The New Order of War
At the Interface
Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Nancy Billias
Advisory Board Dr Alejandro ...
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The New Order of War
At the Interface
Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Nancy Billias
Advisory Board Dr Alejandro Cervantes-Carson Professor Margaret Chatterjee Dr Wayne Cristaudo Dr Mira Crouch Dr Phil Fitzsimmons Dr Jones Irwin Professor Asa Kasher
Owen Kelly Dr Martin McGoldrick Revd Stephen Morris Professor John Parry Professor Peter L. Twohig Professor S Ram Vemuri Revd Dr Kenneth Wilson, O.B.E
Volume 64 A volume in the At the Interface series ‘War and Peace’
Probing the Boundaries
The New Order of War
Edited by
Bob Brecher
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2010
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-2941-5 E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-2942-2 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2010 Printed in the Netherlands
Table of Contents Introduction: The New Order of War Bob Brecher Questioning Just War Thinking: A Critique of Walzer Tarik Kochi Torture and the ‘Ticking Bomb’: Fantasy and the So-Called War on Terror Bob Brecher The Language of War: George W. Bush’s Discursive Practices in Securitising the Western Value System in the ‘War on Terror’ Janicke Stramer Is the War on Terror Real? Should it Be? Avery Plaw The Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications For Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation of Outer Space Arjen Vermeer Yugonostalgia and the Post-National Narrative Stephenie Young
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17
35
49
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Veterans, Vietcong and Others: Enemies and Empathies In Larry Heinemann’s Paco’s Story David Boulting
111
The Immediacy of Narrated Combat: Operation Iraqi Freedom as Public Spectacle Jason T. McEntee
131
Ethical Crossings in War Writing: Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost and the Sri Lankan Civil War Elke Rosochaki
149
The Unlisted Character: Representing War on Stage Julia Boll
167
Confessing Complicity and Embracing Victimhood: Negotiating the Meaning of the Border War in Post-Apartheid South Africa Gary Baines A Psychosocial Perspective on Support for Terrorism In the Wake of Attacks Kiran Sarma
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Non-Lethal Warfare Seth B. Scott
223
Teaching Non-Violence Helen Fox
237
Notes on Contributors
257
Introduction: The New Order of War Bob Brecher At the beginning of the 1990s, in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was possible to think - sincerely, albeit in retrospect naïvely that the end of ‘actually existing communism’ heralded hope of real and immediate improvement in at least one area of the global dispensation. Of course this was nothing like the brief glimmer in 1968 of something like ‘socialism with a human face’, when it seemed for a brief moment that the hopes of 1917 might become some sort of reality, rather than the Stalinist disaster into which they had transmuted. No one was any longer quite as naïve as that. Nonetheless, even if the economic future were certain – exemplified by Russia as a re-run on a massive scale of late 1920s Chicago, with Al Capone played, generally at several removes, by ‘the new oligarchs’ – it seemed that another certainty had dissolved: the certainty that war was always just around the next corner. For war, as Clausewitz had insisted, and the Cold War had amply illustrated across the entire so-called Third World since 1945, is the continuation of politics by other means. But with the ‘end of history’, as announced by Francis Fukuyama, must also come the end of politics; indeed, history had come to an end precisely because liberalism had triumphed and so the era of ideology - of politics - was no more. And so there would be no more war. What was largely overlooked, however, was that the end of politics did not at all signal the end of politics, but rather the end of acceptable oppositional politics, the end of ideology described as such - and not at all the end of ideology. The triumph of liberalism and the defeat of socialism, far from heralding a new era of freedom, in fact ushered in a totalitarianism no less thorough-going, if of course rather more sophisticated in its modes of operation, than that which had collapsed in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. The fact that ‘we’ were all good neo-liberal free-marketers now did not entail either that ‘we’ included all of us or that neo-liberalism would not stand in need of determined political, economic and cultural defence if its vision of the new order, and indeed the new individual arising from the ashes of the Welfare State, was to become embedded in people’s consciousness as well as in the world’s political structures. In short, Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism would appear only some fifteen years later. Politics did not come to an end. Far from it. The ruling ‘common sense’ of neo-liberalism could neither be imposed without challenge nor remain unchallenged once imposed. War continued; in fact, wars spread. What happened, as we can now see all too clearly, was that, instead of ‘the
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______________________________________________________________ end of history’ enshrining a new-found will to prevent international, and indeed intra-national, conflict and to uphold international law, conventions and agreements as a guarantee of peace and security, the world was plunged into new wars and new forms of war. First, the early 1990s saw nationalist and internecine wars spread across Africa and Europe on an unprecedented scale. And then came 11 September 2001 and its attendant ‘war on terror’. ‘They’, it turned out, were not willing to subsume themselves in ‘us’; and the new world order of neo-liberalism rampant was not entirely to the liking of all those it sought to envelop in its corporate embrace. None of that is controversial. How it is to be understood and evaluated, however, is quite another matter. To take just a few examples: the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into what would have been civil war had the outcome been different; central Africa, and Rwanda in particular, witnessed a neighbourly carnage which in terms of efficiency eclipsed even Auschwitz; the United States and its coalition partners invaded and continue to occupy both Afghanistan and Iraq; and torture, whether conducted by the forces of democracy and freedom as at Baghram, Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, or by their proxies across Europe and the Middle East through the medium of ‘rendition’, is a fact of ‘the war on terror’. So is what might euphemistically be described as the attendant ‘re-ordering’ of international law as something the substance of which the world’s sole super-power has derogated to itself. The studies that follow explore central aspects of this new order of war, inviting readers to consider what is really going on, how to understand it and how one might respond to it. Taken as a continuous argument, they thus constitute a deconstruction of the ideologies -- the constructions, at once conceptual, linguistic and material -- that make this new order possible: its forms, its tools and its determinations. Tarik Kochi’s analysis of the assumptions underlying Walzer’s magisterial and so often taken for granted conception of a just war exposes both how and how much it proceeds on the basis of Walzer’s taking for granted assumptions that, apart from anything else, violent conflict itself undermines. His writing on, and conception of, ‘just war’, therefore - far from constituting a means of distinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable violence - disingenuously seeks our assent to exactly what we need to be questioning. I myself argue that the prosecution of unjustified war, and in particular the so-called war on terror, is reliant on its proponents engendering fantasies, and their necessary linguistic vehicles, in those whose support such conflict requires. He offers an analysis of the ‘ticking bomb scenario’, used by civil rights lawyer Dershowitz in his attempt to justify interrogational torture, as an example of one such fantasy – a fantasy that is internally incoherent and which cannot, therefore, legitimately justify such torture even on Dershowitz’s own utilitarian grounds. Janicke Straemer’s study of George W. Bush’s rhetoric uncovers the extent to which the United States’ prosecution of the ‘war on terror’ requires
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______________________________________________________________ that the values on the basis of which that war is said to be conducted – democracy, freedom – be themselves suborned in the service of securitising everyday language and life. Its religious nature and basis should afford us particular pause in light of its characterization of Al-Qaeda, and of its presentation of the struggle in which it takes itself to be engaged, as apocalyptic. Avery Plaw invites us to consider that ‘war’ from another, but complementary, angle: its legal status. For the exceptionalism that a ‘struggle between good and evil’ invokes, and that is furthered by an understanding of the ‘war on terror’ as a new sort of war altogether, and one not subject to the rule of law just because of its ‘exceptional’ nature, constitutes a concomitant material danger – not least, for example, the incarceration of civilian citizens without charge or trial. The underlying question of course concerns how we ought to go about deciding what the law ought to be: should we be guided by pragmatic concerns about likely outcomes given the way the world is; or by differently pragmatic concerns about changing the way the world is? Arjen Vermeer’s argument that law is needed to govern the apparently unavoidable fact of the militarisation of outer space certainly makes a convincing case. Yet one might respond by insisting that outer space ought not to be militarised and that what is apparently unavoidable will only be made to seem more so if brought under the ambit of the law. But would not such a response in fact be wholly irresponsible? While there is indeed a new order of war in the making, the fundamental issue that it raises remains what it has always been: accommodation on the best possible terms versus rejection on account of those terms being inevitably unacceptable. But philosophical, political and legal analyses are not the only means of understanding either the nature of war or its possible justification. Stephenie Young’s study of the Croatian novelist’s Dubravka Ugresic’s The Ministry of Pain at once explores and contributes to the ambiguities of narratives and understandings of ‘nation’, of the identities created by them, and of the wars they have at least helped to initiate. She reminds us of how deeply rooted those ambiguities and understandings have become, at least for those of us in the west, in the notion of nationality, however that is constructed and however ambiguous it may remain. The problem is not, perhaps, that we need to recognize and respect ‘the Other’, but rather that we should be in a position in the first place where that characterization of it has become necessary. The nature of that ‘Other’, and its intimate relation to ourselves, is the theme of David Boulting’s analysis of Larry Heinemann’s Vietnam War novel, Paco’s Story, as emblem of the pathological masculinities – not of course unconnected to the rhetoric and the realities alluded to above – that characterise the pursuit and conduct of war. Atrocity, he suggests, is not so much the psychological aberration of particular individuals, but rather a constant possibility for any of us, constructed as we, citizens of the west, have increasingly become in relation to an atrocious
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______________________________________________________________ enemy: we are who we are only by contrast with who we are not. Jason McEntee, in asking us to consider the ambiguities of both the content and the contested reception of soldiers’ raw narratives from and of Iraq, offers perhaps a somewhat more optimistic possibility. The ‘immediacy of narrated combat’, as he puts it, might constitute a material means whereby those on ‘the home front’ might counter the ideological impact of that other element of the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’: the media narratives that sustain, among other things, the pathological masculinities discussed by Boulting. In her analysis of Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost, set in Sri Lanka’s continuing civil war, Elke Rosochaki argues that the totalising narrative and impact of the ‘war on terror’ variously explored by earlier contributors, is one that renders highly problematic the very idea of disinterested observer or reporter. We are always already on one side or another, so that the distance required if judgements made are to be in any sense objectively valid is no longer possible in the new order of war: even to report is already to have been made to play a part. We are indeed who we are only by contrast with those who we are not. But that is not the whole story. In attempting to respond to that truth, we become in part also who we were not. Julia Boll’s study of how the dramatic presentation of the experience of being caught up in a war that is nebulous, apparently never-ending and above all almost impossible to distinguish from ‘normality’ invites us to consider the extent to which it may be possible to understand experiences not our own. Might drama literally be able to show us something in a way that helps us to understand it, and that we could otherwise not understand? And if so, how does such an understanding relate to ‘knowing about’ war? Gary Baines’s analysis of the experience of veterans, and of their later experience of that experience – especially as they relate to the experience of their erstwhile opponents – asks us to think about what the conditions might be of a ‘reconciliation’ that is more than superficial. In particular – and this picks up on Boll’s theme – does that require some sort of empathetic understanding of ‘their’ experience, both ‘then’ and ‘now’? If so, then might that very fact not imply that reconciliation is necessarily a far more fragmentary business than one might have hoped? Kiran Sarma’s attempted construction of a psychological paradigm of acts of terror, while focusing specifically on various relations between experience of, and support for, such acts, raises a parallel issue: how might different sorts of understanding of what people do be brought together into some sort of whole on the basis of which a rational policy towards various forms of violence might be proposed? Indeed, is any sort of unitary understanding possible here, or must the analyses proposed from different perspectives - political, moral, religious, psychological, sociological and so on – remain necessarily partial and thus in certain respects irreconcilable?
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______________________________________________________________ The volume ends with two proposed antidotes to ‘the new order of war’: war without death; and a commitment to non-violence. In offering the possibility of war without death, Seth Scott attacks a very common assumption, namely that war is fundamentally about killing ‘the enemy’. Certainly the thought that that need not be so appears at first sight to offer some much-needed optimism. And yet, even if we are not overly cynical about the likelihood of such a possibility in practice, there is an unsettling question lurking in the background. Is death the worst that can happen to us? First, the disabling weapons systems he discusses raise the prospect of one group of people’s establishing total physical control of another, along the lines of the dystopias explored by writers such as Aldous Huxley, George Orwell and Margaret Attwood. And second, just how ought we to weigh, for example, economic sanction, physical blockade and cultural destruction against physical death? Finally, Helen Fox asks us to reconsider the equally common assumption that war is inevitable, that it is, so to speak, an inescapable feature of human nature. Again, her thought – that it is not – is an optimistic one: perhaps war could be eliminated. But should it be? Might not the ‘internal’ peace of Fox’s student at the end of her chapter signal a dystopian acquiescence rather than a utopian rejection of violence? For might there not be some things that it really is worth fighting – and dying and killing – for? Is war always the worst thing we do to each other? Or are there forms and means of oppression worse than physical violence and even death, and which have sometimes – all too often, perhaps – to be violently resisted? And should those of us who wish the world to be a better place than it is not focus on those forms and means of oppression, and on arguing about which and whose violence might be justified, if not – speaking from the UK - our own?
Bibliography Klein, N., The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Allen Lane, London, 2007.
Questioning Just War Thinking: A Critique of Walzer Tarik Kochi Abstract Under the shadow of the so-called war on terror, this chapter questions the manner in which a broad and ambiguous notion of just war appears to dominate much of contemporary thinking and opinion about war and terror. I ask whether a number of differing approaches within the just war tradition, like that of Michael Walzer’s just war theory, really do take the problem of war seriously, or, of whether, shying away from central questions lying at the heart of the problem of war, many accounts of just war, only really treat war as nothing more than a game. Key Words: Aquinas, Augustine, just war, legitimacy, ordering, right, terror, violence, Walzer, war ***** For many the ‘war on terror’ is a just war. The conflict is described as representing a legitimate moral struggle in the defence of freedom, human rights and the values of modern, Western liberal civilisation against those (i.e. the ‘terrorists’) who desire to destroy this. Very often the ‘war on terror’ is portrayed by Western media agencies as one, which represents a battle of Western values of freedom, human rights and democracy pitched against the forces of evil. President George W. Bush’s response to the bombings in New York and Washington in 2001 framed the ‘war on terror’ within a broad moral sense of representing a just war in defence of freedom and civilisation. He argued: This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.1 Continued statements of many prominent Western political leaders have echoed this broadly and ambiguously moral just war language. Yet there are many others who are highly sceptical of a grand, moral just war language and argue that it operates as a mere rhetorical and propaganda device that hides the interests of political, economic and social power.2 One manner of coming to terms with the competing claims over the justness of the ‘war on terror’ is to turn towards an intellectual tradition known as the just war tradition. At first glance this tradition might offer some
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______________________________________________________________ assistance in addressing the ambiguity of the moral concepts and language bound up with competing justifications and condemnations of war. In recent history one of the popularisers of the just war tradition has been Michael Walzer.3 He argues for the contemporary importance of the notion of just war and his work has been highly influential in reviving this tradition of thought against legal positivism and ‘reason of state’ theories. For Walzer, just war involves a set of moral arguments about the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular acts of war and the manner in which they are conducted. Just war theory is normally seen to involve two elements: the question of the right of war, and the question of rightful conduct within war. Here I shall focus only on the former, albeit noting its fundamental connection with the latter. Walzer’s version of just war theory makes the assumption that there exists something called a ‘common morality’ and that the content of this common morality is ‘human rights’. Judgments about the rightness or wrongness of going to war are to be based upon an assessment of how the use of violence relates to the common morality of human rights. Walzer’s just war theory operates, then, in two senses. In one sense, the theory operates negatively or critically, in that wars normally legitimated by political, economic and power interests, and even those justified by positive law or notions of utility, may be condemned as unjust because they threaten a common morality of human rights. In another sense, the theory operates positively, in that it offers a ground for legitimating war in the name of protecting and safeguarding the rights of individuals who are threatened by some form of violence or coercion. Walzer sets out a number of arguments under which the positive sense of just war is limited and restricted: the notion is generally limited to instances of self-defence. However, Walzer also outlines other broader possibilities of the use of force as being just in the context of a perceived immediate threat, the necessity of humanitarian intervention; and, he argues, in situations of ‘extreme emergency’ each allow exceptions from the more restrictive aspect of his theory. It is at the point of these exceptions to a restrictive just war theory, and their opening onto a more proactive use of the intellectual discipline of just war theory to legitimate sometimes aggressive acts of international violence, that brings a popular just war theory like Walzer’s into question. It is worth here drawing attention to what Walzer describes as the sphere of ‘morality’, which informs a notion of just war: I want to account for the ways in which men and women who are not lawyers but simply citizens (and sometimes soldiers) argue about war, and to expound the terms we commonly use. My starting point is the fact that we do argue, often to different purposes, to be sure, but in a
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______________________________________________________________ mutually comprehensible fashion: else there would be no point arguing. We justify our conduct; we judge the conduct of others. Though these justifications and judgments cannot be studied like the records of a criminal court, they are nevertheless a legitimate subject of study. Upon examination they reveal, I believe, a comprehensive view of war as a human activity and a more or less systematic moral doctrine, which sometimes, but not always, overlaps with established legal doctrine.4 Further: I shall always refer to the laws of international society (as these appear in legal handbooks and military manuals) as positive laws. For the rest, when I talk of law, I am referring to the moral law, and to those general principles that we commonly acknowledge, even when we can’t or won’t live up to them. Throughout the book, I treat words like aggression, neutrality, surrender, civilian, reprisal, and so on, as if they were terms in a moral vocabulary – which they are, and always have been, though most recently their analysis and refinement have been almost entirely the work of lawyers. I want to recapture the notion of just war for moral and political theory. My own work, then, looks back to that religious tradition within which Western politics and morality were first given shape, to the books of writers like Maimonides, Aquinas, Vitoria, and Suarez – and then to the books of writers like Hugo Grotius who took over the tradition and began to work it into secular form.5 With regard to what Walzer precisely means by ‘morality’ or the ‘moral law’, he argues: There is a particular arrangement, a particular view of the world that seems to me the best one. I want to suggest that the arguments we make about war are most fully understood (though other understandings are possible) as efforts to recognise and respect the rights of individuals and associated men and women. The morality I shall expound is in its philosophical form a doctrine of human rights, though I shall say nothing here of the ideas of personality, action and intention that this doctrine probably presupposes. Considerations of utility play into the
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______________________________________________________________ structure at many points, but they cannot account for it as a whole. Their part is a subsidiary to that of rights; it is constrained by rights. That is above all true of the classical forms of military maximisation: the religious crusade, the proletarian revolution, the ‘war to end all war’. But it is true also, as I will try to show, of the more immediate pressures of ‘military necessity’. At every point, the judgments we make (the lies we tell) are best accounted for if we regard life and liberty as something like absolute values and then try to understand the moral and political processes through which these values are challenged and defended.6 It should be noted that Walzer positions his work as a ‘practical morality’7 and he tries to develop his moral account of war through the use of case studies and by contrasting historical examples. This said, however, Walzer makes many very broad assumptions about what constitutes ‘morality’ and thus about what should be drawn upon as a notion of right when judging the legitimacy of an act of war. He assumes that there is a ‘common morality’ and asserts that the content of this common morality is human rights. On the basis of his notion of morality as human rights, Walzer passes judgment on particular acts of war in history. It is questionable whether such an approach is an example of what it means to take the problem of war seriously, however. Is it enough for a scholar simply to assert what a ‘common morality’ is and then say ‘I think’ that such and such an act of war is just or unjust? Does this kind of approach lead thinking out of the ambiguous use of moral statements all too often made by politicians in their justification of killing, or does it lead straight back into a realm of moral ambiguity? By simply declaring what he thinks morality is and then proceeding to judge the justness of war on this basis, Walzer overlooks a deeper question lying at the heart of war. This question is centred on a relationship between war and right. The term ‘right’ refers here not to the limited sense of legal rights or human rights, but denotes a broader concept encompassing differing notions of ethics, morality, law, justice and the good.8 In this latter sense, the term refers to a broader sphere of thinking about the ethical or normative arrangement of human lives in the world. A broader concept of right could thus be seen to involve a number of differing historical and social conceptions, which might stand in conflict with one another. For example, the concept of right can be seen to include, among other things: a set of claims by the state against its citizens and against other states; a set of claims by an individual relating to dignity, freedom or property linked to the fact of being human; a particular thick conception of the ‘good life’; animal rights. The arguments that underlie these differing formulations within a broad
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______________________________________________________________ concept of right may be in conflict and may draw upon differing theoretical, philosophical and historical ideas. In this respect differing formulations within a broad concept of right are grounded in very different ways. Some of these grounds may be seen to include, for example: legal texts and constitutions; historical and cultural traditions; philosophical arguments (such as social contract theory or utilitarian and deontological arguments); and theological and secular myths (such as divine hierarchies of creation or the law of nature). Viewed from the perspective of a broad concept of right, when we say that a particular act of violence is ‘right’, there are a variety of meanings and justifications which may be drawn upon and thus a variety of ways in which someone might attempt to justify or condemn a particular act of violence. What is being overlooked by thinkers such as Walzer (and by politicians who speak in a similar language) is the possibility of a deeper relationship between war and right, which marks, frames and even organises our thinking about war in general. This relation has developed historically over a process of ongoing attempts of human ethical thinking to come to terms with the role and status of killing and violence in general and the act of war in particular. Certainly Walzer argues that his concern is not with a historical question, but is focussed upon the ‘present character’ of the moral world.9 Yet, in making such a claim and attempting to name the present character of morality as human rights, Walzer confuses one form of right (human rights) with the whole of right (containing a number of different, inter-related forms). Further, he suppresses the continuing role and significance of other forms of right, which are essential to his judgments upon the justness of particular acts of war. By not acknowledging the role these other forms of right (the state, sovereignty, legal violence and coercion, political community, differential forms of ethical life, historical and sacred territorial boundaries) within his own ‘moral’ judgment about war,10 Walzer presents only a thin, surface-level account of just war which does not differ substantially from much of the just war rhetoric of state propaganda. There is a deeper set of questions involving the complex relationship between war and right that lies beneath the just war language of theorists such as Walzer or politicians such as Bush. While certain theoretical approaches, such as Walzer’s, give the appearance of engaging with these questions, what they are in fact doing is suppressing them in an effort to present an account of just war that is useful and digestible. It would seem that if we are to make sense of the current language of just war, and its use of terms such as ‘humanity’, ‘freedom’, and ‘democracy’, to justify violence, it is necessary to move beyond contemporary populist accounts and perhaps look towards more historical accounts of just war.11
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______________________________________________________________ Two central historical figures within the just war tradition are the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. While Augustine did not develop a comprehensive theory of just war as such, his comments have been highly influential. In City of God (426)12 Augustine responds to the initial prohibition of killing contained within the Decalogue and the Christian Gospels and in this sense engages with an early Christian tendency towards non-violence and pacifism. With regard to the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill’, Augustine states: But the divine authority itself has made certain exceptions to the rule that it is not lawful to kill men. These exceptions, however, include only those whom God commands to be slain, either by a general law, or by an express command applying to a particular person at a particular time. Moreover, he who is commanded to perform this ministry does not himself slay. Rather, he is like a sword, which is the instrument of its user. And so those who, by God’s authority, have waged wars, or who bearing the public power in their own person, have punished the wicked with death according to His laws, that is, by His most just authority: these have in no way acted against that commandment which says, ‘Thou shalt not kill’.13 With regard to an express command by God to kill, Augustine gives the example of Abraham, who was commanded by God to kill his son.14 In this biblical story - something of a cruel test of faith - the prophet Abraham is asked by God to sacrifice his son but is at the last moment reprieved and told to sacrifice a goat or sheep instead. For Augustine, the story operates as an example of an instance where killing is justified by divine command. In his account, with its ambiguous mirroring of divine and earthly cities, the sovereign is often positioned as holding something of a God-like position, or at least the sovereign exhibits aspects of divine authority. One consequence of this for Augustine is a certain exemption of sovereign power from the prohibition upon killing. With regard to those bearing public power, Augustine seems to impute that the role of public office (or at least that of the Christian monarch) - necessary for maintaining public peace and order against crime and civil war - allows a legitimate use of violence exempt from the prohibition on killing.15 For Augustine, such acts of justified killing are bound up with the ‘wretchedness of man’s condition’.16 This involves not only the misery of living in the condition of sin but relates also to the necessary error contained within human judgments and the consequences of public authorities often torturing and killing the innocent.17 In this respect,
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______________________________________________________________ while a war fought against a harmful or threatening enemy may be a ‘just war’, it is certainly not celebrated or romanticised by Augustine: But the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, however, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will be much readier to deplore the fact that he is under the necessity of waging even just wars. For if they were not just, he would not have to wage them, and so there would then be no wars at all for a wise man to engage in. For it is the iniquity of the opposing side that imposes upon the wise man the duty of waging wars; and every man certainly ought to deplore this iniquity since, even if no necessity for war should arise from it, it is still the iniquity of men. Let everyone, therefore who reflects with pain upon such great evils, upon such horror and cruelty, acknowledge that this is misery. And if anyone either endures them or thinks of them without anguish of the soul, his condition is still more miserable: for he thinks himself happy only because he has lost all human feeling.18 Elements of Augustine’s account were inherited and developed by Aquinas and organised around the notions of authority, just cause and intention. In the Summa Theologiae (1266-1273)19 Aquinas, in response to the question of whether war is always sinful, argues: There are three conditions for a just war. First the ruler under whom the war is to be fought must have the authority to do so. A private person does not have the right to make war since he can pursue his rights by appealing to his superior. In addition a private person does not have the right to mobilize [convocare] the people as must be done in war. But since the responsibility for the commonwealth has been entrusted to rulers it is their responsibility to defend the city or kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is legitimate for them to use the material sword to punish criminals in order to defend it against internal disturbances -- as the Apostle [Paul] says in Romans 13 ‘He does not bear the sword without cause, for he is a minister of God, an avenger in wrath against the evildoer’ – so they also have the right to use the sword of war to defend the commonwealth against external enemies...
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______________________________________________________________ Secondly, a just cause is required - so that those against whom the war is waged deserve such a response because of some offence on their part. Augustine says, ‘Just wars are usually defined as those that avenge injuries, when a nation or city should be punished for failing to right a wrong done by its citizens, or to return what has been taken away unjustly’. The third condition that is required on the part of those making the war is a right intention, to achieve some good or avoid some evil. St. Augustine says in his book, On the Words of the Lord, ‘For the true followers of God even wars are peaceful if they are waged not out of greed or cruelty but for the sake of peace, to restrain evil doers and assist the good’. Yet it may happen that even if the war is initiated by a legitimate authority and its cause is just, it can become unjust because of evil intentions.20 This latter point relates to what is sometimes called the doctrine of double effect and to the notion of proportionality. Aquinas argues: One act may have two effects only one of which is intended and the other outside of our intention. Moral acts are classified on the basis of what is intended, not of what happens outside of our intention since that is incidental to it.... The action of defending oneself may produce two effects - one, saving one’s life, and the other, killing the attacker. Now an action of this kind intended to save one’s own life cannot be characterised as illicit since it is natural for anyone to maintain himself in existence if he can. An act that is proportionate to the end intended. This is why it is not allowed to use more force than is necessary to defend one’s life. However, if moderation is used in repelling violence this is justified self-defence, for according to the [canon] law, ‘It is legitimate to meet force with force if it is an act of innocent self-defence and exercises restraint.’ It is not required for salvation that a man not carry out actions of proportionate self-defence in order to avoid killing another person, for a man is more obliged to provide for his own life than that of another. However, because killing is only allowed by action of public authority for the common good, it is not lawful for someone who is acting in selfdefence to intend to kill another man - except for those who
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______________________________________________________________ in the exercise of public authority justify the act of selfdefence as related to the public good. This is the case of a soldier fighting against the enemy or an officer of the law combating robbers - although these too commit a sin if they are motivated by private animosity.... 21 The accounts presented by Augustine and Aquinas move much closer towards taking the problem of war seriously. One way they might be seen to do this is through their positioning of the act of war within a broader question of killing. By relating the question of war to a religious prohibition on killing and then setting out the exceptions to this prohibition, the line of thinking developed by Augustine and Aquinas opens onto a set of issues, which mediate the relationship between war and right. Following on from the accounts of Augustine and Aquinas we can see how a discourse of just war is linked very closely to a set of arguments about when it is right to engage in acts of killing. The rightness or justness of war is shown to sit within a wider context concerning arguments about the legitimacy of the city or state and its control over the lives and deaths of its citizens and non-citizens. The just war tradition as initiated by Augustine and Aquinas presupposes, and cannot be separated from, a set of arguments about the source of the legitimacy of a legal-political community, the extent and limits of the power of the sovereign and the technical and juridical distinctions between war and murder. In this sense, when an individual argues that a particular act of war is ‘right’, their statement implies and draws upon a whole range of arguments about the legitimacy of killing and the legitimacy of a particular legalpolitical community. Arguments about war and those about the legitimacy of the city are linked. If we suppress this link and ignore the range of acts of killing and violence that are commonly pushed out of our juridical definitions of war, we hide a set foundational arguments and justifications that are already implicit and contained within our claims about just war. For thinkers like Augustine and Aquinas this link was obvious, albeit sometimes tenuous – legitimate violence is linked to the way particular legal and political institutions are given legitimacy by God. Today, while many assumptions are made about the legitimacy of particular, Western, legal-political orders (i.e. the so-called democratic legitimacy of Western states), within popular just war thinking the links between the question of the legitimacy of the city and of its killing, and the legitimacy of war are less often explored and more readily passed over. Part of the responsibility of taking war seriously involves drawing out and examining the issues, which mediate the relationship between war and right with the intention of obtaining a thicker, more concrete picture of how the rightness of war is formulated. In the accounts given by Augustine and Aquinas, a number of issues, or lines of mediation, might be identified.
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______________________________________________________________ By invoking the authority of God and a divine law or divine justice, the rightness of war is linked to a notion of transcendent authority. In this respect the relation between war and right, and the claim that a particular act of war is ‘just’, is mediated through a third transcendent aspect which is partly understood in terms of the infinite and unknowable operation of God’s justice, and which is partly understood through the interpretation of religious texts and religious law. In another respect, the relation between war and right is mediated by the role and status of the public authority of the empire or the city. This authority, which keeps the peace and punishes crime, holds a particular legitimacy over violence and killing, which is not necessarily held by private citizens. Further, (in Aquinas) the relation between war and right is mediated by a (particular Aristotelian)22 notion of the common good of the city or political community. In determining what constitutes an act of ‘just war’, the notion of the common good might be seen at times to conflict with divine justice or the legitimacy of the public authority. Particularly in the situation of conflicts between elements of the Church and particular monarchs or magistrates, or between the monarch and citizens who view the monarch as a tyrant and thus its law as ‘unjust’, the questions of what is a ‘just war’ and, of who makes such a determination is not unproblematic. In this respect, the classical linkage between just war and the legitimacy of the city leads almost naturally to the pairing of just war in the form of revolutionary violence (or even ‘terrorism’) and the illegitimacy of the city. In yet another respect, the Christian notion of subjective intention further complicates the relationship between war and right. Within this notion the idea is introduced that a war is ‘just’ not because it furthers the interest, glory or common good of a city, but rather that the justness of war is linked to the motivations of rulers. What can be seen within this older just war tradition is a variety of differing grounds that are drawn upon to justify killing and violence. The limitation of this older tradition is that these differing grounds are not explicitly recognised or drawn into central focus in the moment of religiousmoral decision-making about the legitimacy of a particular act of war. Any contemporary approach to the question of the justness or rightness of a particular war must grasp the differing grounds upon which killing and violence is legitimised within Western thinking and show how these differing grounds reside and are ordered in terms of value within every moral decision about the rightness or justness of an act of war. In other words, contemporary approaches to just war thinking need openly to consider the problem of just war with reference to a broader concept of right. It is not enough to claim that a war is justified in the name of a socalled common morality, or even in the name of human rights. Every such claim already contains within it forms of the ordering of violence which are hidden by a grand moral language. What are these different ordered
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______________________________________________________________ relationships between notions of right and acts of killing and violence? Well, in Western social and political life there are many, of which I shall here name just a few. Some different orders of war include: the notion that it is right to kill plants and animals; the notion that a monarch or city official has a certain limited monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence for the purpose of protecting of maintaining peace and civil order and in protecting the populace from outside threat; the notion that there is a right of public officials to punish criminals; the notion that there is a right of a political community to protect itself and at times to use violence to realise its conception of the good life; the notion that violence is legitimated for the purpose of fulfilling the some form of divine will; the notion that violence might be legitimised by the futural promise of international law; the notion that violence may be drawn upon to protect and realise human freedom and human dignity both at individual and social levels; the notion that forms of institutional and social violence may have legitimacy as a consequence of particular forms of economic organisation; the idea that using violence in the present is justified by a notion of historical progress. This list is not exhaustive, but it is enough to outline a number of different modes of thinking that reside within our historical and contemporary conceptions of when it is right to use violence and to kill. These differing justifications are in constant conflict and it is these moments of conflict and contradiction that make up the underlying content of a notion of just war. Why just war thinking - in the manner in which it is presented by Walzer - should be questioned is because it fails to give an account of how a moral decision about the justness of a particular act of war already assumes that certain questions about the legitimisation of violence have already been decided: i.e. the killing of animals, or the monopoly on the legitimacy of violence held by the sovereign. If just war theory were properly a moral theory, it would consider all of these orders of violence as open questions, and as ones which impact upon all moral decision-making. However, just war theory only pretends to be a moral theory: in reality it is merely a form of window-dressing, a language of sorry comfort and apology which stands upon the back of different orders of killing so that it might appear righteous when speaking about others. The argument being put forward here is not that an individual cannot hold views about whether a particular act of war is well justified or not. Rather, what is at issue is a concern with how an individual arrives at a particular conclusion about whether it is right or not to engage in or support an act of killing. What is required when an individual considers the rightness or justness of war is a moment of reflection upon how one’s view of war takes place within a conceptual, historical and social background in which justifications about the legitimacy of killing and violence have already been arranged, organised or ordered. The moment of judgment about the rightness
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______________________________________________________________ of war does not take place within an intellectual space abstracted from these orders of the legitimacy of violence, but is intrinsically connected to, and often dependent upon, them. When making a judgment about war the individual should consider their own reasons for or against an act of war with a wider framework that includes the differing social-historical orders of the legitimacy of violence. It is very easy to be arrogant when talking about war. It is very easy to claim that one’s view of history or factual circumstances is superior and that an act of war is clearly justified. It is very easy to say ‘I think’ that a particular war is right on account of human rights, or because the enemy are crazy religious fanatics, or because the enemy is ‘evil’. It is harder to be humbler in one’s approach to considering the justness of war. It is harder to move past the initial arrogance of the ‘I think’ and to consider how the notions of legitimate violence which appear so vivid and complete to the thinking individual are only moments and snapshots of a wider history concerning the different ways in which humans have ordered their arguments and practices of legitimate violence. Humility in this context does not mean weakness. It involves a concern with the implicit danger of adopting an arrogant approach to the problem of war. The danger stems not simply from the arrogance of presidents, but emerges also from academics, intellectuals, bureaucrats and military personnel who refuse to reflect upon war as a question of killing linked to all aspects of social and political life. In response to the arrogant and dangerous arises the demand to challenge, question and criticise their ‘I think’ in a manner that attempts to undermine the words, which they use to justify violent and bloody deeds.
Notes 1
http:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html,accessed 11 December 2005. 2 See the various critiques within: V I Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in Essential Works of Lenin, H M Christman (ed.), Dover Publications, New York, 1987; C Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, G Schwab (tr.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996; C Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007. 3 M Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed., Basic Books, New York, 1992; M Walzer, Arguing About War, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004. 4 M Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. xxvii. 5 Walzer, p. xxvii. 6 Walzer, p. xxx.
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______________________________________________________________ 7
Walzer, p. xxix. With regard to his account of morality Walzer at p. xxix argues: I am not going to expound morality from the ground up. Were I to begin with the foundations, I would probably never get beyond them; in any case, I am by no means sure what the foundations are. The substructure of the ethical world is a matter of deep and apparently unending controversy. Meanwhile, however, we are living in the superstructure. The building is large, its construction is elaborate and confusing. But here I can offer some guidance: a tour of the rooms, so to speak, a discussion of architectural principles. 8 In this sense ‘right’ refers to also the ethical norms contained within both subjective morality and within positive law. 9 Walzer, p. xxvii. 10 Walzer does engage with these questions to a degree, and in his later work, Arguing About War, he pays more attention to them. The problem is however, that Walzer never examines these questions as foundational questions and does not acknowledge their place within his conception of morality and justice. 11 This is not to say that the just war tradition should be dismissed only that populist accounts should be treated with caution. For a scholarly accounts of the just war tradition see: J T Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975; J T Johnson, The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981. 12 Augustine, City of God against the Pagans, R W Dyson (tr. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 13 Augustine, p. 33; I, 21. It should be noted that these comments are made within the context of Augustine’s discussion of suicide and his condemnation of suicide as murder. At this point Augustine also makes an important distinction between the killing of humans and the killing of plants and animals. For Augustine the commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ does not extend to the killing of plants and animals whose ‘life and death are subject to our needs’. 14 Augustine, p. 33; I, 21. 15 Augustine, pp. 944-5; XIX, 16. 16 Augustine, p. 928; XIX, 6. 17 Augustine, pp. 927-8; XIX, 6. 18 Augustine, p. 929: XIX, 7. Augustine at p. 104; III,10, with regard to a number of wars carried out by Rome in defence of its territory, argues: Clearly, however, the Romans did have a just defence for undertaking and waging such great wars. They were compelled to resist the savage incursions of their enemies; and they were compelled not to do this by greed for human
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______________________________________________________________ praise, but by the necessity of defending life and liberty. Augustine at p. 39, I, 26, exempts soldiers from the prohibition on killing. He argues: But when a soldier, obedient to the power under which he has been lawfully placed, slays a man, he is not guilty of murder according to any laws of his city. On the contrary, if he does not do so, he is guilty of desertion and contempt of authority. If he had done this of his own will and authority, however, he would have fallen into the crime of shedding human blood. Thus, the deed which is punished if he does it when not commanded is the same as that for which he will be punished if he does not do it when commanded. 19 Aquinas ³Summa Theologiae 1266-1273² in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, Sigmund, P. tr. ed. (New York: Norton & Co.: 1988). 20 Ibid, pp. 64-65. 21 Ibid, pp. 70-71. 22 There are other Greek and non-Greek traditions that order the rightness of war which influence and lie behind the Christian just war tradition. These numerous traditions which stretch backwards into history cannot be addressed here.
Bibliography Aquinas, T., ‘Summa Theologiae 1266-1273’, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics. P. Sigmund (tr. and ed.), Norton & Co., New York, 1988. Augustine, City of God against the Pagans. R. W. Dyson (tr. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. Douzinas, C., Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism,.Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007. Johnson, J. T., Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975. _____
, The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981. Lenin, V. I., Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, in Essential Works of Lenin. H. M. Christman, (ed.), Dover Publications, New York, 1987. Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political. G. Schwab, (tr.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996.
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______________________________________________________________ Sigmund, P., (tr. and ed.), St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics. Norton & Co., New York, 1988. Walzer, M., Arguing About War. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004. _____
, Just and Unjust Wars: Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Basic Books, New York, 1992.
Torture and the ‘Ticking Bomb’: Fantasy and the So-Called War on Terror Bob Brecher Abstract The creation and exploitation of fantasy is a key component of the so-called war on terror; and calls for the legalisation of interrogational torture play a central part in that policy.1 The fantasy of the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario therefore needs to be exposed as such. I argue, first, that its time and effectiveness constraints run against each other; that the likelihood of accurate information is very far from certain; and that the necessity, which the circumstances are said to press upon the relevant authorities, can only ever be retrospective. Second, I argue that what ‘we’ would do is beside the point: all ‘we’ could do is to employ, for use in just such cases, professional torturers. Torture remains wrong, and calls for its legalisation in ‘ticking bomb’ cases are at best disingenuous, serving merely to further the ‘war on terror’. Key Words: Dershowitz, fantasy, ticking bomb, torture, war on terror ***** Governments, including our own, have exploited the fear of terrorism to excuse actions that in normal circumstances would never be thought of as acceptable.2 Amnesty UK’s comment is entirely apt. But in keeping to Amnesty’s ‘apolitical’ remit, it tells only half the story, and it is the other half that is even more important. Governments not only exploit people’s fears: they deliberately create them. Whatever else the so-called war on terror may be, it is first and foremost a manufactured fantasy. Empirically, its prosecution rests in large part on untruths: from Saddam Hussein’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, to the British government’s insistence that the terrorist attacks in London of 7 July 2005 had nothing to do with the invasion and occupation of Iraq; from its ‘advice’ to universities on how to combat ‘Islamic extremism’, to the United States’ corporate administration’s creating a ‘democratic’ Iraq; from its denial - despite building five ‘enduring’ super-bases across Iraq to ensure its continuing control of Iraqi oil - that such control was ever part of its raison d’etre for the occupation,3 to its association of Saddam Hussein with the attacks on New York and the Pentagon of 11 September 2001. Conceptually, the very idea of terror’s being something on which it is possible literally to wage war is a nonsense: for that
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______________________________________________________________ would be to misconstrue terror as an end, rather than a means, to suppose that a war may be fought against someone’s weapon rather than against them, whether that agent be a state or an ideology (and even the latter at least begins to be an analogical use of the term ‘war’, closer to such metaphors as ‘the war on drugs’ or ‘the war against obesity’).4 The very declaration and prosecution of the ‘war on terror’, then, depends on engaging in, and appropriating, a whole range of fantasies. That is uncontroversial. No serious commentator can pretend otherwise. What is no less the case is that fantasy plays a crucial role in the creation of the public fear that is a necessary condition of its giving its support for such a policy. The United States’ pursuit of its agenda is set out in the Project for a New American Century’s Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century, published in 2000 and thus composed well before September 2001. It is an agenda that depends on public fear for support, not only in the USA but among all its allies. My claim here is that fantasy is a key element in feeding that public fear. With the end of the Cold War, a new enemy needed to be found or created; and preferably an enemy endowed with the most fantastic capabilities, an almost superhuman enemy that knows no limits, which can strike anyone, anywhere and at any time without warning. For it is only such an enemy that can be used to justify the measures necessary, no less at home than abroad, that the neo-liberal project increasingly requires to secure its position against those whom it excludes, and on whose exclusion its ‘success’ relies. None of that, of course, is to deny the reality of attacks such as those in Bali, London, Madrid or New York. It is, however, to deny the truth of the accounts given of the cause and nature of those attacks; and thus the appropriateness of policy decisions they are said to demand. Consider just a few examples. Consider the US Patriot Act, which may be cited as the ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001’,5 and which provides for governmental powers of surveillance, interception and incarceration well beyond anything known before in the United States; or the UK Terrorism Act (2006), which ‘contains a comprehensive package of measures designed to ensure that the police, intelligence agencies and courts have all the tools they require to tackle terrorism and bring perpetrators to justice’.6 Or think of measures such as ASBOs (Anti-Social Behaviour Orders) in the UK, introduced in 2002 and recently ‘updated’, which empower local authorities to ban young people from entering certain areas of their home towns or villages or from leaving their homes at certain times - effectively a form of house arrest; or reflect on the size of the UK’s prison population, already proportionately the highest in Europe and still rising; or of CCTV, again, more widespread in the UK than anywhere else in Europe (currently one camera per 14 of the population). All these are designed to engender fear, and to do so by means of creating
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______________________________________________________________ fantasies for those fears to play upon: the fantasy of hordes of young people rampaging the streets; the fantasy of an epidemic of crime; the fantasy of the need for constant vigilance. And of course the solution in each case is itself a further fantasy: that ASBOs will solve problems of social disaffection; that prison works; or that the all-seeing government or corporate eye can in fact keep people safe. I am not of course claiming that this is new: it has been a central feature of authorities’, whether state or otherwise, social policy from, I daresay, time immemorial. Certainly the medieval Church’s efforts in this direction were far from amateurish: just look at fourteenth- or fifteenthcentury frescoes in, say, Italian churches; or the eighteenth-century ‘epidemics of vampirism’ in eastern Europe;7 or nineteenth-century AngloAmerican medical strictures on masturbation; or the centuries-old European blood calumny against the Jews, to say nothing of the Nazis’ campaign, involving as it did the whole gamut of such fantasies, from the religious to the medical. Fantasy has long been a weapon of first resort in the effort to gain support for a political policy of slaughter. The case of the so-called war on terror is no exception in that respect. At the same time, however, the ‘war on terror’ is indeed something new. It is new in respect of its being presented as knowing no bounds by the leader of the most powerful state the world has ever known, and a state that regards itself as having a mission to convert the rest of the world to its own vision of the good life. For President George W. Bush, and for all too many others, it is a permanent war and a war that knows no moral or legal bounds. And what is being done under its aegis reflects exactly that: we are told that the enemy, ‘the terrorists’, are potentially everywhere and nowhere; they are potentially anyone and no one; and there is no end to the pseudo-causes such dedicated addicts to terrorism may take up as an excuse for their murderous pursuit of evil for its own sake. The ‘war on terror’ is a war for freedom and against tyranny … a war against those who favour death and by those of us who favour life. We are fighting against nihilists, against agents of destruction whose only objective is destruction itself, although they disguise this with social crusades.8 It is one thing for those words to be spoken by Admiral Massera, a member of the ruling triumvirate of the Argentinian military junta from 1976 -1983. It is another when such words are so closely mirrored by the President of the United States in 2001.9 In such a war for our very survival, fought against an enemy that literally knows no bounds, none of the traditional rules apply. The Geneva Convention, for example, is something merely ‘quaint’;10 ‘enemy
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______________________________________________________________ combatants’ are suddenly invented in order legally to circumvent such ‘quaint’ requirements as the legal obligation to treat prisoners of war decently and those accused of criminal acts according to due legal process. Guantanamo Bay, surely unthinkable just a few years ago – unthinkable, that is, as an overt torture camp, the open and deliberate creation not of some military dictatorship but of the US government – is testament to the ways and senses in which the so-called war on terror really is a new development. This, together with clandestine and not-so-clandestine torture ‘facilities, ‘rendition’ and their associated practices, is where torture enters the scene. For centuries, torture has been the bottom line for civilized values. ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, in human or degrading treatment or punishment,’ according to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights insists in Article 4 that its prohibition of torture (Article 7) is not derogable, even ‘during time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’; and the Convention against Torture applies such prohibition to acts inflicted or instigated by, or with the acquiescence of, public officials (Article 1) as well as reasserting its absolute standing (Article 2).11 Not least for symbolic reasons, the concerted attack on the prohibition against torture mounted by the United States government after its declaration of the ‘war on terror’ is central to its pursuit of its ends. Of course the United States, like the great majority of other countries, has a long and dishonourable history of torturing its enemies, real or perceived.12 But to make torture open, an instrument of state is something different. The public’s sensibilities need seriously to be reeducated. Nor is that all. This logic also works in reverse, so to speak. If you can get the public to approve torture as a legal instrument, then there is no limit on what else you can get people to support, or at least acquiesce in: for torture really is the bottom line. Shift that, and everything changes. The point of torture, of course, is as a weapon of terror: as a method of obtaining accurate information, it is universally recognised as useless. But even the United States government is not going to have the nerve, or perhaps the political idiocy, to admit that. So torture has to be promoted at the point its opponents are perceived - by the public, by the politicians and by the great majority of academics – as having the most difficulty in justifying an absolute prohibition. Richard Posner, for example, a respected judge and eminent academic lawyer, insists that ‘if the stakes are high enough, torture is permissible’ and that ‘No one who doubts that should be in a position of responsibility.’13 And so the fantasy of the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario is wheeled in to justify torture. In what follows, I aim to show that that scenario is indeed a fantasy, and thus to offer at least one antidote to the poisonous fantasies feeding the so-called war on terror.
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Dershowitz’s Version Dershowitz has: always challenged (my) students with hypothetical and real-life problems requiring them to choose among evils. …The classic hypothetical case involves the train engineer whose brakes become inoperative. There is no way he can stop his speeding vehicle of death. Either he can do nothing, in which case he will plough into a busload of schoolchildren, or he can swerve onto another track, where he sees a drunk lying on the rails. (Neither decision will endanger him or his passengers.) There is no third choice. What should he do?14
We have to choose; the only question is how that choice is to be made. Should we take into account the number of people involved; who they are; both; none of these; or what? Even deciding to leave it to chance is to make a decision. However you decide, someone is going to suffer. And so, Dershowitz would have it, with torture to prevent catastrophe: there are some extraordinary cases where interrogational torture is the least bad option; and, since torture is here to stay, it is better to drop the hypocritical pretence that it is something ‘we’ don’t do and legalise its use in relevant cases. Whatever our view of the morality of using torture in these circumstances – and Dershowitz is careful to register his moral disapproval of torture despite his advocating its legalisation - this would at once eliminate the hypocrisy and serve to limit and regulate the use of torture.15 But the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario is a deceptive fantasy. When unpacked, the argument falls apart. Its time and effectiveness constraints run against each other (section 2); the likelihood of accurate information is very far from certain (section 3), so that the necessity which the circumstances are said to press upon the authorities can be established only retrospectively (section 4). Crucially, furthermore, what ‘we’ would do is entirely irrelevant: all ‘we’ could do is to empower an elected government to employ professional torturers on ‘our’ behalf (section 5). Calls to legalise interrogational torture merely serve the prosecution of the ‘war on terror’ and the prosecutors’ attempted legitimation of their longstanding terroristic use of torture in their determination to subjugate the rest of the world to their own ends. 2.
Time and Effectiveness Field Manual 34-52, the rulebook of American military interrogators (updated after the revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib), ‘prohibits the use of coercive techniques because they produce low quality
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______________________________________________________________ intelligence.’16 Dershowitz, however, argues that ‘It is precisely because torture sometimes does work and can prevent major disasters that it still exists in many parts of the world and has been totally eliminated from none.’17 So what about the specific circumstances of a ‘ticking bomb’? Such evidence as we have is inevitably anecdotal and contradictory. For instance, I have personally been told that members of the Israeli security forces claimed that a bomb was found and defused as a result of torturing the person who had planted it.18 On the other hand, such claims are also denied. What is striking, however, is that Dershowitz’s own examples, of Egypt and Jordan, to whom of course ‘the U.S. government sometimes ‘renders’ terrorist suspects’,19 are not remotely of the ticking bomb variety. Furthermore, his examples of Abu Nidal and the 1993 World Trade Centre attacks in his explicit defence of the claim ‘that torture sometimes works, even if it does not always work’20 are blatantly irrelevant. ‘Jordan,’ he tells us, ‘apparently broke the most notorious terrorist of the 1980s, Abu Nidal, by threatening his mother. Philippine police reportedly helped crack the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings by torturing a suspect’ (my emphasis).21 The first case is obviously not one where physically torturing a terrorist, or a suspect, worked; it was when his mother was threatened that Abu Nidal ‘broke’, and that is quite another matter. Nor was there any ticking bomb waiting to be defused in either case. Odder still is this attempt to show that torture is effective in extracting genuine information: There are numerous instances in which torture has produced self-proving, truthful information that was necessary to prevent harm to civilians. The Washington Post has recounted a case from 1995 in which Philippine authorities tortured a terrorist into disclosing information that may have foiled plots to assassinate the pope and to crash eleven commercial airliners carrying approximately four thousand passengers into the Pacific ocean, as well as a plan to fly a private Cessna filled with explosives into CIA headquarters. For sixty-seven days, intelligence agents beat the suspect. … 22 Sixty-seven days? So what on earth has this report to do with any ticking bomb, or with any imminent catastrophe? So much for the empirical evidence offered by Dershowitz. Still, as the only evidence we have about real ticking bomb cases is anecdotal, probably speculation is all that is open to us. So, accepting for the moment that the captive really does know where the bomb is, what is their strategy likely to be? The important point is that only interrogational torture is permitted. The captive’s position, then - as Dershowitz himself recognizes -
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______________________________________________________________ is that ‘the torturee will know that there are limits to the torture being inflicted’.23 So they know, first, that unless they reveal where the bomb is, they will be (non-lethally) tortured; second, that the torture will stop immediately they give the information required; and third that, since the torture will stop immediately the bomb explodes (and remember that that is imminent), the time for which they have to endure the torture is comparatively short. It is obvious that the best course of action is to lie; to deny knowing where the bomb is, or to try to persuade the interrogators that someone else knows where it is. But let us assume, whether or not reasonably, that such an attempt would not last very long; or that the captive would calculate that it was after all not worth trying, since they knew that the interrogators knew that they knew where the bomb was - the interrogators had, after all, persuaded the relevant authorities to issue a torture warrant on the basis of the evidence of such knowledge. What now? The critical issue here is time. And one pretty obvious way of buying time in these circumstances is simply to lie about the whereabouts of the bomb, and in as complicated a way as possible, hoping that by the time it was discovered that they had lied. the bomb would be that much closer to going off - and the torture, remember, therefore that much closer to stopping. So why not lie repeatedly? And that is so far to say nothing of lying out of desperation (hence the Field Manual). Note too, that since only strictly interrogational torture is to be used, the torture would have to stop while the authorities checked the captive’s story - however cynical one might be inclined to be about interrogators actually behaving in such a ‘gentlemanly’ way, or about observers insisting on this condition. The less time there is, the more likely it is that lying, whether deliberately or desperately, would work. So the more urgent the situation and thus the more justified the torture and the warrant authorising it - the smaller the chance of stopping the bomb going off. So what we are being invited to weigh is not the torture of one person against the death and maiming of hundreds, or even thousands, of innocent civilians. Rather, it is the torture of one person against the possibility of the death and maiming of hundreds, or even thousands, of innocent civilians. How high is that possibility? We do not know. But we do know that, assuming you agree with the utilitarian approach on which the argument is based in the first place, the higher you think the possibility is of death and mutilation, the more heavily you will take it to weigh on the side of torture; and the lower you think it is, the less heavily you will take it to weigh. So unless you do know what the possibility is, at least roughly, you cannot be in a position to judge its weight against torture. Your position therefore has to be that torture is justified by even the possibility of catastrophe - not by its certainty.
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______________________________________________________________ Furthermore, if there really is good reason to suppose that there is a bomb about to go off very soon then, as Levinson points out, ‘anyone who believes that torture is acceptable with a warrant would, I suspect, waive the requirement when time is truly of the essence’.24 Nor is that all. To the extent that time really was pressing, then surely ‘it seems all too likely that a genuinely stringent process of scrutiny would slow the process down to the point of ineffectiveness. … it would take time to compile evidence, and time for judges to sift through it (and even) [I]f authority to issue warrants was reserved to a small set of highly qualified judges, it might well be difficult to obtain rapid access to (them)’.25 Or to put it rather more bluntly: these are ‘classic cases of emergency or exigent circumstances in which the police generally do not have time to obtain warrants’.26 The more deeply a conscientious judge inquires as to whether or not the matter really is sufficiently urgent, the more time will turn out to have been wasted if it does turn out to be urgent. On the other hand, the louder the ticking, so to speak, the less time for a judge to consider the matter. Under these inevitable counter-pressures, it is a reasonable expectation that judges’ default position would be to issue a warrant lest it turn out that they be accused of having blood on their hands. 3.
Knowledge and Necessity Jonathan Allen sets out the situation regarding knowledge succinctly: we would have to know: (a) that we are holding the right person; (b) that the person being tortured really does possess the information we need; (c) that acquiring the information the captured terrorist possesses would be very likely to put us in a position to avert a disaster, and that his accomplices haven’t already adopted a contingency plan he knows nothing about; (d) that the information we obtain through torture is reliable.27 Even Levinson, who reluctantly semi-endorses Dershowitz’s proposal - since we ‘are staring into an abyss, and no one can escape the necessity of a response’28 - notes that ‘there is no known example of this actually occurring, in the sense of having someone in custody who knew of a bomb likely to go off within the hour’.29 As we saw earlier, Dershowitz offers in response only his unreferenced claim that in Israel ‘There is little doubt that some acts of terrorism - which would have killed many civilians - were prevented. There is also little doubt that the cost of saving these lives measured in terms of basic human rights - was extraordinarily high.’30 Nor is he alone. Others who countenance torture in extremis are even vaguer.
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______________________________________________________________ Walzer, for example, writes of authorising ‘the torture of a captured rebel leader who knows or probably knows the location of a number of bombs …’31 (my emphasis): note here how easy it is to slide from knowledge to suspicion. Again, the empirical question of how likely it is that a given captive has the requisite knowledge remains uncertain. We have to speculate. It seems reasonable to suppose that any bomb-planter will have taken care to leave as little time as possible between planting the bomb and its going off. Unless they had already been under surveillance, therefore, their being taken into custody in the interval between planting and explosion must be extraordinarily unlikely; and of course, if they had been under surveillance, then those conducting the surveillance would be very likely to know where the bomb was or who the person was who knew where it was. To put it succinctly: ‘we cannot usually be certain of guilt if we do not have all the information. If we did have it, we would not be tempted to resort to torture.’32 In the United States, as Elaine Scarry points out, ‘In the two and a half years since September 11, 2001, five thousand foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists have been detained without access to counsel, only three of whom have ever eventually been charged with terrorism-related acts; two of those three have been acquitted.’33 So how likely is it that in the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario the authorities should come to be blessed with the near-omniscience they lack elsewhere? 4.
Necessity That takes us to the issue of necessity. The whole point of the ticking bomb fantasy is to engender a sense of necessity: ‘the terrorist’ who knows where the bomb is has to be tortured in order to prevent the death and maiming of thousands of innocent people. But what sort of necessity is this? How do we know that the torture is indeed necessary, that the disaster is imminent and unavoidable other than through the use of torture? Dershowitz might argue that of course empirical knowledge can never be certain, and that ‘necessity’ here is to be understood in the ordinary, everyday, sense, and not in some philosophical sense. That seems quite reasonable: but precisely because certainty is unavailable, what we are actually being invited to accept, once again, is that interrogational torture is morally justifiable because it might avoid a catastrophe. The issue here is the possibility of having the knowledge that time is sufficiently short to make the case a matter of necessity. If it is not known that time is (sufficiently) short, then it cannot be known that the case is a matter of necessity. So how does the interrogator know that time is (sufficiently) short? It is logically possible that the detainee has told them - but of course the knowledge that the interrogators’ knowing this leads to torture would make this even less likely than it already is: can you seriously imagine a prisoner’s admitting that there is a bomb set to go off at a particular time but then adamantly refusing to say where it is, knowing
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______________________________________________________________ that they will be tortured to make them give that information?34 I suppose someone else might have told them that there is a ticking bomb, which they themselves do not know where it is, but that they do know that this other person knows where it is. But then how do the interrogators, or the authorities charged with issuing or withholding a torture warrant, know that that information is reliable? It is inordinately unlikely, to say the least, that they could have the knowledge that is a logical condition of invoking necessity. To argue, then, that the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario is one where torture is necessary is misleading. It is only in the everyday, non-philosophical, sense that we can, in the real world, say in advance that something or other is necessary. But in that case all we really mean, is that - for example - taking an umbrella when it’s raining is one way of not getting wet. You could take a mac; or you could stay at home. You could also choose to get wet. The necessity of torture in any particular instance can’t be known in advance. That is why the ticking bomb scenario remains radically underspecified. Probability is all there can be. So how strong a probability would be required to generate a torture warrant? If the standard were set too high - say 99% - then the whole practical point of legalising interrogational torture would disappear. Again, Dershowitz himself rightly points out that no legal sanctions or processes are 100% effective. Perhaps, then, a 90% likelihood would be sufficient. But in that case, why not 89%? After all, the circumstances are so extreme as to justify what even the advocates of torture and/or its legalisation agree is a last resort. The more convincing the urgency, the lower it makes sense to set the threshold of torture. So why not 51%? Or less? So of course there has to be some risk, and very probably an increasingly considerable one, of torturing the wrong person, or of torturing a person when torture might not have been necessary after all. No wonder that the best evidence Dershowitz can cite is that ‘the Israeli security services claimed that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, at least one preventable act of terrorism had been allowed to take place, one that killed several people when a bus was bombed’ (my emphasis). In fairness, he clearly recognises the shortcoming: ‘Whether this claim is true, false, or somewhere in between is difficult to assess’,35 he says. But yet again, what he does not recognise is the impact that that admission should have on his argument. The best that can be claimed is that it may be necessary – no more than that. Substitute this more cautious phrase and any initial plausibility the ticking bomb fantasy might have quickly disappears.
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______________________________________________________________ 5.
Who Tortures? Back in 1971, when the British army’s ‘interrogation techniques’ in the north of Ireland were eliciting at least some disquiet, Anthony Quinton commented: I do not see on what basis anyone could argue that the prohibition of torture is an absolute moral principle. … Consider a man caught planting a bomb in a large hospital, which no one dare touch for fear of setting it off. It was this kind of extreme situation I had in mind when I said earlier that I thought torture could be justifiable.36 Oddly, Quinton himself sees the obvious problem, but fails to see that it rules out just the sort of example he puts forward. He rightly points out that ‘any but the most sparing recourse to [torture] will nourish a guild of professional torturers, a persisting danger to society much greater, even if more long-drawn-out, then anything their employment is likely to prevent’; and that ‘If a society does not professionalise torture, then the limits of its efficiency make its application in any particular extreme situation that much more dubious.’ The inevitable ‘limits of its efficiency’, however, do not ‘make its application … much more dubious’ (my emphasis):37 they rule such application out, simply because the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario requires just that efficiency which the amateur torturer could not bring to it. The train driver is a train driver, not a trained torturer. Nor are Dershowitz’s students. Nor is Dershowitz or other lawyers or philosophers. Nor are you. Nor am I. The ready acceptance of the ticking bomb scenario without distinguishing between what you or I might do in that imagined case, what you or I could do in an actual case and what ‘someone’ would be expected to do in an actual case has been disastrous. Its irresponsible use by philosophers engaged in thought experiments to test moral theory has in fact had a profound effect even on those who offer a detailed critique of other aspects of this sort of argument. Perhaps Michael Walzer’s is the most galling example. In a recent interview, conducted in 2003, he quite reasonably objects to Dershowitz’s use of his (Walzer’s) treatment of ‘the problem of dirty hands’ to justify torture warrants because ‘extreme cases make bad law’, yet immediately goes on to accept the case itself, apparently without noticing exactly what he is committing himself to: ‘[Yes], I would do whatever was necessary to extract information in the ticking bomb case - that is, I would make the same argument after 9/11 that I made 30 years before. But I do not want to generalise from cases like that; I don’t want to rewrite the rule against torture to incorporate this exception.’38 Or has Walzer recently undertaken torture training?
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______________________________________________________________ You or I can imaginatively put ourselves in the position of Dershowitz’s train driver, at least to the extent of knowing how to operate the controls so as to ‘swerve onto another track.’ But we cannot put ourselves in the position of a torturer, and for two reasons. First, there is the sort and the precision of the skills required; second, and far more importantly, there is the question of the depths to which the acquisition and practice of such skills requires the torturer to sink,39 to realise the absurdity of asking the question, ‘What would you do in a ‘ticking bomb’ case?’ Even if you were there when the person you knew to know where the bomb was, you would not know what to do. The train driver example and the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario are radically different cases. The latter requires us not to imagine what we would do, but to imagine what we would require someone else - a professional torturer - to do on our behalf; and not, furthermore, as an act of supererogation or altruism, but as the practice of their profession. What remains puzzling is why neither Dershowitz and other proponents of the legalisation of interrogational torture, nor Posner and other proponents of illegal interrogational torture, address themselves in any systematic manner – or indeed in any manner at all, apart from Dershowitz’s few comments - to these obvious and fundamental empirical issues surrounding the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario in their published writing on these matters. Most disturbing of all is that even where they recognise, as Dershowitz does, that there is a danger that ‘If we create a legal structure for limiting and controlling torture, we compromise our principled opposition to torture in all circumstances and create a potentially dangerous and expandable situation’,40 the issue is one towards which they do no more than gesture. Simply to remark that ‘The strongest argument against any resort to torture’ is ‘that if torture, which has been deemed illegitimate by the civilized world for more than a century, were now to be legitimated –- even for limited use in one extraordinary type of situation –- such legitimation would constitute an important symbolic setback in the worldwide campaign against human rights abuses’41 is offset by the advantages of legalisation is wholly inadequate – not least because that setback would be a good deal more than symbolic. It would be also logical, and thus physical. In legally permitting interrogational torture on the basis of the fantasy of the ticking bomb scenario, fantasy-based policy would become even more widespread – and in that process, more and more people and their bodies would be subjected to torture. As a weapon of terror, it works. And if the danger posed by ‘the terrorists’ is great enough, whatever works must be used: as in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, Brazil, Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, to name but a few, so wherever else.
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______________________________________________________________ 6.
Conclusion Not only is the alleged necessity of the case spurious; its consequentialism blithely ignores the most important consequence of all - the impact of the institutionalised practice of torture on any society adopting it. The institutionalisation of the profession of torturer is a necessary condition of the example’s even getting off the ground. Basing public policy on individuals’ likely visceral responses to fantasy is the last resort of those whom power has utterly corrupted. Here as elsewhere, the so-called realists’ fantasy is a fundamentally dishonest one, serving, whether disingenuously or not, the purposes of the United States government and their allies in at once creating and exploiting fantasies to create public fear and complaisance in their pursuit of the war on terror, itself a fantasy created as a cover for realpolitik – and a realpolitik whose proponents have been and remain content to use torture in the pursuit of their ends.
Notes 1
A version of this chapter was first published in Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte vol. 1, 2008, pp. 110-124: my thanks to the editors - Tessa Debus, Regina Kreide, Michael Krennerich and Anja Mihr – and the publishers – Wochenschau Verlag – for publishing it in order to reach a German audience, in the knowledge that it had already been commissioned to appear in this volume. 2 ‘Don’t sign up to terror: unsubscribe’, Amnesty Magazine, vol., 145, September/October 2007, p.15. 3 J Holt, ‘It’s the Oil’, London Review of Books, 18 October 2007, pp. 3-4. 4 I pursue these issues elsewhere. See also R Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005, esp. pp. 113-118. 5 www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html. 6 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act-2006/ 7 Brilliantly analysed by P Cole in his The Myth of Evil, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006, p. 78ff. 8 Admiral Massera, quoted by M Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. ix. 9 See Jackson, esp. pp. 47-51, 124-150. 10 A Gonzales, ‘Draft memorandum for the President from Alberto R Gonzales: Decision re application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, 25 January 2002, accessed 25 December 2005, <msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek>.
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______________________________________________________________ 11
See, respectively, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; and Convention Against Torture, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A.Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N.Doc. A/39/51 (1984). The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture was passed with no dissenting voice in 1975: G.A. Res. 3452, 30 GAOR, Supp. (no.34) 91, U.N.Doc.A/1034 (1975). 12 See esp. J Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American Way: the History and Consequences of U.S. Involvement in Torture, Beacon Press, Boston, 2005; and, for a profound analysis of the parallels between neo-liberal economic ‘shock therapy’ for the body politic and the physical and psychical shock of torture on people’s bodies, N Klein, The Shock Doctrine, Allen Lane, London, 2007. 13 R Posner, ‘Torture, terrorism and interrogation’, in Torture: A Collection, S Levinson (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 291-298, p. 295. 14 A Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002, p. 132. 15 I explore this aspect of Dershowitz’s position in B Brecher, Torture and the Ticking Bomb, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, p. 45 ff. 16 D Rose, Guantánamo: America’s War on Human Rights, Faber & Faber, London, 2004, p. 95. 17 Dershowitz, 138. 18 Dershowitz’s claim, incidentally, that ‘There is little doubt that some acts of terrorism - which would have killed many civilians - were prevented’ (140) is unreferenced. 19 Dershowitz, 138. 20 Dershowitz., 137. 21 Dershowitz, 249, n. 11. 22 Dershowitz, 137. 23 Dershowitz, 249, n. 11. 24 S Levinson, ‘The debate on torture’, Dissent, Summer 2003, unpaginated, n. 1, viewed 25 December 2005, <www.dissentmagazine.org>. 25 J Allen, ‘Warrant to torture? A critique of Dershowitz and Levinson’, ACDIS Occasional Paper (2005), Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, p.13, accessed 29 December 2005, <www.acdis.uiuc.edu>. 26 K Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal/Kingston, 2003, pp. 101-102; quoted in M Plaxton, ‘Torture warrants, hypocrisy, and supererogation: justifying bright-
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______________________________________________________________ line rules as if consequences mattered’, paper delivered to The Barbarisation of Warfare conference, University of Wolverhampton, 27-28 June, 2005, p. 8. 27 Allen, p. 9. See also C Tindale, ‘Tragic choices: reaffirming absolutes in the torture debate’, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 19, 2005, pp. 209-222, p. 216. 28 Levinson, ‘The debate’, unpaginated. 29 Levinson, ‘The debate’, n. 1. 30 Dershowitz, 140. 31 M Walzer, ‘Political action: the problem of dirty hands’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2, 1973, pp. 160-180, p.167. Reprinted in Levinson (ed.), pp. 61-75. 32 R Trigg, Morality Matters, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, p. 64. 33 E Scarry, ‘Five errors in the reasoning of Alan Dershowitz’, in Levinson (ed.), pp. 281-299, p. 284. 34 Consider the gratuitously silly fantasy of having captured ‘one of the terrorists who admits to having planted the bomb, but who smugly refuses to reveal its location’ - G Jones, ‘On the permissibility of torture’, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 6, 1980, pp. 11-15, p.13. Even Anthony Quinton, usually a careful thinker, invites us to ‘Consider a man caught planting a bomb in a large hospital, which no one dare touch for fear of setting it off.’ - Views, The Listener, 2 December, 1971, pp. 757-8, p. 758, n. 5. But the knowledge which is a necessary condition of the necessity of torture precludes the relevance of the example: how likely is it that ‘no one’ -– not even the bomb disposal unit - dare touch the bomb? And if it really were the case that only this man can defuse the bomb, then it is not for information that he would be tortured, but rather to force him to defuse the bomb; and that is quite a different matter. 35 Dershowitz, 150. 36 Quinton, 758. 37 Quinton, p.758. 38 M Walzer, ‘The United States in the world – just wars and just societies: an interview with Michael Walzer’, Imprints, vol. 7, 2003, viewed 3 January 2006, . 39 R Crelinsten, ‘In their own words: the world of the torturer’, in The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters, R Crelinsten, and A Schmid (eds), Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 65-97. 40 Dershowitz, 153. 41 Dershowitz, 153.
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Bibliography Allen, J., ‘Warrant to torture? A critique of Dershowitz and Levinson’. ACDIS Occasional Paper, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Accessible at . Amnesty Magazine, vol. 145, September/October 2007: ‘Don’t sign up to terror: unsubscribe’, p.15. Brecher, B., Torture and the Ticking Bomb, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007. Cole, P., The Myth of Evil, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006. Convention Against Torture, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A.Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N.Doc. A/39/51 (1984). Crelinsten, R., ‘In their own words: the world of the torturer’, in The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters. R Crelinsten, and A Schmid (eds), Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 65-97. Crelinsten, R. and Schmid, A. (eds), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture: G.A. Res. 3452, 30 GAOR, Supp. (no.34) 91, U.N.Doc.A/1034 (1975). Dershowitz, A., Why Terrorism Works, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002. Feitlowitz, M., A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998. Gonzalez, A., ‘Draft memorandum for the President from Alberto R Gonzales: Decision re application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, 25 January 2002. Accessible at . Harbury, J., Truth, Torture, and the American Way: the History and Consequences of U.S. Involvement in Torture, Beacon Press, Boston, 2005.
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______________________________________________________________ Holt, J., ‘It’s the Oil’. London Review of Books, 18 October 2007, pp. 3-4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Jackson, R., Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and CounterTerrorism. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005. Jones, G., ‘On the permissibility of torture’. Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 6, 1980, pp. 11-15. Klein, N., The Shock Doctrine. Allen Lane, London, 2007. Levinson, S., ‘The debate on torture’. Dissent, Summer 2003, unpaginated. _______
, (ed.), Torture: A Collection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.
Plaxton, M., ‘Torture warrants, hypocrisy, and supererogation: justifying bright-line rules as if consequences mattered’. Paper delivered to The Barbarisation of Warfare conference, University of Wolverhampton, 27-28 June, 2005. Posner, R.,, ‘Torture, terrorism and interrogation’, in Torture: A Collection. S. Levinson (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 291-298. Quinton, A., ‘Views’. The Listener, 2 December, 1971, pp. 757-8. Roach, K., September 11: Consequences for Canada. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal/Kingston, 2003. Rose, D., Guantánamo: America’s War on Human Rights. Faber & Faber, London, 2004. Scarry, E., ‘Five errors in the reasoning of Alan Dershowitz’, in Torture: A Collection. Levinson (ed.), pp. 281-299. Tindale, C., ‘Tragic choices: reaffirming absolutes in the torture debate’. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 19, 2005, pp. 209-222. Trigg, R., Morality Matters. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.
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______________________________________________________________ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948). Walzer, M., ‘Political action: the problem of dirty hands’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2, 1973, pp. 160-180. Reprinted in Levinson (ed.), pp. 61-75. _______
, ‘The United States in the world – just wars and just societies: an interview with Michael Walzer’. Imprints, vol. 7, 2003. Accessible at . <www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html>. <www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act-006>
The Language of War: George W. Bush’s Discursive Practices in Securitising the Western Value System in the ‘War on Terror’ Janicke Stramer Abstract The phrase, ‘western values’, is a broad one, which includes matters such as democracy, freedom, libertarian values (both economic and political) and free speech. The American version of freedom is ambiguous and far from self-evident or straightforward. What is particular about President George W. Bush’s rhetoric during the ‘War on Terror’ is that it has a strong religious element. This chapter will examine his securitising speech acts as a means of promoting ‘western values’. In order to assess these discursive practices and expose the role of religious rhetoric in securitising the latter, I shall follow the approach of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Key Words: Copenhagen School, religious rhetoric, securitisation, U.S. foreign policy, ‘war on terror’, ‘western values’ ***** 1.
Introduction ‘Western values’ is a broad notion, which covers matters such as democracy, freedom, libertarian values (both economical and political) and free speech. The American version of freedom is ambiguous and far from self-evident and straightforward: although a very prominent element of presidential rhetoric, it generally remains implicit under cover of a strongly religious tone and content, rather than being made explicit. Bush seeks to sanctify the United States by stating that America’s strength and resolve is to advance freedom, which is God’s gift to the world: hence America is doing God’s work in its export to, and imposition of ‘western values’ on, the rest of the world, and the Middle East in particular. But, I shall seek to show; Bush's claims about religion and terrorism in fact create a major internal problem for his own religious rhetoric. Focussing on his religious rhetoric and its importance for the strategy followed in the so-called war on terror, I shall first argue that, although Iraq was an intended target well before 9/11, it was religious rhetoric that was used as the means of focussing on it in the context of 9/11. I shall map three important issues about Bush's religious rhetoric: the religious tradition his rhetoric stems from and how and why it changed during his presidency; how that rhetoric was used and to what effect; and how exactly his claims about
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______________________________________________________________ terrorism and religion create an internal problem for that rhetoric. Second, I shall discuss how the vagueness of his language, in particular regarding ‘democracy’, enabled him to forge a fictional link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden in order to target Iraq. Finally I turn to the Copenhagen School's conception of the facilitating conditions of securitising issues: the use of security grammar; the role of social capital - the securitising actor must hold a position of authority that allows her or him to securitise the relevant matter; and the supporting external or historical conditions - tanks on the border, verbal threats from the enemy or a history of attacks from that enemy. 2.
Bush’s Language of War After 9/11, the Bush administration declared war on terrorism, referring to the struggle between the good represented by Western values and evil as represented by terrorism - and immediately extended to the so-called rogue states of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. However, there had been plans to invade Iraq long before 9/11, as evidenced by The Project for the New American Century.1 9/11 offered the perfect platform from which realistically to put this war plan in motion. Bush was already started thinking about Iraq as part of his response to that attack as early as the Camp David war cabinet meeting on 15 September 20012 - the only dissent came from Colin Powell. Donald Rumsfeld made it very clear that ‘any argument that the coalition wouldn’t tolerate Iraq argues for a different coalition’,3 thus demonstrating that the U.S. was willing to act unilaterally if need be. Dick Cheney concurred: as Bob Woodward puts it, ‘it was as if nothing else existed’4 for him. At the same meeting Rumsfeld advised the group that they would need to control information by, for example, exercising tighter control over public affairs, and further advised the Administration to treat Iraq as a political campaign with daily talking points, reminding them that ‘sustaining requires a broad base of domestic support. Broad, not narrow. This is a marathon, not a sprint. It will be years and not months.’5 Public support was vital. A few days later, at another war cabinet meeting, when Bush outlined his plan to give the Taliban leaders an ultimatum, he ended the debate by saying, ‘I believe Iraq was involved, but I’m not going to strike them now. I don’t have the evidence at this point.’6 Clearly Iraq was already a target. From this point on Bush and his war cabinet would slowly but surely build their case on a fictional link between Hussein and bin Laden in order to persuade the public that war in Iraq was necessary. The first public step was the famous state-of-the-union-address in 2002, in which Iraq was named part of an axis of evil. There was, however, no such axis: the three states did not share similar political goals, nor did they share a similar ideology. The ‘axis of evil’ was born of the need to create an argument for going after Iraq. David Frum, the speechwriter charged with the
Janicke Stramer
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______________________________________________________________ task, was inspired by World War II rhetoric: but since Iraq alone could of course be no axis, he simply added Iran and North Korea on account of their common contempt for the West. Originally, Frum had termed it an ‘axis of hatred’, but his boss, Michael Gerson, changed this to ‘axis of evil’.7 This was neither an accident nor surprising: Gerson was not only Bush’s chief speechwriter, but a fellow Evangelist. Their shared religious convictions are evident in Bush’s speeches, in which he often draws on gospel hymns that resonate deeply among the faithful in his electoral base. The speeches immediately following 9/11 spoke of good versus evil and the righteousness of God in a more abstract way: after Iraq had become the overt target, they focused increasingly on the predestination of America as an agent of God in the war against evil represented by Hussein's regime and terrorist networks. Since Bush appeared on the political scene, he has been quite open about his religiosity. Early on, he was inspired by a largely Wesleyan theology8 of ‘personal transformation’, such as his born-again post-alcoholic experience. One of the most important components of that theology is experiential faith; today’s Wesleyan churches insist on the centrality of the conversion experience. The core of Wesleyan theology thus lies in the individual's private faith and relationship with God. Bush, a convert at 39, saw his later elevation to the presidency as an extension of the personal to the political: after all, if, to quote Deborah Caldwell’s perspicuous analysis ‘we serve one greater than ourselves’, 9 then we do so as office-holders no less than as private citizen; and of course his decision to run for President, as he later told Richard Land,10 was itself an act of obedience to God’s will. Since his election, Bush's theology has shifted towards a Calvinist theology of the ‘divine plan’ laid out by a sovereign God for both country and himself. According to Deborah Caldwell, he is (at the time of writing) not only talking more about God, but talking differently about ethics. The main differences between Wesleyan and Calvinist theology lie in the way they view human nature. For Wesleyans, although humans are sinful, they can choose to avail themselves of God's grace in order to redeem themselves. Events are not predestined: all human beings have the possibility of salvation. According to Calvinism, however, human nature is sinful and irredeemably incapable of righteousness. God's grace therefore falls only upon those few chosen by God: events are predestined and there is nothing human beings themselves can do to redeem themselves in the eyes of God to ensure salvation. Their salvation, or otherwise, is entirely a matter of God’s will. The shift in a Calvinist direction appears to have taken place quite suddenly, after 9/11, and since then Bush has made several statements to the effect that God is directly involved in world events and that he, and by implication the American people, are God’s tools in his refashioning of the world. Bush shifts from the nation’s being the agent of history - as in his claim in the carefully scripted religious service in which he declared the ‘War
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______________________________________________________________ on Terror’ from the pulpit of the National Cathedral: ‘[o]ur responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil’11 to claiming that it is the agent of God. While very different in content, however, these claims are remarkably similar in form. Indeed, Calvinist predestinarianism makes it very difficult to maintain even a substantive difference: for history is whatever God chooses to make it, and ‘history’s call’ is simply that of God differently expressed. Bush in fact started with the USA as agent of history, and then went on to the USA as agent of God. So, for example, there is evidence of increasing Calvinism in Bush’s rhetoric as we move closer to the invasion of Iraq, as in this statement just a few months earlier: ‘And we will continue to fight terror. It’s our obligation, our duty. History has called us into action.’12 By the time of his 2003 National Prayer Breakfast speech, however, the term ‘history’ takes on an explicitly religious meaning: ‘events aren’t moved by blind change and chance. Behind all of life and all of history, there’s a dedication and purpose, set by the hand of a just and faithful God.’13 By now, God has predestined America to undertake the mission of ridding the world of evil; and from that it is only a short road to Baghdad. With this subtly changing theology came an increasing predilection in Bush’s rhetoric for pre-emption and unilateralism in American foreign policy, and thus an encouragement of a national mission against terrorism with or without the help of the international community.14 Consider this example. In Bush’s speech to Congress on September 20, 2001 just after 9/11, he claimed that ‘[f]reedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them’.15 Here God will exercise his agency and intervene in the world to mediate between good and evil. By the time of Bush’s second inauguration speech, however, in which he states that ‘[h]istory has an ebb and flow of justice, but history also has a visible direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty’,16 the claim is that there is no question of mediation since God has set the course of events from the very outset. It is no longer a matter of God’s intervening in the world (on America’s side), but one of America’s was having been predestined by God to fulfil his will on earth. By now, Americans are a ‘special people watched over by a benevolent God’.17 And so as long as Americans believe they are God’s chosen people, of course, they need not worry about the outcome of the conflict: for it is directed by the hand of God. Not only that. Since Americans are God’s chosen people, it follows that their values are also God’s own. And so to say that God is on America’s side is no longer to invoke the hope of a divine being who will come to America’s aid, but rather to make a statement of the logically inescapable. From this, it follows that there can be no doubt about the righteousness of exporting those same values:
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______________________________________________________________ We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.18 Yet this statement, highlighting as it does the core of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy - the export of Western values of freedom and liberty - raises an interesting theological problem at the root of Bush’s rhetoric. Calvinist predestinarianism allows no logical space for ‘hope’, or for the contingencies implied by the alleged increasing dependency of ‘our’ liberty on ‘theirs’. For Calvinists, ‘Whatever will be, will be’: and that’s that. But here is not the place for a theological deconstruction of Bush’s speech acts. Let me return, then, to my central argument. The use of Christian biblical rhetoric has been a facilitating condition in Bush’s speech acts, inasmuch as it has moved the security threat from the military into the social sector by playing on the ideological aspects of the conflict instead of its pragmatically military aspects. We are being told to fear not only a terrorist attack on physical targets, but also an attack on our value system - freedom and liberty. Furthermore, the answer to terrorism is to expand this same freedom and liberty as embedded in our democratic ideals. Central here is the biblical imagery of good versus evil and the specific use of the term ‘evil’ with regard to terrorism. In his short press briefing at the White House just a few days after 9/11, Bush referred to ‘evil’ or ‘evildoers’ nine times.19 Originally a biblical term relating to the never-ending struggle of good versus evil and light versus darkness, ‘evil’ is a clear facilitating condition in the staging of an existential threat to freedom and freedomloving nations from Hussein and al Qaeda. Religious scholars such as Gaddy and Pagels have expressed concern that Bush is using religious rhetoric to manipulate unfavourable public reaction to his policies, by making them an issue of (theologically based) morality and thus ensuring that the only way for Americans to be ‘morally right’ is to agree with Bush. By naming Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an axis of evil, he is by implication naming himself as head of an axis of good: again, anyone who disagrees with his policies is in the moral wrong.20 Furthermore, this sort of religious rhetoric in times of conflict also helps motivate people to violent action, something far easier to do if they feel they occupy the moral high ground. The other side of this state of affairs is of course obvious: Gaddy and Pagels are not alone in voicing concern that the portrayal of the United States as a Christian nation doing God’s will is bound to make it a target for Islamic terrorist groups. To be described as ‘evil’ is, to say the least, provocative, and especially so when directed at those espousing a set of religious beliefs in which such a description resonates. That is why,
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______________________________________________________________ they argue, this kind of religious rhetoric is dangerous and has no place in American politics: ‘It discourages political discourse, disenfranchises members of other faiths and puts the country at greater risk of attack by nonChristian militants.’21 It is dangerous because it plays right into the rhetoric that the Islamists themselves are using, and so demands that people choose between Christian and Muslim in the so-called war on terror. This in turn will inevitably alienate the entire Muslim populations of the world who feel their religion is being attacked. Thus Bush's language of religion and terror creates a major internal problem for his own rhetoric; he is using the same language as the enemy, in this case the terrorists. Bush and bin Laden, then, both analyse their opponent in exactly the same formal terms. They both invoke God and ‘good versus evil’, and each does so from his own perspective. The result is that sometimes Bush comes close to crossing the line between President and Preacher, just as bin Laden regards himself not only as Preacher but also as leader: on their very similar accounts, the Caliphate and the USA turn out to be remarkably similar. 22 Consider for instance Bush’s frequent use of old gospel hymns and biblical passages to explain current events: the trope is one of Americans carrying out the will of God,23 just as Islamic radicals make use of the similar rhetoric of their religious tradition to ‘sanctify the cause and demonise the enemy’.24 This brings us to the core dilemma of Bush's rhetoric, namely his attempts to exploit the emotionally charged religious rhetoric in his language of war to gain support for the war, while at the same time insisting that it is not a religious war. So, for example, Bush does not speak of religion as being the cause of the terrorism directed at the U.S.; instead he argues that the bin Laden terrorists ‘fear’ Western freedom and democracy, as if their hatred were motivated by rejection of positive Western values.25 In other words, Bush uses religion positively by emphasizing that God is with people of faith, while at the same time trying not to alienate Muslims by referring to Islam negatively. It is interesting to note here that he most often refers to terrorists as ‘evildoers’ and speaks of their ideology without mentioning Islam, referring to it rather as an ‘ideology of hatred’; and that he makes an effort to separate Islamic Radicalism from mainstream Islam, differentiating in his speeches the ideology behind Islamic Radicalism from the religion of Islam. While this demonstrates the careful deliberation behind every word in order not to turn the ‘war on terror’ into an open war between Christianity and Islam, it demonstrates at the same time the internal contradiction in his rhetoric. For such careful deliberation notwithstanding, he continues to use Christian biblical references to justify military action; and the clearly implied contrast here is not with ‘Islamic Radicalism’, but with Islam itself. And then we are back with the so-called war on terror as a religious war.
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______________________________________________________________ 3.
Linking Iraq with the ‘War on Terror’ In extending the ‘war on terror’ to include Iraq, Bush used securitising speech acts to link Hussein with bin-Laden and thereby the war in Iraq with the ‘war on terror’, as the following interview clearly illustrates. When asked by a reporter, ‘Mr. President, do you believe that Saddam Hussein is a bigger threat to the United States than al Qaeda?’, Bush answered: The war on terror, you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror. And so it’s a comparison that is - I can’t make because I can't distinguish between the two, because they’re both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive.26 This demonstrates the external facilitating condition of Bush’s securitising speech act at work: according to Bush, if action were not taken immediately, an attack by Hussein and al Qaeda was imminent. The history, briefly described above, of the aftermath of 9/11 supports such a hypothesis and makes it credible in the minds of much of the American population. His basic message is that al Qaeda and Hussein are one and the same - despite the fact that he has no proof that they share the same ideology and that there is in fact plenty of evidence to the contrary. Thus, while it is frightening, it is by no means surprising that a large percentage of the public let themselves be convinced that such a link existed, with sixty percent saying they believed Iraq had provided direct support to al Qaeda,27 despite extensive evidence that Hussein was not cooperating with bin Laden’s terrorist network. During the autumn of 2002, Bush continually warned the American people that ‘Iraq has longstanding ties to terrorist groups, which are capable of and willing to deliver weapons of mass death.’28 On another occasion Bush made this statement: Countering Iraq's threat is also a central commitment on the war on terror. We know Saddam Hussein has longstanding and ongoing ties to international terrorists . . .. We must confront both terror cells and terror states, because they are different faces of the same evil.29 The message could not be clearer. Bush forges a connection between the two in order to gain legitimacy for the attack on Iraq by characterizing Hussein and bin Laden's terrorist network as two faces of the same evil. Nor is this offered as a best guess or a plausible hypothesis; the connection is presented as fact, a device greatly assisted by the non-specificity of the ‘terror cells’ of al Qaeda and the ‘terror states’ that indicate Iraq. One of the
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______________________________________________________________ most effective persuasive strategies in politics is to repeat short, catchy statements that are easy to understand but the meaning of which remains at least greatly under-specified. And so the sentence ends by bringing under one ‘simple’ head - ‘the same evil’ - two crucially different phenomena. The term ‘evil’, of course, lends itself all too readily for such manipulation, with its pulling together of theological and moral understandings, as well as its allencompassing designation of what it is said to describe as being somehow beyond ordinary understanding and explanation. Of all the ready-made facilitating conditions of securitisation in this context, this is surely the most powerful. ‘Evil’ is the social threat par excellence. Taking on the project of ridding the world of evil is a vague foreign policy goal at best, and obviously presents a considerable array of difficulties in assessing what constitutes the enemy and determining when the battle is won. At the same time, declaring war against evil confers moral legitimacy on the nation’s foreign policy - and even on a contested presidency.30 The ‘war on terror’ gave the Bush administration an ideal opportunity not just to initiate the long-planned attack on Iraq, but at the same time to wash away any discussion about the democratic legitimacy of the Bush presidency as simply irrelevant, not to say unpatriotic. Just forty-three days after 9/11, the Patriot Act was passed - with minimal debate.31 This was not the time to question the legitimacy of the presidency, but rather a time for Americans to rally behind their President and, of course, their own values. As history has shown, wars always achieve that. 4.
The Felicity Conditions Placing the elements of Bush’s rhetoric thus far discussed into the framework of the Copenhagen School has shown how securitising grammar the first facilitating condition - plays its part, through religious rhetoric, in the general securitising process necessary for Bush’s prosecution of the ‘war on terror’; and how he has been able to use his authority as Commander in Chief to extend that securitising process by fulfilling the second facilitating condition, that of invoking social capital. (Admittedly the latter could only ever be partially fulfilled through rhetoric: it is the central fact of realpolitik the United States is clearly the world’s major political power - that allowed Bush convincingly to speak of unilateral action against Iraq as a means of enlisting a ‘coalition of the willing’ for the act itself.) The third facilitating condition - external/historical factors - has several facets. In relation to al Qaeda and bin Laden, the external condition was fulfilled by the 9/11 attacks. Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in Afghanistan as retaliation against the terrorists behind 9/11 and the regime harbouring them, an attack fully supported by the United States’ allies as well as the United Nations on account of 9/11’s being regarded by all concerned as an act of war against the United States. Operation Iraqi Freedom, however,
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______________________________________________________________ was another matter. Unlike the attack on Afghanistan, it required an enormous rhetorical effort to draw Iraq into its allotted role as an essential part of the ‘war on terror’, a role carefully scripted as part of a larger plan originating long before 9/11, namely ‘The Project for a New American Century’. 5.
Conclusion When looking at how all three felicity conditions were fulfilled it becomes even clearer how carefully directed Bush's language of war was from the beginning, and how events played into the policymakers’ hands, as well as how powerful a role this language has in the Iraqi case. An attack on US soil by Al Qaeda, an organisation quite unrelated to Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq - indeed, in crucial ways, political and religious, utterly antithetical to it, and sharing only one thing in common, namely an antipathy towards the west in general and the United States in particular - was able to be rhetorically manipulated to ‘justify’, at least to the majority of the American population, and certainly to just about its entire political élite, an attack on a target identified years earlier: Iraq. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the rhetoric used to accomplish that does not survive analysis; indeed, such an analysis lays bare precisely the differences between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, as well as the intellectual contradictions underlying that religious rhetoric itself. Nonetheless, it has achieved its purpose: to gain, and to a considerable extent to maintain, support for the attack on Iraq (if not necessarily for the resulting wars in Iraq - but that remains to be seen). But not only that, it has also enabled the US administration to implement the Patriot Act, with its attendant denials and withdrawals of freedom in the name of Freedom. Perhaps nothing less than a religious framework would have sufficed to achieve that, whether theologically presented and understood as calling on Americans to heed the voice, whether of History or of God entreating them to defend and to spread freedom - or simply to realise themselves as the vehicle of God’s unchangeable will. This analysis has demonstrated in particular how the shift towards Calvinist theology added a strongly predestinarian element to Bush’s securitising grammar; and the cost of that shift. What the implications will turn out to be of Bush’s securitising speech acts, not just as Commander in Chief, but as spiritual leader, and of the irony of that parallel with Osama bin Laden, remains to be seen.
Notes 1 2
For more information see < http://www.newamericancentury.org/>. B Woodward, Bush at War, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002, p. 81.
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Woodward. Woodward, p. 346. 5 Woodward, p. 88. 6 Woodward, p. 99. 7 M Reynolds, ‘Axis of evil' rhetoric said to heighten dangers’, Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2003, accessed 15 September, 2007, . 8 The Methodist doctrines, polity and theology developed from a Protestant Christian movement founded in England by John Wesley in the 18th century. 9 D Caldwell, ‘An Evolving Faith: Does the President believe he has a divine mandate’, Beliefnet, 7 February 2003, accessed May 25, 2005, . 10 A friend of Bush, and President of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, the public policy arm of the Southern Baptist Convention. 11 J Wallis, ‘Dangerous Religion’, Sojourner’s Magazine, vol. 32, 2003, p. 20, accessed 15 September, 2007, . 12 G W Bush, ‘Remarks by the President at the National Prayer Breakfast,’ 6 February 2003, accessed September 4, 2007 White House News Releases, . 13 Bush, ‘Remarks’. 14 D Bostdorff, ‘George W. Bush's Post-September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation’, Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 89, 2003, pp. 293-319. 15 Caldwell. 16 G W Bush, ‘Inaugural Address’, 20 January 2005, accessed May 10, 2007, The American Presidency Project, . 17 Bostdorff, p. 302. In its predestinarianism, Calvinism is of course particularly susceptible to the notion of a ‘chosen people’ - whoever they may be. 18 G W Bush, 'Second Inaugural Speech,' 20 January 2005, accessed September 23, 2007, 19 G W Bush, ‘Remarks upon arrival at the White House,’ 16 September 2001, accessed 31 May 2005, White House News Releases, . 20 E Pagels and Rev Dr C W Gaddy, ‘President or Preacher: Audio News Conference on the President’s Irresponsible Use of Religious Language’, 11 February 2003, accessed May 25, 2005, 4
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______________________________________________________________ , pp. 13 – 14. 21 B C Neff, ‘Bush and God-talk’, National Catholic Reporter, vol. 39, 2003, p.4. 22 D Kellner, From 9/11 To Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2003, p.61. 23 C Hedges, ‘War, Love, and the Divine,’ Beliefnet, accessed 4 February 2005, . 24 Hedges. 25 Kellner, p. 63. 26 G W Bush, ‘President Bush, Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism,’ 25 September 2002, accessed June 7, 2005, White House News Releases, . 27 D Balz & R Morin, ‘2 Years After Invasion, Poll Data Mixed: Bush’s Approval Ratings’, Washington Post on-line Edition, 16 March 2005, accessed 20 May 2005, . 28 G W Bush, ‘Radio Address: Iraqi Regime Danger to America is ‘Grave and Growing’’, 5 October 2002, accessed 7 June 2005, White House News Releases, . 29 G W Bush, ‘President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution’, 2 October 2002, accessed 7 June 2005, White House News Releases, . 30 See Wallis. 31 For more information see The Patriot Act: .
Bibliography Balz, D., and Morin R., ‘2 Years After Invasion, Poll Data Mixed’. Washington Post, 16 March 2005, on-line edition. Accessible at . Bostdorff, D., ‘George W. Bush’s Post-September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation’. Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 89, 2003, pp. 293-319.
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______________________________________________________________ Bush, G. W., ‘Inaugural Address’. The American Presidency Project, 20 January 2005. Accessible at . _______
, ‘President Bush, Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism’. White House News Releases, 25 September 2002. Accessible at .
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, ‘President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution’. White House News Releases, 2 October 2002. Accessible at .
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, ‘Radio Address: Iraqi Regime Danger to America is ‘Grave and Growing’’. White House News Releases, 5 October 2002. Accessible at .
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, ‘Remarks by the President at the National Prayer Breakfast’. White House News Releases, 6 February 2003. Accessible at . _______
, ‘Remarks upon arrival at the White House’. White House News Releases, 16 September 2001. Accessible at .
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, ‘Second Inaugural Speech’. 20 January 2005. Accessible at . Caldwell, D., ‘An Evolving Faith: Does the President believe he has a divine mandate?’. Beliefnet, 7 February, 2003. Accessible at . Hedges, C., ‘War, Love, and the Divine’. Beliefnet., 4 February 2005. Accessible at .
Kellner, D., From 9/11 To Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2003. Neff, B. C., ‘Bush and God-talk’. National Catholic Reporter, vol. 39, 2003, p. 4. Accessible at .
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______________________________________________________________ Pagels, E., and Rev. Dr. Gaddy, C. W., ‘President or Preacher: Audio News Conference on the President’s Irresponsible Use of Religious Language’, February 11, 2003. Accessible at . Patriot Act. Accessible at . Project for a New American Century. Accessible at . Reynolds, M., ‘‘Axis of evil’ rhetoric said to heighten dangers’. Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2003. Accessible at . Wallis, J., ‘Dangerous Religion’. Sojourner’s Magazine 32, Iss.5, 2003, pp. 20. Accessible at Proquest, via . Woodward, B., Bush at War, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002.
Is the War on Terror Real? Should it Be? Avery Plaw Abstract Should the war on terror be conducted as a vast law-enforcement operation; as a conventional international war subject to existing humanitarian law; or as a new kind of war to be prosecuted according to a new and evolving set of rules? On legal, political and moral grounds this essay argues for the middle course: the war on terror should be recognized and conducted as a real war fully subject to existing international conventions and customs of armed conflict. Key Words: Armed conflict, counterterrorism, humanitarian law, war on terror. ***** 1.
Introduction Is the ‘War on Terror’ currently being waged by the United States and other states, including Israel, a war in the sense of triggering the laws of armed conflict (i.e., humanitarian law)? Or is the expression ‘War on Terror’ better understood, as Human Rights Watch Director Kenneth Roth and others have suggested, as intended ‘metaphorically’, as ‘a mere hortatory device’, similar to the ‘war on drugs’ or Lyndon Johnson’s ‘war on poverty’.1 Or is it, as Condoleezza Rice put it while commenting on an American targeted killing in Yemen, ‘a new kind of war … [to] be fought on different battlefields’, and according to new rules?2 The question of the legal status of the ‘War on Terror’ is not mere hairsplitting. It has serious implications for the way that the campaign against terrorism is being conducted. As Roth notes, for example, ‘the rules that bind governments are much looser during wartime than in times of peace’.3 For one thing, ‘humanitarian law accepts that one of the legitimate objects of warfare is to disable enemy combatants (and in many cases this necessarily involves killing)’, as Christopher Greenwood aptly put it in the Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts.4 On the other hand, if the ‘War on Terror’ is only a rhetorical trope, as Roth suggests, then the deliberate killing of terrorists (as in, for example, American and Israeli targeted killings) would be a violation of the human right to life guaranteed under article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) as well as in many domestic legal codes; in short, it would be murder. The difference lies in the legal status applicable to the situation.
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______________________________________________________________ There are at least three basic positions on the legal status of the current war on terror that have been widely articulated and defended. In the first place, the traditional response to terrorism has been that it is a crime subject to normal criminal law enforcement. Some commentators, like Roth, argue that no fundamental legal change has occurred, and assert that talk of ‘war’ really signals a commitment to be rigorous about law enforcement in the same way that the ‘war on poverty’ expressed the intent rigorously to confront the social problems connected with economic deprivation. A second widely articulated view (and the one that will be defended here) holds that it is a real war that invokes the laws of armed conflict in their conventional form.5 A third position is that it is a real war in the legal sense, but also a new kind of war that needs to be fought under new rules that will be developed as it unfolds.6 American and Israeli policy-makers in particular have tended to vacillate between positions two and three, sometimes framing the war on terror in the traditional language of war, sometimes arguing that it is different from other wars and permits them to employ policies that would not normally be permitted: former Vice-President Dick Cheney, for example, has defended the United States’ interrogation and rendition of prisoners by arguing that it is ‘vital for us to use any means at our disposal to, basically, achieve our objective’, regardless of Geneva Convention protections for POWs.7 Alberto Gonzalez, the then White House Counsel (and later Attorney General) confirmed the Bush Administration’s belief that the Geneva Conventions ‘do not apply to American interrogations’ at least of prisoners in the War on Terror held overseas. This chapter argues that there is a convincing legal and normative case for rejecting the first, ‘traditional’, position in favour of the second, ‘conventional war’, perspective. However, the same arguments that make the move to the second position compelling undermine the case for embracing the third. In essence, then, I argue primarily on legal, but also moral and political, grounds that the war on terror should be viewed as a war in the traditional sense and should therefore be conducted according to the existing law of war (allowing for its gradual adjustment to the new condition of asymmetrical armed conflict through the established mechanisms of agreement among states and decisions of judicial authorities). It begins with an examination of the legal case for applying humanitarian law and then turns, more briefly, to questions of politics and morality. It focuses primarily on the policy of the United States and Israel as the two states most closely associated with the war on terror. 2.
The Question of Humanitarian Law The American and Israeli government positions, that they are literally at war with terrorist groups, is not without some initial plausibility. On the American side, for example, both al-Qaeda and the United States
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______________________________________________________________ government appear to regard themselves at war with one another. Bin Laden has, in his own words, has ‘declared jihad against the US government’ repeatedly since 1996.8 On the other hand, on the morning of September 12, 2001, a little before noon, President Bush responded with a declaration of his own: ‘the deliberate and deadly attacks that were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war’.9 With this statement President Bush launched what he termed a ‘global war on terrorism’,10 leaving little doubt that this was to be a new type of war, fought in novel ways. In his words of 29 September 2001, ‘our war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. The war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.’11 Similarly, Israel and the armed Palestinian resistance organizations, which it and many other states designate as terrorist groups consider themselves at war with one another – or, as it has more typically been put in recent years, in a state of ‘armed conflict’. Palestinian organizations such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Hamas consider themselves engaged in legitimate armed struggle (or jihad) against an illegal foreign (Israeli) occupation. (e.g., Article 7 of the Hamas Convenant (1988)). Moreover, they characteristically explain their use of atypical military tactics – such as suicide bombing – by reference to what Fathi Shaqaqi called the ‘unequal balance of power’. In Hamas leader Sayeed Siyam’s words, ‘we do not own Apache helicopters ourselves, so we use our own methods’.12 In other words, like the former American President, they see themselves as pursuing war by novel means. On the other side of the conflict, the Israeli Government has recognized a state of armed conflict with the Palestinian resistance organizations at least since early in the second intifada. In the words of Colonel Daniel Reisner, the Head of the International Law Branch of the Israeli Defence Force Legal Division, in a press conference on the 15th of November, 2000: The current situation, the fact that now a large percentage of the attacks involve live weapons … that we are facing a Palestinian Security Service which in part is taking part in hostilities, has brought us to the conclusion that we are no longer in the realm of peace. ... We are definitely in the realm of armed conflict.13 Moreover, the Israeli government’s reassessment of the legal situation in the occupied territories has been consistently reflected in its public defence of its policies. As Michael Gross observes, for example, where before 2000 Israel defended its policy of ‘targeted killing’ as a justified form of law enforcement, the subsequent intensification of the conflict ‘led Israeli
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______________________________________________________________ officials to relinquish the claim to law enforcement and [to] argue instead that assassinations are an acceptable means of armed conflict’.14 So again, both sides see themselves as engaged in armed conflict. However, the validity of the claims raised by the American and Israeli governments does not turn on politics or perceptions. They are rather legal claims. The American and Israeli governments claim to be in a legal situation of armed conflict, and that therefore the body of law which has primary application is international humanitarian law rather than human rights law or domestic criminal law. The question then is not how the different sides portray their use of armed force, but whether the violence meets the legal definition of ‘armed conflict’.15 As noted above, a great deal hangs on this legal question. The answer, in short, is that the US and Israeli governments’ claims are controversial but ultimately plausible. Their arguments are controversial because the application of humanitarian law has traditionally been limited to situations of war, and war was traditionally defined as armed conflict between the forces of two sovereign states: for example, in a frequently quoted 1905 definition, Lawrence Oppenheim held that ‘war is a contention of two or more states through their armed forces, for the purposes of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases’.16 This narrow conception of war, and consequent narrow understanding of the application of humanitarian law, held sway throughout the first half of the century. In the latter half of the century, however, the ambit of humanitarian law broadened considerably. As Greenwood notes, for example, whereas the older humanitarian treaties applied only to a ‘war’, today humanitarian law is applicable in any international armed conflict, even if the parties to that conflict have not declared war and do not recognize that they are in a state of war.17 Moreover, the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 addresses ‘armed conflict in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, foreign occupation and against racist regimes’ (Article 1.4), while the Second Additional Protocol addresses ‘non-international armed conflict’. Both these latter cases involve states fighting armed nongovernmental organizations rather than other states. The key question in relation to the war on terror is whether the legal definition of ‘armed conflict’ is now broad enough to encompass a low-intensity, asymmetric conflict between a state (or coalition of states) and an elusive international terrorist organization (or group of similar organizations), and therefore whether
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______________________________________________________________ humanitarian law should have primary application in relation to states’ use of armed force against such terrorist organizations. Some leading commentators have expressed doubt about the application of humanitarian law to the war on terror. In her 2005 The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, for example, Helen Duffy raises doubts about whether it ‘can meet the criteria for the contemporary definition of armed conflict’.18 For one thing, in order to trigger the laws of armed conflict, a conflict must involve at least two clearly identifiable parties with recognizable armed forces engaged in the conflict. Duffy, however, doubts that terrorist organizations and their armed forces can be identified and distinguished with adequate clarity. She asks, for example, ‘how one can define and identify with sufficient clarity the relationship between disparate individuals and their membership, support, or sympathy for al-Qaeda’.19 In other words, how can we be certain who does and who does not qualify as an enemy combatant? The difficulty in clearly specifying ‘al-Qaeda… as an identifiable and distinct party to a conflict’ leads Duffy to conclude that ‘asserting that an armed conflict can be waged with an entity such as alQaeda may not be an accurate assessment of the law as it stood at the time of the September 11th attacks, or indeed as it stands in the first few years thereafter’.20 Nonetheless, she recognizes that ‘the law has been moving toward recognizing’ armed conflicts with non-governmental ‘organizations’, and that September 11th has now sown ‘the seeds of debate… as to whether it may be, or should be, possible for an armed conflict to arise between states and entities such as al-Qaeda’. Noting some arguments in favour of such recognition, she remarks that ‘this is an area deserving of further analysis’ where ‘legal development’ might unfold.21 Other leading legal commentators, however, contend that the war on terror clearly fits within the contemporary understanding of international armed conflict and is primarily subject to international humanitarian law. In particular, they stress that terrorist acts such as those of September 11th constitute ‘armed attacks’ that trigger a state’s right of ‘self-defence’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter, including the legitimate use of armed force, and hence invoke international humanitarian law. Yoram Dinstein, for example, in the fourth edition of his War, Aggression and Self-Defense (2005), writes that The simple proposition that forcible action taken against a state may constitute an armed attack, even if the perpetrators are non-state actors [e.g., a terrorist group] operating from a foreign state … was categorically upheld in previous editions of the present book. ... All lingering doubts on this issue have been dispelled as a result of the
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______________________________________________________________ response of the international community to the shocking events of 11 September 2001.22 Dinstein cites three international responses in particular, each of which recognizes an American right of self-defence which, as he notes, is under the UN Charter legal only in response to an ‘armed attack’ and which in turn triggers the application of international humanitarian law. First, he notes UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, passed in the wake of September 11th, which both affirm the ‘right of individual and collective selfdefence in accordance with the Charter’ in the context of the ‘horrifying terrorist attacks’.23 Second, Dinstein notes that NATO voted to invoke, for the first time, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), which provides that ‘an armed attack against one or more of the Allies … shall be considered an attack against them all’. He stresses that ‘armed attack’ is employed with specific reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter and the right of selfdefence. Finally, Dinstein notes that in September 2001 the members of the Organization of American States similarly declared that ‘These terrorist attacks against the United States are attacks against all American States,’ again with specific reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter as well as Article 3 of the Rio Treaty and the right of self-defence. Dinstein’s evidence from the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks illustrates a clear willingness on the part of states to recognize a right of self-defence against attacks by international terrorists, and hence a corresponding right to employ armed force in self-defence under the auspices of international humanitarian law. The organizations and member states he cites were not deterred from authorizing the use of force against al-Qaeda because of any doubts concerning whether the entire membership of the organization could be precisely and uncontentiously established, as Duffy feared. The fact that there may have been some marginal cases of peripheral participation in al-Qaeda activities was not seen as a serious obstacle to recognition that terrorist organizations exist and have carried out transnational attacks triggering a right of self-defence, and that the membership and active participation of many individuals in such groups can be established beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, in using force to prevent further attacks by terrorist organizations, attacked states, and in some cases their allies, enter into an armed conflict with terrorist aggressors and are thus subject to humanitarian law. Duffy’s point that there may be some ambiguity surrounding the combatant status of some alleged members of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda does warrant care and precision in applying military force, and possibly judicial review of the procedures by which dangerous terrorists are identified and the means to neutralize them are chosen; but it provides no compelling reason to doubt that states can find themselves in armed conflict with terrorist groups.
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______________________________________________________________ Moreover, the UN’s recognition that armed conflict can arise between states and armed organizations employing terror was not a response solely to the horror of the September 11th attacks. The possibility of such conflict was already strongly suggested in international criminal jurisprudence in the mid-1990s. It already seems implicit, for example, in the general definition of armed conflict offered by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1995: We find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is achieved; or, in … internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.24 It is not entirely clear from the foregoing decision whether the second criterion of armed conflict - ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups’ - is intended to relate to international in addition to non-international armed conflict. The ICTY Appeals Chamber was not required carefully to distinguish between international and non-international armed conflict in order to resolve the jurisdictional question that was before it. It simply decided that ‘the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have both international and internal aspects’.25 Its decision suggests, however, that in at least some cases ‘protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and armed groups’ can generate conditions of international armed conflict. Whether it was an international or non-international matter, however, the key point for present purposes is that the legal definition of ‘armed conflict,’ and hence the ambit of humanitarian law, already included anywhere where there was ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups’. This might well be interpreted to cover, for example, the campaign of terror waged by armed Palestinian organizations like Hamas and the PIJ against Israel as part of the second intifada – resulting in 1084 Israeli fatalities (525 from suicide bombings) and 7484 injuries between September 2000 and the end of 2005.26 In this context it is worth noting that the September 11th attacks were similarly not wholly isolated incidents, but part of a larger pattern of attacks on American installations and citizens that included the attacks on the USS Cole on 12
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______________________________________________________________ October 2000 (17 fatalities and 40 injuries) and on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on October 7, 1998 (in which at least 235 people were killed and over two thousand injured). Both the Israeli and American governments responded with military campaigns that have resulted in literally thousands of fatalities. Both cases, then, appear to meet the standard of protracted violence between armed organizations and governments, and therefore to meet the ICTY’s definition of ‘armed conflict’ - and thus to invoke humanitarian law. It is historical precedents like this that Helen Duffy seems to have in mind when she writes of the slow movement of international law towards recognizing protracted violence between states and terrorist organizations as armed conflicts subject to humanitarian law. But the most powerful rejoinders to her insistence that the law has not yet passed this critical threshold comes neither from the ICTY nor from the declarations of international organizations in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, as emphasized by Dinstein, but (first) from the carefully considered and argued decisions of the respected Supreme Courts of both the United States and Israel years after the initial shock of the September 11th attacks, and (second) from the reaction of the international community to Israel’s war with Lebanon’s Hizbullah movement in the summer of 2006. The Israeli Supreme Court has unambiguously accepted in a series of decisions the notion that a state of ‘armed conflict’ exists, and has existed from the start of the first intifada, between the Israeli state and Palestinian terrorist organizations. In its December 14, 2006 decision in The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. the Government of Israel, Aharon Barak, giving the court’s consensus position, wrote as follows: The [Court’s] general, principled starting point is that between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip… a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the first intifada. The Supreme Court has discussed the existence of that conflict in a series of judgments. ... In one case I wrote: Since late September 2000, severe combat has been taking place in the areas of Judea and Samaria. It is not police activity. It is an armed conflict. (HCJ 7015/02) This approach is in line with the definition of armed conflict in the international literature…. Humanitarian law is the lex specialis which applies in the case of armed conflict.27
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______________________________________________________________ This pattern of decisions invoked by Judge Barak forms an important legal precedent for recognizing that a state of armed conflict can exist between states and terrorist organizations. The US Supreme Court has also weighed in on this question and indicated that it regards the war on terrorism as a genuine armed conflict subject to international humanitarian law. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., decided on 29 June 2006, the Court ruled that an alleged enemy combatant was not subject to trial by military commission because, among other things, the trial would violate his rights under international humanitarian law. Specifically, the Court ‘conclude[d] that the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the Geneva Conventions’.28 There can be no doubt, then, that the Court considers the United States to be engaged in a war on terror; and thus subject to international humanitarian law, in which al-Qaeda is at least one of the enemy parties. Indeed, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas went so far as to specifically ‘treat Osama bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of Jihad against Americans as the inception of the war. The majority, however, ‘focus on the September 11th, 2001 attacks that the government characterizes as the relevant ‘acts of war,’ and on the measure that authorized the President’s deployment of military force [i.e., Congress’s Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF)]’. They ‘do not question the government’s position that the war commenced with the events of September 11, 2001’.29 The US Congress’ AUMF cited by the Court is notable not only as an effective declaration of war, but as explicitly authorizing war with ‘organizations or persons’, rather than exclusively with terror sponsoring states. Specifically, Congress authorized the President to ‘use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organization or persons he determines planned, authorized or aided’ the September 11th terrorist attacks. The Supreme Court merely added that, regardless of whether this legitimate exercise of force in self-defence were to be directed against a sponsoring nation, a terrorist group or an individual, it remained fully subject to the law of armed conflict. These judicial decisions by the Supreme Courts of the United States and Israel provide jurisprudential support for the practice of international institutions and states cited by Dinstein. Together the precedents go a long way towards establishing a new rule of international humanitarian law. The new rule, moreover, seems to have been validated by the response of leading states and international institutions to an event in the Middle East in the summer of 2006. The event in question is the war in Lebanon between Israeli forces and Hizbullah fighters. What was revealing here was Israel’s behaviour and
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______________________________________________________________ the international community’s reaction to it. The war was precipitated by a Hizbullah incursion across the Israeli-Lebanese border on 12 July, resulting in the killing of three soldiers and the kidnapping of two others. The Israeli government reacted by sending IDF units over the border in an attempt to rescue the kidnapped soldiers. The operation failed to free the captured soldiers but resulted in the deaths of five more Israeli soldiers. The Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, then declared that the Hizbullah attack was an ‘act of war’ and launched a full scale military campaign against Hizbullah, beginning with extensive air strikes across Lebanon and leading to a major ground campaign in the South.30 The fighting continued until a UN ceasefire went into effect on 14 August. There can be no doubt that Israel’s war was, as Israeli leaders continually stressed, against Hizbullah, not against Lebanon. On 16 July, for example, the Israeli Cabinet issued the following statement: ‘Israel is not fighting Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian- and Iraniansponsored terrorist enclaves of murder.’31 Israel’s operations were directed specifically against suspected Hizbullah militants (although arguably with insufficient precision), and deliberately sought to avoid confrontation with the Lebanese army, which equally sought to avoid engagement. Hizbullah, for its part, flung defiance at the Israeli government, daring Israel to launch a ground assault against its forces in southern Lebanon, and launching over 4000 missiles into northern Israel. The final list of fatalities included somewhere between 250 and 600 Hizbullah fighters, 119 Israeli soldiers, and somewhere between 850 and 1191 Lebanese civilians.32 It was clear to all observers, then, that the fight was between Israel and Hizbullah - with unfortunate Lebanese civilians too often trapped in-between. What is critical for present purposes is that there was widespread support in the international community for Israel’s right to defend itself by pursuing a military campaign against Hizbullah under the laws of war, and while the international community became increasingly critical of the manner in which Israel prosecuted the armed conflict, its criticism was almost entirely framed in terms of humanitarian law. In an address to the UN Security Council on 30 July, for example, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, affirmed that ‘no one disputes Israel’s right to defend itself’ but noted that there was growing concern about ‘its manner of doing so’, and in particular about what appeared to be ‘grave breaches of humanitarian law’. Finally, he recalled that ‘the UN High Commissioner for human rights had reminded both sides that they may be held accountable for any breaches of international humanitarian law’.33 Similarly, the G8, meeting in St. Petersburg, recognized Israel’s ‘right to defend itself’ against Hizbullah
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______________________________________________________________ aggression but cautioned Israel ‘to be mindful of the strategic and humanitarian consequences of its actions,’ calling on Israel in particular to avoid ‘casualties among innocent civilian’.34 At the national level, most countries focused their criticisms exclusively on what India called Israel’s ‘disproportionate and excessive use of force’ and what Turkey called ‘bombing civilians’ – that is, on its failure to fully comply with humanitarian principles of proportionality and distinction.35 Similarly, NGOs such as Amnesty International complained that Israel’s ‘widespread attacks against public civilian infrastructure’ was ‘deliberate and an integral part of the military strategy, rather than collateral damage,’ and called upon Israel to uphold the humanitarian principle of proportionality.36 In essence, the international community accepted that a country attacked by a terrorist organization had a right to go to war with that organization provided that it complied with the humanitarian law of armed conflict. The war in Lebanon, then, not only established an additional precedent of armed conflict between a state and a terrorist organization, but indicated a growing international consensus that terrorist organizations could take actions that warrant a military response and that that military response should be subject to the law of armed conflict. In combination with the precedents cited above, international reaction to this event strongly suggests that the legal threshold for recognizing the applicability of humanitarian law to armed conflicts between states and terrorist organizations has now been passed. In summary then, while the question of whether a war on terror can qualify as an armed conflict in the legal sense cannot be described as definitively settled, both Israel and the United States maintain that it can and does, and their case seems to be strong and getting stronger. Not only can they point to a clear pattern of legal development and some highly supportive expert opinions before 2001, but also to a transitional event in the September 11th attacks and then to a clear set of precedents from states and international institutions in the wake of that event, confirmed in relation to more recent armed conflicts. Most importantly, they can point to strong support in judgments of their own Supreme Courts (as well as the US Congress). Obviously, these courts are the final arbiters of American and Israeli law. They are also, however, respected and influential sources of precedent for the larger international legal community, and it may well be that the judgments rendered by the courts effectively settled the controversy over the legal status of the war on terror. After all, even Helen Duffy, who raised doubts in 2005 over whether the law could be said to have made the transition to recognizing ‘armed conflict against an organization’ such as a terrorist group (or groups), was prepared to acknowledge that ‘this perspective, while not perhaps reflecting current law, signals a possible direction for future legal development’.37
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______________________________________________________________ 3.
New War, New Rules? If, however, there is a strong legal case for recognizing that the war on terror triggers the application of humanitarian law, there is an equally strong legal case for denying that it should be conducted according to new and evolving rules, as exemplified in the American policy towards prisoners, a policy that included secret detention, aggressive interrogation and extraordinary rendition - all in defiance of the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, the very qualities which lend strength to the legal case for the recognition of a state of war militate against allowing special exceptions or new rules in regard to state conduct. The first key point in support of the legal designation of armed conflict was the strong support of many states and leading international organizations. The situation is the opposite, however, with regard to claims for exemption from the existing laws of war, such as the USA’s claim that its treatments of prisoners is not subject to international conventions including the Geneva Conventions. These claims are widely rejected both by other states and international organizations. To cite just one dramatic example, on 14 January 2004, 175 parliamentarians from Britain (America’s closest ally) submitted an Amici curiae brief in support of the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush challenging the legality and morality of the Guantanamo Detainment Centre – a facility that even the State Department has described as a ‘lightning rod for international criticism’38 and which President Obama undertook to close within a year the day after his inauguration. What is even more striking is that both the American and Israeli courts, which are the second source of support for the claim that the laws of war apply to the war on terror, have themselves insisted that international conventions, including the Geneva conventions, apply to detainees in the war on terror. Indeed, the US Supreme Court decided against the US Government in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in part on the specific ground that US policies violated the Geneva Convention. The third ground of the legal case was the 2006 war in Lebanon, and the international community’s reaction to it. As already indicated, the bulk of the international community was willing to accept that Israel was within its rights (under article 51 of the Charter) to conduct a military campaign specifically against Hizbullah (rather than against Lebanon) under the laws of armed conflict. On the other hand, as noted above, many states and international organizations became virulent in their criticism of Israel for what they perceived to be violations of the laws of armed conflict, particularly in terms of the way that Israel responded to Hizbullah operatives allegedly hiding among civilian populations or using civilians as shields. Specifically, Israel was criticized for responding too aggressively and therefore visiting disproportionate harm on civilians. All of this criticism, however, reconfirms the international community’s commitment to the full
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______________________________________________________________ applicability of the entirety of international humanitarian law to armed conflicts between states and international organizations – even when the illegal behaviour of terrorists (such as failing to distinguish themselves visibly from civilians) in fact imposes serious difficulties for the prosecution of military campaigns against them. Thus each of the three key precedents that strengthens the case for recognizing the war on terror as a legal armed conflict subject to humanitarian law militate against the legality of claims to exemption from those laws or that the war on terror may legally be fought according to new laws appropriate to a new kind of warfare. In the final analysis there is little to be said from a legal perspective either for the first widely held position that the war on terror is merely a hortatory device and that the struggle with terrorism must be conducted wholly within a law enforcement paradigm, or for the third familiar perspective which held not only that the war on terror is a real war, but that it is a new kind of war to be fought according to new rules (which the belligerent states would evolve over time). Rather, the balance of evidence clearly indicates that international law currently recognizes the war on terror as a real war that is fully subject to humanitarian law. This conclusion does not exclude the possibility that some of the existing humanitarian law may have to be adjusted over time to properly address an armed conflict between states and terrorist groups, but it suggests that the international community must agree upon adjustments before they can be legally applied to actual conflicts. In addition to arguing that the law of war applies fully and rigorously to the war on terror, this essay concludes by arguing that it is fortunate that it does so: for legal clarity and restraint is exactly what is most needed today in the prosecution of the War on Terror. 4.
Conclusion Even if there is a compelling case that the war on terror has come to be legally recognized as a real war, a normative question can still be raised over whether this is a desirable development, or whether it ought perhaps to be resisted and, if possible, eventually reversed. This question has both political and moral dimensions. I shall conclude by arguing that the war on terror is indeed best approached as an armed conflict constrained by existing humanitarian law. The war effort has been deeply compromised in recent years – not only in terms of breadth of international support, but also in terms of its perceived legitimacy - by policies that have strayed beyond the bounds of the laws of war, including American programmes of detainment, torture and rendition and aggressive Israeli counterterrorism tactics that have imposed disproportionate harm on civilians (such as the 22 July 2002 targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh that resulted in the deaths of fifteen civilians including
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______________________________________________________________ nine children). A clear public declaration to abide by the laws of war and demonstrated commitment to uphold this pledge would contribute significantly to arresting or reversing declining international support and legitimacy. Moreover, American and Israeli actions outside the law of war have lent a degree of legitimacy to terrorist organizations and have thus contributed to their popularity in certain parts of the world (the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative election of 25 January 2006 is perhaps the most spectacular manifestation of this trend). If the states purportedly fighting terrorism regularly violate the law, how can they credibly condemn terrorists for doing the same thing? This legitimising effect is most evident in parts of the world that sympathize with terrorist organizations’ announced objectives (such as freeing Palestine or forcing American influence out of the Middle East), if not necessarily with their means. Lending growing legitimacy in these regions to terrorist groups threatens to contribute to the nurture of a new, larger and more extreme generation of terrorists, and hence to the increasing unlikelihood of a successful outcome to the war on terror. This war is clearly not a contest solely of armed forces, but also a competition for hearts and minds, and little could be more detrimental to that struggle than to allow the distinction between terrorism and counterterrorism to become blurred. The United States and Israel need to mobilize international law to clearly distinguish their policies from those of terrorists, and to do that they need to be able to point to clear, well-established, broadly supported rules and distinctions: they need existing humanitarian law. On the other hand, the credibility and authority of international law has taken a terrible beating in the last eight years, particularly at the hands of the United States, the world’s superpower.39 In particular, in its policy on detainees and its invasion of Iraq, the United States has publicly flouted international law, and correspondingly diminished the force of that law in dealing with cases like Iran’s nuclear programme. There is an enormous need today for a re-commitment on the part of important states, and particularly the United States, to compliance with the provisions of international law. A public declaration of commitment to humanitarian law in prosecuting the war on terror followed by sustained fulfilment of that pledge would be an important step in the right direction. Finally, what is at stake from a moral perspective? Considering the issues raised it hardly seems fit to belabour the question: secret detention, rendition, torture and disproportionate killing of civilians, are categorically illegal in part for obvious moral reasons, whether deontological or consequential. On the one hand, they all violate the most widely recognized and accepted moral duty to others: to treat them as ends rather than means to one’s own ends. On the other hand, permitting such policies, particularly in secret, invites abuses and even atrocities: as has already been amply
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______________________________________________________________ demonstrated at Abu Ghraib. And having facilitated the conditions for immoral action, we all bear complicity for the consequence. Some weapons, Benjamin Constant observed, ‘are too heavy for human hands’.40 We share a moral responsibility to ensure that they are not made available, either to terrorists’ intent on their use (by failing to confront and deter them) or to powerful states in conducting a war on terror (by exempting them from the constraint of the law). Not only on a legal basis then, but also on a normative basis – that is to say, whether emphasizing international politics and the health and stability of the international order, or from a moral perspective stressing individual and collective agency in the performance of rights and wrongs - the answers dovetail with the evolution of international humanitarian law. The war on terror should be recognized and conducted as a real war, and correspondingly must be constrained within the existing law of war.
Notes 1
K Roth, ‘The Law of War in the War on Terror’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, 2004, pp. 2-3. 2 A Dworkin, ‘The Yemen Strike: The War on Terror Goes Global’, Crimes of War Project, accessed 5 June 2007, . 3 Roth, pp. 2-3. 4 C Greenwood, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law, D Fleck (ed.) , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 19-20. 5 See, Justice H Jilani in M Vorkink and E Sheik, ‘The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of Law’, Human Rights Brief, vol. 14, 2006, p. 5. 6 E. Posner, ‘Terrorism and the Laws of War’, Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 5, 2004, p. 423. 7 J Mayer, ‘Outsourcing Torture’, New Yorker, 14 February 2005, accessed 24 June 2007, , italics added. 8 B Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden, Verso, New York, 2005, pp. 46-47, 23-30, 41-2, 48, 52, 61, 69-70. 9 G W Bush, ‘President Meets with National Security Team’, White House, 12 September 2001, accessed 6 February 2007, . 10 G W Bush, ‘President Discusses Global War on Terror’, White House Press Secretary, 5 September 2006, accessed 7 February 2007, .
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______________________________________________________________ 11
G W. Bush, ‘Radio Address of the President to the Nation’, White House Press Secretary, 29 September 2001, accessed 6 February 2007, . 12 R Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House, New York, 2005, pp. 31-3. 13 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Briefing by Colonel Daniel Reisner’, 15 November 2000, accessed 1 February 2007, . 14 M Gross, ‘Fighting by Other Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Assassination Policy’, Political Studies, vol. 51, 2004, p. 354. 15 H Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 218-9. 16 Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 4. 17 Greenwood, p. 10. 18 Duffy, pp. 250-1. 19 Duffy, p. 252. 20 Duffy, p. 254. 21 Duffy, pp. 252-4. 22 Dinstein, pp. 206-7. 23 Dinstein, p. 207. 24 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Tadic Interlocutory Appeal’, 1995, paragraph 70, accessed 14 February 2007, , italics added. 25 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, paragraph 77. 26 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ‘Palestinian Terrorism in 2005’, 31 December 2005, accessed 22 January 2007, . 27 Israeli High Court of Justice, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 7609/04, 2006, accessed 7 January 2007, . 28 Supreme Court of the United States (2006), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct.2749, 2004, p. 2, accessed 11 February 2007, . 29 Supreme Court of the United States, Opinion of the Court, p. 35fn. 30 C Urquhart, and C McGreal, ‘Israelis Invade Lebanon after Soldiers are Seized’, Guardian, 12 July 2006, accessed 27 May 2007, .
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______________________________________________________________ 31
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Hizbullah Attacks Northern Israel and Israel’s Response’, 2006, accessed 27 May 2007, . 32 For example, Amnesty International, ‘Israel/Lebanon Deliberate Destruction or ‘Collateral Damage’? Israeli Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure’, MDE 18/007/2007, 2006, accessed 27 May 2007, . 33 UN News Centre, ‘Security Council Must Condemn Israeli Attack, Demand Cessation of Hostilities, Annan Says’, 30 July 2006, accessed 8 June 2007,www.un.org/apps/ news/story.asp?NewsID=19345&C r=Leba n& cr1. 34 G-8, ‘St. Petersburg Declaration on the Middle East,’ 16 July 2006, accessed 26 July 2007, . 35 Kuwait News Agency, ‘World Efforts Continue to Stop Escalating Israeli Violence in Middle East’, 14 July 2006, accessed 28 May 2007, ; CNN Turk (2006), ‘Erdogan: Israil’in Derdi Nedir?’, accessed 28 May 2007, . 36 Amnesty 2006. 37 Duffy, p. 252. 38 See S Tisdall, ‘White House Close to Guantanamo Decision’, Guardian Unlimited, 22 June 2007, accessed 6 August 2007, ; and ‘Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,’ accessed 6 August 2007, . 39 Vorkink and Scheik, p. 2. 39 Quoted in I Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in The Proper Study of Mankind, H Hardy and R Hausheer (eds), Pimlico, London, 1998, p.234.
Bibliography Amnesty International, ‘Israel/Lebanon Deliberate Destruction or ‘Collateral Damage’?’, MDE 18/007/2007, 2006. Accessible at .
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______________________________________________________________ Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in The Proper Study of Mankind. H Hardy and R Hausheer (eds), Pimlico, London, 1998. ‘Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners’, 14 January 2004. Accessible at . Bush, George W., ‘President Meets with National Security Team’, White House, 12 September 2001. Accessible at . Bush, George W., ‘President Discusses Global War on Terror’, White House Press Secretary, 5 September 2006. Accessible at . Bush, George W., ‘Radio Address of the President to the Nation’, White House Press Secretary, 29 September 2001. Accessible at . CNN Turk, ‘Erdogan: Israil’in Derdi Nedir?’, 2006. Accessible at . Dinstein, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. Duffy, H., The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. Dworkin, A,. ‘The Yemen Strike: The War on Terror Goes Global’. Crimes of War Project. Accessible at . G-8, ‘St. Petersburg Declaration on the Middle East’, 16 July 2006. Accessible at <,http:/e,n.g8russia.ru/docs/21.html>. Greenwood, C., ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law. D Fleck (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 1-43.
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______________________________________________________________ Gross, M., ‘Fighting by Other Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Assassination Policy’. Political Studies, vol. 51, 2004, pp. 350-368. Israeli High Court of Justice, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 7609/04, 2006. Accessible at . Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Briefing by Colonel Daniel Reisner’, 15 November 2000. Accessible at . Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Hizbullah Attacks Northern Israel and Israel’s Response’, 2006. Accessible at . Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ‘Palestinian Terrorism in 2005’, 31 December 2005. Accessible at . International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. ‘Tadic Interlocutory Appeal’, 1995. Accessible at . Kuwait News Agency, ‘World Efforts Continue to Stop Escalating Israeli Violence in Middle East’, 14 July 2006. Accessible at . Lawrence, B. (ed.), Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden. Verso, New York, 2005. Mayer, J., ‘Outsourcing Torture’. New Yorker, 14 Feb. 2005. Accessible at . Pape, R., Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House, New York, 2005. Posner, E., ‘Terrorism and the Laws of War’. Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 5, 2004, pp. 423-434.
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______________________________________________________________ Roth, K., ‘The Law of War in the War on Terror’. Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, 2004, pp. 2-7. Supreme Court of the United States. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct.2749, 2004. Available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/ 05pdf/05184.pdf>. Tisdall, S., ‘White House Close to Guantanmo Decision’. Guardian Unlimited, 22 June 2007. Accessible at . UN News Centre, ‘Security Council Must Condemn Israeli Attack, Demand Cessation of Hostilities, Annan Says’, 30 July 2006. Accessible at . Urquhart, C. and C. McGreal, ‘Israelis Invade Lebanon after Soldiers are Seized’. Guardian, 12 July 2006. Accessible at . Vorkink, M. and E. Sheik, ‘The ‘War on Terror’ and the Erosion of the Rule of Law’. Human Rights Brief, vol. 14, 2006, pp. 2-6.
The Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications for Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation of Outer Space Arjen Vermeer Abstract The military use of outer space has been integral to national security strategies since the space age began, almost 50 years ago. Recent developments in technology and military doctrine have led to states’ being increasingly interested in deploying weapons in space. An assessment of the situation in terms of international law is therefore necessary. Contrary to common belief, the arms control provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty reserve only celestial bodies for peaceful purposes’: it thus limits military activities in the space between them - outer void space – only in respect of prohibiting weapons of mass destruction applying general international law, including the UN Charter. But force application by space weaponry challenges the regime governing the use of force in international relations, jus ad bellum. First, the concept of force needs to be revisited. Second, the differentiated regimes of outer void space and celestial bodies have a significant impact on the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence, including the deployment of spatial missile defence shields. Thus I shall explore a possible jus in bello spatiale. Military activity in space is likely to increase in wars to come. We therefore need a framework for applying the norms of international law in outer space. Key Words: Ballistic missile defence, environmental protection, law of armed conflict, militarisation and weaponisation of space, outer space treaty ***** 1.
Introduction The ascent into space of man-made objects made it possible to use space as a medium for military purposes. Space militarisation can be described as any activity in space, which is executed by a man-made object incorporated de jure or de facto in the military organisation of a State.1 Satellites, for instance, may perform a number of military tasks, including communications, weather information, remote sensing and navigation (e.g. GPS and missile guidance). Space weaponisation describes the introduction of operational weapons systems in outer space, such as Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEWs) and Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). The object of Kinetic Energy Weapons is simple: a ‘kill’ is being achieved through high
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______________________________________________________________ velocity impact (hit-to-kill). Directed Energy Weapons include a broad variety of technologies such as lasers, particle beams and signal interference technologies, the latter including high-powered microwaves or high power radio frequencies. Electromagnetic and Radiation Weapons (ERWs), a subcategory of DEWs, operate through the emission and/or creation of an electromagnetic pulse or radiation. The device that brings about both consequences at once is a nuclear weapon. Lastly, Explosive Proximity Weapons (EPWs), also referred to as space mines, explode upon contact or in proximity. Despite these technological development, political realities have prevailed to the extent that apart from the USA, all states involved in space are very careful not explicitly to include space capabilities in their national military doctrines.2 Nevertheless, the weaponisation of space by these, and other, nations looms no less.3 This chapter focuses on whether and to what extent force application by space weapon systems is, or ought to be, regulated under existing international law, in particular the Outer Space Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations and the laws of armed conflict. 2.
Obligations Arising from Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), consisting of two paragraphs, has significant bearing on military activities in space.4 A. Article IV(1): Weapons of Mass Destruction The first paragraph prohibits putting ‘nuclear and any other weapon of mass destruction’ in orbit or in outer space. However, the treaty leaves crucial terms undefined, in particular ‘outer space’ and ‘orbit’. It is generally understood that ‘outer space’ comprises celestial bodies, including the Moon,5 and all space in between, so-called outer void space.6 ‘Orbit’ means at least one full orbit around the Earth in order to exclude from the scope of the provision intercontinental ballistic missiles (possibly carrying nuclear warheads) passing through space.7 Further, the object of the prohibition is objects carrying weapons of mass destruction, not the weapons per se. Nonetheless, for the purposes of the OST, nuclear weapons that do not have the characteristics of a weapon of mass destruction and a fortiori do not contain nuclear material intended for use as a weapon are excluded from the prohibition.8 Thus, space weapons that use nuclear energy, such as some DEWs, but that does not possess the characteristics in effect or design of a weapon of mass destruction fall outside the scope of Article IV(1). B. Article IV(2): The ‘Peaceful Purposes’ Debate Article IV(2) is concerned with the demilitarisation of ‘the Moon and other celestial bodies’ only.9 It is important to keep in mind that in 1967 neither the US nor the Soviet Union attempted to bring about a complete
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______________________________________________________________ demilitarisation of the whole of outer space.10 The omission of any reference to outer space sensu lato is therefore deliberate. Nevertheless, Article IV(2) arguably has the effect of establishing a regime of complete demilitarisation, albeit spatially limited to celestial bodies. The main debate, however, focuses on the interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’ in the context of the use of outer space for ‘peaceful purposes’. The USA argues that ‘peaceful’ means ‘non-aggressive’, but this is erroneous.11 Replacing ‘peaceful’ by ‘non-aggressive’ in Article IV(2) would mean - if one accepts the limited spatial application of Article IV(2) - that outer void space may be used for aggressive purposes.12 This conclusion cannot be warranted, however, particularly as Article III makes the UN Charter and its provisions on the prohibition of the use of force applicable to outer space. In other words, the American interpretation would make Article IV(2) redundant. According to the customary rules of treaty interpretation, treaty terms are to be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty concerned. ‘Peaceful’, therefore, should be understood as ‘non-military’.13 First, the ordinary meaning of ‘peaceful’ implies ‘non-military’. Second, in the context of the OST there are several references to ‘peaceful purposes’ hinting at a non-military point of view.14 Third, other treaties with a similar nature can be referred to for interpretation purposes, as the practice of the ICJ has shown.15 There are a number of treaties that, according to their object and purpose, understand ‘peaceful’ to denote ‘non-military’.16 Admittedly, none of these treaties provides a definition of ‘peaceful’. But there is no indication that the parties intended to attach any special meaning to it; hence it is reasonable to argue that the ordinary meaning of ‘peaceful’, as ‘non-military’, should also be applied to Article IV(2). C. Military Space Activities in Outer Void Space The OST regulates military activities in differentiated regimes; one addresses the Moon and other celestial bodies (Article IV(2)), and the other the outer void space (Article III).17 In light of the above, one may reasonably conclude that the use of force in outer void space should therefore be judged by general international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and the law of armed conflict. 3.
The Threat or Use of Force in Outer Space The cornerstone provision on the regulation of the use of force between states is the well-known Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force in international relations.18 Article 2(4) is a declaration of customary international law and even considered to be jus cogens,19 thus binding upon all states in all their international relations, including those in outer space. However, Article II of the OST excludes appropriation in outer
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______________________________________________________________ space sensu lato and, thus, negates the possibility of the use of force against territorial integrity.20 Without an associated terrestrial attack, the political independence of a State is not threatened.21 Hence, all uses of force in outer space are necessarily subject to the ‘in ‘any other manner inconsistent’ with the UN Charter’ clause. It is generally accepted that ‘force’ denotes armed force.22 However, signal interference weapons, for instance, do not apply force in the ‘classical’ sense that is to say, as kinetic weapons do.23 To make Article 2(4) applicable, then, Brownlie argues that new types of force application devices would be covered if ‘the agencies concerned are commonly referred to as ‘weapons’ and forms of warfare’ and if ‘these weapons are employed for the destruction of life and property’.24 This re-interpretation of the notion of force seems justified in light of the generally accepted understanding of ‘force’ as ‘armed force’. 4.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter The only generally accepted exceptions to prohibition on using force are a Security Council authorisation and forcible measures taken in the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. The United Nations system provides the Security Council with coercive means under Chapter VII of the Charter. Though the drafters of the Charter may not have been concerned with the inclusion of space limitations, it would seem perverse not to extend this application to outer space. Prior to applying these means, however, the Security Council has to determine a situation pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, most likely a threat to the peace. This could involve either a threat to mankind (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, space debris, or theoretically even space weaponisation as such) or a threat to another state’s national security (threat or use of force against a state’s space assets). Interestingly, Article 41 provides for the possibility of interrupting ’telegraphic, radio and other means of communication’.25 This could include space-based assets, such as communication and GPS satellites. Lacking any reference to space or space forces, however, Article 42 would not automatically bar military measures from or in outer space. But even if such a literal approach were adopted, there are no grounds on which to assume that the Security Council could not change this interpretation by subsequent practice.26 To a certain extent, in fact, this has already been achieved with regard to military space activities. Moreover, technological advances in space could serve as an asset in UN peacekeeping missions.27 Space assets, then, may not only be called upon to support Earth-based measures, but force application in or from outer space may come within the purview of the envisaged actions as well.
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______________________________________________________________ 5.
Self-Defence Article 51 of the UN Charter does not conclusively define the right of self-defence: rather, it sets out the conditions under which measures in self-defence are lawful.28 Basically, it requires an armed attack and prescribes a temporary response until the Security Council steps in. Customary international law places two additional constraints upon the lawful exercise of this right, namely necessity and proportionality.29 How exactly might this right of self-defence apply to outer space, given the common acceptance that the principle of self-defence should apply?30 A. Self-Defence in Outer Void Space The right of self-defence would need to be activated in the event of an attack on a military space asset wherever it were located.31 However, there is considerable controversy as to whether the individual right of self-defence extends to the protection of civil assets owned by either a state’s own nationals or by another state’s nationals outside the territory where they are registered.32 Since space assets - military or civil – have to be registered in a particular state, these may benefit from diplomatic protection by the state concerned.33 Support can thus be found for the claim that the protection of any state-registered asset falls within the ambit of protection afforded by the right of self-defence.34 B. Self-Defence On Celestial Bodies The issues related to the interpretation of ‘peaceful purposes’ can be put in the context of the place of self-defence in the regulation of a demilitarised zone in general, and of celestial bodies in particular. A socalled non-aggressive approach would argue in favour of military installations on celestial bodies for the exclusive purpose of self-defence.35 But such individual self-defence would preclude the demilitarisation of celestial bodies as a collective act tailored precisely to prevent threats to peace quite generally, and thus to each individual state. Celestial bodies are best thought of as res communis and denoted as demilitarised zones to achieve precisely such collective self-defence. Were this to be accepted, then – as in other areas – this could not be derogated from, even in wartime. Hence I would argue that Article IV of the OST can, and should, be understood as precluding any military activity whatever on celestial bodies, whether it be offensive or defensive. C. Ballistic Missile Defence A ballistic missile defence system seeks to defend the state through, among other things, military deployment in outer space that aims to track and intercept incoming missiles. It may be characterized as a magnified effort of the generally accepted concept of ‘interceptive self-defence’.36 The issue
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______________________________________________________________ involved here does not so much concern the orbit of those components - this is an entirely legal activity when compliant with Article IV of the OST - but rather that some of these components would undoubtedly claim a protection, identification or exclusion zone around them, so that any space asset coming within such a zone would risk being targeted. The question then is this: does the apparently permanent nature of the associated ‘keep out zones’ of these assets run counter to international law? On the high seas, states have arguably acquiesced in the declaration of such zones, at least for the duration of a conflict.37 Interestingly, the claim that such a deployment of assets would contradict the principle that outer space cannot be occupied appears to be losing ground, but state practice here is at best inconclusive.38 Yet a strong argument can be presented that such a zone - be it in peace- or wartime would be contrary to the freedom of navigation in space.39 Thus it seems that permanent ‘keep out zones’ would indeed fall outside the legal framework and limit current initiatives for the unilateral deployment of ballistic missile defence when assets used for it make peacetime use of such zones. 6.
The Law of Armed Conflict in Outer Space The use of force is judged both by the regime governing the legal resort to armed force, jus ad bellum, and by the law applicable to the conduct of armed conflict, jus in bello. Over time, several significant principles have been accepted as applicable to any type of armed conflict: military necessity, humanity, proportionality and discrimination. But it cannot be simply assumed that this corpus applies in toto to armed conflict in outer void space, just because of the unique environment that the latter presents. However, to assume that hostilities will not arise in outer space would be entirely unrealistic. How, then, might the customary laws of armed conflict be attuned to that environment minimally shaped as they are by the OST? I shall focus here on two important applications of the principles underlying that treaty’s provisions: the protection of the space environment and targeting in space. A. Means of Warfare: Protecting the Space Environment The concern of the law of armed conflict for the protection of the environment is evident in its dealing with the effect of warfare on the environment and with the use of the environment as a means of warfare.40 Article 35(3) and Article 55 form the direct protection regime of the environment afforded by the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I). It is safe to assume that both provisions are now entrenched in the body of customary law, although there is some disagreement about this.41 The place of Article 55(1) in the section on the protection of the civilian population on land may suggest that its application is confined to land warfare. However, Article 35(3) is less limited and
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______________________________________________________________ extends such protection to all types of warfare, including space warfare. However, although both articles mention the ‘natural environment’, it is nowhere in AP I defined. Thus one could interpret the term in such a way as to make these provisions applicable to all orbits around celestial bodies 42 in the event that future generations may inhabit, at least be present on or in orbit around, celestial bodies. While those bodies and orbits would on this account be covered by the regime protecting the environment of space, the rest of outer space would however remain excluded; and this would need in the long run to be remedied. Turning to the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention), this is concerned with the deliberate manipulation of the natural process (Article I) and is explicitly applicable to outer space (Article II). Nevertheless, the treaty’s utility in the context of space weapons is doubtful, as current space weapon technology does not focus on deliberately manipulating the natural process.43 Be that as it may, force application in space will leave its traces during and long after any armed conflict in the form of space debris. Furthermore, debris in space can also have the same effect as a weapon.44 Since, then, it would take an enormous effort by belligerents to limit the production of space debris a future law of armed conflict in space should reflect this appropriately. B. Targeting Issues For the most widely accepted contemporary definition of a military objective, one has to consider Article 52(2) AP I of the Geneva Convention.45 This article is intended to give effect to the principle of distinction, contained in Article 48 AP I, between civilian and military objects. It sets out a twopronged test for an object to qualify as a military objective. First, it must by its nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action. The ‘nature’ of a military object is established by its integration in the military structure. Its ‘location’ generally refers to either a construction located at a strategic point or a designated area as a whole: interestingly, the latter could include an orbit.46 The criterion of ‘purpose and use’, generally indicating as it does a dual-use (military and civilian) object, speaks for itself. Second, the objective’s total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization must offer a clear military advantage in the circumstances as they prevail at the time. The question thus arises whether a civilian satellite or spaceship that provides information for military purposes, or performs military functions, can be considered to be a military objective, as a dual-use object.47 Interestingly, it was proposed that certain means of communication, including satellites, fall under Article 52(3), where it is stated that in case of doubt a civil object is presumed to be so used; but these were ultimately excluded precisely on account of their more probably being used for military
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______________________________________________________________ purposes in wartime.48 Hence, the general rule of Article 52(2) should apply, that in the case an object has a military purpose or use, it constitutes a legitimate target, notwithstanding its registration as a civil space asset. There are also a number of proportionality issues, which serve to make targeting a legal labyrinth. These issues are further complicated, it seems, by multi-ownership and neutrality issues. However, all that the law requires (Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(a)(ii) AP I) is to weigh the concrete and direct anticipated military advantage against the anticipated loss of civilian lives; the latter must not be excessive in relation to the former.49 The foreseeable long-term or reverberating effects - except environmental concerns - are, even if identifiable, not considered as part of the current legal restraints on targeting. They appear clearly to worry states nonetheless, as they increasingly rely on sophisticated and (civil-military) integrated systems, networks and infrastructure.50 These systems often use satellites which, in turn, are the likely objectives of space weapons; and since attacking these satellites may damage large civil segments of any contemporary state, dependant as these are on satellite data and communications, they too need to be brought into the ambit of the law of armed conflict. 7.
Conclusion Technological developments and states’ interest in the weaponisation of space call for a legal appraisal. The OST’s regulation extends only to its prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and its nonmilitarisation provision applies only to celestial bodies. The OST thus leaves it to other norms to fill the gaps but determines through its differentiated regimes the framework in which other sources regulate the use of force. Moreover, space weaponry itself poses a challenge to existing norms. The prohibition on the use of force requires an acknowledgment of this challenge. In particular, an extension of the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is clearly needed, and the reach of the legal right of self-defence has to take account of the division of regimes in the OST. However, a law of armed conflict in space - a jus in bello spatiale – is unlikely to emerge in the near future: laws of armed conflict tend to be shaped after a conflict rather than in advance. Nevertheless, the issues identified above are central in the shaping of such a legal regime.
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Notes 1
J F von Bentzien, ‘Die militärische Nutzung des Weltraums in Friedensund Kriegszeiten aus rechtlicher Sicht’, Zeitung für Luft- und Weltraumrecht, vol. 35, 1986, p. 324. 2 ‘In order to … enhance national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities (in order to) [E]nable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there’. - National Science and Technology Council, Fact Sheet: National Space Policy, 19 September 1996, accessed 6 April 2006, . This was followed a recommendation made by a 2001 congressional commission, chaired by later to be Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld: ‘[W]e know from history that every medium-air, land and sea-has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities.’ - Report of the Commission to Access United States National Security Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001, p. 100, accessed 6 April 2006, . 3 T Hitchens, ‘Developments in Military Space: Movement toward space weapons?’, accessed 4 April 2006, . See also J W Heath, ‘The Vanishing Horizon: Will the Asymmetric Battlefield Make Space-Based Weapons a Reality?’, Proceedings of the Forty-fifth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, vol. 45, 2003, p. 206 ff. 4 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS. 205, entered into force, October 10, 1967. Article IV OST reads: ‘1. States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 2. The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.’
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The Moon has always been treated as a celestial body in the framework of the UN. In resolutions and agreements subsequent to GA Resolution 1884(XVIII) explicit reference was made to ‘the Moon and other celestial bodies’ (emphasis added). See for example C Q Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space, Pergamon Press, New York, 1982, p. 22. In the case of Article IV(1) of the OST this exclusion should be attributed to poor drafting: compare Article IV(2). 6 The term ‘outer void space’ was introduced by B Cheng, ‘Introducing a New Term to Space Law: ‘Outer Void Space’’, Korean Journal of Air and Space Law, vol. 11, 1999, p. 321 ff. Outer space in the sense of Article IV(1) of the OST is, thus, outer space sensu lato. 7 See L Condorelli, and Z Mériboute, ‘Some Remarks on the State of International Law Concerning Military Activities in Outer Space’, It.YIL, vol. 6, 1985, pp. 20-25. 8 Compare Article 5 of the 1967 Treaty For The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 634 UNTS 326, entered into force 22 April 1968. See also Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror - Freeing the World from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, 2006, pp. 17, 32 and 42, accessed 9 April 2007, < http://www.wmdcommission.org >. 9 Even though in the second sentence of Article IV(2) there is a reference only to ‘celestial bodies’, the Moon is clearly such; it therefore cannot be excluded from the scope of that sentence. But see R J Zedalis and C L Wade, ‘Anti-Satellite weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967’, California Western ILJ, vol. 8, 1978, p. 461. 10 This became apparent when both superpowers rejected a proposal to that effect, see UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1493 and UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2.SR.66 of August 1, 1966. 11 Initially, both the USA and the Soviet Union aimed at a complete demilitarisation of outer space. See D Goedhuis, ‘An Evaluation of the Leading Principles of the Treaty of Outer Space of 27th January 1967’, NILR, vol. 15, 1968, p. 23. However, it was already in 1958 that the availability, use and potential of satellite systems prompted the USA to change its interpretation of ‘peaceful’ from ‘non-military’ to ‘non-aggressive’: see C M Petras, ‘The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial Space Systems - Reexamining ‘Self-Defense’ in Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities’, J. Air L.&Com., vol. 67, 2002, p. 1253. 12 Thus Vlasic concludes that ‘[i]f ‘peaceful’ means ‘non-aggressive’, then it follows logically – and absurdly - that all nuclear and chemical weapons are
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______________________________________________________________ also ‘peaceful’, as long as they are not used for aggressive purposes’: I A Vlasic, ‘The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’, B. Jasani (ed.), Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva; Taylor & Francis, UNIDIR, Geneva, New York, 1991, pp. 44-45. 13 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 1969, 679, Article 31(1). Article 31 VCLT reflects customary law: see ICJ Reports 1999, Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment, 1999, p. 4, para. 18. 14 Following Article 31(2) VCLT, see OST, preambular paragraphs 2 and 4, Articles IX and XI. 15 See ICJ Rep. 1980, Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between WHO and Egypt case, p. 73, paras. 45-47. 16 1956 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 276 UNTS 3, entered into force October 26, 1956; 1959 Antarctic Treaty; 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty; 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161, entered into force March 5, 1970; 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention; 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The object and purpose of those treaty provisions referring to ‘peaceful purposes’ are similar to that of the Article IV OST, namely of an arms control or disarmament nature. The notable exception is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3, entered into force November 16, 1994, which refers to ‘peaceful purposes’ in its Article 88, but which is nevertheless generally considered to denote ‘non-aggressive’. 17 B Cheng, ‘Properly Speaking, Only Celestial Bodies Have Been Reserved for Use Exclusively for Peaceful (Non-Military) Purposes, but Not Outer Void Space’, M.N. Schmitt (ed.), International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Essays in Honour of Professor L.C. Green on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday, International Law Studies vol. 75, Naval War College, Newport, 2000, pp. 81-117 and G Zhukov and Y Kolosov, International Space Law, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984, p. 224. 18 Article 2(4) UN Charter reads: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’ 19 See for example ICJ Reports 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 27
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______________________________________________________________ June 1986, p. 14 (Nicaragua case), para. 83. Note that the Court did not acknowledge this status but underlined its support thereof. 20 It has, however, been argued that territorial integrity may, in addition to land mass, be interpreted to include human and natural resources in space: see R L Bridge, ‘International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space’, Akron L.Rev., vol. 13, 1979, p. 660. 21 See I Brownlie, ‘The Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Outer Space’, BYIL, vol. 40, 1964, p. 8 and R Higgins, ‘The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice’, BYIL, vol. 37, 1961, p. 283. 22 Support for this interpretation can be found for instance in the preambular paragraph 7 of the UN Charter and UN Doc. GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of October, 24, 1970 Declaration On Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations And Cooperation Among States In Accordance With The Charter Of The United Nations. 23 See for example W von Kries, ‘Die militärische Nutzung des Weltraums’, K-H. Böckstiegel and M. Benkö (eds.), Handbuch des Weltraumrechts, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 1991, pp. 337-338. 24 I Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 362. He further argues that ‘it would be in accordance with general principles of law to include intended and direct consequences in the prohibition of the use of force in international relations’ - p. 25. 25 Article 41 UN Charter reads: ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’ 26 See R J Lee, ‘The Jus ad Bellum in Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space’, J. of Space Law, vol. 29, 2003, p. 110, in particular fn. 32. 27 See R A Morgan, ‘Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and ‘Peaceful Purposes’’, J. Air L.&Com., vol. 60, 1994-1995, p. 309. This applies not just to UN SC authorized missions but also to those pursuant to UN Doc. A/Res/377(V) of 3 November 1950, Uniting for Peace and to regional arrangements under Articles 51-53 of the UN Charter. 28 Article 51 UN Charter reads: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack
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______________________________________________________________ occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain international peace and security.’ 29 Nicaragua case, para. 176; ICJ Report 1996, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, p. 226 (Nuclear Weapons case), para. 226; and, ICJ Reports 2003, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 6 November 2003, para. 76. 30 See Morgan, pp. 307-308; N Ronzitti, ‘Problemi Giuridici Sollevati dale Iniziative in Materia de Disarmo Spaziale’, F. Francioni e F. Pocar (eds.), Il Regime Internazionale dello Spazio, Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1993, pp. 79-87; E.S. Waldrop, ‘Weaponization of Outer Space: US National Policy’, AASL, vol. XXIX, 2004, pp. 18-21; L Haeck, ‘Aspects Juridiques de Certaines Utilisations Militaires de l’Espace’, AASL, vol. XXI, 1996, pp. 9297. For an early recognition of this right, see J C Cooper, ‘Self-Defense in Outer Space and the United Nations’, I.A. Vlasic (ed.), Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays by John Cobb Cooper 1946-1966, McGill University Press, Montreal, 1968, pp. 412-422. For an example of a certain confusion about this at the beginning of the space age, see M Chandrasekharan, ‘The Space Treaty’, Indian JIL, vol. 7, 1967, p. 61 ff, where the application of the right of self-defence to outer space is denied. 31 Compare A V Lowe, ‘Self-Defence at Sea’, W.E. Butler (ed.), The NonUse of Force in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 188: ‘the extension of the right of self defense to cover warships is arguably necessary for the practical survival of the right to defend the State itself’. 32 That collective self-defence would permit such action seems clear from the text of Article 51 itself: see Haeck, p. 84. 33 See Article VIII of the OST. The 1975 Registration Convention requires every man-made space object to be registered by the launching State: see ICJ Rep. 1955, Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), p. 24, in which the Court held that a State ‘assumes the defense of its citizens by means of protection as against other States’; A Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization, North-Holland, Amsterdam/New York, 1986, p. 74, fn 84; and Brownlie, International Law, p. 4. This matter may be complicated by the
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______________________________________________________________ fact that space assets may be registered in one state but owned by an entity in another . 34 See for instance H H Almond, ‘Military Activities in Outer Space - The Emerging Law’, Proceedings of the Twenty-third Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, vol. 23, 1981, p. 150 and Haeck, p. 89, fn 88. 35 See for instance Almond, p. 150 and idem, ‘Demilitarization and Arms Control: Antarctica’, Case Western JIL, vol. 17, 1985, p. 250. 36 Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 172. 37 See C Michaelsen, ‘Maritime Exclusion Zones In Times Of Armed Conflict At Sea: Legal Controversies Still Unresolved’, JCSL, vol. 8, 2003, p. 363 ff and W J Fenrick, ‘The Exclusion Zone: Device in the Law of Naval Warfare’, Can.YIL, vol. 24, 1986, p. 91 ff. 38 It has been argued that if such a defence is required, it should be constructed cooperatively: for example D Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2006, pp. 126-127 and T Graham Jr., ‘Space Weapons and the Risk of Incidental Nuclear War’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, 2005, p. 12 ff. 39 Article I OST. See Bentzien, pp. 322-323. 40 ICRC Commentary, Article 35, para. 1450, accessed 2 April 2007, . See also P J Richards and M N Schmitt, ‘Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict’, Stetson L.Rev., vol. 28, 1999, p. 1049. 41 See M Bourbonnière, ‘Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Ius in Bello Satellitis’, JCSL, vol. 9, 2004, p. 43 ff and L Henkaerts and L Doswald-Beck, ICRC Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, CIHL Rules 44-45. For a xcontrary view, see Y Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under The Law Of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge University , Cambridge, 2004, p. 185: Dinstein cites the authority of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case to argue that these provisions ‘have not yet crystallized as customary international law’. 42 Note that a direct reference to the stability of the ecosystem on Earth was rejected; nonetheless, the definitions mentioned in the text above appear to pursue precisely this purpose, as opposed to the characterization of the environment as a ‘human environment’: see ICRC Commentary, Article 35, para. 1451. 43 See N Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1999, p. 114 and R A Ramey, ‘Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space’,
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______________________________________________________________ AFLR, vol. 48, 2000, p. 58: ‘So long as space weapons do not change the outer space environment ‘through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes’, the treaty is not likely to serve as a bar to the deployment or use of space weapons.’ 44 M Benkö, ‘The Problem of Space Debris: A Valid Case Against the Use of Aggressive Military Systems in Outer Space?’, in Benkö and Schrogl (eds), Space Law: Current Problems and Perspectives for Future Regulation. Eleven International Publishing, Utrecht, 2005, p. 167. 45 Article 52(2) reflects customary law: see CIHL, Rules 40-45. 46 See M Bourbonnière, ‘National Security Law in Outer Space: The Interface of Exploration and Security’, J. Air L.&Com., vol. 70, 2005, pp. 5960. 47 Regarding the lawful military use of satellites, see Morgan. On the International Space Station, see C M Petras, ‘‘Space Force Alpha’, Military Use of the International Space Station and the Concept of ‘Peaceful Purposes’’, AFLR, vol. 53, 2002, p. 135. The answer to this question pertains equally to multi-owner space assets: see Ramey, pp. 144-150. 48 ICRC Commentary, op. cit., Article 52, note 3. These communication means included broadcasting and television stations, and also telephone and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance. 49 CIHL, Rule 14. 50 M Sassòli, ‘Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law’, Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, June 27-29, 2003, p. 7, accessed 3 April 2007, .
Bibliography Almond, H.H., ‘Demilitarization and Arms Control: Antarctica’. Case Western JIL, vol. 17, 1985, pp. 229-284. _______
, ‘Military Activities in Outer Space - The Emerging Law’. Proceedings of the Twenty-third Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, vol. 23, 1981, pp. 149-157. Benkö, M., ‘The Problem of Space Debris: A Valid Case Against the Use of Aggressive Military Systems in Outer Space?’, in M. Benkö and K-U. Schrogl (eds.), Space Law: Current Problems and Perspectives for Future Regulation. Eleven International Publishing, Utrecht, 2005, pp. 155-172.
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______________________________________________________________ Bentzien, J.F. von, ‘Die militärische Nutzung des Weltraums in Friedensund Kriegszeiten aus rechtlicher Sicht’. Zeitung für Luft- und Weltraumrecht vol. 35, 1986, pp. 319-334. Bourbonnière, M., ‘Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Ius in Bello Satellitis’. JCSL, vol. 9, 2004, pp. 43-69. Bridge, R.L., ‘International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space’.Akron L.Rev., vol. 13, 1979, pp. 649-664. Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963. _______
, ‘The Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Outer Space’. BYIL, vol. 40, 1964, pp. 1-31.
Chandrasekharan, M., ‘The Space Treaty’. Indian JIL, vol. 7, 1967, pp. 6166. Cheng, B., ‘Introducing a New Term to Space Law: ‘Outer Void Space’’. Korean Journal of Air and Space Law, vol. 11, 1999, pp. 321-327. _______
, ‘Properly Speaking, Only Celestial Bodies Have Been Reserved for Use Exclusively for Peaceful (Non-Military) Purposes, but Not Outer Void Space’, in M.N. Schmitt (ed.), International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Essays in Honour of Professor L.C. Green on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday. International Law Studies, vol. 75, Naval War College, Newport, 2000, pp. 81-117. Christol, C.Q., The Modern International Law of Outer Space. Pergamon Press, New York, 1982. Condorelli, L. and Mériboute, Z., ‘Some Remarks on the State of International Law Concerning Military Activities in Outer Space’. It.YIL, vol.6, 1985, pp. 3-32. Cooper, J.C., ‘Self-Defense in Outer Space and the United Nations’, in I.A.Vlasic (ed.), Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays by John Cobb Cooper 1946-1966. McGill University Press, Montreal, 1968, pp. 412422.
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______________________________________________________________ Dinstein, Y., The Conduct of Hostilities Under The Law Of International Armed Conflict. Cambridge University , Cambridge, 2004. _______
, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. Fenrick, W.J., ‘The Exclusion Zone: Device in the Law of Naval Warfare’. Can.YIL, vol. 24, 1986, pp. 91-126. Goedhuis, D., ‘An Evaluation of the Leading Principles of the Treaty of Outer Space of 27th January 1967’. NILR, vol. 15, 1968, pp. 17-41.
Graham, T. Jr., ‘Space Weapons and the Risk of Incidental Nuclear War’. Arms Control Today, vol. 35, 2005, pp. 12-16. Haeck, L., ‘Aspects Juridiques de Certaines Utilisations Militaires de l’Espace’. AASL, vol. XXI, 1996, pp. 65-103. Heath, J.W., ‘The Vanishing Horizon: Will the Asymmetric Battlefield Make Space-Based Weapons a Reality?’. Proceedings of the Forty-fifth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, vol. 45, 2003, pp. 206-215. Henkaerts, L. and Doswald-Beck, L., ICRC Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. Higgins, R., ‘The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice’. BYIL, vol. 37, 1961, pp. 269-319. Hitchens, T., ‘Developments in Military Space: Movement toward space weapons?’ Available at < http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/space-weapons.pdf>. Hurwitz, A., The Legality of Space Militarization. North-Holland, Amsterdam/New York, 1986. Jasentuliyana, N., International Space Law and the United Nations. Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1999.
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______________________________________________________________ Kries, W. von, ‘Die militärische Nutzung des Weltraums’, in K-H. Böckstiegel and M. Benkö (eds.), Handbuch des Weltraumrechts. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 1991, pp. 307-349. Lee, R.J., ‘The Jus ad Bellum in Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space’. J. of Space Law, vol. 29, 2003, pp. 93-119. Lowe, A.V., ‘Self-Defence at Sea’, in W.E. Butler (ed.), The Non-Use ofForce in International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 185-202. Michaelsen, C., ‘Maritime Exclusion Zones In Times Of Armed Conflict At Sea: Legal Controversies Still Unresolved’. JCSL, vol. 8, 2003, pp. 363-390. Morgan, R.A., ‘Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and ‘Peaceful Purposes’’. J. Air L.&Com., vol. 60, 1994-1995, pp. 237-326. National Science and Technology Council, National Space Policy. Available at . Petras, C.M., ‘‘Space Force Alpha’, Military Use of the International Space Station and the Concept of ‘Peaceful Purposes’’. AFLR, vol. 53, 2002, pp. 135-181. _______
, ‘The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial Space Systems - Reexamining ‘Self-Defense’ in Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities’. J. Air L.&Com., vol. 67, 2002, pp. 1213-1268. Ramey, R.A., ‘Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space’. AFLR, vol. 48, 2000, pp. 1-158. Report of the Commission to Access United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001. Available at .
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______________________________________________________________ Richards, P.J. and Schmitt, M.N., ‘Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict’. Stetson L.Rev., vol. 28, 1999, pp. 1047-1090. Ronzitti, N., ‘Problemi Giuridici Sollevati dale Iniziative in Materia de Disarmo Spaziale’, in F. Francioni e F. Pocar (eds.), Il Regime Internazionale dello Spazio. Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1993, pp. 79-87. Sassòli, M., ‘Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law’. Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, June 27-29, 2003, unpaginated,. Available at . Vlasic, I.A., ‘The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’, in B. Jasani (ed.), Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva; Taylor & Francis, UNIDIR, Geneva, New York, 1991, pp.37-55. Waldrop, E.S., ‘Weaponization of Outer Space: US National Policy’. AASL, vol. XXIX, 2004, pp. 1-28. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror - Freeing the World from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, 2006. Available at . Wolter, D., Common Security in Outer Space and International Law. UNIDIR, Geneva, 2006. Zhukov, G. and Kolosov, Y., International Space Law. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984.
Yugonostalgia and the Post-National Narrative Stephenie Young Abstract This chapter examines Croatian writer Dubravka Ugre_i’s book The Ministry of Pain (2005), as a narrative of the relationship between nation, 1 narrative and the so-called phenomenon of Yugonostalgia. The latter is defined as a certain disorientation that occurs under the transitional process of ‘new’ political and/or ideological circumstances, functioning as a cæsura in the way that national literatures are read. It starts with an examination of how Ugreši’s work questions how exiles struggle to witness the past while trying to build a new life in the present; of the relationship between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ historical discourse; and of the exile in relation to Agamben’s concept of ‘bare life’. It then explores the relationships between history, memory and justice. How may ‘post-national narrative’ describe these? How does literature grapple with the relation between memory and the recent history of a nation while creating a narrative of a community beyond national boundaries? Finally, does contemporary literature’s attempt to go beyond the border of national literatures add to an understanding of discourses of memory, history and justice or does it only expose a crisis of literature’s role in a so-called transnational setting? Key Words: Exile, justice, memory, nation, ‘post-national’, Ugreši, Yugonostalgia, Yugoslavia ***** Memory aids survival. - Proust2 1.
Synthetic Realities In The Hague there exists an ‘S/M porno club […] called the Ministry of Pain’ - or so Croatian Dubravka Ugreši tells us in the opening pages of her 2005 book The Ministry of Pain [Ministarstvo boli].3 The narrator’s students, exiles from the war ravaged Yugoslavia who now live in Amsterdam not far from The Hague International Tribunal, work in a sweatshop where they make exotic outfits for the local sex shops. The work was simple, the students said: ‘all you had to do was assemble items of sadomasochistic clothing out of leather, rubber and plastic’.4 Because of its proximity to both the sadomasochistic porn club and the famous court that metes out its own version of punishments to the most notorious of international criminals, their nickname for the sweatshop is ‘The Ministry’. A
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______________________________________________________________ name that turns the reader’s attention to justice-related issues such as memory and truth, and hints at the parallels between the artificial reality created in the porn club, the life of an exile who works in the sweatshop to create costumes that aid and abet that false reality, and the synthetically conceived transnational space of the war crimes tribunal. The Hague is also a space that attempts to go beyond traditional national boundaries and as Ugreši says, it is ‘a place meant to make everybody feel at ‘home’’. War criminals, but also exiles from that same war, come to the same place to begin the next stage of their life.5 Thus, the victim and victimiser have both left the scene of the crime, but the spectre of nationalism follows them wherever they may go. This play with exile, synthetic realities, memory and the attempt to conceptualise a place that transcends national boundaries (such as the international war tribunal) in the opening pages of The Ministry of Pain, shows us that in the literature of the former Yugoslavia, narrative is called upon to carry out a complex task. It is asked to function as a disruption of epistemic thought, such as the accepted definition of nation, and to represent a post-war malaise evident during the transitional period both for those who remain in the Balkans and for those who have left for a ‘new’ life. The Ministry of Pain then is a response to, or a thinking-through of war and its haunting ‘afterlife.’ Here, literature is used as an arbiter between trauma and recovery. At the same time Ugreši’s narrative exposes the fragile and synthetic façade of the nation-state and its effort to control and contain national narratives - to delineate and have power over its own history - while it simultaneously makes a claim to be a transnational project that attempts to shatter preconceived notions of the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’. Thus, Ugreši’s text in particular must be studied for its focus on the ongoing struggle for control over historical memory, and the use and abuse of the concept ‘Yugonostalgia’ in this bitter skirmish to delineate national identity during the transitional period. Accordingly, this chapter considers how The Ministry of Pain examines the ways in which one writes the after-life of a particular war and of a nation. The novel is a consideration of the politically charged neologism Yugonostalgia, and of how exiles, in the attempt to counteract the silence imposed upon them by the state, endeavour to construct histories and communities beyond the state toward something called the post-national narrative. It is a narrative that recognizes the role of official discourse, but attempts to move beyond that discourse and create an alternative space of enunciation. Thus the central question I address here is this: how does literature grapple with the relation between memory and the recent history of a nation while it attempts to create a narrative of a community that is beyond national boundaries? Is there a replacement for what we know as national literature? If so, might there be such a thing as a ‘post-national narrative’ that
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______________________________________________________________ functions as an epistemic break in this continuum about the way that nation and literature are related? Finally, does contemporary literature’s attempt to go beyond the border of national literatures add to what one understands about discourses of memory, history and justice or does it only expose a crisis about what literature’s role is in a so-called transnational setting? 2.
Yugonostalgia and Cosmetic Surgery To better understand Ugreši’s book, one must first consider the concept of ‘Yugonostalgia’ - an idealistic longing for a time before the war in the Balkans, which occurs during the transitional period in which new political and/or ideological circumstances have arisen. Ugreši argues that Yugonostalgia is primarily a political weapon used by the state as a response to silence alternative histories. In the Balkans this strangulation of voices has been widespread both during and after the war. This phenomenon of Yugonostalgia that Ugreši grapples with in The Ministry of Pain can be better comprehended if one considers the historical circumstances both leading up to and during the war in the former Yugoslavia. With the death of Tito, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and vast economic decline in the 1980s, it seemed inevitable that the idea of a unified Yugoslavia would dissolve and newly delineated regions would rise up to identify their ‘particular nationalism’.6 As the Balkan states attempted to separate and establish themselves as autonomous, Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman, who was also the former general of Marshall Tito, along with Serb leader Slobodan Milosevi, attempted to ‘re-tailor history’.7 For example, history did not evolve, so to speak, in Croatia. Rather ‘[i]n order to provide Croatian statehood with the legitimacy of historical continuity, Tudjman skipped fifty years of ‘Yugoslavdom’ and grafted the new Croatia directly to the Independent State of Croatia of the 1940s, a Fascist state’.8 This was both confusing and devastating for those caught in the middle of this swift dissolution. Citizens of these newly formed states were asked to disregard the past that they yearned to return to in the wake of the war (idyllic or not), and instead to look toward the future in which new histories would be written by new powers who, according to Ugreši, would manipulate that past at any cost. She writes: They claimed that Yugoslavia was a gigantic lie. The Great Manipulators and their well-equipped teams (composed of writers, colleagues, and even generals!) began to take the gigantic lie apart. . . . They threw ideological formulae out of the dictionary (‘brotherhood and unity’, ‘socialism’, ‘titoism’, etc.) and took down the old symbols (hammer and sickle, red start, Yugoslav flag, national anthem, and Tito’s busts). The Great Manipulators and their teams
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______________________________________________________________ created a new dictionary of ideological formulae: ‘democracy’, ‘national sovereignty’, ‘europeanisation’, etc. The Great Manipulators had taken apart the old system and built a new one of the identical parts.9 Essentially nothing had changed; it was only the existing parts (such as the language, place names and borders) that had been rearranged by the so-called Great Manipulators. In the midst of this rearrangement the people of the former Yugoslavia struggled to hold onto their memories of the pre-war past that they knew as a community, but as Ugreši asserts, ‘[t]he right to collective memory was taken from [exiles, refugees, survivors of the war] and all reminiscence about the former life was termed jugonostalgija by ideologists of the new (Yugoslav successor) states’.10 History was strongarmed by the latest leaders, and their vision of nationalism became the new language. This inability to validate the past made the population even more desperate to construct its own history. Moreover, it did not matter whether that history be based on a ‘real’ past or a synthetic mythological Yugoslavia just as false as any that might be construed by leaders such as Tudjman. It was a matter of memory aiding survival. It became a tug of war over history, where both sides realized that those with the control over the narratives of the past would have power over those of the present and the future. As is well known, the attempted manipulation of the discourse of historical memory is not an uncommon occurrence during transitional eras or in other times. For example, the desire to whitewash the recent past exists in many postdictatorship societies in which the aim of neoliberal power is to present the population with an official history whose structure and content resembles that of what Baudrillard calls a ‘cosmetically corrected’ face.11 With a bit of cosmetic surgery behind closed doors, the object in question historical discourse - exits with a more beautiful visage. In this surgically corrected narrative, past, present and future are all synchronized and compatible because they are rewritten to create a synthetic linearity and cohesiveness. The layering of the real and the hyper-real creates an uncanny moment where the border between the real and the imaginary blurs. Like Baudrillard’s ‘cosmetically corrected’ face, the historical narrative results in a synthetic, plastic version of history determined by the desire of the present. Consequently be it el blanqueo in post-Pinochet Chile or Yugonostalgia in the Balkans, we see how the uncanny aspect of whitewashing attempts to function a corrective tool and is evident during periods when a cosmetically corrected historical discourse is used to cover or deride alternative histories. As a politically charged neologism, ‘Yugonostalgia’ is used by politicians in the Balkans to undermine the reminiscences of a past that they would rather the populace forget. It deems memories of a past, united Yugoslavia to be inane and is a derogatory term, which refers to those who
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______________________________________________________________ are nostalgic for the past (often the exile) rather than willing to face what the newly formed government has deemed ‘truth’ and the ‘improved’ reality of the present. Yugonostalgia then stands in for the sustained desire of the state to control historical memory and to create an official version of history. Thus, it has been used as a political tool in Croatia and other Balkan states to exclude those whose past is not relevant to the present or future needs of that newly formed nation-state. Yugonostalgia is also exploited as a way to divide the population between those who fit into the new nation states’ discourse and those who do not. In other words, the state appears to use Yugonostalgia as a way of excluding citizens who are not willing to adapt the new discourse. Yet this exclusion from the state appears to be logically impossible because those who are excluded from the vision of the new state are still a sector of bodies that identify with and are included by that nation-state through the act of exclusion. These people might be dubbed as what Agamben refers to as ‘bare life’ - someone who exists in the law as an exile. In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben examines the homo sacer, the figure in Roman law who ‘may be killed but not sacrificed’ for his analysis of notions of sovereignty in postmodern nation-states.12 Agamben refigures homo sacer as the bare life that is held in a position of simultaneous inclusivity and exclusivity through the declaration of a state of exception. The homo sacer exposes an unnatural, man-made birth of the sovereign nation-state. In a hierarchical conjunction, the two, homo sacer and the sovereign, are reliant on one another. Without the homo sacer, there is no affirmation of the sovereign, yet the affirmation of the sovereign creates homo sacer, the one who is not sovereign. Hence, in order for a nation-state to define itself, it must define its borders - inclusivity and exclusivity - both aspects essential to the paradigm. Those who exist both inside and outside of the law (i.e. the jurisdiction of the state) are necessary to the body that excludes them. In the case of a transitional state such as Croatia in the 1990s under Tudjman, the relationship between the sovereign (the state) and the homo sacer (the exile) is one of mutual need. The state is able to transform a human into a homo sacer through the revocation of citizenship, for example, leaving the homo sacer in a state of confusion and lost identity. Yet at the same time that the state excludes them, it needs these bodies of evidence to show what is included and what is excluded. For these reasons Yugonostalgia as a means of historical discourse is important not only to those who are outcast from the state, but also to the state itself because the state needs an enemy to counter as it rebuilds its past in sight of the present and future. As with Baudrillard’s reading of cosmetic surgery, there must be something before (the imperfect visage) that needs to be fixed, manipulated and ultimately beautified. This would be the past that
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______________________________________________________________ Yugonostalgia is said to evoke, and therefore must be fixed, cleaned up, and rewritten for the new order. The exile and his or her attempt to write memories of the time before the war, problematises the relation between nation, the exile and claims in historical memory, and should be further examined. 3.
The Exile, Yugonostalgia and Nation The relationship between the exile, Yugonostalgia and nation can be better understood through the first person account of the Yugoslavian exile Tanja Luci in Ugreši’s The Ministry of Pain. It should be noted that Luci clearly acts as a political conduit for the author who herself fled the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and now lives in Amsterdam and that the life of the protagonist loosely parallels that of Ugreši. Assigned to teach SerboCroatian literature at the University of Amsterdam, Luci’s story is a clever polemic about the psychological and physical state of the exile that must live with the traumatic past, while she attempts to establish a new life abroad. In a classroom filled with other twenty and thirty something exiles like herself, Luci decides that rather than teach a language that no longer officially exists, Serbo-Croatian, she will encourage her students to reconstruct their pasts by writing essays that guide their Yugonostalgia and therefore their memories of both Yugoslavian culture before the war and the subsequent disintegration of it. There would be no such thing as an a-political classroom because according to Luci, politics had already decided the fate of her discipline. She says, I was naturally well aware of the absurdity of my situation: I was to teach a subject that officially no longer existed. What we once called jugoslavistika at the university - that is, Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian literature - had disappeared as a discipline together with its country of origin.13 Nevertheless, she and the students would travel to a time before the war to recuperate memories that the leaders of the newly formed nation-states would rather they forget. By the end of the book the reader will come to see that her project to subvert authority and redesign her class around Yugonostalgia in the hopes that her student-exiles will create a new type of community will ultimately fail, and what the reader understands of Luci and she of herself will radically changes as she comes to realize her own fate. Yet, the first half of the book is an exploration of the collected memories of these fellow exiles as they are offered an opportunity to tell personal stories which in other more politicised contexts (such as back ‘home’ in Croatia or Serbia) would be
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______________________________________________________________ framed as subversive histories and exorcised from the discourse of post-war nations as mere utopian myths. In an attempt to witness the trauma of war The Ministry of Pain follows the lives of the students and their interactions with Luci by way of the ‘Yugonostalgias’ they present for their homework. Each student is asked to draw from his or her own memory, from his or her own familiar past, and to write about what stands out in that personal history. At first this seems simple. Though varied in subject matter, their stories that recall the times when there was a so-called unified nation of Yugoslavia before Tito’s death in 1980 and the decade leading to the war appear to unify the diverse classroom space and, to some extent, calm the underlying national tensions that occasionally surface amongst the students. With each story prefaced by its author’s name, the subject matter ranges from ‘Meliha: Bosnian Hotpot’14 (directions for how to make a traditional dish), to ‘Dakko: My Mother Holds Hands with Tito’15 (a memory of his mother as a Pioneer who meets Tito) to ‘Igor: Horror and Horticulture’16 (comments on the demographics of Yugoslav poetry).17 Yet as one reads more of these, it can be seen that they get darker and gloomier in tone. For example, in ‘I Wish I Were a Nightingale,’ Uroš tells the story about how as a very young child he was assigned to write a poem to Tito after the leader had had his leg cut off and was recovering from the operation.18 Uroš wrote that he wished that he ‘were a nightingale so [he] could fly to Comrade Tito’s hospital bed . . .’.19 What begins as a somewhat charming story, a small child writing to his national leader, quickly spirals downward into a critique of the hypocrisy of the student’s own family and culture, and ends with the telling lines: ‘Yugoslavia was a terrible place. Everybody lied. They still lie of course, but now each lie is divided by five, one per country.’20 As Luci urges the students to write their memories, a forum develops in the classroom, which extends to after hours meetings in the pubs and streets of Amsterdam that appears to function as an alternative space for the exchange of personal histories and the recuperation of memory. The extended classroom acts as a depository of memories in which the exiles can immerse themselves in their ‘Yugonostalgias’ beyond the institutional walls of the university. Early on though, Luci has her doubts about such a utopian project both in and outside of the classroom. She writes: I realized I was walking a tightrope: stimulating the memory was as much a manipulation of the past as banning it. The authorities in our former country had pressed the delete button, I the restore button; they were erasing the Yugoslav past, blaming Yugoslavia for every misfortune,
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______________________________________________________________ including the war, I reviving that past in the form of the everyday minutiae that had made up our lives, operating a volunteer lost-and-found service, if you will.21 Even as she makes the decision to go ahead with her project of Yugonostalgia she is wary of the affects it might have and aware of the subjectivity of memory. Whether or not this exchange helps the exilestudents in matters such as how to work through personal pain or how to obtain some form of justice for the crimes that led to their condition, will never be clearly resolved. Yet, even here in the beginning Luci is wary that ‘Perhaps by stimulating memories of the past [she] would destroy its halo. Or perhaps [her] attempt to reconstruct the past would end in no more than a pale imitation, thus exposing the poverty of the ‘baggage’ we deemed so powerful.’22 Nevertheless, she goes ahead with the classroom project, because, as she says ‘it was too late: I had set the gears in motion and could no longer stop them’.23 As the exile-students in The Ministry of Pain attempt to recuperate memories while they form a new community in exile, they also embark on a project that reconsiders the nuances of their own identities alongside the meanings of nationality and nation. This identity crisis is reflected in the daily lives of the students and their attempt to control language. For example, they no longer know what to call themselves: ‘Yugoslavia, the country where they’d been born, where they’d come from, no longer existed. They did their best to deal with it by steering clear of the name, shortening it to Yuga … or playfully transforming it into Titoland or the Titanic. As for its inhabitants, they became Yugos or, more often, simply ‘our people.’24 Yet in exile in the Netherlands they have little control over the language that defines them - they are written off as those who have no control over their identity. As Luci remarks, ‘they were stigmatised as ‘the beneficiaries of political asylum’’, as ‘refugees’, as ‘children of post-Communism’, ‘the fallout of Balkanisation’, or as ‘savages’.25 This identity crisis is a micro-reflection of the immense amount of discourse that has been produced about Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the war. This conversation is consumed with questions about the relation between historical memory and national identity, which often have conflicting answers. For example, how does one shrug off a national identity that he or she has been indoctrinated into and begin again? It is not easy, but as Andrew Baruch Wachtel points out in Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia, it might be possible that national identity can be unlearned and re-learned. Wachtel writes: It is, after all, a fiction to think that most people independently choose their national identity. Rather, people
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______________________________________________________________ have to be taught what a nation is in the first place (for the very concept of a nation is modern, dating back at the earliest to the seventeenth century) and then how to identify with ‘their own nation’. Given that this is so, they can also be retaught, and their national identity and ways of viewing it can change . . . .26 If one can be ‘retaught’ national identity, as is the desire of the newly formed Balkan states, he or she may be able to create other kinds of identities in other communities that are not necessarily based on nationalism. As Benedict Anderson writes in Imagined Communities, communities ‘are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the way in which they are imagined’.27 It is a matter of re-imagining oneself, and through this act perhaps opening up a space for a new definition of community. Both the loss of national identity and the way that both that lost nation and the new community are imagined, is a central concern that arises in The Ministry of Pain which attempts to create a narrative that elucidates the complexities of the experience of a community of exiles. As the students tell their stories, Luci comes to the realization that what they were saying was ‘untranslatable’. She states, ‘we were speaking an extinct language comprehensible only to ourselves’.28 The language of Yugonostalgia had become a private language among Luci’s exiles. And if communication to ‘outsiders’ was seemingly impossible, it was also becoming apparent that the same problem existed amongst themselves to a certain extent. They were only an ‘imagined community’ of discontinuity brought together as a result of their political status and perhaps united by nothing more than their desire to sustain their imagined relationship. For this community to work, it had to keep re-imagining itself. Thus, there arises a self-awareness about the peculiar community of exiles suffering from so-called Yugosnostalgitis, if you will, in which they have found themselves. As Serbs, Bosnians, Croatians and even a Dutch woman who spoke ‘the language’ of the student-exiles with a Bosnian accent, they are aware of both the seriousness and the absurdity of Yugonostalgia to ‘fix’ anything. They all make light of the idea repeatedly. For example, in a critique of the nostalgia for another time and place, the Dutch student Johanneke29 who had been married to a Bosnian but is now divorced with two children, comes to class with Bosnian food that she has bought from a delicatessen during a trip to Rotterdam which she labels, ‘First-Aid Kit for Yugonostalgitis’.30 As one might use sterilizer to clean the bacteria out of a fresh wound, the students eat the food, temporarily medicate the festering of an internal wound, and momentarily the yearning for a return to the past. Therefore, even as they interact in the classroom and meet socially in different parts of the city to exchange stories, there is always the underlying
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______________________________________________________________ reality that most of them are, in one way or another, refugees from a nation and a history that is no longer allowed to exist. They have temporarily been thrown together like a group of addicts searching for a quick fix of the past on the streets of Amsterdam. Even as the student-exiles become conscious of the weaknesses of Yugonostalgia, they appear to be motivated to continue the practice to establish a space of enunciation outside of the nation in which they grew up. This leads to a question that becomes even more entangled in the obscure relationship between exile and nation. Is there a possibility to create a language and a community that functions beyond the nation-state paradigm? Or is this only a literary utopia in which the aggressor (the State) is demonised, and the victims (the student-exiles) are held up as the possessors of truth? These are struggles that arise in the first half of the book in which there seems to be no way to move beyond the hegemonic voice of nation for the exile. Hence a conflict becomes apparent. For the exile, there is the need to move away from nation, but at the same time the exile must continually revert to references about the nation as he or she attempts to create a ‘new’ language that re-imagines a community that transcends nation. It is not surprising that Ugreši explores ways to rise out of these paradoxes. As a vehement polemicist against the manipulation of historical memory and the dangers of ‘forgetting’, she asserts that Croatians in the postwar period have been scorned for any mention of a Yugoslav past that might injure the fragile historical discourse of the present. It is supposed that the post-war re-structuring would create radically different and separate nation states but as Wachtel aptly says: Perhaps if one is a true Croatian or Serbian nationalist it is possible to convince oneself that the sacrifices - political, economic, and moral - have been worth it, but most others would probably agree that the ravaged economies, the millions of refugees, the thousands of rapes and murderers, and the incalculable psychic damage sustained by both the victims and victors was a high price to pay for the creation of five independent South Slavic states. This is particularly true given the fact that so little has actually changed in the new countries, for in great measure the new is merely a repackaged but far less creative version of the old . . . . 31 After the horror of the war, the actual changes are few and slight in many cases. The violent physical restructuring of Yugoslavia, was intended to coincide with, or be closely followed by, a psychological and linguistic restructuring that would parallel the new countries’ identities. No matter how subtle the distinction was between the new nation-states, it was necessary to
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______________________________________________________________ accentuate difference, and language was often at the centre of this positioning. Ugreši shows us just how easily language can both create and obliterate a concept of so-called national unity: Language was a weapon, after all: it branded, it betrayed, it separated and united. Croats would eat their kruh, while Serbs would eat their hleb, Bosnians their hljeb: the word for bread in the three languages was different. Smrt, the word for death, was the same.32 Thus, this reorganization was coupled with the stifling of a hard-won unified Yugoslav tradition and a rejection of anything that hinted at a united Yugoslavia. For Ugreši the only thing that they have left in common is their mortality. No matter how hard the student-exiles try to live in the present and create a new space of community, the past continues to haunt the present. The thing they share, smrt (death), hits hard at the beginning of the third section of the novel when Luci returns from the break in which she had spent a bittersweet week in Croatia with her mother. When she arrives to campus she is told in an offhand manner by a secretary that one of her students was dead. He had committed suicide over the break. She immediately starts to collect the bits and pieces of the story of Uroš’s death from her students. Yes, they’d heard that Uroš had killed himself. No, they didn’t know how it had happened. . . . Oh, and that Uroš’s father was suspected of war crimes and was currently under interrogation at the Hague Tribunal. No, they’d had no idea, no idea about his father.33 As they slowly bring the fragments together, the students admit that they really never knew Uroš well. His life was a secret to them. The only remnant they have is his story about Tito and the Nightingale. Hence, Uroš is just another casualty of the war that they are all trying to escape but that continually haunts them. Their imagined community is not immortal. It is not untouchable. It has limits which can be trespassed and violated, and which are as unstable as their new lives in Amsterdam. Thus, even as they try to create a reality outside of the former Yugoslavia, the former reality that they tried to leave repeatedly impacts them - sometimes fatally. As the lives of the characters in The Ministry of Pain unfold so does Ugreši’s biting critique of nationalism as she strives to untangle some of the complexities of memory and the construction of history in Yugoslavia. According to Anderson, the nation can be defined as ‘an imagined political
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______________________________________________________________ community . . . which is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ and nationalism as that which ‘invents nations where they do not exist’.34 One must remember that essentially the nation and state are distinct entities yet the dream of the state is to become conflated with the dream of the nation and this is where nationalism is created. It is the fantasy for this corrupt marriage to become naturalized to the point in which ethnicity, race etc. and citizenship (or even the biological and the political) have become one psychotic union of identity in which one believes it cannot exist without the other. Ugreši considers what lies behind the different masks that both the exile and the modern day nation wear as she attempts to break down the myths on all sides without creating new ones in their place. Nationalism, Ugreši asserts, serves many different needs and ‘. . . is a struggle for the control of collective memory’.35 She continues: . . . at certain moments nationalism becomes an ideological refuge for those who do not have anything else. Nationalism is also a collective therapy . Nationalism also means being in power to change cultural memory, to rewrite it, touch it up, falsify it and contract it, all in order to preserve the ‘truth’ and ‘history’.36 Ultimately, she says, it is similar to a disease that kills many, yet whose origin and disseminators remain largely unknown, and ‘Yugonostalgia’ is one of the most deadly strains of this disease.37 As she explains, … we had been deprived of what was our right to remember. With the disappearance of the country came the feeling that the life lived in it must be erased. The politicians who came to power were not satisfied with power alone; they wanted their new countries to be populated by zombies, people with no memory.38 Ugreši paints a picture of an apocalyptic society whose leaders wish for the population to return to a glorious past that never existed in the first place. Perhaps what has happened in newly-formed nation-states in Yugoslavia is not as radical as something like the Khmer Rouge’s desire to turn the clocks to year zero in Cambodia. Yet historical discourse in the Balkans would be splintered and compartmentalized to erase the past (a ‘unified’ Yugoslavia) to fit the new self-image of each nation-state. Ugreši employs the term ‘confiscated memories’ to describe this attempt at erasure. ‘Confiscated’ is often used in situations that are lawrelated, or include some kind of authority figure. To have something
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______________________________________________________________ confiscated is to unwillingly release a personal possession to an authorial figure, for example. As children, our parents ‘confiscated’ our toys when we acted out in some way or misused them. As adults, confiscation takes a more serious turn. Our passport is confiscated if we are accused of breaking a law and going beyond the boundary of acceptability. To confiscate a memory then is to violently strip that memory of one jurisdiction and shift it to another to satisfy the other’s desire that others desire for a certain historical memory. Memory, personal and subjective, is used as a political tool when it subsumed by a nation-state and deemed to be the memory of a people, when it is in fact only the newly written narrative of a nation-state that exists in the hope that no one will attempt to look behind the façade to find only emptiness. As a consequence, in The Ministry of Pain it becomes apparent that Ugreši wishes to identify the power struggles over memory and history on all sides but privileges the exile. Yet, the question is whether the exile can move beyond the circumscribed idea of nation in which he or she has been socialized to create some other space of enunciation that does not necessarily hearken back to the nation. In other words, in all of these literary and linguistic games of memory and history, one must ask a key question: Is it possible to move outside of ‘nation’, or is that merely the unfulfilled yet ongoing dream of the exile? It is seemingly a dream because the exile in The Ministry of Pain is caught in a paradox. When he or she is accused of Yugonostalgia by the newly-formed state, he or she is simultaneously recognized by the state, and enveloped into its discourse as the necessary other - the outsider who attempts to create his or her own way of speaking about the after-life of war, (such as with the ‘First-Aid Kit’) who the state must counteract. The state bases its functionality on the forgetfulness of its citizens and its ability to ‘confiscate’ memories. The way that The Ministry of Pain highlights the function of state in its relation to historical discourse, and how it points out what the state must both include and exclude to exist is what marks this text as one that attempts to break new literary ground. It is a narrative that creates a caesura or epistemological break in the accepted framework of the traditional national narrative and creates new ground and possibility for historical discourse that speaks to something beyond the restrictions of the national space and nationalism. That is to say, The Ministry of Pain points to something that might be called the post-national narrative which refers to a caesura in the embedded tradition of national literatures and the role they are expected to play as representatives of the state to some extent. Post-national narrative, as read here, is one which draws attention to the synthetic relationship between the state and literature and looks for different ways to write about exile, human rights, systematic violence, physical displacement and psychical trauma. It is deemed ‘post’ because it
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______________________________________________________________ distinguishes itself in the attempt to create narratives that do not speak for or from a particular nation, and as that, which takes into account the fluidity of borders in the postmodern world. Thus, while it is understood that literature is always engaged to some extent in a conversation with nationalism, the post-national narrative calls attention to the inability to mark a complete rupture with that relation (the relation with the state) while it simultaneously opens onto new possibilities for a type of literature that creates narratives that go beyond traditional parameters and definitions of the national narrative. The possibility for the post-national narrative can be further elucidated in a discussion about the role of justice in the contemporary world, and how this abstract concept that is still undefined is used in The Ministry of Pain as another way to call to attention the imagined relation between the nation-state in the Balkans and the exile. 4.
[Yugo]Nostalgic Justice In his discussion about politics and the State39 in Metapolitics, Alain Badiou breaches the question of what justice is and how it functions in the state apparatus. More specifically, he hones in on a question that concerns human rights’ theorists: We must set out from the following premise: injustice is clear, justice is obscure. For whoever endures injustice is its indubitable witness. But who can testify for justice? There is an affect of injustice, a suffering, revolt. But there is nothing to indicate justice, which presents neither spectacle, nor sentiment.40
According to Badiou there exist witnesses to ‘injustice’ who can speak to that injustice to some extent because injustice has some kind of suffering attached to it. Even if the affects are psychological rather than physical, it still has an object. Yet ‘justice’ is unclear as it has no object. It is abstract. Justice may only show itself in some form of punishment, for example, in the imposed suffering on those who committed the injustice in the first place. In other words, there is a physical consequence that can be seen. In this reading one might believe that something such as the enactment of Hammurabi’s Code on the violator of the law was effective for the way that it showed the implementation of a form of justice, subjective as the punishment might be, for unjust acts to the citizens. It is through this method that the population came to understand that there was a given and therefore accepted equivalence between a crime and its punishment, no matter how abstract. Similarly, one can see this acceptance in modern times in which money as the payment of a fine often replaces corporeal punishment for the very same crime. What this means is that essentially for justice to function successfully the non-relation
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______________________________________________________________ between the crime and the punishment must be forgotten and there must be belief that there is equivalence between the two. Yet, as Badiou discusses the historical development of the concept of ‘justice’ he also surmises that ‘. . . even by drawing on a history . . . we still have no clear idea of what this word [justice] means today’.41 In The Ministry of Pain the examination of justice and memory add to the book’s development of the possibility for a post-national narrative. Not so subtly hinted at in Ugreši’s book is the way the relationship between exile, memory and justice are posited to create an identity that it not necessarily connected to one specific nation state but yet somehow moves beyond the restricted borders established by politics to another space of enunciation. Yugonostalgic justice, if one can call it that, is the attempt to gain justice through remembering. It is through the creation or recreation of a history before the war (although as fallible as any history) that there is an attempt to indicate justice. The narrator Luci believes that she is subverting the institutions that try to control her, including the nation-state and the university to some extent, and attaining justice when she changes the course curricula from the study of Serbo-Croatian literature and language to journal writing that concentrates on Yugonostalgia. Her exile-students must not only remember, but they must write these memories down, and by doing so create a space of enunciation that is privileged to the exiles from Yugoslavia and which turns its back on the state’s supposed control of historical discourse. For Luci, t