Civil Society and the Internet in Japan (Routledge Contemporary Japan)

Civil Society and the Internet in Japan Civil society has gained prominence lately due to recent changes brought about from issues of globalization and an ageing population, and no more so than in Japan, making the role of Japanese civil society actors crucial in strengthening society against the impact of change. New technologies undoubtedly have the potential to support the work of civil society organizations and increase their efficiency. However, empirical studies on the use of new information and communication technologies (ICT), most notably the Internet, by civil society organizations in Japan are still rare. Civil Society and the Internet in Japan addresses this hitherto neglected area of study, asking how citizen groups utilize the Internet and how significant it is in their effectiveness. Isa Ducke provides an introduction into the theory regarding technological impact on democracy and this is supported with a series of fascinating case studies that take a closer look at the role of the Internet during the history textbook controversy; analyse the strategies of small citizen’s groups; make comparisons between Internet use in Japan, Korea and Germany; and examine how the Internet is used as a platform to discuss the dispatch of Japanese troops in Iraq. Providing original qualitative and quantitative research based on extensive empirical data, Civil Society and the Internet in Japan will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese politics, media and information technology and civil society. Isa Ducke is a Research Fellow at the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo, Japan.

Routledge contemporary Japan series 1 A Japanese Company in Crisis Ideology, strategy, and narrative Fiona Graham 2 Japan’s Foreign Aid Old continuities and new directions Edited by David Arase 3 Japanese Apologies for World War II A rhetorical study Jane W.Yamazaki 4 Linguistic Stereotyping and Minority Groups in Japan Nanette Gottlieb 5 Shinkansen From bullet train to symbol of modern Japan Christopher P.Hood 6 Small Firms and Innovation Policy in Japan Edited by Cornelia Storz 7 Cities, Autonomy and Decentralization in Japan Edited by Carola Hein and Philippe Pelletier 8 The Changing Japanese Family Edited by Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka 9 Adoption in Japan Comparing policies for children in need Peter Hayes and Toshie Habu 10 The Ethics of Aesthetics in Japanese Cinema and Literature Polygraphic desire Nina Cornyetz

11 Institutional and Technological Change in Japan’s Economy Past and present Edited by Janet Hunter and Cornelia Storz 12 Political Reform in Japan Leadership looming large Alisa Gaunder 13 Civil Society and the Internet in Japan Isa Ducke

Civil Society and the Internet in Japan

Isa Ducke

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX 14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 Isa Ducke This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-96431-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-41864-X (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-96431-4 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-41864-5 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-96431-6 (ebk)

Contents

List of illustrations

viii

Acknowledgements

x

Note on the text

xi

Glossary and abbreviations

xii

1 Introduction

1

2 The Internet and new technologies in Japan

15

3 Civil society in Japan

30

4 Use of the Internet by political actors in the Japanese-Korean textbook controversy 5 Website strategies of small citizens’ groups: a quantitative website analysis

40

6 How umbrella organizations in Japan, Korea and Germany use new technologies: a comparative approach 7 The Internet as a platform for political participation and mobilization in the debate about the dispatch of troops to Iraq 8 Conclusion

82

55

117 130

Appendices

135

Notes

150

Bibliography

154

Index

177

Illustrations Figures

2.1

Internet subscriptions by access type

22

2.2

Share of Internet users in Japan, projected from surveys

24

2.3

Mobile phone subscriptions in Japan

25

5.1

H1: Relation between use of the Internet and success of the group

69

5.2

H2a: Success in relation to a user-friendly interface

71

5.3

H2d: Success value of groups in relation to their homepages’ generation of return visits

72

5.4

H2g: Success value of groups in relation to a prompt response given to an online request

73

5.5

H3a: Number of Google hits by homepage ownership

74

5.6

H3c: Feedback depending on the ease with which a group’s homepage can be found

76

5.7

H3d: Visibility depending on the ease with which a group’s homepage can be found

77

5.8

H3e: Success depending on the ease with which a group’s homepage can be found

78

5.9

H4a: Use of the Internet by gender

80

6.1

JD homepage

89

6.2

JT homepage

91

6.3

Peace demonstration, Tokyo, 21 March 2003

94

6.4

JP homepage

95

6.5

GD homepage

97

6.6

GE homepage

99

6.7

GP homepage

101

6.8

KD homepage

103

6.9

KT homepage

105

6.10 KW homepage

106

6.11 Overview over the five levels of Internet use by the nine umbrella organizations

107

6.12 Size of websites

111

6.13 Internet use and length of website history

113

Boxes 1.1

Five qualitative levels of Internet use

13

Tables 2.1

Internet use by age in 2002

23

2.2

Internet penetration rate

28

5.1

Percentage of groups offering certain Internet services

66

6.1

Official Development Assistance in comparison

102

6.2

Overview of groups

108

Acknowledgements I would like to thank all those who contributed to the completion of this book, most importantly the numerous members and activists of citizens’ groups whose Internet use I researched. Many of them were willing to talk to me about their homepages and their use of e-mail and Internet features. Some are listed in the references as interview partners, but many others have also contributed important insights. I am especially grateful for their time because they had other work to do and because this is work they believe in. Many other people also had a share in making this book possible. Numerous researchers have commented on earlier drafts of the chapters in presentations and at conferences. Some of them, like Eun-jeung Lee, Leslie Tkach-Kawasaki, Peichi Chung, Iris Wieczorek and Andreas Moerke, have collaborated with me on similar topics and contributed findings from their own research. Two anonymous reviewers made very useful suggestions, and Stephanie Rogers and Helen Baker of Routledge were helpful throughout. I also want to thank Natascha Thoma for reading and rearranging my drafts and thoughts. I would not have conducted this research without the opportunity of staying in Japan for research at the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in Tokyo. Studying the Internet and politics in Japan in the first place was originally the idea of my former DIJ colleague, Verena Blechinger-Talcott. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

Note on the text Japanese and Korean personal names are quoted with the surname first as is usual in these countries. For Japanese names and terms, the Hepburn transliteration system is used, for Korean the academic form of the ‘Revised Romanization’ system (which allows re-conversion to Hangeul). For convenience, the Republic of Korea, or South Korea, is often referred to only as ‘Korea’, whereas the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is called ‘North Korea’ in the few instances where it appears. I try to avoid excessive use of abbreviations and Japanese terms, but some do appear. They are always explained where they first appear. All can also be found in the glossary.

Glossary and abbreviations Anime

animation film

ANOVA

Analysis of Variance

AHRC

Asian Human Rights Commission

APC

Association for Progressive Communications

Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o

Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform

Tsukurukai Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho

BBS Beheiren

New History Textbook

Bulletin Board System Citizens Union for Peace in Vietnam

Bōgen

offensive remark

Borantia

volunteer

Burakumin

(ethnic Japanese but historically discriminated) minority group

CDMA

Code Division Multiple Access

Chōnaikai

neighbourhood association General Association of Korean Residents in Japan

Chōsōren CNNIC

China Internet Network Information Center

CSO

Civil Society Organization

DAC

Development Assistance Committee

DOS attack

Denial of Service attack

DSL

Digital subscriber line

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GEM

Gender Empowerment Measure

GSM

Global System for Mobile telephones

ICT

Information and Communication Technologies

INGO

International Non-governmental Organization

IWC

International Whaling Commission

JCAFE

Japan Computer Access For Empowerment

Jimintō

Liberal Democratic Party (=LDP)

jūgun ianfu

‘comfort women’

jūmin undō

residents’ movement

JUNET

Japan University Network (digital network, since 1984)

JWRC

Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility

keitai

mobile (phone)

keitai denwa

mobile phone

kisha kurabu/kisha club

press clubs

kōeki hōjin

common good corporation

komyūnitī katsudō

community activities

LDP

Liberal Democratic Party

machizukuri

town planning (by citizens)

matsuri

(traditional) festival

MEXT

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (=Monbu Kagakushō)

Mindan

Korean Residents’ Union in Japan (pro-South Korean)

minikomi

‘miniature communication’ materials self-printed by activists, as opposed to mass media

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)

MOFAT

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (South Korea)

Monbu Kagakushō

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (=MEXT)

nakama hōjin

Friends’ Corporation

NGO

non-governmental organization

NIDA

National Internet Development Agency of Korea

NIMBY

‘not in my backyard’

NPO

non-profit organization

NTT

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

ODA

Official Development Assistance

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PDC

Personal Digital Cellular

PKO

Peace-Keeping Operations

Podcasting

broadcasting of digital audio files via Internet

POEL

Public Offices Election Law

SDF

Self-Defence Forces

shibiru sosaetī

civil society

shimin katsudō dantai

citizen activity organizations

shimin sanka

citizens’ participation

shimin shakai

civil society

shimin undō

citizens’ movement

SMS

Short Messaging Service

Sōmushō

Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications

Tokutei Hieiri Katsudō Sokushinhō

Law to promote specified non-profit activities (NPO Law)

Tsukurukai

Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform

UN

United Nations

UNCED

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

url

Uniform Resource Locators

WCDMA

Wideband Code Division Multiple Access

WIDE

first IP network in Japan, from 1987

zainichi/zainichi chōsenji

resident Koreans in Japan

1 Introduction Civil society needs networks. In fact, networking is what everyone else is doing too, but for civil society actors it is arguably one of the most important activities since they lack many resources that other political actors have. Thus, they have to rely on the power of information and ideas (Keck and Sikkink 1998:17). What could be better suited to such networking than the Internet? It is not only a net in itself but also an affordable tool—in the countries researched here, even for very small organizations and many individuals. This book shows how Japanese civil society actors use the Internet, and asks how useful it is for their work. Does the availability of Internet tools change the way citizens’ groups work? Does it influence their effectiveness, and does it do so differently in Japan compared to other countries? By most accounts an active civil society is regarded as an important factor for the functioning of democracy. This is especially true for direct democratic models, where the communication and deliberation of policies among the citizens is clearly part of the functioning of the system. However, it also holds for representative democracies, where civic communication and deliberation can improve the choice of representatives, and add knowledge, viewpoints and ideas to the representatives’ decisions. Barber’s concept of ‘strong democracy’ (2003) explicitly adds a strong element of public discussions about a broad range of topics to the general—direct or representative—model. Individual citizens and the institutions of civil society can provide both topics and viewpoints and fuel such a discussion, as long as they have access to an arena where their viewpoints can be heard. Indeed, various forms of media have become the most important space where politics take place (Habermas 1962:292; Castells 1996:476). They form a major part of the public sphere where opinions can be voiced and viewpoints exchanged. It is obvious that all forms of democracy, direct as well as representative, can only benefit if as many citizens as possible have access to as large a share of the public sphere as possible. Participation in the public sphere does not affect the legitimacy of making political decisions. In a representative democracy the decision-making power remains with the elected representatives (Habermas 2001). The Internet presents itself as an ideal medium where citizens can communicate and be heard, exchanging and producing resources through networking and discursive learning (see Betsill and Bulkeley 2004:479, 486). Inequalities in Internet access will, at most, replace the existing inequalities in traditional media access, at least in terms of self-expression. By far, most people can indeed receive information via traditional media, at least radio and TV and, to a lesser extent, newspapers and other written media. However, dissemination of one’s own views in traditional media is only possible for a very small minority. Just consider what people are prepared to do to be on TV for a few minutes.

Civil society and the internet in Japan

2

The Internet may still exclude many, but it offers a far broader sphere for public deliberation than traditional media. To civil society organizations, it offers opportunities to amplify their voice with the help of networking to make up for a lack of financial and organizational resources compared to other actors.

Equalization or normalization? A debate is occurring about the validity of the assumption that the Internet is good for both civil society networking and for public debate, and thus for democracy. While some researchers argue that the Internet with its new, informal and horizontal ways of communication provides a better platform for minority groups, and will create a more equal society, others are concerned about negative aspects, such as the digital divide. After an initial euphoria, many researchers now suspect that the Internet does not change political processes, and that a normalization sets in. ‘Imagine if the Internet took hold in China. Imagine how freedom would spread.’ It was not only George W.Bush who appeared optimistic regarding the impact of the Internet (Bush 1999): since Rheingold’s (1993) assertion that the Internet would change politics, some practitioners have reported positive results, and researchers found a positive impact on political participation, especially for certain groups or certain countries—South Korea in particular is regarded as a prime example of an equalizing effect of the Internet (Uhm and Hague 2001:5; JoongAng Ilbo 2003; Lee 2005; see also Margolis and Resnick 2000; Norris 2000; Axford 2001:4; Painter and Wardle 2001). The unquestioningly optimistic accounts have decreased in recent years, however, and most researchers now limit their optimism to specific conditions or conclude that the Internet offers the potential to improve only some things. For example, Åström (2001:5– 7) argues that online deliberation benefits direct and interactive democracy, but offers only little advantage for indirect democracy. Stromer-Galley and Jamieson (2001:175, 187) emphasize the impact on hierarchies in enabling ‘direct contact between leaders and led’, and Morrisett (2003:30) sees the Internet as improving at least the groundwork for informed choices and action with its potential for information and deliberation. Publicity of political activity, as such, has for centuries been regarded as a desirable check on abuse of power, or a test of the validity of arguments, and the Internet should have a positive impact because of its ability to generate more publicity (Setälä and Grönlund 2005, referring to Bentham and Kant). In other studies, the benefit of the Internet is seen as limited, not to certain aspects of democracy but to certain groups for whom the Internet increases opportunities. They can include sexual and ethnic minorities and groups outside the mainstream political system, or groups who operate on a local-government level or use issue-oriented (rather than person-oriented) mobilization (Castells 1997:350, 352; Grönlund 2001:6; McLelland 2003:143). Norris emphasizes the flexibility of some smaller groups that facilitates their successful use of new technologies: those benefit especially ‘smaller, less well-resourced and adaptable challengers with many potential supporters online, like Green parties’ (Norris 2001b:12), or transnational groups like the ‘Campaign to Ban Landmines’. To some extent, these benefits depend on similarities in the group’s member profile and the user profile of the Internet (e.g., affluent and educated) (2001a:21; Norris 2002).

Introduction

3

An additional benefit for small groups is that they often have a clear common identity and interest and thus find internal agreement on their self-presentation easier than large organizations with diverse aims and audiences. Thus, they can profit from the opportunity to reach a broad audience with just one homepage, rather than tailoring their selfpresentation to different media and audiences (Geser 1998). The argument that issue-oriented campaigns benefit more from online activism resembles that made by Keck and Sikkink (1998:27) on the benefit of right/wrong issues for transnational campaigns: in both cases, resource mobilization is a key factor. For example, mobilizing the time and physical presence of supporters is generally easier for clear black-and-white issues, especially those with a ‘villain’, and also for personalized campaigns with an identification figure. Organizing helpers and other resources for abstract, structural issues is far more difficult. Since online campaigns require less resource mobilization—much more can be achieved by fewer people—these latter, issuebased campaigns can benefit relatively more from the opportunities of the Internet (Geser 1998). Most of the optimists who see the Internet as an equalizer still agree that the positive impact they are expecting has been slow to materialize. So far, the Internet may have helped some smaller activist groups, and only those that were already active and mobilized, to ‘punch above their weight’ (Gibson et al. 2004b:198) but, on the whole, the opportunities are judged to be ‘not fully utilised’ (Leggewie and Bieber 2001:45) or ‘under-explored and under-exploited’ (Tsaliki 2003). This viewpoint gradually merges into the ‘normalization’ position: more sceptical researchers think that the old patterns will just be replicated (Gibson et al. 2003). The technology alone will not change the way people act, they argue, and political processes will continue broadly as they did before the advent of the Internet—just as previous technologies like television did not cause major revolutions. Most Internet communication appears direct and unmediated, and this immediacy is regarded as a key factor for the utilization of the Internet’s democratic potential. In fact, however, much of the information available on the Internet is still screened and thus replicates the control patterns of traditional media. Messages sent to the BBS or mailing lists often have to be approved or may be censored. Websites have an editor, and providers have to screen contents for their lawfulness. In the case of unmediated information, which is also available, its amount is often too overwhelming to be useful, and it lacks a legitimizing authority to sort it (Axford 2001:15; Mekata, in Asahi Shinbun 2003e:28). Barber stresses that the point of democratic online interaction is not to eliminate all mediation (Barber 2003:42). The prevailing communication style—mostly one-way and passive—is another area where the expected radical change fails to appear. Researchers note that most people still rely on TV for their political information (Moog and Sluyter-Beltrao 2001:56). Since the Internet is still mostly text-based and not radically different from other media, its impact on political communication is not very high (Åström 2001:19). Most people use the Internet for entertainment and commercial activities rather than for political participation, and the sceptics argue that this will not change greatly, at least in industrialized societies. Margolis and Resnick point out that a political impact of the Internet is more likely in countries where ordinary means of dissent, such as demonstrations, letters to the editor or electoral decisions, are unavailable or stifled (Margolis and Resnick 2000:211).

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Some scholars go even further and suggest that the Internet might not only have little or no impact, but that it could have a negative impact on equal democratic participation, for example by widening already existing participation gaps. The concept of the digital divide (see pp. 9–10) postulates that differences in Internet access and use even increase inequalities, and thus produce an ‘Athenian democracy’ where only an elite group has access to democratic deliberation (Castells 1997:351; Norris 2001b:3). In addition, the tendency to likeminded exchanges in ‘mini-public spheres’ could even reduce discussion and deliberation rather than encourage it. Some researchers have found that these segregations tend to assist the fringes rather than the mainstream, and especially the far right (Åström 2001:5; Dahlgren 2001:76). This argument is not so different from that of the optimists, who argue that the Internet will give smaller groups outside the mainstream a stronger voice—only that most of them envision disadvantaged minorities rather than political extremists as beneficiaries. In this introduction, I will first develop some definitions of key terms used throughout the book and give a short overview of the literature. I will then briefly describe the outline of the book and touch upon some methodological issues.

Definitions Civil society The term ‘civil society’ is often used but rarely defined. Its explicit or implicit meanings vary greatly among different authors—from Tocqueville, who referred to ‘[t]hose associations only which are formed in civil life, without reference to political objects’ (1840) to Habermas, who explicitly mentions the visibility within the political public sphere as a condition (1992:443–4). Gramsci, who is often referred to in relation to this subject, never found a single definition for the term. He juxtaposed civil society with political society but not necessarily with the state (1971). The following are all quite recent and explicit definitions of civil society. They demonstrate the breadth of meanings associated with the term: I define civil society as the medium through which one or many social contracts between individuals, both women and men, and the political and economic centres of power are negotiated and reproduce. (Kaldor 2003:45) Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres. (Habermas 1996:367)

Introduction

5

Civil society is a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, nevertheless, entered freely rather than imposed either by birth or by some awesome ritual. (Gellner 1995:42) Civil society is: [the] arena in which people come together to advance the interests they hold in common, not for profit or political power, but because they care enough about something to take collective action. (Edwards 2001:2) Several authors have attempted to categorize these different concepts for civil society. Mary Kaldor (2003:5–7), for example, distinguishes five different understandings of the term: 1 The understanding as ‘societas civilis’, with a focus on the lawful environment and civility. 2 The bourgeois concept used by Marx and Hegel: the ‘Bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ encompasses everything between family and state, including markets and economic organizations. 3 The activist view, emphasizing active citizenship, self-organization, and the influence of citizens. 4 The neo-liberal position which concentrates on charities and voluntary associations that perform welfare functions for the state. 5 The less universalistic postmodern concept, including, for instance, fundamentalist movements. Of these, the first and last are today least used and are only partially relevant to this study. Other categorizations often distinguish between three types of civil society concepts, often roughly corresponding to Kaldor’s bourgeois, activist and neo-liberal concepts. Edwards (2004) finds three different conceptualizations: first as associational life; second as a good society; and third as a public sphere. On a somewhat different level, Kaviraj (2001:289–306) finds that most concepts of civil society describe it in a dichotomy, be it in contrast to natural society, to the state or to community. A number of factors differ among the various concepts: does civil society describe a state (of civility), a sphere or a body of actors? What exactly is its relation to the nation state? Is it a normative or a descriptive concept? Can activities in the civil society by definition only be for the common good, or can they also promote private or sub-group interests (Fraser 1997; Kaviraj 2001)? Since most concepts of civil society apparently include the different aspects of actors, place and values, it does not make sense to limit the concept to only one of these aspects. Civil society, for most authors, consists of both organizations and the environment that makes them possible, of both social values and a set of institutions (Hall 1995:2). However, the focus varies between different authors. In many concepts of civil society, the focus is on the people who act in it: these are either seen as individuals, or more often as groups. Other views emphasize the way these individuals or groups interact: they share

Civil society and the internet in Japan

6

certain values and follow certain rules and laws, and they act not only for their own profit but for the benefit of all. Again other authors emphasize the environment in which these groups function and communicate with each other and with other actors. In that case, the arena where such a discourse takes place, i.e. the public sphere (or public spheres) (see Fraser 1997), becomes a key feature of civil society. Depending on this emphasis, civil society can be seen as either a part of the state, or as its counterweight. On the one hand, civil society acts within the state in so far as it relies on the rules and laws that guarantee both the civility of exchange and the sphere in which it takes place. On the other hand, the actors making up civil society are distinct from government and state institutions. In particular, the connection between civil society and democracy is a topic of debate. The simple equation that a strong civil society automatically means more democracy (see Baker 2002:2–3) often relies on a simplified concept of direct democracy. Others focus on deliberation and debate by a large public. They should also strengthen indirect democracy as they give more people the opportunity for involvement in issues, and it is more likely that all aspects are considered and all arguments sufficiently tested (Barber 1984; Habermas 2001). There is some consensus in these descriptions, definitions and categorizations of civil society. Most contemporary concepts of civil society define it as different from both the state and economic corporations. Some define the latter aspect explicitly as being ‘nonprofit’, and many are, at least implicitly, normative (see Edwards 2004:37–53). The examples appearing in civil society literature, as well as the expectations for civil society (and its larger role) implicate that civil society is inherently ‘good’. In most cases, this means not only that it is desirable to have a strong civil society, but also that every individual actor in this framework is morally ‘good’. The non-profit status of many civil society actors also suggests that civil society acts for the common good and is therefore altruistic. However, the legal requirements for registering a non-profit organization do not always guarantee that the organization has noble aims, or does indeed serve the benefit of all. Indeed, criticism of non-profit groups is not all that uncommon: Hudock (1999) even claims that international developmental NGOs (INGOS) are ‘not necessarily a contribution to civil society’ even if they do not make profit and act with the best intentions (but the wrong results). One could also argue that citizens’ groups, like all networks, are ‘held together by the perception of individual advantages’ (Koehn and Rosenau 2002:107) and that everyone has some personal advantage even from non-profit, voluntary work. Even leaving subtle questions of egoistic aspects of altruism (regarding emotional satisfaction and fulfilment) aside, substantial advantages of voluntary work include contacts, social benefits, and skills, as well as economic advantages for those who receive generous travel allowances or can work as paid staff in a voluntary organization. For analysis, it does not make much sense to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ movements (Castells 1997:3; Jenkins 2001:267–8). If the concept is normative, not everyone will agree on the moral criteria. An organization that regards itself as beneficial to society and even gets the legal status of a non-profit organization (NPO) based on its views may still be strongly opposed by others. For example, environmental activism is likely to receive the label of moral superiority but, in conflicts with big corporations, some people who would spontaneously support the environmentalists might change their

Introduction

7

minds if the economic consequences (e.g. higher gasoline prices) affect themselves. Conversely, less obviously ‘good’ organizations may fulfil all the criteria for a civil society organization. Promoting patriotic education or the right to smoke on the street could appear as worthy aims for their proponents. Indeed, right-wingers blaring xenophobic paroles from black trucks fit perfectly the activist concept of an active civil society that challenges the state and takes up controversial issues.1 I will therefore avoid normative definitions of civil society. Most of the citizens’ groups (see pp. 8–9) included in this book are typical well-meaning volunteer organizations who either have a formal NPO status or would fulfil the requirements for ‘common good’ activities. Few people would disagree with their aims and methods. There are some groups both on the political left and right included, however, who might not pass uncontested. I regard civil society as the arena in which group actors that are distinct from state institutions and economic corporations participate in the public discourse about political and societal issues. These civil society actors, the constituents of civil society, are freely formed associations and institutions but do not need to have a legal organizational status. They perceive their activities to be for the benefit of all, although they are not necessarily completely altruistic nor welfare related. For example, support groups for certain minorities who campaign not only for the immediate advantage of this particular group but also for equal rights in general, but also groups who promote non-mainstream values (such as the right to eat whale meat) are regarded as civil society organizations. Not all of them are necessarily politically progressive. Citizens’ groups The terms used to describe civil society actors are manifold. Most describe organizations and thus end in ‘O’: NGO (non-governmental organization), NPO (non-profit organization), CSO (civil society organization). The term ‘NGO’ was originally used by the United Nations (UN) for a number of recognized development aid organizations (also termed INGO, ‘International NGO’), but the definition provided by the UN is very broad: A non-governmental organization (NGO) is any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring citizens’ concerns to Governments, monitor policies and encourage political participation at the community level. (UN 2002) Since there are many different means and motivations for not making a formal profit, NPO is a legal term rather than a description of the type of an organization. It is however often used in a slightly different and more normative sense. In Japan, NPO is a relatively new legal status that adds other requirements (such as public benefit and a certain share of voluntary workers) to the non-profit condition. CSO is often used to avoid the implications of the two other terms.

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The preferences for different terms again indicate the normative aspects of the civil society debate: while, for example, many Japanese groups prefer the ‘NPO’ label, with its implications of working for the common good rather than one’s own profit, Korean groups like to emphasize their independence from the government by using the term ‘NGO’. Other descriptions suggest a rather loose organizational form, named movement or network.2 Depending on the membership restrictions, such groups can also be called citizens’ groups, residents’ groups, or community groups, or can include more traditional interest groups. In principle, individuals are also part of civil society, but in this book, only groups are considered. Very occasionally, community groups that are not freely formed but have compulsory membership, e.g. based on ethnicity or religion, are included in concepts of civil society. This is problematic, not least since their claim to the commitment of their members is rather similar to that of the state (Kaviraj 2001:319–20). In the Japanese context, however, such community groups do not play a major role. Citizens’ groups considered in this book may occasionally come from a specific community background but have, as civil society organizations, more general aims (e.g. human rights) and open membership. As mentioned above, no norma-tive selection criteria were employed, and not all of the groups are unmistakably ‘good’ and politically progressive. In some issues, different groups within civil society disagree. It is particularly interesting to compare the Internet use of such opposing groups (see especially Chapter 4). Not all of the groups considered here are formally incorporated as NPOs or similarly recognized organizations. Thus, the term ‘citizens’ group’ is used throughout this book as a general term describing all forms of even loosely organized groups, networks and organizations. A more detailed description of the meanings associated with different terms in Japan (for example, ‘residents’ movement’ or ‘citizens’ participation’) is included in Chapter 3. Digital divide In 1995, a report by the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) titled ‘Falling through the Net: a survey of the “Have Nots” in rural and urban America’ used the term ‘digital divide’ to describe the gap between the ‘Haves’ and the ‘Have Nots’. Since then the term has been widely used both in domestic and international contexts. Domestic divides can run along the usual cleavages of race, education, socio-economic status, gender and age. Many scholarly works, such as Pippa Norris’ book (2001a) Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide concerned primarily the international divide between industrial and developing countries. Most of these studies looked at reasons for differences and at ways to measure them (see Chinn and Fairlie 2003; Dolnicar et al. 2005). Originally, the divide was understood as a binary distinction between access to the Internet and lack of access. Recent works, however, have emphasized the importance of including more subtle differences: a divide exists not only between those who do and do not have access, in some form, to the Internet. In industrialized countries, a majority now have access to the Internet, and even more could afford to have home access if they wished. Public access, e.g. in libraries, is accessible to almost anyone in these countries.

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The binary distinction between access and non-access does not even distinguish between autonomous and public access, access at home or at work, and between new and old equipment, let alone between the skills of the users. In many countries, not using the Internet now depends largely on factors other than the economic means to buy a computer—age, race, location, etc.—and the non-binary differences among users may be even greater than those between users and non-users. As Mossberger et al. (2003) have demonstrated, differences in skills and experience are responsible for the continuing divide—be it the ability to use mouse and keyboard, to read a short text, or to retrieve online information from the Internet or a library catalogue. Apart from the access divide, many researchers now consider a ‘skills divide’ (Mossberger et al. 2003), ‘information divide’ (Oden 2004), ‘social digital divide’ (Norris 2001a:4; Harper 2003) or ‘second-level digital divide’ (Hargittai 2002) that opens primarily between generations (‘Grey digital divide’: Millward 2003) and between the educated and non-educated (Mossberger et al. 2003; see also Schroth 2005). According to the knowledge gap theory developed for other mass media, information most benefits those who are already better informed, and thus the divide, digital and otherwise, will open up further (Bonfadelli 2002:65–67; cf. Hartmann 2005 on non-users). Although the binary, access divide can be almost neglected in Japan and the other countries mentioned here, other factors such as skills and age that are more relevant for non-binary difference will require attention in this research. New technologies. Internet, and the World Wide Web The term ‘information and communication technologies’ (ICT) is applied to a very broad range of media. ICT can be described very generally as a ‘set of goods, applications and services used to produce, store, process, distribute and exchange information’ (Gunawardene 2004:66)—including letters, telephones and photocopiers. Of these technologies, the ‘new ICT’ are normally defined as the digital ones: New ICTs, broadly speaking, constitute forms of digitized information flow, whereby data, be it text, sound or moving real-time images are compressed into a series of zeros and ones and transmitted via airwaves, underground cable and overland networks. (Graham 1998, quoted in Gibson and Ward 2000:10) They include, first and foremost, the Internet, but also other digital media, such as mobile phones, satellite phones and even cable TV, DVD and floppy discs, and their uniqueness lies mostly in the speed and amount of data that can be transferred. In this book, only the Internet is considered, including the World Wide Web as well as individual e-mails and mailing lists. In the Japanese context, the mobile Internet is also relevant—the use of mobile phones for e-mails and web access is therefore an object of this study, but mobile phone use for voice communication is not. An important aspect of the Internet in the context of political uses is its interactivity and its potential to reduce centralized control. I use the term ‘website’ for any collection of files provided under one title on the Internet. They may be stored on different servers and have quite different addresses, but

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all of them are accessible from one ‘homepage’. An alternative term for ‘website’ would be ‘web presence’. ‘Web sphere’ is a term used by some researchers to define a number of websites that are linked for a certain time by an issue or campaign. In most cases it is difficult to establish the boundaries for such a web sphere, but it can be a useful concept to group several websites that are relevant for an issue but otherwise have not much in common (Kluver 2003). In the appendices, I list the address for the homepages of all the groups and organizations studied. Additional addresses of individual web pages within their website are listed in the bibliographic references when I specifically referred to them in the text. E-democracy and e-government In the context of Internet and politics, the terms ‘e-democracy’ and ‘e-government’ are often used. Of these, e-government is usually a top-down programme initiated by the government to improve efficiency. It includes the digitalization of government services as well as the online dissemination of information. The increased availability of information may contribute to democratic participation by citizens, but democracy and participation are not necessarily the objectives of e-government (Gibson et al. 2004a:6–10). By contrast, the term ‘e-democracy’ emphasizes participation. According to Andreas Bauer (2004:3), e-democracy includes all measures that use Internet technologies to offer citizens additional opportunities for participation. These measures can be introduced by the government but also originate from below. While the research presented here only rarely touches upon the subject of egovernment, it is clearly related to the concept of e-democracy. The use of Internet tools by citizens’ groups as discussed here can open new means of political participation for them and thus have an impact on democracy.

Literature on the Internet and civil society Most books and articles debating the political impact of the Internet at least mention civil society, but relatively few of them deal explicitly with civil society and the Internet, as opposed to government and political parties. Authors like Rheingold, Barber, Habermas and Castells have focused on the potential of the Internet for increased information and participation and debated the implications for democracy. Within these systemic considerations, civil society plays an important role. Apart from theoretical works, there is a rather large body of empirical literature available, mostly focusing on political parties and the Internet. Many books on international NGOs touch on the topic of Internet use, but do not cover domestic civil society as they are primarily concerned with development aid (e.g. Hudock 1999; Hirata 2002). Some authors focus on specific issues such as the digital divide, but there is not much to be found yet on interest groups and citizens’ groups (Gibson et al. 2004a:12). While there is some practical literature available for activists wishing to use the Internet successfully—manuals such as Podolsky (2003)—few researchers have explored the actual effect of Internet use on citizens’ groups. Pickerill (2004), for instance, sees benefits for non-hierarchical grassroots groups because they can use the speed of the

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Internet better. Some other recent works (e.g. Meikle 2002; van de Donk et al. 2004) also look at Internet use by political activists mostly in Western and/or English-speaking contexts. Most of these works put their emphasis on political protesters who are not only rather dedicated but also quite ‘tech-savvy’. These activists have a technological knowledge that is out of reach for most citizens’ groups—be it for hacking or podcasting. Most case studies also look at groups that are far more confrontational than the overwhelming majority even of politically active citizens’ groups. The literature on Japan reflects the lack of scientific research on the political use of new technologies. Empirical studies are relatively rare compared to theoretical works and hands-on manuals, and even fewer scholars have surveyed the use of the Internet by citizens’ groups. A number of works on civil society in Japan and on the Internet in Japan will be introduced in Chapters 2 and 3.

Outline of the book In this book I follow the issue of Internet use by civil society groups in Japan using different research frameworks and adjusting the methodology along the way. After providing background information about the Internet in Japan and about civil society in Japan in Chapters 2 and 3, I present four separate empirical research projects in Chapters 4 to 7. They cover the ‘textbook affair’ in 2001, a broad research of many very small citizens’ groups, an analysis of umbrella organizations, and the evolution of the peace movement after 2003. Some of the key questions and hypotheses that run through the book are informed by the theoretical discussion described above. They concern the equalization/normalization theory, the digital divide, but also a description of the status quo. The major questions to start with are as follows: How do citizens’ groups in Japan use the Internet? Which features do they use most, and why? Are those who use the Internet ‘more’, or who use certain features of the Internet, more likely to be successful than other groups? Do they use the Internet as an extension of previous communication tools (newsletters etc.), or do they also use the specific dialogic features inherent in the Internet? If they do, does it help them in networking with likeminded groups? Is the situation in Japan similar to that in other countries? If not, what are the differences, and how can they be explained? Which factors influence the use of the Internet and the effect it has: for example, infrastructure, group size, issue area, controversiality or immediacy of the issue, etc? I have chosen a subject-driven approach rather than a methodology-driven one. While the latter would offer the security of one guiding framework, the subjectdriven approach allows me to use mixed methodologies and select those in each part of the study that are suited best for exploring the guiding questions. The results of each chapter are used as a starting point for the next one. Cases from previous chapters are often integrated into the next framework, but looked at from a different angle, and transnational comparisons, especially with Korea, are frequently embedded. Sticking to one methodology would not only reduce the flexibility in exploring different aspects of Internet use by citizens in Japan, but it would also require a sufficient amount of data that do fit into the framework but might dilute the focus of the book. This study contributes to future methodological research, however, by providing such data on Japan’s Internet and civil society that are

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not easy to obtain for people who are not Japan specialists, especially because of language barriers. The most obvious starting point for a study on the Internet and civil society is a single case study (see Hubert 1998:45), trying to trace the use of the Internet by the involved parties (Chapter 4). I selected the ‘history textbook controversy’ in 2001 as a case study with a clear and relatively measurable outcome that allowed me to develop hypotheses about the effects of Internet use. In the next chapter, by contrast, I used a far larger set of cases and fewer variables. This more quantitative approach allowed me to visualize the data and to make some tentative statements on the validity of the hypotheses. The results demonstrated the relevance of some of the explanatory variables, while indicating that others (e.g. how quick a website loads) were not worth further exploration. Only the reduction of variables achieved in this way allowed me to follow up with a comparative study with several cases in Japan, Korea and Germany in order to include the technological and socio-cultural environment (Chapter 6 on Internet use by umbrella organizations), and finally a longitudinal study of the peace movement with comparative aspects to examine whether the conditions observed in short-term issues remain steady over time (Chapter 7). Both are fruitful approaches for identifying relevant variables and generalizing the findings (see Hubert 1998:45–6).

Some methodological issues Measurement of Internet use and success Measuring Internet use depends to some extent on the object of observation: when looking at individuals, the use (and extent of use) of some simple features is usually more relevant than the details of website design. For organizations, these factors are also important, but website analysis takes up a larger part because this is where the differences between different organizations lie. In addition, the scale and type of a study dictates which measurements are possible, as some measurements require users’ self-reports, experimental settings and test design, or access to log files. On the user side, some researchers have developed scales based on experiments and self-reports to measure Internet skills (Hargittai 2002, 2005) or ‘information fluency’ (Bunz 2001). For website analysis, Taylor et al. (2001:266) have suggested a framework of five levels to describe the interactivity of websites: from the ease of interface of a website to its dialogic loop functions. These five categories can be adapted to generate indices describing the Internet use on each level. Box 1.1 gives an overview of the modified five levels as used in this book. Measuring the success of the citizens’ groups is quite difficult. Success means something different for each group, and causal relationships involve too many factors for an objective or even metric measurement for success. At least there are some indicators. Forsythe lists five different areas where a judgement about success is feasible: bringing an item on the agenda, bringing about serious discussion, achieving procedural change, achieving substantial change—and obstruction efforts by powerful opponents, especially governments (Forsythe 2000:14, 177). A somewhat similar effort is that of Putnam et al.

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(1993) in compiling factors to count the ‘civicness’ of a community. He considers, among others, the number of associations, election turnout and the level of newspaper reading in a certain geographic area. In this book, I add self-reported success, feedback and satisfaction with achievements to the areas listed by Forsythe. Together, these various success areas allow for a judgement, if not a measurement, of success.

• Ease of Interface • Search function • Sitemap • Navigation bar • Usefulness of Information • Group information: group size, group structure • Registration • Topics • Common identity: aims, logo, endorsement

• Conservation of Visitors • Links separate • Speed • Update info • Generation of Return Visits • Comeback appeal • Links • Chat • Newsletter • News • Calendar • Dialogic loop • Comment form • BBS • Other interactive features • Prompt response Box 1.1 Five qualitative levels of Internet use (based on Taylor et al. 2001). In researching Internet activism, it may seem appropriate to consider only the online world: online activities, online links and online visibility. However, as the results show, and some observers have noted before, it doesn’t make much sense to separate the virtual from the real world. Online activism’s greatest strength lies in its ability to make offline

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activism more feasible, and to support those who are already involved: ‘The Internet provides a powerful tool of communication for those who seek to become involved in peace movements, but has little capacity to reach out beyond these limits, or to preach to the un-converted’ (Morris-Suzuki 2002). A study of Internet activism or Internet use by civil society actors can therefore not limit itself completely to the virtual world. Offline events and their interaction with online activities always have to be considered. Online polls Online polls seem to offer themselves as a means for measuring support and success, but this poses several problems. First, they are not a frequently used feature in the Japanese Internet, and especially not by citizens’ groups. I do refer to them occasionally, however, especially in comparisons with South Korea, where they are very popular. The main caveat is that they are not representative and thus clearly flawed as an indicator for public opinion. They can be hijacked by dedicated groups, or even technically manipulated. A good example is the election of the Korean team as the most interesting team in the FIFA World Cup 2002: the overwhelming majority of votes in this international poll came from Korea (fifaworldcup.com 2002). Although most voting programmes try to limit manipulation by restricting double voting from the same account or computer, these restrictions can be sidestepped with programmes installed on computers in Internet cafés. On the other hand, such efforts to influence the outcome of online opinion polls and thus the visibility of a certain viewpoint are also an expression of activism. Even if the FIFA poll does not prove whether most viewers indeed liked the Korean team best, it is a proof of online activism in Korea. Apart from technical manipulation, this can also be achieved by mobilizing others to vote in such polls (or again, to manipulate them). Both the mobilization or manipulation and the failure to do so tell us how the groups involved in the issue at hand use the Internet and how much importance they attach to Internet activities.

2 The Internet and new technologies in Japan Introduction This chapter gives an overview of the use of new technologies in Japan in the years between 2000 and 2005, including its main features, with some background regarding the developments in the 1990s. The use of new technologies and the status of their permeation were constantly changing over this period as these technologies developed. As in many countries, expectations for the democratic potential of new technologies are high in Japan: the possibilities for a new spread of knowledge are sometimes likened to the invention of moveable print (Aiba 2004). With a large technology industry and a whole town quarter (Akihabara in Tokyo) dedicated to selling newly-developed high-tech gadgets to test their market strength, Japan can be expected to be at the forefront of the digital revolution. Indeed, in some areas of new technologies, Japan is among the most advanced nations. Mobile phones, which were first marketed to youngsters rather than to business people, became ubiquitous accessories in Japan when most people in western countries still found them unnecessary. Rather than just being telephones, they soon became e-mail stations, web browsers, game consoles and digital cameras. Like the technology itself, academic research on the use and impact of Internet-compatible mobile phones is well developed (Ikeda 2003; Miyata 2003; Miyata et al. 2005). On the other hand, the speed with which several new technologies spread has differed greatly between the different types: the particularities of the Japanese writing system have given non-text aspects of new technologies a far greater chance of spreading fast. The boom of Japanese animation films (anime) and the importance placed on the multimedia industry testify to this (see Bell and McNeill 1999). The Japanese language employs a complicated, mixed writing system consisting of three different sets of characters. Two of them are syllable alphabets, but most of the important words are written in the non-alphabetic Chinese ideographs that do not lend themselves easily to keyboard input. It is not surprising, then, that fax machines spread vociferously and are still an important fixture in most households, and that digital word processors were greeted as a salvation from the incon venience of typewriters (Tanikawa 2003). For a number of reasons, the Internet itself took longer to take off. In a political context, the Internet has primarily been used as a one-way tool to spread information, be it in town information sites for citizens or in Prime Minister Koizumi’s weekly newsletter launched in May 2001. The latter became widely known, reaching over two million subscribers at one point. By December 2001, a majority of Japanese had heard about the newsletter.3 This marked a revolution in terms of public attention given

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to such political online tools—most people had never heard of concepts such as e-government or electronic voting, but the newsletter was widely discussed in the media (NTT Data Corporation 2001:11; Koizumi 2005). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) introduced its first homepage in 1995, then mostly to make information about Japan and its policies available abroad. It introduced a site geared to (Japanese) mobile phones only ten years later (MOFA 2005b; see also MOFA 1995). Other government-sponsored sites, such as the 2001 Internet promotion homepage ‘Inpaku’ or the tourist information site for visitors to the FIFA World Cup 2002 failed to meet even the most basic expectations (Inpaku 2001; JNTO 2002). More successful experiments often took place on a local scale. The commuter town Yamato, one of the first municipalities to use new technologies for communication with its (often absent) citizens, also became one of the forerunners in experimenting with dialogic online tools (namely BBS and an Internet based community currency) (Jain 2002:252; see also Yamato City 2003). Apart from mobile phone and e-mail use, recreational use of the Internet is not highly developed, although by 2003 a majority of Internet users (about 68 per cent) did access the Internet from personal computers at home (Sōmushō 2004a). Participation in webbased newsgroups and bulletin boards is still not very active compared to e-mail-based communications such as mailing lists and (personal) newsletters. Sites such as emaga.com offer free newsletter services for individuals who prefer to publish their diaries or thoughts on shopping in regular e-mails rather than on a website, not least, presumably, because they expect their readers to have e-mail access rather than web access. In addition, bulletin boards and online chatrooms do not necessarily have a good image: ‘Many people fear that the discussion there is overly emotional and vulgar’, commented a Japanese expert (Yokoe 2003). This is perhaps one of the reasons why many organizations and informal groups who do use direct e-mail and closed mailing lists for their internal communication eschew such open fora. PC-based online games, although increasingly gaining in popularity, are far less successful in Japan than in South Korea (Kobayashi 2004). With the increase in broadband access on the one hand and more resources for mobile Internet use on the other, the situation may quickly change, but Coates and Holroyd (2003:129) comment dryly that the Japanese Internet ‘leans heavily toward the electronic pamphlet approach’. Since the Japanese situation of Internet use and other new technology tools—mainly mobile phones—is different from many other countries, a short note on the Japanese infrastructure and the meaning of terms used will be useful. The most important difference between Japan and western countries is the prevalence of mobile phones (keitai denwa, or just keitai). The standards used by Japanese mobile phone providers are mostly PDC (Personal Digital Cellular), CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) and WCDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access). While they are incompatible with each other and with the predominant standard elsewhere, GSM (Global System for Mobile telephones), Japanese phones also have higher technical standards and more advanced features than those used in other countries. Instead of text messaging services (SMS) such as Japan Telecom’s skymail, which was introduced in 1997, Japanese providers soon offered e-mail services. One reason for this was that the encoding of Japanese script takes up more space and the maximum number of 128 letters allowed for short messages thus shrank by half. By 1999, several Japanese providers

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started to offer web-compatible mobile phones, allowing not only the sending of e-mails but also the accessing of websites (Miyata et al. 2005; Vodaphone 2005). At first, the number of websites that could be read was limited because the sites had to be specifically designed to fit the small display size. For easy access to these sites, the providers offered a portal site with a limited number of categories and subcategories, such as news/weather, banking, traffic, shopping, gourmet, melody, game, horoscope, sports, mail, etc. They even published catalogues listing all the official sites available and the price of services (NTT Docomo 2001). However, websites could soon also be accessed via search engines or by sending a link from a personal computer to one’s mobile e-mail account. Those sites that could not be registered as ‘official sites’ (either because the backlog for applications was too long or because they did not fulfil the provider’s standards) were thus accessible to users, and the number of special websites with reduced design soared. Soon, sites offering mobile homepage design for individual users appeared and were widely used (Funk 2001:29–30; Miyata et al. 2005). Newer keitai then started to use browsers such as jig or Opera that could satisfactorily display a normal website for PCs on a mobile phone screen by changing the layout or zooming. Statistics on Internet subscriptions (see pp. 22–7) give the number of keitai users subscribed to Internet services, but do not differentiate whether that means web access or just the use of e-mail. In fact, many people who could, with their phone and contract, access the web via their mobile phone do not do so. Many use the system only for e-mail, others use a limited range of services offered by their provider, such as downloading a new ring tone. A new trend of ‘simple’ keitai suggests that many people may not even have used the e-mail ability of their phones. These keitai, which are mainly marketed towards elderly users, have only a few large buttons, no display or e-mail function, and are sold without a manual (Tu-ka 2004). Internet access via PC, on the other hand, was long dominated by dial-up connections. This was due to the regulatory system that gave NTT, the former national telephone service, a monopoly over telephone lines and prevented the quick spread of digital subscriber line (DSL) services. Only a shift in government policy towards active promotion of Internet use from about 2000 made a strong increase in the number of broadband connections possible (Coates and Holroyd 2003:41–67). Literature on the Internet in Japan There is of course a large body of literature in Japanese that deals with the Internet in general and its use in Japan, ranging from technical manuals to white papers for the media sector and a variety of publications offering practical, and sometimes quite specialized, advice: on opening an online shop, for example, or finding online information on popular Korean stars (Shufu no tomo 2005), as well as useful applications of the Internet for citizens’ groups or aspiring politicians (Matsushita 2000; Yoshida 2003). A good overview of the development of the Japanese Internet, including Internet access via keitai, is available in Coates’ and Holroyd’s (2003) book, Japan and the Internet Revolution. Although it focuses on economic aspects of the Internet, and its broader coverage tends to be a bit overenthusiastic and at times superficial, the book describes the history of Internet introduction in Japan as well as regulatory issues, the

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road to the keitai revolution and the situation of e-commerce in great detail. For the latter, for example, the spread of keitai-based Internet use was extremely important because it facilitates charging even for small amounts in a society wary of credit cards (Coates and Holroyd 2003:75–6). A number of researchers have looked into specific areas of Internet use in Japan, such as the ways new religions or minority groups use the Internet (McLelland 2003; Kienle and Staemmler 2003). Other authors consider the impact of the Internet on education and different age groups (Kumagai 2001) or on publishing and academic debate, for example in the case of history disputes regarding contested issues like the so-called comfort women or official visits to Yasukuni Jinja (Morris-Suzuki and Rimmer 2002; see also Morris-Suzuki and Rimmer 1998). A few academic books and articles in Japanese and other languages deal specifically with the political use of the Internet, and these, although increasing in number, tend to focus on the government side and the various e-government and e-democracy initiatives. Some researchers do also include citizen participation, often in connection with local governments’ e-initiatives (e.g. Iwasaki 2004). In English, Jain (2002) introduced the new ‘e-Japan’ initiative started by the national government in 2001 and went on to study the implementation of e-government in prefectures and municipalities. He found that the provision of at least a minimal homepage by national and sub-national governments greatly increased between 1998 and 2000. The number of national government homepages rose from 338 in 1996 to 1,215 in 2000. By 2000, 83.6 per cent of cities and 61.1 per cent of villages had a homepage. However, a self-evaluation by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (Sōmushō) in 2001 found that most of the municipalities offered only top-down information for most service areas, if at all: on a scale from 0 (no homepage) to 4 (fully serviced including real-time correspondence and rich services), the average score was below 0.5 for the areas of living, health, welfare and business, and only 0.54 for community services and 0.84 for education and culture. Interestingly, the quality of services in a number of municipalities considered in greater detail did not depend much on the wealth of a town or its location in very urban areas; rather, the adoption of Internet services appeared to be a matter of political will or resistance in the municipal government and bureaucracy (Jain 2002:245, 252–3). Tkach-Kawasaki (2003, 2004) has written several articles describing the use of the Internet for campaigning by political parties and candidates. One of the most specific articles about the Internet and civil society in Japan is the chapter by Laurie Freeman (2003) in Pharr and Krauss’ book, The State of Civil Society in Japan. She argues that the lack of diversity in the traditional mass media—exemplified by the cartelization of journalists in kisha clubs (press clubs) where only loyal members get access to information—offers a particularly powerful incentive for grassroots activists to use the Internet for their purposes. Indeed, computer networks were used very early for grassroots activism. Freeman follows the development of online protest activities from 1985 onwards, when the use of telephone lines for data transfer first became possible in the wake of the denationalization of NTT. She also covers the links the Internet offers for non-profit organizations to gain access to government information. Both Tkach-Kawasaki and Freeman also discuss the difficulties that the established legal framework poses for

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the use of Internet tools in political campaigns because the old laws were formulated with a completely different situation in mind. Japanese statistics are available on the website of the Sōmushō, where the exact address of the newest results shifts occasionally (http://www.soumu.go.jp/). Most are subscription data, but occasionally Somusho also publishes survey results. Other useful sources for finding statistics on Internet use in Japan and other countries are the abovementioned CIA World Fact Book and Nielsen/Net Ratings. The latter offer their own calculations that can differ greatly from government statistics, but only for select countries. Development of the Internet in Japan The Internet was relatively slow to take off in Japan despite Japan being one of the technological frontrunners. In fact, this may have been one of the reasons for the ensuing difficulties because the standards developed in Japan were not compatible with the Internet as it developed in the USA. Japan’s computerization started in the 1970s. It was mostly a top-down effort with much government support, and since then a variety of different standards and systems for information and communication technology were tested. In the 1980s, the government started a number of massive research initiatives meant to promote the development of new technologies and to increase technological opportunities for all. The ‘technopolis’ initiative drew together governments, business and academia in an effort to improve technological capacities in different areas of Japan (Coates and Holroyd 2003:42–3). A large-scale trial by NTT in some Tokyo suburbs in the 1980s offered participating households the opportunity to use technologies such as fax, videophone and videotext. Of these, only the fax evoked genuine enthusiasm among users and went on to become a household standard (Morris-Suzuki and Rimmer 2002). Word processors, which appeared in the 1980s, presented another breakthrough. Their most important feature was not the digitalization of data and the fact that they could be stored and later on transmitted—instead it was the basic typewriter function. Until then, most individuals and small companies used handwritten documents because typewriters and printing machines for Japanese characters were very large and complicated. Word processors had a keyboard with Latin characters for the input in Latin transliteration,4 and offered (more or less) plausible sentences in Japanese characters.5 This system, although still improving, is the same one that today’s computer programs use. Many people (and businesses) therefore saw no need to switch to a personal computer in the 1990s, and this in turn hampered the spread of the Internet. In addition, the keyboard input of Japanese text is still relatively inconvenient compared to other languages because it requires the mental transfer into Latin character transliteration, and the writer has to confirm and occasionally correct each sentence offered by the machine. Statistics indicate that 85 per cent of Japanese adults can write Japanese faster with a pen than on a keyboard (Horn 2002; Sight and Sound 2002a, b; see also Nakayama Shigeru, quoted in Coates and Holroyd 2003:46). This contributes to the continuing popularity of the fax and reduces the attractiveness of Internet use—at least as a text-based exchange medium. The first Japanese digital networks (JUNET and WIDE) appeared in the 1980s, and by the early 1990s the Internet became more widely known. The Japanese government in

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1990 announced the creation of a nationwide broadband system by 2015 (Morris-Suzuki and Rimmer 2002) and went on to promote e-government in 1997 and a ‘Japanese Information Technology (IT) society’ in a famous speech made in 2000 by Prime Minister Mori, who himself was not familiar with the technologies he was advertising and had never used the Internet (Coates and Holroyd 2003:51). This time, however, the top-down approach to the spread of technology did not work well, as most of the potential users had already settled down comfortably in the technology previously available. For most purposes, the combination of fax and quite elaborate word processors was sufficient throughout the 1990s. Even data transfer between word processors was possible, so that most people felt no need to switch to a personal computer, and thereby add Internet access as an option. Morris-Suzuki and Rimmer (2002) argue that, in addition, teenagers in Japan were less exposed to new technologies than in other countries. Since the curriculum in secondary schools is dictated by the preparation for university entrance exams, Informatics played a minor role, and most schools were slow to promote Internet access. Government initiatives Apart from the general promotion of technological development, the first government framework for IT policies was initiated under the Obuchi government in 1998, leading up to the first ‘Basic IT law’ in 2000 and a more concrete ‘e-Japan’ plan in 2002 (Mainichi Shinbun 2001; Jain 2002). In 2000, the Japanese government also concluded international agreements with neighbouring countries such as South Korea and China, regarding cooperation and exchange in the area of new technologies (MOFA 2001b). As Internet security and issues such as intellectual property rights became global issues, these were followed by further international agreements and initiatives in the following years. They included, for instance, the promotion of the ‘Asia Broadband Programme’, an ambitious project started in 2002 aiming to provide broadband access everywhere in Asia by 2010, and a joint statement on ICT cooperation with the European Union in 2004 (Sōmushō 2003c, d; MOFA 2004d). These government regulations mostly still concerned the development of a modern IT infrastructure and the necessary legislation regarding taxes, privacy, libel, etc. Online transactions were also integrated into new information disclosure guidelines and rules for (limited) public participation opportunities in decision-making processes (public comment etc.) (Freeman 2003:249; Saibansho 2003). Some government initiatives also started to explore using new technologies for political purposes. Electronic voting, for example, was first tested in June 2002 in a mayoral election in Niimi, Okayama. However, the relevant legislation for this, enacted in February 2002, did not allow an online connection between the voting machines and the counting centre (Asahi Shinbun 2002e:19; see also Japan Today 2002). On the whole, however, the government tended to obstruct the political use of new technologies rather than encouraging it. This becomes obvious in the official interpretation of the Public Offices Election Law (POEL). The law, originally enacted in 1925 and reshaped in 1950 and 1964, places heavy restrictions on media use in election campaigns. While it allows a certain number of postcards, posters and a loudspeaker truck for each candidate, door-to-door canvassing and a range of public speeches are

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forbidden during the campaign period. The intention was to prevent unfair advantage of candidates able to spend more on their publicity, but, applied to online campaigning, the law is interpreted as prohibiting the use of websites, even existing ones, for election campaigns. It is primarily the candidates of smaller and opposition parties who have protested against this interpretation, while the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been opposed to online campaigning. Some candidates struggle to utilize the potential nonetheless, either by posting just a blank website with a voice message, disabling all links on their site, or by leaving the previous information online but abstaining from updates (Freeman 2003; Tkach-Kawasaki 2003, 2004). Users and subscriptions The number of Internet users in Japan has steadily increased since the 1990s and throughout the first years of the twenty-first century. The statistics can be divided into subscriber statistics and user statistics based on surveys. The former list all access points, including keitai, home and office PCs, dial-up and broadband connections without considering multiple users, the latter can only estimate the total numbers by extrapolation. The cumulated number of subscriptions (see Figure 2.1) passed 100 million in 2004— but of course that does not mean that 100 million (in a population of 127 million) use the Internet, let alone the World Wide Web. Both dial-up and broadband PC connections are likely to be used for web access, but Internet subscriptions via keitai include the use for e-mail access alone. For estimating the spread of home Internet access, it often makes sense to calculate subscriptions per household (assuming that every person living in a household with Internet access has the opportunity to use it), but this works best for desktop computers and perhaps Internet access via other appliances such as TV. Even laptops are not necessarily shared, and keitai almost never. Since relatively few people only access the Internet, including the web, via their keitai, the high subscription figures for mobile Internet are not very relevant for the actual penetration of web access. Data for Internet access rates in Japan are therefore usually based on surveys and can differ greatly depending on the method used. There are unfortunately few representative and comparable surveys that cover IT use in Japan, and the data are usually much older than the subscriber statistics by the time they are released. The Japan part of the World Internet Survey is the most comprehensive project dealing with Internet use in Japan. It consists of several larger surveys that are joined together as a long-term panel study and linked in a comparative study with corresponding surveys in several other countries.

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Figure 2.1 Internet subscriptions by access type (source: Sōmushō 2001a, 2002, 2003a, h, 2004b, 2005). Note Sudden jumps in the figures are due to shifts in the categories (e.g. from ‘dialup access’ to ‘Internet connection contracts’) and re-arrangement of indices. These surveys also show the high increases in Internet and mobile Internet use visible in the subscriber statistics, but the answers confirm some newer findings in the digital divide debate. They reveal that many people do not use the Internet access that is theoretically available to them: in the 2000 survey, nearly half of the keitai users who could theoretically access e-mail did not use this function, and 17.9 per cent answered that they owned a computer but did not use it (Kubota et al. 2002). While the first survey put the actual Internet use rate for 2000 to 33.1 per cent, this rate increased to 43.3 per cent in 2001 and 49.6 per cent in 2002 (Kubota et al. 2002:9, 2003: table 2.2.1). These figures include all kinds of Internet and e-mail use at home and at work, as well as using computers or keitai. In 2001, 27.1 per cent of all respondents used their keitai to access the Internet, and 18.3 per cent actually used it to access websites (rather than e-mail) (Kubota et al. 2002). In another survey in Tokyo in July 2002, 30.5 per cent of respondents said that they accessed the Internet by desktop computer, and a further 11.3

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per cent by both computer and keitai. Just 6.9 per cent only ever accessed the Internet via keitai (Nakano kuhō 2002a). These survey results show a very significant age gap: while well over 70 per cent of young Japanese are Internet users, only about 10 per cent of those over 60 use the Internet, and to a far less extent (see Table 2.1). A slight gender gap is gradually closing: in 2002, 52 per cent of men and 43.5 per cent of women used the Internet. Other differences, such as by profession and educational background, are visible but less pronounced than in other countries, where heavy Internet users are typically male, middle class, urban, well-educated and in professional employment—and between 24 and 40 years old (Gibson and Ward 2000:15). By contrast, the highest user rate by education in Japan is found among those currently attending school (83.5 per cent). It is telling that 65.8 per cent of this group access the Internet by mobile phone, slightly more than do so via PC (62.0 per cent). Internet access by keitai (although often limited to e-mail) is higher than PC access among young people, women and people with low income, and thus increases the total user rate among this group (Kubota et al. 2004: chapter 2).

Table 2.1 Internet use by age in 2002 Age Average time per week (min) User rate (%) 12–19 526.45 20–29 416.97 30–39 315.34 40–49 164.18 50–59 76.10 60–74 27.00 Source: Kubota et al. 2003: Chapter 2.

73.90 74.30 64.80 52.80 32.10 10.70

Other regular surveys include those conducted by the responsible ministry, Sōmushō, which apparently asked respondents whether they had used the Internet at least once during the past year with any tool, including keitai and game consoles, and the commercial panel surveys conducted weekly by Nielsen/Net Ratings. The latter survey the ‘active Internet universe’ and ask for Internet access during the past week (Nielsen/Net Ratings 2002, 2004; Mikami 2005). Additional figures can be found in various sources, although it is not always clear how they are calculated or whether the surveys they are based on are representative. One summary apparently based on Sōmushō figures noted that almost half of the Internet users in 2003 used broadband to access the Internet (Asahi Shinbun 2002a:23), while other sources placed Internet access rates for 2002 at 43.6 per cent (Asahi Shinbun 2003d:3) or at ‘about half of Japanese’ (IHT 2002b). Figure 2.2 shows some different survey-based estimates for Internet access rates in Japan. Similarly, the figures given for the penetration rate of broadband access vary greatly depending on the sources. For 2002 and 2003, broadband connections are put at between four and eight million, or up to ‘a quarter of all household Internet connections’ (IHT 2002b; Belson 2003; Clark 2003). Undisputed is that the share of broadband connections is increasing. Although the speed of different broadband connections varies, they do make the Internet and particularly the World Wide Web more accessible. As the usual

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amount of data on each site increases, dial-up connections become even slower and more expensive. The most outstanding feature of the Japanese Internet landscape is the high penetration rate of mobile Internet. The expansion of the keitai itself peaked

Figure 2.2 Share of Internet users in Japan, projected from surveys (source: Nielsen/Net Ratings 2001–4; Sōmushō 2004a). between 1994 and 1998, when the number of keitai subscriptions rose more than tenfold from about two million to over 30 million (see Figure 2.3). Around this time, text messaging and e-mail were introduced, followed by websites. Marketed towards younger users who already had a keitai mostly for personal communication, Internet-compatible keitai spread quickly. In February 2002, Japan had 50 million mobile Internet users (Kobayashi 2003). By 2004, 64 per cent of all Japanese, and 98 per cent of people in their twenties ‘normally’ used a keitai; one-third of them could not even think of life without it. For young people between 20 and 24, keitai is the medium of communication that they would least want to do without, more so than TV and CDs or talks with family and friends (NHK Bunken 2004). These figures indicate a generation gap that applies to mobile Internet use as well (and, to a lesser extent, to Internet use in general). Young people have Internet-compatible keitai almost as a matter of fact. This includes most teenagers: a survey of boys aged 16 to 20 found that 96.5 per cent of them had a keitai, and that they spent as much as average adult users on the bill. Seniors, on the other hand, use them less, and more often against their own preference.6 Many would apparently prefer a phone without Internet functions (Asahi Shinbun 2004f:15; 2005a; see also Tu-ka 2004).

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The surveys indicate numerous other differences in the use of Internet, keitai and mobile Internet. Not only do they clearly show the existence of several digital divides in binary terms (user/nonuser) alone: people in less-populated areas, for example, use the Internet less than average. The way and intensity in which new media are used also differs greatly (Asahi Shinbun 2004d). Among keitai users, e-mail communication has a greater importance than voice communication for the youngest age groups, and for women. The time spent on sending and receiving e-mails on mobile phones surpassed that spent on voice communication in 2002, while web access took the least time (InfoCom Research

Figure 2.3 Mobile phone subscriptions in Japan (source: Sōmushō 2001b, 2003b, 2005). 2002b). Yet, in a survey in 2004, around 60 per cent of all keitai users employed it primarily for voice communication, compared to 40 per cent of mobile Internet users in a different survey in 2001. Although the surveys may have different designs, which makes them difficult to compare, these results suggest that there is no sweeping trend towards Internet use in the actual use of Internet compatible keitai (Mikami 2001; Asahi Shinbun 2004f:1, 15). For many commuters who spend hour-long train rides sending and reading e-mails this may be the best available option for creating a sense of privacy in a crowded space, given that talking on the phone is not considered appropriate. The comparison of subscriber statistics and user surveys demonstrate that the total number of subscriptions to certain types of Internet access do not easily translate into figures about the actual Internet use of the population. Reading such statistics is further complicated by the fact that some people use different types of Internet access (at home and at work, keitai, online game consoles) while others do not use an Internet connection that is available to them in their household.

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Purposes of Internet use Since subscription figures cannot reveal the extent to which the technologies are actually used, let alone the type of information or communication for which they are used, polls are very important resources. Surveys also offer some insights into the extent to which users access the Internet via different devices and what they actually use it for. In one survey in 2002, the greatest fear of Internet users, much more relevant than concerns about viruses or fraud, was about personal information being misused (Nakano kuhō 2002a). Still, security concerns did not prevent many people from using the Internet. In the Sōmushō poll in late 2002, which indicated a user rate of 54 per cent, the reason most often cited by non-users for not going online was that they felt no need (Asahi Shinbun 2003c:3). This also became the most frequent answer in the World Internet Project survey in 2002, overtaking the ‘do not know how to use’ category (Kubota et al. 2002:19). Much of this defensiveness and vague uncertainty probably still stems from the same lack of knowledge and technical skills—it is only becoming more embarrassing to answer that ‘I don’t know how to use it’. The most popular activities for people who use the Internet are e-mail (77.2 per cent) and accessing specific information on homepages (82.5 per cent), while e-commerce and financial transactions (booking flights and hotels, 26.7 per cent) are less popular, and chatting (14.6 per cent), creating own homepages (7.5 per cent) and using telephone services (3.5 per cent) are rare (Nakano kuhō 2002a). The more detailed questionnaires of the World Internet Survey Project also asked for the types of websites accessed by those who use the web. While the analysis of these surveys takes longer to become available than purely quantitative access data, the results offer useful insights even when they are somewhat outdated. The most popular categories were search, weather, transportation and music, followed by news and fortune-telling. For keitai access, the most popular usage (at 63.2 per cent of mobile Internet users) has consistently been the downloading of ring tones and melodies (Kubota et al. 2002:72), and it probably continues to be the main activity of many mobile Internet users. By contrast, according to a survey in 2005 by Sōmushō, 3.35 million people operated blogs in Japan, and 16.51 million visited blogs at least once per month (Japan Today 2005c). Compared to Sōmushō’s 2003 estimates for the total number of Internet users, this would amount to up to a sizeable 4 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, for blog writers and readers.7 E-commerce has so far played only a minor role. Commercial transactions via computer are hampered by the widespread aversion to using credit cards online. Since purchases via mobile Internet can be paid with the telephone bill, this restriction does not apply. Yet, in a (non-representative) survey in 2002, only 13 per cent of mobile Internet users had purchased tickets or goods via mobile Internet, and only 18 per cent found e-commerce a very important application for mobile Internet (InfoCom Research 2002a). In quantitative terms, even less relevant is the political use of the Internet. Even the high number of subscribers to Prime Minister Koizumi’s famous weekly newsletter, which peaked at over two million and remained above one million about four years after its introduction, does not prove that all subscribers are ardent readers of the newsletter (Koizumi 2005). Once subscribed, it may be more bothersome to unsubscribe than to delete one more message per week. The numbers of e-mails actually sent to government

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agencies give a slightly better indication of the online participation: in May 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs counted up to 1,000 messages per week, mostly regarding the dismissal of a popular foreign minister. In August of the same year, the Prime Minister’s Office (Kantei) received about 2,000 e-mails in one day commenting on Koizumi’s controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. However, these figures can be misleading, since identical chain mails often make up a large part of these messages. Although they do express concern by the sender, they will be less impressive than the same number of individually formulated messages. The same goes for web access and similar statistics: even if a local government’s online community currency is used over 40,000 times, this may still be due to the same few dozen regular users who are required to use it for certain transactions. Similarly, 58 million web accesses to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 2001 do not prove that nearly every other Japanese has accessed the site. The figure only gains meaning in comparison—compared to just ten million hits counted in January of that year, September 2001 was clearly a busy month (Hamao and Fukasawa 2001; Yomiuri Shinbun 2001:2; Akiyama and Watanabe 2003).

Internet use in Japan in a comparative perspective Since by far most research on new technologies is done regarding the USA, and to a lesser extent western European countries (especially the English-speaking and Scandinavian countries), they offer the most accessible data for comparison. Comparative studies consistently find that not only Internet penetration in terms of absolute access opportunities, but also the actual use of the Internet and relevant skills are far higher in the USA than in Japan. This becomes particularly obvious in the higher number of seniors who use the Internet actively in the USA (SeniorNet and JRI 2000, 2002), but the gap is not limited to seniors and unlikely to close with the demographic development. Compared to Europe, however, the Japanese figures do not trail behind so far: a threecountry study in 1996 found the Internet use in Germany to be even less developed in Japan—at a time when mobile Internet did not exist yet to tilt the statistics in favour of a nominally high Internet access in Japan (Batinic et al. 1997). Newer figures given in the CIA World Fact Book place Japan’s Internet penetration rate slightly behind Germany, while the ‘active user’ estimates from Nielsen Net Ratings’ panel studies indicate a larger gap (see Table 2.2). The difference between the two statistics suggests that more people in Japan do not use the Internet actively and regularly, although they do have access. The ready availability of various survey data on the US and Europe means that other Asian countries are often forgotten. South Korea, as Japan’s closest neighbour and traditionally a step behind in development, makes a particulary interesting comparison. Due to a very active IT promotion policy, Korean Internet use began to explode in the second half of the 1990s. Since then, South Korea has become one of the most advanced Internet nations. Official statistics quote a 72 per cent household Internet access rate for December 2004 and claim that 70.2 per cent of all persons over six years of age use the Internet at least once per week. The broadband rate soared from 2001, when half of all Internet households had either a DSL or cable connection—by 2004 only 4 per cent of household Internet connections were by (dial-up) modem. As a result, the average time

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spent online per week is 48 hours (Korea Informatization Promotion Committee 2003; NIDA 2004). Comparisons between Japanese and Korean uses of new media can also include the use of mobile phones, since both countries use the same standards. In contrast to the numerical gap in PC Internet access rates between both countries, the differences in mobile phone use are more in style: Koreans apparently use their mobile phones less to access websites, but more for e-commerce (InfoCom Research 2002a). Both use their mobile phones extensively for e-mails and messaging, to send pictures and access e-mailbased services. During the 2002 FIFA World Cup, when citizen exchange programmes between the two organizing countries were en vogue, Internet sites and translation services via mobile phone were used to connect Japanese and Korean fans (Asahi Shinbun 2002c:7, 2002d: 12). Of course, the Internet is also frequently used for protest activities between the two countries and also in controversies between Japan and China. While the Internet penetration rate in China is naturally much lower (about 8 per cent, CNNIC 2005), Chinese Internet users are said to visit more sites abroad and to use the Internet more for political activities. The government’s efforts to restrict access to foreign sites and limit the spread of dissident views cannot prevent political uses completely (Buruma 2001:112–21; Japan Today 2005b; see also The CASS Internet Report 2000).

Table. 2.2 Internet penetration rate. Calculated from estimated number of users in different sources Japan (%) Germany (%) United States (%) CIA World Fact Book (2002/3) Nielsen/Net Ratings (8/2005; Japan: 11/2004) Sources: CIA 2005; Nielsen/Net Ratings 2005

44.9 28.8

47.3 39.6

53.8 47.5

The comparison with China and South Korea also reveals that both countries have a specialized government agency dealing with Internet policies and research. The China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC: http://www.cnnic.cn/) in China and the National Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA: http://www.nida.or.kr/) in South Korea provide easy access to Internet statistics both in their national language and in English.

Internet use by civil society actors Considering that the introduction of the Internet in the official and economic areas was slow, and private use of new media is still biased towards limited or non-text applications (mobile Internet, games), it is not surprising that new technologies are not one of the most dominant features in civil society. However, Internet and online tools are used, as the examples in this book will demonstrate. The use of new technologies within civil society ranges from a simple means of communication for associations and clubs whose members are spread too far to meet in person, or who find meeting difficult due to age and illnesses (Asahi Shinbun 2002c:

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7; McLelland 2003), to more elaborate applications of Internet tools for translation, protest and mobilization (Hamao and Fukasawa 2001; Asahi Shinbun 2002d:12; Onosaka 2003). Publications and support groups have appeared to help civil society organizations use the Internet to their benefit. The focus of such publications at first was firmly on the passive use of the Internet: they explained what the Internet is and how to find information previously difficult to obtain for small citizens’ groups, and then went on to list useful sites (e.g. Yasuda 1997; Matsushita 2000; Iguchi et al. 2001). Some recent manuals and informative books for citizens’ groups do include advice on the active use of websites and networking tools (e.g. Nonoshita et al. 1997; Hamada and Onoda 2003; Kawaguchi et al. 2005:90). Technical support organizations often do have an activist agenda. Some, such as the APC (Association for Progressive Communications) affiliated support network JCAFE (Japan Computer Access For Empowerment),8 are modelled on international support organizations. They connect similar groups, sometimes internationally, and help groups to make the most of their limited resources. The Japanese support groups, while less developed than English-language organizations and self-help networks, provide hosting services and technical training. They also offer information about cheap domain names, software discounts or free offers for citizens’ groups, which the volunteers who find themselves webmasters in civil society organizations often lack (Asahi Shinbun 2002f:22; Horvath 2003; see also TechSoup 2005; Yahoo Groups 2005).

Summary In Japan, the Internet developed slower than in western countries for various reasons, but usage rates have greatly increased in recent years. In 2005, Japan’s Internet usage was similar to that in many European countries. The main difference is the prevalence of mobile Internet in Japan. The wide availability of this relatively cheap technology on the one hand, and its limitations on the other hand, affect the quality and quantity of Internet use. The literature on the Japanese Internet is sparse; while numerous manuals on Internet use are available, few comprehensive surveys and empirical studies exist. As in many other countries, the political use of the Internet, and Internet use by civil society actors, fails to tap its undisputed potential.

3 Civil society in Japan Introduction ‘Civil society’ has become a buzz-phrase in Japan, dating back to the late 1990s. Depending on their definition of civil society, observers disagree on whether the sudden popularity of the term testifies to the enormous growth of civil society, or whether it hides the fact that civil society is so weak that it has only recently become noticed at all. The number of organizations and participants engaged in civil society activities in a wider (neo-liberal) sense has certainly exploded: ever more people have tried some sort of volunteering work or community participation. Amidst political disengagement expressed in declining party support and voter turnout, some observers hope that other forms of participation represent a political reengagement of disenchanted citizens. This would indeed be the case if the participation considered is political, at least in the widest sense, and if it comprises a rather large and relevant share of the population. This chapter will provide the background of that popular keyword ‘civil society’ and its meaning in Japan.

Literature on civil society in Japan Japan saw an explosion in the number of books published in Japanese about topics such as civil society, volunteerism, and NPOs after a new law was passed in 1998 that specified such an organizational status; now nearly every corner bookshop stocks some books on NPOs. In 2005, Amazon Japan listed nearly 500 books in the category ‘NGOs and NPOs’ alone. The majority of these books are manuals for activists and prospective volunteers: they explain the meaning of the terms ‘NPO’ and ‘volunteer’ and suggest initial steps for individuals who want to volunteer somewhere. Some offer advice for those already involved on the benefits (or disadvantages) of registering their organization as NPOs and on the relevant steps for doing so. Others give tips on NPO management, cooperation with companies or public relations issues. Numerous ‘voluntary action centres’ and support organizations offer a similar practical service and even more information booklets as well as collections of newsletters and leaflets from various groups. They may list appropriate organizations conveniently by geographic area or time slots for which they need volunteers (TVAC 2002). Some of the Japanese organizations offering information on NGOs and volunteering also have limited English-language materials, often on their homepages (e.g. JANIC 2002). Most academic books and articles on civil society are limited to a certain issue, such as the environmental movement or welfare activities. Usually they give an overview over

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the specific topic as well as a history of the relevant social movement and its key actors. Such texts offer a lot of insight into Japan’s civil society, its mechanisms and trends (e.g. Hase 2001; Sasaki 2005). Relatively few of them, however, discuss the position of civil society, and its social and political relevance in general. In fact, some general works explain civil society in western countries and mention Japan only for comparison (Hatsutani 2001; Satō 2002). As late as 1999, Vosse judged that grass-roots organizations, and particularly those that advocated citizen influence on policy decisions, were typically ignored in Japanese studies on civil society (Vosse 1999:35). Those who do examine social and political aspects of civil society in Japan tend to introduce their efforts with an explanation of why volunteer movements and NPOs are an appropriate subject for social scientists in the first place. Mifune (2005), for example, traces statistical relationships between voluntary engagement and political participation. This distinction itself is based on the presupposition that voluntary engagement is not political and reflects the dominance of the welfare sector in the volunteering field. Based on his results, Mifune argues that voluntary participation has gradually shifted from a strong emphasis on the social participation aspect towards other aspects of political participation and influence on decision-making processes. Therefore, social science has only recently started to cover voluntary activities, as opposed to traditional citizen participation ( shimin sanka), e.g. in the local administration. Hasegawa (2003) draws similar conclusions from his analysis of the environmental movement: he distinguishes between residents’ and citizens’ movements ( jūmin undō and shimin undō, respectively). Most environmental movements originally were jumin undō, immediate local protests by the affected residents. The residents’ movements are often NIMBY-type (‘not in my backyard’) protests and may also be labelled ‘antipollution movement’, ‘victims’ movement’, or ‘human rights movement’. Participants come from a wide social background but a limited locality. With changing environmental challenges, the protest movements developed into broader and more general shimin undō. These new movements were less about confrontation and more about political responsibility. Their outlook has shifted to cooperation and efforts to change the values and the system underlying the problem (Hasegawa 2003:35–46). This highlights the potential for environmental movements, including voluntary activities, to become a ‘counter power’ (Hasegawa 2003:209). The most comprehensive source in English that covers all aspects of civil society in Japan is the edited volume by Schwartz and Pharr (2003), The State of Civil Society in Japan. Apart from a detailed discussion of the history and background of civil society in Japan and the specifics of terminology, the book includes several articles on different thematic areas of voluntary activities and on relationships between the different actors. Terminology is an important consideration for the research of Japan’s civil society in western languages, since the meaning of many Japanese terms is not necessarily the same as the corresponding English term. Seifert (1999) discusses the overlap between the different Japanese, English and German terms as expressions for associational life or new social tendencies. Abroad evaluation of Japan’s civil society can be found in Vosse (1999), who also stresses the importance of terminology. He emphasizes that Japanese terms often have different associations from their western counterparts, and questions the appropriateness

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of describing the Japanese situation in western terms without reflection on their meaning. In particular, he notes that the Japanese concept of civil society often focuses on internationally active NGOs and organized philanthropy, but ignores advocacy movements (Vosse 1999:35; see also Vosse 2003). Indeed, developmental NGOs are also the topic of many texts in English on Japan’s civil society (e.g. Hirata 2002; Reimann 2003; Tsujinaka 2003). The relationship between the Internet and civil society is only very rarely a topic of discussion in either Japanese or English studies. One article that deals with this topic is the chapter by Freeman (2003) in Schwartz and Pharr’s volume.

Definitions Civil society in Japan is associated with a wide range of more or less related concepts. The term itself is usually translated as shimin shakai ( society of citizens), but sometimes a transliteration of the English term is used: shibiru sosaetī Seifert compares these two terms with the German differentiation between the older term Bürgerliche Gesellschaft, and Zivilgesellschaft or Bürgergesellschaft as an expression of new tendencies and autonomous citizens’ movements. He notes, however, that the more common term, shimin shakai, is used in both meanings, and in both a positive and a negative sense. Depending on the context, shimin shakai can mean a modern, developed society of free individuals, or a bourgeois society with a large middle class (Seifert 1999:21). It is therefore difficult to rely on this term for statements about civil society in Japan. As Vosse notes, the notion of civil society for most Japanese is […] dominated by concepts such as volunteer and volunteer movement, NPO (Nonprofit Organization) or perhaps the nonprofit sector, and sometimes includes a general notion of citizens’ movements. Notions of civil society that stress its independence from state power, as well as more political notions particularly in relation to domestic politics as imagined by Gramsci, are hardly ever mentioned in daily conversation, the media, or in academic research concerned with the emergence of civil society in Japan. (Vosse 1999:34) Other key concepts are similarly difficult to define. In Japanese, some English abbreviations, such as NGO, NPO, and CSO, and English loan words such as borantia (volunteer) have the broadest meaning, compared to Japanese terms. Since most Japanese are not familiar with the original English terms, they have lost much of their original meaning in the process of incorporation into the Japanese language. Borantia although a highly important concept in most discussions about civil society, still requires an explanation in most contexts. Volunteer support centres and coordination programmes thus offer their own definitions. They will often

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refer to Christian traditions and mention ‘doing good’, welfare and social work as important aspects of volunteering. The voluntary aspect, however, is not always mentioned and apparently not part of the general understanding of the term. In 2002, plans were even made to introduce ‘volunteering’ as a mandatory school subject, although this concept, or at least the name, were later given up (IHT 2002a). Other official sources use the term borantia to describe local community activities with strong aspects of self-interest. Judging from the results of a survey on disaster preparedness and willingness to volunteer, for example, the observed ‘volunteer’ spirit emerged mainly under the condition that one’s own family or business was affected (Gekkan Seron Chōsa 2003a). In Japan, as in other countries, the abbreviation NGO (non-governmental organization), originally a term used by the UN for certain development organizations, has come to be used both for internationally active organizations in the development field and for a much broader range of civic organizations. Its main use, however, is still for organizations dealing with ‘issues on a global scale’, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines it (MOFA 2001a). NPO (non-profit organization), on the other hand, denotes primarily domestic organizations, usually those concerned with welfare issues. The term became ubiquitous with the introduction of the NPO law (Law to promote specified nonprofit activities: Tokutei Hieiri Katsudō Sokushinhō ) in 1998. It allowed relatively small groups to incorporate with far fewer requirements than previously. Since then, the term can either mean an organization that has been registered as an NPO under the new law, or in a broader sense any organization not working for profit. Many large non-profit organizations—in the second meaning—never registered for NPO status because they already had a formally different status such as foundation or ). Although the use of the term NPO is common good corporation (kōeki hōjin interwoven with that of civil society (as shimin shakai or shibiru sosaetī); at least in its narrow meaning, it lacks any reference to the public sphere and to autonomy from, or counterbalance to, the state (Vosse 1999; Schwartz 2003b). A similar range of meaning is expressed by the mixed Japanese and English expression komyūnitī katsudō ( community activities). This covers mostly local associational life, such as matsuri (festivals), school activities, caring for public flower beds and recycling activities. Komyūnitī katsudō is often used in the same context as NPO and volunteer (e.g. Iwasaki 2004). By contrast, shimin sanka ( citizens’ participation) denotes political participation in honorary offices in the local self-administration. While this is by no means regarded as a counterbalance to state or bureaucracy, shimin sanka emphasizes the power of citizens; compared to volunteer activities, trust in the government’s decisions is lower (Mifune 2005). Political activities that are critical of the government are called shimin undō or jūmin undō. Of these, jūmin undō denotes a more specific, local type of protest, often against local environmental pollution and similar NIMBY issues. Shimin undō usually has a broader outlook with topics such as peace or nuclear reactors. Its supporters are from a geographically wider area, but often a narrower social background

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with a larger share of highly educated participants. Hasegawa argues that both types of movements have become more cooperative in the last decades as they found it increasingly difficult to single out one ‘enemy’ against whom to protest (Hasegawa 2003). The common notion of ‘civil society’ includes cooperation with state agencies and especially support for welfare or communal projects. Independence from the state (and economic corporations), critical debate, or even confrontation, are rarely considered as features of civil society. Instead, even political activities such as peace demonstrations are presented as associational events without any confrontational aspects (‘peace parade’) in order to fit this image of civil society (Vosse 2003). Ironically, a critical debate with the state, as could be expected in a civil society contributing to democratic deliberation, can almost only be found on the fringes of society—including extremists whom many observers would not regard as beneficial for democracy. In this book, civil society is interpreted in a more activist way than in most Japanese works, with an emphasis on the public sphere in which independent associations engage in political exchange and activities (see Chapter 1).

History of civil society in Japan Civil society, even in its non-confrontational sense of ‘non-profit sector’, arguably has a much shorter history in Japan than it has in western countries. At the least, it had been rather weak until the mid-1990s when its importance increased. The reasons given for the late arrival of civil society in Japan include religion and belief systems as well as the traditional societal order. Some argue that good deeds were less required to attract new believers as Japanese religions are less missionary than Christianity. In addition, the Confucian tradition may have added to this as Japanese have traditionally relied more on the state for welfare, and on close-knit groups for self-help (JANIC 2002). This system of local self-help is still visible in jūmin undō and chōnaikai ( neighbourhood associations). In spite of such obstacles for the formation of a civil society, civic awareness in Japan was quite high in the 1950s to 1970s and not limited to specific, localized issues. In fact, more people than in other countries believed that political activities (such as demonstrations, petitions or signature campaigns) could have an impact (Vosse 1999: 38–41). Political demonstrations were frequent, well attended and rather violent, especially compared to today’s rare and rather tame ‘parades’. The peace and environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s would correspond much closer than many of today’s NPOs to the activist definition of civil society (including critical public debate). Remainders of such activist movements used the Internet as soon as it became possible in the 1980s (Freeman 2003:245–6). The number of demonstrations and similar narrowly political activities has declined drastically throughout the 1980s and 1990s. They were replaced by welfare and volunteer activities and a more cooperative mood (Hasegawa 2003:41; see also Hase 2001). The share of people participating in demonstrations dropped steadily from 4 per cent in 1973 to below 1 per cent in the 1990s, and other political activities like petitions also experienced further decline in the 1990s (Nakatani 2005:95).

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Compared to such visible manifestations of (activist) civil society, the non-profit sector (broadly corresponding to the neo-liberal interpretation of civil society) is rather large because it includes a large share of the educational system as well as numerous health and social service institutions. Much of these are quite professional, and smaller or even critical citizens’ groups do not play a large role in the non-profit sector (Vosse 1999). An ever-growing number of volunteers add to the workforce of this sector. The volunteering trend started in the 1980s, but the 1990s are generally regarded as the watershed for the volunteering movement: ranks were swelled by middle-aged workers made redundant in the restructuring along with housewives whose children were grown, looking for a new mission. At the same time, the first Japanese UN peace-keeping missions (in Cambodia in 1992–3, in Mozambique 1993–5) popularized humanitarian assistance and thus also the idea of voluntary work in developmental organizations. These activities could combine the purely humanitarian aspect of helping those in need with political activism regarding developmental policies. Indeed, the wave of popular interest in development aid and volunteering in general strengthened the developmental NGOs and has also gradually improved their position in relations with the government. Government agencies have started to recognize their work and to include them to some extent in decision-making processes. Nonetheless, activists complain that these cooperation policies are implemented very selectively, only when it suits the government, and that the focus of developmental aid (and volunteering) is on rather apolitical activities (MOFA 2002; Takahashi 2005). Undoubtedly the most important trigger for the Japanese volunteer boom of the 1990s was the Hanshin earthquake in 1995, when neither the authorities nor large social service providers were flexible enough to react appropriately. Bureaucratic hurdles prevented even some of the larger ‘common good’ non-profit organizations (kōeki hōjin) from emergency help because domestic relief was formally not part of their activities (Schwartz 2003a:14–16). Neighbourhood self-help and small, decentralized volunteer groups thus were crucial to providing help. The introduction of the NPO status for organizations in 1998 helped to increase the number of non-profit and volunteer organizations even further. Although a formal recognition of ‘corporations for the common good’ had existed for 100 years before that, the approval process required was long and complicated. Before 1998, civil society organizations could only register under a number of ‘common good’ labels (such as social welfare corporation or medical corporation) if they not only made no profit, but also worked for the benefit of everyone—that excluded, for example, organizations working for the benefit of women (as a limited group). They also had to fulfil a number of other criteria, especially in terms of endowment and budget size. The alternative for non-profit groups was registration as a nakama hōjin or Friends’ Corporation, which offered very few practical benefits, or to stay in the grey area of nonincorporated ‘citizen activity organizations’ (shimin katsudō dantai ) (Schwartz 2003a: 10–1; Asahi Shinbun 2004b). By contrast, far fewer conditions have to be met for registration as an NPO. The process is relatively quick and, in most cases, only a formality, so that even industry associations like the Japan Hair Color Association can register as an NPO if they fulfil certain criteria (JHCA 2005).9

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Activities associated with volunteering include first and foremost welfare and health, followed by other mostly apolitical activities such as recycling, collecting rubbish, removing parked bicycles from crowded pavements, etc. (TVAC 2002). The motivation for many of these activities is probably often more a sense of belonging than the urge to fulfil a moral or societal duty. Articles about the joys of volunteering emphasize that hito no tame) is just as much about ‘doing ‘doing something for others’ ( something for yourself’ ( jibun no tame) (Yahoo Japan 2004). Civil society has come to be associated with these non-profit, volunteer activities rather than with political activism (Vosse 1999:34). In this neo-liberal interpretation, civil society has certainly experienced a boom. The sheer numbers of organizations and participants in such activities, as indicated in the statistics below (pp. 38–40), testify to this. Other aspects associated with civil society, especially the more political movements, have arguably not developed at the same pace. It is not unusual for civil society initiatives to find that participants lack an understanding of the social motivation or the community idea that informed the project and just took part because it seemed fashionable (Saga 2003). In particular, the awareness of civil rights or human rights as an area worthy of citizens’ activities appears low. In a representative survey in 2003, only 36 per cent of respondents believed that the constitution guaranteed them freedom of opinion—in contrast to 42 per cent who thought that paying taxes was their constitutional right (NHK Bunken 2004:90). The concept of human rights itself is interpreted rather broadly as the right to a pleasant life, and applied mostly to majority groups: a local government publication, for instance, lists as groups to be considered in the context of human rights first ‘women, children, and elderly’, while ‘Burakumin, foreigners, and people with HIV’ close the list. Concepts like freedom of speech are not even mentioned (Nakano kuhō 2002b:1).

Statistics Every effort to grasp the size of the Japanese civil society in numbers leads first to the number of organizations, and thus usually to the statistics for registered NPOs and similar organizations. Since the introduction of this category in 1998, it has grown quickly, not least because information on the registration process is easy to come by in books and support centres, as described above (pp. 32–3). The number of NPOs had passed 10,000 less than five years after the introduction of the category, and by 2005 was nearing 25,000 (Cabinet Office 2005b). To these, numerous organizations already registered under different labels must be added. The number of registered common-good corporations (kōeki hōjin) alone had reached its peak at 26,380 in 1998 and only decreased slightly after that to 25,825 in 2003 (Cabinet Office 2004)—changing their status to NPO did not make much sense for them because kōeki hōjin pay lower taxes than registered NPOs (Asahi Shinbun 2004b). Thousands of registered social welfare, educational, religious and similar corporations could be added to the number of organizations in the non-profit sector. In addition, many more small groups which do not have such a legal status are still informally registered as shimin katsudō dantai (citizen activity organizations) with their local administration. They include many local groups such as seniors’ clubs and

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children’s playgroups. A survey in 1996 found 85,786 such unregistered organizations in Japan. By 2003 the total number of registered NPOs and unregistered groups was estimated at about 90,000 (Asahi Shinbun 2003b; Schwartz 2003a:12; see also Vosse 2003). This estimated ratio of only about 10 per cent registered groups appears reasonable. It also applies, for example, in the limited area of developmental organizations: of about 250 Japanese developmental NGOs, 90 per cent do not have legal status, according to a network organization in the sector (JANIC 2002). The vast majority of the citizens’ groups, be they registered or not, are active in the health and welfare sector. Statistics concerning registered NPOs show that well over 50 per cent name health as one of their main fields of activity. The fields of social education, machizukuri (town planning) and children are included in over 40 per cent of the groups (Cabinet Office 2005a). The economic relevance of civil society groups depends on the type of groups included: while some statistics put the domestic production of non-profit groups at less than 0.1 per cent of GDP, other figures estimate up to 3.2 per cent. The latter apparently includes all registered ‘common good’ corporations in the welfare and education sector, while the former number counts only those groups registered as NPOs or as citizen activity organizations, which are much smaller in scale, although they account for the majority of all groups (Asahi Shinbun 2002b: 3; Salamon and Anheier 1996:92–3). The reach of these various groups is considerable, however. For example, the total number of members or supporters of the registered ‘common good corporations’ kōeki hōjin alone nears 40 million (Japan Today 2003a), although many of these may not actually be actively engaged members of a civil society organization, but rather consumers of a welfare or educational service. The number of volunteers registered at municipal volunteer centres amounted to about five million as early as 1995 (Vosse 1999). In surveys, an increasing share of the respondents profess to have experience of, or at least interest in, volunteer work: one representative survey found that 28.9 per cent of those over ten years of age had participated in some sort of volunteer work in the year between October 2001 and September 2002 (Japan Today 2003a); another survey in December 2001 found that about 30 per cent of respondents had never participated in local politics but were interested in doing so (NTT Data Corporation 2001:4). In a survey in 2005 that asked respondents if they had ever participated in volunteer activities, 44.7 per cent affirmed, compared to only 30.1 per cent 12 years earlier (Gekkan Seron Chōsa 2005b:55–8). On the other hand, only 5 to 6 per cent named volunteering and community activities as a regular way of spending their free time in a similar survey in 2003, far behind such activities as ‘hobbies’, ‘doing nothing’, or ‘going for a drive’ (Gekkan Seron Chōsa 2005a:8–11). The older generations spend more time during the week on such activities, while at weekends those in their forties and fifties claim to be most actively engaged (Gekkan Seron Chōsa 2005a:8–11).10 Unsurprisingly, older respondents are more likely to be interested in health and welfare, but also environment and machizukuri, while younger respondents find education and economic issues more important (Asahi Shinbun 2005c).

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Within the apparently growing interest in volunteering and participation in community events, distinguishing between non-profit-sector volunteering, regular inclusion of citizens in local government processes, and the participation in civil society activities can be difficult. Often, volunteer activities are grouped with other community events and/or participation in local self-administration. In a poll in 2001 in which more than 50 per cent answered that they had taken part in such community activities, the most frequent activities included sports festivals and local festivals, but also included environmental volunteer activities such as collecting rubbish or supporting recycling projects (Iwasaki 2004:38). Over 20 per cent had also taken responsibilities such as local assembly posts, but there was no marked category for other clearly political activities (Iwasaki 2004:38). This indicates that citizens’ participation within local government (shimin sanka) does not reach the scale of uncontroversial feel-good group activities that make up most of volunteering, but far surpasses critical citizens’ movements and debate (shimin undō) that is expressed in petitions and demonstrations. If civil society is understood as a public sphere in which independent, freely formed associations engage in public discourse about political and societal issues, Japanese civil society is still weak in spite of the recent boom of NPOs and volunteerism. The Internet has the potential to provide an alternative public sphere that is much needed for the growth of this type of civil society (Freeman 2003:256).

Civil society and the Internet The Internet, in spite of being so ubiquitous, has not really taken root in Japan’s civil society yet. It is mostly the large, professional non-profit organizations in the welfare and education sector that have introduced new technologies relatively early and on a large scale for automatization and procedural improvements. Usually, however, their use of the Internet is by no means innovative but, rather, con-forms to established professional standards. Most of the smaller groups, and those more engaged in public debate of political issues, tended to be slower to take up new technologies. There are also examples of small groups successfully utilizing the networking functions of new media to further their cause. A domestic environmental group, for example, found itself in the role of coordinator for an Asian citizens’ groups’ support network when it started to use the Internet actively to connect similar groups abroad (Asahi Shinbun 2002f:22). Similarly, other NGO support organizations have increased their efficiency in dealing with large numbers of groups and individuals by using the Internet extensively (Takahashi 2004). As early as 1985, a protest against American military housing units was successful because it could use US computer networks to distribute appeals. Citizens campaigning against landmines or protesting against the administrative information-gathering project, Juki Net, relied heavily on the Internet (Asahi Shinbun 1998:33; New York Times 2002; Freeman 2003:245–6). On the other hand, traditional political participation via the Internet is not a widely discussed or well-known issue in Japan. In a survey in 2001, a large majority of respondents had never heard of various key concepts of online government, such as electronic voting or the public comment system on the homepages of government agencies (NTT Data Corporation 2001:11).

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Will the Internet be good for civil society in Japan? The above overview offers a picture of a relatively weak civil society, in the activist sense, within a growing apolitical non-profit sector in Japan. Yet there is some hope that political citizen engagement can profit from the Internet in several ways. One is the increase of participation in general, including apolitical and non-traditional forms of participation. Some observers hope that this will eventually result in more political participation as well. Another way citizens can profit from the Internet is its beneficial impact on those areas of participation that actually move towards a more political and activist stance. Assuming that the Internet facilitates all forms of networking, it should have a positive effect on many forms of voluntary participation. At times when traditional political participation and affiliation and voter turnout decrease, it may well be that all forms of civic engagement, even those not openly political, are an outlet for new forms of participation. Proponents of the idea of a new political culture argue that not only old cleavage structures have disappeared, but that the traditional tools of political engagement are replaced by other forms of participation. Taken to its extreme, this argument could mean that traditional citizen participation and citizens’ movements—both political participation tools of an older generation—do not appeal to younger citizens, and that recycling groups and welfare services replace them as new means of political participation in its widest sense (Mifune 2005:99; Clark 1998; Clark and Inglehart 1998; see also Nakatani 2005). Civil society in this sense is barely distinguishable from the non-profit sector, but would presumably profit from the networking opportunities afforded by the Internet. There may be a trend within Japan’s civil society, however, to shift from mere service provision towards advocacy and debate and thus a more political outlook. It is true that citizens’ groups who actually take up political issues and engage in critical debate do not enjoy a high status in Japanese society. This became obvious when three civilian activists who were critical of their government’s engagement in post-war Iraq were taken hostage there. On their return to Japan they received such a hostile treatment that even US Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed his bewilderment that Japan was not proud of them, citizens who had taken personal risks for a good cause, just because they disagreed with their government (Embassy of the United States in Japan 2004). Indeed, for some NPOs it is more attractive to cooperate with local administration and welfare organizations rather than with other citizens’ groups (Akiyama and Watanabe 2003). An activist in a developmental NGOs notes that, in many respects, the status of an organization rises with its acceptance by the government; but, on the other hand, it does lose legitimacy in becoming too close to the government (Takahashi 2005). Arguably, however, a gradual change is taking place, at least in some areas. Activists as well as external observers may bemoan the amateurishness and the developmentalism of Japanese NGOs but, at the same time, they do observe a trend from the producer sector to social services and on to advocacy (The Asia Foundation 2002; Tsujinaka 2003). Civil society, even in its activist sense, is growing, and since small activist movements often have more use for swift mass communication than, for example, local welfare groups, the Internet may indeed have an impact on this trend.

4 Use of the Internet by political actors in the Japanese-Korean textbook controversy11 Introduction As a first approach to the study of Internet use by civil society actors in Japan, this chapter deals with the use of the Internet by a variety of political actors involved in the so-called ‘textbook controversy’ in 2001. As a case study, this issue has a clearly limited scope, and the civil society actors were quite prominent. In addition, the controversy about the content of Japanese history textbooks, and one in particular, which flared up within Japan but also between Japan and Korea, had strong transnational aspects. It was therefore well-suited as an entry into the research topic since the Internet is particularly useful for activities that involve great distances, and thus reducing the networking costs that traditional media would generate. The issue was also sufficiently controversial that some actors could actually ‘win’ or ‘lose’. This outcome had to be decided within a certain time frame, making it easier to make judgements about the success of individual actors. The issue, which my colleague Sven Saaler has researched and described in great detail (2005) took place over a few months in the summer of 2001, when history textbooks were approved for use in schools by the responsible ministry, and then one book had to be selected for each school. The potential consequences of a new textbook with right-wing ideology being used in schools meant that the selection process was highly contested. Apart from Japanese schools, local authorities, parents and other concerned citizens, including some Korean actors, were also involved because the most sensitive issues in the textbooks concerned Asian history, especially the period of the Japanese annexation of Korea (1910 to 1945). A description of the main events of the textbook issue follows later in this chapter. I have studied the activities of various actors in both Japan and Korea because this provides a valuable base for bilateral comparisons that will recur in the following chapters. Both countries are technologically advanced and had a relatively high rate of Internet adoption at the time, so that an impact of Internet use could be expected. In mid2001, about 40 per cent of Japanese and well over 50 per cent of Koreans used the Internet, even though many may not have used this option extensively for financial and other reasons (MIC 2001; NIDA 2001; Sōmushō 2002). A few other points to be mentioned regarding Internet use in Japan and Korea relate to the writing system used and government policies. Both countries use a non-roman script and a language that is very different from English. Since familiarity of a society with English, as the dominant language of the Internet, is usually closely related to Internet use (Norris 2000:128), this factor impedes both countries to a similar extent with regard to

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using the Internet. However, the Korean script (Hangeul) is alphabetic and can be input directly via the keyboard, while Japanese requires a somewhat more complicated automatic transformation into Sino-Japanese ideogrammes. The greater ease of typing in Korean may thus facilitate the use of chatrooms, and in turn the Internet in general, by Koreans (Kim 2001). The Korean government promotes the Internet vigorously, not only by requiring government institutions to provide information and services online—in 2001, most government agencies had at least one website, and more than half offered BBS or chatrooms—but also with initiatives to close the access divide (National Computerization Agency 2001; see Park 2001). In comparison, progress of Internet technologies into political life is slow in Japan. Many observers agree that in spite of some government IT projects (‘e-Japan’), the Internet has not yet become a major factor, and established hierarchical patterns of interaction do not look set to change because of new technologies (see Chapter 2). This chapter will explore some of the basic issues regarding Internet use by citizens’ groups and set the frame for further research needs. For an overview of potentially important factors and some initial hypotheses, the textbook issue in Japan and Korea provides a convenient field of study. It is a transnational issue involving countries where the technological infrastructure for wide Internet usage is available, but English is not a lingua franca. The issue involves a variety of state and non-state actors, and is similar to previous disputes about history and history textbooks that occurred before the Internet existed. Do the different actors involved use the Internet differently, and to a different extent? Does it facilitate their networking and improve their effectiveness if they do so extensively? Who benefits most? Equalization theory suggests that small citizens’ groups should benefit more than larger actors, but it could also be that the larger actors profit most, or that the extent of Internet use does not make a difference in terms of effectiveness. The case study should also detect indicators for any digital divide, and indicate major differences between Japan and Korea. Some possible explanations will be considered and provide the basis for hypotheses to be examined in the following studies. The 2001 ‘textbook affair’ in Japan12 The so-called ‘textbook affair’ occurred in Japan during the summer of 2001. Private organizations in Japan and abroad protested against a new, nationalist history textbook, and were joined by some governments of neighbouring countries. The details of the Japanese textbook approval and selection system, and different views of history, complicated the issue. In April 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)13 approved eight history textbooks for use in middle schools, among them one newly screened book, the New History Textbook (Atarashii Rehishi Kyōkasho: Nishio 2001), written by the neo-nationalist group ‘Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform’, or Tsukurukai.14 Only books that have passed the screening by MEXT can be selected for use in schools, but approval by MEXT does not guarantee that a book will actually be used. After the centralized approval of several textbooks, which occurs every four years, the Japanese system for middle school (corresponding to junior high school) textbooks

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presents another hurdle to textbooks in the form of local selection committees. In a rather complicated scheme, 544 regional committees each select one book for a number of local committees they advise. In theory, the final decision is made by these even smaller local committees for all the schools in their area. However, it is customary that they accept the decision made by the regional committee and merely inform their prefectural administration about the number of copies needed. Thus, all publicly administrated schools in each of the 544 regions will be issued the same textbook to be used for the next four years. The selected textbook is free for the pupils, but teachers can use other materials, too. The system of strict screening by the ministry has previously led to protests, but then mostly because leftist books had been censored. In a famous case, history professor lenaga Saburō sued the Japanese government for over 30 years (1965–97) because portions of his textbook covering the so-called ‘comfort women’ issue, the ‘Rape of Nanjing’ or the human experiments of Unit 73115 were rejected in the screening process. In a previous ‘textbook affair’ in 1982, media reports that the ministry had rejected such passages led to a diplomatic row between Japan and Korea.16 This time, however, the protests went against the government’s approval of the new book—although the ministry had demanded 137 revisions in the text, quite a number of instances remained that opponents regard as ‘distortions of history’ (Conachy 2001; MOFAT 2001; Network 21 2001; YMCA 2001). Saaler, who argues that the revisions merely resulted in differences in phrasing and degree, but not in the character of the descriptions, lists a whole page of major criticisms of the final version (Saaler 2005:51–2). History is a sensitive issue between Japan and Korea. Previously an independent, sovereign state, Korea was annexed by Japan from 1910 to 1945. During that time, Koreans were forced to speak Japanese and use Japanese names. As ‘Japanese citizens’, they were drafted into the Japanese military or into forced labour. The majority of women who were forced or lured into sexual slavery for the Japanese military, the so-called ‘comfort women’, were Koreans (Hicks 1995; Tanaka 2002). After the war, the peninsula was divided between the main spheres of influence of the Cold War: two Korean states were formed and fought against each other in the Korean War. Numerous Koreans who had come to Japan during the colonial period remained there. They lost their Japanese citizenship, however (including benefits such as veterans’ pensions), and those who stayed now constitute a minority still discriminated against in various ways. Japan established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965 (none exist with the communist North). Since then, Japanese politicians, prime ministers, and even the Diet, have issued numerous statements expressing various degrees of regret for the past which nevertheless failed to satisfy the Korean demand for ‘a sincere apology’. Among the factors Yamazaki (2006:18) lists as necessary for an apology is a receptive audience. A Japanese official’s complaint about ‘moving goalposts’17 thus has a certain validity as it has obviously become more difficult, decades after the war and after most of the actual perpetrators and victims are dead, to find a form of expressing apologies that will appear ‘sincere’ to a majority of the heterogeneous group of recipients. The more vigorous efforts at reconciliation by some Japanese individuals (such as former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi) were doomed because they were offset by ‘offensive remarks’ or ‘anti-apologies’ (bōgen) by other politicians or officials who denied any wrongdoing on the part of the Japanese government, for instance denying the Nanjing massacre or the

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victimization of the so-called ‘comfort women’. In some cases, but not always, such officials were forced to resign afterwards (Ducke 2002; see Yamazaki 2006:90–6). It is therefore not surprising that Koreans concern themselves with the contents of Japanese history textbooks. Because the textbook approval system gives official legitimacy to those textbooks that pass the screening, protests against this textbook were directed against the Japanese government. In fact, a clause introduced after the 1982 history textbook affair mentioned above stipulates that the Japanese government should consult the neighbouring countries on the contents of textbooks. The South Korean and Chinese governments were accordingly asked for comments in 2001, but few of these concerns were integrated in the final decision (MEXT 2001). The ministry’s approval of the textbook led to a storm of protests against the decision. Even in its revised and approved form, the book was considered offensive by many activists. The governments of China and South Korea complained ‘through diplomatic channels’ (Napsnet 3 July 2001) and citizens’ groups staged protest demonstrations. At the same time, efforts were made to prevent the book from actually being used in schools by influencing the decisions of the regional and local selection committees at the next stage of the lengthy selection process. Opposed citizens’ groups first tried to influence each of the 544 regional committees in their favour. Demonstrations and other protest activities were staged in those areas where the outcome was unclear. When the regional committee of Shimo-Tsuga in the Tochigi prefecture was the first to select the controversial book, the opponents began to lobby the local committees. Usually, the local committees do not make their own decisions but merely confirm the decision handed down to them by the regional committee, resulting in all schools in their area using the appointed book. This time, however, the local committee of Fujioka municipality rejected the decision. Faced with such unexpected protest, the regional committee had to reverse its decision, and eventually, none of the regional committees decided for the ‘New History Textbook’. It was used only in nine private and a few special needs schools not subject to this selection system, totalling 521 copies, or 0.039 per cent of all history textbooks used. In 2003, a further three newly established schools in Ehime prefecture were issued the Tsukurukai book by decision of the governor, bypassing the usual selection procedure (Saaler 2002, Saaler 2005:66). Likely reasons for the widespread rejection of the book include local and national activism, as well as pressure from abroad, which was specifically mentioned in the unexpected decision by the Fujioka committee. The protests from South Korea were most prominent. They included statements by the government, private activism and cancellations of bilateral exchange activities, for example between sister cities or school sports teams. A considerable part of the debate and struggle took place online or utilized the Internet. As textbooks are usually approved and selected for four years at a time, a similar debate, albeit on a lower scale, occurred four years later, in the summer of 2005. The Tsukurukai, which had promised revenge after the bad results in 2001, again submitted a history and a civic education textbook. Both were approved by the Ministry of Education, but the selection process preceded with less media attention and a less enthusiastic protest movement. Although all sides used Internet tools more proficiently than four years earlier, the citizens’ protest movement had lost momentum and failed to mobilize as many supporters as before to their offline activities. Uesugi also laments that

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coordination with local protesters was often insufficient, so that some e-mail protests may have hit the wrong person and offended rather than helped (Uesugi 2005). Eventually, the Tsukurukai history textbook was selected for 48 middle schools, to be used by approximately 4,900 students (Japan Today 2005d; Napsnet 31 August 2005). This corresponds to a market share of about 0.39 per cent, well below the 10 per cent the group aimed at, but ten times the market share in 2001. In addition, the trend of mainstream publishers to leave out or gloss over sensitive issues, which had greatly increased with the appearance of the Tsukurukai textbook in 2001 (Yoshizawa 2001), continued. Most of these issues had only been introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. According to Uesugi (2005), only two of the 2005 editions mention forced labourers, and none of them refers to the so-called ‘comfort women’ in the main text. He also argues that the most uncontroversial textbooks could greatly increase their market share since the appearance of the Tsukurukai book, compared to those books mentioning more of the unpleasant issues. Thus, the textbook landscape has changed more than the low adoption rates for the Tsukurukai book would suggest. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a website offering English, Korean and Chinese translations of selected parts of the middle school history textbooks (MOFA 2005c).

Internet activities of some major actors The major actors in the textbook controversy included a range of citizens’ groups from both Japan and Korea which differ in the influence they had on the affair and in the degree of Internet usage. All the citizens’ groups are activist publics in the sense that they ‘organize in order to influence another public or publics through action that may include education, compromise, persuasion, pressure tactics or force’ (Taylor et al. 2001:263). However, they are not transnational activists in the sense used by Keck and Sikkink (1998:6). They do not necessarily unite in a common transnational campaign by forming ‘explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal’. These Internet activities of citizens’ groups are placed in the context of a larger web sphere involved in the issue. This includes the web presence of the other actors concerned. Thus, the Internet presence of some involved state actors, such as ministries, is also considered. I have selected the groups and organizations mostly by their relevance to the textbook affair, and to some extent by their Internet presence. Groups most actively involved and most visible in the protest movement and in the media coverage of the issue were naturally included, as well as concerned parties such as the Tsukurukai and the Ministry of Education (see Appendix 1). There were, however, several more groups similar to those considered here that had an Internet presence and were involved in the issue, but only marginally so.

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Protest movements against the New History Textbook Network 2118 Arguably one of the most influential actors in the textbook affair was a Japanese citizens’ group

called

‘Children

and

Textbooks

Japan

Network

21’

It had developed from the support network for Professor lenaga Saburō, a Japanese history professor who had written textbooks that were controversial because of their left-wing leanings. His partial victories against the conservative screening practices of the education ministry had influenced the textbook landscape. While most textbooks in the 1990s started to mention Japanese war atrocities, the liberalization also generated a backlash by neo-nationalists, including the writers of the New History Textbook. lenaga’s support network, which had previously protested against the censorship of the screening system, continued to campaign, this time against both the lenience of the censorship system towards the right-wing textbook and against the new textbook itself. During 2001, their focus soon shifted from the ministry and the screening system to the local selection committees. Network 21 is based in Tokyo and links small citizens’ groups and individuals all over Japan. The website maintained by the secretariat in Tokyo is a major part of the campaign activities linking local organizations. In 2001, it was devoted entirely to the textbook issue and offered extensive background information as well as links to similar sites. The news articles posted on the website during the affair were generally more concerned with future protests than with descriptions of past activities: the site regularly posted urgent appeals ahead of committee meetings. Even though newspapers reported on official protests made by the Network, the group often did not post those statements on the site as press releases at all, or only with some delay (Donga.com 2001). The reason for this was apparently a lack of resources. Secretary-general Tawara Yoshifumi (2002) pointed out that matters like upcoming events must be given priority for input on the website. Interactive pages were largely limited to online membership application and the provision of an e-mail address and offline contact information. A proper Bulletin Board System (BBS) was not even planned for fear of damage. The group had the page set up by a professional web designer in 1999, and decided against a BBS after discussions about safety. Planned additional measures included a comment form and Q&A pages to be maintained manually. The organizers explained that they would feel more in control with such a solution than with a BBS. Of course, a Q&A page offers an obvious opportunity for editing (or censoring) the texts posted in a comment form, more than even a moderated BBS does, and thus safeguards the page from opponents. Both remained ‘under construction’ during the whole period of the textbook affair. Network 21 also maintains a mailing list which is limited to members. The secretariat occasionally forwards questions to this list that were sent to the main e-mail given on the homepage but which the secretariat could not immediately answer. The group judges its use of the Internet as ‘very effective’. Campaigns became much faster and more manageable compared to earlier activities. In a similar campaign in 1996/7, for example, appeals were only sent out via fax and telephone. In 2001, the

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website offered not only the necessary background information but also all the necessary contact addresses of committees or committee members, including e-mail, fax, postal and Internet addresses, as well as dates of protest activities and information meetings. In some cases, the site offered direct links to the comment function of relevant Internet pages of the institutions where appeals should be addressed, such as the comment site of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (Network 21, 7 and 8 August 2001). The number of hits per month rose to almost 10,000 in 2001, almost ten times as much as a year earlier. Network 21 estimates that, like e-mails received, about 20 to 30 per cent of those visits were by opponents of the website’s contents. Tawara notes that the presence on the Internet is not only effective for the activists themselves. Their opponents, too, can use the information provided. The group has also experienced more reactions from abroad: although ‘language is still a problem’, as Tawara concedes, an increasing number of foreign groups have got in touch with Network 21, some of them via sub-groups based in Japan. Korean groups in particular often have outposts in Japan, according to Tawara, and communicate with the group in Japanese. Other responses, however, are in English, and this apparently poses a problem when people send lengthy letters and materials in English. Network 21 itself only offers a very limited English-language website which is rarely updated. Overall, the Internet homepage has certainly proved to be worthwhile for Network 21’s campaigning and network building, although the group admits that its organizational structure has not changed much. Textbook Movement Headquarters19 The group with the Korean name ‘Ilbon gyogwaseo barojabgi undong bonbu’ (‘Headquarters of the Movement to Correct Japan’s Textbooks’; in the following: ‘Textbook Movement Headquarters’) is an umbrella organization of Korean civic groups protesting against the New History Textbook. It has worked together with Network 21 in campaigning against the book and its selection in schools. Both groups were subsequently active in forming new Japanese-Korean joint organizations for history research. The group’s website offers full online and offline contact information, background materials, links to Japanese and Korean organizations, several bulletin boards, and a chat function. It also provided the text of a fax appeal sent by Network 21. The group uses email for most internal communication and circulation of materials. For networking and the initial establishment of contacts, however, personal contact is generally more effective than Internet communication, according to a representative of the group. Contacts with Japan are additionally hampered by language difficulties, the representative said, in agreement with members of other citizens’ groups (Kang 2004). Many similar groups have very few bilingual members, and for years, computer encoding also posed a considerable problem for transnational e-mails (Kimijima 2002). Antijapan20 One of the most influential Korean websites operating against the New History Textbook was a site run by three high-school students. The site was called Antijapan and used to

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organize ‘cyber demos’. Antijapan used a combination of manual means and software to attack websites in rather simple DOS (Denial of Service) attacks. Established in protest against the Japanese textbook (hence the name) in May 2001 and spread over several different servers and URLs (Uniform Resource Locators, i.e. web addresses), Antijapan later organized a successful crash of the Warner Brothers website in protest against a programme on Korean dog-meat eating. Participants who had taken part in Antijapan activities may also have been involved in a crash of the Olympic server in Salt Lake City in protest against the disqualification of a Korean speed skater. The site has some information, several links to similar groups and a Korean BBS (a bulletin board in English was introduced later). Notices on the BBS explained the strategy of ‘virtual sitins’, which consisted of many Internet users continually reloading the pages that were to be attacked. Both legally and in terms of Internet etiquette, such actions are rather complex. As long as indeed millions of individuals push the reload button at the same time and thus overstrain the server, the protest would appear reasonably legitimate, but it is easy to multiply the effect with the help of simple programmes, perhaps installed on multiple computers in Internet cafés. While the global Internet community generally does not consider such DOS attacks appropriate, there was no way of preventing or prosecuting transnational attacks. The main victims of Antijapan’s attacks were the site of the Tsukurukai, but also of a supportive newspaper, the Education Ministry, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and some other organizations. Additionally, protesters were asked to send a comment to the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office via the comment form on its homepage. The ‘cyber demo’ was briefly mentioned in Japanese media and received considerable attention in South Korea (Asahi.com 2001; SBS 2001; see also Hangyore 2002; Korea Herald 2002). While the Tsukurukai, which was directly affected by the ‘cyber demo’, was (afterwards) aware of the group’s activities, people at Network 21 had only vaguely heard of the ‘cyber demo’ but did not know who was behind it. It was ‘one way of protesting’, the group’s secretary-general said, although Network 21 would not endorse it. For the students who founded the site, cyber demos were a convenient and less timeconsuming alternative to traditional offline protests, which have a strong tradition in Korea. They see their activities not as illegal hacking but as an extension of other citizens’ protest movements. Given the importance of the Internet in Korean society and education, it was not difficult for them to set up the site and find supporters. While the effect of the cyber demos in Japan may have been rather low, they certainly gained much attention in Korea. The ease with which these protesters used the Internet was presumably related, at least in part, to their age group: young people in Korea use Internet tools as a matter of fact, more so than older Koreans (such as those active in the Textbook Movement Headquarters group), but also more than young Japanese. International citizens’ groups Several international groups were active in campaigning against the new book via the Internet. One rather visible website was that of the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, JWRC (July 2001), which offered information on the New History Textbook, links and an ‘International Scholars’ Appeal’

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against the ministry’s decision of approval. The letter could be signed online and, by the end of 2001, boasted close to 400 signatories, many of them well-known scholars. More than half of them were based in the USA, the remainder predominantly in Asian countries, including Japan. As most of the activist sites considered here, JWRC does not offer a BBS or chatroom, although it provides an e-mail address and offline contact information. The JWRC site had mutual Internet links with the Network 21 homepage; a number of other websites offered links to the letter of appeal or directly posted it on their own page (e.g. Critical Asian Studies 2001). Another group is the Takashima Kyōkasho Soshō o Shien suru Kai (Group for Supporting the Takashima Textbook Lawsuit), which offers various information on their cause, offline contact information (also for membership application), as well as a number of links, including a link to Network 21. The group is one of 12 signatories to the April 2001 appeal coordinated by Network 21. Supporters and bystanders A number of groups that were not primarily concerned with the textbook affair or Japanese-Korean relations also mentioned the issue on their websites, or joined the protest movement with statements, appeals or links to the activist organizations mentioned above. They include such diverse groups as the YMCA, reporting a protest by the Seoul YMCA on its homepage (September 2001), Asian organizations in the USA (Okinawa Peace Network 2001), the Hong Kong based Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC 2001) and IMADR (2001), an international network originating from another Japanese minority, the Burakumin. Japanese history associations like the Historical Science Society of Japan (2001) and leftwing organizations like Weekly Zenshin (2001) or the World Socialist Web Site (Conachy 2001) also covered the issue. Most of these groups were not primary actors in the controversy, but rather cheering from the wings. The Tsukurukai21 The opponent of the above protest groups is the ‘Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform’ (Tsukurukai). Formally, the Tsukurukai is nothing but a private citizens’ association and ‘volunteer group’ (borantia dantai: Tsukurukai 2005). Many citizens’ protest movements, e.g. against environmental pollution, use the suffix ‘-kai’, and at least in its own understanding the Tsukurukai protests against the ‘steady decline of national principles due to the loss of a national historical perception’ (Tsukurukai 1998:3). It was established in 1996 and used e-mail from the start, but only set up its own website in December 2000. No special funds were set aside for this. A regular employee designed the website with software and computers already available at the office. Updates were made frequently but not regularly during the summer of 2001; many pages remained ‘under construction’. For example, even links to regional chapters were limited to two, although at least five groups have websites. Interactive features are almost entirely absent—the homepage does not even offer an e-mail address: only a telephone and fax number are given as contact numbers.

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A Tsukurukai member explained the lack of interactive features as resulting from security concerns. Not only was the homepage successfully attacked by the Korean group Antijapan (see pp. 50–1), but the Tsukurukai was also the target of an arson attack in early August 2001. In 2002, they engaged a professional IT company to redesign their website and establish a BBS and a mailing list with appropriate security measures. While the group did not offer many opportunities for feedback on its own website, it did use the Internet for its own research and to communicate with other actors: the Tsukurukai regularly checked websites of involved institutions and groups. When a parliamentarian of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, Kan Naoto, posted views critical of the Tsukurukai on his website, the group protested and published the whole exchange on its own website (25 July 2001). Mindan22 The resident Koreans in Japan (zainichi) constitute a rather peculiar factor in JapaneseKorean affairs. They number about 700,000, and many of them have been born in Japan as descendants of Koreans who came to the country during the colonial period, searching for work or forcibly brought in as labourers. The Korean community is still discriminated against in Japan, and two organizations continue lobbying for Koreans’ rights: one is in favour of communist North Korea, the other one, representing an increasing share of resident Koreans, in favour of South Korea. While the pro-North Korean organization, Chōsōren, did not have an accessible website during the textbook affair, the pro-South Korean group, Mindan, set up a homepage in 2000 ‘because the new generation demands information available online’. The homepage at that time did not offer any interactive features but was largely limited to some background information and a reduced online version of the most recent newsletter. The textbook affair clearly affected the Korean minority, a group particularly sensitive to Japan’s approach to history. In September 2001, Mindan’s online newsletter mentioned protests of a local chapter of the group against the selection of the controversial textbook by a private school. Another article reported on a meeting organized by Network 21 where Mindan representatives had taken part. The print version of the newsletter included several more articles on the issue (Mindan Shinbun 2001). The group remained low-key on the issue, though. A Mindan member explained that it would have been counterproductive if Mindan had too openly sided with the Japanese protest groups, because Japanese conservatives liked to complain about ‘illegitimate foreign intervention’. Mindan’s limited use of the Internet regarding the textbook affair was probably due to both technical problems and strategic considerations. On the one hand, two regular staff members had recently been placed in charge of the homepage and were still struggling to set it up for efficient use when the textbook affair began. On the other hand, strategic lobbying requirements dictated that Mindan did not raise the issue very prominently at all, not even offline. The group did see the potential of the Internet and increased its web presence considerably in the following years. Had it aspired to a more activist presence in this issue, the Internet project might have been set up with greater urgency.

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State-actors’ homepages MEXT On official Japanese homepages, the textbook affair played only a minor role. The Japanese Education Ministry (MEXT) was directly involved in the controversy, but did not devote a separate area of its website to the issue. Only in July, when the Minister made an official statement regarding the textbook approval, was a direct link to this statement available on the homepage. Apart from this, however, the ministry’s website offered no comments, information or links on the issue. The Minister’s statement of 9 July 2001 appeared on the website in Japanese, but not in English. The Embassy of Japan in South Korea later provided a Korean translation (Embassy of Japan in Korea 2001). The statement asserted that only two of the objected items were factual errors and needed to be changed, but also included the intention that the ministry would ‘make efforts to prevent such problems from happening again’. Apart from providing a postal and an e-mail address, the ministry invites comments on certain topics defined by the ministry. However, the textbook issue is never mentioned in the comment page; throughout 2001, MEXT issued no call for comments on this topic on the page. MOFA23 While the ministry in charge of the textbooks, MEXT, ignored the issue almost entirely, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), occasionally provided information on its website. Apparently it did not perceive the topic as an ‘issue’, however. Items related to the new textbook were not grouped together, but appeared in various sites, for example in press releases or in information on bilateral relations with South Korea; direct links from the ministry’s homepage were rare. Mostly, the new textbook was mentioned in the transcripts of Question and Answer sessions of press conferences with the Minister or Vice Minister, brought up by journalists. MOFA usually only provided these texts in Japanese; in the (smaller but still rather extensive) English version of the website, the issue was rarely mentioned. Although MOFA’s web presence is extensive, the website mainly includes materials that would usually be made available in print or on press conferences: official statements, treaties, press releases, etc. The actual contents of the site differ depending on the department providing them. English language materials were rare and other languages not available at all, not even on bilateral relations. Instead, the site provided links to Japan’s embassies and consulates abroad. The site of the Embassy of Japan in Korea was not always accessible during the summer of 2001, but offered some information in Korean on the textbook issue, such as Korean translations of several important official statements. The ministry’s website offers few interactive features, namely an e-mail address and a form for comments and questions. It states expressly that not all questions will be answered, nor posted on the site. E-mails addressed to the ministry are ideally either dealt with by one of the officials in charge of the website (one for the Japanese and one for the English version), or forwarded to the relevant division, but rarely answered in either case. In 2001, the ministry received a total of about 200 e-mails regarding the textbook issue.

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By comparison, total e-mails received numbered about 100 per week on average. Other topics, such as whaling or then Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko, clearly received greater attention. On issues relating to history, far more e-mails were addressed to the Prime Minister’s office than to MOFA (see MOFA 2001c; Yomiuri Shinbun 2001). A ministry official explained that many of the messages received were chain mails originating from citizens’ groups; about 80 per cent of the mails to the English version are usually related to such campaigns. With another 10 per cent being advertising, only 10 per cent of messages received were actual questions. MOFA decided against a BBS, mostly for security reasons and fear of abuse. Only the intranet, which encompasses MOFA and the embassies abroad, offers a BBS for internal use. The Internet presence itself is regarded as a ‘must’, however. An official argued that the motivation to offer comprehensive information on the website was based less on official requirements than on the perception that the public expected it. As the access figures to the website rose from about ten million hits in January 2001 to over 50 million in September 2001, he said that the ministry could not ignore the demand from users. MOFAT24 The South Korean foreign ministry MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), in contrast to the Japanese ministries involved, covered the issue extensively on its website. Throughout the summer, the homepage had a direct link to the page offering information on the textbook affair—with a large, clearly visible button showing a map of Japan, a book and the word ‘history’ in Chinese characters (thus also recognizable by Japanese readers). The button was only replaced in the autumn, after the turmoil had subsided. The foreign ministry regularly updated its page on the textbook affair, at least the Korean version. The English-language version usually followed several days later, while Japanese translations of the statements were only put on the homepage of the Korean embassy in Japan. The Korean site of the ministry also offers interactive tools like a cyber forum, a comment site and e-mail addresses. The strong Internet presence of the Korean ministry on this issue, compared with the Japanese MOFA, is certainly related to the greater importance the issue had in Korea. A ministry official said there was ‘no question’ that a direct link button to the textbook page was set up when the Japan division asked for it. Usually the divisions would compete for the limited space available for such links, but in this case, nobody disagreed. In addition, the government policy in South Korea appears to emphasize the importance of the Internet far more than in Japan. Clear directives exist, for the Foreign Ministry as for all other government agencies, to put information on the Internet and to consult the public via a BBS or Q&A forms. The official emphasized that Koreans use the Internet a great deal. He noted that, during the summer, the ministry had often received more than 100 postings per day on the BBS concerning the textbook issue (compared to about 200 in a year at their Japanese counterparts). Even here, however, the Internet was not utilized to its full potential. The ministry had no division in its own right dealing with the Internet, and the structure of individual departments had not changed at all. Decisions regarding Internet representation were made on an ad-hoc basis, and interactivity was in fact rather limited. Most of the comments on the BBS were very emotional, if not ‘rubbish’, according to the ministry

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official, and very few would get an official response or even influence policies. In spite of the high importance placed on online tools, the prevailing view in the Korean foreign ministry is that ‘in the end, [print] newspapers are the decisive source of information’. Like those responsible for the homepages of citizens’ groups, the official also complained of the additional workload generated by the advent of the Internet. In spite of the undisputed benefits, it made life for him ‘harder rather than easier’.

Conclusion The study of the web sphere surrounding the textbook issue presented a few general patterns regarding Internet use by various actors involved. While all actors shared a number of similarities, differences were more clear-cut between Japanese and Korean actors than between state and non-state actors. An obvious trend was the very recent increase in Internet usage. All actors reported that their own, and their customers’ or visitors’, use of the Internet had greatly increased over the few years preceding the issue. Those responsible for the websites also noted that an Internet presence generates more workload. The effect on state and non-state actors was not widely different. Larger organizations often created a new position to deal with the extra workload, whereas in smaller organizations the same people who were originally responsible for networking and public relations took over Internet responsibilities. Eventually, they could thus benefit from efficiency gains related to the Internet, but in the initial phase this often put extra pressure on small organizations until the time-saving effects could be felt. At least in the short term, these difficulties confirm the fears of sceptics who expect the Internet to ‘normalize’ and reproduce resource gaps between different actors. Another common feature was that the networking with other groups and individuals continued to take place mainly offline. At least initial contacts were usually established in personal meetings; only later, e-mail links became increasingly important. Although new technologies improve the means of communication for citizens’ groups, the results of this case study do not suggest that the Internet generates any qualitative changes in these groups’ campaigning and networking. Mostly it was used for e-mail communication in a way that resembled the use of telephone and fax exchanges, which the e-mail exchanges replaced or complemented. In contrast to accessing Internet pages or message boards, sending an e-mail still requires the exact name and address of a person, and at least in Japan, an introduction will ensure that the person does in fact answer. Ministries, too, use the Internet and e-mail only in addition to their ‘usual channels’. Common to all groups and organizations was that their efforts to link with others abroad were limited, regardless of the extent to which they used the Internet. This was probably due to language problems: at least activists against the Tsukurukai textbook would have found a sympathetic audience in Korea and other countries. As for the differences, a comparatively wide gap can be observed between the Korean and Japanese usage of the Internet. Korean websites, both those of state actors and of citizens’ groups, tended to appear more professional. They had more features and more interactive elements than the websites of Japanese actors. In Japan, the websites ranged

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from very simple online documents to something professionally designed. Generally, state actors had somewhat more refined websites than citizens’ groups. Interestingly, both governmental and civil society actors in Japan, but not in Korea, frequently mentioned concerns about security issues. They did not necessarily make extra efforts to protect their sites, but these concerns were given as a reason—perhaps a welcome excuse—for not offering interactive features such as a BBS. While this appears reasonable for smaller citizens’ groups lacking resources and technical knowledge, Japanese ministries voice the same concern, although they should be able to ensure an appropriate level of security. Most of the differences between Japan and Korea in this respect are unlikely to be inherent to the textbook issue; but it may have reinforced some of them. To some extent, the ‘security’ argument is related to the reluctance of many Japanese organizations to invite a discussion with opponents on such a controversial issue (even within Japan). They mostly address their established audiences without making many additional efforts to attract new readers to their pages. Taylor et al. (2001:278–9) were concerned about the ability of activist groups to create trust and provide incentives for their audience to act. For many Japanese citizens’ groups in this research, the subtleties of interactivity and responsiveness were a step further ahead, while they still struggled with technical issues. Korean websites, on the other hand, are usually rather well designed and include interactive features. As Korean opinion on a topic like the textbook issue is rather unanimous, it was not difficult for activists to gain support within the Korean Internet community. This may have enforced the Korean organizations’ willingness to invite discussion on the topic. At least from within Korea, they could expect mostly support. In addition, the average age of citizens involved was probably somewhat lower in Korea than in Japan due to the different nature of the issue in both countries. In Japan, it is clearly an ‘education’ issue. Most people become interested in textbook policies only when their children use these textbooks, and many of the active Japanese protesters were middle-aged or older. In Korea, the issue attracts similar types of activists, but also all kinds of people interested in politics and bilateral relations with Japan, including young people with patriotic feelings, like the students of Antijapan. Different age levels would serve to explain some of the differences in the use of new technologies, as computer and Internet literacy is far more widespread among the younger generation (see Chapter 2; Mikami 2005). It is difficult to imagine the greying activists of Network 21 staging a DOS attack on the Tsukurukai website—but on the other hand, neither they nor their Korean counterpart, Textbook Movement Headquarters, wanted to do so, and simple email exchanges and web announcements served their purposes well enough. However relevant the gradations of the digital divide may be, on this level the simple binary distinction between using the Internet at all and not using it made the greatest difference for the protest activities. In the textbook issue, transnational aspects even widened the gap between Japanese and Korean Internet usage. Japanese citizens’ groups could achieve much with simple one-way communication to their members: by offering contact information for committees and institutions which the members should attempt to influence with letters, faxes or telephone calls, or by staging street demonstrations. This would be less effective from Korea. What more effective way than a virtual attack would a small group like Antijapan have had to influence organizations in a different country? Even sending faxes

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or letters abroad would have been relatively expensive. Many of their supporters participating in the cyber demos would probably not have made the effort to post a letter. The study touches on a number of general differences between Internet usage in Japan and Korea. It demonstrates that socio-cultural and political conditions (such as language, government policy and infrastructure) do matter. The Internet policy promoted by the Korean government seems to be more pro-active than that in Japan. The Korean script is more convenient for keyboard input than Japanese. Some even argue that discursive culture in Korea is generally more confrontational and more immediate and fast-paced than in Japan and thus better suited for Internet debates (Hopfner 2000; see also Jin 2000:234–9). The textbook affair reveals only a very limited impact of the availability of the Internet on the campaigning style of citizens’ groups. Activists can and do reach more people who might not otherwise have joined the organization or participated in a campaign, and the groups themselves judge the effort to be worthwhile. The Internet offers some benefits to them but no real breakthrough in the effectiveness of their activism, compared to previous, similar activities. Although the triumph of the activists in fighting widespread selection of the New History Textbook in 2001 seems to imply that their Internet use brought them success, this was probably due to a combination of factors, with Internet use playing only a minor part. The different development and outcome of the issue in 2005—in spite of further increased Internet use by all actors involved—illustrate this. The activists still do not use the Internet to its full potential— but neither did the government agencies and other organizations included in this research. Representatives of governmental websites tend to emphasize that their organization ‘could not afford’ to have no presence on the Internet, but that the increased information exchange does not alter their organization’s policies. Even if their websites explicitly invite comments, insiders remark that their organizations have not become more responsive to citizens’ input. Indeed, direct protests to official websites rarely generate a response or any discernible impact. In large numbers, they certainly serve as one more public opinion barometer for officials and governments to consider. On the other hand, activists’ arguments do reach officials better than previously if they are well presented on the web. Transnational exchanges between the actors involved also did not increase significantly due to the Internet, even between citizens’ groups who could gain most from such exchanges. One of the major obstacles to the globalization of activist networks may still be language (and even encoding technologies), at least in regions where English does not easily serve as a lingua franca.

5 Website strategies of small citizens’ groups A quantitative website analysis Introduction The actors involved in the textbook controversy in Chapter 4 used the Internet in widely different ways: some struggled with DOS attacks and organizational restructurings to rearrange the workload caused by online requests, while others basically transferred their fax messages to e-mail. Those actors ranged from governmental agencies to citizens’ groups in Japan and Korea, but now we will focus on Japanese citizens’ groups. In the last chapter, it appeared that at least one bunch of citizens’ groups, namely the opponents of the new textbook, were rather successful through a combination of online and offline means. Although they had very limited resources and used only some simple and limited Internet tools, these apparently facilitated their networking and eventually led to success. Does this mean that using the Internet indeed increases the success of organizations, and specifically of citizens’ groups? In order to find out whether this assumption is true, a simpler framework is necessary that reduces the number of factors involved and makes it possible to formulate some hypotheses that can realistically be tested. This chapter will therefore focus only on citizens’ groups in Japan and reduce the number of factors that are considered with respect to Internet use so that values can be coded for each factor for each group studied. On the other hand, the number of groups examined is much higher than in the previous chapter. The resulting quantitative approach allows for exploring the use of the Internet in Japanese citizens’ groups. This chapter tries to detect statistical links between certain features of Interent use by Japanese citizens’ groups and their success. Defining useful categories for measuring and describing Internet use and success proved difficult. Ideally, these categories are binary, i.e. answerable as ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or metric. Due to the nature of this research object, however, quite a number of the categories do not lend themselves to metric measurements but are nonetheless important for the study. In these cases, I devised appropriate scales as well as criteria for determining the value on this scale. These values for each group were then compared using quantitative methods to find any associations between variables and to test hypotheses. Based on the theoretical background, general assumptions and the seemingly positive effect of the Internet on citizens’ groups success observed in the textbook controversy (Chapter 4), the following three general hypotheses can be formulated: HI: A higher degree of Internet use increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success.

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H2: The use, or a high level of use, of certain Internet features increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success. H3: The use of certain Internet features affects the success of a group with regard to certain aims. ‘Internet use’ stands for a measure that can be combined from the value of several factors that describe whether and to what extent a variety of Internet tools are used. ‘Success’ similarly means a combined value from several aims that should be achieved successfully. All three hypotheses are expanded into numerous sub-statements to be tested, but only those sub-hypotheses found to be relevant will be discussed. Even if the design of the study does not ensure a very high reliability, the clearest results from this research (significant relations, or a complete lack of them for some hypotheses) will at least indicate which of the hypotheses are then worth considering further. They will provide much-needed insights into the use of the Internet by civil society groups and help judge the validity of assumptions made regarding the Internet and its equalizing potential. They will also provide strategies and recommendations for citizens’ groups on efficient ways to use the Internet.

Research design In this section, I will first describe the set-up of the study and the selection of variables. Following this, I give a very brief summary of the issues covered by the groups researched. Selected issues are described in a little more detail. The cases researched for this study include nearly 150 citizens’ groups which are listed in Appendix 2. Each of them was active in Japan between 2001 and 2003 in one or more of eight issues: foreigners, human rights, textbooks, whaling, women’s issues, dam construction, abduction and the peace movement. All of them are citizens’ groups as described in Chapter 1. All have at least a name and a mission statement, but their legal status is quite diverse. Most are relatively small and many had not, at least at the time of research, obtained NPO status (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the legal forms available to citizens’ groups). Of these, some were loosely formed networks or hurriedly formed groups that may not have aspired to this status at all; for others the law enabling this status, passed in 1998, was still too new and they were still considering the benefits of applying for it. Still other groups already held a (more prestigious and beneficial) kōeki hōjin status before the new law was passed and retained it. Some of the groups have rather close links with related for-profit organizations, which is not unusual for formal NPOs: in many cases, some staff members of a citizens’ group work concurrently in a company doing related business, and sometimes they use the same office. The ideological spectrum of the groups is rather broad. While most are unquestionably working for a ‘good cause’, some have controversial aims. Those without obvious opponents and those mostly opposing the government over an issue usually tend to include more progressive groups, but since in some issues citizens’ groups are opposing each other, they include both groups from the political left and right.

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In theory, the political orientation of a group should not be relevant within the framework considered here (see Chapter 1; Castells 1997:3). However, it may contribute to some differences in factors not considered here, such as the personal connections of leading group members, which can, depending on the issue, differ greatly between progressive and conservative groups and thus cause a bias: a group with influence on leading politicians will need fewer members, funding and Internet tools to be successful than others (see Chapter 4). I have tried to keep the sample as balanced as possible by including several issues with conservative or nationalist activists, but the majority of groups is rather progressive. Criteria for the selection of the eight issues were that they involved a controversial decision or some other measurable outcome. Ideally, there should be a time-limit on this decision (like in the textbook affair described in Chapter 4) so that the variables for success could be coded. In addition, the issues should not be purely local, because in that case direct communication might have been easier than using the Internet, and Internet use accordingly might not have an impact on the groups’ success. As far as possible, all Japanese citizens’ groups involved in either of these issues at that time were selected as cases. While actors other than citizens’ groups were excluded, Internet use was not a selection criterion—thus, groups without a homepage or who barely used the Internet were included along with the more active groups. To find all groups that should be included for each issue, a range of sources were consulted, including directories, literature on the issue and experts. Often the groups campaigned for the same aim, e.g. to improve the situation of women or to prevent the war in Iraq and Japan’s support for it, but in some of the issues (such as textbooks or whaling) there were citizens’ groups opposing each other, so that they had to be distinguished within the whaling issue, for instance, as ‘pro-whaling’ and ‘anti-whaling’. Each issue was covered over the course of a few months. Thus, the data for all groups in the same issue are from roughly the same time, while the research period for different issues spread over a total of two years between 2001 and 2003. A tighter time frame for the whole research would have been advantageous in light of the rapid changes in Internet infrastructure and use, but as many of the issues were limited to certain times, this was not possible. However, the data are comparable because all cases relate Internet use only at the time of the respective issue (a few weeks or months for each issue) with the success rate during roughly the same time. Arguably, the Japanese Internet experienced a greater transformation just afterward the period of research, with the sudden increase of broadband connections. The groups involved were all based in Japan, but some, such as Greenpeace Japan, were local chapters of international organizations. Various research tools—including website analysis, interviews and surveys—were used to determine the values for the independent and dependent variables to be studied. Independent variables: use of the Internet The categories to describe Internet usage are based on and further developed from categories described by Taylor et al. (2001; see Chapter 1) for website analysis, mostly for apparently larger activist organizations. Each of the categories includes a number of variables, which are listed in Appendix 3. Some of the original variables used by Taylor et al., such as image maps or chatrooms, are in fact rarely used by the small activist

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groups considered in this study. On the other hand, variables such as the availability of a mobile site—i.e. a simplified website for access via mobile phone (keitai)—were added to the suggested set. Some further variables have been added that cannot be deduced from website analysis but require surveys and interviews. Some of them are collected in the first category (Use of Internet: general), which includes several subcategories that cover the (self-professed) relevance of e-mail compared to other means of communication as well as the ease with which a group can be found and contacted using the Internet, and whether it has a homepage or not. The other categories are: Ease of Interface, Usefulness of Information, Conservation of Visitors, Generation of Return Visits and Dialogic Loop. Each website was coded to gain values for all variables, and ordinal scales for each category were calculated based on the variables constituting each category (between three and eight). An additional scale, Total Internet Use, combines all these categories. Dependent variables: success factors Once the values for Internet usage are determined, the next task is to establish the values for the ‘success’ of each group. As for the independent variables, it is useful to split ‘success’ into several categories, considering both success factors for the individual citizens’ groups and those for the issue for which they have been campaigning. Success of the group First, success factors for each individual citizens’ group are considered. Since the outcome of the contested issue depends on many other factors as well, the success factors most directly related to each group are various forms of feedback and the visibility of the group. This includes references to the group both online and in print media. Shifts of that visibility over time are also observed. Feedback factors include the number of hits on a group’s website, the increase in contacts made by e-mail, and the general satisfaction of the group with their Internet presence. The values used for these variables are largely dependent on survey data and personal judgement, or even very subjective impressions of the group members, and low response rates can pose a problem. These difficulties in the coding of the values must of course be considered when interpreting the data. Visibility is somewhat easier to measure by counting references to the name of the group in different types of media. With some exceptions, the visibility values were established as follows: first, online visibility was determined by searching for the official name of each group in a popular Internet search engine (Google). Offline media visibility was coded for two periods of time, once around the time of the research, and once for a previous period (the whole year of 1998) with the help of a newspaper database (DNA for Business). In some cases, the official name had to be replaced by a different search term to produce meaningful results. For example, some groups had a very general term or a short word or acronym in Latin letters as their official name ( Cull, HELP). These names yielded disproportionately many unrelated hits. The coding of these variables thus required human control and judgement; the searches could not be automated, and the results are not completely comparable.

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Success in the issue In addition to the individual success of each group, values were defined for the success in each of the issues the groups were campaigning on. As it is difficult to determine causal relationships between each group and the success in the issue, using the same value for all is justified since these values are then combined with individual success values for each group. The values are the same for each group involved in the issue as long as they were on the same side of a controversy. This is usually the case when issues are ‘good causes’ without any organized opposition to the aims (e.g. human rights) or when they are campaigns directed against the government and without any organized opposition within the citizenship (e.g. dams). In those issues where citizens’ groups were campaigning against each other, different values had to be established for both sides. Forsythe (2000:174) suggests a list of success factors that can be used for defining the success in an issue. It makes a helpful distinction between the first step of ‘getting the issue on the agenda’ and various practical achievements. Based on these factors, I have split the rather vague category of success in the issue into several items that are easier to measure or judge: A: Getting the issue on the agenda for discussion: the issue is mentioned in the mass media. B: Success in promoting serious discussion: the issue is mentioned in longer or more scientific articles. C: Success in shifting public opinion, as expressed in public opinion polls. D: Success in achieving procedural or institutional change. E: Success in achieving substantive policy change that eliminates the problem. F: Other factors, such as recognition or criticism of activists by governments, can indicate influence. To determine the visibility of the issue (factors A and B), appropriate keywords for each issue were used in a database for a newspaper (DNA for Business) for factor A, and for journal articles including scientific journals (Magazineplus) for factor B. In both cases, the increase or decrease of references to these keywords over five years was calculated. Although the number of references made to an issue is in itself no indication for the success of one side in the controversy, the change of this number over time can be a sign of the effect of political activities and campaigns during that period. Whether the newspaper is biased towards certain issues or whether an issue is by nature likely to be mentioned more often than another one does not matter so much—if it is mentioned more often several years later, it has apparently become more visible and is ‘more on the agenda’. Public opinion polls, as far as they were available, were used to judge factor C—the success in shifting public opinion—and literature research and the consultation of experts helped to define values for factors D to F. All values were coded on a scale from one (negative effect) to four (high success): ‘Negative effect’ means a deterioration of the situation or loss of successes already gained (e.g. a decrease in media references), ‘medium’ means a situation with no

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discernible impact or success, i.e. even if there were slight improvements in the matter, they were not more than a continuation of previous developments and could not possibly be traced to any campaign. Where comparable figures are available, e.g. with respect to references in newspapers, this usually corresponds to an unchanged situation or increases by up to about 10 per cent. ‘Some success’ describes clear improvements, which are however not very impressive, or a combination of such improvements in one area with less success on other accounts. The conditions for the label ‘high success’ included, for example, in the category of media visibility, that the coverage had at least doubled, and that the absolute number of references was not very low. The success values for each issue The following will give a brief overview of each issue and mention the important successes and failures for the groups involved. A list of values coded for each issue (or each party in the issue) is given in Appendix 4, but more details on the issues and the reasoning behind these codings are explained in Ducke (2003). Textbook issue 2001 Details on the textbook issue can be found in the previous chapter. Here, only the developments between the approval of the new school textbooks by the Ministry of Education (MEXT/Monbu kagakushō) in April and the August deadline for notifying the ministry about the selection made in each local committee were monitored. While the issue received much media attention in 2001 itself, in the long run (between 1998 and 2002) mentions of the keywords ‘textbook’ (kyōkasho) and ‘problem’ (mondai) only increased slightly in newspapers, but quite visibly in journal articles. A number of opinion polls were available not only regarding the contested New History Textbook itself but also concerning the need for patriotic education or national pride. The results of these polls supported the opponents rather than the proponents of the book, and of course the political outcome of the issue also presented a victory for the opponents: none of the selection committees had actually decided in favour of the contested book. The Tsukurukai, as the main representative of the book’s proponents, admitted defeat, not least by announcing ‘revenge’ for the next round of selections four years later (Tsukurukai Webnews 2005).25 In terms of institutional change, the results were not so clear-cut, since the widespread rejection of the Tsukurukai book had been accompanied by a general trend towards other conservative textbooks. Several of the finally approved textbooks included more nationalistic positions, and the committees did select such books (Yoshizawa 2001). In addition, MEXT introduced a more patriotic policy line. The extensive coverage of the textbook issue abroad further emphasized the importance attributed to the issue—and testified to the Tsukurukai’s influence and visibility, even if much of the coverage was critical of the book. The role of the Internet in this issue appears to be limited in several respects. One striking factor is that the supporters of the book achieved some success and were certainly very visible, in spite of a very limited use of the Internet. This can be explained by good personal connections and endorsement by local politicians and dignitaries who

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could put pressure on the selection committees. In addition, the diplomatic relevance of the issue increased the coverage by traditional mass media and thus reduced the relevance of new media in presenting positions—especially dominant conservative positions. The whaling issue In May 2002, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) held its annual meeting in Shimonoseki, Japan, sparking a renewed debate about Japan’s controversial whaling policies. While the IWC banned commercial whaling in 1986, Japan catches about 400 whales annually for research purposes. Some 2,000 tons of ‘scientific’ whale meat are sold in Japan every year. Before and during the IWC meeting, pro- and anti-whaling groups tried to influence the delegates and international public opinion (Brooke 2002). Both sides could register considerable success regarding the visibility of their issue, but opinion polls had widely different results, depending on the contractor and differences in wording. At most, they indicated some awareness of whaling as a sensitive issue, but not necessarily support for the anti-whaling activists. While many people personally did not like whale meat and were not interested in their national right to eat it, most did not care about whaling policies either (Greimel 2002; IFAW 2002). The practical decisions taken at the IWC meeting—rejecting a Japanese demand for a coastal whaling quota and affecting long-term prospects—represented a small victory for the anti-whaling groups (Saito 2002). The defensive stance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which criticized anti-whaling media and citizens’ groups, indicates that the government took note of at least some of the groups’ activism (MOFA 2001c). Internet activities by the protesters, however, were not much in evidence. The abduction issue This was, in fact, a very long-standing issue between Japan and North Korea, but it came into the spotlight rather unexpectedly in 2002. The families of several Japanese nationals who had disappeared in the 1970s and early 1980s had long suspected that they were abducted by North Korean agents. The issue, however, remained relatively low-key; a pressure group representing the families was only formed in 1997 (Nishioka 2003). The issue then gradually gained momentum through the political events of 2002, including a visit in September by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to North Korea, in the course of which the North Korean leader, Kim Jong II, admitted a number of abductions. Five former abductees were returned to Japan in October 2002, followed by their families in 2004 (Cha 2004). Media attention to the issue soared: An increasingly wide range of newspapers and journals covered the issue and continued to do so even long after the immediate goals of the activists were achieved. Public opinion polls also registered a high interest in the issue and the general perception that this was the most important problem between Japan and North Korea (Gekkan Seron Chōsa 2003b:53; Asahi Shinbun 2005b:1). The activists, who were unusual in being more conservative than the government, achieved even more than they had initially aspired to. Their original goal was to get information about the disappeared family members, and to have them returned to Japan if they were indeed abducted. Eventually, the Japanese government not only held the five

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abductees in Japan in violation of an agreement with North Korea to send them back after a short visit (and possibly even against their own wishes). In addition, it was also arranged that the North Korean-born children of the abductees (and one American-born husband) could ‘return’ to Japan. International media and foreign governments also recognized the issue, and even US President George W.Bush issued a statement of support for the cause of the activists (Whitehouse.gov 2003). How could the activists in the abduction case be so successful? Their use of new media was generally much lower than that of most other groups considered here, and they did not have a large membership and supporter base either: a major rally in May 2003 with many very prominent speakers drew only a moderate number of 5,000 people (Japan Today 2003g). However, they received support from right-wing groups and from a number of politicians. In this case at least, the hypotheses about Internet use causing success are unlikely to hold because high-profile contacts and offline networking were apparently more important than Internet use could be.26 The peace issue27 One of the important political issues in 2003 was the looming war in Iraq, evident in protest activities and public debate (see also Chapter 7 for a more detailed description of the issue). Civic engagement in this issue was, at that time at least, exclusively in opposition to the war and the government’s intention to back it in some form. Numerous activist groups joined forces to organize peace demonstrations, which started as small gatherings in 2002 but turned into relatively big events by early 2003. The high visibility of the Iraq war issue itself cannot of course be attributed to the peace movement, but the peace activists arguably also achieved a relatively high visibility for their arguments. Public opinion, which is traditionally pacifist and supportive of the ‘peace constitution’, was generally opposed to the war, but frequent polls also detected some acceptance of the government’s arguments for supporting the war, at least under certain conditions (e.g. Asahi Shinbun 2003a:1). The activists did not achieve their main aims of preventing the war or Japan’s support for it, but the slow reaction of the Japanese government for the American request for support may have been a reaction to public protests. The dam issue The following issues did not have such a strict time frame as those mentioned above. Long-standing protests against dam-building projects gained additional momentum with the election of Tanaka Yasuo, a firm opponent of a large dambuilding project, to governor of Nagano-ken in 2001. The groups studied here protested against a number of different dam projects. Some of them were very small, local gatherings. Dam-building issues became more prominent than previously in the news, and somewhat more visible in scholarly articles. In the few opinion polls that covered dambuilding projects, a substantial majority of respondents (often residents) opposed the projects (Kumamoto Nichinichi shinbun 2001; Asahi.com My town: Nagano 2002). Indeed, by 2002, the activists had succeeded in stopping the construction of about 10 per cent of the dam projects in Japan.28 At the same time, the government introduced some

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legal measures to curb the influence of residents, and thus of the anti-dam citizens’ movements (thereby also acknowledging their influence). Only some of the activist groups operated nationwide. While most of the others could also benefit from supra-regional networking, many of the initiatives were quite local. This made strong links between Internet usage and success in this issue less likely as it decreased their need for Internet use. Foreigners’ issues Foreigners seem to appear in the public discourse in Japan more as a potential threat than as a minority group in need of protection, but newspaper articles associate foreigners with human rights or discrimination issues just as often as with threat or criminal offences.29 All groups considered here as working on ‘foreigner issues’ are citizens’ groups in some way trying to help foreigners, but none worked on a campaign regarding an imminent major decision. Opposing organized citizens’ groups could not be found. Media attention on foreigners increased somewhat, particularly in journal articles, which increasingly concerned foreigners living in Japan rather than in other countries. Opinion polls indicate that this visibility did not correspond to increased concern for their human rights—on the contrary (Gekkan Seron Chōsa 2003c:17). Practical improvements of the situation have been rare. Indeed, some policies have been reinforced, including calls for a renewal of the fingerprinting of foreigners that was only abolished in 2000 (Prime Minister’s Office 2004). Human rights Of the numerous citizens’ groups working on human rights, many are primarily interested in human rights issues in those developing countries where they are active (mostly with infrastructure and education projects). They are included along with some groups doing advocacy work with the Japanese government or awareness raising within Japan. References in newspapers to human rights decreased in 2002, the results of opinion polls which show a slight erosion of human rights awareness after a long period of increase. An unusually high visibility in journal articles can be explained by the focus on the abduction issue described above (pp. 66–7) in many of these articles: they had a quite different outlook from the majority of citizens’ groups researched here. Considering the global change in attitudes to human rights after 2001, the Japanese human rights activists may not have done too badly, but actual human rights standards in Japan as reported by Amnesty International (2003, 2005) have not significantly improved in recent years in spite of some new legislation. Some of the groups researched in this section did use Internet tools rather actively for networking. However, the global trend to sacrifice human rights concerns for anti-terror policies thwarted their efforts, and they were less successful than they might conceivably have been.

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Women’s issues Gender policies and women’s issues are a relatively low-key issue in Japan. Most of the groups selected here as ‘women’s groups’ were specifically concerned with issues such as trafficking, practical support to individual women, often migrant workers or women suffering from domestic violence, and greater awareness for women’s rights. In general, they campaigned for greater equality of women in areas such as work and politics. Some goals and measures for practical success could be defined for them, although there was no one clear focus or a timetable for a specific decision unlike some of the other issues. In addition to these groups campaigning for gender equality and women-specific issues, in the final analysis some other groups were included that were primarily involved in the other issues mentioned above. Groups that were primarily formed by women were added to the ‘women’s groups’ to enlarge the sample for exploring some assumptions about gender and Internet use. Although this was not a primary focus of the study, the data could thus be used to reflect on the digital divide by gender, both in terms of access and use, found by numerous researchers (Norris 2001a; DiMaggio et al. 2004; Cornelißen 2002). For these latter groups, however, the success values defined for their respective issues were used. Those groups that dealt with women’s issues in particular were rather unsuccessful in most respects: The number of newspaper and journal articles dealing with gender issues, equality, and discrimination of women declined over the years before 2002. Various opinion polls also showed a rather low awareness for these issues, and not much support for the causes of the activists. Although the results of the polls were mixed, it is very difficult to conclude any significant success for groups working on women’s issues from them (Gekkan Seron Chōsa 2002, 2003c:17). The practical policy results were also not very encouraging. General indices comparing gender equality in different countries showed Japan as falling behind rather than improving: in spite of its high development, Japan reached only medium or low ranks on the United Nations’ Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), behind, for instance, Namibia and Botswana (UNDP 1998, 2003, 2004b; Cabinet Office 2003), and similarly in the political representation of women as compared by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005). Only one of the more specific issues many of the groups campaigned for registered a certain degree of progress, namely the trafficking of women to Japan. In 2002, Japan signed the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. However, it had neither ratified it by early 2006, nor adopted concrete measures for the prevention of trafficking (UNODC 2006). Japan was harshly criticized internationally, which might have been a result of the citizens’ groups’ successful transnational networking and the boomerang effect described by Keck and Sikkink (1998). However, as international groups were very active even before the Japanese groups, it appears farfetched to attribute the international pressure to Japanese citizens’ groups. Some of the groups studied here started to join forces during the period of research and, in late 2003, formed a joint organization that gained more influence in domestic policy formation and awareness-raising, possibly with the help of a more active use of the Internet (JNATIP 2004). Extending the research period might thus have slightly shifted the results. It is interesting, however, that the new group was formed based on face-to-

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face meetings during a symposium and on the initiative of the Asia Foundation, a USbased NGO.

The status quo of Internet use in Japanese citizens’ groups The data demonstrate a positive trend in Internet usage even in very small citizens’ groups. They show that access is not a significant problem for such groups, although the overall level of Internet use was still rather low in many of the smaller groups. By far the majority of the groups used e-mail regularly and had their own homepages. Information about nearly half of those groups that had no homepage of their own could at least be found elsewhere on the World Wide Web. Considering that many of the groups are extremely small and have no well-established and professional organization, homepages and even e-mail are not the type of office technology that can be taken for granted. In fact, at least until the late 1990s, the fax machine was the main tool of text-based communication for most of the groups. One representative explained as late as 2003 that the Internet did not save the group much money: ‘Many of our members don’t have a computer or Internet access, so we always send letters or faxes anyway’.30 Some of the groups mainly addressed audiences such as foreign workers or residents of rural areas affected by dam-building projects, that had a relatively low likelihood of owning computers or having Internet access, at least during the period of research. It is therefore not surprising that, for most of the groups, the presence on the Internet is not pursued as a major investment within a strategic framework of public relations efforts, but rather ‘happened’ as a side-effect of the need for certain computer hardware and software: A new computer bought mostly to type documents offered an easy-to-use Internet connection, and a new e-mail account came with some web space. Just because it was available anyway, some volunteer who enjoyed tinkering with computers would produce a simple, single-page website in their spare time, perhaps never to be updated. If the data give the impression that even small citizens’ groups use e-mail and have homepages almost as a matter of course, they also demonstrate the limits of this seemingly technophile world. The data collected for this inventory also present the status quo regarding certain features and usages of the Internet that are not covered in most statistics. For example, a majority of the groups studied did not respond to simple requests sent by e-mail from outsiders. Many of the interactive features of the Internet are still only rarely used on the citizens’ groups’ websites. Very few groups offer Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) on their homepages, and none of the groups covered here had a chat feature. And even though a high Internet access rate via keitai is one of the key features of the Japanese Internet landscape (Sōmushō 2003d), very few of the groups offered a website accessible via keitai in 2002 or 2003, and this is changing only very slowly. The following paragraphs will give an overview of some of the most relevant findings regarding factual Internet use by the Japanese citizens’ groups researched in this study.

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Use of e-mail by citizens’ groups Of all the groups studied (N=143), 82.5 per cent could be confirmed as using e-mail at least occasionally, although this includes at least 2.8 per cent who used it only ‘very little’. Only 0.7 per cent of the groups were confirmed as not using e-mail at all. For 16.1 per cent of the total sample, use of e-mail could not be confirmed. Presumably, these include a relatively high share of groups who did not use e-mail at all, but the total share of those who did not use e-mail probably did not exceed a few per cent. Although e-mail had complemented or replaced traditional communication media in most groups, the assumedly greater interactivity of this tool did not lead to a notable openness for dialogue. A majority of groups did not answer e-mail requests directed to a publicly available e-mail address, either given as their contact e-mail address on their own homepage or listed on a directory site. To obtain these values, a very simple request that even new, part-time or voluntary staff members could answer in less than five minutes was sent from a private e-mail account to the address that appeared to be the main contact address, if there were more than one given. A reply within two or three weeks was counted as a ‘prompt response’—replies on the same day were extremely rare. Many groups apparently ignore e-mail requests from outsiders even if they are potential supporters. While they may be more responsive to people they already know, or if an email address is used that can only be obtained via acquaintances rather than anonymously via the Internet, such communication behaviour clearly reduces the potential of the Internet for networking with like-minded people and organizations. Groups with their own homepage By far most of the groups, namely 81.8 per cent of the total sample (N=143), had their own homepage. Information about a further 7.8 per cent of groups could be found elsewhere on the World Wide Web—for example, in online NGO directories or on local government sites. These listings usually included a brief statement about the aims and activities of the group and some contact information. Accordingly, only about 10 per cent were not accessible in any way via the World Wide Web. The lack of dialogic features is even more pronounced on the group’s homepages than in their e-mail use. Very few groups offered a BBS, and even fewer a website for keitai users (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Percentage of groups offering certain Internet services No (%) Yes (%) Regular updates English version (any) Prompt response to a simple e-mail question Bulletin Board System (BBS) Website for mobile phone users

49 55 55 82 88

51 45 45 18 12

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Most groups spent a very small part of their budget on their Internet presence. While over 60 per cent devoted less than 0.1 per cent of the budget to Internet-related costs, only 3 per cent spent more than 5 per cent on their Internet presence (N=32). Considering the limited resources of these citizens’ groups, these expenses often did not exceed the cost of having an e-mail account. Usually, the basic Internet subscription itself included an e-mail account and some megabytes of web space, just enough for a very small homepage. Many of the groups had no budget planning or strategies for the homepage.

Testing the hypotheses Since the three hypotheses given above are very general, the next step is to generate a large number of concrete hypotheses that can be tested with the data. While the first group of hypotheses includes very general assumptions about a connection between Internet usage and success, others explore the concrete relationships between single aspects of Internet use and single aspects of success in more detail. Hypothesis 1 is: H1: A higher degree of Internet use increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success. It assumes that the two combined values for all forms of Internet use on the one hand and for all success values on the other hand are significantly related. This hypothesis can be directly tested with the collected data. The other general hypotheses, H2 (the use of certain Internet features increases success) and H3 (the use of certain Internet features increases success with regard to certain aims) have to be specified by replacing the reference to ‘certain’ Internet features and aims. They can either use individual coded values or the somewhat larger categories describing the kind of Internet use, ranging from technical basics and content-related issues to advanced dialogical options that have been most praised for their democratic potential (see Appendix 3). This results in several lists of hypotheses like the following: H2α: The use of e-mail, or a high level of e-mail use, increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success (use of e-mail <=> success). H2β: The use of mailing lists increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success (use of mailing lists <=> success). H2γ: The use of the World Wide Web increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success (use of World Wide Web <=> success). H2δ: Being listed in web directories increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success (directory listings <=> success). H2a: If it is easier for potential readers to use the homepage, this increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success (Ease of Interface <=> success).

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H2b: A higher relevance of the homepage’s content to potential readers increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will have success (Usefulness of Information <=> success). H3α1: The use of e-mail, or a high level of e-mail use, increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will be satisfied with their work (use of email <=> satisfaction). H3α2: The use of e-mail, or a high level of e-mail use, increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will receive more feedback (use of e-mail <=> feedback). H3α3: The use of e-mail, or a high level of e-mail use, increases the likelihood that a citizens’ group will be successful in the first issue they are associated with (use of e-mail <=> success in issue 1). Although testing such a large number of hypotheses returned a number of significant correlations between the variables, the limitations of the quantitative approach for these data are obvious: the number of cases is not very high, and many of the variables are ordinary rather than metric values and ‘soft’ in the sense that they are based on surveys, interviews and the judgement of people in the group, or observation on ‘high-low’ scales. Other scales are additive values from several variables. Some variables are used here as independent variables, although a case could be made for including them in the dependent variables instead. An example is the ‘easy to find’ variable: on the one hand, a group can make efforts at promoting their page, including having it listed in directories, ask other groups to include a link, join web rings, etc; while, on the other hand, it is already a sign of success and of being well-known if many other sites set links to the page. This may happen without much effort by the group. The latter is relevant only for very few groups in the sample, but distortions because of this double role are possible. These methodological problems meant that methods of statistical exploration could only be used as an indicator of where to look for connections. Only in cases where the data revealed strong correlations between the independent and dependent variables were the corresponding hypotheses taken up and reconsidered. Further confirmation and a discussion of the results in light of the qualitative data, the background of certain issues and problems with exceptions was then necessary. In the following section, only those hypotheses that generated relevant findings are presented. The Internet as equalizer? A general answer The first hypothesis, H1, states very generally that a higher ‘total use of Internet’ corresponds to more success, i.e. the values on the combined scale of Internet usage variables directly relate to the values on the combined scale for different success factors. This is one important precondition for the assumption that the Internet ‘levels the playing field’ since the use of the Internet can only empower marginalized groups if it does affect success at all. Figure 5.1 shows a box plot diagram of the data, with all cases grouped in five categories of Internet use. Those on the right side have more Internet features or use the Internet more actively than those further to the left. The number of cases in each category

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is noted in the line directly below the graph (‘N=’). For each category, the range of observed success values is given as a vertical line, the median31 as a horizontal line. The box represents only those 50 per cent of the cases that are closest to the median (i.e. excluding the upper and lower quartile).32 The graph does indicate a tendency as predicted by the hypothesis. The only outlier, number 116, is one of the groups (Hidankyō) in the peace issue. Clearly, the mean values for the cases depicted on the right are higher than those on the left, and the range of success values for the groups also seems to be increasing with a higher value for Internet use. Thus, the visualization supports the hypothesis that more Internet use is related to more success.

Figure 5.1 H1: Relation between use of the Internet and success of the group. The statistical significance of the difference can also be confirmed. A statistical test (ANOVA) returned a highly significant relationship between the two variables (p<0.001,

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i.e. less than a 0.1 per cent chance that the difference in the means observed in the graph is not significant but just a coincidence).33 The significance alone does not prove any causal relationship—it could, for example, depend on a third factor such as the availability of resources. Due to the difficulties of obtaining appropriate data, I could not control directly for financial or human resources for most of the groups. The more detailed analysis of individual factors below will, however, shed some light on this problem. Since the relationship considered in H1 combines so many different factors, it is also difficult to say whether any of these influenced the correlation more than others, and which one. Therefore, these combined scales were, in the H2 and H3 hypotheses, replaced by more limited factors regarding Internet use or success. Certain features of Internet use The next hypothesis, H2, stated that certain features of Internet use influence the success of a group. This hypothesis was broken up into a number of concrete hypotheses, H2a to H2e, using the larger categories for Internet use (Ease of Interface, Usefulness of Information, Conservation of Visitors, Generation of Return Visits, and Dialogic Loop). In addition, relations between individual variables such as navigation bar or calendar and success were also tested. These hypotheses are here labelled accordingly in the order they are mentioned in this text. The associations mentioned in the hypotheses were first visualized and then tested. Among the most significant results was that for H2a, the association between the Ease of Interface variable and success (see Figure 5.2). The graph shows that groups with such user-friendly features on their homepage as a search function, a sitemap, or just a navigation bar, were on average more successful than others. The difference found between the groups with different levels in this category is indeed highly significant, as an ANOVA test (a statistical test of variances between groups) confirms (with F=13.391 and p<0.001). An interesting additional finding within this category concerned the existence of a navigation bar, a rather simple and common tool. The hypothesis (H2f) for this feature is that groups with a navigation bar on their homepage are more likely to be successful than others. Indeed, the difference between the two types of homepages (with or without a navigation bar) was found to be statistically significant (T-test: p=0.001). The other hypotheses for Internet use categories (H2b–H2e) produced less obvious results. Even though the visualization indicated a vague trend in all the relationships explored, statistical tests offered no convincing support for H2b (Usefulness of Information) and H2c (Conservation of Visitors). These two factors concerned questions such as: can supporters, media and activists each find information on the group and its issues, as well as policy goals and action links that are relevant for them?

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Figure 5.2 H2a: Success in relation to a user-friendly interface (Ease of Interface). Does the page load fast and indicate the last update? Perhaps these factors are—for some reason—not important for the citizens’ groups researched here and thus had no strong impact on the success of groups. None of the individual values making up these categories had a significant association with the success variable, either. The remaining hypotheses, H2d (association between Generation of Return Visits and Success) and H2e (association between Dialogic Loop and Success) could again be confirmed. The visualizations looked promising (see Figure 5.3 for H2d), and the tests confirmed that impression. For H2d the assumed relationship was found to be highly significant (F=6.668 and p<0.001), and for H2e somewhat less so (p=0.018). Among the more detailed hypotheses concerning individual values, one factor within the Dialogic Loop category was especially strongly related to success. Although the category includes mostly features that require some technical expertise to set up, such as BBS, comment forms and other interactive features (online donations, e-commerce), it was the simplest dialogic feature that proved to be highly significant. Groups that

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responded to a simple e-mail request were significantly more successful than others (H2g, see Figure 5.4).34

Figure 5.3 H2d: Success value of groups in relation to their homepages’ generation of return visits, e.g. with regular news forums or the option to register online for a newsletter. Homepage and visibility The third batch of hypotheses includes many combinations of individual independent and dependent variables. Support for these hypotheses would be very helpful for finding interesting associations between specific features of Internet use and specific aspects of success (H3). They are labelled here as H3a, H3b, etc. in order of appearance. The first two hypotheses considered here concern the visibility of a group:

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H3a: Groups that have a homepage are more often mentioned elsewhere on the Internet than groups without a homepage. H3b: Groups that have a homepage are more often mentioned in the print media (newspapers).

Figure 5.4 H2g: Success value of groups in relation to a prompt response given to an online request. Again, the data were first displayed graphically as box plots. In both cases, most of the groups with a homepage of their own had visibly higher values on the scales for Google hits or references in a newspaper, but both graphs showed a large number of outliers and extremes (see Figure 5.5). They also had very few cases in the categories for ‘no homepage’ and ‘other onlineinformation’. This meant that the visualization would not be very reliable. Although both graphs seemed to imply an association between homepage ownership and the visibility of a group, the statistical tests applied only confirmed a significant association for H3a: the difference observed between groups with a homepage of their own and the other groups

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was highly significant (p<0.001),35 regarding online visibility, but not regarding visibility in print media (H3b). Thus there is no basis for assuming that homepage ownership will increase the likelihood of the group’s name being mentioned in print articles. The consequences of this finding depend on the relevance we attach to online versus offline visibility: is it, in a world increasingly functioning online, enough to be visible in the Internet, or is this visibility at least an important factor for considering an organization successful? Or does online visibility not matter as long as it is not

Figure 5.5 H3a: Number of Google hits by homepage ownership. Note A number of extreme values are cut off here; the highest value in the ‘Yes’ category is 10,200 Google hits. The groups with extreme and outlying

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values include some of the larger groups that were active in the peace movement (Peaceboat, WWF Japan, Network Chikyūmura), but also conservative groups such as the Tsukurukai. accompanied by offline visibility? In this study, online and offline visibility are used as additive factors to calculate success, i.e. both are given the same weight. Different viewpoints in this question would, of course, alter the results of the study. The results also illustrate that Internet features—here the most basic difference between having a homepage and not having one—often affect some success factors more than others. Other relevant results with regard to the impact of specific factors of Internet use concerned the ease with which a homepage can be found and, not surprisingly, the effort a group puts into its Internet presence. One of the hypotheses stated that the feedback the group receives, both from members and potential supporters, should be higher the easier it is to find a group’s homepage (H3c). The value for this feature, namely being ‘easy to find’ was combined from results from search engines for the name of the group, Internet directories, and direct links from other sites. If a sympathizer had heard the name of the group, he or she might remember enough to feed it to a search engine, or just look in an Internet directory and recognize the name. In addition, interested web users could just click on an unknown name if it appeared in the appropriate directory or a link list. A higher value is given to more links and references, but of course some factors cannot be considered in this rating. Some names, for example, are so long and complicated that finding the group in a search engine from memory is difficult or bothersome. Some group names consist of only such common words that thousands of unrelated results come up. Usually, the values arrived at by these methods described fairly accurately how easy it was to find a group’s homepage. Although Figure 5.6 seems to indicate an association between the ‘easy to find’ variable and the variable for feedback (H3c), statistical tests could only find a low significance of this association (p=0.035). Even this is problematic because of the uneven distribution and the small sample. In very few of the groups was it possible to gain any technically informed response regarding access statistics, online enquiries, or the number of different visitors to the website. In some cases, the feedback value was defined by responses from group members that were rather intuitive judgements, combined with figures for the number of hits on a website, as noted on the site’s counter. It was not always possible to gain any data at all, and different standards to gain such values make the data less reliable. Hits on site counters, for example, increase when members and staff regularly access the page.

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Figure 5.6 H3c: Feedback depending on the ease with which a group’s homepage can be found. Two other hypotheses concerned associations between the Easy to Find category and visibility (H3d), and between the Easy to Find category and overall success (H3e). The graphs (Figures 5.7 and 5.8) indicate a rather clear trend. The statistical significance for both of these associations is high (p<0.001 with F=7.089 for H3d, and 8.418 for H3e). As mentioned above, the link between success and the ease in finding a homepage can work in both directions. In fact, the group that was easiest to find and, at the same time, most visible in the media was the Tsukurukai. This group of right-wing textbook writers was at the centre of a political storm and thus famous. It is obvious that many other pages linked to this page not because the Tsukurukai took steps to promote their website but because of its previously existing visibility. Still, this is a rather unusual case, and even exempting some groups from the sample that were very visible in the first place (and therefore easy to find) does not change the significance of the correlation.

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Figure 5.7 H3d: Visibility (in Internet and print media) depending on the ease with which a group’s homepage can be found.

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Figure 5.8 H3e: Success depending on the ease with which a group’s homepage can be found. Many of the other groups that were particularly easy to find are not so big, successful or visible that they would be expected to be easy to find on the Internet. They included the Japan Scientists’ Association, and the Consumers’ Union, followed by some suborganizations of internationally active NGOs like Save the Children Japan and WWF Japan, but also less-known groups involved in the peace movement, such as Network Chikyumura or Min’iren (Japan Federation of Democratic Medical Institutions). The groups scoring high on the ‘easy to find’ scale are involved in a broad range of issues (notably, except for women’s issues), and they include very different types of organizations with different aims (including politically left-wing and right-wing groups). The data give no obvious indication of what other factors could be involved in the observed relationship. It seems therefore quite likely that there is indeed a causal relationship between the ease of finding a homepage on the Internet and the respective group’s success.

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Digital divide The concept of the ‘digital divide’, as discussed in Chapter 1, means that some disadvantaged groups are less likely to use the Internet, or less likely to use it in such a way as to utilize it to its full potential. Empirical research about the digital divide has found significant differences in the Internet access or Internet use of different groups depending on socioeconomic status, educational background, race, age and gender (e.g. Hargittai 2002; Millward 2003; Mossberger et al. 2003; see Chapter 1 for details). This implies that those groups that would need the benefits of new media most are also least likely to use the Internet. Thus, even if we assume that a more active Internet presence is able to increase a group’s success, the most advantaged groups would reap the additional success of an active Internet usage, while the disadvantaged groups fall ever more behind, and the gap even widens. In order to explore the hypothesis that ‘disadvantaged groups use the Internet less than others (H4a) and are less successful with it (H4b)’, I have formed the subsample of women’s groups out of both the groups who campaign on women’s issues and some other groups mainly consisting of women (e.g. some peace groups and the pro-whaling group Women’s Forum Fish (WFF)). In all of them, a majority of staff and volunteers are women, and thus the digital divide theory, and statistics about gender and Internet use, would predict lower Internet use in these groups. Contrasting women’s groups and all other groups should therefore show differences in their Internet use (H4a), and presumably in success (H4b) as well. The visualization in Figure 5.9 shows a very clear difference in Internet use between women’s groups and the other groups. This visual impression supports the digital divide hypothesis. Statistical tests also confirmed that the difference was significant, although not highly so (p=0.031); women’s groups were also significantly less successful than the other groups observed (H4b). Evidence from interviews also supports the notion that women’s groups tend to use the Internet less than many others. ‘Meeting someone in person is a qualitative difference from e-mail contact,’ an activist said. ‘Mailing lists are best for short questions or appeals.’36 Keeping messages short is also imperative for the groups because many of their supporters and clients (the women they are trying to help) did not have access to computers, often not even via public libraries. Most, however, did have keitai with e-mail and Internet access. Accordingly, much of their Internet use is still limited to e-mails. They are likely (and well-advised) to shift their emphasis to homepages for mobile phones in the future, although none of the groups studied here had done so by early 2006. Considering the very small sample, with just 12 groups categorized as ‘women’s groups’, this issue certainly requires further research.

Conclusions The results of this research allow a tentative confirmation of the very general hypothesis that Internet use by citizens’ groups is related to success. They also demonstrate the gradual penetration of the Internet in Japan’s civil society: during the period of research, between 2001 and 2003, a large majority of even very small citizens’ groups used e-mail and had a homepage. However, most of the homepages were not very

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Figure 5.9 H4a: Use of the Internet by gender. elaborate. They offered very few interactive features, many did not even have a navigation bar or mention when the page was last updated—in some cases the homepages had not been updated for years. In spite of the prevalence of mobile phones with Internet access in Japan, few of the groups offered a special website with a reduced amount of data, which was then necessary to access a site by keitai. Less than half of the groups responded to e-mail requests, although presumably most of them would have answered a phone call or let an unannounced visitor come in. This illustrates that Internet use was, on the one hand, quite widespread among Japanese citizens’ groups, but not as relevant to their work as could have been expected in a seemingly high-tech country such as Japan. In particular, the technology in most cases did not change the way they worked. Websites were used in the same way as traditional minikomi (self-printed materials) had been before. One-way e-mail newsletters replaced faxes, and personal e-mails replaced some of the personal telephone calls—but usually only between people who had already met in person. The interactivity and anonymity of the Internet, and its anti-hierarchic networking style, did not impact on the way Japanese citizens’ groups did business. In a time of

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hyperlinks and BBS, most Japanese activists built their networks on personal introductions and visiting cards. Yet, the data also support some of the hypotheses about the empowering potential of the Internet, at least of some features, for such groups. The visualizations and statistical tests for these hypotheses suggest some features that are worthwhile to research further— for example, a user-friendly interface, dialogic features and good advertising of the homepage. Moreover, while it is clear that some of these relevant features require technical skills or investments that some groups can more easily afford than others—which explains some of the associations found with success—other, simpler features are also found to be relevant. Examples are the inclusion of a navigation bar in a homepage, and replying to email requests. Both require only very limited technical skills and a certain amount of time; even very small citizens’ groups with a few volunteers and low budgets can score high on these accounts. As the findings suggest an association between these rather simple features and success, they do indeed support the hypothesis of the Internet as an equalizer. On the other hand, the data also hint at the existence of a digital divide at least along gender lines. Some of the other assumed associations (e.g. between the Conservation of Visitors features and success) did not appear relevant at all, however. In addition, correlations might also appear (or disappear) by chance in the results, since many of the quantitative values used are approximations, and because outside factors not considered here could influence both the independent and dependent values and thus lead to a correlation. These difficulties with ‘soft’ data are inherent in the nature of this study and entail that a careful discussion of the findings and refining them in a further qualitative study are necessary. However, the correlation between simple and cheap tools with success indicates that resources as the most obvious outside factor are apparently not quite as relevant as might have been expected (even though it was not possible to control directly for budget and human resources). More money can certainly buy a nicer homepage—but, at least in this sample, that was not the key to success. The results certainly indicate the most relevant leads to pursue in further studies. On the other hand, some specific Internet features such as image maps or chatrooms have been found to be so irrelevant for this sample that they can be excluded in future similar research. Undoubtedly, the potential of the Internet is not yet used to its full extent. One major factor that is potentially a very powerful tool, namely the mobile Internet, could not be meaningfully researched at all because it was scarcely used by the groups studied here. Almost everyone in Japan, including many marginalized groups (like foreign workers or prostitutes), but also housewives, who are a large source of volunteer workers, has a keitai. Offering information specifically geared to keitai users could therefore greatly increase the reach of citizens’ groups who do not otherwise advertise. Presumably, this would increase the feedback from supporters and boost their success in general. However, very few groups offered such services and sites during the period of research, and mobile Internet connections played practically no role in the Internet strategies of the activist groups. This may, however, gradually change.

6 How umbrella organizations in Japan, Korea and Germany use new technologies A comparative approach Introduction This chapter uses a comparative approach to look at the connections between new media and civil society in different countries in order to substantiate the findings from the quantitative research in Chapter 5. Focusing on umbrella organizations as network nodes, it primarily tackles the question of whether new media help to increase the visibility and effectiveness of these groups within civil society and the public sphere. Thus, I consider the IT use of umbrella organizations in Japan, Korea and Germany on the one hand, and the visibility of their positions on the other. In addition to a consideration of Japan, Korea and Germany are also used as examples because all three countries are highly developed and have a similarly good Internet infrastructure easily accessible to civil society organizations. They are comparable in most aspects but have some distinct features (e.g. language, technology policies and political history) that might generate differences in the political use of new technologies. Previous research has indicated that differences in the technological infrastructure—even between similarly ‘highly developed’ countries influence—the way technologies are used, while differences in the political environment—even between democracies—affect the fervency and perhaps even the success with which they are used (Ducke 2004). Again, the choice of organizations and associations promoting minority positions or low-key issues ensures that some skill and effort were necessary for them to become part of the public debate. Indicators for a successful participation in the public sphere include the following: can the groups generate a discussion of these topics in the public sphere, beyond their immediate sympathizers? And are their particular positions visible in this discussion or do they even become dominant? Are they successful in putting the issues they care about on the political agenda? Does their use of new media provide them with a new forum for deliberation—at least with an alternative public sphere where they can introduce issues and viewpoints, with a chance that they will gradually penetrate broader and more traditional public spheres?37 If the intensity of discussion in the public sphere is a characteristic of strong democracy (Barber 1984; see also Habermas 1992; this volume, Chapter 1), a broad range of openly discussed topics and positions are also a prerequisite. These positions must be promoted and made visible in the public sphere so that they can be deliberated in the first place, even though many minority views may then be dismissed in the course of this deliberation. The ability of civil society organizations to carry their positions into the

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public sphere is therefore a precondition for strong democracy. Networking skills, in turn, are a major factor in enabling them to do so, and umbrella organizations play a central role in networking. The new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are generally considered to be (relatively) cheap, unmediated and anti-hierarchical, and as particularly beneficial to civil society with regard to networking and visibility (see Chapter 1). Based on this notion, civil society umbrella organizations should be more successful in promoting their issues and their views in the public sphere the more they use these convenient new media for their main functions, networking and representing their member groups. In this chapter, I examine the following assumptions: 1 Topics and views are more likely to appear in the broader public debate and in policymaking itself if the civil society umbrella organizations active in this field use new ICT extensively than if they rely mainly on traditional, offline methods. 2 At least in the long term, the actual outcome of political decisions is also more likely to be positive for such civil society organizations that use new ICT extensively. In order to explore these statements, I first establish for each case how the groups used new media for networking and self-advertisement. On the other hand, I rate the group’s and the topic’s visibility in the public sphere, and the group’s political success in certain issues. While an empirical testing of the assumptions is not possible based on such variables as can be generated for these items, setting the results in relation permits a judgement as to whether they are plausible or not. Concept of the study The central question is again whether new media, with their potentially empowering features, have a positive impact on the successful political participation of citizens’ groups. Whereas the in-depth case study in Chapter 4 involved a limited number of organizations, and Chapter 5 considered a larger number of very small groups in different issues, this third empirical project involves only nine organizations, all of them umbrella organizations fulfilling a number of criteria concerning the size of the group, technological access and topics covered. The groups are situated in several different issues and countries, but have very similar organizational features. I will briefly introduce each case and discuss the success of the organization, based on actual achievements, visibility and support, as well as assessments by the groups themselves and by outside observers. Finally, I will discuss the possible connection between the use of certain features of new ICT, the country and issue of the group, and various factors that together constitute the success of a group. Comparison between Japan, Korea and Germany Japan, Korea and Germany offer a broadly similar political and technological background, albeit with certain differences: all three countries are representative democracies, offering basic rights such as freedom of association, freedom of speech etc. In all of them, Internet penetration is sufficiently high that even a small citizens’ group can easily have access to the Internet and establish their own website.

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There are, however, some differences in the political system, the development of civil society and technology infrastructure: in Germany both democracy and civil society have a longer history than in the other two countries. In Korea, democracy has only gradually been achieved since the late 1980s, and most citizens regard it as something they brought about with their own actions. While Germany has a strong technological tradition, Korea is the current frontrunner in terms of Internet use and broadband penetration, and Japan is the country of mobile Internet. Participants at a workshop on E-Democracy in 2003 concluded that democratization experiences and the grown culture of political debate seem to be the most important factors for the citizens’ adaptation of new ICT for political activities (Ducke 2004). If persistent differences between the data in each country appear, these differences between Japan, Korea and Germany can become a useful starting point in seeking explanations. Factors considered The factors considered in this study are very similar to the previous project. On the one hand I look at data regarding ICT use, and on the other hand at indicators for the success, effect and outcome of Internet use for the citizens’ groups. Wherever possible, variables are expressed on scales to allow for a visual approach in exploring the results. A website analysis of each group’s site provides most of the data for the variables concerning the use of new ICT. Again, the five different ‘qualitative’ levels of Internet use explained in Chapter 1 (see Taylor et al. 2001) are employed for this analysis: e.g. whether the website is easy to navigate, or how useful the information is.38 Selfadministered questionnaires were used to gather information regarding the resources the groups devote to their Internet presence, and their strategies. Interviews with representatives of each group and additional research provided further data. As indicators for the ‘success’ of a group, I consider visibility and political effects, plus the satisfaction that group members profess with their Internet presence. These indicators are gathered and measured using a variety of tools: while I use interview questions to assess a group’s satisfaction with their networking and success, a judgement on their visibility and political effects is arrived at through background research and expert interviews. Quantitative content analyses of mass media—how often the group or the issue are mentioned in different media (including the Internet itself)—yield statistics regarding the visibility both of the group and of its issues. Political results can become evident in actual decisions made regarding the topic, but also in opinion polls and through evaluations by independent observers. Thus, success is estimated in the different categories of visibility, satisfaction and policy outcomes. Beneficial or detrimental circumstances in which these achievements or failures occurred are also considered to form an assessment of success that can be used for the further analysis of the data. Both visibility and success are indicated on additive, ordinal scales. Umbrella organizations as case studies Umbrella organizations are appropriate case study subjects because they require good networking skills to connect member organizations and, on a second level, individual

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members of these groups, not all of whom have direct contact with each other. As national organizations, they are also expected to establish or maintain connections with similar groups in other countries. It is for these communication and networking functions that new technologies are especially useful. Most umbrella organizations of citizens’ groups have a rather similar size and organizational level and thus are rather comparable. On the one hand, they are often sparsely staffed, depend on volunteers, and may not have the same resources for an Internet presence as governments or large companies, or even large civil society organizations. On the other hand they can be expected, at least in the countries researched, to have a website and some resources available for the use of new ICT. All the groups researched here have a budget for their website—unlike some of the smaller citizen’s groups in the previous chapter. They are relevant actors in the sense that they can represent far more people than other organizations of similar size, since sub-members are included in this figure. Umbrella organizations have two different specific member audiences, in addition to the larger public and the government they want to influence: namely the organizations that form their immediate membership, and individuals interested in the issue, including the members of these member organizations and, in some cases, direct ‘individual support members’ of the umbrella organization. In the three countries researched here, where Internet penetration is relatively high, umbrella organizations of NGOs can reach practically all their organizational members along with a large number of individual members and other interested individuals via the Internet. Most umbrella organizations do not have direct access to individual members, i.e. the members of its member organizations, in the form of membership lists and addresses. Even the number of these individual members can usually only be estimated in a form such as ‘representing approximately X million citizens’. Thus, this larger audience cannot be reached directly. While some individuals may sign up for an e-mail newsletter, most of them can only be reached in the same ways as the general public, namely via mass media or the Internet. Yet, they constitute a particularly interested part of this general public: they are more likely to be interested in at least some of the issues the umbrella organization deals with. Accordingly, they are more likely to watch a TV programme or read an article or an advertisement on these topics, or to visit the homepage of the umbrella organization—looking for information on these issues. For umbrella organizations, a website, together with mailing lists, is the only communication route they can easily use to reach their sub-members, as well as the general public, without any censorship by gatekeepers and almost without financial restraints. It is of course also the route that requires the most active involvement on the part of the audience, which is why the indirect link via the member organizations to individual supporters is relevant: they have a greater chance of learning about the umbrella organization and its homepage than the general public. The organizations researched here are fairly typical for nationwide NGO umbrella organizations in their country. The small selection cannot constitute a representative sample, but none of the groups has any clearly unusual features. All nine organizations selected have up to about 100 organizational members and a full-time staff of ten at most. While their main aim is to connect their organizational members, they also try to appeal to individual supporters. Their issues include development policies, history textbooks,

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peace, women and the environment. In order to make the comparison of groups in different countries and circumstances feasible, they were selected to fit a number of preconditions as closely as possible: • They are concerned with political, often controversial issues that merit deliberation in the public sphere. • The issues, or specific viewpoints on issues, are such that a considerable number of people are interested in them and in their public deliberation, and there are no serious dangers or legal restrictions on the discussion of these issues (as might be the case with, for example, Nazi ideology or illegal drugs). This means that there is a fair chance that the issues will be deliberated in the public sphere, and that the groups’ viewpoints may become visible. • The issues are sufficiently limited and defined to make statements about their visibility and a group’s success in the issue. • Their viewpoints differ (at least to some extent) from that of the government and the mass media. This is important for the analysis because otherwise it would be nearly impossible to attribute any impact to the umbrella organization. Any increased visibility of the issue in the public sphere, or policy decisions favouring the interests of the group, could then quite likely be due to factors such as internal moves within the government. • To highlight the networking potential of the Internet for the groups, they are preferably selected from issue areas with global or international aspects, such as development aid. In such areas, skilled use of new ICT would probably correspond to good international networking skills, which in turn should have a visible impact on a group’s performance. • The groups have an open membership and are not based on pre-existing categories like race or religion. This condition ensures that they are part of civil society as discussed in Chapter 1. • The groups are large enough to make use of new ICTs (e.g. to be able, in terms of budget and staff time, to maintain a website and an e-mail newsletter), but small enough to appear as less powerful actors compared to government offices or corporations, making them a suitable object of study to seek for the new media’s role in empowerment of these actors. They link member groups on the one hand, and individual members of those groups or other interested individuals on the other. Both communications aim at public deliberation, even if the first one is itself often in a private or semi-public sphere, where a limited membership either meets directly or exchanges news and viewpoints in mailing lists and Intranet not necessarily accessible to non-members. The groups are, however, not restricted to a specific legal status, partly because the provisions vary between the countries, and also because, at least in Japan, the legal forms available to such groups have changed in the recent past. All have the coordinating function of an umbrella organization, but in some cases they prefer to be seen as a network rather than evoking the hierarchical image of a traditional umbrella organization; one organization studied does not even have a formal office. The member organizations themselves are not limited to a certain legal type of organization and do not have to be

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formal, fee-paying members. The relationship between these groups is always a ‘one-tomany’ relationship, where the umbrella organization is the link between all other groups.

Brief introduction of the case studies Each case study is named with a short abbreviation. To facilitate matching the nine different groups with their not necessarily self-explanatory names, this abbreviation combines the first letter of each group’s country—K for Korea, J for Japan or G for Germany—with the first letter of its issue area: D for Development, T for Textbook, P for Peace, E for the Environment and W for Women’s issues. Thus, ‘KD’ is the Korean group working on development issues. These abbreviations are also used later in the text and graphics to facilitate categorizing the nine groups and comparing, for instance, those from the same country, or all those working on the same issue. The name and URL of the umbrella organization that stands at the centre of the case study are followed by a brief description of the group, its history, aims and recent achievements. Finally, a description of the website and use of new ICT leads to an evaluation of the group’s success and its connection with the use of new technologies. JD: Japan—Development Official English name: Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC). Original name (in Japanese): (JANIC) (Tokutei Hieiri Katsudo Hojin Kokusai Kyoryoku NGO Senta JANIC). Homepage: http://www.janic.org/ JANIC and Japanese development issues Founded in 1987, JANIC now unites 70 non-governmental development aid organizations. JANIC receives some government funding and its relationship with the government, like that of the other development NGO umbrella organizations covered here, is one of cooperation rather than confrontation. It is fairly professional and established, and became a registered NPO soon after this legal category was introduced in Japan in 1998. JANIC coordinates and supports the activities of its member organizations, for example by referring interested volunteers or by developing a set of guidelines for accountability (a code of conduct) (JANIC 2005) which observers say is influential in changing the quality of member organizations’ self-description (Kuroda 2005). JANIC also plays a role in networking with foreign NGOs on behalf of its member organizations. As one part of its activities, JANIC explicitly aims to inform a broader Japanese public about development issues. JANIC’s political goals include changes in government policies not only with regard to maintaining a high level of Official Developmental Assistance (ODA), but also to policy guidelines: while the Japanese government’s approach has traditionally emphasized development through economic growth, JANIC and its members campaign for human security and poverty reduction to be included as goals of ODA. They also complain that Japan still has no formal law regulating ODA policies and demand a legal framework.

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With regard to its aims concerning ODA figures and public support, JANIC has not been very successful: the size of Japanese ODA has returned to the level of about 1990, and Japan has recently lost its status as the world’s largest donor of ODA (see MOFA 2004c; Table 6.1). These much-publicized high absolute figures of ODA had been part of the Japanese government’s efforts to translate the affluence of the ‘bubble years’ into international influence and status, when military engagements were impossible (due to the pacifist Japanese constitution). On a per capita basis, the payments had not been unusually high, and with a low grant share compared to the other countries belonging to the OECD’s (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), they are not that generous in comparison. Since the early 1990s, Japan has experienced a decade of recession. The public has lost interest in development issues and, in particular, is increasingly less willing to support a high level of ODA. In recurrent opinion polls, the share of people who want to see ODA reduced or stopped doubled in about ten years to 29 per cent in 2003 (Gekkan seron chōsa 2004). This is partly because the payments are perceived as ‘donations’, although they have very practical economic functions, backed precisely by the official ODA policies of promoting development and infrastructure in (mostly Asian) countries that also constitute potential markets (Arase 1995; Söderberg 1996; Nuscheler 1998);. Developmental NGOs can at least witness a certain, slow improvement in official wordings of guidelines regarding ODA. In the ODA charter of 1992, human rights and environmental concerns were, for the first time, mentioned as factors in the assignment of ODA, although observers note that these principles are not necessarily adhered to (Arase 1995; Nuscheler 1998). In a similar way, official texts have in recent years come to include a number of concepts promoted by NGOs. For example, in recent guidelines on Japan’s medium-term policy on ODA, references to ‘education’ or to NGOs themselves are frequently made. Their ratio slightly increased during the draft period for the latest version of the policy document, from summer 2004 to early 2005—but it shows a slight decrease from the previous version of the guidelines adopted in 1999.39 The government has introduced regular consultation mechanisms with NGOs, and JANIC is included in this consultation process. In spite of such changes in the official rhetoric, observers are sceptical, believing that these are only cosmetic changes, and even wondering whether they will instead make it more difficult for NGOs to gain public support for controversial positions (Takahashi 2005). JANIC’s use of new ICT JANIC has a medium-sized website with a brief English version, and a small mobile Internet site. The website offers a fairly broad range of information about JANIC and development issues in general (Usefulness of Information), but its Ease of Interface score is only average, and it does not offer many incentives for casual visitors to come back (Generation of Return Visits). The only interactive feature is a survey regarding the design of the website. In particular, the group has no online newsletter or mailing list that could be advertised on the website, and there is no comment field, chat or BBS. The results of the website analysis regarding these qualitative features of the site are visualized in the overview illustration at the end of the case studies (Figure 6.1: JD). JANIC’s scores are best in the categories of Usefulness of Information and Conservation

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of Visitors, i.e. the middle categories on the scale from ‘one-way communication’ to ‘dialogic’. Its additive value on the Internet Use scale is fairly high, and the highest among the Japanese groups. One of the full-time staff members, without previous webmaster experience, takes care of the website and other online activities as part of his responsibilities. The budget for these activities is quite low both in absolute and relative terms. Although the site has, in different forms, existed since around 1995, the webmaster is not very satisfied with the website because it was meant to attract the general public and increase individual membership to JANIC. ‘But the number of individual supporters has stayed the same for the past two years, and people tell me that the website is difficult to understand’, he complained (Nakagawa 2004). The group’s new strategy is therefore to increase the depth of the site (i.e. the number of levels in which individual pages are arranged) and simplify the design, hiding more detailed information in deeper levels. Immediate benefits of the website can be observed in some cases. For example, JANIC uses its homepage and other web tools such as ‘NHK volunteer net’ or the mail magazine ‘NPO-NGO Walker’ to gather volunteers for events and records an ‘enormous’ response, often from people who would otherwise not have known about the event (Nakagawa 2004).

Figure 6.1 JD homepage.

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The present website does support some of the activities of JANIC, but for the functions it is intended to fulfil, namely broadcasting positions and information directly into the public sphere, it is not appropriate. Even that share of the general public that has some interest in development issues is insufficiently reached by this site, and this is in line with the fact that the visibility of these issues is low, and JANIC is overall not very successful. Of course, the category of success is, as discussed earlier, difficult to put on an absolute scale. Accordingly, statements like ‘successful’/‘not very successful’ must be seen in relation to the other groups assessed here. Considering all factors relevant for this research, JANIC’s success appears to be below average compared to how others have fared. JANIC’s difficulty in using new technologies successfully is two-fold. On the one hand, the strained economic situation in Japan and the public’s indifference to development issues mean that the group is in a difficult position anyway. On the other hand, the aim of attracting a broad audience to distribute information and views would require a different design, where the quality categories of Ease of Interface and Generation of Return Visits, along with Usefulness of Information (which is already high) should be more pronounced. In order to design and maintain such a website, far more resources would be necessary. JT: Japan—Textbook Official English name: Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21. Original name (in Japanese): (Kodomo to kyōkasho zenkoku netto 21). Homepage: www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21 The textbook affair and the background of the organization ‘Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21’ (or ‘Network 21’) was one of the protagonists of the textbook affair described in Chapter 4 (see also Saaler 2005). It emerged from a support organization for the leftist Japanese academic lenaga Saburo, who fought the Japanese government (with some success) for 32 years over his right to include controversial topics (such as the issue of the so-called ‘comfort women’) in school history textbooks (Buruma 1994; Petersen 2001). The group sees itself as an informal network rather than a formal umbrella organization, but it does have paying members—both individuals and groups—and maintains a small office with two full-time staff members. Its original aims were a revision of the government’s rigid screening system for textbooks, long before the Internet became a tool for activism. The ministry’s slow but gradual compliance provided the basis for a new, different problem confronting the group in 2001. Several right-wing journalists and academics had formed a group usually called ‘Tsukurukai’ (Production Group)40 and submitted a New History Textbook (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho: Nishio 2001) to the Education Ministry (MEXT). Although the book was much criticized in the screening process, and numerous changes were requested, the ministry approved it as a textbook for schools. It could then enter the complicated selection process, in which a variety of committees consider the different textbooks available (usually about five to ten for each subject) and then decide on one that will have to be used by all public (=non-private) schools in the district. Neighbouring countries as well as many Japanese protested against the ministry’s decision to approve

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the book, and then took action during the selection phase in order to prevent the use of the books in schools. Network 21 coordinated these Japanese protests. Eventually, the book in question was adopted in an extremely small number of schools in 2001, and only a few more in the following years. In none of these schools was the decision made by one of the normal committees—they were private schools or schools where a prefectural governor could influence the selection process. The authors then pledged a new effort for 2005 (when they managed to obtain a slightly larger share of 0.4 per cent of history textbooks). The revision system is still in place, and public attention has dropped since 2001. Thus, the stunning temporary success in 2001 has worn off a little; but it might still be repeated. Use of new technologies by ‘Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21’ The group has a small and simple website, with a very small English section but no site for mobile phones, and operates its own internal mailing list. The website is technically maintained by an external volunteer, who uploads new content once per week (or sometimes less often). A full-time staff member spends some time every day on the editorial aspects of the Internet presence, mainly postings to the internal mailing list and the preparation of contents for the website. Moderate costs amount to less than 1 per cent of the group’s budget.

Figure 6.2 JT homepage. The website is mainly used to make documents and information regarding upcoming events available to sympathizers. Most details about events circulate first on the mailing list available to paying members (groups and individuals), and this function is regarded as an extension of fax communications. In a comparable campaign in 1996/7, Network 21

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operated mostly offline, with fax and telephone. ‘With the Internet, campaigning became much more convenient’—more potential supporters could be reached, and the campaign was more efficient (Tawara 2002). Since the site is not easily found without some prior knowledge about the issue, most of the information is spread through acquaintances. Some of those who find the site by themselves are sympathizers but, of course, the site also attracts some readers who are opposed to the views presented by the group (i.e. supporters of the Tsukurukai), so that a considerable share of the e-mails sent in response to the website are aggressive. This is one reason why Network 21 has decided against other dialogic features, such as an open mailing list or a BBS. The website has low results in all five categories used to rate the quality—in 2001 it did not even have a navigation bar—and yet the group was quite successful during the peak of activity in 2001. It seems that numerous highly motivated activists accessed the site regularly or received information via the mailing list and took part in (mostly offline) protests advertised there. This suggests that even very simple online tools can improve performance under certain conditions (including, for example, a motivated audience and the feasibility of offline events). JP: Japan—Peace Official English name: World Peace Now. Original name: WORLD PEACE NOW.41 Homepage: www.worldpeacenow.jp/ A network of peace activists World Peace Now is a network founded in 2002 by around 40 NGOs and loose grassroots networks involved in peace activities. A majority of these member groups were primarily developmental, human rights, or environmental groups, but since they were all concerned about the American preparations for war in Iraq and there was no major peace organization or network existing in Japan, they decided to form a platform for coordinating their peace efforts. World Peace Now itself has no formal legal status, and not even a permanent office. All staff members are volunteers seconded part-time from member organizations. Based on the experience of atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, most Japanese regard themselves as pacifist. The Japanese constitution explicitly ‘renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means to settle international disputes’ (The Constitution of Japan 1946, Art. 9) and, accordingly, Japan has officially no military but only ‘Self-Defence Forces’. The Pacifist movement has been strong in the past, as exemplified by the ‘Beheiren’, a peace network during the Vietnam War. The peace movement then began to dwindle, confronted with changing perceptions of civic and military engagement. On the other hand, due to Japanese Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) missions, the image of the Self-Defence Forces improved. At the same time, the concept of civic, non-military engagement suffered after the first Gulf War of 1990, when Japan’s large financial contribution was not recognized internationally. Many disappointed Japanese started to consider the ‘legitimate’ use of

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mili-tary as the only way to gain international acceptance. Thus, there was no powerful peace movement in place in 2002, and the government seemed set on supporting the looming war for strategic reasons. During the winter of 2002/3, the prospect of war and the role of the Japanese government in it became a relatively important topic. Numerous opinion polls showed that a majority of Japanese opposed the government’s plans to endorse the war, let alone any involvement of Japanese troops (Asahi.com 2003; Asahi Shinbun 2003a; Japan Today 2003b; Mainichi Shinbun 2003; Napsnet 14 February 2003; Tokyo Shinbun 2003). The main aim of World Peace Now was to organize regular peace demonstrations in Tokyo and other cities and to distribute information regarding other peace-related events all over Japan. The Internet and e-mail played important roles in the group’s activities, in addition to traditional word-of-mouth propaganda and some advertisements in print media, usually organized by member organizations. The largest demonstrations organized by World Peace Now, on 8 March 2003 and 21 March 2003, succeeded in drawing 40,000 and 50,000 participants respectively, including many elderly, families and women with children. The World Peace Now logo and the peace movement became very visible in the Japanese media and on the streets (Japan Today 2003b, c; Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2003; Asahi Shinbun 2004c; Napsnet 24 March 2004; Figure 6.3). This was a major success by Japanese standards, because the last demonstrations of a similar scale had been violent clashes in the 1960s, and Japanese had come to regard political demonstrations as something that law-abiding and peaceful citizens would prefer to have nothing to do with. In the event, the government did support the war and afterwards dispatched SelfDefence Forces for rebuilding activities while public opinion remained opposed. However, after the war, public interest and the activities and impact of World Peace Now and similar activists dwindled. The temporary success in terms of mobilization and public opinion was quite substantial, although the organization did not succeed in preventing either the Iraq War or Japan’s dispatch of troops to Iraq afterwards (even the latter goal would arguably have been extremely difficult to achieve). Internet use by World Peace Now The website and mail activities of the group were very basic, especially on the lower dialogic levels, Ease of Interface and Usefulness of Information. The main website42 consisted of only two documents. The entry site was extremely long and crowded with information and links. It had no navigation bar, and information on the backers of the site was difficult to find. On the other hand, because there were almost no graphics, it would load quickly even in the slow dial-up connections most Japanese used at home in the period of research. The newest upcoming events were always listed at the top of the entry page. In addition, it was for some time possible to subscribe to a bi-weekly newsletter. The site offered no comment form or BBS, but instead provided some features for offline interactivity, such as downloadable flyers or playful poster designs with the World Peace Now logo for colouring in. Since the logo proclaims the URL of the group, ‘WorldPeaceNow. jp’, this was a quite useful way to attract more people to the website after each demonstration.

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Figure 6.3 Peace demonstration, Tokyo, 21 March 2003. The heartshaped ‘WorldPeaceNow.jp’ logos are clearly visible. The Internet presence of World Peace Now was primarily geared towards activists or at least those willing to get involved. It was made hastily by a few volunteers with some experience in web design, but not much time to test and improve the site. Yet, because of higher monthly server costs, it is the most expensive website considered here (even though the group has a relatively small total budget). A reduced website for mobile phones was added later in 2003.

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Figure 6.4 JP homepage. World Peace Now was surprisingly successful considering the basic and rather unappealing design of the site, and despite the fact that it has no off-line organization to compensate for this shortcoming. Although it worked only through onlinenetworking and some word-of-mouth propaganda, World Peace Now was instrumental in generating a high visibility for peace activists (even if the concrete aims of preventing the Iraq War and Japanese support for it were not achieved). The success of this site can be explained with the urgency of the issue and the high motivation of participants—organizers as well as visitors to the website—that ensured that questions or announcements via e-mail would be dealt with even if there was no automated space for debate. In addition, some simple interactive tools, such as flyers, helped to maintain pressure. GD: Germany—Development Official English name: Association of German Development Non-governmental Organizations (VENRO). Original name (in German): Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen e.V. (VENRO). Homepage: http://www.venro.org/ VENRO and development NGOs in Germany VENRO was founded in 1995 as an umbrella organization for German NGOs concerned with development policies. Estimates for the number of such groups range from about

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1,600 to well over 2,000 (OECD DAC 1995; Schmitt 2004), many of whom are affiliated with local church communities. Due to the specifics of the German support system for developmental NGOs,43 there is a very small number of large organizations, while the great majority are very small and often organized in yet smaller networks and associations. VENRO has about 100 direct members including most of the largest organizations as well as smaller umbrella organizations, e.g. of One-World shops or local initiatives, thus representing about 2,000 NGOs of different sizes and positions. VENRO supports coordination among its members and with the interested public. It also networks on behalf of its member organizations with similar organizations abroad, and promotes their positions. The German government consults regularly with VENRO on development issues. The political aims of the organization include an increase of ODA to 0.7 per cent of GDP, and government consideration of the views of its members. Many of these aims are already included in pledges formulated by the government (e.g. in ‘Aktionsprogramm 2015’).44 An important goal for VENRO is to ensure that these pledges will be fulfilled. VENRO has seen moderate success over recent years. A slight recovery of ODA figures after a sharp drop in 2000 is, to some extent, related to the relevance of ODA for antiterrorist policies, but a higher share of ODA allotted to civil society organizations can be attributed to pressure from the NGOs themselves (BMZ 2003, 2004; see also Table 6.1). These results were mostly due to favourable political conditions and a sympathetic government rather than to specific pressure or a change in public awareness. However, some aims are still far from being reached: ODA spending, at 0.28 per cent of GDP in 2005, is unlikely to reach even the 0.33 per cent promised by the government for 2006 (BMZ 2004; E.Bauer 2004). Internet use by VENRO The VENRO website is not very large, but clearly structured and easy to use. It offers a database of members, a site map and a search function as well as downloadable background texts, a calendar and a newsletter. Communication with immediate member organizations has shifted to direct e-mails, but a mailing list or BBS is neither available to direct members nor to the general public. Member organizations now receive an e-mail newsletter about twice a month—before it was introduced, staff members sent out little parcels full of flyers to the members every few weeks, and of course many of them would be out of date by the time the parcel arrived. The website is used as a more convenient version of traditional print publications. The intended audience are members and supporters as well as the general public. In terms of quality, the website gets relatively high scores on all five levels, and especially on the most basic one, Ease of Interface. Yet, the overall achievements of the organization, given the generally positive environment for its activities, are not high. Why has an organization with such a good website such little (relative) success? One explanation is that VENRO cannot make much use of one of the most important features of new information and communication technologies: speed. Because the issues covered by VENRO are normally long-term issues that require steady support, sending information online may save some money, but will not be sufficient to decide an issue. The website (just like posters and leaflets) first needs to hold the attention of casual

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visitors for long enough to achieve something: to influence their views, or to make them sign a petition or seek contact. A pleasant and user-friendly website is presumably the minimum requirement for generating this kind of commitment, but it still cannot make up for a lack of urgency and motivation on the part of members, sympathizers and activists.

Figure 6.5 GD homepage. GE: Germany—Environment. English meaning of the name:45 Federal Association of Environmental Civic Initiatives (BBU). Original name (in German): Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz e.V. (BBU). Homepage: www.bbu-online.de/ The environmental movement in Germany The BBU is a rather low-profile umbrella organization for about 130 mostly small environmental ‘civic initiatives’ (Bürgerinitiativen). These civic groups are often formed around a local issue. They experienced their heyday in the 1970s, when environmental activism developed in Germany, with often-violent protests against nuclear power plants and environmental pollution. The BBU was founded in 1972 by 15 such groups and soon expanded to become one of the most important players in German environmental activism of the time (Schreurs 2002:83–7). Since the late 1970s, green-voter’s lists started to gain political influence, and in 1983 the Green Party entered Germany’s

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parliament. From 1998 to 2005, it was part of the coalition government, and this gradually changed the political setting. Environmental issues came to be taken seriously by all parties, and today environmental activism is a mainstream rather than a protest movement. The BBU is still a coordinator of its member groups, but the activities have largely lost their aggressive and emotional aspects. Whereas the beginnings of the environmental movement consisted mostly in often colourfully staged NIMBY (‘not in my backyard’) actions against road projects or nuclear reactors, the current aims of the group are less dramatic and include an increase in the share of ecological agriculture and of sustainable energy generation, and a complete discontinuation of nuclear reactors. All these goals are now confirmed policies of the government: in 2002, a law was passed that limited the remaining usage period for existing nuclear reactors and prohibited the construction of new ones (BMU 2003).46 Several other laws promote renewable energy sources with the aim of doubling their share, in relation to 2000, by 2010. At least 12.5 per cent of power production should then come from renewable energies; helped by financial incentives and favourable weather conditions (wind and sunshine), they have already reached a share of 10 per cent (if only temporarily) in 2004 (BMU 2004a, b). Similarly, promotional efforts by the government helped to expand the area used for ecological farming as well as the market for ecological products. In 2002, however, environmental organizations were slow to react to an eco-food scandal, and consumer confidence took time to recover, so that it will be difficult to reach the market share goals (Ökolandbau 2004; Statistisches Bundesamt 2004:398; Bleischwitz 2005). The positive development of this sector is thus probably due to earlier rather than the most recent activities of the environmental movement. While most of the goals of the BBU appear almost fulfilled, the remaining task is to secure the implementation of policies already decided on. For these ends, slow and steady pressure is necessary, quite a different strategy from what the BBU has been used to. Internet use by the BBU E-mail is the main communication tool for the BBU, both for its contact with member groups and individual sympathizers. The group also operates several mailing lists and has used a variety of online petitions—which are most effective in a mixed online/offline strategy. Organizers explain that the online petitions can be ‘quite successful—especially if people print them out and use them to collect signatures in the street’.47 The website, designed in 2000 by a web-experienced volunteer and maintained part-time by one of the staff members, is very small and more a contact point than a source of information and support, although it does offer a seldom-used chatroom. On the five qualitative levels considered, this website gets among the lowest scores of all sites analysed here. The mailing lists and the chatroom are used by member groups and sympathizers already familiar with the BBU and its aims. The website also provides a point of access for interested individuals especially after they have seen TV programmes mentioning the BBU or its main topics, but the group does not see it primarily as a means to attract such new visitors or to provide information to journalists. This is similar to other environmental groups in Germany who are regarded as slow in taking up new

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technologies, compared, for instance, to the much younger anti-globalization movement.48 The success in most of the BBU’s recent goals may be due to factors other than the use of new technologies—mainly its longstanding offline activism and the resulting positive political environment. Still, BBU representatives are quite satisfied with their online activities. Given the political backing for their main aims and the difficulty of generating even more interest and motivation in a general audience, it is perhaps appropriate for this rather small group to place only low expectations on its Internet presence and to limit its function to communication with a very limited range of member groups and supporters.

Figure 6.6 GE homepage. An assessment of the BBU’s success for the purpose of this study is quite difficult: on the one hand, most of the goals are achieved, and many traditional positions of the BBU have become majority views. The BBU continues to coordinate activist groups, and such horizontal networking is regarded as a crucial factor for the success of the environmental movement in Germany (Foljanty-Jost 2005). On the other hand, advocating their common goals to a broader public is not a main priority of the group. As far as the immediate interest of the group is maintaining to be prepared for lobbying if necessary, the low-key networking strategy must be regarded as successful. If, however, the aims include further mobilization and expansion to reach even more people, the BBU is certainly falling behind other activists. In this case, a failure to adopt new technological strategies is one of the reasons behind this stagnation. It is combined with, and presumably related to, the increasing average age of its members, activists and

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sympathizers: many of them have been involved since the 1970s and feel more at ease with offline activities and street action. GP: Germany—Peace Official English name: Network of the German Peace Movement. Original name (in German): Netzwerk Friedenskooperative. Homepage: www.friedenskooperative.de/ The peace movement in Germany In contrast to the Japanese peace organization, World Peace Now (JP), Netzwerk Friedenskooperative, founded in 1989 as a successor to an earlier coordination network for the German peace movement, has a long history. It is a sponsored network rather than a membership organization: the group’s budget depends on donations and subscriptions to a bimonthly journal, but most of its services are freely available to the whole spectrum of peace activists (and others). Accordingly, three full-time staff members at Netzwerk Friedenskooperative coordinate the activities of many thousands of sympathizers organized in quite diverse, often very small groups. The main goals of Netzwerk Friedenskooperative in the period of 2002 to 2004 were the prevention of the Iraq War and Germany’s participation in it, as well as reductions in weapons exports. The Iraq War was not prevented, but public opinion in Germany was decidedly opposed to the war, and the government did not send troops. Considering that the once-mighty German peace movement has struggled with legitimacy problems since the end of the Cold War, the mobilization of protesters in this high-profile issue was quite successful: spread over different locations, about 200,000 people joined the protest activities, although the expected danger of a war in Iraq could not match the nuclear standoff situation in the early 1980s in terms of its mobilizing effect (Johannsen 2005).49 On the other hand, Germany’s weapons exports, which had dropped slightly in the 1990s, even started to increase again during this period in spite of a previous pledge by the government to reduce them. In this issue, the activists failed to mobilize sufficient support (Nachtwei and Roth 2004). Internet use by Netzwerk Friedenshooperative Direct e-mail has replaced the fax as the most important communication tool for Netzwerk Friedenskooperative: the organization has a large database with contacts and sends important announcements or campaigns directly to each e-mail address. In addition, the fairly large website serves as a source for up-to-date information and as an archive for the German peace movement. It is easy to find and well designed. The site was first established in about 1998 with external help, but has since undergone several major revisions. One staff member is a programmer, but all regular staff members spend a considerable part of their time on the Internet presence. While the site deliberately offers no BBS or other communication tool (which the organization does not regard as part of its responsibilities), staff members take care to answer all e-mails addressed to the network.

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Although the German opposition to the Iraq War was largely due to the macropolitical situation rather than to pressure exerted by peace activists, the website of Netzwerk Friedenskooperative served as a major coordination space for peace activities, contributing to the size and visibility of the protest movement. The site mostly aimed to update regular supporters on new developments and planned activities, but could also engage casual visitors. Indeed, in some instances local police have contacted the organizers of a demonstration because they had not officially pre-registered it yet—the appeal for the demonstration was already listed on the Netzwerk Friedenskooperative calendar, and the police just checked the website to keep informed.

Figure 6.7 GP homepage. In contrast to the Iraq War issue with its clearly-felt sense of urgency and impulsive support among peace activists and a broader public alike, it was obviously much more difficult to mobilize steady pressure regarding an issue such as weapons exports which lacks a high profile. Apart from offline factors, such as celebrity endorsement to increase the visibility of the issue, a broader range of online activities and mixed online/offline features, including chatrooms and downloads (petitions, posters, web banners) could have added to the success in this issue. On the whole, however, the peace movement in Germany is seen as doing relatively well for the changed times (Johannsen 2005). This can be attributed to its skilled use of new technologies for networking among motivated activists. KD: Korea—Development Official English name: Korea NGO Council for Overseas Cooperation (KCOC). Original name (in Korean): (KCOC) (Hangug Haeoe Wonjo Danche Hyeob’uihoe KCOC). Homepage: ngokcoc.or.kr

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Development policies in South Korea The Korean counterpart of JANIC and VENRO was founded in 1999 and currently has 39 organizational members. As development NGOs usually rely to some extent on state funding, KCOC is more willing to cooperate with the Korean government than many other Korean civil society organizations (which often identify themselves explicitly as NGOs in the sense of being ‘non-governmental’). KCOC coordinates networking between its member groups and lobbies for ODA increases and government support for developmental NGOs, but it also hopes to appeal to a broader public and to increase awareness of development issues. Part of its role is to refer interested individuals to appropriate NGOs for volunteer services etc. Closer networking with NGOs in other countries is also envisioned. Korean Official Development Assistance, traditionally not a main concern of the Korean government and cut further by the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, has been moderately increasing since 2000. The government follows the worldwide trend of working more closely with developmental NGOs that began after the Rio Earth Summit (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UNCED) in 1992 and has raised the share of ODA allocated through NGOs. The grant share of total ODA is also improving again, although it remains well below the average in the OECD’s DAC countries (Korea Exim Bank 2004). The public and international visibility of KCOC and its contacts are still poor, but in general, KCOC has achieved moderate success.

Table 6.1 Official Development Assistance in comparison ODA million ODA % of ODA Annual average % Grant element % of US$ 2004 GNI 2004 change in volume 1998/99– ODA commitments 2003 2003/4 Germany 7,497 0.28 Japan 8,859 0.19 Korea 183 0.06 (2002) DAC 78,568 0.25 Total Sources: Korea EximBank 2004; KOICA 2005; OECD 2005.

2.5 −4.8 11.1

97.5 87.5 59.7

4.1

97.2

KCOC’s online presence The group’s Internet presence is of rather high quality, although the Ease of Interface of the website is unusually low as the site has neither a search function nor a site map. This may be due to the fact that the group has only had a website for about four years without any complete renewal. It was designed professionally for a reduced fee (for non-profit organizations) and is maintained by an outside provider. The KCOC staff members use an administrator interface which is part of the providers’ homepage contents management package to update the contents. None of them had much experience with such technology before, but they did not find it difficult to learn.

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The site offers a restricted area for members and several bulletin boards, but they are not much used because KCOC also operates several internal and general mailing lists, and most of the members use these for their internal communication. KCOC representatives have no explanation for their audience’s preference for mailing lists over web-based BBS, which is unusual for Korea. The low number of direct members (39 organizations) may account for the low level of activity on the bulletin boards (some of them exclusively for group members). Other sympathizers can perhaps be reached better via mailing lists since they are not sufficiently committed to visit the website regularly.

Figure 6.8 KD homepage. KCOC’s priority is to coordinate activities between member organizations and lobbying on their behalf with the government. Although the group tries to address a general public, too, its mailing lists as well as the website are primarily used for internal networking. The web and e-mail use at KCOC appear quite professional, but more akin to the use of other office appliances than like a new networking and advertisement tool. It appears that this level of technology use is absolutely necessary to achieve any success in the Korean context (including contacts with the government). A further increase in the use of technologies could push the limits to some extent, but would perhaps not enhance the success of this group in proportion to the added effort.

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KT: Korea—Textbook Official English name: Asia Peace and History Education Network. Original name (in Korean): (Ashia Pyeonghwa Wa Yeogsa Gyoyug Yeondae Gyogwaseo Undong Bonbu). Homepage: http://www.japantext.net/ The textbook affair in Korea Asia Peace and History Education Network corresponds to the Japanese group Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 (JT). It is an umbrella organization for those Korean activist groups protesting against the right-wing New History Textbook (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho, Nishio 2001) published in Japan in 2001. The group also coordinates other efforts for monitoring and discussing the description of Korea in history textbooks, not only in Japan. It has 87 paying member organizations and, in 2004, for practical purposes, formalized its legal status to that of a research institute. Compared to JT, the Korean group’s aims are more clearly focused on the defeat of the New History Textbook and similar books. The details of the Japanese textbook screening system are of no concern to the Asia Peace and History Education Network— in any case, the respective Korean screening system is far more restrictive than the Japanese system. In contrast to JT, which is critical of Japanese nationalism, (Korean) nationalism is the prime motivation for the Korean group. In this respect, it was more successful in 2001 than JT was, since the aim of preventing widespread use of the book was achieved and public opinion, not only in Korea and large parts of Japan, but also in the international arena, mostly con-demned the book. Later, public attention receded somewhat, but it may quickly reappear since textbook debates are a recurring issue in bilateral relations.50 Online activities of the Asia Peace and History Education Network The Asia Peace and History Education Network has quite a large website, including not only the backlogs of all its bulletin boards but also a wealth of background information on history textbooks and the textbook controversy between Japan and Korea in particular (Figure 6.9). The last renewal of the website, including the development of an animated ‘cyber classroom’, was made possible through a state-sponsored programme for civil society organizations. The website is geared not only to members and supporters looking for specific information on events, but also aims to provide background information to journalists and researchers: ‘When something happens, people want to get information on textbooks, and then it is important to have all this information prepared as data and readily accessible via the Internet’ (Kang 2004). This dual audience may explain the comparatively low priority given to the Generation of Return Visits category, since both groups have their own reasons for visiting the website whenever the issue is in the news. On the other qualitative levels, the site has rather high results.

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The group gains much of its success from the underlying nationalism backing its activities but, in turn, its coordinating activities, not least through the website, clearly helped to mobilize protest and to make that protest visible.

Figure 6.9 KT homepage. KW: Korea—Women Official English name: Korea Women’s Associations United (KWAU). Original name (in Korean): (KWAU) (Hangug Yeoseong Danchae Yeonhab). Homepage: www.women21.or.kr/ KWAU and the South Korean women’s movement KWAU is one of two Korean umbrella organizations of women’s groups, with a number of regional branches and a headquarters in Seoul—with about ten fulltime staff, it is one of the largest of the umbrella organizations in this study. It was founded in 1987, although its roots reach into the general democratization movement in the early 1980s. KWAU has five regional sections and 28 member organizations, most of them umbrella organizations of their own. KWAU’s main goals are increasing the awareness of gender equality and the share of women in leading positions (in parties and government positions partly via quotas). The most important topic for the group in 2003 and 2004 was the abolition of an old, patriarchal family registration system called the hoju system.51 KWAU led a campaign against this system for years and, in February 2005, it was finally abolished. The improvement of women’s positions and of the perception of gender

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equality are less pronounced, but statistics such as the number of female parliamentarians, the UN Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), and opinion polls about gender perceptions show that the situation has continually improved over the past few years (The Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office (ROK) 2003; Soh 2004; UNDP 2004a). Like many Korean citizens’ groups, KWAU not only keeps its distance from the government, but also engages in a very broad range of issues outside its main area of interst. Thus, the organization also mobilized its members and sub-members (unsuccessfully) to prevent Korean participation in the Iraq War and (successfully) to reverse an impeachment decision against President Roh Moo-hyun. KWAU online The organization had its first website in 1997 and used e-mail and earlier methods of digital data transfer before most government offices did. Online communication is considered very important and includes direct e-mails and numerous mailing lists for quite differentiated groups. The website (Figure 6.10) was designed (with government funding)52 as an archive for the women’s movement in Korea. It is the largest and most professional website of all the groups studied here, with quite high scores on all of the five qualitative levels. Yet, the main audience addressed by the website is not the general public, but regular visitors who want to access one of the bulletin boards on the site or the free member log-in area. Their preferences are carefully monitored. In contrast to JANIC (JD), for example, KWAU has recently decided to reduce the depth of the site and to put most links and features directly on the first page in order to lessen the number of clicks, which regular visitors had found annoying.

Figure 6.10 KW homepage.

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KWAU has been quite successful in achieving its aims, considering that the traditional media, despite the recent democratization, are still very conservative ‘gatekeepers’ and slow to open up to women’s issues. Achieving not only high visibility for their topics but also political decisions in their favour in the hoju issue is therefore a major accomplishment for the group. This can partly be traced back to a charismatic leadership and personal links with other large NGOs, most notably PSPD (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, or Chamyeo Yeondae), one of the ‘key players’ of civil society in Korea (Kern 2005:183). The skilful use of new technologies—especially in the technology-friendly Korean context—has played a role in ensuring the influence of KWAU, in addition to the crucial offline-factors. Summary: use of new ICT in the nine case studies Most of the groups have adjusted their information strategies to make use of newly available technologies and to reach their intended audience in better ways. In spite of the inherent interactivity of the Internet, it becomes clear that one-directional distribution of information is still predominant. A graphic overview (Figure 6.11) of the data gathered for Internet use shows this quite clearly.

Figure 6.11 Overview over the five levels of Internet use by the nine umbrella organizations (source: result from website analysis. Variable range: 0–1 for each category). The most clear-cut differences appear in the Ease of Interface category that describes the most basic (and least dialogic) conditions for one-way communication. The results in the

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most dialogic categories, Dialogic Loop and Generation of Return Visits, are, by contrast, similar (and rather low) for all groups. These differences in the qualitative categories do not show very clear-cut alignments according to countries or issues. This is surprising since some such country- and issue-specific differences in the general use of new technologies become quite obvious.

Results The analysis of the data results in two major blocks of findings: on the one hand, the overall use of new ICT is found to differ significantly between the different groups. These differences can be accorded most clearly to the country where the group is active (although we have just seen that the quality of the websites differed not so much in each country). The type of issue and the audience that is addressed, as well as financial and knowledge resources, also contribute to these differences. On the other hand, some generalizations can be made regarding the success achieved with the help of new ICT. The discussion of the case studies does not support the general assumption that the use of new ICT per se increases visibility and political success, but the findings do highlight some circumstances and applications where technology can make a difference. Table 6.2 gives an overview of the conditions applying to each group.

Table 6.2 Overview of groups. 1 JD

2 JT

3 JP

4 GD

5 GE

6 GP

8 KT

9 KW

HP size

small

small

small

small

small

medium medium large

7 KD

large

HP quality

high

low

medium high

low

high

medium medium high

HP design1

self

out

self

out

out

self

out

out

out

HP maintenance1

self

out

self

self

self

self

self

self

self

HP history

long

medium short

long

medium long

medium short

long

Predominant communication channel

mail

mail

mail

mail

mail

mail

mail

web

web

Budget and grants for HP2

low

low

high

grant

low

grant

low

grant

grant

Audience

general members general mixed

members mixed

mixed

mixed

mixed

Membership/sympathizers

large

medium large

large

small

small

medium large

commitment of members and sympathizers

low

high

high

medium medium medium low

high

high

Issue type

longterm

flash

flash

longterm

longterm

mixed

low

low

Visibility

low

low

high

Strength of network

low

high

medium medium high

Policy success

low

high

medium low

−3

large

flash

longterm

flash

high

low

high

high

medium medium high

high

medium medium high

high

Notes 1 ‘self’ = performed by the group itself; ‘out’ = outsourced with or without payment. 2 ‘low/high’ = budget allocated to Internet presence; ‘grant’ = Internet presence is largely financed by a government grant or programme, irrespective of the amount. 3 No clear assessment possible; see discussion in the text (page 106).

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Different uses of new ICT Country Perhaps the most obvious difference in the use of technology is between the three countries and primarily related to infrastructure conditions. One major difference pertains to the use of mobile phones for electronic communication: they are most prevalent in Japan as a medium not only to read e-mails and newsletters, but also to access a simple version of websites: ‘Our volunteers said we should have a website for mobile phones. It’s rarely updated, but at least there’s our address and a map on it’ (Nakagawa 2004). In Germany, this is far less prevalent as most mobile phones are not capable of web access or even e-mail (as opposed to SMS), while mobile phones are widely used for email in Korea, but rarely for website access.53 Thus, websites directed at mobile phones are more widespread in Japan than in Korea or Germany. Mailing lists—a mainstay for Japanese citizens’ groups—are of less importance in Korea, where most people prefer the more convenient and interactive environment of a website BBS. Many Koreans interested in politics are familiar with such online forums because the Korean print media landscape is dominated by conservative gatekeepers and alternative opinions can rarely penetrate (Lee 2003b). Design and maintenance The rather large size and at least average quality of the Korean groups’ websites can partly be explained by their tendency to outsource both the design of their website and the hosting to companies or NGOs who offer them a tailored website with a contents management system and high size limits. Only the content is managed in-house, and often de-centralized by all staff, via an administrator page. Representatives consider the technical support as ‘not particularly expensive’, although two of the three Korean groups spend more than 1 per cent of their budget on their Internet activities, compared to only one group in each of the two other countries. NGOs often get a relatively cheap deal on such services, offered either by non-profit organizations specializing in such kind of technology support, or by regular companies who regard the discount as a contribution to civil society. Such services are available in the other countries, too, but are less wellknown. In addition, NGOs often use government funding for a specific project strategically to improve their whole website in the process of implementing the project. In Germany, the initial web design is often done by a professional, but the groups then maintain their websites themselves, not necessarily with user-friendly software. These websites are much smaller in size than the Korean ones, and most do not use BBS or other systems that allow easy additions to the content and thus quickly increase the file size of the site. This is related to—at least perceived—higher costs of maintaining a large website. The websites of Japanese groups tend to be designed at no or very low cost by a volunteer or a staff member with some Internet skills who also continues to maintain it. The other staff members often do not know how to update it and instead send their contents to the webmaster by e-mail.

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Interestingly, the difference between countries in overall Internet use and in website design and maintenance appear unrelated: it would indeed make sense, at first glance, that Korean organizations, who outsource much of their Internet work to professionals, have a ‘larger’ web presence than the groups in other countries where amateurish homemade design is the norm, but this comparison does not hold within countries. The groups with the lowest results on the qualitative website ratings, GE and JT, are those who outsource much or all of their web design and maintenance, while GP and JD have, for their respective countries, quite impressive websites cared for by regular staff. It is also tempting to explain the differences between Korea and the other countries by citing the vigorous IT education in Korean schools—but most of today’s activists attended school before IT education was introduced (Lee 2003b). Due to the high broadband penetration and popularity of web-based applications (which is related to government policies), it is obvious that Koreans were, on average, more familiar with the Internet. Especially on the level of basic skills (such as using a mouse and keyboard, finding materials online), the average level of skills is different in the three countries. These skills appear to be an important factor for successfully using the Internet (Mossberger et al. 2003). In this sense, the data support the concept of a skills divide based on experience rather than the theoretical availability of resources (see Chapter 1). This divide is of course replicated as experienced users (such as most Koreans) are more likely to try new tools and thus acquire further skills. Size and depth In terms of file size and page numbers, the Korean websites in the study are by far the largest of the three countries (see Figure 6.12). As most use BBS rather than mailing lists, the websites also contain the backlogs of all the discussion groups. In addition, they often make extensive use of photos, video clips and flash animations. The high level of broadband penetration means that Korean groups can afford to have the kind of flashy sites that users in other countries would quickly get annoyed with because they load slowly and require special plug-ins. Contrary to most of the organizations in the other countries, Korean groups profess to a trend of decreasing the depth of their site to two or three levels, with most headlines and links on the main page: ‘People are tired of those many technical details and clicking through too many levels’ (Kim Y.J. 2004). Issue and audience Few clear patterns are distinguishable regarding the qualitative levels of Internet use, but the deeper investigation of the case studies indicates some trends that are related to the type of issue a group is concerned with.

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Figure 6.12 Size of websites (source: webmasters and log data from webcopying software). Some of the main issues discussed by the groups considered here (such as the textbook issue) appeared rather suddenly and involved a major decision or deadline in the near future. At least initially, it was more important for the activists to gather immediate, massive support than to build up a steady base of supporters. On the other hand, such impulsive one-time support was also forthcoming from an audience already alerted by the media presence of the issue. Even if the umbrella organizations existed previous to the emergence of this particular issue, their websites suddenly became a focal point for potential supporters and only required regular updates with the newest dates and facts to keep the issue alive. Other issues (such as development), by contrast, lacked such a sense of urgency among the audience, and the groups mainly concerned with such issues had a harder time in mobilizing support. In order to reach their intended audience and generate steady support, they had to offer more than just the raw data about the next demonstration. It is especially noteworthy that some of the umbrella organizations pursuing flash issues (notably JT, JP, KT) are content with a rather simple Internet presence with low scores not only at the high end of the qualitative levels (e.g. Dialogic Loop), but also regarding the basics of one-way interaction, such as Ease of Interface, or Usefulness of Information. In a similar way, some of the groups addressed mostly a very specific, already interested audience, while others attempted to engage a larger public and to influence the general public deliberation of, for instance, development issues, peace or women’s issues.54 Among the groups researched, JT, KT, and GE remained most focused on their respective support groups, and these had, in each country, the lowest total score for Internet use on the five qualitative levels. To some extent this is probably related to the fact that websites of groups trying to address a broader public—such as KW—often have an archival function for the public and for journalists. In combination with active lobbying (including press releases), these websites increase the likelihood of being

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mentioned in the media because journalists use the data provided in such archives. KT, however, in spite of addressing a relatively specific audience, has also built such an archive, mainly aimed at journalists. In general, however, we can see a relationship between the type of issue and intended audience, and the design of the websites: simple websites for flash issues and motivated audiences, more elaborate designs for general issues and casual visitors. This relationship may seem trivial but is not easy to measure since most organizations deal with several (related) issues with a changing level of immediacy and impulsive appeal. The design of a website, however, is not changed every time a major decision is imminent. Rather, in many cases the evolution of the website design also involves a development of the organization over several years: as long as (new) groups address a specific, sympathetic audience and coordinate urgent actions, they tend to put low priority on the design of the website, easy navigation features and even responsiveness. They use Internet and e-mail as simple announcement boards and trust that whoever is interested will look for the relevant information. Once the groups move away from just providing an arena for niche interests and hope to open more to the general public sphere, they add more elaborate features and increase the quality of the site. This is often (although not necessarily) a sequential development and accompanied by the gradual settling of the flash issue into a long-term concern. A typical website would thus be set up hurriedly by an ad-hoc group campaigning on a specific, immediate issue, just in order to keep the highly motivated members and sympathizers informed about the latest announcements. As the issue drags on, it loses its sense of urgency, and many supporters drop out, while, on the other hand, the group becomes more organized and more experienced. It will then improve the design of the site in order to retain members and attract new supporters. Money and experience One very important finding of this study relates to the impact of spending on ICT on an Internet presence. While it is obvious, and of great concern to digital divide researchers, that ‘more money can buy better websites and maintenance’, this effect is not as pronounced within the limited range of budgets covered here. Although all groups have a somewhat similar size and budget, they spend very different amounts on their Internet activities. Within this range, higher spending—be it absolute, or relative to their budget— is not found to have any impact on the size or quality of their website. At least among such similar citizens’ groups, resources apparently do not create a digital divide: ‘Whether a website is successful depends on the people who use it and participate in it, not on the money’ (Kim Y.J. 2004). On the other hand, the results point to another kind of digital skills divide that may exist even among these similar organizations. Interestingly, this relates to the experience of the organization as a whole, not to the experience of the webmaster: Those organizations that have had their own websites for years could apparently benefit from organizational learning as an effect of individual members’ experiences on the organization’s shared knowledge (Argyris and Schön 1978:29). These organizations tend to get higher scores on the five qualitative levels of Internet use than those that have only acquired an Internet presence recently. They also assign less staff time to Internet-related work. In some of these organizations with a longer history, the webmaster only learned

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the skills on the job. For example, the webmasters at JD and KW—the organizations with the longest history of owning a website—both say that they never had a personal website or any web experience outside this job, and did not even manage their respective websites from the beginning; and yet these websites offer more features on all qualitative levels than the others (Figure 6.13). Apart from online experience, the average age of members, statistically an important factor in web access and skills, may have played a role in the low level of Internet use in GE and JT (see Chapter 4). Organizations that have delayed their Internet appearance for reasons not necessarily related to access and funding may therefore be in a weaker position to use the potential of the Internet. It is interesting to note that the groups with the shortest Internet history are especially lacking the most basic features, namely those related to Ease of Interface (see p. 122). Success with technology? Technology alone is no solution The case studies in this chapter do not offer any support for the assumption that success automatically increases with the use of technology. Spending more time and money on technology and having a bigger, better, nicer website will not automatically lead to more success, although the frontrunners tend to attribute their success in part to their skilled use of technology. This is not to say that certain ways of using new ICT cannot help an organization to be more successful.

Figure 6.13 Internet use and length of website history (source: website analysis, webmasters. Variable range for Internet use: 0–1).

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There are, of course, depending on needs and circumstances, areas where technological features can greatly improve the performance of an organization. For example, representatives of several groups (especially those in the development sector) noted that their Internet presence has a direct impact on their volunteer recruitment. In some cases, casual visitors to the website had seen a call for volunteers on the website and registered at the whim of the moment; in other cases, people interested in volunteering in one of the member organizations had posted questions at the umbrella organization’s BBS and, taken in by the responses provided, ended up as volunteers for the umbrella organization itself. Another example for the immediate benefit of an organization’s Internet presence is the consultation of the website’s log file for event planning, as an indicator for the scale of participation: ‘From the access to the website, we could often guess how many people would come to the demonstration (Uchiyama 2004). Issues and audiences The results show that the success of using new ICT depends primarily on the context, namely the issue and the audience. Although the case studies were specially selected in order to represent relatively similar groups in these terms, the small differences between them can still be made responsible for considerable variations in ICT use and success. The results indicate that audience and issue are determining factors for both the use of new ICTs and the success achieved with their help. Although all the groups researched here have a rather clearly defined specific audience of members and sub-members or supporters, it turned out in the interviews that they try to engage the general public, or sub-members not very attached to the cause, to a different extent. Those groups who primarily address a specific audience of sympathizers already familiar with the issue tend to achieve more (and to be more satisfied) even with simple websites lacking many basic features. The broader the audience, the more difficult is the task to please casual visitors, inform them about the issue and convince them of one’s position (and credibility). Accordingly, the various qualitative features of the website must be more developed, especially regarding design and information. This is why the groups active in development issues, as well as some others (KW, and to a lesser extent, GP and JP), that try to engage a broader audience, have on average ‘better’ websites (i.e. higher scores on the five quality levels). They have to offer more features to engage their less-motivated audience than those groups focussing on a specific audience—which achieve relatively more with the use of less ICT, or with lower scores on the qualitative scale. GE, for example, with a very simple website, could look back on considerable success—at least when only its smaller aim, of coordinating ongoing activities of a movement that has achieved much over the last 30 years, is considered. Even more pronounced is the distinction between success in flash issues compared to success in long-term issues. Although there were some concrete decisions to campaign for in all issues, in some of the case studies the sense of urgency was naturally greater: The textbook activists (JT, KT) and peace activists (JP, GP) in particular—and, to a lesser extent, the women’s organization (KW)—had an immediate reason to gather support and mobilize urgent action by their supporters. Considering that this immediacy often results from an unfavourable environment and the fear of suffering defeat, these

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groups did rather well, even with simple websites. JT and KT (with the lowest scores for quality in their respective countries) were notably quite successful—JT without even such basic features as a site map, a search function, or information on the group size or structure. The organization also got low scores on the Dialogic Loop level (including feedback features on the website and e-mail responsiveness), but it is possible that responsiveness (via e-mail) was better with regard to the specific, often personally known, audience of the group. Other results, also from the previous studies, indicate that the features included in Dialogic Loop and Generation of Return Visits (e.g. calendars of events, newsletters) are important for this kind of mobilization. In this context, the question of organizational website experience should be considered again. The groups with the longest-standing websites were those dealing with development issues and women’s issues; in other words, more enduring issues in need of constant, steady support. On the other hand, most of the groups primarily pursuing flash issues (JP, JT and KT) had only created a website rather recently, and had simple sites, especially in terms of Ease of Interface. This suggests again that the Internet presence of most umbrella organizations undergoes an evolution from a small and simple site with the aim of coordinating some instant action to an ever more elaborate site. The original audience is already familiar with the topic, convinced of its urgency and visits the website to gain information on upcoming events. This form of Internet presence is an extension of traditional newsletters, mailing lists and direct mails. Gradually, however, the aims of the organization shift to securing a more steady support, or to address a broader audience, and the requirements for the website also change. The findings indicate that the use of new ICT can make a considerable difference in the early stages of this development, i.e. with simple tools but a limited and motivated audience. In the later stages, on the other hand, when a broader and less-interested public needs to be addressed, it becomes increasingly difficult to use technological features. In order to move a website from its niche arena into the broader public sphere, not only a much more appealing design and additional technological features (e.g. chatrooms, fund raising) become necessary, but also far more demanding content editing (information about the issue and the organization itself, frequent updates in several languages).

Conclusions There may be no need for grand strategies, at least in the early stages of developing an Internet presence. This can presumably be generalized from umbrella organizations to be true for other citizens’ groups as well. Most groups are apparently doing just the right thing if they establish a mailing list, and then a very simple website to make information on urgent activities more easily available to supporters and sympathizers. As Chapter 5 has shown, simple strategies such as making an effort to answer e-mail requests can go a long way. This kind of amateurish Internet presence requires a certain amount of staff time, but not necessarily an experienced webmaster or programmer, nor a large budget. Over time, the quality of the website will, in all likelihood, increase anyway as the organization—not only the webmaster—gains experience and skills in using the technology.

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Once the objective of the Internet presence shifts to addressing a larger audience or garnering support for a more long-standing issue, however, a different strategy becomes necessary, and the use of new ICT is less likely to make a difference (although a website is clearly indispensable at this point). For these purposes, the website will require a far more professional appearance—thus reducing cost-efficiency and immediacy, the main benefits of the Internet. Internet use then has the greatest effect on the networking abilities of new, small, adhoc groups with an urgent appeal. The groups that most benefit (in relative terms) from ICT use are thus so small and lacking in influence that they would perhaps not be able to lift their issues into the public sphere, but often these issues are visible anyway. The technology can help the groups to increase the visibility of their respective positions, and, if they adapt their strategies to the evolution of the issue, to keep it from disappearing.

7 The Internet as a platform for political participation and mobilization in the debate about the dispatch of troops to Iraq Introduction This chapter deals with the online participation by civil society activists regarding the troop dispatches to Iraq in 2003 and 2004. Since the previous study suggested that the flash appeal of an issue has an impact on the utilization of online tools and on their effectiveness, the peace movement from its climax during the war through the gradual decline in the following years makes an appropriate object of study for this research. The activists in this issue changed over time from a loosely organized movement with a high sense of urgency to a more established organization trying to maintain its support base, while the issue itself gradually turned from immediate action into a long-term campaign. The results in previous chapters have shown that external factors are relevant for the effectiveness of Internet use by citizens’ groups. These factors change over time, however. How do the citizens’ groups adapt their use of new ICT to the changing environment, for example, when an issue loses its immediate appeal, new technologies become available, or the political atmosphere shifts? Do they increase or decrease their online activities across the board because of success or disappointments, or do they adjust specific features? A longitudinal study traces the changes in one issue and in the strategies employed by civil society actors. It compares the Internet tools used by the groups with the visibility of their positions in various areas making up the public sphere and with the development of the issue. Changes in the methods employed by activists will be discussed. Since an extremely similar parallel development occurred in South Korea, a brief comparison with the respective movement in Korea will round off the chapter to consider whether changes in strategies result directly from the external factors (which were almost the same in both countries). If the groups in Korea changed their methods in different ways, this suggests more leeway for citizens’ groups to adapt to external circumstances.

The Iraq War and the debate about a Japanese troop dispatch As in other countries, the looming war in Iraq became a matter of concern in Japan from its planning stages in 2002: on 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued a resolution warning Iraq that it would ‘face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its [disarmament] obligations’ (UNSC 2002). It did not endorse, however, the use of military force in the case of non-compliance. The USA nonetheless

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prepared for a unilateral attack and gathered like-minded governments in a ‘coalition of the willing’. The public debate about support for such an attack thus differentiated between a one-sided strike by the USA and a UN-endorsement of the use of force. The Japanese public were clearly opposed to a unilateral attack on Iraq. At least initially, most Japanese also opposed any endorsement of the attack by their government under the given circumstances. Only under the hypothetical condition that the UNSC endorsed the attack would more people, as in other countries, agree with it (Asahi Shinbun 2003a:1). When the USA began to attack Iraq on 20 March 2003, after a 48-hour deadline for the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq had passed, the Japanese government supported the attack verbally but, due to constitutional restraints, without sending any troops (Koizumi 2003). On 1 May 2003, US President Bush declared the end of the war in Iraq and called on other nations to support the reconstruction efforts. This included, in particular, a request for troops rather than only financial contributions, and the Japanese government set about preparing appropriate laws. Several months of deliberation followed. Eventually, the cabinet decided to send some troops strictly for reconstruction work—troops from other nations had to provide security for them. For Japan, the dispatch of troops was a very difficult issue because the Japanese constitution explicitly renounces the right to war and military.55 Japan does have troops— they were formed soon after the declaration of this post-war constitution under the name of Self-Defence Forces (SDF), but their constitutionality was long debated. Although gradually most political parties accepted their existence, dispatching troops abroad did not fit well with their ostensible function purely for the defence of Japan. The participation of Japanese troops in UN Peace Keeping Operations, for the first time in 1992, was a major step towards an acceptance of SDF overseas dispatches. Several new laws in the wake of the terror attack of 11 September 2001 paved the way for a broader range of deployments abroad—most importantly, the anti-terror law of 2001 (Prime Minister’s Office 2001). The government quoted Japan’s reliance on the US military alliance for national security and stability as a reason to comply with the American request. Its neighbour, North Korea, had recently not only tested medium-range missiles but also threatened to build nuclear weapons. It was impossible to know whether the reclusive state would indeed be able to do so, and what it would do with such weapons. For Japan, these recent developments meant that North Korea could suddenly pose a serious threat to Japan itself, not only to regional stability. Under these circumstances, the US nuclear umbrella thus gained even greater importance for Japan. The Japanese government argued that it ought to make a reciprocal effort and added that financial support would probably fail to generate the acknowledgement the Japanese wished for. Many people had been quite indignant after the Gulf War in 1991; although Japan had made huge financial contributions to the US efforts, it was famously not listed in the message of gratitude issued by the Kuwaiti government (Watts 2001). Thus, not only hawkish Japanese politicians thought that it was in Japan’s vital interest to send troops to ensure future US support. Accordingly, the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Prime Minister’s Office 2003; Iraku ni okeru jindō fukkō shien katsudō oyobi anzen kakuho shien katsudō no jisshi ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihō 2003) was passed on 26 July 2003. With this law,

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the decision about an actual dispatch of troops remained left to the Cabinet to decide, within the conditions set by the law: the dispatch could not be of a military or threatening nature and could not be made in an area where fighting was going on. Japanese peace activists, on the other hand, continued to campaign against the occupation in Iraq and against Japan’s possible involvement in it. They argued that Iraq, even after March 2003, was by no means a region where no fighting took place. The troops would in effect operate in a war zone, thus breaking the conditions set in the law. Many opponents criticized the law itself and challenged the concept of sending troops meant for self-defence outside national borders at all (10.29 ‘Kagayake Nihon Koku Kenpō’ Shūkai Jikkō linkai 2004). Even though the new law enabled the government in principle to send troops at any time as long as it could argue that the conditions were met, the actual dispatch remained a debated topic throughout the autumn of 2003. During the run-up to the parliamentary election of November 2003, the issue figured relatively large in the general debate and policy statements of individual candidates. The final decision to dispatch Japanese troops to Iraq was made on 10 December 2003, several days before the informal deadline set by the government itself for a resolution on the issue. Because no parliamentary approval or other administrative procedure beyond a Cabinet decision was necessary, the government announced the imminent dispatch of troops in a matter-of-fact manner. The decision aroused only a rather limited public interest although a majority of the population was opposed to it. Just a month after the decision, the first Japanese troops arrived in Iraq. Since Japanese soldiers may not engage in collective self-defence, Dutch soldiers had to provide security for them. The Dutch decision to withdraw troops from Iraq by March 2005 briefly jeopardized the Japanese dispatch until the British government agreed to provide troops for safeguarding the Japanese units. Throughout 2004 the Japanese troops were often confined to their camp due to the dangerous situation. However, only two attacks on the Japanese troops occurred, which did not claim any casualties. By contrast, several Japanese civilians were taken as hostages in 2004. Three of them, later released, were journalists and activists whose work entailed that they could not always avoid dangerous situations; another one was a tourist who was killed by his captors.56 The decision on whether to extend the stay of SDF troops in Iraq or to terminate the mission was due by 14 December 2004, the last day of the confirmed dispatch. The government made the decision earlier than had been expected, namely on 9 December 2004, in the afternoon. The result was an extension for another year, but several conditions were given as to when ‘appropriate measures’ would be taken. They included an improvement in the political situation in Iraq, and changes in the local situation (including security) or the activities of the multinational force. This could mean that under certain conditions the dispatch period might be shortened, although this was not stated explicitly (Asahi Shinbun 2004:1; Japan Today 2004c).

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Activists in the online public sphere While the public debate about a possible troop dispatch to Iraq was under way, Japanese peace activists naturally tried to influence the debate and make their own views heard. The following is an examination of several areas that form the online public sphere. The online public sphere is here defined primarily as freely accessible websites, but some mailing lists and newsletters with easy subscription mechanisms are also included to broaden the range of data. Most of the data are gathered from the websites maintained by activists as well as BBS, online opinion polls and fora maintained by portals and newspapers. Deliberation in activists’ websites and fora Peace activists in Japan had been using the Internet already quite effectively in their mobilization efforts in the run-up to the Iraq War. The joint website World Peace Now, discussed in Chapter 6, and some other groups already had an established network and online audience. Even though their reach had certainly diminished after the immediate decisions and activities on the war were over, their newsletter and mailing list networks still included a considerable number of people. Even more people still knew the groups’ homepage addresses. They could return there to find out about events if they were concerned about the troop dispatch. The peace groups most active in the online public sphere were World Peace Now and Peaceact. Although World Peace Now was originally an association by some 40 very diverse groups with the sole common aim of organizing protests against the war in Iraq, and many of these groups had gradually lost interest after the spring of 2003, the website was continued after the end of the war had been declared. Accordingly, the site became one of the hubs coordinating protest activities against the dispatch of SDF with hundreds of links leading to most of the protest activities in Japan. It was possible for visitors of the site to subscribe to a more-or-less biweekly, later about monthly, e-mail newsletter by entering their e-mail address in a field on the website’s home page. Other regular updates or options for mutual exchange between users were not available. World Peace Now did not engage in any direct cyber action in December 2003 nor throughout 2004. Apart from having only a newsletter, i.e. a one-way information tool, rather than a mailing list for mutual information of members, the interactive tools offered on the homepage had also decreased after the large protest movements of spring 2003. While the site had offered flyers for events and posters with protest messages in the runup of the large protest demonstrations earlier in the year,57 by December there remained only some PDF files with anti-war posters—some of them black and white, to be coloured in by the recipient (such images, also spread as newspaper ads, had proven popular in the earlier demonstrations). The only link to a printable event flyer was broken. The site had thus lost much of its original coordination effect for urgent campaigns. On the other hand, the total amount of information available from the site had increased and broadened in scope. External links led to most Japanese websites related to the peace movement. They offered information about offline events, but also activities

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such as signature and fax campaigns that benefited from online distribution. In addition, World Peace Now had, in 2003, established a simplified version directed at mobile phones (keitai), and the homepage included an appeal to send the address to friends who accessed the web via their keitai. At that time, about 60 million Japanese could access the Internet by mobile phone, and mobile Internet access became an increasingly important factor in the Japanese Internet landscape (Sōmushō 2003d; Miyata et al. 2005). As the technological environment changed, it was important for activists to adapt their IT strategies. By offering a mobile website, World Peace Now could increase its potential audience (even if political changes on the other hand reduced the share of people interested in the issue). The contents of the site and the activities of World Peace Now became much broader after the immediate goals of preventing war, ending the war and preventing the Japanese troop dispatch became obsolete. During 2004, the activities advertised on the site gradually moved away from the immediate issues of the Iraq War and the SDF mission there. Instead, they included information on the presidential election in the USA, a campaign opposing a new military base in Okinawa and an appeal to vote in the parliamentary election (World Peace Now 2004). The day-to-day activities of the site had moved so far away from the Iraq troop issue that even the hostage crises in 2004 did not figure very large on the site. When Iraqi kidnappers beheaded the Japanese tourist Kōda Shōsei in October 2004, World Peace Now posted no article or appeal to take any action. While, in 2003, interested individuals had flocked to the site in spite of its rather low professional appeal, in order to find the newest information about ongoing events, by 2004 the immediate appeal of the issue had decreased significantly. Although the original rationale for the joint effort was fading away, the website remained as a coordination site for a broader range of issues. The materials hoarded on the site became quite complex and thus difficult to maintain. The simple website, designed for urgent action and the coordination of already motivated visitors, was not appropriate for the changed situation in 2004: on the one hand, the visitors were less motivated because the political situation had settled down, and on the other hand, the site was clustered and even more difficult to navigate. ‘Peaceact—hansen/heiwa akushon’ [Action Against War/For Peace] was one of the members of World Peace Now. In contrast to World Peace Now’s newsletter, Peaceact offered registered users a mailing list. Registration was free, and the participants could not only receive information from the portal organizers but also send messages themselves. The mailing list never became a forum for mutual or even heated discussion, however. At about five to ten messages per day, it served primarily as a means to inform other members of news and planned events. The postings to the mailing list were also freely accessible via the homepage of the organization, but since most of the posts were formal invitations to mostly offline events, their contents had a wide overlap with the calendar also available on the site—where these events were also arranged by date. Apart from these event listings, the decision about the troop dispatch did not make up a very large part of the Peaceact homepage: although the main page mentioned it rather prominently, along with several other controversial topics, these references were not accompanied by a collection of background information, action materials such as downloadable flyers or posters, and online action. Occasionally, lists of officials or Diet members, sometimes with e-mail addresses, were included in the materials posted on the

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website and to the mailing list. These were obviously useful to send appeals to the people included, but they were not combined with an explicit call for action. At no point did Peaceact offer online-forms that would enable visitors to send protest e-mails to a large number of people simultaneously just by entering their own name and e-mail address. The website and the use of online tools by the group did not change between December 2003 and December 2004—only the amount of exchange devoted to the Iraq war, the occupation of Iraq and Japan’s role in it shrank compared to other topics taken up on the site. Both the Peaceact and the World Peace Now sites kept their rather amateurish design in 2004, but with a broader range of topics. For casual visitors, this was far less appealing than the focused anti-war and anti-dispatch information had been to the dedicated, already mobilized audience that visited the sites in 2003. Most other protest groups with an Internet presence were accessible via links from these two sites.58 However, the sites of these other organizations were rather small. Some of them offered clear action statements calling on visitors to send letters or e-mail messages to politicians, to convince friends to join the action, and to add their names to a signature campaign. However, these appeals were rarely followed up by more than about 100 or 150 people; in more successful cases, by about 1,000 people (e.g. Shimin iken kōkoku undō 2003). Some of the smaller sites even offered genuine online actions, such as the simultaneous sending of protest e-mails or political requests to decision-makers. One site (Iraku e no kōgeki hantai 2004) offered a form with a list of several decision-making officials and party headquarters. Readers could tick all those to whom they wanted to write. They could then write or paste the content of their mail in a comment field. The previous letters sent were given as references. Within a month of the introduction of this page in December 2003, nearly 1,000 people used the service, but then interest dwindled. Although the site continued to exist until October 2004, when the organizers stopped the service due to misuse, the total number of participants did not reach 2,000. This abandonment of an online tool was obviously a result of the changed political situation rather than disappointment with its effect in general. The failure of the peace movement and reduced interest on the part of the population meant that the effort of maintaining the online action form and solving these problems was not worth the (now limited) effect. If the political interest in the service had persisted, the organizers may have made an effort to solve the misuse issue in other ways. If most of the protest activities against the planned dispatch of troops to Iraq appeared relatively weak, supporters of the dispatch, at least initially, were even less visible on the Internet. Their opinions appeared occasionally on general BBS sites (see below, pp. 130– 3), but right-wing and aggressive nationalist organizations barely mentioned the topic. In some SDF-related discussion fora, the dispatch only appeared as a topic when it was already decided and underway, and even then the presentation of the issue remained quite low-key (e.g. Motto… Jieitai). The examples of some activist sites show that activists on both sides only marginally changed their website strategies over a period of about a-year-and-a-half, although the political situation, the available technology, and their experience all changed. In those cases where activists changed their websites, this was a reaction to outside changes: either a reduction in online tools or contents that became less necessary (online petition,

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Iraq coverage) or an adaptation to new technologies as they became available and spread (mobile Internet site). Both types were sensible decisions in light of the changed circumstances—but, overall, citizens’ groups clearly did not analyse their experiences so they could restrict their methods to those that had so far been particularly successful, avoiding those that were not worthwhile. The public debate in portals and BBS Apart from using their own homepages, activists can try to make their opinions visible in the online public sphere by participating in discussions with a general audience on larger portal sites. If successful, this could carry their views out from a niche audience into the view of the mainstream. Several major portals and BBS sites were therefore checked for discussion threads dealing with the issue of a troop dispatch to Iraq in December 2003, and the extension of that dispatch in December 2004. None of the five major portal sites in Japan (Biglobe, Excite, Goo, Nifty and Yahoo) mentioned the topic of a troop dispatch to Iraq in the run-up to the decision in December 2003 on their top page. When the issue appeared at all, it was in one of the discussion fora that all portals have: so-called ‘chatrooms’ in the Yahoo site (which were then just message boards),59 and bulletin boards in the other four portals. Three of them also offered a page for online polls. In the case of Yahoo and Nifty, the polls were accessible from the main homepage; the Biglobe polls required further clicks to get through from the top page of the portal. Only the polls on the Biglobe and Yahoo sites covered political issues at any point in 2003 and 2004. While the Biglobe poll mentioned Iraq only in March 2003 with reference to the war itself, Yahoo conducted a poll in July 2003 concerning a possible dispatch of the SDF to Iraq. The question was: ‘American officials are not satisfied with the plans for a dispatch of Japanese troops to Iraq. What do you think?’ It received 2,035 responses. Only 15 per cent unreservedly supported such a mission (‘I understand the dissatisfaction and think the activities of the troops should be widened’). Another 12 per cent of respondents approved a mission if it was strictly limited to certain humanitarian activities such as providing food and water, but most were completely opposed to the dispatch (Yahoo! Polls Japan 2003). The poll did not result in further discussions, and the relatively low turnout—some other Yahoo polls receive more than 20,000 responses—demonstrates that the topic did not rouse much interest in visitors to the portal. After July 2003, no poll in the Yahoo portal asked any question related to Iraq. Like the majority of the polls, the portals rarely induced political discussion, and such threads were difficult to find if there were any at all. Their main discussion categories (listed on the first page of the chat or BBS service) covered areas such as entertainment, music, shopping or sports. Only in the Yahoo ‘chat’ area was it possible to reach a thread about the troop dispatch from the front page of the ‘chat’ area (topics_editor 2003). Established in July 2003, it proved relatively popular and reached over 1,800 messages by the end of November, with a further 2,600 written between 1 December and 9 December, and about 600 on the day of the decision, 10 December 2003. For the following months, the message board drew almost 5,000 messages per month, before its popularity slowly decreased. At the time of the decision to extend the dispatch in December 2004, about 36,000 messages had been sent to the thread, but the number of

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messages per day had decreased and reached only 67 even on the day of the decision. The debate, which included opinions from both ends of the spectrum, had some aggressive elements from the start and became increasingly so during 2004. Similar political discussion threads could be found on the bulletin boards of 2-Channel. Although there are a number of other BBS sites and far more sites offering (closed) mailing list and mail magazine services in Japan, 2-Channel is widely regarded as the epitome of emotional Internet debate. It has a rather low reputation for its intellectual level of debate. Even 2-Channel’s founder, Nishimura Hiroyuki, stated: ‘Many people who write on Channel 2 are stupid’ (Japan Today 2004a). Since 2003, 2-Channel has offered a range of several hundred threads grouped under the heading ‘Iraq’ (sports2.2ch.net/iraq) that remained popular throughout the decision about a troop dispatch and the extending of the mission. In addition, a similar group of discussions about ‘Islam’ was also easy to find from the top page of 2-Channel. This included discussions about the general situation in Iraq and US policies, and most of the threads did not deal with the troop dispatch. Some had virtually died down by the time of the dispatch decision, while others did cover the topic, but were not very active. Few of the Iraq threads received more than ten messages per day in late 2003, and many of these had a low intellectual level of debate, often either linking or copying texts from elsewhere or digressing into personal assaults. Some consisted of exchanging carefully crafted pictures made entirely from ASCII characters, often with a political slogan. The discussion was certainly more active and at the same time more emotional than on the Yahoo forum, but the contributions suggested a ‘posting’ of information and opinion rather than exchange and deliberation. For comparison, the topic of the Iraq troop dispatch was also researched on a ‘normal’ Japanese BBS site, the rather family-oriented ‘Teacup’. The homepage listed the following major categories: Hobby, Family, Gourmet, Chic, Shopping, Internet, Music, Sports, Art, Society and Career, Event, Friends and Keitai, as well as ‘Other’, but not Politics. It did offer a search function, however, which brought up ten threads discussing Iraq. Most of them began in spring 2003 and did not cover the planned SDF mission or the Japanese involvement in the war. One thread only consisted in the organizer’s initial call for discussion. Another one, established a day before the dispatch decision, resulted in five replies on that day, which were less emotional than the 2-Channel discussions but did not constitute a heated and sophisticated debate (Doragon 2003). In both 2-channel and Teacup, messages of a deliberative character were rare. Even those messages that related to the thread’s topic (excluding digressions) were mostly brief one-sided statements or referrals or related news and announcements. While populist opinions abounded, most threads lacked deliberation and opinion leaders who would produce their arguments and reply to those made by others. Because of the large number of threads and messages, it is very difficult to generalize about the opinions expressed by the participants, but in many threads the atmosphere gradually shifted towards more acceptance of the troop dispatch during 2004—at least supporters of the dispatch and its extension became somewhat more visible or vocal in the discussion. On both sides, however, urgent calls for action were rare, both in 2003 and 2004. In December 2004, some of the most active threads almost ignored the imminent decision on an extension of the troop dispatch.

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A political debate about the issue was possible in these fora, but rarely took place. On the large and well-known bulletin boards of 2-Channel, on the one hand, too many people obviously not interested in a serious debate generated so much ‘noise’ that reading previous posts was not attractive. The smaller bulletin boards, less frequented by virtual hooligans, were also less active generally, so that the debate never became heated. No public bulletin board attracted sufficient numbers of politically interested users willing to lead a serious debate in Japan. Such debates were somewhat more likely to take place in semi-private mailing lists with an editor and membership system (e.g. the PAML list operated by Peace-act), which did not require a constant Internet connection. How did political activists use these fora to make their views public? Similar to the activists’ websites, the strategies for using public bulletin boards did not change much from 2003 to 2004. In fact, there is no indication that activists developed any strategy for using the fora successfully. Strategic uses of public fora could have included appearing as a group in public fora to increase the visibility of the group and its name, and massive postings of one’s own views to many similar fora. Such basic visibility strategies could be augmented by more subtle strategies, such as disputing an opponent’s statement under several different names, demonstratively agreeing with each other. The political position of forum participants was often clear, and some did forward messages and event announcements originating from activist groups. It is quite likely that some of these forum participants were members, perhaps leading members, of such groups. However, they rarely posted in their capacity as representatives of a certain group. At least the names of such groups were not very visible in most threads. In addition, the activists did not seem to follow an active strategy of cross-posting their statements and invitations to many similar fora and discussion threads. The public online debate in newspapers All larger Japanese newspapers had an online version, but provided almost no space for a public deliberation of political issues such as the troop dispatch, apart from publishing news articles and, occasionally, columns or editorials. An offline comment in Asahi Shinbun even warned against the practice of ‘citizen journalism’, because of the difficulty of verifying the contents of such accounts (Asahi Shinbun 2005d:37). A debate and exchange of opinion apparently does not figure large in this viewpoint. In many other countries, newspapers routinely publish texts by readers. This is an accepted standard in Korean online newspapers, and the BBC, for instance, established a site with (edited) readers’ eyewitness accounts in July 2005 (BBC 2005). None of the five big Japanese newspapers (Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei, Sankei and Yomiuri) included an online poll or even the results of offline surveys on their top page during the preparation for the troop dispatch decision. Only the conservative Sankei Shinbun had a weekly poll, which occasionally also touched on foreign policy issues, in the deeper layers of the homepage. Only one of the polls related to the dispatch issue at all. In November 2003, it asked readers whether they expected terror attacks to occur in Japan. The poll closed on 27 November 2003. The vast majority of 934 respondents affirmed the question, and the comments selected for posting on the site all concerned the

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lack of domestic security and emergency measures. The results page did not even mention the proposed troop dispatch (Sankei Shinbun 2003). At the same time, the English-language online newspaper, Japan Today, the only other national newspaper with regular online polls, conducted a similar ballot concerning the likelihood of terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda on Japan. A very slight majority of 1,179 respondents denied such a likelihood. In the unedited bulletin boards that Japan Today offers for all polls, the troop dispatch also played only a minor role in the debate about this question (Japan Today 2003h). The only other Iraq-related poll, almost a year later, asked only about the legitimacy of the Iraq War itself and made no reference to the Japanese troops in Iraq. The comments made by readers did not refer to the troop dispatch either (Japan Today 2004b). None of the large Japanese-language newspapers offers a BBS or any other opportunity for debate on their homepage. Thus, the newspapers could not serve as fora for public debate; even their role in initiating a discourse in other fora, by offering relevant news, background materials and different opinions, was extremely limited since the troop dispatch issue was not very visible on their homepages. In most cases, the top page of the site had one or two links to recent articles that dealt in some way with Iraq, and a link to a special page combining all articles on Iraq and the war. Articles regarding the troop dispatch could be found on these sites, but were never grouped as an independent topic. Citizens’ groups who engaged in the issue of a troop dispatch to Iraq thus had few means to influence public debate via online newspapers. With declining interest in the issue during the course of 2004, the amount of debate occurring in the newspapers sites dwindled even more.

A comparison with South Korea In South Korea, too, the government wanted to send troops, but the public opposed the dispatch. Just as in Japan, the Korean government made a decision against public protest, and over the following year, the protest petered out. A brief comparison is therefore convenient for putting the Japanese online deliberation in context. The differences and similarities in terms of Internet infrastructure have already been described in Chapter 6. In political terms, the differences relevant to this issue are slightly greater: as the democratization movement is a rather recent and positive experience, political activism, including an anti-government stance, is more accepted in Korea. On the other hand, the danger of attacks from communist North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), with which the southern state is still technically at war, makes the US alliance particularly valuable. In addition, the media landscape is more strongly split between conservative and progressive newspapers; the latter are more active in online media. The most important difference between Japan and Korea in this issue is the legitimacy of military engagement. South Korea has a large and well-trained army of about 600,000 troops. Korean soldiers have often previously participated in overseas missions. South Korea had already sent a small number of troops to Iraq in April 2003, but planned to dispatch a larger contingent. The decision was due in December 2003, and again in December 2004, regarding an extension of their stay (which had only started in

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September 2004). Both times the government and parliament decided in favour of the dispatch (MND 2005). A number of activist groups organized offline and online protests in 2003. Most notable among them was the Citizens’ Association against the Iraq Troop Dispatch (Iraku Pabyeong Bandae Bisang Gugmin Haengdong) consisting of 351 citizens’ groups (Heo 2003). Many of these groups organized cyber protests such as signature campaigns that required only the input of a name and e-mail address in an online form on their homepage to take part. One of the largest and most visible citizens’ organizations in Korea is the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, or Chamyeo Yeondae, in Korean),60 also influential in the two movements mentioned above. The group grew out of the democratization movement and has since diversified into various ‘hot issues’ (Kern 2005). In 2003, it organized an online signature campaign and cyber protest against the troop dispatch to Iraq. Nearly 10,000 people joined the campaign between October and December 2003. Conservative organizations such as the veterans’ associations or the large and established Korea Freedom League (Hangug Jayu Chongyeonmaeng) that supported the troop dispatch used the Internet far less. Only once the troops had actually departed to Iraq, in 2004, did the conservative groups become more active online. This was entirely due to the changed situation and the new need of their audience to communicate with soldiers and their families—the troops also had official homepages where soldiers and their friends and families could exchange public messages (Zaytun 2004). The online versions of all large Korean newspapers offer polls and BBS, which are used extensively. A unique feature in many Korean BBS is that they can list posts by the number of people who read them, and often according to a reader ranking system. In the conservative newspapers, a relatively small number of posts are usually read by many readers, while the progressive newspapers, Hankyoreh and Oh my News (the latter only exists online), receive more active posts. In spite of the different political outlook of the newspapers, most of their online polls showed a similarly high opposition to the dispatch until mid-2004. Korean activists also used the facilities offered by the large portal sites, Yahoo, Daum and Empas. All of them offer frequent and popular online polls as well as bulletin boards. Daum lets readers establish so-called cafés, virtual community centres with a membership system and internal bulletin boards. One of the most well-known activists, Park Gi Beom, hosted such a Daum café that became very popular (Park 2003). Openaccess bulletin boards concerning the dispatch issue were also quite active and generally opposed to the dispatch, until the attitudes in the posts (as well as in online polls and representative opinion polls) turned after the death of a Korean hostage in June 2004. Korean activists have used the Internet very actively to make their views known: on their own homepages or using services such as the Daum cafés, but also by posting messages in BBS on portal and newspaper sites and by participating in online polls. Since the shift in opinion in June 2004 was observed quite widely, albeit not everywhere with the same suddenness as in online polls (Kim T.H. 2004), it is unlikely that activists manipulated the polls or certain message boards. Indeed, the peace activists did not change their strategies at all during the debate. Conservative views gradually became more visible online, but this was not due to a new strategy adopted by conservative

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groups, but a result of the general opinion shift and, to some extent, the appearance of a need for online communication with and about the Zaytun troops.

Conclusions The results in Chapter 6 had suggested that the type of issue is an important factor in the way online tools are used, and can be used, by activists. The study in this chapter confirms this view: the immediate appeal of the issue was indeed the factor that had the most obvious impact on Internet use. Since the study looked at the same groups and fora over several years, only a few external factors changed. The nature of the troop dispatch issue developed from a sudden threat to the pacifist Japanese self-conception to a formality decision about a situation that most had meanwhile accepted. By 2004, the troop dispatch was already an established fact. The decision in December concerned only whether this present situation should continue or change. The call for a return to the previous mode was in itself not enough to mobilize those people who had, in the meantime, become accustomed to the new situation that troops were actually stationed in Iraq, and lost interest in the protest. A similar decline of activity and interest can be observed not only in Japan but also in Korea, and in all the different fora considered. In addition to the loss of interest, public opinion even turned somewhat against the activists due to some political developments. In Japan, this became visible during and after the first hostage crisis in 2004, when three civilians were kidnapped in Iraq and their families demanded an immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops. The hostages were later freed, but they and their families were openly bullied for their pacifist views. Supporters of the troop dispatch saw the victims, who were journalists and peace activists, as troublemakers (Asahi Shinbun 2004a: 4). The death of another hostage, however, did not result in any strong reactions. In Korea, by contrast, nationalist opposition to peace activism became more noticeable with the death of a hostage. It led to calls for revenge and stronger support for a military presence in Iraq. In the online public sphere, such as newspaper websites and open discussion fora on portal sites and BBS services, the troop dispatch to Iraq gradually became less visible, and the atmosphere turned more in favour of the troop dispatch. This situation meant that the peace activists faced two new challenges: first, they had to hold or regain the attention of those who had lost interest with increased mobilization efforts. Second, they needed to convince an online public that had ceased to share their opinions anyway. Their online strategies apparently remained the same, however. The website of World Peace Now illustrates most clearly how a site that was well-suited to the demands of 2003 failed to meet the requirements of 2004: it became larger and overcrowded when it would have needed more clarity and design to attract visitors with relatively low motivation. Here, the features found to be relevant in Chapter 5, such as a navigation bar and dialogic features, might have helped the success of the group. The site still contained mostly event announcements and cluttered links rather than up-to-date background information, argumentative essays and endorsements by celebrities. Broadening the

The Internet as a platform for political participation and mobilization

129

coverage to include all kinds of peace-related topics may have been a natural choice when the focus on the Iraq War disap-peared. In order to attract an appropriate, broader readership, however, this would have required a complete change in the group’s online strategy. The other activists’ websites, both in Japan and in Korea, also remained more or less as they were in 2003. None of the groups opposed to the troop dispatch adopted any new strategies to mobilize occasional visitors. In Korea, the activists’ websites were better suited to attracting general visitors, but they also failed to prevent a change in public opinion. The only change in activist’s use of the Internet was on the part of the proponents of the troop dispatch in both countries, who became more visible. In Korea, the establishment of a website for the dispatched troops added a new online forum. The visitors, mostly family and friends, had obviously not only an increased interest in the topic now, but were also supportive of the dispatch. An apparently more active use of online tools on the part of the proponents was probably a natural development, and not so much a strategic decision. In the discussions in open fora for a general public, such as the bulletin boards on large portal sites, pacifist views gradually lost ground in both countries, both in absolute and relative terms. Nothing suggests that activists on either side tried to turn the tide of opinion in online debates by making, for instance, very frequent postings or by trying to influence poll results. The findings suggest two important factors for activist success with online tools. Even in a conducive atmosphere, an appropriate online strategy is necessary: 1 The results confirm the previous finding that the immediate appeal of an issue is highly relevant for the effectiveness of online tools. Th e basic, disorderly websites of Japanese activists may be sufficient to keep a motivated audience informed of new developments in a flash issue. However, long-term issues apparently require different means as the audience loses interest. The fact that none of the Japanese or Korean groups markedly adapted their strategies to the changing situation suggests, however, that strategic technology planning is neither an easy nor obvious task for citizens’ groups. 2 The failure of peace activists to influence public opinion decisively in 2004 cannot be attributed solely to an inappropriate use of Internet tools alone. Considering the previous cases of very effective online activism in Korea (see Lee 2003a, 2005) and considerable success in previous instances in Japan, the political situation itself must be one of the key factors. Online activism can especially make a difference when the viewpoints of many Internet users differ from the opinion presented in the traditional print media, as was the case in the Korean election of 2002 and at the beginning of the Iraq troop dispatch debate in 2003. When this situation changed, activists could not prevail, no matter what online tools they used.

8 Conclusion The full potential of the Internet is not yet used in Japan. As in other countries, not everyone even has access to the Internet. However, the wide availability of the mobile Internet, including not only e-mail but also web access via mobile phone and other applications, opens Internet access to a far larger audience than PC access alone. The non-profit sector in Japan is welfare-oriented, and civil society in its activist form is still relatively weak and amateurish. A gradual increase of activist and advocacy movements can be observed, however, and the Internet could provide a tool for such citizens’ groups to improve the visibility of their positions in the public sphere. The number of citizens’ groups, and especially incorporated non-profit organizations, has seen a massive increase since the late 1990s. By the early 2000s, nearly all such groups, even very small or disadvantaged ones, used e-mail, and most of them also had their own homepages. The majority of these homepages were very basic in design and contents. Only from about 2003 onward, did a small number of the groups researched begin to introduce websites geared towards mobile phones to reach a broader audience, but these efforts lagged far behind the extensive usage of mobile Internet by their potential audience. Many of the groups (as well as larger organizations) reported difficulties in the initial stages of using new technologies. The introduction of a homepage in particular temporarily increased the workload for those responsible, and this was perhaps felt stronger by the smallest organizations who could not shuffle their resources to have one person solely responsible for the homepage and all related communication. Security issues were mentioned relatively often in the case study in Chapter 4. Due to the nationalistic aspects of the issue, the debate was very controversial and emotional, and many of the groups involved were also still in the early stages of using the Internet. Diffuse security concerns thus served as an excuse for avoiding dialogic features while the opponents on both sides were still nervous about the new medium. The use of interactive features increased over time, but remained very rare in all groups researched. This applies not only to those dialogic features that required complex technological skills or a professional web design, but also simpler tools such as responses to e-mails. Japanese citizens’ groups (like other organizations) are not very responsive to strangers. Most of the initial networking among citizens’ groups still takes place offline, thus replicating long-established patterns: representatives would be introduced by mutual acquaintances, meet in person, exchange visiting cards, and finally stay in contact. In the last stage, e-mail comes in handy, but the technology has not generated a qualitative change in the way contacts are made in the first place.

Conclusion

131

Even if the first contact takes place via e-mail, personal introductions or recommendations are still very important. One of the unique features of Internet communication is thus barely used, namely the ability to get in contact with complete strangers easily, without meeting them or being introduced. This system also impedes the ability to network across borders, which the Internet could facilitate greatly. For the domestic activities which most groups engaged in, e.g. in Chapter 4, very simple digital one-way communication replaced previous communication modes (minikomi) used for transmitting fax numbers to send petitions to, or dates and places of events. Very few of the groups had regular contact with similar groups or sympathizers abroad. Apart from the reluctance to make contact with people not personally known, language problems as well as some computer-encoding problems contributed to this relative isolation. As expected, Internet experience had a visible effect on the use of Internet tools by the groups. Interestingly, however, the results show that not only individuals, but also organizational experience mattered. Even if the webmasters themselves were not very experienced, groups with a longer homepage history tended to have more sophisticated homepages, which, at the same time, took less effort to maintain. On the one hand, this confirms the existence of a digital divide even on the organizational level as late-comers could not easily close the skills gap. On the other hand, it suggests that skills are not necessarily required on an individual level, so that disadvantaged individuals might overcome the digital divide through the group. The same patterns of sparse or incidental Internet use by citizens’ groups are also found in the comparisons with some other countries. Citizens’ groups in Germany were even more reluctant than those in Japan to shift from individual e-mail communication to web-based networking, and Korean groups had habitually nicer online-tools but did not demonstrate more strategic planning than their Japanese counterparts. A different infrastructure and political situation generated differences, especially regarding the use of mobile and dialogic features: while the mobile Internet was nowhere as relevant as in Japan, the Korean groups had more professional websites designed for a broader audience. This is largely due to the infrastructure, as broadband was introduced on a larger scale much earlier, and most groups had a longer experience with the Internet. In addition, online activism was the most convenient way for many of the Korean groups considered here as the issues had more international aspects that ruled out extensive offline networking. The use of Internet tools by citizens’ groups in Japan was thus shaped by a strong quantitative increase, combined with a continuation of established procedures. On the one hand, new features were slowly but gradually introduced as they became available: first e-mail and mailing lists, later homepages, mobile websites and bulletin boards. On the other hand, the technology did not change the way most groups worked: there was no visible impact of the ‘anti-hierarchical’ style of the Internet, and the need for personal introductions persisted. Does the use of the Internet help citizens’ groups in Japan to make their voice heard in the public sphere, and perhaps even achieve their aims better than they would without?

Civil society and the internet in Japan

132

The findings of the research demonstrate that it can, and occasionally does, help. An active use of the Internet by such groups, even in very limited one-way communications, can make them more visible, facilitate networking for (mostly offline) activities, and increase their chances of success. While the discussion presented in the introduction had suggested that success would stem from the qualitative difference of Internet tools, this was not necessarily the case. Some groups that used the Internet not for its dialogic, unmediated, anti-hierarchical factors, but for replicating their previous communication patterns, were among the most successful. In many instances, rough and simple use of the Internet, even very amateurish homepages with some contact and event information or plain mailing lists, proved sufficient for spreading opinions and information and garnering support. Yet, some specific features of ‘Internet use’ proved to be particularly useful for increasing the visibility or success of citizens’ groups. A user-friendly homepage that is easy to understand and offers a simple navigation bar ensures that the audience can find critical information which will make the difference for the group’s visibility and success. Advertising the homepage by registering with various directories and establishing mutual links offers further potential. Neither of these strategies requires unjustifiable expenses, even of a group with limited resources. Responding to the online audience is also cheap and effective. This can include dialogic web tools such as a BBS, but simply replying to e-mails is clearly the most affordable and practical dialogic feature for small citizens’ groups. Why, then, were some of the groups presented here successful with their Internet tools, although they used them less efficiently than others? External conditions, especially the type of issue, determined the effect of Internet tools. They were most useful in flash issues that addressed a dedicated and motivated audience willing and able to participate immediately in offline activities—if they could only find out about the details of planned demonstrations or fax campaigns. Even under such circumstances, an appropriate use of the technology is important, although a highly motivated audience will make more effort to actively find the relevant information. As previous research suggested (Margolis and Resnick 2000:211; see Chapter 1), the success of online tools also increases if the topics that citizens’ groups take up online are marginalized in the mainstream media, the bureaucracy or the political system. Sympathizers, for example, in the peace and textbook issues, felt that their positions were ignored in other media, which increased their motivation to access the activists’ websites and participate in activities. Age and experience were factors that influenced the Internet use of civil soci-ety actors. Although most of the groups had a mixed audience and participants from various backgrounds, age did play a role in the case study in Chapter 4, where many of the Japanese activists and sympathizers were at least middle-aged. In such cases, the World Wide Web is barely used due to a lack of skills and, to some extent, of web access. Extensive use of mailing lists increases the reach to many older users who have e-mail access via their mobile phone, but even e-mails cannot be received by all. This is, however, not the only reason for a low use of the Internet in citizens’ groups, and it would certainly be naive to think that the imbalance will ‘grow out’ as the older generation dies away. First, they are going to be around for a long time. A 65-year-old Japanese woman can expect to live for almost another quarter-century (OECD 2004:10).

Conclusion

133

And, second, technology develops faster than people over retirement age are likely to keep up with. Even an office worker who is now up-to-date with technologies he or she has to use every day may miss some new developments in a few years’ time, after retirement, and quickly fall behind. Citizens’ groups will therefore need a mix of different age groups to combine different kinds of skills with an awareness of remoteness from technological trends. This ‘grey’ divide is exemplary for the digital divide in general. In developed countries, the binary access divide becomes increasingly irrelevant. The fact that someone could use a terminal in a public library, or even owns a computer or a mobile phone with broadband web access or any next-generation gadget, does not make that person an avid Internet user. The obstacles to using the technology skilfully are more subtle. A lack of fine motor skills to use mouse and keyboard or of attentiveness and educational level to feel at ease in a text-based medium, as well as the fear of appearing inept at something so many others find easy may all prevent people from experimenting with new technologies and getting the experience necessary to use them effectively. Does the Internet normalize or equalize? The results confirm the view that the groups most likely to profit from Internet use are small groups working on issues outside the mainstream that can suddenly attract a relatively large, motivated audience. This might include disaster and emergency aid as well as human and minority rights movements or ‘urgent action networks’ (see Castells 1997:350, 352; Gronlund 2001:6; Norris 2001b:12). In this sense, the Internet helps to ‘level the playing field’. But not all issueoriented citizens’ groups will automatically benefit. For groups with more steady, lowkey issues or those in a changing environment, careful planning is necessary, and the Internet cannot change that much. Particularly when circumstances change over time, citizens’ groups must not only integrate new technologies when they appear, but they also need to analyse current uses of technology and their effects. Which of the tools used so far have reached their intended audience best? Are all of them worthwhile? If the nature of the issue, the motivation of the audience, or the general political situation changes, these results have to be reconsidered. It is more likely that an issue loses its immediate appeal and becomes a long-term concern. Some of the tools used for urgent action may become redundant, while others increase in priority. Activists trying to engage a large but unmotivated audience can either stick with a minimalist solution or invest in a more professional homepage, e.g. introducing services such as an archive or comprehensive events listings. This can also be effective but will not be quite as cost-effective compared to using more traditional means. In some favourable circumstances, it is sufficient to have a basic homepage filled with some useful information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain even for an interested and motivated audience. Emerging technologies such as the mobile Internet can provide additional opportunities. Mobile websites could reach an even larger audience, including marginalized groups and those excluded in terms of many of the digital divides. For example, many women or elderly people may not feel comfortable with a keyboard or do not own a computer. Yet, many of them do have a mobile phone and have already learned to use the convenient mobile applications like train timetables or restaurant search functions.

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134

Based on a number of empirical studies centred on small citizens’ groups in Japan, I share the semi-optimistic view of many other researchers who have looked at western activists: the Internet has the potential to improve the visibility and effectiveness of citizens’ groups, especially of small and marginalized groups (including extremists). However, this potential is largely limited to certain, favourable conditions. It is barely used as yet, and there is no major turning point in sight but, little by little, citizens’ groups will realize and utilize this potential.

Appendices 1 List of groups examined in Chapter 4 Antijapan www.antijap.wo.ro/ (not accessible since May 2002). Embassy of Japan in Korea www.japanem.or.kr/ 9 July 2001: Junghag yeogsa gyogwaseo wa gwanryonhan hangugjeongbu wi sujeon yogu

e

daehayeo,

[On the main demands by the South Korean government regarding the middle school history textbooks], http://www.japanem.or.kr/textbook/textbook_11.htm July 2001: Junghag yeogsa gyogwaseo sujeong’yogu geomto gyeolgwa e gwanhan munbu

gwahag

daeshin

komenteo,

[Comments of the Education Minister regarding inquiry results on the demands for changes in junior high school history textbooks]. www.japanem.or.kr/textbook/textbook_14.htm 12 September 2001: Yeogsa gyogoaseo munjae > 2002 nyeondo junghaggyo yeogsa gyogoaseo wi saengdoyong suyoseog (chung: chaetaeg’ yul) e daehayeo, [History textbook issue: On the demand ranking (adoption rate) for middle school history textbooks]. www.japanem.or.kr/textbook/textbook_18.htm JWRC (Nihon no sensō sekinin shiryō sentā, [Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility]), www.jca.apc.org/JWRC/index-j.html 10 July 2001: Information Concerning New History Textbook. http://www.jca.apc.org/JWRC/center/english/appeal2.htm MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, www.mext.go.jp/ 13 July 2001: Chūgaku rekishi kyōkasho shūsei yōkyū ni kakawari kentō kekkara ni kansuru monbu kagaku daijin komento, [Comments of the Education Minister regarding inquiry results on the demands for changes in junior high school history textbooks]. www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/13/07/010799.htm www.mindan.org/ Mindan, 12 September 2001: ‘Tsukurukai’ kyōkasho saitaku no chūgaku ni, [Visit to middle school that adopted ‘Tsukurukai’ textbook]. www.mindan.org/topic/topic_n.htm

Appendices

136

12 September 2001: Shimin dantai, ‘gakkō, kyōshi tan’i de’—‘Tsukurukai’ gawa, todōfuken kyōi ni, [Citizens’ groups ‘on the level of schools and teachers’, ‘Tsukurukai’ for ‘prefectural committee members’], http://www.mindan.org/topic/topic_o.htm MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ). www.mofa.go.jp/ 30 November 2001: The Position of the Japanese Government on Research Whaling. www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fishery/whales/position.html MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea), http://www.mofat.go.kr/ 9 July 2001: Ilbon yeogsagyogwaseo waegoggwanryeon oegyotongsangbu daebyeon’in seongmyeong, [Statement by MOFAT Spokesman on the Japanese Government’s response to the ROK’s request on history textbook corrections]. http://www.mofat.go.kr/web/press.nsf/main354B52861F5B97EDC9256A8400196949?O penDocument. Network21 (Kodomo to Kyōkasho Zenkoku Netto 21, 21 [Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21]). http://www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21/index.htm 9 July 2001: (Danwa) Chūgoku, Kankoku seifu no saishūsei yōkyū ni tai suru Monbukagakushō no ‘seisa’ kekka ni tsuite, [On the results of the ‘close inspection’ by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology regarding the demands for further changes by the Chinese and Korean governments (Talk)], www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21/seimei_03–04.htm 7 August 2001: (Danwa) Tōkyōto kyōiku iinkain no ‘tsukurukai’ kyōkasho no yōgo gakkō e no saitaku ni kōgi suru, [Protest against the adoption of the ‘tsukurukai’ textbook by Tokyo government for schools for the disabled (Talk)]. www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21/seimei_03–04.htm 8 August 2001: Ehime kara no yobikake, [Appeal from Ehime]. www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21/hoka_010808ehime_yobikake.htm Takashima Kyōkasho Soshō o Shien suru Kai (Group for Supporting the Takashima Textbook Lawsuit), www.jca.ax.apc.org/kyoukasyo_saiban/ Textbook Movement Headquarters (Headquarters of the movement to correct Japan’s textbooks, Ilbon gyogwaseo barojabgi undong bonbu, ). www.japantext.net/ Tsukurukai (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai, [Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform]), www.tsukurukai.com/ 25 July 2001: Kan Naoto Minshutō kanjichō to no yaritori (13 nen 7 gatsu 25 nichi), [Exchange

with

the

Appendices

137

Secretary General of the Democratic Party, Kan Naoto (25 July 2001)]. www.tsukurukai.com/kan.html 2005: Tsukurukai kaisoku [Regulations of the Tsukurukai]. http://www.tsukurukai.com/02_about_us/07_join_03.html (last accessed 29 November 2005).

2 List of groups examined in Chapter 5 Japanese name

English name/transliteration

Homepage address

Herath Foundation (HF)

none

Japan-Thai Friendship Exchange Group

none

The Commission for www.tokyo-fukushi.or.jp/3volunteer/npo/asia.htm the Solidarity with the Asian Underprivileged (CSA)

(CSA)

(NICCO)

(SPIEC)

CRI—Children’s Resources International

member.nifty.ne.jp/MusicaBrasileira/10circle/003cri.html (new)

Nippon International Cooperation for Community Development (NICCO)

www.khyoto-nicco.org/ (old: www4.kiwius.com/~nicco/)

Society for Promoting Intercultural Education for Children (SPIEC)

www2.odn.ne.jp/~cao77510/

Services for Health www.ne.jp/asahi/share/health/ in Asian and African Regions (SHARE) ADMA Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS)

The Association of www.amda.or.jp/ Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA) Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS)

www.jca.apc.org/apfs/

Japan International Center for the Rights of the Child (JICRC)

www.jca.apc.org/jicrc

Nagoya NGO Center

www.sf21npo.gr.jp/~ngo/

Association for Aid www.aarjapan.gr.jp/ and Relief, Japan/Association to Aid Refugees, Japan (AAR) NVC

Niigata International welcome.to/nvc Volunteer Centre (NVC)

Appendices

138

(NVC) Friends of Tama Chan

(HRE )

Friends of Tama Chan

www.gutteridge.info/tamachan/index.html

Peace Winds Japan

www.peace-winds.org/

Meisenkai Sponsorship Programme for India

none

Human Rights none Education Network (HRE Network) Franciso no kai— Akatsuki no mura

none

People’s Forum Cambodia, Japan (PEFOC, J)

none

Free East Timor Japan Coalition

none

The Association of One Book

none

World Malaria Relief Fund (WMRF)

none

Campaign to Stop web.sfc.keio.ac.jp/~thiesmey/cp/caspar/i.html the Prostitution of Asian Children and to Protect Their Rights (Caspar) 21 NPO

21st Century Association (21 C)

www.21ca.ac/

International Angel www.angel.ngo.gr.jp/ Association (IAA) The Foundation for none Human Rights in Asia, Japan (FHRA) Japan Antinone Prostitution Association (JAPA)

CAPSEA

Caltural Aid Project plaza18.mbn.or.jp/~CAPSEA/ for South East Asia (CAPSEA) Cull

www5b.biglobe.ne.jp/~cull-irt/

Japan, Asia, Africa and Latin America Solidarity Committee

www2u.biglobe.ne.jp/~jaala/

Japan NGO www.jca.ape.org/~janni/ Network on Indonesia (JANNI) ERIC

International www.try-net.or.jp/~eric-net/ Education Resource & Innovation (ERIC) Red de Cooperacion www.jca.apc.org/recom/ Mutua entre America Latina y Japan (RECOM)

Appendices (RFJ)

21 Japanese name

139

Rainforest Foundation Japan (RFJ)

www.rainforestjp.com/index.htm

Shimin Gaikō Centre

www005.upp.so-net.ne.jp/peacetax/

Human Rights Forum 21

www.mars.sphere.ne.jp/jhrf21/

English name/transliteration Homepage address Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)—Japon

http://www.japan.msf.org/

Shanti Volunteer Association www.jca.apc.org/sva/ (SVA) [old name: Japan Sotoshu Relief Cornmittee (JSRC=SVA)]

(SVA)

Japan Committee for Negros www.jca.apc.org/jcnc/ Campaign (JCNC)

(JCNC)

Chernobyl Children’s Fund, Japan

www.smn.co.jp/cherno/

People to People Aid

www.angel.ne.jp/~p2aid/

Save the Children Japan

http://www.savechildren.or.jp/

Pacific Asia Resource Center www.parc-jp.org/ (PARC) (PARC) The Third World Shop Fund www.palt.co.jp/asante/fund.html The Japanese Educational Volunteers (JEV)

(JEV) JVC

Japan International Volunteer www1.jca.apc.org/jvc/ Center (JVC) The PHD Foundation (Peace, www.kisweb.ne.jp/phd/ Health and Human Development)

PHD

(NPO)

WCRP

(new www008.upp.sonet.ne.jp/jev-ty/main.htm)

Humanitarian Aid to North Korea Network in Japan

www.hanknet-japan.org/ (old: www.ascnet.or.jp/hanknet-japan/)

Amnesty Internation Japan

www.amnesty.or.jp/

Sarawak Campaign Committee (SCC)

www.kiwi-us.com/~scc//

Campaign for the Children of plaza17.mbn.or.jp/~CCP/ palestine (international: www.palestinemonitor.org/)

Plan www.fosterplan.gr.jp/ International Japan Kanagawa none Women’s Space (MsLa) World www.wcrp.or.jp/ Conference on Religion and

Appendices

140

Peace, Japanese Committee (WCRP/Japan) Caring for Young Refugees (CYR) Mikono International (MIKONO) Korean Rights Group Japan Ayus

(CYR)

IMADR

21

www5a.biglobe.ne.jp/~CYR/

mikono.tripod.co.jp/

www2u.biglobe.ne.jp/~krg/ www.ayus.org/

The International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism Japan Committee (IMADR-JC) Zenshin

www.imadr.org/

www.zenshin.org/index.htm

Tsukurukai

www.tsukurukai.com/

Takashima Kyōkasho Soshō o Shien suru Kai JWRC

www.jca.apc.org/kyoukasyo_saiban/

The Association for the Advancement of Liberalist View of History Controversies over the History of Japan— Korea Relations Network 21

www.jiyuu-shikan.org/e/index.html

www.jca.apc.org/JWRC/index-j.html

www5b.biglobe.ne.jp/~koreasu/koreasu/e.korea/index%20ekorea.html www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21/

Appendices

Japanese name

141

Mindan

mindan.org/index.php

Japan Small-Type Whaling Association Safety First

homepage2.nifty.com/jstwa/index.htm www.safetyfirst.gr.jp/

English name/transliteration

Homepage address

Greenpeace Japan

www.greenpeace.or.jp/

Japan Whaling Association http://www.whaling.jp/old:www.jpwhaling-assn.com/

WWF

YWCA CHARM

HELP

Whale & Dolphin Action Network

homepage1.nifty.com/IKAN/

Institute of Cetacean Research

www.icrwhale.org/

WWF Japan

http://www.wwf.or.jp/

Whale Conservation Coalition of Japan

homepage2.nifty.com/kujirahogo/

E-Kujiraa

www.e-kujira.or.jp/index.html

WFF

www.wff.gr.jp/

Kyoto YWCA Asian People Together CHARM

web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/people/ywapt/

National Network in Solidarity with Migrant Workers

www.jca.apc.org/migrant-net

HELP Asian Women’s Shelter

web.sfc.keio.ac.jp/~thiesmey/HELP.html

House for Women ‘Sālā’

none

Dam Busters

www.na.rim.or.jp/~donpapas/buster.html

Suigenren

www.geocities.co.jp/NatureLandSky/4094/suigen.htm

Kitōson no Mirai o kangaeru Ka

member.nifty.ne.jp/Noresore/kito10.htm

Yanba Dam Citizens’ Movement

www.geocities.co.jp/NatureLand/5588/top.html

Tokuyama Dam tokuyama-dam.cside.com/ (old: Opposition Movement www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet/1214/ NGO NGO Association for kjc.ktroad.ne.jp/ Public Works Review

Nagaragawa Anti-Dam Citizens’ Movement

nagara.ktroad.ne.jp/

Senyūren

www.senyu-ren.jp/

Appendices

142

Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea National Association for the Rescue of Kidnapped Japanese by North Korea APA Nihon Junbi Kai

(APA) STOP!

21

http://www.asahinet.or.jp/~lj7kark/english/top.html sukuu-kai.ram.ne.jp/, sukuukai.jp

none

Kenpō o ikasu Kai

none

STOP! Kaiken/Shimin Network Sensō ni kyōryoku shinai! Sasenai! Nerima Action Japan Palestine Medical Association Peace Action 21

none none

www1.ttcn.ne.jp/~jpma/ none

Heiwa o Tsukuridasu none Shūkyōsha net Rōgakusha none

NO!

NO!

Zenrōkyō

www.zenrokyo.org/

NO! Rape!

none

Women against Bases none Network CHANCE! pono2 Japanese name

Iken 30

www1.jca.apc.org./iken30/

CHANCE! pono2

give-peace-achance.jp/2002fall/

English name/transliteration Homepage address Rainbow

ATTAC Japan

www.rainbow.gr.jp/

ATTAC Japan

www.jca.apc.org/attac-jp/

Peacemakers Network

subeteno.ohah.net/

Namakemono Club

www.sloth.gr.jp/

JACSES

www.jacses.org/

(JACSES) Femin

www.jca.apc.org/femin/

Global Peace Campaign

www.peace2001.org/

Uriparam

uriparam.hp.infoseek.co.jp/index.html

Peaceact

peaceact.jca.apc.org/

White Ribbon Fujisawa

www.ne.jp/asahi/kei/ko/ribon.htm

Appendices

LOFT PROJECT

NGO

143

Hidankyō

www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyo/nihon/

Zenkō

www.zenko-peace.com/

LOFT PROJECT

www.loft-prj.co.jp/

Minpō Union

www.iijnet.or.jp/minpo/

Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai

www10.plala.or.jp/antiatom/

NGO No War Net

www.ngo-nowarnet-jp.org/

Earth Tree

homepage1.nifty.com/EarthTree/

Kojin Jōhō Hogo Hōan www.interq.or.jp/japan/s9d/ Kyohi! Kyōdō Apīru no Kai Min-iren/Japan Federation of Democratic Medical Institutions

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Centre Network ‘Chikyūmura’ Consumers Union of Japan The Japan Scientists’ Association No! Yūji rippō

NO! World Peace Now

www.min-iren.gr.jp/

www.cnic.or.jp/ www.chikyumura.org/ www1.jca.apc.org/nishoren/ www.jsa.gr.jp/

homepage2.nifty.com/peacedesk/

World Peace Now World Peace Now Zenkoku FAX www02.soTsūshin net.ne.jp/%7Ehanten/fax.html

FAX

VAWW-NET Japan (APPF)

www.jca.apc.org/vaww-netjapan

Asia Pacific Peace www.bbnowar.org/ Forum Kalabaw no Kai www.jca.apc.org/kalabaw/ Oxfam www2.odn.ne.jp/oxfam/ International Japan Christian Peace Network Shinbun Rōren

http://www.jca.apc.org~cp_net/ www.shinbunroren.or.jp/

Federation of New www.shinshuren.or.jp/ Religious Organizations of Japan Peace Forum www.peaceforum.com/index.html

Appendices

A SEED JAPAN

144

Kenpō Kaiaku— Shimin Renraku Kai BeGood Café

www4.vc-net.ne.jp/%7Ekenpou/

Peaceboat

www.peaceboat.org/

A SEED JAPAN

www.aseed.org/

begoodcafe.com/flash.html

3 Levels of Internet use and coded variables Nominal variables such as names and contact addresses are not mentioned here. Not all actually coded variables are listed separately, especially when different sources were used to calculate a combined value (e.g. for directory entries in different online directories). This means that some of the variables listed here are already combined from several values. Use of Internet: general

Use of e-mail Use of mailing lists Use of World Wide Web Directory listings Links in from other pages Own mailing list Signature campaigns Mobile Internet Homepage size Frames Regular updates Other languages Staff, staff ratio Budget, budget ratio Ease of Interface Search function Sitemap Navigation bar Self-explanatory image maps Use of graphics Usefulness of Information Statement of policy goals Transparency Information of group size and structure Information for offline registration Action links to policy leaders Logo and identification

Appendices Conservation of Visitors

Generation of Return Visits

145

Links open in separate window Speed of loading Indication of last update Comeback appeal Links Chat Newsletter News forum Calendar Online registration FAQ

Dialogic loop

Comment form BBS Prompt response Other interactive features

4 Codings for success in each issue. Chapter 5 1 Textbook issue 2001 A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success) 2 Whaling issue 2002 A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success) 3 Abduction issue 2002 A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success)

Opponents Supporters medium/n/a/2 medium/n/a/2 high high some success/3 medium/n/a/2 medium/n/a/2 medium/n/a/2 some success/3 negative/1 some success/3 some success/3 Anti-whaling Pro-whaling high/4 high/4 high/4 high/4 medium/n/a/2 some success/3 some success/3 negative/1 3 negative/1 some success/3 medium/n/a/2 Supporters of abductees’ families high/4 high/4 high/4 high/4 some success/3 some success/3

Appendices 4 Peace issue A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success) 5 Dam issue A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success) 6 Foreigners’ issues A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success) 7 Human rights issue A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success) 8 Women’s issues A (getting the issue on the agenda) B (promoting serious discussion) C (opinion polls) D (institutional change) E (substantive policy change) F (other success)

146 Peace activists high/4 some success/3 medium/n/a/2 some success/3 negative/1 medium/n/a/2 Dam activists some success/3 some success/3 high/4 medium/n/a/2 high/4 medium/n/a/2 Foreigners’ issues activists some success/3 high/4 negative/1 medium/n/a/2 medium/n/a/2 medium/n/a/2 Human rights activists negative/1 high/4 some success/3 medium/n/a/2 negative/1 medium/n/a/2 Women’s issues activists negative/1 negative/1 medium/n/a/2 medium/n/a/2 negative/1 medium/n/a/2

Appendices

147

5 List of groups examined in Chapter 6 English name Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 World Peace Now Association of German development non-governmental organizations (VENRO) Federal Association of Environmental Civic Initiatives (BBU) Network of the German Peace Movement Korea NGO Council for Overseas Cooperation (KCOC) Asia Peace and History Education Network Korea Women’s Associations United (KWAU)

Original name

Homepage http://www.janic.org/

NGO

(JANIC)

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21

WORLD PEACE NOW www.worldpeacenow.jp/ Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher http://www.venro.org/

Nichtregierungsorganisationen e.V. (VENRO) Bundesverband Burgerinitiativen Umweltschutz e.V. (BBU)

www.bbu-online.de/

Netzwerk Friedenskooperative

http://www.friedenskooperative.de/

(KCOC) http://www.ngokcoc.or.kr/

www.japantext.net/

(KWAU)

www.women21.or.kr/

6 List of websites examined in Chapter 7 Japanese newspapers Asahi Shinbun (http://www.asahi.com/) Mainichi Shinbun (http://www.mainichi.co.jp/)

Appendices

148

Nikkei Net (http://www.nikkei.co.jp/) Sankei Shinbun (http://www.sankei.co.jp/) Yomiuri Online (www.yomiuri.co.jp/) Japan Today (http://www.japantoday.com/) Japanese portal sites and BBS Biglobe (http://www.biglobe.ne.jp/) Excite Japan (http://www.excite.co.jp/) Goo (http://www.goo.ne.jp/) Nifty (http://www.nifty.com/) Yahoo Japan (http://www.yahoo.co.jp/) 2-Channel (http://www.2ch.net/) Teacup (bbs.teacup.com) Japanese activists Worldpeacenow (http://www.worldpeacenow.jp/) Peaceact—hansen/heiwa akushon (peaceact.jca.apc.org) Iraku e no kōgeki hantai [Against the attack on Iraq] (http://www.hyogokokyoso.com/webmail/iraq2.shtml) Motto…Jieitai [More…SDF] (tag.vis.ne.jp/jsdf/index.html) Nishio Kanji no Intānetto Nichiroku [Nishio Kanji’s Internet Diary] (nitiroku. hp.infoseek.co.jp) (new address: nishiokanji.com/blog, last accessed on 2 February 2006) Ishihara Shintarō no kōshiki uebusaito [Ishihara Shintarō’ official Website] (http://www.sensenfukoku.net/main.html) Korean newspapers Chosun Ilbo (http://www.chosun.com/) Donga Ilbo (http://www.donga.com/) Hankyoreh Sinmun (http://www.hani.co.kr/) Joongang Ilbo (news.joins.com) Oh my News (www.ohmynews.com) Korean portal sites and BBS Daum (http://www.daum.net/) Empas (http://www.empas.com/) Yahoo Korea (http://www.yahoo.co.kr/)

Appendices

149

Korean activists Chamyeoyeondae (http://www.peoplepower21.org/) Gibumiraq (cafe.daum.net/gibumiraq) Nosamo (nosamo.org) Korea Freedom League (Hangug Jayu Chongyeonmaeng) (http://www.kfl.or.kr/) Solidarity for Iraq Peace Team (martin.zoa.to) Citizens’ Association Against the Iraq Troop Dispatch Iraku Pabyeong Bandae Bisang Gugmin Haengdong (http://www.antiwar.or.kr/)

Notes 1 This could open a debate about ‘support for democracy’ or ‘abiding by the local laws’ as requirements for civil society, but since they are not very relevant to the Japanese case, and other definitions do not mention this issue, I leave the discussion for others. 2 More on networks and the conceptual problem that they are both structure and agent: see Keck and Sikkink 1998:5. 3 A total of 24 per cent professed to know at least a little about the newsletter, and a further 57 per cent had heard the term. 4 Text input using the 44 characters of the Japanese syllable alphabet is also possible, but not very popular. 5 Because Japanese has many homophones, the transliteration alone can be ambiguous, even for readers or listeners who know the context. 6 For example, 4 per cent of people in their sixties had a keitai because ‘they were made to have one’ (Asahi Shinbun 2004f:1). 7 As the total number of Internet users has certainly risen between 2003 and 2005, the actual percentage figures for 2005 blog users should be lower. The US figures for September 2005 are 9 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively (Pew Internet & American Life Project 2006). 8 JCAFE (http://www.jcafe.net/) offers, among others, web hosting, seminars and a community portal. 9 The law specifies a number of activities that an NPO can be engaged in, including, for instance, welfare, social education, disaster prevention, but also an expansion of economic activity or work-related knowledge. It also stipulates that no more than one-third of officers may receive remuneration (Cabinet Office 1998). 10 Asano and Yamauchi (2001) argue that voluntary engagement by those with higher net costs is perceived as ‘more’, which could explain this survey’s surprisingly high results in an age group with relatively little spare time. 11 The homepages of groups examined in this chapter are listed in Appendix 1 rather than in the bibliographic references. Individual pages are listed in detail there when they are quoted in the text. 12 See Saaler (2005) for a long description, and Saaler (2002) for a brief overview. 13 The Japanese name is ‘Monbu Kagakushō’ abbreviation.

MEXT is the official English

14 The full Japanese name is ‘Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai’ 15 ‘Comfort Women’ (jūgun ianfu, ) was the euphemistic term given to military sex slaves during the war, who were drafted by force or false promises into brothels operated by, or on behalf of, the Japanese army. Their number has been estimated at between 80,000 and 200,000, the majority of whom were Korean. ‘Nanjing Massacre’ refers to the invasion of Nanjing by Japanese troops in 1937, when allegedly up to 300,000 people were killed, most of them civilians. Unit 731 of the Japanese army conducted germ warfare experiments on Chinese civilians. For information in English on these issues, see Williams and Wallace (1989), Buruma (1994), Chang (1997) and Tanaka (2002). 16 Later, it turned out that the objected change of a critical passage had never occurred. For a detailed account of the affair, see Ortmanns-Suzuki (1989). 17 Comment made under condition of anonymity in an interview on 6 August 1996. 18 This part is based on information given by Network 21 and Tawara (2002).

Notes

151

19 This part is based on Kang (2004), and the Textbook Movement Headquarters Homepage. 20 This part is based on several websites and BBS associated with Antijapan as well as personal communication with one of the organizers in 2002. 21 The Tsukurukai homepage, Tsukurukai publications and an interview with a representative in 2002 were consulted for this part. 22 This part is based on the Mindan homepage and publications and interviews with two representatives in 2002. 23 This part is based partly on interviews with three MOFA officials in 2001. 24 An interview with a MOFAT representative in November 2001 contributed to this part. 25 With a ‘market’ share of 0.4 per cent, the book was only slightly more successful then. 26 For more information on the domestic political links of the groups, including support by later LDP Secretary General Abe Shinzō, see Japan Today 2003d, f; McNeill and Hippin 2003; Sukuukai 2003. 27 This issue is described in more detail in Chapter 7. 28 This figure is based on calculations made by Daniel Aldrich for his research on controversial facility siting in Japan. 29 In six months of newspaper articles, the term ‘foreigners’ of articles mentioning human rights discrimination

appeared in 6.2 per cent

and 4.9 per cent of articles mentioning

versus 4.8 per cent and 5.9 per cent for threat

and crime

(Nikkei Telekom 2004). 30 In an interview on 4 July 2003. 31 The median is the value appearing in the middle if the batch is ordered from lowest to highest values. 32 Cases that are separated by a distance of more than 1.5 times the box width are considered outliers; cases situated more than three times the box width away are considered extreme outliers. Both types are marked separately: outliers by circles, extremes by crosses. They are not considered for measuring the maximum and minimum values and thus for the vertical line indicating the total range of values. 33 ‘p’ gives the probability of making a mistake by rejecting the null hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis claiming just the opposite of the hypothesis researched. In this case, the null hypothesis is that any connection between ‘Internet use’ and ‘success’ is purely coincidental. It is more than 99.9 per cent safe to reject this null-hypothesis; only in 0.1 per cent of comparable situations would it be mistaken. For some of the ANOVAs mentioned here, tests on normal distribution where not quite satisfactory. In these cases, this is mentioned in the text. 34 The test e-mail was in Japanese and could easily be answered by any volunteer in less than five minutes. AT-test for the significance of the association resulted in p=0.001. 35 As the many outliers suggest, the ‘yes’ group lacks a normal distribution; but the sample is rather large, and in any case the connection between a homepage and Google hits seems rather self-evident. 36 Statement in a personal conversation on 21 January 2003. 37 See Chapter 1 and Forsythe (2000) for a discussion of different factors for success. 38 These levels are: 1. Ease of Interface (e.g. search function). 2. Usefulness of Information (e.g. information on the group structure). 3. Conservation of Visitors (e.g. speed). 4. Generation of Return Visits (e.g. link list and newsletters). 5. Dialogic Loop (e.g. BBS or email responsiveness). For more detailed explanation of these five levels, see Taylor et al. 2001, Chapter 1 and Appendix 3. 39 The new guidelines were established in 2005. Drafts and discussion papers for the guidelines: MOFA (1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a).

Notes

152

40 The official English name is ‘Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform’, while the official Japanese name, ‘Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai’ translates as ‘Society for the Creation of New History Textbook(s)’ 41 The original name of this group is in capital roman letters. It is occasionally also spelled in Japanese Katakana as (a Japanese transcription of the English name). 42 There are also links to old versions of the site, with the original information and some follow-up for each of the major demonstrations organized. 43 Although the German Development Ministry, BMZ (Ministry for Economic Cooperation), gives substantial support to NGOs, almost 90 per cent of this is earmarked for six foundations affiliated with the political parties represented in parliament and two Christian charities, one of them Catholic, one Protestant. 44 Aktionsprogramm 2015 is the German government’s initiative for reaching the ‘UN millennium goals’ formulated in 2000. These goals include, most prominently, the reduction of extreme poverty by half, universal primary education and gender equality in secondary education. See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ and www.aktionsprogramm2015.de/. 45 BBU lacks an official English version of its name. 46 In 2005, the newly established Grand Coalition government (which did not include the Green Party) confirmed this policy, albeit somewhat reluctantly. 47 In an interview on 16 September 2004. 48 An exception is the protest activities against nuclear waste transports, where SMS messages play a large role (Golla 2004). 49 The German peace movement reached its peak in 1983, when a famous demonstration in Bonn involved 300,000 participants. 50 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the issue flared up again in April 2005. This time the confrontation did not escalate as much, but the controversial book remained rather unsuccessful. 51 In this system, married women were included in the family record of their husband, as were the children of the couple. If they divorced and perhaps re-married, the children could not be transferred to another family record without the father’s consent and even then could not take another name (Jung 2004). 52 The South Korean government has pursued a very pro-active IT policy since the 1990s which included efforts to increase Internet access rates, and financial support for certain IT initiatives (not including regular websites but, for instance, archives or educational tools). 53 Asian mobile phones used e-mail rather than SMS very early because of the non-ASCII script. See Chapter 2 for details. Web-compatible phones are less popular in Korea because of the earlier high broadband penetration there, which made PC access more attractive. 54 KW cannot easily be placed in either category. It has a well-developed website but also several flash issues and a relatively defined core audience. However, the group does attempt to reach a broader public and retain steady support. 55 For details on the debate about a constitutional revision, see Hook and McCormack (2001). 56 In April 2004, Takatō Naoko Noriaki

Kōriyama Sōichirō

and Imai

were held hostage for over a week but released after negotiations

(AERA 2004:20). Kōda Shōsei a tourist, was taken hostage on 26 October 2004 and beheaded on 30 October 2004 (Asahi Shinbun 2004e: 1). 57 The largest demonstration, on 8 March 2003, drew about 40,000 participants (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2003:39).

Notes

153

58 Peaceact had about 200 links, mostly to Japanese sites, including the blog of one-time hostage Takatō Naoko (iraqhope.exblog.jp/) and local groups like Peace Walker Kanagawa (www.geocities.co.jp/HeartLand-Oak/1600/). On the World Peace Now site, links were less organized, except for those to nearly 50 quite diverse member groups. Other groups could be reached through their appeals posted on the site. 59 Yahoo only later introduced a distinction between real-time chatrooms and message boards. 60 In addition to PSPD, the English name ‘People Power 21’ is also used—for example, in the domain name (http://www.peoplepower21.org/).

Bibliography The homepages of groups and organizations that are the object of research in each chapter are listed in the appendices. 10.29 ‘Kagayake Nihon Koku Kenpō’Shūkai Jikkō Iinkai 10•29 (2004) 10.29 ‘Kagayake Nihon koku kenpō’kōen to shinpojium 10•29 (29 October ‘Shine, Japanese Constitution’ Lecture and Symposium).Tokyo, 29 October. AERA (2004) ‘Iraku jinshitsu kaihō made 8 nichi kan no kōbō. Nihon no NGO ga seishokusha ni kyōryoku yōsei’ NGO [‘8-day battle until release of Iraq hostages. Japanese NGO request clergy’s cooperation’], 26 April, p. 20. AHRC (Asian Human Rights Commission) (2001) ‘JAPAN: No! to the Distorted History Textbook’, 8 August. Online, available at: http://www.ahrchk.net/hrsolid/mainfile.php/2001vol11no08/1176/ (accessed: 1 February 2002). Aiba, Atsushi

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[Digital Media and Culture], Paper presented at Nichibunken 14th Tokyo Public Lecture, Tokyo, June. (2003) Interview, Yamato Loves Akiyama, Tomoyuki and Watanabe, Atsushi Support Center Representatives, Yamato, Kanagawa-ken, 25 November. Amnesty International (2003) Report 2003—Japan. Online, available at: web.amnesty. org/report2003/Jpn-summary-eng (accessed: 18 September 2003). Amnesty International (2005) Report 2005—Japan. Online, available at: web.amnesty. org/report2005/jpn-summary-eng (accessed: 1 June 2005). Arase, David (1995) Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner. Argyris, Chris and Schön, Donald (1978) Organizational Learning. A Theory of Action Perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Asahi Shinbun (1998) ‘NGO no seichō, intānetto ga kaisoku—dennō borantia katsudō’ NGO [Internet accelerates growth of NGOs—computer-linked volunteer activities], Morning edition, 29 January, p. 33. Asahi Shinbun (2002a) ‘Internet use surges in Japan’, Morning edition, 22 May, p. 23. Asahi Shinbun (2002b) ‘NPO kokunai seisan 6940 oku en sōtō ni’ NPO 6940 [NPO domestic turnover sizable 694 billion Yen], Morning edition, 27 May, p. 3. Asahi Shinbun (2002c) ‘Netto de tsunagaru nikkan kōryū’ [Japanese-Korean exchange via the Internet], Evening edition, 27 May, p. 7. [Circle of Asahi Shinbun (2002d) ‘Jidō honyaku de kōryū no wa’ exchange with automatic translation], Morning edition, 13 June, p. 12. Asahi Shinbun (2002e) ‘Electronic voting debuts, with glitches’, Morning edition, 24 June, p. 19. Asahi Shinbun (2002f) ‘Kokkyō koeru NGO netto’ transcending national borders], Morning edition, 24 August, p. 22.

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78% [78% oppose [NPO corporations [One in two 5533

7000

[Internet

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10

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Additional interviews not explicitly quoted in the text were conducted between 2001 and 2004, with representatives of Mindan, MOFA, MOFAT, Tsukurukai, and Antijapan.

Index abduction 60, 66–8, 155 access 1–2, 4, 9–10, 13, 17–30, 23, 55, 62, 69–70, 80, 83–4, 88–90, 116, 120–1, 128, 135, 138, 141, 161n52, 161n53; divide 44; see also digital divide accountability 93 action 104, 106, 128–30, 132, 141; links 75, 154; urgent 119, 122, 128, 141; see also cyber action activist 3, 5–7, 11, 20, 30, 32, 36–7, 41–2, 53, 56, 75, 98–100, 103, 106, 108, 126–30, 132, 135–8, 141–2; networks 58; public 47; transnational 48 administrator interface/page 109, 116 advocacy 42, 68, 138; movement 34 age 9–10, 19, 24, 24, 26, 29–30, 40–1, 51, 57, 83, 106, 120, 140–1, 159n10; retirement 141; see also digital divide; elderly; ‘grey divide’; senior; teenagers agenda 13, 30, 63–4, 87, 155–6 Akihabara 16 Aktionsprogramm 2015 102, 161n44 Al-Qaeda 133 anime 16 annexation of Korea see Korea announcement board 119; see also Bulletin Board System anonymity 85, 116 anti-apologies see bōgen Antijapan 50–2, 57–8, 143, 160n20 Anti-terror Law see laws apology 46 appeal: for action 14, 41, 48–52, 83, 108, 123, 128–9, 154, 162; attractiveness 91, 101, 108, 119, 122, 124, 128–9, 136–7, 141

Index

178

archive 107, 112, 119, 142, 161n52 army: Japanese Imperial 160; Korean 134; see also Self-Defence Forces Asahi Shinbun 133, 157 ASCII 9, 161n53 Asia Foundation 70 Asia Peace and History Education Network 110–11 Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 52 Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho 45, 96, 110; revisions 45; see also screening; textbook affair; Tsukurukai audience 3, 46, 56–7, 70, 90–1, 96, 98, 102, 105, 110–14, 115, 117–19, 121–3, 127–30, 135, 137– 42, 162n54; niche 119, 122, 130 Basic IT Law see laws Beheiren 98 Biglobe 130–1, 157 blog 28, 159n7, 162n58 bōgen 46 box plot diagram 74, 78 broadband 17, 19, 21–3, 23, 25, 29, 62, 89, 117, 139, 141, 161n53 bubble years 93 budget 38, 71–2, 85, 90, 92, 94, 97, 100, 106, 115, 116, 119, 123, 154 Bulletin Board System (BBS) 3, 14, 17, 44, 49–52, 56–7, 70–1, 72, 76, 85, 94, 98–9, 102, 107, 110, 116–17, 121, 127, 130–2, 134–6, 140, 155, 157–8, 160n20, 161n38, 162n59 Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umwelt (BBU) 103–6, 157, 161n45 Burakumin 38, 52 Bürgerinitiative 104 Bush, George W. 2, 66, 152 2-Channel 131–2, 158 calendar 14, 75, 102, 108, 122, 129, 154 campaign 3, 7, 10, 20, 22, 41, 48–51, 55–6, 58, 61–4, 68–9, 93, 97, 107, 112, 119, 122, 124, 126, 128, 135, 140, 147–8, 152; online 3, 22; signature 36, 129, 134–5, 154; transnational 3, 48 censorship 3, 45, 48–9, 91; see also screening Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility (JWRC) 51, 143, 149 Chamyeo Yeondae 113, 135 chat 14, 27, 50, 70, 94, 131, 154; room 17, 44, 51, 62, 85, 105, 108, 122, 130, 162n59 China 2, 22, 30, 46 chōnaikai 36 Chōsōren 53

Index

179

Christianity 36 church 102 Citizens’ Association against the Iraq Troop Dispatch 134, 158 citizens’ group 1, 7, 8–9, 11–13, 15, 19, 30–1, 37, 39, 41–2, 44, 46–8, 50, 55–8, 88–90, 112, 116, 119, 123–4, 130, 134, 137–42; international 51; small 59–86, 89 citizens’ movement 32, 34, 40–1, 68 civil society 1–2, 9, 12, 15, 30–1, 84, 87–9, 92, 113, 116, 138, 159n1; definitions 4–8, 34–6; in Japan 32–42; literature on 11–12, 20; Organization (CSO) 2, 7–8, 30–1, 37, 39, 87–8, 90, 102, 108, 111 coding of values 63–4, 155 colonial period 45, 53; see also ‘comfort women’; zainichi ‘comfort women’ 45–7, 96, 159n15 comment 46, 49, 51, 53–5, 58, 133–4; form 14, 49, 51, 76, 94, 99, 129, 155; public 22, 41 common good 6–8, 37; corporation see kōeki hōjin community 6, 8, 13, 19, 32, 38, 40, 50, 53, 57, 135, 159n8; activities 35, 40; currency 17, 28 commuter 17, 27 computer 9, 15, 17–18, 20–1, 23–4, 28, 41, 50, 52, 57, 70, 83, 141–2; encoding 18, 50, 58, 139 confrontation 11, 33, 36, 58, 93, 161n50 Confucian tradition 36 conservative 48, 53, 61, 65–6, 79, 113, 116, 133–5 constitution 38, 125, 162n55; of Japan 93, 98; ‘peace’ 67 Consumers’ Union 82 content 3, 43, 46, 49, 54, 72–3, 97, 109, 116–18, 128–30, 133, 138; editing 122; management system 109, 116 controversial 7, 12, 28, 43, 46–8, 53, 57, 61, 65, 91, 94, 96, 129, 138, 160n28, 161n50 cooperation 22, 32–3, 36–7, 42, 93, 108 correlation 73, 75, 82, 85 cost-efficiency 123 cross-posting 133 cyber: action 127; ‘classroom’ 111; demo 50–1, 58; forum 55; protest 134–5; see also online

Index

180

dam construction 60, 63, 67–8, 70 database 102, 107 Daum 135; café 135, 158 decision-making 1, 22, 33, 37, 129 democracy 1–2, 4, 6, 11, 36, 89, 159n1; strong 1, 87–8; see also e-democracy democratization movement 112, 134–5 demographic development 29 demonstration 4, 36–7, 40, 46, 58, 67, 99–100, 100, 108, 118, 121, 128, 140, 161n42, 49, 162n57 Denial of Service (DOS) attack 8, 57, 59 depth (of a website) 94, 112, 117 developing countries 9, 68 development 16, 19–22, 29, 35, 58, 64–5, 69, 89, 91–5, 98, 101–2, 104, 107–8, 109, 111, 118–19, 121–2, 124–5, 136–7, 141, 146, 148, 161; aid 8, 11, 37, 91, 93; see also Official Development Assistance developmental organization 7, 34–5, 37, 39, 42, 94, 101–2, 108, 165 developmentalism 42 dialogic 17, 72, 99, 114, 140; features 12, 71, 76, 85, 98, 136, 138; loop 13–14, 62, 75–6, 114, 114, 118, 122, 155, 161n38; see also interactivity digital 10, 16, 18, 21, 112, 139; divide 2, 4, 9–12, 24, 44, 57, 69, 83, 85, 119, 139, 141 discrimination 68–9, 149, 160n29 discussion 1, 4, 12, 13, 17, 34, 57, 60, 63, 73, 85, 87, 91, 117, 129, 131–2, 155–6; forum 130, 136; thread 130–1, 133 ecological farming 104 e-commerce 19, 28–9, 76 e-democracy 11, 19, 89 education 7, 9, 19–20, 24, 37, 39–40, 47, 51, 57, 65, 68, 83, 94, 110–11, 117, 141, 147–8, 157, 159n9, 161n44, 161n52; see also digital divide; ministries; textbook affair efficiency 11, 41, 56, 123 e-government 11, 17, 19, 21 ‘e-Japan’ 19, 22, 44 elderly 18, 38, 99, 142; see also age electronic: voting 17, 22, 41; see also e-commerce; e-democracy; e-Japan; e-mail

Index

181

emaga.com 17 e-mail 10, 16–18, 23–4, 26–9, 49–50, 54, 56–7, 59, 62, 70–1, 72, 76, 83–5, 98–9, 101–2, 104, 107, 112, 116–17, 119, 122–3, 129, 138–41, 160n34, 161n38, 161n53; address 49, 51–2, 54–5, 71, 107, 127, 129, 134; mobile 18; newsletter 84, 90, 92; protest 47; use 17–18, 24, 70–3, 110, 154 Empas 135, 158 empowerment 30, 69, 92, 112 endorsement 14, 65, 108, 125, 136 environmental 33, 36, 40–1, 52, 94, 98, 103–6, 157; activism 7, 104; movement 33, 36, 104, 106 equalization theory 2, 12, 44, 60 equipment 9, 30, 50, 52, 70, 116 events listings (on homepages) 49, 97, 99, 111, 122, 127–9, 139, 142 Excite 130, 157 experience 9, 39, 89, 94, 98, 100, 105, 109, 117, 119–20, 122–3, 130, 134, 139–41; see also digital divide extremist 4, 36, 142 fax 16, 20–1, 49–50, 58, 70, 107, 128, 139–40, 153; e-mail as continuation of 56, 59, 85, 97 feedback 14, 52, 62, 73, 79–81, 80, 86, 122 FIFA World Cup 2002 15, 17 file size 116–17 fingerprinting 68 flash: animation 117; issue 115, 118–19, 122, 124, 137, 140, 162 forced labour 45; see also colonial period foreign workers 70, 85 Fujioka 46–7 fundamentalism 5 gatekeeper 91, 113, 116 gender 9, 69, 83, 84, 85, 112; equality 69, 112, 161n44; gap 24; see also women globalization 58, 105 Goo 130, 157 Google 63, 78, 79, 161n35 government 6, 8, 11, 13, 17–22, 30, 36–7, 41–2, 44–7, 57–8, 115, 116–17, 125–6; British 126; Chinese 46; German 102, 104, 106–7, 161n44, 161n46; Korean 44, 46, 55, 59, 61, 63–4, 66–8, 108, 110, 112, 134, 161n52; local 3, 19, 28, 38, 40, 49, 71, 90–4, 96, 99;

Index

182

online 41; see also e-government; ministries; state grassroots 11, 20, 98 green: Party 3, 104, 161n46; -voter’s lists 104 Greenpeace Japan 62, 150 ‘grey divide’ 9, 141; see also age; digital divide; elderly Gulf War 98, 125 hacking 11, 51 Hankyoreh 135, 158 Hanshin earthquake 37 hardware see equipment health 19, 38–40, 146, 148 Hegel 5 Hiroshima 98 history 19, 43–5, 50, 52–5, 87, 92, 110; of civil society 33, 36, 89; of a group and its homepage 92, 115, 120, 120, 139; of the Internet 19; textbook 12, 43–8, 50–2, 58, 65, 91, 96–7, 110–11, 143–5; see also Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho; textbook affair hits (accesses to a website) 28, 49, 55, 62, 81; Google 63, 78, 79, 161n35 hoju system 112–13 homepage 3, 17, 19, 27, 33, 41, 49, 51–6, 61, 62, 70–3, 75, 77–85, 77, 79–82, 93, 95–6, 95, 97, 98, 101, 101, 103, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108–10, 109, 111, 112, 113, 127–30, 132–5, 138–40, 142, 146– 54, 157, 159n11, 160n19, 160n21, 160n22, 161n35; definition 10; mobile 18 hostage 42, 126, 128, 135–6, 162n56, 162n58 hosting 30, 116, 159 human rights 8, 33, 38, 52, 60, 63, 68, 94, 98, 147, 156, 160n29 humanitarian 8, 37, 126; activities 131; aid 148; assistance 37 Hussein, Saddam 125; see also Iraq hyperlink 85 hypothesis 12–13, 44, 59–60, 67, 72–7, 79, 81, 83, 85; null 160n33

Index

183

identity 3, 14 ideology 43, 61, 91 Ienaga Saburō 45, 48, 96 Imai Noriaki 162n56 immediacy 3, 12, 119, 122–3 influence (of citizens) 5, 32–3, 46–8, 55, 58, 61, 64–5, 67–8, 70, 90, 103–4, 113, 118, 123, 127, 134, 137 information 1–4, 9–13, 17, 19–22, 27, 30, 32–3, 41, 44, 48–51, 53–6, 58, 66, 70–1, 75, 79, 85, 89, 91, 94–9, 103, 105, 107, 111, 113, 119, 121–3, 127–9, 132, 136, 140, 142, 154, 161n42; and communication technologies (ICT) 10, 20, 22, 88–92, 94, 103, 113–14, 116, 119, 121–4; online 9, 19, 78; strategy 113; usefulness of 14, 62, 73, 75, 94, 96, 99, 114, 118, 154, 161n38 institution 1, 5–7, 37, 44, 49, 52, 58 institutional change 64–5, 155–6 interactive democracy 2 interactivity 10, 13, 14, 49, 52–5, 57, 70–1, 76, 84–5, 94, 99, 101, 113, 116, 118, 128, 138, 155; see also dialogic interest 5, 37, 39–40, 57, 66, 68, 80, 90–3, 95, 102, 105–6, 108, 116–22, 126–32, 134, 136–7, 142; common 3, 5–6, 8; group 8, 11; public 99, 126; self- 35 interface 13, 85; ease of 14, 62, 73, 75, 76, 94, 96, 99, 103, 109, 114, 114, 118, 120, 122, 155, 161n38 international non-governmental organization (INGO) see non-governmental organization International Whaling Commission (IWC) 65 Internet: café 15, 50; directory 80; etiquette 50; features 60, 72, 74, 79, 85; literacy 57; penetration 28–30, 29, 89–90; revolution 19; security 22; subscriptions 18, 23, 23, 72; tools 1, 11, 20, 30, 47, 51, 59–61, 68, 124, 137, 139–40; user 17, 22, 24–8, 25, 30, 50, 137, 141, 159n7; see also mobile: Internet Internet access see access interview 62, 73, 83, 89–90, 121, 160n17, 160n21–4, 160n30, 161n47 Iraq 42, 61, 67; troop dispatch 124–37; War 67, 99, 101, 106–8, 112, 125, 127–9, 133–4; see also hostage; laws; peace; Self-Defence Forces; troop dispatch

Index

184

Islam 131 issue-oriented 3, 141 JANIC 93–5, 108, 112, 157 Japan Scientists’ Association 82, 153 Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform see Tsukurukai JCAFE 30, 159n8 Jimintō see Liberal Democratic Party jūgun ianfu see ‘comfort women’ Juki Net 41 jūmin undō 33, 36 JUNET 21 JWRC 51, 143 KCOC 108–10, 157 keitai (denwa) 18–19, 23–7, 62, 70–1, 83–5, 128, 132, 159n6; see also mobile: phone keyboard 9, 16, 21, 44, 58, 117, 141–2 kidnapping see hostage Kim Jong Il 66 kisha kurabu see press club knowledge 1, 11, 16, 27, 57, 98, 114, 120, 159n9; gap theory 10 Kōda Shōsei 128, 162n56 kōeki hōjin 35, 37, 39, 60 Koizumi Junichiro 28, 66; weekly newsletter 17, 28 komyūnitī katsudō see community activities Korea, xi, 8, 12–13, 15, 59, 143–4, 148–9, 157, 157–8, 160; annexation of 43; North xi, 45, 53, 66, 125, 134, 148, 151; South xi, 2, 17, 19, 22, 29–30, 43–59, 87, 89, 92, 108, 109, 110–13, 116–17, 124, 133–7, 139, 161n52; see also ministries Korea Freedom League 135, 158 Kōriyama Sōichirō 162n56 Kuwait 126 KWAU 112–13, 151 language 12, 44, 49–50, 56, 58, 87, 122, 139, 154; translation of terms 35; see also writing system laws 6, 20, 93, 99, 104, 125, 159n9; anti-terror 125; Basic IT 22; Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq 126; NPO 32, 35, 60; Public Offices Election Law 22

Index

185

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 22, 51, 160n26 library 9, 141 long-term issue 103, 115, 119, 122, 124, 137 machizukuri 39, 40 mailing list 3, 10, 17, 49, 52, 72, 91–2, 94, 97–8, 102, 105, 110, 112, 117, 122–3, 127, 129, 131–2, 140–1, 154 Mainichi Shinbun 133, 157 mainstream 3–4, 8, 47, 104, 130, 140–1 manual: by hand 49–50; user guide 11–12, 18–19, 30–2 Marx 5 measurement 59, 119; of the digital divide 9; of Internet use 13, 60; of success 13–14, 63, 89; see also success media 1, 3–4, 10, 16–17, 19, 22, 34, 45, 47–8, 51, 62–6, 71, 75, 77, 81, 90, 99, 118–19, 134, 140; mass 10, 20, 63, 65, 90–1; new 26, 29, 30, 41, 65, 67, 83, 87–8, 92; traditional 2–4, 43, 56, 77–8, 91, 99, 105, 113, 116, 137 membership 8, 49, 51, 67, 90, 92, 94, 106, 132, 135 message board see Bulletin Board System (BBS) middle school see school Min’iren 82 Mindan 53, 144, 149, 160n22 minikomi 84, 139 ministries 43, 48, 56–7; Bundesministerium für Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) (Germany) 161n43; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) (Japan) 44, 46–8, 51, 53–4, 65, 96, 143–4; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (Japan) 17, 28, 35, 47, 54–5, 66, 144; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) (South Korea) 55–6, 144; Ministry of Public Management; Home Affairs; Posts and Telecommunications (Sōmushō) (Japan) 19, 25 minority 2–4, 7, 19, 45, 52–3, 68, 87–8, 141; see also zainichi mobile 18, 23, 139, 142; Internet 10, 17–18, 23–31, 62, 85–6, 89, 94, 128, 130, 138–40, 142, 154; phone 10, 16–18, 24, 26, 26, 29, 62, 72, 83–4, 97, 100, 116, 128, 138, 141–2, 161n53 mobilization 3, 15, 30, 47, 99, 106–8, 111–12, 118, 122, 124, 127, 129, 136–7 Mori, Yoshiro 21 motivation 8, 38, 55, 98, 101, 103, 105, 108, 110, 119, 121–2, 128, 136–7, 140–2 mouse 9, 117, 141 movement 5, 7–9, 33, 36–8, 46–8, 50–2, 98, 104–5, 107, 112, 121, 124, 128, 135, 141, 144, 149– 51, 160n19; see also advocacy movement; citizens’ movement; democratization movement;

Index

186

environmental movement; peace movement; social movement Nagasaki 98 nakama hōjin 38 Nanjing 45–6, 160n15 nationalism 44–5, 48, 61, 65, 110–11, 130, 136, 138 navigation bar 14, 75, 84–5, 98–9, 136–40, 154 network 5, 8, 30, 39, 41, 48–9, 52, 87, 92, 96, 98, 115, 139; see also activist network; Asia Peace and History Education Network; Netzwerk Friedenskooperative Network 1, 7, 9–10, 20–1, 30, 41, 48–51, 53, 57–8, 60, 85, 96–8, 102, 110, 127, 141, 149, 157, 159n2, 160n18 Network Chikyūmura 21, 82 networking 1–2, 12, 30, 41, 43–4, 50, 56, 59, 67–9, 71, 85, 88–91, 93, 106, 108, 110, 123, 139–40 Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 106–7, 157 New History Textbook see Atarashii Rekishii Kyōkasho new political culture 41 news forum 154 newsletter 14, 17, 28, 53, 77, 90, 92, 94, 99, 102, 127, 129, 154, 159n3 newspaper 2, 13, 48, 51, 56, 63–6, 68–9, 77–8, 127–8, 133–6, 157–8, 160n29 niche audience see audience Nifty 130, 157 Nikkei Shinbun 133, 157 Nishimura Hiroyuki 131 non-governmental 108; international organization (INGO) 8; organization (NGO) 8, 35, 41, 71, 91, 93, 95, 101, 108, 146–7, 151–2, 157 non-profit 6–8, 35, 38–9; organization (NPO) 7–9, 20, 32–5, 37–40, 42, 60–1, 93, 95, 109, 116, 138, 147–8, 159n9; sector 36–7, 39–41, 138; see also laws non-user 9–10, 27 normalization 2–3, 12 normative 6–8 North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) see Korea NTT 18, 20 nuclear 104, 106, 125, 153, 161n48; reactor 36, 104; weapons 125; see also Korea Obuchi Keizo 21 Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) 93–4, 102, 108–9; see also development offline 50–1, 53, 59, 63, 67, 78–9, 88, 97, 99, 105, 108, 113, 128–9, 133–4, 139, 154; activities 14–15, 47, 49, 56, 98, 105–6, 140 Oh my News 135, 158 Olympic Games 50

Index

187

one-way communication 58, 94, 114, 139–40 One-World shop 102 online 3–4, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27–9, 44, 47, 49–51, 53, 57, 59, 62, 71, 77–8, 78, 80, 101, 103, 105, 108–9, 111–12, 116–17,120, 124, 127–9, 133, 135–7, 140, 154; activism 3, 14–15, 129–30, 134, 137, 139; deliberation 2, 134; donation 76; game 17, 27; newspaper 133–4; petition 105, 130; poll 15, 127, 130, 133, 135; public 136; public sphere 127, 130, 136; tool 17, 30, 56, 98, 124, 129–30, 136–7, 139–40; see also campaign; government; information; visibility opinion poll 15, 63–9, 90, 93, 99, 112, 127, 135, 155–6; see also online: poll organization see civil society organization; non-governmental organization; non-profit organization Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 93, 108; see also development outsourcing 115, 116–17 pacifism 67, 93, 98, 136–7; see also peace PAML 132 Park Gi Beom 135 parliament 104, 126, 134, 161n43 parliamentary election 126, 128 participation (of citizens) 1–2, 4, 8–9, 11, 17, 19, 22, 28, 32, 35–6, 40–1, 77–8, 121, 124; see also shimin sanka; volunteer patriotism 7, 57, 65 peace 36, 67, 74, 83, 91–2, 98–101, 100, 106–8, 118, 122, 126–30, 135–7, 140, 148–9, 151–3, 155, 157, 158; Keeping Operations (PKO) 98, 125; movement 12–14, 60, 67, 79, 82, 98–9, 106–8, 124, 128, 130, 157, 161n49; parade 36; see also Beheiren; constitution; demonstration; Iraq Peaceact 127–9, 132, 152, 158, 162n58 Peaceboat 79, 153 People Power 21 see Chamyeo Yeondae People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) see Chamyeo Yeondae

Index

188

plug-in 117 podcasting 11 portal 18, 127, 129–31, 135–7, 157–8, 159n8 poster 22, 99, 103, 108, 128 postmodern 5 potential (of the Internet) 2–3, 10–1, 16, 22, 31, 40, 53, 55, 58, 60, 71–2, 83, 85, 88, 91, 120, 138, 140, 142 Powell, Colin 42 power 1–2, 5, 34, 36; see also empowerment press club 20 Prime Minister’s Office 28, 51, 54 priority 49, 106, 110–11, 119, 142 professional 24, 37, 40–1, 49, 52, 56–7, 70, 93, 109–10, 112, 116–17, 123, 128, 138–9, 142 progressive 8–9, 61, 134–5 protest 20, 22, 30, 33, 36, 41, 44–53, 57–8, 66–7, 96, 98, 104, 106, 110–11, 127–30, 134–6; movement 33, 47–8, 51–2, 104, 107, 128; online 20, 134 public 1–2, 6–9, 17, 22, 35, 37, 40–1, 47, 55, 67–8, 87–8, 90–5, 97, 99, 102, 106, 108, 110–12, 118, 121–2, 125–7, 130, 132–7, 141, 162n54; comment system 22, 41; Offices Election Law (POEL) 22; opinion 15, 58, 63–7, 99, 106, 110, 136–7; sphere 1, 4–6, 35–6, 40, 87–8, 91–2, 95, 119, 122–4, 127, 130, 136, 138, 140 Q&A page 49, 55 qualitative 14, 56, 73, 83, 85, 89, 94, 105, 111–12, 114, 117–18, 120–1, 139–40 quantitative 13, 27–8, 59, 73, 85, 87, 90, 139 questionnaire 27, 89 recruitment (of volunteers) 121 recycling 35, 38, 40–1 renewable energies 104 resource 1–3, 17, 27, 30, 48, 56–7, 59, 71, 75, 85, 89–90, 96, 114, 117, 119, 138, 140, 146–8 responsiveness 57, 119, 122, 161n38 retirement age see age right-wing 7, 43, 48, 67, 81–2, 96, 110, 130 Rio Earth Summit 108 Roh Moo-hyun 112 Sankei Shinbun 133, 157 satisfaction 7, 14, 63, 73, 89–90 Save the Children Japan 82, 148 school 24, 35, 43, 47, 53, 65, 96, 117; middle school 45, 47; high school 50 screening 3, 45–6, 48, 96, 110 search 27, 63; engine 18, 63, 80; function 14, 75, 102, 109, 122, 142, 154, 161n38

Index

189

security 93, 124–7, 133, 138; Internet 22, 27, 52, 55, 57 Self-Defence Forces (SDF) 98–9, 125–8, 130–2; see also Iraq; troop dispatch senior 26, 29, 39; see also age; elderly; ‘grey divide’ sexual slavery see ‘comfort women’ shibiru sosaetī 34 shimin: katsudō dantai 38; sanka 33, 35–6, 40; shakai 34–5; undō 33, 36, 40 Shimo-Tsuga 46 Short Messaging Service (SMS) 18, 116, 161n48, 161n53; see also mobile: phone signature campaign see campaign site map 102, 109, 122 skills 7, 9–10, 13, 27, 29, 85, 87–8, 90–1, 108, 117, 120–1, 123, 138–9, 141; divide 9, 119; see also digital divide social movement 33 society see civil society socioeconomic status 83 ‘soft’data 73, 85 software see equipment Sōmushō see ministries South Korea see Korea state 5–8, 34–6, 44–5, 48, 53, 56–7, 108, 111, 125, 134 statistical 33, 59, 73, 120; significance 75, 81; tests 75, 78, 80, 83, 85 strategy 50, 94, 104–6, 123, 132–3, 135, 137 subscription see Internet success 43, 58–69, 72–79, 74, 76–8, 81–3, 82, 85–92, 95–7, 99, 101–3, 105–6, 108, 110–11, 114, 115, 120–2, 124, 136–7, 140, 160n33; measurement of 13–15, 155–6, 161n37 survey 9, 20, 24–9, 35, 38–41, 63, 94 Takashima Textbook Lawsuit 51, 144 Takatō Naoko 162n56, 162n58 Tanaka Makiko 54 Tanaka Yasuo 67 Teacup 132, 158 ‘technopolis’ 20 teenagers 21, 26; see also age

Index

190

terror attack 125, 133 textbook 43, 46, 48, 53–7, 59–61, 65, 81, 92, 96–7, 110–11, 122, 143–5; affair 12, 44–9, 52–3, 55, 58, 61, 96, 110; controversy 12, 43–60, 111; issue 43–4, 48, 54–7, 65, 118, 140, 155; Movement Headquarters 50–1, 57, 144, 160n19; selection process 44–7; see also Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho; history; screening trafficking 69 train timetables 142 transnational see activist troop dispatch (to Iraq) 99, 106, 124–37, 158, 160n15; see also Iraq; Self-Defence Forces Tsukurukai 45–8, 51–2, 56–7, 65, 79, 81, 96, 98, 144–5, 149, 159n14, 161n14; see also Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho umbrella organization 12–13, 50, 87–123, 114 United Nations (UN) 8, 35, 37, 69, 108, 112, 125, 161n44; Security Council (UNSC) 124–5; see also Peace Keeping Operations Unit 731 45, 160n15 university 21 update 14, 22, 49, 52, 55, 70, 72, 76, 84, 107, 109, 116–18, 122, 127, 154 urgency 53, 101, 103, 108, 118–19, 122, 124 urgent action see action USA 20, 28–9, 51–2, 125, 128 values: data 59–60, 62–4, 69, 71–76, 77–9, 78, 80, 85, 94, 154, 160n31, 160n32; ideals 6, 8, 33 VENRO 101–3, 103, 108, 157 veteran 45, 135 victim 33, 46, 51, 136, 151 Vietnam War 98; see also Beheiren virtual 14–15, 58; community centre 135; hooligan 132; sit-in 50; see also digital, online visibility 4, 15, 62–8, 77–9, 81–2, 81, 87–91, 95, 101, 107–8, 113–14, 115, 123–4, 133, 138, 140, 142; online 14, 63, 78–9 voluntary action centre 32 volunteer 7, 31–40, 52, 70, 83, 85, 90, 93, 95, 97–8, 100, 105, 108, 116–17, 121, 146, 148, 160n34

Index

191

war atrocities (mentioned in textbooks) 48 web: banner 108; design 49, 100, 116–17, 138; directory 73, 154; presence 10, 48, 53–4, 117; ring 73; space 70, 72; sphere 10, 48; World Wide 10, 23, 25, 70–2, 141, 154; see also hosting webmaster 31, 94, 117, 118, 119–20, 120, 123, 139 welfare 5, 7, 19, 33, 35–42, 138, 159n9 whaling 54, 60–1, 65–6, 83, 144, 149–50, 155 women 5, 24, 26, 38, 60–1, 69, 82, 91–2, 99, 118; groups 83, 84, 112–13, 122, 142, 149–51, 156, 157, 161n51; see also ‘comfort women’; gender Women’s Forum Fish (WFF) 83, 150 word processor 16, 21 World Internet Survey 24, 27 World Peace Now 98–101, 106, 127–9, 136, 153, 157, 162n58 World Wide Web see web writing system 16, 44; see also language WWF Japan 79, 82, 150 Yahoo 130–2, 135, 157–8, 162n59 Yamato city 17 Yasukuni Shrine 19, 28 Yomiuri Shinbun 133, 157 zainichi 53; see also minority