The Kremlin and the Prague Spring
JNT E IlNATJ ON At. C Hl SJS I"I E Il AVI0H SE IIIE S
Edited bl} ,\fie/wd Hreciwr \,OU .l \1E I
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"".I 1973 ( 1980)
A"i Sht.im. The V"ilc,1 Slnl,·. "",III... He,.{i" Hlm:kmle . IfNS-19-19: A Study ;11 C rhis IJtoc h;""· ,\I"kj,,~ (19&.1)
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Ccotfrc)' Juke .• , IliIlu', S,,,I;"l!md /)''C;,';''''_ ' (19/:1.5)
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The Kremlin and the Prague Spring KAREN DAWISHA
UNIVEIISITY OF C.>\UFOHI\ IA ['!lESS
UEIIKE LEY
LOS ANGELES
LONDON
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Contents
f oo' !W fll
Ackll owfedJ!.IIWIII .~
xiii
PAIlT I : INTRODUCTION I.
Soviet Foreign Policy A nalys is ,lIld Crisis Bch;l\'jo[
"
3
prelude to tlw Crisis PAIlT
[j .
1,5
II-IE I'IlF _C BlS I S I'E B!O])
10
37
Phase
4.
phase Two: Ap ril 10 Ma l' 4
62
5.
Findings
78
QIlC;
March
22~A!lril
3.
PA IlT III · Till' C Bl S l S PEB IOJ)
6.
Phase
7.
Ph"." Two:
8.
Phase Th ree: ]um; 2/ - lull' 28
O.
P1wsc Four: Jul y 29 '\UgllS! S
Qlle:
;\'lav 5 !unc 6
rill'" fi
27
93
,'" WI)
10.
Phase Five: August 5-20
271
11.
Findings
294 Gii
"ii i
PAIIT]\I. THF I'OST.C IlISIS PFIlIOJ) 20~27
12.
'\ llgllst
13.
Findings
.'319
333 PA in V: CO NC LUS IONS
14 15
I caders and D ecisioIls ' CWll'J ll siotls on Soviet IIr·h w j pr jn 1968
341
19fi8 an d .\Ike -11", C osts and CUllSel]Uenl'es uf I nvasion
367
ApPflu/ix t\: KC!I/'olilic(d omi Militanl JA:(Jders. USS R. 19(;8
381
A[J/!Cudix /1; KC!ll'o/ilicalllm/ Militlln, Lcru/ers, C:xc/ws/Ol.'okia , 1968
383
Selectct/ Bibliograp/u{
3S5
[!!lIn
399
Foreword
'10 dis sct'l Soviet dt~ isi()n makinc 'Ill!! h" hal' ior in li,reign p()li t~· e rises requ ires di \'"r~ " ski]] s: a 1..:"{)wl". I),:,, "flhe lall g u:l!!e , the I,istorr. and til(' political syste m ami id"ulngy of th,· USSH . it' \\",,11 as insight into I h" personali! y t f :lit S and int e rpersonal rl'lat io ns 01 So· viet lc:ul.:rs; all ability to ;\ppl~' psyclwlogit-" llimlillgs Oil th e .t~ ' namit;s of small groupl){'IM\'ior to the pin,tal group at the ape.\ uf the Sov;d pOII'" r p)'ramid , the I'ulithuru: a !iuniliaril)' \\'ilh tIll' IIlclhuds of lIu,ticrn so,,'ja] sciC II C!: ami" d ispos itio ll to comhim ' ri g(JrOIlS, Sys tctll;ltit- in'plir)" wi th /'m:ign are a 'pl'{'iali~atiun ; a ma.\ tcry of Iii,· ""
dedsion-making pruccss; ;Ind . h na]] y. a
pl:lvc{1 in "buml"m;c in the pa!,:cs thai I()liuw, K;u'cn J);lwis ha nwkcs tl U d;lim to u,: linitil'CIW SS ill he r h\~d natin g: stud), uf th e Krcmlin 'I ll~l the Praglle Spring. I nd ee d. at tIl(' outsd . ,11<' pn''''' n is tlw ... ·,,,1,·,. with an illlo'i!!"illl! .mal .. gy I".. twe e ll ;l parbhioHl<;:r at a Hu"j '
"
, (.·ontc m pomry in terna ti onal relat ions. with partie"I,lr focm o n de-
cision makin g and action withi n the Communist h loc. T he ,lutlm r's obj ect ives arc twofuld: lirst, to uncove r the exten t to which the quali ty of Suviet dcci5iull makin,!!: was affect ed by tile cst-ala ti o n ;Uld Ilecsca lalioli of te nsions Iluring var ious pcr i u\l~ uf th e crisis t ha t a ttended tile i'r;Lgll c Spring; a nd second, to cont rib ute to the liter;lIufc on uedsion m aki ng in internati o nal crises. The firs t o hjt!divc is aUained hy;m ill ll lllin'lting aL"'~J\lIll nfSuviet percept ions, decisiuns. an d adiolls. T he .' ccond is aC\'om p lishcu by a rigowlis a nd irna!!inal ivc usc of th e Inter nation al Crisis Be havio r (Je ll) fr'l1lw\\'ork III gem:ra!e co mparative Ilildings fo r theo ry buildin g o n c risis. And both arc cnhan('(!d by a IUdd p resenta ti on uf tile dra lna a tld signifl~'all('e uf II,,: Pntgut: Spring ami ils ,l e l1
ach of Ihe principa l dec ision makers filtered th e information abo ut th e Prague Sp ring th mugh a differen t pen'epl ll al lclls: Brezlmc\' was primarily conccrned wi th (lomes ti ~· llissenl: Susl!)\' focused o n the me nace from Peking; Kosy,c:in, who al one had a ,·,,,lll'l.·x. ti iA" ,-,," l iatt,ti, 'lilt! """s l"r,,oIY lwd ;""'g" "1' 11.,, in lernationa! e n\'ironment, was worrkd alX)u l th e c1l'eds on e('Onomic ref" r lll and a r lll s li ltl it;lt ion: and Gn" ,hk" c mp hasiz.:d Ihe ,Iirect t h rt:n! of U.S . military act ivity. As the cri sis int c nsifi ed , howeve r. al! ~'on~'lI rred 1Ii al events in Praglle co nst ituted t he major clialI c ngt: to So"iet powt:r in E;lsl<:rn 1·;\lI111'e. The t llt'oretimlly oricnted find ings ;Ibou\ Soviet behavior
''''
o::h
F O IIE"·OIlI)
xi
disru pte{1 with the uuster of Novotn}' and other hard-line party leaders. Direct contacts wilh the lead c rsl,iJl l)f Suvie t l>loc· stales increased " "I;(."{, ahl~·. And, as expected. th" i",~ , l ve mell t of senior decision makers in the informatiun p rocess ).(rew with stress- in h igh-level negotiat ions :lIIt! fact-Hmlillg mL~s i on s ;md in written an d telephone (."ommunieation with Czechoslovak Icaders. Dawish:,·s findings about t he J ecL~iun:11 I()rum arc slrikin).(. Altho ugh the Poli thmo remained the iw,titlllional foc us I()r all formal and majur decisions. an inner eore aded hoth formally in th e negotiations w;lh Ihe Czeci)()slov,lk p,lrt~' [ead,:rs and infonnall y as a self-appuinted crisis management group. The membersh ip oj" Ihe twu gruu ps overlappe d and included Brezh ne\', Kosygin , Podgorny, Suslov, and Shdest. This d ecisional core was no t full y cohesive at any stage oj" thc crisis: Kos~'gin and Suslov wcre persistent advocates of caut io n, Shelest uf intervent iun: Bre zlmev aligned with tI le majority at all times bllt did not provide Icadl!rsh ip; allll Kosygin \\"..l5 freq uently excludcd from dedsions by lhe inner (;o re witl,in tile Politburo. ThrougllOut the {Tisis, llOwevcr, th e nu mue r of pe rsons all(1 groups (.~Jnsu 1t cd b y Soviet decisiOll makcrs did not chan ge markedly. As in othe T fo reign policy crise s. illLTeasi ng Soviet stress dming th e Prague Spring reduced th e n umhe r of alternatives unde r considerat ion and narmw(..J Ihe r:lIlge of perceived Sovid oplions fro m ten ·, in Augusl 1968. to Iwo: political pressure on DulK.-ck tl) p re ve nt Ihe fur th er growl h uf anll-Suv ie t ele mellts. allli a full-scale in vasion to support an alternative Czech Communist leadership. Ironicall y, ~·l os(.'O\\"s m ix turc of tim strategies uf (.'Oercion and COlIIllTOIII(se may have in;l(l\"crt c ntl y made an in vasion more likel y. III a (·oncluding Cil;lptcT Dawisha pn)\' iJcs a" in,ighlful allalysis of t he (.~)s t s and (.~mscquenl"e s or Ihe invasioll. \\'i tllill th e Soviet Ullio n, th e prima ry cllcd was to set rigid ;md narnm· limits lor re lorm and Tevisio" in the po lit ical, C<.,)lJoll1 ic, ami cuitu nl l spheres. Thro ugho ut E :L~ tern Eu rope. th e invasioll t·ast a shadow over :111 d ehatc nn politic,,1 reliJrlIl. Yugoslavia. (·ollvillced that ;U) in vasion would have been deterred by a high er risk uf I::nst-West confrontaCioll, sought and obtaine{1 a u.s. security guara nte e . Amung th e bloc leade rs, only H Ung;lry'S Kadar an d Bulgaria·s Zhivkov survive{1 tl ,e political fallout from the invasion. Aluania deci ded to withdr'dw from the \ V"rsaw Pact, tu rning to Pekin g instend. well
xii
~'Ol\EWOlln
Kare n Dawisha's ul timate explanatiou ofthc Kr(' mlin decision to suppress till' Pragut' Spring by force proviues \'~Iuable gUitbn t'c about the USS lfs prubahle f\ltme forei gn poliey be havior: wh e n t he Soviet objcdive was to maintain th e Soviet positi on in Eastern E urup!, "fur eterni ty," tllc tnmsie nt ~liellation of one or two geuerati ons of sigllifknnt segnwnts of th e populati on and clites within the bloc mattered ve ry little. :\lie/wei B recher
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Acknowledgments
This hook {-,ould not h~\'c be en w ritten without assistance from many indivillnals and urg.uliz;ltiuns. ~Iy [irsl debt of gra t itude goes
to ~lichael IIreche r. who invited me til llarlicipatc in the Il1tc rna~ tionai Crisis Behav ior Project in 1977 and then p,lticnlly ami meticulous ly read ali t! (.1)mmentcd on th e dmfls of this manllscript. The Canada Council, which supported th e project and generous ly funded my own research, also deserves a speda] men tion. So too doc~ the University of Southam pton, whk-h Ilnant'Cu my trips to the VSSH and Eastern Europe and gave me a stud y I<:::t\"c to under-
take paris of m y research .
For a hook such as this, lIlall Y lihrari c.~ and archin:s must he consulted. The unparallded llrt.'hin: s of th e Press Lihrary ,l.t th e Royal Institll(c of Internat ional A/hirs. loget her wit h the lInelllling assislance of its staff, made the re5cardl hoth more e nju y"hl.:; and mOrt: profitable. For this project . I oht:linc(1 man y prcvio usir cbssiRc(1 U.S . d<>e ll nHlnts from Ilw \Vhil e HUIlS<' , Nation;l] Security CUlmeil . State Department, and th e Central Inlelligence Agency. They were declassifie d under tlte U. S. Frce{lor1l of Information Ad, an d I would like to thank the staff a t the Slate Departme nt alld tile L y ndo " Ba ines
Juhn~"n
Lihnn'y stalfi" Ans tin . 1C:
sistance. I \\~)ul{1 Ilnally lih, 10 t llallk th e slall' of tile lihnlries al the London School of E{x)]1omies. London Unive rsity's School uf SI;l.VOllic and E
M: KNU\VLUx.;,\I£s· rs Stah: Dt:p,l rt11lent ), J,lcol1 Be am (U.S. amlmssm.lor, Prague), Pau l Cuok (U.S. Eml.hlssy, ~loSl-"()w) , 1',lul Costohmski (U.S. State De ]l;lrtment), Haym ond Gm·t holr (U.S. Slate iJepartm ent), Helmut Sonnenfeldt (U.S. State Department). rllld Walt \Y. ilosto\\" (Nat iollal Security Advisor to the president ). :\mollg t he British officials I wuu ld like to t hank Joe Banks (British EII1 I)(1ss),. Prague), Maieolm L\hckintosh (Foreign
rdatnllo Soviet puliry ill Eilslerll Europe amI Soviet be-
Illivior ill crisis ('1mditions. Of (.1)u rse, not e\'eryonc I lalkcd wit h e,lll be thanked pe rsonall y, hu t I wo uld like In ;Ickllowlt:{lgc Artur Starew;e..:, a sl:cn:tary of the Poli sh United \\'urkl:rs Party (PUWI') in 1968 and a partk-ip:lnt in the llratisbv:l negotiations. Also the shill' of t he Polish Inst itille li,r Inft!fI ta t iOilal Afrai rs \\';IS most helpfu l in arranging discllssions at t he institute and wit ll ollicials and journal ists outside it. Amoll): tll m;c will) help ed me in :\Ioscow. I would li ke t" thank t Ill: stall' oft III~ 111 st it \II e of w"rI{1 E(~'l1llm y aml inle m ation;ll He btiollS ,l1ld th e Institute for the Study of the USA ,md Canada hlr their insighls into Easl- \Ves t n :bl ions am! Ihe celltralit y of Eastc rll Europe in Soviet COr)(."C rns. III tlw pre p;lT;11 ion of tIll: man llst:ripl . thanks go to I nan r including Hilary Parker lin' her e.xper t typing and J,\ncl I lurst and Hohert Houdek for their skillful dr
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PART ONE
Introduction
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Soviet Foreign Policy Analysis and Crisis Behavior
T his is Ho t th e first book to he written ahull! what h:ls COllie to be known as the l'nlgue Spring: of ]96S. I Nor is it the hrst attempt to :malyl.(.' and "xpbin l he II lotil-ation, hehind til!' SUI'it:! iU\(' ITI'IIlion in C~.(~dlOSI()\'" kia. : Neverthe less. it sct·ks tu ""Ike i' slll"\;lllli,'c ('~ >lltrnHltiOiI I"~ the lit."ratul"c 'lI, s,,'";"! dcci s;, 'u Illakill).! during tlll' Illon ths Icadill;! lip 1<1 till' l'll tr r of \\"arsa", I'act truops on th e night of '\U)!IIS\ 20, If)r:il'i. T ll<: );1<.:11> "f Ih" siudy. Ihcrd<m:. is not dlC Pr,Lguc Spring per S\'. hut tIle way the Soviet leadership rt."lcled t() dmnges in C7.echos )ov,. k ia amllh .. exte nt to wl ,id , the quality ofdcdsion 1l1"king was "tll"de,l h)" till' C"S<:il];,\i"ll :.nd <.llTSc;lblioll of tellSi()ll ~ tlMI <:harade ri /,ed th" I'arious p.!rio(\s of th e tTbis. Th is is th" major " illl of t1,,-, s hl\<:1. T he't' .1"... ,,, ,,,·,,ls. ill ,,,11;1;0" to ",·s"" ...; 11 trips to t1,.. USS II. Pola",\. tl,,, Ull itcd 51,,1.·,. " ",1 1·"riOIlS \Vesl Ell,""!',,;,,, ~·oll"lrics. hal": 1\1,'1·1l,· 1"' ,1 "" .. I),,·, . ~. the l'e.,~" .. 5I'ri,,~ "."'.,'" (;"1 1,, (:"t,,, •. T/,,' ",·"/,,,,/,,,',,l/I,'[.,,,,, ,110 m""",, Cali. '--:"1.,,,, 11,f."',,, 11,,/,' in ( ;""'/w..lm<J!;" . • ,,,111. (~"d"" ~l.illi,,". C"'c/,,,· "Im'" kia:, )"" ·"""'o'
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c,l rlh elillludl previou sly u nknown info rmatio n ahout Soviet (Iedsion makin g;.
In spite of this inforrnatioll ,
t h(~
progress of lll )' research has
hee n slnw and impe{led hy rn e lluxlologie,l i dilTiclilties. Any scholar seeking to t1 arif~' thc Illo tivat ions and images of decisioll makers in a syste m suc h liS th e Sovie t UnilJll is (Iced first with th e almust ill su rmountable prnblem of evide nce. Without '\l.'t:css to Politb uro m inutes, po lit ical mem oirs, ami records o f o pe n d e hat es or i nt e rviews with uAieials. it is ,ll mosl impossi hle III draw (.'O nere tc (;onelllSi01lS ,Ihou l th e yalues, ilnag<'s, ;lnd \l1O \i va\i ons of inJivjl\ U,I[ So-
vie t leaders. II is
equal!~'
diflkult to assess th e relative imporltull'c
of various l:lc!OfS or to isolate aud meas ure th e spedfic im p,let of '1Il~' sin gle variahle. In resea rch on Suviet politics_ and un dccisi(JIl making in particu la r, o ne is stru ck by !ht: 'L II;t]ogy hdw':ell the researche r ami th e parishi o ner at a Hu ssi'lIl O rt hodox dHi rch se rvice. The priest chants, am! th e c hoirs, divid ed into scdions, issue fo rth w ith gloriously ritualist ic and hYllnoti c n~Jlli es. The smell Ilf ince nse, th e lig htin g of candl es in front of icons spr(·ad throughout the congn'ga t i"". ,,,,d tl,.. pa rading of th .... roSS a nm",] tit ,.. ""Isid .. "f th e
church prod uec
it
feding that one has participated in ;lnd derived
intilll,lt c kn owl.:tlgc of the PH>(.·cetlin ).\s. Onl y on reflect io n <10.: 5 one rea li ze that t he priest has onen di sappeared behind ,I screen and th at Ihe mosl impo rl,ml par is of th e eo m muniou itself have bec n (.~ )I \{luctc d in the sanct uarr, nhSl· un:.1 fTOm vicw. One ass um es Ihal Ihe pries t spends ILis time Ih.;re oH"crin g pra r.:rs, bUI ooe h'15 lit! wa y ofk nowi lL g /()r SU l"e lh
5
SOVU:T FOIIE[ GN POLlCl' AKALYS[S
of the analyst. Thus more than twenty years after Daniel Hell's "Ten Theo ries in Search of Soviet Hcality,'" Soviet specialists are still d ebat ing IVhether the Kremlinolog:ic:tl or \ot:llitarian approaches should be replaced by models thai take more cogni7.am.'C ofburcallcrati<: politics ,mtl interest grou ps. 11 is an important deb..1tc. ami one in which this aut hur has becn involved.' but it is unlikely to be resolved onee and lor all because of the tlilllculty of verifying an y particular hypo thesis. Advance.~ in the mcthodology of t he social scient'cs have offered the prosJled tlmt new models ami !!lore sophhti mtetl llletll{xh would at last solvt: sonl(: of Ihe mysteries of Sovie t pulili<.:s. Ono: of the majo r contributions of these new approaches has been to turn out Soviet spL~ ial ists with uroader training: and an inclination to study previously ignored aspects of the Sovid poli tical syste m sudl as local government elections and interest groups, But few would dcny 111,,1 the central roc'us of aUlhoril~'. particul,lr!y ill the realm of furdgn p()lic~'. n:mains within Ihe higlu:st t'l'hdons oft I,,: party a lld state hie ra rchy and that therefore analys is illtc re~ted in unders tal1tlin~ the actions taken by tllt~ Suviet Union will ~till end up tr ying to glim ps.! he hind the pruv.!rhial screen. Few new tools have been devc\opc{1 tu aid I he analyst in Ihis eliorl. Contellt analys is is une such tooi. It can take one of three fo rms. delw nding OJ) the availahility uf {bt,\: L lulellsily of crisis
sing an
awarcnes~
lIercelilim~Y,
(Ieri"cd from an y statenwnt e_~prcs of thrcat. time wn~tr,'in!. and/or probability of
War, '1~ l eLllenl' of rricndship and hos \i li ty. expressions of sati~facti on with the stntus quo, nnd demands for ch'LIl~c in the stato, '1"0. It is mcaslIred by Ihc "I'"ir ~~Hnp"ri so,," sC'J.ling me thod dC"elopcd hy D . .-\. Zinnes_-l
Z. ,\ 'Ill/ysia of aflil"des, base
3. ,\ric"""n'y m",ly.• j.•. ",e"slIn'.! al"ng " niu "-I",;n! a
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ISTIlOl)U CTJOX
6
The val ue of Illest: variOllS form s of (;onlcnt anal ysis in th e assessme nt of Sovid politics lies in 1111) main arC'L~. First , if IL sed to form a gene ral picture n[Suvict elite views over a lo ng tim e span or to d evelop attitudinal profiles of in(li\'idllal leaders ove r th e e ntire le ng th of th eir ca reers, content analpis hi\~ pruved useful part icularly in re vealing inkr<~ sting nuanceS of JiHc rc n(;c betwee n occllpational or generational gruups. : SCL'tJIIJ. in s pL~ iri c case studies such as t h is OIlC, l~ml c nt alHilysis has sen "cd to snpplement or c onfirm dct,lilcJ resc,lTeh , particularly by meusuring the changes in th e intensity uf (T isis pCIl-,cpl ion by the leade rship as a wlllli e. At the same 1;111<;, th e limits 011 til': value of content analysi.~ are great in tlIC Soviet case because of tlIC absolute p"ul'ity of 1.l;.terver [Jr Suvie t po lities 111I1 S I be cqually S(!II siti vc 10 both what is said and wlrat is not said. In an;rl yzing a short series of spcedles, all of whi ch may have be en writte n aceor{liug 10 some preagreed 1(lrmula . th e number oftimcs a se t phnlse is repeal e d takes on milch less sign ifi can ce
j,,,
' Sec. fo r n",,,pk F Tri>b ""d l),,,,d O. Fink·)". Sud
.\11),,,01.
",,,/
-"i~/" Frm /
in "m"", . p. 2::19.
''''
o::h
7
than even a sin~l c word of d issent; ye t q uan! itative conten t analysis would class if~' that single word of dissent as insignificant. Tllis stud y llisn reveals th,lt drawing infcrcra.'Cs ahout th e posi-
tions of tup leaders from views ex pressed in th e editorial columns of certain news papers is
eX lre m d~'
diffi cult. Such infe rences IHLve
been drawn in previous studies to verifr the existence uf diffe ra mung el ite groups or burca ucrades over issues such as pa rticipatury attitlL{l c~ , tb e ~ Iiddl c East. or eve n Czechoslovakia," Al -
C IK'CS
though greu! differences have sometimes been gleaned by the (.'o mparison of individual articles or a sInd), of the overall trend of
editorials over lime,Ahe ass1lmption thai unsigned editorials in any newspape r represent th e p rc"iously un knowll views of a specific leader or facti Oll is qu estionablc. First. ,Ill m!wspapcrs are published hy th e p:lrty cOllllllitlee within th e minist ry or p ub lic body conce rned. KI"I/.wwY(l :.vc:.da. for exampl e. is formally the newspaper of th e party cmnmittce within th e 1-.·1inistry of Defen se. not a paper in whk-h th e milit,lry can express illdc pellde nl views. And this is the casc with evcry newspape r. whet her it hc a eentr.ll publi(-atioll sudl as l :,vcfltill or a regional p uhlicatioll such ,IS p r(lc(ill Ukrainy, all arc unde r part y eu nt rtl1. SCl.~md , lOp leaders have access to a nu mber of newspape r outle ts. In 1968 military leade rs often pulJlisheu in pr(lvdll \If / ;;ve~· till. Kosygin had several articles published in I'ravt!lI rath er than /;;vntifl, and th e re often appeared to be differe nces of opinion amon)! COlll nlentato rs working for th e
same newspaper. And neWSIlaper siaHs are frequently posted to new positions in other puhlieations, furth e r rciufordng part y co ntrol and limiting th e ability of any ne wspaper to tlcvclop a distinct line. To t,lke but on e case. Konsl~ ntin Z,u"tx lllV, wl lo in 1968 was chie f t..>di tor of th e World M(! rx ist /kvicIG. ;] tll t:ore ti cal and intormation journal for Co mmunist ~ nd alli ed parties that is sold in about 150 l."Olllltries. had previously been fi rst depu ty editor of I'm oe/II aud chief .~ditor of Suvi:/skayu Il(),\ ,~ iyll . as well as a candidate membeT of the Centra! Committee. \\fhile not oe ll ying tlHlt he may Il
"S"";et " " " ' j"
1978).
in pa.ticu!a(, ~I ilwn C. l..ooJg,·. Sul(I ••, c.,~ ., : lIb " ,;",.. P" ,,, .
~o"';~n
I:d",
ll'TlHlJ)ucnus
8
part)' line is not yet firrnl~' established or is under challenge from wit ll in Ihe party. In such c irClLlllshmccs, persis tently di\',~ rgell t opiniu1lS am ong puhlished commentaries are llsually a fair indic(lliu n of ~pli t, at th e lop. Bul e"en herc, it is JitliCl11t, hecause o f th e mobility of journalists arullcadcr s' liSe of >'ariOi IS IIl,wspa]lc r s to air their views, to L'tm n ecl any ont' fact ion with a sin gle puhlk'
Tlms, although UterafunwUII J!.u;;;dll ,U\d
SO!;et.~kll!'(I /l os.\'i!11I \n: n~
ofk n th e most olllspnkcn in their t~l1lde lll n,ltinn of eve nts in P r.I).!;UC and tILt' appeara nce ofcritit':ll articles led to t ll1~ eS(;(lbtiun ofh:nsiuus between the Su\'id Unio" and Czcclms \uvaki,\, thcre is still illsuffidcnt evidence to justify concluding that a speci ne Icmlcr was advo•.:al in£ a partieu!:lr CO Il NC of ;1('lio n such as mi litar r in\t:IT" " I i, " I.
D es pite Ihese limitations. th e importancc of analyzing Soviet dL"Cisiun m aking is undimi nished. The data hase :lVailahl l;' on Soviet hehavior in til e 1968 Czc{; hoslu\'ak c risis is heller than thai It)r mall)' uther Soviet crises, mainly hec
r",,,,~.
m""""", u,,;wr<;,)'
n .· /,J/,·,-, .. " /;d' .... .' 1'Ioml PllrI;C' ;" h 'U'''d ' WMI eri .. ,. (I',itl<.·d o" ,
I',~". 19671. p. 9. '1""""1 1,, Philip \\';]\;"'" •. erl, ;, .\I"""~CI"r''' . 1,. 20 " Ch",1e, ~k(;ldt, ....I. "C,;';, an ti Tineal it, Ihe [ntc","I;on.,1 S",,;,,)(, SO Ule Ilel.,t;"".1 Cono"l" " ('), I"'''·';pl). 'I'H 'I, ~I j " .\1 ;,,'1,,,,,1 11"",1,,·,. '"J;",•• n1, a Th"",)· of l"h',,,.lin,,al C,hj. Ilch ..·;o,." ". ·10.
9 10 do so wa.~ 01"<111 Young, who identified the characteristics of an
international crisi~ as "a sharp break frum tIm ordin ary lIow of poli. I iC5: s hurtn ess of {juration; a rise in tIl.: p c n:civcd prosp ec t thai \'io-
Icm:e will hreak out; and significant implicat ions for the stability of some system (or pattern uf re latiunships) ill intcrn:.ltiunal p()litic~." " Although thi s definition is appropriate for describing and ex-
plaining th e effect of stress on the relations among states. th e
C111-
ph:1Sis ill this specific stu dy is UII the crisis facing the d ecis ion
make rs of one pmticut;lr shltc. the Su\'ict Union. In other \\lJrd s , our t'()llccrn is foreign policy crisis rather than iute nwli O/wl crisis. " \Vith in thi s pe rspl.'divc th e must widely accepted defin ition
of crisis is th e one forward ed by Charles Il ermann: A crisis is a sit uatinn t hal (I) threatens high priority goals of I he dedsiOlHnakin g Ililit. (2) resiri cls I he ;1111011111 of tim" """ib]'le fi,r fe"IK""" hefiJre th e tled sion is tran sforllll'd . lind (3) surprises th e n1<:I11],,:r., of til e dt...::isinn-nlnking unit hy its o•.'(:'urre nt'C. Umle rlying th e j""IKI.w d definition is th e hy poth esis that if "II th ree trait s ;IT<: p,..:,,,,,1 the n lilt, dcd sion p""-,,,ss will hc snh,ta nliall)' , Iill,,,'e lll Ihan if onl )· one or t\\'O Ilf till< dmr.ICt.-ristics appear." ~'lidmcl Brecher and a number of associates in the Inte rlHlt iu1l(11 Crisis Behavior (ICB) I'rujed have ende:I\'ure{! to re flne the He rma no defi nition hy m(){lifying some of its ennceptuu! cl"ments. In the first place, they found the term basic wlu(!.\' more pertinl;:nt t han high -1!rioril y goals ;I.~ tilt: filCliS of I hreat. nasie val lies include "core" values, which rarely var~' and arc few in number. and " highpriurity values," whkh de rive frum ideulu,!!;;eal ,lIld/or 1lHilc riai inkres!s as Jdilletl by th t: n:lc\' an t decision makers. Tile second point of dep;lTt llrc from Hermann 's defin it ion rdates to time _ In the leB's terms of refereru.'C, it is not so much th e ~IHJrtn ess of time that inlluences the crisis be h:wiur uf {lecision make rs, but rat her th e awareness of finite time lor their response to th e value threat. In other words, an dl:ll1enl of crisis perce ption is the realization
" 0"." It Y"" ,,~. TI,,' ' h/iIi"" 'if fi,,-,:' t: IJ" ",,,h,j,, c d",i,,~ [,,1<"""""""/ cn.;., (l"i",.., · 1,,,, : 1',;,,"..,1"10 U";"~"il)' I'",,.. 1!JGb). p. J~. '1""'''\ i" I\'itli."". eri." _1'","'~c"IC " I, I'· ItS. " The di,lInc!i"" i' dr.,,,·,, hy Will i,m" en.';" ,!I""{/ ~... l't" 21_ 2; . ·n, i. ,li"i'K" iO<', ,,'''c'po:>I>d, ,,, Iloe a",t ),! ;c,.. t d,n'- ,e"e,. \"'h" ~-n II", ,\,,;,lvu ",,,l-;,,~ and .ysl,.",ic ~I' I..-.. ",h~s .• s ~!at",,~t..J ill Cl,a,k, f , Ik ,,,,.,,,., .. ,1.. /"" "'"" lIv,,,,/ L'n"".1't', 6-1 •. "Charles f , Ik r"~''' ''. -1"1<',,,ahon.1e ,i,i, '" • Sil" .. t~,,,at \'a,i.,""', " p. HI. ","'ted in B,,,d,,,.. '"[""'.rd •• Th,,,,}':' 10, ,Il.
,,,e,,'.
~".
10
1." TIlO I) UGJ"I(>S
that alt l!ou)..\h a deeision could be clchlYt!d. it could not be delayed indefi nitely. T ll{! third (loi nt of co nt ent io n is with H Crlllann"s a_~ su mpl io ll Iha! surprise is a necessary condition fi,r a crisis s it uation. Bred lcr argues Ih,,\ "ume situ"l i,,,,s pe rn:ivcd by Jc<:isioli makers to involn: th reat. th e likdihO
finite time may be dearly foreseen. This helief is reinforl'Cd hy the skeplit-is rn of ot her scho lars about th e "sur prise" d im ension."
L. P. Brody has fuund tha t H c r mHnn~~ typology is "not as SUl'CCS Sful as predicted,"" and D. '-I. "IcCormick has concl uded that surprise is "not Illc;\slIrabl<:: from c(lntent analysis,"" T Illis. in its (e B llsuge, surprise is no! a n cccss ar~' or ulliversall y present l~lIldi
lion of crisis, bul when il pn;ssurt:,
e,~ ists,
it Illa y IlCi~htcn the impact oftimc
Finally, a most crucial addition to the Hermann definition is IC lfs indusjoll of "pert'dved high probahility t)f war" as a nel'eSsaTY conditi on, Indeed, whereas the likelihood of llIi1i1~lry in volvement presupposes a peree ivet! vnllie threat, "the reverse does nut obtain. Thus, probability of war is th e pivuta! cundition of crisis, with threat l1nd lime closely rel a ted, ,"" The pcrt'C ption that w"r is likely is also closely related to the notion of I1n(;crtain ty, Indeed, uncertainty 'Ihoul "',Ir, rei " forced hy "'Ilue t], refll a,ld li me salicn(;e, Ilceessit al cs '\,risis-t}'pC" dedsion making,
Given these refinements of th e He rmann definition of crisis, Breche r offered th e fullowin g more elaborate defin ition: A er isis is a situa ti on with Ihree 11~><-'Cs s"rv ami sullll'ie,,1 OJlldiU"ns, deriving fWIll a "ha,,!,e in ils ede"",1 ur inl"Tlla] el1vimll",e"t, All three clJnd it ;IJ"~ lIrc pc reept ;u"s h eld hy the hi!,h(:st 1",-c! .Jedsiu,,_ Ill"kcrs: " )1""0""" lti",,., lf Lie, ",-'k,~,,,,lcd~..J tl,;" S<:e CI",rle' F lIn"""", 'TI",·.,. Tim" . " d Surp';"".~ SimuLtioll III Illlt'",.tiuo,1 Cn,e,," I" Ch.rl", E " d.. Illten,,,· I;""dl eriM'." I" 2O!i_ "1 ~ P. 8""1.,, ·-rh,...I . I),,,,; ,;,,,, T;Il ... "',,! A"·""·,,,·,,, T1 ,~ ''''p.>
I\",,,,a,,,,.
in
~ rc"Iot'" r. l) , ~I .
',\,w""I, a 11"",); -
1' ,
H
,\ttG,roll;,'k,
/)".,;
,1/,," ,,,,-;,,,, "..
em l""al "'''. 1U7,~). p_ lfi. '1'10'.'] In /l,,·doc'. , J)«;"""" in /,, ,"el". F" .... ;~ .. r"lk~. p, ~2, " Mi<:b.d 1I«"lot", /)u;"i,,,,,;,, C<;.,/. , I.rue!. 1')67 a"d 1')jJ. p, fi, (;1"n S,,)'de< I"" " ,",ide", 'he p"'<"i'-~.J 1''''~ <"",1;1;"" .-,f 01,1., S,.., GI~" 1\,
S")",I,,, . "d l'au1 1)1 .. , lng, C",ojIicr A",()"~ ,\'« /i","" PI" 6 _ ; , Th~re .'''. '" """"", ul ht'r 1)'1"" "f ,'rl"", hu, r, .. lUI 1""1"'''"'. " ",i,i, ,~f,",s "".,1)" I" milii''')" ." "'t'''r;~ )' i"""-,, a p",,'ly ",-,,,,,"ni<' c,i li •. "'" ~tid,.d llft't'he" -h,d;~', !k\'.lu.ti.~"or 1966, Linb"c I ~,t;lk> ami Cri,i. D.~,;'i'",· Mak;,,~. " H,"iti.I, ,,"''''''/ "J IJI/'''''"/~m,,1 S,",I;" , .) fl!(77 ), 1_ 25.
t,,,
ICh
JIz
M
11
SOVIET FOHE[Cl' POLICY ASALYS[S
I. 1I threal 10 Iwsic valllcs, with a si "''' h"",." ""s ur .'" h.
2. hig" probability of itJwl~£'m~ JJt JJJ military Im,'lilili£'$ ""d I he awarm",""
3.
or
fi"jt~ lime for res/){)rJSe /" the
",Tlrnwl tulu e , h n :Il'- ..
This d e finition of crisis refers 10 the perce ptions and beh.lVior of 1I single relevant stllte in a c.-his situatiuli . The he havior of other states and insti tution s in the international system is conccptualized primarily as inputs influencing "t he beh.IVior of the crisis actor by sh,lping its dcfinition {lfthe situation and the n its response. [Thus] the state actor remains the eentr.ll objcet of in \"es tigation~ how its decision-m'lkers pert-eiw: environmental chan),(e and how they choose, in Ihe (:ontext of escalating or tie-escalating perceptions of threat, time press ure, and probahility of \\11r.·· '" In keeping with this defin ition , th is study analyzes Su viet pe rceptiuns and [lehavior during the Czechoslovak cri si .~ . T his crisis-bchavior model is a refinement of the Jell formulation \lu bl ished in 1977:' which posited an intl:rad iv(: pro(:es.~ h etwee n an independe nt v
in en,."
I'. I.
" 'hid .. p. 2. ~ UII<:he..
'"",,,,-J, a Th,,,,<)':
PI' .';2 -!">I.
"' TI,;, .....1;,", d"w, un R,,~·hd•• l.h"r.'"", or Ihe "'(JIt. 15 (lllt:>S). p. J W.
J
""
l~
.
,
•
12
TI.., all_xi,'lv o r Ii,ar an illdiv id " al ,,~p"ri': "L"'S in a si tuat;"" whid, ],.. pc rcdn" '" I>tHing a
,,.\"t'rt'
tlorl'" t to o"e ur nil"" " .. IIlCS,
Psy_
eholngit'lI! stre." rC' lui res all i l\ \l-'rpl'ctat io" III' the SII hjed of the ,igniflc" "l'C of l h" sli m "lll s ,it"a l i" n, I'.,yd",lllgil·:d ,Ircss (lCl'lIn e ither wh"" tl", su hj,-'c! "'I",ri""cl~~
T he len con ee p liull of stre ss d iflcrs slightly. 10 Hulst; and G(~u rgc, ~ 'rcss is ca u sL~1 by a pcrCc llt ion of t hrcat; in te ll ter m s, st ress is in duced by th e co m pos it e in d e pend en t l'ari;lblc c ris is penx' ptioll, wh ich is ('om posed o f tlm: a l, I im c pressure, a nd the proba h ilit~, of war, T hus, th e terms "stress" or "crisis-induced sl ress" will represent the pcrl'ept iun of threat ,md/ur time salience and/ ur wa r
likeli hood, T he model postulates that th e initial respoll!;c of decisioll ma kers to a pe rceptioll of t hre at (cop ing) is to seek in lim llation a hou t t he th rea teni ng ,1(:1, T he Illodel :ISSIllll e!, that stress i ndll('('_~ a greater need, and broader quest. for information. Fo])uwing this in ilial s l"l). d"" ;s;" ,, ,,, ,,kers " ",h;,,- k
lilllows : Seurch refe rs to the pnlCesses of obtain ing and shar ing relevant information, ami of iden t ify; n!: and inve nting "lternn!;"e "I'!i" ns: Innd ) (/lw/y.I'is (n r ('""lll"t;on ) rl'f\'r~ th,- p r llC('SS('S of ,,~:uni ning and " "'11-
'n
uati ng tI,e rdative a ppropria te ness of ah,' I'IMli",! " p lio"s with l'di'renee t" sta tet! UT alt.'rnal i"" "hjed i" es ""t! ""I ues .~; "()I~ I\.
11,,1' li ami ,~ I~,·.,,,lcr I..
I~'"'n:" , 'The Eft, .. ·" ..I' S, "." .. " ,h~ I",.f"',,'a,,,·~ of P,,/;U,'a/ _~c~""',. ,\u,,''''/ 6 1I97.~), 2.,7. ll,~ """".. 01;"" hel",e,-" i. al ." t'mph.,,;<e,1 l". Jan'is and ,\1""" , ,,-1><> ",.iniai.. Ihot ,1",,.. "i, - Ih,ea' - anJ (j ... ~1 a, . gc,,",;ne 'eton ,,, de'i~n.'" "" pie"""", "",0,;"".1 ,la'". """k,1 b)' IIIT".i",,;ng en_ "irum"",,'.' ~,,,,,I ( ' >f ,1i",,,1;''' ' T'!"g I.. J,''''i' a"d I " '" ~b,,,, . /)"6,';"" .It,,~;,,~ , A r.y_ d" ~"~i«ll """I~$l, ,if C",ofiit:" 1'. 50 " 11,;, ddillilio". \,~' Silt,,,,,. M.. d, ""d (;) ....1. i, «"oted ill lio1,1i a,"1 C.c",~c, '"11,e E1fl,<-1. of SiR'», · p _ 271 lO _ 10. 11 ,,,,'(" ',·,. K" '
·-.'re."
''''''io)"
all "lIT ~)U, "'pi"g """'" ...,""''' ."d -iJ~" l iI"; n~ . "d in,""nl ;"~ ahc",,,t;,'~ (~" i.. " , i. ;" oU, '",;m:" fo, ,,It<,,,,. th'c , .' J"f"" ",.;"" s",,~h' 01. ,,,, ,he 'h ,c "c" ;"~ c'-ell'. ><,1and/", d ..,,,,,,,, .1t ,he ""he' , i. m.. le a, ·., jt.,hle ,,, th~ "m, "hI,,·., <"in '''' a",1 .l"d.;',,,,1 f,,,, .. ,, . ",1 h "",'i,,.. 1 dud,,\( .10 .. " ,,,, ,,1,,,.11 .. ,,
"r ah .. " ",III'.._, ."
Se .. 1I, .. -lL .... /)ffi,i"", ;" C ,j,i>. 1'. ll .. . 2.:;,
''''
o::h
SO\, I~~r
FOIIEIGN POLICY ANAl.YSIS
JJ
Clearly the inte nsity of stress, particuhlrly in terms of tim e avail a hiHty, will affect Ih e ~earch fu r ami eV~l lllaliol) of alternatives. T hus. here 100, a eausal link is es ta hlished betwee n the pcn:cption uf crisis and the process ofar rivin~ OIl a dcd~iun . Dll riug th e crisis, scveral choices arf' apllo h(~ madc. and many of these will he made in varying eo nd it ioll5 of escalating and deescalal ing slress. To specify Ih e changes that take place w ilhin the e ntire tim e span of the crisis, a tllree -period mudel was dev ised; the inception of the cri sis (t he pre-crisis period), its peak (the cri sis p e riod ), ami its dl.."Cline (the post-crisis period ). In mu re detail. The IJn~-c ri.! is period is marke<1 olf fmlll a pn:<:'eding Il [)[)crisi~ peri.",1 I,), a L~lIl spit:tlOllS inercase in peTt:eil'ed Ihw"t . HI the p:lrl of de.:;is ionmakers ufthc st,lte Illider inquiry. 11 1"" gins wilh the en:" t (\,r clus ter of event,) whieh trigg{Jrs ... ri'iC in Ihre"t pe rwplinn, The crisis period is ehar.lCtcri zcd b~' the preSellt'C of all three necessary co ndit ions of cri~i ~-a sharp ri~e in perc-ci\'ed !hre nt to basic valne s. an mm"me.l~ uf time con'tr~ints on decisions. and an image of ! he [lfol ~Ihility of ill vokcrneut ill military !instil itic! (wa r likelihood) at S"IllC I",,; nl hdurc II,.. issuc ;s rcso]ved. It. too , hcg in ~ wilh a trigge r;n" .:\'e nl (or d,,,t e r uf ' :\,cnb), Jr,,"lI r "Lt.'UI'> :II I he nulsd or I hc eTisi.. pe ri ,,.} ur within ils lime f.:une , the th; rd mlld;t;nn takes II,,, form of a pcrL'Cil'cd ded im: ill m ilil:try ",([lahil it y vi s-,\-vi s Ihe elle Illy (or aUl'erse change in the milil:lr)' balanl'''), i.e" in!'Tc salien t:e. alld th e probability of w ar) on th e decisio n makers' (:oping mechanisms an d choices? The indiv id ual case stud ies thus attelilpt !o answer nine specific quest ions. \Vlmillre th e e llect~ of e st:alating and deeSt:aJating crisisinduced stress 011
i ll!onllt/lion :
J. <-'Ogni li vc pe rfurma nl'C 2. Ihe pCf(.·ei'·cd ,wed ,mtl consc
"' Urc""he', Du;, ;om ;" Cri,; •. I'P. 23 - 23.
II
I :l! (.T IU:>;
3. th~' receptivit y and size ufthe i1lionn,,!io!!pro(-,c~sing
on cOII"lIlfalio,,;
groUt)
4. the ty pe ,,,,,I size
"r mns"!!a! i" ,, ""its
5. grou p part it"ipatioH in II,,: (~lI ", tl t"ti\'<·
prtx:ess
,,,,
uri decisional furUIII~: 6 . t he s i/.e st ru cture of dct:'isional fOf U ill S i , authority patt" .." wit hi" dec;s;o",,1 " nits ()!I
"/lc,-,w/i,,,,&:
8. Ih" ,c"r~h fu r
;lntl
evaluatio" of,llt cnmti vcs
9 . th e P <'r<,<,i,'"d ra!l !,(c "f a\'ailablt.'
"lte n ",lives r: Th c~c
questions constitute tbe focus for (~ HnparJ.ti vc anal ysis. The find ings of this particular stud y wil! be used to i.lSSCS~ the validit y of
m ajo r h ypu' h escs "n tTis;s l>c h,,\' iu r, If Ill{: en tr y of \V"rS1!W Paet troo p s int o C7.I!chus[ovak h:rri \uTy (luring the night of August 20- 21, 1968. pred pil:.ltcd a major t'risis w it hin t li e Pr:.I~\le le ,ull.'Tsl1 ip , t h e i nl'asioo a Iso marked t he cul m inatiun of a Inn g crisi~ p c ri(KI li) r Soviet deci sion m'lk c rs. Indccd Breche r's denllition o f c ris is is particularly suited to th e Sovie t ('asc. ;\Int only wcrc all fOllr I wc.~":n·y " "'] s nlTk ic nt cnn dit i"ns presen t- a chan!;:c in the c nvinmmcnl, perccptions of a thrt~"1 In hasic valnc s, " hi g h p m1",], il ity of involvement in m ilitary 1mstilit ies, and a fin it e tim e for response- but Brcc her's alt e rati o n of ('OIl\'entiollal deilllition s o f crisis f;ldlit,ltes ill the Su\'id C:lse :l m ud l do se r (~)Jl ce ptual fit. S p ecilka ll y, hi s o m ission of the element of surprise as a nece ss ary ('Ollllit io ll of c risis en ables th e examinat ion of a case in w h ich I he deci sion-m akillg unit rcacts lJ"er a long p c riod " f tim c in :0 c" lc ulat cu and vari e d ""Iy to iI d~' namie situation for which it llIay not be wholl y res pons ihle b ut 10 wh ich it has ce rtainl y contrib utcd, The om issi" n o f s u rp ri s,,", with its ('Otlnotat ion Ilf pu rel y rc spolisi l'c ,md dcfcnsil'c hehavior. an d the re place ml.'llt of a sho rt respo u se tim e h y a Ilnite li me e llitatl('e tb e :tpplil'atioll of Brc du: r's defin ition "I' c risis to Sovie t hdlllv iu r toward Czec hoslovakia in 1968 and make it poss ible to te st the rn(Kie l's h ypot heses abo ut decision nmk ing un d e r crisis l'01l(l itio1lS.
''''
o::h
C HAPTE H TWO
Prelude to the Crisis
It is difficult to pinpui nt th c date or spedfit: evenl in Prague tll al
prooul'Cll pen'e ptions uf tl lrea t within tile Suviet lead ersllip suffi cie nt tu trigger th e pre-crisis period. The cump lex inte rnati onal situation and th e growing disunity within the bloc nat urally af-
fected Soviet respollses to d lallgcs ill CZt"'C hu,\uvakia. Increased disso,; nl in Poland, in th e Uk rain e, ;uul ' UlUl11!; iulcl leclua\ circles wit h in th e USSH met with allard-line resplJ11se from Sm'ie! le ader s, ,lnd heighte ned th ei r sensitivity to si mi!;lr unrest in Czechuslova kia. \ Vit hin the Krem lin itself, thre e years alier Ihe ousti ng of Khrushchev. a clea r foreign pulicy line had ye t to cmerge. Thus th e "Pr.lgue Spring" unfolded ag,linst a bat'kdTIJIl of dispute and Ilncertainty on vital policy issues. The Soviet respunse to Czeclmsluvak refurms wuuld be th e bencllllwrk fur the fu ture devc\upmen! of Soviet domestic and fOl"ei gll policy. Give n this sihllliion, il is ra th er surprising tha i thc crisis took as long to d evelop as it did. As early as the slimmer of 1967, leading intellectuals :md oiJici'lls in Pr.Lgue were ddJatiu g highl y sensitive issues. At the "ourth \Vr it cr.~ · Congress in Jun c . speeches attacked the party's domestic and foreign policy, Official censorsh ip was eond e llllLcd uy man y speakers, ld.tok ke., ;nLo"·;ol....d 0"
Ocl")",, 2·L. 1U77. <"O"hnn<..J Illat al hi,
j"'Ligolion Lhe IMle , " '.. o'n;Ll,~1 [,om 11,. offici.,1 ,.,.,,,fc N ncc L> roc<',.dio!p " "' of mn ,;d~ •• , tion for "ll,e , ep""""" ;""' ' ''ch all ..:\ """td ".,.,. in ~10 ..., ,,,·.·· AI ><> ..... II . c-;"nItK' S kil1; ,,~. C",."I""/'''·4k(;'·f Inlr"""lrd fl """ J"' ion. I'l" 00_ 70
1(1"'' '
15
"
16
I )",UOJl\lCTlOl'
At thE: Central CO!ll1l1itlt'c plenullI in ]>ragllf~ in Ot-Iol.cr WH7, t he p racticl~ of duplicating lop party and s tale pmts was criticized, and th e rcsiJ.,:nat iol) uf First SC{Tctary '\Illonin Nuvu tn y wa~ d e mamlc{1. NIl\'''!u}' appealed to the Soviets lilr assistam:c in main-
taining his position. h UL aI! SOllft'CS agree. ;"Ioscow did no l in te rfere to prevent a diminution in No\'o!n}','s power. CZCdlOs[ovakia had bet' ll one of th e few b ilK' slales to escap e d c-S t,llini7~l ti lm, ,tlul it was gc n crall ~' helieved that the heavy COlicclltratio n of authority in NO\'O!ll{S hands a nd th e oVcn'clll rali'l c d and bure allcr:llizcd powt:r strul'iure WCrt! n:spollsi hl c for thl! t:(.~ )n()mi{· stagna tioll tb a t lUld Ch,H'Ucterizcd the s~'slem since t he early 1\)f1Os. ;\Inreover. Nuvotny"s pe rsonal uhjccti<1Il lu Ihe ousler "f Khrushchev li: ,,, ,I". f"tt"w; .. ~ "',""." E. C"I,I""d .. ,. in' e"·;,·.... o"'<~"" :!-J. 19i7, l in lI:1j,·k. m, an, ~1,,~._J'm~"c . 1!l6.~_ 1lJ7~. 1'. 76:" IlIgt..r.U1 l ill~ Dllh{d .;d~ " 'nlin!' ,,"der
" p'elld"")·,,, (_
~Iom"u'
11'""",1. 1). "Slo.",·""" n"lkk- A \);If,·,.·",l)u)l(o,·k .- p. 208.
AI", a C IOC/. 1'. ,,,,,ldl,,,,, "ah'"'''''' ".'1"",,..,1 - "''1''i ...· and """,Ii"" -•• 1\1"",I,<\,e,", ...",'c. a",1 al'p,,,,,;al ion of hi> " " ",I;;h ,,,·,,,,,r,,1 '"O<";"CTK"t: . ,,,1 ,lte ,1;"·10",,,,· of 'he ""nm",,,' ", •.1I",,1, I" ,I." ,,,,,~,J ,,( Il'e c,,1t of ,,.......,,,,,1;').:..\·ru, r".k T;m"., . Aug"" 21. 19&5. Fin lo ...·l~rouud 10 ,hi. p. ,;,,J. ",e (:.t;" e"I.",. rI... G:,c/,"""""k /l./o"", .1/".. ,,,,,·,, .. ' J", ..r S",.~,,,·, l~ . "-,, Vlifi";'J.,·,/ C,,'u.".·..."I1.." . 1'. 7. Sl iltinK. c:.!... h".. Im·"k;{/:' /"Icr"" I"r,/ n,wl"r~,". 1'. Iff) . • ",1 ~ I Id,d T.,'u. /.....I/,,"d,. l.u"",,}· I~. IfQ. AI" , ~ 1\,1;,1, lie ..... '· 1"'1"" l",IoIi ,I"',1:.. , ''' k~' hr ~ I',,,~~, ,, """"I~,,,d .. n! d"l'~"io~ ' he 'p,e." "f ""h·S",·;"Ii<m ill C"...·I,,»lm·.li~. ""de Cl·.·" "m',," 1"',fi,li"'" ,In'" i' I, ~,·,,,·~~tI,· know" llIoa, I~ .. i'io" """' IA~o I.)" IlIn.t.o",· ,Io"in~ hi' "]"t ,,, I'r.'g"" in 'he '·"ti<-.,I ,\.1p- wi",,, ill .....·.""" ']>1"" ,"" , " ,1"" ,I", S,"'k, 1I";"',, Ji,l 'K'! ,,,,,.,,,1 '0 h" ... f,·,,· i" C,.<..·I",,)o,·.'~i.:' ,,,, ... ,,al ~If"i~'" ( Zyd " II'. ... "''''.~. ~IJ)· 4 . 196Ii).
"11", S"'·;,., dc...·i.~.n "0 ' to ,',,"e ~""" "i' had I" ·,·,, a ";do,)' f", "o')"~in" til", ~.IIt.",,,]> i" tI,,· 1\,\i,Io,,,,,. "'~'"rdin g ,,, ,,~·lt ·inf,"m,"1 \" "1""1.". ,m" ,,·, '1 ,,,,,,"1 h~· I ..jo" L.. ,I",,·r. n~ OI,..·rt·r . (1."',]00) . ~ L , ...h 2-1 . HIfi.'I ' Il .j"k. /);rd",o ,m's . 1' . T6
~hch
•
l'ltELUUE TO TilE
/7
CI\I~ I S
havc reassured I3rezllllev hy telephone on jilnuary 6 IIHlt no further personnel changes would be neede<;:1 no\\' Ihal Novolny had heen remove{I." Not surprisingl y. ther.,/',re, Ihe eled;on or Alex" ndel' DubCck as first seerct ar~' of th e Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) on january 5, 1968, \\,:15 rc).:arded in ~IOSL,{)W as a IXlssihle solution to long-st.Ulding pruhlcms in Czechoslo\'akia. nol as Ihe beginning of a crisis. Throughoul January and februar y, reialiullS remained openly L~Jr{liaL Dulx:ek's visit 10 ~I oscuw at th e end of january, as dl;scribed in the official L'Ommuniquc. took pll\L'C in an atmusphere of "L'{)rdial friendship, sincere and Ide mlly understandiug," with "L~lll1plete agreement" on all issues discussed.' The celebrations of thc twentieth anniversary of the February ]9-18 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia occasioned I'isits b~' Suviet .lILd Illoc leaders to Prague, Brezhnev praised the "outstanding part" playc{[ fly the erez "in strengthenin g and de"eloping th e soeialist L~Jlllmunity " and su ppurted ··Ihe creative approach of your party \0 th", solution of problems arisin g at all stages of th e stru ggle il, r the victory or sol.'ialism.'" Although the Soviet newspapers c:>rried almos t llO inde pth anal ysis of th e leadership changes, th e few rejlor ts Ihal did appear were, on th e wholl~, favorable. " This public facade of unit y and support llid lIot always conceal indications tl) the L1.l11lrary. howI;"er. The MO.K1)\\' meeting between lJllbl:'Ck and th e Soviet leaders on January 29- 30 was perImps till! first OL't."dsion at wh ich some lluu],ts were ojlenly e.'prcssed. Thc :lutilOritatil'c Soviet explan"tion of th.! n ;;Lsons fi,,. th e innlsion. issucd by PrtlVda on August 22. 1968. dl~;lrly stated that thert~ Imel heen e:luse fllr worry as cHrly as January: Our part)' took atl lImlcrstatidin/: :lltitudc toward the dc<:ision of the Jalllm ry 19f,s plenary se.;sinn of t he CI'C" Central COIllUl ittce. Ne\'ertheless. it "'as already evident al that lillie that the del'eluping situa, tion <.~)\) 1d Ic".l tu " weakeni nl; uf I],,, CZL'Clmsl"""k C()llllmUi ist 1';lrt )' ;11)(1 ,<> t I,,: growl h (If s"ntilllt'nh d.nlg"l'Uus I() ,ucialism amo"g ~~'r tai II cird.,., ,l()'·il k .",cict\' Ihat wen, \111\1,·,. II", in/!"','I('e of ho"rgeois views .lUd illlperi;llht p;ol'aganda. 'Willi,,,, Sha"""" •. /)IJI>«k. p. 153. ' I~""'lia .
l'chTU .. Y I, 1\I6!I_
' 1,,,,, 11... Felm ......' Zl. 19RI. ' P~d,·,'~. J~"u~,y 6. J96'i. p"LI;,heJ 11,",.1",..,,", 1.. 1e'!!,,,,,, "f "" ,~ ", '"l.li"" h, i)ul":'Ck "i!1o a I""glhy a"d I_;lh·~ hi'W"I,hi..-JI , keld, of dw nt'W r,,,! ,...,' da,)-, ,\1>" ,e'1.· rrac,/u.
..
,
J.HU"Y 19,
n. 2.1. 31. and
I'elm '.'~ S. 9,
."d 17.• ",]
"':~";,, .
j.""..,y 21 and
Fc!"u"y G.
"' "
I'
[ N Tn01J[ J CT10~
In t he talks bc hH'c n CI'S U lcadcr~ ;tnd CU'l'ho.,!",-ak le ad ers held in MUSl~)W in Janu:lr)' and in i'm,"uc in Fchruarr, these lIppre hc II _~ions w(~ rc "o;e.;<1 openly, in a parly spirit. At the Sa me lim e it W:,S sl" tcd ill 110 uncertain terms th at tin: choil'C 'If paths uf hU ildin g so c i,,1i." " ""'! the chui ce " fform s and meth"ds "rparty gu j, b """ "I' S(x'i;.l pnK.~:SSCS we ..: within t he full a",1 cx du s;"c tompch"K'" uflh" CI'Cz Cu"lral Committe"'"'
During the January meeting in ~I()scow, I3rc7.hn cI" is said tu have
supported J)1l1x:d, ,[gai ns! \11f' cunSCf\';lt;n:s alld to have ollerc(J to felll,lee them. Zdcni':k ,\ llyuM", ,I C I'C7. sc(:retary who was prcscllt ,It th e postinv,]sint1 " 'Iost't)\\, ne gotiations. recalls that Juring tl1{)se August negut iations Brezhne\' reminded Dubcek uf this suppurt:
"',I.'
Fnu n th e "cry [" ,gi nn ing. ] pn:par,'d to help YOIl ag.1ill ~ t N""ol nf·. . and ] ask,!(l )'uu "s t·ady ,IS January: You "re Ihreakllcd hy his IIlt:n. ar~'n't you ? Du yo" ",,,nl h . dO:lIlge Ihem ? Do )UU w:ml 10 lIa\'" ;u,otlu' r Minis lN uf Int.·mal ,\IT'lirs~ y"" said at 1],<1t time th:d thi s wuuld nllt he nL'<-'C~Saf\'. hL...·<1USC th ey "'erc ~()od t~)1nradcs . .... nd nn ly , ,,I)st,,],,en ll,.. JiJ I hear Ihal )UlI had changed Ihe ;'Iin is!<:r of InlCr· nal Affairs. the ;'Iinistcr of Defen ~e . ot her Ministe rs and Secretarie s of the Cent ral Committee. " Th o: Fo:hnmry lll e ding in I'ntguo:, d esp it e its ~'t:ro:m ull ial purpose. "~IS also 'Ill (K'C[lsion of som e tens io n. Sov iet lead e rs ohjccted to purtions of D uh':'ek's puhlic addTGss in whid, he sp()ke o fCzechoslo\',lkiil's intf>rests in Europe, "in the center of whic h our ('
1'_ Z'lS_ " R"./t ''''\,.", ~"·h" .,ry 2.1. l'lf>ll. 11,.. ,1 ......·10
w., al". ,·." .....1 ill
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,-,·J,"'''Y 2.1.
l!lr~~
.,
/9
PUEL. Ull f: TO TilE e Ulsls
n :primambl Dllh(;ek: "I ill Fell m an'] I told you of Ill\' ohjed ion to your spce<:h amI ~·a!!.;d to your alti:lltion so me fiwlIllllaliollS whidl W("'C nol ,"01"]"<.."<:"1. But ) 'OU did,,'t change t he m. lI erc wl,en I prc .. pare a spee~'k ' : \"1'11 I my,elf llUl~t )!;i\": the \t;~t to th e otller me mhen of the Politburo. in ord er t llat th ey should ~i"e their judge me nt. . \Ve ha\"e a L'O!!edive le'ldcrship :lnd Ihat me,IllS thai Olle has tn Sli hurd inate one 's views to ot he rs."' " Th is I-chrua r) ' i ncid.ml W,I S (~Jll firm c(! aller the invasion h~' V;lsii Bi\"ak. head of I he S!o\'ak Com 1111 mist p:ll"l y and olle of Dul >i·.,k·, "JlIl< III.,nh I h ruu ghuul mr,s. He reported th:ll on Febru,LfY 2.7. I.I n :l.hlleV, havi ng received an advance ('OilY of Dnlx:e k's spel'tll. telephollell Dub(·ck. At"('Onlin g I" Bil""k; "Co mrad e Bre~ hn cv , afraid. trie.l lto ex plaill" Inng lime 011 th e tclep!lO ne, whal kind of scandal wO llld OL"Cltr if sudl a speedl \\" <:re pn-,s.; nh,d al . tIll: C.:nlral Commitlc.:. They wOIil.1 pruh .. abl y re,lcl to it ,wd lea\"e."· !\\though some eh:mgl~s in Ihe speech were in Jild made, lIi1',lk daim s, th ey still fell [Ir short of Soviel d e nmnd s." Yet the Jan uary and Febrllar)' illdde nls w"re nut slIffieil,nlly st'riolLs 10 trigg"r ,I IIwjor crisi s. Gust;h' 1I 1I._;ik. DIIIK:c k's ~ Ut;L"t:ssu r, suhs{~quc nll y stat ed that Brcl.lmcv and ulll(~ r EWi t Europe,1ll lead .. e rs who had gathe red in ]l 1 ~l!!"e for til e Fehruary meeting "expressed quit e frankl y Illeir sl1JlJlmt for th e m'l\' leade rship and its g.~ ",: rall), ,I{h-ueated "i m5. J n ot he r words. the y hatk,:d I he leader .. sl,;!,. ils aim s "f '111'1",rlil1.1; .,,><:i:<1is lil . do il1 ).( away witl, mistnk"s, and providing greatcr St~'Jle. ·· '·· LEADEJISHIP
CHA~GF:S CO ~\!CEHN ~10SCO\V
III th e mon Ih fi lllowing I he Fe hro I ar~' t·.'lel)]":,t ion ~. I,. I\\"(:\" er. So\"id apprehens io ns Arew 10 ~1It;h ,I II· vcl that a crisis seeilled I1namidahlt:. of te nt ral imp{)rlallte ill prcdpilat ing Ihe crisis we re Icadership chan ges t hai thrc:1Icllcd th e strut;lllrc of part\". polk"C . and ar my c ha nnels th rough whic], III., S""i"'", had Iraditim"dl y exercisell (~)11 5id c rahl e informal influl'lIc,' "," 'r C~.ech()sl'''·;lk "fr.\ir~. ~ ~It )·".il . ,\''''''''f''',,', 1'. 2!1'I- !I!J. B,,·,.I,,~, ,··, "I,j'~'\i"" ,,, I'"' to' "f lJ"t.: ,·k·, >I''''·..!' "."'-, .t,,, ,..."1;,,,,,"<1 in t.ad." I.,," Bil\",a". T/,,- /)""'pli,m (;"''', . p. I~·I .
.. R", I~ t"·l k". s"l'"",,,IH" 3. 1%'1. '1",,1,,1 ; n Ji' ; \ :,1 ",,, • • S,,,·;.·,
.It" li"~
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rvl j,·, /),·d,I",, ·
",,,/I1'''''''''''mhc lIili';
"SI"'" I, to)" Il",.:ik •• l'r"~' ''· . ,\,,~">I t\l, 196'!. \" I he .tI·,' I~I '· ubi,· ,,( ,·t";"",·,, ,~. 1',;. 1',"1)' ""ib in i"cl ",l,y. <"", t"Kli"" . muJ 1,''''' I""t. 11rlt"h II,..:"I,-.,
""or )"
ICh
!z
M
20
1:>'T110UUCTI US
Cadre changes began when Cencral \%::luv Prchlik. then bead of the ~bin Pulitical Administration (M PAl of the Czechoslovak M in~ istry of National Dcft!n sc. replaced \ Iirnslav \ Iamula us chief (If the t'rm:ial eighth department of the party SCl'Tciari;Lt, the depar tment n:spollsible for supervision urthe af lll Y aml t!l t; sl.'Cllrity services." Prchlik's uld joh in the M 1'.'\ was th en fiIh: Ll by ann llu,r Dubec k suppurt e r. Ge neral Egyd I'cpich . The reaso ns "If the
ch.mgcs bCC;ITTIe de,l)" a week I,Ltcr when, un Fe bruary 25, General Ja n Scjna, head of the import:ml parly ('mll millt:c within the .\1 in-
ist r y of National Defense, dclcdcu to the United States amid reports th;1t he and Mamu la h;\([ been at the center of atte mpts to usc the military to pn:\'cnt No\,otn {s downEdl tIll: prcviulis Decem, ber. Despite nlll1\erOIl.'; rumors. the prC'Cise role of the Soviet mili· lilry in these ci;llldesliuc ildivilies WilS never madc publil-. " Soviet L"Ollce rn over the leadership cha nges umltlie defe nse rmnill.cations uf the possibility that Sejnll had taken tup militar~' secrets with him" were sufficient filr the Soviets tu plilte mubile air and light armored units in the Carpathian military district on alert.'·' Then, un f e hruary 28, ~ larsh .. 1I. J. YakuUovsky, the supreme cummander uf the \Varsaw Pact furces, arrivc\1 in Praglle in tIle flrs\ of mallY attempts to assess Ihe elfed of changes inside Czt..'(:hoslov'lkia Oil Soviet str;Ltegic l"Oncerns. Yilkubo\"sky held talks with Duhee k, President No\"otn)\ Parly Secret.lfY J07.cf Lcm1rt. and Defcnse ~linister l30humir Lomsk~'; and sources indicat e that the di scus, ~"[lw ~'l " " .h·~ I'"" .. ~.,
,,r , I,,· ";~h'h
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Dr. O,~a, Ilizik . P,d,lik', del"")"' wh" i" .n i"te rdew on Ilr.li '~.'· . t,· l~,"i'io" "" ~!o,n.~' 27 . 1\J6S. ,"~i'\I"iTt",1 II." ';1 •• " ,\". ""~~ of II ... .\!i"h '.)" "f "_u",,.1 n,·r~,,,,· . ,10 .. ~I ;"I>tr)· .,( 110,· l utc·,io,. the I'"",-,-·.,tol·' Offiet". the ,,, u,I, "f I.,,'. a"d the ",ill! I., ' (SII'n. 1':£12739' (:116 ).
" Mid,,,,,! S'"p,.. ,,,k.Suonone. , . 1 ,Ioor ti,n" 1", ••on.1 p,e" offie", 10
th~
min;,le, ,,r de·
f~n_'" and late, t" Pre,ide,,1 S'·'~XKh. ",.i"l.i", 11,.,1 ~ejn" ,,,,,..,i,,,,,1 '''I'l""t fn '''' S,wi"1 ",i lila,)' ",h"i"", i" Pr.~"'· "')'" "~'1<" """"fIid~l\)" .. '''I'I"''U'''': ""'"""'i'" II ... ,I~ ,
·'i,'.·.. ;"
"'1'1""" Scjtta'., . "I1>e'I'"·''' , t.u·""·,,, !hal (;,·",,, ..1 JanL" h:.d I""n Ink! I", S"",e( "m""." "thal • military otl ..,k [.,)' tbe So"iet ~"n)" ",,,,1,1 he ,n""it"ble if 11u- " ·"j,'",,i,t. i" I'ra,:"c "",tinu"d ,,,,h thei, wo,L of de,lrue!i"","' s.::-., Mid,,,,,! Slel",,,,·k.St.l,,, ,,,,,,. Vi<: r'c/"'d,,~ ,tlm,""Hw:/,r Anr~ ·r. 1'1'" 22 -2~. ·n ... ",",,"'< I'''IW'' of ' I,.. (;"~, h,,,~,,·.k P,'''I,I,,', I~"!)" /.;,/",'d d,·"",rm'~k. "n J,,"c 5. 1M. • 1", '''I''i", ....1a r", l r;"", ..,lid. all"~i"g ,hat .'\eJ'" 1"",1 heen .101,· «, I"a,',' Ihe "".. "«)-!,,-....-.,,,,, loe w .., in I""""»i"" (Of. dip~""ati," 1""IM>rt i»",,,l
."·w
I,,' ~ 5<,,';';1 ~en ~.'l. n,;, .1I,·pli"" ,,'" ",·,·cr L
" \';';I",:luTZ.> i" TI,~ G",,..,I;.,,,. j"l,- e. 1968. a",I .~"~"'1 21. 19r,s . • ",1 J"\''' E,;.,-k,.~, i" The S,mday nmc• . September 1. 1968, ~ .-\ " klljo" \\'·~k and S"d"" 1i""",ol,,~y . .\1"«+, 25. 100Il,
~Irch
•
21
I'HH.. u m ;; TO T ilE elll SIS
siollS cenlered on t1,,~ Sejna alElir, le'ldership dl,Ill)!;l'S ill II,,? IIppll mt, and tIn: spring Warsaw Pad mmlPuve rs long sdwdul ed tu take placc in Czcchus]ovaki;I."'· \VIHllcver reussur..mces Yukuhuvsky 1ll,ly have TCce ived in pri\"(I t e, I'll hlk c,llls in IJ)";\gne filr t he n~si).!;n at ion IIf con sc rvative le key I"IIIst ,1(1 or t\1(> party·s h!l:o lo)!;ieal Commission to Joser Space k. wh o thc previous June' had roundly c riticized t he muno]lolistic: way t he ]lart~' was e.xerdsin).!: its le'lding ro le." I'ress ure on th e ('Hlse rvati\"e fad io!l was mai nta ine(1 throughout "- lard1. with thrce tradf" uuion lcad er~ resign ing on March 12. 011 ~1a rch 1·1. it was ,l!ll\()un eee \ that Dep ut y Defense .\ linist<: r Ge lw ral J,mko had eo mmittell sn idd c, lililowing n'velatium tlllll he had been invoked with Sejn,l ,nul .\lamub in th e :. ~ S",·'; '''Y'/. "". 1:.1 (j ... " . 2,. 191),), 3 _1i . ." " .... i.. S~.ltj .. c. (;:.-.·/.. "/",.,,H' , /m r , ·
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11>" I'lIOOUCTIOX
Soviets !lad been willing to repiace Kud rna as minister of the in terior in order to strengthen Dulx:ek's hill)(1. WIHlt tb ey could uot countenance was 1\ioscow's cxdm ion from t he se!eet ion process alt ogether. A title of newspaper art id t~~ dc mamled l· hange, an d far fro m ste mm illg this outcry, man y C PCz "lTidals. illcituiil1),: DlllX::'ck him_ self, we re spe akin),: uul in favur of pnJ),! rcssivc pulicies . AI a municipal party confe re llt:e in Bmo, Duhcek s talt~d tlHlt " th e Party i.~ seekin g out ways ad l'<:luate !y tu exp ress th e nCl..:ls uf the 1l,lt ioIIS, of sodet y. (If sot:i,11 grou ps, ,l!\d of th e individl1il1. Th(' search is a complicated proce ss. But without SUdl a search it is nut possible to lead society.'· ~ ' Tbe 1'r.lesilli ulll of tht! part}' had l!1ldorsed these views hroadly ilt its ~I a reb 14 meeting. in wh ich it resolved to suh mit to th e Apri l Cen tral Cumm ittee ple num proposals fur cadru cha ngl's and 11 wide-ranging "action prugram" th at would serve as a hlueprint for th e reform mOye lllent. t\ ke ~' iss ue was censorshi p. wh ich had been ellt.'<: tivel}' 'I holis hell at t he heginllillg of ~I:lrch when th e l'rnesidill lll decided to re move the Central Pu blicat ions Board from th e jurisdiction of tl u, .\liJlistry uf the Interior. A c "these fears al-e the n:sllit of oM hahits, t,,)r llle r \\~lyS oft hi "king and met hod s of sodal pract ic{:s. . Critit;ism . must hff'(lme a peTrn:mCl1t!Catlire of 0111' life. . Tile I'raesidil1 lll (.~>ns ide rs it ri ght to d edare that this is a ddi ni te settling or at'l'(lU nts with the Jl,for mat io ns which hll\-e in the past enda ngered the developme nt uf sudety. " " SOVIET PHEOCCU PAT fO N ELSEW l tEHE
The response of th e Suvict press to th ese dc\'el ilpme nts was t'autious iu th e ex treme. There was a virtllal hlaekou t 011 :my d etailell analys is uf Czcchnslnmk atfai Ts. The ft~ w aTt icies that dit! appeaT " R"d~
I,m, '". M>r<,h 17. 19!>'\.
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I'UEL UDt: TO TilE
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ClllS l ~
were neutral repo rts of selected evcnts such as the regional party cuufc rcnce5 ur the Czechoslo"uk stand at the Sofia meeting; of the \ Varsaw Pact's Political Consultative Comm ittee. "' Certainly t he press gave no indicution durin g; the first threc weeks (If /I.·lareh (If imminent crisis. Editori'lls rellt""(.· ted cOIII;ern wit h other issues, do-mcstie and foreign ; and indeed the le;I{lership's preoccupation with lllore pressing, if related, prohlems explains the Ill n before the storm. On the domestic front the Soviet lemlcrship had h\l) majo r Jlmb~ lems associated with the growt h of dissent. Firsl , the Jun ua ry trial of" four intellcduuls, indudin g Al e~ander Ginl-llUrg, had clidted unexpected protests and petitions from leading figures in the artistic and cultural world. "" In Leningrad, the party l"Ommilice was o(Reia[[y reprima nded fo r its slackness in i{lcologit-al educll.t ion;" and a major editorial in Pra(;ila Oil .'.Iarch 1;1 calling for greater vigilance agains t the sub ve rsive influctll"e ofoourgcois propaganda and ot her f()feign idco1ogies marked the heginllillg of a major CI"", the riV:llry he tween the Ukr;lini;Ul p"rt>,·.~ first secretarr, Piotr She1est. and the Ukrainian prime minister. V V. ShclJe ruitsky. Both were in the CPSU PulitlJU ro, but Shelest was a "S~~ 1~<€"i<J. ~11",h
"",11',,,,.,10 . M. n ·l, 2. 1.•",1 10. 196~ . "l1,~ In, .. ,,,.I,,",.I;,,,,'' '''os .~'). modeM<';" lon c: "Con""",,i,1 1);1,1;", lOOa)' "1)0.·",,1,' in th,' ",,,, t ' ".>r;",1 "",di'~"", Thi, j , why 11""e ".u, he "0 ' lue,lio" '" o,""""jzi,,~ 0 k.din~ <"<"nh" of d,e C"mm " n i,1 mo'·eme,,1. The", i. no n, ...<1 fo, . uch • run'c,. I'","·nl..:la), funn> of '>oity ."d comJ;"""d act;,,,, .mong 'he f...,ern.1 p"";~' a ,~ . uffic;"n.l)" ",01o;1~ anti H~.\ibl ~ . ·· " f or de.ail, "f Ihe'" p,m.,I; ...... Th p Ih'ily T;,I,~ml,h . J.m".,)· 4. I9&!: TI", .\/"mj,,~ Sinr. January 6. 1008, The Time •. J'''''''''' 10, 100$. a" d ~ehnoa".· ~. i\l(iS, J"hc S,,,,d,,y 1U,,· /:mph. F"bou"'}" II. 1008, ""d Sew ro,k ~e l"",'1· Hl. I96/!. "1'",,,,/,,. J.""a')· lY. lOOIi. 'l"'~<-.J II,., r",.~ "!I"" "r Ih~ lool~" 1.. "U ,~r",,1 C it)" I'a" y C,~, lc,e,,<-.: : "1" ;,I<",I"~k>f"r"o><"<" w .. on .hi. then,e. - The ronf",en,,, "" p"·",,d II". ",·,~l 10> .. ,..~i ... 11... 1~,·~1 of 'he itl"'logical and 1)Q1i!i<..-.1 ,,]>Io,;"I;;"1l ,of 11,,- \"Jt~I"~ l><"<,pl .. . "'1>«<";,11)" )"""~ people. I" Ih.t of 1""'""''' .... Ia)· ''''"l ui'''''''''''''.. [" Janua,y 1!)6S. h ... " P q ·"I",,,·., rc;""~he
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full memher. whereas Shchcrbitsky was a nUl]\"uting candidate member."" TIl{' two mcn previously had (."o opcfilt ed in mold ing a more inde pendent cultuml policy in the Ukrai ne. but the growing in toler-mcc of 11Ie central leadersl li p in }'losl.1lw fil l" any firrm of dissent made such (1 policy impo~5ih[e. Shclest, in particular. became (L vociferous upponcnt of political refurm . Many ubservers fclt that his npposition was increased h y Ctl Ll t;crn fur the S{:~'lLTity uf his uwn position, whieh was furt her undermined by Shchcrbilsl..y 's reported duse affiliation with Brezhnev. Shelest"s keynote s p e~'
In foreign afhi rs. tou. the Soviet Ic,ldcrship W,IS far t()O prcoccupied with events in Hu mania, l'oiaml. and the GDi~ to foc'us e.~ c\usi vc
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25
PIU;L UDE TO TIn; e m sls
and ~lJPporlt:(ltl,,: Snviet call fur an earl~· "()Il\'o(:;llioll of tile inter_ national conferencc. KouckY. howc\·er. also SUPlmrted efforts encouraging ~1USl'()W to reverse the anti- Yu,goslav li ne ad opted by the 1957 and 1960 meetings. Even in early ~'I a rch the Suviets showed their concern over growing sym pathies between Belgrade and PrJ.gue b y IUllging:t n official cum plaint with t he Yugoslav ~'linistry of Foreign Affairs over th e prn-C ;,eehoslov"k line adoptctl by tile Yugoslav press. "" Never th eless, at this time th e duminant view in Moscow was that "'revision ism" (in this case pro-Yugoslav views) might have to be tolerated if th ey wcrc tu ('()IIs true! an effecti ve frunt againsltllt! Chinese. The ;\'lardl (j meeting in Sofia o f the \Varsaw I'ael's Political COIlsultative Committee also fa iled to brin g Humania back into th e fold, Among Ih e issues discussed, ;K~"'()rding to Kliszko, were "certain proble ms cOIllll"ded wi th t he work uf the hcadqlm r tcrs of the \ Varsall' Pact,"'" Some of the East Europeans, not untypicall y perhaps, were resis ti ng Sovict cfforts tn furt llcr ('enlralizc and integrate th e military command ~truclu re and were pulli ng forward aiternativc proposals, among these a rotatio n of leadin g posts between mem ber states tha t WQu id there by ellCcliveiy redute Soviet COlltrol. ·~' Ilumania·s President Nicolac Ceall~C~eU later eonfiTlllcd that part icipa nts at the meet ing had agrue d to rufer reform plans back 10 Ih e ir m iniste rs of dufense ,md 10 suhmit fn:sh PI'UPUSills within a six-month period.'" But Humania was excluded from subscquent discussions about I'a(' t refor m as a resu lt of its efforts to check Sovic t influcnce. Also un th e agenda at thu Sofia meeting was the N udear Nunprolifcrati on Treaty, 1m whkh the USS H had esp.:ndetl L"'()nside rahlc efio rt ovcr till' previous mouths. Sovie t leade rs we re especially worried that \Vest Germa ny wo uld rcfuse 10 adhere to th e treat y; ,IrlJ they m,IY have e;llc u\;lt L,
.. .'·"w York Tiro..,., M.rch:!9. Hffl. ,·aki•. May 21. 1968.
" lIepoTl' ..I", ",gge.l P"",i,tell! C~""I"><:'" <)f H"m, "i •.
"'O, "1'1~".,,1 !" In'I'''''';lIg .,,~'
arm. r,IlI" l h~ USSlllhll ..",,1<1 I,.. rm,j,,,,..,1 ill II""I,,,i., E.,l ~:uJOl'e ." re,;;la",..- 1" [",. lhe, inc",,,,,,,, in ,jeren .., 'l",",lin~ "." .t"" "" ;'.\1,' al d,~ lillie, l'a,'K,,,t .. cI)· .he ~,,,!~cl fur mi!it.lr)' aid.o the A,..!J .l:tlC •. Vietn"n). and LUW., Se. &,c lo,t Tion ... ~hlIl,h \I and 10. 196!I, Tho< Cuardian . M,,~h i , 1968, 1-", Ob.~n:... r f"'rri~n Neu" S.",j(t , Kcpnrt nn . 2·1~1 9. Mo."!l 11 , 1968: S,,,, ;,,, ,~''''''J, 12 .",1 19. 1968: .,,,1 ,v.... ,,' Tk"' ...·/'/d"'/, ,\1 .,d,9. I96S. "'~~'''PI~'''. Aplil 4. 196'1. '" '1""let'urc~ . Ear""". C:ed"-"I,,,,~kia,
.\I.",.,
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E".,
26
I N TI\ OL>UCTIO ~
support fur the treat y within th e I'ac\ might spur th e Americans to put similar pressure on th eir own allies in Paris and Bonn . It was the refore ,\ grave setba(l whe n Human;a refused tu sign a joint s t:li e m en i alTinll in g t he intent iun of all Warsaw Pact memhers to adh e re to the treaty. Ceau ~eS{'1I subsequentl y gave his I"Cilsom for refusing 10 sig n the dcdarat iun: liul1Ian;a has heen aut! is in fa\"or or II non-prol iferati on tn:~aty. We think h"",e\"e r. that r"rll><:r .;II')r(.< ",mI 1,,: "",de to " bta in improve· ments tu tlli.' trealy. Jlartku l nrl~' I he pledge to \;,kc IH c aSIlr/:S regar.!ing Illld,~ar disarm'lI",: " t ami th e giving of g",m"' tc,~s It) UH Ull rics rctloll ndng Ilnck;LT "'''''1'' '''' 110", th",,' \\'(-"[""" """hi"n! he II s.:.\ ;lgainsl thelll ;md lhat they would nol II.; ,,"hj.'(.'I(~d In hlackulail wilh Ihes" w"a p.,n.~, "",I insur ing r,'r a1\ slales t h" p<>ssihilil), of lit> limit,'ll nl iliM Unll of Il "d "llr "tH'rgy p"';,~~{,,1 pnrt>ns.·, ..'"
"'f
Czechoslovakia's po~i ti on was more modernte, but Dubeek did state tll ilt although Hu mani"',, reflt sallo ,\ign th e declaratiotl was not "realislic:'thc rc wc re in fact utltcr Pact memhers who felt the nee d to link th e treaty with furth er eHorls toward tludC;lr d isarm;l11lCtl! " UN HEST I N !'O L ,\ N D
If the HUl11anian revolt uf early \Iarch d eflected much Suv iet atte ntion from Czcclmsluv;lkia, So IUn diJ tl ,c la rge·,cale riuts that brokl;"
uul in I'oland afler March 8. Dem(>mtrati ng st u dctlt~ and in tel lectu als prulcslc{1 Ihe g:u\"ernmcnt'~ in l'reCI~ k." Altho ugh Ih e riots were quickly (.'ontrol1ed, th e)' had lasling repercussions. The llIerlb I;lutl chcd a campaign " Sp"""]' bl ~iC1~'" C.·.,,,I'-·><'" lu t h~ lI"d """'1 ParI" IIWv. Apri l 26. l!1bS. rmm /lohi" I'm~lI c. I" 59, " H,u];" Hmli, I..·• of ~L",·h 6 . I9&!. • , ,[,,,,Ie
Ali",,, 11""';"1:1<,)). ,~I , . II 'in/crill
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TIn, d ." ,e "" ~ Lla",nl~~' 1\"" "'H"""I"I.·", .101<', "'ill h.,,'" ,," ",-",,_, 10 ", ...·10.. ''"'"4>0''' ,of Ih" fi"n,,"( a ~",," I"'W' " " 'h;d, ,", ..." Ihdr h'nito>'v, "I,,, <'1l1l_ .",rn> lil,' "the, m~",b,'r ""'nl,,," .~' II,,· W"",. w '[" '." )' ___ If th., ,,,,,,,,,'" ,,( Ihe S,,,-id
"'n ... ·pl to,,!;)· "" \o ", ~~r ",:.,,,1 il "<,<,,,,<;Iry tn "'ply 10""
"' ,,"'. "" ""e ,of 'I.... ",.,. Ii" ,,,,,,,"ir, w;,h • ""d..." ,II il,· . _II .., ,,,,,,,,I~'r ,,,,,,,In.·, .~' II", II'""",", l 't'aI)- In;,)' ... \0 'I"",tj",,, ,imil .. r I" lime a~o. I,~I ,I" C, ull., 10 'Iui l -', .no, W"~,, \bud, 6. 1!lf;S , ;n .~\\,H, H:IZ,15ICIi ~)
l'r.,~".·
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Had;" Il ome Sc".. ;c."
27
PHJ::Lum: TO TilE cmsls
blaming the disurde rs on Zionists, intelleduals, and nco-Stalinists. Further. any del11,mds for reform. it was claimed. wou ld weake n Poland's (~Ipab i lity tu "ithshllld the subvers h'e intentiolls uf \Ve st German revanchism, whose aim was to revise t he postwar boundaries of Europe. These allegations presaged a fairly ("Qmprehensh'e purge of liberal illtdleduals and oHlciais, many of !h",m Jewisl!. The purges were the result not unly uf the riots but ,llso of a major challenge to Comulka"s lc'l(l.;r .• hill tll,.t h;.d t;,ke n place "under cover" of the demonstr.ltions." T he challenge came from the rightwing and uitr;lllationaiist "1';1rtis;Ul" l;u::tion he;uk'(i by Mil,<::t.yslaw M0C7..ar, minister of the interior and head uf the secret polite. Gomulka was also attacked by Edward Gierek, who previously had been idenlifiL.J as a mudcr-lle ;lIld it.-cll nLJcr.lt ically minded reformer in the leadel"lihip. " GOlllulka responded to this dual onslaught in a major speech to the \ Varsaw Part y uktiv un March 19, In an eiTort tu st renglhen his position , he attempletl to find l'UIllIllOIl ground between the factions. Favoring a right-willg lurn ill dom estic politics 10 please his det ral'\ors. he Simultaneously empliasized the need for strengthened relations wilh the Soviet Union. a move designed tu l'On\'inee :-'losCQW t hat he was the best guamntor of So-
viet interests in Warsaw. Gumulka upenly admitted that the party was hupeless ly split, with the leadership "still not in a tundilioll to formulaiC, much les.~ unravel. all th e prohlems"t hat fal"C the l~)UIL try." As a result, Gumulka was in 11 0 position 10 support or cveu ignore the Prague refurm n1()\'cment, even if, as has heen snggested. he had sympathies to t he cUlltrary." He emerged from the March crisis much weaker dumestically ami mure dependent Oil - All ~-dilori~tl" Pro ..", i 1:!,I<"it. \laId, z... 100>.'>. t.y "",j ,n"".. Kal;,,1 h1:.m.-d Ihe king .cl"""I"j;e of. een,i" clcpce "f cli>inlegr.I,u" I.. Il,e iutem.otion.1 (, ill "'" 1""W tc;u!~rst'lp. . W~ h.~,... h.d '" ,1 ...1 will. aU.. ",!'!; 10 .I d~c al II.~ !~..J~r ,hil' . . . ,,·ith aU"",,,,, ,1 • ""'I' ,r~t"I " (, ,,,,,,,·,1 1,,,,,, lIFE. 11>/;./, rr.... S~,.w~. "n . :ll:! I, Apdl I , 1968). f". "Ihe. ",.al)"",,, ,,f Ihi> pl,a,,', ><~. M . ". Ihk"· ..,,,,"'ki, T/U' C61111",,,,;,1 l'uf1y "f I" 3(.0, 11",,, •• , W. Wolf•. Sm·...1 1'1",.... alld 1:""" "" I'll. 361;- b<}, amt A. 110>. )010""", . "l1.e I'UWI' I ~',.
r"I"",I.
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28
ISTlIOl)!JCTJON
th e Soviel Union . It was nol dear whether he l·ould surviv(, any furth er un rest in Poland such as might spl!! over from Czeehuslu\'(Ikia. TIllis Comulka was one of th e first bloc leaders tu impl y that cvcnb in CzcdlOslovakia were hav ing a negat i\"e elfed on the bloc as a whole. In his March 19 speecfl, he maintained that "impc dalist react ion and the enem ies of sOl'ialism have l"Ollle furth under various /lags. Acti,'e in our (."Oliulry, (Jud aclive ill lite cOllulrie.~ >leighboring on Poltmd. they are attempti ng to weaken the ties binding the \ Varsaw Tre aty states."" It wa.~ a full t hree days before the Sovie ls made lip their m inds to support Comulka against the Mocz,1r-Cierek facti ons. lI.!oscuw·s imlecisiun was cvidcnt in ti m cumplete al.mmee of any ment io n in the Soviet press of the c'·cnts in I'obnll. Then. on -'larch 22, Pracda published Cornulka's spet-,dl in full with an article th e fol lowing day attesting to the popu lar su ppo rt in \Varsaw for th e Polish leader. On March 2.5. Pracda firml y maintained that " th e authors of th e escesses havc not slIl'(.'CeJell in cre
,loa,
lellt "u;, ,,,l,- of (;"" ",!b . ttoo lX)p.·,1 i/ C,......·h",\" .... ki. ,,,,.,.,,..&-.1 ill ...·hieving a ..... ,'ain li!>.... li'"li"". )", ,,",hi l,mr,1 f"'m Ihb br ~" ll i,,~ '''' '',. Il,",,· ;"(\~f".·,,(I~n' .. fn' 10;, [I<~K"l-' low.. "I, M" .......... 11,;, ch....,,,1 ,"h><'~l"""llv" (f,,,,,, \"Iad;",i, v. "; ''';Il. ,-.I .• TJ.€ Cu:d",,/nwk IIr/on •.\I!lC~" ... n' ,~. I' . 60). .. P""·'/d .
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2.2. 1!!6Ii
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"TIw So'·iP.1 "!llI );lS""~" '0 I\,t.ml. M~, ki Ari,I"'·. ,ef~""l "I~k(l\)' In ,10 .., .. eWllls (Imins. ,p.,,,,,h m",kin)( !l,e " .... "I)"·11oi,<\ """I,"''''''')' "I ll,.. ,i~"i ,,~ "f ,h,· S(,,"id ·l~,I I'\' F,i,n,hl,lp T,~.W -W~ w~r .. ~,,,\ ".1>.. " ,I .. r.,I;.h linil'-.I Wmh,." 1'",,,,. " 'ilh th,· r.'"Uuoile .on of 1M ,\>Ii,), nation . WI...Jy,hw (;'m",lk~ 0' it< h,,:od " "as . . r,"I:" ..d.....t OI:,i"'1 all hl..,k fo"",. of ,,,,,,,tion :' whi
29
PIIELUDF. TO T il E c m S[S
Even if it did not, the regime f"ar<)(1 that a ny major leadership or I)o liey change in e ither Warsaw or Prague mighl lilrlher isoble I he GD H and u nd<) r1nille Ul hricht's eHort _~ 10 mainlain East Gcrm in the early months of l96S indieates the sensitivity of th e issn e. The East Germans feared th at tlte Sovie ts, llespite t heir " ~c.., N. Edwin.> MurdO" . --rhc Imp.",. 0[ 1)<,,,,,,,, "" lIeu';Iln. Hel,.."" " the Member S",e. of [he \\\I .... w 1':><.1.-' ~h.p. 3 . " ,\ '"", li'rk n"""•. ,.""a'y17. 19(">11. ,.., <-i''''] in ibi,L. 1" 197 _ "For e .... "'pl". in • ",. jo< re'·"'''' 0[ i»"", f"d,,): &n..... , f,,,d~n l~.\iq·. lh" G". man ,["e._ h un "'" li, ' tod .. One oflhc ei):hl t"ll-p"orilyarc .. ,,"Mr<, it Ir.ad ]""'n and alle):,," II .., [he W"" German. "'~ r" "",.elty d"'·e~~'i"g n"d,-ar W~~[~.", ( PYd ·",1 nole ~olhc \\bt C"' .... "",n. condemnin" th.i. "New t:.U~m [l<1 Germ.n
.i"" ..
f,,", (,,'" f'rat·,fa. ,\1 • ..,1, 5. 19611).
" ""
30
\:-',1I0nUCTION
p u ulic protestations. might subordinate previous {.'O rnmitm c nt s to
til,: CDH to an a grc,: mc nt wit h \Vest Germany u\'er Berli n. Perhap s hup ing tu forestall any such agreement. in February tllt:y puhlishcd .. head uf schedule a new draft CDR Cunstltut ion tlml
claimed all of Berlin u.s the a lpital orthe CDR" In March they also beg an 10 disrupt the transit routes tu Berlin , dearly implyin g that 110 agreemen t un that city wo uld \\l)rk without th eir appro",IL If the East Germans were worried tha t Moscow might serve its own inltncs ts lIya more Acxi hlc in tc rpret,lI ion of the K,lrluvy Vary agreements, til Cir fears were not assuaged hy the developments in
Poland and Czechoslovakia. Br:Uldf~ annmIlK'CTllcn\ on ~'lardl 18, in th e millsl urthe Polish {'risis. that the FnG wuuld resp<-oct the Oder·Neisse li ne as the western bou ndary of P"l,md lLntiltl...: signing uf a peace treaty'" was seen t hrullghuut E'lslcrn Europe as an effort to tempt t he Poles lIway from th eir (:omrnitmellts :lIld to further isolate th e GDB. ~l Gumulka maintainc{l his pusitiun and rejeded t he \Vest C(:rman ul!cr. :lI1d lilT the time heillg. the East Germans seemed reassured thai the Poles. atieasi. we rc not likely to respoud positively 10 \Vest German initiatin!s . Such was not Ihe case in Cz{:choslu"akia, howCVf;r. DnlX::c k's
FcbrlUl!'Y speeeh asserting
C:I.C(·ho~lo\'akia·s
intention to
e_~ t'lbli sh
normal relations with all European slales irres p<-'Ctive of their sodal syslem was interpreted as a dircct reference to \\'est Gcrmany. Umil:r NO\"l)lnY. the \\'esl Germans had .~lIe(.'t!e{let.1 in estahlislling ,I trade mission in I'r.lgue. and after Dulx'ek\ a(.'(;cssion to power, this mi ssio n's fUndiun s began tu increase, ~ l oreu\'eT. Czechosluvak e lforts to obtain ,\ massive hard Cllrrency loan lor the restructuring of the economy met with initial su pport in Bonn." This created a dual fear in East Germany. Not only wonld snch a loa n inevitahly lead to improved economic and political rclat iOlls between Czechoslovakia
Ill'''.
~bu-Io
IS.
19('08.
j"
UFE .Ii""~FcI,. C""",,,,,, j,, .. Iml. USS R . .~I.,d,
2~.
HIM .
"'S,·,·. f,,, ,·,a'''l'k·. 11o...,,~,rf,,\ ,'<11'0,;..] I" I I,~ "It"";,,, I"fly "'""~1"'r,:r 7..,,, ; I'''rltlll;, .
c""jll,·d "11,,. W"ki,,£ (;Ia.. j" I\e";,i,~,i'l Co" n!!i.-, ,II ",I (;"m.' 00"" 10 lhe ll;otlk·6dd an,1 11.·"0.... 1l,~ lJitlaH)"hir "r III<' Prol~"'rjat - ..-101<;' (,,,,,,,. ,1 e,-e n" in ful."d ."d C,....~~,.h·.'"". "",,1,1 (",I I"" 1",I.t<· II.· CIlH ."'\"""1(1«.11)" """.,h Ilw \1',,,,,,,,, Tr~.'}' ~",lll,,· C ~IE "" (".k.,,~llor .H", ~b,d, 2-1. IOOS, SII·8. 1::1,:/2,;)61,,211-6 ."d E EI2,371
,Iu,
A:!I I _9), ~ Scu'
lid, Tim .... Mort!, 26, 19&.1
1'l\I( l.U UIC TO T IU; C KISI S
31
aflccted. Tht: East Cermans fclt that thev had morc to losc than any other bloc state, including the USSH, by an improvemellt in CzedlOslo,'l ardl19, in a sp-ef..'eh marking the fi rst anlliversary of the Czec1toslovilk-Eilst Cerman Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation. and r...lutual Ass i s~ lant"e, Ulhricht refcrred to treatr t~) mmitment s hinding Prague to a un ited front (Lgainst West Gerrmltl mi1it(lri~m. He stated that Oil thi s ot"Casion "the st~te lc~dershi ps ded~rcd that they would strictly upllold that treaty:' Yet in fact the Czt:choslovak anniversary telegram to Ulbricht did not l"Ontai n any such explicit dedamtion.'" A major speech delivered bl' CDR Politburo member Kurt Hage r at the end of ~laT(:h openly t~mdelll n cd Czt'Choslovakia and made it clear that any links with tbe FnG would only sen 'e Bonn's aim of "subverting the socialist eoulitries f)'om within, of dividing them. and especially of isolating t he COB. .. ~, The East Germans we re aiso greatly "\)rried aho ut the elTects of the Prague Sprin!,: un dumestic stahility withi n their own L·tmntry. As t:arly ,~~ ~ l arch , the)' wcre reported to have cca.~ed issu ing tourist visas for travel to Czeclmslonlkia." Prague students returning from visits tu E:Lst Berlin (t1su reported they had been prevented from participating in prcschcdnled Jlublic dehates. ~' C7.echosloVilk journalists ("Omplained that two issues of ,\ Ccrm::m-language weekly published ill Prague had heell harmed in the C OB . They also alleged t hat Soviet newspaper articles repuhlislled in the East Ger· man party daily Neues Deutsclr/u rl(/ were being ("ensored, with al! positive refercnces to e" c nls in C7.ccito.dovakia removc\\. '" This fear of "spillover," together with the links hetween Prague and Bonn. put the E:L~t Germans at t he furefront of those blOC' leaders e nt~JHragin g the Soviets to halt the reform mo\"c rn t: nl. T HE BBEAK ING I'OI NT IN MOSCOW
The evcnts in Poland and East Cermany cuindJed with a sharp risc in t he Soviet percept ion of tllfcat emanat ing from Czedmslovakia after March 21. On March 19, Prime ~linister Cernrk had
USSR and lia" Ii·urn!"'. ~I""'" ~7. 1001>. .. " .... (" lark Ti"", • • nJ S""day 1Hr~nif'h. M.,."h 24 . 11168.
" Ihld. "r.·cw ro,k Tim ••.
~Iarcl,
30. 1001> .
32
1 t\'T K OllUC rI O~
ROWIl to Mo.~(.·(lW for talks wit h P ri me ~'I inisler Al e ksei Kosygin and
Gosplan chi ef Nikolai llailmkm' on l~ )()rdinati()n ortbe 1971-75 plans and a possible large-scale loan to Czechoslova kia for el'O!1omic revitalizat ioll. , 7 This W,I_~ t he Ilrst mee ti ng in which th e top leaders of th e two countries di scllssed Czechoslovakia's planned c~:vllomic reforms-refurms which if implemented would rcur ie n! Ilwl (:{lUIIIry's ext ernal trading links all',l)' rrolll the socialist hloc and to\'~lrd the \Vest. 1\l ajor Ge neral E:gyJ Pepk-h, the new hC:lJ of the Czech usluv:lk army's ~lain l'olitieal Ad min istnllio l1, was also in " InscoII' cunfcrring: with the millistcr of d efen se, ;\Iarshal A. A. Grcchko. ;mu the head orthe Sovie t Main Political Administ ration, G.,tleral A. A. Yt:pish e v. A Sovie t t~)l11mlHliqu {: suggests th e cx iste m:e of ten sions by noti ng that th e meet ing had taken place in a "fri endl y and wo rking atm os phcre" in ",hidl Pcpich had "replied to a se rie s of q ues tion s conce rning th e , \c\"dopm e nt of t he process of dcmocr.Jti7~ltion in Czechoslo\"akia ." ~' I n an in terv ie w with abril/III /ifill, th{~ C~.{~d1Uslo\,~lk milita ry ncwsJl;tpt: r. 011 his re tur n, " e pich 11)aintained that he had initiated the visit and that the Soviets had e~ pres sed th eir beli ef thilt the pre.~e llt policy in 1'r.lgue wo uld .~ t rengt h e n socialism. li e did ':"n~'ede , however. that illtl Hlugh there \v;L~ IIIlI "one ·~Ilecilil." (Incst ion" on internal d evelop!ll en l.~ and cad re c ha nges in the military, the Sovie ts we re interested in the elfects of th e Sejna case. a t"(JIleern Pe pich rega rde{\ as "unde rstandable and logical." '" C e rtainl y events in P r.J.gue had been moni ture{\ dosely in Moscow since J ,IIl 11~lr y, wilen Dul":ek replilced Noml!!}' itS fi rs t secretary. The Sej na case, cad re changes, a nd s tah:mcnts by til(: n ew leade rs \md elicited fu rt he r <-"OIH.:crll ill ~·I uscow. But th e Soviets' Jlr<-~ K,"C\lp .. ti un with vthe r, mure pressing iss ues amI their ini ti al Willing ness to allow Dubl·ek som e tim e to settl e in appear to have d im in is ll cd Soviet ;l1;lrm over th e de vel opme nt s in C~.echo s lo v;lkia. By I he e nd of th e third week of ~ l areh. however. indications are th aI th e Sovie l leadershi p f{·1t it could no lunger sanction th e cvent.~ taking place in I'raglH:. The mav e ric k policy of Bumania. the ri ots in Po lan d , s trun g: East Ger man ],ustility tuwarJ Pr.lgue reforms. ;llId even Hllng.1 rian w a rnin gs th aI matt e r.~ mll s t not be allowed to get out of hand in Czechoslovakia as they had ill Hlln·
""'e,,' M~rd l
l,,,l
20. 19f>';.
Ti,,.,. •. .~[ .".I,
20. [9\>'l , lIFE. 1l'...Md •.
f~.s' 1::""'1""' C",·cI""',,",,ki~ .
"Cn: II h~ C7A."<.~~"I",,,k '"'e ..·• ,\ ~'·nl"")·) in f;n~l i, I •. ~lat
crl,-
I'II1:Lum: T O Till: C III SIS
ga ry in 1956'" all furth er mot ivate<1 the Sovie t lead ers. who were already taking stricter action against disse nt at home. to call the CZl--choslov:tk !e:tde rslli p to order. Th l: breaking 1\(lint I)('·(.' urrc{) Oil .\lardl 21 wh,m. IInde r imm ense pressure of puhlil' Ol)inion in C7.echo.~ lovaki a, Antonin Novotny resigned :ts president. Clearly. had the Soviets been attadled tu Novotny tl my would have preve nted his ouster fro m the post of Hrst secretary the previuus J anu:\r~·. Bather. the core of the issue was that the Czechoslovak Pmesidi um hosition of t he remaining conservat ives within the CPCz would be hopelessly we akened; and they would have no chalice uf SUl'1livillg the forthcoming April CPCz Centnll Com mittee ple num. Novotn}"'\ resignation focused bloc attent ion S{IUarely on Czechoslovakia. T he pros pe ct of a comple te and im mine nt {'~Jllapsc of COIIservative and p ro-Soviet influence in Prague made it imperative to act hefore a SlIl'cessor (.~lUld he named. and Moscow made the crucial decisioll to t1Jnvene an e me rge ncy meeting IIf hloe leaders in Dresde n. Th us Novotnfs resigna tion produccd both aconspicuoos increase in the perceived level of threat and all hnportiting ill 1I,"'!,t"fY pTiM ,,, W5Ii. Altlt""J(I, I", de"'ril..,.! ,h~ I''-~l\u~ SI'Tin~ ., • - fen.i.",,,<~. [" II of 1~,l iti<'.J I~'I "" and .0elaH,1 in il> "'"tent." 10" .1>..... " lio"",1 ,h.] "f", to •• 11M' rc'~'i".'l<'e . . . ",,\ h;~h 11", ",""" ' .. ",,,n\orti,,,, ,!~! '~>I .I~" ;0 ou r "'-"'"If}' I,,' ~iII in~ Cumm"ni", and "d,er ho" e" men_ 11,i. "-'" d"n~ onl)'l.kr. Fi",' Ih"r on l)' repeal,..! tlut it i, 0"""''''1'}' 10 correct lhe miSta1~> of ''''''''Ii<m. , . Total [" ,.,_ ,I,~" "r ,";1;";'00 " .. , ~r..I".II)' 1"" ....1 ].) ''-'m l~~]p "~",,,'im' n".. I '''~ ,,,I ,lop. ' r.m,rpr "r 11,,·
a
".ili"i." "
""n_.. ,
0( ."'''"in "';'(4~~' .nd t~.<1,·,~ 10 an . u,,'k ")(ai",l lh~ wh"l" A~~I>l'}' [ ~ITt\, March 21. 1!l66. SlI'li. EfJZi3l~CI14).
!(ari"" N.."""
oJ'olen'" (11", 110",·
PAIHTWO
The Pre-Crisis Period
CI-lAPTEH THHEE
Phase One: March 22-Apri110
THE DRESDEN ;"IEETINC There is unive rsal agreement among both Suviets and Czechoslovaks that the decbioll to call the D resden meeting marked the real beginning of the crisis. There had been ala r m wit hin s(.'Ctions of the Soviet political and milil(:>. Cenlml COIIII"ill~ .. plenll'" '''' s"lllellll"" 25. 11l6!I . • Ialed , ··11 i. already a k,"",,, ["dll>.1 (lot (raten ..1 II'Irll,·, p-u~I ;.." I)· " ·t"kulned Ihe d,,,,~c >
,,";ell .....~·IIH.J in C .......·.... ,lo.""ia aft~ , January I\I&~ . Th.·y ded.:uelilhi> ,tand pllhlid)· in f",lern.l meetings on 100 O<"Ca>ioo of the 20th "n"ilw",,")· o[ Fe b",.>")· 1:U8. lln ...,·,·,·r. de· ' ·c\"I'" ,e"" in [hI> , ..... ","t· Ito>\; Ih~ "'"'''' ",." I,.",· I"N·H,· u"'II,,, ~I. 0", o( ""'c,," n ~,.. H,[, de,..,Io"ment in C=hmlm-aiia.• nd of ""'>0<,," " fur Ihe Ja"~"r fo, th" wloole !.OCiali.l ""np. a ronf.,ren"" of.i>; Communi" P"rI;". " .... ron'·cned in I),eodcn on 23 ~la",h 1968" ((.T .... s"pt<·,,,1.oe,2II. 1969. 5",8. £ElJl90ICIlT). Hil"ak. in •• "h""lllcni inle,,·iew. not"", ··Look· ;"11 ~·k. il ""''''' to ,hll' O"" in lorIgl,, _1)"" (Rudi I'm"". s"llI~ lnl><:, 3. 1969. ,~p,,~h ....ed in P....",/" /"./)<:./,,/,1<" . 11.1J.3). s.,., . ion ibr ,Wte,nenl by Kolder. ibid .. 1'.156; a ""jot" Rudt r",le" " d;'Oji.1. ··Wh y ,,,•• Ale. a"d ... DulJtel e>p"lloo from the Cl'Czt· Jlliv 16. W.O. ;n ihid . . p. :lW. J;n lI tjek. Vie Augll,1 22, 1975. lleJz!ar. in Vladimi,\'. !.:u.in .•..J .. rl" C=<,d",o/",·"k Hrfo ....' .\ I""r"","' 1961<. p. roO, \'.,11 IIlra!< .."11,., T,lIlh Ve ... ", U,.,.:· S,w Ti",,". ,,". 3.1 (A"g,,'t 1975j. p.20: •.IIJ Z
"I<.
"..ci'.
37
38
THE PIIE-CIIlSIS I'E II.IOO
which \\',IS tu have bee n presented at the plan ned Fourteenth epe..: Congress, also nppnrcnl ly perceived Dresden as a landmark: it cont:lincd section \ral'ing C7.cclmsluvak attemph COIl!,;fC SS:'
,I
"frolll the Drcslien meet ing up \'0 the present Congress" to all,l}' fore i~n "fear.;" about " the process of rebirth in Czechoslovakia.'" On the Soviet side , Lmt h the July 15 "Warsaw lette r:' addressed to the Czcchos]o"ah by the live hlnc parties. ' ilnd th e authoritative Au gust 22, 1968, l'muda editorial sin gled out the importance uf Dresde n. Ac(.'(mling to the August 22 ;o rtidc: Evcllts showed that an Ji1tlosph c rc of di so rdl·r. ,",Lcillations ,unl UIl was beginning to 'ak" shape wit I,;" the CI'Cz itse lf. Ht:ac-
~'cr laiotr
tioll:lry, :luti,.,cialist f()rl'C~ SOP I)()rh:d Io~' world imperialism Were
rearing Iheir heads. All Ihis :lbmH::d nol "oly "01' Ix,r ly, The frale,n,,1 pa rlie s of n"l· ~'ri: •. Huoga 'y, till' CIJR and Poland wen: a, ,,;rio,,-,1~' dislnrht)d as we were h" the courS<' of ,'\',;uls in Czcchus l""akia . II ]'.)camc net;c,· ""'Y 10 ho1;1 a l~ ,I!.!Cli,",· mt..,ling ,\",1 I'xl·I"", );.! opinin'" wilh II,,! It:.. dcrs of the CI'Cz "nd the (;SSR, Il y mulu,,1 "on-",o t. t hi' nwet i, 'g wa.' hdd nn
~la,d , :2.1
in Drcsd.!" .
Evidence suggests that the Soviet decision (llumller 1) to calJ a blue meeting was made un ~ I ardl 22 under heavy pre~sure frl,lm the Poles and Easl Genmms. The Czeehoslovak amlmssador \0 Moscuw. Oldfich I'av l ovsk~', was s ummone,l to the Kremlin on \Iarch 2 1 f(lr ,. two-hOll r m,,,:ting,
nut informed, however. of the dt-"Cisiotl to eonvene
II
hloe sum mit:
and it was only af!er the meeting had begun on the morning of ~Iard l 23 th,lt Ih e Czed l o.~IO\·'lk media anllounced Ihat DlIlx:ek
had left for Dresden.' Well- placed Czeeh sources maintained that 11m mee ting had iJcen called at the insistence of Polimd .ul{l East Germ'lllY. ' Badio Belgrade, commen ting Oil th e Dresden meeting, ' C"nlO;",·.] in I,t; ,..,libn . ed .. TI,~ S......... 1'~ . otR"~ Co"~,, ... p . 219, ' Th~ \\, .""'". [",tier. whit'1< .PI~·.or,"I; II I'mr. la n" /nl)' loS. 19(>8. ",,,I.r Ih~ h.... l;"14 ' To Ih~ C,,,,,IM,,lo,,," C" "uonni>1 I'.!flr (;. ,,1,.1 Comm;ttoe - ,1.\<·J : "We <,.,p"-.,,,,-.J Ihe,,", f.· ..., .1. mo~I;,,~;n Dre"l"n."" In d;",·",,;,,~ li,e ",i~;n, "fl.l,)o c"''''~'tn. t)<eroCtl " '." 'ho ~ '" tl"-'din~
,,,,·nti,,,,,,J.
' f/", Ol",·n;u. \1'0'"
2~ .
19(>8, .,.,1 ti.· Chri>lj"" S""'ncc .Ilm.ilo, (1 ..,000"
~:ditio" l.
March 2.5. I!JfO/;. ' .\'rw ror k J"i"",•. ~larcl. 2-1. 1!1;!i. Altho~!!h hotlt Ii:Jdir .ntl G('molb h...d heM Lil.t"",l m""ting' with t)"b(.,k in ~cLn"'I)·. Ulb,k"hl .,·t'''r'c~!!)' h.J l""oed dOlm '1"0 olfe .. 10 mo · f~r
.... ith Uul>l'<'k in C .." ho,In,·.ba. r">{errin~ . multil:il~ml ,,,...,!i,, ~ i"'t~.J. 1"""""""1)'
I,.;cOl,,,, gre,h'r 1''''''''''' " H.ld I.· lo","gl" ,,, I",.,
11><· ,,~,.k,itran'
C•..,.,h<"I.".,k<.
''''
o::h
~ 'M\CII
39
22-AI'IIIL 10
agreed t!Jat "il is not a secret l!Jat c!Jangcs in Czechoslovakia were nut wdcomed in the CDR and to a certain d~'grec in Pohilld ...• \Vest Ge rmany's foreign minister " ' ill y Ilrandl allrih"h.:<1 the primary in itiative for calling the mee ting to Ulbricht. ' zJenek ~lI ymir, who beC'.l.Ine a Cl'Cz secret:!ry soon aner Dresden, also l'Onfirmed that Poland and East Gernwn>" and t he latter espccially. we re imporlanl fo rces behind the con\'oc:ltion of the nweti ng, and that the Suviets and Brezhnev himself did no t :!ppear to be at the forefront of effort s to control Czechoslovak affairs. ' Soviet insiste nce 011 a collective meeting bl'Ca u~e the othe r fraternal parties "were as worried as we were '" was corrohorale<1 by Dulx:ck, who umflrmed that t!Je initiativc for the meeting had l"(lllle from "scveral parties."' " That the meeting was held in the C Dill"ertliinly suggests that the East Germans we re keen to mn\"ene the summit. Present at the conference were delegations from the uss n, the CDR, Puland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and of course Czechosluvakia. Bllmania, however, had not heen invited. The Soviets were represented by Bre zhnev. Kos)'gin, A. P. Kirilcnko, a Po litburo me mber and secretar y of the CPSU Cenlml Committee; P. Ye. Shelest, the first secretal")' of the Ukraine Communist party; N. K. Baibakov, cimirmllll of the USSR State P]:mnillg Committee (COSpl:tll): and K. V. Husako\', listed as a mem be r of the C PSU Centr:.llltlsrll>dion Commission . u but who was soon to be nmned head of the Central Cummittee's Department for Liaison with Huling Comm unist and Workers" Parties, llaving been fi rs t deputy head of til at department since 1965. Notable we re the ab~encc of Suslov .md the presence uf Shclest . Suslov, reported by some to be ill, " was replaeed by Kirilenko. Shclest, who as a regional party sl'Crclary had no fo rmal ' IWi" Hd~.oJ • . Mard.~. 100<>. quoted i~ HFI': , C,,""'''' ~;., .1,.., •. USSR .m! 1':4" f;."" p<". M ~",h 27. lOOI! ' Willy H... od!. P"'I'IPllnd p,,",;,;,:.•. p. 210. ' I,"~"'kw ,,111 •• ,,'\ ..... J""~ 1. 1971l. ' I'nIcda. " "~U'I 2.2. IOCl/i. " 1),, 1 >61'~ inh'ry!"w will. tTl.: . l'u\'li, I".J j" P"",·,/a. ~! " ,d. 2/;. 1961l. u rm,·,I~. March 2.~. 19("oS. " TJ.~ O~""'r.
M.. ",h 3\, 1968. ",,,lib... .'"elL' l~ck T;r"". of M~rel. 31 and April Ll. 1968.
,,·hieh reponed Ih.t S"d",' had
"ppc."'"
oot hren p",.ent ,ll h"
f"~ c,,d
mC""",,,... n!
\"u,; Gagarin
anJ hoJ 01,1)' ... in ruht;con A]>'i I12. AI "".,., liF E. Cmnrmm,,' A,,,,,, U~SIl. April 4. 1961l . /1,',,1 " nl)' ....... S",I",' a/""", frum Ih~ c:.garin r"n .."I. I... " ....' '~,I I"~'""'" .1 ,he Mu....,,"" Cit y r.rly C""f,,,~,,,,,, (rl"d
Mm" .,mad,..,. fu.
in Un;"" H~Jl"bl i<' 0<.1;'·iH~. at th.t ,;n ••
"
,"
TilE P HE·UUS1S
P~: l\lOU
co mpetence in til e fore ign policr fleld, was included, as bead of the Soviet repu blic dosest to Czechoslovakia, because any spillover from the P rague Spring m ight be expected to affect th e Ukraine Il rs!. O n the agcnda we re a nu m ber of issues: ceonomit; relations, \ Vars,lw Pact openlt ions, th c internation"] situation, p,]rticu b rly in Ccntnl] E u ropc. undo of <-'Ourse. IllC evcnt._ in Czechoslo"akia, T hc CI..'OllOmit' mailers c.~plai n t hc prcsenl.."C of Baibako,' and his (.'{m n· ter p'lr ts from th e other bloc states, T he oIHcial l..'Ommliniq ue isslle{1 after t he Dresden talks noted: Th e ]lurtici]larr ls ill !lIe llIeeting expressed their views on pmspeds for furt her g w\\1 h uf the suei,,1 ist emrrumy orr the basis uf Ihe "til i~"" tioo of e«)ournic Iies Within the framework uf the Cuuneil for ~ I utua l Economic Assistance and on a bilater,d basis. . They unanimously reaffirmed their delermi nation in the near future to effcci concrete measures, ,fur cooper.:.tion in achieving a furt he r ups\\~ng in the economics of the socialist commo nwealth. For the pUIl'ose of comid· ering c.)mnllln ",-'Onomic prohlems. Ihe parties agreed to hold an eco· num ic conference on tire highe.t level in the ncar future. "
Subse(I'Jlmt reports s uggest Ihnt al issu e were effi,rls In dissuade Prague from seeking a hard currency loan from the West and the growing demands ofCzechoslo\'aks to l'~structtlre t heir Ir,1(le rela· t ions to bette r su it t he ir own need s. " AC<.'ord ing to "Com mun is t suurces in E ast Berlin ." the USS R and the c on agreed to cons ider t he possibility of cx temli ng suhstilUtial soft-c urrcut,), c redit s to P rague to prevent he r tu rn ing to t he \Vcst. " '''Uhin this con t c.~t Dubcek's rcmarh ahout t he eco nomic uspects of th e Dresde n meeti ng m igh t best h~ underst()()d. Aa'ordi ng to DlI lx"Ck. /(osygin "spoke at great length about the prospects fo r t he growt h of the " I· ... eda. " In •
~! .. ch
~Io",h
4
25. U!b/;. P,.~!\ue
""Ii"
di..,,,,,i,,n e ntilloo - Pr"hlem. and t)illiou\tie , in the 1.1';" """" .<1" ,,,,..,.] II .. n n.
C ~ I E.~:· the p. nd ;'t, ",,,int"in,,,1 th.t I ~....-~" ••: Ct<,<,I....I"'-" ia
.1."
,,11,e' hI"" ])OnneN, I,ad .. wa. Ie» ;",h'.nt~g",~" 10 l'r.I~"e. r,,, did nol ,~, I'r.~',., . eurirn,.tL.J U. tm''''' mOTe t owa,d th~ \ \ 'c>t (S\\'Il. F.F) Z7141C2114 _ IS). ... P",ooa ... tide "" ~t ",d, 14 . ,,·itl, the cur(o u,ly ,irnil., title "I'TOhl",," "f "",""no",ie C""l"'r.,wo in Ihe So<'i.!(, t Countn .. ,," , aw further integra,;o n ". the "01), ,,,Iution tn ~'W probl"m" ~ New lurk Time•. ~t "n~):!Ii. 1008: . 1", Jnlt" ~:r;',';;'on. "lnt<'1 ,,,t ",,,.1 ."d ~\,ate~i<' 1",plk:a';o" . or tl,., c,....",]""I,,,·.k l\"r,,,,,, ~ I o ..."ne nt ." in "",in , ,·d.. C:R<:/,,»lowk 1(,/o"Q .II",-em
~;,'ing O
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~[AJ\CIl :l~ - A " '\IL
41
10
ecollomies of the socialist (.'tllln tries. He sllOke about the many possibilit ies for strengthening e(''Ollom ie ('OOperat ion and said t hat in the framework of the C~ I EA t(K) t here are lOimy ullllsf:d re.~o\lrces. Responsible bodies in individual countries should prepare proposals for the ro ming talks on the highest level in order 10 lind new and real ways for the devciopme nt of the eronnmie system ..... Apparently, the Soviets hoped tn forestall any CzedlOsiovak approach to the \Vesl by assurJllces that the hloc was capahle of solving it s own e(.'Onornie problems, The del'ision to examine the matter in greater depth as a preln{le to an eeonom ic summit (.'Onfercnee de;'rly was intended to assure Prague of evcryone's good intent ions without actuall y committing anyo ne to a spedfk' eourse. The promise of substanlial credits \\.'Ould be used to extra,·t political concessions fro m the C7.t_-choslovah. In the area of military seeurit)' the participants, according to the commu nique, "reaffirmed the (:oincidell('"C of their vielVs on the questioll discussed and the unity of thcir positions as set forth at the Sofia ronference of the Political Consultatt.'e Committee of \Varsaw Pact states. . They ummimously rcafllrmed their ddermi natio[J in the near future to e flect(.'onercte measures for strengthening the Warsa\\! Treaty Organi7..a! ion and its armed forces. '"" The {liscussion of Pael reform WliS dcarly meant In isolate Ihullania and to kill before its inccption ilny support th;lt Hum(mian proposals might find amo ng othe r blue states such as Czechoslovakhl. The '"(''Olleretc measures" refe rre d to ~'I oseow's continui ng efforts to strengthen its position in both the joint military command and the Political Consultative Commi ttee. DnlK'Ck late r ad mi tted that the Soviets had no intention of waiting the six mont hs agreed to at Sofia for bloc members to suggest refor ms: inste(ld the part icil)anls had agreed to '"a speedy elaboration of proposals to pe rfel:! the Wily in wl)ieh t he joint cOTlHnand aels ..... President Ni(.'Ohle Ceau~escu of Rumania was furious that discussions had been held about C \tEA and \vro alhi rs without Rumanian participation. In a speech on the Dresden meeting. he declared: "We are (lstonished that the 11Iilitary C011lmand of the \Vilrsaw Pae! mellloor states was discussed. bC(,",lUse it was decided in Sofia by all delegations that the mi nisters of the armed forct: s in\c ....ww. lk.\i>b,"" ,..,1;0. ~\a rch 26. 1965. 511'11 . J:: t:J27J21("J1. Pm,,/a. M. ,,·h 25. 1965. ~ [)uh':-ek inletv;~"'. Br.li.b,·. ,,,,Iio , ~iarc" 26. 1965, 511'8 . Et:l2732/C14. ~ J)"b-'ek ~
ICh
JIz
M
should draw up within six month s proposals for improving the ac. Our country is dete rmined to m(lkc its tivity of this command . direct (."(Jn tribution to the activity of the Political Consultative Committee of the \Vars;lw 1';ld , induding th(~ activit y of t],e mili_ tary high command of the states participat ing in this pact ... ,,, However determined Ceau~es{·u may 1I:l\"e been tu participate in rcl(lrln of\Varsaw J'ad structures. the So\·iets were equall y deteTmiul..J to block such reforms. At Dresden it Rrst became clear that the Soviets were willing to furego Bum;mian support in !"etum for a more cohesive inner grouping of bloc ~tatcs , which of geognlphical necessity would h;Lve to include Czechoslovakia. On the suiJjed of Cze-c\JOslov;.ki'L the discussions WI.'"fC most heated and the communiquc least specific; indeed it was restricted to a hroad statement; The Czechoslov;lk delegation had ··provided information Oil progress ill the reali7.ation of the January plenary session . Confidenl"C was expressed that the working class and all the \.\'Orking people of tl,e CSSH, IInder tIle leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, will ensure the further de\·dopment of socialist construction in the l-"(Julllry"· '" Yct cadre ch:mges, the successor 10 No~·otnY. the April Central Committee plenn'" agenda, and evidence uf ··anti-socialist :lets" were among thus!! items known to have been discu~scd. Dui>l-ek initially denied that cadre changes bad heen proposcd at Dresden either "officially or nnofficially,"" but later l'e exphli nc(l this denial: " I was not in favor of re\'ealing the fact that in Dresden there had been talk :LI)()ut the change of Presidcnt in C7.l.'ChosIova kia ... .. The bloc parties apparently considered Svoboda an acceptable candidate and wanted to prevent an y of the more olltspoken reformers from obtaining the post. in p,Lrticular the dismissal of Smrkovsky, onc of the presidelltial (-.mdi(btes, was sought by Bre7.hnev, who supported DulX'ek but said that he was ··hc culUing a prisoner of reactionary and an ti-Communist clements"· '" Vasil Bi]"ak, a leading l-,(lllservativc, pmvi(k.J the fullcst at~"(J\J n t of the
·d, to ,I,. 8"" I>oo"..t Pori)" AWe. April ~>t;. 1968. ,n ScinUia. April2!i.
~<':C'''' I'' ...,;•• po....
1968. " Pm <
" D"L...:ck \" 'h" AI" '] ere,. C,·,"r.1 C,,,,,,n;ltcc pi,·""",. /,,,em,I"'.,j R~L"OI"'i<,,,. p. 2«1.
",oo(,~l
'" II.
GorJ,~,
Sk 'l!i"II.
(;;:.och,,,loc,,k~".
" 1),,1~ k"> . 1'......+, 0" s.·p,.",I ... , 26. 19&.1, '" !l,~ (;[,(;,. C.·"tr~l (:"""";It~~ pl~"" ,,, . I" Willi-un Sh"""cr,,, •. J)u/,..,·k. 1'. ~.
" A,-..""];,,o: 'u P~,·d Ti~riJ. Wh y J)ul~
p.
57. ..,J !lu· ,,,,h.." ;"'e"·;,,,,,· ,,·;,h
''''
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MAIIC Il ZZ-AI'RIL 10
Dresden meeting; he maintained that apart from the issue of who should succeed Novotny, the bille leaders were <-'1mcerncd that "IJy permitting the recall ofille Presiden t without ,Ill)' preliminary d iscussion of such a serious step by the Centr.ll Cllmmittee," the C7.echos!ovak leaders had "viohitoo the hasic principles of cadre policy."" Firm cont rol b y the party of appointments to a!l leading IXlsts in the stale and govern me nt hierarchy (known as the tlOmenkl(ltllf"(I system) is a fundamental feature of Soviet-style socialism. C7.ediOslovak violation of this principle in allOWing the selcttion of a new president without party interference th reatened to underr nine the party's hegemonia! position within Czeehoslovak society. Furthermo re, because tilt;' USS R exercised its OWIl control uf East European developments hy mai ntaining the doses t ti e.~ with the ru li ng Communist parties. any d iffusion of power away from the party also weakened the (Ibilit)' of tile Suviet Uniun to supervise and <-"{)[Jtml events. Fur these rea.~ons, ratber than out ofloyulty to Novotn )', the inciden t became a key factor in t he Soviet decision to convene the Dresden meeting. Soviet and bloc leaders ,llso sought information ,It Dresden ahout "alltisocialist te ndencies." IlartkuiJ.rly in the mass media. As the Soviets subseltuently stated, At the Drcsden ",eetin g the C7.ech,,-,lo,,~k (1nn rad"s did not den)' that some Heg(lli"" p n)('Cs.~cs W,'rI, dcn'loping in til( ' lu"ulry. Ihal th e radio. lc1 c"isiou and prc-ss h"d hmkcn aw,.y from party conlrol ;l1ld w,m; in fact in tht: h(HL ,[s of aulis.)(·iatht t:I ,;,u,t:uts aud that rightwing [')I"(.'es were UHls()tid~ti"g tl,eUlst:\\·"s. At ttu~ sanw ti1lH~ th e C7.echostOl'ak representati\'es stat ed tl,,1t 011 the wholl! the party was in ~~"' trol of the situation and that tI",n' ,,"liS no ea"se fur s"rinns ;Ibrrn. The S,,,,iet representat ivc .• ,,,,d "I] t h" delegations uf the fraternal parties noted ",ith complet" candor that ther ';ow til{' pkt)]re in a different light. They pointed /lut the real danger of tlw situation that Iwd t;oken shape. "
Czechoslovak partidllants concllr that the Soviets insisted on ur)!:ent measures to reestablish control of the press. 10 end attacks on ~ nir.~ 11l1",,·iew. s.-l'lem h,·, 3. 1(0). it, l'm",l" !~",",,:d''/~d. I'. I,". 7... ~·"o!k ~ltp,it. i"l~"'k,,"c,1 loy the ."lho, on June L. 19i9. m';nl.o.iu,.,j lh.l II;!".!;', 'c";on of the D ...•..dcn m""lin~
"'l'",,,,, ule d , fai r .u mm"!)· of tnc m;nule • . ,,·h;,-Io
''''n:
Ji" ,;h",oo ;0 ,he t969
(:"nlral c""""m"" plenum " 1'r",.,III . .~" ~"'122. t'J6N .
''''
o::h
the party and its Ilistory. ,md to prevent the reactivation of mass associations amI no n-Com mu nis t politil'al part ies.'" Brczhll e v. act"Ording to Bil'ak, stated that wh e reas (;c rtain antisocialist te nden d es pre viously lmd been regarde d purely as "transitional phenome non : ' there was now a growing discrepant'Y betwee n "words ilnd deeds." H e is said to have p leade d w ith th e Czechoslova ks to "mobilize th e part y and t he working class in time" to p revent "dmos_ " " The Sovie ts' condusion that " there \'~l~ evidclll."e of develop m e nt s that l."Ould lead to a co unterrevolu ti onary l'Uu p""" lu tilid supIx)rt frum lithe r delega tions , The Cwd mslovuks were sp.!d fka lly warn ed by the Soviets. the Poles, alld also by K,idar himself that th ey mllst tak e mC
Ulbricht . too. expressel] concern aboul developme nts in Czechoslova kia and was particu larl y worried ahout s pillover clrce ts, lIiLlk c it es Ulbri chl as say ing that "any weakenin g of the C PCz will le ad '' ' Ihl",·k """'~, I",, I th.,t " il i , ,~, I ,u.,"i.i n~ II..I ,'O',loiu "nK"1',n ,,"., .!~,wu , , , 110:11 .uH.oci.li.1 dem,'n', , huuld nul tah· .,h'.nt .~ e of tl", 1"'''''''' ,~ J "" ~.,~~Ii,-"H ,,u," B,a· ti,I.,-" TaJi<>, ~b rch 26, 1!16&, SII'I:I , EEl l ;JlICl4. Jt u;;k, .pe.k ;n~ Ihe in'",i"", """ ",ore oul' poken : "All ~w 1"'>1;'" ,-pry '''K@''lly I"'int," ",'Wet I" ,," ,trol ,he· t"~" (SOC Ick,.;.i"" J """menlar>' (l) . . kin): the 10th Ann;,-cr",,), of'he i",' •• ion, on A "~,," 21, 1!fi81_
aft,,,
~
lIil 'ok.
I',."cda I)())",d,,/orl. Pl'. 135 _ 36, .~It ~It:; - 37_
" Fr""da,
'' ' fhi d.,]>, IJ6
''''
o::h
./5
.\IAIlC Ii ZZ - AI'lIIL 10
to ,\ weakening of socialism in the CSSH, a weakening of the al· li:llwc with the socialist t"()untries and th e f(llIndations of soeialism in general."" Other so nrces maintain Ulhricht was ralh~' r more blunt in his analysis of the dan ge rs oflhe I'rague Spring. One re· [lo r I, which rin gs tru e ifonl y het·au.' c it attrilJllles to Ulhricht th at uniqu e directn ess of approach hc had shown Oil numerous other oc"(."asions, {lllotcs him as follows; "If III(' January line is continlled in C/.(,'(.'!llIsl<)\',lkia, ,L11 of liS here willlH~ running into greal danger. We Tl\;IY all fiml ou rselvcs kit-ked oul. .. ·" Although the lJloc's policy tuward \\'cst Gernw.ny was far from being the l'Cnlral issue, East German l"(lIlcern thaI the co mmllll ,I]lpro
or
/Jed-" i,,,,
1: 10
h"ltllhc :"l:ird, 23 ~" "fc rt'n('c .
Ded.·;OtI2: to ho ld" hid, -lc\'cI C(,)Uu",je ~'lIlferen('c in th e ne"r fulurc 10 e"lIl.~idc r, nlnoill-! olh"r Ihin)!s. Cz,:choslovakia', ""'I",'st li,r a loa" to rt:stmdu/"t" her \'(.·onOlllr.
/J{"(';!f;'''' 3: 10 ~'1Il1 ill"'~ wil h pia" , till' 111<' i" leg "ati"lI of t I", '" ili_ a",1 hi widcll the S("PC of adi \" it >, of it,; Poli ti (,;!1 C"II.uitatj l·e CmlltlliU('c.
tary hi)!!> t'ol1llll:lI1d of till' Warsa,,"!'aN
IJCr:lsiml -/: not to inter\"Cne fu rther in Cz('chuslo\"ak internal affairs prol'ided that tilt' aSSlifill1C,'S and pTOmi ws r{'("c i,·ctl fTOm th e Cz.'('llOsluvak delegation WCfI' ;.dcd " pOll . The lan)!lIage of th e
t~lInmlmi(lue
is !tl(H.lenlte: "ColifiJencc WlIS t~ ns"re thl: /ilrther d e velupment of s()cialist c()nstmctiun in the t~lUntrY:> " But Bil'ak maintains thai an .:arl;,:r \"ersi<Ju of th e umlllll lniqlle kId referred t~x prt;:sse( lth "t
[th e CI'C/. It;:,ule''ship l will
~
Ihi
~
D."';d Fl o)". !. '-n", C>,,,ho,, t,,,,, ~ C,;, h "f 1\16..... .. 1'. :m.
• ' 1"(1"'/". Ma,ch 3 . 1!If>'>. ·o lhi(!.
"' "
TilE 1'1\£-ClIlSIS 1'1:;11101}
lu promises 10 deliver a "decisive rdmlfto enemy ti)rces:· ..., lli1"ak luter stated that "at that meeting we prumised to resture order "nd to tuke the gUidance of the state firmly inlo our hands within two months:':'; Hus,ik, too. refers 10 the factlh:lt "th ere were nutifklllions and promises that we wou ld institute order und would take action o n these mallers: ' ''~ The Soviets exprl~ssed (~)llfide n(.'e that the CPCz leadersllip wou ld heed bluc advice without furth e r s:ml'tiuns or warnings. but th ey gave no indication that th ey had yet de veloped it dear policy on bow they would respoud if their umfidenee in th e C7.CdlOSlovaks wcre disapl}()intcd. They gaine{l so me political leve rage in promising to l'tJllsideT Prugue's rClluest 1i.1T a In,ln. but heyond this. nther spl:dfit- plllie), options did not emerge at Dresden.
HEACfION TO DHESDEN It is custom"ry for Prtlt;tlu to ,LlIII(1Un(:e that the oot<:orlle of ,I delegation's fore ign negotiations had r eceived th e approva l of the Politburo. and sometimes tbe approval of tbe Council of :\Iiniste rs :llId/or Ih., Cent ral Committee. Thi~ was in bel done /ilr the Sofi:1 :lnd BljJ:;pe~ t IYl ee tin g.~ held only week., lH:fOre." yet nO such ,\1\nouncement appeared tilr Dresden. It is pos~ihlc that II rezhnev's inclusion in th e delegation gave it sufficient authori ty to act independently withuut requirin g subsequent Pulithuru .. ppro\·"l. Yet I3rC7.hm:v·s trips tn Sofia ea rlier in :\Ian:;h. to Warsaw in Ju ly. and to Czeehoslovakia in Jul y and All~llst at the head of similar dele!!a(ions were indef:d the sllilj,:<:t of sl1hs"' jlwnt mee tin gs.'" Tlw t the Dres{len results were 10 he l~mfirme{1 by the furtheoming Centnl!
Committee plenum might also have vitiated the necessity of specific approv,ll by the entire l'olithllfo. Nevertheless. it is " rather curious anom"ly. und it appears tl ..,t either approval was not sou!!ht or ('(mId 110t he uhtained. TII{~ pussihility of a split ill th e Polithuro ,It this stage exists, although thc cvidcn('C is not at all dC,lf-CUI. Soviet press reports fo llowing t hl~ meet in); reaHlrmed th e imjKlftan ce nfh]oe unity, of lies with CZI..'Chos]ovak ia, and the helicl~ or at least th e hope, that the CI'Cz leadership was both willing and able " Flit'ak. Pruu/" ,,,,I,,,:/,dm·' . 1'. l:ro. " Bit'aI;. '-ll,e Trulh \...,~u, Lie.: I'· 20. ~ 11 .. clk·, ,\u~u ~ (Sur,a) .. Pnll'lla . ~Ia",h
t3. Juty 20.•,«1
"'''~(]>I
7. l!l611.
1Gh
JIz
M
MAtlCIl 22-AP tlU . 10
tn hrin g: tbe Ilo me_~ ti c situation firm ly und('r ('<)ntrol, as the Polish party wa.~ doing. " The stand adopted by the Politb uro after Dresden (or by a dominant faction wit hin it) waS signaled in an aut horitati ve (Irtide in Pra vda 011 ;"l art'll21:1 hy I. Ale );"a ndrov, a pseudonym used for editorials expressing top Ic\-cl party policy." The d ccision In refr.lin from any kind of publit polemic with Prague ur ovcrt inte rferellt"C ill CzedlOslol'ak domesti(' politics lI'as restated whe n A l e.~ androv condemned as "imperialis t snibblers'" all those who were "striving tu sow distrust amo ng tile Communist parlies" by raising aJleg,lt io ns of Soviet pressure un Cwt"llOslovaki a's nell' leadersh ip. It described events there positively: "Noll' t he CPCz is carrying o ut great [ho l"shyyu] work in the ;l(;ti\"atiun of the COl nm unist party orgall i7~lli on and th e slale allm inistrati ve appmalus." Whil e reaffirm ing tim dcep bonds uniti ng the 1\\"0 (,(JUn tri es and parti es. the editorial also t'(mtaincd the mos t c,\"plicil state ment yel to appear in
th e Soviet
pres.~
of the Soviet IC
m ination to maintain Czechoslovakia's position as a fore most mem-
ber of the sodalist comll11lllity:
'nw1l<.~Jfl\es of tIle Soviet Unio" amI CZUdlOs\o\"akia und OHr Cum-
mllni.~t pa rties arc li llke' \ by imli~s"l\1h l!~ ti.·s offralcrna] fr ieHdship. This frie nd ship h,,~ tl~'<:p historkal roots. It b ali l>lx lI scaled with the blood of th e best SonS of Ihe Soviet and Czc.·I",,]ol"ak pcuplcs, shed togdhe r In thl' struggle against the ('O lllmUn enemy. f:lsd'ln . Ihe stru ggle in which the nnshake:thlc :tlli:u>ee ],.,1"'<''<:11 the USS H aUlI Czechos]ov"ki:l ellle rg~.J. The COlll lll UH iSI par t ies of 1he Soviet Unio n and CzedlUslovaki:l, united hy fhlclity to the principles of Marxis Ul Le nini sUl anti proletaria n internationalis m. ins pire and direct our fr iends hip. . No one a11l1 110Ihi1lg, ullde r any (1mditions, C',tU shake oo r f",tern,,1 fn{·nd,hip. which seT"CS the vita! interesis "fthe Soviet Unio n anl1 Cn"Choslo\'aki3_"
I3 rczllllev did not dabor.tte u n this stand ill the publis hed versio n of hi~ speech to the ~I oscow City Party Confe re nce un ~1ardl 29. Althuugh. acr;ord ing 10 l'mvt/{I. he did " in!(lTIlI" th e delegates of .. ~.., . fur e","",ple. tl.e f'u"t' I"~e I'.-.m/" c.Jil"dal ,," M> ow" aW.,;" ",,,1 nf partk"ll''''u"S In ~ff,,"> tu "'r"I1'),~u th~ ><,II,b,I' )' oJr tI,~ l.~lC. " In July. dU';"1I a pre" <"O"rerr'''"t' in Swede n. I( ",)"~iu <,"".."jed tl,at tl ", AIc.a,,, lr<w c.!i'o,ial, ",Ked"" 1\)I"l.u", ol);" "'n. t.:().).~;", ,,,[,, ,,j,,): ,,, .\ie,..,J",,··, J"I), II r ...."dd . ,. liele ..... \lack "" the Sod.li'l ~ou ndation' jn Cn-"<:hosk,,-.ki •. - ..I"j ....! the juumoli,l< to ,e.,j it "')'ing "it ,~H<:<'" "to, ''''''''''n~''' ,,[ Ih~ .,.",," """" I .k i"~ IOu.,.. i" C,-'"'-·l .,,",..~~i •. " Tlor t.:' ''H(in i"te"'iew l> iu Pra,-da. J"ly 15. 19611. " I. Alc"""dnw. Pra,·Jd . March !!Ii, 19611.
''''
o::h
Til E l' IIE-C IUSIS l'ElIIOD
the results of holh the SuR>I >Inti Dresden meetings, he dlUse tu d eal almost exclusively with domestic politk111 ilnd ideological m;\tlers, The confcnmce was devoted primarily to th() social responsibilities of scientists, write rs, ;Iud th e iutelli~e llt sia and t Ill' need for ti)l)m tn d ispb.y great er "political maturity." Brezhnel"s speech \\"dS a h(lrd-line call for increased party discipline particularly in the re,llm of ideologic(ll work, which he labeled "the Rereest frOilt ufthe class stm ggie ," Indeed an editorial in S(l!)cfskll !/fI Rossiyn that appcarcd two weeks bier on April 13 (ilioted Brezlllle\' as warning eonlerelH:e dcll)gates that those "rtmegades" holding bOll rgL'ois views "cannot count on impuni ty." In an apparent reference to Czechoslov,lkia, he m(lintaillf)d that "imperialism is tr ying tn weaken th e ideological and politicaluuity orthe "llrkin g pcople of the socialist countri es, [n doin~ so, it is chielly gambling on nationalist and re visionist clements. "OJ Although the bulk of Brezhnev's speech
~b,"h
30 . lOOS,
.. ,.,..,,,.,/,,, "'I'ril I, I9hli
~IA n G Il
22 - ,u' IIlL 10
situation. At a philosoph)' t-"Ongress on March 26, Kurt l'lager, the leading ideologist in EtI.';t Germany's ruling SocicJlist Unity party
(SED), launched a hlistering and personallillack ()tl Josef Sm rkovsky, who was at that time still a candidate for the Czechoslovilk presidency. Hage r maintained th at Slllrko\'sk~' and others like him we re giving \Vest Germ
e ntreaty to '"gu intu battle ou twu !'rouls'" was hased un tCIJ;lr's stmtegy fo r reform in Ho ngary and fo rmed the fi Hltl(la\iu tl of Ih e cautious yet sympathetk- Hunga rian app ruach tu Ihe developments in Prague. East Europe an opinion, especiall y from Poland and East Germ,lny, dearly in f!uenl·t-'£l Ihe Soviet e\',lluat ion of evenls in I'rdgue. Su tuo did the domestic Suviet campaign against dissident intellectuals and insufficient parly discipline. Bulh factu rs enluUlccd the growing t-~)ll viclil)n itmong somt: Sovi<:t leaders tlwl '"dogm,Ltism '"the threat fro m the ri gh t particularl y from ~I aoist ideas-was no longer t he most immediate danger either to I h" ilL\ernal stahi lity of party (nle Of to the extenHll un ity of Ihe Commun isl bloc. Indec(I, t he Soviet leadership increaSingly viewed revisionism in the form
" ..."t·. D/!. "SLut'" ""d llr.,,~" .Of ··S[onn • .,d S[",. ,· ;,. ~ tCrete",,, 10 ~ 1,1_)' by I'rioorieh H.." Kl i1lf(\.·t ,..h;.,h . 1;",,,lalcd, h.·.dr poh1it.,.j d i>eu"ion 100 by Coelh~ in lhc ~'lc ,,;~hh~'nlh """,uIY. MTI . March 26, 1968. S",8. t:EJ2.:J."lIA2ll - S. I.;"",""";n·, 1,,1.' "j. . . ,,,,L '~I'tinl.,.j in Ih" S.wieL I"e". &
w.,
,~J
Tilt: Pllt:-ClI ISIS Pt;IU Oll
of att acks from th e left and from th e intellige ntsia as all even mure seriolls d,lIlgcr to basic values. In Poland, the Soviet Union, and now in C/.cchoslovakia, the major ideolugkal challenges in rel'CTI!
mont hs ha(1 come fro111 the
l(~ft.
not fro m the right. As a result, the
tllt:scs governing party wo rk sill('c the Twe nt y-Third CI'SU CO Il g ress. which h ad stressed th e necessit y for dos ing mnks agai nst the "splitt ing , ..elics" uf 1o.1;mism, were no longer app rop riate tu th e c urre nt do mestic and inlrabloc situati on and \\'0111<1 requi re re think ing. Til E APB!L
Pl.F. NU ~1
O F Til E CPCz
The greatest spur 10 this reevaiu,ltioll was the April ple num uftil e Cen tr;l] Cnmmillce, willi its wholesale leadership changes ami adop tion of tile Action I'rognllll . It had appcared al fi rst that th e plenum would no t subst;Ullially w e ake n l~JIlser"ative influ e nce wi th in party and stale organs. The sta temc nt t()Uuwing th c C I'C ~, I'raesidium·s Mareh 25 meeting, for e~ampl(~ , had assert ed that " tile I'raes idi um ha.~ fur th er de;llt wilh tlw prep;IT;I\iolls /(Jr the electioll of the president of th e Bcpublie. It took note of the inforUlatiu n b y Ale.~andcr DulXOek " buill the UisC llss ioll "f o llr u e leg;I\iOU a t Dresden ,"" As a reslllt of th at meeting, General Lud vik S\'oood;1 betaIne the part~" s presidential nominee, and the pos iti ve app rai sals in tIle Soviet pres.~ of $\'oh(j(!;J"s h:lckgroll nd and hi s unswcrvin g support fi, r " th e indestrll ct ih le allianec wit h th e peoples of the USS If" ind ieate that his l~lIldi&\ey was e nt irely ae-
ere?
ecptahlc to MOSl~)W. " If the Soviets hoped that Svoboda's scledion augu re d well for the mainle llallCC uf l'onserva ti vc influt:m:c in the le,lder,h ip, the ple nu m proved th e m wrong. hI th e <;Ollrse of th e session. Qldi"ich Ce rn ik was e ndorsed as th e p
,adi".
~b,d,
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~h",h 2 1. 1968. Also , ec "rocd", M,,«h 26. 1!IIi!i; b 'e..ria. ~la,,'\' 27 , 19f>ll: ~n,1 I'm",/a , .\1 .,.,,\, 31 ,,,,,I Ap'il l. 1\I6.'i, ~.,. I,).. 'nt,·,,!;,",,', "i.1o S\"I~.I~ .,,'\ reI."'"
.. Pro,·da.
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~IA I IC H
5/
ZZ - Al'n1 L JO
as Bil'ak, Oldrich Svestka, J07.ef Lenart. Alois l nd ra. and Stefan Siidovsky mlmaged to keep thei r positions. Yet the elevation of Z
("
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plenum, an a<"l;ounl h eav ily influeneetl b y Soviet urtlu.Klux)', pbct:u an !;(!lLal1y ncgali\"c inte rpretatio n on the illll uc nec of the Act ion
Progr.llll ill cnl'Ouraging antisocialist d ements:" SECU IUTY ISSU ES In (uldition to ~'Insc()w's v.'Orries ahout t he pOlilic
eo nccrnin g the Action I'rogram's stand on internal sccmity. The program had l1l11J e mned the "violations orbw alltl. the privileged pusition nfi ll t: st:curil y fun.-" in Ih e poli th;ai syste m" and h,IJ made proposals for the reform of t he enti re stmdllrc. The mOllopoly uf polk't: ]lower cnjorcd by t he lIIini.~ t cr uf th e interiur WliS
to be e nded and a !lew state security serv ile given jurisdiction sulely lor " defen uin J! th e st(lle frUIll the activit ies of e nemy ce nte rs abruad," TIlt' Ad iun Prugram )!u' It \\l )Uld al~() disrupt th e sllustantialuc\work ufa)1;ents used hy th e Suvie ts lu mU llilor aud infl uence develo pme nt s in Czechoslo vakia. Zdellck 1>,[[ YIlM has c[;.imed that whe n h e was elected tu the p,lrtv's Sc-~'re tari a t in " ',1", I."""" " or I I~, e n , i, Il<"'ek'l'n,,,, ,t in the e",,,,,,,,,,i.1 I'.rl )' of C,"",~ ",.I ,,,· .ki • • "d ;" S"e;"I )' .n,'r 11", 13\ 10 C"" Ilf"" of ,!,,, C l'C . :' <'<"''''t...·r 1\170. i" I'","dd I~""'~''''d''t. I'· 2') " . ·.-om Ih~ A
..
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" 11",,,, pmpmah ",,·r., ""dor ",d \,), Ill<' .\ 1i"i,l ry of In'erio< "01 ~b,... h 26. On ~b,d, 29 Ihe 1'.li o".1 A,,,,,,,,bl)' ""Iab\i,hcd a ro, mnill"" for miti tlrY and """uril)' 'Ine.'in", ,h.1 " ,m id inheril ' he I""I}' d~hth <1"'1"',10""",", f""'i inn, or " ...·""'~n~ the miti'a,)' .",1 'c' ~"r;IY f"ree,
MARCil
April. the information then availahle sllgges!ed that of the 10,000 full-time empluyees in the :\li ni~ try uf the Interiur's Prague offi ces, 30% (rungh ly 3,3(0) were also working for the Soviets, Alt hough the syste m of Soviet liaison office rs largely had heen disbanded under Khrushchev, ncvertheless, :\'Il)'lIl!i'lIl,lintuincd, must of the assistant heads of departme nts workcd fur MU5(',()W, thereby giving the Soviet security services substantial control over the I'ra",'uu ~·Iinistr)' of the Interior. '" The break up of the min istry and the purge of t he CQr1.~c rva t i\'e elements within it wOllld dislocate, if no! destroy. that control. At the same time demands for tIle rehab ilitation of political fi~ ures imprisoned in the lH40s and 195()s continucd to surface .Illd achicve official sanctioll. The Adioll Progr:.Ull'S admission th;.t the securit y forces Imd violated the law in the past gave impetus to calis for investigations into various activities, including the circumstances surrou nd ing the
C,,,,,ho,Ic,,·al;ia. 1O.000...r Ihe."" 1"",~! in Pr.u:.,e a1.mc . .. .~I,,
.1", I.., ,llom"- Apri1S, 19(",1;.
" 1' r.. ~"e r",li" "" April J. '('"~ In~ Il,c r<")""I , ,,,,,,mcnlc,1 : ·· If 11,.. rel",,1 I, In", Ir """I
I., w.,l"ome<J . But nne oonnol
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to '" [,"''' MundI "",\ lUll
54
Till:: l'lIl:;·(;1USIS I'ElUOIl
vic ts h.ul guod reasulJ tu wurry awul such a IIlc aSUTC. Nut unl y (;'O uIJ fore ign agents more eas il y infiltmtc int o Cz,->chos!nV(Lkia hut Czechuslovaks and. mure imp'Ortant, Soviets and East Europeans wou ld !ml'(! meg.ll egress fro m the bloc' viii this route. Surely, the Soviets and East GCTm:ms did not withstand all t he international igno min y surrou nding the 1..'Olls tru (·tinn of the Berlin \Vall in lOOt ill lITtle r 10 sec anoth e r ullcontro lled ex it f(lule c rca tc{l.
OEHAT£S IN 1>IOSCOW The btl of firm reassurance from the Czechoslovak Central Cornmillee p lell um l'()m biu t.-d with ce rtain negative iu(!ic;LtiullS ahout Prague's internal secu rit y policy formed the h:ld:Jrop ror th c de bates beginning within th e Soviet leadership. The first ind ieator of a possible dcha!c was a rat her interesting d iHc re nee of e mphasis be tween two major articles that 'Ippeared in the Soviet press. On April 3 l'm"dr/ published a le ng th y TASS de spatch quotin g fmm Dulx-ck's re port to the CPCz Ce n tral Co mmittee plenum. The article, nut surprisingly, em phasize" (SII'B. £V2':]!)fii). At.. , IL .IIollde. _~l'riI5, tOO8, ""oJ o.,ily Telegraph. June 5. IY6IJ . .. P",,,,k AI"II J. l\lti~ 1.1", in 1 '"~'lkl. April ... )1JIi.8).
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MAIIUI 22-A I' 1I1 1.. 10
live red hy Uager only days earlier when he declared that the search fur national form s was a violation of internationalism, a supreme principle that mllst I>e protected, lo r not to do so would unde rmine bloc un ity and ultimatel y socialism itself '" The strength of the SovelskaYII RosslYII denuncatio n was all the more appare nt in its " e ing t he only editilriaillf its kind til ap]}Car in t he period preceding the Sovie t Central COlJlmittee Illenum. nornwll ya time reserved for e nunciating the formal party line. It is also un usual for a major editorial propoundin g, or at least proposing, official party pulicy on internatiunal COlll lllunist aA;lirs to apP':ilr in newspapers other tlllln Pra"da. Its appearance in a republic party newspaper supports {but does not in itself prove) the <-'(Inten lion iI,at a hardline lohhy was emerging within t he leadef'; hip with views lIot ye t (l(.'Ceptable to the lJIajority. Kosygiu's dccisiun tu cut shurt his visit tu ] r,ln aud ret urn hume a day carly. on April 7. en(.'O nraged speculation about It!adership splits. Kusygin had left Mos<-'Ow Oll April!, arri ving ill Tehran o n .o\pl"il 2, folluw ing ,Ill overnight .~ t;o)" in En: V(Ul .'" This w;os tbe first visit h)' a Soviet prime mi nister to Iran since Sialin met the re with CllUrcliill and Hoose\"elt in 1943. The visit was of the utmost e<-'Onomic :md political importanl'l! (II the USS H, :lIId the p:llleTS re_ ported Kos),gin's progress dail)'. It was therefore all the more snrprising that he should retu rn a day early to Moscow. leaving Imn without even allowing Prime Ministe r Hovcida e nuugh tillle to see him off from Shinlz airport. the provincial c;Jpital Kosygin happcned tu be touring wIlen he decided to return."' Before beginning his visit, Kosygin \\'(Iuld have hean l Lyndon johllSon's [I.·l arch 31 announcement not to stand for anu ther ter m as U.S. preSident. so it seems unlikel y t haI this was respollSihle lilr the early !light back to Moscow. Heports at the time s uggested t hat Kus}'gin returned to attend the Central Committee 1Il<->e ting. " An offieiai visit to Tur" S",:dslmya ROlli!!" . Al'Til4. !9tiII. lbi, ,n",·k I'rOOuce,l an im,"L.Ji'l~ ""I"m ,e from
'he
C= h",lo,·~k ,.
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April 12: and h ... " S~'''~k "On the S!",,-iHc Path h, s< ... ~,I ;'m :· Rud.. "raw . Apri l 1ft. lOOS. " s",,;"t No",s. ~Iarch 12. lOOS . onn"" n"",", ti,.! KO'lKin h, ,·i.i! Ir." [",n, AI"i1 21o 8. f'.... ooa ..\pr,1 2. repor<ed th.t K"'l'~i" ..... ""''' "If o n April! Lr \(m~N"·. Kirilenku. Mozu rm·. PoI}"'n>~·. AoolOJlO'·. K,pila""v . • ncl "" lalo.·. On April 3. I'...",cln <-.,,';"'1 a long >rhd" ah""t hi. arri,...1 Dn ,h. 1'""1<.. ,, ,10)'. .. Pro,~In . .~pril 6. ]!lIio/i . II" ....., met I»' " irik"l(). ' '''t:'loe. 1\,I)"aJ"l ),. A"cl""",~ . .... pilam.... a nJ Ku l,,' u,·. ., Tho Times. Apri l to. I96/!.
w"
56
T il E I'IU:-C RI SIS I'EIIIOI)
key h~' Geor~ian 11,Irly leader ami Polithuro candidate mem ber Mzhav:lnmizl) was alsu cancdeu at th e last min ute,"" w h ich \\~mld furth er inuit-ale th,lt tI le ut'dsiun (IltllHver5) to hold ,\0 im mediate Central Com mittee plenum W,IS taken ;It the e nd of the first wee k of April. A number of Politburo me mbers werc not in MoSt'uw at thi s li me,'" and t1l!lsidering Kosygin's own abrupt {·!lange of sched"Ie, it would certain ly appear thaI this decision was taken without fi rs t consulti ng all Politb uro mCl1lher.~. Irresp ecti ve of an y e ffort s to
isolate Kosygin or any of the other leaders not in , ",'Inscow al the ti me, this Cenlml Cmnmillcc ple num did pro\'c to be th e most h,lnl-li m: pilrty mediug e
I' LE NU ~ 1
The plenum convened in \-Iost·ow on Ap ril 9 and 10 imd. :K'Cording tn official press re purt s, WilS de"uted e.w lllsivcly tu the disclissioll ofSo\'iet foreign policy. It began with a re port by Brezhnev sign ificantly titlc{l "On the ,\ dua l Problems of the Interniltional Situat iun and the Struggle of the C PSU f{lf the Col,esiun of the World Comm un ist :\·Iovemenl." The speakers who partid patcu in the dchale rcpre~cnl cd a curious cross section of those with l'uUt'!iollal responsihiliti es fil r foreign and milit:lry pulicy (A. A. Gromyko. the fure ign min i s tl~ r. and A. A. Grechko. th e ddi:nsc ministe r) ilnd those in clwrge of the major cities and republics with a history of dissident pmhlc ms (\I: V. Grishill , ~'I {)s{1IW; " S. l i.lls tiku \', Lenin~rad: P. Ye o Shdes\. Ukraine; v. P. \Izhavanadze, Georgi;l; P. M . M iI.~he)'() \', Belorussia; sh. H. Hashid"", U~,hd;istiln ; I. G. Kellin, Esto nia; and I. I. B(Klyu t \1 01ua\'ia). Also involvcd wcre key c ultu ral and ideoloAieal figures. including the (]ireetor of the Centra l C()m mitt ct~'s In"tilu te of ~ hln i s ll1 -Le nini.'\ ll1. 1'. N. Fcdosccv: the secretary of the hO
He",,,,,,,,
., U.S . 1)"1""1"".,,, of SI;,'e. I);,...,.", of ' ''I..J li ~,· ",-,· aool!e .....dTCb . .lle"""",,, · A"~ ' ''' 16. Ilffl (d,,' I."iR,~I) ~or ,h~ ("II a",1 ,-andi,bl" lI,e, " h"" H( 'h" /\,Iill",,,,_ • "" J1r1.in~ ,,,,,,,her 'PI"'" I" 1'4'·c t",en rfC~""" l'k,1 ,·t,,·wh,-,,· ']", i"c ,I .. /;,,1 ,,',~, I< of .\p,il. indndin~ ~b",,, ,,, (in Fi n· 1.".1). \'()IU'~"· ("""1 i,,~ '[,'0 I" Snm.>ihir-I1>,'""",I/.c. l\"h;dOl' . • nd Shehe,hibl;r). loll' it i, 1101 known whelh", 11><·)· we,c in ~1,"'",,- " '''i''~ 110.· ,,·,,·k or .\pril . Shd'1,in 1"")(":"I' ~,1 "'ilh a \\." hi ••• I,·r."i"" o( Tr.LlI., Unill'" 111' FfU I "-'"~ ..,, 1111 ' ·;e"m",. which (l1)(",~,t ill M",,_.~" "n Al'ri) S. ,111m IISt:· /Z7.
"';I'
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M:lrkov; th e head of Ihe Young Communist League (Komsomol ). S. P. Pavlov; the minister of culture , ~hdarne E . A. Furtsevu; and the editor of Pravda (who previously h:1(1 also been the ambass:ulor to !'rugu e), ,,1. V. Zim yanin. "" The only leaders res ponsible for foreign policy and bloc affairs who did not p;lrtidpate were Prime Minister Ku sYgin, Party Se<:retary Susluv, and KGB chie fYuri AndrollOV. The inte resting mixture of partidpants in itself indicates th e strong inten.'O nnedion made within the Soviet leadership between threats to th e cohesion of th e bloc and problems of inte rnal dissent. The silence of Kosygi n and SlIslov might be cxplained by the former's exclusion from preliminary preparations an d the latte r's reported illness. It is more difficult 10 de termine the reason for Andropov's silence. As a me mhe r of the Central Committee with long experien<..'C in bloc affairs (he was am h'Lssador to fl un gar y ill 19,'56 bclore being promoted to party secretary in charge of rela tions with ruling Communist parties) and eurrc nt rcsponsibility as head of th e KCB tilT both th e internal and e.~te rn 'll securit y of the USSH, one might have expectc{\ Andropov to participate. particularl y if hc shared the CQncern about rcvisionism ;md subversion reflected in tilt;' final resolutions. [Jut t hen Andropo \"'s las t speech had been in December 1007. and as he made ItO speeches at all durin g 1968, it is possible thai h is silellee was attributable to his style urlead e rship ((lther than to his views. One other person who did g ivc a speech was Kon stantin F. Katushe v, wlm prior to the plenu m had been party setrelar), in Corky. He was promoted at this ple nulIl to Ce ntr,l1 Committee s<.·<,:rclar~' in charge of liaison with rll ling COllllllunist ami worke rs parties, thus fillin g the post le ft vamn t sinl'e ~Iay J967 b ~' Andropov's promotion to head of th e KG B. K,jtushcv had 110 prcvious experielll,:c in tilis field . Konstantin V. Hus,\ko\' also move
" "","d".
A,"i! 10 ao\d II . 1965. " I i'; \·alen'~. S"dtllmrrremkm in C"'c/""!"'·d'·itl. 196'i. Pl'. 30_ 31. I"rr)' ~: lI u'"Sh . "d .\I,·,l e F.II, .. ,.) . ill ' he Sod" (j" i,,,,;, (;".:.-,,"'/. I' . .jf,t••1.. , ,'.,~ i"",,,.,..1 I)' II>.I KlIlu,he" " ,IS l"omol~d to lwly """r.,lar)· al 1he Ju lr .... Ihe r ll,~" 'h<.\[>,;1~nu'aJ (;","",;1-
1/,,,,,
Husak"" llad ncvcr hdd thc position of secret,lry, and lie was him~ sclf promoted, Moreover, he ('~llltinued to take an act iye part in tl1C formulation of bloc policy. ;..!c\·erthcless, as Katushev's 0\\11 (;U111maml of his job grew, Husakov increasingly was exduded from h loc' enclaves thilt disc\ls.~ed t he Cl.ech oslov'lk crisis."' The full proceedings uf tIle A!Hil plenu m (like thuse of all other plenums) were lIel"er puhl i.~hel1. Yet hoth t he press editorials appe'lring durin!;: the session and the resolut iolls and reports issued Ht its duse undl;riilll:d the tllOI'ement within the pilrt)' to reasse rt the m,.;essi ty for paTty <'"(.Intml ,,"er 1111: intelligentsia. In iI leading edito rial th'lt appeared th e first day of the plell um, the director of the Illstitut.: of the ]ull'ru;tl irJllal \\'m"ke rs' ~ l ove111e n l, T, Timofeyel". made it clear that th e pa rt y's "anguanl rol e was bein!;: challenged lIot only in th e Soviet Uniun but in other <''OlIn· tri es as well. lie rejel"lel! the ~I,\()ist f(lrl11ulatioll that th e historic missio n of tlw prole tariat could he fulfillel! hy the peasa ntry or the army. Eq U;llly. he as.~erlcd, thuse wlu) 1ll,lill!;lill th"t the pro· lelilriat shunk] follow t he intelligentsia or i C ~ \'i\n!;:ll,lrd were ;tlso " under min ing t lte scien tific principles of re\'olutionar y ~ lan is m .·· Timofe yf'v <'~l ll Ci1l111·d, •. Ie is lin ,1L..,id p ll t I hat II ,ei r cn d " ,,\"t)F to ],,,. lilllC! th e rolC! (if thC! working (.Ja~s; is comhincd wilh attempts al deny ing Ih\: Comlllunist parties' vangua rd mit:. Sm·h <''lJnl'cptions, regardles5 (If their origi n, in ti,et r eflect the inHuenec of petit hourgeo is ideology." '" Thc r".~olllt i ()11 i.~s'lI: d Ii,]]nwing the se.'., iun reit e r,,\ cd tllcs(! Ihemes, Although it did lI ut refe r specifically to dcvelopmcnts in CzedlOsllll'akia. the formul ati olls used and th t: rt:pnrts later circ ulilted ind icate th at Czel'ilOslovakia was indeed di<\:llssed and that th e plenum <.~msensus did lIut e ll tirel y favor a sympathetic interpretat ion "I' I hc Praguc Spriug.... The resnlu t iOIl . in pIal'; ng speci"l emphasis on the important·c of th e Dresden meet ing. reaffirmed ~,,\ , ;,., a",,,~,,,,.. ·"\<',\t " f ", .. ".1",,", I'",,,.. ~ i ,,,, i. ",",,'ain,"] in Pmn/II. Ap,il il. 19!iS. ""d .~""" " "" ",;k P'''·W",~,,, m/,,,,,,;k,,, I" 1~. AI", ,,~· ,Iw /"'~"W';'"wlll,,,,/'/ T,; /"",,' , \b)' 7. 19f.S. f<" ,1,.,,,;1, ,,[ K"""h~,.'~ .,,,I n ,,,.L,)I"·, IkK'L""~,,,d, "n,\ n. l.ew) 1,.It)·;
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the decisions rC;lchcd thcre "to do cvcrything nc(:cssury for t he 5te:lI.ly political. CC01l0Init' alld defensive (.'o nsolidatioll IIf the sucialist commo1lwealth:' In the intercst of "cxposing r""an<-·lli5111 and militariSIlI in \Vest Germ:llIY." the resolu tioll emph:lsi7.ed the lIet:d 10 "increase tht: solidarity of t he socialist tUl lntries . . against \Vest German imperialism." Howeve r. the presellt period was cllaraeterized not as Olle of Ollen cunflict hetween East ;Jnd \Vest but as Olle in which the greatest {langers stemmed from imperialist subversion. 'Ihe e nti re massive apP;Jratus of (t ntit"Qlllmunist propaganda is nuw directcd at weakclling the unity of the socialist CilllnIrics and Ihc internation;!l Communist llIovement and attempting to undcrmine socialist society from with in:' The policy d ircct ive~ tk lt e me rged from tIl!;' plenu lli were dear: DOlllestically, all efforts must now he directed at "an uficlISive struggle against bourgeois ideology" ( deci~' ioll 6). involving all e.~tens ive informatiun and propaganda campaign within t he party, p ublic organ i7A"ltions, and the press , to e,"plmsize t he need for greater discipli ne and vigilance against "foreign ideulogieal subversion'-' ExterT):llly, the p:lrly endorsed the d..:<:isiullS readl.:d ,It Dresd(.'Il stressing t he need for greah:r bloc unity (decisioll 7) . ~' Nt:ither the
pleJlu m rt:!solutioll nor allY suhst:!(IUt:!llt reports
~uggest
that at this
t ime a decisiun was made 10 invade Cl.edlOs lu\'akia ur to intenere in any direct form in its alfairs." On the (.'{lntrary. the Suviets are said to h:lVc told the C PC7. leadcrs tklt CzedlOslovakia was :Iel ua11y discussed in "temper:lte terms,"' and it appears thallhe SPI:_ cifie decisions reached at Dresden were not altered by the .'\ p rj] plen um. ,.. Thc April plenum did. huwevt:r. contrihute significantl y to the debate uver CzedlOslovakia by dearly biasing the parameters uf that deb,lle in f:l\"or of hard·line opinion. This w:.L~ done. Ilrst . by rcsolv ing that in dealing with disse nt at hlllne , hourgeois ideological infl uence had 10 be <-"
,e
1\l6.~.
Ih;, ",.~w,~. s"r "oto 12 of ch.l'kr 4 f<>r '''' r'1'1",ali,n .. " A<"«>rding 10 Bit'u', acruunl of di«;ussio", wi.h Su"id Icod,'" ,,( 11". M~y 4 Mn""",' n>oo1inl(. !Ii"en in hi. CPC. C enld Crun"'ilt~", plenum 'I""-,,,h in .\1")" 196/1. in Skilling. ~S"'n~ <>Inf"oIon 1....,hen .I~~,I B'~.""r'''' >1..... ..1' 10
CU,",W.luc6*irlrl,IIcrrol',,,/Il,c<J/,Hi,,,' .],. b64 ro. 12,
IGh
JIz
M
TIlE I'm:-CJIl$ IS I'E IlIOO
viet lead e rs thc u would han: the righttu in,'oke themsc!ves. This aspect of th e resoluti on attached conditions to th e principle of noninte rference aud undermined the argumen t that the Soviet l ead er~ sh ip did nut IHl\'I~ the anthuri ty tn de mand changes in Prague. The plenum's secund (.'o ntribu tion to a hard line was to attrib ute dom estic dissent and hloc disunity to th e same b etor: im perialism's efforts to sub\'ert soc'ialism from within. This made it difficu lt to support t he Prague Spring without appearing insufflciently cautio us about th e \Vcst's intentiolls in th e area. The cmn paign against ' Vest Germany's policy of b ridge-I mil ding was inevitably IXlistcred by the April plenom, as was Soviet se nsiti vi ty to rumurs of rapprochement he tween Prague and Bonn . At the same tim e, bye mphasizing that imperialism's majo r thrust was now sub" ersion . the p lenum. ill e nect, sup por ted the argll nwnt th at Sovie t secllrityarul inlleed th e securit y of the entire bloc-was threatened b y even ts hi C~.echuslovaki,t. As a result. a new uricntatiOll began to e merge: a {iI.."'t.Teasing conL'CTIl with direct ex ternal mi litar y threats and greater concenr with issues such as the mor.lle of the bloc armies. Pulitical assess me nts of t he refu rm movemen t bccame bound "p wilh hroad c r L"o " .;dcrati o". relating 10 Sovie t strategic in t erests
:lnd hllK' set'uril y. if Czechoslovakia hecame the ··\\,eak link" in the \ V,lrsaw Pact . East Europea ns and. more im portantly, th e Soviet defense est" blishlrrent t'ould legit intattdy enkr th e Ilulit ical debate over th e reform mo\'cmc nL The interdependen(."f' uf pulitical
ICh
!z
M
M"'lICII 22 - "'I'RIL 10
61
ber 1) to (.'all the D resden meeting-a det'isioll motivated hy the sharp increase in the perception of threat and till: cnllse{lllent quest fur information . The affirmation of the Dresden decisions (mll/lvers 2,3, (/m/oJ ) by tile Cen tral Cummittee plenum l ciecil;ioll ,wmber 7) llnderline{l the desire to expand the size of the consultative unit primaril y lor the purpos(!s ()r{~msenslJs bUilding. The hwk of any mention of Politburo or Council of Mi nisters {~m6 rmati o n of the results of the Dresden mee ting may hll ve indicated a split within the top Soviet leadership. tl wreby necessitat ing a wider {Iebate at t he Central Committee plenum. B rc~.hnev's speech at the Moscow C ity Party Confcrem:e, tim tone of cditorial repo rts up to and durin g the ple num . the L'O mpositiotl of the {lcbatc participants, and the published resolutions indkated. with few exceptions, the increasing <mlhority of ha rd-l ine opinion. T ht: plenulll imposed a party line again st ideological d ive rsity. thereby allowing the search lor alternatives to begjJl in carnes\. This search WilS spurred by time salie nce. which introdueed a furth e r ele ment of stress and the beginning of the secoml phase of the pre-erisis l>eriod.
" ,"
CHAPTEH
Foun
Phase Two: April 10- May 4
EVENTS IN I'HAGUE The l.~JIltiuuing deterioration I)f the sitnation in Prague heightened thc pe rc(~ pt i (ln of thn~at in ).Iosmw. On April 8, Qldrich Cernik's new government was sworn in . Among the ncw min isters were some of the chief advocah,s of n :form , including Ota ~ik and Gustav Hus;'\k as d epu ty prime minist(~rs and Ji i'i Hajek C(menil Martin Dzt'lr, and Josef Pavel as ministers of fore ign afluirs , defense , and interior. respectively. There wa.~ the beginning of a reviva l in b-oth the Nation'l! ,\ ssemblr, under JosefSmrkovskfs new leade rship. and the N'ltional Front, with Franmck Kri egel as chairman. Smrkovsky advocated a National Assembly that would be nol only" ,L 1 )"s.~i oll;lte and aggressive trihull
62
"
•
6J
APII[L IO - MAY 4
which \\1 IS not scheduled to meet hefore 1970. Knnwledge tha t the most radical reforms would he hlockt~d so long as these conservatives maintained their scats in t he Cen tral Committee le<1 to an i ncrea~ ing numher of calls to (:ol1vene an earl y extraordinary (!ongrcss to re mu ve t hem. Dilbeck was \lilling to move the congress forward to tIlt: spri ng of 1969, but sOllie of the lIIost impo rtan t regional organ izations. including South Moravia. West and Sout h Bohemia, and Prague municipal. passed resolutions urging a COIlgress hy t he end of 19G8 at t he lates t, in order to m'oid , in the words of the Prague resolution, the "Ioss of confide nce in the party and the real danger. . that people would seek a sohition of problems outside or agains t the part}','" Growing pressure for an earl y plen um to institutionalize the reform movement and change the t'OmlXlsitiun of the Centr.tl Committcc mcant that the Sovictlead· e rshi p might havc a shorter pe riod of time than ex pl."Cted to agree on what could be done to prevent e\'Cnts in Prague from getting out of hund. The sense of urgene y prooueed hy calls for an early congress was exacerbated b y fu rt he r indications from the ~linistry of the Interiur tl mt tIle eonservati vcs there we re alsu losing their positions. Minister Josef Pavers !\ pril 12 article in /'rrice , e ntitled "What Next in the St"Curity Field?'· set out Il is reform plan ~ fo r the minist ry. His intention to movc (Iuiekly to reform tI n: sl."Curity appar.ttus hecame appareut toward the end uf April whcn he announced that threc or fou r of his deputies would soon be rcplaced, along with other top officials. Mureo\"er, he state<1 that the minist ry was now unde r government. and not party, control. ' A series of rmlic;tl ar tieles in the C1.ceh press elaborating the fUIl(\;llll e ntal fc,ltun:s of tIle reforlll !llow: n U!]lt presented lillIe prnspt"Ct that the C7.t"Chn~ln\"ak l ead(~rs hi p s(~ri ollsl y inte nded to hring tile media unde r t'Ontro\.· Art icles dirL~tly implicating S.wiet agellts in the dca th of Jan r..lasnryk and the purge of HudolfStinsky (the party's general secretary until t he anti-Semitic purges of the earl y 195Os) appeared in mid-April amid cal L~ lor the official rehabilitatiun ofthuse twu CzedlOslu\"ak lcadcrs.' ' Rudi waca. April '27. 1965. ' T"" G.""/;a,, dnJ The lJfJilV TelrW"!)/, . Mal' I, 1_. ·S~e.
ro, ""'''1'1.'. );", );",,,It:. -0" ,
\"cI
Pro/:r.om
1968: anJ P. I'Bha,!.
"f .
I,,~""tll er;,;, : ' f~l",i r"{ Ihlg. April
Do:m<>..,..h (" Ik,'i,·~t
":"~l ioll.I
11, t96S: It Sc·
(or S,"'wbl C"",loo,~,,",,k i ...- PnIa. Apr; t II,
FnM,j or I'drtiament : ' Urmlmi I;"y, April
·s,"" fI",/f I,ni,'<>, April 1.2. I~ . a",llb. 100II.
t ~.
t96S,
TIlE PIIE-C/II SIS I'hlU OU
&1
HEAcnON I i'\
The CI'Cz reg ional party
~\OSCO W
l'() nfere llce~ ,
calls for an early congress,
d e mot io ns in th e ~ llll is try of th e Int erio r. alld revt"la tions in the press about past Soviet wrongdu in gs wc rc in terprc\ed in ~'Ioscow hi th e context ufthe new hard er l illc adop!t:d at the April plenum . ,\ Pmv(la editorial of April 12. l'Ommcn tin g un the CJ>Cz Central Cummi tt ee m eeting, did not 'Id a p! an u\'c rtl ~· hostile tunc; bul it
nevert heless stressed that the C I',cchnsJu\',lks had de live red
";1
df'-
('[sivc re buff to 311 ali e n, demagog ic. utl-.\I auist an d :.mtisoci;llist views:'b Suvctslwyu Ru~~ i!lll un the following (\;IY rermined frum
direct mention of C7.cchos]uva kiu. but it carried a sweeping ("{Indcmnatiun uf \Vestern effurts tu sulwcrt socialism frum within . ~Iaintaining that the Western policy of"hu ilding Inidges" was th e major manifestation of these efforts, the editorial warned:
Cum umn;sl s ~""",,, I ignun, inslmK'l's "I' id.~)I(>~i(" ,1 inl nm l" rit y :Hul \'acillal in1l in some re]ln,scnlal i""s of 1he i1llell ige1l Isia. [I is 110" P"rl~' C) rg:mil"oI i" ns' "blig:.tion . I" d",,1 a ...,s" I"It, n-lmli't" I hnse who 100M oourgl'ois "iews, to vari ous Z'e ne~ades and 10 th eir defcndL'rs a ",[ Y"S.1IU,u. " H" n',gade" "'''''',,' (~""" "" impu"i ' y," Cn,nrad., B rf''l.h l1~\' . ~I:trclo 29 ).
L I.
.
~;Iid
at ti ll:'
~Iosto\\'
City P:u·t)' Cuufcrclwlllon
O n April 17, Pravda puhlished ewerp ts of th e CzedlOslovak Act io n Progr;llll for the first time, th crcb r gi ving th e Soviet Jlu hlic its li rst glimpse of thi s majo r rci(l r m plalfnnn. The pap!!r indicated Soviet disq uiet about the program b~' also carrying an ed itori al on th e party 's rule as the lead i n~ Il.Jn~e in all sociali st societies. The author, I' . Pctrenko, stressed thai t he eurre lll siluat iun was pa rticularly dange rous llt.'t:ause " th e targe t of the most fl erce alt,lcks by imperialist reaction is th e I'ang uard of th e working (·lass-the C ommunist parties of til e socialist co untri es.'" Thc grow ing strength of negati ve opi niun un CzedlOs .l ovil kia and thc campai gn a~ain s t rc visionis m gcncrJ..lly (~Jmbincd witll the in creased saliellt"" of tim e to spur Ihe .~cilrch fi lr ,llteTllil\ivc wa ys (If d ealin g: with the sit uat io n in Prague. Part of this scarch in volved increased links he lween Soviet o ffi (' iais and leading t.'o!lSer val ives in C/,ec hllsluv'lkia. Co ntinuing purges within this group were grad " r ..u",k " pdt 12. 1(l6S. ' ''1'1", ShO ll"" " I'mnt of the Cta.. • PnlHia. April I., 19611.
Slr " ~clc." S<"~"'·"!I" /1,10>1'1'" .~I"iI 1 3, 1\1(,01; .
APIIII. iO-MAY"
65
uaIJ y depriving the Soviets of "reliable" sources of information about events within t he highest levels uf leadership. Thus it was re ported (lu ring April thaI Soviet Ambas_~,ldor Chcrvoncnko had he ld secret talks with leading conservatives. including Novolny. DlIbl'ek is said to have stated his objections abo ut these L'tlntacts to Chcrvoncnko personally, on April 23. but this was latc r ufficiall y de nied by a government spokcsman in Pm!,'Uc, although DlIhcek never IIddc{l his uwn denia!.~ M [LITAnY CONTINGENCY COi\SI DEIlED
At this time the Ars! public indicatioos appeared that the CPSU hierarchy was serio usly considering the military option. At the end of April, there was a series of region;ll p"tn ~ ( ..... ning...d). St.clc,' (Kiev). Ki,,:lenlo (H.klli. SII<]"" (S ,·~rd. Junk). \·"n~"'" (""linin). A",I"'I"w (lIigo). l)",,,lrh,,,,· (Il)""j,,). K",,,.o·v (Ahn .·Ata}. Ka· t",I",v (C,Ml y). 5<>10",.,,,1,.,,, (K"",,"). FnlL'J", April 20, 11lI>~. wm l'lcI<·d Ihe li , l of ,!"'ak· in~ <' n):;l ~e m "nb , I'd·,he ( \'oron~,h). l'ul~·,".kr ~A,hkh"I>ad ). ~ I ",he",,· (M imk). U,tino,(H""hkiria). Shoherhi .. k)· (C,imea)_ Ii: "lako~ ( li:r""nodor). 1'000"""..". (1,,10). Si,"'· ( D"l'l~ ' I"n). Sh~t~pill (U,huanla). G,,,d,k,, (~!i n lf Dlf,·",,·) .tlt! \1>h ..-...".,],., (C....,I)(;.).
66
TilE l'm;'CIIIS rS PEIlIOIl
uf the regiunal cunferences, as Iw was un a state visi t to Pakistan and Inuia frnm Aprillfi tu 21. The speeches hy Brczhm:v and Yc pi.,hcv were not puhlishcu . A re port of the prot.,<: t,.·. Jings, Iou"'ev!; r, was \(:ak c u vi;. Pr;.gll c to Mic hel T;lt U of Le Mfmde. Brczhll c" is _",id to have s po ke n in vc ry pessim istic term s a hout th e situation in Prague. \ Vithoul doubtin g th e loyalt y of Duill'ek. whom III;' ])T
Czechoslovakia might address all
[,,,,,, <1 " n "1'1")I"hmil y I"
1l111ke yel :mother atl llck Oil ideo]ogic'a] J a~l\e~s at hom e and ahroad. On :\pril 22 Grishin delivered a speech a l a m ee tin g marki ng the nine ly-eighth anniversary uf Lenin's hi rt h . T he mee tin g was attend!:!1 by Politbu ro me mbers, indnd ing I3rezhnev, t\o,"}'gin, ,Ind Podgorny. \Vell ove r h,& th c Sp\~ed l d Citit with in ternat ional issues, ilnd pri marily with d lilrts tn <-1llnhat imperialist suhvcrsio ll . " I~' .I/<m,/r. May ~ _ 6 . 1!1fi.S_ T.I" 'tot .. , .,,,,,,,,-..1 1)' II,., ,!ti, n"~'ti,, ~ 1<"', pia". "" Ap,, 1 2-1. n,~,~ I..... " m'K'1, ",,,f,,, i,~, in " .."""I.ry """,..., ,,1~'''III,~ y,'pisl",,' .",1 Ihe,)",~,' r~"oa,k>. Iter",I"" Skl\) I"~. (.';.." d"... I()1·" ~;"" /"I<''''',lr,,'[ R,,.r hi, ,1.t,·",... ", th"t ,"cI,b ),c,· '1~'~c"1 the ,lp,,1 Cen,,:tI (.'",,,,,,111<.., pic",,,,,. Yet T",u do,"" "nt me,,'''.\ 'he plen"", . ,u,,1 \·"I'i.hev i. i",:I"",.l;,, an)' "It"" "met.! 'or """llic.;.1 S""i~1 tor 11".. ""'ro·'·" h"'i "~ I~·,·"" " I~ ·"k'·T a l Ih,' Ap,iI 9-10 ",eeli"g. Il owc,..,.. un;", b ,!I'" Ihc " lIid ,1 tl.til)· "<:"-'I"'1'e , ,,[ Ihe ~I o><:<'w P",ly , Me. on _\ 1',;1 19. 1008. (I",~ I"~h Il"";,,,c,' and \"~p;'he,· 'I" 'k., ,1 Ih" m'~1;ng "Iii... ~!,,".,>w Pa,'" ,,1,;< un AI'';! IS. It ""'"'' lil.. k .10 •• hI" i, ft:f~,n"..: ,.. thi' meelilOg .",1 not to ei lhe,.he p, .. '-i .~" C~IO 'm1 C.. ""nil1"" p\e"",,, '" 'he ., ,,h><"w "I.k" ,,,. n ,,," li' l ,of 'I)... k~" ",,,I I~'d k'; I"nl_' ~" (I ,i, lau. , mc.... 1in_~ w • • p'inl,~1 ;n I",,,in.l uv, ""~"'q. u" ApIi\ 2~, 1!J&i, . nJ ""ilh(", lIre·, Io",·,· ""I r"l'ishev were ""en rep"'!,,!! '" p,e,enl .
h.,
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67
Grishin's speech WliS notable both fu r i( s hawkishnc~s and its authority. He wenl heyond the standard !()rmu)ations, stating thai imperiali sm is scckin),! not the me re wC;;lkcn ing of socialism but the actual n :sturati ull of capi tal ism in th e socialist L'OlIlitric s. A large
part of the speech clahomted th e principles un which the C I'5U Central Cummittee based its relations w ith fraternal state s- "pru idariiln internatiu nalism. b ruth e rl y mutu al aid , equalit y of rigllts and so vere ignty:' H e went on to quali fy thi s: "OurjJarty" co nsiders tIm! " now as never ilt;'fure, t he unity of the (.'Otmt ries of the s(x.'iulist
C01l1monwclIlth and the harmoni7.atiull uf the natiOlml interests of each frate rnal countTy with t he ge nera) interest of the wo rld socialist system a nd the internat iunal cummtmist moveme nt is paramount." Comple tel y Iltissiltg frottt Grishin's list ofprindples was the standard refere[J(:e to noninterference. In its place. there appeared "urothe rly mutual aid" and Ihe idea t hat the individual inleresis of member slales t1lU ld no lo nge r take primacy over the general interests of the bloc. Nee dless to say, these general in te rMoscow in such way as to best ser ve ests were to l>e deflned Soviet inte rests. The introduction by Grish in of "broth e rl ~' mutual aid" WiU; a qualitative siel) li) rWard hi lhl: dl:vclupment uf the illculogical raison d'ctre fo r the invasion. All that 11'(1$ re(juired was agreement that :111 furm s uf aid. including military means, could be extended tn safegu.trd sodal1sm. And C rishin pruvidcli this as we lL Alie r reaffirming the results of the Dresden meeting, wit hou t. huwc \'er. mentioning C~.echos lovakia, Grb hin amtoutlced that "the Soviet Union will c xte nd tu those people whose freedom and imlependenec is threate ned by impe rhtlism 'lll-round poIitie:ll, et'Orlomie, and-if necessary-also military ait!. " <) That such a majur policy stateme nt was made by a relatively junior Politburo me mbe r (Crishin had only bet'Ome the !>.\OSt'Ow party boss in 19(7), uutside proper p:lrty urgans (the dta nge was not Signaled previously at the Central Committee plenum, the meeting of the MUSt'OW party Ilkfiv, or at one of the reg ional party L'Onfercnccs). and published in I ::.!';cslill ruther (him Prav(/a suggests that the escalatiun of the crisis was not llniversally approved within party ran ks. The deputy chie f editor of Pnwr/a, Vadim Ne krasov. was quoted un April 21 as presenting an e ntirel y l'ontra ry view uf develop-
uy
" I:"'~'I", Apri l S!:), 196!l
''''
o::h
68
TilE PIIE-CIIISIS I'EIUO[)
menls in Prague. D uring :l Moscow radiu forum, Iw stated that huth 11,,: March- April ere..: ple n um and the Action Program had pointed 0 111 t he ex istence of an ti socialist t rclHis and had resolved
both to "strengthen the ideological unity of the CPCz and to increase its leading role in society." Nckrasov \\NdS i()rthright in hi~ support for the Prague Spring: " Ill my opinion, if one sums up vcry briefly what is now happening in Czechoslovakia, il is not eve nts in Czechoslova kia which arc of an u nh ealt hy na ture, bu t the interest displayed in th em by impe rialist propaga nda.'" " Along t he same lines, l'ruvdll published a llInjnr article from its I'rdg uc correspon-
dent on AprilJO that positively described the Action Program and the r<:gioll;ll party l.~mferences, stressing th e ellort5 to improve party work and suppress a nli soci!llist ele men ts. It is possible that tllese two d ivergent views represented equal yet l."On lliding trends within t he Politburo. Nekras()v's improm p tu remarks, howeve r, cannot be comparea with the report presented by Crishin. Tl,e presencc of the Soviet trilllll\'imt" aud tl w " HIlly imli cati ons in Crishin's speech that hi s formulations had th e ;lUthorHy uf the party beh in d them woul d ('ertainly m ake any thes is suggesting factional "cl ivity
delivered on such anniversaries tend to be sel pi{l{'C aflilirs. refleeting th e general line; it w(lul{] ,m t be typical fur st"tem cnis to be made that did not mee t with Poli tburo approvaL Yet the absence frolll Mosl.·()w of Kosygin and many ot he r Polithuro members \\xm ld l.'Crtai n ly have made it possible for the speech to h;lve been passed by a Politburo minority. And sillce th ere is no ind icatiu n that these major policy changes were collull'mic;lted tn the party during th e scries of reg ional party meetings on April 18- 19, it seems like ly tltat tlte dedsion (lIuml)er8) to indudc "brnthc rly nllltll,11 aid" ,IS a principle governing: relations and military assistance as a possible mod"lity W"$ m"de e it],er w],ile th e majority of the Pulitburo was dispersed ill th e regio ns (April 18- 1!)) or after o nl ~' some oftllem had re turned to l\[os("ow (April 20 or 21 ). In either ease, Kosygin euu ld nut have been present. O n .""pri! 21 he left I'"k is tan (a (lay lat e r th'lIl p re viously scheduled) and instead of ret urni ng to ~losc."Ow a.~ Origi na lly planlled, I.e made a deto ll r to New Delhi for a bricf l"tmn:rsatilln w ith Mrs. Candhi . lie could no t therefore have been in ~In.~c()w befilre the early hours nf April 22." Grishin's speech " Mo","w rulio).
Aprit 21.
196!i. SII'/J . SU /2751IA2Ii.
" On "'pTiI 5. l!lr>li. p,·" ct/" ""''''JIlt,, •.,,, I"",,"r~" Ap,;t 17 ~",t 2[1. Il r lell M""-,,,," t"' Ap,it 16.• ,,;'·ill~ in R.""tl'h"l; n" ,be 17,1>. t"""i,,~ P.,ki,'."
''''
o::h
69
and th e previous remarks by Urezll11ev ,mJ Ycp ishcv, the refo re, seem to indicate that co ntingency pi:.llls for;.ln in vlIsion were seriously being (;o ntemplateJ at this time.
The Suviet military appears to have uccn highly in\'olved in this process, an d coincidi ng with Ycpishcv's re marks at the Moscow meeting. C7.cchosiovuk sources r eported tlwi \ Varsaw Pact headquart ers J ecidc{1 be tween f\pril lB llml2.() to send
~I ars hal
Yakllbov-
sky to Prague fo r negotiations on \ Varsuw Pact maneuvers (([ccisloll 9). Negotiations for holding th ese maneuvers in Czcdwsluvaki a had begun in 1\)67; and althougll the new Czechuslovak leade rship had su<.-'C ccd cd in postponing them and reducing their scope, pressure fro m \\'arsaw Pact headquarters bemmc lIIore inte nse at this time." Ma rshal Yakubo ysky visitcd Prague on April 24 - 25 as part of a tour including Poland. th e CDR H ungary. and Bulgaria for discussions on "(juestiolls t'Ontocrn ing a lilrt her im;reilse in the dde nse preparedness of the \\'arsa\\' Treaty member states," " Yakubovs l,), held talks with Svoboda. lJlll-.{-ek, Cern fk. and the tl efense minister. Mart in Dzu r; and it was D/,lir whu sll bsc{jucntly confirmed that the talks had indee d cenlcred on military exercises. He denied rC I)()rts tlmt he had cntirely rcjected Pact mancu\'cr phlns. Yet at the saT~ le tiTlIt'. he 111:\Ue it d ear that the e~ertises were not to he on a massive scalc: Th e cxtcn l uf Ih{~ cxcrcisc.<- whieh ure indced tu takc place this yc ar . prn'isely ddinc u in the same wlly as h,,-~ alway.• been donc. "lorl'O\'cr, thcre ~re 10 he staff man euve rs and nol exercises of soch" size as the Vlta\,
on our te rritory- will havc 10 bc .
]) ~.Ilr·s chie f of generill stair. Gelleral Karul Rusuv, was mu rc e.~ plicit about th e results of Yakuhovsky's visit. The exercises, he
ro, New lkll,i on ..11',;1 21. li e held . brief o<""-.",,,H<>" .."h ~I ... Gandhi bef","" 1I);n): bock fl)'in)\ time. ",,,uld l",,' ~ ".ad. il Im[lO"ihl~ r,,, I("')"gin 10 he I...,k in 'M' th~ 21 ... ~'o, "~I."b ,,r hi' ,·i,it. ".,.. rn""/,,. ApMI 22. I96S. SWD, SUI27·l(l,'; . ",",", ;""" C""U"'IK".'~ A.-c/o;,,·,. 1"')' 6 _ 1:1. lOO~. " . 227113.
1<>
.\to..,.,..... The
M,,,•.• ,,,,· ho:fo,e
mid" i~.t
- In ~ teiev;,,,d intc,,·;""· "n ~t.r 21. W68. M",lin Ih,;" Ihe C.rtl,,,,Io,-ak mil,I'h" of n.l;o!1al d,·/,·"...,. " . I,'<'Ilh,ul"" .. " , ,, 'M,h" I••• itt Ib~ .""r I"",..","" J.nuar}· .",1 AI"il .",1 ,It" f.a, In D",""mh", 19!i7 ,h., th" ""uld ",i>l''''' its 1"'''.'''. ".. lie, 1'1.,,> to hold "'I"l(~·>cal" ",.n,,,,'·,·,. ;n C""'lto>Im·~k;. -h>O ci ...."I.Hn~"' the en d of M..... h th .t the II'........ P...1 lI"od'l".1' t"" had ,,,It-i,,,,1 Pr..g"" it """ ",It .·d utin ~ "p'ing ",a, ,,,,,,'.,, in C,,,,4 ... ~,,",,k;. hut Ilm l Pr~g.", 1,,,,1 """,,-,.,It,1 Ih ~ ",.,,,.,,,.~ .. (" I", held •. I,.,...·)''''e ("'"", };"k Ti""" ·. ~ta r<"h ~ .
,i,,, ..
'''''l"
llJ6.'l).
" GI.lI\ and Bul= ;an p,e» "~encic>. April:!.l. llJ6.'l. in Sir/:!. £ ~21"U;: J'",~uc r.w;<>. Ap'il 24 . 1965. SlY/! . " Pr..,.u~
...dln.
~: ~:t27.531h olld ~t l1 .
Mat· 3.1968.
S\\'H.
April 27. 1965. SW/!.
EFJ27fHIC2I2.
EElZ75611.
70
TII[ PIl f;·CIIIS rS PE IUOD
sla t~d, w~re
planned fi,r ble summer or fall. Czechoslovak fo rces wou ld fi rst carry out slaB' Ill llll CU \ "crs, and only th en, "if t he plan were fu lfilled," would exercises of allied staffs be arranged. L" Cle~lrl}'. th e CzedlOs\o"ak leade rs were st ill resistfn~ pressure tu hold fullscale troop c~ercisc s. and tllC more th e)' resisted. the more th e Soviet m ilitary and polil icalleadership grew concerned about Prague's reliah ility as a mem ber of the Warsaw 1"lel. YakuDovsky's failll~c to
obtain an yth ing morc than the \'a guc a ssuralll.'C tll;lt maneuve rs of some type would he held hclurc the e nd ufthe yea r suhject to further negotiations contributed significantly to the escalatio n of th e crisis and was to precipitate a series of hi gh-lcvel Sovict military visits to Prague iu May. Thc last wcck of April also saw the publicati on of importan t articlcs in PmtA/(J by leadin g party ollicials, incl ud ing V. V. Zag\;ldin, deputy head of the In ternat ional Departm e nt oftllC Centrdl Committee and P. N. Fe do'iccv, di rector of th e Institute of ~ I arx i sm Leni nism. whu had been one of the speakers at th e April Ccnt ral Com mitt ee plenum .'" On April 25. PrarJdll published an ar ti cle on ·'~ I arx i sm and tlte Contemporary Ideological Strugglc" by S. Ko\'ale\', th e parly otlida l w hose Sep te mher 2(j I'ro,;,I" art ide jll .~ tifying the illva~i on wa.~ to heeo!tle kno\\'l us the "Brezhncv Doc'trin e :· " In an attack un the democratic ideals of the Prague Sprin g,
Kovalev made th e fo!\owin g statement : Only those to whom tllti iliteTt~ st s of the \nJrking J)(~opl e arc a liell l'Ould call fur " absolute'· frc<-'O p. ~. F... to",,~v. - t..,,,l nl"" - lhc ~ t ""'i.m ,,( I),.. ''''''Il!kl h C~Il!"r)':' Pm",/", Aprtl 22. 1968: .nd V. \., ?...!(I.di". ·-fh~ 151kh A""iw,,,,'Y
"s, !.: ,,,'.le.'. ··Soyorei~nl)' and the
Pm"lll. Seple,"t,.., 26. 19f,s .. Pru_"". Ap,il Z$ , 19(>8
[nlemali .. o.\i.tOhliF(:ltion
71
This linking of calh for freedom with coun(errevolution and attacks on the very foundatio ns of socialism clearly did nol augur well for til e C7.tlchusluvak reformers. Nevertheless. Kov,,!clt made no m ention uf th e "hrothe rl y mulual aid" formula. Indeed his state me nt
that "life exposes IxJth ri ghi-wing [!luI 'left' revisionism, particularly I\laoism" seems to ind icllt e t Imt he still reg;lrded the idcologic(ll threat from C hina a.~ more dangerous. The Czechoslovak press reacted immediately to the increased activity of the Soviet leader.;hip und press. Pnice nn April 25 acclised Grishin of making unfair gCllerali7~Lt ion s and dcrnandt:d an explanatio n uf Suviet inten tions. M/1Il1Ii jrunla
011
the same da r
t'Om plaincd that the Soviet press was presenting a distorle(] picture of ('vents in C7.Cchoslovakia. It critici7_cd the Soviet Union for seeking to impose ideological control ovcr the bloc and attributed Soviet apprehensions to tIll' fe:lr uf spillover. Perhaps even Illore damaging to Suvict-Czechoslov(lk rel;ltiollS were the relevations by Karul Bacilek. the former Czechoslova k min ister of public securit y, thaI the arrest and trial of Hudolf SUnsk}' hml been ordered personally b y StaHn. supervised by Amlstm; Miko yan. and carried uut by Soviet "advisers" working in the CZL'{!husluvuk ministry at
the time.""' !;ol1owing
the"~e
re\·elations. there were two more sUI-
cides in the Ministry of the Interior, bringing to twenty-six the reporled nomber of suit'ides in that ministry during April." The ecstatic and jubilant atmosphe re that characterized the ~Iay Day de mOllstrJ.tiOll in Prague wa~ ill sha rp contr'!'st to the \I SU~11. Illore orderly and sombre parades in the otlIcr bloc L-a pit;lls. Television viewers wcre ahle to watch IJulx'Ck heing greeted by Czechoslovak-style hippies carrying homemade placards and even an American flag. '" L.1.if:r thaI even ing, a gmup of students protested against the ("()nditions of their Polish (.'Oon terparts; and on May 2 in Stare Mesto square, thousands gathered to hear speeches by reform leaders in what p/'avdt/ described as ;l"provocative assembly.""" Suviet lea{lers, by this time. were drawing very n e~;ltive L"()ndusions from almost all the events in C~.edlOslovakia. By the beginning of !>.Iay they had decided t hat the March- April CPCz Central .. S, .... ,"'. April 28. 11!66, 'nl''''rali,m"III" ",I,J Tril",,,,·. .\1";] 2<J. 11!66 .
.. .'·rID l"o,l nm,:•. April 30, 11!66. " A> ,1""," 1" Ihe AliI": ". ".,.;,;,~, ,-er .. ry of Ihe I",·a.ion . .. P'-"L"l/Q. Au~'''1 2.2 . 19(1l;.
'~ ).:"n"')""'Y
I.) I.:. /,h 1.: )"1.. m.. k/n~ tl.., 1.111" a lln;,
72
THE l'I1F.-CRISI S I'EI1 IOl)
Cummittee plenum hud hecn "unable to s tal>ili~,c the situatiull." I'r(ll.)(/(I re leaseclthe olfidal aCl'uun\ of Suviet reaction to th e May l'T is is on August 22., ] %8: [Soviet] amiNI' iltcre:\.~eJ sti ll further when, , a wkle-seale e:IITIpaib'll was launched in the <..~>u ntry to discredit all the previuus act ivity uf the CPCz; whell a
IJr("-'C~'
of maSs
rC]ll:K~'nl{'''1
of parly and
statc personnel dc\'cloPL-« 011 a wide ~c;,l c . : wh e ll a dearly in stigat ed waVe of anti· Soviet propu!!'l1'UU roSe in the press, nldio and I cJ c\'i.~i() n ; and when all surls of organinliolls ullI}()S(·d to the C"IllIllllll;sl Party began Iv c", cT)~c . This was why II!" CI'SU Central Com mittee _ . again pro[>OscI I tlHlt a hilal era l meeting he held.
On "by 3, the decision (mlluber /0) was tak en to summon the Czechusluvak leadership to Muscuw for im mediate talks,
SUMMONS TO MOSCOW
Insofar as the Czechs had e,~prt's sed their desire to discuss economic matters, they eould clai m with some justificatiun tha t the ).Ioscow meeling cOllvelled Oil May 4 had heen called at t he ir initiat ive. Ye t Ihis sCems 10 have uecn more a fal:e-savt ng de"kc to
ameliorate th e elrcct of having to leave for ).·l osCQW without allY prior notice . Dilbeck, Smrkovsky, Cernfk, and Bil"ak arrived the re at 2:00 A . ~I .• and talks began immediately." The Soviet delegation (.-onsisted of I3rezhnev, Kosygin , Podgorny, K.ltushev, and Hllsakov. The eommllniqlle pliblisllL'd in Pravda on ). Iay 6 reported that t he talks tuok place in an '·open and <-'{)mradcl y spirit ," but mentioned noth ing abou t total ag:reement. t hus imlicating that the Inet ting d id not stop the serious clcteritlrdtion il l rd,lti(llls he tween
the two sides. Eeo no mic matte rs were indeed 0 11 the agenda, with th e Czecho.dov;)k loan application und er considl:wtion, Pe rhaps in n : spcmse to increasing rc ports that CZL"Choslovakia was seeking a loan Iro m v(lrious \\'estern snur<-"Cs, induJilig the \\'orld Bank .IIIJ the i ntcrwltioTHl1 ~'I onctary FUlld." it had heen made known ill Praguc that ,-Mich~1 Tal". 1£ .11 ,,,,d, .. .. "
111\il~
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.11.), .1-6,
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Ii.
,I'~""" a" ,h"n fUl the It,,,-,,,d. d,l<..I April
19&i . 26_ 1968. "f " 1\""",,;,) S,··
,·". il)· C""",,,il rn''''li n~ "" E.,,,,,,, E""~,,, I,dd i" \\"""hi"~(o,, un AI',il 2·1. J!J68. ",,, Hfm~d 11..1 Cz«:ho<".ibl,- rne,nh" ... hil' in (h~ 1\<>rl,1 l'I;.nk " ,,,I \I", 1 "(~r"atio,,~1 M ",,~'.,)· Fund . II al", "" -..-.,1,,,1110.( 11o'''gh"""., So..,,,,Wri •• n", k. CI;H' ....1. ~"d F""k" CIA D"".:\'" lie], ,, •. Ih-pu'" VuJe, S''''f.-1,,,)' 1~ ,j,lc'" . ml n,h_ "". Th" memof."d"m " -'" Jcd." ,; ~,~l .".1 ,dc.,.,d '0 'h" ""tlo", und", , h~ h ....do", of
"
,"
73
APHIL I O- MAY.;
the Soviets might he favorably disposed to extending the loan themselves."" At the meeting, however, the Soviets 'iOught further clarification on Czcchoslovakhl's irlVr,slmcnt plans. As Smrkovsk}' makes clear, Kosygin in particular appearcd 10 he concerned lest the Czechoslovaks reorie nt their e('"Ollomie development toward the West: Cernrk . ex plaine<1 our need to modernizc Our manufacturing in_ clustrv. \\'e needed about .100 10 500 milliun ruhles. We wanted tu have the luan from the Soviet Union a"d we said that if the Suviet comrades couldn't manage tn lem! us that milch, we would apply to the international hank ur sumc 01 hl'[ source. We un derlirH.'d that in th e event of our borrowing from the West . the ueal On OOr side would he Ift~ated 011 a strict ly mn llll eft:iall);l~i.'i without polit iwl ~trings. T he reply 10 that- frorn K"sygin-was (·"snal. th,,! they "~),,Jd r:~ amin e our request. But Kosygin dilln't lilrgt!! to TCmark-for whom tliu We actuall y want tn rna rlllf"cturc eonSo",e r ~o()(l s? For exporl? He ,;.aid tl];lt the 'Vest dilln't m,ed oor l'OmUrIler ~oods antl wuuldn'l wanl them in flllure. So then we'd be wanting 10 get oor goods on the markets of the socialist countries. especially "f th e Soviet Union. " 'ith the help "finvestment capital from the western muntries. Bul the socialist market didn 't wnnl our ~'OnSo",er g'K,J, e ither. it r"_,,,,!.:cl our invcstment goo,ls, '" Judg ing from t lte compos iti on of the two negotiatin g te:JllIs :Jl1d the repor ls that circu lated la\l:r. ut h,:r important items we re also on th e agenda. As in the Dresden IIIccting, the Soviets wanted all explanatio n from Ihe Prag ue leadership li)r the increase ill antiInfO.-ma! ion
.1.<1. ti" n!Io" , .'!c<",,,b of "'IX)!!' i" I'r.s". of df",b !o .""k \\'",!e", I""", !o
,,,,,,;.,,,! it, "",)ow,,")'. ,.... Galia CoI.n. n_{r"m n"I.· I" C!Ldw'/,,",,'''' . 1', 39.•"'\ S~iI\in~,
(;=h",l"mlia', ',,'em'l'led Il,·ro/,,' itm. p. 600, " Ae"ordin~!o z.Jeni'~ MIl'nM, ' t",,!ed 10)' Ihe .\'"" li. rk 1'i",~,. Mav l. J9&!!. Michel Taw (I", M(mJ~. MOl' 4. 1!1!Xi! al,.., '!'H)' ~" -~, •• ! ,,,,,,,,,,,' in I' .... ~" " to the dr..,. rh .. the USSR "'.., bm ..... hl)' ,1;'1""''''!10 'l "d), lng th" 1""'ll>llil)' of ~Mcndlng a UOiI mlltl'"1 10;,,, !n 1101.1 '" C<>I\..e,lil,\e C''''~''''Y to I'r.~',., . In conne<1 io" with !I,e;" "'1''''1." i! "'.. ,,,ntored lho! """1',"" .1 .." r" ,'1,1, 1'.... ~,,~. I"""ihly f;", ,JH' n: n.y c.,ld,,,,,;,,,,. 0" M.y 9. Fu, " de~ai1Ct! .nal)', ;, 0( the I~'nd (0 (;zet'h",~,,·.ki", 1";,,, 'PI'Ii<-.!iWl. incl uding th~ p.,or:o_ <1",1<,.1 r••:! !Io" !Ioe (;()H . ">1.,,.1. • "d ,10" lIS SlI '''''•.• ( C,,,d~,,~ ,, .. l (a 1l.:WO milli"" r...-. e il:!' ,,,d,~nl'" """"'" lalon ... l $1.56 1,;tt;'H,). ..,e HFF.. Il.",urc/•. f.a.ol r.urn" •. C= lu..J,,· ,,,,kia , ~t.r 28, 1\l6II. ~U p'1' oJ,,, nw.i",.i"cd ,1,a' rhe So,';'" Union lu> <1",o1c,I)' ' ''pp\y of ",10"'1 10 C,,,-,<,h<,, Io.,,kl, . n,i. I"O'''\''~( an immedl,le offici,! '!enla\. " 'i'h c';n;: an,~"",dog rio" 125.000 '00. <>f wlo~,,) h.d I..,.." de1i.-~,.,,1 h"", -",,n April I_Z,'i. "'1110 ,I,ipnlt'n!.> du,ing lhe I.,! nin c d_l" l'i~I.~, 110. " """,I, "'!i "',.".,f Sm,""",!.:)·. All flllfinuh.d (:~n<"~'flli"". I" IZ, Th.. !h~ 100." applicalion lu>C(J'" mcelin~ ..... . 1", ",nfi,med h)' Sm n,,,,,,ki' in hi' '''''timony t" th.· N~llorlal A.. cmhl)' ForelWl Atfai" Otmmill •..,. en:.. ~tay 15. 1965: h~ l),dK'ek in hi. R,,,I~ ",
,,=
a,"
IGh
JIz
M
TIlE I'IUH.': III S1S l'E IIlOI)
socblist 'Ict i\'it ~'. Brezh n ev spen t lIIuc h of th e ti lile readin g aloud excerpts from n e \\'spapers or re ports of mee tings , man~' of which were previousl y lJllknuwn tu the Cwclltlsluvak leaders the mselves. Th e folluwing U('t-'Ollnt hy Smrkovsky provides an e xcellent in d ic:llioll of the lone oflhe m eel ing: th e whule. we spe nt the day listenin!! to ~ luni,: li st of the th ings which . . th e Sovie t re prl.'se nt ative.\ disliked about developments in oor cou ntry. In efr~ L it WaS a rea ding of th e While Book from a work ing draft. Uurin" the talk. secretaries ke pt ('()Ill in!!. hringing Comrade Brl.'zhnel' more "ml moT(' info rm"li on "bonl what th is ur that newsp"pe r or m~ga7.ine wa.~ writin" ~hout us. ",hat this pl.'rson or that hud said. It's a fact that IlUIiC of us h,u l ;U\ ~' idea ahout muny ufthe thing.~ they re"d " ut lu "'. "'p<'dally Brt,~J , ,,cv. \V],,,I W"S in "01"" ,listricl HeWS paper. that there was such and slich an article. a mccling someplace. where M.llllehody spuke and what he sa id. I low l,mhl we bave known il all? They galhere,l the infi>rtnation-aml here [in Praguel Amhassadur Chervonenko did ii - from the people who were l"te r C'.lllcd Ihe (.·•.>n~crvatives. Those people mlleeted ;lil kinds of !!ossip ~Jl(1 handed th em to th e Soviet embas~y-~ml from there the stuff wen t 10 Bre7.hnev. We coulllcreil. espe<·ially Dubc:<ek and others. with fac ts and iuformatioll or much gr('ater we ig ht. . \\'e "'ere di s('~lll(."erted to fiud that the y show ...od no illtere~t whatsocver in Ma)' Day. where the p"r_ ticipation had he en so im pressive. . That d idn 'l in lef('S I them. They were interesh.od in meetings of KA N "nll K 231. attended hy fifty or" hundred people, sometil1le~ less. \\'e were sicke ned by the whole b usiness, because We re:,li7.et! th ey wer,m 't intere .• leu in the facls. in our o\'erall silu"lioll, bUI were look ing fur prele.~ t s for opposing liS. '" 011
FollOWing the m eeting . in hi s les tim uny to th e Nationa l Assembl y's Foreign Affilirs Com mittee. S1I\rkov s k~' stated th~1 th e Soviets had bee n try ing to discern whe the r th e Pr.t.g u e le adersh ip ha d control of the s ituation in their own count ry. Althuu gh he rei te rat e d D u bce k's assttratwe" that the Sl)"ids hud rC{'eived CZCdlOslova k cxplanali()n.~ w ith sOllie unders tanding, Smr kovsky's {leHallt pmlllise that "no fOTCe , wh e ther international or domestic" would d eIled Czech os lovaki ,\ frolll es tablis hin g a '·hu manis t. d e m{}eratil' " Sm,ko,·,ky. ,\n I./.!linhl",t/
Col'''·'·...",;,'''.
p. II. I" hi, 1~'1i"'()"r I" Ih~ 1", li'H,;,1 A,-
,.""ht)· Fo , e;gn AIT"; ,, ()H",,,;II ,,,,. S""k...., k)' . J",ilh·, t 11,,1 tI,~ C"",)",.l",·ak ,1d"!,"Ii,,,, loa
b<,,,,"
" RuM 11'0'«'.
"'illo " a ,,,,,lOll,;, "f,I"-"";('" f",-1.>" aboul """ """iali'l
~I "J' 6. tll&l
ro,,,,,,
~PIUI.
75
H'-MAY 4
ilnd sociillisl society" '" clearly implies that the "Ilks lwd not ended in agreement. Indeed , this is confirmed hy the statement in ilis memoirs: "'Ve came b:wk from Mos<-"Ow so disillusioned that we <-'(J\1ldn't, in all conscience, say .mything to our puhlic at horne, since it was impossible to speak about the actual <-'Ontent of the talks," '" DulX:-ek, too, made it clear that disagreements had been voiced, and in an interview with Hudti I'nlvo, which , interestingly enough. was reprinted in Pmt;dll , Dul:H:ek m:lde only the most transparent drurt tu prese nt the ne){utiatiuns as norm;,1 and trolLble-ffl:(~ :
It is prol}er amollg good friemb . 1101 In hide behind diplumatic IlOlitcncss hut 10 speak oul openly, as an C'Ioal with c'1 uals. In this spirit. the Sovici comrndcs expressed COHt-ern lest the process of d emocrati7.oltiull in our country be U5<-...I against socialism."
Bil'ak, the lllost <-'Onsc rvat ive mem ber of tht~ Cz<->t:]m.lovak (Ielegat ion, and nne who, acco rdi ng 10 Smrkovsky and H:ijd: , agreed with the Soviet assessment of the situation in Prague, "" also subsequentl y provided a full :K't-'Vunt of the :\hy rnee! ing. Tn !he Sovie!s' judgmellt, l3il'ak main!ains, the C I'Cz lea\l{:rship had no! carried out the promises made at Dresde n and, Oil the contrary. !Ite siluation had dc!eriumte{] sint"C theil, Ar.:<-'Vnlin,l! to ml"ak; They litcntHy 1X:gJ;"d us 10 re .."gniz.c til<" dall!;"r which threa tens th.: CI'Cz and tSSII arisinl! ""I "r t 10" );1"0"'110 of t')1IlIlerrc""lut iouary fUR"t;S. In Ihat situatiun nn aid of any kind muld in dIed improve Ihe position or Ih" T<: ['\lltli~' and th e sta mlard of li\'ing uf its pt.~'I)le . when th e lear\.:r.;h ip "f t I,,: part)' "!HI )!UH:nIHH:nt wen: 1I0t taking matte rs illlo their OWII hallus. They implored liS 10 r<::,li7.: thaI disor.lcr "nd d,aus "'"nuld ine vitahl y spTU"d from th" politit,,1 sphere to the lIational t....."Ouom)' whid, ... ,ulll leild to a ..·"t:l5tmp],e .
The Soviets, he said, "hegged liS not to forgel tlta! the Western boundaries of the CSSR were at the same time the boundaries of the soci;,lisl C;UllP" Th ey t:"'I'I"l'iz."d II,.. , ,,c rifk.,s that Soviet leaders had made in cstahlishillg socialism in Czechoslovakia and (k>t:lan,d tll:1I "limier 110 circumstiUlt.·CS \\~)ll id it he permitted for " (1'10:. ,\ taf' 15. tIlf>'l. quo!,..:! in liFE. R""ca,e/', t:".,'II:"n'I" , (;,r;lw.I,~'ak",. M~r 16, 19lill . ~h" /lu,/f I'ol{:ll. SII'R . E ICf27follK'i 4 "SI1lTko'-s~)' , 1\." U"fi~;., IK:,1 C"""",..,,,~'''. M.r 8. 1!l6/i_
,'_ I~,
.~ I'm"d~.
"'Smrk,,,-.kj'. A" Unfini,h,,/ C"",-~r""lio", I'. Il , .,,,1 J lIij<'k. f)ir an. aI'''''. p. 80.
''''
o::h
76
Tilt: I'lIt:·cmSIS I'EIUO[)
evcnts tu dc"dup ill .~uch u w,ly thai suvm:r ur laler socialis Ul wuui(1 be liquidated in C:wchoslu\"ukia. Th is had IXK"OIllC the concer n nut only of CzccllOsluvakiu, but of internat ional socialism as a whole. " ,r. In llis speech to th c S,~plt:ml)('r tOO\) C I'Cz Central Cummittee plen u m. Bil'ak paraphrased the Soviet Jl05i t iun as fo llows: "To permit CZtlchuslovuk ia to fallout of t]le sod,llist ,,:unp \\1)ulJ mea n the be trayal of socialism an d t ill; annulling of the results of th e second world war, . an d this they C()!Il< m"jor Ill/,ll "ni w .rUde (Of 1,,1), 16. 1970, .1 .. , in /'n"A" IHIIH': hd." " p. ,'1(;(1, " S"b./cdl'i 11), " " . 3S (tu701. 2&1 _&5. "'Spo,,,,,h h ) 11 .. , 11<, A"~'l>t W. I%'J, i" S\\' H. EEfJ I;'7/(",.IH~ i "t,''''i<'w " -ill< ~lIy"o\I, I , !~7\j,
"u,ho,'
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ICh
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M
AI'IIIL IO-MAY"
77
creased demands were being made for erea{ ing a legal political opposition to the CPC7. that by nature (.'fiuld only he ,In anlisocialist opposition., . They said they knew the speci6c pcople responsible for this and asserted that an end would be [mtto it." " The results of the May 4 meeting were a setback for Czechoslovak negotiators. AltllOugh their appliC"dtiun fur an ecunomic loan was to be considered further, it was dC;lr tlnlt the Soviet.~ \\lJuld !Lot allow its use for any fundamental reorienting of C7.eehoslovakia's t rad ing links ur industrial dc velopme nt. Further, it would appear that Moscow firmly ticd the question of a loan to the success of the epez leaders in carrying Ollt political mea.~ures to put an end 10 antisoci,llist activities. The Soviets called for the suppression of KAN (the Club of Nonparty Activists), K 231 (a human righb duo opell tu anyone imprisoned under 1948 Law No. 231 for the defense of the relJUhlie) and similar grou ps, and the reintrodllctioll of censorship. Dubcck (."()nccded that military maneuvers Imd also been discusSl..J . \Vllile be agrec(] that "joint military e:l.
CHAPTER FIVE
Findings
I)I~C I S I ON.s
Then: we re ten decisiuns taken in the twu phases uft llc pre-crisis periud: Der;ision x""","~ I'IIASE OSI;: MAUCH 2;2 - ""1111. 10
1'>-[:lrr'h 22
2.
Under heavy pressure rrom Poland and Eas t GermallY. Soviet leaders de<:ide to con\" ~I1C " 61"" SU11IIIIit in Dre~den to discuss. among otlier issues. th e situation in Czeehoslo\'akia.
)T,hrth Z3 11,,) Soviet .Ielegalioll to the Dre,de ll meet_ ing agmcs to hold a high_le"eI hi"" '~1) nomic conference in the ncar future to (1)nsider. among other things. C1.edlOs lo""kia's re'luest fur a loan tu restructure her ceonom~ ·.
:l
Mar<:h 2.1 The Soviet delegation to the Dresden illeeting agree s to cnntinlle witlt plans ror the rllrther in tegration urlhe military high command "flit" \\'arsaw ]';1(,1 and to wid"n the smpe of adivity of its \'olitic;,\ Consultati"e Committee. ~laf{'h
23 The Soviet dele!;Utlon to the Dresden meeting agrees not to intervene further in C1.echus lo'-ak inkrnal affain provided that the Czechoslovak delegation acts 011 the asSUr,U'Cl', a",lpromises it has given.
79 Decisim' ."'·w"be r
5
Oa te (.'O"/,',,t Apri!6 - 7 The decision is hlke n. possibly by all ad hoc group withi n either the Politburo or the
S<-'(.>rclari:lt. 10 alter t he last-minute ~rr::lIIgc "'ell ts fur II,,: CP!iU Central Co mmi tt ee I'lcnlllll.
6
Ap ril ]O
The party', Central Committee plenum conflrt"s thnt a C'~tnpaign must be w~ged to tighkll i,ko!ogical di sci pli ne wit hin th e CI'SU and the country as:, whule.
7
April 10
The Cent ral Co nnnitlcc cmlurscs the need for greate r blo<' unit\' as e:lll.·t! for at the Dresden ml'Vting. I'IlAS~: TWO; ", "IIlL JO- MAY 4
8
Between A group wit hin the Politburo decide s to indude "mutual brothe rl y aid" as a pri nciple April 18 and 21 guv" rn in g r "lation s bt- twccn communist states and "mili tary ass istance" as a possible modality.
9
Be tween April IS and 20
10
May 3
\ \'ar.<>vsky to Prague for negot iations on Pact maneuvers.
The Pohtlm w dccidc~ to summon thc C~ech().,lo\" .. k
leadership to mediate bi l:lteT,,1 talks.
~I OSl"W
for im-
TH E PS YC HO LOG ICAL ENV IIIONMENT
The p rc-cri~ i~ period began with t he decision to call the Dresden meeting un ~'I arch 22 and e nded wit h t he bilateral meeting between Soviet and Czechoslovak Ica(lcrs in Moscow on ~I ay 4. The re were seven speeches or articles b~' the ]lo\itiml und military leade rs hi p published in li,l1 d uring this pc riud .' "nly Iwo of which were diredly relevant to the situation in Czechoslovakia. These were the speeches by Brt:zhnev tu the ~l oS<.~)w City Party Confere nce on " larch 29 and Grishjn at the meeting marking the ni ne ty-eighth annin:rsa ry of Lenin"s b irt ll on :\ p ril 22. C7.CdIOSlo' Desc, iption, or ,h~"" .""""he. and ~"."",b (l "ol.~-d ",~ from ,h~ futtu"'i"~ .... 0""'>: B"'tJ'ncv. l'nI~da. ~torcll 30. J9&I: !.:o'r!9 n. Liuro,u"",,,,, I;":.<"'Q • .... pril 3. 19611, Slt,c· menk<>. K ...u naY" ~u=-1a . .~p,i1 1. J96II: Sh"lt'pin, Tn,,' ..... pdl ~ . IlIfi.S, (; ,;,111" . J;;<e.tkl, .... p,il 23. UIfi/I, C,,,,,.j, k,, . Pm",I~ . M~) ' Z. 1968: l\ ·I', lw ,\ ',"", 0..",,,.1,1,,,,,1 . .'by 3. 19M.
""
o::h
80
vukia was also th e subject of debat e at the April CPSU Central Committee pl{mu1ll and th e mee t ing of tb e ~'Ioscow party IIktiv ad dressed by BrcdlllCV and Ycpishcv. but neithe r the proceedings nur th .. sp.:I·dlt':s were published. Other S llCf.'C h c_~. howeve r. par-
ticularly those by Shc1cpin . Grcchko. and Pc l'shc un various internatiunal the mes, rcinfiJTCe the results of tbtl analysis of the Ilrczhn c v and G ri shi n speec hes. All the speeches 1l1(lintaincU th'lt the increased a~rcssin: n css uf U.S. imp c rialiml was tIl e major source "ftens ion ill inte rnati o nal
affairs. Probably the most severe de nunciation of the United 51,IIes (:arne from Shclcpin . T his is nol too surprising ,IS the oeC'asiull of his speech was Ih e D ay of Solidarity w ith th e Vi e tn;mlCse ()Cople. He mig ht have taken thi s o pportunit y to a ttack U. S. polides in general in area~ uth e r th a n Vic tn am, ~ut'h a~ th e ~liddie East ur Ct: n" tral Europe. But thi s he did not do. and e ven in his men tion of the resu lts uf the \\'arsaw Treaty Orl!ani7.ation (\ VTO) me e ting in Softl, he l.~>ll fint:d hi IIlsc1f to t h,lt sect ion of t Ill: Sofb resol ot i011 O il Vietnam. Grechk o's speec h. (It the ~Iay I),IY panlde in Hed Square, was ,"cr y ""wh ,\ sct·pic('c aA~... ir. Soc ialism. hc dcc;larcil. con ti n"ed tn
l'njll}' new ~l1t~'l'SSl'~, htlt he wanwd that imperialism \Va~ t!l11harkin g on a mOT!' aggressin, policy. The soun:es of this increased thre'lt were, in th e order listed by Gre{.,hko. upt:n military ventures s uc h as Vietnam. " ilieolog ieal su bver~i on aga inst socialist states, blatan tly interfering in th e dome stie affa irs of ot her countries," and "the in creased activit v of th e militaris t and reva1H:itist forces in \\'cst Germany. " For dealin g wi th th ese e hall e nges he proposed rai sin g eombat prepart:llness, improvint< IInit y hetween socialis t countries, an d imple m c ntin g "spL'{;ific measures" !ilr strength enin).( th e \Va rs aw I'aet. Grechko r eminded the audi ence that th e Centwl C UlIlmittee plen ll m rel'entl y hal\ reafIinm:d its readi ness "to do c~'e ry thing necessa ry" for th e lilTther consolidation of the socialist co mmonwealth. His speech . th erefore, while pay in!! lip se rvice tl> the sll\J\'ers ive dange rs of U. S. imper ialism revealed him liS cunL'ern ed primarily with mcetill g direct military ehallenges, sudl as tllO~ e presented in Vietna m and Central Europe. I'ershe's orientation was somewhat differcn t. His spceeh, markin g th e 150th alln ivt:rsary of Karl ~1arx's birth. was dc!h'e red in th e GDH. The su bject nHlttcr and the venuc lent th e msc!ves to an orthodox and hard- line oration, and Pe rshe ('e rtainiy did not disap" point ,mY01le. Apart from speakin g 'Ihullt " Ian. he pr;.ised th e new
PINU INGS
8/
GOB l'Ollstilutiun as an exemplar of sol'i:llist leJ.!ality :md democracy and comlemneJ the rise of neo-Fasclsm and militarism in the Federal Bel)ublic, which he describe<1 as a serious threat to European securit y. TIle situatiun in Europe filled the Soviet leadership and other progrcssivc forces with ,m~icty, ilL'(:ording to I'el'she, and one action to meet th is danger was the fortht11m ing November meeting uf Communist ,uul 'Vurkers part ies. which wuuld help unify the Communist movement and all rcYtllutio nary furt't!s. HeYealing himself as a staunch. orthodox " larxist. unlikely to greet Brandt's Jlolicy of"huilding hridges" with :my enthusiasm. Pel'she nevertheless did not {Jwell on subversion as a particular threat to socialism and did not advocate allY drast ic ur speciflc (:uurse of action. This was, of course, in some marked ("{mtrast tu the sJleech by Grishin, already analyzed in depth in chapter 4. Grishin was t he only political or milit:lry le,lder to Hdvocate 1he sllet'iflc lise of military mea ns to defend the frecdom and independence of peoples thrt:atened by imperialism , wherc ver ,md huwe ver they might be threatened, and to link that adn.eacy closely to the resu lts of the Dresden meeting. He must be ciassiGe(l, therefore, as the mujor spokesmun lilr hard-line opinion in the leadership Juring the precrisis period, and the fact that his speech w,\,~ made ,tt an imporhmt party occasion in the presence of the "triumyirate" indicates that such opinion was not , even at this stage, insuhst:mli,IL Brczhne\" s speech to the ~lo'>COw City Party Conferencc of March 29 t'Ont'(:Tltr:lh:d prinwrily un dorlll:stic ideological issues and revealcd his strong eoncern about revisionism. nationalism, ,md intel1ecllHiI dissent. Unlike SO Ill{: uf llis colleagues. Brczhney did nut cunsider Vietnam ur Central Europe the Irunt line in the struggle between East and West. Indeed the major threat was not a direct eXhlTllH! ~lllac k ~lt ~lll: "lh put it hriell~', the ideological struggle is today the Bereest Iron l of the da~s struggle." \Vhereas Shclcp;n alld Grechko felt Ilml imperialism waS ",ure Ihall capable of launcbillg a direct milit,lry attack. Brct.lmey fearc(1 a more indirect approach: "Not daring to c ngtlp:c in a frontal attack Oil the world of socialism, irnl>erialisill is trying 10 weaken tllc ideulogieal and political unity of the Ilxlrking people of the socialist countries." Brezllllev's attack on revisionism amllhe ,luScnt'C of all}' mentiun uf
82
TIlE I'IlE-(;KI.S IS I't:Il IUJ)
shIVs, tile Hu mall ians , and ti le E\lro-L~)1Il1l1\11l i st s aga inst til e "splitting tactics" of the Chinese dogmatists. Based Oil th e adnal spet.'(:lies made dllring th e pre-L'risis periud from ~ Iarch 22 to ~Iay 4. 19G5. olle ma)' contlude that as yet CZl'Chosluvaki a was nut the un iversal and overridi ng cOllcern for the Suvit:'l leade rship. Bre/.hnev, he L'ame of his L"{}nCCTTl for ideological suhve rsion . mi ght naturall y have shared th e views uf Shc1est ,lilt! even th e Polish ,lilt! E,lst Ge rm ,1Il leHde rshi ps about eve nts in Pnlglle, hu t ,111 ilulil"a[ions are tha t ilrezli nev .~ [ iII l \ad (.~lIlritl ell ee in ])ulx'Ck's ab ili ty to (."{}n trol the si tuat iun. By the cnd of t he pre<;risis pe ri od, however, when th e Czeehoslovak leadership was sU lll m()1led to MOSl'OW. there was growing evidence that Brczhnev was lusin g patie nce with Prague and he<',(lll1 ing Illore asse rti \"[~ within the Soviet leadl' rship. I\eve rt hdess. he still was a grea t adhe re nt of CO ll se nsus politics. and th us to th e ex tent that his stance on Czechoslovakia hard e ne{] tuward th e end uf t he pre-<.Tisis period. it wa~ p robably his resp{)ll .~e to a general slli1i in the bldership's view of the j'mgue Spr i ng. ~ Bre7.1meV·S upinions un till" dangers of re\'isionism, nationalism . :md imperialist subversion Pllt him rnll gh l ~' on the SHme side of t he
ideological
.~pectrllm a.~
Shelest. Grishi n. ami Yepishel': whereas
Shdepin and Grechko were much more (~lI1cerned with impe ri alism's ove rt activi ties in p!a<'"es snell ,L~ Vietnllln rather than with the thre .. t of su bversion. Shdepin. I'e r.~lll'. Sus]"". ,l[ld I'on " ;"'W of I!",>f,",~' i, '''I'1",rt.li,'Y 1)"';' 1.. ,, · M"kl"~ "", I H" ,,","H"r",k' 1'.. lil b :' 1'1' . :vI _f,7 .
83
FIl\ml\CS
demning revisiunism, for snch a (:ondcrn nation would alien:lte the vast majority of p,arties upon whom the Sl1l'CCSS of the l~Jl1fcrcnce depended. Suslo\' also huped that the Socialist part)' ill West Ge rman y (the SPD), headet:l by Willy Brandl and currell!ly part uf the ru ling coalition, would be represented; and Shclepin, for his part. had established [.'ontael5 with the nun-Communist tr,l
IGh
JIz
M
84
TilE I'lI.t:-CIIIS1S 1-'t:1I10U
Cz~chusluvakia
toward the \Vest might d eprive Soviet markets of
needed cap ital goods; also excessive or uncontrolled reform might jeopardize the survival of Kusygin's own, more limited, cHort s to
refurm the Soviet economy. Kos ygin had another interest during these months, namely, the beginning of disarmament lind arms control negotiations with the \Ves t. Negotiation of th e Nud ear l\unprulifcT;llitm Tn::aty was
to pass its first hurdle in carly summer when the United States. the Soviet Union, anil Great Britain were to be its first sig natories. The real object of the exercise for th e Soviet Union , however, was to
pressure the United Stales into obtaining West Ge rman adh erctwc to the treaty; ami in order to llchicve this. ,Ill th e Soviet Union's own allies would have to show willingness to si~1. Soviet problems began when Rumania annouueeo:l that it would not support any treaty that legitimi7.Ctl the superpower monupoly of nllde,lr weapOilS. \\'hell sympathy for this view was expressed in PrJ.gue. it began to appear that tllis major diplomat ic initiat ivc would amount to very little. T Im.> Primc Ministcr Kosygi n. who with Foreign ~linis tel' Gro myko had personally gUided the negotiatiolls, might havc had littlc reason to led sym p.lth)· for I'Tilgllt!'s iml.:pemlent .~ta lld 011 this issue. t\t th e same lime. initial conlat'is betwec n the Un ited States and the Suviet Uniun began on s.trategic arms limitatiun. Kus ygin was c ntrustcd with main t«ining and develuping tl lese conlads which were the precursors to the SAt..:r negotiations. Both he and Gromyko developed a keen persona! interest in th e negot iat iuns. despite grllve misgivings and mistrust hy other memhers of the leadership. ' Although not so apparent at this IlOint. the issue of wllether to negotiate with the United States at the same time that the Hussians were engaging "u. S. imperial ism" directly in Vietnam and indirectly in Czedlllslovakiu became illtrieiltely intc rtwinc(l with the Soviet handling of th e I'rague Spring amI also vcry possibly with ('ontinucd attempts within the Politburo to dis(:reuit Kosygin iwd his policies. George Brestauer ha., ,-~)gently detailed the rivaIry between Bre7.hn ev ilnd Knsygi n over domestic policy, which WilS particularly acute dur ing 1968. ~ This dOlllestic rivalry was certainly parallele(1 in foreign policy. hut in t llC latter area there had not yet emerged within the leadership a clear split be' s,,,, )01." Nc",holl"'. C"ld Oa,,,,,, -rhe S,,,ry "I S,ILT ' C~O!l'e
W,
Ilrcsl~"N.
KJ,,,,,hclu'c ,,,,,I H ..."I ,"~" 4.
uad".,
IGh
liz
M
85
tween hard-liners and soft-liners, or hawks and {loves. There were crosscurrents and c1euvagt:s hut few, if an y, (;uhesive ur dominant
factions , although the marked isolation of Kosygin was so acute
(l~
to serve almost as a public sigmll of his politit-.!! decline. Even at this stage, Kosygin had very few allies. Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB , although probably not a major figure in th e inner decision-making drde,
Ill:'!)'
hallc shared
some of Kosygin's views. He made no speeches during the precrisis period; his last had marked the occasion of the fiftieth annive rsary of the founding of Suviet intelligt:!llt-e services at the end of Dece mbe r 1967.' His comments at that time, lmwc \'c r, were not without significum:c for the dcbutc taking place during the Ilrccrisis pcriod , lie maintained that imperi:llisrn, nlther tlHIll herollling more aggrcssive, bad lost its " previous position of dominance. " He emphasized neither the militllT'Y threat nor the threat ofimperialist subversion : the inte rnational sitnation was "L'Olllplex:' he said, and Suviet SUL't.'CSS demauded a "pcrsistent struggle on all fronts -cL'Ollomie, political, and ideo!ogkal," He did point out tlmt Mao's "splitting tactics" worked to the advantage of imperialism, but be did not go so far as to back Sus!ov's call for an intcrnational Commlln ist eonferenee. Two statements, howcvcr, revealed him as particularly sensitive to changes in Eas tern Europc. First, hc referred to tIle importanL't' of strung ties between the KGB and fraternal intelligellee serviL-es, who toget he r L'O uJd deliver a " rebuff to enemy intrigues," Serond, he made the peculiarl y geopolitical observation that the Soviet Un ion's own bonk' r securit y was immeasunlbly enhanced by the contiguity of tIle other socialist statesessentially a restateme nt of the notion that Eastern Enropc scrvcs as a huffer wne for the USS R. It would be very difficult on tltis basis to conclude that Andropov bad a p:ldienlar view on Czechoslovakia, hul his nit her mild formulation s Oil the international syslem would not have Pllt him amon g those who feared eithe r [\n increase (n A!uerlcan aggressive ness ur a revival uf lIcu- I;"asclslIl ill \\'esl Germany. If anything, A!\{lropo\"~ rc ference to the need for struggle on the eCQllomic fronl - a mtller unusual statement for the head of tllC KGB-might have placed him as a liberal , although his emphasis on security links with Eastern Europe would have inclined him to he eauli()l1~ ahout the negative political repercus-
" ""
86
Tl I~: pn~:-cmsls
1'[IIIOD
siuns of any e('Ollomic reform. One shuuld remember thilt
These dilrererK't;!s of opinion hetwcen the leade rs are su ht le. but t hey gained sign ifiL-lInee as t Ire crisis ('scabte.l. In the Iigh t of t Irese differences. one can appreciate tir e extent to which the resolu tiolls passed by Ihe April Centn.1 Committ ee plenum really di.1 rcpresent lit best II conglomerate and at worst an lLn C,L~y (.'Omprornise between these varying images of th e external environment. AII,u::ks weTe 1ll,lde «I the plenllm on both dogma tism ami revisio nism, on both Western subversion and its h igh level of military prepar.llion. on both V.S. imperialism an.l \Ves t Cerm:m revanchism. The lead-
ership had concluded that there was heightened threat fmm the external e nvironment. hut certainly there was not yet (.'Omplete agreement that Czechoslovak "revisionism" and "irllpc rialist suhversion" were th e primary sources.
CRISIS CO:\IPONENTS As was note•.! in Chapter 1. the pre-crisis pe riod is distinguished from the preceding non-crisis period by a (.'Ollspicuous increase in pert:eived threat 011 the parI of det:isioll makt:rs triggcrl.-o by :111 eve nt or duste r of C'-ClltS . Evcnts surrounding the dismissal of Novotny from his post of first secretary and the first tentative attempts at reform by th e new Dulx'ck lead ersllip in January ami Fcbruary may be (.'Onsidcrcd the prelude to crisis. But it was nol until the worrying iniormatiull front Pr.lguc at't·umulated sufficiently to re{lnire (;onvening of th e multilatcral Dresden (.'{mferent:c that the pre-crisis period reali)' ue~n. The threat tu values was dilfuse, yet spt'(:ifie events did represent a particular threat. The prospect of cadre selecti on proceeding in Prague withuut lI. IOSt'Ow·s direct approval re presented a clearcut challenge to Soviet ('(m tro!. De tails of th e CPCz Action Pro-
''''
o::h
87
HNIllNGS
gram and criticisms in the Czcchoslovak press of the past twenty rears of Communist rule in the CSSH threatened the legitima('y of all Soviet-style systems, And Prague's proaastinaliun on the issue of \Varsaw Pact maneuvers presented the worrying prospect of another Humani:m-style def('Ction, th is time frum the very heart of tile pact's central front and thus <:ollstituting 11 ('Ollspicuous threat to the unity of the socialist camp and to the seemity of the Soviet Union itself, Except for Grishin's ('OlllTnents awut "military aid," the re is 110 real indicat ion that the Soviet leadership had as yet Jecided that the C7-cehoslovak reform movement must be stoppeJ, even ifby military means. Indeed as late as the heginning of ;\'iay, the Soviet leaders subsequently elaimed, thcre was still "understanding both for the objectivc complexity of the situation and for the ('Umplexity of the position of the cpez leadership itself" which prompted them "to abstain fro m making any public appraisals ilnd statements" abont Czechuslovakia that might exacerhate relations between fo,'l os('OW and Prague even furth er,' COPING I>.IECI-IAN ISMS Our model of crisis he havinrseeks tn examine the extent tu which a crisis situation affects the way decisions are made, It examines the impact of the crisis Oil the variUllS limc\iolls performed in the course of arriving at decisions: information processing, the pattern of ('Ollsuitatiull, the strncture of decisional funullS , and the consideratiou of altermltives, Loo king flrst at information processing, it is L'C rtainl y possible that the perceived ('U mplcxity of the international situatiun and tile diffuseness of threat perception aJll.'Cted the (,'gnitive perfOl'lll;tn('C of Soviet decision makers by leading them to process (Uld interpret information ;l])UUt CzedlOslova ki,l in different way_~, But on the whole, natural Jjfferences in outlook and function,ll responsihilities within the leadership wuuld predispuse individual leade rs tu process information diversely, and at this stage of the crisis, there is no clear-eut indicMion that crisis-induL'Cd stress was affL'Cting L'Ugnitive perfonnarK'e. As for the effect of cri~is on the pc recivc{l need and conseqnent qucst for infurmation, certainly the ('Ummuniqu(: of the Dresden meeting admitted that one main purpose of the conle rence was to • f ....<
88
'fHE PIIE-cIlIS IS PEIUOIl
o btain information abou t C7.cdloslovakia, ~ TI I(: growin g: U\lrnbCT of pllrges of l-'Onscfvalivcs from within th e C7R.chos]m'(lk security services and party IIPIJIIW I was deprivin g ;\'Iost-ow of its (lslI,11 information suurces ahou! tI le highest levels of the lCHde rship. This Jed the Soviets to increased usc of a lternati ve sources. espeCially the Soviel embassy in Pnlgue, whose 'I1nhassaduf upe ned up informal co mmunication dHltlllcls with leadin g co nse rvatives. many uf
whose political careers were being th reatened. It is {lilliculi to de ter mine how a crisis alfeels the rece ptivity and size of the information-processing group hecame littl{: is known about who receives and processes infor mation on CzedlOslovakia liuriHg HOH-crisis p,eriods. Yet it is interest ing that only at the end of t he pre-crisis period, at the bilateml ~ Iosrow mee ting of Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders, is any me ntiun uHlde of Brezhnev reciting excerpts from the Czechoslovak press verbatim from press clippings. This was to be a feature of s.:vera l later meetings as well and suggests that by the heginni ng of t...tay crisis escalilt ion had the e llcel of increasing the (Ullount of raw data reaehinl' the top leade rship. In te rms of the sc('olld L"Oping llleCh;Ulism, Ihe pattern of lunsultat ion. two gro ups seem to havI) hl:en cspcciallr important from an e arl y stage. The firs t was t he Central Comtllittee. It is irn]}ortant to nole tha t press ure for ronvening the Central Commitlt:e plenu m lit the beg inning of April (~lme from within the apporat itself. par ticularl y fwm part y ideologues anxious to achieve a firmer policy primarily to\\11rd dissent at home bu t also toward rev isionism abroad . This group \\';lS supp.orted by the second major consultative gro up. the East European leaders. The East German and Polish leu{lerships. more fearful of the effects of the spillov(:r frO Ill the Prague Spring than the Soviets werc at the outset. did not wait to be consulted: by all aC(.'(lunts the y imposed the ir views on '\!os<-'Ow and advoca te{l a ha rdt~r line toward Czechoslovnki;1 from ~1 ;lreh onward. Neither the Centra l Committee nor the East European leaders ('Ould be dassified as part of the d~' i s ion al forUlIl in the pre-crisis period. but the ir functions nevertheless extended wei! beyo nd mere passive {'Onsuliation . From the beginning the~' acted as policy advocaks. \.~l1lstitute{l pressure groups. and served as allies in the slow process of con senslls-building that began in the pre-crisis pe ri{}{l, but reall y only gained momentum later Oil . :"Jetthe r the Ceutral Committee fll/jlam! nor the East l~ lI ropea n lead-
" ""
n!,>l)lt'OGS
en repre5ented a unified group; there were cros5currents of opinion in hoth groups. It is interesting, however, that in both cases hard-line opinion was apparcnt ly ascendant Ii-mil the beginning, even before tbe Prague Spring became the overriding preoccupation of the Soviet leadership. As 10 d eds ional fnrums. infor mat ion here is vcry scant but several conclusions Clm he drllwn; 1. Authurity for llll strollegic or policy decisions resled wit h the l'olit-
hum. During Ihe pre·erisis [lCr iod. only two other formal orl"ln iw tioll s were ill\'olved in deeisioll makin)1;. and both made on l)' tactical or implementing decisions. The Centrol Committee forma!!)' took decision s 6 and i at their plenum. bUI the strategic decision 10 roll the plenum al all was lI1ade at a higher le\"el. Also. Ihe ehok<.l of speakers and th e tone of th e reso lutions would ha\'e bCt!1l dl.'Cided at the top. Similarly, military pressure to lw ld maneu"erS as reprcsented in decision \01 ",as a con! inuation of past policy, li nt a ne w de[lartllre. 2. The Politburo did delegate full authority to a subgroup, its negotiating team at Dresden. The SOviet team did , after all. mnsist of Brezhnc\", KO I}"",';n. Kiril cuko. ~hcle~t. Ilaii.>akov. and Itusakov; and evideuce suggests that tI('goti~tioll s wcre far from pro furma. furthermore, the subgroup did not seck. or at leas t did not ob· tain. post hoc approval of the results of the Dres den meeting from the fu ll Politburo, although th is was evcn tu ally forthL~ )ming fTtlm th c Central Committce plcnm" . 3. A ~UbgrollP of the Politburo did uppe~r to act either in the n~nlC of the Politburo or as a pure ly ad hoc group. Bee-oluse it is not known what constitutes a quorum lilr >\ Politburo meeting, it is impossible to determinc whethe r thou' dn'isiolls (numhers 5 and 8) takc n while important Politburo !lH:l1lbers were absent froUl Moscow were tak\~ll in the 1131llC of the Polithuro or on a purcl~' inforlllal husis. \\'hat does seem clear is Ihnt cven at this stngc. the decisional unit was not particularly cohesivc. judccd, Ihe pressurc to call a Central Committee plenum and to revisc th c set of principles gO\'erning inter·Cmmnunbt relation s appcars to have ("Omc not from" unitl."art)' See.-etariat ami Central COUl mittee !lppmllt. TIle fioal point of inqoiry is th t' effcct of escala tin g stress in th e search for ,lI\d range of alternatives. The be hav ior of th e Suviet leaders a t the variou s nego tiat ion s with their Czechoslovak COUllterparts indicates tlwt Most"(lw conside red till! range of alternatives available to be greal. includin g dialugue and persuasiuo, e(~mumic assistance, minatury sanctions , and diplomacy. By the end uf the
00
THE
PI\ .:-C I HS1~
r EIIlOD
pre-eris is period, at le,lst some of t he Soviet leade rs alsu felt t hat "militarr aid" \V,IS a !>ossihl(· altern,IIi\'(: for dealing wuh t he t hreats im posed by the Prague Spring, but this argument was not resolved un til the crisis period.
~
''''
o::h
"
PARTTHHEE
The Crisis Period
,
"
C HAPTER SIX
Phase One: May 5-June 6
MOSCOW CONS I DEBS TH E
~l I LlTAHY
OPTION
In Breche r's de finitiou, the crisis pcriu<1 is diffc rc u! ia!cd frum the
pre-cris is period by several key factors.' Firs!, there must he a measurahl y sharp rise in the saliell(:e ofUmc. Ol"c(lual impurtance, the increased perceptiun of threat is such that the decisiun makers \\~den their search for altern atives. And for the first time the possibility of involvement in military hostilities 1)e(1)mes a high probability by active ("tmsider.lt iun ufthis optiun. In Czechoslovakia, calls for the early COl\mcatiol\ of an E.~tra ordinary rouriL'cnth Party CunW"css to iustitutionalize the refor m movement and ,-,arry out cadre dmngcs increas.:d throllghollt ~1 [1y, making it clear in Moscow that the time availahle for bringing the negative a.~pects of the Prague Spring under t"Ontrol was dearly lim ited. ' The CPCz leadership's dl;.>t:ision at the e nd of ~'I ay to convoke the (."Ongress on Septembcr9 established a finite time for Soviet response. Also, in [I(."t:Qnl with Brecher's tlefillition, there is good evidence to suggest that during May fo ur ~eparJte but related military d eciS Ion s we re
U\;ld e
t hat in(.·n~as"d tlw prohability of in -
\'olvement in military hostilitie.~ . Detnils will be l)re.~en tcd late r in the chapter, but to summarize brieRy. Soviet leaders decided a. to IlOld extensive "nd prolunged '\'ars"", Pact ,,,,,,,euvers in C7.echoslovakia heginning in Ju ne; ' Mit-had Bwok,. """",J, a 1"hc
"
,"
TilE e ll l S IS I'EIUOI)
h. to press as an lIrg"nl matter for th" pcrmallent statiuning urSoviet troops on C7.Cchoslovakia·s w c .. tern frontier; c . 10 usc military maneuvers aod the presell l'fl of S"viet lroop ' ,,-, minatory diplomacy to dc tcr anti·Soviet he113vior and to support ''Qmer\'3tive cle ment' in their attempts to stage a comeback;
(1. to
pn'I""'" for an in vasion shonld ,,11 oth er meanS fail.
AC(.'Qrding 10 a variety uf persuasive sources, military options were first considered a vialll e allernative in ~Iar. Brez h ncv is c re d ited wit h s
Mlyn;ij', -,,<'Chlj'''''' 1'_ :1(16,
' ",,,,,,,riling to Eugene V. R""!<>w. under ~',,·. e!l"· of Male !n
IK ...·"''''
tI,~ C"n l",1 A
Ih~
Johm!lll iid,nini
'n,'.,;o"
''''lni",,1 ~~ " m,,,,I),, (,,' "'mplet~ lu,,, ;" ilidt "d b)' " .rl)· ~ I ay aillte !Jl~_" ( ....'" C. n, U,b.n, 'The 1"",,,in" "r c>c,<"" , ~,,-Aia. 1!JG/j, " 1' _ 110)_11", u, S. D" p." " .., nt of De · fen.e .1", CQ " .;JeJt~ 1 the h~dioo"d of S,,,-it'l in,·•• i(~, t» h. ,·~ i"' .... ,. ,,,1 i" ~I')'_ AI;,i" C_ .;" 'h",·~". 'lo~ ",,,h,.,,t " " 'fda'), "I' ,I~f~"", r,,, '),,;k nl' .. ,al)~;,. p '~p.t,eJ a n II _I"'~~ me"",. 'dl"] ,,m in ~I ay which ",,,d,,,hl 11,,1 a So" ict i"'-.'''.m C,=·h ",~,,'.k", wn,M nol "1'",1 the bal."cc or 1"""~r in Ccnlr..1EII"'I"" E"lI,o\'cn cond"ded th.. "s.,"ic l fo.-ce. arc h";n~ ",aitot.in"d i" • ,t,te of i",,,,,.,,,,,1 .1"" .",1 ,h"l' h.,,, , le p.,, ~~ 1 ,,·,·,·r.ll .. ],I ili'" ,al ,1;";,; 0,,. \" Ea'l~ m E" rol><'_ 0" Ilw ,,111'" hand . lflt. 1'",,1 th,t tl... C>t>Ch rt,,,,,,, ore I~" ",]i.hl" . nd thaI th~ WaJ>aw I,,,,,t ",,,,t IlC,,(rdliw the", ~"<..,,., ""It~, th~ C,,,,,,h 1~)I ,,,I"lio,, ",,],,<,<,> the Ih,,.,,," to NATO "f.n i",·.... i(~'- 11". m"""' "", _",1"'''1''''''11), l,uhl;,\o",1 in th" N"'TO "e,,~ h""l . ,1tI~nlic /1:", !S3 (0<1"t,<'T 3 1, 100II1.., nd ",f. " ed lo ;n 1M ;SS""" In r;e,m. "y. Ilw, ;"telti~.""" ","vi,,,, ,·hi.,[. C,·n~r.1 G",h"d We.",I. • ngJi])' cL,ime,1 .rtcr II". 1r""'., I"" that I". had ",<,,,,,,1 """" I\''''~''''''~''I Ic,.,I"" ' hnt "" ~Ia)' tI"~, n-C,,,,,," 11'"'<;1,,- Pacl In o,!" ",me I"'in~ 'rdined a"d ,'." na,\;"J fo, the jn,.,.,iw " (>c" Tlu: S,,,,d,,y r;",~•. .~"~,,, ' :15. 1968). Sir W;1I; .. ", Hayter. 11,;,;,1. .. "h... udor 10 M"",,)w. "],,, ".ted th, t 5<)\';," <'~ Ili"gen")- "l.nllh'~ and "'illl. , ), p"'p;I",II"", l'<"gOn in ~ I .y ("'.. Sir Willi~m II~)'_ '~', R"" ;,, t/". 'l'>rld. p. 3• . ' .\'~I& )i,,~ Tin",., MaJ' I~. I!J(;B. an,] [·'mllk!,,,I .. , Mlcc"u:ine 7,"ill"'~. ,\ by 13. !9(~~_ .\I",,.,,,'t'J. lllJt'C )\ ,1;,10 1"'1''''''- '1." "''''' c;"-"I.Ii",, 7.y"" ;';oI"i"" Il'ohmid. a"d • Commllni" ),)uth 1'"1"'" S::Ja",I~r _u /,,,I!lCh-L'.lrr;.,.t ~rtide< on ~"'}' .1. 19M. 1,,- 11 ... l'r.~'''' """"I~""I~" t "f I'A P ITIo,' 11,1i,!. \\("~,.,, A~" T"'}' 1"~" "". "i,,,) ,.Jit ie; d,,~ (Ioe ""\t·, ~""c" "r- "~lIt,.l;'t aml .. ,h·Sn,-kl le"d",,";.,," ;u C,_c'ch(),I("'a~ ia , T1, e . ,lid,·, 'I~ '~" "f . lkml'l. - to, ;",,,,.1,,,,, • 'didat"",hil' "f tilL' inl",H~" nt'i'- "nd ,,, m;"j· ,0;>0' ,,,,, ;"ltnr,,,-,, 01',1.., "", ki,,~ ,h,i' in CZL'cho. .. lovak,. "lid ""e" ,·,1 11,", "''''('1,,,,,,,1,,·,,
vr
"'"fL",
"".t ,,,,-, -"..
95
MAY 5-J ll r.;1: 6
even more explicit: the Duhcek leadership, it cbimed , "is guilty of treason against its allies," and as such "the provisions of the \V"rsaw P"ct llI"ke possihlc an intervention ",hidl would he in keeping with the interests nf the socialist countries." Warning its party workers that such an intervention would also involve the usc of East German troops, the memo stated: ··However. in the event of an interve ntion , which might include military intervention, collective measures will have to be taken. " ~ A similar circular was re ported on Ma}' 5-6 to have been re ad at party meeti ngs in Bulgaria.' It is not known whether similar informatiun bulletins were distributed to party cadres in the USSR altlmugh a secre t U.S. Department of Shlte telegram to its e mha.~s ics in Europe revcaled that Suviet diplumats at the UN and elsewhere weTl~ eirclliating st\lries that the Suvit:! Union hild the mo r;jl and legal right to in tervene militarily in C7.t.'Choslovakia if an an tisocialist or bourgeois govern ment were to be est;lblisllL'd there.' All these reports strongly support the argument that the decision tn hegin invasioll preparations was taken in earl y lI.lay as part of a morc active bloc strategy to explore the widest numbe r of alte rnati ves to bring C7.eehoslovukia into line. h may be impossible to isolate the precise day on which this decision was taken, aud there is uut much diret'! evidence pointing to a particular day. i nJcl...J, the transition from the pre-crisis to the crisis pcriod may not be a result of a spccific event or events bringing on a sudde n increase in threat pe rception. For a dL~is iun viewed by the analyst as marking a qualitative jump in the cscalation of the crisis sufficient to distinguish hctween a pre-crisis and 11 crisis period may 110t he pcrt"ein:d by the d,:cisio11 m,lkers in the same light. \vlult the amllyst conside rs a clualit
c.r
"r
the Ceo tral eommittN" th~ C'.i"Ctu..,Io,-~1: (;'''8"",ni<1 parj)' were '1'1',,,I.,,n,;'·e ...,",,' <1 .. ",1"1""'''''' ""~h' " I',,,h C"""I" .. I,,,·.~ •• ,~I ,I... 1'",1, ,,r " . ...."Ii>!
jh"t
tI",ckJI''''''''':' [" ,ep!)·. ,],,"" 0"",1,,,,kl\"~ l ",... it"", ,,,m,, ... ,,l<.'t.! in /'J&~ '''' ~Ia )' H. ]!_ilI. th.,j d", 1',,1;,10 le.,\~" , h(Jutd "'\: tn,·m,,·!.·,·, "",I,e(\,," d ,e , t"m"n,lr.!i,,", of 1'" l i,1o ""i ... ,... ;I)· .",0.1 ",,,, "'" n(~ roo"..! in di'<3hd'ction ",ilh li>e , tote uf ...,id)'. '" " ..., d ,e <...'" ill CTA."Ch",\,,,·.kl,.• UI"nlrnC Il>ty . MaJ' 30. 19b'l: .",1 ~'r,,,,"i' f'·j',l. "M",,,,,,,, "",I its ... 11 ... <.- p . 36. A, •
1>'' ' ' "",r~re" ,..- '''' ~ ! ')' 30. lh~ C''''''hu,k,,1lk fu'";~" ",;,,;,Ie< J~,,;...l an}· r<"lx"h that jh" CDR t"od ""hip ",:as 1""1",ri"l( il.> e.odre. ~T i,,,",,,ion IFiMne",1 Tim' •• ) nne l. t9f,lj). N" '"PI"'rHn~ ,leni'" "'..., i" ....-.:I. I~'wcvc,. in ea.' c.,,,,,",,,),. ' ~ I k-hcl Tal" . /~ Monrir . M,y ~_6. tll&i.
·U. S. D.:p" ,h"" ," ,,(S'~te. r~/
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Tilt; OUS IS I't; I\(QI)
decisiull maker may consider an incre11leutal escalation. And tltis possibility is enhanced if th e managemcnt of the crisis is inherently cautious, wi th escalation ac hieved only gradually and against (.'onsiderahl e opposition. III slIch cin:u,n ,hut'-"C', tl1<) clwn'-"<:s of .. tl1:.jor dCl'ision being blurred are ,-·tmsiderabl y enh:mced. Such was t llt~ Soviet e;lse, and it is likely th at the variuus splits and debates in the Politburo decr cased the darit y of decisions and Simultaneously increased the scupe of inte rpretation for ,IllY p:lrtieular d ecision. AltllOUglt it is p robablc, th erefo re . that th e d ecisions marking the beginning uf th e crisis period and facilitating the in vasion were taken in early Ma y, it is possible that tIL t: uccision makers may not have seen it in those terlllS.
THE SmL\llT FAILURE ESCAL\TES THE CIUSIS Despite the gradual b uild up uf h ard -line an d even interventiunist opinion. marked by tIle April Central Committee ple num an d the speeches by Crishin. Brezlmev. ;lIld Yepishev at th e end of Apr il. it was th e esse ntial failure uf th e ~h)" 4 summit tu resolve the disput e b e tween Ihe two side s Il,..l p roduced" de" r
behavior. This
W;l~
marked by a renewal of
pre.~s
~hift
in Soviet
polemics, in-
cre ased bilateral and multilateral blue nego tiations. and a notable increas e in th e lise of military {!isphLYs of force agailtsl CZe<::il()slovalda. as part of i\ gcneral campaign uf minato ry diplumacy. This sllift became noticeable imm,-. J iateiy foll owing the ~Iay " summ it ~Llld signaled all impurtan t dedsioll (nllmbe r 1/ ) made di n.:dly aft er the departure of th e Czechoslovak delegation on ~Iay 5 . U.S . State Departmt:nt officials . after cons ult ations with J;u.:uh Ileam. the ir ambassador in Prague. aho cOllduded that (m '\1;ly5 t he S(n'iets had {Iecided tu pu rsue a policy ur"decisive half-measures" and "a war of nerves" toward Czechoslovakia." This decision appare ntl y encompassed a ren ewal of press polemics. including an increase in .\Iose()w radio Czecl l-languagt: bro;.uicasts, th e liSe of military maneuvers ncar the Czechoslovak border. increased contacts with Cwehllslo v;.\k and hl oc leader; tu gange opinion an d g;Lther infi)r~ lIIatiun . and finally the approval (Jf co nt ingency plans fur a possi ble in vas iun. The evide nce strongly suggest., the decision to preparc for in' Sew r~rk Tim" •• May 12. J!JIi.!j. "",\ .\1 . )· Z7. !!If>/;. Abo ,he . uthor". inle ,,'iew " 'ilh (" .... me. U. S. amb.:.u .oo. to (;"",ho.to".Iri • • />«.>1, &·am .
ICh
!z
M
~IAY 5-JUNE (j
97
vasion was inde ed taken in early May. Yet because of the tenuous 1~lan ce of fnrccs within the Politburo, the decision was probably <:ouched in terms of hoth increasing til() number of ~.Jternative s available for dealing with the (Tisis and ensuring that the Suviet Union was prepared lilr any eventualit y. including a Hungarianstyle uprisi ng or a militarr move by NATO states to take advantage of e vents in Pmgue. It was tbe vcry unce rt;linty amI <."o mplexity of the situation that may have convinced the more recalcitrant Soviet leaders that the devc10llment of military contingencies would not in itself e.~calate the crisis but nllher en;Jhle the Soviets to respond to any eventual ity more eITecth'cly. The Czechoslovak foreign minister. Jin Hajek. flew to Moscow for urgent consultat ions wit ll Gromyko and Knsygin on Ma y 6, nnly one day after the departure of Dubcek·s delegation from the Soviet capital. In his report to the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, Hajek stated that measures to incre;lse direct eont;lcts bet....een the two ministries had been discussed and that Gromyko also had considered it neu~ ss;lry ··to W,lm me ;lhol1t some distu rhing manifestations in the Czechoslov"k [IT(!SS lind tn explilin how the Soviet government understoog1' P R;~!i". ~br l6. l!lfi8. ~:Elm.llC III. Pragllr. lla< . I...:.-ad r in ~I """"·. " Im" ...""~"",IIJ.,,,ld Tnl",,,... ~1o). 7. 19(1/1.
"ad
" IWE. Eo, ' Ehrtll"'. PoI"I,
SiWQliI", R~I",rl.
Ma)· 9. I9&!.
ICh
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M
TilE ClllSlS 1'~IUOIl
98
military all iance amoll~ the fr.lternal sOt'ialist l~lUnt ries joined by the \Varsaw I'ad."" Th is unmistakably hard-line rhetoric was acn)mpanie d by an (md to Soviet sil.mce over Cz()d"" ln\"ak claims of Bu'si:1tl (.~"n_ plicit)' in th e 1948 {leath of Jan '\ l a~aryk. On ;"Iay i T,\ SS dellllll llce<1 these claims as '" lies from start to finish"'" 011 the same dar. Litem/ II rtI(lya ga :.clll pu hI ishell an 11 ttack Oil J,m Pf()(:h:izb, un e of t he leaders (If the C/.eclloslovak \Vrite rs' Union. ('ailing him a "hourgeois nationalist.·· " III th e midst of t his period "I' ill <.: reasl:d tt:ns jm,. spee<.:hes were being dcliwre<1 lo y Soviet and loloc leade rs markin g the 150tll ann iversary of ;,,'Iarx's dca th. Pel'sllc's speedl, discussed prcviously. was deli \ ered at the beginning of MolY; it was a rat her u no riginal defense of .\Ianist ortllOdox>·. Suslov's speedl, eX'lmined in greate r tletail in Chapter II . W,tS
If th ere were still So\'ietle'lder s who b iled to he CO rlvirl ced that ti,,, Prague Spring W,IS '·herctit·"l. " the spc(.'(;h Oil tIle .~'llne e)(:casion b y Cestmir Ci~at. a secretary of the CI'Cz, did llHH:h to dwn ge ti Jat. On the one anni ve rsary must associated with pro limlla dedara tions of idcological orl l lC)(I()~y, CisnT pmdaimc{lthat "evcry ~·lan: ist·Lcni n jst party must havc its own polic>', which takes into 'K'<."Olllit natio llal L"Omli ti ons." Un ity uf Communist parties must be achieved "not on th e basis of any melllopoly in th e interpretat iun of J\'lauis m in L"On t em po rary eonditiellls, or on the I",sis of th.: sllhordiuiltioll of a part uf th e IIlUVemelit to anothe r part of t he mon:men t, but only on the I"L~is of th e recognition of the right of cvery p'lrty til ,Ill
.\10)' 7. t!./6!i.
" 1'",«16,
~1a)"8, 19&J.
" ur~"'I'm,ny"
" R,,,/f
)(":<'Ia , "'"'. 19, ~I.y IN. 1!J&j
I"~m. ~1a)'
7, 19&1.
99
MAY 5-Jul'J:; 6
negatfoll of its international significarK'e and a de nial of the premise that Le ninism is a gu idc to adion in l)fc~cnt day l~Jrnliti()ns." "
THE
~IOSCOW ~·I F.ETI:-JG
O F FIVE
A further impact of the Cis,lf artide w,~~ to contribute to the Soviet dedsion (number 12), prob(lbly taken on ~lay7, to convene a summit of the "five" to consolidate positions and consider furt her me,lSllres. The last-minute timing of the d cci.~ion is sugg:e~ted by the fael that the first announcement of the SlJllHnit W;L~ on the actual day of the meeting, May 8. Ordinary multilate ral meetings , such as tho~e surrounding the planned Intern,ltiOlml Com nllJllisl Confe renL"C, were typically publici;-:ed in advance. TIlt: C~.•,ehs themselves learned of the meelinguuly ,It Ille \;IS! minute; ;lnd sinL"C the Ea51 Germans and Poles had been pressing for ;In immediate Sllmmit, once tile Soviets the mselves had dl.'Cided to hold one, Ulbridlt and Gomulka 'Ippareutly su pported immediate l"OuvOC"dt io n. On May 8, the Soviets (xJIlvened a meeting in ~'I oseow with party leaders from Poland, Huuga r y, Bulgaria, and East Gennauy. This was tu he the only muli ilateml meeti ng thruu ghuut tire entire crisis to which neither Czechoslovakia nor Hum:mi:I was invited (the Pmgue leadership Wa5 invited to the July W:lrsaw meetiug but dec lined to ,litem] it). When Foreign ~1inister l-hijek inquired why the number of participants at this meeting W:lS lim ited to five , he W:IS olfid,llly told that the recellt visit of the C7.echoshlVak deleg;\lion to ~IOSl~)W "had rende red superfluous their partilOipation in these multilateral l'OIlSuli:ltions."" Although only Gomulka, Kild:\r, Zirivkov, and Ulbricht rep resented t heir l~Hlntries, the Suviet delegation was larger, l"Onsisting of I3rczhnc\', Kosygin , l'oogorny, and Katushc v. T he le rst;! L~)[ll llll.H1i<[uc isslled after the met:ting spoke of 'Ill ""exchange of opinions on topit'al prohlems of the intern ational situat ion and the "~)rld Communist and workers' mm·ement."" '· t\ Pravda editorial two days later substituted the te rm ""urgent" for " Prot-da. Augml 22. 1961j. AI"" I),., a rti..!. by ~o'''I.n!ino.· in Pmcdn (~, J"n~ 1·1. IlI!>S. dir ...1ly "",,,..,,,,,1C[>;1"'-" h)' \'. S'"I»'II''''' in l:u"i<J on ~Iay II. 19611. ... I,ile not referrin\( to Cbaf Iw 1Ialne. 01",,,1)· ",f"I<~1 the '''~~)'' I],ot .. " t],e (!,,~.t ;"" "f'],e w"i" IHindpb 1>.:It1)· t"le. Iii"", ,""" Id I", multiple inlorpl"Cloti"", based on ".ti"""l
rondilion •. ~ Jifl
...r
IUjek. /)I~ aM al''''''. I" M May 9. l\l(j/j.
~ r",cda .
IGh
JIz
M
100
T lIt: CIUSIS 1'.l:IIIOD
"topical"
jor subject of discuss ion !' T he 1;lilurc of t he comm uniq ue to ment ion a "unani mi ty of views." rcf(:rring instc(ld to il mere "exchange of opin ions," points to a substantive inabilit y 10 reach agreemen t. 111c Polis h and ~ast Ger man lcaJ c rships urc said to have stro ngly
pressed th e Soviets to conve ne the summit. whereas Kadar was said to have aite ndc{1 on ly with ",tnmg reservatio ns."" Ulb rich t was rC!)(Irtcd by Czechoslovak SOllrCCS tu have repeated the demarul t hat Soviet tmops he stati olll:d permancn tly in C1.echosloV(lkia.'" These measures an d ot her sa nct iuns, incl uding accordi ng to some re purt, mili tary inte rvention. were deba ted br the Ave in ~ I oscuw, a ppa rcutly wi thou t L~)J1 cl I I S i o(l . ·' Et~JU o n l i c sauL'lio ns were discussed. b ut it was evidently fclt that such measures wou ld un ly serve to furt he r increase Cwchoslovaki a's links with tIle \Vest . t n tl cccl. sou1"t:cs in Pn ,,..,,,, ""I'" rl "tl tha i 11." ch" n.::cs of """uri,,!; :1 lu:m from the hloc lIctuall y may have increased lifte r the snmmit. although dearl)' nu hJ<11l would he [lrolfe red wit hout politic;)1str ings," KJ tl iir ullduuhted lv played" pivuti tl rull: in support ing th e Te"I' ... rda . .\lay ll. I!J6Ij. ~DP!. AFP. Rou,.· ... 1LI.!in 7_'S,"h. a"d IbJ;o 11. • .;.1.,·•. Mu)' Y. 1968; " nJ 1\;1.(1;0 P~~K'''-' Mar 10. 1\Ifl.S, " A,,-"On1ln~ 10 Jl:!j~k . DI1:
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furm moveme nt. He W(IS reliably repOrk(\ to \wve opposed the imposition of any sandiolls on CzedlOs]ov,Iki;I, and indet'(l be apparen tl y dclcnJed tilt: hasic trc nds of tile I'mgue Sprillg ant! o(]c rcd hi act as a met!iator to seule t he growing dispute, "" Clearl y H ungary's own eX]lt: ricnces in 1956 and t,;:,ittir's hope to ell ad his OWl! New Economic :'.-\odd se rved as the hases II)!' his nHKlcratt: attitu d e, Kad:\r is a lso said to ban' prewnted a r"'port on tIl{' prepam ti u)]s for the Interna ti onal C<)mmlm ist CO ll fere ll ('c sdw(I"led lu ],egill On November 2.'5, IWS, in Budapes t. T he importance of the conference running smoo lhly ma y also Iw,\'e eonlri!Jll\cd to K,\tl;\r's des ire for m(KlI~rali()n Oil the C~,echosl() v;l k iss ue, " Sunl(' n·ports ,LL~() credit 1~lLlgarian [Jar t ~' 1{',lder ']f)dor Zhil'ko\' w it h having ,uloph·,I;l wail-and -see attitude
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states suggests that no one SO\'ie t leader could adequately represe nt th e views of the entire Politburo. T hird, th e freedom with which East Europ ean Icmlcrs ;'p p aren tl y cxp rcssed wi(lely divc rgen t p olicy propmals is itsclf a solid indicati on tha i th e Soviets did not convene the su mmit to ('{)I nmllni L~lt c n set of dedsions on how th(: hloc wou ld h;l1ld l {~ th e crisis. Hather. it appears that the cnclave was calletl for genuine consultation wit h bloc leaders in a n effort not only to reass urc Comulka and Ulbricht that thc Soviets were taking th e crisis seriously, h ut also to es tahlish the pmame tcrs within wh ich thc crisis would be handled. and possibly also to resolve th e {lille rences within the Soviet leade rshi p itself. From the reports of th e meet ing. the suhsequent diverge ncies in the Soviet ami bloc press, and t he {.'t)llt ~dictory actiuns that marked Soviet hehavior d urin g -"lay, it would se{:m thn! althou gh hot!. extre mes-a{.'t;epting the re form move men t and mounting an imm{:dial e in vasion-wcrc ruh:d out, no si nglc inte rp retati on or un ited stmtegy emerged fro m the con/Crence. As told b y un official Soviet sourccs to Czcchosluvak re po rtcrs in ~ I us('()w, "1here was no IIni ty uf views on t he de velopmen ts in Czech()slovakia" at the ~b y8 Ill('cting .... ln an
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d ecision ( lIlIl!!/Jr:r II ) for measured escabti on . Ye t one im porlanl out(.'()me uf the summ it was the decis ion ( lIumfJer 13) to welcome a greater role by tIll: Ells t l·: urop.~ all leaders in crisis malla~ement. The acccptancc uf Kjd:'r·s uffc r uf m(!
At th e same li,lie lilal Easl Europe;U) lead"r.~ wen: mak ing their views known in .\ Inscow, n high-level Soviet In il i hlr~' delegation arrived in Prague on ,I fact-findin g to ur_This " isit init ial ed a periud of \' cr y high mi lita ry part idpation in crisis LLI 'lLI age n\(~ nl. Th.) dd ega~ lion. ()stcnsi h[ ~· in th e conn try to particijJ;lle in tht: twenty-t hird an n ivcrsary celeb ratiuns 01' th e [ibcr;lti un of Prague. was led by "·! "rs[ml K()n c" and incl ud cd M;u',I,al \ ]usk" I.-nko ;. ud Geucral z haJov. They rem ained in C";CcllOs[o\'akia un til .\by 14. and in aJ~ clili on to delive r ing lm n l-li ne speeches at th e u~ lch'~lti()n Ceremonies, th ey \'isi kd military nnils, factor ies. and agriculimal (~) ope ra t h·cs in fiftcen dtics, _KThey also held talks on "problcms of defensc·· wil h the ir Czechoslo\';lk ('1)ll11 t('rpar ts.'" Ko nc\"s speech un " lay \) was Iln,..;wer vingl y hawkish . denlllLndng \Ve st German revancl, i' J11 "nll p romising that thc US SR a n d ib ;Ill ics will "always fir m!y and rcli;lhly de ftmd Ollr soci;'! i~ t g;l il\ ~ as well as ollr [sic] frontiers nf t he socialis t I:amp ." I-laving emphasized th e rcadin ess of th e Sovic l arm ell fll rt'I:_~ 10 pmtL"C1 "ot only tl,c sn'lIri!)' o f thc bloc hILt also its socialist naturc, he mad(~ his point even m()n~ explicit: "VigiLLLwe is particularly Ilel'essar~' hy the CSSH, which is " /',.,,,,,/,,. ~I O\' t5. Wfi~. (;n; in b, .:]hlo, M"r Ll ,,,,d t2. toos. E~:12Tf-.!lI(; lIfi _ ' . "' n",lat,,",t 11,,,1;,,. .\1.)' II . 19f>'l . ;" tlFE. /ll',nln "' . f:" .•, H" ....,"·. 1"",C/jf]J. \ h r 15. t96~_
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the bridgehead situated righ t next to the capitalist wurld," He COIlcl ud ed with a wMning: "I can say outright that events (;;1111101 catch us unawares. The Soviet forces arc always in complete <-'om bat readiness. " '" !-o r a n yone who [,iletl to understand KOl1cv's llleSsage, he rellCuted it in a speech to \\lurkers in Kladnu. where he
encouraged them to further strengthen their militant prulet:uian traditions and promised that "we sh:lll pe rmi t no Ollt~ to brenk the fraternal ties binding our people. " '" The military delegation's fact-finding lo ur was illlcnded primarily 10 assess the strength of popular support for the reform movement and to judge the likelihotKi of a l~mserval i\"e comeback. Vi.~its 10 r,lctories, militia units, ;lnd military barracks-the tr.lditional bastions of conservatism- were designed hoth to gauge the respo nse of working class elements to what the Soviets t'Onsid ered primarily an intelligentsia-based phcllomemm and to e ncourage these elements to continue, in Kon ev's worrls, their militant proletarian traditions. Yet Koncv's voice W(l.~ not the only one hcard .Lruong the Soviet military. ~-lars hal ~Ioskal enko was reportLoJ by Prague radio and television on May 13 to have stated that the ussn would '"not interfere in the intenml affairs of Czechuslov:lkia." 1·l e WaS said to havc spokcn '"vcry positively" about evcnts in Czcchoslovakia and to have dcnounced "various slanders" that were "trying to dri ve a wedge between th e friendship of the C7.t!choslovak amI Soviet nations." The USSR, he said, was ready to "do its utmost in strengthe ning friendship" and to provide "help ill all that is needed." Significantly, the report was not carried hy the Soviet media, :lnd j\·loskale nko's speeches received nunc of the coverage that Ko nev's enjuyed.'" '''hile the military delegation wa.-; in Praguc, Sovict troups in Puland, East Germany, and the Ukra in t:: begall lu mllvt: toward th t: Czechosluvak border, \\'estcrn diplomats and tOllfists were prevt:n tt:d from IrJ\'eling inside P()l~nd ," .ond .. lthough the C~,echo slovak news "geTlcy laler stated that Praguc officials had hee n " Pru,o:"" It..!;<>. Ma~· Il. 1968.•:EI2767ICi3. " MO>«1W lbdio, ~I ay 13, 1968. S UI~'69{A2!1 " u .s . Del"',lmenl ul" SI.le. ·iH< ~",,,, ,' ·" . /I>JJ75. ~b )· ].I , 19t>'I, u .s . 1)"1',,,lllIe n\ of S\"t~ . Tr lrgF"'" ," " /(i.jJ9.j . ~!:.). 15. 19&1, . .. ,1 1\',11."" F. H,d,;",.",. · "(.:,<""~,,· .h•• "d ;1< Allie>:' p . 16-1 .
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informed of these maneu\'ers," it was in faet clear t hat the troop movements were part of the escalation of pressure on Prag ue. \Vestern intelligence sources concluded that "the Czechs undoubtedly were not aware of tIle movement of hlrge numbers of Soviet lroops towfm\ their border" and that the Sovicts had stagemanaged the maneuvers. leaking information about them deliberatel~', in order to put pressure on the Dubcek government :'" Prague Hauin did in fact respond rather an xiously to the maneuvers. with oue uroadeaste r pleading. " lour God's sake. let us not have a . repetition of. 1956."" Al'(.'Ording to e_~tim:ltes, sc\'e Tal thousand Illen at most were involved, mainh' in headqllllrterS units. In addition. in East German y an estim(lted twelve tank and mechanized divisions of tile Red Arm y and two East German divisions moved southeast toward the CzedlOsJovak border, taking up positions in the En. Gebirge. an (Irea that had never before been used for military maneuvers.'" Onee the troops were in position , they remained there even aBer the completion of the exercises, thus marking tlIC end of the first stage of military preparations for the invasion." SOVIET DEBATES The maneuvers and the activities of the military delegations were al't-'Olllp,lIlied br iUl upsurge of polemk-s hetween lorees for and against the Prague Spring, The Soviet prcss did not ahound with articles praising the Praguc Spring for its positive t'Ontributioll to the cre ative developmen t of ~larxism-Len i nislil. The tilll e for this llad clearly passed, lind art icles tl ll~t could he L'Onst rllcd as supportive ofCzechoslo\'lIkia were those that did nol opcnly attack the rcform movement or tlla! expressL-d l~)\]fiJenl"c in tht;: ability or the CPCz leadership tu solvc its uwn prnulc11ls, Similarly, articles that " s "", l ;>rk Timel',
Maj' II. 1%/1 . "U.S. 1),;1>-"l"lC'" of S\a'~. Di, ...~u' of J",dlig,;uc-" and JIe""a",h. 1"lelfil."et>cr ,\ '01< 591. July 26. loo.s, U.S . o.,p,u'me"' ofSUle. Te/<'gflk. a' ",al lime "'''n,,,,,,,de' of NAnr, (;e"tr.t Army CmI'l'. i" " lIcAC'rliom "" .he (;,,,,,hosl,,,·. ki.,, !n,.",ion, 19611," 1'. 31. . nd Inl~"""jo nal Ikrnld T";I",n~, Ma~ 21, l\lfill "U.s. I),:partm..,t of SlOk . Td'~'.II' ,\ '" . 1(1f)761 . Mal' I ~. 196'J, ,",1 tj. S. 0..'1»"11\,"", of SMc, Dh'du< "f I IIkIlI~c"<,, ~IId IIc,,-''''''!.. , ",dlie"r,,, ne
100
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d e flected criticism of Prague's "right is t revis ion ism" hy ~n t erin g
atte nti on inste(ld on the equal or gTe.ller dange r of Chinese "left is t dogmat ism" ('Quid also he classified as indirectl y supportive of th e Prague Spring. insofar as it \\~\S (.'o nsidcrcd by sOl11e to be the lesser uf two evils. Us in g these c rit e ria. o ne
C,U\
fi nll a whole series of articles a nd
s\(lteme nts [.wombly disposed or al least ne ut ral toward th e tre nd of eve nts in Czechuslovakia. The Ilrezhn cv.Kusyg in-Pudgu rny triumvirate sent a vcry support ive telegram to the ( ;SSH gove rn ment on the anniversary of Prague's liberation. expressing their "fi rm ('OllVidioll th at relations between the Sovh:t Unioll and sochllist CZI...dlOS!o"" kia will be llcvclopcd amI strengthened fu r th e welfare of th e Suviet and Czechoslovak peoples and in th e inte rests of socialism and eummunism. " " In additiun, artiele s b y both Svuboda ;1 11(1 (:ernik expound ing views on the nature of th e ne w cO urSe were printed in th e Soviet press on May 9. " Also (l u ring May there was ,I [,Iir amount of ]}oueuitori'll reportage of event s in Czech().~ l() vakia. such as the party conferences and various del egat ion visits." At the same time a num hcrof articles rcfiet"ted the li ne adopted by Suslov i ll hh May speech attucking unly leftis t uugm;IUsm. " Others, such liS o ne by T. Kolesnichc nko, proposed a stra te gy of"st ruggle against all deviations fmlll ~'l uxism-Lenillis111 , ,md 'Igainst nationalistic, dogmat ist and revisionist d is tortions of it s revol utionary principles:' " And in Kommlm ist. th e World Ma rxist Rer;iew. and New Times, articles ap peared a tta<:kin g Maoism as the g:reu test dan ge r confront ing the unity nf th e bloc. or Singling Oll t certai n aspects uf Sik's L'(.'Ollum it, refurm ur th e Actiun Program for sc riO lLS (lIIalysis and support. These arlides s u~es t that tll ere was a cunsiderable body of opinion in top party circles that did not rcgurd th e Praglle events as 10",lI y negati ve and thrcllten ing. " This was " /'",,,·,{a. ~I . )"\I. I!!&S . "(;~rnll . r:.~r" ja. Ma)' \I. 196/1; .. "I Sml~>
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" S",1,,,,. Pnmln. ~Ia)' 6. 191">11. ;.rnm/u. \1")' /2. I%~. ""0 l'ol ;hd,e,k"", l" "" \!:O" l ·"..,·,Jun. OJ m ~z.hd"n"rodnoi a, c~.., ." ",,",,,, ;,,,bt. " ". S ( \1>)" j!l6l'l). 1'1'. 111-1_06. """1'1.• ;" ...1 Ih., II", >100 , "pl ;". I;'H1 of \I,nel,,,,· I,,·,, ;,,I,,, .. , .", ,, , . ;n~ p",lcl.,ia" foeS';"''''')"' ''''' , ... ~" ,~j"",,,,, I" Ih~ M"';" n,,~1.,1 "'I~;ru Ihe , ~"';""')' play' a ,k:<.·i,I\·~ ,ole. '"11, ;; ph..,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,, " ""pl;"."",o::., II ,e ,J~"d","n~nl of Ihe ,"'ol ll liw.' ,",,, I'n,I~"'"" """""";,,,..Ii,n, ",,,,I IK' ul'l~·"I.p;"" ".tI""~I;,, ",""hll\~"h 0< " .. . 11''''.'1'."""10,;",, "h;.,·h "OW "'~I"""" "l tl, " "''',' ".,;."" ,I.' '' ~f G" II,~ nlt"",,,,,i,l ."d
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particularly true in intellectual cirdes . In May, a delcga tio n of distillguisllcd, and hardly dissidcnt, Suviet write rs visited Prague. In the course of discussions, K. Simono," described the reform mo\'c~ ment as "" grellt contrihution for world socialism, and Boris Polevoy, anotller member, added. "what is good for you is good lor us."" Significantly, however, whcre,ls these views werc openly puhlished in the Czechoslovak and H un g:lri,m press, they were not rcprinted in the Soviet Union. This rather uuusual state of affairs ulso upplicd to Foreign ~linis ler Gro myko's interview wi tll L'U.,itii and Prime Minister Kusygin's interview with MagYllr lIirlll /J. neither of which ,·cce;\,e(1 any co\'crJge in the Soviet mass media. " In Kosygin's interview, which was ~Ictulilly given dnring a visit to CZI,.>choslovukia, he issued a harsh denuncilltion of \Vcst German nco-Nazism, whose rClictivation, he said. had mme about with the connivanl'c and elll'tlurJgement of the government of the Fedeml Ikpublic. At the same time, Kosygi n m;lde .I specific reference to "positivc tendencies in Europe" and also made the intriguing statement that the stand of the Soviet Unio n and the Hungarian I'e()ple'.~ Hepublic was uniform in thc cvaluation of every fundamClltlil prohle m of international life. In light of Hung:.iry's Jh'crgent evaluation of the Pr.lgue Spring at th e May8 Mnscow summit, this statemen t apt l~' reflects Kosygin"s own identification with the l-Iungari(1II position. Compared with the Kosygin interview, Gromyko's press l-'tJllfcrellce with L'Uliita displayed some interesting similarities
~"11",
, emh,'irn,a, v ","""""'''\' - I), V"I.h ("Whe,. 'he PH Mt~", 'he Pre""",:' S",,. r;",r•. "", 12 [~,.y' I~. 19!i8)j 1",1olid)" '''1'1~)I')' '~ he' ,,.,il,,,, "'., "",fonne,t ;n the ."tl,,,'., ;n'en';'-,w "ith ~:. Guld,li>eker, October 24. 1\1,;, "Crnm)'ko. f.'UniM. MOY 12. 1!l6.S: ""'l'gi ll •.\'~~!I'" 1/;'/"1'. MO)' IQ. Ill&! • •:EF.!7751 A2IJ. N", ... Dclttocitland of Ma)' 20. lOOS .lId S""iel .\'",., (l~",don ) of May 21. 1968. pull. li ;ltL'
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Til E C III S1S PEIIIOU
Nazism . Although appe ariug to d ismiss the possibility of a positi ve So viet response to th e new Eas te rn poli cy of the Kiesillger-13nmcl t
government. Gromyko did in fiu:i admit that a number of positi ve ideas had been put forward in " 'estern Europe that would strength e n pe;lce :ll\tI sec uri ty. He also laid down rath er mod erate eondit ions for th e improve men t of\Vest Ge rm an relations wilh the sod alis( hloc', including ;\l-'l.:eptam:c of Eu ro pean Iro ntie rs. r e 11UIIcintion of access to iltn mk WCil[XlIlS, the (;CSsa\loll of att acks from \ Ves t Berli n, and reco gniti on of the validit}' of the " lon;\<.'{J agreemen t. H e J i,l not U C tll:Ull i fm c x,unplc . as even the Czta:hs h,uJ do ne, thai \Vest Ger m an y rC IlOlIll(;C, all initio, any ter rito ri al claim s on lands now governed h y s()('ialist regimes. And . in teresti ngly. neither C rom ykn nor Kosygin m:lde an y refe re nce 10 any of the re curre nt th emes that might howe s ignal cd t he ir (''O[)('"Cnl ovcr eve nts in C:tx ehoslovakia- th reats to tI lt: un ity of th e socialist b loc, tile aggressive inte nt ions of NATO. tllC sub l'c rsive p la ns of im pe rialist ci rcles, or Weste rn responsibili ty for the res urgence of revisionist and nat ionalist te nd c ndes withi n t he sol"ialist (.~'ml m illit y. Finall y, t he speech by v. V. Kuzne tsov, fi rs t de puty foreign mi nishlT. to th e United Nut iullS U ll ~ l ay 20, elskaya RossiYIl, now increaSingly iden t ified as !hc bastion orhard -linc sent imen ts. On ~by 14, it claimcd th at C:t.edHlslovaki,,·s first presi" /ohn S,·wh<,u'e . CuM/law" . 1'1 ..· S'",-, ,>jSM .f . 1'. IIll. lu ~ .\1 , )" 21 .dJn...;,. u"Je" ~; " g~,.., 11,,,,,,,,, " ",,·e)·.. 1 11 ... ",1",;"i>I,...It ~" , ·, """ '1'11>";, )· ,,, S", ;,'1 ."".,. h,,,,,. ;lIdi".li"~ Ihul 'he ley,,, U.S. r~I.
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MAY 5-JUNE 6
J()9
dent, Tom£ Masaryk, was an "imperialist hireling bent on destroy. ing Bolshevik power" who had finam.'cd emigres involved in a plot to assassinate Lenin. The article concludcd: "We wo uld not be discussing this now if vokcs wcre not being raised in fnlternal Czechoslovakia by those who deliberatdy or mistakenly adv,ul(."cd tllC slogan 'Back to Masarykr "" It is interesting that Brezhnev subsequently apologized to a visiting CSSH parliamentary delegation le d by Josef Smrkovsky for this article and for other "extreme tendencies" that characterized Soviet behavior toward Prague during ~fay. Brezhnev chdrned rather meekly that he "had never gillen instructions for anything to be done one way or the other...... Smrko\'sky added thai the Sovict leaders "were not very pleased wit h the article by Shiryamov on Tom:U Masaryk. . {and] that certain con· sequen(.'cs have been drawn so as to pre\'ent any possible repeti· tion of this kind of oCCllTre nce. "'" II is incredihle that at the very lime the Soviets were ('Omplaining about the lack of press "discipli ne" in Prllgue, tllt:y were also daiming tu he experiencing similllr difficultics in kec ping their own journalists in order. Such arti· dtls, howtlver, could not have apilellred in the Soviet press wi thout sponsorship at the highest levels," and in
11"..;11", .\I.y 1.1. 1\l6Il.
" Ueport of the (;SSII p .. l;.,n"n'ar~ Jckg... ion "i,i', headed by Smrk",.. ky. to the USSII in J"n~ . "·titt~,, b)· J<""r 7..,.l"ik d"""t)· 'f""lhr ,,( the /I;~lion.l A.",mbly ""d ,e· te..",.! to Ihe sO'''' };"k Ti","", J"m, IS. 19G8.
>l(;fK. Juty 3.1968 , EF.i2Bt:l!OI -2. ~b.<aryk th.t ll ",zhnc" ..,port"'! t)" (',"mt "" obi"chon.lok in ~1a)' " ..,.e jn [;oct ",p'''~l<>d "e,I,,'im i" the InaJor nn>isn<"! l'Tanlu editorial th.t apl"'"fC-J on
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Augu" 22. 1968. i",tifji"l( th~ inv.'~," ' ",\ft." .n. it i, ,, fad II"t Ih~re tw 1_" ~ recent .." .j ....... or tl, ~ cult or M~"" )" ~ , who w.>"I~~,.. • •_ .. " o"" ... ~ .. r .t.~ c.~." "o"' ,, ,,,,,,,om,,," and "".>S an in"iltltor of tlte i "t~,..,..,nlion 0.0;>;",1 s",'i<:1 IILt.. i~. Jt b •• tr2nge de,..,!opment when ~"en ..,me Comnnmist, in Cre<"h",h·~~ ", 1.",1 .1~"'rw«'1' ~K"ru.1 woo.e ;".Irueli ... " Ih~ CI.""I""k)\"a); Cn"",,,,,,I.1 Port)· ...,,' ]>e""""l<.'d." " " ",,,wmoWroya ~,..,t:tIa. May It t\J&l. all""keJ Stu,k'ot rue pr<>mo'inll a .. udenu· union indt"J"'ndcnt of part)" ron,,,.,t a"d p rin'ing ",tid", ""impb"ahte in their oh<cur.lnti .m," induding too.e of I-'on S"it:lk whu ". II.d", ~ ' "ni'm. tlte '""mnunl .. parly and the dicta· t"",hip of lit. prol.·t.ri.t wi ll, .It"o'l manl""al hlll."'~>' . " Tmd. May 15, 1968. crilid7...d L. Sochur hi. Inle.",et. t i"" "f Mani"n and prom'~ ~," of. plurul .. t ",det)'. Ut.",wr· ""ya I:'loc/G, no. 19 I~t.)· 8, 19b5) and no. 20 ( ~by 18, 19(8). ",salte
rn,.
110
T ilE CHISIS I' F:IUOD
b ut attempted to provide an ideological rest:! te menl of the funda-
mental principles of socialist construction and proletarian internatiunalism. A major Pm vd{/ editurial emphasized the "stru~le un Iwo fronts " as " one of tile most important lasks of Marxist-Leninist parties:' Helinqu ishing the leading role the party could "jeopardize the gaim of socialism," and this was claimed to be "t he lIlust important political lesson" of events not in Czechoslovakia, but in China. The Prague Spring \\",lS not named spccilk".llly in the artide, but the fu llowing excerpt , with dear applicability tu even ts there, shows a certain moderatio n as well as a much more welldefin ed ideolugical stanl-'e than had previously been evident:
or
Di SC\l.~sion of t he prohlcrlls or Ihoc tle\'clopmcnl of so<;i"list demo..'mey. e rit idsm of il. sh{)rl"~J min gs ,mt! ' 1",,, ls for the I.est " "'ys "rim_ p r!wi n)l: its dlcc\i\'ellc~s ,.re pmfouml1r I)os il ive ph e nrll"':"". Il ut all this is So onl y " "der the absolutel y IIL..,,,,,ar)' ... lIltl it ;,," that these quesls arc ha sed Oil I he ]lr;n"'iplc~ of so"i:llist d,:m(l,:r.i ..·" :lml do ,ttlt e n..'ro.,d, (11)(111 il s f",ub"'c" l"l l'rin<"il'l,, - tIl<: 1c",l,'rsl;ip of the COIIIrn unisl parl ~'. li e who forgt'l .1 I h i. n,,,-·,,s.a ril y tak"s a posit iou of rev isionism, hreaks with Marxism amI ads in the intcres ts of th e 1 )(", rgt!"i sie agailIs! ~odal i s ill. '"
Act'Ornpanying these artirles was an unusually large number of pie,"...,s 0 11 foreign policy and stralegic themes, man y of them writte n hy military leaders. The basic trend represented was a hardening in the altitude toward the \Vest and all almost uuiversal ('011 demnation of Bonn's policy of lm ilrling bri(lges as, in Ihe wonls of an /;:.vestiu article, a "reaclionar}' policy of the ruling groups of llam.:e (,Jpital, ,\ [)(Ilie), (',Ilcuhlled to a(.· hicve the str,ltegic "ims of imperialism-the restorat ion of ca pitalism everywhere. "", In general, therefore, the ideologi('"l tone of the polemic was still moderate, hut the contcnt of lITticlcs on Czechw.lo\'lIkiil was lI nd o ubt e dly more Imstile, witb views favorable to Pnlgue infi-e(juent ,Lnd I1ml: lied . Moreover, the Soviet press, 'U)(.I in putict'\ar the military press, reacted sharpl y to ,,\lega tions that ;\-Ios('o w had been in to uch
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a",] M~)' 27. 1965 , ,m , I,,· hltdllg""" i' 10, _ " d)·. Iml"",.1;"", . Hemp" In ,ul" 'e,L .. ,d.t· I., m. and ,h~ e • ..,ntl.il ruk ,,(,he p"" r.' 'he '·.n ~",1f(1 o[,t", p rolel • •••t. " '"U.!;'I, May 16. 19&1. AI", ,.." 1'"" .,/". ~b)' 9. 19f~~. [or C, .." hlo: M~)' 1·1. HJf,s. ['" Y.rl:ul>OI·,ky ,,<> W.",,"w 1'...·1 : M.y IS. I9&!. "'-' n)'iu~ ~o,·j'·h"m"rio.·,u <",I1",j"" 0,',,, C;rech,,,k.,.. ki.: ~l>y 2~ . HI&i, ~" ",ncle",n, l ion ,,," II'. Cern",n ,·u,e.!("ncy I....., . Km." ",v" ~n:
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wit h high officials in Washington to asce rtain Ameri(',1n lIttitudes to t he crisis." Judging from the nature of the press campaign, Brezlmev's SUbSC(IUent disavowal of its more e1
The ('Vnservativcs :llso had growing support in East Germany and Poland, where anti-Czechoslovak ,Ielivily increased aller tbe May 8 meeting. The ElI$t Germans printell an article on ~ l ay9, thc day the maneuve rs began, alleging tIm presence of Ame rican tanks and troops on Czechoslovak territory.'" Prague responded that since it was well knoy>'ll that these tanks were in t he l'Ountry to make a film. th is allegation was a clear provocation and re quired an apology. None was for tllcoming, and indeed East Genmm amhassador Florin protested against C7.cch()slovakia·s anti-GOB press repor ting."" In Polund, an uns igned editorial appeared ill Try/nlllu Illc/r, on ~tu)' 9 calling Oil Czechoslovuk "cnmmdes" to "fordbly silence" and "paralyze" lmtisocialist voiees."' TWIJ days later, Prime ~'l illister . . Kra,,,,ay~ o",,~/a . .~'.)' 2-1 . 1968 .•\1>0 Pra«/• . M.)- IS. 100/;. alk,s>-..:I t l... t Ihe ,el""! '" So,-iel-A",crkan ",ntact, 'M' C.."hu.Iu,-.ba .""itt In lhe r~lJtlon' 001..-""" lhc USS II "" d (;,.e,,),o, Im·.h•. " .. /lulinu 7~" ''''S . M.), 9. 19611_ 11,~ "h:"~,, '"'' " "",.,,<1 tl", fi>Il<>\\'; ,,~ .lor i" J~"~" 11'''1. ,\'e"" Zell . • .,d .'·al~",,,I'7.el1""~. ,\ he. P,·m., d,/u,,,1 (H, ~")' 9. 1!If>'l. r.I'';''I<~II..i'er ' a l""""~Q ~a""'a', .Uock on J'I) Pro<;h.I:!.b. 0" ,\ l . y I L 19611. il ,~ili"'.ed 11m CR'Ch "",.. d"m_ i<:. ",h" had p;>1b.;""I<c neM d~~' it c.,,;,<1 a" arlicle de"",," ..,,,, " -,,,.,,,1 twnd. in C"-",I",,",, .. k lit~ r.t"r e •• .,.1 nn .\Iay 2,1 it> oSOi,I.,,1 ",lilm ",rol e . major p i""" implkaHn)! lI'e 'l C",mallY .. tl,e ;n'1i~lor t"~
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Pr"!:,,o Spri,,~. M""",":<. III< E:I.>L Cerl"o" . .. thi> H"'~ ' ''' ..... , to j.,,, Ge ,,,,.,, l.",g,,~~ broadcast. from I~ue (Me!-;n (;"""'. "C ...",hu.I"'.-aL;". Ulbricht. Oi,d the German P,,, .... p. J), - 1I. r-/in.r Z.. il«"g. M.y II . 100II. 111<"}' " e re 1,.rlk"I.,ly a),,,,,t .U.;pLl",,' m..d~ 11, Ru,/t "mw u!( ~Ia)' ;} 11 ..1 Lh" CDR " '..., ,ldil"·",,,,I), ,""",!.;in~ <~i"" in 1I0rli " to hdghle" len,ion in Ihe "'!(iun and mok" il """e dilli",,1t fo, C/-<~~""''''''''';~ Ln I",.."e 0 ""I".m pr"gram. ~ Ea,'~ Ma)·. ""fm~ lIw May S ,um,n il. 1'.. ~tlC hl~'r~l, ",,\ ,1 ......·;He-.n)' "r ;l i<'i"",1 .... pre.,;,;o" "",1 "nli·St"n;Li,,,, in 1\)1."d.• ,,<1 it> a hi!i:l>/r " )1)1"",,-,,, ..1~"'t",e. Cl .. U" i,~ ... ,ily oJfcn::d h-"""hi,,~ po>L> 10 t"'O 1Illi,h Inldl''l1 U.b " ....""ti)· d;"tt\;'><."-' rn~" Wa'>aw U"i, )crn,"
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Cymnkicwic-J: dclivcrctl a spccch thatle rt no dou bt ab{}ul \Va rsaw's view of evcnts in Praguc. He state d lhat "thcrc exists in the socialist camp the superior raiso n d'e tre in the shape of commun inte rcsts of all socialist e(llln t rie~ . These interests demand the ability to harmonize the policy of every ("Ql1l1 tr y and of every part y wit h the intercsts of soci(llism liS a who[e ."· Cynl1lkicwicz made it crystal clear that his interest in prevcn ti ng Prague fro m pnn ui ng all independcnt [w Hcy was motiva ted no t only uut uf dcvotio n to abstract notions of proletarian illtt:rnatio n ali.~m : "It is also a uictatt: of the instinct of self-preservation, in order that we may not be gr,lbbed by the throat one by one, in order tllilt the weakest links shall not he picked nll t from ollr camp. lind so that those links shall not be thrown at othcrs."· '" In a spL'Cch on May 16, d ur ing a signing of a new PolishHu ngaria n Friendship Treat y, GOllIulka too was indirectly critical nl"lhc Pr,lgue Spring. Claiming tlull id ..... ,logic'll slll)\"er.~ion and the weakening of socialist syste ms fro m within was now the " primary weapon" heing ust:d hy impcrialis m, he maintai ned in ,1 clear refe rence to Czcehoslovakia that imp.c rialism '"fre1lucnt [y camoullages it.~ SlIhvf'rsive aClivily wil h Ihe ma.~k Of 'imllrovin,l!:' socialism."' He labeled as ("(lllllierre\'o!utionary those activities aimed at "the undermining: and qucstioning of thc leading role of the purty, the res lHlping of socialist democracy un Ihe pattern of bourgcois tlemocnu::y."· Apart fro m cnlling ror "increased vigilancc" and the "he ighte ning of the un ity of the so('ialis t states," Comulka made no othe r policy prescriptinns in pu blie. In L"Qll trast. K:'id:'irs speech on thc same occasion. while also cnllfi
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113
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ing for "vigihlllce, t'lJhesion and an active sland of Ihe forc(,s of p rogress," made 110 sp ecifi c r .. rcre lll·c 10 Ih" sil",lliol1 in ,my Cummu nisl si'lle lmd indicate(1 neitl.e r active support nor de ni grat io n of the reform movemcnl. 6 ' This air of n e ulralit~, \\'ling. /'n' (..~ample . t Iwt the omdal parl y pa per. NCIHUlluulsrig, di d not c " cn rc po rl K,\(Lks departure for the Moscow sum mil. Ne ithe r did it publish Ille lext of th e COlllmu niq ue nor an y of th e major So viet . Polish, or East Ccr man de nunciat iom of Prague, A s th e C ;r.ccllOslu\'Hk pape r I'niCf: l-'O l'I'cctl y observed on Mn v 1·1, "the H \ln ~arian pre ss docs not puhlish nny prohle matie arl icles which m igllt p rovoke an undesirahle atmosphe re ." Nor did they follow Ihe lend of Iheir YllgoshlV. HUlll,m i,ln . and Euro-Co mmu nist c(Junterpa rt.<; who were hy now ope nl y s upporting Ihe Prague Spring and t he prind ple of nonintc rfe re nee. '" DELEGATIONS TO I'HAC UE The te n days fi)llowing th e May 8 snmmit. th erei()re . we re mark-,tt h y a high d egre e of tension .~ urr() " ndin g th e maneu vers ncar th e C;r.':chosluv;lk hu n le r, th e ;ldi" il il:' of tI, e Suvid militar y dcl q ;;Iti o n. and t he press pulc mics between supporters an d detractors uf th e Pra~ue Sprin~. The situatio ll "';IS not inlllleJiat ely impruved by the simuitam,uus arri val in Czechus lu\'akia on ~ I ay 17 of twu
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114
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scpar-Ite delegatiolls; onc, ,Ill assem blagc of top military offiecrs(" led by C redlko, whirll arr ivt'{l in PraJ.,:lIe to full hunors; the oth e r, a " ddeg,ltion" of onc, consisti ng solely of Primc .\1iuister Ko sygill, whosc visi t. it was a!lnount~d, was for th e pllTpOSC of taking th c waters at Karlovy Var y. It had been rumored since tile beginning of .\b y th aI Kosy).:in might hL ke up th e invit,Ltion nf the CSS H govcrnment to visit I' ra).:ue ,~' imd as [ate 'l~ .\Iay 14 C(:rnik stated that Ihe invit;lth)l] \\'iIS still opc n hut th at "ml eX,let dat c liils IlCI:n set." 1[(0 ,lssluncd thaI tlll~ visit would "not take piace in th e foreseeable fu ture,"'" On "by 15, CzedJ(Jslol'ak leade rs wert! informed that Kosygin would in fad be IH king up their invi tali m} and wou ld be Hrril'ing in under lorty,cight h01lTs .... Simibrl y thc ,UlllOUlleement of Creeh ko's visit was mad e only aft er his plalle had adual!y landed. The II naIllIlJllllt't:d, IIneX[ICd ed, ami suddcn nature of both vis its po ints to yet anotlll:r h~t - minut e decision in jl.IOSt~)II', Indeed I;erlailL el'ideLlL'C suggests tlml ,mother Pul itl>uro L~)mpm1Tlisc J •.,L'isinn (1IIIIU/Il: ,. 14 ) was made fiJllolI'ing Knn ev's return nn lI. la y 14 li nd prior tn informing Praguc of Kosygin's imminent visit on '\la~' 15, Thc L~we of tl", d,:cisiun II', L~ \0 dCUl(L1ld militilry 111,lIlc " "ers in Czechoslovakia :md 10 incrcase eonlacts with eO nSCrV!ltivc foret·s in Prague, m,l king it dear that once truops we re in place, th ey wuuld he free to help "stah ilizc" t he situation. A Western report quntlng " Czedloslovak official sourees" revealcd on }'l ay 18 th at "as late as last week "Iosttlw still scriously ('~lIlsid erc{1 milit ary intervcnti on on the ilsSll mptioll that t'O ll serl'lin1.l or (;('I1(,,,,t Al" ., ei repi,)",,'. M~"t.,\ 1')'~' 1\:,,,)'.,,,,; , Colonel (;""(',,,1 \ " ,. il; Ik')''' 'n , C"~'nd ( ;('(,,' ra1 !"' ;~"I"i O)\a'~. ,,-, .nJ "Ih~", ., ~lid.d T., ,, "'I~"lc(! in /L .I/ .. ",/c ()n ~[a)'
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~'larsha.l Yakubovs ky, in a major Pravda ur!ic1e appearing on May 14 , mmle dear his own position that m;UlCUVers tlntl the develoll ment of furthe r (:{}opel~lti()n in till! milit;lr~' splwre we re an inlegral part of the struggle agains t imperialist suhversion. He stated that ·Joi nt exerds es playa particlIl:lrly import;lnt role in Warsaw Treat~' de fense (xl(lrdination. The memher states ofihe \Vars<\W Pact in th e interests of the further strengthcnin)! of thci r defense capabilit y llave carried (lUi. nn;11 nature of Kosn::in·s visit suggests t lmt whereas a I)(}lilkal soluUvn Illar still have IICI:n favore(1 by th e Politburo as a wl."Io.:, {;ek lc;,dership Ulltl acceptance of the re fo rm move ment was no longer seriollsly c llvisaged by Ihe majorilr." The uflidal purpose ufGrechko's visit W,IS ·· to h{:{.~n\le ;I{."illlainted
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with tI Le new co mm and of th e Czechoslova k People's Army, to exchange exp eriences, and to di scu ss qu es tions of interest to both si ues." '" Negotiations with the So\' iet milit'lr)' delegatiO LL t~ntered on t'o mhat pn:part:dness, and th e Soviets we re n :ported to lnwe argu ed that th e mil it'lry elJidcno::y of the W,Lrsaw Pact's defcnscs vis-a-vis th e \Ves t was heing adversely allet'll,t! by the reform lllove ment, '6 T he militar y dcleg;ltion gave Czechoslovak repo rters the op port un ity of questio ning .\l:lrshal Yepishev a\)()ut th e ,\ Iay ,"i-(, f-A: MOl/rle report "I!eging he 11<,,\ pledged that the Sovie t army wo ul d resp()nd to a call to save socialism in Czt'ehosloV
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port: the Czechoslovaks had me rely "informed" th t.! Sovicls '';lbol1t th e plan ned solution of tIle topic-,ll problems of th e Army as it is suggestc(! in the ministry's Actinn Program," and th at th e So· viet cle!f'J atioll in response had " inform ed " the Czechoslova k side ahout the Soviet "armed fnrt.-cs huilcl-u p, this yea r's e.~e rci ses and th e planned measures in both military training and th e sphere of political work. ...., It was only 011 ~I ay 24, after Grcchko had left hut while Kosygin was still in Czechoslovaki'l. th,lt th e CSSR ministe r of national de· fe nse announced: "Joint command-slaff exercises will he held in J une on th e territ ories ofCzcchoslovakia and Poland. The staffs of ,Ill services of the lorces of the \Varsaw Treaty l11u nt ries will take pHrt in th e joint exercises. The aim is to test (;oope ration aml l1l!llm:l1ld und e r conditions of present-day operations and to improve the preparedness of th e troops and staffs ..... Although the timing of Kosygiu's visi t (-..lU ll: as ,I surp rise, all rt:ports su ggest he wa.~ well-received and Ihat negotiations wcre, in Fore ign ~lillister H;\jc k'.~ terms, "rational and n:alislic."'" The ini _ lial ammoncellwnt that Pri me "'Ii nisler Kosygin, responding to tIl e previous in vitation uf the CSSH. ~o\"ern[J) en t , had arrived for a health cure at Kar!uvy Vary anti ftlr a "con tinuatioll of th e exc h:mge of views . ,on q ucstiuns of interest lu bu th sides" was made twu hours after C7~hoslovak leaders "md Soviet Amhassador CIH:rvun_ enko had gone to Ihe airporl to m eet his plane .... On tIl{' following day, ~Ia}' 18, Dr. FrantBek Kouril, an official govern me nt spokes111<111 , ;mlloul lt'cd tllat after initial t;llks, Kosygill wou ld he going for a te n-day cure to Karlovy Vary where ((Ilks on el"()llom lc questi ons woul(ll"()ntinue. Kouril also annuunced Illat Kusygin would be givin g a press conference at the end of his slay."' Laic in tIl e same day L:TK rel ea.~ed a state menl from "authorized CzedlOslo"ak sour<.-cs" that "the talks were developed :It th c initiati\'c of hoth .~ idcs :llId a solutiou In a numher of l~lIl cre te economic q uestions 'Irising frmn the traditional economic relat ion s of Ihe two countrics and the current re{l u ire me nts of the Cz...'"(:hos lo \,~l k o..'l1>llOmy is being approached." Then, in a ~cu l en cc widely in terpreted as proof of Kosygiu's pro-reform altitude, it was staled lllat " the discussion of "Cn:. ~1 ")' 22. 1!16!1. t:~::.r27781CII. ~ I'rogue Ibolio. Mar 24 , 1Cl&S. EEl27bU"ClI. " I Uj~k. mx .,,. " I' ..... II. 1)3 " CTK , M ~y 17. 1!lf>8. £El2774/C11; New j"I!,k
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political probl e lll .~ also showed th;lt !he p,lth of the further de\'dopnlt!nt nf socialism upon which C7.cchuslm'(lki:l ha.~ embarked is mee tiug with ur]{lc rstand i Il~ ,trnung Suviet leaders ... ~, This impression was connrlllt:d till! follow ing day by Josef SmrklJvs ky in Hilde /lniv(J: "CrJdual! y, althuugh not c\'c r ~· thin g is satisfactory. th e C PC;r. is su(.·(;(:edin g in uvclToming fears ur reservatiuns about tlevcinprnellts i" C;r.eehosluvaki" which ("ol1 ld :md still can he 01.se rved amon g some of C;r.l'ehoslovuki,,·s trad it ional friends and allie s. This has ht:en borne out in sevcral rC{:ent t,llks, with Lu igi lAJ ngu, Nikc zic, during the re{"ent /o.losl~)\\· talks and~wh i ch is especially important-in the current friemlly talks with Aleksei Kosygin.""" It i.~ inte resti ng that ndther of th e two shl\em ent .~ rcfe rr e(l to Creehko's dele gatiun as pnx,( of improv(."{1 understa nd ing. Furthe rmurc. Smrkovskfs account is nutable fo r its reeugnition of the d isu ni ty withi n th e hlol: over tile interpretation of C;r.echnsinvak events. Kl)sygin himself dil\ not hin g tf) ass uage t his per(.'C ption of him as basi<.~llly sym pathet ic tow;ml the reform movement. 011 .\Iar 19. he gave the inte rview to th e H urI!,:arian paper Magyar lI;r/a/" anaI y~.cd previously. in which I,,: n:portcd with "sul i.sf;lclioll " Ihu t "the .~ t;md uf Ihe Soviet Union and the 1I 11n~ari:U\ Peuple's il e publie is uniform ill th e enlluati on of e very fund ame ntal problem of illtern;ltion;l1 life: ' ';-; Kosy)!;ill'S st,ltelllent W;lS widc1~' reported in C7.cdllJslo\'akia anti inh:rp rc tcd ill t he l~JIl t cxt uf K:id:ir's known dm mp ionship of the reform movement at the "" Ia ~' 8 bloc summit. D urin!:, his stay 'It Karlu\'y Vary, K()sy)!;in made a pu int of mixing with holid:1Y l 'TOW.:\S , :lllowing himsel f to b.: photogr;lphed witl, his granddau ghte r. He was also quoted as saying that "cxec1lc nt con· v()Tsnlioll s" werc tak ing pIne.: b.:I-..\,cI·III I", two sid.:s.'" On .\tny22. during:m appcar:mce 011 C7.CdlOSlovak tele\'ision. he stated that h e persollally regard ed "till: C7.<.'chs :md Siu vaks as Olll" great friends" ;lnd tlmt it was "very pl c:l~an t to tuke a rest among peupl e who have the same opill iolls 'L~ I do." Kosygill added that these "arc 1I 0 tj1l S( banal words. . Afkr all , we ha\'l' gUile UI'er a lung path of st ruggle togethe r and our parties arc fi).!:hting on th e same front:' '''' If the atmosphere of the lalks was friendl y. the re is less spc" (:1'1;, I>r.~'w I\;"t)" . ~l,)' III. l'lfA ICE/ 2 775.'ClI . .. flu,l" pnim.
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Kosygin to he hasically sympathet ic hnt worri c.:1 that forccs of hoth th e left all.:1 th e right might take ml vantage of current instability. He urge.:1 the CPCz leaders hip to alluw only Communists tu fill key gove rnment positiuns, es peciall y in th e sec urit y .~cr\' ices and nrged Ihem not to legalize an~' o ppositio n gro ups. He is quoted by 01.1 Sik ,IS \\"Irning Iklt the situatiOIl W'l~ hel"Qming dan gerous: "Don't you see the de velopnumts in yo ur l"Q unt ry arc playing into th e han d~ of your enemies?"" '" The pressu re s e.xe rt ed on the C;w dws!uvak leade rship by Kosygin ami others thron ghout May cer tainly seem to have affected th e results of th e CPCz PrJesidiulll lncctin g held on " ·I ay 21 - 22. which rejcc\c(1 til e formation of new politi.::,,] or quasi political gro upin gs, ind",ling KA N. K 231. ami 11](: StI<:iall)emocnllic party. Tin! I'r,l("sidiu III also discussed th e final draft oflhe agenda for th e forthcomin g CI!lltral Commill.!e ple nulI1 . alltl inciud{:d ill it 110t o nly qU l;:s tiol)s of cadre chan ges lind restr ictio ns Oil polit ical organizations hul also the Sejna defection lind th e nced Jill" greater press censorship. I"" The pll;:!Hllll reso lutions we re to includc ,\ Jimnulalio n att:lck ing ,mtisoci:llist and anti-Sovie t tendencies. and as Smrkovsk~' latcr said : 'TlIC !>,e! is that th e p ressun, I"rum a hmad, f,.um the Suviel
Ullioll. also helped to get that formulation in ." "" \Vhile Kosygin wa.s still in Czecho~ luva );ia , the Oulx::e k leadership Signaled tilt' serious ness of its in te nti on to pn:vcnt any furthe r erosion of th e CI'Cz"s posi tion h y san ctioning a i\'jinistr y of th e Interior annOUlICI;: IlH' llt on \ 'Iay 2-1: "OrwmizeJ activ ity purpurting to hI;: th at of a po!it ical party" would be eon sidcre
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vakia's relations with the Warsaw Pact :lIlt! Cl\'IEA. "N Yugos!uv sources stated that "Kosygin's talks hcncc . . were of help to hoth sides alul eliminated various misgivings." '" It is not known whether Kosygill W,IS tnlt! specifically that the extmurJinary congress was l>eillg planned for Septemher. Certainly by the time Czeehosl(Jvak biders lIIet with Kusygin , there was general agreement in the Pruesidiulll on an early convocation. It is less clear whether the C J'C-l Praesidiu1l1 kl(J :Idual!y set the (lllte .1Il Yet there were goud reason s why Dilheck should have discu~scd convening lin carly congress with Kosygin. First, any Communist leadership st ill claiming to be allied to the USS H would at least haw: to inform tim Soviet le;nl"rshi p hclilre taking action on an issue of this magnitude. Second. lllan y reg;trde<:1 the decision to call an carl y t"Ongress as an opportunit y to stabilize the situation and reassert the controlling inte rest 01' the Duhcl:k core against both extremes of the left and the ri ght. III this way, some \\1mld :Irgue, Dubeek t'Ouklltavt: used 1 li t: uecisiun 10 t'all the cungrcss as prooftlmt he was taking firme r control. Thus Prat,dfl of August 22 stateu: " It was hope d that the PraesilJiulll the CPCz Central Commillce would lise the preparations fur the l'lth Extraordinary J>arty Congress, scheduled for S~ptemhcr D. to IlUt an end to tbe defamation of cadres. But th is did not happen, V;lc!av KniL director or the Czechoslovak Institute for tlte History of the European Socialist Countries, in an at~'Oulit of the 1968 crisis published ill the USS II, used phrJ-~es that sl iglltly ,literI'd the I'ra ol/a ve rsion: '-rlm ~lay plenary meeting decided til L~)II\"Clle, in Septeml..: r. an extraordinary congress of the party, This decision " 1lUld have heen
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p.372. ,""""""1,,,-,, ,,, a " ...~.., h ",.. I,· hy Ilil",k i" S,'pl,·ml ..,. 1!J6!J. • fI,·, ,b~ .\ l,y ~ ,\ I """,w c" "f~r~"re. I}",*," ,k-c;J.,J 'hal . " Au~,,,' 1,1,·" "", ,'"",\,1 h. held i.e. Sl ill;u~, C~cI,() · h'tem.,,,,d Rrco/"'i<'''. I'· 252 u' 91» . A",",Ii,,~ '" I"dr.;, Ihe ,k";'(",, ,,, I"M ,"~ <'<''')(reO> in .'\"),,,,.1 ". Sq>lcmt..:-' ..... m.dc Of) Mal' 25. in Ihe ...~'md h. 1f of 1h.o d.)·, al ~ meeting i><:1"'ceu 1),,1~·k . b(r.k. Cc'ntk. Sld,,,,,ly. and him""lf (I'Ta" I/" ,JO/",=/,darr, p. 190). Yel Ihi, ..~"""I i< ""\ enli",I,' ",,,"lllcill~ , i'K" 1he (:".,..:1, 1..· ... I<"I's ,,'ell' I"""'-~ ~"I);ed " ';11, """ t'~I" ,,,,iii ~I" .. ,,\ 11,,<"<; , ..~~ ",k a"J lI, ra!.: had "" ",,,!,,J ;I ""'di,,~ witt, Shde.1 and Shcbe ,bil.ly in U,J)~<>rod un llul d,)' I" «·It'l,,,,1c Ulmini.u" l:zech".k,,·. k ()~)"I ,,( Culture. hom lh,·,.,. lIil'ak " ... "'ro,le...! I.. h",'c 'I",nl f""r J a)'•. from May 251 .. 2,). ,,·;,ll. Sl",k.'<1 In Ihe lll",;,,... "["hcrofo,,· . (f (Ioe \ Iay 2) ,tl"c"O)l: look pi"".,. II ;' h;~hlr " "!ild)' Ihal lIil'a!< ,,"" p.e>.", t. " or lIil'.k·, """ .. n~"1> ,~e U.S, /:lel... I""·,,l ,i Slale. Di_ , ,,,,I,,, of lnlelli~"""" .",III.,.,,,,d, . n.....a.cn Melly,,,,,,,I,,,,,. RS[ ,I~i . .... "~\"I 16. 196'1,
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justifit:d if th e healthy forces in tIle p;lrly took the preparation lilr the congress into their own hands. But just the opposite occllrred."'" This is tIle attitude the Soviets and hard-liners came to adopt. It is nut at all d"ar that their imm.:diatl: rcactiu" to t he Czechoslovak decision was so measured. for irrespective of I he Soviet ca1cIl];ltion of the conservatives' ability to reasserl L1.mlro\, th e decision to ~el the congress deadline tilr Sl""ptemher U certainl y incrensed Ihe snlience of time . 011 "-i;IY 2-1, Kusygin left Kar10vy Vary ,nul returned to " r;I£lIe for talks with President Svohoda. The next day he left for Mos(."()w 1,l[luwing a lU!l(:h Ilwt Cernik had hu rriedly ·urg;lJJized. It is not known \\"h~' Kns~'gin cut slmrt his slay h~' two llilYS, retllrning In th e US5H without giving his promised press eonfere[)('e and without proViding even an informal st:ltemenl un th e visit. That no com munique was issued is undersiamlahle since Ihe visit to Czechoslovaki'l W,l~ not a sla tl~ ()t-'::'l~iull. This lIlay also explain why no menlioll wa~ ever m,ule of il in ,my of th e "lrki,11 Soviet or C,.echoslovak Hcc(lllnis of the period. K()syg in ',~ visit undouht ....Jly kill improvcd relations hy 1..111lI'iUI..'iug the I)"h""k leadership IIUlI nt I"a.t ."'"<' Soviet 1",,,I<)~. wcrc rCS
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125
MAY 5 - 1 U:-;'1; 6
Committee session ."'" Some reports sugg('sted that he may h.l\'C been called baek to Moscow'" or that he decided!lJ return earl y bt'~:ause uf informatiull he received about t he im'reased act ivity uf leaders no t so favor.Jhly iuetinl'{l tnw(lrd C~.echoslovakja. Whatever the real reason for his return, the contrast between the size and nature of the Gn."(:hkn ;lUd Kvsygill missiolls (:crtain] y indicatt's that the majorit y in the Polilbur
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slovakia, of leading Ille repu blic away frmn Ihe road of socialisl ('011siruct ion and allial1l.'C with tile Soviet Union and with other socialist ('{)Unlries. "Let us not fo rge t ," said Indra, "that we live in a worlll full of eonllict and di squi et. that there are still forces which would like to carry out their revisionist proj!rarn ."Il' C ierek, for his party. ('o udemned those fnrt'es in buth C7,echosluVilkia and Poland that had attempted 10 weaken th e leadin g role of Ihe party. Yet, in terestingly enough. he p raised the resllive of the CPCz to "L'Onsolidate the unbreakabl e unity and fricndsh ips of thc (;SSH with the USSH. th e PPH and the other t'OlIntries of ollr socialist community" and its internal efforts "to tXJ!lsolidate and enrich the ach ieveme nts ofyonr republic:'''' Ifolle considers that this stalement was made three days after the Polish j!o\'e rnrn e nt h:ul taken the un 1lsual step of formally prot es ting t he Czecilosluvak reporting of Polish de velopments. Gierck's failure to condem n the reform movemc nt , particularly in thc li)!ht of Inora's speech, might suggest his 1110re lUut\e rate view of events in Prague. An impor tant aspect of th is period in Czechoslovakia wa.~ the difference het ween Czedl alld SlovHk attitudes 011 tIl e reform movenwnl. At hotl, tl,.. p"p" br ,md "ffi ciallc vcls. th c Sl"vaks ~'On .. id e red isslles of rrgiO Il;l1 allto llomy :Ind ff'df'rali;r~'ltiol1 10 he more im portant than democr;lti;r~lti()n. This plus the generally more COIlsen'ative Slovak nat ional trad ition (l'1 e rical and populisl ill eharn cler) damp(:ncd Ill(' ri.~ e of th e more extn:me vicws currellt among Prague's intellectual eirdes. ~lore()\'er. it meant that Slovak l(~ad crs, like liusak, L~m ld gain in po pulilrity hy t'U lleentrating on th e national quest ion , wi th()ut having to bke a fir m .~tand on (lemocr;lli;r~lti1>n. II" For Ihis reason , cfli>rts by th e Soviet Uni"" :1".1 her East ElITopean allies to a., sess th e strength of t'{)I}se rvative opinion in Czechoslo"akia as a whole were t'f)l}c(mtratC{ltO:l ('On_\j(lcr,lhl e degree 1>11 Slovakia. In l11 i
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MAY 5-jus,: 6
pro-Soviet Cwch broadcasts fmm East Germany, but it is not J.mowo whethert his in part icular was discussed by the Czechoslovak central leadership, who despatched President Sn,boda to Hrat islava on May22 fur 1I three-day vi~it aimed at d issuad ing the conservatives within tile Slovak Central Committee frolll hlocking liberal reform. Svoboda was followed tit the end of Mtly by Cernfk, Goldstucker, and utllcrs whu alsu suught tu win over Slovak support. .~ , On May 2.'5, Shdes! and Shellerhitsky mel Hirak :md liarhirek in the Slovak border town of Vys ne Nemeck.:: (UzhgoTod) at tile beginning of a week of cultural exdm1Jgcs 1.>e l\\"\:el1 Czcehuslovllkia and the Ukraine. '" Shcherbitsky delivered a speech on this O<.-.::asion that was l'Ollside n ...J quite modemte: "'Ve sincerel y wish Ol1r C7.eehoslm'ak friends. new Slll"Cesses ,LIId victories in fiJI Riling tile decisions of the Thirteenth Congn:ss of the C I'Cz, in implementing the party line in the eunstructioll uf a developed socialist society, in tl.e ~tr\lggle against all enemies of peace, progress ami socialism." He tIla(le no mentiuJl uf any tbreats tu the leading role uf the CPCz and tbanked the C7.l~h s m.d Slovaks fur tbe posit ive mle their partisan units had playetl in the liberation of Belorussia and the Ukrain e after the war. m It was Sheherhilsl..·y, the Brczhnev protege, and not Shclest, who then went Oil to Slovakia for a further series of rallies ilmlmeetings in (:onncction wit h these "dars of Ukrainian culture." lZl It is not unlikely that Sllchcrhitsky was Heling as an e nvuy fur Brezlmev, pru\'i(lillg him with a llisintcrested report ,lbout tbe strength (If (."Unsen'uti\·(" opiniuo in Ihe l~)Untry and particularly in Sluvakia.·" It is intcrest inf!: in th is (.'Onnection that Shcherbitsky. the UkrJine premier and CPSU l'olithurOl'a1Ulidate 11U:mbe r, chose to heild the delegation to Bratislava. while his subordinate, PeotrT. Trunko, deputy pre mierfur the Ukraine, was sent to Prague, '" This is a furt her indicilti01I of the le vel of activity taking plal"C in Siuvakia i11 the \asl twu wee ks of May. Although Shcherbitsky led the Ukrainian llelegati un to Bnltislam, Shelest was also active durin g this time. Hil"ak represented the Cz(."<.·husiuvaks in the parallel exchange in the Uknline: thus he
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was able to have a nu mber uf meetings witb Shclcst uurin)4 bis stay from ~hy 2.5 to 29.''" T hc subjed IIf t heir CO III'c rs,llinn is not known. On ~"iay 31, however, at B iLlk's in tervcnt ion, t he p roposc{l {'ongrcss ofUknlinians and Il ut henians phlll lw{1 10 lie held in PresO\'
was called ofr'''' The Hut henians had. li h· other nation al m in or it ies, wit nessed a cnlt ural rena issance ill 1968. 13uI thi s illl:rease{\ (" nlt nral aWa relle.~s ma nifes lcd itself partiallr in a revival of Ukra inian nalionalism a mong th e Hul hcni~lll s. Par ty leaue rs in Ihe Ukrainc a nu partk lllarly in its \ \'eslcTll oblas ts WCI'C t:spcci;llly t h ...."It; n e<1 by t lo.: y t he Buth enia n minority. Th c usc of Ukrni n ia n la ngu:lgc bruad casis over Bad io I'resov an d increased borde r c.~ JIl tads , of the typc Bil"ak agreed tu eancei. were specific e xa mples of t he nna(.~ep\(lble "spillovcr" of t he Prnguc Sprin g thai Shelcst w as (."nccrn ed til p reven t. "" O t he r m eet ings a nd euutads d uri ng the closing days of ~lay included 11 visit tu ~-I os(."t)\\· hy the CzedlOslllvak milliste r of t:lIiture and in formation. ~ I . Gal ll.~b , who met wit h Vonmo\". De mi cllCv, and K,ltlisli ev, in addi tion 10 openi ng an ex hili ition dcvotc d to Cz()c1",.lovak ClIltlLr('. ''''' T h., So"id t""ha.«~' in Pi'll;!;"" W;lS al so parlieub rly ac ti ve in Qlidting I{'tl e rs and petit ions from party urganizatio ns in ,"arillus Prague 1~ld<J,.i es. Pet it ions expressing sup port for the greater uni ty of the socialis t bluc were passed on to ~l oscuw an d fur mc{1 part of the (,·1.mlinui ng eHurts uf C lo crl'one nko and Ut!;I!tSCV ttl (.~lIl\"incc th e Soviet lcade rshi p allllll! t he w(wr ies uf
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"'" U. S. 1)"I~"IIII~nl of Sial.· . l)i,...1... "f Inldlic""<,, ,,,,d Ik.rorch ;\I""wmll,/"",. RSf: ·12~. '\II~"'I IIi. IlI&i . "' \: V. ""'ill ami Z. Ilej,Jar. C:eclw>I()t;"k~II.'I6S- I96!J. p. ~S "' TI,.· ~If,,<."l ' " C>~" I II"",,-"~ ",.""1> ill II,,· IIh.i,w ,,"" i,,, Ik-.,,,, by • 1~1t,·r. oL.lc"tl May 3. /"'''' \\..dl<·,I.v Ch"",,,,·il. ,10" dh,idellt Uhdilli.II",lio".li,1 wh" w,,,l e th .. ""1,i.,I"..;.-.1 '''I><:rienc", . 1.,.... Il>al Iw" "dl)" h;.xc I~"",,"~ di,,,·,,,,\'1.; ill .. ",...1;,,", II", al ,," ~ ..... hkh y"go,!;,,·i • . and now C"..,ho,lov.ki=o. a,c ("ding Ih"i, .....~)".•",1 Ihal of St;·,liR and Mao T .... ""'K.. ('111", ...1 in ~I it."',,· l fifO""",,, ,..J .• ",".."""" In rl,e Ilk",inc. ]>. 1711. [, " .• , .J,." ,~. I~"tcd a t II,i, ti",e Ihal Iwe],'" Ub-. ini.n ",liter>. indllllill~ \"i~I'''' :\"".""'. 1.. 01 1><,,," Ihm'lcII'~! "ilh di ....1pl;IIot)· ...1'on fOlkM'ill~ Ihd, prot",1 a.g.;) . II'",,)· ",',., Ilw 1"'101 i,~.l "1""~I II," "f inh.h'lan" In II ... ,,·~;"n "I", i.Irt<,-"" .. l. '" e" ide"rt ),-,,,11>"" (I'",",/~ lih"i"~. j,,,,,, I. lll&i). AIs" ....,,, Crt·)· lloonctl aodl"'lc. J. l'v'ichnyj ..,,,., Ukr.&int> . ,,01 the C"""h<»Io"a ~ Cri,i •. - p. 78 _ 7\1, ~"d Skillin!\. C:ecl,Mlo,·~k;..:' /"10""1)/,,,1 R,,·"'~ 'it, " . pp 605 _ 06 r.... a flltJ~. """"'"" of Uk~.h\l;m '~Jj ...·tl""' In I\ulh.";.,, ...1 i"ltk, I" C,,,,·h,,,Io>·.k ... ... Pmc,I" . .\t.)" 31. I!JG/i, U.S. D"I"',I",,· "I "f S\~ .... "f 1"ldli~c.«~· a"d It, .. ",.rd,. R ....·",d• .II"'Ju)'''"'/''m. R"'F.·I~7. ,\ ,,).~ .. I 16. 19611.
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"honest Communists." '''' Soon after, durin g an official visit to the USS H, Smrko\"sk~· (.~)mJl l aine{1 to II re 7.lmev personally ;Ihou\ the ad ivities of C heTnllle nko and U,lahscv: "Comrade II rezhne\', these two reprcsentativcs oflhc Sovid Union ,Irc dOing (Ill ill service 10 our tdcmlship. They're not informing you co)"]"edly."·11I It is not known definitely whether the Soviet e mbassy was also actively involved in the I.:afld eamp\lign hy i'\o\'otn~' supporters jusl prior to Ihe ~hy plenum, although it h,IS hee n allq,:ed Ih .. , the printing: presses at th e otJkes of 1he journal l'n>hflwIS of I'CII CC aud Soci(l/isllI- a hloc journal controlled by ~I().~(."O\\'-wcre llsed. Yugoslav r.ulio firsl rejxlrled " ,111 organized appearan ce of lI te ("Onserval il"c forces." Uelgradc re ported that this included sign c(] and ulISigllcd [callds d.:m
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the charges of Smrko\"sk5' amI uthers tli :l! the L~mscr\'a ti ves were th emselves holding "meetings, )!,ltI Lerin gs of iK' ti visis, in fad ille gal factional aclivity:" ' ''' This ope ned up th e pruspect that th e .\Iay Cenlnll Cummittee mee ti ng mig!]! lu: us ed by thes e (.1)nw~ r\'atin~s filT a \KIWCr struggle. Une call certainly ass um e thai Chc r\'(lIlc liku kcpt ;\Ioscow, alld I3rcdmcv Jlcrsunall r. illfurmc.1 of these dc\'dnplllCllls.''Io Although N()V() tll~' wa s kilow n to 1HIVe Ilad contacts with the (;Olls l: r vu li,'c bction ,''' th ere is no hard ev idence to suggest that he actuall v orchcstr,ltcd these pre-plenum activities,
MOSCOW INCHI:':ASES .\IILITAHY PHESS UHE .\l;Jy W,IS th e most ;lcliv,: month " f Ihe '~ Iltirt: (; risis ill I,'rlils of meetings betwccn Soviet lIml Czcl'llOslovak leade rs. The <:ontent and n:sults of tin: meet ings ar.. nut all known, yd Irom tln:i!" trend one may l.~lII clude that th ey we re main ly initiated hy the SOl'iet side to seek mon: information and tn cikit Praglle's :tgree llleni for maneuvers ,Ind a more t'all\iolls :tpproac h In rc/iJrll1 . At th e ,~a1J1e tim e , di ffere nces in the style and SPCCdlCS oflhe SOl'icllcad ers is ,'vid,·.,,-,,, or ,-,",l""ding int,'rl' rctatiun' ",,,I priuritit's within th e SO"iet le adership. Also incrMsed activities of tbe mo re c(mse rvative members uf bvth th e CPSU PulillJllTO ,lilt! Ihe epez I' raesidill1l1 rcinliJrl."Cs th e vie w thai hoth IJll hcek and Brczlmev were Illuderates Irying 10 m,linlain t he l1nih' of the cente r against th e extremes ofhoth righ t ami left . although DIIIK'd:s illlIe r loyalties lay with ti l{, reforme rs and Brczhncv's with th e l.~)]\se r\';lth·cs. By the e nd uf ~I a~', huweve r, it seellwd that lu!"t:es ill the S{1vid le ade rshi p w e re less evenly bal:ml.'Cd. Negativc v;ews on thc Prague Spring we re b eing expressed wit h relati ve freeJOI1l, ""d (.'onS\"TV;ll ive "ctivi tit:s were [lromine nt : their slu:c r b ck al'i i-'ily indicates the weakness of pro-Praglle li)rce s . !\"everthe less, t h~ aeti viti('S of Kosygin and t he s t:lt eT1lt'IIt.~ ~I oskal t' nku ami Grechku abollt noninterference perhaps [Joint to the con ti nui ng support, at
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131 least wit h in an [nA llen!ial (, m : url ht: lead ership, for a lIun m ilitary solution to th e poli t ical crisis. Afte r Kusygin had cut short his visit on ~ I a}' 25 to return 10 ~'l oscow, til Crc e nsued a period or fi \'(: da~' s prior to th e open ing of th e CPCz Central Comm ittee d uring which th e Soviets (:o uld assess the results of th e Gn:c hko ,Lud Kus~'!!ill visits ,lS well as the re porls L1) llIi ng in fro m ot he r inforHwtiull dHl nllck On \ Iay 29, Gene ral ~ L I. Kazakov arrivell in Prague to prepare the WTO maneuvers. T he Prague gove rnment had agreed only on May 24 to hold J une mane uvers in C:1:l"l:hos \uvakia. S(J it seems reasonable tu assume th at betwee n th e day of Kosygin's re turn to Moscow ( ~I ay 25) ami t he beginn ing of the bo rde r crussi ng (May 30) a Pulitburo decisio n was madc. Judging onl \, fm lll suhsc(jucn t cvcn ts, it would appear t bt 't he decision Wi.L~ t:tke n on ~-la y 26 or 27, since Ko.~ygi n rt:l urn ed to ~l us('1)w la tc on ~-lay 15 mltl KlI"llkov arr ive<1 in Pmgue on May 29 wi th a stalfthat [lrollDhly wou ld have take n 2-1 to ,18 hours to asse mble. The dccisio n ( u!IIu/Jer 15 ) ali t hori7-c{lt hc movc ment of troops
into Czechoslo\'akia fo r the June WTO maneUvers. Ilolltine ,mtho· ri:latioll of a militar y order of tIlt! dar wo uld not lJormall y have to (;ome from the Politu uTU; but til t! political e le men t of th e ded sion involved escalat io n of the t"fisis to an un preeeden ted high level. for troops of a d ifferent type and in nu mbe rs greater th,IJI th ose to which th e Czechoslovak ,llI thur ities l\lld agree{1 we re aut hurized tu cross th e horde r on th e very day t he C PCz plenum convened. The decisiun to move tmojls int n Czed\os]ov,lkia. therefore . clearl y rep resented a for m of mi natory {liplomacy, a stark re minder to all t h,lt the Soviet Union (;ollIJ not. and wOllltlno \, rem,lin d is· in tcrestc{1 ill Czcehoslovak alfllirs ...... II ('111l(;eivahly a lso (.1lU ld ltave rep rcsented anoth e r cmn promisc d ecision incor porat ing t he low· e st common de no minator in ap proaches to t he crisis. ~ I ilitary pref. e re n(.'Cs for la rge-scale mane uve rs to test Cz(.'Chosluvak etl mba t preparedn ess were me l by agrccing to IJ ve rride t he (."Omprom ise d eds ion reached wit h K(lsrgin in pr;.guc (In ~-lay 24. Inten·t:n· t ionist opinio n was assuaged hy in cre,L~ing mili tary prese nce in soch a w" y that t"O li servative s in P rJgue ('"llUld interpret it as a sign of sup port lo r the ir views. Nnni nte rvCll liolli.ds (."OIlIJ be p leased or It;" <-.oty .PI"'''''''''<'' or Sod
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132
THE ClUStS 1'.:11 \0 1)
t hat the C I'C7, CCllt nl1CO]11L1Litt<:c ple lllL rlL was goi ng tLl be lIlluw(...:1 to e~ pd r\o\"otn}' and that th e policy of strengthening DulX>ck's posit ion against bot h the le I! and t he ri f!ht mi~ht yet be l"OntinucII. On .\ Ja}' 2f). GCllc ral Kazakov arrived in I'r.lgue with an inte.l!:ratcd command staff and a Soviet arm y liaison unit to m:lkc the in iti;11 arrangemen ts for the llHl1w uvers. On th e same day, some 50vid un its sta r te{\ lIIoving into Czechoslovakia, appa re ntly without informing Prilgue. Pavel Tigrid main tains that "the first news came frum proVincial Par\~' amI administrative organs. askin g what lilL(: th ey shoul d takl:." I... On the fullow ing day t he prcss secrclary of th e Czechoslovak ~ I in i stry of th e In terior, J. Kudrn a, ill a state1Ilimt on Pr;lgue Ib uio l~mllrm cd that some Soviet troops had heg ll n to cross th e horde r. many ,lthem apparently at roin\ s not p re\'ious!y ag:reed to by the two sides.' ·' Neither Kudnw nor the spokcsman for t l,c Czechns lovak .'.Iinistr)" of Nati onal De fe nse was able to sllecify the numbers involved. although the latter di d init ially say th at in addit ion to prepar;ltory stall' "some un its and prilll;lrily signal tr()()ps of Ihe Soviet arm y will grad1lally arrive." The numbcr.~ in volved wu1lld depen d on th e size of the mane uve rs. whkh, ,If,....,,,rrling 10 Ih" sp"k,·.
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olRcials has had. or c~'cn now has. any idea as to how many soldiers uf tim friendl y armies have been, and huw many slil! are, 011 OHr territory." ,., THE I'HESSUIIES SUBSIDE
Fortunately, th c CPCz plenum wcot smoothl y, ,l!)d WiH.\("vcr intentions the (;CJ!lscrvn!ivcs ma y have had , 110 <-'O lll c bac k material-
ized . The plenum adupted fin: hOlsic documents nlld carried nut ,\ number of cadre changes that resulted in the resignation of Anluntn N()v()tn~', Huhumir Lomsk~', "larlin Vaculik, lIudolrC"ik . ;md other (.'(mscrvativcs and the promotion uf two noted progressives, Buhum i] Simon and Zdcnek "ilYIl,ii". In additiun to ut..'Ciaring thai an Extraordinary Fourteenth Parly Cungress would he t..'tI1l\'tlllcU 01\ September 9, th e plenu11I passed a reso lution on Ih!: current situlltiun and th e p,u-ty's future l'UUrse th,lt represented a shiH aw,ly frolll absolute l'ummilrnellt 10 SollIC fllnd",,,,,,,tal asp"cts of tim reform movement. The plenum re affinnetl the leading role of th{~ party as the first print"iple of socialist t~mstruct ion and undertook to insure th'lt any rel(mn of th e ulllstitution, th e legal system, or the National Front would take plaee within a socialist c()n t c.~1. The party was committed to prevent violations ofla\\' and order an d was warned that '·the socialist dlaracter uf puwer ami uf the social urtler should not be threatened from nny direction. either hy ri ghtist, anti-Cummunist tendencies, ur by l"Ollsurvat ive fUI"(;cs:· '" Dubeek in his concluding report stressed tIm! th e danger from the right was not counterrevolutionary but the possihilit), thaI ··a wave of spuntaneous ,l1ld disintegr,lting tendeucies could assume an antico mmunist direction and administration.·· '" The 1\lay 1>lellulll was interpreted as a vic tor y for th e moderates, for those who saw in thc plenum pruuf ofa willingness on th e part uf th c CI'Cz I'mcsidium to wagc a unit ed r~CI6 - 1I . 'MQut>".d in S ~ ilti"ll. C:rch"."=okiu. Intrrn,plr.1 R~f"nn R"I•. t'p. ~">O_2t
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Tbe Sovie t decision to reduce tensions with Prague \'~\S influenced p rimarily by events with in Czt'ch()~l()\'ah.l. Yet other fil('tors in the external ellviron me nt may also klVC been taken into account. Within the Soviet bloc'. East Germany's previuusly (nlmnsigclll attitude to th e Prague Splinj! appt~~lred 10 soften for a short while . The G DB lcadcrsllip slIpp<>rtt·d the results "r the Grcch ko and Kos ygin talks ,lIld ,lttcmptcll to play down the growing impression Ilml th e GDH had hee n responsible "IT nnnc(:css,lrily fillllling the crisis. An East German news ,Igcncy (AIJN ) dispatch \luhlished in Netles Dcutscillflnd on May 24 declared that in regard to 'h" building or s"d"liSHl i ll Cz"d""lm'akia wilid, i.' ; " t>;,rl pnH1",d-
ing ""der mn,litin,,", dilfacnt frum nUN, th e leadership of OUr p~Tty and st~t c is gUided hy I he princilJle of [Jrolct~riat l internationalism, These arc ~Iso the l'O Il{.'C rn s of tllC Czechoslo vak workin)! class, the Czeehosluvak CnllllllUlIist party and its CClltrul Committee und er Ihe leaders hip uf its fi rsl ,e.,rel"r\', ColtlT,lde Alexamler Dul..:..,k. The task is to. . til-vel0l' SOCialist deltl ocrac~' in accord" II (''C witll th e lIew level ofd e\·clopment . 110'" the tasks arc tll he suh-ed i., th.: busill{'sS of tht' Czct'liosiovak Com munist party- as far as We;lrc conl'erne.l. we arc l~)nlidellt th at th,;y will sol"e th e t,,~k s SIIL''-'t.'ssfully.'"
Furthermore, Ulbricht . who had been in Moscow since the
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9
meeting, was joille(1 on Ma y :29 hy a tup-Ievel GDH delegation fm three days of talks with the Soviet leaders. The commun ique emphas ized "the complete ullit~, of views e_xist illg between the C PSU an d the SED on qu es tio ns of th e thl'ory and practice of cOIllIll"nist and soci;llist constructi un" lind reaffirmed thei r mutual desire to "strengthcn thc solidarity of the {1J11nt ries (If th e socialist co mmonwealth. " In a phr;lse that once
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the join t t'O llllllllllique, b ut th e edit urial in the fl rst Ju ne issue of KmwlUmist was d evutt.-.:I to th e Illeet ing. The article em plwsize<1 th e need for solidarity On issues of ...·ommou inkrest to th e move· me nt (Illd made a llumher of positi ve gestures in the direction of the European Communist p:lrties. C riticism was rese rved enli rcly for th e Chinese.'" The Soviet d ecision to redu ce pressure un t he Prague Icadershil> may also have heen infiuent"(!d hy wider chan ges in th e inte rna· tional situat iun pertaining tu Suviet relations with both Chiull lind th e Uu ited States. On \lay 20, th e Soviet fi rst de puty fore ign min· ister. V. V. Kllznetsov, deli vered a speech at the United Nation s an· nouncing h is gove rnment's readiness "to reach an agreement on practical ste ps for the li mitaliUl1 and consequent redudion nf the strategic means for deli vering nuclear wea po nry.""" Although President Johnson had hee n st.'Cking these talks, and previously had sigu;,lc(ll,is entllllsia.-m to t he Suvid lea(h,rship, thc n c~ t day, the under secretary "f state, Nicholas Kat~.cn h"c k mad" a majUT speech un Sino·American rdat ions. He stressed that Ameril.'a did not seck to tlll·eaten China·s seeUl·ih· all(1 that should China "wi, 11 for improved relations, the Unite d States will he happy to respo nd pusitively," 'll Fe arin g Sino·Ameriean rapproche me nt, the Sovie ts step pe d up tlleir campaign agains t the C hinese, assc rti ng in an editoria! in K Ol1l1l11mi$t, for example , that "China se{;ks to put the USS H ami th e US A on a ...'Ollision course to provoke a nuelear con· fliet anll take th is opport nn ity to cnhancc its domina tio n in th e in· ternationnl are na." '''' Iinstilit}" toward th e Chinese an d fear that th ey m igllt e nter int n an :I11U·Sovie t lcr dange r th an rcvisionism, snch , Ihe Ihreat from Ch ina W:l.~ temporarily seen as more serious tkln the threat from Cwcho·
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slovakia, and the China issue served lu pul Ihe Prag ue Spring 011 the back burner for the time ueiug. It was widely rumored in ,,·Ioscow t1wt Iloris I'onollwrev nctivcly ilrg ued Ilwt ilily lise of military furce in Czcchusluv'lkia wuuld cemeut thc Sino-American rapprochement that t lte Soviets were sel:king to preve nt.'~' Only in the Ukmine during the first Jars of June did articles appear thilt L"IIntinned to ("IIndellln the situatiun in Pmgue. Pravda Ukfllilllj , fur example, puhlished an artide un JUlle" stating that "the imperialists are seeking to undermine the solid.ITity of sociul ~ i.,t c()untrics from wit hin, usiug fur tllis purpuse revisiou ist, nilt iunalist, Ziunist, and other hostile elements." This was espedally Ih~' cilse in Czechoslovaki,l, aceording tu PrUl;du Ukmiuy, where Ih ese " hostile elem e nt s under the gu ise uf 'delT1oer;lli~~lliun' and 'liberali zil tio n' ilre using cvcry means to weaken the leading role of Ihe Cum munist Parly.'· Press ar ticles published in ~'I oscow did not wholeheartedly su pport the view of the Ukrainian party press. On j une 8. a week after the conclusion of the CPCz plenulll, the first Illajor report of its findings appeare<1 in Pravl/IJ. ,-\Ithough reporting Dllbi.ck's speed} in n culru ll crms, Ih e " "alysis oftl", debaics "I Ih e p lenary sessio n
dearly sllOwe(! a t'tmt inuing :lnli-reform hias: The parlicipants in the ple nal]' session made many crilical re marks . On IIlC uth e r hand, there aboul the pre£s, radio and televisiu ll. appeared ;n Ihe speeches of sume p.1rtiC"ipants in the plenary sessions a tendency 10 underestimate th e {langer posed by alliisocialis t forces and attempts 10 foist "If a dubiou s th eo ry a],01lt a "new moJel"' for Ih e sodalist society...•
Nevertheless, PrlJtx /u repurled Dul)('Ck's dccisiun lu (um'ene the Fourteenth Part)' Congress in Seplember and ;Ippeared to sup port renewed efforts to ("IImbat both "the righ tist forces, who are trying cons tantl y to ui S(>re dit the party;as:1 whol,," and Simi larl y "the ( ' ( I n scrvalivc fi)rces in Ibe party" who arc sel:king 10 "return to tIl(; sil uation whkh exisled unlil j'IIHJ;lry 1968." The appeanmee of this article on j une 8 points to it Politb uro llechion (number 16), probably ((Ikcn 011 June 6 at the reg ularly schedu led l>olitllllTO meeling, lu defuse the crisis ilnd suppnrl Ihe
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MA\' 5-JUSE 6
Duheek leadership in its efforts to {',{JIltrol hot h lellist ,md rightist tendencies, They may also have discussed at this time the forthcoming negotiations with till! CzcdlUslovaks "hou! a loan. It is likely, however, given the length of thne hetween the end of tlll~ plenum and the appear.mce of the Pravda 'Irticle. that the Polit buro was split on the attitude it should take to the crisis. II would appear that the decision ultimately invoked a cum:ession to conscrvalh'c opinion. pa rtieularly among t he Ukr;linian :md military leadership, insofar as the mililary buildup in Cz{."('hoslovakia in excess of pre agreed requirements continued. ,\toreover, the Sovie ts ma(le it clear that tile crisis had lIot {.'Ollle to an e nd: they were merely adopting a wait-and-see attitude. Should the resolutions of the "lay CPCz plenu m not be carried out, the situation would h.. ,·c to Ix: reeval uated . Yet fo r the momen t, the Soviet leadersllip had good rt,a..~on 10 hope that the Czechoslovaks were putting their own house in orde r. As Pravda was subsequently to state: "At the May plenary session of the CPCz Cent nIl COrlll11ittee , il W;IS ;l d~ mittcd that Ihe chief dan ger to the ("J.llSC of .~oe ialism in C7.eehoslovakia {'"()lOes froni the ri ght. This seemed to }!:ivc grou nds for hoping tlmt the leaders of the CI'Cz Centnll Committee would pass from words to de(-'d ~." ID Furthermore, Brezh nev is reporled to haw, told Ihe Czechoslovak delegation during the post invasion negot iations that the Soviet le,ulership initial1}' had {''O llsidere d a military solut ion in May. "But then," he continued. "it seemC(1 that this would not he necessar y. The first swallow appeared- the plenary session of the Central Committee of the C PC7.. " '" III rd urn fur ('Ol1l inucd vigilance, therefore, the moderates in the l>olithuro sl1{."{;eeded in persuading their opponents to postpone the use of military «lrce. Yet although Ihe first sW;lllow m;!y h,we brouglll spring, I hat spring was to prove short-lived, '""I'",mk
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C HAIYJ'EH SEVE N
Phase Two: June 6-27
The second phase uf the crisis period was differentiated from the prel"edin g and sUl't-"eeding phases primarilr by the ti,ct that no escalation of tensions oc'Curred. Bot gone were th e honeymoon days of earl y 1908. Conservatives and muJer:ttes remained polarized both in th e Sovie t Un ion and Czedwslovakia. Kre mlin leade rs a n ~ io udy watched even ts in Prague, hoping, as Pravllo late r put it. "th"t th e Pn'e<;d;"m "f Ill" CPCz Cenlral Committee w.." ld usc the prcparatiolH for the Extr~rd i nar}' FourteCtlth Party COIIgrcss, seheduled for September 9, to put an end to the defimmtion of emires."l There was no longer any question that the Czechuslovaks would have to call a halt to many major aspects of th e re form movement in ord e r to meet minimum Soviet conditions for non inlerferenl'C. But it was a Quiet phase, in that fur these few weeks in June th e Soviets decidetl to give th e C l'Cz leadership the bendit uf a doubt and allow th e m to get on wit h putting their own house in order.
HIE SOVIETS OBSEIWE THE: I'HAGUE EVENT S There wcre ma ny evcnts in Pragu e Juring Junc of which th e Sovie ts 1lLight have app roveJ. The conservatives in Czedloshll'akia foun d it slightl y easie r to publis h their vie ws; ViHam Salgovit·, an old No\"otn)' sUPlxlrtcr. was aplxlintcd deputy ministe r of the interinr. a position th at would allow him eventually to pia}' a key role in facili tat ing the Soviet in vasion ; anJ th e C PCz and thc National Front issued a joint stateme nt against res toration of th e Social
138
JUi'O £ 6 - 27
139
Democratic party. And indeed there were some indications that the Soviets had more (:onfidence in Czechoslovak "hilit y to bring tile ~ itu"ti on unde r control. E(.'t)nomil' ncgoli;.tion5 Ilcld in Moscow from June 10 to 12 with the Czechoslovak dep ut y prime mi nistc r, LuiJomfr Stro ugal, fared better than previousl>, ex pecte{1. T he Soviet Un ion seemed read y to aid the recovery of the Czechoslovak c{.,(Jnomy through the deli ve ry of" nu mber of installations,' with some repur ts from Prague even suggesting tklt the Soviet Union was willing to extend a loan pro Vided Czechosluvakia did not seck further fund ing from the \\'est :' Prime ~\( n i ster Kos~' gin was respoTl5i6le fur t he cr:anumic negutiations nn the Soviet side, and t be relativel y favor-Ible resu lts of these negotiations indicate the general, if short-lived, Soviet desire to take pressure uff the Cz{."Chs at tbis time. Even more, the results reveal Kosygin·s own efforts to demonstrate to Prague the be ne Rt s of making the co nccssiuns agreed to in his ~hy visit tu Kurlov)· Vary and Prague. Certain l>, there were slill tllO~e ill the Soviclleadership wbose views on Czechoslovakia were less than sanguine and who remained to be {.'()nvin{."Cd of the C PCz leade rship's t·otmnitmc llt to clamp d own Oil right-wing and anti-Soviet adil'ity. li uwCl'c r much Soviet le aders may have been impressed by the fine words uttered by Dulx."ek and othe rs at the ~b >,-Ju n c cpez ple num , they ~ ti1l loo ked for n)]lcrcte {leeds in Prague to prove tllO real inte ntions o[ the Czechoslovak leadership. Uuf()rtunatcly. these deeds were not [(Jrtll(,(Jlll ing, and indcetl those within the Soviet le adershi p who douhted t he inte ntiun or capahility of the CI'C7. l'r5. Also censorship, which had been suspended de facto since the spring, was to hI:: declared illegal. The rel'itali71ltion of the National Front and the preparations for t he Fou rteenth Congress also oC!.."upied reformist circles in e;lrly Ju ne: a most impo rtant issue was the elect ion of deleg.l tes 10 t he congress, sioce it would be these delcg;lIes who the n would elect the elm tral Committl!e. The Prague Spring was clearly at a critical ' ( ;"Ii, Gol .. ". H,j",,,, Hul" ;,, C..,ch".\/",,~ kln. p. 41). ·' IIFt:. I(,wm::/,. t:a" !:UI"l>,J<'. C!<"Clw.>/",·" l;il,. J"'''. H. 1\161:1.
140
stage _ It was being tr.msformcd from a spontaneolls, unorganized, and r.lther superficial rc\'o! utioll Ii-om abuve in to ,I dee ply rooted and institu tionalized mode l of society that would not easil y be n~\'ersed. [t was
cruda l thcrdiJre at this jUI1l:lu n: tlwl MOSL' )W he reassured that the reforms would not harm socialism in I'mgue but rathe r stnm gtil c il it , and t hat t hey were nut intended as a model lilT ilny other sodaJisl .~()dc!y. Ullfi)TtUlliltd y> th e vis it to th e USSH
from Ju ne 4 to 15 by a Czechoslovak parliamentary delegation headed by JosefS mrkO I'_~ ki' SCC IlH to ha ve had al most the opposite effect. The Je1('gal ioll hcld talk:> with Sovie t leade rs arul toured Hussian towns for discussions Oil t he reform mllvcm e nt. Soviet offidais appare nt ly WCTe ex treme ly lI'orried ahout the ..,!lccts Oil th e Soviet lx'pulati uu of S mrkuv~ky '~ ~pcedH!s aho ut th e I' rague Spring. Smrkovs k)"' reL~ )llllt s that after three days of hi s tour, when he W:IS preparing to fl r to Biga, h e rL'(:ei\"ed a new eSl~)r t , ~ li khai l Zimyan in , who ,IS th e form er ;"lInhaSS,Ic1or to Prague and a current Centra! Cummittee me mbe r and editu r of PruDe/II . h"d l~lIl s icler abl e influe nce in th e part)' hieraTl'hy. AL"('o rd ing to Smrkovsk~' , Zimyan,n to ld I,i m that ,n his speeches he shuuld nut ment iun " the problems 01" the day in C~ccl,ft~ I()\' aki (\, th ose p" obbm tll'lt we [th e C~cch oslo\"uksl call democrat il.ation ." Zimyallill pointed out "t ha t th e Soviet peuple weren't so well infoTllll...o, th ey weren't acquai nt ed with tllese matters and to e.~plain the m thorou gh ly at such gath erings was impossible . and j ust to tuu ch on th em- thai would L~ H l f\l Se people.'" As Smrkovsky co nt inu ed his tour, ot her even t s in Praguc reinforced Soviet worries, On Junc 5, fur exam ple. Lidu))(i dellJOcTllcie repdnt ed ,\J) ,lI·tide from th e New York Tilt/e,\", ,ll!cgilig thai Czceh oslo\'ak Genc ral Sej n:l, who hat! defcdc(l to th e \Vest following his implic
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protested to the C7.echoslovak amhassador in Moscow about the matler. 5 Other aspects of the security situation also ga\'e Soviet le aders eause for (:oncern . Despite the appointment of Salgovic as deputy minister of the interior, that ministry, and the conservatives within it, lost considerable power after the ~lay C PCz plenum. Following a two-day session of the National Assembly's Defense and Security Committee, it was announeed that the functions of this committee vis·,I-vis the Ministry of the Interior were to be increased. " On the same day. June 6, the Czechoslovak government transferred jurisdiction for the administmtion of prisons from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministr)' of Justice. The government al~o formally approved the abolition of censorship and the Centra! Publishing Board, and the ;\'1inistr y of Culture :lnd Information was instructed to prep..1re draft laws to strengthen the protection of individuals against false testimon y.7 Josef Pavel, the ~'lini st er of the Inte rior, also disclose d at this time that there was continued resistance within his own ministry to implementation of the Action Program , He is said to have expressed surprise at the numUcr of Soviet agcn ts working within the ministry; and he increased the purge or these agents, mostly Czechoslovak cit izens, by continuing their salary but taking away the ir entry passes to the ministry: TllC "screening" of ministry personnel conti nued throu ghout Ju ne, and it was ex pected that more dismissals would be added tn the 250 cited by Pavel as having already le ft the ministry for ill\"oI"emcnt in previous "u nlawful acts," " In addition to these threats to wll;lt the Sovids ca!l "the organs of state power." Foreign Ministe r H;ljek also delivered a repor t to t he N;ltional Assembl y's Forei gn Allairs Committee 011 June 11 in which he stated that Czechoslovak participation in the \Varsaw Pact and CMEA did not mean that the process of reducing formalit y and rigidity would be stopped. ne fo rm was dearl y necessary to reverse the low shmdanls hrnught ahou t through the intcr' TAS S;n En~li.h. J'," ~ 10. )!I!>S. S{J/271131A2n .ml rm"I~. J"ne II . jll6ll. ' Pmgll~ l\;u!;". J"ne 6. 19(">11. ~;Etr.9lJ("JZ. ' crt.:. J"n~ 6. 1968. EElr.ullOl. • Pawl ligr;d. Why /J""c~ k Fell. p. M. 11,.- b, ~.. """,1 ... , of a~~"" 'm,k; l\~ fo< lhe Sm';, el< .... jlhin Ihe Czecl""lo""l ~1in;,I')' of ll,~ Int"".,, ..= roTlRnn....J h·I ·I~I ...ool Mh· ,,~I;n th~ ,uII~,r.• l"te,,'1ew "ill, I,; ,,, '"' Ju",," 1. 1m. , ( ,t,:. lone 6. 1\168, E ~::I2711IfCl2, Nt"U· l'" ,I.. Time • . l UI'" ... 11l6'1. .IIorftiQ~ Star. June l!. 11l6'I.
142
Til E (:IIISIS l'Etl IO I>
mLt ional division of bbur. As a s mall state, H;ijl'k believed that CzedlOsluv,Lkia had dil\"erent fure ign polll,y l1JIH:erns frmn t he Soviet Union . and in future Prague would place greater emphasis un the proble ms of Central and SoutheastI'm Europe. On the Ge rman question. Prague wo uld eo nlinue to sup port the Hl67 Karl ovy \~lr y ugreement, but, ael1Jrding to Hajek, the re was a need to take greater l"Ogni~.iIll Ce of the fad tha t "a re'Llistic apprecia tio n of realities and prospects in Europe wus making headway in the ruling circles of t he FRG.·· .. l\IOSCOW LOOKS TO BEHUN AND WASHINGTON This was nut the must propitiuus iTImnent for II ,ijck tu 'Ilake slleh a positive state ment ahout relatiuns with thc I'ed cral Hepuhlie. sinee it was at this very lime that a crisis hetween the G DH and the USS H came to thc surface ovc r the lat tl:r's UII'Il atte mpts to ilnprove relations with Bunn. On June 7, Ulbricht delivercd a blisterillg atl,wk un the West Cenmm Jlolicy of huilding hridges, which he maintained wa.~ designed purely to sul}\"crt the socialist countrie.' from within. He '!oIlJd not IlI\d"r<"'nd why II... S,,,,;,,ls we re improving relations with Bunn ilt thc \'(!ry time that the Federal Republil' was luring Czel·hoslovaki'l :m'ay from the bloc. since "it ~huuld be dear tu everyone wh y t he \ Vest German impe rialists arc so greatl y interested in e\'enls in CzechosJo\'ilki,I."·" Although ulbricht's spel""l'h il\ex]llicabl~' W;IS nut published evc" in East Germany "nlil June 21, West Genw m foreign minister Brandt appeared to be replying In it on Jmle 10 when he condemned the polit ical pressures being e.xertcd by \ VHrSilW PHct st;
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~ ~lIl1i, " )' fo, Alt ·C,,' mao\ Alrai". r..",r~ ~'" Iku/.x:I,I"",I,,,JIHk. ,,,t 2. II""". Illfo/!. 160. '1",.c ..·0:1 in .\ -. Edwina .\1 0"""". f.a" C.-nno"y .",1 ,h~ II ",.. ",,· .111~,,><,·. p. 15.
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nounced in Glassburu, New Jers:ey. th e site of (:onstructive talks with Kosygin the year hdure. th,1( tile U. S. was re ady to negotiate ou arm.' limitation and that "we arc muving tuward uthe r agreements." " Johnson was to give a major speech at the United Nations un June 12. and thus th e Suviets had guud reasuntu wurry that any new Berlin crisis. caused large ly b~' Ulbricht's dcsirc tu prcvcnt both Prague and MoS(~)w from improving relations with Bonn, would spill over and alfect the pHssihility of a breakthrough on Soviet-American relations.
THE SOVIETS SEEK A llILATEHAL \IEETIN G With all these fadors in mintl-Smrkovsk)"s speL"Ches, the Lidooo ~ituation in I'rague, the pressure frum Ulbricht, ami abovc all the failure of the DulICek leadership to match words with deeds following th e May-J une ple num-a decision (111111!ller 17) wa.~ taken hy the l'olithuTO to seck ,I further bibte ral meeting between Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders. Tllis decisiun was probahly made on June II . while both 5trougal and Srnrko"sky werc still in the USSR. In view of deteriorating events, the Politburo authurin.u Brezhne v to write to DulJ{'Ck seeking immediatc bilatcralllcgutialions. A statemellt by PI"/JUc/fI on Jul y 22 affirmed that thc I'olithuro had "repeate
democmcie article. the security
On 12.th JUlie bst year the CI'SU lea.!ership. abrmc<.! by the develop. mcnts in Czeehoslu'·akia, proposed a meeting wi th <Jur party leadership al any place on So"iel Or Cr.c-chosl,,,",,k terrilory. or 0" th e horder, to talk ahollt th e rnattcT5 alarrninl!; them. the dangerous dc,""l"pments ;n Czed.o.,l",·ak;a and Ih,,;r in,pad Un II", e" lin, ",c;al;st system. Our Il"rt)' It',ukrship did !lot "(~:Clltlhi s ,,/fer and r"jected this ill\"itatioll for >"arious reaSOllS, 511Ch as mnferent"es. holidays, and so forth. We an, sneh a greal p"wcr that in such a diHi<'lI lt sitllatiml we nloed nul negntiate with """ of the hig):est ]lowers "n "arth, need nul "egoliate wilh frieml. an.! <~)ll1rades amI <"Ill ,,(for.! <,,,[,,,1)" 10 rcfuse- t" I>e<.~nne isolat"d and heigl'I"" Ih .. lellsioll." " \\ ;,.,kIV Coml'll~ljlm II! P,..., id,otial Dt;c""",ol .• ~. no , 23 (J ltne 10. I\!&S), OOJ. "P .... ,.,/" . J,,1)' 22. I\!&S , ~ SI",,,d,
hy
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..\II~ II>I
19. 1969.
E ~;/.1IS7l ClIJ.
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144
TH E C IH SIS P E1110D
Bil'ak in an interview also confirmed the substance of Hus,iks remarks, adding tha I th e Pulitu uru aui li urizt:d Brt:zlmcv to write a Il c r.~una! h~ lIt:r to Dub{ck and thai he had had the opportunity to read it himself on June 15. Bil'ak mai ntained that Brczhn cv was p repare!] tu meet Dub.::c!.: either alone or as part of a larger hilateral meeting a\ ,IllY pla<.'C that D llix-ek ('are{] 10 de signate. l3 il'ak confirmed thai DulX:c k turned down th e req ues t for the rC,lsons d Ied \w H us:ik. " Du) X:-e k's refusal In meet II rczhncv :lPPC:1TS 10 have h,ul a m,ljor c lfcet in ;"lusl'Uw. Zucn{·k ,\'llynM rc pvTtcd that du ring the \Ju slinvasiull negotiation s, Brcdmcv rcpc,llt:dl y sln,,:.:l thai he had de ft~ nd{~{1
Dubeck within th e l'oli thuTO as a "rcliahlc comrade" who wus ba~ i call y pro·Soviet in oUllook and c;lpah1e of defending and m;lint;li ning the leadership of the party and the unity of th tl hloe. Yet when Duheek stopped consult ing with \ !oscow hefore making majo r ehanges. Brezhnev also began 10 aArcc I1Hlt Dubte k was we,lk, unreliahle, ;lnd unw ill ing In curh the anl i-Soviet and an li.~odalist manifestations of the I'r;lg\lc Spring. '7 MOSCOW IlES PO N D S TO D U BCEK HEFUSA L
On Ju ne 13, at the ir regula r Thursd ay atiernoon meetin A, the Polito buro would have received Duhi:ek's negati ve repl~" They would probably also have received the morning reports from I'rnguc and Illlls le;lrned t hat the blest edit io n of I~i te/"/irni fisty <.~m t ained h11 ) major articles: one b ~· O. ~tae halka nn the executio n te n years ear· lier of Hun~ari;lIl Ic,lder Imre N;I!,.')' (this article seriously affected the al lll()sp here surrou nding Dulx'e k's visit to Budapest. wh ich ,Ibo beg,ln on June 13); ,Ind ,I!loth er by t\ntonin Lieh m, ca!ling for a new constitu lion to be emlo N;eJ by a referendulll. "Alier ils final adopt ion," Lieh m argUl!,· ere.?' "",I " .• , al", in PI'Il"I" 1~,"'·:JIII"t·r. I'. 361. " ....tl"n~k MI)·,dt . .\"drh'fmu. 1'. ~ I. "l.Ile ,<>k ,,~, mud, ,,,,,,I;n~ I",',,"e~n 'hr lill'" 1<> ~'" III~ "'''~nin~. I ,,,".1 r. .... lI",hi· I'.fly J.,. moe,;o(")" "ilh,,,,1 "'11I;'·,,,,,,lion." from hi, i"I",.,.;c.,.· wil h U. II. UIlJ.1I ill ,h.· h"" , :,. mlln;,' Ref"mwtion. p. lOl ,. R,,,/r Ilrd,·".
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Soviet press 011 a curren! C7.cehoslov'lk le,l(ler. This was a reply by AI."..ldemician F. V. Kunsta nt illuv to the speec.:h delivered by Cestmfr Cfsar to com melllorate the 150111 hirthd,IY of Karl ~lar~ . " Since the speedl had been made at the oc.:ginning of "'by, the timi ng of the Soviet reply must indicate a cle ar hreak wit h the previous de cision to cease polemics. Cisar's v i ew~ were l'Olllle mned as rev isionist and compared with those Jl r.~vi() us[y (~xJlressed hy Kautsky, Martov, and the Bussian Menshe viks. :\Iaking it dear that the criticism applied not just to Cisar o ut to the ent ire refur m leadership, Konstantino\" stated that "it is difficult to understand people whu strive tu propagate :\hmdsm and at the same time try to present Leninism as a phenomellun l'On nel"icll solely with Hussian conditions:' Yet in a reflection ofl.~)nlillllerll'ol ithu ro worries over China, Konslanlinov made an e~'en harsller attack on :\-lao Tsetung, demollstr.lting thai the re we re still those wit hin the le,lder· ship who bclievcd that the 1'r:.lglll' Spring \\",!S nul as threatening as China's domestic ami furcign poliI.Y. ") Also prnlmhly 011 the
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TilE CIIISIS PEIIIOI)
In th e li).:ht of these evenh. especially Dubcck's refusal to meet II rtnhnt:v, it seems likdy thai th e I'nlilhll rll :llsn di sellss.:d a possillle change of leade rship in Prague. At this stage, the Soviets were pinning their hopes on finding someone to rcpl:lee Du hcek within t he currc ut I'racsidi ll ill w ho ('(u dd cnrnm:md a majori!y and m(li n!ain suppo rt withi n the coun try. They helievcll thaI th ere was sUPl)Ort fur tile Sovit:l positilul ill Cze~:hoslov,l ki:l; tIlt: (1ifficlllty was in getting th e I'mcs idiu ll\ to rd y Oil ,ll1d mobilize th ..t support to defeat the rightist forces. '-' l\ u ;ord ingly, it would appear that at th e ir July 13 meeting, the 1'"litll1l rl> t(lok two basic d(.:(:i~illns. Olll' (1il/lII/'er 18) was tn seek hibtcr..I1 talks (Ill d 10 kecp Soviel military un its in and around Czechoslovakia at th eir l'urnmt level (If preparedness. The se(',(lIld (1IIImlll:r W ) (:onstituted a measu r ed eSl'ala tion of the crisis and reHeeled the inere,lsingly stn}])g opinion thaI the C/.eclloslovak hod y pnlitil' was " rolliliS from the hC~ld <10\\'11" insofar as top leaders th emselves rather than isoltlted gro ups of students or intellectuals wcre helll dlie Hy res ponsible for the L'( )Hli nuing mome nhl nl ofthe re form mon:mcnt. In resl)Onsc tn this view, th e Soviet Icade rship d<:(:id.~(1 tn 1l1lblish tl)!, Hrs t press ,,\t'lck un " '''"llcd C"cdw"l"v"k lead{:r to signal the s trc~ n gth of !iol'icl displeasllTc with the activiti es and views of ce rtain of th c l'racsidiulli members, and also to activatc a lIlass ca mpaign at th e grass-routs Icvel in the USS II ami Cz~hosl ovakia to show the Prague Icad en;hip precisely wlu~ re they l'Ould Inrn fur sup port 10 Ild;:,lt an tisuci,di sl elemcn ls. As p;lrl of this d~isi()n. the Polithuro :lppcars tn haw: d iscussed th e {Iesir,Ibilily and l)Ossibility of (lnlling ;111 (lltern;ltivc IC;ldcr to Du lx·I~k. so"'co ne uot Il.:l·cssarily fro", II,., "oll":"",lti"e win g, 1",1 une who {;uuld urin ),:: matters under (,m lrol. Of course. it is impossible to kn ow th e c.d en t "fSo"iet Ilisl'IISsi'llls, bllt it is known tlmt Brczll ne\' t he very Ilex t day did in fact e xplore th e po~sihility of rcpladng Dulx-ek with Josef SmrkovskY. " 1I1l"ik , in. '1""',,1, d ,·Ii'· ~n~1 on S ~ p!,'ml~" 2,.0;. mfo!l. ~fl",,~I . ri.,Ii8. TI,.re I... "" Ji'I"M '"' Ih~ ['" ,h." "''' pa'I)'. d ,~ \\l"ki"~ ~1 .... 1,,,,1 "'~~IU''' ~ 'I r""~lh 10 p,e'-,.nl II. .. o",\.,u~'1 "I' II,.. ri~hl ."iu~ .n,\ ."li~ ~,;.I;'I h«=< ",Iok'l, \\'~, .. di<· "'I>lin~ ,I." I"''' r. d,,· " ... kl)·. II", ,141" ",,,11 I... ....,,''''''')'. 1"",lr,.i"~ d ... ""'Ii,·, of _,;. li,1 pi""er ;md lI"e"I"n;n~ 100 [",,"d.lliom ,0/'11", ",..;,li,1 ",.I~m. '11l("~"-" ~'f>()1("" ,1"-'f>gI1. 1",,,·,,"1 ,h,· .,,'; ·S(J\'ld ,-.. ",p,li~"_['" in'):',...·. ,,,,,,,,,1 ,10" In,,,,'''''''''' "r 11", .lI i,~t ,,,,ui,,,. ;u lhe r",,,u',,', ,,l of Ilw w.".", l ...."h·. "",I IIw li\;,,-<'[ ''''''''' . ""d~r Ihe ",I" " ~«lili,,,, Ihal 11.,-, 1'""";,li,,," ".,",1<1 <1",,,, ,-,,,,,,,I,,,i,,,, , f",m i1. ""'" "'1'<',;,.",,, and ("'''' 110" 0"" "\1., · ,io<" ",'h "nil",1 I~"ti~ •. if i1 . ,,~,,<'
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147 S~ IHKOVS K1' !'.IEETS BIlEZII NEV
O n June 14 , Smrkovsky and his d elegat ion met with Soviet ll~ad ers he lore re turnin g 10 Pr:l).:ue. A puhlic a('(.~)JI 1i1 of thai meeting was provided by Josef Zednik, th e \·ice-chairman of th e C7.echo~I{)vak ~atillnal Assembl y, who slated th at in the course of discussions, Brezlillev had he" n moved lolc ars, ,,,",,,,ring thai th e USS H had no inte ntion of intcrfering in Czcchoslovakia·s internal Rffairs, The Soviet Union, Zednik report s Brezlmev as saying. had never forced C(ll1ee\ivi7.1tion on Poland in tIll: W50.<;, so why should it inlerff're in Pmgue's reforms? That I3rezhnev referred to Poland and not to Uung"ry is highl y instrudive of I he att itud" lie was hiking 10 events in C7.cchoslovakia. Brezhncv also admitted thallhe Soviets had (.'0111mitted errors in their relations with Praguc, hut he stressed th ai he personally ··had never given instrudi olls for anything to be don e onc way or anot he r: · ~l l\e fcrrin g tn th e more extreme pllblished attacks, such a.~ Shiryamov's art ide Oil ' 1{ lImB ~lasaryk ( 50vdslwYII JlossiYII , M:ly 14), th e So viet, st,llf:ci, aCl'Ordillg to Smrkovs],.i ·, that ··certain (.·o nSl' l/lle nces have be en (lrawil so as to prevent any possi»le repetition of this kind of O<.'Currcnce:· " Pmlgm·II Y, also present alulig wi th Grishi u ,md Ka!llshcv, had noted many posit ive features of the rclimll mOI·emell! hut expressed his regret that th e In,ISS m edi:1"do nut always speak up in a way J esignc{l to strengt hen frh:lldship hctwl,,-n our l,ountries:· ... Podgorny is also said In have lec tu red the d elegation on how ung rat eful the Czechs anll Slovaks were: "Your l"<-~ lIlomi s ts should do ~)lne c,llculating ,Ind ex plain \111 yo ur radio and tdevision Ilwl . t he Soviet Union sends grain to C7.l.'choslol'akia el'en at times of bad harvest whe n we have tu bu r Ii-om th e capitalist co unt ries wi tll our gold." '" Despite this ,,"tburst, Smrkovsk~· repor ted thaI th e ge ne ral mood of th e meet ing was t"!lrdial. At th e t"ml of th e meeti ng, Ure;dlllev asked Smrkovsky to sta y fhr a private tete -a-tete. At thts time !lre/.hne\' ·· re iterated his anxi.:!y, his llissat isl;ldiun with tile way thin gs were going wit h us·- and sugges te!l , in th e words of Sm rkovsky, that D ulX'ck "wasn't the ri ght nmn lor th e job." BrezhlIe v apolngiz.:tl to S lllrkovsk ~' fi,r th e Suviets· earlier ncga ti ve as" h'le" ·;'-,,, ""ill> J"",r z...J"ik. ,·kt,·d,. i,,,,,,, " f 11", "",,,",.,t
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THE C IIISIS
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scssme nls of him , an error Brczhnev put dOWll to "\aek of information." Now th ey had ('Ome 10 appreciate Ilis lung ('O nlribution to the p(lrlr Smrkovsk)' r l.'f..'(} llnts that BrC7.hncv "put it as if I should
bear the n:spullsihility for an uhollt-turn in our affairs." Smrkuvsky c untinlles:
I waS tl isnHlycd b~' the talk , becan.le [ I",,,w what he Wa~ "lfering tTlc. Nuw how to rciilsc ~() t h"t th,: form was "<-'(.'cpt]" hut Ihe a ll.'WeT ' til ile dear. So I defended Dulltt!k. Nut j us! our polir:r. hut Dill K",k In". H"w he was dC"duping
Smrkovsk}' claims to have recounted th is offer to DubCek. Cernik, and Svoboda filllowing th e Suviet in vas ion. ;\llyniif co ncurs that Smrkovsk)' and others. indudin g probably Cernik. wc,'e ap~ proadlc(1 to see whet he r they would replat'e Dulx'Ck. this be ing th e geneml stmte/,,'Y of th e noninterycntionists within th e Soviet lead ers hip at this time. Smrkuvsk}", because uf his refo rm views, had hce n descrihed hy I3rezl1l1cv at Dresden as "not a promising political figure"; '" but this did nut uppa rcn tly matter in Moscow, /tlr, accurJing: to f..·l lyn;H, if he \'a(1 :I(.'(.'Cplcd "he wuul(ll,avc been like putty in th eir hands." "" And in allY case, Smrkovskfs ad m ission during his tour ufthe USSH. that it was indeed difficult tu de fend so me uf the articles ueing publishell in th e Cz~hos l uvak press may have given Brczh nev reaso n 10 believe, o r alleast hope, that Slllrkovsk}"s liher.l.lism was only skin-deep. POLAIHZATION IN I'HAGUE : SOVIET WO HlU ES
tn tht: twu weeks f(.llnwing Smrkovsk{s rd""n fro m ~1"Sl'OW. tlw polarizatiu n between left and right l'Ontinned in CzecllUs luvakia. All artidt: by Jusef Judas t:xp rcss ing (.'OnscTvalivc fears that socialism was endangcred in Czcchoslov~ .
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JUNE 6-27
Sik on JUlie 18 cntil lt..-.d "A Communist Should No t Obscure Facts." " Sik's warnings to the population abollt the threats to the reform movt:lncnt from the "liraeonservat ives Were reiterated by Edward Coldstucker. who published the text of an ,l))ti-Semitie hate letter he had received the previous 111onth, '1(.'C"0111IX1nying it with the rel'omme lldation that the part~' sholi id he purged of a!lthose timeservers who "while speaking :l~ the defenders of the interests of the workiug dass, the nations and the party" in fact have notliing hut "contempt"" for them ." Calls for tIll.' lcgalization of1xolitkal groups outside the N'ltional Front SlIthe red momentum. By June IS, ovcr seventy requests Il)r legal registration by politic,)] groupings had been rece ived at the Ministry of the Interior.'" Although decisions on most of these gro ups were {lela red indefinilclr, it worricd MostQW that they we re allowcd tn operate in limllO withollt heing su ppressed." of particular (:o!l(:crn to th e Sovit!ts was the fad that despite the CI'C7. Praesidiurn's d"'{:ision 10 the (:<JntnLry, the Social De mocmtic party IHld been allowed to establish a pre paratory committee to plan the party's reinstitution ami had laid the basis for the subsequent formation of party hrmll"hcs throughout the country. ~' Because of the popnlarity the s(}ciallJcm(}crati~ party (mjoyed among the working dass prior to Communist rule, tlLt~ Sovie ts lLaturally were keen to prevent its reappearance ;l~ an organized and independent force. A subsequent Praoe/a ed itorial (Irew attention to the fact t]Hlt 0)1 June 12. a doc ume nt of the Social DernocT
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TItE (: III SIS i't: UI Ol>
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attacked the views ofZbignicw Brle7.i nski, who hiltl delive red a lecture in I'ragucon j1lne 14 supporting the etforts 10 "im-
prove socialism," A('(."{)nling to IlIlenwliom!l ~\JJ{/irs: Th rowi ng a li ght un the "jml"""c",,,,,! or "~i"li s ,,, " r,m,," kl. wc fi nd thai the idea is to suh ,litllte for scitm tifi c Sodal;.", th e "Suciilli~m" that has been Ilr"'ctic*,d by Some Sl',uldi n""j,Ul leaders fi,r s"vcr.!l dl~ "dcs. an d that is c urn'ul ly heing p n',l("lwd hy the Rrit i,h I ~Lh(lu " leaders, In its fight against Socialism, the lIIoliopoly buurgl:uhk . h :L~ tried In Im:athc lif~: in to old. h"ukrul,1 Soe;,,1 D.:",o"ratic theories. it has SCi7-t'd upon and ad\"t:rtiscd th., Right-wingOJl I)IJrtun. ist alld revisio ni st views. [I is 01"';011 •. tlw refor;., that "II thi s talk of, . '" improvement of Soeblism.'· etc,. is designed to racilitate the pe net ration of hou rgc"Qis ideo logy into th e Sodal ;, t l·ountries.""
Anuth e r de fe nde r u f this \'icw was Erik HOl\cekc r. ,lme l11ber of th e E as t Ger man leadersh ip, ",110 published an article in Pravda on t he GDH c Xlleriem:e, ty pic.lll y en titled ··S()<:ial!st I)cnu)(: rat~' in Action:· H onecker claime! l that socialism and de m ocracy we rc insepa mble, with the bu ildiTl!,\ of socialism malic possib le only t hrough l1Uls is ten t applit:lIUon uf ~'I ar)( is t -Lcn ill ist principle s of democr..ltic centmlis m a nd the leadin /! rol e uf th e party. H e disIllisstu th c ··hyslc riml criC5 of somc pcuple mncernillg frect\olll of opinioll lIlld th e press·' and insiste d that true de moc racy was bascd on sOI:;ety's d e mand s on the ind iv idu al. mther than vitc \'ersa. >Th() following day, Izvestia carried 11 long art icle by V. Plntkuvs ky on th e ro le ofoppnsi tiu n parti!;:, ill Com m un ist sodety tholt l'Choe d th e May 18 artiL"l e by ~liIus l a\" Sc h ultz in /lude /lnivo. Dr, Sc holt z h a d rej e cte d th e fo rmation of OPIX)s itioo parties on th e g round s that ··the uu mb er of par ti t"s is uut the d('cisive factor for the {ll:vdOl)me nt of real socialist democracy." I'lntkovs ky agreed. reiterating the c rudal leading rol e of the Communis t part y and addi ng: ·· Lenin warn ed of the dange r (If special maneuvering by the enemies uf socialism whu d e mand 'merely· the removal of Commu nists from hodics of power .lIld admi nistratio n. . T hercfiJ rc, be declared uncat egoricall y tha t ·the dictatorsh ip of the p roletariat is impossible cxtept th rough the Communis! Party.""'" The noti o n of a real pl \lra lit~' of parties with in t he Nati olJcell distllSSed for some tim e in Czechuslovakia. The Frunt " " ~blci~1l
I" li lico ""d Id""lur
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had long since ceased to be :1 ge nui ne forum for policy innovation, discussion, or opposition as all of the non-Com munist groups or parties re presentc(1 in the Fro nt were entireh' controlled by the Communist ]l:lrty. The Front flc t{~d neither as :l fumm of polky maki ng nor even as a loyal opposition. But there were m:ln y suggestions for change, indu di ng o nc ffOrTI ni l' F"ront"s chairman , Franti ~ek Kriegel, whidl appe,\red in Rude prd!;o on June 19: policy-gui{lance fundious , said Kriegel, increasingly shuuld shift from the Commun ist party to the NatioU<11 Front. Kricgel did not envisage the Front ever including an tistK·ialist parties , but should the non-Communist parties ever unite, the CPCz could easily be defeated within the existing I' ront. The likel ihood of this IHlppc ning increased with the rehabilihltion of politicians from parties now in the Front who had led opposition tu the Communists prior to 1948. It was also dUri ng th is period in June th,Lt the public debate began over the revised CI'C7. statu tes that were to be presentf..'tito the Se pte mher congress. In addit ion. legislation was be ing d nlfi ed to protect freedom of the press. and a law on judil'itLi re h abilitation~ was Bnall}' passed hy thc Natiunal A s~em b l ~' un J une 25. And in Ih t! r.,·linistry of the Interior. PfiVerS continuing stmggle to rid his ranks of conservatives met with some success whcn he dismissed tluee deput )" ministe rs and delllull:(1 twu utll<;rs. including Milo~ Jakes, the influcntial he[ld of the party·s Audit and Control Cummissioll . "' T h r<:e !leW de put}' mi llisters We[e .Ippoin ted on June 21." Not just the events in Prague me t with attentio n in the USSH. FollOWing the SUl"('"CSS of tile '· Days of Uk mini an Cult ure'· in ~hy, the I'rdov area of Slovakia had hosted a large number of visits and exhibitions. On June 17, the first exhi bition {If Ukrainian art held since 1931 ope ned in Kusice, ,U\d later that week thc Prdov l'llilo~oph ica l Facult y hosted an international scmin,jr un "The Development of Ukrai nian Studies in Socialist Countries"· T he seminar grou p decided tn puhlish a hulletin and orgillLi7.C furlh"r COlLfercnees. with the next semina r planned fur Ju ne 1969 on the exI)!osivc subject of··Ukra inian National Consciuusness." The gro up agreed that ideally institutions in the Ukraine it self should take the initiati ve for organ izing an association, but in case the "Ukrainian t·o rnrades" d id nothing, the respo nsibility for llI,LilLt;lillillg links imd "S lllida~ TeI,"~,aph .
" \~
v. " ",III an" z.
June 23. I!!&>, RFE . R.".rcn. C~ choJn ... H• . June 24. I9&!. Ilt-jLl ... C::tch",'",:a~·~j . 196~- I969. [1. ~
152
TI n ; C IU SIS PEIII OD
activities wuuld rest wit h Prdov, " It ~{)es wit hout sayi ll~ tlult altho ugh such a developmcn t may inllecd havc hccn wcll'tlmcd by Ukra inian nationalists and d issidents, it was anathema to the Ukr;ti nian party leadershi p, Shelest in p'lrtic ul:lr respollded wit h more outspoken statements such as those in early july that marked the Artiet h annh·e rsary of the fou nding of thc Ukrainian COIll Ill Unist p,lrty (as di scll_~se
",,
~ G.e)· Ihlnell IH.-. J. I\,lid ", )j. -Tt ", Ukr.,in(" . ",1 11", c,.~·t~""",,k Cri,.i,." 1' 1'· (,(;- 66_ " I,,.~"r Il,di", J""" I_I, I!I(>.~, EE/2711' /Cl L ,\J,,, ",.' (.1"1.:_ J""" 15. I96S, 1:1'.I279' ICl I,
" /lu,/I! ,led,:".
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~ Tn"l. P,~,'d".
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freedo m for political de magob'Y, for the most extre me , far-out expression of one point of view, and for the persceution and d efamation of all IllO$C who think (lilfe renlly, who are all de fin ed in advance as re trograde, """, Ivan Svihik. a rcgubr <-~mtrill\J tor to Studelli , was described as someone who ",Lttacks ~br:.;ism, the Communist pmty, and the dictatorship of thp pru!ctariat with almost maniacal bitterness." Svitak's viuws were classificd as "primiti vely amlrehic. "·· The playwrigh t Vaelav Havel was singlet! out for criticism br the Soviet trades union newspaper, Tnal, lor ad\"oc;Lting the dcpolitid~.a tio n of the Czedl{)s!o"ak Un ion of \Vrilers. li-Tu{ interpre lf... J t his ,IS meaning both "full freedom for :my _-ie ws, including antisocialist ones, and no oblig:ttion on writers to defe nd I)ruletarian idenlogy. ,." Helleet ing the symp,tthics fdt hy some membe rs of the Soviet \Vritcrs' Union for the re form move ment, an open lettcr from Jan Prochazka was publisllt.J in hIll ill that Ullion's newspape r, UlertllllrrWIjCl gazdCl. The Icll..,r attacked the ine fficie ncy uf socialized ,lgriculture, claiming that "agriculture should feed p<..'opIc, not sen'e ,I (lo<:lrinc:' Pruch,\zk;l ~'On lill ueJ: "~ layhe I :1111 not acquainted with Marxism, for I sllOu!d he able to understand wh y such a brilliant theory hrin g~ absolu tel y opposite remits. Our Moscow friend s. . cannot {'OllVince me that one model of farming can be idea! lor the UkrJ.ine. the Himalayas ,md Czechoslovakia." In reply Lilefll/uf]wlju g/J;:;c//J's <..>tli tor madc his own views known wben he described Prochazka's ideas as ·'e!lcap principlcs" that departed from Marxis m-Leninism and did an ill-service to snciaJ.ism. ,'J Throughout this perioJ the only article to c~ \lr(>s s views mildly favorabl e to Prague ,LppC,lre(1 in New nnw.I' on Jlllle 21. when it s Prague f..'Orres pondent D. Volsky published a thr<..'C-page re port outli ning the current policies oflhe DulK'ck regime. ~ I E SS AGE
FHOM HIE PEOPLE'S ).llI.lTI A
In the midst of this exchange of pole mics, II national Ilkli o uf 10,000 Peoplc '~ )'Hlitia mcmber.~ met in I'rngue Oil June Wand was addressed hy both Dubl':ek and Simon. The mee t ing sent a letter of greeting to the USS li via Amhassador Cher\'unenko. reaffirming the basic principles of socialist f.."QnstrUCtiOLl and ('alling for doser .. Ko/'I><'~w"'~·"1I" I,mn/a , J"" e 21. 1008.
" tbid, J""c 21.
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' 501
Sovie t-Czechoslovak ti cs. The le tt er continued : "We disagree wi th and di sassociate ourselve s from th e ir responsihle adions of sum e journ alists who, borrowing va ri ous fabri cati ons from th e \\'estern press, seek to under mine our fri c mbhip. " .'" Beca use oft he status of th e Peuple's Mili tia as Ihe arm e d win g of Ihe party and th e or!;1
The part icipatioll of Soviet e mbassy pe rsonnel in the People's ~lilitii\ mee tin gs in Prague, the emp has is of the~1' mee tin gs on S(wiet-Czeehoslo\'i\k fri encisllip, t he common for mat of all th e resolutions passed in til e fadory gat heri ngs in both th e USS H and C7,ec!mslova ki a, ami th e .~imu1talleity of the me-ctin gs cerhlinly indieate th at ~ I oseow orchestrated this ca mpaign ami that it imp le me nted decision mmtber /9, to !l1ol)i!ize (.' mser";lti \'e gr'lss-TVols press ure 011 Dub{:ek to slow down th e rc! 'Jrlll move ment , to stre ngthen t he lemlill)!; ro le of t h e party, to end th e purge of ('a{lres fronl nrgall s of slal e ,uilil inisiralioll, and to stop attacks Oil til e Soviet Unio n. COl'T,\ CTS WITI I WAS I I I NGTON In tIle midst of th e People 's ~ 1 ilitia campaiJ;n, the Politb uro was also iuvol\'ed in I:tr more impur t:mt dist;IISsio lis Oil stra te).(k arms li mitation. 0 11 Saturday, JUli e 15, Soviet first deputy foreign mini.~ ler Kuznetsnv met with U.S. secretar y or state Husk ill New Yo rk. '" rrd["(J". "'·" rill . Ju ne 21. I~Ki.~, /10,,/,' I""''' ''. 1"'''' :P. l'lGS. ~ h,-,·";a. J"'''' 2<;. l!)foll. Sitn;lar arlid.,. "PI",. ".~ 1 j" 11K' So--icl w,~,k. willl Ih .. <.. n' I'";~" b
p
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155
Their diseussio us centered uot (July un strategic ;trim limitatiuu but also on the :\'Iiddle East , the Nonproliferation Treaty and Be rlin. Informe{l SUUR'eS repurted th;lt Hus k hat! made it clear that Washington was nut going to risk a new (; risis over Berl in if it thre atened to postpon e a bre;lkthrough 011 anm limitation talks. " Joll1lson's enthusi:Jsm wuu ld IH\\"e strengthened the hand uf those in the Pulitburo who abo f;\\"ofc{1 di.~"rn""ll c nt talks. Yet resistance to any improvement ill relation s with \Va.shinp;tun was strong, as de monstrat ed by a major I'fIIl>£/1l art ide by Viktor :\Iayevsl,;y, interest ingly ent itled ··Na:cssary Hem itlders," that nppeared un June 19. In a dear pulemie with Suviet propOilents of impruve{[ Eas t-\Vest contacts, Maye vs ky reminded th e duves that there were four hasic impedin1f:nts to allY il1lprn\"(~ me"t in rdations wi th \Vashingtoll: the AmeTi(~lIl ;1!4:fessioll in Vie tnam, U.S . support fiJT Is rael, the American and NATO arms build-up, :tn{1 flnally, u.S. trade discrimination aga in st th e Soviet bloc. Through the nse uf phrases such as ··we believe·· and ··we repeat,'· \Ia )"evsky created tht) impression that he was speaking Oil behalr of at least a strong coalition within the leadership. He umcludeJ un a pessi · mistic note: If the USA is really in terested ill the !(enUille den·loll111ent of SovietAmerican rebt iuus, it will meet with a respunse frum the Suviet Union. Bnt. ,,;11 rcpclIl. there arc substalltial obstacles in the way, above all, the American aggression in Vietnam . It wunld bo.' unrealistic to belie\"{' that Amerirnn-Sov iet relations ulllld he il!lllnll"ed, re· ga ntlcss uf the solut iun ur mainr intcrnatiollal problems (italies '" aycvsky 's). Ambassador Dobrynin attested to major divisions within th e Politburo when he inlonned u.s. nation;11 security adviso r Walt Rostow at t he end or lhe month th;tI th e Poli thuro had finally t:st;lhlished a ··uniled position·· only ·'aflcr lallf! travaiL'· " Whatever objections individual.< within tIl e leadersllip m;'y hav!: h;ld to expanding cooperation with the United States, they were apparently overruled at the Polit buro meeting un Thursday, June 20, when Ihe dom inant mood appears 10 have hCt:11 in fil\"or of improvement in Soviet-American relatiuns. A('(.'Oruingl)', Kosygin was allthori'l.cd (dcchiml 20) II) pnx'ecd with t'tUltacts, (lIlcithe next dOlY he wrote to Pres ident Johnson exp re~s ing the hope that it w()uld be possible " New l·",·l· n"" •. I"''''' 15.,,<111. 1968. " n""IOW. Dijf,,'''m of futL",r. p. 3/;7; .",1 ,ulhor' int~"'i<.",,' witl. llosl(}W. Au,UtI. Tc'""'. luly 25, 1980.
156
THE
c J\lsrs
PERIOD
mure concretely to exchange VJews on arms limitation ,~' This meeting must also have given final approval to the major re port Oil Soviet fore ign policy delivered o n June 2i by Foreign ;o.'l inistcr Crnmyko 10 the Supreme Soviet . His speech. "The International
Situation and th e ....nreign I'oliey orlhe USS II,"" repeated all th e ·'re minde rs" mentioned in ~'layc\'Sky's I'rotxla article only to re fut e thelll , th ereby indicliting th e depth of divis ion within th e Polithun:!
on this subje ct. Neverth eless these d ivisions had heen
u\'cr(.~) m c,
al leas t te mporaril y, and he "115 able to [\ nIlOUlK'C that the "Soviet gUVt~ rnmcnt i.~ ready for all t~xch ,lIIgc of () p i ni()n _~ on the mutual
limitation and subseqnent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, ooth offensive and defensive , includin g an t ihallist ic missiles," ,\I though (:om:elling th e baSically ag,l;ressive nature of imperialism, sh uw n par ti cularly in Vie tnam, Grumyku's repurt took iss ue with a numher of Mayevsky's al'gumcnts and indicated the current thinki ng th at duminated th e Polithuru. While accepting that NATO was spending more on anns . Gromyko 1ll;lintaincd that Am e ri can infl uence was in fac t declinin g. as proved by he r setbacks in Vietnam. H e '·l!j.,e tl!.1 110" ide .. th"l tl", "r,"s race ",,,s,, "f'ltal inevitahil ity"; an d he re th e report 's conclusions we re aimed no t at th e Pt:ll ta~tlll hut at hard-line Suvie t military planne rs. In a remark,lbl y fran k (.~l!l trib\lti on to tup leadt:rship d('h~lt es, Grn lll yko stat ed : lI uman r""S"n r.. hel , al II,.. fad that II,.. ge n;", of ,e;""tisis. tll" knowledge "f ell gi,,,,.:,.,. ;'l\\ll'mdll~'!i"" ",ganize r~. tilt: ~k illed imllds "rwork"r•. the tal e nt "f lead ing l·"It"",1 fi gnre, an,] trememl,,", n",· te rial fumb are Sl i ll b.:illg "' I" and" red " " lh" ]1"I tell us , ;IS they do all l·hampions of di san"a",e"t, Ih" t di s"";,,,,,, ... nt is "n milS;;)!). we r"ply; /'y II/kiu/{ .
Gromyko .,[SrI appcale{[ for a llcgotiatcdlsraeli withdrawal from occu pie d Amh territories ; attacked "the Mao Tse- tu ng" gro up for deliherately aggrav atin g rdatinns against th e wishl:s nf th e Soviet Union ; ;I!lci call ed on Bonn tn h,,-~e its Eastern policy on th e rceogJ' ~ """n, fI. < I'""to~" P",,,,, I" .j f;:; . in h""'/d . In,," 21;. 1965 "/',-",-,{". I'n'" ZII. ll)(>'l (Cn''''r~''-' ,·",,,h.';'I.
"Lp"I'm 11_ >OT,·"
1,57
JUNE 6 - 2.7
nition that "the question of the frontie rs of Germany was settled by the Se(.'ond World War, and settled IinaJJy." Ne\'(~r thc1 ess, Gromyko (:o1lf"irmed thllt the 50llll,t lead.:rship w;os prepared fur '·a continuation of the exehang(: of v i ew.~ with the FIlG on the re nund:Jtion orthe lise UffOfL"e." Although e-" pressing lIloderate views till East-\\'est relat ions, Gromyko's report reRected the ~,'rellte r intransige nce of the Soviet leadership on bloc affairs. It aJilrmed that imperialist subversion was the greatest threat to the streltgth ,md <:ohesiou oflhe blue li nd stated that "lor the CPSU CentraJ Committee and the So\'iet Governme nt and lor the Soviet people , tlte re is nothing Inore sacred in the field Ilffllrc igll pillicy than the cunsolidathm of the communit y of socialist countries. The defense of the J!;lins and of the unity of the socialist states is our sacred duty, to which otlr {'()Untry will be loyal despite ,m)' trhils."' It \\'ilS evident lila! Gromyko had Czcchoslowkia in mind when he confirmed the Soviet eOJlllllitment to the absolute immutability ufbloc borders: 'Thuse who want tu wTench even a single link U1lt of tile socialist ('OInmlinity ,In' hlind and are Illanning in vain, however. The socialist ('(Immunity will not permit th is. The commullity of socialist states is a single entity." The clear authol"ily of Gromyko's statement on the bloc, its hilrsh ,md Illiambiguolis tOIlC, and phrases such as "sacred duty," "nothing more sacred," and '·despite an y trials" dClll')!lstr.lt(.-.;] hoth the Soviet re('(Ignition uf risk and the acceptance of high cost to maintain Czceliosluvilkia a.~ a loyal memher of the socialist blue. However milch reliltions hctwt!en \VashingttJl1 and Moscow might improve, the Soviet leadership had clearly decided that such improvement would never be at th e e-" pensc of Soviet COlltrol o\'t!r bloc affairs, and in t he wecks ahead it would hccnme di!fieu1t, ifnol impossible, to prevent tile crisis in Czeehuslo\'akia frolll adve rsely affecting ilttempts at improvcd E,ost-\\'cst relations. And clearly, tIle escalating crisis in Prague wO\lld he used by those in the I'ulilbum and in the mili"lr)' leadt:rshi p who we Te still hostile toward strategic arm s limitation to torpedo illly efforts to improve lies with \Vashillgtoll. DEBATES IN .\ IOSCOW
This c ll unciilt ion of the dominllllt foreign IXlliey line took place against the backdrup of two major and continuing debates on domestic pulicy in ~Ios("()w, hoth orwhleh were linked to the events in Prague and served to shape the Soviet decisiun-milkers· (lercep-
/58
Tilt: CRIS IS I'''';RJOIJ
lions of til e refo rm movement. T he Ilrs! iss ue
WdS the rehab ilitation of Sial in, .lIlt! related to this was th e dehate hetween tllc party lind th e growing dissident movem ent over censorshi p and intellectual freedom. The quest ion ufStalin's plul'<J in Soviet history had heen fiercely argue<1 since his death, with his contrib ution dearly receiving more favorable appraisal after Khrushchev was ousted . In Jun e 1968 a book was published cnlitk·J The Gcucral Siaff 0111-· iug th e \\'iIT. by Gcncntl Sergei Shtc lI\c nko, who praised Stalin's wart im e lcadc rsllip. In a review uf the book, Krasndya :.vezda commente(ilh;li th e GerWT;11 Siaff ll;,d not heen so IlrlprCp;lred Ii),. th t, Nazi invasion as some historians believed. Th e attack had no! thrown th e General StaB' into dh.arr.J.Y, thanks pri maril~' to Stalin, who had remain ed in the Kre mlin thmllghollt , refusing to eVa<;uat e the Stalf headquarters to underground shelters in Kirovskaya ~ I dro ..'; Shtemen ko , who h.ul bceJl demuted by Kl lrushchev fur Ilis loralty tu Stalin. was soon to regain sume of his form e r prominence . H e was to l>ct'Ome t he dli ef of staff of the Warsaw Pact only th ree wee ks bclilre the invasion ofCzcl"iwsluvakia. In mid-J un e a meeting of the party cell wi thi n th e ~Ioscow Un ion o f \\'rile r. I"'ard s t'f"(..·d"" , "'gg,·slillg that b"n rg
" T.\SS. J",w 211. loo.~. Sl'l2'jjl:l! tlll. At ", "' .•. II .. arod,· hI" r .,,1 \\".. 101 . · Slall" lh",,,, .. "til)' Cull I)",,,,, t o n: - ("1" ..>1;'" ScirnCf" .1/,,,,;10' (un,do" ,. J""c II. 1965. "S"";'" .\ ;." .• • June IS. 1!Jf, s .
159
JUNE 6 - 27
surship was rejectcd as an "attack un the fundamental principles guiding Soviet literature ." HeRccling the splits within the Writers Union, however, the ar, ticle also re ferred to the letter sent by the nuvelist Venyarn in Kaverin to Konstantin Fedin, the president or the \\friters' Union, in January. In the leiter Kaverin had lamented that uthere is lmrdl y a single seriolls wriler who docs not ha ve in his desk a manuscrip t that has heen submitted, considcred , and forbidd en:' and suggested that Fedin personally had overruled other Secretariat mem bers to stop Sulzhenitsyn's Caucer \\'1ln/ from publicatiun .... The editorial in Utemtuntt/ya ga:ctll claimed thllt Kave rin had "disturted th e :Ittitude uf some Secretilriilt members" and eondemlled Ilim for failing tn e1mllenge the authe nticity of the le tter, despite the fact that he has "heard it recited almost every day hy foreign ·VUll'CS. Yet Kavt:riu's statellie nt thai there wcre hoard memhe rs who supported So[;-;henitsyn l'Ould not have bee n '"distorted" since th is silme issue of Litel""allll""uUlj1l ga:Clll also puhlished the rullted of Solzhenitsyu's open le iter protesting the publication of CIIIU; CI"" \Vurrl in Britain and Italy without his l'OllSen!. Furthermore, :ltthe ve ry time that CUllcer \\'tln/ was being ein:ulated. aeeording (0 Kiwe rin , from hand to hand thrm lghout :-'IO~l'()W in "thousands of galley proofs." " lIilother manuscript b y the nuclear physicist aud Acu(iemieian Andrei Saklill rov \VilS also hcillg deh'lted . Eutitled '-nwughts on Progress. l'(:ilccful Co-exis((:ncc and Intclk'Ctu ..1 Freedom:' the essay l'Ontaine{1 outspoken criticism of many cllllologkal intelligentsia "over the principles and specific aspects ofiilre ign and domestil' policy."' Ue rejected the current "Ioud d e nlilnds that the intelligentsia subonlinalt: its strivings to t he will ,1Ild interests of the workin!,: class:' whieh hc claimed really IIlcant "subordi nation to the will of the 1);lrt )" ()r, even m() re spt.'Cifk·ally, 10 the party's l-enll"ill apparatus and its officials." and a.s ked: "Who will b'Uilrantcc that " TI,e \".\1 "f Ih..·1eller "1>I...·J ....~1 ill IJ.~ e/'ri.' /;'!/I .~&IIC< .II,,"I/M. 11 .. ",1"" c~lill''''). Mo)" 23. 1Il6S.
"' Ihid.
~lIch
•
/6()
these officials always express the genuine interests of the working class as 11 whule amI the genui ne interests uf p rugress rath er than their own <'::L~ te illl c Tcs tsr In [l;l1lh.: uhIT Sl1khHTUV ..'t.m(\t:mlwd 51:rgci P. TrJIlCZnikov, the director ()f th e SdClll'C Departmen t of the Celllnil Commi tt ee;
said, " it is impossible to hope fu r a stre ngth enin g of the party"s pos itioll aln ong scienlilk and ar listic inlcllcclu ,lis ." Turn ing to th e quest ion of intdlcdual tree(l o m. Sakharov re-
marked. "we are all fami liar with the passionate and closely argued ,Ippcal aga inst censo rship hy the outstanding Soviet writer A. Solzhcnits yn, " which has shown "Ilow ineumpctc nt l-eIlSOTS hi p d e-
stroys the living soul of So\'iet literature." He continued: The S"me ;,pplies. uf" coursc. to all othcr nmnifcsta tion s of weial thought . causing stagnati"" ;md dullness "ml pr.:\"t'ntillj! fn's h amI d eep ide"" Such iue'L<. "Iter "II, C"n arise only in ui ';(·ussiull. in the fa'"e of nhjeeti ons. onl~' if there is ;\ pu~si l ,ilit y "f e~ !H"es,i ng nut unly true but duhiuus ideas . . Aft er fifty years uf (~""l'le !t- dumi' ".tiun OVer the n,im[s of'lI' ent ire nation, "lor le,u]ers Scc n, tu fe:or e"c n all"si""s tn " IC], " disl·u.. iun.
The
".~s ay
"lsI1 cond"",n.,.] "hacksliding intn " nli.St' ",iti." " i" "",.
appointmen ts policy" and aUempls hi
mh~lbili tate St ~llill .
Sakharuv
praised "the histori c rol e of Khrushch ev" in t he stru ggle for deSta tin izatiOll and appe al ed for a "es trk-lion in th e ac\iv Ui es of nco· Stalinists, prop-osing that tilt: C I'SU slllJll ld imple mc nt the decision, apparen tl)' taken in I\Xi4 ,Iod forcst,ll\ed by the overthrow of Khrushchev, lor the sy mwlie expulsion of Stalin fro m the party. The il in a major chall enge to the nrthodoxv tha t trlle socialism springs from the Soviet model amI all else is ]lC resy. Sak h ~lrov indicated that the basis for II OllC by in t he ,dilrm of the Soviet sys tem alon g the li nes clIrre ntl y h e ing e xplore d in Pragu e: l i.>d"r I hc k<-'r to ;, pmgressivc rc." ruduri ng or til<: 'p ten, "r gove rnme nt in the in tere.'t., or mank ind lie.< in intcl k'Ct ual freed"", . This be en nmle.-'o"d. in I,art i~·ular. I>v th e CZCdlO.l" v"ks. ami llw re be n"
h,,, ,".I"
The challe nge prese llted hy $,lkll1lrtl v ,lIul hy ,1 hlrge \Iud p rogressive wing of the Soviet intellige ntsia who dearl y supported the "The e,,,,,)" ,.-~, >;):I ,e,1 ;" I "'''" loo..~ ""II " .... r"l";" ,,,1 ;" ,I K' .\ '"", l,,,·k Tiu",. 1\II">Ii. II II.." ~I><, 1",f,Ij,h,~1 '''' , t"",~ . I'n,~ ...... C",·,i d ",", ... " '''/
d"n : And ,,· I"·"t",·h. 1%&')
~"Jul, 2~.
h" ,-li«"'di " ....."c/ow, ILot,·
Just: 0-27
/6/
Czechoslovak experiment as an evolutionary model lilr the ir own society was extrcmclr threatening to the ideological legiti macy of the Soviet leadership, The dJa!lenge had to he ;tnswen:J , ami un Junel9, P. N. Demichev, a Polithuro calldidate member and a party secre tary with responsihility fo r ideological work and education. delivered a speech subsequentl y published in the Soviet press and, in ex panded I<mn , in the July issue of K m/lfUlmis/. The (x."casion was a meeting of heads of social science departme nts at higher educatioll institutes. Demichcv bunchcd a scathing critiq ue. witllOut however mentiuning Sakharov hy name. of t hcories of convergence and the "deideo!ogi7~lti oll" of science th,lt "sow the illusion that the path to the trut h lies through repudiatiun of class l)()sitions:' With Trapc znikov himself chairing the meeting. Demichl'\' claimed that cnntrary to Sakhl\l"()v's Ol)inion. "the party, after crit idzing pedantry and dogmatism and in oVeH."oming both the eonsefjuelK'CS of the cult of personality [Stalinism] and suiljeeti vist mistakes [under Khrushchev]. has created favomhle conditions for the furthe r development of theory'" De michev also dealt with thc {Illest ion increasingly raised by progressive eirdcs wth in Mos("(lwand Prague. namely. the relationship between the working dass and the inte!!ige ntsia. He insisted tlwt "tl\(: wo rking d,lSS ("(l n s ti~u tcs the ehief sod,11 force (If t he .~ocialist system ami its main support. . OUT foes have a direct interest in putting the intelligentsia agai nst the working class. in detachi ng those engaged in men tal labor fmm the working class. Indc(."tl , this is llr1(lerstandable: the bourgeoisie would like to hr(."ak up the moral-political unity of the peoples of the socialist {."ountri es."~' The linkage he tween intellectual disscut and thc ()\'cnls in Prague had become qu ite dear in June. and no doubt the uphe avals in the Komsomol added to tllis pcr(.~p ti on. It seemed obvious that an y a(."{;omm{){lation with the Prague Sprin g would lead to demands for sim ilar reforms at home. Indeed, as cvidcI\(.'cd by Sak· hamv. Sob:hcnitsyn, and the debate in the \ Vrite rs' Uninl1. this wa.~ alread y happc ninA. THE SU:\·IAV,\ MANE UV ERS Whilc the politicians in the Kremlin attem pted to deal with domestic disse nt and also keep the Pnlgue leadership in line. the military were involved in the Sumava maneuver", which fonn;lll ~ "' P"""'/ll and IZ "~"lja. June
w. t968. ""d I\,,,m,,,,"i.
162
T IU;
ClII ~ I S
I'UIIOO
began in Czeehos[ov,lkia 011 june 20. As ,L1re,Ldy lIole(1. Suvid Iwops h,\([ ..,nt ered the l~JllIlt r)" in the last days of ~la}". Throughout june, Suvict illilitary cummande rs tuurc{llhe L"O ulltry ,Lo;sessillg Ih.., [lolili<:al mood of th e peuple aud the morale th e arm y. Prag ue mdio. for ex,lmple , reporte d on june I\J Ihat Soviet ulTice rs had held discussions till! pre\'iull.o; d" y wit l, political wo rke rs in th e C~.echos lovilk ar my. The olfice rs were ''showing great interest in current affairs iu Czechoslovakia. "or Illi ~ fe'L~Otl , " the L"O!ll mc lltal<>r co ntinued. "I he dired llr"l e of Ihe .!xc n:ises hlls made ar nl1l gelllClIl s with Czechuslovak civilians ,I1lJ I\\i!i! ury organs to ofgani7.e ,I program of parl y pulitical work for Suviel suldiers in th e lnttllltl{l ers and sian' of ,,11 arills of th e se rvices. includi ng also sup pl y an d communicati ons stall' from th e US SH , CzedlUslovakia, th e CDH , Hlin gar~', and Puland . The exercises Ihe m.<eJve.< had !>('ell exll-nde
or
" I'r.~"~
"'TASS .
, .. I;" . ,,,,,," HI. 1lJ&;. E t;/2/iOUC/-I
J""e
I•. 19foll. ':~:l2T11'.JICr.l
., " ....,,"''1<' ~"~Z,.~ .n in"",,·i,...· t" tl,,· ~I<~ ",' 'WI<" I",,,dent or II"dt I'mw wbkb".", m ,nma,; ",,1 I,y T"'~S "n j,,,,," 17. l!j(,!!. £ E/2'00:C13
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103
Ju"t: G-27
slo vak arm y-that aSSUlllI!{1 impurtmce in th e mane uvers. Because of th e near im possibility of "proving" such an isslle one way or the oth er except in actual combat conditions. the mane uvers th e msel\'CS bet-.nne an additional source of"aggravution in Cwchos\ovakSoviet relations. llI-fceling wus also creatcd ueeause PW).:lle leaders had difficult y in gaining :It"(.>(!ss to those Soviet marshals in CWc\lOslovakia for till: exercises. [t W·J.S rumored, for cxamp le, that Cernik, on trying to teleplmne YakuUovsky, was tuld that lie would have to go through Mosl.·o w to talk to the Soviet marslwl. " And yet on Jun e 28, Yakubovsky held talks open l~' wit h Bil"ak in Brutislav<\ and indeed w ru; the g uest of honor ,It a lunch given by the Praesilliul\l of the Slovak Central Cuml\littee.' ~ Humors ubuum\ed tbat Sovie t flln:cs had brought th eir fa milies and were ma kin g arrangcmcnts fur th e p ermanent statiuning uf troops , that th eir numl>ers we re in th e tens of thou s:l.1lds mther than the hund reds, '"" and so forth. It cven became known that Cl.cehosiovak intc lligenec had intercepted a L~J1lVerSa rion betwcen Yakubov.~ ky and Kazako" in wh ieh tI le former had stated that Soviet fo rees wo ul d remain '"at leas t un til 20Septe mber," th c planncd dos ing dat e of t he fourteen th COllgress. "After that," Yakubo vsky is re po rted to havc said. "we sh;ll1 see."' '''' Pri me Ministe r Cern fk iss ued iI denial th"t S.,vict troops would be staying in the country fur th is le ngth of time," but th e Soviet H igh COIllllIand was silent. Given Prague's nh"iuus LK-k of knowl edge about " I). ,·i.. r h. "Crl\:. Ju" .. 211. 1008. H :J2810',\2!1
1i1t'.>I.
J"""r
" In . d,lili"n In unit; (hal arri"c"fl "t Ih" ,~"d "I' Ma~·. Ih~ \1 '" \) p..,,;\ 'l~lke)m'l\. Ccpidr.• 1 .t~<.I u n J"ne 6 (l'r.J(\(c raJio !;W~7!.O'ClII th"t "'I'I~'r1 . '''!'I>ll. ",,<.I <"""""""""" lion "nil' ,,,,,,1<.1 su pplement the <"()mm.nd I~"il~m •. [n the "..",,"', of !I,,, "',nc,,'·e ... f..... m Ju"e 20 !<> :II). the following ,Ulc"w,n\; w .. , " ""Je "I ..", fn"'" le" rk cTli: {Jun" 21. E t".lZ8OJlClI[) anll"ull<:e.1 ,h .. markin~ 1"''1'''. mot",;",,1 inf."tly unil> . "",I a !:.,;k u"it ,",o,,1t! I", .. "k' i "~ C ..."-·t.o,I",·. k , .. "it, ,,)· fo, Ih. ","n.·i,,·>. On II ", """c d.O)". Ccn,," (I>,.~ue r. ,](u. June 2.1. EEtlS03ICtl2) clc·nit.-d "'1. ,,1> thai II", "u ,,,loe,, uf S..... id ",k.lkt> h,..1 , i"'n 'n 30.0tx!. th, J m ,," 2fi.
of ~"'id
I' r.o~ ,,,. r."J;" ": ~: J2"'07JCJ4 ) . "m li m,,~1
.1,,,. "" , 11 no"nl.. ·"
am,,' al",.....n " h,,'~ I..,.." 'l.tj'''I~,1 'm " 'Hml C,.t"
Lat ""Ii..il i." in .he ~ir:' On June 27. p,.~"c r",liu (E t".l2SIl~.\2IIJ. " " ,uli"",,<.1 t'"'I,,:r.t!; ou bel"·"",, "'m,o,et! and ,n<>l w;lb Iht· .i rfo",,:onJ ~ rtill " r y. " On Ihe ncd <1;,)•• J_ f c..ll"k~ In 01"''''4/;,1" ,~j"",..-d ,"","n: Ih~1 th,· ",JF m'''~''''e" had I"",n lmn '· r",,,, ...! iulo rull _",..k ~,e,cl>", wit h t ""'I'" ·T.lk of rIO." 1'.,licil"U"" "f 1 "~'p, is .I .. "n!. I " ' I,.,.I ..,:ai" 11,.1 lI,e men .,e <",,«Ied;n the l,"u<.l".J.,." II ,,-., >1.h·d in Jul)' 11..1 • iii!"):.., numb", of .crl.< had 1",,11 il" .... a>HI th.t th" lolal number of fmci~~L t,,,op' h. d reached 16 .()((l\,i,h 4. 500 ,·ehielc"> .•0 tanh and ·10 airplane< ,,«"
,,·,,1
"' "
161
TIlE ClI lSIS PJ::IUOD
the ~xtcn t of the exercises and ofthe real intentions orlhe Suviets, incvitahly the atmosphere deteriorated. Instead of th e exe rcises bolste rin g th e strengt h of pro-Soviet forces in Czcchoslovakhl, th ey un ly served to furth er isolate the C'Onserval ives and increase an t iSovie ti sm.
Fears in Czechoslovakia that tllese wcre no ordinary maneuvers were shared in the \Vesi. The U. S. Slate Department (;o nduded that "when tin: Soviets int rud ut-~d sizeable Il umb ers of tmops in Czechoslovakia, th ey seemed to h ave JOlle so in the hope that the troops migh t be able 10 assi sll'U llse rva ti vtl fu rces in the l'Ollnt ry tu regain control- perhaps in it l 'OllP ,"'" T he Cummand uf NATO"s Celllml Arm y Grullp sim ilarly umcl uJ ed tlml while "Sumava" was indeed " more of a Command Post Exe rcisc (C PX) than a fullstrcngth Aeld manc uve r," nevertheless "we judged th is particular exercise to he a rehearsal of a planned invasion , h ut more spe<:ifically to se rv{~ as /i. :t(;'·"'T.) Ja'l"" 11. ]',Ik... Jt.· n~' ·I ;''''' ,., t he (;""...·h" •• "-, k;,,, In,", <;",,:'
p.
J2
C HAI'TER EIGHT
Phase Three: June 27 -July 28
THE "2.000
worms" AND THE SOVIET HEACnON
011 JUlle 27 a stateme nt written b y Ludvik V~'eulik entitled "2.0()() \\'ords to \\'orke rs. Farmers. Scientists. Artists and Evcryon c " ,'1'peared in leading Prague papers.' The statt" ment was signcd by ovcr siX"ty persons incl udi ng leading Prague inlelh.:c tlJ'lh, scie ntists. ,lIld writers. It su pported th e reform 1lI0VCIlll'n t and th e Communist party's leading rule, but c.\prcsscu fC1 b
rrJ>rillt<~1
III I\oloh. Ali ..", I\","i"gl'", . "d ,. Il 'i llier i" j· ... gll • . 27. 1968. h)' M/ad~ /""''''' /JUrd"'l /i>ly. I'''k:~.
PI). 196 _202. It w •• I'lIhh,t ....! <>11 J"n~ alld 7..cftltdM"id " ortlly.
165
166
TilE ClIISTS 1'.:Juon
myanin carlyon the Ill orn in g uf th e IwenIY-SC\'cnth even hefore Sl1lrknvsk~' had him self read ti le manifesto. Zimyanin, Smrkovski' re me mb ers. "lei fly at me. what did I think ufi!, it was outrageous. Zirn vanill was ind ignant, he told n i l' it was a call for l'Oun\eTrevolution.'" Smrkol'sky was not the only Pr,lguc leader who first heard about the existence of tile "2,000 Words" from Soviet sources. Dnhcck is sail\ to have recl'i \'{~d a ll irale personal call from llrczhIlev ilhou! tIle manifes to h efore Dil beck himsel f had read it ! The Soviet emhassy in Prague. th erefore. doc_~ _~cem to have received advance no tke abollt th e "Z,OOO \\'nrds.·· Am i, of cou rse, Zimyanin wou ld have heen ahl(~ 10 give Moscow his own immedi ate highlevel a.~sess ment. ' IJrc7.lmey mllst have decided (rlechioll 21) on the morning of June 27 that the situat ion was serio us (mough to require an immediate explanat io n and assuranee from Dubeek . It is 1l111ikelr thai Ihe Polilb urtJ would have becn L'OIIVcned formally 10 agree to Ikc7.hnev's call. Such communication between i\!OSl,.'OW and Prflb'ue Wfl~ IICt'oming more frequent; and although IJre:dmcy may have been aware of t he views of ot her leaders. it is likely that this was an ad hoc and informal decisioo designed primarily to gain fu rt her infor-
mation and to communkatc th e
l cader5hjll'~
amazement that the
stat cmen t had bee n p u blishc(l in the first place. In an app,lrcn t ref_ enmee to Hrezhn cv's early-morning call 10 Duhi:·ek. Pravdll latcr
stated: The le"tlership of our ll;lrt y called A. I) uhc.~k·s ;!ttention I., the d:111gel' of th is JocUlIlcnl u. a pl:ltfOTl ll for furlher intensification of eouater rc\'Olutiollaryactions. He replied th,,! Ihe PraC_lidiurn of th e Cen_ tral Committ ee was di<cu <sing this 'I ue.tion
,,,,d that the severest
appraisal of the statement would he givcn and thc most reso lute measures taken. But aside from u libcrJl veri);ll dcnunciation. no practical rnea.
, J",,,f ~mrk()",lj"-. "" ' '''''-''nli''~
Unfini, " ... /
C:UIII·"""';',,,. 1'. 15.
10 Willi,,,, 51,.",·"",. n"/,,,','l . 1'- If,S
' _-\o:;",Ji"~
10 EdlV~,,1 Cold"ncl.-r. inle ..-ic",od h)' the .ulho,- on {).:Iol><·r 2-1. 1977. Ihe I"'«on mU<' re't~JIl_'ihle I,,, Ih" t·.'~~"r.1 ion or ,I,,· ' i~";~'-J""" "",I I'''' t~>rb"'" ,..- 11". "2,(:X~J \\,,,,k- ill ~I" """·. 'rmc'/r1 . "'''~'''I 22. t!l6'!.
"limpnin
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JU:-;E ~7 -JULY:t8
167
attitude will be helping the development of our polilicallife, then they are quite mistaken." Showing itself to be basically in agreement with the Soviet assessment, the i'mesidillill (.'Oncluded that "the political platform on which the declaration is based opens the way for the activation of anti-Communist tendencies and I>lays into the hands of extremist forces which could provoke chaos and a sitnation fraug ht with conA ict ... • Yet following the Praesidium's strong condemnation, several individual leaders mude s\(ltements expressing their own, often quite different, views about the "2,000 Words:' Dubcek Sik, Kriegel, Ce m'k, and Smrkovsk9 all hasically maintained that although the good intentions of the signatories could not be douhted, tlley were "naive" or "romantie"to believe that the appeals for extra-party action would nut ue met with a strong reaction from (.'{lIlservati ve forces, ' The Soviets were IJartieularly sensitive to the fact that Praesidium members were defying the principles of uemocmtiC' centralism by making statements (.'{mtrary to the line that had been agn:ed to and estahlished, The major Pravda e{litorial issued on July 11 specifically ,~ tated that "unfortunately, some Czechoslovak leaders have made ambiguous statements attempting to minimi7.e the danger of the '2,000 Words' statement and declaring that tile fael of its promulgation 'need not be drJmati7,et\, ''', The manifesto l'ertainly highlighted ,Illd l'x,u:' these members of the PraesidiuTIl of the CC CPC.... In my opinion, this was the basic reason for the growing apprehension of the fraternal parties, .. • One oflhe mos t outspoken condemnations eallle from General Samuel Kooaj in a sllI..'Cch to the National Assembl y describing the manifesto as an "appeal t{H_'Ountcrrc\'olution" ami cal!ing for the criminal proslocution of its signatories, '" ~Iose()w "wombJy reported Kooaj's sp(.'Cch, noting that he had "justifiably calk'!! the '2,000 Words' a 'cal!
,,,'Il,,,,,
• n",/f Jnn" 2',), 11If>S. , H",/t ,,,4,-0, Ju"e 30, l OOIl ; ;r""'':1: H,,,/t )"1'1,,,, JLltl' I, 19f>S, .",1 Smrkt,,·.k{. "!,iJ(X) W",lI," in I!",j~ J"'4"" . '''h' 5. 19f>!i 'I. 1I1",",,
• h"e"';",,, wilh D,
Kotder,
R,,,/f I,mw,
S¥plcn,t."
10, 19(>9
- Sr.oiHor/,,1; .Im:" , J'n'" 2S, lOOll.
"' "
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168
T IU ; CH1S1S
p~: mO[)
fur L'(mnte rrc\,ulution : "u In addition, lntlr';l ll'us instructed DY the Pracsiuiurn 10 telex its position to all the subordinate party office s. which were at that time preparing to hold district ro nfcrem:es to elect delegates 10 the Fourtee nth Parl y Congress. This he did , h ut.
Smrkuvsk)" said, Inura "wrote the message according to hnw he understood the Pr.lcsidium's discussion ,"" In his telex. Indra warned thai
"<\
counterrevolutionary sit uat ion" wus in the making, lead in g
to "anarc hy . . and th e ucstnlction of tile state." " The Pracsidium stateme nt th e subsequ e nt leadership debate, and Jmlra's telex intensified public interest in the "2,000 Words," and if anything the party's heavy-handed reaction probably increased ]>opular sympathy for tile \1I;lnifesto. At the district and regional eunfere nees. ddegalt:s eriticil-e{] the pliTty react ion and responde{i hy electing an overwhelming majority of delegates who we r'-' (:ommitte
practice of appointing disgraced officials to amhassadorial posts was eriticizeu; multiple-candidate eieetiolls we re ins titu\l!d at soml! sessions; and a numher of d istrict party committees were entirely reco nsti tuted. In addition. several confere nces demanded the recall of party fUllction'lrit:s atl{1 critieized the work of high party officials. The regular rotat ion of lcalling party officials was abo proposed, and sOllie (.'Onferences introdu(."{'{] SL'L'rc t oallotin!4 of dclegates with the result tltat in
e'lmlidat c.~
propose<1 for the m :w Cen tr,,!
Committee we re among its cnTTent me mhers; Illany leading a JII servati ves were uropped altogether. At tllis stage it began tu ; 1])pear that conservat ives such as Kold cr, l3il"ak. and Ilidra would not be reclceted at the Fourteenth Party Congress. At the Bratislava " .~le ..",lrov.
P",cda. Jul )' II. JQ6/!.
v"I"';>/""/
,>.
~ S 'm "')\"45·. ,\~ C,,,,,·cn -mion . I.~. "111~ telt-, 'n",,~,'I" " ..., plthli,h~J j" 5",.1,·,,,. Jul)· 10. I96/;. ," '1,",t",ll" II . (;, ,,,J,,,, Sl.-; Ili n~ . C",",'I,,,./"""~-i
i"f'''''II"·,/lkc,d,,am •. 1' . Z77.
wa. '\le>.anJer Uul~k E. pell,·J f",m tho JI,.n k. of Our I'..I)T nudi p m,"". Jul)" 17. t970. in Y",..,la ""/><;/,,laN. 1'- 3.'>1l . n C-n.: . June 2!l. I~>'i , I'r..~u.· r..,Bu. J,m" 2Y. 1!Jf, s: I',~~", . r. ,];u. Jll"" 30 . 19(">'1 . all a, ~ "Wh y
'I",~<·d
in
E: E:/2SII),(;II~J.
"
,"
W9
municipal meeting, Husak, who had not previously been a particularly prominent figure in Slovakia, bunched an attack on "'the old tcam ," arguing tli!lt Slovakia b ggc<1 beh ind the CZe(;h lands in implementing the Action Program, Progress would he impossible, Hus;'\k asserted, without a "'L'Unsistent purge"' ufthe leadership in Slovakia. Yet he was critical too of Czceh negh..'t:t of Slovak demands for autonomy. and he urged that the SlovaJ.: Communist party (the CPS) should break witll tmdition and hold its party L·tltl, gress before the l'\mrteenth Party Congress met in Septemhe r "so as to adllpt a firm standpoint" on federalism. " Slovak leaders such as Bil'ak were now under pressure both from liberal reformers in Prague and from Slovak "'nationalists"' eager for more autonomy. As a result of these conferenccs. the salicncc of timc for thc conservatives in Czechoslo\'akia 'e forces certain ly circulated at this time. and they were no douht monitored in Moscow in all aitemptto judge the pn..'c ise strength of these fOTL"CS (ulI:lt he likelihood of their regain ing control. Nm; ri sl;oboda tJ uhlished a report on Ju ne 29 alleging that i n(\ra was organizing the L-onserValives with in the Ccntr:ll Comll1ittee to stage a (.'( Illw],aek prior 10 the Septemher Cungress. Utcnirn! listy reportc<1 on Jul y 4 Ihnt " S" ... lIa . j"l)' 7. 100II.
'I'K~",t
ill
S k ittill~, C:..rI""I.",~k i" "
, .. lemlpINI R",""uli"'. ,
1'1)· 279 - 82. " s.,.·icl wOI"rk.. we", furl her iocreased al 100 "lId of Jtlne .nd b"ginninK of J u t)" b)' Proglle', .1I1101l""",,,.nl. d,ot .h~ gm"" "".,,' Iud "'-"" Ie l"''''~''. l lldlldl"~ Ih" riKhl I" dl;mi» • .,d al't")i", Ji".." ...... S"d, <",,",.;1, ",~,kt "I"''' II", " .• y H,e K'..." ·" .... b p.utjdr>ti.", ~ ,,," i>:o~ed in Ih" "'2.000 \\'u.d •. - Ah" at Ihi> li me i....... a;: ....." lhal an inJ~I"'nJenl CT.cch N~lio".1 O~.n dl .h.",IJ he Wrm.oJ ,,, \io" pa..ed in iu""" 11," P"'I""" 'of the roundl " ...., "p,,,,ly " .,,,1 ,,, he th~ ,cp,e..,,,tation ,of. "CW...~, national <",".'.'~>tJ'n~'< (Skillill~. C:.rd""I,,,,,,kin:, ""emll'("/ 1'. H(i)
r...,,,,y
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170
THE
C IH ~ J S
1": 1110 1)
th e re were plans for th e People's l\'l il ilia to U<-'C IlPY key offi ces as a pre lude to a special Central Committee ple nu m thai wuuld elect a new Pracs idium, :\ state me nt 0 11 t he "2, 000 \\'ords" by va ri ous artists' unions maintained t hat powerful conservat ive forces we re " regrou pi ng" amI using the " 2.000 \ Vurds" as an .. c.\ c usc to l'1H:u llragc
hysteria and ll CI"OllSness
.
.
[ in order] to disintegrate the un ity of
th e progressive forces." The statc lllc nl ..:ontiudcd ; "\\'e lw \'c )!;ood reason to be sure that had n u t til e '2,000 \\fo rd s' be en p nhlishL"{\, th e conse rva tives wou ld have fo un d ano th e r prdcx t." " As anu th er L1l1lHll c n talor
slated, tlw only th re:]! of :1 <-~)llll te rrc\"()l u ti()n t">l m e
from COllSe T"ll livc force s. ,. T he Icalle! c,nnpaign mounted by eo n servaliws also heightened tension at this ti me, leading Edward G oldsliid er to ask th e Peu ple 's " Iilit ia " to work vigo rously at
stampin g out p ropaganda effo rts wh ich make th em look like a }J!l hch organizat ion : '''' T ile presenl'e uf \ Varsaw Pad fOfl'es and tile acti vities of DiJ'l1k in mee tin g wilh Yaku bovsky, and re port ed ly also traveling to th e Ukraine for secret talks wit h Shclcst," d id li tt le to ass uage the p uhlic frum believing th at the (.'()1lservati ve s were ind ec(1 p luttin g 11 comeback. The admission on Ju ne 28 by t he Cz()choslovak d()p ul y minis t() r of the interior, J, Rypcl, Iha t Sovi()t advisors con ti n uC(1 to work as liaison omeers within t he )I inislry cou ld not have added to public confldellcc in the 10~'aI I Y of the organs of sta te power to Ihe re furm moveme nt. !.! T he reaction in Moscow bordered on alarm. Fo llowin g Brezhnev's fr;mlic C:l[[ to Dubcck on Ju ne '1.7, t he re were sevt;:ral days til' calm before the storm wh ile a consensus e merged as to th e hest course of acti on. The one decision taken on Jun e 30 (!lumbe r 22) wa~ to ke ep Sovie t I((KJpS in C7.<;:chnsluvakia for th e time he ing. T he mane uve rs we re tu cnd on that datc. but without esphmut ion TASS killed a sto ry on the sche d ul ed (."Ompletion of t he exercises, lIl O n Ju ne 3() TA SS reportc(1 th at "the military .~talf a n d comman ci exercises of the Warsaw Pad count ries ended lodav on tIle te r ritor y of C/.echoslovakia." Pral1dll on Ju ly I also reported tha t t he ~ U t<,cdn,lli"y. J" n ~
27 , Ilffl. I::,, ~t;, h le.• 1 i " 0,1•..,· e\ at.. C",·c/"" lot:a*itJ. Pl'. 271 _ ; 2. NfjPI"IFI';,. J"I )· )O- I" " ',J t7- N. 1008. " R",/t V...I .... e.J ..I)..•. tM.ol... l).•• ly Jd("~ .".. •• io . )nl ). ~ . I!l6l!.
''''
o::h
171
JUIliE :il7 - JULy:;:8
maneuvers had ended, as did the press a,eencies in Hu ngary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Ge rman y. But T,\ SS in Russian, at 2250 GMT nil Ju",; 30, carried a servke message stating thai Ille report on the termination of exerdscs should bc killed. TA SS in English 0531 GMT, Jul y 1, also rescindc{1 the earlier report ! ' This indicates that a dl..'C ision was made after I'ru lJdu had go ne to press carlyon Sunday evening. Since I he East Europc an press agencies erroneously went ahead with the report , il is unlikely tlwt tlll~ decision came from \VIO headquarters or from Yak uhovsky's staff in C7.cchoslovakia where East European l"Ur res pondents were attached. Apparentl y a last-minutt: political decision was made ill Moscow. Czechoslovak journalists confirmed that speculation over the prolongation of the Soviet troops' stay hall hcgun "lasl weekend" with the killi ng of the TASS SIOTY. "" No information is available, however. to suggest who was responsible for the decision to extend the tTOOPS' stay, but olle c,m assume that the mili\(lry l"UllHnand had been in mlved alo ng with top party officials. That the TASS story was not replaced by anot her statement S ll~e s t s that the Politburo as a whole had not vet decidc{! what l~l\lrSe tn take. Ye t C\'ent s in the coming Jays would support Zden ck :\ lIynafs opinion that although the ~Iay C PCz Cent ral Committee plenum had brought the doves 10 the fore in the PoJithuro. I ht~ ""2,000 Wo rds"" onl'C again lipped the hab nce in f(l\'or of the IHlWks. " THE INT EHVENTIO NIST
~100D
HAH DENS
The appea rance of the ""2,000 ,Vords" l"(Jincide{1 wi th Grumy ko's announccme nt that t he USS Il was pn:parc{l to entcr into a scrious dip lomatic dialogue on a relaxation of East-West tensions. One resu lt of the manifeslo's appeara nct; W,L~ evide nt h}' Ihe bt~ginn in g of July: de te nte bad de finit ely taken a hack scat to the larger and more immediate issue ofth e Cze<.·llOslo\"ak crisis. Tbe effect of the "2.000 \Vords" was not to end efforts to hring all-out an agreement on arms limitation but rather to reduce Ihe iml}(}rl:ml"C of these dliJrts to the Soviet leade rsh ip (Ind tu stre ngt hen the position uf those who opposed an y aCl"(Jmmodatio]J witll ""'Vestern imperialism"; fnr, conservatives ("(Juld arg ue. \\'estern gove rn ments were "S~~ B" y \\';11;. ", Stall",, 1. "S;~". I1;,, ~ . ".1 n~>t" ,,, ,,,, .. 1'. 7i .. . 9. " /1I1' nlllliOlIlI/",,"/t1 Tri/"' ..·. J"I)' 4. 19(1~ " Zd~,":'k MI)·,,:!I, .\'~d"f"'''' , 1'. 212 .
172
Till:: elli S IS I' I::IIIUO
su pporting "counte rre\"olutionary tendencies" in Prague. Altllougll Kosygin di{1 :J{lvise President Jullllson in the last d:IYs of Ju ne that the Soviet Union was prcpared tu annuunce on July I that SuvietAmcriean talks on th c limitation of strategic wcapons and ADM systcm s eould gu ahead ··in the ne arest lilture ,"" the ,UH10lUl('"ement rcee ived nhnost none of the custumary Soviet p uhlicilY. Similarly, Ko.., ygin·s spe(.'i.:h at the signing of tile Nuclear Nonprolifcmlion Treaty (N PT) r(.'"{'eh·ed vcry poor I.:vve r-Jge in the press, and .. !though Gromyku, Susluv, Vorunov, Crechko, and I'ononmrev attended the signing ('"eremony, Bre~.hn ev
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12 . 1\1&81.
JUNE ~7 -JULY ~B
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coastlines, and airspace, to protecting the dignity ufthe Soviet flag, the ri ghts and security of Soviet citizens.":"> Neither Kusygin nor Izveslia made any reference to the formulation of the April Central Committee plenum that a phase of intensified international class war existed in which a weakened but therefore more cunning and dange rous imperialism was seeking to subvt:rt the socialist bloc. By contrast. tIle next morning's So(;clskaya Rosslya contained a sharply worded editorial prodaiming prolt:tarian internationalism as the highest Soviet aim. Several passagcs in the c(litoriu1 apl>eared to be dired rebuttals uf the argume nts made by Izvestia and Prime Minister Kosygin. Sovie t workers were striving not only lor their own country but for the future of humanity throughout the world. The dut y of the Soviet people, according to Lenin as quoted by SovetskaYII RossiYII. was to do tIle most " in one count ry for the development. support, and arousal of revolution I N AUJ COUNTRIES."" Auotl)er sign IIf IHlrd-line opin;un. this lillll: within IIII' Soviet military. was an article in Kofmmmis/ (;ooruz/wfwykh sil, t he journal of the "hin Political Ad ministration , h"aded by General Yepishe\'. The article appeared to he a pole mic with Grnmyko's (:011demnation on June 27 of those "sorry theoreticians" who claimed that disarmame nt was an illusi un. The article argued that "so long as aggressive f{)fces exist" a country's securit y wil! de pend on the constant renewal of even the latest types of weapons. "This is one of the mosl impur tant laws of military construction in (xmditions of the existence of aggressi ve military blocs:' With clcar implications also for the military situation in Czechoslovakia. the article declared that given present military doctrine, "there might he no time to build IIp fo lUls" duri ng a war mHI that it is now necessaJ)' "evell in peacetime to have a stahle superiori!}' over the probable advcrsary." " This "',IS onc of Ihe essenU,,[ 'IrgU !IIcnts uscd to (.'Onvince the CzechoslOl'uks that the permaucnt stationing of troops WaS ne(·cssary. These remarks wcre not just a polemic with Gromyko; they contribute
"' "
TilE CIUSIS I'E IU O])
July 2 in Lit/ovel a/7/wda, they made suggestions for reform that could only h av~ caus~d alarm in other lI1~muer <-'tJ\Jntr ies. Th~ document. "On the Cwehoslovak Stilte Interests in t he Military Sphere," was prep~lred unofficially by iI group wit hi n the Gottwald ~lilitary Academy. The group d,.-c lared its allcgiance 10 t he Warsaw Pud but stated that Czechoslovakia should respond to changes in military strategy "liS a partner, and not as a sacriBce to a developme nt o n which we have no infllleIK'C." In (lHrtieular, the group maintained, crises in Europe lead ing to "a situation between war and peat'e" have "eat~l~troJlhie effects" on the Czechoslovak t'COIlomy, ;lI1 d hence Czeehllsl(lv~lkia should take allmeasllres to ;\\·oid such situations. By advocating "an act ive foreign policy wit hin the allian<:e" ;111([ st:eking th, . "nurmal i ~.a lion of r<:lations" with \Vt:st Ccrmany, it was later alleged that t his ami other documents prepared hy the acade my were in fild promoting a 1>o1icy of neutnllity. Even without sut'h an extreme inlt:rprciation, it is not difficu lt to assess the impact that publication of t he doc ument had in Moscow. Sbaring the vi~ws ex!)ressed by SfJI.Jl!lskalja· Rossiyu and KomIl11mi~'1 vooruzhell ll ykh sit, the Ukrainian party leadership lent ih supp·o r t to the interven tionist call.out the event began to appear at t he end of June. The :illn iversary afl:orded the Ukraiui;1Il le,ulership all ullusuall y good OPlx)rtunity tn express their views on a wide range of issucs including the Pnlguc Spring. The perceived link hetween events in Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine was dearly rellecled in the statemcnts by party leaders. Yu. V. Il' nitsky, the Brst sccret
"
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and the bloc; and he warned that "striving to avoid the impleme ntation of internationalist du ty would only res ult in reverses :lI1d e ven failu res. T he CPSU, carrying Ollt the legacy of Man; and Lenin, repealedly and consistently struggles lor the un ity of the socialist camp, , and the consistent implementation, of the principles of prole tarian internatinrmlism,"'" His most outslxlken statement appeared in Pral'do on Jul y 5 when he declared that the Communist party of the Ukmine "has always and will always carry out an im placable struggle agains t any man ifestations of right and 'left' opportun ism, revisionism lind rciormislll , wflere!;cr they might appear, [Shelest's italics]" In a dear reference to events in Czechoslovakia, he ('{mtinued; We ('anno! amI nevcr will agrce with tho M: pse udo "th..:<:! retidall_~" who, forgett ing about the class nature of sociali st sodety and the sha rp struggle again st i"'perial is", and readio", stri" e to assert and pro])agandi/.c farfctchcII alld lifell:s,; "",odels "f soci;Ll ism," al"traet hum,m ism and abstrart den)(>cmti~.lltion. Buurgeuis propaganda in i'" strugglc against Corumuuis",. . fab· ricates th e vi le myth that Lenini sm is a 5peci fic;llly Russian phe nome· non not applicable to other (-'O lmtries. Its aim is clear . . tu weaken the frate r nal internationalist li nk b,~twcen thc socialist <::uuntrics. For us Communists of the Ukraine. who have jl:lsseJ through the weat school of class . tnlggle a""inst internal a",1 edeTLla l enem ies, the danger is clearly seen of the position taken hv individual Commu nist s in sume fnltc rnal pa rt ies when they fall for the bai t uf buurge ois prol);Lganda and its yes·",en opportuni sts uf "ariu"s strip.,s.
Then in ,1 polemic with opponents of interve ntion , Shelest enunciated his own view (If the principles on whit-h a truly Leninist lure ign policy should be ba~ed: It is impossible to agree with those who reducc proletarian interna· tionalism to the mere recognition of th e indepeuucllcc and c
It is ca.~y to discern the differe nces in the views of SlIdes! an d Kosygin. Equally interesting is the article written by Shcherbitsky,
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"" '. Yeo Sllde,l. <>1T)'od KI'SS:' \'''I'n,.~ i, r",,( Krs S, No ... U,, ]v t9M). », 16. '" Prn"d". Julr 5. 196!\, Simitar ,,~,w, "'I""',.,J lor Sh.,k" j" hi; 'I"~"'~l t",~"e 1M Ukrainian C~ "lrai C<»mnillec I'tcnum on Jut)' S. os ICpollcJ in PnlL·d" Ub,,(n~ a nd Radjandw Uk",;na on July 6. 19611. Soorte, "~"'io'" of ,he ,p.,,,,,,h "",.., a1"" ""mod h)' Pro,.!" 0",11«",..... ,
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176
TilE CIIISIS !'EIIIOU
which appeared in I:vestia 011 Jul y 5, the sallie day II,al Sh ele~t's art icle was carried h~' I'm vcla . Shchcrhitsky concentrated rar mOTe on the steady and nunJmmatil' prugress made uy the Ukrainian peopl e in tlIC ]"-,, fifty YC;Irs (1 11<1 111.. <1.: unly perfunctory refcrcm:c.•
to the "struggle aga inst right and 'left' opportun ism, revisionism. nationali,m and chauvinism," H is comments on foreign policy we re less emotional Ihml Shclest\ ,ll\d he avoided llInking any L,{)!lncction between cxlernallind internal policy, ('(Jnnning himself tu support for tht: April plenum's resuiu tion on combating imperialist sub\'(~ rsil)n and expressing confidence in the Centml Committec's .. uility to "strcugthcll the u nit y of all th e forces of sodalisTlI and democracy in their struggle ;lgainst imperi;llism anti lilr pe ace and progress." No Inention at all was m,lde of proletarian internationalism. mutual aid, or the dangers pused to the un ity of the camp ur the sodalist oriclltat ion of some fraterna l parties. The secretary in charge of the Ukrain ian party's propaganda de· partmellt. F. D . Oveharenko. also published an article in early July to mark thc party's fifti eth annivcrsary. \Vhcrcas Shdest had heen sUL"Cessful in pladng a lengthy article only in Vvpms!! is/orii KPSS, " journal of relatively s",all ei n:ulali ..", Ovc::har() nko's artide "p_
peared in the p:rrty's prcmiur juurTl:lI. KmlUmmi.'lt. The authur da· voted himsdfalmost (:ntircly to a rather hland descrip tion urthe development of the Ukrainian party. ad mittin.l! however t hat imperi;llist re(lctiun and "its yes·men in our PllTty" llUvc t"ken on "all open[y anli·Soviet cha racter." "" Ye t he made no mention of any spilluver fru m Czeehus[uvakia or uf prolet,lrian internationalism. to..! udl has been writlen about "the Ukrain ian hlctur" in the inter· 1lompromisingly hard line, as apparentlr werc Il'nitsky's, hut the same L'C rtainly could not he said of Sheherbitsky, Less is knuwn aLout Qveharenko except that Ire Imd (>cen :lctively involved with shelest in sup pressing mallife stations of intellectual dissidence.'''' The referenl'C by Loth She· "' F.
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lest and O vcharenko to splits and Jisagreements would seem to indicate a subtly dh'erse approach to t he processes taking pla(.'e in Czechoslovakia. '" One might also (;onclude from this that there was an active and urgent debate going un in the p:lrty as a whole"-'" an impression supported by the arrival in .\ loseow of a top· level Hungari:1Il deleg:ltioll. CONSULTATION WITH THE H U:-.ICAHIANS
The "2.000 Words" appeared on June 27. the same dll}' t hat a Hungarian party and guvernment delegalionled by Janos Kadar arrived in Mus(;i)w. It (.."Quld not have eS(.."il peJ uutiL"C that tIlt: lasl time a full-scale HUngarian party-s tate delegat ion paid an official visit to the USSR was in July 1963 at the very tillle the Sinu·Soviet dispute was e ruptin g ove r the puhlieatioll of the letters exchanged between the Soviet and Chinese Central Commi ttees. In 1963, as in 1968, the Soviets had ceased to be satisnc{1 with general and ambiguous support from other \Varsaw Pact members fo r the Soviet stand. A common and publicly enunciated attitmle h)" the Pact hlld Lecome necessary to hack the Soviet leadership, and H ungary's posit ion Ilad 1.>C(.·olllc particularly cruda!' As a (..~)ulltry with Soviet force s on its territory, it could not alford the luxury of HUlmlllianstyle de nllll('e; as a people who had experienl-ed the bloodshed uf the 1956 nprising, they knew that ('ooperation with the Soviet Union was the only path available: hut most enlcially, as a party that had lollowed an increasingly moderate and reformist pa th, the HS\VI' had a centr.t.l role tu play, not olily in mediating between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaderships, but also conceivably in helping to resolve the splits within the Politburo itselr. An y con· tinued SUppOlt fur the Prague Spring by the HSWP would favo r the non interventionist stand . whereas recognition by thosc leadcrs (liFE . Co"""u ~"" A, ~~ •. USSR lu i)" 1. Ulf"'). "I1~, """,·1. ",Io,d. I"'" '.)', 1",, \0 'h~ I>< ...;'h'
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the 1"'800)" of pre,elll . .u)" m.., .... ho i. ,uPI'n..,"'..! I". in,t it ""un •. • "thoritic. "nd proh,I>'I Io" . he loa, h',n..,lr er..ated. In hi' hook lhe Ulr. iniaz, write, ~"", e •• mple. of Ihi. traged~' ... hid, ly (!i. illt <"W""'~. t)", ",·;,),10\ tlw fr." ........,k of """.Ii' t ti,"<:. a"J (,..crrom~> Ih~ int~nt'ctual uphea,,,] which ;' at pre" nl l,oXing pia<.... jll oM" ' ..... m· try" (nn:. Co"'mu~;" Mea •. USSR. Ju ly 16. 196!l). " Tbl< ,;"',. i •• upporled hy e,ey Hod .... " .",1 Peter l\>heJltt)"j. '-nIC UkrJ;ne .IId lh,· C,.ec:ho.llOCteJ hy Mll·nlt. Nadll!",. , . p. 212. 011
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who had bee n t hrough the i-iungari:lll "counterrevolution" of simihlr I<mdencies in Czechoslovakia would do more t han any ot her action to favor tIn: in tervent io nist argument. Hungary's vieeprem ier. L:.ijos Feher. was later to t'(JIlfirm that the HUllgari'l11s' own views of tilt: t'Ump,lris"n he tween Hl56 ,Uld 19fiB Jlild he t:ll dkited by 1\1oscnw and "being desirous of helping. we re iterated our eXJlerient'e which t'Ost us so mallY .~at'rilkcs." \Vhalevl:r sympathies the Hungilriillls may have init i'llly fell lor Ihe moderat e aspects of the reform Illovement . by July "the right-wing and reactionaries in Czcchoslovakia s1Jt~~>eded:' at~,(lrditig to Fellt:T, "in creal ing greilter !I:gill grou nd for t he m selv('s I him Ihey did in I-\ ungary towards the end of the summer aud the beginning of the autunlll ()rI956. "~' \ Vlle n th e I [ungarhm leaders IcCt for ~lost'U\\", t lll:Y were idc llt iRed liS one of the East European regimes still fa"orable to the Prague Spring. Nevertheless the appearance ofO.l\laehatka's article in mid-June [lrni.,illg Imre Nagy had undoubted ly affected the HIJ1l j.!;lrhlll attitude." D uring Dulli"'ek's mid-June visit to Hun~ary, Kadii r had stated that the HSWP wou ld indeed favor efforts by the CI'C" to "ov"rt~ II"I' "ar;o,,_< "h
mc:nt." Tl u: Hun garialls l'T; 11 c,.,d~"I,,\.,k; • . Add,,·., hl' C", n ,.d~ 1..;11'" ~"h"'- ~jpml"'r of il,,' 1~ )lit;" ,, 1 c.:,""m iU."· of I) ... It ~II'P. \"i<., ' -CJ)~ i "n a" "li b<, C",,,,_ <; 1of ~"""IN', Ih""k",t "" " " )("" 10. 19fi.'l. - l>if"nlH";''') 11"II~H" 411" (:~"'ml e",,,,,, il· Ire of ,"~ !lSII'P. ",,_·1 (O.. h~~·' J!)6.S). I). UL " I""er&.-"I k"9, Jm,," 13 . II_~~ . I'.-d,t;l, in I,;, [,,,,,,,,, i"h' ''';,,,,· of I LlI)" I.~ . ,,,I,,,ill<- the ",.1",1.1 wl, k)' wa, 1',,10II,h",1 in Ij,,,,i,,,i U"Y "" th" (11)' of II", " i,;t ( ~. ()()I p;lt' )" ~O\-"f)JI"" )tt JeI,,~.lt"> a"d whk'h rt>f~" I" the ""'" ()f 1>:""<')'. TI.l> art ido ha, e""I"'r.lI<~1 om! w()rri,>d lh,'m" (le_ ' 1 ;n He01i)))(. 1011 . lI'illIU]" r ... ~,,,. p. 21!J). " fl,,,/" I"dw. I'me 15. 196'i. " S"'JI~al""bae. JLl'~' 2;, 196/!, lI"dt pniw. June ;!l:l, 1008_
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J U ~IO 1l7- JULY:VI
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tinu t..>tl to receive morc ohjt..'(; ti w, t..'tIVe rage ill lI ungtl on th e Hun l4a rians to ado pt a firm e r .~t;Ul (;t: un the CZedlflslu" ilk even ls." Yet the (;0 111muniquc of the talks did not re lied any such differenccs ilnd m ercly rcaflin ne{l th e un shakuhl e nature of Sov iel-I·lu ll);
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" irrespcct ive of whieh eoun try this struggl e unfolds ill." th e HS\V P "expresses full solidarit y , . with those defending the rule oft he \\lJrki ng class and the t'uuse of sodalism against the clll:nmdlllle lits of dogma tists, revisionists and th e class enelllY," In a final statement , omitted uy Hlllie Jlrci~() in its repurt urt lle spee(;h, •. K.ida r d eclare{l: " ' \'e undcrs taml the mcnni ng of this struggle. amI we arc p repared 10 rcnder evcry kind of illternational assistalll,:c."" Although K .id ,ir'.~ st,Lit:Ill(;llts u nduLlhtcdl}' rdll:d a more negrn plcx fotrn~ ." He did 110\ lllClltioll C~e<:'h()s l l>\':lki,1 by mlule, howeve r, and he was carcful to assert th e cu ntinucd necessity of a st ruggle on two fron ts "agai nst both righi isl aud Ieliist distur ti ons." Furthe rmore, he di d not say that socialism was achtall}, threHtened anywhere in th e blot: except in China...\nd fhwll y. in t'Ontradictioll to the joint cnnlllllmiquc Jlublished at th e e nd uf his vbi t, 110:: de· sc ribed th e views of the Soviet amI Hunga rian sitlcs as '\inrilar" rather th an "idcnt ical."" BHEZU NEV SEE KS CO~SENSUS At Ihc samc Krem li u rally, Ilrczh rr cv delivered a major forc ign pol. icy spec(.'h. relayed live, th"l (~lrtlaincd several indications thallhe Soviet lellder's posit iun had hardened. '" It was particu larly nott~· \\'Orth y for its unusually ha rsh condemn atio n ofthc United Statcs. Only Ihree d,I}'S aitcr Kos ygin's speed!, th e signing of til e NO)l.. n",l,;
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l SI
proliferation Treaty, and the ;ln nOU!l(:ClIl Cli t (If imminent ta lks o n strategic arms li mi tation, it seemed rat her oul of place for the
CPSU first secretary to he dClloundng the Un ited Sbles as "the sodal and politlcal system which engenders jlolitk,11 band itry an d arOllses cont e mpt and revulsion t hro ughout the world. A rotten society. a dcgmdin g society, a uco:llllposing society-t his is what the US A is cill1cd even hy those who rC(.~ :nlly praised the AmeriC".ln way of Hre." It is difficult to tell whether Brczhm;\' was makin g ,\ critical stat e me n t alxlII \ the I·jews of lmy of his own ("o llcagucs, bllt hi s own refe re nce 10 th e Nonproliferation Trea ty and th e arms lim -
itation talks we re certainly much more guarded than Kosygin and Gru myku's had been the previolls week. Nowhere did he repeat t he Gromyko formulation that th e USSH was rca{ly to improve rel.. tiollS with the United States and work toge ther to solve outsta nding inte rn ational prohle ms. On t he c.~ Hltrary, speaking of eliilrts to bring about a negotiatetl settleme nt to t he Vietnam war. Llrc:r.hne v accuse{1 \Vashington of "prncraslinat ing in every way with regllrd to concrete ste ps towards pe ace:' As sc.~s ing th e international situat ion, I3 rezh nev seemed to fin d a crisis whe rever he looked: " Frallec has hecume an are na for th e most aClite .. m ] Unprec.'etlented class hattles": "Brit,lin is in the grip of an acute fin ancial crisis." 'Vest German y\ recently introduce d emergenc.·y bws he c.~)mpared to the legislation that "in Nazi Ge rmany servecl to pu t th e co unt ry's whole life on a militar y basis," and he rcpeated the lIsual foreca st th at " Bonn's revanchist policy. eve n when d resscd up as its so-called new Eastern po licy is d oomed to fail ure,"'" On events within the sodal is! c:unp, Brezhnev definitely adopte d a Imrslle r note than pTI;vinusly, Hec.1)gni7.ing tht~ divers ity of forms th at Communist <:o nstruc!ion t(luld take, he illso rec.'alled "the tri:.Is" Hungary bad faced in 1956 ":11 th e time uft he furious attaek un H ungary's .~oci:.list pOSitions by th e fun:.:s of in ternal and international rcaction," The Hungarian Cummunist~ had prevailed by "rclying on th e slIp rwr t of th e workin g class am i most (If th e pcople, on I he fratc rnal international allia nce wit h the other socialist co untries." Bwzlmev's posit i\'e :Ipp r;,is;ll of the act ions of Soviet troops in 1956, cou pled with his state lllent that as internat ionalists "we tannot an d ncver will be indifferent to th e fat c of socialist construe'"TI.i , """,e p"",I",I>li,- h'k'P''''''li"" of I)" , "cri>i' of L'3pi, .. Ii.m" ",eo, rep"'''''.! hy (" a 'I"-,,,<,h !O>'n all·"";,,,, «lI\~r~" 0>( !~",'h"" 0" J"I)' 4 I%~, 11,,, le\! i> h, 1'",,,,1., Jut r 5, 1!l68, H",,_hn~ v
''''
o::h
182
T il t;
CI\I~I S
1' t:lllOll
lion in other countries," strongly indicates Ihut th e Suviets were activel y ('{msidering mi li ta ry inlervcutiuu as an alte rll ativc s tral~ egy. On the nat ure of socialist runstru rtioll. Brezhncv was ex plicit. outli ning what he believed wcre the eommon principles un iting socialist count ries rcgunl1ess of the va ri ct~· of lim ns among th e dif~ reTell! stales. "There is nut and ca nnot be socialism," ;lC{:ording 10 Brc:d lllcv, "without th e <.'OI1I11\on owne rship of th e means of production ; the re is not an d {',mno! he socialism w ith uu t th e in volvement of the broadest masses of the people in the govern men t of the suciety .lUd the st;ll e. There is nut and {';IIlHO! be su(;j .. lis1]1 without the Com munist part y, which is {'(Insiste ntly gui(h:d hy l\'larxis m-Lenioism and proletari an intcmatio ll"lis m , pb~ing the le ad ing role ." Brezhnev admitted that "the :lIXJlogis ts of the hourgeois ordcr are ready to don any pseudosocialist mantle and try un der a nationalist cloak to rock and. as they say. 'soften up' socialism and to weakell the fra ternal links between th e socialist countries," Yet he made no .~ I >cd fic me nt io n or C7.cd\O~ lovaki a , and his prcst;ription for deali ng with thesc "apologists" would apply as mut;h to domestic dissent a.~ to problems in CzcdlOslov",kiH. "The t,,-, k "he
183
COil and the German Federal Rep ublic, having fu ll rip;hts, should both participate, is of great imllOrtancc to th e Soviet Union", and he repeatedly emphas ized the val ue offrcqucnl bilateral and multilate ral coninl(:ts wi thi n the socialist bloc "for disc llssing l'(lmprehensivcly and working out l'O\l ectivcly ollr j uiut line on the main issues of our time." He noted the importance of consultation both on a bilatera l basis and withi n the framework of the \Vars,lw Pact, CMEA. and the forth coming internat ional Communist conference which, he slated , "is d estfned to playa great role. " On bahuu:e, the uutco me of Kadar's visit as re flt.'Cted in the (."O mrnunique and the speeches or the two leaders pointed to th e Hungarian al'(.'Cp tam:c of the use of lurce as a last resort if the C PCz d id not bring negative influences under<.~mtroJ. On the Soviet side the need for a un ified bloc approach t o all quest ions. including Czechoslovakia, clearly emerged, as d id tbeiT need lilr iIK're:J.~ed consulta· tio n and coord ination. If Brezhncv himself now believed that the threat to Communist CQnstmction in Czechoslo\-akia had increased. as h is remarks seemed to imply, nowhe re did he indicate that all alternative methods of deali ng with the crisis had been ellhaush.'!l. On the contrary, his emphasis o n bloc cohesion and the value of negotiation wa~ ver y mllch in :I,-,<-"Ord wi th Ktid:ir's statemen t th at the hest way to overcome bloc diffic ult ies was to "stre ngthen and develop the socialisll"Ountries' organi~.ations ami all forms of bilateral and mult ilate ral l"OOperatio n."·" Thlls the visit <)f the Hungarian delegation seemed to ha ve been successful in l!Clping tu create a l"Ollsensus in favor of l"Olllinuell, if urgent. negutiation to avo id the usc of force . These results bore fru it in the series of letters that the CPCz leadership received from the fi ve frate m al parties following K:id~lr"s de part u re on July 4.
MOSCOW UBG ES MU LTILATEHAL TALKS By the time Kadar departed , the Soviets had agreed on the ir next l"Ou rse. TIII~y, in l"Uncert with Hungary. Bulg;lria, l'oland and Eas t Germany. wo uld ask the c pez leadershi p til attend a multila te ral l"Onferenee for the purpose of strt::ngthening bloc cohesion and reminding the C~.c<:h s tllat no socialist l"olliltry l"Uuld re main i nd il~ ferent to the negative p n)(.'Csses taking place in Prague.
J&,
T H I:: ClHStS l 'EII IO IJ
The re is no d e finite indicatiun of wh en th e u L"cisi oll ( lIl1mber 23) was take n. But it is likely that the june J() ucc isinn ( ,wmber 22) to
rescind the report an nouncin g th e end of P,lct maneuvers spurred a seardl for alternatives th at led to :Ig ree m en i (prohahly on July 1 or 2) to furthe r postpon e the withdrawal of troop s and seck an ur-
ge nt multilateral meeting with the C PCz leadership and other bloc' stat es. The need for jOint consultations appears to have h et:n di s-
clIssed with the Hllng.1 rian delegation on Juiy3 and was certain1r ge n{~ rally
refl ected in the {:Olllilluniquc and th e speeches of K,'id:'ir
ami Brezhncv _ Even if i\ I'olithuro mee ting formally made the decision , th e numhers present would have heen diminished, for Kirile"ko, Shc1esl, Shehe rhilsky, a"d nashidov were kno wn to he out of Moscow,'" and Polyansky, Dc miehcv, Kunae,', .\'1ashe rov , ~ l zhavanaJze , and Kulako \' were not me nt ioned in th e Soviet press as pr('scllt ill the ('a pila] Juri ll ~ the fir st drtys of Jul y. Brezh nev, Kosygin, I'odgorny. and \ 'oronov (all of whom with eromyko and Lesec hko, Ihe Soviet amhassador in ~ udaJlest, ('Oll duele d th e negoti at ions with th e HUllgari<ms) wcre in ~I{)scuw, ,IS
were M,17.urov, PeI'she, Shclepin, a number of important Politburo ,·,.",li,]"I " Ill,·ml)f·rs. ",,,I nil,... in ll" .. nt ial I"",]"rs sllch as An_
dropov. Cri ~ hin, Grechku, and Crumyko l1 The firs t letters from ;"ios('ow, Poland, and East Berlin arrived ill Prtl,"uil h'" pi,'''''''' (r"'''''/d \ '"""k", I " " " 2l. 1!l6>I.• "d rr~t'd", ) ,,1) S. I\J('>';); Sil.,I" " . .. d Shch~,ili .. k)' w~,~ al II", Ukr..i"i." 1'''' )' pk''' ''''' (1:O:" _,li". J"II' :;, )!)(,S. "",II'"" ,/", I"t) ", 1!l6>I). " TASS . J"tv 4. 1%8 . S U/2/lIJ/GI , U.S. \)('[1'11,,,,,'''1 •.rSlate, 11<>'<:0"'1. ,1/emom",I,,,,, , Il SE _ J2~_
" ThO'
... "~",, 16. 1968
'C'l""'''''' ,,'i.h ",hId, ,I ... 1.,tI,'r< orr"',,1 ",0< ,, "\linTl.~II»' S,,,,",,,,',k)'. en.:. 1,,1)'
6. 19(,S. EE/2Str.'CI4. " Bo;I)(,,,d .. r,,,I;,,_ 1,,1,' "'S ' nr~,,,',h'.
la.
19f>~.
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18.5
pu l down Ille co unl l! rre l'ol ulio n in Prague. " Fordgn i\liniste r I'\ ;ije k has revealed that th e oll~ n s i\"e ton c of tIl(: "in vitat io n" wa~ emphasizcd in the offid:11 C~.cdlo~ ]o \":lk respOIISC, which specifically sl:lled Ikll I I I{~ ve ry "Ienor" ofth c ]dte r.~ 11:ld hl r th e r l 'OIlvin l'ed tIll: C wdw s]o\"llk leade rship thai olher 1)101.' slates we re insuffidentl y informed ahouttlw situation in Pr:lglle.-"' PressllI"e ())l Du])(:ek to ae(.-e llt th e "invitation " was l;'.dn: llId ~· strong. Amhassadur CI1Crl'o!J('nko n :portedl y delive red 1I spedal I{;tt e r to Dul)(',ek. informing h i m - iIK·on<.--(: tI~· as it Il;Ippc ned that the uth er del e~ation s we re in Ell"! a]reu{ly on th eir way to \\'arsaw 10 begin th e bloc meet ing. '" Al"l.xww ng to S mrko\"sk~' , th ... spedal Ictt{~ r from Cherl'one nko arril·I...'(1 Ht th e s:u ne time t l\;lt th e Sovie t invitation was n ."l"t."ived . and Ihis sugges ts th at th e C he rvonellko le tt er probabl y was ueli l"C rcd on Jul y 4 . Du ucck the n received a tdeplulIu; ('all fro m Brezlmcv c:lrl y Oil j uly 8 :Iskin).!: th e Czech"slo,"uk leadl;rsllip tu altt 'nd a medill g on j uly 10- 11, "n ()f~ Je r Duhl-ek bter lIl;tinlained he decl ined to d is('uss with ou t specific Praes idiulil authuril.ation. '" Des pit e press ure for all immed iat e res pOllse, Duhee k d id not (~ lll \'ene:l I'raesidiulll me et illg UlI ti! !(llIr day~ ;dic r th e receipt of Ih e inili"llcllers. TIllS d elay Wa S parll ~ ' d ul;' to t he di spe r.siun of tIl e lead ership at th e various regi onal party mcetings be ing held throughout th e l"() unt ry. \\'he n th e Pmcsidi um eventu ally d ill meet Ull J u]y 8, il aCl.~:pte{1 th e prind ple " I' [(Irlhe r d iRuss ions h u t :Ittache{1 ,,\~) l.1mditi (lIls: first, nay lll illtihllc r;ll ('Infe rcu{." (" wuuld hal"; to he pre(:edc d h ~' ;1 fu rt !Jel" ro und of bilat l'ral consultat i O Il S O il CZl!d lOs]uva k soil : sL1."ond . any Illnc eOll\ueati on 1I"0uld have tu h,: e nlarge d to indudc Humani:! an d Yugoslavi a.'' ' Dulx-ck ("()nHllUllic• •\1 . 011 july 9 .": Brezll1lev;s said to li;1\"C b ... c n p;ll"l il'u]arl v in tcres ted in a$(Ce rla;11 iug if th e del'isioll Ilot to :11 teud
., Mkhd ·I" lu. /A" .I r... nlle. luI)" ~'<J. l%~ . • 1«, ll.
"·t· f ... "kj'''/f"' .. 11I~f""",i"" 7..d/ n "~. I uly
)9(>'i .
" ' iii lI:ij" k. m . 01'" "I"" ·'. [>. b:. " S,,,,kQ,·, H . .·1" V»/< .. i.• Mr/ C...." ·c"alio". 1' . II!. " I) u l "'~k·. ' 1""'''' [' or So·I ,... ,,,h,·, 26. I'lfllj. ,,, lh" CI,(;, C,·"", ! c...",mit[,·, . a, «"" .li", .. l (n SJ",,,"'''''' . 1)"J,t,·k. p . :!'J6 . • ),, ' l! S. D" I... 'I "~"'1 of S1. k . Re ... ,,,~·/, .I/,·""mm"u ,,, . /ISt:_J2" .... U~" . , 16. 1 1l6~ . '"' ~!i"ltd h ." . / .. > .11".",,·. ,uh' 20 . • ls., ll",.u.·, ' I ~~~·h u" S'."pl"" ,I"" 25 . l\J6!J. 10 Ih., C )'(; , C.''''''') <;""",,;1],.,. ((;"n.: iu t;"~)i , I, . ~t"plcm) ~'r ~. J!~;!l. ':E/3 l lI0ICl I ~! ~IIJ Sm,k",·,ki·. A " I/'>fin;'-/,," r;",,,·e,,,,,j .. ,,. p. N . .., n"h(,·l ·, >I "'''~ ' ,,, S'"l>h·",I." I %~. C I"C, C,·",,·. I C" "",," h'" I'~."",,, ;" SI, .. " ",., ,,, . /) u/><'ck. I'. 2S6
J
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186
Tille CI!lSIS rt;tllOD
meeting had been ratified by all the membe rs of the I'mcsidiu11l, including particularly Drahomir Koltler, '" Bre;.]lllcv dearly kncw of Koltle r's 111e1110rlmtlulll that there was "a raging umntcrre\'olulion" in CzcdlOslovakia which iflcft unchecked could lead to a "po[itka[ catastrophe,"'" JiN Pelik
Hefusul or the Dubeek le,ulcrship
10
attend the Warsaw meeting
was not the only issue \\'Urryillg ~I()scow. Soviet IC;lders also ll;lll !o
decide wlm! to do wilh ,lilt he Soviet and bloc troops still in Czechoslovakia lullowinf,; the ulficial end of stall' exercise ··Sum:iI'u," ~lar shal Yakuhol'sky's hca
JII]~' ~1I.
lOOK
.. 1\11111,·,', meOllllrdlldllOll. ",hOllin,~1 '~I J"I)' II . "'., pllhhsh...1 ill Tril",,,,, . S"l'lemh", 10. 19M. "",I '11101,,1 111 Sklll l ,, ~. c:ed "",/",.uki,,:, /,,In''''I'I'''/ RU";"li,"' . )'_ 2S9 " . 106, " Jili I\·];ka". "ill "nj /,IiIJ ~. 1']1. ~) - 51.
"" '''''£1/'' IH,I"':'/"/ffd.
PI'· !!~)- 61.
lSi
JU1'1.: 27-JULY 28
dmwing up detailed plans of all military f;\ci Hties and air bases, became convinced that the Soviets were preparing for an invasion should they be forced to withdraw, "' Far frum a military dccscalali ull in early Ju ly, sh ips ufthe Suviet Baltll' /ll"et muved into the Atlantic, placing themselves astride Eurupe's supply routes wit h Nur th America, in l~lse NATO sbuuld ('olltemplale an y resist,lntC to a possible Soviet ill\'nsin n of Czechoslovllki'l late r nn. The Soviet decisio n to kill the TASS stor y announcing the end of maneuvers on Ju ne 30 gave rise 10 Czechoslovak fears that Mos(.'()w had ever y intention of keeping its fOf('CS in the (.~) untry to achieve the de facto stationi ng of troops. Such fears were not allayed when Czeclloslovak jourualists were denied en tr y to a briefing by Yakuoovsky at tilt: official cnd of Ihe exen:iscs. Humurs circulated that Yakubovsky had concluded that the poor pcrforJnance of the Czechoslovak army nel'Cssitated II further round of m,mcuvc rs. \\' hen C;t;echoslovak l~)lnmander s protested th;l! further exercises were not possible until after the harvest, Yakubovsky is rcported to have replied that in that ca,e Soviet troops would have 10 stay until autumn ." Czechoslovak military allthurities respondcd by allnouncing p ublici)' on July 2, in
or f.-",.","' T'H/"~, p. ~l: 1'..11\:1". F.hJ fn'/'/;"g. p_ 249.
"X..." }iJ~k Ti, ...·•. ,,,t)' H. 100II. 'I'M'1h\~ .1/1'",,,,.11.· ,0"'' ''" rIO,,,, Wa,,","'·. "Pr"~uc It.Ji ... July 2. !9(;/I. m"~;. " ,,-,<.rc!,. C=>cc/"u/"""lu. . Jul)· 10. 1965.
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(:IllStS 1'1,;11100
strengthen our lulle!'!i",: dd(~nsc and improve the IlIad,inc ry of Ct) ope ralioll between the frat ernal armies. '"
I3rc zhncv's failure to make
iU1\'
mention "f t he success of the P;let
rnam:uvcrs that h ad just ended in Czechoslovakia and that were in -
tended , after all. to test
militar~'
{'UUpcratiou ;md coonliualioll he-
twef'n Pac t IITmics is ,I nlt!ler notahle omission.
Gn:chkn, speaking on the sam e occasiun, did no! repeat any of Brczhncv's formulation s about IIII' iclculugiL';tl sahotage offmicrnal armies. AmI although he ton relra ined from making any specific (.'o mmen! on th e reccllt rn:'Ul(.'lIvcr s. he did st;lte that previous maneuvers of the fraternal ;Irmies ·'had proved the Inmelkial inHue nce of the friendship and fllutml llnderstanding of the officers' corps of th e \\'; lrsaw Tre:lt~· lVlIlltries on de,lling with l'Oll llllon I;t~h." · T Il is ccrui n ly was a Illore opt illl ist ic 'Ippraisal of t hc ('urrCl1 t state of military cooperat ion than seemell warrantcd by the dispute betwce n ~ I os(vw and Pr<"""
~""ho.
1"')" I!. It06S. SU I2SI : IClJ
" I:,.r. 'i~, /"')' 9 ,
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/89
JlJ,,-"E ""7 - JlJl.Y ,,8
Soviets for withclr.\w,,1 whcn hc said tlHLt '"we belicvc thcy will understand us:'" The ne.~ 1 day, Jul y 10, C cne ra! Prchllk w,,~ ""kcd;11 th e (:oursc of a television inte rview why Sovie t Iroops had not wi thdra wn despite Ce(lick~" s statement. Prehlik res ponded: '" [fCcner:ll Cel>ick}, said that , ohviom])' suc h a pbn was undep;onsicleDition. And sill('e it did not matc riali 7.c, apparc nt])· a new situation Ihls a ri.~en." when asked at wlUtt tim e the C7.echoslovak military authorities would have a dellnitc date ror wi t hdnlw,,], Prdllfk replied: '!illnorrow I will 1m wiser than I roaching de [ado stationing. and clcarly a d edsion would hal'e In he made in ~los('O\\'.
HIE J ULY
J()
l'>IEETI ;-';C
Th ree interrelated decisio ns (nllmbe rs 24 . 2,-j. and 26) were in fad made on July 10. The Brst decision was to defusc the situation surrounding the maneuvers by agreein g 10 withelmw at least some Soviet troops, ,\t 10:00 P.M. Oil Ju]y 11 , Czec hoslovak radio stations broadcast a t'ommunique of th e \\lTO Joint Stalf H igh Com mand stating 11i'11 troops Cllrreully ill Cz<:choslovakia would "gradually" be re tllrnin g to their respec! i\'e ('()Untries in . C"c/w,/m:alia. Ju[)' [0, [!lG8. " C,,,,·h, ... t,,,'.k Id"'·i.I<''' ./u [ ~ Ill, I OO~. IIFf; . /I." .. ·" ...·h . I;,.'dJo),J,~·"ki<,. lui) II. 1\jIiI;.
" Kennet h A",,,, . "H,·f""", ""d n.....,lk,,,." 1'- ~~. " CT"./"t)' U. [968. EEl2S:!OII: [IFE. Hr.rnrch . Cu d,,,d,,"" k;•. July 1~.
1 9tk~_
"' "
190
THE CR ISIS I'ERIOLJ
It se ems likely t1wt the telephone t·al1 from Dulx'ek prompted L3rcl'.hncv's participation in the decision to withdraw, making t his a joint decisiun by high military and party leaden. An editorial in KrllSUII!la ;:ue::.I!a o n JlI l)' 12. en titled '~nle Invincible Friendship of \Varrinrs" attempted 10 dispcllhe \ ".J.riolls ntlllOTS surrounding the maneuvers. The article stated that the purposes of the c.~crcises hnd h.,cn In pe rfect coordination be twee n allied armi e s, increase comhal readiness. and promote friendship and thai all th ese objectives had bee ll achieve.!. Attacking the various "imperialist [ilurk-aliolls" cin:ulating ilbout th e mrt!leu\'ers, Krl/SII(I!/(! ;:vl:zda aske d: "\Vlm!. for imtancc, is the good ort he clumsy atte mpt II)' \\'estern anti-Soviet propagandist.~ to depict the join t exercise as a means of forCing th e USS lfs OW]] strat egic concepts on its allies?" It is likely th~lt Grechko was involved in the decision to withdraw Soviet troops; it is also possible that he had a hand in th e KrU.\I!alja ;,vc:;da article. th e phmsing of which seemed to label anyone who favored de facto stationing (including Yakulx)\'skyj as a "Western anti-Soviet p ropagandist." An unexplained change in Grechkos sdlCdulc further sU.I!...!.!;csts that he and the rest of the 50"it>! Ui gl, CII",m,,,,,l_ as IIpp<>s." l ll1 th e \Varsa\\, I'"ct H igh Cum-
mand- hegan to playa more pro nounced role in military decision making il)r Czechoslovakia. On J ~l1I e 30, it was anllllllnt"Cd but h un Soviet mdio and in the neWS]lapers. that 1<.larslHlI Greehko w(l\lld begin an official visit to Alge ria O il July 9. Ilis departure, however, was postponed "'ithllllt e ~p\;matitln. All the rellwining miHt;lr), maneu vers t"Onductcd after j uly 9 were commanded not by \Var.~aw Pad nHit-ers but dire<:tly hy th e Soviet Hi!;ll Comm;llld in t'ollaboration with individual East ElITopean military e stuhli. tb e Sovid High C Olll!n;l1l d . Hnder Greehkfl's direct supervision . T he Cwchoslovak auth orit ies responded with con.~idenlhl e re-
"I"''''''
" \\",cu" er> held I,kuv, S....-iet atIm ir.il of th.. He"t, " Ix'rolli"" ··Sky, hi,·l,l." '''t''n,tt,~1 loy ~t."h .llht ihk )· ofth" Sm 'i," Ai, r"" ...: .",10l ~·' ~' ion · · ~t~IIl ~t.·· in",ki n~ th.· IIK"·" I1I.· "t of So";et , esc,,·;;I > and IlId, ' ·' Iuiplll .. n! to tl,,, ' ""'''lIldi'' ~ C,..,d" .. ],,'·... i.1. Th .. m:l1, .. U'·e" that ]K'I!:I1' o n Au~"'1 tt and ,"u[m;n,letl ill Ihe in""ion we , .. al" ,
.,t·.,
IGh
JIz
M
191
JUI.a: 27-JULY 28
lief to the annoUllrement of troop withdrawals. General Prchlik, answering further questiolls on television. asserh.:d: Any ··stalioning of troops" hy one slale on the territories of olher states was dune "'always in agreement with these states- I stress after an agreement with these states"· \Vhen asked whether ··guarantees were really given this time·· that allied trcKJpS '\1)uld leave CzcciJ()sluvakia by the agreed deadline, Pn:hlik responded, ··1 see the guarantee in the filct tbat it is an uflk-ial, uhviullsly ,,·ell-advised and responsible statement by the commander of the \\'arsaw Treaty. and 1 personally do not doubt that this military word willl>e kept by the commanders:· '" OSTPOLITIK REJECTED
At the same time that the Soviet leadership was tryi ng to reach agreement over the withdrawal of Pact troops, anotller decision ( mHII/>er 25) W'I.~ made: tu ,lbandon the ~eerct n egotiation .~ with the Bonn government over the renunci~ltion -ol~fort'C agreement. Despite the statement by Foreign ~Iini ster Cromyko on June 27 thai ··the Soviet government is ready for a t'lmtinuation of the e:l"clmnge of views witll the FRG on the renunciation of the usc of furee," the promulgatiun of emergelK·y laws in \Vest Germany, l'Oupled with Bonn's growing fri endship with Prague mul the commensurate deterioration in relations with E:L~t Germany, made it almost impossible fo r any Soviet leader to argue in f:mlllr of \\'estpolitik. It was clearly inconsistent to blame \Vest German ··mvanchists" for inciting eounterre\'olutiou in Pra,;ue allli ,It the same time negotiate with Bon n to strengthen security ill I~ urope. I~ven Gromyko's speech had contained an icy denunciation of Bonn·s Ostpolitik, and scveral Soviet leaders, including Brezllllev, increase!l their criticism of \Vest German elforts to divide the sociali st bloc. This theme was expressc« in newspaper articles during the first week of July'" and until Jul y 10, when the Soviet leadersh ip conclusively decided to end the exchange of1elters with West Germany. On Jul y II the Soviets ht:gml the unibteral publication of the previously 5eerel documents invulvcd in the exchanges. and from the published evidem_'C it would appear that negotiatiuns lound" 1'rAg,,,, ..... Iio. , .. I)' ll . 100'1.
F;~:f2ljN'CJ2,
.",1
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Id,·'·I>III" . J"I)" 11. \9(;1\.
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/92
nl!; ClUS1S I'EII 10[)
crcd on tll'O main iss nc.' : Suviet dcmand~ t ha t 1301111 t'(mdu{le idcnti e'l1. al1{1 presumahly simul taneo us. renllllt"iatioll-of-jilree ag reements with all East Eu ropean s tates, indudill~ th e G DH, until whid l tim e the USS H \\11111<1 ma intain its right of inte rve ntiun in West Germa ny; an d t he de mand fi,r a signillcant reduction in th e {''ellenll Republic's preSCll t"C in \Vest Berlin.'1 Both these re(llI irerllt;mts wen' t~lIls istt'nt wilh LIst Ger man allitu{les. COIllU!ka, i
PHAVDA SIG NA LS
CONSI.::~SUS
Dt!t:is iIJII IIIwdw ,. 20 was to pnK"Cc{1 with tIl e puhlica ti on of" major Pra vda editorial entitled '"Att;wk on the Socialist Foundation s of C~.eehuslu\";lkiil ." Publislled un Ju ly II , it represented the Suvicls' harshes t ulflcial (Icmmciatiou of lhc Praguc Spring to datc. Signed by [. AlcxanJrov, tl te artidc dcarly hatl Politburo cmlorsclllcnt, as eo nfirmc(1 b~' Kosygin two {Ia>'s la tc r (luring his prcss cu nfcre n("C in Stockholm. Askcll hy jonrnalists to c.xplain tIle Soviet view of th e J {' IllOCrati/~lti(j n pn K'ess in Czedloslovakiil. he adv ised th em tu read th e Alexa nJruv article, saying. "' 1\ re fl ects our asst;SSIIl(!nt of th e evc nts now taking plaec in CzedlUslovakia."''' Prcvious il mll yses of t 1)(> AIe!.;;! ndro\' art ide have point cd to the mure unyield ing elemen ts uf th e pic{'e as indicating that th c hawks wcrc in tllc as•."cndancy. Altllollgh th e domina nt imprcssion left b~' Aleximdrov was indeed t l1<11 Soviet p;ltience was Hlllning out. a care"Thi>
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193
ful cli~ scc tion reveals that the arlfcle was in fad a hlcml of the various views on Czt..'('ho~lovak i(\ being expressed by Soviet leaders. To 6cgill, the "rllde <''l mtain c J an explicit c..'O mpar isuIl Lel wee n
the tactics used by "counterrevolutionary dClllt:n t ~" in Czechoslovakia ,lnU those IIsed twelve years previously in Hungary. To the cxlenllhat there were an y clilferences hetween 1956 and 19GB, the editorial maintained, "the tactics of those who \\lJUld like 10 undermine the iOUlldations of socialism in Czechoslovakia are eHm more ~u btlc and insidious." This was th e fl rs l time that the Politb uro had specifically endorsed de ments of th e theory of "quiet counterrevolutio n ," wh ich was to gain pro minence as an
hard-line rs in favo r of in vasion . It was most fully enunciated afte r the invasion in the Se ptember 11 Pravda article b y Kovalcv (also the author of the so-called Brezlmcv do(.·trine). A (."(.~JT(l ing to this theory. it is not neecssary to wait filr blmKI in th e streets hefore going to tile aid of good ComnlUnist.~; indeed the leaders of caeh new cou nterrevolution . awa re that open revll l!. as in i95(j. had in the past only Ilrovoked overwhel ming military TCSpOnSe. would heeome ever more subversive and in sidious. D efellders of socialism. the refore . shoul{1 tnke action not solel y in re.~pome to an irrevu.. cable breakdown in law ami order but when the socialist founda .. tiu ns of a society are being IIlidermined. SeulIlu, the Alexandrov article made \'eiled refere nce to Smr .. kovskY. Kriegel, and othe rs who had eensured the "2,0<Xl \Yorus" filr its "politiml roma nt ieism" " without however l"tmu c mning it as counterre volu tionar y. The article se e nlt~ d to e.~ press regret rather than anger ahout this: "Unfo rt unately. some CZl"{:h".d ovak le,lde rs have made amhigllous state ments att cmplillg to minimize tile dan .. ger of the ·2.0<Xl \\'ord s... · Th is mild rehll kc was in contrast In m uch harshe r arlidcs tlwt ;lpp(~,Lred at tlLp. sam(~ ti me in ho th Lit .. emtumaya ga;:etfl and Socctska[/fl il.ossi ya . with the form er specificall y accusing FrallU'ck Krie~d of IL,Lving "csprcsscd solidarity . with works of this il k. "" The "2,()(X) Wor ds" was condemned in itself, hut the main thrust of t he harshp.r clements of the Alexandrov artil-Ic was th at supp nrt fnr th e ··2.!)()() Wllrds" IHld Jlmv{~d that this document was "not all isolated phenomenon, but evi .. de nce of the inc reasing: activity in Czechusluvakia of righlfst and " Sc...: Smr~'''', k f, "1000 \\'" nl," in R,"N I,m,'". lui \" 5. 19C>ll. ~ "'Lid" b)' · -lh"n~.Ii.L : 1~lrml"mnyn ~"~IQ. , ,,I)· 10. 1\168;
.1,,, S"f<'lskn!/,' R",.iya .
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overtly counterrevulutionary t(ITCeS u[}\'iulLsi y !illkCli willi imperi ,I lisl ren<:!ioll." The article reprinted excerpts from the ]llne press, drawing from tIl e
Bul!;arian Ravu/lliciwsko
De/(I the st>l\cmen\ that "our
puhli(.'
canno t re main ill{li/Tcrc nt when th e /(mudali ons of socialism arc un der attack in a fricndl~', fraternal eounITY." The H ungaria n party newspaper NoiIJ.~:.n I"lI/.~(jg was '1" ulct! ;,~ a{l\'ising th at " th"se W i lli
arc speak ing ou t against the people's rule, against t he socialist system and its le)!a! order tIlusl be fought hy the most eflt;.c\iyc means
rC(lllirc(] in t he present situatiou ," This latter stat u m!:n! call cerlainly he (;onstrllcd ,IS Hu ngarian advice to th e CPC7. 10 em ploy im mediate admin istratil'e measures to put an end tu ,llltisod,tiist activities- it t·,lI}lHlt in itse1f he interp ret ed as Ilul ig-triall sllpport for ,lI) iuv,lsion. On this isslle , the final sc nt c nc l: uf th e Alcx;\mlruv ar t ide prumises t hat "the work ing class and all Czechosluv;lk pf:ople C;ln Hlways ('ount on t he und ers ta nd ing an d co mp letc suppo rt ufthc pcople uf tlt e Sovie t land." A l.~)l lllnitme llt ultimalely 10 usc force if llct 'CSS
helieve that all ulher aIte rna th'cs had heen exhausted, Thlls, the article was careful to detail the fad thaI " the health y forces" in CzedlOslovakia had (~mdem n ed tIl e "2,000 " 'onls ." noli ng that the C PCz Praesid iu m, the sl(wak Cent ral Co mmittee, the CI'Cz reg;ion;11 p,lrt y o r~Ul i"..;l t iollS> the CZcdlOsiovak govcrn me nt, Ihe N;Ilional Fro nt . the National Asse mbl y, public organi",a tio ns, and vario us enterprise collectives had all "expressed sh'lrp criticism" of the ducll men t. In the pennlt imatt: pan.graph, t he art ide <.'o ndn{les thaI "the peoples of t he Soviet Union and ot hcr socialist mUlllri es ex pre ss t1mfldence Ihat Ille Czedmsl()vak Communisfs and all th e \ltJrking people in the (;SS lI, bCing dceply intereStell in strell~l h elljng Ihe l.1)\Jn try's socialist foundations, will sueceed in dC'll i"~ " decL~ i v e rehufr ttl the rC;LdiuLlary ,,,,ti sn<:i,,list forces. " Nol yet had a l.'OnSCIlSIlS eme rgcd in the Pu li tburo that the " healthy fOR'es" were imufTident to deal with th e si tuation inside their own t~lII ntry, alt ho ugh th ere was apparent agreemenl tha t "t1HlIlterrevolutionary fon.'e s," in th e words of ,\I exandrov. wcre making "fierce attach agai nst the fonlHlalions of socialist Stalel loud" and that these forccs had to I){: stoppel!. one way or tIl{.' othe r. T hat th e developing mnseUS lJS in the Pn\itb uro represented a halanl.,(: hetwcen t111llendi ng views com he se,.'n more de'lriy when
195
one considers the subjects 110/ included in the Alexandrov article, There was no mention at all of··proleta rian internat ionalism:· de:.llt with at slich length hy hoth Brezhnev anti Shelcst earlier in the month (S heles! recentl y had included ··mutual aid" as a vitally important dement of pmlelarian internationalism).... Nur was there :.lny reference to the possible usc of the military as a legitimatc form of"mutu,ll brotherly aid:' as proposed by Grishin in April. ... Imperialism ill ge neml and the \ Vestern press in particular were condemned for their inkrest in supporting antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia, but the Alexandrov article is notable for making no speci fi c mention of "Bonn 's revanchist pulicies," crit icize d earlier in the week hy Brczlmev and frc( jue ntly condcmne(1 by the Sovie ts. Fin:.llly, alth uugh the 1956 Hung,lrian uprising was discussed ami Hung:.lrian upinion l."OITI p:.lring the event s in Prague ami Budapest quoted, the re were many more hard-line stateme nts on this sulljed made ill hutl! the USSR and the hloc that Mos('uw L~llll(1 have quote(] had a more militant consenSUS e nll~ rged in the Politburo. Brczhnev's own vicw, st'lted the previous wee k. that the Hungari •.m COllllllunists had prevailed in 1956 by rel ying 011, among other things, ""the fmt e rnal intemational alliancc" was not cxplicitI)' mcntiuned, Nor, interesting!), enough. did Alexandro\' (juote any of the more extreme articles ,Lppearing in till;' E.ast Germa n or Polish media, even though some of these articles were being reprintcd verbatim in the So\'iet press fit this timc. " Decision IIUmuer III;en/y-~'ix , therefo re, t'ommitted the entire PolithunI to this general line: The situation in Czcchoslovakia thrcate ncd the socialist foundations of thaI country. and fut ure action of some type by the USSH and its allies llIight bt: neL't:SS(lr y to help de tc r ,mHsocialist forces; for thc tilile being, however, it was agreed th'lt the CPCz had the capability to deal adequately with the situation . There were still , howe ve r, SOUle So"it:! kaJe .... wi", felt that the C7£ehoslovak au t horities lacked the will to stup anlisocialist excesses and f,li led tn appredate the ser;"usness with whic1L tILe situation was seen e lsewherc in t he bloc. Hrczhnev's own speech only days e,Lrlier had been more hard-line than the Alexandrov article, " !luth I'"bli.h.,d I" rrd,,/n. J" t)" 5, 196.~. "' /, .... ,ill , April 21. 1968: U:N;",k"" "''' ' '9<1 ..\pdt 23. 1968 " A .\"<"'.. Oeu!lchlDnrl edilor'" of ,ul)" 13. I9&;. clll,"~-d for e,,,,,,pt~ thai '" the ""I'licill o/fcn,i" e of impcriili, m i, di rected , pi".t Czt."<."boc "itol i nt~",.l< of the CD R an" of.n th~ .,.,"" of tt,~ "",~,Ii't w ''' '''''''ity.'" Thi. aprear".! ill July H. t966 ...·ith Ilw word. ·"r tl,~ GI)R and'" re ll~,,·ed. h,,,,,,,c'.
Prae,u, ""
"' "
J9(j
Tlr~; (; l\I~rs
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and it musl be ('ondudcd that Bre7JlIlev now cuunted himself as one uf these leaders. Thc general lint: «ctlIa]]}' appears to h;\\'e been th e lowest com mun denominator, in which invasion was held a.~ an option hilt W:L~ still nol in evitable. With Brezllllev's publie proclamati on t hat (~lIln t erre\'<)!\Jtilln in Hungary h;ul heen i\verted by Soviet mil itar~' assistance. the possihle became the probahle, His cu nversatiuns w ith Dul){-ek a nd tIle CZI.-choslovak rcfusallo allend a mlllliliitenil meeting appear 10 have made Brezllllev milch more pessimistic abou t the chance for a peaceful solution to the ~'()nllid. As a re sult, "lmosl from t he momen t Ihe dceisinn ("lImber 26) was taken to commillhe Polit hllTo to tl ill Alcxandrov line. that line was under incredihle pressure, It was bC<.,()1l1ing de:lr that an impasse h;ld heen reached, an d one side or the other wou ld h;lVe to break iL OBSEHVEHS FEAH INVAS ION
Conti ll ued Cz~"<.'ll ()sl()vak refusa l to attend the \\'arsaw meeting prodllcel] a discern ible escalation of tension. and a numher of inddl'llts le d observers to (~mclmle that;ln invasion was ;,c!ively lwing l'CIllsiilereil ill ecrtain Quarters, III line such incident nn Jllly 12, :tn arrn ~ cache of American-made weapous de posited in five rllcks,u:ks was jimml near Sukoluvu in " 'estern Uoheml;l. It II',I~ suh'l:qllently stalcll by Intcr ior ~li!lister I'avclt hat the arms had heen plant cd and that the incident had heel! inte llded ,IS a pruv\)l'atiou designed to "prove" U. S. b;lcking for ('OUIl t,~ rre\'(lhr t iorwry IOrces .... Furl h crmore. CZI~choslovak sources later in the month made it known that the wca pons h;ld been of mix,~d origin-possibly including some of Ens! German manufacture-t hat the Soviet and Bulgarian press agcncic.' rcportr:(l th e ('lit,hl: he/tIre th e Czechoslovak aut horities had revealell its existcnc(~ , ;m'! tlUlt al th ollgh 1111: Soviet report quo ted local eyewitnesses to the disuJVcry. nonc ~'()\l ld hc found. "" It was also ..lIegcd t h;,t \VaTSaw I'ac! troops hal! ~~m(!ud ed man c uvers in th e Sokolovo area only days bdiJre th e cache was un(~)vere d. '" In a sCL~)ml irK'ide rrt. th e prumised wit hdr:.lwal of Pact l roops, which heg,m on Jul y 13, was abrupt ly halted on the nex t da r. \\"ith reports circulati ng in Prague that planeloads of "Soviet tourists" " (,Juol<'J in
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JUI"t: :.I7-JULY:.I8
197
were arriving at various C7.edlOsluvak airfields lind report ing l!i rectly to Soviet un its.'" Yakuboysk-y informed the CzedlOsloY,lk government that any ",ithdn"",,1 wOll ld lIot now take pI:H.'t.! bclf'fe July 21." He appears to have het~ n conl"Crned t hat any usc of Soviet troops to achie ve political objectives in Prague would beeome immeasurahly 1110re difficult if those tnM.ps were forced 10 withdraw and then reenter Czechoslovakia in a dear invasion of soverei gn territory. From the military standpoint , it "';\S far better to delay ",ithdnlwlll, even if it fo stered C7.cchoslovak resentme nt; for to ha\'e to intervene at a later date across C7.eehoslov'lk frontiers I>osed enormous military and polilk-dl problems. Pnx:rast inatioll was, thercfnre, the military"s st rategy un til the pll\iticalleadcrship formally decided what it was going to do. Prchlik was not the only leader wllo feared itll imminent in\'<1sitm. Kadar met with Dulx:ek aud Cernik on the C7.cchoslo\"akHu ngari:m border on July 13_ bot h to e nl'Oumge them to attend the \Varsaw meet ing (md to W:lfll t], -: Czccim,I()"aks that in thei r al.senec, some participants might press for an invasion. As I'rchlik re ported the cnt-'Ountcr, K,iltir tu ld Dubeek and Cernik that although the Hungarians '·llarllor l"(:rta in apprehe nsions abou t the intensity of antisocialist maniiest;ltions:- tbey ··vc r), positively"' assess the over-,ll objectives of tilt: refur lll lIlov.:mcnt and they "are resolved to act in Wa rsa.w in such a marliler Ihat nolhing is adopled there which wo uld fu rther ,Iggrallate the dispute as well as no th ing whieh would involve a violation of our [C7.edlOslovakia-sj state SO\'ereignty."'''' Other stateme nts by Hung!.' oJ I»· l;",)·u~. J"\ r !6. 1ll65. E ~;/282-11
CJJ5_ "'hnyug. July IT. 19&i. EEI281,IICII5,
.. p.....'Uc lIaJiu. Jn1r !,~ , 1\I6Il. 'lootoh,,· Nev., "1!""cr Tan)'us abo "·I~'rI"" tto" ",,,,·ting "" July 13. 1\l6ll: also ,to" Ti" ...... . j"ly IG, 1966. "~ITt. Julv 13. 19&i. EI'.I2S2:VA VJ,
198
TilE C ]IIS[S PEnlOI)
tile fact that "[mtisocialist fon::cs have become livelier in Czechuslovakia, H ung.,lrioms remain t-·t>1lvinced that the Czechoslovak sisler party will carry out the cause of socialism to triumph in its country."""
Statements trom Yugoslavia and Bumania also made it clear t hai the danger of invasion was pe rceived as imminent ami real. President THo lmd granted an interview to Egyptian journalist ~ Iu
hamed lidkJ!. which wa.~ clue to he published in Heikal's t'Olumn in al-Ahram on Jul y 19. Be ikal t hen received an urge nt telegram from T ilo asking th at th e section of the interview {\cali ng with
Czechoslovakia be released immediately. This was done on July 13, with Tilu quuted as sayi ng:: " I do nut believe that there exist in th e USSH people so shortSighted ,IS to r('sort to a PQlicy of force to rcsolvc Czechoslovakia's internal questions. .\lorc()vcr. I do not believe that th ere is an ythillg about the prese nt situat ion in Czechoslovakia whieh constitutes a threat to soeiuILml:· ... President Ceau~escu of HUllla.nia took the occasion of a visit to, of all plal'cs, ,I tral·tor fal'tory to deliver this war ning aguins t inva sion: "Our pcople. the Humanian Communist party. do not share t he view of t hose who arc abrm e d over what. allege{Il},. is Im[lJlening in CZ{~clHlSI()va kia. and would like to inte rvene to hring Czechoslovakia on a particular socialist road. \\'e have full l'Onfidence in th e Commun ist parly of CzecilUsl(lwkhl, iUld we arc con vinced thev will know how to build socialism in Czecho.~ lo\'akia tlmt in al'(;ordance with their hopes ;11lt1 aspiratiolls.""' So great was the concern of 1~lIro-Com mun ist parties that \Valdeck Hochet head of the French party, fl ew to .\IOSl'(JW wilh two Italian COlllmllnisl party rel'1'csc nliItivcs, Giilllcario I'ajdta ami Carlo Galuzzi. thus marking tlte first time that t he two !.lrge.sl CommunL~t parties in Europe had ,Ide<.! in l'OIK't"rt against a Sovie t policy. Frencb Communist party s()un:t~S leak{:d a story 10 the \Vestern press three weeks later to tbe effed that Hodwt's trip had been prol1lpted by iI definiil! warning t hat th e Suviets had assembled a puppet govern l1lent which th ey we rc preparing 10 install as soon as Dubtek ('()lJld be toppled eit her by military pressure ()f by a palilce coup,"" I~y tllC time th e del egation arrivcd in "MTl , lui)' 13, 1!l68. EEl2I>23.'AII4. "~loh"m,~1 ! lcikaL Sl)h;~x "",/ (;,m""iHM. 1'1'_ 2lJ-,l_ CI!>, ·I:'n)"ll~. lui)' 13. 19(08. F. KI 2IlW1. " "' ~"'i>""" July 15. H;&~, ~:t:l2S231"'If2 . .. Sttuduy Je/,J!.ropi•• quotit\~ F,,,",,h (;om"ll", i.1 1'..,.1)' >OU""'_•. "'U~~lSl II. 1!IIlS, The
I'CF .IOlerne,,!
i",.~(1 roll",,';,,~
II ... in,''';''"
~'K'~fm"llltat
l\u,,·I,el had " 'o",,,d d.e S,nic!.'
199
JUNE Z7- JULY z8
Moscow on Julr 14. howcvcr. Sovict Icadcrs had alrcady Icft for hurriedly arranged talks in Warsaw. and as a result ther were able to see only Suslov and Zagladin . Ponomarev's de puty in the International De(mrtmcnt. All the evidence, therefure, puints tu a discernible and sudden reverse in the Soviet attitude tuward invasiun, The gcncralline rcRectm..! in the Alexandrev article appare ntly had becn perceived by the hard-liners as merely a consolid:ltion belore a further aud immediate round of escalation , KOSYCIN IS OUTMANEUVEHED
Prime ~'linister Kosygin left for Sweden on the lllorning of Julr 11. at.'companied by First Deputy Foreign ~-linist e r Kuwctsuv and L. M. Zamyatin. From heginning lu end, his trip to Swedcn was overshadowed by events in Moscow, \Varsaw, and Prague. His plane touched down late, officiall y explained hy a late takeulr frum ~·lo scow. Then as soon as he landed he annuuneed that al though he had intended to stay until Sunday, July 14 , he would now be retllming to Muscow on July 13. Througho ut the three (lays. he was preo<:e upicd with Czechoslovakia, and on scvcral occasions whcn speaking auout cvents in Sweden he inadvertentlr substituted Czechoslovakia. He did, howeve r, flnd time hefore leaving Swe· dell 10 hold a press conference fur Westem journalists, \"hen asked whet her events in Czechoslovakia were the cause of his early departure, Kosygin replied; "It is because our time is limited. and because we have concluded our work somewhat ahead of schedule that we llTl) leaving Swmllm t
Mr. Chairman. do vou consider that the lead. ing roh) uf the C",';mllnisl part~' of Czeehoslu·
a~in>!
in,·•• iun (I;/lo"",,,ite, "'u~".I!!3, lOOIl .."~'" )"ork TimrJ , "''')(\J>I !!3, 196/1). AI", .,,~ 'he "."""il" of ,I.e ,"""'i"~ I..""",," R""hct ""J I)ul"",k "" July m. 19&5. ill whk-h [l""hct ..,,,,,~'in" 'n\p"... n\i,m.
"
200
vakia b
,ll>W
seriuus ly cntbngcrc. l. amI du yuu
eon sider military ur pul;t i~'a l in terven tiun ! !i'''Ii,l lwtd:\'I~'' I in C~'!chu,l()"ak affain p<>ssib Ic
,,,,deT l'(' rlain cire,,,"stanres? O ur ml",try a ",1 UlI r party hav.., long 11l1lrd,,:d ill st rng.gip a ll d fr icmiship s;lh, hy side wilh ti lt: Czc(.'hus lu\'ak petlp l,· and Ih" ere..:. TI,,· fight again.,! Gennau f"wi sill ill the S~'l'(md \\'orld W;,r cemented the fri endsh ip hctween the C l.t.-..:hus\u\'ak U,\<1 S" "ict peoples amI strength . e ned th e tru st and unit\' between th e CI'Cz an d the CI'S U. We arc oHl fid cnl the CPCz will yidd its 1." ,dil1l'( role to no
U IlC .
An attac k on
the socialist b~c of Cz •.'chu.\lo\'~kia wou ld Ilwel wit h Ull e ffective rc buff from the Czech oslovak (leopi" and Communisls. We are abo confiden t that no force cxisb thai can destroy the frie nd ~hip netwccn our two peoples. Th e Soviet Union and Czechos lovakia arc aUies in the Warsaw Treaty, \\'c I.a'·e mu tual ubligati on, deriving I'm ", th i, treaty, and we shall fulfil the m wit hu ut rc.' crvu ti on. '"
Kusygin's puinted re ference to th e ob ligaUou~ deriving from Soviet meml>ership in th e \ Varsaw Pact was part icularly intercsting since the terms uf the \\larsaw P:wt Tre
20/
from the decision to go to Warsaw was further illustrated by the TASS statement printc{1 on the If·unt page of Pmvti" un Jul y 14: On July 12 Ihe de]'.:gali"" or Ihe Sovi'" Union I"fl Mn ...~'w fur War· saw for pa rlil"i11atioH in a meeting "f lead"r5 "r sudalist ml1ntrie.~. th e m l11posit i" n of whid. ;"d",k.J . L. I. I1 wd.llev (he"d of th e dd,,g"tion). N. V. PiKl gornr . A .N . I\.Q.\'ygi". . P. YI!. S h l!lI!.~t. K. F. Kat ushev. On Jull' 13 the de lc~tioll arri \"{'t\ in Warsaw [cm phasi, "Jd"d].
Ofcollrsc. it is known tlmt Kosygin ",a~ nut on the train to \\'arsaw, and indeed he did not arrive until Jul y 14. the day the formal con· ference actuall y started. \Vlmt is even more re11lark"ble than cr· roneously listing Kosygiu·s name among the oll,e rs was that d irt.:ctly helow the TASS alllHl UllCelnt:nt on the front page of Pra vda was the text of the joint Soviet-Swedish commllni4uc. the first sentence o/" which slated that Kos ygin had been in Sweden from Jul y II to 13. If the careful Pra1)da rcader fail ed to pick up this diserep. ancy, Ii'Tt I.er proof was given elsewhere un the page that Kusygin could not possibly have be en on the train when it left Moscow. or even picked it up e n route tu \\',U"saw. Twu articles giving detailed a{·(!uunts of Kosygin·s llU1Yements in Swede n and his fli ght hack tu Moscow told tile readcr tllat K().~)"gin ·s press t."(Jnference in Stockholm had take n I}lace "in the sem nd h"lf of the day·· after an official lu nch. He {"{mId not have arrive{1 in ~·l u~t.'Uw, therefore, before early eve ning. and in any case, prohably after the rest of the dcleg;llion reached \Varsaw. These arlides. comhined with the publka. lion of the press eonfe rence the follOWing day. de monstrated not only that th{:re was no tmth in the TASS story hut also, and more im purtantl y. that altho ugh KusYl!in I...d bee n exduded from tl,e decision to go tu \ Van;.aw, he had .~lI mcien t su pport to signal publielr that counsels were d ivided in the Krem lin. HAHD-Li N Ens
nEGnO UI'
There se{:ms little du uht that the dt:cision to proceed with the im me diate ('Unv(.lCatiun of tl,e \V,lrS;lW meeting was 1;lken without Kosygin·s participation , and ver)' possihly without his foreknowledge. The re are in fact two decisions th,lt (.'1Il be traced. First, the Suviet leadersllip decided (dl1cisioll 27) un Jlll y lltu reassert the need for a meeting and dill y organi zed a jnin! letter from the ·'five·· tlmt was deli ve red. :tt."t."tJrding to Dubeek. "on Thursday. lui>' ll. in Ihe hill' hours"· Although D \11~ek st,lle{1 tlwt the lette r urgetl the
"
,"
202
THE
e llis,s
l'EHlOlJ
CPCz Pnlesidium to participate in the 'Vars,IW (:Qnferencc, he wa:; adamant that "the new day fur this (.'()nfc rence was not mentioned in the letter." "" Thus, at the Pwesidium meeting on Jul:< 12, the Czechoslovak leadership Iclt llO immediale pressure and rciterated its desire for bilateral talks. The Praesidium was hiler In stale Ihal their meeting had been superlhwus sinee the Soviets. wilhout informing; Prague, had alread y fixed the date uf the meeting for July 14 . .-\11<1 indeed they claimed not to IHlVe been informed of the date unlil July 13 wh{'n the news agencies reported Ihe arrival of the CI'SU delegation in Warsaw. "" ~'I ost Czechoslovak Ic,ulers subseque ntly agreed that Ihe failure to attendlhe '''arsaw meeting had been a "hltal mistake,"' wilh uthe rs. induding Bil"ak and Husak, alleging Ihal Duhl·(~ k had hee n told the d,lte of the mee ting and h,ld 1~lile{1 to inform the Pr.lesidium. Either way, the Suviet decis ion (number 28) 10 hold the mecling un Jul y 14 must have bcell made on either Jul y 11 ur 12."" The Warsaw meeting was ,lImos! (.-e rtainly called lu fur mulate a hloc consensus for inclusion of military measures as one of the possihle-and increasingly likely-alternatives for dealing with the crisis. The Celltnll Committee of"t he C PSU would also need to he (.'()nsulted, lind given the ,lmount of time requin.>d ror the organ ization or a rull plenu m, for tIle prep,lratioll of speeches ,nul for pruvineialleaders lu fl y lu Museow. il would seem likd)' t hat the decision (nllmber 29) lu ('()nvene the plenum was made on July 11 Of 12, hefore Brezhnev. Shdes!. Podgurny. allIl Katushe\' left fUf Poland -and while Kosygin was still in Sweden. The plenum eventually opened on July I7, less tllan twe nt y-fuur hours afte r Ihe Soviet delegation's return frolll \Varsaw. There were several important pillars of support for itI tef ve nt iotl . One was Shdest and his suppor ters wilhin Ihe Ukr.linian leitdership. SUllle of these, including Yu. V. Il"nitsky (first secretary of the Transcarpalhi,1Il oUast') and A. P. Botvill (,I Ilicmher of the Central Auditing Commission and head of the Kiev City Party Committee) recently had puhlished ex plicit 'It\llt'ks un the reform movemen t and ils effecl on the Ukraine, daiming, as Butvin did, that r(.~e nt1y in the Ukraine " people are even ready to reiterate Ihe decadent '" J)ub&·k·, '1"'''''1, \" Jul)" HI. I~. CI'C. CC 1'1,,0.,"'. '" n,·m;"~~''''. 1\·;"Jr .. ;" I'.a~u~. \>. 245 .
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203
JUNE 2i - JULY 28
petty 'theories' of enemy propaganda about the neecssity of a 'dcmocrati7..ation' and 'libcrali7..ation' of socialism.""" A scn)l1t\ group included tile re puh lican ~UlJ im p{)rlant provincial (oblasn party secrctarics and Central Committce functionaries responsible for ideological indoctrinat ion and eOlltrol, a task that was bet-'()In ing increasingly difficult. Hard-line sentimen ts Oil Czechoslovakia within the top leadership were reported by Weste rn inte lligence as shared "to the point of alarm by the n;gional Party leaders on the Union Hep uhlic and Ohlast' (pm\-incc) level, mallY of whom arc Central Committec me mbers," The report went on to state that "these men, being in direel charge of the po pulation , would havc to worry about Czech contagion at the grass-roots level, and they t'Onsequently ure 11 very conservative lot on the whole,"'" Judging from the newspaper artil'ies written by members of tllis group and from tlleir input into Central Committce plenums- wl1ere men such as Crishin (r..loscow). Kuliehenko (Volgograd ), Snechkus (Lithuania), and Vuss (Latvia) delivered hardline speeches against Czechoslovakia-many of thcm were indeed worried to the "point of alarm," This group was compose(1 of party secretaries with many Jifferent motivations, however, Some, in cha rge of non- Bllssian areas, particularl)' the Ukr.linc and Baltic republics, were cont'erneJ ahout the revival of anti-Buss ian nationalism in their n:gions, Som(! frolll the illlssi;11l Republic viewesed !hc m for that reason, \Vestern intellige ncc sources noted that "some Incal leaders arc even facell with revived Hussiall 1I'ltiolialislll ag;linst the Czechs:"'" and given the upsu rge of what AII:xander Yano\, has called t he " Hussian New Hight" Juring 1008, the importance of gr
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IImth",,,,.",, Sm",ld 1j."C'Kl'" Sl m"~"r, - WriU"K on the -l' kminw. Ihy. _" "hieh had ",. cc-nliy he"" held i" the P,.dov ,~gion of C,-,-",hod",... ki., tl .... u.ho. ru..J quot"" e",I",h',,1y ."d nh''''>lh'~1)' rmm \I", (;z.oo;lo p",." (M' \I,,, f~,ti, ·.1 . , 1'''•• tl"'t C"",h",k",.k· Ukrai" i. " fne",bhil' ,,,., "", li" ".II)' 1P'''''i'',o:, TI",,v,,,,, 1'",-" .1"" r~lx"t<:<1 ,'" lul)' l g, 1968, .hat Shclo,l himself h.d .taled -th~ pm"io,,' ,,-cd - Ihal lioorAI inAucn".,. frum neighborin~ (;"",hoslO\-ak", ru..J ,t;trcd dem""d •• mon~ )",un~ UL-raini.n ...",ke", ",fa,m" "U_S. lk,wtmc"l "fSlal~, 1I,... ",h .I /",.-m,",'",,, , IISF.- 127, "'''g'''' 16. 1968. "'ll>id_ .\ u",i,,1.t1 p"l>li""t i(m .rl"'..... l in Mm'-"w i" llJflll ~nli tled "TI ,e ~.ti"n.1 Slo",,,c of Cre.1 1I""i.,,,," w),kh ockno,..lcd~ed Ilw 1><""'" of e,e.l I(""ia" naliona!i.m .1 .he h;gh~.. L",'cL. ••• mol;,-• •or of 'he de"';.;"n to ;m'..Je. The p;""" i, "'p rin'.,..j in Step""n (',ohen. 00" An 1:",/ to SII",N'. rl', Z\!.;-[W;_
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tionulisl feeling against the CZl'(;hs and it s support aud cm:uurageIilen! right up tu the highest lc\'cb shuuld !Iut lliscou lltcd. If rallo\' is to he helieved, Pulyansky was its chic flJUi nol sole patron wit hin the Politburo, "" OtllCrs, represented by party secretarie s Kiril c nko, D emicht:v, ami l'ershe, were (.illlt'CrneJ abou t the effed of Czechoslovak n :forms of Ihe part y stru cture on their own ability to cuntrol the intellige ntsia and th e intertm] workings of th e C PSU in the f:K'e of possible similar dCIll,l11ds for revision (If the cad re s ysh~ m, dcmcx:mlic (.'(!ntra li s lll , inner-party (l e rn OCT;\c},. ,\lid so nil. Dcmicl lcv rece nt])' lHld identified himself openly witll a hanl line tuwarli C7.CdlOS1ovakia in hi s article in KmwlUlIlis/ e ntitled "'Tile Building of Socialism and the Tasks of the Social Scie IKcs." ·" He Hrst rejected th e nntion of " ideulogical plu ralism" within Marsism. attacking it as a <:over for it fundnrnental challenge to the party's munopoly ufideolngy (p. 17) and labeling it a.\ a ve iled form of "an ti -Sovie tism," which had ht.·(;ome "the l'OIIlIllUll platform of all th e rev ision ists and unit es them wit h professional an ti COlllllH.mists" (p. IS). He l'OntinlleJ with a long sectio n on tb e development of th e rdat ionship hl' twcc n various d asscs in a socialist
ue
society, maintaini ng that t he \ Vc.dcrn inh)Tcs t in C z<)C hos]"vakia
was furth er proof that "the bUlITgeoisi(J would like to hrl!ak the 1ll0rJ.l-politieal unity uf the peoples of the socialist l1IUntries." (p. 26). On th", issue of the {lcveiopmcnt of SOd;llisl (le mocT;u:y, th e leading role of Dcmiehc\' mndelTlned those who "slande r the Communist Party," and he offe red a slnmj! remi nder to an y possible supporters of th e C7.eeh expe rim c llt: I I istorical e xpe rience h;ls alreadr shown 1hat cs pat iatioJl s about dernocrJlT and '- liberalization" arc IIsed hy m Ullt e rre\'ulutioll as a s llH>kesereell for "ttl'llll'ts tu liqu idat e the (1)IIh-rrevol"tiull l';o\lse d the hl oody I.;;,rnagc ofCommuuists [p, 2iJ.
G iven th e nature of Podgorny's speech on C~cehoslovakia th e folluwing we e k ami his knuwn dose cuntaets witlt Ulbricht (he was in East Ge rmany from Jun e 30 to July 2 to cclehr.lte Ulhrit·ht's sevcn l ~'-fift h bi r thday), il call prulJably he aS~Ulnc(llhat PUllgofil Y ('(,m nted himself amon g the h,\rJ-lin<~ rs. i'ubHc,l\ioi\ in So cctskuYIl ... Alt'Xl&llder \"111' '''. l 'M /!u.t>iaJl SCLl' Ili~"'. pp_ L~. tiO
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Rossiya and Utcmillnlayu gazetll of harsher denunciations of Czechosluvakia than had been ine1uded in Alex:mJrov formulations showed that although th e hard-liller.~ were irl{lee
knowlI, although certain spcci Re developments in C~.e(.'hnslovakia at this time cHIIld nol have been viewed vc ry favorably by security chiefs in any of the bloc countries. The first was the revelat ion by CZc<:ilosiovak Interior Minister Pavel Ilwl sh Im~ mhers ofthe KGB were working in his ministry as "liaison officers" and that a Czechoslo vak state st:'L'urit ~, unker was s imilarly ,\ssigncd in the USSlt''''' I'avers claim (.'ume ilt a time when Czedlllsluvak ilgents of the KG B increasinglr were being purged from the ~linistry of the Interior. In Hnolht'r development , M;'jor Gencr"] I\:prny, the (.~lmmandc r of the C..:eehoslu\-ak burder guards, statc{1 th ilt in the firsl six months of 1965, 5 13 persons, 40 percent from the GDH, IHld been apprehended while tryi ng to ("ross 10 the \Vest. Although lie a{lmilled this was a large r numher thanl1sml. he reaffirmed the official policy of removing the harllt;:d wire along the Czech-Austrian IXlrdc r. ,.' These developments as well as the (.~)))tro\'Crsy o\"er the document produced by the Cottwald " Iili tar~' Academy. the I' r(.·hHk intcrview, Hnd Pavcl's open alle)l;ation that the arms cache had heen plantcd a_~ a provocation 1I1ust h;] vc nl1lvinced s(.'Cll rity chiefs that somc. if not all, of their c01 mtcrparts in Prague were politicall y unreliable all(l would h;l\'{: to he replaced. H' THE WAHSAW "IEETING
I3rezll1lc\', I'oog:orn y, sl,elest, and Katushev Hrrived ill \Varsaw early in th tl afternoon or July 13, ". It is 1101 known how many of tIle other hloc leade rs werc alrf!ady in \Varsaw h~' this l ime. hut the Il..ti..,
" Pr'~'''' 1.. 1) 7. 19t>'i. t; FJ2S!&'("J~ '~ (;n;: . /,,1)' I~ . [9f,s. F. ]'.I2~l]'Cl8,
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T ilt: (: HI S1S P EH IO])
Soviet delegation, wi tho]]t Kosygin , wQuld have had the opportunit y for at least a day of prc(:onferen<:e talks with Gomulka and the ut hcr Pulish leaders. II is higlily likely that sUllle uf the uther East European leaders had also ar ri ved to discuss the stratel,.'Y tlley would adop t before the ('()nference formally ope ned, Since it became known that the ult imate \ Varsaw Lette r caille out of two preliminary drafts presented by the Poles and the Soviets, these presumably were disl'ussed al this time, again in the ausence of Kosygin,"" The lone of t he meeting was set by a tuugh ellitorial in TnjbllllrJ !rICIII appe aring Jlily 14, the IIlvrning of the Conference. The article focu sed Oil the possibility that Czechoslovakia might leave the \ Varsaw Pact, warning thai t he entire Communist ,Il!iallcc \\',IS ,II stakt: an{l that " none of our co untries ean reject this responsibility and its obligations," 1"ryblllw lwlu t'{lmplaincd that "hostile forces" were tryi ng 10 push Czeehuslovakia "UII a libe r;ll- bourgeois ruad, tu disowlI it [socialism), tll suhvt:: rt the socialist unit:r and h. op pose Czechoslovakia's ,dlia nt'e with the frat ernal sochdi~ t l'OUll tri e~," The article went on to asse rt tlmt "if in a socialist t1>1 mtr y the forces of reaction e n
has i,~
of ,~uci:~ lism , thi s undermi n es th e in-
tere~l s of olher socialist coun tries."' In aclmcating any particular course of action, however, the editorial was less specific, If the Polisll leadership declared that " 0\ dedsi\'e reb ut!' tu the fOlT CS uf reaction and imperialist maneuvers in C zecho.~I()vaki;1 is of vital inte rest to all fmternalnatiun s," it did not gu so far liS tu suggest that "frate rnal assistance" was re{ILlire{i. The cdi tori,11 statel]; "\Ve believe that the Czechoslovak Communist party will find this rchuff ,11ll0ng the working dass :lIlt.! among ,,11 the progressive ",1<1 really de mocratic lo rccs in the country," It did, however, possihly leave its options open by staling that "OIlT party full y backs those read y to oppose enemy forl'es to assme tilt: fa"omble socialist developme nt uf Czechoslovakia and to strcngthen fricndship and un ity wit h fratcrnal socialist stales." By the time the formal sess iun began un Sunday morning, Jul y 14, Kusyg in had arrived in Warsaw, His altitude suggested, act'llI'd· ing to Erwin \\'e it (one of the offici;11 interpreters at the session who subseq uently defected and wrote his memoirs), that he was "very worried," 'u He and the: other participants l'{luld not ha ve been plensed by the impl ications of the cahle they received from ''' Alii]"" .. ;IlW"'ievI' with 7~]"nH ~tI)' mif, Jnllt' l. ]97\1, ' ~ E rwh ' \\,~jl , F.!I"-·I<'ir,~ ..., ,,- 2 11
207
the CZ('·dlUSiuvuk Pracs iuiulII: "In the interests of tilt: internal jonal ti es which link our Communist parties, no rnC:Lmrcs sho uld he taken whieh might have an unfuvor:lble impact on the complex sit-
uat ion in C7.t!Choslovakia,'·'" At the conference, Gornulka made the opening speech, obtaining agreement that 1\0 chairman he elected and that no official report of the procee din gs be kept. The Polish leader maintained that despit e previous CZCdIOS[(jvuk a$suranccs that antisocialist manifestations would be eliminated ul'(,'Ordin,g to an agreed time Ifllli! , this promise had nut bet:n kept, ;Hld illdCl:tlthc \lllblicalhm uf the " 2, 000 \\ford s" and the support it had received from some party leaders shuwed the situation to be Illllch wurse now than before. Furthe r, the swt.:cping c,ulre chilnges be ing lllaul: werc in fad ouly disguised attacks on the party and had to be stopped. Although clearly statin g that "in no drcumstanccs can we allow the (:ou nto rrevolutioll to be victo rious," be uph d d th e li m: set out in the Tn)JJllua /IU/II article by stoppin g short of auvocating direct milit,lry a.~sist,m(:e. '"
Kadar spoke next, provi{ling a report of his meeting with Dubeck ill which Kadar hall been told by Dubi:ek that he was in C0111plete control. Kad:.ir agreed that there were a number of worrying antisocialist h::n{lendes in C7.echos]owkia and snP!}(lrtc{1 the sending of a strongly worded joint letter {th ereby indicating that this (:ourse of action had already becn discussed in the prcc:onfercnt'e session)_ b ut remained true to the aSSllninces of support he had givcnto Dubi:ck in their n.'{:ent 1Ilt.'Cting by stating that "any decision over and above tI, is l'ould le,l(\ to scriou.s conSC(lucnces in the whule world t'Ommunist movement, and also inside Czechoslo\'akia, ""~ At this point, 'Veil claims that Ulhricht interrupted Kadar, impatiently shout ing in his high-pi tche<1 voice: "If you thillk. Comrade K,ldur, that you are helping th c cause of socialism with your objections and rescrvations, thcn ~'ou are making a big mistake. And you have no idea what will happen next. Once the American'''est Cerman hnl.eri;IHsts havc got Czec110s1ovakia ill tlu::ir t'Ontrol thell you will he the next to go, Comrade Kadar. But this is someth ing you can't or won't understand:'''' th"lt ,"<1m. J"t ~ !Y. l\J:iI!. 1':11'"'<-;,'..... Pt>. m8_ 2(J(). '''11.1.1.. 1', 201. KOolI., j. ~b.o >aid \<' t"" and I'· :.:12. "' ll"ht~k . ' ~ \\,~jl.
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Ulbricht's SPC(:dl was prcd ictablr hanl-liue ami paTticularly pl:Ssimistic aLout th e cap,.-,hility nf" lmllcs t Communists" in Czechoslo\'akia to make a L'(II1l(Ohatl without c ~ ! ernal support. Of p rim'lry (~lI1('c rn In Ulhricht w;.s that th e W{'si Gf'rman le mlersbip. in its efforts to isolate and weaken th e CDH. was phLcinj.!; )!rcat hU[>e on C zecll()s]u\'akia's dcfedioll to tIl e Wes ter n l '
the CDH's southe rn flank. The problem with the current situa-
tion was that "wil1in)l;l~' Uf unwillingly" se ve ral uf th e CZt:<:'husluvak leaders had hel-1lm e "se rvant s of \\~)rld imperialism ." Furthe r more,
Ulbricht was keenly awarc of Ii me limitations. If the C l'Cz wcre ,llIu wed In llold an c xtnlOrJin a ry eungre ss in Se ptemher, tlu~re
\lnuld he all f'ntircl~' lI ew (amI, by impli<:a tion , more liheral) Ce ntr..tl Committee . and the five would he f.lt·ed with a qU;llitllIing siloTt of openly mlvt}<:;tt ill1,: militar y intervent ion. The Suviet leader mad e no an alysis of th e "Ge rman tllreat " or tlu: .·.~t ent to wili(oh Cze<:hoslov;lkia \V,IS he ing "'cd by i1l1p(aialiSI11 to divid e the social ist camp. Hat he r, he waS almost cxelllsivdv l'ollce rn cu with th e ref(wrn 1110\'e ment itself. in partic u lar th e attach on two fundamental principles o f sodalism: d emocra tic centralism an d the leading rul e of the part)', I3rezllllcv's great e st t~meern was that the CI'Cz leatl'~ lt ,i,t. .
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JUNI:: z7 -J u l .Y z8
209
ers hip was riO longer in (.~mtrul of the re furm mu vement , and fll r this reason he appeared to Jouht the trustworthiness of promises offe reJ by Czeehos lov~lk leaders_ Withou t explidth' aJw{'Uting in· vas io n, Ilrezhn ev did statc that whenever the unity, stren gth, or e xistence of the socialist (.'Om monwealth was endangered, it was the dut y of oth ers to e liminate th e source of that d:mger. Thus it was th e duty uf th e hloc to assist th e Czechoslovak working class so that " the coun terrevolution will not sllcceed in Czedloslovakia:"'" AI the em] uf tlill speedles and disl'ussi ulls, in whidl unly th e heads of delegat ions reportedl y tuok part . thc confcrcnl'e elected a drafting cummittee to work out a joint lett er to he s{ml to th e CPCz Central Committe e. The 6nalle tte r was based O il til e two earlier dr.Jfts hrou ght 10 t hc L'Onferencc t~llllc by th e Polish and Soviet del· egations. revised to mee t th e views of the c ntirc group. Ont'e the final version h:ld heen drawn up. it was agreed that t he lette r was to he ad dressc{1 to the C I'Cz Central Committee, rather than to th e Praesidium. This W'L~ prolmhlv dune in th e hope that such a move would fOT(;e t he t~m\'()(;ati
''' Ihid .. 1'. 215. "' Ibid.
"' "
210
TilE e lU SIS l'Elllon
percussions of the course it was pursuing. it asked [\ pointed question: " Is it possible that you fail to see that the <:ollntcrrc\'u]ution;lries have t,lkcll one position after anothe r from YOIl and th,lt th e party is losing control over the course of events amI is retreating II1me and more un de r the p ressure of anti-Communist forces?" The n, in a dear shift away from th e view c.x prcsscd in th e Alexandrov artid e of July II that CZCdlOsiu\'iIkia can ah\';ty.~ (:OIl O! un "the unde rstanding an d comple te s lI(l(}{)rt" of th e USSH, the Warsaw Letter stated unequivocally t hai "it is nut unl y YUllr task Lut OUTS too to deal i\ resolute re!}\Ilf to I he anti-Communist forces and to wage a resolute .~t ruggl c for the preservation of the sociillist sys-
tem in CzedlOs[uvakia:'
[t
then outlined spedfic uemalllis-the
t:L~ks required to dcfcnd " tll c rule of th c "~Irk i u!> class:' Tl lc firs t was '" a resolute and bold affensh'C against rightist and antisocialist furet~s and th e mobili1.ation of a lllllc,U)s of ul,feuse created by th e soc,jallst stat c,'" dearly implying th atth c full weight of police :md administrative measures imme diatel y be lised to erack down on anyone e xp ress ing :mt imcialist v i ew.~.'" The ne.xI de m:lJld W~IS '"II eessation of th e activities of all poliHeal organizations that oppose sod alism." the K 231, KA N. nud rel:ite{l groups I hat were organ izing outside th e fram ework of th e Nation n! Front. Third , censorship wns to be immediately reimposed over the mass media. And fi· nally, the \Varsa", Le tter demanded "solidarity in tIl(: ranks of the party itself un the fundam ental basis of Marxism· Leninism , steadfast observa ll('C of th e principles of demoeratie t'c ntralism an d stmggle against those who through th eir activitics assist hostile fort'e s:' This was clearly the must t'entr..ll amI t'untentious {Iemand, f,stcm and d ealing a dcfcatto t he antisocialist elements :' Sccn together wit h th e hisl de mand and the st:.lc{l fcar Ih:l! "the party is losing control," it Ix:comcs clear Ihat t he primary worry of Ihc fi ve was not so much that ,.'ollnterrevolutionarv clements existed in th e
... u.s . lk""rtmenl "f SMe. I""I/j~t·"r" .\">If" 5(>1 . l,tI )" IS. 1ll6li. in'~ '1""lo;-J 'hi' In,· .. g~ I" impl;- I~'I m~""rp, <1.",1] he I", .. " 1"" ,,,,1 '"tlo .. ,·"Iu""',,,,'ol Ilf !I". 1~>\\""T 'HII", ......·rel l"'IIe.., ...
211
t'Olin\ry a~ that th c~' existed in the party itself-and indeed at the very top of the party, within th e leadership. Thus, the appeal was no longer to DulX>ek personally Of to th e epe" Praes iuium, but 10
"healthy fo rces" wherever they might exist in th e country and in the party. The final paragraph of the letter made th e position of the five dear: "\Ve express OUr eOllvid i"" Ih,,\ the C"L·dlOSiuv"k Communisl parly, realizing ils res ponsibi lity, will lake the necessary
measures to block the path of reaction. In th is struggle you may l'Oun t on the solidarity and cornprdlcnsive :\ssist:uu:e of the fraternal socialist countries." The threat of military inte rve ntion was still not explicit. but the formulation "comprehensive assistancc" had never bcl(m~ been use<J in (I hlnc <-1Jmll1unique and thus represented hoth an e~L'a l ation and an implied willingness to us c (Ill means, including military, to put Czechosluvakia back on course. Although the \\'(Irsaw Letter clearly represented (Ill escahlt inn in te nsions, there we re still certain omeiliatory clements in the letter that showed moderate opinion had not entirely been overturned . first , th e signatories reass ured tIl e CI'Czlhat they "have not Iwd and do not have any intention of interfering in affairs that arc purely th e internal affairs of your party and your state. " The problem, of (:oune, W(IS in findin g ,Iny asped of the refoflh mOVen'lc nl t hat the five conside red to he purely th e inte rnal affair of the CPCz. They eVidently decid ed t here were three (and by implication only three) slIch areas: The first was "the reclific:ltion of errors and sh() rt{,.~)mings, including th e violations of socialist legality that took pbce" in th e past. Se<:OIllJ. th e five declared "we do not interft:re with the methods of pl(llllling 'IIU.I udllliuistratinn of Cz<-~ho slovakia's nationul economy or with the act ions aimed at perfect ing the e~'()nomic structure an d devdoping so<.:ialist (!e l1locnlcy." This wou ld e xtend. presumably. to ~'Over mnst as pects of Czechnslovaki;I's planned economic reform , althou gh it gives no e.xplicit approval to aspects of the " market socialism" b"ore{! uy Ota Sik or 10 uny measu re that would rt..'Orien t Cl.echos!ovukiu's foreign trade more toward the West. Finally, th e five positively alllrmed that th cy wuuld "wek~)me adjustment of th e rc1alinl) .~ between Czedls and 510\',115 on the healthy foundations of fraternal cooperation within t he Czeehoslovak Socialist lIe puhlic." It might he ass unw
212
T II~;
n u s ls I'I-:II IO U
At th e ctlndusion of the C,.·t)llfer enee TASS issued a t'O tlltlluniquc .~ talin g only tl\;lt the partici pants "unanimollsly lldopted a deci.~io n on th e ques tion unde r discussion." '" The \Varsaw meetin g. to the ex te nt that it emled in unanimity, eert aiu ly was not characterized by a single and resol ute commitmen t to one course of actio n. Inform ed sources, for example. reported that Hun Aa ry flatl y refused to subsc ri be to a SL't.'O nd ult imatu m be ing sent tu Prague tha t tlemand ed a multilate nll co nfe rence within th e next 1\\lJ wee ks . fo l· lowin g a series uf bilate r.ll talks hetween Pr;lgue a",1 cal'll of t he five. The oth er fo ur sign;ltories infunned Pr;lgue over the next few days t hrough scparate chann els of th is se("(lnd de lllS. U.S. D" l""tllle"t of Stat~ . l " r""I~...".....\·"I~ 51>1. JILt)' III. 1966. al", ''''IC;o,,,·d t llat tl,¥' W.'>aW Lelt~, W.> "onl)' I'.ul of III., «lI""llOlIde" ,'c f"'l11 I),,· fil'~ I" C""'t",,d<>'·... ia" ... il t. II," 1"" ';<, • • 1"" i"'i,Ii"~ "''" "tl.." t.;bk~.>l"""'!i"':' ."d a joi nt , umm;! "it hin two .........·h ...
JUNF. 27 - JULY 28
213
ably remains that situation can be controlled without such (ICtion ... ..,. It onlr rem(lined to be seell whdher Czechoslov(lkia would put its own house in urder. THE CPSU CENTBAL Cm.Ii\IITTEE PLENUM Having arrived back in Moscow by tmin Otl Jul y lll, the Soviet leade rship [."tlllvt' ncd an extraurdinary plenum of Ille CPSU Central Comm ittee to discus.~ the results of the 'Vursaw meeting. As mentioned previously, the decision to convene the meeting was prohahly made hefore the (Iepar ture or the Sovid delegat ion to Warsaw. probablr on July 12. If this was the case, then Kosygin cuuld not ha\'f'" heen privy 10 the decision to ['"OII"e111: the Jul y ple nulIl , just as he was not privy tn the decisio n to COIl\'cne the April plenum. The plenu m was opened by Ilrezlmev. who presented fo r discussion and approval a document l:llHtlcd ·· lIcsult s of the :o.leetillg in ,Varsaw of Delegations of the Commun ist ,lIld 'Vorkers' Parties of the Socialist Countries."'I'" Fo llowing Brezhnev's introduction , fourteen speeches we re given, and it is instructive to list the speakers in the order given by the official communique: Shelest. Grishin, Kunaev, L. C. Kuliehenko (first secretary of the Volgograd ohkom). Yu. V. n·nitsky (fi rst secretary of the Tr.lIlsearpathian uhkom ), N. :\1. Gribachev (secretary uf the hoard of the Writers' Union). V. S. Toistikl)v (first sc[.·retary nf the Leningrad nhknm ), A. I. Shibacv (first secretary of the Saratov obkom ), A. E. Voss (first secretary of the Celllnil COlll mittee of the Latvian COl1l1llunis \ party), V. I. Konotop (first St.l oetary of the '\Ioscow ohkmn). V. I. Dcgtiarcv (first secretary of the Donetsk obkom in the Ukraine), ~1. V. Keldysh (president uf the Soviet Acade my uf Sciences), A.1'II . Snechk us (first secretar y of the Central Committee of the l.ithuanian Commuuist party), and S, C. Lapin (general d irector of TASS). "" Althollgh the t e~ t s of their specdll:s we re never reve,lled, v,lrious analyses have pointed to a strong coalit ion between Ukrainian interests. party secre t(lries cOI1[.ocr ned ;Ibollt the .~]li11over of the reform movement, and nHiciuls involved in the [."tllltrol of the intellige ntsia and the media. T.'lking the Uknlinian clement first, tlte
'" u.s. OCI'-''''",,,nt 'If St~I'· . Tclr~"'m !.'Q-!('J.'. J"I)" IS. IY6S. [" U. S. Mi"I'HL. NATO "' Sl"ut·,,,,lmll· i'urllin""" ... b"I,,;kG. mi. ~ 1M,,,,,,,,,, 1"[",·)"",,, p<,III .. ·I",,~<>y lite,._ lur)·. l!lfoS). p. 12 L~ lhicl.
21./
T ilE CIUSIS PEIIIOU
views of Shclesl arc we ll known; and it is most int e r~ stillg tllal he was th e only me mbe r of th e Warsaw del egation, with the exception of Brezhnev. to give a speech at th e plen um. Il" nitsl.:y had spent his e ntire career as a party omcial in th e Tr'lIlst:arpathian OUIISt", that area incorporat eJ into th e USS II in UN,,) from Czceiwslovakia. Il'nitsky would have been particularly worried about spillover frum th e reform mm'emtmt sinn' the inlmhitants of his reg ion had historical an d lingnistic ties with Czechoslovakia. On seve ml oc"Casions during July. Il"nitsky publidy criticized th e reform movement , emphasi7,i ng th e deep imp ression that life under th e '''democracy' :Uld 'freedom' nf Masaryk and Be neS" had made nn the inhabitants of his region. '" T he difficult y of pe rsuad ing th e peo ple of th e oblrut" that the Prague Spring was in [Ict counterrevolutionary ('Quid not have b ee n made easier by the ability of in]';Ibit,mls;n Tr.,lIlst·arpathia to pick up CZI:choslovak radio an d television stations, and indeed ll"nitsL-y was later to complain nf th e harmfu l influence Oil exist ing nationalit y te nsiollS in Tnl nscarpathia of"fim:ign rauio stations ami television studios:" >: It is extremely significant thut Il"nitsky gu\'e a speech at th e plenum. since he was not a member of th e Centml Committee. Therefore. as Ho{l ne tt
lind Potichnyj stllte, '" he mllst h:we been invited to dramatize the dan ger ofCzecilOslovOlk inlluent'C upon the UkrJ.ine : · It is diffi cult to disagree with their ('Onclusion that " this is ;m {~xtremcly iml}()rtan t point , for it reveals better than almost anything else possibly could that th e majo ri ty in th e l'olithllTO wanted or neede{1 to ('Onvince th e Central Committee of the seriousness of th e Czechoslovak threat to the Soviet Union 's suuth-western i1ank:'c~, One might aulit·IIII)j. '''h~ U ~ .... .nd tl,~. C...""I"'.Io>,..k p, 1~5.
j""
e, j,;,:'
"' Ibid .. I'. 1i6.
''''
o::h
215
and in particular the power at this time of Shclcst and the Ukrainian co ntinge nt. Also wit h the Ukminian l~lIl t ingl'n t were J)egtiarev ami Konotop. The first seeret.'lryofthe ~'loSC{lW obkom, Konotop was Uknlin ian hy ethnic origin. O nly the previous day be had re turned from CzedloslovlIkia, where he W;IS at t he head of a i..-losl1lW O{,//Ist delegation. His lIrrival in Prague occurred shortly ~Lffcr his very liberal counterparts there, the Prague City Party Committee. had decided to go into permllncnt session, a deveiol)men t that the Soviets felt threate ned the guiding prinCiple of democratic (."C ntnliism. Kono!op, ac(.'Ording to U.S. intelligeu(.'e (.'Onclusious, reported to t he Central Committee on the "counte rrevolutionary act ivities" of this group.c"" Of the other speake rs, Voss and Snechkus also rep resen ted republics that had had their fair share of nationality (lrohlcms. Although leader of the Latvian party. Voss was no t a Centnll Commi ttee me mbe r, probably Ilt:CallSe his predeeessor Arvid I'd'she, a full l'o litburo me mber and head of the Party Control Com mittee, was responsible for representing the interests of thc Baltic states in Moscow. Latvia h~ld g<Jue through a major nationality crisis under Khrushchev. In 1959, a number of top o1fici:l.ls accused of n!ltiol1alism had been purged. Pel'she took up his post as head of the Latvian party soon aftcr and had sinl.'e been promoted 011 t he hasis of having de monstrated his spccialloyalt y to the Soviet Union 's !HItionali ty poliey,'" Voss himself does not appear to have played a major role in tlH~ months leading lip to the illvasion of Czechoslovakia, except for a meeting with Smrkovsky when the latter visited Riga during his tour of the USS ]{ in June. FollOWing the invasion, Voss W~lS <juotcd ~L~ admitting that thc situation in Latvia had he(.'Ome particularly dangerous during 1968, when "the revisionists and natio nalists" we re using a program uf'\lcmocr;.!il· and h Ulll'l Uist socialism" a~ a smokescreen fo r "the restoration of capitalis t socicty.""" Just as nonme mbe r lI'nitsky WllS almost certainly invited to support the vicw of Shdest, Voss's prescn(.'C can be most satisfactorily explained in terms of representing t he views of his Mos(.·ow patron, Pe1'she . ... u.s. [)el""tm~nt of S!at•. 1!t 16. lll&l, n. Jun. D,eirdd .... Lo" 'ian National Dema"ds and Group Con",",u""",,, Si""" J95!J , '" C;""rge W. S!mnoond., .. I., ,\'nlloMII"n In Ih~ USSII "nd f;"u<,n, f:~ "'J"" r l'· 136 - .51;. "' A, F.. \-"". i'oIilid,e.JI",!I<' ..,,,,,,,,Im,wt... ni!l". no, 9 (Septemher !968). pr. 22_ 30, '"' 'IUOI.,.j in Volen .... S.",I<"II"lerW"'i, ~. 60.
21(;
THE CIUSlS PElIIOn
Lithuanian party boss Snechkus was in a slightly stron ger I}()sit ion insofar as he at least was a member of the Central Committee. t-le had also gone on rel-'(JT(1 prior to t he Jul y plenum in favor of a " tireless st ruggle agai nst nationalism and rev isionism." " Lithuania" he clai med, " together wit h other Balt ic rejlublies, had Uct.'O IIl C an object of hi Iter attacb b y imperia list prop,lg;mda." rr: Fo r Snechkus. this claim was not idle pulemieizing. for dur ing this time a mass nlO\'c mcnl was t;lking root in UIllllania among groups of C alholic priests protesting restrictions on the print ing of Bibles and religious lite!';lture, the entry of stude nts to seminaries. ,l1ld related church issues. The party hil~r;l rchy ,1[Jpearf'J tn 1)(" Ill most helple.~s in preventing its spread; by 19i2. for example. all appeal tu the United N,ltiuJlS ,1g;.li nsl religiulls pI:rseeution had heen Siglll:J h}' li,OOO people frolll Lithuania. '''' The other speakers were eith t" r provincial and city party secft't,lries or officials in clulrge of maintaining paTty oTthodoxy oveT intellectuallife. Severa! had been directl>, involved in t he development nf the Sovie t posit ions on t he reforlllllluve ment. Kuliche nku, for example, had gone tn Pmguu with II rc~.hn(:v . Shele~t. and Katush cv i11 Fehruary fo r ,I hilaleral meel ing ,iII.1 had also paTlicipate.1 in the April plenum dehate on Czechoslovakia. He had conferred with Imlra and Giere k on ~by 9 at t he Czechoslovak-Polish bordeT, and he had hosted Imlh SlII rknvskY's delegation lit the beginning of Jllne and KMI:ir's delegation at the end of June durin~ their respective visits tu Volg()gmd. As fo r Grishin. he had been Ilighly ,lctiv(' in advocat ing a hard-line app ruaeh to C,wch()slovakia. as witnessed by his April 22 speech. and in [wt he was t he only Soviet leader, with the ex~ pl ioll of HTuzhnev, to paTticipate in the dehates 0 11 Czechoslovakia ,II all thTee Cenl!,;l! Commitlee plenums held in 19b/:! (S heicsi alsu alldressed all three plcnums, hut ,It the Oct (lh(~ r meeting he sl}()ke not in Ihe fOTei gn pOl it'y debale but in the agricultural de bate). Tolst ikov llad abo paTticipatcd in the April debate. and with Lc ningra(l as nne uf the fix.'i "f the l-'Ilntinuing sigllaIlITe campaign against the trial and imprisonlllent Ihe previous Ja nuary "I' Ginzhurg am i Gala11 sknv, il could he cxp"•..'led 1],;,1 Tolstikov and the repTcsentat ives ofT.<\SS. the \Vriters' Union, and the Academy of Selent-es would all be stron g mlherents of a harsh '~ A . Yu . 5,_·lIk", . "(~111""";,'!
(Lilt",""i.), ,.,. "
(j'III~ 1'lI>8). I'P. 3- 7, ,,
'1'.'I"t
ill iLicl . '~ l 'de, I\~,,),l,w. ,)",
~,;,·t",,·l
'Tl",
!)~"~~'rmont
of Di,,,,n ' "lUt Orl'",ilion, " in Arehie II ",,,.., amJ !'I'. 13._311.
"""" . I'd, .. n~ s,,,·"" 1)"1",, SI"c, '/,r Fall (If "~c,,",cllc~'.
IGh
JIz
M
21i
stand against "iml>crialist ideological ~ub\"crsion," particularly if it came from a neighboring mcialist state. SUPl>ort for the Prague Spring l>y Andrei Sakharov and other Soviet il1tellectual~ threatened to further eomplicate the authorities' efforts to clamp down on dissent, and it appeared to 1.~1ll6rm Soviet fears of spillover. Soviet efforts to gain support among iea{ling intellectuals for acampaign against C~,L"Choslo\'akia had not been an overwhelming SIK'(.'t:SS, and i!l{leed it was only Oil Jul y 23, a full mOllth after the publication of the "2,000 Words," tllat Sor;;ct.~kf}y(/ kultuni managed to lind seven National Artists who would sign an art ide explicitl y condemning it. General Petro Grigorenko, who hr that time had been identified with dissident causes, subsequentl y wrote that the "2,000 \\'ords" had been sCt:rctiy tr.lnsla\l.o into RussianCzech II tlwspa pers were 110 IOllger sold openly-and eireulaled widely among the intelligentsia who generall y followed developmtlnis in Prague "as if[ they] were all a fairy talc." ,... Tile party ranks had only n..'CCntly heel! purged of all those members (almost all of the m inte llectuals) who had signcclletters protesting the illegality of the Ginzhurg-Calallskov trial, hut a gTIIU(l of over a bundred writers had notified the Writers' Union Secretariat that if even one signatory were expelled from the Writers' Union, they would all resign. ,... Among this gro up was the writer A. Ye. Kosterin. who later in July was to re~ i gn from the party in protest over Soviet attempts to re press the I'rague Spring. '" It was lIot surprising, therefore, that the day alter the dose of the plellum the I'ropagamla De partment of the Central Committee issued a direct ive on the nec(l for Illuch more work ill instilling "ideolngk;l]l~"'viction ;llnong the Soviet intelligentsia."'" This strollg r.:otlllC'etion, first clr.twn at the April plellum. hetween domestic ideo logic;l] (.~llltf() l and the threat to that (,'()JJtrnl posed hy the events in Czechoslovakia was further reinforced hy the July plcnum. It has been pointed out that l'odgoTll~', Kat ushcv, and Kosygin, the other participants in the Warsaw meeting, were not called on to discuss its results at the plenum . It is also noteworthy that none of tbe leaders (''Oneerned with /orcign policy and the international Communist lno\'ement SI)()ke. most !lotahly. of (.'Ourse, Suslov and Puuomarcv, Loth of whom werc interested in "" Petro Gri!(of~nko. ,If",,,,;,,. PI'. 351 - 5'J.
'''' l'cteflk-dJa""y. ~-d_. V""" ....orrd H"..,.... t'p· SJ-.'>Y. "' ,\'= l'o,k Tjll.... . Jul), 30. I9&S.
H.
''''"
''''
o::h
218
THE e lII SI S
P ~:1II01)
the effccts of the Warsaw Letter on the plans for thc Novcmber International Communi~t Conference. Neither Gromyko nor Grcdlko (who had finally depa r ted on July 15 ll)r Algeria) was on th e list of speakers. despi te their participation in the April debate and despile II Ie fact tlHlI any clecisiu u (."()tl(:erning Czechus\o\";lkia would hav c immcnsc conscqnences for thc ir respectivc sphercs of activity. Thc list of spcakcrs, therefore, slrongly suggests a narrowing of th e focus O il C7~~choslovakia; irK"reasingly it was seen through the prism of its impact on ideologic;ll control and orthodoxy at home and in the hloc. It also suggests an intensification of th e peTL"Civcd thrcat of th e Pmgllc Spring; and the apparent inahility of all those known for their more Illoder.lte views to participate in th c plenum debate indicates a mark ..-d illl'rease in til e strength of th c t"Oalilion favoring a lr,lro line to t~)lln t er that threat. Furthermore, tir e strul"illre of tire debate , with its prepondcr.mce of middl e-level olfid,lls ,IS upposed to top Polit!mro memhers (If party secretari es. repreSellt.~ an atte mpt to hroaden thc base of support fur a hard-linc policy. This represents a further stage in ('"fmsenslls-lnrilding, an IInamhiguuus welding of til e party tn a par(ieular v iew of Czecho slovakia and (0 " particular cnllr«, "f ad ion. TASS ,LllIlOunt'Cd on July 17 tli .. t a resolu tion had bl!en ":Idopted u nanimo usly" by the plenum statin g that the Central Committee "'completely ,Lpprovcs" th e al"ii vi ty of the Politburo and "'high l~' appreciates and unanimously end orses" the results of th e \\'(Lrsa\\' rneethlg. Spccifically. it backed "the (tlllclusions reached" at Warsaw, includ ing th e nt:e{lto en sUl"e .. t he eonsol id,Lt io n of t he socialist .~}'stc m on th e basis of th e principles of p ro le\ari'l1l internationalism ,md tir e cOlldusions or, the Ilct!d for resolute efforts in su pport of t he cause of socialism in Czechoslovaki a." It stopped short of discussing what "'resolute eHllrts" might he requ ired. hut in an alle lllpt to rein/oree Ihe Weight of t he Warsaw Leiter. the resolution sialed that th c Clmlral Committee "expresses t"() nR{I{~nt"C that the le tter (If the fraternal parties, adopted in \",l rs,lw, will mcet with Ilndl:r stan
The next para).{raph de,lrly imlicated the direct connection bc-
IGh
JIz
M
21!J
tween the Prague reform movement nml the thrent to ideological orthodoxy at home. The resolu tion, in a br from uptimistic formulation, stated tlmt the Central Cum mit tee "~"()nsid ..,rs it 'H.!<.'CSsary to continue in every possible \\"ay to ("()nsolidate the unity of the party and the people, to extend ideologiC".l1 1I"0rk all(l to popularize the great teaching of ~1arx ism-Lcninism in all spheres." By unanimously supporting the \Varsaw meeting (."undusions about the need for "resulute elrurts" tu aid the cause uf socialism in Czechoslovakia. the Ce ntral Commillee endursed the pusition e xpressed in the \ Varsaw Letter that counterrevolu tionary tendencies existed in Czedmsluvakia as well as the need lor ad iun by the community as a whole to restoTe Czechoslovakia to the socialist path. 'Vhere[J$ the April Central Committee plenum rcsolution had mcrt:!y cndorsed the Drcs(lcn meeting del"isiuns UII greater bloc unity. the Jul y plcnum resulutiun wc nt several steps further ; it openly named CzedlOsluvakia, declared socialism to be tlueatened there, publicly e ncouraged the epe... to heed the advice ol~ fered in the \Varsaw Letter, and su pported the need for " resolute ell"orts" uased on the prineiple of prole tari,m internat ionalism if all else fail ed. From the standpoint of preparing the party rank and file for a possible invasion, the July plenum resolution we nt as far as ~~JUld bc expected without explicitly calling for military m(':tsUfes. Ye t there is no evidence that an actual itwasion was even d iscussed. Indeed, it is unlikely that it wouJdll
Int.lli~'"'"
,,"nt, 56/ . Ju1 r
18. I9&.!.
~lIch
•
220
Till:: CIIISIS
P~:R IOD
THE C ZEC HOSLOVAK HEACfIO N
Although til e five signatories had addressed th e ir leiter to the C PCz Centra l Cummitt ee in the hop" th"t this would a\low conservatives th e opportunity to usc that forum to recoup th ei r strengt h, Dulx'Ck did not immediately convcne a special plenum. The official reply was l"Um l}(}sed by the e pcz Praes idium on July 17, and only tlw n on july 19, aft e r it wa.~ m ade public, was it disc\ls.~ed and endo rsed at an extnwrdimlry CPCz Central Committee plenum, whose r;mks hall been swollen by a number of liberal no nmembers. The I'raesidium reply l"o nceded that the re mi ght be so me "extremist tend encies,," some "antisocial'st acti vities" or even on occasior,s "violati un of th e prin ciple of democ' rati<- centra lis m. " It rejected . however, any justifi l11lion for "calling the prescnt situation l"Uunt e rrevolutionar y, im'oking a direct threat to Ihe basis uf t he socialist sys telll or cbiming thai Czcchoslov;lkiil is pre paring ;! chan ge in th e orien tation of our socialist f()re i~n policy or that tllere l.~ it l'onere te dallger of ollr co unt ry bre;!kill g awar fro m tlw socialist community." COIll'(:{ling th
w hid . d o n o t eo indd " w ith th e I>ositive e n-
of the party," the
I'me~idillm n e\'crlh ele~~
refuscd 10
reintroducc a(lmi nistraliv c mC:lSli res 10 de;!1 wit h the situation. replying t hat "w" consider the 501llt ioll of th" s" qm,stinllS to ht: a long-tc r m task. ·· They aho bluntly m.lde d ear th eir vi<,w uf the \VaTsaw meeting: " \\le think that th c common calise of socialism is nnt advanced hy th e ho lding of conferences at whidl th e polky and aelivily ofono of tb e fr;l lenHlI p:lrl ii'S is jll d gl~d withnllt tht: prese nce of 111c ir n 'prese ntat ives," The reply endcd by urgently rei teratin g th e desire of the C PCz lead"rs hi p tn hol tl bilatCT;lI t:llks as a prcllldt: to "" common mect ing of the sodalist t"U lintri(,s,"'" lIu sa k "'J:k-' ' 1",,",,10 ,II I"~ Cf'(:.o, C.'"lml Co",,,,ilh',' pl",,,,,o ,
Sq'h'''rt ~ 'r
2!i, 1009.
EE/3tOO'Clt\l,
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,"
221
JUr.E 27-JULY 28
THE C:ONS I DEHATION OF AI: rEIW:HI VES By th e tim e th e CPS U Cen t ra l Committee L~ l!Ic1"ded its session on reaffirmin ~ the party's suppo rt for the resu lts of the Warsaw m eeting, th e C I'Cz l' raesidi u lll k id already rejeeted the Ic tt.:r of the five, fo rcing Most'Ow to rcact f;lirly quic kly. The broad variety of u ptions discussed int!icalc<] a wi<\e nin g search for alte rnatives as th e crisis escab tell intn th is crucial s tage. The vario us and often conflictin g: act ions advoca ted d ifferent leaders in cl uded th e ji)llowing:
July 17.
uy
I. Support for th e French Conul1un i.l l p~rty's plan 10 convene nn im · me
3. Mooem t ion of ovcrt pulit ical p ressllre ou Prague iu nn eHurt to cnl III the si tu ,,1ion and nlluw the Dubl-<·k leadenh ip lu regai n Ii rm L'O"trol 4. Pursoit ofhilnlernl Inlks with Ihe Czeehosl ov~k I'rnes idiulll as a prelude 10 a mu ll ilaleral l'onfe rcnL'C oflcadcrs fWIll socialisl c.,"nt ri,:~
5. An increased public cam paign aga inst I'ra).!"l: in an att empt not unly tl) signal to the Ci'C:f. leauersh ip tlw St'rio"sne~s of Soviet in te nt , bu t also 10 prepare Soviel IJuhlie opillion for uny evc ut uulity ami to create a climate mOre mlluuciv e to a mililary inlerventiu n 6. ile newcd demand s for iItl1lwlIS h~' I he Czechoslovak ''''thoril ie' in th.: " "e3 of ,e<:lJrity and in I he "' ilil:lry , phe n:, ill~'llld ing cad re changes and , Ial im,i"g of lroops 7. In creased military preparedness for u f,,11 ;'l\'ilsiOll that could be mOllnted nt short nolit'C, even if all Sovi<:l an d bloc lroops currenl ly still in Czcchoslm'aki:, had lirst to he wi lh dr..."" . These various alternativ es were :111 de ba ll".:1 alld .:xamined in the following the return of thc Soviet delega tiun fwm \ Varsaw amI Ihe rC<:ci pt ufCzedwslovakia's " egalive response to tIm \\',\rsaw Letter. Seven sepaT:l lc {I': ~'isi ons <;an he ide nlill ed and are analyze d beluw. They can be sUllimarized he re a, folluws:
da)'.~
Jul!} 17, rieci.\iml30 : The Cenlnl l Committee affirm, the need I('r a nal ionw ide ~'arn l)ajgJl II> fa,"il iaril'.c IIll: Sovi<:l IlUblic wil h thc \Varsaw Letter and tl> mobi lize pllblk opi ni on against l'OulIlerrc,'Olu lionary te ndencies ill CzC(,hoslov:lkia. July 17. decisiollJ/: Urezhncv se<-'ks bilah,ml tnlks with C:f.cchoslo vuk ia.
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Tilt: e lll SIS P ERI OI)
J!< Iy 19. decisiuu 32: Ane r Prague reje('ts Bre~hne"·.~ appea l. th" C PSU Politburo publicly rcaffi rms the
TJ-1F. Il EN F.WAL O F PO LEl\IICS The C PSU Cen tral Comm ittee plenum of July 17 had affirm ed th e r1(.'Cd for a countrywide cnmpai gn hut h " to strengthen the unit y of the party" an d to reaffi rm the SUPll<)rt of t he Soviet people for t he results of th e Wa rsaw mee tin g. In effect, decision 30 involved bot h the (.'CJnvocat ion of nationw ide par ty akl il;.y to moh il i!.e par ty cad res and the start of a mass ive press campaign. These measu res were designed to infor m the Soviet pub lic of the e.d ent of leade rship (,'CJlIC,:e rn lind to c rea te a politkai climate t hat wo uld pu t pressure Oil P n lgue ,I"d at t he s,un e t ime prepare the p uh lk for a possible invas ion. As I'l"Iwllu stated on July W. "t he Communists ;md all tIl e working peo ple of Czechoslovak ia can he sure that Ihe C PSU, th e Soviet guvern ment and our pe o ple are read y to render them all nf..'CI!ss,lry assista nce in defcndi tlg socialist g;lins:' Pa rt y a k tio~' we re held 011 July 18 in ~ lost·ow. Le ningra!l, an d all th e e,lpital cities of the var iou s Un io n lIe pu blies, w ith Grishin , Toist iko\'. Sheles t , l\I ziJavanadzc, and ot her part y leade rs as speakers. '... These sen'L'{1 ,IS the first found in a se ries of party meeti ngs designed to mohili ze the rdnk a nd fi le. l'mv(lo, Oil July 22, noted wit h sa tisfat· tj oll IIHlt th e exlent of suppor t hy Soviet Com m unis ts
" ,"
223 for the \V,lrsaw Letter was demonstrated by "the resolutions adopted at meetings of the ]'arty akav and tlie numerous letters from the working pcople that are heing received hy th e Party Central Committee and newspaper offices.·· The need for party ullit}' was n ever more apparen t than in th e days immcdiatc1r following the Centnll Committee ple num. when almost all the top political and milita ry leaders we re engaged in feverish activity to eitller promote or 'lI'ert a final decision to prepare for a full-scale in \,'L~i on . That decision, discussed in detai l helow, was made durio g a weekend meeting of an ex panded Politbu ro on J uly 20-21 , but in th e days and hours before th at meeti ng, there wa~ a very high level of both public and bell ind- th e-sccnes acti vity. JULY 1i- 20: M ULTI-THACI': APPHOACHES Bn;:;:)wcv au d tlie Bilateml Talks
On his return from \Varsaw. Brezbnev spent most of his time t rying to persuade th e Dilbeck leadershi p to agree to hll,lteral t'llks. He scnt a personal le tter to th e C ]'Cz Praesidium wh ich was delivered by Ambassador Chervonenko on Wedn esday nigh t, July Ii, while the Pr.lesiJium was still ill session trying to dedde 0 11 its n:p ly to the Warsaw Letter. CheTvo ncnko ar rived at the Central Committee building to find the Prague [Illd the world press <.'Orps camped in the ante room outside the Praes idillTn cha mhc rs. Uc was ushered in for talks whieh lasted over an h our. dUring the course of which Smrko\'sky slippe{l (Jut and sHid ·'victo ry" to waiting n~porters and seoondHry 1"'ITty officiak Dubcc k. too, e merged Hfter Cher...onenko had left, exclaiming '·it is h ard to repair tile e rro rs of twenty years:· '" In his note, Brezhn ev struck all extre mcl y <."Onciliatory tone. report tlJl y stating thai the \Vars,lw Letter had not Iltlell an ultimatum . The Sovie t Unio n nwrc\y wished to warJI Prague t hat groups hustile 10 socialism Wer.., gai ning: In strength. Bre~.],lIev so ught direct bilate ral tal ks betw een the CI'SU I'olithuro autl th e CPCz Praesidium and eVidently proposed that they be held th e (:oming Frh.by. Jul y 19, in the Sluvak town of Ko sice.'''' There is some evidence th at Brezlmev had sent an earlier note on the same day suggestin g Mos<.'O\\' as a venue_ but D ubl-ek had rejected this " ' Il cnry K.IIllll. "'portin~ from Pr.KUc. 1l,~dl<1tlll" I'ro~u •• I~'. 2fj2-1i.1.
"' I.e,)·. 1'1'. 262_&3.
,,"<"It'
l"ork Ti",,,, . Juty N. l!16S, At~n Le,·y,
224 site, as well as Kiev, Lvov, and Uzhgorod. ,n If this is Ihe case, the n Chervonenko's arrival, direct from Moscow's Cent ral Cum mittee plenum, would have :l~sul11ed an air of even grcatcr urgency. Only after r\.-'Ccivi ng these new proposals from Brezll!lcv. rcgarde{1 in Prague as a triumph for their point ofvicw, did Dilbeck dcddc to \.-"
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"W'" ,,," "UI,'" "_10m ..\."", )""d· Tim,"" 1,,1), [9. [OOS.
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accedc to Prague's requcst that tlie talk~ he held on C1.echoslovak soil was in itself a victory for th e moderates; and <-'Onsidering that the prev i()\l~ •.'olnlllllnication witll the CPC1, Pr;tesidiunl bad be~ n at Brezhncv's own initiative , it can he colmte
,~ U. S. 1)<1""hn~nl "r Sl~t.· . in,d/;,:",IC'J ".,,,~ 5,6. J ul)' ~, lOOS. :rnd U.S. of SMc·. 1H9;"'''' 2(1i59J8 ,n ~n J:;u"~"'"n Il;t'~>tna,ic 1\»1'. Jul)' 23. 1%11.
J.kp." ' m~n'
226
THE (;I\ISIS pt: molJ
both fuller partidp;lliull and sh;lre(1 responsibility. This tendency was clearly su pported by Brczhne\', who had been calling for a full I'olitburo-Praesidium meeting from his first letters to Duheek Ull July 17. Brt:'zhnev's Ilwn prefere[lce fur full partidpatlon rdlccted his leadership style and nu duubt his desire fu r collective responsibility jf the talks produl·ed nu results ami thereby precipitate d an invasion. Su~/vlJ s!!!!ks EllnJ-Cummullisf M!!diulivn
'\S discussed previously. a delegation l"Onsisting of Waldeck lIochet . the French Commllnist party chief, and Ciancarlu Pajelta and Carlo Caluzzi. two Italian Comllllluist party representat ives. arrived iu Muscuw on Jul y 1,1. h avin~ received a "defin ite warning·' from UIlspecHled sOlln:e s that the Soviets had assemhk><1 a puppet government they were preparing to install as soon as Duheek clluld be toppled. ~ The Euro-Colllllilmist"s met Suslo\' and V. V. Ztgladin. Boris Ponomarev·s deputy in the International De p;'lrtment of the Central Comm ittee. and they warned the Russians that they would oppose a Soviet interventioll. Ind~etl Pajetta stated after his return that he Imd also told the Soviets Ihat the Italian party \\1lUld only attend the November intematiOlla] CommUilist ConierenL'e provid ...-d. the prindple 01" llonintertcrCIlCf: in the internal a/f,lirs of otlJer partics was strictly upheld. ""' Pajetta alSll (:onfirmed that prior to their departure fmm MOSL~IW, they wem informed of the contents of the \Varsaw Letter. I n response, Hoellet sought, and apparently received. the endorsement of Susluv amI Zigiadin for a proposal to L~mvene an immed iate European Communist Conference to discuss Czcehoslowkia. ACL"rding 10 " SeL·rct 51011<: Department memorandum on Jul y t7, it was Soviet "'L~ser tjon s of deep conccrn which in turn led him [lloehetl to propose a EumPC;1Il CI' (.'(mi"t:rence on the Czeehos!ol':Ik s itu;ltion :· '~' Se\'enll othcr sources havc indicated that. at the vcry least , Suslov ami Zagladin did not 0PIXlse this iniHat ive. ""' \Vilbin hours of lIochct"s retu rn to Paris on Jul y 17, a PCr Politlmm communique formally proposed ··a meeting of Communist and \Vorkers· parties of Eu "'Su"d.y Trle~"'Jlh . '1'""'lIg Frrllc h c. ' '''''''' '';''l'' '' y """''"'. A"~'''' II. 1968. AI", ,..... n. 9S .w.. ,.. '" /"'cm"lio""l lIc,,,/d Tribu,u'. Jul)" 18. l~. '" U. S. o..·I",,'tnr,lt "f S•• ," . '."d/i~.,,,,,, 563, J"I. J ~. 1!l6!I '" /",. "",,;,,,,,,11/,,,,,/,1 T.-;I,",,,,. J"I). 2(1_ 21 . I9&'!. ' 1' K>l i ,, ~ · ,,·Ii.hl~ d; II~)llIa l ie ill \·ien"."" , Ch '-;"'i.,, S""'n« .If,,n;I,,,. J"I)· 20- 22. I9r,~
""",,
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rope in the coming days" tu discuss the Cl.cchuslovak situat io n "and the problems arising from it."'" Suslov and Zagladi n also a p p~fl'll tl y tm l'Ou ragl..J Hoc·het to visit Pr.lgul;'. S t~te Department suurces t~llculalL-d that '\loSl.'OW had ··consciously gene rated conccrn over its willingness to usc force to enlist parties sympathetic to the Dubeek regime in mediating efforls whit-Ii eould include pressure on the Czechnsl n\'ilk leaders tu exert greater cuntrol ov.~ r iiheralilA1.t ion:·'" Ha"ing just sustained a maj ur eledoral d efeat in tIle June ek-'diuns. the PC F W'L~ particu larly concern ed ahout th.: dumestic l'Onsequenccs of a Sovict interve ntion, particularly h';yen the pro-Soviet sympathies of the party's inne r COTC. Consequentl y, on Jul y 19, Buchet visilt..J Prague and sought Czechoslovak support IllT his proposal. Duheek, however, was far from enthusiastic: " \\'e have not said no to a meet iug hetween parties of tIle soc'ialist countries, ,lIld we are nut saying IIU to a Eurupean t,mfercllcc. \ Ve silliply say that bilateml meetin gs arc necessary Ilrst and that . the object uf an y eulleeti ve mee ti ng mus t nol be Ihe e:<mnin"tion nf the situatiu n of any single part)': ''''' After Hucllt:fs return to p,lris un July 2 1, the PC F issued a communique stating that although suppo rt for the proposal had been received from fumteen Communist p~lrties, it had been decided that liS lung as there was the possihilit y of bilateral talks hetween Moscow and Prague, the planned Euro-Cummunist confe renL'C wuuld not be held. 'w Soviet intentions mJ(1 actions regarding thi~ episode arc extremely difficult to discern. Evidence suggests that Suslo" and Zagladin did not immedi'ltcly seck to dissuade Buchet frolll pu blicly proposing a confertmL'C. T here arc at least two possible explanations for this initial support. On the one hand, tlley lIlay have calculated that the Czechoslowks migh t attend such a gathe ring aud that ~Ioscow would be able to ('Untrul its results. If this was tllcir calculation, they were wrung Un bUlh e
.. L·II,,,,,,,,,jr~.
M~y
1968. of SI"I~.
1",.111)(",...., .\',,'e .';63. /"Iy 17. l!l&l, 18. 1970. rd.. _-d Ihe t,,~1 '"' II", """'en.li",, 1""lwee" R...cI,d ...,d
Duhh-k. "' L"lI,"'ut"II~./u\)' 22 .
19611.
228
Tilt: CR ISIS l'EIl IOD
the rCF to abandon the idea, Alternati vely, Suslov an d Zagladin JIIay have hoped tll,lt the Polit buro would have been fOr(.'Cd tn respond to a r CF invitation an d in th e process at l ea.~ t be maue aware of th e ram ifications of the escalating crisis on th e CPSU's standi ng in th e world Communist movement. In t his vein, th e "-Ioseow correspondcnt of Prticc report ed that "in talki ng with ccrtain people th ese days, une bet-~Jlnes :L\\~lre that they are uisturbed by the d ifferent points uf view adupted hy th e Communist parties of Western Europe and b y those uf certain socialist cou ntries. , People arc beginn ing to wonder if th is le tte r from Warsaw has not di vided the Communist moveme nt insteau of unifying il .·· ...' Despite Hochet's repeated insistence that he had t"Ome to Most"Ow at his uwn initiati ve and that he was sulely re spunsible for propos ing a European Com mun ist meeting. the TASS d is patch of his departure, printed in Pravda on Jul y 18, stated not only that he had bee n seen off at the airport by Suslo\' and Z1~la{lin but that 1m ha{1 bf:cn in f-,Ins(.~)w "at tll c invit,ltion of the Celltnll Committec.'· a statement vigoro usly denied by Roche!. This led some cum mentators. including sOllle who fillot ed PCF SOUrt'Cs, to suggcst that h anl_lillcu ill lI.Ioscow w e re "Ucm ptin g 10 di serc{lit Susl"v ,"m d ()t h l!r.~
hy implying th nt
he h;nd-the- ~ n e~ ~ch l!ming W[I~
phlce while othe r Soviet le:lders were in
\\':lr.~aw. '"
t!lking
In this cunnec-
tion it is interesting tu note that the he,lll of TASS. S, G. Lapin,
was one of th e hard-line speake rs at th e Ce ntral Cum mittee pIe. num cunve ne{1 un Jul)' Ii; hence he may not have been adverse 10 releasing such a state ment.
PO>lOlUaret; ilJ the Shadott;s It has be en suggested , notably b y Jiri Vale nta. that Boris Ponomarc\'. the heal] oftlw International Department. sup porte d Sus· lu v and Zagladin in welcoming t ile Budlel ini tiat ive.'.... Certainly, Ponumarev worked closely with Suslov in planning th e Nove mhe r International Communist confe rence and was likely tu have calculated th e negative effect of ,I[I in \ ':lsion On the Sll('(;ess of the conferent'C, There is rea!!y no evidence , however. to suggest that Punornarev hacked this initiative. Indee{1 if this had been th e case, one mig ht have expected Ponomilrcv himself. rathc r thml his dcp"" V""I<..J t,y Mid,,,, T,l". /" .11"",[,,. Jul )' 25. !96S, '" ,,",w 1'o,k Ti ...... , Jil l)" 25. 1\l6S, ""Jin \ '"1011(,,, S"l'jfll"l~r,.~"Ii"" ;,, C=h".(ot:akia. pp. 6' _ &J.
229
uty. to have joined Suslov in mee ting with Hoehet. Moroover. it has been daimech press. I'm/go ,.,,!} <1m/ VOrf)",'" CUIlf",m/
If Kosygin had dilfieulty ill finding a fu rum for his views the same was certainly not truc for others in t he Politburo. On July W. two Politburo members, Podgorny and Vorono\,. gave speeches to the "" Val"~ t", int~rview
will, I'~.",. ~1:""k Ii"." • 1~,litl".fU m~"'\'.,. of t he "'", tria" c."" .
",u niot 1"',,)., Socirl/,dut't'nlion, p. &>.
"'I'r..gue JUdio. , ul)· 19. 1968. EEl2!i2,ICi1I_
" T"'SS. , ul)· IS. 1008.
S UI2fj2f~.~214 .
"'en.. I"I ~ 18. 1006, un;.
11""'"ard•• C=~".I,,"akia. lui)" N . 19(>11_
230
TilE elliSIS PElIlon
Bussian republic's Supreme Suviet. The ottasion was the bestowal on that republic of th e Orde r of th e Octobe r Hevolu tion. Prescot at the session were all the full and candi date members of Ihe Po· litburo exeept Slleles!. Mzhavanadze. and uth er republic part y secrctari es whose prcse nce would not be expI.:cted at such an "all· Russian" ul'(.'asion. Brezhnev and Shelepin we re also absent, hut the one reall~' surprising ahsen tee was D. S. l'ol yansky, the first deput y prime ministl'T and the former cha irman of the Council of l\linist!~ rs of the Hussiun repuhlic. Plli yansky has heen ide ntified a.~ one of the primary patrons of the resurge nce of righI-win g Hussian nationalism tlmt began durin g 1968, "" and his ahselll'e frum a meeti ng devo ted to the glorificat io n of ~ I oth c r Hussi a must support rumors that he was quite ill durin g this tim e ."" Voronov, in a speech published in Pmv(/Il on July 20, dealt almost exclusively with the aehievc ments of th e Russian repuhlic, Only in concluding did VOrullOV me ntion that dele gat es tu the Supre me Soviet session had "e ntirely endorse!i th e n :sulutiun of the ple num of th e CC C l'SU, th e resuits of th e mccting in Warsaw . ilnd th e le tt er of th e frat e rnal parties t u the Central Comulittet: of th e Comn1llni5t party of Czechoslovakia." But ap,ITt from tllt:se assurances , Vorono\, did not make any st:lti:ment~ abo ut Czechoslovakia. Podgomy's spet!ch was in marked contrast to Vornnov's. In th e fi r~ t place. perhaps because lie was a Ukrainian. Podgorny had felt obligetl to express his filial afii:ct ion lilT the great Ru ssian pcuple, and this he did, glorifring their ·'rich culture the ir stoicism, !lleir persistence, thei r l'tmrage and hcruism" and th'1I1killg them for giving the country both Vladi mi r Il yit' h Lenin and th e Bolshe vik party. Then, launching into a lengt hy tirade abo ut the eurrenl struggle he twee n imperialism and sncialism that was man ifest ing itsclfmost d ea rly in Czechoslov,lkia, he co ntinu ed : Here. wit 11 the adi"" sUPIXJrt uf i rnpe rialisl1I, right.wing, :lIlt isodalist fOTl...·s-relll nants of 1\", defe3ted , e'piuit ing dasses, TCvisiol.ist ami natiunalist clements are slI bjl'Cting th e "ery founuations of socialist construction to Beree atlul'ks. Havin)!; taken auvanl:lge of meaS
•.
1l<'~11
>et'll in Jluhlie
for wrek •.
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JU:'E 27-JU LY 28
party of Czechoslovakia and to deprive it of its leading role, alld to discrcGit Ma rxist-Len inist teachin g, Ho~tik external and internal forces clearly seek to posh Czechoslovakia 011' the path of socialism, and to tear her from the soc ialist uunmunilv, The representatives of Commnnist ami \";Jrke ..... p~rties who llIet rc(.'Cntly in \Varsaw ,,~pre~sed the decisive will to strengthen the socialist system, its onit)' amI L'{)hcsiun, Th ey firmly tll,(;brcJ tlm\ they would never consent to the h istorical victories of socialism being threa tcne d. to imperi:uism making a breach in the socialist syst~m by peareful or nonpeareful mean s from within or without. Our party, our pt,'{)ple. sioccrcly helie\'e that the Communis t party ofCzcchoslovakia. the workin g class. . arc "ble to block the path of reaction. . Our CZl'Choslov<J k friends, ,Hced not dooht that C<)mlllunist.~, all Soviet pe op le. fulfilling their intefl)ationali~t duty, will render them the utmost ait! aud support in this ....
Podgomy's speech may ]Jossibly have been a public reflection of a raging debate within the leadership around thl;' issue of in\'asion. It almost certainly was dl;'signe{l to increase the political pressure on Czechoslovakia and to create a climate within the ussn more accepting of invasion should that ('OUTSI;' be necessary, In such circumstances the role and attitude of the military assumed great importance.
Th e Mar,~ha/,~ lir.:/uru 10 Moscow The unexpected return to Most'Ow on Jul y 19 of Marshals Crcchko and Yakul>ovsky raise(] fears that a challge ill S()I'iet military policy toward Czechoslovakia was in the offing, Marsh al Grcchko had only just begun hi s much-postpo ned visit to Algeria on Jul y 16, with the Arab press reporting that he W,I$ (luc to stay thcre until july 21.'''' He cut short his visit. howcver, and returned to Moscow on the evening or July 19,'" On the same da~', ;\larshal Yakubovsky left Prague by air for :<.loscow'"'" ill the midst of reports that Soviet troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia had once again been promised by Moseow,''' On Jul y 20 Knl.~'wy(/ ;;.t;cu/(/ publisllcd an editorial euiogi7.ing the 145,<XlO Russian soldiers who had gh'cn their lives in the liberation of Czechoslovakia Irom Nazi Germany. The newspaper, which a.~ the organ of the party ('Ommittce in the :<',1inis"' I'roo;do, )lIty 20, [00') , ,'" f.~YllriCIrc. 11I1!' 16 .nJ J7, 1968. on Tj""", )ul), 20, t9&;, and Pr.~"" [ladi,. , Jut)' 20, tOOS. EE/2M7/GI2. '" 1'r'guc Radio , Juty \9 , 1968. H J 2SWClI 2. '" Inr~n",rillll"'II.rnld TnJlIIlI~. )ul)' 23. t9l'0II.
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THE C IH S I S 1'~: 1\I 0 U
tr~
of D ~fe ll se was under t ile cont rol of Yepishev ami no t Grecllku, re ported that Soviet soldie r~ we re "deeply distnrbed by the in trigues of ,ultisocialist forces in Cn~hoslovaki :l" ,md would increase their combal r(!,uliness 'lIHI vigilance. II i~ likely Ih"l bolh Gn:chko ami Yakll bovsky arri ved in '\Io ~(,'()w after this art ide w,to; written alld possiLly evell after it had gune tu press. Tile editorial conde mlled a "hostile campaign'- IInleashed by the Czechoslovak press against the ret'Cnt W1'0 sl.:llf exercises. and it accused that press of saying " nol it wonl aboul why or for what purpose the armed forces of Ihe aggressive NATO bloc, 10 which the revanchist forces of \ Vest German y belongs, arc holding ma neuvcrs ncar Czeehoslovakia's borde rs." The arl il'le alleged that antisocialist cleIlle nts "arc attempting 10 . un dermine the truism that Czechoslovakia can mai nt.lin its independen(,'t! and sovere ignty onl y as a socialist ..:voniry and as a member of the socialist commonwealth," Kras'w ya :;ve::cla concluded by promising thai "Soviet fighting men have rallied the ir ranks ever Illore dosely around their leninist party and its Central Committee and arc demonstnlling t heir readiness to t'Onlinue st,uu]i ng Vigilan t guard over socialism."'" The in teresting a.' I>Cci of thi., lasl stalement was thai .\I arsha! Greehko had not been given the opportu nity to rtilly his OW!} ranks arllllncl t he Centr.tl Comm ittee. A s a fu ll Central Cnulluitte(: meUlber. he was eligible 10 attend. but he was in Algeria duriug the ple num , And it was Yepishev and not Gredlko WllU ,lddrcssed the Party aktiv in the Ministry of Defe nse. which unanimously endorsed the \Varsaw Letter. '" JULY 17-20; :\lILITAHY SECURITY ISSUE TAKES PHOMINE NC E
\ Vhile Grechko was still in Alge ria, a press cam paign heg;lIl. signaling a rise in tile importance of the military security issue. Several articles alleged the existent·e of a \Vestern plan to subve rt CzedlOslovakia. One of thesc art icles. publisllCd by Pravda on July 19, purported to quote directly from a secret CI..\ alHI Pentagoll plan for the ""ideolo.\!:ic:ll ~ahot a.\!:e·· of Czechm lovakia as a prelude to the "" Ii1J.cration of East Germany and Czechoslovakia:" The plall ad"ised agents working in Czec1 loslov'lkia 10 mo ni to r "'the degree of
'" "",,,,ny,, .c~",I" . Jul}· 20. I!JbS. " """"'''11'' 'l'~;;;I" , Jut}' 2 1. jIll>/!.
233
the opposi tion forces' (>cnctrati on of the Communist party," an d "of Czechoslovakia's state sccu rity agencies. military intelligence and her t,()lmterintelligem.'c services," In th e words of Pra vda. "the condu ct of direct aggressio n is 10 begi n when, in the opinion orlhe plans' aut hors, ideological sabotage has created the 'rC(luisite situatioll, '" The sit U;I(iOI1 "demands all-oul vigilan t't' and solidarity from
the peoples of the socialist commonwealth. the strengthening: of their defense migh t and readiness to (leal a resol ute rebuff to lIg~ gressive assau lts 011 the positions Or SOCi:llislll." An article on the same day cXIXlsc{1 th e SI.'CTct arms (:ache that
had been found on July 12 ncar Sokolovo in Western Bohemia. Czechosluv:lk minister orthe interior Pavel had already stated that th e nlcksaeks of arms Ilad been clumsil y planted th erc as a "prov ocation," aud rumors in Prap:uc attributcd the cache to E,lst Ge rman machinations. b ut Pfllt;d(i WCllt aheild with th e story on Jul y 19 , The art icle claimed that th e arms had hee n bro ught from the FHG by " Sudetan rcvanchists" and that "the com pleme nt of ~t'i zed wea pons full>, conformed to the needs of an insurrecti on and could be used for act ions by small gron ps of rebels." The appeanlllcc of th ese articles WHS (1I nlO.~ t certainly de.~ign ed In co nvin ce any recalcitrant Icader thilt tIl{' sN;lITity situa ti on had deteriorated markedl y and that Western military and intelligence serviccs. even if th ey were 1I0t initiall y responsible for the rcior m movement, had by noll' develope d a clear and sophislic, heart of the CzechoslovHk Sl'ltc seetlrit>, system. Na tu rally, under such (:o nditions, attention was focused on Czechoslovakia's borGer security. but also and more parti cul ar!>' on the politic;ll situation wilh ill the ke y organs of state security. namely the Ministr}' of the Interior, th e Ministry of Defense . and the party's eighth department. And UIl fortunatel y almos t whe rever Ihe leaders chose to loo k, the)' were alarmed by what th ey saw. Pn:fI{ik Plom' l k.fis/(lIIce
While the five were still holding th eir enclave in Warsaw. Lieutcnant General Prclilik, reacting to thc continued failure of t he Pact High Com ma nd to withdr.lw its filrcl:s from CzedlOslovakia al1l1to the news of the \Varsaw meeting. gave a press conferencc. Prchlik d eplored th e e mergence of a fact ional grouping wi t hin th e Pac t, witnessed, as he saw it. by th e current meeting in \ Varsaw. I-Ie criticized the work of the .~ tate set'urit)' ~yst e lll . which, unde r
~lIch
•
234
TIlE e lll SIS !'EIHOIl
Novotny. had been oriented away frolll L'Ounterespiona),:e toward internal security. and lit: proposed that the rcsllOnsibilit)' I,)r controlling the security foft'es and the military be shifted fro m the party tu the state. For this purpose the reL-enlly established Military and Secu rit~, Aflairs Committee of the National A ssemhl~' should be furth e r stre ngthened. and:l state defense council should be established to discuss "tlle nocessary L~md iti ()ns for working oiH a Czechoslovak military doctrine." l'reh lrk made other rcfcrcnccs to the need fur an independent duetrine , strongly implying also thai any Suviet military interventiun to achieve the permanent stationing of troops would have no legal basis within the fram ework of exist ing bilateral or multilateral agreements. He stated: " 1 myself h,lve lilken interest in the problem as to whether there arc any provisions in the \Varsaw Pact which would entitle the other partners tu arbitrarily s!(ltio n or place the ir unils on the territory of the other memher states. I ha\'e studied all the available mat erials. but I have not found such a section in an y of til e m."' In res ponse tu questions about whilt guarantecs c.~istcd to prevcnt u violation ofCzechoslovukia's state sove re ig nty, Prc hlik's re ply was amhiguous: "In my opiniun. we have unly one way oul and thai is. . to insisllhal we shall not pcrmit iI violation of our state sovereignty. . and tllilt we shall un (.'O mpromisingly demand thai all perti ne nt provisions uf uur treaties an.: respected."' Prchlik made ot lier proposab fu r the reform uf the \VTO structure tu alter an unetl'lal situat iun. As he llescrib~ the existing stmcture, the Pact's "command is form cd hy marshals. ge ner.lls, and oflk-ers of the Sovie t Army and the other armies have only their representatives in this joint (~)m rnal1d . · · "· Prchlik also complained that the Czct:hoslovak leadcrship and the military lmthurilies had been kept in the dark about both the rccent maneuve rs and the promiscd withdr.I\\~.. ls. That Yakuhuvsky had "'failed to fu lfil his promise Ito withdmw \ given to . D ub{-ek and Cemik" cou[d 110t he ignored. The troop withdrawals scheduled for July [3 had been canceled by Yakubovsky and were now set fur Jul y 21. Only 1,500 troops IHld [eft C~.l!Cho.dovak territory. aecording to Prchlik. and Yakubovsky's entire Ileadquarters with its equipment was still in the country. Prchlfk L'Omplained that "'none of the cumpt:lenl Czechusluvak officials has had, ur e ven nllW has, ''' I'ra~ue lladio. Ju ly 15. 19(;/;. 'I'KI"~t Irom llop le,l in l\. oni"~lon . Il"i"',, i" rru~u,.
pr . ~1 · 1 _ 2U.
235
JUNE 27 - jULY 28
any idea as to how many soldiers of the friendly ar mies have been, and how many still are, on our te rritory." "'" Prchlfk's press conference was explosive enough in its content and possible repercussions. But there \\'ere additional indications that Prchlik"s l'all for resisting an y "violation in our state sover· eignly" was in fact a call to develop phllls for military rcsistanl·c. Jin Pelikan later stated that Prchlik "and some of his collaborators submitted to the party Praesidium an alternati ve plan for the case of an invasiu n, suggesting how some military defen se action eould be carried out."' According to Pelikan, "this plan was immediately withdrawn before it was even discussed because it was considered a provocation."' But, as Pelikan states, "there we re people in the Praesidium who probably infor med the Soviet leadership about this matter." '" It is less clear whether the Prague leadership actuall y discussed other forms of civil. nonviolent resistance. An additional investigation carried out by Prehlik fo llOWing his press l"Onference revealed that Soviet military units had installed electronic jamming devices on Czechoslovak soil to which. in the words of Michael StepanekStemmer (a l"Olonel in the ar my and Presiden t Svoboda's advisor and press oUker), "Czechoslovak military experts and supervising bodies had no access."'''' As a result. Stepanek-Stemmer claims, the Dulx-ek leadership, against the votes uf Knhler, Indra, Svestka, and nthers, decided tn "take countermeasures" so that in the event nf inw,sjon the leadership l"Ould ensure their ("Ontaets with the public. Ste panek-Stemmer continues: "A fe w d,lYs hlter Dllix-ek in fact succeeded as a result of an excited tclephnlJ(~ disCllssion with Moscow in persuading the Soviet leadersh ip to dismantle the Soviet military jamming lIppliances and remove tllem from CZl"<:hoslovakia. ""'" Afte r this Stcpllnek-Stemmer claims, "the Czechoslovak mass medi:1 officially halted their prepamlions for the even tuality of an y "'hnn'K. J"I)" 11. 1%11. E t:J2'!2.-I(U I5. '''' rdiloi" in V. V. 1-:",;". ~.J .. Th< C ,.,c/,,,,,l{)ook RA"<.~' IlIe;., .h" hlnled lh.l phon> fu r r~.i,\an<.'" had 10",," d",,,.,, " I'. '" in CTK. Jul y 27. lOOl!: 7",mld.tsU '''''';''V. July 30. 19611, ~nd
RC/lOrlh. J. nuary 16. 1969.
"1<
"' .' 1 ;cluel Stcpa""k·Stc mm" r. Dir t.ch""'",,/.....d ~ .. .~rmu. r . 45. " TI, ;; "" l~'rt ... nl'l~>rh~l h)' on a rt icle; n the Doily r,/,·~"'t,". J"ly 17. 111M . tl~,t the C,......·h .ron y h.d di. c",·~ ,..,.1 «,n, r.>< lin tmn .. nl" ~'" .,,,1 .e,·er.1 j."''''in~ In".u.l;'HI> wl,;d,
""'1' had ",de,c.J J;'",a,,'lc.J .
.,
236
TII~
e lllSIS I' EJIlOD
military intervention from the east,"'!l As is known. however. a lo t of lI!lOffiei;li media preparation l'On tinu etl and iMlTe l i'llil after August 20.
Purges ill the luterior Minislry Prchlik was not th e only leader giving intervi ews in Prague that weTe alarmin g to Mos(.'Ow. On July 16, V. Salgovic, Pavers dep uty in the f.linistry of th e Interior and a proponent of a pro-;\Ioscoll' li ne, announced in an interview that most of the department heads, as well as a number of regional heads, in tIle Directorate of Shill' Secu rity had bee n dismissed.'" O fficial Yugoslav sources
comme nted th at this CUTrell! purge "which took place lust weekend " was "still going on" 'InO was ,kimet] ,It strengthening the power of the progressives. These same sources went on to state th at " th e underground activity of conservative furees-such as distributiun or leanets, the content and pnrpose of which arc strikingly similar to the campaign of some ndghho ring Ctlunt ries llgainsl Cze<.'hoslovakia-is also beillg: linkLod with so me people who arc now being removed:-'''' Also at this time further dismissals of Soviet ad visors or 1;" ; <011 officers were rumored ."" Pavel Tigrid has maintained that these purges in the Ministr~' of the Interior "were th e subject of seveml alarmist reports sent by the Sovie t liaison olTicers to th e ,., igh Command of the \Varsaw p,I(:!. They only serv ed to reinfi)rce M OSL,()W\ growing fears at the dange rous weakening of its inll ue lK'e in th e Czechoslovak ar my alld security forces ." Cernik was later to state, aL'LvrJ ing to Tigrid, that these factors were "the drop which made the cup brim over."'''' Certainly Soviet wo rries were ev ident in the alarmis t art ide puhl ished in Prtlcdll on Jul y 19, alleging that a key object ive of th e C IA's plan to subvert Czedl()slo· '~~ !;d ,,,..1
S"·I",,,,·k.S,,·,,,,,,, ·,. /)1,
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I'.
~ 5.
"' rr"l4u~ lIo&<1i". J"ly 16. 19(".... E £I:!~25lCl2. a"d U",l i,la,,, H.odi". Jul)· 23. lOOS. E t"J283-lIt:12. Sal~o" iC al, o 'lalc~lthat ,ill"'" I%(;. :!';, INd.,,): offiel"l, I" SI.t" S,,,,,,, lI y l"d
"""" di.mi..e d fo, Ihd, romp1kity in the Stalin;,1 lri.I •. Mo'l of Ihe,"" di'lni.ul, h,~II"'t'n j)1",~' in Ih" pa'l fc'w ,,,,,,,,h., .nd .\ licheil'm, Tel~III",1 in I", .11,m,/p"" J"I)' 20. 100s. ,hal ill Il,,, l.ito,1 Jl"'~~. h' enl)·.ni"e Ili>:h ("'>l.11"n.';., ILul h""n ,e",,,,..,d. I n .. ldIU"" 10 Il"",: ",,,"on..J I,)" P""d, II,e SC'<'uril)" . Tld [)d,·"",· (:.'"11,,;11."<" Q( the ~,'l;""al ,\,,,·,,,),1, ' .1"" ,..,. l"",t,.Jly ",mo\"{..J thi"""" I".dill~ "me;"'!> " mainl )' ill the ...",t"I" of .t.. e ",,"UTit)·" al Ihi, linl<". ",:,"n!in~ I". 11c"t ... " n:1~"t hu", V.... ", ... '1," ,1<..1 I»' ,t,,, l)ail~ f:", ........ July 26. 1!16S. ''''!'''Y''!I, J\lI)' 17. 1!l6.~. ~: E I :l1i 2.\I (;I:I . .., P,,·.. I Tig"d. \\'h ~ /J"loll,l rell. p. 64. '''dinla;,,> th.1 d",i,,~ the ''' "''n~' I."') .~""I; of I[' e Stw icl sn"U,il)· i<",:,,,. ,,""II ,. CiL,·lk,,~,,'·ak dt it~'I1' "w.in~"' So"';el "'ki'''.... ,,~.,..: l''''.~. , d .
"' 11 M .. p.
(;.~.
J US ~: 2 j - J UlY
z8
237
\'akia was to ascertain "tI ll! d egree of tbe opposition I(m~:es ' pt~ netra · t ion ofC)'£chos[ovakhl's state sc<:urity agencies" in urder to achieve "the rec ruitment of agen ts to ~''' rry nut subversi\'e s~'he llle •. "
Border Security Border security also {'~JIlt i nue{1 to worr y ~ h)s{.~)\\' a1ltl t lll~ East Eurupean allies. Czcchoslovak admission that more arrests 111:1n IIslial had been made of persons, Illany of them Irom the GD lt trying to cross il!cg:tll}' to the \\'est L'" led the East German allllLllritit~s In th e extremc measure of e recting harbed wire fences "long th eir own hord ers with C)'.ed loslov'lkia. ,,' II was also reported that aft er Jul y 24 both the USSH and the GDH stop ped issuing lomi"t visas to their own citizens for holidays in Czedlllslo\'akia. '" ~ I ()seow. of course. was Itot olLly worried ahou t the ease with whkh people cO\1ld cross to the \Vcst; t hey w.:n : alsu ~'(>neeTllcd "hout the inereas ....J numbe rs of '''estern tu urists in Czcchuslovakia, many of Wl10111 werc jOllrnalists and otTicials visiting Prague OIL t()urist visas hut who nevertheless rc('cived aecess to Czechoslovak uecision lIIakers. ~ l ost worrying tu th.! Soviets \\'iIS 1'r:t!!Ilt~'S apparc nt willi ngne.~s to eneouragc such {.~mtilct s. es pecially wit h \Vcst Germany. It was certain ly lru.! that sever;!! hi.!!1 1olTicials milde inlimnal visits to Pnlgllc in the spr ing and slimmer Illonths : Zhigniew Brzezinski, th e architect of thc U.S. pulicy of "h uild ing bridges": il groUJl of deputies tr01n Bon n who visited Pragul' in ~['Iy to estahlish parliamentary (.~ mt;lets: " 'alt e r Schecl. leader of th t: West German opposition Free Dcmocrat ic party. who had talks with Fore ign ~ li nis t er Jii'L Jl aje k: an d K. )u l), l~. 19r,~. Et:12S2 1/c/b. • ..,1 01",,,,,,, f,'n'i~"
x,."" S" " 'i«' , J"I )" 2 I,
I!~i~.
'"'. ~<;'II \1,
'" '"I,."""iI ..,"III.'lo''' Tdl", ,,,·. ),, 1)' ~r. .
I%S j "t)' 16. ]!)f,s . ,,,,,I A do,., u"..,It., ~ ,,~;"" po lK')" .. h';"" ltJ" "",I 11 ..1""" ~ ch m ;, h 0' \'hih .,",
,.. T'w
C''''nli~",
.
~".
TIU: e lll SIS I'E IU OU
Ilito. . The favorit e me,HlS of crossing the Czechoslovak horder is to proclaim oneself a tourist. T he 'guests' from the \ \'eSI are delighted. 1I 0w easy it h,ls het~ lIlie n()wr'~ Two other R'CUrity m;ltters concerned the So\'iets at this time. Oue was the im pending publit"".Ilion of the report of the Piller Commission 011 the politil'aitriais of tile fiftie s. Although the report was not n~ady in Jul y, a series of arti cles by Karl Kaplan, the chiefrcsearcher for the commission. appeared at this time alleging, amo ng other thi ngs, th,lt Sovid advisors had ,Lcted indepe nde ntl y of the Czechoslovak aut horities. Piller is said In have warned part y lead ers that the report t"ontained sudL "shucking faets that its distribution t"() uld seriously shake the authority of the C I'Cz and some of its chie f rep resentatives." ,. Its puhlil'atiun was postponed, hul, as H. Gordon Skilli ng states, " there is little d oubt that the su m ,Iml substance of the documcnt were well known 10 Soviet authorities.""'" The set~m d iss ue illvolved the Piller Commis."ion·s recom mendation that the political police be d isbanded. Act~)rdill g to Antonin Lie!Lm. the Dllb6;:k leadership approved this ll)eIlservat ive fOfces wi thiu tlw milit:lr y and security appamtu5 heig htened the "siege mentality" of those who re mained and (."QlItributed to the view ill Most-ow that measures had to be take n to prevent a total rout of " healthy forces:' INC HEASED TIM E PHE SSU HE Tile time availa ble lur taking adio n to protect the "health y forces" wa.~ affecte d appreciably by the 'lIl!\OUIl(.-emcnt from Urat islava 011 July 18 that the Slovak Central Committee plenum had decided to b reak with trad it ion and hold their own Slovak Party Congress h c "' I'nt
19(>'1.
'" Shtt ;ng. C=I",.J,,,·~ku." /nlr . .... pl"" u...·,>1",;"". 1'. •110 "'Ibid .. p. 411 . "' l.ie~m in K",;n . ....1.. C"...,h,,./,,,,,k lief""'" .110,"'",,"101 /9611. I" 61.
," "
239
fore the Extr.wrdinary Fourteenth Party Cungress. T his was to insure a unified Slovak stand Oil fcd c wli]..oIt ion propos als tv takc /iJrward 10 Ihc cre]. Congrt~ss. h ul it also wO\lld llllnw a "consistent purgc" of the Slovak Centml Committee and Pwesidium. in t he words ofCustav HUSiik, the proposars main supportcr.... This was an extremely imlJOrta nl event: it mean t that the Soviets were now working toward a deadline not of Septembe r 9 but of August 26, the u(lte the extraordilHiry ('~Hlgrcss of the Sluvak Communist pmt)' \\1JUld open in Bmtisbva. Afte r that congress, t he Sovie ts (.'Ould expect many of the t'Onse rv(ltives, possibly including BiJ'ak, to 1I,lve lost their party positions. T hus an)' '"fraternal assist(Ul(.'C" offered by the Soviets in response to a mil hy "healt hy forces" \\'O uld have to come before August 26. Afte r that d,lte. an ill\'asion \\'Ould be(.1nJle a milch mo re di!Ticlllt op(~ mlion ]Mllit ically, for Soviet for('(:s wo uld have to he used not in support of a " palaec ('Oup" hut to put private eitizcns in puwer. in the proc'Css flouting CVClI further the legitirnaey ofl ht; very Cmnmunist (larty organizations the inYolSion would be mounted to support. POLlTB UHO DIi:C ISIONS: J ULY 20- 2.1
All availahle evidence points to a nllcial meetill)'; (If the Politburo. with the pruh'lblc participation of ot he r kt;y military am] poliHeal leade rs. during tbe weeketJ(1 of J ul~' 20- 21. Three d(;ds iolls were adopted ind uuing tIm key stroltegil' dceisiou to pre pare for a fulJ sC
and
l)ut":"'k.
"
Tin; C IU SIS PEIUOLl
240
confe re nce in return /ti T a commitment to hi lateral talks wit ll th e
Czechoslovaks. ,~, I'resumably IJrczhnc\'. who h;ld been seeking sudl hilatcml talks sinct' the hey:inning of the week. wuuld have agreed. anti so wou ld have Kosygi n. The Pnlithuro duly agreed (dr.cision 33) 110\ to proceed with th e peF call for a European Communis! (.,(JIlference, and the l'ommitmcnl to at least out: further
round of h ilalcwl \;Ilks was renewed.
l'o110trWTC\"
as discussed
above, informed all those Europ ean Communist parties sup port-
ing the Hoelle! proposallhat ~1USL'OW would regard the
L'{JIl"cn i ng
of sllch a conference as a hostile act.'''' A[so a])parcntly discussed dUTing the mcctin.c: was th e status and di spusi tion ufthuse Suvid Iruups st ill in CzcdlUsluvakia. Prag uc's resentment and tension U\'er the rcpeakd P()stpollernen t of troop withJmw,,1 was exa<:e rh"teo hy the ~"lIls t ,,"t rellclati() II s ill the Czcchoslovak press that jamming equipment lmd been dis~'o\'ercd. t hat the Soviet military headquarters had not ye l been dismant led, th:lt the postexercise e\';ll u;l\ioll of the perfOTl11an<:e of the (:SS H (Ir illed f()rCI~S had (,'()!lcluded th lw we re unable to hold (I defens ive line f(lf the requisit e sevcnty-two hou rs. that th e Pmgue leadership had 11 0 d irl'l"\l1("ces.' to Soviet milita ry personnel still in Czechuslu~o OIL Th e m:xt prom ise(\ dcmlline for the withdm\\'a! of Soviet troop s
vakia, and
was Jul y 21, and dearl y a decision had to be made. One option was open refusal to wi thd mw, t hu s sparking oil' ,lrl inuILedialc political crisis. Such an option would have forestalled bilateral talks. amI its su<-,,:css would have depend ed un poiitimi <-v llaborators being i)) place -"'e .,,",.l.~ -k ><' m\ld, ><' ,h .. d,,, ",',',,1 u.t ",It.]>", ,,[ hi' t",.h), . ",1 Ihe ~«J , ~. hi' I~,t;' ic.) "'"..... I..,·" t"",« '-ari,n"l )" """rilK'd 10 il - (Auwn'" Lid"n, -E~,,)o(omm\lni,'" aud the I'r"~ut' Sp'I\I~." in G . II. U,h.:m. rd .• C""m"",;,r flrfi'''''w''~''', 1'- 9'J). Ih'!>'" fdl ill in 1')6<). 'lC'W I" ""',,,.,'•. In in'e,· ,.;.,v.. in I... Figtl , ,, , ""hn'"~' 2-1 . 1977. S,,,·;.I;,, 1,·",1". CIt)" ~ 1 "lIet ,I,., h~ h.tI b lk"l tu ll"d'~1 jll J"t)· 19f" , ;Uk' hi' ,du", [">Il' I'r,'~"" "",I Ihe ,,,tL'I,,e "fi,i, 1""1",,,,1 ["T" ",ml"'-"n,,'.- "Af' er hi, re'u", {" .,n l'r.~"c . I~ ",I,,·, " .• , '0' I""~,,, Ih~ ... "". ,""" _ li e " "., ill 'he ("""'''' "f drinK O'-N CR'Ch".lo,".dd.o: ·
!i"'''
"a'..,;
.n
JUNE 1l7 - JULY 28
241
Time was running out. however, and the strength of the conservati ve fnrces in the CSSH was being liIulennined to the e~ t ent t hat the eunlinge nt of Soviet troops still in Czt."Choslovakia might nol he sufficient to achieve even minimum I}()litical objectives. A second military option was tlle rclore considered. and because of the pressure of ti me. adopted. T his was the option of a full- scale invasion of CzedlOslovaki:l by the combine{llort.'es of the five. Judging from the extremely high level of military activity from July 23 to August lO- including the mobilization of hund reds of thousands of soldiers in tIle USSH, the GDH. and Pohllld- it .~eems deur tlult this optiun was only adopll'd at the July 20-21 meeting. It mar very well have been discussed previously, and judging from the swiftness with whieh the mobili7.alion was orga ni zed, L'O tn ing onl y two days afte r the decision. it would indeed appear that the Soviet High Command was quite ready for this t'Ontingency. The upenltiun of the plan inclutJ.:d the transfer of military ctllllmand from \Varsaw Pac! Headqnarters to the Soviet Hig.h Command. the mob ili~~Ltion of reservis ts, the req LL L~itioning of <:lvilian tnLtlsporl, the place ment of trooJls. fuel supplics. and logist ical and comm unication e4uipme nt in a ring around C7.eciloslovakia, and the appointlIIe nt military l'Om1tlaIllJers 10 handle Ihe ope ratioll. NUlle of Ihese measures were taken before Jul y 23, and they {.1mtin ued unabated up until Augnst 10, whe n ... 11 t he military for{."()s wcn t into a holding pattern. awaiting final in st rudions. The Soviet leadership dealt with four possible options al th is meeting: (I)thc Hoellet initiati ve, which it rejected; (2j hi!ateral negotiatiolJs. which wcrc lKt.:Cph:d but witluHLt great opt imism; (3) t he use of military force s still ill Czechoslovakhl to support a palace l..'O up. also apparen tly rejl..'(:ted as un likely to sU{."(."eeli; and (4) full inva.~ion. If these we re the alternatives. ",hat we re the objectives and Ihe sl>ccific points of agreement and decision that carne out oft he meeting? Moving be yund the decision to rejeet the Rocbet initiative (deci.1ion 33). the Politburo agre.:d that the deteriorating security situation in Czechus luvakia warran tcd im mediate atten tiun . A«.'Ordingly the), decided (decisirlll 34) to send an o!~ fleial note to the Czechuslovak leadership demanding. among other things, the immediate stationing of troops. The liote. which was delivered by A1l11)(1ssador Chen'onenko on " Ionday. Jnly 22. demande d the stationing of troops on tbe basis uf a previous agreement with Novotn y that station ing would be allowed if it became necessary. The Soviets argued that the arms ("ache had proved the
or
T il E e lll SIS I'HUOD
laxness of bonie r SCl'Urity and that the poor performance of the C7.echosiovak armed for('es ill the recent manell vers had proved th e ir inahility to hold their positions fur th e 72 hu urs rC{jll ired for the arriva l of Soviet reinforce ments. ~ I oren\'e r, cadre changes h:.d made certa in e lements with in th e armed lorces pulitita!ly lIme liahle. ;IllJ th.: note J cm;mded that Pn.:lllfk in partic ular he re muved.'·" Deci.~i(m 35 to prepa re I(lr f" lI·scal e invasio n was almost cert;linly not adopted without considerab le de bate and dissent. The eud extent of the d isse nt cannot he measured , but it was kllowll in ho th Eastcrn Europc alul the \Vcst tlrat dccp {Iivisio ns wcrc expressed at this meeting an d were resolved by a compromise. albeit Olle th at favo red inlt:rnmtiouist opiniun. In \Vashingtun. l'ah1(:s we re recei ved from hoth Ambassador Beam in Prague and Am hassador Thompson in ~"os("Qw that an in\'a.~ion now seemed almost inevitah le. '''' Se(:rct ar y of State Husk. rel ying on a report fro m Chil) Bohlen in " l o~cuw, tuld President Johnson th at "th e udu.~ we re {lO to 40 lilr a Soviet-led in vas ion.·· ...' As a ('Onscqll cnce. ull Jip[oll1,ltic leave W,L~ pos tponed , am1 a spe cial State Departmen t c risis un it was es tablished to munitor cvents around the d ock."'" As tu th e ex tent of d ivision w ithin the Kremlin . oth e r evidence seems to snpport th e concl usions rea clwd in a ll:ngthy. sCl'rd rcport. rel ease d to th e aut hor unde r the U.S . Freedom of In forma t ion Act. Prepared lilr SCl"Tet,lr), uf State Husk Ull Jul y 22, immediately following the wec kell,1 Polithuro meeting. the re port is entitled "Czechoslovakia- The Pros and Cons of SOl'iet :\ Iilitary Acti un." "~ EX'llIJinillg inact ion a s an opti un. the re port conduu ed ... u.s. De\>;I.rlmr nt of Stotc. /,,,,lIIw"a ,",~~ .\ ;6. J" ly 22. 1\1&1, T,'('S""'''' 2f169J1i. JlIly 23, 1966. 10 ,\11 Ell n~"'a" Dip~lll"I~' 1\» 1" Pr.~' ... !\lIdio. Jill)' N . I9r.s. ~;E /2Ii3O/1 ~1\\1 Jll ly 2-1. 19b/l. E E I2-'j.'J()/c/2 . Sn,/xH/"" . 1",,(>. Jul)' 2-1 . 190"'>11; Tall)· lI ~. Jill.' 23. l tof>'i . ill IlFE. H,'.... ...,I,. C=h".j",'«k~,. 1\lll 26. 1U6S, 11,,' rim... ~Ild Ihe (;"""/.,,', 1111 ), 23, 1\)bK ~n c<>u1d I..,·c b.·cn ",Ii,hod h)' Ihe .I"h"n;n~ of. !imiled numbe, o[ lrool" (in partiru!ar. "r~· h :):ie f""",...,. ami a lO""h """" 'hoole.' ,el(.,.", mm'cmelll could I""'e I"",,, .I to"",! to roll ' liml<' ,,,,hinde,,,,,I" t ~lI}'nit, .\ 'Dchtf" ..' , p. 2\)/j), "''' "1 1.,, . ill l,'''·jew ,..ilh I"", d, II".,.., S.,.'eml"" 16 , 1971), "I.. , ,I ... illl""'j,,,,· .... uh Il~"",
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that there had already been "grumbling from the party bureaucr.lcy" to the elfect that inact io n hy " the top Soviet leaders" was the cause of the currcnt imp:l ~se and that action th crefore had to be taken to break out of it. The itnpatienl"C of the intervention ists was rdlected in a July 22 PfflVr/l/ editori al that asked, almos t in exasperation: ··Can it he th at one should wait until the l"Qunterrevolutionary forces become master of the situation in Czechoslov,lkia before giving Imlile to t hem?'" It ,lJlpeared IIHlt eveu thnse in the party 11lIn:aucracy who might nut have "!Vored an im"l.~ ion had by now al'<-"epted it as almost inevitable. ~likhail Vosl en sk ~', who worked durin g 1968 as an al\viser ttl the Central Committ ee on \\'estern policy and as the secretary of the Disarmamen t Commission of the Academy ofScieIK·{;S, rl....~llIn t s a (.1mvers:llion Oil Jul y 19 with V. A. Kirillin, himself a Soviet Celllmi Committee memher and a d eputy pre mie r in charge of the State Commillee for Selenee and Tedl1lology, in which Kirillin staled that un[(lrtunatcly ·'extre me measures·· migh t he nl'CesS;U)' ,Igainst Cze<:!lOslovakia. TIlt) same view was exp ressed three dars late r to Voslcnsk)' by anotlle r Central Comm ittee ofilcial. le ading hilll to record in his d i;lry on Jul y 29 that ··the MoS(~)w people " were read y to sma5h Czechoslnvakia withuut reference tu its effect on the Commu nist parties in Europe in onler to set an example for the intelligentsia in the Sovie t Union ...... Simi];lr pressure [or il)\·;Isiul) W,IS belng cxt;rh;{1 frum l"er t"ill uf :-' Ios(.'(lw·s East Eu ropea n ..lli{·s, T I", East Ger ma ns typically weI"(; most l"Qlll'CfIled . with the SED Central Committee declaring on Jul~· 19 t hat "we stand fir mly hcsille O Ul" Czedl l1J mrades in the necessary fight :· "" In I'olalili. the July Hl 'frY/llmll lue/I/openly attacked Dllheek b y name. the firs t time 'Ul~' organ in t he bloc press had d one so, and dism isst..'(l his protestation s o f lo~·alt y to Communism ;>s "r<m~s\lring words eU ll tJ, lJiekd hy fads,·' As Iisual, onl y the Hu ng .. ri:ms showed an~· sympath y !ow,\rd I' r"glle. H ungarian par ty leaders had not matched t ile d"mallli.> of the other \\'a r~aw signatories fo r biiater..1 talks. The~' also 1",<1 h roken the ;I)!reement reached in \ Varsaw to adopt uniform press t·overage hy aut ho rizing the immedi ate release of the text of the Warsaw Leiter alld hy;\Ilowing tIle puhlication of e'xl'erpts from the C I'Cz Praesidi um re ply to the lette r. In addition . Hungary had printc{1 the Czedluslovak "" kr S/,ku"/. "u. 3-1, ",,~.,,\ 21. 197~ .
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n n: e lllSIS !'E!HOO ve rsion of th e arills cad!e in Bohemia ,I!onl!silh, Soviet ,ll1ej!:tti o ns tlmt the wcapo ns had bec n plan ted hy "Slilictan revalll:his ts ... .." T he seercl U.S. State Depa rtm ent report to Husk stated tlHlt "a tlecision on lise of force agai ns t a Commn n ist (.·mllltry wo uld be ,I d itHcult one for tIll! Soviet !e,ldll r.s" ,:speciali y in light "f "(li/lcrC1K'eS wit h in the Polithu ro on wh,lt t he effects of Soviet action versus inad ioll wo uld be," T he New l'ork Ti me,~ of August i( quoti ng " highl y pla<x d .sOIm:es ill I~ast Berli n:' relcas(~d a story t hat th e So\'iet Uni on and Eas t C e rman y had come close to in vad ing C ZI..>choslov" ki" in ,n id-Ju ly. bul t h,,1 motienlte el,~ n ..:nts "ill the Suv iel leadersh ip succeed ed in defl ecling 'OIl tIm lI th hour' th use who favored illvasion an d ul t imately pers\lad ed th em tu sett le fo r t he S ()Vit:l-C~.echos lovak meeti ng at (;ien m," Tht~ r,ltinn alc lil r ,Iclio n passed on to ~·l os(.'()w hy t he E:a.~ t G ermans. according to t he sou rce, was that D ul>l:t k an d the rclun ners we rt! like "a ro tt c n fi sh t hat b(~gins stin king ,I t th.: head," T in: pretext wo uld 11<1\,(' het:11 t he Ju ly 19 revelations ahou t t he arms cach e , which wo ul.1 be use.l as a siglUll for remai n ing t~ HL sc r\'a t i\'cs ill )'r.,I).!;ue to "rise up iUl d cry fur help," wi th th e rellloval of Dub<:'c k and his fiJ llowers as th e objeeliv(>, T h e Il rohlem in Moscow. "'-...~>nl i ng to this s(m r c" , "'liS II",t most Soviet leaders still had f:lith ill Dullte k hu t helieved he WflS tryi!l~ to "ri. le UII t hc back of a ti ),!;er," III mid-Ju ly, th e illformant con tinued, "Mos('~ JW hridly lea ned tuwar.1 th e Eas t Ge rman in terp reta t ion bu t revert cd SOO Il to its uriginal theu ry:' The U,S, repu rt stated th at invasiu n W,IS he ing res isted hy two grou ps. There wert: those \\'1)(1 fc .. red th e negll t iv(~ rcp,:rellssions of invas ion on E;\st-\Vest relati ons and on th e planne d Inte rnational C om m unis t C"n f{: r'~ Il(.'e ; '1I1I111,o: rc we re Ihost;: who "d illi,r in Iheir read ing of the tact ical situation - had t he moment liJr mili tarv acti on ,LrrivcdT An.1 could a Jl uppe t re),!;i me ins t'llIc.1 b ~· lu rtt in Cz.:chos!o"a kia (:\,e r he viahle? H:ars .. ho ul the possih!.:: rep,;r-'-;lIssions "f lin invasion on th e S" vid Union's slandill).!; in Ihe inle rn ati onal comml mi ty ce rt ainly do ap pear to ha ve hee n d iscussed at th is meeti ng, for th e following week Soviet ,111lhaSS,ldors nwde ,Ip pruaehes tu \ \'es te rn Illn"i),!;]) ministries (.lhcussed heluw), Also th e Soviet leaders may have lwen sOll1cwhal myst ified hy lite likel y U, S. reactio n to an invas io n. O n Jul y 17. "qualified ini()r ma nts" reported that the Unilcd Stales had ad\'isc. ll'. losl'ow th at Eas t-\\'t'st Do Scu; )'o,k 1'i" .... , A" ~">t ~ , b", ";11,,,",, ,h~ I." st·"l"n.,."
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,"
JU]\;E 27 - JUL" 28
245
cooperat io n would he imperiled by an invasi on. »~ But nn the next d ay, Set'rotary of State Rusk went uut of his wa~' to disdaim tile report an d insiste.1 thai tile U"ited St;,les had ""I e.~!,resse d its concern to the Russians, twice statin g emphat ically Ihat "we have not in\"ok(.'"tl ourselves in this in au y w'IY.·· ~" The following (ht~" a State Department official appeared tn hacktraek h y sayin g he was not "rulinj! Ollt Ih .~ possihility of a t"(ltll'crS;lli nll betwecn an official of th e United States guve rnm ent an(1 an ul1icial of the Soviet guvern mcnt on the suhject of Czechoslovakia... ",.. Thcn , to comple tel y 1..'(mfi.lse th e sit uat ion, tile State D epart men t mailltained on l illy 2.0 that "onc or two Amc~rica n diplOl\l,lts may have infim naliy discu sscd th e crisis with Hussians, hut i nsi~t they \\'e T(~ not instn lcted tn do so." .... Signa ls l.."O ming fmm Washi llgtcm may well ha ve j!ivell th e Politllllm reason to hcliev(! that intern at io nal relX!rt"lIssions \\lJUld bc limitcd. evcn millimaL hut t here was st ill sum c ulleertaillt y. The final dt."l..'isiull (mun/)I:( 35 ) of this long amI I.."OllIplicated meeting WitS nnc.:e ;Igain ;11..·vmpru luise. F;n;ti prep;lrations for a filII invasio n were ordered. The militar y l\Xl\Ild not he read y for sueil an e~ t reme Ill<1, <"011<1.,,><1 ,,( A!lw, I<"" ,~r.d,l< ('".It;n ~ 'oJ ,I, " "" ,." , ... " ,of S,"'i<'1 "I~,,",l, "1;,,,,;,1, .",1 oChpr mon_ nwnl"')' I" cl ... Am~'i<"n 1"''''. " I'C')' k,,,,·h 1' ,lil'k""ah,· ..tfo,! ;",h·,1. \I ·o.,I';"CI"" I, A,,~,," U . 19&1. '" /ntr" •• riu,,,,1 1/,·,.1,1 r,.;J",,,r. Jll"· Iil, l\lfiS.
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Pulitburo made nny puhlic eomment on Czeehuslovakia until well alier t he invasioll-nut ulle except Prime :'lillister Kusygin, who managed on July 25, in the course of a mecling with C:j>;('cho~l (j\'
Having exte nded a puu\ic invitatiun to the C I'Cz Pmesidiu m to attend !.ihller«1 t"lks (.1.;<;i..ioll 32, 011 j uly 19), and Il:lving rl~n mrm cd that d ecision durin g their weekend meeting, the Soviet leadership w;lited for the Czechoslovak response. Dilbeck on<-'t! again refused to leavc Czechoslovak territory; amI late on Jul y 22, thc same d«y that the talks we re originally scheduled to wgi n, the Politburo b,lt'ked down , a)p'eeing ( deci~' ivlI 36) 10 lIeguti,ltiullS un Czechusluva k soil uut heartenc{1 no douht by the C,.edlOslu\'ak decision that theirenlirc Pr:lCs idiu m wuu ld be rCI',·cse nl c d . '" Neg u ti"ti" ns werc to begin at the cn(\ oftbe month in the vilbgt! orCi<-nw nad Tis(}II , on the Czechoslovak-Soviet oord er. It was ,Ilso 0 11 :'1CTlmment stationing of Soviet troops and the dismissal of Lie utenant Gener.ll Prdllik. The <.:harges "buut la~ l>ordcr securit y were resisted. iI.-lajor General Karcll'eprn y, the cmnmand er of t he Cz{.'Choslovak Border Guards, tummented on July 23 about ~ Io s <->(w/s ('tlneern over the arms cad le and hl_x l,m rd cr set-urH}'; "I UII derstand th is concern: and I also fu ll y unde rstand that (>co ple should see a <-'Onnect io n between wcupons being found on our tcrritory and the standard of the d.,.rense of our state Irontier. I can reasonahly state that in rCt'cnt years we huve apprehended all violators of the frontie r coming from eapitalist states. "." Despite this denial, the Soviet note evoked widespread concern. A meeti ng of the N;ltional Assembly's Defense and Seeurit)' '" frQll k!lIr','" '\II~
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Committee was <-'onvlmed "in view of {;ert
moval. vchemently denying nunors tlwt military
m easurc.~
would
be taken to counter a Soviet invasion .,.. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovaks <-"Ontinued to resist Soviet pressures for the permanen t st,ltiolli ng oftrnops; ,md although the nole resulted in Prehlfk's dismissal and clear signals that any Soviet military move would not be resisted b y the Czech ar my, the Soviet victor y was not <-'O T1I plete. As a t~)f\ce.~silln to domest ic supporl for Pn:hlik. the strategically key department he headed was also abolished, thereby renloving in one blow a powerfu llcvcr of parly <-'O iltrol over the state s(!Curity services. Furthe rmore, I'rt:hlfk W'l~ reassigned to he,ld the Cwchoslovak military district in Eastern Slov
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TH E CIUSIS PE UlO [)
p ress Ull the Cwdwslovaks fu r the shee r "impudence" of th eir 1,eha\"ior."'" Duuhts \\'cn~ n~isc(1 alll)\lt thO! CPC7. l(·,~dl:rship's (;;1pahility and wilIingness to pre ven t a "political catastrophe," and indiv idual l",ulcrs wcre s i n~l ed out in th e SHvid pn~s~ for ,Ienunl'iati on, "" The we:lkening of de mocrat ic ce lltr.lIL~m was or sppcial (,~mcern, witll specific ment ioll made of th e soon-!o-h,~ - puhlished draft C I'C7. stat utes allowing the prum ul ~at i on uf m in urity views. :>.I<' A co mmentary hY:1 military offieer un CDH radio eame doser Ihan any other to eallin!-\ openly for in vasio n, Col. Karl Dittmer statcd 'Ill J lJl~' 22 tha I "Ilo e \\'arsaw Pad has always proved ilsel!'" n·liah l,: instrument fur p reserving pcaec. In 1851;, the Soviet troops, loya l to their internat iunal nhligation, re ndered fnllcrnal aid to th e revolutionary liln.'Cs of th e people in Hunga ry," Alh:r !juoting the exa m pIc of August 1961 in Ih e CDn when th e \\'all "'
(Iuct. " :!.li This was followcd on J\lly 24 hy an oll1cial statemen t from 11", SE: D l'oliII", r" Iha \ ,'v,'" , inc., Ill<' \Varsaw nlt'(· lin J.(, tl ".:r<· I",,1
hccr) Sij!;M of;\ ".nc[),wi r\ g (Ictcrio!';\ti on in Czc('\)()Slo\,;\kia. ''''' This view linmd suppur t in Poland when , on }lIly 2,:;, tl ..: I}<\rty paper, 'fi'!!fIUHII furlrl. stated that if :lIl ything the Czechosluv:Lk repl~· to th e \Varsaw Letter had only im: reilsed t he anxiety Ill' I'TaJ:tue', alii," allo1l 1 II", will ing"':ss of Ihc CPC~. leaders hip to struggle lIj.!;"illSl :mlisuci:Llisl cle menl s, '~' An llrtil'ie in th e Polish al'ln ~: newspHper Zolllicl'z I',,{ski on J u l~' 2/; wen t e\'en li,r ther: "The C7.ech people arc so hewi!dered h~' whut has happe ned th e past mo nths Ihal Ih,:y ('c ali llol d isl illgllis!, 1,..\ """' n Iru th ,mel t:.lse huuds: il i_s t ime t he Czechoslovak annr restored (lrder," Three days hIle r the TIIilitHry jllll r u,,1 Zolllim'Z \\'iJl"(),~d slaled thaI Ihe Polis!1 arilled fon_'Cs, " l;lit hili I to t heir all ic'll ubligat ions res ul t ing fTl)l1l I'obml's Illem Ile rship in the \Varsaw Pad. will tloc\'c rythinJ,: in thc ir powc r to prcvent til(' enemy from lIl:Lking ;1 hre:I(:I, ill IlL\' fra(ernal l;Hn il l' of sl)<:ial ist n
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'" l'nA,lik i" kro.,,,"'1" ~",',d" , J(1)' 2-1, I II!;~: I'.I,.~J in b-e,';"_ July 2 1, 19('>6, S,,,,jd!,ok i" I.;I" '-'''''''''"yd ~"''''d , J"ly Z·' , 1!1f>'i: Sik I,,' I'm, ',/" , ) "I ~' 2.~, 1!)(;~ "" I'"rr ',/" , Jul)' 2.~. [!)611, ." lhJ;" GIlB . Jul y 2~, 1IJ(>'!, EE /2~2~1<': 1 4 "' X,'''' ),,,k '( j",c. , ),,1\' 2.~ , HlIO'i_ " " ',\ 1', J"I) 2.1_ Illf>"'. ~: f: 12I>:iII l.
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JUNt,: '!i-JULY
249
z8
tlllln tr ies. ··.uTbis was tilt: same messa!:,' tllnta incd in a declara tilln issued hy th e Bulgarian Central Committ ee. whith agreed that since the \Varsaw rnl..'Cting, 1.."o11l1terr(.'\·ulutiull~'ry furl'cs ,,:,t! bCt"O lllc "lIIore active" and that the Bulgar iau \lart y, "gravely alarmed" by cu rrent developments, "will spare no efforts to strengthen the milit:mt un ity between the socialist l'()untries. " lUI Even the Hu ngarians were fllrced to admi t that ;wtion I,,\(.! to IXl taken by the CZl-choslovak leadership against rightist clements. The Hungarian leadership offered adl'il.."C. as in this cditori,l l from ,\'e/ls~tl!Jad.! II . Polk . ··H.fi ....ii"", "" th~ C, ....·b."I",·.kl,u Io".,,,,i'M':· 1' . 3~ . .... 1 "t~,, ·M:w "n t>;',,"emh~, 14. 1!179. wiLl. 1'. ,,1 Cook. 'I""'ial ",1"1"" Lo Llw. dl,<.'C t<>r "f t h~ Boreo" uf I ntdli~c"<,,, "n" l\c.c~reh. U. S. SL"t ~ l>Cp,,,Lm(·,,t. who W,," in LI", U.S . e,,,l.,.,,, in ~1 ,,=,,' In L96II.
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requisitioned by th e milita ry, and hot h t he summcr Iwr\,cst ,Ind ci\'il transpor t pmdil'ally l';\ me to a stands till """ Th e man in charge uf th c cxe rcises, arm y ge neral S, S, ~-1arya kh in, depulY minister uf det~nse and chief of Hear Sl:rviccs, l,mfi rm ed that these (:xt:rcises of rea r support troops were the largest eve r t1mdueted in Soviet h istory and thill their function WiL~ to perlcd l'1)mmnniea tiuns mul improve supply tu Ihe front li ne,"'"' It was dea r t hai in this cas" Ihe fro nt line Wa_~ II", bu rdt:r wilh C~.eehosl o vakia and not \\'est ern Europe. A l'1)m ll11ltl ieations eenler was cst,lblishcd just llorth of C ies7.yn un th e l'olish-Czt:ellOsIO\'ak fro ntier, and Buss ian troops hegan to pour into Poland, where ther wert: stal ioned in areas adjacellt tu Czechusluva kia al ul1~ide troops that hadjlLstIH":11 withd r;lwll fmm Czed loslovakia. The movel uent of7,5.()OU Soviet truop s along; the C DB honler with Czechoslovaki ,l was also rcpor ted."" as was t he publicized alcr t and partialmuhi!i~~l t i{)1l of East Ger m,11l ,I rmcd fur<:t~s filT three .lays al Ihe " uti of JIII~', justi fied to th e troops by th e nccd fur vigilancc durin g th e pTt'par.lliulls for Ih" NATO exe rci se "BI'lck Litl1,." ~" The ...~ml mander qf NATO's Central Army Croup late r t111llirmed as "a !:Iet of conside rah lc si).:;nificallt·c" that t hc Suvic t units wilhtl J"wll fi'om Cwt'llOslo\'akia at thi s lime (the pIIllont hild rel~) ln 1\)t:l ll"(:d follOWing ])uhtck's ,Ign~elllent to bilateral talks) "did not retlll'1l tu Imllle slatio llS I,ut remained in cnl'a mplIlt:nis "TO il lid the C,.ed, hordeI'. " Oil O n Jill,' 25, extemin: air defense excrcises in t he B ,dtic-~ I uscow Bbck S,~a triangl,· w.:n ' il1lnOll!ll~· 'I. ' " Code-nmllt:d "Skyslticltl," HI(' exerci ses werc cont rolled by ;" Illrshlll I'. F. Bati ts ky. Crechko vi,itcd tll c he adquarters uf lhe e.x crdscs, whi ch 1a.~lcJ unt il Jilly 31 , when K,-f/suII!l1I ;;~t:;:,dll all1lO1111Ced tl'dl" sllccess!'1 11 c()lnpl ct i ()n. ~" o.~ -,""W
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\Vit h th ese cxcrcis c ~ th e Sovie t ,Irmy, the navy (which h;ld h ec n on maneu vers in th e Balik'). mHI th e air defense furecs werl! all mubiIi......·." :llollg with tl,,: 1\,1;,,1, 'Ill{1 Eas\ GeT man "nuil's 'lIld tlwi r navics. The Hnngarian lind Bnlg;lri;l1l ;mnies and Sovie t fon::es sta· tiun ed in Hungary were not, howeve r. ;nmlved until mid-August . immediately prior to th t: in vasio n . As late r evellts were to show. the " Nemcn" and "Sky Shield" exercises dk't:t i vel~' acted as a cove r for the logistical lind air build' lIp Ii,r th e Augus t in vasion. \Ves tern military intelligc m:e was su h~t:q ll t: ntly forced tu admit that the sU(:(:cssfu\ camouflage by tile USS H of its milit,lry build·up led NATO chiefs to "misintcrpret" th e rear sen ·k·c ewrcisc, which "was not given due we ight ill t he in te llige m.:e cstimatc, ho tll (lIlr own and those of h igher llc adq\Jarh~ rs:" ~ A flJrtht~r impo rtant indicator that the key d...'Cision Ull llIilitar~' interven ti un had bt:t:ll takc n prior 10 th e beginning nftll C "i\"t~ mell" exe rcises Oil JlI lr 23 was the shift in tlw locu~ of l'Olll mand fruUl the Warsaw Pact High Cummand tu til e Soviet ~'Iinis tr y uf Defe nse. AI 110 point in the Soviet press n )\'cragc of the "]\;C1I1CI1" and " Sky Shield" e~ ereiscs was any mention madc of the \\',ll"'\all' Pad stan; evcn thuu gh thc armies of mure than une \Varsaw Pact stal e were il1\"olved. "" In th e midst ofth e.~c military 11lan ell\'c r~, Gredlko i ~sllcd an Or· der uf the Day un July 27. published in Pravda , stating that " the paramoun t task of th e Suviet armed forces is to hlrther raise tll e ir combat rcadin ess." This W;IS m;\de I1 t:ce.iSHry by the directivc of the July C e ntral Comm ittee plen um "for fu rthe r strengt hen ing th e ...'Ohesiun ur t he soc'ialist ...1lm IlIUII i t~' Oil I he b"sis " r t ht: prillt'ip!e uf proletarian inte rnati onalism and lor a resolute stmggle li, r thc calise nfsoeialism." It is in terestin g to noll" . however, that Greehko's statement . iss ued on Navy Day. still pllt "the criminal war th e USA is conducting in Vie ln,lm" above "the atte mpts ufinternatiunal imperialism to make a breadl in the socialist syste m and to altcr I he Imlan ...-c of lilrccs to il s own advan tage" in tf lU !ist of activities threaten illg world peace. Grechku seems tu hal'c IISt.-111' mande rs who ultilllately \Ixmld be respons ihle upcnttionally fur thc in vasio n " ...-came 1I10rl: visible, Cene l-al I. G. P''''lu vsky, dc put y .... ",I~ . "'tkfi",1i"", "" 1i ,~ C,.•:d".,~"·~'I,," 111".,1"". ' p. 32. • r.
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m inister of defense an d chief of ground filrces , wrote an art icle in Kmma!la ;;vezdll on July 26, choosing ,IS his suhject ,I particularly interes tin g Hlltl topic'll issue, the importance of murale, discipli ne , and psychological facturs in an army's p repmedncss for war un der "t llC current difficult an d complex eonditiolls." Gene ral S. M . Shkmenk", whose prumut ion to the <,'h ief of stan' of the Juint Armed Forces of the \ V1'O (n:placing General :\1. I. Ka7~lku\") was no t ,It\nOllllt'ed until earl y Augus t, was, huwever, present at a meeting 1l(;ld in tIl(: Suviet :\1 inistry of Defense on Ju ly 29. I' n :sell t at th e Illeeting, announced hy the East German news ageney, were Gene ral Heinz Il uUlmmn, the GD n minish~ r of def(!llsc and prohably th e most inA uential non-Sovi et mi litary <.'ommsitioll Oll C/.cdltJsloV
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liun was an "internal" Commun ist matter uf l\{) l11llCern 10 \Vasllington,"" A Stale Department memo ('o nduded that l1. I OSL'(lW, in eak-lltaH"g: the <-1)st "f invasion. ",w)"IJ havc tu c~pt~d c'I1,,:dlntiull ur postponement of talks with Ih., U.S. un .~I rat egic ;mllS, Hml th ey may exped a step up in d(~ femt~ ~pcnding; in tlw U.S. and in Weste rn Eurupe. " 21' Bllt riO militar y UJuntermeasurt's of any kind we re cm'isaged by the L'nited St,II(:s. "resident julmso n's pe rsOIHII illterest in arms limitation talks was well known. and he (."ertainly guvc no indication Ihat th ese talks wou It! be c:lllcdet! or postpollcd in th e event of a erisis in Cent r.ll Europe. On the (1I1ltmry. HI the ve ry lime tlmt hundreds of thousands of So vie I. East German, and Polish troops were being mobilizell in timl1atio!lS enci reiing Czechoslovakia, Johnson held a pn:ss clllltcrCn('C deebring his pursu it of arms limitation talks with ;\loS(.'(lw as th e most important single elfort of his olllce and the one he desired to slK~..:ed in most !" \Vashingtoll also in s tr\J ch~ll NATO headquarters "not to exacerbate the in terual political struggle in Czel"lwslovukia hy stepping up of e"cessive land or ai,. patmlling and. to avoid any sorl of" incident or a('(.·idental over-fli ght in t he sensitive area of the Czech border.""" In the words ol"th.: u.s. illn!Jassador to NATO. "ifwe have any deep-dyed plot in this maller, it i~ to keep we ll out of it ... ~ " On July 24, the lhlY after opcr.ltion "Nemen" was annuunce d, the \Vest Germilll govern men t. al Amerk-,ul urg:ing. arHlOunl'Cd thilt the "Black Lion " mane ",·cr.' sc!tctl"led for mid-Septe mber had been moved from an area ncar the Cwchoslo\'ak lJO rder to a less "provocal ive" venue 120 miles s()"th we., t of the tJr igi",,1 site"" The Soviets, at~~>rdin g til th e British (,:thinet minister lIit-hard Crossman, had also inslrudcd their amhass,ldors in every \Vestern cupit"l til "test \\'estern read io"s" to an i,,"ash"' ...... amI L..: rtainly th e re i~ no doubt th at the dominant vicw cxpressed. aC('1)rding to C rossman, was that "there v.'Oul(1 be no response whatsuever and tl);ll th ey [the C7.eehsl must fend for th,~ ",sdves." '" "'LD) Lib"u)", I\Jp",. "I D<~II Ilu ,k. Do> ~. 100'}; ~n int""·;'·,,, with v..."" I\u . l in Stafford. "Si~nallin~ anJ lIe.pun..,." p. tOO. '" U.S. [)"p"rtm~n t of St.(", III"Uil."'''c<" No" 5,5, JIII)"!!:l, 1\168. .., New l"orl n""" . "'"~"'I I. 1966, aho John •.,n. Tlw l;""Gj!r. /,'''",. !'P, ~71l_4S6. ·"P"tk. " Il""'~~~)n. "" tb .. C.""t""1"",k;.,, r,,'''';0,,: 1'. ~) "' Cilrnt;,m .'ic;"""" Monitor (London <""ili"n). Ju t)" 20 -22. Wtili . ... Tin"". J"t)' 25. 1\168: "".I SI.lforo. "S i~"aJtill~ o"J He'txtr'''':· )l. 1Il1. 10, "vide""" of U.S, I"""' '''~ on tbe t·U(; 1" r~ h.. t., th~ .. ",,"{'i.~.,
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T II £ C III SIS PEIlIOIl
\Vith the repeated public assurances ofinal'livity hy the United States
,.. U.S. Del'J , lmenl of Sl,le. 1"1 ,IIi~r"C<" ,' lotr WI . Jnl)' 26. loo.~ . ... rn"·'/4 . J.. I ~ 28. 19("011. 11.,1/" ~l",."w I" ( :"~'l" /"lr 2b, I!lf>S . S 1J12SJ.Ilo\~ ("'''ph,,,;;
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C HAIYfEH NINE
Phase Four: July 29-August 5
THE CIEHNA NEGOTIATIO NS On Monday, July 29, the Soviel negotiating leam arrived by train at the Czcchoslovak border town ofCie rna !lad Tisou. Almost the e nti m top Suvie t pulit icalleadershi p was present, induding all the full Polithuro mc mbers with the exccption of I'uiyansky (rumored to be ill) and Kirile nko. Politbum candidate members De michev, ~tasherov , Kalllshev, and 1'0rl(I1II,lr;;:V were irlcluded, alld Soviet am bas~ador Chervonenko also managed to find his way into the So~ viet dde gation. or the Soviet party leaders who had previuusly been involved e ithe r in negotiating wit h the C~.ed)Oslovaks or in speaking ahout Czechoslovakia, only Grishin and Shchcrhitsky were excluded from the team. Also the ahsence of Andropov, Grec hko, and Gro myko made d caT that this was purely a party conclave. The fu ll c pez Praesi(lium WitS includc(i in the Czec hoslovak delegation, as was j'resiue nt Svoboda and ~I . Jakes, the llcad of tllt~ part)' s Commission on Supervision and Auditing. But whereas the Soviets ('ame full y prepared wit h advisors. l"Omple te documentation of Czechoslovak I>Tess "deviations:' and even a communications system linked to ~10SL"OW and independent of Czechoslovak ("Ontrol, the CzecilOsiovak si(l e clearly was less well prc pan..od and mOTe disunited. z.:lenck ~ nyn d.f" relates tlHlt before the Cierna meeting. the c pe z Praesidium llad met to discuss their negotiating tactics. After two hours of pointless debate, which, according to ~ Ilynaf, seemed more like '"t he editorial 1I0;ll"d of some magazine than an important state funct ion," thc mcdi ng brokllUP, with 255
256
THE CIIJ SIS l'EIUOD
Jifi IHje k ask ing :-.Hyn;'ii· in exaspe nltion: "If this is the party lead ership. I ask you, how can I he \linister of Foreign .'\tEii rsr·' I3n:zlmev opcned th e negotiations at Cie rna. He put 011 thc 'able a thi<.·k pile uf press <.-lI !l ings-smn e from Czt-d, and Slovak p,jpc rs , ot l,ers fmm \Ves tern p"blieatiun s-all(1) mm e nt i n~ Oil Ttl(;en t events in Prague . [t is symptomatic of infurmat ion pm(;essing throughou t th e entire crisis that the tup Suvic t lead ers wurked IrOI11 raw data and not frum th e hrie[~ and Sl1 mlllilril~ s mOTe t~'p i (;ally used by th eir \\'estern counterparts. I3rezllllev Ilsed t he clippin ~s to 1.1)\'I:r c\'l:ry topic fru lI! n,lIl-Cnnullunisl po [it ica! at-li l'ity, th e !cading role of th e party. and press censorship to th c \Vest German "thrca,," bloc uni ty, and CzedlOslu\' ak t()rci!-(n po lit·~·. In a spcI:eh lasting ,tl m<J, t fOllT hours. II rezhm:v repeat ed man y of tIll" demands a! reatly made in the \VarS
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charged tlll~ Czel:hs with repeate d h readlCS of sel'llrit y over th e last mouths-he referred to I' n:h lik's inte rvie w amllhe pu blic det>
The serond day also go t off to ;1 had st,lrt. wit h 13rezhnev (I ngril y tlmt lIlorn ing\ edition of Rude I' ni vo. He was illl'ensecl not over a n ed ito ri al or all article hilI over all advertisellie nt Ii)!' a party secretary's post at the Czechoslovak partv headquarters in Prague , in wl,il:h th e oil ly (IUalificaliolis reqllired we re a un ive rsit y degree.' If t he Sovie ts had reason to he an noyed. so too did th e Czechoslovaks, since on t lwt 1l1Orning I'm vda had published a letter written Iwo weeks earl ie r /iU Iil ni nety-nine Prague wo rke rs, me mbers of a factory peo plc's militia ullit. who de nou nced th e ir l~) lI ntr y lll en 's Jem a lld.~ for wit hdrawal of Sovie t truo p~ from C7.t:1.·l, t1s1,)\·" ki;l. Ye t , accord ing to man~' accounts, it was Preside nt Svohod a's strong spced, in support of Dub':'ek ,lml ti'l' post-J;llllJ;o ry COU TS' : bran di ~ hinJ.!
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that most surprised th e Soviet Icadership, As a ;,:cncral who had lought alongsid e the Re(\ ."rm}, in tlw G rea t I'atriot ie \\'ar, Svohoda commanded l'Ons idemhle personal respect from thc Soviets. :lUd he k ill 11C\'Cr Iwd ; 1I1~' thing hut pr.l ise frum t he Soviet ule di: .. l ie dt:scri hed Soviet suggestions tltat Czt;c!l<Jslovaki a was I,,;traying th e socialist camp as ··inli lm p rehensible:' Ali e r all, there was long-stan d ing Fri,:nush ip hetwccn Ihe Cz.cclHIsluvak and Hussiall peoples. he argll ed. a fri e nd ship that had hee ll tc sle(\ in hattie . As IIII' th e issue of CzedlUslovakia·s wes lern ho rders, he himself had t(Jun·d the l\efell,~I; an·as with J\ l arshal Y:lku hovsky " arlin in tht slim me r; and he d esc ribed how, at the e nd of the tour, th e Sovid mars hal had declared himself impressed with the montie , '''Iui pme n t, and hattIe remli ncss " f t he I ro" ps. A<:l·"r
they called for the scpan\ling
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Soviet Union, and he hdd liS respo nsibl,' _"- In Iltl: (:nsu ill,l! Iracas, SlIdest (and some sources sa)' Kosygin too) mad e d is paraging ,md anli -Semitie re ma rks ahou t Fran tik k Kri egel. callin g him th e '- Jew from Galil-ia. " ·' Kreigcl's I;unily had e migra ted to Czedwsluvakia ii-Hm Galicia duri ng t he Husso- Polish W(tr in the 19i?Os, anti tha t area later was inl'Orpo rated into the USS H, there hy making "riegel particulnrly vulnerahle to Shekst 's ot he rwise Il ldi)ltnd"d "('(;IIS:Ilions thai he harbored separat is t amh itions lor his former 1101llCla nd. At thi s poin t, tIl e lalks l~)lhlps et! , as SlIll'ko vs k},' reo:..ilUn ls: jThe Soviet delegation said1!l whole 101 of Ulltra)!;<:ulls Ihillgs_ wh ich ended in Dubeek gelling up, !lnd We with hinl , bel'all,u wu ,,"crun-t "illin)! to lisl(m an y 101lg('r 10 tl}{',,~ in_lIlts _ Duhi;(' k anuuunred thnt if it was to continlle like that, w<: wo;,.,ld p;lCk lip !llld go h"llle, w<: '\1)"1<1 ,, 't tak,; part anr longer in proC('eding, or that kind_ I got np_ ' Gu,J,~, H"K,k_SI,,' pl, .. ,,1 .. ,J I.l~,'i.t FI"1~! , S,,,,{i"~ l1_ 1'i.3 Idlt _,I .t~ 11",1 "O\)'~i" "\,,, ,,It,~-k,, ! K'''g,>I, ,1".1 11>. ,v,.."
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JULY 29-AUt,;UST 5
lUI>, I went U\,I:r 1<) Che r\'ulle nk" \Vhu was prese nt. I iold hi'" to take it frolll lI,e ill III)' ~"Jr-1~' it y as CI",irrnm, uflhe National A~sclllhly (and to co'wc~' officiall), to his gu\'c rnm cntth at I would not he 113rty
to sudl proceedings, if that was how rcprcsentali\'n of the cssn
werc ire;>tcd, ~"eh I"""il iatin,!: a nd insniti",!: pr
After the talks broke down, i3 rezhne" evidently re<-"t:iv ed three c;llItioning th(: So\'il~ t Un ion aga inst an )' military inlervtmt ion, One was from Tfto, ,\ second, much more strongly wordl'd emotiolwl appeal was front Ce;lU~eSt'IL The third, ddin' rt,<1 to Kirilen ko in Mosc()w by two Span bh Cotlltnllnisb represcttting eightccn European Co mmunist parties and tra nsmitted to Brczhnev, demanded an e nd to Soviet intericrellt't' ill Cz(.·dlOslovak al~ fairs and threatened to call a t~mlCrent'e to cond elllll Soviet hellal/io r," Such a move would have ended ;my hopes ~ I os<-'()w nwy have had of conve nin g th e Intcrnatiorwl COlllnlll llis t Conference, sd ,ed llied firT NO\'cmhc r and being org,lnizcd by S ll,~I{)v and l'onomart;v. It is th ought that as a result of th ese lctters, " i3 rel.hncv, Kosygin and in p'lrt icular Suslllv" h<-'<'ame lllllre cllnciliatory,"' The Soviet lcaders we nt to Dubeek's rail wa~' car, apolog iZing for S hcl c~ (s behavior, saying that he had "exat-:gcrate.\" ; and at'txmling to Srnrkovsky, the y Iried "to reumcile evt: r ythi ng so we wou ld t',IT ry on wil h t he talks ned day,"" \\'ednesday's talks brought the p,lrties much doser to a lIImha vivemli. It started with a private meeting IlI~ twcen Dlihee k an.i Hrezllllev after the latter had co mplained of heing too ill-disposed to hold full-scale negotiatiolls, Bn:zhncv's illness was widel}' reported til llave been political amI not mcdi nl l. 11 was ca us ed, somc say, by criticism fro m his own 1'0litlJllro, and espt't'ially from Suslov, who is said to ha ve accused him of "speaking like Ulhrieht" and 10 have rcmi nd c.l hi m that " th e Soviet l'olithuTlI several wec ks I:arlicr rej"t:ted the forceful approach towards Czechoslovakia ".1\,0leltl~ rs
"Sm,Lo",ky, A" U"finl."..JC'm'...""I;,' .. , \' , 21 , "'\,~M ,\1 ~lIer, Dk r..,I,.c/",;/".."k,i atif ,/
Jul)' 31. 19f.8, E [J2S37112l2),
" Til:lid, lI'hy Duj,&i Fell. 1', ~i" <''''~n'''.J l'l' ;om,u"t. ~'''''' I,)' S,m Lo,·.ky. t cn ,lk, ond crs..t 10
IcaJin~joum.];'II, .'"~K'
\ ,,,k Tim"., Ausu>1 3,
"Sm ,km" ]q\ An Unjinilihe
t~,
26()
Tin: C IUStS PE IUOD
c ate<1 hy Eas t Germany's Ulhricht. " " ~'I ly niif ad d s a fasci nating at'·
of the private meet ing b etween lIrc~.Im ev oml Dulx'c k, wll ich is based 011 his reading uf the 5OO-p~lge Ira n ~riJl t of the Ci(~ rrm n':guti
As I"T :OS [ know, the impress;"" D uh{d, );<'i ".,:<:1 fn)lll this pTh'all: \'~IS that Bre~ h rw\' was in l'lm A;~t with the "hawks" in his own l'olid lllro (rep resen te d by Sh{'icsl. though the [x'Oplc really b.·· hind th erll WeTe the marshals of th e olein !'cllcrat inn), and waS genuinciy looking for a way 0 111 of the pred icamen t that \\\lllid vindicllt c his moderatio n and enabl e him to stand up to prr'ss urc frolll Ulhrieht " nd (;mnnl k", who we"': nnikd ,,~th tl,.. Su"ie! "hawks" in p ll.• h ing thc sitn ation toward opcn ~~",lIi ct "",I " "'ilitlL ry iuter,",'n!inn in Czeehoslo\·aki a. Thc rcal ar;(U nlCllts hc hiud the SCCIlCS had li ttle t" .1" with thc p"hlie " tl lLds "gainst /jl cra r"i bly. which w."" ""I)' the p rnlJagmulisL id eul"gi~·~ 1 guise. h ut T"ther wen ' hase.1 "" the claim th ai I he security of the ell t irc Soviet hloc \\"" s 110 r.,,,it'ne,]. a",l t hal tI ,e nll" [ili,,ns in Cz....,l"'"'l"',,,kia ,,"<:re in 'pairing the def" nsi"': "apabilit y " flhe hi"" aud w"
g',,"O Il Y of ~ I".',<."w."
Th e privn!e "'e<:l illfi: ],dw..•..·11
J) I-ez]' nc"
and D Il I..::..... k ! I ' e ll un I"d-
ened 10 inclnde i(osygin , l'odgorny, and Suslov on Ihe Soviet side and Ccrnik, Smrkovskv, and Syohnd;\ for th e CZCdlos lov;lks. " Ge n e ra l D Zll r a lso fl ew into (:i e rlm IH ' \\'ednes{lay, wh ich s uggests that Ih e re \\',lS in dced di sclIs.sion o f trou ll \\"ilhdwwals or statio n ing. " The Suviet delegatiun see me d sll{ltlenly kee n tu reach an agreement , wit h S u.~ I{)v cve n t~nu;etling a t one po int th a t the pnstJa nuary cou rse did indee(1 represent" re)l;i issanl'e of ~ l arxi s m to a l'erta in e xlt: l, t. Then' <.~" ,I d 1.11' "no nlore eX~'() 111 mu n icatiun s," li e sa id. a lld " th e CzedlOsiovak quest ion mll st he settle d h y a greel1I ell l if g real h ar m is nollo e nsue for th e int ern ati onal c Olllm un is! moveme nt and its un itv... .. Ih We{lnesday, Ju ly 31. th e negotiat ions. which ur ig in a ll y had been sl"ll edu lc d ti)r un ly one U'ty. had hee ll cx lc mi",d ill fuur. I I was an nOll 'K-ed t 1I,It t 11t: Ill':ct ill g lIuu l.1 "'lid I h"t .~\"cnillg, and ,I d os in g hanquct was planlled to .Ic mu ll s tra te that thc talks had been ( "OIl"(;"Ii" C h"p""lII .
'\II~II'/ ~,,/ _ T!o~
Hal'"
of C=«hool",·a kia.
III I-',."g,"', p. 27\1: I)IIl1y JHrg"'lIh. "'''gil'' 3. HI(;/;. ~MI)'l dt . Sid" 1', 1.~2. " Smr""," ")', ,1" Vnfini.,h cr/ C,,,,,·,,,,,,'iull. p. 21: .ntl XCI ~
p . 30. A.
t-,-~·)·.
!lou·b.",/
r",.".
),,,l Ti~If" ",,,g,,,l I. 19&1. 11I1,'nlati" ",,/llrmld Tn/"",,·. '\ Il~I"t I. 1\l6K ~lkn,1. \\ 'hy IJ"I"'~k N·II. p. S6: '''ntirm.~t h,' '"~"r """",~, i"d",lin~ lh" , ulhor', j". len'i.·w, "il)' E. (;(lj,I,lIkl"r, 0<1"h... 2-1. lfC7. ,,\01 Z. ~1t )· I\'\' . Jnl\O' l. 197!1. h
261
JUl.Y 2Q - AUGUST 5
duded in a conciliatory and frat ernal spirit. lIeporters asscn lhlcd lor a promised news (~>nferenec but wcre mddcnly tnld that it liad been (·,mceled and that the negotiati uns woul{l continue for .. furthe r day. A U.S. State Department telegram to its Enropean missions. bascd on information rcce in.:d from its emhassy in Prague. (:oufirme{] that Ulbriclit once again was working Icvt:rishly uchiml the scenes to fort'e a unified hard-line Suviet stance. The tdt~gwlll re ad: '· U,S. Embassy souree reports delay in signing Ciem,1 communique C'dused hy Ulhri<;ht telephont· tall designcd to frllstw\la~reemen t'-' ''' On the same day. /:-ul:s lill n:pri utea an cxtre mdy provoc'ativt:: Nelws Delll~'c"'(/Iid art icle that daimed that the absence of bloodshed and 0(1'."1 insnrr<.-·t;! ion in Czechoslovakia did not provc that the situation was not {'olinterreH)lutionary: "Perhal)S such notions were pro\'oked by the 1956 eounterrevolutionary putsch in Hungary, which II';IS (.·h'lradt:riwd hy arson, shootin~ and the murde r of Communists. IIOWI 'VI 'T, a l~l1l11\errevo l titinn does nol neeessarily have to luuk pr{-'('isely like this. . The illlpcri:IHsts and the antisocialist/()rct's in the CSSH t'(J!1aborating with them arc openly, systematically and dt:liheratdy applying methods diflercnt from those us(.>
.. u_s_
l)efMrhn~nl
of Slak. 1i:le~ra", XI> . ~IJ7J2. ALI~II'1 I. Pic Zuh'if' fUllkumilM. SeWn"" .\ Iulli'"'' An!!",,1 ~2. J!!6II.
l!ll;~ ,
~ F (k•..-r,
IGh
JIz
M
262
TilE C IIIS IS PERlO!)
example, spc\lking in 1969, reaffirmed tha t the re were no secret clauses lind that he had presented "a report" to the Soviet lcaders on "proposed methods of control of infurmatioll medi,\ :lnd on those problems of cadres 10 which we intend In give urgent altention Juring our prc-Congress Plenary scssion." ~l CCOlik, speaking in Ostrava in Scptcm!J.cr 19(;8, ex plained: "'\'c did nul conclude any agreeme nt at Cierna. \\'c only informed t he Soviet represe ntatives of what our futu re prtK'eclure "'oulll be in orJl'T tu prevent
hoth r ight-wing and left-wing extremisl actinn ..... Hlls.ik, in August 1B69, made I1U nlcrcncc In ,my thing like a written agreement. but st(IWJ tIm! the Soviets had made "urgent demands that we should institute order in our l111lt1try," At the negotia ti on's end, he sai{l, "there were these co nclusions, and aga in there were these promises made on uur part to solve thes t: or other problems," " Smrkovsk5' ;llsn suhseqllently d eni ed that there had heen any written agreement, hut he recalled ('e rtain de mands: " \Vhen I recapitulated in my own m ind what th e S'j\'iet comrades had concretely wanted of u~- throllgh that flood of criticism it boiled down to six (.:{)ncrcle points ," Th e.\ e six points were, al'l'Onling In Smrkuvsk5', the dismi ss"l "f f..:dcgcl, of Clsa;', the """ning of the Social De mu cratic parly, uf KAN, ;Iud of K 231, and the firl11l"Ontro l of the IllllSS media.'" Soviet references In Cie rna alsu fil ilc{l to mention any written agreement. The Soviets seemc{lto be in nu dou"! , huweve r, that the C7.cchnsluvab had made cle;\r and unequivocal promises to undertake various immediate measures. The Augusl17 letter uf warning from Ihe Soviet Polilh uro In ])lll x:~! k referred specifically tn effurts in g(L;n "finn CQntrul uver- the mass media", to stop "antiso(:ialist and anti-Soviet publicily in the press, radiu and televisinn", 10 end (Lc\i\"ities of dubs, groups and organi7~1.tions that take an anlisocialisl ;Ltlilude; to prevenl ,lilY ;LCtiVit y by a Sodal Demucrati c party; and to "take further appropr iate measures, including steps to strengthcn the le;\dinj! puhlic;Llions in the interest of the " 1),,1>l'ek"< 'Pl'<'l,,-a) Sel"<mh<" 22. ' I"",d in H. Cmdun Sk;lIin~. C::tch,...lot"k'd S In· I ",~,e -'''1'1>0"",1 b)' Du1,{oek", '1'1:<'Ch ,,, tl", CI'(.' < Cc,,'ml C" ... ",iU"" Sq,,,,,,,I,,,, 26, 1S.;G. i" S1",,,",-~,,,,, Dul>t<-k. p. 2119. and I,.,· th~ .,)",;~" ~h" i. !.,r JiH IUjek i" hi, """"'''' •• I)i~ Q'" al"~" p _ 10-2_
26.:1
JUl.\· 2f)-AUGUST 5
leadi ng mil' of the Part y and to cOllsolidale tilt: posit iun of sudalh ln in Cz.~eh(lslovakia."' " Some say appropriale lIleasures includcd Czedl()s\ov,lk rcaSSllr,l!ICC wlh of loya lt~· 10 t he \\'TO and C~. I EA and 0[" slip porl for 11 1(, SOI'it:! posilioll ,II Ihe Novcm bcr In lt! rnaliOlLal COlllmllnist l11 ct"\ in g ."" Tilt: I'nl!;dfl .,.lilorial of ..... ll gll~ t :!2. lUG-8. also referred to Cierm. st,lti ng t hat till' CPCz l eadl~rs bd given "assurances t iwi Ihe)' would lakc immed iate concre te measures to stabiliw th e situation ."' The re has never heen any l'\'iuent'e that the two sides d id sign all agrc(' lllcnl. I\«the r, th ese slaiellwnis dppcar I •• (1)llfinn t hat Ill<: two sides parted with a " gentleman"s agree ment." T his impression is strt:ngtllened by lIirak, who maintains t hal at tile end of t he fln ;tl (;ierna mecting. Brczh ncv renl~uciali ~ 1lI with a h1lman fat'e."· The Soviets had agreed thai t h." forthl"omillg nlllitilatentl meeting would hc Ilcld on CzedlOSloyak te rritory and I hat it \\\Jl)ld IIOt d iSl"n ss e il he r Cn'Choslol':lk ill teTll
""'''It"'''
•.
... S",,,luy 1·;mc •. A"~,,,, 4. 1!I6S. (1,",1 j ,,~ ,.~" I" th,· C""l""k "'ak t'"""j,lj"",. " 1'.."",1" ;;';,I"I~ I'nt,·d"". 1'. HI). 'I',ul<,,( in S k;Ui".~. C=
hr SmTk.,,·,"·. (; omi' . ""J (:[",1 .
i,,,,,,,.,ti,(' afk, tt". I"lb
J
""
~lIch
•
2&1
T il E C llIS . S I'E llI O D
Despite EUlhas.<~' Prague inf"Tmalit T"I>llTI Ihal C~I'(:h(l"I,,"aks 10,,1'" not ag reed 10 statiml in~ nf Imups under \\'ars:!'" Pad pro"isiun, D"ht'Ck and S\'ul>lKl" sl:ll"",cnls on ""cd for adJi liollal",e"sllrcs In strengthen Pal'\. as 'n'll as e,'ash-e Smrkol'sky rl'marks on depa rlure of So"id troops, l..1)old indil"alc 'O llll' So"i!"! dl'II1Cllb ",ar Ill.' n ,,,,aill ing in CwdlOslovukia, SOllie CzedlOslol'ak diplomats have hinle(1 new Sl'(:Urity arr,lngeml'nts might "rm-id c rOT prCS(' IlW in C,.(",hml,,vakia of \\'arsaw Pact n/lil-<:: rs . w i! h ' "I'I)<>r! ill g and h:d", ic,,1 wT,-i" .. " .. nol c.~e.: euing few IhOllsanus_.. ~
D ul>t::ek had stressed upon hb return frum (;ierua lil;lt ""ur Army is lIot olily a fi 1"111 1..1)111 pone nl i" Ihe defense "four sodalisl COlll lI lllnity bul also a suffide nt guawntee of th e defeHse of Ollr sl,Lte fronti e rs and hy Ihe same toke n of Ih" frUl llif:rS uf socialism ." '" Yet as the Slate Departm ent telegram points ou t , DniJt'd:'s 1;,illlTe to ment io n e it he r t roop presenl'C or wilhd rawal is an indication of the lack of s[Jedfie an d firn I agre e ille n I (i)r Ihe fu ll ,Illd im met! i:l\e wi Ihdrawal of Soviet troops. And as Colonel Stepanek-S te mmer. press o!nl..-.:r to President S\"o buda, liaS stated, the Soviet mili\;Lry ;llIache 'lIld ot her Soviet " ffiee rs in PI'ague l~JIIlin\led to e m]JIH, ~i~,e after C ierna liI,,1 " th e CzedlOslovak rectangle," the '"l-ornerstolle of Soviel delcnse" in E: urope. was in 110 way adequalely guaranteed and that '"it could no t remain unprot ~ted fo r th e foreseeable or imlefin ile fulure ,"'" In trying to assess the res ults or Cierna for the Soviets, sereral poillts e me rge. Glle is that but h hanl-line aUal'ks on the Czeehosluv,lk relonn moveUlent and military maneuver.~ conlinUf:d Ihroughout ti lt.' negot iati ons. making dear the u ncompromising and eve n incn:asing hostililY to t he reform movement felt h~' ,U\ overwh el U\ing majorit y of the leadership_ Ciema was designe d as a last-ditch att empl 10 get th e Czechs 10 do themselves II"hal th e Soviets we re oth er'",ise prepared to un derlake, howeve r rcl\lcta n tl~·. Undu uhl edly Ihere were lli visiolls wil hi n the Soviet leade rship nhuu I II 'e h(:st 1.."{Illrse lu Itlllow; so 100 W1L~ Ihere indcdsinll and waveri ng ,md d,angcs of view amo ng eertain of the Suvie l l eaJer.~ Jllring II,," course uft he Inl ks. part ;"n la rly hel'ause uf t he letters received li'o m othe r Commun ist p;lrtics whil"h high ligh ted ,lIld even incrcased the perl"cived costs uf an invasion. T lllls re ports Ihat bo th til l.' French and Italian Communist par ties n~e i \'t:d a$SU ranL~:S f"llow ing Cicrna ~ lI. S.
D"I,"," ,nen' of SI.h-. Ti1"gT"'" ,\'" . 2H&37.
,\o~''''
3, IOC.s
"'ug'''' 2, I!!6S , El'.h!.~'lIli CIS. "SI "I~"",k. S',' m""'T. m,' ,_ ,d"',}",.,)"" '
-" r~.~~>u
I\ad;",
IGh
liz
M
265
J U Lr Zg-A UGUST 5
that the uss n woul.l not nse for~e ~' dcmollstrat t:d th e promincnt roncern amon g at ]'l:l..~t some S,wict le;odc Ts for the unity of th e International Commu nis t mo'·ement, which moth'atcd, however temporarily, the Soviet impulse to achipvt' a ]>olit ieal settlement at C ierna. In essetll.."C. the und,:r:standing rc:1ched at Ciern:1 was not a compromise but a t.juid pro quo- thc Soviets wo uld withdraw troops in re turn fiJI" l"(Hlcretc an,l inunedi:. "' f nm/u. A,,~"'t 2. lOOS.
"
,"
Tilt; CU ' ~IS l't;mo n
266
Both GOllIulka aml Ul hricht maue clear fru m tht: very heginl1illA their open host ility to the Cierna compromise ,1IIU to the e<:hoslo\'ak ohjcdions and (.~)IJntcrpf()p05als. '\l lymif, who \\1L~ a particip:mt in the negot iat ions. claims tl lat th e Czeeh uel egatio n. often SUPIXlrtet:1 hy th e Hu ngarians. spent immeasurable time obtaining d,:mges of phrasing. For exampl e. th e draft re li~ rretllo only two "rorel:s of peaee" standi llg .Igains! the re\'ancl list
"(;oh" (;h"n"'''''. A'.~"" 2M. 1'1'_ :M _ 3<'i. '~ MI)''''; t, si~l!I f'ro", I'. 15.~, -"' ''C''lOr<"C''<~'
ofll,.. S;,-(;""""",,;'-1 .,,,1 \\'" ,le,; l'd"~"
i"
Vi¢~.r (I'r"~"c). no. J.:l (A")(,,, I S. 1!J!:>!>1. 1'1'· lL - 12. "" ' 1",,1<,.1
I),.,j,\."d." (;::<~'h("I"l'(!k
in
r.le",..
"S"";,,, H'r<'i~n
1'<>1;<,), J><-c;,;"".M~kin !'. - 1'. 525
" 1... ,;,-. Sih,ibbYJ, " 11,~"11",11",,,.of 11r," I,),,,".': ~I ~, ~II) ".1. ,\ 'ic!a f''''-'' . 1'1' F..",r. 1'1'_ 151 _,U; Ti~,id . lI 'I'li /)"IIl,·k ft'll. p, 00.
~ .\ lI r" Jt . .\'i~l"
.,,,1
''''
o::h
151 -.;~ .
267 policics of t hc Bonn Gove rn ment- the GDB and t he West Germa n Commun is t party. Against consid erab le opposition from Ulhricht , t he Czechoslovaks managed In insert t he phrase 111:11 support wou l(:te(1 It) ;lIld t b;!! );I\(-r hC(:;l1ne en shrilled as t he (.~!ntr.l) (.~)re of Ilie "Hre~.hn e\' (I()ctrill!~ of limited sovere ignty. " The pass;lge in its final version reatl: II is \ he l"'lllUuHl iuterll"\ inn ..] dill !I nf ;dl s(lci.. lis\ {~)lIntril's In ' ''1'pur l , streng th,," "",I l!dem! these gai ns, whieh were :wh iew,d:lt the "'~t of (~\·.'ry p .... )p! c·~ hc:roit dlorb aile! sdfless I:,l)c)f. This is Ihi! 1111:1nimous tl piniull of all t he ~~lnfer"n ...., partil'ip,mts. " ~ l lyn:if" states t hat he wanled to cpmlify the first sentell(''C wit h the cb use "while respccting t l]{~ sovereignty :l11d national inJcpcndell~'C of each t~lUlllrr," an d he sllggesl (.'"{I joi n ing: I h is clause 10 I he $(.,(;OI1J sentence with a dash. Bul as .\-llyn,\!- rccUlmts, Brezhl1c\' vehemently ohjected, c~cbill\ing that "the dash in this inst
we nt UIl , there ""
M)\'t,rcignty ami 11;,li01l,,1 indcp,:ndcm;t'"' sew'ral par"gr;'phs I,,\(:r. Zhi\"ko\", Ulhricht, and Gnrnlllkn all sllpporte<1 Brezhncv's for mula· ".\1t)·n~r, ,\,j~",
f",,"
]l .
I!; I; 1"/", G,,~,.rI;D " .
"S~"dllg lH~J:nrl'Io , 1.l< ,()I~· r
~MI!,,,ft. "'j~ilr "u~I"'~ .
fr",r. 1'.
A,,~ .. ' l
s. JlW.
6. 19!iS_
,,;.1: '1""'.' fmm lh~
I!r~li,I;,,·.
,l,,,·,,,",,I.,,, f,o", FraO:'/
19I.iII.
n Fm",/", _\"I'".l 4. 11l6ll ("mph ..;> m;,,,' I. "' MI)'nM, .' ·lgl" FMJI. 1'- 15 / _
"' "
•
268
TI ll:: CmS[S PEmOn
t ion; K,ldar took the Czechoslovak side. TIlc dcclaratio n tIlay refer tu "respect fur sovereignty," uut nuwhere dues it menti un nUll i n~ te rfen:nce in (Iu tll csti e affairs as onc of tht: prindples goveming mutual relations. Th us the Bratislava Dedarat ion co ntains ull th e elements of th e theoret ical and ideological justifi edtiun uf in vasion- signed and sealed hy all th e participating slatcs, including Czechoslu\"lkia. In th e weeks to co me, th e Bralis!ava DedaratiOll was evoked Oil nunwmns o("(;asions. On the ve ry da y of t In, in vasion , Angust 20, both Prat)r/a and ht)cstia praised the results of Bratislava as "'(\ b,lI" rier to imperialist subversitm." And in the flnal ('Ummuniqu e of the ()()stinvasion /o.·! oscow negotiations, tIle Soviet an d Czedwslovuk leaders undertook resol utely to implement the joint J el.'isions made ;It (ierna and th e prindples procl,limed at Jl ratislava." Most im portantl y, th e Angnst 22 pruvdtl editorial explain ing th e n :asons fur the invasion stated that tIle det'ision had bee n made "in ;K'('UrdalK't: witll the (~l lll mitm c nt ~ undertaken at the eo nfe re n("(; of Communist and \\'orkers· parties in Bratislava."' \Vh ereas it is und e niable that th e Bratis];wa Dedamtiun was ust'tl to lcgit imi 7.c th c c"cntu,,1
in v,~~i{)n,
it is c.: rtainl y
q\l{!~ ti{)llah1<J
whe th er ihai was the sole inte ntion of all the non-C7.t'Chos)ov" k lead ers who alte nd e.ltlie confere nce . Eve n wit hin th e d cclamtio n th e re wcre impor t,mt indications of mode rate opi ni on . There was. fur insta rK'c, H loug S("(;t;ou on thc need tu imp ro\'c ct"Orlolnk eoopcration that stressed " th e trrgenq' of holdin g au c(~ l\lomic (~ ) lI fcr Cll t't: ;It th e hi glrest level in th e vcry ne"r future."' and th e re W;IS;I call1i)r a EUTll]le:m sccurity t·onre ren ee. ArHI in a passage t hat must have 'lppeased Sosluv, the declaration nu ted tha t "recently a good d.:al of work h;" h(" '11 lioue in prep;Lring fi)r ;) !lCW inteTll;ltioll;L1 (~JlJ lcrc n cc of Commu nist and \ Vorkers' part ies . The fmtl:rn lll parties wlue this work highly aud express th e t1J!lV icliuu that th e fl)rtlico rn ing ("(mfere nce will proct:cd s uc(~: sslll!1y H\\(lwi ll make all important contrihution to th e ("(lUrse of ("()lJsolitbtin.l!: all tir e Ten) lu tionary forces of t he llresent day." It is also note worthy th at a numhe r of til{' participants the mselves praised Bnltishlva as ;1 vktor~' for moderatiun . The Cwchoslo,"
"
,"
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vival process."'" ~'ll ymH, even in retro.\[lect, rejects the view that Brezhncv was consciously see king a stat e me nt to just ify invasiun. He says of Brezhnev's moth'cs: " 1 think rath e r that at this stage he was only covering his op tions and thaI no eone re le decision to intervene . lllld yet bee n made. " .., The Hungarians also gave a positive . if morc guarded. appraisal of tIle results of Bratislava. The Budapcsi daily MU/!.lJur lIirlllp , whil e l"Oneee~ . "0111,1;,.",. I' . 2tJ. '1,.,]<"<1 in S~ilti"~. C~cI""lo'd l·ia" I",~"",,,/u_ Ii"" . 1'. 31 L S~il1j,,~ 't'H~'" , b"jl" \.~."., "'1",·,,,,<1 Ill' t.,]1o (:"mll: .",1 Ilil"al. "~ I1)""it. Sigl" F..,,,,. 1' . 10>3. " V"o]ed i" 'f /,e C"n,,/ian. ,1."1(\,,1 6. IOC,.s ~ 1"10,' (; ",,,·
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Phase Five: August 5-20
AUGUST6 PO LlTBUHO
~IEETI NG
\Vith the return of the Soviet dclegatiron from Bratislava un August 5, almost the entire Suviet political and military leadership was in ~1oscow. This was made dear hy Soviet !lres~ t~J\'erage or their return and of the fun eral the same day of Soviet r-.larshal nokossovsky (who had been sent by Stalin to Poland as minister of defe nse ). Shdepin, Kunaev, :\Izhavanadze, (illd Sheherbitsky were the only members of the Politburo or the SI..'(;relaria t nut mentioned as present in the capital that dar. On August 6 , it was an nounct'<.l that tile W(l rSaW Pad's chief of staff, General ~1. I. Kazakov, was to be replaced b~' Gene ral S. i\I . Shtemenko. The expl:.lIJation given for K:17..:lkov·s e(lrly retirement-"for reasons of iIl-health"-(lfIJved tu be transparentl y false when III~ laier appeared at several \Vestern embassy social functions in apparently vigorous form. It has been suggested that Kazakuv was advocating a different course of actio!) in C7.edlOSlovakia and that he opposed an invasion hccause of the long-term negative reper('ussitJlIS it would have on tllll C:wchoslo\"ak army's reliability as a member of the Warsaw Pact. It was therefore COIlduded that mllre resulute (End hard-line mflitary leader was required for any invasion . Shtemenko. as the former chief of operations during the Great Patriotic \Var, not only had been responsible for planning the liberation of Prague in 1945 (Who better to ('onduct a repeat performance?) but had recently retu rned to favor as a chro nicler of Stalin's positiVI! aehie\"ements at the head of the war effort. Shtcmcnko. t he refore. l\;Id the right political ami military
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T il E elllSIS l'EIlIOU
prufile fur part icip.. tillll in an impenJill~ illv,,-~i()n. ' It is lIot clear \\"lwtl1<:r ,Ill uther Pad memhers were "onsultcl] in advance ahllut this change in the P,lct High C01llmand. ,ll thouJ!h the pn~sence in ;\10S(~lW of top Polish m ili tary fi gures I(lr Huknss()vsky's limera] would at least have al10well some consultation. \ \'I1r~' either for intcrven ti on or lilr tltlllinlerYcn ti oll. The (~lmmn niqll C reported that tile Politburo "fully appro\'e<]"' t he activity of t he C PS U du1<'Silt itJn itt Bmt is];"'iI- it ,lid " o1 USc tl, e stron!;"r term " '"oanimollsly'" The Silll\e e ndo rSI~ 11lenl W(L~ no! reported for th e Cierna cUIlLl"". 011 C ie rlla, tbe Politb uru .,impl y "nutes" th"t the (:ier n:l me e ti ng was " Ii mely and of greil! importance (ilr the furt her developmcnt ,nll] strcngtllening uf relatinns" hetweell th e Sovie t Uniun and CzechoslOYilkia. Snch a meager assess ment of the results of l:ierna is deilr indi C(Ltioll that the leadership was beginning to recognize it (il r Ihe r;,L~('~l thai it had heen . By 1..~ )lltTiLSt , th(~ Politbnro "high ly nppreciilted" the ('~ lIldu s ion 5 rCiLched at Brati.-;]nva th at th e fu t lire of suL"ia]i",1ll "lies in lin Uind liLl,\!; IUYillty til \·litr:"i.~ m -Len inism , in th c Cllit iv,lI ion atnung the popular masses of. ~ocialist i c and proleta ria ll intel"lliltionalism.·· The communique. however, did not re,lfTi rm Ill!: Brilt islil\'il stai ,:mt:nt's Te"ugn it iun uf vario\ls .. nat ional charadcristics and L~JIlditio n s:' f\or did it pial'" value on "wise, calm , tllllllghtful il nd pa tic nt"' lICgoti;ltiollS in .~c ttling disputes. ilS • f"r ,tdaij, o( I he d"",~~ frum
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had the PrIlvt/{/ and l::vest ill editorials tlll~ previous day, It ;lcloptecl instead a wait-and-see appro;l(·h. putting the bll rdt!U on Prague to lid on tl\() prillciples of ti m Bmti~la\'a slnh'mclIt . As t he Politburo communique '-'()flc1udcu: 'The implementat ion of the Statements propositions is the pilral110unt internaliulI;tl task of the frat ernal parties:' An implicit threat of military actio n was contained in the '-'t.l r1lmun iquc's 'l~scrtiOIl that the Soviet Uniun wuuld {[u "everything in ils power" 10 guaTanlt:e Ihe li,lIillmtmt uf the I1ratis1ava Declaration. No statemen ts or SIJeL,(:hes were m'lde hy Suviet lt~itders following t heir re t urn to 1'-'losc(lw. hut iUlillysis of t he l.1) m III uniqll e und of intelligence information reaching \Vestern governments leads une to ('oncl ud e tlmt at til is meet ing, t he last he forc Polit htl TO me mhers [eft th e clipi ta[ fur thcir holidays. the decision {mlmher38) was Illude to proceed with the inv'L~ion plan s delineated during the July 2021 Politlmro meeting, and to impleme nt those plans heli)re th e August 26 deadline unless the Czeehnsluvak [callers showed clear and unequivocal adlleren('e to the Soviet interpreta tion of the Bratislava statement. There is eonsider.tble cvidc]}('C to suggest that on August 6 the Politburo cu ~ ergcd ]\lOre united ill its reSolve to go "head with military phlll _~ for an invasion hefnre th.~ August 26 Slovak plenum ;md certainl y befure th e Septeml>er C I'Cz Congress convened. should DulX':ek fili[ to take flrm measures "gaillst antisol'ialist activities. A first piece of evidence was a tcl egr.lln sent to the u.s. State Dep;trltnent fmm lhmm y Thompson, th.~ Amcrie.m alliJ,'L~sadnr in ,\Inseow, irulieating th at th ere was immine nt danger of ill\':l.~it>n. As Eugene Rostow later admitte.I",·"k;. I!If>S:' I', Ul(;. '10; ' nll.I)'.;, " 'as " .... roi>or.l.d hy Pmll Co.I"I.", ki in .1", .",1.". inl~"i",,' wil), hi", . \\'."hin~l"n. D.C. , N,,. "c",bo.-, I~. 1!r.9. eo"l"I.,, '~i ,·.Ielllal,..! 111,1 SU'id ab"n u\'t'r Ih" CI'l:,. I}r~O S"'U'C, ",-.. Ihe n">j<>T f",,~or hehind II,,· A"~"'l 6 d<,<';'ion .
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July 23, alter th.~ Politburo lIlcctin).! Ull J uly 20- 21 authurizt'u t h(: ]11 ili!;lr y tu t'flll UllelH.'e Ii nat pn:p:mlt iuns. lI y th e t inlC Suviet leaders returned Irum Brut ishv,\, tIll' military were ill positiun an d awaiting flirt her orders. The Polithuro. acting before its memhers ui.~pe r.~cu , !\uth ori7.eu th e military tu cont inue full mob il i7~1tio n. despite the heavy fin ancial (;()st- p,lrticuhlrly nnw that th e grain harvest in western Hussill and th e Ukraine was h eing totally llisrupted . Only a le w days remained bdine t he August 26 11cadHn e. and these would he devo ted to determining whet her t he C()\l1ltdown tu illva.>iull shuuld- or indee(] L'()1J ld-he stup pt...o. gUll Ull
EVE NTS IN
CZ I ~C IWS LOVA KI A
[n Prague. pOJlular skepticism ahullt possihle concessions made at Cierna and Bmt isia\'a soon ~a\'e wav to euphoric prepamtions for th e I~xtr.tonlinar)' Fourteen th I'" rty COllgress. On August 10 th e revised dra ft part y .~ t atll i es we re puhlishe.l. Alt hulIJ;h the party wuuld maintain its essentiall v lInificll and hier.ln:hieal structure und e r th ese provisiOlls, minurity f;ld ioliS wou[d he giv.·n the ri ght 10 li)Tln ,lUd to puhlicil_C their views, and h'lllol ing wit hin the party was to he secre\. Another re l'Klr! was also presenteu tu th e CI'Cz l'raesidi ulTI lilr uisellssinn prior tn its ado ptio n at t he L~mgress. This wa.~ th e so-cai!e<1 K;t~par report. prepared hy <"~l)lservatives within th e information depart men t uf t he Central Committee and designed to evaluate th e possihle lilture de"dupment "ftllt! part y in th e pe riod follnwing th e f"rthellllli ng t..~l1lgress. lis t..1meiusiollS could on ly have furth er alar med those who already fea re(1 the worst. 1\ predicted t hat alnms! ti,e e ntire Celllnli Committee would he re pl:lt'Cd: :111(1 [:Ir frmll st'lbili7.ing th e situ,ll iun, Ih {~ ('(I ngress 1l1 igl ll lead to fu rl he r unt..'Cr l ainl~' over I he lead ing m!e ,lILd int ernal eo hesi\·encs.> of ee nlnt! party organs. Cl!rta in h' the report was II O! optimistic tltat th e ('ungress ill itself would r.llly t he country aro und I lit: part y aud put an aillo mat ic e lld to ,ttll iso..:;"l;,l dements. Th e Pracsidium decided at its Au/:,'Ust 13 nlC
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tio n to forestall not onl y the Fourteenth I'art v Congress hut also th e Sluv,lk Congress sc heduh: d to ('ummcncc uu AU!;llst 2(j, dllrill~ whidl BiLlk ,Iml other Iwrd-lillc Slovaks \\'\'rI' IIOW (:ert;lil) \ll lose their positions, B y (:Qutras!, the ]I:'isllrdy IMC!.: wit h wlli<:h D\lh':'ck appeMell to ht; moving in curhing th e press and grollps snch as KAN and K 231 did not give th e impres_~i on Ihat 1,1' was aware Ihal tllt~ (.~l ]Ultdown tu invasion had ht~~lIn. The Soviet le'lder.s· dell,lrillH: to t he Bbck Sea and 1)1Ibcck's p rCIX.'Clipation witb preparations for the congress and hibte r'll meetings with East Europe leaders also Cll ntrihulcd to ,I dist inct hlt'k urgt:1lcy in refu rmist drt'l cs.
or
MEETI NGS WITI-] TITO ANI)
CE ,\U~ESCU
Yugoslavia's Presillent Tito arrivell in Prague on August 9 for a twovisit. De spite ullidal attemp ts tu kt~t·p his sujourn 'HI a tormal h;lsis amI THo's own pu hlie ;lSSnranc{'s t ha t then' \V,IS flO need to sign a ti"ielldshill trcaty betwcen thc two nnmtries. nutlling could stop til{: m'Lssive olltlMlIlring of jllililation crcnll:d hy t lte Pl"CSCII(:c in the mpilal of th e first leade r SU('<.'Cssfull y to defy the Hussians ,lUd huild h i~ OW11 na ti/lIla! hrmld sudnli_<;m. The CPCz l'taesidiu ,n 's exhortations to the press to "tnke into <.'Ousideratioll the nat ional ,mt! internat ional interests of the C~.l.'(-,hu.,lo\'ak pcuple"'" in til e covc ragc of Tito's visit ,llso wenl lln h {~edell a.~ th e llledia got (;aughl up in the popul,lr spirit . Utcrdmi listy. fill' eXalllP!e. stated on August iO Illat tlt e respo nsc to Ti t,. c .\ ]lresscd "t Ite yearn ing of th e nation fo r its own Tito ." Yet in private the Yugoslav lender ~ lrongl y urge(1 the Czeehos]I,,:tk Jl,lrt y not tt> abandon its leading ro le and to proceed more cautiollsly." A simi!:lr ,l\l!losphere surrounded th e trill to Prague b etwccn Augmt 15 .UH] 17 of Hum,mia's I'resid{·llt Cean~t~Scll. The limnal pUll)ose of his visit was to rcnew the bilateral treaty binding til e two c:mm!ries, but, like Ti\(), ht;: was the subjcct "r <'''lIs idel~lbl e public adnlation. He too
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mallia, and Yugosla via shon!!1 filrm "a firm h ilK of dl'11UICr:.lq', reasodali ~ lll ."" Cl';lu~escu firmly di scounted sud, notions, statin g that th.'r(' \\'(''''' "nitH' SOCLliist states whi ch ha\'I~ th e same views 011 the del'c!opment of rciation s among t hcm selves" an d th at whil e hc ;HII,crc.lto ti lt' principle of mm interferelwe in dOl1lcslk alEliO's, he ;llso stl ppor te.1 the streng! hening III' the defel1sil'c uni t ~' of til e Warsaw Pad ," Howcve r mu ch Ceal1 ~es('l1 a ud Duht:d.: mal' have hoped tha t th eir meet ing wou ld uot ~'sc ;(l atc th e crisis, the te r ms oflhe new treaty amI t he fild that it W
son, and humanistic
ULBlUC HT- DunCEJ..: CONC LAVE While T itl) was still in Prag ue, U lh rich t \\',IS ad dr .. ssing the C D II \'olkskamm e r Oil th e "lItt~)llW of t he I3ratisla"a conte re nce, st ressing Ihat imple",,,,,t:! t; ,,,, "I' \1,,,, d, 'da ration n 'qllin:d a resolu te struggle to pn:\'ent imperialism ii'o m .Irh'ing a wedge llel"'een tl", CDn ;md "l lw l' sl l(.'ialist ~1JUntr i es, III tlw Sall I e speedl, Ull,,-idlt (mnml1lt;etl East Gc r nmll~"S readine ss In nego tiate din 'elly with the """II,imy ,;wt, ABc,,,1 16_ I%'>, "11 ,,,/,, ,m;"", A"~"'II'>, 1!ll0/i,
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b r Bo nn .uu ) that tIll' FBe d.:clared Hse1f ··willing to ",mdutlc treaties on the rcnundalion offorce in ollr mutua! relations and on th e r~'()gniti()n of frontiers. " '" This stakllltmt was ~1l1.'um p'lnk'{l by an increase in anti-FHG propaganda. giv in g rise 10 th e interp reta-
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"uk delcg;ltion, as they were also frolll the meetings with Tito alld Ccau~escu), but cxtcnsin : Icab from th l! C7.cdlOslovak sidc imlicated thai Ulbricht had particularly oujCl'leu to the grow th of eont,Lets between Pmgue and Bonn outside the frame\\~)rk of united hloc po licy. Dul-K:'ek is said to have {Ienied Ulhricht's r igh t to make Prague at"COlLnt for it s roHey toward a third part~·, and he refused to include a stron ger de nunciation of tlLc FnG than that mntained in Ihe l3r.ltislava Del'laration. " C7.cchus]"""kia·s intern,,] problems " Iso c"used h.,acNI arg'" ,w" t. Ul bricht's impatie LL t"!: with Dulli:ek's cx plana tions ahout the difficulties of (Jven:mning "'past d(:formiti es" and the neeuli)r a special congress was evident in an acrimonious public exchange durin g a joint pre ss nJllfercnce. If the C I'C7. was unahle to find a solLLtioli to its problems, Ulbricht asse rted, it nced only look 10 the East German political syste m li)r a model: " We are am(l1l g the most stahle party and state leaderships in Europe. We have Iwd a pe rfe ctly continuous development in thc work of the party lead ership and alsu in the rejuvt: nation uf th e party leadership. Ar u\ Ihis is not a Ill,,\ter for a party cungres.,."" Ulhricht is known to have h cen l!sp t.'C ially cOllcenle(1 with whether Dul..cek was re"lly willing to reasser t media censorship. and ,It th e e nd of the press conference he cYllit-allr e.~p ressed the hope that Czechoslovak journalists wuuld succeed in raising the ir "'socialist consciousness.""" The talks were offidall~' d cst'rihed ,l~ h,wing takt:n plat·c in all "atLllosphere of candur," and if furt her evidence we re neede d that tllc negotiations had btlen acrim onious, Dub(-ek made it knuwn • .... 0 .... (t;;', 1 ("... ·""~B ",""", ~);""L",,). A"g"" 9, 19f>l!. EF.I:!Ii-I7IAIII.
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th:Jt Ulbrkht h:Jd invited himself.") The C7,edlO~l()v,lks n:ruscd to release a Rnal commllnique. They aArced oIl I ~' to a "press stat enl(mt," ~1 ",h i.. h th e East C " rmallll ews "~"Iley I,,'r si,!t;d ill d "st.'I'il,· ing as (I l'{)lIulluniquc in an y cas,~ , " F'ul1lJwin),( th e in \'a~ilJn, the Easl Germans made it perfectly ckar th at they had assesse,l the sitllation ver~' lIegatively alier Karlovy Vary: "the 1:llks s how,~d Ih"t the ri).(hl-win).( ),(roup of th c CPCz was nul preparl,{] tu adhere tu the Bratislava ag reements ]11I1 th,11 it Wi.l~ strenglhen ing ils d:lIIgerulLs right-wing <'~IIIrse," :l "lier the invasi un, the E>lst Germans insisted that the Czcd loslovak leadersllip imple ment Ihe dl'mands made at Kariu vy Vary p,a r ti clllarly cClIll'cmi ng til e G.:n ll"n <juesUIl", ;Uld imke.1 Ihe y even raised Ihe results of lhe Augusl13 K>lrlovy Vary meeting to the status of an ;Igre{:men t hetween tll c two cOllnt ries: " in Ihe sallie measure as tll(~ agrc,~mt~ nt IH:lwcCil thc p>lrty and state IC>lde rs of the Suviet Un iun and CzeellOslovakia of 2i Au).(ust, which we "p]11'0\'(:(1, is he ing imple mente{l. it wi ll 1)(' ]lossihl.~ tu imp l"ml'lIt the agreements of Karlovy Vary," ", C learly the East German le:ulerslli p ;Lttadwd gre;Lt import'LIl<.'C to the demands t hey matle. but there is no (\diuitc .~ videIlL'C that Ulbrich t reported immcdi att'ly to l-o lost"OW on the reSlIlts of this trip, The CzedlUslovak leaders who negotiate,l wilh Ulbrich! most certainly j(({lge.l lh.: sihmtio" to It"ve lake" "g.-m": lurn Ii,,' lite worse after his visit; and it was widely helicw:J hot h in PmAuc ,111<1 in \Vashin gto ll th'Lt Ulbrkht did in fad pres"lI t a highly alannist report 10 Soviet officials, C PCz leaders learned after Ihe illvasion of Ulbricht's insistence that PI~lgue had sel'rel links w;lh Bonn and that Humania ;lIld Czedwslovakia had plans to leave the \Varsaw Pad, " I ntle,~{I, inl(lI'In:lt ion to this e!fcct rel'Cived from ~1()s(.~)I\' by \ Val! Hosto\\', Prcsi{lent Juhll son's lIational set'urit\' advisor, was one ..fthe ractor.~ that Ic{1 him to ;t{kisc th e pre,~idenllh'll th e t'l' isis in Czechoslovakia WlI.> not going to he resolved pellecfllll), "nd that ehau<.'Cs of an ill\'asioll were nu'" vcry high, '" " D""I>t'hl""d",ud" " .'\"~U>( ~ PT"~"e
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Til l:: e m s l s PEIlIOI)
THE WA IIS AW PACT :\IILlTAHY
~ 1 0VE S
\ Vhi le th e Soviet leaders we rc dc li heratill~ in ~Ios(:ow on :\ ugust 6 , Soviet marshals Wert~ in volved in th e rear se rvi ces exe rd ses, codenamed Ne men, designed to t('st suppl y and Ingisties capa hilit ies ami to h rillg op to full strengt h Class II and III di visions stat ioned in th e Ukril ine ilnd wes te rn Bllssia, " 'estern >lnd Soviet militarl' anal ys ts agreed that th e Sll<.'tess of any Soviet "oficnsivt" operation would rc1~' he,l\'il~' on Soviet ahilit y to su ppl y tllcir forward troops wit h tf-.:hnkal and mc(lkal supplif' s amI espf:da li )' wit h fud . ~ Thus I'ra vd{/'s assess men t of th e eXf:rcises is info rmativc , "Our fnlly medlani )'-cd re;lT scrvil.:es (;;1 11 supply th e troops with eveT), thin~ Ih"y need. ~Iain pipelines have heen hlid at"mss Ii )rests and rivers righl behind .Iwlcking units ,mti ha\'e supplied fuel withu ut allY hreakd"wn ill t h.. hattie ~ illl "li()n :' ''' Pn: sll m"bl ~' in su hsta m:c this WaS th e re port IIl arslml G rcchko rc(~ i\"cil wh en he visited th e e.xe rd se headquarte rs in ~l insk it)r ta lks with its (1)1l1 Imllldcr, Celleral ~'lar)'a khin . on Au gllst 9.'" Eas t German and Polish tmop s also participated ill th e eXCrcise s: .IIHI troops rro", IIlllgaria a"d C.. ntr:.] .... ,ia. app:""' ntl y " .,ing th e exercise liS ,\ (~)\'C r. al.~o InOyeJ into position on the Soviet, CzedlusIowk horder,"" Arwther lilll("lioll of Ihe exerdSl:S di rect ly rela te d to th e preparations fo r the invasiun was t he testing of mpid tnKlp transport l·ilpabili lies. Th is asped of the (·xerdscs was 1I0t n :vcal('d ill th,; Soviet p rt·ss unti l just hd<' n: tl w invasion when ~ la rsh al Ve rshin in stat ed that S(Jviet aircrait l~JU ld oper:lte at extrenll'ly low altitudes <.:arr)'ing: hig p'lylo;u ls. This cHpllbilit)', he sai.1. 1,,1.1 he en .Ie mo",tr",,·d duri ng the Nemell exerl'iscs wh ere it was proved th at mi li tary transpor t airnatl "could now Inmspurt troop s a'l(l",ilit,lry C']lI ipmenl. . Ii,r ],mg-<listalH. .. : liS" in a .dlOrt Sp:K'C of t ime ... ·" I nll lle{li,ltcly SlItTcf'ding t lws.. " xerdst!s Utl AllgU,I II wI:n : joint operali ons of t he Soviet. Polish . ,uu! Eas t Ger man ('{)mmunication troop s. whi ch in fact alluwed Ihe flnal es tahl islllllellt lIlldc r Gen" S<'e l:
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ef,l] Shtemenko of a (.'ommaud and signals network filf the invasion :'" In connection wit h t llese exefl'ises, Shtemeuku met wit h General Boleslaw Chocha. t he I'olhh vil-'C-minister of nat ion;l] dc/ense, on August 13. ~' On the same day. Ma rshal Grechko and Ge neral Yepishev were met (n East German~' by Soviet '\larshals Yakubovsky and Koshe\'oi where ;111 four attended "an exercise of the Soviet forces in Germany"'" and :1 meeting un August 14 witll General Hoffmann. the CDB minister of national dc/c nse." From the c ou, Creehko, Yakubovsky, and Yepishe\' Rew on :\ul,'Ust I G to southwest Poland to l-'Onfer wit h Shtemenko and the Polish High COlllm:md on p roblems uf"l-x}{)peration m,d c()onlinat iun (JUl,e fraternal ar mies."'"' The Soviets never announced a t'ompletion date for t hese exercises. an(1this. mmbined with the reports that Soviet milHary pe rsnnnd in C ~,cchosl o\'a k ia had heen put o n ale rt on August U'r. and that Sodel enu (military intelligence) and KG B age nts were he i"g infiltrated iutu Prague, " was fu r the r eviderK"C that the excn:ises we re a (1)Ver f"f final invasion prepm'atiolls , These prepanltions were a('(.·or11 panie(1 by II,e amlOUrK1'lllenl on '\l1gust 15 (again hc/un: Soviet l'oli thllf<1ll1e n,hc rs had all returned to ,\!OStXIW) that the relnctant I-1 l1ngari;l1ls had also finally commenccd jOint Sm'iet.H un ga rian maneu ve rs .... As earl y as August 1:3. Ilre.~.~ statements by both Soviet and I~ast European military leaders maintained t hat "our fighting men . are prepared to perform any task, including extremely ~'Qmplcx ones, ...., and that because of "t he gwwth of hos ti le and d;mgertJlIs trends in fraternal CzedlOslovakiil." the Pact mililan' has declared its "readiness to sup port and aid the p:lfty and people of CzedlOslovakia."" Such si;rtcments, along with the high le\'elnf military "J.
";""",,11. n ;,,1. 73S. UI'AI'. AU~U>1 J.i. 19611. E ~:t2&r9lA2I4. "1''''S~ . A"~"'I 15. 11ll>S, SUI2&I<WA~. " r", rda. AU~II>IIS . 191'06.
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aeti vi tr, dearl y showed the d e te rmin ed readiness of th e .Ii ~h Command for th e !lnal s i~nal fron l Ih t: politkal lead e rsh ip, T I1I:Y ,llso lead one to wo nde r wh e the r th e re w as by thi s time so mu ch mom e ntum hc hin d m ilitary prcp.. ratio ns that it would be almost impossihle to p ilil hack from the p recip ice, I'OLlTI~U HO
VAC.o\TIO N ACnV ITY
Ahllou~h Illns t of til e 1(1) po liti l'a lleaders were oiTIcially un holiday betweell 1\II!,!ust i ,Iiltl 15, Ihe n:t~)lIml\: Ill:C ll l1:nt Oil August \.J of hard-lin e attacks 011 CzedHlslovakia in th e Soviet press imli ealed that political llI,ulI: llv,:ring was slill taking P"'l'C, " At'l.:ordinl!; 10 Pravda rl:porh of Augllst 10 alltl II , a mt:d in g of the powerflll .\Ioseow regiOlllll party l~JIllinittee (ohk o lll) had bee n addressell by Gr is hill ,md KOllotol ), Both had partici pat e d in inne r- Il art \' deh:ltes ;1Iltl nego tiatio ns \ )1) C zcc hos lo";lk i:I, :md Konotop l];Id only recently returned from heallin g a '\iOSl'(jII' ou ko l!l llcle~a tion to Cwd mslo\'akia al the iuvitatioll of the s:mu: !'ragut: part y l~ l lIIm i l lee Ihat was o n ly one we ek late r 10 he accused by Ih e Polit b uro of "-", ki,, g 1"",la['l i,1, a --,, ,,,,,,,,,1 CC ,"" It i, ""Iikdy, Ih. 'rd'''-'-, 11,,,1 [..:()ll Ot01 )'~
r"\lort would h:wr. prC~('ll t r. d ,I'l ythi" j,! hut :. PCSS il l"li~ti(:,
;md e\'l:n a l:. rm isl, pidll r(: ofthl: siluatio" ill Praguc, News of tIl(: '\I osco\\' mc(:ti llg u)illcid e d with 11 U. S, illte l!igcm:c [(:]Ior t that s,-nllid-eL,hclo" ofHcials in Ih e C I'SU i"crc,Ls ill~l y we rc llistu rbc II by th e p rnsllcd of h;lv ing 10 reorie nt the lII;I""e 101:',] lead e rs ,,1', ' CI''''I) f,l\~,d wit h re" iw,
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AUGUST 5 - >!O
There \\'en~ ~(~ ver,L1 reli;lhle n:ports at the lillle tlwt di ssat i sfal~ tion Hmnng Ce ntral Committe(' memhe rs was such th,ll it actually foreed th e leaders to return from holid a~· arlll step up t he plans for iuv;lsiol\." It h;ls illso bee n suggt:steJ Ib,.1 their ;Ispiratiolls llI ily have been suppu rt ed or e'·en manipulated by hard-line Politburo mcmbers with political ambitiolls. zgt!! her, milS! li k.·ly, hy til e ()If.~r of I It.: Secrclary-Gener," PO, iUllil to "<>""~""e. I ,ion'l know wi", it w;l.<- pe rhal'.< She](' llin - IJllt I aSS"llI" til "",.1"...,1" , (",..,,1,,1\,·,1a p"I .'L·t, i" d", " ,..·", Ii" hy ""l'itlly takin g the init iat il'e :ltlli linitin g with thl" ··I",wh·· owr tltt' ,uilit;,"y interl'ention ill Cze"hoslol'ukia, thus defu sill!; tht~ nwi" arg1l11lcnh "f
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of the C c,,'r..! Commil(" " ." Ih" mid.1I or t he lup teoJ e, ' ' ...... l ~,n"· IU. S. G.·"l ,...! Inld · 1i ~n "" .~genC)·. U i,octo r~le of Inte lti~" " ,"" . l"/,e S,,,,ict Ikci. ;,,,, I.. /"""rTm, ·. .-\"~,,.t 21. 196/1).
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the ant H.lrczhncv force s_ In such a situation. nothing Dul!\;ck might havc Jon e in I'nlguc ~'Ould have avcrted the invasion ihdf. "
In an interview with the aut ho r,
~llrnM'
<:onfirmed that it was
widdy helitl\"ecl mnong I'ra guc lcaders. particularly in th e light of what they learned in :\luSCQw during th e postin\",lsiun negotiations. that all inknwl t:halle nge 10 Brezhnev let! hy Shelcpin had indcc(l heen a major canSt' of th e cha nge in the Sovie t position. Ye t this {'Ondusion must be tempered hy the f,lt·t that fillal militar y prepara tiu ns we re Hlread~' wdlund cr way hy this tim e . and in any (·asl:. nothing is known uf Shclcpin's wll.:reahouts hctwcc n August I and 15. 1\1,,1'''''''.,1'. Shcl',pin is ull e .. f tl,., leade rs late r repur ted t.. ha ve exp resse{l douhts abou t th e le asibil it y of military action. " Although his ~r.Klua! poliliwl de mis e nml i'll'e
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fined to Mos(,.'ow. Brezhnev, residing with othe r Soviet leaders, illeluding I'odgorny, in the Bbck Sca retreat of Yaha, (~lllti n ued to put pressu re On Du\"'ek. 0 " August 9 and 13, Brczll1lev is known to have (·alle{\ DulK-ek, ~trougl y ur,.dng hi m to fulfill t he t~)!lI lllit ments entere{l in to at (ierna and Bratislava. Smrkovsky was prese nt at one of th ese COJlversations and n ..'(.1mls that ·· Dulx-ck explai ned again wl lat would Ix: happening at th e [Central Com mittee plenum] at the e nd of August. what " xmld happcn at tbe Congress, and tllat we {"Quldn 't use admiuistrat ivc mcan s:' sudl as poli t"C power and execut iv(' privi1 /:ge tu \wlt ;llltiso"';aiist ilt:tivi ti t>.~"1 Apparentl y uni mpressed by Dulx."ek·s assur:mces and no douht aware of tile growing stre ngt h of intcI"V("ItjOll ist opilliou with in the party-opinion now sUPlxlr ted hy a military machine that was on the move-Bre;dlrlev decided (decision 39) on August 13 to seud a strongly wurded persol"II Idler to DlI],l·ek. As ti ter reve;tled hy Huslik, Brczlmey ··gravely pOintt:{1 out the dange r of d eyelopments in t his ~1) tm l ry, recall ing I he obi i).!;,,1 ion 10 fu Ifill th e adopted u" dertakings." " On the same day, ae<xmling to lIus:ik, another le tter was sent to Du bee!.:, this time in the name of t he Poli tiJurn, and ugain drawing the atte nti"n uftbe CI'Cz leadershi p to tl ll~ nonfulfillment of earlier agreements . A later letter sent hy tht: Politburo to D ulx:c k on August 17 also stated that Amb
(J"fi"l,h..1C,,,,,·~,>·,u ;'m. p. 22. Sm, k(>, ,kj· ,Ial,·' 1001 Hr'"lu ... v ··c'·c r)· da), " Tdel't~x,., wn'w>.,'i,~" w,·, e al", ""·,,(10,,,,1 by It,, >'!k i" 1>1, I'r~~,,~ ., I ....~"'t.l.d",~ • 1';"I r ahi".,,, A"~,,, ' \(I. I\l!fJ. EfJ315WCI\). "",( h)· A,I", S l"'~"·;"-,_ a _ ret,,,")" of the I' U\ \ ' I' in 1\l61j. in the ~ut h or"> i,,1,·,,·ic" · with him j" Wa"." · 0" ,\"~,,,t !!11. 19bO. Th~ Idler ...,nl 10)· Ilw· CI'SU I'oli,h"", I" Ih,· ct'(;, Pr.. ",j,li"'" on A"~u
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TIlE C IU SIS Pt:1\1(1)
1t:\'e1 bilateral rnet:t iil g. ~' It was furthe r repor ted !lmt Hungarian party lende r pnos Ku{hir. learning uf the change in the Soviet pusi' tion. had traveled to Yalta just before Brczhncv's departure for M oseow 011 Au gust 1.'5, Brczllllcv (decl,.ioll 42 ) is said to havt: aeecde(l to K,id,ir's urgent .lppeal that he he all uwed to mediate bctween ;\l us('uw an d Prague.'" These {k'd siuins point tu the eOIltinued. if fadin g, hopes amung B re~,hllcv and some of the Soviet leaders th:lt a full -scale militar y ill\',lSiUli mi ght st ill he avcrted. By frillay. AUgll.~t W. all the Politburo le
Tlw Iragile
kim l "I' 1'''] icy and have """Ie lise of t he time ,,,,d ']"" t']opmcnt .; sint.... Cien", t" um] " the agree ment. '"
FINAL POLITBUI\O DELIBEHATJO NS Th e mood on Aug us t 16, th e Jny t he !)"" ic\ [cad"," n :",sembled in
).Im(\ )\\', wa_~ rdl cdcd in a I'nwdu article hl' (ht: inlluential po liti. cal {.'Qmmentator Ymi Zlmko'-. who deserihe d sOllie of t he reports appc ar in).!: in (he CI.edmslovak press as '·arrogant. vulgar anti vile" and demand ed "a {.'OllSis(cnt and unwaver ing fulli!lrneu t of the ilratisl:lVa Agree ment." Thc atmosphc re in ~Iuscow had sudd e nl y Hnd perccptibly harde ned, and ev,·ut s now unfllid ed in a mu ch more eunfused ailll haphazard fashion than had previously heen th e case. I3rez hncv, re tur nin g to ~ 1
" A"{l,,,,' i"!<'n'k'W with J"""h .,.,,,"' . .'\,,,-,.,,,1>,,, !7, !!l7lI. in \\'.54ICI17, " ~\jehd l;,l". I... .II"",I~. A "~'''{ 20. tOC.,. 1I;"t,." t [,"'·... "1.,1. "S!,"",,,,' I". ( ~'~"." p _ 26. '''U.S. (;c"".l t ntdti~n<~' .~~'·nq. n;,,,<,!<>W(' (,f !"h,th~~""" . rI,e S"dn /)"c,,~'" to I"ten.'~n~ , AUi1:<'" 21, 196'i, Artue St" ...",i,'~, ;n ... th" , '; i,,','rY;"w ,.-;,h him In II'.,,,,,,, nn A"~ ''' { 28, 1!~'lO, "" , R" ,,,,llh ~ 10;1.,10,: , "al)',I, 11,.1 <1..- h.l~ ,,,,· h",,,·,,,,,, Ih~ h. wk • • "d .\,," ~. had lil>l""t ;" lh ~ ~>"n"i, f."" h~' 'h" end "f Ih~ ,·...",li"" 1"'';'~1. " f;~I'''I:>-''I";l. H"', Io<}tj S",~".k,,~ f;",.,;JJ",,...jji. IfHI. p_ ·10'2, "L",,·, "r \\'.. "in~. " [', H2
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.~UCUST
287
5-20
As previously II1cntiollc
There were a nll mber of implementing
deci.~ion s
arising fru m
tbe eOI1SellSllS that finally emcr),(cll: .. M ich~)l:'t". I.., .I/o"de. S"plemher 24. 1963: S",,,lay Tim... . Octob", 6. 1963: '"trrna· ,1"'1a/1l"",ld Trll",,,~. /)e<.... onl "" 27. 1972. Tal" ,,·po ... "~111 .. 1 all,,, d", r.;tme ,,( I),., i",'~' ,"", '0 !>"~I ' '',,, "q"l>lin~ ~o'·"'nu,<·u l . S", I",' hl.,nrcl q"'''·'H"" uk,, !<JT ,ni »~"dln): tI ,~ l'olil"",o. I" Ihe l\r.~ 'e1'".1 F<>llowi"S SI,,,I,,,!". J"tn,>lio". ~ It'ak Ii.. "" Il' e K'etn lin p"II"e hl.me "" SIr"k·.1 (n, (""~1H,,~ Ihe l\otilh"tu I••." ~ In ~I,,>,", . ,,· .",lpr<.:"'"Ii,,~ I' wilh,n "q·rlJ· .l:umi,1 "'I~)tl . =-1ig,id. II'I.y lJT.i.&k Frll. 1'. !!.S. TIg'iti h"",,,] hi' inf,"n ,.Ii,~. n" a "'["'" ("'''' C,·mile. U. S. nffidd)' """".""~) 11",1 I I... m H·.,t ,I""i,i"" h",II .• k,·" I't... •. n" A"~"'I 17 (I .". n""{",,,,/ Ikrald Tn",,,,,,. \"",·,·,,,I~· r 27. 19(">11). "'I'.,ul t:onk. in I"" U.S. "mI..",) ' in M" ...,,,,· 01 Ihe lim" n(l hc im-"";on .•1.100 il .... , Ihe ,·."I""v< "j",," 11.'1 de.. pll.· t.~'I",1 '111""'''''' ",,,I " ·"',... lIon •. 'lte ];""",1 ,"01" 10 io,·,><1.· \w,·" ""."Im",,' . Oil ... , "' u" .. , >I",~ Ihi' ,·i,·"" - 1"F,," n,~1 .u"·~rnm""1 "",,,,,,' q\H~ <.J bJ' TI", Ol,,,,rca. .~"":u>1 25. IlI&l .• .,d Il,c Ch ,;";",, SC .... 'ICC .\I,mi'o'. S"l'lomIH" II. 1\1(>'>; Dimilri Simc •. who ,,,,,k.-d ., II,,· So.. ;c ' I"'lil"", o[ WnritllC""k,n'J' . ,,,J 1"1"',,,· ti,~,al nd.I;,," •. in ·· n,p So,·[,·' 10'''';''" "fC","'Oh<,,~,,·"H. ".. Id,e Limil' nf ",,·mlinok»O·.S,,,,/i,, ill CU"'I'.mllu e,.,,,,",,,,I<,,, 8 ....... 1 .",1 2 (SI"I"gfS'nm"~ •. Hr.5j, 179. F.u g~n,· no,'n,," ,laic, lloal a joinl An~~~A",erit""n inle1li~"'!t.., "" .",menl "~",l,,, W ,11:.1 Ih~ ''''I~ h.J Ik"'" n"."i"""" (in Uri",,,. ·TI." [,,..,,i,,,, uf C,-,,,I.,,,I,,,oo"". - p. 1m). O1JIi1<1 a g""c,,,ment m""tin~. foli,....;".<: I,i, relu", f",m M""-,,,,·. IhOi ollh"u!l.h Su,k><' anJ Shdel'ln h,Ml h.o l ,~,~,,·.li nDl. {hc " , ,,~ I" inl",l" h.d 1k'C" ""."im"'" (os "'1)011.<1 on 1" '.<:"" ,,,,,Iio . Aug",1 ZII. Il1&l .•",1 'fun'...! i" (;"1",,. Refom, R"i~. [I. 2..>:;). 0,1"" "n",,,,·, >"~c'l d "'t whc,e.' d"·,,, w.IS "I:,,,c,,,,,,,1 .'" Ilk' ",.~I [,,,. in,,,,iol) . ,h~,~ we .......·,., .. '·alin'" aIM'''1 u:""" to ;n,·..fc. A <,,,nm,,nla,)' '"' l'rdSuc mJio (.~ u).~"1 20. 1961I. t; t:r.Jl !i-lllC/ U ) i, . e'·e:dmg: "[" lite SO"i," Un i,", . ,h",,· \\"~". ,It",,· ... l~, "1'1'''''',,1 ,j{ "",h ""
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authurized ,I leiter from the full C I'SU Pulithuro to tIlt: C I'Cz Prac_\ idiulll , .\ctti ng ou t th e prel"ise g rounds for Soviet concern. Some Sm-iet leaders may ha\"e hoped that the lett"'f would alert Dubeck to the necessity for illlll\,~dial e 'Idioll , wlw n ·as oth e rs ilia)' ha\"e m lclilated thai il l~)lIld Ill' lIs(!d hy proSoviet clements within the I'rat'sidium as the bas is lin all aplleallu :-'lllSl.~'W lur fraternal assistante .'"' This lelkr was sent to Dil heek 011 Au gust 17 liJ ll uwing Ihe Polithllf\) meeti ng ('lltho ugh he claimed no t to IUive rece ived it untlllUX) 1' . _\ 1. un AlIgu~t 19)'" amI the \ext was read 0111 (Jilt ytar late r ,,\,c r Prague Hal\io. It ('OII I'line(\ spt, l·ilic (Ti t idsms of the C I'Cz leadership I() r I>liling to undertake me;lsures "gn~e(l 01) ,It Ciem,1 and Bratislava illdutiillg mntrul of the m'L~ S me(I;;! ,\rJ{1 su ppression of all anlisocialist :llLd an ti-Soviet activity. '~"'r.oli'",.
h"l r." a )..1,·, do',,, a, ""'" "' 1"'''1'1,· ,,'"'~ kilt,·,1. ,,,1 inj"''''! in (:"'d""I,,, "~ I' . S.,,·iH U"i,,,, ",~,l.t I~, ..,l,,1 f,,, ."hl",,,~· . A I" " "'"'''''' inl,·,,,·,,li"" ,,,,,1,1 li",,,. Ihe s." id Il'aJ,·,. arri"c,t al !I,e ,i~h' "",,,·I,,.i,~ ,- ·· Thc "'''''''''''''''''y al .. , ... ·1",,'('<1,h~, B"·A,,,,·,· I...! I"kl J", Pitt"" '"An,·.. Ih~ linn!,"';"" ~xl"-·";en<"' . 'he h~ul ,~ • _ ' i n!.ti< C""-·h,,,I,"'.k C""""""i,1. ,>I'. 'i"td~ onli · ""I)' I"''''''' . i. d~a,~ , I"." 1\0"" It,~ h·"\I~"~,,· l,,,; ,f 1"",Ii~ i" Ih~ "'o,U " 0,1 ... , ",,,,,,., '''). II,,· ml,' l,ul ",,' I.,·" ""''';''''M". '11,,' "H", ' r,,,,I'''''''''- ""'ono"" ,1 "1'P', .. "nl., of i",",,,i .. ,, "we S",~,,· "Old " ",)-rin. "ilh SI,d",lH' ",." '~l II,.. 1,,1. The II",,· ga, ;"n . ",),,,,,,,1,,, 11<"",' ..,1.1 <:. 1._ S"I,I"'~" T (~, ""Mm,.. ,1 ;" .-I " '\ g'. "I .I/'·'/"M·n·'y . p. ~651 tI,;u s ,,,t,,,· h;"I I1JI~tI.l(.li"" i,w;" i",, _(:' '' ....~ 1I, ,,wo . ll 'iI .. fOf"'~f f"'''i~'' " "",-,"'ao ). "",eI,,·,1 f", "" _'~',,;n-' ,h i, h ,-"·d,,,,1 i.. I, t [,·~"j,,~ SIi",'/""I_ :-;",-,·",t~" I-I and 15. 1\IbIj). An ,IF!' dl"'I",kh frum ~h,><111001 II"·,,, ""'" '" '''',''' of (:,,,r),k,,-, "I~x";t",n ~arller ito tlo" """"".,. t:,-e" Ih ,,'t"'....· is ",enli"" " l ... Io;"'in~ 'I""' ~ ,,,;,·,,·.'i,~,, .,1 Ii.i, L,,,, 'I.,~", .1 11"",~h it ., al"",,, n·""i" ,10'1;" tl ... 1i,",1a,,"I~,;, 1M' ,,,,,,.] i" f.,,,,_ T/", .\",...: }i>rk Tim,:• . ..\to~'''' 29. 1!It>'i. 'I''' ~ in~ , "Cum",,,,,i,' ",,,,,,. wl..-. H,·", In ~"",,,,,. 1.,,1 w,·c). r... ,,,, I'ra~n,.. . ,Ia'o.! tlmt B"',hne,,, !.;,»)·Wn. ~", I S",I",' all h.d ' \,ro,,~ ,.,,~,,·.I~H"" al .. ,,,t 'he im·.1>i"tl . 1),,,-i<1 11;",1.,. '1""li,,~ -hi~l, t )" ,.Ii.hte E.-t t:"",p"".. "~,,tti' t."" """,ul,,.] h)' h,,,I·lio,,,,. Will )" II m" .!t Ir",,!',," u"d 1"'litic8. p_ 2J.J ) <"OOdu,k..J that -th",,· arc ):roU"d, for "UllflO';"~ (h,,( Ih" ~""iel 1\.lil· bum', ,Ir.,,;" >tel' wo, , ,,,i,,,,,1 '0 ,I,e I;.,; .. 11,,· ""Ii,,~ ".,,, 1'...1..1>1)" .i, '" ~,.,._ It la" " ,,,,,,,,,,,.1 Ih..1 1l, ,,, I,,, ~v. wl~, "U ~ w~t1 10.,·" co.,1 11,e d",ii"" .,,01 l"kll.,,·, I~·. ·" ,·rili..-;,-,",I i" tl ... 1'-"')" 1'" .. ""' h ,~ ··",,,!,.,,,,Ii,,,.h,ll h, · do",g,·" ,.rll,~ ,,,,,,,,,.,. ",,,.tuliu,," in I',;o~"l". " 1',.",. ,/" . '\"It" '1 2~. I(.,. ",ad,· 'l',·dfi< "{,.,,., "', . ,,, tlw 'ptil wilh i.. th,· (;J'(;, ProM"i· di"", . d.im'''!,\ Ih.lt '-. "'i"o'it)· of I'r...",i,I""" ""·",l~· ,,,. 1""Ml,,! I'l A. I)"b("k. ".,l ",.,." Ir 'il(l,{ - "'i,,~ "1'1~"I""i'l , 1;",,1,- a"d ',h""ukd li,lfill""",,, ,>I' II ... ""'~"'I.",ti" g f~,,,'h, .. 1 (" e;.·cu> ,,;oJ Ti><.}<, .uKI Ilr.lill",·.... .. (;"1.,, •. /1<-/<".,,, 111<1,'. 1'_ 2-1-5 ,h ~
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289
AUGUn 5-:0:0
The Pol itb uro co nde mned both Cisar· and I'rch li k by name an d singled Ollt re(."cnt stude nt demonstratiuns in Pmgllc. the attacks ,Ig"in .• t the wo rkers at th e Pr"g'l factory am i ml)lnh"rs of the People's ,\1 ilitia. and t he act i\~ t ies of the Praglle C ity Part)" Committec as proof th at t here was a "growing th reat of a (."Ollnter rc\·olut iun.·' It e nd ed wit hout threaten ing specific punitive measnres. but it di d e mphasize "the im mediate necess ity of fulfilling th e obligat ions wh ich we juint ly 'l(.'Cepted at the meet ing of hro the r P'lrtieS."~l Decisiml forly-six informed It;mliug offid,i15 inside the Soviet Uni on and in the fnlternal <:Ollllt d C5 ,md p;
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,..,II/il J SSSR j m")"/,"'''''''/nykh "/ .w.,It~,,ii. p. 453) ,~alo, tI", 'he ,Ioo,io" "-10 i" troduce <>Ilt for"", inl0 ("£<·ho,lm-. kia" " .... uk"" hy ,h~ CI'SU (;,,"t,:11 Commj""e ~nd th~ S"'-iet ~o"~n'Tt"'ttl -~"It~'h,", "."j, Ih,· C" ,,'rJl C"mmil"',,,-.nd II,.. gO""mmenl> "f ~he r"", fr.,h·",,,1 , I"t.,.: A,I,d[ ~lo1n,·, (/)i' T...T,,,,,I0,,,/,,,,·,,lri ,,,,I ,I~r _~ "rl". .wd, Sid,rrl,..i/. 1'. 3(2) ' I"""" a"",,,,,, wiil,in 'h~ (:I'C>. .'><."<,el",'" a, '"'); "~ Ihal • ,n"..1in~ "f Ih~ r," e hx,k I~"'--~ in ll",,~ar)' '"' A"~"'I IS_ F..t,.-~,ted 'hal i, ,,-..., t"".~"ri
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C lused channels were also ohviousl" use{] to inl(lTln other Suviet olfici,t\s of the Politburo's decision, hut th ere is no firm c\'id"ncc that pa rty me mhers helow Ihe Central Committee [e"eI we re ,l!;iven anything hut the most I'eil!:d and gClle ral Sigll,lls.'" TllI~ "c is so nle indicatiun that further meet ittgs between t[t e Pulitbtlro anti uther (."Onsultiltive groups louk pbc.'C fi,lh,wing I[l\: ,\ugusl 17 {Iccisiun, Some reports speak of a formal hut secrd C{:nt ral Com mitt ee ple num , otllcrs uf :.n ad h"c meet ing of key C(~ll t r,,[ Commit\l~e memher, station c{] in .\]osc{)w. " '"stern intelligenc.'C monito red l1)1lsid erahl y " T!. SS, ,\"~u>117. 196.~, SUIZS5J/.\212. MLo"~,, ,d".",·d I;",,,, .\10'"'''' I" I~ " ",· " ia 1',';•. ""10,·,,· b,· ",1,1 .;.""",1;,,, .L"" i" .. , ,!~,,' "i't. S ,,,~,, a ,~l " Ih,·, " I"" I",~ ""·,,,I~·,," " f Il ... So.... , .. , (;",,,,,,,,,,,,1 1'" ,1)' I,~ ~'l,,~...,I 25. 19(11). [~ ",g" "'"
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AUG U ST 5-20
heigh tell(.'(1activity ill ;l!ld (I rou nd tIll' Kn' l11lill during th e weekend, although tIlt: ahsence of similar activilr at Ihe airports might suggest that party [unci iOllarics "'l're nol bd n)! e"lleJ ill frulll I he pro v; nees. Certain lv. the otlieial CPS U vcarbook illr 1908 Inakes no mention ofa . Ce ntral Committee mcdillg durin g Ihis period, ami it is possihle that the Politburo assembled lea(ling part~· amI governmen t officials tu inform them of its decisio n (lll an ad ho(; and (·.I!lsultati vc, nl\her than a fo rmal ,lIld dt;cisio nal. hasi.~. n' It is also quite possihle that sume leade rs still sought to prevcllt, or Ihou)!ht they ('lUld prcven t. th e in vasion at this late stagc. Decision forly -seve'l sought to <."On\(lin the internatiunal consequences of th e in vasion, ('ertainl y in Ihe polillcal area und perhaps also in th e m ilitary sphere. °lh t his e nd . Pre mie r Kos)'gin 011 August 19 informe d President Johnson th ;lt the Sm'kt Uninn was prepared to announce its read iness 10 hust a sum mit he tween th e two le"ders in Leningrad heginning September 30 til d iscuss th e limitation of strateg ic arms. Bolh leaders agrectl t hat a simultaneous aTlllUuncemcnl til t llis efled would he made in \ Vashington and ~l lJSL"oW on \Vcdnesday morning, ."\ u gust 21. " ,. Michel ·",HI. I~ JI",,,/, . A"g".1 20. 1'>'1'>9. ' 11e.,k- " f . ",,"pli,,\( "f I'" W f"",1i,,, ,.,i, .. "n 17 ~ 18. we,/;. 1"1" $ "",I,,~ Ti~"" . ,\"~" ' I ~. Hlr,.;. "" 11K' I."i, "f 11<", G~ .. ",,,,, i"ld· lig~noc. "'I~ "I' . U,ezhnc" "\l...,ti ,, ~ wilh C " ...·t.L". \'"L uIH,,", k), ~",I Y<"pi.he'·. Jiti lI:ij,·k (Dlr dM dl"h. 1'. 11·11 refer> ,,, "" ··u"e'l"·d,·J ''''~'I i,,~ ,,.. ,10 .. s",,.;,-I (;,·"lr.1 Co,","ilte~ from which nolhinll C' -"T 10, . . ... ",.,Ic L,u",... , .. The (;1 ,1 ""'",ur.",\t ,rn ~'~'~'I O"'i,.", ',J It"",·~,,~. A"It" ,1 21. Hlr\/; . • 1", "·f,·,, ,.. ,10 .. """·,·,,r,,~ ,of ~ C""I~,l e n,,,,"ill,'" 1'"''''''''. '" Jut·,1:...1 S"", lc I" the S..... }'0 "·I·~.I,,J ,10.1 ,1 SO.) ,'. " . 0" A"\-~'" 2U ","", ... ,...·ll<"d ,Iw'''' u/." i''' I",,,ding i""a';"" anll Ihal Ihe n,·W' (""~ "'e (ru", "ll,~ M",,",,w "' .... Ii ,, ~ "f Ill,· C~ "l r.l C"",,,,ilh..e" (S,,"riuy n"'... . A"g"'I~. IOCo'j). \"I;"li",'. ~I ..,in"" (in Urh.n. C,"""'~",,' fl,J"""",li"". 1'. 2&,l) 10"" 'l",c~lll,.1 .. \'" I h" .., "'huk ddl', Il'e Ce" lr.,1 O>"""iu ,"t" " ...., in c,~,li",,',", ,wn b.'<:".u >e d ",re w:'" 0 pre' '' '''l'liun tlt.1 Ihe C7A"j" "' i,.ht fidll. ond Ihal Ihi. onidll I"",uke further I"",hle ~hc,..h,· re in ""-,Sle,, , Lnn,,,, .. ,t! in Ihe So, ;'1 Un~"'. ·· TIo~ StJru/uy Till"". AtJ~"c ... P'c,""," '" .""Id "M ,d . ~".Jy ~;." . .... "f Au ~u , ' 20. 1!lGS. l~'lh "'port nomo .... 01 "" "mctg"ncy C,nlrJ Commilic"<.' pic""", l...~"n i"~ on A,, _ g",1 19. J)I;) ~i" ""d ,~ h er ,"".~, ,,.;.,.;1 to fnr~' I"lI ll", ;tt'.. ,",n u]> to 1I,~ I~'I "",,,,,'<11 " '1110 ;n, 31l·,,;~hl rn","1i"~ "" "'''~~"I 1H ~2() ( F."~. "'''I: Sla",J~,,/. ~""~ ,,,I,,, , II. 19C0II). r<>.k Tin..... Au",""t 23. 19&i. 11,c da' " .nJ I'enue f\Jr the t;;"'n tin ,J"I",,,,,, . ",nm i. had I.,.,,, Ji ....,"..,.r L"O.TI;.·, ;n 'he ,",,' me, . • , ,"nG.,,,,·,1 h)' R'p"" " ,1(",,,lh,,1f ".h<, ".,., 'h ~ " I" It.~ Siale ])ep. . r1me"ll"'·I.. rin~ Ihe U.S. Ix>;il~Hl. i"",, i"le"''''''' \'YII,~ " ull"". ,\1 3",h R 19S-!. A"~"'I
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If the decision to in vade \V,L~ h y this tim e firm , un,Uli1nous, and irre vocable, Kosygin's message eoUl he interpreted as a rather cy nienl aite mpt to offer the :\m eric<\ns the carrot of SALT while using the st itl agaiust l'ra~ue , on the assumption that Johnson's desire for an East -\Vc st summit W'I.~ slIeh tll,lt he would not abilndull it, even if it were to be anno unced si multaneously with the invasion, " Th ere are of cou rse other explanations of th is rat he r strange se(luenl'e of eve nts. One is that KI)s yg in did not belieVl' til{> dl:<:ision to invad(~ was irrevocable and that h l~ hO[l(~d to !lSI.' Jnhmon'5 agreeme nt to alteml a summit in Le ningrad as a ('onstrJint UII th ose who favon:!1 ,In invasion of CzeclioslovHkia, whicb would inevitably scuttle nny hopes of a slimmit. " A thin! view has hec n forwarded - thai t he "hawks" hop ed tn kill two birds with Ime stnn e. Th c~' may havc agr(,l:d to app nmd l Ihe Ullile{1 SLlteS, hoping, on Ihe one hand . to mask Soviet preparaliollS lind (Iefuse Ame ril"an reactions while , estahlishill )!: its pusitio n and presti)!:c aft e r th e sctbaek uf th t: Khrushclle v em, 7' or (1 )n Tse, it is l"Crt
spcc!1 with whi ch Soviel-Ame ric,m l'01\l:lc\S OIl SALT were resumed afte r th c in vasion suggest s a degree of unity 011 Ihis iss ue. It has also heen snggested thaI OIl Augus l 18 ~luSl.uw receive{1 a_~sn r..11lCC.~ frum th e Unitl~d States Ihnt il would nlll resporid militarilv Iu t he Pad inl'asiull. This ;lll e~al iun uf A rnt:riean l'lUlII;I',IlWC, la ter hotly di sputed in \Vashing ton , was mad" most clcar1 ~' by Zde nck "'ll vn;\f, whu IT(1)rdc{1 thal'lt Ihe posli n\',l~iun .\IUSlUW nc)!:oliatiutls, Dn·dUl(·\" , in a sud den fit ofirrihltiun at Duh(-ck's refu sHI to sig n Ihe "nn r llln li~_ali()n " llgrC"me nt , shoutelllli the Czechoslovak dc1e~ntiun: " S,·.· '·'I,,·ci.J1r F1 110" <1"";,i",, 10 i",·... t.· ,,~, ",.,t~ ""t), r,,,aUr d", tid)' l~,ti'n' the t".~" "H"'c~1 in (".,. Uu, k., K Il"hl"n. ll'i/""... ,,, 1Ii>lof>j. W~ _ l'J6IJ. t""~,,
I~ "
5:1I _ 3l.
" Thi' ',-,tnnl("nl '"AA''''' that ,ti''''", i"" ,we, tl ... it"·.,i",, "'Ih,,'''~! ]",,,,,1.. , ,li",~,,'''' ,,, ,- n'" ,I.,r~n,. ' I"·,,, t in~ ""tI ", n" "",I",t. I" Ih i' ' . '1",.1. ""t<. r'a.-do '" 1"-,,t""' ,,1 ,,fa '1,,,,,,,10 h)' I',till""" ""-,,,t ..·, Kidt M"'.I " ""mil: ··U",· ,,,n """,11 in thi' eon"."ti,!!) ,hot "-,, h,a" c ~'l',e.",-·J ou,. ,."....tin" .. to "e!!l~i.I'· "'ilh th,· l' nl,,~t Slat .. , "I) Ih,· "t.,I" rompte, ,,f .10,,,,," '1' ",,,1,,,,<, 11", !~ "iti'-~ '01 ,,1 i'H' . I"","" ,·r. ,t'·I"·,,d, "'~ 'H' d ,,, S,,,-;,,I .' id,· . 1,)),. " (Ra_ dio .\ 1n"",,'. N"".·,,,tM·' (;. 19f,~\. ruml" in ",prinl i,,~ II,;' ' t"·"'·1. tl", ",·,1 J.,,' delete.1 thi. I,",'ti n~ ('()nl i nu,~t lacl (,f .p,""",,·,,1,H' , hi. ;""' ",
""N
," "
2"
AU(;UST 5 - 2.0
\VIMt ;tTe YOII waiting rUT'~ Do YUU ,:.\ ]x·~,t m,ythillg i ~ going tu ha]l]>cn tu help yOld Nu, th e re is gui"g to ht: "" war-yo" might as well take not e of tIm\. I had all enqniry se llt to I'resident Johnson a,king him whl"lher the Uuih,:d Stall:s wuuld n'~]X"d the Y,,1I .. ,HId Pobdan, agn:emcnts, ami on 16 August ] rL"l'"j\'ed hi, rc ply sayi ng that as far as C:wd,oslol'akia "",llIu""",ia we rc l"IJJll..:rI\cd the u.s. would IIn{luest iOllabl ~' honor these agreelllenls-Illl' cas., of Yugosbv ja. he said, would haH: to he I he SII hj,;<:t of nq:otialio"s."
It must he said that although the re cunld he little duubt in Suviet minds by Augusl 20 of\Vashington 's pulicy nfstritt n()ninlerferell('e, there is no other spccifi(;(widetK'e to support .\Il)'nar's ,u,x-"Ount. Certainl y MOS'~IW'S posture immedi,tlcly prinr to the invasiun was designed. a.~ t he British amh,lssador to the USS II recall('d, 10 show the Soviet Union's "anx iety tu reassure the United Stales government that Sovid p(llit·~, in Cn~h(Jshl\" lkia had no n,al anti-American aim.""; But beyond this. there is no indication of specifk- agreement between ~ Ios(."(}w and Washingto" Ol'" r spl,e res of influent'c. The de<-"ision 10 invade hro ught tilt' (.·risis period to an end. The final J;IYs before the intervent ion WI,,-ocifi,-.II)" ,"C"H,,"ill~ .")' ",-",rei ,i~. 1I.ling.• hif;l> U, S. ,,!Fie..1..JmiHeJ .. cotJ)' "-' ",,,!(Ust 2-1. 1968, ,1 .. , N...TO a"J 'he \\"[0 ;uil",u' I" ",,"'rill~" " 11<' lroo[1' ."""seme,,l> - .",111..1 .i'K'<' C"","h,,",~'nl " 1.)' wilhin llle "11",,;0" .phere of i,,/tuell''':' I]K' l', S, ··u,,,·,,,· 1.n)· oni]ilar)' ",:Iim, in n"I~)n'" 1<> "', i"v»io ll (0/"..",.,", Au~u'l 2S. 1001»,
""" i,]""..
C J-IAI'TE H ELEVEN
Findings
DECISIONS TII C crisis pcril Ki was divid(:d intn fiv(: phases, with the iiJllowin g major decisions being take n in each phase:
Dr";""" S"",brr
C",,/clil
Dale f'I1,\~t;
O=-,t; , MAY 5 - J U ~.: Ii
"
~Iay
5
The Pt)lithnn) ,k'Cid"s In ct,n"", press IK)" Icrnics, conduct hilah)rJ I and multiblcral hloc neg.(ltiati un!i. and US!) milihlr)' displays of foree agai"st Cl.eeho.lovakia as part of a campaign (If minatnry diJllmna~T As part of this "iden;n)! of alt ernal in,s. develnp", en l of eOnlin)!el1 e)' plan s fur n possible ;n"<1S;O" W;IS also likely 10 han, bee n agreed On at th is ti me.
12
Mav i
The I\,lilburn decid ~s to umvene a " " "mit oflh.) fiv,' (U SSR. H,land , lI ungary, lI ulgari;l, ,n,,1 the GBB) the follu wing day in M<)st~'w,
13
~Iay
8
The So" iet ,kk~!;l\iu n to th(~ ~h)!('Ow meC!' ing of t h c five "irec, h' greal e r part icipal ion in crisis ma nagement by East ElITopean leaders. The l\,lilhllro (pro1",h1y wilh mi litary re llresenl"tinn\ lle,'ides (:d 10 Jlr<·SS for "''''JeuVerS ""d disl'11SS Ill" 5t:1I iOll I, 'Ii: oft nx,p' ill C~.~'Cho slo,,"ak;a: (h) 10 llclerm inc wl,..1 hc r t h " "nJ"·r";1l i,,.., ",-., lik,·l~' tu re< .. ."p tI",;r [,usil i""s . wi th ur with",,1 Suvi"t help: (cl tn 29·(
FINDINGS
295 L'Onlinue ne);"liali"". wil h Ih.) Dulx'C k ~(j"_ emmellt in 3n e m)rt to reach a poHtiml solution withou t fu rl her crisis esmlaliou, and (d ) to send Grechko and Kos)'~in to Prague as rl-Jlr~ S.,n t"t ives of these 1\,., views.
15
May 26-21
The Polilhun> (prohably with mililary repre_ sl-n tatiou) au thorizes the SO\'iet militar y to begin movi ng un its inlo Czechoslo"akia o stensihly for the JUll e \\'TO maneuvers hut actuall), to coincide wi th the .Iolay C I'Cz Central Committee plenum,
16
June 6
The Polithuro d,,<:ides to d efuse th e "cisis and support the Dubeek leaders hip in its efforts 10 conlrol both lellisl and righ tisl te mhmcics.
17
Ju ne II
Th e l'nl ithu ro an thurizes Brezhnc" 10 write tn Duh"""k st.'ekin g inlln ed ialc hil ateral ,,, lk s,
Ju ne 13
The l'uIHbllt'O decides to sec k bilaterallalks amI to keep Soviet mililary units in and around C7.L~ h "sl u\'akia at th eir curre nt Ie\'el of p!,(,parcdness _
J""e 20
noe I'ulil l"oro authoriw!" nati onwi.Ie .,ampail<" of solitbrit y wit h Ihe Peo]lle 's ~Iilitia and the v.mkin g: po:opl., of Czechoslovakia und increases press pole mi cs ugainsl Pmgue with I he IlUl,li l-,ltion of the first pe rso nal allack on II Cz.,..1u",lovak lead.,r (Ci.~u f).
June 20
The Polithu ro agrccs th .. t KosYllin shou ld writ e Presid e nt John son see king arms lim_ ilati ou talks.
I'IIA~f; T WO : j USf; 6 - 27
19
21
Ju ne 27
22
J une
3{)
l uI)' 1- 2
PII...S.; Tilli E.:: jUSf: 21- jUl.Y 28 Brczhn e" ca lls Duhe"k 10 protest the pullIkat inu nf t 1)<' ""Z. OIlIl \\'"nl s" ",a"ifest,,_ Th,) I'olithu ro d'''''h]" , In keep S"vie t truups in Cz,·("h<JsIuv"kia fi ,r !loe Ii",., be ing. Th., Plllithu ro .kcides to seck un ur);en t multibtcr:ll meeting with th ., lcuden; of Czeehoslovukia and otll('r members of th e fi ve.
July 10
The 1~)l i thuro (with milita.-)· partieipatiun ) ;lgn'Cs to formally end maueu".,,, and wil h_ tim\\' Sume lroups fro on C~,:<'h"slnv;l k ia , at
ICh
!z
M
TIl E (;IUS IS I'EIHOl)
the same t ;me "1,,,) apparent lr !r~ ll sferrjll).: ope ra ti onal control for an y f"!,,ro) e",~ r<;i s(' 0 .. military adion frolll the WTO I [cauqua rtcrs under Yalmho",kr tu th e Sovid lI igh CUll)Ill~lId limIer Grcdlko. 25
July iO
Th e l>ulitburu dc~'ides to "haml" " the Secret ncgotiali""S with t h~· ll,,"n io!"n: rulllcll t o\'er ,I r.~nulldati "n-uf-lor(:c agl'CeIlH:nt.
26
Ju ly
TIll) Pulitburo "j!Tt"'S tu the ]lllhlinit io n "f an artide b\' 1. ,\l e." lml"}\' en l itl ed "Atl:ll'k " " the Su,,':.!i s! ];j",,,,btiull s "fCZCl,h"sluvakia," the lmrs]",s] " HIe; ,,] de "u"ciatioll "f the Prague l.~;uhm;hip yel tu Iw madl' by th" SIl" iel leade rship.
27
July L I
The Po litburo (minu s Kosygin) agrees tha i the Ih·c shuuld un'::l) aga i" de"''''''] ;'I. ",,,It il;'Il"n>1 UI,~<) ling with C~l.'.::h os l"v"k k:"I(' r.;.
J uly 11 - 12
T In: Pohthuro (minns KosY.l:in) agrees 10 despatl'h a delegatioll to War-;;.w immediatel y for a bloc enclave,
J()
T Ilt, I\,\ilh"", (minu s 1("'Yl:in ) nll re ",' Ihal fo\lowing th e Warsaw rne{'t ill~. a sl)C{'iai CI'SU Ce n t",1 Comrnitt ee plenum should be L, mve neJ, 30
J uly 17
T he Centm l COiLLmittee affirms th e t. ecd lilr a lL:lliunwiJe ca mpaign to farniliaril.C the Suviet publi c with the \\'ar.;:,w Letter and to Inuh iliz.: I,uhlie opinion a)!"inst ~''' ' ntl'r_ f('volutinn a ry t.mJenci.·' in CZ.,dHlSi,,\,(,kia.
31
Jllly 17
Urezhtwv s•.'cks hilat..ra l talb wit h CZel' 11< 'S I, 1 va kia,
32
Jul), i9
T he Politl>uro [)uhlic\y re"mrlll' the ~a\l for bilateral talks.
33
July 20-21
The Politburo f;'its to endurs.:: W;.tde"k lIochct's for a Eur,,[>ca n Co mmunis t L,,,,fcn,ncc to discn,' s C~. ,d"'sl,,vakia
31
J111r 20- 21
T he ['olithum (prcsun",bl)' with militar y parti"i pat iunj de.::;des tu send J forma l leite r to the C~.e~·h(),lo\'ak )!o"."nme nt d.::malHhn)! the im med iate st "tionin~ "fSoviet tmops in Czcchos lo" "kia ,
J uly 21) _ 21
Th,' l'oli t I"'n> (wit h t I,.. ]I;'rl id l ,,,I io" of "t le ;lst (;rolllyko amI Gredl lw ) a\:rc ..s to pro-
""II
ICh
JIz
M
297
Fl NDI .... GS ~.... ed
with a fl1 l1 -s,,~I., iuv:o, i"n ofCl.•,dwsl,,'·ak;a. h..:I< ,re :\lIgu,! 26. unkss DII I"::..:k "pees hu l h tu end t1." r"furlll m,,,,eme nt ;md allow the pe rln ,mc nt stationing of So· ,'ie t tmollS " " CzedlO,lovakia'~ we~ t c rn hurd"r. A<...·""lin);I)·. the p.,lith"m (;.) auth,,rizes th e military 10 make fin alllrC l)amti oll s; 01",1 (0) ins tructs the foreign mini ste r 10 as~"Crt",in the likcl)' \\'este rn response.
36
Jul y 22
Th e Politbu", "gr~..:s \" h"ld ncgotiatio ns On C7.•xhoslovak sui1 at ( :ierna lIat! 1'1.")11.
37
July 3 1
The Suv;,-' drit:gation
P IlA S~: I'Oll l~: JlIl.Y 2!J - AUGlIST .'i
P ItAS t: t"[\"t:, M i(;UST 5 - 2n
38
August G
Th e I\Jlit],uFO [lcddc .• to pr< IC,'ed ",ith plans for a" i,,,,asio,, and to imp1eme nt thus(' plan ~ he fore the Augu st ~() dead lin e uule!s til\" G,.•;ehmlm-ak l e,,(leT~ sh"w de"r and IOu· (~ IHh'(I('al adhe n~ nl'" to th., Soviet iHleTpretal ion uf t he Br.lt bla,"" st ate",.,,,t .
AU!-'ust 13
Brel.hnev deeidc s 10 send a leH er to Du1.>&> k fulfill meul of undertakings madc at Cierna and !lrati .•!:,,"a . d em ~",li n g I he
40
Au gust ]3
.>1
Sovie t lead er~ semi a '~""Hullt!l,,"r to Du l>_ (.... k in th e na,n e "fl he e ntire Puli tburo. <1mwing Il le utl c ul ion of the C PC~. le ad er· ship!o the nonfulfillm ent 01" prior ugrcerncllh. 0" P"lil hu ro ;,,,Ir"l"t ;'ms. ,\",1"",,,d"r
Clwr,"une nku mrch Czech",lu,"ak leaders. app;m'n tly ",·.. kin g p,:rmiuw nl statinnin g (If lroops "ml d'!UH""li ng ,,,,,,the r high-le,"el h il,lI!:ra1 mcrlin)!.
42
Augusl 15
1\r<~7.1 ' !l<"\' agme .• t" J..:,\d~r" u.;:ent appeal th at he be allowed 10 mediate hetween M() smw an d Pr:\)!uc.
,\ ugus t W
I\ rcllnwv ' (' nds Dub'::!:k a letter a[}pc ali ug to him 10 he,·d pre vio us ",amings.
",h
!z
M
298
Tille C HI S I S I'EnlUI)
-14
August 17
TI .e Pol itull ro agre," '0 prOl.,<-·,,<1 Oil Allgn,1 2() with the illterl'''u!;"" pian.
·\S
August 17
T he 1',lit h uTU a!;rce.< \0 semi" let te r tu tlw C I'C~ I'r:\(:., i
-'6
August Ii
The I'ulilhmo agrees to inform leauin!: om<,;" Is ins id e tlw S"" il'l Uuion amI ill lr.l t,·rual <'OlI nt r;"s ;mll parti cs of the impen di ng iuv". sion amI its likely l'O!lSC' I IlClll"CS,
.Ji
.... "gllst 17
The I'"lith"m dt·,-id "s .111 ""ri ous measures 10 "",ta; n th e ;II te rn at; "",,! "'"":'l""lll'''S of tIll: ;",':0,;"" ,
DECI SION
~IAKEHS
AND THEIH PSYC HOLOGIC,\L
ENVIHON~IENT
The length y crisis perioll. uissLi,.'lcd into its fi ve phas ~s . revealed a high level of Jlar tic ipatiun h y the Sovicl lcau crsh ip ill th e Illa twgeme n! of the Czechosluvak crisis. In tnldng th e decisions that were made , th e analyst is faced with th e proble m that in many eases, the ditlleulty lies not in discerning that a dcdsiun has ucen made but in divin ing by whum. This is particularl y :Ippanmt in the <:risis period when th e general lel·d of political "etivity was lligh , {Iivisions within th e leadership were ap parent, and individual leade rs were ofte n dispersed iut he p rul'in<:cs or ahwild . The analyst can assu me th at there was buth upportun ity and motivation fur heightened (Id hOI,.· aetivity hy leaders hip factiuns, yet it is stH! I't:ry difficult tu ascertain by mea ns of direct eviden ce which leaders or grvups wcrf' controlling the uel'isiun-making proce~~ and which were h('in).! excluded frmll it. There (I re, however, a 1Iumber of imlin:ct indicators, illdmli n).: particip"tiun I.u lh ill ne).!o t iatiuns over the C;r.edmslu\"ak issue an d in the public debate over Czcchoslovakia. Looking fi rst ,,' particip"tiull in negu tiat iuns, th e re were dnrin g the l·ris is periuJ th irtythree d elegations reccll·ed Of s(:n t hy the USSH in which Politbu ro ur Central Committee members o r military leaders were invulved an d in which CZl>t:husllJl'akia W.IS known 10 havt: heen d isc ussed . An analysis uf participan ts reveals the existence of a I'olilbtt ro inner (.'U re l'Ullsistin)4 uf Kusy)4in (whu was invulved in IIU less thall Iwcl l't~ ofille th irt y-three negl)tia t ion.~ ); B re7.hl\(~ \· (ni ne); l'odgorll Y(dgh t); Katll shel' (eight); Suslov (six); D emichcv (f"ur); VorOIlO\, (three ):
'99 Shclcst (th re e); and POllomarcv (t hree ), Analysis of th e negnl iat ing t(~ams also shows th e very high level of military ilwukerncnl , wit h Crcchko included in six orthe thi rty. thrcc dc1cS;Lt ions, Ycpishcv in fi\'(~,
Sh tc m cn ko in five, Yakuhovs ky in four. ;nul Kosluw oi in t hree.
Examination of involvement in the pulllie debate over Czechosluvakia reveals a nnt d issimilar pidure. Tlw re were twenty-one llolit ical1calle rs amI twe nt y-seve n milit ary leaders who hetwee n
th e m were responsible for fi fty published speeches, articles. statements, and Jlrt~SS interviews 0 11 tlliIttcrs n: bting directly Of inlli rectly to Czccll()s1ovakia during the crisis pt~ riod. Several of the
speeches Were in facl del ivered at dosed sessions of the Cen tral Committee or lit party IIk/ivs. and although t he y indic<1 te leadership activity. their l'Ontent c~nnot he assessed in the amllysis of leadership views. Of the total, Kosygin W,IS responsible for e ight of the fift y. I3rczhney fu r six. Sheles t fur five, PoogofllY for three. and C romy ko for two. The military once again were act ive in the pll hlie d ebate. Twen ty-one of the forty-one spee<:hes. articles, or press l~lIlferenccs published WI: [(: mad,: by mili t;lry lcade rs. with Ya kuhovsky re.s ponsible for se\·cn. KOll ev for th rcc. Zakharov for three. and Grecllko lor t wo~ exc1udillg orde rs of the day print ed over Il is name.
These two indicators su pport t he ,lIlalysis prc.scnteU in th e preceding chapters, which Ull(Jerlili es the t~;n t ra lity ill th e J ee i.~ i on making process of Bre7.hnev, Kusyg in . I'odgofll )'. Suslo", and Shelest ;l~ political leaders ami till' generally high level of involve me nt of m ilihlry leade rs. The act ivi ti,:s 0 [" th e~e 1l1t: 1I have already been analyz!:!1 extensively, hut il is worthwhil,: sl lInrnaril.ing th e sim i!arities and diffcn :nl"cs in th eir views he re.
Bre::.huev In Brezhn ev's speeches, the views lie expressed in the ('ou rse uf tI ll: \V"r'~'I\\' ami (:it! nm 1lI,>clinj!.< • .111<1 Io. ll yn,i{, r" cor
promptu speech Brczlmcl' (Ielil'cred at th!: postin v;lsioll .\ loSl.·o\\' negol iat ions •.~el'enl l ft>(:lITring t 1lt.~ lllc S ami characterist ics appcar. I
!"""""'"
' I\, ..,.h",·,; ,p....."h " S."·kl-II""~r;"" r,; .. ",!'Io,p ''' ... ·1 ill~ ;11 Mo,,,,,... ;n ui Kid.,. 1.. 1)' 3. l00S. S U '2Il]3ICII~;: ' 1'''''\.'10 ~I II!" .\ll-U";'Hl c<~,gn.". "f Tead",,... I'...."JII. Jul)' .5. 196/j, '1",,"< 11 ul II,,, K,eml;" "'\.~·I" "'" f,,,. ~,""".",,' of ''';';''')" "","",Clnic>, J~I)·II. ]96/j. S UI2sI7iCll ~ 5: "'-.:0""(>-of hi' ,;<.".".•, ~,p,",,,,,cl ;" In""';ng. ,,;th Sm ,lo,·.l y on J"n~ 14 « har'~' 7) • • , th" II·a ,,,, ... m<""rl;n~ (d"'ple, 8).•, (;"'rn" (d,"plc' 9). • nd.1 Ihe ]~ ",ti"" ~';"n
M"",,,,,. "" ..,1;n~ Id,.",.., 12).
ICh
!z
M
3/)()
TII £ CIIISIS PUllOll
O ne is a l ead c r.~ hip style strvngly inclined tuwan l cunciliation and colledive leadership. This appears to hav,: heen tile pru<:luct "ot just of tlte balance of fon.-cs within thc I'olitburll bul also of his own pe rso nal orienlat ion. Brezllllcy followed opinion. he did nol make it ; he was ndthe r t he first of the Sovicl leaders to puhli cl ~' advocate th e lise of military means where socialism was tilreaten L.J (Crishin, April 23), nor \V,IS he the last perso n to express confidence in til e ab il ity of the Czechoslovak people and part y to del iver an dfective rebuff tu any attack on th e sociaiisl uasis of CZl>choslo\'akia (Kos),g in, J uly 13). He hoth helped tu fo rm a political L~lJlSenSUS and refl ected that consensus; he W'L~ an \\Tch ilect of hoth th e h\\rd-line \ Varsaw Leiter and the Cicrna l"Om prolll ise, although he was neither th e most hawkish of leade rs al \Varsaw (Ulhricht and GolII ulkal nor t he most dovish of leaders at Cicrna (Suslov). Brezhnev viewed the events in Czechosluvakia very much t h rO llgh th e lens of t he threat I hey I"MlseJ to t he ideological Itlll nJalio ns of t he socialist system. He had revealed himself to be deeply opposed to any manifes tati ons of inte llectual dissen t or nationalis t activities in his own country, and it was tl lis aspect of the Praguc Spring t llat mo~1 ''''''ricd hi m . Fur Brezlmev, in Ihe l,,,lance !,,,tween d ogmatism and revisionism, th e lalle r was the grea te r &111ge r. The Ch inese example fuund little edlU in his own country. ],ut lhe C,.echoslovak rd(JI"ItL movement sto,xl to exacerlmte the tell siollS within th e C PS U and be twee n Ihe part y and th e intellige ntsia brought about hy Ihe harder liJle in l'lIltllral alLlirs in th e \}{ lst-Klum hehev period . If 13rezhnev opposed il\\"Hsion, as he 'IPparently did for so long, it \Vas not out ofs vmpath y wi th the Prague Spring; it was attrilmtahle to tile C
Alwlysis uf Kosygin's participation in negotiat ions and in the public debate revcals ;1 ve ry high level of ;lcti Y it~'. indeed t he Ilil-\hes t of ;lny Sovie t leader. At t lt t' same time , it has hee ll sIH)\\'ll tlmt Kosy-
.,
301
gin was exdudcd on several oc'Cusions from important decisions cs('alatill),!: the crisis with Czedllls1o"akb, indlldin g: tIle eOllveuillg of
th.· A t".i] Cen ir,,1 Cm"mith:c ple"" ,,, a",1 the det"isi oll to ]',,1.1 th e \\',lrS1\ \\' mcctinj!; withou t C7.l'(Clms]o"uk parlicip:ltinn . LolJkin):; at Ilis ~pe~ h es and th e ac(xmnis of hi s views,' a.~ exprcss(!(\ p'lrlicuhlrly during hi s OtIC-lllim sojourn to KilrlU"y V,lry ill .\lay, Kosygin emerges il-~ a lcu(lcr with il lllllt'h hroader vision than Brezllllt.'y, He did not inte rpret the eyenls ill Czechoslo"akia solel y or eyell primarily through th e attitudill;ll prism of Ihe threat imposed lIy the re/1mn mo"ement to the socialist (~)mnHltlity ,IS a whole or to tile ideological h,IS;S of So\'iet·sl~'le systems. Tklt is !lot 10 ,~;ty Ihal Kosygin W:1S sympalhcl it: to Ihc Pragu c n'/iJrln per se or in tnto. jusl Ihat he W;IS not opposed to the very uotioll of refo rm and that Iw had a mm:h mor" pragmatic apprccialioll "I' th e pmhle m> iUl"Ol\-ed in (~ Hltrolling th e crisi, /Tum ~I()scow, lie , almost alone of the Soviet I",atle rs. valued quiet diplornaey: ami lie may Ilav,' 'lL·l1::pl/·d Czedl us lowk reassuran ces 11!;lt th e proll!t:ms Iidug ellCOIlutcn:d in Cl.cclu)slo\'akiil we re a trallsier\( phenomeno n. Ccr tainl~ ' t,: osyJ.(in t~!UJ{! sec that an il1\',\~iun would jeopardi"e two poli tics to which he was Ilersunall y l'uUllnitted: tilt: rdilTlll III' the Soviet ewnom~'> ,lIId the I~as l - Wes t detent e. Il is positive ,ltti tude to an impro\'e nwnl in E'Lst- \Vest relations \\',lS more than "pparclIt \rOIll hi s .s tat ... m ,: nl sin Sw"d"n. l I [,. an ,sw ... n·d 'l,";st ions on I he G/'rItlall prohlcIll hut did not tD nd clllll the p()lk ~' of" hu ilding bridges" ami {·.. lled iw;t{" 1{1 fill' an all-European sCl'urit y mnIC I'C1 Il'C: hc talked aboul Ihe SC{lInd \\ 'orld Wilr. Jlllt ill.\tc'ld of' stre ssing the e);:tenl of Sllviel sacrifices (which be as a part y apparat chik in besieged Leningrad wou ld ha\'\~ w illH'ssed) be concluded Ihat the fi ght ag:linst fascism had "Cl'lllcntc{[ th e fripndsh ip belweell tll/~ CzcdlOslnvak and Soviet peoples and strengthelll'd th e trust anllunily between th e C I'Cz .111\1 th e;: CI'SU," II ... ;lital'ked Ihe rell\~ wed AIlH:rieilll hom h ing uf Vietll il m. hul inste"d uf inl el'prd ing it as l'J'uuf of U. S. perfidy and i nereas.' d aggres-iv'· II /·ss. lit' stat"d t II" t I hi s was all tIlt' more R'aSOIl why the: Paris lalks had ttl continu/,. This cUntnlstcJ sharply wilh tIlt' viI'w ".~press'·ll hy Shdqlin in his April 8 speed I ' 1\",) ~ in. into ''''j"", ,,-ith .I/. e!l''' llid,,,..
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Oil Vietnam discussed in chapter 5. It is also relTlarkaulc that b .. rel~' Olle week after Brezl1tle v had desol'rilrellthe United Stat es lIS:1 "rotte n, decaying society" and luu l stated that the "crushing of reaction in Hungary" in 1956 had saved socialism there, Kosy)!in sho uld praise E
l'udgu nl Y There are lew aC(:Ollnts of Poogufll r's po',ilion from CZl'C hosl"va k or othe r infurmed sources. Yet d uri ng the erish perin'll, he delivered three public sllCL'Ches and gave one ill terview,' On :\-Iay (j Vhldimir Kouck}", Ihe new CzeehoslOl'ak aTl IIJHssador to MO SL~ IW, prese nted his crede ntials; lind in th e t~mrs(' of tll (~ wekom ill ~ ce remu ny, Podgorn y took tile unusual oPlxlrtun ity of wislling CzedlOslovilkia SUl'Ct:SS "in ll,e _, Irugg!., "gainsl Ihe in Iri gn t:s ,,/' ci rdes hostil e 10 the cu nrse uf progress aml socialis m." Ins te ad of ta lking about th e bOllds of trnst and nni ly linking th l: h'~1 counlries, as Kosygin had don e, he stated that "our peoples' socialist gains arc reli .. hl}' guaran teL..:i "gaillst II Ie l~n<:ruadllne nts of im perialis m by the power of the indestructi ble mi litan t alliallce among the Iraternal soeialisll'OlIl1 lries formed hy the \V,lrsaw p,let." The follOWi ng month. in an interview with a British membe r of Parliament , he b illcrl y att acked u.s. policy in \ 'ietllalll an d the ~liddle East withuu t ml:lltiolling the v,l luc of IICgutire libe ral- mind ed l~lll eaglles, IIC Slated on the sa me ou:asion that it was "dangerous to display toler'I\>
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ance tuward the growth uf militarism, rcv(mt,hisrn, and nco· Nazism in the Federal Ilepubl ic of Germa ny," The fourth speech, and the nuly one in which I'odgorny spoke directly on Czechoslovaki a, has heen analYl.{'(1 extensively in Chapter 8, Delivered (I t a meet ing of the Hussian republic's Supreme Sovie t, it was the I
Suslov gave only one public speech du rin,!! the entire crisis period. Lut this was a major atldress uf nearl y 17,000 wurds marki ng the 150th anniversary of Marx's hir th " II is speech WS. ' Pm~da ,
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OWll societies. Thus Sus\o" would not ha\'c sanctioned much of the fundame nt ..1 rdonn t:lking piat'C in Czed l()_~lov;lki;! and inlleeJ wou ld have disagreed wit h much of Ccstmir Cisar's speech tlIHUC on the same day (sec chapter 6), but he did not sct himself up ,IS an
uppun e nt of reform per se. Th e mnsl int e res tin g part of his S!lCL~'h W;tS a vil'il)1IS d e nunciati on uf ~hlO is m and its tliv;s;'-c effect on the IIllity of the international Communist mnV('l1lt:nL On th e hasis of this speed l , Sus\uv can not be c Ollntc t\ as one of thuse leade rs who eOllsiu c rc d revisionism the major Ii,mger, nO T ,IS one ",i lU fdt :m eq ual battl e il
or" pe W-hou rgeois nationalism (md c1HLuvinism."· which might und c r other circumstances have hcen a veiled criticism of Czechoslovakia. was spcl'i flcall y tied to the Mauist ··pern:rsion."· Soslov t hcrclilre emerges as a leade r who "~l\I ld be prl'disposc(l to :le<.1)1ll1Il0dall' th e less radical aspects of th e Praguc Sprin~ in ordcr to maintain tIn: lmit y of nm ks ag,tinst t he Ch inese. This is precisely th e im pression the CZedlOsl(Jva k dcIeg,lt iun ,\I Cie m a funncd of Suslov. ' [t can be ass ntlwII t hat his priorities remainell unchanged thro ug hout t he crisis pe ri()d. ri ght np ttl the del"ision to invade.
Shdest In ildditiotl to th e speech Shde.~ t ddivered at t he dosed session of th e CI'SU Central Com mittee in Jul\', th ere are h is four articles or p ub lislle{1 speedl es alill th e st(l t {~ ment s by C7.cdmslovak le'ld e rs of {mcount{:rs with ShdcsL' all of whic h reveal that s hd est was [IT()hahl y th e rnajur ad vocate invasion within til ': S()vid h:ade rship. Concerned with mai ntaining a fragile imlcpendellcc filr th e Ukrainc in matte rs of l: u!turc ami lwti onaiit ics polil: )'. Shclcst was al: Ut ely sensiti ve to tIll: separat ist tend e lleies with iII his own population that could su e,L~ily he exacer hatc(1 hy the PrJ.gllC Sprin g. Thus he t"()1l de mne{1 an )' move ment t()warU libe raIi7.ati()1l ill Czed ms lovakia t hat m ight spill ovcr into t he Uknlillc; ,l11d althougll hi: p,lid lip se n 'it"C to the ncccss it~' fitr ,In e q n,11 stTllgg:l<: against ho th right and
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ldi \Jpr~.lThlllism, his Illost bitter Jellunl"iatiol1s were saved for the light. Gn:chk(lllmllli.~
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The military high eOllllllanJ was active not only in implemcntinj.!; the decision to invade hut aiso in slwping ;md interpreting for the political leadership the t)arameters of the llIany strategic and military issues involved in theerisis. The entry oftllc military into the debate on the extent to which till: reform mo\'{:ment per se was threatcning the security of the Soviet Union ami the \\'arsaw Pact was legitimi'/.t:d by thl: resululiollS of the ,\pril CI'5U Cenlral Committee plenum , which declared impt:rialist subw:rsion (rather than a direct military buiMup) to uc the major front of East-\\'cst conflict. B~' so doing, the party deerecd that the Illilit;,ry had 10 b,rivc priolily to areas where <-'omnnmism was being thrcatcn<-"
If the April plenum authorized the Illilitarr to enter the debate on subversion , not all the marsh,11s most i"'I"',tant 'l",,'Ches .nd .,tide> in the eri Jl'.. ri'~I .,,· ""lLt.in~,1 in I'mcd. , 2 .nd ~ta)' 9 . • nd in l=1·~, II • . Jnl r 9. 19611. " Iz<~"'; •. J,,1)' 9. 1008.
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come to regard Czcclulsluvai.:ia as a weak link, he may have acccp1cd the necessity of invading prim;lrily ill (lalcr to obtain th e stationing oftnMl ps. Such a position is cOllsis\l;nt with reports that th e re were those within the Soviet military, indml illg Crcchko .11Id
Yakuhovs ky. who had used the Ju ne Illnncu\'crs to "prove" that th e CZCdlOSlov,lk arm y was incapahle of holding a lk,ft'nsi\'c li ne fo r the rI!'1l1 i rCI I seventy-two hours. " It is trom thi s pl'rSr)(: (,tin.' thai une must \'iew SO,,;!!! ('(lnccrn abuut ;\;,\TO depiuymcnts duse to Ill(' Cz(~ h ()sl()\,;l k hurd.-r Hud the dnllll;ll ic "rC\'c!,It[UllS" in the Soviet pn:.~s in July ami August ofa NATO plan to invaJe and overrun Czechoslovakia in [orty-eigl ,1 llOLIrs bdore tllrning Oil I'ulalld and thc G DII. " That there werc hoth militar y amI politicalle,ulers w llO W{' re concertw.l less ahout tlK' rci()rlll mow'men t than about scc urity arr:mg.~m etl l s is also cUll sis l.~ tlt with ~ I Jymir's statcll1t:nt th aI in th e ~loscow n c~()tiation s ii)lIowing th e invasion. " th e dcmands of the h, lwks t~llIld Iwvc bccn s(l\is£ied h)· th e st,ttiollin g of a limited Ilumher of troop_~ (in parlicu lar s t rat egic ti»"{.'Cs), an.1 a mudl more modcst reform movement t~lUld have heen all owed to t'Ontinu c unh in dered," " WlldlwT IIw C~,.~ll nsl,)\'ak artl1I' had tIlt: ('ap,lil ilit)' of holdin g a de fe nsive lin e was re bted to a se{~mJ issue, n:llnely, whether th e rciorm movement was atfecting: mili tary morale and in part icular whether li beral and anti -S.l\'iet te nd encies wit hin t he army had hegl111 to erod.: its loyally ma! re liabilit y, lI "re tlwn, was i\ nwrked diffcrc n{'C in approach hetween the SO"iet mi li t'lr~· leaden;. During: hi,~ visit to Prague in ~Ia)·, ~[ars hal Yakul)()\'sky reporle.lly COIllplain('.1 10 D Zlir ahottt Ih" t'Otlti nnin g IW)rries within Ihe Sovid le'III.:rship over the reform nlO\,l) ml!ll! ·.~ effect o n th e llI oral e of th e C~.t,<:hoslovak army. ,vhen Dz{tr replie.l Ih:tt he too W,l~ worried ahuut low morale. Yakllho\'Sky i, mmored to have etnhrnecd him. sayillg ·"tllle frie nd has u ll derstood ,IIlOII1t~r!" ,Illd 10 lwve lISC.\ th is ,u\missiun in his arglllllcn t li)r th e pcrlllalle n t sIal ion ing of I TOOpS. " In marked t'ontr.lst, tim-ill )! his OWn tdp to Czechoslovakia latt'r in ~1,ly, Gn·chko was '1 IIoh.·.J .)S SHying " th c solution ()f th e int .~ rll a l '" 11>n",-
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JU7 problems of the Czechosloq,k People's :\n tl~· is th e inlernal aliair of C7.ec hos l()v,!ki:l ... " COllce rn ahoul Ihe impad "f " il nperialis l .~u b ,",; rsioll · · Oil tl!e nlOnlle :l1l d ellcdh'eness uf th e C7.edlUsluvak armv was not (~11! fin ed to t hc military leade rs. Indeed Ilrezlmev. in a speed ! to mi litary cnd <:!s o n July 8. l"a!1\li,lI~' st;lt e& It is " " I I" I", ,,,,,,,1,,,"(,(\ al Ih"l ou,' '"'''11';''' ill Ih,.;,· ;\11<:'''pl, III wenke " II,,, , ,,cia tisl CHIIl",,,,, il,, or ils u"it)· n·,,,,.1III i
Crec hko's fa illtt"c to inclltde any s im ilar refere nces in his speech to Ihe ",!dds il l dical~ 's I hat he did 'lOt CI,I irel ~' a~re,! w it h his m ili ta1")' colle agu", ,,1' lI'ilh IIr" zhl1"". If ~br sh al Gnx·hko wa.' lI ,mhle I" a.l(ree fi., ll~· wilh Brt'7.1lllev·s pef{:e i \'{~{l lIe.:d 10 t~)tllimt imp" .-ialist suh vc rsio n. II H'I"<: were :my numbe r of othe r ('om m"nders who di,l. Ge lle r,ll Yep is!Je\'. th e ll e"J ur II Ie ~I:l i ll I'olit i('al Adm itl istra tiutt \rithin tlw .-.\inistrv or DdCmc. was among the first ,nilitary It'adcrs to e.~prc ss L~lJ1 Ce rn ahout Czel'l ,oslo\' ak deve lopmen ts. w!Jil"h Ill' viewed so negatively t hat he was rcpo r ted in .\ I;IY 10 havc d ..dared the Sovie t military's readiness to in tervc ne should an appea l l~ )m e fmlll ""loyal Commnn is ts " ill P rap'c. " ~I :'rshal K()l\ cv, too , was "diVe in uplUJl di n).!; the Illililar \'·.~ right tn 1.1,".!e llln all.! l~ ' Ill\'''1 s ul)\',"r~ion . wh"l e "er its sourcc. Konev L'() lIsid ered it the mili l" " ~"_~ (h , t~, In defend !lot onl y t he fro n t ie rs of I he socialist stalt:.s Ill! t also th e sucialisl orienlat io)] of I hose slales. and thi s was th e ke ~' n()1t: of Ihl' speed, he delivere d in Pragul' on '\1a ~' 9. He .Je c! a re(llhal Ihe USS I1 :lIlJ il s Eas l E ll· ropean allies will ""alway.s fi rmly and rl"li"hly d.. f"n.! Ollr soeialist ).!;a i" s as wdl as Otl r fixml it'rs of t h e So )(; i,,1 is l <:al)) p . Vigilance is p,lrticlllarl y n ecessary h~' I Il(' (:SS[{ , which i.s thl' hridg dlCad silu· I (;"n s"y outright th ai aled righl ne.~t to the (;lpit"lis\ world. e"" ",,,,,,i, ' 1'." ' f " .. ·...·,1 'h"'
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events [here] cannot (-atch us unawares."" F'or anyo ne who failed In u nders tan d Ko ne\,'s m essage. lie repeated it ill ,I spe(!~' h to work -
e rs in Kladno. c u(:ouraging them to continue 10 strengthen mil itant proletarian traditions ami prom isin).: that "we sl lall permit 11 0 oue to hreak the fraternal t ics b inding o ur peo ple.·· ..
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sky. too. was tOllt'crncu ahout the need to t'(:l1n hat imperialist subvcrs ion; a nd in a n ar t ide writt e n imme di ately prio r to negotia ti ons in PWb'UC on t he holding of joint WTO maneuvers. he slated his
position : "The st ruggle against im perialist ideological su bnnsiou, the expUSll re of anti-~ l arx i sm and various types (If anti-sodalist clemen ts. unt irin g work. and the wo rk of strengthe ning t he fraternal friendship and cooperat ion of the p l~oples and armies uf t lle sodalist states have ,K11ui red pri mary sign iflc
CO :\\ PO~Er\TS
Brechcr gives the \illlowing de fi nition of the crisis pcrilld: erisi~' I!(' riO/i is c1mra(·tcrizcu hy thc prcS{'lIre of allthr("c IWl"CS' m nu i!;"n' of nisis- " sharp rise ill pcn;ci,"cu thrcat to hasil,"al;,cs, an """,,rc ness uf t illl" <-~mslraiHts "n dcl"isioHS. amI an i",,,gc HI' th" I'ruh"h ili ly ur i, ,,"u l,,c,,,cnt in til i lit ar)" hos l il it ics (war I ikc lihnod ) al '0"''' pu iu! be fore the is.He is fe.oket!. It, t"" . I...,gins with ,. triggcr evcH t (o r duste r (II' e\·cn ts)."
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FINDINC S
A cluster of events at the elld uf April ,md beginn ing of ~ by served as the source of th e (Tisis periud . III Czec1 10slo\'akia, the calls for th e earl~' COII\TK.'ation of an Extr.tordinary FOlIrteenth Part)' Congress, the increase in press attacks on the ussn and so~ daBst prad ices undcr Novotn}·. tllC refllsal to huld fu ll -scale spTin).; nwneuvers nn Czechoslovak soil, ,md t hc spontaneous tlermJllstrati olls and SPCCdlCS cclciJrJt ing ~br Da~' had all ("(Intrihuted to a heightened p erception of tllreat In lmsic va lues in '\Ios<-'O w. Thc essential f(liit rre of th e May·, Sovict-CzeclHlsluvak summit in :\-\oscow to allay these fears adc(1 as the particular trip-wire for the cscabtion to th e crisis perio(i. From early May onward, the probabilUy of involvement in military hostilities perceptibly inercased. Then: wefe two main militar y ('Ontingc ncies thai <1ppear tn havt~ been (Ievcio pe d morc Of less simuitanNlUsly in 1-,·!uscow. The first was to usc the presence of Soviet troops already in C7.(~chos l ()\'llkia for maneuvc rs to su ppo rt ('OlIscr\"ali\"c clcmc nts in their aUe mpts to .~tag(: (' (~)mt:],ack . This OptiUIl was bvorcd until th e end of July. when the Sovi(~t lead ership had tu agree to the ,ll most totalwithdfawal of troops as a ('011cc.~siun to Dub":'ek ill ret urn !i)r his own ...~)mm il mellt 10 ("Ontai n allti50eiali~t I()rccs. The second eontingency. a lilli-scale invasion, then ga ined preemincnce in Soviel Pfcll"wtiOllS. Thc phm allowc(] for SUptX1rt by ('Ons(:r\"ative demen ts in CZI.-'Clmslo"akia but was not depende nt on it. Time pressure was manifest durin g the crisis period at seveml crucial points. The first such poin t, (luring Phase One, involved Soviet concern that the C I'Cz plenum sche(l lrled to convene in th e last da ys of :\Iay wo uld be use(1 to rout remaining conservative forces. The precipitant amllln
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l:IlI S IS I'EHIUl)
uut during the luw-stress Phase Two (Julle 6-27) this did nul CTeate particular concern; fur, as Pml:dll later stated. it had initially bcen hoped that uth e Pr(lcsidiu1ll of the CPCz Celllmi Committee wuuld use the pre p
CO Il -
vim:eJ :\Ios{'ow that th e Duheck leadership was nut going to take d ecisive measures against antisnciaJist clements. and t he Soviets
rea!i1.cd that the de;<1 in chapler 8 suggcsted that thc Soviets callle \'cry dose to a military solution at th c cnd of July. Whcn thc dcl"isinn was nwde to give negotiations one An,11 clwnce, th ey w,lT!lcd 1'r,lgue that the threat to social ism in Cl:.,dmslo\"akia had in tensified and that therefore "there is no time to lose." " phase Four represented the short remission of th e Ciernn and Br:ltLslav;i ncgotiatiuns. Imt d"ady it ,,"as not louJ! hc fore SOl'iet
leaders decided tlwl the negothltiOnS had failed tn resoll'e such f1lndamental iss1Ies as the future of pro- ~I{) s("w (,mservath'"s am i the direction of political ehaIl),:c as a whole, both of which were still to be J<..>cide d whe n th t: Slovak Congrcs, (Au gust Zfi) and tlte Fomteenth Party Congress (Septc mbcr9) cOl1\"Cned. Phase Fivc. th erefore, saw a dralllatic increase in th e saliencc of time; mId th e increased time prcssurc did ult imatdy furte th ... leadership to llwke the J ... tiS iUll to in vllJc. Without such pressurc they probably would have put uffthc d t!'t.·bhm ,llmosl i' ldcfiuildy. COI'ING ;",IECIIA NIS;"IS hi/orlllatjoll
It is UlHluuhlt:llly tr ue that tht: Soviet Il·ad ... rs fumlamt!ntally ovc restimated both the strength of conservath-c opinion in Czcchoslova kia and th e lik ... lihooJ that Ilm-;"!OSl'OW eleme nts wi thin th e It!ad ... rship would ollCn ly appe al for militar y ass istantc and th ereby legitimize the invasion. The inditHlti on to perceive th e working " P""da. Aug"'! :U. l!lbll, " "mn/II. ,uly 2M. 1965.
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HND1NCS
class, the Communist party, and organil.,a tiolls such as the People's Militia as unswerving ly pro-Sovie t in their urie nbtion was a eOIlstant feat ure of the Sovie t ideologiea! outl(Jok. The eOrlvieti Orl that any anti-Soviet manifes tat ions were therefore the resu lt ofimperialist subversion and nut symptumat ic of int rin~ic weaknesses e ither in Suviet-style sOl'ialisrn IJT in Sovie t allialK'C manage mc nt wa~ equally ch(lracteris tic of the Soviet attitu(le. The escalatio n of the crisis in Czechusluvakia served to rcinfort1' these prcexisting perceptions and misperccptiuns, hilt it was nllt responsible for creating them. Thus one musl t'ondude Ihat Sovict cognili\'e perfor_ mance was not in esselJ(:e Ihe pnxluc\ uf crisis-induced stress. Cognitive pe rform ance definitel y was affected by previous crisis expe rient'C. however. Until the c nd of July, there was a tendency for Sovie t stateme nts to t1)1Upare tIl(: events in Cl.cchostuvakia with those in Hung;lry in 1956. Sim;e there m ls no armed insurrection anJ no bloodshed in Czechoslovakia. it was argue d, there was nu t"Oulllerre\'olution. 0111 by Allgus t, the infi uell<."e of the HU Ilgarian e xpe rie nce had diminish{.'{ I, an{1 with that diminut ion a me ntal barrier to invasiun was removed. '" The crisis alsu had a discerni!J le (~ H"ed on the pcrceivCiI nee(1, and eonsequenl quest. for inli)rmation . Thi~ nccd W(l~ most :lllp:lrent during the three high-s tress ph(lSeS of the crisis period: Ph (L~e One (:-" \a), 5-June 6), Phase Tln ee Ol lne 27-JII I,. 28), ;md Phase Five (August 5 - 20). The quest for information is reflede{1 to some degree by the num!.>er of negotiatiolls Most·ow conduded du ring the crisis pe riod. Of the thirty-t hree negotiating sessions, thi r teen were in Pha.~e One. four in phase Two, e ight in pli:.l.se Three, two in Phase FOUT, (md six in Ph;lSe Five. Of CO UTSe, not all delegatiuns were ~ent to ga ther iufoTllw\io)l, (lild inJeed this ubject ive decreased as the crisis escalated. In particular, none of the negotiati uns in Ph,lSes FUIIT or Five-tlmt is. thuse after Cierna-was d evoted to obtaining fu rther information "boul thc situatiou in Prague. B e fu re that t ime , 1,o\\le\'er, :\-I o seow ]'",1 h e en <."On "e rn e u about the nee d for furt he r informatinll. Brezhne\' bad eVen apologized to Smrkovs10' Juring the ir Ju ne l 'l meeting fur previous negati ve assessments of Prague events, putting these down specificall y to "'lack of information ."" " 1~<~.lw "" J"ly 31. )\l6II. IOf exampte .• ",,,,i~,·all)· ..-arue..! ('(Jlonlky, An U'!finj,),...-/ C,m""",ah,m . p. 17.
al\Oli" . 1 I"inkin~ ,h. 1 all
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THE
C IUSI~
PUIiOD
The Czechoslovaks certainly bclicvcll that a ke y musc of tllt: escalation oftcnsions was misinlimnatiOiI provided to Suvie t au thorities by their c mbassy in Praguc, At th e he igh t of tensions in July. the Czcchoslovak-Su viet Friendship Soc i et ~ in Prague passed a resolutioll statin g tlmt th e major proble ms bei ng experienced i n bilateral relations were "the result of in sutlk' ient ohjective information," '" Dllheek, tOf), Pllt milch (If the blame for ~Ioseow's miscalculations oft be threat imposed ll~' til t: (' ragu e Spring 011 {l isturt.:d information. As he was to write in lUi+ " I still cannot hdicn: how uu r illlies (."u uld receive ami believe uhviu llsl v twisted ;llId nunobjective informat ion abollt th e solution we planned lor th e internal troubles of our party and country. "'" Hes ponsible for init ially rel."t! iving imd processing this inlimnation was the Soviet emhassy in J>raglle. ~Joscow in t"fCilSed its staff in the Prague em bassy thruu ghollt the crisis perio{L recruiting more int(' rprete rs and twns laturs to maint'l;n contact wit h pro~I()scow clement, (somet hin g which Dulx'ek repeatedly objected to) il1l tl to Iilunitor the Czechoslovak media l1Iore fully. S i mi1arl ~' in the Soviet Union, Slavists with iI kn owl edge of Czech were sec"n.l"d tn tI", g"",>rnme nt Ii'm,. t he lItll\·" r.,)".. . "" \!,·,,,l\,,,·li,,,,, "I" IIr.I "I,"'. ...
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a thick I)ile of press clippings, some translated from Czech and Slovak papers, others from \\'esttru pllhlil'aliolls. Seveml soun ·cs have maint,lined that in the Soviet s\·sl cm there is a gwater tendency than in the West for raw data on critical issues to reach the highe st Politburo le,·el withoul much previous filter ing or d igesti ng. ~' This certainly happened througll
Tllere were three 1II,lin gmups (:oll.~ulted du ring the (:risis period: the East Eu mpc(m leade rs: the military: ,md the party CI!ll1ral Commi ttee. both a~ an IIPJ!a/"Ot and as a plenary Organi7~ltion, The entire management of the (This. fflJ m the pre-clisis to the post-crisis perilxl, involved East Ellropean leaders. This ill\'olv.:ment was in I)art sought b r the Soviet leaders and in part forced 011 t he m by East Ellropeans set' king part icipalion. It was greatest during the crisis period and led to numerous mll itilateral and bilateral meet ings. T he military high comm
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marked Juri ng the t'ris is pe riod p er st.'. F'rnm the beginll ing "ftht! crisis period the military tHll sti tuted a n act ive pressure group seeking th e achi eve me nt of spccifk objcdives: the 1101ding uf ma· lI e uv<~rs in C".,~cI""l()v;\ki a ,mel IltC penna"cn! s tationing of trnops
nc ar Pntguc's horder with the Fcdcr:.ll Hcpllblk. Certainly the salience of military ohjedives and preparations fUf invasion was a t its pe ak du ring the high-stress phases (One. Three. and Five), ,lllJ therefore the iml}()ftan<:e of llIili tary advice increased (~JIl l'() lll i tantly in tb ese periods, reachinp; its peak in Phase Five. Thcre was clearly a high level of participat io ll hy militarr leaders (Grechko, \'c pishcv, Yukubovsk y, Shlcmc nko, Kon e\', Zakharo\', and Koshe\'ui helng !,m::most) ill nego t iations :lml in puhlil' ddmte on C~.l·dl\Jslo vakia. Indecd suc h was thc impo r tanec of military issucs in thc Sovi(~ 1 percep tion mlll handlin g of t he crisis thaI individual militar y leaders werc on sevenll 11(.'C:I.~io Ii S actively involwd in decisionmakin ).!; as such rallic r than as I"' TI of a more p,l..;sivc l1lJls ui tative p rc.K;ess. The third 1ll:1jor gro up involved in the consultative process was th e sf!(:o nd echelon ,,( the pa rt y. Th is ~nl1lp \\,,(5 amorpho us and it.• elf
The data on ded sional fo rum s has already ]'e,·]1 pn:sc ntc,1 ill th e fint t\\~) scctions of th is chapter, bu t brieH~' the ~' can be summariZ(:,1 as follows . The basic nnit tbf(JIll4hOll t the crisis period relllained th e ]'nli thurn. which oec
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level ofi l1\"olvemen t partkularly high and increasing ill Phase F ive. Alt hough there was evidence of~, high level of part iciplltiun ur Kusygin, his ouvious opposition to;1 military .
'/6
Tilt: CIUSJS
~t;IIIOll
guvcfllmcnt formed, at"l'Ording to Soviet {'all'u latiuns, li'urn a ma-
jority of the ex isting I'racsidium and from other key government functiu naries. The major tasks o f the new government would be not only to requ es t. and lilcn,foTc lcgitimi7.t:. fratcrnilll~~'istiince hut also to carry (Jut all the adm in istrative measures- arrests, purges, l'CllsoTsll ip, :1m] so on-Ilecessary 10 start Czcl·hoslovaki;t Ull the long ru;Ld to "norm;I]j;wtion." All indkntions arc that at th e political level th e Soviets had not cstahlisheJ alternative pbns
should the revolutionary worke rs' and peasants' govern ment (',11lapse or not he formed. And of c.~)ursc. it was this hick of contingcnc~' plannill,l!; that GlliSCI] a nCilr catastrophe when the pulitk'al ~ide
of th e in vas ion went woeflilly astray,
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PART FO UR
The Post-Crisis Period
,
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August 20-27
THE INVAS ION I'LAN
It is generally rel'o gni1.eU that th e invasion was a military su(.'t.'ess. During tile night of Tuesday, Aug\l~t 20-21, \ISing a combination of air and road approaches, the Soviets mounted an impressive <..'0111billed arll1~ operat ion which PU l up\\,lrds of twenty front-lin e divisions from fi\'c \Varsaw I'aet countries into Czechoslovakia in a 111atier of hours. Beginning at 2300 Central European time, LOO A.'\1. ~·l os<.."Ow time. units of the Twenty-fourth Sovictlilctieal Air Arm y took control of Prague's Huzyne ai rport and othe r airports throughout the countr y and guided in hu ndreds of tank- and tn>op-carryi ng An tonovs. By this time, the grou nd ope ration was we ll under way. Four Soviet tank divisions and one East Ge rman division moved 10 tl<:c u py Karl ov>, Vary, Plzdi, and Ust i mul Labem and to seal the Cz~hoslovak border with \Vest Ge rmany. Five more Soviet d iviSions, act.'Omp:mictl by one East Cerman di Vision, e ncirdC{1 Prague and established tile headquart ers lor General Ivan I'avlo\'sky, Soviet deputy defense ministe r and l~JIlHnander of Sovi~t ground forces, who was to take dl
3:20
THE POST -C IU SrS
l' EmOl)
\Ve(lnesd(I~' August 2:1 , th e 1..1)Un tr ~' ·s road and co mmlmications ne twork was in th e ir h:mds. The Czechoslov:lk ar lll Y had he en nentralized. although it ne"er appeared that organize.1 military resistam:e W:l~ t1H1lempbled. All Ih e pu rely lIlilitary "bjt>elives h:H.l bee n achieved. ' No'" it remai ne d to tmnsform military powe r into pulilieal l..'Vnlrol, ar}{1 in this process the invasion plan proved to he TlIost pe rilously .Idicient. AI! th e major
military pcrsnn ncl involved ,~ u.l!ges t s that the Soviet High COlllmand was !;Iking IHl l; ha nL'Cs sirould Illcrc I,., po,:kels of n :sisla nct:. At the same time, th ey dearly cxped ed [ I tidy and speedy tr..I1lsfer of power wit llin C7.cl'ilOslovakia ;llld wc rc nut parti cularly we ll equ ippe d to rope with the passive n :sist;lI1 ce ;lI1d gelll:r;t1 t'V1J;lpse of au thurit y th l.t in fact oc'Curred . TIlE CO LLAPSE OF' T il E INV.-\S IO N PLA N Zdellck .\ llymif reveals IIUlt [ I gro up uf full and c.1l1tlid;lte me mlx:rs of the CPCz Praesitlillln "t'h ie ll y t'on sis till~ uf Hii'ak, Indl'a, Kold e r and Jak d;. hut to wllieh Svcstb, l'ilit:r, Lemirt and K:lpek als" helun ~ed (and which nlllnted un the suppurt uf Hig\), Barbfre k an d pe rhaps e ve n "ole nik), promis,:d the Krc mlin that th cy would engineer a dom es tit' po litical justifi catio n fur legaliZing th e in ter' ,\ I ilildry e,<1 .,,01 1)," i; On" ",n 1';,-6, >\"" ;"1.if [~ruJ~.' 1",1~~ . PI'- 91 _ 92 , Phili p \I'i"<1",, and A,t~", IIQ\o..,I>, C:oI" c~ k l" 1!J6II, 1'1', lOT _ 9; ~:rio.·l " H' in V, V, " ",i". ,~!. , C::,d",d",." k Il,/om" .1/"1'*,,,"'''1 Ul6'1, I', 3t, Fn",(f,m" Allc• ..,O'/ ,"' ".... ,",,'C. ,\ "0:",1 26, JlItiIS, . rr d .\'Clt) )',,"'k Ji""" , S~I"~ ",l,,'r 1(1, J!Jli.'>,
J21
AUCUST 20 - 2 7
vention.'" The group agreed at n meeting on the morning of All" gust 20 that at the I'mesidillm meeti ng that afiernoon they wo uld u.'iC the lIu:nlOra n dum prcpan:d hy Kohler all,1 [ndl<' on the socalled KaS par re port as a vehide f()r pass i n,:!:~' nep:ative assessme nt of developments in the country ti l,,' tl wlI l~ H .ld be used as the basis for legitimizing the interve ntion. The meeting began at Iwo 0 'dock th ai afternoon under the chairmansh ip of DulX::e k, and immediately the me mbers of the I'raesidium go t involved in a le ngth y proc'Cd ural wTangle over which item to take up fi rst on the age nda. The <,'olbborationists obvioml)' wante{l to discllss the Kold cr-l ndr.. Ille nwr,mdllm first, hut they wert' defeated by those, including Dubcek. who fe lt that the preparations for the Ulx.~lIl . ing Fourteentl. Part y Congress should be taken up first. Most accou nts suggest thilt Dubcek did not suspect a link between the Kolder-Indra memorand um and the illtervention. \Vhat Ill' did suspt.'d was t hat Ihis posit iult paper ,,"uul{] lead to a discllssion of the letter he Iwd received from Brezhncv only the da y before , the existenee and conte nts of which still hall not formally been made knuwn tn the I'raesidium . Any {I t~ hate u\'cr the I3rezlmev letter wuuld have split the leadership, with the colluooru tiorlists possibly u s iil~ airY FmesidiurII reply as a de 1:1<:10 request for frat em,II assis tance ..' Althollgh a majo rit y wOllld Itot have i~ sued an op·en request for armed intervention, the l'(lllaborationisis still hoped to muste r a majority in tl te Praesidium for a reso lution supporti ng a negati\'e assessment of the situa tion in Czechoslovakia. They could t hen have use{1 the authority l."Uufe rred on them by the majority vote to tnohili7.e l"()-l·O!lspirators in the state orgall~ , ~ueh u.s Oldneh Pavlu\'sky, Salgu"ic, Sulek. and Ka rel HoH: mauu, to issue an opeu request fo r assistance. After this, with tile arri v,ll of the
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CI1 , : J"".{S""k",·, ki·. An U'ifo"",,,t/ COIll... rsatioll . Pl'. 23 _28: Tad Sin,.,· Il,,,/,/ \\;'T II . 1'1'. 367 _ &. . 372_71.
26. 1\l6ll. EE I211591
S""I~.
Gu<"iwdOl"akia
322
TilE I>OST _(;HlS[S I'E1U OlJ
"a Cze(.· h ve rsiun uf the ulIS igned rCfllms t published in th e ~luSl-'UW Prll vlill on August 21, 1968 and purporting to <-1)mC from 'party an d government leaders' actually exislL..:1 in Praglle in th use day s."' .!t W' IS unsigned but was tu ha ve hee n iss ued in th e name of th e new revolutionary work(~ rs' and peasa nts' ~O\-ernm ent. It he(~)m es immeu iat ely apparent, t 11I~ ref()re , t hat the e nt ire SIK'Cess of t he polit ical aspect of th e Soviet invasion p lan dependc{il lpOn the fo rm ation of this new government . It was to have emcrged out of t he Praesid ium meet ing, but th is part of the plan went wrung from the very heginning. As it happened, th e liiscussion of the Kolder-Imlra mem()nmdUI1I had not been cOlUl)lcted hy the tim c the l'racsillium rccd \'ed the news that \Varsaw Pact trou ps wcrc b reaching Czeehusluvak li·outi ers . In response 10 thLo; news. the I'raesidium passed thy a 7 tU '1 vote) a resolution conde mning the invasion an u appealing for calm." Onl y then was th e Brezhnev le tt er (liscussed, but by this ti me Ihe ('o[]ahorationists had lost courage to thall e nge Dnheek openly; an d the meeting was adjourned in disarra)'. Neve rth eless, for anul hl!r forty-eight IUlI lrs th e culhLhu r;lliOLlists and th e Soviets kept to the plan to form a revolutionar y workers' and pe asa nts' government. By t he morning of Wednesday, Angust 2 1, troops had surrounded ,Ill th e key P;lrty. governm e nt . ami media bUildings in Prague, but no ini tial e/fort \\',15 made 10 dispiate (;;,_echus)ovak il utho rities, thert:by giving the m WiLl,I]'I \: time to organize pas.~i\·e resistan<-'C. Tnen at It(X) .'\ ..\[ ., Dub(·ek. Ccrnik , SmrkovskY. Kr iegel. Sp'll·ek. ,lIld Simon w,~ re ,lrrested il), Sovie t so[d ier.~ and Czechos[o\'ak stat c security agents in the nam e of a rc voluliotj;,ry Iribunal headcd by Comrade ind r;l. All of Ihese men We fl' interned in KeB {'amps in tIle So\'id C;lrpal hian mountains. Fro m the afternoon of August 21 th ro ugh August 22 "lfor ts w,:rc mad e bolh ;1\ the Hutel Praha ;lml at tI ll' Suvid cmhassy to form a quisl ing gon~ rnm c nt. These clforts f'liled for seve ral n:,lso n.o;. First. th e l-'Ollabor;ltionis ts had nut sUl'I:eedc{1 in asserlin),!; {'(Jillp lt:\ c <-..-m tml ove r the medi,l. Altl mugh th e mIIlISI(,r ur<-~ml"' u ni cll lions (Karel Holfmilnn), th e head of the Cwchoslovak press age n<-'}' ( ~lir(lslHv Sulek). ,lIId Ihe ed itor uf ilIUM }Jra vu (Oldrich Svestka) l-'(Juld all be indud e(1 among the agl' nts workin g for th e Soviet ' .\11)·" . 1. ,\'id" F",.,. 1'. 20'2 . ' Iloch Sl1l rk"'·'~"i· (,1" U"fi,,;, he<1 C",,« ~,a'itm . p. l-I ) s,-..·,tk. (IliuM I'''''''''' '\"~".'l 21. 1969) " " ",'"" ,I\. t Hlr.k. I(" kl,·,. HI~". An,l i;,-,·" b ,-",p,1 .~;"" . I"cl ~. ""J S.itl,,,·, k)·.
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323
Un ion in Prague, immediate action hy Smrkovsk5' assured that the collahorat ionists' ;Jppcal fur assistance was not broadc(lllent disappearance of OulXek ami other popular leaders, whose release became the focus of the population"s resis tanee. The Soviets did no! foresee the Sllccess of mohile radio units, but they d id uf l"{Jurse plan a seri uus prupaganda campaign that l.."{J mbinecl tilt! d istribution of le;lllcis and t he beaming of pro-Soviet informatiun into C~.ech(lsl(lvaki'l_ including iladio Vlta\'a, which bruadt-dsl in Czeeil and Slovak from Karl-~ I arx-Stadt in East Ge rmany. Badio VJta\"
" ""
32-1
TilE I'OST·CIl.ISIS l'EiUOU
men!. C her\'Ulie nku's whole attitude suggests that having hee n instrume ntal in <-'()Jlvincing th e Kre mlin that th e <-~msc n'a ti \'es within the C7.cehoslo\"ak leadcrs hip were willi ng and really to wei· ('()me Ii-aternal assistant'e and form ,I new )::o\'ernmen t, he was dearly lEnder some pressure to pwducc the good s. These discussions at th e Soviet emhassy too k piace at t he same ti me that delegates to Ihe Extraordinary "'d ing 11 nell' PnwsiJium ,md ,I new Ct:ntral Committee from w!Ji ch anyon e rumored to he collahorating with the oc<'uI'ying fi)n.~·s ....." s c.~~·I",I ( ·d . A" E :",,] A"",,·.b ]), wa~ ,\[ro (:(JEwened to e)ppMe the in va~ion and any cOllaborat ion. This situatioll th e Soviet authorities dearl y had not anticipated. and th ey were ill p re p,m:d to deal with it. No t ollly II',IS it going to be r,IT more d iffi t- ult to ge t th e C7.edwslovak leaders still at libert y to agree to lorm a revolutionary worke rs' and peasan ts' governmen t. but sueh a governmen t lI"uuld ver~' ob l'iuusly he oont rary to th e wish es of th e highes t party and governme nt bodies. TIle only hopt: lor M OK'()W (1I1d th e colhlbo nltionis\s \ I',IS tlnlt Presiden t Svoboda would use his position as the highest co nstituHemal
~i,""n
in It ", Ird".c,il'l of 1\,,· hi"'" p""",,,d inp of Ii>,· b l,,,,,,di,,,,,.,. I'ou", Vy"""",, em,e .......
I~"'n lb Ci»>~,,,." 'm A,, ~,," 2! . 19!iII. iFF lin I"'\i~j" . ,.,\. , floe .~rc""
1'. III.
' MI,.,,;U. ,"iel" Fro.,'. I'. 191\
''''
o::h
325
AUCUST 20-27
eventuall y chosen) to negot iate the release of Dubcek, Ccrnik Smrkovsky, a nd the others. As Mlyn,if reports th is, Svoboda (old the I'mesidi um delegatiun that prior to their arrival at the Castle be lmd informed Chervoncnko that "this W,LS the onl y course uf action he would t'•.msider, and no\\' t he 1ll,llIer had heen decided and be would fi )' tbe next morning," "' Thus the collapse of collaborationist ,Ittempts to limn a govcrnment, the widespread passive resistance, t he cnnvcning of the Vysoi'any C'()ngrcss, and the at t itude of Preside nt SI·ol>oda all worke
THE VI EW FBOM
~ I OSCOW
From tile very heginning, ~ l os{"ow's bchavior indi(-,.IIed tha t t he Soviet leade rs hall nnt evolved any alterna th'(: political strategy shuuld the ir original plan cullapse. When the revolutionary worke rs' aud peasants' govern ment failed to materializc in the toursc of Aogust 20 ~ 21, Soviet autllOri ties wcre f
..
100-9• .
IGh
JIz
M
326
THB POST·eIllSIS PElI.IOJ)
That tile appeal was published at all, however. relleets l'Olltinucd, if short·li ved, Soviet hope.~ that the ir emb,\ssy in Pragne would succeed in forming a oew gO\"crnment. The "ppeal called on .... ll citi~.ens to give all possible support to the military units of our allies"" wlm would withdraw .... !ler the danger of a reactionary coup is liquidated:· Without singling anyone out , Ihe appeal claime{l lllat righ t isis, supported hy ··cerl ..in forces within the party and in party bodies·· had taken the llost-January reforms beyulid Iheir umslitutiunal limits and had organiwd a ""disgusting campaign" aimed at slandering and persec uting honest Communists. including many within the CPC1. leadership. They had ",lctivated b,lse Il
world and in the Wcst , and it co uld possihl)' have reSigned the Czechoslovak po pulation at b rge to the inevitahle. A similar purpose WlL~ to hc served hy the lengthy /'rur;(/a edi· IllTi:l1 ent it led "" Defense nfSocialism Is th e H i)!hest Internationalist Duty." which also appeared on the morning of August 22. It again made onl>, ge neml reference to ullIHlmcd "party and state leaders" who had "'requested immedi;llc ,L~sistance, including ass ist;lIlL'e with armed fiJR'CS."" But il did specifically condem n Alexander Dubeek, by nuw uf L~)lIrSe under arrest. for hdng at the head uf"a minorit>, of I'mesidium memhers" who '"took overtly right.wing opportullist stands:' Th is was the /irst direct attal-k on Dubce k in tht: Soviet press ~inL't: he had becomc first secretary in Ja nuary, and il reflected the Soviet prcinvasion calculation that his politicall'a' reer was over. The editorial slated tlmt Illis group of "right-w ing revisionist dements among the leatiership nfthe Comil1unist [l;lrty and the governmtmt of C".cclJOslovukia thwarted fulfillm ent of th c understandi ng reached in C iema nad Ti~on ami Bratislaya [and] were in reality attempting only to gain time, while pandering to cuuutc rrc\'ululiun. As a rC5ult uf their perfidious. treacherous actions."" I'ravcla continued , ·'01 rcal threal arose 10 Ih,~ socialist gains of Czet'll<>slovaki". "" This was vcry stTOng, amI il amply re·
''''
o::h
327
AUGUST 20 - 27
fleded the Suviet assumption tha t by the time the Pravda t..-d itorial appeaTt!d, tllOse described in this way would havc bet!1I replaced by other CzcdlUslo\'ak le
STBATEGY
By the evening of !\ugust 22. the Soviet leadership was fully awarc that a quisling government was not going to he formed and that in any case tim leadership chosen at the Vysocuny Congress would challenge the au thorit)' of any government Ihat the Suviets succeeded in constructing. And without the constitutional authority of Presiden t Svoboda behind them, Soviet officials in Prague really stood no chance of SUt1.'t:ss. Pa~s i\'c rC5i~t;I1lCC was much aided by c ffectivc underground radio s tation .~ whit'll the occu pation forces l·tJIIld nut immediately ~ilcnCt!, On August 22. there was a one-hour general strike throughuut Czcdluslovakia. al"t:ompanil-tl by massive, but largely pcaceful, demonstrations in Prague ,Iod other cities. Clearly if Soviet leader~ d id not mo\"e quickly on the puliticall'ron l, they risked losing the military initiat ive, particnlarly in the light of conl'Crted efforts by C7.cchoslovak civilians to d emoralize occupying troops by arguing with them and de priving them of food and other sllpplies. Most reports <'"QT\cur that tl,c Suviets rejcct<.,d frum the uutset any idea of establishing di rect military ru le in Prague. It ha~ been suggested that this view was put across initially hy Snslov, who ar~ g llcd against fullowing the invasion with upen repress ion and mass arrests. Cener.ll Pavlo\'sky told hi s Czechoslovak counterparts that I,e was under strict urders nut to in terfere wi th ur displace the civil and political authorities, and fur this reason the National Assembly and the Fourteenth Party Congress were both allowed to convene witl, im pu nity." ","0"" r",~ I.:1Ih.
n"",•. "' ,, ~u'l 27. 100';.
' IL"~hIS
a," I.,ritalh·,' ""''',.. , c~''''' ", ,h~ .\1""-,,,,'
" ""
328
TilE
1'O ~L·CIUSIS
PEIHOl)
It would appear therefore that hlte on August 22, the Politburo took the decision ( uumba-l&) to negoli,lle d irectly wi lh I he e:l:isl in).( C7.C(;ho~lovak le adership. This de('isi()ll is rellcctccl in S\'olxxla's ' uf the C7.cdlUsluv"k lead· e rs were still imprisoned ,1I As a result the Soviet leadcrs ulti· mately ,lgreed (llecisioll .50) to bring the rest of th e illlprisone{l Czechoslovak leaders to Moscow and to treat them (Ill as the form;11 representatives of the Czechosluwk party and state. Nu furth er ellorts were made to form a revolutionary workers' and peasants' government. It wouiu Ire Duix'e k and all the ut\l(:r leaders (with the ext'(!ption of Kriegel, who was hrought to :-'Ioscow hilt ex· cluded from the negotiations until the very end) whu would be obliged, or forced , to tegitim ile tbe inte rv e ntion and "normaliw" Ihe situatioll , Tbis cha nged strategy, which emcrged incrcmentatl~· frolll Au· gust 22 to 25, call he attritmled hu th tu Svohoda's att itude ,llId to the situation ill Prague, above all the results emerging from the Fourteenth P,lrly C{)ngr"~s. Whe n Sr1lrknvsk~', Simon, and Spal·ck were brought to ~Io sl.'()w, they learned at first hand of Soviet plans and Czechoslovak developme nts, At the Central Committee build· ~ ~lh- n'f. XiJd, t f m'l. PI'_ 1!II;_ 97. " S,,,,ku,-,, kr, ,I" Uojinj, J, •• / C",,,:~,,,,"io,, , 1' _ 31.
look """I~
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22.
1'.
329
AUGUST 20- 27
ing, they met Brc7.hnev, Ko sygin, and Podgorny; and as SmrkovsJ..1 rel'Ounts: Comrade BrC7.h" e\· lei fly; A lerrible Ih;"g has happe ned a",1 he star tell to tell us abuut the 14th Party Congn:S5. Su w" heard from hi s lips that tlaere was Ih" 141h Congress, the re W:L~ a strike, the nation had taken its stand agljinst this husilWSS. And we alsu understll(}(llhatthere was,,', a new guvcrlllileni. \Ve learnt from Ih"", that they were "Iking li S to the Kremlin for talks ami the" we would travel home. Comrade Brezhnev- and Kusyg;n _ told me . . thai we mllst go home and liquidate the 14th Party Congress. " They wen~ then taken to th e Kremlin to begin full-scale talks with Soviet le,lders. By tllis tillle, Oll A\l~,'mt 25, the C.,.echdovak del ega tion also included Mlymii'. Hus,lk, Svestka, Lemirt, Simon , Barbrrek. Rigo, and Jakd, As ~'l1y nar later (.'(mcluded, the only course of action ~1oS(."{)w cOlild take was negotiat ion with Dulx'ck and all those who were snpposed to have heen sentenced for suhversivc and antisocialist activities by a rc\,olutiolwry tribunal: Co mpelled to negotiate, .\Ioseow had no on" else to negotiate with in the end but the Dubcck leadership. Its [Mos('()w's1 agents had failed to carry off an internal putsch, amI it wUS uut uf the (t"eslio[l for .\Iosoow 10 deal wilh the leadership elec!ed II)" the Fourteenth Cungress. " THE PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIO NS B)" August 2.5 th e Soviet Politburo had arrived at another decisio n
(number 51): There would be no more gentlemen's agreements be · tween MOSL"OW and Pmgue, as at Clerna. Ins tead th e two sides would sign a formal protocol setting out the specific measun~s th e Czechoslovaks would have to unde rtake on th e road to '" normali7..alion." Negotiations on the protocol began Oil August 25, wit II th e cxchange of drafts. The C/.cehnsl(jvak drJft W k )· .
- ~tll""at.
,h, U'ifi" " /,r
lI'il:;'1 Fr"'I. L'.
21~1.
330
the final session, Soviet positions were negotj,ilcd principally hy Brczhncv, Kosygin. I'udgorny, Sus!o\', and i'nuomarcv, e ithe r individually o r in groups of twos, threes. Of fOUTS. !'ollomarev appears to have acted as the funnel for proposals and l1JU ll icTpropo sals from the C7.l,cJmslovak side to thc Soviet side, with the other fouT Soviet leaders at'livcly involved in the substantive negotiation s. Smrkuvsl..i' mentions that "when there were any particlIIar matters. then fouT from thc Soviet side and fOllr of ours always met: Brczllllev, Kosygin, Pod gorll~', Suslov; and of (Jurs. Dulx-ek, Svoboda, Cernfk and my~c1f.'· Ye t th ere are numero us other rclcr('Ewes in both accounts to smaller and more informal meetings. Since :\·l ustx)w'S purpose was Ilut unly to l~lIlvinee the Duh('Ck leadership to sign the protocol but also to discern which fi gu res mi!;h t later be willing to l~lI)perate with MOSl"OW'S aims, a lot uf (Iuiet ami informal tCte~i\-tctes also took place . Apparently, Soviet leadcrs wcre aware that they would no longer be able to achieve their objedives th n:m!;h Jndra, Bil'ak. Svestka, and the other openly prn-lI'l osC(lw le"dcrs. If the Czechoslovak population and the party were not going to resist implementation of the protocol. either Dubeek and the uther reform leaders would have If) carry (luI the necessary measures themselves. ur someune would have to he fOIll}(1 whose reform credenlials wert: accept;lbl(' hut who IV,IS in fact willing to serve '\l oseow in urder to stay in power. AL'Cording to Mlyniif. Soviet leaders had their eyes on Gust,iv Husiik from tile very beginning. Indeed Kosygin remarked to .\l lynM- at the dose of negotiations: "Comrade H usiik is such a c:ornpetent l,{)T1lr.lde and a wonderful Communist. \\'e didn', know him person,tlly bettlre, hut he quite impressed us here."" \Vben mosl of I he (ietaiJed {liscllssio!) o n the prolUl-oI bad been completed. the two sides met in full session, Llre~.1m ev made SOllie formal opening remarks to which Cernik responded. as Dubeek was in no fit emotion,11 slale (t)
331
prohle m had heen that
M()Sl~)W,
",hile s lI[lport in ),( the posl-j:UJuary
course , had gradually los t faith holh in J)u!J(-ck's ability Of willillgness to preve nt "Ulllisndal ist tendencies" fmlll growing and in their own ahility 10 control the si tuation in 1'r;l).(llC through v:lrio\ls part)' a nd stat u Ill Cdl
Theil Brczhn c \' cX ll bin cd to l)uheck that the end re su lt of all thi s w,~~ M()s~~","s rcali7~1ti()n that th e Duh"ck l"adcrship l'(H,ld no' he d" I>':I1<1,:
And
Oil
those results,
Brc7.1l1lc \'
was uneqUivocal: The Second
Wo rl d War had established thc burde rs uf socialism up to tI,C Hivc ]" E lh c ; tho.';(; borders had h(;(: n e stahlish e u at g rcat <'
or
~ It,;d _
" [1,;,1 .. p . 2-11. ~ I h ; ( t.
332
TilE POST-CIl ISIS I'E lU on
mali7.atiull lind to "discharge from their p,usts thuse individuals whos e furl her activities would nut cunfurm to t he ne eds of consul·
i{itlling the leading role of the.
party"; th e need to re impose
strict (1ltltro1 orthe mass media; and a Tcsolutioilin stre n gthe n mili_
tary and POlitiC;l[ cooperation he tween C/.echoslovakia and other socialist {1Jlmirics. In foreigll affairs. the CZCdlOSiuv ... ks agreed to
(·oordinate their EUTOpc;m !}(Ilicy with the rest of the socialist states ami tu protest the discussioll of th e "CSSH problem" in th e Security Cuuncil (C:wehoslovak represen tati ves at the United Nations baJ initially rC(lU es teo an u rgent debate on th e Soviet invasion). Soviet troops were to be withd rawn from urban centers as soon as possible, and "a treaty e()!Jt'CTiling tIle t~)!l{Ii!ion s uf stay :md complete removal of allied troops" was to he t~)!J elnde{1 in th e ncar future. The (IUestion uf the permanent statiun ing of troo ps and th e securit y of C7.echoslovakia·s burder with th e Fe{icrai Hepuhlic was to he th e suhject of a special stud y. Wit h th e siguing of the protoc"Oi, the hm s iJc.~ <-~) lI el lld eJ tl ICir negotiations. Following a short period of inilll"tnal discnssion , in which the Czechuslu vak side refns{~J to llleet the other East Euru(>can le a der .. who, it Irnllsp ir e d , we ..., " Is" in tl' e Krcm lin ;" th " C7.eehuslo\'a\.:s were dri ven tu the airpurt fur their re turn tu i)ra~ue. The only last-m in ut e hitch o<-"currc{] when it became known that Soviet biders intended to keep Kriegel imprisoned in Muscow. After the del egation refused to leave Soviet te rrit ury withou t him, he was duly delivered to th e plane. The signing of the \1 us('Ow Protoc'Ol brough t the ]lOs t-crisis peri od til an end ; and tl, e Soviet leaders re5l1me{1 their holillays. T I,e strategy was set for th e period of normaii7.ation. which lasted until weI! btlyuml Dul,,:~:k's rtln\uval the follOWing spring. The u ut ("O me of th e crisis in mll ny ways had been unsatisfactory and uncertain for th e Soviets. Yet they had achieved the mpituhltioll of the Du lX":ek leadership without un due loss of life and without lInc.xpe cted ur ulUK"Ceptahle internatiUlHl1 rep(~r<:uss i()n .~ . The securi ty of the borders of socialism Ilad beel! safeguarded. and Suvicl l'Ontml ofpolitieallifc in Prague had been reasserted. The action {'1)St them the loyalt y of an cntire ).:cncratiun of Czeehoslovak dti zc ns ,lnd of millions (If reform-minde{\ Commnnists. hut in the end this ('Ost eOll nted for Ilothing. " A, «>nJjrm~,t br ~ rY~,,,I,, ""''''''''';'1'''' '"' A"~'''' Vi. I96/!. A«""!I"~ ,,, ,10 .. .\I"rni"~
Slar. ''''It'''\ 26. 1968. the tc.J e" uf t t", ,~he, A" ~, ,,l 2·1.
f,"" ;"" ..l;"g .,t,l<" h.,t .. ,h ",I I" ~""..."w ''''
CHAPTER TH mTEE ~
Findings
DECISIONS There were lour majur, cluse ly inte rrelated decisions adup ted in tllC post-crisis period : Drcj~i""
.\'!lml,,·r
Date
48
Augus t 22
TIlt: Pnlill!uro ah:lIl\lnns its illiti;,! pu!iti':,,! slrJtej.!y and del'id es to llt'j.!ol iate din.'(."lly with the C7.l.'(;hosln,"nk h~~dt~rship in ~'nsmw.
4lJ
Au!,:mt 2.3
The 1\,lit1>u..., ;Ign·", 10 inc\",le D ul>c<:k :md Cern ik in tlie tH'Kntiatio ll S
C""t~"1
The Po!ilh llTO deeides 10 hriug ;,11 the irn I'ri so lle.J CZeeho,I",·ak lL·aders 10 ~ I OR"oW
a "d to I'l'al II":,,, as Ihl' formal rt:1'rt:senlaIin' s of IIH..' ewch"s!o,·"k parly a",1 , Iatl'. S]
AlIg"'124- 25
The [,>I ilhum de~·i.les !hul II 'l' IWI) sides m ll st sign a li>rlH ;ll l'ro lnu>1 sl' tting nul t1 11: sp.;·
" ill" m"aslIn's I],,, C7.<,,·hos[u,"aks would have 10 lI",h:rlak .. Oil tile ··mad lllllormaliniioll."'
" SYC HO LOG ICAL
~NV IHON" ' ENT
The pust-c ri sis periud uegan with th e in vasion uy Soviet-led fon:es o n t he night of August 20-2 1 and t:ndcd w ith the signing of the ~1 (lsc(lw P rotocol on August 2i. Duri ng th is period. no Soviet 1)11lit ical le;u[er mad e a puhlic .~ peech . wrol e all ar ti dt~. tIT even isslted a press stat e m ent. HeIlL"C there is no illliependent docnme ll tation Ihal WOU[l[ allOIl" the a nalysl to a.ssess the psyl"ilOlugk....!1 e Tl virun-
men! during this period. All that is available are the se("{)nd han d reports of CZe<;hoslo\":lk leaders who partkipatcd in tIlt" l\ttlSt"uw negotiations and who were th emselves under (;onsiderahle stress. In :lddition 10 th ese at"t."0111lts, I}()wever, th e anal yst docs llave the hard tilcts of Sovict actions from which to infer changes in th e psydlOlo)!i('al environment. The singl.., must import:mt aspect of th.., posh; ri ~ i s pt:riv,J was th e sharp change in Soviet st rategy so me forty-eight hours ali er the intcrvcnti on. Musmw clearly h:IJ ealt"ulatcd th at Cz<..'(;ho.duvak lead ers loyallu the Suviet Union would iss ue an appe al for assistance and establish a new government. thus ensurinJ.!: a smoot hand rapid transfer of [lower. \"hen this did not happen and wh e n popular resist;uICl! took;lll unforesecll form. Mus<.."ow changed its stnltcgy. Although Moscow's course shifted from military imposition to llcgotiatcd impus ition, Soviet views showcd little siJ.!:1I uf <:hange. The invasion 's failure tu spur conservath'e C7.echoslol'Hk le ade r.~ to takc power in urd er to "cnd the drift tow,lrd l"Oll11terrcvolution" did not alter th e Suviet eun vid iun th at tI le ahsnl ult: n :ssat iun of all antisocialist acts was still th e object of interv entiun. If BiI"ak. Indm. antI 1111' oth ers I..~ ulld not or would not form all alt ernativc ~O\'em ment to carry unt th e Iwccssary meaSllrc.~, then tll()SC \"er~' Icaders whum the t·ollaborationists had originally sought to displat·c wuuld bc res tur<:{1. pTOvi{lcd lImy served Soviet lo ng-term goals. As Ponomarcv poi ntedl y told Sm Tk()vsk~' when the I,lltcr protested tllat Ihe Sovit:! draft uftit<: ~lu s("U,," protocul was unac('cptablc , ''If you dnll't sign now, YOlI'11 sign in otweek. [fnot in a week. th e n in a furtni ght and ifnot in a fortnight, then in a month.'" The dmnge in Soviet hcll Hvior aftt;r th e first li,rl y-eight hours was not , th e refore. th e result uf an y reassessment of their basil" att itude tuward th e Prague Spring, but merel y a shift in laelies.
C IHSIS
C()~ IPON [~N TS
Brecher defines the post-crisis period as follows: The !wsl-cri.\·i.\· period h" gins with an o1,sc!".-,,1,1.: d... dint: in inten'it y "f "n" or more of t [", 1hr ... t: p... r{·... pt",,1 l"l,dit ion' -t hreM. tim e prl'ssure, and war probability. If Il.e Ollset of th is period is syno nomons with th e outbreak of war. th e tl.ird {'(JUditiou is replaced hY:1lI image
''''
o::h
335
of w.... ater militar\' ~'''Ix,hilit)' v is · i\ ·\·i ~ th" c"e",~' (ur famr.,!,l" d,an):!", in the military halanl" '), i ,(' .. dcdini n" t 11 !"" "t. ' It is dt'ar th at th e relative su~'(;c s s of th e pllrc1y mili tary aspeds of the inva,ion a nd th e "bsclIl:e of an y Western military re spunse did pWl!lICC an inml,,{lialc p{)n 'c p ti on u f dedi ning tlm'"t. Furthe rmore. pop ular re s istance. "ltho,,!!h wi(lesp H''''!. was p,\ss iv,), :lIlt! th is also red uced tIl e li kcli llOod of all~' mili tary adion 11t:~'n"d Ibe maintenance of law and orde r. r\c"c rthclcss, the inability uf t he Suv;cb to limn an alterna ti ve gov e rnment t111ltinllcu seriously h) Ihreaten "dlicl"cmcnl of their objectives. The ('Ollvenin); of the E ~ tr:lord i llar~' Fourh)c nlh Party Cong ress 'Ili U th e cled iOiI of " Cel,lr,,! C ()'lllllit tce l'''"lmitkd to the l~)I]ti nu a ti "n of th e rc!i,rm lIl{)V( ' Ill Cllt pnscd a part il'ular problem for ~ 1 ()Sl~)W. Not onl y d id it heighten tIl<:: pc rceptio n of Ihreat . bu t it (1Is() increas e d the s;llient...· of time. Onl'e it had become dcar thai tl, c congress II,\(I intl",,(1 met :mel d"d(~d :1 n e ll' Cenlral Cornllliltee . ~ [ ()s<:"w '1l1i<:l';[" 1",\1 tu p roduce ,I jlolil iml fi,l'mula that would pre "e)] t th e new conH nilt e.; fi'olll l1J llso1idating its position, This was tb e d l:mg e in th(~ C~.cchosl(Jv;lk situation that spurre d tl,e Soviets 10 negoliate direl'll y w il l, DulO<:'ek amI tl",se ol her leade rs whom they !Hld originall y pJanne
'I'll<' ]losl-crisis ]le riod (" ",I II,,· ,·"tin· c rb i_) "''''' b., ';'id to It-rlllina l< ' wit"" tl, e i"tl'", it,- of ,,:levan t pen"Cl'tio"., ),," ;·e,,"'n.·<1 til "'"l(:ri,j, "UTI"' , tf. " r" 1,;,,1 ,,,c ,,n·<1 t h .. s i~''''t ",'<" "f tl ", C zcch", I"vilk
delegation to the :'-Ioscow Prot()coL the crisis as a whole cmlle to an end, T he Ull tl"Ome of th e crisis was. llOll'en'r, hig h I ~' Iltll'ert;,i n an d inconclusive, a m] ill tIll: ",uuth, thai tj,lIuwc<]. Soviet aulllOritie s h ad un lold problems in ).:ai nin g tl,e "t.>mpliancc of tIll" D ubl:'ck lea(lcrship to the So\"it;! iu le rpretat it)ll of th e prv\tI('uL ' ~tid ",,"l Hr,~·) ... r,
' tbill .. ", 25,
/)" "j, j,,,,., ("
c,,.,.. ,",
~1
336
TIlE I'OST-CKIS1S l 'EIIlOU
COPING
/o. I EC H ."'NI S~I S
InjonlllltiOlI
Informaliun sen Tell was cllhaneed willi th e invasion . The physic;l! ot'Snviel troo ps and secllrity nllicers t hroughout 111I~ cm m tr y. th e effurts at th e Soviet embassy to fur m a revulutionary wurkers' :md Pt~;IS;l11IS' gnverlllHent. '-Ind the detention of most of th e CPCz PracsiuiuITI ~rcatly im proved Jl,lusnlw's control ove r (lyell ts in Prag1lt: and L'Ullcumitantiy c nhatlL'Cd th e qua lit y of information seeking. H CII L'C th e (.11gn il ivc pcrforman t'e of th e Suvi(,t dl,.·dsion makers also improve.!. Of 1,.~ H1rs c, the t"on\inuatiull of pa.ssivc resis tance ;mu the (x f1l\' c lIill!:\ of th e V~'s(){an y Congress eeTtainly had an adve rse effect. p,ldicu!arl y Oil th e perceived need and conseque nt q ues t for information. Despite, for example. th e massive in put of data ~ I OSCUI\! n lUst have 11t! " U receiving daily about t hc sit lIation in I'rague, the Soviet leadership was in the dark aoout many aspects uf th e Vysocall YCungrcss. Smrkovsky rC{'"{Hl nts that durin~ his first cncouuter with Soviet leaders in ~Iose()w aft er the invasion , Brczbncv kept ,Isking, "W1H1t's Shilgan?"" He W,IS refcrring to V'\lIck Silh;ln . tlw prolessur of e{'"{HI(lI11ics appoin ted by th e Vysntany Conftress to {]eputize for Duhl"Ck in t he laller's ahsence.' prese n(.'(~
Consul/a li!)e lind D ecisimwf
FOri/filS
T he twn key {."nsuh ative un its, the E.as l European leadership and the Suviet milit;ory. both rem,lined adive during the post_crisis period. E.ast Europe an leH{lers were present in I-.jos{'"{JW I
337
FINU II<{;S
in the negutiat iuns with the C:lL"dlUsluvak leadership. T hey uperated eithe r indhoidually ur in small gruups, with llrezlmev the principal acto r and Ponomarev tbe (."unduit fur proposals between the two sides. There is no real evidence that t he Soviet leadership was not cohesive during this period, and indc{'tl the Czechoslovak leaders make no mention of havi ng ohserved ;lIIY such di visions at th is t ime (in {"tllltras t to their n:eolled ions uf (:arlie r meclings). It is interesting that shc1esL formerl y a key me mber of all Soviet delegatiuns, was not a part of the inncrdrcle at this stage. He had heen a major p ropo nent of the uriginal invasi un plan, an{l his absence suggests that after its failure he was in some disrepute.
Search for Altenwtif~~' The speed with which '\!OS{'iJw's a lternative strategy e merged suggests that there was not a wide searc h for alternatil·es. The one eventuall y adopted Ilecessitatell a {"Umplcte vulte-face in te rms of the attitude toward the deposed leaders, and this clearly indicates that the ,lltern;ltive strategy W:L~ nut though t uut ill advarH:e. Indeed it stron gly suggests that the Soviets had no uJlltingclIey plan that they {"{lUld implement if their first action failed. O n realizing that unlike in H uugary in 195G. !I revulutionary workers' and pcasauts' gow;rnment was not going to be established in Czechoslovaki a in 1968. the Politburo moved qUickl y- even has til y- to prevent the Fourteen th 1',Lrty Congress liulII selling up a rival leadership. As with so many uther oc'C;15ions in the pre-crisis and crisis pe riods, Soviet leade rs relied heaVil y on the experience of past crises to guide their actions, with 'Ilm us t invariably disastrons res ults. Once they had broken with the past and decided to negotiate with Dubeck, they were able to d efin e their objectives and pursue them in a much mum dired and cl ear-.~ ighted way. The dedine in crisis-induLocd stress. typical of the post-crisis period, the refore, had the e lf<.."Ct of e asing, b ut not eliminating the (J lIcst Ii )T in fnrrmL ' iuII ali t! tl IC ",ca n; h for alter·" " t ives. Th e L"{rn Su tt,,live pn){:ed ures "ud decisional furums bo th evolved around the {"{llItinued centmlity of the Politburo Hlul the inner L"Ure within it. The post-crisis period as defined here was b rice las ti ng only one wee k. At the e nd of that week Soviet leaders may have felt salLg uine ahout t he prospects for no rma li 7~l t io Jl in PrJ-gue, but the Czechoslovak leadershi p fclt nu similar optimism. As discussed in the nex t two dl
"
,"
338
Til E I'OST-C/US IS l't: 1I100
in mall~' ways ..1m from the Soviet vantage po in t. It was th e unsatisfactory Qlltt'Ome of the crisi.. as a who le !h,lt provukes questions about the o vc mll Sovie t pc rformam_,<, in t he crisis ;lIld th e
extent to which Sovie t management. and mismanage ment. ('(miri bu \t' d to the lxmlinual escalation oft ensiotl s that in th e e nd led to invasion.
''''
IGh
," "
PART FIVE
Conclusions
,
,
"
C HAPTEII FOUHTEEN
Leaders and Decisions: Conclusions on Soviet Behavior in 1968
HIE PSYC H OLOG ICAL
ENV II\ ON~IENT
The tlu..'o reticalliterature on d ecisiun mak ing is replete with studies examining til e cfli..'C \ uf crisis and stre ss on individual decision make rs an d on the decision-making pn)(:ess as a whole .' A (..'Onclusiun freq ue nt ly drawn hy rcseardle rs and ana lrsts is that the intense stress prodl1ced by a major crisis impairs the (':lpahility o[ dncis ion makers to deal with the crisis. This is also ;l major component of t he model d eveloped hy ~ I ichacl Bn..'Clwr and llsed in th is stlldy. There arc many assu mpti ons ahout thn exact effect of c risisindUl:ed stress on d!;;'Cision makers. Lut inadeq uate data ahou! til e precise impact of the Czeclluslovak crisis un individual Sovie t lead ers precl udes a full analysis of all of these assumptions. Tllere are, however, three hypoth eses in th is :lrea that can be exam ined more closely. Ke eping in mind that stress is defined to include a threa t to a state's basic values. an awareness that time for reso lVing a crisis is Loth limited and fin ite , and a calcnlation thai use of military force is likely, olle may express the hypotheses as follows: L Th" gr" ~leT th ., 'I,." " , II", g,.""I (',. will he Ih e ~~ II"-"'J'l"nt rigidit y orthe dedsioll Illakers anti th e less l'lpahle th ey will be ufeither
a"oidin g the use of slt:rcotypes or mpin g with the complexities atlll ambigu ities of the situa!ioll. 'S~.., ~.",,<:ial\)' U.,-i> D, D,,~m'" ~ l al" - UnJeT> I ,"J i l~ JI,,\\' Ollie," '!,ca' C,;, i" A MlIllime 'hoJ App......,II ." !'P_ 199 _ 22 1: In, epll Dc Rh",a . Tiu: l'.ychli/odcaIIJi"",m;IIn <1 ~"'.-ri!111 ro/icy: ell.f\e, E lI erm. nll . 00" /,lIc""nl io".1 CIi",., lr"I II ~ J' '''i, ~,)l1 I A.~'" M. "". D'Ci.';'III·.\f~~IIII(, 1I'~"'rt k f" ;'. 1'" "",'1;'>11 .\Ii" ",Tc'·I"~1II in IlIlpnla ,illlu,!I',,!ilic", Gunl"n Paul [.. ur~ n . IJip/llnl
lIiel,.'" J-IJ
",,
J·t:?
(X)SC l.I)S I OSS
2. TI", grealer the stres~ . the greater will he the propensity or d ..·..,isioll make rs tn rely"" fl'.st e~!lCrienL~·s. the misapplil'atiu" or o\,ergeneraliwtion or which is " primary so un:c "flow-quality dedsions .
3. Th e greate r th e stres,. th e highe r th e "alne put on II", immcdiate re,,,lt s o r decis ions and adio"s r:lthcr thall Oil the I""g·term <'Onsc,]"e" ..'Cs. buth pos iti"., ami ne gat ive, "fthus" d.,cisions.
In the Czechoslovak crisis, the pattern of escalation was not
u. the pre-crisis thro ugh the crisis period and then d ees.calate sharply typ ical, for the l'risis did not
e.~l'alat(:
gr"d lLally
uniformly from
aiter the in vasion. Instead, the c risis was marked hy fluctnating phases of higher and relat ively lower tensions. Furthermore. althuugh stress diu pcak just prior to the inv'l~ iol1. the must sustaine d period of acute stress O(;curred 110t in ]'Ililse Five, hilt ill Phase Three, when the munth-Iong buildup of pu litical pressurc to in vade Czechoslov"kia was only narf{)wly averted by the Ciema compromise at the end of July. And finall)', although the Soviet military within hours of in\"asion {,ould reassure the political leader.;hip thai the major military object ives had heen achieved. politie" luncertainty was aClIte in the post-crisis pe rino:!" The likelih()()(] of in volvcment in further military hostilit ies did decrease soon after the invasi un, but not until the PulitlJUro l!lId the signatures uf Dul>ce k, 5volloda, and Ceruik-Ihe heads of P
:F1J
tional constraints operating in the Soviet srstem. Because of the eunceptual (;onformity impnsed on the Soviet elites br ideology, hnth the ir "''Orld "iew ami their polit ieal language tends to he less ncxihle, even in periods of nonerisis. There is greater consensus among tilt: Soviet clites on core principles t han is often the case in the more pluralistic West, ancltherc are more regular and ritualistic protestaliuns of loyultr to these principles at party plenums, congresses, conferences, and akt ius than would he fnund in the West, atlcast outside preelection periods. There is also something to be s,lid for the view that the Soviet leadership believes itself to be in a state of almost permanent cri.~is in its foreign affairs-insofar as fears of encirclement and feelings of vulnerability and insecurit y have been abiding features uf the Soviet \\Htansc!wrumg at least since the 1917 Hevo[ution. The eXI>erience of world War II. slHlred by the enlire political an d military leadership, fostered a sensitivity to the Sl:CUrity of the Soviet Union·s borders, particularly on the \\'estern frontiers, and an absolutely unquestioned and un ified commitment to the postw:lr division of ElITope. At the lime of the Czechoslovak t·risis, howe"er, the Soviet Union·s foreign and domestic policy was in an unusual state of fhL"l:. The war in Vietnam was poised at the crossroads between eSC'.I1ation and negotiation ; relations with the UnitcJ States had bmught breakthroughs in urms limitations but were nevertheless filled wilh animosily over U.S. snpport lilr Isr.. cl .uld South Vietnam and with unecrtainty fulluwing l'resi{lent Johnson·s decision not to seck another term. Aml in the Feder-al Hepuulic, Ihe revival uf ultraconservative I)()litics in Bavaria ,md the cunt inued refusal of the Bonn government to recognize the division of Germany was t'OUpled with the first victories the re hy sut"i;llists whu, if ent'Ollraged, might eventuall y and finally Tcrognize postwar realities. All of these uncerlainties in relations with ti,e \\'eslcrn \\'Orld ('{Iindded with a l>eriod of renewed host ilit r \vitll China, following a brief postKhrushchev respite, forcing the lSrezhnev teadership to evolve a firm stnttegy tnward the containment aTllI isolation (If the enurmulis ideological tlueat being posed by C hina's Cultural He\"olution . All uf these foreign policy issues eonlronted a leadership already heavily pf(!o(''Cllpie([ with dom'!stic politicaL coonumic, and social management and reform. Thus other problems were ('{I nstantly intruding and compet ing wil hilt.: Pr:lguc Spring for I h" uU"nt ions (If the Soviet leadership, wit h the ne t effect that Czechoslovak events remained outside Soviet t"Ulltrol rather lunger than might normally
I.:U)<;I.:LUS IU:O<S
have been tim ('ase, Mureuve r, fur many uf the Suviet leaders t he urgency uf ot he r issues L~)lorcd their perspect ive on the I'mgue Spring. Brezlmev, fur example, was invoked in revising Khrushchev's "over-leu!l!nt" att i!mle toward domestic llissent. anll he repeatedly SllW the J'rague Sp ring through this focus . Suslnv was L'OIJ(:t:rned lest the Czcdwslovak crisis upset his efforts to cuntain the Chinese, whereas Kosygin and Gromyko w.!n: preO<.;cupie(\ with brcakthroughs in ar ms limi tatiu n, Eurupcan sccurit y. and (in Kosygin's case) eL'Ollumic refo r m. All worried th:lt:ln invasio n of" Czechoslovakia would t hreaten these po licies. Gn....::hku. ,I professional soldier. was concerned with the direct im pact on Soviet inte rests uf U.S. m ilitary ac tivily in Suull, t.'lISt Asia and Eu rope and di d nO I. initi;llly at le'I$t. <.~mside r suhversion t he p rimary threal lo tile socialist system. Neverthelcss, as the crisis in CzecllUsluvakia grew, the enti re leadershi p came 10 focus more d irectly on the problems in Czcchosi<)v;lkia itself. so that by J uly-at the heigl' l of the crisis-most Soviet leaders considered Ihe solution of all other foreign policy proble ms and even some dumestic proble ms to be <.'Ont ingent un the reso lutio n of (I.e C~.edUistuv .. k crisis. Thus. l ' m..juf event such as the sign ing of the Nuclear NOll prulifemtiull Treaty un July I went virlually un noticed in Ihe Soviet p ress and, except for Kusygin and Crumyko, unmen tioned by Soviet leaders. Sim ilarly in July. secret contads with Bonn over a re n unciat ion-of-(orce a.c:ree me n! were abandoned and were nol resumed unl il afte r the in vasion. The Vie tnam peace talks in P"ris were stalled. ,IS \I',IS Soviet diplomatic backing for Arab efforts to ob tai n an lsnlcli witl\llrawal from oct'upied terri turies, despite an urgent visit to Moscow from EgY\lt's Presid en t Nasser in Jul)". By the end of July, Virtually the only two foreign policy initi ..lives still :id ively being pursue d were the November International Communist Cunference backed by Suslul' and the Soviet-Americ~m summit negotiated by Kosygin to inaugumte strategic arms limitatio n tatks. Both of these policies wefe promoted by t heir spVllsnrs throughout the crisis and long aftcr other leaders had focused atte ntion ;llmost exclusively on Czcdloslov
LEADERS "'I'D DEC ISJOI'S
345
sight into the complexities of the modern world, although certainl y he had more extensive experience than some of his contemporaries. It1t her, he appears to have had an k/ee fixe abou t the Chinese threat, for his concern was far in excess of his fun ctional responsibilities as the Kremlin's chicfideulugue, In comparison tn other Suvid It:adt: rs, Kosygin was remarkable; for active as he was in the Czechosluvak crisis he did not t~llt1e to view;l11 internation;ll events through the prism of PrJgue, \Vhereas Brezl mc\', fur examplc, became increasi ngly pessimistic about the possibility of positive relations with Bonn or \Vashington , and ,1liogetlwr less interested in the Sinu-Soviet {'Unflict, Kosygin never ceased to have a complex appreciation of international affairs, This is not to say that he was uniformly Iibellll in his idculogical out look, altllough he was so to the extent that he {'Unsistenlly fin'ored the negotiation of outstantling llilfert: nees as a mt:ans of resolVing disputes, Kosygin, during his stay in Stockholm at the height ufthe crisis, was dea rl~· t'UI1L'Crned about Czechoslovakia (so concerned, in /act, that (luring his press cllllfcrcllcc he re(>cate(lly said "Czechoslovakia" when he Incant "Sweden') and desirous of Jlulling forward his views on the subjed; but be also covered a whole range of international issues, and he dealt with these issues in (1 vcry complex way, It is interesting, for cxample, that he should attack U,S, poliCies in Vietnam wbilc support ing tbe Paris nego tiatiolls for e nding the war and praise Soviet-American disarmament negutiations as "already a great thing" only days after Brezhnev had written ofJ'<.'OOper.ltioll with the United States, describing it as a "rotten decaying society," On the GeT!nan ques tion, Kosygin showed his blunt and forthright support for the postwar division of Europe: "'he nmin reason filr the tensioll in Europe is the dem(l11 u frOIll the revanchbt military circles ;n the German Federal Republic fur a chan ge in postwar frontiers . He who calls for a revision of this postwar order calls for a ncw world war,'" But here ,Igain, Kosygin did not spL'CificaHy denoUlwc tile policy of boil ding bridges, ami indeed he issllL"( j ,I e,lll for a European securit y <''\1Ilference , 011 the basis of available evidence, it seems that of all the Suviet leaders it W;L~ Kosygi ll alone who t'Unl inlied throughout the crisis to hllve a complex, differentiated, and Ilonstereotypcd image of the international e nviron ment. As tilr the changes in the Soviet view of the Czecho,dov(lki;1 sit' f :",ning S'"nllanl, J"l), 12, 19M,
3·16
CO:" t:LUS IOI'S
uatiOl!. there is lillie douDtthat as the crisis progressed. the Soviet leadership became less and less cOllvin<--ed by Cz(.><;hos]ovak protestations that they had the situation under control and that negat ive manifestations were transient. In the puulished rc(.'Ord of the Soviet reaction to the cri.~ i s, the leadershi p maintai ned that as late as the beginning of May (the beginning of the crisis period) the Polithuro lllemhers still hall an "understanding both fo r the objective complexity of the situat ion and for the complexity of the position orthe CPCz leade rship ft self." " :-O los(.'Ow had initially ac(.-epted the principle of extensive l'adre changes, lind tl1('re was a general belief that given prnl>er support and "encuuragement." DubC::-ek would <-'{)[)solidate his position aud put an e nd to antisocialist infringements. As time went on. however. institut ionalir.ation of the reform movement and its support wit h in the higllest echelons of the Czechoslovak party ultimately forced those, including Brezhncv, who had personally supported Dubcek tu admit that the problem lay not in prov iding the le:ulership with the means to regain <-'O ntrol but in finding a leadership who had the will to exercise control. Sume of the Suviet leaJers (and their East Eu ropean a!!ies) Jtwe lopcd a ncgativc tl.'ISCSSmCnt of Duh(:(:k, Cis;IT, Kri cgel, Smrkov~k)', alld other l!;:aJing Iihe raL~ from a very early stag!;:. Smrkovsk}"s suitability as a president ial <-'illldidatc was {liseusscd ilS e
''''
o::h
3-17
L.t:ADt:lIS ANli Pt:C [S [ONS
greater will he the prupe nsity uf decisiull makers to rely un past experience-reveals fairly mhe{1 results when ap plied to Soviet behavior in 1008. In the course of the crisis, four disti nct episodes in recent Soviet history had PIay that (.'oincided "" 'ith his departure fo r the CSSH as part of the highly political tOllr u)llduc\<.'d hy Sovkt gener:.lls. Konev maintained that Hitler had the ('apahilily tLL smash the Prague u prising and that "only the Soviet arm~' had savcd Prague.'" Melltio(l of this hJooJ deht W,IS particularly Ii-elluent betwee n J uly 17 and 26. when no less than five (Irtides apPc(lreJ in K l1lsLlaya ;:;vc;:;cla exhorting the Czeehosl()"aks not to W(l~te the sacrifices made during the li beration of Prague. As une l'ULnmcntator rcmarked acidly, when 145,OO() soldiers had die{/ ill freeing C1.ec!mslovakia from fascism. no one in that u)Untry had called t he entr~' of Sovic t truops a ""rc;lch uf .,u,·t:rdgnty:·· Tll c peak "f this prc.'.'
activity (.'()incided with the Soviet Politburo delibemtions un fullscale invasion,
B"-"L·h~r. I),>:i'~)n . '" (:";"1,.]'_ :} 13 .
' /oU,'ia. M'r 6 ~nJ 7. [OC,s "1\"",,"1'" =<",.,I~. J")r 26. )9fi.ij. ~h" Krd' ""'J" ,n·.,I• . J"[Y17.
[yo
20. a,,,l 21. [OClll.
348
CO;';C l.US10:-;S
"blood debt" we re less frC
milch assisted by "the gloriuus L~Jrp S of Lud vik Svuboda:' whom the Soviet., were currfmti y rdyi ng on In legitimize the ne ll' re volutionary workers' and peasants' AO\'c nHllCnl in Prague. Not tlntil afier the signing of the :\Ius..~)w I'r()t<x~)1 was a place once ag,lin fo und for D uhi':ck in Snvici llistorv, with :\brshal Kon ev writin g in I ::,vesti(l on September 2, 1968, that huth Duhl'Ck lind Svohoda had made d eds ivc L~lILtrillUti()n s to tlte war e nlJrt. The 19-<18 excommunication of Tito from th e Soviet bloc was in the mind s of some Czechoslovaks who looked to th e Yugoslav leader's res istance as an examlll o.; of the sllL'cessful defiance of s()~ \"iet dktates. ' The negative an d long- lasting cun,e(ln ence~ of that eXL'OllI llIl1I lieation for the Communis t movem e nt as a whule w ere alsu in th e thullgllt.~ of some So\·ie t leade rs. ~Iikh a il 51ls1ov had di rected the 1948 Cuminfurm (·n nfe rell("es Ihal indicled Tilo, :llld he lwd a<:t ed as Stalin·s e nvoy at t he par ty cunfere nce s he ld in the eD it, Bulg(lri(l. a nd Czechoslovaki;! that had ushe red in the IJri cf hul In I"IJu] ent pt~ ri (>d of anl i _Ti lo isl p" rw~ s in I hose ("(. 11 n tri es. Twent y ye ars later. aft er ~ l o sL"OW had swallowed ih pride and sough t rapproche ment with Titu on hi s uwn lerms, Sus]uv :Irrivcd at the negotiations in (;icma nad Tisou. wherc he rcpei\tcllJ y II rged buth his Soviet and CzedlOs]ovak L~)lllp:ltriuls 10 reach :1 ne~utiat ed set tl ement. Th is W;IS 19(;8. \lut iH-I /). he is repo rted to ll to (:"...·)",,)o,·.ki.:· • AH,h"" ;,\1(",,.;....v wi,h E,I"" "t (;"td,We.·k.·,. U,igl,ton. ':,,~hn" . o n IM"t .. " ~L 1\1".
f,,,
• ..
.,i,,,,,
LEADE RS
A~I)
DECISIONS
lion of bluste r, unity, and realism on the part of the Polish leadership, V. y, Zagladin, Boris Pono man:v's deput y in the Internatio nal De partme nt, reportedly rchlted to ~t ikhail Voslensky, himself an advisor to the Central Committee, that the current situation in Czechoslovakia should not he compared with Uungary in 1956 but rather with Poland, fo r although there l);Id initially been "panic" in Pubnd, COllimon sense had prevaile{l, and "nothing had happe ne d," · A ,~im ilar im pressio n was given hy Brezhncv. He told Josef Slllrkoysky, during tile hitter's visi t tn Mos(.'Ow in JUlie, th(lt the Soviet Unio n had not "forced Poland in to sociaIi7~ltion" in 195{i and could acco mmodate a similar degree of reform in Prague."' Comparisous with Yugoslavia and Poland, however, were relati"ely lew-particularl}, after the publieatinn of the "2,000 \Vords" in l'r,lgue. Alter that time, the mnst fre1 luent and nVI:rrid ing connection was made with the Hungarijln uprising in 1956. Many of thc Soviet lead ers had been directly involved in the ll1o\' " lSI> played ,L key role in 1956 as the Soviet ambassador in Budapest. ,\ Iars hal Kon ey was commander ill chief of the W(\rs(\w P'ict, ;Iflll h i~ mhotdiflate at tlw time, Marshal Grec.'hko, was ('Olllm;Lmler of the Soviet forces in East Ge rmany, StrJ.ngcly these 1()U r leaders, who between them had Ihe most direcl experience of H ung;ary in 1956, made nu puhlk rc ferences to it in 1968, Suslov's silence is especiall y interesting; and given Khrushchev's suhsequent admissiun that the re had been dissensioll in the Pracsid ium un iuv;Lsion," it mOlY be that Suslov had hee n nne of those with douht s " houl a d eci.~ion he later accepted as necessary. The lack of direct know ledge ur eXIWrien(~: of the Hun garian uprising did 1101, howe"er, prevent (It he r Soviel bulcrs from drawi ng pamllels, As earl y as the Dresdcn rnt:c ti ng in .\ Iarch, Ilrezh ncv is reported to have plead ed with Dilbeck not to allow "ehalls" and to "mobilize ill time the party and wu rkin g: class" so as tu prevent a repe tit ion of what lLappened in I-I ungary, " Afte r referring tn tIll: Polish parallel in June, during Smrkovskfs visit, Brezlmcv re• ~! Ikh.i t v", t.,,,,kl', I)", SI,;.'g..t, " ... 1.1 1 A,,~u, S<'pt" ",I~ ', 3,196')
ICh
!z
M
350
CO-,;Cl.liS IO:.S
tum eu again to the comparison w ith H ungary on the oc'C;lsio n of Janos Kadar's visit to ~" os('Ow in carly Ju1y, when he spoke of 110w socialism had been ucfcndc{ilhc rc through the "fraternal internationalist as~ istance" of the Soviet Un ion.'} TIle lack of violence and of armed iusurn:ctionist prcp.lfiltiolls distinguL~hcd the Prague Spring from Hun g
," "
351
It seems. Ilowever. that the Sovid le:ldersh ip diu eonsiucr certain aspects nf their handling of the Hungarian crisis as relevant In ~o[vin l! Ihe Cz(~cllOsl()v'lk cris is. The invasion of Hu ngary ha{1 been legit im ized by requests frum the Hungarian Communist party itself fo r military assistance. Tllis ()<.,'(;urreu on October 23, 1956: it was followed on Novem ber " hy a sC<'Ol1d appeal from a newly form ed "rc \,otu tioll;lTY gove rn ment of \mrkcrs and p e,LSli nt s," hClld c{\ by Janos K:id:ir, for assistance in {Iuclling q uite open ill surre('tion. Tile hK'k of slis tailll"d illicmat in na l <--ensure and the relati ve sm.'Ccss of K:ldar in estahlishing his :mthnril}' and eVell tually gaining both respectability and popularity certain ly contributed to the Soviet dccisioll to repcat tll is pattcrn-with quite d i~ilstrOllS rcsults-in Prague. Thi s was an aspect of previous clisis cxperiencc that docs appear to have flgured in Soviet calculations right up to, and illllllt-diate1y anC f, the invasion. T he third hypothesis prcse nted earlier suggests that d edsion makcrs lose sight oflong-tcrlll gains and t'OnSC(lucnces as thc crisis est11lates . Although the Soviet leaders had dedded that the Scpte mher 9 Extraordinary CPCz Congress and the August 26 Slovak Congress had to be stopped at all t'()s ts. there is no overwhelmi ng evidence to suggest th:lt the Soviet le;l{lers lost sight of long-term gains and conseqmmees. Indeed to them, thc issues at stake in Czechoslovakia were extre mely central, and to ignore them would be to .~at· riflt'C hoth id Nllogical primacy ,lIlt\ Suviet sccurity-the absolu te t'Orne rstones of Soviet foreign policy. For the Soviets, the los.~ of the loyalty of su<:(:eedillg ge ncratitms of CZI..""Choslovak cit i7.ens, the alienatio n of Euro-Cvmmll llists. and the setbacks to detente werc short-term conside rations measured perlwps in years or even in dt.""Caties. but transient none theless when t~J m pan:d to the absolu te nct'Cssity of defen{ling C~.edHJsl()vakia 's lllemht!f5h ip in the Warsaw 1',let and ofl1pholding the Soviet Unio n as the only legitim:lte innovator and interpreter uf "·I arxism-Lcninism . These were pert.'Cived as at Slake in 1V<Xi. and the USSH never lost sig.ht of" t hem throug hout the crisis; and if anything ther hecame Illore t~Jl\ vinecd of the necessity of uphold ing them as t hc crisis escalated.
I NFOH/l.IATiON There are severJI hyj:lOt hcses posed by BrcdlCr and other ;In;llysts relating to inl(lI"mation ga thering and cvaluatioll for wh ich Soviet oeh;lvior ill 1968 provides evide nce. SpeCifically, they
352
ue (a) the pe rc.:cived need anti t'Ollscqllcnt qUl:'st for information: (b ) the involveme nt oftnp (!cd~ i (lII make rs ill the cV
1101"
of events in !'rague was t hat they were losing
(.'()n troi of the situiltion and t klt their _~ll p p\)rlcrs in Czc~:hos lovak ia were also losing (.'UniruL The fear uf chaos, so much a Soviet reA e.~ at the hes t of times, was omnipresent in th e Soviet reaction to the erisis and was heightened by the loss of trad itiona l channels and SOlln:es ofinf(lTtnat ion tha t ol."curred with th e perso nnel and orga nil~ltiollal c11(l11ges in I' rague. IIl pa rt k- ular, the re moval of l'\ovotn >:.. Hcnd ryeh . Koucky, and Strougal from the C I'Cz Sccret(lri;lt in I\p ril 1968 ami the appoint me nt of libcnds slIch ;\, I-I;ijek. I'([vel , an d PrehHk to head the ~-1in istry of Forcign Affairs, the Ministry of thc Intcrior, and t he cigllth dCIl;. r tmcnt "fthe Ct:nt r:
were majur
b low~
to traditional patte rns of information gatheri ng.
The lIew m in isters alld party ofTk i al.~ were less ind inl'tl-ol" positi vely d isinclined - to pass information on to the ir counterparts in Moscow, and to make ma tte rs mure d ifficult, Czechoslovak age nts of Soviet securi ty servk-cs and Soviet liais(ln uffi(:ers were aho n :moved , particula rly from the ~Ii nist ry of the i nterio r. For the Soviet Un ion, therdiJre, infort]l(ltiull SOll r(:CS and patterns of informatio n gat heri ng were disrupted at the very t ime th at th e need for infill"tll:Jti on was gmwin)!. thereuy hd)!htl! nin)! tlldr perception of chaos in Prague am i fOfl."ing them \() lise other less reliable suurces. In particular, Mosl."Ow heeded the wafll ings of ind h' id ua ls who were d e moted or threatt~ ll etl by the refor ms and who presented a onc-sided pit-ture of cvents. They also relied O il ufflcials at t he Sovie t emhilssy in Prague, primarily Amhassador ChervOllcnko and his de pn ty U dallst~v. both of whom we rt' kn own 10 he partit-U[;lrl y opposed to 111(: refor m muveme nt. T[lere WeTt:, of course , a\so many <'~JIlscrvatives who ma in ta im:tl official Illlsit iullS th roughou t 1968, and t hey t oo were instrumental in keepi ng ~ l us<."Ow informed . The~' indudl""tl Bi\";lk, Julin', $,·c stka. ;md of " D' L"
Da" ;",,, ;" c,;.,;,. 1'..T'S, G~·,,,, [)
I l ~nn,ulI\. <...t .. International en",<. pp.
:!(~2 _ 4.
l'" i~,·. TI,~
,;,,""'''' I)"'.~,,,. 1'. i!!!! , OI\(l
LEADEIIS ASD DEC ISIOSS
353
course Kuuck}:" who :L~ ambassador iu ;\IOSL~)W was particularly wdl-placell, amI also many lowe r level Ceutral Committee memhers and parliame ntarians who W(:re {'vidcntly very activc in pa~s iug on data. As member of parliament Dolmuluvu bter taunted Josef Smrkovsky: "We took care tlmt the Soviet cumrades should klloll' everything tlHlt 11'(15 happening here al that lime." " The disruption of traditional information channels and sources t."Urnbi ned with Ihe onset of the crisis had the died of spurring greater involvemenl uf lup dcdsion makcr.~ in both till: g(IIhering and the evalu(ltion of informatioll . This invulverllent \\~ts eneouraged also by Dulx-ek and otlLt~ r Czechoslovak leilre-erisis period, the exchange of information was once again cviJent, wit], Bre~.hnev rL-citing verbatim from stacks of press (:utting.~ to build a negative pictuf(: of de"elopllllmls in I'r;lguc. The Czcehoslovak side, by their own at.'("Ouut, "dc\'oted that day to refuting ;Iml exp];lining. \VC t.,Hmterc{l-with fact s HIllI information of much grcater weight than their random assortment of so-called information. "I.' This pallern L"U rltinued throughuut the ('risis period, right up until. and including, the Cierna talks allhc end uf July. It ma), he that for some top decision makers di rect involvement in seeking further infurmation from Dulx:ek and uther reformers Juring negotiations had the effect, however short-livcd. of ('asting doubts Oil the quality of information l>eing rt.'f.."cived frum the Sovie t embassy and hard-lincrs in Pnlglre. Kosygin t.'crt;liniy considered his May visit to Karlovy Vury as un oPl>ortunity both for quiet diplomacy and for gaining a firsthand impression of the atmnsphe re in Czedroslovakia. IIrez!mev. too. felt a need fo r more and bettcr infimmltion; and indeed he ap()lngizt..J It) Smrkovsk5', during their June 14 meeting. for previous negative assessmcnts, which the Suviet le(lder put down specifie'llly to "lack of infonn(ltion ." " Suslov ~ s""k{) .. ky. U"fi"l1l.rdC"n"'·....,Ii"". p . 11. MS"" the " ...·tI,HI I~I i"f."",,\inll I" ,·h.pll·, II f<,.. f""l,.., del.;)..
" P", ..,I".
25. r9r,8 II"fin;,heJC,,",n''''';V''. p. 11.
~h"' h
~ Sm,k,,",ki.
6 [b;d .. p. [~ .
COXCU ) SiOXS
too is s:tid to have voit'ed t'Q IK'ern abo ul the qu:ility of information passcd on by Chc rvoncnko during th c crisis .... Such t·oncern. howevc r, could not havc been that profound, for the role of the Soviet e mbass y increased mther than de<'reased up until Chel"onenko's fa ilure to produt"e th e promised revolutionary workers' :md pe:lsants ' govcrnmen t in t he wake or thc invasion . Aficr that time. when th e ne~oliation s sh iftNI to !\ IOSl~ )W, th e role of th e Soviet e mhassy dedined. Its rol e as the primilry source of infor mation was supplanted by military intelligence and the direct presence of envoys from \Ioscow (such as First Dl'put y Foreign ~Iin istcr Ku zlletsov). The involveme nt of lop del'ision make rs in info rmation gatherin g an d evaluill iou prudlll'ed ilho il ten dency to rely on direct c.1)I11munications with the Czechoslovak leaders as the crisis progressed. not just face-to-face co mmunication b ut writtcn t'Urrespondencc an d telcphone c.~m\"crsa tion s. Of COHrse. all th ese furms served t he dual purpose of gaining infurmation and eliciting ehimge in t he behav ior of th e Czcclmslo"ak leaders. Th us, ti, r cxa mp le, Urczllllev's tele phone call to Dnh('Ck on the morning the "2.000 Words" appeared was bu tll tu gauge D ulx:ek's reaction and to e nsure th ai th c reaction WilS go in g tl> he pwmpt and negative . An d in August, followin g Bratislava, Brezh ncy ealled Dubce k almosl daih' not unly to rel'ei\'e a report 011 th e si tuation ill PnlgUl~ hut also, and in deed more impo rtalltiy hy that stage. to impress on Dubee k th e absolute necessity of takin g immediate me,lsures to end "antisocial ist execsses." The whole pattern of d in.'d eOllllllnniciit ioll with th c Czechoslovak leade rshi p suggests that whi le th e frcquelJ(:y of such l'Un tacts increased as Ille crisis escalated, thc rolc of informa ti on ga th ering in such contacts decreased and W,IS supplan ted hy effort s to dUUl)!e the direeti OIl of the refo rm move ment. Tu rnillg IIOW to th e nex t infonmlt ion hypoth es is, there is evidence that contucts with states oth er than t hose directly invoked inc.·reased only marginally :IS th e crisis eSc
rh,
"' "
L t :A I}UIS .... :-.0 O EC1SIO:-'S
and Zaglad in in ~ I oscow in ll1i d~Jll ly ; inform ing the preside nt of the invasion." Although th e diplomatic elfort was aeeeicrated in the hi gh-stress periods, Phases Three and Five, th e tup Soviet lead ers. as far a.~ is known. did not increase the ir own in volvement in (.'{Jnlaets with foreign heads of state. The " Il.id .. , d C,..",,,,,.n. rl>e IJian .. of a Cabin
[m." 11",
.n·hi'·~'"
,,( 11,,·
356
CU:'IO(;LUS JUSS
hul lin e was no t lI SC{1. for example; and this inJ ie:llcs not unly tha i '\ lus{'Ow eonsiuc rcd t his tu be un Eastern rather than Ull Easl-\Vcst altllT, but also I ha t hy th e time of the invasion, Sovie t lead e rs wc re fa irly S
activit y
wa.~
never vc ry inteuse. The: perceived IIcc{1 and
{~JIl SC
qu e n! q uest lor infor mat ion lIhuu l development s in Czcdws\uvaki a, 011 th e other hand. was hi),( h from th e outs;'! bt"l"Ulse of the dis rupti o n uf traditional path:rns a nd sources. This need increased up 10 Jul y, b ut in Phase Three there was no inUk·atioll tll;lt Soviet leaders wa nted more informati on or Illlestillllcll th e Ilualit y of lh e in formal io n they were receiving. So me of the Icadcrs, nolab ly S uslm· and Ko sygin h ul also pussibly Bn:zhn e\', may hav c rema in cd receptive to new informatio n ane r that tim e and ge nu inely diu t hink that D ub<:'ek w01lld fi dflll the p rum ises th ey helieved he mauc at Cicrna. b ut such hopc was s hort·li ved. Finally, t he involvc m e nt of the top leaders in th e illfonmlt iun gathe ring ,ltllJ c"al·
uatio n
prtll'CSS
certainly did im:rease with the crisis. in terms of
bot h high-lc vel negotiations ami fact . findin g missiuns an d of writt e n and tele phon e eommunieatiun s w it h Dulx:ck a nd other leade rs. C O NSU I; rAT IO N Ti,e lite ntlure (~>nl'e r ning th e imp..ct of crisis un cunsu liati\'!: patter ns cun\;lins sevcr,d hYJloth eses that (.'",m be cxami nell wilh referelH:c III Sovie t involve m e nt in C ;wc hos lov'lki'l. These hypotheses ass ume th'lt the greater the ('risis and the st ress induced by it, the greate r will be (a) th e nll mhe r IIf person.' mill gro llps nmsu lte d ; (h) Ih e frequ ency with whidl th ese persons and gro ups are lVIl s uited; ami (c) th e telllieltey fur ('tmsultalioll II) be a{1 hue rather tha n ins tituti o nal. In addi t ioll. all exa miuatiou of the relation b.:tw een l'ris is a nd (~m s ultation Illust (~)Ilsidcr the mure gencral ,lilt! various reaso lts why any Soviet lemler e nters into (v nsilli nt ion. AI· e xun de r G eo rge , in hi s work en titl ed I're,I'ideutia/ Decision .makin g suggcsts four obje<:l ivcs tlt'll Ill" ), he ser ved hy t'Orlsulting in th e Am e rican system. ~' T hese objectives. in ,\ mndifl ed and e"p'lIlded " AI"",,,J,,, C,·o,,,,·. l'rc-,id
f),-'Cj ,j"" . ,,,,, k; ,,~ ( II" "I,~·"
C"h , II'''''''H;\('
d" l't~ r~_
''''
o::h
1',,,,•.
LEAVENS AN]) DECISIO ..... S
357
form , apply 'llso to the Sovit:'t sys tem and are exp ressed as I{)llows: (al to ohtain inlormation ,md advil'e to mcci th e I!XL'Clitive's ('Og nitive needs; (h) to seek reassurance and moral hackin~ to alleviate stress and meet the executive 's e motiunal needs for S~lpport; (c) to ind ut'e participation in th e decision-making pro(.'Css to meet th e cxc(.·uti vc·s need for L'OIlSCI1SlIS among tl, e consultati ve and llecisionmaking groups; (d) 10 olrer otile r elile grou ps ,Ill opportunity to express th eir opinions in order to Illcct cxpectations of (,(lIlsultation by th ese elites-that is, to legitimi?c 1ir..'C isioIl S; ,mil (e) lu use support from consultative groups in an 'Itte111 pt to fvrgc consensus within the ke y decisional unit. (G corge docs nut t'Onsider th e last pvint tv be a rea.~vn fur t'Onsu itatiun in th e United States.) \Vhat observations arise about th e IIYl)() theses from an e xamination of Soviet actions in 1968? The t hree major consultative groups whose activities were visible in 19G8 (tb", exduding tb e KC B and military intellige nce ) were the Centml Commillee and its lIl/liara/. the East Eu ropean leadership, and th e militar y. Eat'll g;mu p \\1"~ diffuse and d ivided in its responses In th e l'rague Spring. yet be cause the top part~' leadership did consult e at'll of th em as distin ct and d c l1nilhle groups. th e discussion of tb eir rol e will also assume th eir definitional (1)hesion, In the prc-eri ~ is period. tbe East European leaders and the party upp(!r(l/ were the must visible. A Central Comm illee pienulli was hurriedly called in April . necessitati ng Prime Minister Kosygin's precipitate re turn from a state visit to Iran . Press ure for this ple num carn e from those within the Central Cmnmillee ul)/!aml who worried ai)()ut th e spillover c fiects of the I'r..gue Spring, This group was supported by Comulka and Ulbricht, wbo e ve n at this stage tonk UpOIl themselves th e .-ighl tu itnp;lrt and impose th eir views. In the pre-crisis period, th erefore. the major reasons fur consultation appear to h,we IIcen the nt:t:d "r t h" e~el'\lt ive to gain consensus. the e xpectation lIy key h'1'OU PS that they \'1)lIld he eonsulied, and aho ;11' ;<1I1:mpl tu II.~C th e rcsulutious adupted at th e plenum (which Pllt idcological suhversion hy "revisionist, nat ionalist, and po liticall y imm;.ture clemen ts" at tl,e fowfwnl of Soviet ('Ollcem s) as a means uf f()rging CO II SC IISU S wi thin t he tvp decisionmaking circles. In the crisis period the military pbycd a very adh'c role Ootll as a consultative group and a pressllre grollp seekin g bo th tlliLneUVcrs in Czechoslovakia and the permanen t stationing of Soviet tn)()ps Oil th e borde r with the f e deralllqmblic. Data presented in chapter
ICh
!z
M
COXCLliSlO/I;S
II i1lustr;lted th e high level of participation of military leaders both ill " cg"ti,Lliolls Oil the C7.echosl"v,lk iSSUI: ;lnt! in th\:! public de hate o n th e eflc cts of th e re form mo"e ment. Kone" an d Yepish ev were among till: carl ies t "J" o(.'at es of mca,,, res tu "impruve C~.L'(: hos lo \·aki;l·s rdi;L bility ilS " me mbe r of th e War.~aw l'iI<:I." b ut so serio us was th e breakdown of hilateral relations on th e mi litary front by th e eml of Jul y tlmt it is doubtlill if any uf tIle ke>· military leallers co unsele d against in"as ion. On thc L'(mtrary, there is 'I uitc ovcrwhelm ing evidence not only that they fa\"orcd it hut that they act ively pressed filr it. Pnnom;ITt~" and K;Ltusltev arc said tu ha ve told ti ll: C7.cdll>slov'Lk deh:gat ion in BUliapcst in September ID6H that th is was th e t" L~e;" \llynM· gained th e same impression d uring the ~IOSI,{IW negotiations; '" and CCllrge Brown. thc lrlflnef Urit ish fure ign secretary, was told by high party sources in Yugosluvia il) August 1968 that th e Sovie t militar y in part icul ar ··were in earnest"· ahout inv"sio n. "" The /I)J ng;lrian ,unhassad lJr in Italy, in an inte rview with C. L. SulziJer.!!:er in Octobe r 1968. paintell an inte restin g pidure uf t he reasons fur invas ion in whidl th e military were t he Ilrivi ng lrITC(' behind th e (Iecisinll to invade. lie nw int,Lined th at mancuvcrs held in C;(.cchoslovukia in 1068 h"J <-'O,,,"i,u.,.-:,d th e So· ,·id I-l i!;h COlLulI;Lml that "the C7.(~(· hs just did not Im ve the fightin),: quality: · amI t hat the Soviet army, which, lIL'L,(l rding to Amlmssado r S7~L I1 , ··now Tlms th in.!!:s in ~ I OS(1lW, was determine{1 tu pIng th e ga tl," '" The p n :sti.!!:", of tlL C military was enlmneed b~· the e fiiei c ney of the invas ion and SIl ILsl:(lllent O(.'I." up;Lt ion. in marked co ntrast to th e pe rforn\;lll cc of th e Soviet emhassy and other olficials in c ha rge of imp lc ll1enl ing th e political side of the pbo. The role uf the Lnilitary was acknowledge{1 hy GrL'(:hko's preselLt·(! at the signing of th e .\Ioscow I'ru{o(:u\. th c first timl' he had heen included in any such t'e n: mony throughout Ih" whole t'rL,is, and ,Llso by Grcchko·s Ilifeci involvement in th e e"cnts of .\brch- April 191i9 which led to DulK.-ek's repl;LC'e mc nt by Hus,ik. Th is iLK·rense in the Ln ilitary's de<;is inn-maki ng rol c was also appare ntl y a suhjed of L1HJVersation in 1970 betwee n Greehko ;md Egypt's Prcside nt N,lsse r. a fn~ qll e llt vis itor hf:twcell 1%7 ;111(11970. Nasser bte r re<:ai!ed the llist"llssioll in aIL ill te rview. Hc ex pressed surprise at th e diffe rence of opin"T;~ri
J),,/>tt'k f"U. I'. In Xfjrhtj",,'- 1>[>. 2l~!. 2S7. '" r. ...·"i"c St"",I",,/. N,,,·~ ,,,l .. r 15. l~i>I . " C . I.. S"lfl"· ,~,·, , .1" .~~" .if .I/,·,/;".. ,;ry. 1'. ·r!;.; " ~ II )""M,
.,
l.I>AI)~:I\S
ANI)
llLC I SIO~S
35.9
ion between militarr and civilian leaders, l~J mmenting that this had nevcr been the case in his previous negotiations in ~ 1 ()Sl~)W. Creehko had replied that ··he was giving his own views. which were not necessarilr those of others:· He had had the freedom to cxprcss his views indcpendently since !Db8 when, he told Nasser, '·thc civilians had nol been ahle to mal);lgc the C7,cehs and had had to get him to do il. ·· ... The inAucncc of the other two uJllsultativc llil its was also greater in the l'risis period than in either prc-crisis or post-crisis periods; and on the wholc Iwither of thest! groups had {Iuite the inlluenee nn the decision 10 invade tllat the military di{1. Although the Ccntroll Committee as a rollective was not consulted after mid-Jul y, and the East European leaders did nut llleci en hloc with the ir Soviet counterparts after Bratislava, considcrahl(' ad hoc activity was evi{lent and increasing with the escalation of the l·risis. No formal Central COlllmittee ple num was l~mveru~d to HpproVt; ei tll{~r the Ciemll amI Bmlislava met;tings or the decision to invade. but there is cvidence (chapter 10) that :m ad hue gathering of ke>' party omdais was calle
w;-:.
;nlcn ';'w "ilh N. .. er in I9iO. llUhli.hcJ hy 1'/" Tim"•. Fd,,",,)' 1\1.
" ""
""
CONCLUS IO:"S
phase Three, J:inos K:idtir came In Mos(.'U\\·](lr 1ll,IjnT ncgoti,ltions between Ju ne 27 and July 4: ami Pudgorny took the oppurtuni ty uf Ulhricht's scn~ n t y- fifth h irthday to visil Easl Berlin hetween June 29 'IIlJ Ju ly 2. But h K,iu'lr ,Inti Ulbricht rCIll"incd :.et ive in prcssinA DullCCk an d t'Ommunil'ating wilh Soviet leaders right up to th e invasiu n, hut K,i(Lir's departure fmm ~ 1 ()Sl1)\\' on July.:l wa_~ the I;ls\ ]llIilliciy reported f,lL'e-to -lill'c bilateral puiiliL'ai L1>usul tati un he-
tweell
~ 1 0st'()w
and any uf the East European five
(l1lJllilCtS
be-
tween the Suviet and East European militar y leaders, however, inCTcas.:d sllilrply prior to tl u: ill\';)"ion). Almost (.-c rtainly the East European leaders. t ch""w' r"die:.lly thmugh""t the erisis, TI,.. li"'q''''ncy "I'
l'ol1sultat iuu was highest in the crisis periud. with the military in particular heL~uning very active anJ renw ining 'Idive in tIle postcrisis peri{xl. Then, was not (I Inajor shift tow;lf(l ;It! hoc l'Otls ultation witl, I lie eSt';llatiOIl of thl: LTisis; til<' Ce nt ral Committee plenlll11 and thc \Vanaw meeting of the live uceurred in the high-stress phase Three, not Phase Fi\'e. There was, l"lWe \'Cf, L'(:rtainly mure ad hoc than !~lTIllal l~msll lta tio n in phase I"i\'e, le;ul ing up to the invasion, with l'tllleelive eonsultalion among all the East Enropean leaders. reappear ing ill Ihe post-crisis PCl'i{KI. DEClS!O:\:AL FOHmt S Theft! (Ire three h"sit; ilSS 11!1l pi irl!)s aholl t th e ellcel of lTisis Oil
I'.,i~.·,
TIo,· " ,"-,-"" P,·r;,;"". 1'. 2li!. ot"
1\ 11,,),1; "",I .\)"u",b t_ G",,~,'. '-rlo.- 1,:11;" ·,, .of Sh, ·", "" the I"";"","",,,· " f I';"ci~" 11:>1~' )-'
\I.,l"...·· 1',~iI;rnl S, i...,",· ,\''''''''/ 6 11!175), 2.';6
!~1.
ICh
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M
"'I
LL'!.D EIIS AND IlEe lSIOSS
T he overw helmi ng im pression of research findings is that the Poli tbu ro remai ned t he in st it utional foclIs lilr all the ii)nwlI ami major decisions made on Cz('choslnvaki:L TIl(l party Se<:retarial may havc had a role in detcr mi ning the date and agenda of the April and July Cent r.ll Com mi ttee meeli n ~, which would part ially ex plain why Kosygin. who a.~ chairman of the Council of Ministers had no position in the party uurt"
repcrcussions of iIlVasior). discussed
;l(
thc cml.:ial
J uly 20-21 meeting that J.......·itled to pruceclI with invasion unless D ulx:ek met minimum demands; hut there is no firm evidence on Crumyko's role . Neit her is there clear evidel\{"e aho llt the role of other non-Politburo members havi ng functional responsih ility for mon itoriu!; even ts in l'rJglle or for oIlier aspects ofhil,lteral SovietC7.echoslovak rela tions. b ut the c"idellce tl()e~ ~uggcst the act ive involvemen t of Ponomarev (esll·...-ci:ll1y in the post-crisis period) and !lusako\' and Ka tushey (in thc prc-crisis pc riod part icularl y). There is no indication of Antlropo,,'s rolc, alt hough certainly his complete absence from al1 negotiations and his total silence in the public de· h,l te spcak significantly for his lack of iUI'olvemenl, particularly since his fu nctional responsibility anJ pas t expertise \\llUlJ havc given him a righ t to cnter t he debate. Certa inly there was all ill ller (.'orc withi n the Polithuro that acted both formal1y in the ml1lIU of the l'ulitburo in negotiat ions on Czechoslo"3kia and iniilrnmlly as a suhgro up wit h apparently sdfappoi nted respons ihility for the management of the crisis. The members hi p of IIlese two groups o\'erJappcd hut indudeJ Brezhncv, Kilsygi n, Podgorny, Snslnv , and Shc1est, wit h Suslov l es.~ openly active in the pre~risis period :lIld Shc1e.~ t absenl li'om ne-
ICh
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362
got ialions in Ibe posl.-(;risis perioll. This gruup was not full y (.~lh e sive al any stage of the crisis; Kosygin 3tH] SuslIJV wcre persistent advocates of caution. and Shele_~t an early and (.'Onsistenl source of inte rvention ist pressure. "Ioreover. Kosygin, although highl y active. was /.-'O llstantly t hreatened with exclusion from the in ncr j.(TOUp, and on three (x.'easiolls {al the beginuin g of April. while he was in Iran; at the end of "'lay, while in Karlovy Vary; and in midJuly wh ile in Sweden) he was indeed excluded from key decisions. Des pite misgivings of some members abou t the wisdom of invaSiOIl, it nevertheless appe,ln; t h,lt all P(llithllr(l memben; had acceptet] th e July 20 - 21 decis ion that invas ion "'oul
posed hy B re~'h e r: W] lal arc the effects of changing stress (a) on th e search for and evaluation of alternatives; ami {h} un th e perceived range of av" ihl blt: alternati\"(~s ? II is genemll y ,lssllmed that the ,c:reater the slress induced IIY 1I crisis, t he !,.'reatcr is th e tendency to retlu('"e t he number of altern:ltives under consideration . T his assumption is certainl y support ed hy Ihe flllding.~ related to Soviet behavior in 19r1B. The numher and nlllge of alternatives considered by some or all uf th e Soviet leaders throughollt the t' risis c,m be summarized as follows; l. There is 110 imlllinellt threat fmm CZl·dllJslo\"ak ia: therefore no need for acti()n.
2. Czcchoslovakia is experiencing tmnsitional prohlems: d ose monito rill~ is re(luin~d h ut no action is needed . .1. EeOllOmi(' aid lIIigh! :llk"i,,!.. :11,,1 1I0W t,,,"sing I'millem,. .J .
I"('~sllr('s
huilt III' "nder NO'"')tu)'
Political SIIP I""t ,hou ld he I'mvided for Dllb.-,.,k!o st,en)l;t hcn his p
5. Dialogue a1l(1 fra!ernal adviL-e are requirt,..1 bt.'i.·:Ulw l)ulJ{"Ck. !hough relhlble. is unlried and n,ak inK some mis takes. 6. U,,"ti"e military mHllc","'r< sh"uld go ahead ,IS 1'1a"llcd to j,n· pmve th e pe rformancc or Ihe CZL'i.·hoslu,"ak aTi ny. 7. 1'olitieJI pressurcs should he exerted 011 iJu l:>Cc k hoth through
hilateral ami multilateral neKntiations ,,,,d hy "",hili7.ing c<)1lscr,"ati,'c fuTt."Cs 00 which I,,: call rcl~' to p'c"':llt thc further gro"ih of :lIltisocialist eicillenb. 8. I< l ilitar~' m:l1leu\"crs should he cxp:u\{I~"(1 to tcst Ihe .::.pability ami rdin"i lity of the Czed",slovak arm r. wit h Ihe perm,.,ncnl stationing of S""ict tmop., th e ouku me of poor p,~ ,f() rm:"lce. 9.
EL~mornic sanctions should I,., applic.IIO prc,",:,,1 th,: ""favorah!.: wlnn n of t IH: C7.cch ,,~hl'·ak l><:~ nIlJllII' and !o remind the I'raJ/:\lc Iemlcn;hip of the ex te nl uf e,""''''11 i.: into 'gmt iu" inlo Ihc 1,1".;.
10. .\1 ilitary maflc u\"e rS shuuld be ",cd to ('<"lIpcl politica\ COlllplian ce. II.
~ I iii I:ITY mH'H.' UVcO sl"", It! he use,1 facto St:otiUll in): of t mOl'"
:IS
:0
~''''''r
h. :1<:l. i","., tI.e d"
12. COlll:lds wilh f"Tt."Cs "PIX'S"" In I) nhi.::k should lot: .:'p:lt\ded to ga"ge Iheir strength alld c;lpability (If fortll il'g an ,Ihana! iI'e kadership, withollt" Soviet invasiull hut pe rhaps with th e aid of Sovi\:! troops wim happen to he in C~cdmslo\"
f;,I1.sL~IIl'
S"";d invasion to suppnr!
14. An ;llva.lioll shOll Id he ""Ill ntl·" In ('<JllIlx·1 ! he (":ll' illl b! inn or the Oul>l:"C k !" .. ders hit) to all Sovid demands. is. Direct Suviet lIli!itaTl' rill<: should h,: eslablishetl (I"er Czcchoslovakia. Ol her (1 It ern,lt ives may (If L~)UrSt· have hcen L'ontemplate<1. The Duhee k leadership. for exampltJ, was determined not to leave Czechoslovak territory after JlI l~' hCC"J ll.~e they feared they might be lIrrested IIr kidnapped hy Suviet authorit ies, as had happe ned 1I dec'lde r>reV i "\l51~' in l·hlll J!::lr r . S011lC Czcch leade rs also hdievcd t hat one (I ltern;lUve L'(ln.~illere<;1 in ~ I oseow was a repetition of Hifler's stmtcgr: d irect ru le of the \J nnlly Czechs an d nil independent st(lte for th e lIIore L"011Iplian! and luyal Slovaks. Nn e"ide m.:e has L'O llle to light suggesting th a t eithe r (I f tlle se alte rnatives \\"l15 (."Qllsidcred. It mu st he s~id. however. that had a rel-olulionary tri 11lLnai he,tde<;1 hy ItHlnt indeed heen estahlhlwd to "try" reformist leade rs, it is no t at all clca r w hat t he ul ti mat e fate of iJubee k and th e uthers woul d h,we heen. In examinin g til e alt e rnativcs ums idcrf'd. alternati ves I thTtlugh
3&1
1.:U:':Cl.. US JU:':S
6 were must prevalent in the pre-crisis period, althuut:h
uy the end
orlha! pe ri od alternatives 7 ,md H had also hee n :[(lople
we re unde r considcr.llion; and V; l gUC rcfcrcrl!::cs to mutu;l1 broth· e rl y (lid and militar y assistanc:c were hc~innin g to he maul'. In th e early crisis period. the range of a ltc rnath'cs W~IS at its \\id cst with all the optiuns, c.\dmlill).!; num bers I. \." and 15, umlcr l'ullsi{leratinn . By Ju ly, with th e rcfwml of lJuheck 10
meeting. th e heightening of tensions folluwing the publicatiull uf the "2,O()() \Vnrd s:' and th e Soviet uouwitiuirawal of troops, th e
range of options narrowed greatl y In incl ude only numbers 7. 10, II. 12. \VhelL howe"er, the Soviets agreed to wHlldnlw their reIlwinin)!; t1"lJUp~ from CzedlOsluvakia in return I'lr Dubeek's ,1);reeme nt to hold hilateral talks at Ci<'rna, t he alternatives narmwc{1 to only two- numbc rs 7
IGh
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l.t:ALJ ElIS AI'/)
365
D ~:ClSIO:-OS
appears to Ilavc hccn awa re of the 5eriuU 5UC.~S of Sovie t intc utiol1s ill mid-Jul y, the d eescalation of t he ('fisis in early August may in fact have eont riuuted to the lack of Ilrgef)ey and (:ollvictioll with which Dulx-ck set :Ihout curhing tIll: rdilrlll 1l1<)\'cmcnt , the reby predpitatin),; the invasion, The mhturc of the strategies of force 'llld (;omp romi5c aduptcd b~' ~ I os('(}w may, therefore, ha ve inadverte ntl y made li n ultimate invas ion more lih:ly. The sccond ohservation reiat('s to Ilrczl111Cv's styl(' of lead ership. Th roughout the crisis, al least un lil the invasion, S rezhnev slayet\ al Ihe cente r of the dOll1irwnl opinion-whether that was for or alYlinst invasiOll, II (~ rdl ccted lIlt· comensus nit he r tha n s!llIped it, and he al!owed the innt'r gro up tu t~m tain the major ad\'ucates uf ('t)ntending views, willi Shclesl's partidpal iun ill Ihe innel' core eclipsed only in thl: ]lost-crisis per iod, "Ii) the extcnt thai pour and ('(mtradidury Soviet signaling was une of the ma n)' rea· sons for the Czedlo.dovak failure to appn:d:lte t hc seriOllsncss of the sihlatio n, Brezh nev's own style of leallership ean be held par· tia ll y responsi ble. finally, docs the explanation fnr l~ lIllradictory signals go beyond Bredmev's style of leadersh ip and the ge nuine d i(ferenl'C5 of opinion be tween Sovicl leaders over tIle reform I)lOVClllcnt? Did the political strengths, reSOllf('CS, l}t)silions, and amiJitiolls of individuallcaders shape and ultirn:l tdr dete rmi ne the d('Cisioll to invade? Is it possible, to cite the view of some CzedHlslo"ak leallers, that C".cdloslo",lkia was invaded not so 11l1l('h bt"Callsc of the rt:fuf!11 movcme nt hu t hecau5e Brezlllley \\115 t hrea tencd by Shclcpin or some ut ill!T lemle r with disliliss,11 if he tl ill not agree to invade? The relationship between po wer and polie)' is of constant (~mecrn to Soviet spe('ialists, ,1I1d of ('Ourse it is true thilt the process ofhu ilding tIlt) eOl1.~e Il S11S tu invade was polit k aI in t hat it was (~)lJnected with many other i ~s ues and poli('ies, The contcxt was also political insofar as part idpat ioll in dedsiollS was ofie ll denied for appare ntl y pulitieal rathe r t han functional reasons. The exdllsion of KosygiTL in particular, had political oVertones; and Brezhnev's ,Ltte1llpt~ to di lil inish Kns ygin's influcnce ill a number of ot her arcas during 1968 adds credence to the argumcnl that the noninterven tionists carried less weigh t hecallse of Kosygin's dedining fortun es . nut givI!1I Ihe trcuH:ndolis inllll(1)ce of Smluv, if t he I.vllsti( uCIICY for noninter\'ell tion had hee n wider and events in Czcchoslovakill itsclflmd hee )) manage{1wit ll grealer realism and fin esse h y Dulx:e k and other Cl.cehoslovak leaden, an interventio n lIliJ!ht pe rh aps
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366
CO~Cl. U S[O:'S
have hee n avoided. In the Ilnal analysis. however. one must be skeplieai about tilt: effect uf political infig hti ng on the decisi un to invade b ecau se ufthc almost complete ahsence of ne gative po liti(."'!! repe rcussiuns fur the upporumts of the in vasion. TI IC membership
of the Polithuro in the Soviet Union and parly leadership in 1~(L~t e rn Europe were vcry _~tab l c in th e years folluwilll,: the invasion; and wh en dlmlOtion s we re c\'c ntu ully lUmUUnCL-tl, althe top of t he list were t hose who had bee n the most vociferous advocates of iuva-
sinn-Shdes! in th e Ukraine, Comulka in Pohmd, and Ulbricht in E'Lst Gc nmmy.
CHAPTEH FI FTEE N
1968 and After: The Costs and Consequences of Invasion
THE
AFTER~tATH
OF THE I NVASION IN PHAG UE
\Vh e n Alexander Dubtek and th e other members of the Czechoslovak del egation return ed fronl "Iusco\\'. th eir persunal status ;mu the status of their country was most undear. I'i)r the lIext e ight months, they "~mld explore the extent of th eir indepe nde nce and test Soviet resolve to prevent a rdurn 10 t he status {tUU anle. The population a\ I~.rge, l1\ud\ rdic \'c(l that the 1"t(:I',\ell C?f:dlOsluva.k leade rs had been restored to Iheir fonner positions, gradually return ed to work and refrained from mass resistance, th c rehy allowing the occu pying troops 10 withdraw partially frOln urhan enclaves. In general. the situat ion returlll_"
368
COSCLUSIO:-;S
CPCz PracsiJium we re constantLy ncgoli:tt ing with Soviet lead ers and e nvoys. Ambassador Chcrvo ne nku was onmiprcscnl; First Deputy Foreign '\ Iinistcr Km.nelsov was in Prague JIlTing Septe mher; Dubeck was summoned to MOSl'OW in Odober. to \Varsaw in Nuvemher. and tu Ki ev in Dcn: mhc r; amI C I'SU SC(Tctar y Kalll-
she" was in Praplc for two weeks at the end oftlw year. The n egotiatioll s ccn tcr(.'{] on two su bjec ts, th e imple men ta ti on of t!w 1\los(1)w Protoco1 amI Ihe sl atus of Sovie t forces in C:r.cchoslo"'Ikin. The Soviets, supported by COllscr\,ul il'cs wi thin the Czc('hoslovak leadershi p, put IIllTdcnti ng: prc.~Sllrt- Oil Duh6:k to uphold
without exception all the provisions of the '\\oscnw Proto(t)L At the same ti me, in retll rn for a partial wit hdrawa l uf occupying forces (par tiCll larly th e ~~mli"gent s of t l,e Eas t European iL rmi es), the CWdlOslovaks were forced to sign a treaty allowing the pennanent stati'lIling of Soviet trooJls. The treaty did not specify an y uppe r li mi t to the nLlmher of tr(J(}ps t hat wOlild he station ed, >lnd although it stated thai troops would rcmain on Czceh soil only " temponlrily lor the pllf]}()se of S:lfcgllilrdi ng t he security of the countries of Ihe soeialist commonwealth against the mOllnting ,."v""",!>i<1 amh itio ns of \Ve_
no mClllion of a timdnbl e or co nd itions ulJ(\(:r wbicb tllOSC [on.:cs wO llld be withdrawn. Moreover, unlike th e treaties governing the stilt ioning " f Sovid t ftl()PS in Pol iI" t! ""d Il ung"r~', this t rt:at y lit;tween th e US SH illl" Czcchoslov,lkia (,IS with th e treatv between th c USSIl and thc GDB) ,lid not req ui rc Soviet ">Tl'CS to seck till' permissioll o f the h ost l;ove fnllle n t in ord':f to l1lo\'e its troops anywhere in tl, t: '-~H!!L tr y. T ILt:y ,-"uld III m 'c b11 till: d ire d o rd ers of .\1" s~·uw ,]'o,,!d th e " ccd ari se. And it wa.s p redsely thi s threat that was lLsed by the Soviet Union in tho:m ids t nf th e cris is tbat Imlkc <Jut ill April J\}(j9. Th e crisis was provoked by t he mass riots and derllo!lstmti ons Jiwcto:-d a)!aill st SOl'i!:! proller ! ~' and installa tio ns in I'r.l)!ue fu ll owing C:wdlOslo\'akia's victory ove r tb e Hllss ialls ill a" iec lux--key final held in Stockholm Oil .\ Iarl'h 28. SOI';t:t lead ... rs had ohv;ollsly been !!wwill)! ill l'reasill)!ly dissatisfi e d with DulX:'Ck's 1l.'f ,I", "'''01]" ~'"""ing .1,.. i ",-~,;o" "'" ,,",t,,;o,,1 m F". t II. t:i,!lin_ lllr I~'~;" "I · ,\·o",,,,li'dli,,,, - ; Cal,a (;"h .. . n,j,,,m nltl, in (;,,,,,/0"'/"1'0 " ;" . II, (~,,<~, .. S l ,l l ll'~ . C,rc/",' . Iv,:"kl,,' I .. "·,,·,,r""'/ 11.-, ·..1",;,,",. 1"""'1 -]';" ", 1. II'/,y 1),,/ ... ,·( F,·II . \/;,·10", Ta'" , 1:1,1'-'<,,;, 'mp,,", i/./r . •,,," \'I."I"nlr \ : 10:".;,,_ fr-" ", f)"/K"k I" (; /""". ,- ii.
369 and were ]I)()king for a pretext to replace him with someone more am c nabl t: to Mus(.'(}w's aims. AL'{:urdingly, following the riot s, the Soviet de put y foreign m inister, Vladimir S. Scmyunov, ulI{llhe defense minister, ~Iarshal Grechko, new 10 Prague (~IrI)'ing an ul-
timatum from Brezhnev dlmumding II rgent political dmnges if a seL'Ond military inlerventiOli wc re 10 he averted . This occurred on Marth 31. 1969, and in the next two weeks, under the direct supervision of G rcchko. Scmyollov. and AmlmssaduT Chcrvullcnko, Dubcck's replacemen t by Gustav Husak was engineered. Beginning with the .o\prill7 CClltr;l] Committee plenum, whkh elected Husak to the position of first secre ta ry. th e Soviets gained a much firm er grip on the situation in Prague. Li herals were gradually excl udt:d from all pusitiolls of inllucnce, eensorship was ri gidl y reimposed, an d all talk of economic or IJolitiea! reform ceased, Nurmali7.atiun has been defined by Vladimir Kn sin as the " restor;lt ion of authoritari~nism in conditions of a post-intcrventionist lack of indigeuuus legitimacy, l'arried uut under tim close super vision of a do mi nan t foreign puwer whidl retaincd t he prerogatin: of supreme arbitration and inte rpretation hut which preferred to work through its domestic agents ,'" It took MOSl'OW and its supporters in Pmgue well over a year 10 rcaeh th is stage: but by the summe r of 1969, acCtlrding to this dellnition, the situation in J'rague was well on its way toward "norm ..li7.a!ion," Soviet-style.
WIDEn CONSEQUENCES
O ~:
THE INVAS ION
Although the e nt ry of I'act troop s into Czechoslovakia did nut ph ysil'ailyall'e<-t th e populations of other l'ountries, its repercussions inside ,md outside the USS I~ in IxJlh East ami \Vest were e norm ous. or course one must not eo nclude that everythi ng that Ol'l'urred ..ftef the ill v;tsi un happened beo.:"llse of tile invasio n-pust Iwe ergo procter Iwc. There we re wide-ranging discllssions, divis ions, and debates before the invas ion , and m,ln y of t l'ese con I in u.,d ali erward. Neve rth eless, on a ",Iwlc ra nge III' issnes, I he invasion crys· tallized opinion and scI the seal on policies pursued by, and tow;\rd, the Suviet Union . \Vithin th e Soviet Union, th e primary elfeel of the in vasion was the setting of rigid par.uneters for rcform and revisioll. The more unyielding attitude toward dissent had already hec n signaled by ' 1.:"';", Fm,,, f)"btd,,, C/w,,,,, ;;, p. J.l5.
" ""
370
CO~CLUSlO~S
thc Brezhncv leaders hi p well before the Praguc Spring with the arrt:_~ t :md trial of Cinzlmrg alld Galanskov and the ce1Horsh ip of Solzhen itsyn. The dehatc within th e elite itst:\f on the possihle exten t of t he pol it iml and enOllnllli<: reform "f t he Soviel syslcm had h~' no m eans heen .Iecided hefore the inya.~ion. Any talk of suhsl,mtial politic;l1 chall ~c in the di r e{."\ ion ofliber.llizalion was firml y emle.1 by the invasion , whe n "revisionism" in an y lorm was C II shri ne d as a danger equal 10 ·'dog matism."' And in th e realm of eeoIlOlllic rdorm , ': I'(JIl Ihuu gh KlIsygin loimsdf had championed tIle 1;lll ih:d emlillioll ofl lu;, Soviet c(!nlmlly planned economy as ear l~' as H)6.5. th e Praglle Silring, which was IIsed hy detractors of Kn_~yg in's et"()n omic reform ;IS proof of the negative political t"()nseIjlle nces of c"Hlnmic dt."{.·entr,dization, e nd ed all chan ces of et~J nomic rdorm in the USSH durin g Brezlme\"s tenure. ' This was due hotll 10 t lie real ft:ar of a repet;t ion of t he Pl"llgue Spring in thc Sovid Union and to th e fi'rtlu: r loss of politi.::l1 inl1ucnce wllieh Kosy!-;in hi mself sufferL'tl after the inv,\sion. In Eastern ElIW]lt·, tilt! fe]ltm:ussions of the invasion vllri" d_ Undouhted ly it cast ilunivenlll shalhm' over all dchiltcs un political rdi, rm, 1",( I... yo ud Illnl. II,,; l"~soll s 1,,,,rm·,1 depende.1 very mlld, Oil illdi vidual East Euwpe,nl leade rs' peTL"{!ptions ofthe reasons l'or th" invlIsioll. The H UllgariHns, wlto ltad introduced tlteir IIwn wideranging hut pnrely ec:.1mOlll ic reforms in J an\lar~' 1008, decide.1 t hat til,: invasion was no t fiwant II> tbreakll Iflllse refi,r m s. and Ih ey eOll tillll"d to illlpll'lllent Illt'fl). HllIllania and Yu gos lavia felt thai the Soviet dedsion to invade lwd b"I' n inllu"lll"Cd hy tv.-\> k(:~' fat:lor~: II,,: ;llmost ce r lain knowledgc that th e ri sk of Western mil it:lry t~,u nte radion against the Soviet [,loc· was negligi\)I(:; ;111(1 th e (·a!t·u l"tion Ih:lt CI,e L"ilOslo\'"k milit"ry ami d\'il rcsisl:tll<"t." would he' ntinim;(1 a1l<1 (~)\ lld I... t~>II tained, The Yu gos lavs in par ticula r condlld ed that the USSIl would 1I0t havc ill\'mled h;ul t he risk of ;In East-\\'es t t. mfrontaliu n heell hi).!he r: and as a result the~' sOll.l!:ht to dd cr llny simililr thrcat to ' 11.- ;"'1'. '" ,.rC"~· I,,, ,~,,- .~ ,·,... .. h "n , ....,," " "' ...... of".", jn ,),,' s", ·~·, Unj"" ."d ,·1,,·, j" tI", hh, h 0" 11,,· I, ,, ,, ,of Ik·""".,1 "'Ik"i,' ''''' II)" wt"ddm i'T/. II,,, ,.
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J71 th eir own cOllnt ry hy oht;lillillg ami puhlieizing: :\lIlerican ~'~c\l rit y gua rant~~s, which Bclgratl., inte r preted as prvof thai I II(' Ull ileu S\'lk~ ",o uld ." ,;,tl all· tn glohal cOIl1'rulI\"l i01' if Yug()slav ia 11'1',-,: ever in vaded .' The Humn nians aLso followed sud, a !)(>Iiey, mllt-h aide d by I'resid,:nt J<)llIlsnll·.~ "'"ruillg tn \losl'ow ,lllI'l" th., in vasi()n of Cwdmslovnkia that a" y simil,lr pressure 011 l\ um,lll i" II,renlened tv un leas h " the Jogs of war,'" Til e Hu m;miall P()Pul; llioll W'l.~ Pllt o n n;lliOlHll
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assistan l'C wit h the famous ph rase " E lo vas he Jelo!" (This is your aIElir)- could ecllO throughout £astcrn Europe an d te mpt COil tenders for power in th eir own l'Ountries, Although the invasion l'C rtainly did reassert Soviet l'Ontrol over the East Europea n ti D mcnklaillrll, it {lid no t s i gnif~' unend ing SO"iet commitment to e ither CO!llulka or Ulbrich t personally. The form er \\~l.~ replaced hy Edward Gierek alie f riots in Polmul in Decemher 1970, and t he latter was cased out h y ~~rik I-\on eekcr the foliowi ng spring as a n:mlt of his continucli obstruction of OSipolitik. Of the East EurnPC,lU lead ers whose troops were ill\'Ulvt:d in th e invasion, ollly 1\:,\lJ.ir and Zhivkov survived th e p(. liticai tur moil produced after the invasioll , and indeed Kad,\.r c njoyell unusual support and proteelion in ~·I ()SL~JW. despite his L,mtin u,ll e ffiJr ts throu ghout I8G8 to pleali for moderat ion there.' The only othe r direct effecl on I~as t e rn Eu rnpe of the Soviet invasion was in Albania, where th e rc~irn c, iOJl~ estnLll~eJ frn m th e Soviet Union , fi nall y deciclelilo wi th dnLw from th e \Varsaw Pact. The ,Ll1innce hetween Tirana and Peking was subs equ en tl y furth e r secured. 0 " ,) of Mikha il SlIsl"v's 1l1'Ljor pre'''''e ullalions in ]!)()8 h:l(l heen tn l111lstruet :1 united front to isolate Chinese ··uugmatism." As a n:su lt of th e in v,lsioll , th e fmnt was more diin cliit to forge. ,md thl) Chinesl) became even more intransigent and assertive , Ap,L rt from i .~sui n g the stro lL ~es t l~md em na t i(l n of tlds "ahominahle {Time" perpetrated by th e "clique of SO\'iet revisionist rCllegades,'" the invasion sparked o1f two oth er devclopme nts that f, Ir t he r damagl)d Sino-Soviet relatiuns. Onc was I'eking's co nclusion t haI the USSH h'Ldliegeneratell in to:. shItI.' uf"sue ial-ilu!ll)rialis lIl and S{)(" ial fasd sm "" 1:'111<11 tn. ,md in fact in (xlU usi on with . U.S. imJl(~rialis l1l. · Pcki n!{ accused both Sllpl)rpowcrs of pur.\U ilL ~ ,p h eTt~s of i"lluencc polides tha t ruthl essly SlI pprt:sscd th e L~)mm()n aspirations fur ml, ~i" rL"' Io~, ... ,1)",", ,.( Ih,· cH, ..... "f ll..-- ;" ' -. ,;"" ,~, Ih. , ron·. ,,~' Fnl,. E""a. h. I"u,""· rimw/;"", ~pcuri'~ h'I'I~" 10."" . ··S", id II "~""~H' Y in E",It', n 10""'1"': 1'". 2 Ifi _·ll : I." W"pl,·",I ..1. " J~,h,1o 1,,-,];,; ,·, "",1110 .. C,-,~'I""I""ak C,; , ;, '" n_;8" ~ I ..t,·;" en " " . "C> ..d,,"lo, .. ~i,, _ IllhrK'hl ",,,I the (;. ,,""" Pwhl.", ," 1'1', 1- 7, I'kl",I", Willi .. " !I.·,h,·II . G""",11". 1/1 . r"/,,",, "'''/ II;, C"",,,,,,,,I<,,, : .. ",l ~ I. 10: _ n ",,, ,,,,,,,,"~; ' TIl. c"", _
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373 tionallibcralion ; and Soviet ;tdiun~ in C,-cdms1ovakia were CCjUi\led with American policies in Southeast Asia. Another dired lievc\opment of th e invasion was th e escalation of te nsion s alon).:; 'he Sino-Soviet fronti e r, with Cilina making tIll; first formal diplomatic protest 10 Moscow over uonlcr disturbances at this time. These
tellsions escalated into;\ major skir mish hetween Sovie t and Chinc.~C border guards in March 1969 "II Clum -rmo Island in th e Ussuri Hi ver. Chinese propagandists suhsequently equated their own efforts In l~lIItain So vie t military incursio ns with Ihe "muragcous
stmggle of the Czcc\lUs]uvak people who strongly oppuse the mili· tary ()(.'Cup;ltiun by Suviet revisiunist social.imperialism ... .. Thus
lessons d rawn h)' Pe king rro lll the Soviet ill\'lIsiun of CzedlUsluvakia nol only added to the almost complete brcahlown of relations ootweell the two t{)unt ri es, hut also engendered additional fear s in Peking of '-loscow's capahilities and intentions, :\s such, the invasion was an important stepping slone toward Ch inese i\(,"(.'cpt:mee of the not iOIl that an entente with "t Ilt: enemy uf yo nr ene my"- namcly, th e Uni ted S tates - \\'a,~ the hest guarantee of Chinese security against Hussiall expansionism. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was, of eonrse, bnt one episode in th e long and C()lllpliC!J. " ,\"ru· rork 1";",~•. :-;",·,·ml,..r ll . 1!16S.
374
(;U:-; CI. USIO ,-: S
··n~duced
the !Let threat" to Europe from Ihe \V:trsaw Pad , sim:e the reliability and 10Y;lhy of th e Czechoslovak army and population had been damaged," In th e polit ical .~p he re. of course. any hope of sUIXess for the \Vcslcrn policy of bridge hUildillg in Easlern Europe wa.~ das hed by th e invasion. But that {lid nut e.xcl tt de th e possihility of hridge building to fI.'l oscow. The in vasion adcd as a kind of tabula rasa ul}(}n wh ich Ostpolitik and dCtente- Soviet-style- eould he written. It succeed ed. where the 19fi7 Karlnv}' Vary C onfe re nce hlld fa i1(:d, in making it d ear to Ea.~t and \Vest alike that any bridges th at m ighl be built across di vided En ru pe wou ld have tn pass through Moscow. By interpreting th e Soviet action as an att e mpt not un ly tu stamp uut dum est ic r efurm in Prague but alsu to regain (:onl rol ()VeT hl oc exte rn al policy, it is possihl(: to eliminate much of the contradiction between the act of in vasion and th e SUbSe(IUent promot io n of East-\Vest co ntads. Ahhough Easl-\Vest relatiu ns were adversely affl'c tpd initially, by Ihe Ilrst anniversllry of t he invas ion ne~o tiat i on s were pnx:ceding Ojpa('t:! om:c again on tlte German qu es tion, nuclea r nonproliferation . strategic arms lim italio n. und " E\lropeun security (.~",fcren cc- all of whid\ ho re fruit in th e first ha lfoft he 1970s,u l' rogress in Eas t-'Vest relat ions wa.~ made not only in the shadow ca.~ t hy tl1l: rcassl~r ti ort ufS<)l'ic t h c~':rno t1 y in E'l.~l ern E uro\ll~. but also as a di rect f('sttlt of recognition by the \Ves t of that hegemony. T he rela tio ns hip \\';\s enshrincd in Ihe 50-<:".Il1ed '·Sonnenfe illt doctrine" pursued by th e Nixon adln inistra tioll ami eSI}(}Us.!d. olfth e record. by Secretary of SI;lIe HelHy Kissingcr·s chief advisor on Soviet policy, Helm ut Sonnen feldt , ill 1975. " The dod rine 'lcknowl_ edged that th e ennmnlgement of greater "organ ic unity" between E'ISt E urope and ,\:IOS(1)W, by inl'Teasing slahilit y in Cenlral EIlml)C , was actu all y in America's stmtcgic interest. Of ('Ou rsc, Ihe ad vc nt of Presi den l Jimm y Carler's adrninistr.J.t ion. wil lt its urn \l hasi.~ o n Ju ullan righ ts. pu t illl .:nd 10 thi.~ policy ilnd sci Iht: p al'C for a mueh more aetive U,S. interest in internal transformatio n in Eastern Eu rupe. This irth:res t nm linued inlo the Beagan years, 'I.S U
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Aplil6. 1\I';{i.
375
1!)68 A:-':O ....,UI
evidenced hy the support givcn to S"liditrily in Polalld aRer 1980. But however short-lived, the early and major successes of detente were ba~ed on \Vashington's iK"celltance of Sovie t power in Eastern Europe and Soviet troops in Prague.
nil:: INVASION. IDEOLOGY. ANI) Tin: INTEHNATIONAL CO\-\:\IUNIST MOVE~IENT Surveying the international s<."cnc, onc (."Olild com·Judc that the Soviet intefvention did not in(.·ur great Of C\'en substantial L"Osts to Moscow. Occurring at iI time whcn Sino-Soviet relations were already at their lowcst ehb and u. s. power, {lnlill(,d of its essential will and life hlood in Vietnam, couj{) not chilllenge Soviet strength, the invasion reversed no trends, impL-tlcd vcry few, and even facilitated others. In one area only is it IKlssihle to say thai the invasioll perhaps threatened to reverse a trend. and this was in the international Communist movement, which prior to the I'ra)!ue Spring had witnessc(1 a llllmhcr of S"viet su(.~·csscs in furging a hroad un ited front against the Chinese. ARer the hll'asiOIl, which \\"d.~ condemned by all the leading nunruling Com munist parties (with
the
e~cepti()n
of those of
We~ t C(~r11lallY.
Luxemhourg, Greeee,
and Portugal- the last heing in exile in Moscow at that time ), Soviet hope.~ for L"Olwening an intermtliunul Commun ist L~l!lfer", n ce in Nm'elllh(:r wef(~ dashed. Soviet theorct ichl!ls previously on the uffensive against Chinese dugmatism were nuw on the defensive, fe ebly trying to justify tile invasiun in ideulugical terms a(."(.'C ptablc to the internatiunal Communist movement. At the core of the dispute was the new meaning the invasion gave tu the terms "proletarian internatiunalism" and "sovereignty."' l\losl'oW was forced to respond to sustained criticism from wi thin the mO~'ement to the effect that proletarian illternationalism nmld ncver n:place nooi!lterferen L~: and equ;tlity ilS guidillg prinL"iples of relations bdweell Communist parties (a view particularly espuused hy Lnigi Longo). "' Fidd Castru. wllO suppo rted tIle iuvasion fm m a purely politit".I1 point of viL'w, nevcrtheless attack(.-tl MuS(."Ow fur trying to L"Onstruct it thl..'"Oreticill or legill justification. Spe;tki ng on the i SS\H~ ufwhethe r or not Czechoslo\'akia's so\'ereignt y had been . It had violated. he dedared that "the violation was flagmnt. " [,·Un;,". Sepre,nh.,. II. 1!l6!:l. AI .... " .... J.: ••••j" Il.·.·lin . '11", Nc...· C,i .i> in (;"",,,,,,n;,,,,. - 1'1" 57 _ 6\1
"'"''p':'''
3 76
absol utel y no t onc appearan('e orlegali ty."'· ln the same sJleeeh lie dis lllissc,1 th e uns igned alllwal hy C7.L",:huslova k party ,lI ld guvt:rn ment offic ials as 11 "fi g leaf. " say ing "1 do not thi nk th at th e appeal by hi gh -ra nkin g pe rsons L~m ld he a just ification bet'ause the justi fi Ciltion call onir he th e po li ti cal fllct in itsdf-- tlwt Czedloslovak ia was m archin ~ toward a co u nte rre \'o lutionary situati on." " In S]lcd th e not ion tl lal socialism • AJ'J,,",""NU of .II"},,, f ;,M C",/n' flu: . '- Ibid. ~ Sa"ti.I~" c."H h,. f:,,'f""""""'''''''' ~ rm["(I".
Sq.temb", 16.
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,md sovere ignt" were nut hein).!: l-"Untrasted, lIather, as une au thor sta\t;d, th e Illliltling of so(:iali,;m \\',IS n " hi ghr: r sovere ign right of th e jN:OPJcs" tlHln fornHiI defens e of the ahstnict rights ora so\'er' d J;n sta\t:. As such. ",ll-'(,: U s,ltiun~ of a 'violaIiOlI' of CZCdlOslovak so\'ereignty" were both <\vi tllllut ';1Ih.,tallee" Hnd ba~ ed O il "an ahsolutd~· abstract understanding llnd inte rpreHlti oll of th e mean ing of sovereignt~; nn an illte rprdatioll which is lindted to f"rlllal logic."'" Aho at tll<:~ cente r of the SlIviet ideologists' att e mpts to deHI."Ct tTilicism from th e int ernational Com munist movement was th e debatc over the " mcanin,l!: in lifc" ofp ro!elarian internationalism. [ t will he rem e mhe red thHI thi s terlll n>pLtct:d "mminlcrf,'Tcnct." as a cardinal pri ncipl e gO\'t~ rn i n g inte r-Comlllunist rebtion s ve ry e;lri)' in t he Czt~dJt)slo\'al.: crisis, hut it was not until th e invasion thai the te rm Ul u"ed from th e rC and the reby \0 salvage tlH' plali lled illte rnathllwl COllimunist t.~mft; rCIl{;r: , In "\Ct, thi s wa_, at;hi e\'cd th mugh patient and wcll-tlirt~de,1 .. mu,ts hy 5nslol' :1Ilt! PllIlI,marc\': and the t;ollferellce u ltima td y L"])I',~ u cd in l\loscow on JIIII .. ,,), 1H6H. The SCI','utye igh t parties that att endl'tl re solved to strive li)r gre:lter ullity allti to o\'t~ rlo{)1.: diHe nmces 011 "puiul s uf dctail"- namd)' Czt>dmslu"akia and Ih,' Sino-Soviet t'onll id . Tlle r/: w,'re wide-ranging :lnd ope n d e ha tes, sllI nmari z..d in t h" pages of I'm edll, ni t i<:al "fS,l\'ie t p{)licy toward hoth Pragnc and Pe kin g: but Brcz hncl', too, was ahl e to use th e I(,rum to de m:lnd a resolute light :ll.(a illsl hoth "revision" A. Sm-," ' ''' . .. S<J,· ... " w nnp _\l ": h ,/,""' n~!Jlay"
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M
378
C ()~CLUS I ():\S
ism amI uPl>ortun is m whctlll'T of th e ri ght or uf the lcli _" " It W,l~ Cnlll ll!ka ami U]hridl! whu ad\!d as tl U! kllclu:t men Ii'T th e ill vasi nn of Czcd\{)s1u"akia. t hcn:hy ;Iflowing '\ 1 ()'>l~ )W to n ;collstrll d a basis for lIlJit ~'. Following th e t:(lllfcrcncc, t he uulhllTsts a m llng the Euru·Com mu nist parties against · ·n or mali~..at i on" in I' rJ~u(~ uecrt.',lscd , pllrticu lll ri y after le,tlling uppo ne nt s of th e in vasion were ~'.~pcll cd from th e Aust ri an nml Frc m:h C ummunist Jl;lrties (Ernst Fisc hl:r amI Huge r Camudy). Nevertheless, Ellro·Communist uhjection s ttl ir\(.~lrpor"til\g tIll' Suvid IleHnitioll of prolt:tari,1I1 ill ie rnatiollnl· ism intu the Communist lcxiL'Ull continued. with the dlallcngc cul m i lI aU 11),( at 11 Ie A 11- E urop eall Cunfcrcm:e o f C01l111l UIllst Part les III Be rl in in J une 1976. The C~ lItHlHlIIi( llI{; nlOst sign ifi cantl y contained nu rde re nt"'" 10 prulcl;lri;ln inte r nation"lism, rde rri ng Ins tc;.d tn "1I1 utu al solid ari ty among wo rking pe{lple~ of all n'"ntri es .·· " It insis ted on th e slrid inde pendence of c;lch Comm uni st purty an d on n un inlc rfl:n:nec in th e ink m al af!;\irs or an y onc !l;lrl y by an· (lth(~r. Eight ye(lrS aft e r the invas ion of C ~.echos10\';lkhl . therefore. ~ I osc~)w had slIc'Cecded io rceslablish in~ the sulit.laril~; if nut the lin i\ y. of \ 1m in!ern"lional Co m t11" n i.' \ mOH '''''' '' I I,), pa! ic,,! .. IJi>r!s (primari1 v Suslov's) to stre ss c"t.lmmon inte rests rathe r than Jilfcr· e nces. Th is mean t in th e end dropp ing a ny hope s t it a t thl: E nrn· Communists would at'Cept the Soviet notions of limited sover· eignl y lUul prnletarbu iu le rt Hltio u;,lism or an)' other theore tkal jllstilicarty not alread y in powe r. EUH)·Commllll ists who attackC(1 th e invasion we re di._missed as 1I;li\"e and i1ll]ludellt ""anti·S()vieleh iks:· T hi s vicw was c~prcsscd by 13re~.hne v him self in th e pustinvasion negotiatiuns in ~IU SL""'W. ~llyn;H repo rt s tit;lt in n:s pu nse \" (In im· prumptu uutburs t by O uhcc k, Brczhncv lashed out: So WIt;lt do ~"OU think willI ... done un y,," r I...lta)f? No thin )<. Then' will be no "'''T. emll",de THo and Co nI ,","]" Ccan~esl'" wil l sa~' th eir ~ I'c"" ,/,o. I" ",·l>. 1!J69 " I'mella . 1,,1 )" 2. 1976. AI" , ,,~. n,,)· G",t,,", ",,,I Slq,h,·" ft .",·It-r. /,:""""",,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (IAmJ,,,, , \I""'millan. J~7~ 1 , J'a.Jk' Fik, Jell" ·n",,· pI aI .. ,oJ,.. brocon",,,,,,,'>m . .lly'/) OJ" H,.,,/;,y'> (I"",len" !'cn!:,';" . Jjr.!l) . ,,,,,I (;. II. 1I,h,,,. ,~t .. (L ... d""
f:""""m,,,,,,,,,,,,,
\I ~",;("e T""'Jlt~
Smith .
J97~) .
ICh
!z
M
379
piece, :Uld su "ill Cumrade Bcrlin~llcr. Wel l. ~ nd wh~t of it? You arc courting the Communist I!lO\'C llll,,,t in Wcs tern Europe. bUllh al won 't ,unnunt to anrthinJ! fur Afty rcars." This e mphas is on th e relative inSi g nificance of the non ruli n g p;lrt ies increa sed witl. th e neg:! ti ve re'ldioll tn tI' e in vas iun; ami <.--ditorial s in lead ing journals a sse rt ed as ne"er hcll)re th e illl[l()r t1lll<;C of the un ity of th e Tuling parties as the key to the powe r and future uf socialism in int e rnatiunal re lations, Thus a majur arlit'le "ppearin g in November 1968 showed its complete di sdain tor the rol e of non ruling parties by failin g to even IlIcnt io n them in any equation o f th e power of soci,llism : Faithfnln.·s_, to pml.,"'ri:", internat ionalism is mainly ,,·,..:aled by th e COlUm UIl ist p:lrties and pt:oplt:s of fm h-r ll,,1 (')nll Irks in til" c"rrying Ullt of tbe so rt of in lcrnal and fureig n pOlil'~' th ai prom utes II,e in ternational sodali'l 'ystelH "s I IH' lI\o~1 importaUI fachor in presc nt-e d esi rahl e to IUl\'e t he ,~ lIpp()rt o f no It I'll ling Com III II n ht p;!rties. b ut
at the end ofthe da)', Commde
Bcrlin~\II~ r h ;L~
no tan ks. The SOIlf(.'C
uf puwer uf th e internati unal st",.' ialist sys te m rests nut un tile al1prob;!t iOIl of th e d eba' i ng drclcs t ha t call them selves Com III Ull ist parties in Europ e, vut on th e reul politi cal, c eu numic, gcographie. ;mcl III ilit;lr}, un it y nf wi ll ;II\J action of t be Soviet ~t'Otl trolled bloc uf socialist states. At int c rnational Communis t IllCI~ tin gs, \Inscow may ha l'() c ho· S(:n to downplay its own views nil limit e d sO I·.:rt:igllty ;lll d proleta rian int e rnationalism in ordcr to prcv(~ nt furthl~r rifts in tin: world Communist moveme nt, hu t thi s is not to s,,~' tll a! they (:cased to I>e g uiding pri nci ples of So"iel forei g n policy. 0" the (xmtnlr), tile ), were rons istently reaIRrmcJ at the t wen t~'-fourth , twent y- fifth. and twc nly-si.,th part>· congre sse s a mI in ke y textboub un int e rlJational law a nd foreign p oliey published after 1968. "" In all these docum e nt s, \IUSt'(/w wa., careful tu plal'e fideli ty to th.: Suviet" 7~1~I)~k \l l)·"M, Ni ~ht h ,,,, in I'",~" •. p. 241. "" Velikii "" r.b. i milO'''')' olo.)'d""h.·o,,~'; l"o-.:,~ ... " r"li/id"./.;", ""'H,,,l,,,, ....,,, ,, k It IN{)\-'cmhcr 19(;/1), II, Abo see \\. I. 'Im <, - u '1l ;o skii prioh;p)' .-n.·, hoei po1iHli SS SII i prulel,nlii ;o1<-no"l,;,,,,.t;,,,,:· I'''I'''''Y fu,,";i Kl'SS II (N"'''',,, ..... , 1!IbS), :u fro< !I,~ .. I..... ,;.,. I." ,II,,,,-ih·,,,· 'H' !I", .t>p1iC"~li'H' of prokla,"m i"l~mali"n .ti>", ill C ...d,,,,kw.li,,, " See. '" ~ •• rnl'l~, A, .~ , G"" "tl" ."d fl_ N- I\m ... ".,.,v. "I" . ",",.;~ " ,..·.h ,,,,; '~J;,;~i
SSSIl. wI. 2.
IlU5 - 19~6
(M,,,,,,,,,,, I"tht er,,,,, "aut..:-...
19j~).
pp, 350- S2, V.
~1.
Kh ""iOv.
380
CO:-;CLUS IO:-':S
define(1 principles uf limited s()\'crcignty ;lnd prolct~lri;11l internatiu nalism alongside Soviet rcco~nilion of. in Brczhncv's words at Ihe 26th Part y Con~rcss, "a wea lth of ways and Illetitods for devcloiling th e socialist way of life:' " Neye rtheless, as Brczhncy slated in this same speed!. al){1 ..s the Politburo reafnrmcd in ils Ilumerous exchanges wilh the Pulish leadership during the crisis in that <.'(luntry alief August 1980, these principles were still ,md would al _ ways he th e {lctcrmill'lnt.~ of Soviet a('!ioll in "C(unplex nnd crit ical mo ments. Th;lt is how it was and IlIlw it will he, and let no one Iwvc any duubt :IS to O U T common determination to secure our inleresis .!UtI to d e f{:1111 the s(K: iali.~ t gains th e peoples," " The must d ire cunsequences uf the in vas ion of Czechoslovakia ()('curred, it l',UI he t~HldllJeJ , nut o ll ts ide the Comlllun i ~1 bloc but inside it. tu th e cxten t tlt,ll unity of ,~<;tio n was preserved al tlte e"penn' uf unity uf will o n t he part of a ~ignificant section of the pnpul,jlinn ,lIld elite ofCzcehosl()\'nkia a nd olhe r slales in Eastern Europe. L1ut ;l~ became so (l pp,Hent with the inVllsioll, when the Soviet objective was to lIl;lintain th e Soviet pus itiull in Easlt:rn Eu rope "for eternity," I he trans ien t illi enilti(ln of one or two genera-
or
tions in th e e nd ",,,tt e,...d ["r ve r y little, r flMm,y ;,wrii ,,,",,/m'; 1~'llli~'i ,~SS" i ""';l"/,,,,,, ....I,,yl'/, "",,,,/r,-"iI, 1'. -1.'111. v, I'. r..'i\.;l"~'''i" d ~I . (I 1i~lo~r p"")' Sd,,",1 ,.r , I ,~ crslI C." ",,1'A""m;lIe~l, ...1•. , S"'-'-"""'''''Y!It' mc:/rd"""rfH/"Y!I" "',ws/IC";!!,' i ""<>/'Y"ya ,,,.rilil~ ~"<~h~""" Smjl"~ (" " ' ''''''' h.d",e!'.h·o m),,!', 1971),1'1'. 8 _ 12, 153_ S7, 1. I). ()'·.~"'n)· Ie' al" A Swo/y af ~ad('1 f"r('lg" /"~Icy (,\1< ....,,,,,, I",.,.:,,"" l'"IoH ,,/ ~"·ic1 -C,..:d~"I,,,·,,k ",1..1i,,,,. p"l,li, I",,! .in,,, ,h~ i".,•• i"", ..'" Able"';),' r>.'.... k SSSII, h .. Wu, :-;,,,ch,,o; lnr,,,· mohii po Ob>l,,:he.tvenn),m t-;.uhm , Chrkh,,,/,'
,/ru:M,y. :". N. I\"J;",",,' cl .1.. c,I . ..
,~""c/.k",d",.I,,,,I,,,,~',l;!P' "' ,,,,,I,,',,iy~,
"' n"'71"",,", 'p,,,,.,h, lr.mmiUNllh·c b)' lladio ~l,,"-')W, Fd""'T!' 23, 1lJ81. SUIti61T/CI6, " lhkl.
''''
o::h
APPE NDIX A:
Key Political and Military Leaders, USSR, 1968 T H E POLlTBUHO: FU LL .\ 1E.\ lBEHS L. I. Brc;d",,~v, Gcneral Sec-relar)'. Cen tra l Cmlllllillt:e G. I. Yu runOl', Ch,lirman. nSFS n Cu"ntil "I" .\H"istcrs A. P. Kiri k" kn, Sc<.·rclarr. Central Committee A. N. Kosygin . Prim e Minish!r K. T. ~ I "zuruv, Fi rs t Depul)' Prim,! IIlin i,h; r A. Yu. Per~ h(; . 1·l<;ud. Party Cu((t ro l Commi ttee N. V. Podgorn y. C hai rnmn , Praes idinm of till: $"p1"<"l((e So\"iet D. S. Pol yan sky, First Deput y Prime II lini.>t" r M. A. Smln\". Secre tar},. Central Committee A. N. Shelepiu , Ch"irmau. Trade Union. P. Ye. Shdest, First Secretary. Uk r:liuian C""lml Cn"" lI itl (,·c
THE POLITHU HO: CAN DIlJ."'TE MEMBEIIS Yu. V. Andropoy, Head, KGB V. V. Grishin. ~1c"J . .\\osmw Cit)" Part)" Cm nmit k,,-' P. N. Demid,cv. Secretary. Ccntral ('.. Hnmilt.:e D . :\, KUlmev, Fi rs t Secretary. K..,..akhstan Ce nt ral COnlnlittce 1'. M. Mashcrov. Firsl S..!<:rctary. Belorussian CeHtral Committl!<: V.I'. .\Izh:w:m,ull.c, Fint Secretar\". GeoT)!ia n Ce ntral Cmumittce Sh. it Rushi du\". Fir.~t Se~·rel ary. Ulhekblan Ce ulral Cumm ittee D. E Usti"o\". Secretary. Central Co mmitt ee V. V. ShdlCrbitsky, Chairman . Ukr,\in iafl Co uncil of~ \ inisi<:rs
T H E SECHETAIUAT OF Til E CENTH AL COM,\llTTE E (excluding those SelTct<.lrics listed <.I l.>o\'c) \. V. Kup ita uo\" K. F. Kal ushe\", after April 10, 19611, in charge uf Ce ntral Com mitJ8J
382 le.!
Department for Liaison witl, Rul ing Communist a",1 \Vork-
ers'
Partic.~
F. I). K"lako\" B. P. Pnnumarev, in charge uf C~·ll l r:l1 C Un, ",itte" Inte rn atiunal Departm unt ,,1. S. Su lnm e ntsev
KEY MILITAIW LEADEnS A. A. Crechku. ,\Ii lli. ter of Defe nse I. I. Yaknbunky, Cummande r in Ch ief. \\TO M. V. Z"kha,."". C hid . G"n" " ,1 Starr A. A. Y"pis"e'·. C h id ', "I uin Pnliti~'~l Administration J. Kh . Ba!:ramyan, Chi c[ Hear (until l uly 1!J68) S. S. hlaryakh in. Chief. lI" ar ("ftcT Jn ly lHr>s) 1\:. A. Ve rshinin , Cummande r iu Chief. Ai r F'>rL"e S. C. Curshko\', Commander ill Chid. Navy N. I. Kryln\'. Cnm",:!ud" ,. in Chi e f. Strat.:gie 1I(l(.·k" t 1'<m::'I:' 1\:. S. Moskalenko, Chief Ill spedor 1'. E Ih titsky. First De puty Ch ief. Ge neral Staff I. S. Knne\". Gc ",:ral-Insr..:dor " I. I. " "~.,, k,,\", Chid"f S'a'f. WTO (""til .·",. ly A"g,,' l Jl)Hk) S. hi . Shtemcuko. Chi ef of Staff. WTO (aft" r " arl )" Angust 1965) I. C. Pllvlu\'sky, C umma"d"T ill Chid. G rnll'\<1 Fo rces 1'. K. Kushen )i. C"m",a",I" ... Gn.up SO"id t'm.~". Ge rma" y A. hi. Kushd e ,·. Il ead. \\'TO Perlna"e "t \ 1;";0", Pragnc \\ V. Zhado \", Dcp utv H,,:u\. \\~rO P" rm anen t \ Iissio". Pragu e
OTH£H ACTIVISTS (!lot ttlen ti OrleJ :lhove) V. Il"nitsky. First Sec re tar y. Tr::tlls("llrpathian oblast" L. S. Kulich c nko. First Secre tary. \'ol~ograd I!h last" V. V. Zagladin . D" put y lhwl . C(",tl"") COlllmitt,·.. lnC e rnu titlltal D l'p:orl men t M. V. Zilllym';lI. Editnr. /'ra cd« .~ . A. Grnmyku, )'liuistcr of FOl"eign AIl' lirs V V. Ku zne tsov, F;rst Deput y Minister of Forei~1l Alfain; S. G. Lapin, Gene ral Di rel'lor. TASS K. V. lIu sakov . llead . Centra l Committee De lMrtmen l li,r Liai sou with 1I1I li n~ Co mm uni st a",1 \Vo rkers' P"rtics (after Al' r;] 19(18) V. I. Konotnp, First Se<:rda,.y, Mmco\\" ohlll.~t" V. S. lblsli k"v . First S,,('Tetar)'. I..() uillgrml nhlast" S. V. C he rv",,,,uko . USS II Alllh'L'iSador. !'rag "" I. I. Uda lf.~e\", \lilli ster-C uuTlselor. USSH Embas sy. I'm!:ue )'11 .
APPENDIX ll :
Key Political and Military Leaders, Czechoslovakia, 1968 )mwnn) .5_ 1' llAES [l) I U "
O t < Tilt: (;I'<':l
Al'ri/ 5
, , , ., ,
Oldi'kh Cernik jarmnir l)olan skf Alc~andcr Duhl'ek Jifi II cndrych Micloal Ch"Jik DraluHnir Kold,~ r Bohuslu\' Lasto\'icka jo~",f Lenarl Anhmin No\'otny Otakar Sim imek An lonin "apek Miros];,v Pastyfik I\ lichal SaholCik Stefan S;iu","sky Ludvik Vac" lik \'as il Bil'ak Juse]' Hori",b
, , ,
•
, ,
x k aml. )
x (ca ml.)
X (~·Jnd . )
(ca ml. ) x (cand .) ~ bond.) x (cand .)
, , , , ,
J""" r ~ l',,('C k F"l1lti" ,k BarhfTl·k H-;mmc k Kri eg.,] josef Slllrko"skf aldrich Svcslka BuhulIlil Sim on
, , , ,
, , , ,
x (cmul. )
O t' TIlE (;I'CZ
Antonin Novu tn }' Jift Ile"drych
, ,
~
Jan Piller Emil Iligo
SE(;RE T,\I\I~:S
"\1'11/ 5 A"~'''' 31
,s,
, ,
38·1 IJrahomk Kold e r Vladimir Koucky Stcl;m S ;illl)v.~k)· Ale~amler lJu bl..,k C"stmiT Cisar Alois lndra J07-cf Lcmirt ZJenck Ml yn:if (J une)
, , , ,
, , ,
, , ,
O Tlllm ACTI VISTS, SOT MD.- rlOSE Il AIlOn:
Ludvik S\'O boda JiH It,ijt: k V:ida" Prd!llk ~ I arlin DZllr Josd P.. ,·d Ota 5ik
Pres ide nt urthe lIe public I'llf/: ign ,\ lini Slt'r
I leal\, C I'Cz Ce"tml Cum mittee's Eighth De partment ~Iinislcr of NatiO!m1 Defc lI sc ~Iinhtcr uf the Inl crio r Deputy I'reln icr. Econumic Re fOTm , and Meluher, Ecolloluic C()un~ il
Gu~tjv H u ~:ik
Deputy Premier. IIcfurm uf the Fedeml Sy.tem
''''
o::h
Selected Bibliography This bib!ioj!mphl! excludes III{/~( nussiau , Ellg/ish , (lml !orcigll-!(/ugrwW: 1I;:lVsl/{/Jler.~ IIml journals reJerred to iulhejoofllules.
P U IIJ.JSIIED WO!\KS Aad . T;u miS ... lllldajll:S! 1!l-'>6- ['ragw ' 1968. SPO kCS lll CIl of Ht'\,ol, ,t iOIl ... I'rob/em.1 o!Cotiumm iwlI 18. nos. 4 _ .'5 (July - Oeto!>.>r 1969): 60-67. A!lume il, I [anll es. S(l!;iel Ili.l k- 'Iili,;.'!! !Iliff C d si.\' IJ e/wrior. 1.1,"'[",, : C;"" rgc ,\11 .... amI Unwin , mS2 .
- - -, and Hobert Boardman. ('{Is. fmrign P(J/icy .\/ilkiuj.!. ill GUIIJ"'U"i.• t C "'lUlri;:.,,:\ C OIJI/lllm/i,-,' A./,I''"'''''},' E,rnl Mlr<)lI )'d " J 1Il1'sc . [979
Sa.' ''"
Akademiy" Nnllk SSS II. Ill stitu' NaudulOj lll forl ll "tsii PI) Oh, hd, ,,s t,,,,,,. "Y'" /1.' ", ,kam, C lw klw .• I"';fl kiY(I ; A.kl "'Jll" 0 /'.1'''''''''.' ''''''' " f)'
""I'
J",liliciw" 'i.:iy,' i ,w l.l'iu/' Iw-d.:",wlllldw"ki!l" I'""J,J,' IIIY. rrj<" 'II/i'!II!I;
.'boruik. ~[ osmw : IN ION , [978. Aili,,,,,, Gral,,'m T. I" ''''''''c oj I)"";$i",,: !::r:plaill;III! 1/01' e ll/nm ,I/issi/" Crisi,~ , fl", I" n: Liul" . Bwwn. N7[ Ames, Kennel h , .. H{' form nnd H..,,{'Iion." I'~o"k ", .~ of C fIIHHllm;SIII J7 . no. (i (Nu " e mher - [)e<.:embcr I\JtXi): J,';- 50.
Amort , Che tmir. SSSfl ; osw/m:,/u/l'lIiy" CIII:kI",.I/"WW, .\ [ "Sl·""': ['rogrc.s 1'1lh1i ~IH'rs , H176. A/"''',,,Wlt'f' of ,II (lj , /' idd Ca, / ,." 1111 ;, :\ uaIY;;1I1! I:: u... ,/., ill C;;,.'dw,~II!1)(1/.:;11 . ""·M" y. .'11I!p•.,/23. l~iII. '["",,,, Ia! i,,,, "flra,,-,(·,il'! 111."1,, h~' lh,' Be\',,1u, iOllar~' (;"" er lllnell" , lkp .... lllw /l I "I' Sit·, '''graph i,· Tr-,I11,("il'_ lion s, H avana. I n., lit"to .1,-1 l.ihro, 1968. ,\vtorkha"(lv. :\lId"ra'.;] ""nn , Sil!l i J",..-..iJiljf' Iln' ~/", nd : /H,lilid",,-IdYf' eiy",/y. Frankl'nr lf)T.1ain: I'os,c\,.\·"rb )(, 19i9. Beam. Jam h D, Multiple Ex!',);"!,,.,'. N(",' Y"rk: W, IV. :"Io rtoll, Wi S, Bendef, ['el er. Ea.,'1 bUll)!!' j" SCllrch ojS,,·n,rily. BallillH>i'e : T he Joll!l s
H"pki"s Universit y !'",-'s. 19,2 Bethell. Kichobs Wi1! ia m. Gmmdka . /lis I'II/fltld
L""d",,: 1.. " ,;("""", mfi! , ,11>5
"
s t:l.u ; n ;u
386
1IIIILl()(:lV,PIIY
Be tts. lIidmrd K. S,,/di!'f.l. S/a/emlC'I. ullii Cold \I'm' C d sl:,I. C;UIIbriu~c, ;"l ass., Har\'ard Uniw rsity Press, 1977. ll ia1 cr. ScwcrY Il. ed. 'f ile Domestic COllin/ of S"",'" /<"o reigu I'''/ky _ BOlilder. Co lo. : \\'t:st vit-w I'rcs_~. 191'11 BiI'ak Vasil. Prunla us/olai prrm/oi, Sl (,ti i r;;c/,i . \l OSl~)W: Pulitizuat,
H.m. lliUm;!n , L" dmla\', til" /Ja"fll'li,m (;"""': C=..,dw,,1f1,,"k '''Idlig~"c" ill Soviet Po/itiCill Wa rfare. Srr~"\IS", 1\. Y.,' Syr~"lJSC Uni l'ers it y lIes<:n rdl Corpuratio" , 1972.
B" I>...,,,\ Davis II .. Stc,"en Chan, "",1 J"hn A. KringeT. "U",lcrst;,,,di,,,c: How Oth ers Treat Crisis: A ~llllti",,~th()d Approadl." /IItl!r!I a., Lcaders: BrliMill t,: ,\lIl/wrily I" S,,~lel Politic"~ . 1..0 ",1",,: G""rg<: All<:n and Unwin . 1982 Brczhnev, L. I . Lcn;uski/U Kll rstllll. Ilec},1 i stat'l. tom v tu m i. ),,'I us~'t)w: l7.clatclstvo politichcskoy litc ral nry. 1U70. - - - . USS II- CSS /i . Friends/lill tII,,1 Culws,,,,, , S" eeche., /'y /" / . Bn:zJl1rev ill I'rtlg rlc. ,\los~'Ow: No''Osti , 197 1. British Broadcasting Corporation. SUlUmary (Jfll'odd Ilromlcllsls. Part I: TIll! SOf;;I!/ Ulliu ll. Part II : E(ule"" Elm,!'c. 19('>8 (dail y). Browll. AT<.·h ie , :md Michael Kaser, L"<.lS . Tlw Suricl Urlloll Siure tlw filII of Khrlls" cI,c ~ . 2d cd. London: )" I a~'millan , I!HR Bmwne, Mid,ael, "d, Fen"""t 11u: Ukra ill e. Lo",lo,,: )"lacmillan, Wil. Brumberg, Ab mham, ed . In Quest of Justice: f'ro/Csl {lnd /Jia,'cll t ill the Soviet Unio" 'fodaV. Lo"dn,, : 1,";,11 ~1 .. 11. HliO. Bu milam, Junes , 'The I~,larb I'l'
,n
ICh
!z
M
SE Lu: n :u BIB LI OGRA PH Y
387
Carrillo. Santiago. EllrocO/umrmi,mr a.,,1 tir e St,r/e, Lo"do,, : Lawren ce and Wi sh3rl, 19i7. Chapman, Coli n . August 21st-t"e Ilalle of C=eciwsloookio. philaJcJphia: J. II. Lippincott, 1968. Ch(~m yshe\' . M. G. Obs"chestw Sm.:c/"l:o-ciwklw., /owukoy (iru;:,hby. " Iosem,,: Sarnto\' Oblasf Publishers, 1976. Cohe n, Stephen E, ed. An End to Sil.:,rce: Unceusu red Opinion in lire Soviet Unim' from Roy M cdveder;;, U",krgr{J!md M"/!."~i"c ··Politlcal /Jillry." N.:w York: \V. W. Nurl!HI. 1982. Cr..i,!!. Rkhanl B., :lnd J. David Gille~pie . " Yug{)slav Headinu lu the Czcehrn;lovak LiberJ li7..atioll MO\'ern e nt and the l nv;\.';ion ofl!J68:' Au.,'/ ra/lm' JUIl n",{ "f P,,/ilil;s ",,,II fi~,tory 201. "". 2 (1977): 227 - 38. Croan, " Idvi n . ··After Ulbricht, The End 0[:'" Er:.?" SIIn;eyI7. nu. 2 (Spring 19i1): i4 -93, - - -. "Czed ."~I,,vakia , Ulbridlt and the German prohl em." l'rnlJlelll., ofCommr.nism 18. no. 1 (Janu ary- February 1969): 1-7, Crossman . Hkhard . '/'lie Diaries ofll C(Jbinel Mini"te r. vol. 3 . Loudon: lI alll ish lI anrillun , 1977, Czcr\."jllski. E. J., and Jarosla\' Picblkiewic1.. L>t1S. The Sodet ftlwsion ofCzed,,~~I(}v(Jkia , N"w Yurk: Pra"gcT. W7::!. Davyduv. Yu. 1'" V. V, Zhurk in , and V S, HudrlC'·. eds. /Jol:lrhW Nil:,5011<1. Mo",'Ow: l7.dateJst\'o l\'auka. 1972, Oawi.• ha , Karen. ·ihe Limits orthc Ilu w"ucr:rlic l'uli tic~ " Iodc!: Ohscr\','t io" , nil th c Soviet Ca,,,," Stwfju'u CU"'!,,,,.,,!ic!! Co",,,,unism 13 no. 4 (Winter 19S0), 300- 346. D"wisha , Kan:n. "Snvid Sn'ur; ty ,u,,! the IIn!e "f th e ;"liHt;l ry: The 19f>S Czed.us lo":lk Crisis." Brit,.'I, Jon mal "f Polilical Sc;ctlee to (l9S0): 341- 363. - - - , mrd Phil ip !l anson . eds. Soviet-fils/ EurtlJlCIII! /Ji/ct1l mlu: Coerdrm, COlllpctitiOlI 1/11(1 Cou~e,,'- Lundun : Il eillCUlann: l\ew Yo rk: Ii olmes and Meicr, for thc Hoya l ln,~ titut c of Intcrnational Affairs.
19S1. DeaL~lIl>
Hkhanl. A If .stury (}f Ihe R".'~irm Secret Sen;iee. L"n<1on: Frederic k ;" Iu llcn , 1972. Dc"" . n"bert \ v, N"'i()""li~,,, "lUI P,,/itiwi C/u",,,,c in ':;""ten' ~: "r{)I'C' Till.' S/()Wk Qw:sti(J1I awillie G::ec/ws/ocak /lrjonu MUl;/!>mml. De nvcr, Colu.: Un i""rsity "f De"Y"r, 1973. Dc Hivcra, jus"ph. TIlt! Psyc/w/ogiCt,1 Dimc usiou of l'orcil-:Il I'ol;ey. Culu",lms, Ohi,,; Charlcs E . Me rri ll , l~l6I:I . Dcvlin, Kcvin. 'ihe Nc'''' Crisis in Euwpe an Cotnnlunisnr." ProlJlems of Comlllunism 17, no . 6 (No\'CllIhcr-Occcmlx;r 1968): 57- 69. Dumhe rg, jnlur , Rre;:,lmev; Tlu; Musk of I'or~• .,.. 1.',)I1d",,: Andre De ut sch, 1974,
388
St:LECTH> UlllLJOGHM'I IY
DUbi:·l· k. Ale,. amler. "LeUer to th" F"JerJI Ass"",hl" uf C~..,dlUSlu""ki~ und the Slo,'ak National Council of October 28. W74.'" U st!! (llome )
5. 110, 3 (Al1ril l975), 3- 16. DUIlIl, Ke ith A. "LiIllit~ Upun Soviet ~ l ilitary Power." !lo!la/ Ullited Scn;ices IU5li1 ulliJounwl124. no." (Dc,-cmhcr 19(9): 38- 45. D~icw"""wski, ~I _ J..: . The em""""" .
Eidlin, Fred II The Logic u['·,\'O...."'/i;Ul/i""'" Tlw Sot,id IlIlcrv,mli(J1l in Czcciw.JO!)- I'H . S;u,ta '\loni w. Calif.. Th " liand Curl"onltion. lHf>'J. F.:heg"duik. B,,('slwy S{)vet,1. "Th e Role of I" ternational TraJe in the eweh,,_ , I ov~k Eenn omy." C mlmli(1Il Slue;m,jc Papers JO (Winter 1\.168): -151 478. Fejlo. ~J-anl~)is. ".\Ioscow and It, All ies." prol,!c,,"s "f C""",,,,,,i8,," 17. nn. () (No"emher- December 1»(8): 2<J-3II. F]oyd. David. 'T ]w C~echn,1.ll'y" Aurum!: The Anm:d Fo rce .• rClJriJ(JQk, 1969. London: William Clowes and Son" 1%9. Frei, Dau ie l, cd . IlIlenwlimwl Crisi.I' (Hid Cri.·i.• Mmwge,,,,,"I. Westmead. England: S'Lxun UOllse, 1978. Vreund. Michael. fnn" Col.! War Iv O~II'()lilik. GCT"W"YIH,t/ Ihe .\'1'W E"m/le. Lo"don: Os"",,,I,] W"lIf. WI:!. Frolik, Jo'ef. TI'I! Frolik IJcjn'lio ll. London: Leo Cooper. l!.l75. C"lIagher. Matthew 1'" and Karl E Sl'i cl!1Hl1l. Jr. Savict IJedl;(!!!:\I,/king for IJcjell3": ..\ C rit i'/I'" "j Per'
'''u'
u.s.
( 196S ~ I969) : 43~53.
Gl:orgc. Alcxalldl:r, "The 'Operation al Cudc': ... Nc)
r
389
SELECTED IlIDLlOG llAl'lIY
Colan. Ca lia. rlw C:.eCh(Mi(}ouk I!cfo l111 Mou :mcllt; Communism in Cnsj,f, 1962-1968. Cambridge: Caml,ridg(! Universily Press. 1971. - - - . Reform Rule in C:.ecJws/u~(Ikjo: Tlw Duluek Era , W6R_I9{;9, Cambridge: Cambridge UniV("niily l're_ls. 1973. enid. I-I yam. "Foreign Policy D.,dsiun- Maki"l{:md the En vironmenl: Th e Claims of Snyder. BrL'"her, and the Sprouts." International Shulie.~ QlUlrterl!/22 , no. 4 (DeL,.,,,, h,,r 1078): 56\1- 86. Cun:, Albert Arnold. Winln} Days In Pmglle lIlu/ .\ foscow. 91st Cong. 1st '<'-'S. Washington, D_ C.: GPO. 1969, Crigore nko. Petro C_ Memoir.,. New York: \V, W. Norton, 1982. Grornyku, AU
1973. tl nrsk)', Vladimir. Pro/!, 1968 Sy~'te",~crii"den"'l!. uud S!Jstcmwrteidigunl!. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag. mi5, "Iough, Jerry F. , ;In,] M.·rl c Eli"." "!. 11<1'" /111' S"",,,, I.• C"". erTlCd. Camhridge" " lass,: Han'ard Uni\'ersit)' l'res~, 1979. Ilronek, J iti. cd. GSSR: TIl(: 11(1(11/ to /)cmocm/ic Socia lism: Faels on f:v.mts from January to May 1968. Prague: Publishe rs PragopTCs_, Features, 1968 . james, Robert Rhodes, "t!, The C~edw~-Io!i(lk Crisis 1968. Londo n: Weidenrc1d and Ni<'O I ~"n, !969. jar\'i~. (rving 1...
Un,,,,,
SELt;(:n : ll IIll1UO(; 1tA!'ll \'
390
Jerv is. Rohert. Percepli(JU mu/ MispcITl!pli(JU ill /ulenm/iollo/ "v/ifies. Prinwton. N.J.: PrinCdon Unin:rs ity Prcss. Hl7(; , Juhnson , I.)'",lon Uainc •. '1'1,,: \"111/"1;<: l'u;"I : l'er..l'ed i~es 'HI 11u: I',.<:s;· den e!/, /963 - /969. New York: Holt , Rinehart and Winston, 1972, Jones, Christopller D. "'Autunom y 0< Inter\"cntiun , TIH~ C PSU a nd the Struggle fur th., CZedlOSlo\'ak CUllllnunist I'"rly, 1968." OrJ,i, 19, nu, 2 (SU1l1 111er 1975,); S9I - fi2.."i. - --, "Suvid Hej!c rn()ny in E ~ster" EurOJle: The Dy" ~ 1l1 ics of Politi· eill Alllonnm~' and Milit"ry inl er vention .·· \I'pr/d Politics 31, nIl. Z (Jauuar~' 1977): 216- 41. Jnviler. Peter H. " Sovi ct .\lotiv3tions fur thc Invasion , aud D01l1cstic Suppu rt ." S/"die,~ for l1 Ncw Ce,,1 mi Europc 2. nu. 3 (1H68- I96U): 97 -100. K ~Ob!/Ii!/um c Ch ck'w$lo~l,kii , fllk/Ij, (iokumculy. scideld'stvu pre,<.'!! i oclu:~idtscu. Moscow, 1!J6B. Kahn , Il erman ... How tn Th ink ... huUl Ih e Ilu ssians." For/rlU e 78, no . (; (Nuvember 1968), 125- 27. 231 - 48. K""e l, Huger. cd. 'rl", BellU~;"ra/I! """ i"Ii()" "II(/ em"""III;sl sll"ii,,~ . N"w York: Th., Fril e Pn'"" ]971 Ka re, V. A. ClwkIIOSlovutsku!Jl1 Sotsialislich".'kuyu Resl",blika. ~·l o~,'Uw; Il(latd 's tvu nauka, 1975. Keegan , J . World Arrllie$. I.~ ",d(),, : Mat' millan , 19"ffi. KIr \"(l~tov, V M . Pro/JIe/U!/ istorii rilles/w ei poliliki SSS R i me: luirrllll rodlI!!kh ottwslumii . .\Iosoow: l7.datd'stvo "aub. W7G. King, I{ohe rt H. Mi"o,-i/in efJII"",,,,i..,,,; Nati(ma/ili"" as (I So"rc" of"fellsioll mlUJUS Bu/karl Cmmllllrli..1 SllIln . Cambri dge , ~las~,: l iar· vard University Press. lI.l73. Kiraly, Ucla K. ·· lllldal'.. ~st: J9S6 - Pmgll<:: : 1968, Para llel s ""d Co ntrast s."' ProMell~' ufCmrrrmmi.. ,,, IB , " "S. 4 - S (JIl II'- Ocluher 19fi9): S2 - r.o . K]"ibe r, Wolfgang. "fh.! eri.•is in C;:(,c1wdo ~akio ifr 1!J68. •"riin)!;toll. Va.: I""titute for Ddellse Analr~ i '. 1970. Koh out, Pave l. Pr",,, 1/,,: Diury of ,j Corm/errewililimllIl"Y, New York: MeG n lw_IJilJ, 1969. Kolkowicz, lIoman, cd. The \l'orsOlo PIlet. Arliol!tOIl , Va.: Institute for Defensc Ana lys is. 1969. K'''ygill, A. N . I:l>rUlIII!!!!" r('cl,i i Ma(i. Mos,,',,": [ ~.(bters t\'() politichcskoy litcralury. 1979. Knol. "ucla\, . l.essa"s ofl/i..,ory . .\1<>S'1lW: N",·.,sti Press '\!leney. 1978. Kunze, llein er, TI. E L""c/!/ re((,-.~. Lond"n; Si,I!,'wiek and Jaeh {)H. 1978. K" ~in, Vladimir v.. l:·d , rhe C:cclws/ouak Ilefonn Mowmellll968, I'm('eedillS,. of lire Sem;,w r fl c/d al I/' E Ullivc r,"iI y uf Refll/ins m, 12- 17 }ul!/1971. London: Intcrnutional Re search Documl'nts, 1973.
I""it"
391
S£L£L'T£1) H1HLlOta\AI'IlY
- - - , From Dub~ek to Charter 7i: A Siudy of'Xonulll;suIiOIl ' in Czec/w,./or;ukia. /968-/978. Edinburgh: Q I'ress. 1978 , - - - . The Illtel/cctl/II/ Origim ofll.e Prague Sprillg. Cmnbridgc : Cambrid!!;c Uni versity Press. Wi t. - - - , and Z. licj7Jar. C::.cclwJ:/ovukill . /.968- /969: '\1I/Wllllion, BiM;ug HJ/'i.y, Chrull% gy. Ne w York : Garland. lili4. Lauren. Gordon Paul. /Jiplomacy: New "pproac/w8 iu IIi-du TY. -th eo ry uurl I'll/icy, Ne w York: Tht: Fret' Prt:5s. 19i9. Lazarus , Ridlanl S . Psyciwlugicai Siress /1Ilt! the COl1i1l1.! I'roca .'. New York: McGraw-WI!. 1966. "Leiter of Warning frcnn the C PSU Pu lithu rI) , Aug us t Ii , \968,'- Stut/in In COI"JlMlltir;e Comltllmism 3 . no . I (j anuary 19i O): 1'11- 44. Levy, A];m. RowlxUlI to Pragll e. New York: G ruM man . 1972, Lewyt7.kyj , B. , and J. Stro)'nowski. 'V/w:. 11'1", ill .~(!cili/isl C mm lrWs. New York: K. C . Saur, 1978. Lodge, MiltOll C. Soakl /Jitl: Alii/lilies Sillce S//ili'l. CO!lllHhu-,. Ohio : Charles E. Merrill, 1969. Lowc nthal, Richard. "Spano,,", in th e Cage." ProM""" , of C''''''IU",ism Ii, no. 6 (No\'cmhcr - Deceml >l~r 1!J(;8): 2 - 28. ~kCld Jan d , Charles A. "The Acute Inte rnat ional Crisis." Ill,rld Politics H (October 19tH): 182 - 204. - -- , "The Allticipalion Inte rn ational Criws, Pro" lx'ets fo r Th eory and Hcsearch. " In ternot;OIIl1I Studies Quarterly 21 (March 1977):
ti,,,
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15- 38. Mac kinto sh, Malm hn. Tlw Eou/ulifm '1lhe \\\,r.<1I1 1) Pucl . il.delph i Pape r nO. 58. London: Inditute fo r Strategic Studies. June. 1969 , Marko . Milosh. Clie rU!l1H IHI /l{;loIllY. 0 .,o/'yliy(/k/, a Cit .SSll 0 1968- 1969 gm/aklt . M{)~(."w : P r()g rc~s Puhlishers. 19i4. - - - . PSik/wlogicl",.'kaya voy"a /·dwklwslocat.,kiy " kspe rimll"(' Moscow: Nauka , 1972. Maxa. Jo~ef. Die Ktmlmlier/ ~ Rcoolldiull. Vit:lU la: r. Zsolnak. 1969. - - -. Ii Year ill Eight Months, by Journalist )..1, Introdudion by Tad 57.ule. Gartle n City, N. Y. : Dou hk
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392
SE u :cn : lJ U1HUO,;lIAP1IY
~I".-a" us
[p seud.]. "Shaweross's Du lXck- A Diffc r<:ut Dilbeck." Sun"y 17.110. " (Autumn HI;I): 203- 16.
~ ' "rclu ll. N, Ed",i 11<[.
i'; uM G enua"" 1I1If/ the lI'"r.l
tics of DeWUlf.'. Boulder. Co!o.: We .lv;,,\\, Pr"". 1978.
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ICh
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M
SELH: n : n II IUl. I()(;IV,PIIY
393
Poiach , Jarosiav G . " Nuclear Eneq,,'Y in Cz.:c li oslovak ia: A Study in FTlIS' trJtioll. " Or/Ji~ 12. no. 3 (Winte r 1008): S3 1 ~ 51. Polk. James II . " l\eHt:dion s nn tIll: C ~I~: hnsl()l'ak i;HI 11I1·;\sioli. 1!l68."· Strategic Ilc ~ ielV 5 (Wint e r 1977); 30 - 37. ~I. , A. A. Crom r ko, amI V. "I. "h'·oslo\' . hloriiu vllcs/nwi /loli/iki 55511. 191 7 - wiO ~ . Vol . II. 19-1.5- /970. Musmw: (zdaterst vo n:lllka, 1971. Pravda lIolxd,d(ll!t. Mnscow ; Izdate rst\"o polilkhcskoy lit eralory, 1971. I'rov;\7.nik. J"II [pscud .]. 'The 1~)I;l il" "I' Ilctrc"d""c"t. " I'm/,/em. of C 01ll""mism 18. nos. 4 - 5 (july - Ot-wher. 1009); 2 - 17. l\apaporl. Aualn!. Til e Big 'liL~): S" uid-A "'criCIH! "',rcl:/!/1ol1S of Fordgll I'o/icy . New Yurko Peg3.lus, 1971. Reddaway, Peter. Unce7lsorcr! Russiu . London; Cnlbnt-z. 1979. lIewingh>n. Hobin Alison. "Arnll'd Forces and Society in Yugosla\"i a. " lu Catherin e McArdle Kelle he r, cd .. 1'"/itical-.I/ililaJ"Y Sy.~t cms: C01llJlamti~e I'crsl'e<;/i""s. lIc\' c rl~· lI i11 s. C,Ii[: Sage. IiJj·I. \l\l, 16:)- 191. Reminglon , Rohin Alison . ed, lVifl/er iu Pra!!ue . Docume n/., 0 11 C:eclw_ siowk ComUlullis!!! in Grisi$ . Camhridgl\ I-I:lS5. ; The MIT I'ress.
Ponornarc l'. B.
1009.
"Replie s 10 Queslions Relating to tl .e E\'e"ls in Cz(.·d",s1u""kia. Add ..:ss hy C umrade I,;'io, Fe her. I-I ellil ler "f I hr, I'olil iral Cornm ill ce uf tl ,e IISWP. Vice-Chairman of tlH~ Co uncil of Mini.lte rs. Bru"d~'a st on 30 Augmt 1968." Illjonllutioll Bulietill of I/Ie Ceutral Committee of the IISWP (Blld"pest), ,m. 4 (klnhc r 19(8): H-20. Robinson. William E "Cze dlns1o\'akia "",I Ih Alli.~s . " Studies ill Com· purali~e Commull ism. no. I (j uly - O ctohe r 19(8): 1-11- 71. Ho9. Sel uek,·, Iladosla\". CzcchosIQ~(lkl(l. Tile I'/(/t! tlwt ti!ded. London: Nelson. 1U70. - - -. 'The Dul ll'C k Era Revisite d ." p roM"III.' oje",,,,,,,,,,;.,·,,, 24 (January- Februar y 1975): 3.'l- 4J. Shuwcross, William. Dubtck. umdon ; Wcid cnfc1d and Nicolson. 1970. Shcvtsov. V. S. Natsi01w/""yi .t(l cer" "ilel. C/!m/'Jemy t ~orii i melnr/,,/ogii). MU~l"uW ; lu ridi ches kap LitcraturJ. 1978. Shitiko\'a. A. 1'. Sm;efskayu VI/c.l/myayu jloiilik,! ; f;UTOjlci8k(!yu I )C:;{!1108Iuo$(. ~1()S<.~!w: l1.dalel·,t,·o 11lczlHlullarodn y),c ntnns"e lliy". 1972. Shtc lll e nko . S, ,\I . Geue ral'uyi shtab t) god!! winy. )'10,'-''-'''": \'ocnizdat . 1968.
. "
,
•
SJ:::I.ECfICU IllIlLl()(:tlAI'IIY
SJwedkuv. Yll. A.. ed. SShA: V,uw/",el'{!/Iric/wskii lIlek/uml:m. ,\IuSl')W; lzuatcl'st m nanka. 1972. Si]'''it~kaya, Lari, ... "Ikcolledions or Il rat islava, . Il(,,/io Liherly /)i-
"r
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S t :Lt :<:rE D III BLlOGIL\I'IIY
395
- - - , r",rer ito Ille 1\relllli,,; Frail! 1\" r"sl,clw~ I" 1\""yJ!.;u. 1\:"e,," Ynrk: Viking. Wi]. - - -, 'The Suvid UlIjnn," /utel1'/oy , !\o\'('mhe r W68, 1)]1. .J- 7.
TllOm:ls, John H. Sudd Furdgtl/'u/icy (/1/(/ Couflici u;irlliu the Pu/it/JIII"td. I'd/. Loud",,, 'kK..:]"nal!!. 1971. Triska. Jan I':, and Da"irl O. Finl c ~', Sodd Fordg'll'o/ky, New York: \1"("milia,,, 1968. Tllr1,i\'illc, Cmham II .. Jr. '" 1nkC"enti"" in Yng"'[;"'i'" An :bs{'.'slllent "r ! I", 5""iel ~ 1ilitar}, ()p t ion," S/ m/,'I!,;c Il,' ~;",~ .') (' Vi nkr 1977): fi2 - 73. U. S. Cent ,~,I [ulell igen(", Ag"nl'Y. lJirt'<.'!nmtl' " I' 1"tdlig,,"ce . TIu: So· vi", Peels;,, /! 10 I,,/(TI;I'III', !\\lgllst 21. 19f~') (dcdass iflc,l ro r :mlh"r under u. s. Frccdun, "f l,,[imna!ioJl .... et). - - -. Frn , II ',,..,,, Ik'ictiou 10 I':l;e'II,' ill C~clu~\/owki011 G o\'('!"n""ml Op'>nlt iOllS. C ;;Cc/IO.,/(J~8. (All I ntdli)!enl...· Noll'S Wl'W liridi,,)! .!"l'UlllCIiIs "f .3- .5. oon words li)r I hl' sl'eTelary ..'r 13. mrl8. US . D CI):lrltllt'1I 1 ,,['SI:lll'. k/"gm", l62651. '\"'~' lL 1968. (.... lJ lel"pa", s wc rc 2 -:1.000 \",rd s in ICII.c:lh "11(1 W"TC dl'<:hs'ificd fi)T author und er U. S. F",,:,(olll of I n[i1l"ltl,,1 jnll Ad.) - - -. 'Ii:/('gnIHl 163375, \bv 1-1. 19{)S. - - -. 'Ii:/I!gmm 1fi.l39·/, '\1ay IS. 196,'1.
L(,!),,,,,.,"i,,,
N",,,
M.,,,,,,,,,,,,/,,IOI
---.
'k/eCJ'{IH< 1(j{;;(;1. .\!:oy Ili, I9r}) . Tr·/q!.nltI/
2()26J5. J"I " 15. ]96b,
.
,
•
396
SELECTE D BUILlOCllAPJIY
- - -. Tc/"g'""'" 205078.
July 19, 1968.
- --. 1Hcgrmll 206<J31$. July 23, 1968. Tdllgmll1 213732. August L 1968.
---. Td"l;ralll 214637. Augns! 3, I96/). - - -.
T~legm'" 2153·13. "-Ub'ust 5, W68. Y,'iegrmu 218860. Augu st LO, 1968. - - -. Te/egralll 2/93~4. August L2. 1008. u.s. roreign IJ mmk'Hs' In l'>rrnatiun Sen';"c. Duily Ilejwrl, J!J68. U.S . Join t P"l>lic:!lioll Hcscarch Scrvi~..,. Ellsler" Ellr""e, 1968. U.S. Nn ti onal Security Council. Memoranrillm for tilt, lIecan/, NSC Mcding oj April N 1m Eus/em Euml'c. April 26. 1968 (declassified fOT ~lIt llOr u nder u.s. Freedom of Information Act). Urhan. G. II., cd. Communist Reformatioll . L01ldon: ~lal1ricc Temple Smith. 1979. - - -, 'The Invasion 01' C7-cchoslo,'akia, 19G8: The Vicw from \\'~sh ingt"" , A C",wcrsatioll with Ellgene Hosto"'. " The Washing/oil QIW'" ledy 2, no. I (Wint er 1979), 106_120. Vulenta. Ji ti. "Soviet torcign Policy Decision -;" \uking ,lHd Burcuucmtie Polilic~; Cz~...,ho~!ov"k Crish 19Gb." 1'\0. D, dis", The Johl)~ il opkins University, 1975. - - -. So~iel Itllerc e'ltiofl in CzecilOslowkiu. 1968 . Allolomy of 0 Vt!ci~ i"" . Balli",,,,e; Jolon. Hopkin. Ull iv<:r.ily Press. m7\). V'W8J,y"y" /JOlinl", Suoct,-k""" SOY""" i It",;;;I"!"",,,,,,I,,yy,, v""",I,e"iYil. ,
Wallace. William V.
C~ecllO,y{ocukja.
London: Ernest Henn. 1977.
Warner. Edward L., Ill. Tlw ;\filit/lry ill CVllteml'''fllnj S"vi<.'ll'o/Wc." All luslituliouoi ' \IIuiysis. New York: Pra .. g"r, 19i7. Wei t. £,,,,in. Eyewitness: rhe !\IltoiJiograpllY of Cornu/ko's Interpreter, London: Andre Deutsch, 1973. Weydenthul. Jan B. "Polish Politics and the Czcrhoslovuk Cris is in 1968." Canadian Stovollie 1'0lJCrS 14. no. 1(1972): 31- 56. W lweler-Rcnllctt, Sir Jolm , and ,\nthony Nicloolls. Tlw S"",bl{/u ~e of PeUf;e. Lundun: M:Ol'",illan. 1972. Whetten. Lawrence L. "Crises in I'mguc and MosCQw." Bul/etin uftlw /,uWutc for tile Study of the USSR. ~Iay 1969. pp. 27- 36. - - -. " Mil itary .... sp'.. ets of th e Suviet Olt-'upa tiun uf Czel'llOslo\'aki a." The World Today 2,.':; (February 1969): 60 - 68. Wi1<:'/.ymki. J. ",\lolllil' Eu crgy ror pcal~ r"IPu'l)()-'C~ in tI,,, War,;;,w Pact C ountries." SVl'iet St"dicg 26, nn , .j (19701): 568-00. \Vi1!iam s, Ph ilip. Cri,lis Mmmgcmcu/: Cm'fflmlutiou and Diplrmwcy hI t I. c N "e/ear Age _ 1.."",1",,, ),[",.t i" l\"[,c rt.;",,. W76,
sta .. l::cn:u
ISI Ii Ll OGllf,.I'll1"
397
Wiho n, I [a mid. rhe tuliullr Guvernml.'rlt, 19tH - /970: A Pf: rsullull!ccord. London: \\'o;>ide nfcld and Nicolson and ~ [ iehad J~cph . 1971. Wind50r, Philip. Ge rmall lIeun!/icolioli. Lundon: Ele k nooks, J969 . - - - , and Ad'im Ruberts. Cu:ciuLY/ot;akin 1968. London: Clmttu ;.ml Wind us. 1969. Wolfe, JaUle~ H. "West Gerno;Hl)" an d CledH)~I(}\'"kia: The Struggle ror Reconciliation." Or{,is 1-1 , no , 1 (Spring 1970): 15-1- 79. Wolfe. Thoma. W. SOllier /'ower ill E,,,'o/Ie, /9-15- 1970 . Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins ['rcss, m70. Yanov , Al exande r. The Russian Neu; Rig/lt . Institu te of [lItcrllutional Studies. nesearch Series No. 35. Uni"ersity of California. Berkeley. 1978,
Youog. Oran It The ['o/itics afForce: Bargaining Dillin" Intenliltilllwl Cris"... I'rinttlon, N,J.: !'rinct:lon Unin:rsil), Press. 1968, Zartman. I. Will iam, cd. cu:dU!s//)~'Jk ia: 1" 'C r~cllt iollIllIf/IIllJla ct. New York: New York University l'ress, H:l70. 'l...c n,an, Z. A. B. Prug"" 5,,";11£: A liel'orl ' ''' C:::.ec/w.'/' File, Cotlnt ry Fil,', ussn, I" l'apers of Dean Rusk. Sl'<.'relar\' of State 1961- 1009, Box 4. 1968 Wh ite li ons<: Cen trdl File, Confid(:ntiul FiI.:. CO 303. I" White House Cen tral File, CuuFiJent i"l File, ND I9ICO 57. 5 pp. Wh ite 1I0use Cen tral File. Cuuntrit's 303 (USS Il ). I' ll"
•
Index
or. W!i. 2+1- 44
AB~llalks . S""jel.Amcrican, IZ? Acad"",y of Scic"ce •. Sovie t. 1!!. ill.
c."
:i\:ill; SO";l't p loilJlion of, ~ Anm ~'Ontml and dis~ ,,,,amcnt , J.!.!!i. in Gromyko's june report to SUI''''''''' Soviet, !:'i!!; Ko.ygin',
m
ill
m.
Actioll I'rogram (Czech <';ommunist Pm"ty), SO - 52, 86-87 . UQ. !:!!; SU'-;e! rcadiu" to, 51-S2. !H. ~
m w. m
1(11:'" "". x, !H.. Pre.ident john50n ', ;nlc ,e. t in,
Advocacy anal),.i, _ 5 AI-AIm"" (E,;),pt ). J.llli All>an;". xi. 372 AI"."rl
m
m
2J2 AII . E uropean Conference of Commu· nist Partie •. J78 AI",a·Ata. USS H, 650 Aherna!"'c'. ,carch for and ~"n>jd ..,a. tin" "f.11. 362 frI ' in crisi~ p<:r i,.J,
~
So\,;eh"mcric'J." tuJks
15-1_ 57,
bum ""
!Zh
,,"C
",cd
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355, by I'oli t· of i,,,'as,ol1 to n"u'
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China. I'coplc', Hcpnhlieor (cu lllirUJ ed )
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Crimea. Soviet leade,.. in. 63n Cri,is-altt·mali,·". in, """ id.'mlion of.
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of Fllrdgll AffairS in . l'iZ: a",lli"";)!nl,,,li,')' ."f<",n. 1~)-42
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- cris is in , c'OI11p.1'l'd to Polish and " ""gari;o" c'ri,e<, 3JI:6.5l _ Ea, te", h l"('<"untri,:s .-a11 fur Hlatt'ral <""re,,'n •.., "", l..8J.=.S6 - Ea, te", h i"" roun tries hold 'U"" mil "n. 9!blil3 _ and EaS! Cennany; and ",eelin gs with Ulhrkht. 2711_ 79, Tr<:aly "f Fricudslo lp I><.:Iw.,~n. :u. Sec ul", Ge n nan o.,moeralic R~public - crono", i" ref"rms in, Th !.!!!1 121 - 22, ill a",1 10"'" "o,,)!h! f",m W",te," "'UR' '', i2- 73 , I"'T' forma n{'<-' u f. t!o1:.tH _ isola tion of, 253.=.5:1 - mi litary maneu"ers in "nd """u",,· lioll "f, prior 10 ill","< i"", 1!!'!.
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m 2111_20, 2.J!h1l - "".I Wur>aw »""1 juinl Slat,'ml,,,t ( ... Iareh!. 2li _ WarSaw P""t par!ic'ipati,," hy, !..:!!.. lo.I''''i" Cn'Chn,lm'ak In'titu l" r"r tl", 1-li, 1",y lhe Eur"p"an Soda]", Com,trie" 123 C.~,.,ho,luvaL: ).tilitarv Cuu ncil. US CZL'Cho,luvak l'~.. )pl,,', Ar",y, i l l C'L'Ch"sluvaL:. S" ... ,,1 ""Ti,,,,eI,l,i]> Su· cie ly . .112 Cz
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O<..:;;,;nn ",ak; n~, Sn,,;et (cm,l;n,wd) Cn",,,,,,,,;,t C""f"",,,",,,, 219 - ~O. Z11.; reje, 't;o" "ro..tl",/mk, 191 lt2.; ""ponsc to ::zJK!!1 W""l,," !!i2. Ul!.; rule " f militar)' in, ~ stationin!: of troops , lc· ",,,,,,1,,<.l, 2.J 1- ~2 ' 'Var",,,, ", ..'Cting ,"""'ok,,d (jul y), 2l1J.=.2.. 221-21; \\To. man"n""" in CZl'C1",.1o· "uk;a. L1l - and dcd,ion,l (on""., :l6ll..dt!. - ;",d <.l iff'cr<'nl"-" of opi nion "mo ng 1",,,le,,, 365=.fifi -infimn.li"" a"d , ~ -and military; {'(Imultati"" rol" of, Jl!.!.. :).57 _ 59, :!!lQ; dcci,ioMI TOle \lU -.'" Z911-99 :U3- 14 :l:l1:.:e!; dillcr<'''l~'' of opi nion ;""o,,~, l',,,,tigc of, c"h"n~c.t h)' in,-as;"", :~'iS _ f>!l ; 1,,},.,hol"l(ic'al ."",iron", ,,nt of 1""dcTs of, J05.=.8. -a"d 1',,1;,10 e,i,i, "f 1956, 3:I.6dll - i n I'", t.ensi, pt"i,><1. ami <,,, I. lap,,,d ;n,'as;o" pb"" l2.II.=.2!l _ in ]>rl'..-n
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Di ctatorship of Ihe pmletariJ l, S",lo\, on, 3tl3 D;sarm"ment. S~~ Arm. ~."nt TOI and d i<arrnamc,,1 D i..idencc, Urezhnc v e",(:~down " n, ;!!1; as focu< of Jul), C I'SU Ccntral C.un"n ittec plenum, 2 16_ 18 , S", "ie l l,ml'CnlS al~"'t, ~ 21=.2:1. 1l!. 'HI-.')O, ISR- fil 3ti!b1tl Dittmer, "-v i, 2&! Do hryni", Anatnly Fl.J"mvkh, .!§. 2.')2-5.1. 355 [)o h"olod, \tarta . J.:iJ Dre sden , Ea,t Cerrnm,y, ",ectin" al (~lard, ]96!I), :ll.
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