The Kremlin and the Prague Spring
JNT E IlNATJ ON At. C Hl SJS I"I E Il AVI0H SE IIIE S
Edited bl} ,\fie/wd Hreciwr \,OU .l \1E I
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"".I 1973 ( 1980)
A"i Sht.im. The V"ilc,1 Slnl,·. "",III... He,.{i" Hlm:kmle . IfNS-19-19: A Study ;11 C rhis IJtoc h;""· ,\I"kj,,~ (19&.1)
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Ccotfrc)' Juke .• , IliIlu', S,,,I;"l!md /)''C;,';''''_ ' (19/:1.5)
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The Kremlin and the Prague Spring KAREN DAWISHA
UNIVEIISITY OF C.>\UFOHI\ IA ['!lESS
UEIIKE LEY
LOS ANGELES
LONDON
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Contents
f oo' !W fll
Ackll owfedJ!.IIWIII .~
xiii
PAIlT I : INTRODUCTION I.
Soviet Foreign Policy A nalys is ,lIld Crisis Bch;l\'jo[
"
3
prelude to tlw Crisis PAIlT
[j .
1,5
II-IE I'IlF _C BlS I S I'E B!O])
10
37
Phase
4.
phase Two: Ap ril 10 Ma l' 4
62
5.
Findings
78
QIlC;
March
22~A!lril
3.
PA IlT III · Till' C Bl S l S PEB IOJ)
6.
Phase
7.
Ph"." Two:
8.
Phase Th ree: ]um; 2/ - lull' 28
O.
P1wsc Four: Jul y 29 '\UgllS! S
Qlle:
;\'lav 5 !unc 6
rill'" fi
27
93
,'" WI)
10.
Phase Five: August 5-20
271
11.
Findings
294 Gii
"ii i
PAIIT]\I. THF I'OST.C IlISIS PFIlIOJ) 20~27
12.
'\ llgllst
13.
Findings
.'319
333 PA in V: CO NC LUS IONS
14 15
I caders and D ecisioIls ' CWll'J ll siotls on Soviet IIr·h w j pr jn 1968
341
19fi8 an d .\Ike -11", C osts and CUllSel]Uenl'es uf I nvasion
367
ApPflu/ix t\: KC!I/'olilic(d omi Militanl JA:(Jders. USS R. 19(;8
381
A[J/!Cudix /1; KC!ll'o/ilicalllm/ Militlln, Lcru/ers, C:xc/ws/Ol.'okia , 1968
383
Selectct/ Bibliograp/u{
3S5
[!!lIn
399
Foreword
'10 dis sct'l Soviet dt~ isi()n makinc 'Ill!! h" hal' ior in li,reign p()li t~· e rises requ ires di \'"r~ " ski]] s: a 1..:"{)wl". I),:,, "flhe lall g u:l!!e , the I,istorr. and til(' political syste m ami id"ulngy of th,· USSH . it' \\",,11 as insight into I h" personali! y t f :lit S and int e rpersonal rl'lat io ns 01 So· viet lc:ul.:rs; all ability to ;\ppl~' psyclwlogit-" llimlillgs Oil th e .t~ ' namit;s of small groupl){'IM\'ior to the pin,tal group at the ape.\ uf the Sov;d pOII'" r p)'ramid , the I'ulithuru: a !iuniliaril)' \\'ilh tIll' IIlclhuds of lIu,ticrn so,,'ja] sciC II C!: ami" d ispos itio ll to comhim ' ri g(JrOIlS, Sys tctll;ltit- in'plir)" wi th /'m:ign are a 'pl'{'iali~atiun ; a ma.\ tcry of Iii,· ""
dedsion-making pruccss; ;Ind . h na]] y. a
pl:lvc{1 in "buml"m;c in the pa!,:cs thai I()liuw, K;u'cn J);lwis ha nwkcs tl U d;lim to u,: linitil'CIW SS ill he r h\~d natin g: stud), uf th e Krcmlin 'I ll~l the Praglle Spring. I nd ee d. at tIl(' outsd . ,11<' pn''''' n is tlw ... ·,,,1,·,. with an illlo'i!!"illl! .mal .. gy I".. twe e ll ;l parbhioHl<;:r at a Hu"j '
"
, (.·ontc m pomry in terna ti onal relat ions. with partie"I,lr focm o n de-
cision makin g and action withi n the Communist h loc. T he ,lutlm r's obj ect ives arc twofuld: lirst, to uncove r the exten t to which the quali ty of Suviet dcci5iull makin,!!: was affect ed by tile cst-ala ti o n ;Uld Ilecsca lalioli of te nsions Iluring var ious pcr i u\l~ uf th e crisis t ha t a ttended tile i'r;Lgll c Spring; a nd second, to cont rib ute to the liter;lIufc on uedsion m aki ng in internati o nal crises. The firs t o hjt!divc is aUained hy;m ill ll lllin'lting aL"'~J\lIll nfSuviet percept ions, decisiuns. an d adiolls. T he .' ccond is aC\'om p lishcu by a rigowlis a nd irna!!inal ivc usc of th e Inter nation al Crisis Be havio r (Je ll) fr'l1lw\\'ork III gem:ra!e co mparative Ilildings fo r theo ry buildin g o n c risis. And both arc cnhan('(!d by a IUdd p resenta ti on uf tile dra lna a tld signifl~'all('e uf II,,: Pntgut: Spring ami ils ,l e l1
ach of Ihe principa l dec ision makers filtered th e information abo ut th e Prague Sp ring th mugh a differen t pen'epl ll al lclls: Brezlmc\' was primarily conccrned wi th (lomes ti ~· llissenl: Susl!)\' focused o n the me nace from Peking; Kosy,c:in, who al one had a ,·,,,lll'l.·x. ti iA" ,-,," l iatt,ti, 'lilt! """s l"r,,oIY lwd ;""'g" "1' 11.,, in lernationa! e n\'ironment, was worrkd alX)u l th e c1l'eds on e('Onomic ref" r lll and a r lll s li ltl it;lt ion: and Gn" ,hk" c mp hasiz.:d Ihe ,Iirect t h rt:n! of U.S . military act ivity. As the cri sis int c nsifi ed , howeve r. al! ~'on~'lI rred 1Ii al events in Praglle co nst ituted t he major clialI c ngt: to So"iet powt:r in E;lsl<:rn 1·;\lI111'e. The t llt'oretimlly oricnted find ings ;Ibou\ Soviet behavior
''''
o::h
F O IIE"·OIlI)
xi
disru pte{1 with the uuster of Novotn}' and other hard-line party leaders. Direct contacts wilh the lead c rsl,iJl l)f Suvie t l>loc· stales increased " "I;(."{, ahl~·. And, as expected. th" i",~ , l ve mell t of senior decision makers in the informatiun p rocess ).(rew with stress- in h igh-level negotiat ions :lIIt! fact-Hmlillg mL~s i on s ;md in written an d telephone (."ommunieation with Czechoslovak Icaders. Dawish:,·s findings about t he J ecL~iun:11 I()rum arc slrikin).(. Altho ugh the Poli thmo remained the iw,titlllional foc us I()r all formal and majur decisions. an inner eore aded hoth formally in th e negotiations w;lh Ihe Czeci)()slov,lk p,lrt~' [ead,:rs and infonnall y as a self-appuinted crisis management group. The membersh ip oj" Ihe twu gruu ps overlappe d and included Brezh ne\', Kosygin , Podgorny, Suslov, and Shdest. This d ecisional core was no t full y cohesive at any stage oj" thc crisis: Kos~'gin and Suslov wcre persistent advocates of caut io n, Shelest uf intervent iun: Bre zlmev aligned with tI le majority at all times bllt did not provide Icadl!rsh ip; allll Kosygin \\"..l5 freq uently excludcd from dedsions by lhe inner (;o re witl,in tile Politburo. ThrougllOut the {Tisis, llOwevcr, th e nu mue r of pe rsons all(1 groups (.~Jnsu 1t cd b y Soviet decisiOll makcrs did not chan ge markedly. As in othe T fo reign policy crise s. illLTeasi ng Soviet stress dming th e Prague Spring reduced th e n umhe r of alternatives unde r considerat ion and narmw(..J Ihe r:lIlge of perceived Sovid oplions fro m ten ·, in Augusl 1968. to Iwo: political pressure on DulK.-ck tl) p re ve nt Ihe fur th er growl h uf anll-Suv ie t ele mellts. allli a full-scale in vasion to support an alternative Czech Communist leadership. Ironicall y, ~·l os(.'O\\"s m ix turc of tim strategies uf (.'Oercion and COlIIllTOIII(se may have in;l(l\"crt c ntl y made an in vasion more likel y. III a (·oncluding Cil;lptcT Dawisha pn)\' iJcs a" in,ighlful allalysis of t he (.~)s t s and (.~mscquenl"e s or Ihe invasioll. \\'i tllill th e Soviet Ullio n, th e prima ry cllcd was to set rigid ;md narnm· limits lor re lorm and Tevisio" in the po lit ical, C<.,)lJoll1 ic, ami cuitu nl l spheres. Thro ugho ut E :L~ tern Eu rope. th e invasioll t·ast a shadow over :111 d ehatc nn politic,,1 reliJrlIl. Yugoslavia. (·ollvillced that ;U) in vasion would have been deterred by a high er risk uf I::nst-West confrontaCioll, sought and obtaine{1 a u.s. security guara nte e . Amung th e bloc leade rs, only H Ung;lry'S Kadar an d Bulgaria·s Zhivkov survive{1 tl ,e political fallout from the invasion. Aluania deci ded to withdr'dw from the \ V"rsaw Pact, tu rning to Pekin g instend. well
xii
~'Ol\EWOlln
Kare n Dawisha's ul timate explanatiou ofthc Kr(' mlin decision to suppress till' Pragut' Spring by force proviues \'~Iuable gUitbn t'c about the USS lfs prubahle f\ltme forei gn poliey be havior: wh e n t he Soviet objcdive was to maintain th e Soviet positi on in Eastern E urup!, "fur eterni ty," tllc tnmsie nt ~liellation of one or two geuerati ons of sigllifknnt segnwnts of th e populati on and clites within the bloc mattered ve ry little. :\lie/wei B recher
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Acknowledgments
This hook {-,ould not h~\'c be en w ritten without assistance from many indivillnals and urg.uliz;ltiuns. ~Iy [irsl debt of gra t itude goes
to ~lichael IIreche r. who invited me til llarlicipatc in the Il1tc rna~ tionai Crisis Behav ior Project in 1977 and then p,lticnlly ami meticulous ly read ali t! (.1)mmentcd on th e dmfls of this manllscript. The Canada Council, which supported th e project and generous ly funded my own research, also deserves a speda] men tion. So too doc~ the University of Southam pton, whk-h Ilnant'Cu my trips to the VSSH and Eastern Europe and gave me a stud y I<:::t\"c to under-
take paris of m y research .
For a hook such as this, lIlall Y lihrari c.~ and archin:s must he consulted. The unparallded llrt.'hin: s of th e Press Lihrary ,l.t th e Royal Institll(c of Internat ional A/hirs. loget her wit h the lInelllling assislance of its staff, made the re5cardl hoth more e nju y"hl.:; and mOrt: profitable. For this project . I oht:linc(1 man y prcvio usir cbssiRc(1 U.S . d<>e ll nHlnts from Ilw \Vhil e HUIlS<' , Nation;l] Security CUlmeil . State Department, and th e Central Inlelligence Agency. They were declassifie d under tlte U. S. Frce{lor1l of Information Ad, an d I would like to thank the staff a t the Slate Departme nt alld tile L y ndo " Ba ines
Juhn~"n
Lihnn'y stalfi" Ans tin . 1C:
sistance. I \\~)ul{1 Ilnally lih, 10 t llallk th e slall' of tile lihnlries al the London School of E{x)]1omies. London Unive rsity's School uf SI;l.VOllic and E
M: KNU\VLUx.;,\I£s· rs Stah: Dt:p,l rt11lent ), J,lcol1 Be am (U.S. amlmssm.lor, Prague), Pau l Cuok (U.S. Eml.hlssy, ~loSl-"()w) , 1',lul Costohmski (U.S. State De ]l;lrtment), Haym ond Gm·t holr (U.S. Slate iJepartm ent), Helmut Sonnenfeldt (U.S. State Department). rllld Walt \Y. ilosto\\" (Nat iollal Security Advisor to the president ). :\mollg t he British officials I wuu ld like to t hank Joe Banks (British EII1 I)(1ss),. Prague), Maieolm L\hckintosh (Foreign
rdatnllo Soviet puliry ill Eilslerll Europe amI Soviet be-
Illivior ill crisis ('1mditions. Of (.1)u rse, not e\'eryonc I lalkcd wit h e,lll be thanked pe rsonall y, hu t I wo uld like In ;Ickllowlt:{lgc Artur Starew;e..:, a sl:cn:tary of the Poli sh United \\'urkl:rs Party (PUWI') in 1968 and a partk-ip:lnt in the llratisbv:l negotiations. Also the shill' of t he Polish Inst itille li,r Inft!fI ta t iOilal Afrai rs \\';IS most helpfu l in arranging discllssions at t he institute and wit ll ollicials and journal ists outside it. Amoll): tll m;c will) help ed me in :\Ioscow. I would li ke t" thank t Ill: stall' oft III~ 111 st it \II e of w"rI{1 E(~'l1llm y aml inle m ation;ll He btiollS ,l1ld th e Institute for the Study of the USA ,md Canada hlr their insighls into Easl- \Ves t n :bl ions am! Ihe celltralit y of Eastc rll Europe in Soviet COr)(."C rns. III tlw pre p;lT;11 ion of tIll: man llst:ripl . thanks go to I nan r including Hilary Parker lin' her e.xper t typing and J,\ncl I lurst and Hohert Houdek for their skillful dr
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PART ONE
Introduction
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Soviet Foreign Policy Analysis and Crisis Behavior
T his is Ho t th e first book to he written ahull! what h:ls COllie to be known as the l'nlgue Spring: of ]96S. I Nor is it the hrst attempt to :malyl.(.' and "xpbin l he II lotil-ation, hehind til!' SUI'it:! iU\(' ITI'IIlion in C~.(~dlOSI()\'" kia. : Neverthe less. it sct·ks tu ""Ike i' slll"\;lllli,'c ('~ >lltrnHltiOiI I"~ the lit."ratul"c 'lI, s,,'";"! dcci s;, 'u Illakill).! during tlll' Illon ths Icadill;! lip 1<1 till' l'll tr r of \\"arsa", I'act truops on th e night of '\U)!IIS\ 20, If)r:il'i. T ll<: );1<.:11> "f Ih" siudy. Ihcrd<m:. is not dlC Pr,Lguc Spring per S\'. hut tIle way the Soviet leadership rt."lcled t() dmnges in C7.echos )ov,. k ia amllh .. exte nt to wl ,id , the quality ofdcdsion 1l1"king was "tll"de,l h)" till' C"S<:il];,\i"ll :.nd <.llTSc;lblioll of tellSi()ll ~ tlMI <:harade ri /,ed th" I'arious p.!rio(\s of th e tTbis. Th is is th" major " illl of t1,,-, s hl\<:1. T he't' .1"... ,,, ,,,·,,ls. ill ,,,11;1;0" to ",·s"" ...; 11 trips to t1,.. USS II. Pola",\. tl,,, Ull itcd 51,,1.·,. " ",1 1·"riOIlS \Vesl Ell,""!',,;,,, ~·oll"lrics. hal": 1\1,'1·1l,· 1"' ,1 "" .. I),,·, . ~. the l'e.,~" .. 5I'ri,,~ "."'.,'" (;"1 1,, (:"t,,, •. T/,,' ",·"/,,,,/,,,',,l/I,'[.,,,,, ,110 m""",, Cali. '--:"1.,,,, 11,f."',,, 11,,/,' in ( ;""'/w..lm<J!;" . • ,,,111. (~"d"" ~l.illi,,". C"'c/,,,· "Im'" kia:, )"" ·"""'o'
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c,l rlh elillludl previou sly u nknown info rmatio n ahout Soviet (Iedsion makin g;.
In spite of this inforrnatioll ,
t h(~
progress of lll )' research has
hee n slnw and impe{led hy rn e lluxlologie,l i dilTiclilties. Any scholar seeking to t1 arif~' thc Illo tivat ions and images of decisioll makers in a syste m suc h liS th e Sovie t UnilJll is (Iced first with th e almust ill su rmountable prnblem of evide nce. Without '\l.'t:css to Politb uro m inutes, po lit ical mem oirs, ami records o f o pe n d e hat es or i nt e rviews with uAieials. it is ,ll mosl impossi hle III draw (.'O nere tc (;onelllSi01lS ,Ihou l th e yalues, ilnag<'s, ;lnd \l1O \i va\i ons of inJivjl\ U,I[ So-
vie t leaders. II is
equal!~'
diflkult to assess th e relative imporltull'c
of various l:lc!OfS or to isolate aud meas ure th e spedfic im p,let of '1Il~' sin gle variahle. In resea rch on Suviet politics_ and un dccisi(JIl making in particu la r, o ne is stru ck by !ht: 'L II;t]ogy hdw':ell the researche r ami th e parishi o ner at a Hu ssi'lIl O rt hodox dHi rch se rvice. The priest chants, am! th e c hoirs, divid ed into scdions, issue fo rth w ith gloriously ritualist ic and hYllnoti c n~Jlli es. The smell Ilf ince nse, th e lig htin g of candl es in front of icons spr(·ad throughout the congn'ga t i"". ,,,,d tl,.. pa rading of th .... roSS a nm",] tit ,.. ""Isid .. "f th e
church prod uec
it
feding that one has participated in ;lnd derived
intilll,lt c kn owl.:tlgc of the PH>(.·cetlin ).\s. Onl y on reflect io n <10.: 5 one rea li ze that t he priest has onen di sappeared behind ,I screen and th at Ihe mosl impo rl,ml par is of th e eo m muniou itself have bec n (.~ )I \{luctc d in the sanct uarr, nhSl· un:.1 fTOm vicw. One ass um es Ihal Ihe pries t spends ILis time Ih.;re oH"crin g pra r.:rs, bUI ooe h'15 lit! wa y ofk nowi lL g /()r SU l"e lh
5
SOVU:T FOIIE[ GN POLlCl' AKALYS[S
of the analyst. Thus more than twenty years after Daniel Hell's "Ten Theo ries in Search of Soviet Hcality,'" Soviet specialists are still d ebat ing IVhether the Kremlinolog:ic:tl or \ot:llitarian approaches should be replaced by models thai take more cogni7.am.'C ofburcallcrati<: politics ,mtl interest grou ps. 11 is an important deb..1tc. ami one in which this aut hur has becn involved.' but it is unlikely to be resolved onee and lor all because of the tlilllculty of verifying an y particular hypo thesis. Advance.~ in the mcthodology of t he social scient'cs have offered the prosJled tlmt new models ami !!lore sophhti mtetl llletll{xh would at last solvt: sonl(: of Ihe mysteries of Sovie t pulili<.:s. Ono: of the majo r contributions of these new approaches has been to turn out Soviet spL~ ial ists with uroader training: and an inclination to study previously ignored aspects of the Sovid poli tical syste m sudl as local government elections and interest groups, But few would dcny 111,,1 the central roc'us of aUlhoril~'. particul,lr!y ill the realm of furdgn p()lic~'. n:mains within Ihe higlu:st t'l'hdons oft I,,: party a lld state hie ra rchy and that therefore analys is illtc re~ted in unders tal1tlin~ the actions taken by tllt~ Suviet Union will ~till end up tr ying to glim ps.! he hind the pruv.!rhial screen. Few new tools have been devc\opc{1 tu aid I he analyst in Ihis eliorl. Contellt analys is is une such tooi. It can take one of three fo rms. delw nding OJ) the availahility uf {bt,\: L lulellsily of crisis
sing an
awarcnes~
lIercelilim~Y,
(Ieri"cd from an y statenwnt e_~prcs of thrcat. time wn~tr,'in!. and/or probability of
War, '1~ l eLllenl' of rricndship and hos \i li ty. expressions of sati~facti on with the stntus quo, nnd demands for ch'LIl~c in the stato, '1"0. It is mcaslIred by Ihc "I'"ir ~~Hnp"ri so,," sC'J.ling me thod dC"elopcd hy D . .-\. Zinnes_-l
Z. ,\ 'Ill/ysia of aflil"des, base
3. ,\ric"""n'y m",ly.• j.•. ",e"slIn'.! al"ng " niu "-I",;n! a
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ISTIlOl)U CTJOX
6
The val ue of Illest: variOllS form s of (;onlcnt anal ysis in th e assessme nt of Sovid politics lies in 1111) main arC'L~. First , if IL sed to form a gene ral picture n[Suvict elite views over a lo ng tim e span or to d evelop attitudinal profiles of in(li\'idllal leaders ove r th e e ntire le ng th of th eir ca reers, content analpis hi\~ pruved useful part icularly in re vealing inkr<~ sting nuanceS of JiHc rc n(;c betwee n occllpational or generational gruups. : SCL'tJIIJ. in s pL~ iri c case studies such as t h is OIlC, l~ml c nt alHilysis has sen "cd to snpplement or c onfirm dct,lilcJ resc,lTeh , particularly by meusuring the changes in th e intensity uf (T isis pCIl-,cpl ion by the leade rship as a wlllli e. At the same 1;111<;, th e limits 011 til': value of content analysi.~ are great in tlIC Soviet case because of tlIC absolute p"ul'ity of 1.l;.terver [Jr Suvie t po lities 111I1 S I be cqually S(!II siti vc 10 both what is said and wlrat is not said. In an;rl yzing a short series of spcedles, all of whi ch may have be en writte n aceor{liug 10 some preagreed 1(lrmula . th e number oftimcs a se t phnlse is repeal e d takes on milch less sign ifi can ce
j,,,
' Sec. fo r n",,,pk F Tri>b ""d l),,,,d O. Fink·)". Sud ~,'r";~ " f"~i<.'Y' amt rhe " r· hoi .. , by C h"rl~. Cali. D"n C . 11<·td",,,,,. ~I id" .. t P. (;,·t.t ~" . •,,,1 .\ 1""',,<"1 \Idlr ;d ~" ;" !log", K I.:."d . • ,1 .. TIle 1I,.,"'d"mlll, ·... ~"' i<'" em,,,,,,,,,;.,/ .\IO"li.." . ' Q,~)Ic~t ;n Z.t~nfk
.\11),,,01.
",,,/
-"i~/" Frm /
in "m"", . p. 2::19.
''''
o::h
7
than even a sin~l c word of d issent; ye t q uan! itative conten t analysis would class if~' that single word of dissent as insignificant. Tllis stud y llisn reveals th,lt drawing infcrcra.'Cs ahout th e posi-
tions of tup leaders from views ex pressed in th e editorial columns of certain news papers is
eX lre m d~'
diffi cult. Such infe rences IHLve
been drawn in previous studies to verifr the existence uf diffe ra mung el ite groups or burca ucrades over issues such as pa rticipatury attitlL{l c~ , tb e ~ Iiddl c East. or eve n Czechoslovakia," Al -
C IK'CS
though greu! differences have sometimes been gleaned by the (.'o mparison of individual articles or a sInd), of the overall trend of
editorials over lime,Ahe ass1lmption thai unsigned editorials in any newspape r represent th e p rc"iously un knowll views of a specific leader or facti Oll is qu estionablc. First. ,Ill m!wspapcrs are published hy th e p:lrty cOllllllitlee within th e minist ry or p ub lic body conce rned. KI"I/.wwY(l :.vc:.da. for exampl e. is formally the newspaper of th e party cmnmittce within th e 1-.·1inistry of Defen se. not a paper in whk-h th e milit,lry can express illdc pellde nl views. And this is the casc with evcry newspape r. whet her it hc a eentr.ll publi(-atioll sudl as l :,vcfltill or a regional p uhlicatioll such ,IS p r(lc(ill Ukrainy, all arc unde r part y eu nt rtl1. SCl.~md , lOp leaders have access to a nu mber of newspape r outle ts. In 1968 military leade rs often pulJlisheu in pr(lvdll \If / ;;ve~· till. Kosygin had several articles published in I'ravt!lI rath er than /;;vntifl, and th e re often appeared to be differe nces of opinion amon)! COlll nlentato rs working for th e
same newspaper. And neWSIlaper siaHs are frequently posted to new positions in other puhlieations, furth e r rciufordng part y co ntrol and limiting th e ability of any ne wspaper to tlcvclop a distinct line. To t,lke but on e case. Konsl~ ntin Z,u"tx lllV, wl lo in 1968 was chie f t..>di tor of th e World M(! rx ist /kvicIG. ;] tll t:ore ti cal and intormation journal for Co mmunist ~ nd alli ed parties that is sold in about 150 l."Olllltries. had previously been fi rst depu ty editor of I'm oe/II aud chief .~ditor of Suvi:/skayu Il(),\ ,~ iyll . as well as a candidate membeT of the Centra! Committee. \\fhile not oe ll ying tlHlt he may Il
"S"";et " " " ' j"
1978).
in pa.ticu!a(, ~I ilwn C. l..ooJg,·. Sul(I ••, c.,~ ., : lIb " ,;",.. P" ,,, .
~o"';~n
I:d",
ll'TlHlJ)ucnus
8
part)' line is not yet firrnl~' established or is under challenge from wit ll in Ihe party. In such c irClLlllshmccs, persis tently di\',~ rgell t opiniu1lS am ong puhlished commentaries are llsually a fair indic(lliu n of ~pli t, at th e lop. Bul e"en herc, it is JitliCl11t, hecause o f th e mobility of journalists arullcadcr s' liSe of >'ariOi IS IIl,wspa]lc r s to air their views, to L'tm n ecl any ont' fact ion with a sin gle puhlk'
Tlms, although UterafunwUII J!.u;;;dll ,U\d
SO!;et.~kll!'(I /l os.\'i!11I \n: n~
ofk n th e most olllspnkcn in their t~l1lde lll n,ltinn of eve nts in P r.I).!;UC and tILt' appeara nce ofcritit':ll articles led to t ll1~ eS(;(lbtiun ofh:nsiuus between the Su\'id Unio" and Czcclms \uvaki,\, thcre is still illsuffidcnt evidence to justify concluding that a speci ne Icmlcr was advo•.:al in£ a partieu!:lr CO Il NC of ;1('lio n such as mi litar r in\t:IT" " I i, " I.
D es pite Ihese limitations. th e importancc of analyzing Soviet dL"Cisiun m aking is undimi nished. The data hase :lVailahl l;' on Soviet hehavior in til e 1968 Czc{; hoslu\'ak c risis is heller than thai It)r mall)' uther Soviet crises, mainly hec
r",,,,~.
m""""", u,,;wr<;,)'
n .· /,J/,·,-, .. " /;d' .... .' 1'Ioml PllrI;C' ;" h 'U'''d ' WMI eri .. ,. (I',itl<.·d o" ,
I',~". 19671. p. 9. '1""""1 1,, Philip \\';]\;"'" •. erl, ;, .\I"""~CI"r''' . 1,. 20 " Ch",1e, ~k(;ldt, ....I. "C,;';, an ti Tineal it, Ihe [ntc","I;on.,1 S",,;,,)(, SO Ule Ilel.,t;"".1 Cono"l" " ('), I"'''·';pl). 'I'H 'I, ~I j " .\1 ;,,'1,,,,,1 11"",1,,·,. '"J;",•• n1, a Th"",)· of l"h',,,.lin,,al C,hj. Ilch ..·;o,." ". ·10.
9 10 do so wa.~ 01"<111 Young, who identified the characteristics of an
international crisi~ as "a sharp break frum tIm ordin ary lIow of poli. I iC5: s hurtn ess of {juration; a rise in tIl.: p c n:civcd prosp ec t thai \'io-
Icm:e will hreak out; and significant implicat ions for the stability of some system (or pattern uf re latiunships) ill intcrn:.ltiunal p()litic~." " Although thi s definition is appropriate for describing and ex-
plaining th e effect of stress on the relations among states. th e
C111-
ph:1Sis ill this specific stu dy is UII the crisis facing the d ecis ion
make rs of one pmticut;lr shltc. the Su\'ict Union. In other \\lJrd s , our t'()llccrn is foreign policy crisis rather than iute nwli O/wl crisis. " \Vith in thi s pe rspl.'divc th e must widely accepted defin ition
of crisis is th e one forward ed by Charles Il ermann: A crisis is a sit uatinn t hal (I) threatens high priority goals of I he dedsiOlHnakin g Ililit. (2) resiri cls I he ;1111011111 of tim" """ib]'le fi,r fe"IK""" hefiJre th e tled sion is tran sforllll'd . lind (3) surprises th e n1<:I11],,:r., of til e dt...::isinn-nlnking unit hy its o•.'(:'urre nt'C. Umle rlying th e j""IKI.w d definition is th e hy poth esis that if "II th ree trait s ;IT<: p,..:,,,,,1 the n lilt, dcd sion p""-,,,ss will hc snh,ta nliall)' , Iill,,,'e lll Ihan if onl )· one or t\\'O Ilf till< dmr.ICt.-ristics appear." ~'lidmcl Brecher and a number of associates in the Inte rlHlt iu1l(11 Crisis Behavior (ICB) I'rujed have ende:I\'ure{! to re flne the He rma no defi nition hy m(){lifying some of its ennceptuu! cl"ments. In the first place, they found the term basic wlu(!.\' more pertinl;:nt t han high -1!rioril y goals ;I.~ tilt: filCliS of I hreat. nasie val lies include "core" values, which rarely var~' and arc few in number. and " highpriurity values," whkh de rive frum ideulu,!!;;eal ,lIld/or 1lHilc riai inkres!s as Jdilletl by th t: n:lc\' an t decision makers. Tile second point of dep;lTt llrc from Hermann 's defin it ion rdates to time _ In the leB's terms of refereru.'C, it is not so much th e ~IHJrtn ess of time that inlluences the crisis be h:wiur uf {lecision make rs, but rat her th e awareness of finite time lor their response to th e value threat. In other words, an dl:ll1enl of crisis perce ption is the realization
" 0"." It Y"" ,,~. TI,,' ' h/iIi"" 'if fi,,-,:' t: IJ" ",,,h,j,, c d",i,,~ [,,1<"""""""/ cn.;., (l"i",.., · 1,,,, : 1',;,,"..,1"10 U";"~"il)' I'",,.. 1!JGb). p. J~. '1""'''\ i" I\'itli."". eri." _1'","'~c"IC " I, I'· ItS. " The di,lInc!i"" i' dr.,,,·,, hy Will i,m" en.';" ,!I""{/ ~... l't" 21_ 2; . ·n, i. ,li"i'K" iO<', ,,'''c'po:>I>d, ,,, Iloe a",t ),! ;c,.. t d,n'- ,e"e,. \"'h" ~-n II", ,\,,;,lvu ",,,l-;,,~ and .ysl,.",ic ~I' I..-.. ",h~s .• s ~!at",,~t..J ill Cl,a,k, f , Ik ,,,,.,,,., .. ,1.. /"" "'"" lIv,,,,/ L'n"".1't', 6-1 •. "Charles f , Ik r"~''' ''. -1"1<',,,ahon.1e ,i,i, '" • Sil" .. t~,,,at \'a,i.,""', " p. HI. ","'ted in B,,,d,,,.. '"[""'.rd •• Th,,,,}':' 10, ,Il.
,,,e,,'.
~".
10
1." TIlO I) UGJ"I(>S
that alt l!ou)..\h a deeision could be clchlYt!d. it could not be delayed indefi nitely. T ll{! third (loi nt of co nt ent io n is with H Crlllann"s a_~ su mpl io ll Iha! surprise is a necessary condition fi,r a crisis s it uation. Bred lcr argues Ih,,\ "ume situ"l i,,,,s pe rn:ivcd by Jc<:isioli makers to involn: th reat. th e likdihO
finite time may be dearly foreseen. This helief is reinforl'Cd hy the skeplit-is rn of ot her scho lars about th e "sur prise" d im ension."
L. P. Brody has fuund tha t H c r mHnn~~ typology is "not as SUl'CCS Sful as predicted,"" and D. '-I. "IcCormick has concl uded that surprise is "not Illc;\slIrabl<:: from c(lntent analysis,"" T Illis. in its (e B llsuge, surprise is no! a n cccss ar~' or ulliversall y present l~lIldi
lion of crisis, bul when il pn;ssurt:,
e,~ ists,
it Illa y IlCi~htcn the impact oftimc
Finally, a most crucial addition to the Hermann definition is IC lfs indusjoll of "pert'dved high probahility t)f war" as a nel'eSsaTY conditi on, Indeed, whereas the likelihood of llIi1i1~lry in volvement presupposes a peree ivet! vnllie threat, "the reverse does nut obtain. Thus, probability of war is th e pivuta! cundition of crisis, with threat l1nd lime closely rel a ted, ,"" The pcrt'C ption that w"r is likely is also closely related to the notion of I1n(;crtain ty, Indeed, uncertainty 'Ihoul "',Ir, rei " forced hy "'Ilue t], refll a,ld li me salicn(;e, Ilceessit al cs '\,risis-t}'pC" dedsion making,
Given these refinements of th e He rmann definition of crisis, Breche r offered th e fullowin g more elaborate defin ition: A er isis is a situa ti on with Ihree 11~><-'Cs s"rv ami sullll'ie,,1 OJlldiU"ns, deriving fWIll a "ha,,!,e in ils ede"",1 ur inl"Tlla] el1vimll",e"t, All three clJnd it ;IJ"~ lIrc pc reept ;u"s h eld hy the hi!,h(:st 1",-c! .Jedsiu,,_ Ill"kcrs: " )1""0""" lti",,., lf Lie, ",-'k,~,,,,lcd~..J tl,;" S<:e CI",rle' F lIn"""", 'TI",·.,. Tim" . " d Surp';"".~ SimuLtioll III Illlt'",.tiuo,1 Cn,e,," I" Ch.rl", E " d.. Illten,,,· I;""dl eriM'." I" 2O!i_ "1 ~ P. 8""1.,, ·-rh,...I . I),,,,; ,;,,,, T;Il ... "',,! A"·""·,,,·,,, T1 ,~ ''''p.>
I\",,,,a,,,,.
in
~ rc"Iot'" r. l) , ~I .
',\,w""I, a 11"",); -
1' ,
H
,\ttG,roll;,'k,
/)".,;""-, , ~:,.~,,,. and /\::""'1";0m- I" lntc",,,U"n,,1 Gm'c" ,'" I. l. ",,opl/,m. I" """lirl /""",,,,11,,,,,,/ C''''Jl/,. (,I"" ,1,10",. ~t;"h" Fl r.j A"" ,1,1 • ..-
,1/,," ,,,,-;,,,, "..
em l""al "'''. 1U7,~). p_ lfi. '1'10'.'] In /l,,·doc'. , J)«;"""" in /,, ,"el". F" .... ;~ .. r"lk~. p, ~2, " Mi<:b.d 1I«"lot", /)u;"i,,,,,;,, C<;.,/. , I.rue!. 1')67 a"d 1')jJ. p, fi, (;1"n S,,)'de< I"" " ,",ide", 'he p"'<"i'-~.J 1''''~ <"",1;1;"" .-,f 01,1., S,.., GI~" 1\,
S")",I,,, . "d l'au1 1)1 .. , lng, C",ojIicr A",()"~ ,\'« /i","" PI" 6 _ ; , Th~re .'''. '" """"", ul ht'r 1)'1"" "f ,'rl"", hu, r, .. lUI 1""1"'''"'. " ",i,i, ,~f,",s "".,1)" I" milii''')" ." "'t'''r;~ )' i"""-,, a p",,'ly ",-,,,,,"ni<' c,i li •. "'" ~tid,.d llft't'he" -h,d;~', !k\'.lu.ti.~"or 1966, Linb"c I ~,t;lk> ami Cri,i. D.~,;'i'",· Mak;,,~. " H,"iti.I, ,,"''''''/ "J IJI/'''''"/~m,,1 S,",I;" , .) fl!(77 ), 1_ 25.
t,,,
ICh
JIz
M
11
SOVIET FOHE[Cl' POLICY ASALYS[S
I. 1I threal 10 Iwsic valllcs, with a si "''' h"",." ""s ur .'" h.
2. hig" probability of itJwl~£'m~ JJt JJJ military Im,'lilili£'$ ""d I he awarm",""
3.
or
fi"jt~ lime for res/){)rJSe /" the
",Tlrnwl tulu e , h n :Il'- ..
This d e finition of crisis refers 10 the perce ptions and beh.lVior of 1I single relevant stllte in a c.-his situatiuli . The he havior of other states and insti tution s in the international system is conccptualized primarily as inputs influencing "t he beh.IVior of the crisis actor by sh,lping its dcfinition {lfthe situation and the n its response. [Thus] the state actor remains the eentr.ll objcet of in \"es tigation~ how its decision-m'lkers pert-eiw: environmental chan),(e and how they choose, in Ihe (:ontext of escalating or tie-escalating perceptions of threat, time press ure, and probahility of \\11r.·· '" In keeping with this defin ition , th is study analyzes Su viet pe rceptiuns and [lehavior during the Czechoslovak cri si .~ . T his crisis-bchavior model is a refinement of the Jell formulation \lu bl ished in 1977:' which posited an intl:rad iv(: pro(:es.~ h etwee n an independe nt v
in en,."
I'. I.
" 'hid .. p. 2. ~ UII<:he..
'"",,,,-J, a Th,,,,<)':
PI' .';2 -!">I.
"' TI,;, .....1;,", d"w, un R,,~·hd•• l.h"r.'"", or Ihe "'(JIt. 15 (lllt:>S). p. J W.
J
""
l~
.
,
•
12
TI.., all_xi,'lv o r Ii,ar an illdiv id " al ,,~p"ri': "L"'S in a si tuat;"" whid, ],.. pc rcdn" '" I>tHing a
,,.\"t'rt'
tlorl'" t to o"e ur nil"" " .. IIlCS,
Psy_
eholngit'lI! stre." rC' lui res all i l\ \l-'rpl'ctat io" III' the SII hjed of the ,igniflc" "l'C of l h" sli m "lll s ,it"a l i" n, I'.,yd",lllgil·:d ,Ircss (lCl'lIn e ither wh"" tl", su hj,-'c! "'I",ri""cl~~
T he len con ee p liull of stre ss d iflcrs slightly. 10 Hulst; and G(~u rgc, ~ 'rcss is ca u sL~1 by a pcrCc llt ion of t hrcat; in te ll ter m s, st ress is in duced by th e co m pos it e in d e pend en t l'ari;lblc c ris is penx' ptioll, wh ich is ('om posed o f tlm: a l, I im c pressure, a nd the proba h ilit~, of war, T hus, th e terms "stress" or "crisis-induced sl ress" will represent the pcrl'ept iun of threat ,md/ur time salience and/ ur wa r
likeli hood, T he model postulates that th e initial respoll!;c of decisioll ma kers to a pe rceptioll of t hre at (cop ing) is to seek in lim llation a hou t t he th rea teni ng ,1(:1, T he Illodel :ISSIllll e!, that stress i ndll('('_~ a greater need, and broader quest. for information. Fo])uwing this in ilial s l"l). d"" ;s;" ,, ,,, ,,kers " ",h;,,- k
lilllows : Seurch refe rs to the pnlCesses of obtain ing and shar ing relevant information, ami of iden t ify; n!: and inve nting "lternn!;"e "I'!i" ns: Innd ) (/lw/y.I'is (n r ('""lll"t;on ) rl'f\'r~ th,- p r llC('SS('S of ,,~:uni ning and " "'11-
'n
uati ng tI,e rdative a ppropria te ness of ah,' I'IMli",! " p lio"s with l'di'renee t" sta tet! UT alt.'rnal i"" "hjed i" es ""t! ""I ues .~; "()I~ I\.
11,,1' li ami ,~ I~,·.,,,lcr I..
I~'"'n:" , 'The Eft, .. ·" ..I' S, "." .. " ,h~ I",.f"',,'a,,,·~ of P,,/;U,'a/ _~c~""',. ,\u,,''''/ 6 1I97.~), 2.,7. ll,~ """".. 01;"" hel",e,-" i. al ." t'mph.,,;<e,1 l". Jan'is and ,\1""" , ,,-1><> ",.iniai.. Ihot ,1",,.. "i, - Ih,ea' - anJ (j ... ~1 a, . gc,,",;ne 'eton ,,, de'i~n.'" "" pie"""", "",0,;"".1 ,la'". """k,1 b)' IIIT".i",,;ng en_ "irum"",,'.' ~,,,,,I ( ' >f ,1i",,,1;''' ' T'!"g I.. J,''''i' a"d I " '" ~b,,,, . /)"6,';"" .It,,~;,,~ , A r.y_ d" ~"~i«ll """I~$l, ,if C",ofiit:" 1'. 50 " 11,;, ddillilio". \,~' Silt,,,,,. M.. d, ""d (;) ....1. i, «"oted ill lio1,1i a,"1 C.c",~c, '"11,e E1fl,<-1. of SiR'», · p _ 271 lO _ 10. 11 ,,,,'(" ',·,. K" '
·-.'re."
''''''io)"
all "lIT ~)U, "'pi"g """'" ...,""''' ."d -iJ~" l iI"; n~ . "d in,""nl ;"~ ahc",,,t;,'~ (~" i.. " , i. ;" oU, '",;m:" fo, ,,It<,,,,. th'c , .' J"f"" ",.;"" s",,~h' 01. ,,,, ,he 'h ,c "c" ;"~ c'-ell'. ><,1and/", d ..,,,,,,,, .1t ,he ""he' , i. m.. le a, ·., jt.,hle ,,, th~ "m, "hI,,·., <"in '''' a",1 .l"d.;',,,,1 f,,,, .. ,, . ",1 h "",'i,,.. 1 dud,,\( .10 .. " ,,,, ,,1,,,.11 .. ,,
"r ah .. " ",III'.._, ."
Se .. 1I, .. -lL .... /)ffi,i"", ;" C ,j,i>. 1'. ll .. . 2.:;,
''''
o::h
SO\, I~~r
FOIIEIGN POLICY ANAl.YSIS
JJ
Clearly the inte nsity of stress, particuhlrly in terms of tim e avail a hiHty, will affect Ih e ~earch fu r ami eV~l lllaliol) of alternatives. T hus. here 100, a eausal link is es ta hlished betwee n the pcn:cption uf crisis and the process ofar rivin~ OIl a dcd~iun . Dll riug th e crisis, scveral choices arf' apllo h(~ madc. and many of these will he made in varying eo nd it ioll5 of escalating and deescalal ing slress. To specify Ih e changes that take place w ilhin the e ntire tim e span of the crisis, a tllree -period mudel was dev ised; the inception of the cri sis (t he pre-crisis period), its peak (the cri sis p e riod ), ami its dl.."Cline (the post-crisis period ). In mu re detail. The IJn~-c ri.! is period is marke<1 olf fmlll a pn:<:'eding Il [)[)crisi~ peri.",1 I,), a L~lIl spit:tlOllS inercase in peTt:eil'ed Ihw"t . HI the p:lrl of de.:;is ionmakers ufthc st,lte Illider inquiry. 11 1"" gins wilh the en:" t (\,r clus ter of event,) whieh trigg{Jrs ... ri'iC in Ihre"t pe rwplinn, The crisis period is ehar.lCtcri zcd b~' the preSellt'C of all three necessary co ndit ions of cri~i ~-a sharp ri~e in perc-ci\'ed !hre nt to basic valne s. an mm"me.l~ uf time con'tr~ints on decisions. and an image of ! he [lfol ~Ihility of ill vokcrneut ill military !instil itic! (wa r likelihood) at S"IllC I",,; nl hdurc II,.. issuc ;s rcso]ved. It. too , hcg in ~ wilh a trigge r;n" .:\'e nl (or d,,,t e r uf ' :\,cnb), Jr,,"lI r "Lt.'UI'> :II I he nulsd or I hc eTisi.. pe ri ,,.} ur within ils lime f.:une , the th; rd mlld;t;nn takes II,,, form of a pcrL'Cil'cd ded im: ill m ilil:try ",([lahil it y vi s-,\-vi s Ihe elle Illy (or aUl'erse change in the milil:lr)' balanl'''), i.e" in!'Tc salien t:e. alld th e probability of w ar) on th e decisio n makers' (:oping mechanisms an d choices? The indiv id ual case stud ies thus attelilpt !o answer nine specific quest ions. \Vlmillre th e e llect~ of e st:alating and deeSt:aJating crisisinduced stress 011
i ll!onllt/lion :
J. <-'Ogni li vc pe rfurma nl'C 2. Ihe pCf(.·ei'·cd ,wed ,mtl consc
"' Urc""he', Du;, ;om ;" Cri,; •. I'P. 23 - 23.
II
I :l! (.T IU:>;
3. th~' receptivit y and size ufthe i1lionn,,!io!!pro(-,c~sing
on cOII"lIlfalio,,;
groUt)
4. the ty pe ,,,,,I size
"r mns"!!a! i" ,, ""its
5. grou p part it"ipatioH in II,,: (~lI ", tl t"ti\'<·
prtx:ess
,,,,
uri decisional furUIII~: 6 . t he s i/.e st ru cture of dct:'isional fOf U ill S i , authority patt" .." wit hi" dec;s;o",,1 " nits ()!I
"/lc,-,w/i,,,,&:
8. Ih" ,c"r~h fu r
;lntl
evaluatio" of,llt cnmti vcs
9 . th e P <'r<,<,i,'"d ra!l !,(c "f a\'ailablt.'
"lte n ",lives r: Th c~c
questions constitute tbe focus for (~ HnparJ.ti vc anal ysis. The find ings of this particular stud y wil! be used to i.lSSCS~ the validit y of
m ajo r h ypu' h escs "n tTis;s l>c h,,\' iu r, If Ill{: en tr y of \V"rS1!W Paet troo p s int o C7.I!chus[ovak h:rri \uTy (luring the night of August 20- 21, 1968. pred pil:.ltcd a major t'risis w it hin t li e Pr:.I~\le le ,ull.'Tsl1 ip , t h e i nl'asioo a Iso marked t he cul m inatiun of a Inn g crisi~ p c ri(KI li) r Soviet deci sion m'lk c rs. Indccd Breche r's denllition o f c ris is is particularly suited to th e Sovie t ('asc. ;\Int only wcrc all fOllr I wc.~":n·y " "'] s nlTk ic nt cnn dit i"ns presen t- a chan!;:c in the c nvinmmcnl, perccptions of a thrt~"1 In hasic valnc s, " hi g h p m1",], il ity of involvement in m ilitary 1mstilit ies, and a fin it e tim e for response- but Brcc her's alt e rati o n of ('OIl\'entiollal deilllition s o f crisis f;ldlit,ltes ill the Su\'id C:lse :l m ud l do se r (~)Jl ce ptual fit. S p ecilka ll y, hi s o m ission of the element of surprise as a nece ss ary ('Ollllit io ll of c risis en ables th e examinat ion of a case in w h ich I he deci sion-m akillg unit rcacts lJ"er a long p c riod " f tim c in :0 c" lc ulat cu and vari e d ""Iy to iI d~' namie situation for which it llIay not be wholl y res pons ihle b ut 10 wh ich it has ce rtainl y contrib utcd, The om issi" n o f s u rp ri s,,", with its ('Otlnotat ion Ilf pu rel y rc spolisi l'c ,md dcfcnsil'c hehavior. an d the re place ml.'llt of a sho rt respo u se tim e h y a Ilnite li me e llitatl('e tb e :tpplil'atioll of Brc du: r's defin ition "I' c risis to Sovie t hdlllv iu r toward Czec hoslovakia in 1968 and make it poss ible to te st the rn(Kie l's h ypot heses abo ut decision nmk ing un d e r crisis l'01l(l itio1lS.
''''
o::h
C HAPTE H TWO
Prelude to the Crisis
It is difficult to pinpui nt th c date or spedfit: evenl in Prague tll al
prooul'Cll pen'e ptions uf tl lrea t within tile Suviet lead ersllip suffi cie nt tu trigger th e pre-crisis period. The cump lex inte rnati onal situation and th e growing disunity within the bloc nat urally af-
fected Soviet respollses to d lallgcs ill CZt"'C hu,\uvakia. Increased disso,; nl in Poland, in th e Uk rain e, ;uul ' UlUl11!; iulcl leclua\ circles wit h in th e USSH met with allard-line resplJ11se from Sm'ie! le ader s, ,lnd heighte ned th ei r sensitivity to si mi!;lr unrest in Czechuslova kia. \ Vit hin the Krem lin itself, thre e years alier Ihe ousti ng of Khrushchev. a clea r foreign pulicy line had ye t to cmerge. Thus th e "Pr.lgue Spring" unfolded ag,linst a bat'kdTIJIl of dispute and Ilncertainty on vital policy issues. The Soviet respunse to Czeclmsluvak refurms wuuld be th e bencllllwrk fur the fu ture devc\upmen! of Soviet domestic and fOl"ei gll policy. Give n this sihllliion, il is ra th er surprising tha i thc crisis took as long to d evelop as it did. As early as the slimmer of 1967, leading intellectuals :md oiJici'lls in Pr.Lgue were ddJatiu g highl y sensitive issues. At the "ourth \Vr it cr.~ · Congress in Jun c . speeches attacked the party's domestic and foreign policy, Official censorsh ip was eond e llllLcd uy man y speakers, ld.tok ke., ;nLo"·;ol....d 0"
Ocl")",, 2·L. 1U77. <"O"hnn<..J Illat al hi,
j"'Ligolion Lhe IMle , " '.. o'n;Ll,~1 [,om 11,. offici.,1 ,.,.,,,fc N ncc L> roc<',.dio!p " "' of mn ,;d~ •• , tion for "ll,e , ep""""" ;""' ' ''ch all ..:\ """td ".,.,. in ~10 ..., ,,,·.·· AI ><> ..... II . c-;"nItK' S kil1; ,,~. C",."I""/'''·4k(;'·f Inlr"""lrd fl """ J"' ion. I'l" 00_ 70
1(1"'' '
15
"
16
I )",UOJl\lCTlOl'
At thE: Central CO!ll1l1itlt'c plenullI in ]>ragllf~ in Ot-Iol.cr WH7, t he p racticl~ of duplicating lop party and s tale pmts was criticized, and th e rcsiJ.,:nat iol) uf First SC{Tctary '\Illonin Nuvu tn y wa~ d e mamlc{1. NIl\'''!u}' appealed to the Soviets lilr assistam:c in main-
taining his position. h UL aI! SOllft'CS agree. ;"Ioscow did no l in te rfere to prevent a diminution in No\'o!n}','s power. CZCdlOs[ovakia had bet' ll one of th e few b ilK' slales to escap e d c-S t,llini7~l ti lm, ,tlul it was gc n crall ~' helieved that the heavy COlicclltratio n of authority in NO\'O!ll{S hands a nd th e oVcn'clll rali'l c d and bure allcr:llizcd powt:r strul'iure WCrt! n:spollsi hl c for thl! t:(.~ )n()mi{· stagna tioll tb a t lUld Ch,H'Ucterizcd the s~'slem since t he early 1\)f1Os. ;\Inreover. Nuvotny"s pe rsonal uhjccti<1Il lu Ihe ousler "f Khrushchev li: ,,, ,I". f"tt"w; .. ~ "',""." E. C"I,I""d .. ,. in' e"·;,·.... o"'<~"" :!-J. 19i7, l in lI:1j,·k. m, an, ~1,,~._J'm~"c . 1!l6.~_ 1lJ7~. 1'. 76:" IlIgt..r.U1 l ill~ Dllh{d .;d~ " 'nlin!' ,,"der
" p'elld"")·,,, (_
~Iom"u'
11'""",1. 1). "Slo.",·""" n"lkk- A \);If,·,.·",l)u)l(o,·k .- p. 208.
AI", a C IOC/. 1'. ,,,,,ldl,,,,, "ah'"'''''' ".'1"",,..,1 - "''1''i ...· and """,Ii"" -•• 1\1"",I,<\,e,", ...",'c. a",1 al'p,,,,,;al ion of hi> " " ",I;;h ,,,·,,,,,r,,1 '"O<";"CTK"t: . ,,,1 ,lte ,1;"·10",,,,· of 'he ""nm",,,' ", •.1I",,1, I" ,I." ,,,,,~,J ,,( Il'e c,,1t of ,,.......,,,,,1;').:..\·ru, r".k T;m"., . Aug"" 21. 19&5. Fin lo ...·l~rouud 10 ,hi. p. ,;,,J. ",e (:.t;" e"I.",. rI... G:,c/,"""""k /l./o"", .1/".. ,,,,,·,, .. ' J", ..r S",.~,,,·, l~ . "-,, Vlifi";'J.,·,/ C,,'u.".·..."I1.." . 1'. 7. Sl iltinK. c:.!... h".. Im·"k;{/:' /"Icr"" I"r,/ n,wl"r~,". 1'. Iff) . • ",1 ~ I Id,d T.,'u. /.....I/,,"d,. l.u"",,}· I~. IfQ. AI" , ~ 1\,1;,1, lie ..... '· 1"'1"" l",IoIi ,I"',1:.. , ''' k~' hr ~ I',,,~~, ,, """"I~,,,d .. n! d"l'~"io~ ' he 'p,e." "f ""h·S",·;"Ii<m ill C"...·I,,»lm·.li~. ""de Cl·.·" "m',," 1"',fi,li"'" ,In'" i' I, ~,·,,,·~~tI,· know" llIoa, I~ .. i'io" """' IA~o I.)" IlIn.t.o",· ,Io"in~ hi' "]"t ,,, I'r.'g"" in 'he '·"ti<-.,I ,\.1p- wi",,, ill .....·.""" ']>1"" ,"" , " ,1"" ,I", S,"'k, 1I";"',, Ji,l 'K'! ,,,,,.,,,1 '0 h" ... f,·,,· i" C,.<..·I",,)o,·.'~i.:' ,,,, ... ,,al ~If"i~'" ( Zyd " II'. ... "''''.~. ~IJ)· 4 . 196Ii).
"11", S"'·;,., dc...·i.~.n "0 ' to ,',,"e ~""" "i' had I" ·,·,, a ";do,)' f", "o')"~in" til", ~.IIt.",,,]> i" tI,,· 1\,\i,Io,,,,,. "'~'"rdin g ,,, ,,~·lt ·inf,"m,"1 \" "1""1.". ,m" ,,·, '1 ,,,,,,"1 h~· I ..jo" L.. ,I",,·r. n~ OI,..·rt·r . (1."',]00) . ~ L , ...h 2-1 . HIfi.'I ' Il .j"k. /);rd",o ,m's . 1' . T6
~hch
•
l'ltELUUE TO TilE
/7
CI\I~ I S
havc reassured I3rezllllev hy telephone on jilnuary 6 IIHlt no further personnel changes would be neede<;:1 no\\' Ihal Novolny had heen remove{I." Not surprisingl y. ther.,/',re, Ihe eled;on or Alex" ndel' DubCck as first seerct ar~' of th e Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) on january 5, 1968, \\,:15 rc).:arded in ~IOSL,{)W as a IXlssihle solution to long-st.Ulding pruhlcms in Czechoslo\'akia. nol as Ihe beginning of a crisis. Throughoul January and februar y, reialiullS remained openly L~Jr{liaL Dulx:ek's visit 10 ~I oscuw at th e end of january, as dl;scribed in the official L'Ommuniquc. took pll\L'C in an atmusphere of "L'{)rdial friendship, sincere and Ide mlly understandiug," with "L~lll1plete agreement" on all issues discussed.' The celebrations of thc twentieth anniversary of the February ]9-18 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia occasioned I'isits b~' Suviet .lILd Illoc leaders to Prague, Brezhnev praised the "outstanding part" playc{[ fly the erez "in strengthenin g and de"eloping th e soeialist L~Jlllmunity " and su ppurted ··Ihe creative approach of your party \0 th", solution of problems arisin g at all stages of th e stru ggle il, r the victory or sol.'ialism.'" Although the Soviet newspapers c:>rried almos t llO inde pth anal ysis of th e leadership changes, th e few rejlor ts Ihal did appear were, on th e wholl~, favorable. " This public facade of unit y and support llid lIot always conceal indications tl) the L1.l11lrary. howI;"er. The MO.K1)\\' meeting between lJllbl:'Ck and th e Soviet leaders on January 29- 30 was perImps till! first OL't."dsion at wh ich some lluu],ts were ojlenly e.'prcssed. Thc :lutilOritatil'c Soviet explan"tion of th.! n ;;Lsons fi,,. th e innlsion. issucd by PrtlVda on August 22. 1968. dl~;lrly stated that thert~ Imel heen e:luse fllr worry as cHrly as January: Our part)' took atl lImlcrstatidin/: :lltitudc toward the dc<:ision of the Jalllm ry 19f,s plenary se.;sinn of t he CI'C" Central COIllUl ittce. Ne\'ertheless. it "'as already evident al that lillie that the del'eluping situa, tion <.~)\) 1d Ic".l tu " weakeni nl; uf I],,, CZL'Clmsl"""k C()llllmUi ist 1';lrt )' ;11)(1 ,<> t I,,: growl h (If s"ntilllt'nh d.nlg"l'Uus I() ,ucialism amo"g ~~'r tai II cird.,., ,l()'·il k .",cict\' Ihat wen, \111\1,·,. II", in/!"','I('e of ho"rgeois views .lUd illlperi;llht p;ol'aganda. 'Willi,,,, Sha"""" •. /)IJI>«k. p. 153. ' I~""'lia .
l'chTU .. Y I, 1\I6!I_
' 1,,,,, 11... Felm ......' Zl. 19RI. ' P~d,·,'~. J~"u~,y 6. J96'i. p"LI;,heJ 11,",.1",..,,", 1.. 1e'!!,,,,,, "f "" ,~ ", '"l.li"" h, i)ul":'Ck "i!1o a I""glhy a"d I_;lh·~ hi'W"I,hi..-JI , keld, of dw nt'W r,,,! ,...,' da,)-, ,\1>" ,e'1.· rrac,/u.
..
,
J.HU"Y 19,
n. 2.1. 31. and
I'elm '.'~ S. 9,
."d 17.• ",]
"':~";,, .
j.""..,y 21 and
Fc!"u"y G.
"' "
I'
[ N Tn01J[ J CT10~
In t he talks bc hH'c n CI'S U lcadcr~ ;tnd CU'l'ho.,!",-ak le ad ers held in MUSl~)W in Janu:lr)' and in i'm,"uc in Fchruarr, these lIppre hc II _~ions w(~ rc "o;e.;<1 openly, in a parly spirit. At the Sa me lim e it W:,S sl" tcd ill 110 uncertain terms th at tin: choil'C 'If paths uf hU ildin g so c i,,1i." " ""'! the chui ce " fform s and meth"ds "rparty gu j, b """ "I' S(x'i;.l pnK.~:SSCS we ..: within t he full a",1 cx du s;"c tompch"K'" uflh" CI'Cz Cu"lral Committe"'"'
During the January meeting in ~I()scow, I3rc7.hn cI" is said tu have
supported J)1l1x:d, ,[gai ns! \11f' cunSCf\';lt;n:s alld to have ollerc(J to felll,lee them. Zdcni':k ,\ llyuM", ,I C I'C7. sc(:retary who was prcscllt ,It th e postinv,]sint1 " 'Iost't)\\, ne gotiations. recalls that Juring tl1{)se August negut iations Brezhne\' reminded Dubcek uf this suppurt:
"',I.'
Fnu n th e "cry [" ,gi nn ing. ] pn:par,'d to help YOIl ag.1ill ~ t N""ol nf·. . and ] ask,!(l )'uu "s t·ady ,IS January: You "re Ihreakllcd hy his IIlt:n. ar~'n't you ? Du yo" ",,,nl h . dO:lIlge Ihem ? Do )UU w:ml 10 lIa\'" ;u,otlu' r Minis lN uf Int.·mal ,\IT'lirs~ y"" said at 1],<1t time th:d thi s wuuld nllt he nL'<-'C~Saf\'. hL...·<1USC th ey "'erc ~()od t~)1nradcs . .... nd nn ly , ,,I)st,,],,en ll,.. JiJ I hear Ihal )UlI had changed Ihe ;'Iin is!<:r of InlCr· nal Affairs. the ;'Iinistcr of Defen ~e . ot her Ministe rs and Secretarie s of the Cent ral Committee. " Th o: Fo:hnmry lll e ding in I'ntguo:, d esp it e its ~'t:ro:m ull ial purpose. "~IS also 'Ill (K'C[lsion of som e tens io n. Sov iet lead e rs ohjccted to purtions of D uh':'ek's puhlic addTGss in whid, he sp()ke o fCzechoslo\',lkiil's intf>rests in Europe, "in the center of whic h our ('
1'_ Z'lS_ " R"./t ''''\,.", ~"·h" .,ry 2.1. l'lf>ll. 11,.. ,1 ......·10
w., al". ,·." .....1 ill
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,-,·J,"'''Y 2.1.
l!lr~~
.,
/9
PUEL. Ull f: TO TilE e Ulsls
n :primambl Dllh(;ek: "I ill Fell m an'] I told you of Ill\' ohjed ion to your spce<:h amI ~·a!!.;d to your alti:lltion so me fiwlIllllaliollS whidl W("'C nol ,"01"]"<.."<:"1. But ) 'OU did,,'t change t he m. lI erc wl,en I prc .. pare a spee~'k ' : \"1'11 I my,elf llUl~t )!;i\": the \t;~t to th e otller me mhen of the Politburo. in ord er t llat th ey should ~i"e their judge me nt. . \Ve ha\"e a L'O!!edive le'ldcrship :lnd Ihat me,IllS thai Olle has tn Sli hurd inate one 's views to ot he rs."' " Th is I-chrua r) ' i ncid.ml W,I S (~Jll firm c(! aller the invasion h~' V;lsii Bi\"ak. head of I he S!o\'ak Com 1111 mist p:ll"l y and olle of Dul >i·.,k·, "JlIl< III.,nh I h ruu ghuul mr,s. He reported th:ll on Febru,LfY 2.7. I.I n :l.hlleV, havi ng received an advance ('OilY of Dnlx:e k's spel'tll. telephollell Dub(·ck. At"('Onlin g I" Bil""k; "Co mrad e Bre~ hn cv , afraid. trie.l lto ex plaill" Inng lime 011 th e tclep!lO ne, whal kind of scandal wO llld OL"Cltr if sudl a speedl \\" <:re pn-,s.; nh,d al . tIll: C.:nlral Commitlc.:. They wOIil.1 pruh .. abl y re,lcl to it ,wd lea\"e."· !\\though some eh:mgl~s in Ihe speech were in Jild made, lIi1',lk daim s, th ey still fell [Ir short of Soviel d e nmnd s." Yet the Jan uary and Febrllar)' illdde nls w"re nut slIffieil,nlly st'riolLs 10 trigg"r ,I IIwjor crisi s. Gust;h' 1I 1I._;ik. DIIIK:c k's ~ Ut;L"t:ssu r, suhs{~quc nll y stat ed that Brcl.lmcv and ulll(~ r EWi t Europe,1ll lead .. e rs who had gathe red in ]l 1 ~l!!"e for til e Fehruary meeting "expressed quit e frankl y Illeir sl1JlJlmt for th e m'l\' leade rship and its g.~ ",: rall), ,I{h-ueated "i m5. J n ot he r words. the y hatk,:d I he leader .. sl,;!,. ils aim s "f '111'1",rlil1.1; .,,><:i:<1is lil . do il1 ).( away witl, mistnk"s, and providing greatcr St~'Jle. ·· '·· LEADEJISHIP
CHA~GF:S CO ~\!CEHN ~10SCO\V
III th e mon Ih fi lllowing I he Fe hro I ar~' t·.'lel)]":,t ion ~. I,. I\\"(:\" er. So\"id apprehens io ns Arew 10 ~1It;h ,I II· vcl that a crisis seeilled I1namidahlt:. of te nt ral imp{)rlallte ill prcdpilat ing Ihe crisis we re Icadership chan ges t hai thrc:1Icllcd th e strut;lllrc of part\". polk"C . and ar my c ha nnels th rough whic], III., S""i"'", had Iraditim"dl y exercisell (~)11 5id c rahl e informal influl'lIc,' "," 'r C~.ech()sl'''·;lk "fr.\ir~. ~ ~It )·".il . ,\''''''''f''',,', 1'. 2!1'I- !I!J. B,,·,.I,,~, ,··, "I,j'~'\i"" ,,, I'"' to' "f lJ"t.: ,·k·, >I''''·..!' "."'-, .t,,, ,..."1;,,,,,"<1 in t.ad." I.,," Bil\",a". T/,,- /)""'pli,m (;"''', . p. I~·I .
.. R", I~ t"·l k". s"l'"",,,IH" 3. 1%'1. '1",,1,,1 ; n Ji' ; \ :,1 ",,, • • S,,,·;.·,
.It" li"~
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rvl j,·, /),·d,I",, ·
",,,/I1'''''''''''mhc lIili';
"SI"'" I, to)" Il",.:ik •• l'r"~' ''· . ,\,,~">I t\l, 196'!. \" I he .tI·,' I~I '· ubi,· ,,( ,·t";"",·,, ,~. 1',;. 1',"1)' ""ib in i"cl ",l,y. <"", t"Kli"" . muJ 1,''''' I""t. 11rlt"h II,..:"I,-.,
""or )"
ICh
!z
M
20
1:>'T110UUCTI US
Cadre changes began when Cencral \%::luv Prchlik. then bead of the ~bin Pulitical Administration (M PAl of the Czechoslovak M in~ istry of National Dcft!n sc. replaced \ Iirnslav \ Iamula us chief (If the t'rm:ial eighth department of the party SCl'Tciari;Lt, the depar tment n:spollsible for supervision urthe af lll Y aml t!l t; sl.'Cllrity services." Prchlik's uld joh in the M 1'.'\ was th en fiIh: Ll by ann llu,r Dubec k suppurt e r. Ge neral Egyd I'cpich . The reaso ns "If the
ch.mgcs bCC;ITTIe de,l)" a week I,Ltcr when, un Fe bruary 25, General Ja n Scjna, head of the import:ml parly ('mll millt:c within the .\1 in-
ist r y of National Defense, dclcdcu to the United States amid reports th;1t he and Mamu la h;\([ been at the center of atte mpts to usc the military to pn:\'cnt No\,otn {s downEdl tIll: prcviulis Decem, ber. Despite nlll1\erOIl.'; rumors. the prC'Cise role of the Soviet mili· lilry in these ci;llldesliuc ildivilies WilS never madc publil-. " Soviet L"Ollce rn over the leadership cha nges umltlie defe nse rmnill.cations uf the possibility that Sejnll had taken tup militar~' secrets with him" were sufficient filr the Soviets tu plilte mubile air and light armored units in the Carpathian military district on alert.'·' Then, un f e hruary 28, ~ larsh .. 1I. J. YakuUovsky, the supreme cummander uf the \Varsaw Pact furces, arrivc\1 in Praglle in tIle flrs\ of mallY attempts to assess Ihe elfed of changes inside Czt..'(:hoslov'lkia Oil Soviet str;Ltegic l"Oncerns. Yilkubo\"sky held talks with Duhee k, President No\"otn)\ Parly Secret.lfY J07.cf Lcm1rt. and Defcnse ~linister l30humir Lomsk~'; and sources indicat e that the di scus, ~"[lw ~'l " " .h·~ I'"" .. ~.,
,,r , I,,· ";~h'h
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Dr. O,~a, Ilizik . P,d,lik', del"")"' wh" i" .n i"te rdew on Ilr.li '~.'· . t,· l~,"i'io" "" ~!o,n.~' 27 . 1\J6S. ,"~i'\I"iTt",1 II." ';1 •• " ,\". ""~~ of II ... .\!i"h '.)" "f "_u",,.1 n,·r~,,,,· . ,10 .. ~I ;"I>tr)· .,( 110,· l utc·,io,. the I'"",-,-·.,tol·' Offiet". the ,,, u,I, "f I.,,'. a"d the ",ill! I., ' (SII'n. 1':£12739' (:116 ).
" Mid,,,,,! S'"p,.. ,,,k.Suonone. , . 1 ,Ioor ti,n" 1", ••on.1 p,e" offie", 10
th~
min;,le, ,,r de·
f~n_'" and late, t" Pre,ide,,1 S'·'~XKh. ",.i"l.i", 11,.,1 ~ejn" ,,,,,..,i,,,,,1 '''I'l""t fn '''' S,wi"1 ",i lila,)' ",h"i"", i" Pr.~"'· "')'" "~'1<" """"fIid~l\)" .. '''I'I"''U'''': ""'"""'i'" II ... ,I~ ,
·'i,'.·.. ;"
"'1'1""" Scjtta'., . "I1>e'I'"·''' , t.u·""·,,, !hal (;,·",,, ..1 JanL" h:.d I""n Ink! I", S"",e( "m""." "thal • military otl ..,k [.,)' tbe So"iet ~"n)" ",,,,1,1 he ,n""it"ble if 11u- " ·"j,'",,i,t. i" I'ra,:"c "",tinu"d ,,,,h thei, wo,L of de,lrue!i"","' s.::-., Mid,,,,,! Slel",,,,·k.St.l,,, ,,,,,,. Vi<: r'c/"'d,,~ ,tlm,""Hw:/,r Anr~ ·r. 1'1'" 22 -2~. ·n ... ",",,"'< I'''IW'' of ' I,.. (;"~, h,,,~,,·.k P,'''I,I,,', I~"!)" /.;,/",'d d,·"",rm'~k. "n J,,"c 5. 1M. • 1", '''I''i", ....1a r", l r;"", ..,lid. all"~i"g ,hat .'\eJ'" 1"",1 heen .101,· «, I"a,',' Ihe "".. "«)-!,,-....-.,,,,, loe w .., in I""""»i"" (Of. dip~""ati," 1""IM>rt i»",,,l
."·w
I,,' ~ 5<,,';';1 ~en ~.'l. n,;, .1I,·pli"" ,,'" ",·,·cr L
" \';';I",:luTZ.> i" TI,~ G",,..,I;.,,,. j"l,- e. 1968. a",I .~"~"'1 21. 19r,s . • ",1 J"\''' E,;.,-k,.~, i" The S,mday nmc• . September 1. 1968, ~ .-\ " klljo" \\'·~k and S"d"" 1i""",ol,,~y . .\1"«+, 25. 100Il,
~Irch
•
21
I'HH.. u m ;; TO T ilE elll SIS
siollS cenlered on t1,,~ Sejna alElir, le'ldership dl,Ill)!;l'S ill II,,? IIppll mt, and tIn: spring Warsaw Pad mmlPuve rs long sdwdul ed tu take placc in Czcchus]ovaki;I."'· \VIHllcver reussur..mces Yukuhuvsky 1ll,ly have TCce ived in pri\"(I t e, I'll hlk c,llls in IJ)";\gne filr t he n~si).!;n at ion IIf con sc rvative le key I"IIIst ,1(1 or t\1(> party·s h!l:o lo)!;ieal Commission to Joser Space k. wh o thc previous June' had roundly c riticized t he muno]lolistic: way t he ]lart~' was e.xerdsin).!: its le'lding ro le." I'ress ure on th e ('Hlse rvati\"e fad io!l was mai nta ine(1 throughout "- lard1. with thrce tradf" uuion lcad er~ resign ing on March 12. 011 ~1a rch 1·1. it was ,l!ll\()un eee \ that Dep ut y Defense .\ linist<: r Ge lw ral J,mko had eo mmittell sn idd c, lililowing n'velatium tlllll he had been invoked with Sejn,l ,nul .\lamub in th e :. ~ S",·'; '''Y'/. "". 1:.1 (j ... " . 2,. 191),), 3 _1i . ." " .... i.. S~.ltj .. c. (;:.-.·/.. "/",.,,H' , /m r , ·
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11>" I'lIOOUCTIOX
Soviets !lad been willing to repiace Kud rna as minister of the in terior in order to strengthen Dulx:ek's hill)(1. WIHlt tb ey could uot countenance was 1\ioscow's cxdm ion from t he se!eet ion process alt ogether. A title of newspaper art id t~~ dc mamled l· hange, an d far fro m ste mm illg this outcry, man y C PCz "lTidals. illcituiil1),: DlllX::'ck him_ self, we re spe akin),: uul in favur of pnJ),! rcssivc pulicies . AI a municipal party confe re llt:e in Bmo, Duhcek s talt~d tlHlt " th e Party i.~ seekin g out ways ad l'<:luate !y tu exp ress th e nCl..:ls uf the 1l,lt ioIIS, of sodet y. (If sot:i,11 grou ps, ,l!\d of th e individl1il1. Th(' search is a complicated proce ss. But without SUdl a search it is nut possible to lead society.'· ~ ' Tbe 1'r.lesilli ulll of tht! part}' had l!1ldorsed these views hroadly ilt its ~I a reb 14 meeting. in wh ich it resolved to suh mit to th e Apri l Cen tral Cumm ittee ple num proposals fur cadru cha ngl's and 11 wide-ranging "action prugram" th at would serve as a hlueprint for th e reform mOye lllent. t\ ke ~' iss ue was censorshi p. wh ich had been ellt.'<: tivel}' 'I holis hell at t he heginllillg of ~I:lrch when th e l'rnesidill lll decided to re move the Central Pu blicat ions Board from th e jurisdiction of tl u, .\liJlistry uf the Interior. A c "these fears al-e the n:sllit of oM hahits, t,,)r llle r \\~lyS oft hi "king and met hod s of sodal pract ic{:s. . Critit;ism . must hff'(lme a peTrn:mCl1t!Catlire of 0111' life. . Tile I'raesidil1 lll (.~>ns ide rs it ri ght to d edare that this is a ddi ni te settling or at'l'(lU nts with the Jl,for mat io ns which hll\-e in the past enda ngered the developme nt uf sudety. " " SOVIET PHEOCCU PAT fO N ELSEW l tEHE
The response of th e Suvict press to th ese dc\'el ilpme nts was t'autious iu th e ex treme. There was a virtllal hlaekou t 011 :my d etailell analys is uf Czcchnslnmk atfai Ts. The ft~ w aTt icies that dit! appeaT " R"d~
I,m, '". M>r<,h 17. 19!>'\.
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I'UEL UDt: TO TilE
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ClllS l ~
were neutral repo rts of selected evcnts such as the regional party cuufc rcnce5 ur the Czechoslo"uk stand at the Sofia meeting; of the \ Varsaw Pact's Political Consultative Comm ittee. "' Certainly t he press gave no indicution durin g; the first threc weeks (If /I.·lareh (If imminent crisis. Editori'lls rellt""(.· ted cOIII;ern wit h other issues, do-mcstie and foreign ; and indeed the le;I{lership's preoccupation with lllore pressing, if related, prohlems explains the Ill n before the storm. On the domestic front the Soviet lemlcrship had h\l) majo r Jlmb~ lems associated with the growt h of dissent. Firsl , the Jun ua ry trial of" four intellcduuls, indudin g Al e~ander Ginl-llUrg, had clidted unexpected protests and petitions from leading figures in the artistic and cultural world. "" In Leningrad, the party l"Ommilice was o(Reia[[y reprima nded fo r its slackness in i{lcologit-al educll.t ion;" and a major editorial in Pra(;ila Oil .'.Iarch 1;1 calling for greater vigilance agains t the sub ve rsive influctll"e ofoourgcois propaganda and ot her f()feign idco1ogies marked the heginllillg of a major CI"", the riV:llry he tween the Ukr;lini;Ul p"rt>,·.~ first secretarr, Piotr She1est. and the Ukrainian prime minister. V V. ShclJe ruitsky. Both were in the CPSU PulitlJU ro, but Shelest was a "S~~ 1~<€"i<J. ~11",h
"",11',,,,.,10 . M. n ·l, 2. 1.•",1 10. 196~ . "l1,~ In, .. ,,,.I,,",.I;,,,,'' '''os .~'). modeM<';" lon c: "Con""",,i,1 1);1,1;", lOOa)' "1)0.·",,1,' in th,' ",,,, t ' ".>r;",1 "",di'~"", Thi, j , why 11""e ".u, he "0 ' lue,lio" '" o,""""jzi,,~ 0 k.din~ <"<"nh" of d,e C"mm " n i,1 mo'·eme,,1. The", i. no n, ...<1 fo, . uch • run'c,. I'","·nl..:la), funn> of '>oity ."d comJ;"""d act;,,,, .mong 'he f...,ern.1 p"";~' a ,~ . uffic;"n.l)" ",01o;1~ anti H~.\ibl ~ . ·· " f or de.ail, "f Ihe'" p,m.,I; ...... Th p Ih'ily T;,I,~ml,h . J.m".,)· 4. I9&!: TI", .\/"mj,,~ Sinr. January 6. 1008, The Time •. J'''''''''' 10, 100$. a" d ~ehnoa".· ~. i\l(iS, J"hc S,,,,d,,y 1U,,· /:mph. F"bou"'}" II. 1008, ""d Sew ro,k ~e l"",'1· Hl. I96/!. "1'",,,,/,,. J.""a')· lY. lOOIi. 'l"'~<-.J II,., r",.~ "!I"" "r Ih~ lool~" 1.. "U ,~r",,1 C it)" I'a" y C,~, lc,e,,<-.: : "1" ;,I<",I"~k>f"r"o><"<" w .. on .hi. then,e. - The ronf",en,,, "" p"·",,d II". ",·,~l 10> .. ,..~i ... 11... 1~,·~1 of 'he itl"'logical and 1)Q1i!i<..-.1 ,,]>Io,;"I;;"1l ,of 11,,- \"Jt~I"~ l><"<,pl .. . "'1>«<";,11)" )"""~ people. I" Ih.t of 1""'""''' .... Ia)· ''''"l ui'''''''''''''.. [" Janua,y 1!)6S. h ... " P q ·"I",,,·., rc;""~he
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full memher. whereas Shchcrbitsky was a nUl]\"uting candidate member."" TIl{' two mcn previously had (."o opcfilt ed in mold ing a more inde pendent cultuml policy in the Ukrai ne. but the growing in toler-mcc of 11Ie central leadersl li p in }'losl.1lw fil l" any firrm of dissent made such (1 policy impo~5ih[e. Shclest, in particular. became (L vociferous upponcnt of political refurm . Many ubservers fclt that his npposition was increased h y Ctl Ll t;crn fur the S{:~'lLTity uf his uwn position, whieh was furt her undermined by Shchcrbilsl..y 's reported duse affiliation with Brezhnev. Shelest"s keynote s p e~'
In foreign afhi rs. tou. the Soviet Ic,ldcrship W,IS far t()O prcoccupied with events in Hu mania, l'oiaml. and the GDi~ to foc'us e.~ c\usi vc
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25
PIU;L UDE TO TIn; e m sls
and ~lJPporlt:(ltl,,: Snviet call fur an earl~· "()Il\'o(:;llioll of tile inter_ national conferencc. KouckY. howc\·er. also SUPlmrted efforts encouraging ~1USl'()W to reverse the anti- Yu,goslav li ne ad opted by the 1957 and 1960 meetings. Even in early ~'I a rch the Suviets showed their concern over growing sym pathies between Belgrade and PrJ.gue b y IUllging:t n official cum plaint with t he Yugoslav ~'linistry of Foreign Affairs over th e prn-C ;,eehoslov"k line adoptctl by tile Yugoslav press. "" Never th eless, at this time th e duminant view in Moscow was that "'revision ism" (in this case pro-Yugoslav views) might have to be tolerated if th ey wcrc tu ('()IIs true! an effecti ve frunt againsltllt! Chinese. The ;\'lardl (j meeting in Sofia o f the \Varsaw I'ael's Political COIlsultative Committee also fa iled to brin g Humania back into th e fold, Among Ih e issues discussed, ;K~"'()rding to Kliszko, were "certain proble ms cOIllll"ded wi th t he work uf the hcadqlm r tcrs of the \ Varsall' Pact,"'" Some of the East Europeans, not untypicall y perhaps, were resis ti ng Sovict cfforts tn furt llcr ('enlralizc and integrate th e military command ~truclu re and were pulli ng forward aiternativc proposals, among these a rotatio n of leadin g posts between mem ber states tha t WQu id there by ellCcliveiy redute Soviet COlltrol. ·~' Ilumania·s President Nicolac Ceall~C~eU later eonfiTlllcd that part icipa nts at the meet ing had agrue d to rufer reform plans back 10 Ih e ir m iniste rs of dufense ,md 10 suhmit fn:sh PI'UPUSills within a six-month period.'" But Humania was excluded from subscquent discussions about I'a(' t refor m as a resu lt of its efforts to check Sovic t influcnce. Also un th e agenda at thu Sofia meeting was the N udear Nunprolifcrati on Treaty, 1m whkh the USS H had esp.:ndetl L"'()nside rahlc efio rt ovcr till' previous mouths. Sovie t leade rs we re especially worried that \Vest Germa ny wo uld rcfuse 10 adhere to th e treat y; ,IrlJ they m,IY have e;llc u\;lt L,
.. .'·"w York Tiro..,., M.rch:!9. Hffl. ,·aki•. May 21. 1968.
" lIepoTl' ..I", ",gge.l P"",i,tell! C~""I"><:'" <)f H"m, "i •.
"'O, "1'1~".,,1 !" In'I'''''';lIg .,,~'
arm. r,IlI" l h~ USSlllhll ..",,1<1 I,.. rm,j,,,,..,1 ill II""I,,,i., E.,l ~:uJOl'e ." re,;;la",..- 1" [",. lhe, inc",,,,,,,, in ,jeren .., 'l",",lin~ "." .t"" "" ;'.\1,' al d,~ lillie, l'a,'K,,,t .. cI)· .he ~,,,!~cl fur mi!it.lr)' aid.o the A,..!J .l:tlC •. Vietn"n). and LUW., Se. &,c lo,t Tion ... ~hlIl,h \I and 10. 196!I, Tho< Cuardian . M,,~h i , 1968, 1-", Ob.~n:... r f"'rri~n Neu" S.",j(t , Kcpnrt nn . 2·1~1 9. Mo."!l 11 , 1968: S,,,, ;,,, ,~''''''J, 12 .",1 19. 1968: .,,,1 ,v.... ,,' Tk"' ...·/'/d"'/, ,\1 .,d,9. I96S. "'~~'''PI~'''. Aplil 4. 196'1. '" '1""let'urc~ . Ear""". C:ed"-"I,,,,~kia,
.\I.",.,
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E".,
26
I N TI\ OL>UCTIO ~
support fur the treat y within th e I'ac\ might spur th e Americans to put similar pressure on th eir own allies in Paris and Bonn . It was the refore ,\ grave setba(l whe n Human;a refused tu sign a joint s t:li e m en i alTinll in g t he intent iun of all Warsaw Pact memhers to adh e re to the treaty. Ceau ~eS{'1I subsequentl y gave his I"Cilsom for refusing 10 sig n the dcdarat iun: liul1Ian;a has heen aut! is in fa\"or or II non-prol iferati on tn:~aty. We think h"",e\"e r. that r"rll><:r .;II')r(.< ",mI 1,,: "",de to " bta in improve· ments tu tlli.' trealy. Jlartku l nrl~' I he pledge to \;,kc IH c aSIlr/:S regar.!ing Illld,~ar disarm'lI",: " t ami th e giving of g",m"' tc,~s It) UH Ull rics rctloll ndng Ilnck;LT "'''''1'' '''' 110", th",,' \\'(-"[""" """hi"n! he II s.:.\ ;lgainsl thelll ;md lhat they would nol II.; ,,"hj.'(.'I(~d In hlackulail wilh Ihes" w"a p.,n.~, "",I insur ing r,'r a1\ slales t h" p<>ssihilil), of lit> limit,'ll nl iliM Unll of Il "d "llr "tH'rgy p"';,~~{,,1 pnrt>ns.·, ..'"
"'f
Czechoslovakia's po~i ti on was more modernte, but Dubeek did state tll ilt although Hu mani"',, reflt sallo ,\ign th e declaratiotl was not "realislic:'thc rc wc re in fact utltcr Pact memhers who felt the nee d to link th e treaty with furth er eHorls toward tludC;lr d isarm;l11lCtl! " UN HEST I N !'O L ,\ N D
If the HUl11anian revolt uf early \Iarch d eflected much Suv iet atte ntion from Czcclmsluv;lkia, So IUn diJ tl ,c la rge·,cale riuts that brokl;"
uul in I'oland afler March 8. Dem(>mtrati ng st u dctlt~ and in tel lectu als prulcslc{1 Ihe g:u\"ernmcnt'~ in l'reCI~ k." Altho ugh Ih e riots were quickly (.'ontrol1ed, th e)' had lasling repercussions. The llIerlb I;lutl chcd a campaign " Sp"""]' bl ~iC1~'" C.·.,,,I'-·><'" lu t h~ lI"d """'1 ParI" IIWv. Apri l 26. l!1bS. rmm /lohi" I'm~lI c. I" 59, " H,u];" Hmli, I..·• of ~L",·h 6 . I9&!. • , ,[,,,,Ie
Ali",,, 11""';"1:1<,)). ,~I , . II 'in/crill
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TIn, d ." ,e "" ~ Lla",nl~~' 1\"" "'H"""I"I.·", .101<', "'ill h.,,'" ,," ",-",,_, 10 ", ...·10.. ''"'"4>0''' ,of Ih" fi"n,,"( a ~",," I"'W' " " 'h;d, ,", ..." Ihdr h'nito>'v, "I,,, <'1l1l_ .",rn> lil,' "the, m~",b,'r ""'nl,,," .~' II,,· W"",. w '[" '." )' ___ If th., ,,,,,,,,,'" ,,( Ihe S,,,-id
"'n ... ·pl to,,!;)· "" \o ", ~~r ",:.,,,1 il "<,<,,,,<;Iry tn "'ply 10""
"' ,,"'. "" ""e ,of 'I.... ",.,. Ii" ,,,,,,,"ir, w;,h • ""d..." ,II il,· . _II .., ,,,,,,,,I~'r ,,,,,,,In.·, .~' II", II'""",", l 't'aI)- In;,)' ... \0 'I"",tj",,, ,imil .. r I" lime a~o. I,~I ,I" C, ull., 10 'Iui l -', .no, W"~,, \bud, 6. 1!lf;S , ;n .~\\,H, H:IZ,15ICIi ~)
l'r.,~".·
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Had;" Il ome Sc".. ;c."
27
PHJ::Lum: TO TilE cmsls
blaming the disurde rs on Zionists, intelleduals, and nco-Stalinists. Further. any del11,mds for reform. it was claimed. wou ld weake n Poland's (~Ipab i lity tu "ithshllld the subvers h'e intentiolls uf \Ve st German revanchism, whose aim was to revise t he postwar boundaries of Europe. These allegations presaged a fairly ("Qmprehensh'e purge of liberal illtdleduals and oHlciais, many of !h",m Jewisl!. The purges were the result not unly uf the riots but ,llso of a major challenge to Comulka"s lc'l(l.;r .• hill tll,.t h;.d t;,ke n place "under cover" of the demonstr.ltions." T he challenge came from the rightwing and uitr;lllationaiist "1';1rtis;Ul" l;u::tion he;uk'(i by Mil,<::t.yslaw M0C7..ar, minister of the interior and head uf the secret polite. Gomulka was also attacked by Edward Gierek, who previously had been idenlifiL.J as a mudcr-lle ;lIld it.-cll nLJcr.lt ically minded reformer in the leadel"lihip. " GOlllulka responded to this dual onslaught in a major speech to the \ Varsaw Part y uktiv un March 19, In an eiTort tu st renglhen his position , he attempletl to find l'UIllIllOIl ground between the factions. Favoring a right-willg lurn ill dom estic politics 10 please his det ral'\ors. he Simultaneously empliasized the need for strengthened relations wilh the Soviet Union. a move designed tu l'On\'inee :-'losCQW t hat he was the best guamntor of So-
viet interests in Warsaw. Gumulka upenly admitted that the party was hupeless ly split, with the leadership "still not in a tundilioll to formulaiC, much les.~ unravel. all th e prohlems"t hat fal"C the l~)UIL try." As a result, Gumulka was in 11 0 position 10 support or cveu ignore the Prague refurm n1()\'cment, even if, as has heen snggested. he had sympathies to t he cUlltrary." He emerged from the March crisis much weaker dumestically ami mure dependent Oil - All ~-dilori~tl" Pro ..", i 1:!,I<"it. \laId, z... 100>.'>. t.y "",j ,n"".. Kal;,,1 h1:.m.-d Ihe king .cl"""I"j;e of. een,i" clcpce "f cli>inlegr.I,u" I.. Il,e iutem.otion.1 (, ill "'" 1""W tc;u!~rst'lp. . W~ h.~,... h.d '" ,1 ...1 will. aU.. ",!'!; 10 .I d~c al II.~ !~..J~r ,hil' . . . ,,·ith aU"",,,,, ,1 • ""'I' ,r~t"I " (, ,,,,,,,·,1 1,,,,,, lIFE. 11>/;./, rr.... S~,.w~. "n . :ll:! I, Apdl I , 1968). f". "Ihe. ",.al)"",,, ,,f Ihi> pl,a,,', ><~. M . ". Ihk"· ..,,,,"'ki, T/U' C61111",,,,;,1 l'uf1y "f I" 3(.0, 11",,, •• , W. Wolf•. Sm·...1 1'1",.... alld 1:""" "" I'll. 361;- b<}, amt A. 110>. )010""", . "l1.e I'UWI' I ~',.
r"I"",I.
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28
ISTlIOl)!JCTJON
th e Soviel Union . It was nol dear whether he l·ould surviv(, any furth er un rest in Poland such as might spl!! over from Czeehuslu\'(Ikia. TIllis Comulka was one of th e first bloc leaders tu impl y that cvcnb in CzcdlOslovakia were hav ing a negat i\"e elfed on the bloc as a whole. In his March 19 speecfl, he maintained that "impc dalist react ion and the enem ies of sOl'ialism have l"Ollle furth under various /lags. Acti,'e in our (."Oliulry, (Jud aclive ill lite cOllulrie.~ >leighboring on Poltmd. they are attempti ng to weaken the ties binding the \ Varsaw Tre aty states."" It wa.~ a full t hree days before the Sovie ls made lip their m inds to support Comulka against the Mocz,1r-Cierek facti ons. lI.!oscuw·s imlecisiun was cvidcnt in ti m cumplete al.mmee of any ment io n in the Soviet press of the c'·cnts in I'obnll. Then. on -'larch 22, Pracda published Cornulka's spet-,dl in full with an article th e fol lowing day attesting to the popu lar su ppo rt in \Varsaw for th e Polish leader. On March 2.5. Pracda firml y maintained that " th e authors of th e escesses havc not slIl'(.'CeJell in cre
,loa,
lellt "u;, ,,,l,- of (;"" ",!b . ttoo lX)p.·,1 i/ C,......·h",\" .... ki. ,,,,.,.,,..&-.1 ill ...·hieving a ..... ,'ain li!>.... li'"li"". )", ,,",hi l,mr,1 f"'m Ihb br ~" ll i,,~ '''' '',. Il,",,· ;"(\~f".·,,(I~n' .. fn' 10;, [I<~K"l-' low.. "I, M" .......... 11,;, ch....,,,1 ,"h><'~l"""llv" (f,,,,,, \"Iad;",i, v. "; ''';Il. ,-.I .• TJ.€ Cu:d",,/nwk IIr/on •.\I!lC~" ... n' ,~. I' . 60). .. P""·'/d .
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2.2. 1!!6Ii
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"TIw So'·iP.1 "!llI );lS""~" '0 I\,t.ml. M~, ki Ari,I"'·. ,ef~""l "I~k(l\)' In ,10 .., .. eWllls (Imins. ,p.,,,,,h m",kin)( !l,e " .... "I)"·11oi,<\ """I,"''''''')' "I ll,.. ,i~"i ,,~ "f ,h,· S(,,"id ·l~,I I'\' F,i,n,hl,lp T,~.W -W~ w~r .. ~,,,\ ".1>.. " ,I .. r.,I;.h linil'-.I Wmh,." 1'",,,,. " 'ilh th,· r.'"Uuoile .on of 1M ,\>Ii,), nation . WI...Jy,hw (;'m",lk~ 0' it< h,,:od " "as . . r,"I:" ..d.....t OI:,i"'1 all hl..,k fo"",. of ,,,,,,,tion :' whi
29
PIIELUDF. TO T il E c m S[S
Even if it did not, the regime f"ar<)(1 that a ny major leadership or I)o liey change in e ither Warsaw or Prague mighl lilrlher isoble I he GD H and u nd<) r1nille Ul hricht's eHort _~ 10 mainlain East Gcrm in the early months of l96S indieates the sensitivity of th e issn e. The East Germans feared th at tlte Sovie ts, llespite t heir " ~c.., N. Edwin.> MurdO" . --rhc Imp.",. 0[ 1)<,,,,,,,, "" lIeu';Iln. Hel,.."" " the Member S",e. of [he \\\I .... w 1':><.1.-' ~h.p. 3 . " ,\ '"", li'rk n"""•. ,.""a'y17. 19(">11. ,.., <-i''''] in ibi,L. 1" 197 _ "For e .... "'pl". in • ",. jo< re'·"'''' 0[ i»"", f"d,,): &n..... , f,,,d~n l~.\iq·. lh" G". man ,["e._ h un "'" li, ' tod .. One oflhc ei):hl t"ll-p"orilyarc .. ,,"Mr<, it Ir.ad ]""'n and alle):,," II .., [he W"" German. "'~ r" "",.elty d"'·e~~'i"g n"d,-ar W~~[~.", ( PYd ·",1 nole ~olhc \\bt C"' .... "",n. condemnin" th.i. "New t:.U~m [l<1 Germ.n
.i"" ..
f,,", (,,'" f'rat·,fa. ,\1 • ..,1, 5. 19611).
" ""
30
\:-',1I0nUCTION
p u ulic protestations. might subordinate previous {.'O rnmitm c nt s to
til,: CDH to an a grc,: mc nt wit h \Vest Germany u\'er Berli n. Perhap s hup ing tu forestall any such agreement. in February tllt:y puhlishcd .. head uf schedule a new draft CDR Cunstltut ion tlml
claimed all of Berlin u.s the a lpital orthe CDR" In March they also beg an 10 disrupt the transit routes tu Berlin , dearly implyin g that 110 agreemen t un that city wo uld \\l)rk without th eir appro",IL If the East Germans were worried tha t Moscow might serve its own inltncs ts lIya more Acxi hlc in tc rpret,lI ion of the K,lrluvy Vary agreements, til Cir fears were not assuaged hy the developments in
Poland and Czechoslovakia. Br:Uldf~ annmIlK'CTllcn\ on ~'lardl 18, in th e millsl urthe Polish {'risis. that the FnG wuuld resp<-oct the Oder·Neisse li ne as the western bou ndary of P"l,md lLntiltl...: signing uf a peace treaty'" was seen t hrullghuut E'lslcrn Europe as an effort to tempt t he Poles lIway from th eir (:omrnitmellts :lIld to further isolate th e GDB. ~l Gumulka maintainc{l his pusitiun and rejeded t he \Vest C(:rman ul!cr. :lI1d lilT the time heillg. the East Germans seemed reassured thai the Poles. atieasi. we rc not likely to respoud positively 10 \Vest German initiatin!s . Such was not Ihe case in Cz{:choslu"akia, howCVf;r. DnlX::c k's
FcbrlUl!'Y speeeh asserting
C:I.C(·ho~lo\'akia·s
intention to
e_~ t'lbli sh
normal relations with all European slales irres p<-'Ctive of their sodal syslem was interpreted as a dircct reference to \\'est Gcrmany. Umil:r NO\"l)lnY. the \\'esl Germans had .~lIe(.'t!e{let.1 in estahlislling ,I trade mission in I'r.lgue. and after Dulx'ek\ a(.'(;cssion to power, this mi ssio n's fUndiun s began tu increase, ~ l oreu\'eT. Czechosluvak e lforts to obtain ,\ massive hard Cllrrency loan lor the restructuring of the economy met with initial su pport in Bonn." This created a dual fear in East Germany. Not only wonld snch a loa n inevitahly lead to improved economic and political rclat iOlls between Czechoslovakia
Ill'''.
~bu-Io
IS.
19('08.
j"
UFE .Ii""~FcI,. C""",,,,,, j,, .. Iml. USS R . .~I.,d,
2~.
HIM .
"'S,·,·. f,,, ,·,a'''l'k·. 11o...,,~,rf,,\ ,'<11'0,;..] I" I I,~ "It"";,,, I"fly "'""~1"'r,:r 7..,,, ; I'''rltlll;, .
c""jll,·d "11,,. W"ki,,£ (;Ia.. j" I\e";,i,~,i'l Co" n!!i.-, ,II ",I (;"m.' 00"" 10 lhe ll;otlk·6dd an,1 11.·"0.... 1l,~ lJitlaH)"hir "r III<' Prol~"'rjat - ..-101<;' (,,,,,,,. ,1 e,-e n" in ful."d ."d C,....~~,.h·.'"". "",,1,1 (",I I"" 1",I.t<· II.· CIlH ."'\"""1(1«.11)" """.,h Ilw \1',,,,,,,,, Tr~.'}' ~",lll,,· C ~IE "" (".k.,,~llor .H", ~b,d, 2-1. IOOS, SII·8. 1::1,:/2,;)61,,211-6 ."d E EI2,371
,Iu,
A:!I I _9), ~ Scu'
lid, Tim .... Mort!, 26, 19&.1
1'l\I( l.U UIC TO T IU; C KISI S
31
aflccted. Tht: East Cermans fclt that thev had morc to losc than any other bloc state, including the USSH, by an improvemellt in CzedlOslo,'l ardl19, in a sp-ef..'eh marking the fi rst anlliversary of the Czec1toslovilk-Eilst Cerman Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation. and r...lutual Ass i s~ lant"e, Ulhricht refcrred to treatr t~) mmitment s hinding Prague to a un ited front (Lgainst West Gerrmltl mi1it(lri~m. He stated that Oil thi s ot"Casion "the st~te lc~dershi ps ded~rcd that they would strictly upllold that treaty:' Yet in fact the Czt:choslovak anniversary telegram to Ulbricht did not l"Ontai n any such explicit dedamtion.'" A major speech delivered bl' CDR Politburo member Kurt Hage r at the end of ~laT(:h openly t~mdelll n cd Czt'Choslovakia and made it clear that any links with tbe FnG would only sen 'e Bonn's aim of "subverting the socialist eoulitries f)'om within, of dividing them. and especially of isolating t he COB. .. ~, The East Germans we re aiso greatly "\)rried aho ut the elTects of the Prague Sprin!,: un dumestic stahility withi n their own L·tmntry. As t:arly ,~~ ~ l arch , the)' wcre reported to have cca.~ed issu ing tourist visas for travel to Czeclmslonlkia." Prague students returning from visits tu E:Lst Berlin (t1su reported they had been prevented from participating in prcschcdnled Jlublic dehates. ~' C7.echosloVilk journalists ("Omplained that two issues of ,\ Ccrm::m-language weekly published ill Prague had heell harmed in the C OB . They also alleged t hat Soviet newspaper articles repuhlislled in the East Ger· man party daily Neues Deutsclr/u rl(/ were being ("ensored, with al! positive refercnces to e" c nls in C7.ccito.dovakia removc\\. '" This fear of "spillover," together with the links hetween Prague and Bonn. put the E:L~t Germans at t he furefront of those blOC' leaders e nt~JHragin g the Soviets to halt the reform mo\"c rn t: nl. T HE BBEAK ING I'OI NT IN MOSCOW
The evcnts in Poland and East Cermany cuindJed with a sharp risc in t he Soviet percept ion of tllfcat emanat ing from Czedmslovakia after March 21. On March 19, Prime ~linister Cernrk had
USSR and lia" Ii·urn!"'. ~I""'" ~7. 1001>. .. " .... (" lark Ti"", • • nJ S""day 1Hr~nif'h. M.,."h 24 . 11168.
" Ihld. "r.·cw ro,k Tim ••.
~Iarcl,
30. 1001> .
32
1 t\'T K OllUC rI O~
ROWIl to Mo.~(.·(lW for talks wit h P ri me ~'I inisler Al e ksei Kosygin and
Gosplan chi ef Nikolai llailmkm' on l~ )()rdinati()n ortbe 1971-75 plans and a possible large-scale loan to Czechoslova kia for el'O!1omic revitalizat ioll. , 7 This W,I_~ t he Ilrst mee ti ng in which th e top leaders of th e two countries di scllssed Czechoslovakia's planned c~:vllomic reforms-refurms which if implemented would rcur ie n! Ilwl (:{lUIIIry's ext ernal trading links all',l)' rrolll the socialist hloc and to\'~lrd the \Vest. 1\l ajor Ge neral E:gyJ Pepk-h, the new hC:lJ of the Czech usluv:lk army's ~lain l'olitieal Ad min istnllio l1, was also in " InscoII' cunfcrring: with the millistcr of d efen se, ;\Iarshal A. A. Grcchko. ;mu the head orthe Sovie t Main Political Administ ration, G.,tleral A. A. Yt:pish e v. A Sovie t t~)l11mlHliqu {: suggests th e cx iste m:e of ten sions by noti ng that th e meet ing had taken place in a "fri endl y and wo rking atm os phcre" in ",hidl Pcpich had "replied to a se rie s of q ues tion s conce rning th e , \c\"dopm e nt of t he process of dcmocr.Jti7~ltion in Czechoslo\"akia ." ~' I n an in terv ie w with abril/III /ifill, th{~ C~.{~d1Uslo\,~lk milita ry ncwsJl;tpt: r. 011 his re tur n, " e pich 11)aintained that he had initiated the visit and that the Soviets had e~ pres sed th eir beli ef thilt the pre.~e llt policy in 1'r.lgue wo uld .~ t rengt h e n socialism. li e did ':"n~'ede , however. that illtl Hlugh there \v;L~ IIIlI "one ·~Ilecilil." (Incst ion" on internal d evelop!ll en l.~ and cad re c ha nges in the military, the Sovie ts we re interested in the elfects of th e Sejna case. a t"(JIleern Pe pich rega rde{\ as "unde rstandable and logical." '" C e rtainl y events in P r.J.gue had been moni ture{\ dosely in Moscow since J ,IIl 11~lr y, wilen Dul":ek replilced Noml!!}' itS fi rs t secretary. The Sej na case, cad re changes, a nd s tah:mcnts by til(: n ew leade rs \md elicited fu rt he r <-"OIH.:crll ill ~·I uscow. But th e Soviets' Jlr<-~ K,"C\lp .. ti un with vthe r, mure pressing iss ues amI their ini ti al Willing ness to allow Dubl·ek som e tim e to settl e in appear to have d im in is ll cd Soviet ;l1;lrm over th e de vel opme nt s in C~.echo s lo v;lkia. By I he e nd of th e third week of ~ l areh. however. indications are th aI th e Sovie l leadershi p f{·1t it could no lunger sanction th e cvent.~ taking place in I'raglH:. The mav e ric k policy of Bumania. the ri ots in Po lan d , s trun g: East Ger man ],ustility tuwarJ Pr.lgue reforms. ;llId even Hllng.1 rian w a rnin gs th aI matt e r.~ mll s t not be allowed to get out of hand in Czechoslovakia as they had ill Hlln·
""'e,,' M~rd l
l,,,l
20. 19f>';.
Ti,,.,. •. .~[ .".I,
20. [9\>'l , lIFE. 1l'...Md •.
f~.s' 1::""'1""' C",·cI""',,",,ki~ .
"Cn: II h~ C7A."<.~~"I",,,k '"'e ..·• ,\ ~'·nl"")·) in f;n~l i, I •. ~lat
crl,-
I'II1:Lum: T O Till: C III SIS
ga ry in 1956'" all furth er mot ivate<1 the Sovie t lead ers. who were already taking stricter action against disse nt at home. to call the CZl--choslov:tk !e:tde rslli p to order. Th l: breaking 1\(lint I)('·(.' urrc{) Oil .\lardl 21 wh,m. IInde r imm ense pressure of puhlil' Ol)inion in C7.echo.~ lovaki a, Antonin Novotny resigned :ts president. Clearly. had the Soviets been attadled tu Novotny tl my would have preve nted his ouster fro m the post of Hrst secretary the previuus J anu:\r~·. Bather. the core of the issue was that the Czechoslovak Pmesidi um hosition of t he remaining conservat ives within the CPCz would be hopelessly we akened; and they would have no chalice uf SUl'1livillg the forthcoming April CPCz Centnll Com mittee ple num. Novotn}"'\ resignation focused bloc attent ion S{IUarely on Czechoslovakia. T he pros pe ct of a comple te and im mine nt {'~Jllapsc of COIIservative and p ro-Soviet influence in Prague made it imperative to act hefore a SlIl'cessor (.~lUld he named. and Moscow made the crucial decisioll to t1Jnvene an e me rge ncy meeting IIf hloe leaders in Dresde n. Th us Novotnfs resigna tion produccd both aconspicuoos increase in the perceived level of threat and all hnportiting ill 1I,"'!,t"fY pTiM ,,, W5Ii. Altlt""J(I, I", de"'ril..,.! ,h~ I''-~l\u~ SI'Tin~ ., • - fen.i.",,,<~. [" II of 1~,l iti<'.J I~'I "" and .0elaH,1 in il> "'"tent." 10" .1>..... " lio"",1 ,h.] "f", to •• 11M' rc'~'i".'l<'e . . . ",,\ h;~h 11", ",""" ' .. ",,,n\orti,,,, ,!~! '~>I .I~" ;0 ou r "'-"'"If}' I,,' ~iII in~ Cumm"ni", and "d,er ho" e" men_ 11,i. "-'" d"n~ onl)'l.kr. Fi",' Ih"r on l)' repeal,..! tlut it i, 0"""''''1'}' 10 correct lhe miSta1~> of ''''''''Ii<m. , . Total [" ,.,_ ,I,~" "r ,";1;";'00 " .. , ~r..I".II)' 1"" ....1 ].) ''-'m l~~]p "~",,,'im' n".. I '''~ ,,,I ,lop. ' r.m,rpr "r 11,,·
a
".ili"i." "
""n_.. ,
0( ."'''"in "';'(4~~' .nd t~.<1,·,~ 10 an . u,,'k ")(ai",l lh~ wh"l" A~~I>l'}' [ ~ITt\, March 21. 1!l66. SlI'li. EfJZi3l~CI14).
!(ari"" N.."""
oJ'olen'" (11", 110",·
PAIHTWO
The Pre-Crisis Period
CI-lAPTEH THHEE
Phase One: March 22-Apri110
THE DRESDEN ;"IEETINC There is unive rsal agreement among both Suviets and Czechoslovaks that the decbioll to call the D resden meeting marked the real beginning of the crisis. There had been ala r m wit hin s(.'Ctions of the Soviet political and milil(:>. Cenlml COIIII"ill~ .. plenll'" '''' s"lllellll"" 25. 11l6!I . • Ialed , ··11 i. already a k,"",,, ["dll>.1 (lot (raten ..1 II'Irll,·, p-u~I ;.." I)· " ·t"kulned Ihe d,,,,~c >
,,";ell .....~·IIH.J in C .......·.... ,lo.""ia aft~ , January I\I&~ . Th.·y ded.:uelilhi> ,tand pllhlid)· in f",lern.l meetings on 100 O<"Ca>ioo of the 20th "n"ilw",,")· o[ Fe b",.>")· 1:U8. lln ...,·,·,·r. de· ' ·c\"I'" ,e"" in [hI> , ..... ","t· Ito>\; Ih~ "'"'''' ",." I,.",· I"N·H,· u"'II,,, ~I. 0", o( ""'c,," n ~,.. H,[, de,..,Io"ment in C=hmlm-aiia.• nd of ""'>0<,," " fur Ihe Ja"~"r fo, th" wloole !.OCiali.l ""np. a ronf.,ren"" of.i>; Communi" P"rI;". " .... ron'·cned in I),eodcn on 23 ~la",h 1968" ((.T .... s"pt<·,,,1.oe,2II. 1969. 5",8. £ElJl90ICIlT). Hil"ak. in •• "h""lllcni inle,,·iew. not"", ··Look· ;"11 ~·k. il ""''''' to ,hll' O"" in lorIgl,, _1)"" (Rudi I'm"". s"llI~ lnl><:, 3. 1969. ,~p,,~h ....ed in P....",/" /"./)<:./,,/,1<" . 11.1J.3). s.,., . ion ibr ,Wte,nenl by Kolder. ibid .. 1'.156; a ""jot" Rudt r",le" " d;'Oji.1. ··Wh y ,,,•• Ale. a"d ... DulJtel e>p"lloo from the Cl'Czt· Jlliv 16. W.O. ;n ihid . . p. :lW. J;n lI tjek. Vie Augll,1 22, 1975. lleJz!ar. in Vladimi,\'. !.:u.in .•..J .. rl" C=<,d",o/",·"k Hrfo ....' .\ I""r"","' 1961<. p. roO, \'.,11 IIlra!< .."11,., T,lIlh Ve ... ", U,.,.:· S,w Ti",,". ,,". 3.1 (A"g,,'t 1975j. p.20: •.IIJ Z
"I<.
"..ci'.
37
38
THE PIIE-CIIlSIS I'E II.IOO
which \\',IS tu have bee n presented at the plan ned Fourteenth epe..: Congress, also nppnrcnl ly perceived Dresden as a landmark: it cont:lincd section \ral'ing C7.cclmsluvak attemph COIl!,;fC SS:'
,I
"frolll the Drcslien meet ing up \'0 the present Congress" to all,l}' fore i~n "fear.;" about " the process of rebirth in Czechoslovakia.'" On the Soviet side , Lmt h the July 15 "Warsaw lette r:' addressed to the Czcchos]o"ah by the live hlnc parties. ' ilnd th e authoritative Au gust 22, 1968, l'muda editorial sin gled out the importance uf Dresde n. Ac(.'(mling to the August 22 ;o rtidc: Evcllts showed that an Ji1tlosph c rc of di so rdl·r. ,",Lcillations ,unl UIl was beginning to 'ak" shape wit I,;" the CI'Cz itse lf. Ht:ac-
~'cr laiotr
tioll:lry, :luti,.,cialist f()rl'C~ SOP I)()rh:d Io~' world imperialism Were
rearing Iheir heads. All Ihis :lbmH::d nol "oly "01' Ix,r ly, The frale,n,,1 pa rlie s of n"l· ~'ri: •. Huoga 'y, till' CIJR and Poland wen: a, ,,;rio,,-,1~' dislnrht)d as we were h" the courS<' of ,'\',;uls in Czcchus l""akia . II ]'.)camc net;c,· ""'Y 10 ho1;1 a l~ ,I!.!Cli,",· mt..,ling ,\",1 I'xl·I"", );.! opinin'" wilh II,,! It:.. dcrs of the CI'Cz "nd the (;SSR, Il y mulu,,1 "on-",o t. t hi' nwet i, 'g wa.' hdd nn
~la,d , :2.1
in Drcsd.!" .
Evidence suggests that the Soviet decision (llumller 1) to calJ a blue meeting was made un ~ I ardl 22 under heavy pre~sure frl,lm the Poles and Easl Genmms. The Czeehoslovak amlmssador \0 Moscuw. Oldfich I'av l ovsk~', was s ummone,l to the Kremlin on \Iarch 2 1 f(lr ,. two-hOll r m,,,:ting,
nut informed, however. of the dt-"Cisiotl to eonvene
II
hloe sum mit:
and it was only af!er the meeting had begun on the morning of ~Iard l 23 th,lt Ih e Czed l o.~IO\·'lk media anllounced Ihat DlIlx:ek
had left for Dresden.' Well- placed Czeeh sources maintained that 11m mee ting had iJcen called at the insistence of Polimd .ul{l East Germ'lllY. ' Badio Belgrade, commen ting Oil th e Dresden meeting, ' C"nlO;",·.] in I,t; ,..,libn . ed .. TI,~ S......... 1'~ . otR"~ Co"~,, ... p . 219, ' Th~ \\, .""'". [",tier. whit'1< .PI~·.or,"I; II I'mr. la n" /nl)' loS. 19(>8. ",,,I.r Ih~ h.... l;"14 ' To Ih~ C,,,,,IM,,lo,,," C" "uonni>1 I'.!flr (;. ,,1,.1 Comm;ttoe - ,1.\<·J : "We <,.,p"-.,,,,-.J Ihe,,", f.· ..., .1. mo~I;,,~;n Dre"l"n."" In d;",·",,;,,~ li,e ",i~;n, "fl.l,)o c"''''~'tn. t)<eroCtl " '." 'ho ~ '" tl"-'din~
,,,,·nti,,,,,,J.
' f/", Ol",·n;u. \1'0'"
2~ .
19(>8, .,.,1 ti.· Chri>lj"" S""'ncc .Ilm.ilo, (1 ..,000"
~:ditio" l.
March 2.5. I!JfO/;. ' .\'rw ror k J"i"",•. ~larcl. 2-1. 1!1;!i. Altho~!!h hotlt Ii:Jdir .ntl G('molb h...d heM Lil.t"",l m""ting' with t)"b(.,k in ~cLn"'I)·. Ulb,k"hl .,·t'''r'c~!!)' h.J l""oed dOlm '1"0 olfe .. 10 mo · f~r
.... ith Uul>l'<'k in C .." ho,In,·.ba. r">{errin~ . multil:il~ml ,,,...,!i,, ~ i"'t~.J. 1"""""""1)'
I,.;cOl,,,, gre,h'r 1''''''''''' " H.ld I.· lo","gl" ,,, I",.,
11><· ,,~,.k,itran'
C•..,.,h<"I.".,k<.
''''
o::h
~ 'M\CII
39
22-AI'IIIL 10
agreed t!Jat "il is not a secret l!Jat c!Jangcs in Czechoslovakia were nut wdcomed in the CDR and to a certain d~'grec in Pohilld ...• \Vest Ge rmany's foreign minister " ' ill y Ilrandl allrih"h.:<1 the primary in itiative for calling the mee ting to Ulbricht. ' zJenek ~lI ymir, who beC'.l.Ine a Cl'Cz secret:!ry soon aner Dresden, also l'Onfirmed that Poland and East Gernwn>" and t he latter espccially. we re imporlanl fo rces behind the con\'oc:ltion of the nweti ng, and that the Suviets and Brezhnev himself did no t :!ppear to be at the forefront of effort s to control Czechoslovak affairs. ' Soviet insiste nce 011 a collective meeting bl'Ca u~e the othe r fraternal parties "were as worried as we were '" was corrohorale<1 by Dulx:ck, who umflrmed that t!Je initiativc for the meeting had l"(lllle from "scveral parties."' " That the meeting was held in the C Dill"ertliinly suggests that the East Germans we re keen to mn\"ene the summit. Present at the conference were delegations from the uss n, the CDR, Puland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and of course Czechosluvakia. Bllmania, however, had not heen invited. The Soviets were represented by Bre zhnev. Kos)'gin, A. P. Kirilcnko, a Po litburo me mber and secretar y of the CPSU Cenlml Committee; P. Ye. Shelest, the first secretal")' of the Ukraine Communist party; N. K. Baibakov, cimirmllll of the USSR State P]:mnillg Committee (COSpl:tll): and K. V. Husako\', listed as a mem be r of the C PSU Centr:.llltlsrll>dion Commission . u but who was soon to be nmned head of the Central Cummittee's Department for Liaison with Huling Comm unist and Workers" Parties, llaving been fi rs t deputy head of til at department since 1965. Notable we re the ab~encc of Suslov .md the presence uf Shclest . Suslov, reported by some to be ill, " was replaeed by Kirilenko. Shclest, who as a regional party sl'Crclary had no fo rmal ' IWi" Hd~.oJ • . Mard.~. 100<>. quoted i~ HFI': , C,,""'''' ~;., .1,.., •. USSR .m! 1':4" f;."" p<". M ~",h 27. lOOI! ' Willy H... od!. P"'I'IPllnd p,,",;,;,:.•. p. 210. ' I,"~"'kw ,,111 •• ,,'\ ..... J""~ 1. 1971l. ' I'nIcda. " "~U'I 2.2. IOCl/i. " 1),, 1 >61'~ inh'ry!"w will. tTl.: . l'u\'li, I".J j" P"",·,/a. ~! " ,d. 2/;. 1961l. u rm,·,I~. March 2.~. 19("oS. " TJ.~ O~""'r.
M.. ",h 3\, 1968. ",,,lib... .'"elL' l~ck T;r"". of M~rel. 31 and April Ll. 1968.
,,·hieh reponed Ih.t S"d",' had
"ppc."'"
oot hren p",.ent ,ll h"
f"~ c,,d
mC""",,,... n!
\"u,; Gagarin
anJ hoJ 01,1)' ... in ruht;con A]>'i I12. AI "".,., liF E. Cmnrmm,,' A,,,,,, U~SIl. April 4. 1961l . /1,',,1 " nl)' ....... S",I",' a/""", frum Ih~ c:.garin r"n .."I. I... " ....' '~,I I"~'""'" .1 ,he Mu....,,"" Cit y r.rly C""f,,,~,,,,,, (rl"d
Mm" .,mad,..,. fu.
in Un;"" H~Jl"bl i<' 0<.1;'·iH~. at th.t ,;n ••
"
,"
TilE P HE·UUS1S
P~: l\lOU
co mpetence in til e fore ign policr fleld, was included, as bead of the Soviet repu blic dosest to Czechoslovakia, because any spillover from the P rague Spring m ight be expected to affect th e Ukraine Il rs!. O n the agcnda we re a nu m ber of issues: ceonomit; relations, \ Vars,lw Pact openlt ions, th c internation"] situation, p,]rticu b rly in Ccntnl] E u ropc. undo of <-'Ourse. IllC evcnt._ in Czechoslo"akia, T hc CI..'OllOmit' mailers c.~plai n t hc prcsenl.."C of Baibako,' and his (.'{m n· ter p'lr ts from th e other bloc states, T he oIHcial l..'Ommliniq ue isslle{1 after t he Dresden talks noted: Th e ]lurtici]larr ls ill !lIe llIeeting expressed their views on pmspeds for furt her g w\\1 h uf the suei,,1 ist emrrumy orr the basis uf Ihe "til i~"" tioo of e«)ournic Iies Within the framework uf the Cuuneil for ~ I utua l Economic Assistance and on a bilater,d basis. . They unanimously reaffirmed their delermi nation in the near future to effcci concrete measures, ,fur cooper.:.tion in achieving a furt he r ups\\~ng in the economics of the socialist commo nwealth. For the pUIl'ose of comid· ering c.)mnllln ",-'Onomic prohlems. Ihe parties agreed to hold an eco· num ic conference on tire highe.t level in the ncar future. "
Subse(I'Jlmt reports s uggest Ihnt al issu e were effi,rls In dissuade Prague from seeking a hard currency loan from the West and the growing demands ofCzechoslo\'aks to l'~structtlre t heir Ir,1(le rela· t ions to bette r su it t he ir own need s. " AC<.'ord ing to "Com mun is t suurces in E ast Berlin ." the USS R and the c on agreed to cons ider t he possibility of cx temli ng suhstilUtial soft-c urrcut,), c redit s to P rague to prevent he r tu rn ing to t he \Vcst. " '''Uhin this con t c.~t Dubcek's rcmarh ahout t he eco nomic uspects of th e Dresde n meeti ng m igh t best h~ underst()()d. Aa'ordi ng to DlI lx"Ck. /(osygin "spoke at great length about the prospects fo r t he growt h of the " I· ... eda. " In •
~! .. ch
~Io",h
4
25. U!b/;. P,.~!\ue
""Ii"
di..,,,,,i,,n e ntilloo - Pr"hlem. and t)illiou\tie , in the 1.1';" """" .<1" ,,,,..,.] II .. n n.
C ~ I E.~:· the p. nd ;'t, ",,,int"in,,,1 th.t I ~....-~" ••: Ct<,<,I....I"'-" ia
.1."
,,11,e' hI"" ])OnneN, I,ad .. wa. Ie» ;",h'.nt~g",~" 10 l'r.I~"e. r,,, did nol ,~, I'r.~',., . eurirn,.tL.J U. tm''''' mOTe t owa,d th~ \ \ 'c>t (S\\'Il. F.F) Z7141C2114 _ IS). ... P",ooa ... tide "" ~t ",d, 14 . ,,·itl, the cur(o u,ly ,irnil., title "I'TOhl",," "f "",""no",ie C""l"'r.,wo in Ihe So<'i.!(, t Countn .. ,," , aw further integra,;o n ". the "01), ,,,Iution tn ~'W probl"m" ~ New lurk Time•. ~t "n~):!Ii. 1008: . 1", Jnlt" ~:r;',';;'on. "lnt<'1 ,,,t ",,,.1 ."d ~\,ate~i<' 1",plk:a';o" . or tl,., c,....",]""I,,,·.k l\"r,,,,,, ~ I o ..."ne nt ." in "",in , ,·d.. C:R<:/,,»lowk 1(,/o"Q .II",-em
~;,'ing O
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~[AJ\CIl :l~ - A " '\IL
41
10
ecollomies of the socialist (.'tllln tries. He sllOke about the many possibilit ies for strengthening e(''Ollom ie ('OOperat ion and said t hat in the framework of the C~ I EA t(K) t here are lOimy ullllsf:d re.~o\lrces. Responsible bodies in individual countries should prepare proposals for the ro ming talks on the highest level in order 10 lind new and real ways for the devciopme nt of the eronnmie system ..... Apparently, the Soviets hoped tn forestall any CzedlOsiovak approach to the \Vesl by assurJllces that the hloc was capahle of solving it s own e(.'Onornie problems, The del'ision to examine the matter in greater depth as a preln{le to an eeonom ic summit (.'Onfercnee de;'rly was intended to assure Prague of evcryone's good intent ions without actuall y committing anyo ne to a spedfk' eourse. The promise of substanlial credits \\.'Ould be used to extra,·t political concessions fro m the C7.t_-choslovah. In the area of military seeurit)' the participants, according to the commu nique, "reaffirmed the (:oincidell('"C of their vielVs on the questioll discussed and the unity of thcir positions as set forth at the Sofia ronference of the Political Consultatt.'e Committee of \Varsaw Pact states. . They ummimously rcafllrmed their ddermi natio[J in the near future to e flect(.'onercte measures for strengthening the Warsa\\! Treaty Organi7..a! ion and its armed forces. '"" The {liscussion of Pael reform WliS dcarly meant In isolate Ihullania and to kill before its inccption ilny support th;lt Hum(mian proposals might find amo ng othe r blue states such as Czechoslovakhl. The '"(''Olleretc measures" refe rre d to ~'I oseow's continui ng efforts to strengthen its position in both the joint military command and the Political Consultative Commi ttee. DnlK'Ck late r ad mi tted that the Soviets had no intention of waiting the six mont hs agreed to at Sofia for bloc members to suggest refor ms: inste(ld the part icil)anls had agreed to '"a speedy elaboration of proposals to pe rfel:! the Wily in wl)ieh t he joint cOTlHnand aels ..... President Ni(.'Ohle Ceau~escu of Rumania was furious that discussions had been held about C \tEA and \vro alhi rs without Rumanian participation. In a speech on the Dresden meeting. he declared: "We are (lstonished that the 11Iilitary C011lmand of the \Vilrsaw Pae! mellloor states was discussed. bC(,",lUse it was decided in Sofia by all delegations that the mi nisters of the armed forct: s in\c ....ww. lk.\i>b,"" ,..,1;0. ~\a rch 26. 1965. 511'11 . J:: t:J27J21("J1. Pm,,/a. M. ,,·h 25. 1965. ~ [)uh':-ek inletv;~"'. Br.li.b,·. ,,,,Iio , ~iarc" 26. 1965, 511'8 . Et:l2732/C14. ~ J)"b-'ek ~
ICh
JIz
M
should draw up within six month s proposals for improving the ac. Our country is dete rmined to m(lkc its tivity of this command . direct (."(Jn tribution to the activity of the Political Consultative Committee of the \Vars;lw 1';ld , induding th(~ activit y of t],e mili_ tary high command of the states participat ing in this pact ... ,,, However determined Ceau~es{·u may 1I:l\"e been tu participate in rcl(lrln of\Varsaw J'ad structures. the So\·iets were equall y deteTmiul..J to block such reforms. At Dresden it Rrst became clear that the Soviets were willing to furego Bum;mian support in !"etum for a more cohesive inner grouping of bloc ~tatcs , which of geognlphical necessity would h;Lve to include Czechoslovakia. On the suiJjed of Cze-c\JOslov;.ki'L the discussions WI.'"fC most heated and the communiquc least specific; indeed it was restricted to a hroad statement; The Czechoslov;lk delegation had ··provided information Oil progress ill the reali7.ation of the January plenary session . Confidenl"C was expressed that the working class and all the \.\'Orking people of tl,e CSSH, IInder tIle leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, will ensure the further de\·dopment of socialist construction in the l-"(Julllry"· '" Yct cadre ch:mges, the successor 10 No~·otnY. the April Central Committee plenn'" agenda, and evidence uf ··anti-socialist :lets" were among thus!! items known to have been discu~scd. Dui>l-ek initially denied that cadre changes bad heen proposcd at Dresden either "officially or nnofficially,"" but later l'e exphli nc(l this denial: " I was not in favor of re\'ealing the fact that in Dresden there had been talk :LI)()ut the change of Presidcnt in C7.l.'ChosIova kia ... .. The bloc parties apparently considered Svoboda an acceptable candidate and wanted to prevent an y of the more olltspoken reformers from obtaining the post. in p,Lrticular the dismissal of Smrkovsky, onc of the presidelltial (-.mdi(btes, was sought by Bre7.hnev, who supported DulX'ek but said that he was ··hc culUing a prisoner of reactionary and an ti-Communist clements"· '" Vasil Bi]"ak, a leading l-,(lllservativc, pmvi(k.J the fullcst at~"(J\J n t of the
·d, to ,I,. 8"" I>oo"..t Pori)" AWe. April ~>t;. 1968. ,n ScinUia. April2!i.
~<':C'''' I'' ...,;•• po....
1968. " Pm <
" D"L...:ck \" 'h" AI" '] ere,. C,·,"r.1 C,,,,,,n;ltcc pi,·""",. /,,,em,I"'.,j R~L"OI"'i<,,,. p. 2«1.
",oo(,~l
'" II.
GorJ,~,
Sk 'l!i"II.
(;;:.och,,,loc,,k~".
" 1),,1~ k"> . 1'......+, 0" s.·p,.",I ... , 26. 19&.1, '" !l,~ (;[,(;,. C.·"tr~l (:"""";It~~ pl~"" ,,, . I" Willi-un Sh"""cr,,, •. J)u/,..,·k. 1'. ~.
" A,-..""];,,o: 'u P~,·d Ti~riJ. Wh y J)ul~
p.
57. ..,J !lu· ,,,,h.." ;"'e"·;,,,,,· ,,·;,h
''''
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MAIIC Il ZZ-AI'RIL 10
Dresden meeting; he maintained that apart from the issue of who should succeed Novotny, the bille leaders were <-'1mcerncd that "IJy permitting the recall ofille Presiden t without ,Ill)' preliminary d iscussion of such a serious step by the Centr.ll Cllmmittee," the C7.echos!ovak leaders had "viohitoo the hasic principles of cadre policy."" Firm cont rol b y the party of appointments to a!l leading IXlsts in the stale and govern me nt hierarchy (known as the tlOmenkl(ltllf"(I system) is a fundamental feature of Soviet-style socialism. C7.ediOslovak violation of this principle in allOWing the selcttion of a new president without party interference th reatened to underr nine the party's hegemonia! position within Czeehoslovak society. Furthermo re, because tilt;' USS R exercised its OWIl control uf East European developments hy mai ntaining the doses t ti e.~ with the ru li ng Communist parties. any d iffusion of power away from the party also weakened the (Ibilit)' of tile Suviet Uniun to supervise and <-"{)[Jtml events. Fur these rea.~ons, ratber than out ofloyulty to Novotn )', the inciden t became a key factor in t he Soviet decision to convene the Dresden meeting. Soviet and bloc leaders ,llso sought information ,It Dresden ahout "alltisocialist te ndencies." IlartkuiJ.rly in the mass media. As the Soviets subseltuently stated, At the Drcsden ",eetin g the C7.ech,,-,lo,,~k (1nn rad"s did not den)' that some Heg(lli"" p n)('Cs.~cs W,'rI, dcn'loping in til( ' lu"ulry. Ihal th e radio. lc1 c"isiou and prc-ss h"d hmkcn aw,.y from party conlrol ;l1ld w,m; in fact in tht: h(HL ,[s of aulis.)(·iatht t:I ,;,u,t:uts aud that rightwing [')I"(.'es were UHls()tid~ti"g tl,eUlst:\\·"s. At ttu~ sanw ti1lH~ th e C7.echostOl'ak representati\'es stat ed tl,,1t 011 the wholl! the party was in ~~"' trol of the situation and that tI",n' ,,"liS no ea"se fur s"rinns ;Ibrrn. The S,,,,iet representat ivc .• ,,,,d "I] t h" delegations uf the fraternal parties noted ",ith complet" candor that ther ';ow til{' pkt)]re in a different light. They pointed /lut the real danger of tlw situation that Iwd t;oken shape. "
Czechoslovak partidllants concllr that the Soviets insisted on ur)!:ent measures to reestablish control of the press. 10 end attacks on ~ nir.~ 11l1",,·iew. s.-l'lem h,·, 3. 1(0). it, l'm",l" !~",",,:d''/~d. I'. I,". 7... ~·"o!k ~ltp,it. i"l~"'k,,"c,1 loy the ."lho, on June L. 19i9. m';nl.o.iu,.,j lh.l II;!".!;', 'c";on of the D ...•..dcn m""lin~
"'l'",,,,, ule d , fai r .u mm"!)· of tnc m;nule • . ,,·h;,-Io
''''n:
Ji" ,;h",oo ;0 ,he t969
(:"nlral c""""m"" plenum " 1'r",.,III . .~" ~"'122. t'J6N .
''''
o::h
the party and its Ilistory. ,md to prevent the reactivation of mass associations amI no n-Com mu nis t politil'al part ies.'" Brczhll e v. act"Ording to Bil'ak, stated that wh e reas (;c rtain antisocialist te nden d es pre viously lmd been regarde d purely as "transitional phenome non : ' there was now a growing discrepant'Y betwee n "words ilnd deeds." H e is said to have p leade d w ith th e Czechoslova ks to "mobilize th e part y and t he working class in time" to p revent "dmos_ " " The Sovie ts' condusion that " there \'~l~ evidclll."e of develop m e nt s that l."Ould lead to a co unterrevolu ti onary l'Uu p""" lu tilid supIx)rt frum lithe r delega tions , The Cwd mslovuks were sp.!d fka lly warn ed by the Soviets. the Poles, alld also by K,idar himself that th ey mllst tak e mC
Ulbricht . too. expressel] concern aboul developme nts in Czechoslova kia and was particu larl y worried ahout s pillover clrce ts, lIiLlk c it es Ulbri chl as say ing that "any weakenin g of the C PCz will le ad '' ' Ihl",·k """'~, I",, I th.,t " il i , ,~, I ,u.,"i.i n~ II..I ,'O',loiu "nK"1',n ,,"., .!~,wu , , , 110:11 .uH.oci.li.1 dem,'n', , huuld nul tah· .,h'.nt .~ e of tl", 1"'''''''' ,~ J "" ~.,~~Ii,-"H ,,u," B,a· ti,I.,-" TaJi<>, ~b rch 26, 1!16&, SII'I:I , EEl l ;JlICl4. Jt u;;k, .pe.k ;n~ Ihe in'",i"", """ ",ore oul' poken : "All ~w 1"'>1;'" ,-pry '''K@''lly I"'int," ",'Wet I" ,," ,trol ,he· t"~" (SOC Ick,.;.i"" J """menlar>' (l) . . kin): the 10th Ann;,-cr",,), of'he i",' •• ion, on A "~,," 21, 1!fi81_
aft,,,
~
lIil 'ok.
I',."cda I)())",d,,/orl. Pl'. 135 _ 36, .~It ~It:; - 37_
" Fr""da,
'' ' fhi d.,]>, IJ6
''''
o::h
./5
.\IAIlC Ii ZZ - AI'lIIL 10
to ,\ weakening of socialism in the CSSH, a weakening of the al· li:llwc with the socialist t"()untries and th e f(llIndations of soeialism in general."" Other so nrces maintain Ulhricht was ralh~' r more blunt in his analysis of the dan ge rs oflhe I'rague Spring. One re· [lo r I, which rin gs tru e ifonl y het·au.' c it attrilJllles to Ulhricht th at uniqu e directn ess of approach hc had shown Oil numerous other oc"(."asions, {lllotcs him as follows; "If III(' January line is continlled in C/.(,'(.'!llIsl<)\',lkia, ,L11 of liS here willlH~ running into greal danger. We Tl\;IY all fiml ou rselvcs kit-ked oul. .. ·" Although the lJloc's policy tuward \\'cst Gernw.ny was far from being the l'Cnlral issue, East German l"(lIlcern thaI the co mmllll ,I]lpro
or
/Jed-" i,,,,
1: 10
h"ltllhc :"l:ird, 23 ~" "fc rt'n('c .
Ded.·;OtI2: to ho ld" hid, -lc\'cI C(,)Uu",je ~'lIlferen('c in th e ne"r fulurc 10 e"lIl.~idc r, nlnoill-! olh"r Ihin)!s. Cz,:choslovakia', ""'I",'st li,r a loa" to rt:stmdu/"t" her \'(.·onOlllr.
/J{"(';!f;'''' 3: 10 ~'1Il1 ill"'~ wil h pia" , till' 111<' i" leg "ati"lI of t I", '" ili_ a",1 hi widcll the S("PC of adi \" it >, of it,; Poli ti (,;!1 C"II.uitatj l·e CmlltlliU('c.
tary hi)!!> t'ol1llll:lI1d of till' Warsa,,"!'aN
IJCr:lsiml -/: not to inter\"Cne fu rther in Cz('chuslo\"ak internal affairs prol'ided that tilt' aSSlifill1C,'S and pTOmi ws r{'("c i,·ctl fTOm th e Cz.'('llOsluvak delegation WCfI' ;.dcd " pOll . The lan)!lIage of th e
t~lInmlmi(lue
is !tl(H.lenlte: "ColifiJencc WlIS t~ ns"re thl: /ilrther d e velupment of s()cialist c()nstmctiun in the t~lUntrY:> " But Bil'ak maintains thai an .:arl;,:r \"ersi<Ju of th e umlllll lniqlle kId referred t~x prt;:sse( lth "t
[th e CI'C/. It;:,ule''ship l will
~
Ihi
~
D."';d Fl o)". !. '-n", C>,,,ho,, t,,,,, ~ C,;, h "f 1\16..... .. 1'. :m.
• ' 1"(1"'/". Ma,ch 3 . 1!If>'>. ·o lhi(!.
"' "
TilE 1'1\£-ClIlSIS 1'1:;11101}
lu promises 10 deliver a "decisive rdmlfto enemy ti)rces:· ..., lli1"ak luter stated that "at that meeting we prumised to resture order "nd to tuke the gUidance of the state firmly inlo our hands within two months:':'; Hus,ik, too. refers 10 the factlh:lt "th ere were nutifklllions and promises that we wou ld institute order und would take action o n these mallers: ' ''~ The Soviets exprl~ssed (~)llfide n(.'e that the CPCz leadersllip wou ld heed bluc advice without furth e r s:ml'tiuns or warnings. but th ey gave no indication that th ey had yet de veloped it dear policy on bow they would respoud if their umfidenee in th e C7.CdlOSlovaks wcre disapl}()intcd. They gaine{l so me political leve rage in promising to l'tJllsideT Prugue's rClluest 1i.1T a In,ln. but heyond this. nther spl:dfit- plllie), options did not emerge at Dresden.
HEACfION TO DHESDEN It is custom"ry for Prtlt;tlu to ,LlIII(1Un(:e that the oot<:orlle of ,I delegation's fore ign negotiations had r eceived th e approva l of the Politburo. and sometimes tbe approval of tbe Council of :\Iiniste rs :llId/or Ih., Cent ral Committee. Thi~ was in bel done /ilr the Sofi:1 :lnd BljJ:;pe~ t IYl ee tin g.~ held only week., lH:fOre." yet nO such ,\1\nouncement appeared tilr Dresden. It is pos~ihlc that II rezhnev's inclusion in th e delegation gave it sufficient authori ty to act independently withuut requirin g subsequent Pulithuru .. ppro\·"l. Yet I3rC7.hm:v·s trips tn Sofia ea rlier in :\Ian:;h. to Warsaw in Ju ly. and to Czeehoslovakia in Jul y and All~llst at the head of similar dele!!a(ions were indef:d the sllilj,:<:t of sl1hs"' jlwnt mee tin gs.'" Tlw t the Dres{len results were 10 he l~mfirme{1 by the furtheoming Centnl!
Committee plenum might also have vitiated the necessity of specific approv,ll by the entire l'olithllfo. Nevertheless. it is " rather curious anom"ly. und it appears tl ..,t either approval was not sou!!ht or ('(mId 110t he uhtained. TII{~ pussihility of a split ill th e Polithuro ,It this stage exists, although thc cvidcn('C is not at all dC,lf-CUI. Soviet press reports fo llowing t hl~ meet in); reaHlrmed th e imjKlftan ce nfh]oe unity, of lies with CZI..'Chos]ovak ia, and the helicl~ or at least th e hope, that the CI'Cz leadership was both willing and able " Flit'ak. Pruu/" ,,,,I,,,:/,dm·' . 1'. l:ro. " Bit'aI;. '-ll,e Trulh \...,~u, Lie.: I'· 20. ~ 11 .. clk·, ,\u~u ~ (Sur,a) .. Pnll'lla . ~Ia",h
t3. Juty 20.•,«1
"'''~(]>I
7. l!l611.
1Gh
JIz
M
MAtlCIl 22-AP tlU . 10
tn hrin g: tbe Ilo me_~ ti c situation firm ly und('r ('<)ntrol, as the Polish party wa.~ doing. " The stand adopted by the Politb uro after Dresden (or by a dominant faction wit hin it) waS signaled in an aut horitati ve (Irtide in Pra vda 011 ;"l art'll21:1 hy I. Ale );"a ndrov, a pseudonym used for editorials expressing top Ic\-cl party policy." The d ccision In refr.lin from any kind of publit polemic with Prague ur ovcrt inte rferellt"C ill CzedlOslol'ak domesti(' politics lI'as restated whe n A l e.~ androv condemned as "imperialis t snibblers'" all those who were "striving tu sow distrust amo ng tile Communist parlies" by raising aJleg,lt io ns of Soviet pressure un Cwt"llOslovaki a's nell' leadersh ip. It described events there positively: "Noll' t he CPCz is carrying o ut great [ho l"shyyu] work in the ;l(;ti\"atiun of the COl nm unist party orgall i7~lli on and th e slale allm inistrati ve appmalus." Whil e reaffirm ing tim dcep bonds uniti ng the 1\\"0 (,(JUn tri es and parti es. the editorial also t'(mtaincd the mos t c,\"plicil state ment yel to appear in
th e Soviet
pres.~
of the Soviet IC
m ination to maintain Czechoslovakia's position as a fore most mem-
ber of the sodalist comll11lllity:
'nw1l<.~Jfl\es of tIle Soviet Unio" amI CZUdlOs\o\"akia und OHr Cum-
mllni.~t pa rties arc li llke' \ by imli~s"l\1h l!~ ti.·s offralcrna] fr ieHdship. This frie nd ship h,,~ tl~'<:p historkal roots. It b ali l>lx lI scaled with the blood of th e best SonS of Ihe Soviet and Czc.·I",,]ol"ak pcuplcs, shed togdhe r In thl' struggle against the ('O lllmUn enemy. f:lsd'ln . Ihe stru ggle in which the nnshake:thlc :tlli:u>ee ],.,1"'<''<:11 the USS H aUlI Czechos]ov"ki:l ellle rg~.J. The COlll lll UH iSI par t ies of 1he Soviet Unio n and CzedlUslovaki:l, united hy fhlclity to the principles of Marxis Ul Le nini sUl anti proletaria n internationalis m. ins pire and direct our fr iends hip. . No one a11l1 110Ihi1lg, ullde r any (1mditions, C',tU shake oo r f",tern,,1 fn{·nd,hip. which seT"CS the vita! interesis "fthe Soviet Unio n anl1 Cn"Choslo\'aki3_"
I3 rczllllev did not dabor.tte u n this stand ill the publis hed versio n of hi~ speech to the ~I oscow City Party Confe re nce un ~1ardl 29. Althuugh. acr;ord ing 10 l'mvt/{I. he did " in!(lTIlI" th e delegates of .. ~.., . fur e","",ple. tl.e f'u"t' I"~e I'.-.m/" c.Jil"dal ,," M> ow" aW.,;" ",,,1 nf partk"ll''''u"S In ~ff,,"> tu "'r"I1'),~u th~ ><,II,b,I' )' oJr tI,~ l.~lC. " In July. dU';"1I a pre" <"O"rerr'''"t' in Swede n. I( ",)"~iu <,"".."jed tl,at tl ", AIc.a,,, lr<w c.!i'o,ial, ",Ked"" 1\)I"l.u", ol);" "'n. t.:().).~;", ,,,[,, ,,j,,): ,,, .\ie,..,J",,··, J"I), II r ...."dd . ,. liele ..... \lack "" the Sod.li'l ~ou ndation' jn Cn-"<:hosk,,-.ki •. - ..I"j ....! the juumoli,l< to ,e.,j it "')'ing "it ,~H<:<'" "to, ''''''''''n~''' ,,[ Ih~ .,.",," """" I .k i"~ IOu.,.. i" C,-'"'-·l .,,",..~~i •. " Tlor t.:' ''H(in i"te"'iew l> iu Pra,-da. J"ly 15. 19611. " I. Alc"""dnw. Pra,·Jd . March !!Ii, 19611.
''''
o::h
Til E l' IIE-C IUSIS l'ElIIOD
the results of holh the SuR>I >Inti Dresden meetings, he dlUse tu d eal almost exclusively with domestic politk111 ilnd ideological m;\tlers, The confcnmce was devoted primarily to th() social responsibilities of scientists, write rs, ;Iud th e iutelli~e llt sia and t Ill' need for ti)l)m tn d ispb.y great er "political maturity." Brezhnel"s speech \\"dS a h(lrd-line call for increased party discipline particularly in the re,llm of ideologic(ll work, which he labeled "the Rereest frOilt ufthe class stm ggie ," Indeed an editorial in S(l!)cfskll !/fI Rossiyn that appcarcd two weeks bier on April 13 (ilioted Brezlllle\' as warning eonlerelH:e dcll)gates that those "rtmegades" holding bOll rgL'ois views "cannot count on impuni ty." In an apparent reference to Czechoslov,lkia, he m(lintaillf)d that "imperialism is tr ying tn weaken th e ideological and politicaluuity orthe "llrkin g pcople of the socialist countri es, [n doin~ so, it is chielly gambling on nationalist and re visionist clements. "OJ Although the bulk of Brezhnev's speech
~b,"h
30 . lOOS,
.. ,.,..,,,.,/,,, "'I'ril I, I9hli
~IA n G Il
22 - ,u' IIlL 10
situation. At a philosoph)' t-"Ongress on March 26, Kurt l'lager, the leading ideologist in EtI.';t Germany's ruling SocicJlist Unity party
(SED), launched a hlistering and personallillack ()tl Josef Sm rkovsky, who was at that time still a candidate for the Czechoslovilk presidency. Hage r maintained th at Slllrko\'sk~' and others like him we re giving \Vest Germ
e ntreaty to '"gu intu battle ou twu !'rouls'" was hased un tCIJ;lr's stmtegy fo r reform in Ho ngary and fo rmed the fi Hltl(la\iu tl of Ih e cautious yet sympathetk- Hunga rian app ruach tu Ihe developments in Prague. East Europe an opinion, especiall y from Poland and East Germ,lny, dearly in f!uenl·t-'£l Ihe Soviet e\',lluat ion of evenls in I'rdgue. Su tuo did the domestic Suviet campaign against dissident intellectuals and insufficient parly discipline. Bulh factu rs enluUlccd the growing t-~)ll viclil)n itmong somt: Sovi<:t leaders tlwl '"dogm,Ltism '"the threat fro m the ri gh t particularl y from ~I aoist ideas-was no longer t he most immediate danger either to I h" ilL\ernal stahi lity of party (nle Of to the extenHll un ity of Ihe Commun isl bloc. Indec(I, t he Soviet leadership increaSingly viewed revisionism in the form
" ..."t·. D/!. "SLut'" ""d llr.,,~" .Of ··S[onn • .,d S[",. ,· ;,. ~ tCrete",,, 10 ~ 1,1_)' by I'rioorieh H.." Kl i1lf(\.·t ,..h;.,h . 1;",,,lalcd, h.·.dr poh1it.,.j d i>eu"ion 100 by Coelh~ in lhc ~'lc ,,;~hh~'nlh """,uIY. MTI . March 26, 1968. S",8. t:EJ2.:J."lIA2ll - S. I.;"",""";n·, 1,,1.' "j. . . ,,,,L '~I'tinl.,.j in Ih" S.wieL I"e". &
w.,
,~J
Tilt: Pllt:-ClI ISIS Pt;IU Oll
of att acks from th e left and from th e intellige ntsia as all even mure seriolls d,lIlgcr to basic values. In Poland, the Soviet Union, and now in C/.cchoslovakia, the major ideolugkal challenges in rel'CTI!
mont hs ha(1 come fro111 the
l(~ft.
not fro m the right. As a result, the
tllt:scs governing party wo rk sill('c the Twe nt y-Third CI'SU CO Il g ress. which h ad stressed th e necessit y for dos ing mnks agai nst the "splitt ing , ..elics" uf 1o.1;mism, were no longer app rop riate tu th e c urre nt do mestic and inlrabloc situati on and \\'0111<1 requi re re think ing. Til E APB!L
Pl.F. NU ~1
O F Til E CPCz
The greatest spur 10 this reevaiu,ltioll was the April ple num uftil e Cen tr;l] Cnmmillce, willi its wholesale leadership changes ami adop tion of tile Action I'rognllll . It had appcared al fi rst that th e plenum would no t subst;Ullially w e ake n l~JIlser"ative influ e nce wi th in party and stale organs. The sta temc nt t()Uuwing th c C I'C ~, I'raesidium·s Mareh 25 meeting, for e~ampl(~ , had assert ed that " tile I'raes idi um ha.~ fur th er de;llt wilh tlw prep;IT;I\iolls /(Jr the electioll of the president of th e Bcpublie. It took note of the inforUlatiu n b y Ale.~andcr DulXOek " buill the UisC llss ioll "f o llr u e leg;I\iOU a t Dresden ,"" As a reslllt of th at meeting, General Lud vik S\'oood;1 betaIne the part~" s presidential nominee, and the pos iti ve app rai sals in tIle Soviet pres.~ of $\'oh(j(!;J"s h:lckgroll nd and hi s unswcrvin g support fi, r " th e indestrll ct ih le allianec wit h th e peoples of the USS If" ind ieate that his l~lIldi&\ey was e nt irely ae-
ere?
ecptahlc to MOSl~)W. " If the Soviets hoped that Svoboda's scledion augu re d well for the mainle llallCC uf l'onserva ti vc influt:m:c in the le,lder,h ip, the ple nu m proved th e m wrong. hI th e <;Ollrse of th e session. Qldi"ich Ce rn ik was e ndorsed as th e p
,adi".
~b,d,
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~h",h 2 1. 1968. Also , ec "rocd", M,,«h 26. 1!IIi!i; b 'e..ria. ~la,,'\' 27 , 19f>ll: ~n,1 I'm",/a , .\1 .,.,,\, 31 ,,,,,I Ap'il l. 1\I6.'i, ~.,. I,).. 'nt,·,,!;,",,', "i.1o S\"I~.I~ .,,'\ reI."'"
.. Pro,·da.
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~IA I IC H
5/
ZZ - Al'n1 L JO
as Bil'ak, Oldrich Svestka, J07.ef Lenart. Alois l nd ra. and Stefan Siidovsky mlmaged to keep thei r positions. Yet the elevation of Z
("
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plenum, an a<"l;ounl h eav ily influeneetl b y Soviet urtlu.Klux)', pbct:u an !;(!lLal1y ncgali\"c inte rpretatio n on the illll uc nec of the Act ion
Progr.llll ill cnl'Ouraging antisocialist d ements:" SECU IUTY ISSU ES In (uldition to ~'Insc()w's v.'Orries ahout t he pOlilic
eo nccrnin g the Action I'rogram's stand on internal sccmity. The program had l1l11J e mned the "violations orbw alltl. the privileged pusition nfi ll t: st:curil y fun.-" in Ih e poli th;ai syste m" and h,IJ made proposals for the reform of t he enti re stmdllrc. The mOllopoly uf polk't: ]lower cnjorcd by t he lIIini.~ t cr uf th e interiur WliS
to be e nded and a !lew state security serv ile given jurisdiction sulely lor " defen uin J! th e st(lle frUIll the activit ies of e nemy ce nte rs abruad," TIlt' Ad iun Prugram )!u' It \\l )Uld al~() disrupt th e sllustantialuc\work ufa)1;ents used hy th e Suvie ts lu mU llilor aud infl uence develo pme nt s in Czechoslo vakia. Zdellck 1>,[[ YIlM has c[;.imed that whe n h e was elected tu the p,lrtv's Sc-~'re tari a t in " ',1", I."""" " or I I~, e n , i, Il<"'ek'l'n,,,, ,t in the e",,,,,,,,,,i.1 I'.rl )' of C,"",~ ",.I ,,,· .ki • • "d ;" S"e;"I )' .n,'r 11", 13\ 10 C"" Ilf"" of ,!,,, C l'C . :' <'<"''''t...·r 1\170. i" I'","dd I~""'~''''d''t. I'· 2') " . ·.-om Ih~ A
..
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" 11",,,, pmpmah ",,·r., ""dor ",d \,), Ill<' .\ 1i"i,l ry of In'erio< "01 ~b,... h 26. On ~b,d, 29 Ihe 1'.li o".1 A,,,,,,,,bl)' ""Iab\i,hcd a ro, mnill"" for miti tlrY and """uril)' 'Ine.'in", ,h.1 " ,m id inheril ' he I""I}' d~hth <1"'1"',10""",", f""'i inn, or " ...·""'~n~ the miti'a,)' .",1 'c' ~"r;IY f"ree,
MARCil
April. the information then availahle sllgges!ed that of the 10,000 full-time empluyees in the :\li ni~ try uf the Interiur's Prague offi ces, 30% (rungh ly 3,3(0) were also working for the Soviets, Alt hough the syste m of Soviet liaison office rs largely had heen disbanded under Khrushchev, ncvertheless, :\'Il)'lIl!i'lIl,lintuincd, must of the assistant heads of departme nts workcd fur MU5(',()W, thereby giving the Soviet security services substantial control over the I'ra",'uu ~·Iinistr)' of the Interior. '" The break up of the min istry and the purge of t he CQr1.~c rva t i\'e elements within it wOllld dislocate, if no! destroy. that control. At the same time demands for tIle rehab ilitation of political fi~ ures imprisoned in the lH40s and 195()s continucd to surface .Illd achicve official sanctioll. The Adioll Progr:.Ull'S admission th;.t the securit y forces Imd violated the law in the past gave impetus to calis for investigations into various activities, including the circumstances surrou nd ing the
C,,,,,ho,Ic,,·al;ia. 1O.000...r Ihe."" 1"",~! in Pr.u:.,e a1.mc . .. .~I,,
.1", I.., ,llom"- Apri1S, 19(",1;.
" 1' r.. ~"e r",li" "" April J. '('"~ In~ Il,c r<")""I , ,,,,,,mcnlc,1 : ·· If 11,.. rel",,1 I, In", Ir """I
I., w.,l"ome<J . But nne oonnol
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to '" [,"''' MundI "",\ lUll
54
Till:: l'lIl:;·(;1USIS I'ElUOIl
vic ts h.ul guod reasulJ tu wurry awul such a IIlc aSUTC. Nut unl y (;'O uIJ fore ign agents more eas il y infiltmtc int o Cz,->chos!nV(Lkia hut Czechuslovaks and. mure imp'Ortant, Soviets and East Europeans wou ld !ml'(! meg.ll egress fro m the bloc' viii this route. Surely, the Soviets and East GCTm:ms did not withstand all t he international igno min y surrou nding the 1..'Olls tru (·tinn of the Berlin \Vall in lOOt ill lITtle r 10 sec anoth e r ullcontro lled ex it f(lule c rca tc{l.
OEHAT£S IN 1>IOSCOW The btl of firm reassurance from the Czechoslovak Central Cornmillee p lell um l'()m biu t.-d with ce rtain negative iu(!ic;LtiullS ahout Prague's internal secu rit y policy formed the h:ld:Jrop ror th c de bates beginning within th e Soviet leadership. The first ind ieator of a possible dcha!c was a rat her interesting d iHc re nee of e mphasis be tween two major articles that 'Ippeared in the Soviet press. On April 3 l'm"dr/ published a le ng th y TASS de spatch quotin g fmm Dulx-ck's re port to the CPCz Ce n tral Co mmittee plenum. The article, nut surprisingly, em phasize" (SII'B. £V2':]!)fii). At.. , IL .IIollde. _~l'riI5, tOO8, ""oJ o.,ily Telegraph. June 5. IY6IJ . .. P",,,,k AI"II J. l\lti~ 1.1", in 1 '"~'lkl. April ... )1JIi.8).
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MAIIUI 22-A I' 1I1 1.. 10
live red hy Uager only days earlier when he declared that the search fur national form s was a violation of internationalism, a supreme principle that mllst I>e protected, lo r not to do so would unde rmine bloc un ity and ultimatel y socialism itself '" The strength of the SovelskaYII RosslYII denuncatio n was all the more appare nt in its " e ing t he only editilriaillf its kind til ap]}Car in t he period preceding the Sovie t Central COlJlmittee Illenum. nornwll ya time reserved for e nunciating the formal party line. It is also un usual for a major editorial propoundin g, or at least proposing, official party pulicy on internatiunal COlll lllunist aA;lirs to apP':ilr in newspapers other tlllln Pra"da. Its appearance in a republic party newspaper supports {but does not in itself prove) the <-'(Inten lion iI,at a hardline lohhy was emerging within t he leadef'; hip with views lIot ye t (l(.'Ceptable to the lJIajority. Kosygiu's dccisiun tu cut shurt his visit tu ] r,ln aud ret urn hume a day carly. on April 7. en(.'O nraged speculation about It!adership splits. Kusygin had left Mos<-'Ow Oll April!, arri ving ill Tehran o n .o\pl"il 2, folluw ing ,Ill overnight .~ t;o)" in En: V(Ul .'" This w;os tbe first visit h)' a Soviet prime mi nister to Iran since Sialin met the re with CllUrcliill and Hoose\"elt in 1943. The visit was of the utmost e<-'Onomic :md political importanl'l! (II the USS H, :lIId the p:llleTS re_ ported Kos),gin's progress dail)'. It was therefore all the more snrprising that he should retu rn a day early to Moscow. leaving Imn without even allowing Prime Ministe r Hovcida e nuugh tillle to see him off from Shinlz airport. the provincial c;Jpital Kosygin happcned tu be touring wIlen he decided to return."' Before beginning his visit, Kosygin \\'(Iuld have hean l Lyndon johllSon's [I.·l arch 31 announcement not to stand for anu ther ter m as U.S. preSident. so it seems unlikel y t haI this was respollSihle lilr the early !light back to Moscow. Heports at the time s uggested t hat Kus}'gin returned to attend the Central Committee 1Il<->e ting. " An offieiai visit to Tur" S",:dslmya ROlli!!" . Al'Til4. !9tiII. lbi, ,n",·k I'rOOuce,l an im,"L.Ji'l~ ""I"m ,e from
'he
C= h",lo,·~k ,.
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April 12: and h ... " S~'''~k "On the S!",,-iHc Path h, s< ... ~,I ;'m :· Rud.. "raw . Apri l 1ft. lOOS. " s",,;"t No",s. ~Iarch 12. lOOS . onn"" n"",", ti,.! KO'lKin h, ,·i.i! Ir." [",n, AI"i1 21o 8. f'.... ooa ..\pr,1 2. repor<ed th.t K"'l'~i" ..... ""''' "If o n April! Lr \(m~N"·. Kirilenku. Mozu rm·. PoI}"'n>~·. AoolOJlO'·. K,pila""v . • ncl "" lalo.·. On April 3. I'...",cln <-.,,';"'1 a long >rhd" ah""t hi. arri,...1 Dn ,h. 1'""1<.. ,, ,10)'. .. Pro,~In . .~pril 6. ]!lIio/i . II" ....., met I»' " irik"l(). ' '''t:'loe. 1\,I)"aJ"l ),. A"cl""",~ . .... pilam.... a nJ Ku l,,' u,·. ., Tho Times. Apri l to. I96/!.
w"
56
T il E I'IU:-C RI SIS I'EIIIOI)
key h~' Geor~ian 11,Irly leader ami Polithuro candidate mem ber Mzhav:lnmizl) was alsu cancdeu at th e last min ute,"" w h ich \\~mld furth er inuit-ale th,lt tI le ut'dsiun (IltllHver5) to hold ,\0 im mediate Central Com mittee plenum W,IS taken ;It the e nd of the first wee k of April. A number of Politburo me mbers werc not in MoSt'uw at thi s li me,'" and t1l!lsidering Kosygin's own abrupt {·!lange of sched"Ie, it would certain ly appear thaI this decision was taken without fi rs t consulti ng all Politb uro mCl1lher.~. Irresp ecti ve of an y e ffort s to
isolate Kosygin or any of the other leaders not in , ",'Inscow al the ti me, this Cenlml Cmnmillcc ple num did pro\'c to be th e most h,lnl-li m: pilrty mediug e
I' LE NU ~ 1
The plenum convened in \-Iost·ow on Ap ril 9 and 10 imd. :K'Cording tn official press re purt s, WilS de"uted e.w lllsivcly tu the disclissioll ofSo\'iet foreign policy. It began with a re port by Brezhnev sign ificantly titlc{l "On the ,\ dua l Problems of the Interniltional Situat iun and the Struggle of the C PSU f{lf the Col,esiun of the World Comm un ist :\·Iovemenl." The speakers who partid patcu in the dchale rcpre~cnl cd a curious cross section of those with l'uUt'!iollal responsihiliti es fil r foreign and milit:lry pulicy (A. A. Gromyko. the fure ign min i s tl~ r. and A. A. Grechko. th e ddi:nsc ministe r) ilnd those in clwrge of the major cities and republics with a history of dissident pmhlc ms (\I: V. Grishill , ~'I {)s{1IW; " S. l i.lls tiku \', Lenin~rad: P. Ye o Shdes\. Ukraine; v. P. \Izhavanadze, Georgi;l; P. M . M iI.~he)'() \', Belorussia; sh. H. Hashid"", U~,hd;istiln ; I. G. Kellin, Esto nia; and I. I. B(Klyu t \1 01ua\'ia). Also involvcd wcre key c ultu ral and ideoloAieal figures. including the (]ireetor of the Centra l C()m mitt ct~'s In"tilu te of ~ hln i s ll1 -Le nini.'\ ll1. 1'. N. Fcdosccv: the secretary of the hO
He",,,,,,,,
., U.S . 1)"1""1"".,,, of SI;,'e. I);,...,.", of ' ''I..J li ~,· ",-,· aool!e .....dTCb . .lle"""",,, · A"~ ' ''' 16. Ilffl (d,,' I."iR,~I) ~or ,h~ ("II a",1 ,-andi,bl" lI,e, " h"" H( 'h" /\,Iill",,,,_ • "" J1r1.in~ ,,,,,,,her 'PI"'" I" 1'4'·c t",en rfC~""" l'k,1 ,·t,,·wh,-,,· ']", i"c ,I .. /;,,1 ,,',~, I< of .\p,il. indndin~ ~b",,, ,,, (in Fi n· 1.".1). \'()IU'~"· ("""1 i,,~ '[,'0 I" Snm.>ihir-I1>,'""",I/.c. l\"h;dOl' . • nd Shehe,hibl;r). loll' it i, 1101 known whelh", 11><·)· we,c in ~1,"'",,- " '''i''~ 110.· ,,·,,·k or .\pril . Shd'1,in 1"")(":"I' ~,1 "'ilh a \\." hi ••• I,·r."i"" o( Tr.LlI., Unill'" 111' FfU I "-'"~ ..,, 1111 ' ·;e"m",. which (l1)(",~,t ill M",,_.~" "n Al'ri) S. ,111m IISt:· /Z7.
"';I'
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M:lrkov; th e head of Ihe Young Communist League (Komsomol ). S. P. Pavlov; the minister of culture , ~hdarne E . A. Furtsevu; and the editor of Pravda (who previously h:1(1 also been the ambass:ulor to !'rugu e), ,,1. V. Zim yanin. "" The only leaders res ponsible for foreign policy and bloc affairs who did not p;lrtidpate were Prime Minister Ku sYgin, Party Se<:retary Susluv, and KGB chie fYuri AndrollOV. The inte resting mixture of partidpants in itself indicates th e strong inten.'O nnedion made within the Soviet leadership between threats to th e cohesion of th e bloc and problems of inte rnal dissent. The silence of Kosygi n and SlIslov might be cxplained by the former's exclusion from preliminary preparations an d the latte r's reported illness. It is more difficult 10 de termine the reason for Andropov's silence. As a me mhe r of the Central Committee with long experien<..'C in bloc affairs (he was am h'Lssador to fl un gar y ill 19,'56 bclore being promoted to party secretary in charge of rela tions with ruling Communist parties) and eurrc nt rcsponsibility as head of th e KCB tilT both th e internal and e.~te rn 'll securit y of the USSH, one might have expectc{\ Andropov to participate. particularl y if hc shared the CQncern about rcvisionism ;md subversion reflected in tilt;' final resolutions. [Jut t hen Andropo \"'s las t speech had been in December 1007. and as he made ItO speeches at all durin g 1968, it is possible thai h is silellee was attributable to his style urlead e rship ((lther than to his views. One other person who did g ivc a speech was Kon stantin F. Katushe v, wlm prior to the plenu m had been party setrelar), in Corky. He was promoted at this ple nulIl to Ce ntr,l1 Committee s<.·<,:rclar~' in charge of liaison with rll ling COllllllunist ami worke rs parties, thus fillin g the post le ft vamn t sinl'e ~Iay J967 b ~' Andropov's promotion to head of th e KG B. K,jtushcv had 110 prcvious experielll,:c in tilis field . Konstantin V. Hus,\ko\' also move
" "","d".
A,"i! 10 ao\d II . 1965. " I i'; \·alen'~. S"dtllmrrremkm in C"'c/""!"'·d'·itl. 196'i. Pl'. 30_ 31. I"rr)' ~: lI u'"Sh . "d .\I,·,l e F.II, .. ,.) . ill ' he Sod" (j" i,,,,;, (;".:.-,,"'/. I' . .jf,t••1.. , ,'.,~ i"",,,.,..1 I)' II>.I KlIlu,he" " ,IS l"omol~d to lwly """r.,lar)· al 1he Ju lr .... Ihe r ll,~" 'h<.\[>,;1~nu'aJ (;","",;1-
1/,,,,,
Husak"" llad ncvcr hdd thc position of secret,lry, and lie was him~ sclf promoted, Moreover, he ('~llltinued to take an act iye part in tl1C formulation of bloc policy. ;..!c\·erthcless, as Katushev's 0\\11 (;U111maml of his job grew, Husakov increasingly was exduded from h loc' enclaves thilt disc\ls.~ed t he Cl.ech oslov'lk crisis."' The full proceedings uf tIle A!Hil plenu m (like thuse of all other plenums) were lIel"er puhl i.~hel1. Yet hoth t he press editorials appe'lring durin!;: the session and the resolut iolls and reports issued Ht its duse undl;riilll:d the tllOI'ement within the pilrt)' to reasse rt the m,.;essi ty for paTty <'"(.Intml ,,"er 1111: intelligentsia. In iI leading edito rial th'lt appeared th e first day of the plell um, the director of the Illstitut.: of the ]ull'ru;tl irJllal \\'m"ke rs' ~ l ove111e n l, T, Timofeyel". made it clear that th e pa rt y's "anguanl rol e was bein!;: challenged lIot only in th e Soviet Uniun but in other <''OlIn· tri es as well. lie rejel"lel! the ~I,\()ist f(lrl11ulatioll that th e historic missio n of tlw prole tariat could he fulfillel! hy the peasa ntry or the army. Eq U;llly. he as.~erlcd, thuse wlu) 1ll,lill!;lill th"t the pro· lelilriat shunk] follow t he intelligentsia or i C ~ \'i\n!;:ll,lrd were ;tlso " under min ing t lte scien tific principles of re\'olutionar y ~ lan is m .·· Timofe yf'v <'~l ll Ci1l111·d, •. Ie is lin ,1L..,id p ll t I hat II ,ei r cn d " ,,\"t)F to ],,,. lilllC! th e rolC! (if thC! working (.Ja~s; is comhincd wilh attempts al deny ing Ih\: Comlllunist parties' vangua rd mit:. Sm·h <''lJnl'cptions, regardles5 (If their origi n, in ti,et r eflect the inHuenec of petit hourgeo is ideology." '" Thc r".~olllt i ()11 i.~s'lI: d Ii,]]nwing the se.'., iun reit e r,,\ cd tllcs(! Ihemes, Although it did lI ut refe r specifically to dcvelopmcnts in CzedlOsllll'akia. the formul ati olls used and th t: rt:pnrts later circ ulilted ind icate th at Czel'ilOslovakia was indeed di<\:llssed and that th e plenum <.~msensus did lIut e ll tirel y favor a sympathetic interpretat ion "I' I hc Praguc Spriug.... The resnlu t iOIl . in pIal'; ng speci"l emphasis on the important·c of th e Dresden meet ing. reaffirmed ~,,\ , ;,., a",,,~,,,,.. ·"\<',\t " f ", .. ".1",,", I'",,,.. ~ i ,,,, i. ",",,'ain,"] in Pmn/II. Ap,il il. 19!iS. ""d .~""" " "" ",;k P'''·W",~,,, m/,,,,,,;k,,, I" 1~. AI", ,,~· ,Iw /"'~"W';'"wlll,,,,/'/ T,; /"",,' , \b)' 7. 19f.S. f<" ,1,.,,,;1, ,,[ K"""h~,.'~ .,,,I n ,,,.L,)I"·, IkK'L""~,,,d, "n,\ n. l.ew) 1,.It)·;
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the decisions rC;lchcd thcre "to do cvcrything nc(:cssury for t he 5te:lI.ly political. CC01l0Init' alld defensive (.'o nsolidatioll IIf the sucialist commo1lwealth:' In the intercst of "cxposing r""an<-·lli5111 and militariSIlI in \Vest Germ:llIY." the resolu tioll emph:lsi7.ed the lIet:d 10 "increase tht: solidarity of t he socialist tUl lntries . . against \Vest German imperialism." Howeve r. the presellt period was cllaraeterized not as Olle of Ollen cunflict hetween East ;Jnd \Vest but as Olle in which the greatest {langers stemmed from imperialist subversion. 'Ihe e nti re massive apP;Jratus of (t ntit"Qlllmunist propaganda is nuw directcd at weakclling the unity of the socialist CilllnIrics and Ihc internation;!l Communist llIovement and attempting to undcrmine socialist society from with in:' The policy d ircct ive~ tk lt e me rged from tIl!;' plenu lli were dear: DOlllestically, all efforts must now he directed at "an uficlISive struggle against bourgeois ideology" ( deci~' ioll 6). involving all e.~tens ive informatiun and propaganda campaign within t he party, p ublic organ i7A"ltions, and the press , to e,"plmsize t he need for greater discipli ne and vigilance against "foreign ideulogieal subversion'-' ExterT):llly, the p:lrly endorsed the d..:<:isiullS readl.:d ,It Dresd(.'Il stressing t he need for greah:r bloc unity (decisioll 7) . ~' Nt:ither the
pleJlu m rt:!solutioll nor allY suhst:!(IUt:!llt reports
~uggest
that at this
t ime a decisiun was made 10 invade Cl.edlOs lu\'akia ur to intenere in any direct form in its alfairs." On the (.'{lntrary. the Suviets are said to h:lVc told the C PC7. leadcrs tklt CzedlOslovakia was :Iel ua11y discussed in "temper:lte terms,"' and it appears thallhe SPI:_ cifie decisions reached at Dresden were not altered by the .'\ p rj] plen um. ,.. Thc April plenum did. huwevt:r. contrihute significantl y to the debate uver CzedlOslovakia by dearly biasing the parameters uf that deb,lle in f:l\"or of hard·line opinion. This w:.L~ done. Ilrst . by rcsolv ing that in dealing with disse nt at hlllne , hourgeois ideological infl uence had 10 be <-"
,e
1\l6.~.
Ih;, ",.~w,~. s"r "oto 12 of ch.l'kr 4 f<>r '''' r'1'1",ali,n .. " A<"«>rding 10 Bit'u', acruunl of di«;ussio", wi.h Su"id Icod,'" ,,( 11". M~y 4 Mn""",' n>oo1inl(. !Ii"en in hi. CPC. C enld Crun"'ilt~", plenum 'I""-,,,h in .\1")" 196/1. in Skilling. ~S"'n~ <>Inf"oIon 1....,hen .I~~,I B'~.""r'''' >1..... ..1' 10
CU,",W.luc6*irlrl,IIcrrol',,,/Il,c<J/,Hi,,,' .],. b64 ro. 12,
IGh
JIz
M
TIlE I'm:-CJIl$ IS I'E IlIOO
viet lead e rs thc u would han: the righttu in,'oke themsc!ves. This aspect of th e resoluti on attached conditions to th e principle of noninte rference aud undermined the argumen t that the Soviet l ead er~ sh ip did nut IHl\'I~ the anthuri ty tn de mand changes in Prague. The plenum's secund (.'o ntribu tion to a hard line was to attrib ute dom estic dissent and hloc disunity to th e same b etor: im perialism's efforts to sub\'ert soc'ialism from within. This made it difficu lt to support t he Prague Spring without appearing insufflciently cautio us about th e \Vcst's intentiolls in th e area. The cmn paign against ' Vest Germany's policy of b ridge-I mil ding was inevitably IXlistcred by the April plenom, as was Soviet se nsiti vi ty to rumurs of rapprochement he tween Prague and Bonn . At the same tim e, bye mphasizing that imperialism's majo r thrust was now sub" ersion . the p lenum. ill e nect, sup por ted the argll nwnt th at Sovie t secllrityarul inlleed th e securit y of the entire bloc-was threatened b y even ts hi C~.echuslovaki,t. As a result. a new uricntatiOll began to e merge: a {iI.."'t.Teasing conL'CTIl with direct ex ternal mi litar y threats and greater concenr with issues such as the mor.lle of the bloc armies. Pulitical assess me nts of t he refu rm movemen t bccame bound "p wilh hroad c r L"o " .;dcrati o". relating 10 Sovie t strategic in t erests
:lnd hllK' set'uril y. if Czechoslovakia hecame the ··\\,eak link" in the \ V,lrsaw Pact . East Europea ns and. more im portantly, th e Soviet defense est" blishlrrent t'ould legit intattdy enkr th e Ilulit ical debate over th e reform mo\'cmc nL The interdependen(."f' uf pulitical
ICh
!z
M
M"'lICII 22 - "'I'RIL 10
61
ber 1) to (.'all the D resden meeting-a det'isioll motivated hy the sharp increase in the perception of threat and till: cnllse{lllent quest fur information . The affirmation of the Dresden decisions (mll/lvers 2,3, (/m/oJ ) by tile Cen tral Cummittee plenum l ciecil;ioll ,wmber 7) llnderline{l the desire to expand the size of the consultative unit primaril y lor the purpos(!s ()r{~msenslJs bUilding. The hwk of any mention of Politburo or Council of Mi nisters {~m6 rmati o n of the results of the Dresden mee ting may hll ve indicated a split within the top Soviet leadership. tl wreby necessitat ing a wider {Iebate at t he Central Committee plenum. B rc~.hnev's speech at the Moscow C ity Party Confcrem:e, tim tone of cditorial repo rts up to and durin g the ple num . the L'O mpositiotl of the {lcbatc participants, and the published resolutions indkated. with few exceptions, the increasing <mlhority of ha rd-l ine opinion. T ht: plenulll imposed a party line again st ideological d ive rsity. thereby allowing the search lor alternatives to begjJl in carnes\. This search WilS spurred by time salie nce. which introdueed a furth e r ele ment of stress and the beginning of the secoml phase of the pre-erisis l>eriod.
" ,"
CHAPTEH
Foun
Phase Two: April 10- May 4
EVENTS IN I'HAGUE The l.~JIltiuuing deterioration I)f the sitnation in Prague heightened thc pe rc(~ pt i (ln of thn~at in ).Iosmw. On April 8, Qldrich Cernik's new government was sworn in . Among the ncw min isters were some of the chief advocah,s of n :form , including Ota ~ik and Gustav Hus;'\k as d epu ty prime minist(~rs and Ji i'i Hajek C(menil Martin Dzt'lr, and Josef Pavel as ministers of fore ign afluirs , defense , and interior. respectively. There wa.~ the beginning of a reviva l in b-oth the Nation'l! ,\ ssemblr, under JosefSmrkovskfs new leade rship. and the N'ltional Front, with Franmck Kri egel as chairman. Smrkovsky advocated a National Assembly that would be nol only" ,L 1 )"s.~i oll;lte and aggressive trihull
62
"
•
6J
APII[L IO - MAY 4
which \\1 IS not scheduled to meet hefore 1970. Knnwledge tha t the most radical reforms would he hlockt~d so long as these conservatives maintained their scats in t he Cen tral Committee le<1 to an i ncrea~ ing numher of calls to (:ol1vene an earl y extraordinary (!ongrcss to re mu ve t hem. Dilbeck was \lilling to move the congress forward to tIlt: spri ng of 1969, but sOllie of the lIIost impo rtan t regional organ izations. including South Moravia. West and Sout h Bohemia, and Prague municipal. passed resolutions urging a COIlgress hy t he end of 19G8 at t he lates t, in order to m'oid , in the words of the Prague resolution, the "Ioss of confide nce in the party and the real danger. . that people would seek a sohition of problems outside or agains t the part}','" Growing pressure for an earl y plen um to institutionalize the reform movement and change the t'OmlXlsitiun of the Centr.tl Committcc mcant that the Sovictlead· e rshi p might havc a shorter pe riod of time than ex pl."Cted to agree on what could be done to prevent e\'Cnts in Prague from getting out of hund. The sense of urgene y prooueed hy calls for an early congress was exacerbated b y fu rt he r indications from the ~linistry of the Interiur tl mt tIle eonservati vcs there we re alsu losing their positions. Minister Josef Pavers !\ pril 12 article in /'rrice , e ntitled "What Next in the St"Curity Field?'· set out Il is reform plan ~ fo r the minist ry. His intention to movc (Iuiekly to reform tI n: sl."Curity appar.ttus hecame appareut toward the end uf April whcn he announced that threc or fou r of his deputies would soon be rcplaced, along with other top officials. Mureo\"er, he state<1 that the minist ry was now unde r government. and not party, control. ' A series of rmlic;tl ar tieles in the C1.ceh press elaborating the fUIl(\;llll e ntal fc,ltun:s of tIle reforlll !llow: n U!]lt presented lillIe prnspt"Ct that the C7.t"Chn~ln\"ak l ead(~rs hi p s(~ri ollsl y inte nded to hring tile media unde r t'Ontro\.· Art icles dirL~tly implicating S.wiet agellts in the dca th of Jan r..lasnryk and the purge of HudolfStinsky (the party's general secretary until t he anti-Semitic purges of the earl y 195Os) appeared in mid-April amid cal L~ lor the official rehabilitatiun ofthuse twu CzedlOslu\"ak lcadcrs.' ' Rudi waca. April '27. 1965. ' T"" G.""/;a,, dnJ The lJfJilV TelrW"!)/, . Mal' I, 1_. ·S~e.
ro, ""'''1'1.'. );", );",,,It:. -0" ,
\"cI
Pro/:r.om
1968: anJ P. I'Bha,!.
"f .
I,,~""tll er;,;, : ' f~l",i r"{ Ihlg. April
Do:m<>..,..h (" Ik,'i,·~t
":"~l ioll.I
11, t96S: It Sc·
(or S,"'wbl C"",loo,~,,",,k i ...- PnIa. Apr; t II,
FnM,j or I'drtiament : ' Urmlmi I;"y, April
·s,"" fI",/f I,ni,'<>, April 1.2. I~ . a",llb. 100II.
t ~.
t96S,
TIlE PIIE-C/II SIS I'hlU OU
&1
HEAcnON I i'\
The CI'Cz reg ional party
~\OSCO W
l'() nfere llce~ ,
calls for an early congress,
d e mot io ns in th e ~ llll is try of th e Int erio r. alld revt"la tions in the press about past Soviet wrongdu in gs wc rc in terprc\ed in ~'Ioscow hi th e context ufthe new hard er l illc adop!t:d at the April plenum . ,\ Pmv(la editorial of April 12. l'Ommcn tin g un the CJ>Cz Central Cummi tt ee m eeting, did not 'Id a p! an u\'c rtl ~· hostile tunc; bul it
nevert heless stressed that the C I',cchnsJu\',lks had de live red
";1
df'-
('[sivc re buff to 311 ali e n, demagog ic. utl-.\I auist an d :.mtisoci;llist views:'b Suvctslwyu Ru~~ i!lll un the following (\;IY rermined frum
direct mention of C7.cchos]uva kiu. but it carried a sweeping ("{Indcmnatiun uf \Vestern effurts tu sulwcrt socialism frum within . ~Iaintaining that the Western policy of"hu ilding Inidges" was th e major manifestation of these efforts, the editorial warned:
Cum umn;sl s ~""",,, I ignun, inslmK'l's "I' id.~)I(>~i(" ,1 inl nm l" rit y :Hul \'acillal in1l in some re]ln,scnlal i""s of 1he i1llell ige1l Isia. [I is 110" P"rl~' C) rg:mil"oI i" ns' "blig:.tion . I" d",,1 a ...,s" I"It, n-lmli't" I hnse who 100M oourgl'ois "iews, to vari ous Z'e ne~ades and 10 th eir defcndL'rs a ",[ Y"S.1IU,u. " H" n',gade" "'''''',,' (~""" "" impu"i ' y," Cn,nrad., B rf''l.h l1~\' . ~I:trclo 29 ).
L I.
.
~;Iid
at ti ll:'
~Iosto\\'
City P:u·t)' Cuufcrclwlllon
O n April 17, Pravda puhlished ewerp ts of th e CzedlOslovak Act io n Progr;llll for the first time, th crcb r gi ving th e Soviet Jlu hlic its li rst glimpse of thi s majo r rci(l r m plalfnnn. The pap!!r indicated Soviet disq uiet about the program b~' also carrying an ed itori al on th e party 's rule as the lead i n~ Il.Jn~e in all sociali st societies. The author, I' . Pctrenko, stressed thai t he eurre lll siluat iun was pa rticularly dange rous llt.'t:ause " th e targe t of the most fl erce alt,lcks by imperialist reaction is th e I'ang uard of th e working (·lass-the C ommunist parties of til e socialist co untri es.'" Thc grow ing strength of negati ve opi niun un CzedlOs .l ovil kia and thc campai gn a~ain s t rc visionis m gcncrJ..lly (~Jmbincd witll the in creased saliellt"" of tim e to spur Ihe .~cilrch fi lr ,llteTllil\ivc wa ys (If d ealin g: with the sit uat io n in Prague. Part of this scarch in volved increased links he lween Soviet o ffi (' iais and leading t.'o!lSer val ives in C/,ec hllsluv'lkia. Co ntinuing purges within this group were grad " r ..u",k " pdt 12. 1(l6S. ' ''1'1", ShO ll"" " I'mnt of the Cta.. • PnlHia. April I., 19611.
Slr " ~clc." S<"~"'·"!I" /1,10>1'1'" .~I"iI 1 3, 1\1(,01; .
APIIII. iO-MAY"
65
uaIJ y depriving the Soviets of "reliable" sources of information about events within t he highest levels uf leadership. Thus it was re ported (lu ring April thaI Soviet Ambas_~,ldor Chcrvoncnko had he ld secret talks with leading conservatives. including Novolny. DlIbl'ek is said to have stated his objections abo ut these L'tlntacts to Chcrvoncnko personally, on April 23. but this was latc r ufficiall y de nied by a government spokcsman in Pm!,'Uc, although DlIhcek never IIddc{l his uwn denia!.~ M [LITAnY CONTINGENCY COi\SI DEIlED
At this time the Ars! public indicatioos appeared that the CPSU hierarchy was serio usly considering the military option. At the end of April, there was a series of region;ll p"tn ~ ( ..... ning...d). St.clc,' (Kiev). Ki,,:lenlo (H.klli. SII<]"" (S ,·~rd. Junk). \·"n~"'" (""linin). A",I"'I"w (lIigo). l)",,,lrh,,,,· (Il)""j,,). K",,,.o·v (Ahn .·Ata}. Ka· t",I",v (C,Ml y). 5<>10",.,,,1,.,,, (K"",,"). FnlL'J", April 20, 11lI>~. wm l'lcI<·d Ihe li , l of ,!"'ak· in~ <' n):;l ~e m "nb , I'd·,he ( \'oron~,h). l'ul~·,".kr ~A,hkh"I>ad ). ~ I ",he",,· (M imk). U,tino,(H""hkiria). Shoherhi .. k)· (C,imea)_ Ii: "lako~ ( li:r""nodor). 1'000"""..". (1,,10). Si,"'· ( D"l'l~ ' I"n). Sh~t~pill (U,huanla). G,,,d,k,, (~!i n lf Dlf,·",,·) .tlt! \1>h ..-...".,],., (C....,I)(;.).
66
TilE l'm;'CIIIS rS PEIlIOIl
uf the regiunal cunferences, as Iw was un a state visi t to Pakistan and Inuia frnm Aprillfi tu 21. The speeches hy Brczhm:v and Yc pi.,hcv were not puhlishcu . A re port of the prot.,<: t,.·. Jings, Iou"'ev!; r, was \(:ak c u vi;. Pr;.gll c to Mic hel T;lt U of Le Mfmde. Brczhll c" is _",id to have s po ke n in vc ry pessim istic term s a hout th e situation in Prague. \ Vithoul doubtin g th e loyalt y of Duill'ek. whom III;' ])T
Czechoslovakia might address all
[,,,,,, <1 " n "1'1")I"hmil y I"
1l111ke yel :mother atl llck Oil ideo]ogic'a] J a~l\e~s at hom e and ahroad. On :\pril 22 Grishin delivered a speech a l a m ee tin g marki ng the nine ly-eighth anniversary uf Lenin's hi rt h . T he mee tin g was attend!:!1 by Politbu ro me mbers, indnd ing I3rezhnev, t\o,"}'gin, ,Ind Podgorny. \Vell ove r h,& th c Sp\~ed l d Citit with in ternat ional issues, ilnd pri marily with d lilrts tn <-1llnhat imperialist suhvcrsio ll . " I~' .I/<m,/r. May ~ _ 6 . 1!1fi.S_ T.I" 'tot .. , .,,,,,,,,-..1 1)' II,., ,!ti, n"~'ti,, ~ 1<"', pia". "" Ap,, 1 2-1. n,~,~ I..... " m'K'1, ",,,f,,, i,~, in " .."""I.ry """,..., ,,1~'''III,~ y,'pisl",,' .",1 Ihe,)",~,' r~"oa,k>. Iter",I"" Skl\) I"~. (.';.." d"... I()1·" ~;"" /"I<''''',lr,,'[ R,,.r hi, ,1.t,·",... ", th"t ,"cI,b ),c,· '1~'~c"1 the ,lp,,1 Cen,,:tI (.'",,,,,,111<.., pic",,,,,. Yet T",u do,"" "nt me,,'''.\ 'he plen"", . ,u,,1 \·"I'i.hev i. i",:I"",.l;,, an)' "It"" "met.! 'or """llic.;.1 S""i~1 tor 11".. ""'ro·'·" h"'i "~ I~·,·"" " I~ ·"k'·T a l Ih,' Ap,iI 9-10 ",eeli"g. Il owc,..,.. un;", b ,!I'" Ihc " lIid ,1 tl.til)· "<:"-'I"'1'e , ,,[ Ihe ~I o><:<'w P",ly , Me. on _\ 1',;1 19. 1008. (I",~ I"~h Il"";,,,c,' and \"~p;'he,· 'I" 'k., ,1 Ih" m'~1;ng "Iii... ~!,,".,>w Pa,'" ,,1,;< un AI'';! IS. It ""'"'' lil.. k .10 •• hI" i, ft:f~,n"..: ,.. thi' meelilOg .",1 not to ei lhe,.he p, .. '-i .~" C~IO 'm1 C.. ""nil1"" p\e"",,, '" 'he ., ,,h><"w "I.k" ,,,. n ,,," li' l ,of 'I)... k~" ",,,I I~'d k'; I"nl_' ~" (I ,i, lau. , mc.... 1in_~ w • • p'inl,~1 ;n I",,,in.l uv, ""~"'q. u" ApIi\ 2~, 1!J&i, . nJ ""ilh(", lIre·, Io",·,· ""I r"l'ishev were ""en rep"'!,,!! '" p,e,enl .
h.,
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67
Grishin's speech WliS notable both fu r i( s hawkishnc~s and its authority. He wenl heyond the standard !()rmu)ations, stating thai imperiali sm is scckin),! not the me re wC;;lkcn ing of socialism but the actual n :sturati ull of capi tal ism in th e socialist L'OlIlitric s. A large
part of the speech clahomted th e principles un which the C I'5U Central Cummittee based its relations w ith fraternal state s- "pru idariiln internatiu nalism. b ruth e rl y mutu al aid , equalit y of rigllts and so vere ignty:' H e went on to quali fy thi s: "OurjJarty" co nsiders tIm! " now as never ilt;'fure, t he unity of the (.'Otmt ries of the s(x.'iulist
C01l1monwclIlth and the harmoni7.atiull uf the natiOlml interests of each frate rnal countTy with t he ge nera) interest of the wo rld socialist system a nd the internat iunal cummtmist moveme nt is paramount." Comple tel y Iltissiltg frottt Grishin's list ofprindples was the standard refere[J(:e to noninterference. In its place. there appeared "urothe rly mutual aid" and Ihe idea t hat the individual inleresis of member slales t1lU ld no lo nge r take primacy over the general interests of the bloc. Nee dless to say, these general in te rMoscow in such way as to best ser ve ests were to l>e deflned Soviet inte rests. The introduction by Grish in of "broth e rl ~' mutual aid" WiU; a qualitative siel) li) rWard hi lhl: dl:vclupment uf the illculogical raison d'ctre fo r the invasion. All that 11'(1$ re(juired was agreement that :111 furm s uf aid. including military means, could be extended tn safegu.trd sodal1sm. And C rishin pruvidcli this as we lL Alie r reaffirming the results of the Dresden meeting, wit hou t. huwc \'er. mentioning C~.echos lovakia, Grb hin amtoutlced that "the Soviet Union will c xte nd tu those people whose freedom and imlependenec is threate ned by impe rhtlism 'lll-round poIitie:ll, et'Orlomie, and-if necessary-also military ait!. " <) That such a majur policy stateme nt was made by a relatively junior Politburo me mbe r (Crishin had only bet'Ome the !>.\OSt'Ow party boss in 19(7), uutside proper p:lrty urgans (the dta nge was not Signaled previously at the Central Committee plenum, the meeting of the MUSt'OW party Ilkfiv, or at one of the reg ional party L'Onfercnccs). and published in I ::.!';cslill ruther (him Prav(/a suggests that the escalatiun of the crisis was not llniversally approved within party ran ks. The deputy chie f editor of Pnwr/a, Vadim Ne krasov. was quoted un April 21 as presenting an e ntirel y l'ontra ry view uf develop-
uy
" I:"'~'I", Apri l S!:), 196!l
''''
o::h
68
TilE PIIE-CIIISIS I'EIUO[)
menls in Prague. D uring :l Moscow radiu forum, Iw stated that huth 11,,: March- April ere..: ple n um and the Action Program had pointed 0 111 t he ex istence of an ti socialist t rclHis and had resolved
both to "strengthen the ideological unity of the CPCz and to increase its leading role in society." Nckrasov \\NdS i()rthright in hi~ support for the Prague Spring: " Ill my opinion, if one sums up vcry briefly what is now happening in Czechoslovakia, il is not eve nts in Czechoslova kia which arc of an u nh ealt hy na ture, bu t the interest displayed in th em by impe rialist propaga nda.'" " Along t he same lines, l'ruvdll published a llInjnr article from its I'rdg uc correspon-
dent on AprilJO that positively described the Action Program and the r<:gioll;ll party l.~mferences, stressing th e ellort5 to improve party work and suppress a nli soci!llist ele men ts. It is possible that tllese two d ivergent views represented equal yet l."On lliding trends within t he Politburo. Nekras()v's improm p tu remarks, howeve r, cannot be comparea with the report presented by Crishin. Tl,e presencc of the Soviet trilllll\'imt" aud tl w " HIlly imli cati ons in Crishin's speech that hi s formulations had th e ;lUthorHy uf the party beh in d them woul d ('ertainly m ake any thes is suggesting factional "cl ivity
delivered on such anniversaries tend to be sel pi{l{'C aflilirs. refleeting th e general line; it w(lul{] ,m t be typical fur st"tem cnis to be made that did not mee t with Poli tburo approvaL Yet the absence frolll Mosl.·()w of Kosygin and many ot he r Polithuro members \\xm ld l.'Crtai n ly have made it possible for the speech to h;lve been passed by a Politburo minority. And sillce th ere is no ind icatiu n that these major policy changes were collull'mic;lted tn the party during th e scries of reg ional party meetings on April 18- 19, it seems like ly tltat tlte dedsion (lIuml)er8) to indudc "brnthc rly nllltll,11 aid" ,IS a principle governing: relations and military assistance as a possible mod"lity W"$ m"de e it],er w],ile th e majority of the Pulitburo was dispersed ill th e regio ns (April 18- 1!)) or after o nl ~' some oftllem had re turned to l\[os("ow (April 20 or 21 ). In either ease, Kosygin euu ld nut have been present. O n .""pri! 21 he left I'"k is tan (a (lay lat e r th'lIl p re viously scheduled) and instead of ret urni ng to ~losc."Ow a.~ Origi na lly planlled, I.e made a deto ll r to New Delhi for a bricf l"tmn:rsatilln w ith Mrs. Candhi . lie could no t therefore have been in ~In.~c()w befilre the early hours nf April 22." Grishin's speech " Mo","w rulio).
Aprit 21.
196!i. SII'/J . SU /2751IA2Ii.
" On "'pTiI 5. l!lr>li. p,·" ct/" ""''''JIlt,, •.,,, I"",,"r~" Ap,;t 17 ~",t 2[1. Il r lell M""-,,,," t"' Ap,it 16.• ,,;'·ill~ in R.""tl'h"l; n" ,be 17,1>. t"""i,,~ P.,ki,'."
''''
o::h
69
and th e previous remarks by Urezll11ev ,mJ Ycp ishcv, the refo re, seem to indicate that co ntingency pi:.llls for;.ln in vlIsion were seriously being (;o ntemplateJ at this time.
The Suviet military appears to have uccn highly in\'olved in this process, an d coincidi ng with Ycpishcv's re marks at the Moscow meeting. C7.cchosiovuk sources r eported tlwi \ Varsaw Pact headquart ers J ecidc{1 be tween f\pril lB llml2.() to send
~I ars hal
Yakllbov-
sky to Prague fo r negotiations on \ Varsuw Pact maneuvers (([ccisloll 9). Negotiations for holding th ese maneuvers in Czcdwsluvaki a had begun in 1\)67; and althougll the new Czechuslovak leade rship had su<.-'C ccd cd in postponing them and reducing their scope, pressure fro m \\'arsaw Pact headquarters bemmc lIIore inte nse at this time." Ma rshal Yakubo ysky visitcd Prague on April 24 - 25 as part of a tour including Poland. th e CDR H ungary. and Bulgaria for discussions on "(juestiolls t'Ontocrn ing a lilrt her im;reilse in the dde nse preparedness of the \\'arsa\\' Treaty member states," " Yakubovs l,), held talks with Svoboda. lJlll-.{-ek, Cern fk. and the tl efense minister. Mart in Dzu r; and it was D/,lir whu sll bsc{jucntly confirmed that the talks had indee d cenlcred on military exercises. He denied rC I)()rts tlmt he had cntirely rcjected Pact mancu\'cr phlns. Yet at the saT~ le tiTlIt'. he 111:\Ue it d ear that the e~ertises were not to he on a massive scalc: Th e cxtcn l uf Ih{~ cxcrcisc.<- whieh ure indced tu takc place this yc ar . prn'isely ddinc u in the same wlly as h,,-~ alway.• been donc. "lorl'O\'cr, thcre ~re 10 he staff man euve rs and nol exercises of soch" size as the Vlta\,
on our te rritory- will havc 10 bc .
]) ~.Ilr·s chie f of generill stair. Gelleral Karul Rusuv, was mu rc e.~ plicit about th e results of Yakuhovsky's visit. The exercises, he
ro, New lkll,i on ..11',;1 21. li e held . brief o<""-.",,,H<>" .."h ~I ... Gandhi bef","" 1I);n): bock fl)'in)\ time. ",,,uld l",,' ~ ".ad. il Im[lO"ihl~ r,,, I("')"gin 10 he I...,k in 'M' th~ 21 ... ~'o, "~I."b ,,r hi' ,·i,it. ".,.. rn""/,,. ApMI 22. I96S. SWD, SUI27·l(l,'; . ",",", ;""" C""U"'IK".'~ A.-c/o;,,·,. 1"')' 6 _ 1:1. lOO~. " . 227113.
1<>
.\to..,.,..... The
M,,,•.• ,,,,· ho:fo,e
mid" i~.t
- In ~ teiev;,,,d intc,,·;""· "n ~t.r 21. W68. M",lin Ih,;" Ihe C.rtl,,,,Io,-ak mil,I'h" of n.l;o!1al d,·/,·"...,. " . I,'<'Ilh,ul"" .. " , ,, 'M,h" I••• itt Ib~ .""r I"",..","" J.nuar}· .",1 AI"il .",1 ,It" f.a, In D",""mh", 19!i7 ,h., th" ""uld ",i>l''''' its 1"'''.'''. ".. lie, 1'1.,,> to hold "'I"l(~·>cal" ",.n,,,,'·,·,. ;n C""'lto>Im·~k;. -h>O ci ...."I.Hn~"' the en d of M..... h th .t the II'........ P...1 lI"od'l".1' t"" had ,,,It-i,,,,1 Pr..g"" it """ ",It .·d utin ~ "p'ing ",a, ,,,,,,'.,, in C,,,,4 ... ~,,",,k;. hut Ilm l Pr~g.", 1,,,,1 """,,-,.,It,1 Ih ~ ",.,,,.,,,.~ .. (" I", held •. I,.,...·)''''e ("'"", };"k Ti""" ·. ~ta r<"h ~ .
,i,,, ..
'''''l"
llJ6.'l).
" GI.lI\ and Bul= ;an p,e» "~encic>. April:!.l. llJ6.'l. in Sir/:!. £ ~21"U;: J'",~uc r.w;<>. Ap'il 24 . 1965. SlY/! . " Pr..,.u~
...dln.
~: ~:t27.531h olld ~t l1 .
Mat· 3.1968.
S\\'H.
April 27. 1965. SW/!.
EFJ27fHIC2I2.
EElZ75611.
70
TII[ PIl f;·CIIIS rS PE IUOD
sla t~d, w~re
planned fi,r ble summer or fall. Czechoslovak fo rces wou ld fi rst carry out slaB' Ill llll CU \ "crs, and only th en, "if t he plan were fu lfilled," would exercises of allied staffs be arranged. L" Cle~lrl}'. th e CzedlOs\o"ak leade rs were st ill resistfn~ pressure tu hold fullscale troop c~ercisc s. and tllC more th e)' resisted. the more th e Soviet m ilitary and polil icalleadership grew concerned about Prague's reliah ility as a mem ber of the Warsaw 1"lel. YakuDovsky's failll~c to
obtain an yth ing morc than the \'a guc a ssuralll.'C tll;lt maneuve rs of some type would he held hclurc the e nd ufthe yea r suhject to further negotiations contributed significantly to the escalatio n of th e crisis and was to precipitate a series of hi gh-lcvel Sovict military visits to Prague iu May. Thc last wcck of April also saw the publicati on of importan t articlcs in PmtA/(J by leadin g party ollicials, incl ud ing V. V. Zag\;ldin, deputy head of the In ternat ional Departm e nt oftllC Centrdl Committee and P. N. Fe do'iccv, di rector of th e Institute of ~ I arx i sm Leni nism. whu had been one of the speakers at th e April Ccnt ral Com mitt ee plenum .'" On April 25. PrarJdll published an ar ti cle on ·'~ I arx i sm and tlte Contemporary Ideological Strugglc" by S. Ko\'ale\', th e parly otlida l w hose Sep te mher 2(j I'ro,;,I" art ide jll .~ tifying the illva~i on wa.~ to heeo!tle kno\\'l us the "Brezhncv Doc'trin e :· " In an attack un the democratic ideals of the Prague Sprin g,
Kovalev made th e fo!\owin g statement : Only those to whom tllti iliteTt~ st s of the \nJrking J)(~opl e arc a liell l'Ould call fur " absolute'· frc<-'O p. ~. F... to",,~v. - t..,,,l nl"" - lhc ~ t ""'i.m ,,( I),.. ''''''Il!kl h C~Il!"r)':' Pm",/", Aprtl 22. 1968: .nd V. \., ?...!(I.di". ·-fh~ 151kh A""iw,,,,'Y
"s, !.: ,,,'.le.'. ··Soyorei~nl)' and the
Pm"lll. Seple,"t,.., 26. 19f,s .. Pru_"". Ap,il Z$ , 19(>8
[nlemali .. o.\i.tOhliF(:ltion
71
This linking of calh for freedom with coun(errevolution and attacks on the very foundatio ns of socialism clearly did nol augur well for til e C7.tlchusluvak reformers. Nevertheless. Kov,,!clt made no m ention uf th e "hrothe rl y mulual aid" formula. Indeed his state me nt
that "life exposes IxJth ri ghi-wing [!luI 'left' revisionism, particularly I\laoism" seems to ind icllt e t Imt he still reg;lrded the idcologic(ll threat from C hina a.~ more dangerous. The Czechoslovak press reacted immediately to the increased activity of the Soviet leader.;hip und press. Pnice nn April 25 acclised Grishin of making unfair gCllerali7~Lt ion s and dcrnandt:d an explanatio n uf Suviet inten tions. M/1Il1Ii jrunla
011
the same da r
t'Om plaincd that the Soviet press was presenting a distorle(] picture of ('vents in C7.Cchoslovakia. It critici7_cd the Soviet Union for seeking to impose ideological control ovcr the bloc and attributed Soviet apprehensions to tIll' fe:lr uf spillover. Perhaps even Illore damaging to Suvict-Czechoslov(lk rel;ltiollS were the relevations by Karul Bacilek. the former Czechoslova k min ister of public securit y, thaI the arrest and trial of Hudolf SUnsk}' hml been ordered personally b y StaHn. supervised by Amlstm; Miko yan. and carried uut by Soviet "advisers" working in the CZL'{!husluvuk ministry at
the time.""' !;ol1owing
the"~e
re\·elations. there were two more sUI-
cides in the Ministry of the Interior, bringing to twenty-six the reporled nomber of suit'ides in that ministry during April." The ecstatic and jubilant atmosphe re that characterized the ~Iay Day de mOllstrJ.tiOll in Prague wa~ ill sha rp contr'!'st to the \I SU~11. Illore orderly and sombre parades in the otlIcr bloc L-a pit;lls. Television viewers wcre ahle to watch IJulx'Ck heing greeted by Czechoslovak-style hippies carrying homemade placards and even an American flag. '" L.1.if:r thaI even ing, a gmup of students protested against the ("()nditions of their Polish (.'Oon terparts; and on May 2 in Stare Mesto square, thousands gathered to hear speeches by reform leaders in what p/'avdt/ described as ;l"provocative assembly.""" Suviet lea{lers, by this time. were drawing very n e~;ltive L"()ndusions from almost all the events in C~.edlOslovakia. By the beginning of !>.Iay they had decided t hat the March- April CPCz Central .. S, .... ,"'. April 28. 11!66, 'nl''''rali,m"III" ",I,J Tril",,,,·. .\1";] 2<J. 11!66 .
.. .'·rID l"o,l nm,:•. April 30, 11!66. " A> ,1""," 1" Ihe AliI": ". ".,.;,;,~, ,-er .. ry of Ihe I",·a.ion . .. P'-"L"l/Q. Au~'''1 2.2 . 19(1l;.
'~ ).:"n"')""'Y
I.) I.:. /,h 1.: )"1.. m.. k/n~ tl.., 1.111" a lln;,
72
THE l'I1F.-CRISI S I'EI1 IOl)
Cummittee plenum hud hecn "unable to s tal>ili~,c the situatiull." I'r(ll.)(/(I re leaseclthe olfidal aCl'uun\ of Suviet reaction to th e May l'T is is on August 22., ] %8: [Soviet] amiNI' iltcre:\.~eJ sti ll further when, , a wkle-seale e:IITIpaib'll was launched in the <..~>u ntry to discredit all the previuus act ivity uf the CPCz; whell a
IJr("-'C~'
of maSs
rC]ll:K~'nl{'''1
of parly and
statc personnel dc\'cloPL-« 011 a wide ~c;,l c . : wh e ll a dearly in stigat ed waVe of anti· Soviet propu!!'l1'UU roSe in the press, nldio and I cJ c\'i.~i() n ; and when all surls of organinliolls ullI}()S(·d to the C"IllIllllll;sl Party began Iv c", cT)~c . This was why II!" CI'SU Central Com mittee _ . again pro[>OscI I tlHlt a hilal era l meeting he held.
On "by 3, the decision (mlluber /0) was tak en to summon the Czechusluvak leadership to Muscuw for im mediate talks,
SUMMONS TO MOSCOW
Insofar as the Czechs had e,~prt's sed their desire to discuss economic matters, they eould clai m with some justificatiun tha t the ).Ioscow meeling cOllvelled Oil May 4 had heen called at t he ir initiat ive. Ye t Ihis sCems 10 have uecn more a fal:e-savt ng de"kc to
ameliorate th e elrcct of having to leave for ).·l osCQW without allY prior notice . Dilbeck, Smrkovsky, Cernfk, and Bil"ak arrived the re at 2:00 A . ~I .• and talks began immediately." The Soviet delegation (.-onsisted of I3rezhnev, Kosygin , Podgorny, K.ltushev, and Hllsakov. The eommllniqlle pliblisllL'd in Pravda on ). Iay 6 reported that t he talks tuok place in an '·open and <-'{)mradcl y spirit ," but mentioned noth ing abou t total ag:reement. t hus imlicating that the Inet ting d id not stop the serious clcteritlrdtion il l rd,lti(llls he tween
the two sides. Eeo no mic matte rs were indeed 0 11 the agenda, with th e Czecho.dov;)k loan application und er considl:wtion, Pe rhaps in n : spcmse to increasing rc ports that CZL"Choslovakia was seeking a loan Iro m v(lrious \\'estern snur<-"Cs, induJilig the \\'orld Bank .IIIJ the i ntcrwltioTHl1 ~'I onctary FUlld." it had heen made known ill Praguc that ,-Mich~1 Tal". 1£ .11 ,,,,d, .. .. "
111\il~
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.11.), .1-6,
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Ii.
,I'~""" a" ,h"n fUl the It,,,-,,,d. d,l<..I April
19&i . 26_ 1968. "f " 1\""",,;,) S,··
,·". il)· C""",,,il rn''''li n~ "" E.,,,,,,, E""~,,, I,dd i" \\"""hi"~(o,, un AI',il 2·1. J!J68. ",,, Hfm~d 11..1 Cz«:ho<".ibl,- rne,nh" ... hil' in (h~ 1\<>rl,1 l'I;.nk " ,,,I \I", 1 "(~r"atio,,~1 M ",,~'.,)· Fund . II al", "" -..-.,1,,,1110.( 11o'''gh"""., So..,,,,Wri •• n", k. CI;H' ....1. ~"d F""k" CIA D"".:\'" lie], ,, •. Ih-pu'" VuJe, S''''f.-1,,,)' 1~ ,j,lc'" . ml n,h_ "". Th" memof."d"m " -'" Jcd." ,; ~,~l .".1 ,dc.,.,d '0 'h" ""tlo", und", , h~ h ....do", of
"
,"
73
APHIL I O- MAY.;
the Soviets might he favorably disposed to extending the loan themselves."" At the meeting, however, the Soviets 'iOught further clarification on Czcchoslovakhl's irlVr,slmcnt plans. As Smrkovsk}' makes clear, Kosygin in particular appearcd 10 he concerned lest the Czechoslovaks reorie nt their e('"Ollomie development toward the West: Cernrk . ex plaine<1 our need to modernizc Our manufacturing in_ clustrv. \\'e needed about .100 10 500 milliun ruhles. We wanted tu have the luan from the Soviet Union a"d we said that if the Suviet comrades couldn't manage tn lem! us that milch, we would apply to the international hank ur sumc 01 hl'[ source. We un derlirH.'d that in th e event of our borrowing from the West . the ueal On OOr side would he Ift~ated 011 a strict ly mn llll eft:iall);l~i.'i without polit iwl ~trings. T he reply 10 that- frorn K"sygin-was (·"snal. th,,! they "~),,Jd r:~ amin e our request. But Kosygin dilln't lilrgt!! to TCmark-for whom tliu We actuall y want tn rna rlllf"cturc eonSo",e r ~o()(l s? For exporl? He ,;.aid tl];lt the 'Vest dilln't m,ed oor l'OmUrIler ~oods antl wuuldn'l wanl them in flllure. So then we'd be wanting 10 get oor goods on the markets of the socialist countries. especially "f th e Soviet Union. " 'ith the help "finvestment capital from the western muntries. Bul the socialist market didn 't wnnl our ~'OnSo",er g'K,J, e ither. it r"_,,,,!.:cl our invcstment goo,ls, '" Judg ing from t lte compos iti on of the two negotiatin g te:JllIs :Jl1d the repor ls that circu lated la\l:r. ut h,:r important items we re also on th e agenda. As in the Dresden IIIccting, the Soviets wanted all explanatio n from Ihe Prag ue leadership li)r the increase ill antiInfO.-ma! ion
.1.<1. ti" n!Io" , .'!c<",,,b of "'IX)!!' i" I'r.s". of df",b !o .""k \\'",!e", I""", !o
,,,,,,;.,,,! it, "",)ow,,")'. ,.... Galia CoI.n. n_{r"m n"I.· I" C!Ldw'/,,",,'''' . 1', 39.•"'\ S~iI\in~,
(;=h",l"mlia', ',,'em'l'led Il,·ro/,,' itm. p. 600, " Ae"ordin~!o z.Jeni'~ MIl'nM, ' t",,!ed 10)' Ihe .\'"" li. rk 1'i",~,. Mav l. J9&!!. Michel Taw (I", M(mJ~. MOl' 4. 1!1!Xi! al,.., '!'H)' ~" -~, •• ! ,,,,,,,,,,,' in I' .... ~" " to the dr..,. rh .. the USSR "'.., bm ..... hl)' ,1;'1""''''!10 'l "d), lng th" 1""'ll>llil)' of ~Mcndlng a UOiI mlltl'"1 10;,,, !n 1101.1 '" C<>I\..e,lil,\e C''''~''''Y to I'r.~',., . In conne<1 io" with !I,e;" "'1''''1." i! "'.. ,,,ntored lho! """1',"" .1 .." r" ,'1,1, 1'.... ~,,~. I"""ihly f;", ,JH' n: n.y c.,ld,,,,,;,,,,. 0" M.y 9. Fu, " de~ai1Ct! .nal)', ;, 0( the I~'nd (0 (;zet'h",~,,·.ki", 1";,,, 'PI'Ii<-.!iWl. incl uding th~ p.,or:o_ <1",1<,.1 r••:! !Io" !Ioe (;()H . ">1.,,.1. • "d ,10" lIS SlI '''''•.• ( C,,,d~,,~ ,, .. l (a 1l.:WO milli"" r...-. e il:!' ,,,d,~nl'" """"'" lalon ... l $1.56 1,;tt;'H,). ..,e HFF.. Il.",urc/•. f.a.ol r.urn" •. C= lu..J,,· ,,,,kia , ~t.r 28, 1\l6II. ~U p'1' oJ,,, nw.i",.i"cd ,1,a' rhe So,';'" Union lu> <1",o1c,I)' ' ''pp\y of ",10"'1 10 C,,,-,<,h<,, Io.,,kl, . n,i. I"O'''\''~( an immedl,le offici,! '!enla\. " 'i'h c';n;: an,~"",dog rio" 125.000 '00. <>f wlo~,,) h.d I..,.." de1i.-~,.,,1 h"", -",,n April I_Z,'i. "'1110 ,I,ipnlt'n!.> du,ing lhe I.,! nin c d_l" l'i~I.~, 110. " """,I, "'!i "',.".,f Sm,""",!.:)·. All flllfinuh.d (:~n<"~'flli"". I" IZ, Th.. !h~ 100." applicalion lu>C(J'" mcelin~ ..... . 1", ",nfi,med h)' Sm n,,,,,,ki' in hi' '''''timony t" th.· N~llorlal A.. cmhl)' ForelWl Atfai" Otmmill •..,. en:.. ~tay 15. 1965: h~ l),dK'ek in hi. R,,,I~ ",
,,=
a,"
IGh
JIz
M
TIlE I'IUH.': III S1S l'E IIlOI)
socblist 'Ict i\'it ~'. Brezh n ev spen t lIIuc h of th e ti lile readin g aloud excerpts from n e \\'spapers or re ports of mee tings , man~' of which were previousl y lJllknuwn tu the Cwclltlsluvak leaders the mselves. Th e folluwing U('t-'Ollnt hy Smrkovsky provides an e xcellent in d ic:llioll of the lone oflhe m eel ing: th e whule. we spe nt the day listenin!! to ~ luni,: li st of the th ings which . . th e Sovie t re prl.'se nt ative.\ disliked about developments in oor cou ntry. In efr~ L it WaS a rea ding of th e While Book from a work ing draft. Uurin" the talk. secretaries ke pt ('()Ill in!!. hringing Comrade Brl.'zhnel' more "ml moT(' info rm"li on "bonl what th is ur that newsp"pe r or m~ga7.ine wa.~ writin" ~hout us. ",hat this pl.'rson or that hud said. It's a fact that IlUIiC of us h,u l ;U\ ~' idea ahout muny ufthe thing.~ they re"d " ut lu "'. "'p<'dally Brt,~J , ,,cv. \V],,,I W"S in "01"" ,listricl HeWS paper. that there was such and slich an article. a mccling someplace. where M.llllehody spuke and what he sa id. I low l,mhl we bave known il all? They galhere,l the infi>rtnation-aml here [in Praguel Amhassadur Chervonenko did ii - from the people who were l"te r C'.lllcd Ihe (.·•.>n~crvatives. Those people mlleeted ;lil kinds of !!ossip ~Jl(1 handed th em to th e Soviet embas~y-~ml from there the stuff wen t 10 Bre7.hnev. We coulllcreil. espe<·ially Dubc:<ek and others. with fac ts and iuformatioll or much gr('ater we ig ht. . \\'e "'ere di s('~lll(."erted to fiud that the y show ...od no illtere~t whatsocver in Ma)' Day. where the p"r_ ticipation had he en so im pressive. . That d idn 'l in lef('S I them. They were interesh.od in meetings of KA N "nll K 231. attended hy fifty or" hundred people, sometil1le~ less. \\'e were sicke ned by the whole b usiness, because We re:,li7.et! th ey wer,m 't intere .• leu in the facls. in our o\'erall silu"lioll, bUI were look ing fur prele.~ t s for opposing liS. '" 011
FollOWing the m eeting . in hi s les tim uny to th e Nationa l Assembl y's Foreign Affilirs Com mittee. S1I\rkov s k~' stated th~1 th e Soviets had bee n try ing to discern whe the r th e Pr.t.g u e le adersh ip ha d control of the s ituation in their own count ry. Althuu gh he rei te rat e d D u bce k's assttratwe" that the Sl)"ids hud rC{'eived CZCdlOslova k cxplanali()n.~ w ith sOllie unders tanding, Smr kovsky's {leHallt pmlllise that "no fOTCe , wh e ther international or domestic" would d eIled Czech os lovaki ,\ frolll es tablis hin g a '·hu manis t. d e m{}eratil' " Sm,ko,·,ky. ,\n I./.!linhl",t/
Col'''·'·...",;,'''.
p. II. I" hi, 1~'1i"'()"r I" Ih~ 1", li'H,;,1 A,-
,.""ht)· Fo , e;gn AIT"; ,, ()H",,,;II ,,,,. S""k...., k)' . J",ilh·, t 11,,1 tI,~ C"",)",.l",·ak ,1d"!,"Ii,,,, loa
b<,,,,"
" RuM 11'0'«'.
"'illo " a ,,,,,lOll,;, "f,I"-"";('" f",-1.>" aboul """ """iali'l
~I "J' 6. tll&l
ro,,,,,,
~PIUI.
75
H'-MAY 4
ilnd sociillisl society" '" clearly implies that the "Ilks lwd not ended in agreement. Indeed , this is confirmed hy the statement in ilis memoirs: "'Ve came b:wk from Mos<-"Ow so disillusioned that we <-'(J\1ldn't, in all conscience, say .mything to our puhlic at horne, since it was impossible to speak about the actual <-'Ontent of the talks," '" DulX:-ek, too, made it clear that disagreements had been voiced, and in an interview with Hudti I'nlvo, which , interestingly enough. was reprinted in Pmt;dll , Dul:H:ek m:lde only the most transparent drurt tu prese nt the ne){utiatiuns as norm;,1 and trolLble-ffl:(~ :
It is prol}er amollg good friemb . 1101 In hide behind diplumatic IlOlitcncss hut 10 speak oul openly, as an C'Ioal with c'1 uals. In this spirit. the Sovici comrndcs expressed COHt-ern lest the process of d emocrati7.oltiull in our country be U5<-...I against socialism."
Bil'ak, the lllost <-'Onsc rvat ive mem ber of tht~ Cz<->t:]m.lovak (Ielegat ion, and nne who, acco rdi ng 10 Smrkovsky and H:ijd: , agreed with the Soviet assessment of the situation in Prague, "" also subsequentl y provided a full :K't-'Vunt of the :\hy rnee! ing. Tn !he Sovie!s' judgmellt, l3il'ak main!ains, the C I'Cz lea\l{:rship had no! carried out the promises made at Dresde n and, Oil the contrary. !Ite siluation had dc!eriumte{] sint"C theil, Ar.:<-'Vnlin,l! to ml"ak; They litcntHy 1X:gJ;"d us 10 re .."gniz.c til<" dall!;"r which threa tens th.: CI'Cz and tSSII arisinl! ""I "r t 10" );1"0"'110 of t')1IlIlerrc""lut iouary fUR"t;S. In Ihat situatiun nn aid of any kind muld in dIed improve Ihe position or Ih" T<: ['\lltli~' and th e sta mlard of li\'ing uf its pt.~'I)le . when th e lear\.:r.;h ip "f t I,,: part)' "!HI )!UH:nIHH:nt wen: 1I0t taking matte rs illlo their OWII hallus. They implored liS 10 r<::,li7.: thaI disor.lcr "nd d,aus "'"nuld ine vitahl y spTU"d from th" politit,,1 sphere to the lIational t....."Ouom)' whid, ... ,ulll leild to a ..·"t:l5tmp],e .
The Soviets, he said, "hegged liS not to forgel tlta! the Western boundaries of the CSSR were at the same time the boundaries of the soci;,lisl C;UllP" Th ey t:"'I'I"l'iz."d II,.. , ,,c rifk.,s that Soviet leaders had made in cstahlishillg socialism in Czechoslovakia and (k>t:lan,d tll:1I "limier 110 circumstiUlt.·CS \\~)ll id it he permitted for " (1'10:. ,\ taf' 15. tIlf>'l. quo!,..:! in liFE. R""ca,e/', t:".,'II:"n'I" , (;,r;lw.I,~'ak",. M~r 16, 19lill . ~h" /lu,/f I'ol{:ll. SII'R . E ICf27follK'i 4 "SI1lTko'-s~)' , 1\." U"fi~;., IK:,1 C"""",..,,,~'''. M.r 8. 1!l6/i_
,'_ I~,
.~ I'm"d~.
"'Smrk,,,-.kj'. A" Unfini,h,,/ C"",-~r""lio", I'. Il , .,,,1 J lIij<'k. f)ir an. aI'''''. p. 80.
''''
o::h
76
Tilt: I'lIt:·cmSIS I'EIUO[)
evcnts tu dc"dup ill .~uch u w,ly thai suvm:r ur laler socialis Ul wuui(1 be liquidated in C:wchoslu\"ukia. Th is had IXK"OIllC the concer n nut only of CzccllOsluvakiu, but of internat ional socialism as a whole. " ,r. In llis speech to th c S,~plt:ml)('r tOO\) C I'Cz Central Cummittee plen u m. Bil'ak paraphrased the Soviet Jl05i t iun as fo llows: "To permit CZtlchuslovuk ia to fallout of t]le sod,llist ,,:unp \\1)ulJ mea n the be trayal of socialism an d t ill; annulling of the results of th e second world war, . an d this they C()!Il< m"jor Ill/,ll "ni w .rUde (Of 1,,1), 16. 1970, .1 .. , in /'n"A" IHIIH': hd." " p. ,'1(;(1, " S"b./cdl'i 11), " " . 3S (tu701. 2&1 _&5. "'Spo,,,,,h h ) 11 .. , 11<, A"~'l>t W. I%'J, i" S\\' H. EEfJ I;'7/(",.IH~ i "t,''''i<'w " -ill< ~lIy"o\I, I , !~7\j,
"u,ho,'
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ICh
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M
AI'IIIL IO-MAY"
77
creased demands were being made for erea{ ing a legal political opposition to the CPC7. that by nature (.'fiuld only he ,In anlisocialist opposition., . They said they knew the speci6c pcople responsible for this and asserted that an end would be [mtto it." " The results of the May 4 meeting were a setback for Czechoslovak negotiators. AltllOugh their appliC"dtiun fur an ecunomic loan was to be considered further, it was dC;lr tlnlt the Soviet.~ \\lJuld !Lot allow its use for any fundamental reorienting of C7.eehoslovakia's t rad ing links ur industrial dc velopme nt. Further, it would appear that Moscow firmly ticd the question of a loan to the success of the epez leaders in carrying Ollt political mea.~ures to put an end 10 antisoci,llist activities. The Soviets called for the suppression of KAN (the Club of Nonparty Activists), K 231 (a human righb duo opell tu anyone imprisoned under 1948 Law No. 231 for the defense of the relJUhlie) and similar grou ps, and the reintrodllctioll of censorship. Dubcck (."()nccded that military maneuvers Imd also been discusSl..J . \Vllile be agrec(] that "joint military e:l.
CHAPTER FIVE
Findings
I)I~C I S I ON.s
Then: we re ten decisiuns taken in the twu phases uft llc pre-crisis periud: Der;ision x""","~ I'IIASE OSI;: MAUCH 2;2 - ""1111. 10
1'>-[:lrr'h 22
2.
Under heavy pressure rrom Poland and Eas t GermallY. Soviet leaders de<:ide to con\" ~I1C " 61"" SU11IIIIit in Dre~den to discuss. among otlier issues. th e situation in Czeehoslo\'akia.
)T,hrth Z3 11,,) Soviet .Ielegalioll to the Dre,de ll meet_ ing agmcs to hold a high_le"eI hi"" '~1) nomic conference in the ncar future to (1)nsider. among other things. C1.edlOs lo""kia's re'luest fur a loan tu restructure her ceonom~ ·.
:l
Mar<:h 2.1 The Soviet delegation to the Dresden illeeting agree s to cnntinlle witlt plans ror the rllrther in tegration urlhe military high command "flit" \\'arsaw ]';1(,1 and to wid"n the smpe of adivity of its \'olitic;,\ Consultati"e Committee. ~laf{'h
23 The Soviet dele!;Utlon to the Dresden meeting agrees not to intervene further in C1.echus lo'-ak inkrnal affain provided that the Czechoslovak delegation acts 011 the asSUr,U'Cl', a",lpromises it has given.
79 Decisim' ."'·w"be r
5
Oa te (.'O"/,',,t Apri!6 - 7 The decision is hlke n. possibly by all ad hoc group withi n either the Politburo or the
S<-'(.>rclari:lt. 10 alter t he last-minute ~rr::lIIgc "'ell ts fur II,,: CP!iU Central Co mmi tt ee I'lcnlllll.
6
Ap ril ]O
The party', Central Committee plenum conflrt"s thnt a C'~tnpaign must be w~ged to tighkll i,ko!ogical di sci pli ne wit hin th e CI'SU and the country as:, whule.
7
April 10
The Cent ral Co nnnitlcc cmlurscs the need for greate r blo<' unit\' as e:lll.·t! for at the Dresden ml'Vting. I'IlAS~: TWO; ", "IIlL JO- MAY 4
8
Between A group wit hin the Politburo decide s to indude "mutual brothe rl y aid" as a pri nciple April 18 and 21 guv" rn in g r "lation s bt- twccn communist states and "mili tary ass istance" as a possible modality.
9
Be tween April IS and 20
10
May 3
\ \'ar.<>vsky to Prague for negot iations on Pact maneuvers.
The Pohtlm w dccidc~ to summon thc C~ech().,lo\" .. k
leadership to mediate bi l:lteT,,1 talks.
~I OSl"W
for im-
TH E PS YC HO LOG ICAL ENV IIIONMENT
The p rc-cri~ i~ period began with t he decision to call the Dresden meeting un ~'I arch 22 and e nded wit h t he bilateral meeting between Soviet and Czechoslovak Ica(lcrs in Moscow on ~I ay 4. The re were seven speeches or articles b~' the ]lo\itiml und military leade rs hi p published in li,l1 d uring this pc riud .' "nly Iwo of which were diredly relevant to the situation in Czechoslovakia. These were the speeches by Brt:zhnev tu the ~l oS<.~)w City Party Confere nce on " larch 29 and Grishjn at the meeting marking the ni ne ty-eighth annin:rsa ry of Lenin"s b irt ll on :\ p ril 22. C7.CdIOSlo' Desc, iption, or ,h~"" .""""he. and ~"."",b (l "ol.~-d ",~ from ,h~ futtu"'i"~ .... 0""'>: B"'tJ'ncv. l'nI~da. ~torcll 30. J9&I: !.:o'r!9 n. Liuro,u"",,,,, I;":.<"'Q • .... pril 3. 19611, Slt,c· menk<>. K ...u naY" ~u=-1a . .~p,i1 1. J96II: Sh"lt'pin, Tn,,' ..... pdl ~ . IlIfi.S, (; ,;,111" . J;;<e.tkl, .... p,il 23. UIfi/I, C,,,,,.j, k,, . Pm",I~ . M~) ' Z. 1968: l\ ·I', lw ,\ ',"", 0..",,,.1,1,,,,,1 . .'by 3. 19M.
""
o::h
80
vukia was also th e subject of debat e at the April CPSU Central Committee pl{mu1ll and th e mee t ing of tb e ~'Ioscow party IIktiv ad dressed by BrcdlllCV and Ycpishcv. but neithe r the proceedings nur th .. sp.:I·dlt':s were published. Other S llCf.'C h c_~. howeve r. par-
ticularly those by Shc1cpin . Grcchko. and Pc l'shc un various internatiunal the mes, rcinfiJTCe the results of tbtl analysis of the Ilrczhn c v and G ri shi n speec hes. All the speeches 1l1(lintaincU th'lt the increased a~rcssin: n css uf U.S. imp c rialiml was tIl e major source "ftens ion ill inte rnati o nal
affairs. Probably the most severe de nunciation of the United 51,IIes (:arne from Shclcpin . T his is nol too surprising ,IS the oeC'asiull of his speech was Ih e D ay of Solidarity w ith th e Vi e tn;mlCse ()Cople. He mig ht have taken thi s o pportunit y to a ttack U. S. polides in general in area~ uth e r th a n Vic tn am, ~ut'h a~ th e ~liddie East ur Ct: n" tral Europe. But thi s he did not do. and e ven in his men tion of the resu lts uf the \\'arsaw Treaty Orl!ani7.ation (\ VTO) me e ting in Softl, he l.~>ll fint:d hi IIlsc1f to t h,lt sect ion of t Ill: Sofb resol ot i011 O il Vietnam. Grechk o's speec h. (It the ~Iay I),IY panlde in Hed Square, was ,"cr y ""wh ,\ sct·pic('c aA~... ir. Soc ialism. hc dcc;larcil. con ti n"ed tn
l'njll}' new ~l1t~'l'SSl'~, htlt he wanwd that imperialism \Va~ t!l11harkin g on a mOT!' aggressin, policy. The soun:es of this increased thre'lt were, in th e order listed by Gre{.,hko. upt:n military ventures s uc h as Vietnam. " ilieolog ieal su bver~i on aga inst socialist states, blatan tly interfering in th e dome stie affa irs of ot her countries," and "the in creased activit v of th e militaris t and reva1H:itist forces in \\'cst Germany. " For dealin g wi th th ese e hall e nges he proposed rai sin g eombat prepart:llness, improvint< IInit y hetween socialis t countries, an d imple m c ntin g "spL'{;ific measures" !ilr strength enin).( th e \Va rs aw I'aet. Grechko r eminded the audi ence that th e Centwl C UlIlmittee plen ll m rel'entl y hal\ reafIinm:d its readi ness "to do c~'e ry thing necessa ry" for th e lilTther consolidation of the socialist co mmonwealth. His speech . th erefore, while pay in!! lip se rvice tl> the sll\J\'ers ive dange rs of U. S. imper ialism revealed him liS cunL'ern ed primarily with mcetill g direct military ehallenges, sudl as tllO~ e presented in Vietna m and Central Europe. I'ershe's orientation was somewhat differcn t. His spceeh, markin g th e 150th alln ivt:rsary of Karl ~1arx's birth. was dc!h'e red in th e GDH. The su bject nHlttcr and the venuc lent th e msc!ves to an orthodox and hard- line oration, and Pe rshe ('e rtainiy did not disap" point ,mY01le. Apart from speakin g 'Ihullt " Ian. he pr;.ised th e new
PINU INGS
8/
GOB l'Ollstilutiun as an exemplar of sol'i:llist leJ.!ality :md democracy and comlemneJ the rise of neo-Fasclsm and militarism in the Federal Bel)ublic, which he describe<1 as a serious threat to European securit y. TIle situatiun in Europe filled the Soviet leadership and other progrcssivc forces with ,m~icty, ilL'(:ording to I'el'she, and one action to meet th is danger was the fortht11m ing November meeting uf Communist ,uul 'Vurkers part ies. which wuuld help unify the Communist movement and all rcYtllutio nary furt't!s. HeYealing himself as a staunch. orthodox " larxist. unlikely to greet Brandt's Jlolicy of"huilding hridges" with :my enthusiasm. Pel'she nevertheless did not {Jwell on subversion as a particular threat to socialism and did not advocate allY drast ic ur speciflc (:uurse of action. This was, of course, in some marked ("{mtrast tu the sJleech by Grishin, already analyzed in depth in chapter 4. Grishin was t he only political or milit:lry le,lder to Hdvocate 1he sllet'iflc lise of military mea ns to defend the frecdom and independence of peoples thrt:atened by imperialism , wherc ver ,md huwe ver they might be threatened, and to link that adn.eacy closely to the resu lts of the Dresden meeting. He must be ciassiGe(l, therefore, as the mujor spokesmun lilr hard-line opinion in the leadership Juring the precrisis period, and the fact that his speech w,\,~ made ,tt an imporhmt party occasion in the presence of the "triumyirate" indicates that such opinion was not , even at this stage, insuhst:mli,IL Brczhne\" s speech to the ~lo'>COw City Party Conferencc of March 29 t'Ont'(:Tltr:lh:d prinwrily un dorlll:stic ideological issues and revealcd his strong eoncern about revisionism. nationalism, ,md intel1ecllHiI dissent. Unlike SO Ill{: uf llis colleagues. Brczhney did nut cunsider Vietnam ur Central Europe the Irunt line in the struggle between East and West. Indeed the major threat was not a direct eXhlTllH! ~lllac k ~lt ~lll: "lh put it hriell~', the ideological struggle is today the Bereest Iron l of the da~s struggle." \Vhereas Shclcp;n alld Grechko felt Ilml imperialism waS ",ure Ihall capable of launcbillg a direct milit,lry attack. Brct.lmey fearc(1 a more indirect approach: "Not daring to c ngtlp:c in a frontal attack Oil the world of socialism, irnl>erialisill is trying 10 weaken tllc ideulogieal and political unity of the Ilxlrking people of the socialist countries." Brezllllev's attack on revisionism amllhe ,luScnt'C of all}' mentiun uf
82
TIlE I'IlE-(;KI.S IS I't:Il IUJ)
shIVs, tile Hu mall ians , and ti le E\lro-L~)1Il1l1\11l i st s aga inst til e "splitting tactics" of the Chinese dogmatists. Based Oil th e adnal spet.'(:lies made dllring th e pre-L'risis periud from ~ Iarch 22 to ~Iay 4. 19G5. olle ma)' contlude that as yet CZl'Chosluvaki a was nut the un iversal and overridi ng cOllcern for the Suvit:'l leade rship. Bre/.hnev, he L'ame of his L"{}nCCTTl for ideological suhve rsion . mi ght naturall y have shared th e views uf Shc1est ,lilt! even th e Polish ,lilt! E,lst Ge rm ,1Il leHde rshi ps about eve nts in Pnlglle, hu t ,111 ilulil"a[ions are tha t ilrezli nev .~ [ iII l \ad (.~lIlritl ell ee in ])ulx'Ck's ab ili ty to (."{}n trol the si tuat iun. By the cnd of t he pre<;risis pe ri od, however, when th e Czeehoslovak leadership was sU lll m()1led to MOSl'OW. there was growing evidence that Brczhnev was lusin g patie nce with Prague and he<',(lll1 ing Illore asse rti \"[~ within the Soviet leadl' rship. I\eve rt hdess. he still was a grea t adhe re nt of CO ll se nsus politics. and th us to th e ex tent that his stance on Czechoslovakia hard e ne{] tuward th e end uf t he pre-<.Tisis period. it wa~ p robably his resp{)ll .~e to a general slli1i in the bldership's view of the j'mgue Spr i ng. ~ Bre7.1meV·S upinions un till" dangers of re\'isionism, nationalism . :md imperialist subversion Pllt him rnll gh l ~' on the SHme side of t he
ideological
.~pectrllm a.~
Shelest. Grishi n. ami Yepishel': whereas
Shdepin and Grechko were much more (~lI1cerned with impe ri alism's ove rt activi ties in p!a<'"es snell ,L~ Vietnllln rather than with the thre .. t of su bversion. Shdepin. I'e r.~lll'. Sus]"". ,l[ld I'on " ;"'W of I!",>f,",~' i, '''I'1",rt.li,'Y 1)"';' 1.. ,, · M"kl"~ "", I H" ,,","H"r",k' 1'.. lil b :' 1'1' . :vI _f,7 .
83
FIl\ml\CS
demning revisiunism, for snch a (:ondcrn nation would alien:lte the vast majority of p,arties upon whom the Sl1l'CCSS of the l~Jl1fcrcnce depended. Suslo\' also huped that the Socialist part)' ill West Ge rman y (the SPD), headet:l by Willy Brandl and currell!ly part uf the ru ling coalition, would be represented; and Shclepin, for his part. had established [.'ontael5 with the nun-Communist tr,l
IGh
JIz
M
84
TilE I'lI.t:-CIIIS1S 1-'t:1I10U
Cz~chusluvakia
toward the \Vest might d eprive Soviet markets of
needed cap ital goods; also excessive or uncontrolled reform might jeopardize the survival of Kusygin's own, more limited, cHort s to
refurm the Soviet economy. Kos ygin had another interest during these months, namely, the beginning of disarmament lind arms control negotiations with the \Ves t. Negotiation of th e Nud ear l\unprulifcT;llitm Tn::aty was
to pass its first hurdle in carly summer when the United States. the Soviet Union, anil Great Britain were to be its first sig natories. The real object of the exercise for th e Soviet Union , however, was to
pressure the United Stales into obtaining West Ge rman adh erctwc to the treaty; ami in order to llchicve this. ,Ill th e Soviet Union's own allies would have to show willingness to si~1. Soviet problems began when Rumania annouueeo:l that it would not support any treaty that legitimi7.Ctl the superpower monupoly of nllde,lr weapOilS. \\'hell sympathy for this view was expressed in PrJ.gue. it began to appear that tllis major diplomat ic initiat ivc would amount to very little. T Im.> Primc Ministcr Kosygi n. who with Foreign ~linis tel' Gro myko had personally gUided the negotiatiolls, might havc had littlc reason to led sym p.lth)· for I'Tilgllt!'s iml.:pemlent .~ta lld 011 this issue. t\t th e same lime. initial conlat'is betwec n the Un ited States and the Suviet Uniun began on s.trategic arms limitatiun. Kus ygin was c ntrustcd with main t«ining and develuping tl lese conlads which were the precursors to the SAt..:r negotiations. Both he and Gromyko developed a keen persona! interest in th e negot iat iuns. despite grllve misgivings and mistrust hy other memhers of the leadership. ' Although not so apparent at this IlOint. the issue of wllether to negotiate with the United States at the same time that the Hussians were engaging "u. S. imperial ism" directly in Vietnam and indirectly in Czedlllslovakiu became illtrieiltely intc rtwinc(l with the Soviet handling of th e I'rague Spring amI also vcry possibly with ('ontinucd attempts within the Politburo to dis(:reuit Kosygin iwd his policies. George Brestauer ha., ,-~)gently detailed the rivaIry between Bre7.hn ev ilnd Knsygi n over domestic policy, which WilS particularly acute dur ing 1968. ~ This dOlllestic rivalry was certainly parallele(1 in foreign policy. hut in t llC latter area there had not yet emerged within the leadership a clear split be' s,,,, )01." Nc",holl"'. C"ld Oa,,,,,, -rhe S,,,ry "I S,ILT ' C~O!l'e
W,
Ilrcsl~"N.
KJ,,,,,hclu'c ,,,,,I H ..."I ,"~" 4.
uad".,
IGh
liz
M
85
tween hard-liners and soft-liners, or hawks and {loves. There were crosscurrents and c1euvagt:s hut few, if an y, (;uhesive ur dominant
factions , although the marked isolation of Kosygin was so acute
(l~
to serve almost as a public sigmll of his politit-.!! decline. Even at this stage, Kosygin had very few allies. Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB , although probably not a major figure in th e inner decision-making drde,
Ill:'!)'
hallc shared
some of Kosygin's views. He made no speeches during the precrisis period; his last had marked the occasion of the fiftieth annive rsary of the founding of Suviet intelligt:!llt-e services at the end of Dece mbe r 1967.' His comments at that time, lmwc \'c r, were not without significum:c for the dcbutc taking place during the Ilrccrisis pcriod , lie maintained that imperi:llisrn, nlther tlHIll herollling more aggrcssive, bad lost its " previous position of dominance. " He emphasized neither the militllT'Y threat nor the threat ofimperialist subversion : the inte rnational sitnation was "L'Olllplex:' he said, and Suviet SUL't.'CSS demauded a "pcrsistent struggle on all fronts -cL'Ollomie, political, and ideo!ogkal," He did point out tlmt Mao's "splitting tactics" worked to the advantage of imperialism, but be did not go so far as to back Sus!ov's call for an intcrnational Commlln ist eonferenee. Two statements, howcvcr, revealed him as particularly sensitive to changes in Eas tern Europc. First, hc referred to tIle importanL't' of strung ties between the KGB and fraternal intelligellee serviL-es, who toget he r L'O uJd deliver a " rebuff to enemy intrigues," Serond, he made the peculiarl y geopolitical observation that the Soviet Un ion's own bonk' r securit y was immeasunlbly enhanced by the contiguity of tIle other socialist statesessentially a restateme nt of the notion that Eastern Enropc scrvcs as a huffer wne for the USS R. It would be very difficult on tltis basis to conclude that Andropov bad a p:ldienlar view on Czechoslovakia, hul his nit her mild formulation s Oil the international syslem would not have Pllt him amon g those who feared eithe r [\n increase (n A!uerlcan aggressive ness ur a revival uf lIcu- I;"asclslIl ill \\'esl Germany. If anything, A!\{lropo\"~ rc ference to the need for struggle on the eCQllomic fronl - a mtller unusual statement for the head of tllC KGB-might have placed him as a liberal , although his emphasis on security links with Eastern Europe would have inclined him to he eauli()l1~ ahout the negative political repercus-
" ""
86
Tl I~: pn~:-cmsls
1'[IIIOD
siuns of any e('Ollomic reform. One shuuld remember thilt
These dilrererK't;!s of opinion hetwcen the leade rs are su ht le. but t hey gained sign ifiL-lInee as t Ire crisis ('scabte.l. In the Iigh t of t Irese differences. one can appreciate tir e extent to which the resolu tiolls passed by Ihe April Centn.1 Committ ee plenum really di.1 rcpresent lit best II conglomerate and at worst an lLn C,L~y (.'Omprornise between these varying images of th e external environment. AII,u::ks weTe 1ll,lde «I the plenllm on both dogma tism ami revisio nism, on both Western subversion and its h igh level of military prepar.llion. on both V.S. imperialism an.l \Ves t Cerm:m revanchism. The lead-
ership had concluded that there was heightened threat fmm the external e nvironment. hut certainly there was not yet (.'Omplete agreement that Czechoslovak "revisionism" and "irllpc rialist suhversion" were th e primary sources.
CRISIS CO:\IPONENTS As was note•.! in Chapter 1. the pre-crisis pe riod is distinguished from the preceding non-crisis period by a (.'Ollspicuous increase in pert:eived threat 011 the parI of det:isioll makt:rs triggcrl.-o by :111 eve nt or duste r of C'-ClltS . Evcnts surrounding the dismissal of Novotny from his post of first secretary and the first tentative attempts at reform by th e new Dulx'ck lead ersllip in January ami Fcbruary may be (.'Onsidcrcd the prelude to crisis. But it was nol until the worrying iniormatiull front Pr.lguc at't·umulated sufficiently to re{lnire (;onvening of th e multilatcral Dresden (.'{mferent:c that the pre-crisis period reali)' ue~n. The threat tu values was dilfuse, yet spt'(:ifie events did represent a particular threat. The prospect of cadre selecti on proceeding in Prague withuut lI. IOSt'Ow·s direct approval re presented a clearcut challenge to Soviet ('(m tro!. De tails of th e CPCz Action Pro-
''''
o::h
87
HNIllNGS
gram and criticisms in the Czcchoslovak press of the past twenty rears of Communist rule in the CSSH threatened the legitima('y of all Soviet-style systems, And Prague's proaastinaliun on the issue of \Varsaw Pact maneuvers presented the worrying prospect of another Humani:m-style def('Ction, th is time frum the very heart of tile pact's central front and thus <:ollstituting 11 ('Ollspicuous threat to the unity of the socialist camp and to the seemity of the Soviet Union itself, Except for Grishin's ('OlllTnents awut "military aid," the re is 110 real indicat ion that the Soviet leadership had as yet Jecided that the C7-cehoslovak reform movement must be stoppeJ, even ifby military means. Indeed as late as the heginning of ;\'iay, the Soviet leaders subsequently elaimed, thcre was still "understanding both for the objectivc complexity of the situation and for the ('Umplexity of the position of the cpez leadership itself" which prompted them "to abstain fro m making any public appraisals ilnd statements" abont Czechuslovakia that might exacerhate relations between fo,'l os('OW and Prague even furth er,' COPING I>.IECI-IAN ISMS Our model of crisis he havinrseeks tn examine the extent tu which a crisis situation affects the way decisions are made, It examines the impact of the crisis Oil the variUllS limc\iolls performed in the course of arriving at decisions: information processing, the pattern of ('Ollsuitatiull, the strncture of decisional funullS , and the consideratiou of altermltives, Loo king flrst at information processing, it is L'C rtainl y possible that the perceived ('U mplcxity of the international situatiun and tile diffuseness of threat perception aJll.'Cted the (,'gnitive perfOl'lll;tn('C of Soviet decision makers by leading them to process (Uld interpret information ;l])UUt CzedlOslova ki,l in different way_~, But on the whole, natural Jjfferences in outlook and function,ll responsihilities within the leadership wuuld predispuse individual leade rs tu process information diversely, and at this stage of the crisis, there is no clear-eut indicMion that crisis-induL'Cd stress was affL'Cting L'Ugnitive perfonnarK'e. As for the effect of cri~is on the pc recivc{l need and conseqnent qucst for infurmation, certainly the ('Ummuniqu(: of the Dresden meeting admitted that one main purpose of the conle rence was to • f ....<
88
'fHE PIIE-cIlIS IS PEIUOIl
o btain information abou t C7.cdloslovakia, ~ TI I(: growin g: U\lrnbCT of pllrges of l-'Onscfvalivcs from within th e C7R.chos]m'(lk security services and party IIPIJIIW I was deprivin g ;\'Iost-ow of its (lslI,11 information suurces ahou! tI le highest levels of the lCHde rship. This Jed the Soviets to increased usc of a lternati ve sources. espeCially the Soviel embassy in Pnlgue, whose 'I1nhassaduf upe ned up informal co mmunication dHltlllcls with leadin g co nse rvatives. many uf
whose political careers were being th reatened. It is {lilliculi to de ter mine how a crisis alfeels the rece ptivity and size of the information-processing group hecame littl{: is known about who receives and processes infor mation on CzedlOslovakia liuriHg HOH-crisis p,eriods. Yet it is interest ing that only at the end of t he pre-crisis period, at the bilateml ~ Iosrow mee ting of Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders, is any me ntiun uHlde of Brezhnev reciting excerpts from the Czechoslovak press verbatim from press clippings. This was to be a feature of s.:vera l later meetings as well and suggests that by the heginni ng of t...tay crisis escalilt ion had the e llcel of increasing the (Ullount of raw data reaehinl' the top leade rship. In te rms of the sc('olld L"Oping llleCh;Ulism, Ihe pattern of lunsultat ion. two gro ups seem to havI) hl:en cspcciallr important from an e arl y stage. The firs t was t he Central Comtllittee. It is irn]}ortant to nole tha t press ure for ronvening the Central Commitlt:e plenu m lit the beg inning of April (~lme from within the apporat itself. par ticularl y fwm part y ideologues anxious to achieve a firmer policy primarily to\\11rd dissent at home bu t also toward rev isionism abroad . This group \\';lS supp.orted by the second major consultative gro up. the East European leaders. The East German and Polish leu{lerships. more fearful of the effects of the spillov(:r frO Ill the Prague Spring than the Soviets werc at the outset. did not wait to be consulted: by all aC(.'(lunts the y imposed the ir views on '\!os<-'Ow and advoca te{l a ha rdt~r line toward Czechoslovnki;1 from ~1 ;lreh onward. Neither the Centra l Committee nor the East European leaders ('Ould be dassified as part of the d~' i s ion al forUlIl in the pre-crisis period. but the ir functions nevertheless extended wei! beyo nd mere passive {'Onsuliation . From the beginning the~' acted as policy advocaks. \.~l1lstitute{l pressure groups. and served as allies in the slow process of con senslls-building that began in the pre-crisis pe ri{}{l, but reall y only gained momentum later Oil . :"Jetthe r the Ceutral Committee fll/jlam! nor the East l~ lI ropea n lead-
" ""
n!,>l)lt'OGS
en repre5ented a unified group; there were cros5currents of opinion in hoth groups. It is interesting, however, that in both cases hard-line opinion was apparcnt ly ascendant Ii-mil the beginning, even before tbe Prague Spring became the overriding preoccupation of the Soviet leadership. As 10 d eds ional fnrums. infor mat ion here is vcry scant but several conclusions Clm he drllwn; 1. Authurity for llll strollegic or policy decisions resled wit h the l'olit-
hum. During Ihe pre·erisis [lCr iod. only two other formal orl"ln iw tioll s were ill\'olved in deeisioll makin)1;. and both made on l)' tactical or implementing decisions. The Centrol Committee forma!!)' took decision s 6 and i at their plenum. bUI the strategic decision 10 roll the plenum al all was lI1ade at a higher le\"el. Also. Ihe ehok<.l of speakers and th e tone of th e reso lutions would ha\'e bCt!1l dl.'Cided at the top. Similarly, military pressure to lw ld maneu"erS as reprcsented in decision \01 ",as a con! inuation of past policy, li nt a ne w de[lartllre. 2. The Politburo did delegate full authority to a subgroup, its negotiating team at Dresden. The SOviet team did , after all. mnsist of Brezhnc\", KO I}"",';n. Kiril cuko. ~hcle~t. Ilaii.>akov. and Itusakov; and evideuce suggests that tI('goti~tioll s wcre far from pro furma. furthermore, the subgroup did not seck. or at leas t did not ob· tain. post hoc approval of the results of the Dres den meeting from the fu ll Politburo, although th is was evcn tu ally forthL~ )ming fTtlm th c Central Committce plcnm" . 3. A ~UbgrollP of the Politburo did uppe~r to act either in the n~nlC of the Politburo or as a pure ly ad hoc group. Bee-oluse it is not known what constitutes a quorum lilr >\ Politburo meeting, it is impossible to determinc whethe r thou' dn'isiolls (numhers 5 and 8) takc n while important Politburo !lH:l1lbers were absent froUl Moscow were tak\~ll in the 1131llC of the Polithuro or on a purcl~' inforlllal husis. \\'hat does seem clear is Ihnt cven at this stngc. the decisional unit was not particularly cohesivc. judccd, Ihe pressurc to call a Central Committee plenum and to revisc th c set of principles gO\'erning inter·Cmmnunbt relation s appcars to have ("Omc not from" unitl."art)' See.-etariat ami Central COUl mittee !lppmllt. TIle fioal point of inqoiry is th t' effcct of escala tin g stress in th e search for ,lI\d range of alternatives. The be hav ior of th e Suviet leaders a t the variou s nego tiat ion s with their Czechoslovak COUllterparts indicates tlwt Most"(lw conside red till! range of alternatives available to be greal. includin g dialugue and persuasiuo, e(~mumic assistance, minatury sanctions , and diplomacy. By the end uf the
00
THE
PI\ .:-C I HS1~
r EIIlOD
pre-eris is period, at le,lst some of t he Soviet leade rs alsu felt t hat "militarr aid" \V,IS a !>ossihl(· altern,IIi\'(: for dealing wuh t he t hreats im posed by the Prague Spring, but this argument was not resolved un til the crisis period.
~
''''
o::h
"
PARTTHHEE
The Crisis Period
,
"
C HAPTER SIX
Phase One: May 5-June 6
MOSCOW CONS I DEBS TH E
~l I LlTAHY
OPTION
In Breche r's de finitiou, the crisis pcriu<1 is diffc rc u! ia!cd frum the
pre-cris is period by several key factors.' Firs!, there must he a measurahl y sharp rise in the saliell(:e ofUmc. Ol"c(lual impurtance, the increased perceptiun of threat is such that the decisiun makers \\~den their search for altern atives. And for the first time the possibility of involvement in military hostilities 1)e(1)mes a high probability by active ("tmsider.lt iun ufthis optiun. In Czechoslovakia, calls for the early COl\mcatiol\ of an E.~tra ordinary rouriL'cnth Party CunW"css to iustitutionalize the refor m movement and ,-,arry out cadre dmngcs increas.:d throllghollt ~1 [1y, making it clear in Moscow that the time availahle for bringing the negative a.~pects of the Prague Spring under t"Ontrol was dearly lim ited. ' The CPCz leadership's dl;.>t:ision at the e nd of ~'I ay to convoke the (."Ongress on Septembcr9 established a finite time for Soviet response. Also, in [I(."t:Qnl with Brecher's tlefillition, there is good evidence to suggest that during May fo ur ~eparJte but related military d eciS Ion s we re
U\;ld e
t hat in(.·n~as"d tlw prohability of in -
\'olvement in military hostilitie.~ . Detnils will be l)re.~en tcd late r in the chapter, but to summarize brieRy. Soviet leaders decided a. to IlOld extensive "nd prolunged '\'ars"", Pact ,,,,,,,euvers in C7.echoslovakia heginning in Ju ne; ' Mit-had Bwok,. """",J, a 1"hc
"
,"
TilE e ll l S IS I'EIUOI)
h. to press as an lIrg"nl matter for th" pcrmallent statiuning urSoviet troops on C7.Cchoslovakia·s w c .. tern frontier; c . 10 usc military maneuvers aod the presell l'fl of S"viet lroop ' ,,-, minatory diplomacy to dc tcr anti·Soviet he113vior and to support ''Qmer\'3tive cle ment' in their attempts to stage a comeback;
(1. to
pn'I""'" for an in vasion shonld ,,11 oth er meanS fail.
AC(.'Qrding 10 a variety uf persuasive sources, military options were first considered a vialll e allernative in ~Iar. Brez h ncv is c re d ited wit h s
Mlyn;ij', -,,<'Chlj'''''' 1'_ :1(16,
' ",,,,,,,riling to Eugene V. R""!<>w. under ~',,·. e!l"· of Male !n
IK ...·"''''
tI,~ C"n l",1 A
Ih~
Johm!lll iid,nini
'n,'.,;o"
''''lni",,1 ~~ " m,,,,I),, (,,' "'mplet~ lu,,, ;" ilidt "d b)' " .rl)· ~ I ay aillte !Jl~_" ( ....'" C. n, U,b.n, 'The 1"",,,in" "r c>c,<"" , ~,,-Aia. 1!JG/j, " 1' _ 110)_11", u, S. D" p." " .., nt of De · fen.e .1", CQ " .;JeJt~ 1 the h~dioo"d of S,,,-it'l in,·•• i(~, t» h. ,·~ i"' .... ,. ,,,1 i" ~I')'_ AI;,i" C_ .;" 'h",·~". 'lo~ ",,,h,.,,t " " 'fda'), "I' ,I~f~"", r,,, '),,;k nl' .. ,al)~;,. p '~p.t,eJ a n II _I"'~~ me"",. 'dl"] ,,m in ~I ay which ",,,d,,,hl 11,,1 a So" ict i"'-.'''.m C,=·h ",~,,'.k", wn,M nol "1'",1 the bal."cc or 1"""~r in Ccnlr..1EII"'I"" E"lI,o\'cn cond"ded th.. "s.,"ic l fo.-ce. arc h";n~ ",aitot.in"d i" • ,t,te of i",,,,,.,,,,,1 .1"" .",1 ,h"l' h.,,, , le p.,, ~~ 1 ,,·,·,·r.ll .. ],I ili'" ,al ,1;";,; 0,,. \" Ea'l~ m E" rol><'_ 0" Ilw ,,111'" hand . lflt. 1'",,1 th,t tl... C>t>Ch rt,,,,,,, ore I~" ",]i.hl" . nd thaI th~ WaJ>aw I,,,,,t ",,,,t IlC,,(rdliw the", ~"<..,,., ""It~, th~ C,,,,,,h 1~)I ,,,I"lio,, ",,],,<,<,> the Ih,,.,,," to NATO "f.n i",·.... i(~'- 11". m"""' "", _",1"'''1''''''11), l,uhl;,\o",1 in th" N"'TO "e,,~ h""l . ,1tI~nlic /1:", !S3 (0<1"t,<'T 3 1, 100II1.., nd ",f. " ed lo ;n 1M ;SS""" In r;e,m. "y. Ilw, ;"telti~.""" ","vi,,,, ,·hi.,[. C,·n~r.1 G",h"d We.",I. • ngJi])' cL,ime,1 .rtcr II". 1r""'., I"" that I". had ",<,,,,,,1 """" I\''''~''''''~''I Ic,.,I"" ' hnt "" ~Ia)' tI"~, n-C,,,,,," 11'"'<;1,,- Pacl In o,!" ",me I"'in~ 'rdined a"d ,'." na,\;"J fo, the jn,.,.,iw " (>c" Tlu: S,,,,d,,y r;",~•. .~"~,,, ' :15. 1968). Sir W;1I; .. ", Hayter. 11,;,;,1. .. "h... udor 10 M"",,)w. "],,, ".ted th, t 5<)\';," <'~ Ili"gen")- "l.nllh'~ and "'illl. , ), p"'p;I",II"", l'<"gOn in ~ I .y ("'.. Sir Willi~m II~)'_ '~', R"" ;,, t/". 'l'>rld. p. 3• . ' .\'~I& )i,,~ Tin",., MaJ' I~. I!J(;B. an,] [·'mllk!,,,I .. , Mlcc"u:ine 7,"ill"'~. ,\ by 13. !9(~~_ .\I",,.,,,'t'J. lllJt'C )\ ,1;,10 1"'1''''''- '1." "''''' c;"-"I.Ii",, 7.y"" ;';oI"i"" Il'ohmid. a"d • Commllni" ),)uth 1'"1"'" S::Ja",I~r _u /,,,I!lCh-L'.lrr;.,.t ~rtide< on ~"'}' .1. 19M. 1,,- 11 ... l'r.~'''' """"I~""I~" t "f I'A P ITIo,' 11,1i,!. \\("~,.,, A~" T"'}' 1"~" "". "i,,,) ,.Jit ie; d,,~ (Ioe ""\t·, ~""c" "r- "~lIt,.l;'t aml .. ,h·Sn,-kl le"d",,";.,," ;u C,_c'ch(),I("'a~ ia , T1, e . ,lid,·, 'I~ '~" "f . lkml'l. - to, ;",,,,.1,,,,, • 'didat"",hil' "f tilL' inl",H~" nt'i'- "nd ,,, m;"j· ,0;>0' ,,,,, ;"ltnr,,,-,, 01',1.., "", ki,,~ ,h,i' in CZL'cho. .. lovak,. "lid ""e" ,·,1 11,", "''''('1,,,,,,,1,,·,,
vr
"'"fL",
"".t ,,,,-, -"..
95
MAY 5-J ll r.;1: 6
even more explicit: the Duhcek leadership, it cbimed , "is guilty of treason against its allies," and as such "the provisions of the \V"rsaw P"ct llI"ke possihlc an intervention ",hidl would he in keeping with the interests nf the socialist countries." Warning its party workers that such an intervention would also involve the usc of East German troops, the memo stated: ··However. in the event of an interve ntion , which might include military intervention, collective measures will have to be taken. " ~ A similar circular was re ported on Ma}' 5-6 to have been re ad at party meeti ngs in Bulgaria.' It is not known whether similar informatiun bulletins were distributed to party cadres in the USSR altlmugh a secre t U.S. Department of Shlte telegram to its e mha.~s ics in Europe revcaled that Suviet diplumats at the UN and elsewhere weTl~ eirclliating st\lries that the Suvit:! Union hild the mo r;jl and legal right to in tervene militarily in C7.t.'Choslovakia if an an tisocialist or bourgeois govern ment were to be est;lblisllL'd there.' All these reports strongly support the argument that the decision tn hegin invasioll preparations was taken in earl y lI.lay as part of a morc active bloc strategy to explore the widest numbe r of alte rnati ves to bring C7.eehoslovukia into line. h may be impossible to isolate the precise day on which this decision was taken, aud there is uut much diret'! evidence pointing to a particular day. i nJcl...J, the transition from the pre-crisis to the crisis pcriod may not be a result of a spccific event or events bringing on a sudde n increase in threat pe rception. For a dL~is iun viewed by the analyst as marking a qualitative jump in the cscalation of the crisis sufficient to distinguish hctween a pre-crisis and 11 crisis period may 110t he pcrt"ein:d by the d,:cisio11 m,lkers in the same light. \vlult the amllyst conside rs a clualit
c.r
"r
the Ceo tral eommittN" th~ C'.i"Ctu..,Io,-~1: (;'''8"",ni<1 parj)' were '1'1',,,I.,,n,;'·e ...,",,' <1 .. ",1"1""'''''' ""~h' " I',,,h C"""I" .. I,,,·.~ •• ,~I ,I... 1'",1, ,,r " . ...."Ii>!
jh"t
tI",ckJI''''''''':' [" ,ep!)·. ,],,"" 0"",1,,,,kl\"~ l ",... it"", ,,,m,, ... ,,l<.'t.! in /'J&~ '''' ~Ia )' H. ]!_ilI. th.,j d", 1',,1;,10 le.,\~" , h(Jutd "'\: tn,·m,,·!.·,·, "",I,e(\,," d ,e , t"m"n,lr.!i,,", of 1'" l i,1o ""i ... ,... ;I)· .",0.1 ",,,, "'" n(~ roo"..! in di'<3hd'ction ",ilh li>e , tote uf ...,id)'. '" " ..., d ,e <...'" ill CTA."Ch",\,,,·.kl,.• UI"nlrnC Il>ty . MaJ' 30. 19b'l: .",1 ~'r,,,,"i' f'·j',l. "M",,,,,,,, "",I its ... 11 ... <.- p . 36. A, •
1>'' ' ' "",r~re" ,..- '''' ~ ! ')' 30. lh~ C''''''hu,k,,1lk fu'";~" ",;,,;,Ie< J~,,;...l an}· r<"lx"h that jh" CDR t"od ""hip ",:as 1""1",ri"l( il.> e.odre. ~T i,,,",,,ion IFiMne",1 Tim' •• ) nne l. t9f,lj). N" '"PI"'rHn~ ,leni'" "'..., i" ....-.:I. I~'wcvc,. in ea.' c.,,,,,",,,),. ' ~ I k-hcl Tal" . /~ Monrir . M,y ~_6. tll&i.
·U. S. D.:p" ,h"" ," ,,(S'~te. r~/
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Tilt; OUS IS I't; I\(QI)
decisiull maker may consider an incre11leutal escalation. And tltis possibility is enhanced if th e managemcnt of the crisis is inherently cautious, wi th escalation ac hieved only gradually and against (.'onsiderahl e opposition. III slIch cin:u,n ,hut'-"C', tl1<) clwn'-"<:s of .. tl1:.jor dCl'ision being blurred are ,-·tmsiderabl y enh:mced. Such was t llt~ Soviet e;lse, and it is likely th at the variuus splits and debates in the Politburo decr cased the darit y of decisions and Simultaneously increased the scupe of inte rpretation for ,IllY p:lrtieular d ecision. AltllOUglt it is p robablc, th erefo re . that th e d ecisions marking the beginning uf th e crisis period and facilitating the in vasion were taken in early Ma y, it is possible that tIL t: uccision makers may not have seen it in those terlllS.
THE SmL\llT FAILURE ESCAL\TES THE CIUSIS Despite the gradual b uild up uf h ard -line an d even interventiunist opinion. marked by tIle April Central Committee ple num an d the speeches by Crishin. Brezlmev. ;lIld Yepishev at th e end of Apr il. it was th e esse ntial failure uf th e ~h)" 4 summit tu resolve the disput e b e tween Ihe two side s Il,..l p roduced" de" r
behavior. This
W;l~
marked by a renewal of
pre.~s
~hift
in Soviet
polemics, in-
cre ased bilateral and multilateral blue nego tiations. and a notable increas e in th e lise of military {!isphLYs of force agailtsl CZe<::il()slovalda. as part of i\ gcneral campaign uf minato ry diplumacy. This sllift became noticeable imm,-. J iateiy foll owing the ~Iay " summ it ~Llld signaled all impurtan t dedsioll (nllmbe r 1/ ) made di n.:dly aft er the departure of th e Czechoslovak delegation on ~Iay 5 . U.S . State Departmt:nt officials . after cons ult ations with J;u.:uh Ileam. the ir ambassador in Prague. aho cOllduded that (m '\1;ly5 t he S(n'iets had {Iecided tu pu rsue a policy ur"decisive half-measures" and "a war of nerves" toward Czechoslovakia." This decision appare ntl y encompassed a ren ewal of press polemics. including an increase in .\Iose()w radio Czecl l-languagt: bro;.uicasts, th e liSe of military maneuvers ncar the Czechoslovak border. increased contacts with Cwehllslo v;.\k and hl oc leader; tu gange opinion an d g;Lther infi)r~ lIIatiun . and finally the approval (Jf co nt ingency plans fur a possi ble in vas iun. The evide nce strongly suggest., the decision to preparc for in' Sew r~rk Tim" •• May 12. J!JIi.!j. "",\ .\1 . )· Z7. !!If>/;. Abo ,he . uthor". inle ,,'iew " 'ilh (" .... me. U. S. amb.:.u .oo. to (;"",ho.to".Iri • • />«.>1, &·am .
ICh
!z
M
~IAY 5-JUNE (j
97
vasion was inde ed taken in early May. Yet because of the tenuous 1~lan ce of fnrccs within the Politburo, the decision was probably <:ouched in terms of hoth increasing til() number of ~.Jternative s available for dealing with the (Tisis and ensuring that the Suviet Union was prepared lilr any eventualit y. including a Hungarianstyle uprisi ng or a militarr move by NATO states to take advantage of e vents in Pmgue. It was tbe vcry unce rt;linty amI <."o mplexity of the situation that may have convinced the more recalcitrant Soviet leaders that the devc10llment of military contingencies would not in itself e.~calate the crisis but nllher en;Jhle the Soviets to respond to any eventual ity more eITecth'cly. The Czechoslovak foreign minister. Jin Hajek. flew to Moscow for urgent consultat ions wit ll Gromyko and Knsygin on Ma y 6, nnly one day after the departure of Dubcek·s delegation from the Soviet capital. In his report to the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, Hajek stated that measures to incre;lse direct eont;lcts bet....een the two ministries had been discussed and that Gromyko also had considered it neu~ ss;lry ··to W,lm me ;lhol1t some distu rhing manifestations in the Czechoslov"k [IT(!SS lind tn explilin how the Soviet government understoog1' P R;~!i". ~br l6. l!lfi8. ~:Elm.llC III. Pragllr. lla< . I...:.-ad r in ~I """"·. " Im" ...""~"",IIJ.,,,ld Tnl",,,... ~1o). 7. 19(1/1.
"ad
" IWE. Eo, ' Ehrtll"'. PoI"I,
SiWQliI", R~I",rl.
Ma)· 9. I9&!.
ICh
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M
TilE ClllSlS 1'~IUOIl
98
military all iance amoll~ the fr.lternal sOt'ialist l~lUnt ries joined by the \Varsaw I'ad."" Th is unmistakably hard-line rhetoric was acn)mpanie d by an (md to Soviet sil.mce over Cz()d"" ln\"ak claims of Bu'si:1tl (.~"n_ plicit)' in th e 1948 {leath of Jan '\ l a~aryk. On ;"Iay i T,\ SS dellllll llce<1 these claims as '" lies from start to finish"'" 011 the same dar. Litem/ II rtI(lya ga :.clll pu hI ishell an 11 ttack Oil J,m Pf()(:h:izb, un e of t he leaders (If the C/.eclloslovak \Vrite rs' Union. ('ailing him a "hourgeois nationalist.·· " III th e midst of t his period "I' ill <.: reasl:d tt:ns jm,. spee<.:hes were being dcliwre<1 lo y Soviet and loloc leade rs markin g the 150tll ann iversary of ;,,'Iarx's dca th. Pel'sllc's speedl, discussed prcviously. was deli \ ered at the beginning of MolY; it was a rat her u no riginal defense of .\Ianist ortllOdox>·. Suslov's speedl, eX'lmined in greate r tletail in Chapter II . W,tS
If th ere were still So\'ietle'lder s who b iled to he CO rlvirl ced that ti,,, Prague Spring W,IS '·herctit·"l. " the spc(.'(;h Oil tIle .~'llne e)(:casion b y Cestmir Ci~at. a secretary of the CI'Cz, did llHH:h to dwn ge ti Jat. On the one anni ve rsary must associated with pro limlla dedara tions of idcological orl l lC)(I()~y, CisnT pmdaimc{lthat "evcry ~·lan: ist·Lcni n jst party must havc its own polic>', which takes into 'K'<."Olllit natio llal L"Omli ti ons." Un ity uf Communist parties must be achieved "not on th e basis of any melllopoly in th e interpretat iun of J\'lauis m in L"On t em po rary eonditiellls, or on the I",sis of th.: sllhordiuiltioll of a part uf th e IIlUVemelit to anothe r part of t he mon:men t, but only on the I"L~is of th e recognition of the right of cvery p'lrty til ,Ill
.\10)' 7. t!./6!i.
" 1'",«16,
~1a)"8, 19&J.
" ur~"'I'm,ny"
" R,,,/f
)(":<'Ia , "'"'. 19, ~I.y IN. 1!J&j
I"~m. ~1a)'
7, 19&1.
99
MAY 5-Jul'J:; 6
negatfoll of its international significarK'e and a de nial of the premise that Le ninism is a gu idc to adion in l)fc~cnt day l~Jrnliti()ns." "
THE
~IOSCOW ~·I F.ETI:-JG
O F FIVE
A further impact of the Cis,lf artide w,~~ to contribute to the Soviet dedsion (number 12), prob(lbly taken on ~lay7, to convene a summit of the "five" to consolidate positions and consider furt her me,lSllres. The last-minute timing of the d cci.~ion is sugg:e~ted by the fael that the first announcement of the SlJllHnit W;L~ on the actual day of the meeting, May 8. Ordinary multilate ral meetings , such as tho~e surrounding the planned Intern,ltiOlml Com nllJllisl Confe renL"C, were typically publici;-:ed in advance. TIlt: C~.•,ehs themselves learned of the meelinguuly ,It Ille \;IS! minute; ;lnd sinL"C the Ea51 Germans and Poles had been pressing for ;In immediate Sllmmit, once tile Soviets the mselves had dl.'Cided to hold one, Ulbridlt and Gomulka 'Ippareutly su pported immediate l"OuvOC"dt io n. On May 8, the Soviets (xJIlvened a meeting in ~'I oseow with party leaders from Poland, Huuga r y, Bulgaria, and East Gennauy. This was tu he the only muli ilateml meeti ng thruu ghuut tire entire crisis to which neither Czechoslovakia nor Hum:mi:I was invited (the Pmgue leadership Wa5 invited to the July W:lrsaw meetiug but dec lined to ,litem] it). When Foreign ~1inister l-hijek inquired why the number of participants at this meeting W:lS lim ited to five , he W:IS olfid,llly told that the recellt visit of the C7.echoshlVak deleg;\lion to ~IOSl~)W "had rende red superfluous their partilOipation in these multilateral l'OIlSuli:ltions."" Although only Gomulka, Kild:\r, Zirivkov, and Ulbricht rep resented t heir l~Hlntries, the Suviet delegation was larger, l"Onsisting of I3rczhnc\', Kosygin , l'oogorny, and Katushc v. T he le rst;! L~)[ll llll.H1i<[uc isslled after the met:ting spoke of 'Ill ""exchange of opinions on topit'al prohlems of the intern ational situat ion and the "~)rld Communist and workers' mm·ement."" '· t\ Pravda editorial two days later substituted the te rm ""urgent" for " Prot-da. Augml 22. 1961j. AI"" I),., a rti..!. by ~o'''I.n!ino.· in Pmcdn (~, J"n~ 1·1. IlI!>S. dir ...1ly "",,,..,,,,,1C[>;1"'-" h)' \'. S'"I»'II''''' in l:u"i<J on ~Iay II. 19611. ... I,ile not referrin\( to Cbaf Iw 1Ialne. 01",,,1)· ",f"I<~1 the '''~~)'' I],ot .. " t],e (!,,~.t ;"" "f'],e w"i" IHindpb 1>.:It1)· t"le. Iii"", ,""" Id I", multiple inlorpl"Cloti"", based on ".ti"""l
rondilion •. ~ Jifl
...r
IUjek. /)I~ aM al''''''. I" M May 9. l\l(j/j.
~ r",cda .
IGh
JIz
M
100
T lIt: CIUSIS 1'.l:IIIOD
"topical"
jor subject of discuss ion !' T he 1;lilurc of t he comm uniq ue to ment ion a "unani mi ty of views." rcf(:rring instc(ld to il mere "exchange of opin ions," points to a substantive inabilit y 10 reach agreemen t. 111c Polis h and ~ast Ger man lcaJ c rships urc said to have stro ngly
pressed th e Soviets to conve ne the summit. whereas Kadar was said to have aite ndc{1 on ly with ",tnmg reservatio ns."" Ulb rich t was rC!)(Irtcd by Czechoslovak SOllrCCS tu have repeated the demarul t hat Soviet tmops he stati olll:d permancn tly in C1.echosloV(lkia.'" These measures an d ot her sa nct iuns, incl uding accordi ng to some re purt, mili tary inte rvention. were deba ted br the Ave in ~ I oscuw, a ppa rcutly wi thou t L~)J1 cl I I S i o(l . ·' Et~JU o n l i c sauL'lio ns were discussed. b ut it was evidently fclt that such measures wou ld un ly serve to furt he r increase Cwchoslovaki a's links with tIle \Vest . t n tl cccl. sou1"t:cs in Pn ,,..,,,, ""I'" rl "tl tha i 11." ch" n.::cs of """uri,,!; :1 lu:m from the hloc lIctuall y may have increased lifte r the snmmit. although dearl)' nu hJ<11l would he [lrolfe red wit hout politic;)1str ings," KJ tl iir ullduuhted lv played" pivuti tl rull: in support ing th e Te"I' ... rda . .\lay ll. I!J6Ij. ~DP!. AFP. Rou,.· ... 1LI.!in 7_'S,"h. a"d IbJ;o 11. • .;.1.,·•. Mu)' Y. 1968; " nJ 1\;1.(1;0 P~~K'''-' Mar 10. 1\Ifl.S, " A,,-"On1ln~ 10 Jl:!j~k . DI1:
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furm moveme nt. He W(IS reliably repOrk(\ to \wve opposed the imposition of any sandiolls on CzedlOs]ov,Iki;I, and indet'(l be apparen tl y dclcnJed tilt: hasic trc nds of tile I'mgue Sprillg ant! o(]c rcd hi act as a met!iator to seule t he growing dispute, "" Clearl y H ungary's own eX]lt: ricnces in 1956 and t,;:,ittir's hope to ell ad his OWl! New Economic :'.-\odd se rved as the hases II)!' his nHKlcratt: attitu d e, Kad:\r is a lso said to ban' prewnted a r"'port on tIl{' prepam ti u)]s for the Interna ti onal C<)mmlm ist CO ll fere ll ('c sdw(I"led lu ],egill On November 2.'5, IWS, in Budapes t. T he importance of the conference running smoo lhly ma y also Iw,\'e eonlri!Jll\cd to K,\tl;\r's des ire for m(KlI~rali()n Oil the C~,echosl() v;l k iss ue, " Sunl(' n·ports ,LL~() credit 1~lLlgarian [Jar t ~' 1{',lder ']f)dor Zhil'ko\' w it h having ,uloph·,I;l wail-and -see attitude
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states suggests that no one SO\'ie t leader could adequately represe nt th e views of the entire Politburo. T hird, th e freedom with which East Europ ean Icmlcrs ;'p p aren tl y cxp rcssed wi(lely divc rgen t p olicy propmals is itsclf a solid indicati on tha i th e Soviets did not convene the su mmit to ('{)I nmllni L~lt c n set of dedsions on how th(: hloc wou ld h;l1ld l {~ th e crisis. Hather. it appears that the cnclave was calletl for genuine consultation wit h bloc leaders in a n effort not only to reass urc Comulka and Ulbricht that thc Soviets were taking th e crisis seriously, h ut also to es tahlish the pmame tcrs within wh ich thc crisis would be handled. and possibly also to resolve th e {lille rences within the Soviet leade rshi p itself. From the reports of th e meet ing. the suhsequent diverge ncies in the Soviet ami bloc press, and t he {.'t)llt ~dictory actiuns that marked Soviet hehavior d urin g -"lay, it would se{:m thn! althou gh hot!. extre mes-a{.'t;epting the re form move men t and mounting an imm{:dial e in vasion-wcrc ruh:d out, no si nglc inte rp retati on or un ited stmtegy emerged fro m the con/Crence. As told b y un official Soviet sourccs to Czcchosluvak re po rtcrs in ~ I us('()w, "1here was no IIni ty uf views on t he de velopmen ts in Czech()slovakia" at the ~b y8 Ill('cting .... ln an
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d ecision ( lIlIl!!/Jr:r II ) for measured escabti on . Ye t one im porlanl out(.'()me uf the summ it was the decis ion ( lIumfJer 13) to welcome a greater role by tIll: Ells t l·: urop.~ all leaders in crisis malla~ement. The acccptancc uf Kjd:'r·s uffc r uf m(!
At th e same li,lie lilal Easl Europe;U) lead"r.~ wen: mak ing their views known in .\ Inscow, n high-level Soviet In il i hlr~' delegation arrived in Prague on ,I fact-findin g to ur_This " isit init ial ed a periud of \' cr y high mi lita ry part idpation in crisis LLI 'lLI age n\(~ nl. Th.) dd ega~ lion. ()stcnsi h[ ~· in th e conn try to particijJ;lle in tht: twenty-t hird an n ivcrsary celeb ratiuns 01' th e [ibcr;lti un of Prague. was led by "·! "rs[ml K()n c" and incl ud cd M;u',I,al \ ]usk" I.-nko ;. ud Geucral z haJov. They rem ained in C";CcllOs[o\'akia un til .\by 14. and in aJ~ clili on to delive r ing lm n l-li ne speeches at th e u~ lch'~lti()n Ceremonies, th ey \'isi kd military nnils, factor ies. and agriculimal (~) ope ra t h·cs in fiftcen dtics, _KThey also held talks on "problcms of defensc·· wil h the ir Czechoslo\';lk ('1)ll11 t('rpar ts.'" Ko nc\"s speech un " lay \) was Iln,..;wer vingl y hawkish . denlllLndng \Ve st German revancl, i' J11 "nll p romising that thc US SR a n d ib ;Ill ics will "always fir m!y and rcli;lhly de ftmd Ollr soci;'! i~ t g;l il\ ~ as well as ollr [sic] frontiers nf t he socialis t I:amp ." I-laving emphasized th e rcadin ess of th e Sovic l arm ell fll rt'I:_~ 10 pmtL"C1 "ot only tl,c sn'lIri!)' o f thc bloc hILt also its socialist naturc, he mad(~ his point even m()n~ explicit: "VigiLLLwe is particularly Ilel'essar~' hy the CSSH, which is " /',.,,,,,/,,. ~I O\' t5. Wfi~. (;n; in b, .:]hlo, M"r Ll ,,,,d t2. toos. E~:12Tf-.!lI(; lIfi _ ' . "' n",lat,,",t 11,,,1;,,. .\1.)' II . 19f>'l . ;" tlFE. /ll',nln "' . f:" .•, H" ....,"·. 1"",C/jf]J. \ h r 15. t96~_
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the bridgehead situated righ t next to the capitalist wurld," He COIlcl ud ed with a wMning: "I can say outright that events (;;1111101 catch us unawares. The Soviet forces arc always in complete <-'om bat readiness. " '" !-o r a n yone who [,iletl to understand KOl1cv's llleSsage, he rellCuted it in a speech to \\lurkers in Kladnu. where he
encouraged them to further strengthen their militant prulet:uian traditions and promised that "we sh:lll pe rmi t no Ollt~ to brenk the fraternal ties binding our people. " '" The military delegation's fact-finding lo ur was illlcnded primarily 10 assess the strength of popular support for the reform movement and to judge the likelihotKi of a l~mserval i\"e comeback. Vi.~its 10 r,lctories, militia units, ;lnd military barracks-the tr.lditional bastions of conservatism- were designed hoth to gauge the respo nse of working class elements to what the Soviets t'Onsid ered primarily an intelligentsia-based phcllomemm and to e ncourage these elements to continue, in Kon ev's worrls, their militant proletarian traditions. Yet Koncv's voice W(l.~ not the only one hcard .Lruong the Soviet military. ~-lars hal ~Ioskal enko was reportLoJ by Prague radio and television on May 13 to have stated that the ussn would '"not interfere in the intenml affairs of Czechuslov:lkia." 1·l e WaS said to havc spokcn '"vcry positively" about evcnts in Czcchoslovakia and to have dcnounced "various slanders" that were "trying to dri ve a wedge between th e friendship of the C7.t!choslovak amI Soviet nations." The USSR, he said, was ready to "do its utmost in strengthe ning friendship" and to provide "help ill all that is needed." Significantly, the report was not carried hy the Soviet media, :lnd j\·loskale nko's speeches received nunc of the coverage that Ko nev's enjuyed.'" '''hile the military delegation wa.-; in Praguc, Sovict troups in Puland, East Germany, and the Ukra in t:: begall lu mllvt: toward th t: Czechosluvak border, \\'estcrn diplomats and tOllfists were prevt:n tt:d from IrJ\'eling inside P()l~nd ," .ond .. lthough the C~,echo slovak news "geTlcy laler stated that Praguc officials had hee n " Pru,o:"" It..!;<>. Ma~· Il. 1968.•:EI2767ICi3. " MO>«1W lbdio, ~I ay 13, 1968. S UI~'69{A2!1 " u .s . Del"',lmenl ul" SI.le. ·iH< ~",,,, ,' ·" . /I>JJ75. ~b )· ].I , 19t>'I, u .s . 1)"1',,,lllIe n\ of S\"t~ . Tr lrgF"'" ," " /(i.jJ9.j . ~!:.). 15. 19&1, . .. ,1 1\',11."" F. H,d,;",.",. · "(.:,<""~,,· .h•• "d ;1< Allie>:' p . 16-1 .
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informed of these maneu\'ers," it was in faet clear t hat the troop movements were part of the escalation of pressure on Prag ue. \Vestern intelligence sources concluded that "the Czechs undoubtedly were not aware of tIle movement of hlrge numbers of Soviet lroops towfm\ their border" and that the Sovicts had stagemanaged the maneuvers. leaking information about them deliberatel~', in order to put pressure on the Dubcek government :'" Prague Hauin did in fact respond rather an xiously to the maneuvers. with oue uroadeaste r pleading. " lour God's sake. let us not have a . repetition of. 1956."" Al'(.'Ording to e_~tim:ltes, sc\'e Tal thousand Illen at most were involved, mainh' in headqllllrterS units. In addition. in East German y an estim(lted twelve tank and mechanized divisions of tile Red Arm y and two East German divisions moved southeast toward the CzedlOsJovak border, taking up positions in the En. Gebirge. an (Irea that had never before been used for military maneuvers.'" Onee the troops were in position , they remained there even aBer the completion of the exercises, thus marking tlIC end of the first stage of military preparations for the invasion." SOVIET DEBATES The maneuvers and the activities of the military delegations were al't-'Olllp,lIlied br iUl upsurge of polemk-s hetween lorees for and against the Prague Spring, The Soviet prcss did not ahound with articles praising the Praguc Spring for its positive t'Ontributioll to the cre ative developmen t of ~larxism-Len i nislil. The tilll e for this llad clearly passed, lind art icles tl ll~t could he L'Onst rllcd as supportive ofCzechoslo\'lIkia were those that did nol opcnly attack the rcform movement or tlla! expressL-d l~)\]fiJenl"c in tht;: ability or the CPCz leadership tu solvc its uwn prnulc11ls, Similarly, articles that " s "", l ;>rk Timel',
Maj' II. 1%/1 . "U.S.