study missions and small project grants – were set up in the early 1990s at the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of Construction, as well as by local governments coordinated by the Ministry of Home Affairs. (MOFA 1996a and 2007) In the late 1990s and early 2000s a second wave of NGO support programs appeared, first at JICA in 1999 with its new contracting out system for NGOs and then at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in 2001. These new programs mark a major shift in state policies toward IDNGOs in the 1990s.

International development NGOs in Japan 89 200 180

US $, million

160 140

Total

120

MOFA

100

MPT

80

JEC

60

JICA

40 20

03 20 04 20 05

20

20 02

19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01

19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97

0

Year

Figure 4.4 Japanese NGO support programs, 1991–2005 (US$ million) Sources: Government pamphlets and internal government documents, various years and email correspondence with MOFA officials. For MOFA: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/ seisaku_4/sei_4f.html (accessed 7/18/01). For JICA: http://www.jica.go.jp/partner/index.html# project (accessed 6/30/01) and internal government documents. For JFGE: Internal documents. For POSIVA: http://www.yu-cho.yusei.go.jp/volunteer-post/english/a2.htm (accessed 7/18/01 and 8/4/06). Notes Years are budgetary fiscal years. US dollar figures are calculated at $1=¥110.

MOFA Of all the state programs, the MOFA programs have been the earliest and largest. MOFA’s NGO programs are divided into those that are open to both Japanese and non-Japanese IDNGOs working in developing countries and those exclusively devoted to the support of the Japanese IDNGOs. The Grassroots Grants Program, set up in 1989, has provided small grants for development projects in developing countries designed and implemented by NGOs, national research institutes and local governments. This program is open to local NGOs, international NGOs and Japanese NGOs and has grown enormously since it was first set up – from $2.7 million in 1989 to $127 million in 2005. Since applications for the Grassroots Grants Program are administered by Japanese diplomatic offices in the field and not in Tokyo, however, Japanese NGOs have not been the major recipients of these grants.3 Besides the Grassroots Grants Program, there now are a variety of support programs for Japanese IDNGOs administered by MOFA’s NGO Assistance Division. The earliest program is the NGO Subsidies Scheme which was set up in 1989 and has provided small grants to Japanese IDNGOs for their overseas projects. As this program expanded throughout the 1990s from $1 million in 1989 to $10.9 million in 1997, it became an important source of funding for many Japanese NGOs throughout the 1990s. From 1999, MOFA started to scale down this program while diversifying and expanding other types of NGO support.

90 International development NGOs in Japan (MOFA 1999a and 1999b) That year MOFA began providing funds for emergency relief, and in 2000 Japan Platform was set up as a mechanism for Japanese NGOs working in emergency relief to get funds raised from both public and private sources. (MOFA 2007) In 2002, MOFA started up a new, revamped grant assistance program for Japanese NGOs, which now includes funding for NGO projects, emergency relief efforts of Japan Platform, micro-credit assistance, mineclearance assistance and transportation of recycled goods. (MOFA 2007) MOFA also now provides some funds for administrative costs of IDNGOs, funds for research and training, and internship programs to build up human resources. (MOFA 2007 and 1999b) By the early 2000s, therefore, what had initially been a small NGO subsidy program had diversified to include emergency relief and a more multi-pronged effort to strengthen the IDNGO sector. Considering the relatively strong political support for NGOs in recent years, it seems likely that these programs will continue and perhaps even grow. (Nagasaka 2007: 290–293) MPT and JFGE The two other main state-supported programs that funded IDNGO projects in the 1990s were the MPT’s Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid (POSIVA) and JEC’s Japan Fund for the Global Environment (JFGE). Set up in 1991, POSIVA is not a government funding program per se but rather an innovative form of government-organized fundraising for IDNGOs. It is a special government postal savings account that allocates 20 percent or more of an account’s interest to a general fund that supports Japanese IDNGO projects in developing countries. Since these funds are not part of the Japanese government’s annual budget, they are less restrictive and easier to use than MOFA grants, and they became a very popular source of funding for IDNGOs in the mid-1990s – they funded the largest absolute number of IDNGO projects in the first half of that decade. This source of funding, however, started to shrink in the mid-1990s due to a sudden drop in interest rates and it has become a less reliable source of funding for IDNGOs since then.4 In addition to funding, POSIVA has also provided public relations benefits for IDNGOs with POSIVA posters and pamphlets about IDNGO projects visible in most of the 24,000 post offices across Japan throughout the 1990s.5 The JFGE was established as a semi-public fund within the quasi-governmental Japan Environment Corporation (JEC) in 1993. It provides small grants to IDNGOs and environmental NGOs for projects overseas and within Japan related to the global environment.6 While relatively smaller in size, this program expanded throughout the 1990s and has provided funds for hundreds of NGO projects. In addition to the grant program, JFGE has a small NGO support program that includes surveys on Japanese NGOs and training courses for NGOs on the basics of non-profit management, project development and environmental conservation. (JFGE no date)

International development NGOs in Japan 91 JICA In addition to these programs, several new NGO support initiatives have been set up at JICA since 1999. After running pilot programs that provided contracts to NGOs in 1996, the JICA Partnership Program was launched in 2000 as a contractstyle project-funding scheme that pays NGOs, universities and other nonprofit organizations to implement JICA technical assistance projects.7 (Interview with JICA officials, May 2005) JICA also has several NGO support programs that provide technical assistance and support, such as local “Japan Desks” in developing countries, a technician dispatch system and NGO staff training. There are now 25 JICA “Japan Desks” at embassies and field offices in Asia, Africa and Latin America which work with NGOs to coordinate projects, provide technical support and improve relations with NGOs at the field level.8 Upon NGO request, JICA experts have provided technical expertise on more than 50 NGO projects in the field as well as dozens of consultations for NGO headquarter offices in Japan. By the mid- to late 2000s, therefore, JICA had become a significant new state partner of Japanese NGOs in terms of both funding and capacity building. With the establishment and expansion of these major NGO support programs, state–IDNGO relations underwent a major transformation in the 1990s and early 2000s. In contrast to the period prior to 1989 when there were only a very small group of IDNGOs that received state support, by the end of the 1990s there were more than 700 IDNGO projects a year that received some kind of state-organized funding. (See Figure 4.5.) The type of groups that received funding also changed. Unlike in previous decades, when only a few well-connected IDNGOs with legal status as public interest corporations had access to official funds, most of the

800

Number of IDNGO projects

700 600 500 TOTAL projects 400 POSIVA 300 200

NGO Subsides and New Programs (MOFA)

100

Fund for Global Environ. (JEC) Grassroots Grants (MOFA)

0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year

Figure 4.5 Japanese IDNGO projects with official support, 1991–2000 Source: Government pamphlets and internal documents, various years.

92 International development NGOs in Japan IDNGOs that received these funds in the 1990s had no legal status and were more clearly autonomous from the state. In 1995, for example, about 80 percent of the IDNGOs receiving MOFA subsidies did not have legal status, 79 percent of all POSIVA grant recipients did not have legal status, and 65 percent of all JFGE grantees were not incorporated. (MPT 1996; JFGE 1996; www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/oda/category/ ngo/chart_4.html, accessed 7/18/01) The 1990s, in other words, was a fascinating period in which the Japanese state actively began to support IDNGOs that were autonomous groups with a more citizen flavor and not only groups with public interest corporation status. Since the passage of the 1998 NPO Law, most IDNGOs have obtained legal status as an NPO and from the 2000s many government programs began requiring legal status of some kind. This sudden appearance of funding for NGOs had a big effect on the development of IDNGOs in the 1990s and was an important source of IDNGO emergence and growth in this period. Given the fact that many of the tools used by NGOs to raise money in other industrialized countries, such as tax breaks on contributions and bulk mail rates, were not available to Japanese IDNGOs (see Chapter Two), these state support programs for NGOs were crucial new sources of funding supporting the NGO boom of the 1990s. Using data for IDNGOs collected by JANIC, Figure 4.6 shows the number of IDNGOs that received official funding between 1994 and 1998 by founding date. As the graph shows, a relatively large number of IDNGOs received some sort of official funding in the 1990s. Overall, 52 percent of the close to 400 IDNGOs listed in the JANIC NGO directories received some sort of official funding and 22.6 percent of them received 25 percent or more of their budget from an official source. Since funding information was not available for 133 groups which were listed in these directories and included in the

45

Number of IDNGOs

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

94

97 19

19

88

85

91 19

19

82

19

79

19

73

76

19

19

70

19

19

67

63

19

60

19

19

54

51

19

19

19

48

0

Founding Date All IDNGOs

All IDNGOs with official funds

IDNGOs with 25% or more official funds

Figure 4.6 Number of IDNGOs receiving official funding in the 1990s, by founding date Source: OECD–ICVA 1967, OECD 1981, 1990, JANIC 1998, 2000 for total number of IDNGOs, 1996, 1998, 2000 for IDNGOs with official funding.

International development NGOs in Japan 93 total number of IDNGOs used in the graph, the percentage of NGOs with state funding could be even higher.9 Of the 91 groups that received 25 percent or more of their funding from official sources, although most groups were in the 30–50 percent range of dependence on state funds, 11 percent of them had state funding levels of more than 60 percent. Another indication that state funding was important to the emergence and growth of the IDNGO sector is the fact that a large number of Japanese IDNGOs were set up in the early 1990s, shortly after these programs were created. As Figure 4.6 illustrates, in the mid- to late 1990s, a relatively large number of NGOs that had been set up in the early part of the decade used state funding to finance their overseas projects. New points of access In addition to the creation of new government programs promoting IDNGOs, by the mid-1990s there were changes in the political opportunity structure for IDNGOs and an opening of new access points to decision-makers and elites which also supported the growth of the sector. As noted in Chapter Two, prior to the 1990s, the domestic POS for NGOs in Japan was highly unfavorable, with few formal or institutional channels through which NGOs could lobby or communicate with the government. IDNGO representatives were never included on governmentappointed policy bodies that included societal representatives such as advisory councils (shingikai and kondankai). Except for a tiny number of “insider” groups, contacts between government officials and IDNGOs were very limited and there were few opportunities for exchange. The Diet also provided few opportunities for access or influence since most IDNGOs did not have any contacts with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a conservative party that showed relatively little interest in NGOs until the late 1990s. In the 1990s, however, together with the emergence and expansion of the new official funding schemes described above, there was a gradual opening up of access for IDNGOs at MOFA and other government agencies. New formal and informal bodies were created which provided IDNGOs with an opportunity to express their opinions and present their requests in an officially recognized setting. From the 1990s, IDNGOs were also appointed to sit on government advisory committees and councils and they became legitimized actors at this level of policymaking in Japan. Table 4.1 lists the major formal and informal official bodies that were set up in the 1990s which brought IDNGOs into the policy-making process and provided them with access to government officials which they previously did not have.

94 International development NGOs in Japan Table 4.1 Formal and informal official bodies that include IDNGOs, 1990s–early 2000s Name of body

Type of body

Year

Global Issues Initiative (GII) Consultation Dialogue

A study and recommendation group at MOFA focusing on issues relating to MOFA’s GII projects and programs in the areas of population, AIDS and other social sectors.

1994–ongoing

Community-Based Development Initiative (CDI-Japan)

A network of NGOs, local government, academic and community-based organizations interested in sustainable development. This network has provided informal and formal opportunities for IDNGO–local government collaboration.

1996–ongoing

MOFA–NGO Quarterly Meetings

A regular opinion and information exchange between IDNGO representatives and MOFA officials.

1996–ongoing

MOFA–NGO Joint Project Evaluations

A joint report process done by MOFA and IDNGOs which evaluates an IDNGO project and an ODA project in the field.

1997, 1999, 2000

Ministry of Finance MOF and NGO officials meet quarterly (MOF)–NGO Quarterly to exchange views on MOF’s Meetings international development- and international finance-related policies.

1997–ongoing

Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century

An advisory committee set up by MOFA to provide recommendations for ODA reform.

1997–1998

Committee for the Promotion of Collaboration of NGOs in Local Government International Cooperation

A committee set up at the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) to examine ways to deepen IDNGO–local government relations and collaboration.

1998

JICA–NGO Quarterly Meetings

Regular meetings between JICA and IDNGO officials to talk about JICA–IDNGO cooperation and JICA policy. There are also three subcommittees that meet separately: the Development Education Subcommittee, the Subcommittee to Examine JICA–NGO Collaboration, and the Joint Evaluation Subcommittee.

1998–ongoing

JICA–NGO Joint Training Seminar

Presentations and discussion on JICA and IDNGO project approaches. A new form of relationship building and networking.

1998, 1999

International development NGOs in Japan 95 Table 4.1 Continued Name of body

Type of body

Year

Subcommittee to Achieve the Objectives of the ODA Reform Council’s Final Report

A committee that discusses ODA reform measures taken by MOFA in response to recommendations made by the Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century in 1998.

1999–ongoing

Council on the Yen Loan System

An advisory council set up by MOFA for recommendations on the yen loan system.

2000

Council on Economic Cooperation with China for the 21st Century

An advisory council set up by MOFA to examine Japan’s international cooperation policies toward China.

2000

Second ODA Reform Council

The successor to the Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century. JANIC and JOICFP are the NGO representatives on this council.

2001

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)–NGO Quarterly Meetings

An opinion and information exchange forum for JBIC and NGOs modeled on quarterly meetings conducted in other government agencies.

2001–ongoing

Sources: For MOFA related meetings and groups: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/ seisaku_4/ sei_4f.html; http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_1/sei_1f.html; and http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_4/renkei/sougo.html, accessed 7/18/01. For MOF meetings: http://www.jacses.org/sdap/mof/index.html, accessed 12/29/01. For other meetings and councils: Chikyu Shimin, 63, January/February 1999; CLAIR 1999; CDI-Japan no date. For JICA: various internal JICA documents.

Explaining new state policies: international norms and socialization When the government introduced NGO support schemes in 1989, it did so not out of genuine appreciation of the role NGOs could play, but out of compulsion to catch up with the practice of other donor countries. The typical perception of NGOs held not only by bureaucrats but by the public in general was nonconformists or deviants, if not antagonists. Watanabe Tatsuya, writer and IDNGO practitioner (Watanabe 1995) Governments and aid organizations are not the only actors of international cooperation. A wide range of partnerships with various actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private-sector economy is necessary in order to further improve the effectiveness of Japan’s ODA. Foreign Minister Nakasone Hirofume, 2008 White Paper: Japan’s International Cooperation, February 9, 2009

96 International development NGOs in Japan During the 1990s, therefore, there was a sea change in state policies and institutional access for IDNGOs toward a much more open and supportive regime. What brought about these shifts in policy? These changes, especially the creation of new NGO funding programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, were puzzling for several reasons. First of all, the change itself marked a policy shift that was surprising. As numerous Japanese commentators have noted, for most of the postwar period in Japan NGOs were viewed with disdain by government officials and were long perceived as “anti” governmental, leftist or, at best, harmless but of marginal importance. (Takao 2007; Menju 1995: 149; Saotome 1995: 78; Watanabe 1995) Considering the patronizing and dismissive attitude of the state toward NGOs, the sudden shift in policy toward active promotion and support of IDNGOs in the late 1980s and 1990s was surprising. (Wakisaka 1996: 77) Second, the creation of these new programs did not appear to be a response to domestic pressure, from either the IDNGO community or the Japanese public at large. Unlike the United States and other countries, in Japan there was no well-organized IDNGO lobby pressuring the government or politicians for funding in the 1980s or early 1990s. Although there were several IDNGOs with whom MOFA had made informal contacts in the 1980s that were in favor of new funding programs, IDNGOs as a whole were divided on this issue, with many groups suspicious of the government’s real intentions or fearing cooptation. (Koshida 2006: 110; Kokoro 1989; NGO interviews, August 1998 and July 2000) The general Japanese public also did not play a visible role in this policy shift since few Japanese knew what an NGO or IDNGO was in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was not until 1992 and the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro that the acronym “NGO” started to appear in the Japanese press, and only in the mid- to late 1990s that the Japanese public knew what the term meant. If not domestic pressure, what then explains the shift in state policies? The functionalist argument of the usefulness of IDNGOs as a subcontractor for the state is one possibility: as with those in other OECD countries, state officials in Japan may have started to view IDNGOs as a functionally useful private “partner” for delivering foreign aid. This argument seems unlikely as the main motivation, however, given the very small size and limited capacity of the Japanese IDNGO sector at the time. Even if Japanese policy-makers had felt that IDNGOs would be functionally useful in principle, the IDNGO sector would first need to be built up and strengthened in order for it to provide these useful functions adequately. The fact that capacity building and training components were added to most official NGO programs in the mid- to late 1990s indicates that the IDNGO sector in Japan was still weak and thus did not offer the serious functional benefits provided by its more professionalized counterparts in other advanced industrialized countries. Furthermore, none of these explanations can account for the timing of these programs. Why, after decades of excluding NGOs from foreign aid programs, were policy-makers now interested in supporting NGOs? One factor, as will be discussed in greater detail below, was criticism emerging both domestically and internationally regarding Japan’s foreign aid. This criticism provided a motivation

International development NGOs in Japan 97 for a change in policy, but not the specific decision to create NGO support programs. However, a more dynamic explanation that combines domestic politics with the international context is more convincing. In the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese officials and politicians were operating in an international political environment that actively promoted IDNGOs. As outlined in Chapter Three, during this period a pro-NGO norm emerged in international development circles and the UN that promoted NGOs as agents of people participation and good governance. In this new normative context, Japan’s foreign aid policies and its policies vis-à-vis NGOs were examined in a new way, leading to socialization processes from above that influenced officials and politicians in their decisions to adopt more NGO-friendly policies. Specifically, the new international promotion of NGOs created a new global standard by which Japan’s foreign aid policy was judged and put normative pressure on the Japanese government to cooperate with IDNGOs. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s Japan did not have to bother with including IDNGOs in its foreign aid policies, by the mid- to late 1980s it became difficult to be a leading member of the international donor community without supporting the new paradigm of greater inclusion of “the people.” International norms promoted in this period influenced Japanese state policies through the socialization mechanisms of social influence and social learning. In terms of social influence, the international donor community’s embracing of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s created new social pressures and image concerns for outlier donor countries such as Japan that did not have NGO support programs and did not have strong IDNGO sectors. As one of the world’s top donors that had virtually no NGO support programs, Japanese policy-makers and leaders faced potential issues of “cognitive dissonance” whenever Japan rhetorically promoted NGOs in the international realm while simultaneously not adopting policies that supported Japanese IDNGOs. That is, the gap between what Japan officially preached internationally and what it practiced at home produced a contradiction in rhetoric and practice that put social pressure on state officials to change policies. Image concerns were also of potential importance, since the implicit message behind the pro-NGO norm was that democratic states relied on NGOs to promote people participation and good governance. With no NGO programs, Japan’s foreign aid policy would be open to criticism for its lack of participation by the Japanese “people” and Japan itself would look undemocratic since its domestic policies were so unfavorable to NGOs. To ensure a more positive donor image that was in line with international norms, policy changes were required. In terms of social learning, most of the new programs of the late 1980s and early 1990s also involved the influence of international players that provided Japan with examples or advice on how to incorporate the new pro-NGO norm into state policies. These programs, in other words, often included teaching, emulating and a learning process through which officials in Japan “learned” over time how and why to cooperate with IDNGOs. The rest of this section examines the origins of the NGO support programs created in the late 1980s and early 1990s at MOFA, JEC and MPT. The main focus

98 International development NGOs in Japan is on MOFA’s programs since they were the earliest, most generous and have had the longest continuing impact on the IDNGO sector. MOFA programs The fact that MOFA was the first ministry to create NGO support programs in Japan is consistent with an international norms argument since MOFA is the government body in Japan that is most directly involved in international development circles and its officials have been the most exposed to international norms promoting NGOs. The two main programs set up in 1989 by MOFA – the NGO Project Subsidies Scheme and the Grassroots Grants Program – were responses to a complex mix of normative and social pressures on Japan to make changes in its foreign aid policies. Although domestic politics also played a role in bringing about changes in foreign aid policies during this period, the specific decision to fund NGOs was largely shaped by international norms and pressures. Four norm-related components that explain the creation and expansion of these two MOFA programs through the 1990s were: (1) a perceived need by MOFA bureaucrats in the 1980s to catch up with leading OECD countries regarding NGO policies and the NGO sector itself; (2) image concerns related to criticisms of Japanese foreign aid in the 1980s and 1990s; (3) social pressure from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to provide more aid to IDNGOs in the 1990s; and (4) social learning processes and transgovernmental diffusion of norms through the US–Japan Common Agenda in the 1990s. Catching up with the rest As participants in DAC meetings and at other IGOs, MOFA officials were very aware of the rising international interest in NGOs in the 1980s and increasingly felt normative pressure to catch up with the West. In this case, catching up had two meanings: first, Japan had to catch up in terms of foreign aid policy programs such as matching grants and other types of NGO support program; and second, Japan’s IDNGO sector needed to catch up and become a sector that was visible and working alongside IDNGOs from other industrialized countries. Evidence of MOFA’s awareness of the new international focus and debate on NGOs is visible in its annual reports and documents in the mid- to late 1980s. Just as NGOs were increasingly mentioned in the OECD’s DAC reports, MOFA started to devote more attention to the topic of NGOs in its own annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) reports. From 1985 to 1987, DAC’s annual reports on ODA made special reference to the role of NGOs as partners of the state in development, the comparative advantages of NGOs and the need for donors to pay more attention to them. (OECD 1985: 151–155, 1986: 21–22, 1987: 25–26) This new focus on NGOs by DAC was soon reflected in MOFA official documents. After mentioning NGOs only in passing in previous reports, MOFA’s annual ODA reports started to include larger sections on cooperation with NGOs in 1987. In that year and 1988, the MOFA reports’ discussion of NGOs was expanded from just two short paragraphs in 1985 and 1986 to three pages that

International development NGOs in Japan 99 included practically verbatim passages on the role of NGOs found in the DAC reports. (MOFA 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988) MOFA officials were also made aware of Japan’s outlier status among OECD donors in terms of NGO support programs during the 1980s as several DACrelated activities brought attention to Japan’s exclusion of NGOs in its ODA. These activities put pressure on MOFA officials to start reexamining its relationship with IDNGOs. First, the DAC annual review of ODA in 1985 included a special section on NGOs which included a table showing Japan’s relatively low level of support for NGOs. (OECD 1985: 152) Also in 1985, a DAC Expert Meeting formally discussed the topic of state–NGO cooperation and invited NGOs from DAC member countries, including Japanese IDNGOs, to participate. This meeting provided an opportunity for Japanese IDNGOs to meet with MOFA officials (MOFA 1987: 87) and opened doors for both sides to communicate. In 1986, DAC held a special meeting with NGOs in conjunction with a survey and report on NGOs it published two years later. (OECD 1987: 126, 1988) This series of international events, according to a leading NGO figure in Japan, was one of the reasons why MOFA first started showing interest in NGOs in the mid- to late 1980s. (NGO interview, August 1998) In this context, MOFA also began to examine setting up its own NGO support program in order to catch up with the emerging international norm. At around the same time that the DAC was compiling information on NGOs for its reports in 1984 and 1985, MOFA began commissioning surveys and studies on NGOs in Japan and Asia, many of which recommended that Japan should consider cofinancing grants and other NGO support programs found in other OECD countries. (Shigeta 2005; MOFA 1990: 139; Sadotomo 1988: 45–46; APIC 1985) MOFA also started to examine the NGO support schemes found in other countries. (Shigeta 2005) By 1988, MOFA’s annual ODA report tacitly acknowledged both its awareness of Japan’s laggard state and its plan eventually to start its own: “In the US and in European countries, co-financing systems by which ODA funds are extended to small-size development projects implemented by NGOs constitute Government’s most basic support measures for NGOs . . . Though there is great expectation for the introduction of such a system [in Japan], it is necessary to carefully study the experiences of Western countries in this regard.” (MOFA 1988: 108) When MOFA’s first two NGO programs were set up in 1989, therefore, the international context and Japan’s need to “catch up” with other OECD countries played a role.10 The other way in which MOFA wanted Japan to catch up related to the state of its IDNGO sector and the fact that Japanese IDNGOs were still small in number and size when compared to those in the other OECD member countries. One of the officially stated reasons for setting up the NGO Subsidies Scheme was to help Japanese NGOs catch up with Western NGOs, which, according to MOFA, had the cultural and historical advantages of religion and colonialism. (MOFA 1987 and 1988) MOFA thus recognized Japanese IDNGOs’ small size and the difficulties they faced in fundraising compared with IDNGOs in North America and Europe11 and in its publications presented the NGO Subsidies Scheme as

100 International development NGOs in Japan necessary to help build up and strengthen Japanese IDNGOs as a sector. (Saotome 1997; MOFA 1996b, 1992: 58, 1990: 139–140, 1989: 31, 116, 118) As the 1992 ODA Annual Report boldly states: “Government assistance to NGOs is important because Japan’s NGOs are still financially weak compared with NGOs of other donor countries.” (MOFA 1992: 58) This reasoning was very novel for MOFA and only comprehensible in the context of the new pro-NGO norm of the 1980s and 1990s. Prior to the 1980s, MOFA showed little or no interest in Japan’s IDNGO sector or its laggard state compared to the West. The fact that MOFA became concerned about helping Japanese IDNGOs at this particular point in time is difficult to understand if one does not take into account MOFA officials’ participation in DAC and other international donor gatherings that heavily promoted NGOs. As NGOs became celebrated partners in development in these international circles, MOFA officials started to feel international social pressure on Japan to have a larger IDNGO sector in order to be a more “normal” donor country. Criticism of ODA and the NGO solution Another source of inspiration for the new government funding programs for NGOs in the mid- to late 1980s was growing international and domestic criticism of Japanese foreign aid. Claims that Japan’s foreign aid was overly commercial, environmentally destructive and closed were creating a negative international image for the country, and one way to address these criticisms was to make aid more “participatory” by setting up NGO support programs. MOFA was also struggling with fallout from ODA corruption scandals involving former Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos which led to increased domestic scrutiny of ODA and calls for reform. (Trinidad 2007; Koshida 2006) The creation of the new MOFA NGO programs, therefore, was also in part a response to image concerns related to one of its most important foreign policy initiatives. By adopting the new programs, MOFA was able to kill two birds with one stone – it could respond to rising criticism of Japan’s ODA while also addressing Japan’s outlier status as one of the few OECD countries that had no NGO support program. By the late 1980s, Japan had become the largest foreign aid provider in the world and it retained this status for most of the 1990s. As Alan Rix and Susan Pharr have noted, Japan’s rise as an economic and foreign aid superpower in the 1980s brought with it increasing international attention, which included critical assessments of how foreign aid was being implemented. International criticism of Japanese aid claimed that it was overly commercial, lacking in a clear philosophy, environmentally destructive and “faceless” money without a human touch. (Koshida 2006; Jain 2000: 28; Saotome 1997; Pharr 1994; Rix 1993; Sadotomo 1988: 42) Within Japan as well, foreign aid became a topic of public debate in the mid- to late 1980s with the appearance in the Japanese press of several foreign aid scandal exposés (Trinidad 2007; Rix 1993) and the emergence of activist academics and groups advocating the need for more socially and environmentally responsible foreign aid policies. (See Chapter Five.)

International development NGOs in Japan 101 These criticisms were hard to ignore as Japan expanded its ODA programs to be the centerpiece of its diplomatic efforts at international cooperation. During this period, Japan was under increasing pressure as a new economic superpower to contribute more to the “burden-sharing” of Western powers in international politics. (Akaha 1993; Pharr 1993; Inoguchi 1991; Pyle 1989) Restricted by its constitution from making significant international military contributions, Japan was limited to more peaceful international contributions and foreign aid was increasingly seen by politicians and government officials as one of the most promising policy tools for Japan to show its commitment to international society while also gaining international prestige. (Wan 1993) Criticism that Japan’s ODA was self-serving, lacking in principles and environmentally unsustainable were potentially damaging for Japan’s international image and its standing in international society. To get the maximum diplomatic prestige benefits from Japan’s new position as the largest foreign aid donor in the world, MOFA officials became concerned with countering criticism and responding to public debates that cast ODA in a negative light. They also had to respond to the domestic politics of scandal and find a way to put a positive spin on a program that was expanding, not shrinking. In the process of reviewing and searching for ways to improve the image of Japanese foreign aid, cooperation with NGOs emerged as a solution for making Japan’s aid both more democratic and more human. NGOs were first mentioned in the context of the larger review of foreign policy in 1987 when then-Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro set up an advisory council to examine ways to improve Japan’s foreign aid policies. The advisory group’s report gave a positive evaluation of NGOs and recommended that Japan provide support to IDNGOs. (APIC 1995; Sadotomo 1988) In the following year, with international criticism in mind, the ODA Fourth Medium Target was passed by the cabinet and called specifically for improving cooperation with NGOs. This provided the nationallevel justification for the creation the new NGO support programs in 1989. MOFA officials in charge of the NGO programs in the 1990s openly admitted that criticism of ODA in the late 1980s was an important reason for establishing the programs in 1989.12 (MOFA officials interviews, December 1997 and July 1998; Saotome 1997; Chiba 1996: 6) In 1989, criticism of foreign aid and Japan’s contributions to international society was of enormous concern for MOFA and a substantial section of the annual ODA report that year was devoted to addressing the issue.13 Once the NGO programs were established, their purpose as an image enhancer became very clear in MOFA publications, where support of NGOs was now boldly presented as “people’s cooperation” (MOFA 1993 and 1994), “broader-based participation of people” in foreign aid (MOFA 1994), and “visible Japanese aid.” (MOFA 1996b) Throughout the 1990s, the section on cooperation with NGOs in the annual ODA report expanded to ten pages or more and NGOs became an integral part of an attempt by MOFA and politicians to sculpt a new image of Japanese foreign aid which was more humane, less “faceless,” and more internationally politically correct. That the Japanese turned to NGOs for this solution to its image problems reflects their awareness and sensitivity to the new

102 International development NGOs in Japan international pro-NGO norm. As at least one scholar has noted, Japan’s enthusiastic rhetorical support of NGOs was somewhat surprising for a country with such a weak IDNGO sector and indicated the presence of norm diffusion. (Chabbott 1999: 247) Since the mid- to late 1990s, MOFA has also had to deal with domestic image problems, and scandals at MOFA became an important domestic political factor that interacted with international politics to keep pressure on MOFA to strengthen its cooperation with NGOs. MOFA slush fund scandals in the mid- to late 1990s and the Suzuki Muneo scandal in the early 2000s provided other important backdrops that put MOFA under public scrutiny, propelled the process of ODA reform (Trinidad 2007; Kingston 2004) and ultimately led to higher official levels of cooperation with NGOs. These domestic politics were an important background factor behind MOFA’s adoption in 2003 of a new ODA Charter, which includes collaboration with NGOs as one of the basic policies and implementation principles for Japan’s ODA. Monitoring and social sanctioning by DAC Once the NGO support programs were set up in 1989, DAC continued to play a role in promoting NGOs in Japan, and through its monitoring of Japanese foreign aid policies it kept pressure on Japan throughout the 1990s to expand its NGO support programs. Although DAC was not directly responsible for the expansion of official NGO programs in this period, its reports provided one persistent external source of pressure on MOFA and provided a source of legitimacy and support for NGOs in domestic debates. By monitoring Japan’s NGO-related policies and calling attention to Japan’s continuing outlier status among donor countries in terms of NGO support, DAC reports functioned as a social sanction that “shamed” Japan for not living up to a norm, which in turn provided fuel for pro-NGO forces both internationally and within Japan. The expansion of the MOFA programs can therefore be seen in part as the continuation of a socialization process, whereby Japanese NGOs came to use international social influence strategically to pressure the government for better support programs and institutional access for IDNGOs. With the adoption by the OECD of guidelines on participatory development and good governance in the early 1990s, DAC started to monitor its member countries’ ODA policies regarding the degree to which each country was promoting these two principles. (OECD 1991 and 1992) From the early 1990s, Japan had to report formally to DAC how it was incorporating these principles into its foreign aid policies, leading MOFA officials to place great weight on its two NGO support programs. The expansion of coverage of NGOs in MOFA’s annual ODA reports in the 1990s and MOFA’s attempts to present a more participatory image of Japanese foreign aid described above was therefore also a response to new DAC guidelines. Overall, however, DAC’s annual reviews of Japan in the 1990s were not very enthusiastic, and DAC reports repeatedly called attention to the need for greater support for NGOs. The 1991 DAC review called Japan’s NGO support programs

International development NGOs in Japan 103 “relatively modest by DAC standards” (DAC 1991: 29) and the 1992/1993 DAC review also mentioned that “Japan’s assistance through NGOs (0.8 percent in 1989) has been among the lowest of the DAC Members.” (DAC 1993: 47) In the 1995 and 1996 annual reviews of Japanese ODA programs, DAC reviewers recommended that NGOs be used more extensively and steps be taken to provide better legal status for Japanese IDNGOs. (DAC 1996b; Kyodo News 1995) In 1999, the DAC review bluntly described the “double bind of limited government support and insufficient private contributions” facing Japanese IDNGOs and strongly recommended expanding foreign aid funding for NGOs. (DAC 1999: 17) DAC’s 2004 peer review also highlighted Japan’s low percentage of funding for NGOs and noted that “(e)xperience from elsewhere within the DAC would suggest that the government could be more proactive in supporting NGOs, including innovations in grants for NGO organizational development or better understanding of the NGO comparative advantage so as to promote additional collaboration and funding.” (DAC 2004: 49) Since the 1980s, DAC has provided a source of top-down normative pressure on the Japanese government to include NGOs in foreign aid policy and encourage their growth. As the 1990s progressed and pro-NGO domestic forces appeared within Japan, these types of international document were used in political debates on foreign aid and helped NGO advocates in their domestic battles. DAC reports were mentioned and strategically used in ODA reform reports issued by several government agencies and policy study groups in the 1990s that recommended a larger role for NGOs in foreign aid policy. (Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century 1998; Sangiin Kokusai Mondai ni Kansuru Chosakai 1998; EPA 1991 and 1997) International actors such as DAC therefore played a role in ensuring that the pro-NGO norm would be internalized, and contributed to the expanding acceptance of the norm over time. Learning and persuasion Finally, in addition to DAC’s and Japan’s international image concerns, international actors encouraged norm internalization through persuasion and made efforts to teach Japanese officials how and why to support IDNGOs. Foreign IDNGOs were instrumental in suggesting the establishment of the Grassroots Grants Program, and, once the NGO support programs were created in 1989, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played an important role in encouraging Japan to continue to expand its support to IDNGOs in the 1990s and early 2000s. USAID’s interactions with Japanese aid officials indicate how lateral policy diffusion or transgovernmentalism – transnational policy coordination at the bureaucracy level (Slaughter 1997 and 2004) – can provide another opportunity for international socialization of state actors through learning. In addition to being a response to the emerging international norm of participatory development, the creation of MOFA’s Grassroots Grant Program involved the participation of foreign IDNGOs, both Southern NGOs and Western IDNGOs, which brought new models of foreign aid to the attention of the Japanese

104 International development NGOs in Japan government. From the mid-1980s, local NGOs and Western IDNGOs in developing countries began to approach Japanese embassies and aid offices with requests for funding and assistance for their projects. (MOFA 1989: 31) At around the same time in Japan, the Management and Coordination Agency (MCA), a review body under the Prime Minister’s Office, examined cases of MOFA grant success and failure as part of a review process of Japanese ODA grant policies and noted that numerous requests were being made by local groups for more flexible funding in order to complete projects. (MCA 1988) Based on a series of case samples, the MCA recommended that a small-scale grant system be set up to meet some of these new requests. The Grassroots Grants Program was therefore also a response to outside actors proposing a new kind of foreign aid program, and it provides a case of norm diffusion through both persuasion and learning. Modeled on the USAID’s incountry small grant program, the program was created after MOFA conducted an extensive review of in-country small grant programs among OECD countries and concluded that “other donor countries receive major policy benefits” from them. (MOFA 1989: 77; MOFA official interview, July 1998) The Grassroots Grants Program is an interesting example of policy diffusion triggered by foreign nonstate actors and based on standard practices found in the field. The other way in which persuasion and learning contributed to MOFA’s changing attitude toward NGOs and its expansion of the Grassroots Grants Program in particular was the activism of USAID and its use of the US–Japan Common Agenda to promote NGOs as part of US–Japan bilateral cooperation on global aid. Officially launched in 1993, the Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective was a bilateral diplomatic initiative for jointly promoting global aid projects in 18 areas. Through this program, which lasted until 2001, MOFA officials were gradually socialized as they learned through experience the practical and public relations utility of using NGOs in aid projects. From the start, USAID encouraged the active participation of NGOs in Common Agenda projects in the areas of health, population, the environment and development. The Japanese side, however, was less enthusiastic, especially in the area of the environment, where some MOFA officials were concerned about possible protest activity by local NGOs.14 (USAID official interview, January 1997) USAID officials insisted, however, and by the mid-1990s, IDNGOs and NGOs were part of most Common Agenda project missions in these four areas. By then, as some of these projects became diplomatic successes, MOFA officials began to look at NGOs quite differently and even started to publicize their importance in both the Common Agenda and the development process in general.15 American officials and NGOs, by showing MOFA officials through practice and experience how state–NGO cooperation works, were therefore able to change MOFA’s originally skeptical view of NGOs and advance the process of norm internalization within MOFA. The role of USAID and American NGOs as socializing agents is notable in this case since many MOFA officials involved in the Common Agenda had never dealt with large-scale Western IDNGOs and these bilateral efforts expanded the exposure of high-level officials to the pro-NGO norm. Since the Common Agenda

International development NGOs in Japan 105 was coordinated by MOFA’s North American Affairs Bureau and included the participation of senior officials in US–Japan Common Agenda events, the process was able to reach high-ranking officials within MOFA who were normally less exposed to IDNGOs.16 This had the effect of raising the importance and profile of NGOs within MOFA, while also providing such officials with positive experiences of working with NGOs. By the end of the 1990s, MOFA bureaucrats’ images of IDNGOs were completely different than the leftist, anti-establishment and protest images they had held of NGOs in the 1980s and earlier. The program also encouraged greater interest and support within MOFA for its own NGO support programs and for Japanese IDNGOs. Since most of the Common Agenda projects that included IDNGOs were funded through the Grassroots Grants Program, the initiative raised the profile of the program within MOFA and provided the political support it needed to expand. Similarly, over time, the Common Agenda also encouraged MOFA officials to pay more attention to Japanese IDNGOs. Although in the initial phases of the Common Agenda, most of the IDNGOs involved in joint US–Japanese projects were American or developing country NGOs, as new projects started to get off the ground USAID officials started to suggest that Japanese IDNGOs also be included. (USAID official interview, January 1997) Over time, some Japanese officials also started to feel uncomfortable about the predominance of American NGOs and became more active in soliciting the participation of Japanese IDNGOs for Common Agenda projects and initiatives. (MOFA official interview, July 1998) These efforts in turn led to a deepening of relations between Japanese IDNGOs and MOFA officials in various divisions and bureaus. Japan fund for the global environment As was the case for MOFA programs for IDNGOs, the origins of the Japan Fund for the Global Environment (JFGE) were not domestic but more a reflection of international politics, norms and Japan’s desire to present an image as a contributor to international society. This program was a by-product of Japan’s preparations for the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and is both an example of social influence – i.e. Japan’s adoption of a norm to gain the social reward of international recognition and status – and a case of successful persuasion by an international norm entrepreneur from the UN. Through the international channel of UNCED and the initiative of UN bureaucrats, Japanese IDNGOs were given a new source of funding for their overseas environmental projects. Similar to the MOFA programs, the JFGE was not the result of domestic lobbying or popular pressure for the creation of such a fund. If anything, most environmental NGOs and IDNGOs that focused on the environment in Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s were even more suspicious and hostile toward the government. Moreover, IDNGOs that specialized in overseas environmental projects were only beginning to form in the early 1990s and most of these groups did not have strong ties to the Environment Agency (EA) or the Japan

106 International development NGOs in Japan Environment Corporation (JEC). Although EA had on its own initiative started to look into the idea of providing funds to NGOs in the late 1980s, it did not have the political strength bureaucratically to put together such a program.17 Instead, JFGE was the result of international diplomacy originating from a higher political level and was aimed primarily at enhancing Japan’s international image as a global leader. The creators of JFGE were then-Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru and then-Secretary-General of UNCED Maurice Strong. In the preparatory process leading up to UNCED between 1988 and 1992, Takeshita underwent a sudden “green” transformation in the area of foreign diplomacy. (Schreurs 2002; Ohta 1995: 154–160 and 2000: 103–107) During this period, Japanese global environmental policies became more proactive and regimesupporting than in previous periods, a shift that included several diplomatic initiatives which aimed at showing Japan’s leadership in and commitment to the environment. (Schreurs 2002; Ohta 2000) UNCED provided Japanese leaders with an opportunity to make a bold statement in this area and became a focal point for showcasing Japan’s new environment-related initiatives and policies. The JFGE was one of these initiatives and its launch at UNCED was timed for maximum diplomatic advantage. The fund was one of Japan’s contributions to UNCED and was meant to show Japan’s strong commitment to the environment and sustainable development. Although Takeshita was one of the critical figures behind the creation of the JFGE, the idea to set up a fund that would support NGO projects was not originally his. As a conservative politician who intensely disliked environmental NGOs, Takeshita probably would never have come up with the idea to provide funding to NGOs on his own. Instead, the idea came from UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong, the UN official in charge of organizing UNCED. Strong, who was the conference Secretary-General for both the first UN international conference on the environment in Stockholm in 1972 and UNCED in 1992, had a long track record of actively supporting and promoting NGOs in the international political arena. When Takeshita met with him to discuss preparations for UNCED and what concrete contributions Japan could make, it was Strong who suggested that Japan set up a fund for NGOs. (Kokoro July 1993) JFGE is therefore an example of how an activist UN official could appeal to a leader’s desire for prestige and global leadership, override prevailing domestic norms, and create new funding opportunities for civil society. It is a clear case of activism from above the state promoting NGOs. Postal savings for international voluntary aid Although the origins of POSIVA were less directly tied to international organizations and international events than the MOFA programs and JFGE, its creation was also firmly rooted in the desire to prove that Japan was committed to contributing to international society in a norm-conforming manner. Once again, there was no organized lobbying for this program, nor any public pressure to create it. Rather, POSIVA is an example of social influence and norm diffusion working at a more general level.

International development NGOs in Japan 107 In the late 1980s, MPT became interested in finding a new catchy theme for its postal savings program that would spark consumer interest in opening a new account. In 1989, MPT appointed an outside advisory group composed of academics to draft recommendations for a “Vision of Postal Savings in the 1990s.” (MPT official interview, December 1997) In a 1990 report with the same name, the study group recommended the creation of an “international volunteer” postal savings account that would raise the general level of interest among Japanese citizens in international society as well as “participation consciousness.” (MPT no date) The postal system, the report argued, was an ideal way to reach a large number of Japanese citizens since it had thousands of offices throughout rural and urban Japan. The fact that MPT chose NGOs as the channel through which Japanese citizens could contribute to international society is interesting given that most MPT officials had never heard of NGOs. (MPT official interview, December 1997) The choice reflects the need perceived by the Japanese intellectual elite for Japan to show more actively that its people had a positive contribution to make to the world.

Other international explanations for IDNGO growth In addition to socialization processes, the two other international explanations of the activism from above model – international political opportunities and transnational diffusion of ideas – were operating and contributed to the emergence and growth of the IDNGO sector in Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s. They did so directly, by providing funding and access for IDNGOs; and indirectly, by changing the behavior of the state and other elite actors and opening up the domestic POS for IDNGOs. Combined with the socialization explanation presented above, the following examples of international political opportunities and transnational diffusion of ideas illustrate how the changing international context for NGOs was an important source of IDNGO growth in Japan. International political opportunities The international political opportunity argument posits that increasing levels of international funding and opportunities to participate in international political arenas have been important external sources of NGO growth and expansion, especially since the late 1980s and 1990s. (See Chapters One and Three.) NGOs have been able to circumvent domestic obstacles to organizing and gain legitimacy by turning to new international sources of funding, access to international organizations, alliances with other international actors, and a variety of international programs that promote the role of IDNGOs in development. Japanese IDNGOs have benefited from such international opportunities, both in terms of funding and access to international meetings. International funds and support As presented in Chapter Three, the growth of new international funding opportunities and other support was an important factor in the worldwide NGO

108 International development NGOs in Japan “boom” of the 1980s and 1990s. Japan was not an exception to these trends, and IGOs such as the UN as well as globally active private actors such as the Asia Foundation have contributed both funding and technical support to IDNGOs in Japan. While not exhaustive, this section mentions some of the ways in which international actors nurtured the IDNGO sector in the 1980s and 1990s. Although Japanese IDNGOs do not secure a high proportion of total UN contracts, several of the most prominent and well-respected IDNGOs in Japan have received considerable funding from the UN. Six of the 25 largest IDNGOs in Japan in 1996 received funding from the UN and for five of them UN funding comprised more than 30 percent of their total budget. In addition to the UN, several of these groups received funds from other international sources, such as Western NGOs and foundations. Since these are the largest, most capable and professional IDNGOs in Japan, a few examples illustrate how outside funding and collaboration have made a difference. The Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC) is one of the most well-known and politically active IDNGOs in Japan. Since it was first set up in 1980, JVC has received substantial funding and support from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as from several other UN agencies and Western NGOs. (NGO interviews, November 1997 and July 1998) In its first couple of years of operation, JVC worked for the American NGO CARE and the British NGO Oxfam in Thailand, receiving both funding for its staff and experience in the field. (Yoshida 1997: 29; JVC 1990b: 31, 48–49) In 1981, in its second year of operation, about 72 percent of JVC’s project costs came from UNHCR contracts in the field in Thailand. (JVC 1990b: 23) Throughout both the 1980s and the 1990s, JVC received funds for its projects in Southeast Asia and Africa from various international sources, including the UNHCR, the World Food Program, the UN Development Program, the Christian Relief and Development Association and BANDAID.18 (NGO interview, July 1998; JVC 1990b: 266–267; Sadotomo 1988: 43) Although most of the international funding came from applications and requests made by JVC, in at least one case the UNHCR solicited JVC to set up a project in South Africa. Although JVC has also relied on domestic funding sources, it has therefore had strong connections with IGOs and other international sources of funding. The Japan Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP) is one of the most well-respected and effective IDNGOs in Japan in the field of population. Since its inception in 1968, JOICFP has cooperated closely with the UN Population Fund (UNFP) and has received funding from both UNFP and the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). (Ikegami 2004) Of all the large IDNGOs in Japan, JOICFP’s work is most closely tied to a particular UN organization, and a substantial portion of JOICFP’s work has been done in conjunction with UNFP and IPPF. In 1998, 40.8 percent of JOICFP’s budget came from UN sources. (JANIC 2000) Two relatively new IDNGOs that formed in the mid-1990s, grew quickly and took advantage of rising levels of humanitarian aid are Peace Winds Japan and Japan Emergency NGOs (JEN), a coalition group for NGOs active in emergency relief. Peace Winds Japan was set up in 1996 as an emergency relief and

International development NGOs in Japan 109 development NGO and in its early years it received as much as 35.5 percent of its budget from UN sources. (JANIC 2000) JEN was set up in 1994 in part to pool efforts of Japanese IDNGOs in obtaining and disbursing UN relief funds. In 1998, about 57 percent of JEN’s funding came from UN sources and it has relied on the UN for a substantial portion of its budget. (JANIC 2000) In addition to funding, IGOs and foreign foundations with offices in Japan have sponsored programs that support IDNGOs with training, logistical support and networking opportunities. The UNHCR regional office in Tokyo has supported Japanese IDNGOs since the mid-1990s through its Partners in Action (PARinAC) Program, an NGO partnership program it runs worldwide. In Japan, UNHCR staff learned quickly that the usual approach of using PARinAC meetings to brief IDNGOs on contracting procedures would need to be adjusted since many of the Japanese IDNGOs were very small and needed more basic training. (NGO interview, October 1997) Since the program started in Japan in 1995, it has sponsored workshops for Japanese IDNGOs on capacity building, training on protection issues, program management and emergency management issues. In the 1990s, about 40 Japanese IDNGOs participated either as a UNHCR implementing partner, a UNHCR operational partner or an observer. (UN official interview, November 1997) In addition to these sorts of support program, the UNHCR office in Tokyo provided Japanese IDNGOs with networking opportunities and access to Japanese government officials during UNHCR regional and international conferences held in Tokyo. Finally, the PARinAC Program also educated UNHCR officials on the challenges that Japanese IDNGOs face domestically in terms of their legal status and fundraising options. In the late 1990s, UNHCR officials became advocates for Japanese IDNGOs, using their meetings with Japanese officials and the business world to press for changes or raise funds.19 (NGO interview, July 1998) Another international actor that started promoting NGOs in Japan is the Asia Foundation, a quasi-governmental foundation based in the United States. The Asia Foundation began funding civil society programs in Asia in the 1990s and started to get interested in supporting the non-profit and NGO sector in Japan at around the same time. Together with the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Asia Foundation was an important funder and supporter of the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) – the main umbrella group for IDNGOs in Japan – in the early 1990s when it was struggling to stay alive. (NGO interview, August 1998) The Asia Foundation office in Tokyo also became very active in promoting legal changes for nonprofits in Japan and put pressure on MOFA and other state agencies for more liberal laws for nonprofits throughout the 1990s. (Foundation officer interview, March 1997) Aware of the various challenges facing NGOs, the Asia Foundation provided logistical support, such as leasing out office space to NGOs that did not have legal status, organizing English language courses for NGOs and organizing seminars for NGOs in different issue areas. (Foundation officer interview, October 1997) In a variety of ways, therefore, the Foundation was a strong supporter and ally of IDNGOs in Japan during their initial emergence and growth stages.

110 International development NGOs in Japan International meetings as opportunities for access International politics and the expansion of structures of global governance also had a stimulating effect in expanding official channels of access for IDNGOs to policy-makers and policy-making processes in Japan. Although many of the new access points listed in Table 4.1 were outgrowths of new NGO support programs, several of them were also linked to international events and the general trend of the 1990s at the UN and other IGOs of including NGOs in policies related to global governance. In addition to the official bodies listed in Table 4.1, Japanese MOFA officials began to include IDNGOs in diplomatic initiatives and processes at the UN, the G-8 and other international fora. New opportunities for access at the domestic level in the 1990s were therefore often closely linked to changes taking place internationally, where NGOs were now seen as the voice of the people and actors that ought to be included in some way in both international and nationallevel policy-making. These new international trends were impossible for Japanese officials and politicians to ignore and provided IDNGOs with new opportunities for access. The establishment of several of the state–IDNGO dialogue bodies listed in Table 4.1 were linked to international events and internationally created opportunities. The MOFA–NGO Quarterly Meeting group (MOFA-NGO teiki kyogikai), which brings together IDNGO representatives and MOFA officials from various divisions dealing with ODA or NGOs, originally came about as a response to an international NGO conference in Tokyo hosted by JANIC in 1995 that examined NGO support schemes in several countries. (Hirata 2000: 232; JANIC 1995) This conference included 137 government and NGO participants from seven Asia-Pacific countries and country reports with detailed comparative analysis of state–IDNGO relations. (Kokoro 1995) In the comparative data presented at the conference, Japan stood out as an outlier for its lateness and very low levels of cooperation with IDNGOs, and its country report was quite critical of the lack of access to decision-makers. (Watanabe 1995) Among the recommendations for Northern governments that came out of the conference was to have “regular dialogues with northern and southern NGOs and establish joint committees to allow NGOs to provide inputs to ODA policies and programs.” (JANIC 1995: 211) This international event – one in which NGOs were able to apply normative pressure by publicly comparing Japan’s closed system with governments which had more open policies vis-à-vis IDNGOs – was the initial event that eventually led to an official channel of dialogue through the establishment of the MOFA–NGO Quarterly Meetings. Another IDNGO–state dialogue listed in Table 4.1 that was inspired by an international conference is the Community-Based Development Initiative (CDIJapan), an initiative that has brought together IDNGOs, local government officials and academics to explore IDNGO–state collaboration at the local level in Japan. CDI-Japan’s creation was an outgrowth of an international conference of local governments held in Europe in 1995 by the International Union for Local Autonomy (IULA) at which the concept of community-based development was

International development NGOs in Japan 111 adopted. (NGO Jijitai Kokusai Kyoryoku Shuishin Kaigi 1997) CDI is the promotion of international cooperation and development at the local level by local governments, IDNGOs, NGOs and community-based organizations. Using this as an opportunity to gain better access to local officials in Japan, several prominent Japanese IDNGOs that attended the IULA conference organized a symposium in Tokyo with local government officials as a way to kick off a CDI effort in Japan. (Kokoro March 1996) CDI-Japan, an initiative that has greatly improved IDNGO–local government relations, is therefore a national adoption of a larger, international movement. Another important NGO–state dialogue listed in Table 4.1, the MOF–NGO Quarterly Meeting (MOF–NGO teiki kyogikai), was also started as a result of international events and the strategic use of international opportunities by NGOs. This dialogue was triggered by events related to Japan’s hosting of the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in 1997 and was in part a response to normative pressure applied by NGOs criticizing the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for being behind the United States and other OECD member states in providing access and information to IDNGOs. (See Chapter Five for more on this.) In addition to these dialogue efforts, NGOs have been given representation in Japanese delegations to UN conferences and have been included in policy dialogues related to specific Japanese diplomatic initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s, such as the Global Issues Initiative (GII), the Common Agenda, the Tokyo Conference on African Development (TICAD), and the Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative. In these cases as well, IDNGO access was the trend of the 1990s to include NGOs at international meetings. Prior to the 1990s, for example, the idea of including an NGO in Japan’s official delegation to a UN international conference was never seriously considered. By the early 1990s, however, since most OECD member countries included NGOs in their delegations, it became harder for MOFA and Japanese politicians to ignore pressure from NGOs for better access. In 1994, in response to intense lobbying efforts by IDNGOs that called attention to Japan’s outlier position compared with other Western countries, for the first time Japan included IDNGOs and NGOs in its official delegation to the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. (NGO interview, July 1998; JACSES 1996: 121) This was a turning point for the Japanese government, which from then on regularly included NGOs in its delegations and gradually opened up several study groups and dialogues with NGOs related to various diplomatic initiatives Japan was promoting at the UN, the G-8 and through its bilateral partnerships with the United States. All of these initiatives – the Global Issues Initiative (GII), the Common Agenda, the Tokyo Conference on African Development (TICAD), and the Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative – were issue areas in which NGOs were active globally and they provided international opportunities for IDNGOs in Japan to gain better access to policy-makers and the policy-making process.

112 International development NGOs in Japan Transnational diffusion of ideas Finally, in addition to their effects on the state, international norms and ideas promoting NGOs brought about changes in how elite and Japanese society viewed NGOs. Historically, transnational societal diffusion processes have played an important role in the evolution of philanthropy in Japan (Wanner 1997; Yamamoto 1997; Roy 1993; London 1991) and one of the interesting developments of the 1990s was the shift by Japanese corporate foundations to start providing funding to NGOs. This section looks at the creation of the Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund (KNCF), a big-business-sponsored fund that gives grants to IDNGOs for their environmental projects in developing countries. Prior to the 1990s, this sort of fund would have been unimaginable given the conservative character of Japanese industry and its high distrust of citizens’ groups and movements promoting environmental causes within Japan. (Yamakoshi 1994: 4) The changing international norms of the 1990s and the new public relations benefits of being “green,” however, created new incentives for corporate foundations to consider collaborating with and supporting NGOs. In the case of Keidanren and KNCF, the transition toward greater cooperation with IDNGOs came by way of its transnational links to philanthropic communities in America and the activism of several American environmental NGOs. KNCF is a good example of how transnational diffusion of ideas at the societal level can lead to new opportunities for NGOs. The Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund and diffusion of ideas KNCF was set up in 1992 as an annual fund of corporate donations organized by the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), which provides small grants to foreign and Japanese IDNGOs for environmental conservation projects in developing countries. After initially only funding projects of nonJapanese IDNGOs, KNCF started extending grants to Japanese IDNGOs in 1994 and later added a capacity building component for Japanese IDNGOs that includes internships at Western IDNGOs, training programs in Japan, and special projects such as visits to the World Bank. (KNCF official interview, July 1997) For most of the 1990s, the fund averaged $2 million in grants annually and it has funded hundreds of projects in Asia and other parts of the world. Although the total grant amount has decreased to an average of $1.5 million since 2000, the fund continues to support more than 60 projects a year.20 The creation of KNCF in 1992 would be hard to explain without taking the international context into account. Prior to the 1990s, Keidanren and big corporations in Japan had poor or no relations with NGOs and there is no evidence that Japanese IDNGOs solicited Keidanren in the 1980s or early 1990s to set up such a fund. Instead, KNCF was an international initiative that later trickled down to the domestic level, and it is an example of how international ideas and international actors have helped reshape the domestic landscape of corporate funding for IDNGOs. The inspiration for KNCF came from two sources: (1) a

International development NGOs in Japan 113 desire by big business in Japan in the early 1990s to improve its public image by contributing to the global environment; and (2) persuasion and teaching by American NGOs and foundations interested in developing corporate philanthropy in Japan. KNCF was part of larger efforts by Keidanren in the early 1990s to respond to the emerging international debate on sustainable development and present Japanese industry as more caring about the global environment. Just as the Japanese government was criticized for the environmentally destructive aspects of ODA, Japanese corporations were increasingly blamed for environmental problems both in Japan and in developing countries where Japan had large investments. In a trend paralleling efforts made by corporations in North America and Europe, Japanese corporations started to pay more attention to building up a “green” image to counter negative publicity from media exposés and various advocacy campaigns by environmental NGOs. In 1991, Keidanren launched a new corporate policy toward the environment with its Keidanren Global Environment Charter and it was looking for possible environmental projects or initiatives it could sponsor in the upcoming UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. UNCED was seen by Keidanren officials as a unique international opportunity to show that Japanese corporations cared about the global environment. Besides its new charter, Keidanren officials were searching for ideas for a program or initiative that would provide more concrete proof of corporate support for the environment. This is where transnational actors yet again played an important role in promoting NGOs. In 1992, Keidanren was approached by The Nature Conservancy (TNC), an American NGO specializing in nature conservation projects, with the idea of starting a special Keidanren fund that would support environmental projects in developing countries. (NGO interview, October 1997) At the time, the general view of NGOs among most Japanese businessmen was highly negative, with most of them seeing NGOs as troublemakers that only criticized business. The meeting with TNC was a turning point in this respect and was corporate Japan’s first glimpse into the high level of professionalism of large Western conservation NGOs that often work with governments and corporations to protect areas of wilderness. TNC’s representative gave Keidanren officials a polished Powerpoint presentation of its many global conservation projects, the variety of corporate partnerships that supported its work and various proposals for how Japanese corporations could also get involved by creating their own fund to support NGO conservation projects. (NGO interview, October 1997) Keidanren’s response was extremely positive. TNC’s presentation was well timed – Keidanren needed a project to show its commitment to the global environment and to add substance to its new charter. (KNCF official interview, July 1997; Keidanren 1997) Discussions with TNC led to further consultations that included other American NGOs and foundations, leading eventually to the announcement of the fund at UNCED and its creation in 1993. In addition to providing the initial idea for the fund, transnational actors played a very important role as teachers and advisors for KNCF in its early years and the

114 International development NGOs in Japan fund was a socializing and educational process for businessmen in Japan who had no knowledge of NGOs. Beyond providing basic advice on how to set up the fund, TNC and other foreign advisors taught Keidanren and Japanese businessmen how large-scale, professional NGOs in the United States and Europe operate. Every year, Keidanren officials were sent to the United States to do internships at American NGOs and throughout the 1990s missions of high-ranking Keidanren officials visited TNC projects in developing countries. (KNCF official interview, July 1997; NGO interview, October 1997) These were all eye-opening experiences for Japanese businessmen, who had generally thought of NGOs as protest organizations and low-budget operations that were not capable of such high levels of professionalism and expertise. Collaboration with foreign NGOs and foreign foundations also taught Japanese executives that there were positive gains for businesses that supported NGO projects. With this new exposure to and appreciation of the wider NGO world, many Keidanren officials and Japanese businessmen also started to gain a greater understanding of the problems facing NGOs in Japan. KNCF is now one of the promoters of NGOs in Japan and Goto Yasu, the Chair of KNCF for most of the 1990s and the former Chair of Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company, became an enthusiastic advocate for building up the IDNGO sector in Japan. (Okajima 1998) KNCF is therefore a good example of the transnational diffusion of ideas and new practices in the corporate foundation world and how global actors have influenced wider societal understandings of NGOs and activism in Japan.

Conclusion After quietly working in the shadows, Japanese IDNGOs are now a visible and recognized sub-sector of the nonprofit community in Japan. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the acronym “NGO” was well known, universities in Japan were offering courses on NGOs in international development and job applications to work at IDNGOs rose to far outnumber the available positions. (NGO interview, 2005) Although Japanese IDNGOs are still on average much smaller than IDNGOs in North America and many parts of Europe, they are now established and influential players in international development circles in Japan. As recently as the early 1980s, this had not been the case, and the rise of IDNGOs in Japan over the past two decades parallels changes in both the domestic and the international political environments. Domestically, new funding opportunities and the opening of institutional access – as was the case in many other OECD countries – have supported the emergence and growth of Japan’s IDNGO sector. Internationally, the global promotion of NGOs made its mark on Japan through DAC committee reports, US foreign aid officials, international institutions that provided funding to NGOs and other transnational actors that actively promoted the IDNGO sector in Japan. International factors interacted with domestic political factors and helped shape the debate on the role of NGOs in Japan and official NGO support programs that have funded thousands of NGO projects in developing countries.

International development NGOs in Japan 115 While this chapter has stressed the importance of international political factors, there are, of course, limitations to this part of the activism from above argument. Although international factors play supportive roles of foreign pressure and the introduction of new ideas, ultimately it is how domestic actors respond to this pressure and these ideas that matters. The outcomes in Japan have been generally positive: state officials responded to outside pressure and ideas by adopting policy changes that have brought them closer to international norms and NGOs have used international norms strategically to increase the funding and access points available to them. That said, however, compared with IDNGOs in other OECD countries, the domestic political environment and opportunities for Japanese IDNGOs are still more limited and obstacles remain that have prevented them from developing to their full potential institutionally. It is only since 1998 that NGOs have been able to incorporate easily as a nonprofit organizations and only since 2003 that the rules for special tax status have become more flexible. With the entire system for nonprofit incorporation now in transition, it may take a while longer for Japanese NGOs to reach the stage of having the full set of organizational tools that their counterparts in North America and parts of Europe have possessed for decades. Until then, it may be difficult for them to become the professional mega NGOs found in the West. The process of change has started, however, and Japanese IDNGOs are here to stay.

5

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs in Japan

Starting with the first international UN conference on the environment in Stockholm in 1972, sustainable development and the environment have become major foci of activity for advocacy NGOs, and since the 1980s NGOs active in this area have proliferated worldwide. Over the years, there have been countless campaigns and movements organized by advocacy NGOs to promote more environment-friendly policies that have made headline news, ranging from protests against World Bank projects in developing countries to campaigns for sustainable tropical timber practices to a multitude of efforts to stop global warming. While still relatively small-scale and less influential than their counterparts in many other industrialized countries, Japanese advocacy NGOs have also recently become active and visible players in the politics of sustainable development and Japan’s global environmental policies. This chapter examines advocacy NGOs working in the area of environment and traces the ways in which the domestic and international political contexts have shaped the evolution of this type of group. It provides some data on environmental advocacy NGOs in general, but focuses mainly on a smaller sub-group of NGOs advocating policies that promote sustainable development in developing countries. The emergence of environmental advocacy NGOs in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s is noteworthy given the various obstacles facing advocacy groups critical of Japanese government policies. Although state policies and the closed domestic political opportunity structures in Japan prior to the late 1980s described in Chapter Two discouraged the emergence and growth of both service and advocacy NGOs, these structures were particularly challenging for advocacy groups due to the political nature of these groups and, as critics of the state, their self-perceived need for autonomy. Obtaining legal status as a public interest corporation, for example, was anathema to most advocacy groups, since having such status in effect provided the central government with supervisory powers that could potentially threaten the independence (and very existence) of the group. (Pekkanen 2006: 75–76) Because of this, practically no advocacy groups considered obtaining legal status until the 1998 NPO Law, and this situation of legal limbo limited the development and institutional growth of this type of NGO for many years. Similarly, while lack of access and political influence with bureaucrats and politicians was a problem for both advocacy and service NGOs, this closed nature

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 117 of political institutions and elite allies was even more problematic for advocacy groups given their ultimate goal of policy change. In general, for many years the literature on social movements and civil society in Japan has been pessimistic about the role of independent and critical advocacy groups in politics due to the “strong” state. Scholars examining several areas of social change have explored and shown the ways in which the Japanese state has used a variety of tools – legal, cultural and regulatory – to contain, reshape or coopt any kind of political activism that challenges state policies and/or the authority of the state. (Pekkanen 2006 and 2004b; Pharr 1990 and 2003; Maclachlan 2002; Garon 1997; Upham 1987) The case of advocacy NGOs focusing on international environmental issues is an interesting one that simultaneously confirms and challenges these arguments. On the one hand, the arguments hold true since the sector remains extremely smallscale and underdeveloped in comparison to similar sectors in the United States and other countries with relatively liberal NGO policies and open political structures. At the same time, however, advocacy groups have emerged as new voices and have become important players in the policy process in Japan, despite their small size. This has been particularly the case for the sub-group of NGOs examined in this chapter, which have criticized Japan’s foreign policies for the detrimental environmental effects they have had in developing countries. Why did these new groups start to appear in much greater numbers in the late 1980s and 1990s, and how have they managed to survive to this day? With these questions in mind, this chapter analyzes both domestic and international political structures in the late 1980s and 1990s to show how they changed, interacted and provided new opportunities for environmental advocacy groups to form and grow in comparison to previous decades. Domestic barriers to organizing have been tougher for advocacy groups than service groups, but in the 1990s there were nonetheless policy changes and openings in the domestic political opportunity structure (POS) that were supportive of advocacy NGOs focusing on sustainable development and the environment. New official funding sources, such as the Japan Fund for the Global Environment, provided grants for advocacy NGOs in the early 1990s, and throughout the decade several NGO–government dialogues were set up that provided them with formal access to policy-makers. As was true for the IDNGOs examined in the previous chapter, however, one must take into account the international political context to understand how these changes in the domestic POS came about. Once again, international socialization processes and the strategic use of international norms by NGOs were very important in bringing about political openings at the domestic level. But socialization and changing domestic POS were not the only important elements for understanding the growth of environmental advocacy NGOs in Japan. Compared with IDNGOs, the emergence and evolution of advocacy NGOs have been more directly influenced and shaped by international political opportunities and the politics of international organizations. For advocacy NGOs, in other words, one important source of support for the sector came directly from outside Japan. As described in Chapter Three, the increasing number and openness of international organizations to NGO participation and rising levels of international

118 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs funding for NGOs provided new opportunities for activism in the area of the global environment. From the late 1980s, as issues related to the environment and sustainable development were promoted by more international organizations and actors, Japanese activists – like those in many other parts of the world – were increasingly drawn to the global political stage and were able to take advantage of newly available international resources, such as funding and alternative political venues. This chapter will explore how these new opportunities were particularly important for Japanese advocacy NGOs active in the area of sustainable development. Finally, since they tended to be more actively involved in international conferences and transnational advocacy networks than IDNGOs, environmental advocacy NGOs were also more exposed to Western NGOs and the transfusion of ideas. Many of the NGOs and activists in Japan most active on sustainable development issues in this period were those who worked closely with Western NGOs and foundations and/or had experience overseas. Ideas and new practices transmitted through these interactions and international experiences influenced the organization and goals of the NGOs and contributed to their ability to establish themselves as legitimate actors. This chapter builds on previous studies that have examined international norms and how advocacy NGOs have used norms to promote political change in Japan. (Chan-Tiberghien 2004; Miyaoka 2004; Gurowitz 1999) However, in contrast to these studies – which analyze mainly policy change brought about by NGOs – this book focuses more squarely on the use and effects of norms and other international factors on the development of NGOs themselves. The chapter starts with an overview of the rise of this new sector of advocacy environmental NGOs in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. It then lays out the changes in domestic political opportunity structure during the 1990s that supported their rise and growth, as well as the various ways in which international norms helped bring about these changes in the domestic POS. The rest of the chapter explores international political opportunity and transnational diffusion, and how these two processes directly supported the emergence and development of Japanese advocacy environmental NGOs.

Advocacy NGOs active in global environment and sustainable development Advocacy groups active in global environmental issues are a recent phenomenon in Japan. Although there were a large number of very active local environmental movements in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, these movements never congealed into national-level ones with strong national environmental associations as was the case in many other industrialized countries. (Hasegawa 2004; Schreurs 2002; Broadbent 1998; McKean 1981; Krauss and Simock 1980) Whereas in the United States and several European countries the emergence of national movements in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the growth of NGOs that focused on global environmental issues in the 1970s and 1980s (Caldwell 1992; Dunlap and Mertig

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 119 1992; Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap 1992), in Japan environmental protest movements had died out by the late 1970s and the majority of groups that existed were local in their goals, organization and membership and were not active on national or international issues. (Hasegawa 2004; Schreurs 2002; McKean 1981) From the mid- to late 1980s, however, a variety of NGOs interested in various aspects of global environmental politics and sustainable development started to appear in Japan. Figure 5.1 shows the growth of advocacy NGOs active in global environmental issues. As the figure indicates, there was a surge in the establishment of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s. Of the groups in the chart, 80 percent were founded after 1986. Furthermore, since most of the groups founded before the 1980s were local or national groups that did not get involved in international and/or environmental issues until the mid- to late 1980s or later, one could argue that nearly all the advocacy NGOs active in global environmental issues appeared in the 1980s and 1990s. Within this larger set of environmental advocacy NGOs, a sub-sector of NGOs focusing on sustainable development and environmental issues in developing countries emerged in Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s, several years after such NGOs had appeared in North America and Europe. NGO activism in the area of sustainable development first appeared in the early 1980s in the United States with a campaign against several environmentally destructive development projects funded by the World Bank (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Fox and Brown 1998) and within a few years became a much larger movement that included hundreds of NGOs from all over the world. It now focuses on a variety of development-related issues, such as tropical deforestation, dam construction, reform of international 600

140

Number of IDNGOs

120

100 Total

80

New 60

40

20

0 1890s

1900s

1910s

1920s

1930s

1940s

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

Decade

Figure 5.1 Japanese advocacy NGOs active in global environmental issues, 1890s–1990s Source: JANIC 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004; OECD 1967, 1981, 1990; Honnoki 1992; JACSES 1994; internet searches.

120 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the rights of indigenous people. (Fox and Brown 1998; Nelson 1997) Interest among Japanese advocacy NGOs and activists in sustainable development-related issues emerged in the late 1980s when Japan more than doubled its foreign aid and became the world’s largest aid donor in 1989. The core group of NGOs that has been involved in several overlapping international development-related advocacy campaigns in Japan since the late 1980s include: the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN), the Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC), Friends of the Earth-Japan (FOE-J), the Institute for Alternative Community Development (IACOD), the Japan Center for Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES), Mekong Watch, the Japanese Indonesia NGO Network (JANNI), APEC Monitor NGO Network, Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), the ADB Fukuoka Forum and Oxfam Japan. Compared with environmental advocacy NGOs in North America and parts of Europe, Japanese environmental advocacy NGOs – both in general as well as those working on sustainable development issues – are much smaller in scale and capacity. For the 56 NGOs included in Figure 5.1 for which financial information was available, the total combined income in 2002 was approximately $40.5 million, with a majority of these groups (60 percent) having budgets of less than $250,000. (JANIC 2004) For the NGOs which have been active in promoting sustainable development issues, annual budgets have ranged from $18,000 (Sarawak Campaign) to $2.4 million (JVC), with most groups having budgets between $80,000 and $300,000. (JANIC 2004) These figures are tiny when compared to advocacy NGOs in the United States, and two American environmental advocacy NGOs alone – the World Wildlife Fund and Environmental Defense – had combined assets of $190 million in 2002.1 Although there are also many small advocacy NGOs in the United States and Europe, in Japan very small NGOs are the norm. Despite their small size and limited resources, advocacy NGOs active in the area of sustainable development have nonetheless emerged as players in the politics of foreign aid and sustainable development in Japan. When these NGOs first became active in the late 1980s and early 1990s, although they had little direct access to policy-makers, their publications and media campaigns influenced the domestic debate on Japanese foreign aid, tropical forest degradation and other sustainable development issues. A network of NGOs and academic activists, for example, were important contributors to the public debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s of whether Japanese foreign aid was environmentally destructive, which in turn led to much internal debate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and eventually a repackaging of foreign aid in the 1990s. (Koshida 2006; Matsui and Ruprecht 1992; Rix 1993: 51–62; Murai 1992; Sumi 1989 and 1990; Murai and Kanda 1987) Similarly, the NGO JATAN was important in this period in getting the issues of tropical forest degradation and Japan’s role in such degradation in Asia into the public debate through its media campaigns and research papers; FoE-J lobbied and brought public attention to Japan’s funding of the controversial Narmada Dam in India, which eventually led to a reexamination

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 121 of the project and the suspension of Japanese loans. (Wong 1998; Schreurs 1997; Udall 1995: 210–221; Sumi 1990: 41–45) In the 1990s, as these NGOs were able to get better access to officials at the MOFA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and other government agencies, they became a more institutionalized part of the policy-making process. Since the mid- to late 1990s, through both lobbying efforts and participation in several official committees and NGO–state dialogues, advocacy NGOs have regularly provided input on Japan’s policies regarding foreign aid, World Bank loans/projects and policies, Asian Development Bank loans/projects and policies, JICA projects, environmental guidelines at JICA and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, debt-related issues and the inclusion of local populations in formulating projects. Although NGOs are not always successful in obtaining their goals, their voice is now heard at various stages of the policy-making process and officials spend a good portion of their time responding to NGO queries about problematic development projects. (MOF official interviews, May 2005 and July 2008; JBIC official interview, May 2005; ADB official interview, May 2007) Compared with the period before the late 1980s – when they were practically non-existent – Japanese NGOs now play a far more active and visible role in policy-making in the broad area of sustainable development. Considering their small size, they have been, if anything, surprisingly successful in surviving and becoming players in policy circles.

Explaining advocacy NGO formation and growth: activism from above How does one account for the belated but rising presence of this new set of advocacy NGOs in Japan? The delayed appearance of advocacy NGOs interested in global environment issues and sustainable development in Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s is the result of a complex mix of factors, both socio-economic and political. Given the timing of the rise of these groups, however, political explanations and the activism from above model provide a more complete and well-specified set of causal factors which correlate to the patterns described above. Changing political structures and the availability of new resources at both the national level and international levels in this period brought about the necessary conditions for the rise of these new environmental advocacy NGOs in Japan. The rest of this chapter examines these changes and the ways in which domestic and international politics interacted to create new opportunities for NGO activism. Changing state policies and domestic POS As discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, state policies and the domestic political opportunity structure (POS) in Japan for most of the postwar period have had the effect of restricting the formation of Japanese NGOs and strong professional advocacy groups. (Pekkanen 2006) Since inside connections with

122 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs bureaucrats and/or politicians for many years were standard prerequisites for obtaining legal status as a public interest corporation, most advocacy groups that were critical of the state did not even bother to apply because they lacked such connections – in 1998, 85 percent of the advocacy environmental NGOs had no legal status. (JANIC 2000) Even if such groups had applied, it is unlikely that their applications would have received favorable treatment, since most bureaucrats viewed social change advocacy groups and NGOs with disdain and suspicion. (Menju 1995: 149; Wakisaka 1996: 79) Such views persisted even as late as the mid-1990s, with bureaucrats publicly objecting to the idea of granting legal status to advocacy groups that were critical of the state. During the debate in the 1990s on setting up a new “NPO” non-profit corporate legal status similar to that found in the United States, the quoted reactions of bureaucrats included: “Even an antinuclear group could obtain legal status. Does that make sense for the country?” and “How do we deal with the possibility that gay-rights groups could organize an NGO? People would never allow it.” (Wakisaka 1996: 79) The idea of a group such as Greenpeace obtaining legal status in Japan, apparently, was still unthinkable to many government officials. Bureaucratic disdain of advocacy NGOs also translated into a lack of access to policy-making processes and bodies which severely hampered NGO efforts at policy change. Prior to 1997, relations between advocacy NGOs and officials at MOF and MOFA were existent but tense, and most NGOs felt they had poor access to bureaucrats. (Kanda 1999; NGO interviews, August 1998) When advocacy NGOs promoting sustainable development policies abroad first started to try lobbying officials in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they usually received the cold shoulder of unanswered calls or, in the rare cases when officials agreed to meet with them, they would get the silent treatment in which the bureaucrats would simply refuse to answer questions. (NGO interviews, August 1998 and February 2001) One NGO found that the easiest way to get access to an MOF official was to contact an American environmental NGO friend who would use his contacts in the US Congress to get the US Embassy in Tokyo to schedule an appointment with MOF for the Japanese NGO! (NGO interview, August 1998) Finally, access to politicians and the use of the legislature were also difficult for many Japanese environmental advocacy groups due to the long dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) until the end of the “1955 System” and advent of coalition governments in 1993. Although some activists had links to the opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP), these links were not particularly useful prior to the 1990s because the JSP was perpetually out of power. Given these various political obstacles in Japan, it is not surprising that advocacy environmental NGOs are far fewer in number and far smaller in size than those in the United States and several other OECD member countries that have more generous state policies and more open domestic POS. Advocacy environmental NGOs active in international issues in the United States emerged and became world leaders due to the relatively generous opportunities provided by state policies, structures and domestic POS. All the tools and resources commonly cited by American scholars as important to the rise and growth of

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs in 123 American environmental advocacy NGOs in the 1970s and 1980s – tax incentives, mass mailings using bulk mail rates, foundation grants, and access to lobby both Congress and the executive branch (Jenkins 1987 and 1998; Bosso 1995; Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap 1992; Walker 1991) – were unavailable to Japanese activists for most of the postwar period. From the 1990s, however, changes started to take place in both state policies and access in Japan which provided more political space and opportunities for advocacy environmental NGOs. These changes have been one important element in the rise of this new sector and have helped the core group of advocacy NGOs active in the area of sustainable development gain legitimacy and survive. New state funds One of the more surprising policy changes in the 1990s was the availability of state funding for environmental advocacy groups with the creation of the Japan Fund for the Global Environment (JFGE) in 1992. (See Chapter Four for background information on the JFGE.) Given the antagonistic attitude of bureaucrats to groups critical of government policy, one might have expected that JFGE grants to NGOs would have gone only to service NGOs and not to politically active advocacy environmental NGOs. However, many of the new environmental advocacy NGOs which appeared in the 1980s and 1990s have received JFGE and other state grants and have used state funding as a source of revenue for both environmental projects in the field overseas and for advocacy at home in Japan. In 1998, for example, 64 percent of the environmental advocacy NGOs for which there was detailed funding information listed in the JANIC NGO Directory received some form of official funding, and in 2002 the figure was as high as 81 percent. (JANIC 2000 and 2004) For the core group of NGOs working in the area of sustainable development, nearly all of the groups relied on JFGE funds for research, projects and advocacy activities throughout the 1990s. Table 5.1 lists the JFGE grants received by NGOs active in sustainable development issues during the 1990s and early 2000s. While the grant amounts are small, the availability of such funding to politically active advocacy NGOs from the state represents a sea change in policy compared to the pre-1990s period. Expanding access to state officials In addition to the appearance of new state funding, the other important domestic political change for advocacy NGOs in the 1990s was the opening of new avenues of access to policy-makers and elites. Prior to the 1990s, lack of access to bureaucrats diminished both the effectiveness of advocacy NGO efforts and their legitimacy. (NGO interview, August 1998) From the mid-1990s, however, environmental advocacy NGOs became participants in policy dialogues with several ministries and government agencies. (See Table 4.1.) These regular and institutionalized meetings have given advocacy NGOs the opportunity to present their positions and establish new networks and personal relationships with

124 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs Table 5.1 JFGE grants to advocacy NGOs working on sustainable development issues, 1994–2008 Group

Year

Grant amount and purpose

Friends of the Earth – Japan (FoE-J)

1994 1995 1996

$28,000 for a forest research project in Siberia $34,000 for continuation of the 1994 project $34,000 for a sustainable social development program $26,000 to support sustainable development for an indigenous community in the Russian Far East $26,000 for continuation of the 1998 project $50,000 for activities to disseminate concepts of the conservation of global environment in preparation for the Johannesburg Summit $13,000 for constructing an Internet Information Center on illegal logging and illegal trading of lumber in South Africa $58,000 for organizing an international conference on devising an equitable global strategy on climate change $34,000 for a study on climate change impacts on developing countries in Asia $33,000 for continuation of 2005 project $37,000 for continuation of 2005–2006 project $32,000 for research and advocacy on Japanese foreign aid to developing countries to address climate change

1998 1999 2002 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008

Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN)

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2002 2003 2004 2006

Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC)

1994 1995 1997

$46,000 for seminars on tropical forest protection with Asian NGOs $72,000 to coordinate Asia-Pacific regional NGO activities and workshops on tropical forest conservation $75,000 for continuation of 1994 project $66,000 for continuation of 1994–1995 project $34,000 for international NGO workshops on tropical forests in the Asia-Pacific region $46,000 for public awareness-raising concerning forests and global warming policies $32,000 for research and making recommendations for promoting the use of lumber through sustainable forest management $34,000 for policy research on promoting use of timber from sustainable forest management $32,000 for continuation of 2003 project $23,000 for promotion of tropical plywood supply management $28,000 for environmental and development education in Japan $19,000 for continuation of 1994 project $22,000 for joint research on economic development and environment in Asia

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 125 Table 5.1 Continued Group

Year

Grant amount and purpose

1998

$48,000 for research on abandoned shrimp ponds in Thailand $34,000 for continuation of 1998 project $32,000 for a people’s network on rivers in Thailand $35,000 for research and advocacy on water problems in developing countries $48,000 for continuation of 2004 project $48,000 for research and information dissemination on sustainable fisheries $49,000 for continuation of 2006 project $54,000 for continuation of 2006–2007 project

1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

2003

Mekong Watch

1995 1996 1997 2000 2003

$22,000 for post-UNCED research $34,000 for research to promote Japanese environmental NGOs and international cooperation $51,000 for continuation of 1994 projects $46,000 for an international research seminar for the 1997 UN Sustainable Development Committee $37,000 for research and an international conference on Agenda 21 in the Asia-Pacific region $46,000 for research and a conference on sustainable energy policy and development funds in Asia $46,000 for research on greening of finance $50,000 for development of policy proposals and holding of workshops and international seminars for “Greening Japanese Fiscal Policy” $37,000 for continuation of 2000 project $46,000 for research on “funds” for realizing sustainable development, and making policy recommendations, ten years after the Earth Summit $53,000 for research and awareness-raising about trade and finance issues related to sustainable development, part of World Summit on Sustainable Development $46,000 for research and activities on natural resource conservation in Laos and Cambodia $46,000 for continuation of 1995 project $11,000 for environmental studies and reports on the Mekong region $27,000 for participatory media project for environmentally friendly development in Laos $18,000 for advocacy and outreach activities for improving environmental and social considerations in foreign aid (continued)

126 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs Table 5.1 Continued Group

Year

Grant amount and purpose

2004

$27,000 for field study, advocacy and outreach activities to improve environmental and social conditions in foreign aid planning and implementation, and the role of Japanese financing in the Mekong region. $29,000 for research on local forest resource management in Laos $29,000 for continuation of 2005 project $30,000 for continuation of 2005–2006 project $26,000 for developing written and visual resources on environmental issues in the Mekong region

2005 2006 2007 2008

Fukuoka NGO Forum on the Asian Development Bank

1996

$26,000 for the formation of an NGO network

APEC Monitor NGO Network

1999

$25,000 for forming an international network for stopping environmental decline from agricultural trade liberalization $27,000 for continuation of 1999 project $27,000 to research environmental deterioration caused by the deregulation of forest products and raising public awareness of this issue

2000 2001

Japan Indonesia NGO Network (JANNI)

1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2005 2006 2007

Japan International Volunteer Center

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

$58,000 for an environmental survey in Indonesia $56,000 for continuation of the 1994 project $46,000 for continuation of the 1994–1995 project $28,000 for a workshop on people participatory environmental conservation $37,000 for a guidebook on environmental monitoring for NGOs in Indonesia $27,000 for a study on institutionalizing ecological reform in rural Indonesia $33,000 for continuation of the 2005 project $32,000 for continuation of the 2005–2006 project $69,000 for a forestry project in Thailand $94,000 for continuation of the 1993 project $85,000 for continuation of the 1993–1994 project $74,000 for continuation of the 1993–1995 project $59,000 for research on environmentally sound agriculture in Thailand $66,000 for continuation of the 1997 project $66,000 for continuation of the 1997–1998 project $64,000 for continuation of the 1997–1999 project

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 127 Table 5.1 Continued Group

Year

Grant Amount and Purpose

2001

$51,000 for environmental education on pesticide effects to farmers in Thailand $49,000 for continuation of the 1997–2000 project $51,000 for a participatory rural development project in Vietnam $53,000 for continuation of 2003 project $60,000 for continuation of 2003–2004 project $59,000 for sustainable agriculture and environmental protection project in Cambodia $53,000 for continuation of 2006 project $60,000 for continuation of 2005–2006 project

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Sources: Japan Environment Corporation, internal documents listing Japan Fund for Global Environment grant recipients, 1994–1999. For 2000–2002, JFGE webpage: http://www.erca.go.jp/ jfge/english/frame/f_prog1.html, accessed 7/31/2006. For 2003–2008, JFGE webpage: http://www.erca. go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/04orig.html, accessed 3/15/2009.

bureaucrats. While they were not the reason for NGO emergence per se, such openings of new access points have nonetheless been very important in supporting the development of this sector since they justify the existence of advocacy NGOs and provide a way for NGOs to advocate their causes more effectively. The earliest state–NGO dialogues for NGOs working in the area of sustainable development are the NGO–MOFA quarterly dialogue (NGO–MOFA teiki kyogikai) and the NGO–MOF quarterly dialogue (NGO–MOF teiki kyogikai). The NGO–MOFA quarterly dialogue began in 1996 mainly as a channel of communication between MOFA and NGOs that received MOFA grants and subsidies, but from 1997 NGOs started to use these meetings to discuss ODA reform and issues relating to NGO participation in the foreign aid policy-making process as part of MOFA’s new country program policy. NGOs were then included in numerous MOFA foreign aid policy advisory councils and committees such as the Subcommittee to Achieve Objectives of the ODA Reform Council’s Final Report, an NGO body that met regularly with MOFA in the late 1990s and early 2000s to discuss implementation of ODA reforms. More recently, in 2003, MOFA decided to set up a separate NGO teiki kyogikai devoted solely to policy and reform issues which includes primarily advocacy NGOs from different parts of the country. Through all of these bodies, advocacy NGOs now have direct access to MOFA officials and have had far less difficulty getting information and doing their work than they had previously. (NGO interviews, July 1998 and May 2005) The NGO–MOF quarterly dialogue started in 1997 and has become a regular channel of access and interaction between sustainable development advocacy NGOs and MOF officials from the latter’s International Bureau. Since MOF was long viewed by activists and NGOs as one of the most closed bureaucracies, the establishment of this dialogue was seen by advocacy NGOs as a major

128 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs breakthrough. (Kanda 1999: 57; NGO interviews, July 1998; Foundation officer interview, March 1998) In addition to transforming MOF officials’ negative protest image of NGOs (MOF officials interviews, July 1998), the quarterly meetings have provided NGOs with personal contacts within MOF that they can use to advocate their causes and goals throughout the year, and NGOs no longer have the problems they once had in terms of gaining direct access to MOF officials. (NGO interview, May 2005) Participation in the dialogues has increased NGO influence and introduced an alternative “voice” that had been left out of official policy-making processes for decades. In addition to these two important official dialogues, advocacy NGOs now participate in a similar official dialogue with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and have become regular members of advisory councils and other policy bodies that contribute to policy formation related to sustainable development overseas at MOF, JBIC and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Since the late 1990s, advocacy NGOs, for example, have been members of advisory councils at MOF related to debt issues and international finance, of JICA’s Council for Implementing Environmental and Social Considerations, and of several JBIC committees related to the formulation of JBIC’s Basic Strategy and evaluation of JBIC loan projects. (NGO and JBIC officials interviews, May 2005) Finally, since the early 2000s there has also been an opening up of the policymaking process in general, mandated from above through the Management and Coordination Agency (Somucho), with the introduction in most government agencies of public consultation periods for major policy reviews and new initiatives. This has provided new opportunities for advocacy NGOs to participate and influence policy processes, and they have utilised them. In the area of sustainable development, for example, in the early 2000s advocacy NGOs participated in the review process for formation of environmental guidelines for JBIC and JICA and, by successfully organizing their positions on several policy bodies, they were able to introduce significant policy changes related to transparency and accountability of Japanese funding of ODA projects. (NGO and JBIC officials interviews, May 2005) Taken together, all of these new domestic political opportunities at the central government level since the mid-1990s have allowed a core group of advocacy NGOs concerned about sustainable development at the global level to become an institutionalized part of the policy process in Japan. They have provided NGOs with a degree of recognition and legitimacy that has led in some cases to policy influence, which in turn has helped NGOs achieve their goals and survive. Access to the powerful MOF and international development agencies has also made these Japanese advocacy NGOs valuable allies to NGOs in other parts of the world that wish to influence Japan’s policies regarding foreign aid, international financial institutions, developing country debt and a variety of issues that have potentially significant international environmental and social impacts.

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 129 Changing political dynamics Lastly, with the fall from power of the LDP in 1993 and the advent of coalition governments, NGOs have also seen some opening of POS in the legislature. In the coalitional period of 1994–1996 when the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was part of the ruling coalition, for example, NGOs that had contacts with JSP politicians were able to obtain information and more easily put pressure on the government for environment-related policy changes. (NGO interviews, June and July 1998) Even when the JSP was no longer part of the coalition and declined as a party in the late 1990s, the rise of new parties in the 1990s created a better overall POS for advocacy environmental NGOs as politicians in general started to adopt a more pro-environmental stance on development. As “civil society” and NGOs became hot topics in this period, championed by many politicians in the rising Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the LDP also became more supportive of NGOs. Although connections to the legislature are still not as close or useful for Japanese environmental advocacy NGOs as they are for US NGOs, this part of the POS has improved when compared to the pre-1993 period. Explaining new domestic political opportunities: norms and socialization of the state Changes in domestic policies and POS for advocacy NGOs in the 1990s are therefore important elements in NGO growth and the emergence of NGOs as legitimate nonstate actors in Japan over the past two decades. But why did these domestic political changes initially occur? Given the fact that many bureaucrats and politicians – even as they launched new NGO funding programs and NGO dialogues – remained resistant to engaging with advocacy NGOs well into the 1990s, many of the changes are quite puzzling. While domestic political trends and factors played a part in bringing about some of the changes described above, these changes are hard to understand without taking into account the international political context and the rise of new global norms related to both the environment and people participation. As was the case with IDNGOs, norms and socialization processes are important parts of the story of new domestic POS for environmental advocacy NGOs. Starting in the late 1980s, the interaction of international and domestic politics produced an ongoing socialization process whereby state officials and politicians in Japan gradually adopted and internalized the norm of engaging with advocacy NGOs. Below I describe the rise of new norms related to sustainable development and how these norms then played a part in the changing domestic POS for NGOs. Rise of the sustainable development norm Although global environmental issues first appeared in the international political arena in the 1970s, it was only in the mid-1980s and 1990s, with advancements in scientific knowledge and the rise in number of environment-related international

130 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs treaties, that a normative concept of “sustainable development” emerged as a global ideal for states to emulate and champion. (Held et al. 1999: ch. 8) Defined as a form of development which “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987), sustainable development also came to include a people participation component that emphasized the importance of democratic decisionmaking processes, the inclusion of local communities and citizens in policymaking and state accountability in the area of the environment. At UN conferences and in international programs related to the environment and sustainable development since the late 1980s, the “pro-NGO norm” described in Chapter Three has been institutionalized in global environmental politics, with NGOs often described as advocates, stakeholders and “partners” of the state. As global environmental issues and NGO participation in solving environmental problems became institutionalized in IGOs and international regimes in these two decades, Japanese officials found themselves under increasing pressure to reconsider their treatment of NGOs active in global environment issues. In fact, Japan was particularly vulnerable to such normative pressures and influence since it chose the environment as one of the issues in which it would show global leadership during this period. When Japan became an economic superpower in the mid- to late 1980s, it both needed to increase its level of “burden sharing” in international cooperation efforts and wanted to use its new wealth to raise its profile as a global power. The environment was selected as a feel-good, imageenhancing and non-controversial issue to support, and a wave of “green diplomacy” was initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. (Schreurs 2002; Ohta 2000) This policy choice, however, opened the door for criticism of the poor domestic political environment for Japanese NGOs. If Japan wanted to be a global leader in the area of the environment, it would also have to adopt the international norm of supporting and including NGOs in policy-making processes that was quickly becoming a standard part of global governance practices related to sustainable development. In these and other ways, international norms were behind many of the changes one sees in state policies and domestic POS vis-à-vis environmental advocacy NGOs. Socialization processes operated at several levels. First, officials and leaders in Japan became more open to NGOs due to social influence and learning processes they experienced while participating in international conferences and other international arenas where the pro-NGO norm was being promoted. Prestige and Japan’s international image were often motivating factors in policy change; but learning also mattered and over time bureaucrats came to see engagement with advocacy NGOs as normal. Second, international norms were brought into domestic politics as Japanese environmental advocacy NGOs consciously and strategically used normative arguments to pry open new access points in the bureaucracy. Aware of Japan’s sensitivity to its international image, NGOs used norms to “shame” Japan into catching up with Western countries that had more participatory policy-making processes in the areas of sustainable development and foreign aid.

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 131 JFGE funding for advocacy NGOs and norms One can see one or more of these factors of international normative influences operating in all of the domestic policy changes mentioned above. The creation of the Japan Fund for the Global Environment (JFGE) and state funding for environmental NGOs, for example, was one component of Japan’s prestige-driven “green” diplomacy of the late 1980s and early 1990s that responded to international norms. As described in greater detail in Chapter Four, leaders at the time chose to set up this fund for NGOs because it was an internationally correct, normconforming initiative that would shed a positive international light on Japan. Japanese political leaders such as then-Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru learned of the importance of NGOs from UN officials as they prepared for the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and were looking for ideas for how Japanese money could support the global environment. JFGE was originally set up as an UNCED showpiece, and was a response to social influence and the positive “prestige” social benefits Japan would receive in the international arena by setting up such a fund. (See Chapter Four for more details.) Although this was a shallow form of norm adoption, once the JFGE was set up it gained a life of its own and became a location for deeper norm internalization among bureaucrats as they started to come into greater contact with Japanese environmental advocacy NGOs. The process started with internationalized officials taking the lead in making JFGE funds available to advocacy environmental groups in addition to service-oriented NGOs. While bureaucrats from the Environment Agency who initially ran the JFGE in the mid-1990s had little previous direct contact or personal ties with Japanese NGOs, some EA officials were open to supporting NGOs since their extensive international experience had already made them aware of international norms and the role of Western advocacy NGOs promoting the environment at international conferences. (JEC official interview, June 1998) One of these officials was Matsushita Kazuo, the Director-General of JFGE in the mid-1990s when the fund began actively supporting advocacy NGOs. Matsushita was an EA official seconded to JFGE in the mid-1990s who had spent several years in Geneva in the early 1990s tracking global warming and other international environmental issues. As someone who had been exposed to NGO activism at UN conferences and international norms of including NGOs, he was an internationally socialized bureaucrat who saw that NGOs had a role to play and was sympathetic with the idea of helping them in Japan. When he became Director of JFGE, he used the fund to launch a new initiative to help network-style advocacy NGOs active in international issues by setting up a new separate JFGE budget called the “Global Partnership Program.” (JEC official interview, June 1998) Through this program and under Matsushita’s leadership, JFGE officers started to provide grants to many of the core advocacy NGOs involved in global environmental issues. Over time, these types of grant were institutionalized, and providing grants to advocacy NGOs came to be seen as standard practice. By the late 1990s, officials at JFGE internalized the norm of supporting advocacy NGOs

132 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs and saw these NGOs as partners in promoting important global environmental initiatives. The JFGE and its support of advocacy NGOs is therefore a good example of a policy initially adopted for international prestige reasons (social influence), implemented by an elite who were consciously importing ideas they observed in the international arena (learning) and then internalized over time as standard practice among officials administering the JFGE program. The MOF–NGO dialogues and the influence of norms Norms and socialization processes have also played important roles in opening up new channels of access to policy-makers through the creation of new NGO–state dialogues in the 1990s, such as the MOF–NGO quarterly dialogues, one of the most important policy venues for environmental advocacy NGOs that promote sustainable development in developing countries. This important change in domestic POS at MOF in many ways can be seen as the adoption and internalization by Japan’s bureaucratic elite of the “people participatory” component of the international norm of sustainable development. As I shall show below, the MOF–NGO quarterly dialogues came about as a result of a combination of international and domestic politics that involved processes related to social influence such as mimicking, the pursuit of prestige and shaming. International politics, and the politics of hosting important international conferences, provided social incentives for MOF to open its doors and talk to NGOs, in order to show that – like many rich nations active in international politics – it was a supporter of the norm of people participation. Domestic politics was also part of the socialization process, with Japanese NGOs strategically using international norms to pressure and “shame” MOF into meeting with them formally and on a regular basis. The combination of these factors led to a policy change that would otherwise be hard to fully explain or understand. Before the creation of the MOF–NGO quarterly dialogues, the Japanese government’s first step toward adopting the international norm of including NGOs in the policy-making process came in the early 1990s as a result of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). This early phase corresponds to what norm scholars have referred to as the rhetorical adoption of a norm, during which a state superficially supports a norm mainly through words and symbolic actions rather than through practice. (Risse and Sikkink 1999) UNCED was the international political event that first forced Japanese government officials to take some kind of action regarding the emerging global norm of participatory sustainable development. One of the outcomes of UNCED in 1992 was a “plan of action” called Agenda 21 which provided a blueprint for countries to set out national environmental goals and agendas for the coming decade. Two aspects of Agenda 21 were governance processes and the inclusion of civil society and NGOs in promoting sustainable development. Using the Agenda 21 template, in early 1994 Japan submitted to the UN its National Action Plan for Agenda 21, which included a section on strengthening the role of NGOs that specifically

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 133 mentioned the need to include them when formulating and implementing policies related to sustainable development and the environment. The Plan’s preamble also pledged Japan’s commitment to “enhancing the level of effective cooperation among the major constituents of society, including the central government, local authorities, businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).” (Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation, 1993) This document, which was the first official government statement recognizing the new global norm of NGO support and inclusion, was a first rhetorical step toward norm adoption. A filtering and deepening of this process of norm socialization then took place at ministries that dealt with foreign policy related to sustainable development during the rest of the 1990s. In the case of MOF, the shift from rhetorical support to practice of the norm to include NGOs started in the mid-1990s as the ministry became more aware of the norm through its participation in the World Bank and other international organizations that were starting to promote the norm. (MOF official interview, July 1998) The turning point seemingly came in 1996 and 1997 with events related to the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), during which MOF officials for the first time considered the international implications of not including NGO participation at an important international meeting. Through these experiences, as well as through more general exposure to the pro-NGO norm among MOF officials seconded to the World Bank and ADB, MOF officials became more aware of the international norm of NGO inclusion and realized that MOF’s past policies of excluding NGOs would give Japan a bad image of being undemocratic. (MOF official interview, July 1998) Social concerns about international image and lagging behind in this norm were therefore factors that contributed to policy change. The 1996 ADB annual meeting in Manila was the first step in this shift. MOF, displaying its traditional skepticism toward advocacy groups, rejected 5 out of the 15 Japanese NGO applications for observer status at the ADB annual meeting that year.2 (Kanda 1999; NGO interviews, July 1998) This was a large number of applications to reject, especially considering the fact that NGO observers at annual meetings of international organizations were usually encouraged – not discouraged – to participate by donor states. MOF’s rejection of the NGO applications was reported in the press and caused a minor uproar among Japanese NGOs and activists, who charged the Japanese government with being more exclusionary than some of the less democratic developing countries attending the meeting. (Kanda 1999) In light of this criticism, MOF officials learned that there were possible international costs to excluding NGOs in international political fora in terms of its image and reputation as a democratic country. This lesson was taken to heart the following year when Japan hosted the annual meeting of the ADB in Fukuoka. As hosts, Japanese MOF officials wanted the meeting to be a success and an image-enhancer for Japan both nationally and internationally. Because of this, during the preparation process for the meeting MOF learned to take NGO participation more seriously. Since “people participation” at UN and other international conferences was now considered (according to the pro-NGO norm) important, MOF started to see NGO participation in their

134 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs own interests in terms of good publicity for the event. With this in mind, MOF reexamined the accreditation process for NGOs at the ADB annual meeting to make it more, not less, participatory. Reversing the hardline position it had adopted for the 1996 ADB meeting in Manila, MOF decided actively to encourage NGO participation in the 1997 ADB meeting and even asked the ADB to loosen accreditation rules to allow observer status for two representatives per group. In the end, there were no rejections of any of the 33 applications of Japanese NGOs. Hosting the meeting and prestige factors associated with its success therefore encouraged MOF officials to adopt the pro-NGO norm and change the way it viewed NGOs. This opening up of participation at the ADB meeting provided a new opportunity for Japanese NGOs to push for the next step in norm adoption and internalization: better access for advocacy NGOs to important policy-makers at MOF in general. NGOs were the other key actors in the socializing process and strategically used the pro-NGO norm to pressure MOF into setting up a more formal and regular dialogue with advocacy NGOs. For many of the Japanese NGOs participating in the 1997 ADB meeting, this was the first time they had had a chance to meet with MOF officials, and most NGOs considered the Japanese hosting of the ADB meeting a key opportunity to open a more meaningful dialogue with the ministry. (NGO interviews, July 1998; Friends of the Earth-Japan 1997) Even before the ADB meeting in Fukuoka began, NGOs following Japanese foreign policy related to sustainable development issues had started to put together a norm-based argument for opening up the policy process to participation of NGOs. Through their close collaboration with American and European NGOs, several Japanese advocacy NGOs, such as JACSES and FoE-J, were well aware of the gap between their lack of access to MOF and the relatively open access enjoyed by Western NGOs to important policy-makers in their countries. JACSES, which had been closely monitoring Japan’s follow-up of UNCED agreements and action plans, decided to produce a report that would systematically compare the sustainable development component of foreign policy-making in seven industrialized countries, including how NGOs and other societal groups participated in the formulation of official development policies. Finished in 1996 and based on a survey of policies in Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, the report concluded that “Japan is the only country among those surveyed that has not established policies or mechanisms to promote a participatory approach in development assistance.” (JACSES 1996: 159) The report provided clear documentation showing that Japan was an outlier among industrialized countries when it came to the international norm of participatory development. In 1997, realizing that the ADB meeting in Fukuoka provided them with a good chance to approach MOF, NGOs used this report to put normative pressure on the ministry to set up a formal dialogue with them. Since their own contacts with MOF were not good, NGOs contacted a sympathetic Diet member, Akiba Tadatoshi – a Japan Social Democratic Party politician from Hiroshima who had previously worked as an academic for almost twenty years in the United States – and

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 135 presented him with the comparative data showing Japan’s poor record on NGO participation. As a self-proclaimed democrat, Akiba found this to be embarrassing evidence of the undemocratic nature of policy-making in Japan. Using the JACSES report, he publicly questioned MOF officials over why NGOs were so excluded from the policy process during a Budget Committee meeting of the House of Representatives. Citing examples of NGO–state dialogues in other countries taken from the report (e.g. the Tuesday Group in the United States), Akiba used the normative argument that Japan lagged behind other industrialized countries in terms of its recognition of NGOs and needed to catch up. (NGO interview, July 1998; Lindahl 1997) Through Akiba, NGOs were therefore able to introduce international norms into domestic politics and “shame” MOF officials for their bad record on participatory development by casting Japan as an international laggard. After Akiba’s questioning in the Diet, with his help they were able to arrange the first NGO– MOF quarterly dialogue meeting. Once this process was instituted, it gained an organizational life of its own and MOF officials came to see it as “normal” and not a temporary reaction to international pressure. (NGO interviews, July 1998, 2000 and 2005) Domestic political factors interacting with international factors In addition to these normative factors, domestic political pressures provided another incentive for MOF to set up new, official talks with NGOs. In the mid1990s, the domestic debate on ODA and ODA reform included an annual battle over possible budget cuts and rising criticism by politicians and the public that MOF’s foreign aid policy was nontransparent and lacking mechanisms for public accountability. Concerned about their slice of the budget pie, MOF officials in the International Bureau started to look for ways to respond to these criticisms, and the timing of NGO requests for more access was perfect. (MOF official interviews, July 1998) By the mid-1990s, a more liberal faction within the International Bureau that favored opening dialogue with NGOs had emerged and the new domestic political pressure gave this faction the justification it needed to overcome anti-NGO factions in MOF: meeting with advocacy NGOs was one way to respond to domestic critics and show MOF’s willingness to be more open. (MOF official interviews, July 1998) International political opportunities Socialization of the state and changing domestic POS were not the only reasons for the growth of the new environmental advocacy NGOs: also important was the new availability of international resources. As shown in greater detail in Chapter Three, the evolution and expansion of an international system of governance has been accompanied by increasing levels of international support and participation for NGOs, such as funding, technical support and access to alternative political venues. The issue area of the environment and sustainable development was given

136 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs high priority and received a lot of international funding and political attention in the 1980s and 1990s, and many of the environmental advocacy NGOs that formed in this period took advantage of this new situation. This was certainly true for Japanese advocacy NGOs active in global environmental issues. Given their relatively limited domestic political opportunities, Japanese environmental advocacy NGOs have relied on global forces from above to inspire and support their activities. Both international funding and expanding international venues for political participation have been significant factors in the rise and growing influence of this type of NGO in Japan. International funding One of the issue areas that has consistently received funding from international donors since the 1980s is the environment, and activists in Japan interested in global environmental issues in the late 1980s and 1990s were particularly well positioned to benefit from this funding pot. With Japan’s rise as an economic superpower and a leading foreign aid provider in the mid- to late 1980s, international donors became more interested in the country’s environmental record and in supporting “bottom-up” forces within Japan that promoted environmental causes. (NGO interviews, July 1998 and February 2001; Greene 1990) At the time, Japan was coming under heavy international criticism for having an overly pro-business and anti-environment approach to development, and American foundations and environmental NGOs started to seek NGO partners within Japan. As they discovered the relative weakness of the advocacy NGOs in Japan, these international actors readjusted their goals from just partnership to also providing more active support of the sector in general. (NGO interview, February 2001) This meant that Japanese environmental activism became one of the funding priorities of several private foundations and international environmental NGOs. (NGO and foundation official interviews, March 1997, March and August 1998 and February 2001) In addition, American NGOs started to set up shop in Tokyo with the goal of both influencing the Japanese government and supporting the growth of more environmental NGOs. (Greene 1990) It was at this time, for example, that Greenpeace set up a branch in Japan with funding from its international budget (NGO interview, October 1997), and several American NGOs, such as the National Wildlife Federation, Conservation International, World Resources Institute and Worldwatch Institute, set up offices in Tokyo. (NGO interview, February 2001; Greene 1990) One part of the explanation for the rise of Japanese environmental NGOs is therefore the active interest and support they received from the international donor community. This was particularly true for Japanese NGOs active in sustainable development issues, since their goals of changing Japanese foreign aid policies vis-à-vis developing countries and of raising awareness of global environmental issues in Japan overlapped with the goals of international donors. Practically all of the core group of Japanese NGOs that have focused on sustainable development issues since the late 1980s have relied heavily on international support, both when

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 137 they first set up and throughout the 1990s and early 2000s as they started to make progress in their work. (NGO and foundation official interviews, 1997–2008) Table 5.2 lists the foundation grants for five of the core Japanese NGO groups from 1993 through 2001. Given the very small total budgets of these groups, it is fairly safe to say that funding from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Alton Jones Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the MacArthur Foundation has been a major factor in keeping the advocacy movement on sustainable development issues alive in Japan. According to key staff at these and other Japanese NGOs, most of their funding for international programs comes from foreign foundations and other international actors. (NGO interviews, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2008)3. In addition to foundations, many of the core group of Japanese NGOs active in sustainable development had strong support from Western NGOs and foreign activists in their early years. JATAN, one of the most active advocacy environmental NGOs in the late 1980s, got its initial seed funding from Friends of the Earth-International and the salary of its director and funding for its research in the late 1980s and early 1990s was provided by the World Wildlife Fund-US.4 (NGO interview, August 1998; Wong 1998: 140–141; Greene 1990) FoE-J, one of the older groups, was initially set up in 1979 by Jonathan Holliman, an environmental activist who was one of the founders of Friends of the Earth-UK in the early 1970s. In addition to private donations from Holliman, FoE-J received about half of its funding from foreign foundations and FoE-International in the 1980s. (NGO interview, February 2001; Greene 1990) Holliman also paid rent for office space for both FoE-J and JATAN in their early, unstable years. JACSES similarly received seed money and support from Holliman when it formed in 1993, and it relied heavily on help from him and the East Asia representative of the National Wildlife Federation to generate funding from foreign foundations. (NGO interview, February 2001) International political arenas as focal points for new activism The growth in the number of IGOs and international meetings, as well as increasing access for NGOs at these global political venues, is the second part of the changing international opportunity structure of the 1980s and 1990s that has stimulated and supported NGO emergence and growth. As described in detail in Chapter Three, the expansion of international forms of governance through greater numbers of IGOs and international regimes has also provided many new opportunities for activists to participate in politics at the international level and promote their causes in new arenas. The evolution of international governance as a more open and participatory political space has made it a focal point for activists which has in and of itself helped bring about the creation of many NGOs. One of the ways that IGOs have provided a focal point for stimulating the growth of new NGOs is through their convening of large thematic international conferences, a practice which has increased over time. (Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005; Van Rooy 1997; Willets 1989b) This has occurred in two waves, the

138 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs Table 5.2 American foundation grants to Japanese advocacy INGOs, 1993–2001 Advocacy INGO

Foundation

Grant year(s)

Grant amount

Friends of the Earth-Japan

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

1993

$70,000 for planning an environmental center.

Alton Jones Foundation

1994–1997

$376,000 for a study of Siberian forest ecosystems and to monitor ODA and multilateral development bank (MDB) policies of the Japanese government.

Charles Stewart Mott Foundation

1995–1997

Funds channeled through the National Wildlife Federation. (Approximately $115,000 divided among three groups.)

Alton Jones Foundation

1998

$320,000 for research project in Siberia.

Turner Foundation

1999

$30,000 for research projects and campaigns in Siberia.

C.S. Mott Foundation

1999

$200,000 for advocacy related to international financial institutions.

Alton Jones Foundation

2000

$300,000 for research project in Siberia.

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

2000–2001

$200,000 for ODA reform advocacy and institutional development.

John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

1993–1996

Funds channeled through the NWF. ($75,000 divided among three groups.)

C.S. Mott Foundation

1995–1997

Funds channeled through the National Wildlife Federation. (Approximately $115,000 divided among three groups.)

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

1996

$45,000.

Wallace Global Fund

1999

$100,000 for advocacy related to MDBs and ODA.

Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 139 Table 5.2 Continued Advocacy INGO

Foundation

Grant year(s)

ADB Fukuoka NGO Forum

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

1997

$10,000 for organizing NGOs at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank.

Mekong Watch

MacArthur Foundation

1993–1996

Funds channeled through the NWF. ($75,000 divided among three groups.)

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

2000–2001

$120,000 for general institutional support.

Alton Jones Foundation

1992

$75,000 for general support.

Alton Jones Foundation

1994

$100,000 for analysis and advocacy on Japanese trade in timber, and to monitor projects of the Asian Development Bank with environmental impacts.

Alton Jones Foundation

1995–1997

$225,000 to advocate for sustainable forest management practices in Siberia and Irian Jaya, and to address the role of Japanese ODA and MDBs in these regions.

C.S. Mott Foundation

1995–1997

Funds channeled through the National Wildlife Federation. (Approximately $115,000 divided among three groups.)

C.S. Mott Foundation

1998

$112,000 channeled to several groups through the Bank Information Center.

Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN)

Various groups

Grant amount

Sources: For Mott Foundation grants: interview with Richard Forrest, 2/15/01, and 1999 Annual Report (http://www.mott.org/publications/LOWRESPD/NARRATIV.PDF). For Rockefeller Brother Funds grants: annual reports for 1993, 1996, 1997, and (http://www.rbf.org/sustaingrant99.html; http://www.rbf.org/sustaingrant00.html) for 2000–2001. For the Wallace Global Fund: 1999 grant list on its webpage (http://www.wgf.org/grants99_env.html). For the MacArthur Foundation grants: interview with Richard Forrest, 2/15/01. For Alton Jones Foundation grants: Friends of the Earth-Japan (1997) and Alton Jones Foundation webpage (http://www.wajones.org/grants/search/ template.cfm?fuseaction=show_results&primary=sustainable&refer=sustaindex). All websites were accessed in February and July 2001.

140 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs first of which comprised the international conferences of the 1970s, which provided a focal point and stimulant to Western activists who were the main participants. The second wave came in the 1990s when a record number of international conferences were convened and provided a focal point for both Western and non-Western activists. In the area of the environment, global conferences held in the 1972 and 1992 were turning points for the growth of environmental NGOs first in the West in the 1970s and then in the rest of the world in the 1990s. The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm was an important international event that internationalized many North American and European environmental groups and encouraged the subsequent formation of new Western-based groups that focused on global environmental issues (Caldwell 1992; de Lupis 1989). The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, in contrast, was a much larger event that became a focal point for environmental activists all over the world. UNCED’s far more elaborate and lengthy preparatory process involved close to three years of global meetings that attracted more participants with each meeting, leading eventually to as many as 18,000 NGOs gathering in Brazil during the conference. (Morphet 1996) Many new environmental NGOs formed in non-Western areas both leading up to and right after UNCED, which was therefore a turning point event for the spread of global activism to new parts of the world. This was certainly the case for activists in Japan, who were part of the second wave of activism in the 1990s. UNCED was the first major UN conference attended by a large number of Japanese citizens and the first attempt by a wide array of individuals and groups in Japan at organizing a national network on global environmental issues. (NGO interviews, July and August 1998; JACSES 1994) Japanese NGO mobilization for UNCED started in 1989 when the Japanese government co-sponsored with the UN the Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Response Toward Sustainable Development as part of the preparatory process for UNCED. (Holliman 1990: 288) Japanese NGOs were not invited to this official conference, but in response to their exclusion activists organized their own “people’s forum,” a three-day alternative NGO conference with 1,500 participants, which eventually led to the formation of ‘92 NGO Forum Japan, a national network for Japanese NGO participation at UNCED. (NGO interview, August 1998) In the two and a half years leading up to UNCED between 1989 and 1992, activists and NGOs held regular meetings and symposiums and built up a new set of groups and networks focusing on global environmental issues and politics. UNCED was therefore a very important focal point in stimulating Japanese activists to form new environmental advocacy NGOs as well as a national network that brought together very diverse groups. Besides UNCED, international organizations and conferences in general were important focal points and starting points for many of the core Japanese NGOs active in promoting sustainable development in developing countries: •

JATAN. The decision to set up JATAN occurred at an international meeting of Northern and Southern NGOs working on tropical forest issues in Penang

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 141

•

•

•

in large measure to insure Japanese NGO activism and representation at the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), a newly established IGO headquartered in Yokohama, Japan. (NGO interview, August 1998; Wong 1998) Mekong Watch. Mekong Watch was initially created in 1993 as an NGO network organization that would focus on multilateral development bank and Japanese foreign aid policies in the Mekong region of Southeast Asia. The specific event that triggered its formation was the announcement and hosting that year by the government of Japan of a major international conference to develop strategies for aid and establish a “Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina.” (NGO interview, July 1998) The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was the other primary target of Mekong Watch’s activism, and the NGO’s formation also coincided with the rising levels of NGO activism at ADB annual meetings. APEC Monitor Network. APEC Monitor Network is an NGO that was set up after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial summit in Osaka in 1995. Regional NGO mobilization for APEC meetings started at the 1994 APEC Summit in Jakarta and after that meeting Asian groups contacted activists in Japan and urged them to organize NGO events for the 1995 APEC Summit in Osaka. (Wilkinson 1995) In order to continue activism started at that conference, APEC Monitor Network was set up in late 1995 and its focus soon expanded to include a variety of development issues, including ODA, multilateral development banks (MDBs), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI). ADB Fukuoka NGO Network. This network was set up in 1996 in order to prepare for and organize NGO participation at the ADB’s 1997 annual meeting in Fukuoka. After the meeting, however, the organization did not disband, and it has continued to participate in national advocacy efforts and lobbying government officials in Japan.

International conferences and meetings have also encouraged nationwide networks and coalitions of NGOs promoting international sustainable development policies. Besides UNCED, for example, the annual meetings of the ADB became focal points around which Japanese NGOs organized a network of activism within Japan in the 1990s. Initial NGO interest in the ADB began in 1989 when JATAN joined three NGOs from other countries at the ADB’s annual meeting in Beijing. In 1992, NGOs were given official observer status at the ADB’s annual meeting for the first time and in the following year several Tokyo-based Japanese NGOs formed the Japan NGO Working Group on the ADB. This network became a more national one in 1996 when it was announced that Japan would host the ADB annual meeting in Fukuoka in 1997. Japan’s hosting of the international event inspired activists and NGOs in other parts of the country to organize their own events and activities and led to the formation of a new national network of groups based in Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka that remains active in sustainable development issues overseas. The expansion of access to the ADB for NGOs, as well the opportunity

142 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs to attend an international meeting in Japan, therefore were factors that stimulated new national mobilization efforts. Transnational diffusion of ideas The transnational diffusion of ideas is another international process that has influenced the formation and activities of key advocacy NGOs working in the area of the global environment. As activists have participated in more global conferences and received funding from Western private foundations and aid agencies, they have been exposed to new models of activism and have set up NGOs and networks based on ideas picked up in the international realm. Diffusion of ideas has taken place through both non-relational and relational channels. (See Chapter One.) First of all, IGOs and global conferencing are locations for initial exposure to advocacy-style NGOs, and activists from different parts of the world have created new NGOs and adopted organizational tactics of Western advocacy NGOs due to their exposure to and observations of NGO politicking at these international venues (non-relational diffusion). Second, IGOs and international conferences are meeting grounds where relational diffusion often starts: at them, activists make international allies that provide them both funds (mentioned above) and ideational concepts of how to set up and operate an NGO. As recent work on the international funding of civil society has shown, international funds often involve a “training” component and the transferal of ideas of how to organize advocacy campaigns that are based on a Western model of interest-group advocacy. (Bob 2005; Ottaway and Carothers 2000) For Japanese activists working in the area of international sustainable development, international conferences and relationships with international allies have been important training grounds for setting up a new type of advocacy NGO and learning new organizational strategies and tactics. Although Japanese advocacy NGOs working on global environmental issues are by no means carbon copies of American or European advocacy NGOs, they represent a new type of societal group in Japan which has often been inspired and shaped by international models. For some groups, this has been a non-relational process, with activists watching and learning about NGO activism at IGO conferences. As mentioned earlier, UNCED was an important turning point for the emergence of advocacy environmental NGOs and networks in Japan, and for the 350 Japanese who attended UNCED in 1992 this large-scale international conference was an eye-opening experience which exposed them for the first time to the sophisticated world of NGO politicking with its lobbying, its active use of the media, and its strategic use of information. (JACSES 1994; Yonemoto 1994; Iwasaki 1993) After watching how NGOs from other industrialized countries operated and their ability to use all stages of the international conference process to lobby governments, Japanese activists returned from UNCED ready to learn how to participate more actively and lobby their own government. (NGO interview, August 1998; Iwasaki 1993) There has also been a significant amount of relational diffusion of ideas which has been quite pronounced among Japanese NGOs working on sustainable

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 143 development issues in developing countries. Influenced by their contacts and funding ties with Western NGOs, many of the activists in the core group of NGOs examined in this chapter have been seeking to create a new type of advocacy NGO different from the protest and leftist groups of the past. A fair number of these Japanese activists have lived in the United States or worked with American NGOs and foundations, and the ideal type for these activists is the information-oriented US model of NGOs which blends research and policy activism through lobbying and the strategic use of the media. (Lindahl 1997) This type of NGO was rare in Japan before the mid-1980s, but by the end of the 1990s the core group of NGOs working on sustainable development issues emerged as a new set of specialized professional advocacy groups operating at the national level in this way. Among the leaders and staff of the NGOs listed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, there is a fairly strong pattern of relational diffusion of ideas through their many international contacts, training and participation in transnational campaigns. Two prominent NGO leaders in the early years of activism on environmental issues in developing countries in the late 1980s were Tanaka Yukio of FoE-J and Kuroda Yoichi of JATAN. Tanaka has acknowledged how FoE-J’s early campaigns on MDBs were modeled on earlier campaigns in other countries and that many of the skills and strategies used by FoE-J came from its partners in the United States. (Cameron 1996: 55) He was a globetrotter and spent time in other parts of the world participating in Narmada Dam campaign-related efforts organized by American NGOs, such as lobbying World Bank officials in Washington, D.C. (Udall 1995; Sumi 1990) In addition to working with the foreign staff at FoE-J, Tanaka’s extensive global experiences shaped his own vision of what FoE-J should be and he was a pioneer in bringing Western NGO-style activism to Japan. Kuroda had an even longer background in international activism, dating to the mid-1980s and participation in the first international conference of the Pesticide Action Network, a transnational coalition of NGOs devoted to advocating safe pesticide policies and practices. This initial experience provided him with his first vision of advocacy NGOs as professional groups with paid staff, offices and budgets autonomous from the state. (NGO interview, August 1998) Most of Kuroda’s early experiences lobbying the Japanese government in 1987 were with Western NGOs and foreign environmental activists, and it was from these early efforts that he learned different lobbying methods that he later used for JATAN’s campaigns. JATAN’s adoption of a focused media strategy was also based on advice and close coordination with its international partners. (NGO interview, August 1998) Similarly, many of the key players in the more recent MDB and ODA reform campaigns of the 1990s have had some sort of contact with and training by Western NGOs that have led to more professional advocacy-style NGOs in Japan. Before taking charge of JACSES’s MDB and ODA programs in the mid-1990s, Saito Tomoyo received a master’s degree at Boston College, where she studied social change organizations under NGO scholar and practitioner David Brown. Immediately prior to joining JACSES, Saito worked for the US NGO National

144 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs Wildlife Federation’s East Asia branch office in Tokyo and when she joined JACSES her model of aspiration was another American NGO, the Environmental Defense Fund. (NGO interview, July 1998; Lindahl 1997: 18) At FoE-J, international training of Japanese staff is standard procedure and all full-time Japanese staff start their tenure with a three-month international internship program at a Western NGO. (NGO interview, May 2005) Matsumoto Ikuo, the head officer for FoE-J’s MDB and ODA programs in the 1990s, was an intern at the Berkeleybased International Rivers Network, and recent staff of FoE-J went to NGOs in England for their internships. (NGO interviews, May 2005) The head of Mekong Watch since the late 1990s, Matsumoto Satoru, had many years of overseas experience that included working at a well-respected research institute in Australia where he networked with scientists and academics. Based on these experiences, he rebuilt Mekong Watch into a more research-based organization that could take on revenue-producing work which would help fund the organization’s advocacy work. (NGO interview, July 2000) In addition to their personal experiences and training, some NGOs, such as JACSES, have organized advocacy training workshops for other Japanese advocacy NGOs and have invited American NGOs to present the basic ABCs of advocacy NGO organizing. (Kokoro, December 1996) The other relational channel of transnational diffusion that has influenced and shaped advocacy NGOs in this area were several key foreign activists from the NGO and foundation world who had longstanding ties to these groups and provided detailed advice on strategies and organizational practices, such as grant writing, as well as many hours of work in the trenches helping the NGOs navigate their lobbying, research and media efforts. Key figures who provided this sort of support from the 1980s through the early 2000s are Jonathan Holliman, Richard Forrest, Peter Riggs, Jerry Inman and Andrew Horvat.5 In addition to being mentors and comrades, these men were important connections to external funding for many of these NGOs and were thus the relational diffusion link for both funding and adoption of Western models of activism. (NGO and foundation officer interviews, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2005)

Conclusion This chapter has traced the recent rise of a new set of environmental advocacy NGOs in Japan and the domestic and international political factors that have promoted their delayed appearance. As was the case with international development NGOs, changes in both the domestic and international political environments in the 1980s and 1990s led to a more conducive setting for NGO emergence and growth in Japan. Compared with IDNGOs, advocacy NGOs in Japan face even tougher domestic political obstacles since they are critics of the state and this has had consequences in terms of the relative importance of the types of international factor promoting them. In short, while both types of NGO have been influenced by international norms and socialization processes, Japanese advocacy NGOs active in global

Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs 145 environmental issues have relied more heavily than IDNGOs on international support and international opportunities, especially when it has come to funding sources. Compared with the advocacy NGOs working on sustainable development issues examined in this chapter which have received generous funding from American foundations throughout the 1990s, IDNGOs have relied less on international funding and instead have had more options for state funding. (See Chapter Four.) This makes sense, since, as Pekkanen and other Japan scholars have shown, the state is often more willing to support the growth of groups that produce social capital and other benefits to the state. (Pekkanen 2006; Garon 1997) As “partners” of the state, IDNGOs in Japan provide beneficial functions to the state such as service provision, an increase in the diversity of contractors, and good public relations as evidence of people participation in Japan’s foreign aid. While environmental advocacy NGOs have also used state funds through the JFGE, their state funding options have been more limited and it is fairly unlikely that powerful ministries such as MOFA and MOF will ever provide much funding to advocacy groups. These limitations have meant that advocacy NGOs are more likely to use whatever international opportunities are available and rely on them more. But not all advocacy NGOs are able to find international allies and funding, a situation facing not only advocacy NGOs in Japan but many other activists and advocacy NGOs in other parts of the world that are blocked at the domestic level. (Bob 2005) In the case of the rise of Japanese advocacy NGOs interested in sustainable development, access to international funds and their rise as a sub-sector of advocacy NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s was also a function of the international popularity of their cause and the “match” between their goals and those of international donors. Private foundations, Western NGOs and foreign environmentalists were actively interested in supporting this new sector in Japan and these foreign actors made a difference in several ways. As this chapter’s sections on both funding and transnational diffusion of ideas have shown, many of the core groups in this area of international activism have been nurtured, trained and kept alive by outside supporters. Finally, this chapter revealed the importance of international conferences, especially those held in Japan, as special opportunities for NGOs to “bring in international norms” and use this type of external pressure (gaiatsu) to persuade the state to implement changes that improve the domestic POS. In addition to being focal points that stimulate NGO formation and mobilization of national networks, international political events are also prestige arenas where NGO “shaming” tactics of holding states accountable to international norms have greater potential effect since states do not like being publicly exposed as norm violators at such large gatherings of the international community. Realizing this, Japanese advocacy NGOs have used international conferences to enhance their legitimacy and have strategically used international norms at these venues to pressure officials to improve the domestic POS so that advocacy NGOs can survive in the long run. Japanese government officials take these international events seriously, especially when Japan hosts them, as it did in 1997 for the ADB annual meeting. Social influence – concerns about prestige and other social rewards, as well as avoidance

146 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs of social punishments such as a bad image as a norm violator – has mattered and over time has been an important factor in getting Japanese officials to start the process of norm internalization and, in this case, opening access for advocacy groups.

6

Conclusion States, political globalization and the growth of NGOs

Since they first emerged in the West in the nineteenth century, NGOs have spread to all corners of the globe and are now considered visible and influential players in international politics. The proliferation in recent years of new literature on NGOs and transnational activism attests to this fact. As this book has shown, NGO emergence and growth have been uneven and heavily influenced by both domestic and international political factors, which have changed over time and across space. Returning to the original puzzles of convergence and divergence laid out in the beginning of the book, this chapter brings together the findings of the previous chapters and offers a new narrative and explanation for the rise of NGOs in world politics which focuses on changing domestic political structures and the evolution of global governance as promoted by the West. As presented throughout this book, the story is a top-down, “activism from above” explanation, which emphasizes the larger political environment that activists operate in and how this environment has changed over time with the expansion of international cooperation and institutions promoting global welfare and peace. First emerging in Western states with strong liberal democratic traditions, capitalist economies and open political opportunity structures, NGOs then spread to other parts of the world as these same Western states promoted a liberal democratic international order via the creation of new international institutions and regimes. Over time and especially since the end of the Cold War, Western donor states and elites have turned increasingly to NGOs to provide governance functions and have supported them in order to promote their larger global agenda of spreading Western models of democracy and capitalism. Although NGOs have exercised agency and played a role in shaping this larger narrative, they are nonetheless only one of many players and have tended to be more influential in areas where their goals have overlapped with those of dominant states and when mutual interests have prevailed. After presenting this larger narrative of NGO emergence and growth, this chapter analyzes the case of Japan and brings together the findings of Chapters Four and Five. As a late developer in the area of global civil society, Japan provides an interesting illustration of the activism from above model since it is a case where both changing state policies vis-à-vis NGOs and the active use of new international political opportunities by activists in Japan have led in recent years

148 Conclusion to an NGO “boom” and significant changes in state–society relations. Referring to the two parts of the domestic–international model, this chapter places Japan in the larger global story of the worldwide growth of NGOs and identifies the mechanisms through which international political factors from above have promoted NGO activism and the general growth of the NGO sector in many countries. Locating my argument in the wider Japan literature, I also examine how the study both builds on and adds to previous analyses and normative explanations of political change in Japan. Finally, going beyond the model, I analyze how changing domestic factors in Japan in the 1990s also contributed to the salience of international norms and ideas, and provided a more receptive domestic political climate for change. The chapter ends with an examination of why NGOs have been promoted globally from above in the first place and a discussion of the larger theoretical implications of the study for understanding the evolving story of NGO emergence and growth. First, I argue that NGOs have been promoted from above by Western states for political or ideological goals and provide one conduit for Western domination of international politics. This is not a new phenomenon, and historically since the age of imperialism and the rise of global politics Western states have relied on the global projection of their domestic societies to pursue their interests. Second, I argue that there is a functional logic behind the top-down international promotion of NGOs, which is most clearly expressed by the fact that IGOs and NGOs have grown simultaneously over time. In order to promote international governance processes, states and IGOs increasingly depend on the services and advocacy work of NGOs. As international institutions have grown and international governance processes have deepened, a functional and symbiotic relationship has developed whereby donor states, IGOs and NGOs rely on one another for accomplishing their separate but overlapping goals. The growth of NGOs is therefore part of a wider story of the expansion of global governance processes and state promotion of these processes. To conclude, the chapter considers power dynamics and the limits of the activism from above model. Not all states are enthusiastic about promoting NGOs. Just as the Western promotion of various international norms and ideas has had an uneven success rate across countries, the top-down promotion of NGOs has faced obstacles and resistance in many parts of the world. The continued growth of NGOs will therefore depend on how domestic political actors respond to these models and the ability of activists to transform international resources into domestic ones.

The big story: how states and international politics shape citizen activism In contrast to the bottom-up portrayal of NGO activism found in the literature, which analyzes the influence of nonstate actors promoting social and political change, this book presents an alternative vision of how NGOs have grown and spread throughout the world. The two-part puzzle of NGO divergence and

Conclusion 149 convergence identified in Chapter One goes to the heart of the bigger questions of: (1) the conditions under which NGOs first emerged as important players in some parts of the world; and (2) how and why NGOs have appeared in greater numbers all over the world in the past three decades. Although this book has focused on the advanced industrialized OECD member countries, the larger story it tells is a more global one that could be extended to include the many cases of NGO growth in developing and transitional countries found in the expanding literature on NGOs. It is a story of two waves of NGO formation: an initial wave in some advanced industrialized countries, followed by a second wave in both industrialized and developing countries from the 1980s onwards. In both waves, political forces from above played a key role in stimulating NGO emergence and growth. The first NGO wave: activism from above by the state As noted by scholars of transnational actors in the 1970s, NGOs emerged first in the industrialized, capitalist, democratic West. (Nye and Keohane 1972; Skjelsbaek 1972) While these initial observations of the first wave of NGOs were not incorrect, as an explanation for NGO emergence they were underspecified and overlooked the variation in levels of NGOs among advanced capitalist democracies. This book shows that while it is true that NGOs historically first emerged in the more socio-economically developed democracies of the West, political institutions have mattered more than socio-economic factors. Socioeconomic factors – wealth, education, levels of technology, and other standard features of modern industrialized society – are not irrelevant factors for explaining NGO emergence since they provide important resources that can be used for organizing and supporting activism. However, they are insufficient to stimulate organized activism and the creation of NGOs. Rather, political structures and opportunities are the crucial variables, and democracies differ in the way the state steers society and socio-economic resources toward or away from NGO-style activism. Thus, while NGOs initially emerged in the West, they have flourished first and foremost in countries with a certain type of democracy – i.e. liberal and corporatist democracies with policies and political structures that have actively supported and nurtured NGOs. In particular, NGOs first emerged in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, where domestic political structures and policies have encouraged a variety of forms of activism and political participation by citizens, both domestically and internationally. Over the course of the postwar period, the evolution of state–society relations and political culture in both pluralist liberal democracies (US, UK) and corporatist/social democratic democracies (Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Switzerland) have been more conducive to the establishment and growth of professionalized service and advocacy NGOs when compared with the more statist democracies of Italy, France and Japan, where NGOs exist but face a more challenging political environment. In the former types of democracy, there

150 Conclusion are more political opportunities and political space for NGO emergence, and states themselves have often actively encouraged societal activism by providing state funds and/or tax breaks to organizations that promote international cooperation and Western norms. As Chapter Two has shown, state policies and structures have direct effects on the material and political resources available to activists who are interested in global issues and international affairs. Overall, compared with statist democracies, the liberal, social democratic and corporatist democracies have provided better legal structures, more tax incentives, more state funding and more channels for political participation in policy-making processes for activists than the statist democracies. Given such differences in the political environment, it is not surprising that statist democracies have tended to have smaller and weaker NGO sectors when compared with liberal, social democratic and corporatist democracies. The emergence of NGOs therefore relies on not only activism from below but activism from above: NGOs emerged first in states that themselves have taken a more activist approach in supporting the global political activities of citizens. The differences in political structures and state policies vis-à-vis NGOs among different types of democracy reflect differences in how states approach organized societal activism both in domestic politics and in part of foreign policy and the pursuit of wider international goals. At the domestic level, liberal, social democratic and corporatist democracies have tended to provide more political space and opportunities for both NGOs and social groups in general; and, in comparison with statist democracies, countries with these sorts of democracy have tended overall to have higher levels of nonprofit groups involved in advocacy and/or service provision. (Salamon and Anheier 1998) Policies toward NGOs, in other words, are a reflection of domestic political cultures and the evolving space for organized societal activism found in each culture. Domestic politics and political structures are therefore the logical starting points for understanding the basic challenges and/or opportunities that activists in any country face when it comes to organizing an NGO. They comprise a first-level “baseline” set of factors to consider when analyzing NGO emergence and potential for growth. In terms of wider implications for international relations theory, the data and findings in Chapter Two also hint at an interesting evolution of foreign policy whereby the promotion of NGOs has become an increasingly larger and important element of how some wealthy Western democratic states have defined and pursued their larger global interests. The liberal and corporatist democracies of the West have tended to be countries that have better domestic political environments for the emergence and growth of NGOs; and ultimately they have tended to promote and/or utilize NGOs more actively as parts of their larger foreign policy goals. As will be discussed at greater length below, there are various reasons why these states and many IGOs have promoted NGOs and provided a wider set of opportunities for them over time. In terms of the data presented in Chapter Two and the policy and structural differences found among OECD countries, however, one interesting theoretical implication of this study is that different types of democracy in the West have tended to produce different types of foreign policy profile. In particular,

Conclusion 151 the democracies with more open domestic political institutions and structures – those that have encouraged organized societal activism domestically – appear to have foreign policies that more actively promote “universal” values and transformative political and social change in other countries. These implications build on previous work done by liberal international relations scholars who have emphasized the domestic roots of foreign policy (Moravcsik 1997; Snyder 1991) as well as constructivists who have called attention to domestic norms and domestic culture as sources of foreign policy. (Katzenstein 1996; Johnston 1995; Berger 1993) The patterns presented in this book add a new set of propositions to test and explore further in future research. Is there something about the more liberal and progressive forms of democracy that have led them to project their own domestic political norms and struggles internationally? While all industrialized democracies have pursued economic and security interests in their foreign policies, it is the liberal, social democratic and corporatist democracies which have, over time, appeared to be most active in the international promotion of more normative political and social goals, such as human rights, sustainable development, peace, democracy and humanitarian aid. David Lumsdaine’s well-known study of foreign aid, for example, has shown how social democratic donor countries whose domestic cultures and politics were more deeply rooted in social justice were most altruistic and generous in their foreign aid. (Lumsdaine 1993) Comparative studies of donor aid policies (Clear 2002) and donor influence in multilateral organizations (Stiles 1998) have found similar patterns and policy biases, with the progressive and liberal democracies being more activist in promoting civil society than statist democracies, which tended to channel aid through recipient country governments or IGOs rather than civil society. This book’s presentation of state programs supporting NGOs in Chapter Two reinforces these findings, with the social democratic and progressive countries (the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Canada) taking the lead in providing state support to NGOs and the progressive causes of NGOs. Liberal countries (US, UK) also provided support to NGOs, but less in proportion to GDP, and the statist democracies have always provided the least support by either measure. (See Chapter Two.) Although further research needs to be done, this book supports the general claim that domestic politics and structures shape foreign policy and suggest that foreign policy is at least in part an outward projection of domestic institutions, values, culture and society. The second NGO wave: activism from above by international actors Activism from above in some democracies, in other words, has also evolved over time into activism from above towards the rest of the world as these states have outwardly projected their societal activism through foreign policy. This takes us to the second wave of NGO growth and the story of the spread of NGOs to new parts of the world. Just as the domestic political context was crucial for understanding the rise of the first wave of NGOs in liberal and progressive Western democracies, the changing international political context has been one of the key driving forces

152 Conclusion in the emergence over the past two to three decades of NGOs in both industrialized and developing countries. These changes in the international political context have not been random and have followed a distinct political logic. Reviewing the three international components of the activism from above argument of the book, I will now outline how the second wave of NGOs since the 1980s is in large part a result and response to the internationalization of Western political institutions, norms and domestic culture. Growth of international governance and its implications First of all, there is the international political context of IGOs, international regimes and the so-called international system of governance. As Chapter Three showed, changing international political structures and the growth of IGOs and global governance have greatly altered the political opportunity structure (POS) facing activists, who now can “go global” to obtain resources and political access. (Keck and Sikkink 1998) The interesting theoretical story that emerges in the international political opportunity explanation presented in this book is how global governance and the expansion of international institutions have evolved over time to mirror governance patterns and processes found in the liberal and progressive capitalist democracies that have promoted NGOs. Just as the expansion of the state in the some Western states in the postwar period led to new opportunities for service and advocacy NGOs (and nonprofit organizations in general) in the form of new funding and greater political access (Salamon and Anheier 1998; Weisbrod 1998; Salamon 1995), the increasing number of IGOs, international regimes and global programs have provided similar new opportunities to activists and NGOs in all countries that participate in the international system. As Chapter Three indicated, billions of international dollars now flow annually from IGOs, bilateral aid agencies, private foundations and quasi-public foundations to both service and advocacy NGOs from around the world. IGOs also welcome NGOs as partners, representatives and advocates in their meetings, conferences and governance structures. In these and other ways, the expansion of global governance has evolved in a strikingly similar manner to the evolution of governance in liberal and progressive Western democracies. Although the POS at the domestic (i.e. country) versus the international (i.e. IGO, regime) level is not identical, some of the institutional frameworks at each level have nonetheless come to resemble one another more over time in the general ways that stimulated the first wave of NGO growth. Just as nonprofits and NGOs were given state support and an institutionalized role in the domestic governance processes of many Western liberal and progressive democracies, a similar political role (as service providers and advocates) has been created and institutionalized for them at the international level in the past three decades. This development has been due in part to processes described above originating in the wealthy OECD donor countries, whereby the more liberal and progressive rich democracies have increasingly “projected” their domestic political norms and institutional structures on to the global arena as part of their foreign

Conclusion 153 policy. As will be discussed below, there have also been functional reasons for the greater use and incorporation of NGOs into international governance structures. The normative promotion of NGOs and state identity In addition to changing international political structures, NGOs and activists have benefited from a changing international political environment in which NGOs and “civil society” came to be normatively promoted by donor states and IGOs as a solution to many of the world’s problems. From the 1980s on, NGOs became an important component for many of the new global programs sponsored by both bilateral and multilateral agencies ranging from international development to environmental programs to women’s rights to humanitarian crises. (Dichter 1999; Stiles 1998) As Chapter Three argued, in addition to merely including NGOs in programs and projects, donors became promoters of several pro-NGO norms that made the very existence of NGOs a requirement and standard for being a democratic, capitalist country. New normatively charged concepts such as “people participation,” “good governance” and “accountability” that became both goals and criteria for aid included in their definition and implementation the participation of local NGOs or other representatives of civil society. (OECD 1988, 1991, 1992 and 1995) In order to include NGOs, however, it was necessary that indigenous NGOs existed in the first place, and countries were urged to open up their domestic POSs to allow for and even encourage the formation of NGOs. Democracy promotion is the international project that has most blatantly and directly promoted NGO formation and growth, through a “civil society” aid component which has aimed at nurturing national and local advocacy NGOs. (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Carothers 1999) In order to be considered a fully democratic country that practices people participation, good governance and accountability, it is now necessary both to have NGOs and to provide a favorable political environment for the rise and growth of them. (See Chapter Three.) In contrast to the previous argument about evolving international structures, which emphasized the new opportunities for resources and access for NGOs and activists at a higher level of politics, the norm story of NGO growth promoted from above is a story of donor states and IGOs directly seeking to change states and open up domestic POS all over the world to make states more friendly to activists and NGOs. While there have been numerous country-level studies of these efforts at NGO promotion (Henderson 2003; Barrow and Jennings 2001; Hulme and Edwards 1997) and some more general writing on civil society aid in the context of democracy promotion (Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Carothers 1999), so far few scholars have sought to locate this normative project within the broader context of international relations theory. The normative promotion of NGOs and attempts by the West and IGOs to strengthen society vis-à-vis the state in countries all over the world, I would argue, represents a new phase of global politics in which powerful democracies are now attempting to transpose not only political and economic structures of the West but

154 Conclusion also Western-style social structures and political movements to non-Western countries. Although they have not always been successful in achieving these goals, this story is an important one for understanding the second wave of NGOs since the 1980s and their spread from the West to the rest of the world. Transnational society and bottom-up growth from above Finally, in addition to norm promotion by states, ideas supporting NGO growth have been diffused from the international to the domestic and local levels by societal actors operating internationally: activists, international NGOs, academics, foundation officers, labor union officials, IGO officials and others in the West have been exporting their knowledge and experience in setting up NGOs and NGO campaigns. The spread of NGOs to new parts of the world has also been a process in which activists in non-Western countries have learned how to set up and run an NGO through their interactions and partnerships with such international actors. As described in Chapter Three, this type of diffusion has gone hand-in-hand with the two previous international factors mentioned above – the growth of international governance and the normative promotion of NGOs by the international donor community – and has sometimes been a by-product of these factors. As the institutions and institutionalized processes of global governance have grown in time and provided more opportunities for participation by nonstate actors, activists from countries with fewer NGOs have “gone global,” shown up at international meetings, and in the process have met activists from NGO-rich countries who have provided them with ideas and models for setting up NGOs and new types of activist organization. At the domestic level, activists have “learned” how to set up an NGO from norm-promoting funders such as foundation officers, bilateral aid agency officers, international NGOs and foreign activists working in their country. In the process of hearing about international funding, applying for it, using it and then seeking more funding, activists discover what an NGO is and how to set one up in order to get funds to support a political or social goal. (Lofredo 2000) The international and transnational diffusion of ideas via societal actors is therefore one important means by which both international governance structures and norm promotion have spurred on the growth of NGOs in new parts of the world. Taken together, these three international components of the activism from above model present a coherent narrative on how the growth and spread of NGOs have been promoted politically from above the state by IGOs, wealthy liberal democratic states and nonstate actors such as private foundations and well-funded international NGOs. Without question, these three international factors and the separate but interlinked processes they represent played important roles in creating the worldwide “NGO boom” of the late 1980s and 1990s that is mentioned so often in the literature. In more recent years, country- and regional-level studies of NGO growth and activities in Africa (Bob 2005; Barrow and Jennings 2001; Ottaway 2000), Eastern Europe (Glenn 2001, Wedel 1998), Russia (Henderson 2003; Sperling 1999), Latin America (Petras 2003; Macdonald 1997) and Asia (Shigetomi 2002; Reimann 2001a) all provide strong empirical evidence of the

Conclusion 155 importance of IGOs, outside actors and funding in bringing about a sudden growth spurt of NGOs in this period. Many of these studies also provide good examples of the activism from above model applied to specific cases. Most of them, however, are theoretically underdeveloped, and one of the goals of this book has been to provide a clearer and more comprehensive theoretical framework for the international causes of NGO growth.

The story of Japan: the late emergence of NGOs Japan is an interesting and illuminating case that shows the importance of political factors over socio-economic ones in explaining the delayed emergence and growth of NGOs. Although Japan had become the second-largest economy in the world by the early 1970s and scored high on various measurements of socio-economic development (e.g. income, education, media diffusion, etc.), it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that it experienced its first large NGO “boom”, and the NGO sector remains relatively underdeveloped in terms of budgets, staffs and memberships. The ongoing evolution of NGOs and civil society actors in Japan fits well into the narrative presented in the activism from above model, and shows how both domestic and international political factors and their interaction matter. Statist domestic political structures and the weak NGO sector in Japan As presented above and argued throughout this book, the starting point for understanding the emergence and growth of a country’s NGO sector is domestic political structures. Statist democracies such as France, Italy and Japan have not been active when it comes to promoting or encouraging the development of the nonprofit sector and NGOs. To the contrary, these countries’ political structures and policies have, if anything, posed obstacles to organizers of activism. Japan follows this pattern and its weak NGO sector reflects the political environment in which social activists have found themselves for most of the postwar period: cumbersome and nontransparent legal structures, lack of government funding and other fiscal incentives, lack of access to both bureaucrats and the ruling political party, and relatively few elite partners or allies with whom to work. This story fits well into the general narrative told in the Japanese politics and social movement literature. According to the standard accounts by Japan scholars of the Japanese political economy, until recently Japan was a late developer or “developmental” state with a strong bureaucracy and one dominant political party which formed an iron triangle with big business to promote Japan’s rapid industrialization and economic catch-up with the West. (Curtis 1999; Johnson 1982) Although democratic electoral politics insured that the less competitive but politically powerful sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, the construction industry and small businesses, would be protected, creating the so-called “dual economy,” the main story that emerges from the literature is a political system

156 Conclusion and government policies that have favored producers and business over consumers and societal activists whose goals may conflict with the larger economic goals defined by the state. (Upham 1987) In this story, the Japanese state is certainly an activist from above and uses policies consciously to promote the emergence, growth and/or maintenance of certain nonstate actors. But it is not an activist state that promotes social change activists and NGOs. To the contrary, as the social movement literature has documented, the lack of political opportunities and marginalization of challengers of the status quo have led social change activists in the past to resort to protest and to using local politics to overcome the obstacles to organized activism at the national level. (Maclachlan 2002; Broadbent 1998; McKean 1981) Similarly, as Robert Pekkanen has shown in his detailed study of civil society in Japan, when the state supports societal organizations they are almost always groups that promote goals that are in line with official goals or needs; advocacy groups and other civil society groups that promote change and question the state are systematically discouraged through law, domestic POS and state policies. (Pekkanen 2006) All of these arguments have clear implications for NGOs: since most NGOs promote social change goals and are not part of the iron triangle or dual economy of producers, they have been systematically discouraged. Just as statist democracies such as Japan have tended to favor and promote economic actors over social change actors, these domestic POS and state policies have also been reflected in foreign policy choices and projected into the international realm. In the international political arena, compared with the liberal and progressive democracies, which have promoted a mix of both economic and social interests, Japan’s foreign policy has been characterized for most of the postwar period as mercantilist and driven primarily by the promotion of Japan’s economic interests. (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998; Ross 1996; Arase 1995) Universal norms, social change struggles and the pursuit of social justice goals have not been at the forefront of Japanese foreign policy; and, with the possible exception of Japan’s “pacifist” non-nuclear image, most observers have not considered Japan an activist promoter of principled ideals and norms at the international level. In the areas of the environment, human rights and democracy promotion, for example, Japan appears to be more of a norm follower than a global norm leader that proactively encourages or pressures other states to conform to norms found in these areas. When Japan has actively promoted ideas in the international arena in recent years, they have instead tended to be those in economic areas that reflect domestic policies and culture, such as the promotion of the East Asian development model that emphasizes the role of the state as an alternative model to neoliberal economic theory and its heavy reliance on free markets and open borders. (Terry 2002; Wade 1996) While in many ways a welcome addition to the debate on economic development, which has been dominated by the United States and neoliberal economic theory, Japan’s alternative development model is clearly based on a strong state that works with the private sector and it has little to say about NGOs or social change actors and their role in development.

Conclusion 157 The changing international political context and the emergence of NGOs in Japan Despite these domestic political obstacles to social activism in Japan, it certainly is not the case that domestic structures and policies have been static, and the other part of this book’s research has focused on change and why countries such as Japan that previously had few NGOs experienced an NGO boom in the late 1980s and 1990s. As in many countries, a confluence of international and domestic political changes in this period provided new material, ideational and organizational opportunities for activists interested in promoting social change issues, which in turn led to an upsurge in the number of NGOs. International factors have interacted with domestic ones to produce a more fluid environment for NGOs in Japan, as they have in many other parts of the world. Using the activism from above model, it is possible to trace the processes through which society and the state have changed in Japan in the past two decades in response to the larger international political context. Stimulation and help from above the state: the international sources of activism in Japan As the case chapters in this book show, the three components of international activism from above – the international political opportunity structure, the promotion of a new NGO norm and the transnational diffusion of ideas – have been important factors stimulating and supporting activists and their NGOs in Japan since the 1980s. Turning to the international realm for both inspiration and help, Japanese citizens interested in global issues have been able to overcome some of the domestic-level obstacles to forming an NGO. Although this has been true for both service and advocacy NGOs, it has been particularly true for the latter, which in Japan (and other statist countries) have tended to face high barriers to organizing. The expansion of the international system and the new opportunities provided by global governance structures have been important sources of growing activism and support of NGOs in Japan. Many of the leading advocacy environmental NGOs examined in this book were set up in response to international conferences and events or to lobby international organizations and were in this sense outgrowths of the international system. International meetings were also focal points that spurred on more coordinated organizing among groups at the national level and created new networks. These new NGOs and their networks were also often funded by international donors and international allies who targeted Japan as a country that needed a more developed advocacy NGO sector in the area of the sustainable development and global environmental issues. As Chapter Five revealed, some of the most influential advocacy environmental NGOs in Japan have relied on foreign funding since they were first set up in the 1980s and 1990s. While somewhat less reliant as a sector than advocacy NGOs, service NGOs in the area of international development also received support from political institutions and forces above the state. Many of the largest and most technically

158 Conclusion experienced Japanese international development NGOs (IDNGOs) are contractors to UN agencies and receive a chunk of their income from international organizations; international conferences have also led to better access to government officials as new dialogues between various divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and IDNGOs have been set up since the 1990s in different issue areas. (See Chapter Four.) Japanese citizens interested in global activism were also aware of the new proNGO norm by the early 1990s and used that norm strategically to improve their domestic POS in Japan. This was the case for both the service-type IDNGOs and the advocacy environmental NGOs examined in this book. Japanese IDNGOs were invited by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the late 1980s to participate in the new international discussion on the role of NGOs in foreign aid and became more aware of the larger international context and the emerging proNGO international norm. Based on that and other experiences, leading IDNGO advocates became active in the 1990s in using OECD reports, their own comparative studies and new pro-NGO norms promoted by the OECD (e.g. people participatory development, good governance, etc.) to pressure the Japanese government to increase the amount of foreign aid channeled through service NGOs and to set up new official bodies for NGO participation in the policy-making process. Similarly, advocacy NGOs in the area of global environment also learned about the emerging pro-NGO international norm through their participation in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and other international conferences, and in the early 1990s they began to conduct a series of studies that documented Japan’s laggard status in both supporting NGOs and including them in policy-making processes. These advocacy NGOs then strategically used these reports to pressure the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to set up a more formal and institutionalized dialogue with NGOs, leading to an important opening of the domestic POS for advocacy NGOs promoting global environmental and sustainable development goals. Finally, the mechanism of transnational diffusion of ideas to societal actors in Japan has also been an important part of the story of the growth of NGOs in Japan. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s and 2000s, relational channels linking different parts of Japanese society to American and European activists, NGOs and private foundations have been important in transporting new ideas and understandings of organized activism to Japan. In this period, the leftist “outsider” and protester view of NGOs as pure but marginal actors that was previously dominant in Japan slowly gave way to a new, more professionalized vision of NGOs as organizations that constructively engaged with the state. As Chapter Four illustrated, the corporate sector in Japan came to take a very different view of NGOs with the national association for big business, Keidanren, setting up the Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund (KNCF) for NGO environmental projects in the early 1990s, which eventually also funded training and capacity building for Japanese NGOs. KNCF was a direct result of ideas provided by an American NGO and a lengthy consultation process that involved numerous American and European

Conclusion 159 NGOs, foundations and government officials who “taught” Japanese corporate heads how highly professionalized NGOs operated and contributed to the advancement of social and environmental goals. International actors therefore helped transform Keidanren’s understanding of what NGOs are and encouraged the business elite in Japan to become a promoter of NGOs in Japan. Transnational ties between Japanese society and international actors were also very pronounced among the advocacy NGOs examined in Chapter Five. Leaders and staff of the most successful and prominent Japanese NGOs active in international environmental issues often had education and training experiences abroad and adopted strategies based on American models of advocacy activism that emphasized lobbying, media exposure and research-based information campaigns. Foreign NGO staff and foundation officers were also mentors to Japanese activists on these various components of activism and were an important source of changing views among Japanese NGOs on their role in politics and society in this period. Norms, identity and changing state policies In addition to providing inspiration and direct support to Japanese activists, the international institutions and actors aided NGOs from above through norm promotion and socialization of the Japanese state. With the emergence in international politics in the 1980s and 1990s of pro-NGO norms emphasizing the importance of state–NGO partnerships and the participation of NGOs in policymaking processes described above and in Chapter Three, the Japanese state came under pressure to open up its domestic POS and adopt more NGO-friendly policies resembling those found in other OECD countries. Changes in state policies vis-à-vis NGOs in the late 1980s and 1990s in Japan can be fully understood only with reference to this important international political context. As this book’s chapter on IDNGOs showed, most of the new state funding programs for NGOs set up in the late 1980s and early 1990s were internationally inspired and were promoted by international actors as a way for Japan to show its commitment to important global issues such as international development and the environment. Once these programs were in place, Japanese service and advocacy NGOs themselves started to use international norms to lobby and pressure the state for more support and for better and more institutionalized access to the bureaucracy. In this way, several progressive stages of norm internalization took place throughout the 1990s and 2000s in a process that has involved both international actors and Japanese NGOs pushing for change. Although there is still plenty of room for improving the domestic POS for NGOs (e.g. more funds, tax breaks and better access for NGOs), internalization of the global pro-NGO norm in Japan has progressed to the point now where both state officials and NGOs think it is “normal” for NGOs to be partners of the state and to participate in policy-making, which was not the case for most of the postwar period. Part of the explanation for the growing number of NGOs in Japan is therefore provided by changes in state policies toward NGOs, which in turn were a result of

160 Conclusion the changing international political environment and state adaptations to these changes. This larger narrative of change from above is not a new one for Japan and the explanation and the findings of the book complement and add to the scholarly literature on norms, outside pressure (gaiatsu) and policy change in Japan. As numerous scholars and observers of Japan have noted, the country’s policy-makers, opinion leaders and general public have long shown an active interest in Japan’s place in international society and whether Japan is meeting international standards. (Gurowitz 1999; Tamamoto 1999 and 1993; Hook and Weiner 1992; Hatsuse 1990; Murakami and Kosai 1986; Passin 1983; Dore 1979–1980) Given this relatively heightened awareness of the international political environment and Japan’s place in the world, it is not surprising that international norms, the adoption of outside ideas and the use of gaiatsu have often been prominent in policy debates in Japan. Scholars have examined the political, strategic and ideational conditions under which new norms and/or policies from outside have been adopted in the area of economic policies (Schoppa 1997), foreign aid (Rix 1993; Orr 1990), immigration policy (Gurowitz 1999), environmental policy (Miyaoka 2004; Schreurs 2002) and women’s rights (ChanTiberghien 2004). While these studies differ in the relative weight they assign to the various explanatory factors, all of them provide evidence of the importance of international actors and ideas interacting with both domestic politics and the political elite. This book adds to these studies by using socialization theory to highlight the international “social” mechanisms through which norm diffusion and policy change take place and how gaiatsu in Japan also often relies on Japan’s identity in the world. As a nation that has been concerned about its standing and place in world politics since the mid-nineteenth century, Japan is a good case that shows how internationally defined socialization processes such as persuasion, role playing and social influence can contribute to the adoption of new state policies. Although Japan was a donor country and, unlike developing countries with similarly unfavorable domestic POS for NGOs, was under no material pressure to adopt pro-NGO norms, it was under social pressure internationally to do so since most leading OECD countries and IGOs were heavily promoting these norms. Japan’s creation of the NGO Subsidies Scheme and the Japan Fund for the Global Environment (JFGE) in the late 1980s and early 1990s are two good examples of how Japanese bureaucrats and politicians responded to international social pressures or incentives. The creation of the NGO Subsidies Scheme can be seen as a combined case of persuasion and role playing in the form of mimicry, whereby Japanese bureaucrats at MOFA created new NGO support programs in the late 1980s both as a response to efforts by the OECD DAC to persuade Japan to start the programs (persuasion) and as a way of conforming to commonly accepted practices among donor countries in order to remain in good standing in that grouping (mimicry). The case of the JFGE, on the other hand, is more one of social influence, with then-Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru establishing the JFGE for the social reward of international prestige and creating a positive “green” image of Japan at UNCED in 1992 – by supporting NGOs, Japan would look good in the

Conclusion 161 eyes of other countries at the conference. In neither case did domestic politics or domestic pressure play a very large role in the creation of the new program, although once they were set up each program became an important part of domestic politics and funding for NGOs. Changing state–NGO relations in Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s have therefore constituted a very complex process that has involved international socialization and Japan’s evolving identity in international politics. Like most countries, Japan has multiple identities and its leaders are motivated by the desire to see their nation internationally respected and admired. This book presents the most recent phase in a much longer evolution of identity and changing state– society relations in response to international changes. From the time of the Meiji era, starting in 1868, an important component of Japan’s international identity has been influenced by its standing among the Western world powers – first the socalled “Great Powers” in the prewar imperial era, then among the so-called “free” democratic and industrialized nations in the postwar period. Similarly, as the process of political globalization has evolved and as paradigms of global governance have shifted over time, Japan has faced new and different challenges of how to manage the domestic social changes associated with its changing foreign policy goals and international identity. In the Meiji period from the 1860s to the early twentieth century, Japan’s entrance into world politics after a long period of isolation and its quest to be a respected nation in international society and a Great Power inspired the adoption of new domestic policies and political structures that led to enormous domestic social changes ranging from the elimination of the samurai class to the adoption of a democratic system of governance that dramatically altered Japanese people’s view of themselves and their relationship to the state. (Duus 1998) In the immediate postwar period and during the Cold War, identity shifts imposed or sanctioned from above affected the development and direction of state–society relations, such as the US Occupation and the Cold War remolding of Japan into a pacifist, democratic, capitalist nation focused primarily on economic growth. In this period, Japanese civil society embraced Article 9 of the externally imposed Japanese postwar constitution which placed limits on the Japanese military and gave society a stronger voice in defense-related politics. Cold War politics and alliances also emphasized economic growth and the global promotion of capitalism, which justified Japan’s postwar single-minded focus on economic growth and the rise of Japanese big business. Although the West also promoted democracy, until the late 1970s the school of modernization theory placed a greater emphasis on state building and state-led promotion of economic growth as the first step in modernizing, a process whereby higher levels of wealth and a larger middle class would eventually lead to more stable democracies. Cold War competition for allies reinforced these tendencies, since authoritarian and undemocratic countries were courted by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and a country did not need to be fully democratic to be invited into the Western camp. In comparison with many non-Western countries, Japan appeared to have a relatively strong and stable democracy. Given these paradigms and the

162 Conclusion economic focus of the first several decades of the postwar period, Japan’s international identity as a rising economic power in the Western coalition was in sync with its domestic policies and state–society relations that emphasized economic actors. Since the 1980s and with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, global paradigms and identities have started to shift, bringing about new challenges for Japan’s international identity and how this identity relates to domestic state–society relations. As Japan emerged as a high-tech economic superpower in the 1980s, started to shed its “catch-up” identity, and sought more global recognition, it ran into the new set of challenges in defining its place in the world. In addition to now being criticized for being overly mercantilist in its foreign policies, Japan faced the tough question of how precisely to make its name as a global leader. Given the fact that military leadership was not a realistic option, Japan chose to expand its foreign aid and became the world’s leading aid donor for most of the 1990s. This choice, however, posed its own new challenges, since the new development paradigms of the 1980s and 1990s promoted by the international donor community were often foreign to Japan in the sense that – unlike some other OECD countries – they did not emerge out of Japan’s domestic political developments and relationships. In this sense, many of the new normatively charged goals of aid of this period – sustainable development, women in development, people participation – were not initiated by Japan but rather imposed on it. This was particularly the case with the aid concerning civil society and NGOs, which forced Japanese leaders to reconsider the Japanese state’s relationship with its own society and NGOs. In this way, Japan’s quest for more international recognition led to a basic reexamination of domestic state–society relations that had not occurred for many years. Domestic causes of NGO growth in Japan Although this book has emphasized the role of international political factors in stimulating the rise and growth of NGOs in countries such as Japan that did not have many NGOs until recently, its argument is not that international political factors are the only cause or source of global activism in these cases, but rather that it is the interaction of international and domestic political factors that has been crucial. Many internal domestic changes in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to supporting the growth of NGOs, including: the rise of postmaterial values, the implosion of the LDP and advent of coalition politics in 1993, corruption scandals and the demise of the “iron triangle” and Japan’s developmental state model in the 1990s, the rise of a new interest in volunteerism in the aftermath of the powerful earthquake in Kobe in 1995, and the passage of the NPO Law in 1998. (Takao 2007; Pekkanen 2006 and 2004a; Hirata 2004; Kingston 2004) As many of these examples indicate, the 1990s was a period of political and social change in Japan and a time of flux that provided domestic opportunities for social activism independent of international changes. While many of these changes were important background factors for supporting the rise and growth of NGOs in Japan, they do not appear to be the crucial factors

Conclusion 163 for explaining the NGO boom of the late 1980s and 1990s. First of all, many of these domestic changes did not take place or their effect was not fully felt until the mid-1990s or later. So in terms of timing, although many of these domestic factors appear to be supportive of NGO growth in the mid-1990s through the 2000s, they were not necessarily part of the original impetus for the NGO boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, while they make sense as supportive factors behind the growth of general activism in Japan, they appear to be less clearly or specifically connected to the international activism of NGOs, and it is often harder to make direct causal connections between these domestic factors and the founding of many of the NGOs that have featured in this book. Overall, I would argue, these factors provided a general changing domestic context that was supportive of NGO emergence and growth; but to understand how NGO emergence and growth took place, one must look at the interaction of the international and domestic factors that are at the center of this book.

Governance, symbiotic relationships and the worldwide spread of NGOs To end, I would like to suggest the deeper logic driving the international activism from above argument and how changes over time in the international system and models of international governance have made it increasingly difficult to resist the (mainly) Western promotion of NGOs. If Japan and other NGO laggard countries have been under pressure from forces above them to accept and even embrace NGOs, what is the source of this international pressure? Why, in other words, have NGOs been promoted from above the state by the international system and international actors? My answer, which is theoretical in nature and will require further investigation in future studies, is twofold. First, NGOs are being promoted as a larger political project of some powerful states that seek to spread democratic and neoliberal economic institutions and values worldwide. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the promotion of NGOs by these states – found not only in their bilateral foreign policy but expressed multilaterally through the IGOs they are able to dominate through funding – is an outward projection of their domestic political and ideological values on to the wider world and an attempt by them to solve international problems by replicating elements of their own governance systems globally. Second, in addition to this political logic driving NGO promotion there is a functional logic since NGOs are in many ways functionally indispensable for the particular type of international governance which has emerged in the past century, a style of governance that attempts to avoid highly centralized power while also aiming to get states to change their behavior in order to achieve universal goals. In this story, functional interdependence drives states, IGOs and NGOs to embrace one another as a crucial means to achieve their separate but overlapping interests.

164 Conclusion Political globalization and the extension of western democratic models on to global and national politics The larger, historical explanation for how and why NGOs are now promoted internationally can be found in the evolution of political globalization, changing forms of global governance and the way in which nonstate actors have represented the interests and values of powerful states. Political globalization of the past several centuries has been a Western-dominated and -led process. While regional political empires have existed since ancient history in many parts of the world (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999; Doyle 1986), the extension of empire and politics to cover the entire world started with the simultaneous rise of the nation-state and capitalism in Europe and Europe’s colonial spread to all corners of the globe. As noted by historians, European states’ competition over and acquisition of colonial territories globalized politics and political structures in several ways: it extended the scope of international politics from Europe to include most of the world, and it planted the seeds for the spread of the nation-state as the main political unit once former colonies gained independence in the latter half of the twentieth century. European wars also produced the initial efforts at international cooperation – peace treaties, the Concert of Europe, rules of war, the League of Nations, etc. – that became the foundations of today’s international regimes and institutions. Although imperial in design, this period represents an early stage and form of global governance, in which large sections of the world were organized, ruled and brought into a unified system. By the end of World War Two, this system of formal empire began to decline, and was replaced by a system of nation-states and a new set of international institutions which over time expanded dramatically to cover a wide array of political, social, economic and environmental issues. In addition, with the onset of the Cold War, the two competing Western political ideologies of democracy and communism consolidated into two camps led by two “superpowers” that promoted the globalization of these two contrasting political systems. With the end of the Cold War, the system is now moving toward promoting the ideals of the “winner” of that era of international political competition – i.e. democracy and free market capitalism. In the postwar period, therefore, the formal empire of colonization has been replaced by new forms of international governance that have progressively moved toward promoting the political and economic ideals of leading Western states. This has been done through the bilateral foreign policies of leading OECD countries and through the elaborate system of international institutions that promote concepts and practices which originated in the West, such as sustainable development, human rights, people participation, good governance, free markets and free trade. This evolving process of political globalization has always involved nonstate actors who have historically benefited from it due to their close ties with the powerful states. In the age of imperialism, nonstate actors such as merchants, missionaries and businessmen who traveled to or settled in the colonies served and sometimes drove the interests of European states as well as Japan in their imperial goals. (Snyder 1991) Styles of colonialism also varied across the colonies and

Conclusion 165 reflected differences in political, social and economic culture among the colonizing countries. (Myers and Peattie 1987; Doyle 1986) Although the politics of empire were strongly influenced by interstate competition and international strategic factors, therefore, they were always also closely tied to domestic political culture and involved the projection of national societies on to far-flung locations around the world. For the most part, however, this initial period of political globalization did not involve the systematic international promotion of Western political ideals such as democracy or human rights – concepts and practices that were still themselves emerging and establishing themselves in the West and were considered by Western states and nonstate actors alike as too advanced for the “barbaric” regions outside the West.1 All of this changed in the twentieth century, as democracy deepened in the West, World War Two brought about the eventual end to colonialism, and international organizations like the UN formalized the new global system of sovereign states and codified “universal” goals such as human rights and social, economic and political development. In the course of the twentieth century, as most Western states evolved into liberal democracies with advanced capitalist economies, their global interests and foreign policies – as they did in the past – advanced and sometimes were shaped by domestic nonstate actors. In addition to international strategic factors, foreign policies of Western states have continued to project and promote nonstate actors that reflect their domestic values and political constellations. NGOs have been an important part of this process and the increasing amount of state support they have received over time indicates both their increasing domestic political power (Smith 1990) and the increased appreciation by states and politicians of the role NGOs can play in promoting foreign policy goals. (Carothers 1999) Promoting NGOs has therefore become a way for some states to promote their interests and the spread of Western norms and political organization. These states, as this book has shown, have tended to be the Western states with the most developed nonprofit sectors and the type of political system and culture that encouraged the growth of NGOs in the first place – e.g. the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Over time, as these same Western states became more committed to promoting democracy globally, they came to see the utility in promoting not only their own national NGOs but NGOs of all nationalities in all countries. In this way, the global promotion of NGOs by many Western states can be seen as an attempt to project their own political culture and system on to states and IGOs. This argument overlaps with recent work done in international relations on power in the context of global governance and adds to this emerging literature. International relations scholars working at the intersection of constructivism and realism have recently started to examine how both ideas and power shape global governance. In contrast to neoliberal institutionalism’s more functionalist approach to international organization, this theoretically diverse set of scholars has reexamined global governance to include power structures and power relations often left out of previous studies. (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Hurrell 2005; Boas

166 Conclusion and McNeill 2004) Their approach has made it clear that power matters, and Western states have tended to dominate and disproportionately benefit from global governance processes and from participation in international organizations. (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Hurrell 2005; Boas and McNeill 2004) Similarly, NGOs have also benefited from Western dominance of global governance and have contributed to imbalances in power. (Hurrell 2005; Woods 2002) The connection between NGOs and powerful states made in this book is therefore part of an evolving debate on global governance and contributes to our understanding of how societal actors have been shaped by and can influence global governance. Functional interdependence and symbiotic relations In addition to being a way to project domestic values and norms of some Western states internationally, the promotion of NGOs from above by states and IGOs has emerged as a result of more utilitarian and functional factors. As I have argued elsewhere (Reimann 2006), states, IGOs and NGOs have significant overlapping interests in promoting international governance and have functionally depended on each other for accomplishing their mutual as well as their self-serving goals. This functional interdependence can also be seen in the symbiotic relationship that has evolved between IGOs and NGOs over the past century, which has promoted the mutual growth of IGOs and NGOs. IGOs and NGOs have grown simultaneously since the mid- to late nineteenth century and this growth has been an interactive and mutually reinforcing process. The creation of new international institutions (in some cases in response to NGO demand and action) has led to the creation of new opportunities for NGO formation and growth, which in turn has led to rising numbers of NGOs whose activities have consequently led to new and more complex systems of governance. One of the reasons that states and IGOs have promoted NGOs, therefore, is that they themselves have benefited from the advocacy and services of NGOs as the world has moved toward greater international regulation of global problems. These functional dependencies go in both directions. As this book has shown, NGOs have relied on states and IGOs for both material resources and political access, without which few NGOs could achieve their goals or survive for very long. Despite the fact that NGOs are often critical of states and IGOs, whether they like it or not, NGOs are also dependent on the support and cooperation of states, IGOs and other elite actors. States and IGOs, on the other hand, have also become increasingly reliant on NGOs to achieve their goals in global governance. Following a functional logic similar to neoliberal institutional theories on international cooperation, NGOs offer one attractive solution for solving problems of cooperation facing states and IGOs, especially as the number of international regimes has grown and the problems have become more complex. Exactly how have states and IGOs depended on NGOs for solving global problems? Here the literature on NGOs provides a wealth of answers through its highlighting of the various roles and strategies of NGOs: service provision, agenda setting, information gathering and analysis, monitoring of agreements, lobbying

Conclusion 167 and pressuring states to reach and ratify agreements, and the mobilization of public opinion and media attention. (Raustiala 1997; Gordenker and Weiss 1996) All of these functions performed by NGOs have been system-supporting ones that have often served states and IGOs well. This has been particularly true since there is little support among states for a very strong “world government” or centralized international state with big budgets, staff and extensive field operations and capabilities. Lacking a strong infrastructure for international governance, both states and IGOs have increasingly had to rely on NGOs to fill institutional gaps and help them achieve their stated goals. Just a few examples make these functional compatibilities quite clear. In the area of international development and humanitarian crises, service NGOs have become the contractor of choice for both donor states and IGOs as previous development models and developing states themselves have been judged as failures. Wary of giving too much to governments in the developing world, unwilling to expand the UN’s operational capacity greatly, and not always willing to expand their own bureaucratic and operational infrastructure, donor states have turned to service NGOs as a solution for implementing aid and providing relief in humanitarian crises. Advocacy NGOs, on the other hand, have been crucial players in the creation and maintenance of international regimes (Gordenker and Weiss 1996) and have helped states overcome coordination and information problems inherent in achieving international cooperation. In the regime formation stage, NGOs have often helped states set up new international institutions by providing new “focal points” for cooperation through their agenda-setting activities, by helping states solve information problems through policy and technical expertise, and by bringing about conditions favorable to international cooperation through the mobilization of public support and the lobbying of key states needed to reach a viable agreement. Once new regimes are set up, advocacy NGOs have become indispensable for their implementation and maintenance since in practice most international agreements rely on self-reporting by states, and the UN machinery for monitoring and implementation is understaffed, underfunded and often unable to complete its mandated work on its own. As monitors and suppliers of information on compliance, NGOs fill an important functional gap in regime maintenance that states and IGOs are either unwilling or unable to perform themselves. (Reimann 2006) For all these reasons, both IGOs and states have found the promotion of NGOs to be in their interest. This argument about the functional compatibility and the symbiotic relationship between states, IGOs and NGOs has strong similarities to recent “governmentality” theories of NGO growth and influence which argue that states support and use NGOs for governance functions similar to those mentioned above. (Sending and Neumann 2006) While these theories follow a similar basic logic, they have largely focused on the foreign policies of particular states. My argument here, in contrast, is not theoretically restricted to governmentality at the national level but also highlights and emphasizes a more international process involving powerful states, relations with IGOs and, at times, transnational linkages

168 Conclusion with weaker states that benefit from alliances with NGOs. NGO functionality and symbiotic relations with a variety of governmental institutions at multiple levels (national, transnational and international) have made them the natural partners of both states and IGOs seeking to promote global governance.

Concluding remarks As a final note, I would like to reflect on some of the limitations of the international component of the activism from above model and return to the model’s starting point of domestic political structures and policies. Although, as I have argued, global governance and the promotion of NGOs by IGOs and powerful states have been extremely important causes of the emergence and spread of NGOs to many non-Western parts of the world in recent years, they are not the only reasons. The domestic political environment continues to play a fundamental role in shaping the level and scope of activism; and to understand the evolution of NGOs in any given country, one must consider the ways in which international factors have interacted with domestic politics and the degree to which domestic POS have been altered by this interaction. Although international support from above can help start NGO activism, in the longer run NGOs will have a hard time surviving on their own and becoming a vibrant sector if their domestic POS does not also open up. International–domestic interactions have varied across states – domestic POS for NGOs has opened up more in some states than others – and this has meant that, despite the near-universal NGO booms of the 1990s, the depth and stability of the NGO sector varied across states over time. This book’s case study of Japan provides evidence for both the power and the limitations of the international promotion of NGOs from above. On the one hand, in the past decade the domestic POS has clearly improved in Japan due to external pressures and the three forms of activism from above, with the Japanese government now funding and having dialogue with NGOs and Japanese more involved in international activism than they have been in previous decades. In addition, other domestic-level politics such as the passage of the NPO Law in 1998 have improved the legal environment for activism. That said, these changes have been piecemeal and the domestic POS is far less friendly in Japan when compared with those in the more “activist” Western states which have promoted NGOs for much longer – funding levels in Japan are the lowest among the OECD member countries, tax breaks are extremely limited and fundraising tools provided by the state in other countries (e.g. tax incentives, bulk mail rates) remain largely nonexistent. Thus, while a core group of stable service and advocacy NGOs has emerged in Japan and they are here to stay, the NGO sector as a whole is still in its early developmental stages and it will probably take years (and more opening of the domestic POS) for it to become as large scale and professionalized as the NGO sectors found in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands. The same can be said for many other developing and transitional countries that experienced their first NGO booms in the 1990s and 2000s as a result of

Conclusion 169 international funding and pressure. As many of the case studies on NGOs in these countries show, the promotion of NGOs from above has not always led to thriving NGO sectors, but in some cases has produced foreign-aid dependent NGOs based in national capitals that do not have broad-based support and struggle to survive if cut off from international funding. (Smillie 2001; Carothers 1999) Furthermore, states do not always positively or consistently respond to pressure from above, leading to backlashes and serious limitations to the opening of domestic POS. Russia’s policies in this area since 2004 are a good example of this. (Carothers 2006; Gershman and Allen 2006) The promotion of the pro-NGO norm, in other words – like the promotion of many international norms – is a work in progress or an ongoing project, one with stops and starts and more progress in some countries than others. (Risse and Sikkink 1999) International factors matter, but it is the interaction of international and domestic politics which produces actual outcomes, and this interaction will vary both over space and over time. The argument of this book, therefore, is not that international actors have on their own created thriving and robust NGO sectors in every country around the world. Rather, it is that international actors and global governance processes have stimulated, funded and normatively supported the initial spread of NGOs to nonWestern parts of the world and continue to provide a framework and support system for NGO activism. For, although countries will vary in the degree to which their domestic POSs have opened up for citizen activism, it is hard for most countries to resist activism from above them completely, since in many cases this would require that they adopt policies that would effectively cut them off from international society and from the material and social benefits derived from membership in the larger global community. Until non-Western states dominate international institutions and governance processes, and unless there is a paradigm shift regarding the use of NGOs to provide global governance functions, the topdown promotion of NGOs is likely to continue to affect global, national and local politics for years to come.

Notes

1 Introduction: activism from above 1 For a good sampling of studies done in the issues areas mentioned see Bandy and Smith 2005, Carey and Richmond 2003, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, Smith and Johnston 2002, Smillie 2001, Florini 2000, Boli and Thomas 1999a, Evangelista 1999, Fox and Brown 1998, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Price 1998 and Wapner 1996. 2 Globalization theorists (Mathews 1997; Rosenau 1997; Brown 1995) as well as scholars outside the interdependence and globalization traditions (Lipschutz 1992 and 1996; Salamon 1994) have made similar arguments. 3 In addition to the high number of televisions listed in Figure 1.6, Japan has one of the highest rates of newspaper circulation in the world. (Pharr 1996) 4 Sikkink (2005) also uses the concept of international political opportunity structure in combination with domestic POS to create a model for understanding likely types of coalitions and transnational activism. This model, however, does not try to explain NGO emergence or growth. 2 States and the domestic political economy of NGOs 1 Although these are countries with civil law traditions, in the context of nonprofit regulations they are in practice closer to the evolutionary, normative common law approach. See Hodson 2000. 2 The process is rather mysterious for people without specialized knowledge or political connections, and many groups probably have not applied since it is not clear where or how one goes about doing so. (London 1991: 39–40) 3 Once a group obtains legal status, it comes under the supervision of the ministries which have the authority to revoke legal status if they feel that the group is not fulfilling its stated goals or financial requirements. (Menju 1995) Incorporated groups are required to submit lengthy financial reports, program summaries and proposed budget and program plans for the coming year. There is little room for flexibility and growth in the system for groups that want to change or expand their activities beyond those they were originally approved for, since all changes must be negotiated and approved by the ministry officials. Because of the many ways bureaucrats can interfere, many activists have felt the system threatens autonomy and discourages any activities critical of the government. See Pekkanen 2006: 64–66. 4 According to Articles 4 and 7 of the Corporation Tax Law, public interest corporations pay a rate of 27 percent on income earned from profit-making activities. This compares with the regular rate of 37.5 percent for business corporations. If profits are used for services done in the public interest, then up to 20 percent of business-earned profits are tax exempt. See Amemiya 1998.

Notes 171 5 Another factor that has discouraged individual contributions to the nonprofit sector is the fact that, with the exception of farmers and other self-employed categories of workers, most Japanese do not file individual income tax returns. (Smillie and Helmich 1993a: 186) Instead, taxes are automatically deducted from wages by employers and paid to the government. Making a tax-deductible contribution, thus, is an act that requires extra paperwork and this additional step has probably discouraged many people from making a contribution in order to get a tax break. As stated earlier, the system has tended to favor corporate donors, and for many years private contributions by individuals in Japan have been tiny when compared to those made by corporations. In 1993, 94.3 percent of all charitable contributions in Japan were made by corporations and only 5.7 percent by individuals. (Amemiya no date) The United States has very different patterns, with more individual than corporate contributions. 6 The combination of new inheritance taxes and tax deductible contributions in 1936, along with the higher taxes of the 1940–1959 period spurred the growth of the large foundations in America. Many of today’s top 25 internationally active foundations were set up during this period, including the following (establishment date): Ford Foundation (1936), Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (1940), Pew Charitable Trusts (1948), Henry Luce Foundation (1936), Starr Foundation (1955), W. Alton Jones Foundation (1944), Rockefeller Brothers Fund (1940), Lilly Endowment (1937), Edna McConnell Clark Foundation (1950), Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation (1942), John M. Olin Foundation (1953), American Express Foundation (1954), Leo and Julia Forchheimer Foundation (1957), and Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation (1959). See Foundation Center 1997: 34–35. 7 By most accounts, Japanese NGOs were receiving only several million dollars in subsidies prior to 1989 and it is thus unclear what these figures reported to DAC represent. Not a single MOFA official I interviewed was able or willing to tell me how the Japanese government determined the figures it reported to DAC. According to one NGO source, the official figures sent to DAC by Japan on official development assistance channeled through NGOs includes expenses for technical assistance projects done by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a quasi-governmental agency, and financial aid to other quasi-governmental NGOs (QUANGOs) set up by other ministries. See Kitazawa 1994. Watanabe (JANIC 1995: 98) also notes that Japan’s official figures are exaggerated since they include funds going to QUANGOs and he estimates that in 1992 there was only $5 million in state funding rather than the $107 reported to DAC. Another NGO scholar, Miyake Takafumi, has also claimed that Japan’s reported official figures for NGO aid are inflated, and estimates that in 1996 the “real” amount of funding going to NGOs was about $64 million. (Miyake 1999) 8 In the 1970s and 1980, there were six public interest corporations that received funds or other support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1986, the five organizations that received a total of 430 million yen ($4 million) were: the International Medical Foundation of Japan, OISCA, Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP), the International Nursing Foundation of Japan and the Association for the Promotion of International Cooperation. See MOFA 1987. Of these groups, only OISCA and JOICFP were NGOs that were autonomous from government control. Prior to the early 1990s, therefore, there was practically no government funding of NGOs. 9 This was confirmed by a retired MOFA official who said that government figures are often inflated to make it seem as if Japanese NGOs are getting a higher percentage of foreign aid than they really are. He stated that the “real” percentage of ODA going to NGOs was 0.5 percent in 2001 and increased to 0.8 percent in 2005, in contrast to the inflated figure used by MOFA of 2.6 percent for 2005, which includes grants to developing country local NGOs and local governments as well as to Japanese NGOs. MOFA official interview, May 2005.

172 Notes 10 Data for France is inconsistent, and more accurate figures for France appear in DAC country review reports in the late 1990s. According to these reports, co-financing and volunteer programs provided NGOs with $46 million in official aid in 1992 and $50 million in 1995–1996. (DAC 1994 and 1997) If one also included humanitarian aid channeled through NGOs, of which 46 percent went through NGOs (Randel and German 1999a: 108), the total official funding for NGOs would be closer to $100 million. Considering that France disbursed $8 billion in foreign aid in the mid-1990s, however, this is still a relatively small amount, representing approximately 1.3 percent of the total aid budget. 11 World War One and Two were formative events in the United States for the emergence of state-sponsored NGO activism abroad and brought about the establishment of new state bodies, such as the American Relief Administration and the War Relief Control Board to promote and coordinate relief efforts made by citizens. During World War One, state coordination of voluntary group efforts abroad first took place through the newly established American Red Cross, which channeled state and private funds, goods and services for war relief efforts. In 1919, the American Relief Administration was set up under Herbert Hoover and continued joint private–public relief efforts in Germany, Austria and Russia. (Curti 1963: 273–275) More elaborate state control of voluntary groups came under the Neutrality Act of 1939, which required all NGOs to register and file reports with the government. State control over relief NGOs was expanded during World War Two with new measures adopted by the War Relief Control Board, including active management and merging of groups to make them more efficient and accountable. (Curti 1963: 454) To represent their interests, large NGOs formed the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, and close collaboration between this Council and the War Relief Control Board set the stage for state–NGO collaboration in the postwar period. (Sommer 1977; Hoskins 1960; Bolling 1984) 12 Nordic countries have channeled a large amount of total foreign aid through NGOs. The breakdown for the mid-1990s is: Finland (10 percent); Denmark (11 percent), Sweden (12 percent); and Norway (25 percent). See Smillie and Helmich 1999 and Steen 1996. Since some of these figures do not include funds given to NGOs for disaster relief and special programs, total official aid going through NGOs is often even higher. If one includes such programs, for example, one-fifth of Sweden’s total development assistance is channeled through NGOs. See DAC 1996d. 13 Cohen (2004) also notes that among this small group of larger-budget NGOs, only Médicins sans Frontières refuses to take government funding and all the other NGOs rely heavily on state funding. So, even in France, government funding has supported the rise of the larger NGOs. 14 In 1998, 77 percent of NOVIB’s income came from government subsidies. See NOVIB 1999. Canadian NGOs active in advocacy received the following percentage of their budgets from the Canadian government in the mid-1990s: Canadian Council for International Cooperation (84 percent), CUSO (47 percent), the North–South Institute (91 percent), Oxfam Canada (41 percent), and RAFI (65 percent). Van Rooy 1999: 112–113. 15 According to Sommer (1977), CIDA’s NGO Division in the 1970s was staffed almost entirely by people who had previously worked at NGOs. More recently, Smillie (1999b: 21) has mentioned the old boys’/girls’ network of people who have floated between the two worlds, including prominent politicians and cabinet members. 3 Political globalization, “civil society” politics and the global growth of NGOs in the 1980s–2000s 1 These foundations are “quasi-governmental” in the sense that they have been regularly funded by the government, have state officials on their boards, and/or were set up through acts of legislation that have made them subject to public review and management.

Notes 173 2 In the case of environmental treaties, for example, a new burst of treaties in the late 1980s and early 1990s – e.g. the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on Transboundary Hazardous Waste, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Convention on Biodiversity – gave NGOs new opportunities, roles and focal points for activism. (Raustiala 1997: 722–723; Smith 1999) 3 This initiative was sponsored by the World Bank, USAID, the European Union, UNDP, numerous bilateral aid agencies and regional multilateral development banks in Asia, Africa and the Americas. It involved a series of meetings over several years that included the participation of more than 1,000 NGOs from developing countries, donor organizations, Northern NGOs and academic institutions. See the 2003 report of IFCB available online at: www.foodaid.org/capacitydocs3.htm. 4 International development NGOs in Japan 1 Of the 14 listings for Japan in the 1967 NGO Directory, at least half were affiliated with an official organ of the state and/or an industry grouping. A large number of Japanese NGOs in this period, therefore, are what international development scholars have referred to as quasi-governmental NGOs (QUANGOs), commercial NGOs (CONGOs) and government-owned NGOs (GONGOs). See Vakil 1997: 2060 and Fowler 1997: 32. 2 In the 1980s, for example, there were only six groups which were registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that received subsidies for international development activities. Of these, one was a parastatal group that was under MOFA’s control (Association for the Promotion of International Cooperation), two were professional medical organizations that had strong connections to professional and state interests (the International Medical Foundation of Japan and the International Nursing Foundation of Japan), and the remaining three were groups with good elite ties to both bureaucrats and politicians (JOICFP, OISCA and Japan Silver Volunteers). See Wurfel 1996; Rix 1993: 65; Nakano 1991: 124; MOFA 1987: 87; and Akatani 1985. 3 Since Japanese NGOs often do not have branch offices in developing countries, this puts them at a distinct disadvantage for applying for the Grassroots Grants Program project funds. The absolute number of Grassroots Grants going to Japanese NGOs has, however, increased over the years – rising from only a handful in the early 1990s to close to 70 projects in 2000. (See http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofa/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_4/ sei_4f.html, accessed 7/18/01.) 4 The decline in POSVIA funding is accountable to a huge drop in interest rates since 1996. Subscribers to POSIVA steadily increased in number from 6.7 million subscribers in 1991 to 26 million in 2000. (See http://www.yu-cho.go.jp/~volunteer_post/vo_post/ data 1999.htm, accessed 10/9/2000.) 5 In addition to posters and brochures, IDNGOs were featured in MPT publications and a 30-minute video that was shown daily in about 1,500 post offices throughout the 1990s. (Interview with MPT official, 12/16/1997.) 6 Although it is a semi-public fund that also solicits private contributions from individuals and corporations, the main financial source for the fund is the Japanese government. (Interview with JEC official, 11/11/1997.) 7 For more detailed information on the program and how it is administered, see the JICA webpage: http://www.jica.go.jp/partner/kusanone/index.html, accessed 3/15/2009. 8 For details on the Japan Desks see the JICA webpage: http://www.jica.go.jp/partner/ ngo/support/japandesk/index.html, accessed 3/15/2009. 9 In the three JANIC NGO directories, there were a total of 256 IDNGOs that had a detailed profile in at least one edition that included funding source information. Of these 256 groups, 202 (79 percent) had received some sort of state-sponsored funding in the 1990s and 54 groups (21 percent) had never received any. Among groups for which there is data, therefore, a very high percentage of IDNGOs have relied on government

174 Notes

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

funds. Although there is no funding source data for the remaining 133 groups, it is likely that some of these groups also received official funding. Interviews with IDNGO officials have confirmed this statement. Two NGO officials from leading IDNGOs who were active in the 1980s both claim that international pressure – not pressure from IDNGOs or public opinion – was one of the largest factors prompting MOFA to create the new NGO subsidy and grant programs. One of them estimated that 60–65 percent of the reason why MOFA set up the programs was international factors and pressures. NGO interviews, August 1998 and July 2000. “Most Japanese NGOs are young organizations with limited financial resources, and they are unable to finance their projects through large-scale public fund-raising in the manner of NGOs in Europe and America . . . In such circumstances the Subsidy System for NGO Projects was established in FY 1989.” MOFA 1989: 31. Saotome Mitsuhiro, the Director of MOFA’s NGO Assistance Division for most of the mid-1990s, has claimed that one of the main reasons for setting up the NGO support programs in 1989 was to counter criticisms of ODA. See Saotome 1997. As Chiba (1996: 9) reports: “According to MOFA’s Saotome, the decision to allocate budget funds to NGOs came in response to criticisms both at home and overseas that Japanese ODA was ‘faceless’ . . . The government can now respond to these critics with the counterclaim that Japan’s subsidies to NGOs are growing faster than in any other major donor country.” The ODA 1989 Annual Report has a rather remarkable section on the “Recent Debate over ODA” which describes the various criticisms of ODA, why they are wrong, and what the Japanese government intends to do to improve ODA. (MOFA 1989: 18–21) For example, in 1992, when a joint US–Japan biodiversity project in Indonesia was discussed between MOFA and USAID, the Japanese side resisted the idea of including NGOs but eventually gave in to USAID officials who insisted that NGOs had more expertise. This project went on to be a huge diplomatic success. (USAID official interview, January 1997) In January 1997, for example, MOFA’s journal Gaiko Forum had a special feature on the Common Agenda which included several articles on IDNGOs and stressed the importance of their role in development. (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ agenda/jiho.html, accessed 7/26/01) In the 1990s and early 2000s, the main MOFA bureau that dealt with IDNGOs was the Economic Cooperation Bureau and the bureau that coordinated the Common Agenda was the North American Affairs Bureau. By expanding MOFA’s involvement with IDNGOs to officials outside the Economic Cooperation Bureau – where ODA policy was the central focus – USAID officers raised the visibility of IDNGOs within MOFA as a whole. EA was aware of Japan’s laggard state in terms of funding environmental NGOs and their projects. Its Environment White Paper in 1988 discussed the international trends at the UN and among some Western governments to support and cooperate with NGOs and argued that the Japanese government should also find ways to support them. See Sadotomo 1988: 74. The Christian Relief and Development Association was an umbrella NGO active in Ethiopia that received funding from the EU and other Western donors. BANDAID was another Western-organized funding source that provided grants to NGOs working in Africa. In the mid- to late 1990s, a Japanese national – Ogata Sadako – was the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and used her position there to push both the Japanese government and business leaders to show more support for Japanese IDNGOs. (NGO interview, July 1998) For a more detailed list of the projects and annual funding amounts, see the Japanese language webpage for the Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund: http://www.keidanren. or.jp/kncf/fund_results.html, accessed 3/15/2009.

Notes 175 5 Sustainable development and advocacy NGOs in Japan 1 The World Wildlife Fund had net assets of $146 million in 2002 and the Environmental Defense Fund had assets of $44 million in 2002. (Information obtained from tax returns found on the GuideStar webpage database at www.guidestar.org, accessed 7/27/2006) 2 In order to obtain observer status at ADB annual meetings, NGOs must apply through their national governments. Although there were cases of developing countries rejecting NGO applications in the 1990s, it was very unusual for an industrialized country to deny observer status to one of its NGOs interested in attending the meeting. Kanda 1999. 3 Such support, however, is not necessarily unique to Japan, since these same private foundations have also been strong supporters of advocacy environmental NGOs in the United States, Europe and the developing world. Japanese environmental advocacy NGOs, in other words, joined an international club of NGOs that relies on foundation grants and international funding opportunities. 4 In addition to this early funding, JATAN relied heavily on other international sources in the 1990s. In 1991, for example, JATAN Director Kuroda Yoichi was awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize, an award given to grassroots environmental “heroes” that came with a $60,000 prize. In the early 1990s, JATAN also received funding from the Rainforest Action Network, the Threshold Foundation and the World Rainforest Movement. (NGO interview, 2/15/2001; Green 1990) 5 As mentioned earlier, Jonathan Holliman was one of the founders of FoE-UK and became a major supporter of Japanese environmental advocacy NGOs when he moved to Japan in 1979. In addition to supporting the creation, research and funding of FoE-J and JATAN in the 1980s, he played a similar role at JACSES in the 1990s as a provider of seed money and as a volunteer senior researcher there during his free time. (NGO interview, February 2001) Richard Forrest was the East Asia Representative of the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) who was hired in 1989 to spearhead NWF’s efforts at helping the non-profit environmental community in Japan and raising the level of interest in global environmental issues among Japanese policy -makers. He was in Japan throughout the 1990s and was involved in most of the sustainable development NGO campaigns in that period. Peter Riggs was the program officer for Asia for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for most of the 1990s and early 2000s. He provided funding and advice for the groups and actively participated in creating NGO campaigns. Holliman, Forrest and Riggs were all well-known figures in the NGO community devoted to global environmental issues and practically all Japanese advocacy NGO activists I interviewed in the 1990s either worked with them or knew of them. Jerry Inman and Andrew Horvat were the Japan representatives for the Asia Foundation in the 1990s (Inman) and early 2000s (Horvat). Both were active in promoting the nonprofit sector in Japan and had a strong interest in advocacy NGOs. JACSES rented office space from the Asia Foundation, as did several other advocacy NGOs – since none of these groups had legal status until after the passage of the NPO Law in 1998, all of them would have had a hard time both signing a lease and finding an affordable space in downtown Tokyo. 6 Conclusion: states, political globalization and the growth of NGOs 1 There were, of course, efforts to promote Western norms that reflected these principles, but these were partial efforts to “civilize” the primitive people and not to transplant Western values and political systems wholesale.

Bibliography

Adachi, K. (2005) “Why Japan Signed the Mine Ban Treaty: The Political Dynamics behind the Decision,” Asian Survey, 45 (3): 397–413. Akaha, T. (1993) “Japan’s Security Policy in the Post Hegemonic World: Opportunities and Challenges,” in T. Akaha and F. Langdon (eds) Japan in the Post Hegemonic World, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Akatani, K. (1985) No title, Asahi News Service, March 22. Albrow, M. (1996) The Global Age — State and Society beyond Modernity, Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press. Alger, C.F. (1994) “Citizens and the UN System in a Changing World,” in Y. Sakamoto (ed.) Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System, Tokyo, New York and Paris: UN University Press. Amemiya, T. (1998) “The Nonprofit Sector: Legal Background,” in T. Yamamoto (ed.) The Nonprofit Sector in Japan, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. —— (No date) “The Nonprofit Interest Corporation in Japan,” JCIE paper. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange. Andrews, F.E. (1952) Corporation Giving, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Anheier, H.K. (2005) Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy, London and New York: Routledge. —— (2000) “Facets of the Third Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Scale and Structure,” Paper delivered at the conference The Long Run: Long-term Developments in the Arts and Cultural Industries, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. Anheier, H.K. and Toepler, S. (1999) “Philanthropic Foundations: An International Perspective,” in H.K. Anheier and S. Toepler (eds) Private Funds, Public Purpose. Philanthropic Foundations in International Perspective, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London and Moscow: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Arase, D. (1995) Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Archambault, E., Boumendil, J. and Tsyboula, S. (1999) “Foundations in France,” in H.K. Anheier and S. Toepler (eds) Private Funds, Public Purpose. Philanthropic Foundations in International Perspective, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London and Moscow: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Association for Promotion of International Cooperation (APIC) (1995) Wagakuni NGO ni taisuru shien taisei chosa [A Survey of Support Programs for Japanese NGOs], Tokyo: APIC. —— (1985) Tojokoku no minkan koeki soshiki (NGO) jittai chosa [Survey on Developing Country NGOs], Tokyo: APIC.

Bibliography 177 Axelrod, R. (1986) “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” American Political Science Review, 80: 1095–1111. Ayes, J. (1999) “From the Streets to the Internet: The Cyber-Diffusion of Contention,” Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 566: 132–144. Bandy, J. and Smith, J. (eds) (2005) Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Barbetta, G.P. (1999) “Foundations in Italy,” in H.K. Anheier and S. Toepler (eds) Private Funds, Public Purpose. Philanthropic Foundations in International Perspective, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London and Moscow: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Baron, B.F. (1997) “Funding Civil Society in Asia: Philanthropy and Public–Private Partnerships,” The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series, No. 3, July. Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (eds) (2005) Power in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barrow, O. and Jennings, M. (eds) (2001) The Charitable Impulse: NGOs and Development in East and Northeast Africa, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Bater, P. (2005) “Reform of Laws Affecting CSOs in the UK,” International Journal of Civil Society Law, 3 (1): 107–115. Beckman, D. (1991) “Recent Experiences and Emerging Trends,” in S. Paul and A. Israel (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and the World Bank: Cooperation for Development, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Berger, T. (1993) “From Sword to Chrysanthemum, Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International Security, 17 (4): 119–150. Berkovitch, N. (1999) “The Emergence and Transformation of the International Women’s Movement,” in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds) Constructing World Culture, International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Berry, J.M. (1999) The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. —— (1984) The Interest Group Society, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. Boas, M. and McNeill, D. (eds) (2004) Global Institutions and Development: Framing the World?, London and New York: Routledge. Bob, C. (2005) The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boli, J., Loya, T. and Loftin, T. (1999) “National Participation in World-Polity Organization,” in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds) Constructing World Culture, International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Boli, J. and Thomas, G. (1999a) “INGOs and the Organization of World Culture,” in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds) Constructing World Culture, International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press. —— (eds) (1999b) Constructing World Culture, International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bolling, L. with Smith, C. (1984) Private Foreign Aid: US Philanthropy for Relief and Development, Boulder: Westview Press. Boris, E.T. (1987) “Creation and Growth: A Survey of Private Foundations,” in T. Odendahl (ed.) America’s Wealthy and the Future of Foundations, New York: The Foundation Center. Bosso, C.J. (1995) “The Color of Money: Environmental Groups and the Pathologies of Fund Raising,” in A.J. Cigler and B.A. Loomis (eds) Interest Group Politics, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

178 Bibliography Brecher, J., Childs, J.B. and Cutler, J. (eds) (1993) Global Visions, beyond the New World Order, Boston: South End Press. Broadbent, J. (1998) Environmental Politics in Japan, Networks of Power and Protest, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, L.D. and Korten, D.C. (1991) “Working More Effectively with Nongovernmental Organizations,” in S. Paul and A. Israel (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and the World Bank: Cooperation for Development, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Brown, S. (1995) New Forces, Old Forces and the Future of World Politics, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers. Brysk, A. (1994) “Acting Globally: Indian Rights and International Politics in Latin America,” in D.L. Van Cott (ed.) Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America, New York: St. Martin’s Press. —— (1993) “From above and below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies, 26 (3): 259–285. Bullain, N. (2004) “Explaining Percentage Philanthropy: Legal Nature, Rationales, Impacts,” The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 6 (4). Available online: http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss4/art_3.htm, accessed 12/8/2008. Bulmer, M. (1999) “The History of Foundations in the United Kingdom and the United States: Philanthropic Foundations in Industrial Society,” in H.K. Anheier and S. Toepler (eds) Private Funds, Public Purpose. Philanthropic Foundations in International Perspective, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London and Moscow: Kluwer Academic/ Plenum Publishers. Caldwell, L.K. (1992) “Globalizing Environmentalism: Threshold of a New Phase in International Relations,” in R.E. Dunlap and A.G. Mertig (eds) American Environmentalism: The US Environmental Movement, 1970–90, Philadelphia, Washington and London: Taylor and Francis. Cameron, O.K. (1996) “The Political Ecology of Environmentalism in Japan: Protest and Participation: 1983–1995,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Trinity College, University of Cambridge. Camilleri, J.A. and Falk, J. (1992) The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Hampshire: Edward Elgar. Carey, H.F. and Richmond, O.P. (eds) (2003) Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding, Aldershot: Ashgate. Carothers, T. (2006) “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs, 85 (2): 55–68. —— (1999) Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carty, V. and Onyett, J. (2006) “Protest, Cyberactivism and New Social Movements: The Reemergence of the Peace Movement Post 9/11,” Social Movement Studies, 5 (3): 229–249. Castells, M., Fernández-Ardèvol, M., Qiu, J.L. and Sey, A. (2007) Mobile Communication and Society: A Global Perspective, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. CDI-Japan (No date) CDI Japan, Pamphlet, Tokyo: Committee for the Promotion of Regional International Cooperation. Cernea, M. (1988) “Nongovernmental Organizations and Local Development,” World Bank Discussion Papers, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Chabbott, C. (1999) “Development INGOs,” in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds) Constructing World Culture, International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bibliography 179 Chan-Tiberghien, J. (2004) Gender and Human Rights Politics in Japan: Global Norms and Domestic Networks, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Charnovitz, S. (1997) “Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance,” Michigan Journal of International Law, 18 (2): 183–286. Checkel, J.T. (2005) “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International Organization, 59 (4): 801–826. —— (1997) “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the RationalistConstructivist Divide,” European Journal of International Relations, 3 (4): 473–495. Chen, M.A. (1996) “Engendering World Conferences: The International Women’s Movement and the UN,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Chiang, P. (1981) Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations – Identity, Role and Function, New York: Praeger. Chiba, H. (1996) “NGOs: Healing, Teaching, Nurturing,” Look Japan, 42 (487): 4–9. Clark, A.M., Friedman, E.J. and Hochstetler, K. (1998) “The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society, a Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights and Women,” World Politics, 51 (1): 1–35. Claude, I. (1966) “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organization, 20: 367–379. Clear, A. (2002) “International Donors and Indonesian Democracy,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 9 (1): 141–155. Cohen, S. (2004) “A Model of its Own? State–NGO Relations in France,” U.S.–France Analysis Series, Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., January. Conca, K. (1996) “Greening the UN: Environmental Organizations and the UN System,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Cortell, A.P. and Davis, J.W., Jr. (2000) “Understanding Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review, 2 (1): 63–87. Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation (1993) The National Action Plan for Agenda 21, Tokyo: Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation. Available online: http://www.env.go.jp/en/global/iec/agenda/index.html, accessed 8/11/2006. Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century (1998) “Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century Final Report,” Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online: http://www.infojapan.org/policy/oda/reform/report2.html, accessed 2/14/2000. Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) (1999) Chiho jichitai no kokusai kyoryoku katsudo to NGO. Jichitai ni okeru NGO to no rentai suishin chosa kenkyu iikai, Jichitai ni okeru NGO to no rentai suishin iikai hokokusho [International Activities of Regional Local Governments and NGOs. Report of the Research Committee to Promote Collaboration of NGOs in Local Government International Activities and the Committee to Promote Collaboration of NGOs in Local Government International Activities], Tokyo: CLAIR. Crole, B. (1999) “Switzerland,” in T. Harris (ed.) International Fund Raising for Notfor-Profits, a Country-by-Country Profile, New York: John Wiley and Sons. Cumming, G.D. (2008) “French NGOs in the Global Era: Professionalization ‘Without Borders?”’ Voluntas, 19: 372–394. Curti, M. (1963) American Philanthropy Abroad: A History, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Curtis, G. (1999) The Logic of Japanese Politics, New York: Columbia University Press.

180 Bibliography Cvetkovich, A. and Kellner, D. (1997) Articulating the Global and the Local, Globalization and Cultural Studies, Boulder: Westview Press. Dahlen, O. (1982) “A Government Response to Pressure Groups – the Case of Sweden,” in P. Willet (ed.) Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organization, London: Frances Pinter. de Goys, M. (1993) “Switzerland,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD. de Goys, M. and Helmich, H. (1993) “Germany,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD. Dehne, A., Friedrich, P., Nam, C.W. and Parsche, R. (2008) “Taxation of Nonprofit Associations in an International Comparison,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37 (4): 709–729. Deibert, R.J. (2000) “International Plug ‘n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet and Global Public Policy,” International Studies Perspectives, 1 (3): 255–272. della Porta, D. and Kriesi, H. (1999) “Social Movements in a Globalizing World: An Introduction,” in D. della Porta, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht (eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London: Macmillan Press. de Lupis, I.D. (1989) “The Human Environment: Stockholm and Its Follow up,” in P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds) Global Issues in the United Nations Framework, London: Macmillan. Dente, B. and Lewanski, R. (2002) “Italy,” in H. Weidner and M. Jänicke (eds) Capacity Building in National Environmental Policy: A Comparative Study of 17 Countries, Berlin and New York: Springer. Deudney, D. and G.J. Ikenberry. (1994) “Wither the West?,” in A. Clesse, R. Cooper and Y. Sakamoto (eds) The International System after the Collapse of the East–West Order, Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (2008) Statistical Annex of the 2008 Development Cooperation Report, Paris: OECD. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/ document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34485_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 11/15/2008. —— (2006) 2005 Development Cooperation Report, Paris: OECD. —— (2004) Peer Review of Japan, Paris: OECD. —— (1999) Japan, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 34, Paris: OECD. —— (1998a) Canada, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 28, Paris: OECD. —— (1998b) Germany, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 29, Paris: OECD. —— (1997) France, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 21, Paris: OECD. —— (1996a) Italy, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 16. Paris: OECD. —— (1996b) Japan, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 13, Paris: OECD. —— (1996c) Norway, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 14, Paris: OECD. —— (1996d) Sweden, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 19, Paris: OECD. —— (1995) Participatory Development and Good Governance, Paris: OECD. —— (1994) France, Development Cooperation Review Series, No. 2, Paris: OECD. —— (1993) “Aid Review 1992/93, Report by the Secretariat and Questions for the Review of Japan,” OCDE/GD (93)119, Paris: OECD. —— (1991) “Aid Review 1990/91, Report by the Secretariat and Questions for the Review of Japan,” OCDE/GD (91)198, Paris: OECD. Dichter, T.W. (1999) “Globalization and its Effects on NGOs: Efflorescence or Blurring of Roles and Relevance?,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28 (4), Supplement: 38–58.

Bibliography 181 Doherty, B. (2002) Ideas and Actions in the Green Movement, London and New York: Routledge. Donini, A. (1996) “The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in the Relationship between the UN and NGOs,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Dore, R. (1979–1980) “The Internationalization of Japan,” Pacific Affairs, 52 (4): 595–611. Doyle, M.W. (1986) Empires, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dunlap, R.E. and Mertig, A.G. (1992) “The Evolution of the US Environmental Movement from 1970–90: An Overview,” in R.E. Dunlap and A.G. Mertig (eds) American Environmentalism: The US Environmental Movement, 1970–90, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and London: Taylor and Francis. Duus, P. (1998) Modern Japan, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Economic Planning Agency (EPA) (1997) Economic Cooperation Study Group Report “Jizoku kano na Keizai kyoryoku ni mukete” [Toward Sustainable Economic Cooperation], Tokyo: EPA. —— (1991) Nihon no kao no mieru jijo doryoku enjo wo mezashite [Toward Self-Help Style Foreign Aid with a Visible Japanese Face], Tokyo: EPA. Edwards, M. (2004) Civil Society, Cambridge: Polity Press. —— (1994) “International Non-Governmental Organizations, ‘Good Government’ and the ‘New Policy Agenda’: Lessons of Experience at the Program Level,” Democratization, 1 (3): 504–515. Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996) “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations,” World Development, 24 (6): 961–973. Esping-Anderson, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. European Commission (1998) “Digest of Community Resources Available for Financing the Activities of NGOs and Other Governmental and/or Decentralized Bodies Representing Civil Society in the Fields of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid,” VII/424/98 EN. Directorate-General VIII, Development, April, Brussels: EC. European Foundation Center (2004) “Foundations in 15 European Union Countries – Legal and Tax Comparative Overview: Highlights.” Available online: www.efc.be, accessed 3/15/09. Evangelista, M. (1999) Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Evans, P. (2000) “Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: CounterHegemonic Globalization,” Contemporary Sociology, 29: 230–241. Field, J.A. (1972) “Transnationalism and the New Tribe,” in R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye (eds) Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Finnemore, M. (1996) National Interests in International Society, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization, 52 (4): 887–917. Fisher, W.F. (1997) “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 26: 439–464. Florini, A. (ed.) (2000) The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo and Washington, D.C.: JCIE and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foch, A. (1993) “Italy,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD.

182 Bibliography Foundation Center (2008) International Grantmaking IV: Highlights, New York: The Foundation Center. Available online: http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/ research/pdf/intlgmiv_highlights.pdf, accessed 3/26/2009 —— (2000) Foundation Yearbook, New York: The Foundation Center. —— (1997) International Grantmaking, A Report on US Foundation Trends, New York: The Foundation Center. Fowler, A. (1999) “Advocacy and Third Sector Organizations: A Composite Perspective,” in D. Lewis (ed.) International Perspectives on Voluntary Action: Reshaping the Third Sector, London: Earthscan. —— (1997) Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of NonGovernmental Organizations in International Development, London: Earthscan. Fox, J.A. and Brown, L.D. (eds) (1998) The Struggle for Accountability. The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press. Freeman, D.F. (1991) The Handbook on Private Foundations, New York: The Foundation Center. Fremont-Smith, M. (1965) Foundations and Government: State and Federal Law and Supervision, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Friedman, E.J., Hochstetler, K. and Clark, A.M. (2005) Sovereignty, Democracy and Global Civil Society: State–Society Relations at UN World Conferences, Albany: State University of New York Press. Friedman, T. (2005) The World Is Flat, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. —— (1999) Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Friends of the Earth-Japan (1997) Kokusai Enjo Uotchi [International Aid Watch], 8 (July). Frost, Y.I. and Frost, G.J. (1999) “Japan,” in T. Harris (eds) International Fund Raising for Not-for-Profits, a Country-by-Country Profile, New York: John Wiley and Sons. Gaer, F.D. (1996) “Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Garon, S. (1997) Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gay, M. and Schiavoni, A. (1999) “Italy,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. Gershman, C. and Allen, M. (2006) “The Assault on Democracy Assistance,” Journal of Democracy, 17 (2): 37–51. Gill, S. (1994) “Structural Change and the Global Political Economy: Globalizing Elites and the Emerging World Order,” in Y. Sakamoto (ed.) Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System, Tokyo, New York and Paris: UN University Press. Glenn, J.K. (2001) Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gordenker, L. and Weiss, T.G. (1996) “Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Greene, S.G. (1999) “Activists on the Move in Japan,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, December 2: 1. —— (1990) “US Non-Profits Help Groups in Japan – Yes, Japan,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, November 27: 6–16. Gurowitz, A. (1999) “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants and the Japanese State,” World Politics, 51 (3): 413–445.

Bibliography 183 Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hall, P.D. (1999) “Vital Signs: Organizational Population Trends and Civic Engagement in New Haven, Connecticut,” in T. Skocpol and M. Fiorina (eds) Civic Engagement in American Democracy, Washington, D.C., and New York: Brookings Institution Press and Russell Sage Foundation. —— (1992) Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy, Voluntarism and Nonprofit Organizations, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. —— (1987) “A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector,” in W. Powell (ed.) The Nonprofit Sector. A Research Handbook, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Harris, T. (ed.) (1999) International Fund Raising for Not-for-Profits, a Country-byCountry Profile, New York: John Wiley and Sons Hasegawa, K. (2004) Constructing Civil Society in Japan: Voices of Environmental Movements, Melbourne: Transpacific Press. Hatsuse, R. (1990) “The Internationalization of Japan in Historical Perspective,” Sheffield Papers in International Studies, No. 6. Heginbotham, E. and Samuels, R.J. (1988) “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International Security, 22 (4): 171–203. Heineken, H. and Pekkanen, R. (2004) “Legal Changes Affecting Not-for-Profits in Japan,” The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 7 (1). Available online: http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol7iss1/art_1.htm, accessed 12/12/2008. Heinrich, V.F. and Shea, C. (2008) “Assessing the Legal Environment for Civil Society around the World: An Analysis of Status, Trends and Challenges,” in V.F. Heinrich and L. Fioramonti (eds) CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Volume 2, Comparative Perspectives, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Helmich, H. (1993) “Germany,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD. Henderson, S. (2003) Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Herrmann, R. and Shannon, V. (2001) “Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest and Perception in Decision-Making,” International Organization, 55 (3): 621–654. Hirata, K. (2004) “Civil Society and Japan’s Dysfunctional Democracy,” Journal of Developing Societies, 20 (1–2): 107–124. —— (2002) Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid Development Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. —— (2000) “Bureaucrats and Rebels: The Odd Alliance Reshaping Japanese Foreign Aid,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii at Manoa. Hodson, H.V. (2000) “A Brief History of Foundations,” in The International Foundation Directory 2000, London: Europa Publications. Holliman, J. (1990) “Environmentalism with a Global Scope,” Japan Quarterly, 37 (3): 284–290. Honnoki (1992) Japanese Working for a Better World – Grassroots Voices and Access Guide to Citizens’ Groups in Japan, San Francisco: Honnoki. Hook, G. and Weiner, M.A. (eds) (1992) The Internationalization of Japan, London and New York: Routledge.

184 Bibliography Hopper, P. (2007) Understanding Cultural Globalization, Cambridge: Polity. Hoskins, L.M. (1960) “Voluntary Agencies and Foundations in International Aid,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 329: 57–68. Hulme, D. and Edwards, M. (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors, too Close for Comfort?, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Human Rights Internet (1982) Human Rights Directory: Western Europe: A Directory of Organizations in Western Europe Concerned with Issues of Human Rights and Social Justice, Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Internet. —— (1981) Human Rights Directory: Latin America, Africa, Asia, Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Internet. —— (1979) Human Rights Directory 1979 Directory of US Based Organizations Engaged in Work in International Human Rights, Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Internet. Human Rights Internet Reporter (1994) Masterlist: A Listing of Organizations Concerned with Issues of Human Rights and Social Justice Worldwide, Ottawa: Human Rights Internet. Hurrell, A. (2005) “Power, Institutions and the Production of Inequality,” in M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds) Power in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ICNL (2002) Global Capacity Statement. Available online: http://www.icnl.org/gendocs/ capstat.htm, accessed 3/15/2001. Ikegami, K. (2004) “Kokuren kikan to NGO” [UN Organizations and NGOs], in I. Katsuji and H. Katsuhiro (eds) “Renzoku kogi” kokusai kyoryoku NGO: shimin shakai ni sasaerareru NGO e no koso [International Cooperation NGOs: A Framework for NGOs Supporting Civil Society], Tokyo: Nippyo. Ikenberry, G.J. and Kupchan, C.A. (1990) “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization, 44, 3: 283–315. Inglehart, R., Basanez, M., Diez-Medrano, J., Halman, L. and Luijkx, R. (eds) (2004) Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Surveys, Coyoacan and Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores. InterAction (1997) InterAction Member Profiles 1997–1998, Washington, D.C.: InterAction. Inoguchi, T. (1991) “Japan’s Foreign Policy in a Time of Global Uncertainty,” International Journal, 46 (3): 579–606. Iriyama, A. (1994) “Nonprofit Organizations in Japan: An Overview,” in K. Jung (ed.) Evolving Patterns of Asia Pacific Philanthropy, Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University. Itoh, M. (2007) “Nihon shakai to NGO: Kokkyo wo koeru shimin soshiki” [Japanese Society and NGOs: Citizen Organizations that Cross Borders], in N. Umahashi and A. Takayanai (eds) Gurobaru mondai to NGO shimin shakai [Global Issues and NGO Civil Society], Tokyo: Akashi. —— (2004) “Nihon no kokusai kyoryoku NGO no rekishi to nettowa-ku no nagare” [History of Japanese International Cooperation NGO and Networks], in K. Imata and K. Harada (eds) “Renzoku kogi” kokusai kyoryoku NGO: shimin shakai ni sasaerareru NGO e no koso [International Cooperation NGOs: A Framework for NGOs Supporting Civil Society], Tokyo: Nippyo. Iwamoto, K. (1984) “An Overview of Japanese Philanthropy and International Cooperation in the Third World,” in K.D. McCarthy (ed.) Philanthropy and Culture: The International Foundation Perspective, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Iwasaki, S. (1993) NGO wa hito to chikyu wo musubu [NGOs Tying People and the World Together], Tokyo: Daisan Shokan.

Bibliography 185 Jacobson, H.K. (1984) Network of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Jain, P. (2000) “Emerging Foreign Policy Actors: Subnational Governments and Nongovermnetal Organizations,” in T. Inoguchi and P. Jain (eds) Japanese Foreign Policy Today, New York: Palgrave. Janoski, T. (1998) Citizenship and Civil Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES) (1996) Environment and Sustainable Development in Official Development Assistance since the 1992 Earth Summit, Tokyo: JACSES. —— (1994) Report of a Survey on the Earth Summit Follow-up Activities in Japan, Tokyo: JACSES. Japan Fund for the Global Environment (JFGE) (1996) “Environmental Protection Activities in Developing Countries by Japan-Based NGOs,” [Internal Document dated November 28], Tokyo: JEC, JFGE. —— (No date) Japan Fund for the Global Environment, Pamphlet, Tokyo: Japan Environment Corporation. Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) (2004) NGO dairekutori- 2004 [Directory of NGOs in Japan 2004], Tokyo: JANIC. —— (2002) NGO dairekutori- 2002 [Directory of NGOs in Japan 2002], Tokyo: JANIC. —— (2000) NGO dairekutori- 2000 [Directory of NGOs in Japan 2000], Tokyo: JANIC. —— (1998) NGO dairekutori- ‘98 [Directory of NGOs in Japan 1998], Tokyo: JANIC. —— (1996) NGO De-ta Bukku [NGO Data Book], Tokyo: JANIC. —— (1995) Creating Together a New Partnership – NGO Support Schemes Contributing to People’s Self-Reliance, Country Reports and Manila Statement from a JANIC conference in Tokyo, December 9–10. Jencks, C. (1987) “Who Gives to What?,” in W. Powell (ed.) The Nonprofit Sector, a Research Handbook, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Jenkins, C.J. (1998) “Channeling Social Protest: Foundation Patronage of Contemporary Social Movements,” in W. Powell and E.S. Clemens (eds) Private Action and the Public Good, New Haven: Yale University Press. —— (1987) “Nonprofit Organizations and Policy Advocacy,” in W. Powell (ed.) The Nonprofit Sector, a Research Handbook, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Jepperson, R.L., Wendt, A. and Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,” in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press. Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Johnston, A.I. (2005) “Conclusion and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and beyond Europe,” International Organization, 59 (4): 1013–1044. —— (2001) “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly, 45: 487–515. —— (1995) “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, 19 (4): 32–64. Jupille, J., Caporaso, J.A. and Checkel, J.T. (2003) “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union,” Comparative Political Studies, 36 (1–2): 7–40. JVC (ed.) (1990a) NGO Sakusen – Nihon kokusai borantia senta- 10 nen no kiroku – Ge [NGO Chosen – Japan International Volunteer Center Ten Year Record, Volume One], Tokyo: Mekon.

186 Bibliography —— (ed.) (1990b) NGO Sakusen – Nihon kokusai borantia senta- 10 nen no kiroku – Jo [NGO Chosen – Japan International Volunteer Center Ten Year Record, Volume Two], Tokyo: Mekon. Kamarck, E.C. and Nye, J.S., Jr. (eds) (1999) Democracy.com? Governance in a Networked World, Hollis: Hollis Publishing Company. Kanda, H. (1999) “ODA kaikaku ni wa NGO no rikiryo ga kakatte iru” [NGO Strength Weighing in on ODA Reform], Gaiko Forum, July: 54–59. Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.) (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press. —— (ed.) (1978) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists beyond Borders, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Keidanren (1997) “The Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund,” Brochure, Tokyo: Keidanren. Kelley, J. (2004) “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions,” International Organization, 58 (3): 425–457. Kelly, H.M. (2005) “At Last: A New Federal Not-for-Profit Corporation Statute,” International Journal of Civil Society Law, 3 (1): 75–76. Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S., Jr. (2000) “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?),” Foreign Policy, 118: 104–119. —— (1998) “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs, 77 (5): 81–94. —— (1977) Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Khagram, S. (2004) Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Khagram, S., Riker, J.V. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (2002) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kiger, J.C. (2000) Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century, Westport and London: Greenwood Press. Kingston, J. (2004) Japan’s Quiet Transformation: Social Change and Civil Society in the Twenty-first Century, London and New York: Routldge Curzon. Kitazawa, Y. (1994) “Overview: NGOs in Japan,” AMPO, 25 (3): 12–17. Kofman, E. and Youngs, G. (eds) (1996) Globalization: Theory and Practice, London and New York: Pinter. Kokoro 8 (1), March and (4), December 1996. —— 7 (4), December 1995. —— 5 (1), May, (2) July and (3) October 1993. —— 1 (2), November 1989. Koshida, K. (2006) “NGO to ODA wo do kaeyou to shite ita no ka” [How Should NGOs Try to Change ODA], in M. Fujioka, K. Kiyokazu and N. Kenji (eds) Kokka shakai henkaku NGO [States, Social Change and NGOs], Tokyo: Shinhyoron. Krasner, S.D. (1995) “Power Politics, Institutions and Transnational Relations,” in T. RisseKappen (ed.) Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krauss, E.S. and Simock, B.L. (1980) “Citizens’ Movements: The Growth and Impact of Environmental Protest in Japan,” in K. Steiner, E.S. Krauss and S.C. Flanagan

Bibliography 187 (eds) Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J.W. and Giugni, M.G. (1995) New Social Movements in Western Europe, A Comparative Analysis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kuroda, K. (2003) “Japan-Based Non-Governmental Organizations in Pursuit of Human Security,” Japan Forum, 15 (2): 227–250. Kyodo News (1995) “OECD Says Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy Improving,” November 14. leBel, G. (1999) “Defending Human Rights,” in A. Van Rooy (ed.) Civil Society and Global Change, Ottawa: The North–South Institute. Lindahl, L. (1997) Country Notes for Japan, Unpublished report on NGOs working on policy reform of international financial institutions. Lipschutz, R.D. (1992) “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21 (2): 389–420. Lipschutz, R.D. with Mayer, J. (1996) Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance, Albany: State University of New York Press. Lissner, J. (1977) The Politics of Altruism, a Study of the Political Behavior of Voluntary Development Agencies, Geneva: Lutheran World Federation. Lofredo, G. (2000) “Help Yourself by Helping the Poor,” in D. Eade (ed.) Development, NGOs and Civil Society, Oxford: Oxfam GB. London, N. (1991) Japanese Corporate Philanthropy, New York: Oxford University Press. Lumsdaine, D.H. (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lundstrom, T. and Wijkström, F. (1997) The Nonprofit Sector in Sweden, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Macdonald, L. (1997) Supporting Civil Society: The Political Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Central America, New York: St. Martin’s Press. —— (1994) “Globalizing Civil Society: Interpreting International NGOs in Central America,” Millennium, 23 (2): 267–285. Maclachlan, P. (2002) Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan: The Institutional Boundaries of Citizen Activism, New York: Columbia University Press. Maiguashca, V. (1994) “The Transnational Indigenous Movement in a Changing World Order,” in Y. Sakamoto (ed.) Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System. Tokyo, New York and Paris: UN University Press. Management and Coordination Agency (MCA) (1988) “ODA no genjo to kadai – Somucho no dai ichi gyosei kansatsu kekka: mushoshikin kyoryoku, shijutsu kyoryoku” [ODA: Current State and Issues. MCA’s First Administrative Inspection Report – Grant Aid and Technical Cooperation], Tokyo: MCA. March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1998) “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization, 52 (4): 943–969. Maren, M. (1997) The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity, New York: Free Press. Martens, K. (2005) NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave. Martin, L.L. and Sikkink, K. (1993) “US Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973–80,” in P. Evans, H.K. Jacobson and R.D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. Mathews, J. (1997) “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, 76 (1): 50–66.

188 Bibliography Matsui, Y. and Ruprecht, R. (eds) (1992) NGO, ODA enjo wa dare no tame ka? Nihon to doitsu to daisan sekai [NGO, ODA Assistance for Whose Sake? Japan, Germany and the Third World], Tokyo: Akaishi Shoten. McAdam, D. (1995) “’Initiator’ and ‘Spin-off’ Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles,” in M. Traugott (ed.) Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. (eds) (1996) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, D. and Rucht, D. (1993) “The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 528: 56–74. McCarthy, K.D. (ed.) (1984) Philanthropy and Culture: The International Foundation Perspective, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. McCarthy, K.D., Hodgkinson, V.D., Sumariwalla, R.D. and Associates (1992) The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. McKean, M.A. (1981) Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press. Mendelson, S.E. and Glenn, J.K. (eds) (2002) The Power and Limits of NGOs, New York: Columbia University Press. Menju, T. (2000) “Kokusai kyoryoku – kokusai kyoryu to NPO” [International Cooperation, International Exchange, and Non-Profit Organizations], in Y. Yoshimura (ed.) Nihon no NPO/2000 (Nonprofit Organizations in Japan 2000), Tokyo: Seibundo. —— (1995) “The Evolution of Japanese NGOs in the Asia Pacific Context,” in T. Yamamoto (ed.) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: Nongovernmental Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community, Tokyo: JCIE. Meyer, J.W., Frank, D.J., Hironaka, A., Schofer, E. and Brandon Tuma, N. (1997) “The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870–1990,” International Organization, 51 (5): 623–651. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (2007) International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japanese NGOs, Tokyo: International Cooperation Bureau, Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, MOFA,. Available online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/ngo/ partnership/english.pdf, accessed 3/15/2009. —— (1999a) ODA Annual Report (1999), Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1999b) “Supporting Our International Volunteers. Japan’s NGO Support Schemes,” Brochure, Tokyo: NGO Assistance Division, MOFA. —— (1996a) ’96 NGO shien gaido bukku [Guidebook for Supporting NGOs 1996], Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1996b) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1996, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1994) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1994, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1993) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1993, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1992) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1992, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1990) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1990, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1989) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1989, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1988) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1988, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1987) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1987, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1986) Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1986, Tokyo: MOFA. —— (1985) Japan’s Official Development Assistance, 1985 Annual Report, Tokyo: MOFA.

Bibliography 189 —— (1984) Japan’s Official Development Assistance, 1984 Annual Report, Tokyo: MOFA. Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) (1996) Heisei 8 nendo. Kokusai borantia choking. NGO katsudo jokyo hokokusho [Fiscal Year 1996. Postal Savings for International Voluntary Activities. NGO Activity Report], Tokyo: MPT. —— (No date) Excerpt from the 1990 “Vision” report relating to the establishment of a postal savings account for voluntary aid, Tokyo: MPT. Mitchell, R.C., Mertig, A.G. and Dunlap, R.E. (1992) “Twenty Years of Environmental Mobilization: Trends among National Environmental Organizations,” in R.E. Dunlap and A.G. Mertig (eds) American Environmentalism: The US Environmental Movement, 1970–90, Philadelphia, Washington and London: Taylor and Francis. Miyake, T. (1999) “A Subcontractor or a Partner? Opportunities and Constraints of Partnerships between ODA and NGOs,” Paper presented to the Advanced Development and Management Program, Sophia University and FASID, Tokyo, January. Miyaoka, I. (2004) Legitimacy in International Society: Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave. Modelski, G. and Devezas, T. (2007) “Political Globalization is Global Political Evolution,” World Futures, 63 (5–6): 308–323. Moravcsik, A. (1997) “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization, 51 (4): 513–553. Morphet, S. (1996) “NGOs and the Environment,” in P. Willet (ed.) The Conscience of the World, the Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Morse, E.L. (1976) Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations, New York and London: The Free Press. Murai, Y. (ed.) (1992) Nippon no ODA [Japan’s ODA], Tokyo: Komonzu. Murai, Y. and Kanda, M. (1987) Dare no tame no enjo? [Aid for whom?], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Murakami, Y. and Kosai, Y. (eds) (1986) Japan in the Global Community, its Role and Contribution on the Eve of the 21st Century, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Myers, R.H. and Peattie, M.R. (eds) (1987) The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nagasaka, T. (2007) NGO hatsu, “shimin shakairyoku”: atarashii sekai moderu he, [NGO Led “Civil Society Power”: Toward a New Global Model], Tokyo: Akashi. Naisbitt, J. (1994) Global Paradox, the Bigger the World Economy, the More Powerful its Smallest Players, New York: William Morrow and Co. Nakano, Y. (1991) A Message from OISCA to Mother Earth, Tokyo: OISCA International. Ndegwa, S.N. (1994) “Civil Society and Political Change in Africa, the Case of NonGovernmental Organizations in Kenya,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 35 (1–2): 19–36. Nelson, P.J. (1997) “Conflict, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Who Speaks for Who in Transnational NGO Networks Lobbying the World Bank?,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 26 (4): 421–441. Neuhoff, K. and Haibach, M. (1999) “Germany,” in T. Harris (ed.) International Fund Raising for Not-for-Profits, a Country-by-Country Profile, New York: John Wiley and Sons. Newman, C.L. (2002) “New Relations between the French State and NGOs: The ‘State Association Charter,”’ The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 4 (2–3). Available online: http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol4iss2_3/cr_8.htm#france, accessed 12/18/2008.

190 Bibliography NGO Jijitai Kokusai Kyoryoku Shuishin Kaigi [NGO–Local Government International Cooperation Promotion Council] (1997) Shimin to jijitai ga tsukuru kokusaika [International Cooperation Made by Citizens and Local Government], Tokyo: NGO Jijitai Kokusai Kyoryoku Shuishin Kaigi. Nichols, J.B. (1988) The Uneasy Alliance. Religion, Refugee Work and US Foreign Policy, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Niezen, R. (2004) A World beyond Difference: Cultural Identity in the Age of Globalization, Malden and Oxford: Blackwell. Non-Governmental Organizations Liaison Office of the United Nations (1997) List of NonGovernmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (1997/NGO Lists Parts I/II), New York and Geneva: Non-Governmental Organizations Liaison Office of the United Nations. NOVIB (1999) Annual Report 1999. Available online: http://www.novib.nl/partners/ AnnualReport1999.pdf, accessed 5/20/2008. Nye, J.S. and Keohane, R.O. (1972) “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” in R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye (eds) Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Odendahl, T. (1987) “Independent Foundations and Wealthy Donors: An Overview,” in T. Odendahl (ed.) America’s Wealthy and the Future of Foundations, New York: The Foundation Center. OECD (2003) “Philanthropic Foundations and Development Cooperation,” DAC Journal 4 (3). Available online: www.oecd.org/dataoced/23/4/22272860.pdf, accessed 10/14/2008. —— (1998) Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations Active in Sustainable Development. Part II: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, United States, Paris: OECD. —— (1996) Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations Active in Sustainable Development. Part I: Europe, Paris: OECD. —— (1995) Participatory Development and Good Governance, Paris: OECD. —— (1992) Development Assistance Manual: DAC Principles for Effective Aid, Paris: OECD. —— (1991) Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the DAC, Paris: OECD. —— (1990) Directory of Non-Governmental Development Organizations in OECD Member Countries, Paris: OECD. —— (1988) Voluntary Aid for Development. The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations, Paris: OECD. —— (1987) Development Cooperation. Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Paris: OECD. —— (1986) Development Cooperation. Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Paris: OECD. —— (1985) Twenty-five Years of Development Cooperation. A Review, Paris: OECD. —— (1981) Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations in OECD Member Countries Active in Development Cooperation, Volume 1: Profiles, Paris: OECD. OECD–ICVA (1967) Development Aid of Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organizations, Paris: OECD. Ohmae, K. (1995) “Managing in a Borderless World,” in K. Ohmae (ed.) The Evolving Global Economy – Making Sense of the New World Order, Boston: Harvard Business Review.

Bibliography 191 Ohta, H. (2000) “Japanese Environmental Foreign Policy,” in T. Inoguchi and P. Jain (eds) Japanese Foreign Policy Today, New York: Palgrave. —— (1995) “Japan’s Politics and Diplomacy of Climate Change,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University. Ohta, T. (2006) “Public Benefit Organizations in Japan: Present Situations and Remaining Challenges,” The International Journal of Civil Society Law, 4 (4): 72–90. Okajima, S. (1998) “NGOs Poised to Shape 21st Century,” Daily Yomiuri, August 26: 5. Orr, R.M. (1990) The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, New York: Columbia University Press. Ottaway, M. (2000) “Social Movements, Professionalization of Reform and Democracy in Africa,” in M. Ottaway and T. Carothers (eds) Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ottaway, M. and Carothers, T. (eds) (2000) Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Park, W.S. (1992) “The Role of NGOs for Human Rights in Asian Countries,” Thesis for Diploma in International Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. Passin, H. (1983) “Overview: The Internationalization of Japan – Some Reflections,” in H. Mannari and H. Befu (eds) The Challenge of Japan’s Internationalization, Organization and Culture, Tokyo: Kwansei Gakuin University and Kodansha International. Passy, F. (1999) “Supranational Political Opportunities as a Channel of Globalization of Political Conflicts: The Case of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” in D. della Porto, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht (eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London: Macmillan Press. Pekkanen, R. (2006) Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates, Stanford: Stanford University Press. —— (2004a) “After the Development State: Civil Society in Japan,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 4: 363–388. —— (2004b) “Japan: Social Capital without Advocacy,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, Stanford: Stanford University Press. —— (2000) “Japan’s New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law,” Journal of Japanese Studies, 26 (1): 111–143. Petras, J. (2003) The New Development Politics: The Age of Empire Building and New Social Movements, Aldershot: Ashgate. —— (1997) “Imperialism and NGOs,” Monthly Review, 49 (7): 10–27. Pharr, S.J. (2003) “Conclusion: Targeting by an Activist State: Japan as a Civil Society Model,” in F.J. Schwartz and S.J. Pharr (eds) The State of Civil Society in Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1996) “Media and Politics in Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,” in S.J. Pharr and E.S. Krauss (eds) Media and Politics in Japan, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. —— (1994) “Japanese Aid and the New World Order,” in C.C. Garby and M.B. Bullock (eds) Japan, a New Kind of Superpower?, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. —— (1993) “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing,” in G.L. Curtis (ed.) Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change, Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe. —— (1990) Losing Face: Status Politics in Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press.

192 Bibliography Phillips, A. (1999) “Exporting Democracy: German Political Foundations in Central–East Europe,” Democratization, 6 (2): 70–98. Price, R. (1998) “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization, 52 (3): 613–644. Princen, T. and Finger, M. (eds) (1994) Environmental NGOs in World Politics, London and New York: Routledge. Pyle, K.B. (1989) “The Burden of Japanese History and the Politics of Burdensharing,” in J. Makin and D. Hellman (eds) Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for American and Japan, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research. Quigley, K.F.F. (1997) For Democracy’s Sake. Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Randel, J. and German, T. (1999a) “European Union,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Governmen–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1999b) “France,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1999c) “Germany,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1999d) “The Netherlands,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1999e) “United Kingdom,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1999f) “Sweden,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1999g) “Switzerland,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. Raustiala, K. (1997) “States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions,” International Studies Quarterly, 41 (4): 719–740. Reimann, K.D. (2006) “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs,” International Studies Quarterly, 50 (1): 45–67. —— (2003) “Building Global Civil Society from the Outside in? Japanese International Development NGOs, the State and International Norms,” in F.J. Schwartz and S.J. Pharr (eds) The State of Civil Society in Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (2001a) “Building Networks from the Outside in: International Movements, Japanese NGOs and the Kyoto Climate Change Conference,” Mobilization, 6 (1): 69–82. —— (2001b) Late Developers in Global Civil Society: Domestic Barriers, International Socialization and the Emergence of International NGOs in Japan, Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University. Renz, L. (1998) “International Grant Making by US Foundations: Issues and Directions in the 1990s,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 27 (4): 507–521. Risse, T., Ropp, S.C. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (1999) The Power of Human Rights, International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Risse, T. and Sikkink, K. (1999) “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction,” in T. Risse, S.C. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds) The Power of Human Rights, International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bibliography 193 Ritchie, C. (1996) “Coordinate? Cooperate? Harmonize? NGO Policy and Operational Coalitions,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Rix, A. (1993) Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, London and New York: Routledge. Roberts, H.R. (1986) “The Domestic Environment of AID-Registered PVOs: Characteristics and Impact,” in R. Gorman (ed) Private Voluntary Organizations as Agents of Development, Boulder and London: Westview Press. Roberts, W.T. (2005) “The Uneven Globalization of Civil Society Organizations and the Consequences for Cross-National Disparities in Human Development,” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 25 (1–2): 118–144. Rosenau, J.N. (1997) Along the Domestic–International Frontier, Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1990) Turbulence in World Politics, a Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ross, L.J. (1996) “Japanese Elites and Foreign Policy in the Era of Emerging Asian Policy,” Perspectives on Political Science, 25 (2): 81–86. Roy, D.A. (1993) “Japanese Corporate Philanthropy in the United States, 1984–1993,” Center for Global Partnership, Newsletter, 2 (6): 2–4. Ruttan, V.W. (1996) United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid Assistance, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sadotomo, T. (1988) “ODA to NGO no kankei – NGO gawa kara ODA shikin ukeire no hoho wo kangaeru” [Towards a Sound Relationship between ODA and NGOs], Heiwa Kenkyu, 13: 42–58. Saitoh, M. (1989) “Seifu kaihatsu enjo to kaihatsu NGO katsudo” [Governmental Development Assistance and Development NGO Activities], Keizaigaku ronsan (Chuo daigaku), 30 (3): 105–120. Sakamoto, Y. (ed.) (1994) Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System, Tokyo, New York and Paris: UN University Press. Salamon, L.M. (1997) The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, New York: John Wiley and Sons. —— (1995) Partners in Public Service, Government–Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. —— (1994) “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector,” Foreign Affairs, 73 (4): 109–122. Salamon, L.M. and Anheier, H.K. (2006) “The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective,” in W. Powell and R. Steinberg (eds) The Non-Profit Sector: A Research Handbook (2nd Edition), New Haven: Yale University Press. —— (1998) “Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector CrossNationally,” Voluntus, 9 (3): 213–247. —— (1997) Defining the Nonprofit Sector, a Cross-National Analysis, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. —— (1996) The Emerging Nonprofit Sector, an Overview, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Salamon, L.M. and Toepler, S. (2000) “The Influence of the Legal Environment on the Development of the Nonprofit Sector,” Center for Civil Society Studies Working Paper No. 17, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. Sampson, S. (1996) “The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania,” in C. Hann and E. Dunn (eds) Civil Society, Challenging Western Models, London and New York: Routledge.

194 Bibliography Sangiin Kokusai Mondai ni Kansuru Chosakai [Upper House Subcommittee on International Cooperation] (1998) “Taigai keizai kyoryoku ni kan suru shoiinkai chosa hokokusho” [Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Cooperation], Tokyo: National Diet. Saotome, M. (1997) “Kokumin sanka-kata no kaihatsu kyoryoku. NGO to chihojijitai no yakuwari chushin” [People Participatory Development Cooperation. Centered on the Role of NGOs and Local Government], Kokusai Mondai, 451: 34–47. —— (1995) Za borantia [The Volunteer], Tokyo: International Development Journal. Satoh, S. and Inouchi, M. (1999) “Non-profit Organizations in Developed Democracies, with a Focus on Japan’s Private Foundations,” IIPS Policy Paper 221E, Institute for Policy Studies. Schimmelfennig, F. (2005) “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe,” International Organization, 59 (4): 827–860. —— (2003) “Strategic Action in a Community Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East,” Comparative Political Studies, 36 (1–2): 156–183. Schofer, E. and Longhofer, W. (2006) “The Structural Sources of Associational Life,” Paper presented at the American Sociological Association meeting, Philadelphia. Schoppa, L.J. (1997) Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do, New York: Columbia University. Schreurs, M.A. (2002) Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. —— (1997) “Conservation, Development, and State Sovereignty: Japan and the Tropical Forests of Southeast Asia,” in S.H. Hashmi (ed.) State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Schwartz, F.J. and Pharr, S.J. (eds) (2003) The State of Civil Society in Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scott, A.M. (1982) The Dynamics of Interdependence, Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press. Seary, B. (1996) “The Early History, from the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference,” in P. Willet (ed.) The Conscience of the World: The Influence of NonGovernmental Organizations in the UN System, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Sending, O.J. and Neumann, I.V. (2006) “Governance to Governability: Analyzing NGOs, States and Power,” International Studies Quarterly, 50 (3): 651–672. Shigeta, Y. (2007) “NGO to ODA” [NGO and ODA], in N. Umahashi and A. Takayanai (eds) Gurobaru mondai to NGO shimin shakai [Global Issues and NGO Civil Society], Tokyo: Akashi. —— (2005) NGO no hatten no kiseki: kokusai kyoryoki NGO no hatten to sono senmonsei [The Path of NGO Development: The Growth of International Cooperation NGOs and Such Expertise], Tokyo: Akashi. Shigetomi, S. (ed.) (2002) The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Sikkink, K. (2005) “Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider–Outsider Coalition,” in D. della Porta and S. Tarrow (eds) Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions and Power, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. —— (1993) “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America,” International Organization, 47 (3): 411–441.

Bibliography 195 Skjelsbaek, K. (1972) “The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century,” International Organization, 25 (3): 420–442. Skocpol, T. (2003) Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. —— (1999) “Advocates without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life,” in T. Skocpol and M.P. Fiorina (eds) Civic Engagement in American Democracy, Washington, D.C. and New York: Brookings Institution Press and Russell Sage Foundation. —— (1984) “Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds) Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Slaughter, A.M. (2004) A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press. —— (1997) “The Real New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, 76 (5): 183–197. Smillie, I. (ed.) (2001) Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises, Bloomfield and Ottawa: Kumarian Press. —— (1999a) “At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship between Northern NGOs and Northern Governments,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1999b) “International Development and Civil Society,” in A. Van Rooy (ed.) Canadian Development Report 1999. Civil Society and Global Change, Ottowa: The North–South Institute. —— (1995) The Alms Bazaar, Altruism Under Fire – Non-Profit Organizations and International Development, London: IT Publications. Smillie, I. and Filewod, I. (1993) “Sweden,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD. Smillie, I. and Helmich, H. (eds) (1999) Stakeholders: Government–NGO Partnerships for International Development, London: Earthscan. —— (1993a) “Japan,” in I. Smillie and H. Helmich (eds) Nongovernmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD. —— (eds) (1993b) Nongovernmental Organizations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD. Smith, B.H. (1990) More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Smith, J. (2004) “Exploring Connections between Global Integration and Political Mobilization,” Journal of World Systems Research, 10 (1): 255–285. —— (2000) “Social Movements, International Institutions and Local Empowerment,” in P. Unvin (ed.) Global Institutions and Local Empowerment. Competing Theoretical Perspectives, London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press. —— (1999) “Global Politics and Transnational Social Movements Strategies: The Transnational Campaign against International Trade in Toxic Wastes,” in D. della Porta, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht (eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London: Macmillan Press. —— (1997) “Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector,” in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Smith, J. and Johnston, H. (eds) (2002) Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

196 Bibliography Smith, J. and Wiest, D. (2005) “The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: National and Global Influences on Transnational Association,” Social Forces, 84 (2): 621–652. Smith, S.R. and Lipsky, M. (1993) Nonprofits for Hire. The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting, London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Snow, D.A. and Benford, R.D. (1999) “Alternative Types of Cross-National Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena,” in D. della Porta, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht (eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London: Macmillan Press. Snyder, J. (1991) Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Sollis, P. (1996) “Partners in Development? The State, NGOs and the UN in Central America,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Sommer, J.G. (1977) Beyond Charity: US Voluntary Aid for a Changing World, Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. Sperling, V. (1999) Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Steen, O.I. (1996) “Autonomy or Dependency? Relations between Nongovernmental International Aid Organizations and Government,” Voluntus, 7 (2): 147–159. Stienstra, D. (1994) Women’s Movements and International Organizations, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Stiles, K.W. (2001) “Intermestic Policy Circles. Emerging Donor-NGO Networks in the Developing World,” Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago. —— (1998) “Civil Society Empowerment and Multilateral Donors: International Institutions and New International Norms,” Global Governance, 4: 199–216. Strachwitz, R.G. (1999) “Foundations in Germany and Their Revival in East Germany after 1989,” in H.K. Anheier and S. Toepler (eds) Private Funds, Public Purpose. Philanthropic Foundations in International Perspective, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London and Moscow: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Sumi, K. (ed.) (1990) Kiwareru enjo: Seigin-nihon no enjo to narumada damu [Despised Aid: The World Bank, Japanese Aid and the Narmada Dam], Tokyo: Tsukiji Shokan. —— (1989) ODA enjo no genjitsu [The Reality of Japanese ODA], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Szarka, J. (2002) The Shaping of Environmental Policy in France, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. Takao, Y. (2007) Reinventing Japan: From Merchant to Civic Nation, New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave. Tamamoto, M. (1999) “The Uncertainty of the Self, Japan at Century’s End,” World Policy Journal, 17 (2): 119–128. —— (1993) “The Japan That Wants to Be Liked,” in D. Unger and P. Blackburn (eds) Japan’s Emerging Global Role, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Tanaka, H. (1996) Namboku mondai to kaihatsu kyoiku [The North–South Debate and Development Education], Tokyo: Aki Shobo. Tarrow, S. (2005) The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1998) Power in Movement, Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Second Edition), New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1996) “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements,” in D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (eds) Comparative Perspectives on Social

Bibliography 197 Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S. and McAdam, D. (2005) “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention,” in D. della Porta and S. Tarrow (eds) Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions and Power, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Terry, E. (2002) How Asia Got Rich: Japan and the Asian Miracle, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Therien, J. (1991) “Non-Governmental Organizations and International Development Assistance,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 12 (2): 263–280. Tilly, C. (1984) “Social Movements and National Politics,” in C. Bright and S. Harding (eds) Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Trinidad, D.D. (2007) “Japan’s ODA at the Crossroads: Disbursement Patterns of Japan’s Development Assistance to Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective, 31 (2): 95–125. Udall, L. (1995) “The International Narmada Campaign: A Case of Sustained Advocacy,” in W.F. Fisher (ed.) Toward Sustainable Development: Struggling over India’s Narmada River, Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe. Union of International Associations (2007) Yearbook of International Organizations 2006/2007, Geneva: UIA. —— (2005) Yearbook of International Organizations 2004/2005, Geneva: UIA. —— (2000) Yearbook of International Organization 2000/2001, Geneva: UIA. —— (1997) Yearbook of International Organization 1996/1997. Volume Two, Geneva: UIA. United Nations (1998) “Report of the Secretary-General,” A/53/170. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2000) The State of the World’s Refugees 2000, Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, London and Geneva: Oxford University Press and UNHCR. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2006) 2006 VOLAG: Report of Voluntary Agencies, Washington, D.C.: USAID. Upham, F. (1987) Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Vakil, A.C. (1997) “Confronting the Classification Problem: Toward a Taxonomy of NGOs,” World Development, 25 (12): 2057–2070. Van Rooy, A. (ed.) (1999) Canadian Development Report 1999. Civil Society and Global Change, Ottowa: The North–South Institute. —— (ed.) (1998) Civil Society and the Aid Industry: The Politics of Promise, London: Earthscan. —— (1997) “The Frontiers of Influence: NGO Lobbying at the 1974 World Food Conference, the 1992 Earth Summit and beyond,” World Development, 25 (1): 93–114. Vogel, E. (1979) Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wade, R. (1996) “Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective,” New Left Review, 217: 3–36. Wakisaka, N. (1996) “Putting People back into Aid Programs,” Japan Quarterly, 43 (4): 76–81. Walker, J.L. (1991) Mobilizing Interest Groups in America. Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Wan, M. (1993) “Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Used its Economic Power, 1952–92,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University. Wanner, B. (1997) “Japanese Corporate Citizenship: Beyond Growing Pains,” JEI Report, 1A: 1–14.

198 Bibliography Wapner, P. (1996) Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, Albany: State University of New York Press. Warkentin, C. (2001) Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Watanabe, T. (1995) “NGO Support Schemes of the Japanese Government,” in JANIC (ed.) Creating Together a New Partnership: NGO Support Schemes Contributing to People’s Self-Reliance, Country Reports and Manila Statement of the Conference, Conference Report, Tokyo. Wedel, J.R. (1998) Collision and Collusion. The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989–98, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Weisbrod, B.A. (1998) To Profit or Not to Profit? The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector, New York: Cambridge University Press. Weiss, T.G. and Gordenker, L. (1996) “Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions,” in T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Wiest, D. and Smith, J. (2007) “Explaining Participation in Regional Transnational Social Movement Organizations,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 48 (2–3): 137–166. Wilkinson, J. (1995) “Dealing with a Fiction: The NGO Conference on APEC,” Ampo, 26 (4): 6–9. Willet, P. (1996) “Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations,” in P. Willet (ed.) The Conscience of the World, the Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. —— (1989a) “Interdependence: New Wine in Old Bottles,” in J.N. Rosenau and H. Tromp (eds) Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, Aldershot: Avebury. —— (1989b) “The Pattern of Conferences,” in P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds) Global Issues in the UN’s Framework, London: Macmillan. Wirth, D.A. (1998) “Partnership Advocacy in World Bank Environmental Reform,” in J.A. Fox and L.D. Brown (eds) The Struggle for Accountability. The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements, London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wong, A. (1998) “The Anti-Tropical Timber Campaign in Japan,” in A. Kalland and G. Persoon (eds) Environmental Movements in Asia, Richmond: Curzon Press. Woods, N. (2002) “Global Governance and the Role of Institutions,” in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds) Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge: Polity. World Bank (2006) World Bank – Civil Society Engagement: Review of Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. —— (2001a) Chapter 4: “Enabling Environment for NGOs and Civil Society.” Available online: http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/essd/ . . . 88/265698fa4c68ea25852567ed004c4c 10i, accessed 4/29/2001. —— (2001b) World Bank–Civil Society Collaboration Progress Report for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. —— (1999) World Bank–Civil Society Relations. Fiscal 1999 Progress Report, Washington, D.C: World Bank. —— (1996) The World Bank’s Partnership with Nongovernmental Organizations, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. —— (1995) Working with NGOs, a Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Bibliography 199 World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press. World Trade Organization (WTO) (2001) “WTO and NGO Relations with NonGovernmental Organizations/Civil Society.” Available online: http:// www.wto.org/ english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.html, accessed 5/23/2001. Wurfel, D. (1996) “Civil-izing Japan–Southeast Asian Relations: The Role of Japanese NGOs,” Research Report No. 06620057, Tokyo: International Christian University. Yamakoshi, A. (1994) “The Changing Face of NGOs in Japan,” JEI Report, 37A: 1–8. Yamamoto, T. (1997) “The Evolution of Japan’s International Giving and its Future Prospects,” in Foundation Center (ed.) International Grantmaking: A Report on US Foundation Trends, New York: The Foundation Center. Yamamoto, T. and Amenomori, T. (1989) “Japanese Private Philanthropy in an Interdependent World,” JCIE Papers, August. Yamaoka, Y. (1999) “Japan,” in T. Silk (ed.) Philanthropy and Law in Asia: A Comparative Study of the Nonprofit Legal Systems in Ten Asia Pacific Societies, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Yamauchi, N. (1999) NPO de-ta bukku [NPO Databook], Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Yonemoto, S. (1994) Chikyu kankyo mondai to wa nani ka [Explaining Global Environmental Problems], Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho. Yoshida, M. (ed.) (1997) “NGO no genzai: Kokusai kyoryoku no genjo to wadai” [The Current State of NGOs: Conditions and Topics of International Cooperation Activities], Ajiken topikku repo-to [Asia Institute Topics Report], August, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. Zaidi, S.A. (1999) “NGO Failure and the Need to Bring back the State,” Journal of International Development, 11: 259–271. Zurn, M. and Checkel, J.T. (2005) “Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State,” International Organization, 59 (4): 1045–1079.

Index

access to decision-makers 22, 48–53, 54, 63–4, 158; advocacy NGOs 48, 49, 117, 121, 122, 123, 127–8, 132–5; international development NGOs 93–5; at international meetings 110–11 activism from above 2, 53, 147, 148, 163; by international actors 20–6, 151–5, 157–62; by state 17–20, 149–51, 156 ADB Fukuoka NGO Network 120, 126, 134, 141 advocacy NGOs (see also environmental advocacy NGOs) 3, 8, 29, 71, 167; and diffusion of ideas 79; elite networks 51, 52; funding of 39, 41, 46, 47, 61, 62; political opportunity structure 48, 49, 50–1, 52; in USA 50–1 African Development Foundation 61 Agenda 21 73, 132–3 Akiba Tadatoshi 134–5 Alton Jones Foundation 63, 137, 138, 139 Amnesty International 3, 37 APEC Monitor Network 120, 139, 141 Asia Foundation 61, 109 Asian Development Bank 133, 134, 141 Association for the Promotion of International Cooperation 171, 173 Australia 6, 8 BANDAID 108, 174 Beijing Platform for Action 75–6 Belgium 5,6 bulk mail rates 18, 47, 92 business, NGOs and 112–13, 158–9 Canada 6, 7, 8, 19, 149; legal and fiscal regulation 31, 35, 36, 39; membership

of NGOs 8, 9; modernization indicators 13, 15, 16; political opportunity structure 52, 53; state support for NGOs 42, 43, 45, 46, 47 Canadian International Development Agency 52 capacity building 58, 80, 91, 96, 112 CARE 3, 29, 108 Carnegie Corporation 63 Catholic Relief Services 3, 45 charities, legal and fiscal regulation of 31, 32, 33–4 Charities Act 2006 (UK) 34 Charities Commission 34 Christian Relief and Development Association 108, 174 church taxes 47 civil law, and nonprofit organizations 35, 36 civil society 10, 74–5, 78,153; pro-NGO norm and 70, 71–2, 81 colonialism 164–5 Committee for the Promotion of Collaboration of NGOs in Local Government International Collaboration 94 Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective 104–5, 111 common law, and nonprofit organizations 31, 35, 36 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), NGOs in 78 Community-Based Development Initiative 94, 110–11 Convention of the Rights of the Child 69 convergence of NGO development 4, 5, 8–9, 13, 55–82; political globalization and 20–5

Index 201 corporatism, and citizen activism 30, 35, 36, 42, 45, 52, 53, 150 Council on Economic Cooperation with China for the 21st Century 95 Council on ODA Reforms 94, 95 Council on the Yen Loan System 95 democracy 11, 164, 165; in Japan 161–2; NGOs and 149, 165; promotion of 61–2, 153 Democratic Party of Japan 129 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 49, 98–9, 158, 160; monitoring Japanese NGOs 102–3 diffusion theory 25–6 direct mail strategies 47 divergence of NGO development 4, 6, 8–9, 13, 29–54; ; domestic political opportunity structures and 16–20 donors (see also funding; private foundations) 26, 151; international 22, 136–7; promotion of pro-NGO norm 77–8 economic development, and NGO growth 10–11 economic globalization: indicators of 13–16; and NGO growth 1, 9–10, 11–12 ECOSOC see United Nations Economic and Social Council emergence and growth of NGOs 4–9; early theories 9–16; first wave 149–51; political explanation 16–27; second wave 151–5 emergency relief funding 90 Environment Agency 105–6, 131, 174 Environment Defense Fund (USA) 120, 175 environmental advocacy NGOs 116–18, 144–6, 157; development of 119, 120; dialogue with state 127–8; international training 143–4; political change and 121–3, 127–9; and sustainable development 118–21; state funding 117, 118, 123; transnational diffusion of ideas 142–4 environmental NGOs 105–6, 112, 113, 116–18, 120 environmental treaties 173 Eurasia Foundation 61

faith-based NGOs 53 fiscal regulations 18, 19, 31–4, 35–6; in Japan 37–8 Food and Agricultural Organization 59, 65 Ford Foundation 40, 41, 63, 78, 109 foreign aid, and NGO support 18, 42–5, 53, 172; donors and 72, 151; in USA 44 foreign aid (Japan) 97, 135; criticism of 100–2; Grassroots Grants Program 104; monitoring 102–3; and sustainable development 120, 121, 136; USAID and 104–5 Forrest, Richard 144, 175 France 5, 6, 7, 19; indicators of modernization 13, 14, 16; legal and fiscal regulation 31–2, 35, 36; membership of NGOs 8, 9, 29; NGO development 30, 149; overseas aid from NGOs 8; political opportunity structure 49–50; state support for NGOs 42, 43, 44, 172; UN affiliated NGOs 4, 5 Friends of the Earth – Japan 120, 134, 137, 143, 144; funding for 124, 137, 138 functional interdependence 166–8 funding see international funding; private foundations; state funding gaiatsu 160 Gates Foundation 63 Germany 6, 7, 8, 19; headquarters of international NGOs in 5, 6; indicators of modernization 13, 14; legal and fiscal regulation 32, 36; membership of NGOs 8, 9, 29; NGO development 30, 53; political opportunity structure 52, 53; state support for NGOs 42, 43, 45, 46, 47; UN affiliated NGOs 4 Global Compact 67, 68 Global Environment Facility 60, 61, 66 Global Fund for Women 63 global governance see international governance Global Issues Initiative 94, 111 Global Urban Partnerships 67 grants to NGOs (see also private foundations) 61, 62–3, 78, 90, 124, 138–9 Grassroots Grants Program 89, 98, 103–4

202 Index Greenpeace – Japan 3, 29, 136 Habitat II 1996 76–7 Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations 78 Hewlett Foundation 63 Holliman, Jonathan 137, 144, 175 Horvath, Andrew 144, 175 humanitarian assistance 50, 58, 90 identity 23, 160, 161–2 IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) 70, 80, 148, 150, 163; and diffusion of ideas 142, 154; and international governance 152; and NGO development 21, 22, 57, 64, 137, 140–2, 154, 166–7 image concerns 97, 100–2, 160; advocacy NGOs 130, 145–6 industry, NGOs and 112–13, 158–9 industry organizations 85 informal associations 37 information technology, and development of NGOs 1, 9–10, 11, 12 Inman, Jerry 144, 175 Institute for Alternative Community Development 120 Inter-Agency Learning Group on Participation 66, 68 Inter-American Foundation 61 interdependence theory 11–12, 166–7 intergovernmental organizations see IGOs International Campaign to Ban Landmines 3 International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development 62 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 78 International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo 1994 74 international conferences 25, 79–80, 81, 157, 158; and growth of advocacy NGOs 137, 140–2, 145 international development and relief NGOs 3, 8, 29, 51, 144, 157–8, 167; elite networks 51, 52; political opportunity structure in USA 51; state funding 46–7, 61, 145, 159; UN and 58 international development NGOs (Japan)

84, 114, 157–8, 159; changing state attitudes to 96; changing state policies and 87–95, 157–8; citizen-initiated groups 85, 87; evolution of 85–7; international norms for socialization 95–107; international political opportunity structure 107–11; and transnational diffusion of ideas 112–14, 158 International Forum on Capacity Building of Southern NGOs 80 International Fund for Agricultural Development 59, 66, 67 international funding 22, 26, 152, 154; environmental advocacy NGOs 136–7, 138–9, 157; and global growth of NGOs 57–63, 81; and international development NGOs 107–9; by private foundations 61, 62–3, 138–9 international governance 1, 56, 63–4, 137, 157, 163, 164; power and 165–6; spread of 26, 152–3, 154 International Labor Organization (ILO) (UN) 65 International Medical Foundation of Japan 171, 173 international NGOs 3, 19–20 international norms (see also pro-NGO norm) 22–3, 24–5, 159; reasons for adoption 23–4; role of conferences 145; for sustainable development 118, 129–35 International Nursing Foundation of Japan 171, 173 international political opportunity structure 20, 21–2, 56–69, 152; and growth of advocacy NGOs 135–42, 145; and growth of international development NGOs 107–11 International Republic Institute 61 International Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 69 International Union for Local Autonomy 110–11 Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements 76–7 Italy 6, 7, 8, 19, 149; headquarters of international NGOs in 5, 6; indicators of modernization 13, 14, 16; legal and fiscal regulation 32, 35, 36; membership of NGOs 8, 9, 29; NGO

Index 203 development 30; political opportunity structure 50; state support for NGOs 42, 43, 44, 47; UN affiliated NGOs 4 JANIC (Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation) 109, 110 Japan (see also Japanese state) 19; foreign aid see foreign aid (Japan); foreign policy 150–1, 156; identity of 161–2; legal and fiscal regulation 32–3, 35, 36–8; modernization in 13, 14, 16 Japan Bank for International Cooperation 49, 88, 95; dialogue with advocacy NGOs 128 Japan Center for Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES) 120, 134, 143; grants to 125, 138 ‘Japan Desks’ 91 Japan Emergency NGOs (JEN) 108, 109 Japan Environment Corporation 88, 90, 106 Japan Federation of Economic Organizations 112–14 Japan Fund for the Global Environment JFGE) 90, 105–6, 117, 123, 160–1; Global Partnership Program 131; support for advocacy NGOs 124–7, 131–2 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 49, 88, 91, 94, 171; environmental advocacy NGOs and 121, 128 Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC) 37, 108, 120, 126–7 Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) 109, 110 Japan Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning 108, 171, 173 Japan Platform 90 Japan Silver Volunteers 173 Japan Socialist Party 49, 122, 129 Japan Tropical Forest Network (JATAN) 120, 140–1, 143, 175; funding for 124, 126, 137, 139 Japanese Indonesia NGO Network 120 Japanese NGOS (see also environmental advocacy NGOs; international development NGOs) 13, 83, 149; access to political institutions 25, 48, 49,88 93; affiliated to UN 4; development of 29, 30, 54, 55, 155–63;

governmental attitude to 84, 96–8, 101–2, 115, 121–2, 129–30; headquarters of international NGOs in 7; human rights 7; membership of 8, 9 Japanese state 132, 156, 159, 168; and advocacy NGOs 116–17, 121–3; changing attitudes to NGOs 84, 96–8, 101–2, 115, 121–2, 129–30; changing policies 159–62; funding for NGOs 42–3, 88–95, 117, 118, 123, 131, 145; and international development NGOs 145; support for NGOs 25, 42–3, 46, 47, 84, 98–100, 102–3, 145, 159, 160–1 JATAN see Japan Tropical Forest Network JFGE see Japan Fund for the Global Environment JICA see Japan International Cooperation Agency Joint Program on HIV/AIDS 60, 61, 67 JVC see Japan International Volunteer Center Karl Renner Institute 62 Keidanren Global Environment Charter 113 Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund 112–14, 158–9 Kellogg Foundation 63 Kuroda Yoichi 143, 175 labor organizations 53, 85 Latin America, human rights movement 79–80 Law to Promote Specific Nonprofit Activities 1998 (Japan) (NPO Law) 36, 37, 38, 92, 116, 162 legal codes 17–18, 19, 35 legal regulation, and NGOs 30–6; grant-making foundations 39–42; and public interest corporation 36–8, 122; reforms 77–8 legal status 36–7, 92, 116, 122, 170 liberal democracies, and NGO growth 30, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50–1, 53, 150, 151, 152 Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 49, 93, 123, 129 lobbying 51, 79, 121, 122 logistical support 109 MacArthur Foundation 63, 137, 138, 139

204 Index Management and Coordination Agency 104, 128 Matsumoto Ikuo 144 Matsumoto Satoru 144 Matsushita Kazuo 131 Médecins Sans Frontières 3 meetings, international 137, 140–1, 157; with state bodies 49, 110–11, 127–8, 132 Mekong Watch 120, 141, 144; grants to 125–6, 139 Ministry of Finance (MOF) 49; influence of international norms 132–5; NGO Quarterly Meetings 94, 111, 127–8, 132–5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 49, 88, 89–90, 94, 145, 158; and advocacy NGOs 121, 122; Grassroots Grants Program 89, 103–4, 105; NGO Quarterly Meetings 49, 94, 110, 127; NGO Subsidies Scheme 89, 98, 99–100, 160; Official Development Assistance 98, 99, 135 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) 88, 90, 107 Miyake Takafumi 171 modernization theory of NGO development 10–11, 13, 16 Mott Foundation 63, 137, 138, 139 Nakasone Yasuhiro 101 nation state 56, 164 National Democratic Institute 61 National Endowment for Democracy 61 National Lotteries Charities Board 47 Nature Conservancy, The 113, 114 neoliberalism 71 Netherlands 6, 8, 19, 29, 149; indicators of modernization 13, 15; legal and fiscal regulation 33, 35, 36; NGO development 30, 53; political opportunity structure 52, 53; state support for NGOs 42, 43, 45, 46 networking 58, 79–80, 109 networks of activism 26, 79–80, 141, 142; elite 51, 5205 ‘New Policy Agenda’ 71 NGO-state dialogues 49, 51, 52, 94–5, 110–11, 117, 121, 127–8 NGO Subsidies Scheme 89, 98, 99–100, 160 NGO support program 88–93, 101–2

NGOs (see also advocacy NGOs; emergence and growth of NGOs; international development and relief NGOs) 3, 147; headquarters of 5, 6, 11; promotion of 163, 165, 166, 168, 169 norm adoption (see also pro-NGO norm) 23–4 Norway, advocacy NGOs 47 NPO Law see Law to Promote Specific Nonprofit Activities 1998 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 158; Development Assistance Committee 49, 98–9, 102–3, 158, 160 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 66, 68 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 98, 99, 135; criticism of 100–2 Ogata Sadako 174 OISCA 171, 173 Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative 111 Olaf Palme International Center 62 openness of political system 18, 19, 64 Oxfam 108, 120 Pacific Asia Resource Center 120, 124–5 Packard Foundation 63 participation 18, 48, 64, 149, 153; mentioned in action plans 73–7; openness and 64; in USA 50 Partnership for Poverty Reduction 60, 61 Peace Winds Japan 108–9 persuasion, and norm adoption 24, 103–5, 160 Pesticide Action Network 143 political change 121–3, 127–9, 162; effect of political globalization 83–4; international norms and socialization 97–107; and NGO growth 87–95 political foundations 61–2 political globalization 20–7, 55–82, 164–6 political institutions (see also United Nations) access to 48–53, 54, 63–4; and advocacy NGOs 122, 123, 127–8and growth of NGOs 18–20, 88–97, 149 political opportunity structure (see also international political opportunity structure) 18–20, 48–53, 93, 149, 150, 152; advocacy NGOs and 117, 121–3, 129; changes in 129–35; in Japan 49,

Index 205 93–5, 117, 121–3, 156, 159, 168; liberal pluralist 50–1 political parties, contact with NGOs 50, 52–3, 129 Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty 60, 61, 67, 68 Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid (POSIVA) 48, 90, 106–7 power, international governance and 165–6 pressure to adopt international norms 97, 98, 100–1, 103, 130, 160, 174 private foundations 53–4, 62–3, 78; Japanese 39–41; regulatory environment 38–42; in USA 41–2, 62, 138–9 pro-NGO norm 24–5, 97,159; and environment 130; in Japan 102, 158; liberal legislation and 77–8; promotion of 70–2, 169 public interest corporations 37–8, 116, 122; incorporation of 36–7, 38, 53 quasi-government foundations 61 religious affiliations 85, 87 Reuter, William 51 Riggs, Peter 144, 175 Rockefeller Brothers Fund 63, 109, 137, 138, 139 Rockefeller Foundation 63 role playing, and norm adoption 24, 160 Saito Tomoyo 143–4 Saotome Mitsuhiro 174 Sarawak Campaign 120 Save the Children 3, 29 social democracy, and NGO development 30, 35, 36, 42, 45, 52–3, 150, 151 social influence, and norm adoption 24, 87, 97, 100–3, 106, 131, 145–6, 160–1 social learning 97, 103–5 social movement theorists 18, 21, 25–6, 56, 156 social sanctioning 102–3 socialization, international norms and 22–3, 24–5, 159; and growth of advocacy NGOs 117, 129, 130–5, 160 socio-economic conditions 1, 10, 87–8 sociological institutionalists 21–2, 64

state (see also Japanese state; NGO-state dialogues) 1; failure of, and rise of NGOs 11, 12; and NGOs 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 166–7, 169; pressure on 22–3; role in activism 2, 17–20, 53 state funding 18, 19, 42–8; in Japan 42–3, 88, 89, 90–3, 117, 118, 123, 131, 145 state lotteries 47 state policies 30; advocacy NGOs and 121–9; influence on NGO sector 17–18; international development NGOs and 87–94; international norms and 95–107, 129–35; and NGO development 149–51, 152, 156 state subsidies 18, 19, 88, 89–93 statism, and NGO development 30, 42, 54, 149,155–6; legal and fiscal regimes 35, 36; political opportunity structure and 48–50; support for NGOs 42, 43–4, 151 Strong, Maurice 106 sustainable development 106, 130; advocacy NGOs and 116, 118–21; international norms and 129–30, 132–3 Sweden 6, 19; foreign aid policy 52; indicators of modernization 13, 15, 16; legal and fiscal regulation 34, 35, 36; membership of NGOs 8, 9; political opportunity structure 52, 53; state support of NGOs 42, 43, 45, 46, 47 Swedish International Development Agency 52 Swedish International Liberal Center 62 Switzerland 6, 7, 19, 149; indicators of modernization 15, 16; legal and fiscal regulation 34, 35; political opportunity structure 52; state support for NGOs 43, 45; UN affiliated NGOs 4, 5 symbiotic relationships 166–8 Takeshita Noboru 106, 131, 160 Tanaka Yukio 143 tax breaks 35, 38, 41, 53, 92, 168 tax deductions 18, 37–8, 40 tax exemption 18, 37 technical expertise 91 Tokyo Conference on African Development 111 Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Response

206 Index Toward Sustainable Development 1989 140 Toyota Foundation 40 trade, levels of, and NGO development 13 training 26, 80, 109 transgovernmentalism 103 transnational diffusion of ideas 21, 25–6, 79–81, 154, 158–9; advocacy NGOs 79, 118, 142–4; international development NGOs 112–14 transportation 12 tropical forest degradation 120 Turner Foundation 63, 138 UNCED see United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNESCO (United Nations Education Science and Culture Organization) 58, 65, 67 UNICEF (United Nations Children Fund) 58, 59, 65, 67 United Kingdom 6, 7, 8, 19, 149; headquarters of international NGOs in 5, 6; indicators of modernization 13, 14, 16; legal and fiscal regulation 34, 35, 36, 39; membership of NGOs 8, 9, 29; state support for NGOs 42, 43, 47; UN affiliated NGOs 4, 5 United Nations 57–61, 70; Charter 64; Department of Public Information 65, 67; funding from 108, 109; General Assembly 66, 68; inclusion of NGOs 64–9, 72; International Drug Control Program 60, 61; Joint Program on HIV/AIDS 60, 61, 67; partnerships with NGOs 72, 73–7 United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) 58, 59, 65, 67 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 59, 69 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 69 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 113, 158; and growth of advocacy NGOs 131, 132, 142; Rio de Janeiro 1992 73, 80, 105, 106, 140 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 1972 140 United Nations Development Fund for Women 69

United Nations Development Program 58, 60, 66, 68, 108; Sustainable Development Networking Program 80 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 4–5, 64, 65, 67 United Nations Education Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) 58, 65, 67 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 66, 67, 69 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 108; and NGOs 58, 59, 65, 67, 68, 78; Partners in Action 65, 109 United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service 66, 67 United Nations Population Fund 58, 59, 66, 67, 69, 108 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 58 United Nations Relief and Works Agency 58 United States of America 6, 7, 8, 19, 30, 149; Congress and NGOs 51; environmental NGOs 118, 119, 120, 122–3, 136; grant-making foundations 39, 40, 41–2, 62, 138–9; indicators of modernization 13, 14, 16; legal and fiscal regulation 34, 35, 36, 38–9; membership of NGOs 8, 9, 29; NGO development 29, 44, 50; political opportunity structures 50–1; state support for NGOs 42, 43, 44, 45, 46; UN affiliated NGOs 4 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 103; Common Agenda 104–5 Vienna Declaration 1993 73–4 volunteering 8, 9 Wallace Global Fund 63, 138 Western states 81, 164, 165–6; NGOS in 147, 148, 149–50, 165 Westminster Foundation 62 World Bank 58, 59, 66, 78, 80; Global Urban Partnerships 67, 68 World Conference on Human Rights 1993 73–4 World Conference on Women, Beijing 1995 75–6

Index 207 World Food Program 58, 59, 65 World Health Organization 65, 67 World Summit for Social Development 1995 74–5 World Trade Organization 66, 68 World Vision 29

World War I, and state-sponsored activism 172 World Wildlife Fund 120, 175 Yearbook of International Organizations 5 YMCA 85