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Contents Introduction Chapter 1
ix Pain, Interrogation, and the Body: State Violence and the Law of Torture John T. Parry
Chapter 2
“Too Many Foreigners for My Taste”: Law, Race and Ethnicity in California, 1848-1852 Fernando Purcell
Chapter 3
71
Mental Health Care During Apartheid in South Africa: An Illustration of How “Science” Can be Abused Alban Burke
Chapter 8
59
Exception as the Norm and the Fiction of Sovereignty: The Lack of the Right to Health Care in the Occupied Territories Dani Filc and Hadas Ziv
Chapter 7
47
Adding Injury To Injury: The Case of Rape and Prostitution in Turkey
·tar Gözaydn Chapter 6
31
Sin, Scandal, and Disaster: Politics and Crime in Contemporary Turkey Ruth A. Miller
Chapter 5
17
Protection, Harm and Social Evil: The Age of Consent, c. 1885-c. 1940 Shani D’Cruze
Chapter 4
1
87
Schistosomiasis and Capital Marxism Rui Zhu
101
Contents Chapter 9
The Inevitable Impunity of Suicide Terrorists Elena A. Baylis
Chapter 10
The Lessons of Nuremberg and the Trial of Saddam Hussein Douglas J. Sylvester
Chapter 11
173
The Execution as Sacrifice Jody Lyneé Madeira
Chapter 15
159
New Balance, Evil, and the Scales of Justice Vincent Luizzi
Chapter 14
143
Humanity and Inhumanity: State Power and the Force of Law in the Prescription of Juridical Norms Roberto Buonamano
Chapter 13
127
Responsibility for Atrocity: Individual Criminal Agency and the International Criminal Court Kirsten Ainley
Chapter 12
111
183
Legitimacy and Violence: On the Relation between Law and Justice According to Rawls and Derrida Bram Ieven
Notes on Contributors
199 211
Welcome to an At the Interface Project Evil, Law and the State is an inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary research project which seeks to explore issues surrounding evil and law, with a focus on state power and violence. Perspectives are drawn from those engaged in any field that touches on the study of law and legal culture: anthropology, criminology, cultural studies, government/politics, history, legal studies, literature, philosophy, psychology, religion/ theology, and sociology, as well as those working in civil rights, human rights, prison services, politics and government (including NGOs), psychiatry, healthcare, and other areas. The key themes being explored by the project are: x
when and why is law evil or a source of evil?
x
state violence and coercion
x
justifications for punishment, including capital punishment
x
whether and under what circumstances the adversary or inquisitorial models of legal process generate, tolerate, or allow evil outcomes
x
issues of distributive justice in law, including distributing the costs of legal error
x
the intersection of law with issues of choice, responsibility, and diminished responsibility
x
state responsibility for terrorism, war, intervention, ethnic cleansing, and other problems of international law and international relations
‘At the Interface’ projects aim to bring together people from different areas, backgrounds, and interests to share ideas and explore various discussions which are innovative and exciting. Behind the rationale of the each project is the idea that learning and reflection is best conducted through an interactive process which engages in mutual and reciprocal dialogue. Dr Robert Fisher Inter-Disciplinary.Net http://www.inter-disciplinary.net
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Introduction The topic of “evil” means different things depending upon context. For some, it is an archaic term, while others view it as a central problem of ethics, psychology, or politics. Coupled with state power, the problem of evil takes on a special salience for most observers. When governments do evil – in whatever way we define the term – the scale of harm increases, sometimes exponentially. The evils of state violence, then, demand our attention and concern. Yet the linkage of evil with state power does not resolve the underlying question of how to understand the concepts that we invoke when we use the term. Instead, the question becomes what evil means in the context of and in relation to state power. One approach to this question is to invoke the law. Governments, one might argue, can be constrained in their use of violence by law. When these constraints seem to work, we often describe the result as “the rule of law.” But the rule of law is not an abstract, apolitical, and neutral thing. It results from a complex interaction of forces, so that rule of law ideals and claims that the rule of law actually exists can take a variety of forms. Indeed, under some approaches, one can assert with confidence that repressive regimes are consistent with the rule of law precisely because their policies follow legal forms. Law, then, does not solve the problems of state violence and evil; it merely provides another arena for inquiry, and another set of questions. The fifteen essays in this book share a concern for these issues. Drawn from a broad array of papers presented at a conference on Evil, Law, and the State, held at Mansfield College, Oxford in July 2004, they bring multiple perspectives to bear on the problems of state-sponsored evil and violence, and on the ways in which law enables or responds to them. The approaches and conclusions articulated by the various contributors sometimes complement and sometimes stand in tension with each other, but as a whole they contribute to our ongoing effort to understand the characteristics and workings of state power, and our need to grapple with the harm it causes. The collection begins with my essay, “Pain, Interrogation, and the Body: State Violence and the Law of Torture,” which has two overlapping goals. First, I provide an overview of the complex and incomplete ways in which law responds to state violence, with a focus on the problem of enforcement. Law cannot constrain the violence of the state if it cannot be enforced, yet courts depend upon state power to enforce their decisions. The predictable result is that law often fails to confront or manage state violence. Second, I make these issues concrete through a discussion of the law of torture. I contend that international and domestic laws (using the law of the United States as an example) fail to control or prevent – or even to outlaw – torture, despite the widespread view that torture is absolutely forbidden. The critical move here is the recognition that legal meanings are often intentionally cramped, so that the forbidden category of “torture” fails to cover large areas of violent state action. Chapter Two, “‘Too Many Foreigners for My Taste’: Law, Race and Ethnicity in California, 1848-1852,” by Fernando Purcell, discusses the ways
x
Introduction
in which Anglo-Americans used legal process – both state-sanctioned and vigilante – to discriminate against non-whites and especially against Mexicans and Chileans in the California gold fields. For example, Purcell considers cases of lynching, which was predominantly directed against nonwhite foreigners by popularly-appointed judges and juries. These extralegal tribunals appeared because of many authorities’ lack of legitimacy and power or simply because in many cases authorities did not exist. More legitimate forms of process also supported the racial agenda, as when the state of California imposed special taxes on “foreign miners” and denied non-whites the right to testify in court. Purcell’s larger goal is to explore the ways in which “racial and ethnic discrimination have been attached to many processes of state formation in the last centuries,” as well as to highlight the complicity of ordinary citizens in the formation of laws that permit violence and discrimination. The next chapter is the first of three in which issues of gender and sexuality play important roles. In “Protection, Harm and Social Evil: the Age of Consent, c. 1885-c. 1940,” Shani D’Cruze considers the legal history of the age of consent in cases involving sexual activity by or sexual assault of teenagers and adolescents. She sets out the ways in which identifying the “evil” or “outrage” in such cases is problematic. Evil appeared sometimes in the provocative sexuality of the young person, sometimes in the man (or very occasionally woman) accused, but it was often more diffusely located. Age of consent legislation was intended as much to address wider conceptions of social evil as much as to protect young people and children. Cases applying this legislation contested contradictory conceptualizations of the child as sexually innocent or as sexually knowing, as in need of care and protection or in need of discipline and control. In these decisions, courts differentially emphasized both punishment and welfare. Through this analysis, D’Cruze highlights changes and continuities in the discursive frameworks framing expert, judicial, and popular knowledges about sexuality, youth, and consent. In Chapter Four, “Sin, Scandal, and Disaster: Politics and Crime in Contemporary Turkey,” Ruth Miller begins with a discussion of the devastating 1999 earthquake in western Turkey. She explores the narratives of blame that emerged from that event and reveals how they coalesced around corrupt contractors whose buildings collapsed, leading to the deaths of thousands. Yet the nature of this blame was curious, because it focused less on the deaths caused than on the damage done to the state. Miller goes on to link this assessment of blame to the “Susurluk” political scandal and discusses the ways in which even the concept of deviant sexuality has been co-opted by a discourse of state purity. Put differently, Miller demonstrates and explores the ways in which crime is constructed as an attack on the modern Turkish state. She further suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to Turkey but rather is symptomatic of modernity in general. Chapter Five, “Adding Injury to Injury: The Case of Rape and Prostitution in Turkey,” by ·tar Gözaydn, discusses a different aspect of
Introduction
xi
contemporary Turkish criminal justice. Gözaydn explores changes in Turkish rape law from 1926 to the present, with a focus on former Article 438 of the Turkish Penal Code. She particularly considers the statute’s application to prostitutes, which in turn often involved the use of lesser charges or the imposition of lesser punishments because of their status. From this vantage point, she also considers the history of the women’s movement in Turkey and the interlocking ways in which modernity and womanhood have been described in relation to the Turkish state. The next three chapters share a concern with public health. In “Exception as the Norm and the Fiction of Sovereignty: The Lack of the Right to Health Care in the Occupied Territories,” Dani Filc and Hadas Ziv use Carl Schmitt’s and Giorgio Agamben’s concepts of sovereignty and the state of exception to explain Israel’s health care policies in the Occupied Territories. Under their analysis, limits to freedom of movement, lack of access to health care, and the reactions of Israel’s authorities and judiciary system make plain that the state of exception has become the norm in the Occupied Territories, and Palestinians have become what Agamben termed homines sacri. Filc and Ziv detail how, when the state of exception becomes the rule, the limits between the state of law and the state of violence become blurred. The result, they argue, is that Israel has built a fiction of Palestinian sovereignty to maintain a permanent state of violence. Chapter Seven, “Mental Health Care During Apartheid in South Africa: An Illustration of How ‘Science’ Can be Abused,” by Alban Burke, describes state manipulation of the mental health system under apartheid. Burke highlights the “scientific” basis of apartheid and the ways in which its scientific dogmas became law. For example, he discusses the Involuntary Commitment Law of 1973, which allowed the government to detain people for a legally unspecified period of time without either their families or they themselves knowing where they were. “Idle or undesirable” Black South Africans were committed to mental institutions for various reasons, such as if they broke curfew, went to a general hospital seeking medical treatment and were subsequently admitted to psychiatric hospitals, or were classified as dissidents. To hold the thousands of people who had been committed, disused mining camps were turned into psychiatric facilities. Burke also explains the complicity of mental health professionals in these practices and their continued “shamelessness” about the practice and ongoing effects of apartheid. In Chapter Eight, “Schistosomiasis and Capital Marxism,” Rui Zhu reveals the public health effects – an explosion of schistosomiasis, or liver fluke disease – resulting from the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China. In the process, Zhu describes a particular aspect of the relationship between evil and state power. The construction of the dam led to an increase in the disease, but the government of China failed to take responsibility for the outbreak. Yet the government has not been indifferent to the spread of the disease; to the contrary, it has dedicated resources to combating it. As Zhu
xii
Introduction
observes, this creates a perverse “win-win scenario” – the government of China benefits economically from the dam and also, by failing to admit its responsibility, wins praise for its commitment to public health. Zhu uses this episode to provide more general comments about the current socio-political climate in China, which he calls “Capital Marxism.” With Elena Baylis’ essay, “The Inevitable Impunity of Suicide Terrorists,” the book shifts to a consideration of international law, crimes against humanity, and the “war on terror.” Baylis directs her concern at the claim that suicide terrorists are immune from the ordinary deterrent effects of the criminal process: because they expect to die, the prospect of punishment means little to them. She posits that this impunity drives claims that the criminal process is incapable of dealing with terrorist crimes. Rather than turn to military solutions, Baylis suggests a renewed focus through the criminal law on terrorist organizations. Although those who commit terrorist acts may be undeterrable, their leaders are likely to respond to the incentives created by effective law enforcement. Baylis closes by discussing the need for careful application of this strategy in order to avoid assertions of collective responsibility against the religious or national communities that most terrorist groups claim to represent. In Chapter Ten, “The Lessons of Nuremberg and the Trial of Saddam Hussein,” Douglas Sylvester considers the controversial practice of trying defeated heads of state for war crimes. As Sylvester notes, such trials are often derided as “victor’s justice,” with the corresponding suggestion that they are illegitimate. In response, proponents go to great lengths to ensure that principles of due process are applicable at all stages of the proceeding. Yet the resulting trials are extraordinarily time-consuming and all too liable to be hijacked by defendants who use the process as an opportunity for “personal and political grandstanding.” Sylvester proposes a novel solution to this quandary. Instead of trying to replicate the ordinary criminal process, he urges a frank recognition that these trials are political spectacles at which the result is usually foreordained and the goal is less a conviction than it is a desire to create an accessible historical record. Sylvester seeks to force a reconsideration of what criminal justice means in this context and, more importantly, what the international community should aim to achieve with these trials. Chapter Eleven, “Responsibility for Atrocity: Individual Criminal Agency and the International Criminal Court,” by Kirsten Ainley, explores “the shift in international political discourse away from assigning responsibility for political violence to states and towards assigning criminal responsibility to individuals” – a move that she finds problematic. She then considers the ways in which individual agency is defined in international criminal law, specifically the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Ainley’s conclusion is that the Rome Statute “provides an internally inconsistent concept of the individual: at times seeing the person as a free and rational actor, independent of social role and culture, but conversely requiring
Introduction
xiii
that some persons (the victims) are entirely defined by their social role or group membership.” While she recognizes the forces that led to this contradictory approach, Ainley predicts that the result of the Rome Statute will be neither prevention nor satisfactory justice. The final four chapters of the book provide broader theoretical perspectives on the problems of evil, law, and state power. Roberto Buonamano’s contribution, “Humanity and Inhumanity: State Power and the Force of Law in the Prescription of Juridical Norms,” is “a preliminary attempt to analyze the problem that history creates for the discourse of human rights.” Buonamano begins with the paradox of human rights – the fact that they always depend upon the existence of a political community. From there, he considers how the subject of rights has been constructed in relation to sovereignty and state power. Buonamano is particularly concerned with the transformation of the rights-holder from “man” to a larger but more amorphous conception of humanity. At this stage, human rights become international, yet Buonamano insists that they remain tied to the nation state, so that they stand as “an effect of the form of power exercised within the institutions of the modern liberal state and through the instrument of international law.” Chapter Thirteen, “New Balance, Evil, and the Scales of Justice,” by Vincent Luizzi, asks us to consider overhauling our response to crime so that the emphasis is on the offender’s doing good instead of doing bad to the offender. Luizzi’s proposal – which he terms “new balance” – reflects the influence of therapeutic and restorative justice approaches to criminal justice that de-emphasize retribution and doubt the efficacy of extended incarceration. At bottom, however, Luizzi claims a pragmatic justification – the need for “creative, experimental solutions to problems,” in order to ensure better “practical consequences.” Luizzi then raises the stakes by considering whether such an approach is at all viable in dealing with acts of extreme wickedness, terrorism, or crimes against humanity. To convince skeptics, he provides a detailed “life sentence” for a perpetrator of genocide that includes a variety of activities designed to reform the offender and provide material assistance to victims. In Chapter Fourteen, “The Execution as Sacrifice,” Jody Madeira analyzes the execution – capital punishment – as a ritual in an attempt to understand its redemptive potential. Madeira seeks to unite René Girard’s theory of primitive sacrifice with a more nationalistic theory of execution. She highlights the function of execution as a ritual killing, including the processes of victim selection and ostracization. Sacrifice, moreover, is founded upon redemption. Madeira focuses upon execution’s redemptive and purifying functions, and how these functions are fulfilled by participants such as witnesses, jurors, and the media. She then applies this theoretical framework to the 2001 execution of Oklahoma City Bomber Timothy McVeigh. She concludes by questioning whether executions are truly as “visible” to witnesses as they first appear to be.
xiv
Introduction
The final chapter, Bram Ieven’s “Legitimacy and Violence: On the Relation between Law and Justice According to Rawls and Derrida,” returns to some of the themes touched on in the first chapter. Ieven is concerned about the use of force to make law work, or, more precisely, with the force that is legitimate as opposed to the force that is merely violence. He begins with the problem of violence that founds law as opposed to the more easily legitimized violence that maintains law. Ieven focuses first on Rawls, who ultimately claimed that legitimacy is based on consistency with an overlapping and reasonable consensus within a society, and then on Derrida, who insisted on a difference between law and justice, where justice provides a basis for deconstructing law and critiquing violence. For Ieven, justice and legitimacy are not matters of theory alone but of interpretation, of contingent practice in the world. With his focus on interpretation, contingency, and practice – and his concern for legitimacy – Ieven draws the various themes of this book together, so that readers come full circle while also, I hope, appreciating in new ways the issues and problems of evil, law, and the state. As a way of concluding, I want to thank series editor Rob Fisher and the contributors to this volume for their insight and responsiveness as this project was assembled. I also want to express my gratitude to all of the participants in the Evil, Law, and the State conference, who collectively created an atmosphere of engaged and productive scholarly inquiry. This volume is dedicated to all of them. John T. Parry Portland, Oregon February 2005
Chapter 1 Pain, Interrogation, and the Body: State Violence and the Law of Torture John T. Parry Near the middle of Thomas Mann’s novel, The Magic Mountain, is a chapter titled “Snow.” The protagonist, Hans Castorp – whom Mann goes out of his way to describe as a thoroughly ordinary young man – has been caught throughout the novel in a debate about civilization, violence, law, and values. In “Snow,” Hans tries to leave the debate behind by going skiing. He gets lost in a blizzard, stops at a makeshift shelter, and falls into a stupor. He then has a vision of an ordered, egalitarian, happy, and peaceful country whose people demonstrate love, nobility of spirit, mutual concern and deference. But amidst the landscape is a complex of columned buildings and porticos – a temple, but perhaps too a place in which secular authority resides. Hans makes his way to the middle of the complex, and his vision of peace and love changes to one of horror. Two half-naked old women – crones or priestesses – are tearing a baby into pieces and eating it. Hans stumbles, falls, and wakes from his dream. He vows to remember and draw a lesson from the vision, but by the time he returns to his lodgings, he has forgotten it.1 There are many ways to think about this episode. I want to read Hans’ dream as a myth about civilization, an assertion that violence and death are always present under the trappings of order and peace. Going further, the murderous crones inside the temple suggest that violence is not just present but is necessarily at the heart of our governing structures. Finally, Hans’ reaction to the vision suggests that even when brought face to face with this possibility, we are unable to accept it for very long – that we forget it because we have to, because the violent foundations of civilization are too terrible to affirm. The rest of this paper will grapple with these possibilities. 1.
Private Violence and State Violence Violence is a persistent threat in our lives. Organized state violence responds to and protects us from private violence and the violence of other states. In political theory terms, one might think of Hobbes’ account of government as the solution to a state of nature in which life is nasty, brutish, and short. State violence is not, of course, the only protection we have. Custom, friendship, good faith, ideas of justice, morality, and religion – all play a role in regulating or controlling violence. But state violence or the threat of state violence is particularly effective. One reason may be that most responses to private violence implicitly or explicitly promise consequences of one kind or another, such as shunning, unwillingness to deal with that person in the future, stigma, and damnation, and so they impose a degree of
2
Pain, Interrogation, and the Body
deterrence. Among these responses, the threat of violent punishment is a particularly powerful deterrent. So far, however, we have only the violence of the state opposed to private violence and the violence of other states, which by itself provides limited cause for rejoicing. Without more, the violence of our own state is no better than other forms of violence; it may sometimes be useful to us, but it may also harm us. And precisely because it comes from the state, it will usually be more systematic, sustained, and powerful than other forms of violence. State violence thus raises the threat of – indeed, it actualizes – tyranny and repression even as it holds out the possibility of protection, and the tyranny of state violence could be more destructive than the anarchy of private violence. Moreover, state violence often manifests itself on the bodies of individual members of a community and even more on the bodies of outsiders. State violence thus protects and makes space for creative or productive activity, but it also causes physical pain, mental anguish, and palpable injury. The policeman’s stick, the soldier’s gun, and the tools of the interrogator leave visible or internal marks on people’s bodies and psyches. When we talk about state violence, whether in positive or negative terms, we must be careful to keep in mind what that violence produces. 2.
Law and the Effort to Control Violence Law is one of the tools that help regulate the state’s use of violence to maintain social order. Marsilius of Padua contended long ago that law is “a command coercive through punishment or reward.”2 It seeks to change human behavior; it asserts authority over our lives and sometimes even asserts authority over authority itself. As Robert Cover observed, “A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.”3 Yet as the stakes increase in legal disputes, the less likely people are to endure an adverse result solely from a commitment to the rule of law. People obey the law for a variety of reasons, but surely one of those reasons is that the law will be enforced. As Cover said about the criminal process, The act of sentencing a convicted defendant is among the most routine acts performed by judges. . . . If convicted, the defendant customarily walks – escorted – to prolonged confinement, usually without significant disturbance to the civil appearance of the event. . . . There are societies in which contrition or shame control defendants’ behavior to a greater extent than does violence. . . . But I think it is unquestionably the case in the United States that most prisoners walk into prison because they know they will be dragged or beaten into prison if they do not walk.4
John T. Parry
3
Cover’s observation holds for ordinary civil cases as well. If a defendant loses a contract case and refuses to pay the judgment, that judgment will ultimately be put into effect through force. No matter how civilized a society deems itself, its laws rely on guns.5 Worth noting here is that this account appears to create problems for international law. Can we even speak of international law as law if – as is often the case – there are no formal mechanisms to enforce it? Yet despite the lack of formal enforcement, most nations appear to obey international law most of the time.6 Indeed, the fact that international law is often obeyed despite the lack of formal enforcement threatens my account of law. If individuals and states obey rules for reasons apart from the threat of enforcement, then “law” is more than rules that are enforced; it also includes rules that are obeyed. Note that this broader account makes law more amorphous by overlapping it with social norms, morality, and other sources of rules.7 In many ways, that overlap is accurate, particularly if we want to speak generally of the various ways in which social forces shape and constrain behavior. Under this account, international law, which at the very least is an important source of constraining norms, easily qualifies as law. Yet norms cannot guarantee compliance. The distinction between willing obedience and formal enforcement remains critical if we turn from the law-abiding and focus on those who resist law. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously asserted, “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict.” For Holmes, a statute that could not be enforced “would be empty words”; from the bad man’s perspective, “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are . . . the law.”8 Now return to international law, especially the issue of international human rights. Do nations obey international human rights law? Oona Hathaway’s research on this issue led her to the conclusion that “noncompliance with treaty obligations appears to be common.” Indeed, she was unable to find “a single treaty for which ratification seems to be reliably associated with better human rights practices.” To the contrary, she identified “several for which it appears to be associated with worse practices.” In other words, Hathaway could not find a positive correlation between law and behavior in the area of international human rights. Many countries abide by the norms of international human rights law, but many do not, and whether or not a country follows these norms appears to have little to do with whether that country recognizes those norms as formal international law.9 From the perspective of the Holmesian bad man, the status of international human rights norms as law is uncertain at best.
4 3.
Pain, Interrogation, and the Body
The Limits of Law’s Power over State Violence State violence simultaneously protects and threatens us. To manage state violence, we rely in part on law. Yet law depends on the very violence that it is meant to control. Enforcement, after all, requires state power. If law depends on state violence, how can it also hope to control it? One way to resolve this tension is to deemphasize what we expect from law. We could resign ourselves to the fact that law is often little more than the tool of authority, a ritual for channeling state violence rather than controlling it. Examples abound in history and the contemporary world. Indeed, much of criminal law today remains a forum for the ritualized application of state violence, albeit with greater regulation than in the past.10 Perhaps, then, we should conclude that the ideal of law as a significant constraint on state power is a peculiar development of western politics and political theory. A thinner or lowest common denominator account of law might not seek so insistently to tear law away from the authority that provides its power. Most readers, I imagine, will reject this thin description. Law, you might insist, should not only resolve disputes but must also regulate the state’s use of violence. Yet that view requires law to have a double conscience as servant and master of state violence. Sometimes law is up to the task of mastering state violence. The Bivens doctrine, which allows people to sue U.S. officials for damages arising from violations of constitutional rights, is one example – although federal Courts have shown uncertain commitment to it. The recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, insisting that the Executive branch cannot detain people indefinitely without judicial review, demonstrate that courts can confront even military authority – albeit, in these cases, somewhat halfheartedly.11 Legislators sometimes craft statutes that limit the state’s power to wield violence or that allow people to receive compensation for injuries inflicted by state actors. But law often shows itself to be the servant of the violent state. During World War II, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld blanket curfews and internment of Japanese-Americans, without regard to their individual guilt or loyalty. The U.S. Congress’s adoption of certain provisions of the U.S.A. Patriot Act provides a recent legislative example. Or, again in the context of U.S. law, consider the failure of federal courts to confront police violence in minority communities, failures that are often cloaked by the claim that the courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims that might force the reorganization and oversight of police departments.12 One consequence of law’s reliance on state violence for its effectiveness is that law must often defer to that violence. It cedes to the state the power to act lawlessly in some instances in order to preserve the greater power to regulate private violence and some aspects of state violence. So far, I have been speaking of law as if I believed that erecting a better network of laws could itself protect us from the evils of state violence.
John T. Parry
5
(As if, for example, Robert Bolt’s Thomas More were correct that the forest of laws is what protects us from the devil.13) But it is misleading and perhaps even false to think of law this way. In the United States, for example, the legal realists reminded us decades ago that law is not autonomous. It has no independent existence. It is not something that we extract from pure reason, or from fundamental, established, and knowable principles. Law is a thing that we make and manipulate for our purposes. Nearly every rule has an exception, and every fact pattern raises the possibility of a different result even under a uniform rule.14 Doctrines are constantly changing, not for the sake of progress but simply through interaction with social forces and in response to skilled arguments. The malleability and manipulation of law often favors state violence. Officials are usually ready to seek, and courts are only slightly less willing to create, expanded executive power. The memos drafted by U.S. government lawyers asserting nearly unlimited executive power in what they call a “war on terror” and seeking to rationalize sweeping abuse of prisoners show how far a government often defined as democratic and rights-enhancing will reach.15 And, too, when a government makes the argument, courts are willing to hear claims of necessity – that public order, the survival of the state, or protection against “terrorism” require or justify a particular course of conduct, with the claimed result that courts should declare the that conduct to be legal. Yet law can also be manipulated by ideas of morality and justice. Necessity claims in this context can limit state power by ratifying individual acts that violate the law for “good” reasons. The problem with these claims is that we have trouble defining those good reasons. Clear, objective, external reference points are in vanishingly short supply. All we know is that legal controversies will result in decisions, and that legal doctrine is always changing, but we cannot assume that some conception of “justice” or the “best” legal rule will prevail. All of this is just to say what we already know. In the face of state violence, law often fails, and it fails because as a human product dependent upon human agency it is set up to fail. We cannot depend on legal rules or norms as such, because they are only tools, not solutions. Nor, if this is true, can we claim that our willingness to obey the law turns on the link between law and some rough degree of justice or morality. Even when this link is absent, the threat of enforcement will be sufficient. Law, then, compels our obedience but only fitfully regulates state violence. 4.
Interrogation and Torture I’d like now to use the law of torture and interrogation to provide a concrete example of my claims about state violence and law – in particular my claim that law fails to control state violence. Interrogation is a core problem for those seeking to control state violence. It presents issues of persuasion, pressure, coercion, and physical or
6
Pain, Interrogation, and the Body
psychological harm. Interrogation of a criminal suspect is rarely gentle even if it appears calm and orderly. On the surface, at least, it is about extracting information, which requires control, even dominance. An interrogator is often – perhaps must be – willing to use the suspect, to approach him as a vessel to be emptied rather than as a person possessed of dignity and rights and entitled to equal concern and respect (although a skilled interrogator may disguise this attitude).16 The temptation exists to go just a step further, to get just one more piece of information, to make the interrogation just a bit more uncomfortable. When the information is important enough, incremental discomfort may slide into torture. The reaction to the September 11 attacks illustrates this dynamic fairly easily. Within two months, federal officials were already starting to talk about the need to develop new, more lenient standards for interrogating suspected terrorists. Several commentators – myself included – explored the extent to which coercion could be justified in rare cases.17 That conversation continued among government officials whose concern was not to control state violence but rather to unleash it. And we can see the results of that conversation on people’s bodies at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan and Iraq. All of this took place against a web of international and national laws that claim to prohibit torture absolutely. The Convention Against Torture declares that torture is “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” by state actors to obtain information, to intimidate or punish, or “for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” The Convention also binds signatories “to prevent . . . other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture.”18 The Convention does not define “cruel, inhuman or degrading,” but the United Nations has said that the phrase “should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental.”19 Domestic law in most countries also appears to ban torture. In the United States, the use of coercion in interrogation violates the victim’s constitutional right to due process and may violate her right against compelled self-incrimination. Law enforcement officials who use excessive force in the course of “seizing” a person violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by correctional officials on a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Federal and state statutes criminalize conduct that meets the Convention’s definition of torture, as well as most conduct likely to qualify as “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” and other statutes or doctrines allow victims of state violence to seek damages.20 U.S. law’s prohibition of torture is supposedly so clear that the State Department was able to state flatly in 1999 that
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Torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States. It is categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of state authority. . . . No official of the government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official condone or tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a justification for torture. U.S. law contains no provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be employed on grounds of exigent circumstances (for example, during a “state of public emergency”) or on orders from a superior officer or public authority.21 As with international law, in short, U.S. law seems to leave little room for coercive interrogation, even of suspected terrorists. Sandy Levinson recently observed that these layers of international, federal, and state law might “appear to establish a Ulyssean contract to be honored whatever the lure of the sirens.”22 But, as he recognized, if we dig a bit deeper, the terms of the contract become ambiguous. Many of the countries that have enacted law and signed multilateral agreements against coercive practices continue to engage in them, and the Abu Ghraib revelations confirm that the United States is one of that number (although the persistence of police violence in American cities would be sufficient proof). The most plausible explanations for this kind of conduct are that policymakers in these countries do not believe that the prohibition of torture has the status of law, that they simply care little about legal niceties, or that they believe their conduct was not torture or was justified under the circumstances. This last possibility generates further complexity. There are good reasons not to like the restricted definition of torture found in the Convention. I prefer something more expansive that acknowledges the fact that torture is about domination more than interrogation and that also includes an element of escalation, or the risk of it, so that seemingly mild mistreatment is torture if the victim reasonably believes worse will follow.23 But any definition of torture and of the distinction between torture and other categories of legal or illegal treatment must be applied to specific facts, which in turn will create ambiguity and controversy. The most famous case to examine the difference between torture and cruel or inhuman treatment is Ireland v United Kingdom. In the early 1970s, British forces subjected suspected IRA members to wall-standing for hours, hooding, continuous loud and hissing noise, sleep deprivation, and restricted food and water. The European Commission of Human Rights found that these practices, used together, amounted to torture, but the European Court of Human Rights disagreed. The court found that the British practices were
8
Pain, Interrogation, and the Body
inhuman and degrading but did not rise to the level of torture. The court explained that the difference between torture and inhuman treatment “derives principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted.” Because torture is an “aggravated” form of inhuman treatment that carries “a special stigma,” it should be reserved for practices that exhibit a “particular intensity and cruelty.”24 Israeli interrogation practices – prolonged standing or uncomfortable sitting positions, tight hand or ankle cuffing, loud noise, sleep deprivation, hooding, cold rooms, and violent shaking – have also been the subject of significant international dispute. U.N. officials claimed these practices were torture, but with the exception of shaking, Israel’s conduct was not much different from that of the U.K. An Israeli commission concluded these practices were not torture, and it cautioned that interrogators should be careful not to cross the line from permissible physical force to impermissible torture.25 The Supreme Court of Israel ultimately prohibited most of these coercive practices, not because they were torture, but because they were not authorized by law. The court described several of these methods as degrading, harmful, or unnecessary, but it never suggested that they met any legal definition of torture. Significantly, the court also ruled that a justification defense would be available in individual criminal prosecutions of interrogators for using these methods.26 The British and Israeli cases highlight yet another complexity in the law of torture. The Convention bars torture absolutely. “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” By contrast, the Convention requires states to “undertake to prevent” cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, but the “no exceptional circumstances” provision does not explicitly apply.27 Thus, if Britain’s and Israel’s former practices were not torture, an exceptional circumstances justification could be available under the Convention even if the conduct was cruel and inhuman.28 Put differently, the Convention forces us to ask whether a particular form of coercion is more like torture or more like cruel and inhuman treatment. If the former, it is illegal and unjustifiable. If the latter, it is probably illegal but possibly also justifiable. The consequences of this distinction provide one reason why officials will deny using torture while sometimes admitting to practices that are clearly coercive. So long as they are not “torturing,” their conduct, however reprehensible, may be justifiable under the circumstances, and those justification arguments have force in the court of popular opinion as well as in courts of law. The word “torture” thus carries not just a moral stigma but also very real legal and political consequences. The laws of individual countries add still more complexity. For example, in the course of consenting to the Convention, the U.S. Senate made
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two important changes to the definition of torture. Torture, according to the Senate, is not the intentional infliction of severe pain, but the specific intention to do so. In criminal law terms, to engage in torture, an interrogator must do more than take an intentional act that causes severe pain; instead, an interrogator must act with the purpose of causing severe pain. Second, the Senate narrowed the definition of mental harm by requiring it to be prolonged as well as severe, and by limiting the kinds of conduct that it was willing to recognize as able to create prolonged and severe mental suffering. This restricted definition also appears in federal legislation that implemented the convention. Finally, the Senate tried to give clearer content to the category of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. According to the Senate, “the United States considers itself bound by the obligation . . . to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ only insofar as the term . . . means the cruel, unusual and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”29 In other words, the Senate declared that the Convention bans conduct that is already unconstitutional, and its changes to the document show a desire to preserve room for coercive interrogation. Notably, the Senate’s statement that the definition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment must be tied to the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts the ultimate power to define the government’s obligations under the Convention in the course of civil rights litigation and pursuant to the American practice of judicial review. A series of cases assessing the voluntariness of confessions suggests that these obligations could be broad. But the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chavez v Martinez suggests a much narrower approach. Chavez was a damages case arising out of a 45minute emergency room interrogation of a severely wounded man – shot by police during a fight – who thought he was dying. Three of the Court’s nine justices said a claim for damages resulting from a coercive interrogation is governed by the “shocks the conscience” test, which considers whether the conduct at issue was not only shocking but also “unjustifiable by any government interest.” They declared that “the need to investigate whether there had been police misconduct constituted a justifiable government interest given the risk that key evidence would have been lost if Martinez had died [without telling] his side of the story.” At least two other justices also appeared to endorse this standard although they did not say how it would apply to a specific case.30 The critical point about Chavez is that a majority of the Court appears to have embraced a necessity standard for judging the constitutionality of coercive interrogation. Under this standard, if a sufficient government interest exists, then the victim has no constitutional right against coercive interrogation. Thus, we see again the pressure created by necessity. At least some coercive practices that would otherwise be illegal under
10
Pain, Interrogation, and the Body
international law or unconstitutional as a matter of U.S. law can be justified if the state can articulate a good reason for using them on a particular person. One last point about U.S. law. Necessity also surfaced in the memos prepared by Justice and Defense Department officials. The memos used necessity in the two ways I highlighted in my discussion of law’s malleability. First, they expressly recognize necessity as a defense to criminal liability, so that an official who used torture would be able to raise a necessity defense. Second, in a long section, they contend that the commander-in-chief power vested by the Constitution in the President of the United States in effect frees the President from the irritations of federal criminal law. Put clearly, the necessity of successfully exercising the commander in chief power during an armed conflict excuses or justifies the President, in advance, from compliance with federal law.31 In short, the seemingly absolute prohibitions of torture in international and U.S. law have hidden ambiguities and exceptions, which in turn create space for argument and manipulation – and for lawful torture. Most significant is the idea of necessity as a criminal defense and a justification for state violence. In the case of coercive interrogation, law prohibits some forms of state violence, subject to exceptions, limits or channels other forms, and in so doing legitimates coercive interrogation by state officials. 5.
Assessing Necessity I want to finish with a few thoughts about the necessity argument in the context of torture. Necessity or, as it is sometimes called, justification is a well-established but perennially controversial idea. Think of it as a safety valve that makes the rule of law possible but which is also hard to constrain. Necessity usually requires a balance of harms and interests, but the assessment is never as easy or as rule-bound as the metaphor pretends.32 The application of necessity to coercive interrogation provides a good demonstration. First, we must ask whether necessity can ever justify coercion, even torture. The easy answer is “no,” but if coercion provides the last remaining chance to save a large number of lives in imminent peril, can we so easily hold to an absolute ban? What if torture could save the life of a kidnapped parent, lover, or child? As with other crimes, the definition of torture includes the possibility, however remote as a matter of doctrine, of justification in individual cases.33 So much for a general answer. What about the conduct of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq? The photographs from Abu Ghraib and other reports demonstrate that much – perhaps most – of this conduct amounts to cruel and inhuman treatment and in some cases rises to the level of torture under the Convention. Is there a sufficient doctrinal justification for these practices? For several reasons, I think the answer is “no.” First, the reasons for the conduct of U.S. forces went beyond foiling future attacks. They sought
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to learn who was involved in or provided support for past attacks, to destroy entities that support those attacks, and to intimidate or pacify prisoners. These purposes do not justify torture so long as the necessity rationale requires torture to be a means of obtaining information to prevent imminent harm, as opposed to a tool of domination or overall military strategy. The same is true of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Although the level of necessity would be lower for what international law defines as a lesser harm, general claims of need are not sufficient. The necessity argument attains meaningful weight only when there is specific reason to fear an imminent attack. Second, even where the purpose of interrogation is to prevent future attacks, physical mistreatment should not receive a blanket justification. The future will bring more attacks on the U.S. and its allies, but without firm suspicion that a particular individual has specific knowledge about imminent attacks, policymakers and courts should be wary of making coercive interrogation an option. U.S. forces appear to have adopted a policy of physical coercion that applies to large numbers of detainees who almost certainly lack specific knowledge of future attacks. We have mistreated these detainees because they may have significant information, because they are hostile to us, or simply because we can. The repercussions of that treatment will last for years, perhaps decades, and are unlikely to be positive for the U.S., its military, or its civilian population. Third, even if an official believes a prisoner has significant information, physical force should not be a first step. Necessity also contains an idea of escalation. Except under extreme circumstances, coercion should be a last resort after other efforts fail, not a routine practice and certainly not a means of “softening up” a prisoner. To be justifiable, torture should be the exception, not the norm. Yet accounts of U.S. practices suggest that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment was the norm and that torture was often a viable option. Finally, if we take up the broader idea of necessity as a source of state power and not just a defense, the conduct of U.S. forces remains unjustified. A great many theorists accept some form of the proposition that executive officials may act outside the law in certain instances, and this power arguably includes the ability to use torture.34 Yet even if that proposition is true, it does little to justify Abu Ghraib. U.S. forces did not face an emergency situation that could not be addressed in any other way. Their conduct is legitimate only if emergency power is a synonym for executive expediency. Although some Bush administration officials have come close to asserting this position, it risks undermining the already limited ability of law to constrain state violence. Where does this leave us? We can conceive of a necessity exception to the law of torture, and the exception likely fails to justify the conduct of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps, then, necessity is a sensible approach to regulating state violence. In theory, that is, we can admit an exception to the prohibition of torture without undermining the values that
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Pain, Interrogation, and the Body
support that prohibition. Yet the malleability of necessity raises the possibility of expansion and what most would call abuse, especially when used to justify state power instead of merely as a criminal defense. Further, the line from the rhetoric of war and toughness, to policy debates about necessity and other doctrines, to the actions of troops on the ground, is clear to all but the most blinkered partisan of U.S. power. If ideas of necessity as a justification for coercive interrogation helped give the green light to the abuse of prisoners by U.S. forces, then we may want to rethink the value of necessity. Does admitting the possibility that coercion can be justified provide enough benefit to outweigh the harm that it helps create, particularly in the context of an imperial power exercising its military might abroad? But if we decide the harm outweighs the benefit and insist on better enforcement of an absolute ban on physical mistreatment, what should we do in cases where justification doctrine would allow coercion? Do we sacrifice lives by adhering to principle? If an official violates the principle and saves lives, do we brand that person a criminal? Yet if we fail to enforce the absolute principle, aren’t we back to the necessity exception?35 We could have a rigorous public discussion of these issues, perhaps with the goal of developing meaningful guidelines for coercive interrogation and the necessity exception. Or, we could reaffirm the absolute ban and put resources and commitment into preventing and punishing torture. We could even explore the links between torture, other forms of coercion, and state violence generally. But because these options require the will to engage in public debate and to make hard choices, I suspect we will take a different course. We will be like Hans Castorp as he heads for home, his dream fading in his mind despite his vow never to forget it. We will remember Abu Ghraib as a crime, as an episode we label “regrettable,” maybe even “terrible,” but the larger truth it tells about the violence at the heart of our societies will fade. Indeed, I suspect these things will fade from our minds because we want them to. We prefer that our coercive practices be at best an open secret, a topic for spy novels rather than for the nightly news. We prefer a silent deal with our governments, letting them do what they “have” to do, while we refrain from asking too many questions. Perhaps in some vague sense we even approve of or are grateful for the government’s violent protection. Over time, the harm to our body politic from this approach will rival the harm to the bodies of the detainees at Abu Ghraib and other places, known and unknown.
Notes 1. Mann, 480-485. 2. Marsilius of Padua, 36. 3. Cover, 1986, 1601. 4. Ibid, 1607.
John T. Parry 5. I am not claiming law is illegitimate because it relies on violence. To the contrary, we ordinarily presume that the state violence associated with enforcing law is legitimate. I am not seeking here to overcome that presumption, although I hope the rest of my discussion will complicate this idea to some extent. For a good discussion of legitimacy, see Bram Ieven’s contribution to this volume. 6. Koh, 2603. Koh also suggests reasons why nations obey international law even when it is not enforced in traditional ways. For the argument that most individuals obey the law for reasons other than fear of punishment, see Tyler. 7. See Berman, 144 n.21. 8. Holmes, 459-460. 9. Hathaway, 1940. Hathaway reached the same conclusions when she focused specifically on international law regulation of torture. See Oona A. Hathaway, “The Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture,” in Levinson, 2004, 201-202. 10. For exploration of one aspect of this phenomenon, see Jody Madeira’s contribution to this volume. 11. For the Bivens case and discussion of the doctrine that derives from it, see Fallon, 804-825. The Supreme Court’s detention decisions are Rasul v Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and Rumsfeld v Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 12. The curfew and internment cases are Hirabayashi v United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The U.S.A. Patriot Act is Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). For discussions of judicial failure to confront police violence in the United States, see Cover, 1983; Parry, 2002. 13. Bolt, 66. 14. For a discussion of these issues in the context of criminal law and particularly the necessity defense, see Parry, 1999, 446-457. Horder offers a convincing criticism of the effort to achieve clear, legislated rule of criminal law. 15. Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 25-26 (March 6, 2003); Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 39-41 (August 1, 2002). 16. This characteristic of interrogation is pervasive. For example, relief and human rights workers confront “torture survivors [who are] resistant and hostile when interviewed.” To get “necessary” information, relief workers “must be strict.” Dawes, 253. Thus, “to protect the vulnerable from injury you must treat them as opponents,
13
14
Pain, Interrogation, and the Body but in treating them as opponents you subject them to injury.” Ibid, 256. 17. For discussion of government proposals and my own assessment of the necessity defense in this context, see Parry and White. 18. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, pt. 1, arts. 1, 16 (1984). 19. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, art. 5, cmt. C, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/169 (1979). The Geneva Conventions also ban torture and other coercion, with no exceptions, but only for certain classes of people, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bans torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Several regional agreements add additional weight to the prohibition. See Rodley. 20. Seth Kreimer provides a thorough discussion. 21. U.S. Department of State, Initial Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee Against Torture (1999). 22. Levinson, 2003, 2017. 23. Parry, 2003, 246-249. 24. See Ireland v United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 512, 792-94 (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.); Ireland v United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 79-80 (1980) (Eur. Ct. of H.R.). The U.N. Committee on Human Rights, the European Commission of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights have given additional content to the terms “torture” and “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.” For discussions, see Rodley, 75-106, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “The European Convention on Human Rights and Its Prohibition on Torture,” in Levinson, 2004. 25. For the U.N. position, see Rodley, 95. For the Israeli Commission, see Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity (1987), reprinted in Israel Law Review 23 (1989): 175. 26. H.C. 5100/94, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v The State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817 (1999), reprinted in International Legal Materials 38 (1999), 1478, 1480-86. 27. Convention, pt. 1, arts. 2, 16. 28. For a brief discussion of other relevant sources of international law, see Parry, “Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad,” in Levinson, 2004, 162 n.27. 29. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, part I(1), and part II(1)(a), 136
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Congressional Record S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). For the statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000), and 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). 30. Chavez v Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774-75 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.); ibid, 779 (Souter J., concurring in the judgment). For the voluntariness cases, see Parry and White, 748-751. 31. In late 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a new memo that “supersedes the August 2002 Memorandum in its entirety.” The new memo states that discussion of necessity as a defense or a source of state power is “unnecessary” in light of “the President’s unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture.” Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General 2 (Dec. 30, 2004). When necessity is a source of state power, it has an obvious kinship to the concept of the state of exception, which Dani Filc and Hadas Ziv explore in their contribution to this volume. 32. For extensive discussion of the necessity defense, see Parry, 1999. 33. One sometimes hears the argument that torture cannot be justified because it does not work. This claim is mistaken for two reasons. First, if the goal is to get useful information, coercion works at least some of the time. See Sanford Levinson, “Contemplating Torture,” in Levinson, 2004, 34. Second, if the goal is domination, torture is likely to work quite frequently. This second goal, of course, is rarely if ever accepted as legitimate by commentators, even if it is a common state practice. 34. For a good discussion, see Oren Gross, “The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law,” in Levinson, 2004. 35. For classic responses to these questions, see Henry Shue, “Torture,” in Levinson, 2004, and Michael Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” in ibid.
Bibliography Berman, Paul Schiff. “Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes Toward a Nonskeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis.” In Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism, ed. Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon, 105-152. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Bolt, Robert. A Man for All Seasons: A Play in Two Acts. New York: Vintage, 1990. Cover, Robert M. “Nomos and Narrative.” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 4-68.
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Cover, Robert M. “Violence and the Word.” Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 1601-1629. Dawes, James. “Atrocity and Interrogation.” Critical Inquiry 30 (2004): 249-266. Fallon, Richard H., Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro. Hart and Weschler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System. 5th ed. New York: Foundation Press, 2003. Hathaway, Oona A. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 111 (2002): 1935-2042. Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. “The Path of the Law.” Harvard Law Review 10 (1897): 457-478. Horder, Jeremy. “Criminal Law and Legal Positivism.” Legal Theory 8 (2002): 221-241. Koh, Harold Hongju. “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2599-2659. Kreimer, Seth F. “Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (2003): 278-325. Levinson, Sanford. “‘Precommitment’ and ‘Post-Commitment’: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11.” Texas Law Review 81 (2003): 2013-2053. Levinson, Sanford, ed. Torture: A Collection. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Mann, Thomas. The Magic Mountain, trans. John E. Woods. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. Marsilius of Padua. The Defender of Peace, trans. Alan Gewirth. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. Parry, John T. “The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law.” Houston Law Review 36 (1999): 397-469. Parry, John T. “Judicial Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 35 (2002): 73-149. Parry, John T. “What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?” University of Pittsburgh Law Review 64 (2003): 237-262. Parry, John T. Parry and Welsh S. White. “Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be An Option?” University of Pittsburgh Law Review 63 (2002): 743-766. Rodley, Nigel S. The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law. 2d ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
Chapter 2 “Too Many Foreigners For My Taste”: Law, Race and Ethnicity in California, 1848-1852 Fernando Purcell In 1855 Hinton Helper published The Land of Gold: Reality Versus Fiction. In his book, when referring to California’s population during the Gold Rush, he stressed the idea of an unharmonious society by positing the following question: “Will a panther from America, a bear from Europe, a tiger from Asia, and a lion from Africa, organize in peace and good feeling around the body of a fresh slain deer? If not, will the Americans, English, French, Germans, Chinese, Indians, Negroes, and half-breeds, greet each other cordially over a gold mine?”1 Helper’s analogy recognizes the cosmopolitan feature of California during the Gold Rush and addresses how different and anxious peoples from all over the world gathered with the same goal in mind: the accumulation of gold. However, California society at the time of the Gold Rush was not unharmonious because of the competition for gold only. Conflict and violence that resulted from racial and ethnic tensions contributed, primarily, to the creation of an unharmonious environment. In this article I will examine dramatic, but representative incidents that illuminate the ways in which legal procedures and the exercise of justice allowed Anglo-Americans to impose a racial agenda in the California gold fields that discriminated against non-whites and especially Mexicans and Chileans.2 That law became a source of discrimination for non-whites is clear in the case of lynching, for example. This form of punishment was predominantly directed against non-white foreigners and was usually legitimized by extralegal populace-appointed judges and juries in the gold fields. These extralegal tribunals appeared because of many authorities’ lack of legitimacy and power or simply because in many cases authorities did not exist. The State of California, established in 1850, also found legal ways to discriminate against non-whites, in which laws provided an implicit legitimacy to the discriminatory actions committed before and after 1850 by many Anglo-American individuals against non-white people. Among the concrete actions taken by the State were the Foreign Miner Taxes of 1850 and 1852, and the denial of the right to testify in court to non-whites. During the California Gold Rush, Anglo-Americans felt upset by the incredible number of foreigners who were “stealing” their gold and threatening their predominant position in the newly conquered territory of California, acquired after the Mexican American War of 1846-1847. In a letter written to his wife, John Baker, a physician in Jackson, California, referred to this place as a good and decent camp with “some very good buildings, but decidedly, too many foreigners for my taste.”3 These “too many foreigners” that bothered Baker were mostly non-whites. His words, in fact, were charged with the idea of Manifest Destiny that in mid-nineteenth
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“Too Many Foreigners For My Taste”
century United States was seen “less as a victory for the principles of free democratic republicanism than as evidence of the innate superiority of the American Anglo-Saxon branch of the Caucasian race.”4 As Reginald Horsman argues, the westward expansion in the mid-nineteenth century, of which the California Gold Rush was an important part, was permeated also by a racial ideology that “helped determine the nature of America’s specific relationships with other peoples encountered in the surge to world power.”5 The dissatisfaction of Baker and many Anglo-Americans with the presence of non-whites in California took violent forms in numerous instances. According to David A. Johnson, between 1849 and 1902 there were 380 cases of lynch law justice in California and approximately half of them occurred during the short period of the Gold Rush between 1849 and 1853.6 In those crucial years when the California State was in a formation process, Johnson states “non-whites, primarily Hispanics, composed a dramatically disproportionate percentage of those who experienced the wrath of the ‘people.’”7 In order to illustrate my argument, I will concentrate on two of these lynching cases that, although dramatic, represent the dimension and types of discriminatory practices that Mexicans and Chileans in particular, suffered in California. On the afternoon of July 5, 1851, Josefa, a Mexican woman from Sonora, was taken to the gallows in the small mining town of Downieville. At the place of the execution she was received, as witness David Barstow pointed out, by the “hungriest, craziest, wildest mob standing around that I have ever seen anywhere.”8 Josefa the only known women hanged during the California Gold Rush, was executed for stabbing Anglo-American miner Frederick Cannon, early on the morning of the same July 5. In the short and expedited trial, Josefa’s argument was discredited by most Anglo-Americans. Josefa declared that she had stabbed Cannon to defend herself after he had forced her house’s door with the intention of taking sexual advantage of her. In the trial Josefa testified: “I had been told that some of the boys wanted to get into my room and sleep with me; a Mexican boy told me so and it frightened me so that I used to fastened the door and take a knife with me to bed.”9 During the trial, however, the idea predominated that Cannon had fallen against the door of Josefa’s house because he was drunk and that the door gave way because it was frail. Josefa’s testimony, which during the trial was supported only by her Mexican paramour named José – who was also accused of participating in the murder – was supported ten days later by the Sacramento Times & Transcript. This newspaper included a report based on witness John S. Fowler’s observations that coincided with Josefa’s statement. According to this newspaper, “she had stabbed a man who persisted in making a disturbance in her house, and had greatly outraged her rights.”10 It is impossible today to get the truth of what really happened, but José and Josefa’s testimonies seem plausible and more credible than the story of the drunken man accidentally falling against the door of the house where one of
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Downieville’s few women – and coincidentally a Mexican – happened to live.11 Josefa’s version of the event seems credible, especially taking into account the common discriminatory practices against Mexicans in California at that time and the images that existed in the United States during the 1840s of lazy Mexican men and sexually-available Mexican women. These images were established by the accounts of Anglo-American travelers and reinforced during the Mexican American War where racial stereotypes of the Mexicans were combined with sexual overtones.12 For instance, during Josefa’s execution the excitement was impressive and, as a result, “ropes had to be brought into requisition to keep the mob back. They would once in a while make a rush for her,” according to David Barstow’s testimony.13 The sentence for Josefa was ready as soon as she committed the crime. Early that morning the populace embraced the general cry of “hang them [referring to Josefa and José]. Give them a fair trial and hang them!”14 In other words, the mood of the populace was for using a legal trial to legitimize a decision that had been made as soon as they knew a Mexican woman had killed Cannon. The excitement in town was impressive and at 1 o’clock on the same day of the stabbing, the people in Downieville had organized a court with John Rose as Judge and another twelve people as jurors. The informal, sporadic jury created that day to judge Josefa found her guilty and condemned her to be executed. José, her paramour, was ordered to leave the town. The jury’s decision to hang Josefa was not only based on law, but also on the belief of Mexican racial and ethnic inferiority. This is why the possibility of interpreting Josefa’s action as self-defense was not even considered by the jury. Testimonies about this case, for example, expressed the idea that there was a propensity among Mexicans to commit these kinds of crimes. Josefa, according to witness John R. McFarlan, “presented more the appearance of one who would confer kindness than one who thirsted for blood; but the propensity of her race was truthfully developed not only by the entire testimony, but by her own statement and that of her paramour.”15 This speaks for itself in terms of the behavioral assumptions commonly made at that time about the racial and ethnic background of people, Mexicans in this case. In fact, other contemporary accounts provide similar descriptions of Mexican women. Louise Clappe described an incident in one of her letters where Domingo, a “tall majestic-looking Spaniard” had stabbed Tom Somers, an Irish-born United States citizen at Indian Bar, California. After the stabbing, Domingo walked through town with a “Mejicana hanging upon his arm, and brandishing threateningly the long bloody knife with which he had inflicted the wound upon his victim.”16 Anglo-Americans reacted quickly, persecuted all the Mexicans in town and elected a Vigilance Committee to try several Mexicans. The first one to be tried was the same Mexican woman who was with Domingo after the incident because she has been the indirect cause of the problems between Somers and Domingo. Some Anglo-
20
“Too Many Foreigners For My Taste”
Americans even suggested hanging her, but she was finally ordered to leave the town. According to Louise Clappe, there was no doubt that she was a “regular little demon.”17 An important aspect influencing Josefa’s execution, then, was her origin and not only the fact that she killed an Anglo-American miner. The extralegal authorities nominated by the town to judge Josefa clearly brought their racial prejudices to the trial and accepted the call of the anxious populace who asked and pressured for a “fair” hanging. This case demonstrates how Manifest Destiny and its racial implications were at work in early U.S. California and how this made possible the existence of precipitated legal judgments, especially in criminal cases involving nonwhites. The importance of law and justice as a tool to impose racial supremacy becomes even clearer when examining the so-called War of the Calaveras, known also as the Chilean War, that occurred in the California foothills, 150 miles east of San Francisco, in December 1849 and early January 1850. This incident originated after a group of Chileans refused to obey the order from Anglo-American miners to leave the area. As witness John Hovey wrote in his diary, these Anglo-Americans felt a duty to form a code of “just laws” to maintain the privilege of exploiting what they considered their own land. As a result, a group of miners met on December 9, 1849 to “make laws to have our rights as American Citizens,” and as Abraham Nash pointed out, to expel the “D’d copper hides every one of them.”18 Following common democratic practices among Anglo-Americans, a group of miners elected their own authorities for the area where they were mining, chose L. A. Collier as district judge, and elaborated a series of laws. The first one established that no foreigners were to be permitted to work in the mines of Calaveras after the following day.19 Chileans, however, continued working in the mines, and AngloAmerican miners, under the leadership of their newly elected Judge, captured and fined them because of their defiance. After their release, a group of Chilean miners departed to the nearby town of Stockton where they complained to the local authorities saying that they had not been treated fairly by Judge Collier and worse than that, he lacked the legal authority to perform as judge. Implicitly, the Chilean patrones were also complaining about the legitimacy of Collier’s authority and his appointment as Judge by a group of common Anglo-American miners.20 The Chilean socio-political background, where common people never had the power to appoint authorities or pass legislation through spontaneous public meetings, made them distrust Collier’s authority and the validity of his resolutions. Chilean patrones were not complaining for having been left out of the appointment process of Judge Collier. Their problem was that they considered that common Anglo miners from the lower and middle-classes had no legal power to appoint authorities. In other words, they were not accustomed to these organizational democratic practices common in the U. S. nineteenth-century West, which though
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racially discriminatory, were usually respected by Western white communities.21 As Florencia Mallon argues for Latin America, “by the second half of the nineteenth century, however, nation and citizen were concepts applied to a select group, usually property-owning, of European descent, literate, and male.”22 As a result, upper-class Chileans who were leading these mining companies in California did not consider most Anglo-American miners part of a “select group” with the authority to appoint judges. They probably saw the action of these Anglo-American miners as illegitimate because their democratic notions restricted the power of electing authorities to a few elite people, and these notions clashed with those of Anglo-Americans, who accepted the power of “the people” to elect authorities. Nevertheless, the Chileans were able to obtain a warrant from the Stockton authorities, who may have had personal reasons to defy the authority of the recently-nominated Judge Collier or simply considered his nomination a challenge to their power.23 The warrant stated that the Chileans were authorized to arrest and bring to Stockton “either freely or by force all of the individuals residing in Calaveras who have defied the legal authority of this sub-prefecture and who have recognized Mr. Collier as a judge.”24 The arrest order was put in the hands of Chilean miners, providing them with an unusual judicial prerogative. Justice in the mines was used throughout the Gold Rush not only as a way to impose “order” but also as a consistent and conscious form of establishing Anglo-Saxon racial superiority in the recently conquered and foreign-crowded territory of California. In this case, this racial agenda, carried out through the exercise of justice, was being harmed and turned the opposite way. With the warrant in their hands, the Chileans returned to Calaveras on December 26th. There they asked Calaveras Judge Scollen – whom they recognized as the legitimate authority for Calaveras – to authorize them to execute the arrest order. Scollen, who was the area judge recognized by Stockton authorities, dismissed the order because he feared the reaction of those Anglo-Americans supporting Judge Collier. At that point, the Chileans decided to take justice in their hands. Eighty armed Chileans went to the Anglo-American camp in the area. Once there, they went through the different cabins, killed several people, and injured others. After the attack, the Chileans tied some of them to trees and took sixteen prisoners to Judge Scollen’s cabin.25 Scollen refused to see the Chileans because he did not want to become involved in the incident. Therefore, the Chileans decided to march toward Stockton with the prisoners. A couple of days later, while the Chileans were on their way to Stockton, the sixteen prisoners were rescued by a group of angry Anglo-Americans, and the Chileans passed from being captors to captives.26 The Chileans were brought back to Calaveras on December 30, and the following day Anglo-American miners formed a jury of twelve men and found them all guilty of murder in the first degree. Meanwhile, as John
22
“Too Many Foreigners For My Taste”
Hovey wrote in his diary, “the news had spread like wildfire through the different mines,” and hundreds of miners made their way to Calaveras in the following days to witness the execution of the Chileans.27 At the end, several Chileans were punished.28 One was sentenced to have his ears cut off and three of the leaders to be shot. The execution of the sentences took place on January 3, 1850. As Argentine Ramón Gil Navarro later wrote, the cutting of Chilean Ignacio Yañez’s ears was followed by a cry of pain such as one might hear in the last agony of a martyr. The ear with a part of the cheek was in the hand of the executioner who, after a moment, threw it aside and went after the other ear with the coldest insensitivity. A sea of blood inundated the face and clothing of the poor fellow, giving him a look more horrible than you can imagine . . . Finally Terán, Damian Urzúa, and Francisco Cárdenas were tied to oak trees . . . then shot from a distance of fifty feet, not all at once but one after another.29 The same day of the execution, and not knowing the tragic end of some of the Chilean miners yet, the astonished editor of Pacific News in San Francisco could not believe what his correspondent had written when reporting about the origins of the incident: If we understand our correspondent right, the warrant was issued by the American authorities, and placed in the hands of Chilians, [sic] for the arrest of American citizens. If this was the case, such a course was undoubtedly wholly injudicious in itself, and likely to produce the calamity which has arisen. We trust, however, that there is some mistake in this, and that the matter will be satisfactorily explained hereafter.30 In reality, the correspondent had provided an accurate report of the incident and the incredulous editor continued by blaming Stockton authorities and stating that there was culpable carelessness somewhere in this matter. Why send a party of foreigners to arrest Americans-especially foreigners who could not speak the English language, and who even did not take with them an interpreter? . . . Shameful, indeed, is it, that an American was not sent to make the arrest, if there was any need of it.31
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James Ayers, who ended up as a prisoner of the Chilean extralegal authorities, also stressed this problem by lamenting the great mistake by the Stockton authorities who, according to him, “did know that they had no authority of law to invest a foreign mob with any such semblance of legal power.” For Ayers, there was a “general consensus of opinion amongst the miners upon this subject, and it would have been a ‘most lame and impotent conclusion’ to permit an alien to exercise a privilege which was denied to an American citizen.”32 There are many aspects that help explain the Anglo-American animosities against the Chileans. Among them, one can mention AngloAmericans’ reluctance to admit the presence of Chilean peons in California, who were seen as hired serfs or slaves.33 Scarcity of gold may have been another factor especially since the incident took place at the beginning of the Winter season when the extraction of gold became more difficult. However, there were two other elements that account for what happened. One was the belief among Anglo-Americans that they, as whites, had the exclusive right to extract gold from their own territory. The other was the fact that Chileans had the audacity to try to make justice by themselves, something that was simply unacceptable for Anglo-American miners. They, as I have argued before, attached a racial connotation to their laws and legal procedures in order to impose their racial superiority in the newly conquered territory of California. In a time when Anglo-Americans in California had not yet established their racial hegemony extensively through labor control, lynching and law became powerful ways to impose Anglo-Saxon racial hegemony. What was contradictory about California during the Gold Rush were the numerous cases of public executions at a time when, as Michel Foucault points out, there was a rapid worldwide process leading towards the disappearance of punishment as spectacle.34 Many places in the United States banned public executions, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1845, all of the New England and Mid-Atlantic States, where the great majority of Anglo-American forty-niners came from, had eliminated public executions. This practice continued in the slave-based South Eastern States and in California, where the “danger” of the presence of “undesirable” inferior people was present. This shows how powerful racism was in the United States, but more important, how connected public executions were with the imposition of racial supremacy. Hence, it is not surprising that public lynching in California remained legally accepted in the State until 1858, when Anglo-Americans had advanced considerably towards the consolidation of their racial supremacy in California. In that year, the California Legislature moved executions inside county jails and required at least 12 respectable citizens as witnesses.35 Lynching worked well in terms of scaring many non-white foreigners and attracting large crowds of Anglo-Americans during the Gold Rush. As Philip J. Ethington points out, “by extinguishing a human life in public – leaving the body for view and sometimes abusing it – crowds and
24
“Too Many Foreigners For My Taste”
their leaders intend[ed] to transform the individual [victim] into a collective symbol.”36 The non-white victims examined in this article became collective symbols of racial inferiority. At the same time, the motives for these lynchings were eminently public and had a function of communication linked to a strong racial ideology. Hence, the Anglo-American witnesses for the trials that led to these lynching cases had the chance to testify against nonwhites as well as to make the establishment of racial and ethnic hegemony more tangible. When discriminating against non-whites, Anglo-Americans developed a sense of accomplishment regarding their positioning as rulers of California. Something similar happened later in the South with the lynching against blacks at the beginning of the twentieth century during the age of Jim Crow. Lynchers in the South, like those in California during the Gold Rush, were interested in maintaining white racial supremacy, using lynching as a tool for their purpose. As Leon Litwack points out, the lynching of blacks gathered large crowds of white witnesses in the South where they “came together in an impressive show of racial and community solidarity,” much like half a century earlier in California.37 The role of the State of California, in terms of legislating and supporting measures against non-white people, is a clear example of the broader framework in which law and justice, in relation to race and ethnicity, operated in California during the Gold Rush. For instance, the State did little during the Gold Rush to stop lynching and public executions. Nevertheless, the State of California did not have a passive role only. The first Foreign Miner Tax was passed by the State Legislature on April 13, 1850, and it imposed a monthly fee of twenty dollars on every foreigner working in gold extraction. Thomas J. Green, the author of the legislation, argued “this bill requires the foreigner, upon the plainest principles of justice, to pay a small bonus for the privilege of taking from our country the vast treasure to which they have no right.”38 What Green considered a “small bonus” was a large amount of money, which essentially sought the expulsion, rather than the exploitation, of foreign miners. There are different interpretations of this tax. Richard Morefield points out that the aim was to eliminate competition because of the mining skills of Mexicans and Chileans.39 Leonard Pitt argues that behind the law there was an attempt to exploit the foreign miners because Thomas Jefferson Green, the Texan author of the law, expected Anglo-American miners to buy licenses for the foreign operators they employed. Thus, many foreign miners would have been obliged to work for Anglo-American miners in order to pay back the permits acquired by their “masters,” developing a relationship of bondage.40 This law, however, “was designed more to exclude than to exploit such foreigners as the Mexicans.”41 Early in 1850 for example, people like T. Butler King, collector of the Port of San Francisco, pointed out, “I would not allow them [foreign miners] to purchase permits, or work vein-mines . . . the object [of a potential tax] is not only a suitable revenue, but to preserve for the use of our own fellow-citizens the wealth of that region.”42 This way of
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thinking, which was shared by most of the Anglo-American miners, demonstrates that behind this law was the attempt to expel rather than exploit foreign miners. Tax collectors, who had the right to keep three of the twenty dollars for themselves for their services, rarely asked white foreigners for money and singled out mostly Spanish-speakers. The same happened with the 1852 tax law that was directed against Chinese miners who started arriving in California in considerable numbers only in 1852. The 1850 law was published in English and Spanish only, which shows who the target of this law was. Since the 1850 tax was directed toward Spanish-speakers, mainly Mexicans, William Smith recommended to Governor Peter Burnett in 1850 the nomination of William Martin as tax-collector in Calaveras because “with Mexicans he is remarkably popular and would have less difficulty in collecting the tax from them.”43 As an English immigrant who was in Chili Gulch in 1850 pointed out, the tax collectors arrived at their place “armed to the teeth” and remained at their camp for the night, “But they never asked if we were naturalized Americans or not and did not solicit fragment [sic] from us. They collected the tax, 30 [sic] dollars a month principally from the Mexicans, and in default of payment would seize their mules, and on the slightest demur would shoot the owner.”44 This anecdote illustrates how the tax was charged with a racial and ethnic connotation when dealing with Mexicans and Chileans and explains why other foreigners, including Englishmen, were not charged with taxes for mining. An infuriated group of Mexican and Chilean miners protested against the law and wrote to California Governor Peter Burnett complaining that they were “being prevented from working the mines [while] other foreigners are allowed that privilege.”45 This statement referred implicitly to Irish, English and German miners who were permitted to work in the mines even though they were foreigners too. Some non-U.S. citizens, including the Irish portion of the so-called Sydney Ducks, or immigrants from Australia, used the tax as an opportunity to be considered “white,” or in other words to enjoy the privileges denied to non-whites or “partially white people.”46 The editor of the Stockton Times complained in November 1850 about the high amount of money that the Foreign Miners’ Tax imposed on foreigners. For him, a lower amount of taxes would have protected foreigners from “the impositions and insults of that portion of the American, pseudo-American, and Sidney-American people who would banish or exterminate every ‘foreigner’ in the country.”47 This editorial implies that people like the so-called Sydney Ducks who came from Australia and “pseudo-Americans” – presumably Englishmen, Irishmen and Germans – sided with the Anglo-Americans in opposition to a limited number of foreigners against whom the tax was imposed. Hence, certain foreigners sided with Anglo-Americans as a way to define themselves in opposition to the “undesirable” foreigners. This strategy sought to ease their incorporation into California society. At the end, and as Sucheng Chan points out, “the
26
“Too Many Foreigners For My Taste”
English, Irish, and German lined up on the side of Americans against the other foreigners, in the process solidifying their own standing as honorary Americans.”48 Another example that reveals the important role of the State of California in establishing racial supremacy is the California law that prohibited certain non-white people from testifying in court. This sought to avoid non-white testimonies against white people in court as well as to impede non-whites from testifying in favor of other non-white people. In the two cases examined here, non-whites who were not directly involved in the incidents were not allowed to testify. Blacks and Indians in California were denied the right to testify in court in 1850. The same happened to the Chinese in 1854. Only in 1863 were blacks allowed to testify in California courts, even though California was born as a free State in 1850. Indians and Chinese had to wait until 1872.49 The denial of the prerogative to testify is probably the ultimate expression of how law and justice, with the sanction of both the people and the State, became sources of discrimination and a fundamental tool for imposing Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy in California. The California case examined in this paper reminds us that, historically, racial and ethnic discrimination have been attached to many processes of state formation in the last centuries. Hence, the California process of state formation is not an obscure and hidden event lost in time but an interesting case to compare how other states in the past and present have dealt, and still deal, with ethnic and racial minorities at the moment of their formation. At the same time, this article underscores the issue of the relationship between the State of California and the public and their respective responsibilities in the discrimination against non-whites during the California Gold Rush. During this event, there was a complex equation that differed from the practice of state intervention and passive public consent. Instead, there was a more intricate relationship between the State and AngloAmericans living in California. As demonstrated, both responded to the same project of racial hegemony entrenched in the ideology of Manifest Destiny. The State of California, established in 1850, legitimized the previous discriminatory practices against non-whites by Anglo-Americans by promoting new legislation that also affected people like Mexicans and Chileans. On the other hand, the discriminatory practices of Anglo-American miners in the gold fields provided an implicit base of support for any ethnic or racial discriminatory measures on the part of the State. The result was a powerful process in which Anglo-Americans and the State of California worked together towards the creation of a hegemonic racial supremacy in California during the Gold Rush.
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Notes 1. Helper, 38-39. 2. In this article I concentrate on Mexicans and Chileans only. However, other non-white communities suffered similar discriminatory practices at the hands of Anglo-Americans. 3. Letter of John Baker to his wife, Jackson, California, December 10, 1854. John Baker Letters in Bancroft Library. 4. Horsman, 1. 5. Ibid, 6. 6. Johnson, 560. 7. Ibid, 573. 8. Barstow, 23. 9. The Steamer Pacific Star, San Francisco, July 15, 1851. 10. Article republished in Alta California, San Francisco, July 14, 1851. 11. In the California census of 1850, women comprised only eight percent of the State population. Levy, 176-177. 12. Horsman, 233-234. 13. Barstow, 24. 14. The Steamer Pacific Star, San Francisco, July 15, 1851. 15. John McFarlan, Journal of a Voyage to California via Cape Horn in 1850 [aboard the ship “California packet” trip to Oregon, and life in the mines at Downieville California]. Unpublished journal in Huntington Library, 159. 16. Clappe, 134. 17. Ibid, 137. 18. John Hovey, “Historical Account of the Troubles between the Chilians and American Miners in the Calaveras Mining District, commencing December 6, 1849 and ending January 4, 1850,” in Journal of a Voyage From Newburyport, Mass. to San Francisco, California. Unpublished diary in Huntington Library, 85 and 88. 19. Hovey, 85. 20. The Chileans in the area were performing their mining work organized in companies under the leadership of patrones, or upper-class Chileans who had hired lower-class peones in Chile. 21. Ridge, 25-27. 22. Mallon, 13. 23. Beilharz and López, 120-124. 24. Ibid, 125. 25. Alta California, San Francisco, January 2, 1850. 26. Pacific News, San Francisco, January 3, 1850; Ayers, 52. 27. Hovey, 81-82. 28. Ibid, 80. 29. Beilharz & López, 145-149. 30. Pacific News, San Francisco, January 3, 1850.
27
28
“Too Many Foreigners For My Taste” 31. Ibid. 32. Ayers, 61. 33. Ibid, 46; Alta California, San Francisco, July 26, 1849. 34. Foucault, 8. 35. Ethington, 100. 36. Ibid, 98. 37. Litwack, 294. 38. California. Senate, Journal of the Senate of the State of California, vol. 1850, 494. 39. Morefield, 40. 40. Pitt, 60-61. 41. Peterson, 267. 42. Taylor, 372. 43. Letter of William Smith to the Governor of California, 1850, no date. Governor Peter Burnett papers, letters received, in California Historical Society. 44. Unknown English author, Early Days in California, Manuscript written in October 1852, in Bancroft Library, 5. 45. Letter of Julian Abechuco, Jacinto Fernandez, Francisco Garcías, José Andrade, Raimundo Gonzalez, José Duarte, Pablo Arana, Joaquín C. y Verrano, Richard Paynter and José María Cota to the Governor of California, Jesus Maria, Calaveras, May 1, 1850. Governor Peter Burnett papers, letters received, in California Historical Society. 46. For a good summary of the state of the field regarding whiteness studies see Kolchin, 154-173. 47. Stockton Times, Stockton, November 23, 1850. 48. Chan, 60. 49. Moore, 118-120.
Bibliography Ayers, James J. Gold and Sunshine: Reminiscences of Early California. Boston: The Gorham Press, 1922. Barstow, David Pierce. Recollections of 1849-51 in California. Inverness: The Press of Inverness, 1979. Beilharz, Edwin A. and Carlos López, eds. We Were 49ers! Chilean Accounts of the California Gold Rush. Pasadena: Ward Ritchie Press, 1976. Chan, Sucheng. “A People of Exceptional Character. Ethnic Diversity, Nativism, and Racism in the California Gold Rush.” In Rooted in Barbarous Soil: People, Culture and Community in Gold Rush California, eds. K. Starr and R. Orsi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
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Clappe, Louise. The Shirley Letters: From the California Mines, 1851-1852. Berkeley: Heyday Books, 1998. Ethington, Philip L. The Public City: The Political Construction of Urban Life in San Francisco, 1850-1900. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977. Helper, Hinton R. The Land of Gold: Reality Versus Fiction. Baltimore: Henry Taylor, 1855. Horsman, Reginald. Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. Johnson, David A. “Vigilance and the Law: The Moral Authority of Popular Justice in the Far West.” American Quarterly 33 (1981): 558-586. Kolchin, Peter. “Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America.” Journal of American History 89 (2002): 154-173. Levy, Jo Ann. They Saw the Elephant: Women in the California Gold Rush. Norman and London: Oklahoma University Press, 1990. Litwack, Leon F. Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow. New York:Vintage Books, 1999. Mallon, Florencia E. “Decoding the Parchments of the Latin American Nation-State: Peru, Mexico and Chile in Comparative Perspective.” In Studies in the Formation of the Nation State in Latin America, ed. James Dunkerley, 13-53. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2002. Moore, Shirley Ann W. “‘We Feel the Want of Protection’: The Politics of Law and Race in California, 1848-1878.” California History 81 (1998): 96-125. Morefield, Richard. “Mexicans in the California Mines, 1848-1853.” California Historical Society Quarterly 35 (1956): 37-46. Peterson, Richard. “The Foreign Miners’ Tax of 1850 And Mexicans in California: Exploitation or Expulsion?” The Pacific Historian 20 (1976): 265-272. Pitt, Leonard. The Decline of the Californios: A Social History of the Spanish-Speaking Californians, 1846-1890. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Ridge, Martin. “Disorder, Crime, and Punishment in the California Gold Rush.” Montana. The Magazine of Western History 49 (1998): 12-27. Taylor, Bayard. Eldorado or Adventures in the Path of Empire. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.
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Chapter 3 Protection, Harm and Social Evil: The Age of Consent, c. 1885-c. 1940 Shani D’Cruze 1.
Sex, Violence, Power and Age The law has used the categories of rape and indecent assault to criminalise certain kinds of violence in sexual encounter. It has generally been most convinced where that violence was demonstrably physical and in its deliberations over consent has often looked for physical resistance (in other words a violent response) from a prosecutrix. The law has also criminalised certain sexual practices and object choices that legislators and courts have deemed reprehensible in themselves. One of these areas has been sexual activity involving people below certain stipulated ages. Historically, the age of puberty has had no strict correlation with the statutory age of consent.1 This paper asks how far sex-with-minors has been of itself seen to involve violence or whether such practices have been criminalised because (like – and not like – bestiality, buggery and, after 1885, gross indecency between males) it involved an inappropriate object choice. I argue that the law found itself with certain definitional and inpractice problems that were frequently addressed through (contested) rhetorics of “protection.” Discourses of protection actively constitute vulnerabilities in their objects.2 The threatened harm was itself a sign with unstable referents. The recurrent moral inflection of discourses of protection amplifies harm as “social evil,” a category far less measurable in any utilitarian sense and thus less susceptible to diminution through control. Such rhetorical moves acquired shifting inflection through the discursive and institutional trends into the twentieth century which have been labelled as penal-welfarism. Constituting the numerous persons who came to the attention of the criminal justice system in such cases as objects in need of protection, potentially invoked misrecognitions and produced subaltern subject positions that had perforce to be occupied to mobilise the protection of the law. Feminist (and other) scholarship has demonstrated how limited such protection might be and how judicial, criminal and even welfare intervention has perpetrated its own violences on those already vulnerable (the Cleveland affair comes to mind).3 Therefore, who is a “child” in need of protection, exactly what might be the relationships between pleasure, desire, and “adultness” or its absence, and what exactly has “consent” amounted to before the law in the area of sex legislation?4 The answers are complex and contingent. Of course there is not, and never has been, a unitary “age of consent.” English law has banned certain activities, sexual and other, and categorised people by age for particular treatment in diverse areas. Such age stipulations have changed over
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time, are not necessarily consistent with each other, and have varied by gender. Two not necessarily congruent and often contested impulses have been at work; firstly that sexual activity between adults and children is normatively presumed to constitute an offence; secondly, that any sexual activity between children (however defined) should be against the law on wider grounds of social harm (or social evil). However, dominant constructions of sexual desire and of the child have together compromised the application of these presumptions in heavily gendered ways; by which I mean that gender has been drawn upon both socially and symbolically to obscure relations of power and subordination (and their immanent violences) in sexual encounters. Such processes have made violence harder to define both historically and by the law in practice. It is not easy, as researcher, particularly given the mediated nature of the criminal justice record, to evolve an analytically effective concept of violence. To the extent that violence is performative and expressive, it is incapable of being understood outside the specifics of its historically located social interaction. Hence, do (feminist) theoretical insights about the silences and inarticulacies produced by power permit us to identify violence where the sources (and the actors) do not? Do wider formulations of “social violence” help us with historical interpretation? How might we untangle coercion, aggression, censure and violence, and how do such categories relate to rhetorics of “evil”?5 This paper addresses just a segment of these big issues. It interrogates the intersections between violence, harm and evil in the law concerning heterosexual sex involving adolescent girls from the midnineteenth century to the Second World War. As such it is a re-crossing of ground already traversed by women’s historians and other scholars with different – or differently formulated – questions in mind. 2.
Victorian Legislation When Victoria came to the throne, the age of consent for girls was effectively 10.6 The 1861 Offences against the Person Act was a major consolidating statute, part of the procession of legislation that Weiner sees as a sea change in the disciplining of men’s violence in Victorian England.7 Section 48 reiterated the crime of rape as a felony. Overall this act was concerned with physical violence, and this association as well as the expectation of demonstrable “resistance” underlined a legal understanding of sexual violence as physical violence. The context of the clauses prohibiting sex-with-minors was therefore one preoccupied with violence in its most legible form. In enacting that it was “no offence to have sexual intercourse with a girl under 12 who ‘freely consented’ however ignorant,” the 1861 Act maintained the age of consent at 10, two years before the age of valid marriage. Consent (from a 10 year old) thus negatived violence. Although “carnal knowledge” with girls under 10 was a felony, evidence of “valid consent” by such a girl effectively meant that the charge was reduced to the
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misdemeanour of “attempted carnal knowledge.”8 If consent, which presumably enabled carnal knowledge to be the more fully gained, resulted in a charge of the attempt rather than the accomplishment, the legal position seems to have been that force could procure consent from girls under 10 as much as from adult women. So did such force (once negatived by consent) still amount to violence, to harm or even to evil? The Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860s focused on the adult woman prostitute and sought to regulate this “social evil” through medicalised disciplinary technologies.9 Campaigners drew attention to the violence of the speculum. These laws implicitly acknowledged prostitution as a necessary outlet for the sexual imperatives of (initially, though of course not exclusively) the military – a potentially disorderly male population with a significant working-class component. The furore about child prostitution of the 1880s, however, had as its legislative outcome in the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act (CLAA) a raising of the age of consent to 16. Thus the response to concerns about sexual abuse of female adolescents was to legally re-position the boundaries of feminine sexual innocence. “Protection” implied that adolescent girls were not fully in control of their nascent sexuality. Although this Act also, of course, criminalised gross indecency between men through the Labouchère Amendment, this was an afterthought and the predominate representation of the wrongs of child prostitution was of the sexually innocent female child, sold by corrupt working-class parents and violated by the adult (middle or upper class) male. Such representations bundled together anxieties about class, sexuality and the symbolic role of normative constructions of family as guarantors of a wider social order. Although the age of 12 had been raised to 13 in 1875,10 the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act established the legislative framework of the forthcoming century. The CLAA established the felony of sexual intercourse with a girl under 13 irrespective of consent, and the misdemeanour of intercourse with a girl between 13 and 16 irrespective of consent but outside lawful marriage. The anomaly that a girl could marry at 12 but not consent to sexual intercourse outside marriage until 16 remained in place until the Marriage Act of 1929.11 Girls were therefore capable of consenting to marital sexual intercourse at 12, since agreement to marriage established a woman’s ongoing consent to her husband’s sexual access. Hence, it was less any direct, physical or psychological harm to an adolescent girl caused by sexual intercourse per se that was at issue. The “evil” was moral and was to do with loss of sexual chastity. 3.
Questions of Desire Men tried for child sexual abuse have not infrequently pleaded affectionate or playful behaviour, locating abusive sexual practices in the domain of the intimate.12 For Giddens, intimacy is a potentially progressive notion, overcoming the gendered power imbalances implicit in concepts of romantic love. Nevertheless, historically, intimacy and violence have not
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been mutually exclusive and can be mutually constitutive categories, not only but most saliently here in the domestic and the everyday. For Ann Laura Stoler the intimate is a cultural space, where (raced and gendered) identity boundaries are made, risked and (with difficulty) defended. The proximities of intimacy are about the body-as-surfaces but also about embodied subjectivities. If as Jeff Hearn argues, heterosexuality is a “social relation and a social form of sexuality that is usually founded on difference and the eroticisation of difference,” proximity remains in tension with the lived identification of distance.13 GR, a British army officer in India between the wars, wrote: I naturally prefer to satisfy myself with a woman, a friend and a lady of my own class, but in the absence of the best I naturally take the next best available, down the scale from a lady for whom I do not care, to prostitutes of all classes and colours, men, boys and animals, melons and masturbation.14 This imagines sexual desire as an expression of masculine power and autonomy, and being fairly adventitious in choice of sexual object. The resultant sexual practices subordinate the othered object of desire. In the eroticised spaces of Empire male desire may have more easily ranged untrammelled (though eroticised spaces are potentially anywhere and always elsewhere). Nevertheless, from the perspective of the “reasonable,” bourgeois, respectable, and heterosexual man (returning home) on the Clapham omnibus, English law had a role to play in containing sexual desire and focusing it on a normative object – the respectable wife – thus reproducing comfortingly hegemonic gender relations. Dominant family ideals called for both the heterosexual married couple and the asexual child. Legitimate, manly desire was valorised for its ability to “conquer” its object against obstacles and chaste feminine refusals. Hegemonic masculinities contained the implicit contradiction that, even while normative male sexual desire was considered wide-ranging and insistent, the “reasonable man” combined agency with self-control and the ability to manage desire. Some masculinities, of course didn’t make the grade – and not only homosexual or otherwise deviant ones. Official as well as quack nineteenth-century medical practice, for example, did a brisk trade in diagnosing and treating “spermatorrhoea,” a syndrome linking masturbation, nocturnal emission and impotence.15 As Lesley Hall has demonstrated, the plethora of men’s anxious letters to Marie Stopes show that they still weren’t getting it quite right in the 1920s when the popularised versions of sexology had if anything raised the stakes of masculine heterosexual performance. Masculinities “othered” through debility, class or racial position were precarious. Feminine sexualities (and by elision the feminised charms of the homoerotic other) were by their nature disorderly and an ever present
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temptation. Louise Jackson’s work on nineteenth-century child sexual abuse draws attention to an eroticisation of “littleness”16 – the sexually innocent girl was both a miniaturised woman and always already on the point of loss of innocence. Furthermore, the eroticisation of the forbidden necessarily contributed to the contradictory status of the female adolescent as a problematic object of both sexual innocence and of desire. Judgements about harm, violence and the location of evil were thus slippery. The frequent use in nineteenth-century press reporting of court proceedings of the term “girl” for both a female child and for an adult woman prostitute evidences the difficulties experienced in solidifying the social (and legal) boundaries between the innocent child and the sexually knowing temptress. “Girl” is a term I use here, but simply to designate a young female individual that in the context of this argument is not unambiguously a child. 4.
Tyrrell – the Provocative Child Late nineteenth-century social purity campaigners regarded many sexual practices as socially and morally contaminating. Regulation of sexuality up to the First World War was heavily driven by such activists. The 1880s scares over “white slavery” and the trafficking of English teenagers to Belgian brothels, though exaggerated and alarmist, framed regulation in questions about nation, state and the implied depravity of foreigners. Girls subjected to sexual assault were implicated in a diffuse and extensive “social evil.”17 Both feminist and conservative social purists addressed a wider wrong than individual harm. Chastity was a defining attribute of the respectable female. Above all it was through her sexual chastity that a woman or girl established her moral (and thus her social) value. Once activated, female sexuality meant her ready resort to prostitution and seduction. Conservative social purists held that once “fallen,” a girl or woman could never regain her respectability; and in so doing arguably administered social violence against the already sexually abused.18 The sexual precocity of “fallen” girls meant temptation not only for themselves but signally for men. Social purists asked (British) men to rein in their sexual impulses, rather than questioning the nature of such desires. The case law that followed the 1885 CLAA illustrates further how these assumptions came to be written into law through the processes of judicial review and appeal. Such cases raise questions of how “the law,” embodied in the appeal court judges and counsel, imagined what happened to bodies in such sexual encounters; both harm and pleasure. In September 1893, the Central Criminal Court convicted Jane Tyrell (13 years and 8 months) for “aiding and abetting” and also for “soliciting and inciting” Thomas Ford to commit a misdemeanour, to whit of having “carnal knowledge” of herself. It was proved in evidence that she had solicited the sexual contact; such proofs were not infrequently taken as plausible at law. The conviction was overturned on appeal, the grounds being that since the relevant provisions of the CLAA had been drafted for the purpose of “protection,” it would be a “reductio in absurdem” if the act was
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relied upon to underpin a prosecution of an underaged girl. Jane Tyrrell lacked the necessary mens rea but was nevertheless accepted to have the sexual and social capacity to initiate sexual contact. Chief Justice Ld Coleridge saw the CLAA as having “the objective of protecting women and girls against themselves” (i.e. rather than against the men involved), indicating both the fragility of their sexual chastity and their diminished capacity for rational consent. Dominant constructions of femininity saw these two things as not unrelated. The prosecution also argued that irrespective of whether it was an impossibility for an individual to incite an offence against themselves “. . . it was an offence not merely on herself, but against the State.”19 The collectivity of respectable citizenry as much as Jane Tyrrell were victims. In different ways the Court of Appeal accepted that a 13 year old was entirely capable of initiating consensual sexual intercourse but also subsumed the harm (if any) done to Jane Tyrrell in wider formulations of social evil and moral danger. In Sumner’s formulation, there is more here of the violence of censure than the censure of violence.20 5.
Competing Discourses, Professionalisation and Legal Review between the Wars Age of consent was next reviewed, though not changed, between the wars. Parliamentary Committees on England and Scotland reported in 1925 and 1926. Sexology had by then emphasised the inevitability and pleasure of desire as well as its potential variety but had also given a new kind of scientific legitimacy to dominant models of male insistence and female submission.21 Social psychology gave a fresh array of reasons why premature sexual activity was deleterious to an adolescent’s future development; “not only unfortunate impressions but severe neurosis may persist in later life.” This Freudian concern for psychological harm is still, however, morally inflected. Early sex will “ confound (a child’s) sense of right and wrong.”22 Furthermore, eugenics and social darwinism deplored deviant sexual activity through fears of racial degeneration. Anxieties about sexuality and social stability, heightened during the First World War and epitomised in the postwar persona of the “flapper,” were confronted by this rather different set of discourses and structures. Without taking on uncritically all of Garland’s formulations, the interwar proliferation of institutions and expert opinion around the child certainly looks like penal-welfarism. Pamela Cox has shown how the formula of “care and protection” enabled the institutionalisation of an array of both victimised and delinquent girls whose deviance was attributed in both newer medical and older moral discourses to premature or excessive sexual development.23 If penal-welfarism aimed to manage delinquency in a liberal, collectivist state, the persistence of melodramatic moral discourses kept the notion of evil in play. The perceived increase in illicit sexual activities during wartime had been challenged in part by the heavier policing of women and the imposition of curfews in military towns. A notorious provision under the Defence of the
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Realm Act, 1918 (40D) had authorised the forcible removal for treatment of any woman known to be a source of venereal infection.24 VD was a major concern, with the debate veering between health education arguments for more information and access to treatment and more conservative positions which still emphasised the potential moral contagion of too much knowledge. 1920s teens could buy into a racy, sexualised leisure culture. Lesley Hall cites a diarists’ reminiscence of “all the little girls in the 1917 Club who used to run about talking about libidos and orgasms.” A good deal of casual and sexy dating stopped short of intercourse, but nevertheless, the sexual knowingness of the flapper, able through paid work to delay marriage, seemed alarming in a number of quarters.25 Between the wars, amongst the cases it decided around sexual consent, the Appeal Court was exercised several times by appeals arising from the operation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1922. The 1885 Act had established a defence to a charge of “carnal knowledge” where the girl had consented and the defendant could prove he had a “reasonable belief” that she was 16 or older. The 1922 legislation removed the (by now notorious) “reasonable belief” defence, but made an exception for young men defendants under 24 years old on a first charge.26 The practice had grown up of adding an indictment for indecent assault to one of carnal knowledge. This covered the eventuality of the evidence not supporting the greater charge, but also positioned sex-with-minors as assault. Where young male defendants after 1922 relied successfully on “reasonable belief,” because the facts of the intercourse had necessarily been proved, they were finding themselves automatically convicted of indecent assault. Was such arguably consensual sex violent? Was it evil? The Appeal Court decided against young men who were physically violent or who hunted in packs; such stories matched known paradigms of rape.27 However, where defendants appeared respectable, reliable and moderate in their sexual practices, the model of sexual relations invoked became a romance narrative of normal courtship gone a little astray. The girl, though under-aged, had necessarily to be represented as an unharmed, consenting party to intercourse, not the victim of sexual assault. The 21-year-old defendant in R v Keech (1929) was of the “highest character.”28 He had intended to marry 15 year old Lily Bird, but had been prevented by the 1929 Marriage Act. She was pregnant and he was paying her a voluntary 10 shillings per week maintenance. On appeal his 1 month’s sentence was reduced to 1 day and he was discharged. “Reasonable belief” called for evidence of an adolescent girl’s capacity to consent and often found it in her appearance. Lily Bird’s mother had testified that she “looked eighteen.” Visual witness, or autopsy, is particularly culturally credible. The capacity to consent was read off from bodily clues that signed premature female sexuality which, though in other contemporary circumstances indicated irrationality and delinquency, here were taken to evidence rational consent. Gender, says Gatens, is “a material effect of the way in which power
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takes hold of the body.”29 The appearance of sexual maturity in an adolescent was held to shape her sexual behaviour and thus her social identity. (By 1929 all adult – sexually mature – women were considered sufficiently rational to vote). The judgement in R v Maughn (1923) had mitigated a 19 year old youth’s sexual responsibility; he was “a boy who is tempted and induced to have carnal knowledge of a girl who misrepresents herself to be over sixteen, and who appears to be so.” Hers was thus a wilful pass, in terms of claiming legal identity but its vehicle was an embodied sexuality which both psychological and moral discourses naturalised.30 Respectable young men (boys) like Keech and Maughn were vulnerable to temptation because of their youth and so themselves acquired a limited amount of protection from the law. They could be explained by both Victorian moral restraint and by modern sexology, as exhibiting the right kinds of manly desire but making fairly minor mistakes in its management. In the courts, expert witnesses may increasingly have expressed views shaped by psychological knowledges. Nevertheless, given the constraints of precedent and the fuzzy drafting of statute, when imagining what happened to bodies, courts decided specific cases by working between new knowledges and more longstanding legal logics, both of which ignored (or misread) power and occluded harm. Despite anxieties about rising juvenile delinquency in the 1920s, the professional and discursive parameters of welfare as the appropriate response to youthful disorder continued to expand. The 1933 Children and Young Persons Act gave juvenile courts jurisdiction over children and “young persons” aged under 17 who were categorised as neglected, abused or offending. Rehabilitative objectives bound “protection” with “training,” its goal the production of (gendered) citizens.31 The Appeal Court in 1937 was willing to categorise as “child” a 13½ year old who had accepted a ride in a lorry and gone off to the woods with Ronald Harling, who there (with her “consent”) had “carnal knowledge” of her.32 Equivalent behaviour had in 1895 evidenced the sexual initiative of 13 year old Jane Tyrrell and put her at risk of judicial punishment. The interwar juvenile justice and welfare systems blurred definitions between deprivation and depravity and saw both as linked causes of moral (sexual) danger to adolescent girls. The “weakling” girl assaulted by Harling was herself likely to be institutionalised. The 1933 Act also brought more mid-teens girls, including 16 year olds, into the penal welfare net as in need of “care and protection,” effects it seems not unconnected with the stability of statute and case law on age of consent; thus social evil seemed rather more amenable to management. Disciplinary regimes had clearly shifted though the substratum of sexual abuse which they “discovered” may not have.
Shani D’Cruze 6.
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Come on Silly The Second World War re-opened concerns about illicit sexuality and its effects. Suffolk was a rural and fairly impoverished county in the late 30s. Because it became the site of large numbers of airfields, the influx of soldiers, airmen and construction workers suddenly produced a larger, younger population, and boosted the ailing economy. As one Bury St Edmunds diarist wrote in 1942, “The town is simply packed with people, natives and outsiders . . . At night, soldiers loiter on the town pavements watching for girls, and the girls here think it is just lovely.”33 This hedonistic and highly sexualised leisure culture proved exciting (if sometimes dangerous) for many women, girls and boys. This was a national phenomenon of course, but had particular impact in this conservative county. In October 1943 the Bishop of Norwich fulminated against “[t]he behaviour of many of our women – and peculiarly of quite young girls – in town and village alike in casual acquaintance with soldiers, English or foreign, [which] is a disgrace to their sex and the nation.” Despite the shifting rhetorics of penal-welfarism, in this moment of national crisis sexual danger was again represented as a social evil. Although some East Anglian voices sought to allocate blame more equitably, most dominant definitions of “the moral slump” highlighted the conduct of teenage and adolescent girls, for whom the Suffolk establishment rushed to provide talks in school by doctors, girls’ clubs and rescue homes – as well, of course, as probation orders. The perceived breakdown of the family in wartime had produced these apparently prematurely eroticised feminine subjects who blurred the normative boundaries between childhood and adulthood.34 Despite this moral panic, the local courts were little exercised by sexual assault cases involving teenagers. Such matters were dealt with elsewhere and otherwise (if at all). One might imagine – though of course one does not know – how the experience of unacknowledged sexual violence was “folded into everyday relationships.” Nevertheless three Suffolk Petty Sessions cases of 1942 and 3 are telling. These are provincial, lower courts, interpreting and not making law. Furthermore the depositions enable an albeit mediated opportunity to hear something of what under-aged girls and men were saying when called upon to account for their sexual conduct by the court and the police.35 Reg Bamford, a married soldier, attended a village dance. He paired off with Agnes Ward, whom he claimed he did not know was 15. It was her first dance, but she knew the etiquette. Her friend, Ruth, was “with” an airman, and she “got off” with Bamford. Their erotic moment during which she claimed – and he flatly denied – he sexually assaulted her, ended when by accident or design she rolled from the grass verge of the lane into a waterfilled ditch and was rescued by neighbours. Clearly pushed by questions in court, she carefully delineated the boundaries around consent; “I did not meet him by arrangement but I did not tell him to go away. I don’t know why I did not shout for help. I did cross the road without struggling but I did not lie
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down on the grass. . . . I was quite calm till I fell into the ditch.” As far as he was concerned it was a harmless bit of necking after 6 or 7 pints of mild. Her analysis is more knowing about the etiquette of teenage sexual encounter; she did successfully end the moment of intimacy (or violence) by screaming for help.36 An RAF airman who hung out with a servant in the streets of Saxmundham tried repeatedly to “mess around with her,” said she was “silly” for refusing, exposed himself and speculated that he could compel her by hitting her on the head “but had no intentions of doing so.” She had just turned 16 and was outside the protection of the age of consent. We know most of the story through her statement, which however emphasised his words, his agency and her powerlessness. A passing motorist stopped to rescue her and escorted the young man to the police where he corroborated her story without scruple.37 She got on her bike and rode home, having managed to ward off unwanted intercourse through passive resistance. George Griffin picked up 14 year old Audrey Bennett in his lorry, purportedly asking for directions, and sexually assaulted her, despite her protests and resistance. Her story, laced with euphemism (“he did what he shouldn’t do”) but explicit in its detail, is a narrative of abduction and physical coercion as well as aggressive persuasion. His story is to do with consensual sex and a “silly” girl who “looked 17,” smiled in invitation and then changed her mind and struggled.38 This was the only case of the three that resulted in a guilty verdict. Suffolk magistrates, part of the respectable public opinion worried at wartime sexual activity, were nevertheless wary of conviction when teenage girls might be thought to be colluding. They recognised harm most easily when accompanied by physical violence. These men were insistent in their pursuit of sex, but did not see their conduct as coercive, let alone “evil.” They elided young women’s social and sexual consent.39 They did not read these teenagers as children but as sexually knowing and “attractive,” though the recurrent use of “silly” encodes the eroticisation of littleness and reads refusal as coy flirtation by the subordinated sexual object. Before the law, girls mobilised tropes of victimisation, passivity and powerlessness to secure its protection. 7.
Conclusion Given models of desire (generally coded masculine) which are proactive, motile and go-getting, if not plain predatory, the desiring subject relates to the eroticised object which incites desire through pleasures produced by risk, temptation and “provocativeness.” Attraction is constituted across distance and difference that intimacy (inevitably unsuccessfully) seeks to collapse. The object, be it male or female, is to an extent at least feminised as he/she/it is eroticised, across potentially shifting power dynamics. To the extent that law has naturalised power differentials by gender it has had only the fairly blunt conceptual tools of “assault,” “indecency,” “carnal knowledge” and of course “rape” to adjudicate what kinds of sexual
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encounter constitute what kind of offence.40 By setting an age of “consent,” the law aims to “protect” a person it positions as a “child.” But what a “child” might be is gendered and historically specific. The protection afforded by the age of consent has often been understood in terms of the prevention of wider social harm, recurrently amplified through rhetorics of “evil.” The reasons for “protecting” that child have not been formulated around the defence of individual rights. Rhetorics of protection have constituted their object through the imperfect ability for rational consent, inscribed on the body, not through vulnerabilities to the complex and nuanced power differentials and potential violences in sexual encounter.
Notes 1. Waites, 2003; Waites, 2002; Waites, 2001. 2. When a 1916 prosecution appealed to a jury “to protect young girls from men like these” the defence counsel countered by asking for the “protection” of his client from conviction. R v Banks (1916) 12 Cr App R, 74; (1916) 2 KB, 621. Compare Shah. 3. Ferguson. 4. A flurry of debate as the 2003 Sexual Offences Bill went through parliament asked whether the act would criminalise consensual sexual activity short of intercourse by people under 16. John Carvel, The Guardian, 11 July, 2003; David Batty, The Guardian, 24 November, 2003; Miranda Sawyer, Age of Consent, Channel 4, 19 November, 2003. 5. Stanko, 12; D’Cruze and Rao; Kleinman. 6. For the earlier legal history, see Simpson, 182-185. 7. Weiner. 8. Stevenson, 96. 9. Walkowitz, 1980. 10. Offences Against the Person Act 1875. 11. Radcinowicz, 329. 12. L. Jackson; D’Cruze, Crimes of Outrage; Suffolk Record Office, (SRO), BB2-6. 13. Giddens, 60; Bourke; Stoler; Hearn, 157. 14. Quoted in Hyams, 133. 15. Mason, 210-212. 16. L. Jackson, 122-123. 17. Mort, 102-106; Bland, ch 3. Compare Robertson; Daily Telegraph, 3 April, 1885; “English Girls Being Systematically Entrapped,” The Sentinel, March, 1880, 1; ibid, April 1880, 4; Gorham; Walkowitz, 1992.
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Protection, Harm and Social Evil 18. Society for the Rescue of Young Women and Children, 18th Annual Report year ending 31 March, 1871, published 1872, 23, 22. “It is not that there is a large amount of open criminality amongst female juveniles, as a means of giving a livelihood, but that a large number at a very youthful age, are led astray from virtue, and having fallen, become an easy prey to subsequent temptation.” 19. QBD 710 R v Tyrrell, 16 December, 1893; Times 18 December, 1893, 14. 20. Sumner, 4-5. 21. M. Jackson. 22. Cmd 2561, 1925, xv 905; L. Jackson, 153. 23. Garland, 1985; Garland, 1990; Garland, 2001; Cox, ch 6. 24. D’Cruze, “Crime”; Woodeson; Hall, 95. 25. Davidson, 75; Hall, 99; D’Cruze, “The Villa Madeira and the Eastbourne Foxes.” 26. Radzinowicz, 331. 27. Compare R v Blackman, 21 Cr App R, 132 (1929), D’Cruze, Crimes of Outrage, and articles by Jones and by Stevenson in D’Cruze ed., Everyday Violence. 28. 21 Cr App R, 125 (1929). 29. Minkley and Legassick; Hartog, 261; Gatens, 66. 30. 17 Cr App R p. 103; (1923) 2 K B p. 404; Lawes 1929 21 Cr App R 45; Cox. 31. Hendrick, 183-185; Bailey, 165, 167. 32. R v Harling (1937) 26 Cr App R, 127; (1938) All E R, 307; R v Donovan (1934) 2 KB, 498; 25 Cr App R, 1. 33. Mass Observation diarist, Winifred Last, quoted in Johnson, 87. 34. Cooper; Johnson, 96-105; Rose. 35. Das, 220; Hartismere Petty Sessions tried 111 motoring offences and 32 property cases in 1943 compared to 12 cases to do with sexuality, including prostitution or sexual violence. American servicemen were tried under US martial law, not in British courts. SRO BB6/1/1/6. 36. SRO BB6/1/2/15, 11 June, 1943, 149. 37. SRO, BB2/1/7/1, 27 January, 1946, 126. 38. SRO BB6/1/2/15, 12 April, 1943, 131. 39. Compare MacMartin, 9-40. 40. Nelson and Oliver, 554-577.
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Bland, Lucy. Banishing the Beast: English Feminism and Sexual Morality, 1885-1914. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995. Bourke, Joanna. An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare. London: Granta Books, 1999. Cooper, Ashley. Heart of Our History: 500 Years of Village History along the Suffolk Essex Border. Bulmer: Bulmer Historical Society, 1994. Cox, Pamela. Gender, Justice and Welfare: Bad Girls in Britain, 1900-1950. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003. Das, Veena. “The Act of Witnessing: Violence, Poisonous Knowledge, and Subjectivity.” In Violence and Subjectivity, eds. V. Das et al., 197-229. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. D’Cruze, Shani. Crimes of Outrage: Sex Violence and Victorian Working Women. London: UCL Press, 1998. _______. “Crime,” In I. Zweiner-Bargielowska, Women in Twentieth Century Britain, Ch. 13. Harlow: Longman, 2000. _______. Everyday Violence in Britain, 1850-1950: Gender and Class. Harlow: Longman, 2000. _______. “The Villa Madeira and the Eastbourne Foxes: Gender, Murder and Compromised Respectability in Two Inter-War English Seaside Towns.” Paper to Social History Society Conference, Leicester, January 2003. D’Cruze, Shani and Anupama Rao. “Violence and the Vulnerabilities of Gender.” Violence, Vulnerability and Embodiment, A Special Issue of Gender & History, eds. S. D’Cruze and A. Rao, 16 (2004): 495512. Davidson, Roger. “‘This pernicious delusion’: Law, Medicine, and Child Sexual Abuse in early-twentieth-century Scotland.” Journal of the History of Sexuality 10 (2001): 62-77. Ferguson, Harry. “Cleveland in History: the Abused Child and Child Protection 1880-1914.” In In the Name of the Child: Health and Welfare 1880-1914, ed. R. Cooter, 146-173. London: Routledge, 1992. Garland, David. Punishment and Welfare. Aldershot: Gower, 1985. _______. Punishment and Modern Society. Oxford: Clarendon, 1990. _______. The Culture of Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Gatens, Moira. Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. London: Routledge, 1996. Giddens, Anthony. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Society. London: Routledge, 1992. Gorham, Deborah. “The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon Revisited.” Victorian Studies 21 (1978): 353-379. Hall, Lesley. Sex, Gender and Social Change in Britain Since 1880. London: Macmillan, 2000.
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Hartog, François The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History. Berkeley, California University Press, 1988. Hearn, Jeff. Men in the Public Eye: The Construction and Deconstruction of Public Men and Public Patriarchies. London: Routledge, 1992. Hendrick, Harry. Child Welfare: England 1872-1989. London: Routledge, 1994. Hyams, Ronald. Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. Jackson, Louise A. Child Sexual Abuse in Victorian England. London: Routledge, 2000. Jackson, Margaret. “The Real Facts of Life”: Feminism and the Politics of Sexuality, c 1850-1940. London: Taylor and Francis, 1994. Johnson, Derek C. East Anglia At War, 1942, 2d ed. Norwich: Jarrold & Sons, 1992. Kleinman, Arthur. “The Violences of Everyday Life.” In Violence and Subjectivity, ed. V. Das et al., 23-58. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. MacMartin, Clare. “(Un)Reasonable Doubt? The Invocation of Children’s Consent in Sexual Abuse Trial Judgments,” Discourse & Society 13 (2002): 9-40. Mason, Michael. The Making of Victorian Sexuality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Minkley, Gary and Martin Legassick. “‘Not Telling’: Secrecy, Lies, and History.” History & Theory 39 (2000): 1-10. Mort, Frank. Dangerous Sexualities: MedicoMoral Politics in England since 1850, 2d ed. London: Routledge, 2000. Nelson, Andrea and Pamela Oliver. “Gender and the Construction of Consent in Child-Adult Sexual Contact – Beyond Gender Neutrality and Male Monopoly.” Gender & Society 12 (1998): 554-577. Radcinowicz, Leon. Sexual Offences. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959. Robertson, Stephen. “The Age of Consent and the Making of Modern Childhood in New York City, 1886-1921.” Journal of Social History (2002): 781-798. Rose, Sonya O. “Girls and GIs: Race, Sex and Diplomacy in Second World War Britain.” International Historical Review 19 (1997): 146-160. Shah, Svati. “Prostitution, Sex Work and Transnational Formulations of ‘Violence’: Discursive and Political Contexts for Five Texts on Paid Sex, 1987-2001.” Violence, Vulnerability and Embodiment,” A Special Issue of Gender & History, eds. S. D’Cruze and A. Rao, 16 (2004): 794-812. Simpson, Anthony. “Vulnerability and the Age of Female Consent: Legal Innovation and its Effect on Prosecutions for Rape in EighteenthCentury London.” In Sexual Underworlds of the Enlightenment, eds.
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G. S. Rousseau and R. Porter, 182-196. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987. Stanko, Elizabeth. “Introduction.” In The Meanings of Violence, ed. Elizabeth Stanko, 1-13. London: Routledge, 2003. Stevenson, Kim. “‘Ingenuities of the Female Mind’: Legal and Public Perceptions of Sexual Violence in Victorian England, 1850-1890.” In Everyday Violence in Britain, c 1850 c 1950: Gender & Class, ed. S. D’Cruze, 89-103. Harlow: Longman, 2000. Stoler, Ann Laura. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Sumner, Colin. “Introduction: the Violence of Censure and the Censure of Violence.” In Violence, Culture and Censure, ed. Colin Sumner, 1-6. London: Routledge, 1996. Waites, Matthew. “Equality at Last? Homosexuality, Heterosexuality and the Age of Consent in the United Kingdom.” Sociology 37 (2003): 637-655. _______. “Inventing a ‘Lesbian Age of Consent’? The History of the Minimum Age for Sex Between Women in the UK.” Social & Legal Studies 11 (2002): 323-342. _______. “Regulation of Sexuality: Age of Consent, Section 28 and Sex Education.” Parliamentary Affairs 54 (2001): 495-501. Walkowitz, Judith. Prostitution and Victorian Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. _______. City of Dreadful Delight. London: Virago, 1992. Weiner, Martin J. Men of Blood: Violence, Manliness, and Criminal Justice in Victorian England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Woodeson, Alison. “The First Women Police: A Force for Equality or Infringement?” Women’s History Review 2 (1993): 217-232.
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Chapter 4 Sin, Scandal, and Disaster: Politics and Crime in Contemporary Turkey Ruth A. Miller The August 17, 1999 earthquake in western Turkey left 15,000 people dead and 600,000 homeless. It also acted as a focal point for heightened ideological debate among the Turkish population. The earthquake was a natural disaster, but it quickly became more than that. Its size, the extent of the devastation, the fact that it had happened in the “civilized” western part of the country rather than in the “underdeveloped” eastern part – where natural disasters are supposed to happen1 – all prompted debate, discussion, and above all an attempt to endow the destruction with meaning. In the days following the first few aftershocks, state-owned and secularist television stations used analyses of plate tectonics to broadcast images of an angry Arabian peninsula – dominated by jagged arrows representing the Wahhabi Saudi state – aggressively slamming into a peaceful Turkish Anatolian plateau.2 Islamist newspapers strongly implied that the earthquake was divine punishment for the moral depravity of the current Turkish government.3 Liberals used the opportunity to attack a cumbersome and overwhelming state structure for its slow response to the suffering.4 And radical nationalists – such as the neo-fascist health minister, Osman Durmu· – created martyrs to Turkish racial purity by, for example, refusing to allow blood transfusions or aid from Armenian and Greek donors.5 But in the midst of all of these attacks and counter attacks, the group that eventually incurred the most popular and political wrath was not the Islamists, the secularists, the state, or religious minorities – it was the building contractors. The contractors, it turned out, had been corrupt. They had bribed state inspectors, they had used shoddy materials and pocketed the funds left over, and they had received their contracts – both public and private – via nepotism and favouritism. The result was a death toll that rose into the tens of thousands. In the weeks following the earthquake, stories circulated of contractors set upon by angry mobs, while local authorities looked the other way.6 Many in construction simply left the country. Finally, the state opened a formal inquiry into the relationship between its bureaucrats and the contractors – the eventual goal being to root out the corruption inherent to the building industry. At that point, the discussion in the media also switched from the contractors’ role in the earthquake’s carnage to their role in the corruption of state institutions.7 Within weeks of the earthquake, that is, the evil perpetrated by the contractors had shifted from a personal evil in which they were responsible for the deaths of thousands of individuals, to a political evil in which they were responsible for sullying the bureaucratic structure of the Turkish state.
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The victim of their crime ceased to be the individual, and instead became the nation. Eventually, the contractors, the evil that they had perpetrated, and the guilt that they had incurred were all co-opted by a renewed discourse of state purity. That the contractors became the targets of popular and political anger at all is worth discussing. Yes, their dishonest or simply incompetent practices were the cause of death and misery. Yes, natural disasters and epidemics rarely occur without an immediate attempt to attribute to them (usually negative) moral value. Violence – even the arbitrary violence of an “act of God” – must have meaning, and someone must be responsible for it. Thus we see, to choose at random, Eastern European immigrants to the United States blamed for nineteenth century typhoid epidemics8 and “Communists” or “Jews” blamed for the 1933 German Reichstag fire. But why attack the contractors specifically, and not the cumbersome state denounced by the liberals, the religious/ethnic minorities blamed by the fascists, the religious extremism targeted by the secularists, or the atheist ministers condemned by the Islamists? I would argue that the contractors, more than any of these other groups, could most effectively embody the contemporary Turkish understanding of “evil.” By 1999, “evil” – especially in the public sphere, where the civic and the moral overlap to a large extent – had a specific meaning, tied to the purity of state institutions. And by 1999, it could be applied only to corrupt bureaucrats or to those responsible for their corruption – in this case the building contractors. This meaning, however, had been in the process of articulation over the course of a century and a half, and it owed its existence to trends in Ottoman political-legal thought that existed long before the Republican Turkish state had even been imagined. It was in the Ottoman period, and not in the Turkish Republic, that both civic and moral evil had become key supports in a proto-authoritarian state structure. One of the defining characteristics of power in the modern period is the rationalization and bureaucratisation of law. Legal codification, or at least debates over the merits of legal codification, became an almost global phenomenon in the nineteenth century as state power was centralized and made uniform.9 The fact that often this rationalization, bureaucratisation, and codification occurred in a colonial or quasi-colonial context does not detract from – and in fact underlines – the normative nature of the process. As a number of scholars have noted, to the extent that colonialism was a process of identification, assimilation, and control, legal codes helped and even provided the foundation for this process.10 At both the imperial centre and in the “periphery,” the rationalization of criminal law in particular standardized not just the concept of crime, but also the concept of evil, victim, and perpetrator. The Ottoman Empire did not escape these trends. Between 1839 and the end of the First World War, the Ottoman legal system also underwent a massive change as political power was re-situated. In the Ottoman Empire
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too, codes replaced what was largely a case-precedent system, liberal neologisms for concepts such as “citizen” and “public opinion” were incorporated into and legitimised by these codes, and the relationship among state, citizen, and law became self-consciously rational.11 Criminal law sought to eliminate the “deviant” – be it local power, alternative political identities, or threats to a modern, uniform, moral standard. Finally, the religious establishment began to play a new role in defining “evil,” creating a situation in which threats to the political or social norm became as dangerous as threats to religious orthodoxy. As a result, criminality and evil began to occupy a new and fluid position in the Ottoman imagination. As Ottoman and then Turkish criminal law was repeatedly re-interpreted over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, what could be defined as “criminal” or “evil” also changed. In particular, it was during this period that religious or moral evil was conflated with political or bureaucratic evil. Indeed, by the turn of the twentieth century, evil had become largely a political rather than a moral category, setting the stage for the Turkish Republic’s eventual 1927-1938 adoption of Mussolini’s fascist code of criminal law.12 The abstract concept most in need of legal protection had by the 1930s become not “the individual,” “God,” or even “society,” but “the state.” A corrupt bureaucratic functionary thus posed more of a threat to Ottoman and Turkish selfdefinition than a murderer, an apostate, or a sexual deviant. This trend was very much a part of nascent legal modernity in the late Ottoman Empire. Between 1841 and 1859 in particular, criminality became more and more overtly an issue of threatening the bureaucracy or the state rather than the individual, society, or God. Two categories of criminality became the almost exclusive target of codes promulgated over these decades: on the one hand, legislation addressed rebellion, “banditry,” revolution, and similar collective external threats to political legitimacy; on the other hand, it addressed bribery, corruption, graft, and similar discrete internal threats to uniform bureaucratic function.13 In each of the new criminal codes, articles on these issues range over a number of pages, and go into great detail about the various ways in which a group or an individual can be rebellious or corrupt. Articles on such issues as murder, theft, rape, and the like are, contrarily, comparatively short, general, and in many cases perfunctory to the point of meaninglessness. Indeed, when articles or chapters on “personal” crimes do occupy a significant amount of space in nineteenth century Ottoman codification, it is at moments when the moral authority of legislation against personal crime is needed to underline the threat posed by political crime. The 1851 code, for example, contains a long article devoted to murder and the criminal nature of “attacks on life.” But only the first few lines discuss what we would ordinarily understand as “murder” – that is, an attack on the life of an individual human being. The rest of the article focuses on rebellion and treason, explicitly privileging not just the rhetorical, but the legal value of the
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“life” of the state over the “life” of the individual.14 Similarly, the chapter on “crimes against property” – a section ostensibly concerned with theft of various kinds – contains only one article actually devoted to theft, with the rest of the text focused on bribery, bureaucratic corruption, and the importance of a uniform system of tax collection.15 The state and the bureaucracy, that is, very quickly became the only “victims” that modern Ottoman criminal law sought to protect. From the outset, political crime was the crime of paramount – and to some extent sole – importance. It was the religious establishment, however, that turned this political and bureaucratic crime into sin. The Ottoman religious establishment played a key role in the transformation and modernization of law in the Ottoman Empire. Ulema – scholars of Islamic law attached to the me·ihat, or religious hierarchy – occupied many of the important posts in the late Ottoman Ministry of Justice and made up the vast majority of the functionaries in the new legal system.16 These ulema simultaneously became mouthpieces for a number of statements issued by the bureaucracy that endowed with religious legitimacy both the centralization and the rationalization of political power.17 The result was a uniquely modern relationship between the religious establishment and the state. Whereas in the pre-modern Empire, dialogue between the two spheres certainly existed, it was only after 1839 that the two became effectively one, with religion as a pillar of uniform state power.18 The ulema – former arbiters of religious, social, and personal morality – began to operate instead in a system focused exclusively on political morality. Their role as interpreters of human evil was effaced by their role as interpreters of bureaucratic crime; sin and crime were conflated and, to the extent that crime had become solely political, sin came to mean any anti-state or antibureaucratic activity. It is not, for example, an accident that anti-state activity was more often than not designated as “banditry.” Everyone from political conspirators to nationalist revolutionaries to disobedient soldiers was accused of “banditry” and tried and convicted accordingly.19 This is not just because banditry implied a collective criminality that made it feasible for a state to go after others in the “gang” without proving individual culpability.20 Nor is it solely because attributing to a bandit the aura of martyrdom that is often attributed to revolutionaries can be difficult. In the Ottoman context, “banditry” was already a religious crime. It was one of the “classical” had crimes in Islamic law, and thus the term had a tinge of sinfulness already built into it. By accusing revolutionaries and rebels of banditry rather than – or in addition to – treason or even rebellion, the state was thereby underlining the evil as opposed to criminal nature of their act. Even more than rebels, however, corrupt bureaucrats had become threats to the purity – and thus identity – of the state. By the turn of the twentieth century, nearly 40% of the vacancies created in the Ottoman legal hierarchy were the result of functionaries having been dismissed and
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prosecuted for corruption.21 This is compared to 5% of the vacancies created fifty years earlier. It is, however, safe to say that functionaries had not become progressively more corrupt over the years, at least not in a concrete, measurable manner. Instead, they had become – more telling – the victims of a new mania among Ottoman administrators for the regularity and uniformity of the bureaucratic process. A regulation of 1915 eventually codified the policing of legal functionaries, prohibiting “social interaction” while on the job, especially in corridors or with people on official business.22 Deviation from the bureaucratic norm, that is, was simply no longer tolerable, and had to be stopped. Finally, between 1933 and 1938, the Turkish Republican government adopted all of the salient sections of Mussolini’s fascist code of criminal law.23 The two most important of these were chapters on “crimes against the nation or race” and “crimes against the personality of the state.” The first targeted for the most part “internal” threats to a uniform national or racial norm. The second targeted “external” threats to bureaucratic structures or political self-definition. In general, the fascist ideology embodied in both sections self-consciously sought to use the concept of criminality to protect the state from any conceivable attack on its “life” or its “honour.”24 The evil that had formerly been associated with violent aggression against the individual or religious morality was thus completely transformed by fascist philosophy. In both fascist Italy and early Republican Turkey, “evil” came to mean instead any aggression against the rights, honour, or safety of the nation-state. Indeed, as the first Republican Turkish Justice Minister argued, criminal law had to protect the rights of the state, the rights of the revolution, and the rights of the people, in that order. He concluded: Our criminal code is very harsh because the revolution is very jealous. But it is both harsh and scientific. Those who will be afraid of it, and those who have need to be afraid of it are those who are against the interests of the Turkish nation, against the rights of the Turkish nation, and against the revolution; and these people ought to be afraid.25 The trajectory of Ottoman criminal law, the conflation of religious evil and political crime, and the coming together of personal corruption and bureaucratic corruption had all set the groundwork for this moment. Personal evil and political evil had become one. At the same time, it must be emphasized that the rationalization and bureaucratisation of the law that led to this situation were general and largely international phenomena in the modern period. In nearly all modern criminal codes, the individual disappeared as the victim in need of protection and was replaced by an abstract collective concept such as “society,” the “social body,” or “the state.”26 Nearly everywhere, that is, evil had become a collective (and mildly authoritarian) issue rather than a personal issue.
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What led the Ottoman Empire and Turkey in a more radically authoritarian and eventually fascist direction was therefore not so much the elimination of the individual, but the unification of the social body or society and the state. It was only when the needs, desires, and identity of “society” were manifested in bureaucratic and political institutions, when it was these institutions rather than “society” that criminal law protected, that the line between a moral or even religious “evil,” and a civic or bureaucratic “criminal,” disappeared. And it is the elimination of this line – the fact that political crime had to be evil – that can help us understand the unfortunate position of the contractors following the 1999 earthquake, as well as popular reaction to scandals such as “Susurluk.” “Susurluk” requires some elaboration. In November 1996, a Mercedes with a trunk full of automatic weapons crashed near the Turkish town of Susurluk, killing all but one of its passengers. Those who died included Abdullah Çatl, a radical right neo-fascist assassin who had been sought by Interpol, Hüseyin Kocaday, a senior member of the Istanbul police, and Gonca Us, Çatl’s common law wife. Sedat Bucak, a Kurdish tribal leader and close associate to Tansu Çiller, the former Turkish Prime Minister, survived with a dubious case of amnesia.27 The Susurluk scandal, as it came to be called, prompted widespread discussion in Turkey about violence, authority and, in a quite basic way, evil. Stories of state violence that had been believed, but deemed apocryphal, suddenly gained legitimacy, and the “accidental” or mysterious deaths of various prominent politicians and business leaders were re-evaluated in the light of new information. The fact that all of these people were found physically together seemed to demonstrate the truth of claims that before had seemed dubious or the work of conspiracy theorists. Nearly ten years later, “Susurluk” remains a byword for pervasive criminality and corruption. The sort of criminality or corruption that it represents, however, is not perhaps what one might expect. Çatl began his career as a young, radical right militant, soon became a heroin dealer, and eventually graduated to assassin.28 Over the course of the post-Susurluk investigations, it came out that Kocaday had been involved in 22 cases of homicide or torture and held a major share in Turkey’s illegal gambling market.29 Us, despite her honorary title of “Miss Cinema 1991,”30 was for all intents and purposes a prostitute. And Bucak, even given his ties to Tansu Çiller and his pro-state activities, represented an ethnic group that directly threatened the official ideology of uniform Turkish national identity. In other words, attributed to the passengers in the Mercedes were classical or religious evil in the form of murder, torture, and prostitution, social evil in the form of drug dealing and gambling, and even nationalist evil in the form of a threatening ethnic identity. Susurluk, however, is now associated almost exclusively with political evil. In the press, among the population and in the papers of the state investigators, the question that is repeatedly asked is how such extensive bureaucratic corruption – in the form of state ties to these criminals – could
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have occurred. Çatl and Kocaday are not evil because they killed or maimed other human beings, because drug dealing is immoral, or because gambling is theft. They are evil because these activities polluted the state structure. Us is not evil because of her deviant sexuality, and Bucak is not evil because of his deviant ethnicity. They are evil because their deviance personifies bureaucratic corruption and the entrance of inappropriate power networks into bureaucratic function. Susurluk, that is – much like the 1999 earthquake – led the Turkish population and government to question, to attack, and eventually to correct the rationality of the bureaucracy, the purity of the state, and the honour of those associated with it. Personal evil was still invoked – but only to the extent that it highlighted the political. Newspaper articles, scholarship, and government reports almost always follow the same analytical framework when addressing Susurluk. First, there will be biographies or sketches of the various individuals who were in the car. These biographies will almost always include detailed analyses of the ways in which each individual was personally corrupt. Second, there will be a more theoretical section, discussing the extent to which state institutions and state networks have been infiltrated and warped by this personal corruption. Hamit Bozarslan’s excellent study of the incident, for example, consists of three quite evocative biographies, and then a conclusion that argues that the solidarity networks of the 1980’s and 1990’s have a much more complex texture than did the traditional tribal or religious allegiances of the past. They are capable of using the state not only at a local or provincial level – becoming mayor or corrupting a civil servant, as in the past – but at the very level of the central power, or even from the outside . . . .31 Although Bozarslan’s project is not to posit the prior existence of a pure Turkish state that was then tainted, the re-imagining of personal evil as political corruption is very much present in his study. Every detail of Çatl’s and Bucak’s criminal pasts is presented for the reader’s consumption. The lesson to be learned, however, is a lesson about state networks, political power, and the post 1980 spread of bureaucratic corruption. Veli Özdemir’s Susurluk Documents follows a similar pattern. It consists of a number of biographical interviews and interrogations conducted by a parliamentary committee charged by the Turkish government with fact finding. These interrogations, however, focus almost exclusively on the illicit behaviour of various individuals and only then turn to the question of political crime. Indeed it becomes clear from the transcripts that the committee was following an exact procedure: they would first reinforce the personal nature of the scandal, second invoke the evil perpetrated by the various individuals
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involved in it, and finally link this personal evil to the political crime that the scandal represented. The committee was not remotely interested in “crime” per se, in accuracy, in law, or even in legal “truth.” Instead they were seeking personal confessions of immoral activity – sin that could eventually be turned into bureaucratic crime. The interview with Mehmet Ayar, the protector of the “Susurluk Gang,” for example, begins as follows: “first of all, welcome. I hope that your daughter recovers from her illness soon. May God grant her recovery and patience. Hopefully she will be well in a short time . . . .”32 The committee thus places the interrogation immediately into a personal framework. Ayar is not asked his bureaucratic title, his rank, or his time in service. He is made instead to operate outside of these civic and legal norms. From the very beginning, he is defined as a “private” individual, capable of grief, worry, and presumably evil as well. The committee then asks Ayar to give a brief biography. Ayar does so, leaving out neither the date of his marriage nor the birth of his children in discussing key moments in his political career. He then, however, tries to turn the interrogation away from the personal. He starts to speak in the abstract about state-sponsored black market activities, competition among various intelligence and police agencies, and the ways in which state violence was co-opted by extra-state organizations. He makes every effort to talk about these issues as politically corrupt or criminal, denying them the attendant evil that the committee is trying to attribute to them. But the committee does not allow him to proceed in this style. They repeatedly stress the personal nature of the interview, and whenever Ayar talks in the abstract, they lead him back to his own private impressions. Indeed, when he balks at revealing these impressions, reminding the committee that they are personal and therefore likely inaccurate, they respond: “We are not making a classification as to whether this is right or that is wrong, whether this is guilty or that is innocent. If we did that the boundaries that you’ve mentioned would make sense . . . .”33 Whereas Ayar worries about accuracy – or even “truth” – that is, the committee worries about morality. The committee is not interested in discovering what exactly various state functionaries did and whether or not these activities were criminal – whether these functionaries were “guilty” or “innocent” – but discerning the extent to which the situation as a whole could be construed as personally immoral. Individual legal culpability, legal accuracy, and crime are completely irrelevant to the interview. The committee wants instead to ensure that the political corruption that is their genuine interest have an attendant sense of personal evil associated with it. The committee needs Ayar to talk about his – possibly completely erroneous – impressions, his personally corrupt activities, because if he does not, the political crime can be nothing more than crime. In the end, Ayar complies, and it is to a large extent a result of his testimony that Susurluk has become the scandal that it has among the
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Turkish population. Ayar himself, although his parliamentary immunity protects him from indictment, has become for many the embodiment of personal evil manifested as political corruption. The 1999 earthquake and the 1996 Susurluk scandal are not usually analysed in the same intellectual framework. On the one hand, we have a horrific natural disaster that caused death and misery to thousands of people. On the other, we have a political scandal that – despite its invocation of statebased violence – for the most part titillates and provides fodder for back page newspaper editorials. Evil, however, can be imagined in a variety of different ways, and so placing both under this rubric should not cause disquiet. But neither should it be surprising that when evil enters the public sphere, is rationalized as “crime” in modern legal codifications, and is standardized as “corruption” in modern bureaucracies, these two very different issues can also overlap. The late Ottoman and early Turkish Republican understanding of criminality and state power in particular created a situation in which the spectacle of a toppled cement building, outside of which surviving family members search for the bodies of their loved ones is morally equivalent to the spectacle of Miss Cinema, 1991’s relationship with a hit man on the run from Interpol. By virtue of the authoritarian and eventually fascist nature of criminal law in the Ottoman and Turkish contexts, both became spectacles of political crime and bureaucratic corruption, and that is all. The misery of a father who has lost his family is co-opted and then abstracted by the state – and the sexuality of Gonca Us is used to turn the administratively deviant into sinners.
Notes 1. “The year 1975 marked a turning point in Cantürk’s life; he started a bus line and got involved in tourism. The same year, however, he also faced a personal tragedy: the earthquake in Lice destroyed the whole town, killing a few of his family members. The indifference of the authorities toward this tragedy provoked his strong reaction.” Bozarslan, 18. Earthquakes in the western part of the country generally attract more attention from the Turkish government than earthquakes in the eastern part. 2. See especially the coverage on NTV. The Eurasian and African plates received little comparative attention. 3. See Fehmi Koru’s numerous articles in the newspaper Yeni ¶afak. 4. See the newspaper Radikal’s coverage in particular. 5. Hurriyet. 22 August 1999. 6. Milliyet. 25 August 1999.
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Sin, Scandal, and Disaster 7. See Sefa Kdk’s writing in Hurriyet. 22 September 1999. Also, Metin Toke’s writing in Milliyet. 4 September 1999. 8. Porter, 424. 9. See, for example, Farmer. For a similar perspective on codification during this period, see Cook. 10. See, for example, Said, 78: “[William] Jones’s official work was the law, an occupation with symbolic significance for the history of Orientalism. Seven years before Jones arrived in India, Warren Hastings had decided that Indians were to be ruled by their own laws . . . to rule and to learn, then to compare Orient with Occident: these were Jones’s goals, which, with an irresistible impulse always to codify, to subdue the infinite variety of the Orient to ‘a complete digest’ of laws, figures, customs, and works, he is believed to have achieved.” 11. See, for example, the “Hatt- Hümayun of Gülhane.” 12. Compare Italy, Penal Code, with Turkey, Code Pénal. The original 1889 Italian Code – adopted by Turkey in 1926 – was “reformed” after 1931 by inserting large sections of the fascist Italian code of 1930 into its text. 13. Ahmed Lütfi, 128-141, 152-163. 14. Ibid, 1851 Code, art. 1. 15. Ibid, chap. 3, arts. 1-9. 16. This conclusion is based upon information found in the following documents from the Ba·bakanlk Archive in Istanbul: radeler, Dahiliye: 1402, 1836, 32168, 39013, 41072, 43291, 40072, 40040, 40067, 40870, 40840, 45005, 45893, 45932, 45448, 45587, 46008, 46152, 46253, 46700, 47122, 46945, 47443, 4991, 47366, 48866, 50612, 50508, 60705, 63291, 64263, 64444, 64161, 63583, 63712, 64080, 64631, 64690, 64700, 66797, 66449, 66568, 65875, 65163, 65164, 67692, 67997, 67832, 68860, 69323, 68783, 68124, 68459, 68006, 69394, 69718, 71287, 71404, 69857, 69573, 69442, 72036, 81477, 85244, 84119, 82674, 83461, 84989, 86560, 98813, 99860, 100466, 100367, 95480, 95149, 99204; MV: 16306, 7948, 9397, 25790; MM: 1557, 1817, 1819, 1943; AM: 1312-C-11/310, 1313-S-5/5, 1313 – 18/10, 1313-C-23/2, 1314-¶-12/8, 1314-¶-12/11, 1316 – 29/7, 1316-R-20/11, 1316-Za-9/8, 1323-¶-24/4, 1325-R-5/17, 1325-B-1321. 17. For example, Lütfi, 1851 Code, pp. 150-151, in which the bureaucratic goals of the Gülhane Edict are described as “mansus,” or divinely authoritative – a word ordinarily used to describe exegeses of the Quran. 18. Visitors even to the early Turkish Republic noted this modern re-imagination of the role of religion. The government advocated “worshipping the state in place of Islam . . . [whereas] the State still retains the right to interfere in religious matters, the regime
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has practiced tolerance to some degree . . . Islam must conform to the nationalist program.” Merrill, 191. 19. For example, Ba·bakanlk Archive, radeler, MV 294.7 S.1257. 20. Nathan Brown has noted similar trends in Egypt under British rule. 21. See above, footnote 15. 22. Turkey, Düstur, vol. 7, no. 262, p. 631. 23. Turkey, Code Pénal. 24. Rocco, 10. 25. Öztürk, 1:528. 26. See Ferri. 27. Bozarslan, p. 1. 28. Ibid, 4-5. 29. Ibid, 1, footnote 2. 30. Ibid, 1, footnote 1. 31. Ibid, 22. 32. Özdemir, 229. 33. Ibid, 245.
Bibliography “Hatt- Hümayun of Gülhane,” Osmanl Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1995): 114. Ahmed Lütfi. Mira’t- Adalet, yahud Tarihçe-i Adliye-yi Devlet-i Aliyye. Istanbul: Kitapç Ohannes, 1304/1888. Bozarslan, Hamit. “A Car Crash and Beyond: Network Building, Solidarity, and Violence in Turkey,” Occasional Paper, Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (1999). Brown, Nathan. “Brigands and Statebuilding: The Invention of Banditry in Egypt,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 33 (1991): 258-281. Cook, Charles M. The American Codification Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981. Farmer, Lindsay. “Reconstructing the English Codification Debate,” Law and History Review 18 (2000): 397-444. Ferri, Enrico. The Positivist School of Criminology: Three Lectures, ed. Stanley E. Grupp. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968. Italy. Penal Code of the Kingdom of Italy, as Approved by Royal Decree of October 19, 1930. London: HM Stationery Office, 1931. Merrill, Frederick T. “12 Years of the Turkish Republic,” Foreign Policy Reports 11 (1935): 190-192. Özdemir, Veli. Susurluk Belgeleri. Istanbul: SCALA Yaynclk ve Tantm A.¶, 1997.
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Öztürk, Kazim, ed. Türk Parlamento Tarihi: 1923-1927. vol. 1. Ankara: TBMM Vakf Yaynlar, 1993. Porter, Roy. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity from Antiquity to the Present. London: Harper Collins, 1991. Rocco, Alfredo. “Les postulats du régime fasciste dans la nouvelle legislation pénale,” Centre International d’Études sur le fascisme 3 (1930): 10. Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. Turkey. Code Pénal. Istanbul: John Rizzo, 1939. Turkey. Düstur, vol. 7. Dersaadet (Istanbul): Matbaa-y Amire, 1295/1878, 1333/1914.
Chapter 5
Adding Injury To Injury: The Case of Rape and Prostitution in Turkey
·tar Gözaydn The statutes that criminalized rape in Turkey, from 1926 to 1990, provided that the punishment for the crime would be lessened if the victim was a “prostitute.” In this article I use this praxis to deconstruct “modernity” and “womanhood” in Turkey. The argument I put forward runs as follows: 1. In terms of good and evil, modernity has been perceived as “good” by the founding elite of the Republic of Turkey. “Women” were introduced as a backbone of the modernisation process. Indeed within the emerging Kemalist paradigm (the official state ideology of Republic of Turkey, named after the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), women were bearers of Westernisation, carriers of secularism, actresses in the public realm and would therefore incite a shift of civilisation. A deconstruction of womanhood in Kemalist discourse reveals, however, that a woman earns esteem only if she becomes an asexual creature who at least happens to be able to conceal her sexual self. 2. Law was another important instrument for modernising in late Ottoman and Republican times. To reach the ends of modernity safely, altering not only the public sphere but also the private one, was an intended result of adopting Western codes. After the source legislation of the Italian Penal Code of 1889 (Codice Zanardelli), the Turkish Penal Code of 1926 provided protection only for “virtuous” women preferably positioned primarily as a wife and a mother. Due to this approach, women who had a profession like prostitution were not in a position to deserve protection. 3. Despite the famous myth that the modernisation process, and especially the Turkish Republican founding elite, gave rights to women, there had long been an indigenous women’s liberation movement, at least to a certain extent. Abolition of article 438 of the Turkish Penal Code was one of the first achievements of a second wave of feminist groups in Turkey. 4. The “new” Turkish Penal Code that was adopted on September 26, 2004 (no. 5237) with an effective date of April 1, 2005 regulates rape as one of the crimes under the title “crimes against sexual inviolability,” and includes several provisions against crimes such as intermarital rape and domestic violence. This seems to be quite a drastic change, in the sense that the Turkish Penal Code of 1926, which lasted until March 31, 2005, regulates rape as one of the crimes against the “family order and public morals.” Although the way in which a legal regulation gets applied is critical in a country where 58% of women are victims of violence, a regulation with an obviously different approach than the previous one looks promising.
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“Concerns for Women” in the Ottoman-Turkish Modernisation Process It is a well known fact that the Ottoman modernisation experience started in the state strata to stop the crucial military defeats of the period. The Ottoman ruling elite, the inheritors of the brilliant and great Ottoman Empire, were under the influence of a deep anxiety, which was created by economic, politic and military regression. Additionally the influence of a new ideology was shaking the foundations of the empire and mobilizing the ethnic groups to create their own countries: nationalism. So, in order to escape from coming to an end and to “be modern,” the Ottoman decision-making elite started some “official” modifications such as opening new technical schools and reforming the military system. Meanwhile a new intelligentsia of so-called “Young Ottomans” was emerging. These early intellectuals such as Namk Kemal, ¶inasi, Tevfik Fikret and Ziya Pa·a were somewhat pioneering figures for the Ottoman society. They were trying to reconcile the traditional values, such as Islamic life patterns, monarchy and the crucial role of the state, with western ideas of liberty, democracy and development. Their ideology was kind of a pendulum that represented the traditional Turco-Islamic way of life and western libertarian ideas, which were under the influence of the French Revolution. The new emerging intelligentsia that was almost completely male was deeply interested in women’s issues. For instance, Celal Nuri argued against polygamy, and Halil Hamit in 1910 advocated voting rights for women.1 One of the earliest objections of male intellectuals was against the traditional way of marriage adjustments in the Ottoman society. Men and women were marrying without even meeting/knowing each other, and the marriage adjustments were usually made by the decisions of the parents. It is striking to observe that improving women’s social status and making some radical changes in issues regarding marriage were a priority and some sort of a crucial demand for these men. This “male feminism” can be interpreted as an influence of the new western libertarian thought, or as a general secularisation ideology, or as the influence of the emerging Turkish nationalist ideas, but it should not be overemphasized.2 This criticism of the traditional marriage was a very common theme in this “male feminism” line. ¶inasi wrote a play, “The Marriage of a Poet” (¶air Evlenmesi), that satirized the classical Ottoman marriage, and Tevfik Fikret, after the tragic death of his sister, wrote a poem on obligatory marriages that made the Ottoman people unhappy. In my opinion, the criticism of marriage adjustments and the status quo for women reveal both the potentialities and the handicaps of this “male feminism.” Women’s liberation was not a goal in itself; the solution of the “women question” was to modernise and to progress the Ottoman society. This perspective is quite coherent with the young Turkish Republic’s modernist elite. The Kemalist elite needed women’s mobilization in many aspects: a new nation state was building and every faithful nationalist, including women, was welcomed. Nilüfer Göle claims that specifically the
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role of women in Kemalist policies, like the making of modernity in early Republican China, is a point of differentiation between western modernity and non-western modernities.3 Unlike the West, which formed its public sphere first as a bourgeois sphere excluding the working classes and women,4 “in Muslim contexts of modernity, women were the markers of public space.”5 Characterising this phenomenon as “extra-modernity,” Göle argues that, [M]ore than the construction of citizenship and human rights, it was the construction of women as public citizens and women’s rights which made up the backbone of Turkish modernism. The taking off of the veil, the establishment of compulsory co-education for girls and boys, civil rights for women (such as electoral eligibility and voting), and lastly the abolishment of “Sharia,” the Islamic law, and the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (1926) guaranteed the public visibility and citizenship of women. In other words, women’s corporal, social and political visibility define the public sphere. The grammar of Turkish modernisation can best be grasped by the equation established between national progress and women’s emancipation. In a Muslim context, women’s visibility and the social mixing of men and women would endorse the existence of a public sphere.6 The ruling elite of the early republican era used a rhetoric of equality and liberty for women. The fight against the ancien regime thus included the area of women’s rights. The status of women was a question of prestige for the new ruling elite. For the Turkish Kemalist Revolution in 1923, the central agents of modernism were women. Every revolution redefines the attributes of an “ideal man,” yet the Kemalist revolution celebrates an “ideal woman.” However, just like their Ottoman ancestors, women’s emancipation was not a goal for the nationalist ruling elite. It was a means and a sign of modernity and national development, and, also, the constructed “womanhood” in the Kemalist sense was indeed an asexual/sterile one. Within the emerging Kemalist paradigm, women were to be bearers of Westernisation, carriers of secularism and actresses in the public realm, and would therefore incite a shift of civilisation. Ay·e Kadoylu qualifies this phenomenon of early 20th century Turkey of women having modern costumes and dominantly Western behaviour, but with traditional role selfperceptions especially in relations with men and in inter-family encounters, as “simulation of modernity.”7 Indeed, women were the icons of both modernism and indigenous Turkish culture, so the borderlines of this image were clearly blurred: honourable teachers of the Turkish nation without any obvious sign of sexuality. The ideal type of woman for the nationalist ruling
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The Case of Rape and Prostitution in Turkey
elite was clearly explained in the very popular novel of the early republican era: Çalku·u (gold crest kinglet/the nickname of the heroine) written by Re·at Nuri Güntekin. In this novel the author tells the story of a young woman who is deeply in love with her cousin. When she is informed about her cousin’s “betrayal” just before their wedding, she leaves her house and becomes a teacher in the lost and undeveloped villages of Anatolia. Some years later, after some complicated adventures, she comes back home to Istanbul, still a virgin, and marries her cousin, still the love of her life. The story is quite explanatory in various aspects: she is a high school teacher (a nationalist metaphor teaching tomorrow’s adults); she is a devoted monogamist who keeps on being in love with “the right man”; and she can easily conceal her sexuality when it is necessary. This asexual image of women was a crucial myth of Turkish official nationalism. A good Turkish woman should never forget that she was in the service of her nation first of all, as the teacher/virtuous role model of the nation. It is true that the young Turkish Republic mobilized a great number of women for the service of modernisation process, but their discourses stayed similar to the determinant approach of the state strata. The perception of an independent women’s liberation movement and the definition of a feminine sexuality have been problematic domains of the ruling elite up to the present day. 2.
Article 438 of the Turkish Penal Code of 1926 The Swiss Civil Code was the first set of norms to be adopted by the new Turkish Republic (17 February 1926). Adopting a western set of legal provisions reflecting a different way of regulating family affairs, heritage and ownership conditions, the founding elite of the Turkish Republic explicitly expressed their intention not only to alter the public institutions but to transform the private sphere as well. After the reception of the Civil Code and Code of Contracts, other major codes were translated from various Western sources and put into power. The French Penal Code of 1810 was already in force since the late 19th century. However, the new Republican decision-making elite preferred the Italian Penal Code of 1889 (Codice Zanardelli) for reception. The main consideration for the new preference was announced by Mahmut Esat Bey, the Minister of Justice, to be the need for a new penal system for a new republic. The French code was qualified for regulating a royal and absolutist system, whereas the new Republic was said to be a most populist and secular regime.8 The Turkish Penal Code was adopted as a whole on March 1, 1926, and went into force on July 1, 1926. The Italian Penal Code was amended on October 19, 1930, and the Turkish Penal Code was amended as well on June 11, 1936 in accordance with the new legislation (Codice Rocco). Nevertheless, the eighth section of the Code regulating “crimes against public manners and family establishment” remained the same. Rape, kidnapping for carnal abuse, deception for prostitution, and adultery were
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crimes regulated in this section. Article 438 provided a statutory basis for punishing the crime to a lesser extent: For acts of rape and kidnapping done to a woman who adopts prostitution as a profession, punishment is reduced in a 2/3 ratio to the punishments determined in the related provisions. This provision was an inconsistent regulation even in its existing general legal system. Primarily, prostitution was a profession acknowledged by the legal system. The major legislation concerning prostitutes was the General Hygiene Act of 1930, and due to maintenance of hygiene it was required in the Act to issue an administrative regulation. Thus article 15 of this specific regulation provided a definition for prostitution as a profession: “women satisfying professionally the sexual needs of others for a benefit are prostitutes,” and in order to perform their profession these women had to have work permits. Moreover, an amendment to the Social Security Act provided a professional disease pension, health pension, motherhood pension, old-age pension and death pension to women performing prostitution with work permits. In comparative law, crimes of rape and kidnapping for carnal abuse are regulated in one of four ways: i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
systems that do not have any consideration for the style of life that the victim conducts. Thus no punishment of a lesser degree is valid here. Almost all contemporary laws have such regulations; systems that do not consider the act of rape a crime if the victim is a prostitute. This used to be an ancient regulation. Under the Germanic legal system of the 19th century, only if the victim happened to be a virtuous woman was the act considered a crime; systems making differentiations between a woman who happens to be a prostitute and one who is not. Accordingly punishment gets lessened absolutely (Italian Penal Code 350); systems that give the discretion to the judge for lessening the punishment to a certain degree (1975 Federal German Penal Act, article 177/11).
Article 438 of Turkish Penal Code was applied to several cases over many years. In 1988 the issue was taken to the Constitutional Court. On 12 January 1989, the Court examined the case and verified that the provision
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was constitutional by a vote of 7 to 4. The decision was published in the Official Gazette, and it became controversial. Various women’s organisations and political parties reacted against the decision, and it received extensive coverage in the media, mostly by being criticised but also sometimes praised.9 In the majority opinion, it was claimed that if a virtuous woman is the victim of rape or kidnapping for carnal abuse, the damage to her honour and her respectability in the society and in the environment in which she lives is greater than the damage to a woman who performs prostitution as a profession. It was thus asserted by the majority vote that the provision was consistent with the principles of equality before law (article 10), nature of fundamental rights and freedoms (article 12/1), personal inviolability, material and spiritual entity of the individual (article 17/1), and personal liberty and security (article 19/1). In 1990, the feminist campaign against article 438 took place spontaneously in the enthusiastic atmosphere of the movement’s “golden times.” On January 23, 1990, a group of women went to the famous street of brothels in Istanbul to protest the Penal Code. Their major slogan was, “neither virtuous nor non-virtuous, we’re just women.” Feminists were particularly underlining the parallels between two official documents: the marriage certificate and the work permit to perform prostitution. There was quite a consensus among feminist groups to resist the concept that “nonvirtuous women deserve to get raped.” The only point of dissension was about the representations of the prostitutes. Some feminists argued that in demonstrations it was the feminists who talked in the name of the prostitutes and asserted that this was wrong. According to these feminists, power was exercised when some women talked and acted in the name of the other women. The issue for them was to question the fact of “acting in the name and for the rights of the other.” However the majority of the Turkish feminists thought that it was legitimate to make demonstrations against article 438. A second demonstration was held on 18 February 1990, and more than 2000 women protested against article 438. Women were once again claiming that the “virtuous and non-virtuous” differentiation among women was completely unjustifiable and that every crime of rape was equally illegal. This demonstration, named “all women against article 438,” received wide coverage in the mass media. The women’s liberation movement hence was able to shape public opinion against the Provision. Even women who were not as politicized and mobilized as the militant women of the women’s liberation movement supported this demonstration and the feminist reaction against this sexist clause. Finally on 21 November 1990, article 438 was abolished by the Grand National Assembly. This was the first legal achievement of the feminist movement after the 1980’s in Turkey.
·tar Gözaydn 3.
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The Women’s Liberation Movement in Turkey Despite the famous myth, which asserted that it was the modernisation process and especially the Turkish Republic that gave rights to women, there had always been an indigenous women’s liberation movement to some extent. Women’s studies of the last decade reveal that there existed a feminist Ottoman women’s movement by the fin de siecle. The women’s magazines of the period give some clues to understanding the ideology, politics and dimensions of this movement. The first magazine for women, Terakki-i Muhadderat (intellectual progress) was published in 1869. Even before 1908 when a new Constitution went into effect, there were many women’s magazines such as ¶ukufezar, Mürüvvet and Hanmlara Mahsus Gazete (newspaper for women). These magazines emphasized the importance of education for women, and there was an implicit stress on equality between men and women. It would be unfair to argue that these magazines were only proposing the traditional gender roles to women. Women authors of these periodicals were not only advocates of being good wives and good mothers but also were questioning their positions by comparing themselves with men. After the Constitution of 1908, the number of women’s magazines increased. New magazines such as Mehasin, Demet, Kadn (Woman), Kadnlar Dünyas (Women’s World) and Seyyale were published in this period. Some associations such as Osmanl Müdafai Hukuku Nisvan Cemiyeti (Ottoman Association to Defend the Rights of Women) emerged in order to fight for the betterment of women’s life conditions. In these magazines and associations the restricted participation of women in political and social life, women’s rights, educational conditions for women, the family structure and traditional marriages in the Ottoman society were severely criticized. In the women’s magazines, women readers were encouraged to write their own experiences, and readers were not indifferent to this invitation. Many Ottoman women shared their ideas, experiences and problems with the editors of these magazines, and the magazines became a platform of communication and solidarity among some Ottoman women. Halide Edip, one of the most interesting figures of the women’s movement, wrote about the history of the Ottoman women’s movement in 1913: A history of Ottoman women’s activities on the path of progress has not been written yet, but that does not necessarily mean that they have done nothing. On the contrary, to have the opportunity of addressing women on such an intimate subject in a large theatre and having such an esteemed mass of an audience composed of women is a source of pride. Today, as I address you, and as you listen to me, without any doubt, we are making history. Whenever our grand-children make this history long enough to form a conference, certainly will be referring to our powerless but good-willed and hard gained struggle.10
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The emergence of the Turkish Republic included a mobilisation of women in order to create the Turkish nationalist project. Women were exalted as the teachers, mothers and cultural icons of the Turkish nation. The widespread opinion about the early republican era is that the new regime granted women their rights even though there existed no grassroots demand for them. However, during that period there existed some associations which actually fought for women’s rights. Türk Kadnlar Birliyi (Turkish Union of Women) was established on 15 February 1924 in order to fight for voting rights and other political rights for women. Their leader Nezihe Muhiddin, who was a faithful feminist, was found too radical by the new regime, and Türk Kadnlar Birliyi in time became more and more docile and harmonious with the official ideology as a consequence of the state’s pressure.11 In 1935, alleging that there was no need any more for such an association since Turkish women were precisely equal with Turkish men, Türk Kadnlar Birliyi, which was still active, was abolished by the State. Thus, this bridge between the women’s movement of the turn of the century and the Republican-era independent grassroots women’s movement was ended. ¶irin Tekeli, a prominent feminist and political science academic, claims that “our mothers’ generation that identified themselves as Kemalists rather than feminists (both by being forced and were to be so by considering the reforms) rejected feminism especially by the opportunity given to them by the Republic in reaching relatively distinquished educational and professional positions.”12 One had to wait until the 80’s for a second wave of a feminist movement in Turkey. During the 60’s and 70’s, “women” was discussed as a question only in Marxist paradigms and in institutions. Such a question was considered as a specific outcome of the capitalistic system. According to this approach, “after the revolution” there would be no exploitation of women, so the solution of the “question” was inherent in the struggle against capitalism. Women who were mobilized and politicized then, in the leftist/socialist movements, were not seeking an independent organized women’s movement. By the mid 80’s, women started to get organized about other exploitations such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, pornography and domestic labour. They organized demonstrations not only against capitalism or state pressure but also against patriarchy as a whole. A great number of women got mobilized and politicized for their feminist demands. During the 80’s and the 90’s a lot of political magazines such as Sosyalist Feminist (socialist feminist), Kaktüs (cactus), Feminist, Pazartesi (monday), were published, and a lively atmosphere for feminist theoretical and political discussions was created. Different voices and various feminist methods started to get expressed for the first time in the Turkish political sphere. In the 1980’s, feminist groups established two important institutions as remedies for violence against women: Mor Çat Kadn Synma Vakf (Purple Shelter Foundation for Women’s Sheltering) in Istanbul and Kadn Dayan·ma Vakf (Foundation for Women’s Solidarity) in Ankara, both providing shelter for
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women who had been victims of domestic and other violences. In May 1987, the first demonstration against domestic violence (Dayaya Kar· Dayan·ma Yürüyü·ü) took place with mass participation from women. After this famous demonstration a lot of feminist women’s groups emerged. Feminist women’s groups did not always have large memberships, but they became a political power that influenced Turkey’s political discussions. There has been a lively atmosphere in which feminists expressed their ideas and political attitudes concerning domestic and sexual violence, women’s labour, incest, the ideology of domesticity, and prostitution. Recently, during the drafting process of a new penal code, feminist groups formed a platform to express their demands such as a non-discriminatory regulation, provisions against domestic violence, marital rape, sexual assault in the work place, so-called “honour killings,” and many others. If a text has been achieved that involves so many provisions reflecting a much better environment for women, the lobbying force of the feminist groups should certainly be appreciated. 4.
Recent Developments in the Turkish Penal Law System Regarding “Rape” and Violence against Women The “new” Turkish Penal Code that was legislated on September 26, 2004 (no. 5237), effective April 1, 2005, regulates rape as one of the crimes under the title “crimes against sexual inviolability,” in contrast to the Turkish Penal Code of 1926, which regulates it as one against the “family order and public morals.” By categorising rape as a crime against the “family order and public morals,” it is the “family order” and “public morals” that get disturbed when a woman gets physically violated. In the Turkish Penal Code of 1926, the word “rape (tecavüz)” is not used; instead there exists “rza geçmek.” “Irz” is a complicated word; it means “chastity/purity/honour,” and comes from a root meaning “consent.” Thus, “rza gçmek” means violation of a woman’s chastity/purity/honour without her consent. In such a context, the woman is considered as an instrument of family honour; her self and body does not exist; she simply gets perceived as a possession/property. A violation against the woman’s “chastity/purity/honour” means dirtying a possession/property that belongs to the family and is “supposed to be” clean/pure. Several implications of such an understanding are reflected in various provisions regarding women and rape in the Turkish Penal Code of 1926. Foremost of all are differentiations such as married woman, virgin, prostitute, etc. Two provisions should particularly be mentioned in this context: Articles 434 and 51. Article 434 provides, [S]hould one who rapes a woman marry her, his conviction gets suspended. In case that a divorce resulting from the convict’s wrong-doing takes place within five years after the date of marriage, his conviction gets executed.
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Such a regulation means that the victim is forced to marry her violator, and it clearly expresses the decision-making elite’s perception of women. A judicial praxis that reveals such a view gets reflected through article 51. Article 51 is a general provision that regulates “extenuating circumstances.” It is commonly invoked, however, for so-called “honour killings,” and it allows murderers to plead family honour as an extenuating circumstance to justify their killings – with the result that females fall victim to customs dating back generations. “Dishonouring” relatives by being raped is one of the most common cases in which brothers or cousins of a victim are called upon by a family council to conduct murder, often in broad daylight as an admonition. Perpetrators are often punished leniently after invoking article 51. In a report on violence against women in Turkey, Amnesty International highlighted the case of a man whose 24-year prison term for stabbing his partner to death was reduced to two and a half years after he produced photographs of the woman with another man.13 In the new Turkish Penal Code, no. 5237, it appears that several objections made against the prior regulation resulted in significant changes. Mandatory life sentences are required in article 82/j for those who carry out “honour killings.” Rape is regulated as one of the crimes under the title “crimes against sexual inviolability” without mentioning the gender of the victim. Article 102 provides that, (1) Anyone who violates another one’s bodily inviolability by sexual conduct, upon a complaint by the victim, will be punished from two years to seven years by imprisonment. (2) If the action takes place by entering an organ or device into the body, the punishment of imprisonment will range from seven to twelve years. If the action is against the spouse, judicial procedure is run upon a complaint by the victim. (3) If the crime is commited (a) against one who may not protect herself/himself bodily or psychologically, (b) by using power of public authority or an authority arising in working relations, (c) against one who is tied in blood and relative relationship to the third degree (third degree included), (d) by gun or by more than one person, punishments are doubled. (4) If force was used in commiting the crime beyond being a means of breaking her/his resistance, one also gets punished for intentional battery.
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(5) If as a consequence of the crime, the victim loses her/his bodily or psychological health, the punishment of imprisonment will be not less than ten years. (6) If as a consequence of the crime, the victim goes into a vegetative state or dies, the punishment is a mandatory life sentence. Article 105/2 regulates sexual assault in the workplace and provides a punishment of six months to four years, upon a complaint by the victim. Although the application of a law is as important as its text, it remains the case that in a country where the following figures prevail, a regulation with an obviously different approach looks promising. Figures gathered by comparing the data obtained in surveys made by two institutions for women, Kadnn Statüsü ve Sorunlar Genel Müdürlüyü (Directorate for Woman’s Status and Women’s Problems), a governmental agency, and Kadnn Sosyal Hayatn Ara·trma ve nceleme Derneyi (Association for Research on Social Life of Women), a non-governmental organisation, reveal that with 58% of women as victims of violence, Turkey holds a terrible record. The overwhelming ratio of violence against women is domestic; most of the women who are victims of violence are beaten and/or killed by their husbands, fathers and brothers. Among the violence cases, 79% of women consider the violence they have been exposed to as physical violence, 52% as verbal violence, and 29% as emotional violence. 45% of men in Turkey believe that they have the “right to beat” their wives if those women fail to obey them, and 23% of men “rape” their wives. 80% of men consider activities as cooking, cleaning, and taking care of children to be “duties of a wife,” whereas 20% of men say that they “actually hold such activities.” To conclude, the devil comes in all shapes and sizes. In the case I have exemplified here, it came from patriarchal (needless to say, patriarchy can also be exercised by women) decision-making and adjudicating elites of the Turkish Republic. The consequence of this procedure was to victimise a woman legally, who had already been victimised through rape. This is not adding insult to injury, but rather adding injury to injury.
Notes 1. Kadoylu, 1999, 120. 2. Kandiyoti, 174. 3. Göle, 1977, 61-81. 4. See Habermas. 5. Göle, 1977, 61-81. 6. Göle, 2000, 51. 7. Kadoylu, 1994, 652. 8. Bozkurt, 199-200.
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The Case of Rape and Prostitution in Turkey 9. For criticism, see Cumhuriyet, 11 January 1990; 12 January 1990; 16 January 1990; 19 January 1990; Milliyet, 12 January 1990; Tercüman, 13 January 1990; Güne·, 16 January 1990. For praise, see Türkiye, 13 January 1990. 10. Çakr, 10. 11. Zihnioylu, 7. 12. Tekeli, 31. 13. Turkey: Women Confronting Family Violence, AI Index: EUR 44/013/2004, 2 June 2004. http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ engeur440132004.
Bibliography Bozkurt, Gülnihal. Bat Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmesi (Reception of Western Laws in Turkey). Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996. Çakr, Serpil. Osmanl Kadn Hareketi (Ottoman Women’s Movement). Istanbul: Metis, 1996. Göle, Nilüfer. “Gendered Nature of the Public Sphere.” Public Culture 10/1 (Fall 1977): 61-81. _______. “Global Expectations, Local Experiences: Non-Western Modernities.” In Through a Glass, Darkly: Blurred images of cultural tradition and modernity over distance and time, edited by Wil Arts, 51. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, translated by Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. Kadoylu, Ay·e. Cumhuriyet radesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi (Will of the Republic Judgement of the Democracy). stanbul: Metis, 1999. _______. “Women’s Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the Villain?” Middle East Journal 48/4 (1994): 652. Kandiyoti, Deniz. Cariyeler, Baclar, Yurtta·lar (Concubines, Sisters, Citizens). stanbul: Metis, 1997. Tekeli, ¶irin. “1980’ler Türkiyesinde Kadnlar” (Women in Turkey of 1980’s). In Kadn Bak· Açsndan 1980’ler Türkiye’sinde Kadn (Women in Turkey of 1980’s by the Women’s Perspective), edited by ¶irin Tekeli, 31. Istanbul: leti·im, 1995. Zihnioylu, Yaprak. “Bir Osmanl Türk Kadn Haklar Savunucusu: Nezihe Muhiddin” (An Ottoman-Turkish Women’s Rights Advocate: Nezihe Muhiddin). Tarih ve Toplum 183 (March 1999): 7.
Chapter 6 Exception as the Norm and the Fiction of Sovereignty: The Lack of the Right to Health Care in the Occupied Territories Dani Filc and Hadas Ziv Since the beginning of the Second Intifadah in October 2000, access to health care services became very difficult for the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. Their situation got even worse when, in April 2002, Israel returned to a full and direct occupation of the territories that, as a result of the Oslo agreements, were under Palestinian control. While the Palestinian Authority still enjoys formal control over those areas, de facto Israel has total power over most of the Occupied Territories, severely controlling Palestinian’s property, movement and lives. Israel exercises its power through road-blocks, the wall/fence and the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) constant presence, strictly limiting Palestinian’s access to health care services. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority meets insurmountable difficulties in managing everyday activities related to health, such as garbage disposal, the performing of sanitary actions and providing basic provisions for health care facilities. The Israeli administration claims that responsibility for Palestinians’ health status and access to health care services belongs to the Palestinian Authority. Israel argues that the Oslo agreements transferred to the latter the responsibility for services such as health care and education, even if the reoccupation of the Territories puts an end to any possibility of the Palestinian Authority to actually fulfill this role. In the present article we propose to build on Carl Schmitt’s and Giorgio Agamben’s concepts of sovereignty and exception in order to show how Israel’s re-invasion of the West Bank and the Gaza strip produces evil as a situation of constant exception and fictitious sovereignty. While Israel becomes the de facto sovereign power, a fictitious Palestinian sovereignty is constructed in order to free Israel from any concrete responsibility for Palestinians’ health status. In the first section we will discuss the concepts “sovereignty” and “exception” which will provide the theoretical basis for our analysis. The second section will present the problem or Palestinians’ lack of access to health care services. The third section will argue that the Occupied Territories represent a case where the state of exception becomes the rule. We will claim also that the appeal to the Palestinian Authority’s fictitious sovereignty consolidates the state of emergency. Finally, in the conclusions, we will point to the possibility of further developing the concepts of sovereignty and exception in order to better understand situations as the one reigning in the Occupied Territories.
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Exception as the Norm and the Fiction of Sovereignty
Sovereignty and the State of Exception The importance of the state of exception and its relationship with the idea of sovereignty was first posited by Carl Schmitt in his book “Political theology,” where he proposed that “[S]overeign is he who decides on the exception.”1 For Schmitt, the authority to decide on the exception is sovereignty’s main mark, “the authority to suspend valid law. . . is so much the actual mark of sovereignty.”2 The decision whether the state of exception should be applied cannot be rationally derived from a set of rules or norms. The state of exception cannot be deduced from the norms since the exception is the state in which all norms are suspended and the installment of a state where exceptional measures can and should be taken. In Schmitt’s view, only the sovereign may decide on these questions, and this capacity is what defines him as sovereign. The sovereign is the entity who determines “what constitutes public order and security” and “when they are disturbed.”3 In the state of exception the sovereign enjoys unlimited authority. The constitutional order is suspended, and while law recedes, the state, the sovereign, remains.4 The state of exception as the suspension of the state of law is valid, however, insofar as it leads once again to the state of law. The need to suspend the valid law is exceptional, and it is justified only as a way to protect the state from its enemies and as the only mean which will allow the restoring of the state of law. For Schmitt “sovereignty is always established upon a border and is primarily exercised in the imposition of borders.”5 The occupation of land and the demarcation of borders are the original juridical acts, the border draws the limits of the space where law is suspended, the locus of the exception.6 The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben builds on Schmitt’s concepts of sovereignty and exception, while ascribing them a different meaning. The sovereign, by installing the state of exception, produces bare life; i.e. life exposed to death. The inclusion of bare life into the polis, in the figure of homo sacer, is at the basis of the Western state and politics and at the basis of the idea of sovereignty. In Agamben’s words “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”7 This inclusion, however, is an “excluding” inclusion. Bare life is included in the political by its exclusion from the juridical order, by its constitution as homo sacer. The sacred man is the one “situated at the intersection of a capacity to be killed and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine law.”8 The homo sacer is included in the community as the excluded one, as he who may be killed and his/her killing will not be considered a murder. S/he is included within the law as s/he who is excluded from the protection of the law.9 For Agamben, this is the meaning of sovereignty, “the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it.”10 Since the sovereign is the entity which includes life within the law by the suspension of life, Agamben can state that “the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.”11
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This form of relation which defines sovereignty, a relation in which something is included solely through its exclusion, is what Agamben understands as the state of exception.12 Agamben follows Schmitt in linking between sovereignty, the demarcation of a territory and the state of exception. The state of exception is the foundation of Western polities;13 “in its archetypical form, the state of exception is . . . the principle of every juridical localization, since only the state of exception opens the space in which the determination of a certain juridical order and a particular territory first becomes possible.”14 In the state of law, the valid norm, the law, enjoys also the force of law. In the state of exception a separation is introduced between those two elements. The valid norm has no force and decisions which are not legal do have the force of law. The state of exception represents “the isolation of the force of law from the law itself. The state of emergency defines a regime of the law within which the norm is valid but cannot be applied (since it has no force), and where acts that do not have the value of law acquire the force of law.”15 The state of exception is not a dictatorship but a space devoid of law, characterized by the existence of the force of law without a valid law. The state of exception is a “zone of anomy in which all legal determinations find themselves inactivated.” In Agamben’s view, this space devoid of law is essential to the legal order itself. The law, in order to guarantee its functioning, necessarily has to relate to an anomy. In sum, the anomy is not a transient interruption of the state of law but is always included in the latter, which must constantly refer to the former as a condition of its functioning. Agamben does not consider the state of exception as a temporal suspension of the rule in order to ensure the viability of the state of law. He follows Benjamin’s claim in the theses on history, where Benjamin argued that if we look at history from the point of view of the oppressed we can see that “the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”16 However, while Benjamin considers that the state of exception is the rule only for the oppressed, Agamben sees it as the fundamental characteristic of modern states. Agamben claims that in Western societies, where the limits between the state of emergency and the state of law are blurred, the former becomes permanent. In different politico-juridical contexts the sovereign makes the state of exception permanent by declaring a “fictitious” state of emergency. Agamben states that “at least since Napoleon’s decree of December 24, 1811, French doctrine has opposed a ‘fictitious or political’ state of siege in contradistinction to a military state of siege. In this context, English jurisprudence speaks of a ‘fancied emergency’; Nazi legal theorists spoke unconditionally of an ‘intentional state of emergency’ in order to install the National Socialist State.” He considers the intentional creation of a permanent state of emergency “one of the most important measures of contemporary states, democracies included.”17 Thus, in our days, the state of exception is not, as Schmitt thought, a sovereign’s decision limited in time, aimed to defend the state from its
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enemies and allow the return to the state of law. The state of exception is not a transient condition “whose aim it is to make the norm applicable by a temporary suspension of its exercise,” but a permanent situation where the sovereign may suspend the law in such a way that “it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the law, such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any remainder.”18 In this state of indistinction between violence and the law it is the sovereign who has the power to decide between the two “to the very degree that he renders them indistinguishable from each other.”19 When the state of exception is not more a transient situation and the clear distinction between the state of law and the state of exception disappears, we are left with “a zone of anomy dominated by pure violence with no legal cover.”20 All men and women become, potentially, homines sacri. In certain contexts, such as in the Occupied Territories, people become de facto, and non potentially, homines sacri. For them the law exists only as they are excluded from it, and “the political system transforms into an apparatus of death.”21 2.
The Occupied Territories: The State of Exception as the Limit of Palestinian Access to Health Care Since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, and until 1993, Israel was in charge of the health care system in the Occupied Territories. The Oslo agreements transferred the responsibility for several services, health care among them, to the Palestinian Authority.22 The first steps of the Oslo agreements also left in their place all Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. Thus several blockades and controls were established in order to protect the Jewish settlements. With the beginning of the second Intifadah in September 2000, Israel erected new checkpoints and barriers within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These checkpoints divide each area into several “geographical cells.” The West Bank is dissected into northern and southern blocs (with Jerusalem and its environs in between), and is additionally divided into regions according to city-governorates: Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Salfeet, Jericho, Tul Karm, Qalqilya, Bethlehem and Hebron. Each region is in turn divided into sub-regions, which may at times constitute a single village, isolated from all other villages and towns in its vicinity.23 By the end of 2003 there were fifty-six manned checkpoints in the West Bank, as well as 607 physical roadblocks that prevent the passage of motor vehicles – 457 dirt piles, 94 concrete blocks, and 56 trenches.24 Moreover, most of the main roads in the West Bank are closed for Palestinians. At times, the internal closure has been accompanied by siege (known by the euphemism “encirclement”). Israel has “encircled” districts and individual villages, cutting them off from the remaining parts of the West Bank. The Gaza Strip, for its part, is dissected by the Gush Kattif checkpoint into two blocs: the southern bloc, including Rafah and Khan Younis – which in turn includes the completely isolated Mawasi area – and the northern bloc, which includes Deir Al-Balah, Gaza and Jabalia.25
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In addition, Israel is in the process of constructing a complex of fences and barriers, known in Israel as “the separation fence” and in the Occupied Territories as “the wall.” This system is located east of the 1967 borders and within the Occupied Territories. The declared objective of this complex is to constitute a physical obstacle preventing entry of Palestinians into Israel. However, the route of the fence, determined with a view to including as many settlements as possible on its western side, forms isolated Palestinian enclaves within the West Bank. For example, the city of Qalqilya is completely surrounded by a wall, with only one gate in the northeast. Passage via this gate is also controlled by the Israeli military. In the area of Baqa a-Sharqiya and Nazlat Issa two parallel fences have been erected.26 The development of settlements and the physical division of the West Bank and the Gaza strip by internal borders show that Israel is the de facto sovereign in the Occupied Territories. As a consequence of the internal division of the Occupied Territories, a complicated system of permits and authorizations was established, in order to pass the blockades, travel from one territorial cell to another, or enter Israel from the West Bank or the Gaza strip. Palestinians’ daily lives are bureaucratically managed by an apparatus whose only aim is control. The first step to achieve a permit is to get a magnetic card, which makes it possible to obtain a transit permit. The multiplication of internal checkpoints, which require transit permits during blockade, has turned the magnetic card into a life-saving card. Getting one is dependent on the absence of a “prohibition on security or police grounds.” Palestinians are subjected to double jeopardy, since the fact that someone in the family has been killed by the IDF makes all the family a security threat, as it is “more likely that they will be involved in a terrorist attack.”27 The case of Muhammad Tabazeh tragically exemplifies this. On 20.10.03 the Israeli air force directed two rockets, within a minute and a half, on a car whose passengers were suspected of being Hamas activists in the Nusseirat refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. Many residents who arrived there after the first rocket were hit by the second, including Mahmoud Tabazeh, a 14 year old boy. Because of his serious condition, he was transferred for treatment to Tel HaShomer hospital. His brother Abed, aged 23, a student of economics and statistics, was killed, as was his cousin Ibrahim, a schoolboy in the 12th grade. Other members of the family were also injured. His father Muhammad had a permit to work in Israel. But when he tried to go and visit his son in the hospital, the soldiers at the Erez checkpoint (the main gate to and from the Gaza Strip) confiscated his permit. When he asked why, he was told “it is because of your children, because of what happened to your family.” From the moment his sons became victims of the IDF, the father was prohibited on security grounds: not only could he not visit his son, but he also stood to lose his job. Because of the refusal to allow his father to enter Israel, his son Mahmoud had to undergo an extremely serious and complicated operation without a single member of his family at his bedside.28
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The classification of “security risk” can prevent anyone from receiving a permit, even if s/he is seriously ill.29 The prohibition on security grounds is a highly arbitrary one. The fact that different authorities may arrive to contradictory decisions about the same person, and the fact that the intervention of human right organizations has succeeded in modifying the decisions concerning specific cases, show that there are not “objective” security reasons for the denial of permits. The denial of freedom of movement severely affects the access to health care services and causes significant damages, even leading to deaths that could have been avoided. The system of blockades and permits does not only impede patients’ access to health care facilities, but also makes it very difficult for the health care staff to reach their workplace or their patients’ homes. Since Israel’s control of movement is pervasive, health care issues such as the importing of medicines and medical equipment donated or purchased abroad, and the decision to which medical center patients can be referred, are submitted to the Israeli security forces’ will.30 The internal partition of the West Bank and the Gaza strip and the establishment of internal borders are not the sole manifestation of Israel’s de facto sovereignty. Israel’s sovereignty is expressed also in its capacity to decide about the emergency. For almost four years the Occupied Territories have been under a state of emergency, where the rule of law has been suspended and the state of exception became the rule. The fact that the Supreme Court rejected almost all the petitions concerning Palestinians’ freedom of movement or the IDF actions in the West Bank and Gaza strip symbolizes that the Occupied Territories are a space where law has been suspended. Many of the petitions were rejected by the High Court on procedural grounds, without discussing the substance of the claims. Sometimes petitions were rejected under the claim that they were too general, even when the petitions detailed particular cases.31 In other occasions the Court considered itself unable to address policies taken for security reasons, or it accepted the IDF explanations. The de facto suspension of the state of law was reflected also in cases where the Attorney General dismissed petitions claiming that the complaint was “too unspecific.”32 Furthermore, when there is agreement that in certain cases the law or the norms were violated, action is rarely taken against those who violate the procedures.33 Even in those cases where the Court did express its concern about violations of international law and the government accepted the Court’s indications, human rights organizations’ research showed that the government violated its own undertaking to the Supreme Court. The security forces, for their part, clearly consider the Occupied Territories as a space devoid of law. In its answer to the Supreme Court, following a petition by four human rights organizations against the IDF commander in the Gaza strip, the respondent argued that “in this situation [where fighting is taking place], a great caution should be taken in applying the judiciary critic on the security forces’ actions. We are talking about actions that are at the limits of the judiciary audit.”34
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When confronting demonstrated violations of Palestinians’ rights, the government and the security forces claim that the violations of rights, rules and laws are “exceptions.” However, as put by a report of Physicians for Human Rights, “the actual situation in the field proves that it is the ‘exceptions’ that are the true policy.”35 The state of exception is precisely that state where “exceptions” become policy, become the rule, and where the norm becomes the exception. Every action which would be considered normal under the state of law becomes an exception under the state of emergency. Living within restricted “geographical cells” becomes the rule, while “normal,” free movement outside these “cells” becomes an exception requiring special permission. The mere will to stay by a hospitalized child’s bed becomes an ordeal, and the authorization is granted only as an “exception,” as exemplified by the case of the Haruf family. Abed Haruf, a one-year-old baby, the son of Saed Haruf from the village of Odelia in the Nablus district, was hospitalized in Nablus for 5 days while suffering from anemia. The father wanted to visit his baby son and tried to reach Nablus, which is situated 7 Km away from his village. Due to the closure he was obliged to pass via Hawara checkpoint (south of Nablus) on his way. He was not allowed to cross into Nablus since he had no permit. He applied to the Israeli DCO at Hawara for a permit, and was refused. Mr. Haruf was officially denied passage within the West Bank, due to “security reasons.”36 After the intervention of PHR and a Parliament member, Mr. Haruf was allowed, as “an exception,” to stay at his son’s bedside. In its answer to PHR-Israel concerning the denial of movement to medical teams and sick people in the Nablus area, the Ministry of Defense stated that “uncoordinated and spontaneous” movement will be allowed – if it is allowed – only in “emergency cases.”37 Thus, even for medical teams freedom of movement exists only as an exception. The “Procedure for the Handling of Residents of Judea and Samaria who Arrive at a Checkpoint in an Emergency Medical Situation,” makes the IDF policy concerning Palestinians’ access to emergency care explicit. The second article states: As a rule, the checkpoint commander will allow a person to cross the checkpoint (including to enter into Israel) to obtain medical treatment, even if the individual does not have the requisite approval, if an urgent medical emergency is involved. An example of a case of urgent medical emergency is a woman about to give birth, a person suffering from massive bleeding, or a person with a serious burn injury arrives at the checkpoint.38 However, in all non-urgent cases the “resident” must obtain the approval of the local DCO (District Coordination Office) before they reach the checkpoint. Free access to health care services, which should be the norm, is possible only as an exception, in an emergency.
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Under the state of exception all Palestinians become homines sacri, whose life is reduced to bare life and its taking is not a crime. This is made clear not only by the great number of civil casualties, but also by the management of Palestinians’ health. The IDF openly assumes that its aim is providing for Palestinians only as bare lives. In a response to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, the Ministry of Defense stated, “[T]he civil administration offices in Judea and Samaria operate daily in an intensive way in order to allow Palestinian populations that are not involved in terrorism to conduct a basic life pattern.”39 The transformation of Palestinians into homines sacri is clearly exemplified by their lack of access to health care services. The blocks and check-posts make access to health care services, even in emergencies, extremely difficult. Figures from the Palestinian Red Crescent show that ambulances are able to reach their destination only in thirty percent of the cases. Before the second Intifadah broke out, in late September 2000, ninetyfive percent of Palestinian women in the West Bank gave birth in hospital. By September 2002, that figure was less than fifty percent.40 Testimonies given to human right organizations indicate that in many cases, soldiers delay ambulances even in cases of “urgent medical emergencies,” do not consult with medical officials, and do not give sick people the benefit of the doubt, as they should have according the army’s own written procedures. Moreover, in 2003 the roads in the Nablus area were completely closed at least three times even for ambulances, which were not allowed to enter the city.41 The establishment of unmanned blockades such as soil ramps or concrete blocks physically prevents sick people unable to cross these obstacles from reaching the staffed checkpoints, and through these, perhaps, gaining access to the medical centers. But manned check-posts do not prevent the loss of Palestinian lives. On November 14, 2000, Jimal Ibrahim Balawal, a resident of the village of Sinjil near Ramallah, suffered a heart attack. An ambulance that was supposed to take him to hospital in Ramallah was delayed by IDF soldiers when attempting to leave the village. After waiting approximately thirty minutes, during which time the soldiers refused to respond to the pleas of the nurses accompanying the patient, the ambulance was forced to turn back. The patient later died in the medical center in the village, which naturally lacked the equipment and medical expertise that could have saved his life.42 In the village of Azmut, unmanned blockades make it impossible for ambulances to enter the villages. Patients must walk on foot to the ambulance, which waits on the road. Sometimes, however, the ambulance is unable to reach the road, since it must pass through at least two staffed checkpoints along the way. The local physician reported two cases of patients who died due to delays in evacuation. The village pharmacist suffered a cardiac incident and was taken on foot toward the road where an ambulance was waiting; he died on the way. In the second case a woman in labor attempted to walk from Azmut toward the road, but her passage was
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blocked by soldiers. She gave birth in the open and her child died shortly after.43 The obstacles for the access to health care result not only from the limitation of the patients’ movements, but also from limitations to the medical staff’s movements. In one of the absurd cases in which the Occupation bureaucracy is so fertile, a West Bank doctor who works at a hospital in East Jerusalem and possesses a permit for entry into Israel for this purpose was requested to provide expert advice at a hospital in the city of Nablus in the West Bank. When he reached Hawarra checkpoint at the southern outskirts of Nablus he was told that the permit he holds is only valid for entry into Jerusalem. The Civil Administration claimed that he should have applied for a “blockade permit” to enter Nablus. All claims to the effect that if he was found eligible for entry into Israel there was no logic in denying his entry into Nablus were in vain, and the doctor was obliged to return.44 The conversion of the Palestinians into homines sacri is reflected also in the attitudes of Israeli soldiers and authorities. In many occasions soldiers relate to Palestinians as expendable lives. When asked by PHR staff members why drivers were waiting under the sun, the check-post, commander said that the soldiers would “leave them there. . . Let them dehydrate [lit. ‘dry up’ – PHR], let them die.”45 In other occasion an ambulance carrying a woman suffering from a hemorrhage and her husband, a one-month-old baby with a heart defect and a man scheduled for heart catheterization made its way to hospitals in Nablus. It was denied passage via Sal’ous checkpoint and when the ambulance driver insisted upon entering the city with the three patients the soldiers at the checkpoint threatened to shoot the vehicle’s tires. In yet another case, a Palestinian ambulance driver testified that when arriving at the check-post he told the soldier that he needed to get to Husan to take a patient to hospital; “the soldier shouted . . . that the patient didn’t interest him and neither did the work of the ambulance.”46 The very fact that the decision whether a medical condition is urgent enough in order to pass the check-post without previous coordination is taken by a soldier lacking any medical training, reflects the approach to Palestinians as expendable lives. Not only young, plain soldiers, express their disregard for Palestinian as human beings, whose life should not be spared. The health coordinator for the civil administration in the West Bank, when addressing the problem of women giving birth at the check-posts, claimed “The myth of the woman giving birth at the checkpoint is not always correct. The problem is that Palestinian women come to hospital at the last minute – not like us, where the woman rushes off to hospital every time she has a contraction. At Hadassah [Hospital], they often give birth in the emergency room.”47 In the IDF commander in the Gaza Strip’s answer to the aforementioned petition to the Supreme Court, the respondent pointed to the low credibility of a petition based on Palestinian reports. The argument shows that for the IDF, Palestinians are not wholly judicial persons, i.e. they do not enjoy fully personhood within the framework of the law.48
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The examples and quotes analyzed so far illustrate the fact that in the Occupied Territories the state of exception became the norm, and the Palestinians became homines sacri. The Israeli rule is based on the blurring of the limits between the state of law and the state of exception. While for Agamben the blurring of those limits means that the state of law needs to appeal constantly to the state of exception, in the Occupied Territories there is also the constant need to anchor the state of exception in a fictitious state of law, or to adjudicate to the Palestinian Authority a fictitious sovereignty which de facto it does not exercise. In a response to the Supreme Court concerning a PHR’s petition, the Attorney General’s office stated As stated in the agreements between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, powers and responsibility in the field of health were transferred from the military government and the Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority. This principle was first established in the Agreement regarding the Preparatory Transfer of Authorities, the second appendix of which states that the powers and responsibility of the military government and the Civil Administration in the field of health shall be transferred to the Palestinian Authority; in the context thereof, responsibility for all the health institutions was transferred.49 The President of the Supreme Court claims constantly that Israel’s occupation must comply with humanitarian and international law. The appeal to the state of law was revealed as clearly fictitious in May 2004, when the Israeli occupation reached its most violent form, as buildings were destroyed, the population harassed and a tank fired on a Palestinian demonstration killing 8 people (a killing which “is not a crime,” since no one has been yet prosecuted). However, even when the state of exception becomes the norm, its violence needs to refer to a fictitious state of law. 3.
The Occupied Territories, the Exception and the Rhetoric of [Fictitious] Sovereignty In the previous section we saw how the role of the Israeli government and the IDF and the conditions of the Palestinians correspond to Schmitt’s and Agamben’s conceptions of sovereignty and the state of exception. The state of exception that exists in the Occupied Territories does not result from the norm; rather, as Schmitt claims, it results from Israel’s arbitrary (in the sense that it does not logically result from the application of the norm) decision. The Israeli government is the one that makes all decisions; it designs borders and decides over lives. This power does not stem from any legal norm, but results from sheer force. As Schmitt claims, Israel’s “decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense
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absolute.”50 However, there is a central aspect in which the situation in the Occupied Territories does not answer to Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty and the state of exception. For Schmitt the sovereign is bounded by the formula Protego ergo obligo (I can impose my decision since I offer protection). Protection is the sine qua non counterpart of sovereignty, but the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are totally unprotected. Israel’s reoccupation of the Territories since September 2000 did not lead to its taking any responsibility for the needs and the protection of the Palestinian population, especially with respect to access to health care services. Thus, Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty is not enough to explain the situation in the Occupied Territories, and we should appeal to Agamben’s definition of the term. Palestinians are for Israel homines sacri, which can be killed but not sacrificed. As in Agamben’s definition of the concept homo sacer, Palestinians are not killed as the result of the application of the law but as a consequence of the suspension of the law and the blurring of the limits between norm and violence. Moreover, as Agamben argues against Schmitt, the state of exception is not the temporary suspension of the law in order to allow the return to the state of law. In the Occupied Territories the exception became permanent and the law exists only in the form of its suspension. As in the case of the Roman Iustitium, in which Agamben finds the antecedent to the state of exception, in the Occupied Territories the army can “kill a man without going to trial, . . . destroy his house, and take his belongings.”51 The situation in the Occupied territories conforms to Agamben’s claim that in the state of exception the force of law is isolated from the law itself. The norm (the Palestinian Authority’s rule) is valid but has no force, and military rule has no validity but has “the force of law.” The Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories lives in a space and a time where the law is suspended. They are subjected to pure de facto sovereignty, they are subjected to a force that “is outside of the law and of all forms of legal control.”52 The Occupied Territories became “a zone of anomy dominated by pure violence with no legal cover.”53 For Agamben, the link between the state of law and the state of exception reside in the fact that the first needs the constant appeal to anomy and violence. He claims that [F]or one reason or another, this space devoid of law seems so essential to the legal order itself that the latter makes every possible attempt to assure a relation to the former, as if the law in order to guarantee its functioning would necessarily have to entertain a relation to an anomy.54 However, as Israel’s responsibilization of the Palestinian Authority for providing health care to the Palestinian population shows, even in the state of exception there is a need to appeal to some sort of legal cover. The case of the Occupied Territories illustrates that the necessary link between norm and
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anomy functions both ways. Not only the state of law constantly refers to the state of exception, but the state of exception needs the fiction of a legal cover. The state of exception, which became the rule, builds on fictitious sovereignty, in order to perform. In the case of the Palestinians’ [lack of] access to health care services, Israel refers to a fictitious sovereignty and a fictitious state of law, as if the state of emergency would not be the real rule. The Israeli Supreme Court acts as if a fictitious state of law applied to the Occupied Territories. The President of the Supreme Court himself claims constantly that Israel’s occupation must comply with humanitarian and international law. The violence of the state of exception needs the referral to a fictitious state of law. While Agamben speaks about a “fictitious state of emergency,” in the Occupied Territories the state of emergency is real and the role of law (the rule of the PA’s law) is a fiction. The Palestinian Authority’s fictitious sovereignty allows the IDF and the Israeli government to separate the two terms in Schmitt’s Protego ergo obligo formula. Sovereignty (in the sense both of the decision about the exception and as the entity for whom men and women are homines sacri) does not require protection (neither in the sense of protecting the lives of Palestinians, since they are all sacri, nor in the sense of providing basic services). The PA’s sovereignty is fictitious since while it has the validity of the law, it lacks the force of law. However, this fictitious sovereignty enables the perpetuation of the state of exception, covering for the fact that the Israeli government and the IDF do not provide for basic services and needs. The appeal to the norm which lacks force functions as a way to deepen oppression, since its fictitious validity exempts the sovereign power (that which decides on the exception and for whom Palestinians are homines sacri) of the duty to provide even a minimum degree of protection. In sum, the situation in the Occupied Territories conforms to Agamben’s claim that Schmitt was wrong in positing a temporal and spatial separation between the state of law and the state of exception. As Agamben argues against Schmitt, in our times nomos and anomy, the state of law and pure violence, are not more separated, neither temporally nor conceptually. The state of law refers always to the anomy of pure violence and naked life. The Occupied Territories became “a zone of anomy dominated by pure violence,” where the exception is the rule and the norm is exceptional. However, the ways in which the Israeli government deals with health care issues in the Occupied Territories show that the lack of separation between the state of law and the state of emergency is reciprocal. The state of law refers to the state of anomy, but the state of emergency is reinforced by the appeal to a fictitious state of law. The sovereign’s raw power gains in effectiveness by appealing to fictitious sovereignty; the legal cover increases the sovereign’s power, which is not more limited by the obligation to protect its subjects. The legal cover represented by the appeal to the PA’s fictitious sovereignty exempts the Israeli government from any obligation to provide the Palestinians protection, such as the provision of health care services. Thus
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the fictitious sovereignty and the appeal to a fictitious state of law contribute to the perpetuation of the state of emergency. 4.
Conclusions The Occupied Territories are an example of a spatial unity under the state of exception. As in Schmitt’s definition of the state of exception, the situation in the Occupied Territories is not the result of a norm or constitution (on the contrary, the current situation is clearly opposed to international law) but the result of a decision, that of the Israeli government. Following Agamben, we can claim that in the Occupied Territories the force of the law and its legitimacy are separated, and the state of law is suspended. The Palestinian Authority’s law remains valid but lacks force, and Israel’s decisions and actions have the force of law even though Israeli law does not apply to the Occupied Territories.. Finally, as the case of the lack of access to health care services exemplifies, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories became homines sacri in Agamben’s sense, since they can die and be killed without their deaths been considered a crime. However, the case of the Occupied Territories presents two limits for Schmitt’s and Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty and the state of exception. The first one as discussed before, concerns the relationship between the state of law and anomy. While the state of exception does not result from the norm but from the sovereign’s decision, the decision still needs to appeal to the law. The limits between the anomy and the law are blurred not only because the law requires a constant reference to the state of anomy, but also because the state of anomy requires a constant reference to the law. The second point concerns Agamben’s claim that the state of emergency has become the rule and not the exception, not only for totalitarist governments but also for modern democracies, as illustrated by the confusion between the acts of the executive and the legislative powers. However, it is our contention that we must be able to differentiate between certain elements of the state of emergency that underlay modern democracies, and situations such as the one in the Occupied Territories, where the state of exception became the norm. Balibar’s distinction between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty may be of help concerning this second point.55 For both Schmitt and Agamben the only meaning of sovereignty is state sovereignty. In Schmitt’s case the state embodies the people in an unmediated and transparent way, as the nation, thus state’s sovereignty includes and obliterates popular sovereignty. Agamben, for his part, adopts the perspective reflected by Nietzche’s ironic enunciation “I, the state, am the people.” For him sovereignty is always state sovereignty; his conception of sovereignty does not take into account popular participation or the people’s role as constituent power.
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As against Schmitt and Agamben’s reduction of sovereignty to state sovereignty, we can follow Balibar’s suggestion that sovereignty has a dual character. Only in extreme situations it is reduced to only one of its two aspects. In the state of exception sovereignty is reduced almost completely to state sovereignty, in the case of popular revolutions it is almost solely popular sovereignty. We can make a distinction, thus, between the situation in the Occupied Territories, where sovereignty is only (the Israeli) state sovereignty, and popular participation is completely absent, and modern democracies, where sovereignty still presents its dual character. In the latter, the suspension of the law and the indeterminacy between the state of law and the state of anomy are limited by the presence, even in potential form, of popular participation, by sovereignty’s popular aspect. This being said, the necessity of the Israeli government and of the IDF to refer to the Palestinian Authority shows that even in the extreme situation of a prolonged state of exception, we still encounter the remains of sovereignty’s dual character.56 The case of health care services in the Occupied Territories teaches us that unmasking Israel’s appeal to the state of law as fictitious will confront the occupier with the need to protect, i.e. really take responsibility for the health care needs and rights of the Palestinians.
Notes 1. Schmitt, 5. 2. Ibid, 9. 3. Ibid 4. Ibid,12. 5. Balibar, 140. 6. Ibid 7. Agamben, 1998, 6. 8. Ibid, 73. 9. Ibid, 82. 10. Ibid, 28-29. 11. Ibid, 32. 12. Ibid, 18. 13. Ibid, 9. 14. Ibid, 19. 15. Agamben, 2002. 16. Benjamin, 4. 17. Agamben, 2002. 18. Agamben, 1998, 57. 19. Ibid, 64. 20. Agamben, 2002. 21. Ibid
Dani Filc and Hadas Ziv 22. Without the necessary powers to efficiently take care of this responsibility. 23. Ziv, 2002. 24. Swissa. 25. Ziv, 2002. 26. Ibid 27. Ziv, 2003. 28. Ibid 29. When a permit is asked on medical grounds, the petition will be checked by the Health Coordinator in the Civil Administration. 30. Ibid 31. High Court 9109/96. 32. Ziv, 2003. 33. Ziv, 2002. 34. High Court 4764/04:3. 35. Ziv, 2002, 52. 36. Ziv, 2003. 37. Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 26/03/03, quoted in Ziv, 2003, 16. 38. Quoted in Swissa, 8. 39. Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 26/03/03, quoted in Ziv, 2003, 16. 40. Swissa, 8. 41. Ibid 42. Ziv, 2002. 43. Ibid 44. Ziv, 2003. 45. Ziv, 2002. 46. Swissa, 12. 47. Ziv, 2002, 48. 48. High Court 4764/04:3. 49. Ziv, 2002, 36. 50. Schmitt, 36. 51. Agamben, 2002. 52. Ibid 53. Ibid 54. Ibid 55. Balibar, 140. 56. This is also true for the other pole, a popular revolution where sovereignty is apparently reduced to popular sovereignty. However, even in situations where a radical reversion of the existing order takes place, the old state still appears as a residue which constrains the revolution’s possible results, and as the necessary horizon which unifies the people as acting sovereign.
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Bibliography Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. _______. The State of Emergency, lecture given at the Roland Barthes Center, 2002. (4 April 2004). Balibar, Ettiene. We, the People of Europe? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Benjamin, Walter, “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” In Illuminations, London: Collins Fontana Books, 1973. Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters in the Concept of Sovereignty. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1985. Swissa, Shlomi. Harm to Medical Personnel. Tel Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights-B’tzelem, 2003. Ziv, Hadas. A Legacy of Injustice. Tel Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights, 2002. _______. At Israel’s Will: the Permit Policy in the West Bank. Tel Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights, 2003.
Chapter 7 Mental Health Care During Apartheid in South Africa: An Illustration of How “Science” Can be Abused Alban Burke The one thing that really is trying to tyrannise through government is Science. The thing that really does use the secular arm is Science. And the creed that really is levying tithes and capturing school