The Effect of Natural Resources on Fifth Century Athenian Foreign Policy and the Development of the Athenian Empire

The Effect of Natural Resources on Fifth Century Athenian Foreign Policy and the Development of the Athenian Empire A thesis submitted by James Artz

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Classical Archaeology

TUFTS UNIVERSITY May 2008 © 2008, James Artz Advisor: Prof. Steve Hirsch

UMI Number: 1450766

UMI Microform 1450766 Copyright 2008 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

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Abstract This paper explores the role of natural resources in the expansion and transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian empire, concentrating on two particularly resource‐rich regions, Thasos and the Black Sea coast. Thasos was well‐known in antiquity for its valuable precious metal resources, among others, and the Black Sea was likewise renowned for its grain, as well as human and metal resources. These two regions are also related insofar as Thasos was in a strategic location for ships hugging the coastline on voyages from the southern Aegean to the Black Sea. This paper will investigate whether Athenian interest in natural resources could have played a significant role in shaping Athenian policy, and thus affected the development of the Athenian empire. The copious amount of scholarship on the transformation and expansion of the Athenian empire indicates that it cannot be simplistically reduced to a single factor or cause, and the pursuit of natural resources cannot explain or justify the Athenian empire by itself. Nevertheless this paper will show that the Athenian pursuit of natural resources could have affected the events of the 5th century, and ignoring the pursuit of natural resources in the development of the Athenian empire would minimize a significant factor in the interpretation of its motives and causes.

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Acknowledgments This thesis is my greatest academic accomplishment. I received help and support from many people throughout the writing process. I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Steve Hirsch, for helpful thoughts and comments along the way. David Proctor helped me with many details and provided much appreciated advice throughout the project; without his help I would not have finished the thesis on time, and I thank him for helping me graduate with my fellow Tufts classmates. Andrew Klettke graciously offered unrestricted access to excellent research facilities, and I thank him for accommodating my work. Adrienne Antonucci gave me support and encouragement when I needed it most, and I cannot express how much she meant to the completion of this project. Lastly, I thank my parents and sister for their unconditional support, on this project and all my other endeavors, and I dedicate this work to them. J.E.A.

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction: 2 II. Athens and the Black Sea: 4 a. Introduction: 4 b. Athenian Grain Supply Factors: 6 i. Production Capacity of Attica: 6 ii. Population of Attica: 11 iii. Consumption Rate and Patterns: 14 c. Evidence from the Black Sea: 19 d. Conclusion: 28

III. Athens and Thasos: 30 a. b. c. d. e.

Introduction: 30 Archaic Thasos: 30 Classical Thasos, Before 465: 42 Classical Thasos, After 465: 50 Historical Interpretation: 59

IV. Conclusion: 64 V. Figures: 67 VI. Works Cited: 76

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List of Figures

1. Data from IG II2 1672: 67 2. Map of the Black Sea: 68 3. Map of Thasos and its Peraia: 69 4. Eastern City Wall from Thasos: 70 5. Aliki Peninsula, Thasos: 71 6. Thasian Coins: 72 7. Geographic Distribution of Thasian Coins: 73 8. Cities whose Coins were Found on Thasos: 74 9. Ram‐Bearer Kouros: 75

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The Effect of Natural Resources on Fifth Century Athenian Foreign Policy and the Development of the Athenian Empire

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I. Introduction At the beginning of the pentekontaetia (479‐431 BCE),1 Athens assumed control of a loose alliance of Greek poleis known as the Delian League.2 By the end of it, she was a hegemon over an empire of subject states, and the Delian League was a thin veil for what was really an Athenian empire. The transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian empire has been frequently studied by scholars, and many interpretations have come forward, explaining the events and causes of the transformation. Some believe that Athens was primarily interested in protecting the Aegean from the possibility of a Persian attack, similar to the events of 490 and 480. Others argue that Athens had visions of an empire from the very beginning of the Delian League, and possibly even earlier. Although many interpretations exist along this continuum, most would agree that by 450 Athens was acting in her own interests and had assumed the role of ruler over an empire of subject poleis. Although some scholars doubt its authenticity, the Peace of Kallias ca. 449, a peace treaty between Athens and the Persian Empire, is traditionally seen as a defining event in the transition from league of allies to empire of subject poleis. A variety of events in the surrounding years support the contention that at that time Athens became the leader of an empire: the movement of the league treasury from Delos to Athens in 454, construction of the Parthenon begun in 447, and the Coinage Decree passed in 446, among others, are interpreted by most to indicate that Athens was using the tribute collected from her allies for her own benefit, rather than in the interest of the league. These events and their interpretations have 1

Unless otherwise noted, all dates subsequently mentioned are BCE. The Delian League is a modern term used to describe the alliance of poleis under Athenian control. In ancient accounts this group is referred to as Athens and her allies. 2

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been heavily debated, and although it is misleading to speak of scholarly consensus, this paper will accept the traditional interpretation of the consolidation of the Athenian empire circa 450. This paper will explore the role of natural resources in the expansion and transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian empire. Many regions of the Mediterranean contain valuable natural resources, which would have interested a resource‐ poor area such as Athens. A full exploration of all regions is beyond the scope of the present work, which will instead concentrate on two particularly resource‐rich regions, Thasos and the Black Sea coast. Thasos was well‐known in antiquity for its valuable precious metal resources, among others, and the Black Sea was likewise renowned for its grain, as well as human and metal resources. These two regions are also related insofar as Thasos was in a strategic location for ships hugging the coastline on voyages from the southern Aegean to the Black Sea. This paper will investigate whether Athenian interest in natural resources could have played a significant role in shaping Athenian policy, and thus affected the development of the Athenian empire. The copious amount of scholarship on the transformation and expansion of the Athenian empire indicates that it cannot be simplistically reduced to a single factor or cause, and the pursuit of natural resources cannot explain or justify the Athenian empire by itself. Nevertheless this paper will show that the Athenian pursuit of natural resources could have affected the events of the 5th century, and ignoring the pursuit of natural resources in the development of the Athenian empire would minimize a significant factor in the interpretation of its motives and causes.

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II. Athens and the Black Sea Introduction Until recently, scholarly consensus favored the view that Athens was heavily dependent on imported grain in the 5th century BCE, and this grain came predominantly from the Black Sea coast. Athens was thus strongly interested in assuring the existence of a secure passage for grain transport from the Black Sea to the Piraeus, and it is possible to interpret many events during the Pentekontaetia in relation to this motive:3 Upon assuming leadership of the Delian League, Athens was quite active in the northern Aegean, capturing Byzantium in 478, and Eion and Scyros in 476. Carystos also surrendered to Athenian forces shortly after. Naxos, Thasos and Samos all were forcibly kept in the Delian League in the decades that followed, and the Athenians sent out colonists and cleruchies to settlements throughout the northern Aegean, the Propontis, and the Thracian Chersonese throughout the Pentekontaetia. Geographically all of these regions connect the Black Sea to Athens and support the theory that, throughout the period of the empire, Athens placed a high priority on maintaining control of a maritime trade route from the Black Sea to Athens for the shipment of grain. Perikles’ naval expedition to the Black Sea in ca. 436 offers further support, and even the Athenian colony at Sigeum and Miltiades’ kingdom in the Thracian Chersonese in the 6th century could indicate early Athenian interest in the region. However, recent work on the agricultural needs and capacities of Athens and Attica has questioned the extent of Athenian dependence on foreign grain in the 5th century. New 3

Gomme 1933 first suggested this correlation. Acceptance of Gomme’s theory is evident in, among others, de Ste. Croix 1972, 46-49; Davies 1993, 46-47; Casson 1994, 521.

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research has particularly focused on attempting to answer the following questions: how much grain was Attica capable of producing in each year? How many people did the Athenians need to feed during the 5th century? How much grain did the ‘average Athenian’ consume on a daily or yearly basis? Through the use of ancient literary and epigraphic sources, experimental archaeology, and comparative ethnography, researchers have questioned the assumption that Athens was completely unable to provide grain for its own population, and thus was heavily dependent on foreign sources for this commodity. The evidence for this view is controversial. Literary sources provide strong support for Athenian dependence on imported grain in the 4th century, but little is said about Athenian grain imports in the 5th century sources. Thucydides discusses the siege of Byzantium and the Athenian takeover of Scyros and other early activities of the Delian League, but does not mention the grain trade as a reason for these actions.4 Herodotus discusses the Scythians and states that the tribes living near Olbia, which is on the northern coast of the Black Sea, grew wheat, some for selling and some for their own consumption. He also notes the presence of Ionian merchant ships sailing out of the Black Sea in 494/93, but does not say specifically that they are grain ships, nor that they are supplying Athens with grain.5 These references do not provide solid support for the idea that Athens was importing large amounts of grain in the 5th century. Scholars attempting to assess the status of the Athenian grain supply in the 5th century are thus forced to analyze the literary sources of the 4th century, when Athens was certainly importing a large quantity of grain, and project estimations from these sources onto models for

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Thucydides 1.94, 1.98. Herodotus 4.17, 6.26.

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5th century Athens.6 It is, of course, problematic to assume that the Athenian grain supply situation was the same in both the 5th and 4th centuries. Nevertheless, a large body of research has come forth from the available evidence, and brought the level of Athenian dependence on foreign grain in the 5th century into question. Although a number of scholars have contributed to questions about the Athenian grain supply, Peter Garnsey was one of the earliest to question the orthodox position. He has published extensively on many aspects of the grain trade, and argues that the productivity of Attica has been consistently underestimated and Athens was capable of producing a significant amount of grain.7 Garnsey’s arguments about Attic grain supply focus on a reexamination of the literary and epigraphic material relating to the demographics and productivity of Attica. Although the evidence is quantitatively small, and suffers from imbalance toward the 4th century over the 5th, he has produced a large amount of research and created a new model for Attic production capacity that has inspired others to explore the issue further.8 This chapter will explore three factors which are relevant to Garnsey’s model for the grain supply of Attica in the 5th century: the production capacity of Attica, the population in the 5th century, and the consumption patterns of that population. Athenian Grain Supply Factors I. Production Capacity of Attica

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4th century literature, particularly Athenian court speeches, contain many references to Athenian dependence on foreign grain. Among others, see Demosthenes 20.32-33, 35.10, 34.39; Lysias, Against the Grain Dealers 6-7; Isocrates 17.57. 7 Garnsey’s works include ‘Grain for Athens’, in Cartledge and Harvey, (eds) Crux, (1985); Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World (1988); ‘Yield of the Land’, in Wells, (ed) Agriculture in Ancient Greece (1992); Cities, Peasants and Food in Classical Antiquity (1998); Food and Society in Classical Antiquity (1999). 8 An overview of the various theories and issues is presented by Scheidel, in an addendum to Garnsey 1998, 195200.

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An inscription from the 4th century provides important evidence that has previously been interpreted as indicating Attica’s inability to produce enough grain for self‐sufficiency. IG II2 1672, known as the First Fruits of Eleusis Decree, records the contributions of wheat and barley from Attica and its dependent territories to Eleusis in 329/8 and has played a crucial role in the Attic grain supply debate. These contributions are then applied to a ratio known from an earlier 5th century inscription which indicates that contribution amounts represent 1/600th of the yearly barley production and 1/1200th of the yearly wheat production.9 The amounts recorded in the First Fruits Decree thus produce 339,925 medimnoi of barley and 27,062 medimnoi of wheat, or a total of 366,987 medimnoi. This is enough to feed 53,000 people at a consumption rate of 175 kg. per year.10 Although population estimates for Attica have varied widely, an Attic production capacity of feeding 53,000 people is far from high enough to meet the requirements of even the lowest population estimates. Earlier scholars interpreted this Attic production capacity of 366,987 medimnoi as evidence that Attica was unable to support its own population.11 Garnsey has questioned the validity of this interpretation based on the supposition that the amount of grain produced in 329 is not indicative of the true production capacity of Attica, because 329 may have been a year of low production levels. Attica’s vulnerability to low production levels is indicated by the high variability of rainfall in the region, which has been documented in recent climatology 9

IG I3 78, ca 422, from Eleusis. Wheat and barley were the main cereals capable of growing in Attica and throughout the Mediterranean, but wheat was generally considered a more valuable, nutritious and better tasting crop than barley, and thus it is not surprising that more barley is given to Demeter than wheat. It is also thought that Attica grew more barley than wheat (Garnsey 1998, 204). The reasons for preference of wheat over barley will be discussed below. The validity of applying 5th century contribution ratios to a 4th century inscription is generally accepted, although it should be noted as a potential problem. See Fig. 1 for a summary of the data from IG II2 1672. 10 Consumption rate will be discussed below, but the rate given here is the standard rate used by most scholars. 11 Jarde 1979, 31-60. Auguste Jarde published Les cereals dans l'antiquité grecques in 1925 and is widely acknowledged as indicative of this earlier interpretation. References to Jarde’s work in this paper are from a 1979 republication of this earlier work.

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studies.12 He further argues that 329 was a ‘bad year’ by comparing the Attic production levels with those from Lemnos on the same inscription.13 Lemnos produced 305,275 medimnoi of grain in the same year, which is less than the Attic level (366,987 medimnoi), but Lemnos only has a total land area of 47,000 hectares while Attica contains 240,000 hectares. Using standard yield estimates, these figures indicate that only 5.4% of Attic land was cultivating grain in 329, while 24.9% of the land on Lemnos was cultivating grain.14 Garnsey believes these figures are unacceptably low for Attica, and if a higher percentage of Attic land was used to cultivate grain, then the harvest of 329 must have been less than the actual productive capacity of Attica. Based upon his supposition that 329 was a bad year for the production of Attic grain, Garnsey then created a new model for Attic production capacity. His new model includes minimum, likely and maximum estimates for a number of variables, including the percentage of Attic land used for grain production, how much land grew wheat and how much grew barley, and consumption rate.15 The results of his likely estimates are that Attica was capable of producing enough grain to feed 132,000 people, which he then generalizes to 120‐150,000 people ‘under normal conditions.’16 Garnsey is careful to supplement his conclusion by noting that he does not believe that Attica was ever self‐sufficient in its grain production. He believes Attica regularly imported grain in the 5th and 4th centuries, but previous estimates on Attic production capacity have led to the conclusion that Attica was dependent on foreign grain, which his model argues against: 12

Garnsey 1988, 8-10, citing Arnon 1972 among others, states that the incidence of crop failure in Attica due to insufficient rainfall is roughly one year in four for wheat, and one year in twenty for barley. 13 Garnsey 1988, 99-106. Myrina and Hephaestia are the poleis from Lemnos that contribute grain on IG II2 1672. 14 The standard yield estimate is 8 hl/ha for wheat and 16 hl/ha for barley. 15 Garnsey 1988, 102-103. Garnsey’s likely estimates are 17.5% of land used for grain cultivation, of which 80% grew barley and 20% wheat, and a consumption rate of 175 kg. per year. 16 Garnsey 1988, 104.

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Briefly, I am inclined to the view that a serious disequilibrium between Athens’ food needs and its capacity to meet them from Attica and nearby dependencies did not develop until well into the post‐Persian war period in consequence to population growth, and that there was no food supply problem [his italics] (thanks to Athens’ control of the sea, particularly the corn route from the North, and the attractiveness of her market to suppliers) until 431 BC. Garnsey, Cities, Peasants and Food, 194.

While Garnsey’s work is a positive contribution to the fields of demographics and ancient agriculture, many scholars have disagreed with his conclusions. Some have challenged his methodology, while others have doubted the implication that Athens was less reliant on imported grain in the 5th century than the traditional view maintains.17 Michael Whitby has specifically taken issue with Garnsey’s methodology, noting that he believes Garnsey has misinterpreted some of the factors which allowed him to create such a high estimation of Attic production capacity. For example, the issue of whether Attic farmers practiced a system of biennial fallow is a major factor in determining production capacity. Biennial fallow implies that half of all land available for grain production is not in use each year, in order to allow the soil to regenerate nutrients lost during the previous production year. Garnsey’s belief that 17.5% of Attic land was available for grain production relies on the argument that Attic farmers practiced farming techniques other than biennial fallow, such as triennial fallow, cereal/pulse rotation, annual cropping and manuring. The farming techniques used in classical Attica are mostly unknown. Ancient authors such as Theophrastus offer some information, but it is impossible to reconstruct production models based on the information in ancient sources. In addition to examining the ancient sources, scholars have conducted ethnographic research on modern peasant farming techniques (both in Greece and other environments), and conclude that the amount of land left 17

See note 3 for supporters of the traditional view.

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fallow was subject to a number of social and economic factors, such as house size, amount of livestock present, tenant income level, and relationship of tenant to the land. They argue that other techniques such as cereal/pulse rotation, triennial fallow, annual cropping (ignoring the long term restorative effects of fallow in favor of increased short term yield), and manuring were practiced in addition to biennial fallow, depending on the factors listed above. 18 Garnsey also believes these alternatives to biennial fallow could have increased the amount of land available for grain production, thus allowing Attica to feed more of its population through its own resources. Robert Sallares, examining similar data, believes there is strong evidence that biennial fallow was more of a universal practice throughout Attica. Sallares notes that the evidence from modern agriculture is affected by a number of factors that were not present in antiquity. First, modern fertilizers have significantly affected the agricultural techniques of modern peasants. Surveys of modern Greek peasant agricultural techniques, showing that a number of different techniques were used in addition to biennial fallow, do not necessarily show that ancient agricultural techniques followed similar patterns, because the modern crops have the benefit of modern fertilizers.19 Sallares reviewed the fertilizing techniques of antiquity that are preserved in the literary tradition, and concludes that these techniques would not have allowed the farmers of classical Attica to follow the systems in practice today. Furthermore, a cereal/pulse rotation would not have provided enough fertilizer for the soil to regenerate the nutrients lost during cereal production. Sallares concludes that, given the technology available to classical Attic farmers, the yield of the land would best have been maximized by a triennial 18 19

Gallant 1991, 56; Halstead 1987, 77-87. See Gallant 1991, 56 for sources on the agricultural techniques of modern Greek peasants.

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system of cereal the first year, leguminous pulses the second year, and fallow the third year. However, given the constraints of population and land area, it is more likely that a biennial fallow system was favored by most farmers, even though the grain yields per year would have been somewhat reduced, because the soil would have suffered from a loss of nutrients.20 These reduced grain yields would thus need to be supplemented by imports. Whitby agrees with Sallares that a biennial fallow system seems more likely, and thus the production capacity of the Attic countryside would have been lower than Garnsey’s estimate.21 Whitby also discusses other factors that would have limited the amount of arable land available for grain, such as leguminous crops, market gardening, and animal husbandry, and argues that at most 15% of the Attic countryside could have been growing grain in any given year, although a figure between 10‐15% is more likely. A further problem that Whitby notes concerning the productive capacity of the Attic countryside is that Garnsey does not appear to address the issue of unhulled and hulled barley.22 Foxhall and Forbes note that unhulled barley loses about 35% of its weight during the milling process, and thus any calculations for the amount of people that a given area of barley could feed must take into account the loss of roughly one third of the total weight of the barley harvest. Garnsey’s figures could thus be skewed towards a higher number of people fed, if he is not accounting for barley’s milling process.23 II. Population of Attica

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Sallares 1991, 381-82, 385-86. Whitby 1998, 105. 22 Whitby 1998, 114-115. 23 Foxhall and Forbes 1982, 46. 21

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In addition to challenging Garnsey’s figures about the productivity of the Attic countryside, Whitby disputes Garnsey’s estimate for the population of Attica in the Classical period.24 The estimation of the Attic population suffers from problems similar to those regarding the production capacity of Attica: historical sources are meager, and the validity of some is more reliable than others. More information is available for the 4th century, and thus estimates for the 5th century are even more hypothetical since they must be extrapolated from later data. One source for 4th century estimates has been epigraphic evidence for the bouleutic quotas, and ephebe and diaitetai lists, because there are age restrictions for these political groups. Thus, for example, knowing that there were 500 bouleutai made up of citizens over 30 who had not already served more than once, it is possible to calculate how many citizens over 30 were needed to fill this quota. Estimates begin to diverge because it is impossible to know what percentage of the population reached this age, but scholars employ ethnographic comparison to intelligently estimate the makeup of the Athenian citizen population.25 These figures then have to be combined with estimates for the number of metics and slaves living in Attica, for which there is little quantitative data. Due to the abundance of epigraphic evidence for the 4th century regarding the bouleutai and diaitetai, much work has been done to estimate the Attic population in this period. Estimates vary widely, from 120,000 to 300,000 given in various publications.26 Most scholars believe that the Athenian population was higher in the 5th century than the 4th, as the population grew throughout the 5th century until the plague and Peloponnesian War began a 24

Garnsey 1985, 70, states that there were 200-300,000 residents of Attica between 450-320. Osborne 1985, 43, n. 92 notes previous ethnographic studies. 26 Scheidel’s addendum in Garnsey 1998 includes a bibliographic essay on the subject of Athenian demographics, and see also Hansen 1985. A full analysis of the 4th century demographic data is beyond the scope of this paper. 25

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decline which continued into the 4th century.27 However, there is far less quantitative data for the 5th century and thus it is difficult to estimate the 5th century population with confidence. Estimates have been made from passages in Herodotus that discuss the Athenians ability to man ships in the battle of Salamis, in which the Athenians provided 180 ships with 200 men each.28 This leads to an estimate of 36,000 citizen males, although it is quite possible that slaves and/or metics were present in the ships as well.29 Scholars conventionally multiply the number of citizen males by four to calculate the total citizen population, thus arriving at 144,000 as an estimate for the citizen population of Attica in 480. However the accuracy of Herodotus’ numerical accounting has been questioned, and the possibility of slaves and metics being part of the crews cannot be verified or denied, and thus even this small amount of information regarding the 5th century Athenian population is difficult to regard as valid demographic data. Noting the unreliability of Herodotus’ data, Garnsey suggests 120‐150,000 as a range for the total population of Attica in 480, including slaves and metics.30 Other estimates have placed the number slightly higher, such as Patterson and Beloch, who estimate 25‐30,000 citizen males, or 100‐120,000 citizens.31 Slave and metic estimates vary widely, with Patterson estimating 1,000 slaves and 2,000 metics, while Osborne suggests a “conservative, but not unreasonable” population of 20,000 metics and 50,000 slaves.32 Garnsey’s low estimation allows him to argue more forcefully that Athens was less dependent on foreign grain than is

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Whitby 1988, 109. Herodotus 8.17, 8.44. 29 Pausanias 1.32.1 notes the presence of slaves fighting at the battle of Marathon. 30 Garnsey 1988, 116. 31 Beloch 1886, 60; Patterson 1981, 51-56. 32 Osborne 1987, 46. 28

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traditionally assumed, and the lack of scholarly consensus on this topic is problematic for Garnsey’s model. The population of 4th century Attica, deduced from a much larger body of evidence, also has not been settled after vigorous debate, and without the appearance of new information there seems little hope for scholarly consensus. Garnsey’s low population estimate cannot be considered a flaw in his model because solid evidence does not exist that refutes it, but it should be noted that his demographic estimate has received less than universal support. III. Consumption Rate and Patterns The third factor that allowed Garnsey to come to the conclusion that Attica was more self‐sufficient in the Classical period than was previously thought is the amount of grain being consumed by the residents of Attica. Of course, a similar caveat is present in all work on this subject: the estimates are made from incomplete and difficult to interpret data, chronological issues obscure the evidence, and any model is usually referred to as a ‘fragile house of cards’ or a similar metaphor, telling the reader to beware placing too much faith in the conclusions drawn from the sources. Nevertheless, any study of grain in antiquity must involve an estimate of how much the average person consumed. Foxhall and Forbes produced a thorough study of ancient consumption patterns, comparing a wide variety of evidence from ancient sources with data for nutrition levels and caloric requirements from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, as well as ethnoarchaeological data for modern peasant consumption patterns and experimental archaeology testing the technological aspects of ancient agriculture. The results of their study are that the ‘average Athenian’ would have consumed 212‐237 kg of grain per year, although they believe this may be closer to a maximum amount rather than a

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true average.33 Garnsey does not seem to devote as much attention to this issue, but uses the lower amount of 175 kg. per person per year in his calculations.34 Given Garnsey’s lack of justification for his 175 kg. estimate, Foxhall and Forbes’ estimate of 212‐237 kg. per person per year seems favorable, even if the authors stress that this may be somewhat inflated. Moreover, objections have been raised that such calculations overlook other factors that could have contributed to the amount of grain imported by Athens. Particularly, Whitby contends that market psychology would have contributed to a desire for more grain than simply the minimum amount needed to feed the population of Attica.35 He believes that, just as modern research has run into difficulties calculating the amount of grain necessary for the Athenian population, it is likely that in antiquity the amount of grain needed in Attica was uncertain. Rather than having detailed figures on the production capacity of the Attic countryside, the amount of grain being imported, and the number of residents living in Attica, Athenians were more aware of the evidence immediately at hand: the price of the grain they were buying (which may have decreased in correlation with increases in the amount of grain available), and whether their neighbors and fellow citizens had as much, more or less grain than themselves. These factors could have encouraged grain merchants to import more grain than was necessary to meet the consumption levels of the Attic population. While there is less evidence for how Athenians viewed the grain market during the 5th century, there is a relatively large body of evidence concerning how Athenians felt during the 4th: Court speeches from Demosthenes, Isocrates and Lysias, Xenophon’s comments on the 33

Foxhall and Forbes 1982, 71. As noted above, Foxhall and Forbes are quick to caution against using their results for arguments involving the grain trade (72-75). 34 Garnsey 1988, 91; 102-104. 35 Whitby 1998, 119.

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attractiveness of the Piraeus as a trade destination, Aristotle’s discussion of the political offices (grain wardens) responsible for the distribution of grain, and honorary decrees for foreigners providing grain gifts, all indicate a high level of official involvement by the Athenian state in ensuring a continuous supply of grain to the city in the 4th century.36 Aristotle relates that the Athenian government increased the number of officials involved in the oversight of the grain trade, both at the Piraeus and in the city, democratized the process of their selection, and the status of the corn supply was discussed at the meetings of the ekklesia, held once during each prytany.37 These sources show a highly developed interest in the grain trade in the 4th century, and its incorporation into official policy for the administration of the Athenian state. The lack of similar evidence from the 5th century shows that the situation must have been different. However that does not necessarily mean that the grain trade was not important, or that less grain was coming into Athens. Athens’ position as the dominant maritime power in the 5th century could have obviated the need for legislation and policies detailing the inner workings of the grain trade. If the trade was largely being conducted by private citizens, and Athenian maritime hegemony ensured the safe passage of grain from the Black Sea to Athens, it is possible that the lack of literary and epigraphic references reflecting the importance of the grain trade in the 5th century indicate that trade was operating smoothly and there was no need to involve the state or other entities that are likely to leave evidence behind, such as the courts.

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Demosthenes 20.32-33, 35.10, 34.39; Lysias, Against the Grain Dealers 6-7; Isocrates 17.57; Xenophon, Poroi 3.1-5, 12-13; Aristotle Ath. Pol. 51.3; IG II2 360, 398, 408. 37 Aristotle, Ath. Pol., 43.4, 51.3.

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Support for the role that psychological factors could have played in encouraging the importation of grain also comes from a modern ethnographic study carried out on Crete. Allbaugh surveyed a large number of rural and urban residents in and around Khania, Crete, particularly focusing on their dietary habits and consumption patterns. Allbaugh noted that the average consumption of cereals among his subjects was 128 kg per person per year, but the subjects estimated that they consumed 166 kg per person per year.38 Some of this overestimation could be expected in order to account for loss during processing or storage, but clearly this study is showing a larger philosophy that it is better to overestimate the amount of grain necessary for survival, rather than to calculate what is necessary and plan to meet that requirement. Whitby refers to this as the ‘feel good rather than feel hungry’ factor,39 and although it is impossible to quantify the effect of this factor on production or consumption models, it is important to consider the effect that such factors could have had on the ancient grain trade. Clearly the effect would have been to encourage a greater amount of import, as grain merchants would have been aware of their ability to profit from the desire to have more grain than necessary for survival. The consumption patterns of Attica would also have been affected by the type of produce coming from its fields. As Garnsey and others have repeatedly noted, the high rainfall variability and poor soil quality indicate that the majority of Attic farmland was used to grow barley.40 Although the ancient diet is relatively unknown, there are references in ancient sources regarding the cultural significance of certain grains and their association with different 38

Allbaugh 1953, 107. Foxhall and Forbes 1982 also cite three modern ethnographic studies from Greece, including Allbaugh 1953, as evidence for what can be learned about ancient consumption patterns in Greece from modern ethnographic data. 39 Whitby 1998, 117. 40 Garnsey 1998, 204. The standard estimates are 80% barley and 20% wheat.

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classes. Theophrastus and Pliny both discuss the varieties of grain in the ancient diet, and note that wheat is considered a lighter grain, which is preferable and better tasting.41 Heavier grains, such as barley, are considered more suitable for slaves and even animals. Both authors differentiate between the grains grown in various regions throughout the Mediterranean, and comment on their quality and characteristics.42 When compared with these historical sources, the proposed Attic ratio of four times as much barley grown as wheat seems incompatible. Why would the Athenians grow so much more barley, if it was considered a ‘poor man’s food’, instead of wheat? If the proposed 4:1 ratio of barley to wheat is correct, it must reflect that the environmental necessities of the region supersede the cultural preferences of the population. Thus, although the Athenians desired the softer and better tasting wheat bread, they grew more barley because it was much less likely to experience crop failure in the harsh and unpredictable Attic environment.43 While this is a logical explanation for the higher level of barley production, it is also likely that Athenians would have welcomed the import of softer and better tasting grains, associated with a higher standard of living, to augment the barley that made up the majority of their grain diet. Just as there is no way to quantify the effect of Whitby’s ‘feel good versus feel hungry’ theory, it is similarly impossible to know how much desire existed in Athens for softer, better tasting grains. Nevertheless, especially during the rise and expansion of the Athenian empire, Athenians could have developed a taste for imported grains and had the ability to procure it. 41

Theophrastus, Historia Plantarum 8.4; Pliny, Naturalis Historia 18.20-22. It is worth noting here that wheat from the Black Sea (Triticum aestivum and Triticum compactum) is singled out by Theophrastus as the lightest (8.4.5). 43 See above, n. 12. 42

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Thus, although Garnsey’s model for the grain supply of Athens in the 5th century is somewhat problematic, it offers an informative study of the available evidence. Questions that the available evidence cannot definitively answer, such as the Attic population and the details of Attic farming technique, prohibit his model from being accepted without reservations. The value of Garnsey’s model instead lies in probing the boundaries of what can be learned from the information we do have. His work is the most optimistic for the production capacity of Attica, and it is helpful to see this as an upper boundary for the capabilities of Attic production. While it may have been, under ideal conditions, possible for Attica to support a substantial portion of its population, the true results of a typical Attic production season probably did not often reach the levels proposed by Garnsey. However, as Garnsey has brought the traditional assumption that Attica was completely dependent on foreign grain into question, it is perhaps better to think of 5th century Athens as less than dependent on foreign grain. When market psychology factors are considered, such as the natural tendency to desire more than the minimum amount of grain necessary for survival and the preference of wheat breads over barley, it is perhaps more instructive to consider the effects of Athenian desire for grain imports in the 5th century, rather than their dependence on them. Evidence from the Black Sea The research on various aspects of the Athenian grain supply has thus shown that Attic dependence on foreign grain in the 5th century should not be simplistically assumed. Although it is unclear exactly how much grain Athens was able to produce for itself, there seems to be agreement among most scholars that Athens did import grain in the 5th century, regardless of

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how much was harvested from the fields of Attica. While Garnsey and others have attempted to reconstruct the logistics of the Athenian grain trade through historical sources (mainly from Athens), there is also archaeological evidence from the Black Sea which offers a different perspective for interpreting the Athenian grain trade in the 5th century.44 In 2007 Jan Bouzek republished a summary of the extensive archaeological excavations in the area, mostly carried out by Russian and eastern European teams.45 Bouzek’s work focuses on the interpretation of ceramic fineware from the excavations, and documents an evolution of changes from the Archaic to Hellenistic periods. Specifically there are changes in the areas of the Greek world that export pottery to the Black Sea and changes in the sites within the Black Sea that import more or less pottery at different times. There are also changes in the nature of the relationship between the Greek colonies and the local populations, as well as between the Greek colonies and other areas of the Greek world, particularly mainland Greece and the Ionian coast. Working on a site by site basis, Bouzek shows that in the 7th and 6th centuries Ionian pottery, identified as the Wild Goat style, shared a relatively large percentage of the imports with Attic wares (identified as Black Figure). Particularly, early Greek colonies at Histria and Berezan demonstrate a strong correlation between the early period of settlement in the 7th century and imports of Wild Goat pottery, especially from Miletus. This is not surprising, as Bouzek notes that many of the Greek colonies in the Black Sea came from Miletus.46 These sites show that in the early period of Greek colonization in the Black Sea, Ionian cities such as 44

The analysis of evidence for commercial interaction between Athens and the Black Sea is based on the supposition that Athens imported the majority of its grain from this region. It is also possible that other grain producing regions, such as Sicily and Egypt, could have played a role in the 5th century Athenian grain supply, although these areas were less accessible to Athens for political reasons. Analyses of these regions are outside the scope of this paper, but could provide a more complete picture of the Athenian grain trade in the 5th century. 45 Bouzek 2007 is a revised and updated publication of Bouzek 1990. See Fig. 2 for a map of the Black Sea. 46 Bouzek 1990, 19.

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Miletus were heavily involved in the trading activities in the area, at least as can be determined from the ceramic archaeological remains. Attic Black Figure pottery is present at these sites, although in smaller quantities than the Wild Goat ware‐ approximately 20% Attic Black Figure, and 33% Wild Goat. Other production centers whose pottery has been found at these sites include Chios, Samos, Corinth, and Rhodes, although none of these centers seem to have contributed more than 10% to the total assemblage for the period. The conclusion from these sites is that no particular area is dominating the trade in ceramic fineware, although trade relationships with the mother colonies of Ionia are more prevalent than other areas.47 During the 6th century imports in Attic pottery began to increase, and by the 5th century Attic fineware had become the dominant pottery style throughout the Greek colonies in the Black Sea. The sites that revealed the largest amounts of Ionian pottery in the 7th and 6th centuries , Histria and Berezan, were overtaken by other sites that were not importing as much pottery in the early period. Olbia, a site near Berezan in the northwestern region of the Black Sea, experienced a sharp increase in late Attic Black Figure imports. Enough pottery was found at Olbia in the early period to show that the site was inhabited, but the amount of pottery was much smaller than Berezan, which was located nearby and clearly the focus of imports during the early period. It is interesting to note that the ceramic evidence shows an increase in the chora area around Olbia in the second half of the 6th century, which chronologically corresponds with its increase in late Black Figure Attic pottery.48 Sites on the Cimmerian Bosporus and Apollonia were found to contain the highest amounts of Classical Red Figure ceramics, as well as substantial amounts of late Black Figure. Elaious, a site on the Thracian 47 48

Bouzek 1990, 21-25, 29; Bouzek 2007, 1223-1224. The role of chorai in the production of grain will be discussed below.

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Chersonese which was geographically significant as a point of trade, also revealed a high level of late Black Figure ceramics. The entire region generally experienced increases in Attic pottery coupled with a decline in quantities from Ionia and other areas of production.49 Although Bouzek’s work mainly focuses on summarizing the state of research, he does believe that there is a correlation between the increase in Attic pottery and the political events of the 5th century. According to Bouzek the pottery record is exact enough to note changes associated with specific political events, such as the decrease in Milesian Wild Goat ware in the early 6th century, which could correspond with a stasis in Miletus reported by Herodotus and difficulties associated with the wars with Lydia.50 Similarly the Ionian revolt and its suppression by Persia correspond with the decline of Ionian pottery and increase of Attic. The Persian War period is also archaeologically visible, as all Greek imports decline at this time, followed by the reemergence of Attic pottery as the dominant import in the postwar period. Regarding Athenian involvement in the Black Sea during the 5th century, Bouzek is unequivocal: “Towards the middle of the 5th century, Athenian dominance in the Black Sea area was felt equally in politics and in the arts: the number of Athenian vases imported there increases.”51 The correlation between the archaeological evidence for ceramic fineware imports and the grain trade with Athens is difficult to interpret, but nonetheless present. According to Bouzek, grain, flour and other loose substances were transported in bags, and thus there is no evidence for their trade in the archaeological record.52 However, there is evidence from other periods which indicates that a significant proportion of the Black Sea trade cargo would have 49

Bouzek 1990, 42-49; Bouzek 2007, 1228-1229. Herodotus 5.28; Bouzek 1990, 34, with references to earlier scholarship. The decrease in Milesian imports at this time was counteracted by an increase in imports from other East Greek production centers. 51 Bouzek 1990, 42. 52 Bouzek 1990, 96. 50

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consisted of agricultural materials. This evidence comes from archaeological excavations of shipwrecks from periods that are recent enough to have preserved the contents of the cargo in shipping manifests. For example, the Witte Leeuw, a merchant ship transporting goods for the Dutch East India Company, sank in 1613 and was excavated by Stenuit in 1976.53 The shipping records from the ship show that it was carrying 15,000 bags of pepper and a small amount of porcelain. This porcelain was found during underwater excavation, but all traces of the main pepper cargo were gone. The conclusion that these ships were transporting small amounts of ceramics is reinforced by the shipping reports from the East India Company of London, which show that between 1786 and 1789 ceramics, drugs and coffee fluctuated between only 1.6% and 2.6% of the total sales of the company.54 Although no similar data exists for the makeup of cargo in antiquity, it is reasonable to suppose that ceramic fineware did not make up the majority of the ancient cargo. Bouzek and others have rightly concluded that the majority of the import cargo would have consisted of agricultural goods, while ceramics would have composed a small percentage of the imports.55 The correlation between ceramic fineware imports and the grain trade is further supported by Sceglov’s work on the agricultural production of the northern Black Sea coast in the 6th and 5th centuries. Sceglov argues against Herodotus’ claim that the Greeks were trading with local Scythian tribes and that the Scythians grew wheat for selling.56 Using paleobotanical and archaeological evidence he argues that the Scythians of the northern Black Sea coast and the inland tribes (those inhabiting the forest‐steppe zone) were at most subsistence farmers, 53

JNA 6, 1977, 257. Vickers 1984, 91 n. 30. 55 Bouzek 1990, 94; Gill 1987, 84-85. 56 Herodotus 4.17. 54

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based on the archaeological evidence of their agricultural technology.57 Furthermore, paleobotanical evidence shows that the Scythian farmers were mostly cultivating emmer (Triticum dicoccum), a hulled wheat which was not considered suitable for trade.58 The Greeks instead preferred varieties of soft naked wheat (Triticum aestivum and Triticum compactum), which have been found in much larger quantities in the Greek colonies and their chorai. These were the desirable soft Russian bread wheats that the Greeks desired from the region.59 The main areas that were identified by the ethnobotanical remains to be the main production centers for the soft Russian bread wheats correspond well with the areas showing significant increases in late Black Figure and Red Figure Attic pottery: the Greek colonies along the northern coast of the Black Sea, and particularly the settlements at Olbia and the Cimmerian Bosporus. Sceglov concludes that these Greek colonies were growing the grain that was being imported to the Greek mainland during the 5th and 4th centuries, on agricultural kleroi that were located in the chorai of the main colonies.60 There was at most only a small amount of agricultural trade between the Greek colonies and the Scythians living to their north, and since these Scythians were predominantly growing emmer wheat, it is unlikely it would have been exported to Greece. Bouzek agrees with Sceglov, and believes that the main trade between Greece and the northern Black Sea would have been agricultural: wine, olive oil, raisins and figs would have been the main imports to the Greek colonies, and grain grown by the Greek colonists was exchanged for these products.61 The archaeologically visible patterns

57

Sceglov 1990, 154. Janushevich 1984, 267-269; Jaunshevich 1981, 87-96. 59 For research on soft Russian bread wheat see Janushevich and Nikolaenko 1979, 115-134; Janushevich 1981, 8796; Janushevich 1984, 267-83. 60 Sceglov 1990, 157-58. 61 Bouzek 1990, 95; Bouzek 2007, 1228. 58

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in ceramic fineware correspond well with this hypothesis, as they would have composed only a small fraction of the cargo, but show the presence of trade at the same locations that were growing the soft Russian bread wheat that was desirable for export. Although the archaeological evidence supports a correlation between sites engaging in ceramic fineware trade and sites with evidence for production of the soft Russian bread wheat desirable for export, Tsetskhladze believes the evidence is unconvincing as proof for large scale grain trade between Athens and the Black Sea during the Classical period. Tsetskhladze argues that scholarly research on the Black Sea grain trade has proceeded from tenuous literary evidence, and archaeological evidence does not substantiate either the ancient literary evidence or the modern work that has elaborated on it. The majority of ancient authors who discuss the Black Sea grain trade are from the 4th century or later, and thus there is little evidence in the ancient sources for trade before this period. The context of many of these 4th century sources, Athenian law court speeches, also leaves their validity open to question. Some modern scholars have seen these figures, such as Demosthenes’ mention of 400,000 medimnoi of grain from the Bosporan Kingdom, as impossibly high, others as impossibly low.62 Tsetskhladze concludes that they offer no hard evidence regarding the extent of the grain trade between Athens and the Black Sea, and there is a lack of any solid literary evidence for grain trade before the 4th century.63 Furthermore, Tsetskhladze believes that the archaeological evidence does not support the conclusion that there was a significant grain trade during the Classical period between Athens and the Black Sea. Tsetskhladze’s argument here is mainly negative, and based on the 62 63

Demosthenes 20.32. Tsetskhladze 1998, 57.

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lack of solid evidence supporting such claims, rather than the presence of evidence refuting the claims. For example, Tsetskhladze reviews the numismatic evidence regarding finds of Cyzicene coins around the Black Sea, because the Cyzicene was known to be a currency used in international commerce and some scholars have proposed that it was used in the grain trade between Athens and the Black Sea colonies.64 The general trend of Tsetskhladze’s analysis shows small amounts of Cyzicene coins coming from the Bosporan Kingdom, the Thracian coast, and the southern and eastern coasts of the Black Sea. Olbia, however, has yielded a large amount of Cyzicene coins, as well as a 4th century inscription containing an exchange rate between Cyzicene and local coins.65 Tsetskhladze dismisses the evidence from Olbia, and instead concentrates on the sparse evidence in other areas. His main conclusion from the numismatic evidence is that Demosthenes’ claim that the Bosporan Kingdom was the main grain producing state in the 4th century is not supported by the numismatic evidence.66 Tsetskhladze employs similar arguments ex silentio regarding ceramic fineware and the paleobotanical evidence. Rather than working towards conclusions about what the evidence shows, he concentrates on refuting previous scholarship that he believes has been published without sufficient evidence to reinforce its claims. Tsetskhladze states that the quantities of ceramic evidence cannot support the claim that this commodity was traded for Black Sea grain.67 Regarding the paleobotanical evidence, he deplores the lack of complete study in the region, and again concentrates on refuting Demosthenes’ claim about the extent of production in the Bosporan Kingdom. Although he argues mainly against the view that a large quantity of 64

Mildenberg 1993/4, 1-12 offers an overview of the Cyzicene evidence. Dittenberger 1960, n. 218; Pleket 1964, n. 7. 66 Tsetskhladze 1998, 59. 67 Tsetskhladze 1998, 61-62. 65

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grain came from the Black Sea to Athens in the 4th century, Tsetskhladze is careful to include the 5th century in his results as well.68 While Tsetskhladze’s view does provide a counterpoint to some aspects of the grain trade in the Classical period, it does not prove that scholarly research has overestimated the importance of the grain trade during this period, or that Athens was not importing grain from the Black Sea before the 4th century. It is quite possible that Demosthenes lied or exaggerated when he claimed that the Bosporan Kingdom exported 400,000 medimnoi of grain to Athens. It is also true that the literary evidence does not provide strong evidence for the presence of the grain trade in the 5th century. However Tsetskhladze does not address the issue completely: he negates the theory that ceramic fineware was traded for grain, but does not consider the existence of other trade goods in addition to ceramics, particularly agricultural cargo that is not archaeologically visible. He notes the exceptionally large hoards of Cyzicene coins in Olbia, but instead concentrates on their dearth elsewhere, and again does not consider the possibility that trade could have been conducted in agricultural goods, as well as coins. He cites one paleobotanical study from 1975 that supports his position regarding the Bosporan Kingdom, but does not address results from other studies, particularly the works of Sceglov and Janushevich cited above. The archaeological and numismatic evidence regarding the amount of grain exported from the Bosporan Kingdom in the 4th century clearly raises questions regarding Demosthenes’ claims, but just as Tsetskhladze believes previous scholars have drawn too much from the grain trade evidence, he also has taken his conclusions farther than the evidence warrants.

68

Tsetskhladze 1998, 57 n. 2.

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Conclusion Although Tsetskhladze enumerates a number of good points regarding the overinterpretation of evidence, the Black Sea colonies do seem to have been involved in a significant level of trade with Athens during the 5th century. The paleobotanical evidence shows that soft Russian bread wheat, which was desirable for export, was being grown in the chorai of the Greek colonies, and there is a strong correlation between the sites growing wheat and sites with a high level of imported Attic ceramic fineware. The specific nature of the commercial relationship between Athens and the Black Sea colonies may not be archaeologically visible, but Bouzek and others have argued that agricultural produce may have been the primary commodity exchanged for grain during the 5th century. The recent research on the Attic grain supply in the 5th century also indicates that trade was conducted for grain during the 5th century, although it may be extreme to speak of Athenian dependence on foreign grain. Whether the Athenian need for foreign grain was arithmetic or psychological, it seems likely that a significant level of trade occurred with the Black Sea colonies to ensure Athens’ supply of grain. It may also be extreme to justify all Athenian activity in the northern Aegean on the basis of maintaining a grain supply route with the Black Sea, but the pursuit of natural resources, such as grain from the Black Sea, could have affected Athenian activities during the period of the Athenian empire.

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IV. Athens and Thasos Introduction An examination of the Athenian grain supply in the 5th century has verified Athenian interest in the primary natural resource of the Black Sea, although to speak of Athenian ‘dependence’ on grain from the Black Sea characterizes the nature of the relationship too strongly. While the Black Sea colonies were not directly controlled by Athens during the period of the Delian League, their natural resources were important to Athens, and it is possible to see a correlation between historical events in the 5th century and Athenian interests in the Black Sea natural resources. Other regions of the Mediterranean also contained valuable natural resources, particularly Thasos and its Peraia in the northern Aegean. Thasos was more directly controlled by Athens during the period of empire, and an examination of Thasian resources and its relationship with Athens in the 5th century can help to refine our understanding of the extent to which the pursuit of natural resources influenced Athenian policy and actions. This chapter will examine the natural resources of Thasos, its Peraia, and the adjacent Thracian interior, the development and prominence of the city in the Archaic period, and evidence regarding the relationship of Athens and Thasos in the 5th century. Archaic Thasos Thasos was colonized by Greeks from the Cycladic island Paros in the first half of the 7th century BC. The Archaic poet Archilochos, from Paros, wrote about his participation in the colonization of Thasos.69 The island was previously inhabited by local Thracians, and

69

Archilochus, fr. 6 D.

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Herodotus writes that Phoenicians also colonized the island at an earlier date.70 Shortly after coming to the island, the Greek colonists on Thasos extended their territory to the coastal zones of the northern Aegean mainland, which became known as the Thasian Peraia. Thasos established a number of settlements in the Peraia, some of which have been verified archaeologically, while others are known to us from literary sources.71 The principle Thasian settlements on the Peraia included Galepsos, Apollonia, Oisyme, Antisara, Neapolis, Akontisma, Pistiros, and Stryme. These settlements varied in size, but most appear to have been relatively small. The exact nature of the relationship between Thasos and its Peraia in the Archaic period is unclear. Some of the settlements may have been little more than small trading posts (emporia), while others, such as Neapolis, Galepsos and Oesyme, became large enough to mint their own coins.72 Thasos colonized the Peraia because of its natural resources. Precious metals (i.e., gold and silver) were present at multiple sites on the mainland, and will be discussed in detail below. Although much of the evidence comes from later historical sources, the coastal zone between Oesyme and Neapolis, known as Bibline, was famed for its viticulture.73 This area was part of the Peraia colonized by Thasos, and epigraphic evidence from the 5th century, also discussed in detail below, further supports its importance to Thasian viticulture. Nearby along the coast, between Neapolis and the Nestos River, cereals were cultivated in the alluvial plain, both in antiquity and today. Two varieties of wheat, triticum durum and triticum turgidum, were 70

Herodotus 2.44, 6.47; See also Graham 1964, chap V; Pouilloux 1954, 26-33. Isaac 1986, 9-12, provides an overview of the archaeological evidence relating to the Thasian Peraia. 72 Laziridis 1971, 43 n. 160. Hansen designates the Thasian Peraia settlements as ‘dependent poleis’ of Thasos, and differentiates this category from emporia that were part of poleis. He believes that the primary function of the Peraia settlements was to trade with the inland Thracians (Hansen 2006, 24). See Fig. 3 for a map of Thasos and its Peraia. 73 Laziridis 1971, 11-12; Collart 1937, 89; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai, 1.31a. 71

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present in antiquity, as well as a renowned type of barley.74 Timber was plentiful throughout the region, both along the coast and inland in the mountainous areas controlled by the Thracians. Agriculture in the area also produced olives, legumes and other crops, fish were harvested along the coast, and apiculture was also practiced. Because much of the evidence for the agriculture and natural resources of the Thasian Peraia comes from later historical sources and comparative ethnoarchaeology, ethnobotanical studies of the Peraia sites and their chorai could help to clarify the agricultural resources of the Peraia and their effect on Thasian commerce.75 Although the Thasian colonies on the Peraia were agriculturally productive, another main function may have been as emporia for trading with the local Thracians. Isaac’s review of the archaeological and historical evidence relating to the Thasian settlement of the Peraia leads him to believe that, although at times the Greeks made attempts to establish settlements inland, the majority of the inland resources were controlled by Thracians. 76 The Greeks were most able to profit from the inland resources by trading with the inland Thracian tribes who controlled them, rather than attempting to take the land away from the Thracians. These inland resources, particularly precious metals, played an important role in the events of the 5th century, and will be discussed in detail below. But during the Archaic period Thasos seems to have profited greatly from its access to mainland resources, both by possession of colonies in the Peraia and trade with the inland Thracians.

74

Hammond 1972, 15; Laziridis 1971, 12; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai, 3.112a. For example, absorbed lipid analysis of transport amphora sherds from the inland emporion Pistiros revealed evidence for a resinous organic sealant, which may have been used for the transport of wine, fish sauces and liquefied fruit. Similar analysis at other sites could advance our understanding of ancient agriculture and commerce (Heron and Rye 1996, 202). 76 Isaac 1986, 50. 75

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In addition to productive mainland resources, Thasos also possessed considerable resources on the island. Although Herodotus relates that Thasos obtained more wealth from the precious metal resources of the mainland, it is clear from both the literary and archaeological sources that Thasos possessed mining resources on the island as well. Significant remains of mines have been found throughout the western side of the island, as well as isolated sites in the north, south and east.77 In addition to gold and silver, these mines produced lead, chromite, iron, zinc, copper and antimony.78 Herodotus notes that he had personally seen the most impressive mines on the island, which he calls the Phoenician mines, on the side of the island against Samothrace (i.e., the eastern side).79 Although the remains of more mines seem to be extant on the western side, it is possible that the intensive mining operations on the east are not archaeologically visible. It is nevertheless clear that Thasos did possess substantial metal resources on the island. Timber also was abundant during the Archaic period, as is evident from Archilochus’ description of Thasos as ‘crowned with savage wood.’80 This timber was presumably used to develop the merchant and naval fleets of Thasos, along with the timber resources from the mainland. The size and power of the Thasian fleet is mostly unknown, but Thasian shipbuilding capability in the Archaic period can be inferred from their contribution of ships during the early period of the Delian League. The Persians also forced the Thasians to surrender their ships in 490 when they marched through Thrace on their way to Greece. The Thasian fleet did engage the Athenians during the revolt of 465, and were defeated. Accounts relating details of the 77

Osborne 1987, 80. Laziridis 1971, 6. 79 Herodotus, 6.46-47. 80 Archilochus, F. 21. 78

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merchant fleet are likewise lacking, but the abundance of timber on Thasos, the Peraia and inland would have aided the development of the fleet. Two harbors existed in the city, one for trading vessels and the other naval. Although most of the evidence is indirect, many scholars believe Thasos possessed substantial mercantile and naval fleets during the Archaic period, which contributed to the military and economic strength of the polis.81 Many of the same historical sources that inform us about viticulture in the Bibline region of the Peraia also laud the quality of wine from Thasos.82 Archaeological support comes from the remains of amphora production centers and heaps of amphora sherds found throughout the island, which indicate a high level of viticultural production. During the 5th and 4th centuries there is strong evidence for the importance and large scale of viticulture on Thasos, particularly from the study of amphora stamps that Thasos used to regulate the production and trade of its wine.83 Osborne has likewise used the evidence from the amphora production centers and sherd dumps throughout the island to interpret a high level of state control over the viticultural resources of the island, and Pouilloux believes viticulture was central to the economic prosperity of Thasos.84 SEG XVIII.347, an inscription found on Thasos from ca. 480 BC and first published by Pouilloux, shows further evidence for the high level of viticulture on Thasos.85 The inscription concerns the punishment for violating a law regarding wine and vinegar, and shows that by the end of the Archaic period these resources were being produced on a large enough scale to

81

Pouilloux 1954, 43-45; Laziridis 1971, 72; Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968 22-23. Aristophanes, Ploutos 1021, Ecclesiazusae 1119, Lysistrata 196; Xenophon, Symposium 41; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai 1.28c, 1.29c, 31-32. 83 The amphora stamps of Thasos have been studied extensively by Bon and Bon, 1957, and Garlan 1999. 84 Osborne 1987, 104-108; Pouilloux 1954, 121. 85 Pouilloux 1954, 37ff. See also Pleket 1964, no. 1. 82

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warrant an inscription. The content of the law is not preserved, but the punishment includes donating a sixth of each amphora (of wine and/or vinegar) to Athena Polias and Pythian Apollo, and also giving another sixth to the accuser. The accused must pay this penalty in front of a group called the Three Hundred, just as he would if he had committed a crime. The last preserved clause states that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for its violation, whether citizen or foreigner. Pouilloux interprets the inscription as evidence for the existence of an aristocratic class that ruled Thasos during the Archaic period.86 He sees this group primarily as a wealthy merchant class, who controlled and profited off the export of goods from Thasos and its Peraia. Pouilloux’s theory on the existence of a wealthy merchant class during the Archaic period has not been universally accepted, but, regardless of the political interpretation, it does seem clear that by the end of the Archaic period viticulture was highly developed on Thasos and subject to a certain degree of government regulation.87 Thasos also contained considerable marble deposits, which the Thasians used in monumental building construction during the Archaic period. Although the surviving city walls date from the Classical period, they are built on Archaic foundations, and Herodotus affirms the existence of extensive fortification walls when he relates that the Persians forced the Thasians to dismantle their walls when they were marching through Greece in 491 BC and briefly controlled Thasos.88 The Classical walls contained local marble as well as gneiss bedrock, and Osborne has interpreted the use of marble as a deliberate display of Thasian wealth and resources. The gneiss bedrock is easier to work, and thus the conscious choice to incorporate 86

Pouilloux 1954, 43-45. Pouilloux’s interpretations of historical events based on the archaeological and epigraphic evidence from Thasos will be discussed in a later section below. 88 Herodotus 6.46; Pouilloux 1954, 34 also discusses the Archaic walls. 87

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marble into the walls signifies a desire to show off the extensive resources of the island.89 It is unclear whether the Archaic walls were built in a similar manner, but the Thasians were utilizing their marble resources in this period. The rural architectural remains from the Archaic period likewise contain local marble, particularly the square and round towers that are extant throughout the island. The purpose of these towers is unclear, but they may have been associated with the mining activities of the island. There is only one urban settlement on Thasos, on the north side of the island, and much of the rest of the island has left scant archaeological evidence of its habitation. The towers may have served a military function, but could also have been used as strongholds for managers to oversee the workers and slaves employed in the mines throughout the island. Many of these towers date from the Archaic period, and employ both marble and gneiss in their construction.90 While the Classical walls of the city show the use of marble as a display of wealth and resources, the rural towers are built with whatever material, either gneiss or marble, is in the vicinity of the tower. The two Archaic sanctuaries at Aliki on the southeast shore of the island also testify to the extensive marble resources of the area. The sanctuaries are located on a small peninsula, and were first built during the Archaic period, probably shortly after Greeks first came to Thasos from Paros. The buildings consist of two three‐roomed structures, each with two inner chambers opening onto a portico.91 Both sanctuaries contain altars in the north rooms, although it is unclear what particular deity or deities were associated with the sanctuaries. The

89

Osborne 1987, 91. See also Fig. 4. Ibid. 91 See Fig. 5. 90

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location of the altars indoors is peculiar, and perhaps reflects the early development of the sanctuaries in the Archaic period. Graffiti on nearby marble blocks contains imprecations for safe sea‐voyages (euploia) to Heracles, Poseidon, Artemis, Asclepius and the Dioscuri, and show that the sanctuaries were visited by passing mariners throughout antiquity.92 There is also abundant evidence for marble quarrying on the peninsula, including unfinished columns, finished blocks, mason’s marks, and other graffiti. Servais concludes that marble from the peninsula was the primary material used in the construction of the sanctuaries, and quarrying activity continued from early in the Archaic period throughout antiquity. The extent to which Thasian marble may have been exported is unknown, but the large scale of quarrying at Aliki and the graffiti evidence of ancient mariners stopping at the sanctuaries seem to suggest the possibility of export from the site.93 The precious metal resources of Thasos, the Peraia, and the Thracian territory inland from the Peraia are mentioned frequently in ancient sources. Much of the information comes from later periods, but it is fair to assume that the precious metal resources of the area were mined before the Classical period. Herodotus discusses the mainland precious metal resources in some detail, even including the names of the Thracian tribes that inhabit the areas. One important region is known as Skaptesyle, which Herodotus reports to yield 80 talents of gold annually.94 Mt. Pangaion is also known to produce gold and silver, and Herodotus says that it is controlled by Thracian tribes (Odomantoi, Pieres, and especially the Satrai) when Xerxes passes

92

Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968, 87. Servais 1980 and Sodini et Kolokotsas 1984 offer a detailed study of the two sanctuaries and the marble quarries on the peninsula. 94 Herodotus 6.46. 93

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through the region in 480.95 Thasos also possessed mines on the island, which were less productive than those of the mainland, but nevertheless increased the wealth of Thasos. Strabo also mentions the Strymon river valley as containing gold and silver, extending inland to the territory of the Thracian tribe known as the Paeonians.96 Although these locations are discussed in some detail by the ancient sources, their exact locations remain unclear. None of the sites have been discovered archaeologically, which has left scholars to debate the interpretation of the information in the historical sources. Isaac has recently developed the following interpretation, based on a close examination of the primary sources: Skaptesyle was a mine at or near the later site of Krenides, also known as Philippi. This mine was controlled by Thasos during the Archaic period, until the Thasian revolt in 465. The mines on Mt. Pangaion (the mountain still has the same name today, although the mines have not been found) were controlled by the Thracian tribes, and the Thasians traded with the Thracians for these resources at the emporia along the Peraia. The mines along the Strymon river valley were likewise controlled by local Thracian tribes, and trade was conducted in a similar manner.97 The important difference that led Isaac to this interpretation is the distinction between mines that produced only gold at Skaptesyle, and mines that produced gold and silver on Mt. Pangaion and in the Strymon valley. He also distinguishes the Mt. Pangaion mines and Skaptesyle based on Thucydides’ use of the singular to metallon to refer to the mines at Skaptesyle (controlled by Thasos) and the general tendency to refer to the Mt. Pangaion and Strymon valley mines in the plural.98 Isaac interprets this as showing a difference between 95

Herodotus 7.112. Strabo, 7 fr. 34. 97 Isaac 1986, 27-28. 98 to metallon: Thucydides 1.100.2; ta metalla: Herodotus 6.46, 7.112, Strabo 7 fr. 34. 96

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Thasos’ relationship with the Mt. Pangaion mines (trade relationship at the Peraia emporia) and the Skaptesyle mines (direct Thasian control until 465).99 Isaac’s theory on the locations of the mining areas and the economic relationships between the Thasians and Thracians seems sound, although archaeological survey could help to clarify some of the ambiguities in the historical sources.100 His conclusions do fit well with other events related in the sources, which also support the supposition of Athenian economic interest in the area from an early period. For example, both Herodotus and Aristotle state that Peisistratos became wealthy from activity around the Thasian Peraia.101 Herodotus refers to his wealth coming from mines around the Strymon river, while Aristotle describes his activities as around Mt. Pangaion. According to Isaac’s theory, both of these areas were controlled by Thracian tribes, and Greeks (particularly the Thasians) traded with the Thracians to gain access to their precious metal resources in the Strymon valley and Mt. Pangaion. There is no indication that Peisistratos obtained his wealth by force, and it is reasonable to suggest that, like the Thasians, he traded with the Thracians for their gold and silver. Assuming a relationship of commercial interaction rather than direct access to the mines, Peisistratos’ actions thus show Athenian interest and knowledge about the profitability of the Thasian mainland and adjacent Thracian interior in the middle of the 6th century. Thasos thus had many natural resources available for trade, either through direct control or trade with the neighboring Thracian tribes. These resources included precious

99

These mine locations and economic relationships have been interpreted differently by other scholars. Laziridis believes Skaptesyle is located on Mt. Pangaion (see Fig. 3), others believe it is near the Strymon valley. Isaac provides a bibliography on pg. 28. 100 Isaac also notes that mineralogists and/or archaeometallurgists could aid in clarifying the precious metal resources of the Peraia and adjacent Thracian interior (13). 101 Herodotus 1.64; Aristotle Ath. Pol. 15.2.

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metals, wine, grain, timber, marble, and other agricultural goods. The extent to which these resources were traded in the Archaic period is unclear, but support for a significant level of trade comes from the wide distribution of Thasian coinage. Around 525 Thasos first began minting coins, which featured an image of a Silenus carrying off a nymph (Period 1).102 These coins have been found widely distributed in cities around the Mediterranean: Thasian coins have been found in a significant number of hordes in Egypt, particularly in the Nile Delta (1), at Sakha (1), Demanhur (12), Zagazig (1), and Benha‐el‐Asl (3).103 Ras‐Shamra in the Levant has yielded Thasian coins, although they were unpublished at the time of Pouilloux’s work. In the west, Metapontum and Tarentum show signs of commercial interaction with Thasos in the Archaic period, again through the presence of Thasian coins in hordes. Lastly, large numbers of Thasian coins have come from the Balkan interior, as well as contemporary Thracian imitations of Archaic Thasian coins, showing a high level of commercial interaction between Thasos and the inland Thracian tribes.104 The wide distribution of coinage shows that Thasos was involved in commercial interactions in all parts of the Greek world, as well as the Near East, Egypt and Thrace.105 The archaeological excavations on Thasos have also produced evidence for a significant amount of Archaic sculpture coming from the island. The Ram‐Bearer Kouros, which was made around the end of the 7th century and found on Thasos, shows clear influences from contemporary Ionian sculpture, such as geometric patterns in the hair and monumental size

102

See Fig. 6. Pouilloux 1954, 52 n. 1. 104 Pouilloux 1954-58, 48-56 reviews the wide distribution of Archaic Thasian coinage with bibliography. See also Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968, 186. 105 See Figures 7 and 8 for distribution of Thasian coinage throughout the Mediterranean and cities whose coinage has been found on Thasos. 103

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(3.5 meters tall).106 An Archaic kore head likewise shows influence from Cycladic art through its refined hairstyle. Laziridis notes that Thasian artisans created works of art in many different mediums during the Archaic period: dedicatory bas‐reliefs, gravestones, architectural pieces, and kouroi and korai.107 As already noted above, the marble resources at Aliki were already being quarried early in the Archaic period, and the Archaic sculpture from Thasos shows that this resource was used for artistic purposes in addition to its function as a building material. The large amount of Archaic art found on Thasos reinforces the idea that Thasos was an important and wealthy polis during this period, and was interacting with other prominent and developing poleis. There is thus a wide variety of sources providing evidence for a high level of development at Thasos during the Archaic period. The abundance of natural resources, including wine, marble, precious metals, timber, grain, olive oil, and other agricultural goods is also clear. The wide distribution of Thasian coins indicates a significant level of Thasian commerce, and Laziridis believes Thasian commerce in the Archaic period was prolific.108 Pouilloux also believes Thasos was quite powerful and wealthy in the Archaic period, and interprets the Archaic evidence, primarily SEG XVIII.347, as showing that the Thasian aristocracy in this early period was primarily reliant on commerce for its wealth.109 Finley and others believe Pouilloux has attempted to reconstruct too much from the available evidence,110 but, regardless of the political implications, it is clear that a wide variety of evidence exists for Thasian economic prosperity in the Archaic period. The archaeological, art historical, and 106

Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968, 109-114. See also Fig. 9. Laziridis 1971, 26. 108 Laziridis 1971, 23. 109 Pouilloux 1954, 43. 110 Finley 1979, 28-32; Fraser 1957, 98-103. Pouilloux’s interpretation and his critics will be discussed below. 107

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numismatic evidence does support the notion that Thasos was a prosperous polis in the Archaic period, enjoyed many benefits from the rich natural resources of the island and the Peraia, and conducted a significant amount of trade with other Greek poleis, the interior Thracian tribes in the Balkan peninsula, and the distant cultures of the Near East, Egypt, and the Adriatic. Classical Thasos, before 465 The Persian wars initiated a change in the history and development of Thasos, the Peraia, and the neighboring Thracian tribes. In 491 the Persians ordered Thasos to remove its city walls and bring their ships to Abdera, a nearby polis which was controlled by the Persians. Herodotus notes that at this time the Thasians were quite wealthy and had used their money to construct a monumental defensive wall around their city, as well as ships of war.111 Thasos capitulated to these demands, and appears to have generally complied with Persian control of the region‐ which scholars have interpreted as submission, food for the army, and participation in the campaign of 480.112 Herodotus relates that the Persians also took control of Thracian territory, mainly lands near the coast: they deported the Paionians who lived in the Strymon valley, and convinced the Greek leader Histiaeus to leave his settlement Myrcinus on the Strymon. However, they left the Thracian tribes around Mt. Pangaion and other inland Thracian tribes unconquered.113 The Persian acquisition of control over Thasos, the Peraia and the Thracian coast was thus accomplished mainly through diplomacy, although the Persians used force when necessary. Rather than exerting their efforts to gain further control of inland Thrace, the

111

Herodotus 6.46. Isaac 1986, 18; Collart 1937, 65. 113 Herodotus 5.14-16, 24-5. 112

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Persians instead continued westward towards Macedonia and south towards Thessaly and the Greek mainland.114 The path of the Persians thus shows less interest in subduing the many Thracian tribes living inland. Isaac interprets this evidence as showing a general disinterest on the part of the Persians regarding the natural resources of the area, as they were more concerned with maintaining a geographic supply line between Asia and Greece. 115 This emphasis on geographic control of the Greek poleis and the Thracian coastal settlements is a fundamental distinction between Persian and later Athenian attempts to control the region, and allowed the Persians to maintain the geographical supply line without interference from the inland Thracian tribes. Isaac further notes that the Thasians seemed to maintain possession of the Peraia during the Persian war period, presumably in an economic sense rather than geographic or political.116 Thasos thus submitted to Persian rule in the early 5th century, but does not seem to have suffered a serious decline in prosperity. Like many other Greek poleis facing the might of Persia, Thasos was willing to sacrifice its freedom, and although there is little evidence regarding its direct effect on Thasian commerce, Persian rule does not seem to have affected Thasos particularly adversely. After the defeat of the Persians in 480, Thasos became an early member of the Delian League. When Thasos first joined the Delian League, her contribution was paid in ships rather than money.117 At this time Thasos seems to have possessed the Peraia as well, since it becomes the central issue in the dispute between Athens and Thasos in 465. Although Thasos controlled the Peraia, the Persians still controlled nearby areas in Thrace and 114

Herodotus 5.17-21 relates the Persian embassy to Macedonia, which also brought about submission through diplomacy. 115 Isaac 1986, 18. 116 Isaac 1986, ibid. 117 Meritt et al. 1950, 258.

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along the coast, such as Eion on the western side of Mt. Pangaion. As the Delian League was formed in order to drive the Persians from Greek territory and minimize the threat of further Persian aggression against the Greeks, the Athenian siege of Eion in 476 seems to be strategically prudent. The location of the site was geographically important for forming a defensive buffer between Persian possessions in Thrace and Macedonia, and strategically important due to its location on the Strymon river, thus controlling access to the Thracian interior. Thucydides relates that Athens successfully took control of Eion in 476, and reduced its inhabitants to slavery.118 Although Thasos controlled the Peraia, it is significant that Athens gained control of nearby Eion during this early period of the Delian League. The Athenians thus established a presence near Thasos from the very beginning of the Delian League. Although the campaign at Eion was ostensibly justified by the Persian presence in the region, the accounts of Peisistratos discussed above show that the Athenians were aware of the resources in the area. As the Persians seem to have had a low level of interest or involvement in the resources of the area, it seems likely that the relationships of the Archaic period were largely maintained at this time: Thasos controlled its own resources, and traded for access to those controlled by the inland Thracians through its colonies on the Peraia. SEG XVIII.347, mentioned above because of its relevance to Thasian viticulture, is also significant regarding the question of Thasian resource management and control.119 Dated to around 480, the inscription shows the involvement of a governing body, the Three Hundred, in the payment of a fine for violation of a law regarding wine and vinegar. Although the inscription is fragmentary, the involvement of the Three Hundred in a law regarding wine and 118 119

Thucydides 1.98.1. See above, n. 85.

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vinegar is indicative of Thasian control of its resources at this time. The last clause of the inscription also contains an interesting addendum, stating that ignorance of the law regarding wine is acceptable oute politei oute xsenoi, i.e. for neither a citizen nor a foreigner. The word politei has been restored, but none of the editors seem to dispute the general meaning of this clause.120 The dichotomy between citizen and foreigner could indicate early attempts by the Thasians to keep others from interfering with their economic affairs, in addition to Thasian regulation of its own citizens. When considered with the Athenian siege and capture of Eion, the possibility arises that xenoi could even include Athenians, and thus shows an early indication of Athenian interest in Thasian resources. This possibility is far from certain, given the uncertainty of the date and the use of the term xenoi instead of Athenaioi, but the clause at least demonstrates a degree of Thasian concern over the control of their resources and the presence of non‐Thasian agents in the commerce of viticulture at that time. As noted above, the Athenian siege of Eion in 476 was a sound and logical decision from a military standpoint. However, it is possible that economic benefit was also a motive of Athenian action in this area. The relationship between Peisistratos and Thracians in the 6th century shows that Athenians were aware of the economic potential in the area, and the successful defeat of the Persians at Eion could have once again opened up the Strymon valley to economic interaction between the Athenian and allied residents at Eion and the Thracian inland tribes. Plutarch notes that three inscribed Hermae were set up in Athens after the victory at Eion, which were intended to honor Kimon for his achievements in that siege.121 He further relates that neither Miltiades nor Themistokles received honors in a similar way after 120 121

Pouilloux and Pleket restore politei, Bingen restores Thasioi. Xsenoi shows the use of the Archaic Parian script. Plutarch, Kimon, 7-8.

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their victories at Marathon and Salamis, although these battles were militarily more significant during the period of the Graeco‐Persian wars. The inscribed Hermae could thus have been given to Kimon because his victory at Eion offered other benefits to Athens, such as the reemergence of access to the precious metal resources of the Strymon valley and Mt. Pangaion, in addition to the strategic security of pushing the Persians out of Thrace.122 In summary, archaeological, numismatic and literary evidence supports the theory that Thasos was a wealthy state during the Archaic period, and presumably was obtaining its wealth from exploitation of its own natural resources and those of the Peraia. It also seems likely that Thasos did not have direct control of all the mainland resources, but rather was trading with the local Thracian tribes to obtain access to their natural resources, notably gold and silver. During the 6th century Athens started to become interested in these same resources, and after the Persian wars ended they acquired territory in the area. During the early period of the Delian League, Thasos and Athens thus both seem to have had interests in the Thracian mainland. SEG XVIII.347 shows that the government of Thasos was still exercising control over at least the wine production of the region (wine was produced both on Thasos and along the coast of the Peraia), and there is no evidence indicating a change in the possession of precious metal resources before 465. Thasos was a member of the Delian League at this time, but contributed ships instead of money, perhaps because this was more economically desirable for Thasos. In 465 Thasos revolted from the Delian League. Thucydides states that the revolt stemmed from a quarrel over the emporia on the mainland and the mine, from which Thasos

122

Isaac 1986, 20-21 also notes the possible dual motives of Athenian actions at Eion.

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was profiting.123 Thus it seems that whatever political and/or economic relationship existed between Athens and Thasos during the early period of the Delian League became tenuous by 465, and Thasos believed that they could successfully resist Athens militarily. Athens had already shown at Naxos that they were unwilling to tolerate defections from the Delian League by their allies, and they sent Kimon and the Athenian fleet to Thasos. Kimon defeated the Thasian fleet in a naval battle, and besieged the city for three years before Thasos surrendered. The terms of surrender contained both military and economic concessions: Thasos had to remove its fortification walls and give up its navy, just as they did when they were subject to Persian rule at the beginning of the 5th century. However, Athens also made Thasos give up the mine on the mainland (Skaptesyle) and its Peraia possessions. This concession was surely economic in nature, which is reflected in the change of tribute. As noted earlier, Thasos had previously paid its tribute in ships, which Meritt et al. conjecture to be 30 ships worth 30 talents.124 After the end of the Thasian revolt their new monetary tribute was reduced to 3 talents. This drastic reduction in the amount of tribute collected from Thasos confirms the implications of Thucydides’ statement regarding the Peraia and the mine: Athens assumed economic control of the natural resources that Thasos had previously been either controlling or trading to acquire (the emporia of the Thasian Peraia and the mine at Skaptesyle), and thus reduced Thasian tribute because she no longer controlled the resources that had previously made her so wealthy. Thasos also undoubtedly suffered losses during the three year siege, which would have further limited her ability to pay tribute.

123 124

Thuc. 1.100.2. Isaac believes ‘the mine’ refers to Skaptesyle (see above). Meritt et al. 1950, 259.

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While Athenian interest in Thasian resources is instructive in analyzing the revolt of 465, it is also important to consider the contemporary political context. Political factions changed throughout the period both at Athens and Thasos, and the economic relationship between Athens and Thasos was surely affected by political changes in both places. The connection between economics and politics may have influenced the Athenian decision to send Kimon to Thasos in 465 to quell the revolt, because Kimon’s familial connection to Thracian royalty could have aided Athenian efforts. Kimon’s relationship with the Thracians could have aided Athens by encouraging the Thracians not to support Thasos militarily, and also, after Athens defeated Thasos, Kimon could again have used his Thracian connections to secure better commercial relations with the inland Thracian tribes controlling natural resources, particularly precious metals. The later mining concessions of Thucydides, Kimon’s nephew, also support a correlation between this important Athenian political family and the precious metal resources of Thrace.125 While the political situation in Athens is relevant to the events at Thasos, the Thasian appeal to Sparta during the revolt of 465 is also indicative of Thasos’ political ideology at that time. Evidence from the Archaic period indicates that Thasos was originally governed by an oligarchy, and would naturally have been opposed to the democratic ideology of Athens that developed throughout the 6th and 5th centuries. The Thasian appeal to Sparta in 465 suggests that oligarchs were still controlling Thasos at that time, as a democratic government would have been less likely to revolt from Athens. As noted above, Pouilloux’s theory that the Archaic Thasian oligarchy was primarily a wealthy merchant class is an overinterpretation of the

125

For more discussion on the connection between Kimon, Thucydides and Thracian royalty, see below, pg. 51-52.

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evidence, but it is important to note that the economic prosperity of the Archaic period occurred under an oligarchic government. The presence of the Thasian oligarchy could thus have also have been a factor in the cause of the revolt in 465, although the economic concessions of 463 indicate that natural resources were important as well. At the same time that Kimon suppressed the Thasian revolt, the Athenians also pressed to increase their territory in the Strymon river valley. Thucydides reports that Athens sent ten thousand colonists up the river to a place called Ennea Hodoi, which he identifies with the later site of Amphipolis. The Athenians successfully took Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians, a local Thracian tribe, but continued inland and were destroyed at a place called Drabeskos.126 When considered together with the Athenian takeover of Thasian economic resources, this attempt to take control of land from the inland Thracian tribes seems to show a wider desire by the Athenians to gain even more control over the resources of the area than Thasos had previously enjoyed. Unlike Thasos, Athens may not have been content to deal with the Thracian tribes that controlled the gold and silver resources of the Strymon valley and Mt. Pangaion, or at least decided to take the opportunity presented by the Thasian revolt to gain more territory in the area. However they were unable to overcome the inland Thracian tribes, and must have been forced to continue to trade for the gold and silver of the interior.127 Classical Thasos, After 465 Although Athens failed to gain control of the Strymon valley at this time, it did gain possession of the Thasian mine at Skaptesyle and the Peraia, as well as the resources of the 126

Thucydides 1.100.2. A scholiast to Aeschines 2.31 confirms Thucydides’ account, and adds that the Athenians met with disaster nine times in different attempts to colonize Ennea Hodoi, the first occurring during the Eion campaign of 476. The scholiast gives a mythical explanation for their failure to hold the position, but it is more important to note the repeated efforts of Athens to gain control of this territory. See Fornara 1977, no. 62. 127

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island, following the Thasian revolt of 465. The low tribute of three talents indicates a high degree of Athenian control over Thasian resources, and the cessation of the first period of Thasian coinage in 465 coincides with the Athenian subjugation of Thasos.128 Pouilloux notes the numismatic evidence from Egyptian hordes as indicative of the replacement of Thasian coinage with Athenian, although the correlation is not as strong as he believes. Thasian coinage is present in the Archaic hordes, although in most it does not appear in greater numbers than other Greek poleis. Athenian coins appear abnormally large (34 out of 84 coins) in only one horde, from Zagazig, which is not accurately dated. Pouilloux here attempts to extract too much from the coin horde evidence when he states that “Le triomphe athenien est definitif a Zagazig avec 34 tetradrachmes sur un depot de 84 pieces,”129 but it is important to note the cessation of Thasian coinage at the same time that Athens subjugated Thasos and took control of her mainland resources. As Thasos was still a sovereign state within the Delian League, the cessation of coinage could indicate a decline in Thasian involvement in commercial activity, in addition to the Athenian control of Thasian resources. Shortly after Thasos stopped minting its coins, the Thasian painter Polygnotos is known to have gone to Athens. The well‐known painter was in Athens between 457 and 446, when he painted the famous wall reliefs in the Painted Stoa as well as other buildings in Athens and elsewhere.130 Polygnotos’ willingness to paint scenes depicting famous Athenian and Greek military victories so shortly after his native city had been subdued by Athens is intriguing. Pouilloux believes that Polygnotos opposed the Athenian presence at Thasos, as is shown by his

128

Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968, 186. The first period of Thasian coinage was ca. 525-465. Pouilloux 1954, 60. 130 Laziridis 1971, 27; Plutarch, Kimon, 4.5ff. 129

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alleged affair with Kimon’s sister Elpinice.131 However this is somewhat far‐fetched, and such speculation involving personal motives and feelings cannot ever be proven or disproven. It is also possible that Polygnotos came to Athens because of the economic relationship existing between the two poleis at the time, rather than for personal reasons. If Athens was controlling a large portion of Thasian wealth, it is likely that local artisans may have experienced a drop in business at that time. Polygnotos may have come to Athens in search of economic opportunities that were not present on Thasos. Regardless of whether he agreed with Athenian control of Thasos’ resources, he may have realized that Athens was better able to afford his artistic services. His presence at Athens at this time could thus be seen as another indication of a close economic relationship between Athens and Thasos, in which Athens was better able to afford the services of such a well‐known painter. An interesting development in the economic relationship between Thasos and Athens occurred in 446/5, when the tribute lists show a change in Thasian tribute from 3 to 30 talents. The reason for this change in tribute is unknown, but clearly shows a change in the relationship between the two poleis. If Athens had previously been exercising severe control over Thasian economic resources, and exacting only 3 talents of tribute, it is possible that Athens lessened the severity of its control at this time, instead opting for a larger tribute. Meritt et al. interpret this as evidence that Athens gave back at least part of the Peraia to Thasos, although they do not elaborate on which territory this would include.132 Isaac argued that this does not seem logical when the full extent of Athenian interest in the Thasian Peraia and the Thracian inland resources is considered. He further notes that the Athenians controlled the Skaptesyle mine 131 132

Pouilloux 1954, 73-74. Polygnotos’ affair with Elpinice is mentioned in Plutarch, Kimon, 4.5 Meritt 1950, 259.

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until at least 406, because it is mentioned in an inventory list from the treasury of Athena from the late 5th century. 133 It is important to note that two poleis of the Peraia, Neapolis and Galepsos, remain on the tribute lists before and after the assessment period of 446/5. Thus, any concessions made by the Athenians did not include these two poleis in the Peraia, or the precious metal resources at Skaptesyle. The Athenian retention of Galepsos and Neapolis may have been designed to insure Athens’ continued access to commercial interactions with the Thracian tribes possessing Mt. Pangaion, and it seems that, if a concession was granted, it may have involved the agricultural produce of Thasos and/or the Peraia. As noted above, this included wine, barley, timber, fish, and other agricultural products. It is possible that, after controlling these agricultural resources from 462‐446, Athens decided it would be more economically advantageous to concede their control to Thasos and simplify their involvement in Thasian commerce by exacting their profit in tribute.134 The theory that Athens maintained possession of Skaptesyle after 446 is supported by the later evidence for the association of Thucydides with the mining operations on the Thasian mainland. Thucydides’ father Oloros was known to be related to Thracian royalty, as the name Oloros was that of a Thracian king. The Thracian king Oloros was the father of Hegesipyle, who married Kimon and thus initiated a familial tie between this well known Athenian family and Thracian royalty.135 The region of Oloros’ reign is unclear, but Isaac notes that one theory, which has received support, is that he was king of the Sapaioi, who lived opposite Thasos.136 133

Isaac 1986, 31, 48. IG 12 301, B, 1.103f and 116f. Merritt believes the concession of territory may be related to terms of the 30 years peace, also signed in 446. 135 Plutarch, Kimon, 4. 136 Isaac 1986, 33 n. 169. 134

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Thucydides and Kimon were thus linked by blood with Thracian royalty, and Plutarch and Thucydides both relate that Thucydides had mining concessions in Skaptesyle.137 Thus, the transfer of the mining concession after the Thasian surrender in 465 coincides with its later possession by the family that had played an integral role in the Athenian defeat of Thasos‐ Kimon and his relative Thucydides. The connection of this family with Thracian royalty could only have facilitated Athenian access to the gold and silver resources of the Thracian interior. Athens, and particularly Thucydides by the late 5th century, controlled the resources at Skaptesyle, and were in good position to trade with the Thracians controlling Mt. Pangaion through the Peraia cities of Neapolis and Galepsos and Thucydides’ familial connections with Thracian royalty. Furthermore, it is possible that politics played a role in the tribute fluctuations of 463 and 446. While Kimon, who was considered more oligarchic in his politics, had been dominant in Athenian politics throughout the 460s, he was ostracized in 461 and his faction became less influential than Perikles and the democrats.138 While the tribute change of 463 to 3 talents indicates the Athenian control of Thasian resources, it is also possible that Kimon’s oligarchic sympathies influenced the Athenian decision. As Perikles and the democrats became more powerful in the 440s, the tribute change to 30 talents may have been due in part to democratic opposition to the Thasian oligarchy. Just as the available evidence is unable to clarify whether the tribute change of 446 contained a transfer of resource control back to Thasos, it is also unable to clarify whether the political relationship between Athens and Thasos played a role in

137 138

Plutarch, ibid; Thucydides 4.104.5. Plutarch, Kimon, 17.

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the decision. Given the evidence available it seems best to accept the possibility that both politics and economics played a role in the tribute changes of 463 and 446. Athens appears to have maintained control of some of the emporia on the Peraia and Skaptesyle, and any concessions that accompanied the tribute change of 446 did not include complete Thasian control of the Peraia and its resources. Nevertheless, numismatic evidence suggests that shortly after the tribute change Thasos was again becoming commercially active. The second period of Thasian coinage, from 435‐411, bears a similar image of a Silenus abducting a nymph, although on the second series the nymph does not appear to resist the satyr as resolutely as the on coins of the first period.139 Interestingly, while the weight of the first period Thasian coins (525‐465) varied considerably, the weight of some of the second period coins corresponds with the weight of Athenian didrachmas (8.47 gr.), and West believes this shows a conscious attempt to correspond with Athenian currency at this time.140 West also notes that coins from the nearby poleis Abdera and Maroneis from the same period also show congruency with Attic weights, and support his theory that these poleis were allowed to mint their own coins in cooperation with Athenian economic interests. Although there is evidence for congruency in weight between northern Aegean and Athenian coinage at this time, the reemergence of coinage in the northern Aegean has generally been interpreted as evidence supporting a later date for the Athenian Coinage Decree, as Thasian coins continue to be minted until 411.141 If the Coinage Decree was passed in the 440s, it is also possible that Thasos received an exemption from Athens and continued to mint coins congruent with Attic weight to 139

Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968, 186. See Fig. 6. West 1929, 90. 141 For the Athenian Coinage Decree, also known as the Decree of Klearchos, see Meritt et al 1939, II.61-68. The date of this inscription and its historical interpretation have been heavily debated, see Vickers 1996 for a summary of research and bibliography. 140

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facilitate trade. Regardless of the date of the Coinage Decree, the correlation of coin weights with Attic standards does indicate a significant level of economic interaction between Athens and the northern Aegean poleis. Epigraphic evidence from the second half of the 5th century also indicates that Thasos was again becoming commercially active. A fragmentary inscription first published by Picard has been dated by Pouilloux to 425‐415, and contains references to a group of magistrates known as the karpologoi, who have not been previously found in Thasian inscriptions.142 The inscription exists in two sections, both of which are too fragmentary for restoration of a translation. Pouilloux has interpreted the inscription as evidence for government regulation of agriculture, and reconstructs a hypothetical function of the karpologoi as overseeing the buying, selling, taxing and export of Thasian agricultural produce. This interpretation is based on comparison with the wine law inscriptions, the presence of the phrase stateras opheleto, and the word priamenoi. Pouilloux’s historical interpretation of this inscription will be discussed in correlation with the numismatic and epigraphic evidence in a later section, but it is important to note the appearance of this previously unknown group of magistrates, who appear to be involved in regulating agriculture. Further epigraphic evidence from last quarter of the 5th century also shows the reemergence of Thasian control over the viticultural resources of the island and the Peraia. IG XII suppl. 347 I and II, first published by Daux in 1926, record a series of regulations on purchasing wine, as well as restrictions on the import of wine into the Peraia.143 The inscription was found in two parts. The first fragment of the inscription is much smaller than the second, 142 143

Picard 1921, 146-150; Pouilloux 1954, 123. Daux 1926, 214-226.

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containing six lines of text, with most of the text preserved. This text states that wine cannot be bought before the beginning of the month Plynteria, which is roughly the beginning of June according to Daux’s interpretation.144 The penalty for buying wine before this time is ophelein statera para statera, ‘he owes stater for stater’. The exact meaning of this phrase is unclear, but perhaps implies that the transgressor owes as much as he paid, and he loses the money he invested in the transaction. This penalty is further noted to be kataper ton biaion, or enforced as though he had committed a violent act, thus implying that these laws should be considered serious criminal offenses. The last clause states that a person buying wine in pithoi is responsible for making sure the pithoi are stamped, which refers to the well documented Thasian practice of stamping the handles of wine vessels.145 This last clause is especially significant in showing the reemergence of Thasos’ ability to monitor and control viticulture on Thasos and the Peraia, which supports the theory that towards the end of the 5th century Thasos was beginning to regain control of its resources. The second section of the inscription is fragmentary, although a substantial portion (15 lines) exists with few damaged sections. The top of the second section is incomplete, but the bottom is preserved without damage. The main law addressed in the preserved section concerns the importation of foreign wine into the Thasian mainland, and the fine for violation is noted as being the same as for diluting wine with water. The inscription repeatedly refers to a group of magistrates oi pros ten epeiron epitetramennoi, ‘those who are in charge of the Peraia.’ This shows that by the end of the 5th century Thasos was interacting with the Peraia to

144

This is a late time in the viticultural season to be restricting the sale of wine and could reflect an attempt to maintain a high level of quality control. 145 See Bon and Bon, 1957, and Garlan 1999 for studies on Thasian amphora stamps.

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a large enough extent to designate an official group of magistrates for the affairs. There is also a stipulation against dividing wine into amphoras, fake pithoi, or pithaknes, with the fine also being the same as for watering down wine. These laws show a concern for ensuring the quality of the wine, which ancient sources verify to be quite high.146 The clause regarding the importation of foreign wine on Thasian ships shows that by this time Thasos was again involved in international commerce around the Aegean. While the epigraphic and numismatic evidence indicates the reemergence of Thasian control over some of its resources, it is possible that political changes on Thasos may have played a role in the Athenian return of Thasian resource control. The exact dates of some Thasian political changes are not historically documented, but epigraphic and historical sources indicate that in 411 oligarchs staged a coup and gained control of Thasos.147 As noted above, oligarchy was the form of Thasian government in the Archaic period, probably up to the Thasian revolt in 465. Thucydides notes that the Thasian oligarchs regained control from a democratic government in 411, but it is unknown when Thasos became democratic. The changes in tribute and resource control could reflect an Athenian desire to reward a change in control on Thasos from oligarchy to democracy, although the correlation is complex: it is difficult to explain the tribute increase in 446 as a reward, and Thasian tribute remains at 30 talents until another increase in the 420s. The reemergence of Thasian resource control could likewise reflect Athenian favor toward a Thasian democracy, and our ignorance about the quantitative value of

146

Aristophanes, Ploutos 1021, Ecclesiazusae 1119, Lysistrata 196; Xenophon, Symposium 41; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai 1.28c, 1.29c, 31-32. 147 Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 83; IG XII 8.263; Thuc. 8.64.2; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.9; Meiggs 1972, 574-575; Pouilloux 1954, 139-62; Graham 83.

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Thasian resources prohibits us from knowing whether the 30 talent tribute could indeed have been somehow beneficial to Thasos. Historical Interpretation Pouilloux has used the epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological evidence to construct a complex interpretation of Archaic and Classical Thasian history, including the economic relationship between Athens and Thasos. His work published many new inscriptions and generated scholarly debate on many subjects. Although his work is an indispensable resource for anyone studying Thasos, his interpretations have been considered by many to stretch the available evidence beyond credibility. The main problems with his interpretation are based on the following conclusions: 1) Archaic Thasos was ruled by an aristocratic class whose wealth was based primarily on commerce; 2) agriculture and viticulture were more economically important to Thasos than the precious metal resources of the Peraia and the island; 3) After the tribute change in 446, Thasos functioned primarily as an ‘economic relay station’ for Athens in the northern Aegean. Moses Finley and Peter Fraser have both contested various aspects of these conclusions. Fraser’s review focuses more broadly on critiquing Pouilloux’s methodology and his tendency to reconstruct too much Thasian history from the available evidence.148 Fraser particularly questions Pouilloux’s interpretation of the Egyptian coin hordes as showing a strong economic connection between Thasos, Paros and Egypt, and notes that the statistics given by Pouilloux do not support his conclusions: Thasian and Parian coins are present in no greater numbers than coins of other Ionian and Cycladic poleis. The Egyptian coin hordes do provide a

148

Fraser 1957, 98-103.

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good example of Pouilloux’s tendency to stretch the available evidence beyond credibility. The numismatic, art historical and archaeological evidence from the Archaic period does show that Thasos was a well developed polis in this period, and was interacting with other poleis and nations throughout the Mediterranean, but Pouilloux’s interpretation of the trade links between Thasos and Egypt should be disregarded when considering Thasian economics in the Archaic period. Furthermore, the chronology of the agora in Thasos is an important aspect that is frequently ignored when considering Thasian commerce in the Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic periods. The excavations in the city have confirmed that the main architectural structures of the agora were not built before the 4th century, and thus throughout the time of economic prosperity in the Archaic period the Thasian agora appears to have been an open square, perhaps marked off by boundary stones.149 In this early period the agora was primarily a political institution used for assembly meetings, while the main commercial areas must have been the harbor and the mainland emporia. Likewise in the 5th century, when Athens assumed control of Thasian resources, the agora appears to have maintained a primarily political function. It is only in the 4th century, when Thasos was again free from external interference, that the city first began to construct large colonnades and religious buildings in the agora, and development continued into the Hellenistic period.150 In this later period the agora appears to be developing increased commercial and religious significance, in addition to its traditional political function. Although the chronology of the agora is generally ignored by scholars when 149

Hansen 2006, 30 notes the importance of comparing agorai and emporia, although he does not comment on Thasos particularly. Boundary stones (horoi) are not discussed in Martin 1959, but are mentioned by Hansen as a regular feature of Archaic and Early Classical agorai. 150 Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968 24-36; Martin 1959, 45, 84; Grandjean 1988, 476.

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discussing Thasian economic prosperity, the architectural development of the agora in the 4th century and Hellenistic periods do coincide nicely, if roughly, with the reemergence of Thasian control of its resources. Its political focus in the 6th and 5th centuries could perhaps be interpreted as evidence for the importance of the mainland emporia as trade centers. Finley concentrates on a more narrow critique of Pouilloux’s interpretation of the economic relationship between Athens and Thasos in the 5th century.151 He particularly questions how Athens could have restored Thasian economic prosperity after 446 so easily, the exact nature of Pouilloux’s ‘economic relay station’, and why the epigraphic evidence indicates a greater importance for viticulture over precious metal resources on Thasos and the Peraia. Finley’s questions bring up a number of valid problems with Pouilloux’s work, but his thoughts are mainly critical and he does not posit alternative models. He prefers the orthodox view that precious metal resources were the most valuable commodity on Thasos and the Peraia, which means that he tacitly supports the idea that the economic concessions of 446 included the return of some or all of these resources to Thasian control.152 He also brings up the legitimate question of how an economic relay station was managed from the Athenian point of view. We have no evidence for what Athenian body would have been responsible for such a system, and no other examples that offer other examples of such a model. While Finley is correct to point out these shortcomings in Pouilloux’s theory, his lack of an alternative model does little to help explain the nature of the economic relationship between Athens and Thasos in the 5th century. Pouilloux’s view of the Archaic aristocratic class on Thasos as being primarily reliant on commerce for their wealth may be extrapolating too 151 152

Finley 1979, 28-32 Merritt et al. 1950, 258-259 represents the orthodox view of these events.

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much from the evidence, but the evidence for Thasos’ economic prosperity during the period is still strong. There is little reason to see the situation as changing before 465 when Thasos revolted from membership in the Delian League, an event which occurred primarily for economic reasons. After 463 Athens seems to have exercised firm control over the Thasian economy, and the tribute change in 446 must have resulted in a certain degree of relaxation of this policy. The later 5th century evidence shows that this relaxation may have occurred gradually and in stages, with Thasos assuming a greater degree of control as the 5th century progressed. Finley is also correct to question Pouilloux’s interpretation of the epigraphic evidence as showing that agriculture and viticulture were more important to Thasian economics than precious metal resources. The wine law inscriptions show no indication of the amount of wine being produced and regulated, nor its value, and thus there is no way to evaluate the scale and relative importance of viticulture to the Thasian economy. Although viticulture was well developed on Thasos, it is hard to imagine it superseding precious metals in economic importance. Furthermore, the karpologoi inscription is too fragmentary for any more than the acknowledgement of this group’s existence, and Pouilloux clearly overstepped epigraphic boundaries with his reconstructions and interpretations. The inscription does provide support for the presence of an administrative body that was involved in Thasian agriculture, but it can not be conjectured that this was necessarily for export. Nevertheless, it is perhaps more constructive to interpret the Thasian inscriptions and the tribute fluctuation evidence as indications of the degree of Thasian control over her resources (agriculture/viticulture, but not necessarily precious metal), which nicely illustrate

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the changes in control of resources: around 480 Thasian control was strong, as it had been throughout the Archaic period. The low point of Thasian control was 463, when Athens controlled Thasian resources and only saw fit to exact 3 talents of tribute from Thasos. By the late 5th century Thasos was again controlling her resources (again, agricultural and viticultural, not precious metal), and epigraphic evidence again shows Thasos regulating aspects of trade. Athens may have been willing to cede control of these resources because it maintained control over the gold mines at Skaptesyle, which were its main concern in the area. The Mt. Pangaion mines never appear to have been controlled by Greeks, and it is possible that Thasos was better able to trade with the local Thracian population for these resources when she possessed some of the emporia on the Peraia.

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V. Conclusion The Athenian relationships with Thasos and the Black Sea Greek colonies thus provide good case studies for analyzing Athenian interest in natural resources in the 5th century. At Thasos, the takeover of Skaptesyle after the revolt of 465 indicates that precious metals were important to Athenian interests in the region, and other resources such as timber, human resources (slaves), and trading opportunities could also have influenced Athenian activities, as could its strategic location on the northern Aegean coast. In the Black Sea, archaeological and paleobotanical evidence indicates that Athens was interested in wheat, and the region is also known to produce other natural resources such as metals and slaves. In both cases Athens shows an increase in interest in the 5th century, particularly during the period of the Athenian empire. At Thasos, the nature of the epigraphic, numismatic and literary evidence allows the level of Athenian interest in and control of Thasian resources to be dated more precisely. In the Black Sea, Athenian interest is detectable through the analysis of ceramic fineware imports, but the chronology is more general. Attic fineware imports become dominant in the 5th century, and there is a correlation between sites with high levels of Attic pottery and sites producing wheat that was desirable for export. Athens also did not have as much political control in the Black Sea, and thus traded for the desired resources rather than seeking to acquire them through direct control. At Thasos the congruence between later 5th century Thasian and Athenian coinage indicates that trade existed as part of the relationship between Athens and Thasos as well, but Athenian acquisition and control of Skaptesyle and the Peraia show that Athens was willing to use force to acquire desired resources.

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The evidence from Thasos and the Black Sea does indicate Athenian interest in natural resources, but it is difficult to assess the extent of its impact on Athenian foreign policy. For example, during the 4th century there is strong support for the importance of Black Sea grain in Athenian foreign policy, as is evident from court speeches, honorary decrees for foreigners providing grain gifts, and the monthly discussion of grain meetings in the ekklesia.153 In the 5th century similar evidence does not exist, and it seems possible that the state was less officially involved in the acquisition of grain from the Black Sea.154 Rather than the state supervising the import of grain and leaving behind evidence of its involvement, the import of grain and other natural resources may have been primarily the responsibility of metics in the 5th century. The position of metics in Athenian society is difficult to understand, as there is not much evidence regarding their particular functions and responsibilities.155 If the 5th century trade of grain and other natural resources were being carried out largely by metics, it is also problematic to consider how metics could have voiced their commercial interests and thus influenced Athenian actions. Due to their lack of citizenship, metics were not allowed to speak in assembly meetings, and thus there is yet another barrier between the connection of natural resource trade and 5th century Athenian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence for state involvement and the importance of metics in commerce do indicate the possibility that metics were involved in the trade for natural

153

See chapter II, pg. 15-16 above. Although the 5th century sources are not explicit, the benefits of commerce are mentioned in Perikles’ Funeral Oration and the Old Oligarch’s Constitution of the Athenians. Perikles notes the abundance of luxury goods which come to Athens (Thuc. 2.38.2), while the Old Oligarch mentions grain imports, luxury goods, and the necessity of commerce for all poleis (Ps-Xenophon, 2.3-12). 155 Whitehead 1977 reviews the available evidence regarding Athenian metics. Although noting their importance in commerce and industry, the majority of the evidence seems to focus on the status of metics in relation to Athenian citizens. Whitehead’s silence on the specific nature of their commercial importance again reflects the lack of evidence available to clarify this question. 154

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resources, and this paper has argued that there is evidence supporting the importance of natural resources in 5th century Athenian foreign policy. The extent to which Athenian interests in Thasos and the Black Sea demonstrate the pursuit of natural resources as a factor in the development of the Athenian empire is unclear. The evidence is difficult to interpret and sparse; nevertheless, it indicates that Athens did have a desire to acquire natural resources, and during the period of empire she acted on this desire. This paper has focused primarily on Athenian interest in the precious metal resources of Thasos and the grain resources of the Black Sea, but both regions also contained other important resources, mentioned above. Further research on the natural resources around the Mediterranean and 5th century Athenian activities in these areas could add more information about the extent to which the pursuit of natural resources influenced Athenian policy and the development of the empire, but Thasos and the Black Sea clearly indicate a correlation between resource‐rich regions and Athenian interest and activity during the period of empire.

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VI. Figures

Fig. 1. Data from IG II2 1672. (Garnsey 1988, 98).

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Fig. 2. Map of Black Sea. (Bouzek 2007)

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Fig. 3. Map of Thasos and its Peraia. (Laziridis 1971, Fig. 31).

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Fig. 4. Eastern city wall of Thasos, showing use of local marble and gneiss. Photo taken by McIntosh and Heath, www.perseus.tufts.edu.

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Fig. 5. Aliki peninsula. The two sanctuaries are on the northeastern edge of the peninsula, and extensive quarrying is evident at the southwestern end. (Laziridis 1971, Fig. 59).

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Fig. 6. Thasian coins. The top row shows Period 1, ca. 525‐465. The bottom row shows Period 2 ca. 435‐411. (Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968, Planche 1).

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Fig. 7. Geographic Distribution of Thasian Coins. (Laziridis 1971, Fig. 73).

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Fig. 8. Cities whose coins were found on Thasos. (Laziridis 1971, Fig. 72).

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Fig. 9. Ram‐Bearer Kouros. (Ecole Francaise d’Athenes 1968, 109).

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