The Kremlin and the Prague Spring
JNT E IlNATJ ON At. C Hl SJS I"I E Il AVI0H SE IIIE S
Edited bl} ,\fie/wd Hreciwr \,OU .l \1E I
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"".I 1973 ( 1980)
A"i Sht.im. The V"ilc,1 Slnl,·. "",III... He,.{i" Hlm:kmle . IfNS-19-19: A Study ;11 C rhis IJtoc h;""· ,\I"kj,,~ (19&.1)
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Ccotfrc)' Juke .• , IliIlu', S,,,I;"l!md /)''C;,';''''_ ' (19/:1.5)
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The Kremlin and the Prague Spring KAREN DAWISHA
UNIVEIISITY OF C.>\UFOHI\ IA ['!lESS
UEIIKE LEY
LOS ANGELES
LONDON
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Contents
f oo' !W fll
Ackll owfedJ!.IIWIII .~
xiii
PAIlT I : INTRODUCTION I.
Soviet Foreign Policy A nalys is ,lIld Crisis Bch;l\'jo[
"
3
prelude to tlw Crisis PAIlT
[j .
1,5
II-IE I'IlF _C BlS I S I'E B!O])
10
37
Phase
4.
phase Two: Ap ril 10 Ma l' 4
62
5.
Findings
78
QIlC;
March
22~A!lril
3.
PA IlT III · Till' C Bl S l S PEB IOJ)
6.
Phase
7.
Ph"." Two:
8.
Phase Th ree: ]um; 2/ - lull' 28
O.
P1wsc Four: Jul y 29 '\UgllS! S
Qlle:
;\'lav 5 !unc 6
rill'" fi
27
93
,'" WI)
10.
Phase Five: August 5-20
271
11.
Findings
294 Gii
"ii i
PAIIT]\I. THF I'OST.C IlISIS PFIlIOJ) 20~27
12.
'\ llgllst
13.
Findings
.'319
333 PA in V: CO NC LUS IONS
14 15
I caders and D ecisioIls ' CWll'J ll siotls on Soviet IIr·h w j pr jn 1968
341
19fi8 an d .\Ike -11", C osts and CUllSel]Uenl'es uf I nvasion
367
ApPflu/ix t\: KC!I/'olilic(d omi Militanl JA:(Jders. USS R. 19(;8
381
A[J/!Cudix /1; KC!ll'o/ilicalllm/ Militlln, Lcru/ers, C:xc/ws/Ol.'okia , 1968
383
Selectct/ Bibliograp/u{
3S5
[!!lIn
399
Foreword
'10 dis sct'l Soviet dt~ isi()n makinc 'Ill!! h" hal' ior in li,reign p()li t~· e rises requ ires di \'"r~ " ski]] s: a 1..:"{)wl". I),:,, "flhe lall g u:l!!e , the I,istorr. and til(' political syste m ami id"ulngy of th,· USSH . it' \\",,11 as insight into I h" personali! y t f :lit S and int e rpersonal rl'lat io ns 01 So· viet lc:ul.:rs; all ability to ;\ppl~' psyclwlogit-" llimlillgs Oil th e .t~ ' namit;s of small groupl){'IM\'ior to the pin,tal group at the ape.\ uf the Sov;d pOII'" r p)'ramid , the I'ulithuru: a !iuniliaril)' \\'ilh tIll' IIlclhuds of lIu,ticrn so,,'ja] sciC II C!: ami" d ispos itio ll to comhim ' ri g(JrOIlS, Sys tctll;ltit- in'plir)" wi th /'m:ign are a 'pl'{'iali~atiun ; a ma.\ tcry of Iii,· ""
dedsion-making pruccss; ;Ind . h na]] y. a
pl:lvc{1 in "buml"m;c in the pa!,:cs thai I()liuw, K;u'cn J);lwis ha nwkcs tl U d;lim to u,: linitil'CIW SS ill he r h\~d natin g: stud), uf th e Krcmlin 'I ll~l the Praglle Spring. I nd ee d. at tIl(' outsd . ,11<' pn''''' n is tlw ... ·,,,1,·,. with an illlo'i!!"illl! .mal .. gy I".. twe e ll ;l parbhioHl<;:r at a Hu"j '
"
, (.·ontc m pomry in terna ti onal relat ions. with partie"I,lr focm o n de-
cision makin g and action withi n the Communist h loc. T he ,lutlm r's obj ect ives arc twofuld: lirst, to uncove r the exten t to which the quali ty of Suviet dcci5iull makin,!!: was affect ed by tile cst-ala ti o n ;Uld Ilecsca lalioli of te nsions Iluring var ious pcr i u\l~ uf th e crisis t ha t a ttended tile i'r;Lgll c Spring; a nd second, to cont rib ute to the liter;lIufc on uedsion m aki ng in internati o nal crises. The firs t o hjt!divc is aUained hy;m ill ll lllin'lting aL"'~J\lIll nfSuviet percept ions, decisiuns. an d adiolls. T he .' ccond is aC\'om p lishcu by a rigowlis a nd irna!!inal ivc usc of th e Inter nation al Crisis Be havio r (Je ll) fr'l1lw\\'ork III gem:ra!e co mparative Ilildings fo r theo ry buildin g o n c risis. And both arc cnhan('(!d by a IUdd p resenta ti on uf tile dra lna a tld signifl~'all('e uf II,,: Pntgut: Spring ami ils ,l e l1
ach of Ihe principa l dec ision makers filtered th e information abo ut th e Prague Sp ring th mugh a differen t pen'epl ll al lclls: Brezlmc\' was primarily conccrned wi th (lomes ti ~· llissenl: Susl!)\' focused o n the me nace from Peking; Kosy,c:in, who al one had a ,·,,,lll'l.·x. ti iA" ,-,," l iatt,ti, 'lilt! """s l"r,,oIY lwd ;""'g" "1' 11.,, in lernationa! e n\'ironment, was worrkd alX)u l th e c1l'eds on e('Onomic ref" r lll and a r lll s li ltl it;lt ion: and Gn" ,hk" c mp hasiz.:d Ihe ,Iirect t h rt:n! of U.S . military act ivity. As the cri sis int c nsifi ed , howeve r. al! ~'on~'lI rred 1Ii al events in Praglle co nst ituted t he major clialI c ngt: to So"iet powt:r in E;lsl<:rn 1·;\lI111'e. The t llt'oretimlly oricnted find ings ;Ibou\ Soviet behavior
''''
o::h
F O IIE"·OIlI)
xi
disru pte{1 with the uuster of Novotn}' and other hard-line party leaders. Direct contacts wilh the lead c rsl,iJl l)f Suvie t l>loc· stales increased " "I;(."{, ahl~·. And, as expected. th" i",~ , l ve mell t of senior decision makers in the informatiun p rocess ).(rew with stress- in h igh-level negotiat ions :lIIt! fact-Hmlillg mL~s i on s ;md in written an d telephone (."ommunieation with Czechoslovak Icaders. Dawish:,·s findings about t he J ecL~iun:11 I()rum arc slrikin).(. Altho ugh the Poli thmo remained the iw,titlllional foc us I()r all formal and majur decisions. an inner eore aded hoth formally in th e negotiations w;lh Ihe Czeci)()slov,lk p,lrt~' [ead,:rs and infonnall y as a self-appuinted crisis management group. The membersh ip oj" Ihe twu gruu ps overlappe d and included Brezh ne\', Kosygin , Podgorny, Suslov, and Shdest. This d ecisional core was no t full y cohesive at any stage oj" thc crisis: Kos~'gin and Suslov wcre persistent advocates of caut io n, Shelest uf intervent iun: Bre zlmev aligned with tI le majority at all times bllt did not provide Icadl!rsh ip; allll Kosygin \\"..l5 freq uently excludcd from dedsions by lhe inner (;o re witl,in tile Politburo. ThrougllOut the {Tisis, llOwevcr, th e nu mue r of pe rsons all(1 groups (.~Jnsu 1t cd b y Soviet decisiOll makcrs did not chan ge markedly. As in othe T fo reign policy crise s. illLTeasi ng Soviet stress dming th e Prague Spring reduced th e n umhe r of alternatives unde r considerat ion and narmw(..J Ihe r:lIlge of perceived Sovid oplions fro m ten ·, in Augusl 1968. to Iwo: political pressure on DulK.-ck tl) p re ve nt Ihe fur th er growl h uf anll-Suv ie t ele mellts. allli a full-scale in vasion to support an alternative Czech Communist leadership. Ironicall y, ~·l os(.'O\\"s m ix turc of tim strategies uf (.'Oercion and COlIIllTOIII(se may have in;l(l\"crt c ntl y made an in vasion more likel y. III a (·oncluding Cil;lptcT Dawisha pn)\' iJcs a" in,ighlful allalysis of t he (.~)s t s and (.~mscquenl"e s or Ihe invasioll. \\'i tllill th e Soviet Ullio n, th e prima ry cllcd was to set rigid ;md narnm· limits lor re lorm and Tevisio" in the po lit ical, C<.,)lJoll1 ic, ami cuitu nl l spheres. Thro ugho ut E :L~ tern Eu rope. th e invasioll t·ast a shadow over :111 d ehatc nn politic,,1 reliJrlIl. Yugoslavia. (·ollvillced that ;U) in vasion would have been deterred by a high er risk uf I::nst-West confrontaCioll, sought and obtaine{1 a u.s. security guara nte e . Amung th e bloc leade rs, only H Ung;lry'S Kadar an d Bulgaria·s Zhivkov survive{1 tl ,e political fallout from the invasion. Aluania deci ded to withdr'dw from the \ V"rsaw Pact, tu rning to Pekin g instend. well
xii
~'Ol\EWOlln
Kare n Dawisha's ul timate explanatiou ofthc Kr(' mlin decision to suppress till' Pragut' Spring by force proviues \'~Iuable gUitbn t'c about the USS lfs prubahle f\ltme forei gn poliey be havior: wh e n t he Soviet objcdive was to maintain th e Soviet positi on in Eastern E urup!, "fur eterni ty," tllc tnmsie nt ~liellation of one or two geuerati ons of sigllifknnt segnwnts of th e populati on and clites within the bloc mattered ve ry little. :\lie/wei B recher
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Acknowledgments
This hook {-,ould not h~\'c be en w ritten without assistance from many indivillnals and urg.uliz;ltiuns. ~Iy [irsl debt of gra t itude goes
to ~lichael IIreche r. who invited me til llarlicipatc in the Il1tc rna~ tionai Crisis Behav ior Project in 1977 and then p,lticnlly ami meticulous ly read ali t! (.1)mmentcd on th e dmfls of this manllscript. The Canada Council, which supported th e project and generous ly funded my own research, also deserves a speda] men tion. So too doc~ the University of Southam pton, whk-h Ilnant'Cu my trips to the VSSH and Eastern Europe and gave me a stud y I<:::t\"c to under-
take paris of m y research .
For a hook such as this, lIlall Y lihrari c.~ and archin:s must he consulted. The unparallded llrt.'hin: s of th e Press Lihrary ,l.t th e Royal Institll(c of Internat ional A/hirs. loget her wit h the lInelllling assislance of its staff, made the re5cardl hoth more e nju y"hl.:; and mOrt: profitable. For this project . I oht:linc(1 man y prcvio usir cbssiRc(1 U.S . d<>e ll nHlnts from Ilw \Vhil e HUIlS<' , Nation;l] Security CUlmeil . State Department, and th e Central Inlelligence Agency. They were declassifie d under tlte U. S. Frce{lor1l of Information Ad, an d I would like to thank the staff a t the Slate Departme nt alld tile L y ndo " Ba ines
Juhn~"n
Lihnn'y stalfi" Ans tin . 1C:
sistance. I \\~)ul{1 Ilnally lih, 10 t llallk th e slall' of tile lihnlries al the London School of E{x)]1omies. London Unive rsity's School uf SI;l.VOllic and E
M: KNU\VLUx.;,\I£s· rs Stah: Dt:p,l rt11lent ), J,lcol1 Be am (U.S. amlmssm.lor, Prague), Pau l Cuok (U.S. Eml.hlssy, ~loSl-"()w) , 1',lul Costohmski (U.S. State De ]l;lrtment), Haym ond Gm·t holr (U.S. Slate iJepartm ent), Helmut Sonnenfeldt (U.S. State Department). rllld Walt \Y. ilosto\\" (Nat iollal Security Advisor to the president ). :\mollg t he British officials I wuu ld like to t hank Joe Banks (British EII1 I)(1ss),. Prague), Maieolm L\hckintosh (Foreign
rdatnllo Soviet puliry ill Eilslerll Europe amI Soviet be-
Illivior ill crisis ('1mditions. Of (.1)u rse, not e\'eryonc I lalkcd wit h e,lll be thanked pe rsonall y, hu t I wo uld like In ;Ickllowlt:{lgc Artur Starew;e..:, a sl:cn:tary of the Poli sh United \\'urkl:rs Party (PUWI') in 1968 and a partk-ip:lnt in the llratisbv:l negotiations. Also the shill' of t he Polish Inst itille li,r Inft!fI ta t iOilal Afrai rs \\';IS most helpfu l in arranging discllssions at t he institute and wit ll ollicials and journal ists outside it. Amoll): tll m;c will) help ed me in :\Ioscow. I would li ke t" thank t Ill: stall' oft III~ 111 st it \II e of w"rI{1 E(~'l1llm y aml inle m ation;ll He btiollS ,l1ld th e Institute for the Study of the USA ,md Canada hlr their insighls into Easl- \Ves t n :bl ions am! Ihe celltralit y of Eastc rll Europe in Soviet COr)(."C rns. III tlw pre p;lT;11 ion of tIll: man llst:ripl . thanks go to I nan r including Hilary Parker lin' her e.xper t typing and J,\ncl I lurst and Hohert Houdek for their skillful dr
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PART ONE
Introduction
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Soviet Foreign Policy Analysis and Crisis Behavior
T his is Ho t th e first book to he written ahull! what h:ls COllie to be known as the l'nlgue Spring: of ]96S. I Nor is it the hrst attempt to :malyl.(.' and "xpbin l he II lotil-ation, hehind til!' SUI'it:! iU\(' ITI'IIlion in C~.(~dlOSI()\'" kia. : Neverthe less. it sct·ks tu ""Ike i' slll"\;lllli,'c ('~ >lltrnHltiOiI I"~ the lit."ratul"c 'lI, s,,'";"! dcci s;, 'u Illakill).! during tlll' Illon ths Icadill;! lip 1<1 till' l'll tr r of \\"arsa", I'act truops on th e night of '\U)!IIS\ 20, If)r:il'i. T ll<: );1<.:11> "f Ih" siudy. Ihcrd<m:. is not dlC Pr,Lguc Spring per S\'. hut tIle way the Soviet leadership rt."lcled t() dmnges in C7.echos )ov,. k ia amllh .. exte nt to wl ,id , the quality ofdcdsion 1l1"king was "tll"de,l h)" till' C"S<:il];,\i"ll :.nd <.llTSc;lblioll of tellSi()ll ~ tlMI <:harade ri /,ed th" I'arious p.!rio(\s of th e tTbis. Th is is th" major " illl of t1,,-, s hl\<:1. T he't' .1"... ,,, ,,,·,,ls. ill ,,,11;1;0" to ",·s"" ...; 11 trips to t1,.. USS II. Pola",\. tl,,, Ull itcd 51,,1.·,. " ",1 1·"riOIlS \Vesl Ell,""!',,;,,, ~·oll"lrics. hal": 1\1,'1·1l,· 1"' ,1 "" .. I),,·, . ~. the l'e.,~" .. 5I'ri,,~ "."'.,'" (;"1 1,, (:"t,,, •. T/,,' ",·"/,,,,/,,,',,l/I,'[.,,,,, ,110 m""",, Cali. '--:"1.,,,, 11,f."',,, 11,,/,' in ( ;""'/w..lm<J!;" . • ,,,111. (~"d"" ~l.illi,,". C"'c/,,,· "Im'" kia:, )"" ·"""'o'
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c,l rlh elillludl previou sly u nknown info rmatio n ahout Soviet (Iedsion makin g;.
In spite of this inforrnatioll ,
t h(~
progress of lll )' research has
hee n slnw and impe{led hy rn e lluxlologie,l i dilTiclilties. Any scholar seeking to t1 arif~' thc Illo tivat ions and images of decisioll makers in a syste m suc h liS th e Sovie t UnilJll is (Iced first with th e almust ill su rmountable prnblem of evide nce. Without '\l.'t:css to Politb uro m inutes, po lit ical mem oirs, ami records o f o pe n d e hat es or i nt e rviews with uAieials. it is ,ll mosl impossi hle III draw (.'O nere tc (;onelllSi01lS ,Ihou l th e yalues, ilnag<'s, ;lnd \l1O \i va\i ons of inJivjl\ U,I[ So-
vie t leaders. II is
equal!~'
diflkult to assess th e relative imporltull'c
of various l:lc!OfS or to isolate aud meas ure th e spedfic im p,let of '1Il~' sin gle variahle. In resea rch on Suviet politics_ and un dccisi(JIl making in particu la r, o ne is stru ck by !ht: 'L II;t]ogy hdw':ell the researche r ami th e parishi o ner at a Hu ssi'lIl O rt hodox dHi rch se rvice. The priest chants, am! th e c hoirs, divid ed into scdions, issue fo rth w ith gloriously ritualist ic and hYllnoti c n~Jlli es. The smell Ilf ince nse, th e lig htin g of candl es in front of icons spr(·ad throughout the congn'ga t i"". ,,,,d tl,.. pa rading of th .... roSS a nm",] tit ,.. ""Isid .. "f th e
church prod uec
it
feding that one has participated in ;lnd derived
intilll,lt c kn owl.:tlgc of the PH>(.·cetlin ).\s. Onl y on reflect io n <10.: 5 one rea li ze that t he priest has onen di sappeared behind ,I screen and th at Ihe mosl impo rl,ml par is of th e eo m muniou itself have bec n (.~ )I \{luctc d in the sanct uarr, nhSl· un:.1 fTOm vicw. One ass um es Ihal Ihe pries t spends ILis time Ih.;re oH"crin g pra r.:rs, bUI ooe h'15 lit! wa y ofk nowi lL g /()r SU l"e lh
5
SOVU:T FOIIE[ GN POLlCl' AKALYS[S
of the analyst. Thus more than twenty years after Daniel Hell's "Ten Theo ries in Search of Soviet Hcality,'" Soviet specialists are still d ebat ing IVhether the Kremlinolog:ic:tl or \ot:llitarian approaches should be replaced by models thai take more cogni7.am.'C ofburcallcrati<: politics ,mtl interest grou ps. 11 is an important deb..1tc. ami one in which this aut hur has becn involved.' but it is unlikely to be resolved onee and lor all because of the tlilllculty of verifying an y particular hypo thesis. Advance.~ in the mcthodology of t he social scient'cs have offered the prosJled tlmt new models ami !!lore sophhti mtetl llletll{xh would at last solvt: sonl(: of Ihe mysteries of Sovie t pulili<.:s. Ono: of the majo r contributions of these new approaches has been to turn out Soviet spL~ ial ists with uroader training: and an inclination to study previously ignored aspects of the Sovid poli tical syste m sudl as local government elections and interest groups, But few would dcny 111,,1 the central roc'us of aUlhoril~'. particul,lr!y ill the realm of furdgn p()lic~'. n:mains within Ihe higlu:st t'l'hdons oft I,,: party a lld state hie ra rchy and that therefore analys is illtc re~ted in unders tal1tlin~ the actions taken by tllt~ Suviet Union will ~till end up tr ying to glim ps.! he hind the pruv.!rhial screen. Few new tools have been devc\opc{1 tu aid I he analyst in Ihis eliorl. Contellt analys is is une such tooi. It can take one of three fo rms. delw nding OJ) the availahility uf {bt,\: L lulellsily of crisis
sing an
awarcnes~
lIercelilim~Y,
(Ieri"cd from an y statenwnt e_~prcs of thrcat. time wn~tr,'in!. and/or probability of
War, '1~ l eLllenl' of rricndship and hos \i li ty. expressions of sati~facti on with the stntus quo, nnd demands for ch'LIl~c in the stato, '1"0. It is mcaslIred by Ihc "I'"ir ~~Hnp"ri so,," sC'J.ling me thod dC"elopcd hy D . .-\. Zinnes_-l
Z. ,\ 'Ill/ysia of aflil"des, base
3. ,\ric"""n'y m",ly.• j.•. ",e"slIn'.! al"ng " niu "-I",;n! a
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ISTIlOl)U CTJOX
6
The val ue of Illest: variOllS form s of (;onlcnt anal ysis in th e assessme nt of Sovid politics lies in 1111) main arC'L~. First , if IL sed to form a gene ral picture n[Suvict elite views over a lo ng tim e span or to d evelop attitudinal profiles of in(li\'idllal leaders ove r th e e ntire le ng th of th eir ca reers, content analpis hi\~ pruved useful part icularly in re vealing inkr<~ sting nuanceS of JiHc rc n(;c betwee n occllpational or generational gruups. : SCL'tJIIJ. in s pL~ iri c case studies such as t h is OIlC, l~ml c nt alHilysis has sen "cd to snpplement or c onfirm dct,lilcJ resc,lTeh , particularly by meusuring the changes in th e intensity uf (T isis pCIl-,cpl ion by the leade rship as a wlllli e. At the same 1;111<;, th e limits 011 til': value of content analysi.~ are great in tlIC Soviet case because of tlIC absolute p"ul'ity of 1.l;.terver [Jr Suvie t po lities 111I1 S I be cqually S(!II siti vc 10 both what is said and wlrat is not said. In an;rl yzing a short series of spcedles, all of whi ch may have be en writte n aceor{liug 10 some preagreed 1(lrmula . th e number oftimcs a se t phnlse is repeal e d takes on milch less sign ifi can ce
j,,,
' Sec. fo r n",,,pk F Tri>b ""d l),,,,d O. Fink·)". Sud ~,'r";~ " f"~i<.'Y' amt rhe " r· hoi .. , by C h"rl~. Cali. D"n C . 11<·td",,,,,. ~I id" .. t P. (;,·t.t ~" . •,,,1 .\ 1""',,<"1 \Idlr ;d ~" ;" !log", K I.:."d . • ,1 .. TIle 1I,.,"'d"mlll, ·... ~"' i<'" em,,,,,,,,,;.,/ .\IO"li.." . ' Q,~)Ic~t ;n Z.t~nfk
.\11),,,01.
",,,/
-"i~/" Frm /
in "m"", . p. 2::19.
''''
o::h
7
than even a sin~l c word of d issent; ye t q uan! itative conten t analysis would class if~' that single word of dissent as insignificant. Tllis stud y llisn reveals th,lt drawing infcrcra.'Cs ahout th e posi-
tions of tup leaders from views ex pressed in th e editorial columns of certain news papers is
eX lre m d~'
diffi cult. Such infe rences IHLve
been drawn in previous studies to verifr the existence uf diffe ra mung el ite groups or burca ucrades over issues such as pa rticipatury attitlL{l c~ , tb e ~ Iiddl c East. or eve n Czechoslovakia," Al -
C IK'CS
though greu! differences have sometimes been gleaned by the (.'o mparison of individual articles or a sInd), of the overall trend of
editorials over lime,Ahe ass1lmption thai unsigned editorials in any newspape r represent th e p rc"iously un knowll views of a specific leader or facti Oll is qu estionablc. First. ,Ill m!wspapcrs are published hy th e p:lrty cOllllllitlee within th e minist ry or p ub lic body conce rned. KI"I/.wwY(l :.vc:.da. for exampl e. is formally the newspaper of th e party cmnmittce within th e 1-.·1inistry of Defen se. not a paper in whk-h th e milit,lry can express illdc pellde nl views. And this is the casc with evcry newspape r. whet her it hc a eentr.ll publi(-atioll sudl as l :,vcfltill or a regional p uhlicatioll such ,IS p r(lc(ill Ukrainy, all arc unde r part y eu nt rtl1. SCl.~md , lOp leaders have access to a nu mber of newspape r outle ts. In 1968 military leade rs often pulJlisheu in pr(lvdll \If / ;;ve~· till. Kosygin had several articles published in I'ravt!lI rath er than /;;vntifl, and th e re often appeared to be differe nces of opinion amon)! COlll nlentato rs working for th e
same newspaper. And neWSIlaper siaHs are frequently posted to new positions in other puhlieations, furth e r rciufordng part y co ntrol and limiting th e ability of any ne wspaper to tlcvclop a distinct line. To t,lke but on e case. Konsl~ ntin Z,u"tx lllV, wl lo in 1968 was chie f t..>di tor of th e World M(! rx ist /kvicIG. ;] tll t:ore ti cal and intormation journal for Co mmunist ~ nd alli ed parties that is sold in about 150 l."Olllltries. had previously been fi rst depu ty editor of I'm oe/II aud chief .~ditor of Suvi:/skayu Il(),\ ,~ iyll . as well as a candidate membeT of the Centra! Committee. \\fhile not oe ll ying tlHlt he may Il
"S"";et " " " ' j"
1978).
in pa.ticu!a(, ~I ilwn C. l..ooJg,·. Sul(I ••, c.,~ ., : lIb " ,;",.. P" ,,, .
~o"';~n
I:d",
ll'TlHlJ)ucnus
8
part)' line is not yet firrnl~' established or is under challenge from wit ll in Ihe party. In such c irClLlllshmccs, persis tently di\',~ rgell t opiniu1lS am ong puhlished commentaries are llsually a fair indic(lliu n of ~pli t, at th e lop. Bul e"en herc, it is JitliCl11t, hecause o f th e mobility of journalists arullcadcr s' liSe of >'ariOi IS IIl,wspa]lc r s to air their views, to L'tm n ecl any ont' fact ion with a sin gle puhlk'
Tlms, although UterafunwUII J!.u;;;dll ,U\d
SO!;et.~kll!'(I /l os.\'i!11I \n: n~
ofk n th e most olllspnkcn in their t~l1lde lll n,ltinn of eve nts in P r.I).!;UC and tILt' appeara nce ofcritit':ll articles led to t ll1~ eS(;(lbtiun ofh:nsiuus between the Su\'id Unio" and Czcclms \uvaki,\, thcre is still illsuffidcnt evidence to justify concluding that a speci ne Icmlcr was advo•.:al in£ a partieu!:lr CO Il NC of ;1('lio n such as mi litar r in\t:IT" " I i, " I.
D es pite Ihese limitations. th e importancc of analyzing Soviet dL"Cisiun m aking is undimi nished. The data hase :lVailahl l;' on Soviet hehavior in til e 1968 Czc{; hoslu\'ak c risis is heller than thai It)r mall)' uther Soviet crises, mainly hec
r",,,,~.
m""""", u,,;wr<;,)'
n .· /,J/,·,-, .. " /;d' .... .' 1'Ioml PllrI;C' ;" h 'U'''d ' WMI eri .. ,. (I',itl<.·d o" ,
I',~". 19671. p. 9. '1""""1 1,, Philip \\';]\;"'" •. erl, ;, .\I"""~CI"r''' . 1,. 20 " Ch",1e, ~k(;ldt, ....I. "C,;';, an ti Tineal it, Ihe [ntc","I;on.,1 S",,;,,)(, SO Ule Ilel.,t;"".1 Cono"l" " ('), I"'''·';pl). 'I'H 'I, ~I j " .\1 ;,,'1,,,,,1 11"",1,,·,. '"J;",•• n1, a Th"",)· of l"h',,,.lin,,al C,hj. Ilch ..·;o,." ". ·10.
9 10 do so wa.~ 01"<111 Young, who identified the characteristics of an
international crisi~ as "a sharp break frum tIm ordin ary lIow of poli. I iC5: s hurtn ess of {juration; a rise in tIl.: p c n:civcd prosp ec t thai \'io-
Icm:e will hreak out; and significant implicat ions for the stability of some system (or pattern uf re latiunships) ill intcrn:.ltiunal p()litic~." " Although thi s definition is appropriate for describing and ex-
plaining th e effect of stress on the relations among states. th e
C111-
ph:1Sis ill this specific stu dy is UII the crisis facing the d ecis ion
make rs of one pmticut;lr shltc. the Su\'ict Union. In other \\lJrd s , our t'()llccrn is foreign policy crisis rather than iute nwli O/wl crisis. " \Vith in thi s pe rspl.'divc th e must widely accepted defin ition
of crisis is th e one forward ed by Charles Il ermann: A crisis is a sit uatinn t hal (I) threatens high priority goals of I he dedsiOlHnakin g Ililit. (2) resiri cls I he ;1111011111 of tim" """ib]'le fi,r fe"IK""" hefiJre th e tled sion is tran sforllll'd . lind (3) surprises th e n1<:I11],,:r., of til e dt...::isinn-nlnking unit hy its o•.'(:'urre nt'C. Umle rlying th e j""IKI.w d definition is th e hy poth esis that if "II th ree trait s ;IT<: p,..:,,,,,1 the n lilt, dcd sion p""-,,,ss will hc snh,ta nliall)' , Iill,,,'e lll Ihan if onl )· one or t\\'O Ilf till< dmr.ICt.-ristics appear." ~'lidmcl Brecher and a number of associates in the Inte rlHlt iu1l(11 Crisis Behavior (ICB) I'rujed have ende:I\'ure{! to re flne the He rma no defi nition hy m(){lifying some of its ennceptuu! cl"ments. In the first place, they found the term basic wlu(!.\' more pertinl;:nt t han high -1!rioril y goals ;I.~ tilt: filCliS of I hreat. nasie val lies include "core" values, which rarely var~' and arc few in number. and " highpriurity values," whkh de rive frum ideulu,!!;;eal ,lIld/or 1lHilc riai inkres!s as Jdilletl by th t: n:lc\' an t decision makers. Tile second point of dep;lTt llrc from Hermann 's defin it ion rdates to time _ In the leB's terms of refereru.'C, it is not so much th e ~IHJrtn ess of time that inlluences the crisis be h:wiur uf {lecision make rs, but rat her th e awareness of finite time lor their response to th e value threat. In other words, an dl:ll1enl of crisis perce ption is the realization
" 0"." It Y"" ,,~. TI,,' ' h/iIi"" 'if fi,,-,:' t: IJ" ",,,h,j,, c d",i,,~ [,,1<"""""""/ cn.;., (l"i",.., · 1,,,, : 1',;,,"..,1"10 U";"~"il)' I'",,.. 1!JGb). p. J~. '1""'''\ i" I\'itli."". eri." _1'","'~c"IC " I, I'· ItS. " The di,lInc!i"" i' dr.,,,·,, hy Will i,m" en.';" ,!I""{/ ~... l't" 21_ 2; . ·n, i. ,li"i'K" iO<', ,,'''c'po:>I>d, ,,, Iloe a",t ),! ;c,.. t d,n'- ,e"e,. \"'h" ~-n II", ,\,,;,lvu ",,,l-;,,~ and .ysl,.",ic ~I' I..-.. ",h~s .• s ~!at",,~t..J ill Cl,a,k, f , Ik ,,,,.,,,., .. ,1.. /"" "'"" lIv,,,,/ L'n"".1't', 6-1 •. "Charles f , Ik r"~''' ''. -1"1<',,,ahon.1e ,i,i, '" • Sil" .. t~,,,at \'a,i.,""', " p. HI. ","'ted in B,,,d,,,.. '"[""'.rd •• Th,,,,}':' 10, ,Il.
,,,e,,'.
~".
10
1." TIlO I) UGJ"I(>S
that alt l!ou)..\h a deeision could be clchlYt!d. it could not be delayed indefi nitely. T ll{! third (loi nt of co nt ent io n is with H Crlllann"s a_~ su mpl io ll Iha! surprise is a necessary condition fi,r a crisis s it uation. Bred lcr argues Ih,,\ "ume situ"l i,,,,s pe rn:ivcd by Jc<:isioli makers to involn: th reat. th e likdihO
finite time may be dearly foreseen. This helief is reinforl'Cd hy the skeplit-is rn of ot her scho lars about th e "sur prise" d im ension."
L. P. Brody has fuund tha t H c r mHnn~~ typology is "not as SUl'CCS Sful as predicted,"" and D. '-I. "IcCormick has concl uded that surprise is "not Illc;\slIrabl<:: from c(lntent analysis,"" T Illis. in its (e B llsuge, surprise is no! a n cccss ar~' or ulliversall y present l~lIldi
lion of crisis, bul when il pn;ssurt:,
e,~ ists,
it Illa y IlCi~htcn the impact oftimc
Finally, a most crucial addition to the Hermann definition is IC lfs indusjoll of "pert'dved high probahility t)f war" as a nel'eSsaTY conditi on, Indeed, whereas the likelihood of llIi1i1~lry in volvement presupposes a peree ivet! vnllie threat, "the reverse does nut obtain. Thus, probability of war is th e pivuta! cundition of crisis, with threat l1nd lime closely rel a ted, ,"" The pcrt'C ption that w"r is likely is also closely related to the notion of I1n(;crtain ty, Indeed, uncertainty 'Ihoul "',Ir, rei " forced hy "'Ilue t], refll a,ld li me salicn(;e, Ilceessit al cs '\,risis-t}'pC" dedsion making,
Given these refinements of th e He rmann definition of crisis, Breche r offered th e fullowin g more elaborate defin ition: A er isis is a situa ti on with Ihree 11~><-'Cs s"rv ami sullll'ie,,1 OJlldiU"ns, deriving fWIll a "ha,,!,e in ils ede"",1 ur inl"Tlla] el1vimll",e"t, All three clJnd it ;IJ"~ lIrc pc reept ;u"s h eld hy the hi!,h(:st 1",-c! .Jedsiu,,_ Ill"kcrs: " )1""0""" lti",,., lf Lie, ",-'k,~,,,,lcd~..J tl,;" S<:e CI",rle' F lIn"""", 'TI",·.,. Tim" . " d Surp';"".~ SimuLtioll III Illlt'",.tiuo,1 Cn,e,," I" Ch.rl", E " d.. Illten,,,· I;""dl eriM'." I" 2O!i_ "1 ~ P. 8""1.,, ·-rh,...I . I),,,,; ,;,,,, T;Il ... "',,! A"·""·,,,·,,, T1 ,~ ''''p.>
I\",,,,a,,,,.
in
~ rc"Iot'" r. l) , ~I .
',\,w""I, a 11"",); -
1' ,
H
,\ttG,roll;,'k,
/)".,;""-, , ~:,.~,,,. and /\::""'1";0m- I" lntc",,,U"n,,1 Gm'c" ,'" I. l. ",,opl/,m. I" """lirl /""",,,,11,,,,,,/ C''''Jl/,. (,I"" ,1,10",. ~t;"h" Fl r.j A"" ,1,1 • ..-
,1/,," ,,,,-;,,,, "..
em l""al "'''. 1U7,~). p_ lfi. '1'10'.'] In /l,,·doc'. , J)«;"""" in /,, ,"el". F" .... ;~ .. r"lk~. p, ~2, " Mi<:b.d 1I«"lot", /)u;"i,,,,,;,, C<;.,/. , I.rue!. 1')67 a"d 1')jJ. p, fi, (;1"n S,,)'de< I"" " ,",ide", 'he p"'<"i'-~.J 1''''~ <"",1;1;"" .-,f 01,1., S,.., GI~" 1\,
S")",I,,, . "d l'au1 1)1 .. , lng, C",ojIicr A",()"~ ,\'« /i","" PI" 6 _ ; , Th~re .'''. '" """"", ul ht'r 1)'1"" "f ,'rl"", hu, r, .. lUI 1""1"'''"'. " ",i,i, ,~f,",s "".,1)" I" milii''')" ." "'t'''r;~ )' i"""-,, a p",,'ly ",-,,,,,"ni<' c,i li •. "'" ~tid,.d llft't'he" -h,d;~', !k\'.lu.ti.~"or 1966, Linb"c I ~,t;lk> ami Cri,i. D.~,;'i'",· Mak;,,~. " H,"iti.I, ,,"''''''/ "J IJI/'''''"/~m,,1 S,",I;" , .) fl!(77 ), 1_ 25.
t,,,
ICh
JIz
M
11
SOVIET FOHE[Cl' POLICY ASALYS[S
I. 1I threal 10 Iwsic valllcs, with a si "''' h"",." ""s ur .'" h.
2. hig" probability of itJwl~£'m~ JJt JJJ military Im,'lilili£'$ ""d I he awarm",""
3.
or
fi"jt~ lime for res/){)rJSe /" the
",Tlrnwl tulu e , h n :Il'- ..
This d e finition of crisis refers 10 the perce ptions and beh.lVior of 1I single relevant stllte in a c.-his situatiuli . The he havior of other states and insti tution s in the international system is conccptualized primarily as inputs influencing "t he beh.IVior of the crisis actor by sh,lping its dcfinition {lfthe situation and the n its response. [Thus] the state actor remains the eentr.ll objcet of in \"es tigation~ how its decision-m'lkers pert-eiw: environmental chan),(e and how they choose, in Ihe (:ontext of escalating or tie-escalating perceptions of threat, time press ure, and probahility of \\11r.·· '" In keeping with this defin ition , th is study analyzes Su viet pe rceptiuns and [lehavior during the Czechoslovak cri si .~ . T his crisis-bchavior model is a refinement of the Jell formulation \lu bl ished in 1977:' which posited an intl:rad iv(: pro(:es.~ h etwee n an independe nt v
in en,."
I'. I.
" 'hid .. p. 2. ~ UII<:he..
'"",,,,-J, a Th,,,,<)':
PI' .';2 -!">I.
"' TI,;, .....1;,", d"w, un R,,~·hd•• l.h"r.'"", or Ihe "'(JIt. 15 (lllt:>S). p. J W.
J
""
l~
.
,
•
12
TI.., all_xi,'lv o r Ii,ar an illdiv id " al ,,~p"ri': "L"'S in a si tuat;"" whid, ],.. pc rcdn" '" I>tHing a
,,.\"t'rt'
tlorl'" t to o"e ur nil"" " .. IIlCS,
Psy_
eholngit'lI! stre." rC' lui res all i l\ \l-'rpl'ctat io" III' the SII hjed of the ,igniflc" "l'C of l h" sli m "lll s ,it"a l i" n, I'.,yd",lllgil·:d ,Ircss (lCl'lIn e ither wh"" tl", su hj,-'c! "'I",ri""cl~~
T he len con ee p liull of stre ss d iflcrs slightly. 10 Hulst; and G(~u rgc, ~ 'rcss is ca u sL~1 by a pcrCc llt ion of t hrcat; in te ll ter m s, st ress is in duced by th e co m pos it e in d e pend en t l'ari;lblc c ris is penx' ptioll, wh ich is ('om posed o f tlm: a l, I im c pressure, a nd the proba h ilit~, of war, T hus, th e terms "stress" or "crisis-induced sl ress" will represent the pcrl'ept iun of threat ,md/ur time salience and/ ur wa r
likeli hood, T he model postulates that th e initial respoll!;c of decisioll ma kers to a pe rceptioll of t hre at (cop ing) is to seek in lim llation a hou t t he th rea teni ng ,1(:1, T he Illodel :ISSIllll e!, that stress i ndll('('_~ a greater need, and broader quest. for information. Fo])uwing this in ilial s l"l). d"" ;s;" ,, ,,, ,,kers " ",h;,,- k
lilllows : Seurch refe rs to the pnlCesses of obtain ing and shar ing relevant information, ami of iden t ify; n!: and inve nting "lternn!;"e "I'!i" ns: Innd ) (/lw/y.I'is (n r ('""lll"t;on ) rl'f\'r~ th,- p r llC('SS('S of ,,~:uni ning and " "'11-
'n
uati ng tI,e rdative a ppropria te ness of ah,' I'IMli",! " p lio"s with l'di'renee t" sta tet! UT alt.'rnal i"" "hjed i" es ""t! ""I ues .~; "()I~ I\.
11,,1' li ami ,~ I~,·.,,,lcr I..
I~'"'n:" , 'The Eft, .. ·" ..I' S, "." .. " ,h~ I",.f"',,'a,,,·~ of P,,/;U,'a/ _~c~""',. ,\u,,''''/ 6 1I97.~), 2.,7. ll,~ """".. 01;"" hel",e,-" i. al ." t'mph.,,;<e,1 l". Jan'is and ,\1""" , ,,-1><> ",.iniai.. Ihot ,1",,.. "i, - Ih,ea' - anJ (j ... ~1 a, . gc,,",;ne 'eton ,,, de'i~n.'" "" pie"""", "",0,;"".1 ,la'". """k,1 b)' IIIT".i",,;ng en_ "irum"",,'.' ~,,,,,I ( ' >f ,1i",,,1;''' ' T'!"g I.. J,''''i' a"d I " '" ~b,,,, . /)"6,';"" .It,,~;,,~ , A r.y_ d" ~"~i«ll """I~$l, ,if C",ofiit:" 1'. 50 " 11,;, ddillilio". \,~' Silt,,,,,. M.. d, ""d (;) ....1. i, «"oted ill lio1,1i a,"1 C.c",~c, '"11,e E1fl,<-1. of SiR'», · p _ 271 lO _ 10. 11 ,,,,'(" ',·,. K" '
·-.'re."
''''''io)"
all "lIT ~)U, "'pi"g """'" ...,""''' ."d -iJ~" l iI"; n~ . "d in,""nl ;"~ ahc",,,t;,'~ (~" i.. " , i. ;" oU, '",;m:" fo, ,,It<,,,,. th'c , .' J"f"" ",.;"" s",,~h' 01. ,,,, ,he 'h ,c "c" ;"~ c'-ell'. ><,1and/", d ..,,,,,,,, .1t ,he ""he' , i. m.. le a, ·., jt.,hle ,,, th~ "m, "hI,,·., <"in '''' a",1 .l"d.;',,,,1 f,,,, .. ,, . ",1 h "",'i,,.. 1 dud,,\( .10 .. " ,,,, ,,1,,,.11 .. ,,
"r ah .. " ",III'.._, ."
Se .. 1I, .. -lL .... /)ffi,i"", ;" C ,j,i>. 1'. ll .. . 2.:;,
''''
o::h
SO\, I~~r
FOIIEIGN POLICY ANAl.YSIS
JJ
Clearly the inte nsity of stress, particuhlrly in terms of tim e avail a hiHty, will affect Ih e ~earch fu r ami eV~l lllaliol) of alternatives. T hus. here 100, a eausal link is es ta hlished betwee n the pcn:cption uf crisis and the process ofar rivin~ OIl a dcd~iun . Dll riug th e crisis, scveral choices arf' apllo h(~ madc. and many of these will he made in varying eo nd it ioll5 of escalating and deescalal ing slress. To specify Ih e changes that take place w ilhin the e ntire tim e span of the crisis, a tllree -period mudel was dev ised; the inception of the cri sis (t he pre-crisis period), its peak (the cri sis p e riod ), ami its dl.."Cline (the post-crisis period ). In mu re detail. The IJn~-c ri.! is period is marke<1 olf fmlll a pn:<:'eding Il [)[)crisi~ peri.",1 I,), a L~lIl spit:tlOllS inercase in peTt:eil'ed Ihw"t . HI the p:lrl of de.:;is ionmakers ufthc st,lte Illider inquiry. 11 1"" gins wilh the en:" t (\,r clus ter of event,) whieh trigg{Jrs ... ri'iC in Ihre"t pe rwplinn, The crisis period is ehar.lCtcri zcd b~' the preSellt'C of all three necessary co ndit ions of cri~i ~-a sharp ri~e in perc-ci\'ed !hre nt to basic valne s. an mm"me.l~ uf time con'tr~ints on decisions. and an image of ! he [lfol ~Ihility of ill vokcrneut ill military !instil itic! (wa r likelihood) at S"IllC I",,; nl hdurc II,.. issuc ;s rcso]ved. It. too , hcg in ~ wilh a trigge r;n" .:\'e nl (or d,,,t e r uf ' :\,cnb), Jr,,"lI r "Lt.'UI'> :II I he nulsd or I hc eTisi.. pe ri ,,.} ur within ils lime f.:une , the th; rd mlld;t;nn takes II,,, form of a pcrL'Cil'cd ded im: ill m ilil:try ",([lahil it y vi s-,\-vi s Ihe elle Illy (or aUl'erse change in the milil:lr)' balanl'''), i.e" in!'Tc salien t:e. alld th e probability of w ar) on th e decisio n makers' (:oping mechanisms an d choices? The indiv id ual case stud ies thus attelilpt !o answer nine specific quest ions. \Vlmillre th e e llect~ of e st:alating and deeSt:aJating crisisinduced stress 011
i ll!onllt/lion :
J. <-'Ogni li vc pe rfurma nl'C 2. Ihe pCf(.·ei'·cd ,wed ,mtl consc
"' Urc""he', Du;, ;om ;" Cri,; •. I'P. 23 - 23.
II
I :l! (.T IU:>;
3. th~' receptivit y and size ufthe i1lionn,,!io!!pro(-,c~sing
on cOII"lIlfalio,,;
groUt)
4. the ty pe ,,,,,I size
"r mns"!!a! i" ,, ""its
5. grou p part it"ipatioH in II,,: (~lI ", tl t"ti\'<·
prtx:ess
,,,,
uri decisional furUIII~: 6 . t he s i/.e st ru cture of dct:'isional fOf U ill S i , authority patt" .." wit hi" dec;s;o",,1 " nits ()!I
"/lc,-,w/i,,,,&:
8. Ih" ,c"r~h fu r
;lntl
evaluatio" of,llt cnmti vcs
9 . th e P <'r<,<,i,'"d ra!l !,(c "f a\'ailablt.'
"lte n ",lives r: Th c~c
questions constitute tbe focus for (~ HnparJ.ti vc anal ysis. The find ings of this particular stud y wil! be used to i.lSSCS~ the validit y of
m ajo r h ypu' h escs "n tTis;s l>c h,,\' iu r, If Ill{: en tr y of \V"rS1!W Paet troo p s int o C7.I!chus[ovak h:rri \uTy (luring the night of August 20- 21, 1968. pred pil:.ltcd a major t'risis w it hin t li e Pr:.I~\le le ,ull.'Tsl1 ip , t h e i nl'asioo a Iso marked t he cul m inatiun of a Inn g crisi~ p c ri(KI li) r Soviet deci sion m'lk c rs. Indccd Breche r's denllition o f c ris is is particularly suited to th e Sovie t ('asc. ;\Int only wcrc all fOllr I wc.~":n·y " "'] s nlTk ic nt cnn dit i"ns presen t- a chan!;:c in the c nvinmmcnl, perccptions of a thrt~"1 In hasic valnc s, " hi g h p m1",], il ity of involvement in m ilitary 1mstilit ies, and a fin it e tim e for response- but Brcc her's alt e rati o n of ('OIl\'entiollal deilllition s o f crisis f;ldlit,ltes ill the Su\'id C:lse :l m ud l do se r (~)Jl ce ptual fit. S p ecilka ll y, hi s o m ission of the element of surprise as a nece ss ary ('Ollllit io ll of c risis en ables th e examinat ion of a case in w h ich I he deci sion-m akillg unit rcacts lJ"er a long p c riod " f tim c in :0 c" lc ulat cu and vari e d ""Iy to iI d~' namie situation for which it llIay not be wholl y res pons ihle b ut 10 wh ich it has ce rtainl y contrib utcd, The om issi" n o f s u rp ri s,,", with its ('Otlnotat ion Ilf pu rel y rc spolisi l'c ,md dcfcnsil'c hehavior. an d the re place ml.'llt of a sho rt respo u se tim e h y a Ilnite li me e llitatl('e tb e :tpplil'atioll of Brc du: r's defin ition "I' c risis to Sovie t hdlllv iu r toward Czec hoslovakia in 1968 and make it poss ible to te st the rn(Kie l's h ypot heses abo ut decision nmk ing un d e r crisis l'01l(l itio1lS.
''''
o::h
C HAPTE H TWO
Prelude to the Crisis
It is difficult to pinpui nt th c date or spedfit: evenl in Prague tll al
prooul'Cll pen'e ptions uf tl lrea t within tile Suviet lead ersllip suffi cie nt tu trigger th e pre-crisis period. The cump lex inte rnati onal situation and th e growing disunity within the bloc nat urally af-
fected Soviet respollses to d lallgcs ill CZt"'C hu,\uvakia. Increased disso,; nl in Poland, in th e Uk rain e, ;uul ' UlUl11!; iulcl leclua\ circles wit h in th e USSH met with allard-line resplJ11se from Sm'ie! le ader s, ,lnd heighte ned th ei r sensitivity to si mi!;lr unrest in Czechuslova kia. \ Vit hin the Krem lin itself, thre e years alier Ihe ousti ng of Khrushchev. a clea r foreign pulicy line had ye t to cmerge. Thus th e "Pr.lgue Spring" unfolded ag,linst a bat'kdTIJIl of dispute and Ilncertainty on vital policy issues. The Soviet respunse to Czeclmsluvak refurms wuuld be th e bencllllwrk fur the fu ture devc\upmen! of Soviet domestic and fOl"ei gll policy. Give n this sihllliion, il is ra th er surprising tha i thc crisis took as long to d evelop as it did. As early as the slimmer of 1967, leading intellectuals :md oiJici'lls in Pr.Lgue were ddJatiu g highl y sensitive issues. At the "ourth \Vr it cr.~ · Congress in Jun c . speeches attacked the party's domestic and foreign policy, Official censorsh ip was eond e llllLcd uy man y speakers, ld.tok ke., ;nLo"·;ol....d 0"
Ocl")",, 2·L. 1U77. <"O"hnn<..J Illat al hi,
j"'Ligolion Lhe IMle , " '.. o'n;Ll,~1 [,om 11,. offici.,1 ,.,.,,,fc N ncc L> roc<',.dio!p " "' of mn ,;d~ •• , tion for "ll,e , ep""""" ;""' ' ''ch all ..:\ """td ".,.,. in ~10 ..., ,,,·.·· AI ><> ..... II . c-;"nItK' S kil1; ,,~. C",."I""/'''·4k(;'·f Inlr"""lrd fl """ J"' ion. I'l" 00_ 70
1(1"'' '
15
"
16
I )",UOJl\lCTlOl'
At thE: Central CO!ll1l1itlt'c plenullI in ]>ragllf~ in Ot-Iol.cr WH7, t he p racticl~ of duplicating lop party and s tale pmts was criticized, and th e rcsiJ.,:nat iol) uf First SC{Tctary '\Illonin Nuvu tn y wa~ d e mamlc{1. NIl\'''!u}' appealed to the Soviets lilr assistam:c in main-
taining his position. h UL aI! SOllft'CS agree. ;"Ioscow did no l in te rfere to prevent a diminution in No\'o!n}','s power. CZCdlOs[ovakia had bet' ll one of th e few b ilK' slales to escap e d c-S t,llini7~l ti lm, ,tlul it was gc n crall ~' helieved that the heavy COlicclltratio n of authority in NO\'O!ll{S hands a nd th e oVcn'clll rali'l c d and bure allcr:llizcd powt:r strul'iure WCrt! n:spollsi hl c for thl! t:(.~ )n()mi{· stagna tioll tb a t lUld Ch,H'Ucterizcd the s~'slem since t he early 1\)f1Os. ;\Inreover. Nuvotny"s pe rsonal uhjccti<1Il lu Ihe ousler "f Khrushchev li: ,,, ,I". f"tt"w; .. ~ "',""." E. C"I,I""d .. ,. in' e"·;,·.... o"'<~"" :!-J. 19i7, l in lI:1j,·k. m, an, ~1,,~._J'm~"c . 1!l6.~_ 1lJ7~. 1'. 76:" IlIgt..r.U1 l ill~ Dllh{d .;d~ " 'nlin!' ,,"der
" p'elld"")·,,, (_
~Iom"u'
11'""",1. 1). "Slo.",·""" n"lkk- A \);If,·,.·",l)u)l(o,·k .- p. 208.
AI", a C IOC/. 1'. ,,,,,ldl,,,,, "ah'"'''''' ".'1"",,..,1 - "''1''i ...· and """,Ii"" -•• 1\1"",I,<\,e,", ...",'c. a",1 al'p,,,,,;al ion of hi> " " ",I;;h ,,,·,,,,,r,,1 '"O<";"CTK"t: . ,,,1 ,lte ,1;"·10",,,,· of 'he ""nm",,,' ", •.1I",,1, I" ,I." ,,,,,~,J ,,( Il'e c,,1t of ,,.......,,,,,1;').:..\·ru, r".k T;m"., . Aug"" 21. 19&5. Fin lo ...·l~rouud 10 ,hi. p. ,;,,J. ",e (:.t;" e"I.",. rI... G:,c/,"""""k /l./o"", .1/".. ,,,,,·,, .. ' J", ..r S",.~,,,·, l~ . "-,, Vlifi";'J.,·,/ C,,'u.".·..."I1.." . 1'. 7. Sl iltinK. c:.!... h".. Im·"k;{/:' /"Icr"" I"r,/ n,wl"r~,". 1'. Iff) . • ",1 ~ I Id,d T.,'u. /.....I/,,"d,. l.u"",,}· I~. IfQ. AI" , ~ 1\,1;,1, lie ..... '· 1"'1"" l",IoIi ,I"',1:.. , ''' k~' hr ~ I',,,~~, ,, """"I~,,,d .. n! d"l'~"io~ ' he 'p,e." "f ""h·S",·;"Ii<m ill C"...·I,,»lm·.li~. ""de Cl·.·" "m',," 1"',fi,li"'" ,In'" i' I, ~,·,,,·~~tI,· know" llIoa, I~ .. i'io" """' IA~o I.)" IlIn.t.o",· ,Io"in~ hi' "]"t ,,, I'r.'g"" in 'he '·"ti<-.,I ,\.1p- wi",,, ill .....·.""" ']>1"" ,"" , " ,1"" ,I", S,"'k, 1I";"',, Ji,l 'K'! ,,,,,.,,,1 '0 h" ... f,·,,· i" C,.<..·I",,)o,·.'~i.:' ,,,, ... ,,al ~If"i~'" ( Zyd " II'. ... "''''.~. ~IJ)· 4 . 196Ii).
"11", S"'·;,., dc...·i.~.n "0 ' to ,',,"e ~""" "i' had I" ·,·,, a ";do,)' f", "o')"~in" til", ~.IIt.",,,]> i" tI,,· 1\,\i,Io,,,,,. "'~'"rdin g ,,, ,,~·lt ·inf,"m,"1 \" "1""1.". ,m" ,,·, '1 ,,,,,,"1 h~· I ..jo" L.. ,I",,·r. n~ OI,..·rt·r . (1."',]00) . ~ L , ...h 2-1 . HIfi.'I ' Il .j"k. /);rd",o ,m's . 1' . T6
~hch
•
l'ltELUUE TO TilE
/7
CI\I~ I S
havc reassured I3rezllllev hy telephone on jilnuary 6 IIHlt no further personnel changes would be neede<;:1 no\\' Ihal Novolny had heen remove{I." Not surprisingl y. ther.,/',re, Ihe eled;on or Alex" ndel' DubCck as first seerct ar~' of th e Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) on january 5, 1968, \\,:15 rc).:arded in ~IOSL,{)W as a IXlssihle solution to long-st.Ulding pruhlcms in Czechoslo\'akia. nol as Ihe beginning of a crisis. Throughoul January and februar y, reialiullS remained openly L~Jr{liaL Dulx:ek's visit 10 ~I oscuw at th e end of january, as dl;scribed in the official L'Ommuniquc. took pll\L'C in an atmusphere of "L'{)rdial friendship, sincere and Ide mlly understandiug," with "L~lll1plete agreement" on all issues discussed.' The celebrations of thc twentieth anniversary of the February ]9-18 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia occasioned I'isits b~' Suviet .lILd Illoc leaders to Prague, Brezhnev praised the "outstanding part" playc{[ fly the erez "in strengthenin g and de"eloping th e soeialist L~Jlllmunity " and su ppurted ··Ihe creative approach of your party \0 th", solution of problems arisin g at all stages of th e stru ggle il, r the victory or sol.'ialism.'" Although the Soviet newspapers c:>rried almos t llO inde pth anal ysis of th e leadership changes, th e few rejlor ts Ihal did appear were, on th e wholl~, favorable. " This public facade of unit y and support llid lIot always conceal indications tl) the L1.l11lrary. howI;"er. The MO.K1)\\' meeting between lJllbl:'Ck and th e Soviet leaders on January 29- 30 was perImps till! first OL't."dsion at wh ich some lluu],ts were ojlenly e.'prcssed. Thc :lutilOritatil'c Soviet explan"tion of th.! n ;;Lsons fi,,. th e innlsion. issucd by PrtlVda on August 22. 1968. dl~;lrly stated that thert~ Imel heen e:luse fllr worry as cHrly as January: Our part)' took atl lImlcrstatidin/: :lltitudc toward the dc<:ision of the Jalllm ry 19f,s plenary se.;sinn of t he CI'C" Central COIllUl ittce. Ne\'ertheless. it "'as already evident al that lillie that the del'eluping situa, tion <.~)\) 1d Ic".l tu " weakeni nl; uf I],,, CZL'Clmsl"""k C()llllmUi ist 1';lrt )' ;11)(1 ,<> t I,,: growl h (If s"ntilllt'nh d.nlg"l'Uus I() ,ucialism amo"g ~~'r tai II cird.,., ,l()'·il k .",cict\' Ihat wen, \111\1,·,. II", in/!"','I('e of ho"rgeois views .lUd illlperi;llht p;ol'aganda. 'Willi,,,, Sha"""" •. /)IJI>«k. p. 153. ' I~""'lia .
l'chTU .. Y I, 1\I6!I_
' 1,,,,, 11... Felm ......' Zl. 19RI. ' P~d,·,'~. J~"u~,y 6. J96'i. p"LI;,heJ 11,",.1",..,,", 1.. 1e'!!,,,,,, "f "" ,~ ", '"l.li"" h, i)ul":'Ck "i!1o a I""glhy a"d I_;lh·~ hi'W"I,hi..-JI , keld, of dw nt'W r,,,! ,...,' da,)-, ,\1>" ,e'1.· rrac,/u.
..
,
J.HU"Y 19,
n. 2.1. 31. and
I'elm '.'~ S. 9,
."d 17.• ",]
"':~";,, .
j.""..,y 21 and
Fc!"u"y G.
"' "
I'
[ N Tn01J[ J CT10~
In t he talks bc hH'c n CI'S U lcadcr~ ;tnd CU'l'ho.,!",-ak le ad ers held in MUSl~)W in Janu:lr)' and in i'm,"uc in Fchruarr, these lIppre hc II _~ions w(~ rc "o;e.;<1 openly, in a parly spirit. At the Sa me lim e it W:,S sl" tcd ill 110 uncertain terms th at tin: choil'C 'If paths uf hU ildin g so c i,,1i." " ""'! the chui ce " fform s and meth"ds "rparty gu j, b """ "I' S(x'i;.l pnK.~:SSCS we ..: within t he full a",1 cx du s;"c tompch"K'" uflh" CI'Cz Cu"lral Committe"'"'
During the January meeting in ~I()scow, I3rc7.hn cI" is said tu have
supported J)1l1x:d, ,[gai ns! \11f' cunSCf\';lt;n:s alld to have ollerc(J to felll,lee them. Zdcni':k ,\ llyuM", ,I C I'C7. sc(:retary who was prcscllt ,It th e postinv,]sint1 " 'Iost't)\\, ne gotiations. recalls that Juring tl1{)se August negut iations Brezhne\' reminded Dubcek uf this suppurt:
"',I.'
Fnu n th e "cry [" ,gi nn ing. ] pn:par,'d to help YOIl ag.1ill ~ t N""ol nf·. . and ] ask,!(l )'uu "s t·ady ,IS January: You "re Ihreakllcd hy his IIlt:n. ar~'n't you ? Du yo" ",,,nl h . dO:lIlge Ihem ? Do )UU w:ml 10 lIa\'" ;u,otlu' r Minis lN uf Int.·mal ,\IT'lirs~ y"" said at 1],<1t time th:d thi s wuuld nllt he nL'<-'C~Saf\'. hL...·<1USC th ey "'erc ~()od t~)1nradcs . .... nd nn ly , ,,I)st,,],,en ll,.. JiJ I hear Ihal )UlI had changed Ihe ;'Iin is!<:r of InlCr· nal Affairs. the ;'Iinistcr of Defen ~e . ot her Ministe rs and Secretarie s of the Cent ral Committee. " Th o: Fo:hnmry lll e ding in I'ntguo:, d esp it e its ~'t:ro:m ull ial purpose. "~IS also 'Ill (K'C[lsion of som e tens io n. Sov iet lead e rs ohjccted to purtions of D uh':'ek's puhlic addTGss in whid, he sp()ke o fCzechoslo\',lkiil's intf>rests in Europe, "in the center of whic h our ('
1'_ Z'lS_ " R"./t ''''\,.", ~"·h" .,ry 2.1. l'lf>ll. 11,.. ,1 ......·10
w., al". ,·." .....1 ill
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,-,·J,"'''Y 2.1.
l!lr~~
.,
/9
PUEL. Ull f: TO TilE e Ulsls
n :primambl Dllh(;ek: "I ill Fell m an'] I told you of Ill\' ohjed ion to your spce<:h amI ~·a!!.;d to your alti:lltion so me fiwlIllllaliollS whidl W("'C nol ,"01"]"<.."<:"1. But ) 'OU did,,'t change t he m. lI erc wl,en I prc .. pare a spee~'k ' : \"1'11 I my,elf llUl~t )!;i\": the \t;~t to th e otller me mhen of the Politburo. in ord er t llat th ey should ~i"e their judge me nt. . \Ve ha\"e a L'O!!edive le'ldcrship :lnd Ihat me,IllS thai Olle has tn Sli hurd inate one 's views to ot he rs."' " Th is I-chrua r) ' i ncid.ml W,I S (~Jll firm c(! aller the invasion h~' V;lsii Bi\"ak. head of I he S!o\'ak Com 1111 mist p:ll"l y and olle of Dul >i·.,k·, "JlIl< III.,nh I h ruu ghuul mr,s. He reported th:ll on Febru,LfY 2.7. I.I n :l.hlleV, havi ng received an advance ('OilY of Dnlx:e k's spel'tll. telephollell Dub(·ck. At"('Onlin g I" Bil""k; "Co mrad e Bre~ hn cv , afraid. trie.l lto ex plaill" Inng lime 011 th e tclep!lO ne, whal kind of scandal wO llld OL"Cltr if sudl a speedl \\" <:re pn-,s.; nh,d al . tIll: C.:nlral Commitlc.:. They wOIil.1 pruh .. abl y re,lcl to it ,wd lea\"e."· !\\though some eh:mgl~s in Ihe speech were in Jild made, lIi1',lk daim s, th ey still fell [Ir short of Soviel d e nmnd s." Yet the Jan uary and Febrllar)' illdde nls w"re nut slIffieil,nlly st'riolLs 10 trigg"r ,I IIwjor crisi s. Gust;h' 1I 1I._;ik. DIIIK:c k's ~ Ut;L"t:ssu r, suhs{~quc nll y stat ed that Brcl.lmcv and ulll(~ r EWi t Europe,1ll lead .. e rs who had gathe red in ]l 1 ~l!!"e for til e Fehruary meeting "expressed quit e frankl y Illeir sl1JlJlmt for th e m'l\' leade rship and its g.~ ",: rall), ,I{h-ueated "i m5. J n ot he r words. the y hatk,:d I he leader .. sl,;!,. ils aim s "f '111'1",rlil1.1; .,,><:i:<1is lil . do il1 ).( away witl, mistnk"s, and providing greatcr St~'Jle. ·· '·· LEADEJISHIP
CHA~GF:S CO ~\!CEHN ~10SCO\V
III th e mon Ih fi lllowing I he Fe hro I ar~' t·.'lel)]":,t ion ~. I,. I\\"(:\" er. So\"id apprehens io ns Arew 10 ~1It;h ,I II· vcl that a crisis seeilled I1namidahlt:. of te nt ral imp{)rlallte ill prcdpilat ing Ihe crisis we re Icadership chan ges t hai thrc:1Icllcd th e strut;lllrc of part\". polk"C . and ar my c ha nnels th rough whic], III., S""i"'", had Iraditim"dl y exercisell (~)11 5id c rahl e informal influl'lIc,' "," 'r C~.ech()sl'''·;lk "fr.\ir~. ~ ~It )·".il . ,\''''''''f''',,', 1'. 2!1'I- !I!J. B,,·,.I,,~, ,··, "I,j'~'\i"" ,,, I'"' to' "f lJ"t.: ,·k·, >I''''·..!' "."'-, .t,,, ,..."1;,,,,,"<1 in t.ad." I.,," Bil\",a". T/,,- /)""'pli,m (;"''', . p. I~·I .
.. R", I~ t"·l k". s"l'"",,,IH" 3. 1%'1. '1",,1,,1 ; n Ji' ; \ :,1 ",,, • • S,,,·;.·,
.It" li"~
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rvl j,·, /),·d,I",, ·
",,,/I1'''''''''''mhc lIili';
"SI"'" I, to)" Il",.:ik •• l'r"~' ''· . ,\,,~">I t\l, 196'!. \" I he .tI·,' I~I '· ubi,· ,,( ,·t";"",·,, ,~. 1',;. 1',"1)' ""ib in i"cl ",l,y. <"", t"Kli"" . muJ 1,''''' I""t. 11rlt"h II,..:"I,-.,
""or )"
ICh
!z
M
20
1:>'T110UUCTI US
Cadre changes began when Cencral \%::luv Prchlik. then bead of the ~bin Pulitical Administration (M PAl of the Czechoslovak M in~ istry of National Dcft!n sc. replaced \ Iirnslav \ Iamula us chief (If the t'rm:ial eighth department of the party SCl'Tciari;Lt, the depar tment n:spollsible for supervision urthe af lll Y aml t!l t; sl.'Cllrity services." Prchlik's uld joh in the M 1'.'\ was th en fiIh: Ll by ann llu,r Dubec k suppurt e r. Ge neral Egyd I'cpich . The reaso ns "If the
ch.mgcs bCC;ITTIe de,l)" a week I,Ltcr when, un Fe bruary 25, General Ja n Scjna, head of the import:ml parly ('mll millt:c within the .\1 in-
ist r y of National Defense, dclcdcu to the United States amid reports th;1t he and Mamu la h;\([ been at the center of atte mpts to usc the military to pn:\'cnt No\,otn {s downEdl tIll: prcviulis Decem, ber. Despite nlll1\erOIl.'; rumors. the prC'Cise role of the Soviet mili· lilry in these ci;llldesliuc ildivilies WilS never madc publil-. " Soviet L"Ollce rn over the leadership cha nges umltlie defe nse rmnill.cations uf the possibility that Sejnll had taken tup militar~' secrets with him" were sufficient filr the Soviets tu plilte mubile air and light armored units in the Carpathian military district on alert.'·' Then, un f e hruary 28, ~ larsh .. 1I. J. YakuUovsky, the supreme cummander uf the \Varsaw Pact furces, arrivc\1 in Praglle in tIle flrs\ of mallY attempts to assess Ihe elfed of changes inside Czt..'(:hoslov'lkia Oil Soviet str;Ltegic l"Oncerns. Yilkubo\"sky held talks with Duhee k, President No\"otn)\ Parly Secret.lfY J07.cf Lcm1rt. and Defcnse ~linister l30humir Lomsk~'; and sources indicat e that the di scus, ~"[lw ~'l " " .h·~ I'"" .. ~.,
,,r , I,,· ";~h'h
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Dr. O,~a, Ilizik . P,d,lik', del"")"' wh" i" .n i"te rdew on Ilr.li '~.'· . t,· l~,"i'io" "" ~!o,n.~' 27 . 1\J6S. ,"~i'\I"iTt",1 II." ';1 •• " ,\". ""~~ of II ... .\!i"h '.)" "f "_u",,.1 n,·r~,,,,· . ,10 .. ~I ;"I>tr)· .,( 110,· l utc·,io,. the I'"",-,-·.,tol·' Offiet". the ,,, u,I, "f I.,,'. a"d the ",ill! I., ' (SII'n. 1':£12739' (:116 ).
" Mid,,,,,! S'"p,.. ,,,k.Suonone. , . 1 ,Ioor ti,n" 1", ••on.1 p,e" offie", 10
th~
min;,le, ,,r de·
f~n_'" and late, t" Pre,ide,,1 S'·'~XKh. ",.i"l.i", 11,.,1 ~ejn" ,,,,,..,i,,,,,1 '''I'l""t fn '''' S,wi"1 ",i lila,)' ",h"i"", i" Pr.~"'· "')'" "~'1<" """"fIid~l\)" .. '''I'I"''U'''': ""'"""'i'" II ... ,I~ ,
·'i,'.·.. ;"
"'1'1""" Scjtta'., . "I1>e'I'"·''' , t.u·""·,,, !hal (;,·",,, ..1 JanL" h:.d I""n Ink! I", S"",e( "m""." "thal • military otl ..,k [.,)' tbe So"iet ~"n)" ",,,,1,1 he ,n""it"ble if 11u- " ·"j,'",,i,t. i" I'ra,:"c "",tinu"d ,,,,h thei, wo,L of de,lrue!i"","' s.::-., Mid,,,,,! Slel",,,,·k.St.l,,, ,,,,,,. Vi<: r'c/"'d,,~ ,tlm,""Hw:/,r Anr~ ·r. 1'1'" 22 -2~. ·n ... ",",,"'< I'''IW'' of ' I,.. (;"~, h,,,~,,·.k P,'''I,I,,', I~"!)" /.;,/",'d d,·"",rm'~k. "n J,,"c 5. 1M. • 1", '''I''i", ....1a r", l r;"", ..,lid. all"~i"g ,hat .'\eJ'" 1"",1 heen .101,· «, I"a,',' Ihe "".. "«)-!,,-....-.,,,,, loe w .., in I""""»i"" (Of. dip~""ati," 1""IM>rt i»",,,l
."·w
I,,' ~ 5<,,';';1 ~en ~.'l. n,;, .1I,·pli"" ,,'" ",·,·cr L
" \';';I",:luTZ.> i" TI,~ G",,..,I;.,,,. j"l,- e. 1968. a",I .~"~"'1 21. 19r,s . • ",1 J"\''' E,;.,-k,.~, i" The S,mday nmc• . September 1. 1968, ~ .-\ " klljo" \\'·~k and S"d"" 1i""",ol,,~y . .\1"«+, 25. 100Il,
~Irch
•
21
I'HH.. u m ;; TO T ilE elll SIS
siollS cenlered on t1,,~ Sejna alElir, le'ldership dl,Ill)!;l'S ill II,,? IIppll mt, and tIn: spring Warsaw Pad mmlPuve rs long sdwdul ed tu take placc in Czcchus]ovaki;I."'· \VIHllcver reussur..mces Yukuhuvsky 1ll,ly have TCce ived in pri\"(I t e, I'll hlk c,llls in IJ)";\gne filr t he n~si).!;n at ion IIf con sc rvative le key I"IIIst ,1(1 or t\1(> party·s h!l:o lo)!;ieal Commission to Joser Space k. wh o thc previous June' had roundly c riticized t he muno]lolistic: way t he ]lart~' was e.xerdsin).!: its le'lding ro le." I'ress ure on th e ('Hlse rvati\"e fad io!l was mai nta ine(1 throughout "- lard1. with thrce tradf" uuion lcad er~ resign ing on March 12. 011 ~1a rch 1·1. it was ,l!ll\()un eee \ that Dep ut y Defense .\ linist<: r Ge lw ral J,mko had eo mmittell sn idd c, lililowing n'velatium tlllll he had been invoked with Sejn,l ,nul .\lamub in th e :. ~ S",·'; '''Y'/. "". 1:.1 (j ... " . 2,. 191),), 3 _1i . ." " .... i.. S~.ltj .. c. (;:.-.·/.. "/",.,,H' , /m r , ·
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11>" I'lIOOUCTIOX
Soviets !lad been willing to repiace Kud rna as minister of the in terior in order to strengthen Dulx:ek's hill)(1. WIHlt tb ey could uot countenance was 1\ioscow's cxdm ion from t he se!eet ion process alt ogether. A title of newspaper art id t~~ dc mamled l· hange, an d far fro m ste mm illg this outcry, man y C PCz "lTidals. illcituiil1),: DlllX::'ck him_ self, we re spe akin),: uul in favur of pnJ),! rcssivc pulicies . AI a municipal party confe re llt:e in Bmo, Duhcek s talt~d tlHlt " th e Party i.~ seekin g out ways ad l'<:luate !y tu exp ress th e nCl..:ls uf the 1l,lt ioIIS, of sodet y. (If sot:i,11 grou ps, ,l!\d of th e individl1il1. Th(' search is a complicated proce ss. But without SUdl a search it is nut possible to lead society.'· ~ ' Tbe 1'r.lesilli ulll of tht! part}' had l!1ldorsed these views hroadly ilt its ~I a reb 14 meeting. in wh ich it resolved to suh mit to th e Apri l Cen tral Cumm ittee ple num proposals fur cadru cha ngl's and 11 wide-ranging "action prugram" th at would serve as a hlueprint for th e reform mOye lllent. t\ ke ~' iss ue was censorshi p. wh ich had been ellt.'<: tivel}' 'I holis hell at t he heginllillg of ~I:lrch when th e l'rnesidill lll decided to re move the Central Pu blicat ions Board from th e jurisdiction of tl u, .\liJlistry uf the Interior. A c "these fears al-e the n:sllit of oM hahits, t,,)r llle r \\~lyS oft hi "king and met hod s of sodal pract ic{:s. . Critit;ism . must hff'(lme a peTrn:mCl1t!Catlire of 0111' life. . Tile I'raesidil1 lll (.~>ns ide rs it ri ght to d edare that this is a ddi ni te settling or at'l'(lU nts with the Jl,for mat io ns which hll\-e in the past enda ngered the developme nt uf sudety. " " SOVIET PHEOCCU PAT fO N ELSEW l tEHE
The response of th e Suvict press to th ese dc\'el ilpme nts was t'autious iu th e ex treme. There was a virtllal hlaekou t 011 :my d etailell analys is uf Czcchnslnmk atfai Ts. The ft~ w aTt icies that dit! appeaT " R"d~
I,m, '". M>r<,h 17. 19!>'\.
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I'UEL UDt: TO TilE
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ClllS l ~
were neutral repo rts of selected evcnts such as the regional party cuufc rcnce5 ur the Czechoslo"uk stand at the Sofia meeting; of the \ Varsaw Pact's Political Consultative Comm ittee. "' Certainly t he press gave no indicution durin g; the first threc weeks (If /I.·lareh (If imminent crisis. Editori'lls rellt""(.· ted cOIII;ern wit h other issues, do-mcstie and foreign ; and indeed the le;I{lership's preoccupation with lllore pressing, if related, prohlems explains the Ill n before the storm. On the domestic front the Soviet lemlcrship had h\l) majo r Jlmb~ lems associated with the growt h of dissent. Firsl , the Jun ua ry trial of" four intellcduuls, indudin g Al e~ander Ginl-llUrg, had clidted unexpected protests and petitions from leading figures in the artistic and cultural world. "" In Leningrad, the party l"Ommilice was o(Reia[[y reprima nded fo r its slackness in i{lcologit-al educll.t ion;" and a major editorial in Pra(;ila Oil .'.Iarch 1;1 calling for greater vigilance agains t the sub ve rsive influctll"e ofoourgcois propaganda and ot her f()feign idco1ogies marked the heginllillg of a major CI"", the riV:llry he tween the Ukr;lini;Ul p"rt>,·.~ first secretarr, Piotr She1est. and the Ukrainian prime minister. V V. ShclJe ruitsky. Both were in the CPSU PulitlJU ro, but Shelest was a "S~~ 1~<€"i<J. ~11",h
"",11',,,,.,10 . M. n ·l, 2. 1.•",1 10. 196~ . "l1,~ In, .. ,,,.I,,",.I;,,,,'' '''os .~'). modeM<';" lon c: "Con""",,i,1 1);1,1;", lOOa)' "1)0.·",,1,' in th,' ",,,, t ' ".>r;",1 "",di'~"", Thi, j , why 11""e ".u, he "0 ' lue,lio" '" o,""""jzi,,~ 0 k.din~ <"<"nh" of d,e C"mm " n i,1 mo'·eme,,1. The", i. no n, ...<1 fo, . uch • run'c,. I'","·nl..:la), funn> of '>oity ."d comJ;"""d act;,,,, .mong 'he f...,ern.1 p"";~' a ,~ . uffic;"n.l)" ",01o;1~ anti H~.\ibl ~ . ·· " f or de.ail, "f Ihe'" p,m.,I; ...... Th p Ih'ily T;,I,~ml,h . J.m".,)· 4. I9&!: TI", .\/"mj,,~ Sinr. January 6. 1008, The Time •. J'''''''''' 10, 100$. a" d ~ehnoa".· ~. i\l(iS, J"hc S,,,,d,,y 1U,,· /:mph. F"bou"'}" II. 1008, ""d Sew ro,k ~e l"",'1· Hl. I96/!. "1'",,,,/,,. J.""a')· lY. lOOIi. 'l"'~<-.J II,., r",.~ "!I"" "r Ih~ lool~" 1.. "U ,~r",,1 C it)" I'a" y C,~, lc,e,,<-.: : "1" ;,I<",I"~k>f"r"o><"<" w .. on .hi. then,e. - The ronf",en,,, "" p"·",,d II". ",·,~l 10> .. ,..~i ... 11... 1~,·~1 of 'he itl"'logical and 1)Q1i!i<..-.1 ,,]>Io,;"I;;"1l ,of 11,,- \"Jt~I"~ l><"<,pl .. . "'1>«<";,11)" )"""~ people. I" Ih.t of 1""'""''' .... Ia)· ''''"l ui'''''''''''''.. [" Janua,y 1!)6S. h ... " P q ·"I",,,·., rc;""~he
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full memher. whereas Shchcrbitsky was a nUl]\"uting candidate member."" TIl{' two mcn previously had (."o opcfilt ed in mold ing a more inde pendent cultuml policy in the Ukrai ne. but the growing in toler-mcc of 11Ie central leadersl li p in }'losl.1lw fil l" any firrm of dissent made such (1 policy impo~5ih[e. Shclest, in particular. became (L vociferous upponcnt of political refurm . Many ubservers fclt that his npposition was increased h y Ctl Ll t;crn fur the S{:~'lLTity uf his uwn position, whieh was furt her undermined by Shchcrbilsl..y 's reported duse affiliation with Brezhnev. Shelest"s keynote s p e~'
In foreign afhi rs. tou. the Soviet Ic,ldcrship W,IS far t()O prcoccupied with events in Hu mania, l'oiaml. and the GDi~ to foc'us e.~ c\usi vc
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25
PIU;L UDE TO TIn; e m sls
and ~lJPporlt:(ltl,,: Snviet call fur an earl~· "()Il\'o(:;llioll of tile inter_ national conferencc. KouckY. howc\·er. also SUPlmrted efforts encouraging ~1USl'()W to reverse the anti- Yu,goslav li ne ad opted by the 1957 and 1960 meetings. Even in early ~'I a rch the Suviets showed their concern over growing sym pathies between Belgrade and PrJ.gue b y IUllging:t n official cum plaint with t he Yugoslav ~'linistry of Foreign Affairs over th e prn-C ;,eehoslov"k line adoptctl by tile Yugoslav press. "" Never th eless, at this time th e duminant view in Moscow was that "'revision ism" (in this case pro-Yugoslav views) might have to be tolerated if th ey wcrc tu ('()IIs true! an effecti ve frunt againsltllt! Chinese. The ;\'lardl (j meeting in Sofia o f the \Varsaw I'ael's Political COIlsultative Committee also fa iled to brin g Humania back into th e fold, Among Ih e issues discussed, ;K~"'()rding to Kliszko, were "certain proble ms cOIllll"ded wi th t he work uf the hcadqlm r tcrs of the \ Varsall' Pact,"'" Some of the East Europeans, not untypicall y perhaps, were resis ti ng Sovict cfforts tn furt llcr ('enlralizc and integrate th e military command ~truclu re and were pulli ng forward aiternativc proposals, among these a rotatio n of leadin g posts between mem ber states tha t WQu id there by ellCcliveiy redute Soviet COlltrol. ·~' Ilumania·s President Nicolac Ceall~C~eU later eonfiTlllcd that part icipa nts at the meet ing had agrue d to rufer reform plans back 10 Ih e ir m iniste rs of dufense ,md 10 suhmit fn:sh PI'UPUSills within a six-month period.'" But Humania was excluded from subscquent discussions about I'a(' t refor m as a resu lt of its efforts to check Sovic t influcnce. Also un th e agenda at thu Sofia meeting was the N udear Nunprolifcrati on Treaty, 1m whkh the USS H had esp.:ndetl L"'()nside rahlc efio rt ovcr till' previous mouths. Sovie t leade rs we re especially worried that \Vest Germa ny wo uld rcfuse 10 adhere to th e treat y; ,IrlJ they m,IY have e;llc u\;lt L,
.. .'·"w York Tiro..,., M.rch:!9. Hffl. ,·aki•. May 21. 1968.
" lIepoTl' ..I", ",gge.l P"",i,tell! C~""I"><:'" <)f H"m, "i •.
"'O, "1'1~".,,1 !" In'I'''''';lIg .,,~'
arm. r,IlI" l h~ USSlllhll ..",,1<1 I,.. rm,j,,,,..,1 ill II""I,,,i., E.,l ~:uJOl'e ." re,;;la",..- 1" [",. lhe, inc",,,,,,,, in ,jeren .., 'l",",lin~ "." .t"" "" ;'.\1,' al d,~ lillie, l'a,'K,,,t .. cI)· .he ~,,,!~cl fur mi!it.lr)' aid.o the A,..!J .l:tlC •. Vietn"n). and LUW., Se. &,c lo,t Tion ... ~hlIl,h \I and 10. 196!I, Tho< Cuardian . M,,~h i , 1968, 1-", Ob.~n:... r f"'rri~n Neu" S.",j(t , Kcpnrt nn . 2·1~1 9. Mo."!l 11 , 1968: S,,,, ;,,, ,~''''''J, 12 .",1 19. 1968: .,,,1 ,v.... ,,' Tk"' ...·/'/d"'/, ,\1 .,d,9. I96S. "'~~'''PI~'''. Aplil 4. 196'1. '" '1""let'urc~ . Ear""". C:ed"-"I,,,,~kia,
.\I.",.,
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E".,
26
I N TI\ OL>UCTIO ~
support fur the treat y within th e I'ac\ might spur th e Americans to put similar pressure on th eir own allies in Paris and Bonn . It was the refore ,\ grave setba(l whe n Human;a refused tu sign a joint s t:li e m en i alTinll in g t he intent iun of all Warsaw Pact memhers to adh e re to the treaty. Ceau ~eS{'1I subsequentl y gave his I"Cilsom for refusing 10 sig n the dcdarat iun: liul1Ian;a has heen aut! is in fa\"or or II non-prol iferati on tn:~aty. We think h"",e\"e r. that r"rll><:r .;II')r(.< ",mI 1,,: "",de to " bta in improve· ments tu tlli.' trealy. Jlartku l nrl~' I he pledge to \;,kc IH c aSIlr/:S regar.!ing Illld,~ar disarm'lI",: " t ami th e giving of g",m"' tc,~s It) UH Ull rics rctloll ndng Ilnck;LT "'''''1'' '''' 110", th",,' \\'(-"[""" """hi"n! he II s.:.\ ;lgainsl thelll ;md lhat they would nol II.; ,,"hj.'(.'I(~d In hlackulail wilh Ihes" w"a p.,n.~, "",I insur ing r,'r a1\ slales t h" p<>ssihilil), of lit> limit,'ll nl iliM Unll of Il "d "llr "tH'rgy p"';,~~{,,1 pnrt>ns.·, ..'"
"'f
Czechoslovakia's po~i ti on was more modernte, but Dubeek did state tll ilt although Hu mani"',, reflt sallo ,\ign th e declaratiotl was not "realislic:'thc rc wc re in fact utltcr Pact memhers who felt the nee d to link th e treaty with furth er eHorls toward tludC;lr d isarm;l11lCtl! " UN HEST I N !'O L ,\ N D
If the HUl11anian revolt uf early \Iarch d eflected much Suv iet atte ntion from Czcclmsluv;lkia, So IUn diJ tl ,c la rge·,cale riuts that brokl;"
uul in I'oland afler March 8. Dem(>mtrati ng st u dctlt~ and in tel lectu als prulcslc{1 Ihe g:u\"ernmcnt'~ in l'reCI~ k." Altho ugh Ih e riots were quickly (.'ontrol1ed, th e)' had lasling repercussions. The llIerlb I;lutl chcd a campaign " Sp"""]' bl ~iC1~'" C.·.,,,I'-·><'" lu t h~ lI"d """'1 ParI" IIWv. Apri l 26. l!1bS. rmm /lohi" I'm~lI c. I" 59, " H,u];" Hmli, I..·• of ~L",·h 6 . I9&!. • , ,[,,,,Ie
Ali",,, 11""';"1:1<,)). ,~I , . II 'in/crill
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TIn, d ." ,e "" ~ Lla",nl~~' 1\"" "'H"""I"I.·", .101<', "'ill h.,,'" ,," ",-",,_, 10 ", ...·10.. ''"'"4>0''' ,of Ih" fi"n,,"( a ~",," I"'W' " " 'h;d, ,", ..." Ihdr h'nito>'v, "I,,, <'1l1l_ .",rn> lil,' "the, m~",b,'r ""'nl,,," .~' II,,· W"",. w '[" '." )' ___ If th., ,,,,,,,,,'" ,,( Ihe S,,,-id
"'n ... ·pl to,,!;)· "" \o ", ~~r ",:.,,,1 il "<,<,,,,<;Iry tn "'ply 10""
"' ,,"'. "" ""e ,of 'I.... ",.,. Ii" ,,,,,,,"ir, w;,h • ""d..." ,II il,· . _II .., ,,,,,,,,I~'r ,,,,,,,In.·, .~' II", II'""",", l 't'aI)- In;,)' ... \0 'I"",tj",,, ,imil .. r I" lime a~o. I,~I ,I" C, ull., 10 'Iui l -', .no, W"~,, \bud, 6. 1!lf;S , ;n .~\\,H, H:IZ,15ICIi ~)
l'r.,~".·
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Had;" Il ome Sc".. ;c."
27
PHJ::Lum: TO TilE cmsls
blaming the disurde rs on Zionists, intelleduals, and nco-Stalinists. Further. any del11,mds for reform. it was claimed. wou ld weake n Poland's (~Ipab i lity tu "ithshllld the subvers h'e intentiolls uf \Ve st German revanchism, whose aim was to revise t he postwar boundaries of Europe. These allegations presaged a fairly ("Qmprehensh'e purge of liberal illtdleduals and oHlciais, many of !h",m Jewisl!. The purges were the result not unly uf the riots but ,llso of a major challenge to Comulka"s lc'l(l.;r .• hill tll,.t h;.d t;,ke n place "under cover" of the demonstr.ltions." T he challenge came from the rightwing and uitr;lllationaiist "1';1rtis;Ul" l;u::tion he;uk'(i by Mil,<::t.yslaw M0C7..ar, minister of the interior and head uf the secret polite. Gomulka was also attacked by Edward Gierek, who previously had been idenlifiL.J as a mudcr-lle ;lIld it.-cll nLJcr.lt ically minded reformer in the leadel"lihip. " GOlllulka responded to this dual onslaught in a major speech to the \ Varsaw Part y uktiv un March 19, In an eiTort tu st renglhen his position , he attempletl to find l'UIllIllOIl ground between the factions. Favoring a right-willg lurn ill dom estic politics 10 please his det ral'\ors. he Simultaneously empliasized the need for strengthened relations wilh the Soviet Union. a move designed tu l'On\'inee :-'losCQW t hat he was the best guamntor of So-
viet interests in Warsaw. Gumulka upenly admitted that the party was hupeless ly split, with the leadership "still not in a tundilioll to formulaiC, much les.~ unravel. all th e prohlems"t hat fal"C the l~)UIL try." As a result, Gumulka was in 11 0 position 10 support or cveu ignore the Prague refurm n1()\'cment, even if, as has heen snggested. he had sympathies to t he cUlltrary." He emerged from the March crisis much weaker dumestically ami mure dependent Oil - All ~-dilori~tl" Pro ..", i 1:!,I<"it. \laId, z... 100>.'>. t.y "",j ,n"".. Kal;,,1 h1:.m.-d Ihe king .cl"""I"j;e of. een,i" clcpce "f cli>inlegr.I,u" I.. Il,e iutem.otion.1 (, ill "'" 1""W tc;u!~rst'lp. . W~ h.~,... h.d '" ,1 ...1 will. aU.. ",!'!; 10 .I d~c al II.~ !~..J~r ,hil' . . . ,,·ith aU"",,,,, ,1 • ""'I' ,r~t"I " (, ,,,,,,,·,1 1,,,,,, lIFE. 11>/;./, rr.... S~,.w~. "n . :ll:! I, Apdl I , 1968). f". "Ihe. ",.al)"",,, ,,f Ihi> pl,a,,', ><~. M . ". Ihk"· ..,,,,"'ki, T/U' C61111",,,,;,1 l'uf1y "f I" 3(.0, 11",,, •• , W. Wolf•. Sm·...1 1'1",.... alld 1:""" "" I'll. 361;- b<}, amt A. 110>. )010""", . "l1.e I'UWI' I ~',.
r"I"",I.
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28
ISTlIOl)!JCTJON
th e Soviel Union . It was nol dear whether he l·ould surviv(, any furth er un rest in Poland such as might spl!! over from Czeehuslu\'(Ikia. TIllis Comulka was one of th e first bloc leaders tu impl y that cvcnb in CzcdlOslovakia were hav ing a negat i\"e elfed on the bloc as a whole. In his March 19 speecfl, he maintained that "impc dalist react ion and the enem ies of sOl'ialism have l"Ollle furth under various /lags. Acti,'e in our (."Oliulry, (Jud aclive ill lite cOllulrie.~ >leighboring on Poltmd. they are attempti ng to weaken the ties binding the \ Varsaw Tre aty states."" It wa.~ a full t hree days before the Sovie ls made lip their m inds to support Comulka against the Mocz,1r-Cierek facti ons. lI.!oscuw·s imlecisiun was cvidcnt in ti m cumplete al.mmee of any ment io n in the Soviet press of the c'·cnts in I'obnll. Then. on -'larch 22, Pracda published Cornulka's spet-,dl in full with an article th e fol lowing day attesting to the popu lar su ppo rt in \Varsaw for th e Polish leader. On March 2.5. Pracda firml y maintained that " th e authors of th e escesses havc not slIl'(.'CeJell in cre
,loa,
lellt "u;, ,,,l,- of (;"" ",!b . ttoo lX)p.·,1 i/ C,......·h",\" .... ki. ,,,,.,.,,..&-.1 ill ...·hieving a ..... ,'ain li!>.... li'"li"". )", ,,",hi l,mr,1 f"'m Ihb br ~" ll i,,~ '''' '',. Il,",,· ;"(\~f".·,,(I~n' .. fn' 10;, [I<~K"l-' low.. "I, M" .......... 11,;, ch....,,,1 ,"h><'~l"""llv" (f,,,,,, \"Iad;",i, v. "; ''';Il. ,-.I .• TJ.€ Cu:d",,/nwk IIr/on •.\I!lC~" ... n' ,~. I' . 60). .. P""·'/d .
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2.2. 1!!6Ii
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"TIw So'·iP.1 "!llI );lS""~" '0 I\,t.ml. M~, ki Ari,I"'·. ,ef~""l "I~k(l\)' In ,10 .., .. eWllls (Imins. ,p.,,,,,h m",kin)( !l,e " .... "I)"·11oi,<\ """I,"''''''')' "I ll,.. ,i~"i ,,~ "f ,h,· S(,,"id ·l~,I I'\' F,i,n,hl,lp T,~.W -W~ w~r .. ~,,,\ ".1>.. " ,I .. r.,I;.h linil'-.I Wmh,." 1'",,,,. " 'ilh th,· r.'"Uuoile .on of 1M ,\>Ii,), nation . WI...Jy,hw (;'m",lk~ 0' it< h,,:od " "as . . r,"I:" ..d.....t OI:,i"'1 all hl..,k fo"",. of ,,,,,,,tion :' whi
29
PIIELUDF. TO T il E c m S[S
Even if it did not, the regime f"ar<)(1 that a ny major leadership or I)o liey change in e ither Warsaw or Prague mighl lilrlher isoble I he GD H and u nd<) r1nille Ul hricht's eHort _~ 10 mainlain East Gcrm in the early months of l96S indieates the sensitivity of th e issn e. The East Germans feared th at tlte Sovie ts, llespite t heir " ~c.., N. Edwin.> MurdO" . --rhc Imp.",. 0[ 1)<,,,,,,,, "" lIeu';Iln. Hel,.."" " the Member S",e. of [he \\\I .... w 1':><.1.-' ~h.p. 3 . " ,\ '"", li'rk n"""•. ,.""a'y17. 19(">11. ,.., <-i''''] in ibi,L. 1" 197 _ "For e .... "'pl". in • ",. jo< re'·"'''' 0[ i»"", f"d,,): &n..... , f,,,d~n l~.\iq·. lh" G". man ,["e._ h un "'" li, ' tod .. One oflhc ei):hl t"ll-p"orilyarc .. ,,"Mr<, it Ir.ad ]""'n and alle):,," II .., [he W"" German. "'~ r" "",.elty d"'·e~~'i"g n"d,-ar W~~[~.", ( PYd ·",1 nole ~olhc \\bt C"' .... "",n. condemnin" th.i. "New t:.U~m [l<1 Germ.n
.i"" ..
f,,", (,,'" f'rat·,fa. ,\1 • ..,1, 5. 19611).
" ""
30
\:-',1I0nUCTION
p u ulic protestations. might subordinate previous {.'O rnmitm c nt s to
til,: CDH to an a grc,: mc nt wit h \Vest Germany u\'er Berli n. Perhap s hup ing tu forestall any such agreement. in February tllt:y puhlishcd .. head uf schedule a new draft CDR Cunstltut ion tlml
claimed all of Berlin u.s the a lpital orthe CDR" In March they also beg an 10 disrupt the transit routes tu Berlin , dearly implyin g that 110 agreemen t un that city wo uld \\l)rk without th eir appro",IL If the East Germans were worried tha t Moscow might serve its own inltncs ts lIya more Acxi hlc in tc rpret,lI ion of the K,lrluvy Vary agreements, til Cir fears were not assuaged hy the developments in
Poland and Czechoslovakia. Br:Uldf~ annmIlK'CTllcn\ on ~'lardl 18, in th e millsl urthe Polish {'risis. that the FnG wuuld resp<-oct the Oder·Neisse li ne as the western bou ndary of P"l,md lLntiltl...: signing uf a peace treaty'" was seen t hrullghuut E'lslcrn Europe as an effort to tempt t he Poles lIway from th eir (:omrnitmellts :lIld to further isolate th e GDB. ~l Gumulka maintainc{l his pusitiun and rejeded t he \Vest C(:rman ul!cr. :lI1d lilT the time heillg. the East Germans seemed reassured thai the Poles. atieasi. we rc not likely to respoud positively 10 \Vest German initiatin!s . Such was not Ihe case in Cz{:choslu"akia, howCVf;r. DnlX::c k's
FcbrlUl!'Y speeeh asserting
C:I.C(·ho~lo\'akia·s
intention to
e_~ t'lbli sh
normal relations with all European slales irres p<-'Ctive of their sodal syslem was interpreted as a dircct reference to \\'est Gcrmany. Umil:r NO\"l)lnY. the \\'esl Germans had .~lIe(.'t!e{let.1 in estahlislling ,I trade mission in I'r.lgue. and after Dulx'ek\ a(.'(;cssion to power, this mi ssio n's fUndiun s began tu increase, ~ l oreu\'eT. Czechosluvak e lforts to obtain ,\ massive hard Cllrrency loan lor the restructuring of the economy met with initial su pport in Bonn." This created a dual fear in East Germany. Not only wonld snch a loa n inevitahly lead to improved economic and political rclat iOlls between Czechoslovakia
Ill'''.
~bu-Io
IS.
19('08.
j"
UFE .Ii""~FcI,. C""",,,,,, j,, .. Iml. USS R . .~I.,d,
2~.
HIM .
"'S,·,·. f,,, ,·,a'''l'k·. 11o...,,~,rf,,\ ,'<11'0,;..] I" I I,~ "It"";,,, I"fly "'""~1"'r,:r 7..,,, ; I'''rltlll;, .
c""jll,·d "11,,. W"ki,,£ (;Ia.. j" I\e";,i,~,i'l Co" n!!i.-, ,II ",I (;"m.' 00"" 10 lhe ll;otlk·6dd an,1 11.·"0.... 1l,~ lJitlaH)"hir "r III<' Prol~"'rjat - ..-101<;' (,,,,,,,. ,1 e,-e n" in ful."d ."d C,....~~,.h·.'"". "",,1,1 (",I I"" 1",I.t<· II.· CIlH ."'\"""1(1«.11)" """.,h Ilw \1',,,,,,,,, Tr~.'}' ~",lll,,· C ~IE "" (".k.,,~llor .H", ~b,d, 2-1. IOOS, SII·8. 1::1,:/2,;)61,,211-6 ."d E EI2,371
,Iu,
A:!I I _9), ~ Scu'
lid, Tim .... Mort!, 26, 19&.1
1'l\I( l.U UIC TO T IU; C KISI S
31
aflccted. Tht: East Cermans fclt that thev had morc to losc than any other bloc state, including the USSH, by an improvemellt in CzedlOslo,'l ardl19, in a sp-ef..'eh marking the fi rst anlliversary of the Czec1toslovilk-Eilst Cerman Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation. and r...lutual Ass i s~ lant"e, Ulhricht refcrred to treatr t~) mmitment s hinding Prague to a un ited front (Lgainst West Gerrmltl mi1it(lri~m. He stated that Oil thi s ot"Casion "the st~te lc~dershi ps ded~rcd that they would strictly upllold that treaty:' Yet in fact the Czt:choslovak anniversary telegram to Ulbricht did not l"Ontai n any such explicit dedamtion.'" A major speech delivered bl' CDR Politburo member Kurt Hage r at the end of ~laT(:h openly t~mdelll n cd Czt'Choslovakia and made it clear that any links with tbe FnG would only sen 'e Bonn's aim of "subverting the socialist eoulitries f)'om within, of dividing them. and especially of isolating t he COB. .. ~, The East Germans we re aiso greatly "\)rried aho ut the elTects of the Prague Sprin!,: un dumestic stahility withi n their own L·tmntry. As t:arly ,~~ ~ l arch , the)' wcre reported to have cca.~ed issu ing tourist visas for travel to Czeclmslonlkia." Prague students returning from visits tu E:Lst Berlin (t1su reported they had been prevented from participating in prcschcdnled Jlublic dehates. ~' C7.echosloVilk journalists ("Omplained that two issues of ,\ Ccrm::m-language weekly published ill Prague had heell harmed in the C OB . They also alleged t hat Soviet newspaper articles repuhlislled in the East Ger· man party daily Neues Deutsclr/u rl(/ were being ("ensored, with al! positive refercnces to e" c nls in C7.ccito.dovakia removc\\. '" This fear of "spillover," together with the links hetween Prague and Bonn. put the E:L~t Germans at t he furefront of those blOC' leaders e nt~JHragin g the Soviets to halt the reform mo\"c rn t: nl. T HE BBEAK ING I'OI NT IN MOSCOW
The evcnts in Poland and East Cermany cuindJed with a sharp risc in t he Soviet percept ion of tllfcat emanat ing from Czedmslovakia after March 21. On March 19, Prime ~linister Cernrk had
USSR and lia" Ii·urn!"'. ~I""'" ~7. 1001>. .. " .... (" lark Ti"", • • nJ S""day 1Hr~nif'h. M.,."h 24 . 11168.
" Ihld. "r.·cw ro,k Tim ••.
~Iarcl,
30. 1001> .
32
1 t\'T K OllUC rI O~
ROWIl to Mo.~(.·(lW for talks wit h P ri me ~'I inisler Al e ksei Kosygin and
Gosplan chi ef Nikolai llailmkm' on l~ )()rdinati()n ortbe 1971-75 plans and a possible large-scale loan to Czechoslova kia for el'O!1omic revitalizat ioll. , 7 This W,I_~ t he Ilrst mee ti ng in which th e top leaders of th e two countries di scllssed Czechoslovakia's planned c~:vllomic reforms-refurms which if implemented would rcur ie n! Ilwl (:{lUIIIry's ext ernal trading links all',l)' rrolll the socialist hloc and to\'~lrd the \Vest. 1\l ajor Ge neral E:gyJ Pepk-h, the new hC:lJ of the Czech usluv:lk army's ~lain l'olitieal Ad min istnllio l1, was also in " InscoII' cunfcrring: with the millistcr of d efen se, ;\Iarshal A. A. Grcchko. ;mu the head orthe Sovie t Main Political Administ ration, G.,tleral A. A. Yt:pish e v. A Sovie t t~)l11mlHliqu {: suggests th e cx iste m:e of ten sions by noti ng that th e meet ing had taken place in a "fri endl y and wo rking atm os phcre" in ",hidl Pcpich had "replied to a se rie s of q ues tion s conce rning th e , \c\"dopm e nt of t he process of dcmocr.Jti7~ltion in Czechoslo\"akia ." ~' I n an in terv ie w with abril/III /ifill, th{~ C~.{~d1Uslo\,~lk milita ry ncwsJl;tpt: r. 011 his re tur n, " e pich 11)aintained that he had initiated the visit and that the Soviets had e~ pres sed th eir beli ef thilt the pre.~e llt policy in 1'r.lgue wo uld .~ t rengt h e n socialism. li e did ':"n~'ede , however. that illtl Hlugh there \v;L~ IIIlI "one ·~Ilecilil." (Incst ion" on internal d evelop!ll en l.~ and cad re c ha nges in the military, the Sovie ts we re interested in the elfects of th e Sejna case. a t"(JIleern Pe pich rega rde{\ as "unde rstandable and logical." '" C e rtainl y events in P r.J.gue had been moni ture{\ dosely in Moscow since J ,IIl 11~lr y, wilen Dul":ek replilced Noml!!}' itS fi rs t secretary. The Sej na case, cad re changes, a nd s tah:mcnts by til(: n ew leade rs \md elicited fu rt he r <-"OIH.:crll ill ~·I uscow. But th e Soviets' Jlr<-~ K,"C\lp .. ti un with vthe r, mure pressing iss ues amI their ini ti al Willing ness to allow Dubl·ek som e tim e to settl e in appear to have d im in is ll cd Soviet ;l1;lrm over th e de vel opme nt s in C~.echo s lo v;lkia. By I he e nd of th e third week of ~ l areh. however. indications are th aI th e Sovie l leadershi p f{·1t it could no lunger sanction th e cvent.~ taking place in I'raglH:. The mav e ric k policy of Bumania. the ri ots in Po lan d , s trun g: East Ger man ],ustility tuwarJ Pr.lgue reforms. ;llId even Hllng.1 rian w a rnin gs th aI matt e r.~ mll s t not be allowed to get out of hand in Czechoslovakia as they had ill Hlln·
""'e,,' M~rd l
l,,,l
20. 19f>';.
Ti,,.,. •. .~[ .".I,
20. [9\>'l , lIFE. 1l'...Md •.
f~.s' 1::""'1""' C",·cI""',,",,ki~ .
"Cn: II h~ C7A."<.~~"I",,,k '"'e ..·• ,\ ~'·nl"")·) in f;n~l i, I •. ~lat
crl,-
I'II1:Lum: T O Till: C III SIS
ga ry in 1956'" all furth er mot ivate<1 the Sovie t lead ers. who were already taking stricter action against disse nt at home. to call the CZl--choslov:tk !e:tde rslli p to order. Th l: breaking 1\(lint I)('·(.' urrc{) Oil .\lardl 21 wh,m. IInde r imm ense pressure of puhlil' Ol)inion in C7.echo.~ lovaki a, Antonin Novotny resigned :ts president. Clearly. had the Soviets been attadled tu Novotny tl my would have preve nted his ouster fro m the post of Hrst secretary the previuus J anu:\r~·. Bather. the core of the issue was that the Czechoslovak Pmesidi um hosition of t he remaining conservat ives within the CPCz would be hopelessly we akened; and they would have no chalice uf SUl'1livillg the forthcoming April CPCz Centnll Com mittee ple num. Novotn}"'\ resignation focused bloc attent ion S{IUarely on Czechoslovakia. T he pros pe ct of a comple te and im mine nt {'~Jllapsc of COIIservative and p ro-Soviet influence in Prague made it imperative to act hefore a SlIl'cessor (.~lUld he named. and Moscow made the crucial decisioll to t1Jnvene an e me rge ncy meeting IIf hloe leaders in Dresde n. Th us Novotnfs resigna tion produccd both aconspicuoos increase in the perceived level of threat and all hnportiting ill 1I,"'!,t"fY pTiM ,,, W5Ii. Altlt""J(I, I", de"'ril..,.! ,h~ I''-~l\u~ SI'Tin~ ., • - fen.i.",,,<~. [" II of 1~,l iti<'.J I~'I "" and .0elaH,1 in il> "'"tent." 10" .1>..... " lio"",1 ,h.] "f", to •• 11M' rc'~'i".'l<'e . . . ",,\ h;~h 11", ",""" ' .. ",,,n\orti,,,, ,!~! '~>I .I~" ;0 ou r "'-"'"If}' I,,' ~iII in~ Cumm"ni", and "d,er ho" e" men_ 11,i. "-'" d"n~ onl)'l.kr. Fi",' Ih"r on l)' repeal,..! tlut it i, 0"""''''1'}' 10 correct lhe miSta1~> of ''''''''Ii<m. , . Total [" ,.,_ ,I,~" "r ,";1;";'00 " .. , ~r..I".II)' 1"" ....1 ].) ''-'m l~~]p "~",,,'im' n".. I '''~ ,,,I ,lop. ' r.m,rpr "r 11,,·
a
".ili"i." "
""n_.. ,
0( ."'''"in "';'(4~~' .nd t~.<1,·,~ 10 an . u,,'k ")(ai",l lh~ wh"l" A~~I>l'}' [ ~ITt\, March 21. 1!l66. SlI'li. EfJZi3l~CI14).
!(ari"" N.."""
oJ'olen'" (11", 110",·
PAIHTWO
The Pre-Crisis Period
CI-lAPTEH THHEE
Phase One: March 22-Apri110
THE DRESDEN ;"IEETINC There is unive rsal agreement among both Suviets and Czechoslovaks that the decbioll to call the D resden meeting marked the real beginning of the crisis. There had been ala r m wit hin s(.'Ctions of the Soviet political and milil(:>. Cenlml COIIII"ill~ .. plenll'" '''' s"lllellll"" 25. 11l6!I . • Ialed , ··11 i. already a k,"",,, ["dll>.1 (lot (raten ..1 II'Irll,·, p-u~I ;.." I)· " ·t"kulned Ihe d,,,,~c >
,,";ell .....~·IIH.J in C .......·.... ,lo.""ia aft~ , January I\I&~ . Th.·y ded.:uelilhi> ,tand pllhlid)· in f",lern.l meetings on 100 O<"Ca>ioo of the 20th "n"ilw",,")· o[ Fe b",.>")· 1:U8. lln ...,·,·,·r. de· ' ·c\"I'" ,e"" in [hI> , ..... ","t· Ito>\; Ih~ "'"'''' ",." I,.",· I"N·H,· u"'II,,, ~I. 0", o( ""'c,," n ~,.. H,[, de,..,Io"ment in C=hmlm-aiia.• nd of ""'>0<,," " fur Ihe Ja"~"r fo, th" wloole !.OCiali.l ""np. a ronf.,ren"" of.i>; Communi" P"rI;". " .... ron'·cned in I),eodcn on 23 ~la",h 1968" ((.T .... s"pt<·,,,1.oe,2II. 1969. 5",8. £ElJl90ICIlT). Hil"ak. in •• "h""lllcni inle,,·iew. not"", ··Look· ;"11 ~·k. il ""''''' to ,hll' O"" in lorIgl,, _1)"" (Rudi I'm"". s"llI~ lnl><:, 3. 1969. ,~p,,~h ....ed in P....",/" /"./)<:./,,/,1<" . 11.1J.3). s.,., . ion ibr ,Wte,nenl by Kolder. ibid .. 1'.156; a ""jot" Rudt r",le" " d;'Oji.1. ··Wh y ,,,•• Ale. a"d ... DulJtel e>p"lloo from the Cl'Czt· Jlliv 16. W.O. ;n ihid . . p. :lW. J;n lI tjek. Vie Augll,1 22, 1975. lleJz!ar. in Vladimi,\'. !.:u.in .•..J .. rl" C=<,d",o/",·"k Hrfo ....' .\ I""r"","' 1961<. p. roO, \'.,11 IIlra!< .."11,., T,lIlh Ve ... ", U,.,.:· S,w Ti",,". ,,". 3.1 (A"g,,'t 1975j. p.20: •.IIJ Z
"I<.
"..ci'.
37
38
THE PIIE-CIIlSIS I'E II.IOO
which \\',IS tu have bee n presented at the plan ned Fourteenth epe..: Congress, also nppnrcnl ly perceived Dresden as a landmark: it cont:lincd section \ral'ing C7.cclmsluvak attemph COIl!,;fC SS:'
,I
"frolll the Drcslien meet ing up \'0 the present Congress" to all,l}' fore i~n "fear.;" about " the process of rebirth in Czechoslovakia.'" On the Soviet side , Lmt h the July 15 "Warsaw lette r:' addressed to the Czcchos]o"ah by the live hlnc parties. ' ilnd th e authoritative Au gust 22, 1968, l'muda editorial sin gled out the importance uf Dresde n. Ac(.'(mling to the August 22 ;o rtidc: Evcllts showed that an Ji1tlosph c rc of di so rdl·r. ,",Lcillations ,unl UIl was beginning to 'ak" shape wit I,;" the CI'Cz itse lf. Ht:ac-
~'cr laiotr
tioll:lry, :luti,.,cialist f()rl'C~ SOP I)()rh:d Io~' world imperialism Were
rearing Iheir heads. All Ihis :lbmH::d nol "oly "01' Ix,r ly, The frale,n,,1 pa rlie s of n"l· ~'ri: •. Huoga 'y, till' CIJR and Poland wen: a, ,,;rio,,-,1~' dislnrht)d as we were h" the courS<' of ,'\',;uls in Czcchus l""akia . II ]'.)camc net;c,· ""'Y 10 ho1;1 a l~ ,I!.!Cli,",· mt..,ling ,\",1 I'xl·I"", );.! opinin'" wilh II,,! It:.. dcrs of the CI'Cz "nd the (;SSR, Il y mulu,,1 "on-",o t. t hi' nwet i, 'g wa.' hdd nn
~la,d , :2.1
in Drcsd.!" .
Evidence suggests that the Soviet decision (llumller 1) to calJ a blue meeting was made un ~ I ardl 22 under heavy pre~sure frl,lm the Poles and Easl Genmms. The Czeehoslovak amlmssador \0 Moscuw. Oldfich I'av l ovsk~', was s ummone,l to the Kremlin on \Iarch 2 1 f(lr ,. two-hOll r m,,,:ting,
nut informed, however. of the dt-"Cisiotl to eonvene
II
hloe sum mit:
and it was only af!er the meeting had begun on the morning of ~Iard l 23 th,lt Ih e Czed l o.~IO\·'lk media anllounced Ihat DlIlx:ek
had left for Dresden.' Well- placed Czeeh sources maintained that 11m mee ting had iJcen called at the insistence of Polimd .ul{l East Germ'lllY. ' Badio Belgrade, commen ting Oil th e Dresden meeting, ' C"nlO;",·.] in I,t; ,..,libn . ed .. TI,~ S......... 1'~ . otR"~ Co"~,, ... p . 219, ' Th~ \\, .""'". [",tier. whit'1< .PI~·.or,"I; II I'mr. la n" /nl)' loS. 19(>8. ",,,I.r Ih~ h.... l;"14 ' To Ih~ C,,,,,IM,,lo,,," C" "uonni>1 I'.!flr (;. ,,1,.1 Comm;ttoe - ,1.\<·J : "We <,.,p"-.,,,,-.J Ihe,,", f.· ..., .1. mo~I;,,~;n Dre"l"n."" In d;",·",,;,,~ li,e ",i~;n, "fl.l,)o c"''''~'tn. t)<eroCtl " '." 'ho ~ '" tl"-'din~
,,,,·nti,,,,,,J.
' f/", Ol",·n;u. \1'0'"
2~ .
19(>8, .,.,1 ti.· Chri>lj"" S""'ncc .Ilm.ilo, (1 ..,000"
~:ditio" l.
March 2.5. I!JfO/;. ' .\'rw ror k J"i"",•. ~larcl. 2-1. 1!1;!i. Altho~!!h hotlt Ii:Jdir .ntl G('molb h...d heM Lil.t"",l m""ting' with t)"b(.,k in ~cLn"'I)·. Ulb,k"hl .,·t'''r'c~!!)' h.J l""oed dOlm '1"0 olfe .. 10 mo · f~r
.... ith Uul>l'<'k in C .." ho,In,·.ba. r">{errin~ . multil:il~ml ,,,...,!i,, ~ i"'t~.J. 1"""""""1)'
I,.;cOl,,,, gre,h'r 1''''''''''' " H.ld I.· lo","gl" ,,, I",.,
11><· ,,~,.k,itran'
C•..,.,h<"I.".,k<.
''''
o::h
~ 'M\CII
39
22-AI'IIIL 10
agreed t!Jat "il is not a secret l!Jat c!Jangcs in Czechoslovakia were nut wdcomed in the CDR and to a certain d~'grec in Pohilld ...• \Vest Ge rmany's foreign minister " ' ill y Ilrandl allrih"h.:<1 the primary in itiative for calling the mee ting to Ulbricht. ' zJenek ~lI ymir, who beC'.l.Ine a Cl'Cz secret:!ry soon aner Dresden, also l'Onfirmed that Poland and East Gernwn>" and t he latter espccially. we re imporlanl fo rces behind the con\'oc:ltion of the nweti ng, and that the Suviets and Brezhnev himself did no t :!ppear to be at the forefront of effort s to control Czechoslovak affairs. ' Soviet insiste nce 011 a collective meeting bl'Ca u~e the othe r fraternal parties "were as worried as we were '" was corrohorale<1 by Dulx:ck, who umflrmed that t!Je initiativc for the meeting had l"(lllle from "scveral parties."' " That the meeting was held in the C Dill"ertliinly suggests that the East Germans we re keen to mn\"ene the summit. Present at the conference were delegations from the uss n, the CDR, Puland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and of course Czechosluvakia. Bllmania, however, had not heen invited. The Soviets were represented by Bre zhnev. Kos)'gin, A. P. Kirilcnko, a Po litburo me mber and secretar y of the CPSU Cenlml Committee; P. Ye. Shelest, the first secretal")' of the Ukraine Communist party; N. K. Baibakov, cimirmllll of the USSR State P]:mnillg Committee (COSpl:tll): and K. V. Husako\', listed as a mem be r of the C PSU Centr:.llltlsrll>dion Commission . u but who was soon to be nmned head of the Central Cummittee's Department for Liaison with Huling Comm unist and Workers" Parties, llaving been fi rs t deputy head of til at department since 1965. Notable we re the ab~encc of Suslov .md the presence uf Shclest . Suslov, reported by some to be ill, " was replaeed by Kirilenko. Shclest, who as a regional party sl'Crclary had no fo rmal ' IWi" Hd~.oJ • . Mard.~. 100<>. quoted i~ HFI': , C,,""'''' ~;., .1,.., •. USSR .m! 1':4" f;."" p<". M ~",h 27. lOOI! ' Willy H... od!. P"'I'IPllnd p,,",;,;,:.•. p. 210. ' I,"~"'kw ,,111 •• ,,'\ ..... J""~ 1. 1971l. ' I'nIcda. " "~U'I 2.2. IOCl/i. " 1),, 1 >61'~ inh'ry!"w will. tTl.: . l'u\'li, I".J j" P"",·,/a. ~! " ,d. 2/;. 1961l. u rm,·,I~. March 2.~. 19("oS. " TJ.~ O~""'r.
M.. ",h 3\, 1968. ",,,lib... .'"elL' l~ck T;r"". of M~rel. 31 and April Ll. 1968.
,,·hieh reponed Ih.t S"d",' had
"ppc."'"
oot hren p",.ent ,ll h"
f"~ c,,d
mC""",,,... n!
\"u,; Gagarin
anJ hoJ 01,1)' ... in ruht;con A]>'i I12. AI "".,., liF E. Cmnrmm,,' A,,,,,, U~SIl. April 4. 1961l . /1,',,1 " nl)' ....... S",I",' a/""", frum Ih~ c:.garin r"n .."I. I... " ....' '~,I I"~'""'" .1 ,he Mu....,,"" Cit y r.rly C""f,,,~,,,,,, (rl"d
Mm" .,mad,..,. fu.
in Un;"" H~Jl"bl i<' 0<.1;'·iH~. at th.t ,;n ••
"
,"
TilE P HE·UUS1S
P~: l\lOU
co mpetence in til e fore ign policr fleld, was included, as bead of the Soviet repu blic dosest to Czechoslovakia, because any spillover from the P rague Spring m ight be expected to affect th e Ukraine Il rs!. O n the agcnda we re a nu m ber of issues: ceonomit; relations, \ Vars,lw Pact openlt ions, th c internation"] situation, p,]rticu b rly in Ccntnl] E u ropc. undo of <-'Ourse. IllC evcnt._ in Czechoslo"akia, T hc CI..'OllOmit' mailers c.~plai n t hc prcsenl.."C of Baibako,' and his (.'{m n· ter p'lr ts from th e other bloc states, T he oIHcial l..'Ommliniq ue isslle{1 after t he Dresden talks noted: Th e ]lurtici]larr ls ill !lIe llIeeting expressed their views on pmspeds for furt her g w\\1 h uf the suei,,1 ist emrrumy orr the basis uf Ihe "til i~"" tioo of e«)ournic Iies Within the framework uf the Cuuneil for ~ I utua l Economic Assistance and on a bilater,d basis. . They unanimously reaffirmed their delermi nation in the near future to effcci concrete measures, ,fur cooper.:.tion in achieving a furt he r ups\\~ng in the economics of the socialist commo nwealth. For the pUIl'ose of comid· ering c.)mnllln ",-'Onomic prohlems. Ihe parties agreed to hold an eco· num ic conference on tire highe.t level in the ncar future. "
Subse(I'Jlmt reports s uggest Ihnt al issu e were effi,rls In dissuade Prague from seeking a hard currency loan from the West and the growing demands ofCzechoslo\'aks to l'~structtlre t heir Ir,1(le rela· t ions to bette r su it t he ir own need s. " AC<.'ord ing to "Com mun is t suurces in E ast Berlin ." the USS R and the c on agreed to cons ider t he possibility of cx temli ng suhstilUtial soft-c urrcut,), c redit s to P rague to prevent he r tu rn ing to t he \Vcst. " '''Uhin this con t c.~t Dubcek's rcmarh ahout t he eco nomic uspects of th e Dresde n meeti ng m igh t best h~ underst()()d. Aa'ordi ng to DlI lx"Ck. /(osygin "spoke at great length about the prospects fo r t he growt h of the " I· ... eda. " In •
~! .. ch
~Io",h
4
25. U!b/;. P,.~!\ue
""Ii"
di..,,,,,i,,n e ntilloo - Pr"hlem. and t)illiou\tie , in the 1.1';" """" .<1" ,,,,..,.] II .. n n.
C ~ I E.~:· the p. nd ;'t, ",,,int"in,,,1 th.t I ~....-~" ••: Ct<,<,I....I"'-" ia
.1."
,,11,e' hI"" ])OnneN, I,ad .. wa. Ie» ;",h'.nt~g",~" 10 l'r.I~"e. r,,, did nol ,~, I'r.~',., . eurirn,.tL.J U. tm''''' mOTe t owa,d th~ \ \ 'c>t (S\\'Il. F.F) Z7141C2114 _ IS). ... P",ooa ... tide "" ~t ",d, 14 . ,,·itl, the cur(o u,ly ,irnil., title "I'TOhl",," "f "",""no",ie C""l"'r.,wo in Ihe So<'i.!(, t Countn .. ,," , aw further integra,;o n ". the "01), ,,,Iution tn ~'W probl"m" ~ New lurk Time•. ~t "n~):!Ii. 1008: . 1", Jnlt" ~:r;',';;'on. "lnt<'1 ,,,t ",,,.1 ."d ~\,ate~i<' 1",plk:a';o" . or tl,., c,....",]""I,,,·.k l\"r,,,,,, ~ I o ..."ne nt ." in "",in , ,·d.. C:R<:/,,»lowk 1(,/o"Q .II",-em
~;,'ing O
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~[AJ\CIl :l~ - A " '\IL
41
10
ecollomies of the socialist (.'tllln tries. He sllOke about the many possibilit ies for strengthening e(''Ollom ie ('OOperat ion and said t hat in the framework of the C~ I EA t(K) t here are lOimy ullllsf:d re.~o\lrces. Responsible bodies in individual countries should prepare proposals for the ro ming talks on the highest level in order 10 lind new and real ways for the devciopme nt of the eronnmie system ..... Apparently, the Soviets hoped tn forestall any CzedlOsiovak approach to the \Vesl by assurJllces that the hloc was capahle of solving it s own e(.'Onornie problems, The del'ision to examine the matter in greater depth as a preln{le to an eeonom ic summit (.'Onfercnee de;'rly was intended to assure Prague of evcryone's good intent ions without actuall y committing anyo ne to a spedfk' eourse. The promise of substanlial credits \\.'Ould be used to extra,·t political concessions fro m the C7.t_-choslovah. In the area of military seeurit)' the participants, according to the commu nique, "reaffirmed the (:oincidell('"C of their vielVs on the questioll discussed and the unity of thcir positions as set forth at the Sofia ronference of the Political Consultatt.'e Committee of \Varsaw Pact states. . They ummimously rcafllrmed their ddermi natio[J in the near future to e flect(.'onercte measures for strengthening the Warsa\\! Treaty Organi7..a! ion and its armed forces. '"" The {liscussion of Pael reform WliS dcarly meant In isolate Ihullania and to kill before its inccption ilny support th;lt Hum(mian proposals might find amo ng othe r blue states such as Czechoslovakhl. The '"(''Olleretc measures" refe rre d to ~'I oseow's continui ng efforts to strengthen its position in both the joint military command and the Political Consultative Commi ttee. DnlK'Ck late r ad mi tted that the Soviets had no intention of waiting the six mont hs agreed to at Sofia for bloc members to suggest refor ms: inste(ld the part icil)anls had agreed to '"a speedy elaboration of proposals to pe rfel:! the Wily in wl)ieh t he joint cOTlHnand aels ..... President Ni(.'Ohle Ceau~escu of Rumania was furious that discussions had been held about C \tEA and \vro alhi rs without Rumanian participation. In a speech on the Dresden meeting. he declared: "We are (lstonished that the 11Iilitary C011lmand of the \Vilrsaw Pae! mellloor states was discussed. bC(,",lUse it was decided in Sofia by all delegations that the mi nisters of the armed forct: s in\c ....ww. lk.\i>b,"" ,..,1;0. ~\a rch 26. 1965. 511'11 . J:: t:J27J21("J1. Pm,,/a. M. ,,·h 25. 1965. ~ [)uh':-ek inletv;~"'. Br.li.b,·. ,,,,Iio , ~iarc" 26. 1965, 511'8 . Et:l2732/C14. ~ J)"b-'ek ~
ICh
JIz
M
should draw up within six month s proposals for improving the ac. Our country is dete rmined to m(lkc its tivity of this command . direct (."(Jn tribution to the activity of the Political Consultative Committee of the \Vars;lw 1';ld , induding th(~ activit y of t],e mili_ tary high command of the states participat ing in this pact ... ,,, However determined Ceau~es{·u may 1I:l\"e been tu participate in rcl(lrln of\Varsaw J'ad structures. the So\·iets were equall y deteTmiul..J to block such reforms. At Dresden it Rrst became clear that the Soviets were willing to furego Bum;mian support in !"etum for a more cohesive inner grouping of bloc ~tatcs , which of geognlphical necessity would h;Lve to include Czechoslovakia. On the suiJjed of Cze-c\JOslov;.ki'L the discussions WI.'"fC most heated and the communiquc least specific; indeed it was restricted to a hroad statement; The Czechoslov;lk delegation had ··provided information Oil progress ill the reali7.ation of the January plenary session . Confidenl"C was expressed that the working class and all the \.\'Orking people of tl,e CSSH, IInder tIle leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, will ensure the further de\·dopment of socialist construction in the l-"(Julllry"· '" Yct cadre ch:mges, the successor 10 No~·otnY. the April Central Committee plenn'" agenda, and evidence uf ··anti-socialist :lets" were among thus!! items known to have been discu~scd. Dui>l-ek initially denied that cadre changes bad heen proposcd at Dresden either "officially or nnofficially,"" but later l'e exphli nc(l this denial: " I was not in favor of re\'ealing the fact that in Dresden there had been talk :LI)()ut the change of Presidcnt in C7.l.'ChosIova kia ... .. The bloc parties apparently considered Svoboda an acceptable candidate and wanted to prevent an y of the more olltspoken reformers from obtaining the post. in p,Lrticular the dismissal of Smrkovsky, onc of the presidelltial (-.mdi(btes, was sought by Bre7.hnev, who supported DulX'ek but said that he was ··hc culUing a prisoner of reactionary and an ti-Communist clements"· '" Vasil Bi]"ak, a leading l-,(lllservativc, pmvi(k.J the fullcst at~"(J\J n t of the
·d, to ,I,. 8"" I>oo"..t Pori)" AWe. April ~>t;. 1968. ,n ScinUia. April2!i.
~<':C'''' I'' ...,;•• po....
1968. " Pm <
" D"L...:ck \" 'h" AI" '] ere,. C,·,"r.1 C,,,,,,n;ltcc pi,·""",. /,,,em,I"'.,j R~L"OI"'i<,,,. p. 2«1.
",oo(,~l
'" II.
GorJ,~,
Sk 'l!i"II.
(;;:.och,,,loc,,k~".
" 1),,1~ k"> . 1'......+, 0" s.·p,.",I ... , 26. 19&.1, '" !l,~ (;[,(;,. C.·"tr~l (:"""";It~~ pl~"" ,,, . I" Willi-un Sh"""cr,,, •. J)u/,..,·k. 1'. ~.
" A,-..""];,,o: 'u P~,·d Ti~riJ. Wh y J)ul~
p.
57. ..,J !lu· ,,,,h.." ;"'e"·;,,,,,· ,,·;,h
''''
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MAIIC Il ZZ-AI'RIL 10
Dresden meeting; he maintained that apart from the issue of who should succeed Novotny, the bille leaders were <-'1mcerncd that "IJy permitting the recall ofille Presiden t without ,Ill)' preliminary d iscussion of such a serious step by the Centr.ll Cllmmittee," the C7.echos!ovak leaders had "viohitoo the hasic principles of cadre policy."" Firm cont rol b y the party of appointments to a!l leading IXlsts in the stale and govern me nt hierarchy (known as the tlOmenkl(ltllf"(I system) is a fundamental feature of Soviet-style socialism. C7.ediOslovak violation of this principle in allOWing the selcttion of a new president without party interference th reatened to underr nine the party's hegemonia! position within Czeehoslovak society. Furthermo re, because tilt;' USS R exercised its OWIl control uf East European developments hy mai ntaining the doses t ti e.~ with the ru li ng Communist parties. any d iffusion of power away from the party also weakened the (Ibilit)' of tile Suviet Uniun to supervise and <-"{)[Jtml events. Fur these rea.~ons, ratber than out ofloyulty to Novotn )', the inciden t became a key factor in t he Soviet decision to convene the Dresden meeting. Soviet and bloc leaders ,llso sought information ,It Dresden ahout "alltisocialist te ndencies." IlartkuiJ.rly in the mass media. As the Soviets subseltuently stated, At the Drcsden ",eetin g the C7.ech,,-,lo,,~k (1nn rad"s did not den)' that some Heg(lli"" p n)('Cs.~cs W,'rI, dcn'loping in til( ' lu"ulry. Ihal th e radio. lc1 c"isiou and prc-ss h"d hmkcn aw,.y from party conlrol ;l1ld w,m; in fact in tht: h(HL ,[s of aulis.)(·iatht t:I ,;,u,t:uts aud that rightwing [')I"(.'es were UHls()tid~ti"g tl,eUlst:\\·"s. At ttu~ sanw ti1lH~ th e C7.echostOl'ak representati\'es stat ed tl,,1t 011 the wholl! the party was in ~~"' trol of the situation and that tI",n' ,,"liS no ea"se fur s"rinns ;Ibrrn. The S,,,,iet representat ivc .• ,,,,d "I] t h" delegations uf the fraternal parties noted ",ith complet" candor that ther ';ow til{' pkt)]re in a different light. They pointed /lut the real danger of tlw situation that Iwd t;oken shape. "
Czechoslovak partidllants concllr that the Soviets insisted on ur)!:ent measures to reestablish control of the press. 10 end attacks on ~ nir.~ 11l1",,·iew. s.-l'lem h,·, 3. 1(0). it, l'm",l" !~",",,:d''/~d. I'. I,". 7... ~·"o!k ~ltp,it. i"l~"'k,,"c,1 loy the ."lho, on June L. 19i9. m';nl.o.iu,.,j lh.l II;!".!;', 'c";on of the D ...•..dcn m""lin~
"'l'",,,,, ule d , fai r .u mm"!)· of tnc m;nule • . ,,·h;,-Io
''''n:
Ji" ,;h",oo ;0 ,he t969
(:"nlral c""""m"" plenum " 1'r",.,III . .~" ~"'122. t'J6N .
''''
o::h
the party and its Ilistory. ,md to prevent the reactivation of mass associations amI no n-Com mu nis t politil'al part ies.'" Brczhll e v. act"Ording to Bil'ak, stated that wh e reas (;c rtain antisocialist te nden d es pre viously lmd been regarde d purely as "transitional phenome non : ' there was now a growing discrepant'Y betwee n "words ilnd deeds." H e is said to have p leade d w ith th e Czechoslova ks to "mobilize th e part y and t he working class in time" to p revent "dmos_ " " The Sovie ts' condusion that " there \'~l~ evidclll."e of develop m e nt s that l."Ould lead to a co unterrevolu ti onary l'Uu p""" lu tilid supIx)rt frum lithe r delega tions , The Cwd mslovuks were sp.!d fka lly warn ed by the Soviets. the Poles, alld also by K,idar himself that th ey mllst tak e mC
Ulbricht . too. expressel] concern aboul developme nts in Czechoslova kia and was particu larl y worried ahout s pillover clrce ts, lIiLlk c it es Ulbri chl as say ing that "any weakenin g of the C PCz will le ad '' ' Ihl",·k """'~, I",, I th.,t " il i , ,~, I ,u.,"i.i n~ II..I ,'O',loiu "nK"1',n ,,"., .!~,wu , , , 110:11 .uH.oci.li.1 dem,'n', , huuld nul tah· .,h'.nt .~ e of tl", 1"'''''''' ,~ J "" ~.,~~Ii,-"H ,,u," B,a· ti,I.,-" TaJi<>, ~b rch 26, 1!16&, SII'I:I , EEl l ;JlICl4. Jt u;;k, .pe.k ;n~ Ihe in'",i"", """ ",ore oul' poken : "All ~w 1"'>1;'" ,-pry '''K@''lly I"'int," ",'Wet I" ,," ,trol ,he· t"~" (SOC Ick,.;.i"" J """menlar>' (l) . . kin): the 10th Ann;,-cr",,), of'he i",' •• ion, on A "~,," 21, 1!fi81_
aft,,,
~
lIil 'ok.
I',."cda I)())",d,,/orl. Pl'. 135 _ 36, .~It ~It:; - 37_
" Fr""da,
'' ' fhi d.,]>, IJ6
''''
o::h
./5
.\IAIlC Ii ZZ - AI'lIIL 10
to ,\ weakening of socialism in the CSSH, a weakening of the al· li:llwc with the socialist t"()untries and th e f(llIndations of soeialism in general."" Other so nrces maintain Ulhricht was ralh~' r more blunt in his analysis of the dan ge rs oflhe I'rague Spring. One re· [lo r I, which rin gs tru e ifonl y het·au.' c it attrilJllles to Ulhricht th at uniqu e directn ess of approach hc had shown Oil numerous other oc"(."asions, {lllotcs him as follows; "If III(' January line is continlled in C/.(,'(.'!llIsl<)\',lkia, ,L11 of liS here willlH~ running into greal danger. We Tl\;IY all fiml ou rselvcs kit-ked oul. .. ·" Although the lJloc's policy tuward \\'cst Gernw.ny was far from being the l'Cnlral issue, East German l"(lIlcern thaI the co mmllll ,I]lpro
or
/Jed-" i,,,,
1: 10
h"ltllhc :"l:ird, 23 ~" "fc rt'n('c .
Ded.·;OtI2: to ho ld" hid, -lc\'cI C(,)Uu",je ~'lIlferen('c in th e ne"r fulurc 10 e"lIl.~idc r, nlnoill-! olh"r Ihin)!s. Cz,:choslovakia', ""'I",'st li,r a loa" to rt:stmdu/"t" her \'(.·onOlllr.
/J{"(';!f;'''' 3: 10 ~'1Il1 ill"'~ wil h pia" , till' 111<' i" leg "ati"lI of t I", '" ili_ a",1 hi widcll the S("PC of adi \" it >, of it,; Poli ti (,;!1 C"II.uitatj l·e CmlltlliU('c.
tary hi)!!> t'ol1llll:lI1d of till' Warsa,,"!'aN
IJCr:lsiml -/: not to inter\"Cne fu rther in Cz('chuslo\"ak internal affairs prol'ided that tilt' aSSlifill1C,'S and pTOmi ws r{'("c i,·ctl fTOm th e Cz.'('llOsluvak delegation WCfI' ;.dcd " pOll . The lan)!lIage of th e
t~lInmlmi(lue
is !tl(H.lenlte: "ColifiJencc WlIS t~ ns"re thl: /ilrther d e velupment of s()cialist c()nstmctiun in the t~lUntrY:> " But Bil'ak maintains thai an .:arl;,:r \"ersi<Ju of th e umlllll lniqlle kId referred t~x prt;:sse( lth "t
[th e CI'C/. It;:,ule''ship l will
~
Ihi
~
D."';d Fl o)". !. '-n", C>,,,ho,, t,,,,, ~ C,;, h "f 1\16..... .. 1'. :m.
• ' 1"(1"'/". Ma,ch 3 . 1!If>'>. ·o lhi(!.
"' "
TilE 1'1\£-ClIlSIS 1'1:;11101}
lu promises 10 deliver a "decisive rdmlfto enemy ti)rces:· ..., lli1"ak luter stated that "at that meeting we prumised to resture order "nd to tuke the gUidance of the state firmly inlo our hands within two months:':'; Hus,ik, too. refers 10 the factlh:lt "th ere were nutifklllions and promises that we wou ld institute order und would take action o n these mallers: ' ''~ The Soviets exprl~ssed (~)llfide n(.'e that the CPCz leadersllip wou ld heed bluc advice without furth e r s:ml'tiuns or warnings. but th ey gave no indication that th ey had yet de veloped it dear policy on bow they would respoud if their umfidenee in th e C7.CdlOSlovaks wcre disapl}()intcd. They gaine{l so me political leve rage in promising to l'tJllsideT Prugue's rClluest 1i.1T a In,ln. but heyond this. nther spl:dfit- plllie), options did not emerge at Dresden.
HEACfION TO DHESDEN It is custom"ry for Prtlt;tlu to ,LlIII(1Un(:e that the oot<:orlle of ,I delegation's fore ign negotiations had r eceived th e approva l of the Politburo. and sometimes tbe approval of tbe Council of :\Iiniste rs :llId/or Ih., Cent ral Committee. Thi~ was in bel done /ilr the Sofi:1 :lnd BljJ:;pe~ t IYl ee tin g.~ held only week., lH:fOre." yet nO such ,\1\nouncement appeared tilr Dresden. It is pos~ihlc that II rezhnev's inclusion in th e delegation gave it sufficient authori ty to act independently withuut requirin g subsequent Pulithuru .. ppro\·"l. Yet I3rC7.hm:v·s trips tn Sofia ea rlier in :\Ian:;h. to Warsaw in Ju ly. and to Czeehoslovakia in Jul y and All~llst at the head of similar dele!!a(ions were indef:d the sllilj,:<:t of sl1hs"' jlwnt mee tin gs.'" Tlw t the Dres{len results were 10 he l~mfirme{1 by the furtheoming Centnl!
Committee plenum might also have vitiated the necessity of specific approv,ll by the entire l'olithllfo. Nevertheless. it is " rather curious anom"ly. und it appears tl ..,t either approval was not sou!!ht or ('(mId 110t he uhtained. TII{~ pussihility of a split ill th e Polithuro ,It this stage exists, although thc cvidcn('C is not at all dC,lf-CUI. Soviet press reports fo llowing t hl~ meet in); reaHlrmed th e imjKlftan ce nfh]oe unity, of lies with CZI..'Chos]ovak ia, and the helicl~ or at least th e hope, that the CI'Cz leadership was both willing and able " Flit'ak. Pruu/" ,,,,I,,,:/,dm·' . 1'. l:ro. " Bit'aI;. '-ll,e Trulh \...,~u, Lie.: I'· 20. ~ 11 .. clk·, ,\u~u ~ (Sur,a) .. Pnll'lla . ~Ia",h
t3. Juty 20.•,«1
"'''~(]>I
7. l!l611.
1Gh
JIz
M
MAtlCIl 22-AP tlU . 10
tn hrin g: tbe Ilo me_~ ti c situation firm ly und('r ('<)ntrol, as the Polish party wa.~ doing. " The stand adopted by the Politb uro after Dresden (or by a dominant faction wit hin it) waS signaled in an aut horitati ve (Irtide in Pra vda 011 ;"l art'll21:1 hy I. Ale );"a ndrov, a pseudonym used for editorials expressing top Ic\-cl party policy." The d ccision In refr.lin from any kind of publit polemic with Prague ur ovcrt inte rferellt"C ill CzedlOslol'ak domesti(' politics lI'as restated whe n A l e.~ androv condemned as "imperialis t snibblers'" all those who were "striving tu sow distrust amo ng tile Communist parlies" by raising aJleg,lt io ns of Soviet pressure un Cwt"llOslovaki a's nell' leadersh ip. It described events there positively: "Noll' t he CPCz is carrying o ut great [ho l"shyyu] work in the ;l(;ti\"atiun of the COl nm unist party orgall i7~lli on and th e slale allm inistrati ve appmalus." Whil e reaffirm ing tim dcep bonds uniti ng the 1\\"0 (,(JUn tri es and parti es. the editorial also t'(mtaincd the mos t c,\"plicil state ment yel to appear in
th e Soviet
pres.~
of the Soviet IC
m ination to maintain Czechoslovakia's position as a fore most mem-
ber of the sodalist comll11lllity:
'nw1l<.~Jfl\es of tIle Soviet Unio" amI CZUdlOs\o\"akia und OHr Cum-
mllni.~t pa rties arc li llke' \ by imli~s"l\1h l!~ ti.·s offralcrna] fr ieHdship. This frie nd ship h,,~ tl~'<:p historkal roots. It b ali l>lx lI scaled with the blood of th e best SonS of Ihe Soviet and Czc.·I",,]ol"ak pcuplcs, shed togdhe r In thl' struggle against the ('O lllmUn enemy. f:lsd'ln . Ihe stru ggle in which the nnshake:thlc :tlli:u>ee ],.,1"'<''<:11 the USS H aUlI Czechos]ov"ki:l ellle rg~.J. The COlll lll UH iSI par t ies of 1he Soviet Unio n and CzedlUslovaki:l, united hy fhlclity to the principles of Marxis Ul Le nini sUl anti proletaria n internationalis m. ins pire and direct our fr iends hip. . No one a11l1 110Ihi1lg, ullde r any (1mditions, C',tU shake oo r f",tern,,1 fn{·nd,hip. which seT"CS the vita! interesis "fthe Soviet Unio n anl1 Cn"Choslo\'aki3_"
I3 rczllllev did not dabor.tte u n this stand ill the publis hed versio n of hi~ speech to the ~I oscow City Party Confe re nce un ~1ardl 29. Althuugh. acr;ord ing 10 l'mvt/{I. he did " in!(lTIlI" th e delegates of .. ~.., . fur e","",ple. tl.e f'u"t' I"~e I'.-.m/" c.Jil"dal ,," M> ow" aW.,;" ",,,1 nf partk"ll''''u"S In ~ff,,"> tu "'r"I1'),~u th~ ><,II,b,I' )' oJr tI,~ l.~lC. " In July. dU';"1I a pre" <"O"rerr'''"t' in Swede n. I( ",)"~iu <,"".."jed tl,at tl ", AIc.a,,, lr<w c.!i'o,ial, ",Ked"" 1\)I"l.u", ol);" "'n. t.:().).~;", ,,,[,, ,,j,,): ,,, .\ie,..,J",,··, J"I), II r ...."dd . ,. liele ..... \lack "" the Sod.li'l ~ou ndation' jn Cn-"<:hosk,,-.ki •. - ..I"j ....! the juumoli,l< to ,e.,j it "')'ing "it ,~H<:<'" "to, ''''''''''n~''' ,,[ Ih~ .,.",," """" I .k i"~ IOu.,.. i" C,-'"'-·l .,,",..~~i •. " Tlor t.:' ''H(in i"te"'iew l> iu Pra,-da. J"ly 15. 19611. " I. Alc"""dnw. Pra,·Jd . March !!Ii, 19611.
''''
o::h
Til E l' IIE-C IUSIS l'ElIIOD
the results of holh the SuR>I >Inti Dresden meetings, he dlUse tu d eal almost exclusively with domestic politk111 ilnd ideological m;\tlers, The confcnmce was devoted primarily to th() social responsibilities of scientists, write rs, ;Iud th e iutelli~e llt sia and t Ill' need for ti)l)m tn d ispb.y great er "political maturity." Brezhnel"s speech \\"dS a h(lrd-line call for increased party discipline particularly in the re,llm of ideologic(ll work, which he labeled "the Rereest frOilt ufthe class stm ggie ," Indeed an editorial in S(l!)cfskll !/fI Rossiyn that appcarcd two weeks bier on April 13 (ilioted Brezlllle\' as warning eonlerelH:e dcll)gates that those "rtmegades" holding bOll rgL'ois views "cannot count on impuni ty." In an apparent reference to Czechoslov,lkia, he m(lintaillf)d that "imperialism is tr ying tn weaken th e ideological and politicaluuity orthe "llrkin g pcople of the socialist countri es, [n doin~ so, it is chielly gambling on nationalist and re visionist clements. "OJ Although the bulk of Brezhnev's speech
~b,"h
30 . lOOS,
.. ,.,..,,,.,/,,, "'I'ril I, I9hli
~IA n G Il
22 - ,u' IIlL 10
situation. At a philosoph)' t-"Ongress on March 26, Kurt l'lager, the leading ideologist in EtI.';t Germany's ruling SocicJlist Unity party
(SED), launched a hlistering and personallillack ()tl Josef Sm rkovsky, who was at that time still a candidate for the Czechoslovilk presidency. Hage r maintained th at Slllrko\'sk~' and others like him we re giving \Vest Germ
e ntreaty to '"gu intu battle ou twu !'rouls'" was hased un tCIJ;lr's stmtegy fo r reform in Ho ngary and fo rmed the fi Hltl(la\iu tl of Ih e cautious yet sympathetk- Hunga rian app ruach tu Ihe developments in Prague. East Europe an opinion, especiall y from Poland and East Germ,lny, dearly in f!uenl·t-'£l Ihe Soviet e\',lluat ion of evenls in I'rdgue. Su tuo did the domestic Suviet campaign against dissident intellectuals and insufficient parly discipline. Bulh factu rs enluUlccd the growing t-~)ll viclil)n itmong somt: Sovi<:t leaders tlwl '"dogm,Ltism '"the threat fro m the ri gh t particularl y from ~I aoist ideas-was no longer t he most immediate danger either to I h" ilL\ernal stahi lity of party (nle Of to the extenHll un ity of Ihe Commun isl bloc. Indec(I, t he Soviet leadership increaSingly viewed revisionism in the form
" ..."t·. D/!. "SLut'" ""d llr.,,~" .Of ··S[onn • .,d S[",. ,· ;,. ~ tCrete",,, 10 ~ 1,1_)' by I'rioorieh H.." Kl i1lf(\.·t ,..h;.,h . 1;",,,lalcd, h.·.dr poh1it.,.j d i>eu"ion 100 by Coelh~ in lhc ~'lc ,,;~hh~'nlh """,uIY. MTI . March 26, 1968. S",8. t:EJ2.:J."lIA2ll - S. I.;"",""";n·, 1,,1.' "j. . . ,,,,L '~I'tinl.,.j in Ih" S.wieL I"e". &
w.,
,~J
Tilt: Pllt:-ClI ISIS Pt;IU Oll
of att acks from th e left and from th e intellige ntsia as all even mure seriolls d,lIlgcr to basic values. In Poland, the Soviet Union, and now in C/.cchoslovakia, the major ideolugkal challenges in rel'CTI!
mont hs ha(1 come fro111 the
l(~ft.
not fro m the right. As a result, the
tllt:scs governing party wo rk sill('c the Twe nt y-Third CI'SU CO Il g ress. which h ad stressed th e necessit y for dos ing mnks agai nst the "splitt ing , ..elics" uf 1o.1;mism, were no longer app rop riate tu th e c urre nt do mestic and inlrabloc situati on and \\'0111<1 requi re re think ing. Til E APB!L
Pl.F. NU ~1
O F Til E CPCz
The greatest spur 10 this reevaiu,ltioll was the April ple num uftil e Cen tr;l] Cnmmillce, willi its wholesale leadership changes ami adop tion of tile Action I'rognllll . It had appcared al fi rst that th e plenum would no t subst;Ullially w e ake n l~JIlser"ative influ e nce wi th in party and stale organs. The sta temc nt t()Uuwing th c C I'C ~, I'raesidium·s Mareh 25 meeting, for e~ampl(~ , had assert ed that " tile I'raes idi um ha.~ fur th er de;llt wilh tlw prep;IT;I\iolls /(Jr the electioll of the president of th e Bcpublie. It took note of the inforUlatiu n b y Ale.~andcr DulXOek " buill the UisC llss ioll "f o llr u e leg;I\iOU a t Dresden ,"" As a reslllt of th at meeting, General Lud vik S\'oood;1 betaIne the part~" s presidential nominee, and the pos iti ve app rai sals in tIle Soviet pres.~ of $\'oh(j(!;J"s h:lckgroll nd and hi s unswcrvin g support fi, r " th e indestrll ct ih le allianec wit h th e peoples of the USS If" ind ieate that his l~lIldi&\ey was e nt irely ae-
ere?
ecptahlc to MOSl~)W. " If the Soviets hoped that Svoboda's scledion augu re d well for the mainle llallCC uf l'onserva ti vc influt:m:c in the le,lder,h ip, the ple nu m proved th e m wrong. hI th e <;Ollrse of th e session. Qldi"ich Ce rn ik was e ndorsed as th e p
,adi".
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~h",h 2 1. 1968. Also , ec "rocd", M,,«h 26. 1!IIi!i; b 'e..ria. ~la,,'\' 27 , 19f>ll: ~n,1 I'm",/a , .\1 .,.,,\, 31 ,,,,,I Ap'il l. 1\I6.'i, ~.,. I,).. 'nt,·,,!;,",,', "i.1o S\"I~.I~ .,,'\ reI."'"
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as Bil'ak, Oldrich Svestka, J07.ef Lenart. Alois l nd ra. and Stefan Siidovsky mlmaged to keep thei r positions. Yet the elevation of Z
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plenum, an a<"l;ounl h eav ily influeneetl b y Soviet urtlu.Klux)', pbct:u an !;(!lLal1y ncgali\"c inte rpretatio n on the illll uc nec of the Act ion
Progr.llll ill cnl'Ouraging antisocialist d ements:" SECU IUTY ISSU ES In (uldition to ~'Insc()w's v.'Orries ahout t he pOlilic
eo nccrnin g the Action I'rogram's stand on internal sccmity. The program had l1l11J e mned the "violations orbw alltl. the privileged pusition nfi ll t: st:curil y fun.-" in Ih e poli th;ai syste m" and h,IJ made proposals for the reform of t he enti re stmdllrc. The mOllopoly uf polk't: ]lower cnjorcd by t he lIIini.~ t cr uf th e interiur WliS
to be e nded and a !lew state security serv ile given jurisdiction sulely lor " defen uin J! th e st(lle frUIll the activit ies of e nemy ce nte rs abruad," TIlt' Ad iun Prugram )!u' It \\l )Uld al~() disrupt th e sllustantialuc\work ufa)1;ents used hy th e Suvie ts lu mU llilor aud infl uence develo pme nt s in Czechoslo vakia. Zdellck 1>,[[ YIlM has c[;.imed that whe n h e was elected tu the p,lrtv's Sc-~'re tari a t in " ',1", I."""" " or I I~, e n , i, Il<"'ek'l'n,,,, ,t in the e",,,,,,,,,,i.1 I'.rl )' of C,"",~ ",.I ,,,· .ki • • "d ;" S"e;"I )' .n,'r 11", 13\ 10 C"" Ilf"" of ,!,,, C l'C . :' <'<"''''t...·r 1\170. i" I'","dd I~""'~''''d''t. I'· 2') " . ·.-om Ih~ A
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" 11",,,, pmpmah ",,·r., ""dor ",d \,), Ill<' .\ 1i"i,l ry of In'erio< "01 ~b,... h 26. On ~b,d, 29 Ihe 1'.li o".1 A,,,,,,,,bl)' ""Iab\i,hcd a ro, mnill"" for miti tlrY and """uril)' 'Ine.'in", ,h.1 " ,m id inheril ' he I""I}' d~hth <1"'1"',10""",", f""'i inn, or " ...·""'~n~ the miti'a,)' .",1 'c' ~"r;IY f"ree,
MARCil
April. the information then availahle sllgges!ed that of the 10,000 full-time empluyees in the :\li ni~ try uf the Interiur's Prague offi ces, 30% (rungh ly 3,3(0) were also working for the Soviets, Alt hough the syste m of Soviet liaison office rs largely had heen disbanded under Khrushchev, ncvertheless, :\'Il)'lIl!i'lIl,lintuincd, must of the assistant heads of departme nts workcd fur MU5(',()W, thereby giving the Soviet security services substantial control over the I'ra",'uu ~·Iinistr)' of the Interior. '" The break up of the min istry and the purge of t he CQr1.~c rva t i\'e elements within it wOllld dislocate, if no! destroy. that control. At the same time demands for tIle rehab ilitation of political fi~ ures imprisoned in the lH40s and 195()s continucd to surface .Illd achicve official sanctioll. The Adioll Progr:.Ull'S admission th;.t the securit y forces Imd violated the law in the past gave impetus to calis for investigations into various activities, including the circumstances surrou nd ing the
C,,,,,ho,Ic,,·al;ia. 1O.000...r Ihe."" 1"",~! in Pr.u:.,e a1.mc . .. .~I,,
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" 1' r.. ~"e r",li" "" April J. '('"~ In~ Il,c r<")""I , ,,,,,,mcnlc,1 : ·· If 11,.. rel",,1 I, In", Ir """I
I., w.,l"ome<J . But nne oonnol
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to '" [,"''' MundI "",\ lUll
54
Till:: l'lIl:;·(;1USIS I'ElUOIl
vic ts h.ul guod reasulJ tu wurry awul such a IIlc aSUTC. Nut unl y (;'O uIJ fore ign agents more eas il y infiltmtc int o Cz,->chos!nV(Lkia hut Czechuslovaks and. mure imp'Ortant, Soviets and East Europeans wou ld !ml'(! meg.ll egress fro m the bloc' viii this route. Surely, the Soviets and East GCTm:ms did not withstand all t he international igno min y surrou nding the 1..'Olls tru (·tinn of the Berlin \Vall in lOOt ill lITtle r 10 sec anoth e r ullcontro lled ex it f(lule c rca tc{l.
OEHAT£S IN 1>IOSCOW The btl of firm reassurance from the Czechoslovak Central Cornmillee p lell um l'()m biu t.-d with ce rtain negative iu(!ic;LtiullS ahout Prague's internal secu rit y policy formed the h:ld:Jrop ror th c de bates beginning within th e Soviet leadership. The first ind ieator of a possible dcha!c was a rat her interesting d iHc re nee of e mphasis be tween two major articles that 'Ippeared in the Soviet press. On April 3 l'm"dr/ published a le ng th y TASS de spatch quotin g fmm Dulx-ck's re port to the CPCz Ce n tral Co mmittee plenum. The article, nut surprisingly, em phasize" (SII'B. £V2':]!)fii). At.. , IL .IIollde. _~l'riI5, tOO8, ""oJ o.,ily Telegraph. June 5. IY6IJ . .. P",,,,k AI"II J. l\lti~ 1.1", in 1 '"~'lkl. April ... )1JIi.8).
IGh
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55
MAIIUI 22-A I' 1I1 1.. 10
live red hy Uager only days earlier when he declared that the search fur national form s was a violation of internationalism, a supreme principle that mllst I>e protected, lo r not to do so would unde rmine bloc un ity and ultimatel y socialism itself '" The strength of the SovelskaYII RosslYII denuncatio n was all the more appare nt in its " e ing t he only editilriaillf its kind til ap]}Car in t he period preceding the Sovie t Central COlJlmittee Illenum. nornwll ya time reserved for e nunciating the formal party line. It is also un usual for a major editorial propoundin g, or at least proposing, official party pulicy on internatiunal COlll lllunist aA;lirs to apP':ilr in newspapers other tlllln Pra"da. Its appearance in a republic party newspaper supports {but does not in itself prove) the <-'(Inten lion iI,at a hardline lohhy was emerging within t he leadef'; hip with views lIot ye t (l(.'Ceptable to the lJIajority. Kosygiu's dccisiun tu cut shurt his visit tu ] r,ln aud ret urn hume a day carly. on April 7. en(.'O nraged speculation about It!adership splits. Kusygin had left Mos<-'Ow Oll April!, arri ving ill Tehran o n .o\pl"il 2, folluw ing ,Ill overnight .~ t;o)" in En: V(Ul .'" This w;os tbe first visit h)' a Soviet prime mi nister to Iran since Sialin met the re with CllUrcliill and Hoose\"elt in 1943. The visit was of the utmost e<-'Onomic :md political importanl'l! (II the USS H, :lIId the p:llleTS re_ ported Kos),gin's progress dail)'. It was therefore all the more snrprising that he should retu rn a day early to Moscow. leaving Imn without even allowing Prime Ministe r Hovcida e nuugh tillle to see him off from Shinlz airport. the provincial c;Jpital Kosygin happcned tu be touring wIlen he decided to return."' Before beginning his visit, Kosygin \\'(Iuld have hean l Lyndon johllSon's [I.·l arch 31 announcement not to stand for anu ther ter m as U.S. preSident. so it seems unlikel y t haI this was respollSihle lilr the early !light back to Moscow. Heports at the time s uggested t hat Kus}'gin returned to attend the Central Committee 1Il<->e ting. " An offieiai visit to Tur" S",:dslmya ROlli!!" . Al'Til4. !9tiII. lbi, ,n",·k I'rOOuce,l an im,"L.Ji'l~ ""I"m ,e from
'he
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April 12: and h ... " S~'''~k "On the S!",,-iHc Path h, s< ... ~,I ;'m :· Rud.. "raw . Apri l 1ft. lOOS. " s",,;"t No",s. ~Iarch 12. lOOS . onn"" n"",", ti,.! KO'lKin h, ,·i.i! Ir." [",n, AI"i1 21o 8. f'.... ooa ..\pr,1 2. repor<ed th.t K"'l'~i" ..... ""''' "If o n April! Lr \(m~N"·. Kirilenku. Mozu rm·. PoI}"'n>~·. AoolOJlO'·. K,pila""v . • ncl "" lalo.·. On April 3. I'...",cln <-.,,';"'1 a long >rhd" ah""t hi. arri,...1 Dn ,h. 1'""1<.. ,, ,10)'. .. Pro,~In . .~pril 6. ]!lIio/i . II" ....., met I»' " irik"l(). ' '''t:'loe. 1\,I)"aJ"l ),. A"cl""",~ . .... pilam.... a nJ Ku l,,' u,·. ., Tho Times. Apri l to. I96/!.
w"
56
T il E I'IU:-C RI SIS I'EIIIOI)
key h~' Geor~ian 11,Irly leader ami Polithuro candidate mem ber Mzhav:lnmizl) was alsu cancdeu at th e last min ute,"" w h ich \\~mld furth er inuit-ale th,lt tI le ut'dsiun (IltllHver5) to hold ,\0 im mediate Central Com mittee plenum W,IS taken ;It the e nd of the first wee k of April. A number of Politburo me mbers werc not in MoSt'uw at thi s li me,'" and t1l!lsidering Kosygin's own abrupt {·!lange of sched"Ie, it would certain ly appear thaI this decision was taken without fi rs t consulti ng all Politb uro mCl1lher.~. Irresp ecti ve of an y e ffort s to
isolate Kosygin or any of the other leaders not in , ",'Inscow al the ti me, this Cenlml Cmnmillcc ple num did pro\'c to be th e most h,lnl-li m: pilrty mediug e
I' LE NU ~ 1
The plenum convened in \-Iost·ow on Ap ril 9 and 10 imd. :K'Cording tn official press re purt s, WilS de"uted e.w lllsivcly tu the disclissioll ofSo\'iet foreign policy. It began with a re port by Brezhnev sign ificantly titlc{l "On the ,\ dua l Problems of the Interniltional Situat iun and the Struggle of the C PSU f{lf the Col,esiun of the World Comm un ist :\·Iovemenl." The speakers who partid patcu in the dchale rcpre~cnl cd a curious cross section of those with l'uUt'!iollal responsihiliti es fil r foreign and milit:lry pulicy (A. A. Gromyko. the fure ign min i s tl~ r. and A. A. Grechko. th e ddi:nsc ministe r) ilnd those in clwrge of the major cities and republics with a history of dissident pmhlc ms (\I: V. Grishill , ~'I {)s{1IW; " S. l i.lls tiku \', Lenin~rad: P. Ye o Shdes\. Ukraine; v. P. \Izhavanadze, Georgi;l; P. M . M iI.~he)'() \', Belorussia; sh. H. Hashid"", U~,hd;istiln ; I. G. Kellin, Esto nia; and I. I. B(Klyu t \1 01ua\'ia). Also involvcd wcre key c ultu ral and ideoloAieal figures. including the (]ireetor of the Centra l C()m mitt ct~'s In"tilu te of ~ hln i s ll1 -Le nini.'\ ll1. 1'. N. Fcdosccv: the secretary of the hO
He",,,,,,,,
., U.S . 1)"1""1"".,,, of SI;,'e. I);,...,.", of ' ''I..J li ~,· ",-,· aool!e .....dTCb . .lle"""",,, · A"~ ' ''' 16. Ilffl (d,,' I."iR,~I) ~or ,h~ ("II a",1 ,-andi,bl" lI,e, " h"" H( 'h" /\,Iill",,,,_ • "" J1r1.in~ ,,,,,,,her 'PI"'" I" 1'4'·c t",en rfC~""" l'k,1 ,·t,,·wh,-,,· ']", i"c ,I .. /;,,1 ,,',~, I< of .\p,il. indndin~ ~b",,, ,,, (in Fi n· 1.".1). \'()IU'~"· ("""1 i,,~ '[,'0 I" Snm.>ihir-I1>,'""",I/.c. l\"h;dOl' . • nd Shehe,hibl;r). loll' it i, 1101 known whelh", 11><·)· we,c in ~1,"'",,- " '''i''~ 110.· ,,·,,·k or .\pril . Shd'1,in 1"")(":"I' ~,1 "'ilh a \\." hi ••• I,·r."i"" o( Tr.LlI., Unill'" 111' FfU I "-'"~ ..,, 1111 ' ·;e"m",. which (l1)(",~,t ill M",,_.~" "n Al'ri) S. ,111m IISt:· /Z7.
"';I'
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M:lrkov; th e head of Ihe Young Communist League (Komsomol ). S. P. Pavlov; the minister of culture , ~hdarne E . A. Furtsevu; and the editor of Pravda (who previously h:1(1 also been the ambass:ulor to !'rugu e), ,,1. V. Zim yanin. "" The only leaders res ponsible for foreign policy and bloc affairs who did not p;lrtidpate were Prime Minister Ku sYgin, Party Se<:retary Susluv, and KGB chie fYuri AndrollOV. The inte resting mixture of partidpants in itself indicates th e strong inten.'O nnedion made within the Soviet leadership between threats to th e cohesion of th e bloc and problems of inte rnal dissent. The silence of Kosygi n and SlIslov might be cxplained by the former's exclusion from preliminary preparations an d the latte r's reported illness. It is more difficult 10 de termine the reason for Andropov's silence. As a me mhe r of the Central Committee with long experien<..'C in bloc affairs (he was am h'Lssador to fl un gar y ill 19,'56 bclore being promoted to party secretary in charge of rela tions with ruling Communist parties) and eurrc nt rcsponsibility as head of th e KCB tilT both th e internal and e.~te rn 'll securit y of the USSH, one might have expectc{\ Andropov to participate. particularl y if hc shared the CQncern about rcvisionism ;md subversion reflected in tilt;' final resolutions. [Jut t hen Andropo \"'s las t speech had been in December 1007. and as he made ItO speeches at all durin g 1968, it is possible thai h is silellee was attributable to his style urlead e rship ((lther than to his views. One other person who did g ivc a speech was Kon stantin F. Katushe v, wlm prior to the plenu m had been party setrelar), in Corky. He was promoted at this ple nulIl to Ce ntr,l1 Committee s<.·<,:rclar~' in charge of liaison with rll ling COllllllunist ami worke rs parties, thus fillin g the post le ft vamn t sinl'e ~Iay J967 b ~' Andropov's promotion to head of th e KG B. K,jtushcv had 110 prcvious experielll,:c in tilis field . Konstantin V. Hus,\ko\' also move