The Greek and Persian Wars 500-323 BC

volunteer forcr oI'qrv~ralhunclrcd m m . Miltiadex gave thc first instruction Tor battlc, 'contain rile invadinq rorccs nn thr \)c*achr's ancl resist an advance on .4thms'. It'itliin a few hut~rsor thr

t h c cngaqrrnmt must hr f i s u ~ h tanrl won in r11n.c. hours. ' I ' i r n ~was short and thc order tn a t t a r k was

~ivrn.

Tkr A~heniantmopswrrt:drawn up in thr hattlr alarm, some ro,ooo hcavily armccl infitntryrnet~. ordcr Miltiadcs had plannrcl. 'l91r:commanrlrr-inmainly hoplitcs, wrro on the march to thc plain or' chicf, C:alIimacllus csmmaorlnl tlic r i ~ h tflank, Marathon thrrlugh the H yncttus-t'cw t c.lr gal>. and thc lcfi flank was Iicld 1 ~ ) - the Platacans. ' 1 ' 1 1 ~ 'I'hr Athenians took up thcir position at thr centre, which was to takc thr l ~ r u t ~otf thc first sonthern end of thc plain with Mount A~riclikicJn anstaught, was under t l ~ r+joint cornrnenci ol' thcir l e l i flank and the sea to the right ; the Rrvxisa Themistoclm and Rristrides. 'l'ht. Athenian tartic. marsh lay slightlv to thc war. 'I'hr ccjastal road to was to wcakcn the ccntrc hy widen in^ thc space Athrns was tiow efictivclv scalrd. J'rrm rverc cut 'bctwcen cacli man ancl to rcrlucr rhe ranks t o tibur down and man-hauled into drfrnsivc p s i tions with instcad of thr usual r i ~ h a .'Tltc chance r ~ l thc branrlles licing the Pcrsian linrs, a prccal~tion 131.eakthrough was a caltula~cd risk. Thc rnairt atpinst thr Prrsiat~cavalry!..From 7 to I r .August strcngth wi~gmassed on thc flanks which i l was thc front lincs rrrnained static, five kilomctrcs apart, ncithrr side willing to rnakr thr first mnvc. Thc .4thvni;trus wcrv loath to commit thrir tmops to hat tlc, as thc advantap lay wi tk thc Pcrsians in an open -plain con flirt. A q i n s t thr superior Pcrsian force of cavalry and arrhcrs, thr Athrnians had only inrantrymen. The Pcrsians remained irnmobilc hccause r hrv had II(F wish to engage tthcir own weak and i n h i o r infantry agains~thc Grcck hoplitrs in thcir prcp a r d position ; thcy wcrc also hoping for ;t s i ~ n a l from Hippias' ii-iends within Athens itscll: Rut thr stalemate could not last indefinitely and Datis finally put Iiis own battlc plans into action. Under mver of darkncss on thr nigIlt of I I 112 August h r reem barked most oft hc cavalry as well as his task force and, slipping out, sai1r.d Tor Phalrran nay leaving behind Artaphernm with a holdinq force facing thc Athenians. Thc departure of' D a ~ i sdid not ga z~nnoticecl and Milliadcs' scouts wrsc quick to iniirrn him of thc h r t . ?he r l ~ h c n i a n commanders were surnnlonccl and Miltiadcs outIind the only posible chancc of a Greek victory : the Persians could not passi1)ly react1 Phalcron by sea in less than tw hours; 1,eashing and d iscmharking would take a frw more hours, by which timr it would be late aFtrrnoon or early eveninq; in thc immediate vicinity, on the plain of Marathon, Artaphernm had lost a large part of the cavaliy and tmp, but would still have his archrrs. Thr quesrion waq whcther thc Aihenians shnulcl risk an engagemcnt with the Pcrsian forces; if they did, ant1 clefeated thcm, there was still timr to doubIt back Tor the defence of Athens. It was 5.30 a.m., so

11q~d U'C)IIICI complctc at1 rnrirrlinfi movement. "I'hr Pcrsian li>rrcs were drploycd as Miltiadcs anticipatrd : thc crntrr was stalIi.cl with the rriitk troops ar~tl thc flanks wrrr helcl 11y interior hartalions drawn fmnl thc conscripts oft hc clnpirr. 'IBc risks Ihr thc Athenians wcre great, howcvrr; 5. D c d I from a p i mof d f i g t u t Attic bowl (fithcmtury kc), showing m~ Athenian boplite w n m o r mttncking n Fersipp stmdard-befrrr. (LOIMP, P u r i ~ J

rhrir strcngth was a littlr orrcr half' that of thv Persian cen trc, and tIlr opcn qround to hc covcrrd put thr Greeks at the mprcy of thc rlitr Pcrsinrr arrhcrs. At almut 6 a.m. otl 12 August the distance l>ctweetlt11etwo armics was apprclxirnately nnr anrl a halr kilornetres; t11r lrtrrnpet wunded thr conmand and thr Alhcnian ranks movcrl forward. T h e acivance start cd briskly, drveloperl into a trot, thcn

thr. clnublc as thcy rushrtl thc last 140 rnctrcs to avnirl thc hail arrows. T h e Persian royal coneinqc'ents put up a stronq resistance, the centre standinq its ground, forcing t h r Athcnian hoplitrs t ~ ~ c kMranwhilc, . on cither flank the Athenians wit11 thrir slronE concentration uf troops carried all ihcforc ~ h c mant1 ptlt the P&rsi;~n flanks tn fliqht, man?) ~ ~ r t r r a t to i n ~thc Great M;irsh whew they drtmned. Ot hcrs retrratcd along ~ h sllorr c tr, thcwaiting ships in thc I~eof'tbcpronlontow. Zlr'ilh thc Pcrsian flanks in cornplcte disarray, tl~r rlthcnian ancl l'latacan flar~ krrs dimgaged thc pursuit accol-ding to plan. Regroupi nx, thry rclturnrd to thr sccnc of thc batrlc whcrc thc remain in^ Prrsiarls wcrc out flanked in r douhir pincer rnovcmcnt. Thc rctn8at in^ Persians rouxht their way back in the dirrction ol'thcir s h i p along the narrow gap Ir~twcon thc marsl~csand thr beach. Thrv werr closrly pursrlcd l)y t l ~ Athrnr ians, who were drtr*rrninc.clto dcs~rovt hc enemy forces and fleet. 'I'hc I'ailurc at' t h e Persians to envisaqc surh a contingcncv was qui tc astonish in^, especially 21s t h r d>vious Athenian preparations can hartlly h a w mrapcd rhcit notice. c Pcrsian Ry a.m. on r l r \ ~ p ; r l ~ t~ h surviving roval trmps ancl the ships of khr Mararhon task forcc wrrr out at sra and heading for PhaErron. In the final count ol'c;~-ualtiwthr Pcrsians had lost 6400 nlrn and an unrt.c.orclcd num hcr 01' prisoners and ~vounrl~*d ;*long with scvrn ships. "I'hc ?t~Ficnians suni~mrtsurprisin~lyfew castmities with on iy 192 dead, inclucl ing: t hcir commander-in-chief Callirnachus. In orcler to cornplvtc his ovcrall stl-aregic plan, l\liltiadcs had to clernand fmm his mcn ionr more H e ~ u l c a ncndravour, tht- march l ~ a c kto Athens, 'as bst as thrir feet could carry them'. Commander Aristeidrs and one division wcrc left lwhind to guard thr prisoners of war and raptured cquipmrnt. 7'hr rcttrrn ol'the Athenian army, quick in comparison with thc slower naval squadrnns of D;itis, had to take fill1 advantage of surprise iT h'liltiades' plan was to take elrecl, GIfhen thc Persian invasion task iorce arrived, the Athenians were alrcacly in thrir delinaivc posirions at C y n o s a r g ~ , muth or thr. citv ancl fiicin~tlw st:;t. And, whcn Dalis arrived in Phalcron Bay, hc founcl the citv wrll drfended. Attcrnpis t o I;~ndwoultl have h e n tlscl~ssso hc allcharmi and awairtd Arrapllcrnrs' hrokc into

L Pi-orl-d

sbot which w e r t t t n d am rnimdtun

with the d d or n leather s l i a ~ .T h e sling m n a w u q ~mund, d niter aomc turn8 n wider nwep m a r ucctrrnplirhd and one cad of the lrmthrr sling w a n r r l r n u t d , b u r l k ~the 1cmd shot vwuy with qrtat momrrrtum. 'IXe *hot warn o f t e n i n s c r i h r l with mrk.iaEts. (Rritinh Museum, Lnndon)

drtachmcnt. Thcir arrival: i l l a dvplrtrtl and 1)atrrrecI condition Idi only orw rollrsc Ibr thc

Prrsiati inval;icln rot-cv, il stra~eqicwirhdrawal. l,;lck to Asia. Marathon had provcul that the hpavy troops of the hoplirr inrantry cottld cornprrc succrssli~lly ag;Jnst supcrioritv of numbem, particularly whcn tlicir opponrnts wcrr only liqhtly arrnccl, hut [hc Circck victory should not bc o\~rrcstirnattd.Thc Pet-siitn losse~;wrrc c;lsiIv I W ~ ~ R Cl ~ SO y l i ~ ;1r~ W~C T ~ and scnrct only to emphasize thr nccd Ibr a prnprrly pwparcd rxywdition il'Gwrcr was za br suhjigarrcl. 'I'h;~trite Pt-rsians woriltl rrtllrn was incvitahIt*, ancl it was clcartv t-ssrntial h r thr Grcrks to rralizc thar, dmpitr t h e glov of Marathon. they had done Iittlr- morc than I~uvlimr in wliich to prcparr t Iicmsrlvcs for t h r rrsurnption or the con flick. In 4W.9 w:. Miltiad-, rotnmanrling tthv A1hr.niarl flvrr, attrmptcd to regain cnt~~rt)l of rhostAegean islands which had capitz~latcd to thc. Persians, hut his naval forcc insufTicirnt to accomplih this task and his hlockadc of Parm bitcrl ;I dcl'cat which let1 tn his imprisonment ar Athcns, whew h c d i d smn after ol' a wound rcceivcd ar Paros. Thc Ath~niansncxt tried LO obtain mastpry of thc Saronic CuIi'by ovcrpoww-

7-.

C r o m r u t p f d r q a h o w k ~ a nA l h t n i a n horseman, 475 m.c. The h m m i s without *ndrElc or stirrups hut with full head hmeuzrs. 'Fht horwman wrar.c a lonq, hiahly-patlrrnrtl, rtiArlnak and r a m r n the -hart j ~ v e i i n s (Villa . Ciiulira, Hornr)

in^ rhc pro-l'rrsian island oT:\r.@qina whusc raiders By this tirne Gr~rccbhad rcrcivrd alarming relxlns mntinually ravagrd rhc shorm ot'tittica. This too ol' cxtrnsivc I'rrsian inv;~sirln pl.c.parnlit)ns, rumw;rs n f;lilurt, ant1 i t llccamc ob\pious that rhc o t ~ r spr<~pagali~l l>y D ~ I - ~ Ison. I s ' S v t * x v s ~[hr new Arl~rnianflrr~raulrl o&r little pmtrction ;qainst a I'crsian kin^, who apprrriatrd t hc psychalqical 11mlil~S V ; ~powrr. v[Ti.cl o f w~chstorirs, prrhaps haping thcrrhy to 'l'llevacancy crrnlcd 1)y thc fall of h4iltiadr.swas Entlucc selmc areas o ~ G r r ~ 10 r t c. i l l ~ iul;itc l without a frllrd '1'hc.rnislr~:lr-s,who rully apprrciatrd nht fish t . nclvl fir a stronq naval ti~rcc; thc discovr~yof nrw To facilitarr thr rnclvrrncnt ~f his army into silvrr d r p ~ i t it) s chc Lauricln mining district placed Grcecc. Serscs had orrlerrd thr I)rid~ingof the surplus capital (hr dispjsal of' thr A~semblyand Hellcspcmt, a maqnificcnt achivvvrnrnt on thr part enal>lr(l thc Athtbt~ians, ~rcrsuaclcd by 'I'hrrnis- a l his rnqinccrr; who t~seclavtSrsix hunclrcrl ships to toclrs, ~ r stommcncr a shiphuildinq programrnt. construct two huge pontoon brirlqcs. I n order to inrrnrlrcl t o prodrice [wnhuntlrrcl new triremes filr avnLI risking his fleet arountl thc d;ingcrous cape of thc Athrniat~fleet. Moutrt rlthrrs hc tlihrl acannl (lug r:at.rtnsthc isthmus. t 3 idrntificd. ~ Set-xcsdrrnantluu!rcln t ir~grt~ls lkom vvrysatrapy of the Persian Empire ant1 the rmponse enabled him to amam an imposing lbrrc. Ry 48 I KC. he had

and rracm ol'this canal can still

set up his I~eacEquancrs, at

Sardcs in 1,ydia ancl sent out toall t11eGrrpk stat(%rxccpl Athens ancI Sparta for thc carth and wa'tcr of submission. Tlrc sizt. (IT the Persian arm?;has htcn a clurstion ofrlispn~rand conjccturr cvcr since Horoclot us' c~rifinal figusc. gros4y exaggrratccl, of ovrr two millicin comtxttants. More realistic latter-day commrntators estimatr Xrrxm' forcr at some r jo.ooocomhatants, approximately half OF which arc thought to havc h e n Prrsian troops, and i t i n c l u d ~ d thc hcst cavalry available li-orn t h r Mditrrranean arca. His fleet, said by Hrrodot~rsto nurnl~crabout I ,200 vessels, many of which werc snlall t ranslxlrts. hasted a contingent o f skilled Phoenician svilrnrn and forces from E4ypt,Carin and Ionia. Sinrr :in army of such a size coulcl nor hope to live off so arid a land as Gmrcr it nepdpd to be provisionrd rrrlrn the sca as i t prncccclcd around thc shows of thr Thracian scil ancl into ccntral Gwccr. T h r Hvvt would also ~>mvidra mili rer? bar-k-1111w1icnt.w.r necessan. Serxrs clrarly intrndecl the subju~atinnn f tlic whalcofGrrcce ifpossible Tor he harl to~nmittrrfan rnnrrnous numbrr of troops and had mad(. rxtcmnsire ~~rcl)arations, inr:ludinq an aLwr.rntLntwith 11rc

tn pin clown thc wt=qtcmrn Grrrks ol' Sirily whilst S c r x r s attack(.cl from the.

C;~rlhaginianswho wrrc vast.

Hy tlie spring of 480 R.C. [he huge itmy I ~ a d crossvd ~ h Mrllrsl~lr~t r w h ~ r ri t was-joinecl by the flcrt, and was making its way. in 111rce separate columns, rc~warclsThrssaly, prt-c*r.rl(*dby alarrning rumnurs that i t was drinking [hv ri\.ecs dry. Mranwhilc, thr I;rtr.h, in the autumn of 481 R.c., rrummnntd to thr Isthmus of' Crlrirlth 1rpt.rsrnta1ivt-s c~l'allthtsc statrs which hacl nnt at ready subniittcd t o Pcrsia. and an alliancr, lrrl hv Alllens ancl Spart;i, was Srwrnt-c!. I-lowtvrr. a s~~clclcr~ blow was rlc-alt to Crrvk rrcolution 11y ~ h voicr r of thr Tlrlphic. orarlt., which prr~lictc.rl rlisast~rfor ~thc Grccks and arlviscd thr Athrnilins in particular ta flcr For thrir livtx. 'Thv oraclr rlairn~tlthat the only hopr lay in a wtrdr-n wall, and although (his prtw~rnahll;indica~c.rithc wrmclen rlcfcnces oi' t hc :Ir.rt~polis, ir wiu i n ~ ~ r p r e t ~hy r l 'I'hernistoclm to mran tllr Grt-ck f1t.t-t. On the qucstion nf strate,:, opinion ar thc Isthmi;tii cc~nfi*rc.nc-cwas dividrtl. 'I'he Spartans and rhrir l'(-lr~~~r~ri~ic.siiirinrighhours hclcl tcn;~ciouslyt o ~hr:view [hat tlie main d~renccsbould

GEPIERAL S U R V E Y

-----

Road

Trsci Goat r r x k

4.*k h:am

contours

thu Eutxlean Channel, a posirion favourable to the Grcrks bccause i t compris~d narrow, easily detensilrle passm for thr armv ancl hccausc any outflankinq rnovrrncnt hy the Persian flcst would t a k ~i~ into the Euhoean Channcl whrw its sizc would hc a disadvantage. It' tha land hrcc could hold out against Xerxcs' army lonq cnough to indue<:srrrh a move by t hr Persian fleet, the Crccks mighr inflict upon the l a t w a drrrat sufficient to prevent its attacking the Isthmus by sca. Givcn a little extra time by Xcrxrs, who had moved his armv on a tcn-dav detour ol'Mount OEyrnpus, the

8 . DcmU f a a 8 mid on m G m k p v e s h m e , A* late gtb century acj this depicts a s t q l c between Athenian and S p r t n n wnrriom durhp: thr Pclopwncskn war. (Mtnpo-

litan Mu-

of Arc, U.S.A-)

be at the Isthmus of C~rinth-the gateway to thc Peloponnese. This plan howrvcr had drawbacks, principallv that it woufrl leave the Persians Trre lo cstahlish thernsclvcs i n northern and central Greece, also Itiat the Isthmus could he outflankccd ;by spa and i t s drfrndcrs causht between ~ w forces. o I f the plan was adopted Athens wor~ldhe left ao [lie r a v a p or the Persians, and, understandahty, this was an unpopular idea with the Athenians. Consequently it was a ~ r c c dthat an attempt should be made to hold the Pcrsians in Thessaly; hecausc of the inferioritv CI t' Chck numbers, however, this would enlv he possihlc if the narrow passe were dricndecl. At t h nTurst ~ of the 'l'hmmlians, an initial t'orce nf I o,ooa hoptites in two divisions-onc Spartan under Evacnetus and the or her Athenian under Themistoclcs -wcrc transported by ship to Hillus whrncr ~ h m ra r c~h 4 to the Vale ol"1Pmp in northern 'l'hessaly. Hut, on arrival, F,vaenetus found that there werc morc pasqes than he could rcaaonably hope to hold, and, much to the discouragrment or the Grccks. the army retscatecl to thc Isthmus. The Council at Corinth now docidcd to attempt a defcnce in the arca afcentral Grrrcc to the west of

Crccks thrreforr resolved to stand at Thrrmopylae, supprtrd by thrir fleet in h e Malian Gulf. The Crrrk army, Icrl Iy Lconidas, king OF Spana, consist r d of 7,000 ro 8,mo hopli tes and light trtxlps, some o r whom were Roeotians al' dul)ious loyalty, ancl includctl thr 300-strong Spartan roval b c l y guard. Undrr ~ h clTcctivlr control oi'the Athenian Thernistoclrs, the Grcek fleet, comprising 300 triremes, 147 of which werr from Athens, was mooted in the hay of Artemision, north of Euboea. It has been suxgcstcd that the Persian plan was to arrive sirnulrancnusly at Thcmopylae and the northern end nl' thc E u b e a n Channel whilst a Phoenician naval squadron was to enter tht channel frnm thc ~ 1 1 t and h trap the Greek fleer, but the Pemian flcct was still ar its l~aseat l'hcma when Xerncs' advance forces met rhe Greek hoplifes derending 'rht.mr~py!ae.O n hearing this news thc Persian bingnrdrrrd his flrrt toprocced ta Eulmea, but i t was caught in a storm off the east coast of Magnesia and lost, according to Her. d o t u s , 4oa warships. Thc Phornician squadron was also routrd hy thc ralr,enabling; 53 Greeksliips guarding tllc channel at Chalcis to head hack towards the main Ilrrt at Artrmision. Detcrmincd 10 takc advantage of the Persian disorder l'hemistocl~ prnuadrd the Greeks to at tack. Thc cngagvmcnt which followed war incondusive, hut it bccame clcar that the superior mobility oI' thv Check rrircmcs was causing probIcms Tor the l a r ~ c rPrrsian forces. Thc fnllowinq dav, the Pcmians rnountrcl an olf'cnsivc but again the oulc-omr was indrcisiv~, and drspitr bray I w m on bothsides, the Greeks m a n a g 4 to hold the enemy back, prrventing it Tram supporting tht army at Thrrmopvlae, I.19hilst thr Ilrru wcrr- thus cngaged at Artc.

mision, the Persians had Ixrn attcrnptin~to break through the pass ar Thcrmopylae. 'The pass mmistcd, at t h i s rirnr, ot'thrce narrow rlefilrs nr 'g;ttrs*of which rhr crnrral one was 'I'llel-mnpylar pto1,r.r. Thr two o111t.rg;lics, ~II(, IVrst. Iyinc a little ewt or t h ~mouth " oft hc rtsopl~srivcr, ancl t hr East, ncar the tow11 nT :\Ipc.ni, wmt. siruant-d vc111idistanfly otl cithrmr side ol'~ h Midrllr r Catt.. South of thc pass 1;iy t hc vscarpmcnt of Mo~tnrOeta, and throug11 11tis [c~.rairrl a 1 1 a [rack which c.xrt.ndcd from the- I:ik?;t xatc- t o thc Aajptrs I:cqr. Ry rnrnns of this tr;ir.k tllc. pass a1 Thcrmopylac could he nut flxnkrrl Srtvrn (41hc*rdirccrinn. I.ci>nidaschow 10 occupy the. Midrllr <;air. wlicrc thc pass was prnbxbly only fnttr metres witlc. A fPw mtbn\vould he ahle ta hold such a ~msition. a l i h n u ~ htllr Crvrks intender1 to spnd rc.i11 lkrrrmrnls tr) aid Lconidas* small hand. 'I'o Ilrotr-rt himsrlr from bring outflanked to thr south, Lconidas post~tl r,ooo Phncian troop. all t h c - r n m 11e coztld liparc., to guard thr trark through the. cmscarpmc.nt. ~rndthrn srttlcd down to a w i ~ Xrmca' i~ arrival. On reaching the Malian plain, Xcmes waited for bur days, hoping*according to H e d o t u s , that his vast army would Frighten the Greeks into flight, b't~t some rccrnt historians think it mow prohablc that

he

awaitin!: a Pcmian naval victory at Artemision before e n g a ~ i n gthc Grcrk hoplit-. O n thc filih clay, hnwt.vt.r, hr attackccl the Middle Gatc and was rrpulsrd hv thr hcavilv amourcd C:reeh, who wtmrt.suprriclr in respect of training and ctquipmsnt m d against whom his light troops had litrPc cffcct. This tactic was repentetl thc next day with E t ~ csamc rmul L,ancl Serxcs realized that some other way or braking the Grepk position would have to hc found, Sir, with his navy trapped at slrzcmision, he was without supp1it.s. l'hr prnl>l~mwas suddenIy rrsolvcd I>y oncw EphiaItcs whn infornled Xemes of the cxistense of the path which t hc Phociana werc guarding. Acrina as a g u i d ~ , Ephialrrs l ~ c l a conringrnt or thc " 1I mmc~rt;tls'(royal hodvguard) alnng rllv track in an attempt to attack 1,conidas' posi~ionkern th.r rear. ' l ' h ~Phocian guard was routed and news soon rrached Lronidas of zhc imrnincnt danger. Opinions dilfer as to what occurrcd next, but i t is fairly clear that thr forces from central Greece rnovrd hack kowards thc East Gate [caving Lmnidas and was

9.A d d C r a m r bqp m 4-a the st-le htwcta DrtIus in a chariot m d A l t n n d e r *nd his a m . T h e d d o f t h e P c m h koldiefln d m shown ~ ihC high Icmnt head c o v e r i q which also conce~lcdthe lower part OF thc face. (National M U - ~ n mNmplv~) .

thcir headquarrrrs at TheEm, 'Thv Athmiat~s, string their city ~>clwcrlrssagainst Sencs' I~ITCCF., c v a c u a ~ ~ dthr non-combatant popula~ion to r l e ~ i n a , T'rt~czcn and Salamis whilst t h r ablrlwciird mcn wcnt ahoard ~ h ships c tcr await thc ncxz conflict. A few p u tl~rir ~ faith in a drfmcr or Athcns and rcrnained in tht- stockaded. Acrr~polis. Thc Spartans, rn~anwhilr. harl built a Ihstiliuation acmss thc Istl~musof C~rinthand thc Grrck army now concrntrarvd an thr drfmct. which had, all alonq, most appcalcd to the Pelopo~~nt.sians.

'Thcmis~oclcswas strnrlgly in fitvour of an carly rngaEctnetl1, prrfrrahly on Grt:rk terms. E~ut. as IISLI~I,Greek learlrwhip was dividr~l,sqtrnc sfill prcfi-rring a consolidated dcfcnce oS t h e Isthmus. Howcvcr. the size of'tilr Athrnian rnntribt~tionIn the Llert cnablecl cl'hcmistocles to Tclrcc ;I drcision hv ~hrc':ut~ning a withdrawal of thr .Athenians il' hattlr was not olli:rrrl in thc. Stl-aitsorsalarnis. 'I'ltis position was favc~urahlrto the Grrrks hcc:~uscor t hr ~ a r t i r a disadvanragr l

which thr l'rmian nutn-

I~crsw o ~ ~ l~xprrirrlrt. d tl~rrr,At rlrtm~isionthe Persian flcet had I~rrnablc ro drploy itscjf' with rclativr vasc. hut thew would I,r c<)nsidc.r;iblc rrstrictions o n mannvrtvrrs in the narrow straits ?[cm.lueshad no rouble in annihilatitlg thcdcr~nrIc-ss north nlSa!atiiis. 'I'hc-mistoclcs had, oTrc~uwc,still ofthe ACI-opolisand pillaqing ilthcns, ancl Ilmught lo inrlticc Scrsrr; tr~ofi-rl>attlc,and, bc-r-dwith the his flret into thc Saronic Gulf t o a ~nooringat wavering mnralr of his mrn. hr i s said to I-~avc Phalcron. jyhilst thc Grcrk llcrt rrmainecl tin.tlr- rntirrrl rhc Pprsjan corn~t~andvrwith a rnEsr frat&, ~ h c r rwas no possil,ility of Pmian maslr? message. suggestinq i h a ~tl~cGre~ks,dyicrtcd ancl dGrrcce; wonrr or later a navaI engaiyrnpnt was irrrsolulc, woulcl oKir l i t t l r or no rcsistnnct~. inrvitablr. C3n thv r v r ofthr hat~lc,22 Scptcrn1,rr 480 KC.,

MT AEGALEUS

SALAMIS CHANNEL

~LIPSOKOUTALII

t TAlANTONESIk

11.. h n i l from Crrtk lrrbtr n t z i n f i n ~M u bow.

vase

p i n t b g q50 ns, shmving an

the Greck flcct lay krtwern rhr nt~rthcoast of the island or Salamis and thr coast nf Altica north-west of Piraeus. The Pcrsians had drawn up facing north in a line, thrikc d-cp, from thr Cynosura promontory on Salamis to Pirarus. The channel bctwcrn Salamis and Megara, t h r o u ~ hwhich the Grerk pmi tion could be reached r r t m the west, was Irft un~t~artlc-d by Thrmistocles, pssihl l; to tempt Xerxes to rmptov thc same tac~icas had initially been adnprcd at Artemision-la divide his force and trap thr. Crcck fleet in 111rhapr orcapturing it intact. 'I'his Xrrxcs did, senditig his Kpptian ct~ntingmtarouncl t h e south coast ofsalamis to seal t hrw western channcl. The Greeks were apparently still arguing whcn r hcv received ncws of t hc Pcrsian movrs, and thry rra1ir.d that ~ h c r rwas no other course opvn to thcm but to fight. Accordingly, the Grcck fleer rlrrw up in batlie formation facing Hcracleion on the show ofnttica. T h e y had at thcir disposal about y o vessels, the Athenians caking the Icft wing and the Aeginetans the right. Ry the mornin# nf F ~ ha(tl(* C t hr Prrsi ans hail dc-plt)ycd, with thcir right wing held by rhe skilrul Phoenicians and thc Ioniaii ships (once more under. Persian rutc) on the left. Whilst still rnanwuvring into position, the Persians wcrc rowed upon 11). the Gr~ekswho began to rorcc the Icatling Persian ships hack upon rhcir FcIlows, causing disorder in zhc overcmowdcd Persian forma tion, This was ~ollowed hy an Athenian flank attack on the Phoenician ships, which wfrc pushcd hack into their own

rs. Milthdes, the G m k com-drr the C;mk victery at Mmrnchon.

who m s r c ~ i b ~ t

rr*lrr*atiny.Prrsiatl f1cc.t !jut cvenruallv h l l o w d it as h r a s t h r islnntl ol':inrlrt~swherr tlrt=!' llc.ltl ;I council , 01' wral-. I hrrnistnclcs ~ a ~ w u r r sail t l in^ ;kt nncc for t h c Hdlrspnnt ant1 rlrstso~ing;Xrrsrs' Mvny hack suilirt-tl hc.;~vyIrsscs - ;iccorrlirlg tr r 1-irrtdotus. .roo ;~uross thr l~~-itfgr.s, thus trappi~lg liiiri without ship ;irid 1w;rrlvrl hack r o l'halrron wlit.ilc-4. it supplirs: hut ot hcrs k i t 1hal lliis tvottld rnch;in r h r rrturnrtl c.vrnrualty to l l ~ rMrllcxlwn~t.Facccl now pil1;tgin.q nf C:~.cccr1,y a lxrqr and star\-ing army, will1 ilrt. iinpowi I ~ l rtask rh' ~,ro\.ixioningil huge and rllr pl;in w;u dropp~rl. army from st1c1-1a rleplr~trtlflrrl, Srrsr.; had nn h grt-;it tic-ill of prrstiqr harl hc-rt~Inst Ily Xtmcs option h u ~10 withcll-alw the' I,ulk or h i s forces. at Salarnis ancl hc hacl ro consirl~.~. carrfi~llythc 'Fhr Prrsians had hrrtl rleti-ated 1)y ;I cnm- i n ~ p l i r i ~ t i t xrd' ~ s witl~clraw;~l.I,oss or Tact= 1ni~l11 rrvolt on ~ h wtbstt.rn r ln~rdrrorltis ernpire as lin;riion or supcrior Grerk tactics ant1 their own ins~irr+ inrptittwlr in fail in^ lo npprcriatt- that shrc-rwrbight i t had ;~Irr;trlydotle in 'lhracr anrl M;~c.rclonia,and maintain the till-rat t o C:rt*ccc by ol'numtlrm 7it-as insuficirnt to c-arn tltt- clay arainst hr rlt.cidt-rf ly, and forces which. although stmallc-r. wrrc: or h i ~ h r - s lravinq \)art o f his army in ' ~ ' l ~ r s ~ a'I'hrarr - arclnniiis x ~ ~ r; l\ ~ ~ i ~ l f i ~ z ~ qualit?.. I'hr fight for inclepct~.rlcncc was a powerSul !tl;acc-c!r~ni;~.~ ~ n d c lhf ~nolivation for thc Greeks, ;trlcE t 11c. u ~ ~ c l i strd ~ > u whilr taking thr rmt hack wit11 him over thc thr c.;istc-rn victor!: at Salamis hoostet.1 the-it. moritlr ;~nrE Hrllrspor~~10 rtBasscrt cont 1-01 rrpmation at thr rsprnst. ol' Xrrsrs' n ~ i q h\i W i i r Argean coasl. wlrirhcr he srnt his flwt Tctr thi. samv purposr. Mardonius was lcii in 'I'hrssal y with rnachint.. Unawart. (1 "t Xrrxcs' i n t ~ nions, t tlu* Grrrks 13.Dttnil Sa -lid the hcrd aCa G& -0s h a SPrcopham, Pstnnbul drlayecl hcfilrc sctltin~ out in pursuit or thr a Bwotian-qpehelmet. (TheAl-dcr

rcntrr anrl rmlo thc

[.(last

of :\tticn.

:\ti

rvt.rltu;il

.

Museum)

Athens ant1 rctircd to Bocoliir whrrc the ~vrrainw;rs

admiral)ly w~itcd to his cavalry, assrml~linghis filrcca n p p i t r Mount Cir hrrac nn the :%wpua plain hrt w r r n Thcl~csand I'1atar.a. Ry f'rlIin2 a nurnbcr oE' trrrs in thcr area 11rcrtbatccl stitl lilrthrr ad\antage ror his cavalry, and w;u waitinq at tllr rc;rdy when thr 3.5,ooo-strnng Clrcrk huplirc hrcr, mrnrnal~dedFy rhc Spartan Pausimius, nlo\-cld ovrr Mount Cithrrat. and camprd nciw l'lataca na tlic

q. Pi- -f

a relid sbowhg a amggk ktwtcn Marc-

dapinn d Persian warrior* Thtrrc f i p r r r wtr. mmd an the rarnaus AJcxudcr Smrropbnpn by o d e o f &c k i u ~ or Sidon, AWlonymus, who w c c u d hin t h r o w rhrou~hthe innuof M-drt. (TheAlr-ader Srrcopbp~h, Israubul Museum)

suficicnt rorccs to rcnrw tlic olrrnsivc at his cliscrrtir,n. His armv uonsistrtl of 12,non cavalry sncl ahnut .~O,OOO infanlr)l or whom mmt: wrrr run tingen ts from central and northern Grrcr~. Included in this torce, which was a continual threat to Grevk indcprnclencc, wcrc thc Immortals and the Guard C:avalry.

A n attcmpl to won the Athenians and t h ~ i r valuable H i r t into a trenly wirh thc P ~ n i a n smrt with failure, and Mardonius, hoping lo thn:atcn thcm inko sul)mission, rnarchrcl on Athsns, 'l'his provokcd t h r Athenians into an aqrcernrnt with Spasta to mount a n imnldiatc offcnsivr upnn thc irrv;lrlcr. M~si(lt's,Srrxm t l i iq1rl ;12 anv limp srnrl a rrfirrhishcd flrrt to asqist Mardonius; the Grrcks cnuld not affhrd to hrsi tatr Ihr loo long. As thc Spartans rnovccl up through the Corinrhii~n isrhlnus in 479 P.C.. ldardotii~~sfirrd

slnprs ovrrlookiny the plain. Matrlonius cornmcncccE hatilit iw IIV scndinq his cavillry nqainsl 111vGrccks. who wrrt. pmqirianed on ground zrnsuitahJr for a cavalry action. Predictably, t h Prtrsians ~ wrre forcrtl to rctrrat, hut ia has hcrn proposed that the loss nnf is rav;tly was a pricc Mardnnius was prcparccl to pay in orcler to lurr tlw Creeks into il more oprn position on the plain. 'l'liis is indrcd what happrntd, f i r Pausanius Icd his men onlo the plain and statinned them l>ctwrcn Plataea and rhc ~Isopus,a littlr ~ 1 1 t or h ~ h zrivrr. . T h e Spartan hoplites took ~lrrright flank, tlw rlthcnians the Irfi, with the rernaintlcr of the ;~llicsoccup~ingthr tcntrr. On srring this, M a r donills drew u p his f i ) r ~ c lacing s them, can thc other sirlc of the river, and in this position thc two armia wait(-d, sn Herodottrs says, Tor c i ~ h tclays. Earh

commander may h a w bcrn wailillx lfbr Ihr othvr to makr t h t first mow, Imth appreciatin~thr slrrngrh nTa mawd hoplizr drrcncc. Howrvrr, Pvtxian raids ilz thr mnllntainc behind thc Grrck lines seriously threa~rnrdPausanius' supplirs, a situation which the skarionary Grrek rorcr:s on t hc plain could in 110 wa?.allcwintr, Aftrr il pvriotl o r s ~ x ~ r ; ~ skirrnishn rlic betwren rhc two rorces, Maxdonius dccidrrl to commit hirnscl f and at ~ackvdwit 11 his cavaly, whosc missilrs pinned dowtl t hr lucklcs Grceks. Cbntinurd prcssure Tmm thc Prmian cavalr! succcrtled in prcvcnring nhc Grrrk lcfi and crntrr from using thc watrrs aT the Asnpr~s,mmpcllig thrm to rclv on thc Gargaphia spring which lay hchind ~ h Spartans r and Irotn wtrirh thrse latter had heen drawing thcir supplies. PJn fortunate1y I i r Pausanizrs the I'rrsians managrd sonichnw tn ctut flank or push hack the Spartans ;uld rcndcr the spring untlsahlr, thus leavine ~ h Grrcks r withoa wiltcr. Furt trcmorc, t h ~CirrcL supply mum thnmgh hillorrnt Cit hrrac had been l>~sirgr:rd. I t war now ~ l p a rha^ Marclonius was control to pursue a policy of attrition whirh might wrll sw:~.rcdf

Pausanitla did not rnanagr tn rr-r.;t;~l~lish his linrsnf mmrnuniratiim and hrnrr t h r provisionin~01' h i s

and rhr rnanncuvrc was nrll ~ s c c u t c ~until l cl;l>break. Mardnnias' c.avalry wrrr srnt to harass thr Spartans until tht. infantry ct,ultf l,e I~rougllt lo tmgage ~ l i c m antl, , tlircrting tht. 1k)lwtians on lllr Pt-rsim right to attack 1 hc cxp)sctl i2t hc-nians. htb mohilizml ihc hulk of his ann!- a~ainrtthe Greck riqht. Rcalizinc that h i s Spartans wo~~lrl h a w to Iwar thr I3runz nf thr Persian attack, Paulrnniusst.nt ct, thr vrnhattlrd ilthmians Tor assistanrt., h111rht. Grrck ccntrc was by now pinned down and con!d not rtspnncl. IVhrti the Prrsiatl inihnwy was upon the Spartans, Pausat~iusdecided to take aclvantagr of rhr cnnges(ecl Prrsian rii~mhrrsand launch a coun tcrattack with his hopliirs. 'l'hrrr S'ollnwrd a ficrctr hattlr whirh rrmainccl undcridcd until Mardonius himsc.Ef li-ll ant1 his mcn flccl. 'l'he Athtnians rncrtnwhilt. hat! rnanagrd to mut thr Zheolians and the Grprk I'Orcrs w m t nn to capture and clestroy t hc Persian camp. I~ollnwinqrip their victnrl;, thc Grrcks hrsirqvrl 'l'hehrs, whirh capitulated a f ~ c r[went? clays and hnnrlrrl ovrr to I'ausanius, and thcrt-by to thcir

army. '2'hc Spartan cornmantler was I'aced wit11 a ha;rarrlo~~r rctreat into hlounl Ci ther;~r20 hold the main passes. a manoeuvrr hindered 11). 11ie poor 9pir.it in rvhirh snmr nl' the allirti Greeks rrrc-ivtul nrrlvrs from a crimmanrlrr who war, not ~l'thrirown citv-state. It srprns thal Pausatlius plnpsrcl lo withdrr~wthc Spartans, \vho lav on rhr G~.t*ekright winq, to M o r l n ~Ci~hrraein o~*drr to re-oprn tllc supply lines, whilst the a1lir.d li,rces in thr. Grr.r.k centre were to rplrcat south towarrl Ylataea. Last to move woulcl be I he I\ thmians, who wpre tn l>rncei=d wut h-eaxtwards across thr path recently takrn hy ihc allies and positinn ~hrmsclvrsas 111rnew Gr~t-k ccntrr. Severhal Lqctors cmnplicatrtl this manrlc.uvrtm. 'l'hr atrcmpc was scvrrelv l~andicapprd t ~ ydarknt.ss. and i t i s hclicvcd by some that the Athenians tcfi~wcl to obey Pmsanius' order to withdraw, leaving themselves cut OK tinrn the rest of r b army ~ which prcrc~ecl~das plannrd towarrls Mor~nt Cithesar. Although the allied Grrrks srrm tn lmvr rno\~ocl back suuccss~isllyto Plataca, cli~cnsionin 15. D m d from anearly bmm-retitrmhowlng A m b m m w ~ the Spartan ranks dclayccl the Grcck riqht flank n carnet hcial:atcacked by A~syrinan,p h cmtury n , (Palnnof ~ AssurbanipE, Ninwch)

~

Eitnrilitics rtid nt12 cease imrnc*rliatrly.and !i>rman!: yrars altrmtards Persian trnops i.cnlai nrd in Thracr.. Thr rnnflict c*ntErrE finally, i t is hc.licrvccl. t h ;I !rt.al! rl;ttin~f j n n ~ .t+q 48 R.c.. t l ~ rI'cxu-t. of C:alli;ts. A f e r the. virtorim at I'lalara and h4?.cale an atlierl C;rt.ok flret 1111dt.r Pausanitrs s r r ahout drivinq thr F'c.1-siann out ol' thc Carian islands. ( :yy>rus a11tI tllr Hcllesptn~~. Pnrlsanius, how~vcr, provrd 10 1w ;I ~yrannical,comrnandcl-, w l i o a ~ways w c r r unpop~r lar with tht. non-Prlnponntbsi;~ncontinct-t~ts111" thr flcct; evetltu;~ll!., aTt~ran lomian mrttiny l'nllnwing the rakina nf'Ityxantiiirii. hr was r r r n l l ~ lI,\ rhr Spartans. rvl10 pulletl out or thr irvnturc al~ogvc.rhcr. 16. D r d l from the ' G ~ t n m a c h i a Stirzr, ' sbowhg the Creek boplit* ubitld So-tion. (Siphniur Trmnnry. Delphi)

dr:lths, thtnc lcadrss who wcrr svmllathctic to the Ptmrsi;in C ; ~ I F C . Ry this tirnr rhe Pt~rsians,wrrc tnaking ttirir way hack to thr Hcllmpont, having witt~tlt.;lwua strI,stanrial pitrt of rhrir ;~rml;, uncler t\rt;~I,asus, lkom t h r tirlrl at Platac-a. 1311rinq the- si1rnmt.r of 479 R.C. a mrssagc was rrrcivrd kmn ~ h lonian r I;rvrks which st~gqwtrd that il' they I ~ ~ P T$\*~n P rhr arllqmrt 01' a IPirt thcl; wotiltl rrvot t ngilinst t hr I'rwf;~ns. Con~nanrlrctb y rhr S1~r1a11kinq. 1,cotychidas. thc Get-k I1t.c.t lrli Delns Tor Sarnor;, off the eastcmrnAegean coast, anrl rnovtd fkorn tlic.rr. to X4ycaIr in Ionia whew Xrrxcs h i d amaswcl a l;~rg(* army to maintain a sun.rillihnc~nl' thc Ionian Greeks. Lror ychidas' fhrcm landed n l c a r h,Iyci~li-and succt-s~firl ly ?~ssaultt~l thc Pcrsiarn p s i ~ i n r l thr ; Pcrsian sllipq, wlli~llhacl I)CCII 1,citclic.rl f i ~ sality, r wcrc dt.stn)yrd. Hiivinq I lins immol~ilizcdPersian wa p w e r thr G r r r k s rK<.crivrly prntcctcct th~rnsclvc=sarainst rtlrthcr. invi~sintn liom Asia and wrre now snlc marrtrn o f thc ~Zr*qrati.'1'h.c v i c r q at ?ulvralr, ratilitatc.d by the Ioniitn Crr~kswho drsenwl thc Prrsians as snrm as tlie 1);lttlc commrntcd, led to uprisinys throuq11out the Ionian coastal arca anrl t h r rxpulsion nt' Prnian ty.ants and prrisons. The Cirrrks tno\rrtl l i r x t against Srstosin otrler to wn-st rhr H r l l r s p n t kom thc I'rrsians ancl to drstrol~the gatrway into Grrrk tcrri m y . Lccl 13: NantI~ippus,tIlr- Athenians l,t.~;ic,rpclS~stusand the city fdl at Iils~ in thr sprinr: or 478 R.c,, r h o u ~ h

flkpT~~~~o////cv %%-I* I h r Alhenians now scttlrrl down to consider thr li~trtrt* oi'thr hvgcan states and thcir own rclatinns with thc I'rIolxlr~nrsiana. The Pw.si;~nsmighr onc clay rrturu to Ci1-rrt-c to rcnrw rhr rnn flirt, arlrl thr Grrrk?;wisb~ci,mrn-vovcr, to rctain rc~ntrolol'thr eastrrtl Acgctan roast ti-om which the rrcent invasinn harl come.. Thc Spartans, who had alwa?q l ~ c r nrtbltic~rtntto ,ioitl o ~ f i ~ i v w ~ s~ .r cblcirly r not intrrrs~rtlin li~rthrcrxp~ditinnsaqalnst t l l r Pcrsians and wvre II t~rcasponsivrto At hcnian init iat it.6 in this dirrbctian; nr) clr)~rhf tht)? watrhrd with rnncrsn as thc Arhrnians hiistcned to FortiT?~[heir city, which h;icl twice bcrn ra\.aqrd dusinq the war with Persia. ll'ork was also szartccl lo makr Pirarus into a wrll-protcctrrl n i l ~ a lhaw. 12thms. ricrcrnlinrd lo maintain t hr ~)rcssttw againsr th(. Pcmians, stluqh t alliances wii 11 symp;r~lit.tirsralcs, and in thr w i n t ~of478. r j j KC. thr Ilrlian-Attir Maritime Icaguc was iormrd. Ovcr 100 stalt-s joit~ccl with Athct~s in an i i l l i i t ~ ~ c ~ apparcnily intended to I)(. a p.rm;lnrnt ~ ~ n i oThr n. hradq uartcrs wcre sit uatc.d on Dclos, where* rrprcs~nt;rlivcs met ant1 the tscasury was founded. t i t r ~ v rstatrs suppliccl ships to augment thc Atlir.tni;lt> flrrt wllilst l h r smallcr nnts r.ontril>utrd financial support assessrd hy ilrist idcs, thr twasurrr, Apan ii.om hindi1 1 tlnr ~ Lt-afir~c. taqr~hcrhcron a xutr rconnmic h t i n g , this practice p l ; t c ~ llave sums or rnonry undrr Athenian control. The I,crag~rt. opcra~t.rl rlTvutivrly in harassing the

I

G m k Ught Idan1ry (gymnet)

s C m h b-vy infratr). rhaplire) 3 Greek di-r

Petsiaru. l l t l t it slowly hrtame clear that thr ,Athenians rtirl not ronsirlrr i t to hr a clctnocratic alliancr o1'ti.r.r stiur-s. Sclmt. tirnc. during tthr pcriml '1 70 69 D.c., Yaxos trrrnin;~tcd its atlianuc with thp I,~aguc,1t was i tnmctliatcly l~csieqecland li~r-rrd to capitularr ; rlthrns, i t srrrned, wor~lclnot tol~t-a;?te insubordin:ltion From her 'allies'. :\I i~bnut thrsmnv timc (:aryst~anntl thr surrounding land in sor~tl~rrn I : ~ ~ l ~ was l c n fort-iMy ;innrxml hy r h h~ a g u c k~lthc sakr of consnlirlarinq i t s ~crritnrirs. 'I'hr impli calt inns wc~?cthlvious- ;\ t hcns was transforming; thc Lcaque into an crnpire. 'l'lle brcrs avai lahlc to [hc 1,ra~urwrrr mnsidcrable. 111 4fi8 rc.r:. it rlralt a rlrci
helm@dthe arpis muad (Aphaia Trmple,

;a missing.

I& A. P e h helmet, pmbbly w o r n at Mnrathon 490 m . c E. Thmcian h e h ~ 5th t crntury nr:. C. Boaotian helmet, p ~ s i b l y worn by Al-dcr'n soldier^ 3rd century R.(L Grrc'k hdmet p 3ML.0.c:.

n.

mad(*allint~cpsw i ~'Illrss;ily l~ ;~ntlh~Irg;waant1 with Rrqcls, a ~ m ~ . ~ r 1'~Fnponnt~ii~n fi~l rival of r hu Spartans. rls rrlations worst-nr-rl with .~Leginaancl Corinth. who wrrrb+j(maln~rs c ~ t z' h r rr:ldinq potenrial 01' Piracus. hy now tltc c-llirf'6 r c r k Iwrt. tcnsion in thr I't.lopnnt~cserapidly l~rramt-ac-utc.. 'lhc pmmincnr figure in r\tIlcnian politirs at this t i n ~ ewas Prrirlrs, who \vasdrtrrminrrl to unitr thr w l l a l ~of Grcccc under rlthrnian rvli~iousIradrl-ship. I n 457 n.c., Ilc completrrl tllr lbrlifira~icmof' ITraeus and linkrcl i t tr, :\rIicns \vith il wiillcil c.orridor almu t seven kilomrt rtms w i r l ~ . , ;tnrl hir command was 10 scr* thc city reach thc hcigl~lofits imperialist aspirat ions. Athenian expansionist polirv had hecnrnr sn obvious [ha! S p r r a scnt an I I ,mu-s~rongarmy lo Rocotia to prrsztarlc. its inhahitants to join E ~ P Pcloponnesian L v a ~ l i c -and rtmsist Arhrns. and this fclrcr drl'eatsd an Akhrnian army at 'I'anagra, ens1 or Thehes; hut i t thcsn withc!rcw IO the IstEirnrts I r n v i n ~the hroriitns ;it thr mt-rry 01' t h r 111hrninns. who took c o l ~ ~ r oofl t l i r wholv arm, rxct-pr Thrhcs i twff, two months later. Evcnt~rallya fiveyear pvac*c treaty w a s n c g o t i a t ~ d I j t - t w ~ ~tlw n rZItl~cniansancl thc Prlopnnnrsian I,c:lgvr in ,ls'z R.c., I)ut i t was t101 until ++5 n.c. that a c l r f i n i ~ i ~ r

trtt~c'.

intrrldrrl tcl last liu- (lrirty yrnrs.

rr'as aqrt.c*d

rnt~cuallyacct.pt;clhc*t r r n t s whit-11 wnuld hr likcl y to form ii Eal;~in,q pPnrc, and t11r tnmat!:l i b 1 1 prthy to 1 hc* ct)rr f tict ol' irlrrrcsts wl~icll rharitctesisrd rrlittions bctwrc.t~ :\thcnr a11c1 Sparla. howevr-r. find tlcr

19. &tail Fr $rb-tury LC painted v a y rhowing rn varicty o r w r ~ p o a n and clothing. (Louvre, Pariu)

Prl-ic-1w dircl in .y2g Bar:. and thc. rlrw Iradlr-, h i s attituclr, t11r11rcI h i s attrnt inn c I HP Iic>perl to scm\-c.r tllr links I)ctt\*t.~-t~ Syr;~c-~~sc. ;inti t hc

I ' ~ I n ~ ~ ~ n n ~Ihr ~ s irhr ; ~ ~Syrarusnns ~s, h;nl a subwhich roulrl 1,~- n thl-[.a[ to the Xtl~rnians.Thr war provrd inrntlclusivc. Ihr lmth :\tht.ns atlrl Sp;irta, l)ur in 425 R.c:- an t.s11cditiw1ro

stantial flrc-r

Sicily t11rnt.d thc sralrs in favour nr thr -4thrnians. Forty ships undcr Eurymctlion ;tnd Stq)h(-)clrswrgrt8 e r r i t t o rcinbrctr tmops all-cady in Sicily. T't;vcclling with thrm was Dcmosthrnt.~who, i ~ l i h c ~ ~hold~gh ing no cotnmanri, was t-mpowt.rt.d to rlst. t ht. iIc.r't as h e saw GL. Wlwn I
I I

,

,

m. A r6tbcmtury r n g t a v i n ~o f phdcm-ryit~gIhe long 'saris-' (Ii~iolh+~

.

iMadoniaa

!-cayi,

Dernosthenr~maclr thr :ipparcntly cstranrrlin;~~ prc~lmsitionthat thr flrrt slrt~l~lrl instc:trl put in at thr headlnncl nfPyltw on thr wrst coast oTXIIr.csc.nia, along which they w w c at that timr: s ; ~ i I i n ~ . Drmostllenes' plan was tc) hrriSy and htdd Pylrjs, Ijul the two aclrnirals wcrr unimprrsscrl artd wt.rrb only persuaded t n along with t h r - ir1c.a whcn ir storm co~npcllccl111{-mto shcltc~.in N;tvarins I3ay, protcctrd IIV lhc. Pylos prninsula and thc island nt' Sphactcria. Walls wcrthconnrurzrd IO thr southeast and south-tvt-s~ol' PvEos, and alw to ~ h tlc>rtlj r where i~ was cnnnccred by a sand bar In the. mainland Dernosthcnes, with livv shi1.n :lrltl I .ooo hoplirrs nnrl l i ~ 1 1 tt r n p s , was lrfi tn g a r r i s n ~tIir ~ hci~dland.

(Bib

Nmtimnsle, ~ q . i l /

1

1

.\lt~;tntvi.liilc.thr 1niUn l)nd!'

111

2 1 ~ flvrt .

maclr lor

C;nlr?1.a otirc Inrarr. Ilc*nirfitl~er~~\' I ~ ; I I I w:~q to

insiiyatc atlrl nljlltr)l-t I+L'VOIT i n .\!csEvII~;~.i l t ~ ~t IICl S l ~ ~ t i trrspnnst. ~b \\-as ~ \ v i ! i - 'TIlc* I,ulk ol' IIIV I'rlo~nwt~csiattal+ln!*withdrrw frc~rn:\ttica. \r*l~ic.h liad oncc aq;tirl I x ~ r t i nrr.~~l~ir.rl, ancl ~ ~ ~ ~ t . t * l i r c l t l i r r c ~ lt ~( ~I'! 10s. Tt~rS C ~ ~ I ~ I I I I . ;I[ ~ ) ~C:~II.(.~IX ~ W;IS iristnrctetl to sail i~tlr~lrtli;tfr.ly klr tllr samt. spot. n r n ~ o s t h c ~ l t - sLEP.C'EC . \\.it11 lhr ~i-Q.09131'Ct ol' a t !;irk frrlln land ant1 %-;I. reel i~c.stc.tlinimrrlinlv wicl frcim rrf tllr ;irtnihticr h a d hrrn violatrd, rcfil.;ccl to hand t hr rlthcniat~H(-c.1, tlow at %;rt.~;nthirs. Iliic k thra Sj3i1rln11 s l ~ i l illl~! ~ . 1>1~1~kit(l~'~I Sphac~rriii T h r Spartans prcl>at*rult o track tllr garrison at clrlct- nrorr. 'l'hr c*?rpc=c-rirt inn was r l i i l t the garristrn 13!mlus, prrli.r.it11ly hclkrr 11ic. rcttll-ll ol'111c.:tlhrnian o n Spl~;ic-trrinwoultl I)c s t a r ~ r r into l surrender. Ijut llt-ct, l ~ i tliit~n{I 1 h a ~thi. i1111y l~rat-~i(+itl~liap- S ~ ; I I ' Lp lAt r~i f Ii t ~ n l a n ; l ~ ~loE run rtn;dl S I I ~ P s~ h) i j ~ prcr;~chrsw r r r ;I! rliose ~ x l i n i sirlrriltl) limi fit-rl by ;islirrre rln ~ l i cseawartl sicle ol' Spl~uc.tc-ria.w11r.n Dr*n~osthrt~es. Hrqlinq to prriprnt:2tl1r1iiail ~ t s rr d stt-onewincl.; k v p ~ttlr A ~ I i ~ n i a t ~ ~the i t ilmy. ~ i ~and I~~ ~ h rirlancl . nl'Sph;wrrria, ~llr.Sparlans Ia~~rlrtl t h ~ r ;~~ f t c srvrs;~l r wccks ic W;IS rvIc1~11tll~attlw zarrisnn ;\ garrison (11' 420 11r;lviiv ar~nc-rlnlrn, of'\ \ , I w m ;I U.~AIICI l i o t st;In.e. D~rnosthc.11c.r was tuakillq plans filr arr assault nn litili. 11ndr.r a 11ii3r wcre rl-uc6 'Spartialvq', t'l'i~vk Sp;u-tan trrwps. 'I'ltr attack rlri l'!,lte was pnrti- Spliac t r r i ; ~whvn C:Ert)~iirjipc.i~rcd.h a v i r ~I~oi~stcd ~ czilal.ly rlilljcul~ 1 w . c . a ~ti!' ~ ~ 11s strctiqth as ;r Ir, tl~rh ~ ~ ~ - r ninl ~:\lllrns ly thal Ile coultl 1;1kc the fior~ific-i~tion. ;\a(! ~ h Spart;~"' r \wrc coi~iitrti;~ll\ i.;l;rnd in twc-nt y clays. :In initial a s ~ ~ u Ewiis r niatl~ ;Iwanhof T he possil iiit y o I ' a ~ t a c krrtlni t h r :ltl~t.rii;in with 8on Iurplizcs a1 rhc. sclr~~hcrn eml ol*thc idand I1rt.t t hrnugh thr. sot~tht-rrl t.litr;tncc to 111t. I)ay, i ~ n r la S p a r l ; ~ n o u t p s r ht.lrl I>? tllit.2~ 1 ~ 1 c . n rsaq which it was i ~ i ~ ~ ~ c hto~ I~loc-k;itlc iblr succ*qf'irlly. r)\*r-rlmwt-i=vrI; rt>,t)uo rl~ol-rmrn ii~llowrd.tntnrly 1:or thc clcl'rl~rt-ol' hi5 posilicln D r r n n s ~ l ~ r r i t r P i ~ h rtroops itlrlrwling; ahnlil 80n a r c h r ~ WIIO s h i ~ dil ~ m ~ Icl . 1d~qrratcr ~>;irt "This Eirst-r. a t tE?r Iandwalr3 c.onridrr:iI)l~.ittlvan t R ~ tP1 ~ ~ 111'a~ily 1 ' a1-mvC1 hopf o r ~!it-a~ions i wliilq~111m l i i ~ ~ ~ s ~ l l a' l5tmall ~ ~ ~11r)cIv ~ ~ ~ l litc.; r c ~in tht. nrr.kl; tcrrai~l.Ut.rncathcnrs' tacticbwas ot'hoplitrs to fight tJr:~ssnu!~ 1)). sim;l. Thc lat~rlrt-w to await tltt- i~rl.ivnlol at lilt-k. tl~nsc.Sliartans who ha(I not fillell I-rtrr;rtrd m i t i c r i ~ lilr l ~ ~llc.buildin!: ofsieqe rt~ginvs. ill lhcir tratlititmally t l i ~ c i p l j t ~ iil'iliiol~ r~l to thr rot-! Soon alirr rhr lull irt t l ~ vliqh tir~g,chr. i\theninri at thc norllrt-1.n cnd nPtElr islanil. t v h c r ~t h r y r;tngrd ship$, no\\- n ~ ~ n t l ~ rfirfry, i n ~nr.ri\-r.d itnd ir~sprc.rt.d t hcrn.wli-t-s in ;I semi-cil+clr to f i t ~ cthe ent-my. :It t31iasituation. Scrillq no nl)pi~rtut~it> ritht*rto ctltrt' t11c. s~rmntit01' a hill, rh~irflitnks prot~ctril.the thi* bay, \vllic.li W ~ oS~ c i ~ ~ ) i r c ltlic S ~ ) ; ~ r f illrtat, ln tlrli-nrlcrs 11c.ltl ~ h c i rown urliil :t group of' liqhtlr or to ~tlakc,a I;inrlitiq at Pylrls i t h ~ wo111~1 ~v 11;tt-1' armc.rl tnc.11, rommat~clrtlhy n h~lc-ssrniancaptain. ht.rtl rln room l'nr sr, w;my \.c.sst.Ixl t!~c.yI . P ~ ~ F C * ~ !cntnt. 111) o1.t-r thc hill and 1i.H u p o t~h~r ~ nT~nm~ h r rlrwtl~tcl ~ h isl;~tlrl r nl' Protv. rear. Yo.rr.I ha1 virton- tvas assu~=rd, t hc !tt henianr Early ncxt morriin~the Sl>art;inswcrr pu(ting to l~rid off. p l ' ~ t \ ~ ) ~ i ftol g rhe Spartans that tbcy sra, i t t i c a r h a v i n ; ~I,c-auhcd iht-ir ships Tor lhr. ~iight. sut.rr.rrdcr. Rlivr m u c h cliscussicm rhc remaining W I I P I ~ t111- r\tllrtliilrls ~IISIIPCI in I I ~ H I I I 111r111: 111~' 2 9 2 mrn. I st) al' t E i r ~ rSpnrtiat~s. ~ g;~\~c* t hrmst*l\.n S p a r t a n ships urr~+r p u s h ~ dhark 10i h r shnrc am!. 1" iitw'I wcrr takrw to ;lthet~s. rx,r~~tuall?+, t hr ;!rheni;~n~ mrccrerlc+riin c;~ptusit~,q U r p i t c tilr I>rilliancco6l3emnsrl~c:ncs'tactics in fivr \,ca~t-Is ancl cornplt-tc. mnlmaricl; I)T tlir Ila?., t r l i ~ s i n qtt, clllploy liis h o p l i t ~ rin ii s i t ~ ~ a t i owllrw n

-

liqht troops coi~ldbe u m I so much morc cKec lively, it was C:l~onwho. o n returninq to Athens, took [lie praiu- fi~rso prrsrigious a victory. ancl it seclmcd that the roriuncs or (he warmongers in Athcnian politics werP irr thc. ascrnciant. RUL,two years laicr, Cleon tlird in thc rout of thc Athcnian army at :\mphiupolis. and a fi rty-yeat peace treaty was t~ccntiatcdwhich called for Athcns to hand hack thosc cities shc had annexed durinq the war, along: with t h c prisoners from Sphacteria. In return, she rtqaincd nearly all the territories she had possessed a t the commrncrment ofhcrstilities. And so the war, which had heen so acutely cxp-nsivc in h t h human and ctonomic tcrms, led only to a rcsumption of thc sratus quo, as far as Athens and Sparta wcrc cancerned. Rut Carinth, Boeotia and Mcgara were so djssatisfiecl that the reopening of hnstflitirx was incvitablrr. Scvcr;tI firmrr Spartan allics, Argra, Cot-inth, Mantinca ant1 Elis, formrd an alliancc Indcpt'wlrnlly orthc Laccclacrnonians and nrgotiatd a trr-atv with thc Athenians in 420 B.C. under the acgis of a ncw ancl influential ilthcnian st rate go^, Altil,iadrs. This state of afiii',lirswas shortlivecl for, aftrr a Spartan victory at hIantinca in 418 n.c,, the I'rloponnmian statcs rcjoinrvl thc Spartan camp and I,acdacmonian supremacy ovcr t hc Pcloponncse was once morc cstahlishcd. Under hlcibiadr~thc Athcnian qumt for mastery of the Grwk worlrl found ncw inspiration ancl the :\ssernhly, despite the opposition oi'Rlcihiadrsl fellow slrnt~gosNicinq, r a t i f ~d an amhitious scheme toconquer Sicilv, in particular t h port ~ orSyracuse. An impressive rorcr was rnustcrcd comprising 5 , m hopIitcs, 1,300 lighrly a m e d troop and a fleet of t34 triremes with a complement of a b u t 20,000 men. In addition (0 this ~hcrttwere large numbers o f supply ships and attendant vessels. Although the land force was rclativcly small, the supremacy of her fleet ovcr any Syracusan opposition gave Athens hope For victory in SiciIv. 'l'he expedition was led by Nicias, AIcihiadcs and Lamachus; but not lone: i t f i c r i~rrival in Sicily, Alcihiadcs was recallod ro face political charges, and chose instead to cr;c.apeto the Peloponnesc. 1,arnachus ~avoureda swift attack on Syracuse, hut Nicias wasted time in ft~tilc cxcrcises and the Svracusans took the opp~rtunityto orgianizc thcir drfcnccs and srnd for help to Corinth and Sparta.

TR t h r s p r i n ~nf 414 B.C. an Athenian assault gained po~qrssinno f t hr plntcau nrl.:pipoiat., which commanded the city from the wmt, ancl thcv hcgan huilclinq ;L wall running nnrth lo south ovpr the pla~rauin an attcrnpt t o cut Syracuse o r rmm the rPst or Sicily. Tlie Sywcusan op1msiltion was unallle to prcvent this ancl the siruarion was hecornins despcraw, when [he Corinthian fleet arrived, hackrd u p hv a hastily raiscd army of n,ono hop1itc.s and light troops Icd bv Cylippus. This iirmv manaarcl toseizr the nor1hern part orEpipolac and to construct a counter wall wetwarcls across the plateau, frustrating the Arhrnians and cutting;their land communications. This forced t hr: Athcnians to scnd for reinforcerncn ts, which wrrr dispalchtrl unrtrr thr mmmand nf Drrnasthcnrs and Euryrncdon. Upon his arrival, Desrnosthcnes dccidcd that an irnmecliatc. attack offvrcd thc best chancc of surrws. Hc midc a night attack o n Epipolac hut was t~ns~rcccssii~l and ~hvt-rfi,rc.dutidcd that withd r a w i ~ lwas t hc wisest c o r ~ w Drlayrcl . by Nicias' intlrcisinn, tht. hthrnian flrrt was aucldrnl y blockaclrd bv thc Syracl~sansin rhc Grrat Harbnur and, despit~a valiant attrmpr to smash thhr way through tn rrrrdorn, the armv was hrcetl t o makr a lanclwarcl retreat towtlrrls C a ~ a n i a nnrth , ot'Syracuse. 'I'hey mart-hetF in it hallow wltlarth, prnrrctrd around the outside by heavy infantry. Falrltv communications Ird to thr separation ofthr lrading division, undrr Nicias, Tram thc r w r , I d bv Demoslhenrs, and thr. fi~rcvw m sonn overtaken and massacred hy [he Syracusan army. Nicias and Demmthrnm werr cxrcutcul and rhc 7,000 survivom were imprisonrd in ~ h cstone cluarries of Svracusr, where thry sulI'errd rrrril>lleprivations in thc merciless dimate. 'Thc Symrt~sandis:1stc.s was an irnmcnsr srthack to Athenian imperinlism and her enemies were quick to lake aclvantag~of the situation. Several stales revdled, ancl Sparta kegan refurbishing her fleet with too ncw ships. Besides these developments within Greece itsell; thc Persians, on the othcr side of the Aeqean, renewed their interest in thc Ionian Grcek states. Alcibiarlm, who had tcft just bcfbrc thc fateful events at Syrarusc, was at thk timc busying himself with political machinations involving Athcns, Sparta and the satrap nS Lydia, Tissapht.rncs. Puttinq hirnselrat thc tlisposal of the Athcnians,

Alcil~iaclrsIlvlprrl thr.rn ro rrqain tt~rHrlles~~orlr :~nrl I hc Ikq)l~orus1)ul. aftrr the clrii'at cr3' an :ltIirnian flc.c.t i l t Intiurn i r ~ ,l.oI; R.c., hr. was repl;~cvd1); Chlnot~.Hritsinq 1hn1lhc. Sl);~~-t;in llr-ct unclpr L ~ ~ i l t l (W:IP I t ' ~; ~ t r ~ n ~ p l i10l l disrupt g .\11tct1inn Ponlic. tr;itlr nnrl hat1 l~c~
t h r Hclleslm~it,I.>~nonrclok I Ho ships anrl nIlit+ed hat r lc a[ :~cgosptharni. 'Thr t l ; y :ilirr he arsivvd C;c>r~c)rrlwvd n up rowal-rls thc. Sp;trt;in flret at t,ntnpsacus only to find ~ h a lLys;mndt.r rt.fuscd t n engage. ;lncF so 111c ;\I lirnians r c t u r n ~ r lro .2r.%osy,or;1mi, ~)rtrsuculby Sp;lrt;m rccounai~ssnccships. For ;I Khrthcr tour clays this escrcisr was rrpr-a1rrl ; r hr nrst dav. I lie t i t hvnians, relturnit~~ li-om ?;(.I anotlrrr u n n ~ c c c ~ ~ f ~

challengr, put ashnrr in the hay oi'Aegcspotarni to rallcc~supplies. Apprisrrt or this ;)1 his srnurs, Lysander launchrcl a wrprise attack and captured all but nine of thr: Athcnian ships, massacring ovcr 3.000 men. Connn escaped with cighl s h i p to Cyprus, and a solitary dispatch tmar m a d r its way hack to Athrns with news of thr rlisastcr. 'I'he Spartans followcd up this virtual annihilation of the Athenian Ilect by hc*sir,qin~: Athens with thc Pcloponnesian army, and, blockaded from thr sea hy the victorious Lysandrr, Athpns was obliged to negotiate a wttlerncnt. The Spartans, in a position to demand almost any terms, i n s i s t ~ l that the Long Walls and brtifications be pulled down, a11 foreign possrssions ,@vcn up, ancl Athenian control confincd to Atrira ancl Salamis. Sparta. hitherto thr champion ofindividual state autonomy in Greece ancl thc vnrrny o f Athenian imperialism, now revealed thr vrry attitudes against which she had nstensibly f c n ~ ~ h The t. oligarchic governments SIIP at~crnptcdlo impose upon sul!jcct states proved unpopular, and Sparta had considcrahle trouble maintaining her leader-

ship in Grrrk politic?, 11r the rnd at' thc Peloponnesian war thc city militias which, during the years of mnff ict, had been almost permanently mohilizrd, wcrc disbanded. Largt* numhcrs of experjencccl wlclicrs were thus seeking employmenr of some kind, and, capitalizing on their capacity as fightinx mmcn, thcy hired thcmselvcs out to anyone who would pay we11 for their services. In 401 s.c. an opportunity arose for many mercenaries to take up arms a ~ a i nin the pay of Cyrus, yorrngcr brother of the Pcrsinn king Artaxerxes. Intending to overthrow his hruthcr, Cyrus induced the cities of lonia to revolt against

the satrap Tjsaaphcmes, and rnustcrccl an infantry force aT 40,000 ( 1 o,ooo of whom wcm rnrrrcenary hoplites) together with about 3,000 cavalry. Included in this force were joo hoplitrs sent hv Sparta, well aware that she was in debt to Cvrus for aid he had supplied during the Peloponnvsian war. After marching 2,400 kiIomctrrs, Cvrus conrronted Artaxcrxta' armv at Cunaxa, north of Babylon. Artaxerxes' a m y was prnhably half ns stmng again as Cyrus' army and was rquippecl with the scytlird chariots upon which the Persians relied to break up the cncm y's formation. Cyrus' trnops allowed thr I'rrsian chariots and cavalry to p:us

t h m u ~ hthrir ~=anks rrlativcl y harn~lrsslyand thvn i~rf\vinced on the. Prrsians, many nl- whom Ilrd immcdiatcl y. Cvrus' ~ i ~ v a l rthen y charged. but in an attrmpt to rcach h i s hruthvr in ordrr to kill him ~wrsnna11yCyrtis was separa ted lkom t ht*suppnrt r ~ f his army and lost his lifi-. T h e conclusion nl'thc hattlr left both Greeks and Persians unsure oiwhat to rln next. Despite ~ h r i r victory, thc Grccks wrrc faccd with attemptins a withdrawal with many hmtile Bmians still in thv arm. The Persians, for thrir part, wcre Inath ro rngagc the Greeks but krcn to be rid or them. 'l'l~cy offrrrd tn escort them out of the country and hack m Grcccc, hut soon after the march srartrd thc Grcck gcncrals were l u r ~ daway fmm the army ancl put t o dcath and the rctrcatine soldiers were thrn atkackrd. Quick to dercnd thrrnsrlvcs, tl~cygmuperl in *2 hox fnrmatinn with hop1irt.s munr1 t l ~ r outside and, keeping the Persian cavalry and liqhr tronps at hay with slingers, ~ h rGrccks. who had maintained good order and quickly clcctrd new strate~oi,managed to reach Trapezos on thc Rlack Sra. This extraordinary rrlrtmatwrll illustratecl thr in~cnuityof Grrrk soldirrs in maximizing thcir strrn~thin the race or Tar suprrior nurnl)rss. With Cyrus dead, Tissaphcrncs attcmprrd to remtahlixh his rule in Iania, and thr Grrck cities there appraIcd to Sparta Sir pro~rction.A flcct commanded by Pisander was sent to thrir aid hut at thr battle of Cnidus in 394 R.C-it clashrd with a P<.rsian forcr undcr Conon, the Athmian cornmandcr who had rscaprd at Argospotami and had had a change oS l~eari.T11c Spartans lost ii fty trircmcs, and al t hope or naval suprcrnacv in the A c ~ c a n .Takinq advanza~e01' this dcfcat, the Greek ciry starcs handed ~ogrther in revol L. Suppnrbcd by the Persians, Thches, Athens, Corinth and Arxos rrbclld, and although thcy wcrc dcfcated hy the Spartans ncar Corinth in July 394 R.C, they entered upon thc Corinthian war, c l u r i n ~which some notable succcsscr; were scored against thr Spartans hy tht alliecl generals. Even~ualsialcrnatt led to Persian-inspired peace propnsds which dernandrd thcl Forfrit o f Asiatic Greek citios to thc Persians, and sc-cstahlishccl Spartan lradership in Greece. I t was nor long hcfore the inevirat>le rebellion came. This timt. thc centre was "I'hrhrs, fortunate in her military commander Epaminonclas, who is said to have introduced into Grrek

the old PeEopnnacsian IA-~RUCa ~ a i n s hcr, t Icadinq to a r o n ~ r o ~ ~ i a tor l o the n Theban and allied armirs at Manrinca. Roth lbrces were over 20,000 strong and Eparninondas' tactics were the same as they had been at Leuctra. The massed 'I'hehans broke chuir oppencnts*right wing, hut Epaminondas was killed, and without his grnius r h Thchan ~ army failed to push home for a cfccisivtt rrsult, AIicr that, Thcban p w c r failecl, ancl the city states, squabblinx over poIitical control, Ijrtle st~sp~cteclthl: radical changes which la): in the near liiture.

~A/XUIIAYthe 9~/7t

warfare the successf~rlusc of a tactic arainst thc renowncd Spartan hoplitex. In a valley near Leuctra in Bwutia, a Spartan force thought to num her approximately I 0,000, of whom 1,aoo wcrc cavalry, met Epaminondas whose army was of a simiIar siw and constitution. 'The Spartans took up their traditional formation, with thc best tronps on the right wing, and thc rest of their infantry spreacl o m , twelve deep, in a relatively straight line. Eparninandas posted his Theban infantrv, fifty deep, on the left of his force oppmi~cthe track Spartan troops, and had the remainder of his men set obliquely back towards his right wing. The cavalry of both sides, stationed ahead ol' the infantry, cngagcd first, and the Spartans were decisively dcrcatcd; whilst still in disarray, thr Spartans werc hit by the massed strength of the hopli tes on rbe Theban left and were unahlr to resist. The Spartans lost over I ,000 men, qoo of whom werc Spartiates, a trrrible blow to a state whose rorces had never heforc: hren drfeated in pitched, battle. Et was now t h c turn of Thches to dominate, just as Sparla and Athcns had once done, but this served only to unitc thc city states of

On the death of his brother Perdiccas in 359 KC. Philip I1 of Macedonia, then aged ~wcnty-thwe, srizcd the throne. During his reign he created a unificd national army such as had n w e r been seen by thv volatilc alliances of Greek states. In the first twu p a t s ofhis rule he succeeded in redefining the boundaries of the rragrnented kingdom hc had inherited, and spreading his intrrrastsfarthrr afield towards Pangaeus, Thrace ancl Chalcidicc. Although reluctant at first to interlire in the afhirs o f other Greek states, Philip was forced in 354 R.C. to take action against Phocian inaetf'erence in Thmsaly, which lay immerliatrly to thc south of his own lands. Dcfcating the Phocian army near Phcrac in 351 R.c., he movt*d on against Phocis itself, but a m v i n ~at Thermopylae he found the Phocian army supported by 5,000 Athenian hoplitcs and decided that i t would hc prudent to withdraw. Philip was anxious to avoid conflict with Athens, thc forcmost naval power in Greece, but Maceclonian policy was by now amusing concern in the Grcck statcs. Athens however, keenly aware of her current weaknesses, was happy 20 accept peace proposals concluded in 346 B.C. which receivd Philip into thc Dclphic Arnphictyony; this was a federation or Grwk statcs, and i t is at about this time that Philip dcvdoprd iclras not only of extcnrling Maccrlanian hrgcmonv nvcr thr whnleof Greece hut of uniting the Greek states and carryinq the war against thcl Pcnians. Despite setbacks at Pcrinthus and Byzantiurn in an attempt to take contml of the traclr routes of the HclIcspont, Philip moved muth once morr and in 339 LC., bvpassed Thermopylae anrl occupied Elathia. Athcns and

Thehrs f i ) r n ~ d an alliance against him and. raising a forre of owcr 40,cx)n mrn, they nwt Philip at Chaemnea in 3138R.C. Philip, with 3n,m infantry and 3,000 cavalry, cntrustcrF to t l w cavalry on his lrft wing, who werr lcrl hv his son Alexander, thc task of hreaking the Thc'uan phalanx. 'I'his t h y duly did, whilst Philip's rie;ht wing madr a ractical retreat lo draw thr Athenians on and hrcak the Greek linr. Thc plan was succcs~ft~l, and tlsc Athenians, trappcd bclwprn Philip and Alexander's victorious cavalry, wrrc severcly defeated. Apprcciatinq the scnsrlrsmcs5 of annihilating rhosc soldiers he Ilopcd mon lo command himsell; Philip allowrul t l ~ ealljm rt, r ~ x p c . Tltis victory rffcctiv~ly estahlishvrl Philip's It-adenhip of rhr Hellenes, ant1 having sccurcvl hrinrh, hr summoned to thp city rlr.lcptcs from thc Greek states and pmpmed ctlr Ibm;ltion of a drfcnsivea!~~-nsivo lca~utrunder Macrdonian military command. 'l'bc C;rucks wrrc hrccd to accrpz. Philip's aim was to Icad an c x p ~ l i t i o ninto Asia a ~ a i n s trhc Pvrsians whose perpetual intrrfrrrnce in Grrrk alhirs wprcsrnltrcl a ~hrrar t o hllarrclonian hrgrmony. In 376 n.c. he scht11 ~ o , m mrn under ParmcaL)l o rsti~hlishn fmtholcl llryor~rlthr Hellespont in nithynia and t h ~ 'I'roarl wliilat hc himsell' assernblrcl t hc main invxqiotl I'orrr. Philip was, IIOWPVCT, dcrrtincd ncvcr to rralixc his amhition personally, for in thc atltumn ol' 336 n x . . at ltis daughtcr"~wpdctinq in Prlla, he was assassinated, and i t was lrrt ro h i s son,Alexander, tn rnakr sure t h a ~~ h kdcration c did not drgcnoralc rmcc more into a rltrstrr or bickering rivals. I'hilip's death was followcd Isy revolt amonq thc ritv-stares, ancl only after Alcxandcr had swifily supprcsrd rrflrllion in Thchw and destroyed thc rity did the Grrekx rvalizc. that thr rlrw rufrr conld rctain as strnng a holcl as his fathrr had over insurgent rncml~rr-starcsof the contcrlcracy. Thrrr had l ~ e e nimplications of Prrsian I,~-iberyin thr rcvolt, ancl i t was olwioris to Alexander t h a ~his Fat hrr's plan must hr implcmcntcd if Grerk unity was to IK maintainrd. Lcavinq a small force of 9,- men and a fi-w horse to ktrp ortlrr in Grrcce, hlcxandcr leli Pella Ibr Scstos, and in spring 334 sac.brought his army into 'I'roas, ' h e Pclsian forccs untlcr thc recently enthront.4 Darius I11 wcrc cornpowd, as usual, ol' a vast conglomeration of trmps of ditT~rrntnat innalitics

whn were never rvcltlrtl into n sinql~,wtll t ) c v ~ n izcd fightinc bodv. 'E'hc 1mt trt>r~ps, C;~-t=c-k mcrct.nnrirs nncl Persian c;iviilsy, oficn round themst-lvr..uundcr the higher camrnancI of'rclativciy incnmprtmt satraps who l a c k 4 tllc ability to make

the hrqt use of them. Alrxander's force of approximat~l y 3o,noo incintry and 5,000 cavalry had a core or r 2,noo Maccdonian root ancl I ,800 first-ratr hlacrclonian cavalry, I ~ u tinclrirfcd, along with :i,ooo merccn irrica, j,oao i n k t r y ant1 Goo hnrsr from t llr Grrck stales. Qnrstions of stratc-gy lay cntirrly w i ~ l l~ h c M ;tccclonian high rnm nlsnrl , and a sys1c.m was rlrvisc.rl wherclp+ rcinforcrmrnts were 1)rotlght prrinrEically rrom Grrr*rt. lo kccp the arm?. up to st rmgt h. Thc Itlact.tlonisns' chier wc-i~knrss\ r u s their f1t.t-I, which mmpriscd only rfio trin.rnt.s, Thc i~dvancrhrrr ~rnclcrI'armvnitr harl Iwrn s~~llil.inq sr\,rrely at the. h a n d ~ ~ 1 ' M e m n o n 0 ~ R h ~ ~ l ~~1 .h1 t~ ~ satraps ol'thc nci,qhbourina rrgiot~a.on Ilc;~rinqor hlexandcr's arrival, joincd 14cmnon in t hc 'I'roarl.

+P

h m helmets, hw,W p a r r ~ quiver, , tunic, rxe mdjavclfn. Mnny arthcrrc were aftrn worn and c a m r d by Ptmian troops.

U 11dc1-thc cotntrlar~do f Aristz~.satrap o f Hr~llrs~mntinc Fhryin, t h ~ ydiscusserl thcir stratc-gy: Mrrnnon's nt,und arlvicr was t o rrtrc.:it. dcstroyinq the land as 11ley went, arid t l ~ r . t i to v a r y thr war into Grevct-, leaving 1hr. i)c.lr.agut.~*rd Alrxandrr in a hostile wasteland ; l ~ i tlijs t plan was r ~ j r t t r dhy 111~ satraps. who fitv~~urrcl an irnmcdiatr conflict. app;~rcnrly placing thcir uonfidcnce in thc advant i i p thcy h;ld avcr Alcxandcr in their choicr nf' rcl-rain. F'osi tioncd on the eastern !lank of thc rivcr Granivus (which was in thc area ol' the Darclatic.lIt.s), thrv cnt~ldforw .'\lr?cancler to alcernpt a prrcario~~s crossing whic tl wou ltl 111-rak h i s liwmarion and hindrr thr rlf'rctivr use nf rava1t-y. ?\lthouqb thr Pvrsinn infantry was nr) rnatcbh for that ol'thr Macvtfonians, Aristrs war; rrlyingon hi9 supcrior 11t1rnl)rrs or ~ ; - I v ; I ~ I ovvr -v I 5,000- to countcs any Mart.tFonian attack. O n reaching IIIC /,a~tLc-groundAlcxandcr's staff saw clcarly thr dangers o f a dirccc advance across the river, and so, ovcrnight, they rno\~cddownsttram. forcling; the river at dawn. Ry the time the Persian ravalrv, summonrd by scouts, had arrived at hlrxander's crznsing point, tlzr Maccrlaniarl phalanx llaci Sr)r-mt.d u p and hlc*xandcrk cavalry charged, forcing a I'crsian rrtrcat. '131eg~.oundon the castrrn s i c k of rhr Granicus gave the Maccdonian c.aval~-ythe chance to cxercise its skill t o tFlc full. and as soon as the Pcrsians advanced on his position Alrxancler moved his right wing cavalry against r hcm. Moving first towards the Persian Irft, hc suddenlv bore round and forcrd his wrdgc Formation inro the Persian centre. 'I'hc cnrmy rvplirul with a similar chargr a p i t l s t the .Macrdonian ccnzrc, but Irft thcir infijntry an easv target lbr thp Maccdcmian phalanx. A further cavalry c h a r ~ c ,this timc by Parmrnio on the Macedonian riqht wing, pur the Persians to fligfr t, leaving only a pocket ol'rcsistance kern Memnon's Greek mvrccnarics, snon ovcrcome by the triumphatit Alcxandor. 'Thc clrfcat cost ..\ristes 2.500 cav*2lty, and disprlltxl anv illusions Darius miqht have had about thc gmvity of the

/

!

2%

(imk

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dabort sword.

hehim& o f t h e b r r i c sty1c,shittd

Memnon who had cscaprd at Granicus, proved intransi~ent; Alexander leTr. a dctachmrnt of 3,000 font anrl noo horse ro besiege the port, and hradcd on round the Lycian coast, aiming cvcntually to occupy all the ports or the uastcrn Meclitrrrancan, thus renclrrritlg the Persian flcel inoperative. By Octobcr 333 R.C. h e had arrived at 'Tarsus in Cilicia whence he mevcd arnuncl thc coasz of Syria to Myriandsus, only la hear t h a ~Daritls' forces had nlanoeuvr~dinrn position hehint1 him, at Issus, on the northern bank of 111erivcr Pinarus. Hia lincs of supply artcl communication cut, Alcxandcr was forced to turn a h u t and light. His exhausted troops marched back towards ~ h Pinarus c where the Persians, having once again choscn thcir Macerlonian threat. position with care, awaitprl rhrrn. Darius was Many cities in Asia Minor submittrd without protecting his weak Asiatic infantry with Greek troublc to Alcxancler, b u ~h v mt.t with sornr. mercenaries, who, along with the 2.000 first class rcsistancc, particularly at Mllrtua anrl Halicar- Pcnian tmops of the Royal Rodyguard, and rhc nassus, After a short siego ,Milvtus was t~rupicd, lightly-armed Cardaces, made up the Persian front but Halicasnassus, d e h d c d by thc c-xpcrienccd line. As Alexander approacl-lcd, Darius moved his

main cnvalq fi)rt.c.onto his I - ~ s F I ~ wing w a r rhr scil shorc.. Partnrt~ioand i2lcxanctrr- Ictl 111cleli and r i ~ h winq r c . a v : ~ rrppc-r-tivcly. l~ t hc. pl~il!;tnstakinq

wtlirh, suitahlv Ect.rllctE. wr>ultl br atlmirmaI>lr t r ~ ~ n iLi~r t l his r-;l\.;~lry : ~ t l t l chariots. A lirs a110~,in.q11 is ;irIny srvrral rlilvs' rcsl, A l r s a ~ ~ r l rwllo r . harl hcb;tiul l i l ~ r nc-;~ptnrrdscottts of up the relitrr. As soor1 its thr first vclltry of arrrlws h;ld hrerl E);11-i us' finill plan, rract~rcl~ b Ir~ t 1 tlrfic.Irl i171dsaw loosect hy thr Pet+sian;irrhers, 11lvx;iridrr led t h c = to his hol-rc~rrhar I1;lri ~ r l ; ' tbrcc.s WVTF considc*rably ~ hilrl hrlirvrcl. Thc Great King was Cotllpariir~nC:av;~lrl;in a hrilliilztt c-harce ivllich st rnr1qc.r t l ~ n rhcshattr~.rclTkrius* riqt~twinq. Wnwt.vt.r, [his crcatrtl rrlyinq ntl a srrt)nqEy arrnrrl cav;~lr! ol' :+~,O(IO to fntm~hi^ fkont linc: the- hIarr.ilr~nianc a v a l l ~wotllrl a gap to t h r rig111 01' thr ntrugglinq hInccdorliitn i111nt')st livv ro orrtm.O n *r!j p I ~ ; ~ l ; ~aticl n u intn ~ l ~grrp i s Daril~s'sI :i.rrk ~ n c r c r r l - lw ot~tnumllcrctf r ;I t ~ r l ;tri(-s p n ~ ~ r e cIMI l , tling i*m-iotlsly wi I 11 . \ I ~ ~ S : I T ~ ( ~ ~ ~ I - ' S Sep~c.rnl)cr:\lrx;lntlr.l- r*c.c.onnclitrcrl t l ~ plain centre. 121t.xandrr's mitit1cot1cr.r-tintlw wils citlirr t i 1 capturp Dari tis or tcl kill him. hc~pirtqt o rcmoIbe, nltlnq with tl~r.C;rc*iri Kiriq, any 1Lrtl1cr unirrrt oplmsiirinn wit hit1 rhr Pvrsian F,';lttpirt., n;~rius, s r r i n ~rllr rlanqcr, flrtl ~ h l~atrlrfielrl. r : ~ l t h o u h~ ~l~ apparently woundcrl :\lcx;lndrs wf H ) illmost rook him i r i a dirt.rht chargr. I t i n r e h t - rhould ~ n i r s ~ r t .Alrx;~zlrlt~r , hat l first In mxkc sure of his victory: hr twnerl 11Ix right wirlg nqaiust llle 13c-rsE;incvntrc.. Thc nivrrcrlarirs wrrr shatt~rrc!and thrir prrrlicanrcnt taustrl thc caralr.! on thrir r i ~ h t ro li~Ilow P)arius in Clisht. 't'hr. hf;lcedonian~ fbl lowctl and t IIP I'c.t.si;~~isw r r c rnutccl. "rIrsanr1c.rwas now [irt. t o pursllr the. Grri~t Kin3 himwlf, I ~ uI);~ri~ls l Ilai1 T T I ~ I C ~gow1 C his rVscnpr, 0vr.r 1 o,ooo I;I.(*I'~ ~ ~ i ( - r ~ t ' ~ i ~; ~~~~. ci (c*ts~ ~ srpfi~lly trcbst~rl, to nfkt. 111c.ir srrvic.f*sin thr= nrsl c.onflict. whir11 wras i n ~ v i ( i ~ l ~ils I c Ic)tiq its n:ll-iitx n.rnaincrl The E>atilt-orclrr nl':\lrxi~nclvr's army was clr;lwn oveslorcl ur t hz. Prrniiu~F,mp>in.. 1113 1 1 ~ clay ~ ~ in 1 rnuc.11 t h r snttw way ;ts it l ~ n d11ct.11 at r\lrxandrr prtsl~rclon clowr~ rhr Syriars romt. C;r;uiicns ant1 Issus, IJLII with i h t w i n p strt-ngtaking all tllc E'rrsian naval hmra arlrl rlicrt*l>y tilt-nrcl ant1 ; ~ ~ g l rllnrk d li-om the mait1 litrt-c. ollti~iningcomj)Irtr rtll~lroli r rhv ~ r*nstchr-tlhlrtli rcr- 13~*Iiind;I c.;~v;tlry srrckc-11 ( ~ nthr r i ~ l l twine, hc rantLan,rldvtour was made i r l l r ~T,.qpl, hi11 I,? the ~>l:lrrda ~ ) i ~ w c r f imrrrrnar): ~l force, whils~ the sumrncr or 331 R.C. Alcaantlrr hat1 Icrl l ~ i satmy rvrnaind~r01' rl~crl~c.l.r-t.n;lrics and t t ~ c1,raglrc back notthw;trrls 11trt>ughSyria 10 Thapsactw t)n it~lkr~ry ~srr~tcctrtl t h r . rr*nrh.'1'11~1c.t-t winq WRF. its thr Kttphratcs, r n rrltltc' for Ral~ylon,thr rconomic crntrc r)rt hr Empirt.. Mcanwhilt.. Ihrius, 2 hinkinq that hlrxandt=r wt~uldhead clown t l ~ l r f3upl1r;ltcs. preparvtl f i r 1 rrprat of Rrta~c~~~xcms' dvl'ral ; i t tn makc ,a dvcisivt* r l ~ a r g cinto t11r )?c*rsi;tncetllse Cutlaxa which tay a little rrorth or H;lhylori. Thr whc-rr Dsrius Itimscl I' w;w positionccl. i\s t h r two astlltr Mact.rloninn Ir-itdekr was not, l~owtlvrr.I r k I,r ;irmius apprnachrrl rach athvr, r\lrxanrl~t~'srrlrn rlrawt~intr) t h i ~trap. ;rnrl having
easily hccause the walls had been allowcd to crumble awav; from thcre hr moved eascwarcls through Susa, Yrncpolis and Pasgarda, thcn north west to Ecbatana. Darius still eluclrd him, and whcn, a Tew clays latcr, Alexander finally caught up with him, he hacl twcn rnnrdered by UPSFUR, who no doubt felt that Darius'failure at Guagamcla was too murh to hear. h~surnincthe titlc of King aF kin,^, Alexander marched to thv <:asternsatrapirs trt cnnsolidatr his npw empire, csrablishing !I'orts for thc dcfcnce of his north-eastern firmtier be tbre turning south inlo India, Hc cmswd the Indus and arrivcd in 326 B.C. at H ydaspes (Jhclum). Alexandrr had hoped to ford the rivcr,Jhclum at Haranplir but arriving. at the crossing Sound Porus, an lndian king, waiting on the apposite bank with a ~n'orrnidahlerorce including archrm, c hariats and, mtlst t crri fyinp: of all, elephants. Crossing the rain-swtdlrn river at this point was, ofcourse, out ol'thc question, and so Alexander plannccl to deceive Porus in to holding his position whilst the main Macrdonian farce was transported upstrram to cross the river further east atJalapur. Leaving a forcc under thc command of Cratenis at Haranpur to trick Pcwua into hlicving that the army was dctaying there, Alcxandcr moved a rorce o f 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot upstream ancl hrgan to transporl i t across to the south bank. Nrws of this manoeuvre rrachd Porus whilc there was still time for him to counter it, and he r r a l i x d that his wisest move was to cngaye Alcxander as soon as pmible, preferahIy before the Maccdanians re-formed on thc southcrn hank. Leaving a small force to hold Crarsn~soff, he went upstream to mcet Alexander with an a r m v estirnatcd at about 22,000, including ~,ooocavalry and I 30 elephants. Porus drew u p his hattlc Line, ahout six kilomrtresIong,on ii flat sandy plain.castofthccros~;in~ at Haranpur. T h e hulk ol'his m o p wcre infantry bur on each wing hc postcd his cavalry, scrrcncd by war chariots. Whcn thc two armies met, Alrxandm sent two divisions of cavalry, o u t OF sight, around thc Indian right wing. His hope was that upon srring the depfetcd main Macrdnnian cavalryl Porus would launch against i t both win,gsofhisown cavalrv, in an attempt to wipe it our and gain a swirt victory. Alexandef s assumption was correct; as the right wing of the Indian carralrv charqed,

-

q.G m k m r r t o r dm-

from a k r e in m

Florentine @my.

Parmenis was just rnanaginq to hold o l f Mazcus and the Persian right wing cavalry. As sonn as thc Persians were fullv occupicd on both his Ranks Alcxandcr led a rurious charge, in thr prnvecl weclgc formation, riir~ctlyinto the Persian ccntre, and succeeded in putting Ifilrim to nigh[. Bcssus, now cut off from Darius and I'earing that Alexander's wedge might turn upon his cavalry, began to rctreat. Once i i lwcarne cleat that narius had fled, Mazeus iao withdrew from thc stru~gle and the Persian front line rapidlv disintega~rd. Reports of the losses at Guag-arncla wcrr incnnsistent, and t herc are no reliablc f i g ~ s e on s which to base an estimate. Alcxandcr imrnedia~clysct off after Darius, only to find that he had onrc more disappearecl. However, Alexander hacl 1-s cause t o worry now that the defeat at GuagameIa had desrroyed thc Great King's crcdihility. Alexander marched on to Babylon, and looh i t

Alexander's rrsrwr force took them Tmrn the mar. N'i th t h c Indian horsr trapprcl, Alexandrs odered the phalanx and Guards Brigadr to advancc, and the battle was soon won. The march into lndia continued, Alexandrr planning tn rrach the Ganges and then thc coast. However, his men, veterans of an arrluons and lcn~thycampaign, found thcir morale hmkcn hy the unkaral>lc monsoon climate and they rcfuscd to 30 flurt her. Alcxancl~rhad no option l ~ tut o make the journcy homeward. He consrruc~~d a f l c r t on thc Jhrlum and fbllowcd thc river to rhe mouth of the Indus, where, having established a naval station a t Pattala (Hydc.rahad), hr dividcrl his army intcr two sections and made his way hack to Susa, which h c rcached in thc sprinp, of 324 B.C. A yrar later hc moved to Babylon, his chosen capital, and began tn plan various explorations or his empire. Alexander himself ncvcr implemen tcd thrsr projects, Sir be fell ill with malaria, and on lo Junc 323 B-c., he died leaving his empire to bc fought ovcr by the strongest of his gcnrrals. In the years after his death rhe memory or Alexander merger! with romantic talcs of sup~rhumanvalorir giving rise to the myth which represents him as a demi-gd, parsuing a vision of world unity. A closer look at Alcxandet's hiatoty may suggc-qt a rather d i K ~ r t~story, n blr t even today his military prowess and indirrputablv brilliant generalship rcmain his most endllring rnonumrnt.

e8, G

d w a d q drawn f -

-

t

Sicilkan v a ~ .

- -

was a bow

and quiver darrows. Traditionally the Persians and the Meclrs scrved mainly as archers.

A 2 Pmsinn Imrnortol s p ~ n m a n 12rotn information shown in colourrtil glazed -hick rrliers in the ruins or PcncpoIis the Immortal spearman is depicted hcrr in the dress ol*thr kinx's A I Pminn stundard-h ~ m ~ r This s(anda1-d-hearer, taken rrom a paintitl~:or] a bodycuard; thry wcrr thc clite corps of the kinq's Grcck vase, wcars [he traditional woli'-skin tic-ad- bodyguard and army, and they wcrv callcd d r m 0ovr.r thr head and shoulrlrrs as a clistinction or *TmmartaIs' hcc.a~isc thcir numhrrx were never rank. Thc colnurfi~I, pat t~rncd,tir nic and trousers allowed to fall helow ro,ono, with the possjhlc madr thc standarcl-bearcr easy to recognize in addition of somc infantry and cavalry. 'l'hey ware battle. The 'uniTom* followed thc Mrdian style the Pessian style 0~1ong-skirtcd,loose-fitting tunic with close-fitting tunic and narrow slcrvcs, tight at with thc wide flowing slccvcs. The skirt was hitchcd thc wrist; under the plain short skirt, thc close- up in front with a f r i n g ~ waist l sash. I t is possihlc fitting truscm also fitt~l-tightly at the ankk. No that a claw-fit tin^ under-tunic was worn with shield was carried as both hands were required to narrow slrcves fitting rightly at the wrist (these can raise the standard, hut slung from the leu shoulder be seen crmcr~ngfrom the wide slcrve). The tunic,

lg. G m k a -r, showing pn early shield from *be inside, helm&, g m v c q swoxd, bow, quiver m d herald stpffs.

colourrt~llyd r c o r a ~ dwith floral or grornet ric '111~hair and hvard were plaited in thc Persian fashion, and rncircling thc head was a broad twisted cord lillrt. He carried the main Persian weapons, a spear and how with quivcr. h r h the bowand thcvrnatcquivrrwere hung !+om ~ h Irfi r shoulrlrr and the long, 24-mrtrc spear wizh thr pomegranate hrrt t spike was carrird in thc right hand. Far rhc officers, the hurt spikr was gil E and for the m m i t was in silver. On active svrvfce rhr Median stytc clrms wolild probably havc been

was

drsigns.

B Arnh cnmd cfit~nlry 'I'hr has-relief work in thr ruins ol' thc Palacr or Assl~rbanipalat Ninrveh shows details t~ftht.ratnclriding Arabs. The Assyrians had almost des~rnyed thc clesert nomads to which thest. camel riders belonged and had thrrehy oprned thc way Lbr rhc Persian attack and invasion r)T thcir countrv. 'The Prrsians further clrvrlopcd thc camel cavalry corps far lhoir own r~scand thc firsk-known successful operation was ;t~ainst thc RalrvIonian,

547 K C . anrl Iatrr sqainst khc clrsert nomads or Syria and Arabia. The carncI carps was oftcn a two-man unit ol' cavalry, kuing us(:
C:tocs~;us,in

central position, wou Id chargc the cnrmy after several attacks by thr fisiloi. This p n ~ soldier f (~ht. name means nakrcl) was armed with thr simplest wcapons, a sword (ntfirllnira) and a,javrlin or club. Thc hrielks! ofclothing, usually a chiton turned clown and Ihstcnrcl at thewaist, wllich lcft his arms cornplctclv f r ~ e ,and movernerlt unimpairt*d. W e made iin excellent skirmisher Tor the typc ofwarrare which was carried out in this prriod.

Cz Creek henry infonlrv (Irofilite) The massed formation of hoplites was a most formidable tactic, thcir harsh clisciplinr: and fanatical llcrusal to yield gmund making them idcal soldiets, ' 1 % ~heavy brll-shapcrl cuirass so pnpular in the clm~icalpcriocl was now giving way to a composite flc*xihlr leather-I~ackcclcorselet which was covered with small over-lappirt~metal ptatcs. Over this t~ody-piecewere two s houldrr-picrrs, which were sccuscd at the back, and then pulIr.cE 9 G m k trumpeter with shir1d (aspis), from which hlmg n paiattd t r protector, ~ fa vase p h t i n p . over the shoulders and lacccl at the ii-ant. This corselet was worn over the simple chiton which camc down to the miridlc o r thr thigh. Thc hody, kom the waist down, was prfitrctcd, as wrre sornrtimr's the shoulclers, by strips of lrathcr known as ~ / P ~ I I , ~ P . Twhich roll Id Be a rlisadvantaqe in closc-rluarte~. (feathers) usttally weighted with a small mcl;a! fightinq. plate. Thr large round shiclcl, which was called arr Cj: C h p k s l i n ~ ~ r aspis, was peculiar ro the hoplitrs ;it was designed so Similar to t Ile , g m n ~ t \ . ,thc slingcrs were also light that the support arm lsat~cl and the hand grip infanir!. skirmishers (f2~ilni).They worr a simple positioned thr shicld to prott:ct half of the holdrr chiinn with na arrnnur other than the small: round and half oi' the hoplite on his lcft. This rnacle thv shield (pelfe). Apart from the sling thcir only solid Formation firwhich they werc rcnowned. Thr weapons wou1d l)r pcrhaps a small knifc or dagger shield-boss was d t c n shapecl likc thc hcad of'an carricd from a shouldcr sling on rhr Irft sirlc. '['he animal and paintrd. The shins and lower Ergs wt.w sling made tiom lrather could he a most cfTectivr protccred by hronm greaves, with the reel oftm and dangvr<suswcapan in t hc right I~anrls;rnissilcs hare. As all hoplires had tn find thcir own werr tit her sloncs or small [earl pircrs, sornctimes equipment there wrre various stylcs, and thr rnrssagrs were carvtd on rhr rnissilrs, f i r ltse in hclmct was no cxccption. The hopli tc illust r a t d siege warfare. It was said that thc finest sling~rsin wean a Doric-slylc hclmet, which was compIeteIy thr Grcrk army came h~rn thc island ol' Khorlcs. dosed except for two smalI openings for thr eyrs, and ornamented with a large horsehair crest fixed D P~rsjuncnrlnlrymnn to the top of the l~elrnct,with a Leatl~rron each siclr. \Vhm drscribing rhr: Pcmian army of this prriod The sho1.1, thrust in^, straight sworcl was Lor with i t s hrtc.rr>,qrneousapprarance it must he bornc fighting at close quartcrs ; for the fbrmation chargr in mind that, despi re arehacolo~icaldiscovesics ~thclong-shafted spcar was usccl. Until the timc o f and Grvrk writcls such as Mrrtnlotus and XenAlcxandrr, the hoplitcs often wore their hair I r m ~ , ophon, thr dress is rnostly rrr.onstruction ant1 oprn

to dispute, especially as the Persians went unchronicled by thcir own pccrplc. This cavalryman is rirrpinq a shielcl; opinion is ciividr~lallout whrther or not shirldrr were carried. 'l'ht- 1lorse is withrlut armour Tor, although thcrr wrrc cavalry units which were partially armourucl, this was not a widespread practice. Durinc mrnhat the Prssian arm); worc Mcdian drcss, which was mnrr practical f i r horse-hack rid in^ and campaigninq, ancl which was usually brightly rolourtgcl. A vcsy ornate and elahorate bronze helrnrt was worn which had a home-hair crest an [he lop and a trailing tail at the basr of thc helmet. His quil tcd lincn cuirasl;, po~qihly with metal shoulder pit-ccs, had thc advantage of bring

3'. F-ian smIdicre m a v - m i q Pc~snpolis.

dm-

from ruins st

liqht in weight and very functional. The weapons were javelins or spears or bows ancl arrows. The mounts used I>y both Grceks and Pcrsisns wrrt: wrll-brcd horses of about fiurtccn to fiftccn hands and were typical o f the countries surrounding the Mediterranean at this period. The Persian cavalry used bridles that were very much the same as m d e r n onm. 'Sherc was no saddle and no stirrups; the cavalryman's only cumfbrt was a s a d d l ~dorh which was secured l,y a girth to the horse.

E r G r d ho/dir~ Thc appearanrr of' thesr hcavil y-armourcd hoplites varied from city state to city statc only by the various emblems and blazons painted on thc shicld racesand armour. Althou~hconstantly at war with each other, theyjoined forc.esto combat thc Pcmian

invasions in qge and 480 E.C. 'I'hc basic dress was the corsclet with the two shoulder piecm. the lower part ofthc body bring covcrcrl by I he Irathcr strips $ t ~ m x ~ ~Thr r ) . shield was rotind and measurtd a hour one mctre or rnclre in diametcr ; rrlirkn this had largc I ~ ~ S S P Son t l ~ vlitl)n~ in the ti~rmrjrnnirnal hrads ancl werc usvcl i11 close-quarter fiqhting 10 push against the cncrmy and crush him. Thc Clorinthian-

typc helmet was made in onc picrr with ;t larae colourcd horsehair crest. Painted hron7x grcavcs wen= warn as Icx protcrctors. Thc short thrusting: sword was carried hanj$nq from a leather strap over the right shoulder. A long spear was often used which had a hcad at ei thcr cnrl ; whrn thc shaft w a s 't>rokenthc w c a p n could br rr.vcrscd and the fight continued.

E2 Gr~tkard~rn Thc Greeks werr: not renowned Tot thrir prowcss as archers, compared with thr Persians, although same sourccs stair that thr Athenians did maintain a rqirncnt ofarchers during thc Pcmian wars. This rcconstruction is from a statue datcd r . 480 R.C. and shows an archcr in action. Hc wosc a Iion-skin head-covering-. anrl a lrathcr c o m ~ l c twith shnuldrr picc~sovcr the t radi t ianal chilnn tunic. From I hc waist hung the leather p t e r t ~ t e , ~Over . his shoulder hung the quiver which was usually very ornarcly decorated. He squatted so as to be in the best firing position. They were used in the phalanx among the hoplites and, in the p ~ i i o i ,as tight infantry.

These archen were mercenaries and, apart from rhc Scythian archers, were the only troops to be hired by the Athenians as regular light infantry. They were employed in the same capacity as slinqers and othrr l i ~ h ttmclps, c-ithcr a%p.G/ni or positioned among the hoplite heavy infantry. Their di~ltinctivc:characteristic was thc rcd chiton tunic. They worc no body arrnour and rhcir only protection was the small round bronze shicld (Jeltn), As wrll as IHIW i ~ n dquivrr of arrows i t i~

possihlc that r hey i

~ carried l ~

javelins.

m.

Greek noldiet.9 returnlnp; from battle. cmfY;n~: from the mmrnrmnratiun mnrl~lrof Salnmim. (Pirnww M u s e u m )

atrnour was made from leather with metal reinrorcemenw. Under the leather arrnour the arms and lrp wrrt: cnvcrcd with a highly-coloured thick, woven material. which was close-fitting and wa% tight at thr wrisrs and ankles. 'I'he: head wascovrrrd hv a metal helmet which came in various forms; thc one hcrr has movable chrrk-pircrs, which arc shown turned up. Weapns consisted or spear, sword or axe (bipennes). A specia! feature was the crescent-sl~apedshirld which cna bled thc soldirt t o g c t v r r y rlosc to thr cavalryman.

F I PJ~?yginnh~ary-in fnn@ mPrcPnary Thew tough mercenaries came from the north of Asia Minnr and scrvrd h t h Grcrk and Persian FP I'ursintr s / ~ c ~ r n n n maskrs. Their tunics wcrc colourful and thcir body This i s in a11 probability a Pcrsian spearman, hut as

53. Crown Prince Xcnes, detail From the Treasury Frieze Pcrsepolis. ( N a d m l M u ~ r u r n Achcns) ,

at

34. A Creek hoplite without

8

#Meld, dttpfl from a *lief.

( N a t i o p a l Muacum, Athens)

all troop or the Persian army wore the Median- aficn concealing thr lowcr jaw. The, high crown style dathes on campaign it may be a littlr di ficuit was usuaIly a sign of'rank. Equipment was the to distinguish thc regular troops from the d i t c standard shicld, quiver and h w and thc long spcar. 'Immorralq'. T h e ca1ourfi1l tunic came to midthiqh or slightly lower; trousers were worn unclcr F3 PPI.rinn oJictr the tunic and fitted very closely to thc leg and Persian officers ware a quilted type amormr over (he ankle. Various snurms stale that armour was worn rlathing, as the Persians and ,Metlrs wcre used as lightly-armed mounted archers. OfTicerx wore the Irut, as thcre is no evidence of this, i t must IH: assumed rhar it was worn tlndct the runic, a Mcdian-type campaign dress with the knee-length common p r a c t i c ~in warmer climates. Thr head tunic, and trousers. 'l'hr quiltcd armnur camc to was covcrrd by a lnosc cloth which framed the face, waist and a sash encircled the waist. A short broad-

38

sword, similar to the Creek one w m used, mainly lror thrusting, this was supported in a scallbard which hung froni a leathcr sling from ttlc left shoulcler. A turban covered the head and a cloak, which was v c y usrful an c a m p a i p , was olien worn.

G I Gwrk cnvalrynim With all the trappings or thc hoplite, the heavy cavalryman was ablr to fulfil the roles of infan tryman and horseman. Often these elite cavalrymcn cum hoplitcs woulrl ride to the site of thc battic then dismount and fight on Smt. The rtluipmrnt and arms wrrr thr samc as those oi"a 11oplitc with the exception of thc shicld; a cavalryman never carried onc. Thc typc of ht=[m~t worn IJV this cavalryman was known as 'Attic', alier the Coddcss Athene. As a11 thc q u i p m m r was purchased hy thc solcli~rs~hernsrlvcs,therc was very little uniformity. C2 ir-/t~s.~a/inn ra7vlyntan Onc of the most p o p l a r fi~urpsznkrn from Grerk vast: painting is the unualal figure o1'1hi.ThessaIiatl horseman. Thme cavalrymen carnr from thc plains of Thmsaly in the north o f Greecr, and wcre rnercenarics. This tyllical Thesalian wrars the chiton tumcd dawn to he waisl and, over his shouldrrs, a s t i f f brightly-coloured cloak. His clistincrivr Thcssalian hat was aften called a sunhat Sccause of its w r y wide brim and small crown. As all h o w m c n of that period did, h e rndc without saddle or stirrups, only a small rphippion or saddlecloth was sometimes placed on thr home's hack. 'l'he h o w was tbr usual small Mditrrranran type, extensively lrsed by thc cavalry at this time. Spears nr javelins were carricd. G3 Amnured i v f i n ! ~ Rofilif~ TIIOU~IF the appearance of the hoplites varied with

the pcrsonal taste or the individual the basic equipmmt prevailed, the metal or lrathrr Irasrrl torselel over the clrr'ton, shown here, with thr addition o f a cloak. T h c large round shicld jaspir) had a blazon painted on, with a small canopy attached to guard thc Icgs from sword or spear thrusts. Bronze grcavcs werc worn. On the h a d was the Ionic helrnrt which had a fixed nose-piece and two hinged check-picces: the fixed crest was a tnlourcrl horsvtail.

H I . Hz, H-7 Cret-k I I Y ~ O U T Pinfi~n!~_l ~ 'I'hese qoldiers camr rrom t h e Grcek city states 01' Athens, Sparta, Tl~ehcsor Corinr h. A1though 111err was deep enmity between them they sallied to2e:erhprwhrn th(-Prrsians invadrd. At t h e battle ol' Marathon in 490 B.c.,with thc phalanx ol' thr A1lleniar1 l~c~pliws, they dcfcawd thc. Prrsian arc11rr-s who w t w ac-claimed as the Iwst in tIlr. world. At thr l~attlrof Thcrnmopylar 300 Spartan (HP)hoplites hrlcl nul for thrrr days against a fierce t ou times greatpr in numhcr, until all werc k i 3 l d . T h e hoplitr's main squipmcnt rrrnained the cuirass or corseler which covcrrd thr rrppr pa~tof thc M y , made of metal or some flrxi1,lc maai.rial onftr which metal strips werr altachrd. The shield had a rnctal arm-loop inside, at thr ucntrc, thmuqh which the left arm was pushcd up to thc rlhow, ancl a m r h l handle near the rim. Hrlrnrts wcrc ust~alty onc of three types : Doric, cornplctrly closecl with slats For thc ryes, Corinthian, madr in cjnc pirce with Iixccl nose alicl cherk-pirctms, r,r lonir, witl-t movahlc cheek pieces. These helrncts nearly always had crmts, though later ones were worn without crcxts. Metal greaves, sandals and hoots were worn. Thc lung spcars wrrc not thrown, hut were uscd as thrusting weapons, either from almve to the neck, or from 1x10~ to the point under the cuira~q.'I'hc short .word or dagger was used as a ttlsus~ingrat h ~ r than a cutting wcapon.

:I Iln arthrr.cni~rhanruln xrc. rl'llr~ v:ur Crrrqur. .?yr I1.r:. *-a blilriarlrr. lc cornrnnndani Grrcquc r m p n n u h l c dc la vicroirc tlt Muwll~on.c3 'Ti.tr d'un wcrrirr C r m q u c pnrraeil un caquc l h t r . 14 RrlirTrl';'ll~x;lnrl45 ~ r r p h a r m

d l . l w ~ r > ~ nla a ~h~r t r c n r r r Ira p r r r i r n M a r h l a u ~ i c ~c~i t I ' m r s . 15 Bar-rrlirf r l u yrntr qiirlr. nio#ilran\ I- : b ~ ~ r m q t*~all;iquenq i I- Arahr%~ I ~ I I T +-3 uj-lirr t ~ ~ ~ pt.rrr1111r. l ~ i v 17<;lherric*~I ;1rt,i#11r ; ~ wit- ; ~ q u[Iur1<111r r rt l n h ~ ~ r l iri~nr!. rr ~8 n;\ I (~;tsrli~i* In*-m. + ~ I III.<:., ll; C :AUIIIY 'l'tlr~i.ir11a i r 1 ~ E > I I I ~ > ?~n-rlt* rt.~:. C :.nsqk~~ lL,,.l,. dl, .3+,,>? n.<: tg ll"iil,l t l ' l , , , ,-.nr t ~ i ~ l ihl.tc~111~1i111~n i~txr r r p ~IYlrtr i 111. FI>IKIPT I,~III c% 'S.kriw',

I

nt Uravurr N u n phalanx datant d u tfinr Jklr. p.A r r h r r p n a n t u n b n CI l'hrv.~lr.n, u;uc r,~y, n.r:.T*a x r t h r n i t ~ i r n uuliria t par Alcxx~lrlrrrn q : ~R.<:. , sg FCmclirm I'lrrv~irm.ranlutllr r r hipnlrra. y <:.L~II
Notes sur Ies pfpnch- en c e d e a t ha IR Pclrtcut r l r rlra-11

hrac p a r c lrnr roifftbrc cn p u dr lotly,rlr .1 l h c l l l q u ' > ~ I xrll,ullr- Iwwr ~lr*lirlgurlrrn n n c ; il rrl. tmrlr IKIX (14' ~YJII{ LIT ~.mr11 h w i n dc w?i 11rux nlirinr prr E1iv1.r tr rIr.lprau. k z tan4 irr rrrr ' I m n l r w \ ~ t ' 11:llbili r n m ~ ; ~ * du d c n g r p r i l l nli: ilr 6hictu :qllrli.u ximi car ilr ~~'avuifritIM Ic rlrrrlr rldhr l ~ t i ~ i r r t ~ r r r n ~ i r 1rr
B

rn F i n Ikrqrnwhulzc spam! r i n r Wnffr; n a r h dnrr firiwhihrn V m , 4yi

v.Chr r%M ~ l ~ i a t ! r rq,r i w l l i r h r lhfrhlrllalwr w.ihrrnd (lr111 'ivg 'K h l a r ~ h o n . l ~ i v ~ l ~Krin,gvrh~l>I vr I~III -FZew~$;m'1 lrml,n..14 U v h r l \,~btb.\tcx:\rulvm 1.3 t biirkoph.1~ rilit,nl Kimirlld ~ w i w h r nn ~ i ~ ~ w l o r ~ lint1 i w h p-miu-l\rr~ ~n Kriqrm dsm!rlla-ntl. t 5 lb.m-~u-!ir~ di*t~r7. Jiif>rb~u~icie.rt, Aswrirr ~ r r i l r:1mIx1 t~ ;ill( vi11v11 K.*tnrl II~~II~PI?: arb. r 6 D ~ I . ~ I dI r r 'C:~~.~t~roin.wcl~i.a'-Frirqe%' rut jirqrl~llial~l~vr It ~ q ~ I ~ t ~ * - S u ~ t ~ i l r i - F n ti tf ~tr;ar t~i r~cmt i i ~ - h Krlrqc1 rr nlrl ~II~M I1dn1 ti11d r u ~ r t a l ~ , r 5r ~~ I i i t l i .m 8 ,,.I! l'rwwrhrr t l?ltu. i!w%*,(,:l~r. I s 1 '~III Hrtn~. i z t ~ r t i ~ ~ ~ u r'.(:hr. b r r i ~,rrICmliiwhcr 1Irlm; .(, jahrl~utmla+rbv.I Ilr. .rl; I . r ~ , ~ - l r i ~ l1rl111. . l ~ r ~ IN^ jrn r.t:hr. sg 1k-tail r-irwr V i ~ wi l l 1 5 rlrm 5. j.r ttrlr~~trrlr :r..( :hr.I tnil v r t v l l i ~ . t l r n r nIV;~lla-rr1111rl. I l l ~ k l l . i r l a l m i + < ~ t ~ ( ~1:inSlir.h k ~ * . ~ ;trlrtlrrri ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ , t i ~: v111rt r l r ~I~> ~I ~ :r < I r r~ ~~ I'LI.II,WIIX ~ ! ~nmt >dIr In ~ ~ ~\~C n~I rn I '~ S :*t t~ i ~I~ t - l

;,.

or Stirh rinrr Phalmx rros d r m t7. j r h r h u d ~ r t .pn F.in hynuhuzre mil p h v y i r h r r Mu47.r: r l a c l ~ r i n r r Vnwrr, 535 \,.Chr. Alrxandrr srlerr dim- Krirqrr qr+ut - ( :hr. cir~.Q Phrirvgiwlw ?ic.hilrlrr, Ktlrhrr unfl R ~ ~ n r liq r .l'l~~~buIIrlnrv. &rqm, I l i l r n n r . K ( r h r r , t Irnlrl, .k~tunrl WnrRpr.rr. I ' m i w h r rrispprn I~rnlbtztrnviek a L 1 a - w ~ < ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ a5 t d rl l~t lr ri . ~ l ~ i Ku,1cgthr w ~ ~ ~1 ~r ~i 1~iort*c-l~r 1 H r l ~ n ,Srhillt rrrltl kurza.rlr 3%-hwrr~. 16 l'hrl~:in~-a-ht+r4e,llilrl mlr I h q r l ~t l u l l l li~rhrr7 . I;ril.chiwk,~r F;rirprr: n ~ r eillrlll ! ~ ]'lartik rn clnrr Kunrtllsllr ln Flqnrrn~.-zR ;"~LII~\L bwr L r ~ r ~ vnitt-11 r : riwr Vxw . t r ~Si>.ilirtb. q (;riecl~~whrr Ilarrrrsrtt. 30 I:rzccl~iuchrr ~I'n,mprrrr. ,nit r i r r r r n Srlvilrl alavem hinE rillt R 1 ~ ~ Thj m l r 15~411% llutr I~rrrlh. 3F Prniu-hr Solalatrn mrh r i n r r r>n~*lrllum~r: in den Ruincn zu Pcrsrlk ~s li;rirrhivE~r % ~ l ( l . t t rit11f ~ ~ ctrtn Kiirkkctn n:trl~rrincr % hlarht. Nar I clnmm h l a r m ~ a r - I k n l ~ ~i rni S i l r l m i n . 33 Krr,llljrlnr Yrrxcx; n a r l ~ rlrlir ScllstzkanlmrI . r ~ r - r ; I'rrwtx~lis C;rlec:hi* tb.t I~O~LILIT.

CI (;ymnrI, Ii~i-rrrtibnrvri<- I;rr.rulttr.

elr,nl Ir hthl 1winr.i ~1 Ct,bil I ~ P r.t,mn>mccr lr rrurvfli~rn h a r r r l m t I'mrmi. Cn Iloplilr, i n h b r r i r itrvm u r ii n nI I i nac I I i I m ip ir n ruurliir t r n i l ~ 11111' I'kwnllnr (lr m n rhlr p r ~ r f l r I.r s Iloplitnr rl:linll rrntrnlrnk p u r rmr sol~tlr l<~rnallnn.Q Asiioi. fn~rulwrr(irra-tlur; WI lbztdw +tall t i l r I I I t in t i tI 5 I t m iI II~IIII~II rluc 1'011 1.1ilbr .wrwrnl aver- drs innut<m.

Cn I'mr I r l r r m t tine cuira*rr (l(~~llll~ dc roilc- W'JrG1rr skyr drr p i r m d r m r r : ~ Ip ~ u11-rp3ul~k ~r r t un r q u r r i l l r n ~ n z c a v rlrl n r ( r h r cfr t r i l s r l r I-hrv.11 el u l l r qurur rrllinlnrc. II pnr un inrwr,tinhr,lrleliqur l'rm 1111 clllr #,a ric w pnrlrait : ; P i rf mnnlrnr 1.1 Qwlqll- T~ICI-.YUX p , r i ; ~ i r n t d- .~rnrurmli,~", ,Ir.lnol, , r l r l , j l ; la , t%t ~rmlslrih!ri crlui qu'on t ~ q i t i ~ 1i1:11111rn,ant. t*

,,,

,

Farbtpfeln Am Di-rr

~ m i n r h rS l a n d a n m l r k c r lraw D t m t R r j r l s h x ~ i r h mrjnrn $V<~!rtwIrb11~e.rK r ~ p i ~ S ~ rnhd~ ~ l ~ r 1,1 - n ha1 l . kv111rrr.?wl~ilrl4I.k r r tiir \ I . I I I C ~ A ~ ~ n1i1 b w i t l r ~1fi111(Irn ~ 4r.1grn n111w. kt I'~rww11cr' L ~ n % ~ r r l ~ I i c !-in7fn1r;t~rr hcr' in dtr '1 r,rt,l~rulrr krmqliclren Iritbrr.lrrlr. DIP h i m n ' ~ ~ c ~llluu,llrn' a ~ r t ria s i r nn d r r %;thl nir tmrrr ~~,.,~,r, t~rr.ilrzusi.c~kr~~ rrl.lulJr wudm.As lFvrriwllrr l % ~ v ~~n mrrtlst-~lrr ~ I ~ ~ . ~ , ~ I ~ ~ ,

Fl A r ~ l > i w hKr a ~ l t e t r r i t t ~ rntlch i; rincnr Hw-wlici iln l?rl;cr~7-11 Aur~rbanipuP.

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An unriv~lledwurcc o f informstion on the uniforms, insipria and nppmrancc orthe world's fighting mcn of past and present. 'l'hc M~rt-nr-Amtstitles cover suhjccts as clivcrsc as the Impcrial Roman a m y , the Napn~cnnicwars and Ciermnn airhomc troops in n popularpR-page format including snrnc 40 phatagraphs and diagrams, and cipht frrll
COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY

EF,TTE Detnilcd infomation on the uniforms and i n n f p i a o f thc world's most fi~rnnusmilitary forms. Fach Wpngc hook contains same 50 photovaphs and diag-rarns,and 12 pages of full-cnlaur arwnrk.

W.rlRRIOR Rcfinitirc analysis of the armour, weapons, tactics and motivation of thc fighting mcn ofhistory. F ~ c M-page h hmk contnins cutaway9 and cxpfnded artwork o f thc warrior's wcnpons and amour. NEW VANGUARD Cnmprchcnsivr: histories of the dcsip, develnprnent and opcration~Iusc of the world's armuurcd vchiclcsnnd artillcry, I*:ach48-pa~eIumk ctlntains eight paEcs nof full-colnur artwork including s dctaiIed cutaway orthe vchiulc's inrcriar.

C.4MP.IIIGN C ~ n c i s c authoritative , accounts of decisive encounters in military history. F ~ c h 9Gpagc hook contains mare than 90 illustrations includingmaps, nrders o f battle and colour platen, plus a series o f thrcdimcnsional hsttlc maps that mark the critical staws of thc campaign.

THE ANOENT WORLD 21 8

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46 F?on..q~. hrrrv ! E 0 C:cw.-lralan

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THE MEDIEVAL WORLD

147 110tr 1, ir,:3T? ? a r t s h 7 r A'.!--%hc 154 A d h ~ . ,R ;~ryn-57.w.roiW,i-, 252 Arm ct of :I.,. Y L I ~T Lcrlcvcn 125 A ~ Tr . n'~ I< ,ir->. 7 9 - 1 lh; 150 T h r A?,Po!C tlarlrm.11:r~ 89 R y ~ a n . . r e A r n ~ eRRh : 1 1 18 84 Lwr. V k v ~ R Nur.nar 331 f rrirl. Ycd~rvaArmrcr I W -1330 7s A , r c r a ' P + ~ C - L I ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ 171 LiI,~llad~i R :b*5irrrnc, 152 K~lybtrolChr17 200 I 1 :II!& S n orrqurrta 1050- 1493 I 0 5 -he Tr,nvvr 222 - l i d . ficr b! T,jncr .rnc 4r-,-k

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1 BTH CENTURY

I09 An:rwr '*11?,,F,rr: 13F I kc l.cdh.ms >V,=-KC 69 r,r#rL S, P,-.,.~I '&.n., X P . 3 7 3 Rf 148 A r w v n' P .-u.inerr : ~ ' : T . I :

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16TH A N D 17TH ZENTURiES

146 Thp lr 1 1 W3rr IaRYI P I b c r 7 L Ill's Ar-nr 3B 101 263 234 262 I4 IIP 2D3 267 97

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Thc L a w i s k r t u ~ t s Thclopq~~radorm Muaht I r d a I :W- 761 GLC:AVU~ A d d ~ I > u \ lr! I n f ~ n - ~ y C~zauus/~drdd;ll'l~1i7~.CAVII~ knp, shC~vrlW?. h r v ~ s kkw Modpl A. rr y 1645 6C Cosqs XIV ;Army 'Itw Hr ( $hArrny 1660 17W

M.ir b w o ~ g b5 A m y B6 b n u r a A m ~ m15jC 1615 184 f ' d * A r n r r I W llh%[I; 188 Po rh hmmcr I s 9 1596 r?;

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228 39 244 37 3

NAPOLEONIC PERIOD 257 I.J..l*

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