The Psychology of Peacekeeping

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACEKEEPING Edited by Harvey J. Langholtz Foreword by the Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger

PMBQER

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The psychology of peacekeeping / edited by Harvey J. Langholtz ; foreword by Lawrence S. Eagleburger. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-96232-6 (alk. paper) 1. Reconciliation. 2. Conflict management. I. Langholtz, Harvey J., 1948BF637.R4P78 1998 327.1 , 72 , 019—dc21 98-23552 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1998 by Harvey J. Langholtz All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 98-23552 ISBN: 0-275-96232-6 First published in 1998 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

<§>" The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). P In order to keep this title in print and available to the academic community, this edition was produced using digital reprint technology in a relatively short print run. This would not have been attainable using traditional methods. Although the cover has been changed from its original appearance, the text remains the same and all materials and methods used still conform to the highest book-making standards.

Contents

Foreword The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger Introduction Harvey J. Langholtz PART

PART

I Prevention: Psychological and Social Issues That Can Avert or Lead to War 1 The Evolving Psychology of Peacekeeping Harvey J. Langholtz 2 Peace through Economic and Social Development Claudia Gonzdlez-Vallejo and Giselda Barroso Sauveur 3 Early Intervention: Prediction and Action Ervin Staub 4 The Psychology of Diplomacy: Conflict Resolution in a Time of Minimal or Unusual Small-Scale Conflicts Edward J. Perkins 5 Cultural and Ethnic Issues of Conflict and Peacekeeping Paul R. Kimmel

II Psychological Considerations during Periods of Conflict 6 Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing David Fetherstonhaugh, Paul Slovic, Stephen M. Johnson, and James Friedrich

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3 17 31 41 57

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7 Personnel Selection, Preparation, and Training for U.N. Peacekeeping Missions Brian Kidwell and Harvey 7. Langholtz 8 Psychological Aspects of Peacekeeping on the Ground Christian H&rleman 9 Psychological Ambiguities in Peacekeeping Thomas W. Britt PART III

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Psychological Aspects and Confidence-Building Measures in the Transition from Violence to a Durable Peace Humanitarian Intervention, Psychosocial Assistance, and Peacekeeping Michael G. Wessells Peacekeeping and the Psychology of Conflict Resolution Tom Woodhouse Creating a Durable Peace: Psychological Aspects of Rebuilding and Reforming the Indigenous Criminal Justice System J. Matthew Vaccaro The Psychological Consequences of Mines Left Behind Following a Conflict Barry Cox and Harvey 7. Langholtz Postconflict Peacebuilding and Making Efforts Count: Reconstruction, Elections, and Beyond Valeria M. Gonzalez Posse Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and the Contribution of International Peacekeeping Eileen Borris and Paul E Diehl The Peace Process at Its Culmination: The Reconciliation Elections Fabrizio Pagani Treating the New World Disorder Henry Breed Index About the Editor and Contributors

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Foreword The Honorable Lawrence 5. Eagleburger

The psychology of peacekeeping is a timely topic, and this is certainly a timely book. The resolution of disputes between nations requires much more than the application of power. It also requires a deep understanding of the perceptions and needs of the parties to the dispute, their capabilities, their psychological view, and how far they would be willing to go to have their way. In today's chaotic post-Cold War world, this is just as true as ever. This is not to say that psychology can replace diplomacy or that a desire for peace should cause a sovereign nation to weaken its resolve. Rather, it is a recognition that, through better understanding of the psychological factors and dynamics that contribute to conflict, interventions can be taken that will promote stability and peace. PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD The end of the Cold War did not usher in an era of global peace. On the contrary, the end of superpower rivalry and the breakup of the Soviet Union saw a period when the world witnessed a seemingly endless series of violent disputes, civil wars, and collapsed states. Ethnic cleansing, refugees, famine, child soldiers, and chaos are the results of these small-scale but persistent wars. There is always the danger that these initially small conflicts will spill

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over into neighboring regions, escalate, and bring the effects of war to a wider civilian population. These complex emergencies require a multidimensional view. These are not simply security issues in the traditional sense but are more complex problems that call for interdisciplinary solutions involving psychology, economics, sociology, and other fields within the social and political sciences. The pursuit of peace cannot be confined to the period of war; it begins with preventive measures long before a dispute erupts into violent conflict. Neither can efforts at peace end with the signing of a cease-fire. There is a series of postconflict interventions that can be taken to assist a nation's return from the chaos of war to a stable and durable peace. Scholars and diplomats have recently begun to take a more active role in widening our understanding of the psychology of peacekeeping and the decisionmaking processes that can lead to war or peace. Central among this group of researchers are the members of Division 48 of the American Psychological Association and the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, several of whom are among the authors represented in the following pages. In thefirstsection of this book, they explore the economic, political, social, and ethnic factors that may contribute to or cause conflict, asking what early warnings might be identified in advance of a conflict and, even more fundamental, what might be the root causes of a dispute that are likely to escalate into a conflict. There are also psychological dimensions to peacekeeping that must be considered even during the violent period of any conflict. What are the psychological effects of a peacekeeping mission on the soldiers who participate in such an operation? How can soldiers—trained to use force to prevail in battle— be expected to serve instead as mediators in someone else's dispute? How can soldiers or civilians be selected and prepared for such missions, and what psychological issues are they likely to face? The authors contributing to the second section of this book address these questions. Once a cease-fire has been signed, what psychological peacebuilding and confidence-building measures need to be taken to move a nation and a people from a fragile cease-fire to the eventual goal of a stable peace? In the third section of this book, the contributing authors examine how to deal with the aftereffects of war on a civilian population, the establishment of the rule of law and self-enforcement through the development of an indigenous police force and judicial system, the reestablishment of the institutions of selfgovernance, commerce, self-sufficiency, reconciliation, and a return to normal civil life. UNDERSTANDING RECENT SUCCESS AND FAILURE Recent years have been a combination of success and failure in our efforts to maintain peace. The international interventions in Haiti reintroduced free elections and legitimate self-governance to the nation and reestablished its

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own police force and law-enforcement institutions. The seemingly endless violence in the former Yugoslavia has subsided with the assistance of interventions from the United Nations and NATO. The former fighting factions in Cambodia have been brought together in an uneasy accord that at least permits movement towards a more durable reconciliation and lasting peace. A success of a different sort occurred in February 1998 when a second Persian Gulf War appeared to be averted. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 was fought to turn back aggression, and the terms of the armistice following that war included a means for the world community to ensure that the capability to use weapons of mass destruction would not remain in the hands of a proven aggressor. The resolve of the United States to use force to stand behind U.N. arms inspectors was no doubt a key factor in U.N. Secretary General Annan's success in gaining Iraq's agreement to comply. This is certainly an example of at least the temporary success of diplomacy and psychology, but only time will tell how long this success will last. During these same years, there have also been some disappointments, when a peaceful resolution seemed impossible and international interventions—no matter how well intended—seemed futile. In Somalia, peacekeepers succeeded in bringing humanitarian relief to areas affected by famine yet were unable to facilitate a lasting indigenous political solution. In other cases, the international community was not aware, prepared, or inclined to intervene in what seemed like intractable ethnic conflicts where participants' urge for revenge exceeded their desire for peace. While South Africa has proven that it is possible for a nation to make progress in overcoming some of the fundamental root causes of conflict within its own borders, other nations still search for peaceful solutions to their own internal conflicts. Perhaps there are lessons in these recent successes and failures that can provide us with a deeper understanding of the psychology of peace and the psychology of peacekeeping. The contributors to this book have attempted to identify what some of these lessons might be and how we might apply them to future conflicts or potential conflicts. This book represents the first time that such an examination has taken place, and I am confident that psychologists and scholars of other disciplines, as well as diplomats, politicians, humanitarian relief workers, peacekeepers, and serious citizens, will now have a clearer appreciation for the psychology of peacekeeping.

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Introduction Harvey 7. Langholtz

"War represents the failure of diplomacy." This unattributable quote is well known within diplomatic circles. But in today's wars, characterized by ethnopolitical conflict and chaos, war represents not just the failure of diplomacy, but also the failure of psychology. It is the premise of this book that there are emerging roles for psychologists and other social scientists to play in peacekeeping before, during, and after conflict. What are the psychological factors that will bring a people or a nation to war? What are the early warning signs that should be noticed, and what are the steps that can be taken in advance to prevent a dispute from becoming a conflict, and a conflict from escalating to war? Once fighting starts, what are the measures that can be taken to contain the scope in terms of geography and limit the level in terms of intensity and brutality? (Or, asked differently, what are the factors that might lead to a widening of the conflict?) What can be done to hasten a cease-fire so the fighting may stop at least long enough for a truce to be negotiated? What confidence-building measures can be taken to lead to a stable and lasting peace? What can psychologists offer at each of these stages?

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WHY A BOOK ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACEKEEPING NOW? Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and throughout the Cold War, U.N. peacekeeping evolved as a temporary measure whereby neutral and unbiased soldiers would be placed between hostile armies after a ceasefire had been established. Unarmed or lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers would be temporarily deployed with the consent of both nations and it would be the task of the peacekeepers to support the terms of the cease-fire and monitor the separation of belligerents while diplomats sought a more lasting solution to what was fundamentally a political problem, not a military one. However, the end of the Cold War, a blurring and redefining of some national boundaries, and the emerging chaos of small-scale ethnopolitical conflicts necessitated an expanded repertoire of interventions to support peace. The traditional definitions and practices of peacekeeping broke down as the international community tried to address what were simultaneously brutal conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Somalia, and Rwanda. There were several lessons to be learned from these recent well-intended peacekeeping efforts. Perhaps the most widely accepted lesson was that peacerelated interventions should not wait for the onset of fighting, nor cease when the fighting has stopped. Instead, there is a need to examine possible interventions during the full cycle of conflict. This examination must begin at the beginning of the cycle with the root causes of war at the social, economic, and psychological levels. What interventions are possible during the phase of spiraling tensions that lead to war? What can be done during war and what interventions are possible following the cessation of hostilities to speed a return to a civil society, including the rebuilding of infrastructure, removal of land mines and treating their consequences, retraining child soldiers for a peaceful civilian career, and weaving the fabric of civil life that is so essential to economic stability and an enduring peace. These interventions are not within the realm of the soldiers or diplomats, but rather the social scientists—especially psychologists. It is the purpose of this book to discuss the cycle of the conflict from a psychological point of view and examine the psychological interventions that may be available at each stage to avert conflict before it begins, limit it once it starts, end it as quickly as possible, and prevent its reoccurrence in the future. In order to explore these topics and document the findings in a single edited volume, an interdisciplinary and international group of twenty-two psychologists, scholars, diplomats, economists, U.N. personnel, experts in conflict resolution, soldiers, and practitioners have contributed seventeen individual chapters in their own areas of expertise. Seven of these chapters were first introduced as papers presented at the American Psychological Association's

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(APA) Division 48 (Peace Psychology) at the APA's August 1997 meeting in Chicago. I do not believe it would have been possible for any one individual to address this span of topics—it truly requires the perspectives of experts from different fields. In some cases the suggestions for intervention are broad and far-reaching. In other cases they are local, specific, and prescriptive. All these points of view and levels of perspective are needed. STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK Michael Lund's 1996 book, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy fo Preventive Diplomacy, proposed a model of conflict that starts with a durabl peace, but escalates through stable peace, unstable peace, and crisis until it reaches war. At any of these points it would be possible to either continue upward on the scale of conflict, or turn downward and revert to a lower and more peaceful level. Lund's model represents the period following war as moving down the conflict scale through the same levels but in reverse order: crisis, unstable peace, stable peace, and finally durable peace. This book has been structured to follow Lund's model. In Part I we see the psychological dimensions that can sustain a durable peace or serve as the catalysts for war. I introduce the concept of the psychology of peacekeeping and trace its evolution. Claudia Gonzalez-Vallejo and Giselda Barroso Sauveur of Brazil discuss economic and social development as related to peace. Ervin Staub examines the early interventions that may be taken to prevent conflict. Former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Edward J. Perkins, discusses his experiences as a diplomat actually engaged in measures to end conflict in South Africa and Cambodia. Paul R. Kimmel examines the ethnic and cultural issues that pertain to conflict and peacekeeping. In Part II we consider some of the psychological aspects of the violent period of conflict. David Fetherstonhaugh, Paul Slovic, Stephen M. Johnson, and James Friedrich discuss their empirical studies on psychophysical numbing, explaining the tendency to discount the value of lost lives in large humanitarian disasters. Brian Kidwell, the staff psychologist at the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and I discuss some of the stresses placed on both military and civilian peacekeepers, as well as some of the training programs designed to prepare military personnel and civilians to serve on peacekeeping missions. Christian HSrleman of Sweden, the former chief of training for the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and a veteran of several peacekeeping missions, discusses some of the psychological aspects of actually conducting peacekeeping operations. Thomas W. Britt, a U.S. Army psychologist, discusses the psychological ambiguities and dilemmas experienced by peacekeepers. Part HI examines the psychological dynamics and possible interventions once the fighting has stopped and during the period of a return to peace.

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Michael G. Wessells, an expert on humanitarian operations and a veteran of several missions, discusses the psychological issues associated with humanitarian relief operations that may occur immediately following war, or even whilefightingis still going on.Tom Woodhouse of the University of Bradford discusses the psychology of conflict resolution. J. Matthew Vaccaro of the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense examines the role of civilian police in bringing a nation back from the chaos of war and establishing an indigenous police force that enforces a society's own laws. Barry Cox and I discuss the lingering problem of land mines remaining after a conflict and some of the psychological consequences that result. Valeria M. Gonzalez Posse, a career diplomat from Argentina, discusses the steps of peace building that can sustain a lasting peace. Eileen Borris, a recognized expert on the psychology of reconciliation, and Paul F. Diehl, scholar and expert on the recent history of U.N. peacekeeping, discuss the steps of reconciliation as applied not to individuals, but to nations. Fabrizio Pagani of the University of Pisa discusses the psychological importance of culminating elections in returning a nation to peaceful self-governance. Andfinally,Henry Breed, Assistant to the UnderSecretary-General for Peacekeeping at the United Nations, examines internal conflicts, both in terms of the psychology of the individual and the "new world disorder." The reader will note this volume takes an uncritical view of some of the fundamental assumptions of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping does have its critics, even above those who claim it is too expensive or outside national interests. There are some who argue that peacekeeping as we know it is a Western concept and actually represents a form of collective colonialism whereby the powerful nations of the U.N. can artificially impose their Western-style forms of democracy and commerce on cultures where these structures might not otherwise exist. A second criticism is that peacekeeping is a palliative that can actually protract a dispute, leaving differences unresolved and forever pending a permanent solution. When I was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, one such critic (and friend with a deep understanding of both American history and the psychological ties that bind us together as a people) from a Latin American nation justified this argument by asking me what the United Nations might have done if it had existed in 1863, witnessing the terrible bloodshed and destruction of the U.S. Civil War. He challenged, "Would ther have been any purpose in deploying U.N. peacekeepers along your MasonDixon Line while your leaders sought to negotiate a compromise? And how long do you think it might have taken and what might have been included in such an accord?" I have posed this question to my students at the College of William & Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia, but I have never been able to come up with a satisfying answer. Perhaps there are times when a dispute must be left to take its own course.

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TOO SERIOUS FOR ENTRUSTING There is a quote from the French statesman Georges Clemenceau that is well known to diplomats: "War is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to the generals." The contributing authors of this edited volume and I believe that wars—and the methods by which they might be avoided—are so important that they deserve the attention of psychologists. REFERENCE Lund, M. (1996). Preventing violent conflicts: A strategy for preventive diploma Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

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PART I

PREVENTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES THAT CAN AVERT OR LEAD TO WAR Economic ties, social and cultural ties, economic and political stability— these are factors, the presence of which can bind peoples and nations together in a web of interdependence. But these are also areas where shortages, disruption, dissatisfaction, unresolved differences, or an undue sense of competition can lead to a dispute with the potential to escalate into violence. In Part I we examine these psychological, economic, political, and social issues and how they can avert or lead to war. We also examine cultural and ethnic issues, the source of so many small and not-so-small conflicts, how these issues can lead to conflicts, and measures to be considered to ensure better crosscultural understanding. Finally, we see how diplomacy can be— and has been—used as a means for seeking accommodation and avoiding a conflict before it escalates into war. Unfortunately, recent years have seen too many cases where these diplomatic efforts were not successful. These are some of the measures of early intervention, prediction, and action. It is often the case that only after a conflict has become violent and threatens the stability of neighbors or the interests of the international community that any intervention will be considered. But, of course, once the violence begins interventions are dangerous, costly in terms of money and blood, and difficult to manage in an environment of chaos and conflict. In Part I we examine some of the early steps and proactive measures that can be taken to lessen the likelihood that a dispute will escalate into a violent conflict.

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CHAPTER 1

The Evolving Psychology of Peacekeeping Harvey J. Langholtz

In a sense, the psychology of peacekeeping is not a new concept. Scholars, researchers, diplomats, and practitioners have long searched for ways to avert violence or limit its consequences. On the other hand, until now there has never been a methodical attempt to combine existing theory from psychology and other social sciences with practical peacekeeping solutions in an effort to address the root causes and resulting effects of war. Perhaps in the past there was too large a gap between what psychologists had to offer in terms of both basic theory and practical applications and what the global community was prepared to attempt in terms of multinational peacekeeping interventions in the face of conflict and chaos. There was a gap between theories of peace and applications of peacekeeping. With the end of the Cold War, a redefining of national sovereignty, and a simultaneous widening interest among scholars in the psychology of peacekeeping, this gap is now closing. Psychologists and other social scientists, many of whom contributed chapters to this book, have recently focused their attention on the psychological aspects of conflict, how conflict may be resolved without violence, and how violence may be contained once it starts and ended as quickly as possible. At the same time, the international community has become more willing to see U.N. peacekeepers and representatives of other organizations undertake preventive measures that address the root causes of conflict far in advance of the point that might provoke a violent confrontation. These preventive measures

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include economic interventions, awareness of ethnic and cultural issues, public awareness, preventive diplomacy, human rights monitoring, and data gathering. The international community is also ready to see postconflict interventions that include dealing with the psychological and physical needs of refugees (especially women and children), reestablishment of the rule of law through indigenous civilian police, reform of the prison system, establishment of economic interdependencies, reconciliation, voting, and a reestablishment of civil society. Peacekeeping, which used to be thought of as a strictly military operation conducted by soldiers, has now been expanded to include what were previously thought of as social interventions that were the realm of aid workers, psychologists, physicians, educators, human rights professionals, lawenforcement specialists, penologists, jurists, and other members of the social science, legal, and health professions. Psychologists have expanded areas of research to include what were previously thought of as military or political topics: the delivery of humanitarian aid, the treatment of mine victims, retraining child combatants for reintegration into civil society, and reconciliation through elections. Peacekeeping is becoming more of a social intervention and social scientists are developing interventions that support peacekeeping. One fundamental difficulty with studying peacekeeping from a psychological perspective is that peace and war cannot be experimentally manipulated in the laboratory. Two of the chapters in this volume are basic research and provide a detailed view of two specific psychological aspects of peacekeeping. In Chapter 6 Fetherstonhaugh and colleagues examine the numbing effect that occurs when readers learn of large numbers of deaths, and in Chapter 9 Britt discusses the psychological ambiguities faced by peacekeepers themselves. It is possible to ask participant's opinions about war. Levy (1996, p. 185) did exactly this in his article, "Attitudes toward the Conduct of War," with twenty-seven items (i.e., "If a nation thinks that another nation may attack it, it should not have the right to attack that nation to destroy its ability to wage war")- Milgram (1963, 1974) conducted several realistic (and troubling) laboratory experiments where he demonstrated that the participants in his research were willing to kill another person by administering a lethal electric shock, but the focus of this article was more on obedience than conflict or war. There has certainly been a growing body of literature on conflict resolution, but this generally focuses on the settling of disputes in environments that will never escalate to war. The third edition of the Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey & Aronson, 1985) contains no entry for war. Laboratory research is limited in what it can offer to psychologists as we study the behavior of nations as they go to war or accept peace. And yet there are many ways in which today's psychologists (and related social scientists) already offer assistance in the understanding, prediction, and prevention of war and the amelioration of its effects. In this chapter I will demonstrate that today, as never before, there is a need for an understanding of the psychology of peacekeeping, and I will set the background for the subsequent sixteen

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chapters in this edited volume, each of which will address a different aspect of war and peacekeeping from a psychological perspective. EARLY PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACEKEEPING The first recorded efforts to understand and avoid war were reactions to the first recorded wars. Kagan (1995) in On the Origins of War and the Preserv tion of Peace notes The ancient Greeks, wracked ... by perpetual war, were eager to investigate its caus . . . Thucydides, writing . . . about. . . war, sought its causes. . . . He expected his history to be useful "to those who wish to have a clear understanding both of events the past and of those in the future which will, in all human likelihood, happen again the same or similar way." That is why he set forth with great care the quarrels betw the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and the reason they broke their treaty: "so th no one may ever have to seek the causes that led to the outbreak of so gre among the Greeks." The careful study of the origins of war declined for many ce ries to follow, perhaps because it was such a common occurrence, (p. 5 That war came to be tolerated as a "common occurrence" of the human condition is a statement of its widespread acceptance at a psychological level. Rapoport (in Clausewitz, 1968) summarizes Clausewitz (1832) as having a "philosophy of international relations" where the "state is conceived as a living entity . . . [with] no authority above itself Since among the goals of all states is that of increasing their own power at the expense of that of other states, the interests of states, regardless of incidental and ephemeral coincidence, are always in conflict. Clashes of interest between two states are typically resolved by the imposition of the will of one state upon that of another. Therefore war is a normal phase in the relations among states" (p. 63). It was William James (1910/1995), who first questioned these assumptions and came to be called "the first peace psychologist" (Deutsch, 1995). In his 1910 classic, The Moral Equivalent of War, James objected to the toleranc the world had for war and called for a future where "acts of war shall be formally outlawed as between civilized peoples" (James, 1910/1995, p. 23). This same theme of finding a way to outlaw war can be found twenty-two years later in the exchange of letters between Freud and Einstein, as proposed by the "League of Nations at its International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris" (Einstein & Freud, 1933, p. 1). Though there had been hopes that the League of Nations might be the institution to enforce an end to war, by 1932 this seemed to be a fading hope. In his letter of July 30, 1932, Einstein wrote to Freud, asking This is the problem: Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war It is common knowledge that, with the advance of modern science, this issue has

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come to mean a matter of life and death for civilization as we know it; nevertheless, for all the zeal displayed, every attempt at its solution has ended in a lamentable breakdown. I believe, moreover, that those whose duty it is to tackle the problem professionally and practically are growing only too aware of their importance to deal with it As for me, the normal objective of my thought affords no insight into the dark places of human will and feeling.... I can do little more than enable you to bring the light of your far-reaching knowledge of man's instinctive life to bear upon the problem. There are certain psychological obstacles whose existence a layman in the mental sciences . . . is incompetent to fathom: You, I am convinced, will be able to suggest educative methods, lying more or less outside the scope of politics, which will eliminate these obstacles. The ill-success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this goal leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are at work, which paralyse [sic] these efforts, (pp. 3-4) Freud responded to Einstein's questions in September 1932 with a letter discussing several themes: psychology, sociology, law, and international diplomacy. Conflicts . . . are resolved, in principle, by recourse to violence. It is the same in the animal kingdom, from which man cannot claim exclusion; nevertheless men are also prone to conflicts of opinion, touching, on occasion, the loftiest peaks of abstract thought, which seem to call for settlement by quite another method. This refinement is, however, a late development. To start with, brute force was the factor which, in small communities, decided points of ownership and the questions which man's will was to prevail. Thus, under primitive conditions, it is superior force—brute violence, or violence backed by arms—that lords it everywhere. There is but one sure way of ending war and that is the establishment, by common consent, of a certain control which shall have the last word in every conflict The League of Nations... has no force at its disposal and can only get it if the members of the new body, its constituent nations, furnish it. (Einstein & Freud, 1933, pp. 10-14) PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT AND THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS With the subsequent failure of the League of Nations and the advent of World War II, it was recognized that the proposals for collective action to enforce world peace made by James, Freud, and other social scientists and statesmen would need a capable organization with international support and a broad mandate. The 1945 Charter of the U.N. proposed the following: To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

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to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, (pp. 1-2) The U.N. Charter continues through nineteen chapters to establish a structure by which nations might address grievances and avert war. Chapter VI addresses "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes," in which 'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement... or other peaceful means of their own choice" (United Nations, 1945, Article 33). As the U.N. was formed in the closing days of World War II, it was agreed that collective measures must be put in place to prevent a repeat of the sort of aggression that had precipitated the worldwide conflict. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (1945) was drafted to deal with "Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression," and proposed how the community of nations would join against an aggressor nation through the joint application of land, sea, and air force. Chapter VI was intended to address diplomatic solutions to potential conflicts, and Chapter VII was to provide for a united military capability to confront any single aggressor nation. It seemed that the mechanisms were now in place to breathe life into James's hope that acts of war would be "formally outlawed as between civilized peoples" and to respond to Freud's concern that such an organization would need "force at its disposal." COLD WAR PSYCHOLOGY But the U.N. proved incapable of assuming this role as superpower rivalries and opposing ideologies led to the Cold War. If a proposed U.N. initiative appeared to provide any advantage to either the United States or the Soviet Union, the other would veto the resolution in the U.N. Security Council. Thus, throughout the Cold War, U.N. peacekeeping, which was never even mentioned in the U.N. Charter, was constrained to a limited range of activities. U.N. peacekeeping evolved through a series of ad hoc applications in the late 1940s and early 1950s (United Nations, 1990). As long as the Cold War lasted, the U.N. would undertake a peacekeeping mission only when certain criteria were met. The U.N. could not impose peace, but instead was only willing to deploy peacekeepers with the consent of the parties involved. In addition, the participants in the dispute had to be sovereign nations with soldiers who were under the discipline of their capital. The

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armies disengaged along a recognizable buffer zone and a cease-fire had to be in place. Under these conditions, U.N. peacekeepers were inserted between the combatants as a temporary measure to maintain the cease-fire while diplomats sought a more permanent solution to what was fundamentally a political problem, not a military one (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992,1993). For the first four decades, U.N. peacekeepers acted impartially between the parties in conflict and would use force only to the minimum extent needed to protect themselves (Goulding, 1993). With some notable exceptions, U.N. peacekeeping continued as a series of relatively small operations throughout the Cold War and the U.N. was selective not to overextend its capabilities. Despite more than eighty wars (not including many of the smaller intrastate conflicts) that were fought worldwide between 1948 and 1988, with a toll of 30 million deaths (James, 1990), the U.N. Security Council established only thirteen peacekeeping and observer forces (Roberts, 1996). A handful of troop-contributing nations loaned the U.N. less than 10 thousand people per year, and the entire budget for U.N. peacekeeping in constant 1990 U.S. dollars was generally less than $500 million per year (Durch, 1993). U.N. peacekeeping missions were small, peacekeepers were either unarmed or lightly armed, and U.S. and USSR personnel were rarely involved. THE PEACEKEEPING ETHOS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION Through practice rather than planning, peacekeeping came to fall between the pacific settlement of disputes envisioned in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter and military actions outlined in Chapter VII (United Nations, 1945). This accepted practice came to be known as the unwritten "chapter six and a half of the U.N. Charter and was based on the concept of impartial soldiers from neutral nations applying the techniques of conflict resolution to contain and limit violence. This approach came to be known as the peacekeeping ethos and was suitable for these low-intensity conflicts. THE END OF THE COLD WAR: AN INCREASED AWARENESS OF "SMALLER" CONFLICTS While the specter of conflict between the superpowers dominated geopolitical relations throughout the Cold War, smaller-scale intranational conflicts persisted. What changed was not the frequency of these smaller conflicts, but rather the level of public awareness and the willingness of the superpowers to intervene. Nearly one hundred national and minority peoples participated in violent conflicts between the end of World War II and the start of this decade (Gurr 1993, 1994, 1996), and these included almost fifty cases of genocide and

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mass political murder that caused at least 9 million deaths (Harff & Gurr, 1995). While the roots of the cultural and ethnic animosities that led to these subnational conflicts had their beginnings long before the Cold War, the close of the Cold War brought a period where the world community would become more aware of these ethnopolitical conflicts. The CNN effect (Livingston & Eachus, 1995) made "people everywhere more aware of situations that seem to cry out for intervention and more familiar with the human tragedies that accompany these horrible calamities" (Blechman, 1996, p. 288). Viewers of CNN viewed images of starving masses in Somalia and shelled cities in Yugoslavia (Gowing, 1994; Jakobsen, 1996; Livingston & Eachus, 1995; Strobel, 1996), shaping public opinion as abstract information never could (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977) and increasing pressure on world leaders and national governments to intervene. As a result, the number of U.N. humanitarian and military interventions in civil wars and other internal conflicts grew from less thanfiveper year throughout the 1980s to almost twenty per year by the early 1990s. A DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGY: AN AGENDA FOR PEACE In January 1992, with the Cold War over, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the Secretary General of the U.N. Within a month, world leaders asked the new Secretary General to draft a paper proposing his view of the emerging role the U.N. could play in more expanded peacekeeping that would live up to the expectation held for the U.N. at its founding, that of a world body capable of addressing both the causes and consequences of war. Boutros-Ghali outlined his vision in An Agenda for Peace (1992). In it he called for a widening of the size, scope, and complexity of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, and a greater willingness to address the root causes of conflict: economic, social, political, ethnic, and a widening gap between the haves and the have-nots. He recognized that efforts "to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past" (p. 7). This would not be the psychology of mediation, but rather a psychology of active intervention. An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) called for the international community not to wait until a dispute had escalated into violence before attempting an intervention. Instead, the U.N. would take preventive measures early to avert war, or humanitarian and remedial steps following war to help a region return to stability. Boutros-Ghali asserted that "the Organization must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed" (p. 2). He also called for a greater readiness for the U.N. to impose peace on behalf of a civilian population by using force. The Secretary General called for more postconflict peacebuilding measures to "enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace" (p. 32).

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THE PEACE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL Perhaps the most widely known peace psychologist, Johan Galtung, had defined three terms of peacekeeping in his 1976 article, "Three Realistic Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding." To Galtung, peacekeeping was a "dissociative approach" (p. 103) where antagonists were kept apart. He saw peacemaking as a form of "conflict resolution" (p. 109), and peacebuilding as an "associative approach" (p. 110). Boutros-Ghali (1992) offered an updated set of definitions to describe new approaches to U.N. peacerelated efforts. The definition of peacekeeping, according to Boutros-Ghali, is "The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace." Peacemaking is "Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations" and peacebuilding is "Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (p. 11). AN EXPANDED SPECTRUM AND A CALL FOR NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS Following An Agenda for Peace, U.N. missions expanded beyond traditional peacekeeping, which had been attempted only under the limited conditions of an agreed-upon cease-fire and with the consent of the parties to the dispute. Now U.N. peacekeeping operations were being pulled in two opposite psychological directions: on the one hand in the humanitarian direction, as U.N. peacekeepers in Mozambique, Cambodia (Crocker, 1992; Doyle, 1995), and later Haiti (United Nations, 1996) undertook humanitarian operations, voting assistance, and the development of indigenous civilian police; and in the opposite, more military direction, as U.N. Missions in Somalia (Chopra, Eknes, & Nordb0, 1995) and the former Yugoslavia (United Nations, 1996) were deployed when there was, in reality, no peace to keep. Some U.N. missions included concurrent humanitarian and military operations in settings of violence and anarchy, as in Rwanda, Liberia, and Angola (United Nations, 1995b, 1995c, and 1995d). The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mozambique was responsible for providing technical assistance for the monitoring of the entire electoral process and coordinating and monitoring humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel, and the affected local population. The U.N. mission in

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Haiti devoted special attention to the observance of fundamental human rights of the integrity and security of the person, personal liberty, and freedom of expression and association. The mission also examined allegations of human rights violations and undertook a human rights public information and education campaign. The U.N. mission in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium had responsibility for the establishment of a temporary police force, defining its structure and size, developing a training program, and overseeing its implementation. It was also responsible for monitoring treatment of offenders and the prison system, undertaking tasks relating to civil administration and to the functioning of public services, facilitating the return of refugees, and organizing elections. The mission was also tasked with coordinating plans for the development and economic reconstruction of the region and monitoring of the parties' compliance with their commitments to respect the standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms, promoting an atmosphere of confidence among all local residents irrespective of their ethnic origin, monitoring and facilitating the demining of territory within the region, and maintaining an active public affairs element. The United Nations, scholars, and researchers were no longer looking only at the narrow portion on the cycle of conflict that contained the violence, but instead were looking at peace-related interventions that could avert conflict before it started or quickly hasten a return to a stable peace once the violence had subsided. To more fully understand and document the complete range of interventions available, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations established the Lessons-Learned Office to analyze recent operations and make recommendations regarding future interventions. General categories of lessons learned were developed (United Nations, 1995a), and integrated within these categories were calls for interventions that went far beyond military intervention and instead focused on fundamental psychological and social issues. These included both interventions to prevent conflict where economics, development, diplomacy, and early intervention might remove the precursor conditions that lead to violence, and later points on the cycle, after the fighting had stopped, where humanitarian operations, demining, restoration of indigenous law, voting, and reconciliation would be needed. To this end, these new approaches were designed to identify potential problems early and resolve conflicts before they escalated into violence. But where a conflict had degenerated into war the interventions were designed to limit the effects on the civilian populaiton, seek a cease-fire, disarm the combatants, clear mines, restore order, rebuild infrastructure, hold elections, and reinstitute the web of civil society so necessary to the buildng of confidence and trust. These were no longer the peacekeeping interventions of soldiers, but instead were the interventions of psychologists, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and other branches of the social sciences.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES AT DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE CYCLE OF CONFLICT Figure 1.1 depicts some of the interventions and approaches available to psychologists and other social scientists during the cycle of conflict as it begins with peace, escalates to war, and returns over time to peace. This list is by no means complete and the placement of each topic on the curve cannot be precise. Any of them could be moved at least a few places in the sequence shown and should be considered as ranges, not points. Many of the subjects listed in the figure are addressed in the chapters of this volume. Though thefirstfour topics—economic development, social and political issues, cultural and ethnic issues, and the psychology of diplomacy—are approaches to be considered to avoid conflict before it starts, all these could be moved to the right-hand side of the curve and used as tools to support the return to a stable peace. There are three topics clustered near the top of the curve that focus more on peacekeepers than peacekeeping. The preparation of peacekeepers is currently approached differently in each nation with varying degrees of success. Military psychologists have recently reported that peacekeeping missions introduce psychological ambiguities for some soldiers and the transition from warrior to peacekeeper and back can be a difficult one. Once deployed, the peacekeeper becomes a mediator to a conflict rather than a participant to a conflict, calling for a need to understand the psychological aspects of peacekeeping on the ground. As the fighting nears an end, or as the participants begin to lose the determination to fight, there is an opportunity for conflict resolution. In the aftermath of war, the steps of reconciliation and confidence building are needed. Humanitarian interventions and psychosocial assistance address the needs of individuals, especially children, who have suffered through violence. Recent conflicts have left mines that continue to take lives and limbs after the fighting has ceased and there is a growing awareness of both the physical and psychological consequences of mines. Before a society can make the transition from the chaos of war to peaceful self-governance, it must develop its own indigenous law-enforcement system. This must include police, courts, and prisons that are responsive to the indigenous culture and earn the confidence of the population as a system of public protection, not repression. When the measures of reconciliation and peacebuilding are successful, this will create a psychological and political climate where elections are possible. In a very clear sense, the conducting of elections is the psychological culmination of the peace process, as previously warring factions will now participate in the peaceful resolution of issues based on the expression of public will through the ballot box. If elections are attempted prematurely, before the factions are ready psychologically, at least one party will ignore the results and continue to seek through violence what was denied through voting.

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Figure 1.1 Interventions and Approaches Available to Psychologists and Other Social Scientists during the Cycle of Conflict As It Begins with Peace, Escalates to War, and Returns Over Time to Peace

Source: Adapted in part from Lund's Life History of a Conflict (1996, p. 38). CONCLUSION The close of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the blurring of sovereignty, an increase of the number of ethnopolitical conflicts, and the willingness of the international community to intervene in areas of trouble have created opportunities for interventions by psychologists, but have also raised some unforeseen questions. Where does national sovereignty begin and where does responsibility for the welfare of civilians in another nation end? At what point is the international community nurturing peace and stability and at what point are we imposing Western-style solutions and institutions, such as elections, human rights, police, and democratic governments? Peacekeeping is no longer simply a military intervention to halt fighting between armies. The 1990s have brought an era when the international community has been open to addressing the psychological aspects of conflict as never before, and there are now opportunities for psychologists and other social scientists to make constructive interventions at all points on the cycle

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of conflict: early interventions to avert war, measures to limit or contain violence once it starts, and steps after conflict to facilitate reconciliation, reestablish civil infrastructure, and establish a sustainable peace. Many of these are introduced in the remaining chapters in this volume. REFERENCES Blechman, B. (1996). Emerging from the intervention dilemma. In C. A. Crocker, F. 0. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Managing global chaos: Sources of and re sponses to international conflict (pp. 287-296). Washington, DC: United Sta Institute of Peace Press. Borgida, E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1977). The differential impact of abstract vs. concrete information on decisions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 7, 258-27 Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace. New York: United Nations Chopra, J., Eknes, A., & Nordb0, T. (1995). Fighting for hope in Somalia. Oslo: N wegian Institute of International Affairs. Clausewitz, Carl von. (1832). Hinterlassene Werke des Generals von Clausewitz u Krieg und Kriegsfuhrung. Berlin: Ferbinanb DUmmi Clausewitz, Carl von. (1968). On war. New York: Penguin Crocker, C. A. (1992). High noon in Southern Africa: Making peace in a rough n borhood. New York: W. W. Norto Deutsch, M. (1995). William James: The first peace psychologist. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(1), 27-3 Doyle, M. W. (1995). U.N. peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's civil mandate. der, CO: International Peace Academy and Lynne Rienner. Durch, W. J. (1993). The evolution of UN peacekeeping. New York: St. Martin' Press. Einstein, A., & Freud, S. (1933). Why war? Paris: Institute of Intellectual Coopera tion, League of Nations. Galtung, J. (1976). Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding. Impact of Science on Society, 26, 103-11 Goulding, M. (1993). The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping. Internationa Affairs, 69,455. Gowing, N. (1994). Real-time television coverage of armed conflicts and diplomat crises: Does it pressure or distortforeign policy decisions ? Working Paper 9 1, Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge. Gurr, T. (1993). Minorities at risk: A global view ofethnopolitical conflicts. Washi ton, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Gurr, T. (1994). Peoples against states: Ethnopolitical conflict and the changing worl system. International Studies Quarterly, 38,34 Gurr, T. (1996). Minorities, nationalities, and conflict. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson P. Aall (Eds.), Managing global chaos: Sources of and responses to interna conflict (pp. 53-77). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Pres Harff, B., & Gurr, T. (1995). Victims of the state: Genocides, politicides, and group repression from 1945 to 1995. PIOOM Newsletter and Progress Report [Lide University, The Netherlands], 7(1), 24-38.

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Jakobsen, P. (1996). National interest, humanitarianism, or CNN: What triggers U.N peace enforcement after the Cold War? Journal of Peace Research, 33, 20 215. James, A. (1990). Peacekeeping in international politics. London: Macmillan and t International Institute for Strategic Studies. James, W (1995). The moral equivalent of war. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Pea Psychology, I, 17-26. (Original work published 1910) Kagan, D. (1995). On the origins of war and the preservation of peace. New York: Doubleday. Levy, S. (1996). Attitudes toward the conduct of war. Peace and Conflict: Journal Peace Psychology, I, 179-197 Lindzey, G., & Aronson, E. (Eds.). (1985). Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed. New York: Random House. Livingston, S., & Eachus, T. (1995). Humanitarian crises and U.S. foreign policy: Somalia and the CNN effect reconsidered. Political Communication, 12,415 Lund, M. (1996). Preventing violent conflicts: A strategy for preventive diploma Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Mackinlay, J., & Chopra, J. (1992). Second generation multinational operations. Was ington Quarterly, 14(3), 113-131. Mackinlay, J., & Chopra, J. (1993). A draft concept of second generation multina tional operations. Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for Interna tional Studies. Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal ofAbnormal and Socia Psychology, 67,371-378. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Ro Roberts, A. (1996).The crisis in U.N. peacekeeping. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampso & P. Aall (Eds.), Managing global chaos: Sources of and responses to inte tional conflict (pp. 297-319). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peac Press. Strobel, W. (1996). The media and U.S. policies toward intervention: A closer look a the "CNN Effect." In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Manag ing global chaos: Sources of and responses to international conflict. Wash ton, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations and statute of the internatio court ofjustice. New York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1990). The blue helmets: A review of United Nations peacekeep (2nd ed.). New York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1995a). The comprehensive report on lessons learned from Uni Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992-Mareh 1995. New U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1995b). United Nations Angolan verification mission S/I995/4 New York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1995c). United Nations assistance mission for Rwanda, progre report S/l 995/457. New York: U.N. Department of Public Information United Nations. (1995d). United Nations observer mission in Liberia, S/1995/47 New York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1996). The blue helmets: A review of United Nations peacekeep (3rd ed.). New York: U.N. Department of Public Information.

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CHAPTER 2

Peace through Economic and Social Development Claudia Gonzdlez-Vallejo and Giselda Barroso Sauveur

Peace is the greatest pursuit of humankind because it simply and powerfully constitutes the only background under which human life can evolve and prosper. Most contemporary thinkers have discussed peace in terms of the absence of war. In the realist's tradition, peace results from the balancing of powers among nations (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1993). In the game-theoretical approach, deterrence constitutes the basis of peace in a world in which rational actors maximize their values and use information to produce credible threats to avoid military confrontations (Schelling, 1980). Thinking about peace as the complement of war naturally emerges in the context of the horrifying legacy left by the two world wars of our century and our awareness of the detrimental consequences that the misuse of nuclear power can have on our planet. The thinking also follows earlier writers' preoccupation with the long-lasting sense of unity (Pax Romana) that was lost with the collapse of the Roman Empire. But important events have taken place in recent years that move us to conceptualize peace in a more complex, multidimensional, and psychological manner. In this view, the absence of war is still a basic defining characteristic of peace and it is of primary importance in any security agenda. But this is not the essence of peace, because it only rejects the undesirable without nourishing the basic. In our view, peace is more comprehensibly understood as the degree to which life conditions allow individuals to reach their fullest potentials as human beings. That is, the degree to which life conditions make human development possible.

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This was indeed the thinking of the founders of the United Nations, who attached great importance to the fulfillment of the security of the individual in the broadest sense. Security, in their view, entails job security, proper healt conditions, environmental security, as well as security from crime. In the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco (1945), the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, spoke of two fronts of the battle of peace: one dealing with freedom from fear, the other one dealing with freedom from want. More recently, the former United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, eloquently expressed the fundamental link that exists between peace and human development in two inspiring documents. In An Agenda for Development (United Nations 1994), this link defines economic and social development as a fundamental basis for peace: "Development is a fundamental human right. Development is the most secure basis for peace. The lack of development contributes to international tension and to a perceived need for military power. This in turns heightens tensions. Societies caught in this cycle find it difficult to avoid involvement in confrontation, conflict or all-out warfare" (paragraph 18). Similarly, in An Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 1992a), the Secretary General bridges social and economic development with peace in a preventive approach in which development constitutes one of the most basic sources of peace: "The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social develo ment for wider prosperity [Italics added] to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons" (paragraph 5). In these documents, there is also a challenge to the assumption that development takes place under conditions of peace. That is, individuals of many nations strive to satisfy their needs in a background of historical and present conflict. This fact demonstrates that development is an ongoing process that consists of the many efforts of individuals and societies to improve life. It is a multidimensional process encompassing many different kinds of behavioral strategies and circumstances. Thus, peace is a fundamental dimension of development, because growth and prosperity of individuals depend on the degree of security available. Simply stated, if large proportions of the limited budgets and resources of nations are allocated to defense, the provision of many goods such as health and education decrease. On the other hand, condi tions of successful development are not always peaceful, as the relationship between urbanization and crime shows us. Thus, there is a symbiotic relation ship between peace and development. They are both fundamental components of each other, affecting each other in a dynamic process. They are necessary but not sufficient for each other, because the lack of one diminishes the other but the presence of one does not ensure the presence of the other. This symbiosis is key to understanding the patterns of development and violence that the world has experienced, as well as to promoting economic and social development strategies that will support peace.

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DEVELOPMENT AND VIOLENCE Historically, writers agree that the end of World War II marked the beginning of the world's quest for development (we refer to this as the old development paradigm). According to Esteva (1992), the era of development began when President Truman embarked the United States on a program designed to make available the benefits of the advances in science and industry of his country to the people of underdeveloped areas. In some fundamental way, President Truman's position followed the earlier American Open Door Policy of 1900, which opposed colonialism but advocated an American economic and political expansion with the idea that America's preponderant economic strength would dominate in underdeveloped areas of the world (Williams, 1972). Though President Truman's vision went beyond expansionism to instill a new sense of responsibility in the industrialized world toward other nations, development underlied an unfortunate conception of the world which divided it into desirable and less desirable forms of living. Critics are fast to point out that this division simply resonated earlier imperialism and thus constituted the basis for the failure of development. But this was perhaps an unintentional consequence of Truman's plan. It is likely that what followed World War II, and here we disagree with Esteva, was a sense of a new beginning marked by the events of the time, while the thinking of policy makers was sluggish and less malleable than the events would demand. This exemplifies the inertia of human belief, which follows old thinking even in the light of new evidence; unchanging in essential ways even when there is a conscious desire for change. If there is something to blame for recreating a past that was being abandoned, and this is well known to psychologists, it is our human inability to quickly create new ways of dealing with our world in the context of what is known and expected. In terms of economic growth, the old development paradigm defined growth as the per capita production of material goods, having GNP as its main indicator. In this paradigm, a fairly linear trend is envisioned, going from underdevelopment to development with industrialism as the gold standard. This follows Solow's neoclassical growth theory, where the rate of growth of per capita income in steady state is determined by the rate of technical progress, exogenously (in Dornbusch & Fischer, 1994). This implies that access to technical progress is fundamental to promote the growth of poor countries. Other things being equal, if countries have the same rates of population growth and savings, the poorer countries will eventually reach the level of income of the richer countries if they have access to the same technology. Unfortunately, the overemphasis on per capita production as the criterion of development ignored important factors, such as the depletion of natural resources, the production of waste that results from sustaining output, and the problem of wealth distribution. These issues, in turn, relate to peace imbalances. First, the depletion of the world's natural resources and waste production are not even, because the wealthiest nations even today maintain the largest share of resource use (United

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Nations, 1994). This produces resentment and tension from those who feel their needs have been secondary to the needs of the wealthier countries throughout history; it also keeps the wealthiest nations on guard to protect, even forcefully, the resources they have secured for their economic progress. Second, the increased world output has not resulted in less world poverty and the unequal share of the benefits of production prevailing in the world breeds social and political instability. To more clearly see these connections, a few examples are useful. Resources and Peace Imbalances Instances in which the exploitation of natural resources played an integral part in the development of violence abound. In central India in 1930, Britain violently cracked down on tribal members who protested the Forest Acts of 1927 which were to preserve the forest for commercial British exploitation (Shiva, 1992). In Latin America, property rights over land have been a source of violent confrontations in rural areas throughout this century. Furthermore, Latin America's dependency on the exploitation of raw materials for their economies and the limited ownership of those resources lie as an important root of inequity and violence on the continent (Castaneda, 1993). More recently, the Gulf War of 1991 clearly exemplified the connection between violence and the securing of resources. In this event, the industrialized world forcefully protected its access to oil by preventing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which in turn was a violent move to control resources (the United States imports 50 percent of its oil). In a global sense, our current demands for food and water are alarming and they put high pressure on the usage of land and oceans, which are limited. The World Bank estimates that the demand for food will double present levels by the year 2025; these demands will result in population shifts such as the ones already underway in Africa. These demographic movements provoke regional tensions that are likely to instigate violence. Groups with different needs will often collide in the use of resources, as is the case in the Amazons between the tribes who need land for subsistence agriculture and legal and illegal settlers who want land for other uses. Resources have played and will continue playing a role in the creation of tensions and violence. In the old development paradigm, natural resources were ignored because technology was entrusted to expand what is available for production. The Nobel laureate Robert Solow was a main proponent of the idea that the depletion of natural resources was an irrelevant concern. In his words, "It is very easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then there is, in principle, no problem. The world can, in effect, get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a catastrophe" (quoted in Shiva, 1992). We disagree with this position, because increasing production without an understanding of the role of natural resources is vacuous and ties development to peace imbalances.

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In sum, the production of goods needs resources and these are limited. History shows us that the unilateral exploitation of resources for economic achievement promoted violence. The development paradigm did not go far beyond this reality, in the sense that the basic structure whereupon the richer nations obtain natural resources from poorer ones (now in the exchange for the benefits of technology) did not change. Obviously the sources of violent conflicts are complex and overgeneralizing is dangerous, but we must not ignore the interplay between economic interests (specifically resource usage), political interests, and war. If we add to this the lasting patterns of relationships among nations that find their umbilical cord in earlier world systems such as colonialism, we have a prescription for insecurity. The current tragedy of Congo (former Zaire) and its surrounding area serves as an example of this. The interest of the industrialized world in this region's resources (the availability of gold, diamond, copper, cobalt, and oil deposits) plus the historical ties among these countries affect the dynamics of war and peace even today. Inequity and Violence A second path to conflict stems from inequity. Recent statistics document the disparities in the distribution of the world's wealth. According to the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development (United Nations, 1997a), in the last thirty years the gap between the rich and the poor within and between nations has increased. The difference between the average per capita incomes of industrialized and developing countries tripled between 1960 and 1993. Within countries, the richest 20 percent earn up to thirty times more than the poorest individuals. In Latin America, past development efforts were not catalytic of both the distribution of economic growth and full participation in the civil society. According to Castaneda (1993), in spite of the economic growth experienced in Latin America since 1960 and the recent rebirth of democratic governments, Latin America is not much better off than it was in the 1950s. The number of people living below the poverty line increased 39 percent, from 120 million in 1980 to 160-170 million in 1985. Economic disparities promote tension among people and disrupt democratic political processes. Political instability often results in abrupt changes of governments and of economic and social policies. At the international level, these changes are risky, because they introduce new uncertainties regarding trade and political partnerships among nations. It is unclear how to behave toward a nation that is torn by internal wars and/or is ruled by a sealed dictatorship. History, albeit recent, demonstrates that democracies are less prone to enter armed conflicts than are other forms of governance. To the extent that economic and social disparities erode democracy, a greater risk of international violence results. Economic disparities also promote profit-seeking activities that reside at the margins of the economy. These illicit activities have great consequences

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to the maintenance and promotion of peace. A clear example is the production and distribution of drugs. According to the U.N. World Drug Report (United Nations, 1997b), the revenue accruing to the drug industry is about US$4 billion; this figure amounts to 8 percent of the total international trade. Clearly, the incentives to enter and/or remain in these activities is very high. Three levels of violence stem from this illicit economy: (1) At the personal or psychological level, the increase in drug consumption has led to higher mortality rates throughout the world and to lower health and individual freedom; (2) at the level of the society, crime-related activities are on the rise (research in the United States and the United Kingdom shows that one-fifth to one-half of the use of illicit drugs is financed by crime); and (3) at the global level, drug revenues have served to maintain armed conflicts by providing the means to purchase arms and support guerrilla movements. An example of the complex relationship that exists among the drug economy, violent guerrilla activities, and economic and military aid to developing countries is the case of Peru and the Shining Path, one of the most violent and cruel guerrilla movements of Latin America. Between 1990 and 1995, the Bush administration's "Andean Initiative" channeled US$2 billion as economic and military assistance to the Andean countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru in the war against drugs. The approach ignored the socioeconomic reality of the region because by forming alliances with the military the United States weakened rather than strengthened the democratic processes that it was trying to promote (Burt & Panfichi, 1992). As an example, Peru's Shining Path found a niche in the Upper Huallaga Valley as a protector of the peasant coca growers. The growers suffered abuses by the drug traffickers whose purpose was to obtain coca at the cheapest price. With an empowered military that was receiving international aid, the growers also faced abuses from the armed forces. The Shining Path became a protector of these peasant populations and the revenues that it obtained for this protection rendered it one of the most financially independent guerrilla organizations of Latin America (Strong, 1992). At this point we must reflect back on the former U.N. Secretary-General's assertion that development is the most secure basis for peace. How can we reconcile this belief with the economic and political activities that have promoted and sustained different forms of violence in the past? FROM STOCKHOLM 1972 TO RIO DE JANEIRO 1992: SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Current definitions of economic development are broader than the old development paradigm, including other aspects of a country's welfare such as improvements in health, literacy, and longevity. In the works of the United Nations Development Program, for example, the Human Development Index measures the average achievements in a country in the three basic dimensions of longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. These are

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very basic psychological dimensions, because they describe the status of individuals. The defining of economic and social development in a multifaceted, psychological manner is primarily the product of two landmark international conferences, the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, and the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The concept of sustainable development was coined by the Brundtland Report which resulted from the U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development of 1987. According to this report, sustainable development defines an integrated approach to policy and decision making in which economic growth is one aspect of the more comprehensive view of human development. In the more recent report of the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development (United Nations, 1997a), human development comprises adequate income, health, and education, plus intangible goods such as freedom and personal dignity. Socioeconomic development is thus a very individualistic rather than global concept, but that has great implications for the status of societies and of nations. In the psychology of peacemaking, human development as it pertains to individuals satisfying their needs at different levels is essential, because individuals are the backbone of any political reality as they organize and act to promote their values. Perhaps this has been the biggest advance in the development agenda, because policy discussions cannot proceed in the abstract without identifying how individuals in different societies, facing different realities, will be affected by global actions by the state or the international community. That is, psychological dimensions of development, such as people's values, beliefs, and strategies as well as the contexts in which their lives evolve, must be part of development. For example, women throughout the world face very different circumstances than do men; their job conditions, family relations, and behaviors and values are distinct. A proper human development agenda, thus, must be psychologically sensitive and incorporate the very specific needs of men and women in order to advance their development. There are two important lessons from the last two decades with regard to economic and social development. First, economic growth via the application of market principles has served the industrialized nations well, but there has been tremendous losses of biodiversity and environmental degradation. According to the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (United Nations, 1992b), the major cause of the deterioration of the global environment is the consumption patterns of the industrialized world. Furthermore, poorer countries have already lost so much of their natural capital that the prospect of their transition into a global market economy in the near future seems dim. Second, the assumption that economic growth also results in improved economic and social conditions to all individuals must be qualified. Industrialized countries as a whole have increased income, but, as pointed out earlier, statistics also show that the gap between rich and poor within and among nations has increased. Moreover, structural policies that promoted

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market-oriented strategies in many countries have not automatically eliminated poverty. Nor have they resulted in better social systems where individuals are fully incorporated into society and its mechanisms for decision making. This was evident, for example, in the structural adjustment policies applied in Latin America in the 1980s. In short, if one thing is clear from the past it is that the pursuit of development in the traditional way is unlikely to result in a balanced economic path that eradicates poverty and inequity and in healthy productive ecosystems that allow individuals of today and tomorrow to enjoy the resources of our planet. This in turn implies that the conditions for a peaceful world will remain a distant reality, because at the core of human insecurity still reside the old problems of "unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, drugs, and the disparity between rich and poor" (United Nations, 1992a, paragraph 13). Sustainable human development, on the other hand, reshapes our thinking, because it forces us to focus on individuals and on the interconnectedness of nations that inescapably share one single environment. In this entwined socioeconomic reality, political action must foster cooperation among individuals and nations; nothing else is feasible to secure peace. It is within this paradigm that we can understand the complementary nature of peace and development envisioned by the former U.N. Secretary-General. Peace and Sustainable Development An Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 1992a) recognizes that our modern world presents us with contradictions. On the one hand, our advanced means of communication and globalized trade blur national boundaries, while new assertions of nationalism and discrimination simultaneously spring up in different parts of the world. Technological advances change the patterns of life of many cultures and greater communications increase our awareness of others. This heightens our desire for global solidarity, but this progress also brings new forms of instability resulting from our consumption behaviors and the degree to which communications invade our private, family, and community life. In this setting, processes to promote peace encompass issues beyond those of military curtailment, where sustainable development has a unique place. Two key concepts are relevant to this assertion and highlight psychological aspects of development: (1) Promoting development requires the creation and maintenance of partnerships among nations, where there is common understanding by policy makers of the use and management of natural resources and where cooperation is crucial to building confidence; and (2) social stability and the protection of individuals' freedom arise from democratic means of expression and participation. It is clear that we live in a highly interdependent world. Economic interdependence provides the international community with unique opportunities

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for cooperation to promote human development. The interdependence in trade, foreign investment, and monetary relations at the international level bring optimism as to the potential growth of the international economy and the benefits that fuzzy national boundaries have on security. On the other hand, this interdependence brings new uncertainties, because the effects of domestic policies, demand increases, supply conditions, debts, technological changes, and the like on the international political economy are not fully known. Furthermore, there is no international government to regulate the effects of selfserving domestic policies at the international level. Economic interdependence is risky if old development strategies continue, because the presence of nonintegrated developing countries in the world economic system and the pursuit of competitive strategies that attempt to export unemployment and protect one's own industries can lead to political conflict. Sustainable human development requires the realization of this interdependence and its risks by policy makers and the conscious efforts of all nations to behave cooperatively in the instrumentation of policies that support the proper management of natural resources and the benefits of the world's production. As Gilpin (1987) pointed out, structural changes in the world economic system have led to the increasing clash between domestic interests and international norms. The incentives to pursue policies that are beneficial to oneself but that shift costs to others are increasing. Trade protectionism is one such policy. Sustainable human development necessitates that nations establish the proper regime of cooperation in terms of trade partnerships and fair competition. A better understanding of the dynamism of the world economy, of the tensions that one-sided views of the system produce, and a willingness by governments to coordinate efforts to promote sustainable human development are essential to peacemaking. At the level of societies, incorporation of individuals into societies requires proper mechanisms of civil participation. However, while 61 percent of world governments were chosen via elections in 1996, according to Freedom House (Muravchik, 1996), full democracies are rare . This is in part the product of the short-lived social and political institutions that followed the incipience of democracy in many countries and present dismal economic conditions. In many instances the new democracy evolves in a context of shared pain and distrust following years of civil bloodshed, as in the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua. Poor economic conditions lead to social tensions and countries with weak democratic institutions are more prone to abandon policies that may foster long-term benefits but produce short-term hardships. Because new democracies have haphazardly embraced the ideals of democracy and the market with the hopes of quickly fixing the conflicts and wrongs of the past, when new policies fail to rapidly yield the expected benefits conflict over the role of basic institutions results and there is a temptation to resort to authoritarian rule (Przeworski, 1991). Peace is thus threatened, because a government facing

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political instability weakens partnerships among nations. Authoritarian governments, furthermore, tend to violate the basic tenets of human security as they restrict citizens' participation. Democracy, in the thinking of the former U.N. Secretary-General, is indispensable to peace, because social stability results from conditions in which people can express themselves and their fundamental freedoms are respected. Democracy is thus intimately connected to development. Development, furthermore, comprises the fundamental psychological dimensions of individuals' values, beliefs, and decisions: Democracy and development are linked in fundamental ways. They are linked because democracy provides the only long-term basis for managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict. They are linked because democracy is inherently attached to the question of governance, which has an impact on all aspects of development efforts. They are linked because democracy is a fundamental human right, the advancement of which is itself an important measure of development. They are linked because people's participation in the decision-making processes which affect their lives is a basic tenet of development. (United Nations, 1994, paragraph 120) It is worth noting here that the level of civil participation that individuals can have, even when democratic procedures are available, is constrained by their economic security. In other words, the level of responsibility and impact that the marginalized poor can have as citizens and as decision makers is minimal. We simply cannot hear the voice of individuals when poverty keeps them in a vacuum, nor can we easily learn about their preferences when they in fact do not have choices. Thus, hand in hand with establishing the mechanisms and institutions that allow participation in a society, poverty eradication is primal. As noted earlier, development strategies of the past have not accomplished this and often have created new forms of human insecurity. In Latin America, for example, the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s resulted in forms of job insecurity. A rise of occupational vulnerability resulted from a lag of job-creation elasticity in a labor market that could not incorporate individuals who lacked training. These conditions created an informal economy where individuals do not enjoy the protections of the formal market such as decent working conditions and fair wages. More alarming, this informal sector feeds from the needs of the formal sector, creating a positive feedback loop that maintains the precarious conditions of the poor and increases the benefits of the formal economy. Family-run sweatshops that satisfy the needs of the clothing and other manufacturing industries are examples of this marginal economy. The new development paradigm, however, requires new alliances between the state and the business community to abolish these unfair practices. Governments must serve as promoters of basic balances and provide for labormarket regulations that ensure the incorporation of individuals in informal

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economic activities to formal sectors. The state can also provide the incentives that allow business to grow without forgetting that workers (people) are the most important means of production. According to recent World Bank studies, the most important factor in the production of wealth of countries are raw labor and the returns on education; that is, human capital (United Nations, 1997a, paragraph 178). Many new business experiences in the United States and other parts of the world, such as worker-owner enterprises, have shown that it is possible to be profitable, fair, and environmentally conscious. We believe the state can play a key role in promoting such responsible business practices and foster sustainable human development. CONCLUSION In this chapter we echo the former U.N. Secretary-General's belief that peace and human development are tightly intertwined notions and that human development comprises basic psychological dimensions. His words in An Agenda for Development (United Nations, 1994) eloquently portray this: "Economic growth and technological transformation affect human relationships, societal structures, values and lifestyles. Social and human resource development makes social and economic relations more harmonious, facilitates inclusiveness and societal cohesion, and provides a solid and adaptable foundation for achieving long-term progress" (paragraph 94). We come full circle to understand that peace grows from practices that support sustainable human development. Violent conflicts find their roots in economic and social injustices. Averting such injustices provides the soil for peaceful relations among nations and for peaceful living conditions for all individuals. Following the thinking of the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development (United Nations, 1997a), basic policy implications to promote sustainable human development are as follows: (1) promote economic growth as did the earlier paradigm; (2) increase the investment in people, that is, increase spending on social services, education, and health care and promote efforts for a more equitable distribution of the benefits of production and incorporation of individuals into society; (3) encourage the use of clean and efficient technologies and promote the research necessary to decrease the overwhelming reliance on nonrenewable resources such as oil; and (4) internalize the social and environmental costs of waste production, where wasteful consumption patterns are discouraged. Furthermore, governments are responsible for the creation and/or support of institutions that serve as the skeleton for systems of civil and economic participation, and they are responsible for the creation and maintenance of partnerships among nations that support fair trade practices and the responsible use of natural resources. To eliminate the deepest causes of conflict, which reside in economic despair and social injustice, sustainable human development is our greatest hope.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Baker, P. H. (1996). Conflict resolution versus democratic governance: Divergent path to peace? In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Managing of global chaos: Sources of and responses to international conflict. Washingt DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Brown, L. (1992). State of the world: A worldwatch institute report on the progre toward a sustainable society. New York: Pergamon Press. Burt, J., & Panfichi, A. (1992). Peru caught in the crossfire. Jefferson City, MO: Per Peace Network-USA. Castaneda, J. G. (1993). Utopia unarmed. New York: Alfred A. Knop CEPAL. (1993). Panorama social de America Latina, (LC/G. 11648 (CONF80/2) Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, Division de Desarollo Social. Colby, M. E. (1991). La administration en el desarrollo: Evolution de los paradigmas El Trimestre Economico, Mexico, 58, 231. Diegues, A. C. (1992). Desenvolvimento sustentavel ou sociedades sustentaveis: Da critica dos modelos aos novos paradigma. Sao Paulo em Perspectiva, 6,22-29 Dornbusch, R., & Fischer, S. (1994). Macroeconomics. New York: McGraw-Hill Esteva, G. (1992). Development. In W. Sachs (Ed.), The development dictionary. A guide to knowledge as power. London: Zed Books. Flores, J. D. (1995). Reflexoes sobre o desenvolvimento sustentavel. Rap: Revista de Administracao Publica, 29, 5-26. Gaddis, J. L. (1991). The long peace: Elements of stability in the postwar international system. In S. M. Lynn-Jones (Ed.), The Cold War and after: Prospect for peace. Cambridge: MIT Press. Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development a civilization. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Gilpin, R. (1987). The political economy of international relations. Princeton, N Princeton University Press. Guimaraes, R. P. (1990). O leviata encurralado: Continuidade e mudanca no papel do estado na america latina. Planejamento e Politicas Publicas, 4, 5-3 Guimaraes, R. P. (1995). O desafio politico do desenvolvimento sustentado. Lua Nova 35,113-136. Huber, E., Rueschemeyer, D., & Stephens, J. D. (1993). The impact of economic development on democracy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 71-85. Koppel, T. (1996). The perils of info-democracy. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P Aall (Eds.), Managing of global chaos: Sources of and responses to internat conflict (pp. 355-356). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press Lovelock, J. E. (1979). Gaia: A new look at life on earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lummis, C. D. (1992). Equality. In W. Sachs (Ed.), The development dictionary. A guide to knowledge as power. London: Zed Books. Lund, M. (1996). Preventing violent conflicts. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Magalhaes, J. P. (1994). Integracoes economicas e desenvolvimento. Boletim de Integracao Latino-Americana, 13, 24-35. Mearsheimer, J. J. (1991). Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. In S. M. Lynn-Jones (Ed.), The ColdWar and after: Prospects for peace. Ca bridge: MIT Press.

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Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1993). Politics among nations. The strug for power and peace. New York: McGraw-Hill. Muravchik, J. (1996). Promoting peace through democracy. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Managing of global chaos: Sources of and responses to international conflict. Washington, DC: United States Institute o Peace Press. Pinto, A. (1992). A america latina entre duas crises. Revista de Economia Politica 72(3), 16-29. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market: Political and economic reform Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre Rahnema, M. (1992). Poverty. In W. Sachs (Ed.), The development dictionary. A gu to knowledge as power. London: Zed Books. Rapoport, A. (1992). Peace: An idea whose time has come. Ann Arbor: University Michigan Press. Rich, B. (1994). Mortgaging the earth: The World Bank, environmental impove ment and the crisis of development. Boston: Beacon Press. Sachs, W. (1992). Environment. In W. Sachs (Ed.), The development dictionary. guide to knowledge as power. London: Zed Books. Schelling, T. C. (1980). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Pre Shiva, V. (1992). Resources. In W. Sachs (Ed.), The development dictionary. A gui to knowledge as power. London: Zed Books. Singer, P. (1996). Perspectivas de desenvolvimento da Am&ica Latina. Novos Estud Cebrap, 44, 133-164. Snyder, J. (1991). Averting anarchy in the new Europe. In S. M. Lynn-Jones (Ed.), The Cold War and after: Prospects for peace. Cambridge: MIT Pre Sorensen, G. (1993). Democracy, authoritarianism and state strength. The Europea Journal of Development Research, 5, 6-3 Strong, S. (1992). Shining path: The world's deadliest revolutionary force. Londo HarperCollins. Symposia: The state and economic development. (1990). The Journal of Economi Perspectives, EUA, 4(3), 3-74. Taylor, L. (1996). Crescimento economico, intervencion del estado y teoria del desarrollo. Pensamiento Iberoamericano: Revista de Economia Politica, Madrid, 29, 31-84. United Nations. (1992a). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaki and peacekeeping, report of the Secretary-General A/47/277-S/24111. Ne York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1992b). Changing consumption patterns: Report of the United tions Conference on Environment and Development A/CONE 151/26 (Vol New York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1994). An agenda for development, Report of the Secretary-Gene A/48/935. New York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1995). Supplement to an agenda for peace: Position paper of t0 Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Unit Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization 50/60-S/l995/1. New York: U.N. Department of Public Information. United Nations. (1997a). Global change and sustainable development: Critical tre Report of the Secretary-General E/CN. 17/1997/3. New York: U.N. Departm of Public Information.

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United Nations. (1997b). World drug report: United Nations international drug c trol programme. London: Oxford University Press U.S. Department of State. (1945). The United Nations conference on internation organization: Selected documents. Department of State Publication 2490, Co ference Series 83. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. Williams, W. A. (1972). The tragedy of American diplomacy. New York: W. W. Nor

CHAPTER 3

Early Intervention: Prediction and Action Ervin Staub

To intervene early and stop violence against groups of people, we must be able to predict such violence. Discrimination and limited violence against groups is so common that we have to be able to differentiate when they indicate the likelihood of greater violence and when they do not. An empirically based theory of group violence is required for prediction (Staub, 1989). But even good prediction does not tell us exactly what type of violence is likely to occur. Since violence usually evolves, lesser violence may under certain conditions turn into mass killing, which may turn into genocide. Ideally, we would act not to halt actual violence from evolving into greater violence, but to prevent violence. Early intervention, at its best, will be preventive action. A good working theory and appropriate assessment tools are important for identifying conditions that require preventive action.

ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED TO INTERVENE It is a pattern of events and/or conditions that indicate either the need to take immediate action to halt violence or the need to take preventive action. The instruments or tools of assessment can include identification of current actions by a government or by group members towards another group, historical documents, current literature, the media, the laws and changes in them, and interviews with members of perpetrator and victim groups.

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The Presence of Instigating Conditions Genocide usually begins with certain instigating conditions. A primary one is difficult conditions of life in a society, like economic problems, political conflict, great social change, or their combination. Other instigating conditions include conflicts involving vital interests (like territory needed for living space), conflict between a dominant and a subordinate group, or a history of conflict and antagonism between groups which create what I have called an ideology of antagonism. Occasionally, violence against groups is based on self-interest. For example, an indigenous group may live in a territory that others want to develop, as happened in the case of the Ache Indians in Paraguay. To what extent are instigating conditions active, and how does the group deal with them? If there are difficult conditions of life, how intense are they, how evenly do they affect different segments of the population, and how are they dealt with? Are there constructive steps taken to address them? The experience of injustice by groups of people in difficult and turbulent times is an important instigator (Staub, 1989). Are there other active instigating conditions, like conflicts over territory, power arrangements, and so on? The designation of a geographic area where a potential victim group lives as important for economic development is a potential instigator. Mutual blaming by a subordinate and superordinate group, demands for justice, demonstrations and acts of repression, and violence by either side are warning signals. Scapegoating and Ideologies One dangerous reaction to difficult life conditions is to scapegoat some group for life's problems. Another is the emergence of a destructive ideology, a vision of ideal social arrangements with a vulnerable group identified as standing in the way of its fulfillment. The presence of such an ideology, its wide appeal, and leaders propagating it are important indicators of danger. There are different forms of destructive ideologies. They include "better world" ideologies, like Communism, which claim to improve the welfare of all human beings (except the ideological enemy); nationalistic ideologies which stress the power, wealth, and purity of a group; ideologies of antagonism; ideologies of superiority which justify subordinating certain groups on the basis of the inherent superiority of the dominant group, whether due to race, religion, or individual characteristics that supposedly gave members of the group positions of power, wealth, and influence; and ideologies of development, a vision of economic progress with the victim group standing in the way. Any one of them is a danger signal. Harmful Acts and the Continuum of Destruction Violence usually evolves. Smaller acts of discrimination and violence change perpetrators and the whole group, including the attitude of bystand-

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ers, public norms of behavior, and institutions. The first signs of danger are verbal and physical acts of persecution, discrimination, and violence. It is important to identify their presence and evaluate their relationship to the continuum of destruction. What is the point on the continuum that has been reached historically? Has the mistreatment of a victim group stabilized around that point? Acts of persecution, discrimination, and violence may be the "normal" way the group is treated. When this is the case, and the level of such mistreatment has been stable for a long time, this indicates a long-standing potential for genocidal violence, but not necessarily current danger. Recent increase in their degree or frequency is, however, an important signal of current danger. The Role of Elites The attitude that is taken by the political leadership and economic elite of the country is important. They, or a segment of them, frequently spearhead the evolution towards violence. Given the societal base created by the conditions described and certain cultural predispositions, they propagate the destructive ideology, intensify historical antagonisms, work to maintain differences in power and status, and create organizations that are potential instruments of violence. Paramilitary type organizations, broadly defined, have become in many instances tools of collective violence in Rwanda, Turkey, Germany, some Latin American nations, and elsewhere. Bystander Actions The behavior of bystanders in the face of violence against a group is an important indicator of the likelihood of more intense violence. Passivity by internal bystanders (members of the population where the violence is occurring) and by external bystanders (outside groups and nations) encourages perpetrators. Such passivity is common. External bystanders frequently continue commercial, cultural, and other relations with a country that engages in violence against an internal group, thereby expressing tacit acceptance. Often some external bystanders actively support the perpetrator group. The power of bystanders to influence the behavior of other bystanders, as well as perpetrators, is great (Darley & Latan6,1970; Hallie, 1979; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Staub, 1989, 1996b). When there are bystander actions, the assessment must consider where they occur along the continuum of destruction, their appropriateness and magnitude, and the impact on perpetrators. PREDISPOSING CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS These elements, separately and especially in combination, represent current danger. Both to appreciate the magnitude of the danger and to assess the likelihood of genocidal or group violence when there is no current danger, it

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is essential to assess the presence of predisposing cultural characteristics. These characteristics are present to some degree in most societies. When they are present to a greater extent and in combination, they make violence against groups more likely. When they are present to a lesser extent, they can inhibit processes that might otherwise lead to violence. Thefirstand most essential of these characteristics is a history of devaluation of some group that is part of the culture. Devaluation makes scapegoating and the creation of ideological enemies easier and more likely. The following forms of devaluation have increasing instigating power: the other is less intelligent, less likable, or lazy; the other is morally bad; the other is a danger to us, and intends to harm us or destroy us. An ideology of antagonism, with each group seeing the other as enemy and itself as the enemy of the other, has especially great instigating power. Another important predisposing characteristic is a monolithic versus pluralistic society. Analysis of democratic versus authoritarian systems shows that democracies neither engage in genocide nor start wars against other democracies (Rummel, 1994). This is probably more complicated, however, than it seems from such a generalization, since it is in part a matter of how deeply democracy is rooted in a culture and social institutions. Germany was a democracy during the Weimar Republic, but became a totalitarian system under the Nazis. In some Latin American nations military dictatorships replaced elected governments (Staub, 1989). Democracy is to varying degrees incomplete in most places. In a monolithic society, the accepted values and beliefs are limited in range. Freedom to express a broad range of values and beliefs and the practice of varied ways of life may be limited either by the political system or by the nature of the culture. In such a society it is less likely that members of the population will speak out against policies and practices that inflict harm on a potential victim group. In a pluralistic society, in contrast, many voices intermingle in the public domain. Under the best conditions each subgroup of society can express and assert itself. The public dialogue makes scapegoating, the widespread adoption of destructive ideologies, and progression along a continuum of destruction less likely. Limitations on public debate (such as government censorship of the media) and on the access of certain groups to societal institutions and processes are indicators of danger. Increases in such limitations indicate current danger. A strong authority orientation is another predisposing cultural characteristic. All societies teach some respect for and obedience to authority, but there is great variation in degree. For example, long before Hitler came to power, Germans were regarded as especially respectful of and obedient to authority (Girard, 1980). There is evidence as well of strong respect for authority in Serbia (Kressel, 1996). In strong authority-oriented societies people will be more impacted by difficult life conditions when the capacity of their leaders, the authorities, to provide security and effective leadership breaks down. The will have more difficulty dealing with conditions of uncertainty (Soeters,

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1996). They will yearn for new leaders who offer hopeful visions of the future. They may be more likely to blame other groups for life problems. They will also be less likely to speak out against their leaders as they begin to lead them along a continuum of destruction. They may be more easily directed by leaders to engage in immoral and violent acts. I will only mention here one other relevant societal characteristic, unhealed group trauma. When a group has experienced great suffering, especially due to persecution and violence at the hand of others, it is more likely to respond to renewed threat with violence. People who experience trauma are deeply affected (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; McCann and Pearlman, 1990). Their feeling of insecurity in the world will make members of victimized groups see the world as a dangerous place and experience threat as more intense than it is. The resulting self-focus makes it difficult for them to consider the needs of others in case of conflict. They are more likely to engage, therefore, in what they see as defensive aggression (Staub, 1996a, 1996b). The degree of past victimization by a group and the extent of healing from it are both important. Healing can be assessed in part through evidence of certain experiences: others acknowledging the group's suffering, expressing caring and empathy, providing emotional and material support, and the existence of memorials and rituals of mourning and remembrance. Through interviews with members of the group and examination of the group's literature, media, and school curricula the balance of focus on a painful past and hope in the future can also be assessed. INTERVENTION TO HALT THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENCE When intervention is early, perpetrators' commitment to violence against a victim group may still be limited. Neither a plan of violent actions nor a system to execute may as yet exist. As a result, early action by nations, the community of nations, and international organization may make it unlikely that military action becomes necessary. Assessment of the need for action is easier than getting the international community to respond. One way to increase the likelihood of action is to develop standards for when actions are required, what actions are required depending on varied circumstances, and who is to take action. Working out when, what, and who could reduce the usual disregard for early information about signs of impending or beginning violence and the diffusion of responsibility about action. The establishment of appropriate institutions is also important. Institutions for early warning are useful, but the U.N., nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and nations already provide some such information. Institutions for activating response are of the essence, however. Finally, private citizens and nongovernmental organization must work to influence the international climate to make early response the expectation and progressively the norm.

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Communication and Special Envoys To save face for leaders and make it less likely that they try to show their strength to their own people and the world by resisting influence, it is valuable to begin by private communication from leaders of other nations, groups of nations, or the U.N. (this may require some changes in procedures by the U.N.). This luxury of private communication assumes an early enough response. If private communication is ineffective, it should speedily move to public condemnation and public communication of consequences that will follow. The private communication should indicate that others see a serious human rights problem existing and/or developing. It should offer help in resolving conflicts: help with mediation, conflict resolution, and, when appropriate, material aid. At the same time it should indicate that the situation is unacceptable. Depending on the response, it should speedily move into specifying consequences that will follow from the international community if the harmful actions against a group continue. Special envoys of the U.N. and individual nations should be trained for such missions, both to do the diplomatic work and to accomplish additional tasks. Usually leaders of perpetrator groups are seen as acting to promote their power and interests (Allport, 1954; Kressel, 1996). However, I see them as leading toward violence in part because they are also impacted by the forces that affect all members of their group, the conditions and influences described earlier. Special envoys should be trained to know about and have the capacity to respond to these forces, as much as the conditions under which they operate allow. For example, they should have the capacity to engage with leaders in ways that might foster the healing of wounds that these leaders carry as members of their group and as children of victims or survivors, like Serb leaders affected by the mass killing of Serbs by Croats during World War II. Actions by Bystander Nations Communication should be followed by action. A sequence of withholding aid, boycotts, and sanctions should follow. Ideally, boycotts and sanctions will focus on products and services that make the sanctions most harmful to the leadership. Ideally, they will not be connected to implicit or explicit demands that make a change of course by leaders unlikely. For example, Iraq's intransigence in the 1990s may be the result of a subtext that only the removal of Saddam Hussein will lead to the elimination of boycotts and sanctions. The removal of Saddam Hussein was desirable even at the time when the United States and many other nations supported and helped Iraq, in spite of its political violence, its initiating a war with Iran, and violence against its own Kurdish population. But for effective nonmilitary intervention, it is essential to separate the goal of conformity to human rights demands from the goal of replacing leaders. While early responses will reduce the need for military intervention, the availability of military force for such a purpose is essential. An international

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force under U.N. auspices would serve such a function and over time its existence could become a deterrent to aggression. Acting to Prevent Group Violence The existence of certain conditions make genocide more likely. They require preventive action even when there are no current changes along a continuum of destruction and no intense instigation. These conditions include strong cultural devaluation, ideologies of antagonism, intense conflict between dominant and subordinate groups, and historical wounds. Only a few types of actions are noted here. Healing and Reconciliation Helping previously victimized groups heal would reduce the likelihood of later violence by them. Acknowledgment of their suffering by the world, helping them create memorials and ceremonies commemorating their victimization and suffering, and outsiders participating in these can all be helpful to healing. Reconciliation between former victims and perpetrators or between hostile groups requires some prior healing. This makes forgiveness more likely. Forgiveness usually requires that perpetrators acknowledge their responsibility. Frequently perpetrators also feel wounded, if not at the hands of their victims then in some other way. Both groups may need to heal, assume responsibility for their actions, and reconcile. In places like Rwanda and Bosnia, the way groups are geographically intertwined makes reconciliation essential for avoiding renewed violence. Dialogue groups and problem-solving workshops (Kelman, 1990; Rouhana and Kelman, 1995; Rothman, 1992) tend to facilitate these processes either directly or while serving other aims. Writing about experiences of pain and suffering, in the company of others, with mutual support among participants, is a procedure aimed to facilitate healing (Staub and Pearlman, 1996). Participants can then proceed to work on forgiveness and reconciliation. However, these are procedures for relatively small groups. Memorials and ceremonies can facilitate healing and, when appropriately designed, even forgiveness and reconciliation in larger numbers of people (Staub, 1996a, 1996b). Dialogue, Problem Solving, and Joint Projects Beyond healing, dialogue groups and problem-solving activities between antagonistic groups can serve a number of positive goals. These include resolving existing political issues and pointing to solutions for practical problems. Creating contact is a significant contribution of these groups. Deep engagement by members of groups with each other, ideally under conditions of equality and other supporting conditions, is required to overcome negative stereotypes and hostility (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1997; Staub, 1989). The creation of joint

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goals and shared effort in their behalf are extremely valuable. Even though such groups often have shared interests, shared goals and joint efforts are difficult to create given their relationship. Their creation requires the committed effort of bystanders. Nongovernmental organizations, the U.N., and individual nations have all initiated such efforts, but much more can be done. Truth Commissions and Tribunals The punishment of perpetrators is important in prevention. First, consistent punishment of perpetrators, including leaders, communicates to the world that violence against groups is not acceptable. Second, a significant role of tribunals and truth commissions is to establish what has actually happened. Without that, members of the perpetrator group are likely to feel that they are victims. They are likely to create a history that makes renewed perpetration by them probable. A significant outcome of the Nuremberg tribunals, with its heavy documentation of German crimes, was to make it difficult for Germans to once again see themselves as victims. Third, truth commissions and tribunals proclaim the suffering of the victims. This helps them heal. By punishing what has happened to them and by affirming that the violence against them was not normal and acceptable it also helps members of victim groups to feel safer and thereby reduces the likelihood of later violence by them. CONCLUSION The challenge is to make early intervention in reality. This requires changes in procedures within the U.N., and could be promoted by the creation of offices within foreign ministries whose job is to initiate early intervention and to use early warning to activate nations. Early intervention also requires the coordination of activities by the U.N., individuals nations, regional organization, and nongovernmental organizations. Not only a design for when, who, and what, but also the institutional possibilities for them must be created. Finally, it would help make ideas for early intervention into realities if there were increasing public demand for the protection of groups of people when they are endangered or harmed. Any individual can be an active bystander who contributes to this.

REFERENCES Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Darley, J. M, & Latanl, B. (1970). Norms and normative behavior: Field studies of social interdependence. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism an helping behavior. New York: Academic Press. Girard, P. (1980). Historical foundations of anti-semitism. In J. Dimsdale (Ed.), Su vivors, victims and perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust. Ne Hemisphere.

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Hallie, P. P. (1979). Lest innocent blood be shed: The story of the village ofLe Cha and how goodness happened there. New York: Harper & Ro Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered assumptions. New York: Free Pres Kelman, H. C. (1990). Applying a human needs perspective to the practice of conflic resolution: The Israeli-Palestinian case. In J. Burton (Ed.), Conflict: Huma needs theory. New York: St. Martin's Press Kressel, N. J. (1996). Mass hate: The global rise of genocide and terror. New Yor Plenum Press. McCann, L. I., & Pearlman, L. A. (1990). Psychological trauma and the adult sur vor: Theory, therapy, and transformation. New York: Bruner/Ma Oliner, S. B., & Oliner, P. (1988). The altruistic personality: Rescuers of Jews in N Europe. New York: Free Press. Pettigrew, T. F. (1997). Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice. Persona ity and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 173-185. Rothman, J. (1992). From confrontation to cooperation: Resolving ethnic and r gional conflicts. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Rouhana, N. N., & Kelman, H. C. (1995). Promoting joint thinking in international conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian continuing workshop. Journal of Social Is sues, 50,157-178. Rummel, R.J. (1994). Democide in totalitarian states: Mortacracies and megamurderer In I. W. Charny (Ed.), Genocide: A critical bibliographic review: Wideni circle of genocide, Vol. 3. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Soeters, J. L. (1996). Culture and conflict: An application of Hofstede's theory to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Ps chology, 2, 233-244. Staub, E. (1989). The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violen New York: Cambridge University Press. Staub, E. (1996a). Breaking the cycle of violence: Helping victims of genocidal violence heal. Journal of Personal and Interpersonal Loss, 1, 191-19 Staub, E. (1996b). Preventing genocide: Activating bystanders, helping victims and the creation of caring. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 189-201. Staub, E., & Pearlman, L. (1996, November). Trauma and the fulfillment of the human potential. Workshop presented of the meetings of the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, San Francisco, CA.

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CHAPTER 4

The Psychology of Diplomacy: Conflict Resolution in a Time of Minimal or Unusual Small-Scale Conflicts Edward J. Perkins

In the emerging era following the Cold War, foreign-policy management would do well to include conflict resolution in the planning of foreign policy for the future. Western foreign-policy directions have developed along lines of balance of power, collective security, multilateralism, and unilateralism. As nations move increasingly toward political, economic, and social stability, the foregoing, of course, will not disappear. However, other phenomena demand the attention of policy makers. This is a question of how we solve age-old conflicts arising—after being buried for years—when other "control belts" have been loosened. This increasingly common phenomena compels the consideration of conflict resolution as a central theme of foreign policy management. The possibility of armed conflict involving a majority of the big powers, or powers with the economic and military force capability of waging large-scale war, seems fairly remote at this time. The absence of a bipolar world which embraced a continuing ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in a "cold war" and sometimes "hot war" sense, accompanied by an enormous ongoing preparation for large-scale armed conflict gives the whole world a chance to do something different. The stockpiling of largescale war weapons of mass destruction has for years now demanded nonproliferation strategies leading to destruction and outlawing of such weapons. Some success can be claimed. Now, just as important, ways must be found to prevent the escalation of small-scale conflict and to resolve the incipient stirrings that threaten to erupt into conflict.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION DEFINED Conflict resolution as a concept requires added definitions and more international acceptance as a foreign-policy tool. Experience suggests a continuation of small-scale conflicts—and some not so small. Accompanying these will be an escalation of refugees, acute hunger, more widespread disease affecting populations in various parts of the globe, plus accompanying attacks on the environment, for example. Whatever the manifestation, the effect will likely be felt in the developed world as well as in less-developed countries. Any disruption of a political, social, or economic order because of ethnic division, political rights denial, territorial expansion, or economic deprivation (including treatment of the generic environment in such a manner that regions, peoples, and the globe is affected) that does not involve a world conflict would seem to be sufficient definition of "small-scale conflict" in which to frame this discussion. Nash, an academic colleague and an observer of small-scale conflict in Paraguay, notes that when "maximum mutual benefit for all tiers of society" (S. S. Nash, personal communication, September 25,1997) is in denial a conflict is likely to occur. This is another appropriate way to look at conflict within the broad definition offered. Many examples obviously come to mind. The breakup of the former Yugoslav Federation into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro represent just about all the factors in the definition. The divisions within the Cambodian conflict embody conflict which can be examined using ethnic, economic, political, or cultural models. A number of Cambodian students studying in France in the 1950s pinpointed Cambodia's dysfunctional experience with foreign influences in the Cambodian economy (Samphan, 1959). Their bottom line, which led to the "moral objectives" of the Khmer Rouge, was one of "repurification" of Cambodian society. The results are historic. Burundi and Rwanda's age-old conflicts, for example, can hardly be understood using any one analytic model. Instead, the conflict seems ageless, based on ethnicity, a sense of partiality on the part of some, and a seeming belief in mission-endowed destiny to eliminate one group by the other which defies any one definition. Other variables under this broad definition must take precedence if we are to find a way to resolution of that conflict. No one conflict lends itself to a simple or "rational" model of conflict resolution.

SOLVING CONFLICT: A U.S. ROLE FOR THE FUTURE The United States is destined to play a continuing role in defining smallscale conflict and searching for and institutionalizing models of conflict resolution. Peacemaking and peacekeeping will (and must) always be a part of U.S. thinking and action. Peacekeeping will more than likely accompany the solving of an armed conflict. While the United States has been involved in both peacekeeping and

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peacemaking since the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945, there is still an ongoing argument among U.S. government policy makers as a working policy is sought regarding the issue of U.S. participation. No country can afford to take on the role of peacemaker or peacekeeper as a unitary actor. Nations must cooperate with each other in solving small-scale conflicts. While not endorsing Woodrow Wilson's "collective security" concept (Kissinger, 1994), it is clear that nations must see their individual interests threatened by small-scale conflict and see collective action as a practical panacea for solving conflict. A conflict resolution role by the United Nations with the United States in the lead is essential. The efficacy of the U.N. in the future is still debated. It has been notably beneficial in Angola, Cambodia, South Africa, the former Yugoslav Federation, and Somalia, to name just a few places where the U.N. as peacekeeper has worked to the advantage of the members of the world body. U.N. development projects in a number of countries have helped to "jump start" economies at the local level. The work of the U.N. in the Middle East is legendary. U.N. maintenance of the peace in Cyprus has been so successful that its presence has almost gone unnoticed. It is still there, relieving the Permanent Five (P-5) members and the other Security Council members from having to worry overmuch about conflict resolution in Cyprus for the present. Recounting these U.N. actions brings to mind its indispensability in any conflict-resolution policy for the United States. Were there no U.N., we would have to invent it in some manner. Even though the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the League of Nations following World War I, Wilson's "14th Point" has been given currency by every president since then to some extent. The degree and methodology are what matter now, and has been the debating issue among Americans since 1945. U.S. support and continued use of the U.N. in the interest of peace is essential for a minimal conflict situation. The President and Congress have agreed to settle the U.N. dues question; quickly, one hopes. The United States must not only pay its dues, it is essential that the primary leadership role in searching for a way to solve and eliminate small-scale conflicts come from the United States, assisted by its Permanent Five colleagues in the U.N. Security Council. U.N. peacemaking using the Gulf War model in a less macro way is just as necessary today as it was then. This is not to say that the United States must always take the lead. But the influence of the United States with the collective influence of the P-5 must always be there such that funding, equipment, and strategy are used for the greater consideration of the global good. During my tenure as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the debate over the question of U.S. leadership in extensive peacemaking operations arose often. The reasons were, and still are, varied. The overriding cause of such questioning dwelt mainly on "trust" of the so-called unstated motives of the United States. The question, "What's in it for a P-5 power?" can only be answered in a collective sense; that is, the overriding interest of all mem-

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ber nations is that it is better to solve conflicts of any kind quickly and promote enhancement of building tactics to move beyond the possibility of "armed struggle" as a panacea. Only the economically well-off nations can afford to do a "leadership thing." Regional participation for small-scale conflict resolution is not only essential, it is already ongoing to a greater or lesser degree, a la the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) for example. A tentative model (from among others) is the ongoing United Statesled peacekeeping training efforts directed toward African troops in Senegal and Uganda, for example. This effort might be employed on a wider scale. The P-5 military committee, had it been enacted as envisioned by Chapter VII of the Charter, might have pursued just such an effort, but under the colors of the U.N. with training done by the most competent forces. The P-5 can do that and an emerging policy model should include this possibility with leadership by the United States as facilitator. Education as a conflict-resolution tool fits easily in a futuristic foreignpolicy plan for the United States. In November 1997, various interlocutors brought up related questions at the Barcelona conference, "Boundaries and Bridges in International Education." First, if education is of any import to a nation, it is essential to the makeup of foreign policy. When the U.S. land grant college idea was first mooted it was based on the need to provide skills and human resources where needed and when needed. Accordingly, one can easily see some form of land grant model or theory applied to a policy which targets Africa, for example, with a hard-core objective to impact education of several groups: • Consumers, who must meet the needs of a nation on the move to stability and are interested in removing the blockage occasioned by the inability to make this mode work. • Teachers, who are imparting skills to an uneducated elite who need them to enable participation in country institutions and the global economy. • Neighbors, who help hold the society together. • Public universities, that have an enormous role to play in the inclusion of conflict resolution in interdisciplinary studies. • Nongovernmental organizations, human rights groups, foreign-policy debating organizations (the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association), and others, which have an unending role that should be tapped by foreign-policy developers. TRADE AND INVESTMENT: AN ENHANCEMENT OF MULTITIERED ECONOMIC SATISFACTION Trade and economic development go hand in hand. They tap the human potential to prevent small-scale conflicts and promote long-lasting resolutions.

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Zoellick (1996), in discussing China-U.S. relations, notes the value of trade as a change agent in enhancing societal change. He argues that U.S.-China relations must rest on well-laid out plans and programs, a part of which calls for a relationship with built-in conflict resolution models because the nature of the respective national interests demands that problems arising be solved quickly. The AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) is a useful model as nations search for methods for solving small-scale conflicts. The New World Trade Organization (NWTO), the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are theoretically building blocks to stable societies. Conflict resolution can result from the efforts of the APEC, NAFTA, FTAA, and the new World Trade Organization (WTO). U.S. foreign policy seems to embrace trade as a concept of economic development for emerging societies but, more to the point, as a conflict-resolution methodology. Trade and development present one of the few paths to multilateralism as a way to peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation. Taken a step further, it is a natural accompaniment to conflict resolution. SMALL-SCALE CONFLICTS The view that there is not likely to be a worldwide conflict anytime soon is accompanied by an increasing likelihood that small-scale armed conflicts will escalate and continue for an indefinite period. One might argue that if contained they will dissipate, or that when people get tired of fighting, they will stop. If this theory were adopted en toto, causes leading to conflict would be overlooked later. The challenge to conventional diplomacy in the coming era is to be more unconventional in developing a methodology for managing foreign policy. The chances for such unconventionality will increase and become more demanding as small-scale armed conflicts increase. Thus, conflict resolution would be a constant in foreign-policy making and foreign-policy management, among developing and developed nations alike. NEW ROLES FOR LARGE NATIONS The United States, China, Japan, India, Russia, and Germany are examples of great or near-great powers that must (in a national interest mode) recognize the dysfunctionalities that small-scale wars, hunger, refugees, terrorism, and pestilence impose on the longer-term well-being of developed and developing nations. A colleague on the Friends of Salvador Committee at the U.N. during my tenure as U.S. Permanent Representative told me, for example, that "in the end developed nations will not be able to keep refugees out of their countries if that is the only avenue open to them for an existence other than one mixed with hunger, disease, and war" (Mexico's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, personal communication, Spring 1992). We were discussing how to resolve conflict and eliminate root causes of conflict.

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AN APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION A discussion of this magnitude demands both practical and theoretical approaches to conflict resolution. "Justice as fairness," as articulated by John Rawls (1993, p. 5) would seem to apply here. Rawls observes, "Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all" (p. 291). Second, "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. And second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society" (p. 291). Rawls's concept of justice as fairness falls within a political context. No limitations appear in his text on where the political realism of justice as fairness applies. Accordingly, this discussion refers to his concept in a global context. It seems to impose a universality on any principle of conflict resolution which, if adhered to, ensures that the most developed nations see their continued development and good fortune intertwined with that of the least developed of nations. The concept of civil society requires analysis in approaching conflict resolution and examining the causes underlying conflict. Civil society presumes that peoples of a geographic and political entity have learned to live and work together under a set of rules covering politics, economics, and social stability. Kenneth Newton and Sheri Berman, in the March/April 1997 issue of the American Behavioral Scientist, reviewed civil society and social capital, both of which I consider essential to determining how and why conflicts occur. These must precede the application of conflict resolution. First, Kenneth Newton's (1997) discourse, "Social Capital and Democracy," highlights Alexis de Tocqueville's (1968) seminal study, Democracy in America, as a basis in part for his look at social capital as an essential in a "democracy." He sees de Tocqueville's argument that "voluntary associations" are an important source of social capital as overstated or out of date in 1997. Newton defines social capital as having a composition of "(a) norms and values, (b) networks, or (c) consequences" (p. 575). For this discussion, I am interested in the norms and values part, and Newton's observation, "According to this approach, social capital is a subjunctive phenomenon composed of a range of values and attitudes of citizens that influence or determine how they relate to each other" (pp. 575-576). Organizations should be analyzed closely in a conflictresolution context or in analyzing why conflicts occur. In this sense, Newton observes, "Social capital is important because it constitutes a force that helps to bind society together by transforming individuals from self-seeking and egocentric calculators, with little social conscience or sense of mutual obligation, into members of a community with shared interests [italics added], shared assumptions about social relations, and a sense of the common good [italics added]" (p. 576).

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Emphasis here is on the "common good." How to encourage participants in a struggle—armed, economic, or social—to agree to accept a paradigm or model which promises a common good is here the more important point. Sheri Berman's "Civil Society and Political Institutionalization" (1997) offers a useful analysis of the concepts embodied in a "civil society" construct from de Tocqueville to the present. The author argues that civil society elements must go hand in hand with an analysis of political institutions. In the case of conflict it is important to look at Berman's analysis of "mass society and neo-Tocquevillian theories" (p. 563), especially Kornhauser's (I960) The Politics of Mass Society based in part on de Tocqueville's statement, "If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased" (p.563). Berman (1997) says there are problems with this approach, such as groupings leading to the creation of radical and undemocratic schisms. The value in groupings though is the more positive and growth-enhancing elements of crossfertilization and sharing of information on the values associated with a common-good concept. This discussion is intended to highlight the importance of broad behavioral inputs into conflict-resolution mechanisms. DIPLOMACY AND DISPUTES Disputes always have a beginning—sometimes going back for hundreds of years. A conflict-resolution theoretician will have more success if the premise includes an understanding of why, where, and when disputes begin. Protagonists always have a rational view of the dispute in their own minds and never forget the rules of civil society. Sun Tzu (1963) was said to see unity as an essential requirement of victorious war. In order for this to be obtained, a government must be devoted to "the people's welfare," and not to oppression. Thus, benevolence andrighteousnesswere the bases of Sun Tzu's theories (p. 39). Conflict involves a clash of ideas, and not understanding ground rules and coveting something which belongs to someone else now but may have belonged to yet someone else earlier. Defining values, wishes, and ideas helps to evolve a solution. However, one of a set of issues cannot, in itself, provide for a solution. Rawls (1993) and Sun Tzu (1963) both clearly suggest a "revolution of ideas" in solving such problems. As an example, as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, one of the immediate problems I faced was the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation. Almost every problem associated with Yugoslavia seemed to defy a sense of logic. There was no policy paper which described the history of the conflict, nor did the corporate knowledge of the Security Council suggest that it understood the total nature of this problem. An historical review of the conflict, where it began, and what starts and stops occurred along the way to the current breakup was undertaken. The protagonists were analyzed: what

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their values were, how they arrived at this sense of values, and what each protagonist wanted to see in the end or thought they wanted to see. We also looked to what ends they were willing to go to achieve these values. My first speech in the General Assembly welcomed the new nations of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the world body. A concurrent call to Serbia and Montenegro to seek membership reflecting the new geopolitical reality was also issued. Within the context of the historical nature of this conflict, it was not surprising that Serbia refused to concede that Yugoslavia had disappeared and that the U.N. seat occupied by Yugoslavia did not remain with Serbia. This brought other questions to the table in light of this new reality: (1) Who were the players in 1300? (2) What was the point in time when the conflict really began? (3) When did religion become interactive with the political scenes? (4) What ideological formations attached themselves? (5) When might specific individuals have made a difference (plus or minus) along the way? (6) What motivated such individuals? (7) What were the escalating factors along the path to the current conflict? (8) When did the conflict become ideological, if it did? (9) When did it become a conflict where a prevalent solution was seen to be ethnic cleansing? (10) Were there periods of peaceful coexistence between 1300 and the advent of Marshal Tito? (11) If so, when and how did they come about? (12) Were there lost opportunities to provide a resolution to the conflict? In another level of analysis, we determined or asked (13) Who were the contenders, their arguments, and their issues, and (14) What transformations took place at various intervals along the way? Finally, the question of the national interests of the United States was debated heavily. The Yugoslav tragedy in historical context serves as an analytic tool and a comparative element as interested nations seek to take measures to solve smallscale conflicts, prevent them, and affect peacemaking and peacekeeping through the larger context of conflict resolution. What roles other nations play in conflict resolution is key. Appropriate to any conflict situation is to decide what nations can make a difference and when, such as the United States brokering the Dayton Accords. The Yugoslav situation reminds that, as Schlesinger (1997) notes, wars will still disturb the tenor of life, "but where in the past they generally arose from aggression across national frontiers, the wars of the 21st century will more likely be between ethnic, religious, ideological, or tribal factions within the same country" (p. 12). Schlesinger (1997) observes that such wars will be more difficult to define and/or control. But his analysis serves as a reminder that if the benchmarks in the Yugoslavian drama had been seized on during its history, they might have made a difference. The problem was that no nation interested in small-scale armed conflict had at its disposal a conflict-resolution model which would have pointed out the convenient point along the path when the conflict could have been solved or averted. Nor was there a consensus among nations close to the conflict that it should have been tackled until it became an armed conflict—out of control.

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OTHER RELEVANT EXPERIENCES During my tenure as Ambassador to South Africa, conflict resolution became the most important tool of strategic policy planning. In this context, James Michener's The Covenant (1980) provided a historical overview of that country going back to 1652, in the case of all contenders. It became one of the central elements of the American Embassy's conflict-resolution plans and of planning to make the Embassy a change agent. Conflict resolution in U.S. South Africa foreign policy in 1986 was aimed at long-term political dissolution and power transfer, peacemaking, peacekeeping (among the groups according to racial breakdown), and psychological empowerment. The universe covered all South African groups, regardless of racial identification. Thus, knowledge of the history of the people of South Africa down to the last detail (where possible) was essential. It became clear that the breakout of Black politics, Afrikaner politics, Indian politics, Colored politics, and English-speaking politics would be addressed separately as well as collectively. The historical starting date was 1652, the date of Dutch arrival at the Cape. Key questions immediately suggested themselves. Was there a recognized group of people who had control of the land now known as South Africa when the first Dutch people arrived on the Cape? Who were the contenders for the land? Were there rightful contenders in an historical context? Michener (1980) notes that the new people from Europe, led by the Dutch but also composed of Germans and some French, made up this new people from Europe called the Boers and,finally,the Afrikaners. On the other hand, the Black people on the march from the north also laid claim. In discussions among early students of that multiteneted conflict, some said especially the Heerde XVII or the Dutch East Indies Company had a claim on the Cape, and black people everything north. The Heerde XVII actually enacted laws enforcing this view. Another question asked what transformations took place in each stage of the conflict leading to the current South Africa situation. In 1910, South Africa became, in essence, a modern geopolitical state. The British fought the Boer War for control of the land and to extend its mercantilist concepts to all of the land known as South Africa. The Boers, on the other hand, had early on developed the concept of a "promised" land for the "volkV The Boers gave up all sense of being Europeans in favor of a developing Africanness such that they became known as the white tribe of Africa. The Blacks, on the other hand, laid claim to a land rich with diamonds, gold, coal, and oil, and friendly to agriculture. Along the historical way, there was a sense of peaceful coexistence at times, but clearly the Afrikaners were of the opinion that they were God's chosen disciples destined to spread the word to the unenlightened. This gave cause for the Afrikaners to have something called a "greater good" in both a political and a religious sense. They never recognized a distinction between politicalness and religiousness. One supported the other. Both supported the Afrikaner volk.

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It then seemed that in developing a warlike strategy designed to crack the wall of apartheid and bring the disenfranchised into the political, social, and economic landscape without a civil or race war, a study of South African history in as much detail as humanly possible within the time constraints was important. Understanding the protagonists, real and imagined, plus the values within each group was crucial. Accordingly, the overall strategy for conflict resolution in South Africa developed along the following lines, based in part on Sun Tzu's (1963, p. 39) basis for conflict resolution: • Understanding the land. • It was a land twice promised. • Each self-appointed receptor of the land saw it in a context understood only by them. • Religion on the part of the Dutch played an essential part, and religion and politics was seen as one and the same. • The Blacks developed their own concepts of a greater good, resulting in the manifesto of the African National Congress, promulgated in 1911. • The Coloreds, Asians, and English speakers were treated separately by first the English, and later the Afrikaners. Eventually, a strategy developed, in part, as follows: • The concept of change agent would be applied in developing and administering the totality of U.S. foreign policy in South Africa. • The United States had to play an activist role in applying a change-agent strategy if change was to take place without a civil or race war being fought. • South Africa would be well on the way to solving the conflict if the Afrikaners saw their salvation through the Blacks, and if the Blacks saw their greater escalation economically and politically in cooperation with the more economically developed Afrikaners, English speakers, Coloreds, and Asians. • One person-one vote was an urgent initial step. Or put another way, all peoples of South Africa, as in any other nation under the concept of justice as fairness, had the right to decide how they wanted to be governed. • Political parties must be unbanned and political prisoners released, including the most famous in the world—Nelson Mandela. • Prevent capital outflow by enlisting the business community as a change agent, Afrikaner, English, and otherwise. • Develop and sell a model of capitalism, hastily called "community capitalism." We came to this conclusion as we sought to convince the "young comrades" that if they wanted to participate in a growth country they would have to see a place for capitalism even though they had branded it as "the enemy of the people." Karl Beck (Political Officer covering Black politics for the American Embassy in 1986) and I tried out the community capitalism concept on Govan Mbeki shortly after his release from Pollsmoor Prison in 1987.1 called on Mr. Mbeki (G. Mbeki, personal

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communication, early 1988) in his home in Welcome near Port Elizabeth in the Cape Province. During the discussion, a nationalization scheme was discussed should the ANC assume power. When we noted that nationalization of industries would more than likely result in a crippling flight of capital, Mbeki thought it impossible that the ANC could come to power and not "do something." We agreed that community capitalism defined along the following lines might work as a concept among the rank and file: 1. Industry must first of all make a profit from the enterprise in the community where it is located. 2. Industry must acknowledge that it is in part successful because it is supported by the community, and because it draws its workforce and customers in part from the community it accordingly owes support to the community. 3. When industry makes a profit, it is obligated, within agreed-upon guidelines, to leave some of the profit in the community. Then, industry and community become partners (community to be defined jointly by the enterprise and the community leaders). 4. Profit left in the community must be put to use in support of the betterment of the community, decided on by a board of community advisors. We agreed that the board of advisors would be composed of representatives of the industry and the community, including an even distribution of age, gender, and race groups where appropriate. 5. Profits given to the community were to be used for projects that enhance education (old and young), sewer systems, and health delivery systems, among several possibilities. The project list should be agreed on by the community and a kind of "self-help" committee of the community. Cambodia presented a different conflict-resolution problem for the United Nations and for those nations working under the banner of the U.N. to bring peace to Cambodia in the 1990s the following was relevant: • There was the Khmer influence in an historical context, existing before the French arrived in the mid-1800s. • It was crucial that those involved understand the juxtaposition of these two influences and results. • Understanding the monarchy and attendant royalists was essential. • World War II and its effect on all elements came into play. In modern times, the revolutionary faction known as the Khmer Rouge resulted in part from a group of Cambodian modern-day students studying in Paris. They sought to answer the basic question, "How can a society be turned right after going wrong?" The basic theory was that such a society needed to be turned upside down so that reconstructing it would start with the basic elements of agriculture (Samphan, 1959). • Part of that strategy required an emptying of the cities so that the evil influences contained therein would, in fact, be destroyed. • When destroyed, the cities would be reconstructed by people who were purified through allying themselves with a rural agrarian style.

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• We noted that the Vietnam influence also played a role. • It was important to review Cambodia's relationship with Vietnam since the 1860s. • The Vietnam influence also meant the Khmer sought to isolate itself from the influences of a people which it considered to be inferior. • In the final analysis, the decision of the peacemakers, those nations involved in the Paris Peace Accords, would attempt to set up a win-win situation with shared power amongst the two basic factions and a place for the Khmer Rouge if they wanted to play the game. • The strategy was to influence the dissolution of the Khmer Rouge by attempting to attract them to the two recognized factions or defections from the Khmer Rouge. • The Khmer Rouge set themselves up in the countryside and, though they signed the accords and agreed to "stack arms," it was only a partial adherence. • His Royal Highness, Prince Norodhom Sihanouk, who had been king at one time and given it up, had been asked to take on the role of king once more as a rallying point for all elements in Cambodia. In the role of Ambassador to the United Nations, I visited Cambodia and participated in a gathering aimed at creating a governing structure. His Royal Highness Prince Norodham Sihanouk and U.N. Special Representative Arakashi co-chaired the gathering with soon-to-be Co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen and His Royal Highness Prince Norodhom Rannarith, with participation by Khmer Rouge theoretician Khieu Samphan. The meeting took place in Siem Riep, location of Angor Wat There were dramatic moments—funny and serious—during this two-day meeting. In effect, though, it was successful because a machinery of government organization for Cambodia resulted. Some of the elements which were important to peacemaking and peacekeeping are as follows: • Most important, a sense of government with a sense and theory of justice. • How could the participants establish a sense of justice in the context of conflict resolution and in the face of an overwhelming manifestation of genocide resulting in uncountable numbers of people being killed outright or dying as a result of the deprivation encountered during the great march back to the rural areas? • As the reader will note, as of 1998 the Cambodian situation has not been solved, has flared again, and presents itself as a situation similar to that in Bosnia. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A DIPLOMATIC TOOL? Conflict resolution as a diplomatic tool for modem use demands a definition which takes into account the concepts needed for solving the conflict along agreed-upon issues. In the experiences cited, conflict resolution means peaceful settlement of disputes. It demands an understanding of the beginning of disputes, how such disputes escalate, and opportunities for de-escalation. Conflict resolution looks at factors which contribute to the escalation of a

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conflict and allows participants to develop their own concept of intervention and resolution. A conflict-resolution model defines the points of intervention and the points which seem to suggest resolution. Conflict resolution demands an understanding of the concept of constitution building, a theory of justice, a civil society, social capital, and institution building. Frank Sherwood's (1973) framework for institution building is appropriate in building a conflict-resolution model. Referring to the seminal authority on institution building, Philip Selznick, Sherwood quotes from Selznick (1957): "An 'institution' . . . is more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures—a responsive, adaptive organism" (p. 34). We suggest institution building as a part of a conflict-resolution peacekeeping model, because that is what must eventually take place as alternatives to conflict are sought. Such objectives are far from easy. Experience has shown that the facilitator must ensure that a continuum is in effect looking to what Sherwood (1973) terms "infuse . . . with value" (p. 35) accepted by the customers—that is, the protagonists or citizens as the case may be. How can the diplomat use conflict resolution as a constant as opposed to a special intervention called for only when trouble arises? Conflict can be approached before it happens. The diplomat can and should use this tool constantly in the same sense as making a political report or other diplomatic reports. All reporting and analyses, with very few exceptions, in an international sense, can and should be developed on a basis that a chance of conflict is always inherent. We should remember that while conflict is often thought of in the context of armed conflict, sometimes a matter of words can lead to dysfunctionalities in relations between, within, and among nations. It is essential that conflict resolution be a constant in evaluating reports which are to be read by managers and policy makers. In this sense, then, when providing analyses, regardless of whether trade, economic, social development, or politically related, it is important to develop them with the following in mind: • Is a conflict (hot or cold) ongoing? Does it affect this report? If there is an escalation of chances for a conflict, what measures can be taken to de-escalate this situation without suggesting overpowering military force? • Who can be a peacemaker and peacekeeper in the context of conflict resolution? • What transformations appear to have taken place? • What periods of transformation have taken place? • What understandings of what has taken place suggest themselves? • Are there opportunities for intervention now, before an imminent conflict takes place? • A conflict-resolution model must undergo constant sociological transformations in the context of shifting "sands." Conflict resolution operates, for example, hand in hand with economic development, trade, research and development, the environment, clean water, medicines, health delivery, and/or the de-escalation of the rise in eradicable diseases. All are constants, and all are inescapable.

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THE INCLUSION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RESOLUTION PROCESS I have discussed the role of the United Nations and related organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity and the Organization of American States. It is now clear that nongovernmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ecumenical groups, and environmental activists, plus educational, business, and health delivery organizations will have to take on a considerable role in conflict resolution. The concept of trust, a moral base, and a grassroots familiarity with the participants in a conflict make it mandatory that these organizations be called on often. THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF CONFLICTS AND SETTLEMENTS Some constants appear in conflicts which, if looked at in context, might have prevented a particular conflict. However, this review has show that no two conflicts are exactly the same and no one conflict will necessarily lend itself to the same kind of conflict resolution as the last one. However, there are some constants which are always present: • Religion and how it is seen by possible protagonists. • Political differences among several groups. • Ethnic differences, and an unwritten (or written) commitment to ethnic cleansing. • Increasing numbers of refugees. • Hunger and bad health delivery systems.

THE CONCEPT OF SETTLEMENT Settlement must always be looked at as an initial part of the conflict-resolution process and subsequent peacekeeping steps. An overall objective beyond the amorphous concept of resolving the conflict is required. The settlement involves give and take, understanding the values of protagonists, understanding who the protagonists are, and understanding such often-forgotten elements as racial divides and religious conflicts (the understanding of one set of religious values as opposed to another). More important, the concept of a theory of justice or of justice as fairness must always be included. An earlier reference was made to Rawls's (1993) theory of justice, but Reinhold Niebuhr's (1960) concept of man's ability to grant a kind of universal justice in his The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness is worth consideration. Niebuhr notes, "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" (p. xii). Niebuhr's reference to universalism is based on

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a moral concept, and comparing it with the current era's "new force of universality . . . achieved by a technical civilization" (p. 154). In spite of the title of his work, The Art of War, Sun Tzu (1963) never lost sight of a sense of justice. In this sense he thought, "A government should not mobilize an army out of anger, military leaders should not provoke war out of wrath. Act when it is beneficial, desist if it is not" (p. 166). Finally, conflict resolution must highlight averting further armed conflict. Stacking arms, so to speak, is no guarantee of a cessation of conflict. A set of complex issues attach themselves to a settlement which must be attended constantly until the institutions are sufficiently solidified to ensure success. A government structure ensuring a theory of justice, social capital, a sense of representation, and a promise of buying into the world community at large will provide the basis for continuous hearings, giving all participants a feeling that fairness is at play. REFERENCES Berman, S. (1997). Civil society and political institutionalization. American Behav ioral Scientist, 40, 562-574. de Tocqueville, A. (1968). Democracy in America. London: Fontana. Kissinger, H. A. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kornhauser, P. (1960). The politics of mass society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Michener, J. (1980). The covenant. New York: Random House. Newton, K. (1997). Social capital and democracy. American Behavioral Scientist, 4 575-586. Niebuhr, R. (1960). The children of light and the children of darkness. New Yor Charles Scribner & Sons. Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Pres Samphan, K. (1959). The economy of Cambodia and its problems with industrial tion. Paris: University of Paris Press. Schlesinger, A., Jr. (1997). Has democracy a future? Foreign Affairs, 76, 2-12 Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson. Sherwood, F. (1973). Problems on institution building in the bureaucratic system: One experience. In P. C. Buchanan (Ed.), An approach to executive develo ment in government: The Federal Executive Institute experience (pp. 21 Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration. Sun Tzu. (1963). The art of war. London: Oxford University Press Zoellick, R. B. (1996). China: What engagement should mean. The National Intere 46, 13-22.

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CHAPTER 5

Cultural and Ethnic Issues of Conflict and Peacekeeping Paul R. Kimmel

CURRENT DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS Since 1989, there has been a shift in the genesis of organized violence from national states toward groupings of peoples that I will call "cultural states." Whereas the analysis of national wars is the domain of political scientists and specialists in international relations, the analysis of cultural wars is more suited to the theories and perspectives of psychologists and sociologists. The emergence of cultural states is related to a decline in the power of many national states, both internally (the loss of patriotism) and externally (the breakdown of international relations) (Fukuyama, 1995). As a national state is superseded by cultural movements of peoples whose identities are anchored in existential feelings, called "primordial sentiments" (Geertz, 1973), the individual's sense of being a state citizen (civic identity) diminishes (Kaplan, 1994). Subgroups of peoples dedicated to cultural identities surface with cultural imageries that idealize their group and demonize others. The current situations in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Sudan exemplify the growing resurgence of political structures and identities based on the primordial sentiments of ethnicity, language, race, tradition, religion, and region, and the primal violence that follows. Political and economic wars are becoming less frequent, whereas cultural and ethnic wars are multiplying (Gottleib, 1993). In battles among cultural

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states, the organized, technologically managed warfare of national states has been replaced by primal violence (Emminghaus, Kimmel, & Stewart, 1997). Violent conflicts involving peoples who believe they are fighting for the survival of their way of life are more personal and inhumane than wars for economic or political advantage fought by nation states. Because the enemy is seen as totally inhuman and maximally threatening, there are fewer rules and standards regarding the wounded, captured, and civilians in cultural conflicts than there are in international wars. There is less likelihood of a cease-fire, truce, or armistice in a cultural conflict. There are many more attacks on noncombatants, including massacre, torture, rape, starvation, and incarceration (Suedfeld, 1989). Cultural conflicts lead to struggles that demand genocide, fights to the finish, ethnic cleansing, and unconditional surrenders. They are especially cruel and vicious and have long-term repercussions. CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION AND ETHNOCENTRISM The social actualities of language, ethnicity, customs and traditions, religion, race, and region evoke existential feelings or emotions called primordial sentiments (see Shils, 1957) during each individual's enculturation. They are the basis for social connections called "primordial bonds." Associations based on primordial bonds create a consciousness of kind that separates us from those who are different. Sumner (1906) coined the term ethnocentrism to describe the acceptance of those who are culturally like oneself and the rejection of those who are different. As individuals are socialized, their judgments reflect the primordial sentiments of their people. Other cultures and their primordial sentiments serve to define the limits of one's own cultural group. In addition to learning that there are differences between one's own cultural group and other cultural groups, children also learn that the standards of their people are natural and better than other peoples' standards; that they have superior ways of handling the tasks of human existence. This growing sense of in-group superiority and out-group inferiority is ethnocentrism. All humans go through the same processes of enculturation, albeit with very different emphases and content. Thus, the roots of identity in everyone are chronologically and historically primordial (Stewart, 1987). As Volkan (1992) points out, "For centuries, neighboring tribes had only each other to interact with, due to their natural boundaries. Neighboring groups had to compete for territory, food, and physical goods, for their very survival. Eventually this primitive level of competition assumed more psychological implications. Physical essentials . . . evolved from being tokens of survival to becoming large group symbols that embodied an ethnic group's self-esteem and glory" (p. 5). Peoples organized around primordial sentiments—that is, groups emphasizing their ethnicity, language, race, tradition, religion, and/or region—have

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the personal sense that their values, norms, and systems of thought are right and sensible and those of others are wrong and illogical. The bridge between the social culture and the individual personality is the identification process. It is this process that binds people together as cohesive groups and peoples. The primal bonds of an ethnocentric association creates strong fellow feeling that provide security, familiarity, and order. There are other, less ethnocentric possibilities for individual identity formation beyond one's primordial roots, of course, but the primordial groupings of family and local community come first and are strongest in the individual's enculturation. Primordial sentiments' pervasive influence on the individual is difficult to detect, since they generate an internal sense of normality (as, for example, in the use of one's native language). The salience and characteristics of cultural identification vary with the social and psychological situations of cultural groups. Primordial bonds and sentiments are not in themselves good or bad, but they are the source of constructive (patriotic, humanitarian) and destructive (nativistic, xenophobic) behaviors with regard to others. When a people feel secure and content, there is less tendency to demonize and attack other cultural groups. Their civic activities include programs designed to improve and enhance the life conditions of the entire populace according to the dominant social norms (e.g., the American dream). Rather than being preoccupied with the dangers and uncertainties of the present and the ills and injustices of the past, peoples with a positive future based on a satisfactory present within their national state can work together toward political and economic goals and visions. This optimistic point of view allows them to tolerate and perhaps appreciate a wide range of cultural differences in their society and the world. Cultural identification serves a positive social function in such hopeful civic states. However, when a people's physical or psychological security is severely threatened, their primordial sentiments can be aroused against cultural differences so that cultural identification serves a negative social function: the promotion of their group values, norms, and patterns of thought at the expense of those of other groups. When peoples perceive themselves to be threatened, there is a tendency to become more ethnocentric and to seek an enemy as the focus of their fears and anger. Peoples whose identities depends on less flexible primordial sentiments rather than on more adaptable civic actualities of the national state are less able to deal with rapidly changing economic and political conditions. In difficult times, political and ethnic leaders can incite these peoples to become more frightened, angry, defensive, and intent on getting even. There are many well-known processes that lead to violence, usually against old enemies, in such situations. These include dehumanization, scapegoating, negative stereotyping, fundamental and ultimate attribution errors, propaganda, group think, censorship, black and white images, and moral superiority.

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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND CONCEPTIONS OF PEACE Conflict is inevitable in human groups and societies and is often constructive. Western social scientists have found that well-developed peace processes and training programs can make conflicts more conscious and productive (Black & Avruch, 1989). There are three conceptually distinct approaches to stopping violence and managing conflicts: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. These concepts were first described by Galtung (1976) and elaborated by Pease (1987). Table 5.1 presents the basic elements of these three different approaches to conflict management. Table 5.1 A Model for Describing Different Approaches to Peace

GOALS

PEACEKEEPING PEACEMAKING Contain violence Settle differences

PEACEBUILDING Create community, heal traumatized

PROCESSES

Separation of foes Negotiation

Collaboration

CONTROLS

External force

Rules, third parties

Internal rewards

GROUPINGS

Territorial

Legal, contractual

Relationships

DISPUTES

Shelved

Managed

Resolved (forgiveness, reconciliation)

Tolerance

Understanding

RELATIONSHIPS Antagonists

Allies

Friends

LEARNING

Systemic,

Intercultural,

conceptual

processual

AWARENESS

Ethnocentrism

Little

TIME FRAMES

Immediate, past

Near future

Long term

DECISIONS

Power based

Compromises

Consensus, common ground

OUTCOMES

Zones, prisons

Contracts, treaties

Understanding, consideration

Vigilance

Trust, respect

KEY REACTIONS Fear

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According to Galtung (1976), the traditional peacekeeping approach views peace as a somewhat negative concept, the controlled absence of violent conflict between the inevitable wars of history. Conflict management is peace enforcement: the application of military force to separate combatants and restore the status quo when there have been breaches of peace (Hoffman, 1984; Wurmser & Dyke, 1993). Though the use of peace enforcement is required when violent conflict is occurring, I am personally wary of the use of force. Violence is malignant. It can corrupt those using it and those that it is used against. It fosters revenge, vengeance, and other negative emotional states in the victimized and aggression and dehumanization in the victimizers (Staub, 1990). It can arouse and reinforce negative cultural identities and promote ethnocentrism. A more positive conception of peace involves peacemaking. Peacemaking programs are designed to bring potential and former combatants together to manage their differences through negotiation, mediation, and conciliation. Lawyers, diplomats, and social scientists who are trained as mediators believe that with training and assistance people can work through their problems, reach compromises, and manage their conflicts more constructively (Burton, 1987; Cantril, 1961; Etheridge, 1987). The most proactive view of peace is that of the peacebuilders. Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists favoring peacebuilding have as their goal the creative resolution of conflicts without any use of force or coercion (Wagner & Christie, 1994). Conflict management depends upon building and maintaining personal relationships and organizations that promote understanding and collaboration among a variety of individuals and groups. Old enmities are addressed and reconciled through active programs in forgiveness and reconciliation (Feldman, 1991; Njeri, 1993; Volkan, 1991). In my opinion, the peacebuilding approach has the most promise for managing current and future cultural conflicts productively (Kimmel, 1984,1985,1989,1992,1994). Peacebuilding reinforces positive cultural identities and promotes cultural understanding. TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING Traditional peacekeeping has been epitomized by the separation of combatants (Galtung, 1976), analogous to a quarantine during an epidemic (see Table 5.1). In today's world, traditional international peacekeeping usually involves the United Nations peacekeeping forces (see the U.N. home page on the World Wide Web for a listing of past and current U.N. peacekeeping operations, http://www.un.org). However, traditional peacekeeping by U.N. forces has expanded and changed its missions. Examples of recent peacekeeping activities and locations include patrolling cease-fire lines (Cyprus), protecting humanitarian relief shipments (Rwanda and Somalia), demobilizing troops (Bosnia), disarming militias (Somalia), organizing and supervising elections (Cambodia), instilling respect for human rights in police, soldiers,

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and government officials (Central Africa), and even functioning as surrogate governments (El Salvador). Intervention in the form of peace enforcement may precede these peacekeeping activities. The timing and procedures used in these expanded peacekeeping missions involve cultural considerations. These considerations are particularly important in the case of violent conflicts among cultural states (Montville, 1990). Today's peacekeeping missions provide intercultural challenges for peacekeepers. Because the U.N. forces come from different countries and are working in a nonfamiliar environment, culture shock and cultural misunderstandings are inevitable. Communication is a constant challenge in any intercultural endeavor; more so under the stress of violent conflict or its aftermath among cultural states. Peacekeepers are not always welcome in the wake of peaceenforcement programs, as the current situation in Bosnia vividly illustrates. Bureaucratic confusion adds to the difficulties. Peacekeepers often complain of tedium, boredom, and a lack of privacy in the field. They suffer from loneliness, isolation, and intimidation. Differences and inconsistencies in organization and training among multicultural peacekeeping forces creates pay and privilege differences and bias among some contingents toward host populations (Segal & Gravino, 1985). Any past political and economic alliances between the nations of the peacekeepers and those of the combatants further complicate matters, as expectations about friends and enemies come into play. Though the great majority of peacekeeping activities have been free of conspicuous difficulties, newspaper reporters have documented charges of sexual harassment, graft, torture, and murder involving some peacekeeping troops in Cambodia and Somalia, allegations of waste from officials in some countries hosting peacekeepers in Africa, and assertions of conflicting loyalties among some U.N. troops and national authorities in Bosnia (Bates, 1997; Fisher & Wilson-Smith, 1997; Meisler, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). The degree of cultural identification and ethnocentrism among the peacekeepers is a critical factor that affects all of these problems. The risk of violent confrontations between peacekeepers and combatants and among combatants is increased when trust and communication break down and cultural differences are emphasized. Peacekeepers need training in cultural awareness to help them, not only with the combatants, but also with local customs, meaningful contacts with citizens and other peacekeepers, and being good role models. Without such training, the peacekeepers' own primordial sentiments and ethnocentrism often are aroused, making them part of the problem rather than part of the solution. TRAINING IN CULTURAL AWARENESS Since we are not likely to see a single, dedicated U.N. peacekeeping force in the near future, interoperability of programs is a key concern (Williamson, 1989). Such interoperability requires training programs in cultural awareness

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and intercultural communication. During this training, peacekeepers would learn how their cultural experiences with and feelings about conflict will impact their work. Current and past problems faced by peacekeepers on their assigned mission would be specifically addressed. Also, knowledge of all the different parties' beliefs regarding conflict and peace are crucial to such training. Especially important is information on the primordial sentiments that have been aroused in each party to the conflict. Cultural awareness training must be adapted to the existing levels of awareness of the trainees (Bennett, 1986; Kimmel, 1994). For those trainees who begin at the ethnocentric level of awareness, the main goal of the initial training is to provide a better understanding of cultural differences and their implications for their own behavior. For these trainees, the function of the training is to make more tangible the idea of cultural differences, with an emphasis on the relativity of some of their own values and assumptions. As Stewart, Danielian, and Foster (1969) put it, "The primary intention of such an approach would be to increase his [sic] awareness of the possible limitations of his own cultural frame of reference and of the possibility of alternative ways of perceiving a situation" (p. 44). For trainees with more cultural experience and knowledge of cultural differences, it is possible to illuminate some of their values and assumptions and to improve their skills in intercultural communication. I have found a model of intercultural perception and reasoning that Edmund Glenn (1981) and I developed to be very helpful in working with such trainees (see Kohls, 1977, 1987; Kimmel, 1995a). Using this model, the trainer can summarize and integrate discussions of individual and social growth as well as illustrating intercultural communication in face-to-face situations. Cultural awareness training would be conducted (1) in the countries from which the peacekeeping contingents are coming, (2) in a common location near the place of their mission, and (3) in the field as they carry out their duties as peacekeepers. Effective military training and a sense that the peacekeeping mission reflects national policy has been found to be related to more effective functioning in the field (Segal & Gravino, 1985). Successful completion of the first phase of training along with military training in the home countries would be a prerequisite for selection to certain peacekeeping forces and missions. Some trainees would be screened out of the peacekeeping force based on poor performance in this phase. Successful completion of the second, more intensive phase of cultural awareness training at a common location would be a prerequisite for assignment to certain positions or duties. More advanced trainees could be assigned to more challenging duties. Culture-specific information on critical aspects of the mission would be provided in the field for each individual peacekeeper during the third phase of the training, as needed for their successful performance. These training programs would be specifically designed to increase the level of cultural awareness of peacekeepers to go beyond their ethnocentric roots and primordial sentiments. The graduates of these programs would be

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better managers of the conflicts to which they are assigned and would help others in the field become more culturally aware. Cultural awareness training would give the peacekeepers a common orientation toward their mission, motivating them to become more involved with each other, nongovernmental organizations on the same mission, and local populations. Understanding that they are role models would encourage them to get better acquainted with other troops and the local populations. These new relationships and challenges would reduce the problems currently associated with U.N. peacekeeping missions. THE TRAINING DESIGN The technique that I have found most useful for improving cultural selfawareness and understanding is the culture contrast training exercise (DeMello, 1995; Kimmel, 1995a; Stewart, 1995; Stewart, Danielian, & Foster, 1969), in which trainees interact with role players who portray contrasting psychological views of culture. The role players' identities are constructed to contrast dramatically with relevant cultural values and assumptions of the trainees. Realistic scenarios are used to involve the trainees. Through lively discussions before and after the role plays, trainers can help trainees understand their normal reactions in intercultural meetings. By directly experiencing misperceptions and miscommunications, they become more aware of their own cultural backgrounds and their impact on others. Through repeated participation in these lifelike simulations, trainees also improve their skills in intercultural communication and conflict management. Rather than trying to correct or change the perceptions and behavior of their counterparts, they learn how to communicate their ideas and values in ways that are better understood and acted upon. The culture contrast training program for increasing cultural awareness has seven phases: (1) a reconstruction of each trainee's relevant cultural experiences by professional facilitators to elicit meaningful behaviors, perceptions, and emotions in context; (2) an analysis of these reconstructions by intercultural communication specialists familiar with the trainee's culture to isolate crucial primordial sentiments and to relate these to cultural values, assumptions, and thought patterns; (3) the construction of cultural values, assumptions, and thought patterns that contrast with those of the trainee, and of riveting scenarios designed to bring out these contrasts; (4) the training of a professional role player to portray the behaviors and perceptions of a representative of the contrast culture; (5) the facilitation of a simulation using the scenarios (step 3) and role player (step 4) with each trainee; (6) a discussion of the simulation using an edited videotape to illustrate and examine misperceptions and misunderstandings between the trainee and the role player; and (7) the facilitation of additional scenarios with videotape (repeating steps 5 and 6) to refine cultural self-awareness and improve intercultural communication skills.

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A key consideration, of course, is persuading the U.N. and contributing nations to develop and use cultural awareness training programs. Training programs for peacekeepers that are not familiar will be belittled by policy makers and trainees, even though special military courses in peacekeeping in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have been especially effective (Segal & Gravino, 1985). To create interest in cultural awareness training, it is necessary to lessen the allure of reactive and violent approaches to resolving conflicts and to tout preventative and nonviolent approaches. Opponents of peacekeeping must be convinced that it is possible to manage violent conflict nonviolently. Peacekeeping successes produced by effective cultural awareness training programs can generate the credibility for these programs that victory in battle has for the military or catching criminals has for the police. At its best, peacekeeping, like community-oriented policing, can serve a preventative function. For example, greater involvement in the communities of belligerents can inhibit terrorists or make them more obvious. Being on the street and interested in people leads to trust, whereas remaining detached in your bunker or camp may encourage terrorists. Culturally aware peacekeepers will become concerned neighbors who want their adopted communities to prosper. They will create social conditions that encourage and enable the belligerents to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding activities that avoid violence. UNESCO's Culture of Peace Program (Adams, 1995) is promoting the further development of peacekeeping activities within a more proactive model of peace and reconciliation. This program could support the kind of training I am proposing for peacekeepers as well as more extensive efforts in peacebuilding to resolve and prevent cultural conflicts. PEACEBUILDING The primal violence associated with destructive cultural conflicts not only shatters bodies, homes, and cities, it also decimates human relationships (Staub, 1996). The reestablishment of a civic culture after such conflicts requires new and innovative programs. Traditional international peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, as seen in recent U.N. activities, have not been effective during or after primal violence. It is difficult to undertake even the most limited missions using military forces without becoming snared in the dynamics of primal violence (witness Somalia). The continued salience of the primordial sentiments aroused during the violence makes relocation of refugees and communal activities prone to renewed violence. It has been found to be more productive for combatants to work jointly on the more technical and economic problems of rebuilding, letting the development of relationships and the refocusing of their cultural identities from primordial to civic follow from these less direct and more impersonal problem-solving efforts. Such peacebuilding activities can contribute to the

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construction of civic institutions and identities (Galtung, 1976; Kirnmel, 1992). Successful problem-solving groups intentionally avoid interpersonal issues in their initial meetings (Kelman, 1992). These meetings focus on technical concerns, while personal concerns are held in abeyance, so that conflicting cultural identifications are muted. Over time, successful interactions establish trust and greater understanding occurs as members become involved with common problems. The more individual group members come to understand and explain their interests, positions, and relationships to each other, the greater their shared vision of a desirable future (Lumsden & Wolfe, 1996). At this point, these problem-solving groups become cultural retraining groups. Unfortunately, most of them never reach this point after cultural conflicts. To become cultural retraining groups, the participants in problem-solving groups also need special training designed to provide a more conscious sense of control over their own cultural identities. Face-to-face communications in such groups call for new skills, such as high tolerance for uncertainty, constructive use of evidence, positive feedback, meaningful nonverbals, suspension of judgment, considering cultural as well as personal attributions, and listening responsively. Changing established structures and roles is required. Basic to the development of these new skills and concepts is training in intercultural exploration. Problem-solving group activities provide a fertile ground for developing intercultural exploration skills, but they typically present untutored participants with little control over the learning process. Representatives must learn how to learn in these complex situations. A training program in learning how to learn is needed to develop the required skills and concepts through direct experience with and feedback from intercultural communication specialists. The major challenge for any program designed to help individuals manage conflicts among cultural groups more effectively is that their reference culture and identities are sociologically and psychologically different from those with whom they are in conflict. Thus, the program must help them to become aware of and to modify their own cultural assumptions and accommodate other assumptions in their interactions with their antagonists. This process is one that I refer to as learning how to learn. Programs that provide the needed training in learning how to learn are rare and different from most current conflict-management programs. LEARNING HOW TO LEARN Training in learning how to learn begins with cultural self-awareness and results in the ability to participate effectively in intercultural dialogues or intercultural explorations (Kimmel, 1989). Cultural self-awareness requires the individual to make conscious the deep culture that he or she has internalized in an unconscious manner over a lifetime. The degree to which even simple perceptions are determined by the perceiver's background suggests

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that individuals must become more aware of their enculturation—from the basic level of perceptions to the abstract level of values—if they are to cope with their primordial sentiments and cultural sentiments. Such awareness must precede training that develops the individual's abilities to examine, understand, and control their judgments, feelings, and conceptions in intercultural situations. There is little potential for better intercultural communication and peacebuilding without cultural self-awareness. Many of the skills for successfully interacting with individuals from different cultural backgrounds are similar to skills developed during enculturation. However, the problem-solving, decision-making, and negotiating skills learned in one's own culture may interfere with successful communication in an intercultural situation. More generic skills taught by someone who understands the other culture(s) in question, both personally and as an outsider, are required. After increasing trainees' cultural self-awareness, a successful program of learning how to learn will work with them on the management of their communications with others, especially others whose primordial sentiments differ greatly from their own. Since all perceptions involve stereotypes that enable individuals to organize and categorize the characteristics of less familiar groups, a program in learning how to learn must assess the positive and negative stereotypes in each participant's culture. In developing such programs, one must also know which social actualities (race, ethnicity, religion, language, tradition, and region) are important and relevant. Programs in conflict management presented through seminars, discussions, and lectures are unlikely to get at the emotional aspects of the cultural differences embedded in the cultures of the trainees. Mere information about one's own and others' cultures will not affect cultural awareness nor provide a solid basis for intercultural exploration. More emotional involvement and practical skills are needed. Training that stimulates real interaction and communication among the trainees will satisfy these requirements. Cultural topics provide context for such interaction and communication and the social actualities associated with relevant primordial sentiments generate the emotions that make them meaningful. As Stewart et al. (1969) noted, "It is only through the commitment demanded by a 'realistic task-oriented problem' situation that many trainees will confront and re-evaluate long-held assumptions and values about the nature of people and of the world" (p. 28). Cultural training in learning how to learn is specific, not general. Each training program must be tailored to specific trainees, jobs, and situations. Successful communication is learned within and in relation to specific cultures. Role plays that use scenarios containing such contextual information will help trainees understand and grow beyond cultural identities associated with primordial sentiments and bonding. Using such role plays, it is possible to provide training programs that increase the level of cultural awareness of individuals and help them communicate beyond their ethnic roots and primordial sentiments (their cultural identities). The trainer must take an active,

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personal role in such training (see Cole, 1985, for Vygotsky's zone of proximal development as a way of conceptualizing such a trainer's role). Some people believe that this training is part of the socialization process provided by the family, school, or church. When a caregiver asks a child to think how he or she would feel if someone else treated them the way the child is now treating someone else, they are asking that child to try to understand another person. If the caregiver also models this kind of behavior toward others, the child is likely to internalize this behavior (the Golden Rule is based on this kind of learned behavior). However, without some insights into one's own cultural limitations and some intercultural skills for relating to others outside one's own culture, the ability to understand and then communicate will be effective only with those within one's own culture, as studies using role reversal as a training technique have shown (Kimmel, 1963). To develop skills in learning how to learn requires realistic situations focusing on experienced conflicts, primordial sentiments, and real cultures. An atmosphere of reality and emotional involvement is needed throughout the training for cultural awareness and successful intercultural exploration to develop. CONCLUSION Learning to detect the cultural biases in one's own assumptions, conceptions, and behaviors and substituting for these interests, concerns, and messages that connect with the assumptions, feelings, and concepts of the other parties is basic to facilitating understanding and communication in intercultural interactions. Individuals who can understand their own identities and are willing to learn about the identities of those from other cultures with whom they are communicating are better equipped to reduce misunderstandings and to facilitate the search for mutually acceptable solutions in conflicts. The relationships they form while working together can ameliorate or avert destructive cultural conflicts and promote agreements that lead to cultural understanding. Training in cultural awareness begun today with peacekeepers and combatants in places like Ireland, Cyprus, and Bosnia will have repercussions for many others. This training will help peacekeepers overcome the stresses and frustrations that are inevitable in their missions. The interpersonal relationships and integrative programs created by trainees will develop a momentum of their own. International meetings, organizations, and programs involving these individuals will facilitate peacebuilding and be a form of peacebuilding in themselves. Their relationships will avert conflicts based on misunderstandings and promote a positive sense of peace among their peoples. Through increased cultural awareness and intercultural exploration, peoples can overcome the negative ethnocentrism often associated with their primordial sentiments and cultural identifications and work toward long-term peacebuilding. Our old concepts of peace as stability, quiescence, balance of

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powers, and avoidance are dysfunctional in today's world. Understanding and controlling our ethnocentric primordial sentiments through intensive and extensive training in learning how to learn can enable us to bond together as a world community in the context of a global ecology, rather than identifying as diverse groupings in the context of our local social actualities. Developing cultures that promote intercultural exploration through teaching our children high tolerance for uncertainty, cultural awareness, constructive use of evidence, positive feedback, meaningful nonverbals, suspension of judgment, and empirical perception will help us create such a future (Kimmel, 1995b). Such peacebuilding requires empathy, imagination, innovation, commitment, flexibility, and persistence from individuals devoted to the development of relationships and the creation of consensual meanings and outcomes. Of course, there is a great deal more to peacebuilding than reducing intercultural misperceptions and misunderstandings. There are structural as well as relational considerations. Civic institutions dedicated to cultural and political rights and freedoms are also necessary. Pluralistic assumptions and values achieved at the local level by problem-solving groups must be elaborated at the economic and political levels of the culture. Given enough citizens with cultural understanding and pluralistic institutions in a growing number of societies, we can learn to work collaboratively in open groups on the issues that threaten us (like environmental sustainability) rather than threatening each other. Peace can become an active state of cooperation that maximizes the survival and welfare of all.

REFERENCES Adams, D. (Ed.). (1995). UNESCO and a culture ofpeace: Promoting a global mo ment. Paris: UNESCO. Bates, S. (1997, June 23). Slaps on the wrist. The Guardian Bennett, M. (1986). A developmental approach to training for intercultural sensitivity. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 10, 119-1 Black, P. W., & Avruch, K. (1989). Some issues in thinking about culture and the resolution of conflict. Humanity and Society, 13, 187-194. Burton, J. (1987). Resolving deep rooted conflict: A handbook. Lanham, MD: Uni sity Press of America. Cantril, H. (1961). Human nature and political systems. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutge University Press. Cole, M. (1985). The zone of proximal development: Where culture and cognition create each other. In J. V. Wersch (Ed.), Culture, communication and cogni (pp. 146-161). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DeMello, C. (1995). Acting the culture contrast. In S. M. Fowler & M. G. Mumford (Eds.), Intercultural sourcebook: Cross-cultural training methods (Vol. 1 69-79). Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press. Emminghaus, W., Kimmel, P., & Stewart, E. (1997). Primal violence: Illuminating cultur dark side. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 3,167-19 Etheridge, L. (1987). Can governments learn? New York: Pergamon Pre

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Feldman, L. G. (1991). Reconciliation and structural peace: The case of the Feder Republic's relations with France, Israel and the United States. Washingto DC: United States Institute of Peace, Fisher, L., & Wilson-Smith, A. (1997, July 14). Somalia's ghosts haunt Canada. Maclean's. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. Ne York: Free Press. Galtung, J. (1976). Three approaches to peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. Impact of Science on Society, 26, 103-115 Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Book Glenn, E. S. (1981). Man and mankind: Conflict and communication between c tures. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Gottleib, S. (1993). Nation against state. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Hoffmann, S. (1984). Detente. In J. Nye (Ed.), The making of America's Soviet polic New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kaplan, R. (1994). The coming anarchy. The Atlantic Monthly, 273(2), 44-7 Kelman, H. C. (1992). Informal mediation by the scholar/practitioner. In J. Bercovitch & J. Rubin (Eds.), Mediation in international relations: Multiple approach to conflict management (pp. 64-96). London: Macmillan. Kimmel, P. R. (1963). The effects of role-playing and policy formation on subsequ discussions between members of conflicting organizations. Ann Arbor, M Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. Kimmel, P. R. (1984). Peace and culture shock: Can intercultural communication ists help save the world? Abstracts, Tenth Annual SIETAR Conference, 1Kimmel, P. R. (1985). Learning about peace: Choices and the U.S. Institute of Peace as seen from two different perspectives. American Psychologist, 40, 525-54 Kimmel, P. R. (1989). International negotiation and intercultural explorations: ward cultural understanding. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Pea Kimmel, P. R. (1992). Assessing the impact of peace building processes. Modern Science and the Vedic Science, 5, 125-133. Kimmel, P. R. (1994). Cultural perspectives on international negotiation. Journal of Social Issues, 50,179-196. Kimmel, P. R. (1995a). Facilitating the contrast-culture method. In S. M. Fowler & M. G. Mumford (Eds.), Intercultural sourcebook: Cross-cultural training m ods (Vol. 1, pp. 69-79). Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press. Kimmel, P. R. (1995b). Sustainability and cultural understanding: Peace psychology as public interest science. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 101-116. Kohls, L. R. (1977, September). Models for contrasting and comparing cultures. P per presented as part of the USIAs Tenth Annual Intercultural Communication Course, Washington, DC. Kohls, L. R. (1987, June). Models for comparing and contrasting cultures. Paper p sented at the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs Meetings, Washington, DC. Lumsden, M., & Wolfe, R. (1996). Evolution of the problem-solving workshop: An introduction to social-psychological approaches to conflict resolution. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 2, 37-6

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Meisler, S. (1992a, November 15). Mission impossible for the U.N.? Los Angeles Times, pp. Al, A14-A15. Meisler, S. (1992b, November 16). Baby-sitters in blue berets, peacekeepers ease tensions. Los Angeles Times, pp. Al, A14-A15. Meisler, S. (1992c, November 17). U.N. peacekeepers face a crisis of high expectations. Los Angeles Times, pp. Al, A22. Montville, J. V. (Ed.). (1990). Conflict and peacemaking in multiethnic societie Washington, DC: Lexington Books. Njeri, I. (1993, April 25). The conquest of hate. Los Angeles Times Magazine, pp. 2 26,46. Pease, H. (1987, April). The peace triad: Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. Peace Institute Reporter. Segal, D. R., & Gravino, K. S. (1985). Peacekeeping as a military mission. In C. D. Smith (Ed.), The hundred percent challenge (pp. 38-69). Cabin John, M Seven Locks Press. Shils, E. A. (1957). Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties. The British Journal Sociology, 8, 130-145. Staub, E. (1990). Roots of evil: The psychological and cultural origins of genocid New York: Cambridge University Press. Staub, E. (1996). The psychological and cultural roots of group violence and the creation of caring societies and peaceful group relations. In T. Gregor (Ed.), A natural history of peace (pp. 129-155). Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press. Stewart, E. C. (1987). The primordial roots of being. Zygon, 22, 87-107. Stewart, E. C. (1995). Contrast-culture training. In S. M. Fowler & M. G. Mumford (Eds.), Intercultural source book: Cross-cultural training methods (Vol. 1 47-58). Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press. Stewart, E. C, Danielian, J., & Foster, R. J. (1969). Simulating intercultural comm nication through role-playing (Technical Report 69-7, May). Alexandria, V Human Resources Research Organization. Suedfeld, P. (Ed.). (1989). Psychology and torture. Washington, DC: Hemisphere Sumner, W. G. (1906). Folkways. Boston: Ginn & Co. Volkan, V. D. (1991). Psychological processes in unofficial diplomacy meetings. In V D. Volkan, J. V. Montville, & D. A. Julius (Eds.), The psychodynamics of inte national relationships. Volume 2: Unofficial diplomacy at work (pp. 207-2 Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Volkan, V. D. (1992). Ethnonationalistic rituals: An introduction. Mind and Human Interaction, 4, 3-19. Wagner, R., & Christie, D. J. (1994). Psychology and peace. In M. T. Klare (Ed.), Peace and world security studies: A curriculum guide (pp. 230-242). Bould CO: Lynne Rienner. Williamson, R. S. (1989, March). The United Nations as peacekeeper. Paper No. 1. Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State. Wurmser, D., & Dyke, N. B. (1993). The professionalization ofpeacekeeping: A st group report. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace

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PART II

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING PERIODS OF CONFLICT

In Parts I and III we examine efforts that may be taken to prevent viole before it starts, or hasten the return to a durable peace once the frighteni has stopped, but what can be done at the psychological or social-science levels in the midst of war? Certainly the argument can be made that this i not the period of the conflict when peace psychologists can have their stro gest effect, and yet there are still both theoretical explanations and practi applications that can be offered. In Part II we look first at the phenomenon of psychophysical numbing an explanation for people's difficulty in understanding large-scale losses life, and a dilemma in allocating limited resources in an effective way in face of disaster. We also see in two chapters how psychologists can contr ute to the preparation ofpeacekeepers and help peacekeepers deal with so of the psychological ambiguities and contradictions found in peacekeepi In many ways this is a common personnel psychologist's function in any dustrial or military setting: selecting, preparing, training, and assessin dividuals'ability to perform a demanding job and dealing with the challen they encounter. In peacekeeping the stress level and difficulties are hei ened by the multinational and multicultural composition of the peacekee force, the number of lives at stake, danger to the peacekeeper, and politi and military contradictions inherent in any peacekeeping operat When peacekeepers are deployed to support a truce between previousl fighting factions it is often the individual peacekeeper on the ground wh needs most to have the skills of a psychologist. This peacekeeper is to avo

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using force, and it is only through the successful use of persuasion, enco agement, accommodation, mediation, and perhaps intimidation that the p keeper can be successful In a sense, this is the true psychology of peacekee on the front line.

CHAPTER 6

Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing David Fetherstonhaugh, Paul Slovic, Stephen M. Johnson, and James Friedrich

Nobelist Albert Szent-Gyorgi once observed, "I am deeply moved if I see one man suffering and would risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about the possible pulverization of our big cities, with a hundred million dead. I am unable to multiply one man's suffering by a hundred million." Most people seem to at least tacitly appreciate the kind of insensitivity toward loss of human life articulated in Szent-Gyorgi's statement. We recognize the need for creative attempts to drive home the severity of catastrophic losses. One activist group lobbied Congress by placing 38,000 pairs of shoes, boots, and sneakers around the Capitol building to sensitize representatives to the 38,000 gunshot fatalities America experiences annually ("38,000 Shoes," 1994). Another example is given by Rummel (1995), who asked people to consider this century's total democide (state-sanctioned killing aside from warfare) of 170 million by imagining a chain of bodies laid head to toe reaching from Honolulu, across the Pacific and the continental United States, to Washington D.C. and then back again more than sixteen times. Losses of life framed in this way attempt to mitigate the insensitivity that seems to occur so naturally when we try to think rationally about how to mitigate or prevent large losses of life in the future or try to comprehend tragedies such as those that have occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia, Ethiopia, and North Korea. This chapter exposes a psychological phenomenon that may have a profound impact on individual, group, and governmental decision making about

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conflict within and between nations. To the extent decision makers are insensitive to the value of human life, they are likely to choose strategies or adhere to policies that ultimately may lead to a greater loss of life. Our hope is that by better understanding how people make judgments about the value of human life, decision makers will be able to recast components of their decisions into choices that will prevent or at least shorten conflicts and thereby save human lives. To this end, we have conducted a number of laboratory studies that demonstrate a phenomenon we have labeled psychophysical numbing. These studies investigate psychophysical numbing in the context of programs or interventions that save lives. Psychophysical numbing is by no means the only factor that impacts the judgments people make about the value of human life, but we believe it is one of the more important ones. As you read this chapter, other factors will no doubt occur to you as they have to us. These are worthy of study as well, but were not included in our investigation. What psychological principles lie behind the insensitivity in Szent-Gyorgi's statement? In the nineteenth century, E. H. Weber (1834) and Gustav Fechner (1860) discovered a fundamental psychophysical principle that describes how we perceive and discriminate changes in our physical environment. They found that people's ability to detect changes in a physical stimulus decreases rapidly as the magnitude of the stimulus increases. What is known today as "Weber's law" states that in order for a change in a stimulus to become just noticeable, a fixed percentage must be added. Thus, perceived difference is a relative matter. To a small stimulus, only a small amount must be added. To a large stimulus, a large amount must be added to be equally noticeable.1 Our cognitive and perceptual systems seem to be designed to sensitize us to small changes in our environment, possibly at the expense of making us less able to detect and respond to large changes. As the psychophysical research indicates, constant increases in the magnitude of a stimulus typically evoke less and less of a change in response. Applying this principle to the valuing of human life suggests that a form of psychophysical numbing may result from our inability to appreciate losses of life as they become more catastrophic—a phenomenon that could impair our ability to make consistent, equitable, and wise decisions.2 Evidence of psychophysical numbing comes from a study by Summers, Slovic, Hine, and Zuliani (1998), who hypothesized that people may exhibit a systematic distortion in perception of death tolls from wars not unlike the systematic distortion found in many traditional experiments in sensory psychophysics. Thus, respondents in these experiments perceived a war that claimed nine times the number of lives as a second war to be only about three times greater in magnitude. The degree of psychophysical numbing changed in these experiments as a function of how the losses were framed. Respondents' insensitivity was reduced when the same total number of casualties was presented as "deaths per day" rather than "deaths per war."

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Kahneman andTversky (1979) have incorporated this psychophysical principle of decreasing sensitivity into prospect theory, a descriptive theory of decision making under risk. A major element of prospect theory is the value function, which relates subjective value to actual gains or losses. The function is concave for gains and convex for losses. When applied to human lives, the value function implies that the subjective value of saving a specified number of lives is greater for a smaller tragedy than for a larger one (when the lifesaving effort is framed as reducing a loss). Such psychophysical numbing may have dramatic implications for the judgments and decisions people make. For example, an intervention that reduces the number of deaths in a tragedy from 2 thousand to 1 thousand may be judged substantially more valuable than one that reduces deaths from 99 thousand to 98 thousand. Even though both interventions save the same number of lives, in the former people may decide to act while in the latter they may not, perhaps under the impression that saving 1 thousand lives out of 2 thousand is a significant proportion, but saving 1 thousand out of 99 thousand is merely "a drop in the bucket." How should we value the saving of a life? We believe that, in most circumstances, "a life is a life"—the value of saving a certain number of people from death should not be affected by the number or proportion of others who remain unsaved. This perspective presumes a linear relationship between the number of lives one can save in a given situation and the value associated with saving them. Thus, an effort saving two hundred lives would have twice the value of another that saves one hundred lives in the same circumstances. This would lead decision makers to prefer the intervention that saves the greatest number of lives even if that number is proportionally smallest when compared to the number at risk. Stated differently, we argue that the value of lives saved should be based on the number an intervention can save, and should therefore be independent of the size of the population from which the saved lives originate. Under a one-to-one correspondence between the number and value of saved lives, the value of a life-saving effort should also be independent of when in the process those lives are saved. For example, the value of saving the first one hundred individuals in a tragedy should not change if instead these individuals happened to be the last one hundred saved. According to prospect theory's curved value function, however, the value of saving lives will in many cases depend on when in the process those lives are saved. For example, the value of reducing deaths by one hundred early in an intervention would not likely be equivalent to that of an identical reduction later in the process; a reduction in loss of life that brings the death toll closer to zero might appear more valuable. Except for the study by Summers et al. (1998) and a demonstration by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showing that the nonlinear value function does seem to apply to gains and losses of life, little empirical work has been

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conducted that investigates psychophysical numbing in the domain of life saving. The two studies discussed here explored how people value life-saving interventions. We hypothesized that respondents' judgments would exhibit psychophysical numbing by responding to life-saving interventions in a manner consistent with prospect theory's value function. Our studies examined how the perceived benefit of saving lives changed when interventions saving the same number of people are implemented in tragedies that differ in magnitude. We predicted that such life-saving interventions would be valued more highly when the number of lives at risk was small than when the number at risk was large. We also predicted that saving lives later in an intervention, bringing the death toll closer to zero, would be valued more highly. STUDY 1 Method Undergraduate volunteers (n = 54) from two sections of an economics statistics course were instructed in a short questionnaire to imagine themselves as a government official of a small, developing country and were asked to evaluate four government programs (Programs A, B, C, and D) being considered for funding. Each of the programs "cost about the same" and addressed the following issues: the employment problem in their country, the transportation problem in their country, and the life-threatening refugee problem in Rwanda.3 The transportation program proposed to remedy poor road conditions, and the employment program proposed to decrease the jobless rate. There were two Rwandan refugee programs, each proposing to provide enough clean water to save the lives of 4,500 refugees suffering from cholera in neighboring Zaire. The Rwandan programs differed only in the size of the refugee camps where the water would be distributed; one program proposed to offer water to a camp of 250 thousand refugees and the other proposed to offer it to a camp of 11 thousand. Respondents evaluated the programs in pairs, one pair per page. Because the two Rwandan programs were never paired together, only five of the six possible pairings appeared in the booklets. All respondents evaluated the same paired comparisons, presented in one of two randomized orders. Each page contained brief descriptions of two programs being compared, followed by a response scale such as the following for Programs A and B. Program A

6 5 Strong preference for A

4

3

2

1 0 1 2 3 Slight No Slight preference pref. preference for A forB

4

5

6

Program B

Strong preference forB

On the last page, participants responded to several questions designed to verify whether they perceived that the same number of refugees would be

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saved by either of the Rwandan programs. The final item requested respondents to briefly explain whether it was better to save lives in the smaller or the larger refugee camp, and why. Results and Discussion The manipulation checks verified that most respondents correctly perceived that the two Rwandan programs saved the same number of lives.4 Ratings on the thirteen-point preference scale constituted the dependent measure. For the four pairings containing a Rwandan program, participants' responses were subsequently recoded so that a preference for the Rwanda program in a pair was indicated by a positive number and a preference for the non-Rwandan program in a pair was coded as a negative number. For example, in a pair containing the large-camp program and the transportation program, if a participant circled a 2 to indicate a slight preference for the transportation program, the rating would have been recoded as a -2. Thus, participants' recoded responses ranged from -6 to +6. Because responses in the transportation versus employment program comparison were not of theoretical interest, they were excluded from the analysis. An analysis of variance on respondents' preferences revealed no effects due to respondents' gender or to the order in which the paired comparisons were presented. Data were therefore combined without regard for these variables. We predicted that preference ratings would be greater for the small-camp program than the large-camp program. Because these programs were never paired together, however, we compared respondents' ratings for the two Rwandan programs in pairings that shared a common non-Rwandan program. For example, we compared respondents' ratings in the transportation versus the small-camp pairing with their ratings in the transportation versus the largecamp pairing. We expected that the recoded rating for the small-camp pairing would be greater than the rating for the large-camp pairing. As predicted, the results revealed that even though most respondents realized that the same number of refugees could be saved in either camp, they preferred the small-camp program (M = 0.45) over the large-camp program (M = -0.20) when paired with either the transportation or employment programs (see Figure 6.1). We also conducted an analysis on the preferences of twenty-two respondents who indicated on the last page of the booklet that saving 4,500 lives in the large camp was neither better nor worse than saving 4,500 lives in the small camp. Even these respondents who indicated no preference between one life-saving Rwandan program and the other when asked directly preferred the small-camp program (M = 0.93) over the large-camp program (M = 0.41) when evaluations were masked by paired comparisons. One last question asked respondents whether it was better to save lives in the smaller or the larger refugee camp, and to state why. About 44 percent of

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Figure 6.1 Main Effects for Rwanda Camp Size (11 Thousand or 250 Thousand) and Program Type (Transportation or Employment) Using Preference Ratings from Paired Comparisons

Note: Ratings were coded on a thirteen-point scale (-6 to +6). Positive numbers indicate erence for a Rwanda program over a non-Rwanda program respondents reported that it was better to save lives in the smaller camp. As perhaps the strongest evidence for the psychophysical-numbing hypothesis thus far, this result is quite remarkable, especially considering that the lifesaving potential of each Rwandan program was reinforced by the preceding question in which nearly all respondents reported that the interventions would save the same number of lives. Approximately 42 percent of respondents reported no preference between the two programs and 14 percent indicated that it was better to save lives in the larger camp. We suggest that the sizable proportion of respondents who preferred to save lives in the smaller camp reflects people's general tendency to become desensitized to the life-saving potential of interventions applied to larger tragedies. STUDY 2 Study 2 retained much of the content and structure of Study 1. Participants first read a cover story about the Rwandan refugee crisis and then evaluated one small country's life-saving intervention proposed for several refugee camps. For each camp, all respondents answered two questions: (1) How beneficial would sending the aid be? and (2) Should aid be sent or not? Study 2,

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however, differed from Study 1 in several respects. In Study 2, comparisons between the Rwandan scenarios were easier, which would presumably lessen psychophysical numbing among respondents. Whereas Study 1 paired each Rwandan scenario with a "dummy" scenario, making direct comparisons between Rwandan scenarios more difficult, Study 2 omitted dummy scenarios and had respondents evaluate Rwandan scenarios individually. Though easier in this regard, Study 2 was generally more complex because it contained a more detailed cover story and incorporated two additional independent variables. Beside the camp-size manipulation found in the previous study, Study 2 manipulated when in the life-saving process the humanitarian aid was distributed. We predicted that saving a portion of lives near the end of a crisis would be valued more highly than saving an equal portion near the beginning of a crisis because the former solves virtually all the problem whereas the latter does not. Study 2 also manipulated the "reliability" of the equipment used to administer the aid (i.e., purified water). We included this variable to discourage respondents from rating the intervention as maximally beneficial in every scenario. Method Overview of Design The present study manipulated three within-subjects variables: size of refugee camp (11 thousand or 250 thousand), amount of pure-water aid a camp was receiving before a water-purification plane was sent (low or high), and reliability of the plane (60% or 100%). This yielded the eight different scenarios participants read. All respondents evaluated the same eight scenarios. Half received the block of four 100-percent-reliable plane scenarios first and the block of four 60-percent-reliable plane scenarios second, and half received the blocks of four in the reverse order. For each scenario we asked two questions: (1) The rated benefit of sending a plane, and (2) a yes/no decision on whether or not to send a plane. Materials and Procedure University of Oregon students (n = 162) were paid $4 to complete an elevenpage questionnaire about the Rwandan refugee crisis. The cover story of the questionnaire informed respondents that the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was coordinating a massive humanitarian aid campaign by requesting that able countries send assistance to the Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Many refugees had a water-borne disease and would die if purified water did not soon become available. One small country was considering sending one of two Dash-8 water-purification planes to Zaire. Though each water system was capable of producing only a small fraction of the water needed, each

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could keep about 1,500 disease victims alive each day. The purification system in one plane was 100-percent reliable, and the system in the other plane was only 60-percent reliable—reliable in the sense that there was only a "60% chance that the system would work once it got to Zaire." Once a plane was operating in a camp, respondents were informed that "aid-workers will distribute the clean water to designated disease victims, which usually saves the victims' lives." The cost to this small country of delivering and operating these purification systems was significant in light of its economy. The following pages contained eight scenarios about the four refugee camps (see Table 6.1 for a summary of information given in the eight scenarios). Each scenario was identically structured. For example, on one page respondents read the following scenario (Scenario 1): "The city of Moga in Zaire now has about 11,000 Rwandan refugees. Few water purification systems from other countries are now in place. 5% of the clean water needed for disease victims in this camp is currently being met. If the 100%-reliable Dash-8 water purification plane is sent to Moga, 50% of this camp's water need for disease victims would be met." For scenarios using the 60-percent-reliable plane, the following phrase was added: "provided the purification system works." In the other small-camp scenarios (Fizi 1 and Fizi 2; see Table 6.1),

Table 6.1 Summary of Information in the Eight Scenarios Given to All Respondents in Study 2 Scenario number 1

Zairian refugee camp Moga 1

Camp size 11,000

Plane reliability 100%

Prior aid

Post aid

5%

50%

2 3

Moga 2 Fizil

11,000 11,000

60% 100%

5% 50%

50% 95%

4 5

Fizi 2 Uvira 1

11,000 250,000

60% 100%

50% 5%

95% 7%

6 7

Uvira 2 Kalehe 1

250,000 250,000

60% 100%

5% 93%

7% 95%

8

Kalehe 2

250,000

60%

93%

95%

Note-. The prior-aid variable indicates the amount of pure water need being met for disease victims in a camp before the aid was delivered. Post aid indicates the water need that would be met for disease victims after the aid was provided. Within each level of plane reliability, the intervention in each camp was capable of keeping the same number of disease victims (1,500) alive each day (which usually saves the victims' lives).

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50 percent of the clean water need was currently being met, so the aid increased this to 95 percent, provided the system worked. In the two scenarios involving the large (250 thousand refugees) camp, Uvira, the prior aid met 5 percent of the water need and the additional aid would bring this to 7 percent. In the scenarios involving the Kalehe camp (Scenarios 7 and 8), 93 percent of the water need was being met and the additional aid would bring this to 95 percent. Thus, the intervention proposed to save 2 percent of disease victims in a given large camp and 45 percent of disease victims in a given small camp. Recall, however, that the same absolute number of lives (1,500) would be saved in each case, regardless of camp size. Each scenario was followed by two questions. The first, "What would be the benefit of sending this Dash-8 plane to this camp?" respondents answered on a nine-point Likert scale, titled "Benefit," anchored at the ends by 0 ("extremely low benefit") and 8 ("extremely high benefit"). Second, respondents were asked, "Given the benefit indicated on the scale above, would it be worth sending the plane to this camp?" Respondents circled either "Yes" or "No." On each page, participants were reminded that responses to each scenario should be independent of their responses to the other scenarios. After completing this task, participants responded to a question designed to assess whether they correctly perceived that the same number of lives would be saved by an intervention regardless of the size of camp where it was implemented. Results and Discussion A check on subjects' understanding of the problem revealed that 60 percent of respondents correctly perceived that the water systems would save about the same number of lives regardless of refugee camp size, 23 percent believed that substantially more lives would be saved in the larger camp, and 17 percent believed that substantially more lives would be saved in the smaller camp. The analyses reported below omitted this last group of respondents because their belief could have quite reasonably lead them to prefer implementing the intervention in the small camps, not because of psychophysical numbing but simply because it could have saved more lives. The results of the statistical analysis on respondents' benefit ratings indicated that they believed sending the planes to small camps was more beneficial (M = 6.46) than sending them to large camps (M = 4.54; see Figure 6.2). In addition, respondents believed sending the planes to camps that were already satisfying a substantial portion of their clean-water need was more beneficial (M = 5.73) than sending them to camps that were only satisfying a small portion of their water need (M = 5.27). And, not surprisingly, the results revealed that respondents believed the 100-percent-reliable plane (M = 5.67) was more beneficial than the 60-percent-reliable plane (M = 5.33). As predicted, respondents appeared to favor interventions more when implemented in the later stages of the life-saving process. For example, respon-

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Figure 6.2 Main Effects in Study 2 for the Three Within-Subjects Variables: Camp Size (11 thousand or 250 thousand), Prior Aid (iow or high), and Plane Reliability (60% or 100%)

N

\ V

X

Note: Benefit rating was scored on a scale from 0 (low) to 8 (high).

dents thought it was more beneficial to save 2 percent of those at risk when the threat of a tragedy was nearly contained than when it was just beginning to take its toll. As the absence of interaction effects indicated, this was as true for small camps as it was for large. A statistical analysis on respondents' dichotomous decisions about whether or not to send the planes to the camps also revealed a significant effect, indicating that respondents decided to send the planes to small camps more often (93%) than to large camps (59%). GENERAL DISCUSSION Unlike most of the chapters in this volume, our chapter is based on data collected in the laboratory. There are advantages and drawbacks to gaining knowledge in this way. Such investigations allow researchers to isolate variables believed to contribute to a phenomenon and draw conclusions that are based on empirical results and are independent of intuition. Though such conclusions may be narrower than some might hope, they can often be reached with a degree of clarity not achievable by observing naturally unfolding events. So, there is a tradeoff. In such investigations, however, there is always the

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fear that what you discover is an artifact of the laboratory rather than a manifestation of behavior in the "real world." In this regard it is important to note that data for the two Rwanda studies were collected during the height of the media coverage of the Rwandan refugee crisis. Participants' familiarity with the Rwanda crisis would have helped to make the potential loss of life addressed in the judgment tasks, and hence participants' responses, particularly realistic. Another possible drawback to our investigation is that the respondents in our studies were students, and not U.N. peacekeepers, diplomats, or government officials. We suspect, however, that we would have obtained similar results from other populations or humanitarian aid workers. Evidence from our investigation shows that people often judge the value of life-saving efforts in much the same way they judge the intensity of stimuli in traditional psychophysical experiments. Just as a fixed decrease in brightness seems greater when the original intensity is small than when it is large, an intervention saving a fixed number of lives seems more valuable when fewer lives are at risk to begin with—when the savings is a larger proportion of the number at risk. When such psychophysical numbing occurs, the value people place on a life-saving intervention is inversely proportional to the magnitude of the threat, rather than being determined by the absolute number of lives the intervention can save. During times of instability, crisis, or war, psychophysical numbing may manifest itself in numerous ways. Individuals or groups who desire and work for durable peace may endorse actions when many lives are at stake that would be wholly unacceptable if the at-risk population were smaller. As Study 1 implies, accepting the loss of 1 thousand refugees seems far more palatable when there are 250 thousand refugees at risk than when there are only 11 thousand at risk. This leads to the troubling suggestion that people may be less motivated to assist those in need precisely when need is greatest. A significant portion of the respondents in each of the present studies exhibited psychophysical numbing. Many respondents in our studies judged interventions serving larger refugee camps to be considerably less valuable than ones serving smaller camps, even though the interventions could save the same number of lives. There are several other features in the present studies that may have affected the degree to which psychophysical numbing occurred. First, the way information about life-saving interventions was framed changed the degree of numbing. Descriptions of events that focus on the outcomes of the intervention rather than the tragedy it serves appear to reduce the degree of psychophysical numbing. This has obvious implications for peacekeeping and life-saving interventions in general. If one wishes officials or the public to rally behind an intervention, it would be more effective to highlight the number of lives the intervention can assist rather than highlight the magnitude of the tragedy. This strategy might be counterintuitive to those who often attempt to gain support for an intervention by pointing out the magnitude of the problem.

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Second, the ease of comparison between different interventions may have also contributed to the degree of numbing respondents exhibited. Study 1 show that ease of comparison may have been a factor. Those who when asked directly reported no preference between two interventions that saved the same number of lives nevertheless preferred the intervention serving the smaller tragedy in the previous task where direct comparisons were more difficult. Despite this variability, however, the present studies suggest that psychophysical numbing is a robust phenomenon—ingrained in the workings of our cognitive and perceptual systems, which seem geared to sensitize us to small changes in our environment perhaps at the cost of making us less able to appreciate and respond adequately to large changes. When we contemplate nuclear war, for example, and its immense capability for death and destruction, it may be difficult to escape psychophysical numbing as we attempt to grasp the significance of the difference between 10 thousand, 100 thousand, or a million or more deaths. Where we lack perceptual sensitivity, we might also expect to find that our language is also inadequate to discriminate among degrees of harm or destructiveness. Thus, John Hersey's (1946) elegant chronicle of the aftermath of the Hiroshima bombing (which killed about 140 thousand people) simply refers to the scene as "havoc" (p. 5) and "terrible" (p. 86). Lifton (1967) refers to Hiroshima as a "disaster," a term commonly applied to events that are far less severe. Holocaust, catastrophe, calamity, tragedy—the vocabulary of disaster seems sparse indeed. Can the potential deaths of large numbers of people really be comprehended without an adequate vocabulary of destructiveness? Some who have worried about the incomprehension of mass destruction are pessimistic. Humphrey (1981), for example, writes of our ability to be moved greatly by the plight of single human beings at the expense of insensitivity to "giant dangers." He says, "In a week when 3,000 people are killed b an earthquake in Iran, a lone boy falls down a well shaft in Italy—and the whole world grieves. Six million Jews are put to death in Hitler's Germany, and it is Anne Frank trembling in her garret that remains stamped in our memory We must live with this It will not change. I do not expect my dog to learn to read The Times, and I do not expect myself or any other hum being to learn the meaning of nuclear war or to speak rationally about megadeaths" (pp. 21-22). Yet writers such as Hersey (1946), Lifton (1967), Jonathan Schell (1982), and many others do have the power to move us emotionally with their eloquent descriptions of individual and societal tragedies, despite the lack of adequate one-word descriptors. Is that a sign that we can, indeed, comprehend these tragedies in a way that will help us to make good decisions about preventing them or managing their risks? Modern technology has great power to cause, prevent, and alleviate mass human suffering. Yet the psychophysical numbing we have observed in our studies is strong enough and pervasive enough to raise some disturbing ques-

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tions about our ability to make rational decisions when many lives are at stake. Readers can be heartened, however, by evidence from studies by ourselves and others that show that psychophysical numbing is mutable, meaning that if we cannot eliminate its effects on our decisions, we can at least attenuate them. NOTES We acknowledge with thanks support from the National Science Foundation under Grant Number SBR-9422754 to Decision Research and a Graduate Research Fellowship granted to thefirstauthor. Any opinions,findings,conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. We also thank Sarah Lichtenstein and Patricia Mora for their comments on the manuscript and Leisha Mullican for her technical assistance in the preparation of the report. This chapter is based on an article with the same title that appeared in the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich, 1997), and is reprinted by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1. A striking example of psychophysical insensitivity to money was Ronald Reagan's assertion that a $4.6 billion job program "would add virtually nothing to the federal budget" (President Shrugs Off EPA "Fuss," March 25, 1983). 2. Lifton (1967) used the term "psychic numbing" to refer to the accommodation and reduced sensitivity to shocking and emotionally overwhelming threats and experiences, such as those created by nuclear war. Hiroshima survivors, for example, said that they very quickly "ceased to feel." We use the term psychophysical numbing to reflect a more cognitive or perceptual form of insensitivity as opposed to the affective quality of psychic numbing. Whereas psychic numbing is adaptive, enabling survivors and rescue workers to cope with trauma, psychophysical numbing may degrade our ability to appreciate the consequences of our actions. 3. In the summer of 1994, when these data were collected, ethnic warfare in Rwanda had resulted in over a million refugees fleeing into neighboring Zaire. The brutal nature of the civil war, as well as the problems of disease and hunger that plagued the refugees, had made the Rwandan conflict the topic of considerable print, radio, and television news attention (Cooper, 1994; Purvis, 1994; "ABC World News Tonight" July 22 and 26,1994). Participants' likely familiarity with the Rwanda crisis should have helped to make the potential loss of life addressed in the judgment task particularly salient and realistic. 4. Most of the statistical tests we conducted have been omitted in this chapter. Interested readers may consult Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) to obtain these results.

REFERENCES Cooper, A. (1994, July 25). All things considered. Washington, DC: National Public Radio. Fechner, G. T. (1860). Elemente der psychophysik. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Hartel. Fetherstonhaugh, D., Slovic, P., Johnson, S., & Friedrich, J. (1997). Insensitivity to the value of human life: A study of psychophysical numbing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14(3), 283-300.

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Hersey, J. (1946). Hiroshima. New York: Bantam. Humphrey, N. (1981). Four minutes to midnight. In R. J. Lifton & N. Humphrey (Eds.), In a dark time (pp. 21-22). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291. Lifton, R. J. (1967). Death in life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New York: Random Ho President shrugs off EPA "fuss." (1983, March 25). The Register-Guard, p. 3 A. Purvis, A. (1994, June 13). All the hatred in the world. Time, pp. 36-37. Rummel, R. J. (1995, June). The Holocaust in comparative and historical perspe tive. Paper presented at the Conference on the "Other" as Threat— Demonization and Antisemitism, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Schell, J. (1982). The fate of the earth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Summers, C, Slovic, P., Hine, D., & Zuliani, D. (1998). "Psychophysical numbing" An empirical basis for perceptions of collective violence. In C. Summers & E. Markusen (Eds.), Collective violence: Harmful behavior in groups and gov ernments. Lanham, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 38,000 shoes stand for loss in lethal year. (1994, September 21). The Register-Guard p.6A. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology o choice. Science, 211,453-458. Weber, E. H. (1834). De pulsu, resorptione, auditu et tactu. In Annotationes anatom cal et physiological. Leipzig: Koehler.

CHAPTER 7

Personnel Selection, Preparation, and Training for U.N. Peacekeeping Missions Brian Kidwell and Harvey J. Langholtz

U.N. peacekeeping missions are staffed by a mix of civilians, police, and military personnel. At their largest near the end of 1994, there were twenty different U.N. missions on four continents and in the Carribean staffed by 77,783 civilian and military personnel from over seventy different nations (United Nations, 1996, p. 4). These personnel were responsible for missions that ranged in their scope from supervision of an established cease-fire, to humanitarian relief, to peace enforcement under conditions of war. Obviously a force of this size, called upon to face such a variety of challenges and staffed by personnel drawn from so many different nations, will require some standardization of training, selection, and performance to ensure a basic level of interoperability among peacekeepers serving together. In this chapter we outline some of the steps taken to prepare personnel to serve on U.N. missions. There is no single unified training system provided by the U.N. Each nation is responsible for the training, evaluation, selection, and screening of the personnel it sends as part of its national contingent. For military personnel and police this nationally provided training is supported and guided (but not provided) by the Training Unit within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). For the civilians who serve on a mission, not as part of a national contingent but instead as staff members of the United Nations, the training and selection function is the responsibility of the United Nations DPKO.

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CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS Two broad categories of civilian personnel serving in U.N. peacekeeping operations are individuals provided by governments, including military and civilians, and those personnel recruited by or from within the U.N. This section focuses primarily upon the civilians recruited by or from within U.N. organizations. Responsibility for the assignment and appointment of these personnel is with the Personnel Management and Support Service of the Field Administration and Logistics Division in the U.N. DPKO. The following is a partial list of the occupational groups needed for service on U.N. peacekeeping missions: Administrative Support Broadcasting Technology Catering, Accommodation, and Travel Civil Affairs Communications Contracts Management Electoral Specialist Electronic Data Processing Engineering Facilities Management Finance and Budget Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information/Media Relations Interpretation and Translation

Legal Affairs Management Support Management Medical Support Personnel Political Affairs Procurement Property Control/Inventory Records Management Registry/Pouch/Reproduction Security Supply/Property Management/Warehousing Technical Military Specialists Training Transport

Profile: The Civilian Peacekeeper A civilian U.N. peacekeeper is a U.N. staff member assigned to a peacekeeping mission. A peacekeeper may be a current U.N. staff member assigned to a mission, a person recruited internationally for specific skills, or a person recruited locally from the area or country in which the mission is located. A locally recruited Bosnian may have been working side by side with an internationally recruited administrator from the United States in the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (United Nations, 1995c). This unique feature of U.N. peacekeeping staff has both advantages and disadvantages. The obvious differences in culture, language, economics, religion, and so on which often cause interpersonal discord in a peaceful environment are often exacerbated in the high-stress environment of political and military instability. These same differences are the qualities that often contribute to the success of civilian staff performing their multifaceted tasks.

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The increasing diversity of U.N. peacekeeping tasks has civilians working in more locations than ever before in history. One result of this expansion is the increase of mission staff that originate from outside the U.N. system. A decade ago staff members on a certain mission would have had more in common with their colleagues, as they would primarily have been assigned from within the U.N. system. Now a U.N. staff member assigned to a mission is more likely to work with someone newly recruited from outside the system. This might be someone specifically recruited for a mission with no prior U.N. experience. In addition to this general change in the composition of U.N. staff on missions in the past decade, there are changes reflecting the new roles in U.N. peacekeeping missions. These changing roles result in civilians being exposed more frequently to military and quasimilitary situations. U.N. staff are less likely to be "observers" in the peacekeeping process and more likely to become, in some instances, political and criminal targets. In the past a staff member was more likely to be a spectator to violence, political instability, lawlessness, torture, hostage taking, and the like. Recent changes have civilian staff members becoming victims of such events, as they are more exposed and less easily protected. Overall there is an increase in the violence associated with U.N. peacekeeping missions. An Example To give the reader an idea of the kind of exposure a U.N. civilian staff member might face in a peacekeeping mission, consider the following composite picture. A U.N. staff member is providing humanitarian relief during her mission assignment in Rwanda. Without much warning she becomes aware of a general panic in her region. Local people she is assisting are fearful of their lives. Rumors flow of killing between tribal factions. She misses seeing some of the nationals she normally assists. She is told that some of the nationals she knows have been murdered. The violence accelerates. Walking down a deserted street she finds the dead bodies of nationals she had known. She receives threatening looks and gestures from other individuals. Other U.N. staff are threatened. She witnesses a child murdered in cold blood. There is talk of evacuation and she is torn between wanting to help others and concern for her own life. One morning she is told to leave immediately with some other staff. They are to leave directly from their place of work and to travel lightly. They cross the border into a neighboring country with what few items they could carry. She is confronted with loss. There is a general confusion. Some assistance is given to mediate these traumatic events by a visiting Critical Incident Stress team. Within a week she is back home in New York City. Events as described have become more frequent to the experience of U.N. civilian peacekeepers. The Rwanda incident occurred on a grand scale and

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achieved international recognition. Other events, such as the murder of a U.N. staff member during a robbery, will also have significant emotional repercussions to surviving staff members and the U.N. family in general. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SELECTION The multifaceted character of peacekeeping missions require that civilians be completely prepared. This preparation encompasses the professional and technical area as well as the area of personal and psychological readiness. These factors are both essential to the primary task of getting the right people to the right place at the right time. Selection and Recruitment In an effort to increase the competencies of those selected for various forms of peacekeeping, the U.N. has improved its ability to recruit and train the most highly qualified candidates available. Approximately two years ago authority to recruit and administer civilian peacekeeping staff members was delegated to the U.N. DPKO. Supporting this authority has been the development of an integrated database, known as the Peacekeeping Database, to gain efficiency in our selection process. Hundreds of applications for peacekeeping missions are received each month. The best qualified of these candidates are incorporated into the database according to their occupational and functional capabilities. Candidates in the database can be linked with the functions and various job descriptions. This tool increases the ability to select and deploy personnel in a timely fashion. Selection Procedures Individuals desiring to work in peacekeeping missions begin their process by applying to the U.N. DPKO. U.N. staff members submit a mission application form specifically designed for U.N. staff. External applicants submit the "United Nations Personal History" form, known as the P.ll. Along with this they submit a supplementary information form that asks more specific questions related to peacekeeping operations. These forms provide the demographic, educational, training, and work experience information that is essential to the U.N. selection process. Applicant information is entered into the Peacekeeping Database and an electronic and hard file are created for the applicant. A screening process is begun to determine the suitability of the applicant for mission service. This suitability is determined by assessing the applicant's work experience, education and training, language facility, previous U.N. experience, occupational specialties, and more. Applicants who meet the general requirements for mission service are placed in the peacekeeping roster. This roster is used to select individuals when open-

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ings occur in missions. A search can be accomplished according to variables such as occupational group, language facility, experience level, nationality, and more. When vacancies are available, a search of the roster is performed and those with the proper experience and training are reviewed more closely in an effort to find the most suitable candidate for the vacancy. The UNDPKO is working to expand sources from which to recruit staff. As there is less availability of staff from within the U.N. system, we are linking with other resources, such as training programs in the areas of international affairs, human rights, and peacekeeping. Civilian Personnel Preparation As missions become more complex and varied and resources to staff them become more limited, training becomes essential in the effort to put the right people in the right place. The UNDPKO employs international and local staff (those recruited from the specific mission region) in administrative and support areas, including engineering, finance, personnel, procurement, legal, and other related professions. Administration and support are crucial to the success of any mandate in the mission environment. The problem elements common to most missions of minimal infrastructure, poor communication, and out-posted staff make rapid and adaptive administrative support a necessity. More efficient administration and support will result in more cost-effective work. Professional and Technical Preparation The UNDPKO, in coordination with the U.N. Office of Human Resources Management, has developed training programs in specific professional areas as well as in training for senior managers. During the past few years training has been instituted for peacekeeping administrators, covering such areas as personnel, logistics,finance,legal, and procurement. These training programs incorporate current U.N. staff members and recruits with professional backgrounds in each of these specific areas. The training and experience gained in this training is specifically relevant to the mission environment. The result is increased effectiveness in various types of peacekeeping missions as these administrators go to the field better prepared. An initial phase of training for senior administrators was completed during this past year. Candidates for this program have proven track records of administration in various areas in addition to showing high potential for more complex managerial functions. Senior mangers in the field must be able to orchestrate a complex mixture of resources and logistic elements in the field environment. An integral part of the senior administrator's responsibility for peacekeeping is coordination. As missions integrate humanitarian, military, peacebuilding, and administrative elements, coordination both within and between agencies

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becomes crucial. Occasionally various mandates do not match or one branch may duplicate or contradict another. The need for skilled senior mangers to be on hand to resolve these difficult issues is critical. Other ideas for improving these coordination elements, such as joint training in mixed groups, both within and between agencies, are ideas that will greatly improve the coordination attainable after deployment. We are striving to continue this senior managerial training to ensure effective use of our resources. Personal and Psychological Preparation In addition to the job-specific training in administrative and support areas, there are activities necessary for a civilian peacekeeper's personal preparation. These include the general psychological preparation of the staff member as well as preparation related to the historical, cultural, and political background of the mission area. The demanding and often dangerous environment of peacekeeping missions commonly exposes staff to levels of stress beyond the scope of their prior experience. Stress, when it occurs in the context of peacekeeping, may be considered a natural reaction to an "unnatural" environment, to prolonged anxiety and vulnerability, as well as to sudden exposure to unexpected violence and threatening events. Without the benefit of previously learned coping mechanisms or local counseling or training, peacekeeping staff are susceptible to a wide range of negative physical and emotional reactions commonly associated with high levels of stress. These include but are not limited to sleeplessness, a loss of motivation, a sense of powerlessness, false guilt associated with the inability to control events, substance abuse, interpersonal conflicts, depression, and so on. Stress levels beyond the coping abilities of staff therefore threaten both their health and their ability to function professionally within the mission. There are at least three main areas in which staff members are affected by stressors: job stress, critical incident stress, and organizational stress. Job stress relates to the perceived difficulty of doing one's job. Sources of this job-related stress are communication problems, extreme working conditions, security issues, and heavy workload factors. Critical incident stress results from incidents which overwhelm a staff member's ability to cope with a situation and include travel and work hazards as well as exposure to traumatic events. Organizational stress relates to the obstacles presented through administration and organization, including conflicts in policies, communication problems, and personnel issues. Overall, the exposure of staff members to increased levels of violence and vulnerability generally results in a corresponding change in their emotional and work performance. The recognition of stress as a mission hazard, and the need to address this problem, has prompted the UNDPKO to review and address possible solu-

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tions to the problem. The U.N. General Assembly (United Nations, 1993) made a priority of addressing the issues of assistance to staff members dealing with the results of traumatic and stressful mission-related experiences. The U.N. Secretary-General addressed this concern in a note on stress management (United Nations, 1995b). He outlined measures to take which address preventive stress management and critical incident stress management. Measures have been taken since 1994 to provide stress management and mission readiness preparation to many of the staff assigned to U.N. peacekeeping missions. Workshops addressing these concerns and individual counseling of staff are available to staff members. Though there is no mandatory psychological screening, a full medical clearance is required of all staff going on mission. Personnel officers review applications and rely upon their experience to appropriately match personnel to jobs. Continuing efforts are being made to better prepare civilian U.N. peacekeepers for the increased stress they experience in this new era of U.N. peacekeeping. Though there is room for improvement regarding the psychological preparation of U.N. peacekeepers, the recognition of the problem and efforts to ameliorate stresses is indicative of the organization's concern. The United Nations Staff Counselor's Office, in cooperation with the UNDPKO and the U.N. Office of Human Resources Management, has established Mission Readiness Workshops. These sessions include philosophical, practical, and psychological concerns related to peacekeeping service. These workshops are open to all staff who are selected or may be selected for a peacekeeping mission. The psychological portion of this workshop considers the impact of psychological stressors and focuses on specific preparation for peacekeeping mission assignment. In addition, a booklet, Mission Readiness and Stress Management (United Nations, 1995a) has been published as a guide for U.N. staff to stress-related issues. In the absence of established procedures for psychological screening, we utilize the concept of "self-selection" in our workshops. Potential mission staff are asked to evaluate their own mission readiness in light of the information gained in these workshops. The workshops make use of questionnaires to help quantify a staff member's ability to manage the stress of a mission environment. The U.N. Staff Counselor is available to staff for individual and family consultations in preparation for mission service. Returning staff members who come to or through New York are able to take advantage of the Staff Counselor's Office to deal with mission issues, including reintegrating to their pre-mission assignment. Post-mission support groups have been used for returning mission staff in New York. Efforts are also made to assist dependents who have problems related to their spouse's mission assignment. Continuing efforts are being made to better prepare civilian U.N. staff members for the increased stress they will experience in this new era of U.N. peacekeeping.

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Mission-Specific Training for Civilians This training includes orientation to the organizational structure of the mission, the details of the mandate, security concerns, and the host of other issues related to any specific peacekeeping mission. Experience has shown that this orientation is best conducted for staff upon their arrival in the mission area. General introductory training is currently most effectively gained through a staff member's own initiative. Though extensive briefing notes are provided to familiarize staff with specific U.N. peacekeeping missions, the individual can increase his or her potential through personal study of the local languages, history, culture, and political background of the region. An Ongoing Need for Trained Civilians The U.N. asks its civilian peacekeeping staff to live for extended periods in difficult, hostile environments. The consequent risk of their exposure to stress is obvious, with far-reaching personal and professional ramifications. It is important that the U.N. continue its support of all types of preparation for peacekeeping staff. The leadership of the U.N., in recognizing the uniquely stressful circumstances of various forms of peacekeeping, serves to give confidence to the individual peacekeeper, sending the message that there are ways to mediate their stressors. The international community must also recognize the jeopardy in which civilian peacekeepers are placed for the purpose of ending conflict and providing humanitarian assistance. With this recognition comes the hope that the international community will respond by joining in partnership with the U.N. to ensure that peacekeeping staff are professionally prepared and that adequate psychological resources are available to the ongoing needs of civilian peacekeepers. THE TRAINING OF MILITARY PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL Unlike the civilian employees of the U.N., who are recruited individually for a specific professional specialty, military personnel almost always come to U.N. peacekeeping missions as part of a national contingent. As such, these are soldiers who have already been trained in the basic soldiering skills of survival on the battlefield, organization, and communication. The military personnel are different from the civilians, as they arrive at a mission with their existing structure and internal logistical support systems intact and they function as a unit. The soldiers are paid by their own nation and are subject to the discipline of their own national contingents. It is the responsibility of each sovereign troop-contributing nation to train its own military personnel. The U.N. is not responsible for providing training

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directly to the national contingents, but it does support and facilitate this training through the DPKO Training Unit, which was established by the General Assembly in order to coordinate and standardize training among member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations. With an authorized staff of twelve, the training unit is responsible for advising DPKO on all training matters, developing training materials, providing expert training assistance, sharing information, and conducting training (this is limited to Train-theTrainer, Human Rights Monitoring, Senior Management Seminar, and the like, and does not include direct training of full units). The following is a list of instructional and reference material available from the Training Unit on the UNDPKO World Wide Web page: Bibliography on United Nations Peacekeeping (TU-108/91) Executive Reports on the United Nations Regional Peacekeeping Training Workshops (TU-107/96) Guideline Notes for the Guidance of United Nations Civilian Police (TU-104/97) Guideline Notes for the Guidance of United Nations Military Observers (TU-103/97) Guideline Notes Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Operations (TU-106/96) U.N. Guidelines for Peacekeeping (TU-101/95) United Nations Operation Support Manual (TU-105/95) Correspondence Courses on Peacekeeping The United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction (UNITAR POCI) provides self-paced training courses on various aspects of U.N. peacekeeping. There are 1,500 enrollments from fifty-six nations in UNITAR POCFs eight courses in three languages. Students are mailed correspondence course packages which they study in situ. When they are ready, they complete an exam and submit it for grading. The following is a list of these courses from the UNITAR POCI Web page: Commanding U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Methods and Techniques for Peacekeeping on the Ground (in English or French) Demining in the Aftermath of War: Preventing Casualties to Peacekeepers and the Civilian Population History of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations 1945 to 1987 Logistical Support of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (in English or Spanish) Serving as a U.N. Military Observer: Methods and Procedures (in English or Spanish) Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Former Yugoslavia (in English or French) United Nations Civilian Police: Restoring Order Following Hostilities (in English or Spanish)

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International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) The IAPTC is an organization of national training centers that promotes coordination among the members in research, education, and training through the sharing of information, standards, and techniques. Through its informal forum, the IAPTC assists with the development and refinement of common education programs, formal curriculum, and training programs for peacekeeping. There is no single mandatory set of curricula, but through the IAPTC member nations may seek a common approach. The following is a list of nations offering peacekeeping training; however, some of these nations are not IAPTC members (see the DPKO Web page): Argentina

Greece

Poland

Armenia

Honduras

Romania

Australia

Hungary

Russian Federation

Austria

India

Senegal

Belgium

Indonesia

Singapore

Brazil

Ireland

Slovakia

Bulgaria

Italy

Slovenia

Canada

Jordan

Spain

China Colombia Czech Republic Denmark

Republic of Korea Luxembourg

Sri Lanka

Namibia Nepal

Switzerland Trinidad and Tobago

Egypt

Netherlands

United Kingdom

Ethiopia

New Zealand

United States of America

Finland

Norway

Uruguay

France

Peru

Zimbabwe

Germany

Philippines

Sweden

National Military Training Programs for Peacekeepers Each national peacekeeping training program will vary depending on several factors: the historical experience of the nation in peacekeeping, the number of troops provided, the training infrastructure of the military, and so on. Some of these programs will be tailored to specific missions and deployments (i.e., Argentina prepares its personnel for deployment on United Nations Force In Cyprus [UNFICYP]), while other programs will be more generic or topical. The Nordic Nations are well-known for a series of well-integrated peacekeeping training programs, and Canada's Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre has established an international reputation as a leading pro-

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vider in top-level peacekeeping training. The following list provides examples of the training offered by three different national programs (see the DPKO Web page): IRELAND Observation Post Commander's Course U.N. Operations NCO Course U.N. Outpost Commander's Course U.N. Force in Lebanon U.N. Logistics Course SPAIN El Salvador Observers Course Observer Training Course for International Students U.N. Military Observers Course U.N. Police Observer for Peace Missions Course UNPROFOR Training for Military Units UNITED STATES Checkpoint Operations Civil Affairs Civilian Military Operations History and Mission of the United Nations Investigation and Reporting Negotiation Skills Noncombatant Evacuation Operations/Hostage Rescue Refugee Handling Regional Orientation Rules of Engagement in United Nations Environment United Nations Convoy Security CONCLUSION It is certainly no small task to prepare thousands of individuals—military, civilians, and police—from so many different countries and cultures to serve together under the demanding and exacting conditions of U.N. peacekeeping missions. In the case of civilians these are usually individuals selected based on a specific occupational specialty, recruited individually, trained directly at U.N. Headquarters in New York, and deployed as a U.N. employee to serve a specific technical or professional task. In the case of military personnel these

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will almost always be members of a national contingent, trained and deployed as a unit. These are the members of the U.N.'s multinational peacekeeping force, who carry out an international mandate and, before they serve, must be selected, screened, trained, and prepared for this duty.

REFERENCES United Nations. (1993). U.N. General Assembly resolution 47/226 of 30 April 1993. United Nations. (1995a). Mission readiness and stress management, booklet. Ne York: U.N. Office of Human Resources Management. United Nations. (1995b). U.N. Secretary General note on stress management A/C.5/ 49/56 of 16 February 1995. United Nations. (1995c). U.N. Security Council resolution 1035 of 21 December 1995. United Nations. (1996). The blue helmets: A review of United Nations peacekeepi (3rd ed.). New York: U.N. Department of Public Information.

CHAPTER 8

Psychological Aspects of Peacekeeping on the Ground Christian Harleman

Traditional peacekeeping operations have become less common in the current international climate. United Nations records show that the number of peacekeeping troops decreased from 75 thousand in mid-1994 to 25 thousand in mid1997. The pattern of conflict has changed from interstate to intrastate, where political and humanitarian complexities prevail. Between 1948 and 1987, the United Nations initiated thirteen peacekeeping operations, but only five of them were still in existence in 1988, of which four were related to interstate conflicts and only one to an intrastate dispute. Out of twenty-eight operations established between 1988 and 1996, only eight may be referred to as conflicts of interstate character and the rest considered as intrastate. As a result, the international community is more concerned with the major causes of systemic and intractable violent conflict such as ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic factors, with less emphasis on preventing or containing conflicts between nations. Experience indicates that the member states are less inclined to be involved in operations which are considered politically sensitive or might develop into costly undertakings or loss of lives and thus create difficulties in national politics. However, compared with previous and traditional peacekeeping operations, this "second generation peacekeeping" (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992, 1993) has also witnessed a dramatic increase in civilian participation. Though security and stability remain a major problem for the international community, the means to this end have changed dramatically. Today there is

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a new political context which requires a broad and collaborative approach, incorporating traditional notions of diplomacy along with the socioeconomic development of nations and peoples involved in conflict. However, whatever means are to be used, the peacekeeping soldier will continue to represent a physical representation of the world's effort to maintain international peace and security. His or her appearance and performance are essential for current and future peacekeeping operations. In light of this, this chapter outlines some of the conditions where psychological factors may affect a peacekeeping soldier, and describes some operational activities and their psychological conditions in which the peacekeepers operate. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AREA Current peacekeeping employs soldiers at all levels from all over the world. Their professional background as well as their cultural heritage vary and their social and educational experiences are likewise different. They are brought together far from their own settings and asked to work in an unknown and foreign culture and a sometimes hostile climate. Peacekeepers may operate in dangerous and volatile environments, where they may be exposed to ambushes, land mines, and exchange of fire between warring parties. As a third party, their role is to bring peace and, under an international political chapeau, make all efforts to ease conditions for suffering groups. These situations frequently force the peacekeepers to encounter sometimes traumatic situations for which they have never been trained. Contacts with home and loved ones are sparse and their native language is not understood. The pressure on these individuals is obvious and preparation and screening must include both their psychological and physical fitness. In spite of Spartan and uncomfortable conditions and pressure from conflicting parties, they are obliged to remain impartial and rely on their wits rather than their weapons. In order to understand these conditions, one has to appreciate the essence of peacekeeping, which does not always adhere to the normal tactical behavior of a soldier. Operationally, a peacekeeping mission is a static operation with the purpose of monitoring activities and reacting in a way that will deescalate the conflict by peaceful means. Though the conditions may be predictable and monotonous, they may suddenly change with potentially traumatic consequences for the individual peacekeeper. A peacekeeping soldier must therefore possess not only a high standard of professionalism but also a sense of psychological firmness and flexibility in order to withstand unexpected changes and violence. An operation not only involves military units, but may also include civilian organizations with a wide range of activities. Therefore, peacekeepers at all levels are required to establish and nurture an active transparency, not only with the conflicting parties and their soldiers, but also with individuals working within the operation as well as with the local population. Transparency also includes the visibility enhanced by wearing distinctive,

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easily recognized, United Nations headgear, badges, signs, and insignia. Visibility is probably one of the main ways to create confidence and a secure environment, since it provides a visible legitimacy to the operation. It also provides protection, as hostilities against individuals or assets under U.N. markings are regarded as violence against the international community. Thus, the operational objectives should be achieved through an active, visible, overt, and coordinated performance—an unfamiliar tactical behavior for a soldier, and one which differs from normal military tactics. In a hostile environment these may cause psychological dilemmas for the professional soldier who has been transformed into a peacekeeper.

PREPARATION AND THE PEACEKEEPER The visual appearance of a professional peacekeeper has a clear psychological impact. A professional and overt behavior based on an accepted code of conduct creates a positive atmosphere, not only within his or her own organization, but also among the soldiers of the conflicting parties. His or her behavior contributes to a climate of trust and confidence which will be advantageous when problems or hostilities arise. The United Nations has employed some military units whose performance has created an undesirable image of the organization. This is unacceptable. Therefore, a professional peacekeeper must possess an innate level of mental stability, strengthened through training and additional preparation. On the other hand, this kind of stability relies on factors that no training alone can provide, no matter how extensive it may be. The existence of a family or loved ones, a healthy social life, sound personal finances, and an absence of personal dilemmas are conditions that contribute to a good soldier. This will provide a psychological resiliency and firmness which will assist in sound solutions of difficult situations that may be encountered (United Nations, 1995a). Training prior to deployment on a peacekeeping operation is a necessity and there is no doubt that appropriate training will greatly enhance the soldier's ability in the peacekeeping area. The objectives of such training are challenging, with clear psychological impacts. The training objective for normal soldiering in combat is to produce a well-prepared and professional soldier who has developed both the mentality and skill which enable him or her to eliminate an enemy. This requires a heightened degree of aggression and desire to prevail over an adversary through violence. The trainer preparing a soldier for deployment on a peacekeeping mission has to change this attitude into a less aggressive form and simultaneously furnish the soldier with an understanding and perspective which allows him or her to accept the new objectives and conditions. The training has to be exercised with caution. An overly offensive training may contribute to an aggressive behavior which may create unpredictable and dangerous situations, not only for the soldier, but also for others who may be involved. Since the soldier is one of thousands, he or

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she represents a large group, and therefore it is essential that all training among the troop-contributing countries be cohesive and that psychological factors not be underestimated. Though peacekeeping is a non-offensive operation, there are missions that require a more robust performance than more traditional ones. In these cases, the training has to be adjusted accordingly. As a consequence, it is neither recommended to redeploy soldiers from an enforcement operation to a peacekeeping operation, nor to deploy peacekeepers to combat activities. Such redeployment has to be preceded by adequate training. Though most of the troop-contributing countries provide peacekeeping training, their training focus is on the operational and technical aspects and not the psychological issues which in fact determine the behavior of the soldier. CAUSES OF VIOLATIONS The development of a hostile act depends to a certain extent on the roots and causes of a conflict. The interpretation and assessment of such an act is the responsibility of the higher echelons within the peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, it is helpful for the soldier on the ground to have some understanding of the root causes of the conflict. It might be argued that these questions are more at the political level and do not affect the operational or tactical level where the soldier is to be found. However, the soldier on the ground represents the peacekeeping operation and as such, his or her behavior and tactical performance is not the expression of an individual but rather the military collective. In the context of the national defense, the soldiers are (or at least should be) trained in a cohesive and coherent way in accordance with well-established and welldefined operational plans, so that the soldier is familiar with the environment, the plans, and what is expected of him or her as a soldier. Simply, he or she acts as a professional soldier and as a member of a team, and any psychological aspects of the combat action are of less importance. However, in order to prepare for a possible encounter with a hostile activity in a peacekeeping operation, he or she should not only recognize a physical threat but in addition be aware of the psychological factors that might further aggravate the threat. In doing so, he or she might be better prepared for a proper and more flexible response. Conflicts have their own identities, and there have been numerous attempts to define and establish different categories of conflicts. It is not within the scope of this chapter to identify or define a conflict, but more to indicate some differences that have to be understood by the soldier. The cause of local hostility and its level of violence may depend on the root causes of the conflict. A hostility fueled by religious diversities may have an intensity and unpredictable course of action which may be difficult to understand—at least for the soldier on the ground. On the other hand, if the soldier can become

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aware of the root causes, he or she might better appreciate the approaching intensity and take needed perception against possible hostilities. Through this increased awareness, he or she might also be able to recognize the emotional behavior prior to the violence and take appropriate action to avert or limit the violence. Certainly, there are both political and psychological differences between a hostile act caused by clashing religious views and conflicts of socioeconomic character. Mohammed Sahnoun, Representative of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity to the conflict in Central Africa, has suggested five realistic root causes to future conflicts. Some of them may be argued as less relevant, but the lessons learned indicate that violence may be a potential outcome of all of them. Briefly they can be described as follows: 1. Failure in creation of nation-states, where a slow process of national integration may experience a dangerous process. 2. Products of a colonial legacy are mostly linked with border disputes. 3. Products of Cold War legacy, where liberation wars or social revolts became compounded and where old links are still maintained to dubious forces in the outside world. 4. Conflicts of religious character, where the population is separated along religious lines. 5. Conflicts of socioeconomic character, where the conditions are wrongly perceived and violence is a potential outcome in the absence of a democratic system. Some of these conflicts seem to be more frequent than others. In the last ten years, the international community has experienced the frequency and power of religious conflicts which have a psychology of their own. Being aware of the underlying causes of the conflict, a soldier may be better prepared to address how an individual act of violence is to be countered—and to understand the causes of violence. Though conflicts originate from various causes, a violent act depends on several local factors, such as basic needs for food, shelter, or water. Pure frustration, corresponding response (violence spiral), and revenge may be other causes. In addition, alcohol or drug abuse may contribute to expressions of individual violence. Though a violent situation caused by the "survival need" (Last, 1995) for food and water or too much alcohol are understandable, there are other settings where psychological mechanisms exist but may be barely understood. For example, it has been argued that "fighting is a psychological response learned through success" (Scott, 1958), meaning that a series of successes will make local commanders more likely to seek their objectives with force. There might be others. For the soldier on the ground it is a necessity to explore the local "tradition" and adjust his or her preparations accordingly.

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CAUSES OF ESCALATION A hostile action may escalate out of control if not appropriately encountered. One can normally identify some psychological factors that should be taken into account in order to limit the degree to which hostility escalates. The history of previous violence may guide the peacekeeper in determining how to limit a repeat of the escalation. If the experiences indicate that local outbursts of violence have a tendency to be of short duration and peacekeepers are not affected, responses other than an immediate reciprocation of violence should be considered. A feeling of being unknowledgeable about the consequences, an inability to escape, or a sense of being cornered are psychological factors that may escalate a hostile act to an uncontrollable level (Last, 1995). The peacekeeper may become the trigger that inadvertently initiates a local act of violence. Lessons learned from several peacekeeping operations show that unprofessional behavior had been the igniting spark for some tragic events. The accidental or careless display of weapons at checkpoints has in some cases created a physical and psychological climate which quickly escalated into a deadly use of force with resulting fatalities. Truly, one has to accept that the environment and the conditions at a checkpoint are the essence of most peacekeeping operations. The soldier makes spot checks on personnel and vehicles entering or exiting a controlled area and normally there are no problems. On the other hand, the checkpoint itself may create a psychological tension. The problem arises when their is a general tension in the mission area, and particularly when parties attempt to enter a controlled area bringing contraband or other forbidden material through the checkpoint. Under these conditions there might be one or several psychological factors that determine the course of events. General frustration over the United Nations may lead to aggressive behavior when passing the checkpoint and when the checkpoint is considered as the physical manifestation of the United Nations. Frustrated individuals may need to assist the "other" side by smuggling weapons where the checkpoint and its soldiers are the last physical obstacle on a long and dangerous journey. The misinterpretation of the situation and a lack of awareness of the consequences is another example of where peaceful situations have escalated into the use of armed force. The physical appearance of the soldiers is likewise important. As a representative for an intervention force, though peaceful, a peacekeeper has an initial psychological advantage over personnel passing the checkpoint. Toughlooking body language might be considered as psychologically aggressive and could be interpreted incorrectly under certain conditions. To keep drivers and passengers at gunpoint may cause unexpected aggression in some cases but in others may be the correct performance. The checkpoint can be considered as the location for a psychological message at the micro level and soldiers at all levels need to be more attentive to these circumstances.

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Thus, peacekeepers must be able to read not only signals and behaviors of confrontation, but also the psychological pattern of local history. All this has to be linked to a general awareness of the conflict and knowledge of the local causes of violence. Peacekeeping operations should always be underscored with the assumption that the approach for solving the conflict should be of a de-escalating nature instead of an armed solution. This is the essence of peacekeeping on the ground, as the solo and junior peacekeeper brings reality to the words of the U.N. Charter: "arbitration, mediation, conciliation" and "the pacific settlement of disputes" (U.N. Charter, Chapter VI). DE-ESCALATION De-escalation is a process which applies to both macro and micro levels (Fetherston, 1993). The macro level can correspond to the strategic level, and the micro level to where the peacekeepers encounter or interact with the parties. In general terms, the de-escalation process may develop into five phases of activity: • • • • •

stop the hostilities control the situation create a culture of confidence negotiate an assurance for cease-fire conciliation

In theory, the same should apply to the soldier on the ground, but in practical terms it is more complicated. If the peacekeeper is the target for fire, he or she generally has four possibilities: • • • •

use of armed force to put an end to the fire call for attention by various communication means simply wait until thefirehas stopped escape

The same may apply for hostilities not directed toward the peacekeeper. The next phase is critical and assumes that the peacekeeper has the knowledge and tools to be used in controlling the situation. Should he or she use physical power, such as use of deadly force, or expose himself or herself using the psychological advantage of being a representative of the international community? In both cases it requires a psychological courage, since the outcome is still unpredictable and may result in wounded or killed soldiers. If the peacekeeper has been successful in his or her attempts, he or she has already gained some psychological benefits, since the

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achievement is due to the peacekeeper's courageous and decisive interaction—probably also appreciated by the conflicting party. The achieved result should be utilized in the next two phases, creation of a positive and confident atmosphere and negotiation. The peacekeeper should take advantage of recently gained success and use it as a psychological tool in the forthcoming negotiation. NEGOTIATION Negotiation is the most common procedure within an operation in order to settle a dispute. Negotiations can be carried out from the highest level down to the soldier on the ground, but mediation, arbitration, and reconciliation frequently take place at the policy level. A dispute should almost always be downplayed. It does not mean that substance should be ignored or neglected, but rather that an issue should not be brought up to a level where the question may be considered as a matter of principle. Lessons learned show that a problem, in general, should be solved at the level it occurred. Negotiated settlements can only take place with the agreement of the local parties. Planning for negotiations is not complex but requires some preparation, tact, and courtesy. If a peacekeeping unit and its soldiers have maintained a good collaboration and liaison with the local authorities, the negotiation should be a pleasant affair. If not, some more careful preparation needs to be made. The United Nations Military Observers Handbook (United Nations, 1995b) provides some useful advice in this regard. Plans for the negotiation might include what to discuss, what to achieve, who are the negotiators on the "other" side, who will take the notes, what kind of promises can be given, follow-up activities, and so on. However, regardless of previous friendship and good relations, it is essential during the negotiation to maintain dignity and politeness and to remain respectful towards all participants. During the conduct of negotiation one has to recognize that both parties have a stake and a share in peaceful settlement of their dispute, but also that a successful outcome may not by itself represent the end to the dispute. The psychological gaming can be intensive. To convince, to impress, and to threaten are some of the methods used. The soldier on the ground will experience the same set of dynamics, but perhaps in a less sophisticated way. The representatives from the conflicting parties should be encouraged to start the negotiation and suggest constructive solutions. It is important and provides some advantages just to listen and not interrupt and only state the actual facts (supported by evidence) with no argumentation.The United Nations' point of view (facts only) should be stated, and if there are differences these should be noted. If one of the parties expresses a negative view about either the United Nations or the opposing party's morals, politics, or methods, the peacekeeper's response should be measured and restrained.

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On the other hand, it should be a clear policy to convince the other side about the validity of the mandate (agreement) and the solution it promotes. The venue and time for a negotiation also have some psychological aspects. The negotiators concerned should be in the right frame of mind and have the necessary time available. The venue should be where most appropriate and in a peaceful setting. Pleasantries should be exchanged and some food or refreshment should be available as appropriate. The representation has its own psychological importance, but the peacekeeping team should neither be underrepresented nor overrepresented. To do the opposite will immediately create an unnecessary tension. CONFIDENCE BUILDING Confidence-building activities are probably the most important mechanism available to promote peaceful settlements and normal conditions. The activities encompass all levels of an operation, from the single soldier, his appearance, and performance to rebuilding of a country's infrastructure. It aims to create trust, reconciliation, and normal relations among the parties in the conflict as well as those concerned within an operation. At the local level, which mostly concerns the peacekeeper, confidence building should be regarded as an activity to prevent violence. An active liaison and a friendly and overt effort to help and comfort those suffering from the emergency are basic tools of these activities. Though disputes and a tentative provocation or outburst of violence may occur, it is important to establish an air of confidence. The peacekeeper's appearance and behavior will in a very substantial way contribute to such development. Consequently, liaison, collaboration, and information are important issues. To provide logistics, support, and technical assistance, not as a permanent assistance but more as a temporary help in order to show a good intention, also promote a favorable climate for improving relations. However, the basic elements of interpersonal communications are important: To make contacts, to talk to people, to say hello, and to be concerned are human behaviors we normally exercise very frequently at home. These same activities—getting to know people and addressing them by name—provide a psychological trust that can be used if an unexpected confrontation should arise. Under such a condition the possibility to call a soldier from the conflicting party by name is an advantage, and from the psychological point of view it is difficult to maintain a hostile attitude when this occurs. Though this kind of "making-contact" attitude has improved considerably, much more should be done. All this is well known by personnel involved in peacekeeping, military observer or civilian police missions, humanitarian operations, and other similar initiatives. However, to commence and maintain these conditions is essential and critical in sensitive operations that do not have the visible weight of the international community, or where the parties are unfavorable toward the United Nations presence.

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CONCLUSION The psychological aspects of a combat operation are stressful but unambiguous, and steps are taken to prepare soldiers for the confrontations of battle. However, the psychological factors of peacekeeping should also be the concern of peacekeeping personnel, since these factors have an impact on the capacity of peacekeepers to be effective and the well-being of these soldiers on the ground. Peacekeepers must face the political and human complexities of the conflict, sometimes in an environment of threat or violence. Often the peaceful resolution of the dispute at the local level will depend on the peacekeeper on the ground being able to apply the psychology of peacekeeping. NOTE Part of this article has been included in Harleman, Johnson, and Sumit (1998). Report on United Nations guard contingent in Iraq. Presented to Department manitarian Affairs, United Nations; and Harleman. (1998). Civilian peace monitor A challenge for the future. Article presented to ACCORD, South Afri REFERENCES Fetherston, B. (1993). Toward a theory of U.N. peacekeeping (Peace Research

Number 31). Bradford, UK: University of Bradford, Department of Peace Stud ies. Last, D. N. (1995). Theory, doctrine and practice of conflict de-escalation in peac keeping operations. Report No. AD-A299 303. Fort Leaven worth, KA: U.S Army Command and General Staff College. Mackinlay, J., & Chopra, J. (1992). Second generation multinational operations. Wash ington Quarterly 14(3), 113-131. Mackinlay, J., & Chopra, J. (1993). A draft concept of second generation multinational operations. Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. Sahnoun, M. (1996, October). Talk given at the UK based Catholic Institute of International Relations, London. Scott, J. P. (1958). Aggression. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. United Nations. (1945 and later editions). Charter of the United Nations and Statut of the International Court of Justice. New York: United Nations Department Public Information. United Nations. (1995a). United Nations stress management booklet. New York: Uni Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations. (1995b). United Nations military observers handbook. New York United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

CHAPTER 9

Psychological Ambiguities in Peacekeeping Thomas W. Britt

The need to understand the psychological issues in peacekeeping operations is becoming more pronounced as military personnel participate in increasing numbers of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief deployments. Both scientific analyses (Britt, in press; Litz, 1996; Miller & Moskos, 1995; Segal & Segal, 1993) and editorials (Clarke, 1995; Costello, 1995; Hunt, 1994; Roos, 1993) have discussed the increased demands that peacekeeping operations place on soldiers that have been trained to have a "combat" mentality. Often peacekeeping missions are accompanied by psychological ambiguities surrounding the degree of control individuals have over their behavior on the mission, the guidelines for conduct and success during the mission, and the relevance of the mission to the individual's role as a soldier. These ambiguities can serve as unique sources of stress for soldiers that may undermine the motivation of individuals, causing them to become disengaged from their performance during the mission (Britt, in press). Furthermore, these ambiguities, when present to a strong degree, may also put the soldier at risk for stress-related problems (Litz, King, King, Orsillo, & Friedman, 1997). Understanding the nature and sources of the psychological ambiguities in peacekeeping operations will lead to intervention strategies for reducing the ambiguities and therefore reducing stress and maximizing personal involvement in the mission. The uncertainties soldiers face during peacekeeping missions are diverse and at first glance appear to defy categorization. The following list of poten-

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tial ambiguities during peacekeeping operations is by no means exhaustive: unclear rules of engagement for defense, lack of proper training for the mission, restricted ability to act in the face of threat or abuse, unclear standards to judge if a mission is successful, questions about the relevance of peacekeeping missions to a "soldier identity,'* soldier doubts about their ability to truly alter the stalemate, concerns about having to switch from being a peacekeeper to being a warrior, questions about whether the military will reward participation in peacekeeping operations, and questions about the overall importance of peacekeeping operations. Given the diversity of these ambiguities, the Triangle Model of Responsibility (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994) will be used to organize the potential psychological issues soldiers face on peacekeeping operations, guiding discussion of the ambiguities and interventions for reducing them. I will first briefly summarize the Triangle Model of Responsibility. The main section of this chapter then uses the Triangle Model to guide a detailed discussion of the potential ambiguities in peacekeeping operations using examples from recent operations. The final section discusses potential interventions for reducing the psychological ambiguities soldiers face on peacekeeping operations so as to maximize soldiers' involvement in the mission and the potential benefits of participating in such operations. In discussing the psychological issues involved in peacekeeping I may tend to emphasize the experiences of soldiers from the United States more than is warranted, given their limited participation in such operations in comparison to other countries. However, most of the issues discussed are relevant to soldiers from all nations participating in peacekeeping operations, and issues relevant only to U.S. soldiers will be clearly identified. THE TRIANGLE MODEL OF RESPONSIBILITY The Triangle Model of Responsibility (Schlenker, 1986; Schlenker et al., 1994; Schlenker, Weigold, & Doherty, 1991) was developed to organize prior analyses of responsibility and provide a complete account of what causes people to feel and be held responsible. As such, the model was developed as a general model to explain responsibility in diverse settings. However, as will become clear in the discussion of the psychological ambiguities soldiers face during peacekeeping operations, the Triangle Model serves as an excellent vehicle for showing how the psychological ambiguities in peacekeeping can affect soldier involvement in such operations. According to the Triangle Model, responsibility on any given occasion is best viewed as a transaction between the specific eventthat has occurred or is anticipated (e.g., exam, battle, mission, training exercise), the prescriptions or rules that govern the event (e.g., "shop" rules, general ethical codes such as "help others who are in need"), and the identity images the individual has

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that are relevant to the event and prescriptions (e.g., soldier, humanitarian, parent). The event, prescriptions, and identity images are the elements involved in any assessment of responsibility. The three elements and the linkages among them form a triangle when drawn schematically (see Figure 9.1). The amount of responsibility, as well as clarity or purpose, an individual feels on any given occasion is a direct function of the strength of the linkages among the elements and the importance of the elements to the individual. In brief, high responsibility exists when the individual interprets the prescriptions as being relevant to his or her identity or role (strong prescriptionidentity link), a clear and well-defined set of prescriptions or guidelines are applicable to the event (strong prescription-event link), the individual has personal control over the event (strong identity-event link), and the event, prescriptions, and/or identity images are important to the individual. COMPONENTS OF THE TRIANGLE MODEL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AMBIGUITIES IN PEACEKEEPING In this section the psychological ambiguities soldiers experience during peacekeeping operations are discussed within the framework of the Triangle Model. To set the stage for the discussion, the elements (events, prescriptions, identity images) applied to peacekeeping operations are first discussed. The psychological ambiguities soldiers experience are then addressed in sections on element importance and the links between the elements.

Figure 9.1 The Triangle Model of Responsibility

Element Potency: The combined importance of the prescriptions, event, and identity images

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The Elements The event is the performance or unit of behavior that is anticipated or has occurred. Events can vary along a number of dimensions. An event can either be an isolated occurrence such as an exam or a movement in battle, or can be more broad, such as a soldier's performance during a training course or mission or consideration for promotion to a higher rank. For peacekeeping operations, examples of events include performance on courses designed to familiarize the soldier with local customs of the host nation(s), behavior during an escalation among conflicting parties, and performance on the entire peacekeeping mission. Prescriptions refer to the rules or codes of conduct that are applicable to the event. They are guidelines for performance that tell the individual what is required for exemplary conduct. Prescriptions often serve as scripts that guide an individual's conduct on any given occasion (Abelson, 1981; Schlenker et al., 1994). Prescriptions are diverse, ranging from specific guidelines, such as company policy for ordering equipment, to more general ethical codes, such as "do unto others as they would do unto you." Prescriptions applied to peacekeeping operations are diverse and ever changing (Cornell-D'Echert, 1994; Meacham, 1992). Similar to all prescriptions, peacekeeping prescriptions range from the specific rules and guidelines for how soldiers are to conduct themselves during the mission to more general prescriptions or rules that guide the soldiers' conduct. Examples of the former category include rules for how to act with members of the local population (e.g., soldiers are to avoid developing friendships with the local population) and when to use force during the mission (e.g., use force only when personally attacked). Examples of more general prescriptions include those that the soldier brings to the peacekeeping environment. For example, soldiers may believe it is important to help others less fortunate than they (Halverson & Bliese, 1996; Segal, Furukawa, & Lindh, 1990). Identity images are roles, qualities, characteristics, and aspirations an individual possesses. Examples of identity images include being a mother or father, soldier, humanitarian, conservative, or officer. As such a list indicates, the identity images an individual possesses arise from a combination of both controllable and uncontrollable factors. For example, an individual presumably "chooses" to be an officer or of a certain political ideology. However, an individual may be a father yet not have planned to have a child. Even though the individual did not choose to be a father, "father" is still an identity image of the individual, and obligates the individual to behave in certain kinds of ways. Numerous identity images are relevant to peacekeeping operations. In addition to the traditional military identity images of noncommissioned officer, combat soldier, and the like, a new set of identity images become relevant, including peacekeeper, peacemaker, humanitarian, mediator, observer, and multinational

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"interactant" (Eyre, Segal, & Segal, 1993; Miller & Moskos, 1995; Segal et al., 1990; Segal & Segal, 1993). In addition, in most cases these identity images are more or less forced on the soldier. Soldiers who enter the armed forces may not think they will be involved in situations in which they are not defending national interests through the use of force. Though peacekeeping operations are not new (see Gravino, Segal, Segal, & Waldman, 1993), soldiers and society are still at the initial phase of constructing what it means to be a peacekeeper. In an excellent analysis of the social construction of peacekeeping from the U.S. perspective, Eyre et al. (1993) noted that though most people agree that the main purpose of the military is to serve national interests, the use of the military to encourage or enforce peace has not yet been institutionalized as a proper role of the armed forces. Therefore, the process by which soldiers incorporate the role of peacekeeper into their identity is of immense importance (see Miller & Moskos, 1995; Segal et al., 1990). Element Importance or Potency The prescriptions, event, and/or identity images can all differ in their importance to the individual. Some events are more important than others, either because they mean more to the individual or produce greater consequences. For example, a battle can be more or less important depending on its implication for the overall campaign or the number of casualties incurred. Prescriptions are more important when they refer to more serious rules (e.g., murder versus shoplifting) or rules the individual cherishes to a greater extent (e.g., some individuals hold the prescription of compassion higher than that of loyalty). Identity images are more important when they refer to more central components of the individual's identity (Britt, 1993; Schlenker, Britt, & Pennington, 1996). For example, being a parent may be more important to someone than being at the top of his or her professional field. Schlenker et al. (1994) argued that the combined importance of the elements represents the potency of the performance. As the potency surrounding a given event increases, so do the consequences of performance for the individual. Therefore, as the potency of the performance increases, the individual will be become more engaged and motivated to do well on the task (Britt, in press). It is clear that individuals differ in their view of the importance of peacekeeping operations (Gifford, 1993; Halverson & Bliese 1996; Litz et al., 1997). These individual differences are undoubtedly a function of the importance individuals place on the prescriptions and identity images associated with being a peacekeeper. Some individuals believe it is important to promote world peace, whereas other individuals believe it is a waste of time and resources to help other countries solve their problems (Segal et aL, 1990). For example, Miller and Moskos (1995) surveyed U.S. soldiers who participated in Operation Restore Hope to Somalia and found that soldiers were equally

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divided regarding whether the United States was right in sending forces to Somalia, illustrating wide variability in soldiers' beliefs regarding the importance of the operation. Similar variability in perceptions of the importance of peacekeeping operations was found by Halverson and Bliese (1996), who studied U.S. soldiers participating in Operation Uphold Democracy to Haiti. These authors found that 49 percent of the soldiers surveyed did not believe it was important that the United States be involved in the operation. Finally, Britt and Adler (1997) surveyed U.S. soldiers participating in Operation Joint Endeavor to Bosnia and found that in response to the statement, "The U.S. Military serves an important function by participating in peacekeeping operations," 40 percent of the soldiers agreed, 23 percent disagreed, and 38 percent were neutral, again illustrating variability in perceptions regarding the importance of peacekeeping operations. Though questions about the importance of peacekeeping operations are interesting, a significant question is whether such beliefs are predictive of additional outcome measures. Research has shown that doubts about the importance of peacekeeping operations are related to reduced motivation and increased levels of psychological dysfunction. Litz et al. (1997) found that soldiers who reported greater "positive aspects of peacekeeping" (e.g., helping others) during the U.S. deployment to Somalia evidenced lower levels of post-traumatic stress disorder symptomology. Britt (in press) also showed that belief in job importance predicted a soldier's level of morale in an analysis of data collected by the Department of Military Psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (Halverson & Bliese, 1996). Finally, Britt and Adler (1997) found that soldiers who tended to adopt the peacekeeper role also reported lower levels of depression during Operation Joint Endeavor to Bosnia. The importance or potency of the elements is clearly related to soldier's level of morale, as well as potential stress-related difficulties. In addition to soldiers* own views of the importance of peacekeeping operations, they must also contend with their perceptions of how society views such missions. For example, German peacekeepers may experience stress as a function of the ambivalent feelings German society has for such operations (Kornhuber, 1994). As Eyre et al. (1993) noted, societies are still in the process of "constructing" the importance of peacekeeping operations relative to other types of operations. Halverson and Bliese (1996) found that 50 percent of U.S. soldiers in Operation Uphold Democracy to Haiti were unsure whether the U.S. society supported the operation, and, among those with an opinion, responses were divided, with half perceiving public support for the operation and the other half not perceiving support. This discussion illustrates that nations may exhibit the same kind of ambiguities regarding peacekeeping operations as individuals, having to come to terms with the importance of such operations in comparison to other military activities. Discourse regarding the importance of peacekeeping is plentiful in the United States. An example is

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Roos's (1993) article, "The perils of peacekeeping: Tallying the costs in blood, coin, prestige, and readiness." In the article, Roos stresses the importance of recognizing that funding for peacekeeping operations comes at a cost for other forms of training more central to the role of the armed services. It is also important to recognize that the discussions regarding the importance of peacekeeping operations can ultimately affect the soldier. In the study of U.S. soldiers deployed to Haiti mentioned earlier, Halverson and Bliese (1996) found that soldiers perceiving public support for the operation were more likely themselves to support the operation than were soldiers who did not perceive public support. THE LINKAGES The linkages among the elements are crucial ingredients in determining an individual's level of engagement on a given occasion. When these linkages are strong, the individual has a clear "road map" for performance, will persevere in the face of obstacles, and will experience less stress as a function of ambiguities or uncertainties in what is expected. When the linkages are weak, apathy and uncertainty plague performance. Prescription-Identity Link The prescription-identity link refers to the degree to which a set of rules or standards apply to an individual as a result of the individual's characteristics (e.g., being an adult or a citizen of a given country), roles (e.g., being a parent, officer, commander), convictions or aspirations (e.g., being a Muslim, a scientist, a humanitarian), or training (e.g., being a registered nurse or lawyer). In essence, the link refers to the strength of the connection between a set of rules and aspects of an individual's identity. In the responsibility literature, this link is often referred to as "role responsibility" (Hamilton, 1978). A strong prescription-identity link exists when a set of prescriptions clearly applies to an individual. For example, being a commander of a unit clearly implies that the individual must be attentive to the behavior of his or her subordinates. Another example of a strong link is that a devoted Muslim must follow the rules of the Koran. A weak prescription-identity link exists when a set of prescriptions does not apply to an individual or when there is ambiguity or conflict about whether a set of rules apply to an individual. For example, the mental-illness defense argues that certain rules are not applicable to an individual because he or she did not possess the characteristics of being of "sound mind." A weak prescription-identity link also exists when an individual is experiencing an identity or role conflict. For example, an individual may not be able to decide which career to enter, and therefore fails to "connect" to a set of guidelines governing his or her job performance. In addition, individuals may experience conflicting prescriptions within a single job, as

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in the case of a professor feeling conflict between spending time conducting research and teaching high-quality courses to students. Conflicting prescriptions can apply to an individual within a single performance domain (intrarole conflict) or between performance domains (interrole conflict; see Stryker & Statham, 1985). A strong prescription-identity link provides guidance and purpose for an individual. The individual does what he or she was trained to do, and feels bound by the obligations his or her job entails. Individuals experience reduced anxiety and uncertainty when they have a road map that is relevant to their convictions and aspirations. A weak identity-prescription link results in feelings of disconnection from one's job and reduced feelings of commitment. Alienation, which occurs when individuals fail to incorporate any of society's prescriptions (Seeman, 1959), may represent one of the weakest forms of the prescription-identity link. The prescription-identity link is crucial to understanding the ambiguities soldiers experience during peacekeeping operations. This component of the Triangle Model can be weakened a couple of different ways during peacekeeping operations. Perhaps the most basic level is when soldiers are required to do something they are not trained to do (Britt, in press; Halverson & Bliese, 1996). Past research has shown that approximately 50 percent of soldiers report that additional training is needed to succeed on peacekeeping operations (Bartone, Adler, & Vaitkus, 1996; Segal et al., 1990). Soldiers from many countries are trained psychologically and technically to prevail over a foe through force and gain dominance through intimidation and violence. A Colonel from the Fiji Army commented, "From a military standpoint, you are trained to close with the enemy and kill him. In the U.N., an army is sent in for the purpose of peace. That means a soldier has to change his entire state of mind" (Greenberg, 1992, p. 66). It is clear that peacekeeping duties require a quite different set of skills (e.g., negotiation, empathy) that the soldier may not see as relevant to his or her primary role. Britt and Adler (1997) found that, among U.S. soldiers participating in Operation Joint Endeavor to Bosnia, 36 percent disagreed with the statement that the role of peacekeeper was relevant to their military training, whereas 23 percent agreed with the statement (the remaining soldiers were neutral). The U.S. Army has developed peacekeeping training programs, and these programs have been proven effective, at least in increasing soldiers beliefs that "a soldier is professional and does any job he [sic] is given with equal professional skill" (Segal et al., 1990, p. 391). However, it may be premature to suggest that such a finding translates into uan acceptance of the peacekeeping role" (p. 391). Even following peacekeeping training, research has showed that U.S. soldiers inevitably adapt to peacekeeping missions, either by adopting the role of peacekeeper or by falling back on a "combat mode" of behavior (Miller & Moskos, 1995). Another way the prescription-identity link can be weakened is when soldiers experience identity or role conflict between the different prescriptions

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that are relevant to peacekeeping operations. For example, soldiers may experience conflict between the desire to follow orders not to help members of the local population and their own convictions that it is important to help others who are less fortunate than they. Furthermore, the prescriptions associated with the identity images of "peacekeeper" and "warrior" are themselves conflicting, and soldiers are often expected to adopt both types of identities during a single operation. Even if soldiers become skilled in the techniques of peacekeeping operations, they still may not adopt the role of peacekeeper into their view of what it means to be a soldier. Finally, the prescription-identity link can be weakened during peacekeeping missions by the soldier failing to see the relevance of the mission to his or her professional development. Segal and Meeker (1985) studied U.S. soldiers deployed to the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers and found that soldiers who perceived peacekeeping missions as related to their career were more likely to have positive attitudes toward peacekeeping operations than soldiers who did not see the relevance of such operations. If soldiers feel that peacekeeping missions are not really valued by senior leaders of the armed forces, they will exhibit reduced levels of engagement and become apathetic regarding why they should be participating on the mission. Prescription-Event Link The prescription-event link refers to the extent that a clear set of prescriptions, rules, or guidelines apply to a given event. This link is strong when a single set of rules or guidelines unambiguously apply to an event. Examples of a strong link include a student being told exactly what is required to achieve a superior grade in a course or a supervisor clearly laying out the steps to complete an inventory for a company. The link is weak when the rules for a particular performance are unclear or ambiguous, or when more than one set of rules appears relevant to a particular event. For example, an employee may be told to give a report on the current status of a product, yet be given no guidelines about what the report should include. The prescription-event link represents that part of responsibility stressed by legal scholars as the clarity of various rules and regulations (Hart, 1968). Prior research has shown that a strong prescription-event link provides direction to behavior and reduces anxiety (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). When an individual "knows what to do" going into an event, his or her behavior is easily channeled to attaining desired goals. However, when the rules or guidelines are unclear, performance suffers, especially when individuals are expected to do well (Baumeister, Hamilton, &Tice, 1985). Many problems within organizations occur when rules or regulations are too complex, nonexistent, or are not clearly communicated to workers (Brown & Leigh, 1996). Peacekeeping operations are often characterized by a weakened prescriptionevent link. One of the main psychological ambiguities facing soldiers on peace-

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keeping missions is uncertainty about the mission and what is required of the soldier (Gilford, 1993). For example, Miller and Moskos (1995), in describing the experiences of U.S. soldiers from Operation Support Hope in Somalia, noted that understanding the rules of engagement was very difficult for soldiers exposed to hostile acts. The observations of Fair (1995) also support the difficulty of understanding the rules of engagement in Somalia. Fair was a U.S. Army lawyer who instructed soldiers on the rules of engagement for Somalia. Fair noted that the Somalia environment was plagued with uncertainty regarding how soldiers should respond to hostile civilians, arguing that "a wartime scenario would have been more certain than this Military Operation Other than War environment," and that "U.S. troops operated under rathe restrictive, yet vague rules of engagement" (p. 6). During the predeployment training for Somalia, all soldiers were given a "pocket card" summarizing the rules of engagement. However, Fair noted that pocket cards describing rather abstract conditions for firing on an antagonist did not begin to approach the reality of having to decide whether to fire on a young child who might be armed with some sort of weapon. Fair found the need for repeated training using real-world examples in order for soldiers to feel comfortable with the rules of engagement. Abizaid (1993) also noted the importance of clear rules of engagement when describing U.S. participation in Operation Provide Comfort to northern Iraq to separate the Iraqi forces from the Kurds who were in need of humanitarian assistance. Abizaid (1993) felt, "Soldiers had to clearly understand the rules of engagement and the level of discipline necessary to keep cool under the most provocative of circumstance" (p. 12). In training soldiers for the mission, Abizaid noted the importance of "wargaming responses to logical peacekeeping confrontations" (p. 12). Another source of a weakened prescription-event link on peacekeeping operations involves the conflict between the guidelines that soldiers have internalized prior to the mission and guidelines mandated during the peacekeeping operations. For example, Segal et al. (1990) found that 50 percent of the soldiers they surveyed in the Multinational Observer Force to the Sinai believed they could not be effective in a peacekeeping role without using force. Of course, this attitude is the result of repeated emphasis on aspects of combat training such as weapons qualification, self-defense, and nuclearbiological-chemical defense training. However, soldiers are likely to be told upon arriving at a peacekeeping mission that they are not to use force except under extremely restrictive conditions. If soldiers believe that such restrictions reduce the likelihood of mission success, uncertainty arises, resulting in increased stress being placed on the soldier. The rules associated with performance on peacekeeping missions may also suddenly change depending on certain contingencies. For example, an uprising from one of the parties involved in a conflict may necessitate the radical restructuring of guidelines for how to act from peacekeeping to peacemaking

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(Meacham, 1992). Soldiers will then be required to go from a peacekeeping mode to a "semi-combat" mode, once again encountering a set of rules that may be confusing or conflict with other guidelines. Such was the case among U.S. forces in Somalia, who had to prepare for combat in the context of a peacekeeping mission following the deaths of eighteen soldiers participating in the operation. Finally, the prescription-event link can be weakened on peacekeeping operations through the failure to provide soldiers with clear indications of what constitutes successful performance. Bandura's (1977) analysis of self-efficacy stresses the importance of understanding the specific actions that are necessary to attain a successful outcome. In combat operations, the criteria for successful performance are often relatively clear (e.g., conquer the objective, stop enemy troops from advancing). However, in peacekeeping operations it is often very difficult for soldiers to understand what constitutes mission success. Hunt (1994) noted that political talks and negotiations often continue after soldiers have returned from the mission, providing soldiers with little closure on what they have accomplished and whether they have been successful. In discussing Operation Uphold Democracy to Haiti, Benson and Thrash (1996) note the importance of planning clear exit strategies so that soldiers know when a successful mission has been completed. Identity-Event Link The identity-event link refers to the extent to which an individual feels connected to an event, such as by having personal control over the outcome. Heider's (1958) analysis of responsibility dealt primarily with this link, as he noted that the degree of connection could range from simply being associated with an event (e.g., being present at an event) to having full control over an event and being able to foresee the consequences (e.g., an individual commits a preplanned murder fully cognizant of the penalties). The identityevent link is the most extensively and earliest-studied (see Aristotle, 1952) link in the responsibility literature (see Fincham & Jaspers, 1980; Schlenker et al., 1994). A strong identity-event link exists when the individual has personal control over his or her performance and behaves not out of a desire for external rewards, but out of an intrinsic desire to accomplish a given goal (Deci & Ryan, 1987; Rotter, 1966; Spector, 1982). A strong link is also characterized by the belief that the individual can carry out the actions that are required to make a meaningful contribution to the task at hand (Bandura, 1977). The identity-event link is weak when individuals do not feel personal control over an event, either because they do not believe they have the ability to carry out the required actions or they are performing the event because of external pressures rather than because of their own interest (Deci & Ryan, 1987). Of course, when an individual feels that he or she is simply being told what to do

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by someone else, the "someone else" can be held responsible, therefore making the individual feel less responsible. A large amount of research suggests that a strong identity-event link is associated with better task performance, more effective problem solving, greater task persistence, more positive emotions, and even better psychological and physical health. In sharp contrast, a weak identity-event link is associated with poor performance, reduced levels of motivation, and poor psychological and physical health (Bandura, 1977; Deci & Ryan, 1987; Langer, 1982; Seligman, 1975). A weak identity-event link creates a feeling of "learned helplessness" (Seligman, 1975), where individuals do not feel that environmental contingencies are dependent on their own actions. The lack of control soldiers feel during peacekeeping operations may represent one of the most potent threats to engagement and one of the greatest sources of stress during such operations. One of the most difficult issues for soldiers during certain types of peacekeeping operations is to have to stand by and witness horrific acts committed against members of a local population without being able to intervene (Weisaeth, 1990). Soldiers must also sometimes put up with being taunted and humiliated without being able to respond (Litz, 1992; Weisaeth, 1990). Rules of engagement that are overly restrictive can serve to make the soldier feel "out of control," thereby decreasing the soldier's belief in his or her efficacy to perform even the most basic behaviors (Seligman, 1975). Weisaeth (1990) has discussed how the lack of control soldiers feel during certain kinds of peacekeeping operations may lead to a unique "U.N. Soldier's Stress Syndrome," characterized by a fear of losing control over one's aggression. Soldiers participating in these operations must continually suppress their desire to aggress when repeatedly taunted or in some cases assaulted by the local population. Litz et al. (1997) have conducted important empirical work on the predictors and effects of soldiers having to suppress their natural tendency to respond aggressively to threats during peacekeeping operations. These authors found that among U.S. veterans of the Somalia operation, reporting of greater "negative aspects of peacekeeping" (low-level stressors and irritants) was associated with greater pressure of having to uphold restraint in the face of threat. Britt (in press) also found that among soldiers participating in a contingency mission to Saudi Arabia, those who reported having greater control over their job were more likely to be engaged (responsible and committed) in the mission. Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) have shown that in the face of uncontrollable circumstances individuals will sometimes attempt to change their reactions to the lack of control to minimize the threats associated with the loss of control. For example, individuals can engage in distracting activities or reinterpret the situation in terms that provide them with a nondirect form of control. In the case of peacekeeping operations, when U.N. soldiers are faced with taunts and have to restrain their natural tendency toward aggression they should be

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encouraged to reinterpret the situation in a way that provides some form of secondary control over their situation. For example, they could reason that they would not respond with aggression even if such aggression were justified because of the potential escalation in violence that may result. Another possibility for a peacekeeping force to use its lack of control to an advantage comes from a Finnish battalion participating in a U.N. mission. Greenberg (1992) describes the case of the Finnish battalion that was faced with the task of deterring Israeli aggression following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israeli forces were prepared to roll over the Finnish battalion when the battalion laid down their weapons, joined arms, and stood directly in the path of the Israelis. Greenberg (1992) noted that a Finnish photographer was close by, and that the potential for international pressure as a result of attacking the U.N. force caused the Israelis to back off. INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE PSYCHOLOGICAL AMBIGUITIES In summary, psychological ambiguities during peacekeeping operations can be a unique source of stress and cause soldiers to become disengaged from the mission. The Triangle Model asserts that stress will be minimized, and engagement maximized, when a clear set of guidelines applies to the event (prescription-event link), the rules apply to the individual as a function of proper training (prescription-identity link), the individual has personal control over his or her performance on the event (identity-event link), and the event is viewed as important by the individual. Peacekeeping operations run the risk of soldiers feeling confused or conflicted about the guidelines for how to behave, not being trained for the mission to which they have been assigned, feeling that they do not have the capacity to exert control over their situation on deployment, and having doubts about the importance of such operations. A summary of the psychological ambiguities associated with each link and element importance, as well as interventions that should serve to reduce the ambiguities, are presented in Table 9.1. All the interventions in Table 9.1 are designed to strengthen the links between the events that occur during peacekeeping operations, the rules or guidelines that apply to these operations, and the aspects of the soldier's identity that are potentially relevant to peacekeeping operations. For the prescription-identity link, making sure soldiers have proper training and ensuring they perceive that training as relevant to their overall development will reduce the strain associated with being taken away from family and friends for no perceived purpose. In addition, soldiers should be told early in their careers that they are going to be involved in peacekeeping operations, so they can prepare themselves mentally for such operations early on. In addition, soldiers need to be trained in adopting a flexible approach toward their work so they will be prepared for multiple operations.

Table 9.1 Psychological Ambiguities during Peacekeeping Operations and Recommendations for Reducing the Ambiguities Link/Element Prescription-Identity

Psychological Ambiguity "I'm not trained for this!"

Potential Interventions Provide peacekeeping training (U.S. soldiers who deployed in Bosnia all receive additional peacekeeping training)

i*m a combat soldier, not a peacekeeper" Show how the values/traits that make soldiers effective combat soldiers also apply to peacekeeping (e.g., discipline, integrity)

Prescription-Event

Identity-Event

Element (mission) Importance

"How is this relevant to my career?"

Have senior military officials discuss the relevance of peacekeeping operations to job promotion and advancement

"How am I to respond if attacked?"

Clear rules of engagement for self-defense

"What if this thing turns into a war?"

Make sure soldiers understand they may have to move from one set of rules (e.g., peacekeeping) to another (e.g., combat)

"How do I know if I have done a good job?"

Have clear guidelines for mission success (e.g. focus on succeeding at the specific task the soldier has been assigned)

"I have no control over what I can do!'1

Strong rules of engagement for self-defense; encourage other forms of control; avoid overly restrictive rules for off-duty

"What I am doing will have no effect on the warring factions"

Explain to soldiers how they are contributing to a greater likelihood of peace among the warring factions

"My country does not value these types of operations"

Emphasize to soldiers the importance of doing any mission they are asked to perform Communicate to the public the importance and relevance of peacekeeping operations

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For the prescription-event link, clear and unambiguous rules of engagement and guidelines for mission success, along with the acknowledgment that contingencies may change, reduces tension and anxiety for the soldier if he or she is put in a situation where the use of force is necessary. Though the clarity and strength of the rules of engagement are related, they are not the same attribute. When rules of engagement are strong, they also tend to be clear (e.g., soldiers are instructed to fire whenever they feel threatened). However, weak rules of engagement can differ dramatically in their clarity. Fair (1995) has persuasively argued that making the rules of engagement clear is not an easy task, as it requires repeated training using real-world examples. For the identity-event link, strong rules of engagement permitting the use of force when necessary will give soldiers a greater feeling of personal control over their own lives by allowing them to protect themselves if needed. In addition, by discussing how the soldier's specific skill or job contributes to the overall success of the peacekeeping mission, soldiers can perform their job knowing that they are contributing to an overall goal rather than believing they have no impact on the outcome. Finally, for mission importance, soldiers should feel that they are involved in a worthwhile mission that is valued by their society. Of course, showing soldiers that society cares about peacekeeping operations is not easy, especially if such public sentiment simply does not exist. However, leaders should attempt to communicate to soldiers the importance of any operation they are asked to perform. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The psychological issues soldiers face on peacekeeping operations have implications for soldiers themselves as well as more general issues surrounding the nature of work and the development of stress-related problems. Research is needed to examine different interventions designed to reduce psychological ambiguities associated with such operations, and to examine the effects of such interventions on performance, psychological health, and the meaning soldiers assign to their work. More research is also needed on the impact of peacekeeping operations. Though there are unique stressors associated with peacekeeping operations (e.g., enhanced ambiguity), there may also be many perceived benefits associated with such operations, including pride at helping nations reach peace, an increased feeling of resiliency as a function of getting through the deployment, a greater appreciation for the individual's own culture and state of peace, and a better perspective on other cultures and international relations. Britt, Adler, and Bartone (1998) conducted an initial study among soldiers returning from Bosnia (Operation Joint Endeavor), in which they asked soldiers about the impact the deployment had on them. The open-ended responses to the question of the deployment's impact were diverse, representing both positive and negative impact in the areas of identity, work, and family. Over

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one-third of the soldiers reported the deployment had a positive impact on their identity in terms of increased resilience to stress and a greater appreciation for freedom. Britt et al. (1998) also found that soldiers who perceived the mission as relevant to their role as members of the armed forces were more likely to report the deployment having a positive impact. These results suggest that components of the Triangle Model account not only for the psychological ambiguities soldiers experience during peacekeeping operations, but also for the kind of impact peacekeeping operations can have on soldiers. In conclusion, the psychological issues soldiers face during peacekeeping operations represent a new class of potential stressors and threats to engagement from traditional combat operations. In addition to the traditional fears of loss of life and living in an uncomfortable environment, soldiers face a number of ambiguities surrounding the guidelines for their performance and relevance of such missions to their identity. Understanding the nature of these ambiguities sheds light on the nature and sources of psychological stress and the factors that cause individuals to become engaged in what they are doing. In addition, recognizing and understanding these ambiguities may lead to interventions designed to minimize their impact.

REFERENCES Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American Psycholo gist, 56,715-729. Abizaid, J. P. (1993). Lessons for peacekeepers. Military Review, 73, 11-19. Aristotle. (1952). Nichomachean ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Chicago: Great Books Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84, 191-215. Bartone, P. T., Adler, A. B., & Vaitkus, M. A. (1996). U.S.-Soldaten und die Anforderungen von Friedensmissionen-Sozialpsychologische Aspekte (Social psychological issues in the adaptation of U.S. Army forces to peacekeeping and contingency missions). In G. M. Meyer (Ed.), Friedensengel im Kamp anzug?: Zu Theorie und Praxis militarischer U.N.-Einsatze (Angels of p in battle dress?: Theory and practice of military U.N. operations). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Baumeister, R. F., Hamilton, J. C, & Tice, D. M. (1985). Public versus private expec ancies of success: Confidence booster or performance pressure? Journal o Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1447-1457. Benson, K. C. M., & Thrash, C. B. (1996, Autumn). Declaring victory: Planning exit strategies for peace operations. Parameters, pp. 69-80. Britt, T. W. (1993). Metatraits: Evidence relevant to the validity of the construct and its implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 554-56 Britt, T. W. (1995). Using the triangle model of responsibility to understand psyc logical ambiguities in peacekeeping operations. Paper presented at the bie nial meeting of the Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Britt, T. W. (in press). Responsibility, morale, and commitment during military opera tions. Military Review.

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Britt, T. W., & Adler, A. B. (1997). Health and stress among soldiers and spouse during Operation Joint Endeavor. Paper presented to the Army Medical D partment Training Conference, Weillingen, Germany. Britt, T W., Adler, A. B., & Bartone, P. T. (1998). The meaning and impact of stres events: Lessonsfrom the Bosnian peacekeeping operation. Manuscript under Brown, S. P., & Leigh, T. W. (1996). A new look at psychological climate and its relationship to job involvement, effort, and performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 358-368. Clarke, J. L. (1995, February). The enforcement specialists: U.S. forces are best suite to peace enforcement. Armed Forces Journal International, pp. 34Cornell-D'Echert, B. (1994). We need a peacekeeping MTP (mission training plan). Infantry, 84, 34-35. Costello, J. (1995, January). Plenty of room for valor. Armed Forces Journal Intern tional, p. 47. Deci, E., & Ryan, R. M. (1987). The support of autonomy and the control of behavior Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 1024-1037. Eyre, D. P., Segal, D. R., & Segal, M. W. (1993). The social construction of peacekeeping. In D. R. Segal & M. W. Segal (Eds.), Peacekeepers and their wive Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Fair, K. V. (1995, October). The rules of engagement in Somalia: A Judge Advoc diary. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Maryland. Fincham, F. D., & Jaspers, J. M. (1980). Attribution of responsibility: From man the scientist to man as lawyer. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimenta social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 81-138). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Gifford, R. K. (1993, December). The U.S. Army in Somalia: Psychological asp of Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope. NATO Stress Workshop, Antonio, Texas. Gravino, K. S., Segal, D. R., Segal, M. W, & Waldman, R. J. (1993). The evolution o peacekeeping as a military mission. In D. R. Segal & M. W. Segal (Eds.), Pea keepers and their wives. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Greenberg, K. E. (1992). The essential art of empathy. MHQ: The Quarterly Journ of Military History, 5, 64-69. Halverson, R. R., & Bliese, P. D. (1996). Determinants of soldier support for Operation Uphold Democracy. Armed Forces and Society, 23, 81-96. Hamilton, V. L. (1978). Who is responsible? Toward a social psychology of responsibility attribution. Social Psychology, 41, 316-328. Hart, H. L. A. (1968). Punishment and responsibility: Essays in the philosophy of l New York: Oxford University Press. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Oxford U versity Press. Hunt, J. B. (1994). Thoughts on peace support operations. Military Review, 74,76-8 Kornhuber, A. W. (1994, June). Personal experience from GECOMFORSOM UNSOSOMII: Both neurology and psychiatry are required. Paper present the International Congress on Military Medicine, Augsburg, Germany. Langer, E. J. (1982). The psychology of control Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Litz, B. T. (1992). Emotional numbing in combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder: critical review and reformulation. Clinical Psychology Review, 12, 417-43

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Litz, B. T. (1996). The psychological demands of peacekeeping for military personnel. NCP Clinical Quarterly, 6, 1-8. Litz, B. T, King, L. A., King, D. W., Orsillo, S. M., & Friedman, M. J. (1997). Warriors as peacekeepers: Features of the Somalia experience and PTSD. Journ of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65, 1001-1010. Meacham, J. (1992). From peacekeeping to peacemaking: United Nations forces a changing role. International Defense Review, 25,217-221. Miller, L. L., & Moskos, C. C. (1995). Humanitarians or warriors? Race, gender, and combat status in Operation Restore Hope. Armed Forces & Society, 21,615-^ Roos, J. G. (1993, December). The perils of peacekeeping: Tallying the costs in blood coin, prestige, and readiness. Armed Forces Journal International, 9, 13-1 Rothbaum, F, Weisz, J. R., & Snyder, S. S. (1982). Changing the world and changing the self: A two-process model of perceived control. Journal of Personality an Social Psychology, 42, 5-37. Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80(1, Whole No. 609). Schlenker, B. R. (1986). Personal accountability: Challenges and impediments in quest for excellence (Technical report). San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Re search and Development Center. Schlenker, B. R., Britt, T. W, & Pennington, J. (1996). Impression regulation and management: A theory of self-identification. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgi (Eds.), Handbook ofmotivation and cognition: The interpersonal context ( 3, pp. 118-147). New York: Guilford. Schlenker, B. R., Britt, T. W, Pennington, J., Murphy, R., & Doherty, K. (1994). The triangle model of responsibility. Psychological Review, 101, 632-652. Schlenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Social anxiety and self-presentation: A conceptualization and model. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 641-669. Schlenker, B. R., Weigold, M. F, & Doherty, K. (1991). Coping with accountability: Self-identification and evaluative reckonings. In C. R. Snyder & D. R. Forsyth (Eds.), The handbook of social and clinical psychology (pp. 96-115). Elmsfor NY: Pergamon Press. Seeman, M. (1959). On the meaning of alienation. American Sociological Review, 2 783-791. Segal, D. R., Furukawa, T. P., & Lindh, J. C. (1990). Light infantry as peacekeepers i the Sinai. Armed Forces & Society, 16, 385-403. Segal, D. R., & Meeker, B. F. (1985). Peacekeeping, warfighting, and professionalism: Attitude organization and change among combat soldiers on constabulary duty. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 13,167-181. Segal, D. R., & Segal, M. W. (Eds.). (1993). Peacekeepers and their wives. Westpor CT: Greenwood Press. Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness. San Francisco: Freeman. Spector, P. E. (1982). Behavior in organizations as a function of employee's locus of control. Psychological Bulletin, 91,429-445. Stryker, S., & Statham, A. (1985). Symbolic interactionism and role theory. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (3rd ed. vol. 1, pp. 311-378). New York: Random House. Weisaeth, L. (1990). Stress of U.N. military peacekeeping. WISMIC Newsletter, 2(2 15-18.

PART HI

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND CONHDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE TRANSITION FROM VIOLENCE TO A DURABLE PEACE

Once thefightinghas stopped, or at least been contained, there are inter tions that can be taken to relieve suffering, strengthen self-sufficiency self-governance, encourage reconciliation, and assist a nation and a peo in returning to a durable peace. This is a process. While there is some o lapping of functions, there is an order in which the steps should be taken people will not be ready psychologically for the final levels of reconciliatio until the earlier phases have been successfully complete Thefirststep in recovery is almost always providing humanitarian ass tance, dealing with complex multidimensional humanitarian emergenci assisting refugees, providing for the retraining and reintegration of child diers and other combatants, and dealing with psychological and psychosoc needs of the victims of war. In recent conflicts this humanitarian phase h often begun before the hostilities have ceased. Conflict resolution is essential to moving from violence to peace, but perhaps most critical during the transition period from fighting to a cease fire. Once a cease-fire takes effect and parties begin to negotiate peace i earnest, a nation may begin the rebuilding process. One of the most impo tant steps in the recreation of civil society is the establishment of an indi enous police force that enforces society's laws and has the confidence an respect of the citizens. Without a credible police force, victimization, thu

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gery, and anarchy will return. But a police force cannot be created overnig and police must have a jail to hold accused, a credible criminal justice sys tem to hear cases, and a penal system to impose punishment. These systems must be free of the factionalism that lead to conflict or they will become tool of the former combatants as they seek retribution and revenge through the new "legal" system. Before a region can return to self-sufficiency, its infrastructure must be rebuilt and agricultural land must be returned to production. But roads, tra and agriculturalfieldsare likely to be polluted with mines, making recovery almost impossible. Mines must be removed and the physical, psychological and human consequences of mines must be dealt with. Postconflict peacekeeping is designed to lead to forgiveness and a sense of reconciliation, without which there is always a danger of further violence— especially when a conflict has ethnic roots or the parties to the conflict continue to maintain a sense of injustice. Only after these initial steps at recove and reconciliation have been completed can a nation attempt to hold elections and have people address through the ballot box what they have previously fought over through violence.

CHAPTER 10

Humanitarian Intervention, Psychosocial Assistance, and Peacekeeping Michael G. Wessells

United Nations peace operations stand at an important juncture today as they face a mixture of rapidly rising expectations, harsh encounters with reality, and conceptual and operational uncertainties, particularly in regard to conflicts in which fighting continues and the combatants do not consent to the presence of peacekeepers. Although there are many different kinds of peace operations, I will refer to them using the term "peacekeeping" and will use more precise terms such as "traditional peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement" when they are warranted. Questions about the future of U.N. peacekeeping are increasingly connected with issues of humanitarian assistance, defined broadly as "assistance provided in response to urgent and unmet basic human needs" (InterAction, 1988, p. 82). Missions that intermixed humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping were rare during the Cold War, when fearful superpowers frequently deadlocked Security Council decisions, thwarting humanitarian actions that they feared the other side would use to gain political advantage or to call attention to human rights abuses in one's own sphere of influence. Of the thirteen peacekeeping operations established before 1989, only three (Cyprus, the Congo, and southern Lebanon) entailed the provision of humanitarian assistance (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 1995). The 1990s ushered in a new era of peacekeeping operations, as the end of the Cold War broke the Security Council deadlock, created new willingness to

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intervene, and set the stage for the settlement of armed conflicts in areas such as Central America. Complex, multidimensional operations evolved, and the tasks of peace operations expanded to include activities such as monitoring elections, repatriating refugees, demining, and nation building (Durch, 1996; Ratner, 1995; Renner, 1997; Roberts, 1996). Along with this enlargement of the scope of peacekeeping came increased emphasis on humanitarian operations, which is connected with changes in the nature of warfare. The end of the Cold War created a destabilizing power vacuum in many regions and brought to the fore previously suppressed ethnic and political conflicts. Fought within state boundaries, these intrastate conflicts, of which there have been approximately twenty-five annually (Sollenberg & Wallensteen, 1996), have been characterized by ethnic cleansing, mass rape, displacement of large numbers of people, community destruction, and the shattering of social trust. While in the early part of this century approximately 80 percent of the casualties in war were combatants, that pattern has now reversed, as over 80 percent of the casualties in recent armed conflicts were civilians (Garfield & Neugut, 1997; Sivard, 1991). In this context, the international community recognized that security itself— saving civilian lives—is a primary humanitarian need that in some cases is best met through military means. The result has been a sharp increase in the number and diversity of missions, such as those in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, that intermix humanitarian and military operations. These missions will be referred to as "humanitarian peacekeeping operations." The purpose of this chapter is to examine the psychological dimensions of humanitarian peacekeeping operations. The first section focuses on psychological aspects of efforts to meet basic biological needs, the highest priority in a situation of armed conflict. Since armed conflict also creates psychological suffering and disruption that impede movement toward peace, the second section discusses the need to provide psychosocial assistance, and the third section outlines some of the issues, tasks, and interventions involved in providing psychosocial assistance. The final section steps back and examines unresolved problems and the future of humanitarian operations. MEETING BIOLOGICAL NEEDS By destroying communities and infrastructure, armed conflict places large numbers of people at risk due to lack of food, clean water, shelter, and sanitation. In Somalia in 1992, for example, nearly 95 percent of the population suffered from malnutrition, and over 300 thousand people had already died from malnutrition and disease (Weiss & Collins, 1996). Approximately 1 thousand people were dying daily by late 1992, and fighting made it impossible to deliver the food and other supplies needed to prevent mass starvation. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, nearly, 850 thousand refugees flooded into camps in Goma, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). Nearly 2

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thousand people died daily from lack of clean water, and 50 thousand people died of cholera before the epidemic was contained (Vaccaro, 1996). Although the world focuses mostly on conflicts in their fighting phases, large numbers of people are typically at risk long after the fighting has ceased. In the Greater Horn of Africa, protracted conflict contributed to widespread food insecurity, leaving 71 million people without adequate food by 1989 (World Disasters Report, 1996). Land mines, too, pose a grave medical and psychological threat. In sixty-four countries, there are an estimated 110 million land mines, which kill or maim an estimated 2 thousand people each month and make it impossible for people to return home and to resume agriculture (World Disasters Report, 1996). In Angola, which has a population of approximately 11 million people, there are approximately 13 million land mines that have killed 70 thousand people and maimed large numbers of children. Grinding poverty and the high cost of mines clearance ($500 to $1,000 per mine) make it difficult to protect the physical security of civilians. The failure to meet people's basic biological needs can lead to many deaths in the short run. But the long-term effects may be equally profound. As emphasized by human needs theory, when basic human needs go unmet the situation is ripe for additional conflict. Dire poverty often sets the stage for armed conflict, which in turn amplifies poverty and poses formidable barriers to economic reconstruction. Civilian starvation constitutes a form of victimization that can ignite strong fears and desire for revenge. Further, the creation of large numbers of displaced people living in desperate circumstances may destabilize a region and increase the likelihood of additional fighting. Humanitarian assistance is more than a moral imperative—it is an essential part of the wider task of building peace. There are many providers of humanitarian assistance. As in the Goma refugee camps, military units themselves helped to deliver water, food, and other necessities. It is more typical, however, for the military to create space in which humanitarian assistance can be delivered. Humanitarian leadership is often provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, U.N. organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and donor governments (Minear & Weiss, 1993). In recent years, the number of NGOs has increased into the tens of thousands, and they have become important actors in many emergencies, since they operate with considerable autonomy, have the ability to react quickly to crises, and often can make decisions to enter an area without going through bureaucratic decision-making processes on the scale that often exist in governments or U.N. agencies. In addition, NGOs frequently have the longterm relationships with local communities that are needed to pursue the crucial tasks of development and reconstruction after an emergency has ended. Efforts to meet basic survival needs in situations of armed conflict face significant logistical and security challenges. In many instances, warring factions close off roads and make it impossible for humanitarian groups to deliver food, water, and basic material resources. It is in this context that the

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international community has constructed multifaceted operations that intermix military and humanitarian elements. For example, to prevent mass starvation and suffering in Sarajevo during the 1990s wars of the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. High Commission on Refugees conducted a massive airlift, since many roads were impassable or too dangerous. By mid-1995, the airlift had delivered over 150 thousand metric tons of food and medical supplies to Sarajevo, helping to save many lives. The frequent security threats to airlift planes and personnel were addressed through coordination with the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia (UNHCR, 1995). No less challenging are five psychological issues raised by humanitarian assistance, including that which occurs in the context of peacekeeping missions. First is the crisis orientation. Although analysts debate the extent to which the media and the "CNN effect" drive attention to particular crises (Strobel, 1996), there is little doubt that international attention often jumps from one conflict to the next, creating a short-term focus that is ill suited to complex, long-term problems. The crisis orientation is to some extent institutionalized in funding structures, as many agencies provide funding only for emergency assistance but not for long-term development assistance. Too often, funding dries up and humanitarian work decreases when the situation no longer threatens lives immediately and on a mass scale. In this context, there is a danger that international attention will jump from one crisis to the next without the sustained attention that is needed. Behind the short-term focus is a misguided paradigm that envisions a linear progression of relief to development activity (World Disasters Report, 1996). This mode of thinking views humanitarian assistance as the shortterm relief needed to prevent immediate catastrophe and to stabilize the situation, with the peacekeeping component creating a space in which long-term development activity aimed at economic and political reconstruction can proceed. In practice, this paradigm has created divergent emergency assistance and development approaches. Typically, emergency assistance entails the delivery of large amounts of materials, such as food and medical supplies, with the receiving population treated as rather passive beneficiaries. In contrast, much development work focuses on building local capacity and regards local people as creative actors who can be assisted in their efforts to build a healthy society. The reality of many countries, however, defies dichotomies between relief and development situations and tramples the idea of a seamless transition between relief and development. Countries such as Angola that have been torn by protracted war remain in an emergency state on a protracted basis and lack the minimal infrastructure needed to make the transition to long-term development activity. In these contexts, which are becoming more numerous, it makes little sense to segregate emergency and long-term development activity. A third, related problem is the power asymmetry inherent in emergency situations. In situations of armed conflict, local people have extensive needs,

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and relatively wealthy external donors hold a position of enormous power. Unintentionally, donors may deliver food and other material assistance without working through local processes and channels of influence. This not only marginalizes local people but also encourages passivity, which is antithetical to long-term social reconstruction. When external aid such as food floods into a country, it can undermine local capacities for food production and distribution, encouraging dependence on external donors. Decisions to provide emergency food aid should be undertaken with an eye toward developing local capacity, including local people as partners, and avoiding dependency. Fourth, the provision of material assistance can amplify conflict in a variety of ways. Typically, aid is given on moral, humanitarian grounds, and donors attempt to maintain a stance of impartiality and willingness to provide aid wherever it is needed. The reality, however, is considerably more complex. In a war zone, aid is often used as a weapon (Anderson, 1996). The delivery of aid such as food supplies involves much more than shipping and giving it to hungry people. When food aid is delivered, it enters a conflict system where it will be appropriated by various political actors to pursue their particular interests. In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Hutu groups that had orchestrated the killing of some 800 thousand people used food aid delivered to the refugees to cement their control over the camps (Prendergast, 1996; Vaccaro, 1996). Aid workers then faced the dilemma whether they should deny assistance and watch people starve or provide assistance, knowing that it could strengthen genocidal forces and lead to additional killing. In Somalia, local warlords exploited food aid to increase their own wealth, to purchase arms, and to advance their own political purposes (Maren, 1997; Natsios, 1997). In addition, the provision of aid and the creation of large refugee camps increased the vulnerability of many people, as camps became breeding grounds for violence and the recruitment of youth into the local warlord's army (Natsios, 1997). Many NGOs, desperate to provide security for their workers, hired local thugs for "protection," encouraging the spread of light arms of the militarization of civil society (Maren, 1997; Natsios, 1997). The fifth problem is poor coordination. In the humanitarian assistance community, the difficulty is that NGOs and relief agencies operate with a high degree of autonomy. Although the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance (DHA) is designed to provide coordination on the ground, it often lacks the resources needed to accomplish its mission. The result can be a flood of NGOs into a country with relatively little coordination. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, there were an estimated 200 NGOs operating. Although their intent is good and their impact positive overall, the lack of coordination makes for duplication of effort and underutilization of scarce resources. Coordination between civilian and military elements is also a significant issue. In Somalia, for example, operations were characterized by positive relations and cooperation between military and civilian elements, but there was also conflict (Kennedy, 1997). The military was concerned about humanitar-

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ian workers bringing their armed Somali "security guards" into United Task Force (UNITAF)-controlled facilities. Humanitarian workers, on the other hand, complained that military units were reluctant to respond when they faced trouble. In part the problem was differing perceptions about the mission and the role and appropriate behavior of its military and civilian components. In particular, humanitarian workers wanted UNITAF to carry out police functions, while the military saw themselves as having neither the resources nor the mandate to perform police functions. The deeper problem, however, was a divergence of organizational culture (Slim, 1996). Institutionally, the military embodies values of order, hierarchy, and discipline, while NGOs emphasize independence and view freedom of action as an integral part of their work and a cornerstone of their ability to hold governments and other actors accountable. These differences can create problems of perception, as the military may view NGOs as undisciplined and as contributing to the chaos of a situation. On the other hand, NGOs may view the military as excessively rigid and controlling. Many NGOs fear that if they get too close to the military, their image of impartiality will be damaged. These issues make it difficult to construct a fully integrated mission having a command structure that assigns equal weight to military, humanitarian, and political components (Slim, 1996). THE NEED FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSISTANCE Although meeting biological needs is a top priority, psychosocial assistance is also a vital element of comprehensive assistance efforts. In war zones, there is tremendous emotional suffering associated with loss, displacement, trauma, insecurity, disfigurement, and diminished hope for the future. These psychological wounds can be as damaging and incapacitating as the physical wounds of war. In addition, they place populations at risk of future violence. Intercommunal wars create collective memories of victimization, destroy bonds of social trust, immerse youth in systems of violence, forge images of the good "us" against the evil "them," and invite continuing cycles of violence. Without healing of the wounds of war, communities and societies remain at risk of involvement in continued violence. The cumulative stresses operating in war zones often lead to high levels of violence within families and communities. In protracted conflicts such as those in Guatemala and Angola, cultures of violence have emerged as entire generations have grown up never having known anything other than war and as violence has become normalized at every level. As shown by the frailty of the peace operations in Bosnia, it is not enough to sign a cease-fire, reconstruct politically, repatriate, and assist economic development. If hatreds, fears, and old emotional wounds go unaddressed, the situation will remain ripe for additional conflict. Psychosocial assistance is best understood as a set of tools for breaking cycles of armed conflict and preventing further violence.

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Individual Variation in Response to War-Related Stress In zones of armed conflict, everyone is affected by war in some respect. Problems such as trauma (Herman, 1992) and post-traumatic stress disorder (Friedman & Marsella, 1996; van der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weisaeth, 1996) may be widespread. But there are wide variations in how individuals respond to exposure to the same war-related stressors. It cannot be assumed that two people who were exposed to shelling will exhibit the same pattern of psychological response. Whereas one person might experience upsetting flashbacks and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, the other might not. The effects of exposure to traumatic experiences varies according to developmental level, personality, amplitude and chronicity of stressors, the nature of one's war experiences, access to emotionally supportive others, the quality and efficacy of one's coping mechanisms, and numerous other factors (Cairns, 1996; Rutter, 1979, 1985). This variability cautions against uncritical use of categories and labels. Analysis of the psychological impact of armed conflict is aided by a risk accumulation model, which posits that the likelihood of psychological damage or disorders increases as a exponential function of the number, frequency, and severity of the risk factors to which a person is exposed (Garbarino & Kostelny, 1996). This model calls attention to the multiplicity of stressors and to the need to assist groups likely to experience the highest levels of accumulated risk. Several of the most vulnerable or at-risk groups are examined in the following sections. Refugees and Internally Displaced People In the past decade, armed conflict has contributed to massive population displacements. At present, there are an estimated 27 million refugees who find political asylum outside their own country and another 30 million internally displaced people. Because they often live under very difficult circumstances, want to return home, and place heavy burdens on local resources, displaced people are a potent source of political instability. Meeting their needs is equally a matter of conflict prevention as of humanitarian assistance. Many displaced people have experienced direct attack and may face the psychological upheavals associated with uprooting, community destruction, loss, and an uncertain future (Marsella, Bornemann, Ekblad, & Orley, 1994). Safety is an urgent issue, as displaced people are often subjected to human rights abuses of various kinds and are vulnerable to attack, particularly if they are located near a combat zone. In many situations, displaced people are targets of discrimination, marginalization, and assaults on their culture. Longterm displacement is often associated with a variety of identity problems brought on by struggle to maintain one's own cultural identity, by difficulties adjusting to the norms where one lives, or by feelings of difference and alien-

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ation on returning home. Problems of diminished hope and futurity often arise as a result of having been denied access to education or job training or of prolonged experience of living in uncertain, dangerous, rapidly changing circumstances. Children As documented in the recent U.N. study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (United Nations, 1996), children face a holistic assault in contemporary armed conflicts. Children, defined as people under eighteen years of age, comprise nearly half the population of displaced people, and many experience attack and witness deaths as fighting occurs in and around their communities. Children are frequently the victims of land mines, and the surviving child amputees face not only disfigurement and disability but also poor prospects of being fitted repeatedly with expensive prosthetic devices as they grow. Children in war zones are at risk from hunger, malnutrition, and disease. Children may bear the heaviest burden of sanctions, which are intended to pressure political leaders but which, in practice (as in Iraq and Haiti in the 1990s), may create resource shortages for children. Faced with longstanding conflict and the grinding poverty that war amplifies, children may experience loss of hope. Because war destroys schools and disrupts educational processes, it robs children of their right to education, one of the most important for constructing a positive future. At greatest risk are unaccompanied children, who, without adult protection and care, are vulnerable to attack, sexual abuse, and other human rights abuses and who have no adult supervision and emotional support (Boothby, 1988). Although the particular impacts of war vary, the emotional impacts on children include symptoms such as nightmares and sleep disturbances, flashbacks, social withdrawal, aggressive behavior, developmental delays, difficulty concentrating, anxiety, depression, and distorted future orientation (Cairns, 1996; Dawes & Donald, 1994). Women In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, thousands of women were raped and subjected to sexual torture and mutilation (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1996). In the wars of the former Yugoslavia, mass rapes and sexual atrocities were used as instruments of terror, and impregnation was used as a means of reminding women of their horrible experience. Adding to the trauma of such experiences, the victims of such gender-specific war crimes may be rejected by their families and communities. Sexualized violence often takes the form of prostitution, which assaults personal and family honor, heightens the risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, and limits one's options for the future in a variety of ways. Poverty and desperation often motivate prostitu-

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tion, a cottage industry of which may grow up around zones of armed conflict, even after the fighting has stopped. Unfortunately, the arrival of peacekeeping forces can stimulate or help to support prostitution (Nordstrom, 1997; Slim, 1996). Displaced women may be forced to trade sex for necessities such as food. Armed conflict also entails large amounts of indirect violence against women. When resources become scarce, women may be denied equal access. The destruction of health care facilities may lead to heightened risk of death due to birth complications. The psychosocial impacts on women can be profound, and the effects resonate outward, since it is traditionally the mother who carries the main burden of responsibility for rearing children, gathering food, and managing family health (McKay, in press). Women who have been powerfully impacted by violence may not be in a good position to provide emotional assistance to their children, and family stress and dysfunction can add significantly to the levels of risk. Soldiers Because they are exposed to attack, witness death, and participate in killing, soldiers are at risk of a variety of psychological problems, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, guilt over what they have done, feelings of loss and depression, difficulties readjusting to civilian life, and inclination toward substance abuse, among others (Ursano, Fullerton, Kao, & Bhartiya, 1995). In non-Western contexts, such as Angola, soldiers who kill may believe that they are contaminated or haunted by the unavenged spirits of the people they have killed, and this spiritually grounded belief can induce significant stress and fear. As this example illustrates, culture plays a key role in the construction and definition of one's social reality, in the interpretation of events, and in the mediation of responses to potentially stressful events. The increasing use of children as soldiers, made possible in part by the widespread availability of lightweight assault rifles, is a particularly serious problem (Brett & McCallin, 1996; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994). The U.N. study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (United Nations, 1996) estimated that there are a quarter of a million child soldiers worldwide. These children, who may be as young as six years of age, serve in roles such as combatants, cooks, porters, and spies, and girls are often required to serve as "soldier's wives," sexually serving the men. Some are given the most dangerous missions, and others may be trained into executioners. In many countries, coercion via press ganging—abduction at gun point—has been a common method of recruitment. Other factors that may drive youth into the military are ideology, quest for power and honor, poverty, and need for protection. Victimization, however, is the primary factor that leads youth into military activity, as many join as a result of having been attacked, having lost their parents, or having no way of feeding themselves (Brett & McCallin, 1996).

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Child soldiering can have profound psychosocial consequences, as many youth may find their identity in the military, making it difficult to adjust to civilian life. Having tended excessively to obey superiors' commands, child soldiers may experience substantial guilt when they stop fighting and realize what they have done. Some may be rejected by communities who regard them as troublemakers or as spiritually contaminated. Furthermore, training youth for killing before they have developed relatively coherent systems of moral reasoning and skills of critical thinking may lead to truncated moral development and excessive willingness to use violence as a means of meeting their needs. In many postconflict situations, former child soldiers take up banditry, adding to social disruption, civil insecurity, and the normalization of violence (Wessells, 1997). Humanitarian Aid Workers In war zones, people who provide humanitarian aid are themselves at risk and need psychosocial assistance to continue their work effectively. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, aid workers in the refugee camps in Goma encountered frequent deaths, overcrowding, dying people competing desperately for scarce resources, and high levels of disorganization (Smith, Agger, Danieli, & Weisaeth, 1996). Simple acts such as eating evoked guilt at the sight of the starving masses, and workers often felt helpless and overwhelmed by the enormity of the need. In addition, many experienced traumatic events themselves or they vicariously experienced the victims' feelings of rage, powerlessness, and despair. Under these conditions, workers may experience problems of trauma, which is known to be contagious (Herman, 1992); secondary disaster syndrome (Weisaeth, 1993), which includes hyperactivity, heroic overcommitment, and difficulty concentrating; and burnout (Pines, 1993), which involves emotional exhaustion, irritability, depression, helplessness, difficulties concentrating, somatic problems, and risky behavior. Aid workers in a crisis may have such strong desire to "do something" that they fail to take care of themselves. In structuring interventions, then, it is essential to plan to help the helpers. Peacekeepers Peacekeepers, too, face enormous stresses, associated not only with combat but with rapid transitions from quiet situations into fighting ones and with significant ambiguities about how to handle very complex situations for which few clear rules exist. Operating in cultures other than their own, they may not understand local customs, values, and beliefs, making it difficult for them to negotiate practical matters such as the opening of a road. On peace enforcement missions, they may witness horrible events, such as murder or rape, yet they may feel quite helpless to intervene. In Bosnia and similar situations,

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peacekeepers have been attacked, have lived in constant fear of snipers, have watched comrades suffer or die, and have experienced other events that may produce post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, substance abuse, and related problems (Olsson, 1996). Many peacekeepers, having been trained as soldiers ready for combat, experience role conflict and find it stressful to spend long periods waiting. Failure to address these stresses can reduce operational effectiveness and contribute to human suffering. PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTION IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES These psychosocial needs, coupled with profound biological needs, media attention, and pressures from different players in the international community, create a strong impulse to intervene. Before rushing in, however, it is advisable to step back and consider some of the problems and ethical issues that might arise in connection with the provision of psychosocial assistance. Critical reflection and its empirical counterpart, careful evaluation, are key parts of any well-constructed intervention effort. Though a full presentation of intervention issues and tools is beyond the scope of this chapter, the following discussion attempts to establish a self-critical context and to identify important tasks and valuable examples of psychosocial assistance in the conflicttermination and peacebuilding phases. Issues and Challenges A key issue is short-term versus long-term assistance. In a war-torn context, there may be thousands of people in need of psychosocial assistance, yet there may also be few trained psychologists to provide assistance. To address this situation, well-intentioned psychologists who have families and jobs elsewhere may donate their services for a week or two, providing trauma counseling, trainings, and other services. Though these efforts may have some positive outcomes, the possibility of damage should not be overlooked. Just as one's arrival may heighten expectations of those in need, one's seemingly rapid departure can create feelings of abandonment and despair. During short visits, encouragement to discuss one's war experiences may open deep emotional wounds, but little assistance and emotional support may be available following the psychologist's departure. Without adequate long-term follow-up, short-term intervention may be damaging. The best way to provide long-term assistance is by building local capacity rather than relying solely on outsiders. Since many humanitarian crises are media intensive, intervention raises issues of confidentiality, safety, and stigmatization. Journalists, for example, may want photographs of former child soldiers talking with psychologists in a support group. Made public, such photographs may place children at risk of retaliation by people who remember the bad things they had done. Alternately, the pho-

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tographs may be used in an exploitative manner that sensationalizes "child killers," who are thereby stigmatized. Psychologists may inadvertently contribute to this problem by excessive use of labels and terms such as "trauma" that pathologize entire groups of people. Used without proper caution, labels are damaging and can obscure the facts that there are large individual differences in response to traumatic events, that many people in war zones exhibit high levels of resilience, and that war-affected people are survivors as well as victims. Overuse of terms such as trauma may serve to reduce complex sociopolitical problems into a medical framework (Punam&ki, 1989). The provision of psychosocial assistance in war zones occurs in a context of power asymmetry. Psychologists often enter a war zone in connection with Western-based NGOs or with U.N. agencies that wield what by local standards are considered great wealth and prestige (Dawes, 1997; Wessells & Kostelny, 1996). Impoverished and desperate for help, local people may defer excessively to Western-trained Ph.D.s for solutions to problems. Outside assistance can encourage dependency and an "upside-down Eurocentrism" (Reiff, 1995-1996, p. 2), which attributes many of the world's problems to European imperialism on the one hand but that suggests that they can all be solved by outside European and American intervention on the other. Outside assistance can also undermine or marginalize local processes that are available and better suited for the provision of care. For example, large numbers of child-care centers or orphanages were established in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. Though these had been intended to serve unaccompanied children, relief workers soon discovered that mothers were abandoning their children near the shelters on the belief that their children would have a better chance of getting enough food to survive there. The homes not only undermined the family, the strongest venue for promoting survival and psychosocial well-being, but also substituted for better-conceived documentation, tracing, and reunification efforts to connect children with members of their extended families. Cultural issues are tightly interwoven with issues of power. Western psychology, which has much to offer, dominates psychological science and practice worldwide. Since most of the world's psychologists are either Western or Western trained, psychologists who enter a humanitarian crisis are likely to bring with them tools, values, and beliefs that fit Western societies. Unfortunately, these tools may lack proper scientific validation and may not apply well in non-Western contexts. A strong emphasis on individual treatment of the kind that is quite appropriate in a U.S. context, for example, may be quite inappropriate in a collectivist society. Similarly, Western "talking therapies" that emphasize the importance of emotional expression may be ill-suited for addressing problems such as perceived spiritual contamination, which are perhaps addressed best through traditional methods that use rituals and herbs to restore spiritual harmony. In countries such as those of sub-Saharan Africa, where spirituality is at the center of life, Western-trained psychologists may be ill-equipped to un-

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derstand the spiritual dimensions of stress and healing. Even worse, when Western Ph.D.s arrive, local people may hide or even abandon traditional methods of healing that have been used in their communities for centuries, that reflect local beliefs and values, and that may have therapeutic value. In this sense, psychological intervention can marginalize local culture and become part of wider patterns of cultural domination and destruction that contribute to the psychosocial stresses within the communities (Dawes, 1997). While it is important to avoid uncritical acceptance or romanticization of local methods of healing, it would be equally inappropriate to reject them prematurely. The most appropriate intervention strategy is to use community-based approaches that respect local culture, that treat local people as partners to collaborate with rather than as beneficiaries or intervention targets, and that seek to integrate the best elements of Western and local approaches (Dawes, 1997; Maynard, 1997; Reichenberg & Friedman, 1996; Wessells, 1996; Wessells & Kostelny, 1996). Community-based approaches also offer significant advantages of scale—a significant consideration in situations in which entire populations may be affected by war—since they can be used to assist much larger numbers of people than could be reached using individual or small-group interventions in a resource-limited context. Tasks of Psychosocial Assistance Armed conflict creates much stress by damaging community structure and disrupting everyday patterns of living. In this respect, economic rebuilding and the resumption of agriculture contribute to emotional and social wellbeing, reminding one that psychosocial assistance cannot be separated from economic and political reconstruction (Gibbs, 1997). Tailoring assistance tofitthe local needs, situation, and culture is an important part of psychosocial intervention in a conflict zone. If activefightingcontinues and large numbers of people arefleeingtheir homes, the appropriate intervention emphasis might be on providing assistance to refugees and displaced people. If, on the other hand, fighting has ceased and people are returning home but the situation is saturated with fears and hostilities, the appropriate emphasis might be on healing wounds, increasing tolerance, and building civil society. Realistically, interventions are always shaped by what is politically possible—for example, by what local governments are willing to support—and by donor support. Outlined in the following section are seven of the most important areas of psychosocial assistance that need to be considered. Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Combatants. On the ground, tensions often run very high when large numbers of people remain mobilized in opposing armies. Following the achievement of a cease-fire, wary opponents often gauge the sincerity of the other's stated desire for peace by their willingness to demobilize troops. Demobilization efforts may fail, however,

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if basic needs go unmet (Ball, 1997). Former soldiers may choose not to go home if they fear rejection by their community, if they have no jobs, or if being a soldier has become a strong part of their identity. Former child soldiers may have difficulty finding their parents, and, having little education or means of gainful employment, may be reluctant to give up their guns. Even after former combatants have returned home, the risks of reenlistment may be high if children receive no support in handling problems of adjustment. Documentation, Tracing, and Reunification. Building healthy families is essential in assisting war-affected populations. For displaced people whose families may have been separated by war, family reunification reduces the stress and uncertainty of not knowing what happened to loved ones, and it restores the primary source of emotional support. Particularly in regard to young children who need adult care and supervision, steps are needed to document people's identity and to locate and reconnect them with their families. Healing Wounds of War. War may leave in its wake large-scale problems associated with trauma, loss, fear, hatred, and spiritual unrest. Though psychologists debate whether deep healing is possible and the conditions that produce it, there is agreement on the importance of addressing wounds of war, which often heal more slowly than physical wounds. Later in this chapter, a project for blending Western and traditional methods of healing is described. Education. Many war-related stresses arise through the disruption of routines and living patterns that ordinarily provide a sense of stability, continuity, and structure. As recognized by UNICEF in its school-in-a-box program, one can promote psychosocial health in a war zone by arranging simple educational activities, even informally. In situations where youth banditry is a problem, education programs serve to keep youth off the streets and provide alternatives to violence. Beyond crisis situations, education affords channels for growth and development, encourages prosocial behavior, improves access to job opportunities, and nurtures the informed citizenry that is vital for peace. Resettlement. Helping refugees and displaced people to return home are important tasks of postconflict reconstruction. Often, however, these tasks are thwarted by excessive fears, reluctance to live alongside people one's own ethnic group had previously fought against, and difficulties of adjusting to a cultural context very different from that to which one has become accustomed to. Ultimately, the work of resettlement is as much psychosocial as it is physical. Building Civil Society. In the aftermath of war, aggressiveness, intolerance, and norms of violence foster a culture of violence and impede the establishment of law and order. Societies having a long history of military control may find it difficult to establish a civilian police force that respects the law and protects human rights. Addressing these problems entails psychologically informed activities to do the following: • educate people at all levels for peace. • develop skills of nonviolent conflict resolution.

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build respect for human rights. reduce prejudice. increase tolerance and recognition of the positive value of diversity. strengthen norms of civility.

Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation. Peace is intimately connected to social justice, and healing cannot occur in a context in which silence and impunity surround human rights abuses and the psychological damage inflicted by oppressive, militaristic regimes. Numerous societies, such as South Africa and Guatemala, have judged that truth-telling is necessary for building a truly civil society following armed conflict (Hayner, 1994). Others, notably Rwanda, have maintained that there must also be justice and full accountability for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. In important respects, truth commissions are instruments for psychosocial intervention at the societal level. At an individual level, they entail psychological steps such as providing counseling and support for witnesses. Holistic Intervention: Psychosocial Reconstruction in Angola Because armed conflicts destroy the fabric of society and create holistic needs, it is vital to construct comprehensive, holistic interventions that cut across different levels of society and address the wide range of human needs. Holistic approaches are essential in rebuilding societies for peace. One of the key challenges of building holistic interventions is to coordinate psychosocial efforts with wider changes in the political and social milieu. For example, in a combat zone, psychosocial intervention could be used as a band-aid for patching people up enough to allow them to continue fighting. Psychologists who would conduct relief work must always question the wider sociopolitical implications of their work, something that professional codes of conduct often fail to address, and to situate their work carefully within a larger process of building peace. A related challenge is to coordinate psychosocial assistance with the provision of other kinds of aid. Too often, individual agencies eager to make a difference in a crisis rush in without coordinating carefully with other groups. Though the U.N. DHA is charged with providing coordination, it is hampered by a shortage of resources, the tendency of the U.N. to work mostly with governments, and ingrained tendencies of individual U.N. agencies to work independently (Minear & Weiss, 1993). The resulting lack of coordination may lead to turf struggles between relief organizations competing for limited funds, and, worse yet, may contribute to failures to meet human needs by allowing the ineffective distribution of resources. With careful planning, many of these problems are avoidable. A current multiyear project in Angola, organized by Christian Children's Fund (CCF) andfinancedby the U.S. Agency for International Development and UNICEF,

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provides a model of holistic intervention in a community-based mode. The government-approved project was initiated following the signing of a ceasefire and commitments to demobilize soldiers on both sides and to restructure the government to include more members of the opposition faction (UNITA). The project, which originated through consultation with various community, government, intergovernmental, and NGO groups, aims to assist war-affected children through a training-of-trainers approach conducted in multiple steps (Wessells, 1996). First, an Angolan national team received several weeks of training in regard to children's development and psychosocial needs, the impact of war on children, methods of addressing war-related stresses, and means of handling conflicts nonviolently at various levels, from the family on. Dr. Carlinda Monteiro, who oversaw the training of the national team, designed the training to include discussions of traditional Angolan methods of healing, providing support for local cultural beliefs and practices. Next, three-person training teams were constructed in seven of the most war-affected provinces. These province-based training teams received training similar to that of the national team. Since the province-based trainers were from the local area in which they would work with children, they were well positioned to adapt their approach to fit the local culture and situation (rural Angola exhibits considerable cultural diversity), and they were trusted by local communities. The province-based training teams conduct trainings of community-selected adults who work extensively with children and who will advocate on behalf of children in the local area. Training seminars, which had the content described, are conducted for adults in sectors such as health, education, church, displaced-persons camps, and various government ministries, thereby weaving psychosocial work into various services. Over 2,500 trainees have been trained (eventually, 4 thousand will receive training) to provide activities such as drawing, song, storytelling, and informal educational activities to assist over 110 thousand war-affected children in their respective settings. Trainees also work in their communities with traditional healers, who provide traditional healing in appropriate instances. Both the trainers and the trainees work with people in different agencies and groups to coordinate the delivery of basic goods to communities with the psychosocial assistance they are providing. The evidence collected to date, though preliminary, indicates that the adult trainees benefit by coming to terms more fully with their own war experiences, by developing skills of nonviolent conflict resolution that they apply in their own families, and by becoming prepared to assist children and to promote their basic rights. Children living in the intervention areas exhibit reduced frequencies of sleep disturbances, flashbacks, aggressive behavior, and isolation and they show improved relations with other children and with adults. Associated with this project is a program for demobilizing and reintegrating former child combatants. The province-based teams train local commu-

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nity influentials (in Angola, the church is the main vehicle for the delivery of social services) called activistas in the impact of war on child combatants, problems that former combatants are likely to experience, and means of assisting former combatants. The activistas work to prepare the community for the children's re-entry, arranging for school placement, job training, and, where it is appropriate, traditional healing. The activistas accompany the youths from the quartering areas back to their communities, providing emotional support and decreasing the chances that opposition forces will succeed in pressuring youths back to military strongholds. On a continuing basis, the activistas visit the youths and talk with family members, teachers, and community leaders to provide advice and assistance in handling problems of adjustment. In the provinces in which CCF and UNICEF collaborate on this project, over 36 percent of the former child combatants released from quartering areas have returned to civilian life, where their long-term adjustment is being monitored. Although these are small steps, they illustrate a holistic approach that integrates healing wounds of war, nonviolent conflict resolution, and demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers in a culturally sensitive manner and on a national scale. They also illustrate the manner in which psychosocial interventions can be integrated into the much larger project of postconflict reconstruction. THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS Humanitarian peacekeeping operations have had modest success in countries such as Iraq, Bosnia, and post-1994 Rwanda. Since it is painful for the international community to sit by as humanitarian tragedies occur, and since humanitarian emergencies show no decrease in frequency, humanitarian peacekeeping operations will probably be used frequently in the future. It is important to recognize, however, that these operations are very much in their infancy and that they stand in need of significant improvement. In the spirit of advancing the dialogue needed to make this improvement, this section identifies a number of key psychological issues that need to be addressed in order to enable humanitarian peacekeeping operations to achieve their full potential. One of the primary issues is inconsistency in decision making. If humanitarian interventions should meet human needs wherever they arise, why should muscular peace-enforcement operations have been applied in Bosnia while little was done to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda? In Rwanda, many killings involved relatively crude weapons such as machetes, and it is estimated that a force of approximately 20 thousand peacekeepers could have prevented much of the slaughter (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Lack of political will blocked more extensive and early engagement of peacekeeping forces (Vaccaro, 1996), as countries such as the United States, which arguably ought to have intervened, were paralyzed by the Somalia debacle and what has been

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called the "Mogadishu syndrome." The failure to intervene earlier and more massively in Rwanda evoked concerns within U.N. circles about racism. A second issue concerns neutrality—actual or perceived biases in the delivery of humanitarian assistance can provoke conflict and undermine the legitimacy of the mission. Historically, most humanitarian organizations have treated neutrality as an inviolable principle (Minear & Weiss, 1993). Humanitarian intervention is often justified on the grounds that there will be no political favoritism and that the needs of all sides will be addressed. In reality, however, the needs may be greater on one side, and, by design, humanitarian intervention tracks the level of need, which is greatest on the losing side. Thus, in the former Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs criticized the U.N. for providing more assistance to Bosnian Muslims than to Serb populations. In that case and others, the principle of neutrality seems unrealistic and inappropriate (Betts, 1996; Minear & Weiss, 1993). It is probably better to admit this, to deliver aid on all sides of the conflict, and to manage perceptions by linking asymmetries in aid delivery to asymmetries in human needs. A third issue—credibility—has powerful moral, military, and political components. In the United States, for example, humanitarian interventions have evoked strident criticism about risking American lives when no vital strategic interests are at stake, about the greater need to address problems within the United States, and about the inappropriateness of trying to be the world's policeman. U.S. humanitarian interventions have also been criticized as humanitarian imperialism (Bennis, 1996; Betts, 1996) and as amounting to moral salve for the sins of the West. Although there is no easy response to these criticisms, it is vital that every mission have a coherent justification and that this be articulated clearly and in ways that stimulate ongoing public dialogue about the morality of intervention or, conversely, the failure to intervene. Militarily, the credibility of a mission rises or falls according to the successes and failures of the operations. Each time peacekeepers are outgunned or used as pawns in a humanitarian operation, international confidence in the particular mission decreases, eroding the confidence in all humanitarian peacekeeping operations. Issues of political credibility are bound up with the fact that in many armed conflicts the core issue of who will rule is unresolved and is itself one of the main issues that the combatants seek to resolve through fighting (Betz, 1996). Peacekeeping operations are not a political remedy—at best they create space within which political agreements can be constructed. The operations themselves will lose credibility in the international arena if they are not accompanied by real progress in settling the conflict or if they enable a corrupt or oppressive regime to come to power. Within the country torn by war, too, peacekeeping operations may lack credibility. If the parties themselves have not consented to the entry of peacekeeping forces, they will view even the humanitarian elements of the operation as illegitimate. Arguably, the greatest issue is the propensity for reaction—it typically takes a crisis to get the world's attention and to muster the political will and economic resources needed for concerted action. Accompanying reaction is wish-

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ful thinking and the search for a quick fix. The trouble is that armed conflict never arises in a vacuum but is rooted in a wider system that interconnects poverty, hunger, failed government, ecological distress, militarism, and a culture of violence. Since no short-term intervention can hope to correct this nexus of problems, the appropriate emphasis should be on long-term approaches that combine peacebuilding, sustainable development, and patterns of nonviolence (Galtung, 1996). Ultimately, humanitarian needs would be better served by placing less emphasis on peacekeeping, by placing greater emphasis on removing the causes of armed conflict, and by preventing crises before they erupt.

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CHAPTER 11

Peacekeeping and the Psychology of Conflict Resolution Tom Woodhouse

The academic study and practice of conflict resolution has much in common with the role of peacekeeping in international conflict management. United Nations peacekeeping and conflict resolution as a field of academic research have much in common conceptually and both emerged as distinct areas of theory and practice at about the same time. Though there is a longer gestation period in efforts to justify and define a "science of peace," evident in a number of initiatives after World War I, the formation of modern conflict resolution can be dated to developments at the University of Michigan in the mid1950s, including the founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957. At about the same time that conflict resolution was emerging, the basic principles of peacekeeping were defined by Dag HammarskjGld and Lester Pearson. These were defined to guide the work of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), created in response to the Suez crisis in the Middle East in 1956. Both areas have also drawn considerably, though by no means exclusively, from the field of psychology in order to fashion a deeper understanding of the nature of conflict and its management. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of how conflict resolution has drawn on psychological approaches to produce an eclectic model of conflict and its resolution; to indicate specific psychological components of peacekeeping; and to suggest ways in which knowledge from conflict resolution, much of it psychologically based, can be brought within developing peacekeeping doc-

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trine in order to improve the capability of U.N. peacekeeping to respond to post-Cold War conflict. PSYCHOLOGY AND MEDICINE IN THE ORIGINS OF PEACE RESEARCH AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION The failure of the variety of peace, socialist, and liberal internationalist movements to prevent the outbreak of World War I motivated many people after that war to develop a science of peace which would provide a firmer basis for preventing future wars than what were regarded as the frequently sentimental and simplistically moral responses of pacifism. In France, for example, Gaston Bouthol's Instituut Francais de Polemologie opened in Paris in 1945, but had been preceded by the work of Raphael Dubois, who as Professor of Physiology at the University of Lyons was a vigorous advocate of "peace through science." Dubois adopted the analogy, which has since become commonly used, comparing peace research to medical science: "In a certain way it can be said that war is an illness. But for this illness people only have regard for the therapy, whereas the aetiology is completely non-existent" (van den Dungen, 1996, p. 14). Writing in the years before the outbreak of World War I, Dubois was prominent in efforts to convince both the peace organizations La Paix par la Droit and the French Association for the Advancement of Science that "would it not be wise to endow the science of peace with rich and strong schools, just as one has done for its elder sister, the science of war?" (van den Dungen, 1996, p. 14). Though there is no proven connection, it is of interest that in 1931, also at the University of Lyon, what probably qualifies as the first chair in peace research (Chair for the Study of International Institutions for the Organizations of Peace) was inaugurated in the Faculty of Law. The holder of the Chair, Jacques Lambert, outlined a broad-ranging definition of what would be involved in his studies, embracing moral and psychological dimensions rather than merely legal approaches. In Switzerland, the Italian educator Maria Montessori, who was also a medical doctor, made a plea for the creation of a science of peace in a lecture delivered in Geneva in 1932, while the Dutch peace activist and theorist Bart de Light, based in Geneva, published in 1934 his La Paix Creatrice, which called for a peace science drawing on knowledge from "psychology, pedagogy, history, sociology, religion, ethics and philosophy" (van den Dungen, 1996, p. 20). In England, Edward Glover, a doctor and medical psychologist and director of scientific research at the London Institute of Psycho-Analysis, complained that while neither the League of Nations nor national governments supported research into the causes of war, "hundreds of thousands of pounds are available for research on cancer, leprosy, measles, foot and mouth disease, wheat rust, the boll weevil, the death watch beetle, and sundry vegetable saprophytes. A curious example of the uneven functioning of the self-preservative impulse!" (van den Dungen, 1996, p. 21).

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The more scholarly and systematic organization of this aspiration for a science of peace can be recognized in the work of academics who were writing in the 1930s, with the work of L. F. Richardson, Pi trim Sorokin, and Quincy Wright of particular significance (van den Dungen, 1980). Richardson, for example, was born into a prominent Quaker family in Newcastle in the north of England in 1881. Graduating with afirstin the Natural Science Tripos at Cambridge in 1903, he worked for the Meteorological Office but served from 1913 to the end of the war with the Friend's Ambulance Unit in France. His experience in the war, his background in science and mathematics, and his growing interest in the new field of psychology all combined to lead him to research into the causes of war. The first product of this research was an essay finished in 1919 on the mathematical psychology of war, in which what is now known as his arms race model first appeared (Ashford, 1985). Having left France at the end of the war, he returned to work in the Meteorological Office but resigned shortly afterward, when it became part of the Air Ministry, feeling that work in a defense department was incompatible with his Quaker values and pacifist principles. He took a second degree in psychology in the late 1920s, and he spent much time in the 1930s developing his arms race model. During World War II he decided to retire from his post as Principal of Paisley Technical College in order to devote his time to his peace research. He compiled a catalog of all conflicts he could find information on since 1820, and by the middle of the 1940s he had collated his various studies, which were not published, however, until after his death when Quincy Wright (with whom Richardson had entered into correspondence in his later years), and other academics succeeded in having them published in two volumes (Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels) in 1960. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PSYCHOLOGY AS A CONTRIBUTING DISCIPLINE Thefirstsignificant move toward the institutionalization of conflict-resolution research came with the work of Kenneth Boulding. Born in England, he moved permanently to America in 1937, married Elise Bjorn-Hansen in 1941, and began with her a partnership which was to make a seminal contribution to the formation of peace research through the formation of the first academic journal and research center dedicated to conflict resolution. Having held a number of posts at Colgate University, Iowa State College, McGill University in Montreal, and at Princeton as an economist for the League of Nations, in 1949 he was honored by the American Economic Association with the award of the John Bates Clark medal and was shortly afterward appointed as Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan. The appointment at Michigan, on the strength of his reputation as an economist, in fact signaled his move beyond economics and toward conflict research, via an intellectual evolution which saw him define himself as a social

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philosopher. He insisted as a condition of accepting the post that he be given time to organize interdisciplinary seminars to explore a variety of ideas seen from various academic specialties, and he had for some time been concerned that barriers between disciplines meant that the "Republic of Learning is breaking up into isolated subcultures," characterized by "walled in hermits, each mumbling to himself words in a private language that only he can understand" (Kerman, 1974, p. 14). By the time he reached Michigan he had become committed to the use of general systems theory, which sought to "seek the structural uniformities between physical, biological, psychological and social systems" (Kerman, 1974, p. 42). In 1954, Boulding was one of a group of academics, including the mathematician and biologist Anatol Rapoport, who, supported by the Ford Foundation, formed the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS), at Stanford. The plan for the center was to involve a circle of senior academics from different disciplines and gather around each a group of junior scholars. One member of the group was Herbert Kelman, a social psychologist who had started a newsletter with other young psychologists which they called the Bulletin of Research Exchange on the Prevention of War. Also part of the group for that year was Stephen Richardson, the son of Lewis Fry Richardson, who had with him copies of his father's work on microfilm (this material was not published until 1960, as Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels). The research output of the Michigan Center for Conflict Resolution concentrated on a number of areas of research, and the origins of conflict and modes of resolution, using knowledge especially from the field of psychology, was an important component. This work was developed especially by Kelman, who by the early 1960s had made contact with the London group forming around John Burton and thus with the problem-solving methods they were developing. In this early work, Burton made use of psychology as a means of understanding how decision makers can accurately "see," perceive, or misperceive the problems which might lead to conflict. The issue of perception and its modification, and a broad-based definition of the actors and behaviors within the international system in what was for Burton an emergent world society, was developed in three books published over a four year period: Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (1968), Conflict and Communication (1969), and World Society (1972). Within these books he presents a more clearly defined account of conflict and, important for the future development of his work, an elaboration of the "steering" mechanisms and processes which might form the basis for intervention in them: The conflict behavior of communities and states comprises alterable components such as perception of external conditions, selection of goals from many possible values, choice of different means of attaining goals, and assessment of values and means in

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relation to assessments of the costs of conflict. The method hypothesizes that conflicts of interest are subjective, and that experience and knowledge alter these components, thus producing altered relationships. (Burton, 1969, p. x) This early insight into the subjective-perceptive aspects of the conflict experience was to lead to a fuller elaboration of problem-solving methodology. In an early analysis of the possible objectives of problem-solving-based interventions, Kelman suggested that an ideal workshop (or process) might need to combine an approach that incorporates both interpersonal and sociopolitical perspectives in refraining the parties perceptions of the conflict and its possible resolution. Kelman and his associate Stephen Cohen (like Kelman, a social psychologist) held three pilot workshops at Harvard University, one in 1971 involving Palestinians and Israelis, the second in 1972 dealing with the Bangladesh conflict, and a third workshop in the spring of 1979 involving Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Most of Kelman's applied work, however, has been concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his influence has been significant (Kelman, 1996). For many in the conflict-resolution area, and again because of the influence of Burton, human-needs theory is held to be foundational in the search for a broader adequate theory of conflict and its resolution. Fisher provides a thorough account of the relationship between needs theory and the concept of identity in social psychology which links needs theory both to the model of protracted or intractable conflict associated with Azar and Burton, and to the general ideas of conflict resolution. Needs theory was elaborated in the humanistic psychology of Maslow (1954) (needs self-actualization, esteem, aesthetic needs, cognitive needs, belonging needs, safety needs, and physiological needs), though it also appeared in earlier conceptions of the nature of instincts in social psychology and in the identification by Murray (1938) of viscerogenic and psychogenic needs. McClelland and his colleagues identified a need for achievement which was seen to be significant in explaining drives for economic and social development (Fisher, 1990b). Criticisms that early formulations of needs theory embodied Western conceptions of what constituted human values and social goods led to reformulations by social psychologists in an effort to produce a definition which transcended the experiences of specific cultures and societies (Fisher, 1990a). Conflict-resolution theory has developed a sophisticated analysis of conflict causation which has incorporated responses to critiques originally offered by radicals taking a Marxist perspective in the late 1960s, when it was suggested that conflict resolution and peace research aimed at avoiding conflict and thereby supported violent social structures; and that in ignoring the objective nature and reality of conflict, and in accepting a model which was subjectivist and psychologically based, conflict resolution and peace research sought to resolve conflicts based on engendering values of integration, coop-

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eration, and mutual trust. However, if conflict was objectively defined, then a radically different role for conflict resolution emerges: Its subject should be to research the conditions for structural transformation, seeking to render manifest historically latent conflict through the encouragement of polarization and even the escalation of conflict. When the relations of power between the actors have changed, "a structural change can then be negotiated to a point where the system breaks down and is rebuilt into a new structure. The peace researcher goes into the business of 'sharpening conflicts.' Thus peace research would become a different kind of research intended to realize the revolutionary transformation of the external environment (the international system) in favor of the sub-ordinate subsystems" (Lawler, 1995, p. 76). This structural critique of the psychological-perceptive-behavioral nature of conflict resolution led to the clarification of these issues in the later development of conflict-resolution theory and in the place of conflict-resolution theory in peace research. The critiques emerged because of the introduction of the idea of structural violence into the discourse of peace and conflict research. For those who posed a critique of "liberal" peace researchers, it was incumbent in this context to understand the causes of underdevelopment and not to stop wars of liberation, but to support them, since Third World liberation and anticolonial movements set out to liberate the oppressed from structures of violence. From this perspective, conflicts were "objective": that is, conflict exists independently of subjective perceptions, in the sense that the oppressed in these situations may not be aware of the causes or even of the fact of their oppression. "Conflict is conflict of interest. Interest is not seen as a matter of subjective definition but as determined by the social structure. In other words conflict is incompatible interests built into the structure of the system where conflict is located" (Schmid, 1968, p. 226). This is clearly a directly opposite view from the subjective-perceptive definition given as one commonly accepted in conflict-resolution thinking. The case for subjectivism has been made strongly by Mitchell (1991) and others, but in a way which does not preclude or deny the "objective" existence of conflicts of interest which are features of social or political structures. Thus, while objectivists (including Marxists and realists) might see conflict as rooted in real differences of interest according to the position which individuals or groups occupy in a social system, a subjectivist approach would not deny these differences but would stress that altering perceptions and evaluations make an engagement with how parties see a conflict to be the starting point for conflict resolution. Structural conflict is then defined as an outcome of incompatible interests based on competition for scarce resources: It is objective because it can exist independently of the perceptions of people affected by it and it emanates from power structures and institutions which are historically formed and determined (for example, class conflict in the Marxist system, or gender conflict in feminist critiques of patriarchy). If this is the cause of conflict, then structural approaches to conflict must aim at changing power relations in the social and political institutions.

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Structural-objective and subjective (or psychological, cultural, and relational) orientations to understanding conflict can therefore be combined: Real differences in interests (competition for power, resources, territory, positional roles and status, and needs satisfiers) present conflict situations. But as goal incompatibilities emerge, the perceptions, beliefs, and behavioral interactions of the parties to the conflict are crucial in determining its outcome. Conflicts as complex phenomena have both structural and relational-subjective elements and, because conflict is characterized by this complexity, resolution of conflict is likely to entail multilateral responses rather than single and simplistic modes of intervention. In a recent development of this idea, Fisher and Keashly (1991) have suggested that the analysis of conflict must combine objective and subjective levels: Social conflict involves a dynamic process in which objective and subjective element interact over time as the conflict escalates and de-escalates. Depending on the objective subjective mix, different interventions will be appropriate at different stages of the conflict. If objective elements linked to resource scarcity are predominant at a given point then third party methods which facilitate compromise or facilitate a judgement are appropriate. If subjective elements such as misperception, miscommunication and the differential valuing of objective elements are much in evidence then third party activities which improve the relationship and induce problem-solving are indicated, (p. 35) The concepts and processes of conflict resolution produce a means for all social actors to negotiate and renegotiate issues of inclusion and exclusion in political communities, especially in those circumstances where the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion have led to conflict. Social-identity theory and further work in social psychology has demonstrated how group affiliation and pressure to gain distinctiveness by comparison with other groups can lead to intergroup conflict, and there has been a good deal of research over the past twenty years which has concentrated on how positive relations can be restored or new relationships negotiated between groups in conflict. Much of this research has concentrated on prejudice and stereotyping, on changing attitudes, on perceptions of the "other," on promoting mutual understanding and trust, on the development of common or "superordinate goals," and on the general identification of conditions which promote positive intergroup contact (Fisher 1990b; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Sherif, 1966; Worschel & Austin, 1986). Drawing on this tradition of research and in particular on the work of Sherif (1966) and Deutsch (1973), Fisher (1990b) goes on to offer an eclectic model of intergroup conflict which combines analysis at the individual, group, and intergroup levels. This model operates at objective and structural levels and at subjective-cultural levels: In other words, in Fisher's definition, at the objective level conflicts occur over interests and power, as well as over values and needs. Interest-based conflicts are those which are provoked by resource and/or position scarcity, but they intermingle with subjective sources ema-

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nating from incompatible values and unmet needs. Thus, Fisher does not make the sharp distinction emphasized by Burton (1969) between interests and values/needs as generators of conflict, and he demonstrates how needs theory and the role of identity formation in it can have a "dark side" where the search for the satisfaction of needs in exclusive identity groups can just as much escalate conflict as provide a part of the universal foundation on which peace can be built (Fisher, 1990b, pp. 89-112). Developing this idea, Fisher and Keashly (1991) suggest that different types of third-party intervention are effective at different stages of the conflict process, that they can be seen as complementary, and that the type of appropriate intervention is contingent on the stage of the conflict. They argue that softer forms of intervention are more appropriate when miscommunication and mistrust is high (when the subjective elements are strong), whereas harder forms of intervention are more successful when substantive interests are at the forefront. Fisher and Keashly provide their own intervention typology based on six styles of intervention: (1) conciliation, (2) pure mediation, (3) power mediation, (4) arbitration, (5) third-party consultation, and (6) peacekeeping.

PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: USING THE SAME ROUTE MAP Thus, it has recently become more common for conflict-resolution theorists to refer to peacekeeping as an important instrument of positive conflict transformation, using psychological and communication strategies more than military force. In the same way, one of the striking features of recent analyses by practitioners of peacekeeping has been the frequency with which reference is made to the relevance of psychological aspects of conflict resolution. Canadian General Clayton Beattie (in Wiseman, 1983) argued that training for peacekeeping would have to be considerably different from conventional combat training: Peacekeeping involves the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role; from confrontation to third party interposition. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the objective is to avoid hostilities, to improve communications between the parties, and to advance the process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict—political, military, and economic—as well as the social and cultural environment. It demands a fair-minded and impartial approach while operating within an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among the protagonists, often under difficult and provocative conditions, (p. 209) Thus, though its end goals and objectives may be defined militarily (control and cessation of violence, securing the environment), politically (the restoration of legitimate government), and economically (assisting efforts for development), peacekeeping on the ground is an essentially psychological process requiring great sensitivity to local perceptions and culture. This is

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because the original principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, minimum use of force, legitimate conduct, and mutual respect) can only be observed by a close integration of the communication and problem-solving strategies associated with conflict resolution into the doctrine and practice of peacekeeping. Indeed, we can now observe the beginning of an approach by people who are experienced practitioners of military peacekeeping to combine their analyses with insights from academic conflict resolution. There are an increasing number of examples of this. First, it is noticeable how much of the peacekeeping doctrine of the British Army, elaborated in Wider Peacekeeping (1995), is suffused with the language of conflict resolution. The same approach is taken in the American doctrine covering peace support operations (Chayes and Raach, 1995). Here, the managing of consent (based on the principles of impartiality, legitimacy, mutual respect, minimum force, credibility, and transparency) is also related to the techniques of promoting good communication, of negotiation and mediation, and of positive approaches to community relations through an active civil affairs program which is amply resourced to win "hearts and minds." In a recent study based on an account of how peacekeeping doctrine has evolved in recent years in response to the changing pattern of international conflict, Mackinlay (1996) has argued that the concepts and doctrine which defined classical peacekeeping are no longer adequate to cope with the demands placed on peacekeepers in the civil wars into which they have been drawn in the 1990s (for example, in such demanding environments as former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda). Nevertheless, while he argues for broadened and strengthened forms of peacekeeping (peace support operations), he still argues that consent is the major precondition for the success of peace support operations. Consent-promoting techniques constitute the "soft" skills and processes of peacekeeping, designed to win hearts and minds. In the same study, Wilkinson identifies six different sets of techniques designed to maintain consent in conflict areas where peacekeepers are deployed and which are particularly important because "the military element's presence in the operational area does not always inspire local support for them. For this reason, land forces will have to spend more time and effort, down to the individual level, in consent promoting activity" (Wilkinson, cited in Mackinlay, 1996, p. 168). These six techniques are related to: negotiation and mediation, liaison, civilian affairs, community information, public information, and community relations. Much of the objectives of these kinds of activity is to provide good information in order to eliminate rumor, uncertainty, and prejudice on the one hand and to foster trust and stability in the area of conflict, and positive perceptions of the role of peacekeepers and the nature of the peace process on the other. A second example of the use of conflict-resolution theory in relation to peacekeeping is in the work of David Last (1997), a Canadian officer with experience in the UNFICYP and UNPROFOR operations. Last set out to re-

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view the contribution of peacekeeping to conflict resolution as practiced in the past; second, he wished to identify "what new techniques may be used to help peacekeepers work more actively with civilians to eliminate violent conflict." His general proposition is worth noting: To argue by analogy, I believe the situation of peacekeepers today is much like the situation of commanders on the Western Front in 1916, who were bogged down in defensive operations. To push the analogy somewhat, new tools of war were becoming available to commanders in 1916 that would permit them to take the offensive if they could only adjust their thinking about how to use their forces. In the same way, new techniques of peacekeeping, taken from conflict resolution theory and civilian experience, now permit peacekeepers to take the offensive to restore peace. (Last, 1997, p. 129) Elsewhere, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (1996) have suggested that there are ten areas of research and theory building where there is a convergence of interest between peacekeepers and conflict resolvers, and where conflictresolution research has real potential to find ways of operating effectively in the terra incognita of post-Cold War ethnic conflict and civil war. These areas are summarized as follows: First, by an analysis of the roots and dynamics of ethnic and other forms of communal conflict and defining such conflict as protracted social conflict/international social conflict. Second, define structural-political levels of conflict and cultural-communal levels, where peacekeeping is located at the interface between the two. Third, demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between different time frames in managing violent conflict, where short-term settlement objectives may be achieved in months, but long-term resolution may take a generation. In these kinds of conflict, peacekeeping, if it is to have a role, will need to be aware of such time frames. This does not mean that military peacekeeping forces need to be deployed for a generation, but they do need to be aware of long-term objectives. Fourth, identify stages of escalation and de-escalation, and appropriate (contingent and complementary) forms of intervention. Fifth, distinguish between "hard" and "soft" forms of power, where again, peacekeeping forces are poised uncomfortably between two ways of relating to parties in conflict. Sixth, develop an understanding of what determines the relations between conflict parties, including the interplay between interests, values, and needs (structural-political analysis). Seventh, analyze the impact of sociopsychological processes on behavior in violent conflict (relational-behavioral analysis). Eighth, explore the problems of maintaining consent and impartiality in such volatile situations and indicate general principles for overcoming these difficulties (intervention principles). Ninth, develop an understanding of the crosscultural differences in conflict dynamics relevant to forces which need to relate to each other multinational^ and which need to be aware of the values and mind-sets of the communities in which they are placed. Tenth, specify an area of training through which the communication skills and con-

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cepts needed for the negotiation of consent can be acquired (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 1996). However, as David Last (1997) has pointed out, while insights from conflict theory provide much general guidance for the performance of peacekeeping, in the field itself soldiers, commanders, and staff "need more information about combat techniques, contact skills, and the integration of these tactics at the operational level" (Last, 1997, p. 130). To provide this kind of guidance, much research of a practical kind needs to be conducted, and experiences compared from a greater series of specific case studies. For example, how should peacekeepers behave when surrounded by a hostile crowd? How in practice can problem-solving, negotiation, and mediation skills be used (in what situations in the field, to what purpose?) (Last, 1997, pp. 129-130). Though we still need to know much more about the ways in which these skills may be applied in specific cases, some observations on recent missions may help to illustrate how fundamental these skills will be to the success of future peacekeeping missions. In American military thinking it is recognized that while combat operations seldom require any form of consistent interaction with civilians, in peace support operations the military may be required to control hostile crowds, distribute humanitarian relief to civilian populations, and disarm local militias under the general terms of a peace agreement. These tasks require close understandings of and relationships with civilian populations and they depend on the use of negotiation skills at the tactical level (in the field) to secure objectives and to secure the safety of troops. These negotiations are likely to be conducted by company commanders or senior battalion staff officers. However, at the troop level, soldiers in the course of routine duties may find themselves called upon to mediate or arbitrate in a whole series of local disputes. This move into the communications aspects of peacekeeping does not come naturally to conventional military personnel and will require considerable shifts in traditional or conventional military culture toward a culture or psychology suitable for peacekeeping. The contrast in cultures, and consequently in practices, are dramatic. Thus, in standard military thinking combat forces are not taught to negotiate with opposing armed elements, but to destroy them. A less extreme example comes from the task of conducting a cordon and search operation, common in combat and in peacekeeping: In combat operations, the standard technique for opening a door of a building in such operations is to blow it open; peacekeeping forces should address the same task using the far more difficult technique of persuading the occupants to open the door (Chayes and Raach, 1995, pp. 31-33). There are now an accumulating number of examples of good (and bad) practice in terms of the use of conflict-resolution approaches at local or tactical levels of operation. For example, the following account of the positive uses of negotiation and liaison with local people comes from Lt. Col. Bob Stewart (1993), who commanded the British battalion serving with UNPROFOR in Bosnia between August 1992 and May 1993: "We had no mandate for forcing a passage through

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regardless. Negotiation was the way we always intended to achieve our aims. Launching a convoy towards a certain destination in the hope that it would get there eventually was not good enough. We had to create favourable conditions for our work with local contacts, which is why I established a comprehensive system of liaison officers who concentrated on improving relations in a particular area" (p. 317). Stewart claims that this network, effectively a negotiation network, enabled a high-level of knowledge about local people and conditions which contributed greatly to the capability of the British battalion to deliver humanitarian aid throughout the area. In Somalia, one study has demonstrated some of the difficulties which can occur when military forces enter a peacekeeping arena but bring with them the assumptions and behaviors of combat readiness rather then peacekeeping. Keiseker (1993) compared the French and American approaches with that of the Australians in the Badoia area of Somalia, and found that the Australians were far more prepared to communicate with and elicit the ideas and needs of local people (by contrast, he argues, the French and Americans were preoccupied with keeping their distance and with the technical-military aspects of security). Thus, the Australian peacekeepers "did not have to listen to endless elders and try to arbitrate on domestic issues. They did not have to let the elders come in close to them—they could have kept them at arms length as the French did.. . . The Australians were there to 'rebuild a nation' and to do that you need to encourage the nation's people to take the initiative" (p. 73). While the integration of the operational and practical aspects of this kind of approach from conflict resolution, and at this level of detail, into the processes of peacekeeping in the field is still undeveloped and rudimentary, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997) has pointed to the need for peacekeeping forces to find new capabilities for what he refers to as positive inducements to gain support for peacekeeping mandates among populations in conflict zones. While he argues that peacekeeping forces in the future will need to have a greater coercive capacity, reliance on coercion alone is insufficient, partly because the effect of coercion will erode over time, and also because it is better to attempt to influence the behavior of people in conflict situations by the use of the carrot rather than the stick. Thus, while coercion can restrain violence at least temporarily, it cannot promote lasting peace; a durable peace and a lasting solution require not only stopping the violence but, crucially, "taking the next step." For Annan (1997) taking the next step means offering positive incentives or inducements. Peacekeeping forces, in other words, need to be able to make rewards available in the mission area. Annan defines two broad categories of reward: The first is what some military establishments have called "civic action." Its purpose is limited, namely to gain the good will and consequent cooperation of the population. The second, which might be termed "peace incentives," is more ambitious. It is intended as leverage to further the reconciliation process. It provides incentives—a struc-

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ture of rewards—for erstwhile antagonists to cooperate with each other on some endeavor, usually a limited one atfirst,which has the potential for expansion if all goes well. (p. 28) This concept of peacekeeping, which Annan (1997) sees as absolutely essential for the future effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, brings peacekeeping squarely into the realm of conflict resolution: To employ them [positive inducements/rewards] effectively as tools of conflict resolution requires understanding peoples* problems in their complexity and being able to respond at several levels simultaneously and with a certain amount of flexibility Civic action, in short, is neither charity nor luxury but, in the types of conflicts we have been discussing, an essential requirement for operational effectiveness that requires a line item of its own in the peace operation's budget. Peace incentives, similarly, are rewards cum leverage rather than assistance for its own sake. (pp. 27-28) All this suggests that peacekeeping and conflict resolution are beginning to speak the same language. As the ideas of balancing coercive inducements with positive inducements and of supplementing military containment roles in conflict areas with civic action to win hearts and minds, gain currency in new concepts of peace-support operations, then the social-psychology-based knowledge of conflict resolution will become increasingly relevant. The British Army's Wider Peacekeeping (1995) invokes the words of Shakespeare: "A peace is of the nature of a conquest: for then both parties nobly are subdued, and neither party loser" (p. 2-1). This could not be bettered as an expression of the aspirations of conflict resolution.

REFERENCES Annan, K. (1997). Peace operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the next century. Conflict Resolution Monitor, 1, 25-32. Ashford, O. (1985). Prophet—or professor? The life and work of Lewis Fry Richar Bristol: Adam Hilger. Burton, J. W. (1968). Systems, states, diplomacy and rules. Cambridge: Cambridg University Press. Burton, J. W. (1969). Conflict and communication: The use of controlled commu tion in international relations. London: Macmillan. Burton, J. W. (1972). World society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chayes, A. H., & Raach, G. T. (Eds.). (1995). Peace operations: Developing an Am can strategy. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press. Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive proce New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fisher, R. J. (1990a). Needs theory, social identity and conflict. In J. Burton (Ed.), Conflict: Human needs theory (pp. 89-112). London: Macmillan. Fisher, R. J. (1990b). The social psychology of intergroup and international conf resolution. New York: Springer Verlag.

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Fisher, R. J., & Keashly, L. (1991). The potential complementarity of mediation and consultation within a contingency model of third party intervention. Journa of Peace Research, 28, 29-42. Hewstone, N., & Brown, R. (Eds.). (1986). Contact and conflict in intergroup en counters. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Keiseker, P. (1993). Relationships between non-governmental organisations and multina tional forces in thefield.In H. Smith (Ed.), Peacekeeping challenges for thef (pp. 67-75). Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre. Kelman, H. (1996). The interactive problem-solving approach. In C. A. Crocker, F. O Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Managing global chaos: Sources of and respons to international conflict (pp. 501-520). Washington, DC: United States Inst tute of Peace Press. Kerman, C. E. (1974). Creative tension: The life and thought of Kenneth Bouldi Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Last, D. (1997). Theory, doctrine, and practice of conflict de-escalation in peacekeeping operations. Clementsport, Nova Scotia: Lester B, Pearson Canadia International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Lawler, P. (1995). A question of values: Johan Galtung's peace research. Bould CO and London: Lynne Reinner. Mackinlay, J. (Ed.). (1996). A guide to peace support operations. Providence: Brow University, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. Maslow, A. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper & Row. Mitchell, C. (1991). Recognising conflict. In T. Woodhouse (Ed.), Peacemaking in troubled world (pp. 209-225). Oxford: Berg. Murray, H. A. (1938). Explorations in personality. New York: Oxford University Pre Richardson, L. F. (1960). Arms and insecurity. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press. Richardson, L. F. (1960). Statistics of deadly quarrels. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press. Schmid, H. (1968). Peace research and politics. Journal of Peace Research, 5,217-2 Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Social psychology, intergroup confl and cooperation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Smith, H. (Ed.). Peacekeeping: Challenges for the future. Canberra: Australian D fence Studies Centre. Stewart, R. (1993). Broken lives: A personal view of the Bosnian conflict. Londo HarperCollins. van den Dungen, P. (1980). Foundations of peace research. London: Housmans/Sch of Peace Studies. van den Dungen, P. (1996). Initiatives for the pursuit and institutionalisation of peace research. In L. Broadhead (Ed.), Issues in peace research 1995-1996 (pp. 5 32). Bradford, UK: University of Bradford. Wider peacekeeping (British Army Field Manual 5). (1995). London: HMSO Wiseman, H. (Ed.). (1983). Peacekeeping: Appraisals and proposals. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Woodhouse, T., & Ramsbotham, O. (1996). Peacekeeping: Terra incognita—here be ons—peacekeeping and conflict resolution in contemporary conflict: So tionships considered. University of Ulster: ENCORE/United Nations Universit Worschel, S., & Austin, W. G. (Eds.). (1986). Psychology of intergroup relations Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

CHAPTER 12

Creating a Durable Peace: Psychological Aspects of Rebuilding and Reforming the Indigenous Criminal Justice System 7. Matthew Vaccaro

A reasonably effective and reasonably just criminal justice system is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for a society to achieve and sustain a durable peace. It is through such a system that a society regulates and resolves internal conflicts in an orderly fashion. In a society that has attained durable peace, the criminal justice system acts as a pressure relief valve: The law is the means through which wrongs are righted and injustices are corrected. By and large, citizens resort to the police, courts, and law rather than vigilante justice or other forms of violent dispute resolution. The absence of an effective and just criminal justice system leads to instability. An effective but unjust system normally takes on some form of repression. An ineffective system, based on just or unjust principles, typically leads to a vacuum of authority which may be exploited. Contemporary peace operations are often conducted within failed states or states emerging from civil conflicts. In either environment, the indigenous criminal justice system has often been largely destroyed or become otherwise ineffective, or come to be viewed as unjust by a large portion of the population from involvement in the conflict or widespread corruption or both (Blechman, Durch, Eaton, & Stukey, 1997). The condition of indigenous police forces at the beginning of recent peacekeeping operations exemplifies this problem. In Somalia, the police were not operating. They had left their posts when no central government emerged after Siad Barre was deposed

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(Hirsch & Oakley, 1995). In Haiti, the police were part of the country's armed forces and an instrument of the ruling junta's repression. When the multinational peacekeeping force arrived and broke the stranglehold of the junta, the police stopped doing their jobs and began defensive behavior from fear of retribution from common citizens (Sismanidis, 1997). In Bosnia, where police forces had been segregated along ethnic lines and had participated in the sectarian conflict, the police attempted to continue the conflict through intimidation and thuggery after the peacekeepers arrived. The police favored citizens from their own group and were unjust toward those of other ethnic groups (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998). Further, in each of the situations, just as the police were either destroyed, ineffective, or unjust, so too were other components of the criminal justice system, in simplified terms; the courts, the prisons, and, in a less tangible manner, the laws. If the macro objective of a peace operation is to help a society return to a durable peace, then the peacekeepers, be they military or civilian, in concert with whatever is left of the host state, face a significant challenge to rebuild or reform each component of the criminal justice system. The recovery of the basic indigenous capacity to enforce the laws of the land is essential for a country to make progress toward this durable peace. One of the most important jobs of the civilian and military peacekeepers is to steadily press and coax this aspect of recovery, which is likely to be a slow and stuttering process. This nurture of the criminal justice system constitutes a vital transitional phase for the country on the road from chaotic conflict to sensible self-governance. Most likely, the physical condition of the country will greatly hinder efforts to resuscitate the indigenous criminal justice system. The country's infrastructure, at best, will be in disrepair. Roads, ports, and communications systems may be unusable. The housing and office stock in the primary cities may have been ravaged by the conflict. Government services and public utilities may be close to nil. The government, probably nascent, may have no ability to collect taxes or other revenues and be dependent on international donors. Police vehicles, weapons, uniforms, and office materials are likely to have been stolen or destroyed during the conflict (these may have been inadequate before the conflict). Consequently, police stations may be bombed out, burned, or ransacked. Courthouses may have no or sporadic electricity and no running water. If jails and prisons are still occupied, they may be centers of malnutrition and disease. Usable copies of the legal code may be unavailable in the country. The challenges are manifold. The psychological condition of a society following a conflict further complicates and hinders rebuilding of the indigenous system. Most often, the conflict has had extraordinarily ill effects on the society (Maynard, 1997). Public trust, the cohesive element that allows a group of people to place society above self, has often been destroyed. This must be recovered to establish new public institutions that obtain the involvement of the public through cooperation rather than repression. Often there is increased toleration of violence as a justified method of interaction. This is made worse by the proliferation of weapons into a society during conflict and the practice that individuals have had in

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using those weapons. Situations that previously ended in the crime of assault or proclamation of a threat are likely to escalate to murder. Behavior patterns that once were limited to a small portion of society often have become learned behaviors of the majority during the conflict. The pathologies that occur within a society from conflict are probably linked to the severe hardship of enduring war, the coping strategies civilians and combatants develop to survive, the heavy use of rhetoric or propaganda to motivate and justify the conduct of violence, and the traumatic exposure to death and destruction. The remainder of this chapter briefly describes the topic of rebuilding indigenous criminal justice systems during peace operations from an operational and strategic standpoint and suggests that psychological factors shape three emerging principles of international involvement with criminal justice systems. REBUILDING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM During the 1960s, the U.N. initiated a few operations that required the world body to become involved with matters normally internal to the state, including aspects of the criminal justice system. The U.N.'s first large-scale operation, the controversial Operations des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC conducted from 1960 to 1964 in the aftermath of the Congo's sudden independence, was the U.N.'s first experience deploying civilian police officers as part of the peacekeeping force. The operation, conducted in what would be referred to as a failed state in today's parlance, supplemented the remnant indigenous police forces, initially with a small contingent of civilian police officers from Ghana, and later with a 400-person police contingent from Nigeria that was not under U.N. control, but operated by agreement between the U.N., the Congo, and Nigeria. The U.N. police and subsequently, the U.N.affiliated police worked side by side with their Congolese counterparts as best they could (Lefever, 1965). The second U.N. experience deploying civilian police officers was in the South Pacific. The U.N. administered the western half of the island of New Guinea for eight months during 1962 and 1963 as control of the territory was transferred from The Netherlands to Indonesia. The U.N. intended to rely on the indigenous police, but found their leadership to be lacking. To ameliorate this problem, the U.N. filled the leadership gap for a short time with police from the Philippines (Wainhouse, 1973). The U.N.'s third early experience with police came on another island, this one in the Mediterranean. In December 1963, ethnic tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots erupted in violent but sporadic streetfighting. A truce brought U.N. troops and civilian police officers to the island in 1964 to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order. The term "CivPol" was coined from the Cyprus operation to refer to international civilian police officers serving in a U.N. peace operation. There were 173 CivPol deployed in five contingents to overwatch and conduct liaison with the Cypriot police, conduct guard and checkpoint duties, and help resolve grassroots-level disputes among the two ethnic com-

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munities. The psychologically soothing effect of civilian police on the host population was recorded by a participant in the operation, who said that CivPol became the local population's "father-confessor and confidant in one person" (quoted in Oakley et al., 1998, p. 18). The U.N. operation in Cyprus took on a more traditional interposition posture following the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974; only a small CivPol contingent remained after 1974. During the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the U.N. initiated few new operations because the U.N. Security Council members could not reach agreement on most matters and the superpowers preferred to pursue their interests through other means. Hence, a long period elapsed between the U.N.'s initial forays into police matters and the recent era. The contemporary era of peace operations dealing with conflict within states brought up anew the requirement to help rebuild or reform indigenous criminal justice systems. To date, the majority of effort expended on criminal justice matters in peace operations has been on establishing and reforming police forces rather than on the other components of the justice system. The first operation of this era to contain a police role was the U.N. Transition Assistance Group (known as UNTAG) launched in 1989 to assist and monitor the transition of South West Africa (now Namibia) from South African control to independence. The U.N. deployed 1,500 civilian police officers as part of the peacekeeping effort The CivPol in UNTAG were responsible to monitor the indigenous public-safety forces, the South African-controlled South West Africa Police (SWAPOL). Unlike more recent operations, in Namibia the indigenous police force was fully intact. However, it was feared that South Africa, as one of the parties to the peace accords, might influence the police to behave as their proxy once other South African elements had departed the country. The presence of the CivPol monitors effectively mitigated any undue partisan behavior of the SWAPOL—behavior that would have been considered unjust by those that received it (Durch, 1993). Since 1989, the U.N. has launched peacekeeping activities in eighteen different locations. Of these eighteen endeavors, eleven have involved CivPol in some fashion (in chronological order, Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Western Sahara, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Mozambique, Haiti, Rwanda, and Guatemala). During the six-year period from 1992 through 1997, the average number of U.N. CivPol deployed on a monthly basis was 2,345. The high month was January 1993 with 4,581 officers in five operations. As of December 1997, there were 3,132 CivPol serving in seven operations. Of these, 264 were from the United States, serving in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. As shown in Table 12.1, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti have been the major recipients of U.N. CivPol in the contemporary era (United Nations, 1997). Generally, there are four tasks related to the indigenous criminal justice system that are attempted by a mix of military and civilian peacekeepers and other civilian groups that are technically not part of the peacekeeping operation. The first three deal with the indigenous police; the fourth deals with the remaining parts of the criminal justice system:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

Provide basic public order for an interim period. Help reconstitute the indigenous police forces. Monitor and mentor the indigenous police forces. Help reestablish and reform the judicial system, penal system, and legal code.

The amount of effort required in these tasks is related inversely to the capabilities of the indigenous police: The more effective and just the indigenous system, the less external assistance is needed. For example, if the indigenous system were not completely destroyed or corrupted during the conflict, then the host state may be able to maintain basic public order with little or no assistance from the peacekeepers. Alternatively, if the police are not present but the government agencies that normally control them (Ministry of Interior, municipal governments, etc.) are functioning, they may be able to reconstitute a force with little outside assistance. International monitors and mentors, however, are almost always needed, regardless of whether the old police force is intact or a new force has just been formed. In both instances, the police need outside monitoring and mentoring to help them behave as true public servants and to help win the confidence of the public. The international community's efforts to reestablish a police force in Haiti serve as a good example of the how these tasks can be conducted. Haiti should not be considered the norm, however. The activities in Haiti had unusually close attention and participation from the United States. Further, much U.S. money was spent on the indigenous police. Most operations are not conducted with such active involvement from the United States. An ad hoc multinational peacekeeping force led by the United States deployed to Haiti in September 1994 to oversee and enforce the transition of power from coup leaders to the elected government and to help it to mitigate deprivation and develop the basic institutions of democratic government. After six months, leadership of the peacekeeping force transitioned to the U.N. The international community's involvement to restore and reform Haitian Table 12.1 Size and Diversity of U.N. CivPol Contingents Numbering Greater Than 500

Location of Operation Namibia Cambodia Former Yugoslavia Mozambique Bosnia (IPTF) Haiti

Duration of Operation Apr 1989—Mar 1990 Mar 1992—Sep 1993 Mar 1992—Dec 1995 Dec 1992—Dec 1994 Dec 1995—Ongoing Sep 1994—Ongoing

Peak Number of Number of CivPol Contributing Deployed Countries 1,500 26 3,600 32 793 26 1,086 29 2,015 38 874 20

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policing capacity has been significant and is ongoing as of the beginning of 1998. As stated, the Haitian police had been part of the military which had staged the coup. Since they had been very repressive, serving to keep the elite in power rather than responding to public needs, the police feared retribution from the public and largely faded from public presence upon the arrival of the international military forces. Hence, what little public order had been maintained by their actions evaporated. After a few days, violence between the former oppressed and oppressors reached intolerable levels. The military coalition—largely from the United States—took measures to stop public violence and provide public order in the macro sense, the first task presented. The cycle of retributional violence is common to many conflict situations, and peacekeepers are likely to have to deal with it. Thefirsttask is to temporarily stop the cycle by deterring retribution for past wrongs. Interventions to treat and defuse the emotions of anger and hatred through forgiveness or other reconciliation efforts can proceed as long as basic public safety is maintained. However, the importance of dealing with the deep-seated and psychological motives that drive retribution is just beginning to be understood (Natsios, 1997). The second task, reconstituting the police, was accomplished with a twoprong strategy, because the Haitian government accepted a U.S. and Canadiandeveloped plan to use an interim force to deal with crimes that went beyond the basic public order provided by the international military forces while a mostly new police force was created. Hence, an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) and a new civilian-controlled Haitian National Police (HNP) were formed. The IPSF force was composed of former members of the Haitian armed forces who were carefully vetted for past wrongdoing, as well as pro-government returned refugees who had fled the country during the political and economic difficulties following the coup. All were provided special training that was to imbue them with basic skills, needed restraint, and public responsiveness. The interim police were deployed with International Police Monitors (IPMs), which were the same as U.N. CivPol, except that they were under the control of the coalition military commander and carried sidearms, both controversial deviations from U.N. practice. Further, the role to be played by the IPMs was more robust than the U.N. norm, which allowed only monitoring indigenous police and limited mentoring of them. The EPMs were allowed to enforce Haitian law when no Haitian police were available. They could use force to prevent the loss of life and to prevent disruption of the security environment. In essence, the IPMs were asked to accomplish the monitoring task as well as some of the provisions of the publicorder task. Later, when the U.N. assumed control of the peacekeeping operation, the IPMs' title reverted to the traditional CivPol, but the more activist role was maintained. However, the command arrangements were adjusted to make the CivPol component immediately subordinate to the highest ranking U.N. civilian in Haiti, rather than to the U.N. military commander. Meanwhile, the HNP was being formed, trained, and deployed through a combination of bilateral and multilateral efforts under loose coordination. The United States established a Haitian police academy that was largely staffed

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by U.S., Canadian, and French police trainers. Later, to increase training capacity, an additional site in the United States was used on a temporary basis. As new police recruits graduated, they were put to work under the watchful eye of U.N. CivPol, who took on a larger mentoring role to follow up the recruits' initial training. The military peacekeepers took pains to work in conjunction with the indigenous police-CivPol teams. This whole process of collaboration was relatively effective. In just thirteen months, over 5,200 Haitians were vetted, hired, given basic training, and on the beat. A much longer program to develop supervisory and other specialized HNP personnel and to create organizational methods of accountability, such as an inspector general's office, has also been underway since the first year of the operation. Throughout thefirstthree years of peacekeeping in Haiti, the military peacekeepers were a visible presence and were capable of responding to civil disturbances or other events that might endanger U.N. personnel. This capacity gave important leverage in the form of military presence or saber-rattling to the CivPol, as they often were required to enter into psychological brinkmanship at the tactical level in order to encourage reform or indigenous systems. However, the military was withdrawn in December 1997 because its other tasks were completed and the risk of disturbances was minimal. A small, civilian "self-protection unit," similar to a SWAT team, was deployed to Haiti to provide emergency backup to the CivPol, replicating on a smaller scale the psychological and hopefully real benefits of the previous military contingent. This marked the U.N.'s first use of a civilian paramilitary element and civilian police officers in the absence of a military peacekeeping contingent. The fourth task is to reestablish and reform the other aspects of the criminal justice system: the courts, jails, and legal code. The necessity of this task is obvious: Without detention facilities, police cannot arrest suspects; without seated judges, cases cannot go to trial; without functioning prisons, sentences cannot be served. In Haiti, the internationally sponsored improvements in the judicial system have been mediocre and have shown little positive effect. The military and later the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Justice have provided much training and some direct assistance in managing the judicial cases. Nonetheless, the system remains largely corrupt and backlogged (National Coalition for Haitian Rights and Washington Office on Latin America, 1998). Part of the problem is that attempts are being made to reform the old corrupt system, whereas the police force was restructured from a mostly clean slate. Living conditions within the penal system, however, are much improved from the horrible conditions of 1994. In fact, the severity of the earlier conditions rallied the involvement of the military, and CivPol, the new Haitian government, and NGOs. Delayed Justice: Psychological Effects on Citizens and Peacekeepers The weak and corrupt judicial system in Haiti has stymied effective criminal justice as more and more suspects are arrested by the improved police and

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must wait in the jails for long periods before seeing a magistrate. This bottleneck poses significant psychological difficulties for the civilian population. By not bringing suspects before magistrates in a timely fashion, innocent people are held in jail for unreasonable periods while trials and pronouncements of guilt for real criminals are deferred. The common citizen—especially one who has endured the trauma of the old, repressive police force—cannot feel safe in an environment where a few allegations and a bit of collaborating circumstantial evidence result in one being locked up for a long time with not even an opportunity to clear one's name. The absence of due process impinges on the public's ability to trust their new government. To break these psychological impediments, the justice system will have to be perceived as fair. It is unlikely that any society will view its systems as fair unless each component is functioning at a reasonable level. For the peacekeepers, psychological hindrances also emerge from uneven performance within the indigenous system. In a situation like Haiti, they may begin to question their complicity in turning suspects over to a judicial and penal system that will assuredly violate their rights. These peacekeepers face psychological pressures to be more lenient or become more tolerant of hasty, extrajudicial justice. Alternatively, their psychological pressures may manifest as low morale as they become frustrated or are tempted to abandon and disassociate themselves from the rights violations by going home. Furthermore, on a more practical note, an ineffective judiciary makes it more difficult to hold the indigenous police themselves to noncriminal behavior. A police officer who believes he or she has impunity can be a dangerous character. All these conclusions should compel practitioners to further develop the means to rebuild and reform the courts, jails, and legal code. These components are as important as effective police in eventually reaching durable peace. INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS Among U.S. practitioners, general principles to guide the international community's actions in rebuilding police forces are beginning to take shape. This area of inquiry is nascent; future strategies and techniques will be informed by further analysis. The guidelines that are gradually becoming conventional wisdom are influenced by psychological consideration. Guideline 1: Support for Indigenous Systems Outsiders should not accept responsibility for local law enforcement; rather, they should endeavor to assist the indigenous system to function properly. One motive underlying this guideline is to avoid the psychological condition of dependency within the host state. States in which peace operations are conducted are often devastated beyond what can easily be repaired or recovered through the donor resources available. Worldwide, there are more needs than there are resources provided. Hence, if a society is to get well, much of the energy

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must come from within. Outsiders must recognize this and foster strategies in all aspects of recovery from conflict and development that avoid dependency. For criminal justice systems, this means getting the indigenous system operating at some level as soon as possible, not replicating the indigenous system with outsiders. This guideline will prove frustrating because the indigenous system of justice will likely be slow to rebuild or develop fidelity, or may do so in a mixed fashion, as in Haiti. Peacekeepers should be prepared for suspects to be mistreated by police, judges to take bribes, and prisoners to be cared for poorly. Peacekeepers should expose improper behavior and continue to press the system to function properly. However, a situation that is so egregious or a habitual problem, such as consistent refusal to cooperate with reform efforts, may arise in which the international community may need to consider alternative means to restore the state to a stable peace. Undoubtedly, another underlying motive of this guideline—this one a practical concern—is to avoid being overly involved for an extended period. Usurping responsibility for law enforcement might entangle outsiders. This guideline would allow outsiders to accept authority (vice responsibility) to enforce local laws. This status proved useful in Haiti, where the IPMs and CivPol were allowed, but not obligated, to get involved in stopping certain types of crime when local police were unavailable. In practice, they became involved in situations when local police were also involved which enhanced the mentoring and on-thejob training of the Haitians by enhancing esprit de corps. Further, this authority averted the sense of despondency among the international police officers which might have emerged if they were denied the authority to take action. Guideline 2: Civilian, Not Military When dealing with the indigenous criminal justice system, use civilians vice military instruments as much as possible. The psychological underpinning of this guideline is to transform the likely perception within the host state that police forces are militarized. This perception is apt to be a reality. Often during conflict police forces do become militarized and engaged in the war effort in some fashion. Unfortunately, militarized police forces become a tool controlled centrally by the top of the hierarchy, which makes them less responsive to the public at the bottom. Furthermore, there is a visual difference between military peacekeepers and CivPol that will impact the perceptions of the local population. For example, military peacekeepers march through streets in groups, are outfitted in infantry-style combat boots, helmets, and camouflaged fatigues, are equipped with rifles and other heavy weapons, wear military rank insignia, and live collectively in camps. CivPol, who were styled for public service in their home countries, walk the beat alone or in pairs, wear uniforms (often blue or gray) with badges that identify them as police, wear shoes (not boots), do not carry rifles or heavy weapons, and often live among other civilians in the community. The local population will pick up on these psychological cues that differentiate combatants from

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law enforcers. This will help the citizens to trust their new police as they begin to look more like the CivPol rather than the military peacekeepers. The design of an effective and just police force is probably going to require it to be responsive to the local citizens rather than to state directives; in other words, not militarized. Civilian police experts will be better able to design and help create such a system than will military specialists. Military specialists are more likely to create a hierarchical system that responds to downward orders. As police are reorganized and demilitarized in reality, the public perception of the police must be addressed as well, otherwise the public may hesitate to call upon the police. A public-relations plan should be developed to telegraph the new role of the police to the local population. Military instruments have some distinct advantages over most civilian field elements, such as the ability to operate in dangerous areas, to sustain themselves logistically, to communicate over long distances using organic equipment, to surge or mass resources with short notice, and to coerce, among others. These capacities are appealing and may be necessary to enable or provide support to the civilian instruments, which would be permitted under this guideline. The key distinction is that military experts not be the ultimate designers of criminal justice systems, nor allowed to buttress public perception that police are similar to military forces by displaying a substantial and visible training role with indigenous police above and beyond the involvement of civilian elements. Guideline 3: Establish Psychological Conditions for Trust Vet, monitor, and discipline indigenous police forces. The purpose of this guideline is to help create the psychological condition of trust and confidence in the indigenous system in the minds of the host state's citizens. Vetting has come to refer to a selection process that thoroughly examines an individual's qualifications and potential disqualifications for service as a police officer. Anyone guilty or widely accused of strongly partisan activities, ethnocentricity, or disregard for basic human rights will likely be unable to garner public confidence as an impartial servant of the public. These applicants must be weeded out during the vetting phase. Some method should be used to gather the views of the population to be served. If the previous system was corrupt, the vetting process will likely disqualify a large number of the more experienced applicants, which will cause the police force to be less effective initially. There is a delicate balance, somewhere, between recruiting untainted individuals, recruiting experienced individuals, and forming a force that can win public confidence. Of course, the balance is very situationally dependent. The goal in each situation is to maximize public confidence that the system will be reasonably effective and reasonably fair in responding to public needs. Monitoring police forces with CivPol provides the opportunity to either prevent instances of overreaction or other improper behavior by police, or

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mitigate and document them. When police do make mistakes or commit crimes, it is vital that appropriate disciplinary action be taken within the indigenous system. As police are rebuilt, internal mechanisms of accountability should be instituted. Furthermore, a role for the public voice, such as through an ombudsman, should be incorporated. Unless there is some other reason not to, information about police disciplinary matters should be made public to nurture public trust and confidence. CONCLUSION The three guidelines each have psychological influences and ramifications. Respectively, the guidelines attempt to avoid, transform, and create psychological conditions that will ease the accomplishment of the peacekeeping mission. The overall psychological influences on rebuilding criminal justice systems are unknown, however. What has been presented in these guidelines is based on the author's anecdotal experience as a practitioner. A broader set of anecdotes might lead to different findings. Thus far in peacekeeping operations there has been little use of diagnostic tools to gauge psychological conditions among the citizens of the host state nor the population of peacekeepers. Until such data are available, practitioners will be forced to rely on analysis based on deficient information. Practitioners need to understand how influential psychological factors are in getting a society to durable peace. Which psychological conditions most hinder forward progress—lack of trust, fear, despondency, self-centeredness, or vengefulness? Undoubtedly, peacekeepers already influence psychological conditions through their general presence and activities, such as through public information campaigns and close contact with civilians as occurs while peacekeepers are on foot patrol. But depending on their degree of influence, practitioners may choose to treat these conditions more directly and with greater effort if doing so will facilitate recovery or creation of a healthy society. Additional unanswered questions abound: What kind of negative psychological conditions (e.g., resentment or extreme nationalism) might be created from the actions of peacekeepers? What psychological factors pose risks to peacekeepers? Are there psychological phenomena that have strongly positive influences on peacemaking (e.g., hope)? Finally, a more philosophical question: What are the ethical parameters to guide practitioners' involvement with the psychological condition of foreign populations? David Last (1998) has suggested that progressive peacekeeping ought to be a process of establishing indigenous systems that allow peaceful social and economic transition or change. Obtaining Lund's (1996) "durable peace" is consistent with this notion. Durable peace requires government that is responsive to its citizenry. In democratic systems (the type of system peacekeepers usually help establish), the vote has been the main tool to sustain government responsiveness at the macro level. Arguably, the most needed grassroots government agent is the police force and other aspects of the justice system.

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Until these grassroots elements of government are restored and somewhat responsive and fair, voting or other methods to achieve macro-level responsiveness may be impotent in moving the society toward durable peace. This suggests that practitioners should adjust their strategies to place greater emphasis on building responsiveness from the grassroots level upward.

REFERENCES Blechman, B., Durch, W., Eaton, W., & Stukey, T. (1997). Effective transitions from peace operations to sustainable peace. Washington, DC: DFI International Blechman, B., & Vaccaro, J. (1994). Training for peacekeeping: The United Natio role. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center. Durch, W. (Ed.). (1993). The evolution of U.N. peacekeeping: Case studies and c parative analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press. Hirsch, J., & Oakley, R. (1995). Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections peacemaking and peacekeeping. Washington, DC: United States Institute o Peace Press. Last, D. (1998). Winning the "savage wars of peace": What the Manwaring Paradigm tell us. In J. Fishel (Ed.), The savage wars of peace: Toward a paradigm o peace operations. Boulder, CO: Westview. Lefever, E. (1965). Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations force in action. Washi ton, DC: Brookings. Lund, M. (1996). Preventing violent conflicts. Washington, DC: United States Inst tute of Peace Press. Maynard, K. (1997). Rebuilding community: Psychological healing, reintegration, and reconciliation at the grassroots level. In K. Kumar (Ed.), Rebuilding soci eties after civil war: Critical roles for international assistance. Boulder, C Lynne Rienner. National Coalition for Haitian Rights and Washington Office on Latin America. (1998) Can Haiti's police reforms be sustained? New York and Washington, DC: N tional Coalition for Haitian Rights and Washington Office on Latin America. Natsios, A. (1997). U.S. foreign policy and the four horsemen of the apocalypse: manitarian relief in complex emergencies. Westport, CT: Praeger. Oakley, R., Dziedzic, M., & Goldberg, E. (Eds.). (1998). Policing the new world dis order: Peace operations and public security. Washington, DC: NDU Pre Reed, P., Vaccaro, J., & Durch, W. (1995). Handbook on United Nations peace ope tions. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center. Sismanidis, R. (1997). Police functions in peace operations. Washington, DC: U. Institute of Police. United Nations. (1997). Monthly summary of troop contributions to peacekeepi operations as of 31 December 1997. New York: U.N. Department of Peace keeping Operations. Wainhouse, D. (1973). International peacekeeping at the crossroads. Baltimore, M Johns Hopkins University Press.

CHAPTER 13

The Psychological Consequences of Mines Left Behind Following a Conflict Barry Cox and Harvey J. Langholtz

Land mines occupy a prominent place in the psychology of both war and peacekeeping, as their intended uses and resulting consequences are as much psychological as they are physical. What differentiates mines from other forms of ordinance is that mines continue to function in their intended lethal method long after the guns of war have fallen silent, finding as their victims not the opposing soldiers, but the indigenous population, peacekeepers, and humanitarian workers trying to nurture civil society following the effects of war. There are measures that can be taken to mitigate the postconflict damage wrought by mines on an indigenous population, but these measures are often beyond the resources of a nation struggling to recover from war. To tackle only the physical manifestations is to ignore the wider consequences of the problem—psychological, economic, and social. These wider effects on the population must also be considered if a fully effective rehabilitation program is to be implemented, involving the restoration of freedom of movement and use of land. Until this is achieved it is almost impossible to restore the confidence and economic self-sufficiency necessary for a true and lasting peace. THE CURRENT WORLDWIDE SITUATION AND RECENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS Land mines, more commonly referred to simply as mines, are by their nature passive and indiscriminate weapons that can lie hidden in the ground for

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years waiting for their victims. They have been scattered to a greater or lesser extent in sixty countries on five continents during regular or civil wars, and remain a threat long after the original conflict has ended. U.N. experts estimate the number of mines already laid as between 100 and 120 million, a number which is increasing at a rate of about 2 million per year. Some countries contain more land mines than people. Bosnia and Herzegovina has 152 mines per square mile, Cambodia has 142, and Angola has 31. If Washington, DC were mined to the same mines-per-mile level as is Bosnia-Herzegovina, there would be forty-three mines hidden in the mall between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial alone (Leary, 1997). No one knows the exact number of people who die as a result of mine injuries, but among the populations of several regions one person in 200 has lost a limb or been blinded by a mine. The United Nations has estimated that 10 thousand people, mostly civilians, are killed by mines every year worldwide, and another 20 thousand are injured. Some 250 thousand people have lost limbs in mine accidents (United Nations, 1995c). Estimates by the United States are similar, placing the number killed or maimed annualy at 25 thousand (Clinton, 1997). This worldwide problem has certainly not gone unnoticed by world leaders. On September 26, 1994, President Clinton addressed the United Nations General Assembly and called for "the eventual elimination of antipersonal land mines. As a first step toward this ultimate goal, the President proposed an international control regime to regulate the production, export and stockpiling of antipersonal landmines" (Christopher, 1994, p. iii). On December 3 and 4,1997, over one hundred nations gathered in Ottawa, Canada, to sign the International Convention to Ban Land Mines, in which they agreed never under any circumstances (1) to use anti-personnel mines; or (2) to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines (see International Committee to Ban Landmines [1997] Article 1 of the Convention). Largely as a result of this initiative, the Nobel Peace Prize for 1997 was awarded to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and to Jody Williams, the coordinator of the campaign. The Convention to Ban Land Mines was hailed in many sectors, but President Clinton declined to have the United States sign it. Senator Patrick Leahy, perhaps the most ardent supporter of the convention within the U.S. government, appealed to President Clinton in a September 23, 1997 speech on the Senate Floor, saying, "Mr. President, the Ottawa treaty will set a moral standard for the next century that even those nations who do not sign will ignore at the risk of being condemned as international outlaws. And it will be a tribute to those nations who recognize the urgency that this humanitarian crisis demands. The treaty ends the 20th Century, the bloodiest in history, in a way in which the world can be justly proud. It is a gift to the next century. The United States should be part of it" (Congressional Record, 1997).

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However, the Ottawa treaty did have its critics, even within the humanitarian demining community, and this criticism was based on the failure of the treaty to address the existing problem of mines in the ground. On October 31, 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced a U.S.-led initiative to remove all anti-personnel land mines from over sixty-four countries by the year 2010. This initiative, "Demining 2010," has "a goal of eliminating the threat posed by land mines to civilians everywhere on the face of the Earth by the end of the next decade." Demining 2010 promises, among other things, $80 million in 1998 and continued expansion in 1999 and beyond (Albright, 1997). While the signing of the convention in Ottawa was widely seen as a hopeful sign for the future, many members of the humanitarian demining community will point out that, as recently as 1993, 2.5 million new mines were planted but only 80 thousand were extracted worldwide, prompting U.N. demining expert Brigadier General (Ret.) Patrick Blagden to observe, "We're losing the battle" (U.S. Department of State, 1994, p. 1). If clearance and planting continue at their current rates, the total number of emplaced mines worldwide will actually increase to approximately 135 million by the end of the century (United Nations, 1995c). It is unfortunately true that even complete support for a ban on production and use of mines will not deal with the problem of irregular groups or paramilitaries who tend to be involved in what might be termed "irresponsible mine laying" using the ample existing or improvised stocks. In the context of limiting the effects of a conflict, the twin solutions to the problem of mines lie in preventing their further use and in clearing those already laid. PREVENTING SOCIETY'S RECOVERY FROM WAR Even if not a single additional mine were laid worldwide, this would not address the enormous problem of dealing with 100 to 120 million mines in the ground today, and the psychological, economic, and social problems these mines cause. As a region attempts to recover from the effects of war, it is imperative to return agricultural land to production, to open roads, and to rebuild both the physical infrastructure and the social fabric that are needed to nurture and sustain peace. Refugees who have been displaced by war must be able to return to their homes, farmers must be able to cultivate their fields, herders must be able to graze their flocks, people seeking wood to rebuild homes must be able to have access to forests, and children need to be able to play safely without fear of explosives in the ground. Landmines prevent farmers from tilling arable land, undermining food security and creating famine. Mined farmlands also deprive agrarian economies of non-food products of international use and food and non-food produce for export. Mines impede th

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repair and maintenance of irrigation systems and watercourses, which are critical to agricultural productivity and food production. Landmines undermine the national infrastructure. They isolate power lines, bridges, wat plants, transportation systems, roads, rail networks, and waterways from efforts at reco struction, maintenance, and repair. The damage to the national infrastructure has a mu plier impact on national development. (U.S. Department of State, 1994, p. 13) To this end, humanitarian demining operations must find and remove all mines before an area is safe for civilian occupancy, travel, and the reestablishment of normal civil life so fundamental to peace. HUMANITARIAN DEMINING VERSUS MILITARY DEMINING A distinction must be made here between military and humanitarian mine clearing. Military mine clearance is conducted, if necessary, as part of battle. It may be done under fire and it is the objective of military mine clearing to force a path through a mined area sufficient to allow the passage of one's own armed force, on foot or in vehicles. In this situation, speed is of the essence, and some level of casualties are to be expected as part of battle. The standard of clearance may therefore be much less than 100 percent, and the area cleared is narrow. Humanitarian mine clearing, on the other hand, involves the meticulous clearing of large areas to allow the re-use of mined land for all purposes of civilian life with confidence. WHAT ARE MINES? Mines are a particular form of explosive ordnance, designed to destroy or damage vehicles or to injure or kill personnel. They have been in use since the invention of gunpowder; their very name derives from the early technique of digging a "mine" below an enemy position and placing a large charge of explosive beneath it. Mines are normally activated by the victim, though commanddetonated mines also exist. More sophisticated mines may also contain electronic components designed to disarm or destroy the mine after a pre-set period. Two principal types of mines are in common use, anti-tank mines and anti-personnel mines. Anti-tank mines are designed to immobilize or to destroy a tank or other vehicle. They contain a large explosive charge, usually between 10 and 35 lbs. (5 to 15 kg), and are set off by a weight of between 250 and 800 lbs. (120 to 365 kg), though mine fuses exist which operate by other means than pressure. Anti-tank mines are obviously a major hazard to vehicles, but some can be exploded by the impact of a foot. Anti-personnel mines, on the other hand, contain a small charge, often less than 4 oz. (100 g), and are detonated by a pressure of 9 lbs. (4 kg) or more. They are designed to injure or possibly kill

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anyone stepping on them (Royal School of Military Engineering, 1996). At $3 each, anti-personnel mines are an affordable weapon (U.S. Department of State, 1994). Both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines exist in forms containing no metal components. This defeats mine detectors and greatly complicates the detection and clearance of mines. THE PURPOSES OF MINES The obvious military purpose of these mines is to inflict casualties on an enemy, and thus to compensate for numerical or equipment inferiority. Of far more significance for peacekeeping purposes, however, is the fact that mines also have a psychological purpose. From a military point of view, the known or even suspected presence of mines is a potent discouragement for movement in, or use of, an area. Antipersonnel mines not only disable the victim, thus reducing operational strength and placing extra demands on medical services, but also create a pervasive climate of fear among the enemy. Even the rumored presence of mines may have the desired effect, as described in this quotation from a relief worker in Mozambique: "A rumor that there are mines in an area can create great problems. Even if there is a single mine in a place people dare not go there until the area has been examined and we can confirm that it is safe. In Mozambique we found that both parties in the civil war believed that the other party had laid mines in a place, but in reality these were only rumors spread to in order to frighten others from going there" (Norwegian People's Aid [NPA], 1996). This tactic works equally well with the civilian population. In the case of the irregular warfare typical of low-level conflict, the use of anti-personnel mines in particular may extend to a deliberate disruption of civilian life and communications. Mines are then used not so much to inflict military casualties but as a psychological weapon to create a climate of fear among the civilian population which makes normal life in the area all but impossible (Dispatches, 1995). This effect does not disappear at the end of the conflict, but persists as long as the mines remain uncleared. The psychological use of mines finds its most developed application in the booby trap. A booby trap is an anti-personnel device, usually explosive, which is placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act performed. A shorter definition is "a savage practical joke by a devious sadist which ends in death or injury" (British Army Training Team, 1996). The opening of a drawer, a door, or a window, even raising a toilet seat, can and have been used as triggers for a trap. Booby traps can be considered as a special type of mine and have much in common with mines. In fact, mines are very often used as the explosive device in a booby trap. They lend themselves to use in low-intensity conflicts and in Bosnia, for example, have been found in unoccupied buildings, in vegetable gardens,

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and in places of worship (United Nations, 1996). As with mines, they are laid in order to cause casualties, but in so doing they create an attitude of fear and uncertainty in an enemy's mind, affecting morale and hampering movement. Again, as with mines, the hazard to peacekeepers is that booby traps are often left uncleared and forgotten by belligerent forces. Whatever the original purpose of using mines, the end result is likely to be the same: The mines will continue to function indiscriminately after the active conflict has stopped and when people are trying to restore normal civil life, commerce, and productivity. The mines that were placed to instill a psychological sense of fear in the soldiers of an opposing side will now have the same effect on civilians attempting to travel along roads and paths and will hinder the use of land for agriculture, herding, wood-gathering, and so on. The effects of such interference on individuals and societies have been examined in some detail, but in general terms it can be said that mines will prevent, or at least greatly complicate, the restoration of normal economic and social activity on the part of the civilian population (NPA, 1996).

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MINE PLACEMENT When considering the scope of the threat posed by mines to a postconflict society, the psychology of minelaying can provide valuable insights as to the potential location of mines. The purposes for which the mines are laid will govern how and where they are laid, and an understanding of this connection can help predict where mines are likely to be found postconflict. In a major conflict, mines will often be laid by machine in large, marked minefields. These will usually be obvious to the indigenous population and therefore easy to avoid. The classical method of laying mines, and the one most likely to be used in low-intensity conflicts, is hand laying. This is a laborious method and large minefields are unlikely. The mines are usually well concealed under or on the surface of the ground and can pose a greater threat to civilians postconflict. Mines are essentially defensive weapons, and those laid by military forces are placed as part of a broader defensive strategy and will usually conform to a tactical plan which shapes the general characteristics of the types and numbers of mines laid. Minefields frequently contain a mix of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines to make them multipurpose and to complicate the enemy's clearance task. Thus, they are often laid in front or on the flanks of defensive positions to impede an enemy attack, especially on obvious approaches. They may also be used to hinder an enemy's advance or to channel movement in a desired direction. Minefields are used to link up existing natural obstacles, such as woods, rivers, or built-up areas. Marshy or rocky ground is less suitable for minelaying, though in the latter case surface laying is possible. Mines are also less likely to be encountered in areas which can easily be bypassed. Finally, mines are more likely to be found in areas camouflaged by long grass, crops, and the like.

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A few mines may be laid at a specific site in what is termed "nuisance mining," with the objective of interfering with an enemy's movement and taxing morale for the outlay of very little effort. For this reason it is a type of mining particularly suited to irregular forces. For example, a water hole or spring may be mined, or an isolated tree offering shade to enemy soldiers. Other favored sites for nuisance mining include choke points, such as routes, bridges, and the like; the shoulders of roads and tracks; loose-surfaced routes, where concealment is easier; in and around roadblocks, craters, and other obstacles; ditches, buildings, and places affording cover; places suitable for use as observation posts; and around abandoned equipment to hamper its recovery and use by an enemy and to target souvenir hunters (Royal School of Military Engineering, 1996). The use of mines, often indiscriminately, in civil wars and armed conflicts is growing. Mines bought on the open market or stolen from military sources are laid in large numbers and to no coherent plan. As the tide of conflict ebbs and flows, the location of mines is quickly forgotten and they remain a hazard to friend, foe, and innocent civilians alike, not to mention peacekeepers. To illustrate this point, in the period up to May 1994, the U.N. protection force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) suffered more deaths from mines (12) than from indirect fire (8). More peacekeepers were wounded by mines (131) than by direct fire (111) (Dispatches, 1995). THE DURATION OF THE THREAT The duration of this postconflict threat is difficult to estimate, but may extend over decades if the mines are not cleared. Temperature extremes, humidity, and other environmental conditions affect their functioning as time passes. Corrosion and other damage affects the firing mechanism and eventually renders it inoperable. Sometimes the mine self-destructs spontaneously, but more often the explosive charge remains after the rest of the mine has corroded away. Even the case may have rotted away, but the explosive remains dangerous, especially as the mine is no longer recognizable as such. The explosive can become unstable, ready to explode at a touch. Corrosion of the firing mechanism can also progressively reduce the pressure needed to detonate an anti-tank mine to a few pounds. Thus, the passage of time makes emplaced mines more dangerous rather than less. PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES TO LIMIT MINES Where the national government of the country concerned is unable to cope with the clearance problem, which is normally the case, humanitarian mineclearance operations may be mounted by the U.N., other international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and by specialist companies. Some $65 to $70 million was budgeted by the U.N. for mine-clearance work

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and training of indigenous deminers in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique in 1995. This program is expected to widen to include, among others, Yemen, Georgia, and Rwanda (United Nations Secretary-General, 1995). Since 1993, the United States has devoted $153 million to the removal of mines from fifteen nations (Clinton, 1997). The most comprehensive experience of humanitarian mine clearance is held by nongovernmental organizations. These organizations carry out the bulk of the work and support the U.N. Some NGOs actually specialize in the task of mine clearance, while others work in this field while carrying out their more traditional tasks. Some NGOs engaged primarily in medical care use their expertise to provide first aid support to mine-clearing operations, or work in the field of rehabilitation. Commercial enterprises are also contracted by the U.N., governments, and even NGOs to conduct humanitarian mine clearance. They are often engaged to carry out priority mine-clearance tasks using modern technology and new methods. POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF MINE CLEARING Humanitarian mine clearing is often subject to local political and technical difficulties. The country where the project is to take place may have its own sensitivities. Any sense of its own inadequacy or responsibility for the situation will undoubtedly complicate relations with outside agencies whose aims, priorities, and professional standards will inevitably differ from those of the host government. Close consultation before and during a clearance operation is therefore vital to avoid needless friction. In the case of intranational conflicts, disagreements and conflicts may also occur between the former belligerents. They may see the mines as their property and be reluctant to let others remove them. Areas cleared without full agreement may subsequently be recontaminated with mines. Disagreement may also arise over the priorities and responsibilities for clearance. All the parties involved therefore must agree to all aspects of the clearance project. In some cases humanitarian demining agencies may be faced with the dilemma of finding and hiring the individuals most knowledgeable in where the mines have been placed—these are, of course, the former combatants who placed the mines. Sometimes it may be necessary to have the joint assistance of former combatants from opposing sides. Technically, mine clearance is dangerous and very complex. Though there are efforts underway to develop the technology to clear an area of mines using mechanical mine detectors and other automated aids, the reality is that no automated system has yet proven capable of reaching the standard of 99 percent clearance set by the U.N. (United Nations, 1995c) needed to return a minefield to agricultural production or other civilian use. As a result, minefields must today be probed manually, one inch at a time.

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This manual process of probing the ground for mines is known as "prodding." The deminer—who may be a locally trained volunteer—lies on the ground, his or her face inches from the soil being probed, and protected to a limited extent by a clear plastic visor. He or she proceeds to probe the area in front of him or her using a metal spike or a knife to a depth of 10 inches (25 cm) at a spacing of approximately 1 inch (3 cm), locating the mines by feel. The advancing blade is inserted into the ground at an angle so that the first contact with a mine will be on its side, which is less likely to cause a detonation, than from above, where the firing mechanism is located. This implies some 1 thousand probing operations to clear 1 square yard (0.9 meters). Even then it is rarely possible to guarantee 100-percent clearance. Though tedious and very labor intensive, the method works well for large mines in soft ground, but it becomes more difficult in stony ground or where there is a need to find small anti-personnel mines. As mines are found using the probe, they are uncovered and destroyed on the spot by a small explosive charge. Prodding is hazardous and mines may explode even if the operator completely follows his or her safety instructions and works very carefully. This means that only one operator can work within the effective range of a mine at any time. As can be imagined, the work is extremely demanding physically and stressful psychologically. The pressure involved in mine-clearance work is considerable and, no matter how highly trained, mine-clearance experts are not immune from the psychological effects of a mine threat, especially over a period of time. The physical task of clearance begins with a search for individual mines by examining the ground for signs, such as trip wires or disturbed ground, and by the use of hand-held mine detectors. These detect metal objects in the ground reliably enough; unfortunately they cannot distinguish between a mine and, say, an old can, a rusty nail, or a shell splinter. False alarms are therefore common, and all have to be checked (Tomita, McGregor, & van der Meer, 1995). Some modern mines contain no metal and are impossible to detect in this way. The high costs and the dangerous work mean that progress will inevitably be slow. The U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that its Accelerated Demining Programme in Mozambique, employing 450 deminers, cleared nearly 340 thousand square yards (284 thousand square meters) in its first year of operation (United Nations, 1995c). This amount of difficult and dangerous work is a considerable achievement, but represents a square a little larger than 550 yards (0.5 kilometer) on a side. In addition, climatic conditions are often demanding, infrastructure may be inadequate or missing, and appropriate logistic and medical support may be difficult to provide. The sheer cost of demining operations is often more than an economy can possibly bear. At an estimated $200 to $1,000 for each mine removed, demining operations in Cambodia have proven to be less costly than the accepted worldwide estimate of $1,000 per mine (U.S. Department of State, 1994). However, the Cambodian Mine Action Center has estimated that from 7 to 9 million land

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mines have been scattered throughout Cambodia and with an annual per capit Gross Domestic Product of only $200, the demining operation is too expensive to be paid for by the indigenous population: "Thus, to completely demine Cambodia (assuming no international assistance and no economic growth) would require every Cambodian to devote to demining every penny produced in the economy for the next 1-5 years.... The arithmetic is similar for other less developed countries that are trying to emerge from conflict" (U.S. Department of State, 1994, p. 14). Kuwait, the only severely mined nation with the resources to fund its own demining operations, budgeted three-quarters of a billion dollars following the Gulf War (Roberts & Williams, 1995a, p. 6) A lack of resources will normally mean that priorities will have to be set and some areas left for later treatment. It is rarely practical to keep people out of all mined regions, and security measures can be taken to reduce the threat to the civil population and the field staff of the organizations working in the affected areas. These measures include a detailed assessment and description of the mine situation, the establishment of a system for reporting mines, the marking of minefields and isolated mines, mine-awareness education for the civil population and field staff, the training and availability of local mine advisors and instructors, and the provision of medical cover. Mine-clearance measures should be accompanied by humanitarian aid integrated with the mine-clearance program, comprising a number of elements designed to encourage the reconstruction of mine-affected regions. These will include a coherent program of mine-awareness training for the population of the affected region. Such programs have been operated successfully by a number of NGOs, such as Norwegian People's Aid in Angola, and involve the training of students in the topic and in teaching techniques. These students receive a certificate which qualifies them to train other groups and to instruct the civil population in how to live with the mine threat. Mine-awareness training is also incorporated into the education system in order to reach the younge members of communities. Norwegian People's Aid, in association with other NGOs, claims to have reached over 1 million Angolans in one year (1995 to 1996) in this way (NPA, 1996). Another aid task is the rebuilding of the physical infrastructure, which may have suffered from neglect or damage during a conflict, including schools, hospitals, and road communications. Agricultural land may have to be brought back into cultivation by the provision of seeds and tools; several NGOs specialize in this type of aid. Not least, help may be needed in the rehabilitation of mine victims and their families by means of direct medical support, the provision of prostheses, counseling or other psychological support, and reeducation. Safer, faster, and less-expensive methods of mine clearing are urgently needed if there is to be any hope of dealing with emplaced mines within realistic constraints of time and resources. One new method is to detect the vapor of the explosive charge of a mine. Equipment such as gas chromatography devices have shown promise in this application. Some animals, espe-

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cially dogs, are sensitive enough to detect the molecules of the vapor from the explosive and thus locate the mines, with varying degrees of success. It is claimed (United Nations, 1995a) that a dog's nose is one hundred to one thousand times more sensitive than current gas chromatography apparatus, but they require long training with their handlers and become tired or bored quickly. Vapor detection can be used to differentiate between areas or sections of routes which are free from mines and those which contain explosives. This method has great advantages when small numbers of mines are distributed over large areas and was successfully employed for mine clearance on roads in Mozambique. If explosives are detected, a detailed search still has to be conducted. Research is also being conducted into the use of machines for mine clearance. These include plows, rollers, flails, and explosive devices. They were originally developed for military purposes and have traditionally suffered from the disadvantages that they disrupt the topsoil to an unacceptable extent and they do not guarantee clearance to the required degree. Moreover, machines will not be able to solve the problem everywhere and in all conditions, especially in rocky soil or soil which contains metal fragments as is so often the case following war. Even when such technology is developed, it will probably still be a need to complemented with manual mine-clearance personnel. This slow process of manually clearing mines is often not fast enough to stay ahead of an expanding need to use mined land and return agricultural fields and rural roads to operation. Though Heslop (letter to Hendrick Ehlers, October 18, 1997) has noted that in Angola the NGOs have succeeded in removing many mines and the number of mine-caused fatalities and amputations goes down each month, he points out that in the natural course of events, "Most mines are cleared by the painful process of one leg at a time." THE VICTIMS Land mine victims are inevitably the most vulnerable and poor members of society. They are therefore likely to be rural people going about their daily business of tending livestock, working the land, gathering fuel, and fetching water. Even though the indigenous population will try to avoid hazardous areas, the imperatives of survival may leave many with little choice other than to risk the hazard. "Those people who live and work among land mines are very often the same people who rely most on their physical fitness for work and who can least afford the care necessary to treat landmine injuries" (Roberts & Williams, 1995a, p. 8). The victims are likely to live in areas that are less prepared in terms of medical infrastructure. Consequently, the time elapsed between injury and treatment is likely to be long, especially in lessdeveloped countries, and this has a direct bearing on the survival rate. Many casualties in rural areas are unreported and it is impossible to do more than guess the mortality rate from mine casualties. Solitary herdsmen

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or people in isolated areas are more likely to die from mine injuries than those injured near settlements or with speedy access to adequate medical care. Children also tend to die from mine injuries more readily than adults, perhaps because their vital organs are closer to the explosion on the ground. Another major source of mine casualties is the repatriation of refugees back to their home areas which have been mined. According to a study of 3,089 Bosnians repatriated from Croatia, 81 percent did not know if they were in a mine-affected area (Roberts & Williams, 1995b). Of those surveyed, 12 percent reported at least one member of their household involved in a mine incident, 50 percent of which resulted in death. Activities which have proved particularly risky for civilians in Bosnia include working in the fields, gathering firewood, entering unoccupied houses, and children playing. Research at a rehabilitation center in Central Bosnia showed that 62.6 percent of 711 amputees were mine casualties. In Abkhazia, mines prevent the repatriation of thousands of ethnic Georgians to homes and possessions they lost during fighting and ethnic cleansing in the region. In Kabul, hundreds of repatriated refugees were killed by mines and booby traps after the Taliban siege of the capital (United Nations, 1996). Casualties do not arise only from the inadvertent detonation of mines. In 1991, the male inhabitants of the Croatian village of Lovas were forced to hold hands and walk through a booby-trapped clover field by a paramilitary group. The account by survivors describes some of the men as being so badly wounded that they begged to be killed. Seventeen men were killed by mines or shot in the back (Amnesty International, 1992). In 1994, kidnaped Muslim and Croat civilians were made to collect wood from mined areas or clear houses suspected of being booby-trapped. These duties were performed under fire and many were killed or wounded (Anti-Slavery International, 1994). INJURIES AND THEIR OUTCOMES Among those that survive their injuries from mines, three patterns of injury are commonly encountered (United Nations, 1995b): • Injuries caused by stepping on a mine can result in the foot or leg being severely mu lated, or even blown off by the blast, with severe injury of the other leg, the genital and arms. Soil and debris is blasted into the wound, complicating treatment. • Injuries resulting from fragmentation wounds depend on how close the victim was to the mine when it detonated. The wounds are penetrating injuries similar to thos caused by any other fragmentation weapon. • Injuries to the hands, face, and eyes are suffered by those who pick up or play wit mines, as well as by those planting them, and by deminers. The key to survival of a mine injury is the rapid availability of medical help. Access within the first six hours after injury is critical. While this is

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usually met for military victims, it is not always the case for civilians. To ensure rapid treatment for casualties, training for local populations in first aid and rescue procedures can bring great benefits. Information on casualty evacuation procedures and routes to the nearest medical facility should be widely disseminated. Once in medical hands, general treatment consists of stabilization procedures, the management of shock, and control of infection. Surgical treatment, especially for the severe limb injuries encountered, is complex. Many surgeons are untrained or unprepared for this work when they first encounter horrific mine injuries and the psychological preparation of all medical and nursing staff must be thorough. The presence of mine-injured patients places a heavy burden on a nursing staff. Dressings have to be changed frequently and the length of stay may be measured in months. Apart from the physical trauma, the psychological trauma to the victim is considerable, and will require the use of trained counselors to combat depression and the inevitable problems of readjustment, especially in young victims. Recent estimates (United Nations, 1995b) show that the average hospital stay for a mine victim is 50-percent greater than for bullet wounds. Each patient requires three operations on average and in amputation cases four operations may be needed. When the amputee is a child, the remaining bone will sometimes continue to grow faster than the surrounding flesh, making reamputations necessary. In addition, mine victims require approximately double the amount of blood transfusions as those injured by fragments or bullets. This requirement places additional demands on the blood supply system and on screening facilities for diseases such as HIV, hepatitis, and other blood-borne diseases. In the long term, most surviving victims of mine injuries require a prosthesis. These are costly, though recent work has enabled a prosthetic device to be produced more cheaply. Nevertheless, an artificial leg can cost between $12 and $120 (United Nations, 1995b), which may still be unaffordable in less-developed countries. Also, learning to use such a device entails many weeks of expensive physiotherapy. The prosthesis will also require regular maintenance and replacement, especially in the case of growing children. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF UNCLEARED MINES ON INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETIES Apart from the physical and psychological trauma to mine victims, the presence of mines impacts profoundly on individuals'behavior and their daily work and leisure activities, such as herding, water carrying, cultivation, and so on. The disruption to normal life can cause disorientation and anxiety, especially in the rigid, traditional societies sometimes found in developing countries. The inability to fill traditional roles in society, such as earning a

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living, undermines the sense of self-reliance and self-worth vital to mental well-being. This can lead to apathy and pessimism, with associated alcoholism, drug use, and substance abuse. The end result is all too often a breakdown of the preexisting social and family structure. One effective way of countering these negative psychological effects is through training programs in mine awareness (NPA, 1996). These not only help people to survive in a mined area, but can also reinforce their sense of self-worth by reducing the natural fear of the unknown. Many indigenous peoples have evolved psychological mechanisms for living with ever-present threats of disease, starvation, wild animals, and the like. If they can be helped to see the presence of mines in a similar light, their feelings of fear and helplessness can, to some extent, be mitigated. While it is often men in traditional societies who suffer the greatest loss of self-esteem described, the place occupied by women in some countries means that they are particularly at risk as potential casualties. Their loss to the family can be catastrophic, as the following quotation from a Norwegian People's Aid worker in Angola makes clear: In Angola it is the women who look after the family, cultivate the land and fetch water. It is the women who go out into the woods tofindwood—often with children hard on their heels. Due to the division of labor in society the consequences of walking on a landmine are very great [for women]. The consequences are also greater for children if their mother treads on a mine than if their father does. In Angola it is more difficult to get men to look after children, especially in the towns. (NPA, 1996) The impact on civilian society in less-developed countries may be judged by the fact that in Angola, as an example, there are more than 70 thousand mine amputees, or 1.7 percent of the population (United Nations, 1995c). In rural societies, the worth of an individual is usually intimately associated with his or her ability to do productive work, often hard physical labor. Amputees are unable to undertake this work, and are reduced to poverty and begging. Where the victim provides the main economic support for a family, the whole family can be destitute in a very short time. Few developing countries have the medical resources to cope with such burdens. Survivors may suffer terribly, or become so dependent that it is not unknown for the victim to be killed deliberately. Such practices are even said to be common in certain parts of Angola (NPA, 1996). The psychological trauma of the victim's family is inescapable when "mercy killing" is involved.

WIDER EFFECTS ON SOCIETY The needs of civilian mine victims in less-developed countries place a great demand on often slender medical resources, preempting other development priorities. In Angola, over 70 thousand mine amputees place a large demand on the remainder of the population. The rehabilitation of this number of vie-

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tims represents an enormous task for a developing country. If the resources in mine-affected countries are unequal to the task, the death rate from mine injuries will be correspondingly greater. The drain on the available medical services is all too frequently met by reducing services such as vaccinations, medications, and other health care services. Medical NGOs can go some way to compensating for the shortfall, but the loss is felt in terms of the health of the population. The threat of mines also interferes directly with the delivery of these services in affected areas. Assistance to the health system of the affected country may be needed to help in the rehabilitation of mine victims. Depending on the local situation, support may be necessary in the manufacturing and fitting of prostheses, the provision of physiotherapy, with health and first aid education, and with the treatment of the psychological effects of mine injuries. Such assistance can have an important beneficial effect on the morale of the indigenous medical system, quite apart from the obvious practical benefits. The delivery and distribution of relief assistance are also hampered when mines prevent or slow down the movement of supplies and personnel. The obvious consequences include an increased incidence of hunger and malnutrition among inaccessible populations; difficulty and increased cost of delivering relief supplies; and obstacles to repatriation, rehabilitation, and development. In severe cases, the local economy may be completely disrupted, so that the affected region becomes a burden on the national economy instead of contributing to it. Classical aid programs will be needed to support the local economy in such cases, and short-term measures such as the provision of helicopters or fixedwing airlifts can do much to relieve the movement problem. CONCLUSION: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MINES The presence of uncleared mines causes immense physical, psychological, and economic damage to the population of the affected area. The restoration of anything like normal life to a country or region which has suffered minelaying on a large scale is clearly a long-term, difficult, and expensive undertaking. It is nonetheless vital if economic and social rehabilitation is to take place and a true and secure peace is to be achieved. Mines are still widely available and current methods of detection and clearance are painfully slow and uncertain. Though there has been encouraging progress in the political sphere to limit or end the production of mines, progress remains to be made with the clearance of those mines already emplaced. In the meantime, considerable aid and support is needed to enable indigenous populations to cope with the psychological effects and deal with the practical difficulties that are the consequences of this twentieth-century plague. For the indigenous population, the full recovery from war—psychological, economic, social—cannot begin until the threat of mines has been completely removed.

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REFERENCES Albright, M. (1997). Speech October 31, 1997 at the State Department. Amnesty International. (1992). Yugoslavia: Further reports of torture and delibera and arbitrary killings in war zones (Amnesty International Index 48/14/92). London: Amnesty International Publications. Anti-Slavery International. (1994). Forced labor in Bosnia: A pilot study into the u offorced labor in the Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia. London: Anti-Slave International. British Army Training Team. (1996). Mines awareness. Lecture delivered to the Bri ish Army Training Team, Sennelager, Germany. Christopher, W. (1994). In Hidden killers: The global landmine crisis (p. iii). Wash ington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Clinton, W. (1997). Speech on September 17, 1997 at the White House. Congressional Record. (1997, September 23). Washington, DC: U.S. Governmen Printing Office. Dispatches. (1995, April). Mine warfare during peace support operations (Vol. 2) Ottawa: Canadian Army Publications. International Committee to Ban Landmines. (1997). Convention on the prohibition of th use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction. [On-line] http://www.un.org./Depts/Landrnine/UNDcH:s^an_trty.htm. Leary, W. E. (1997, December 16). Better weapons emerge for war against mines. Th Washington Post, pp. Cl, C7. Norwegian People's Aid. (1996). Mines: The silent killers. Oslo: Norwegian People's Roberts, S., & Williams, J. (1995a). After the guns fall silent: The enduring legac landmines. Oxford: Oxfam. Roberts, S., & Williams, J. (1995b). Vietnam veterans of America foundation repo Washington, DC: Vietnam Veterans of America. Royal School of Military Engineering. (1996). U.K. Royal School of Military Eng neering mines awareness presentation. Chatham: Royal School of Militar Engineering. Tomita, H., McGregor, T., & van der Meer, W. P. J. (1995). The international purs of tools to assist in mine clearance: A legacy of hope. Houston: Geo Searc United Nations. (1995a, July). Discussion report by Panel B: Current methods i mine clearance (Background Paper No. 8). Presented at the U.N. Internationa Meeting on Mine Clearance, Geneva. United Nations. (1995b, July). Discussion report by Panel F: The treatment and r bilitation of mine victims (Background Paper No. 6). Presented at the U.N. International Meeting on Mine Clearance, Geneva. United Nations. (1995c, July). Overview paper. Presented at the U.N. Internationa Meeting on Mine Clearance, Geneva. United Nations. (1996). Landmines (Vol. 1.1). New York: United Nations. United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (1998). UNHCR by numbers: Person concern to UNHCR, at 1 Jan 1997, by category. New York: United Nations. United Nations Secretary-General. (1995). International efforts to address the glob problem of uncleared land-mines (SG/CONF.7/2). New York: United Nation United States Department of State. (1994). Hidden killers: The global landmine cr sis. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

CHAPTER 14

Postconflict Peacebuilding and Making Efforts Count: Reconstruction, Elections, and Beyond Valeria M. Gonzalez Posse

POSTCONFLICT PEACEBUILDING The proliferation of intrastate conflicts during the post-Cold War era launched the United Nations into a series of complicated peacekeeping operations amidst civil war that required expanding its capabilities. While the "CNN effect" propels supernumerary emergency relief and humanitarian operations, during its aftermath the United Nations, specialized agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and developmental organizations are left, often under faltering resources, with the difficult task of postconflict peacebuilding. In this postconflict stage, where countries emerging from conflict are not in either a state of war or peace, the behavior of international actors, the parties to the conflict, and civil society can be directly associated with the outcome of the peacebuilding efforts.1 Reconstruction efforts, while also central to peacebuilding even when dealing with some of the underlying causes of conflict, will not suffice in avoiding a relapse into violent conflict if the necessary institutions through which to address conflict are not created. EVOLUTION AND DEFINITION OF THE TERM "PEACEBUILDING" Bearing in mind that the United Nations directly or through its specialized agencies has been the principal organ in charge of the peacebuilding frame-

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work, as well as the developing complexities of recent world politics which reflect on the work of the U.N., it is important to have an accurate overview of what the U.N. understands for peacebuilding. In June 1992, the Secretary-General of the United Nations presented, as request by the First Summit of the Security Council at Heads of States Level, a groundbreaking new document entitled An Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 1992, A/47/277—S/24111).2 An Agenda for Peace broadly defines the basic elements of modern-day peacekeeping operations, including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The document was of paramount importance in the process of unifying terminology and launched a much-needed debate on the instruments of peacekeeping and on peacekeeping as a whole. While peacebuilding per se was not a new concept, An Agenda for Peace formally introduces it into the sphere of the so-called "Second Generation Peacekeeping Operations," which were an answer to the increasing demands emanating from the intrastate conflicts characteristic of the post-Cold War era.3 These conflicts—in which warring factions aggravate the humanitarian situation by either diverting or obstructing relief supplies for their own purposes—seriously complicate the reconstruction task, generating massive numbers of displaced persons and refugees. Another important aspect of An Agenda for Peace lies in the fact that it surpasses the concept of conflict management inherent to traditional peacekeeping and adequately consolidates the array of instruments of conflict resolution in an integrated manner. At this point, the international community believed, like Brian Urquhart, that "the various phases of conflict resolution ought to be considered in the context of a single process and not as separate stages" (Urquhart, 1991, p. 7; Orrego Vicuna, 1993). By 1995, the ill-fated missions of Somalia and Bosnia had taken their toll on the United Nations, and its role in peacekeeping was being questioned. While this attitude may have been greatly fueled by discontent among American Congressmen (Meisler, 1995, p. 334), the thesis, along with the position that peacekeeping was advancing in detriment of development, found echo in a vast number of interventions in the 49th General Assembly. In addition, the expansion of peacekeeping activities brought on a natural increase in the United Nations peacekeeping budget and the lack of payment of dues and arrears by important contributors also triggered a heated discussion on the "financial crisis" of the organization. In this context, while the Secretary-General in his document, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 1995, A/50/60), issued on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, maintains wide recognition to the concept of peacebuilding, his preoccupations for its financial aspects seem to command caution: The timing and modalities of the departure of the peacekeeping operation and the transfer of its peacebuilding functions to others must therefore be carefully managed (paragraph 52).

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It may also be necessary to arrange the transfer of decision-making responsibility from the Security Council... to the General Assembly or other inter-govemmental bodies with responsibility for the civilian peace-building activities that will continue. The timing of this transfer will be of special interest to certain Member States because of it's financial implications.4 (paragraph 54) Taking into account that by mid-1995 over two-thirds of the sixteen peacekeeping operations being conducted were related to internal conflict in which the aim of the U.N., according to a Secretary-General's statement, was "no longer to contain a situation pending a political settlement," but to "seek to restore, or even build peace" (Hill and Malik, 1996), his preoccupations were well established. Definitions In An Agenda for Peace, formal recognition and denomination is given to the activities that take place after a conflict to consolidate peace. An Agenda for Peace provides us only with a generic definition: "Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (United Nations, 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, paragraph 21). It is through its basic tasks, articulated in the same document, that we acknowledge the wide variety of actions it encompasses: • • • • • • • •

Disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order. Custody and destruction of weapons. Repatriation of refugees. Advisory and training support for security personnel. Monitoring elections. Advancing efforts to protect human rights. Reforming or strengthening governmental institutions. Promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

In carrying out these activities, peacebuilding shares a common ground with peacekeeping and development. The existence of overlapping is in fact a direct result of considering the instruments of conflict resolution in an integrated manner and not as separate steps. In this sense, experience in the field has shown that the once popular "emergency to relief to development continuum" is not an appropriate reply, as often emergency, relief, and development activities need to take place simultaneously (Winning the Peace, 1996, p. xix; Heininger, 1994, pp. 121-128). There is also an inseparable link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This link has led in some cases to negate peacebuilding as an entity of its own. In this sense, the United States Armed Forces consider peacebuilding as a "UN term" that is not included in Pentagon document "JOINT Pub 3-0," in which peace support operations are described (Sewall, 1994, p. 38).

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The division line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding tends to fade, particularly where the U.N. is called in to supervise or implement agreements. In such cases, mandates often include peacebuilding capacities where civilian components, acting along with military components, play an important role. There is general consensus that peacekeepers must be peacebuilders as well and that in their "dual capacity" can perform both tasks adequately. James (1990), on the contrary, believes that it is not the purpose of peacekeepers to "create in the parties a genuinely conciliatory frame of mind," and that their contribution to developing "a peaceful disposition in one or both of the parties" is just a side effect (p. 369). There is also a strong link between peacebuilding and what we traditionally understand as development cooperation. While peacebuilding paves the way for developmental activities to take place, often both start at the same time. In this sense, peacebuilding is viewed as a short- to medium-term activity, while development as a long-term activity that focuses on economic and social growth from a structural point of view, primarily entrusted to the World Bank, developmental agencies, and other specialized U.N. agencies. RECONSTRUCTION, ELECTIONS, AND BEYOND An Agenda for Peace and A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace delineate two distinct but mutually reinforcing concepts as being central to peacebuilding: confidence building and the creation of the necessary structures for the institutionalization of peace. The concept of confidence must not be associated exclusively with military security, as Johan Jorgen Hoist rightly points out: "Confidence is the product of much broader patterns of relations than those, which relate to military security. In fact, the latter have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, technical, and social relationships" (Stedman & Rothchild, 1996, p. 19). In this sense, the attainment of peace depends on much more than just a successful short-term implementation of a settlement. While the demobilization of combatants and their disarmament ascertain the military aspects of war termination, long-term stability—in the sense of a lasting peace—requires security building that encompass political, social, and economic sources of insecurity. In the process of peacebuilding, Stedman and Rothchild (1996, pp. 28-32) also identify two types of measures as being at the heart of peacebuilding. On the one hand, there are confidence-building measures, which through verifiable behavior demonstrate the willingness of the parties to make peace, hence creating trust for a continuing commitment within the peace process. On the other hand, there are security-building measures, which through the creation of a framework of rules and expectations address nonmilitary fears in civil wars. In Guatemala, the strong assurances of security given to combatants at all levels allowed the peace process to continue. The process was one of actual

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"peace within the war," in which, though an informal cease-fire was in place, the conditions for peace were established during the conflict. Bearing in mind that combatants are reluctant to give up their arms before arrangements are made and guarantees obtained, the demobilization of combatants was one of the last aspects dealt with. In Mozambique, the process of demobilization was dealt with in a different manner, beginning with the gradual gathering of equal proportions of combatants from each side in "assembly areas." There they also turned in their uniforms and weapons and were either prepared for reintegration into civil society or selected to form part of a new national armed force. This gave the parties not only securities from a military point of view but also addressed nonmilitary fears among the combatants. Undoubtedly one of the first steps in peacebuilding constitutes the reconstruction of basic services and institutions. The former Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Somalia and former Director of UNOMIL (United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia), Mr. Hugh Cholmondeley, pointed out that while "relief is about saving lives, "development" is about saving livelihoods (Winning the Peace, 1996, p. 20). In order to sustain livelihoods, a series of conditions have to be met: roads, communications, provision of water and energy, basic health services, and demining. The reconstruction of security institutions such as the police is also essential. In this area, the civilian components of a peacekeeping operation, such as the civilian police, have a particularly important role to play. In Haiti, for example, an important ongoing task assigned to the civilian police is the formation of a new national police force. Considering that the Haitian police were accused of having taken part in gross humanrightsviolations, the task was not a simple one. Therefore, they not only train and educate new recruits but reeducate the existing force, putting emphasis on respect for human rights. The International Police Task Force concluded a similar task in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These reconstruction efforts, while striving to bring a sense of "normality" back to conflict-torn land, are not enough. Peacebuilding requires structures that promote national conciliation. In this regard, U.N. experts in "Lessons Learned" support this statement and emphasize the need of supporting local nongovernmental society and the leadership of social society. The international community should work with and through these local networks at the community level, slowly building an increasing degree of trust. While this is not something new for nongovernmental organizations or some U.N. specialized agencies, it has constituted a challenge to U.N. peacekeepers turned peacebuilders. In national conciliation, there are two very important issues: elections and the provision of justice. Through elections, an integration of all sectors of society takes place, as long as no sectors of society—such as refugees—are excluded. The return of refugees or displaced persons is also an extremely important measure for national conciliation, and leaving the question unattended could result in reemergence of conflict.

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In the political field, positive ways of power sharing with the opposition or proportional representation should be envisaged; notwithstanding, there may be cases where power sharing may not be an option or may not be desirable. In Cambodia, the complicated power-sharing system devised worked for some time but is now an obstacle to governance. In Rwanda after the genocide, power sharing is not an option. In Mozambique, because of tribal traditions, it is not acceptable (Winning the Peace, 1996, p. xxvii). While systems that encourage an all-or-nothing approach do little in favor of national conciliation, democracy, as we understand it in the Western world, may not be a solution either. Therefore, national cultural patterns must be taken into account in constructing power structures for the emanating institutions to be representative of their lifestyles. In the search for national conciliation, elections can play a pivotal role, but as in the signing of a settlement, holding elections guarantees nothing per se. The Angolan case, where elections were held before a process of demobilization of combatants, is an illustrative example. Heininger (1994, p. 118) has pointed out that in peacebuilding the international community tends to rely on elections as a way of determining firsthand a legitimate political authority. In the case of Cambodia, this approach in the short run worked well and put in place a legitimate governing authority. In Mozambique, after the Angolan experience, elections were not held until after RENAMO was converted into a political party. Reconstruction efforts and subsequent supervision—no matter the success of an election—must continue well beyond that time. In the case of Haiti, though it was perceived as unfeasible, the original plans called for a flash operation and leaving the island six months after the election. Schultz (1997) has pointed out in the case of Haiti that without ongoing international commitment, "Haitians will have been set up to fail" (p. 114). Another important factor in national conciliation is the early restoration of the justice system. There can be no national conciliation while a feeling of impunity, real or perceived, exists. Therefore, a sense of accountability must be restored. In the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the international community established two International Tribunals to investigate and prosecute war crimes.5 While each Tribunal will not be able to process more than a handful of cases per year, the existence of the Tribunal puts an end to the perception of impunity. In El Salvador, a "Commission on the Truth" with a wider scope and binding decision power was established and attained important results for national conciliation. The role of communications in rendering these institutions known is of fundamental importance. In this sense, peacebuilding has an educational phase. The mere existence of these institutions is not sufficient to turn a violent society into a peaceful one. In order to make the qualitative jump, these have to be perceived as a valid alternative to violence. The use of the radio—particularly in local dialects—and close work at the grassroots level have proven to be successful instruments for this task in many

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operations. In Cambodia, it taught the importance of elections and was an indispensable instrument to address refugees. In Somalia, the lack of a U.N. radio not only did not permit the mission to let the population become aware of their mandate, but also prevented them from neutralizing Radio Mogadishu's incitement to violence. THEACTORS In peacebuilding there are a number of actors: external actors (international community, normally represented through the United Nations, regional organizations or arrangements, neighboring countries, countries with special interest, etc.), internal actors (United Nations personnel and staff, members of nongovernmental organizations, and U.N. agencies), and the parties to the conflict. An adequate coordination of all internal and external actors presents a coherent structure to the parties. This facilitates the work of the actors in general and helps to avoid unnecessary duplications, as well as the possibility of being manipulated by the parties. In the field, the diversity of actors requires an even closer coordination and, while they have an overall common task, they often do not share immediate goals, methods, and timetables. Due to this fact, it has been accepted that the overall coordination in thefieldcorresponds to the Secretary-General's Special Representative (SGSR). Knowing the benefits derived from coordination, the United Nations for its mission in Haiti held a week-long coordination meeting to which all U.N. agencies, NGOs, and components of the peacekeeping operation were invited to attend. The Parties and External Actors In retrospect, United Nations experience in peacekeeping has shown that a positive political disposition of the parties towards peace, while of fundamental importance for success, is not always easily identified. In this sense, while the will of the parties is essential for obtaining a lasting settlement, "The fact that an agreement has been signed does not mean that the parties have decided that they prefer settlement to continuing the war" (Stedman and Rothchild, 1996, p. 20). Furthermore, in the initial steps of a settlement, when commitment is low, the process is often accompanied by international observers that prompt and encourage more responsive reactions from the parties, as "In situations of low trust, pronouncements of benign intentions are not enough to encourage co-operative responses" (Stedman and Rothchild, 1996, p. 31). Efforts by the international community, whether headed by the United Nations or entrusted to regional arrangements or groups of countries that aim at an external enforcement of a settlement, must also include the necessary elements for building trust among the parties in order to prosper. International pressure, even if accompanied by severe measures, cannot make up for

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a lack of political will. Effective measures must address some if not all of the underlying causes of conflict. Having said this, even if the parties have willfully consented to the agreement, international pressure has proven that in some cases it can be a useful instrument. For example, in El Salvador a system of incentives and disincentives was established to motivate demobilization. In Haiti, the availability of some foreign aid is also often used as an incentive for compliance (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations [UNDPC], 1996c). In the case of Angola, the persistent noncompliance by UNITA of Security Council resolutions has brought on the application of sanctions, though in this last case the effectiveness of the measure is yet to be seen. The lack of political will is not an exclusive attribute of the warring parties. Likewise, the launching of a peacekeeping mission does not imply the existence of strong political will or commitment on the part of the international community. In Bosnia, this lack of commitment resulted in the Security Council authorizing a bland operation that could do little in light of the situation in the field. Jose Maria Mendiluce, the former United Nations High Commission for Refugees chief in Bosnia, stated that the operation amounted to little more than "an alibi" for the Western world (Meisler, 1995, p. 313). Since civil war rarely operates in a "vacuum," an established practice within the United Nations consists of creating ad hoc groups called "Group of Friends of the Secretary General." These constitute informal groups that exercise tangible pressure on the parties and neighboring countries. The formation of these groups is not fortuitous, but responds to particular political ties, such as involvement in the conflict, purveyance of aid, significance as a troop contributor, influential member of the region concerned, and so on. For example, the Group of Friends for Haiti is composed of the following countries: the United States, France, Canada, and Argentina. In the case of Angola, instead of a Group of Friends, a "Troika" was established. This Troika, made up of the United States, Portugal, and the Russian Federation, has a much more active role based on significant political ties and includes holding summits or peace talks whenever necessary. In the Field: The Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Force The United Nations has expressly recognized in its Lessons Learned documents that the attitude and behavior of its troops and staff are also critical to the success of a mission. In Rwanda, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) experts acknowledge that the behavior of some staff members directly contributed to the new government's growing disenchantment with the mission (UNDPC, 1996a, 1996b). In Cambodia, underemployed U.N. personnel reacted in two different ways. While some were often seen at bars or brothels and contributed to a negative perception, others, like the Malaysian Battalion, through small civic action programs as language train-

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ing or assistance in the construction of latrines in their own mission area, conveyed a sense of trust (Heininger, 1994, pp. 122-129). There is no doubt that maintaining a correct attitude can be an effective way of winning over the local population and increasing grassroots support for the operation, but oddly enough it is the military that go well beyond the reaches of the term "correct attitude." General John Sanderson (Heininger, 1994), Force Commander of the U.N. mission in Cambodia, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), refers to the need to establish a "hearts and minds" dimension (p. 122). Colonel Hillingso, an expert on training, points out that peacekeeping activities as a whole require a particular disposition from the soldier, a "unique spirit, attitude, and understanding," and in training for a mission they are taught "to react differently, often contrary to normal combat reactions" (p. 73). Brian Urquhart (1987) as well, in his A Life in Peace and War, captures well this essence: "Peacekeepin depends on the non-use of force and on political symbolism. . . . It requires discipline, initiative, objectivity, and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction.... A peacekeeping force is like a family friend who has moved into a household stricken by disaster. It must conciliate, console, and discretely run the household without ever appearing to dominate or usurp the natural rights of those it is helping" (p. 248). NGOs: First In, Last Out The growing importance of the work of nongovernmental organizations in developmental and peacebuilding activities has been widely recognized, particularly during the last ten years. NGOs are often the first institutions in the field and are often the ones that remain long after a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission has concluded its mandate. They work closely with the community at the grassroots level. For these reasons, the NGO network can provide very useful information and may also positively influence the confidence-building process. This closeness to the parties and civil society, while creating a privileged relationship, may also cause a loss of overall perspective. An effective coordination, respect for the work of every component, as well as fomenting formal and informal channels of communication between the actors can help in reducing this situation. Last, it is important to point out that ever more NGOs seem to represent the instruments of choice through which civil society channels significant amounts of assistance directly to the field and that this international civil society support undoubtedly legitimizes their presence. Regional Arrangements and Neighboring Countries In almost any situation, neighboring countries of warring states have an important role to play. If a conflict includes refugees or displaced persons,

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these are likely to cross the borders and a spillover of the conflict is possible. In the case of porous borders, an adequate border control can be an effective barrier to arms transit. In the field of cooperation, and at a postconflict stage, neighboring countries can propose cooperation programs at a bilateral level. Neighboring states may sometimes also offer their mediation capabilities. In the case of regional arrangements, the United Nations has recognized the importance of cooperation between both. These, as well as neighboring countries and the international community, must support the repatriation of refugees. At a regional or bilateral level, efforts aimed at creating peace, stability, and cooperation are looked for. In Europe, NATO has adopted an active role in Bosnia. Because of the characteristics of NATO—a security arrangement—this task has been more accessible. In Latin America, the OAS has closely followed the situation in Haiti, participating from the outset in human rights watch missions. While the OAS does not constitute a security arrangement, it has been active in the area of peacebuilding, where it has deployed electoral observers and participated in the field of demining. The Organization of African Unity, through the troops of its member states, has improved its peacekeeping capabilities in the last few years, but requires (and will for a time to come) the assistance of the international community. Taking into account that the deployment ofAfrican troops within Africa seems not only to be favored by the continent but to have good results as well, such efforts must be supported. MAKING EFFORTS COUNT "All societies have conflicts. Peace building is not designed to eliminate conflict from society, but to build capacities for civil society to resolve its conflicts at a level of short violence" (Alvaro de Soto, in Winning the Peace, 1996, p. 18). the post-CNN period, with basic humanitarian objectives covered, countries are subject to little if any internal pressures to continue peacebuilding objectives. Therefore, peacebuilding today would seem to rely more on external commitments than on internal pressures. Paradoxically, this is so even after having invested astronomical amounts of money in relief and humanitarian operations. While the Mozambique mission cost $1 million a day, the $40 million needed to demobilize combatants of RENAMO and turn it into a political party, one of the key issues of the operation, was extremely hard to obtain. Between 1992 and 1995, the international community contributed $1.3 billion in foreign aid for the 10 million inhabitants of Cambodia (Winning the Peace, 1996). While Cambodia has come a long way, current events may show that the interests of peacebuilding may not have been served. While An Agenda for Peace calls for a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, major international efforts seem to be directed at conflict man-

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agement. This would seem to indicate that the will of the international community for establishing peacebuilding missions is ever more important. In this context, regional organizations, closer to the fragile situation, may have a particularly important role to play, by way of promoting the establishment of a mission or through a region-operated mission. As has been seen, the success or failure of peacebuilding depends greatly on the will and behavior of the actors. The employment of the traditional means of conflict resolution such as mediation and diplomacy will also facilitate a positive outcome. Radio transmissions and, in essence, communications, have created a broader base of contact between actors and parties, and expanded the concept of interdependency. While peacebuilding constitutes a political undertaking, it has a psychological dimension. That is, that through its institutions it instills a modification of behavior in which nonviolence is accepted as a method for resolving conflict. In studying and understanding these changes, we might be able to address the issue of violence at an earlier stage. In this sense, the application of peacebuilding as a preventive remedy could prove beneficial and should be further explored. NOTES This chapter is submitted by the author in her personal capacity and does not necessarily represent the views of the institution of which she is a member. 1. An Agenda for Peace refers to peacebuilding in its postconflict significance. In A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, the important role peacebuilding can play a preventive measure is recognized. Gareth Evans (1993) defines preventive peacebuilding as a "series of strategies which aim to ensure that disputes don't arise in thefirstplace" (p. 9). 2. The document was requested through a Statement of the President of the Security Council (S/23500, section "P"), and it was to contain an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provision of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for Preventive Diplomacy, for Peacemaking and for Peacekeeping" (Section D). 3. While there is wide discussion on the existence of a "new generation of peace keeping operations" (James, 1990, p. 11; Hill & Malik, 1996, pp. 212-213), the concept of "expanded peace keeping" used by the Secretary-General (Hill & Malik, 1994, p. 118) has received wide recognition. Other denominations, in consonance with particular perceptions such as "Wider Peacekeeping" (United Kingdom) and "Peace Support Operations" (United States) arose (Sewall, 1994, p. 37). 4. Peacekeeping operations established by a Security Council resolution are funded from the special peacekeeping operations budget, while, in general, peacebuilding activities such as demining must be funded by voluntary contributions. The civil mission in Haiti as well as the humanrightsmission in Guatemala, being authorized by a General Assembly resolution, were funded through the regular budget. 5. In the case of Rwanda, the international Tribunal is not yet fully operative.

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REFERENCES Evans, G. (1993). Cooperating for peace: The global agenda for the 1990's and be yond. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Heininger, J. E. (1994). Peacekeeping in transition: The United Nations in Cambo New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press. Hill, S. M., & Malik, S. P. (1996). Peacekeeping and the United Nations: Issues international security. Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing. James, A. (1990). Peacekeeping in international politics. London: Macmillan. Meisler, S. (1995). United Nations: Thefirstfiftyyears. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. Orrego Vicuna, F. (1993). Peacekeeping and peace-building: The development of t role of the Security Council. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Schultz, D. E. (1997). Political culture, political change and the etiology of violenc In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), Haiti renewed: Political and economic prospects (p 93-117). Washington, DC: World Peace Foundation, Brookings Institution Press. Sewall, J. O. B. (1994). Peacekeeping implications for the U.S. military: Support the United Nations. In D. J. Quinn (Ed.), Peace support operations and th U.S. military. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Stedman, S. J., & Rothchild, D. (1996). Peace operations: From short-term to lon term commitment. In J. Ginifer (Ed.), Beyond the emergency: Developme within U.N. peace missions (pp. 17-35). London: Frank Cass. United Nations. (1992). Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Stateme adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 19 "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111). New York: United Nations. United Nations. (1995). Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position paper of t Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Unite Nations (Doc. A/50/60). New York: United Nations. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (1996a). Comprehensive report on lessons learned from United Nations assistance mission for Rwan (UNAMIR): October 1993-April 1996. New York: United Nations. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (1996b). Multidisciplinary peacekeeping: Lessons from recent experience. New York: United Nation United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (1996c). United Nations mission in Haiti (UNMIH) mid-mission assessment report: April 1995-Fe ary 1996. New York: United Nations. Urquhart, B. (1987). A life in peace and war. New York: Harper & Row. Urquhart, B. (1991).The United Nations: From peace keeping to a collective syste Boulder, CO: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Winning the peace—Concepts and lessons learned of post-conflict peacebuildin (1996, July). International workshop, Berlin.

CHAPTER 15

Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and the Contribution of International Peacekeeping Eileen Borris and Paul E Diehl

Among the dramatic shifts in international peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has been the movement away from operations that occur after a cease-fire but prior to a peace agreement, and whose primary purpose is conflict abatement. So-called "new" (Ratner, 1995) or "second generation" (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992) peacekeeping has given increasing attention to concerns of conflict resolution. Thus, more recent peacekeeping operations have fallen under the rubric of peacemaking and peacebuilding, indicating that such operations are no longer exclusively concerned with stopping the fighting, but also with promoting a lasting peace. Meeting such challenges is now increasingly difficult, in that the most frequent threats to global peace and security are intrastate, ethnic, and religious conflicts, which appear especially difficult to resolve. How do we move such deeply divided societies, characterized by violence, conflict, and untold suffering, to a new negotiated democratic order? What do these long-term efforts require and what roles can peacekeeping forces play in those efforts? A key element in the shift from violence to peace involves psychological changes on the part of the disputants. Forgiveness and reconciliation are essential components in this transformation. In this chapter, we discuss the forgiveness and reconciliation processes, with special attention to how international peacekeeping forces can assist those processes. In meeting challenges to international peace and security, a halt to armed conflict is certainly a necessity, but it is only a short-term goal in pursuit of

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longer-term achievements. Lasting peace requires a change in the outlook and perceptions of the protagonists, with the ability to forgive one's enemy as a starting point. Arendt (1958), writing just thirteen years after the end of World War II and the Holocaust, discussed the importance of forgiveness and its potential role in our public, political realm: "Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victim of its consequence forever" (p. 237). If disputants do not learn how to forgive, they will remain trapped in the quagmire of anger, pain, and grief, perpetuating mutual suffering and thus causing more death and destruction, as the many civil wars raging throughout the world currently attest. Until individuals and polities undergo a psychological change and learn to forgive—not turn their backs, not remain passive, not condone, but forgive—resentment and the threat of renewed warfare will continue to be the harsh masters whom so many dutifully obey. The failure to promote forgiveness may lead peacekeeping troops to be trapped by their success in militarized conflict abatement. Peacekeeping forces may be unable to exit because the underlying conflict has not been resolved, even as its most violent manifestations have been eliminated. Thus, the continuing deployment of U.N. troops in Cyprus since 1964 is a testament to their value in preventing renewed warfare, but also an indicator of the failure to promote forgiveness and reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish communities on that island. It is only when peacekeeping forces can be safely withdrawn without the threat of renewed warfare that ultimate success is achieved, a lesson quite apparent to NATO troops in Bosnia. We begin with a general discussion of the concept of forgiveness, and examine how it is applied to international peacekeeping efforts. We then discuss different stages in the psychological process of forgiveness and how peacekeeping operations might contribute to each phase. Following this, we shift to reconciliation, a next step in the conflict-resolution process after forgiveness has been achieved. There, we discuss the potential, limits, and risks associated with using peacekeeping operations to help facilitate this process. THE MEANING OF FORGIVENESS The true character of forgiveness is often misunderstood. Forgiveness is not about "turning the other cheek" or merely expressing conciliatory words when inside there is still emotional turmoil. Forgiveness is a complex act of consciousness. When forgiveness is offered within the context of healing and commitment, it liberates the psyche and soul from the need for personal revenge. Forgiveness empowers and releases people from feeling victimized. Not only are they released from the past and choose not to be vengeful, forgiveness also means releasing the control that the perception of victimhood has over their psyches.

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Forgiveness and reconciliation necessarily mean a break with the past. Arendt (1958) notes, "Only through this constant mutual release from what they can do men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new" (p. 240). People are either agents or the victims of wrongdoing or both. Held to the consequences of the past, their lives would be chained down forever, and thereby vulnerable to ethnocentric appeals that evoke the memory of hatreds and perceived past injustices. Only through releasing each other from what they have done and a willingness to change their minds and start again can former enemies reconstruct societies. The strength of forgiveness lies in its power to do just that. If those who hold onto grievances cannot forgive, they will never have freedom of vision to create a different society. Forgiveness is a process that focuses on internal restoration. It begins when an individual, group, or state perceives itself as harmed by another and ends in a psychological if not face-to-face reconciliation with those who were perceived as hurtful. When one is able to forgive, certain qualities are manifest. These qualities lead to a psychological transformation concerning painful situations of one's relationship with the other. The original situation is seen in a new light. The specific character of these qualities, which only becomes apparent toward the end of the process, ultimately describes the experience as being spiritual or transpersonal as well as interpersonal. Though there is great debate surrounding the concept of forgiveness, there has also been a consensual agreement with specific points regarding the general meaning of forgiveness. Enright and the Human Development Study Group (1994) spell out these points very clearly, for they bring up many different issues which at times are hard for people to accept: 1. Forgiving another occurs in the face of deep, unjust hurt (Kolnai, 1973-1974; Murphy & Hampton, 1988). 2. In forgiving such an offense, one gives up resentment, hatred, and/or anger toward the other, and instead tries to take a stance of compassion (North, 1987). 3. The forgiver understands that the offender has no right to such benevolence, but nonetheless offers it. Forgiveness is thus an unconditional gift given to one who inflicts the hurt. 4. Forgiveness is distinguished from reconciliation (Horsbrugh, 1974; Kolnai, 19731974). Forgiveness is an internal process and is the psychological response to injury Reconciliation is a behavioral coming together of two or more people. It is possible forgive and not reconcile, but very difficult to reconcile and not forgive. The forgiver is aware that injustice has occurred and yet takes a stance of benevolence toward the offender. In the context of international peacekeeping and conflict resolution, forgiveness may be more difficult to achieve. This is because a collective psy-

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chological change is required rather than a transformation of a single or small number of individuals. Furthermore, there may be significant domestic political incentives (witness the behavior of Serbian leaders in the former Yugoslavia) or risks (note the price paid by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt) that will mitigate efforts at forgiveness or encourage the continuation of hatreds. Forgiveness means that states or groups within states no longer focus primarily or exclusively on their enemies as the source of their dissatisfaction. Attention is directed at other concerns. To the extent that the enemy is the focus of attention, states and groups concentrate less on past wars or injustices and more on future interactions. With respect to the latter, this is not necessarily the expectation of future conflict, which is characteristic of protracted conflicts or enduring rivalries (Goertz & Diehl, 1993), but rather a consideration of how future relations might be peacefully managed. For example, the relationship between France and Germany now concentrates on new ways to cooperate, rather than on past grievances from the three wars that those two countries fought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The critical dimension of forgiveness is a shift in the understanding of, and relationship to, the other person, groups, and the world. The hurt is seen differently, and as a result of someone else's woundedness. The shift permits the forgiver to see a larger perspective, in which the injury becomes a shared pain with other human beings. In international peacekeeping, this is the recognition that enemies have a common problem that needs resolution, rather that viewing the situation from one-sided, ethnocentric, and zero-sum perspectives. Enemies recognize others' suffering and struggles, and therefore feelings of victimization make way for feelings of compassion. No longer is there only one possible connection with the other person, group, or state. There are choices. A new vision creates feelings of interconnectedness that empowers them. This is largely the process being followed by the "truth commission" in South Africa, which has sought to uncover abuses by all sides during the apartheid period as a prelude to forgiveness and national reconciliation. A similar truth commission was empowered in El Salvador as a part of the peace agreements that ended that country's civil war. It is with this backdrop that the stage is set for reconciliation to take place. Arendt (1958) contrasts forgiveness with its exact opposite—vengeance. She speaks of vengeance as a form of reacting against an original trespassing, "whereby far from putting an end to the consequences of the first misdeed, everybody remains bound to the process, permitting the chain reaction contained in every action to take its unhindered course" (p. 240). Arendt is referring here to the psychological process that sets up a reactive cycle of attack-defend-attack. Forgiveness, on the other hand, is an unconditional response, not a reaction, thus freeing the participants from the cycle of revenge. Perhaps here is where we can see the significance of forgiveness in setting the stage for reconciliation. The seeds for the deep-seated need for revenge lies in one's woundedness. When anger and hatred does not get dealt

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with in its respective place, it gets deposited on the dumping grounds of relationships between individuals, groups, or states. A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF FORGIVENESS AND THE ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Enright, Santos, and Al-Mabuk (1989) and EnrigM and the Human Development Study Group (1994) developed a structural model on forgiveness that is strongly influenced by Kohlberg's (1976) model with respect to justice. They began by studying people's perception of conditions that made forgiveness easiest for them. The following list presents six "soft stages" of forgiveness based on information gathered from subjects: Soft stage 1: Revengeful forgiveness I can forgive someone who wrongs me only if I can punish him or her to a similar degree to my own pain. Soft stage 2: Conditional or restitution forgiveness If I get back what was taken away from me, I can forgive. Or, if I feel guilty about withholding forgiveness, I can forgive to relieve my guilt. Soft stage 3: Expectational forgiveness I can forgive if others put pressure on me to forgive; I forgive because other people expect it. Soft stage 4: Lawful expectational forgiveness I forgive because my religion or similar institution demands it. (Note that this concept differs from Stage 2, in which I forgive to relieve my own guilt about withholding forgiveness.) Soft stage 5: Forgiveness as social harmony I forgive because it restores harmony or good relations in society. Forgiveness decreases friction and outright conflict in society; it is a way of maintaining peaceful relations. Soft stage 6: Forgiveness as love I forgive because it promises a true sense of love. Because I must truly care for each person, a hurtful act on his or her part does not alter that sense of love. This kind of relationship keeps open the possibility of reconciliation and closes the door on revenge. Forgiveness is no longer dependent on a social context, as at Stage 5. The forgiver does not control the other by forgiving, but releases him or her.

The term "soft stages" was chosen because many of the subjects exhibited reasoning at two adjacent levels rather than the single stage reflective of structured wholeness (see the Appendix for a series of variables related to forgiveness). The two lowest stages tend to confuse justice and forgiveness because something is required of the offender before forgiveness is granted (Enright et al.,

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1989); this also involves only a limited degree of psychological change on the part of the disputants. Nevertheless, peacekeeping forces can play useful roles in promoting this very limited form of forgiveness. Clearly, the first stage of forgiveness is an undesirable one, in that the pursuit of revenge runs the risk of perpetuating the cycle of attack and retaliation that is counterproductive for establishing even minimal levels of forgiveness. Peacekeeping forces in their traditional interposition roles can prevent the imposition of punishment that is a part of Stage 1; this, in turn, prevents an escalation of the conflict and eliminates the need of the other party to also inflict punishment in response to the original punishment. That peacekeeping forces are important in this process, and that sometimes they fail, is illustrated by the failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to stop the repeated attacks and retaliations between Israel and Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon. If restitution is necessary for forgiveness, peacekeeping forces can facilitate that. For example, a peacekeeping force may supervise the return of captured territory, as in the return of the Sinai to Egypt with the assistance of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), or assist in the redistribution of land in El Salvador, as did the U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). Peacekeepers can also provide the calm environment in which such concessions can be negotiated. The middle two stages do not confound forgiveness and justice, but they grant forgiveness only when significant social pressures emerge. International peacekeeping forces can provide some of that pressure, though there is an equal risk that peacekeeping forces may actually reduce some of that pressure. On the positive side, peacekeeping forces that facilitate the disarming of enemies, as was done in Namibia, Angola, and Cambodia prior to elections, may provide the psychological impetus for each disputant to accept the other side as a legitimate actor. The psychological effect of giving up weapons may also force disputants to accept that the struggle is over and some working arrangement must be made with one's enemies. On the negative side, peacekeeping forces that do little more than stop the fighting may remove the perceived time pressure for settlement and freeze the status quo (Diehl, 1994). This may have the effect of hardening the positions of the disputants and impeding the prospects for forgiveness and attitudinal change that are necessary for ultimate reconciliation. Certainly, stopping bloodshed is a desirable outcome, but a cost of such action may be a stalemate unless the peacekeeping force and the international community do more than separate the warring parties. Conditions are still imposed in Stage 5, but those must occur after forgiveness is granted. It is at this stage that peacekeepers can play critical roles. Several of the new peacekeeping roles involve the restoration of civil society in war-torn areas. One function is the supervision of elections (as occurred in Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Namibia), in which peacekeepers set up the election machinery and ensure that the transition election is conducted freely and fairly. Peacekeeping forces might also be involved in nation build-

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ing, in which police and other government services are developed, especially important in "failed" states. In effect, peacekeepers help create the norms and institutions under which peaceful relations can be conducted and thereby forgiveness can be achieved. Only in Stage 6 is there unconditionality underlying forgiveness. Yet in the context of international peacekeeping and protracted conflicts, this stage is unlikely to be achieved in the near term, and international peacekeeping may be unable to effect this kind of fundamental psychological change among protagonists. International peacekeeping forces do not inherently promote the process of forgiveness, nor do they necessarily exercise an exclusive or primary impetus process when they do have a positive impact. Yet their potential for utility in promoting forgiveness appears to lie in their ability to go beyond simple conflict-abatement functions (though these are not unimportant) to facilitate the peaceful interaction of former enemies. It is when peacekeepers can build the norms and institutions that regularize peaceful interaction that the greatest success will be found. It is then that forgiveness be a by-product, and the physical presence of the peacekeepers will no longer be necessary to guarantee that peaceful interaction. THE CONCEPT OF RECONCILIATION When there is forgiveness, healing takes place within the mind of the forgiver. Inner healing can be extremely meaningful to the one who forgives, but may not contribute to the development of social bonding. Just as forgiveness requires psychological growth, so too does the process of reconciliation. The key factor for the reconciliation process is trust. If for whatever reason trust is not established, then reconciliation will not take place. Reconciliation is a process that moves us away from hatred and injustices of the past toward establishing structures and procedures for establishing durable peace with adversaries once groups have entered a post-settlement phase (Ackerman, 1994). It is a process that restores broken relationships of those who have been alienated from one another by conflict to create a community again. Reconciliation begins with the restoration between the injured and the injurer, and reciprocity is essential. There are a number of essential components to reconciliation as a political concept, including equality, trust, acceptance, partnership, friendship, and the development of mutual interests (Feldman, 1991). Yet for these components to be manifest among former enemies, a significant transformation is necessary. According to Frost (1991), Arendt suggests that there are two primary requirements for this transformation to take place: "the ability of people to make agreements to live reciprocally in new ways which contrast to the ways of the past; and the freedom to enter into these agreements with integrity, setting aside, not the memory, but the continuing hostility and need for

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retribution associated with the memory of the painful past" (p. 200). This setting aside is what Arendt calls forgiveness and the ability to make agreements to live reciprocally in new ways refers to the process of reconciliation. In applying the reconciliation concept to international peacekeeping, we are referring to the stage of intrastate or interstate conflict after a cease-fire or some other temporary agreement. Early in the reconciliation process is the need to devise some peace agreement that resolves at least some of the underlying conflict issues. Such an agreement may also specify a process (e.g., a democratic election) that sets up institutions and processes that provide the mechanisms to deal with remaining and future conflict issues. Yet the reconciliation process does not end with such an agreement. A higher stage of reconciliation involves not only the continuing absence of armed conflict, but the building of a "positive peace" between former enemies. In intrastate conflict, this may mean cooperation among different groups to resolve common problems, and the establishment of tolerance, if not respect, for cultural, linguistic, or religious diversity within society. With respect to interstate conflict, reconciliation would include establishing regular diplomatic, social, and economic ties between states, ties that might normally be expected between states in a given geographic region and level of economic development, irrespective of political or security concerns. The transformation of Europe from a region of hostile rivals in the centuries prior to World War II to the integrated European Union today is an illustrative example of a successful, though as yet not fully complete, reconciliation process. THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS AND PEACEKEEPING The first step in reconciliation, assuming some modicum of forgiveness, is overcoming distrust and animosity. Groups and states that were intimately linked by armed conflict now must build a mutually shared future based on trust and respect. Yet given the historical memory of animosity and suffering, it is difficult for people to transcend the past, even if they have forgiven their enemies for old transgressions. International peacekeeping has the potential to contribute to the process of establishing trust between the formerly warring parties. First, to the extent that international peacekeepers can facilitate a cease-fire and bring stability to an area, then a new history is potentially created for the protagonists. With the peacekeeping forces in place, each side has some psychological assurance that war will not be renewed; and with each day, month, or year the violence of the past fades from memory and is replaced with the more recent experiences that do not involve war. This assurance is not the same as genuine trust, for the latter would make an international military force superfluous. Nevertheless, by replacing fear with confidence, international peacekeepers can provide an effective substitute for genuine trust in the short run. Peacekeepers might also establish trust by performing arms-control verification tasks assigned to them as part of an agreement among

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the warring parties, who may not initially trust each other enough to verify each other's compliance and therefore may want a neutral party to conduct those functions (Jurado & Diehl, 1994). Indeed, multinational peacekeepers in the Sinai perform such tasks, as did U.N. soldiers in Namibia prior to its independence and democratic elections. There are several risks associated with peacekeeping forces providing assurance to hostile parties. First, there is the risk that by separating the two groups or states, peacekeeping forces will inhibit the development of mutual trust and reconciliation that comes with direct interaction. This undesirable effect is notable on Cyprus and apparently in Bosnia; the assurance that war will not be renewed is counterbalanced by the separation of different ethnic communities into enclaves in which there is little long-term basis for building genuine trust. Second, replacing the "old past" with new realities is a time-consuming process, and six months of stability (the typical time period of initial authorization for U.N. peacekeeping forces) is insufficient to overcome years or even centuries of hostilities (note that Serbian grievances against neighbors in the former Yugoslavia extend back several hundred years). Beyond providing some assurance and stability as a first step in the reconciliation process, international peacekeepers may promote environments conducive to an expansion of agreements and treaties between the parties. A comprehensive peace settlement, or even a limited agreement over some issues, is not likely when the protagonists are actively at war with one another and their focus is on short-term military concerns. The cooling-off period provided by peacekeeping forces offers the potential for direct negotiations to take place or makes third-party mediation more likely to succeed. We know that peacekeeping forces alone cannot induce such an agreement. Yet by stimulating a more favorable environment, peacekeepers may help to convince the parties to accept more than just a cease-fire. Such a psychological change will be necessary for building a positive peace between the protagonists, and therefore for a higher level of reconciliation. Higher levels of reconciliation represent a profound healing process. The purpose is to provide the opportunity to redress the trauma and dehumanization of people so that there can be a coming together of community. As with any good relationship, there are certain elements that lay a sturdy foundation on which to build. This foundation holds the entire structure together and, in the case of reconciliation, the building blocks are truth, justice, mercy, and peace (Lederach, 1995). Reconciliation has to be based in fact, and therefore truth is central to the process of reconciliation. Truth is about revealing that which is hidden. Through recounting the horrific events of the past, the human and civil dignity of victims is restored. It is the sharing of their stories that will help the victims overcome feelings of isolation and shame, ultimately forgiving and shedding the burden of shame. Those witnessing the storytelling gain an authentic depth of understanding which breaks down barriers in ways which

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would be almost impossible by any other means. Yet truth suggests honesty and revelation. Without truth, conflicts cannot be resolved, though speaking the truth may leave the protagonists feeling vulnerable and unworthy. Revealing the truth plays a critical role in this healing function. It provides a picture of the psychological landscape of what has happened. By revealing the truth, victims can be acknowledged and empowered, and have their humanity and civil dignities rehabilitated in the process. That, in turn, enables groups and states to be in a position to be ready to forgive. It is this search for truth that can create the moral climate in which reconciliation and peace will flourish. Truth is often relative, especially for enemies with different political or ideological dispositions. International peacekeeping forces have the potential to assist in the process of uncovering the truth from past conflicts. First, one of the hallmarks of traditional peacekeeping, especially that conducted under U.N. auspices, is its neutrality. Thus, to the extent that peacekeeping forces are assigned tasks that require the uncovering of the truth, they may be regarded as less biased than other parties who might perform similar functions. If truth is an important first step toward achieving higher-order reconciliation, an acceptance of peacekeepers as arbiters of the truth is important; yet as the experience of U.N. arms inspectors in Iraq reveals, there is no guarantee that U.N. personnel will be fully accepted in such roles. Second, international peacekeepers might also be charged with various inquiry tasks, including the investigation of past human rights abuses or other transgressions. This is largely the role that U.N. personnel are attempting to perform in the Congo (formerly Zaire) and might yet play well in the former Yugoslavia. In this way, international peacekeepers can help uncover the truth, and if they are accepted as neutral third parties they can help speed the healing process that comes from revelation of the truth. Of course, it is assumed that truth revelation aids in the healing process and does not further reinforce the historical images of one's enemy as evil. Justice, like truth, is another important aspect of the reconciliation process. Most people use the term "justice" in a very narrow sense of prosecution and punishment of individual perpetrators through the formal justice system. When we understand what forgiveness is, we begin to see justice in terms of the meaning of forgiveness. Pope John Paul II emphasized this when he said, "The command to forgive does not precede the objective demands of justice, but justice in the correct sense of the word is actually the ultimate aim of forgiveness" (Encyclical No. XIV, quoted in Bronkhorst, 1995, p. 41). Justice is not punishment but restoration, not necessarily to bring things back to the way they were, but to the way they should be. It is about restoring people's lives, restoring peace, and restoring harmony. Justice that seems to take into account not only the victims but also the perpetrators of crimes may appear to demonstrate a lack of justice for the victim. In a reconciliation process, however, justice not only operates at the

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more individual level, but also at the level of social order. There may be a very expensive price for those individuals and families who are asked to make yet additional sacrifices. This price does not necessarily completely exclude justice. Sacrifices by the few may be necessary for the sake of many. Some may sacrifice the formal trappings of justice for an even higher good to close the chapter of the past and to avoid confrontation (Hansard, 1995). This is the line of defense that the current Minister of Justice of South Africa employed in response to the question of victims' compensation for injustices during the apartheid era: We have a nation of victims, and if we are unable to provide complete justice on an individual basis—and we need to try and achieve maximum justice within the framework of reconciliation—it is possible for us to ensure that there is historical and collective justice for the people of our country. If we achieve that, if we achieve social justice and move in that direction, then those who today feel aggrieved that individual justice has not been done will at least be able to say that our society has achieved wha the victims fought for during their lifetimes. And that therefore at that level, one will be able to say that justice has been done. (Omar, in Rwelamira & Werle, 1996, p. xii) International peacekeepers probably cannot, and should not, determine what the form or content of the actions that constitute justice in the reconciliation process. Such determinations must largely come from the disputants themselves or ultimately they will not be accepted or legitimized. Nevertheless, peacekeepers can appropriately be in charge of the implementation of those provisions. International peacekeepers might be assigned to facilitate the peaceful transfer or restoration of sovereign territory from one disputant to another (a function performed by peacekeepers in the Sinai and to a lesser and less successful extent in Bosnia). Peacekeepers might also assist in the repatriation of refugees or internally displaced persons, as was done in Namibia and Mozambique. The process of election supervision and the creation of government institutions, including the creation of functioning police forces and courts as in Haiti, could be essential elements in establishing justice in broken societies. The failure of peacekeepers to assist in these functions in Somalia is, in part, responsible for the troubles that continue to plague that fragmented country. Therefore, international peacekeepers can play facilitating roles for justice, but justice cannot be imposed on those unwilling to accept it. Philosophers agree that forgiveness is an act which one is praised for performing but not blamed for failing to perform We can also say this about mercy, a third key component of reconciliation. Included in the concept of mercy, similar to forgiveness, is a relinquishment of some right of those who have been merciful, a giving up of something due to them. Mercy articulates the needs for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning. There is a sense that mercy may be the legal analogue of forgiveness with one difference: Forgiveness involves the overcoming of certain passions such as anger and hatred, whereas mercy

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involves acting in a certain way because of certain passions such as love and compassion. Both are virtues, but operate in a different sort of context. The ultimate goal of reconciliation is the building of peace. Peace is also a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, trust, and justice. To achieve peace it must be a permanent state of mind. When the minds of groups or state leaders are hostile, they see hostility everywhere. Acting in anger is not just the result of agitated minds, it is also a cause, provoking retaliation from others and furthers agitation in our minds. International peacekeeping cannot impose the attitudinal adjustments that are required for mercy and ultimately peace in the reconciliation process. The psychological changes that are required must come from the disputants, and it is likely that the process will be a long-term one. Unlike reconciliation within families, those between groups and states have to overcome many more obstacles and involve much greater numbers of people whose attitudes must be transformed. Furthermore, reconciliation after civil or interstate conflict may be difficult, as political incentives will exist for leaders to revive past hatreds for their own political gain and thereby derail attempts at reconciliation. Perhaps the best that peacekeepers can do is to remain in place so that the reconciliation process does not take a step or more backward. Just being in place assures that violent incidents do not arise, and that disputes can be dealt with in a regularized peaceful manner. Attitudinal change may not happen easily or quickly, but the absence of peacekeepers to keep the process on track may lead to an unraveling of the reconciliation process and force the international community to start over. Unfortunately, there has been a recent emphasis on peacekeeping forces being removed as quickly as possible from conflict situations; this is largely for financial and domestic political reasons by those states that supply the bulk of troops and support for the operations. This tendency to exit a crisis too soon, especially acute in the U.N., could jeopardize the long-term stability of the area and abort the peace and reconciliation process. Conversely, there is some recognition that the role of peacekeeping in reconciliation requires a long-term commitment. The end of 1997 saw U.S. President Bill Clinton not only extend American forces in the NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia past the June 1998 deadline (the third deadline so established), but, more important, he did not immediately set another deadline for withdrawal, indicating a recognition of the long and uncertain road that country has in building a peaceful society. The complexities of the reconciliation process lies with the paradoxes within its foundation. The concepts of truth, justice, mercy, and peace, which are at the heart of the reconciliation process, bring out opposing energies, creating polarities. Often their polarities are seen as incompatible, but actually they focus on the fundamental human and relational needs intrinsic to the experience, especially in dealing with protracted violent conflict. Reconciliation then represents the container that holds the creative tension together.

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There are three important paradoxes (Lederach, 1995) that are played out in the reconciliation process, and these may complicate the ability of the peacekeeping forces to carry out their missions and aid in the reconciliation process. The first addresses the necessity for speaking of the painful past and at the same time co-creating a positive vision for a long-term interdependent future. In hearing and absorbing the pain, which is an extremely difficult task, the intergenerational cycles of violence and suffering are hopefully broken. The next paradox, similar to the first, deals with truth and mercy. Truth holds the concern for exposing what has happened and mercy is about letting the painful past go in favor of a renewed relationship. For healing and reconciliation to take place, disturbing details will surface, perhaps stirring up distressing emotions in the community of those whom have suffered. Building an interdependent future on trust requires the truth to come out and yet runs the risk that the emotional healing necessary may be impossible to complete, precisely because of all the pain and suffering. Resolving this paradox seems to be an important hurdle for the reconciliation process and the war crimes tribunal both to succeed in Rwanda. The third paradox deals with justice, peace, and forgiveness. Time is needed and timing is critical in redressing wrongs, creating a space for healing and forgiveness to occur and creating a vision for an interconnected future. The healing process forces the protagonists out of an amnesiac state where they cannot pretend that awful things did not happen. Yet if justice is the end of a reconciliation process, it can mean the death of a coming together for those communities. Without forgiveness going beyond justice, there can be no future. Yet the risk is that such truth will reinforce past enmities and prevent a focus on future cooperation. This may result in peacekeepers having to deal with short-term goals of keeping hostilities from flaring up rather than on longer-term peaceful arrangements between the parties. This is exactly the crippling paradox that has affected the UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon. CONCLUSION Forgiveness is a prerequisite for reconciliation. Reconciliation enhances the process of forgiveness by structuring it into the web of the societies once in conflict. Forgiveness at a transformational level helps break through personal barriers and lift the veil of illusions that may blind individuals, groups, and states to the potential for cooperation. When disputants are able to embrace the suffering of our enemy, then a reconciliation process can begin. Forgiveness and reconciliation requires community and participation; they cannot be accomplished in isolation. International peacekeeping can play a number of facilitating roles in the psychological processes of forgiveness and reconciliation. Peacekeepers provide a stable environment under which these processes can occur, but, equally important, they can assist in the processes themselves. This may be through new roles, such as arms-control verifica-

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tion, the investigation of past human rights abuses, or the supervision of democratic elections. Thus, the international community cannot merely be satisfied with stopping the violence, but must also take positive action to build positive peace between long-term enemies, be they countries or internal ethnic or religious groups. International peacekeepers are not panaceas that precipitate forgiveness and reconciliation themselves; the disputants must carry much of those burdens themselves. Nevertheless, peacekeepers, if used properly and in a timely fashion, have made and can continue to make important supplementary contributions. APPENDIX: PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS OF FORGIVING ANOTHER 1. Examination of psychological defenses (Kiel, 1986). 2. Confrontation of anger (the point is to release, not harbor, the anger) (Trainer, 1981). 3. Acknowledgment of shame, when this is appropriate (Patton, 1985). 4. Awareness of cathexis (Droll, 1984). 5. Awareness of cognitive rehearsal (the thoughts we repeat to ourselves) of the offense (Droll, 1984). 6. Insight that the injured party may be comparing self with the injurer (Kiel, 1986). 7. Insight into a possibly altered "just world" view (Flanigan, 1986). 8. A change of heart/conversion/new insights that old resolution strategies are not working (North, 1987). 9. A willingness to explore forgiveness as an option. 10. Commitment to forgive the offender (Neblett, 1974). 11. Reframing, through role-taking, who the wrongdoer is by viewing him or her in context (Smith, 1981). 12. Empathy toward the offender (Cunningham, 1985). 13. Awareness of compassion, as it emerges, toward the offender (Droll, 1984). 14. Acceptance/absorption of the pain (Bergin, 1988). 15. Realization that self has needed others* forgiveness in the past (Cunningham, 1985). 16. Realization that self has been, perhaps, permanently changed by the injury (Close, 1970). 17. Awareness of decreased negative affect and, perhaps, increased positive affect, if this begins to emerge, toward the injurer (Smedes, 1984). 18. Awareness of internal, emotional release (Smedes, 1984). This list is an extrapolation from Enright and the Human Development Study Group (1994). The references at the end of each item are prototypical examples of examples or discussions of that item.

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REFERENCES Ackerman, A. (1994). Reconciliation as a peace-building process in postwar Europe: The Franco-German case. Peace and Change, 19,229-250. Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bergin, A. E. (1988). Three contributions of a spiritual perspective to counseling, psychotherapy, and behavioral change. Counseling and Values, 33, 21-31. Bronkhorst, D. (1995). Truth and reconciliation: Obstacles and opportunities in man rights. Amsterdam: Amnesty International—Dutch Section. Close, H. T. (1970). Forgiveness and responsibility: A case study. Pastoral Psychology, 21, 19-25. Cunningham, B. B. (1985).The will tofirgive:A pastoral theological view of forgining. The Journal of Pastoral Care, 39, 141-149. Diehl, P. F. (1994). International peacekeeping (Rev. ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkin University Press. Droll, D. M. (1984). Forgiveness: Theory and research. Unpublished Ph.D. dissert tion, University of Nevada-Reno. Enright, R. D., & the Human Development Study Group. (1994). Piaget on the mora development of forgiveness: Identity or reciprocity? Human Development, 3 63-80. Enright, R. D., Santos, M., & Al-Mabuk, R. (1989). The adolescent as forgiver. Journal of Adolescence, 21, 95-110. Feldman, G. (1991, April), the concept of reconciliation in the Federal Republic Germany's foreign policy: How enemies become friends. Presentation at th American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, DC. Flanigan, B. (1986). Forgiving. Workshop at the Mendota Mental Health Institute Madison, WI. Frost, B. (1991). The politics of peace. London: Darton, Longman & Todd. Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. (1993). Enduringrivalries:Theoretical constructs and empirical patterns. International Studies Quarterly, 37, 147-171. Hansard. (1995). Debates of the National Assembly, Second Session, First Parl ment, 16-18 May. Cape Town: Government Printer. Horsbrugh, H. J. N. (1974). Forgiveness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 240-2 Jurado, S., & Diehl, P. F. (1994). United Nations peacekeeping and arms control verification. Contemporary Security Policy, 15, 38-54. Kiel, D. V. (1986). I'm learning how to forgive. Decisions, February, 12-13. Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: Theory, search, and social issues (pp. 31-53). New York: Holt. Kolnai, A. (1973-1974). Forgiveness. Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, 74,91-1 Lederach, J. P. (1995). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided soci ies. Tokyo: United Nations University. Mackinlay, J., & Chopra, J. (1992). Second generation multinational operations. Was ington Quarterly, 15,113-131. Murphy, J. G., & Hampton, J. (1988). Forgiveness and mercy. Cambridge: Cambri University Press. Neblett, W. R. (1974). Forgiveness and ideals. Mind, 83, 269-275. North, J. (1987). Wrongdoing and forgiveness. Philosophy, 62,499-508.

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Patton, J. (1985). Is human forgiveness possible? Nashville: Abingdon. Ratner, S. (1995). The new U.N. peacekeeping. New York: St. Martin's Press. Rwelamira, M. R., & Werle, G. (Eds.). (1996). Confronting past injustices. Durban, South Africa: Butterworth. Smedes, L. B. (1984). Forgive and Forget: Healing the hurts we don't deserve. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Smith, M. (1981). The psychology of forgiveness. The Month, 14, 301-307. Trainer, M. (1981). Forgiveness: Intrinsic, role-expected, expedient, in the context of divorce. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University.

CHAPTER 16

The Peace Process at Its Culmination: The Reconciliation Elections Eabrizio Pagani

THE NOTION OF RECONCILIATION ELECTIONS Since the end of the 1980s there has been a wave of national peace settlements which, with various forms of assistance provided by the international community, endeavored to terminate long-lasting internal and regional conflicts in various parts of the planet. The centerpiece of these peace accords has always been a national election, which the political future of the country was supposed to be built upon. Competitive political elections and referenda of this kind have been held in Namibia (November 1989), Nicaragua (February 1990), Angola (September 1992), Cambodia (May 1993), El Salvador (March 1994), and Mozambique (October 1994). Another case which can be recalled here is that of the elections in South Africa (April 1994), though they presented some relevant differences. In the same period, new conflicts and civil strife emerged, from the Balkans to Russia and its borderlands. In many cases the same scenario has recurred: A peace accord has been negotiated and implemented with a variety of measures of intervention by the international community, and national elections have been its final outcome. Electoral consultations have been held in Haiti (Summer and December 1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (September 1996), Albania (June 1997), and Liberia (July 1997). The suffrages in Palestine (January 1996), Chechnya (January 1997), and Eastern Slavonia (April 1997) can also be mentioned.

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These kind of elections have been defined as reconciliation elections (L6pezPintor, 1997).Their main characteristics can be summarized by the following features: • They are held after an armed conflict that has deeply divided the country, in most cases after a long civil war with widespread atrocities. In several cases the country has gone through a complex humanitarian emergency (Natsios, 1997). • They are framed in a peace process, which the parties of the conflict have agreed upo • They are supposed to be democratic elections, based on the principle of "free and fair" and on broad-based participation. • They are conducted under the close scrutiny of the international community. The inte national community, through different organizations, with various means, and by a wi spectrum of degrees of involvement, is engaged in the peace settlement, in the supervision and verification of the elections, and in the reconstruction of the country. These electoral consultations can be considered a particular genus of "founding elections," which is a notion traditionally employed by political scientists (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 57). The founding elections qualify the passage from one political regime to another (e.g., the voting which marks the transition from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic one). Our type of elections is a specific kind of founding elections, because they also mark the end of a civil war. They go further and present a founding value not just of a new political regime, but in a certain sense of the state itself. In some cases this significance is more evident; for instance, when the voting takes place in completely new states or political entities, as in Namibia, Palestine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other cases the political transformations foreseen in the peace settlement vest, or at least are perceived to vest, such a political importance to redefine the national identity of the country. South Africa and Cambodia are clear examples. Thus, the reconciliation elections present a triple political and psychological pattern. They are part of a peacebuilding process, and generally they are its ultimate outcome. At the same time, they are an essential element of the nation building by contributing to determining the new political identity of the country. Finally, they are, or are supposed to be, the founding element and the keystone of a democratic political system, in the frame of a democracy-building process. These three elements are strongly interwoven (Dreyer, 1995). Reconciliation elections are considered the paramount political instrument and the key psychological turning point in the transition from armed conflict to an acceptable political life. Hence, the electoral process gathers and raises all the expectations of the peace process and constitutes, especially on the voting day, its political and psychological culmination. The scope of this chapter encompasses three aspects of the political and psychological value of elections: first, the electoral process within the broader peace settlement framework; second, the impact of the international electoral mission; and finally, the voting day and its aftermath.

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THE BROADER PEACE SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK The aforementioned national peace settlements foresee at some point the holding of a popular suffrage, which can result in a political election or in a referendum.1 A common pattern both in the structure and in the development of the peace processes can be easily discerned through a comparative analysis of the various peace accords. The conclusion of a national peace settlement is the result of a series of factors which comprises the factual situation of the parties involved, their perception of it, and the leverage of external forces.2 Thus, once the conflict is "ripe for resolution" (Zartman, 1989) and a window for negotiation opens, efforts for an agreement between the conflicting parties converge. This long and complex process always sees as a crucial element the participation of an external mediator (King, 1997; Zartman, 1995). Once the agreement is reached, it is formalized in an accord, which becomes the blueprint of the peace process. This accord frames in a more or less detailed way the phases of the peace process and their timing. The military aspects of the peace process usually precede the implementation of the civilian part, though they are usually largely intermingled. With regard to the military phase, the peace processes usually develop according to the following steps: the establishment of a cease-fire; the withdrawal, if they are present, of external forces in the country; the assembly of the troops, their demobilization and disarmament; and the reconstruction and training of a new nonpartisan army.3 On the civilian side, the mechanisms are even more complex. They may cover a large variety of aspects: the protection of human rights, the constitution and training of a new integrated civilian police force, the repatriation of refugees, and the holding of the elections. The timing of these activities varies, but the holding of the elections is always foreseen as one of the last steps of the process. The implementation of this whole undertaking presupposes the presence on the ground of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation (Durch, 1996). The peacekeeping operation is called to closely follow the schedule established for the peace process and frequently to also certify its progress. The peacekeeping force, which includes a strong civilian component, is an essential factor in the execution of the accord and also plays a crucial role in the implementation of the electoral process. ELECTIONS AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT Elections are generally perceived by all the parties involved as the natural, ultimate outcome of the peace process. They are commonly thought to be the key mechanism for the transition from armed conflict to political interaction. Nevertheless, strong differences can emerge among the parties engaged in

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the peace settlement with regard to the political assessment of the electoral process. At this point we proceed to inspect the significance given by the main actors to the elections at the moment of the negotiations and the conclusion of the peace accord. The following sections explore the political and psychological expectations of the warring parties, the external mediators, and the whole international community. The Perspective of the International Community For the international community, the holding of a democratic vote represents a goal as important as the cessation of the armed violence. In the postEast-West confrontation world, the democratization of political systems and the promotion of human rights has become one of the main aims and activities of organizations like the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Frank, 1992, p. 63). A role of national governments and international institutions in this regard is commonly advocated by international public opinion. In this sense, to interlock the peace process with a democratic electoral process is felt to be an unquestionable duty which rests upon the external actors who play a role in bringing the civil war to a close. Political scientists seem to agree that the final success of an intervention of the international community is measured not just on how well the resumption of the conflict has been deterred, but also on how much the resolution of the conflict has been facilitated (Diehl, 1993, p. 34; Durch, 1996, p. 17). In this sense, the idea that just democratically elected regimes can adequately deal with the problems underlying civil conflicts is largely shared. To base the political competition "on ballots rather than bullets is . . . perceived to serve as an antidote to war and violence" (Kumar, 1997, p. 7). The case of Cambodia gives us a good example of how much a democratic outcome is perceived as a fundamental test for the success of such an operation. Cambodia had been described as one of the major achievements of United Nations peacekeeping. The United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) seemed to have been successful, both in deterring the conflict and in facilitating the process of national reconciliation. An acceptable democratic regime, elected in the "free and fair elections" (United Nations, 1993) of May 1994, had been established. This positive view has been, at least for a certain period, widely shared (Durch, 1996, p. 18; Frieson, 1996, p. 115; Heininger, 1994, p. 202). The perception of the realizations of UNTAC started to tarnish as soon as, in the second half of the 1990s, political violence reemerged. Ultimately, the authoritarian turn of the summer of 1997 urged many observers to a much more severe judgment. This attitude of the international community strongly influences the concrete acting of the external mediators of the crisis, whoever plays that role (a

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single state or group of states, an international organization, or a private institution). In this regard, for example, the mediator may try to commit the parties to a democratic outcome from the very beginning of the negotiations. The Perspective of the Warring Parties The perspective of the warring parties can be quite different. Democracy and free elections have never been part of the political scenario of most of these war-torn countries. Some of the states ravaged by internal conflicts have proceeded directly from colonial rule to civil war (Mozambique, Angola); others have gone through some form of Communist regime (former Yugoslavia, Albania, Cambodia) or authoritarian government (El Salvador, South Africa, Haiti). In the past, some of these countries might have experienced political elections, but in most cases they were "elections without choice" (Hermet, Rose, & RouquiS, 1978), not free and participatory electoral processes. Thus, the parties in the conflict very seldom have some form of democratic and electoral experience. On one side, the insurgents find their political strength either in forms of ethnic and tribal identification or in nondemocratic ideologies. In certain cases the rebels identify with the insurgency itself, not being able to perceive their political role outside of it. On the other side, the government usually does not show a deeper democratic political culture. In certain cases the party or faction in power tends to identify itself with the state, in a totalitarian afflatus. In other cases the government has been involved in serious human rights violations and widespread abuses that deprive it of any democratic legitimacy. Given this background, how do the conflicting parties perceive the issue of elections in the course of peace negotiations? First, it must be considered that any decision and agreement regarding the electoral process is taken in the framework of an overall negotiation, in which all the issues are connected. This negotiation is interpreted by the parties as a zero-sum game: Their psychological approach is that what is lost by one party is gained by the other. There is very scarce understanding of the value of the democratic process itself and the benefits which the country could achieve. In this sense, to paraphrase Clausewitz (1832), the political confrontation and the electoral competition is really perceived as the continuation of the war by other means. Second, the parties usually do not feel that the electoral process has to be a priority in the agenda of the peace talks.4 They are initially engaged in negotiating issues which are felt to be more urgent; for instance, all the military aspects related to the cease-fire, the cessation of external intervention, and the demobilization and disarmament of the forces. In many cases an understanding is reached that provides only a very rough outline of the electoral process or postpones the discussion of the topic to a later time. Furthermore, the negotiators sometimes feel the sense of the historical moment in which they are engaged and thus are more keen in creating a political process than

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in setting its fine details, which in any case can be worked out after the accord is concluded (Berman, 1996, p. 61). Third, in the case of classical asymmetrical negotiations between government and insurgents (Zartman, 1995), the government sometimes shows a strong political and psychological reluctance in discussing certain issues with the counterpart; for example, the details of the electoral process and especially of the administration of the elections. This attitude is motivated by the sensitive nature of having to negotiate topics that naturally fall under the prerogatives of every sovereign government. Similarly, the need to accept a foreign intervention, like the presence of a peacekeeping force, and its intrusiveness can engender a strong resistance by the government. Certain positions taken by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Mozambique (Ciment, 1997, p. 203) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngola (MPLA) in Angola (Knudsen & Zartman, 1995, p. 137) during the peace talks are examples of this attitude. DEMOBILIZATION AND THE PEACE PROCESS The Phasing of the Peace Process Thefinaloutcome of the peace negotiation is a formal agreement between the parties. Once this agreement has been concluded, its implementation develops according to the already mentioned pattern: the cease-fire, the demobilization and disarmament of the troops, the reconstruction and the training of a new army, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force to supervise this process. A common organ is also usually created in order to work as the primary political body for consultation and to oversee the implementation of the agreement. In El Salvador the Comision Nacional para la Consolidacion de la Paz (COPAZ) was created, which was composed of two representatives of the government, two representatives of the insurgent force (i.e., the FMNL), and one representative of each of the parties represented in the Legislative Assembly. A representative of the ONUSAL mission and the Archbishop of San Salvador were also present as observers. In Angola they created, after the Bicesse Peace Accords of 1991, the Joint Political Military Commission (Commissao Conjunto Politico-Militare, CCPM), which included, besides the representatives of the two parties, the government and UNITA, also observers from the U.N. mission (UNITA II) and the states which had sponsored the Accords (Portugal, Russia, and the United States). Other examples could be made. The establishment of this organ, its composition, and its functioning is essential for the success of the whole process. It is, in fact, the main, if not the only, channel of communication between the parties, and also the ground where the external actors can put pressure on them to maintain momentum in their dialogue and in the accomplishment of their reciprocal duties.

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This common body also plays a crucial role in deciding the passage from the sheer military part of the process to the political and civilian phase of its implementation. This time frame is usually fixed in the peace accord itself, but the need to redefine it happens frequently. The timing of the starting of the implementation of the electoral process is a very sensitive issue for its political and psychological implications and sometimes poses a dilemma to the international community. In the peace process there is always a moment at which the holding of the elections according to the originally agreed timetable seems to be impossible. The noncompliance of the parties and the slowness of the deployment of the peacekeeping operation are among the most common causes. At this point the international community faces the dilemma of whether to proceed in the electoral process, lacking some of the appropriate conditions, or to postpone it, maintaining a cumbersome presence in the field. Dangers and potentialities are encompassed in both options. The "Return to the Bush" Syndrome The holding of the cease-fire and the realization of the demobilization program are considered the natural prerequisite for an acceptable electoral process. In certain cases, though, the parties, with the agreement of the United Nations, have decided to proceed with the electoral implementation notwithstanding only partial completion of the first phase. In the case of Angola, for example, in 1992 the whole military phase ran behind schedule and there were clear signs of noncompliance by the parties, but it was decided to go forward with the electoral process. This choice proved to be very dangerous and is considered one of the main factors in the disruption of the entire peace process after the elections (Lodico, 1996, p. 123). In later operations the United Nations and other peacekeeping forces learned from the Angola experience the importance of the temporal linkage between demobilization and elections. In Mozambique, for instance, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) agreed to postpone of one year, from October 1993 to October 1994, the holding of the elections to permit the completion of the military aspects of the process (Reed, 1996, p. 290). An incomplete or fictitious disarmament and disbanding of military forces leaves the parties with a working military tool and thus, in case of electoral defeat, with a viable way of escape or returning to armed strife. This option has usually been described as the "return to the bush" alternative. The return to the bush syndrome is very common, especially for the leadership of a rebellious force which has built its political fortune on the military struggle and identifies itself with it. Thus, in the case in which the leadership of the rebel force foresees an electoral defeat, the return to armed conflict can be a politically and psychologically quite attractive means to avoid defeat. The Khmer Rouge attitude after Phase I of the implementation of the Cambodian Peace Plan (Heininger, 1994, p. 70) and the decision of the UNITA

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leader, Dr. Savimbi, after the 1992 Angolan elections (Lodico, 1996, p. 119) are examples of this situation. The threat of the return to the bush is indeed the main political card of the rebel forces in the whole course of the negotiations of the peace settlement and of its implementation. In any case, according to many observers, the chance to maintain this leverage until the day of the elections should be avoided. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: VOTER REGISTRATION, ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS, AND VOTER EDUCATION The electoral process is a complex endeavor. The political conditions of the country always pose the need to prepare a new electoral law, which even if enacted by the government is discussed and agreed upon with the other party. A body representing the different parties, but with some form of independence, is usually created to organize and conduct the election. The degree and the type of assistance that the international community provides varies greatly from operation to operation. Furthermore, the civilian administration of the country is often so disrupted that a completely new program of electoral registration and compilation of the electoral rolls has to be launched. This program often encompasses enormous practical difficulties, and sometimes is quite delicate and politically sensitive.5 In any case, this program plays a very important psychological role for the population of the country. It is the first visible sign of political change, and sometimes even the first confirmation of the end of civil war. The sight and the personal contact with national officers together with international electoral officers who census and register the population for voting could become a powerful sign of the new course. The whole country perceives this signal; not just the urban dwellers, who might be more aware of the political situation, but also the population of remote rural areas. In many cases this registration process is enthusiastically welcomed by the population. The long marches of many Angolans to ensure to be registered (Anstee, 1996, p. 104) and the excitement of the Cambodians for the "UNTAC's flashy laminated photographic registration cards" (Schear, 1996, p. 162) testify to this enthusiasm and desire for civic and political participation. During this period, other parties and political movements start to emerge. Civil conflicts strongly polarize societies and the politics of the countries ravage and leave no political maneuver other than that of warring parties. The peace settlement, the new political climate, and the imminent electoral campaign facilitate the resurgence of old parties and the formations of new ones. Though their electoral performance results are generally quite poor, their rise is an important element for the rooting of pluralism and democracy in a country by giving some chance of political activism to those who do not identify with the major alignments. The next step after registration is the electoral campaign. The electoral campaign marks the rising of electoral fever in the country. The methods, the

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forms, and the instruments of the campaign vary widely from country to country and from party to party.6 Taking into account the exceptional conditions of the entire electoral process, the electoral campaign does not play a much different role from that of the campaigns in the consolidated democracy. However, it presents specific features. In many cases, the electoral campaign brings back hot political debate and sees a sharp resurgence or intensifying of political violence: elimination of key opponents, political terrorism, or intimidation tactics. After some months of relative peace, the population again confronts the spectrum of the civil war, with all its psychological implications. In this context, the political theme of the electoral campaign is largely dominated by the war and the propaganda issues and slogans often refer to the behavior of the parties in the armed conflict (Frieson, 1996). There is limited room for debate of other political themes. Further, the historic moment which the reconciliation elections represent tends to focus the whole political tension and attention on the clash between the parties, or, in most cases, between their leaders. The fate of the nation is felt to be at stake. Thus, both local issues and candidates, except the nationwide leaders, are usually out of the political interest of the population or scarcely relevant. In this regard, the candidates are often chosen in accordance with the autocratic internal practices that the insurgents, the governments, and their leaders became accustomed to in the long period of armed confrontation. Finally, the electoral confrontation generally offers the opportunity for a massive campaign of voter education. The international electoral monitors have this task. They travel the country explaining electoral law, advocating the right to vote and the means for its exercise, and assisting the electorate and the electoral commissions in technical and administrative matters. International organizations have developed a vast array of techniques to keep the popular attention toward the electoral process and to explain its technical aspects: from video to theater, from radio broadcast to T-shirts (Anstee, 1996, p. 104; Schear, 1996, p. 169). Voter education is a very valuable undertaking. It develops the popular awareness of the voting process and reassures the citizens of their rights after undue pressures and intimidation. In many cases it has helped to eliminate certain false principles or assumptions which the party propaganda had tried to instill in public opinion. For example, the voting promotion of the UNTAC Electoral Division made clear throughout the country that party membership was not a requisite for voting and that to have a party membership did not imply having to vote for that party (Frieson, 1996, p. 191). THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL MISSION As we have seen, one of the main characteristics of reconciliation elections is their scrutiny by an international electoral mission. The international electoral officers are called to play a wide variety of duties within the functions of

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electoral assistance, supervision, and observation (Beigbeder, 1994). The United Nations has classified its electoral-related activities in different operational concepts according to the degree of engagement (United Nations, 1992). Furthermore, other international organizations, like the OSCE, play a major role in election assistance and monitoring. In most of the cases examined here, the election mission is deployed together with a larger peacekeeping operation, either as one of its components (e.g., the Electoral Component of UNTAC and the Electoral Division of the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission II [UNAVEM II]), or as an independent but close partner (e.g., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Implementation Force/Security Force [IFOR/SFOR]). In any case, apart from the specificity of the mandate of each single mission and from the organization responsible for it, these missions share some common patterns and play a similar role: They facilitate the emerging of a politically neutral environment during the entire electoral process, they are responsible for voting education, and they observe, usually with monitors from other international organizations and NGOs, the regularity of the voting and the counting of votes (Theuermann, 1995). With regard to the regularity of the elections, the international community expects from these operations an appraisal of the "freedom and the fairness" of the electoral process. This notion, which is supposed to appear, with nuances and distinctions, in the final statement on the elections, has become a political axiom which the elections are judged upon. The impact of the "free and fair" assessment is politically relevant and has a twofold significance. On one hand, it has a value in itself, by indicating how far the elections have been from the standards commonly accepted for a truly democratic process. On the other hand, it gives to the international community and particularly to the organizations more closely involved in the solution of the conflict a political leverage toward the parties. But the deployment of a large number of international electoral officers also has other implications. Their presence is the visible manifestation of the interest of the international community in the peace settlement and, particularly, in the electoral process. Their presence plays a role similar to the one of the overall peacekeeping force: It internationalizes the issues which it deals with, it has a psychologically reassuring function of guarantee for both the parties and the civilian population, and it raises expectations. This last point merits some remarks which specifically pertain to the electoral officers and to the civilian element in a peacekeeping force in general. The international electoral officers work at close contact with the population for long periods: during the registration, in the voter education campaign, in the electoral rallies, and at the polling. With their cars, caps, emblems, and badges they usually become a popular and highly visible point of reference. The local population begin to know them also in remote areas which have

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experienced the seclusion of the years of the civil war. Their presence can easily raise in the people undue expectations: either unrealistic pretensions or legitimate aspirations of justice and fairness. The frustration of this can be engendered in the form of strong disappointment toward the international presence to the whole peace process. This effect becomes particularly dangerous and politically more significant when it affects some distinct group of the population; for instance, an ethnic minority. ELECTION DAY: A UNIFYING MOMENT The election day is the culminating point of the whole process.7 The electoral fever and the political fervor have risen to their pinnacle. The country is under close scrutiny by the international community. The monitoring of the elections is guaranteed by the addition to the electoral component of the peacekeeping force of a large number of short-term observers who arrive in the country in the last few days. The first aspect to consider is the meaning of the election day for the population. First of all, the voting day is perceived as an historical moment. The elections mark a breakthrough in the psychological perception of the politics and even of the history of the country. In the collective representation they depict the most important moment of the peace process. They are a defined and visible event, they are "moments of great drama" (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 57) which indicate the turning point between war and peace. Second, the elections are participation. They allow a direct and active role for the whole population of the country. They become a sort of joyous, almost religious ritual which nobody dares to disrupt. Therefore it happens that, notwithstanding the rising tension and often violence of the preceding weeks, the voting days are characterized by a sort of unreal peaceful sense of civic commitment. This behavior strongly strikes international observers and its account is one the most recurrent and vivid remarks of international observers (Anstee, 1996, p. 196). The endless peaceful lines of voters in front of the polling stations in South Africa, which were shown by the main international television channels, have become part of the collective imagination of reconciliation and political participation. Third, the election day is felt as a unifying moment for the country. After years of conflict and division, the nation gathers to decide on its future. There are exceptions; this perception is sometimes completely missed. In situations like the 1996 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the vote continues to follow ethnic lines, there was no room for nation unity aspirations. Generally, the turnout at these elections is very high and usually higher than in countries with an established democracy: In Nicaragua, in 1990, it was 86.3 percent of the total registered voters; in Angola, in 1992, 92 percent; in Cambodia, in 1993, 86.7 percent; and in Mozambique, in 1994, 88 percent (L6pez-Pintor, 1997, p. 50).

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Once more, the perspective of the parties, and especially of the alignments which confronted each other in the armed conflict, can be quite different. For them the voting day is the day of truth. Their whole political struggle is at stake. Though they try to control and manipulate the electorate, the elections always represent a challenge. Founding elections are uncertain and unpredictable by nature (Bogdanor, 1990). They are the first elections held after a long period, so there is no close political reference: The electorate is rootless and the electoral life of the country begins from tabula rasa. Given the strong political and psychological pressure and blackmail which the populace undergoes, the electorate can be particularly volatile. Public opinion polls, when they do exist, are not very reliable.8 Moreover, the electoral outcome is uncertain and its acceptance by the political factions is more unlikely; such as in the cases of Angola, Cambodia, and Albania. In these cases a last-minute return to the bush syndrome can emerge. In the days which precede the voting, or even on the voting day, the force which fears its electoral defeat can threaten to boycott the elections. It happened in Mozambique, where Dhlakama, the FRELIMO leader, on election eve attempted to withdraw from the elections, dismissing them as "unfair" (Reed, 1996, p. 300). In other cases, like in South Africa and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the overall results are well understood in advance, but the victory margins and the regional and local electoral cleavages become important. In the aftermath of the election day, the country on one side recovers from the administrative and logistic effort and on the other side discovers its new political balance of power. At this moment the attitude of the parties and of their leadership is crucial. In particular, any statements by the losing parties in which they concede to the electoral winner represent the best signal of the progress of the reconciliation process and of the commitment to democratic rule. This attitude is rarely found, though there are, like Mozambique, significant cases. In other scenarios where the political tension is still too high, the formation of a reconciliation government representing all the main factions according to their electoral weight is the only viable alternative. There is a final point which should be raised. The picture of a successful electoral process with a large popular participation and a free and fair final statement conceals a danger: The importance of the voting can be overestimated. The elections risk being felt by the parties, the voters, and the personnel of the international mission as a sort of doomsday for the whole peace process and the future political life of the country. There could be a widespread sensation that if the elections go well nothing wrong can happen afterward. A success of the electoral process can induce a "satisfaction effect." In reality, whatever government will run the country, even a large coalition government, will have to face enormous political problems. The country will still be deeply divided and the democracy very fragile. A new scenario will develop. The peacekeeping operation, with its assets of political and military guarantees and sometimes also of accidental economic help will leave the

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country in a few weeks. This satisfaction effect may likely bring the international community to discontinue, almost abruptly, its interest and responsibility in the country. At that point the political class will have to seriously commit itself to the democratic endeavor to maintain and develop it. In this regard the second elections will be the true test to assess the achievements and the strength of the democracy-building process. CONCLUSION Reconciliation elections encompass, both for the local population and the international community, a twofold political value: They are a means and a goal at the same time. As a means, the elections play the traditional role of voting, thus being a mechanism to ascertain the prevailing interests and the selection of the government. Particularly in these circumstances, the election process is strongly intertwined with a conflict-resolution process, and thus the voting assumes a strong conflict-solving capacity. But the holding of elections is also a goal in itself. In war-torn societies the possibility of putting on track a democratic process which conducts acceptable free and fair elections is a challenge and an aim. In this regard, the entire process is crucial: The voter registration and the voter education steps are as important as the election day. It is a sort of gamble on the holding of the process, which, if it has successful results, will be able to put the country a leap forward. This second character of reconciliation elections has pushed the international community toward a policy of the holding of such elections as early as possible. The cases of the voting in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 and in Albania in 1997 are proper examples. It is too early to thoroughly understand the implications of this course, which is also based on the willingness to disengage quickly from the country and its consequences for the peace process. In any case, the decision to postpone elections, waiting for all the appropriate conditions, engenders risks. Although it might allow the voting to better act as a conflict-resolution mechanism, the temporal refraining of the schedule of the peace process could make it lose momentum and could generate a sort of frustration of the expectations in the population and in the political actors who implemented the peace accords in good faith. Furthermore, the maintenance of a peacekeeping force for a long period can generate in the country a political and security "dependency culture" like that noticed in post-Dayton Bosnia. To conclude, we can summarize the value of reconciliation elections in a few points. Reconciliation elections are strongly interwoven in the peace process and they usually represent its final moment. Thus, they are perceived, both by the international community and by the local actors and population, as the turning point on the path from armed strife to national reconciliation. The electoral process has a political value, but also a very strong psychological impact. It constitutes a sort of confidence-building exercise among the

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former warring parties and also between them and the civil population. Despite the frequent resurgence of armed violence during this period, the steps of voter registration, electoral campaigns, and voter education represent the necessary preparation and the first psychological hints of a resumption of a normal political life. In this regard, the political, technical, and psychological impact of the undertaking of an international electoral mission and, more generally, a peacekeeping mission is crucial. The voting day is the culminating point of this process and represents, though important exceptions exist, an unifying moment for the country. The country faces its historical moment and its importance is usually perceived by the population with a sort of sacred spirit of civic participation and commitment. NOTES 1. Certain aspects of the negotiations and the peace accords can be compared to the pacts which have been the key element of many transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy in Southern Europe, Latin America, and more recently in Eastern Europe (see O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Bogdanor, 1990). 2. The examination of these factors is out of the scope of this chapter. 3. As noted by Chester Crocker (1992), the removal of the external dimension is a prerequisite for the solution of the conflict, though not necessarily the solution itself. 4. In most peace talks the agenda is set by the external mediator, but the input of the parties plays a major role. 5. See, for example, the case of Cambodia (Heininger, 1994, p. 100). 6. For an enticing description of the propaganda of the two main parties in the 1993 elections in Cambodia, see Frieson (1996). 7. Actually, given the administrative difficulties and the logistic complications, in most cases the elections take place over more than one day. 8. In Cambodia, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General banned public opinion polls to avoid intimidation (see Schear, 1996, p. 168).

REFERENCES Anstee, M. J. (1996). Orphan of the Cold War: The inside story of the collapse of t Angolan peace process, 1992-93. New York: St. Martin's Press. Beigbeder, Y (1994). International monitoring of plebiscites, referenda and nationa tions. Self-determination and transition to democracy. Dordrecht: Martinus Berman, E. (1996). Managing arms in peace processes. New York: United Nation Bogdanor, V. (1990). Founding elections and regime change. Electoral Studies, 9, 288-294. Ciment, J. (1997). Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial wars in Southern Afric New York: Facts on File. Clausewitz, C. von. (1832). Hinterlassene Werke des Generals von Clausewitz ub Krieg und Kriegsfiihrung. Berlin: Ferbinanb Diimmler. Crocker, C. A. (1992). High noon in Southern Africa: Making peace in a rough ne borhood. New York: W. W. Norton.

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Diehl, P. F. (1993). International peacekeeping. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univers Press. Dreyer, R. (1995). State building and Democracy in second-generation peacekeeping operations. In D. Warner (Ed.), New dimensions of peacekeeping (pp. 147155). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Durch, W. J. (1996). Keeping the peace: Politics and lessons of the 1990s. In W. J. Durch (Ed.), U.N. peacekeeping, American politics and the uncivil wars o 1990s (pp. 1-34). New York: St. Martin's Press. Frank, T. M. (1992). The emergingrightto Democratic governance. American Journal of International Law, 86,46-91. Frieson, K. (1996). The politics of getting the vote in Cambodia. In S. Heder & J. Ledgerwood (Eds.), Propaganda, politics, and violence in Cambodia: Dem cratic transition under United Nations peace-keeping (pp. 183-207). Armo NY: M. E. Sharpe. Heininger, J. E. (1994). Peacekeeping in transition: The United Nations in Camb New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press. Hermet, G., Rose, R., & Rouqui6, A. (Eds.). (1978). Elections without choice. Ne York: John Wiley & Sons. King, C (1997). Ending civil wars (Adelphi Paper 308). Oxford: Oxford University Pre Knudsen, C, & Zartman, W. (1995). The large small war in Angola. Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Sciences, 541, 130. Kumar, K. (1997). The nature and focus of international assistance for rebuilding war-tom societies. In K. Kumar (Ed.), Rebuilding societies after civil war Critical roles for international assistance (pp. 1-38). Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner. Lodico, Y. C (1996). A peace that fell apart: The United Nations and the war in Ago In W. J. Durch (Ed.), U.N. peacekeeping, American politics and the unc wars of the 1990s (pp. 102-133). New York: St. Martin's Press. L6pez-Pintor, R. (1997). Reconciliation elections: A post-Cold War experience. In K Kumar (Ed.), Rebuilding societies after civil war: Critical roles for interna tional assistance (pp. 43-61). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Natsios, A. S. (1997). U.S. foreign policy and the four horsemen of the apocalyps Humanitarian relief in complex emergencies. Westport, CT: Praeger. O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. C. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule: Te tive conclusions about uncertain democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U versity Press. Reed, P. L. (1996). The United Nations operation in Mozambique. In W. J. Durch (Ed.), U.N. peacekeeping, American politics and the uncivil wars of the 1 (pp. 275-310). New York: St. Martin's Press. Schear, J. A. (1996). Riding the tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's struggle for peace. In W. J. Durch (Ed.), U.N. peacekeeping, American politics and uncivil wars of the 1990s (pp. 136-191). New York: St. Martin's Press. Theuermann, E. (1995). Legitimizing governments through international verification: The role of the United Nations. Austrian Journal of Public and Internatio Law, 49,129-158. United Nations. (1992). Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic a genuine elections: Report of the Secretary-General (A/47/668/Add.l). Ne York: United Nations.

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United Nations. (1993). Report of the Secretary-General on the conduct and results of the elections in Cambodia (Security Council S/25913). New York: United Nations. Zartman, W. I. (1989). Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zartman, W. I. (1995). Dynamics and constraints in negotiating in internal conflict. In W. I. Zartman (Ed.), Elusive peace: Negotiating an end to civil wars (pp. 3 29). Washington, DC: Brookings.

CHAPTER 17

Treating the New World Disorder Henry Breed

"Internal conflict": Today, in both the psychological and political spheres, these two words go to the very core of our concerns. For over a century, psychology, one of the youngest sciences, has struggled to understand, address, remedy, and resolve the internal conflicts which afflict the individual. Within the last decade, peacekeeping, one of the youngest means of international conflict resolution, faced with the internal conflicts which have torn apart one nation and society after another, has struggled, evolved, and adapted, both to address those conflicts better and to treat them as effectively as possible. In international politics, the words "internal conflict" have become shorthand for the kinds of situations that all of us have seen and read about ever since the end of the Cold War. Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Burundi—in all these areas and in others like them, the world has witnessed implosions of structures and infrastructures, with ethnic and racial rivalries that have shredded societies and with peacekeeping operations that have too often been deployed where there was no peace to keep. Internal conflict has, in fact, become our new political paradigm. The world has emerged from the Cold War, freed from the fears of superpower standoffs and nuclear annihilation, hopeful of a "new world order." But it seems, at moments, that it has done so only to find itself in the grip of genocides and failed states, massive flows of refugees, and an increasingly acute case of compassion fatigue. A "new world disorder," as many have come to call it, has come into being.

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Today, as the global body politic labors under the weight of this load, as it lives with and within this disorder, it has itself become tired, confused, conflictual, and frustrated. It has become, actually, strikingly similar to a psychologically unstable individual, dysfunctional in its environment and at war within itself, struggling to overcome its internal conflicts and ensure its survival. As one tries to come to some kind of understanding of internal conflicts, their implications, and the ways in which they might best be addressed, the thought occurs that the analogy between psychology and politics, between the individual and the national, could contain some powerful parallels that might well be of use. The similarities between the individual (his internal conflicts, his relationship to those around him, and their efforts to assist him) on the one hand, and countries (their internal conflicts, their relationships to the international community, and its efforts to assist them) on the other, are both evident and interesting. Benefiting from this borrowed perspective, this chapter will reflect upon three questions: "What is the nature of this new world disorder?" "What are we doing (or can we do) to treat it?" and "What is the outlook?" Or, in other words, what is our diagnosis, our prescription, and our prognosis? DIAGNOSIS Shortly before his death in 1995, the French psychiatrist and sociobiologist Henri Laborit spoke of a phenomenon whose causes and effects he felt to be vital to understanding human behavior: aggression. He defined aggression as "the quantity of kinetic energy capable of accelerating the tendency toward entropy within a system, or, in other words, of reducing its structure while augmenting disorder" (Joliat, 1996, p. 159, translation mine, italics added). Clearly, when the Berlin Wall collapsed, the global growth of this kind of aggression was not what anyone foresaw. And yet, as the superpowers withdrew the political counterweights that they had posed in various trouble spots across the globe, and as the global balance changed, it was exactly this kind of acceleration toward entropy that occurred, bringing the "new world disorder" into being. The aggression which resulted in (and from) this disorder, and which accelerated this tendency, took a number of forms, both in the conflicts that resulted directly from the end of the Cold War (such as Georgia and Tajikistan) and in those that were more remote from it (such as the conflicts in the Great Lakes region ofAfrica). It could be seen in the clan warfare that led to Somalia's failed state, in the genocide that led to Rwanda's disintegration, in the ethnic cleansing that led to Bosnia's devastation. Each of these aggressions is unique, and generalizing on their roots or ramifications is risky at best. Yet common threads are visible, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has looked at them (and others) more closely than most, has defined those threads as follows:

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• the disintegration of the organs of central government, which is no longer able to exer cise its rights or perform its duties in relation to the territory and the population; • the presence of many armed factions; • divided control of national territory; • the breakdown of the chain of command within the various factions and their militia • grave breaches of humanitarian law; • the largely autarkic economic regime of each faction and consequent prevalence of banditry and crime; • the possibility for [criminals and] criminal groups to use the prevailing chaos for their own ends; • war economies based on robbery and illicit traffic; • splintering of guerilla movements [resulting from] a spiral of crime in which every small group, or even every individual, acts for itself; • greater fragmentation [ethnic or geographical], making it less likely that civilians will identify with the dominant local faction, and therefore remain in their places of origin; • mass movements of refugees and of the internally displaced; • difficulty distinguishing between combatants and civilians; • decline in military discipline, to the point where, in extreme cases, every combatant is his own commander; • an extreme individualization of factions [which makes] every soldier—adult or child—a spokesperson. (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1998, pp. 4-6) While not entirely exhaustive (it barely alludes, for example, to the problem of child conscripts and combatants), this list is impressively indicative. Beyond that, the further one moves through it, the more one begins to understand the aptness of the psychological analogy to the individual: In an age which prides itself on decentralization, we seem to have decentralized war down to its most basic component. In this immense disorder, where structure has been torn to tatters, governments dissolved, communities divided, and families separated, we are no longer in the world of two armies in opposing trenches. It is often every man, woman, and child, quite literally, for himself or herself. What are the implications and ramifications of this change? Perhaps the most important characteristic of these internal conflicts (and one of their most extensive external effects) is the vast flows of refugees and displaced people they have created. Today, nearly 23 million people across the globe are uprooted by war (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1998, p. 1). While the displaced manage to remain within their own countries, if not always near their own homes, refugees are forced to flee abroad, frequently to neighboring countries, thereby destabilizing entire regions. These huge human displacements, along with crossborder arms flows, bilateral financial support to each of the parties from various other clans or countries, and other long political links prove the continuing relevance today of a point made about war in general by Franklin Roosevelt nearly sixty years

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ago, as World War II loomed: "War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and people remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We . . . cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down" (Roosevelt, 1941, p. 411). A number of today's anarchic conflicts underscore this point. We need only look at Rwanda to bring Burundi and the Congos to mind; we need only think of Bosnia to raise our concern for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, and Greece. For all the other changes in conflict that we have seen and will, the contagion factor is still a very vital concern. Within the country of conflict itself, government and administration become inoperable, infrastructure is badly and easily damaged, fields and roads are mined, and marketplaces are targeted. Yet beyond the destabilization and displacement of vast populations, beyond the damage to social, government, physical, and other structures, there is one more signal element of the new world disorder that needs to be noted: the racial or ethnic strife that is often involved. Heightened ethnic strife is characteristic not only of violent intrastate conflicts: The incidents of racial conflict which have arisen in many countries (both stable and unstable) throughout this century and beyond it are painful and important reminders that its reach is far wider. Yet, however volatile it is alone, it seems to become most explosive in conjunction with a growing sense of insufficiency, whether of land, of food, of resources, of social structure, or of political power. This combination, and the insecurity it creates, prove fertile ground for the rise of leaders who aim to divide societies along ethnic lines and rekindle old antagonisms, whether in the name of a greater Serbia or revolt against Tutsi domination. Yet these are not merely "ethnic conflicts," even if that is what they are often called. We have seen that ethnic strife alone, while volatile, is not necessarily combustible. What we have here, rather, is what has been very aptly described as "political conflicts in ethnic clothing." That distinction, however, makes those conflicts nonetheless vicious, because when all the elements are present, as structures disintegrate and disorder increases, the result is disastrous. It can take the form of more than 20 thousand Bosnian women being raped and left to carry the children of their enemies (Morrow, 1993, p. 48). It can equally well take the form of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans being murdered by the bare hands and machetes of their relatives and neighbors. Finally, the reach of these conflicts into the social fabric has become both longer and firmer. In World War I, of every ten casualties, two were civilians and eight were military. In today's conflicts, the reverse is true (Garfield & Neugut, 1997; Sivard, 1991). Further, many factional "armies" are basically civilian, sometimes even conscripting children younger than ten, and further

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blurring the distinction between civilians and combatants, to the peril of all (United Nations, 1996, p. 10). In Bosnia, the blockage of humanitarian aid was a weapon; in Somalia, the sale of humanitarian aid was used to buy weapons. In Rwanda, a hospital and a convent, both of which would have been respected as sanctuaries in another place and time, were the sites of major massacres. The combination of an increasingly broad range of elements in internal conflicts, compounded by their vastness and brutality, has made treatment both difficult and daunting. PRESCRIPTION Sixty years ago, as World War II loomed and President Roosevelt identified war as a contagion, he also offered a prescription for dealing with it: "Quarantine . . . the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease" (Roosevelt, 1941, p. 411). This technique has been applied sporadically over the last sixty years: in the blockade of Cuba, in the sanctions against South Africa, in the isolation of Iraq, and elsewhere. Its success rate has been mixed at best: Nearly forty years into the blockade, Cuba has yet to bow to the will of its northern neighbor; South Africa has made immense and inspiring progress in recent years, but critics are widely divided on the role that sanctions played in it; and Iraq has provided proof, if any were needed, that an instrument as broad and blunt as sanctions can aggravate the misery it intended to alleviate without remedying the problem that it intended to address. Finally, in a broader historical context, it is fairly incontestable at this point that quarantining the Axis Powers neither prevented nor diminished the impact of World War II. Again, the psychological parallel is pertinent. If one looks back through history, and even literature, one sees the technique of quarantining the psychologically disturbed applied with great—perhaps disconcerting—frequency. This was done because it was assumed that those who could not live comfortably within society (or within themselves) were best removed from it, the premise ostensibly being that removing the individual from the stimulus of his problem would address—or at least alleviate—his condition. It is easy enough to imagine the anguish and frustration that this might often have caused to the individual, as well as the guilt and stigma that it placed upon his family or environment. As with political (or medical) disorders, quarantining those suffering from psychological disorders was, and is, sometimes inevitable. But many psychologists, and a growing number of specialists in those other domains, have come to believe that it is better to treat the troubled individual, where possible, within his environment. Doing so makes it possible to look at and address the wider causes of the problem, to allow as normal and uninterrupted a life as possible even as a therapy follows its course, and to make the distance (both physical and perceptual) to reintegration that much shorter.

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The treatment perspective in international relations has evolved very much along the same lines. Within the context of the U.N., four measures have been identified for the purpose of addressing threats to peace and security: preventive diplomacy (and deployment), peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 11). These processes, though distinct, are not mutually exclusive, either in time or in technique. Many of the elements of preventive diplomacy and deployment, for example, are strikingly similar to those of postconflict peacebuilding. The essential difference between them is that thefirsttechnique is employed to avert a conflict or its escalation; the latter is utilized after a conflict has ended, to ensure that the means and conditions necessary to rebuild the society in question, solidify its structures, and avert a recurrence are brought to bear. The negotiation techniques employed in peacemaking (where negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or other forms of pacific settlement are used to bring the parties or potential parties to a conflict to accord before, during, or after a conflict) can easily and productively be blended with any of the other techniques mentioned. What remains, then, is peacekeeping, whose nature—and relationship to the other techniques mentioned—has changed greatly over the last few years. Throughout the Cold War, and even through the Persian Gulf War (which wa followed by a peacekeeping operation on the Iraq-Kuwait border that is still active), peacekeeping came mainly to mean two things: the supervision of truces or cease-fires and the separation of antagonists. Thus, very much like the doctor who quarantined his patient or the psychologist who removed the patient from the environment in which he was troubled, the international community pursued the logic that separation of the state(s) in question from the source of friction, through the presence of an international buffer, could alleviate and eventually address the problem. In many cases this succeeded, often, perhaps, because the patient (or, in this case, patients), were not removed physically from their situations, but simply benefitted from the presence of a buffer, an intermediary who, somewhat like a family therapist, could explain the position and needs of each party to the other, remind offenders of their obligations, and ease the path toward rapprochement. The great majority of the missions that were deployed during the Cold War were of precisely this kind. They were deployed before settlement was reached, as "interim arrangements to help manage . . . a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement... could proceed" (Goulding, 1997, p. 32). To respond to the internal conflicts of the new world disorder, however, peacekeeping had to go far beyond this, broadening widely and rapidly, both the scope of its tasks and the range of points at which they could be applied. Like any other element of the old order, it had to labor mightily to adapt to the new. In the last few years, beyond supervising cease-fires and separating antagonists, peacekeeping has expanded to assist the safe and secure return of refugees, attempt to assure that humanitarian aid is received and properly

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utilized, demobilize soldiers and help them return to the civilian sector, aid those guerrilla movements that work to transform themselves into legitimate political parties, and remain present in cities under siege to prevent the loss of life. It has also extended to involve demining, the reparation of infrastructures, the reform and redeployment of civilian police, the restitution of judicial and legislative mechanisms, the mounting and observation of elections, and the transitional administration of conflict areas. In short, the international community's approach to the patient, as the psychologist's, has become more holistic. As its scope and structure evolved, peacekeeping was also required to make another rapid and demanding change, this time in the number and size of the missions it established. Of the forty-six peacekeeping operations constituted in the U.N.'s fifty years, thirty-one (two-thirds) have been deployed since 1989. And, of these, fully twenty-six have been deployed in situations of internal conflict. Early in 1992, all extant peacekeeping missions were fully staffed with 11,500 people. By 1994, when the operations in Bosnia, Cambodia, and Somalia were all at their height, over 78 thousand personnel were in the field and the U.N. was still nearly 10 thousand short. At the end of 1997, just under 17 thousand were deployed. The missions' costs rose and fell accordingly (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1997, p. 1). The size of these missions increased primarily because of three factors: the broader range of tasks, the greater number of interlocutors, and the increased resistance and threat that have often arisen in internal conflict situations. The last of these has propelled the argument that a stronger presence, a critical mass shy of the "overwhelming force" of which theoreticians speak, would be required to carry out mandates contested by some in areas where conflict touched all. This new scale has often been reflected in operations mounted by a "coalition of the willing," as was seen in both Bosnia (NATO's IFOR and SFOR operations) and Somalia (the U.S.-led UNITAF coalition); U.N. operations have often been forced to take on equivalent or greater tasks with lesser means. Beyond scope, structure, and scale, peacekeeping has also felt the impact of changes in the timing of its application. It has, in a number of cases, continued to be employed at the end of a conflict. It has also been used as preventive deployment, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where it, in part, saved the Balkan conflict from spreading farther than it had. But the U.N. has also been compelled, in many recent conflicts, to apply peacekeeping in the midst of active struggle. And here its success has been less unalloyed. First of all, in the high pitch of battle there is obviously no peace to keep. Imagine, if you will, trying to treat a patient who is fully at conflict with himself and yet, to all outside appearances, unwilling to be treated. He is in denial, those around him are uncertain, and the best that can be hoped for is the responsibility for his recovery without the freedom, resources, or support necessary to implement the treatment in the way that one deems best. This (as

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Somalia, Rwanda, and a number of other countries in conflict have shown) has often been very much the case. Further, when intervention occurs at the end of a conflict, a victor can be magnanimous, a loser contrite, and healing can begin. Even in a situation of stalemate or stasis, resignation can lead to rapprochement. But, if we are forced, however rightfully, to intervene at the height of conflict, we are bound to find ourselves confronted by a situation where each side is still clinging very much to its hopes of victory and conquest, a situation where our presence is likely to be perceived more as an obstacle than as an opportunity. When I first arrived on mission in the former Yugoslavia, I spoke to a young soldier who told me of a difficult encounter that proved this point to me. He was patrolling with a number of other members of his national contingent. A group of local women came up to them, engaged them in conversation, and asked them where they were from. Then the women asked their religion. Having the answers, they turned on the young men in rage, screaming, "You share our God! You are our brothers! You should not be here as peacekeepers you should be fighting at our sides, helping us win this war!!" Clearly, in thi situation, there had been no sense of closure or catharsis, no realignment of options or expectations. Why, then, do we intervene at the height of conflict? The clearest and most compelling reason is that, in one conflict after another, the level of suffering among the population has reached a threshold where it has outweighed the obligation to respect state sovereignty and where inaction by the international community is no longer conscionable. The premise at this point becomes that any state which retains its sovereignty and control over its internal affairs could not possibly allow such abuses to occur, and, therefore, sovereignty must no longer exist and the obligation to respect it must no longer apply. Respecting the sovereignty of the state and respecting (or protecting) the human rights of the individuals within it become mutually irreconcilable, and the foremost obligation of the international community in such situations is to the latter. It is morally bound to protect those who can no longer protect themselves, even at the threat of its own impartiality. This concept—or precept, as it is used here—is neither old nor universally accepted. The "right of intervention" (which also implied the moral obligation to intervene)firstgained wide visibility when it was defended and propounded by Bernard Kouchener, France's first Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, at the moment of the Kurdish crisis in the north of Iraq at the end of the Persian Gulf War (Rosenblum, 1991, p. 3). It galvanized international support in that instance, and it magnetized international attention when the Somalia crisisfirstbroke out. Because of what followed in Somalia, the argument is used less powerfully today, but it remains valid nonetheless, a clear, basic, and persuasive point of reference. In trying to understand the resistance to it, the psychological perspective of the individual again proves useful. At what point can an analyst, a thera-

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pist, or even a family member step in and take the reins from a conflictual individual? When he falls down a staircase once too often? When knives start disappearing from the kitchen? When children or spouses start displaying bruises? If the individual is not yet evidently a danger to himself, any action of this kind is clearly premature. If he is an obvious danger to society, or even to those immediately around him, society fails in its duty if it does not protect the people he might harm. The area in the middle is grey at best, and entered at one's peril. Yet one thing is eminently clear: A course of action forced upon a nation or an individual has immensely less chance of succeeding, precisely because it is forced upon it. Worse yet, whatever agent is forcing a course of action upon an individual or state frequently becomes perceived as (if he does not actually become) an enemy. Forced action or therapy can often be, in essence, another kind of quarantine, with all its attendant problems. It is exactly this situation that frequently makes effective preventive action so difficult. More often than not, it is not that the necessary information is lacking, or that all the signs of danger—or even pending disaster—are not present. Frequently, they are. The problem, more often than not, is that the sum of these signs might lead in more than one direction. They might indicate the possibility of danger, but it is rarer that they indicate the certainty of it. Even when all the signs are clear and present, however, there seems at times to be a natural, and nearly inevitable, process that has to occur before action is taken. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross (1969) describes it vividly in the context of an individual coming to terms with his own mortality or the possibility of it. There are five stages to the process: denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance (p. 265). These aspects of accepting and addressing illness overlap and interact over time, along with a sixth factor, hope. Is it possible that, as the international community, the nations that make it up, and the individuals that constitute them are exposed to an emerging crisis, their first inevitable reaction is indeed one of denial? Is it possible that they must move through (or into) it and other phases before action is feasible? Is it possible that the collective response to death on the largest scale is but the magnification or multiplication of the individual's reaction to the possibility of his own death or that of someone near him? Does what befalls us in these situations give us a glimpse of our collective mortality? We do not yet know. We have a better idea, from recent experience, however, of what we must do when we do act. It is vital that the response provided be as comprehensive and unified as possible. It must be unified, because, if it is possible for those involved in an internal conflict to obtain from one nation, agency, or contingent what another rightfully refuses—if it is possible to obtain humanitarian aid without fulfilling political obligations—this will clearly be the course of action. This is as clear for the state in conflict as it is for the child who knows that its mother will give it candy and its father will ask whether or not it has done its homework.

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In reacting to internal conflicts, and particularly in intervening at their height, another vital consideration, as regards timing, has often had to be borne in mind. Because the conflict has not ended, because there have been no clear winners and losers, and because each side is still clinging very much to its hopes and has not realigned its ambitions, resolution is more difficult than ever. And yet, this sense of resolution, of justice, is indispensable. WTien some of the individuals who had been indicted by the Rwanda Tribunal were arrested in Kenya in the summer of 1997, the U.N.'s Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, welcomed the news, stating that "justice and peace are indivisible, and without justice, healing cannot begin" (United Nations, 1997, p. 1). There can be no contesting that this process is vital to success. Those responsible need to be brought to trial so that a clear sense of responsibilities is established, justice can be served, blanket condemnations can cease, and a spirit of reconciliation can take root. This is neither a new reality, nor one limited to current internal conflicts; history has shown it to us in Nuremberg. And, to the extent that we have been able to overcome the cataclysm of World War II and avoid another like it, it is because our actions have acknowledged that reality. The problem is that where multiple factions remain undefeated one man's war criminal is another man's saint. While driving through Bosnian Serb territory early in 1996, at a time when pressure to capture the Bosnian Serbs' leader, Radovan Karadzic, was mounting, I was shown a poster, put up not far from an airfield used by the U.N., that had a caption beneath Karadzic's picture which read, "Don't touch him; he means peace." It underlined a number of points to me: how vital realignment of goals and expectations was on the part of all the parties, how difficult it would be to extradite and try those responsible, and how unlikely lasting success or peace were if these two things did not happen. The greatest problem within the question of extradition and trial was indeed one of timing: At what point, as the therapy moved forward, might this best be done? By what point would it have to? Beyond what point would (or might) it cause the process to fail if it were not accomplished? The last and often hardest question of timing is this: WTien do we end (or need to end) the therapy? Put one way, this question asks, "What conditions require its withdrawal or termination?" Put another way, it asks, "What conditions are required for the treatment to remain relevant and justifiable over a long term?" Withdrawal or termination, as end points, are clearer to define. Somalia provides the best example. Where there is no will (or concerted expression of will) by those on the ground to address their problems and attempt a remedy, there is little that can be done, and treatment becomes palliative at best. Where an attempt to insist is met with resistance, hostility, and violence, and where the strength and support necessary to insist are not provided, that attempt should be abandoned. Where the risk or threat to the therapist becomes unacceptably high, where, attempting to be part of the solution, he suddenly finds

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himself part of the problem, he must withdraw. Communication can be maintained, and observation as well, but the initiative for treatment and the will to pursue that treatment as far as possible must be generated, expressed, and sustained by the country itself. Identifying the conditions under which a long-term response can and should be sustained is more difficult. Let us examine the case of Cyprus. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been deployed for more than thirty years. It is true that agreement has not yet been reached and that the island has not yet returned to normal rule, but it is also true that armed conflict has not resumed and that the population at large has been kept out of harm's way. The length of the mission and the intransigence of the parties has moved many to question UNFICYP and to call for a "sunset clause" which would provide an arbitrary date of closure for it (and missions like it). They hope that this tactic might push the parties to resolution, but there are many who feel that it is equally likely that it would encourage them to hold out, knowing that beyond a certain point in time in the foreseeable future they would have a free hand. This debate has not yet been resolved. Beyond the question of which pressures can productively be brought to bear at what point, however, there is another delicate balance to weigh here, and it must be considered carefully in determining whether or not a mission should continue. Along with the problems which this mission and others like it have clearly addressed (the level of violence) and those where they have so far failed (achieving and implementing an enduring pacific settlement), it is important as well to consider those that they have averted and those that might well have occurred had the mission not been present. In the case of Cyprus, a number of countries have complained about the cost and length of treatment, ignoring the ground that has been held so far and the wider, more endemic conflict that might well have ensued had the mission not been there to hold it. They fail to compare the contained costs of a small and stable mission to the immense costs of the missions sent at the height of conflict to counter massive internal disruption. They fail entirely to assess the costs of loss of human life that might occur. These last, as stated, are difficult points to prove, or even consider, because of their very intangibility. But if those who clamour for sunset clauses fail to take them into account in weighing our performance and determining our future, they do so to the peril of those directly involved in the conflict, those who are geographically or politically adjacent to it, and, ultimately, the entire international community. In Cyprus, Greece, a central actor, also has very delicate relationships with Albania and with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the only part of the former Yugoslavia spared so far. If Cyprus exploded, would it take the former Yugoslavia with it, undo what has been achieved there, and possibly spread even farther? Would it bring Greece and Turkey into active conflict, thus engulfing the Aegean as well as the Adriatic? These questions demand

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our fullest and fairest possible consideration; the more they are studied, the clearer it becomes that they are as imperative as they are impalpable. Long-term therapy is rarely as popular as a short-term solution with those who have to undergo it, administer it, or pay for it. Progress, even when solid, can be so incrementally slow that it becomes imperceptible, above all to those who are closest to the situation and see it every day. And, naturally enough, the difference made by the problems that we have been able to avert is even harder to perceive. There are, however, situations in which a long-term approach is the only real option; situations where, if the deadlines imposed do not take the broader and deeper aspects of the conflict into account, the missions deployed cannot possibly address them. In a conflict like Bosnia, which some of the parties trace as far back as the Renaissance, we have seen and accepted that we cannot right the situation and restore order in eighteen months. We have also, however, gained a better sense of what we can accomplish, what we can avert, what factors might destabilize our progress, and what we will need to do to keep the process on course over the longer term. As the world gains expertise in treating its disorder, our grasp and understanding of internal conflicts, their implications, and their ramifications improve. A clearer sense of the scope of the problem and of the structure and scale of the response required comes into view. Better coordination between the various actors and activities involved in these new missions results. Our sense of timing—entry and exit; breadth, depth, and interposition of elements—has been honed as well, at least in understanding, if not always in practice. Much of what was made impossible by the discord in Somalia in 1993 was achieved (if on a smaller scale and at a later stage of conflict) in Eastern Slavonia in 1998, through the Erdut Agreement and the completion by the United Nations Transitional Authority of a mission that was both highly complex and highly successful. Internal conflict, like any other disease, has evolved over time, both intrinsically and extrinsically, and it is likely that it will continue to do so. Extrinsically, as we look closer, we see that internal conflict is not one disease, but rather many variants of it, each of which requires its own specific diagnosis and form of treatment. Our understanding of the disease and its possible treatments thus changes. Intrinsically, the disease can manifest itself in different forms at different times and situations, sometimes evolving in ways that make it more resistant to the treatments that have been developed to address it. The disease thus evolves in and of itself. Further, as with a psychological disorder in an individual, our understanding of the disease in general and the instance in particular is often incomplete and sometimes inaccurate, forcing the treatment we apply to be developed and perfected over time. Finally, as with psychological disorders, there is often no short-term solution, and there is sometimes no solution at all. However we tailor our prescription, these broadest parameters must also often be taken into account.

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PROGNOSIS Taken together, what kind of outlook do these realities give us? What is our prognosis? Where can we go from here? In the final analysis, our best efforts and bravest innovations are dependent upon a few small but vital factors for success: the will of the people on the ground (and their ability to realign their expectations), the will of the international community, the means and methods at hand, and time. It often seems that the most underestimated and misunderstood of these is time. Thinking of internal conflicts—sometimes asking aloud, as we did in Bosnia, why we need to remain engaged more than a year or eighteen months to resolve them—we need to reflect more often and fully than we do on both their scope and nature. The images that have reached us have horrified us; at their better moments, they have moved us to action. But, by their nature, they could not fill us with the fear and fury, the anguish and despair, which each and all of the parties to those conflicts have lived. We must realize and accept that the wounds inflicted by experiences of this kind heal slowly, if at all. Further, many of the internal conflicts examined here stretch back far in time. The parties to the conflicts in Africa's Great Lakes often refer back over a century; the parties to the conflict in the Balkans often point to roots five times that long. These realities, these roots, must not be ignored. But it is equally important to ask, at this point, how far they will stretch forward. To gain a sense of the larger response to this question, we must again begin with the individual. The millions who have endured internal conflict firsthand, in the last years of the bloodiest century in history, will bear both physical and psychological scars for the rest of their lives. Among these, those who will bear the longest and deepest scars of today's internal conflicts will be those who have endured them as children. The impact of these conflicts will be deepest upon them because of the impressionability of the young mind, and because the horror inflicted on it will be compounded by innocence and incomprehension. It will also be deepest because a greater and greater number of children are being exposed to conflict and its consequences firsthand and at close range. It will be longest because those who have seen and felt the impact of today's internal conflicts as children will be doomed to carry the weight of their experiences far longer than those of us who have seen the same events as adults. Gra?a Machel, the widow of the former President of Mozambique, recently authored an exhaustive and authoritative report on the impact of armed conflict on children (United Nations, 1996). Highlighting the mistreatment of children in nearly thirty current armed conflicts worldwide, she cites some harrowing statistics. According to her report, between 1987 and 1997 over 2 million children were killed and 15 million disabled or traumatized by armed conflict. Especially when separated from their families—either among refugees or among the internally displaced—children became particularly vul-

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nerable to child labor, to conscription into armed forces, to sexual violence and prostitution, and to other forms of abuse and exploitation, simply as a means of survival. Among the 80 percent of today's casualties that are civilian, fully half of them are children. Children also make up half the people worldwide who are displaced by war. Much of this the report ascribes to "the changing character of modern warfare, where wars are being fought not between States but within them, and are marked by increasing brutality [and] heightened feelings of hatred or aggression [italics added]" (p. 11). It is not difficult to imagine how far and deep the implications and ramifications of this problem might extend. If the body politic has learned anything about child abuse in the last decade, it is the frightening extent to which those who endure it today become those who inflict it tomorrow. Looking at what internal conflicts across the globe have done to children in recent years, the thought of what could lie ahead is deeply troubling. When looking at the longer reach of internal conflict, however, it is not only the plight of children that gives cause for concern. Other long-term effects of internal conflict can be seen in post-traumatic stress disorder, which has swept up—and often broken down—more and more individuals as internal conflict has grown. These individuals, overwhelmed by the shock and horror of the moment, internalize or suppress their experience, reconciling themselves only much later (if ever) to what they have witnessed and survived. Because they are often unable to confront those whose victims they have been, it is difficult for them to address and express the pain they bear. Debriefing, used more and more widely both for civilians on the ground and for the peacekeepers who witness or endure the same crimes, helps break the cycle of internalization and resentment, but it is merely afirststep. Symptoms or expressions of disorder, immediate or delayed, latent or blatant, frequently confront operations on the ground, both on and after their arrival. Many peacekeepers, on returning from the field, have spoken of the attitudes or actions of anger, aggression, or apathy that they have encountered there. At the end of conflicts, when victims are mourning their losses and perpetrators are confronting their actions, these are evident enough. When intervention occurs at the height of conflict, where there has been no clear win or loss, no realignment of options or expectations, no reconciliation or acceptance, where intervention might well be seen as an obstacle rather than an opportunity, they can be clamorous. What results from this is a phenomenon that Laborit referred to as the "inhibition of action." In situations where it has become clear that a course of action (in this case, armed aggression) has become either an "ineffective" means of attaining a goal (conquest) or has been outweighed by "an acquired or sociocultural norm" (insistence by the international community that the conflict be halted), "inhibition of action" sets in, marked by apathy, frustration, repression, and depression. This Laborit characterizes as inevitable in a situation in which "neither fight nor flight can ensure survival" (Joliat, 1996,

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pp. 167-168). "Fight" is not possible here: Intervention at the height of conflict effectively forbids it; intervention at the end of a conflict finds the means and will to fight exhausted. "Flight" is inconceivable for those who have determined to stand their ground and give everything they have to defend it; it is no longer possible for those who have left or lost everything they had to make it as far as a refugee camp or a foreign country. Thus, what often faces a peacekeeping operation is inhibition of action: apathy, depression, frustration, resentment, and what might be called a quarantine mentality. Overcoming this situation is the key to resolving the internal conflict. How can it be achieved? By containing physical conflict, by separating antagonists, and by nurturing reconciliation and restoration through a wide range of means and mechanisms, peacekeeping can, very much like an individual therapist, create the climate and conditions in which recovery can best occur. It can usually prevent further deterioration, but it cannot force or guarantee recovery. This, ultimately, is dependent upon the will of the patient—and on that alone. The cure, in the final analysis, must be created from within. Despite the best of efforts by the state or individual in conflict or by those who wish to help, the long reach of conflict's consequences might inhibit that kind of action for quite some time. In some cases, like Cyprus, it has so far. Yet over time the presence of the climate and conditions for treatment, the amelioration of the environment, the guidance of the therapist, and the support of those concerned has often led the individual state to confront its realities, realign its hopes and expectations, and work to restore and reconcile itself. It is here that our hope lies. And because each of these individual conflicts occurs within a larger body of which we all are part, it is here that our fullest efforts should be applied as well. Internal conflict, whether psychological or political, whether individual or national, is as old as history itself. That alone makes curing it a daunting prospect. In the last century, however, psychology has made enormous inroads in understanding, addressing, remedying, and resolving the conflicts of the individual. A new science with an innovative approach, it has changed our entire outlook on psychological disorder, and has enabled us to deal with it with greater strength and effectiveness. Peacekeeping, much younger than its parallel, has been addressing and adapting to internal conflict for only a little more than a decade. A hundred years from now, through its own innovative approach, we can hope that its inroads will be as extensive in addressing the internal conflicts of nations, and that we will also deal with these conflicts with greater strength and greater success. NOTE Mr. Breed is writing in his personal capacity and the views he has expressed are his own.

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REFERENCES Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace. New York: United Nations. Garfield, R. M., & Neugut, A. I. (1997). The human consequences of war. In B. Levy & V. W. Sidel (Eds.), War and public health (pp. 27-38). New York Oxford University Press. Goulding, M. I. (1997). Enhancing the United Nations* effectiveness in peace a security: A report submitted to the Secretary-General. New York: United N tions. International Committee of the Red Cross. (1998). Armed conflicts linked to the disintegration of state structures (Preparatory document for the first periodical meeting on international humanitarian law, Geneva, 19-23 January). Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross. Joliat, F. (1996). Henri Laborit: Pour quoi vous dire. Paris: LHarmattan. Kubler-Ross, E. (1969). On death and dying. New York: Touchstone. Morrow, L. (1993, February 22). Is rape an inevitable—and marginal—part of war? Time Magazine, pp. 48-50. Roosevelt, F. D. (1941). War is a contagion (Speech at Chicago, Illinois, October 5, 1937). In S. I. Rosenman (Ed.) The public papers and addresses of Frankli Delano Roosevelt, pp. 406-411. New York: MacMillan. Rosenblum, M. (1991, August 19). Aid donors try to build better system. Associated Press. Sivard, R. L. (1991). World military and social expenditures 1991. Washington, D World Priorities. United Nations. (1996). Too soon for twilight, too late for dawn. United Nations Chronicle, 33, 7-14. United Nations. (1997). Secretary-General welcomes news of arrests in Kenya (Press Release SG/SM/6287 of 18 July 1997). New York: United Nations. United Nations Department of Public Information. (1997). Background note on Unite Nations peacekeeping operations (DPI/1634/Rev.7). New York: United Na tions. United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (1998). UNHCR by numbers: Pe sons of concern to UNHCR, at 1 Jan 1997, by category. Most current statis found atUNHCR's web site http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/table2.htm.

Index Active transparency, 102 An Agenda for Development, 18,26 An Agenda for Peace, 9, 10, 18, 24, 196, 197, 198, 204 Albania, 223, 227, 234, 242, 249 Andean Initiative, 22 Angola, 10,43, 133-139, 145-146, 170, 180, 186-192, 200, 203, 212, 227-233 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 37, 42, 48, 52, 57,61,90, 116, 134, 147-148, 168, 180, 196,215,223,242 Brundtland Report, 23 Bystander intervention, 33 Cambodia, 10,42,51-52,61, 170-171, 180, 186-188, 200-204, 212, 223230 Chechnya, 223 Child soldiers, 139-141, 144 Civilian peacekeepers, 90 Civilian personnel selection, 92 Civil society, 46, 144

CivPol (Civilian Police), term coined, 169 Community-based intervention, 143, 146 Confidence building, 109 Conflict resolution, 4, 8, 10, 12-13, 36, 40-55, 144, 147, 153-165, 196, 204, 207, 209, 235, 239; defined, 42; as a diplomatic tool, 52 Correspondence courses on peacekeeping, 97 Critical incident stress team, 91 Cultural awareness, 62-65 Cultural identification, 58, 59 Cultural state, 57, 62 De-escalation of conflict, 107, 108 Degree of aggression, 103 Demining 2010, 181 Demobilization, 143, 198-200, 225, 227, 228-230 Dependency, 174 Documentation and tracing, 144

256 Early intervention, 31 Eastern Slavonia, 11, 223, 250 Electoral assistance, 232 El Salvador, 25,62,170,200,202, 210, 212,223, 227-228 Escalation of conflict, 106 Ethnocentrism, 58,59 Fighting as a psychological response, 105 Forgiveness, 208, 211 Founding elections, 224, 234 Haiti, 10, 116,138, 168, 171-174, 199, 217, 223, 227; criminal justice reform, 171-174 Human development, 17,18, 22, 24 Human Development Index, 22 Humanitarian assistance, 121,133,134, 135, 137,145, 148 Humanitarian demining, 182 IFOR (Implementation Force), 232, 245 Indigenous systems, support for, 174 Intercultural exploration, 66, 67 International Convention to Ban Land Mines, 180 Learned helplessness, 122 Learning how to learn, 66 Liberia, 10, 194, 223 Mines, 179 Mozambique, 10,170,183, 186, 199, 204,217,223,227,233,251 Namibia, 170,212-217,223 Negotiation, 108 Neoclassical growth theory, 19 New roles for large nations, 45 Nicaragua, 25, 212, 223, 233 Nongovernmental organizations, 133, 134; inclusion of in the resolution process, 54 ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique), 229

INDEX

ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador), 212, 228 Operation Joint Endeavor to Bosnia, 118,125 Operation Provide Comfort (to the Kurds), 120 Operation Restore Democracy to Haiti, 116 Operation Restore Hope to Somalia, 116 Palestine, 223, 224 Peace building, 10, 60-69, 195-205 Peacekeeping, 3, 8-14, 42, 52, 57-66, 101-110, 111-126, 131, 153, 195, 202,207,211; ethos, 8 Peacemaking, 10, 52, 57-66 Postconflict peace building, 195 Post-traumatic stress disorder, 116, 137, 139,141 Primal violence, 58, 65 Primordial sentiments, 67, 68 Prospect theory, 77 Psychological aspects of mine placement, 184 Psychological conditions for trust, 176 Psychological courage, 107 Psychological factors on peacekeeping operations, 102 Psychological fitness, 102 Psychological impact of peacekeeping operations, 123 Psychological resiliency, 103 Psychological trust, 109 Psychophysical numbing, 75 Psychosocial intervention, 136, 140146 Rebuilding a criminal justice system, 169 Reconciliation, 213 Reconciliation elections, 224,231 Reconstruction, 198 Refugees, 10,42, 45, 54, 65,78, 131132, 135,137, 143-144, 172, 181, 190, 196, 197, 199, 203, 217, 225, 239,241,251 Relevance of peacekeeping missions, 125,126

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INDEX

Retributional violence, 172 Root causes, 104 Rules of engagement, 112, 120, 122, 124, 125 Rwanda, 91, 145 Scapegoating, 32 Second generation of peacekeeping, 101 Settlement as a concept of diplomacy, 54 Sexual violence, 138, 139 SFOR (Security Force), 232, 245 Sinai, Multinational Force and Observer to the, 119 Small-scale conflicts, 45 South Africa, 43, 49-51, 145, 170, 210, 217, 223-224, 243 Trade and investment as an enhancement of multitiered economic satisfaction, 44 Traditional healing, 146 Training of peacekeepers, 62-68, 96 Trauma, 136-141, 146 Truth, justice, and reconciliation, 145 UNAVEM (United Nations Angolan Verification Mission), 232

U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 1997, 21, 23, 27 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 1992, 23 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, 1972, 23 Underdevelopment, 19 UNESCO (United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization), 65 UNITAR POCI (United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programs of Correspondence Instruction), 97 UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), 203,226, 230 U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987,23 U.N. World Drug Report, 1997, 22 Violations of peacekeeping agreements, causes, 104 Voter registration, 230 Weber's Law, 76 YomKippurWar, 123

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About the Editor and Contributors EILEEN BORRIS is the founding director of Peace Initiatives and an internationally known psychologist, author, and trainer specializing in political psychology, conflict resolution, and interactive problem-solving methods. HENRY BREED is Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping at the United Nations and has served on U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Mozambique, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. THOMAS W. BRITT is a U.S. Army research psychologist in the Department of Operational Stress, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C. BARRY COX served a career as a military engineer in the Army of the United Kingdom and now specializes in issues related to demining. PAUL F. DIEHL is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published widely in the area of peacekeeping. LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, THE HONORABLE, is a former U.S. Secretary of State and U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia. DAVID FETHERSTONHAUGH is a researcher in the Department of Psychology at Stanford University.

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ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

JAMES FRIEDRICH is a Professor of Psychology at Willamette University. His research includes social judgment and inference, attitude formation and change, and applications of social cognition. CLAUDIA GONZALEZ-VALLEJO is an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Ohio University with interests in decision making and policy. She has served as a consultant to the United Nations Development Fund for Women. CHRISTIAN HARLEMAN is a Senior Fellow of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and is presently serving as an international consultant in the fields of peace, security, and development. STEPHEN M. JOHNSON is the Associate Director of the University of Oregon Survey Research Lab. He conducts research in risk perception with an emphasis on medical risks, disasters, and population growth. BRIAN KIDWELL is the Staff Psychologist at the United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations. PAUL R. KIMMEL is a private consultant in Los Angeles who designs, conducts, and evaluates training programs in cultural awareness and conflict management. HARVEY J. LANGHOLTZ is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at the College of William & Mary, where he specializes in Decision Theory. He is an internationally recognized expert on the psychology of peacekeeping and the preparation and assessment of peacekeepers and has been named a Senior Fellow by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. He also conducts research and publishes in the field of resourceallocation decision making. FABRIZIO PAGANI holds the title of Researcher of International Law, School of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy. His specialty is reconciliation elections and he is a member of the Directorate of the School of Civilian PeaceKeeping/Humanitarian Operations at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa. EDWARD J. PERKINS is a Professor at the University of Oklahoma, where he holds the William J. Crowe Chair and serves as the Executive Director of the International Programs Center. He has served as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and to South Africa. VALERIA M. GONZALEZ POSSE is a career diplomat and member of the Ar gentine Foreign Service. She has extensive experience in peacekeeping and is currently posted to the Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations.

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

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GISELDA BARROSO SAUVEUR is a sociologist specializing in public policy analysis and public administration. She is a Professor at the School of Government and Public Administration, Sao Paulo, Brazil. PAUL SLOVIC is a Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Oregon and a principal at Decision Research in Eugene, Oregon. ERVIN STAUB is a Professor at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and specializes in early intervention and conflict resolution. J. MATTHEW VACCARO specializes in issues of civilian police on peacekeeping missions and serves on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs. MICHAEL G. WESSELLS is a Professor of Psychology at Randolph-Macon College and a past president of the American Psychology Association's Division of Peace Psychology. TOM WOODHOUSE is the Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and has written widely on conflict-resolution theory and its application to peacekeeping.