NOMOS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY
OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON 1969
PRESS
GLASGOW CAPE
I'\EW
TOWN
YORK
SALISBURY
BOMBAY
CALCUTTA
KUALA
LUMPUR
PRINTED AT
THE
TORONTO IBADAN MADRAS
IX
PH.INTER
THE
ADDIS
LAHORE KONG
RIDLEH. UNIVERSITY
ABABA
DACCA
TOKYO
BHITAIX PUESS,
VIVIAN TO
HONG
GREAT
WELLINGTOX
LUSAKA
KARACHI
SI~GAPORE
UNIVERSITY BY
MELBOUR~E NAIROBI
OXFORD
might T almost be described as accidental that this has become a book about Cleisthenes and his reforms. However, in looking back upon its beginnings, it seems to me that the inner logic of my initial design inevitably led to Cleisthenes. Stimulated by my teacher, Professor Kurt von Fritz, then of Columbia University and now of the University of Munich, I had long been interested in the meaning of the expression aypaepos vOfLoS. Not only the standard monograph on this problem, published by Rudolf Hirzel as long ago as I goo, but also sporadic (and usually incidental) remarks about it in current scholarly publications seemed to me to be misguided in making the tacit assumption that one single definable concept underlies the expression, and gradually led me to the conviction that its adjectival part, aypaepos, though not free from problems, is less problematic than the noun vOfLos, whose connotations are too numerous and diffuse to be capable of being reduced to one or two equivalents, such as 'law' and 'custom', in a modern language. In order to explain why the adjective aypaepos could be applied to some kinds of VOfLOL but not to others, even though these were also unwritten, the first and most important step seemed to be to subject vOfLoS to an exhaustive and systematic analysis of all its connotations, and a leave of absence from my teaching duties in 1961-2 gave me the leisure necessary to complete this part of the study. In the course of this investigation a new and, I believe, more profound problem began to demand attention. \Vhat I had regarded as the most common connotation of vOfLOS, 'statute', 'law', proved not only to be much less common in the fifth century than other connotations of the term but also to be first attested for Athens as late as 464/3 B.C. This necessitated an expansion of my study to include BWfLos, the word which Draco and Solon had used to describe their statutes, and I was surprised to discover that BWfLo, and vOfLoS do not overlap chronologically in the sense of 'statute': I could find no example of a legal-political BWfLoS in Athens enacted after 464/3 B.C. and no example of a legal-political vOfLO, before that date. Although
I
none of our ancient sources explicitly informs us of a change in Athenian terminology from eWfLOS to vOfLoS, the evidence for such a change and the suspicion that it must have taken place at a specific point in time and as a result of a deliberate policy were so strong that I decided to track it down, and the outcome of that decision is the present book. Basically, therefore, this book contains the philological study of two Greek words which played a crucial part in Athenian political thought. Since my main concern here is with eWfLos and VOfLoS in the sense of 'statute', I chose the end of the fifth century as the lower limit of my inquiry, because by that time vOfLoS can be shown to be firmly entrenched as the official term for 'statute'. In order to find the possible historical circumstances of the change, it seemed necessary first to discover the basic ideas underlying eWfLoS and vOfLoS so as to see as clearly as possible the relation of the sense of 'statute' to other connotations and thus to find a guide to the general atmosphere in which the change may have taken place. The result of this endeavour, namely that eWfLoS describes a statute as an enactment imposed from above, whereas VOfLOS regards it as the ratification of what is generally regarded as valid and binding, pointed to a connection between VOfLOS and the beginnings of the Athenian democracy. Since, however, no word for 'statute' is preserved in any text from the more than forty years between the establishment of democracy and the earliest occurrence of vOfLoS = 'statute' in 464/3 B.C., my second task was to try to narrow the gap by a more circuitous route. Accordingly, I examined every occurrence to the end of the fifth century of all those -vol1'0S compounds which appear in Greek writings before 464/3 B.C. Only one of these, laovofLLa, turned out to have strictly political connotations, and the fact that the earliest occurrence of its adjective, laovofLos, can be fairly precisely dated in the period of the overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny and the establishment of the Cleisthenean democracy enabled me to marshal what I believe to be strong reasons for the adoption of vOfLoS in place of eWfLoS as an integral part of Cleisthenean policy. Many kind friends and colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic have generously helped with advice and suggestions. Professor A. Andrewes and Mr. A. R. W. Harrison of Oxford and Professors Henry M. Hoenigswald and Charles H. Kahn of the
University of Pennsylvania read the finished typescript in its entirety; Mr. Russell Meiggs of Balliol College, Oxford, read an carlier version of Parts II and III, Dr. Victor Ehrenberg of London read the entire book in proof, and Mr. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix of New College, Oxford, not only provided encouragement and stimulation, but did much else to make our stay in Oxford in 1965~6 as rich as it was. I want here to express my profound gratitude to them all and to assure them that they bear no responsibility for the imperfections that remain. I wish to record my gratitude also to a number of institutions which made the completion of this book possible: Swarthmore Collegc granted me the two leaves of absence from my teaching obligations which enabled me, the one to begin, and the other to finish the book, and through its Faculty Research Fund provided secretarial and other kinds of material assistance; a research grant from the Fulbright Commission made it possible to spend 1961-2 in Greece, where I enjoyed the hospitality of the American School of Classical Studies; and the award of a fellowship by the American Council of Learned Societies gave me the opportunity to complete this book in essence during my second leave, in 1965-6, under the best possible conditions in Oxford. Finally, I wish to thank my pupil, Miss M. Rachel Kitzinger, for her effective help in compiling the Bibliography and the Index Locorum, and the staff of the Clarendon Press for their constant and cheerful help in editing and publishing this book. MARTIN
Swarthmore College and the University of Pennsylvania August 1968
OSTWALD
PART
BWf-Loc;
I.
I
and
NOf-LoC;
BWf-LOC;
2. NOf-LoC;
3. Summary and Conclusion PART
II
NOf-LoC;becomes 1.
'Statute'
The Problem Defined
2. Evvof-L{a, L1vavof-L{a,
and
57 }4vof-L{a
62
3. ' Iaovof-L{a and Athens
96 PART
III
Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy Cleisthenes, and
I.
' Iaovof-L{a,
NOf-LoC;
2.
The Originality of Cleisthenes
I37 I6I
ENDNOTES
I74
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I86
INDEX
LOCORUM
I97
GREEK
INDEX
2I2
THIS list does not include abbreviations in general use. When footnote references are in the form 'op. cit.' or 'loco cit.' full particulars of the work referred to will be found within the preceding half-dozen pages. The collections from which fragments are cited are identified in the Index Locorum. Andrewes, Eun. Bowra, GLP Brunnsiiker
Buck, GD Busolt, GG
-GS -Ison. -aD
Gigante, NB Gomme, HCT
Heinimann, NP Hignett, HAC
A. Andrewes, 'Eunomia', CQ32 (1938) 89-102. C. M. Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetryt (Oxford, 1961). S. Brunnsiiker, The Tyrant Slayers of Kritios and Nesiotes (Lund, 1955). G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, 2 vols. (Munich, 1920 and 1926). C. D. Buck, The Greek Dialects (Chicago, 1955). G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte2, 1-2 (Gotha, 1893-5); 31 (Gotha, 1897-1904). W. Dittenberger, Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum3 (Leipzig, 1915). V. Ehrenberg, 'Eunomia', Aspects rif the Ancient World (Oxford, 1946) 70-93. -Die Rechtsidee im friihen Griechentum (Leipzig, 1921). -The Greek State (Oxford, 1960). -RE, supp!. 7 (1940) 293-301, s.v. 'Isonomia'. -'Origins of Democracy', Historia 1 (1950) 515-48. -'Das Harmodioslied', Wiener Studien 69 (1956) 57-69. H. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisches Worterbuch (Heidelberg, 1960- ). M. Gigante, Nomos Basileus (Naples, 1956). A. W. Gommc, A Historical CommentaT)' on ThuC)'dides, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1945-56). W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1962 and 1965). F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis (Basel, 1945). C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford, 1952). R. Hirzel, "'Aypa1Jo<; N6/Lo<;", Abh. d. philol.-hist. Cl. d. Kgl. Sachs. Ges. d. Wiss. 20. I (Leipzig, 1900). -Themis, Dike und Verwandtes (Leipzig, 1907).
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens (Oxford, 1949). W. Jaeger, 'Solons Eunomie', Sber. d. Preuss. Ak. d. Wiss. Philos.-hist. Kl. (Berlin, 1926) 69-85. L. H. Jeffery, The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece F. Jacoby,
(Oxford,
1961).
G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus: bridge, 1954).
The Cosmic Fragments (Cam-
}4ypaepo/ OE vOfko/ TUS apxus J.t~ xpija()at J.tl)OE 71'EPLEVOs. if;~epwJ.ta OE J.tl)OEv J.t~TE {3ovAijs J.t~TE O~J.tov voJ.tov KVPLWTEPOV E[vaL. This law,
The Presocratic Philoso-
cited by Andocides in his speech On the Mysteries, not only set the seal on the revised law code adopted by the restored democracy at Athens in 403/2 B.C.,! but marks also the conclusion of a curious development in Athenian political terminology. From the end of the fifth century on, the primary connotation of v0J.t0s in legal as well as in non-legal literature and documents is that of 'statute' ; it signifies a-usually written-enactment which had either been embodied in the law code at the time of its completion in 403/2 B.C. or had been incorporated into it additionally through the cumbersome procedure of V0J.t0()wLa.2 This does not mean of course that voJ.tos, especially outside the orators, ceased henceforth to carry the several non-legal meanings which had attached to it before;3 but it does mean that the law intended to deprive of legal validity any voJ.tos which was not written and, we may assume, officially published in an authoritative manner.4
G. S. Kirk andJ. E. Raven, phers (Cambridge, 1957).
E. Laroche, Histoire de la racine NEM(Paris, 1949). J. A. O. Larsen,
'Cleisthenes
en grec ancien
and the Development
at Athens', Essays 1n Polztzcal Theory Presented to G. H. Sabine (Ithaca, ?f th~ !heory
N.Y.,
1948)
of Democracy
1-16.
J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren 3 vols. (1.eipzig, 1905-15). ' R.
Meiggs and A. Andrewes (edd.), Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, collated and arranged by G. F. HilI (Oxford,
PMG
D. L. Page,
Podlecki
1951).
Poetae Melici Graeci (Oxford,
1962).
A. J. Podlecki, 'The Political Significance of the Athenian "Tyrannicide" -Cult', Historia 15 (1966) 129-41.
A Commentary on the Surviving Plays of Aeschylus, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1957-8). E. Schwyzer, Dialectorum Graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora (Leipzig, 1923). F. Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (Ithaca, N.Y., H. J. Rose,
1949)· H. E. Stier, "N6fkoS 225-58.
BaazAEVs",
Philologus83
(1928)
M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 2 vols. (Oxford, 19462 and 1948). Vlastos,
--IP
Ison.
AJP 74 (1953) 337-66. 71'OAtTlK.ry", in J. Mau and E. G. Schmidt ;edd.), Isonomia: Studien zur Gleichheitsvorstellung im griechischen Denken (Berlin, 1964) 1-35. H. T. Wade-Gery, Essays in Greek History (Oxford, G. Vlastos,
--
'Isonomia',
'''Iaovofk{a
1958). U.
von
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1893).
Athen, 2 vols. (Berlin,
Aristoteles
und
I
Andoc.
I. 87,
cr.
also 85, and Dem. 24. 30. For the date see D. MacDowell,
Andokides: On the Mysteries 197. 2 For this procedure in the fourth century see Dem. 24. 20-3 with R. Scholl, 'Ueber attische Gesetzgebung', Sber. d. philos.-philol. Cl. d. k. bay. Ak. d. Wiss. Miinehen 1886,83-139;]. H. Lipsius, Berliner philologisehe Woehensehrift 37 (1917) 902-12; BS 2. 1010-14; U. Kahrstedt, 'Untersuchungen zu athenischen Behorden', Klio 31 (1938) 1-25; and F. Wotke in RE, supp!' 7 (1940), S.v. NOfJoo8ETa"578-81. Hignett's view, HAC 300, that the Teisamenus decree in Andoc. I. 83-4 is the first instance of this procedure, has to be modified in the light of the objections raised by A. R. W. Harrison, 'Law-making at Athens at the End of the Fifth Century B.C.', ]HS 75 (1955) 33-5, and by MacDowell, op. cit. 123. 3 In some examples taken at random from Plato VOfJoOS denotes (a) a conventionallinguistic usage (Crat. 384 d 7,388 d 12, Tim. 60 e 2); (b) a customary practice (Symp. 182 a 7, Laws 7. 795 a I); (e) a conventional belief (Corg. 482 e 6, Laws 10.889 e 6, 890 d 4,6,904 a 9); (d) a norm of individual behaviour (Rep. 9. 587 c 2, 10.604 a 10, b 6,9,607 a 7, Polito 291 e 2, Laws 2. 674 b 7,8.835 e 5,836 e 4); (e) a religious practice (Phaedo 58 b 5, Phaedr. 256 d 7); (f) a condition oflaw-andorder (Rep. 9. 587 a 10, Laws 6. 780 d 5, 10. 904 c 9). 4 Andoc. I. 86 and 89 show that aypaqJOSis here the opposite not of YEypafJofJoEvOS but of Q.vayEypafJofJoEvos. No proof is required to show that vOfJoOS refers primarily to written statutes in the orators. For usage in the inscriptions see Tod, CHI 2, Nos. 100.6, 116.21, 162. 15, [36], 181. 25, 200. 217,246. But laws governing interstate relations, especially those involving religious sanctions, were presumably
814277
B
INTRODUCTION
There is evidence that the distinction between vOfloS and ifi~~tafla, which the law of 403/2 B.C. tried to establish, although it had broken down in practice by the middle of the fourth century, remained valid in Greek legal thought. I In the fifth century, however, there seems to have been little difference , theoretically or practically, between these two terms either in form, content, or legal validity.2 In order to have legal authority, all that mattered in fifth-century Athenian democracy was that a measure had been passed by a majority vote of the Council or the Assembly or of both and that no successfulaction had been ~rought against it in court under the ypa~~ 7Tapavoflwv,3 and SInceall Athenian VOflOt as well as ifi7)~taflaTa, with the exception of Solon's laws, were enacted in this manner, ifi~~wfla seems to be merely a procedural term, derived from the fact that the measure was approved by voting (ifi1)~{~€tv),4 while vOfloS describes the same measure substantively as a statute.s Still, even though we cannot determine any difference between vOflOS and ifi~~wfla in the fifth century as far as form, content, and nei,ther ~ritten nor published; e.g. Tod, GHI2, No. 137. 13-14, where the Aetolian Tnchomans are accused of having arrested the U1TOVSOepOPOtof the Greater Eleusinian Mysteries 1Tapa Tavs v6J.LoUS T[OVS' KOl.V]ovs TWV rEAA~vwv. 'Dem. 20. 92, delivered in 355 B.C., denies any difference between the two, whereas the distinction is maintained by Arist. EN 5. 10, I I 37b28-9, and Pol. 4. 4, 1292a36-7· .On thi~ point see the remarks of Harrison, op. cit. 26-35, esp. 27. 2 The eVIdence IS best assembled and discussed by]. Schreiner, De corpore iuris Atheni~n;ium 16., Cf. als? ~ilamowitz, AA 2. 1.93, and Kahrstedt, op. cit. 17-18. B. Ked s ~ssertlOn, Grzechlsche Staatsaltertiimer In Gercke-Norden, Einleitung in die AltertumswIssenschaft 32• 381, approved by BS 1. 459 with n. 2, that 'das Unterscheidende ist eben nicht der Inhalt, sondern die Form', applies to the fourth century rather than to the fifth.
3 The introdu~tory. formula for most enactments, ESOtEV 'Tfj f30UAfj Ka1 'Tip S~fL'I', suggests that r~tIficatlOn by both Council and Assembly was normally required. But the SalamIS decree (IG 12• 1. I), the Hecatompedon inscription (IG 12• 3. 16 and 4·26), and perhaps also Xen. Mem. 1. 2.42 show that sometimes ratification by the SfjfLos alone, and [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3. 2 that occasionally approval by the f3ouA~ alone, was sufficient. The date of the introduction of the ypaep-Tj 1TapavofLwv is not .known; t~e earliest attested case was brought in 415 B.C. by Andocides' father agaInst SpeuSIppuS (Andoc. I. 17) ; Antiphon's speech against the general Demosthenes ma~ have been a little earlier, but cannot be dated on the basis of [Plut.] Life of Anttphon 20 (= Mar. 833 d). See Hignett, HAC 210-13. 4 Although the voting procedure in fifth-century Athens no longer involved the castIng of a pebble (.pfjepos) but took place by a show of hands ; see BS 2. 1000 with n·3· .5 Cf. K~hrstedt, op. cit. 17-18, esp. 18; 'Vor 403 bedeutet Psephisma iiberhaupt k~me bestlmmte Art von BeschluB, sondern den Modus procedendi bei der Schaffung von Nomoi.'
3
legal validity are concerned, it is nevertheless as true for the fifth century as it is for the fourth that vOfloS enjoyed the greater prestige, probably because it was regarded as the more permanent regulation of the two. Thus, while the nature of Solon's office and the manner in which his legislation was enacted explains why later authors referred to his laws as VOflOt but never as ifi1)~{aflaTa, it is remarkable that the laws of Cleisthenes, which were doubtless validated by the vote of the Athenian Assembly and may well have taken the form of ¢rfJ~{aflaTa, are also invariably called VOflOt, never ifi7)~taflaTa.I The fact that the law cited by Andocides affirms a higher status for VOftas than for ifi~~tafla would in itself not be remarkable, were it not for the circumstance that statutes had not always been called vOflOt in Athens. Draco and Solon, to whom the earliest written lerrislation in Athens is attributed (Arist. Ath. Pol. 41. 2, ,'" 7. I), referred to their enactments not as VOflOt but as BWlwt. For Draco himself, we have only one text, the re-publication in 409/8 B.C. of some of his laws on homicide, which refers to itself as a BWfloS;z but BWfLOS is so well and so widely attested in later descriptions of his legislation that there can be no doubt that it was the only technical term he used for his statutes.3 In the case of Solon, we know that at least one of the laws on the axones referred to itself as BWflos, 4 and that in his poems he calls his enactments BWfw{ but never VOflOt.s Moreover, it is likely that the oath exacted from the nine archons, which is placed into the context of Solon's reforms by both Aristotle and Plutarch, I Tbat Cleisthenes' legislation was submitted to the Assembl): and presumably also to the Council is implied in Hdt. 5.66. 2,69.2, as well as Anst. Ath. Pol. 20. I, 4,21. 1-2. That it took the form of.p1J
°
4
INTRODUCTION
included a promise to abide by the 8wp.,ot.l Finally, a fragment of Cratinus' Nomoi (frg. 127), which is believed to have been spoken by Solon, confirms that 8wp.,oswas the Solonian expression for 'statute', and, according to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 35. 2), it was from Solon's 8wp.,ot that the Thirty removed ambiguities. After Solon, it is probable that 8wp.,osremained the technical term for 'statute' at least throughout the tyranny, if we may draw this conclusion from Herodotus' assertion (I. 59. 6) that Peisistratus did not change the 8EUp.,W of Athens, and from the prescript of a regulation dating from the time of the expulsion of the Peisistratids, in which the old Draconian legislation against tyranny is described as 8EUp.,W Ka~ 7fUTpW.2 Thereafter it is only in the archaic (or at least arehaizing) language of the ephebic oath3 and oflocal religious ritual4 and in the elevated language of poetry, where we do not expect to find strict legal terminology, that 8wp.,osretains its Solonian meaning after the end of the sixth century.s The evidence points, accordingly, to 511/10 B.C., the year in which the Peisistratids were expelled, as the latest current use of 8wp.,os--or, more correctly, its derivative 8EUp.,LOVin the sense of 'statute'. 'law' or 'norm' elsewhere in Solon; see Ehrenberg, Eun. 82-4-, and A. Masaracchia, Solone 34-7-9, where also the most important modern discussions are cited. I Plut. Solon 25. 3: W/-,VVEV ... 18lws I)' EKauTos n;,v OW/-,OOET(;JV EV ayopq 7TPOS T0 )"{8<.p KaTarPaT{~wv EL 71- 7Tupaf3a{YJ TWV 8EGp.fiJV, avoplcLvTU xpvaouv laoftETpYJTov ava8~UftV EV .d.€Aq;ofs; cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 7. I: CL 8' fVV€U apxovTES O/-LVVVTES 7Tpas 70 'Al84J KaTErpaTL{ov dvae~a£Lv Uvopu.lvru XPVGoiJv, Jav Twa 7Tapa{3wr:JL TWV VOJLwv. 'The use in both passages of KaTac/JaTl'w (according to LSJ, not attested elsewhere in Greek literature) suggests a common source. Plut.'s independence and more faithful adherence to the original formula is indicated by two details missing in Arist. but corroborated by P!. Phaedr. 235 d: (a) the statue is to be life-size, and (b) it is to be set up at Delphi. On the use of Ow/wl in the formula see also F. Jacoby, FCH 3b, supp!' I (1954-)312, who suggests that Plut.'s 'Ow/-,oOETaL instead of apxovTES is rather a mannerism than a mistake'. 2 Arist. Ath. Pol. 16. ro, with my article in TAPA 86 (1955) 106~9, esp. ro8-9. 3 Tod, CHI 2, No. 204-. 12, with Stob. Flor. 4-. I. 48, and Pollux 8. ro6, as collated by W. Hofmann, De iurandi apud Atheniensesformulis 28-38. 4 B. D. Meritt, Hesperia 36 (1967) 72-84- (No. 15), publishes a 'new inscription of [TOS apxalos] Ow[/-,o,] ... undertaken after a period of war and desolation when much that was sacred had been destroyed by the enemy' (84), which he believes contains a deme-decree of Mclite replacing some of the stones destroyed by the Persians at the Therrikleion, the shrine of the phratry of the Therrikleidai. If he is correct, the original regulation may well date back to the sixth century or earlier. But the fragmentary state of the inscription invites caution. S e.g. Aesch. Eum. 484-, 571,615, 68l ; Soph. Aj. 1104, Ant. 801, Trach. 682; Eur. Med. 494-, Tro. 267, frg. 360. 45; Ar. Av. 33 I; and the epigram on the dead of Phyle cited hy Aeschines 3. 190.
This does not mean, of course, that 8wp.,oswas no longer applied to the legislation of Draco and Solon after the end of the sixth century. But it is interesting to note that the older term was used for antiquarian and not for substantive reasons. This is proved by the fact that simultaneously with 8wp.,os the new ~erm for 'statute', vop.,oc;, is also applied to Draco's and Solon:s le?lslation. A striking example of this appears in the re-publIcatIOn of Draco's law on homicide, to which reference was made above. For while the Draconian law speaks of itself as a 8wp.,os,the decree authorizing its re-publication, which precedes it, refers to it as a VOp.,OS.1 Similarly, Andocides and Aristotle use 8wp.,os and vop.,os indifferently when they speak of Draco's laws,2 although most fourth-century authors speak of them only as VOp.,OL.3The same is true of the terminology applied to Solon's laws. Aristotle spe~ks in his own person only of VOp.,OLwhen he dis~usses the S~l?man reforms in Ath. Pol. 7-12; but when he descnbes the reVlSlonof the laws by the Thirty, he differentiates between the VOp.,OL of Ephialtes and Archestratus and the 8wp.,ol of Solon (Ath. Pol. 35.2). The decree ofTeisamenus, on the other hand, confines the old term 8wp.,osto Draco but uses VOp.,OLofSolo~'s ~tat~tes (Ando~. I. 83), and from the mid fifth century on It IS vop.,os that IS normally used of the Solonian laws.4 We shall postpone until later a discussion of when vop.,os first came to occupy the place which had been reserved for 8wp.,os until at least 511/10 B.C., and content ourselves for the moment with the observation that vop.,oc; was well established as the only current technical legal term for 'statute' by the time the law cited by Andocides was enacted in 403/2 B.C. What our discussion so far has shown is that at some point between these two dates the technical term for 'statute' in Athens changed from 8€up.,os to vop.,os and that the two terms exclude one another: before the I For the law, IC 12• II5 (= Tod, CHI I" No. 87) 19-20: [Kat hot 7TpO]T€[P]?V ICTE[v]a[vTES EV T]0[,8E TO' Ow/-,o, EVEXEcrOOV .(restoration~ ~uaranteed ,by the, lex m [Dem.] 43. 57). For the introductory enablmg decree, Ibid. ~-5.: [T]O[V] L1paKovToS v0J.'OV TO/-, 7TEP
while Dem. himself calls it a vO/-,OS. 2 Andoc. 1. 8; and I. 83 OEu/-,ol, but I. 82 vO/-,OL. Arist. Ath. Pol. 4· I and 7·1 O€u/-,os, but 41. 2 and Pol. 2. 12, 1274b15-16 vO/-,os. 3 e.g. Xen. Gecon. 14.4; Dem. 20. 158,23. 51; Xenarchus, frg. 4·?2. , 4 First in Hdt. I. 29. For a summary of ancient references to Soloman vo/-,o, see
W. Aly, RE, s.v. 'Solon', 958-70.
INTRODUCTION
expulsion of the Peisistratids no VOfLOt were enacted in Athens, and there were no new 8wfLo{ after at least the end of the fifth century. The fact that this change in terminology occurred has often been noticed, but its significance has not yet received the attention it deserves, and the problems which it raises have, to the best of my knowledge, never been recognized. The first and most fundamental problem may be formulated: why did the change take place at all? In Greek, as in English, the terminology applied to social and political institutions tends in general to be conservative. Expressions once adopted usually survive the vicissitudes of changing historical situations and continue to be applied even when the original term no longer provides an accurate or modern description of the institution which it identifies, and often the incumbents of an office are no longer aware why their office or why an institution accompanying it bears the name that it does. This is in our times true in the United States of the Department of 'State', for example, which acttttlly handles foreign affairs, and in Great Britain of the 'Chancellor of the Exchequer', the 'First Sea Lord', and many other offices and institutions. In Athens, the office of 8WfL08ETYJS survived long after 8eufL6s had fallen into disuse as a political term, and a (3aatAeDS was annually elected long after kingship had ceased to exist as a constitutional form. Moreover, the vaVKpapOt seem to have lost their original association with ships already in Solon's time,2 and it is very doubtful whether the KWAaKpETat of the fifth century B.C. remembered the functions of the officialswho bore this title originally.3 One would expect this kind of conservatism also to extend to the technical term for 'statute'. Accordingly, the fact that in Athens a change from 8WfLoS to vOfLoS took place is a sufficiently striking phenomenon to infer that it reflects a deeper change in Athenian thinking about the nature of law and the attitude of the Athenians toward their laws. For since language is the image of thought, a significant change in terminology is likely to reflect an important change in thinking. In attempting to assess the significance of this change, we are I
1 See especially Hirzel, AN 49 and TD V 358, :3 73-8; Ehrenberg, Rechtsidee I 1314; and Heinimann, NP 72 with n. 42. 2 Arist. Ath. Pol. 8. 3, with H. Hommel, RE, s.v. 'Naukraria', 1938-46. Cf. also F. Wiist, Historia 6 (1957), 176-8, and Ehrenberg, CS 30-1. 3 BS 1. 589 and Frisk, CEW, S.v. KwAaKpl"Ta,.
7
helped methodologically by the fact that 'statute' is not the ~nly connotation of 8WfL6s and V6fLOS. Both terms have a great vanety of uses, and by ascertaining what they are and by classi£y~ng them we shall be able to discover the basic concept underlymg each term in its own right and, consequently, determine the differences between them. This means that our first task is to examine every occurrence of 8WfL6s and v6fLoS in Greek lite~ary and epigraphic documents with a view to establishing the v~nous categories in which each term is used. In doing so ther? WIll be no need to take into consideration the whole of Greek lIterature and all Greek inscriptions; for since the law cited by Andocides shows that by 403/2 B.C. v6fLos was firmly entrenched as .the authoritative legal term for 'statute' in Athens, it will be suf?Cl~nt to examine all occurrences of 8WfL6s and v6fLoS from the begmnmg of Greek writing to the end of the fifth century. ~or it is wi~hin that period that the change began and reached I~SconclUSIOn. This stage of our investigation will be ~ndertaken m. Part .1. The results arrived at in that part WIllbe helpful m trymg to answer a second problem posed by the fact that v6fLoS came to supersede 8eufL6s as the official term for 'statute' in Athens. If, for reasons still to be ascertained, the Athenians wanted a new word to take the place of 8WfL6s in the sense of 'statute', why did they choose V6fLOS? It cannot be argued that no word other th~n vOfLoS was available to them either in the G~eek ~anguage ~n general or in the Ionic dialect in particular. lomc ChIOScalled Its statutes !)'T]Tpat in the early sixth century B.C.,I and the same te.rn~ was used not only by such Dorian states as Sparta,2 Messema, Tarentum 4 and Heracleia,5 but also at Olympia6 and on Cyprus.7 Derived f:om the same root as MTpa is the participial form TCt EipYJfLEva, which is attested as a term for 'statute' at Mycenae.8 1 Tod, CHI 12, No. 1. 2 ; Jeffery, LSAC, pI. 65, No. 41. A. 2, dated 575-550 B.C. by the same author in BSA 51 (1956) 159-60. . 2 For the pfj"Tpat of Lycurgus see Pluto Lycurgus 6 and 13; Suda (= PhotIUs), S.V. pfj"Tpat. For later Spartan pfj"Tpat see Xen. Anab: 6. 6. 28 (spoken before a Spartan judge against a Spartan defendant) ; Pluto AgIs 5, 8, 9, I I ; and IC 5· I, 20. 2-3 (age of Trajan). 3 IC 5. I, 1498. 12 (early second century B.C.). 4 Suda (= Photius), S.v. pfj"Tpat. 5 IC 14. 645. 145-6 and 151 (late fourth century B.C.). . 6 Schwyzer, DCE, Nos. 412, 413, 414, and 409, all of the late Sixth or early fifth century B.C.; see Jeffery, LSAC 218 and 220, Nos. 5,6,8, and 15· 7 Buck, CD, No. 23. 28-9 (second half of fifth century B.C.). 8 IC 4. 493: Ko. "To. >€ FP€flolva (early fifth century B.C.).
8
INTRODUCTION
Also available was 'TO ypuepos, which occurs side by side with in some of the sixth-century inscriptions from Olympia, where it refers no doubt to a written law;' 'Tn ypujLjLa'Ta or some periphrasis involving the verb ypuepw, which is the way in which the fifth-century code ofGortyn invariably refers to itself;2 a Ci80s, which appears in Halicarnassus about 460-455 B.C. as a term for a regulation ratified by an assembly;3 or a alvoc;, which is attested in a legal sense for Epidaurus and for Delphi.4 It cannot be said, either, that the Athenians chose v6jLoC; simply because 8wjL6c; was vanishing as the term for 'statute' in the Greek world. For we know of TegeaS and of the Locrians6 that their term for 'statute' was 8€ujL6c; until at least the early fifth century B.C. In other words, it was not inevitable that v6jLoc; should have been chosen to occupy the place left vacant by the abandonment of 8wjL6c;, for many alternative terms were current elsewhere in the Greek world to describe a statute. Obviously, the question why v6jLoc; came to supersede 8WfL6c; is closely linked with the answer to the question when the change took place. Only after we have some idea of the historical circumstances that may have constituted the framework within which the change took place can we venture to surmise what the cause may have been which gave v6jLoS its exalted position in Athens. The historical limits we have so far established-after 511/10 B.C. but before the end of the fifth century-are too wide to be significant, and we shall have to try in Part II to narrow the gap between them as much as we can and find, if possible, an event or set of events to which it can be attributed, and the nature of the event will provide the clue to the significance of the terminological change. p~'Tpa
1 Schwyzer,DCE, Nos.410. 5,4'3.7,412.'-2,4,8. '9; cf. 'TOypaf'f'a, DCE, No. 424. 10-1I (mid fourth century B.C.). •J. Kohler and E. Ziebarth, Das Stadtrecht van Cartyn: at 'Tao€ 'To.ypaf'f'U'T' Eypa'T'Tat et sim., VI. '5, IX. 15-16, XI. '9-23, XII. '5-19; a Eypa-rat et sim., III. 29-30, IV. 3', 45-6, 48, VI. 3', VII. 47-8, VIII. 10, 25-6, 29-30,35-6,40, IX. 23-4, X. 44-5,46, XI. 26-7, 28-9, XII. 15-19; Ka'To. 'To. eypaf'f'Eva, III. 20, IV. 11,50-1, XII. 22-3. 3 Tod, CHI I', No. 25. 19. 4 Dittenberger, SICJ, Nos. 471. 4 and 672. '5. 5 IC 5.2, '59 A. 8; B. 20. 6 Tod, CHI I', No. 24. 46, and Buck, CD, No. 59. A. I and '4.
recognition that 'statute' is not the only sense in which and v6jLoC; are used in Greek constitutes a ~on:enient point of departure for our attempt to assess the slgmficance of the abandonment of 8WfL6c; in favour of v6fLoS. An examination of every occurrence of each of these terms in Greek writings will enable us to determine what particular associations attach to each and what basic idea, if any, underlies each. And once that has been established, it will be possible to determine how O€ujL6c; and v6jLoC; are, each in its own way, related to a concept of 'statute'. Two methods seem to be available for the attainment of this goal. The first, which may be called 'etymological', is deductive in character and has, therefore, only a limited usefulness for our purposes. For while it may help on occasion to know that OWfL6s is derived from the same root as 'T{07)fL~ = 'put', 'set', 'place', this knowledge may turn out to be a liability rather than an asset in contexts in which a notion of 'placing' or 'setting' is not self-evident but depends for its presence entirely upon the ingenuity of the interpreter, especially ifit should appear unrelated to other usages of OWfL6c;. The etymological method is fraught with even greater danger in the case of v6fLoS. There is universal agreement, as far as I know, that this noun is derived from the same root as V€fJ-w, whose basic concept involves a 'distribution' or 'assigning' of some kind. Still, although the notion of 'distribution' does contribute to an understanding of such relatives of v6fJ-0C; as the geograp h· lca I concepts 0 f VOjL7)" = pasturage,, VOfJ-0S = 'pasture', 'abode', 'district', and also of their derivatives V0fJ-€VC;= 'herdsman' and the adjective V0fJ-US = 'roaming about HE
T
8WfL6c;
I
NOTE
for pasture', attempts to interpret either the musical concept of = 'melody', 'tune', or the social sense of vop,o" with which we are concerned here, in terms of the verbal connotations have not been very convincing.2 A more reliable guide to the basic notions underlying 8wp,o, and vop,o, is provided by what we may call a 'semantic' method. Its characteristic is that it proceeds inductively from the particular contexts in which each of the two terms is found, in order to define the variety of usage of each in different areas of Greek thought and action. Once this is done, an attempt can be made to discover whether a common denominator exists which at once gives a basic meaning of each term and explains how this meaning is applied in practice in the contexts in which each term appears. It is at this stage that etymology may shed some light on our investigation, since the basic idea of a term is likely to reflect its linguistic connections and ancestry. Ideally, then, we ought to examine every occurrence of 8wp,o, and vop,o, in all Greek literature and documents in order to establish the full range of each term and arrive at its basic meaning. However, to cover in such an inquiry all Greek writings from Homer3 to, let us say, Galen would not only be tedious but also unnecessary. Our purpose is to ascertain the relation in which the sense of 'statute' stands to the other connotations of 8wp,o, and vop,o" and since we know that vop,o, was firmly entrenched in Athens as the proper term for 'statute' by 403/2 B.C. and that 8wp,o, had lost this meaning in Athens more than a hundred I
vop,o,
I Frisk, GEW, S.v. V€fLW. E. Benveniste, Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indocuropeen 79, takes the basic idea of V€fLWto be 'partager ltgalement; faire une attribution rtguliere, conforme au rang des personnes ou aux convenances de la situation'. However, Benveniste's definition fails to recognize that the root V€fL- never regards
the distribution from the point of view of an agent who distributes, but assumes a distribution or assignment already made in an authoritative and generally accepted fashion. 2 Such attempts are at least as old as PI. Laws 4. 714 a; cf. also [Archytas] in Stob. Flor. 4. I. 138; Pluto Quaest. conv. 2. 10, 644 c; Et. Mag. S.V. V€fLW. For modern linguistic interpretations along etymological lines see Benveniste, loco cit.; M. Pohlenz, 'Nomos', Philologus 97 (1948) 135-42; and the works cited by Laroche, 206 n. 2. Among historians the relation of the social sense of v6fLoS to the verb is stressed notably by Hirzel, TDV 379 n. I, and by Ehrenberg, Rechtsidee 114-15. The limitations of the etymological method in the case ofv6fLOS are recognized by Heinimann, NP 59 with nn. I and 2, and by Laroche 163, cf. also 177 and 187. 3 No precursor of either 6£UfL6sor v6fLOS has so far been found in the Linear B tablets; see A. Morpurgo, Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon 'Index Graecus'.
ON
METHOD
II
years earlier, it will be sufficient to limit our examination to every surviving occurrence of the two words down to the end of the fifth century B.C. and pass over into the fourth century and later periods only when a special point requires us to do so.
NOTE
for pasture', attempts to interpret either the musical concept of vop,os= 'melody', 'tune', or the social sense ofvop,os,with which we are concerned here, in terms of the verbal connotations have not been very convincing.2 A more reliable guide to the basic notions underlying 8wp,os and vop,osis provided by what we may call a 'semantic' method. Its characteristic is that it proceeds inductively from the particular contexts in which each of the two terms is found, in order to define the variety of usage of each in different areas of Greek thought and action. Once this is done, an attempt can be made to discover whether a common denominator exists which at once gives a basic meaning of each term and explains how this meaning is applied in practice in the contexts in which each term appears. It is at this stage that etymology may shed some light on our investigation, since the basic idea of a term is likely to reflect its linguistic connections and ancestry. Ideally, then, we ought to examine every occurrence of 8wp,os and vop,osin all Greek literature and documents in order to establish the full range of each term and arrive at its basic meaning. However, to cover in such an inquiry all Greek writings from Homer3 to, let us say, Galen would not only be tedious but also unnecessary. Our purpose is to ascertain the relation in which the sense of 'statute' stands to the other connotations of 8wp,os and vop,os,and since we know that vop,oswas firmly entrenched in Athens as the proper term for 'statute' by 403/2 B.C. and that 8wp,os had lost this meaning in Athens more than a hundred I
I Frisk, GEW, S.v. V€fLW. E. Benveniste, Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indoeuropeen 79, takes the basic idea of V€fLW to be 'partager ligalement; faire une attribution rtguliere, conforme au rang des personnes ou aux convenances de la situation'. However, Benveniste's definition fails to recognize that the root VEfL- never regards the distribution from the point of view of an agent who distributes, but assumes a distribution or assignment already made in an authoritative and generally accepted fashion. 2 Such attempts are at least as old as PI. Laws 4. 714 a; also [ArchytasJ in Stob. Flor. 4. I. 138; Pluto Quaest. conv. 2. 10, 644 c; Et. Mag. s.v. V€fLW. For modern linguistic interpretations along etymological lines see Benveniste, loco cit.; M. Pohlenz, 'Nomos', Philologus 97 (1948) 135-42; and the works cited by Laroche, 206 n. 2. Among historians the relation of the social sense of v6fLoS to the verb is stressed notably by Hirzel, TDV 379 n. I, and by Ehrenberg, Rechtsidee 1I4-I5. The limitations of the etymological method in the case of v6fLOS are recognized by Heinimann, NP 59 with nn. I and 2, and by Laroche 163, cf. also 177 and 187. 3 No precursor of either BEUfL6s or v6fLoS has so far been found in the Linear B tablets; see A. Morpurgo, Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon 'Index Graecus'.
cr.
ON
METHOD
II
years earlier, it will be sufficient to limit our examination to every surviving occurrence of the two words down to the end of the fifth century B.C. and pass over into the fourth century and later periods only when a special point requires us to do so.
the same concrete sense underlies Demeter's
attribute
(JWfLo-
epOpO,.1
o begin with (JWfLa,. Its earliest occurrence which is at once its ?nly appearance in the Homeric poe~s, comes in what ~nstophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus regarded as the last lme of the Odyssey;2 the marriage-bed which Odysseus and Penelope resume after peace has returned to the household is described as a.A€KTpOtO 1TuAuwv BWfLa,. Some scholars, influenced by lat~r meamngs of BWfLo" have seen in this expression the reestablIshment of an 'order' or of a 'relationship'.3 But, as Ehrenberg has seen, the context demands a simpler and more concrete interpretation; in view of t~e fact that earlier in the same passage. (23. 177-230) the 10catlOn of the bed forms a subject ofdisCUSSlOn between Odysseus and Penelope and crowns as it were Penelope's recognition of her husband, BWfLo, refers 'both to th~ couch and the place at which it is situated and describes therefore, a thing placed in a significant location.4 A similar ~sage is also found in Pindar, who calls the wreaths placed upon the brow of ?Ce~ophon of Corinth an EYKWfLWV nBfLov (Ot. 13. 29),s and agam m a fragment of Anacreon (frg. 61), where the word seems to describe something 'stored away', a 'treasure'. (9wfLo, may denote a thing placed in a significant location also in that difficult passage in Euripides' Helen where Theonoe calls the sulphurous brimstone which she is to use in fumigating the air a (JEofLo, aEfLvov UllJEpO" indicating both the brimstone and the air it is about to fill,6 and, if Deubner is right,
T
I
Homeric Hyr;zn 8 ('To Ares'), which has ()wfLoiat in I. 16, is generally admitted to be ~ost-classleal; see T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, and E. E. Sikes (edd.), The Hommc Hymns· 384-5. • ad. 23·296, with schols. HMQand MV Vind. 133. The view that the Homeric Ot[ysstry ends here has recently been supported by D. Page, The Homeric Odysstry 101-36. I
3 ~o especially Hirzel, TD V 323 with n. I, and E. Weiss, Criechisches Privatrecht I. 64 With n. 106. 4 Cf. Ehrenberg, Rechtsidee 105-6. Busolt, CC 22• 173 n. 2, and W. B. Stanford (ed.), The Ot[ysstry of Homer 2.404, do not go far enough when they interpret ()wfL6, here merely as 'place', 'location'. 5 For the interpretation see Endnote, p. 174 below. 6 Eur. He!' 866. I reluctantly accept Murray's text ()•• 6v orE, u'fLvOU ()WfLoV
Although the other connotations of (JWfLo, are less concrete than this, their relation to the Homeric sense is fairly transparent. In a well-known passage in Aeschylus' Eumenides,2 (JWfLo, describes the place or position in the universe granted definitively to the Erinyes by the gods in accordance with the decree of fate. The term here does not designate a concrete object but a certain status conferred by an external agency. From here it is only a small step to the notion of (JWfLo, as the establishment of a fundamental institution, a sense of which we find a good example in the same play, when the Areopagus is called a (JwfLo, of Athene for the trial of murder cases (484,615), or when in the Supptices (1034) sexual relations are a (JWfLo, of Aphrodite.3 In the same vein, Pindar describes as a nefLo, the institution of celebrating an Olympic victor in song (Ot. 7. 88), the establishment of the Olympic Games by Heracles (Ot. 6. 69, Nem. 10.33),4 and of the Isthmian Games by Poseidon (Ot. 13.40). In addition to denoting the institution established, (JEO"[LO,may also designate the pronouncement or decree which constitutes its founding act. Thus Athene in Aeschylus' Eumenides (68 I ; cf. 57 I ) bids the people of Attica listen to the (JWfLo, by which she establishes the Council of the Areopagus as a court of law, and by a n(JfLa, of the immortals Aegina became a pillar for strangers from all parts of the world.s The decree which constitutes the founding act may later become the basic instrument for the institution which has been established by it, and thus we find
D.
aUJfpo" fLvxwV in preference to Hermann's ingenious (hiov GEfLVOV()W/LOV al()Epo, fLVX6v, which most editors favour, including most recently A. M. Dale, Euripides:
Helen ad loc., since I can make no sense of or find any parallel to the kind of internal accusative which these editors posit for GEfLVOV()wfL6v. I L. Deubner, Attische Feste 44~5, accepted by M. P. Nilsson, Ceschichte deT griechischen Religion 12• 4,64 with n. 4. For a further concrete use of eWfL6, in a religious context see R. Herzog, 'Heilige Gesetze von Kos', Abh. d. preuss. Ak. d. Wiss. Berlin. Phil.-hist. KI. 1928, No.6. 22, line 17, where it seems to mean 'place of burial'. 2
391-3:
fiLoV KAvwv
8EGfLOV
I
TOV P.oLpoKpavTov
€K 8fWV
I
oo{}€vru T€A€ov.
For this interpretation, which makes better sense of the problematic line, see Rose, CSPA 1. 83. 4 Cf. also Nem. I I. 27, where the Nemean Games are referred to as 7l'EVTaET"IpiIJ' EopTflv flJpaKAEo~ reap.tOv. ~ Pi~d., 01. 8. ~5-7: TE,()fLO,OE d()ava.Twv Kat T
n"
7TOLULV U1T€GTaG€
gevoLS
/ KLOva
OaLjkOvLav.
{)WfLO, also describing a fundamental regulation. For example, the {)WfLol of Aigimios are binding not only for his sons and the Doric tribes sprung from them, but also for the descendants of Heracles through his son Hyllus (pind. Pyth. 1. 64). In this context belongs perhaps also the ()€{)< T)fLo" which is found in a law from Olympia of about 475 B.C. containing regulations concerning the tenure of sacred lands by the theokolos.1 Its precise meaning is hard to determine, but it seems to denote some kind of title or contract, by virtue of which an owner may claim a piece of land as his own.2 In some cases, {)WfLol of this sort are found in the plural and are political in character, but their content is not usually specified. The ephebic oath in Athens, for example, contained a promise of obedience to 'the established {)wfLo[ and any others which the rulers in their wisdom may establish in future', 3 Aristophanes parodies the {)wfLov, apxulov" presumably ofAthens, in the Birds (331), and Herodotus (3.31. 3) reports that one of the functions of the Royal Judges of Persia was to expound the ancestral {)wfLol. If these passages have a clear political context, there are other fundamental regulations in which the precise force of the {)wfLol and the authority that stands behind them is not entirely clear. The word occurs twice in successive lines in Sophocles' Antigone (800-1). In the first of these, the yearning which appears in a bride's eyes is described as 'sitting enthroned in power by the side of the great {)wfLo[', presumably signifying the fundamental laws safeguarding the institution of marriage, and in the anapaests which follow, the chorus states that it is carried 'outside the ()wfLo[' by the sight of Antigone proceeding to her death. Here the allusion is perhaps to the fundamental laws of allegiance to constituted authority, which the Old Men are bound to support and adherence to which has prevented them from opposing Creon's measures.4 A similar vague use can be detected in some passages in which the neuter plural forms of 1
Schwyzer, DGE, No. 411. 3 with SEG
LSAG, p.
220,
No.
II,
No. 1178. For the dale see Jeffery,
10.
2 Cf. D. Comparetti, ]HS 2 (1881) 365-73, csp. 368--9, and T. Rcinach, REG 16 (1903) 190-2, for this interpretation. 3 Tad, CHI 2, No. 204. 11-[4: Kat €i)'TJKo~aw TOW afL KpULVOVTWV Ep..ePpOVW'i Kat TWV 8€UI_u»v TWV iopvp..€vwv Kat oUS" av TO AOL7TOV i8pvaWVTUt fj.LeppOVW';. For the literary versions of this oath see above, p. 4-n. 3. 4 Jebu implies a similar interpretation in his translation 'beyond the bounds of loyalty' and in his note ad lac.: 'i.e. like Haemon, I also am moved to rebel against Creon's sentence, and to take Antigone's part.'
the adjective {){ufLw, occur. -When, for example, Herodotus (I. 59. 6) tells us that Peisistratus did not change the {){UfLLU of Athens, he probably means the fundamental regulations which formed the basis of Athenian society, including not only the laws of Draco and Solon but also other institutions and principles, and when Medea wonders in her argument with Jason (Eur. Med. 494) whether the {){UfLLU binding for mankind are different now from what they were at the time when she married, the sentiments she voices are probably not unlike those found in a fragment (360. 45) from Euripides' Erechtheus against thos~ W?o overthr0.w 7TuAwa {){ufLLa. Sometimes, however, the adJeCtlval form III the implied or expressed singular may specify the content of a fundamental regulation. Aeschylus, for example, speaks of reverence for one's parents as written in the third place among the {){ufLLa of Dike (Suppl. 708), and toward the end of the Agamemnon (1564) the chorus warns Clytaemnestra of the specific 8{UfLwV that the doer must suffer. The {)wfLO[ and 8{ufLtU discussed in the preceding paragraph are fundamental regulations sanctioned by powers outside and apart from the human agent who is expected to obey them. But there are also three passages which show that {)WfLo, may denote basic rules of propriety and good behaviour whicJ¥re sanctioned by forces within the agent himself. This meaning is found, for example, in Pindar's excuse (Nem. 4. 33) that T€{)fLo, and the onrushing hours prevent him from telling a story in its entirety, where T€{)fLo, evidently refers to the rule that ought to be observed by the composer of epinician odes, and we encounter it again when he tells us (Isth. 6. 20) that it is for him a T{{)fLtOV UU¢>{UTUTOV to praise the Aeacidae whenever he sets foot on the island of Aegina. Here belong also the {)wfLO[ which Bellerophon claims to honour in Euripides and which bid him act with decorum. 1 Finally, we come to that group of {)WfLO[ which is of most immediate concern to us here, since they include the sense of 'statute'. Each of these {)wfLO[ has a specific content and propounds an injunction usually, but not invariably, of a political nature, which mayor may not take a written form. The {)wfLo[ of Draco and Solon, for example, were written statutes,2 and it is 1 2
Eur. Stheneboea 15 in D. L. Page, Greek Literary Papyri I. 128. For Draco see above, p. 3 nn. 2 and 3; for Solon see above, p. 3 nn. 4 and 5,
and p. 4, no.
I.
16
eEI:MOI:
AND
NOMOI:
probable that the old Draconian {)'afua concerning the establishment of a tyranny at Athens, which were revived after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, were issued and preserved in writing, I as were even earlier, according to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 3. 4),2 the records kept by the {)wj-to{)l.Tat. But written political {)wj-to{ existed not only in Athens. Among the Locrians TE{)j-tO, seems to be the most important, if not the only, word used for a written statute. It first appears about 500 B.C. as the description of a written law, probably of the Ozolian Locrians, in which regulations concerning the disposition of newly-acquired agricultural lands are laid down,3 and in which their law concerning homicide, which may also have been written, is referred to in the phrase KIlT TOV dVDPEepOVtKOV TET{)j-tOV.4 There is, further, a written statute of the early fifth century defining the political conditions of the settlement by the Eastern Locrians of their colony at Naupactus, which refers to itself as TO {)'{)j-ttOV, presumably indicating that it was intended to be the fundamental constitutional instrument of the colony.s Outside politics {)wj-to, survives also as the descriptive term for written cult regulations issued by demes or phratries. In Athens, for example, there was recently found the re-publication after the Persian Wars of an older {)wj-to, probably pertaining to rites at the Therrikleion,6 and from Delphi we know the late fifth-century TE{)j-tO, concerning funerals among the phratry of the Labyadai.7 The existence of so many specific {)wj-to{ in writing does not, however, mean that all political or religious regulations to which the name {)wj-t6s was applied were ipso facto written.S The See above, p. 4 n. 2. See Endnote, pp. 174-5 below. 3 Buck, CD, No. 59. A. I and 14. For the assignment to the Ozolian Locrians the date, and a bibliography see Jeffery, LSAC 105-6 and 108. ' 4 Buck, CD, No. 59. A. 13-14. 5 .Buck, CD, No. 57. 46 and Tod, CHI 12, No. 24. 46, with bibliography and disCUSSlOn.The inscription is assigned to the first quarter of the fifth century by Jeffery, LSAC 106. For a fuller discussion see below, pp. 170-3. 6 B. D. Meritt, Hesperia 36 (1967) 72-84 (No. 15). 7 Buck, CD, No. 52. C. 19. ,8 I do not agree with V. Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles 169, that 'lJw/-,o" or lJ.u/-,wv ... means by itself written law, law "set up", as, e.g., preserved by the thesmothetai, and thus distinct from law by usage, or vo/-,o,', and that 'the view which prevailed, for instance, in Solon's thought and dominated the sixth century' was 'that it was in the nature ofa thesmos to be written'. Surely, the lack of references to aypar/>oL IJw/-,o{ is poor evidence on which to base such a conclusion and the testimony of both non-politicallJw/-,o{ already discussed and politicallJ.~/-,o{ to be I
2
instructions about the use of his blood which the centaur Nessus gave to Deianeira were certainly not written, even if Sophocles calls them {)wj-to{ (Trach. 682), and neither were the {)dvv 7TUV{)VTU {)'aj-tta which Ajax performed (Aj. 712). Likewise, when the Erinyes express the fear (Aesch. Eum. 491) that they will be overthrown by the new {)'aj-tta of the Areopagus, it is rather improbable that they are thinking specifically of written statutes; at any rate, the question whether these {)'aj-tta are written or not is immaterial to their thought. I The problem of writing is also as irrelevant to Democritus' demand (frg. 266) that a {)wj-tos ought to be established for the protection of public officials as it is to Hecuba's question in Euripides' Trojan Women (266-7) which voj-tos or {)'aj-ttOv ofthe Greeks sanctions Polyxena's assignment to the tomb of Achilles. In the case of the fifth-century {)E{)j-tOS of Tegea which states that possible disputes arising from a deposit of money be settled by the people of Tegea, we simply do not know whether or not reference is made to a written statute.2 Slightly different is Teucer's statement to Menelaus in Sophocles' Ajax (1 I04) to the effect that there is no {)wj-tos by which Menelaus was given the right to command Ajax. Taken at its face value, the very fact that written legislation did not exist in the heroic age may be taken to indicate that he is speaking of an unwritten ordinance. But the language, particularly the use of the verb €KEtTO, suggests that Teucer's words must be set against the background of written legislation prevalent at the time when the play was first performed. But here again the question of writing is beside the point. The same is true of the final passage relevant to our purposes. The CiDtKOt {)wj-to{, with which, according to the epigram on the dead of Phyle, the Thirty ruled Athens, no doubt include, but are not confined to, those of their measures which were issued in writing.3 In short, writing is an accidental but not an essential part of the definition of {)wj-tos in the sense of a specific political or religious regulation. We may, then, summarize our findings as follows. In Greek discussed presently argues against it. In fact, Ehrenberg himself (ibid. 34 n. 2) interprets IJwW7,v in Soph. Ant. 797, as 'unwritten laws'. I That statutes are involved here seems beyond doubt, see Rose, CSPA 2. 263 ad loco 2 IC 5. 2, 159 A. 8 and B. 20, with bibliography in Buck, CD 267. 3 Aeschines 3. 190, with the fragments of the inscription found in the Agora excavations and published by A. E. Raubitschek, Hesperia 10 (1941) 284-95. 814277
c
t
writings down to the end of the fifth century, {}wJLOi> is used to describe (a) a physical object placed in a significant location, (b) an institution or establishment, (c) the ordinance by which such an institution is called into being, (d) the propriety inherent in obedience to fundamental regulations, and (e) specific statutes or regulations of a political or religious character. What all these connotations have in common is that each involves explicitly or implicitly not only a {}WJLOi> which is imposed, but also an agency which places or imposes it and a place or group which is conceived of as the recipient of the imposition and for whom the {}EUJL0i> constitutes an obligation. A few examples will clarifY the way in which this general definition applies to the various connotations isolated as (a)-(e) above. (a) In the Otfyssey passage, it is Odysseus who had placed the bed into the stump of an olive-tree (23. 183-204), and in Pindar's thirteenth Olympian the judges had placed the wreaths of victory on Xenophon's brow. (b) The gods are said in Aeschylus' Eumenides to have given the Erinyes their station in the universe, and Athene has instituted the Areopagus both as a {}wJL0i> (b) and by means ofa BEUJL0i> (c) as a lawcourt for the Athenians, while the Olympic and Isthmian Games were bestowed upon the Greeks respectively by Heracles and Poseidon. (c) By a TE{}JLOi> ofthe immortals Aegina was given to strangers as a haven, and Aigimios gave his BWJLoL to his sons. The rulers of Athens give their {}wJLoL to the Athenian ephebes, and the {}wJLoL of their ancestors were binding upon the Royal Judges of Persia. (d) No author is mentioned of the rules of propriety, but such rules are spoken of as imposed on the poet, the visitor to Aegina, and on Bellerophon. And (e) in the case of statutes and similar regulations, men such as Draco, Solon, and Nessus, or bodies such as the Athenian BWJLO{}ETUt, the Areopagus, the rulers of Locris or Tegea or of phratries, are spoken of as authors of {}wJLoL, while the Athenians, Deianeira, Locrians, and phratry members are thought of as the recipients for whom the {}wJLoL constitute an obligation. Moreover, the author of most of the {}wJLoL is a person or agency, divine or human, who is thought of as standing apart from and above those on whom the BWJLoL are imposed, and the position of respect accorded to that agency makes the thing imposed something especially inviolable for the recipients, something that has an obligating character for them. We may, then, state that in the case of {}w~i> the etymological
relation to T£()TJJLL supports what we find in actual usage: it is a thing imposed by a higher power upon those for whom the authority of the imposing agency makes the BWJLoi> an obligation. If we apply this to the sense of 'statute', we may conclude that BEUJLOi> is a law given by a lawgiver who is thought of as standing apart from and above the persons upon whom his law is binding.
vOfLoS plays a more central part in Greek life and thought than does 8WfLoS, and since it has, accordingly, been the subject of more extensive scholarly discussion, it is advisable that at the outset of this chapter we re-state our aim and show how it differs from the aims of some earlier treatments of the term. We are at this juncture not concerned with elucidating the meaning of vOfLoS in one particular passage, as are, for example, those who have tried to define its meaning in Pindar, frg. 169;1 nor with tracking down the origins of the term as a particular philosophical concept;2 nor are we interested only in its sense of 'statute'; nor do we want to give a historical account of the semantic development of vOfLoS and its relations to cognate words.3 Our purpose is rather to determine what basic concept or root idea underlies all the various meanings of vOfLoS as they occur in all their contexts before the end of the fifth century B.C., in order to compare this concept with 8wfLoS and discover the differences between the two. For the sake of convenience we shall for the present not consider the various nouns, verbs, adjectives, and their compounds which are related to vOfLos, since they will not provide us with any insights in this respect that cannot be gained from a study of vOfLoS alone. The thesis which we shall try to substantiate is that vOfLoS in all its uses describes an order of some kind,4 which differs from other words for 'order', such as Tcfgt" in the connotation that this order is or ought to be regarded as valid and binding by those who live under it. In other words, vOfLoS is a norm both in a descriptive and in a prescriptive sense, and although the origin of this norm
5
1N C E
I e.g. O. Schroeder, "Nop.os'; 1Tavrwv {3aa,AEvs", Philologus 74 (1917) 195-204; Stier, NB; Gigante, NB; and my own article 'Pindar, NOMOI:, and Heracles', HSCP 69 (1965) 109-38. 2 e.g. Heinimann, NP, or M. Pohlenz, 'Nomos und Physis', Hermes 81 (1953) 418-38. See also the unconvincing attempt of]. A. S. Evans, 'Despotes Nomos', Athenaeum N.S. 43 (1965) 142-53, to relate Herodotus' view of vop.os to his idea of historical causation. 3 As does, for example Laroche. 4 This point is emphasized by Laroche 177-8, 180, and 196.
may on various occasions be attributed to the gods, to a lawgiver, or to an enactment by a society as a whole, the crucial point is that, regardless of origin, it is recognized and acknowledged as the valid norm within a given milieu. I The earliest author to use vOfLo, is also the first to employ the term in its widest range.2 Hesiod tells us in the 'Works and Days that Zeus ordained for men the vOfLo, that, while beasts, living as they do without 8{wl), devour one another, he gave menjustiee (8{KYJ), 'which turns out to be the best by far'.3 That vOfLo, does not here bear the sense of 'law' or 'ordinance' which prescribes a certain kind of behaviour but designates the behaviour itself has long been recognized.4 It is, rather, an order ofliving, a way of life, which Zeus has given to men and which differs from the vOfLo, he has given to the beasts. The vOfLo, of men includes and that of the animals excludes 8{KYJ; that it is god-given is only incidental, for the poin-Jis that it constitutes a norm followed by any human being who does not want to degenerate into an animal.s There are two further early examples of vOfLo, as describing the way of life as such of men or animals. The lack of context for Aleman's F0t:8a 8' opv{xwv vOfLw, 7TaVTWV (frg. 40) makes it difficult I Heinimann, NP 65, does not go far enough when he defines vop.os as 'das bei einer Gruppe von Lebewesen "Geltende"'. The point inherent in vop.os is not merely its validity but that its validity is acknowledged and, usually, accepted by those whose vop.os it is. 2 Nop.os does not occur in II. nor, I believe, in ad., despite Zenodotus' reading vop.ov for voov at ad. I. 3, which has been defended by R. Merkelbach, Untersuchungen zur Odyssee (= Zeternata 2) 158-9 n. 4, and by Gigante, NB 44 with critical bibliography in n. I. Zenodotus' reading was attacked already in antiquity by Aristarchus. and Pohlenz, Philologus 97 (1948) 139, seems to me to be right in arguing that the plural vop.ovs would be more appropriate if Zenodotus' reading were correct; d. also Laroche 164-6, Stier, NB 232 n. 20, and Heinimann, NP 61 n. I I. 3 276-80: 1'OVOEyap o.vflpomow, vop.ov OtE1'a~E Kpovtwv / lxflvaL p.EV I
NOMa};
to decide whether or not VOfLOS is used in a musical sense; if it is not, the poet may well be claiming knowledge of the 'ways' of all birds. Theognis' complaint that the present rulers of Megara exercise their leadership EKTparr/),owL VOfLOLS can in its context only mean that the moral norms of human life are being perverted by them, so that shamelessness and insolence have \'anquished respect and justice. 1 In the fifth century, this sense of VOfLOS is found in a passage in Sophocles' Antigone (450-2), in which Antigone tells Creon that Zeus and Dike have not given to men the kind of VOfLOL which would permit him to deny burial to Polyneices. In Aristophanes' Birds (r 344-5), the Parricide asks permission to participate in the VOfLOL of the birds;2 in Euripides, Hippolytus doubts that the ways of the gods apply to men (Hipp. 98); the chorus of the Supplices (377-8) appeals to Athens not to desecrate vOfLOVS (3POTWV;3 and the Hippocratic treatise On Airs, Waters, and Places (16 and 23, 24) speaks of the institution of kingship among the Asiatics as VOfLOL and states that in general VOfLoS can implant courage and endurance in the souls of dwellers in valleys where epVULS has not done so. Further, there are a few instances in the vOfWS-epVULS literature in which vOfLoS is treated as the order of human life in genera1.4 A second use of vOfLoS consists in the application of the term to somewhat narrower norms of universal validity which form part of the general vOfLoS we have just discussed. 'When, for example, the chorus in Aeschylus' Agamemnon (1207) asksCassandra whether she and Apollo produced any children vOfLifJ, the addition of vOfLifJ obviously cannot refer to a custom or a statute, but it signifies the Old Men's assumption that in the normal order of things the union of male and female will result in children. Similarly, the chorus of the Choephoroe (4.00) articulates as vOfLoS the universal norm that drops of blood spilled on the ground Theognis 289-90, as punctuated by T. ,,y. Allen, RPh II (1937) 280-1, followed by J. Carriere's Bude text. For the sense see Laroche 173. 2 In the lines immediately following, the comic point consists in a shift of the use of VOjLOS from the sense of customary practice (KU/\OY VOfL!(,€Tat TOV 1TUTfpa TOrS OpVtULV aYX
...
7TPOKUTu),..Vnv.
e.g. Eur. frg. 920; [Hippocrates], 337 c-338 b. 4
De victu
I.
II;
and Hippias apud
PI. Proto
23
demand more blood, and the chorus of Sophocles' Antigone (61314) the rule that there is nothing great in life that does not entail destruction (UTY)). In Herodotus we find vOfLoS used in this sense in his account of Miltiades. The people of the Chersonese, he tells us (6. 38. I), offer sacrifice to him and stage horse-races and athletic competitions in his honour OJs VOfLOS OiKWTfi. From several passages in Thucydides we learn what is the normal order of things in time of war. The Plataeansjustify their actions against Thebes before the Spartans by appealing (3. 56. 2) to the vOfLoS established for all men which permits defence against enemy attacks, and in their rebuttal (3. 66. 2) the Thebans admit that it is 'in accordance with some sort of VOfLOS' to kill one's opponent in battle, but they protest that it was in violation of vOfLoS (-rrapavofLws) to slaughter prisoners of war. 1 Most famous in Thucydides is the VOfLoS, cynically invoked by the Athenians (5· 105. 2) against the people of Melos, namely, that both gods and men rule whatever they have in their power. We find vOfLoS in a similar sense in two passages in Euripides. In the Alcestis (56-7) Death accuses Apollo of favouring the rich, if he were to establish the norm (VOfLOS) that old people get a richer funeral than the young, and Clytaemnestra (fA 694), thinking that Agamemnon's grief is due to Iphigeneia's impending marriage, consoles him by saying that time and vOfLoS will help him minimize his loss. Here the sense of VOfLOS is evidently the fact that one's children get married, which Clytaemnestra urges Agamemnon to accept. Finally, a fifth-century usage may be reflected in Callicles' peculiar phrase about the l'OfLOS TijS epVUEWS (PI. Gorg. 483 e), to which we shall return again later (pp. 39-40, 51). For the present, it will suffice to point out that the phrase itself is clearly intended to show that epVULS and not manmade vOfLoS is the true norm (VOfLoS) that guides human actions. Closely related to this is a kind of VOfLoS which describes a procedure, i.e. the normal way in which something is done. For example, when Hesiod (Op. 388) advises the farmer that the I Interestingly enough, the Plataean appeal to the Spartans (3. 58. 3), to spare them because they surrendered voluntarily, is based on a different kind of vO/-,os, which is confined to the Greeks, see below, pp. 33-4; cf. the Theban assertion (3· 67.6) that the Plataeans transgressed the vO/-,os of the Greeks in attacking without provocation. Although verbally these VO/-,OL are confined to the Greeks, the intention of their proponents is no douht to claim a universal validity for them.
VOfLaS of the plains-and of various other kinds of country-is to strip for sowing, for ploughing, and for harvesting, he merely describes what is the normal and proper way of going about his work. Aeschylus uses vOfLa' in this sense to describe the natural and proper formulation of a prayer (Cho. 93), Pindar praises Xenocrates of Acragas for practising horse-breeding in the way accepted as proper by all Greeks (Isth. 2. 38) and reports that Chiron taught]ason the vOfLa' of using drugs (Nem. 3·55), while Sophocles calls vOfLa' a hunt which proceeds in a proper way (Ichn. 189). Herodotus describes the vOfLa, by which the lake-dwellers erect their buildings (5. 16.2); and of the one thousand noble lancebearers who followed in the train of Xerxes carrying their spears with the point up he says that they held their spears KUTa vOfLov, that is, in the proper way a spear should be carried, in contrast to others who carried them point down (7. 41. I). To indicate the improper way of doing things Herodotus twice uses au VOfLa,: when Peisistratus did not want to have children by the daughter of Megacles, EfL{aYETo at au KUTa vOfLaV (I. 6I. I), and elsewhere he reports that it is au vOfLaS for a bastard son to be king of Persia, if there is a legitimate son (3. 2. 2).1 Also expressions such as EV XEtpwv VOfLlp (8. 89. I) and E, XEtpwv vOfLoV (9. 48. 2) designate a proper or normal way of acting, viz. the way one acts when things are done with one's hands.2 Finally, in a passage of Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae (2 16) wool is to be dyed KUTa TOV apxu'iav vOfLav, in the way it has been done properly from time immemorial. 3
There is a fourth area in which vOfLaS describes what is normal, and that is the sphere of human conduct or of conduct of the gods judged by human standards. Here vOfLa, defines the proper 1 This is one of the many instances which shows how difficult it is to keep the vario\ls meanings of VOfLO~ in strictly separated compartments: if Herodotus had expressed himself here positively, saying that a Persian VOfLo~ gave legitimate children prececlence in the succession to the throne, it would make better sense to regard this VOfLO~ as a constitutional regulation. But the negative character of the phrase suggests that he is thinking of the impropriety this entails in Persian eyes. 2 Cf. Laroche 196. 3 In this context belongs perhaps also Menelaus' advice about the bull who refused to go aboard the ship, as reported by the messenger in Eur. Hel. 1561: he urged his men to carry him on their shoulders 'EAA~VWV vOf''f and throw him into the ship.
way of acting under given sets of circumstances or for a particular kind of individual. When Clytaemnestra in Aeschylus' Agamemnon (594) speaks of the cry she addressed to the gods YVVaLKE{lp vOfLlp in jubilation over the fall of Troy, the dative shows that the oAaAVYfLoS is a cry normally uttered by women under this kind of condition. In Sophocles' Ajax, vOfLa' occurs in this sense in Ajax's wish that his son be trained in that rough kind of behaviour which is proper to his father (548), and in his words to the chorus that they alone have stood by him op8ip vOfLlp, that is, as is the proper conduct expected of one's companions (350). In the Trachiniae Deianeira requests Lichas to observe the vOfLa' proper to a messenger and not to be a busybody (616), and Heracles admonishes Hyllus that obedience to one's father is the best norm of conduct (II 77) ; in the Antigone the heroine explains the vOfLa' which made her honour her brother more than any other relative (914), and the chorus of the Oedipus at Colonus asks Oedipus to step down from the sacred ground and to speak where it is vOfLo, for all to do so (168). Herodotus uses vOfLa' in this sense only once (1. 90. 2, 4), namely when Croesus sends to Delphi to inquire whether it is the vOfLa' of Greek gods to deceive their benefactors. In Euripides this meaning is found more frequently than in any other Greek author. Medea uses it (Med. 238) to tell the chorus that, when a woman marries, she has to adopt new standards of behaviour, and later in the play, after she has announced her intention to kill her children, the chorus appeals to vOfLa' (812) to dissuade her from executing her plan. Pheres in the Alcestis (683) does not accept it as an ancestral or Greek norm of conduct that fathers should die for their children, and in the Cyclops (299) Odysseus calls it a vOfLaS for mortals to receive the shipwrecked. Elsewhere in Euripides vOfLaS describes the love which all living creatures have for their offspring (frg. 346), the honour owed to those in power (frg. 337), and the horsemanship and archery which the Phrygians honour as their VOfl-OL (Tro. 1210). The gods are condemned for contracting incestuous unions
(frg. 388. 3), and in an unidentified play someone refuses to accept it as vO/ws not to love his mother (frg. 1064. 1). Twice norms of conduct are treated like statutory enactments: in the Hippolytus Artemis explains (1328) that she could not save her devotee from Aphrodite, because the gods have a vOfLa<; prohibiting them from interfering in each other's sphere, and an old man in the Ion tells Creusa (1047) that there is no vOfLaS to prevent a person from ill-treating his enemies. 1 It is difficult to be sure in these two cases whether vOfLaS describes a political enactment, a meaning which will be discussed later, or a norm of behaviour. The latter seems more likely, because, as far as the Ion passage is concerned, Euripides knew of course that there were statutes against offences such as murder and assault and battery, and as regards Artemis' declaration, it is difficult to conceive even of a Euripides as believing the gods to have the same kind of administration of justice as men do. There are two Euripidean passages where the opposition to personal lawlessness (dvafL{a) suggests that vOfLaS refers to personal behaviour. In the first of these, the chorus of the Iphigeneia at Aulis, complaining of the absence of ai8w<; and dPET~, laments that lawless conduct is stronger than VofLat (1095), and in the Heracles there is a similar condemnation of a man vOfLaV 7TapEfLEvaS, dVafL{q. XaptV 8t80v<; (778). Finally, there belongs in this group a passage in Gorgias' Funeral Oration (frg. 6), in which he praises the deceased for having regarded as the most divine vOfLaS, which most serves the public interest, to speak and be silent, to act and to refrain from acting, as each occasion demands. A further use of vOfLoS in a descriptive normative sense differs from those we have so far discussed in that it connotes not so much the norm itself, but the source from which it emanates, the authority which issues and guarantees norms. The earliest passage which includes this kind of vOfLaS, in Heraclitus (frg. 114), provides at once its clearest definition and differentiation from other sensesof vOfLOS. The difficulties of interpreting this fragment make it necessary to discuss it at some length. The text reads: gvv vocp
MyoVTas
iuxvp{'w8at
Xp~
1\ , I 17"OlltS, /(at '" 7TOIIV tUXVpOTEpWS.
1
Cf. frg.
IOgl
T0
gvv0
'A.. TpE'f'OVTat
7TavTwv, yap"
O/{WU7TEP vOfLcp
, 8PW7TELOt ' 7TaVTE<; Ott av
for the same sentiment.
yap TOUaUTOV o/(ouov d8E/..H /(OL The relation between J'o/LO<; in this fragment with the Heraclitean /..oyo<; has long been seen and need not detain us hcre,2 but a few words ought to be said about the relation of the dv8pW7TELOt VofLOt to the 'one the divine' by which they are sustained. The identity of these human vO/lOt with the vOfLo~' of the city, mentioned in the preceding sentence, is made abundantly clear not only by the context but especially by the yap which introduces the second sentence.3 Their all-inclusiveness makes it impossible to confine their meaning to any specific customs or political regulations, which thrive in the various citystates, and they must be taken in a wider sense as referring to the way of life or mores of a city as a whole. That this interpretation is correct is confirmed by Heracli tus' analogy (O/{WU7TEp) of the vOfLoS of the city with the gvvav 7TaJ'Twv, that is, with 'what is common to all things', and that is the LogoS.4But what concerns us most here is the statement that these av8pw7TELOt vOfLat depend for their sustenance u7Ta Evas TOU 8E{OV. What is meant by Evas TaU 8E{aV? Are we to take it as a neuter and translate it as 'one the divine' and compare this use to frg. 32, where the 'one the wise alone is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus' ?s Or are we to regard it as masculine and supply vOfLoV from the antecedent 7TavTE<; OL av8pw7THOt VofLOt? The decision is hard to make and is perhaps ultimately immaterial to Heraclitus' thought in this fragment. Yet the contrast between 7TavTES and EVos V()fLOt IJ-rTa Eva<; TOU 8E{OV'
EtOPI(f:~ 7Tllen
KaL
/(paTE~
7TEPI)I{!Jf.TU.L
I
I 'Those who speak with intelligenee must rely with all their strength on what is common to all, as a city relies on its and with even greater strength. For all human vOI'-Ot are sustained by one the divine; it exerts as much power as it wishes, it is sufficient for all and is still left over.' Translation adapted with modifications from Kirk and Raven 213. For a different and very suggestive interpretation see A. P. D. Mourelatos, 'Heraclitus, Fr. 114', AJP 36 (1965) 258-66, with translation on p. 265. It is difficult, however, to accept the basic idea of 'are under the wardship of', which M. sces in TpEq,OVTU<. While protection and guardianship are certainly involved in many epic uses of TpEq,W, the notion of providing sustenance is far too common in the epic to be njected; see Ii. 5. 70 and 555, 1r. 741; Od. 18. 130, Ig. 432, 23·325. 2 See Stier, NB 237; H. Friinkel, AJP 59 (1938) 320-I; Heinimann, NP 66; Gigante, NB 52; Kirk, HCF 51; Kirk and Raven 214. 3 K. Reinhardt's attempt in Parmenides2 215-16 to differentiate between the two was successfully disproved by Heinimann, NP 66, and even more decisively by Kirk, HCF 51. 4 See Heraclitus. frg. I, with the discussions cited n. 2 above. 5 ;V TO aoepov tJ-0VVQV ,\EyEv8at OUK JotAH Kat E8E/\n Z"iJVOS ovolLa. For this translation, see Guthrie, HGP I. 425.
vo,.,.o,
suggests that Heraclitus does indeed posit a divine VO/LOS on which all human PO/lOt depend for their sustenance, that is, a vOILO"- which is the source of human vOflm but stands sovereign above them and is not exhausted by them. If this assumption is correct, we have here a sense of vOfLoS which we have not encountered so far. It is not the norm itself but the fountain-head of norms, which it issues and which are regarded as binding by those who, in the words of f[g. 114, 'speak with intelligence'. This usage is supported by three passages in Aeschylus. In the Supplices (670-3) the chorus says of Zeus that he guides destiny aright 7ToAttjJ vOfLCfJ. The precise content of the 'hoary ordinance', as we may reluctantly translate it, is hard to ascertain;2 is it an ordinance that stands even above Zeus, is the construction in fact a dative of cause, which we ought to translate 'by virtue of a hoary ordinance', or are we to take it as a dative of means and translate 'with hoary ordinance', that is, with an ordinance that is binding on and accepted by men? The latter seems to be the preferable alternative in view of the fact that there is no evidence in the Supplices of an order higher than that of the gods, and the expression here, whatever its sense, places destiny firmly in the hands of Zeus. But in either case we are again dealing with vOfLoS as the general source of norms or actions. Further, in the complaint of the Erinyes in the Eumenides (778-9 = 808-g) : lw \" ' e'€ KUK X€PWV~ EtI\EU "\ 8E' e"€Ot V€WT€pot, 7TaI\UWVS VOfLOVS / KU e t7T7TUUUU fLOV, the old VOfLOt which the younger gods have ridden down and wrested from the hands of the Erinyes can only be the authority which formerly empowered them to wreak vengeance on a homicide. The third passage, also from the Eumenides (17 I ), has the Erinyes accuse Apollo of honouring Orestes, a mortal, 7TUPa. vOfLoV e€Wv. Although it is possible to interpret the passage as meaning 'beyond what is customary or lawful for gods to do' or 'what is proper conduct for a god', there may well be overtones of a general norm which is thought of as standing above the gods.3 In
similar language Pindar (Pyth. 2. 43) describes the birth of Kentauros from the union of Ixion with a cloud as not being EV 8dvv vOflms, and the meaning seems to be that no divine authority sanctioned this monstrous marriage. Likewise, when Teiresias (Nem. I. 72) predicts that Heracles will, after his marriage to Hebe, UEf-LVOV ulv~uELV vOfLov, this vOfLoS is apparently the power of the gods to dispense norms. In Sophocles, we find vOfLoS once in a context similar to that in which we noticed it above in Aeschylus' Supplices, when he calls Dike 'her who sits by the ancient VOfLOt of Zeus' (OC 1382). In the Antigone the authority to dispense general norms is vested in a human ruler. Creon is told by the chorus (213) that it is possible for him to use vOfLCfJ 7ravT£ both for the dead and for the living, referring apparently to Creon's power to issue laws which will be binding on Thebes, and Creon himself states (177) that the ability of a man is not fully known until one has seen how he has handled himself apxufs T€ KUL vOfLOWtV, that is, until his authority in issuing regulations has been tested.2 The most celebrated passage in this connection is the famous ode in the Oedipus in which the VOfLOt VljJ£7TOO€S are praised, the 'norms which range on high', whose father is Olympus alone, and which are the source of purity in word and deed for mortals.3 General VOfLOt vested in a human agent appear also in Euripides' description of a tyrant as 'a single individual who possessesvOfLoV himself in his own keeping'.4 But he also speaks of the Pythian priestess of Apollo as 'guarding the ancient vOfLoS of the tripod' (Ion 1322), the authority to dispense oracles which is vested in the Delphic shrine; and in another passage (Hec. 800), we find a general VOfLoS controlling even the gods, presumably identical with the source of ordinances dispensed by the gods.s
Kirk, HCF 51-5. 2 Rose, CSP 4 I. 59, translates: 'Zeus ... who according to hoary custom maintains equity.' This gives a peculiar meaning to a[aa; and what is 'hoary custom' intended to convey? Aeschylus must have known that it was more than mere custom which entrusted Zeus with the administration of the universe. 3 Laroche 190~1 correctly interprets this passage: 'II faut prendre garde qu'Apollon a viole la loi divine, non pas celle que les Olympiens imposent aux mortels, mais celie qui les regit, eux les Immortels. Ihwv est un genitif objectif.'
7TavTwv,
I
I
The scholiast explains the phrase: El)apwT~aftV T0 napa thofs vop.'!' or T~I' Owfs
IhavEp.wLV T~V napa
3 I
863-7 I: d cLv VOIL0/,
1TaT~p
4
fLovas,
p.o' tvvd') TTpoKHvTaL
ovoe
Suppl. 43 I -2
VLV /
q,EpOVTLp.ofpa Tav / EVaETrTOVayvdav '\oywv /
I
I
8vuTa rpVULS
: E[S 'TOV vOfLoV
Q.VEpWV
K€KTTJfLEVOS
€'TLKTEV
I
aUTOS
I
•••
nap'
aVTo/.
Cf. p. 38 with n. 4 below, and Heinimann, NP 121-2. The role which vop.os plays in the Hecuba has been studied by G. M. Kirkwood, TAPA 78 (1947) 61-8; for a different interpretation, see D. J. Conacher, AJP 82 (1961) 1-26. See also J. H. Oliver, Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World 91-102, with a good bibliography of recent discussions on p. 9 I n. I.-To the vop.o' discussed in the preceding 5
go
f9EEMOE
AND
NOMOE
An interesting problem of interpretation is presented by Theognis' complaint (54) about the rulers of Megara, oi 1TpOU{}' oun atKa, 7}LDwav OUT€ VOfLov, and who are now riding high. At a first glance, it looks as if Theognis meant by vOfLOV, the sort of thing we have just been discussing and criticized them for not having formerly known anything about the dispensation of justice and the issuing of laws. But the context argues against such an interpretation. For Theognis goes on to describe the kind of life the present rulers led before they attained power: 'they wore to tatters the goatskins that covered their sides and pastured outside the city like deer.'1 In other words, the absence of VOfLOLis here tantamount to a condition of life outside human civilization, a life characterized by improper and poor clothing and by a disorganized roaming about outside the confines of the city. The positive conclusion to be drawn from this is that we find vOfLo, herein much the same sense as that in which€vVOfLLais also used. It defines the condition of an orderly civilized society and attaches a moral value to this condition. The same sense of VOfLO, appears again in Heraclitus' demand (frg. 44) that a people should fight for its vOfLo, as for its wall; there may be a hint of it also in the av{}pdJ1T€WL VOfLOLwhich are nourished by the divine (frg. 114),2 and the demand for law-and-order which this entails may further underlie the statement that it is vOfLo, even to obey the will of one man.3 Pindar uses vOfLo, in this sense in Pythians 2. 86-8: €V 7T(lvTa De , '{}' ~ , , ,/.. , / 1Tapa' TvpaVVWL, ",,'. VOfLOV €V VYI\WUUO, avYJp 1TP0'f'€P€L, XW1TOTav ° Aa{1po, uTpaTo" / XWTav 1TOAw ot U01JOLTYJPEwvn. 'A man straightforward in speech brings forward law-and-order to everything
a value above the three types of constitution-the rule of one, of the many, and of the few-with which Pindar's contemporaries were familiar. It stands above party and becomes the hallmark of a well-ordered society. A similar sense of vOfLo, comes out also in several Sophoclean passages. In the Antigone Ismene refuses to join her sister's plan, because it would be a violation of vOfLo, to defy the tyrant's decree (59); at the end of the same play a repentant Creon believes that it is best to end one's life upholding the established order of things;1 when Orestes takes Aegisthus to his death at the end of the Electra (1506), he exclaims that anyone acting in transgression of vOfLo, should be killed; and in the Oedipus at Colonus (914) Theseus boasts that Athens accomplishes nothing without vOfLo,. In Herodotus vOfLo, denotes law-and-order in the statement (4. 106) that the Androphagi do not practise justice and use no vOfLo, whatever, and in the celebrated statement of Demaratus (7. 104. 4) that the Spartans owe their freedom to the mastery over them of vOfLo, alone. Thucydides men tions vOfLo, in the senseoflawand-order exclusivelyin speeches, except for his treatment of party warfare in Corcyra, where it is said that the formation of parties in such a situation is not contrived for the public good fL€TU TWV KELfLEVWVvOfLwv, but for purposes of aggrandizement 1Tapu TOV, Ka{}wTWTa, [sc. vOfLOV,] (3. 82. 6).2 For although vOfLo" strictly speaking, may refer here to no more than the positive political law by which a state lives, the implication is unmistakable that the observance of such laws is equivalent to law-and-order. As far as the speeches are concerned, vOfLo, means 'law-andorder' in the argument of the Athenian ambassadors at the Lacedaemonian Congress that their allies resent any legitimate as at Isth. 5. 43, with vo/-,ov as its object. More difficult is the decision whether 7Tana is to be taken (a) as a masculine accusative singular modifying vo/-,ov or (b) as a neuter accusative plural. I prefer (b), since EV 7Tana neatly completes the idea begun in 7TPOq,€PH, if we take EV as the Boeotian equivalent of €ls to express the goal or purpose. If we accept (a), we shall have to take EV adverbially as meaning 'and besides', 'moreover' (see LsJ s.v. EV C. 2), and translate: 'Moreover, a man straightforward in speech brings forward everything that is law-and-order .. .' ]
I I 13- I
4:
OEOOLKU yap f-L~ TOV~ Kae€aTOrra~ v6f-Lou~
/ apLuTov
V
u<[J'ovTa TOV
{3tov
T€A€rV. Since vO/-,os is not likely to refer to Creon's edict here, as it does in 382 and 449, and since the expression TOUS KaOHJTWTas vO/-,ovs seems too wide to include only the religious laws of burial which Antigone had championed, it is best to take the expression to refer to the norms of a well-ordered society. 2 Cf. the statement in the spurious 84. 2, where human nature is said to have become master of the vo/-,o, and to be accustomed to do wrong 7Tapa TOU, vo/-,ovs.
NOMa};
disadvantage more than if the Athenians, putting aside all consideration of orderly procedure (a7ToOEfLEVO' TOV vOfLOV), had openly aggrandized themselves (I. 77. 3), and soon thereafter, in the speech in which Archidamus praises the Spartans for not being well educated enough to despise law-and-order (I. 84. 3). The most interesting Thucydidean uses of vOfLo, in this respect are to be found in a passage which we shall have to discuss at length in a different context later (pp. 116-19 below). In their defence against the Plataean charge of medism during the Persian Wars, the Thebans allege that they were at that time ruled by a small oligarchical clique, (J7TEpDEEan vOfLo" fLEV KUL Tlp awrpPOVEaTUT
N0iLos
Thebans
33
condition oflaw-and-order, and so also whcn he stressesthe need to honour vOfLO, even under adverse circumstances (frg. 433).1 The vOfLo, which have been our concern so far are thought of as universally applicable, valid, and binding. They denote a general order of life, norms that are recogllized as prevailing in the universe, proper procedures, norms of proper conduct for the individual, and they are applied also to the authority which issues norms and the condition of civilized law-and-order, which is created by adherence to the social norms. We come now to a group of vOfLo, whose validity is confined within a somewhat smaller compass. Foremost in this category is the vOfLo, which describes not the way of life of mankind or of animals as such, but the mores of a particular group of men. We frequently hear, for example, of the vOfLo, which all Greeks share in common (Hdt. 6. 86 (3. 2, 7. I02. I; Eur. Or. 495, frg. 853; Thuc. I. 41) and which differentiate them from the vOfLo, of non-Greeks (Eur. Andr. 243, Bacch. 484), and in many other passages the vOfLo, are clearly limited to the way oflife enjoyed by a particular people in a particular state. In this context belongs the vOfLo, for which, as Heraclitus says (frg. 44), a city must fight as for its walls and which we have already mentioned in a different connection (p. 30). Similarly, the avOpw7TEW' vOfLo, of his frg. I 14 (pp. 26-7 above) also belong here, since they are the sum total of all the vOfLO' on which the various cities rely, and in Herodotus' account of Darius' experiment (3. 38. 4) the vOfLo, which each people likes best obviously refer to its own mores. Often vOfLo, designates explicitly or implicitly the mores of a specific Greek city, such as Athens,2 Sparta, Thebes, or 1 Cf. Or. 523, where Tyndareus asserts that he will defend VOiLeS to the best of his ability. For even though the immediate reference may be to a statute prohibiting talion, the value-judgement implied suggests the larger sense of law-andorder. A more characteristic Euripidean tone can be detected in a fragment of unknown authorship, in which vOiLeS bears this same sense: rrws oilv ni8' ElaopwvTEs ~ Ihwv y€VOS / E{va, AiYWiLEV ~ VOiLOW' XpwiLElJa; (Nauck2, Adespota, frg. 99). 2 Aesch. Eum. 693; Thuc. 3. 34. 4, 37. 4. Cf. the statement at Thuc. 6. 54. 6 that under the tyrants Athens TO'S rrpLV KELiL€VO'S vOiLa'S 'XP"f)TO, although this may equally wel.lrefer to Solo,n's pol,itic~l e?act;ne~ts; the pro;est of Al;ibiades' political opponents In 8. 53. 2: WS 8ELVOV EL"f) EL TOVS vOiLovS {JtaUaiLEvos KaTEW'; and 8. 76. 6, where the soldiers on Samos object to the Four Hundred as TOVS rraTpLovs VOiLOVS KaTa/.vaavTas. However, in these last three cases Thuc. may also be thinking of a body of laws or specific legislative enactments.
814"77
D
34
eEEMOE
AND
NOMOE
Samos;I of a loose political federation such as Thessaly;2 of the Dorians dcscended from Hyllus (Pind. Pyth. 1. 62), or even of a . clan such as the Pelopidae (Eur. He!. 1429)' More numerous still are examples in which no name of a city is given and the word denotes the mores of a city or society in general,3 or where the ways of non-Greek peoples are referred to.4 The fact that vOj.La, appears in the plural in most of the passages we have assigned to the category of 'mores' suggests that the Greeks regarded these vOj.La£ as the aggregate of a number of specific vOj.La£ which dominate different aspects of the life of a people. These vOj.La£, as we shall see presently, are norms which a people regards as valid and binding in its social, religious, and political life, and we shall direct our attention to them now. The time is hard to determine when vOj.La, was first used to describe customs, that is, those social practices which are current among a given group and frequently constitute a typical characteristic which differentiates it from other groups. The discovery in the lyric age that different men have different standardss would lead us to expect that this usage began among the lyric poets, and there are indeed some scattered indications that this may have been SO.6 But the earliest certain occurrence of vOj.Lo, in this sense is in a choral song in Aeschylus' Choephoroe (424), in which the maidens beat their breasts and sing an Arian dirge after the fashion (EV vOj.La£,) of a Kissian wailing woman. I Sparta: Hdt. 7.136. I, Thuc. 5.60.2. Thebes: Soph. Ant. 191, Eur. Barch. 331. Samos: Tod, CHI 12, No. 96.15-16. 2 Pind. Pyth. 10. 70-1, accepting the conventional accentuation. It seems to make more sense, however, to follow the suggestion ofE. Kapp and read vOJJ-ov, see app. crit. ad loc. in Snell+. 3 Soph. Aj. 1073, Ant. 368; Eur. Suppl. 430, El. 234, Or. 487, Bacch. 891 ; Thuc. 2.37. 1,6.18·7; AI'. Nub. 1040 and 1400, Eccl. 609. + Eur. Or. 1426 (Phrygians) ; Soph. OC 337-3 (Egyptians) ; and especially Hdt. I. 94. I (Lydians), 172. I (Kaunians), 173.4 (Lycians, Cretans, and Carians); 2. 35.2,45. 2, 79·1,92. I (Egyptians); 3·20. 2 (Ethiopians), 82.5,83· 3 (Persians); 4.80.5, 105. I, 107 (Scythians with Neuroi and Melanchlainoi), 168. I (Egyptians and Adyrmachidai), 169. 2 (Giligamai and Libyans), 170, 171 (Cyrenaeans, Abystai, and Bakales), 187. I (Libyans); 5. 3. 2 (Thracians); 7. 8 a. I and 9·41. 4 (Persians). 5 Cf. B. Snell, The Discovery of the ;Uind, tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer, 47-50. 6 Archilochus, frg. 230 (Bude) reads: vOJJ-o<; KP1)TLKO<; 8L8auKfTaL, suggesting a Cretan practice. Similarly, Alcaeus (E. Lobel and D. Page, Poetarum Lesbiorum fragmenta, frg. 72. 6: ii"Oa vOJJ-o<; OaJJ-' '''. L] .L] .v1)v) probably refers to a customary practice, cf. frgg. 35. I, 129.25, and 181. I.
8.
NOMOE
~
However, it is not until the second half of the fifth century that this use of vOj.La, really comes into its own, especially in Herodotus . His insatiable curiosity for the customs of other peoples and his delight in telling them are too well known to require a detailed discussion. He likes the Persian vOj.La, which prevents a father from seeing his child before the age of five, lest the child's untimely death bring grief to him (1. 136. 2- 137. I); I he tells us which Babylonian practices he likes and which he does not;2 he enumerates some of the vOj.La£ of the .Massagetae (I. 2 I 6. I), of the Egyptians (2. 37. I), of the Issedones (4. 26. I), and of many other strange peoples.3 He also mentions a few peculiar Greek vOj.La£ : there is the vOj.La, introduced by the Argives to keep their heads shaved until Thyreae be retrieved from the Spartans, while the Spartans, conversely, established the vOj.La, of letting their hair grow long (1. 82. 7-8) ; and another vOj.La, enjoins the Spartans to adorn their hair when about to risk their lives (7. 209. 3).4 The interests of the Hippocratic tract On Airs, ~Vaters, and Places are so close to the ethnographic sections in HerodotusS that it is surprising to find how few uses of vOj.La, as 'custom' it contains. There is little beyond the programmatic statement (14) that only those people will be mentioned who differ greatly from one another ~ ePVUEL ~ vOWtJ and the ancient vOj.La, of the Makrokephaloi of shaping their children's heads, a vO/w, which later developed into ePVat,.6 I For other Persian V0JJ-0L see 140. 3 (Magi may kill any creature except dogs and men); 3. 31. 4 (the Royal Judges find a vOJJ-o<; for Cambyses, permitting the Persian king to do what he pleases); 5.18.2-3 (Persians tell Amyntas of their vOJJ-o<; to have concubines and wives sit with the men after a banquet) ; and 9. III. I (no one asking a boon at a royal banquet must be refused). 2 He likes the manner of auctioning off marriageable women (I. 196. 1-4) and their way of curing the sick (I. 197), but not the custom of temple prostitution (I. 199. 1-5). For other Babylonian VOJJ-OL see I. 195.2,200. 3 4. 68. 2 (Scythian custom to swear by the king's hearth), 103. I (Taurians), I I 7 (Sauromatian custom that a woman cannot be married. until she has killed a man), 172. 2 (among Nasamones a bride must sleep with all male wedding guests), 190 (Libyans); 5. 6. 1-2 (Thracians). + Cf. the Spartan vOJJ-o<; of giving the kings a double portion at feasts (7.1°3. I), and the custom introduced by Argives and Aeginetans after some troubles with Athens, to enlarge women's brooch-pins to one-and-a-half times their original size, to have these dedicated in the shrine of Demia and Auxesia, and to have henceforth local rather than Attic vessels used in that sanctuary for drinking purposes (5.88.2). 5 See Heinimann, NP 172-80 and 209. 6 Cf. the beginning of 19, where the practices of the Scythians described in 18 are called vOJJ-OL. For the only other passages in which vOJJ-o<; appears in this treatise see above, p. 22.
36
BEl:MOl:
A:'\D NOMO};
Thucydides uses vOfL0S' similarly of the Odrysian practice of accepting rather than giving gifts (2. 97. 4) and of the Spartan _custom of having flute-players accompany the troops into the field (5. 70 with 69. 2). Into this context also belongs the old custom (7TuAUU), vOfL0S'), mentioned in connection with the colonization of Epidamnus, that the founder (olKwT~e;) of a new city be chosen from the mother-city (I. 24. 2), the generally Greek l'ofLoe; that the care of sanctuaries lies in the hands of the power occupying the territory in which they are situated (4. 98. 2),1 and also the mLTptoe; vOfLoe; of Athens to bury those fallen in war at public expense (2. 34. 1).2 Among the dramatists it is, as expected, Euripides who speaks of vOfLoe; as a customary practice more frequently than any other. But it is interesting to note that, while he usually describes as vOfL0S' practices which are generally observed by those among whom they prevail, he also applies vOfL0S' to many practices that cannot have had that general validity which the term usually implies. In other words, we see in Euripides the beginnings of that denigration of vOfLoe; which reaches its climax in the vOfLoe;.pvaLe; controversy. We find respect for vOfLoe; in his statement that different men have different customs (frg. 346. 4), in the vOfLoe; of the Greeks to honour athletes (frg. 282. 13), of the Aetolians to go to war with only one foot shod (frg. 530. 9), of the Phoenicians to bow down before a royal person (Phoen. 294), of the Erechtheids to give their children as tokens gold-wrought snakes (Ion 20, 25), and also in the vOfLoe; initiated by Danaus to call the Pelasgians 'Danaans' (frg. 228. 8). But when vOfLoe; denotes the custom of heralds to exaggerate in giving their reports (Heracl. 292-3), the impropriety of women looking at men (Hec. 974),3 or the habit of throwing the remnants of a meal to the dogs (frg. 469), and when Orestes facetiously justifies his murder of Clytaemnestra with the argument that he had put an end to the vOfLoe; of wives to kill their husbands (Or. 57I), we are no longer dealing with customs which are expected to be taken seriously as social norms. The same facetious use is found also in Aristophanes' Clouds (142 1-6), where the VOfL0S' that fathers beat their sons isjocularly I As stated by an Athenian herald sent to the Thebans. Immediately before this, at 4.97. 2, the Boeotians had accused the Athenians of transgressing Tn VO/-,L/-,anvv 'EAA~VWV in occupying the sanctuary at Delium. 2 See Endnote, pp. 175-6 below. 3 For the role of vo/-,os in the Hecuba in general see above, p. 29 n. 5.
treated like a statutory enactment, although he, too, elsewhere (Plut. 789, 795) treats VOftae; with respect; and when the sophist Antiphon (frg. 44A. I. 23-3 I) rejects Tfl. TWV vOfLwv as an arbitrary accretion and favours .pVULS', the final step in the rejection of customary practices has been taken. The VOfLOt we have just dealt with are customary practices unquestioningly accepted as valid and correct by most people of the society in which they exist, even if later intellectuals could frown upon them. The same development can be detected in a closely related sense of vOfLoe;, where the term describes not a practice but a belief, an opinion, a point of view, or an intellectualattitude, which starts out by being accepted without question by all members of a given group, but is attacked by intellectuals from the second half of the fifth century on as 'mere' conventional belief, foolishly embraced by the ignorant multitude but to be rejected in the light of truer values. Still, even here the judgement about the truth or falsehood of VOfL0S' is always secondary, and the term retains its old signification of something regarded as valid by public opinion in general. The earliest example of this meaning is found in Orestes' exclamation in Aeschylus' ChoepllOroe that Aegisthus has received what is commonly held (we; vOfLoe;) to be the proper punishment for him who has brought dishonour to another person. 1 But the best-known and most influential passage in which vOfLoe; bears this sense is Pindar's poem which begins: vOfLoe; a mJ.vTwv (3uatAEve;.2 As was first pointed out by Wilamowitz, vOfL0S' is here that which is accepted as right in the opinion and general belief of people, 3 and it was correctly understood in this sense by Herodotus I g8g-go: Aly{aBov yap au A€YW /-LOpov' I EX€/" yap aLaxvvTfjpOs;, ws- vaIL0S", 3{wrw. This passage has been taken by Rose, CSPA 2. 2 I7, as a reference to the Athenian law which permitted an adulterer to be killed with impunity; and a similar view seems to underlie Smyth's translation (Loeb) : 'for he hath suffered the adulterer's punishment as the law allows.' But apart from the difficulty of equating alaxvvT~p, of which no other example is cited in LSJ, with /-,OLXOS, the law is unlikely to enter here, since Attic law permitted this as justifiable homicide only when the adulterer was caught in the act; see Lipsius, ARR 430-1. 2 Frg. 169+PO-ry, No. 2450, frg. I. I have discussed this fragment at length in 'Pindar, NOMO};, and Heracles', HSCP 69 (1965) 109-38, text on pp. 111-12; for its influence in antiquity see ibid., n. 3. 3 Platon: Beitagen und Textkritik, 3rd eeln. by R. Stark, 96: 'Daraus ist zu schlieBen, daB der vO/-,os, d.h. wie es die Jvlenschen gel ten lassen, bei Gottern und Mensehen liber die Qualitiit einer mensch lichen Handlung entscheidet ....
(3·38. 4)·The point of the poem is that, although the theft of Geryon's cattle and of the mares of Diomedes was accomplished by yiokncc, we must not object to it, since they are generally held to be glorious labours ofHcrac1cs; and what is generally bc1ieycdto be right has royal, that is legitimate and not tyrannical, power, and this power is rccognized by both gods and men.2 Further, the FOfl-OL by which Creon claims in Sophocles' Antigone (r 78-91) to be enhancing the greatness of Thebes seem to consist in conventional beliefs, since he uses the term to sum up his convictions about the nature of a good citizen. In Thucydides, A1cibiades uses FOfLa, to describe the high opinion among his contemporaries which his Olympic victories had brought Athens (6. r6. 2), and in Euripides, Hippolytus' attendant calls FOfLa, the attitude of hatred which most people haye toward a haughty and unpopular bearing (91, 93).3 Whereas in these passages the validity of conventional beliefs remains unquestioned and uncha11enged, there emerges in the second half of the fifth century a cha11enge,which begins with doubt and ends in rejection. Heinimann has shown that Hecuba's famous exclamation (Hec. 799-801): d,\,\' at 8w~ a8EFavm Xw I
KE{VWV KpUTWV / vOfLa" vOfLCfJyap TaU, 8wu, ~YaVfLE8u / KU~' WfLW ({btKU KU~ b{KUt' WPWfLEFat looks at first glance like an expression of
simple accepting faith but contains at the same time the suggestion that such a faith is not very firmly grounded.4 The reason why we suspect this is that we find a distinction drawn between vOfLa, and truth as early as Empedocles, who knows as a philosopher that it is more correct to speak of 'mixture' and I
Laroche 174.
I have argued this point at greater length in my article cited above (p. 37 n. 2), esp. pp. 117~26. 3 Cf. frg. 52. 8, where time is said to make a noble bearing to be thought of (= vOiL'!') as haughty. ' 4 Heinimann, NP 121-2. Cf. p. 29 n. 5 above.-Something similar mav be implied in the enigmatic lines from Eur. Bellerophon, frg. 292. 4-6: voaaL O€/JV~TWV at }LEV fda' avOa/pEToL, / at 3' €K 8EWV 1TapnaLv, ci,\;\a T~ VOJ.L4J / LWfU.B' at.hous. If vOJ-Lw is correctly interpreted in this context as referring to some belief or conviction whi~h whether right or wrong, is commonly accepted, the translation would run: 'but w~ try to cure them [sc. the diseases] in the conviction
'separation' than of 'birth' and 'death', but accepts the common usage when he speaksas an ordinary citizen. 1 Similarly, Democritus (frgg. 9, 125) accepts the way in which people talk (FOfLCfJ) about colour, sweetness, and bitterness, even though he knows that in truth (ETEfi) only atoms and the void exist. In medicine, we find that the author of the treatise On the Sacred Disease uses vOfLa, to discriminate between the ugly and beautiful, the bad and the good, and the pleasant and the unpleasant (17),2 apparently regarding this belief as valid and true; but a few chapters later (20) he asserts that the popular belief (FofLCfJ) in the diaphragm as the seat of understanding does not corrcspond to fact, although he seems amenable to using eppEVE, in ordinary parlance.3 A final example of a conventional belief which is condoned despite the fact that it is, strictly speaking, inaccurate, is Herodotus' assertion (4. 39. 1) that a certain promontory ends FOfLCfJ but not in fact at the Arabian Gulf.4 The next step toward the ultimate rejection of FOfLa, is taken in a number of passages, in which conventional beliefs are no longer condoned, because they do not represent truth. In a Euripidean fragment (141), illegitimate children are only vOfLCfJ, but not in fact, inferior to legitimate ones, and in the Hecuba (846-9) the chorus complains of the vOfLat which compel us to look upon former enemies as friends, and upon former friends as enemies. The same attitude toward vOfLa, is seen again, but in a comic context, in Aristophanes' Acharnians, when the Megarian assures Dicaeopolis (773) that he is offering for sale what is a pig 'E'\,\avwv vOfLCfJ, that is what every straight-thinking Greek would regard as a pig; but the audience (and probably Dicaeopolis, too) know better. Similarly, when in the parabasis of the Birds the chorus asserts (755-9) that the birds regard as good what men here below regard as uZaxpa Tip VOfLCfJKpUTaVfLEFU, what it stresses is that general opinion gives only a very relative term. In other words, conventional beliefs are contrasted with what is real, and however widely FOfLa, is accepted, there arc criteria measured by which it is proved wanting. From here it is only a sma11step to the complete rejection of vOfLa, as conventional belief in favour of
Frg. 9. 5: ~ /JEiL" KaMauat, VOiL'!' (j' ErrLf'liLL Kat aUTO,. A similar point is made in a tragic fragment of unknown authorship, Nauck2, Adespota, frg. 26. 3 Heinimann, NP 86 n. 71. 4 Ibid. 82. I
2
epVat<;, which we find most clearly articulated by Callicles Plato's Gorgias.
III
1
The difficulty of analysing a concept such as vOfLo<; into its constituent elements becomes most manifest as we now turn to its uses in religious contexts. For while it is true to say that the term may denote a ritual ordinance, that is, an injunction that something ought to be done, or a ritual practice, that is, a statement that something is actually done as a custom, or a belief: that is, a conviction that something exists or that it is right that something be done, it is always difficult and often impossible to determine in any given context which of these three notions its author had in mind. The reason for this is not far to seek. As we have seen time and again, the crucial point in vo,uo<; is that it is something which a given society regards as a valid norm for itself, usually ul1selfconsciouslyand without question, something which, even when attacked and disparaged, is attacked and disparaged just because it is a generally accepted norm. It is, therefore, immaterial to the Greek way of thinking whether in any given context VOfLO<; is a rule, a customary practice, or a belief; its characteristic is that it is something generally regarded and accepted as correct for a given group. The difficulty of which we have just spoken is already apparent in the earliest passage in which VOfLO<; occurs in a religious sense. The Hecate hymn in Hesiod's Theogony promises honour and wealth to him who propitiates the goddess ¥powv LEpa.. KuAa.. KUTa.. vOfLoV (417).2 It is impossible to tell whether it is a rule or a custom that the worshipper is to follow, and it is equally impossible to make this decision in the case of a fragment which states that the apxu'io<; vOfLo<; is best for sacrifices offered by a city.3 Similarly, it is hard to know whether vOfLo<;, in the account given by Pherecydes of Syros (frg. 2, co!' 2) about the origin of the unveiling ceremony at weddings (avuKu'\v7TT~PLa), refers to a rule or to a practice. In short, however interesting for us, the question of differentiation between rule and practice was unimportant for the Greek view of VOfL0<;' I
VOfLOS
482 e-484 c, including the re-interpretation TfjS
of Pindar, frg. 169, to support his
epVGEWS.
2 That the 'Hymn' is genuine can no longer be doubted after the searching discussion ~f M. L. \Vest, Hesiod: Theogony 276-80, cr. also F. So[msen, HA 51 n. 169. 3 Hesrod, frg. 22 I : w, KE 7TOAI, pE~naI, VO!"O, 0' apxafo, apWTos.
In Aeschylus the deposition of a suppliant's bough follows (Suppl. 241), it denotes the customary worship of Hermes (Suppl. 220), the rule that wailings should accompany the paean to the dead (Cho. 150- I), and that a murderer must not speak until he has been ritually cleansed (Eum. 448-50). I Pindar uses vOfLO<; (01. 8. 78) in connection with rites for the dead, and all religious VOfLOL in Sophocles relate to the proper burial of the dead (Aj. 1130, 1343; Ant. 24, 519), except that once it refers in a larger sense to temple worship and ritual as such.2 Funeral practices are described as vOfLo<; also by Herodotus (2.36. 1,3. 16.3-4,6.58.2), who uses the term for purification rites (1. 35. I), for the order of worship and specific temple regulations (1. 132.3, 144.3; 2. 39·4, 42.3), for regulations concerning the granting of asylum (2. 113. 2-3), and for the rule which prevented the Spartans, at the time of :Marathon, from going to war when the moon was full (6. 106. 3). The term also has a more general sense when, for example, we are told that the use of cult images, temples, and altars is not EV vOfLcp for the Persians (I. 131. I), when he speaks of the treatment of sacred animals by the Egyptians (2.65.3), or when he tells us ofa king of Scythia who worshipped the gods according to the VOfLOL of the Greeks (4. 78. 4). In this context belong also the VOfLOL of the Athenians in the formula by which Cleisthenes of Sicyon betrothed his daughter Agariste to Megacles of Athens (6. 130.2).3 The Babylonian vOfLo<; prescribing temple prostitution is perhaps equally well taken as a religious or as a social practice (I. 199·1-5)· In the public documents that have come down to us from the fifth century we meet a religious vOfLo<; in the Athenian decree concerning Colophon of 447/6 B.C., in which the oath demanded
vOfLo<;
I
In this context belongs also Apollo's statement,
Eum. 576, that Orestes is
VOJL4J [KE-r'rjl£.
a!"
Ant.
€Kdvwv
285-7:
oan,
KUI. VOJ-LOVS OtaUKEOWv;
NOMOI;
of the people of Colophon is to be sworn in accordance with their VOfLOS',I and two phrases in the one-year armistice agreement of 423 B.C. between Athens and Sparta permit the operations of the Delphic shrine of Apollo to proceed KUTa TOUS' 7TUTp{OVS' vOfwVS" (Thuc. 4. lI8. I, 3).2 The religious VOfLOL were never undermined or disparaged to the same degree to which we noticed this being done to customs and conventional beliefs. And yet it is not surprising that we hear of deliberate infractions of religious VOfLOL for the first time in the last third of the fifth century. In his account of the Plague, Thucydides reports that VOfLOL concerning burial were abandoned in Athens at this time (2. 52.4), and in connection with the story of civil strife on Corcyra he states that alliances derived their strength less from a divine vOfLos--referringprobably to the religious sanctions against breaking an oath--than from a common desire to act in contravention oflaw (3. 82. 6). In Euripides there is only one example of an antagonistic attitude to religious VOfLOL, and that is in the complaint that the gods permit unjust persons to be suppliants at their altars (Ion 1312-13). Still, even here the principle that vOfLoS" makes an altar inviolate seems to be accepted.3 He describes as vOfL0S" the rule to bury the dead,4 as well as certain specific funeral rites.s As in other authors, it governs the purification ceremonies to which a murderer has to submit (Or. 429, HF 136I) and other kinds of purification (He!. 87 I); it plays a part in wedding ceremonies (IA 734, Tro. 324), at the Choes feast of the Anthesteria (IT 958-60), and at the festival of Artemis at Halai (IT 1458). A religious vOfLoS" is also involved when Eurysthcus I IG 12• 15. 30-1: Ka.,.~ [nU)E KoAoq,ovlo<; o/-,oaaL, Ka()' a KoAoq,]ovlov " "0/-,0<; [KEA")" ... J, as emended by W. Kolbe, Hermes 73 (1938) 256-9; cf. also H. Bengt-
son, Die Staatsvertrage des Alterturns 2, No. 145. The reading in ATL 2. D 15 (= SEG 10, No. 17) 41-2 necessitates, without a cogent reason, the assumption of a dittography. 2 There is also a fifth-century lex sacra from Gytheion, in which VO/IO<; occurs in an uncertain context; see IG 5. I, I 155; Schwyzer, DGE, No. 51. 3 Cf. frg. 1049. 2, and Hel. 800, where Menelaus inquires whether it is a nonGreek custom for a suppliant to take refuge at a tomb rather than at an altar. 4 Suppl. 526, 563, and 671. But at 540-1 the possibility of a vO/-,o<; not to bury them is envisaged. 5 Hel. 1241-3, 1246 (when a person has been drowned, clothes are buried in his place); 1258 (barbarians sacrifice a horse or a bull at funerals) ; cr. Tro. 266-7, where Hecuba asks Talthybius which Greek vo/"o<; demands that Polyxcna be slain over Achilles' tomb, .
43
protests in the Heracleidae (roog- I I) that his death will he contrary to the )}OVOL of the Greeks. Finally, there arc passages which refer to gellcral religious VOfl.oL, such as the Taurian custom of sacrificing strangers to Artemis (IT 465, c[ 35), or the order of worship of Apollo's sanctuary at Delphi (Ion 229, 643).2 Aristophanes uses VOfL0S' in a religious sense only rarely and always in a joyous context. Thus we hear that it is VOfLoS' for women to have fun at the celehration of the orgies in honour of Demeter and Kore (Thesm. 94,]) and to invite Athene to join their dance (Thesm. 1137), and when sacrifice is offered it is vOfLoS' that the gods get the entrails (Av. 5 I 8). T
Of the vOf1.oL which constitute the mores of a particular people we have now discussed those that express its social and religious beliefs and practices. To them we must now add the political and judicial VOfLOL, that is, those rules and regulations by which the internal life of society as a state is ordered. It is here that we encounter vOfLoS' in its sense of 'statute', although, as we shall see, the term does not by itself imply in the fifth century what it usually implies in the fourth-century orators, namely, written legislation. But it does imply that the regulation which it describes is accepted as a valid and binding norm by society, and that it is usually accepted as such, or expected to be accepted, by the individual citizen. The political meaning of vOfLoS' is not found before the fifth century B.C.3 It occurs for the first time in Aeschylus' Supplices (387-91), where Pelasgus twice mentions an Egyptian vOfLoS", which the sons of Aegyptus, as next-of-kin, might invoke to win power over the daughters of Danaus. In the Prometheus vOfLoS' appears in the plural in two passages (149-50,402-3) to describe the political principles by which Zeus governs. This may seem surprising in view of the fact that the theme of the Prometheus hinges on the point that Zeus' government is tyrannical and has not yet won universal acceptance. However, this use becomes less surprising as we observe that both passages are given to the chorus of Oceanids, who are resigned to living under the rule of Zeus. Moreover, in both cases the dative plural of the noun is 1 That the VO/-,OL here appealed to are concerned with religion is indicated by the phrase DUX dyvo~ €lJJ-L Tip KTUVOVTt KUT8avwv. 2 On 643 cf. Heinimann,}lF 167-9, who translates vO/-,o<; as 'Tempelordnung'. 3 For the problem of vO/-,o<; in Solon's po~ms see above, p. 3 n. 5.
connected with the verb KpUTlJVW to indicate that Zeus has won acceptance because of his superior power, and further, the addition of the adjectives VEoXfLoL<; and LOtOt<; introduces a sarcastic tone into the use of vOfL0<;: what is regarded as valid and binding under the dispensation of Zeus, the Oceanids seem to say, is in fact something unprecedented and idiosyncratic, enacted without the consent of the governed. While it is possible and even probable that the passage from the Supplices presupposes a background of written law at Athens,z it would be ludicrous even to raise the question of writing in the case of Zeus' laws. This suggests that in the first half of the fifth century vOfL0<; might or might not refer to written legislation; in other words, the question of writing is immaterial to the definition of a political vOfL0<;' This is confirmed by three inscriptions from outside Athens, which are approximately contemporary with the Prometheus. The first of these, dated between 460 and 455 B.C., comes from Halicarnassus and concerns the settlement of disputes over real ~state.3 Since the inscription describes itself as a vOfL0S" (II. 32, 34-5), we are justified in assuming that the term here signifies a written statute agreed to jointly by the Halicarnassians, the Salmacitians, and Lygdamis. But this assumption is not warranted in the stipulation, some lines earlier in the same inscription, I
, VOfLWt
" , OE,
'[ KUTU7T
E]
~ , ~ n- ,\ P VUV, 0PKWlt~U
<"
U/t
\"
'(II • 19-20 TOU<; OtKUUTU<;
).
For not only does the context fail to make clear to whom the oath is to be administered, but it also sheds no light on the question whether such oath formulae were prescribed by a written law in Halicarnassus (as many oaths in Athens were written) or whether vOfLo<; refers here to an unwritten religious regulation or practice. Evidently, the problem whether or not a given regulation existed in writing was of less importance to those who regarded themselves bound by vOfL0<; than it is to us. vVriting or its absence did not apparently make a vOfL0<; any less binding. I For the revolutionary connotations of VEOX/-,OS, cf. Aesch. Pers. 693; Soph. Ant. 156; Eur. Hipp. 866, Tro. 23 I, IT I 162 ; and especially Hdt. 9. 99. 3 and 104; also VEOX/-,OW in Hdt. 4. 201. 2, 5. [9.2, and in Tlmc. I. 12.-The adverb d8ETWS, to which Bentley rig:'tly emended the d8Ea/-,ws of the manuscripts, points in the same direction: Zeus wields his power with new laws without proper enactment. 2 See G. H. Macurdy, 'Had the Danaid Trilogy a Social Problem?' CP 39 (1944) 95-100, esp. 97, and below, pp. 58-9. 3 Tod, CHI 12, No. 25; Buck, CD, :\:0. 2. For a fuller discussion see below, pp. 167--70.
The situation is similar in the second inscription, whose date is perhaps a few years earlier than that of the Halicarnassian law. It contains the instrument, already mentioned in a different context before, by which Naupactus was settled as a colony of the Hypoknemidian Locrians.1 Here the written law refers to itself as a BEBfLtOV, but it contains several clauses stipulating cases, especially where property is at issue, in which the vOfLW (= VOfLtfLU) of the Naupactians or ofthe various cities of the Hypoknemidian Locrians shall apply (II. 26, 27, 28),2 and mention is made also of an 0p90V TOV VOfLtOV (1. 45)' The question whether or not these rules existed in writing cannot be settled on the basis of the text as we have it, and we can hope for an answer only if new inscriptions containing some of the relevant laws should be found at Naupactus or in Eastern Locris. The point is again that the question of whether a VOfLtOV or vOfL0<; is written or not was i.rrelevant for those for whom the BEBfLtOV was drafted; what dId matter was that it was a practice or regulation regarded as binding within a given community. The third inscription, dated about 450 B.C., consists in a decree from Erythrae, which stipulates judicial procedures to be followed, apparently in establishing the qualification of magistrates or in punishing malfeasances committed by them.3 The inscription speaks of itself as a !f;~epWfLu (B 1-2), but it refers three times to VOfLOt in such a way that, although the presumption is that they were written, the text itself offers no unequivocal clues to enable us to determine whether or not they actually were written. In the first of the three passages, the panel of judges is required to swear the same oath as that taken by the Council, namely, that they will pass judgement KUTU vOfL0<; KUL !f;YJeptUfLUTU (II. A 21-2).4 Since the inscription refers to itself as a !f;~epWfLU, we are justified in assuming that the !f;YJeptUfLUm may have been published in writing; and if we further assume that the distinction between these two kinds of enactment was the same as in Athens, we surmise that the ~'ofLOt here mentioned may also have been written. The second passage stipulates that judgement be passed 7TAYJUtOV Tod, CHI 12, No. 24; ef. above, p. 16. In I. 30 vo/-,os is used with the same meaning. 3 The most recent text is that of Meiggs and Andrewes B I 16. The best discussion is still that of A. Wilhelm, Jahreshifte d. listen. arch. Inst. Wien 12 (1909) 126-41 (with revised date, ibid. 14 (191 I) 237)· 4 Note the same phrase in the written heliastic oath in Dem. 24·149· I
2
46
eEEMOE
AND
NOMOE
n8EvT[u KJUTa T[OJV v6fJ-0v (11. A 25-7). This has been interpreted by Wilhelm: 'das Gesetz soIl in del' Niihe aufgestellt werden, so daB es den Richtern VOl'Augen steht und jederzeit befragt werden kann.'1 If this is correct, it would follow that the v6/-w<; is an inscribed document. However, this interpretation would make more sense if the KUnt were not there, and we must reckon with the possibility that another kind of v6fJ-0<; may be referred to which mayor may not have been written. The third passage (B 16-24) permits prosecution of a person ons d[aJ70s ~0EL fJ-~ I to the a¥Tos- read by Meiggs and Andrewes. 3 For Pericles' citizenship law of 451/0 B.C. see Arist. Alh. Pol. 26. 4. and Pillt. Per. 37. 3. who uses the verb £ypa.pf in connection with it. Cf. Hignett, HAC 343-7. 4 5.42.2 and G. 52. 3 (eldest son succeeds to the throne). So perhaps also the law enacted after Demaratus' defection at Eleusis, 5. 75. 2, which prevented the kings from going on a military expedition at the same time. Z
was written which prevented the Corinthians from giving away ships without payment (6. 89), and the same is also true of some political Persian I and Egyptian V6fJ-0Lo2 In Sophocles, v6fJ-0s occurs in a political sense most frequently in the Antigone, to describe Creon's proclamation forbidding the burial of Polyneices.3 Creon is of course the main proponent of v6fJ-0S in the Antigone, and the theme of the play revolves around Antigone's refusal to accept his V6fJ-0<;;4 still, the tragedy would completely lose its point if Creon's v6fJ-0s had not been generally accepted by the rest of the population of Thebes. A judicial v6fJ-0<; is probably involved in Oedipus' plea before the elders of Colonus (OC 548) that he was legally guiltless in slaying Laius, the law which permits a person to kill his attacker in self-defence; and when in the Ajax Agamemnon states (1247) that no v6fJ-0S could ever be established, if like Ajax everyone were to refuse to submit to the verdict of the judges, we have a very clear example of the acceptance which the word implies. . Euripides' use of v6fJ-0<; in its political or judicial sense strikingly reflects the actual use of the term in the lawcourts and in the Assembly. He is the first of the tragedians to speak explicitly of written laws and to praise them as a bulwark against tyranny (Suppl. 433)05 But at the same time the obligating force of v6fJ-o<; seems to begin to wane. We saw this earlier in his treatment of the V6fJ-OL which describe customary practices and beliefs in social and religious life, but his negative attitude is even more in evidence when he mentions political and judicial laws. He may also treat written V6fJ-OL, which he praised in the Supplices, as inhibiting human freedom of action (Hec. 864-7), and the very fact of their existence indicates that there are people who do not automatically accept what v6fJ-o<; demands, and this becomes I 3. 31. 2-5 (Cambyses wants the royal judges to find out whethe~ there is a V0fJ-0> permitting marriage with one's sister, and they find a .v~fJ-OS- whl~h states that the king of Persia may do as he pleases); 118. I (law glvmg the SIX other conspirators against the Magi free access to Darius) ; 7. 2. I (king has to appoint his successor before departing on a military expedition). 2 2. 136.2 (law under Asychis permitting the taking ofloans on the security of one's father's corpse and burial ground); 177. 2 (Amasis' law compelling every Egyptian to show the source of his livelihood annually to the nomarch). 3 Ant. 382, 449, 481, 847; cr. Creon's admonition to Haemon at 663, where, however the word may have the wider sense of 'law-and-order'. 4 See 'C. P. Segal, 'Sophocles' Praise of Man and the Conflicts of the Antigone',
Arion 3. 5
2 (1964) 46-66. See the apt remarks of Stier, NB 244·
48
eEEMOE
AND NOMOE
worst if those who wrote the laws themselves do violence to them (Ion 442).1 Although these are the only Euripidean passages in which vOj1-O£ are explicitly referred to as written, there are many more occurrences of the word which show that Euripides wrote against a background which took written legislation for granted. We hear of voted decrees through which laws are applied,2 and of the enactment of the vO/-Lo, that equal votes for and against the accused before the Areopagus shall result in acquittal (El. 12689), but we are also told that some of the Erinyes refused to accept it (IT 970). Euripides mentions the statutes against murder (Or. 941, HF 1322, Hec. 291) and the law which commands the Taurians to sacrifice any arriving Greek to Artemis (IT 38, 277, 586, 1189); but we find in the general treatment also the same awareness of the inadequacy or restricting force of v0/-L0' that we found in his attitude to written laws (Andr. 176, Heracl. 963): people express a dislike for particular laws,3and for the lawgivers who enact them (Cyclops 338); and elsewhere (frg. 597) the value of a good character is said to be superior to that oflaw.4 A similar influence of written legislation is seen in the works of Aristophanes. He explicitly refers to the Megarian decree as vO/-L0V, YEypa/-L/-LEvov, (Ach. 532), and the 'old law' which the birds have EV Tat, TWV TrEAapywv KVp{JWLV (Av. 1353-4) refers of course to the tablets on which Solonian laws were inscribed. Elsewhere he mentions the Solonian laws about inheritance (Av. 1650, 1655-6) and about the payment of debts on the first of the month (Nub. 1183-7), and we have the written evidence of an inscription (IG 12. 77) for the decree on public maintenance in I The lawgivers in this instance are the gods, but the use of ypa..pavra, suggests that we are dealing with imagery borrowed from human political praclice. 2 Ion 1250-6, where the Pythian .pfj,po, condemning Creusa is described as a vO/-,o, (for the contrast here between IJE/-", and vO/-,os, see Laroche 179). See also Herae!. 141, where the children of Heracles were by the vO/-,o, of Argos €.pTJ,pw/-,€VO' to die. 3 Frg. 402, where the social vO/-,os of marrying one wife only is attacked and treated as if it were an enacted political law. 4 Mention should be made here of the difficult frg. 172: our' ElK,)S apXHv our€ Xp~v EtVQc. VOJ-LOV I Tupavvov ([val: fl-wpla Of Kat OtAnI' I O~ TWV OJ-LOLWV {:3ovAETUt KpUTfLV /-,ovos. Not much sense can be made of the first two lines as they stand: €(va, vO/-,ov rvpawov €(va, is simply not Greek. The corruption is no doubt to be looked for in €(va, vO/-,ov and a correction, such as Bothe's or Bedham's, to read av€V vO/-,wv or av€V vO/-,ov would grcatly improve the sense. An alternative suggestion would be that vO/-,ov is a corruption of /-,OVOV and that the second dva' is a corruption of avopa, so that the first two lines mean: 'it is not proper and should not be that one man alone is tyrant.'
NOMOE
~
the Prytaneion, which is parodied as a vO/-LO, in the Frogs (76 I -4). A background of written legislation is assumed when the Ecclesiazusae establish the vO/-Lo, commanding intercourse with an old woman before a young girl can be gratified, 1 when a sycophant wants to come to the aid of the established laws (Plut. 914), when in the Birds V0/-LOL are offered for sale or offered to the choice of the Parricide (1038-9, 1346), and when there is talk of the laws which the city has enacted (Vesp. 467) or of people who want to change decrees and the law (Thesm. 361-2). It is surprising that we find in Thucydides not a single explicit reference to written legislation, and even when he mentions specific political VO/-LOL, it is not always certain whether they are written or not. The vO/-Lo, prescribing the delivery of funeral orations, for example, is evidently attributed by Pericles to a person (2. 35. I),z but there is no indication whether he thought of it as a written or unwritten enactment, or simply as a practice, introduced by an individual, and then sanctioned by custom. Similarly, we do not know whether the Corcyrean law prohibiting the cutting of vine poles from the precinct of Zeus and Alcinous (3. 70. 5-6) was written or not, and we are also ignorant about the law which laid down the rules of succession to the priesthood of Hera of Argos (4. 133. 3), the Olympic v0/-LO, which imposed fines on anyone attacking Elis at the time of the Olympic truce (5. 49. I), or the Syracusan law which barred young men from holding office (6. 38. 5). In the case of several Spartan VO/-LOL it is again Plutarch's statement (Lycurgus 13. I) that all Spartan laws were unwritten that leads us to believe that the laws mentioned by Thucydides did not appear in writing; but Thucydides himself is silent on that point.3 In addition to these passages there are a number of occurrences of vO/-Lo, in a general political context which suggest that written as well as unwritten regulations and practices are referred to. First and foremost here are the VO/-LOL for which Pericles praises J
Ece!. 944, 1022, 1041, 1049, 1056, 1077; cf. 759, 762.
According to the doubtful testimony of Anaximenes of Lampsacus, frg. 24, the person was Solon; but see Gomme ad loc. W. Kierdorf, Erlebnis und Darstellung der Perserkriege 84-95, dates it after the Persian Wars. 3 4.38. 1 (law defining order of succession to the command of the Spartan army) ; 5. 63·4 (law designed to prevent king Agis from leading an army without the supervision of ten advisers); 5. 66. 2-3 (Spartan vO/-,os that kings give orders in battle to the officers immediately below them in rank, these to the officers below them, etc.). 2
50
BEEMOE
AND
NOMOE
Athens in the Funeral Oration: they are the laws written and unwritten which the Athenians fear (2. 37. 3), the vOflm to which all citizens have equal recourse in settling their private differences (2. 37. 1), and from which they derive their courage less than from their native character (2. 39. 4).1 Judicial vOflm in a general sense are also referred to when the Athenians claim at Sparta that they use the same laws for themselves and for their allies in commercial suits (1. 77. 1), when Cleon upholds the superiority of bad but unchangeable laws over such as are good and invalid (3. 37. 3), or when Nicias gives the contrary advice, namely, that to break the laws by a vote is less bad than to let the city take bad counsel (6. 14). If so far Thucydides' use of vOfL0S' resembles that of Herodotus, he rather resembles Euripides in some instances in which VOfL0S' is envisaged as capable of inhibiting or restraining human action. Neither fear of the gods nor law of men, he tells us (2. 53·4), prevented people from indulging in excesses during the Plague, and in his answer to Cleon, Diodotus states that no vOfL0S' can prevent men from making mistakes (3. 45. 3, 7), and he warns the Athenians that the best protection against revolts lies not in the severity oflaws but in the effectivenessof precautionary measures (3. 46. 4)·In the Diodotus passages in particular we feel the atmosphere of a time approaching in which the positive law not only influences all thought about vOfL0S', but in which also the value of vOfL0S' begins to decline in the face of more powerful forces. The inscriptions of the last quarter of the fifth century2 show how vOfL0S' is well on its way to signifying primarily the positive law.3 The re-publication of Draco's law on homicide of 409/8 I Both here and at 37. 3 specific political or judicial statutes seem to be indicated rather than a way of life in general: at 37. 3 legislation to help the injured is singled out for special mention, while here 7rOVWV WAET!! and fJ-'ryfJ-ETU VOfJ-WV clearly refers to the Spartans, and particularly to laws such as to return either with their shield or on it. 2 I exclude from discussion here the section of the coinage decree of 449/8 B.C., which comes from the Aphytis fragment. The text as printed in A TL D 14 III, lines 14- 15, reads: ~ EVOXO[vs lva' KaTu TOV vOfJ-ov ••. ]. But this reading is so vague that is is practically meaningless, and M. Segre, who first proposed it in Clara Rhodos 9 (1938) 160 with n. I, remarks that it is 'dato soltanto a mo' d'esempio'. 3 This is also shown in the four uses of vOfJ-OS in [Xen.] Alh. Pol., which probably belongs to the early 420S. At I. 9 the term is used of legislation enacted by the cleverest people; I. 10 speaks of an imaginary vOfJ-OS requiring a freeborn person to strike a slave; at 1. 18 VOfJ-O~ gives jurisdiction at Athens to the o;jfJ-OS; and at 3. 2 one of the functions of the Council is to deliberate 7rEpt vOfJ-wv IiEUEWS.
which we had occasion to mention earlier, is called a vOfL0S' in the preamble which authorizes its publication, although it refers to itself as a 8wfl-oS'/ and the task ofre-publication was entrusted to a commission named uvayparPELS' TWV VOfLWV (ll. 5-6), leaving no doubt that written legislation is involved. It is not quite as clear whether there is a reference to an earlier written act in a coinage law of the spring of 422 B.C., which seems to identify the earlier law by the name of its proposer.2 In a decree of 418/17 B.C. concerning funds for the sanctuary ofCodrus, Neleus, and Basile it is likely that the V0fl-0S' on the basis of which the funds are allocated to the Treasurers of the Other Gods and the vOfL0S' concerning the sacred precincts were written.3 Finally, in a decree of 404/3 B.C., probably an act of enfranchisement, the phrase VOfLOtS' DE TOLS' B.C.,
aUToLS' 7TEPL aUT(vv TUS' uPxuS' xp[7ja8at, 0[S' KaL 7TEPL TWV aAAwv n81]vaLwv], speaking as it does of vOfL0S' to be applied by the
magistrates, almost certainly refers to written statutes.4 The meaning of v0fl-0S' as the positive law is also found in what fragments oflate fifth-century philosophy have come down to us. In his Palamedes Gorgias called written VOfLOt 'the guardians of the juSt',5 and in his Funeral Oration (frg. 6) he balances correctness in thought and speech (Aoywv Op80T1]Ta) against the fine points of what must be in this context the written law (VOfLOV UKpt{3ELaS') ; and Pericles and Hippias are represented as having defined V0fl-0S' in the sense of written statutes.6 It is less certain whether Antiphon had the written laws in mind, when giving advice (frg. 44A. I. 17-23) to hold the v0fl-0t in high regard when witnesses are present, but to follow rPvatS' when alone, or when Callicles states in the Gorgias (483 b) that the VOfLOt are the work of the weak and tnere majority. Finally, in the account of the origin of VOfLOt given in the Sisyphus ofCritias (frg. 25·5, 9), the reference is to positive, perhaps even to written, laws, when he attributes IC 12• I 15 (= Tod, CHI 12, ]\;0. 87) 5 and 20, and above, pp. 3 and 5. B. D. Meritt, Hesperia 14 (1945) 119-22, No. 11. 7: [- - - - Kalia7rEp KeAni" 110] VOfJ-OSh[o] K[apM ..... ]. But Meritt is diffident about the restoration and suggests that the reading may be vOfJ-wfJ-[a]. 3 IC 12• 94 (ef. SEC 10, No. 103) 17-18,23-5. 4 IC 22• 10. 6-7. For the date and purpose of this decree see D. Hereward, BSA 47 (1952) 102-17· 5 Frg. I I a. 30: VOfJ-OVS TE ypa7rTOVS q,vAaK(lS [TE] TOU O'Ka{ov. 6 Pericles: Xen. Mem. I. 2. 40--6, esp. 42: 1Ta.VTES' yap OOTOL VOJ.LOI- ElaLv, OU'; TO 7r;";jlios UVVEAliov Kat OOK'fJ-aUaV EypaifiE ..• ; Hippias: ibid. 4. 4. 13 and PI. Hipp. Ma. 284 d-e. I
2
52
fJEl:MOl:
AND
NOMOI:
the purpose of their institution to the need of putting an end to the primeval, brutish, and disorderly state of society. I
There are two further usages of vOfLoS- which, though they are closely related to one or another of the uses we have discussed so far, are still sufficiently distinct to deserve a separate treatment. The fact that the Greeks could think of vOfLoS- as having had a beginning in time2 leads easily into its use in connection with an act by which a precedent might be or actually is established, although I can find no passage in which vOfLoS- occurs in this sense before the fifth century. Twice in Sophocles VOfLoS- denotes the precedent by which customary practices may be initiated. In the Electra Clytaemnestra is warned by her daughter that her killing of Agamemnon in retaliation for Iphigeneia's death may have established a vOfLoS- of revenge, which could easily back-fire against her,3 and in the Oedipus at Colonus (907-8) Theseus threatens to apply to Creon the rules for which he has himself set the precedent, when he tried to seize Oedipus by violence. Herodotus calls vOfLoS- a custom begun by the Carian women who had been forced to marry Athenians not to eat with their husbands and not to call them by their names (1. 146. 3), and a custom of the Aeginetans and Argives, established after some difficulties with Athens, that women should wear brooch-pins one-and-a-half times the normal size and that local rather than Attic ware be used for certain temple rites (5. 88. 2). Similarly, Thucydides reports that the Corinthians, in their speech against the Corcyreans before the Athenian Assembly, warned the Athenians not to set the precedent (VOfLoS-) of admitting as allies those who revolt from others, since that might back-fire against them (I. 40. 4, 6), and in the Melian Dialogue the Athenians disclaim any responsibility for having set the precedent that gods and men rule wherever they are the stronger (5. 105. 2). In Euripides vOfLoS- refers twice in the Iphigeneia among the Taurians to religious practices initiated by Orestes: from his trial dates the I The text, as preserved in Sextus Empiricus 9. 54, contains VO/-,Ol, also at line 40: T~V avo/-"av TE Tof, VO/-,OlS KaT€a~1]aEv. But since the point of the passage is that a clever man (7TUKVOS ns Ka, aorpos yvw/-'1]v aV1)p) invented fear of the gods in order to prevent transgression of the VO/-,Ol, the reading VO/-,OlS is hard to maintain, and it is preferable to accept Schmidt's emendation rpO~Ol, or, less so, Diels's ~poTofs. 2 This is particularly striking in the earliest extant occurrence of the term in Hes. Op. 276, where Zeus has ordered separate ways of life for beasts and men. 3 580-1: opa nOEfaa TOVOETOV vO/-,ov {3POTO"iSI/-'~ 7T~/-,a aauTfj Kat /-,ETayvolUv T'01]"
ritual celebrated at the Choes (959), and Athene bids him at the end of the play to commemorate his experience among the Taurians by establishing the vOfLoS- for the festival of Artemis at Halai that a sword be put to a man's throat (1458). Precedents of social customs are involved when in the Trojan vVomen (103I) Hecuba urges Menelaus to kill Helen to set a vOfLoS- for all unfaithful wives, in the Orestes (892) Talthybius is reported to have criticized Orestes' murder of Clytaemnestra for not setting up KaAovs- vOfLOVS- to regulate children's behaviour toward their parents, and Danaus is said (frg. 228. 8) to have established the vOfLoS- of changing the name of the Pelasgians to 'Danaans'. A second sense of vOfLoS- derived from the fact that it may have a beginning in time is that of a rule set up or a procedure to be followed under certain closely-defined conditions, as, for example, the rules to be followed in playing a game. This usage is first found in Aeschylus' Agamemnon, where Clytaemnestra describes the course she set up for the beacon signal as VOfLOt AafL7Tao1),popwv (312).2 After that, it occurs in Sophocles to describe the 'rule' Antigone followed in honouring her brother above husband, child, or parent (Ant. 908), and in Electra's statement to Chrysothemis that she does not want to live by VOfLOt which demand that a just action be avoided if it brings harm to oneself (El. 1043). Herodotus describes as VOfLOt the terms agreed upon by the twelve kings who ruled Egypt after the priest of Hephaestus (2. 147. 3-4) and makes Hermotimus praise the gods for having applied a just vOfLOS- in delivering into his hands the man who made him a eunuch (8. 106. 3). In Euripides, Phaedra's nurse urges her mistress to follow the rule that love must be accepted (Hipp. 461), Theseus banishes his son on the basis of the vOfLoS- proposed by Hippolytus himself that fathers ought to punish sons who violate their wives (Hipp. 1046),3 and Orestes describes his and Electra's relationship to Aegisthus as an enmity 'which knows not the rules of a truce'.4 I
I e.g. Ar. Eccl. 987-8: KaTa TOV EV 7TETTOf, vO/-,ov, and also the difficult fragment of Cratinus (116), cited by Athenaeus 15. 667 f, where the VO/-,Ol of KOTTa~os seem to be mentioned. 2 Fraenkel translates: 'the rules I arranged for my torch-bearers'. 3 Actually, Hippolytus had suggested (1043-4) that fathers kill such sons, but Theseus is less extreme in his punishment at this point. 4 El. 905-6: aa7TovOowl yap I VO/-,OWlV .xOpav TipOE aUI-'~E~A'7Ka/-,EV.
\Vc have now completed our investigation of the various passages in which vOf1-0S occurs from the beginnings of written Greek to the end of the fifth century B.C. It remains to sum up what we have found and to draw some general conclusions. We have isolated altogether thirteen senses in which vOf1-0S is used in Greek, and although the nature of a study of this kind makes it impossible to be dogmatic either about the number of categories established or about the assignment of particular passages to particular categories, it has been demonstrated that vOf1-0S had a considerable range and variety of connotations before the end of the fifth century. And yet the fact remains that the one word vOf1-0S sufficed for the Greeks to express all the connotations which we have attributed to it, and this, in turn, indicates that there exists one underlying basic idea of vOf1-os, of which each meaning and each occurrence constitutes, as it were, a manifestation. What that basic concept was has been suggested at the beginning of this section. NOf1-os, in all its senses, signifies an 'order' and implies that this order is, or ought to be, generally regarded as valid and binding by the members of the group in which it prevails. This usually means that the members of a given group accept vOf1-0S without question, and general if not universal acceptance is especially in evidence in the most general senses of the term, when it refers to a way of life, to the normal order of things, to normal procedures, and to normal behaviour, or when it describes the authority on the basis of which or by which norms are issued, or the condition of law-and-order, in which the vOf1-0t are obeyed. Acceptance is also implied in the more specific senses, when it designates the mores of a people and its various beliefs and practices in society, religion, and politics. Even when the later fifth century begins to disparage, devaluate, and reject customary practices, conventional beliefs, religious beliefs and practices, and the validity of statutes, it does so against the background of general acceptance by society, which these vOf1-0t enjoy and against which the enlightened individual protests.
are now in a position to compare vOf-ws and BWf1-os with one another. The basic idea of BWf1-oS is, as we saw, that of something imposed by an external agency, conceived as standing apart and on a higher plane than the ordinary, upon those for whom it constitutes an obligation. The sense of obligation is also inherent in vOf1-os, but it is motivated less by the authority of the agent who imposed it than by the fact that it is regarded and accepted as valid by those who live under it. And when we apply these basic concepts to the connotation of 'statute', which both BWf1-os and vOf1-os assumed at different periods in Athenian history, we see that the two terms approach the notion of a statute from opposite directions. eWf1-os envisages it as being imposed upon a people by a lawgiver legislating for it, while vOf1-os looks upon a statute as the expression of what the people as a whole regard as a valid and binding norm. This radical difference between the two terms suggests that the change from BWf1-oS to vOf1-0S came about at a time when the Athenians were disenchanted with living under laws imposed upon them from above, and decided instead to consider as laws only norms which they had themselves ratified and acknowledged to be valid and binding. The most probable time at which this happened would seem to be the establishment of the democracy by Cleisthenes in the wake of the liberation from the Peisistratid tyranny. Moreover, the fact that we have no evidence in Athens of a gradual transition from BWf1-os to vOf1-0S, of a period, that is, in which BWf1-oS and vOf1-os coexisted at Athens as interchangeable terms for 'statute', points to an abrupt change, which is likely to have been the result of a deliberate act. Unfortunately, none of our sources for the history of Athens reports such a deliberate act, and there is equal silence about the reasons for the change from BWf1-os to vOf1-os. Still, there are a number of indications which will enable us to determine with some degree of plausibility under what circumstances and at what point in Athenian history the change took effect. Once
W
E
56
eEl:MOl:
AND
NOMOl:
the date is established, it may be possible for us to discover whether the change was the result of a deliberate act, and also whether in effecting it the Athenians followed or were influenced by similar changes that may have taken place elsewhere in the Greek world. It is to these problems that we shall address ourselves in the rest of the book.
Tis safe to infer from the law which we quoted at the beginning of the Introduction that after 403/2 B.C. any valid statute was written and, conversely, that any reference to vOfLoS in a political or judicial sense is a reference to a written law (Andoc. I. 87). In other words, the definition of the political and judicial VOfLO> included in the fourth century the notion that it is embodied in a written document. To what extent is this definition also true of the fifth century? The question has considerable importance for us in our search for the date when vOfLoS first came to assume the meaning of 'statute' in Athens. Since the BWfLoL of Draco and Solon were written, we are obviously interested in finding out at what time written documents analogous to theirs were first called VOfLOt. For we can have absolute certainty that vOfLo> had taken the place of BWfLoS only when written political enactments bear the new name. But here we encounter a difficulty. The earliest explicit reference to written VOfLOt in Athens is no earlier than 425 B.C., when Aristophanes had Dicaeopolis speak of Pericles' Megarian Decree as vOfLov> WU7TEP UKoAtu JlEJlpufLfLEVOV> (Aeh. 532), and when, a few years later, Euripides' Hecuba complains of the restraints imposed upon free action by vOfLWV JlpU4)uL (Ree. 866).1 These passages suggest in the unobtrusive way of their allusion that by 425 B.C. written statutes were no novelty for the Athenians, but that they had long been part of their daily life. But this date is too late to be meaningful.
I
58
NOMOI:
BECOMES
'STATUTE'
We can push the evidence for written statutes back almost two decades further. When Pericles in his Funeral Oration, delivered in 43 I B.C., mentions fear manifested in obedience to the VOfLOL as one of the principal factors which keep the Athenians from transgressing the laws, the distinction he draws between 'laws enacted for the benefit of the injured' and those laws 'which, though unwritten, bring generally recognized shame' on the offender shows that he thought oflaws as normally being written, else there would be little point in the modifier auoL uypa¢oL ovn<; (2. 37. 3)" The same kind of argument applies also to Antigone's invocation of the uypa7TTa 8(JiJv VOfLLfLU (Soph. Ant. 454-5) some ten years earlier. Her appeal would have made no impression on the Athenian audience in 442 B.C., if they did not automatically associate vOfLo<; with written statutes without stopping to think that historically Creon's VOfLOL2 were proclaimed in an age that had no written statutes. Accordingly, we can be absolutely certain that by 442 B.C. the Athenians thought of VOfLOL as written. Can we go beyond that? There is a method by which we can determine whether a given political vOfLO<; was thought of as written, and although this method cannot lead to absolute certainty, it can give us results which are so probable as to be virtually certain. If we can find vOfLoS in a context in which provisions are mentioned which we know from other sources to have been the content of written VOfLOL at a later period, it is safe to assume that the term refers to a written statute, especially if the language of the passage is legal in character. Now, by a lucky coincidence, the earliest passage in which this is the case is at the same time the earliest passage of all in which vOfLo<; is attested in a political sense. In Aeschylus' Supplices (387-9 I), Pelasgus warns the Danaids: Et
TOL KpaTovUL
vop.,cp
7ToAEW<;,
dVaL,
T:<; av
7TaLo"
AlYV7TTOV aEBEV
rPaaKovTE<; lyyvTaTa TO
Lao' aVTLWBijvaL
yEVOV<;
BEAoL;
I I do not share the confidence of]. T. Kakridis, Der thukydideische Bpitaphios (= Zetemata 26) 5-6, that the free composition of the Funeral Oration after 404 B.C. 'gehort ... zu den sichersten Ergebnissen der neueren Thukydidesanalyse'. See ibid. 6 n. I, for a good bibliography to 1961 on this thorny problem. There is a lot to be said for F. E. Adcock's view, Thucydides and his History 36-7, that the Funeral Oration 'was written in 431 B.C., while the voice of Pericles still sounded in the historian's ears'. 2 Cf. Ant. 382, 449, 481, 847,
OEL TO: aE rPn5ynv
KaTd vop.,ov<; TOV<; OlKOBEV,
w<; aUK EXovaL KVpO<; ouoev ap.,rPL aov.! ,J., d " That expressions such as EyyvTuTa yEVOV<;, 'f'EVYHV, an EXovm KfJpo<; are borrowed from the language of the law has been remarked by many commentators on this passage,2and the tenor of the passage leaves no doubt that the king. is ~ryin? to make th~ women think of the legal aspects of their SituatIOn. Pelasgus warning is clearly based on the fact, known from Athe~ian law ~f the fourth century, that a father had 'absolute authonty.over hiS daughters, whom he could give in marriage or leave by will to the man whom he chose for them'.3 Although the text of no law containing this stipulation has come down to us: texts of similar laws have survived (e.g. [Dem.] 46. 18) and It would be very surprising indeed if such a clause had not been part of Solon's laws on inheritance (Arist. Ath. Pol. 9. 2, 35. 2; Pluto Solon 20. 2). We may, therefore, conclude that the reference is to a vOfLoS which existed in writing when the Supplices was first performed in the archonship of Archedemides in 464/3 B.C.,4 and ~ince no earlier use of vOfLoS in a political or judicial sense has surVived,.we may take this as the terminus ante quem vOfLo<; assumed the techmcal connotation of 'statute'. We stated earlier that the last attested use of 8wfLo<; is to be found in the prescript of the old Dracon~an statute ~g.ainst tyranny re-enacted at the time of the expulsion of the Pelslst~atids which describes Draco's law as 8EUfLw Kd miTpw (Anst. Ath: Pol. 16. 10).5 This means that 511/10 B.C. constitutes the terminus post quem for the adoption of vOfLo<; in the sen~eof 'statute'. Accordingly, vOfLoS must have become the techmcal term for 'statute' at some point between 511/10 and 464/3 B.C. Our ,
I
J
,
I
0;
'If the sons of Aegyptus get the power,over you by
THE
discussionofthe political andjudicial VOfLOt has shown that Pelasgus' indifference to the question whether the law to which he wants the Danaids to appeal is written or not reflects a general Greek indifference to this same problem. I From at least the fourth century B.C. on, the Greeks were aware of the importance of written legislation and tried to discover when it began,2 and Aristotle (Atlz. Pol. 41. 2) notes explicitly that Draco was the first to issue written laws in Athens. But in the fifth century they do not seem to have been inordinately interested whether or not a given vOfLoS was written. The fact that a political vOfLoS was valid and binding was all that mattered to them; they were less concerned whether it was embodied in a written document. Herodotus' language is no different when he speaks of the written VOfLOt of Solon from the way in which he speaks of the (presumably unwritten) VOfLOt of Sparta, or of a (presumably written) law of the Corinthians;3 and Thucydides treats the (presumably unwritten) VOfLOt of Sparta the same as a (presumably written) VOfLo, in Corcyra.4 This circumstance suggests that any political or judicial VOfLOS of which we hear was potentially written, or, differently expressed, that every valid political or judicial vOfLo, had the same authority that a statute has in modern societies. Therefore, any trace that we can find of the use of VOfLoS in a political sense before 464/3 B.C. may be taken as an indication that vOfLo, had assumed the meaning of 'statute' by that time. Now we saw that VOfLO, itself is not attested in the sense of 'statute' before Aeschylus' Supplices. But there does exist a number of nouns, adjectives, and verbs ending in a -VOfLO, suffix, which are at least as old as the 04Jssey. Since these obviously reflect one or the other of the meanings of vOfLo, in Part I, an examination of those compounds which are attested before 464/3 B.C. will enable uSto seenot only whether any of them embody the 'statute' connotations of vOfLoS from their first occurrence down to the end of the fifth century, but also, if they do not, whether we can detect in any of them a change in meaning which suggests that they were influenced by the adoption of vOfLoS as the technical term for 'statute'. And if we succeed I See pp. 43-52 abOve. , See Arist. Pol. 2. 12,1274'22-31, and Ephorus, FGH 70. F 139 (= Strabo 6. I. 8). 3 I. 29. 1-2,5.42.2,6.52.3; 5. 75. 2; and 6. 89. Cf. pp. 46-7 above. 4 4. 38. 1,5· 63·4 and 66. 2-3; 3. 70. 5-6. Cf. p. 49 above.
PROBLEM
DEFINED
in finding such connotations in passages written before .464/3 B.C., we may take that as an indication that vOfLoS, too, was IIIuse as the term for 'statute' at that time. The compounds attested before 464/3 B.C: a~e eUvofL{a, ovaVOfL{a, dvofL{a, laovofL{a, and their cognate adjectIval and verbal forms and to their examination we shall now turn.1 But before we ca~ proceed to that task, we must reiterate what was ~tated at the beginning of Part 1. Analyses ~ased upon etymologIcal considerations have no more cogency III the case of the -VOfLOS compounds than they do in the case of vOfLoS. I,know ?f ~o ~tten;pt to derive the -VOfLOS suffixes from the verb VEfLW = dIstnbute that does not have to strain the meaning of either the root ver~ or the compound,z while those who regard the suffixesas formatIOns from the noun VOfLOS3 rarely, if ever, face the much more releva~t question in which of the many connotations of vOfLoS each suffix~s to be taken.4 In other words, we again have to follow.the semantIc method and base our conclusions on a close analysIs of the contexts in which each of them is found. I We shall also consider KUKovoflo" which, though not attested b.efore 463 B.C.;. enters into contexts in which €IJVofliu is also found. No account wIll be taken °d dlvOflO, and aVOIW, in a musical sense-e.g. €;;VOflO,: Aleman, frg. 10. 10, a~ Pind. Pyth. 5. 67 (Andrewes, Eun., esp. 91 n. 6) ; UVOflO" Aesc~. Ag. 151 (L' Llo.d-]ones CQ47 (= N.S. 3) (1953) 96, accepted by]. D. DennIston and D.. Pa;e, Aesch;lus: Agamemnon 82) and 1142 (E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus: Agamemnon 3· 519). But see also p. 86 below. 8 d' 2 Stier NB 23--6 with 235 n. 26, and]. L. Myres, CR 61 (1947) 0-2, ~nve both €VV;fliu and:>iaovofliu from V€flw. H. J. Erasmus, 'Eunomi.a', Acta Classlca 3 53-64 esp. 54, accepts this derivation for €VVOfliu, and HIrzel, TDV 242-4, (196o) .. ' . r' '. 1 0 Laroche 186-7. The expresfollowed bv BS I. 418, accepts It ,or LGOVOflLU, so as sion taov (~r tau) V€flnv (e.g. Hdt. 6. I I. 3; Soph. aT 579; Pl. Pr~t. 337 a, Rep. 8. 8 C' Arist. EN 5. 3, 113I '23) contributes little to an understandmg. . , , 553 a~Ofliu is universally derived from vOfloS, even by those who denve €VVOfl'U TD V 242-3 n. 4 ad fin. ; Ehrenberg, Ison., esp. 293, and firom tlle ver b , see H,'rzel . , , 1" f / 7 Vlastos, Ison., esp. 348-9, who also derives €VVOflLU and ~aovofl;u ~om VOIJ.O" 34." 1] SE esp 82 n I and for LGOVOflLU }< raenkel, op. Clt. 50 For EVVOJ.LLa see a so aeger, , . ., / d ' , . 68~-2. For discussions which regard the evidence for €VVOfl'U an LGOV~flLU as I~conclusive, see Ehrenberg, Ison. 293; Heinimann, N~1~4 L~r~enk Cie~th. I-I , esp.5n.I3;LarocheI63,200-I,and255;andE.\yI, ~rIntIaa I. 4 Only Ehrenberg, Eun. 75, seems to have recognIzed thiS problem.
k
EYNOMIA,
AYENOMIA,
AND ANOMIA
63
when it describes personal conduct and as a 'condition' when it refers to the state of a society. The only passage in Greek literature before the beginning of the fifth century in which Evvop.,{a describes a quality is also the earliest. In the 04Yssry (17. 487) Antinous is warned that the gods visit cities in the guise of strangers, av()pw7TwV u{3ptV TE Kd EVVOp.,{y)V EepOpWVTEC;. This warning, given in the context of Odysseus' rude reception by the suitors, the antithetical pairing of EVvop.,{a with u{3ptC;, and the genitive av()pw7TwV all indicate that a contrast between proper and improper personal conduct is intended,2 and that Evvop.,{a, accordingly, describes a personal quality. The other occurrences of Evvop.,{a before 463 B.C. describe a condition. With Hesiod it begins to assume a social significance which never quite leaves it for the rest of its history. Hesiod is also the first to make Evvop.,{y) into a personal cosmic force and to give her a place in the divine genealogy. She is the daughter of Zeus, begotten with Themis, the primeval goddess of order, after he had consolidated his power over the universe, and her sisters are the H6rai, the forces of order in nature, Dike (Justice) and Eirene (Peace), the forces of order in human society, and the three Moirai (Fates), the forces that represent the rhythm of the life of the individual (Theog. 901-6).3 Andrewes aptly calls Eunomie here 'one of the guardians of the social order, keeping the city from violence and lawlessness';4 but it is not merely in the city that she maintains order. Her pedigree makes her part of a larger order which transcends the city, a universal order established by Zeus. Hesiod is unique in making Eunomie into a cosmic power. I
F!VVOj1-£a is the earliest of these concepts to be found in Greek l~terature.1 Only the noun form is attested before the end of the sIxth century B.C.;2 the adjective dJvop.,oc; is not found before Aesch.ylus.and Pindar,3 and the verb EVvop.,Eop.,at occurs for the first tIme In Herodotus (1. 97. 3). There seems to be general ~greement t~at before t?e end of the sixth century dwop.,{a has lIttle or nothIng to do wIth vap.,oc; = 'statute', 4 but what has not been clearly recognized is that down to the last third of the fifth century Etwop.,{a and its cognates bear only two senses neither of ~hich is immediately related to vap.,oc; = 'statute'. describes eIther a quality of personal behaviour, in which sense it reflects ~he.v~p.,oc; whic~ connotes the normal and proper conduct of an IndIVld.u~I,5or ~tre~ersto the condition of a well-ordered society, a condItIOn whIch Implies not only the prevalence of good laws ~nd. good governronentwit~in the state, but also the good functIOmng.~f th~ socIa.1orgamsm as a whole. It is, in other words, ~ Co~dItIOnIn whIch vap.,oc; means 'law-and-order'.6 The distInC~I~~between these two senses does not of course preclude the possIbIlIty that they may affect one another: there are several examples, especially of the adjective dJvop.,oc;, where the condition of law-an?-ord.er is pred.ic~ted as a quality of a city. Still, this does not ImpaIr the valIdIty of the distinction. Only with the pseudo-Xenophontic Constitution of Athens does the meaning of vap.,oc; = 'statute' seem to afTect the compound Etwop.,{a and its cognates. I shall in the following speak of dwop.,{a as a 'quality'
it
I The most important full-length discussions of Evv0fl-{a are: ,"Vaser in RE 6 (1909) 1129-31; Andrewes, Eun. 89-102; Ehrenberg, Eun. 70-93' Myres loc CIt.; and Erasmus, loco cit. ' ,. 2
sense
1~hc onl.y exception IS rnuSlcal,
is
Eiiv0fl-0'
in Aleman,
frg. 10. [0 cited above "
,3 Aesch. frg. 198, from the Prometheus Unbound' Pind. }'vem. 9. 29. "
Oi.
I.
where the
37 Isth
..
5 22
,
~.g. Jaeger, SE 82, n. I; Andrcwcs, Eun. 8<)-90; Ehrenberg, Eun. 74-5; and !I!yr(~, loco Clt., ,!he atte~pt ~f Erasmus, op. cit. 57, to show that from Solon on Evvofl-L~lmc,a~tS~lglhtdIstributIOn by law' fails to convince, since v0fl-0' did not vet mean aw lor "-0 OD. . 5 See pp. 24-26 above. 4
I Laroche 200-1 draws a similar distinction between -V0fl-0' compounds that have a social and those which have a personal signification. But he goes astray when he confines the former to derivatives from adverbs+vEfl-w and the latter to derivatives from prepositions+v0fl-0" 2 So Andrewes, Eun. 89-90. W. Nestle, Hermes 77 (1942) 134, V. Ehrenberg, Eun. 76, and G. Vlastos, Ison. 350, speak of the v0fl-0' of hospitality in this connection, but the meaning is surely wider and less specific than that. On the other hand, to accept the view of Myres, op. cit. 81, approved by Erasmus, op. cit. 54, that EVv0fl-lTJ refers here to the state of a society in which each man is given his due, we should have to assume that ii/3p', describes the state of a society in which each man is denied his due; but there is no indication that ii/3p" ever designates the state of a society. 3 But note the inconsistency, typical of Hesiod, with Theog. 217-19, where the Moirai appear among the children of Night. 4 Andrewes, Eun. 89. But there is no support in this passage for his further comment that Evv0fl-la is here 'the social result of the conduct of the individual citizens who make up the community'.
64
NOMOE
BECOMES
When later poets follow Hesiod in personifYing her and in giving her a genealogy, the H6rai and the Moirai do not appear as her sisters, with the result that her sphere of operation is then confined to the city-state. Pindar, for example, celebrates Eunomia with her sisters Dika and Eirena, 'golden children of wellcounselling Themis', as denizens of Corinth,1 and in an anonymous lyric poem, perhaps to be attributed to Simonides, the Moirai Aisa, Klotho, and Lachesis (here children of Night rather than of Zeus) are implored to send to the city Eunomia together with her sisters Dika and Eirena.2 A rather different genealogy of Eunomia is found in a fragment of Aleman, in which Promatheia (Forethought) is her mother, and Tycha (Good Fortune) and Peith6 (Persuasion) her sisters.3 There is no context to help us interpret this relationship, but Ehrenberg is no doubt right when he relates these deities to the Spartan state,4 as implying that lawand-order, success, and the acceptance of arguments in a deliberative body depend on planned policy. Again, it is in the city that EVlJop.,La does her work, and that this work is larger than the establishment of 'good laws' is obvious. Eunomia as a person encompasses the whole social order, which may even be treated, as it is in Hesiod, as part of a larger cosmic order. While €UlJop.,La loses her cosmic connotations after Hesiod, her association with the city-state is perfected by Solon so as to transform and elaborate the statements of Homer and Hesiod into a programme for political action. The definition of EVlJOp.,Ly) as the condition of the society which he hopes to create by his reforms is couched in such lively and precise terms at the end of his poem 'Our City' that some modern scholars have dubbed the entire poem 'Eunomie', even though there is no ancient warrant for this name.S Solon defines EVlJOp.,Ly) by contrasting it with the Ol. 13. 6-8: EV orEf yap EvvolJia val€< KauLyv~ora {3aOpov 1Tolllwv auq,aMs I I
EYNOMIA,
'STATUTE'
7£,
L1lKa Kat OfL6'Tpo¢JosElp~va, TclJ.LL' civ8paut 7TAOlhov, / XPVO'€UL 7TUrOES €Vf30VAoV e€fLLTOSo Cf. Ol. 9. 15-16, where Opus is described as the 'portion of Themis and of her saviour daughter, far-famed Eunomia' (tiv eEfL'S OVYUorTJP orE 0< uwor€<pa MlloYXEv I ILEyalloi)o~os EVvofLla). 2 Page, PMG, frg. I018 (b). 6-7. Cf. Ehrenberg, Eun. 72. On the question of authorship, see C. M. Bowra, CQ52 (= N.S. 8) (1958) 231-40, reprinted in GLP 404-15. 3 Aleman, frg. 64. 4 Ehrenberg, Eun. 77-80. s Frg. 3, esp. 30-9. The most noteworthy discussions of this poem are: Wilamowitz, AA 2. 305-8; I. M. Linforth, Solon the Athenian 194-206 ; Jaeger, SE 6g-85; Stier, NB 233-6; H. Schaefer, Staatsform und Politik 146-51; Nestle, op. cit. 130-5;
AND ANOMIA
,1YENOMIA,
65
negative effects produced by its opposite, LlValJop.,Ly), which 'offers most evils to the city', whereas 'EVlJOp.,Ly) renders all things wellordered and harmonious'. 1 This positive statement on EVlJOp.,Ly) is repeated with only slight variants and with the substitution of 'rational' for 'well-ordered' at the very end of the poem ;Z but the main bulk of the definition proceeds by showing the ways in which EVlJOp.,Ly) counteracts LlValJop.,Ly). It often puts fetters on the unjust, it makes smooth what is rough (that is, it eliminates friction), puts an end to greed (K6pos), blinds insolence (v{3pts), and makes wither the blossoms of fatuousness (aTY)) as soon as they sprout; it straightens crooked judgements (otKat), mitigates the works of arrogance, and puts an end to the works of faction and to the wrath of painful strife.3 To interpret this passage we must begin by comparing it with the statements of Homer and Hesiod on EVlJop.,La and OValJop.,La. Solon follows Homer in presenting EVlJOp.,Ly) as opposed to v{3pts.4 But while Homer contrasts v{3pts alone with €UlJOp.,Ly), Solon's antithesis involves not only the entire K6pos-v{3pts-aTy) chainS but also a number of other unpleasant consequences, which, though mentioned by Hesiod, are not brought by him into any relation to EVlJOp.,Ly) or Llvavop.,tY).6 Thus, the EVlJOp.,Ly) which in Homer appeared as a quality shown in the proper conduct of individuals expresses in Solon the condition of which the blinding of v{3pts is but one factor. For at the same time EVlJOp.,Ly) will also establish law-and-order in the administration of justice by straightening Ehrenberg, Eun. 81-6; G. Vlastos, 'Solonian Justice', CP 41 (1946) 65-83; Solmsen, HA 112-17; A. Masaracchia, Salone 246-72; and H. J. Erasmus, op. cit.
56-7 . •I
Frg; 3; ~ 1-2
ap'TLu
7TaVT
2
38-9:
3
33-8:
:
,ws
'"a1To~~t~€~. EOn i) V1T
KaKa 1TIIEiuora 1TolI€< i)vovofLlTJ ''"'
I
avorTJs !1Tavora
",
Kaor
1TapEX€<, "
avOpw1ToVS apna
! EVVOfLlTJ i)' d5KoofLa \
Kat
,
Ka' 1TLvvora.
Kat OafLa orois aOLKo,o' afLq"orLOTJO' 1TEoas' 7pax€a A€LalvEt, 7TUV€L KOPOV, VfJPLV nfl-aupar, avalvn S' Q.T7]S aV8En q,uofLEva,
Ev8vVEL oE 7TpaVVEL,
O{KUS 7TUtlEt
1Tav€< i)' apyaMTJs
O'KoAuls
tJ7TEP~<pava ..,' Epya
8' Epya O"XoO'Tau{7JS, ep,oos
xOllov.
Frg. 3. 34; Od. 17.487. Cf. frgg. 3. 8-9 and 5. 9-IO. For the traditional nature of this sequence and its variations see D. H. Abel, TAPA 74 (1943) 92-101, esp. 94-6· 6 With Solon, frg. 3. 36, EVOVVE' OE olKas oKolI,as, cf. Hes. Op. 219-24,25°,259-64; the epya o,xoooraolTJS and apyaMTJs ep,i)os XOllos of 3·37-8 recall the bad kind of 4 S
Strife in Op. 11-16. 814277
F
EYNOMIA,
crooked judgements; as a social force, it will put an end to the works of arrogance, and as a political force, it will quell the works off action and strife. Its realm is the entire life of the citystate. Solon is indebted to Hesiod's treatment of both Eunomie and Dysnomie, and it is in fact only in Hesiod and Solon that Dysnomie is found in classical literature. 1 But the differences are more telling than the similarities. Hesiod does not juxtapose these two and establishes no genealogical relation between them,2 whereas Solon's contrast is the result ofjuxtaposition. For Hesiod both are divine persons and part of a cosmic order, which embraces not only political but also personal, natural, and theological relationships. Their places and functions are determined in a genealogical way: it is as daughters and sisters that they are related to other cosmic forces which are, in their turn, treated as divine persons. With Solon it is different. Although he treats Eunomie and Dysnomie as persons in the sense that he attributes actions to them,3 they seem to work without any divine impulse and so naturally that they may more justly be regarded as personified abstract forces which Solon saw at work in the world around him.4 They are 'poetic persons' which symbolize, respectively, the orderly and the disorderly state of affairs in the city. Dysnomie is presented by Hesiod (Theog. 226-32) as a daughter of Strife ("Epts) and as sister ofToil, Forgetfulness,Famine, Afflictions, Fights, Battles, Murders, Manslaughters, Quarrels, Lies, Disputes, Fatuousness (.thY)), and Perjurious Oath. Of these only strife and fatuousness appear under the same name, but not as persons, in Solon's list of the forces to be annihilated or mitigated by EVVOflLY). The rest have their counterpart only in such general expressions as 'what is rough' (TpaXEa), 'crooked judgements' (OtKat GKOAwL), 'works of arrogance' (trTrEp~c/>ava Epya), and 'works of faction' (Epya OtXOGTaaLy)S),which are more likely to owe their inclusion to other parts ofHesiod's work than to the Dysnomie passage,Sand I For Solon's debt to Hesiod in general see the excellent discussion by F. Solmsen, HA 107-23, to which the following remarks owe much. 2 Dysnomie is described in Theog. 226-32, Eunomie in Theog. 901-6. 3 Dysnomie 7TapEXE£, Eunomie aJ.t
JYl:NOMIA,
AND
ANOMIA
67
which are chosen to emphasize the civic and social effects of ovavopI'I rather than the personal characteristics which dominate in Hesiod's list. That Solon deliberately contrived these changes to establish EtJVOpI'I and ovavoflLY) as concepts of political and civic morality is shown by his exclusion from his list of any c.ounterp.art to the Seasons C"Qpat) and the Fates (Mofpat), whIch HesIOd names as sisters of Eunomie. Only her civic and political sisters, Justice (LlLKY)) and Peace (Eip~vY)), a:e,. however in~irectly, r;cognized by him. Moreover, the omISSIOnof Famme (AtflOS), a brother of Dysnomie in Hesiod, indicates that Solon is 'less concerned that Zeus should favour (the city) with goods-such as fertility of the fields, food in plenty, rich wool from the sheep, legitimate offspring-than that Eunomie should secure the healthy equilibrium of the social structure'. 1 • There is one striking similarity between the accounts ofHe~IOd and Solon which may well be intentional. Hesiod descnbes Dysnomie as a descendant of Strife and Night, that is, as p~.:t of the old order which is eclipsed by the order of Zeus. EunomIe, on the other hand, the child of Zeus and Themis, is born only aft:r the establishment of the new order and belongs, therefore, to It. Solon retains the same chronological sequence and makes the order of Eunomie follow the order ofDysnomie, but in a startling innovation he projects the displacement of one by the other into the future, or, to be more precise, he thinks of the displacement as having not yet taken place. In order to understand the reasons for this projection into the future we must set the final passage of the poem, to which alone we have devoted our attentIOn so far, into the context of the poem as a whole. Solon opens the poem with an invocation to Zeus and Athe~e, who will not let Athens perish even though the corrupt and foolIsh greed of the citizens, coupled with the unjust ~ind of its.rulers, tends to drive the city to ruin (frg. 3. 1-10). JustIce, persomfied as Dike bides her time as she silently watches the citizens' actions past 'and present, and she notes how thei.r de~ravity res:rlts in faction war and slavery (14-25), a publIc eVIlfrom whIch no individual c~n hide (26--9). The language in which the description of the corrupt city is couched is echoed in the fin~l pas~age of the poem in a way that leaves no doubt tha.t Solon Iden.tlfied with LlvavofltY) the conditions which he found m Athens pnor to I
Solmsen, HA
116.
68
NOMOI:
BECOMES
'STATUTE'
his reforms. Since Solon also tells us that Dike, though now merely an observer, will certainly come in due course to exact the penalty for this state of affairs,2 we can assume that her coming will spell the victory of EVVO/LLYj, Dike's sister in Hesiod, over fJVavO/LLYj. Surely, Solon is speaking of his impending reforms, by means of which he hopes to aid Dike to restore to Athens that EVVO/LLYj which will guarantee for the city permanence and the continued protection of Zeus and Athene. Consequently, Evvo/L{Yj does not describe any specific legislation which Solon intended to enact but the state of affairs which he hoped to create by means of his legislation.3 Modern scholars have remarked on the religious tone which informs this poem and the hymnic quality of the praise of EVVO/LLYj at its end.4 But it is important to realize that Solon himself regards his task as religious only in the sense that he is conscious of the approval with which Zeus and Athene will welcome his work and of the service to Dike which he will perform in accomplishing it. While Hesiod regarded Eunomie as an already existing hall-mark of the new dispensation of Zeus, Solon knows that it is not Zeus but he himself who will make Evvo/L{Yj a reality and that it is in Athens that this realization will take place: mVTa OLoa~aL eV/LOS }4eYjVaLOVS /L€ K€,\EJ€L.5 His EVVO/LLYj is to become the characteristic of a specific situation in a specific place and at a specific time, and it involves the amelioration of the bad conditions prevailing in the present. Solon's EVVO/LLYj is not meant to be I
I Cf. aq,paQ{1JwIV (5) with tnVV'ra (39); aO'Kos voos (7) and 7T>'ovrovolv 0' aOLKolS ~PYlwa< 7THllo/,Evol (I I) with rotS aQ{Kow' a/,q,LTLII1Jol 7T'1JS d>.ym 7TO>'>'a7TallEtv (8) with V{3pLV a/,avpot (34) and apyaM1J<; ~PIOOS xo>'ov (38); KOPOV (9) with 7TavH KOPOV (34); oraon' ~/,q,v>'ov 7TO>'E/,OV II' Evoovr' E7TEydpH (19) with 7TavH_o' ~pya ,0IxoOr,aOL1JS, 7Ta~E~ 0' apya>'~1J<; 'ov (37-8). z 16: rWI OE XPOVWI 7Tavrws ~>'II a7TOTHOO/,EV1J. 3 Andrewes, Eun. 90, interprets the antithesis between OVOVO/'L1J and .liVO/'L1J in this poem too narrowly as a 'contrast between lawlessness and the keeping of the laws'. But more seems to be involved than abiding by a set of statutes. For the same reason, I cannot agree, either, when he continues: 'But it is possible that Solon had also in mind the contrast of his own laws with those of Draco.' Similarly, C. Meier, 'Drei Bemerkungen zur Vor- und Fruhgeschichte des Begriffs Demokratie' 4-18, esp. 6, is too narrow in his emphasis on legal and constitutional aspects of d,volda in Solon and later. In trying to establish a relationship between Solon's notion of diVO/'L1J and his actual legislation, Wilamowitz went as far as it is possible to go when he said, AA 2. 307: 'natiirlich liegt darin der rat, fur gute gesetze zu sorgen.' 4 e.g. Jaeger, SE 77-8 and 84, and Solmsen, HA 117. 5 30: 'My spirit bids me tell these things to the Athenians.' I owe this point to Jaeger, SE 76-7.
EYNOMIA,
.JY£NOMIA,
AND
ANOMIA
69
a transcendent and absolute ideal of universal validity to which he hoped to attune his countrymen. The negative tone of his definition is alone sufficient to reject an idealistic interpretation. EVVO/LLYj is for Solon simply that condition of law-and-order in Athens in which the Ovavo/LLYj of the present will be eliminated or at least be suppressed, so that the unity and harmony of the city will be re-established, which under the guidance of Zeus and Athene safeguard its survival.z There is one final passage in which €vvo/LLa occurs before 464/3 B.C., and it confirms our contention that before that date the -voILa' suffix in dVO/LLa does not carry the narrow meaning of 'statute'. In his attack on the exaggerated honours heaped upon the victors of the Olympic Games, Xenophanes (frg. 2) claims that his wisdom is worthy of greater honours than the brawn of men and horses.3 Athletic prowess, he asserts, is not likely to enhance the EVVO/LLYj of the city.4 Since Xenophanes goes on to state that an Olympic victory does not 'fatten the store-rooms of the city',5 it has been argued that his chief interest lay in EVVO/LLYj as a source of wealth and prosperity.6 But although it is true that dvo/L{a is often associated with wealth in Greek literature,7 for Xenophanes it is a concomitant of dVO/LLYj rather than an essential attribute. He rather shares, as Bowra suggests, 'the notion of I
I This is asserted by Jaeger, SE 82, followed by Stier, NB 236, and by Schaefer, op. cit. 147, who even goes sO far as to include among the aims of Solon's .l,vo/,La 'bewuBte Verneinung der irdischen Guter, iiberhaupt Beseitigung allen Dbels als der Wurzel der avo/,La'. Apart from the fact that avo/,La or related forms do not occur in any of the surviving fragments of Solon, an asceticism such as that described by Schaefer seems alien to the spirit and substance of Solon's reforms. A modified idealism, similar to that predicated by Jaeger, is attributed to Solon's EUVO/'L1J by Ehrenberg, Eun. 84-5, although Ehrenberg recognizes that its establishment was for Solon 'a goal of his personal policy, the sort of thing he had promised to Athens beforehand for the time when he might be given full power'. Z Cf. Masaracchia, op. cit. 267-8. 3 The dates of Xenophanes' life are now generally agreed to be c. 570 to c. 470 B.C., see Kirk and Raven 163-4, Guthrie, HGP I. 362-4, and the discussion by L. Woodbury in Phoenix 15 (1961) 134-55. The chronological sequence of his poems is hard, ifnot impossible, to determine. In the absence of more cogent evidence, the date of 'before 520 B.c.',offered for frg. 2 by C.M. Bowra, Problems in Greek Poetry 16, on the basis ofXenophanes' omission of the race in armour, introduced in 520 B.C., from his otherwise complete list of Olympic contests, seems perfectly reasonable. 4 Frg. 2. 19: TOVVEKEV av o~ p.ii>..>..ov €V €VvofLlTJL 7ToAtS' £1.1]. 5 22: ou yap tnaLVEl Tavra /,vXOVS 7TO>'IO<;. 6 Ehrenberg, Eun. 86-7· 7 e.g. Horn. Hymns 30. 11-12; Pind. 01. 13.6-8; Timotheus, Persae (Page, PMG, frg. 791) 237-40; and an inscription from Epidaurus of the fourth or third century
B.C. in Page, PMG, frg. 937. 11-15·
EYNOMIA,
Hesiod that just government makes a land rich and is rewarded by the prosperity of the people', and if he criticizes the rewards given to athletes on the ground that they do not enrich the city, it is because 'they have not the true sign of a just government in making the country prosperous, and are in fact a8~Ka'. If this is correct, Xenophanes' view of EvvofLtYJ is not far removed from Solon's; that is, for him, too, dvofLtYJ is the condition of a city in which law-and-order prevails. We have now demonstrated that before the end of the sixth century dvofl.ia was used in two senses. As a quality it describes the behaviour of a normal and decent human being, and as a condition it characterizes a state which is well governed and in which justice, peace, and order prevail. As we shall show later, avofLta is the opposite of dvofLta as a quality; that 8vavofLta is its opposite as a condition has been shown in the preceding discussion. What is important for our central purpose, however, is that, although both EvvofLta and 8vavofLta may be regarded as describing a political condition, they are not associated with the enactment of statutes before the end of the sixth century; in other words, they do not reflect what we called the 'political and judicial' sense of vOfL0C;= 'statute', but other wider senses of the term. What was the situation in the fifth century? Apart from its frequent occurrence in the Anonymus Iamblichi, which will be discussed in connection with avofLta later on, there are only two other instances in which dvofLta is predicated of persons, in which it is used, that is, as it was in the 04Jssf!Y, to describe a quality of personal conduct. The earlier of these is Pindar's description of Tantalus' feast as a dvofLwTaToc; Epavoc; (Ot. I. 37-8), where the adjective underscores Pindar's view of Tantalus' character, stated in deliberate opposition to the traditional tale which had Tantalus carve up his son to set before his guests.2 The second example comes from Sophocles' Ajax (713), where the chorus rejoices at the dvofLta displayed by its master in the sacrificeswhich he offers to the gods. Although the vOfL0C;involved I
Bowra, op. cit. 30, citing Hes. Op. 236-7. Cf. Andrewes, Eun. 89. There may be a reference in deliberate opposition to this passage in an epigram from the first century A.D., ascribed to Nicodemus of Heracleia in Anthologia Graeca 6.316, where the feast of Thyestes is called J..,£.pava O.£7TVWV ovavo/-,a. Note that ovavo!'-a is here used in the sense in which uvo/-,a would have been used in the classical period. I
2
.1Yl:NOMIA,
AND ANOMIA
7'
here may be interpreted in a religious sense,' the context suggests rather that the chorus believes the behaviour of Ajax to have changed in a more general way. All the other passages in which EiJVofLta, EiJvofLoc;, and EiJVofLELa(}a~ occur in the fifth century contain modifications of the themes first struck by Hesiod and Solon. As in Hesiod, dvofLta is regarded as a condition associated with 8twT), (}EfL~C;,and Elp~vT), and Solon's influence is felt in that dvofLta remains closely linked to the state. But there is also something new: both noun and adjective frequently characterize a city which possesses law-an~order. In other words, the condition becomes a characteristIc quality. A first hint of this development can be seen in the late sixth century in Xenophanes' expression EV EvvofLtV Elva~ (frg. 2. 19), which, while describing the condition of the state, takes at the same time a first step toward making this condition a characteristic quality. This tendency is further developed by Pindar who while following Hesiod in making Dike and Eirene sisters of Eunomia, daughters of Themis, and antagonists of Hybris and Koros, deprives them of the universality which Hesiod had attributed to them and names Corinth as their home (ot. 13· 6-10),2 and who elsewhere describes Opus as 'the portion of Themis and her saviour daughter, far-famed Eunomia' (Ot. 9· 15-16). No longer is EvvofLta the healthy condition as such. of law-and-order in city-states, which itself transcends and eXIsts independently of particular states. It has now become also an attribute of particular states such as Corinth and Opus. Whi~e the language of Pindar in these two poems suggests that he IS sincere in regarding Eunomia as a divine person, as Hesiod had done, he is also capable of suppressing the personal element completely when he speaks of Aegina as a EvvofL0C; 7TOA~C; (lsth. 5. 22), when he invokes a EvvofL0C; fLoLpa for the sons of Aetna (Nem. 9. 29-30),3 or when he calls down the blessing of EvvofLta I Cf. above, pp. 40-3. For religious overtones in £uvo!'-£asee also the anonymous poem from Epidaurus, probably from the third or second century B.C., in Page, PMG, frg. 937. 13, and for similar c?nnotations of avo!,-£~ see below,.p. 91.. , 2 On this passage see the suggestive but very sp~culatlve companson of Pllldar s £uvo!'-£awith that of Solon by E. Will, Korinthiaka 620-4· 3 The wish, included in this prayer, that Zeus may keep war far away from them, may be an echo of Hesiod's association of Eunomia ;Vi;h ~ireni'. Unlike I-~esiod, however, Pindar does not personify here. The word €Lp7JV7J IS not even mentl?ned, and if the !,-oLpa prayed for depends on Theog. 904, it must be noted that Pllldar gives her a civic rather than a cosmic context.
EYNOMIA,
upon Thebes. I A similar use of the adjective EiJvofLos is found in Pindar's older contemporary Aeschylus, who is the earliest extant author to characterize with it the law-and-order existing among a non-Greek people, the Scythians.2 Bacchylides takes a further step away from personification. He too seems to depend on Hesiod's genealogy when he calls Dika the 'attendant' (aKoAov()OS) of Eunomia and Themis,3 but the relation is no longer genealogical in that the three are not members of the same family. At the same time, it becomes even more evident than it did in the case of Solon that they are only 'poetic persons', mere symbols of concepts. For while in Solon we had to infer the abstract nature of Eunomie and Dysnomie from the fact that they are given no genealogy and work without any divine impulse, it becomes difficult to regard Dika as a divine person when Bacchylides states that the sons of the prosperous choose her as a 'fellow resident' (UVVOtKOS') and when she is described as 'accessible to all men' (EV fLEUlp KELTat KtXELV 7Tllmv av()pw7TOtS). Her personification has become a literary conceit which does little more than symbolize an abstract quality; and what is true in this poem ofDika will be equally true ofEunomia and Themis. The same trend reappears with a novel twist in Bacchylides' poem in honour of Pytheas of Aegina. EvvofLla is again treated as a 'poetic person'; but her opposition to iJ{jpts, which we encountered in Homer, Hesiod, and Solon, is now expressed positively in that she is described as a 'force of restraint' (uaoeppwv) which 'guards the cities of reverent men in peace'. 4 In other words, the poet is less interested in the condition of EVvofLfa in itself than in the restraining effect it has. Thus he treats it as a characteristic quality rather than as a condition. The connection between EVvofLla and uweppouvvYJ, once established, is taken up also by I Pind. Paeans I. 10. There is no reason to assume for this passage either a personification of £vvop,{a or a dependence on Hesiod, despite the fact that earlier in the poem the' Qpal fihp{yovol are treated as persons. 2 Frg. Ig8, from the Prometheus Unbound. It seems more natural to interpret the adjective here as referring to the orderly and good social organization of the Scythians than to take it with Andrewes, Eun. 8g, as referring to their personal conduct. 3 Bacchylides 15. 53-6. 4 Ibid. 13. 186-g : ticI'mJ. .r' £va£{Uwv dvopwv EV £lp~vq. q,v>.aaa[£]I. The importance of the association of £vvop.{a and awq,poavvT), first attested here, is indicated by the fact that G. Grossmann, Politische Schlagworter aus der Zeit des Peloponnesischen Krieges, devotes an entire chapter (pp. 10-8g) to 'Eunomia im Sinne der Sophrosyne'. But his conclusions go beyond what the available texts justify. Cf. Helen North, Sophrosyne 23-4.
JYI:NOMIA,
AND ANOMIA
73
Pindar and Aristophanes. When Pindar prays in the First Paean (10) that Apollo may crown Thebes with the 'flowersof restraining law-and-order' (uweppovos av()wtv ElJVop.,{as), he is, to be sure, concerned with the condition of Thebes ; but his hope is that this condition should become a characteristic quality of his city.2And in the only passage in which EVvofLla appears in Aristophanes (Av. 1539-40) it is bracketed together with EV{jovAla and uweppouvvYJ as a quality of Zeus dispensed by Basileia. In all other fifth-century passages EIJVofLia and its cognates are used in the way Solon used it to describe the condition of a society without making the condition a characteristic. While Aeschylus (frg. 198) was the earliest author to apply the adjective to a non-Greek people, Herodotus is the first to apply the noun to foreign states in his description of the conditions prevailing in Egypt until the reign of Rhampsinitus (2. 124. I). For if the KaKoTYJS of Rhampsinitus' successor Cheops, with which EVvofLla is contrasted here, consisted in closing all temples and in making the Egyptians build his pyramid by their hard labour, ElJVofLla must be the condition of a state in which the relations with the gods and within society are well regulated, not necessarily only by the enactment of statutes but by the harmonious consensus of ruler and ruled.3 In another Herodotean passage the verb ElJVofLEofLat is used with reference again to a non-Greek state, Media. Kingship was established in Media, according to Herodotus, when, at an assembly convoked to cope with the spread of avofLIYJ throughout the land, the friends ofDeioces proposed: Ou yap o~ TP07Tl{J T<{J 7TapEOVTt XPEwfLEVOt ovvaTol EffLEV I
,
I
,
I
,/..,
I
t
I
,,...
OtKEEtV TYJV XWPYJV, 'f'EpE UTYJUWfLEV YJfLEWV aVTWV
Q
\
fJaatllEa'
I
,tl
Kat
OVTW
See further, Endnote, pp. 176-7 below. See Sandys's translation (Loeb edn., p. 519): 'with the flowers of sober love of law'. 3 That no constitutional question is involved is rightly stressed by both Andrewes, Eun. go with n. 3, and H.J. Erasmus, 'Eunomia', Acta Classica 3 (lg60) 58-g. But Andrewes's argument that £vvop.{T)here refers to personal conduct because its loss was due to the unexpected behaviour of Cheops does not hold water. For if the KaK6TT)S of Cheops' conduct undermined £vvop.iT), that does not mean that
2
EYNOMIA,
' ~\ U7T ~~ YJ TE XWPYJ Euvop.YJUETat Kat aUTOt 7TpOS Epya TpE'f'OP.E 8a OUOE avop.iYJS avaUTaTOt €uop.E8a. I What is of special interest in this passage is that, although avop.iYJ, which occurs in it three times, "
,
"
"
\
,,,
./,
I
refers, as we shall see below (pp. 89-90), to personal conduct, the ElIVop.ia with which the verb contrasts it describes a condition. This is indicated to some small extent by the fact that the idea is expressed by a middle deponent verb,2 and, as the analogy with such middle forms as 0YJp.oKpaTEop.m, oiKEop.at, 7ToAtTEVop.m, etc., indicates, the middle voice in verbs describing social or political activities tends to express a general condition rather than a particular attribute of society.3That ElIVOP.~UETat describes a condition is shown in the present passage by the observation that the country (xwPYJ) rather than the people inhabiting it is the subject of the verb: it is not the quality of the land in which the friends of Deioces claim to be interested but the condition to be created within it, and, as the context shows, ElJVop.ia is here a state of affairs from which the characteristics of the present state of affairs-pillage and lawless conduct-are to be absent and in which each person will be able to pursue his own work free from the threat of disruption by the lawless behaviour of others.4 One final observation on this passage remains to be made. The establishment of Evvop.iYJ here involves a constitutional change, that is, it is to be achieved by instituting a kingship. Does this mean that the -voP.OS suffix signifies the establishment of good statutes either in the sense that the new constitution as such will be good or in that the king will enact 'good laws'? The answer to both alternatives must be negative. As far as the first one is 97. 2-3: 'Since we are not able to live in our country with our present way of life, come, let us appoint a king over ourselves. In this way, the country will enjoy law-and-order and we shall turn to the pursuit of our own business and not be unsettled by lawless conduct.' 2 EvvoJ1,E0fl-a, is only attested as a middle deponent, except, according to LSJ, once in PI. Laws II. 927 b 6,
I.
.dYENOMIA,
AND
ANOMIA
75
concerned, the constitutional change here is merely an accidental and not an essential clement in dvop.iYJ. The chief purpose articulated by Deioces' fi-iendsis not the establishment of a king but the creation of conditions in which people can pursue their own work unmolested by the acts of criminals; their avowed end is not a constitutional change. As for the second point, we can only reiterate what we said in connection with Solon's Elwop.iYJ : while the enactment of good laws is no doubt part of the process of bringing about the condition oflaw-and-order, 'good statutes' do not exhaust the content of dvop.iYJ, and, in addition, they could not by themselves stamp out avofJ.iYJ and ensure the free pursuit of business to the citizens. This brings us to a complex of Evvop.ia passages which requires separate treatment. In antiquity as well as in modern times dvop.ia and its cognates have been related to the constitutional changes in Sparta, which are attributed to Lycurgus, that is, to the enactment ofvop.ot in the political senseof 'statutes' or 'regulations'.I Although Andrewes has shown as long ago as 1938 that Evvop.ia does not directly refer to the Spartan or any other constitution,2 we shall have to examine the relevant passages once again to determine in what sense or senses ElJVop.ia is predicated of Sparta in Greek literature and in what relation, if any, these senses stand to the narrow political meaning of vop.OS.3 The first passage to be considered occurs in the context of Herodotus' narrative of the situation at Sparta at the time of I Plut. Lycurgus 5. 4 paraphrases the oracle given to Lycurgus: .fediaeualia 2 (1939) 247-93 and 3 (1940) 47-118, 'Zur Geschichte der spartanischen Eunomia', and defined the Spartan eunornia, ibid. 3 (1940) 70, as 'eine Gesetzgebung, die das Leben der Burgerschaft regeite und sie zu einem unuberwindlichen Herrn machte'. Cf. the discussion of the crucial passage of Herodotus by W. den Boer, Laconian Studies 26-7, esp. 26 n. 2 : ' •.. this justifies our employing the exp"'ession [sc.
76
NOMOi:
BECOMES
EYNOMIA,
'STATUTE'
Croesus (I. 65--8). Herodotus begins by relating the news which reached Croesus of Sparta's final victory over Tegea (65. I), won, as we learn two chapters later, in the reign of Anaxandrides and Ariston.1 He then proceeds in his rambling way, which has been the despair of those who want to exploit the passage for the establishment of a chronology of early Spartan history, to narrate the developments leading up to the eventual victory over Tegea, and he begins by stating that, although the Spartans in the reign of Leon and Hegesicles succeeded in all their other military enterprises, their campaign against Tegea failed (65. r). The next step is to account for this mixture of general success and partial failure. Herodotus attributes the success to the reforms of Lycurgus, to which he devotes a short digression (65. 2-66. I). As a result of these reforms, Sparta flourished. But prosperity also contained the seeds of failure. When the Spartans realized that they were stronger than the neighbouring Arcadians, they grew restive and wanted to attack them, but first sought the advice of Delphi (66. 1-2). Relying on the oracle they received but which, according to Herodotus, was false (xPTjafL0 KLfJO~Acp 7T{avvoL), they concentrated their attack on Tegea and suffered a severe reverse (66. 3-4). Here the digression ends, and Herodotus resumes the narrative of the Spartan victory over Tegea, won in the time of Croesus (67. 1-68.6). Of interest to us is the account of the Lycurgan reforms and the success which they produced (65. 2-66. I), because they are presented as the establishment of EVvofL{a among a people who, at some unspecified date prior to their failure at Tegea (ETL 7TPOTEPOV TOJTWV), had been KaKOVOfLdJTaTOL aXEoov 7TtJ,VTWV 'EAA~vwV.2 The phrase with which Herodotus introduces his account: fLET<EfJaAov OEWOE es ElJVOfL{TjV (65. 2), and the phrase with which he sums it up : OVTW fLEV fLETafJaAovTES EVVOfL~8Tjaav suggest that he uses both the noun and the verb in the sense in which he uses them elsewhere, namely to describe a condition.3 The adjectival I
On this passage I am in general agreement with N. G. L. Hammond,
(1950) 53-4·
AND ANOMIA
77
KaKovofLwTaToL, found only in this passage in Herodotus, suggests, on the other hand, that a quality is described which lost its force with the establishment of new conditions. This is confirmed by the explanation added to the adjective: the Spartans were KaKoL'op.WTaTOL in their relations among themselves (KaTu TEaePEas mJToJs) and, as a result, they isolated themselves from the rest of the world (Kat gE{VOLaL IlTTpoafLELKToL). This seems to mean that one of the consequences of their original KaKovofL{a was the absence of any foreign relations, including, therefore, paradoxically enough, the absence of foreign wars.1 What is involved in their internal KaKovofL{a is more difficult to determine. We can be confident only that Herodotus did not attribute the KaKovofL{a of the Spartans to a complete lack of VOfLOL in the way in which Homer's Cyclopes completely lacked 8EfLLS (Od. g. 106, I r2-I5). For we are told specifically that LyCurg{lS 'changed' (fLETEaTTjaE) all Spartan vOfLLfLa; Herodotus does not say that he 'instituted' (KaTEaTTjaE) them. This presupposes the existence of vOfLLfLa in Sparta before Lycurgus; only the vOfLLfLa were 'bad' (KaKu) and a reform was, therefore, needed. Further insights into the nature ofpre-Lycurgan KaKovofL{a can be gained by examining Herodotus' account of Lycurgus' reforms by which ElJVOfL{Tj was brought about. Although Herodotus does not decide in favour of one or the other of the two traditional sources for Lycurgus' measures, one unnamed source attributing them to Delphi and the Spartans attributing them to Crete, he leaves no doubt of his conviction that the entire social and political order (KOafLos) prevailing in the Sparta of his own time is due to the Lycurgan reforms.2 That this is Herodotus' belief is also confirmed by his description of the reforms themselves. Lycurgus changed all Spartan vOfLLfLa-and this must include laws, customs, usages, practices, and beliefswhich had previously been regarded as valid and binding by the people as a whole; and not only did he change the old, his reforms also included sanctions against transgressions of the new.3
JHS 70
The
JYl:NOMIA,
We have here, incidentally, an additional reason for referring En rrpoTfpov to the time before Lycurgus; for Herodotus knew about the Messenian Wars and treats them as a foreign entanglement, see 3. 47. 1 and 5. 49. 8. 2 I. 65. 4: TOV VVV KaTWTfWTa KOU/"OV l:rrapT'~TTlU', although verbally associated only with the non-Spartan tradition, is certainly also included in the Spartan version by the TaVTa at the end of the sentence. 3 I. 65. 5: Kat <,pv>'agE TaVTa /"~ rrapaf3a{VELv. I
TOVTWV
EYNOMIA,
The specific military and constitutional innovations which, according to Herodotus, Lycurgus 'instituted' rather than 'changed' (EaTY)(JE) after his earlier measures (fkETU DE) are next enumerated, including the 'sworn brotherhoods', the 'bands of thirty', the 'common meals', the ephorate, and the gerousia. In other words, both the changes and the new institutions are, in the eyes of Herodotus, part of the reforms of Lycurgus, and, as he proceeds to state specifically in the next sentence, the reforms as a whole created ElJVofkla in Sparta.2 We may conclude, then, that El)vofkly) in this passage denotes the condition in which Sparta found herself as a result of the Lycurgan reforms. It does not refer specifically to the legislation by which the reforms were enacted, although that may well be included; for Herodotus says nothing of the manner in which Lycurgus proceeded in enacting his reforms. Accordingly, there is no relation between ElH'ofklY) here and VOfk0C; = 'statute'. True enough, the reforms themselves did involve military and constitutional innovations, but they were not confined to them:3 EVVOfkly) also includes the condition of the Spartan social and political order as a whole (Koafk0C;), brought about by a change of all vOfkLfka and the perpetuation of the new order. It is, therefore, not a name for the Spartan constitution but a description of the whole Spartan way oflife created by it.4 These conclusions enable us to draw some inferences about the meaning of KaKovo,uwTaToL. Obviously, it characterizes the Spartans before they had EVvofkly), that is, before the reforms of Lycurgus. Even at that time they possessed, as we saw, vOfkLfka. But these were 'bad' in that they were not conducive to social stability, to effective military organization, to good government, and, probably because of that, to foreign relations. Moreover, since Lycurgus' order stood for Herodotus at the beginning of the history of civilized Sparta,S the fact that the pre-Lycurgan Spartans are described as KaKOVofkwTaTOL indicates that they exhibited the qualities of a society in which a civilized order has not yet I
I T€
1.65.
5:
J.Lerd
TOVTOLUL Taus
O€
Tn
;r/>opovs
ES 7TOAEIWV ExoVTa, EVwp,oTLas Kat
y€pov-ras
€U'T7]UE
Kat
TpL7JKu3as Kat uvaatTw,
rrpos
AVKofJpyos.
66. I : oiJ-rw /-,'V /-,E-ra~aA6v-rE, EVVo/-,~IJ'YJoav. This point is neglected by den Boer, loc. cit. 4 I agree with the conclusion of Kiechle, op. cit. 191, 'daB I 66 mit Evvo,,~IJ'YJoav die Herstellung besserer sozialer Verhaltnisse zum Ausdruck gebracht ist'. But on p. 204 he reads more about the economic situation in Sparta into this passage than the text warrants. 5 See \\!. \\!. How and J. VlTells,A Commentary on Herodotus 12• 88. 2
3
JYl:NOMIA,
AND ANOMIA
79
been established and which, for that reason, does not yet know law-and-order. In the only other fifth-century passage in which El)vo/.da, in the verb form, is associated with Sparta it is more closelyrelated to the Spartan constitution than it was in Herodotus. But even here it is the stability and permanence of the Spartan order that is emphasized, and there is no indication that EVvofkla was regarded as a name for the Spartan constitution as such. The passage takes the form of a long parenthesis, inserted in Thucydides' sketchy account of the tyrannies in the Greek world, and its purpose is to explain-it is introduced by yap-why the Lacedaemonians played so prominent a part in eliminating them: I
~ yap €7rt
AaKESa{f-Lwv
7TAELUTOV (fjv
T)vvOf-L~8T) Kat
aid
oA{yCiJ
~C; T~V
Tfj
7TAdw
aVTfj
f-LETa T~V KT{ULV TWV VVV ~VOLKOVVTWV aVT~V LlWpLWV
LUf-LEV Xp6vov aTvpavvEVToc; T
7ToALTE{q. xpWVTaL,
Kat
uTamauaua 7)v' ETT) yap
TOVSE
of-LWC; ~K
7TallaLTaTov
~UTL f-LaAwTa
TOV 7ToMf-Lov
d>' oD
SL' aVTO oVVaf-LEVOL Kat
TETpaK6uLa
Kat Kat
AaKESaLf-L6vLOL
TO. .EV TaLC; allAaL<;
7T6AEUL Ka8{uTauav.2
Thucydides is more specific than Herodotus in characterizing the period preceding the establishment of ElJVofkla as one of civil strife.3 But the characteristic of the condition described here as it is in Herodotus by the aorist of the deponent verb EiJVOfkELaeaL is not merely its exclusion of aTaaLC;;4 its positive side, as Thucydides goes on to explain-again we find yap-involves the I The adjective, again in the superlative form, occurs only once more in extant Greek literature, Philo, De sacrijiciis Abelis et Caini 5, II p. 268 M. The noun KaKovo/-,{a is found only once, in [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.8 (discussed below, pp. 82-5). 2 1. 18. I: 'For although civil strife prevailed for a longer time in Lacedaemon after its foundation by the Dorians who now inhabit it than among any other people known, none the less, from the earliest time on, it both enjoyed an orderly kind of government and has always been free from tyrants. For it is about four hundred years and a little more from the time that the Lacedaemonians have been living under the same constitution to the end of this war; for this reason they grew powerful and also settled affairs in other states.' 3 Kiechle's interpretation of this passage, op. cit. 197-8, is untenable: 'Was Thukydides darlegen will, ist offensichtlich : Sparta wurde zwar auBerst lange von Unruhen erschilttert, doch hatten diese keine Schwachung des Staates zur Folge, denn die seit alters bestehende Ordnung erfuhr dadurch keinen Bruch; auch filhrten diese Unruhen in Sparta zu keiner Tyrannis.' If Thucydides had meant to say that the period of Evvo/-,{a lasted into the period of o-ro.o", he would more probably have used the present participle o-rao,o.{ovoa. That Evvo/-,{a put an end to o-ro.o" is correctly assumed by Andrewes, Eun. 94; Gomme, HCY I. I go; and Hammond, loc. cit. 4 Erasmus, loco cit., sees only this aspect of EVvo/-,{a.
80
NoMoE
BECOMES
EYNoMIA,
'STATUTE'
durability of the Spartan constitution over a period of more than four hundred years. And just as in Herodotus' account the €VVO!J-LYJ created by Lycurgus' reforms led to a spurt of prosperity, so Thucydides, without, however, mentioning Lycurgus' name, attributes to it the Spartans' power, never sapped by the experience of tyranny, to put down tyrannies in other Greek states.2 The aspect of durability, which Herodotus had described as the seal placed by Lycurgus himself on his reform of all Spartan VO!J-L!J-U, is confined by Thucydides to the constitution. He does not, like Herodotus, give details of the constitution and the institutions it affected, except to say that it was never disrupted by tyranny. Accordingly, YJvv0!J-~BYJuuv describes for him the condition of stability and durability achieved by the Spartan constitution. There is neither an indication that he would not use the same verb of any other constitution which had stood the test of time equally well, nor that a constitution deserving to be described by the verb t:Vvo!J-€LuBuL would have to have the same institutions as Sparta. Accordingly, the EVVO!J-LU described by the verb in this passage is not the name of a specific constitution but the condition created by a constitution, and it comes no closer than any of the other uses of €VVO!J-LU so far encountered to expressing the narrow political sense of vO!J-os = 'statute'. We may then summarize the results of our inquiry into Herodotus' and Thucydides' use of €VVO!J-LU in relation to Sparta by saying that they use the noun and the verb to describe the lasting social and political conditions brought about by the reforms of Lycurgus, but that the same terms could also be applied, as Herodotus' discussion of Cheops and Deioces shows, to conditions prevalent elsewhere. This sufficesto prove that the Greeks of the fifth century would associate €VVO!J-LU no more closely with Sparta or with the Spartan constitution after Lycurgus than with any other state. I
66. I : avcl T€ €OpafLOV av,dKU Kai Ev(J€v7}81]uav. 2 I agree with Hammond, op. cit. 54 n. 59, against Andrewes, Eun. 94, that 'the explanatory sentence ... states not that Sparta's power was due to the lack of tyranny but that it was due to the continuity of her constitution over four hundred years'. Cf. Gomme, HCT I. 130-1, and den Boer, op. cit. 83 n. I. Thucydides' KaL aiEL aTvpawWToS' O)Vserves a double function. In the first place, it helps explain that the development of Sparta's power was never inhibited by those who 7'0 €¢' EUVTWV p.ovov 1TpOOpWjJ.€VOL €S T€ TO Gwp.a Kat, ES oT() 'TOV rs,ov O[KOV avg€LV Ot' auq,aAdaS' OUOV €OVVaVTO f'aAWTa niS' 7TaAEtS'
AND ANOMIA
81
An indirect piece of testimony concerning early Sparta points in the same direction. In his discussion of the causes of revolution in aristocracies, Aristotle refers to a poem of Tyrtaeus entitled EVVO!J-LU to support his contention that a widening gulf between rich and poor is one such cause (Pol. 5. 7, Ig06bg6-Ig07"2). \Ve do not learn much about the content of the poem beyond the fact that it was written 'at the time of the Messenian War'l against the background of people oppressed by war demanding a redistribution of land.2 The same poem is mentioned under the same name by Strabo, who assignsit more specifically to the Second Messenian War, states Tyrtaeus' claim to have been a general in it,3 and quotes two couplets of the poem to prove that Tyrtaeus was a Lacedaemonian.4 Modern scholars have attributed several other fragments of Tyrtaeus to this poem,s but since the name EVVO!J-LU, which is our chief interest here, only occurs in Aristotle and Strabo, we can use as evidence only what they tell us. Although both are late authors in relation to Tyrtaeus, there is no reason to doubt their word (a) that Tyrtaeus wrote an elegiac poem entitled, either by Tyrtaeus himself or by a tradition which is likely to go back to a time well before Aristotle, EVVO!J-LU; and (b) that he wrote it in the Second Messenian War, in which he himself played a responsible part. At the first glance, Aristotle's description of the background of the poem might be taken to suggest that its title is to be derived from VE!J-W = 'distribute' and refers to a 'good distribution' of the land.6 I I 306b38: 1mo TOV MW1]vtaKOV 7TaAEf'Ov. For the meaning of v7Ta see Andrewes, Eun. 96 n. I. 2 Igo7aI-2: 8AL{36/LEVOL yap TLVES Ou:t 'TOV 1TOA€jJ.QV ~g{ovv avaOaUTOV 7TOL€LV 7'~V
xwpav. 3 8. 4. 10, C 362 : ~v{Ka q,1]ULVaUTOS' UTpaT1]yfjuat TOV 7TaAEf'OV TOlS' AaKEOatf'OV{OtS'· Kat yap Eivai epTJaLv EK€r8EV EV T71 EA€YELq. ..,jv €1TLypatPoUGLV EuvofLLav ... E1TL }-LEV oov
TOU Tvpra{ov " oEvnpoS' 1mfjpgE 7TaAEf'OS'. 4 Ibid. = frg. 2: aUToS' yap Kpov{wv, KaAAwnq,avov oatS'
[
JYENoMIA,
7'~VO€
OE3wKE
7TOALV'
I
o[aLV
nfl-a 1TPOAL1TOV'TfS
'EpLVEOV
7TaatS'·Hp1]S', ~V€J.L(;€VTa
/
I ZEUS' 'HpaKAE{. €Vp€laV
[]tA07TO~
('For the son ofCronus himself, husband of beautifully-wreathed Hera, Zcus has given this city to the sons of Herac1es. Together with them we forsook windy Erineos and arrived in the broad island of Pelops.') 5 Diehl' conservatively adds only the fragments in Diodorus 7. 12 and in Pluto Lycurgu5 6.10 to the Strabo fragment as frgg. 3 a and 3 b. His predecessor, Bergk4, had added three further fragments to it. G. Huxley, Early Sparta 54, apparently also assigns Diehl" frg. 6, to the Eunomia. For a full discussion see Andrewes, Eun. 95-100. 6 The most influential recent exponent of this derivation of EUVOf'{a, J. L. Myres, CR 61 (1947) 80-2, does not use this passage in his argument. vijUOV aq"K6p.€lJa.
814~77
G
But since Tyrtaeus' known attitude toward a redistribution of the land 1 makes nonsense of this assumption, and since, moreover, neither the noun nor the adjective nor the verb bears this sense in any of the passages we have discussed, we must look for a different explanation. The only help we get comes from the Strabo fragment. If there is any point at all in the statement that Zeus himself is responsible for having established the Heracleidae as kings of Sparta and that the rest of the Spartans have followed them ever since the Dorians came to the Peloponnese, it must surely be an appeal to the 'malcontents to abandon their agitation and return to their obedience'.2 In other words, the title signifies that Tyrtaeus' poem called for discipline and order and has, therefore, no immediate or exclusive bearing on the institutions of Sparta or on her constitution.3 It is not until the second half of the fifth century B.C. that the effect of the new meaning of vOfL0<; as 'statute' is unambiguously reflected in d))J0fL{a in the Constitution if Athens which has come down to us under the name ofXenophon. Neither the exact date nor the authorship of the treatise is known, and although a date between the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the Thracian expedition of Brasidas in the summer of 424 B.C. seems to me the most plausible, the questions of date and authorship will not help us settle the meaning of E1JvofL{a in the tract.4 The relevant passage is introduced after a discussion of freedom of speech, especially in the Council, which the democracy grants to every citizen, rascally though he may be. This practice, the author continues, may not be conducive to the best kind of state (7TO'\t<;), but it isconducive to the preservation ofthe democracy. He then explains: 6
yap
bijfLO<; (3oVIo.ETat OUK eVvofLoufLEV7J<; Tij<; 7TOIo.EW<;aUTo<; bOUIo.EVEtv,
dlo.lo.' EIo.EV8EpO<; Elvut
Kat
apxEtv,
Tij<;
bE
KUKOVOfL£U<; UUT/i)
olo.£yov fLEIo.Et·0
Schol. PI. Laws I. 629 a, with Huxley, op. cit. 55, and Kiechle, op. cit. 184-5 with 185 n. 5. 2 Andrewes, Eun. 96. 3 Two late associations of Evvoj1-{a with Sparta deserve a brief mention. Diodorus 7.12.1 adds two lines to the oracle cited by Hdt. I. 65. 3, in which the god promises to give Lycurgus the EVVOj1-{a he had asked for. Since the 'couplet is wholly unsuitable to the original oracle' (Andrewes, Eun. 90 n. 6) and seems to assume the very late meaning of a 'set of good laws' for EVVOj1-{a, it has rightly been rejected as spurious. However, Plut. Lycurgus 5. 4 seems to have known the spurious lines and on their basis initiated the practice of applying the name Evvoj1-{a to the Spartan constitution as a whole; see Andrewes, Eun. 9 I. 4 See G. W. Bowersock, 'Pseudo-Xenophon', HSCP 71 (1967) 33-55, esp. 33-8, for a critical discussion of the dates proposed. Bowersock's own date, 443 B.C., seems to me to be too early. I
,
yap
uu I
'y
,
,
'"
8
VOfLL.,Et<; OUK EUVOfLEtU aL, "
EIo.EU8EpO<; Eunv.
"
,~"
Et
0
I
EUVOfLLaV
8'
.,
' \
"
,..., 7TpWTU
\
I
aUTOr<; TOU<; VOfLOU<; n EVTa<;' E7TEtTa KOl\aUoUUtv \
I
t
\
\....
,
,
/
aUTO<; a7TO TOUTOU tUXUEt
r.... "7JTEt<;,
1\
'''./. fLEV o'f'Et ~
t
0
a'
~,...
o7JfLo<; K L
,~c TOU<; OEsLwTaTo I
\
\
Vl""
,
,
OL XP7JUTOt TOU<; 7TOV7JPOU<; ""
I
Kat f30UIo.EUUOUUtV ot XP17UTOt 7TEpt T17<;7TOI\EW<; Kat OUK EUUOUUL fLUtVOfLEVOU<; I (:) \ I ,~, \ I ,~\, \ 'y , \ I , dv8pW7TOU<; fJOUI\EUEtV OUOE I\EyEtV OUOE EKKI\17UtU.,Etv. a7TO rOUTWV TOLVUV 1 TWV dya8wv TilXLur' av 6 bijfLO<; El<; boulo.e£uv KaTa7TEUOL
In order to ascertain as precisely as possible what the author of this treatise2 means by E1JvofL{a and its verb forms and by KaKOvOfL{a, we have to start with the last part of the passage, since it is here that EuvofL{a is most closely defined. That E1JVofL{a denotes a condition, in this case the condition of a city in which the 7TOVYJpO{, the common people, are kept in subjection, is .obviou~. Three elements are identified as constituent parts of thIS condItion. In the first place, legislative power is to be vested in the 'most capable' men only. Secondly, the 'good' are to exercise judicial power over the 'bad', 3 and third, the 'good' alone are to be members of the Council and in their administration will prevent 'madmen' from serving as Councillors, making public speeches, and even from attending the meetings of the Ass~mb.ly, including, we may presume, meetings called both for legIslatlve and for electoral purposes. What is of special interest in this discussion is that E1JVofL{a is first and foremost described in terms of the administration of the city in its various branches. This is not to say that what the author wants to see established in the city is something other than law-and-order. But when we compare his conception of it with the kind of EuvofL{a associated with Sparta, to say nothing of I [Xen.] Ath. Pol. I. 8-9: 'For the common people wish not to be the,mse!ves enslaved while the city is governed by good laws but to be free and exercIse control; that the system of laws is bad is of little importance to them, For from what you regard as lack of government by good law~ the common people derive their strength and their freedom. But if you are lookmg for government by good laws, you will first of all see that the most capable en~ct laws for t~em; then th: good men will straighten out the bad, the good men wlll dehber~te m the Councll about the city, and will not let madmen be members of the Counol, make speeches, or be members of the Assembly. Surely, good measures such as these would very quickly reduce the common people to slavery.' 2 I am not convinced by the arguments ofE. Hohl, CP 45 (1950) 26-35, that we are dealing with a letter. . 3 This is probably the meaning of KOAaoovotv in this. context, see. E .. Kalmka, Die pseudoxenophontische A6!HNAIQN,IIOAI~EIA 12,0;Vl.th.n.. I. ~~t It mlg~t,have the wider sense of 'administer correctlve pumshment, dlsoplme, reprove, keep in check', as in Soph. Aj. 1108, 1160.
Solon's EVvop,[a, which, among other things, 17aVEt Epya ?hxoUTaULYJ<;,we must conclude that the realm of Eiwo/lLa has shrunk to encompass only the constitutional workings of the state, conceived primarily as the enactment and enforcement of statutes. Not only is the enactment of statutes the first item that comes to the author's mind-for no other vO/lOt can be meant in this context by TOU<; vO/lov<; TtBEVTa<;-but the judicial process involves the application of statutes, and participation in Council and Assembly implies the right to formulate them. In short, although the word may still retain its old notion of law-and-order, it has now become an issue in party politics and embodies, in this instance, the constitutional programme claimed by one political orientation as its exclusive prerogative. I This conclusion is confirmed by the use of the verb EVVO/lEfuBat in this passage. In stating that the common people are more interested in their own freedom and power to rule than in the good government of the city (dJVO/lOV/lEVYJ 170"\t<;) the author attributes self-interest and partisanship to his political opponents, while claiming for those of his own political persuasion the maintenance of what is really good for the state. Moreover, he emphatically states twice that the freedom of the common people cannot be reconciled with the dJVO/lOV/lEVYJ 17(;"\t<;or with EVVO/lEfaBat as such, and goes even as far as naming the absence of EVvopLa (OUK EVl'o/lEfuBat) as the cause of the strength and freedom of the people. If this proves the same partisan spirit in the use of the verb as we found in the use of the noun, the fact that at the beginning of the passage it is the verb and at the end of the passage the noun which is associated with the 'slavery' of the common people suggests that the content of verb and noun are identical in that both regard law-and-order in terms of political institutions and legislation. The pseudo-Xenophontic Constitution oj Athens is thus the earliest surviving document in which law-andorder is seen specifically as the condition of a state whose statutes are good and which, consequently, enjoys a good constitution.2 I I see no evidence for Hohl's contention, op. cit. 34, that Sparta is here intended as the model of d,vofLla. 2 For a similar use of d,vOfLELalJat in the fourth century see Aeschines 3. I.'J'1 and Dem. 24. 139·Aeschines [. 5, where the verb is used of a democratic constitution, proves that not only oligarchs could lay a claim to it. Note especiallv the definition of EVIJop.{a in A.rist. Pol. 4. 8, 129433-7: aUK Eun 3£Evv0/l-La T() eD KE'ia8uL TO V'; vop.ovs, p.ry 1T€Uha8aL o£. 8/.0 pia)) fl-€V EvvofLlav tJ1ToATj1TTEOV fdpUL TO 1TE{8eaBaL TOLS KHfLEVOLS
This enables us to draw some conclusions concerning the nature of KaKOI'O/lLa, a noun which is fi-JUndonly here in extant Greek literature. The context makes it clear that the noun describes the condition antithetical to EVvopLa. It is the consequence of the common people's desire for freedom and power; a condition which, to be sure, is not in itself desired by the people, but which is of less importance to them than the prevention of that enslavement which EiJVo/lLa would entail for them. Like EVVO/l[a, the noun seems, therefore, to refer to the political institutions and legislation which make up the constitution of the state, only that in this case the constitution is bad. Like the adjective KaKovo/lWTaTOt in Herodotus' discussion of Sparta (I. 65. 2), the noun assumes the existence of vO/lOt, which are, however, bad and not conducive to law-and-order. But while Herodotus understood the -VO/l0<; suffix in a wide sense as including everything regarded as valid and binding, it seems here confined to statutes and political institutions, that is, it is used in a narrow political sense. I ~With this we turn now to dVO/lLa, which, as we stated above, is the opposite of EuvO/lLa as a quality primarily of an individual. It is, therefore, best rendered as 'lawlessness', if by that term we understand not the 'absence of law' but the asocial behaviour of an individual who defies law-and-order and who acts in contravention of any or all of the canons regarded as valid and binding by the society in which he lives. It describes neither the transgression of a particular vO/los--the proper term for that is 17apal'o/lLa-nor the kind of unconventional behaviour which most people frown upon yet tolerate. In all its forms, noun, adjective, and verb, its signification is more general than that: it denotes a violent and unruly kind of conduct which infringes vO/lo<; both in its sense of 'law-and-order' and 'proper behaviour'. VOP.OLS, ET€paV KaKW,
OE TO
KHfLEVOL<;).
KaAws
KELa8aL
TOUS V0ll-0VS
O[S €/-L/1-EVOVaLV
(Ean
yap 1Tfd8eo(}al.
Kat
Both parts of the definition are framed with reference primarily .vvofLla is 'obedience to the enacted laws' and the 'enactment of
to the statutes: good laws'. I It is strange that there is no juxtaposition of KaKovofLla and 8vavofLla anywhere in Greek literature, and this lack, when added to the fact that 8vavofLla is found only twice in Greek literature (Hesiod and Solon) and KaKovofLla only once as a noun ([Xen.] Alh. Pol.) and twice as an adjective (Herodotus and Philo), makes it difficult to determine the difference between them. On the basis of the little we know, we might guess that KaKovofLla is the condition of a society which has bad VOfLOt, while 8vavofLla is a condition in which forces disruptive of good VOfLO' prevail, forces such as those enumerated by Solon, frg. 3. 34-8. But we cannot be sure.
Contrary to EVvov[a, of which the noun form is the earlier, the adjective avovos is found before aV0Il-[a makes an appearance. In the only pre-fifth-century passage-the only passage, therefore, which justifies our inclusion of aV0Il-[a in our discussion hereHesiod describes Typhaon as DHvav B' VfJPWT~V T' aV0Il-0v B', terrible, overbearing, and lawless (Theog. 307). The juxtaposition of these three attributes shows that aV0Il-0v refers to his conduct in the same general way as the other two expressions do. Just as DHva, does not describe the impression he makes in a specific context, or vfJpLaT~S his attitude in one particular kind of situation, so aV0Il-0' refers not to his infraction of a specific vall-os but to his defiance of the social order as such. The next occurrence of the adjective in extant Greek literature is after 464/3 B.C., in Aeschylus' Agamemnon, where it is found twice (151, r 142) in a musical sense.1 But the richness of Aeschylus' language and his fondness for iridescent epithets extends the meaning in both passages beyond the musical. When Calchas at Aulis invokes Paian to prevent Artemis from bringing on Bva[av ETEpav aV0ll-av TLV' aDaLTOV, he anticipates the sacrifice of Iphigeneia not merely as a sacrifice 'unaccompanied by music', as sacrifices to the chthonian deities were,2 but also as the turningpoint in Agamemnon's conduct, expressed a few lines further by T() 1TavTaToAIl-0v epPOVEtVIl-ETE'YVW (22 r ). The sacrifice is thus described as one which will defy all norms of proper human conduct. Similarly, although in the later passage the chorus may reproach Cassandra with no more than shouting a 'tuneless tune', it would be difficult for the audience not to associate with vall-0v aV0Il-0v also the 'lawless' conduct which has become the 'rule' for the house of Atreus (I 142). Among the other tragedians aV0Il-0S is attested in two Sophoclean and seven Euripidean passages.3 Heracles in Sophocles' Trachiniae applies the adjective to the Centaurs in exactly the same sense in which Hesiod had used it of Typhaon, when he calls them 'an overbearing, lawless host, exceeding in violence'.4 In the Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus' entreaty to the chorus, Il-~ Il-',
iKETEVW, 1Tpoa[D7)T' aV0Il-0v, is best interpreted as a request not to infer from his having trespassed on sacred ground, of which the chorus has just accused him (125-37), that he is a person who habitually defies general norms of behaviour, especially in religious matters.2 J1v0Il-0S may have a religious significance also in a Euripidean passage concerning Oedipus. For when Jocasta speaks in the Phoenissae of Oedipus' birth as aV0ll-a Il-EV TEKEtV EIl-E (380), she is evidently thinking of the violation of Apollo's oracle which the birth of her son meant: we remember that it was Jocasta herself who reported at the beginning of the play (r8-20) that the Oracle warned Laius that begetting a child would constitute defiance of the gods and that this would involve his own death and ruin for his house. Religious overtones may, but need not, be present in two passagesin which aV0Il-0' isjuxtaposed with aBw,. Both adjectives are found together in Euripides' Andromache (49 r) to describe the murder plotted by Hermione against Andromache and her son; but it is hard to determine whether the planned murder is 'lawless and godless' because Menelaus had lured Andromache away from her suppliant posture at the altar or whether it refers to the conduct of Menelaus and his daughter in more general terms. Similarly, one cannot be certain whether or not religious vall-0L are involved in the chorus' prayer for the death of Pentheus in the Bacchae : on the one hand, Pentheus' attitude toward Dionysus justifies his being named as TOV aBwv aV0Il-0v aDLKOV 'EX[ovo, 'Yavov [or: TaKov] 'Y7)'YEVfj;3 but on the other hand, Pentheus' 'lawless senselessness' (aV0Il-0' deppoavv7)), which the chorus had criticized earlier in the play (387), and the addition of l.tDLKO, to the other two epithets here extend the force of aV0Il-0S beyond the sphere of religion . .I1v0Il-0S is again found coupled with unjust behaviour in Agamemnon's refusal in the Iphigeneia at Aulis to commit 'lawless acts which are not just' against his own children merely for the sake ofHelen.4 Elsewhere aV0Il-0' has a passive sense in that it describes the nature of an act perpetrated rather than the morality of the person who perpetrated it. The Phrygian slave in the Orestes, for example, is I
142: 'Do not, I beseech you, look at me (as if I were) a lawless person.' Cf. possible religious overtones in Evvo/-,{a in Soph. Aj. 713 (above, p. 70). On religious connotations of see above, pp. 40-3. 3 995-6 (= 1015-16): 'the godless, lawless, and unjust earth-born scion of Echion'. 4 399: o.vo/-,a opwvTa KOV 8{Ka,a 1Taroa, ou,
Cf. above, p. 61 n. I. 2 So H. Lloyd-] ones, CQ 47 (= N .s. 31 (1953) 96. 3 I omit the obviously corrupt o.vo/-,o' of the Laurentianus at Eur. Suppl. 45, and prefer the correction o.va /-,0' accepted by Parmentier (Eude, 1950). -+ 1°95-6: u-rpa-rov ... uf3pLaT~v, avo/-,ov, lJ1T€POXQV f3tav. I
2
vo/-,o,
EYNOMIA,
upset by the 'bloody afflictions and lawless ills' that he has seen,! and, if Aristophanes' parody of the Andromeda can be trusted, Andromeda bemoaned the aJ10fLa 7TfLBm inflicted upon her by her father (frg. 122. I I = Ar. Thesm. 1039). Similar uses of the adjective are found in fifth-century prose. According to Herodotus, Astyages treated Harpagus to a lawless feast (avofLO/ Tpa7TE~TI EoawE) when he served him the flesh of his son (1. 162. I), and Gyges called Candaules' request to look upon the naked queen an 'unsound speech' (!loYOJ1 OUK uyda) and the act itself 'lawless' (oEwBat aJ1OfLWJ1), clearly because it offended his notions of proper conduct (1. 8. 3-4). The combination of aJ10fLOS with aBEDS and aOtKOS, which we noticed in the Bacchae, is paralleled in the peroration of Gorgias' Palamedes, in which the speaker tries to turn the table on his accusers by arguing that they would commit a 'terrible, godless, unjust, and lawless act' against themselves if they killed their ally, benefactor, and fellow Greek (frg. Ila. 36), and again in the Anonymus Iamblichi (3. I), where aOtKa and aJ10fLa are combined to describe the kind of acts for which a person ought not to use his talents.2 The most illuminating passage on the precise meaning of aJ1OfLOS comes from the speech of the Thebans to the Spartans concerning the treatment of Plataea, as reported by Thucydides. All the specific charges of transgression are described by the adverb 7TapavofLws or the verb 7TapaJ1OfLEw: the Theban attack during the truce and during the celebration of a religious festival (3. 65. I, 2) ; the killing of prisoners who surrendered voluntarily and about whose lives the Plataeans had given assurances (3. 66. 2, 3); and the attack launched by the Plataeans on the Thebans without provocation (3. 67. 5).3 But when the Thebans sum up their grievances in their peroration, they use ~fLtJ1 aJ10fLa 7TaBovatI (3. 67·6) to describe themselves as victims of Plataean 'lawlessness' as such, that is, to characterize in general terms the behaviour of the Plataeans toward them.4 J
1455: q,OVtWV 1Ta8€wv avoflwv TE KQKWV. Below, p. 92 n. 3. Cf. Eur. IA 399 (above, p. 87 n. 4). 3 In the only general statement in this speech containing a form of 1Tapavo/-,Ew, 01 yap ayovn, 1Tapavo/-,ovat /-,u'\''\'ov TWV E1TO/-,EVWV(65' 2), the reference is clearly to the commission of a specific illegal act. 4 Note that for the specific charge repeated here, that the Plataeans transgressed the law of the Hellenes to honour assurances given for the lives of prisoners. the verb 1Tapa~a{vw is used. I
2
JYl:NOMIA,
AND
ANOMIA
89
There are three examples of the adverb avofLws, whose logical counterpart EVvofLws, curiously enough, is not found. It may have religious overtones in Thucydides' report of Pagondas' speech to the Boeotians before the battle of Dclium, in which he bases trust in divine aid on the fact that the Athenians have 'lawlessly' fortified the temple (4. 92. 7). The chorus in Euripides' Medea uses aVofL(tJs to characterize the brutal manner in which Jason forsook Medea for a new wife (1000), and Gorgias joins it with aOLKws and with the verbs E{3uLaB7) and u{3pLaB7) to describe Helen as more sinned against than sinning in his version of her rape (frg. I 1. 7). While the adjective and the adverb show no trace whatever of having been influenced by the meaning of 'statute' which VOfLoS came to assume, there are some hints of such influence in the case of the noun avofLLa and the verb avofLEw. The earliest preserved occurrences of the noun avofLLa are in prose. Herodotus uses it three times in the Deioces story (1. 96. 2-97. 3), which we had occasion to mention in connection with our analysis of El)VOfLLa (above, pp. 73-4). According to Herodotus it was against the background of much avofLL7) among the Medes that Deioces first embarked upon his scheme of gaining power by cultivating a reputation for justice. When Deioces refused to sit asjudge any longer, ap7Tay~ and aVOfLL7) became rife again, and when a meeting was convoked to deliberate about the situation, the friends of Deioces advocated the establishment of kingship, so that if TE XWp7) " ./;' B a OVOE ,<;;-, EvvofL7)aETat Kat """aVTOt 7TpOSEpya TpE'f'OfLE V7T aVOfLt7)S avaaTaTOt EaofLEBa. While it would seem at first glance that the aVOfLL7) on which Deioces and his friends capitalize describes a condition rather than a quality, closer scrutiny shows that it is not a political but a social disorder which he sets out to remedy, a disorder which is brought about by the asocial conduct of individuals. This is most clearly seen in the second occurrence of aVOfLL7) in this passage, where its combination with pillage (ap7Tay~) shows that the prevalence of crime rather than anarchy is the problem at issue. The final passage, quoted above, provides the corroboration: if the presence of avofLL7) 'unsettles' the Medes and its absence enables them to 'turn to the pursuit of business', aJ10fLL7) I
t
"
I
"
I For the combination of avo/-,w, and aUKw, cf. Gorgias, frg. lla. 36 (above, p. 88), and Eur. Bacch. 995-6, IA 399 (above, p. 87). For the association of avo/-,{a with vf3pt, cf. Hes. Theogony 307 and Soph. Trach. 1096 (above, p. 86).
EYNOMIA,
LJYENOMIA,
A.l\;D
ANOMIA
91
can only be a social malady which consistsin the lawless behaviour of hoodlums who cannot be controlled; it does not refer to a political condition of the kind branded as ovavofLtYJ by Solon.1 Thucydides' only use of dvofLtu points in the same direction. When he introduces his account of the effect of the Plague upon the conduct of the Athenians with the words: 7TpWTOV TE ~pgE KUL €S Ta'\'\U Tn 7TO'\Et €7TL 7TA.EOVdvofLtus TO vOUYJfLU,2 he is obviously thinking less of a political condition than of the demoralizing effect on individual conduct, which he then proceeds to describe in detail. Euripides is the only tragedian in whose surviving works the noun dvofLtu is found, and he is also the earliest author to mention it in a context in which written VOfLOt also occur. Still, the vOfLoS negated by the prefix remains throughout the norm of proper conduct. Twice dvofLta is directed against the gods. The chorus of the Heracles brands with the words BEauS dvofLtq, xputvwv (757) the defiant behaviour of Lycus, who had declared (723) his disdain of divine retribution for having violated the sanctity of the hearth at which Megara and her children had taken refuge.3 Similarly, the simple god-fearing cowherd, who, in the Iphigeneia among the Taurians, reports to Iphigeneia the landing of two strangers, characterizes as dvofLtq, Bpuuvs (275) one of his colleagues who had derided the superstitious fears which the landing had aroused in some of his comrades. In three passages dvofLtu is contrasted with vOfLo" and as might be expected, vOfLoS describes the proper behaviour of an individual in two of these. The chorus of the Heracles illustrates the !heme of prosperity leading to madness by singing of a man who, 'abandoning the norms of conduct and gratifYing his lawlessness, shatters the gloomy chariot of wealth', 4 and when the chorus in the Iphigeneia at Aulis (1095) laments the rule of dvofLtu over the VOfLOt, it means that lawless conduct has eclipsed the order of a society from which respect, goodness, and reverence are gone. The third passage, however, contrasts dvofLtu
with statutes. Ion complains of the injustice of the gods who enact (ypat/JuvTaS) laws for men, while their own conduct lays them open to the charge of dvofLtu.1 The fact that the gods do not enact the kind of statutes by which a city orders its life is irrelevant here; the interesting point is that their rules are treated as if they were no more than human political vOflm, subject to change and annulment, and that, through the use of dvofliu, vOfLOS is brought in in a different sense to deny the gods the moral right to legislate. A closer approach to vOfLo, = 'statute' is also evident in the verb dvofLEW, which appears only twice in Greek literature before the end of the fifth century B.C. Herodotus reports that the members of the Dorian Pentapolis in Asia Minor excluded from their association, whose centre was the sanctuary of Triopian Apollo, TOU, 7TEpL TO LPOV dVOfL0UUVTaS (1. 144. I). That the participle describes lawless conduct in a religious matter is not remarkable, since we have encountered both noun and adjective in similar contexts before (pp. 86-7, 89, 90 above). But it is curious that, while dvofLtu is usually associated with infractions of the general norm of proper conduct, it constitutes here the violation of a specific vOfLoS, which enjoined the dedication in the temple of tripods won in the games of Triopian Apollo; disregard for this law by a Halicarnassian led to the exclusion of Halicarnassus from the organization. In other words, dvofLEW is used here in reference to a specific transgression, which is more commonly expressed by the verb 7TupuvofLEW.2 We must, then, regard this usage either as exceptional or as emphasizing the asocial character of an offence which was directed not only at the god, but also at the association which had entrusted its welfare to his divine protection. There is no reason to assume that the application of dVOfLEW to the infraction of a specific law had anything to do with any change in the use of vOfLoS. But the second passage in which the verb is found, again in a participial form but without reference to
I This refutes the assertion of Jaeger, SE 82 n. I, that OUaV0f'L'l in Solon's poem is merely 'ein metrischer Ersatz fur aV0f'LU'. 2 2. 53. I: 'In other respects, too, did the plague initiate in the city a larger degree of lawlessness.' 3 Wilamowitz, Euripides Herakles 22• I71, thinks that aV0f'LU here refers to Lycus' 'unglauben'. But the context shows that it is rather the act of proclaiming his disbelief (a1>povu '\0yov OVPUVLWVf'uKapWv KUT€{3U'\') that constitutes aV0f'LU. 4 778-80: V0f'0V 7TUP€f'EVO" aV0f'L'! Xap,v Iltoov, I 'OpuuaEv o'\{3ou KE'\U'VOVapf'u.
Ion 442--3: TrW~ o~v 8£KUWV TOUS VOfLOUS VJLOS ~POTO;S I ypaljJavTus, aUTovs 0eP/UGKaVHV; 'The contrast of dVOp.,LU with VOJ.LOS = 'statute' is found again in Critias' Sisyphus (= frg. 25. 40), if the manuscript reading is correct. But v0f'0" ought probably to be emended to 1>0{30", see above, p. 52 n. I. 2 For 7TUPUV0f'€Win Herodotus see the description of Xerxes' maltreatment of the body of Leonidas at 7. 238. 2, where the V0f'0' violated is presumably a sanction against desecration of the body of a fallen enemy; cf. 9. 78-9 and Thuc. 4. 97-101. I
avo/-dav
NOMOl; BECOMES'
92
STATUTE'
a specific vOfLOS, reveals clear traces of the 'statute' meaning of VOfLOS. The passage is part of the most elaborate treatment of dwofLtu and dvofLtu that has come down to us, and for that reason we have reserved it for this, the final point of our discussion of these two concepts. Toward the end of a late fifth-century exhortation to virtue, incorporated into the Protrepticus of Iamblichus and therefore known as the 'Anonymus Iamblichi',1 a large section (6-7) is devoted to weighing the blessings of ElJvofL{u against the harm inflicted by dvofLtu on individuals as well as on states (KUL KOLV?7KUL l8tq,). The theme itself of the treatise makes it as clear as does every occurrence of the two terms in it that both describe a quality of personal conduct. Yet there is no doubt that this conduct is less viewed as, respectively, adherence to or rejection of general norms of behaviour than as obedience and disobedience to the established laws. The primary connotation of vOfLoS is 'statute' throughout the treatise,z and time and again just behaviour is equated with the observance of the statutes.3 This attitude also colours the treatment of ElwofL{u and dvofL{u, and this is shown especially by the frequent application of both terms in financial and economic contexts. After an initial statement that dvofLtu (disregard for the laws) is incompatible with living in society4and that the EvvofLtu (obedience to the laws) inherent in all mankind will make the masses rise up against the rule of a strong individual who uses his power in an unlawful way,S There has been a tendency to identify the author as Democritus; see especially N.S. 10 (1932) 5-22, Rend. d. R. Aecad. Naz. d. Lineei, ser. 6, vol. 13 (1937) 182-210, and REG 63 (1950) 74-106; and A. T. Cole, Jr., HSep 65 (1961) 127-63. The arguments, originally advanced by Blass, that the treatise belongs to the intellectual atmosphere of the late fifth century, carry conviction and are generally accepted. But I feelIess confident that we can identify the author with Democritus or with any of the names that have been suggested, e.g. Hippias, Protagoras, Theramenes, since we know too little of their ethical and political doctrines. 2 This comcs out with special clarity at 4. 3, where in using the term 'Tlfl-,a, for losses sustained by fire, death in the family, and loss of livestock, the author feels called upon to explain that he does not mean 'penalties', ou Td~ EK TWV V6fl-WV Myw 'Tlfl-'a~. 3 e.g. at 3. 1 dya8d KaL v6fl-'fl-a are opposed to O:O'Ka KaL O:vofl-a; at 3. 6 goodness in financial matters is effected by coming to the aid Toi~ v6fl-0'~ KaL T0 O'Ka'VVTL 7ToAEj..dovs KUTUI
Q. Cataudella, Studi italiani difilologia classica
GTu8€VTUS
oLa
T~V
euvTwv
€tJJJ0iJ-{av.
the blessings of EvvofLtu are matched one by one against the deleterious effects of dvofLta. EvvofLta is a source of trust which helps increase the public treasure (7. I), while dvofLta causes lack of trust and of sociability, so that people will hoard their money and thus cause economic shortages (7. 8). EvvofLtu helps us steer the best course in good fortune and bad, both financial and personal, in that it enables the fortunate to enjoy their prosperity in security and without fear of plots against them, whereas the unfortunate are helped by the sociability and trust of the fortunate (7. 2); but where dvofLta reigns, prosperity is not secure, since people conspire against it, while lack of trust and of sociability compound misfortune (7.9). EvvofL{u frees people from annoying tasks (7TpayfLaTa) and gives them time to devote themselves to their proper life's work (Epya TijS 'wijs) and, as a result, releases their thoughts from the most unpleasant concerns and turns them to the most pleasant (7. 3-4); dvofLtu, on the other hand, deprives men of the leisurely pursuit of their own work and plunges them into the most unpleasant of annoying tasks (7. 8). And finally, EvvofLta gives men sleep free from nightmares and pain and thus prepares them to face the next day with confidence and good hope (7. 5), whereas dvofLta will bring no pleasant thoughts to people, neither in wakefulness nor in sleep, and they wake up fearing the memory of those whom they have wronged (7. II). This rather dull and lengthy list leaves no doubt that both dvofLtu and dvofLta are conceived of as qualities of personal conduct. It is also clear that the vOfLOS to which they are related cannot be limited to the sense of 'statute', for the qualities enumerated range so wide over aspects that cannot easily be related to legislation (for example trust, sociability, etc.) that it is more natural to take the -VOfLOSsuffixin a wider sense as referring to behavioural norms. This is especially true of two points made about dvofLta which have no counterpart in the section on dvofLtU. For although the author states at first (7. 6) that 'war leading to subjugation and enslavement' is more likely to happen to people who flout the law (dvofLoiJm) than to those who obey it (dvOfLOVfLEVOLS), it is dvofLtu alone which invites war from abroad and makes for friction at home through plots and counterplots (7. IO). Obviously, more than disregard of the statutes is involved here, and the same is true when dVOfLta is cited as the one and only
94
NOMOI:
BECOMES
EYNOMIA,
'STATUTE'
cause of tyranny. It is not tyranny which creates a condition of lawlessness, but it is the lawless conduct of the citizens, not merely their disregard for the statutes, that creates tyranny; the avofLta is predicated not of the tyrant but of the people as a whole who 'have turned to wickedness' and have abandoned VOfL0<;and 8tKY).2 Still, even here the sense of 'statute' rings through and even more in those passages which reveal the author's preoccupation with economic matters and with plots, where the VOfLOt observed and flouted are obviously statutes concerning the payment of debts and those against treason and conspiratorial activities. We are at the very least well on the way to Aristotle's definition of EiJvofLta as including both the enactment of good laws and obedience to the established laws.3 This part of our discussionhas yielded the following conclusions. Before 464/3 B.C. the suffix of EiJvofLta, 8v(TV0fLta, avofLta, and their related forms does not reflect the political or judicial sense of vOfL0<;, of which we found the earliest example in Aeschylus' Supplices. The suffix of dvofLta before that date reflects VOfL0<; as (a) the norm of proper conduct (pp. 24-6 above), and (b) the condition oflaw-and-order (pp. 30-3 above), connotations which have moral rather than political overtones. The opposite of EiJVofLta in the first sense (a) is avofLta, attested in the early period only in the adjectival form avofL0<;, which signifies conduct defying law-and-order, while its opposite in the second sense (b) is 8vavofLta, which describes a condition in the state which is almost tantamount to anarchy. These findings tally well with the uses of vOfL0<; attested for the period before 464/3 B.C. 'Ve observed that it means 'law-and-order' as early as Theognis (p. 30 above), and while there is no passage before the fifth century in which it refers to individual conduct, it does appear from Hesiod onwards in the closely related sense in which it describes the normal way in which things are done, that is, the norm which avofLta transgresses (pp. 23-4 above). The earliest indications that vOfL0<; in the sense of 'statute' affected the meaning of the compounds comes in the case of I
I ,.
12:
ytV£TUL
Sf:
Kat
OLOVrQt
O€
~ 'Tvpavvts,
KUKOV
ToaOVTOV
T€ Kat
TOWVTOV,
OtJJ<
E~ aAAou
op8wS' aup.f3cf""OVTUt, Tvpavvov ig ci""ov TLVOS Ka8{aTua8uL ... aUK dpewS' Tavru "OYL~OJL€VOL. 2 ,_ 12-16, esp. 13: E7Tftodv yap UrrUVT€S {7TL KUK{av Tpa7TWVrUt .• " and 14: 0rav oov ravru TO. Svo €K TOV 7T,,~eOUS €KA{1TT/, 0 T€ VOj1.0S Kat. ~ 8lK1]. 3 Pol. 4. 8, 1294a3-7 (above, p. 84 n. 2). 'TLVOS ~ dVOfl,{as.
TLV€S' TWV
o..v8pOnTWV,
QaaL i.L~
jjYI:NOMIA,
AND
ANOMIA
95
EVvofLtu and KaKovofLta in [Xenopholl]'S Constitution if Athens, which belongs probably in the early 420S, and in the case of avofLta not until the Anonymus Iamblichi in the late fifth century. Accordingly, since vOfL0<; is attested as 'statute' as early as 464/3 B.C., we conclude that it assumed this sense before the four compounds discussed so far showed a trace of it, and that EiJvofLta, 8V(TV0fLta, and avofLta do not enable us to push the date of vOfL0<; = 'statute' back beyond 464/3 B.C.
IEONOMI
ESU L T
Smore conducive to determining the point at which assumed the meaning of 'statute' in Athens are obtained by an examination of laovop,la, the last remaining -vop,oc; compound found before 464/3 B.C. Its connotations, as we shall see, are from its first appearance until at least the end of the fourth century B.C. purely political, and the context in which it is first attested associates it closely with the reforms of Cleisthenes. In other words, the appearance of laovop,la seems to be linked with the beginnings of the Athenian democracy, and this, in turn, suggests that the adoption of v6p,oc; as the technical term for 'statute' to replace ewp,6c; forms part of the same picture. vVe are faced, therefore, with two tasks: in the first place, we have to demonstrate what precisely the meaning of laovop,la in its various contexts is, and secondly we have to determine as accurately as we can what the date and the circumstances of the first appearance are.2 It is generally agreed that the earliest occurrence of the concept, in the adjectival form la6vop,oc;, is to be found in two stanzas of a song celebrating the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which Athenaeus includes in his collection of some twenty-five Attic skolia or drinking songs.3However, since we can glean little information from them about the meaning of laovop,la,
R
v6p,oc;
I
1 Our discussion will be confined to the political kind of luovoJ1-la and will not embrace that Epicurean luovoJ1-la which Cic. De nat. deorum I. 50 has Velleius translate as 'aequabilem tributionem' and Cotta, ibid. I. 109, as 'aequilibritas'. Some scholars want to attribute the authorship of the Epicurean luovoJ1-la to Democritus, e.g. C. Mugler, 'L'isonomie des atomistes,' RPh 3e seL 30 (1956) 231-50, and S. Luria, 'Zwei Demokrit-Studien', in J. Mau and E. G. Schmidt (edd.), Isonomia: Studien zur Gleichheitsvorstellung im griechischen Denken 37-54, esp. 45-6. That even the Epicurean luovofLla 'fait, en elfet, partie de toute une suite de metaphoresjuridiques appliquees it la cosmo logie' is shown by Mugler, op. cit. 232. 2 I should like here to pay tribute to the work of three scholars to which, despite some disagreements, the following discussion owes whatever value it possesses: V. Ehrenberg (Ison.; OD, esp. 530-7), G. Vlastos (Ison.; IP), and J. A. O. Larsen (Cleisth.) . 3 Athenaeus 15. 694 c-695 f, esp. 695 a-b. The most recent text is that of Page, PitfG, Nos. 893 and 896, esp. line 4.
A AND
ATHENS
97
beyond the observation that in the relevant two lines the la~VOf.da which Harmodius and Aristogeiton brought to Athens IS contrasted with tyranny (TOV Tvpavvov KTaVE-rYJv / laov6p,ovc; T' )1e~vac; E7ToLYJaaTYJv),and since their main interest for us is chronological, we shall defer a discussion of them until we ~ave esta?lished the meaning of the term through a full analYSISof all ItS occurrences in the fifth century, to use them then to date the emergence of the concept of laovop,la in Athens. Most treatments of laovop,la regard it as the name of that constitutional form which later came to be called DYJp,oKpaTla.I But, as we shall see, laovop,la is not a name for a form of government but for the principle of political equality, which, though it is of course more closely associated with a democratic constitution than with any other, is not necessarily confined to it. Chronological problems, less crucial for us than those besetting the Harmodius skolia, also plague the second passage relevant to our inquiry. Alcmaeon of Croton is said by Aristotle to have been a contemporary of the old age ofPythagoras,2 Diogenes Laertius and Iamblichus called him a pupil ofPythagoras,3 and other late authors called him a Pythagorean.4 A number ofmodern scholars, accordingly, date Alcmaeon's fioruit as about 500 B.C., roughly contemporary with the reforms of Cleisthenes,5 or shortly thereI e.g. vVilamowitz, AA 2. 319, Larsen, Cleisth. 6, and Vlastos, IP I, who, however draws a distinction between luovOJ1-ia and DTJJ1-0KpaTia (pp. 7-10); also C. Meier, 'Drei Bemerkungen .. .' 4-18. That it is not a constitution is recognized by Ehrenberg, Ison. 297, and OD 535· 2 Met. A, 986a29-30 (Ross): KaL yap [EY
cr.
cr.
5~·
. Diog. Laert. 8. 83; Iamblichus, De vita Pythagorica 104, where Alcmaeon I.Sals.o enumerated among the young men who were contemporanes of Pythagoras III h,S old age; cf. also 267. 4 Philoponus on Arist. De an. 405'29 (Hayduck, p. 88. II); scho!' P!. Ale. I 121 e. Simplicius on Arist. De an. 405'29 (Hayd.uck, p. 32. 3-6) reports t~at he was traditionally called a Pythagorean, but POllltS out correctly that Anstotle dissociates him from the Pythagoreans. 5 M. Wellmann, Archeion II (1929) 156 and Archivfiir Geschichte der Medizin 22 (1929) 302-3, calls him a younger contemporary of Dem?cede~, who practised medicine first at the court of Polycrates of Samos and after hIS fall III 522 B.C. at the court of Darius; W. H. S.Jones, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, supp!. 8 (1946) 3, dates him c. 500 B.C., but admits, n. 5, the possibility of a date as late as 450 3
814277
H
98
NOMOI:
BECOMES
'STATUTE'
after,! and regard him as a member of the Pythagorean schoo!'z Now, it would of course be very strange indeed if a physician and scientist born in Croton at any point in the late sixth or in the fifth century B.C. were to remain unaffected by the teachings of Pythagoras or his disciples, and the combination of Alcmaeon's provenance with some more or less superficial similarities in doctrine was probably responsible for his classification as a Pythagorean and as a pupil of the master.3 Still, to admit influence is a different matter from asserting membership in the sect. Aristotle recognized this when he noted the similarity of Alcmaeon's penchant for pairs of opposites with the table of the Pythagoreans, but, by leaving open the question 'whether he took this doctrine from them or they from him', dissociated Alcmaeon from the Pythagoreans.4 More recently, Vlastos has proved after a close scrutiny of Alcmaeon's teachings that he was not a Pythagorean.s This still leaves us with the question of his dates. The only way in which the statement that he was a contemporary of old Pythagoras can be checked is by comparing his doctrines with those of other physical thinkers, especially those with whom he shows the closest affinity. Such comparisons have shown that Alcmaeon's work preceded the Hippocratic tract On ancient medicine and certainly the work of Democritus, but that he lived later than Heraclitus and was, perhaps in his later years, a contemporary of 8, and Ehrenberg, OD 535, make him belong to the same period as the Harmodius skolia. M. Pohlenz, Hippokrates und die Begriindung der wissenschaftlichen Medizin 82, goes beyond anything the ancient evidence suggests when he asserts that Hippocrates was born in (sic) 460 B.C., a generation after Alcmaeon's death, thus placing Alcmaeon's death in c. 500 B.C. I W. Schmid and O. Stiihlin, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur 1. 1. 766, date him a little before Euryphon (mid-fifth century B.C.); Kirk and Raven 232 put his floruit in the early fifth century B.C. 2 Schmid-Stiihlin, op. cit. 739; Ehrenberg, Ison. 296, Eun. 89, and OD 535; Jones, op. cit. 3-4; J. L. Myres, CR 61 (1947) 82; Larsen, Cleisth. 9; and L. Edelstein, AJP 63 (1942) 371-2, who, however, wants to push his date down to 'Socrates' time or even later'. 3 How little reliance can be placed on the Pythagorean label is shown by the inclusion in lamblichus' list (De Vita Pythagorica 104) of Philolaus, Archytas, and Leucippus as Pythagorean contemporaries of Pythagoras; see Kirk and Raven 233. 4 Met. A, 986'27-9: OV7T€P TprJ7TOV EO'K€ Kat 14AKJLalwv " KpOTWV'UT1JS tmOAa{3€LV, Kat ifTOL OVTOS nap' EK€{VWV ~ EKELVOI, 7Tupa TOVTOU 1TapiAa{30V TOV AOyOV TOVTOV. 5 Vlastos, Ison. 344-7, accepted now by Ehrenberg, HL 67 n. 23. The same conviction was already expressed by \Vachtler, op. cit. 88, and by W. A. Heidel, AJP 61 (1940) 3-6 and Hippocratic Medicine 43; and it is stated again by Guthrie, HGP I. 341. B.C.; Larsen, Cleisth.
Empedocles and Anaxagoras.! This would give us a date about 450 B.C. for Alcmaeon's activity, and this date tallies well with the statement that his life coincided with the end of Pythagoras' life. For if we follow Guthrie in assuming that Pythagoras died about 490 B.C. and that Alcmaeon may have written his book at any time between the ages of thirty and seventy, we may conclude that he was born about 510 and was active between 480 and 440 B.C.2 The lower limit of this range becomes more likely if we accept with K. von Fritz3 480 B.C. as the date of Pythagoras' death, for this date would enable us to assume 500 B.C. as the approximate year of Alcmaeon's birth.4 This brings us to the fragment which is preserved by Aetius : )1I\KfWLWV vypoD,
EV
Tij,
triPoD,
aVTOr,
[LEV vyLELa, .pvXpoD,
fLOvapxtav
ElvaL UVVEKTLKr;V T~V lUOVo[LLaV TOW ovvapEWV,
8EP[LoD, 7rLKpoD, yAvKEO'
vouov
Ka1 TlJW 1\0L7TWV, T~V 0'
7TOL1]TLK~V' >80p07TOLOVyap EKaTEpov
fLOvapXLav'
Ka1 VOUOV UV[L1TL7TTELVW, [LEV v>' OU V7TEp{3ol\f; 8EP[LOT1]TO, ~ If;vXPOT1]TO',
(V, OE E~ a[fw alTLwv,
ou OLa 7TM"j80, Tpo>Yje; ~ EVOELaV,
~ [LvEAov ~ EyKE>al\ov. vOaTwv
7T1\1]ULWV. T~V
7TOLWV ~ xwpa,
OE
EyyLvw8aL
OE
W, 0' EV 0[, 7TOTE
TOl)TOL<;
~ K07TWV ~ avaYK1],
~ (1TEp1
Diels)
KaK TWV E~W(JEV
~ TWV TOVTOL, 7Tapa-
vyELav T~V UV[L[LETpOV TWV 7TOLWV KpiiuLV.5
vVe have before us a paraphrase in indirect speech and not a direct quotation, a paraphrase, moreover, which, as Diels already remarked, shows traces of Peripatetic and Stoic contamination.6 Caution is, therefore, required in an attempt to extract Alcmaeon's views from Aetius' statement of them. \Ve can, however, be confident that the words laovofl,{a and fwvapXLa formed a part of Alcmaeon's original statement. For not only is the image created by their contrast so striking that it is not likely to have been introduced by a doxographer, but it is also very much in line with the practice of Presocratic thinkers to explain physical [ The most recent full discussion is that of Guthrie, HGP I. 341-59, esp. 357-9. Cf. also W. A. Heidel, Hippocratic Medicine 43 and 47. Jones, op. cit. 3 n. 5, believes that he preceded Empedocles and Anaxagoras. 2 Guthrie, HGP I. 357-8. 3 'Pythagoras', RE 47. Halbb. (1963) 184. 4 I would not wish, however, to lower the date of Alcmaeon's activity as far as 430 B.C. 5 For this text and its translation see Endnote, pp. 177-8 below. 6 H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci 223-4: 'miserrime invrrsum est Alcmaeonis de sanitate placitum V 30 1 ubi Peripatetic a de quattuor causis c10ctrina Stoicorum 7TOWLS mire copulata est.'
phenomena in political or social images.! It is safe, therefore, to assume that Alcmaeon used luovoflia and fLovapx{a not as medical but as political concepts intended merely to help him expound certain facts about the (human) body by analogy with certain features in the state.Z This means that it is immaterial for an understanding of the fragment to speculate whether Alcmaeon preferred one form of government to another or whether his experiences in Croton mayor may not be reflected in his choice of this contrast.3 In the first place, we know too little about the history of Croton at this time and the part Alcmaeon mayor may not have played in the attempt to make the government of the 'Thousand' more democratic4 to use it to elucidate the possible meaning of luovofL{a in this fragment, and secondly, the contrast between luovofL{a and fLovapx{a must have been sufficiently familiar to Alcmaeon's contemporaries in a general way to make its metaphorical use here intelligible to them without previous inquiry into his personal convictions.s Accordingly, the only method by which we can hope to gain an insight into Alcmaeon's meaning is to assume that Aetius' epitome, though couched in the language of Hellenistic eclecticism, correctly reflects Alcmaeon's ideas, and to reverse Alcmaeon's analogy by drawing conclusions from the physical to the political connotations of luovofL{a and fLovapx{a. This procedure is hazardous in that it does violence to Alcmaeon's emphasis. For him, as we saw, the political image was an aid to the exposition of medical phenomena, and this does not I e.g. Anaximander's doctrine of Q{Wf} and TLau, (frg. !), which is taken by Vlastos, Ison. 362, as embodying a doctrine similar to that of laoFop.La here. See also Heraclitus' doctrines of 1TO)..EP.OS (frgg. 53 and 80) ; of the Erinyes as helpers of Dike keeping the sun in check (frg. 94) ; and the relation between FOILOS and the tWOF (frg. ! 14). Empedocles' doctrine of Love and Strife is also relevant here, especially frg. 30, where NElKOS is said to come €S TLp.as. 2 L. Mac Kinney, 'The Concept of Isonomia in Greek ~1edicine' in Mau and Schmidt, op. cit. 79-88, fails to recognize that laoFop.La is fundamentally a political concept, the application of which to medical matters can only be metaphorical. 3 This point is well made by Vlastos, Ison. 363-5 with nn. 83-7. 4 Iamblichus, De vita Pythagorica 257. 5 General considerations make it likely, however, that Alcmaeon favoured laOJ'op.La over p.oFapxLa. Since pre-Aristotelian and particularly pre-Socratic thinkers tend to regard human and natural phenomena as part of one Koap.os, Alcmaeon would not have wished to define laoFop.La as good for the body but bad for the state. For the persistence of this notion we have to think only of Plato's Timaeus and, especially for our purposes here, of the qualitative identity of individual and state in Rep. 2. 369 c-4. 445 c.
automatically mean that every feature of the image must correspond to every aspect of the thing which it is called in to explain. And yet, since the fragment contains no clue which would lend itself to a different method and since, as we shall see, its results will be internally consistent, we must take either this precarious route or none at all. The mere fact that luovofL{a is here opposed to one-man rule, as it is in the Harmodius skolia, has led some scholars to believe that opposition to tyranny is the primary factor inherent in luovofL{a, and the conviction that luovofL{a began as an aristocratic notion, which was only later appropriated by the Cleisthenean democracy, almost made this beliefnecessary.! But the refutation of that view by Vlastos enables us to see the tenor of the Alcmaeon fragment in a different light.z We must begin with fLovapx{a, which is defined more precisely than is luovofL{a. In attributing destructiveness to the fLovapx{a EKaTEpov and in citing the excess of heat or cold as one of the causes of disease, the fragment defines fLovapx{a as the preponderance or supremacy of one in a pair of opposite powers over the other, making, as it were, the hot absolute ruler over the cold, or the dry over the wet, or the sweet over the bitter. In other words, fLovapx{a is not envisaged in terms of the dominance of one quality or power over all the other five (or more), but simply as the preponderance of one member of a pair of opposites over the other.3 Since such a preponderance is, according to the fragment, alone sufficient to cause disease, there was no need for Alcmaeon to consider the possibility, articulated by later medical men,4 that the same body might simultaneously exhibit a supremacy of both the hot over the cold and of the dry over the wet, an eventuality which, if Alcmaeon had wished to apply the political metaphor consistently and exhaustively, he would presumably have characterized as an oligarchy. This point deserves to be made in order to show that the contrast between fLovapx{a and luovofL{a is not necessarily exhaustive, and that it does not necessarily imply that oligarchy was unknown to Alcmaeon. If he did not need it for his purposes in this fragment, Ehrenberg, Ison. 296, and OD 535; Larsen, Cleisth. 8. Ison. 339-44, and IP 10-12. 3 This point is missed completely by MacKinncy, op. cit. 79 with n. I, who arbitrarily changes the correct translation of €KUTEPOV, which he found in Kirk and Raven, to 'any'. 4 Cited and discussed in Galen, De temperamentis 1. 2 (510-18 Kuhn I). I
2
that does not mean that under diftlTcnt circumstances la()vojJ~tu might not be opposed to oligarchy as well as to monarchy.l '!aovop.,[u is defined only as 'that which holds health together' (Tij<; vyudu<; aVVEKTLK~V). But the definition of health which appears at the end of [Plutarch],s part of the fragment enables us to go beyond this and to infer from the description of j1.ovuPXtu what precisely this 'bond of health' is. According to his paraphrase health is ~ aUj1.j1.ETpO<; TWV 7TOLWV Kpom<;, 'the wellproportioned mixture of the qualities'. The Stoic terminology used here makes it unlikely that these words are an exact quotation from Alcmaeon, but the idea of health as a mixture is so common in Hippocratic and later Greek medicine,2 and of the cosmos as a mixture so current in Presocratic philosophy,3 that it would be surprising if Alcmaeon, with his penchant for opposites,4 had not defined it in a similar way.5 We may assume, therefore, that [Plutarch]'s words correctly reflect the essence of Alcmaeon's original statement. What is of greater interest for our purposes, however, is that the mixture which is health is described as aUj1.j1.ETpO<;. The concept of a aUj1.j1.ETpO<; Kpom<; is not uncommon in the Greek medical writers as well as in the doxographers, and it describes the commensurability of two and only two qualities, powers, humours, conditions, or other factors.6 This commensurability is seen as I The formation oA,yapx- is, as far as can be judged, no older than the formation S'7!"oKpaT-, which is first attested in the treaty with Colophon of 447/6 B.C., see IG 12• 15.37 = ATL 2. D 15.48. Herodotus is the earliest literary source for both oA,yapx- and S'7!"OKpaT-; see A. Debrunner, "LJ'7!"oKpaTia", Festschrift fiir Edouard Tieche I 1-24, esp. 15-16. Even if the noun oA,yapxia was not available to Alcmaeon, he might have used a periphrasis to describe it. My point here is merely that the fragment cannot be used to prove that Alcmaeon knew only two forms of government. 2 See the passages cited by A.-J. Festugiere, Hippocrate: L'Ancienne Mldecine (= Etudes et Gommentaires 4) 37-8. Cf. G. Vlastos, 'Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies', GP 42 (1947) 156-78, esp. 156-8, and G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy 20-1. 3 e.g. Parmenides, frgg. 9, l2, and 16, cr. 8. 55-61; Empedoc1es, frgg. 8,17.4-8 and 16-20,21, esp.line 14,22, and 26; Anaxagoras, frgg. 4, 6,10,12, and 17. 4 Cf. Arist. Met. A, 986a31-4; Diog. Laert. 8. 83. 5 W. Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers 1 57 and 226 n. 48, is probably right in asserting that the concept of mixture played a central part in Greek medicine before Parmenides introduced it into philosophy. On Parmenides' role in making mixture a central concept in Greek natural science see O. Gigon, Del' Ursprung del' griechischen Philosophie 273-4. 6 Only the absence of complete concordances to the Greek medical writers prevents me from saying that this is invariably the case. I must emphasize that my
a one-to-one qualitative correspondence; quantitative considerations, which play a more crucial part in modern science, are almost totally lacking or only at an inchoate stage of developmenU While the notion of a well-proportioned mixture occurs frequently in the Hippocratic corpus, I have found no example of a verbal combination of aVj1.j1.ETptU or its cognates with Kpiim<;, j1.ErgL<;, or their cognates.2 They rather tend to conjoin Kpiim<; with j1.ETpW<; or its adverb to express a balanced mixture of two elements,3 although similar conjunctions also describe a balance involving more than two factors.4 But with Aristotle and his successors, among whom are to be numbered the doxographers to whom we owe the preservation of Alcmaeon's fragment, the combination of aVj1.j1.ETptU and Kpom<; begins to appear consistently as an expression for a mixture involving the balance of two elements only. Aristotle's definition of health, for example, is in the Physics couched in terms very similar to the Alcmaeon fragment: vytELUV KUL E!JEgtUV EVKpaaEL KUL aVj1.j1.ETptq. 8Epj1.WV KUL if;vxpwv Tt8Ej1.EV;5 and in the De partibus animalium he speaks of remarks on aV!"!"€TpOS are confined to its meaning in the expression aV!"!"€TpOS Kpaa's. There are passages, especially in Galen, which suggest that aV!"!"€Tp{a may in other contexts refer to the commensurability of more than two entities; see, for example, Galen's account of the Ganon of Polyclitus in DK6 I. 391. 24 and 29-36. I Cf. Vlastos, op. cit. 157. Festugiere, op. cit. 41-3 gives reasons for believing that Hippocratic medicine was groping toward exact quantitative measurement. 2 The question whether or not the Hippocratic writers differentiate between KpaaLS and !,,€,t,s (and their respective cognates) still awaits treatment. I am reluctant to assume with Jaeger, op. cit. 240 n. 13, that there is no sharp distinction between them in the fifth century B.C. Aristotle differentiates between the two in Top. 4. 2, 122b26-31 and 123"4, as does Alexander of Aphrodisias, De mixtione 3 (Bruns 216. 28-217. 2), paraphrasing Chrysippus. 3 e.g. On Ancient Medicine 5 (ad fin.) : patients should be given drink commensurate with their bodily condition: Tiiai T€ Kp~a€(J' Kat TiP 1TA..jOELStar/JVM.aaovTES ,os !"€Tp{WS EXO'; or On regimen 3. 69: disease results if exertion and food do not J.L€Tp{W~ EXEL 71'POS aAA1]Au ... a7To of: TOU larl~€Lv -rrpos crAATJAa vy€LTJ 7TpOUEGTLV. Further passages with discussion in Festugiere, loco cit. The notion of mixture in Hippocratic medicine is ably discussed by C. W. Muller, Gleiches zu Gleichem: Ein Prinzip friihgriechischen Denkens (= Klassisch-philologische Studien 31) 142-5.-Cf. Thuc. 8. 97.2 (on the government of the Five Thousand) : !,,€Tpia yap ~ T€ ES TOUS o'\{YOVS Kat TOUS 1TOA'\OUS tVyKpaa,s, terminology which may well have been borrowed from Greek medicine. 4 e.g. the four humours in On the Nature of Man 4.-0n the idea of symmetry and proportion in the Hippocratic writers in general see W. Jaeger, Paideia 3 (Engl. trans.) 27. 5 7.3, 246b4-6: '\Ve ascribe health and well-being to a mixture and proportion of hot and cold elements.' Cf. Top. 6. 2, 139b21 and 6.6, 145b8, where health is defined as a aV!"I-'€Tp{a of hot and cold elements. Alexander of Aphrodisias,
fluxes beginning in the head when 'the elements about the brain are colder than the well-proportioned mixture'. I In the doxography the expression appears in Empedocles' attribution of the origin of trees to the aVfLfLETp{a TijS" KpaaEwS" in them, which encompasses the formula ("-0Y0S") for male and female,2 in Theophrastus' criticism of Anaxagoras' theory of sensation, where he asserts that the relation of perceived object and perception stands EV aVfLfLETp{q. TLV~Ka~ KpaaEt,3 in his account of Diogenes' theory of smell as coming about when the air about the brain is TV KpaaEt aVfLfLETpOS with the odour perceived,4 and in his description of Democritus' view that thinking presupposes a well-proportioned mixture of the elements of the soul, but that the mind wanders when it gets too hot or too cold.S Among the medical writers it is Galen's De temperamentis (Greek: 7TEP~KpaaEwv) which shows best that a aVfLfLETpOS"Kpoms involves only two terms, and the terms in this treatise are always the paired opposites of the powers drywet and hot-cold.6 These medical and doxographic parallels leave no doubt whatever that in Aetius' opinion Alcmaeon, too, conceived of health as a mixture of the two powers or qualities that belong to the same pair of opposites.7 Since the condition characterized as the Quaestiones I. 9 (Bruns 19. 30-2) is probably dependent on Aristotle: EV floEV yap TV T
n
1
is thus the precise opposite of the and since, moreover, the bond of health is defined as the laovofL{a TWV OvvafLEwv, we may conclude that in this fragment both aVfLfLETpOS KpaatS" and laovofL{a describe a balance between the two opposites in a given pair in which neither one dominates the other.I It is not stated explicitly, nor need it be, any more than it needed to be stated in the case of fLovapx{a, that health requires balance within all pairs of opposite powers, that is, that it requires as many laovofL{at as there are pairs of opposites. For, since the imbalance of anyone pair is sufficient to destroy the fabric of health as a whole, there is no reason to discussin this context what would happen if more than one pair were to be out of balance. Nor does the fragment explicitly state that health requires also some kind of balance between powers that are not formally opposites of one another, for example between the hot and the wet or between the cold and the dry, any more than it envisaged in the case of fLovapx{a that one power might dominate all the rest. A balance of this kind would probably have had to be expressed by the term laOfLotp{a rather than by laovofLLa. For the doxographers as well as the medical writers use laofLotp{a whenever they want to describe the balance of all elements in a mixture,2 and in the language of law and politics laofLOtp{a is the regular word for describing the balanced sharing of-usually-more than two parties in the same thing.3 It should, however, be noted that the difference between these two ideas resides less in the number of parties involved than in the fact that laofLotp{a is always treated as a general concept, applicable wherever there is something to be 'equally shared', whereas laovofL{a remains basically a social and political concept.4 aVfLfLETpOS" KpaaLS TWV 7TOtWV
fLovapx{a
EKaTEpov,
So also Festugiere, op. cit. XXIII. For the doxographers, see, for example, Empedocles in Aetius 5. 19. 5 (= Dox. 430-1 = DK6 31. A 72); the Pythagoreans in Theophrastus, Metaphysica 33 (= DK6 58. B 14) ; and Pythagoras in Diog. Laert. 8. 26. For the medical writers see, for example, the Hippocratic On Airs, Waters, and Places 12. 18-19 (Jones) and Galen, De temperamentis I. 4 (K. I 526-7 and 533-4), 9 (K. I 564), and 2. I (K. I 573). Cf. [Arist.] De mundo 5, 396b35. In this context belongs also Soph. El. 87: yill" la0flo0Lp' d~p, although only two commensurables are involved. The fact that laoflo0lpia usually refers to more than two elements does not, of course, mean that it can never be used to describe a balance involving only two. 3 See Endnote, p. 178 below. 4 \Vhenever it occurs in other contexts, it is as a metaphor or symbol borrowed from the life of society, as here in Alcmaeon's fragment. It is, therefore, not a 'medical formula' (Vlastos, op. cit. 156), since, despite its usefulness in describing I
2
For Alcmaeon, then, laovoflia is a balance in the body politic, seen as the equilibrium of two 'powers'. What Alcmaeon thought these two powers were is harder to ascertain. While it is tempting to identify them with the terms in which Thucydides praised the government of the Five Thousand (8. 97. 2) as a flETp{a gVyKpam, of the few and the many, there is no suggestion whatever in the fragment that Alcmaeon may have had the same elements in mind, and it is extremely unlikely that quantities such as 'the many' and 'the few' would have found a place in his doctrines. 1 We depend, therefore, entirely on inferences drawn from Aetius' paraphrase, and this does not provide us with a very solid foundation. Yet it is perhaps not entirely unwarranted to see a clue again in the treatment of flovapx{a. For if flovapx{a denotes the supremacy of one power over only one other power, it is hard to see what these powers might be, except ruler and ruled. If Alcmaeon's meaning, then, is that monarchy consists in an excess of power on one side and a deficiency of it on the other, we may infer that under laovofl{a the power of those who govern is balanced by the power of those who are governed. Further than this we cannot go, nor can we determine in what terms Alcmaeon may have thought of these two powers in balance with each other. The concept of rotation in office, for example, through which the Athenian democracy achieved its balance, was as familiar to the physicians of the fifth century as it was to its political practitioners,2 but there is no indication that we have here in Alcmaeon an anticipation of the later definition of democracy as the form of government whose citizens rule and are ruled in turn.3 That the term laovofl{a as used by Alcmaeon has closer affinities with democracy than with any other form of government cannot be doubted. But it is noteworthy that he uses as the opposite of flovapx{a not DYJfloKpaT{a, which nakedly denotes the 'rule of the people', but a term which in some way expresses the principle of equality-the equality of vOflO, for ruler as well as for ruled-which a democracy embodies.
The nature of laOVOf{{a is further elucidated by three passages in Herodotus. 1 All three resemble the Harmodius skolia and the Alcmaeon fragment in that iaovofl{a is opposed to tyranny, yet there are clear indications that opposition to tyranny is not the essential meaning of the term.2 This emerges most decisively from the most famous of these passages (3. 80. 2-82), the Debate of the three Persian nobles, which followed the overthrow of the false Smerdis,3 where laovofl{a is opposed not only to one-man-rulecalled, without any difference in meaning, Tvpavv{, or flovvapX{YJ -but also to oligarchy. That Otanes, the champion of laovofl{YJ in the Debate, proposes in effect the establishment of a democratic form of government in Persia is explicitly stated by Herodotus later in his work.4 \Vhile this is sufficient to prove the close connection between laovofl{YJ and DYJfloKpaT{YJ in Herodotus, it still leaves open the problem to which we must now address ourselves: is laovofl{YJ here merely a synonym of DYJfloKpaT{YJ, as some scholars have maintained,s or, if not, what is the distinction between the two? To answer this question intelligently, we first have to examine the other two passages in which Herodotus uses the noun. The earlier of these (3. 142-3), dated in the same year as the Debate (522 B.C.), appears in the story of Maeandrius' attempt to renounce the tyranny over Samos, which he had inherited from Polycrates. The motive for the renunciation which Herodotus puts into his mouth is his adherence to an equalitarian principle, his dislike that anyone man, including Polycrates, should lord it over men like unto himself.6 How seriously Maeandrius takes his equalitarianism is shown by the words in which he casts his decision: EYW DE E, flEaov T0v aPx0v TLBEt, laovofl{YJV UflrV npoayopEVw. Two points in this phraseology are revealing. The constitutional innovation which Maeandrius offers the Samians is expressed in words almost identical with those in which Herodotus had summed up the essence of Otanes' position in the Debate :7 Herodotus uses only the noun, and not iaovoiJ-os or iaovoiJ-€w. See the criticisms of Ehrenberg and Larsen made by Vlastos, IP 5 n. 2. The opposition of the two is also over-emphasized by Leveque and Vidal-Naquet, op. cit. 28-9. 3 See Endnote, pp. 178~9 below. 4 G. 43. 3: WS xP€OV ,,') o1JiJ-oKpaT€wIJa, n':paus. 5 e.g. Larsen, Clcisth. 6-7, and Ehrenberg, OD 526. 6 142. 3: O€O'1TO'WlJ dvSpwv OfLOLWV €WVT4J. 7 3. 80. 2: ES iJ-€aov IUpa'[)a' KUTUIJ"VU' 7<, 7TP>7YiJ-UTU. I
2
a medical phenomenon, its true sphere of application remains political. See also E. Will, Korinthiaka 618-19; P. Leveque and P. Vidal-Naquet, Clisthhze l'athinien 31; and above, p. 96 n. 1 ad fin. I On the absence of quantitative considerations see Vlastos, op. cit. 157, and Festugiere, op. cit. 41-3. 2 See Vlastos, op. cit. 158. 3 The earliest extant definition along these lines is in Eur. Suppl. 406-8. Cf. Arist. Pol. 6.2, 1317a4o-b3, 1317bI8-20.
by 'placing the rule in the middle' he offers any citizen the right to hold high office. That any and every citizen is meant is shown by the fact that the speech is made before an assembly of all Samians, convoked by Maeandrius himself. I There can, accordingly, be no doubt but that the new constitution offered by l\1aeandrius in place of tyranny is a democratic form of government. More revealing still is the second point, the choice of the phrase luovop-L-'lv vp-tv 7TpoayopEvw. The verb usually employed by Herodotus as well as by other Greek prose authors for the establishment of a new form of government is Ka(){uTYJIUz or, when the change from one constitution to another is stressed, fJE8{UTYJlu.3 Nowhere in classical Greek texts, as far as I know, is a verb meaning 'to declare' or 'to proclaim' found to express either of these ideas. Accordingly, the luovofJ{YJ proclaimed by Maeandrius, however closely related to democracy, is not identical with it. The only alternative is that it is the principle of political equality, and that this is the case here is indicated by a number of circumstantial features in the story, especially by Maeandrius' equalitarian motives and his offer to make high office accessible to all. The expression T~V EAEV8Ep{YJV VfJLV 7TEptT{8YJfJt, with which he sums up his offer at the end of his speech, as well as his foundation ofa cult of Zeus Eleutherios (3. 142.2,4), points in the same direction.4 For although later Greek political thought saw a close relation between EAw8Ep{a and democracy,S Herodotus, in the only other two passages in which he links EAw8Ep{a to a form of government, neither confines the connection to democracy nor speaks of it as inherent in a form of government as such. He makes I 142.2: EKKX1u'T}V uuvaydpas mlvTwv TWV aUTwv. On the importance of this see Vlastos, IP 6 with n. 3. 2 Hdt. 5. 92T}. 5,6.43.3, 131. I; Tlmc. 1. 115. 3,4. 74·3, 8.72; Andoc. 1. 97, 2. 27; Lysias 2.18,12.42,13.12; Arist. Ath. Pol. 29. I and 3, Pol. 2.12, 1273b38, etc. 3 Thuc. 4. 76. 2, 8. 75. 2; Arist. Pol. 2. 12, 1274'7, etc. When it is emphasized that the change comes from within, /-'ETafJaXXw is used, e.g. PI. Rep. 8. 555 b, 562 a. Arist. Ath. Pol. 41. 2 uses the nouns /LETafJoX~ and /-,fTauTau<s to describe the constitutional changes in Athens. 4 The fact that Maeandrius wants to retain the priesthood of the new cult for himself and his descendants does not affect the argument.-On the relation of luovo/-,'T} and EXEVefp'T} in this passage ef. Herodotus' caustic remark, after the disbelief of the Samians in Maeandrius' sincerity had prevented them from getting the laovOflIfJ offered to theIn, au yap 3~, W~ oi'KUat, Ef30VAOVTO E:[VUL tA.€VB€POL (3. 143.2). 5 See, for example, Arist. Pol. 4. 4., 1291b34-5 (where EAEVefpia and luoTT}s are the main characteristics of democracy), 5. 9, 1310'28-32, and especially 6. 2, 13 Q'4o-bl 7·
Demaratus attribute the freedom of the Spartans not to their institutions but to the principle of the rule of vOfJ0<; which prevails among them (7. I04. 4-5),' and he attributes to the principle of luYJYop{YJ, won by the Athenians after their liberation from tyranny, the victories of the young democracy over the Boeotians and Chalcidians in 506 B.C. (5. 78).2 Although these parallels do not constitute proof that luovofJ{YJ in Maeandrius' speech refers to a political principle rather than to a form of government in which EAEV8Ep{YJ is embodied, they tend at least to support this view. The second passage which will help us understand the meaning of luovofJ{YJ in the Debate of the Persian nobles is the description of the measures taken by Aristagoras to prepare for the Ionian Revolt: KU~ 7TpWTU fJEv AOYlti fJETE~<; T~V Tvpaw{oa luovofJ{YJv E7TO{EE Tfj MtA~Tlti,
w<; av EKOVTE<; UI}T{:jJ OL MtA~UW£
uvvu7T£ura{aTo,
fJETU
OE
(5·37. 2). Aristagoras' grant of luovofJ{YJ is part and parcel of the same democratic sentiments current in Asia Minor about this time of which Herodotus speaks in connection with his narrative of the events of 5 I 2 and again of 492 B.C. This sentiment is used in 512 B.C. by Histiaeus, fearful of the tyrants' fate without Darius' support, as an argument against the revolt of Ionia from Persian rule,3 and Mardonius took cognizance of it in 492 B.C., when he deposed the tyrants and established democracies in the Ionian cities in order to protect the rear of his projected expedition to the north coast of the Aegean.4 So also here Aristagoras tries to capitalize on democratic sentiments, when he grants the Milesians luovofJ{YJ to enlist their support for his planned rebellion. What precisely does this luovofJ{YJ entail? According to Herodotus' narrative, KU~ EV Tfj aAAn
' !wv{17
TWVTO ToflTO
E7TO{EE
I On the relation between
(1967) 129-40. 3 4. 137. 2: OT}/WKpaTfWea< 4
6. 43. 3:
0TJ/LOKPUTLUS
'TOUr; yap
KUTLUTU
/-,8:A'\OV ~ TUpaVVnJWea<.
TUprivvou~
ES Tas
7TO.\LUS.
TWV ' ]wvwv
KUTu1Tuvaus
7TuvTas
0
Map3oVLG~
110
NOMOI:
BECOMES
'STATUTE'
Aristagoras did nothing about setting up a democracy in Miletus and little, if anything, about establishing democracies in the other Ionian cities whose tyrants he deposed. The connotations of ,\oYo/ leave no doubt but that, in Herodotus' view, Aristagoras' abdication was a sham, and that it was is corroborated in the sequel in that the effective control of the state remained firmly in his hands. In the case of the other cities, we only learn that he ordered the citizens to appoint generals;1 there is no talk about laovofl-{YJ here, nothing is said about the method of appointing the generals, and nothing about their functions. There is, in other words, no indication at all whether the deposition of the tyrants led to the establishment of a new form of government or whether the generals merely assumed the powers previously exercised by the tyrants.2 At any rate, Herodotus states clearly that the final end of tyranny in Ionia and its replacement by democracies had to wait until Mardonius needed Ionian support in 492 B.C. What, then, is the meaning of laovofl-{YJv E7TO{EE Tfj Mt'\~To/, if it does not signify the establishment of a democratic form of government? That the grant of laovofl,{YJ was, unlike the abdication, not a sham is shown verbally by the position of '\0Yo/, which refers only to fJ-ETEiS T~V Tvpavv{oa, not to laovofl-{YJv E7TO{EE, and historically by the fact that it achieved the result intended in that the Milesians remained loyal to Aristagoras during his absence in Sparta and Athens, and continued their struggle against Darius even after the Athenians withdrew their support (5. 38. 2, 103. I). In view of this, Herodotus can only mean that Aristagoras succeeded in granting the Milesians rights similar to those which Maeandrius had not succeeded in granting the Samians. Knowing that without his leadership and organization the revolt would make no headway, he could not possibly have gone all the way in giving the Milesians the 0YJfJ-0KpaT{YJwhich they desired and in entrusting the management of affairs to the people as a whole. But he could give them a greater degree of political equality than they had enjoyed before, even while reserving for himself an 'unequal' status, which would be meaningless, anyway, during his absence abroad. 'Ve are not told what concrete form these rights took, but 5. 38. 2: a'TpaTYjYov~ fV €KauTT/ TWV 71'oA.{wv K€A€vaas- €KaUTOV$" KaTaaT~aat. If Aristagoras' own procedure in Milctus can be taken as a guide, the two generals to whom the leadership of the revolt was entrusted were not democratically elected but appointed by Aristagoras himself, see 5. 99. 2. I
2
they must have included not only the right of all citizens to participate in the election of the officialswho were to rule in Aristagoras' absence, but also, if we are justified in drawing inferences from Maeandrius' use of the word in his offer to the Samians, the right of all citizens to be candidates for election to high office. Moreover, these rights must have been sufficient to maintain orderly government in Miletus during Aristagoras' journey to mainland Greece, and the response of the Milesians shows that Aristagoras had gone some way in satisfying their desire for democracy. We can now return to our point of departure and examine what light these two passages throw on the most elaborate discussion of laovofJ-{YJ in Herodotus, the Debate of the three Persian nobles. We noted before that Otanes' proposal, summed up by Herodotus as II EpaVat laovofJ-{YJv a7TEUowv 7TOtfjaat (3. 83. I), is later paraphrased as elis XPEOV ELYJ 0YJfJ-oKpaTEW8at IIEpaas (6. 43·3), thus establishing a close link between laovofJ-{YJ and democracy. On the other hand, the Maeandrius and Aristagoras passages have taught us that laovofJ-{YJ is not a form of government but a political principle. Does the use of laovofJ-{YJ in the Debate support our findings and, if so, can we learn more from it about the nature of laovofJ-{YJ ? It is peculiar that despite Otanes' espousal of the democratic cause the word 0YJfJ-0KpaT{a or its cognates do not occur in any part of the Debate.l Megabyzus and Darius refer to the form of government proposed by him variously as ES TlJ 7T,\fj80s • • • epEPELVTO KpaTos (3. 81. I), O~fJ-o/ .•• xpaa8wv (3·81. 3), and o~fJ-ov •.. apxovTo, (3.82.4), and Otanes himself speaks of 7T'\fj80, apxov (3. 80. 6). These expressions are the closest approximations to the concept of 'popular rule' and therefore the closest [ The explanation given by Larsen, Cleisth. 6, and accepted by Vlastos, IP 3 n. 5, that the word 0TJll.OKPU·rLU was not yet available when this passage was written, is unsatisfactory. For it assumes either that a considerable time elapsed between the composition of 3. 80. 2-82 and that of 6.43. 3 and 13I. I, where 0TJJ1-0KpUT{U is used, or that Herodotus took the Debate from an earlier source which did not yet know the term 0TJJ1-0KpUT{U. The first assumption is highly dubious, because a gap wide enough for this development in political terminology cannot be posited for the composition of Herodotus' work, even if we do not accept R. Lattimore's view ('The Composition of the "History" of Herodotus', CP 53 [1958] 9-21, esp. 9) that it is 'a continuous piece of writing which Herodotus set down from beginning to end in the order in which we now have it'. For the improbability of the second assumption, see Endnote to p. 107 below, pp. 178-9.
equivalent to 8YI/.LOKpaTLa in this passage. It is, in fact, 7rAfj80s apxov which Otanes sets out to define in the passage which most concerns us here: 7rAfj80s oE apxov 7rpWTa fJ-Evovv0fJ-a mlvTwv KaA-
a
AWTOV EXEt, tUOV0fJ-LYJV,8EVTEpa 8E T01)TWV TWV fJ-0vvapxos 7rodEt ,~, '\ ' , apxas , '" apxEt, V7rEV "8 ~"'"apxYJv EXEt, ~OVI\EVP \ ' OVOEV' 7ral\i.p fJ-EVyap vvov OE fJ-aTa 8E 7ravTa ES TO KOLVOVaVa,pEpEt (3. 80. 6). I
It is important to bear in mind that the statement is made about the 7rAfj80s apxov, not about tUOV0fJ-LYJ,which is merely the first and positive part of the two things said about the 7rAfj8os apxov. ' Iuov0fJ-LYJ, 'the fairest name of all', graces the 7rAfj8os apxov, while, negatively, it does none of the things a monarch does. The arbitrariness and violence of a monarch had been characterized by Otanes earlier in his speech (3.80.3-5), and the institutions with which he now proceeds to characterize the 7rAfj8os apxov are precisely those which at once differentiate it from a monarchy and embody its salient principle, which gives it 'the fairest name', tUOV0fJ-LYJ.The sortition of magistrates prevents the envy, the willingness to listen to slander, and the susceptibility to flattery which had been predicated of the monarch (3. 80. 4-5) ; the accountability of the magistrates (Ev8vva) stands in contrast to the monarch's unaccountability (avEv8vvi.p, 3·80. 3), and public deliberation of all matters of public policy is denied by the very fact of one-man rule. Now, while these three institutions express the principle of political equality, they are embodied in but not identical with democracy. It is a fact, and Herodotus was no doubt aware of it, that these three institutions could, in a different measure, also be found in non-democratic forms of government. We hear of sortition being used in some 0ligarchies,2and in Sparta, which was not regarded as a democratic state in antiquity, some form of Ev8vva is known to have existed3 and, as two recent studies have shown, many matters of public policy were decided not only in the Gerousia but also in the Assembly.4 In short, tUOV0fJ-La and the 1 I prefer the Bude text, which retains the yap after fJ-EV(d P), to Hude's Oxford text, which drops the yap (a Stob.). 2 Arist. Pol. 4. 15, I 300b I~3 (cf. Ath. Pol. 4. 3 and 30. 2) and Anaximenes in L. Spengel, Rhetores Graeci I. 2 (ed. by C. Hammer) 22. 3 Arist. Pol. 2. 9, 1271a6, Rhet. 3. 18, 1419a31. For sortition and euthyna in other oligarchies, see BS 313, 315, 361-4, and 366-7. 4 A. Andrewes, 'The Government of Classical Sparta', in Ancient Society and Institutions 1-20; and W. G. Forrest, 'Legislation in Sparta', Phoenix 21 (1967) 11-19·
institutions which manifest it in the Debate are perhaps found most consistently in democratic forms of government but they are not confined to democracies. This shows again that tUOv0fJ-La is the principle of political equality; it is not a constitutional form, and it ensures for all citizens an equal chance to be elected for office, an equality in holding magistrates accountable for their official acts, and an equal opportunity to participate in the shaping of policies.1 The four passages in which tUOv0fJ-La, its adjective, or its verb occur in Thucydides confirm essentiallythe results of our investigation into Herodotus' use of the term. As in Herodotus, it is closely related to democracy but not identical with it; it is a political principle rather than a form of government, and it implies not only an equality of political rights but also the potential exercise of political power. But there are some slight shifts in emphasis which add a new dimension to the concept. The first of these shifts reflects the difference between the times in which Thucydides lived from those of Herodotus and his predecessors. For the latter, the problem of tyranny versus popular government was a burning issue, whereas the constitutional question which divided the various states during the Peloponnesian War was whether a democratic or an oligarchical form of government was more desirable, Sparta generally tending to support oligarchies and Athens democracies. Accordingly, oligarchy tends to take over in Thucydides the place which tyranny had occupied as the opposite of tUOV0fJ-La in the Harmodius skolia, in Alcmaeon, and in Herodotus, especially that narrow form ofoligarchy which Thucydides calls 8vvauTELa. Thus, for example, the Thebans try to justify their pro-Persian policy in 480/79 B.C. by blaming it on a '8vvauTELa of a few men', which they contrast with both a democracy and an oALyapXLa taOv0fJ-0S (3. 62. 3) ;2Brasidas would not have been able to march through Thessaly in 424 B.C., 'if local Thessalian tradition had not sanctioned a 8vvauTELa rather than taOV0fJ-La' (4. 78. 3); in party warfare the democrats use 1 It is noteworthy that laovofJ-la comes closer than any other Greek word to expressing the modern notion of 'rights' in the sense in which we speak of the 'rights of man', 'rights of a citizen', 'Bill of Rights', etc. 2 It is true that this ovvaaT£la ot.lywv dvopwv is called
814277
rrOAtTtK1] as a slogan to counter oligarchical claims of 'rule of the best' (3. 82. 8) ; and Athenagoras intimates that the young oligarchical hot-heads in Syracuse do not want 'to be on a footing of political equality with many others'. The association of laovofLZa with democracy in three of the four passages shows again its close affinity with this form of government; but its association with a moderate form of oligarchy in the fourth passage shows that democracy and laovofLZa are not identical. That the nature of this difference is for Thucydides the same as it had been for Herodotus is illustrated by two points. Herodotus had already recognized the emotive appeal of laovofLZYJ when he had Otanes refer to it as ovvofLa mLvTwv KaAAtaTOv (3. 80. 6). But while he had shown its operation in specific democratic institutions, Thucydides uses the term almost exclusivelyin propaganda contexts, or, to borrow Vlastos' felicitous phrase, as 'more of a banner than a label'.2 It is, for example, conspicuously absent from Pericles' comparatively sober appraisal of the Athenian democracy in the Funeral Oration,3 while in Athenagoras' partisan praise of democracy over against oligarchy it seems to be equated with the propagandistic ideas of 'equal rights for equal men' and with the participation of every social group in the management of state affairs in a democracy.4 In times of party warfare the democrats use 'political equality for the masses' as a slogan against the oligarchs (3. 82. 8), and the Thebans speak of their own OAtyapxZa laovofLo, when they want to impress the Spartans (3. 62. 3).5 As in Herodotus' account of the Debate, Thucydides uses laovofLZa as a propaganda tool without, however, confining the applicability of this principle to democracy. The second point is seen in the association of laovofLZa with rrA7j(}o,. Herodotus had Otanes in the Debate speak of laovof-dYJ as laovoflZa
I
I
2
6. 38. 5: p.~ p.era 7roAAwv laovop.fra9at. IP 8.-The only exception is laovop.La in the account of Brasidas' passage
through Thessaly (4. 78. 3)· 3 Gomme, HeT 2 and 3. 109-10,347, and 542, comments on 2.37. I (p.E.,..aT' 8£Kurd. fL€V TOUS Vop,ovs 7TPOS 'TU rOta ouJ.¢opa 7TaUL TO Laov) that it expresses 'democratic laovop.La', cr. also J. T. Kakridis, Der thukydideische Epitaphios (= Zetemata 26) 25-6. This is plainly wrong, since the taov here applies to private differences, whereas laovop.{a is invariably concerned with public, i.e. political and constitutional, rights and powers; so also Vlastos, IP IS. 4 6. 38. 5: Kat 1TWS 8tKaLOV TOllS aVTOVS p.~ TWV aVTWV dtwva8aL,' and 39. I: Ofj/-,DV tvp.7rav wvop.aa9a" oA,yapx{av OE P.EpO<;K.T.A. 5 Cf. Ehrenberg, OD 536.
the most beautiful name of rrMi(}o, apxov. Thucydides extends this relation in that he associates laovofLZa with rrMi(}o, or related concepts in everyone of the four passages in which it occurs. Moreover, there is a very slight but perceptible difference in what each author means by rrMi(}o, in its political sense. While Herodotus tends to use it almost exclusively as a descriptive term for the 'people as a whole', encompassing all social strata, Thucydides, in all the laovofL{a passages, confines its meaning to a segment of the population, namely, to the 'common people', the 'broad masses', as distinguished from an upper oligarchical or aristocratic class, usually with the connotation that they constitute a majority which, if given the opportunity, can make the weight of its numerical superiority felt.2 Thus, 'political equality for the masses' is the democratic war-cry (3. 82. 8) ; if the majority ofThessalians had had laovofL{a with those in power, they would have expressed their sympathy for Athens by preventing Brasidas' passage through their country (4. 78.2-3) ; the rroAAo{ with whom the Syracusan oligarchs refuse to share political equality are the common people (6. 38. 5); and it was the majority of Thebans who were muted by an oligarchical clique during the Persian Wars but enjoy political rights under an oAtyapx{a laovofLo, (3. 62. 3-4).3 For Thucydides, therefore, laovofL{a constitutes the political equality of the majority-presumably equality with the members of the upper classes-which, where it exists, makes the will of the majority determine the policy to be pursued by the state. Moreover, as the case of the Thessalian rrMj(}o, (4·78.2-3) indicates most unequivocally, laovofL{a includes political power as well as political rights: without the possibility of exercising political power, the Thessalians could not possibly have been I
I e.g. 3. 80. 6 (TO 7TAij9o<;dEtfLV), 81. 1,82. 1 and 2, 83·2; 4.200. I; 5. 76; 8. 34. Only at I. 158. 2 and 5. 92. 1 do there seem to be overtones suggesting that a 'majority' is meant. 2 The idea of majority rule seems to inhere in all political uses of 7TAij9o<; in Thucydides. In addition to 'common people', he uses 7TAij9o<; (a) for the masses as a political force (3.47. 2; 4.66. I; 6. 8g. 4; 8. 9. 3; 8. 92. 9 [codd.]); (b) as an equivalent of EKKA'Ja{a as the sovereign decision-making body in a democracy (2. 65.8, 72. 2, 73. I; 3·37·5, 70.6; 4. 22. 2 and 3, 84·2 [bis] ; 5·41. 3, 60. 1 and 5; 6. 38. 2,60. 4), in which the vote of the majority determines all issues (3.42. 6, 43.2; 4·105. I, 106.2; 5. 27. 2,45.1; 8. 81. I); (c) to describe a political assembly in a non-democratic state in which all or a majority of citizens may participate (I. 72. 2; 5. 84. 3 and 85. I); or (d) in inter-state relations, to indicate the majority of member-states in a political league (I. 125. I ; 5. 30. I). 3 For 7TAij9o<; = 'common people' see also I. 9. 2; 2. 3. 2; 4. 21. 3; and 8.48.3.
NOMOE
116
BECOMES
'STATUTE'
thought of as able to bar Brasidas' path. However, these differences in emphasis are rather minor in character, and in all essential points the two authors are in agreement with each other. For both laovof-L{a is a political principle and not a form of government, and for both it involves not only the political equality of all citizens but also the potential power they possess; but while Herodotus views it as the political equality of the people as a whole, Thucydides thinks of it as the equality of the power of the majority with that of the upper classes. These points are summed up most clearly in the one Thucydidean passage which has caused most trouble to scholars, namely, in the response of the Thebans to charges of medism during the Persian Wars which had been levelled against them by the Plataeans before a Spartan commission ofjudges in 427 B.C. The text reads: I
Ka{ToL yap
md.jJaaeE
EV
EL8EL
Orl{-'
EKO.TEpoL ~fLWV TO£JTO E1Tpagav.
~ 1T()ALS'T<JTE ETlJYXavEv OUTE KaT'
OUTE KaTa
8TJfLOKpaT{av.
EvavnWTaTOV,
01TEp
eYYVTCLTW
8E
8E Ean
rvpavvov,
oALyapx{av
Kat OUTOL l8{aS' 8VVafLELS' eA1T{aavTES'
rou
KpaT~aELE,
KaTEXOVTES' laXVL
KUL ~ gDfL1Taaa 1TOALS'OUK aUTOKpaTWp
~fLZV fLEV
1TOALTEDovau
VOfLOLS'fLEV KaL T<{1 aW
1TpayfLaTa. M~80v
laovop,ov oMywv
En
dv8pwv
ElXE TO.
fLiiAAOV ax~aELv
El
TO.
TO 1TMjeoS' e1TT/yaYOVTO aUTOIJ.
ouaa
EavTfjS' TOUT' E1TpagEV, ouo'
CigLOV aUTfj oVEL8{aaL J)v fL~ fLETa vOfLWV iffLapTEV.2
The implication here is that, if the common people of Thebes had had any say in the matter at all, if they had enjoyed equal [ In view of this, Gomme's interpretation of Luol'ofJ-la as 'constitutional, lawabiding government, in which all citizens have equal civil rights, though not equal political power' (HCT 2 and 3. 347), is untenable, since Luol'ofJ-la is not a form of government but does involve equal political power. This interpretation is all the more surprising since Gomme recognizes, ibid. 379, that Luol'ofJ-la and apwToKpaTla 'describe certain conditions which ideally should accompany the two forms of government'. For a full criticism of Gomme's views on Luol'ofJ-la see Vlastos IP who takes them as his point of departure. ' , 2 3.62.3-4: 'And yet consider under what conditions each of us acted as we did. Th: consti~ution of our city at that time happened to be neither an oligarchy in whIch all CItizens enjoy equal political rights nor a democracy. An institution most opposed to lawful and orderly administration and to the soundest procedures, and clo~est to ~ tyrant, a clique of a few men, controlled our affairs. These, in the hope of mcreasmg their own power, if the cause of the !'.fede were to prevail, forcibly suppressed the common people and brought him in. The city as a whole had no power over herself when this policy was adopted, and she does not deserve to be reproa:hed .for, ~istakes she committed when there was no lawful and orderly admIllistratIOn. For the meaning of vop.os in this passage see above, pp. 32-3.
political rights, that is, with their oligarchical rulers their majority would have ensured that no pro-Persian policy' would have b:cn pursued at the time. They would have had these rights and thISpower, the Thebans claim, if a democracy or an oALyapx{a laov~fLos had been the constitutional form of Thebes during the PerSIan ·Wars.That a democracy would have vouchsafed the Theban commons this equality is self-evident. But that they would have enjoyed the same equality under an oligarchy required some explanation, and that is the reason why the adjective laovof-Los had to be added to oALyapx{a. The specific reference of Karu oYjfLoKpar{av is presumably to the constitution of Plataea, which enabled the Plataeans in the past to opt for an anti-Persian policy. It is more difficult to be sure what state preciscly is mcant by oALyapx{a laovof-Los. Are the Thebans speaking of the constitution under which they lived at the time of their speech, in 427 B.C., or of the constitution which enabled the Spartans, whom they are here addressing, to take up arms against the Persians in 480/79 B.C. ? Either interpretation has found supporters,! and both can be defended, although it seems more probable that the Thebans are thinking of their own present constitution, since their speech is devised to establish their respectability in the eyes of the Spartans.2 !n order to show that oALyapx{a laovofLos is not an inappropnate name for the Spartan constitution, it is sufficient to recall that Aristotle cites Sparta as the prime example of a mixture of democracy and oligarchy, enumerating as democratic features the equalitarian education of children and youths, the equality of men promoted by the syssitia and the likeness of dress, and the participation of all citizens in the election of the Gerousia and in eligibility for the ephorate, while he calls oligarchical the absence I Theban constitution: P. Cloche, Thebes de BIotie 73 with n. 2; Vlastos, Ison. 360 and IP 14; L. Moretti, Ricerche sulie leghe greche 136; I. A. F. Bruce, An Historical Commentary on the Helienica Oxyrhynchia 160 with n. 2. Spartan Constitution: C. F. Smith, L?eb Thucydi?es, vol. 2 (1953) lIOn. I; K. von Fritz, Wiener Studien 78 (1965) 26. BS 1413 WIth n. I occupy an intermediate position, assuming that the moderate oligarchy was instituted in Thebes under Spartan influence after the battle of Plataea. 2 This assumption would be strengthened if we could take KaTel OTJp.oKpaTlav as a reference to the democratic regime in Thebes which, according to Arist. Pol. 5·3, .1302b29, was overthrown after the battle ofOenophyta. Since, however, this regime ISsaid to have fallen because of its bad administration (cf. [Xen.], Ath. Pol. 3. I I), the Thebans may not have wished to remember it here.
of the lot from the election to any office and the concentration of the judicial power to inflict death and exile in the hands of a few men (Pol. 4. 9, 1294bI4-34).1 Similarly, under the Theban constitution, which lasted without substantial change from 447 to 386 B.C.,2 the full citizens enjoyed rights and powers which would well justify the appellation laovoj.Lo<;. According to the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia each member-state of the Boeotian League had four councils, of which each acted in turn as the executive branch of government and prepared all matters to be discussed by the other three councils; only measures approved by all four councils could authoritatively be acted upon. Any full citizen was eligible for membership in one of the councils.3 These two features, the eligibility to the councils of all full citizens and the rotating administration by each of the four councils, gave Thebes that equality of political rights and of political power which is appropriately reflected in the epithet laovoj.Lo<;. But this did not mean that Thebes was a democracy. For full citizenship was limited to those who owned a minimum amount of capital, probably fixed at the requirement for the hoplite census.4 Since only a minority of Thebans can have ranked as hoplites and higher,Sthis means that the majority was barred from membership in the councils and thus from the active exercise of power, I
Cf. also the Spartan
0fLoW', Pol. 5. 7, 1306b30,
with Xen. Lac. Resp. 10. 7,
Anab. 4. 6. 14. 2 See BS 1414-15; Cloche, op. cit. 71 ;]. A. O. Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History 31; Moretti, op. cit. 133; and Bruce, op. cit. 157. 3 Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (Bartoletti) 16. 2, with the discussions in BS 1417 with n. I, Larsen, op. cit. 31-2, and Bruce, op. cit. 157-64. We know less about the functioning of these local councils than is generally recognized. We do not know (a) of how many members each of the four councils was composed; (b) whether every full citizen was actually a member of one of the councils or whether he was merely eligible (.tiiv fLETEXELV suggests the latter alternative); (c) in what manner the councillors were appointed and (d) assigned to serve on one council rather than on another; and (e) whether those citizens who, because of their low census, were not themselves eligible to council membership were entitled to vote in the elections to the councils. 4 See Endnote, p. 180 below. ; The proportion of full citizens to those below the hoplite census is hard to ascertain even approximately. Of the Boeotians mentioned as participants in the battle of Delium by Thuc. 4. 93. 3, 8,500 seem to have belonged to the hoplite census (this includes 500 peltasts) and 10,000 light-armed troops were certainly below that census. Although these figures apply to the Boeotians as a whole and not even to their full complement, it is probable that the ratio of hoplites to the lower classes was the same for Thebes, cf. Moretti, op. cit. 134 and 150-1. [Herodes], Peri politeias 30- [, suggests that in the oligarchies set up by Sparta after the Peloponnesian "Var only one third of the citizens enjoyed full citizenship, and if
even though they may possibly have had the right to participate in the election of their councillors. From this point of view, then, the Theban constitution was an oligarchy and was called such by Thucydides (S. 3 I. 6; cf. 4·76. 2). In short, if this was the constitution of Thebes in 427 B.C., the Thebans were right not only in contrasting it with government by an oligarchical clique, but also in calling it an oligarchy because of its restriction of active citizenship, but an OAtyuPX{u laoJloj.Lo<;, because all full citizens enjoyed equal political rights and equal political power.2 There is no need to pursue our analysis of laoJloj.L{u into the fourth century. While it is true that there is some evidence that the concept came to be coloured by the 'statute' meaning of VOj.Lo<;, that merely meant that political equality was predicated upon the enactment of equitable laws and adds nothing essentially new to what we have ascertained about laoJloj.L{u in the fifth century.3 Before proceeding now to a discussion of the problem of chronology, that is, of the question when and under what circumstances laovoj.L{u first appeared in Athens, it will be useful to ask in the light of the results we have obtained which sense or senses of VOj.Lo<;laoJloj.L{u is likely to reflect. That it must be a political vOj.Lo<; is evinced by the very fact that, unlike UJloj.L{u, laovoj.L{u is never used of individuals but always of the state.4 Moreover, whereas ElJVo,u{u, OvaJloj.L{u, UJloj.L{u, and KUKOVOj.L{U carry moral overtones, laovoj.L{u always retains a purely political character. Alcmaeon sees in it the balance of a political community in which ruler and ruled do not exceed one another in power; for Herodotus laovoj.L{YJ embodies the principle that every citizen shall have an equal I
this proportion reflects a general pattern, it may well have applied to Thebes between 447 and 386 B.C. At any rate, I know of no other statement that might form the basis for]. A. O. Larsen's assertion, TAPA 86 (1955) 41, that the active citizens of the Boeotian Confederacy constituted 'less than one-half of the adult males of the citizen body'. I See above, p. 118 n. 3. 2 E. Will, Korinthiaka 619, aptly paraphrases o'\,yapxia laovofLos as 'democratie limitee it la base'. For the moderate character of Theban oligarchy, see also BS 1416; Larsen, Representative Government 32; Moretti, op. cit. 135-6; and Bruce, op. ci t. 157-64. 3 The most important fourth-century passages, i.e. those in Isocrates and Plato, are discussed in detail by Vlastos, IP 18-35. For a criticism of his views see Endnote, pp. 180~2 below. 4 The exception, o.vryp laovofL'KoS in PI. Rep. 8. 561 e, is only apparent and not real, since the adjective obviously does not describe a man who 'has equal rights and powers', but one who 'adheres to equalitarian principles'.
opportunity to occupy a position of authority, to check authority, and to participate in framing those regulations which will affect the welfare of the state; and the element stressed by Thucydides is that under laovofL{a the common people, as constituting the majority of the citizen body, have equal rights and equal powers with those who rule the state. This suggests that laovofL{a has its closest affinity with two of the senses of vOfLoS isolated in Part I above. Since it distributes power in the state on a basis of equality, it seems to reflect the vOfLoS which describes the authority to issue norms and of which we found the first indication in Heraclitus and the first clear expression in Aeschylus' Supplices (above, pp. 26-9). In this sense, then, laovofL{a confers equal authority to govern upon both ruler and ruled. But from a different point of view the term reflects the political norms and regulations by which both ruler and ruled are equally bound, the statutes which are valid and binding equally on both, which we encounter first also in Aeschylus' Supplices (above, pp. 43-52). It is no accident that, contrary to the vOfLoS embodied in the other compounds we have discussed, neither of these senses is attested before the fifth century B.C. There is one point to add. By its very nature the principle expressed by laovovla has its closest affinity with democracy, although, as we have tried to show, it is not identical with oYjfLOKpa,r(a, since it does not designate a form of government. But since the terminology for all constitutional forms, except the monarchical, I developed much more slowly than the constitutional forms themselves,zthe authors who wrote before oY)fLoKparla and oY]rLOKparEfa8at were coined used the principle most characteristic of a democracy to describe the democratic form of government, and there can, consequently, be no doubt that Alcmaeon and Herodotus are thinking only of democracy when they speak of
Our next task is to fit the results obtained from our discussion of laovofLla into a historical context. For since laovofL{a has been shown to be a purely political concept, related to the political senses of vOfLos, we may be able to infer from the circumstances surrounding the earliest evidence for laovofLla at what point vOfLOS first assumed its sense of 'statute'. There is, as far as I know, general agreement that the Harmodius skolia constitute our earliest surviving evidence for laovofLla in the form of the adjective laovofLos. But since some controversy surrounds the date at which they were composed, and much controversy the historical circumstances of their composition, we shall have to address ourselves to these problems now. The Harmodius skolia consist of four stanzas, celebrating the achievements of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which are included in Athenaeus' collection of some twenty-five Attic drinking songs (15. 695 a-b). Only two of these stanzas, Nos. 10 and 13, contain the wordlaovo{wvS, but since all four are relevant to the problem of determining the date and the historical background of these two, I shall quote them in full:1 10
T6 g{
KAaDL
WU7TEP :4pfLODLOs KaL i1pWToyE{TWV ~,
aTE
"
II
I
TOV Tvpavvov
lUOVOfLOVS
T'
KTaVETTJV
i18~vas
EV
E7TotTJuaTTJV.
ou n
:4pfLODt',
V~UOtS D'
TTW TE8vTJKas,
UE
fLaKapwv
i1XtAEDs TE t
[va 7TEp 7ToDwKTJS TVDEtDTJV 12
EV fLVpTOV
L1tofL~DEa.
T6 g{
KAaDL
WU7TEP :4pfLoDLOS KaL i1pwToydTwV OT' i18TJva{TJs
laovof-Lla.
While the Linear B tablets speak of wanax and ltiwtigettis (see M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, Documents in Mvcenaean Greek 119--25, and L. R. Palmer, The Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek Texts 83-95), they do not yet know abstracts to describe the institution of monarchy. The earliest uses I can find of an abstract term for a form of government are TVpUVV{, in Archilochus, frg. 22. 3, and /l-ovuPX{u in Alcaeus, frg. 6. 27, in E. Lobel and D.
EV fLVPTOV
EV
aVDpa Tvpavvov
8vu{ats "I7T7Tapxov
EKatVETTJV.
I
13
aiEL u
~
\'
KAEOS
EUUETat KaT'
acav,
:4pfLODtE KaL i1pWTOyEt
TOV,
on TOV Tvpavvov
,
KTaVETTJV
lUOVOfLOVS T' )1e~vas
E7TotTJuaTTJV.
I The text is Page's, PMG, Nos. 893-6. The most valuable recent discussions of the date of these stanzas are: Brunnsaker; Ehrenberg, HL; and Bowra, GLP 373-97, esp. 391-6; see also Podlecki.
( 10) In a myrtle bough I will wear the sword like Harmodius and Aristogeitonwhen they killed the tyrant and made Athens isonomous. (1 1) Dearest Harmodius, you are no longer dead, but people say that you are in the Islands of the Blest,where is swift-footedAchillesand, they say, the son of Tydeus, noble Diomedes. (12) In a myrtle bough I wiII wear the sword like Harmodius and Aristogeiton,when at the sacrificeto Athena they slewa tyrant-man, Hipparchus. (13) For ever will you both have fame on earth, dearest Harmodius and Aristogeiton-because they slew the tyrant and made Athens isonomous.
The internal evidence for the date presents a few problems, but more problematic are the circumstances of composition. The mention of the murder of Hip parch us in three of the four stanzas and of the death of Harmodius in the fourth gives us 514 B.C. as a firm terminus post quem for the Harmodius skolia as a whole. More problematic is the reference in the last two lines of stanzas ro and 13 to the creation of an laov6fJ-ovS' .f18~vaS'. Our analysis of all the fifth-century passages in which laovofJ-la occurs has shown that it embodies the concept of political equality and is usually associated with a democratic form of government. This suggests that these lines refer to the democratic constitution ushered in by the reforms of Cleisthenes, so that we could adopt 507 B.C. as the terminus post quem for the two stanzas (ro and 13) in which they appear. But can we be sure? The result of adopting this view would be that the skolia contain not merely one historical mistake but two. For if the Athenians sang this song soon after the events celebrated in them they would have-or ought to haveknown even better than we that Harmodius and Aristogeiton neither slew the tyrant nor established a democratic form of government. There is no way of getting round the first of these mistakes, and the only way of avoiding the second is to posit for laov6fJ-ovS' a reference to something other than the reforms of Cleisthenes. This path was actually taken by Ehrenberg, who advocated the view that, before being embraced by Cleisthenes and his adherents, laovofJ-la denoted an equality of the members of the Athenian nobility in the face of the 'inequality' of tyranny, and that it became the slogan of the nobles who were exiled after the murder of Hipparchus.1 But this view creates more problems I Ehrenberg, Ison. 294--6; Eun. 89; and OD 530-4. His views were accepted by Larsen, Cleisth, 8. However, Vlastos, Ison. 339-44, has shown that it is easier to
than it solves. Ehrenberg himself regards it as 'something of a puzzle' how this slogan of the nobility could so quickly have become 'the watchword of the democracy'.1 Moreover, in none of the other laovofJ-la passages which we have examined is the term restricted to only one class of society, but it always refers to the people as a whole, and further, Vlastos, after canvassing all the possible historical references of laov6fJ-ovS' in the Harmodius skolia has shown that it can have been used neither as 'a neutral term which simply means liberation from tyrannic rule, without any positive specification of the sort of government that followed', nor as 'a term which does describe the ensuing regime, but thinks of it only as the reinstatement of the pre-Peisistratid constitution'.2 In view of this, Ehrenberg, with his characteristic forthrightness, has conceded that his belief in an aristocratic laovofJ-la was erroneous.3 This means that the laov6fJ-ovS' .f18~vaS' of stanzas 10 and 13 can refer only to the constitution established by Cleisthenes, and the aorists E11'OLY)aaTY)v, with which each of these stanzas ends, show that the constitution was an accomplished fact by the time these stanzas were composed, so that 507 B.C. can be taken as a firm terminus post quem for their origin. But it also means that we shall have to account for two distortions of historical facts in the Harmodius skolia. Before we can discuss those, however, some further problems of dating remain to be clarified. If we could assume that the four stanzas quoted by Athenaeus constitute one song, we should be able to leave matters at that and try now to establish a terminus ante for the song as a whole. But there are indications that this was not the case. The earliest extant reference to 'the Harmodius' is found in Aristophanes' Acharnians (g80), and the scholion on that passage cites as the beginning of that song what appears as the second stanza (I I) in Athenaeus' collection.4 To the two different beginnings given by assume two historical mistakes than to posit an otherwise unattested unlikely aristocratic laovofLia..
and a priori
[ OD 531. Ison. 339-44. HL 67 with n. 23, where he expresses reserve, however, about Vlastos' treatment of the skolion as a whole. 4- EV 'Tar~ TWV 7T(hwv UVV600LS' p..tAOS' 'TL, :4pf-LOOLOV Kai\oVfl-€vOV, 00 ~ apx~· ¢{ATUT€ :4.PfLoou oun 7TOU TfOv'Y/Kas (= Suda, s.v. OVO€1TOT' eyw TOUTOV v1Tooi;OfLat K.T.A. Cf. also ibid. S.V. 7TC5.POtVO~). That the scholiast's identification of this stanza as 'the Harmodius' may be right is suggested by Ach. 1093, where dancing-girls are called Ta #ATa.O' :4PfLooiov, no doubt as a parody on this same stanza. Hesychius, 2
3
noov
124
NOMOI.:
BECOMES
'STATUTE'
Athenaeus and the scholiast on the Acharnians respectively, Aristophanes' Wasps (1222-6) adds a third in a passage which, in giving us the earliest information we have on the traditions of singing skolia, provides us with an explanation for these different beginnings. The setting is Bdelycleon's attempt to teach his father Philocleon how to behave at a banquet. Among other things, he wants him to learn 'how to cap drinking songs properly' (Tel aKo/t!' 07TWS oEgE! KU/tWS), and to this end he starts 'the Harmodius' with a line which he asks his father to cap (4ow oE 7TpWTOS :4pfLootov' oEgat oE au), and this line is not only different from those cited as the beginning by Athenaeus and the scholiast on the Acharnians, but it is nowhere else attested for the Harmodius song at all : OVOELS7TW7TOT' dv~p EyEvT' )1B~vu!s'no man was ever born in Athens .. .'.1 The fact that we have thus three beginnings attested for the song proves that the stanzas did not follow one upon the other in any set sequence-or in any sequence at all, for that matter, since we do not know whether or not a single stanza could stand by itself, and whether or not other stanzas customarily followed upon the first one sung on a given occasion. For if the 'capping' procedure in the Wasps is any guide, the first singer needed apparently to sing no more than one or two lines,2 to which the second would add another one or two lines. If this was the procedure, it would explain why the first two lines of stanzas 10 and 12 of Athenaeus' collection are identical and the last two lines of stanzas 10 and 13 almost identical each with the other. They may, therefore, be 'movable' lines belonging traditionally to the Harmodius song as beginning and capping lines, respectively, capable of being combined with one another according to the pleasure of those whose turn it was to start or to cap s.v. l1p/"OO{OV /"<)\0<:;, attributes TO €71t IIp/"o8{tp 710('l70.v aKdAwv to one Callistratus. But since (a) it is uncertain whether he refers to this stanza, a different stanza on Harmodius now lost, or to the whole group ofskolia on the tyrannicides, and since (b) we do not know who this Callistratus was or when he lived, Hesychius' entry is not of much use to us. I I see no need to assume with Ehrenberg, HL 60-1, that it is merely a variant beginning of what is the first stanza (10) in Athenaeus. It seems much more likely that we have here the beginning of a different stanza now lost to us, in which only one of the tyrannic ides was celebrated, presumably Harmodius, because (a) his name and not Aristogeiton's is mentioned at line 1225; (b) the song is usually referred to by his name alone, see, for example, Adz. 980, 1093; Ar. frg. 430; Antiph ant's, frg. 85; Aelius Aristides 11.80; etc.; and (c) his youth made him the more popular of the tyrannicides. 2 Two, if Philocleon's 'capping' at 1227 is a premature interruption.
II.: 0 NOMI
A AND
ATHENS
125
the song. Moreover, the fact that one of the three beginnings is otherwise unknown to us points to the possible existence in antiquity of additional stanzas, which may now be lost to us, and the practice of capping, as shown in the scene in the ~l1asps, makes it probable that new stanzas were constantly added as long as the practice of singing skolia at banquets remained a living tradition. 1 This in turn makes it likely that the four stanzas which Athenaeus has transmitted to us were composed at different times.2 In view of this, the terminus post quem of 507 B.C. is valid only for the first and fourth stanzas of Athenaeus' collection (10 and 13)' For the second and third stanzas (I I and 12) our only guide is the negative fact that neither of them as much as mentions the liberation from the tyranny and the positive fact that the praise of Harmodius in the second stanza (I I) and the statement that they killed Hipparchus in the third (12) give 5 I 4 B.C. as the terminus post quem. How soon or how late after that date they were composed we cannot tell. But, as Ehrenberg has pointed out, the third stanza (12) differs from the first (10) and the fourth (13) in that it is free from distortion of historical fact: Hipparchus is mentioned by name and he is called a tyrant, not the tyrant, and the Panathenaic festival is correctly identified as the occasion of the murder.3 This and the militant tone of the stanza, more appropriate to a time of struggle than to the years after the expulsion of the tyrants, suggest that it may have originated among the opponents of the tyranny soon after Hippias exiled and killed many of them as a sequel to Hipparchus' murder.4 Once we recognize these as valid grounds for dating the third stanza (12) soon after 514 B.C. but before 51 I/ro B.C., we may also aClmit the I For our knowledge of the tradition, we depend mainly on Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, as reported by the scholiast on PI. G9rg. 451 e, cf. also on Ar. Nub. 1364, and Pluto Quaest. conDo1. 1,615 b-c. The basic modern treatment is that of R. Reitzenstein, Epigramm und Skolion 3-13; the most important recent discussion is that of A. E. Harvey, 'The classification of Greek lyric poetry', CQN.S. 5 (1955)
157-75, esp. 162-3 and 174"-5· 2 The significance of this was first recognized by Reitzenstein, op. cit., esp. 22-3· His results were improved upon by F. Koepp, Neue Jahrbiicher fiir das klassische Altertum 9 (1902) 614-34, esp. 615, accepted by Aly, RE S.V. 'Skolion' 562, and by Ehrenberg, HL 58 n. 5. Cf. also Bowra, GLP 393· 3 HL 66. 4 Hdl. 5. 62. 2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 19. I, with Ehrenberg, HL 66, and Brunnsaker
23-4·
second stanza (II) as earlier than the first (IO) and the fourth (13), since it simply praises Harmodius without specifying his achievements. If we interpret it as saying, 'Harmodius, you have not died in vain', as well we might, its tone would suit the opponents of Hippias as well as does the tone of the third stanza (12). Consequently, Brunnsaker is probably right in assigning it, too, to the period between 514 and SIO B.C.I If the rather tenuous evidence makes a date soon after the event celebrated plausible in the case of the second (I I) and third (12) stanza, can we assume that the first (10) and fourth (13) stanzas were also composed soon after the event which they celebrate, that is, soon after a democratic form of government was instituted in Athens in 507 B.C.? To attain certainty in this matter is impossible and we must be satisfied if we can marshal sufficiently impressive circumstantial evidence to give us any plausible answer at all to this question. The safest way to approach the problem is by trying to find a terminus ante quem for the two stanzas which celebrate the establishment of laovoj-tLa. The direct evidence is not of much help, for the earliest refere~ce to the beginning of the first stanza (10), which is identical WIth the beginning of the third (12), is not found until 4II B.C., when the chorus of old men in Aristophanes' Lysistrata sing of the sword the~ will wear in a myrtle bough to fight against the Spartan conspIracy to set up a tyranny in Athens, which they suspect behind the revolt of Lysistrata's women (631-3). This leaves us wit~ a gap of ninety-six years between the two termini, a gap too wIde to be useful, and we must, therefore, try to narrow it by a more indirect route. We are helped in this endeavour by the conclusion arrived at independently by Reitzenstein and Wilamowitz in' I893, that the collection of twenty-five skolia, of which the four stanzas of the Harmodius form a part, constitutes a unified whole, which Athenaeus took from a single source.2 Therefore, if we can date the songs in this collection other than the Harmodius skolia and find that all belong to a more or less well defined period, we may presume that the Harmodius skolia, too, belong to the same I Brunnsaker 23-4. Ehrenberg, HL 60-1, is uncertain on this point. He dates II ear her .than 13.but suggests only a date 'not very early' for the latter. 2 Reltzenstem, op. cit. 13-14; Wilamowitz, AA 2. 316-22. Accepted by Bowra, GLP 375-6.
period. 1 Since Athenaeus called his collection }tTTLKa ad'\ta (IS' 693 f.), and since the same term is used, apparently for the same collection, by Dio Chrysostom (2. 63), it is safe to conclude that all twenty-five songs originated in Attica. Of the twenty-one songs which remain if we leave the four Harmodius stanzas out of consideration for the present, seven are impossible to date with any verisimilitude, since they contain moralizing maxims and witticisms which could have been composed at any time and for any kind of society.2 Of the remaining fourteen, only four are datable with any degree of certainty, two by their author and two by the events which they celebrate. The ascription of No. 7 with some (though not complete) confidence to Simonides (about 556-468 B.C.) 3 and of No.8, on the basis of papyrus finds, to Alcaeus (born about 620 B.C.)4 suggests that other songs in this collection may also belong to the sixth century or the early decades of the fifth. A more precise date is given by Nos. 23 and 24, also preserved in Aristotle's Constitution of Athens (19, 3, 20. 5), which commemorate two thwarted attempts undertaken after 514 B.C. to overthrow the tyranny of Hippias, the attempt of Kedon, and the defeat at Leipsydrium. Now, since Kedon left no other mark on Athenian history, and since the Leipsydrium song says nothing of the success which eventually came to the opponents of the tyranny, it is generally and, I think, correctly assumed that both were composed shortly after the events, that is within the period SI4-SIO B.C.S I Reitzenstein, who did the pioneer work on dating the collection, reached the conclusion that it was completed by the middle of the fifth century, on the ground that Pindar influenced and Praxilla was influenced by songs contained in it (op. cit. 13-24, esp. 14-15). More recent work on the collection has shown that Reitzenstein's reasons are not compelling, and the date has been pushed back much closer to the time of Marathon and Salamis by Bowra, GLP 375-97, to whose arguments much of the following discussion is indebted. 2 No.6 praises true friendship, NO.9 honesty, No. 19 companionship in love and drink, No. 25 loyalty, while Nos. 20, 21, and 22 contain proverbial wisdom in varying degrees of coarseness. Bowra, GLP 381-3 and 390-1, seems to me to be going too far in trying to link these songs with an aristocratic society, and especially with the world of the Peisistratids. 3 For the testimonia see Page, PMG frg. 651. 4 Alcaeus, frg. 249 with D. L. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus 196-7, and Bowra, GLP
374-5· 5 See Bowra, GLP 383-4. The date of Leipsydrium is confirmed by Hdt. 5. 62. 2. Bowra dates Kedon's attempt before 514 B.C., presumably because Aristotle dates it before Leipsydrium. But it seems much more probable that both Kedon's attempt and the defeat at Leipsydrium are measures taken by Hippias' opponents after their exile from Athens as a consequence of Hipparchus' murder.
A considerable amount of circumstantial evidence has enabled C. M. Bowra to assign five of the remaining ten songs to the times of Marathon and Salamis, and the other five to the period of Peisistratus and his sons. Among the first four songs, all of which are addressed to deities closely associated with Athens, the fourth stands out as the only one devoted to a non-Olympian god, Pan. Moreover, Pan is-strangely for an Attic song-addressed as 'lord of famed Arcadia'-J4pKaoLas JLEOEWV KAEEVVrlS. This can most reasonably be explained as a reference to the establishment of the Pan cult in Athens after the battle of Marathon as a result of Philippides' vision in the Parthenion mountains in Arcadia on his way to Sparta. I Once this is accepted, a number of other songs fall into place. Bowra has shown that the appellation of Artemis as dypoTEpa in NO.3 may well be related to the sacrifice of five hundred goats to her, vowed by Miltiades and offered by the polemarch on the sixth day of Boedromion, the anniversary of the battle of Marathon.2 That at the beginning of the whole collection should stand songs to Athene and the Eleusinian goddesses is natural enough at any time; but the title TpLTOyEVEta applied to Athena in No. I associates this song with a time of special emergency, such as that in which Athens found herself at the time of Marathon and again of Salamis,3 and the invocation of Demeter and Persephone in NO.2 may well be related to the vision of Dicaeus, son of Theocydes, and Demaratus on the Thriasian Plain just before the battle of Salamis, when they saw the dust of an army of 30,000 men 'arise from Eleusis to bring aid to the Athenians and their allies' and heard their mystic shout.4 If, then, the four introductory songs can be associated with Marathon or Salamis, the victory in NO.5 may well refer to one of these battles. The mutilated state of the last line leaves uncertain the role played by Pandrosus in the victory. Bowra has interpreted her presence as an indication that the song was composed in honour of Marathon, when her shrine was still intact.5 But her name may equally well be taken as an allusion to the sacred olive tree which stood in the Hdt. 6. 105, with Bowra, GLP 385-6. GLP 387-9, citing Aelian, VH 2. 25; Pollux 8. gl ; Pluto De malignitate Herodoti 26, 862 b-c. Bowra accepts Aelian's 300 goats and 6th ThargeIion; but see L. Deubner, Attische Feste 20g with n. 6. 3 GLP 388-g. 4 Hdt. 8. 65. Bowra, GLP 389-go, sees only social but no political implications in this song. 5 GLP 386-7. 1
2
precinct of her shrine (Philochorus, frg. 67) and which was burned down by the Persians at the time of Salamis and had miraculously sprouted forth a new shoot by the next day (Hdt. 8. 55; Paus. 1. 27. 2). The first five songs may then plausibly be regarded as a group that celebrates events connected with the Persian Wars, and the very specific nature of the incidents to which they seem to be related suggests that, like the Kedon and Leipsydrium songs, they were composed very soon after the events to which they are devoted. The same may be said of a second block of five songs (Nos. 14-18) which may reflect events associated with Peisistratus and his sons. Bowra has adduced cogent reasons for relating No. 14, the Admetus song, to the help rendered Hippias by the Thessalian cavalry under Cine as at the time when the Spartans under Anchimolius landed in Attica in an attempt to expel Hippias.1 If this is correct, 'the Admetus' was composed in Peisistratid circles, that is, it comes from the opposite side of the political fence to that which produced the Kedon and Leipsydrium songs. Furthermore, it creates the probability that the next two songs in the collection, Nos. 15 and 16 on Ajax and Telamon, are derived from Peisistratus' interest in Salamis and in the Troad. For it was in the campaigns for the possession of Salamis that Peisistratus won his first renown, and it was to Sigeum in the Troad, conquered by his father, that Hippias fled after his expulsion.2 More doubtful, but still within the realm of the possible, is Bowra's association of the two couplets which follow, Nos. 17 and 18, with one or both of the Dionysiac and Panathenaic festivals, which were reorganized by Peisistratus.3 If Bowra's assignment of these songs is correct, we may again assume that all or most of them were composed soon after the events which they celebrate. For while their survival may be explained by the absence of any reference to the tyrants and by the general tenor of their references to gods and heroes, they are not likely to have been composed in honour of Peisistratus' exploits and those of his allies after the expulsion of tyrants. Bowra's conclusions are speculative and the basis which they provide for our inquiry into the terminus ante quem of the first (10) 1
2 3
Hdt. 5.63.2-4 and Arist. Ath. Pol. Ig. 5, with Bowra, GLP 376-9. Arist. Ath. Pol. 17. 2; 14. 1 ; Hdt. 5. 94. I, with Bowra, GLP 379-80. GLP 380-1.
cr.
and fourth (13) stanzas of the Harmodius skolia cannot be said to be firm. Yet their cumulative effect is sufficiently impressive to draw some plausible inferences. Three periods of Athenian history seem to be represented in Athenaeus' collection of Attic skolia : the time of Peisistratus and his sons, the opposition to the tyranny, and the time of the Persian Wars, particularly the victories of Marathon and Salamis. Since, moreover, none of the twenty-five skolia seems to have been composed later, we may regard the time shortly after Salamis as the terminus ante for the origin of the poems contained in the collection, though perhaps not for the collection in its present form. Within these three groups the four Harmodius skolia may well join the Kedon and Leipsydrium songs as members of the group representing the opposition to the tyranny, and since, as we have seen, the datable songs in the collection were presumably composed soon after the events which they celebrate, it is a reasonable assumption that the first (10) and fourth (13) stanzas of the Harmodius were written not long after the establishment of the Athenian democracy in 507 B.C., the only event to which, in the light of our analysis of luovofL{a, the lines luovofLoVS T' }48~vas E7TOL7]UUT7]V can refer. This brings us to a consideration of the historical circumstances in which stanzas 10 and 13 were composed. How are we to account for the two falsifications of historical fact which these stanzas contain? For while these stanzas credit Harmodius and Aristogeiton with having slain the tyrant (and thus having liberated Athens) as well as with having made Athens luovofLoVS, every adult living in Athens in the last decade of the sixth century must have known (a) that Harmodius and Aristogeiton did not kill Hippias and that the liberation was effected by the Spartans under Cleomenes acting under the prodding of Delphi and the Alcmaeonids, and (b) that it was Cleisthenes who established a democratic form of government. Among the solutions proposed for this problem, two deserve particular attention. F. Jacoby tried to resolve it by assuming that the falsification was the deliberate work of forces hostile to Cleisthenes who wanted to deprive the Alcmaeonids of the credit for having liberated Athens by attributing it to the Gephyraei, the genos to which Harmodius I
I (0) Hdt. 5. 62-5; Arist. Ath. Pol. 19.2-6. Arist. Ath. Pol. 21.
(b) Hdt. 5. 66.2,69.2,6.131.
!;
and Aristogeiton belonged.! This hypothesis might conceivably provide a reasonable explanation, if the two stanzas merely credited Harmodius and Aristogeiton with slaying the tyrant, that is, with liberating Athens. But since they are also praised for having made Athens luovofLoVS, it is difficult to see, as Ehrenberg has pointed out, who the anti-Alcmaeonids would have been who would have paid this tribute to the tyrannicides.2 If they had been supporters of Isagoras, as Jacoby seems to believe,3 they would hardly have wished to celebrate the establishment of luovofL{a at all. If, on the other hand, they were anti-Alcmaeonids who supported the democratic reforms but opposed Cleisthenes, the complete silence of all our sources about them makes them too hypothetical an entity to be taken seriously. Moreover, the implied contention that the Gephyraei were 'one of the great clans ... with whom Kleisthenes fell out immediately after the expulsion of Hippias, perhaps as early as 511/10 B.C.' is not supported by any evidence at all.4 This weakness in Jacoby's argument was recognized also by one of the most ardent admirers of his theories of the antiAlcmaeonid origin of the tyrannicide cult, A. J. Podlecki.5 The solution he proposed in its place is very radical indeed. He regards it as axiomatic that the Alcmaeonids 'would have opposed vehemently anyone who put forward the claims of Harmodius and Aristogeiton' and that 'the supporters of the claims of Harmodius and Aristogeiton must have been the political opponents of the Alcmaeonids, at least in the early stages of the fiction before it became established as the "official version" '.6 Not being able to find these anti-Alcmaeonids in the period immediately following the reforms of Cleisthenes, he proceeds not only to attribute the institution of the tyrannicide cult to Themistocles in 477 B.C., but also to speculate that 'it was Themistocles who gave the term luovofL{a the particular democratic slant which it was later to bear', and to assign the present
cr.
I Jacoby, Atthis 16o; 339 n. 53; also 340 n. 54.-For Harmodius and Aristogeiton as Gephyraei, Hdt. 5. 55 and 57. 1. 2 See Ehrenberg, OD 531-2, for a full demonstration of the historical improbabilities to which Jacoby's position would lead. 3 Jacoby, Atthis 340 n. 53 ad fin. 4 Vlastos, Ison. 342 with n. 17. The quotation is from Jacoby, Atthis 339,
n·53· 5 Podlecki 131.
6
Podlecki 130.
Il:ONOMIA
AND
ATHENS
133
version of the Harmodius song to the period in which the statues of the tyrannicides by Critius and Nesiotes were set up, that is 477/6 B.C. Now, since our ancient sources give us considerably more information about Themistocles than they do about Cleisthenes, it is harder to explain in the case of Themistocles than in the case of Cleisthenes why we get from them no hint whatever that Themistocles either coined or ever appealed to the principle of political equality. If he had done so, we should rather have expected it about the time of his election to the archonship in 493/2 B.C., when he may have faced a stiff opposition especially from those whom Aristotle calls 'friends of the tyrants' (Ath. Pol. 22. 4), than in 477 B.C. Moreover, in view of the fact that we know of no constitutional innovation attributed to Themistocles, his authorship of laovolJ-{a is rather unlikely. And with this the necessity of associating the Harmodius song with the dedication of the new tyrannicide group of Critius and Nesiotes vanishes. In attributing to Themistocles the institution of the tyrannicide cult, Podleckiz has to brush aside the importance of a tyrannicide group of statues by Antenor which, we are told by Pausanias, existed in Athens before 480 B.C. and was removed to Persia by Xerxes to be later returned to Athens either by Alexander the Great or one of his successors,3 and which, according to the Parian Marble, was replaced in 477/6 B.C. by the new group by Critius and Nesiotes.4 According to Pliny (NH 34. 17) these statues were set up in Athens 'eodem anno quo et Romae reges pulsi', that is, in 509 B.C. It is true, as Brunnsaker has demonstrated, that this date, with its synchronism of the Athenian with
the Roman liberation from tyranny, does not inspire confidence. But there is an indication that Pliny's date is at least approximately correct. The clue is provided by Pausanias' ascription of the group to Antenor (I. 8. 5), no doubt the same Antenor whose signature appears on the base of Kore No. 681 in the Acropolis Museum,z·and who is believed to have contributed to the pedimental sculpture of the reconstructed Temple of Apollo at Delphi.3 Since the inscription on the Kore base can be dated on epigraphical grounds shortly before or after 525 B.C.,4 and since his work at Delphi is dated soon after 5IO B.C.,s Antenor's activity belongs in the last quarter of the sixth ccntury.6 This makes Pliny's date approximately acceptable, and we may, therefore, assume that Antenor's statues were in fact erected in honour of Harmodius and Aristogeiton soon after the expulsion of Hippias.7 A more precise date is impossible to attain, and we do not know whether the statues were set up before or after conflict broke out between Isagoras and Cleisthenes. The years of consolidation in internal politics which followed the Cleisthenean reforms would favour a date soon after 507 B.C. rather than the turbulent period offriction between 510 and 507 B.C.S If, then, Harmodius and Aristogeiton could be honoured in bronze so soon after the liberation from tyranny, there is no reason why the liberation may not at the same time have been attributed to them in song. In other words, the presence of Antenor's statues soon after 510 B.C. supports a date soon after 507 B.C. rather than Podlecki's date of 477 B.C. for the composition of the first (10) and fourth (13) Harmodius skolion, and, like
I Podlecki 138, 139-40. He avoids committing himself on the problem of what parts of the Harmodius skolia were composed at what time (139): 'Some version or part of the song may have been sung earlier, but what better time for a revival of an "old favorite" and even an expansion of it, than the occasion of the new "tyrannicide" dedication?' We do not learn here when the earlier version originated and what it contained. On Podlecki's assumptions, any part of it must have originated among anti-Alcmaeonids, and since he admits that it must have originated after 510, it is as hard to see in his case as it is in Jacoby's who its antiAlcmaeonid authors may have been. 2 Podlecki 135 and 137 contents himself with the assertion that Antenor's group cannot 'have made much of an impact'. But the very fact that it was erected, presumably at public expense, is sufficient proof that the action of Harmodius and Aristogeiton had made an impact earlier than 477 B.C. 3 Paus. I. 8. 5, who attributes their return to Antiochus; Val. Max. 2. 10, ext. I, attributes it to Seleucus; and Pliny, NH 34. 70, and Arrian, Anab. 3. 16. 7-8 and 7. 19·2, to Alexander. 4 Marmor Parium, ep. 54 (Jacoby), with Paus. I. 8. 5.
Brunnsaker 40-1 and 43. IG 12• 485. The question whether or not base and statue belong together does not affect our argument. 3 See G. Lippold in Handbuch der Archiiologie, ed. W. Otto and R. Herbig, 3. I. 81 with n. 3. 4 Jeffery, LSAG 75. 5 Lippold loco cit. with n. 2. 6 On Antenor's date see P. Orlandini in Enciclopedia del!'arte antica I. 408-9, s.v. 'Antenor' (with bibliography); on the date of Antenor's group of tyrannicides see Brunnsaker 41, 43, and 97-8; and G. Becatti, Archeologia classica 9 (1957) 97-107. 7 Cf. Jacoby, Atthis 339 n. 52. But I do not agree that Cleisthenes' exile is a terminus post quem for the statues.-The suggestion, first made by P. Corssen, Berliner philologische Wochenschrift 23 (1903) 350-1 and Archiiologischer Anzeiger (1903) 41, and elaborated by A. E. Raubitschek, AJA 44 (1940) 58 n. 2, JHS 60 (1940) 54, and Dedicationsfrom the Athenian Acropolis 116,482, and 514, that the Antenor group does not antedate 488 B.C., has effectively been laid to rest by the arguments of Brunnsaker 90-5. 8 Cf. Becatti, op. cit. 100.
I
I
I
2
II:ONOMIA
the two stanzas of the Harmodius skolia, shows that the tyrannicides were in fact honoured as such very soon after the liberation.1 \Vhat made the Athenians accept this misrepresentation of fact so soon after the liberation must remain a matter for speculation; still, a probable explanation is not hard to find. If the Kedon and Leipsyclrium songs were composed, as it is suggested they were (above, p. 127), by the exiled opponents of Hippias soon after the events which they celebrate, and if the same people sang the second (I I) and third (12) stanzas of the Harmodius soon after the murder of Hipparchus, as Ehrenberg has suggested,2 these exiles might after the expulsion of Hippias have credited with the actual achievement those heroes whose martyrdom had sustained them in exile, and who had inspired them to persist in their efforts until Hippias was finally ousted. Moreover, since the role of Delphi and of the Alcmaeonids in the expulsion had been confined to prompting the Spartans, whereas the actual success was due to Spartan arms (Hdt. 5. 62-5; Arist. Atlz. Pol. I g. 2-6), the Athenians may have wished to suppress the fact by making the liberation an Athenian affair.3 This, it seems to me, is the most plausible reconstruction, on the basis of the few facts we do know, of the atmosphere and the spirit in which the first (IO) and fourth (13) stanzas of the Harmodius were created. There is, accordingly, no need to read a slight to Cleisthenes, motivated by party spirit, into the fact that this simple patriotic song ignores the Alcmaeonid contribution to Hippias' ouster. For when patriotic songs name heroes, they name thc dead and not the living, and the courageous attempt of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, their failure notwithstanding, was more likely to capture the popular imagination than either the army of Cleomenes or the machinations of'Delphi and ~ Ehrenber?, HL 68:-9, accepts a date after 507 B.C. for the first stanza (10). The objectIOns raIsed agamst this by P. Leveque and P. Vidal-Kaquet, Clisthine l'~tM~ie~ 30 n. 2, namely, 'on a peine it croire que Ie meurtre prive d'Hipparque solt Slvlte devenu un acte politique', loses its force in that it fails to take anv note of Antenor's tyrannicide group. ' Z See above, p. 125 with n. 3. 3 Th~s has be~n suggested by Ehrenberg, OD 530 and 532-3, accepted by B.runnsaker 25 with n: 94 .. Cf. Bowra, GLP 394.-A good modern parallel is proVIded by the ceremomes stIlI held every 20 July in Germany to commemorate the generals who on that day in 1944 were no more successful than Harmodius and Aristogeiton had been in putting an end to a tyranny which was put down a year later only through the outside intervention of the allied forces.
AND
ATHENS
135
Cleisthenes. The same reason may also explain the second distortion of historical fact, the attribution of the establishment of the democracy to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. \Ve have tried to show above that the opponents of Cleisthenes, to whom Jacoby wants to assign the skolia, cannot be identified. But is it really necessary to assume that only opponents of Cleisthenes could attribute the establishment of Zuovop.,{a to the tyrannicides? Cannot the Harmodius have been sung without malice? If Herodotus (5. 78) could credit the defeat by the young democracy of Spartans, Boeotians, and Chalcidians in rapid succession to its ZU7]yopl7], it is not hard to believe that the Athenians would themselves celebrate the establishment of ZuovofLla in a song. In fact, if we were to look for a specific date for the first (10) and fourth (13) skolion, the enthusiasm reflected in Herodotus' statement about the source of the victories would make 506 B.C. a vcry likely occasion. To have included Cleisthenes' name in the praise of ZuovofLla would have been in bad taste; but to attribute it to the same hero-martyrs to whom the liberation had been attributed could hardly have given offence to Cleisthenes. On the contrary, it would not be surprising if a man of Cleisthenes' political acumen had found considerable propaganda value in attributing to Harmodius and Aristogeiton the sum total of his political achievement, not only his part in the liberation from tyranny but also the establishment of ZaovofLla in Athens. In this manner, far from minimizing his own merit, as some have asserted, 1 he would have counteracted any odium that may have attached to him for having accepted the archonship of 525/4 B.C. from Hippias,2 and at the same time would have enlisted popular support for his programme by presenting it as the continuation and completion of what Harmodius and Aristogeiton had set out to accomplish. These considerations do not, of course, constitute proof that the first (IO) and/or fourth (13) stanza of the Harmodius song originated in Cleisthenes' circle, but they do show that the I K. Schefold, Museum Helveticum 3 (1946) 67-70. For an effective criticism ofllis view see Ehrenberg, OD 533-4· z See the fragment of an archon list of c. 425 B.C., published by B. D. Meritt, Hesperia 8 (1939) 59-65 (= SEG 10, No. 352). That the inscription is an archonlist and that Cleisthenes' name appeared on it as the archon for 525/4 B.C. can be regarded as settled, W. E. Thompson, C] 55 (1959-60) 217-20, C. W. J. Eliot and M. F. McGregor, Phoenix 14 (1960) 27-35. Additional fragments of the list are published by D. W. Bradeen, Hesperia 32 (1963) 187-208.
glorification of the tyrannicides is not incompatible with the role the Alcmaeonids played in making Athens laov6;wvc;, and they support the date shortly after 507 B.C. for which we have been arguing.!
NOMOS AND THE THE ATHENIAN
BEGINNINGS DEMOCRACY
OF
HE fact that the laovop.,{a of Athens was celebrated in song and attributed to the national heroes shortly after 507 B.C. permits the inference that the term was not invented by the author or authors of stanzas IO and 13 of the skolia, but was borrowed from the actualities which he or they set out to celebrate. In other words, these stanzas indicate that the concept of laovop.,{a played a part in the events leading up to and culminating in the establishment of the Athenian democracy by Cleisthenes. Weare not told by any of our sources what this part was, and for that reason certainty about it is impossible to attain. Still, we do know enough about the reforms themselves and the political activities preceding and following them to enable us to reconstruct a sequence of events in which the principle of laovop.,{a can be assigned a place. Thanks to the work of H. T. Wade-Gery! it is now possible to form a reasonably accurate chronology of the events leading up to the reforms and of Cleisthenes' role in them. After an initial period of accommodation between Hippias and the heads of some of the noble 'political' families of Athens, in which Cleisthenes accepted the archonship for 525/4 B.C. and Miltiades that for the following year,2 relations between the tyrant and the noble gene again became strained. Few details are known about this development for the period between the end of Miltiades'
T
I
Essays ! 35-54.
Z
See above, p. !35 with n. 3.
138 NOMOI;
AND
BEGIKNINGS
OF .\ TIIE:\L\N
DEMOCRACY
archonship and the murder of Hipparchus at the Panathenaic festival of 514 B.C. At some time before 511/10 B.C. and probably within the period 524/3 to 514 B.C., the Alcmaeonidae, the genos whose head was Cleisthenes, went into exile; Miltiades of the Cimonid family2 was sent off by the Peisistratids to the Thracian Chersonese, probably about 5 I 6 B.C., which indicates perhaps that the archonship had failed to reconcile him to the Peisistratids, who were suspected of having had his father Cimon murdered;3 and, if any trust can be placed in Andocides (2. 26), his great-grandfather Leogoras went into voluntary exile. Relations deteriorated further after the murder of Hip parch us : the tyranny grew harsher and many members of noble families were exiled or killed.4 As a result, the opposition to the tyranny stiffened. Several attempts by the exiles to force their way into Athens and oust Hippias were thwarted, among them the attempt by Kedon, a nobleman,s and the more ambitious effort, spearheaded by the Alcmaeonidae, to fortify Leipsydrium, which we have already mentioned (above, p. 127). After Leipsydrium, the Alcmaeonids used a different method to secure their aim. Through their friendly connections with Delphi, established early in the sixth century when Alcmaeon commanded the Athenian troops in the First Sacred \Var,6 they obtained the contract to rebuild the Temple of Apollo, which had been destroyed by fire in 548/7 B.C. (Hdt. 2. 180; Paus. 10. 5. 13), and with the contract came the administration of large sums of money and influence at Delphi.? By a judicious deployment of both they persuaded the Pythia to instigate the Spartans to liberate Athens, and the Spartans complied despite the friendly relations which bound them to the Peisistratids. Although the prompting of t~e Oracle is I
I Except where otherwise stated, the account in this paragraph is based on Hdt. 5. 62-5 and Arist. Ath. Pol. 19. 2 The reasons for calling the descendants of Cimon Coal emus 'Cimonids' rather than 'Philaids' are stated by vVade-Gery, Essays 164 n. 3. 3 For Miltiades' dispatch see Hell. 6. 39. I, with \Vade-Gery, Essays 161-3; for Cimon's death, Hdl. 6. 103.3, with Wade-Gery, Essays 155-8, and A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants 110. 4 Cf. also Hdl. 5. 55, Thuc. 6. 59. 2. 5 That he was a nobleman is suggested by the aya8oi, al'8paatl' in the second line of the couplet cited by Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 20. 5. 6 Plut. Solon II, with <W.) G. Forrest, BCH 80 (1956) 41-'2 and 49-51. 7 For an excellent summary of the nature and sources of this influence see Leveque and Vidal-Kaquet, op. cit. 40 n. 3.
IEONOMIA,
CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOE
139
unlikely to have been the only factor in alienating the affections of the Spartans from the Peisistratids,I it was doubtless a sufficiently weighty factor for later tradition to ascribe the eventual liberation of Athens from tyranny to the Alcmaeonids as well as to the Spartans (Hdt. 6. 123. 2; Thuc. 6. 59. 4). A Spartan attempt under Anchimolius to invade the city from the sea was frustrated soon after the landing by Cine as and his 1,000 Thessalian cavalry, who came to Hippias' aid. To discourage similar attempts in the future and to protect himself in the face of a deteriorating situation in Athens, Hippias immediately began to fortify Munichia in the Piraeus, but before this enterprise was completed, a second and larger Spartan force, led by king Cleomenes, invaded Attica and routed the Thessalian cavalry sent against them. Athens was now open to Cleomenes and, together with 'those Athenians who wanted to be free', consisting presumably mainly of the exiles, he besieged the acropolis, where the Peisistratids had taken refuge behind the Pelargic Wall. According to Herodotus, the siege would not have resulted in capitulation, had not the children of the Peisistratids been captured as they were being smuggled out of the country. To obtain their safe return, the Peisistratids surrendered and agreed to leave Attica within five days, which promise they fulfilled by settling at Peisistratus' old stronghold in Sigeum on the Scamander in the Troad. Of these events only the fortification of Munichia, interrupted by Cleomenes' incursion, and the surrender of the acropolis are given a precise date by Aristotle. The former is placed 'in the fourth year after the death of Hipparchus' and the latter 'in the archonship of Harpactides' (Ath. Pol. 19. 2, 6),2 and both dates converge on our 511/10 B.C. The sequence of events in the next three years can be established only in barest outline, and we lack much essential information even on the events themselves, I Arist. Ath. Pol. 19. 4 (cf. 17. 3-4) suggests that the friendship between the Peisistratids and Argos was a source of annoyance to the Spartans. In addition, the Spartans will certainly not have liked Bippias' overtures to Persia after 514 B.C. through the marriage of his daughter to the son of the tyrant of Lampsacus (Thue. 6. 59. 2-3). And, in general, the tradition on Sparta's enmity to tyranny and on her overthrow of the tyrannies in Greek cities is so strong that, although we know few details, it may have motivated her to liberate Athens; see Thuc. I. 18. I, Arist. Pol. 5. 10, I312b7-8. 2 The expulsion of the tyrant is dated in the fourth year after the murder of Hipparchus also by Hdl. 5. 55 and Thuc. 6. 59·4·
140 NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
II:ONOMI
DEMOCRACY
although they are among the most crucial for the development of Athens over the next hundred years. Harpactides had no doubt held his archonship with the approval of the tyrant or, at least, not without it (Thuc. 6. 54. 6). Since nothing else is known about him, we may assume that he was not an important 'friend of the tyrants' and was permitted to serve out what remained of his term of office. The machinery of government probably did not cease to function, because, as Thucydides tells us (6. 54. 6), the tyrants had left the old Solonian constitution intact, merely filling the important offices with their own men, and the fact that the archons were chosen directly and not by lot made this very easy (Arist. Ath. Pol. 22. 5). Immediately after the fall of the tyranny, Athens returned to 'aristocratic politics as usual'. A struggle for political power erupted among the noble families who had played a part in the overthrow, very like the rivalries that had surrounded the rise of Peisistratus earlier in the century (Hdt. I. 59-6 I ). Cleisthenes, the Alcmaeonid, opposed Isagoras, son of Teisander, a member of an old noble family who sacrificed to Zeus Karios.1 It is probable that their rivalry did not burst into the open at once. For the measures, which can plausibly be dated to a time very soon after the expulsion of Hippias, aim at the punishment of the Peisistratids and the amelioration of conditions created by them, and they are unlikely to have divided those whom opposition to the tyranny had just united. The first of these was the revival as BEGfLta Kat 7TCLTPWof an old Draconian law, under which anyone attempting or abetting the establishment of a tyranny at Athens was declared an outlaw, and the publication of the names of the Peisistratids-and presumably also of the ban pronounced against them--on a stele erected on the acropolis.2 The second was the enactment of a decree prohibiting the torture of Athenian citizens (Andoc. 1. 43),3 evidently in order to prevent recurrences of the kind of treatment meted out to Aristogeiton after the murder of Hipparchus.4 Andocides, our source for this measure, assigns it to the I Hdt. 5. 66. I, Arist. Ath. Pol. 20. I, with D. M. Lewis, 'Cleisthenes and Attica', Historia 12 (1963) 25-6. 2 Arist. Ath. Pol. 16. 10, Thuc. 6. 55. 1-2, with M. Ostwald, TAPA 86 (1955)
108-9' 3 It is not clear from the context whether this prohibition was confined to judicial proceedings or whether it was more general in character. 4 Thuc. 6. 57. 4, Arist. Ath. Pol. 18. 4, Diodorus 10. 17. 2, Polyaenus I. 22.
A, CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOI:
141
archonship of Scamandrius, and there are good reasons for assuming this to have been in 510/09 B.C.I There is one further measure which may belong in the archonship of Scamandrius and which was later to be affected by the reforms of Cleisthenes. We learn from Aristotle that after the overthrow of the tyrants a revision of the roll of citizens (owifiTJrptGfLDS) was undertaken, 'since it was alleged that many were enjoying citizenship, although they had no right to it' (Ath. Pol. 13.5).2 We have no information on the procedure followed in the OWifiTJrptGfLDS and little about the identity of its victims. But since proof of citizenship can only have been membership in a phratry before Cleisthenes' reforms, we may surmise that the owifiTJrptGfLDS obliged the phratries (a) to determine who was and who was not a proper member, and (b) to exclude from exercising the rights of citizenship anyone who could not prove his membership in a phratry. This raises the question as to whom the owifiYJrptGfLDS deprived of citizenship. Aristotle suggests that 'people of impure descent' (ot T0 yEVEt fL~ KaBapo{) were affected by it, who-or rather, whose parents-feeling insecure in their possession of citizenship, had joined Peisistratus' diakrioi through fear (Ath. Pol. 13.4-5). Greek tyrants often rewarded their supporters by granting them the rights of citizenship,3 and Peisistratus or his sons may have so rewarded the Thracian and Argive mercenaries who had helped win the battle of Pallene, his bodyguard,4 and perhaps other immigrants whom Peisistratus' development of industry had attracted to Attica.5 Regardless of whether or not such I
T. J. Cadoux, ]HS
68 (1948) 113, accepted by MacDowell,
Andokides: On the
Mysteries 92-3. 2 That there was a 'iita.pTJ>wp.6s after the fall of the tyranny is disbelieved by some scholars on the ground that it is thought to be in conflict with Aristotle's statement, Pol. 3. 2, 1275b34-7, that Cleisthenes 7TO.\,\O,}s... E>vAETEvaft'vovs Kat 80VAoVS p.ero{KovS; see F. Jacoby in FGH 3b, supp!. I. 158-60. However, since Aristotle attributes only the enfranchisement to Cleisthenes, the difficulty can be resolved by assuming that the 8ta.pTJ>wp.6stook place before the reforms of Cleisthenes, very probably soon after the expulsion of Hippias; cf. Hignett, HAC 132-3. On the enfranchisement see below, pp. 151-2. 3 See Hignett, HAC 112. 4 Hdt. 61. 4, 64. I; Thuc. 6. 55. 3, 57. 1,58.2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 15. 2, 18. 4. It is noteworthy that the 80pv>6po. seem to be of foreign origin, whereas the fifty KopuvTJ>6po.,whom the people gave to Peisistratus at the beginning of his tyranny, are explicitly described as citizens by Hdt. I. 59. 5 and differentiated from the 80pv>6po.; cf. Pluto Solon 30. 3. 5 Immigration of skilled craftsmen into Attica and grant of citizenship to them is attested only for Solon (Plut. Solon 24)' But it is very likely that Peisistratus continued Solon's policy in this respect.
142
NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF
ATHENIAN
persons had ever been formally admitted into the phratries, they may well have exercised in practice such citizen prerogatives as attending meetings of the Assembly and of the Heliaia with the explicit or tacit approval of the tyrant, whom they had helped and to whom they looked for protection. The descendants of such people were no doubt regarded by many Athenians as Tip yEVEL fL~ KaBapot and, even though by 510/09 B.C. they knew no home other than Athens, they were deprived by the tnafYJeptafLoS of rights which they may have exercised defacto without possessing them de iure, because they owed their position to the support they had given the tyrants. About the events of the year following the archonship of Scamandrius (509/8 B.C.) we have only the information of the Marmor Parium that Lysagoras-otherwise unknown-was archon eponymus, and that contests of men's choruses were introduced for the first time,2 presumably at the Panathenaic festival. If, in addition, we can trust Pliny's date (above, pp. 132-3), it was in this year or the year preceding it that Antenor's statues of the tyrannicides were erected. Of far greater importance, however, is the rivalry between Isagoras and Cleisthenes, which must have come to a head in this year. What precisely happened we do not know. All we are told is that Cleisthenes lost the struggle (Hdt. 5. 66. 2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 20. 1) and that Isagoras was elected as archon for the following year, that is for 508/7 B.C. (Dion. Hal. 1. 74.6, 5. 1. 1). But we may draw one conclusion from Aristotle's assertion that Cleisthenes' defeat took place Tafs ETatpEtatS. Since ETatpEfat are known in Athenian history primarily as political clubs of young aristocrats of oligarchical sympathies, who played a prominent part in the events of 415, 411, and 404 B.C.,3 Aristotle's statement has been interpreted as 'a mere inference' from the narrative of Herodotus, who uses the verb 7TpoaETatpt~ETat to describe Cleisthenes' step of 'taking the people into partnership' after his defeat by Isagoras. \Vhile I agree that the passage cannot be regarded as 'independent testimony of the existence of I
I e.g. the oopvrpopo' are alleged to have killed Harmodius (Thuc. 6. 57·4, Arist. Ath. Pol. 18. 4). Cf. Ar. Eq. 447-3, where the Sausage-seller accuses the Paphlagonian of being descended from the oopvrpopo' of 'Byrsine', wife of Hippias. 2 Marmor Parium, ep. 46 (Jacoby), with Cadoux, loco cit. 3 For a full discussion see F. Sartori, Le eterie nella vita politica ateniese del VI e V seeolo a. C. 99-143. For their activities in 415 B.C. see also MacDowell, op. cit.
190-3.
II:ONOMI
DEMOCRACY
A, CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOI:
143
Hetaireiai as early as 506',1 at least not in the sense in which they existed toward the end of the fifth century, Aristotle's choice of words may indicate that the part of the conflict which Isagoras won was a dynastic struggle for power in which each protagonist had the support of his aristocratic following (ETafpOt), 2 and the point of Herodotus' 7TpoaETatpt~ETat may be that after his defeat Cleisthenes made the people that which his aristocratic ETafpot had been before, namely, the main source of his political support. In any event, the victory ofIsagoras over Cleisthenes of which our sources speak must have consisted in Isagoras' election to the archonship, and it was probably after the election had taken place that Cleisthenes began to seek the political support of the masses. The chief difficulty in the chronology of the events in 508/7 and 507/6 B.C. is that Aristotle dates the reforms of Cleisthenes in the archonship of Isagoras (Ath. Pol. 21. 1), whereas Pollux tells us that it was under Alcmaeon that the Athenian tribes 'became ten' (8. 110). But the difficulty can be resolved with the help of Herodotus' narrative of events (5. 66-73. 1), which Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 20. 1-3, 2 I) followsvery closely, except that he separates his account of the content of the reforms from his account of the events leading up to the reforms, while Herodotus incorporates his more succinct account of the reforms into the general narrative.3 Following, then, the sequence of Herodotus, we may assume that Cleisthenes proposed and gained acceptance of his reforms after he had 'taken the people into partnership' after the election of Isagoras to the archons hip (5. 66. 2). We shall come back to the significance of this later. For the moment it will sufficeto say that the result of his cultivating popular support and of the reforms was, according to Aristotle, to 'turn the state over to the common people'.4 The success of Cleisthenes' policy is indicated by the fact that he not only managed to get his reforms accepted as a private citizen in the teeth of the archon in power,s but also to get Alcmaeon, to judge by the name his kinsman and Wade-Gery, Essays 138, referring to Hdt. 5.66.2. Note the adjective 7rpoowa€Ta'pov used to describe Leipsydrium in the skolion quoted by Arist. Ath. Pol. 19·3. 3 See Wade-Gery, Essays 136-9, also Cadoux, op. cit. 114-16 n. 249. 4 Ath. Pol. 20. 1 : a7rOO,OOV, .,.0 7rAT/IiH "'~v 7roA,nLav. S Wade-Gery, Essays 136, 142-3. For a more detailed argument which, in my opinion, effectively disposes of all earlier views see Cadoux, loco cit. I
2
144 NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
IEONOMI
DEMOCRACY
supporter, elected as archon for the following year, S07/6 B.C. 1 It is also shown by the consternation revealed in Isagoras' reaction, who knew no other recourse than to call in Cleomenes, with whom he had established friendly relations during the operations against the Peisistratids in 511/10 B.C.2 Before intervening personally, Cleomenes, on instructions from Isagoras, sent a herald to Athens to demand that Cleisthenes and other Athenian families who were under the curse incurred by the Alemaeonid archon Megacles at the time of the Cylonian conspiracy should leave Athens at once (5. 70. 2-71; Ath. Pol. 20. 2).3 Cleisthenes complied, but the others whose banishment Isagoras had instigated Cleomenes to demand departed only after Cleomenes entered Athens with a small force (5. 72. I; Ath. Pol. 20. 3).4 Cleomenes next tried to disband the Council, which was still the old Solonian Council of Four Hundred and which must have played a key role in getting Cleisthenes' reforms adopted, and to entrust the government to an oligarchy consisting of three hundred ofIsagoras' partisans.5 However, the Council refused to be intimidated and, with the support of the common people, besieged the acropolis, where Cleomenes and Isagoras had taken refuge. On the third day Cleomenes and Isagoras capitulated, and Cleomenes and his men were given safeconduct out of Attica.6 Some ofIsagoras' partisans were arrested and executed, but Isagoras himself and probably also others of his supporters escaped punishment,7 probably by fleeing from I Pollux 8. 110, with Cadoux, op. cit. 114 with n. 248, who suggests that Alemaeon may have been a cousin of Cleisthenes and the father of Leobotes, who, according to Pluto Them. 23. I, became the accuser of Themistocles in 471 B.C. 2 Hdt. 5. 70. I, where the friendly relations extend also to Isagoras' wife; Ath. Pol. 20. 2. 3 Cf. Thuc. I. 126. 12. For a similar demand, directed at Pericles and made by the Spartans before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. I. 126. 2 and 127. I. 4 See Endnote, p. 185 below. S That it was an attempt to establish an oligarchy and not merely to reduce the number of Councillors is indicated by Herodotus' Tlh· apXa.<; EVEXdp'~E and by Aristotle's KVp{OVS KaOu'Tava, TfjS 1TO'\EWS. 6 Wade-Gery, Essays 136, interprets Aristotle as including Isagoras and the Athenians in the safe-conduct. However, while it is true that Isagoras and some of his supporters must have escaped the death penalty inflicted on the rest of the Athenians, since Cleomenes soon tried to reinstate him (Hdt. 5. 74. I), Aristotle's TOV'; /-LET' athoil 7TclvTas, like Herodotus' DaoL 7}aav aUTwv AaKEOUL/L6vWL, refers only to the followers of Cleomenes. 7 The fact that Hdt. 5. 72.4-73. 1 mentions Timesitheos of Delphi as one of the executed guarantees the accuracy of that part of his story. On Isagoras' fate see the preceding note.
A, CLEISTHENES.
AND
NOMOI:
145
Attica. Immediately thereafter, Cleisthenes and the seven hundred families exiled with him were recalled (5. 73. I ; Ath. Pol. 20. 3)· The reforms of Cleisthenes were, as we saw, passed in the archonship of Isagoras, and the fact that the curse on the Alemaeonids was used as the pretext for the expulsion of Cleisthenes and his adherents suggests that Alcmaeon had already been elected as archon for 507/6 B.C., but had not yet assumed office, for it is more likely that Isagoras would have called in Cleomenes against an archon-elect than against an archon in power. We may, therefore, place the intervention of Cleomenes in the late spring or early summer of 507 B.C., after Alcmaeon's election but before he actually began to serve. We may further assume that Alcmaeon assumed office immediately after the return of the Alemaeonid exiles and that the business of implementing Cleisthenes' reforms was begun at once. But in addition to laying the foundations for the internal stability of the state, the Athenians also had to protect themselves against external threats. Realizing that Cleomenes would wish to avenge his defeat, they sent an embassy to Sardis to ask for an alliance with Persia, the traditional enemy of Sparta (S. 73. 1).1 Artaphernes, the Persian satrap, agreed to the alliance on condition that the Athenians give earth and water as a sign of submission to Darius. The ambassadors accepted the condition but were disowned upon their return to Athens (5·73·2-3)· When the attack came, presumably in the spring of 506 B.C., the Athenians had to face it alone. Cleomenes had not only gathered a force from the whole of the Peloponnese, in order, as Herodotus says, to punish the Athenian people and to instal Isagoras as tyrant in Athens, but he also arranged with Boeotia and Chalcis to make a concerted attack on Attica from west, north, and east at the same time. Accordingly, while he occupied Eleusis, the Boeotians captured Oinoe and Hysiae and the Chalcidians raided the north-eastern coast of Attica (5·74. 1-2). The Athenians decided to face their opponents in turn, one at a time, beginning with the Peloponnesians. They were helped by I The Spartans had concluded an alliance with Croesus against Persia (Hdt. I. 69. 3), and after the conquest of Lydia had sent an ambassador to Cyrus to warn him not to destroy any Greek city (I. 152. 3)' It is also worth noting in this connection that Demaratus fled to Persia after he was deprived of his kingship (6. 67· I, 70).- That the question of medism is irrelevant to this Athenian embassy is rightly stressed by A. W. Gomme, AJP 65 (1944) 321-2.
814277
L
146 NOMOE
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIA:'\
IEONOMI
DEMOCRACY
dissension, which split not only the Peloponnesian alliance but the Spartans as well: the Corinthians, immediately before battle, expressed disagreement with Cleomenes' purpose and went home, followed in rapid succession by Cleomenes' royal colleague, Demaratus, and by the rest of the allies (5. 75. I, 3). The Athenians were now free to turn against their other enemies, internal and external. We learn that the houses of those Athenians who had joined Cleomenes at Eleusis were destroyed, their property confiscated, and they themselves condemned to death. Of their external enemies, Herodotus informs us, the intention was to handle the Chalcidians first, but when the Athenians heard that the Boeotians were marching toward the Euripus to help Chalcis, they changed their plan in order to intercept Boeotian help before it could become effective. The battle which ensued was a decisive Athenian victory, which claimed many Boeotian lives and the loss of seven hundred prisoners. On the very day of victory the Athenians crossed over into Euboea and defeated the Chalcidians. Four thousand Athenian cleruchs were settled on lands taken from the wealthiest Chalcidians, the prisoners taken from both Chalcidians and Boeotians were later ransomed at two mnai per person, and their fetters dedicated on the Athenian acropolis (5. 77. 1-2).2 The words which Herodotus chooses to indicate that the victories of 506 B.C. constituted the baptism of fire of the Athenian democracy bring us back to the question which prompted us to digress into an account of the factual framework of the end of tyranny and the beginning of democracy in Athens.3 Herodotus regards the victories as showing that ZfI7]YOPL7] is a 'good thing' (XP'TJP,a fITrOVOatov), because it enabled the Athenians to surpass their neighbours in warfare to a degree to which they had never surpassed them under the tyranny, and he attributes this development in Athens to the enthusiasm of a free person to accomplish something for himself as contrasted with the deliberately bad performance of a suppressed person working for a master (5. 78).4 I
I Schol. Ar. Lys. 273. It is a reasonable assumption that Isagoras was among them; see Wade-Gery, Essays 136-7. 2 These cIeruchs were sent to the aid of Eretria against the Persians in 490 B.C. ; see Hdt. 6. 100. I. 3 That Herodotus regarded Cleisthenes' achievement as consisting in the establishment of the Athenian democracy is evident from 6. 13 I. I. • On iUT]yop{T] cf. above, p. 109 n. 2, and below, p. 157 n. 2.
A, CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOE
147
Since ZfI7]YOPL7] is not attested earlier than this passage, we do not know whether it played any part in the events we have just described. But we do know that ZfIovop,La, the adjective of which is attested in the Harmodius skolia, is contemporary with these events, and we may be able to assign it a place by briefly examining the role played by the people, the oijp,o~ or TrA.ijeo~, in this period. Both politically and economically the common people seem to have fared reasonably well under the tyranny. Our knowledge of details is agonizingly sketchy, but it seems certain that Peisistratus based his power originally on the formal approval of the Assembly. At any rate, it was the oijp,o~ which in 561/0 B.C. on the motion of Aristion voted him his first bodyguard (Ath. Pol. 14. I), and it is not insignificant that the first bodyguard consisted of citizens (Hdt. 1. 59. 4-5). Although this is the only specific example of a popular Assembly meeting that has come down to us from this time, the fact that Herodotus (I. 59. 6), Thucydides (6.54.5-6), and Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 14.3, 16.8) agree that public officesand the laws were left intact and that he ruled like a statesman and not like a tyrant suggests that the organs of government as constituted by Solon continued to function, that is, that there were meetings of the Assembly and of the lawcourts, and that the people had at least a formal voice in the election of the magistrates. Moreover, there are several other indications of his popularity. Aristotle explicitly remarks several times on his geniality toward humble folk (Ath. Pol. 13. 4, 14. I, 16. 8)1 as well as toward the nobles (16. 9). It is further shown in that the common people seem to have had no part in the two exiles of Peisistratus but, on the contrary, welcomed him when 'Athene' returned him to Athens after his first exile (Hdt. 1. 60. 5; Ath. Pol. 14·4). Economically, the farmers do not appear to have grumbled about the five-per-cent tax he imposed on their produce (Thuc. 6. 54. 5),2 and when one of them did, on the occasion of one of Peisistratus' inspection tours, Peisistratus granted him exemption (Ath. Pol. 16. 6). In short, the peace and tranquillity which he brought to Attica earned his regime later the reputation of the I In these passages, if anywhere, do we have proof that 01)!"OTLKOS does not simply mean 'democratic'. 2 This figure seems more likely than the ten pe,. cent reported by Arist. A/h. Pol. 16.4 and 6.
'48 NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
'life of the age of Cronus' (Ath. Pol. 16. 7). The more shadowy sides of the tyranny do not seem to have bothered the common people too much. And if the Solonian laws which, according to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 22. I), were eclipsed under the tyranny were laws concerned with the election of magistrates, 1 it is improbable that the lower classes,who were not themselves eligible for election to high offices,anyway, would get exercised over this curtailment of their rights. The friendly attitude of the common people toward the tyrants and their political approval or indifference is corroborated by the complete silence of our sources about popular participation in the various attempts to overthrow the tyranny. Harmodius and Aristogeiton belonged to the nobility, and the repressive measures which followed their attempt must have been directed primarily -if not exclusively-at the nobility.2 Moreover, the epigrams on Kedon and on the dead of Leipsydrium make a special point of the fact that they were nobles,3 and 'those Athenians who wanted to be free', who joined Cleomenes in 511/10 B.C. in besieging the tyrants within the Pelargic Wall (Hdt. 5. 64. 2), were doubtless also predominantly members of the nobility.4 The struggle between Cleisthenes and Isagoras, whose beginnings may date to the period immediately after Hippias' ouster, seems to have been initially no more than a dynastic struggle between two factions of noblemen, one of whom had been exiled from Athens during the last years of the tyranny, while the other had been able to stay in the city.s The first time that the common people enter into the picture in this period is after Cleisthenes' defeat by Isagoras, that is, after Isagoras' election, in the spring of 508 B.C., to be archon for I
This is suggested by Thuc. 6. 54. 6: Tn OE "AAa aVT~ ~
v6JLOCS EXpfjTO,
1T)..~V
Ka8'
aaav
aiEl
TLva
lTplv KELfl-€VOLS €V Tai~ apxais flvat.
lTOALS TOrS
E7TEP..€ADV'TO ac/Jwv aVTwv
For a different interpretation see Hignett, HAC 115-16. 2 Hdt. 5. 55 and 62. 2; Thuc. 6. 59. 2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 19. I. 3 The Kedon epigram, Arist. Ath. Pol. 20. 5, speaks of ayaBors avopacuv, ~,eipsydr!um sko~ion, ~bid. 19. 3, of "vopas .•. / ayaBovs TE Kal EVlTaTploas, e:ongav
OtWv
7TQ'TEPWV
and the / at TOT'
(Gay.
4 These may have included Leogoras and Charias, ancestors of Andocides, if this is the battle ElTl IIaAA1Jvlep of which he speaks at I. 106, c)'. 2. 26; see MacDowell, Andokides: On the Mysteries 140 and 212-13. 5 That Isagoras had stayed in Athens during the tyranny is inferred by G. Busolt, GG 22• 401 n. 2, and Wade-Gery, Essays 138-9 with 139 n. I, from a combination of Arist. Ath. Pol. 20. I, "'lAOS cOv TWV Tvpavvwv, with Hdt. 5. 70 and I. 64 respectively. For their struggle as a dynastic affair see above, pp. 142-3, on the haLpEraL.
II:ONOMI
A, CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOI:
'49
508/7 B.C. Herodotus describes Cleisthenes' appeal to the people as a radically new departure in policy by saying that up to that point the Athenian oijfLos had been spurned, presumably by Cleisthenes as well as by the rest of the nobility.' Our purpose here is not to speculate about Cleisthenes' motives when he took this revolutionary step. Suffice it to say that the durability of his reforms and the success he had in getting them adopted show that he combined the vision of a statesman with the ingenuity of a politician to use the political machinery available to him toward the realization of his goals. Herodotus' statement ?]V TE TOV OijfLov 17poaBEfLEvoS 170'\'\0 KUTV7TEpBETWV dvnaTumwTEwv,2 indicates what common sense demands, anyway, namely, that the people were won over before the reforms were passed, and his strength over against that of his opponents surely refers to the passing of the reforms, to the election of AIcmaeon, and to Isagoras' inability to control the situation without the help of Cleomenes. Perhaps the most amazing aspect of Cleisthenes' success is that within a year, that is between the elections of 508 and those of 507 B.C., he gained not merely the fleeting popularity of the masses, but a loyalty deep enough to make the people join the Council in resisting Isagoras and Cleomenes-and that at a time when Cleisthenes was himself in exile, unable to provide leadership-and instilled in them a morale high enough to cope with an invasion on three fronts in 506 B.C. The crucial question for our purpose is one which, to the best of my knowledge, has only recently been seriously raised for the first time by D. M. Lewis:3 what was the secret of Cleisthenes' success? How did he go about wooing the favour of a people which had prospered under the tyranny, whose disposition toward the tyrants was friendly, and which had presumably not cared very much about politics? What promises did he make to enlist their support? Aristotle explains the trust of the people in Cleisthenes as due I 5. 69. 2:
150
NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
II:ONOMIA,
DEMOCRACY
to (a) his opening the political life in the city to the people as a whole, I (b) Isagoras' mistake in calling in Cleomenes and in trying to establish an oligarchy, and (c) the role the Alcmaeonids had played in the overthrow of the tyranny.2 The last of these factors, (c), is of doubtful validity, unless we assume that the common people had changed from indifferent supporters of the tyranny in 511110 B.C. to its bitter opponents by 508/7 B.C. Isagoras' mistakes, (b), can chronologically only have exacerbated a populace already won over by Cleisthenes or, at least, alienated by an oligarchical policy pursued by Isagoras. The only factor which remains, (a), the extension of participation in political life to the people as a whole, shows the effect of Cleisthenes' political activity3 and only hints at the general character of the propaganda he may have used to win the people over and at the general tenor of his reforms. But the question of the devices used to rouse popular support remains unanswered, and we have to find more indirect ways of finding an answer to it. To do this we first have to turn to the reforms to examine not only what the common people stood to gain from them, but particularly what features in them will have fired the popular imagination sufficiently to explain the enthusiastic support which the people gave Cleisthenes. The institutional innovations which the reforms brought to Athens do not in themselves provide a satisfying answer. Herodotus regarded the increase in the number of tribes from four to ten as tantamount to the establishment of democracy (5. 66. 2, 69. 2; 6. 131. I); but it is hard to see why the mere fact of an increased number of tribes should have evoked such a spirited response. The same is true of the aims which Aristotle attributes to Cleisthenes' tribal reforms, namely the desire to mix up the population so as to have a wider participation in political life4 and to have represented in each tribe all the different regions I
This, I believe with Wade-Gery,
Q.7TOOtOOVs
T~
1TA.:rjfJ€t,
'T~V
Essays 147-8, is the sense of Ath. Pol. 20.
I:
TTO).,,"'T'€Lav.
2 Ath. Pol. 20, with the opening of 2 I. I: o,,1 /-,€V ovv 7'au7'a, 7'11,aiT{a, <1T{U7'£U£V " ofj/-,o, 7'0 KA«uO,v«, where the /-,€V ovv refers to the main points of the preceding chapter; see E. Kapp and K. von Fritz, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts 180-1 n. 117. 3 Note particularly the force of the present participle a1TooLooUS with the aorist main verb 1TpouTJyay£7'o, which implies that the extension of political participation stretched over a period of time, sc. at least from ~pring 508 to spring 507 B.C. • Ath. Pol. 2 I. 2 : ava/-,£r~aL !3ovAO/-,£VOS, 01TWS /-,£7'aUXWUL 1TA£{OVS 7'fjs 1TOAL7'das.
CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOI:
151
of Attica. I While this may be the programme of a great statesman who had recognized the weakness of the Solonian system, would it have had a strong appeal to people who had been indifferent to politics and who would find little in common with their fellow tribesmen from a different region? It is probable that certain aspects of the deme system, which provided the substructure of the tribal reforms and presumably preceded it, had a better chance of engendering popular enthusiasm. The most immediate result of making the deme rather than the phratry the smallest political unit (Hdt. 5. 69. 2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 2 I. 4) was that residence in a given locality rather than membership in a kinship group now became the criterion of citizenship. One of the consequences of this must have been to offset the effects of the OLUI/l'YJepLafLOS of 51019 B.C. There is no indication that the descendants of those foreigners whom the tyrants had admitted to Attica were told to leave the country when they were deprived of their civic status after the overthrow of the tyranny. Accordingly, the presumption is that they still resided in the demes in which they or their parents had settled and that they were admitted as demesmen and thus as citizens in the same way in which all other deme residents were admitted. These are probably the people of whom Aristotle speaks as VWTrOALTUL (Ath. Pol. 2 I. 4), and to whom he refers in the Politics (3·2, 1275b36-7), when he says that Cleisthenes 'admitted into the tribes many foreigners and slaves resident VAfT£VU£in this passage the sense of 'formed into a separate class'-impossibly, since there is no example of a loose use of >vA1in any of Aristotle's works, and since he does not use >OAOVat all. Oliver's arguments have been effectively answered by D. Kagan, Historia 12 (1963) 41-6; cf. also D. M. Lewis, ibid. 37 n. 135.-The 'slaves' mentioned here are probably the descendants of manumitted slaves who, by the time of the reforms, would have attained metic status; see Hignett, HAC 133. 3 Wade-Gery, Essays 148-5°; Hignett, HAC 133. • See Lewis, op. cit. 38. 2
152
NOMOI:
AND
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OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
into voting for the reforms, the effect would have been the very opposite of that which they had intended, and they would have lost rather than gained support for Cleisthenes. A further consequence of making the demes the basic political unit was to undermine the hold which the noble families had had on the political life of Athens. The noble gene had exercised their political influence through the phratries,I which, though left intact as religious units, were now eclipsed in political importance by the demes,2 and membership in the deme was made hereditary.3 If the names of the newly-created demes indicate Cleisthenes' desire to undercut the influence of the nobility,4 and if the demes were grouped into trittyes in such a way as to constitute 'an attack on organisations which held a locality by religious ties, some of them in areas attached to political opponents of Cleisthenes',5 the purpose was not to weaken the noble families as such or to deprive them of their religious centres, but to dissociate political influence from religious institutions. Can Cleisthenes' popularity be accounted for by assuming a desire on the part of the commons pour epater I' aristocrate? If this played a part at all, it must have been a very small one, for if it had been a wholesale attack, Cleisthenes could not have made the people stop at depriving the foci of aristocratic power of only their political role, and if he wanted to use popular support merely to indulge in a personal vendetta against his political opponents, he will have had to endear himself to the people in some other way first before using them for his personal ends. There is a further aspect of the deme reform, however, which, I believe, gets us closer toward an explanation of the popular enthusiasm which Cleisthenes evoked. We know that in the late fifth century and in the fourth the demes enjoyed a certain amount of local self-government of a kind which the naukraries, which they are said to have replaced (Arist. Ath. Pol. 21. 5),6 do I See the excellent article of A. Andrewes, 'Phi!ochoros on Phratries', JHS 81 (1961) 1-15· 2 Arist. Ath. Pol. 21. 4 and 6. This did not mean, apparently, that the phratries were deprived of all their importance: in a citizenship grant of 409 B.C. the person honoured is invited to choose his phratry as well as tribe and deme; see IG 12• 110 (= Tod, GHI 12, No. 86) 15-17. 3 BS 2. 875 with n. 2. 4 See Lewis, op. cit. 26-7. 5 Ibid., esp. 27~36 and 37. 6 This does not necessarily mean that the naukraries were abolished, for Cleidemus, frg. 8, states that as a by-product of Cleisthenes' tribal reforms the naukraries
IEONOMIA,
CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOI:
153
not seem to have enjoyed. The demes had their own chiefs, the demarchs (ibid.),! who held office for one year and were subject to an audit; they had shrines and cults of their own, kept an official register of their members (A1)ttaPXtKOV ypafLfLaTEtOv), had special advocates and financial assessors of their own, supervised the education and training of their own youth, and, above all, met locally rather than in the city for their de me assemblies. Moreover, there was a direct link between the demes and the central government in that the demes rather than the trittyes or the tribes chose the candidates for the Council (Ath. Pol. 62. r). While it is hard to believe that all the de me institutions attested for the fourth century owe their inception to Cleisthenes, it would be very strange indeed if the most basic of them, such as the office of demarch and the deme assembly, did not go back to him. This means that, by guaranteeing a substantial amount of local autonomy, Cleisthenes gave the demesmen a local pride which they had not previously had, especially if, as we must assume, they had in the past looked for political leadership to the noble gene, under whose influence the various localities as well as the phratries must have stood. But it is hard to believe that the promise of a measure of local self-government would in itself have won Cleisthenes the support he needed, unless the promise was made in the name of a principle larger than anyone particular institution, which would hold out hope for a new political way of life. The circumstance that we have in the Harmodius skolia a contemporary document which contains in adjectival form a political principle which is 'more of a banner than a label'2 suggests that laovofLla may well have been the slogan by means of which Cleisthenes rallied the people to the support of his reforms. I know no other word-not even 81)fLOKpaTla-which would have served equally well to describe the salient features of Cleisthenes' programme and at the same time to differentiate that programme from those of his opponents. Practically every trait of the reforms shows that Cleisthenes was less interested in establishing a 'rule were increased to fifty. Their function after the reforms remains, however, uncertain. See Hignett, HAC 142. I For the following see R. J. Hopper, The Basis of the Athenian Democracy 14-15 with nn. 88-126. Cf. also BS 2. 966-72 and Hignett, HAC 136-7. 2 Vlastos, IP 8.
154 NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
II:ONOMI
DEMOCRACY
of the people' (oYJ/-LOKpaTta) than in creating a balanced form of government by giving all citizens equally the right to participate in the political life of the state and by eliminating the political monopoly which birth and wealth had enjoyed so far. If, in doing so, he laid the groundwork for the Athenian democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries, this was an organic development from Cleisthenes' achievement, it was not the achievement itself. The achievement was to give the common people 'equality of rights and power' with birth and wealth by organizing them in the demes, in the tribes, and in the state as a whole in a way to provide an effective check on those who, in accordance with the census classification of the Solonian constitution, were alone eligible to the archonship and other high offices.We have already noted that the use of the deme as the smallest political unit and the way in which a number of demes are arranged in a trittys tended to undercut what political influence religious and kinship organizations may have had. But at the same time, the religious functions of the kinship groups were left intact (Arist. Ath. Pol. 2 I. 6). This is shown by the facts that Probalinthus and Hecale were politically separated from the cult organizations to which they continued to belong long after the reforms of Cleisthenes, by the splitting up of the Tetrakomoi among three trittyes, and by the division of Pallene among at least three demes, all contrived, according to D. M. Lewis, 'to create units which would be sufficiently distinct from existing local units to compete with them and to destroy the influence which they gained from possessing a common cult in a common locality'. Thus the influence of the nobility was fragmented over a number of demes and trittyes, where it had as its counterweight the votes of the common demesmen, and in this way laovo/-Lta was created within the demes. On a larger scale, it was established in the tribes in that the membership of each tribe was balanced among one trittys from each of the three regions,2 and the 'mixing' process of which Aristotle speaks three times I
I Lewis, op. cit. 30-4, quotation from 34-5. In the case of Probalinthus an alternative interpretation of its detachment from the Tetrapolis is that with it the Tetrapolis would have become too large a trittys; see C. W.]. Eliot, Coastal Dernes of Attika (= Phoenix, suppl. 5) 144-5; but this is rather superficial and fails to take account of the political factors involved in its attachment to the coast-trittys of Pandionis, which are stressed by Lewis, op. cit. 31. 2 Arist. Ath. Pol. 21. 4, where Cleisthenes is said to have used the lot in assigning one trittys from each region to each of the ten tribes. The use of the lot for this purpose is doubted by Eliot, op. cit. 141-5, on the ground that it might have
A, CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOI:
155
in connection with Cleisthenes' reforms (Ath. Pol. 2 I. 2 and 3; Pol. 6.4, 1319b2S-6) is in fact nothing but an aspect of the laovo/-Lla established when city, coast, and inland were, through the trittyes, given equal weight in each tribe. I This is sufficient to show that laovo/-Lla would have been an appropriate slogan for Cleisthenes to use in trying to win the common people over to his programme. There are two points which suggest that an appeal to laovo/-Lta would and could have had the effect of enlisting the immediate and fervent support of the people for Cleisthenes' cause. In the first place, no principle and no slogan could have served to differentiate Cleisthenes more strikingly and more correctly from his political opponents than laovo/-Lta. Certainly the tyrants, popular though they may have been, never practised iaovo/-Lla. On the contrary, they had arrogated unto themselves rights which no other citizen enjoyed, not even the nobles. And if the attempted establishment of an oligarchy of three hundred is any indication of the kind of political aims espoused by Isagoras, these, too, would hardly qualify as bringing political equality to the citizens of Athens. In other words, no other term would have served Cleisthenes better than iaovo/-Lla to suppress any sympathy for the tyrants that may still have lingered and at the same time win the people over to his side in his struggle against Isagoras. That the citizenry would have responded favourably to this prospect of greater political freedom in the face oflsagoras' desire to limit their participation in public life requires no explanation. The second point emerges from a consideration of the procedure followed by Cleisthenes in his attempt to get the reforms adopted. Wade-Gery tried to show more than three decades ago that 'Kleisthenes found in the Ekklesia the authority with which to defeat the reigning Archon', 2 and although the grounds of his resulted in numerically unequal tribes. It remains, however, questionable whether the lot would really have created any instances of considerable inequality: on the basis of Eliot's chart on p. 143 there is only one chance in one thousand that a tribe would consist of three small trittyes and no chance at all that three large trittyes would form one tribe. On this point see also the cogent arguments of 'V. E. Thompson, Historia 13 (1964) 400-13, esp. 402-8, who concludes on p. 408 that there is 'no secure evidence for rejecting Aristotle's statement that
Essays
139-48, esp. 142.
156 NOMOE
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
conclusion may be questioned, the conclusion itself hardly admits doubt. Cleisthenes' motive for wishing to establish laovofl,{a can most satisfactorily be explained as a desire to eliminate from Athenian politics the dynastic feuds which had in the past helped to bring Peisistratus to power I and which had erupted again after the overthrow of the tyranny. This accounts not only for the new regional tribes, but also for the institution of ostracism, which Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 22. I) attributes to him, and the primary aim of which seems to have been the prevention of aTom, before it should become rife. For through the institution of ostracism the collective judgement of the people, acting on the principle of laovo}-tla, could be invoked to judge any political disputes between two opposed dynasts before they came to harm the state. It is possible and, in fact, probable that Cleisthenes first tried to get his programme adopted through a forum other than the Assembly. This, at any rate, seems to be the best interpretation of Herodotus' assertion (5. 69. 2) that Cleisthenes, like the other nobles, initially 'spurned the Ofj}-t0,',2 hoping that he could persuade the rest of the political nobility of the merits of his plan. Only when he saw that the interests of birth and wealth were too firmly and too narrowly entrenched to adopt a programme which alone, in his opinion, would be a permanent safeguard against aTom" did he take the revolutionary step of submitting his plans to the Assembly, appealing to the Sij}-to, in the name of laovo}-tla. The institution of a popular assembly is in the Greek world as old as Homer. That an Assembly functioned under the constitution of Solon is indicated by the fact that the thetes were included among its members (Arist. Ath. Pol. 7. 3; Pluto Solon 18. 2), and by the report that Peisistratus' first bodyguard was voted by the SijJLO, on the motion of Aristion (Ath. Pol. 14. I; c£ Hdt. I. 59. 4-5)·But we know nothing about the powers of the Assembly before Cleisthenes. It is worth noting that it is not one of the three Solonian institutions which Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 9. I) singles out as 'favouring the common people', and in the case ofPeisistratus' bodyguard, the impression created by Herodotus and Aristotle is that the Assembly gave its assent in much the same way as the Spartan assembly did: it listened and approved, but probably did not discuss. Moreover, the issue on which the J
2
Hdt. I. 59. 3, 60. 1-3,61. Cf. above, p. 149 n. I.
2,62.
I;
Arist. Ath. Pol. 13.4, 14.3-4,
15.
I.
IEONOMIA,
CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOE
157
Assembly was consulted on this occasion was the comparatively minor one of giving special protection to a distinguished citizen; the people did not know that they were in fact voting for the establishment of tyranny. This means that Cleisthenes was taking a very extraordinary step indeed when, after his defeat by Isagoras, TOV SijJLOV1TpOa€TaLpl'€TaL, I which may be translated 'made the people into his political partners' and which may well refer to the procedure Cleisthenes adopted in choosing the Assembly as the forum in which the fate of his proposals was to be determined. If this reconstruction of Cleisthenes' procedure and of the motives for it is correct, it would be the first application in practice in Athens of the principle of laovoJLla. For in submitting his programme to the Assembly he gave the common people 'equal political rights' with the noble and wealthy to decide the way in which Athens should be governed. That he submitted his entire programme to the Assembly at once is unlikely, and it is equally unlikely that he won over the people by proposing to make the deme the smallest political unit in Attica. For the number of those who would have grasped the significance of the deme reform immediately would have been too small to explain the impressive support implied by the words 'made the people his political partners'. But the prospect of laovoJLla must have appeared as something very attractive to the common people, and if we assume, as we have good reason to do, that it was the principle of laovo}-tla which Cleisthenes used from the very beginning as the slogan or as one of the slogans in submitting his proposals to the Assembly, we can explain the enthusiastic reception which he received.2 We may take a further step. Our analysis of the various -VO}-to, compounds that are attested before 464/3 B.C. has shown I
Hdt. 5. 66. 2; cr. 69. 2: 'TOV J40"lvaLWV o~fLov ••• 'TO'TE71'1lV'TWS7TPOS'T~V EWV'TOV
fLolpav 7TpoUEO~Ka'TO; and Arist. Ath. Pol. 20. I : 7TPOU"Iy6.YE'TO 'TOV o~fLOV. 2 lU"IyoPLa may have been another slogan used in Cleisthenes' propaganda,
although, unlike luovofLLa, this expression is not attested before Herodotus. We have no evidence for the powers of the Assembly before Cleisthenes, but it is probable that only members of the upper classes could address it; on the other hand, we know that in the late fifth and in the fourth century every citizen had the right to do so, see Aeschines 1.23; Ar. Ach. 45, Thesm. 379, and Eeei. 130. It is not impossible that this right goes back to Cleisthenes; if it does, it would explain the peculiar use of the term in Hdt. 5. 78, cf. above, pp. 109 n. 2, and 146 n. 4· G. T. Griffith, 'Isegoria in the Assembly at Athens', Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to Victor Ehrenberg ... I 15-38, wants to assign it to Ephialtes in
462
B.C.
158 NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
that laovop,ta is the only one which has itself exclusively political connotations and reflects the political senses of vop,o, as the authority to issue norms and as the political norms and regulations which a people accepts as valid and binding for itself.1 It is rather unlikely that the suffix should have assumed a political sense without a prior or concomitant assumption of a political meaning on the part of vop,o,. The last use of BEap,tov for 'statute' is attested for the period immediately following 511/IO B.C.2 If Cleisthenes used laovop,ta both as the principle of his constitution and as the propaganda catchword through which he enlisted popular support for his programme, is it not probable that he was the first Athenian to substitute vop,o, for BEap,o, as the technical term for 'statute'? Two considerations lend weight to this assumption, one expressing the conversative and one the revolutionary aspect of Cleisthenes' measures. All indications suggest that Cleisthenes scrupulously avoided creating an impression that he was trying to nullify the work of Solon. He abolished none of the institutions of the Solonian constitution, such as Council, Assembly, the archonships, and the Council of the Areopagus.3 He retained the Heliaia and kept the names epVA~ and TptTTV, for his own political units even while changing their structure, and he left the four Ionian epvAat as well as gene, phratries, and priesthoods the religious functions they had before and under Solon. He left intact the Solonian property qualifications for office, and, above all, he did not abolish the Solonian statutes, published on the axones, and constantly referred to as Solon's by the fourth-century orators. Since Cleisthenes did not impose his measures as Solon did, but, as is most probable, proposed and had them ratified by Council and Assembly,4 it seems to me extremely likely that he offered them as VOp,Ot to the Assembly to differentiate them at once from the BEap,ot of Solon and to indicate that he wanted to offer nothing as a statute that had not first been ratified by the people as something that they would promise to regard as valid and binding for See above, pp. 119-20. 2 See above, pp. 4 and 59. These and the following facts are too well known to require detailed documentation. For a convenient summary see Hignett, HAC 129-58, esp. 156-7. My only major disagreement with Hignett is that I do not believe that the Council was an innovation of Cleisthenes (pp. 148-53). 4 I see no reasonable alternative in this respect to the view of Wade-Gery, Essays 135-54, esp. 139-48. I
3
II:ONOMI
DEMOCRACY
A, CLEISTHENES,
AND
NOMOI:
159
themselves. We may have a small measure of confirmation for this view in Aristotle's statement (Ath. Pol. 22. I) that Cleisthenes enacted new VOp,Ot, aTOxa~Op,€voV TOU 7TA~Bov,. What these VOp,Ot were Aristotle does not say except that he mentions the vop,o, on ostracism. References to Cleisthenean VOp,Ot are conspicuously absent from the fourth-century orators,! and Hignett has drawn from that fact the conclusion that none existed.2 But the fact that Aristotle mentions their existence must give us pause, and it is by no means unlikely that the tjrryeptap,aTa by which, according to \Vade-Gery, Cleisthenes created his 7TOAtnta were called VOp,Ot by Cleisthenes himself. The second consideration favouring the adoption of vop,o, by Cleisthenes is of a more general nature. If laovop,ta literally means 'equality of vop,o,', that is if the term signifies that what is regarded as valid and binding is so regarded by and for all classes of society, no moment in Athenian history seems to be more appropriate for the substitution of vop,o, for BEap,o, than the period immediately preceding and immediately following the reforms of Cleisthenes. The overthrow of the tyranny and the reforms which followed four years later filled the people with a self-confidence which they had never experienced before. One reflection of that is the glorification of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in sculpture and song in order to make the liberation and its consequences an Athenian achievement and gloss over the part played by Sparta,3 and, as we saw, it is not impossible that Cleisthenes may have used the glory of the tyrannicides to promote his reforms by presenting them as the continuation of their work.4 A further example, remarked on by Herodotus (5. 78), is the success with which the young democracy defended itself on three fronts against external enemies in 506 B.C. Much of the credit for this surge in morale goes to Cleisthenes, for by taking the people as his political partners he recognized as vop,o, for the people what had previously been vop,o, for the nobility only, namely, the making of important political decisions. At the same time, by proposing his reforms in the Assembly, he made it clear that he was not acting as a lawgiver in the sense in which Lycurgus or Solon had imposed their legislation on Sparta and Athens, respectively, but that the people were themselves to take the [ V. Ehrenberg, Neugriinder des Staates 60-1. See above, p. 134.
3
2 4
Hignett, HAC 129-30. See above, p. 135.
lOa NOMO;;
AND BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
responsibility of accepting and implementing the measures proposed by him. I If Cleisthenes himself did not make that point, the subsequent presence in Athens of Cleomenes and his Spartan troops on the side ofIsagoras will have driven it home; for that it was driven home is proved by the resistance which the Council and the people offered to Isagoras and the Spartans even when Cleisthenes was not present to provide leadership. Is it not probable that the experience of tyranny and of arams among the noble families, on the one hand, and the function of acting as their own lawgivers, assumed by the people under the guidance of Cleisthenes, on the other, brought with them a deliberate rejection of 8wfLoS as being something imposed by a third party, in favour of vOfLoS as the ratification of what they wished to regard as valid and binding? No proof is possible that the reforms of Cleisthenes are responsible for this change in terminology, but the indications are that, since the change did take place at some point between 5II/1a and 464/3 B.C., it took place at this time and against this background. And if the Cleisthenean reforms do indeed provide the background for the change from 8WfLOS to vOfLoS, it explains also why, in preference to the other possible terms for 'statute', the Athenians adopted vOfLoS, the most democratic word for 'law' in any language.
HI~~ ~.,leisthenes' greatness as a statesman as well as a pohtlclan can be regarded as assured, it still remains to raise the question of his originality in using laovofLLa both to help him promote his political programme and as a description of its content, and in using vOfLoS to describe his measures. Both terms, as we saw, are found in Athens before we hear of them in other states: no form of laovofLLa is attested before the Harmodius skolia and the earliest occurrence of vOfLoS as 'statute' is in Aeschylus' Supplices.2 But it does not necessarily follow from this that the concept of laovofLLa was invented in Athens, or that there were no other Greek states which called their statutes VOfLOL before the term took root in Athens. The survival of more literature and more inscriptions from Athens than from any other part of the Greek world often makes us oblivious of our ignorance of the history of the rest of Greece, and the silence of our sources for other states is not a sufficient argument for the originality of Athens. In short, we lack the information which would enable us to affirm or deny with any confidence that the ideas of laovofLLa, or of vOfLoS as 'statute', or of both originated in Athens in connection with Cleisthenes' reforms. Still, there are some considerations which may help us to clarify the problem of originality, even if they cannot solve it. Although Cleisthenes' was the first successful attempt of which we know to establish a democratic system of government in the Western World, we know of democratic features in at least three other Greek states before him. Is there any hint that laovofLLa and/or vOfLoS may have played a sufficiently important part in any of these to suggest that Cleisthenes borrowed either the terms or the ideas inherent in them from one or more of these states? The earliest piece of evidence that has come down to us is a constitutional document from Chios, which reveals the existence of a number of democratic institutions on that island as
W
I
, This estimate is not shared by K.J. Beloch, Griechische and by U. Kahrstedt, RE s.v. 'Kleisthen,.s'. 2 S,.e above, pp. 43, 58--9, and 121-30. K1 j :277
"I
Geschichte
,2. 2 318~33, .
162
NOMa};
AND
BEGI"'~INGS
OF ATHENIAN
THE
DEMOCRACY
early as about 575-550 B.C.lHowever, the institutions mentioned in this document do not seem to go beyond those attested for Athens under the Solonian constitution. Just as Solon made provision for appeals against magisterial decisions to be lodged before the Assembly sitting as a court oflaw, the Heliaia,2 so the Chian inscription provides for meetings of the popular assembly in some judicial capacity, perhaps to hear the report of an auditor,3 or to hear the appeal of a dissatisfied litigant;4 and in addition has a popular council (f3ovA~ DYj/-wa{YJ) consisting of fifty members from each tribe, which meets once every month to hear appeals. The epithet DYJJ-watYjwhich this council bears is generally taken as an indication that there existed in Chios also a second council, which was dominated by the nobility. If this is so, we have here a further parallel to Solonian Athens, which had both the Areopagus and, most probably, a popular council of four hundred members elected on a tribal basis (Arist. Ath. Pol. 8. 4; Pluto Solon 19. 1).5 Although the inscription gives us information about the judicial system only, we may conclude that any 'democracy' Chios may have enjoyed in the second quarter of the sixth century B.C.went no further than the institutions of the Solonian constitution in Athens, which it is more likely to have imitated than to have prefigured as a pattern. The Chian constitution of the sixth century does not, therefore, seem to have embodied the principle of laovofLta. Its statutes were not v6fLoL in the sense in which we have interpreted that term, but, as the second line of the inscription I First published by P. Jacobsthal and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Nordionische Steine', Abh. d. kgl. preuss. Ak. d. Wiss. Philos.-hist. Cl. (Berlin, 1909) 64-71. The fundamental modern publication is L. H. Jeffery, 'The Courts of Justice in Archaic Chios', BSA 51 (1956) 157~67, with full bibliography of earlier work on p. 157 and date on epigraphical grounds on p. 160. Cf. id. LSAG 336~7. See also J. H. Oliver, 'Text of the So-called Constitution of Chios from the First Half of the Sixth Century B.C.', AJP 80 (1959) 296-,\01, and W. G. Forrest, 'The Tribal Organization of Chios', BSA 55 (1960) 172-89, esp. 180- 1. Z Arist. Ath. Pol. 9. I; Lysias 10. 16; and Dem. 24. 105, as cited by Hignett, HAC 97-8. E. Ruschenbuscl{ has recently tried to show, Historia 14 (1965) 381-4, that the Solonian Heliaia was not instituted to hear appeals but to conduct trials de novo. 3 So Oliver, op. cit. 299. 4 H. T. Wade-Gery apud L. H. Jeffery, BSA 51 (1956) 163-4. 5 The existence of a popular council under Solon is disbelieved by Hignett, HAC 92-6, but his arguments are far from conclusive. A. Andrewes, Probouleusis: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Government 22, thinks that the Solonian council served as a model for Chi os.
ORIGINALITY
OF
CLEISTHENES
163
shows, FJ'ijTpat. Moreover, since these beginnings of democracy do not seem to have led very far in Chios, it is improbable that Cleisthenes took his cue from them when he proposed his reforms in Athens. The Cleisthenean reforms have been related by several scholars to the reforms which Demonax of Mantinea is said to have enacted at Cyrene about the middle of the sixth century B.C.2 Demonax was called in, according to Herodotus, to settle a number of problems, which began with the immigration of people from the Peloponnese, Crete, and the Greek islands. These immigrants had come at the invitation of Battus II Eudaimon. But their arrival had led to difficulties with the neighbouring Libyans, who allied themselves with the Egyptians and, after an initial reverse in the battle of Irasa, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Cyrenaeans at Leucon in the reign of Arcesilaus II. This defeat had been caused largely by intrigues of Arcesilaus' brothers, who after quarrelling with the king, fomented revolt among the Libyans. Arcesilaus met a violent end and, to add further to Cyrene's troubles, his son and successor, Battus III, was a cripple.3 It was to solve these problems that Demonax came to Cyrene. After a survey of the situation, he organized the population into three tribes, one fLoLpa consisting of the descendants of the original settlers from Thera,4 one of the descendants of the Peloponnesian and Cretan immigrants, and one of the descendants of those who had come from the islands. The powers previously wielded by the king were turned over to the people,5 except that the king was permitted to retain his domains and his priesthoods. The language used by Herodotus to describe Demonax' grant of popular power, ES fLEaov Tip 8~fLqJ EBYjKE, is close enough to the language which Otanes uses to propose the establishment of laovofLtYj in I
Sce \V. G. Forrest, loco cit. The chief source is Hdt. 4. 161 ; see also Diodorus 8. 30. 2. The establishment of this relation may be due to Arist. Pol. 6. 4, 1319bI9-27, if the tribal reforms at Cyrene to which he refers are indeed those of Demonax.-For the date of Demonax' reforms see F. Chamoux, Cyrene sous la monarchie des Battiades 138-42 and 151 n. 2. 3 Hdl. 4. 159-61, with Chamoux, op. cit. 134-9. 4 That 7TEp{OLKO' at Hdt. 4. 161. 3 refers to the descendants of those who were 7TEp{OLKOL in Thera at the time when the expedition for Cyrene was organized has been convincingly argued by L. H. Jeffery, 'The Pact of the First Settlers at Cyrene', Historia 10 (1961) 139-47, esp. 142-4. 5 Helt. 4. 161. 3: 7'd a,\,\a 7TCIVTa 7'd 7TPOUPOV dxov ot {3aaLME, ., /LEaov 7'0 (j~/Ltp I
2
'0'1KE•
164 NOMO};
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
Persia and in which Maeandrius couches his offer of laollofl,{YJ to the Samians' to justify Chamoux's description of the constitution of Demonax as 'un regime d'isonomie ou plut6t d'isocratie',2 and to explain why Aristotle may have been thinking of Demon ax when he bracketed 7Tf'P~ KVP~llYJll Ot TOll MifLOll KuetaTUllT(<; with Clcisthenes (Pol. 6. 4, Iglgb22-g).3 Unfortunately, we lack the information we need for a detailed comparison of the reforms of Demonax with those ofCleisthenes, and we cannot tell from the little we know whether the latter may have borrowed from the former. But what we do know suggests that borrowing is unlikely to have taken place and that, their democratic features notwithstanding, the purpose of Demonax' reforms differed radically from that of Cleisthenes'. For while Demonax was faced with the problem of integrating into the citizen body recent immigrants who had not been absorbed into the three Doric tribes, in which the first settlers were presumably organized, Cleisthenes' problem was to bring together different regional and economic interests in the same tribe by means of his trittyes so as to eliminate rivalries which might lead to aTCI.aL<;.4 Demonax' solution was to perpetuate the heterogeneity of the state by the creation of three new ethnic tribes (to replace the old Doric tribes), which received apparently each an equal voice in the management of affairs; Cleisthenes' aim, on the other hand, was to create homogeneous tribes.s In other words, if it is just to attribute laovofLtu to the reforms of Demonax at all, it will have to be in the sense that each new tribe received the same rights and the same power. But since he did not go so far as to abolish the kingship, he cannot be said to have established laollofLtu throughout the state as Cleisthenes did. Moreover, the fact that Demonax came to Cyrene as a lawgiver imported from abroad, as I Hdt. 3. 80. 2 and 142. 3, with pp. 107-9 and Iii -12 above; cf. also 7 164. I, where Cadmus gives up his tyranny in Cos and goes to Sicily tJ1TO O'Katoavv"1~ .~ p.€aov Kc/>OLUt Ka'Ta8£~s 'T~V apx~v. 2 Op. cit. '4I. Unfortunately, Chamoux does not provide an interpretation of the meaning of isocratie. 3 But it is uncertain whether the passage refers to Demonax; sec ,,y. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus 12• 355. Aristotle's reference may equally well be to a settlement following a'Tcfa,~ in 40' B.C., mentioned by Diodorus '4. 34. 6. 4 See B. M. Mitchell, 'Cyrene and Persia', ]HS 86 (1966) 99-' 13, esp. 99. 5 Cf. D. M. Lewis, 'Cleisthenes and Attica', Historia 12 (1963) 39 with n. '46, where I concur with Lewis's criticism of the mixed tribes suggested by Miss Jeffery, Historia 10 (1961) '43-4.
THE
ORIGINALITY
OF
CLEISTHENES
165
indeed many other lawgivers of that period were, 1 constitutes the most profound difference between him and Cleisthenes2 and makes it impossible to believe that he called his enactments llOfLOt; they were impositions of an outsider, not ratifications of the popular will. Finally, the attempt of Maeandrius to establish an equalitarian system of government in Samos after the death of Polycrates in 522 B.C. might have been a possible source of Cleisthenes' laollofLtu.3 The incident itself sounds credible enough, especially since Herodotus mentions the name of an otherwise unknown Telesarchus as that of the man most vocal in frustrating Maeandrius' plans (g. 142. 5-14g. 1) and states that Maeandrius dedicated the valuables from Polycrates' apartments at the Heraeum, where, we may assume, Herodotus himself had seen them (g. 12g. r). The possibility of Maeandrius' influence on Athens receives some support from numismatic evidence which suggests that the 'reign of Maeandrius marked a return to the friendship with Athens which his predecessor had abandoned.'4 However, two considerations argue against an influence on Cleisthenes. In the first place, Maeandrius' flirtation with laollofLtYJ can only have lasted a very short time, so that any influence he might have had on Athens is likely to have come after he had given up his initial plan and assumed the tyranny (Hdt. g. 14g. r-148. I). And secondly, during his reign, Athens was still under the rule of Hippias who would not have taken enthusiastically to the cause of laollofL{u, and we know of no opposition to Hippias in Athens in 522 B.C. that may have wished to use Maeandrius' principle of political equality against the tyrant. For, as far as we know, I Scillus, Miletus, Thebes, and the Chalcidice are cited by Chamoux, op. cit. 139 n. I, as having called in foreign lawgivers about the middle of the sixth century. 2 On the significance of this see also Leveque and Vidal-Naquet, op. cit. 68. 3 Hdt. 3. 142, discussed above, pp. 107-9.-]. P. Barron, 'The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos', CQ N.S. 14 (1964) 210-29, esp. 211-12, does not carry conviction with his argument that Samos enjoyed a democratic form of government also earlier in the sixth century, viz. after the overthrow of the oligarchy of the geomoroi and before the revolution of Syloson 1. Our only authority for that event, Plut. Quaest. Gr. 57 (= Mar. 303 e-304 c), says nothing about the establishment of a democracy or of any other kind of government following the overthrow, a~ is pointed out correctly by M. E. White, 'The Duration of the Samian Tyranny', ]HS 74 (1954) 36-43, esp. 38. Moreover, the adjective 0WLO'TLKO" as applied to Syloson by Polyaenus 6. 45, means no more 'democratic' than it does when used of Peisistratus by Arist. A/h. Pol. 13.4, '4. I, and 16.8. 4 ]. P. Barron, The Silver Coins of Samos 35-6 n. 56.
166 NOMOI:
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
THE
DEMOCRACY
Hippias was still firmly entrenched in power in 522 B.C., on good terms with the other nobles, and supported by the people. As far as a specific programme is concerned, we know even less about Maeandrius than we do about the reform proposed by Demonax. Maeandrius' proposal resembles Cleisthenes' programme in that it involves political equality for all citizens. But it differs from it in two important respects. Unlike Cleisthenes, Maeandrius requested for himself and his descendants a prerogative that went beyond even that reserved by Demonax for the kings of Cyrene. For while Cleisthenes asked nothing for himself and left the traditional priesthoods intact, and while Demonax reserved for the kings only their traditional domains and priesthoods, Maeandrius claimed in perpetuity the priesthood of a cult which he had himself established and a payment of six talents in addition. 1 Still, despite the privilege claimed, Herodotus feels justified in applying the name of laovoiLty) to the proposal, because politically Maeandrius would remain on the same footing as the other Samians. The second difference is more striking. The reason Herodotus gives for Maeandrius' failure is that the Samians were not ready for political equality: ou yap 8~, we; oLKum, Ef30DAOVTO ElvUL EAED8EpOL (3. 143. 2). Cleisthenes' Athenians, on the contrary, were ready, and we may interpret the difference as meaning that while Cleisthenes' laovoiLtu was supported by vOiLoe; and succeeded, Maeandrius failed because the vOiLoe; of the Samians was not on his side. Still, this does not rule out the possibility that Cleisthenes learned from Maeandrius' mistakes, because he was a better politician than the Samian had been; and even if he did not learn specifically from Maeandrius, it is possible that he was influenced by events and currents pervading Ionia in the last quarter of the sixth century. Although the {'vidence that Maeandrius preached laovoiLty) is no earlier than Herodotus, the use of the same word also by Otanes in the Debate of the conspirators (which is assigned to the same year as Maeandrius' proposal and which Herodotus probably owes either to Persians whose Hellenism was derived from eastern Greeks or from eastern Greeks who were familiar with Persian affairs)Zsuggests that the concept Cf. Hdt. 3. 142. 2 and 4 with 4. 161. 3 and with Arist. Ath. Pol. 21. 6. Hdt. 3. 80. 6 and 83. I, discussed above, pp. 107 and III, with Endnote pp. 178-9. I
2
on
ORIGINALITY
OF
CLEISTHENES
167
was current in Ionia before it came to Athens. This view is corroborated by the only other laovoiLty) passage in Herodotus, Aristagoras' grant of laovoiLty) to Miletus (5. 37. 2), which, although its historical context is later than the Cleisthenean reforms, still reflects the currency of democratic aspirations, subsumed under the name of laovoiLty), in Ionia about the same time. As we saw earlier (above, p. 109), a similar democratic undercurrent in Ionia was also recognized by Histiaeus in 512 B.C. and again by Mardonius in 492 B.C. (Hdt.4. 137. 2; 6. 43·3). The cumulative effect of this evidence makes it likely that Athens, whose ties with Ionia were always strong KUTa TO gvyyEvEe;, came under the influence of this Zeitgeist even before the reforms of Cleisthenes. But we must not forget that we know of the relation of this spirit to laovoiLtu only through Herodotus. We do not know whether in attributing it to the sixth-cenTury Ionians he was not applying to the past a concept of his own time, perhaps even a concept he had encountered in Athens. The question whether laovoiLtu travelled from Ionia to Athens or whether it was first coined in Athens and then applied to pre-Cleisthenic Ionia must, therefore, remain open. The situation is similar with regard to vOiLoe;. One of its earliest uses in a legal text is to be found in an inscription from Herodotus' native Halicarnassus, written in the Ionic dialect and usually dated about 460-455 B.C.I It embodies the outcome of deliberations by a meeting of the Halicarnassians, the Salmacitae, and Lygdamis, almost certainly the same Lygdamis who, according to the Suda, was the tyrant ofHalicarnassus second in succession to Artemisia and because of whom Herodotus left his native city for Samos.2 It is concerned with the disposition of real estate in lands and houses-whose possessions arc involved we are not told-and with the procedure of preferring claims for it. As we noted above, the fact that the text twice refers to itself as vOiLoe; (lines 32 and 34-5) shows that the term designates a written statute.3 But this is not the only way of self-reference. In line 19 Tod, CHI 12, No. 25; Buck, CD, No.2. 2 Suda, s.v. 'HpoooTo<;. See p. 44 above, where we pointed out that it is doubtful whether the oath, which, according to lines 19-20, the judges are to administer "o/-,'!', was laic! down in some written legislation other than the present law. Most probably the expression is no more than the Halicarnassian equivalent of "0/-,'/-,0<; 0PKO<;, a customary oath formula, which in some cases at Athens was and in others was not specified verbatim in the written statutes. I
3
168 NOMa};
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
the term aDos is apparently used of the same inscription. What is the relation between the two terms? The tone of the last section of the inscription (lines 32-41) leaves little doubt that voj.to, enjoys a higher status than aDo, and comes, therefore, closer to describing the kind of 'statute' this is. Since aDo, is derived from avOuvw = 'please', it may, like t//~1Jwfla at Athens, denote the form of the enactment, namely, the fact that 'it has pleased the aVAAoyoS" to make this decision, or else it may refer to some formality in the enactment, such as its ratification by some plenary assemblies of the Halicarnassians and the Salmacitae. While it is not surprising to see in the course of the fifth century the spread ofl1oj.toS' over many points of the Athenian Empire,2 it is remarkable to find it in the early 450S as the description of a document to which a tyrant is a party. Still, it is not without significance that we are here faced not with a decree enacted by a tyrant, but with a statute which has resulted from the deliberations of a aVAAoyoS' of three parties, of which the tyrant is merely one. There is nothing here to contradict our contention that voj.toS' is the ratification of something agreed upon as valid and binding. Moreover, Lygdamis cannot here be acting in the name of his subjects, for the Halicarnassians and the Salmacitae are separate signatories to the law, and both are obviously included in the expression .:4ALKapvaaaEwv DE TWS' aVj.t7TUVTLOV in lines 41-2 of the inscription.3 Since it is based on a negotiated agreement, it certainly is a voj.toS' rather than a (Jwj.toS'. However, we cannot infer from this that voj.to, was the exclusive technical term for 'statute' in Halicarnassus: it is possible that the Halicarnassians had two different words for 'statute', one to denote the enactments of the tyrant alone and voj.toS' to describe regulations such as the present, enacted after deliberation by a aVAAoyoS'. Moreover, we do not know whether the Halicarnassians began to use voj.toS' before or after the reforms of Cleisthenes. However, there is one consideration which suggests that voj.toS' I
I Cf. a similar use of 0:80, (but without VOiLO,) in an inscription from Thasos of 412/1 I B.C., IG 12.8, 263. 7. For the use of the verb in a similar sense see BS I. 455 with n. 3. 2 e.g. in Erythrae c. 450 B.C. in Meiggs and Andrewes B 116. A 2 I, 27, and B 1920; in regulations for Colophon of 447/6 B.C. in IG 12• 15.30-1, with above, p. 42 n. I; and in the assessment of 425 B.C. in Meiggs and Andrewes B 87. 15 (restored). 3 For the relation of Salmacis to Halicarnassus see F. Gschnitzer, 'Zur Geschichte der griechischen Staatenverbindungen : Halikarnassos und Salmakis (SylJ3. 45)', RhM 104 (1961) 237-41.
was not transplanted to Halicarnassus from Athens, as it was probably transplanted later to other parts of the Athenian Empire. The reason is not the one usually given in dating this law. Most scholars date it before 454 B.C.,because we know from the tribute lists that Halicarnassus was by that time and remained henceforth one of the most reliable Athenian allies, and it is assumed that Athens would not have accepted into the Delian League a city governed by a tyrant.I This assumption, however, is unwarranted, since we have no evidence that membership in the League was initially contingent on internal ideological considerations; and since, moreover, the Athenians could tolerate an oligarchical regime in Miletus even after her revolt had been crushed in 450/449 B.C.,2could it not have tolerated a tyranny in Halicarnassus, provided that the tyrant would not medize?3 The later loyalty of Halicarnassus suggests that she may have joined the League a considerable time before the fall of Lygdamis, perhaps soon after its foundation. If this made her amenable to Athenian influence in, inter alia, legal terminology, one might suspect that she adopted the Athenian term voj.to, for her own statutes and take perhaps the peculiarity of the use of the Ionic dialect in a Doric community as corroborative evidence for that. However, the use of aDoS' in the same inscription speaks against that. If voj.toS' had really been an Athenian importation, we should also expect to find the Athenian f~1Jwj.ta in place of aDoS', which is not Attic. The fact that Erythrae, after her revolt had been crushed, used both voj.toS' and f~1Jwfla in the same law in the same sense as these terms bore at Athens4 shows the nature of an Athenian influence that does not appear in this Halicarnassian measure. While this suggests that voj.toS' = 'statute arrived at by common agreement' was as indigenous to Halicarnassus as was aDoS', we have no indication whether the term started in Halicarnassus early enough to assume an influence on the Cleisthenean reforms and whether it described the only kind of 'statute' known in Halicarnassus. Yet we can be confident that, as See Tod, GHI 12, p. 38, and I. M.]. Valeton, Mnemosyne N.S. 36 (1908) 289. Meiggs and Andrewes B 30 and [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3. I I, with ATL 3. 150, 151 with n. 10, 153, 154, and 255-6. 3 As did, apparently, the tyrants of Erythrae; see Meiggs and Andrewes B 26. 27 and 33. 4 Meiggs and Andrewes B 116. A 21, 27, and B 19-20 for ,-ofLo,; B 1-2 for f~"'LaiLa. Cf. above, pp. 45-6. I
Z
170
NOMO};
AND
BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
long as Halicarnassus was ruled by tyrants, vO/-l-OS was not associated with the idea of iaOVO/-l-Lu. In the case of the Halicarnassian law we have to reckon at least with the possibility that v0/-l-0S had been transplanted from Athens. Athenian influence is very unlikely in the final inscription we shall have to consider. It contains the foundation instrument of an Eastern Locrian colony at Naupactus, which can be dated on epigraphical grounds in the first quarter of the fifth century 1 and which on historical grounds must antedate the expulsion of the Locrians and subsequent settlement of the Messenians by Athens about 460 B.C.2 The peculiarity of this law, too, is that it uses two different terms in self-reference. That the term TO 8E8/-1-LOV (line 46) indicates the fundamental character of this law as a constitution has already been mentioned (above, p. 16). But it is interesting to note that 8w/-I-os is not used in a similar regulation which Athens issued for the foundation of a colony at Brea about 445 B.C.3 In addition, just as the Halicarnassian inscription used 0 noos of itself to describe the form of its enactment, so we find TO. F€FuOYJ9oTa (line 38) at Naupactus, evidently in the same sense. What is, however, of greater interest for our purposes is that there is in addition one mention of vO/-l-os and six uses of different forms of the adjective V0/-l-LOS. The difference between these two forms is hard to see. The vO/-l-OS mentioned is the law concerning inheritance in the various East Locrian cities which is to be invoked in cases in which a settler's brother falls heir to his property in Locris (line 30). We have no way of knowing whether matters of inheritance were regulated by written statutes in Eastern Locris, but the fact that they were at Athens would suggest an affirmative answer. That they were written is also suggested by one of the uses of VO/-l-LOS in this inscription, which refers back to an earlier clause in this law: special provisions are laid down for members of the Percothariae and :Mysacheis4 who return to East I Tod, GHI IZ, No. 24; Buck, GD, No. 57. The epigraphical dating is in Jeffery, LSAG 106. For a discussion of the historical context see L. Lerat, Les locriens de ['ouest (= Bibliotheque des Ecoles franfaises d'Athenes et de Rome, fasc. 176) 2. 29-33, and A. J. Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece 45-60 with translation on pp. 226-8. 2 Thuc. I. 103. 3; Diod. II. 84. 7-8; Paus. 4. 24. 7, with Tod, GHI 12, p. 33. 3 Tod, GHI 12, No. 44. The beginning of the inscription is lost, but the end, where OWfLo, is most likely to have occurred, is very well preserved. • For these see ibid. p. 34.
THE
ORIGINALITY
OF
CLEISTHENES
171
Locris (mo TWV VO/-l-LWV TWV E-TTtFOLr;>WV (line 27), which refers to stipulations laid down earlier in lines 19-22. It is less certain whether written enactments are involved in what immediately precedes and what follows this phrase: the property of members of these clans left behind in Locris shall be subject to Locrian VO/-l-LOLS and their property at Naupactus to those of that city (lines 22-6), while upon their return home they will be subject each to the VO/-l-LOLS of his city (lines 27-8). Were these regulations laid down in writing or are the VO/-l-LU primarily customary practices? The comparative sophistication of this 8E8/-1-LOV and the parallel of Athens would again suggest that they were written. But we cannot be sure. Nor can we be sure in the case of the Naupactian VO/-l-LU (line 19) which are to apply in cases where a colonist dies without heirs in Naupactus and where the next of kin in Locris fails to register his claim to the estate. Since it is a matter of inheritance, the presumption would again be that the reference is to written legislation, especially since 'customary practices' are not likely to have developed yet in the colony by the time of the enactment of the present law. Another clause bars a delinquent tax-payer from the Locrians until he has paid TO. vO/-l-La before Naupactians (lines 15- 16). The reference isobviously to 'lawful dues', 1 that is to the arrears which he legally owes the Naupactians. Again, we do not know whether the relevant tax laws existed in writing. Finally, there is one use of the singular in the passage in which the judges are required to swear opr;>ov ToV VO/-l-LOV before trying violations of this law (line 45), and it remains just as obscure here as it did in the Halicarnassian law whether a written statute embodied the traditional formula.2 The important feature of this Naupactian law for our purposes is that it contains three terms for 'written statute' : TO 8E8/-1-LOV, TO. F€FU07Jr;>OTU, and V0/-l-(L)OS, each with a peculiar sense of its own. The fundamental constitutional character of the whole is expressed by TO 8E8/-1-LOV and the formal ratification it has undergone by TO. F€Fuo7Jr;>OTU, while VO/-l-(L)OS is used both of (written or unwritten) laws concerning matters of inheritance, property, and taxes not specified in the 8E8/-1-LOV, and of a clause that does form part of it. This multiplicity of terminology demonstrates that it is possible to find different words for different kinds of statute within the legal system of one city-state and should make us I
See A. J. Graham,
op. cit. 51 and 227.
2
Cf. above, p. 167 n. 3.
172 NOMOI:
AND BEGINNINGS
OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY
wary of supposing that words other than vOfLoS may not have existed in Halicarnassus to describe, for example, a 'statute' which did not result from the deliberations of a av'\'\oyos but one which was decreed by the fiat of the tyrant. We know too little of the constitution of the East Locrian states to be able to say whether their VOfLOL or VOfLLU were arrived at by institutions in which the people could express their acceptance (or rejection) of measures that were to be valid and binding for them. The indications are that such institutions existed. Aristotle's words in the Politics (3. 16, 1287"6-8) suggest that Opus had a single ruler with limited powers, who may be identical with the apxos whom the Naupactian law entrusts with the arrangement of trials (lines 42-3). But the text indicates clearly that his tenure of office is limited (lines 43-4), presumably to one year (line 35). Moreover, we can infer from the law that Opus had an assembly of one thousand and that Naupactus had an assembly in which all colonists were members (lines 38-40). Oldfather suggests that the 'one thousand' means all property-owning citizens and states: 'Der Form nach ist diese Verfassung zwar aristokratisch, aber stark gemaBigt, und nicht weit vom Ideal der konservativen Demokratie entfernt, da in einer so kleinen Ortschaft wie Opus die Anzahl der grundbesitzenden Burger nicht vie! groBer gewesen sein kann.'1 If this is correct and if this body was, as is likely, entrusted with the enactment of the laws, the terms vOfLoS and VOfLLU would indeed be an appropriate description of their enactments, even if the system of government could not be characterized by laovofLLu. Still, we know no more than we do in the case ofHalicarnassus how early this terminology started in Eastern Locris and must, therefore, leave open the question whether Cleisthenes may have borrowed the term from there. The lack of our knowledge of any relations between Athens and East Locris in the sixth century makes such an influence improbable. The multiplicity of terminology also illustrates another point. The Eastern Locrians, making proper allowance for dialectical variation, have the same terms for 'statute' as those we encounter in Athens, BWfLo<; and vOfLOS. But while the two terms have different connotations in Naupactus, there seems to be no difference between them in Athens; for if there ever had been a difference , I
RE s.v. 'Lokris (Staat unci KuItur)'
1248.
THE ORIGINALITY
OF CLEISTHENES
173
Draco's law would surely have been called a BWfLo<; and not a vOfLo<; in the decree authorizing its publication in 409/8 B.C. Nor do we know of any period in which BWfLoS and vOfLoS existed side by side as contemporary technical terms for 'statute' as they did in Naupactus. If these considerations suggest anything, it is that the change from BWfLoS to vOfLO<; was not a gradual affair but took place at a specific point in time, since vOfLo<; is not attested in the sense of 'statute' before 511/10 B.C. and BWfLoS no longer has that meaning after that date. That the reforms of Cleisthenes constituted this point in time is not susceptible of proof, but I think the probability that they were is made cogent by the circumstantial evidence we have accumulated. What conclusions can we draw from these considerations about the originality of Cleisthenes? Although both laovofLLu and vOfLoS = 'statute' are first attested in Athens, we have seen that Herodotus relates the democratic currents in Ionia frequently enough to laovofLLY) to make possible an Ionian influence on Cleisthenes' choice of this catchword as an accurate description of his programme. Similarly, we have seen that vOfLOS may conceivably have been a current term for 'statute' in Halicarnassus or in Eastern Locris before it came to Athens. Proof is impossible in these matters, and the position is equally defensible that it was from Athens that vOfLO<; began to spread over the Greek world as early as the late sixth or early fifth century. It cannot be proved, either, that it was Cleisthenes who effected the substitution of vOfLo<; for BWfLoS in Athens. But since our comparison with Naupactus tends to show that its adoption in Athens was the result of a deliberate policy, Cleisthenes is the most likely candidate for having proposed and implemented that policy. And even if Cleisthenes borrowed both vOfLo<; and laovofLLu from other parts of the Greek world, he was original in that he was the first to combine them in a way in which no other state is likely to have combined them before, and to express through them the principle and the instrument of the Athenian democracy. I
Page
12
My interpretation of Pind. Ol. 13. 29 is at variance with the traditional interpretations based upon the scholia, which want BWfL6, here to mean either 'the institution of celebrating Olympic victors in song' ( TE B•fLOV TOV " VOfLOV' VOfLO, , ,. , 0'I\UfL1TWVLKU, , UfLVEW , - B UL) or yup" Eanv aUTO" 'the song of the Olympic victors' (TO V EyKwfLLuanKOV A6yov, 0, Eanv VfLVO, TWV VLKr;
noun TaU, BWfLOO, in connection with Draco's activity at Ath. Pol. 4. I, employs the adjectival TO. B€afLLU in his description of the function of the thesmothetai, suggesting thereby that their work dealt with particular cases and was, therefore, of lesser moment than Draco's work. The purpose alleged for the writing and preservation of the B€afLLU, sc. their use in settling future disputes, provides a possible clue to Aristotle's notion of their nature. He seems to have thought of them as records of judicial proceedings, embodying either the decisions rendered in each case or the principles underlying particular decisions. That records of this kind were actually kept as early as the seventh century is not improbable. But since they were kept only for the guidance o~ the magistrates, they would not have satisfied the demands for codIfication of the existing laws, which culminated in the appointment of Draco. The thesmothetai may thus have paved the way for the more systematic and comprehensive legislation of Draco. For a fuller di~cussi,m of the problems involved see A. Ledl, Studien ::;uriilteren athenzschen Veifassungsgeschichte 268-7 I, and Hignett, HAC 76-7. Page 36 On Thuc. 2. 34. I see F. Jacoby's brilliant article 'Patrios Nomos: State Burial in Athens and the Public Cemetery in the Kerameikos', JHS 64 (1944) 37-66, with the criticism of Gomme, HCT 2. 94- 10 1. The main issue between Jacoby and Gomme, viz., when in fact public burial of the war-dead started in Athens, need not concern us here. What does concern us is Thucydides' use of 1TaTpw, v6fLo, to describe it. In calling the institution a 1TaTpLo, v6fLo" Thucydides is not interested in the date of its origin at all, beyond saying that it has become a traditional practice (so rightly Jacoby 39-40 and 58; Gomme 94 takes Thucydides as dating this law [sic] 'as early as Solon if not earlier') by the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War. 'Even if, as Jacoby 52 suggests, the custom began in fact with a law enacted for the burial of the dead ofDrabeskos in 465/4 B.C., it is not such a law that Thucydides means by 1TaTpw, V6fLo, here, since he explicitly mentions those fallen at Marathon in 490 B.C. as an exception (34.5). This brings us to another point. Sin~e we know. of several other instances besides Marathon where Atheman casualtIes were buried on the battlefield, both Jacoby (42-7) and Gomme (98) accuse Thucydides of blundering. But the yE in the expression 1TA'ljv yE 'TaU, €V MupuBwVL is in itself sufficient proof that Thucydides had no intention of giving a complete list of exceptions: there was no need for him to do so, and to limit himself to the most outstanding exception sufficed to show his awareness that the 1TaTpw, v6fLO, was not always observed. In fact, the expression mJ.Tpw, v6fLo" which Jacoby himself
176
ENDl'\OTES
in a different context calls 'an entirely vague expression which only means "an old law", "a law from the time of our fathers'" (Atthis 244-5), does not imply that the custom was observed regularly, and the atd in Thucydides' statement: Kat atEt EV aVT0 [sc. T0 Ka'\'\LaTqJ , ] 8'a7TTovaL TOVS' " EK TWV ~ 7TOI\E/l-WV \, 7TpOaaTELqJ can carry only the sense of 'on each occasion' when public funerals of the war-dead take place. Page 73 A loose association of aw4,pocn5vYj with EVvO/l-La as a condition appears also in the Vatican manuscript (B) of Thuc. 8. 64. 5. The context is the abolition of the democracy in Thasos by Dieitrephes in the summer of 41 I B.C. and the subsequent revolt of Thasos from Athens fomented by oligarchical exiles. In Thasos, as elsewhere among th~ subject allies, Thucydides continues, the Athenian oligarchs achieved the opposite effect from what they had intended: awcj>poavvYjv yap '\af3ovaaL
"
at
'\
7T6'\ELS'
8
I
aVTLKpvS' EI\EV EpLav
Kat ....,
a8Ewv \
,..,
TWV
7TpaaaO/l-EVwv
'A8 YjvaLWV /
TYjS' a7TO TWV /1
f
1\
ExwpYjaav ,
"
E7Tt
T~l' I
V7TOVI\OV EVV0/l-WS' OV 7TPOTLIH;-
aavTE~: 'for on.ce the cities accepted moderation and immunity in the pursUIt of theIr own course of action, they progressed toward outright freedom, paying no attention to the sham of law-and-order coming from Athens.' In accepting this reading, both Hude and Stuart Jones reject the text of the majority of manuscripts (A, E, F, G, and M) : T~V {mo TWV J18YjvaLwv V7TOV'\OV aVTovO/l-Lav. Their reason for doing so is that the text ofB concurs with a quotation by Dionysius of Halicarnassus,. Epistula ad Ammaeum 2. I I, who cites it as an example of (a) a peculIar use of the genitive and of (b) an imprecise use of a masculine participle agreeing with a feminine subject. That this is s~f?ciently co~ent to accept the genitives and the masculine partICIple as genume has been convincingly demonstrated by W. Rhys Roberts, CR 14 (1900) 244-6. But this does not exclude the possibility that dVO/l-LaS' is a misquotation of aVTOVO/l-LaS', the kind of mistake of which there are many examples in Dionysius; see, for example, a7ToTd"J!.LaLS' (op. cit. 5) for 7TEpLTELXLaLS' (Thuc. 3. 95. 2), where the confUSIOnalso affects the prefix, cf. Roberts, op. cit. 245. I believe for two reasons th~t a~TOVO/l-.LaS' (which, incidentally, also appears as a margi~al c~rr~ctIOnm B) IS the correct r~~ding. In the first place, the adjectIve V7TOV'\OV makes us expect a polItIcal catchword used by Athenian propaganda, and aVTOVO/l-La is far more likely to have been held out to the·Thasian 8ijp.oS' than EVVO/l-La, which is not attested as part of the vocabul~ry of the psychological warfare between Athens and Sparta concernlll?, .the subject allies. Secondly, V7TOV'\OV aVToVO/l-LaS' would serve stylIstIcally better to create a balance with E7Tt T~V aVTLKpvS'
than V7TOV'\OV Eiwo/l-LaS', which falls rather flat. Moreover, would serve better than a7T6 to under.score the irony in aVTovo/l-La. Translate: 'self-determination imposed by the Athenians'. E'\w8EpLav
v7T6
Page 99
I have printed the text which is accepted as Alcmaeon, frg. 4 in DK6. I translate: 'According to Alcmaeon, what constitutes the bond of health is the isonomia of the powers, of wet and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet, and the rest, while monarclzia among them causes disease, since monarclzia of either opposite causes destruction. Disease occurs through the agency of an excess of heat or cold, with surfeit or deficiency of food as the cause, and with the blood, marrow, or brain as its focus. Sometimes, however, it may arise in these foci from external causes, such as certain kinds of water, or a region, or fatigue, or violence, or similar factors. Health, on the other hand, is the wellproportioned mixture of the qualities.'-I accept this text, which is based on [Plut.] De placitis plzilosoplzorum 5. 30, 91 I a, despite the fact that the corresponding text in Stob. Flor. 4.37.2+36.29 (WachsmuthHense 5) omits cj>80P07TOLOV yap EKaTEpov /l-0vapXLav and the last sentence, T~V 8EvyELav T~V aV/l-/l-ETpOV TWV 7TOLWV Kpiimv. In reconstructing the text of Aetius there is in general little to choose between [Plutarch] and Stobaeus, as H. Diels has shown in his fundamental discussion in Doxograplzi Graeci 56-69' On the one hand, 'Plutarchi epitome veram Aetii imaginem reddit sed in angustiorem multo formam redactam' (ibid. 61); on the other, 'in excerpendi negotio Stobaeo neglegentior et liberior est Plutarchus' (ibid. 63). In this particular instance, the reasons for preferring [Plutarch]'s version are the following: (a) [Plutarch] preserves the logical order of the fragment in proper sequence, while Stobaeus breaks it in two, putting the second part, which he starts with MYEL 8ETaS' v6aovS' aV/l-7TL7TTELV ... , first. (b) In view of that, the omission of the last sentence (T~V 8E vyELav ... ) is easily explained, since it makes sense only in relation to the first part of the fragment. (c) Similarly, the omission of cj>80P07TOLOV ydp ••. may be due to Stobaeus' failure to take the fragment as one unit, since it forms the last sentence of the first part. (d) The clause cj>80P07TOLOVyap EKaTEpov /l-ovaPXLav adds nothing new to the thought of the fragment, for both [Plutarch] and Stobaeus go on to ascribe disease to the domination of one in a pair of opposites over the other, [Plutarch] naming the domination of heat over cold or vice versa, and Stobaeus naming the supremacy of heat or dryness [sc. over cold or wetness, respectively]. The additional clause in [Plutarch] is, therefore, merely a clarifying statement which connects the monarclzia image of the first part with the explicit definition of disease in the second, and it 814277
N
,~
ENDNOTES
may well have come from Aetius or from his source. (e) The last clause of the [Plutarch] fragment does no more than define health in terms analogous to the preceding definition of disease. These terms, moreover, are so close to those used by Theophrastus as well as by Aetius in their discussions of Presocratic thinkers (especially Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and Democritus) that it may well be a genuine piece of doxographic tradition. Page
105
The earliest uses of lao/Lotp{a and related terms refer to the balanced distribution of shares or an inheritance among several members, as, e.g., the distribution of the universe among Zeus, Hades, and Poseidon in II. 15. 209 (cf. 186-95); cf. Solon, frg. 23. 2 I, where only two parties are involved-the KaKo{ and the €a8.\o{-whom Solon does not want to have an equal share in the good lands. In this sense, the concept is especially common in legal questions of inheritance by several heirs: LawsofGortynX. 53 (mostaccessibleinBuck,GD,No. II7,P.32I); Isaeus I. 2 and 35 ; and [Dem.] 48. 19 (where only two heirs exist). In Athenagoras' speech, Thuc. 6. 39. I, the verb lao/Lotpdv denotes the political equality of the rich, the intelligent, and the many in a democracy; cf. Agrippa's statement, Dio Cassius 52.4. 3, that equality of birth demands equality of rights. The noun as well as the verb can also refer to a balance of political influence in international affairs, as in Thuc. 5. 69. I or Isocrates 5. 39. Furthermore, both verb and noun are used by Thucydides for the moral sharing of misfortune, e.g. in Aleibiades' speech at 6. 16. 4 and in connection with the miseries shared by the soldiers in Sicily at 7.75.6; cr. also Dionysius ofHalicarnassus 6. 66. 4. Finally, in a number of passages in Xenophon, noun, verb, and adjective are used of an equal sharing of honours, prizes, or privileges, e.g. Apology 21, Cyropaedia 2.1. 31; 2.2.18; 2. 2. 21; 2. 3.5; and 4.6. 12. Page
107
In view of the controversy concerning the source(s) of Hdt. 3. 80. 2-82, I should like to state my position. I see no need to assume that the Debate is taken by Herodotus, either verbatim or in paraphrase, from a previously published Sophistic work. If it were, it would be the only known instance of extensive borrowing on the part of Herodotus, and his twice-repeated avowal of the accuracy of his report, made in the face of the incredulity of his contemporaries (3. 80. I and 6. 43·3), is sufficient evidence to show that he is not merely copying from someone else. This does not of course imply that the fact and the content of the Debate are objectively true history; but it does mean that
ENDNOTES
'79
Herodotus believed in the veracity of those who had told him about it. That his informants were hellenized Persians may be inferred from 3.87, and Jacoby, RE, suppl. 2 (1913) s.v. 'Herodotus', 414-15, has even suggested possible names. Still, the Greek tenor of the discussion does not exclude the possibility that Asiatic Greeks may have been Herodotus' immediate source, although the Greek (perhaps, more specifically, Sophistic) tone can equally well be explained as due to Herodotus' associations at Athens and/or Thurii. Apart from the form of the Debate and apart from most of the arguments used, it seems by no means intrinsically improbable that a discussion on the future form of government for Persia was actually held by the conspirators of 522 B.C. That monarchy, the traditional constitutional form which eventually prevailed (see Darius at 3. 82. 5: TTaTp{OVS v6/LovS /LTJ.\tinv ExovTas EV) would have come up in such a discussion goes without saying. Similarly, there is no reason to doubt that one of the conspirators might have proposed the abolition of monarchy and the establishment in its place of an oligarchy including the seven . (8 ' ,,- aptaTWV , 'i: '\ conspIrators 3. I. 3: avopwv TWV ETTtl\EsaVTES 0/Ltl\tYjV ..• EV ydp 3~ TotiTotat Kat aVTOt €Vw6/LE8a). Otanes' advocacy of democracy may have been made credible to Herodotus (a) by the privileged position which his descendants still enjoyed in Herodotus' own time (3· 83.2-84. I); (b) by the generous way in which Otanes initially acted toward Maeandrius, who had wanted to establish laovo/L{Yj on Samos (3. 142-4) ; and (c) by the fact that later on a Persian, Mardonius, was instrumental in replacing the Ionian tyrannies by democracies (6·43· 3)' The last point (c) is made by Herodotus himself. If the informants were in fact Persians or Asiatic Greeks, Herodotus may still have cast the content of what they told him into a form and conceptual framework current in the intellectual circles in which he moved in Athens and Thurii. In this connection, he may well have discussed the issues with Protagoras and may have been influenced by him. I see no need to assume with E. Maass, Hermes 22 (1887) 581-95, restated by W. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos2 291-5, that Herodotus depends on a published treatise by Protagoras, the Antilogiai; nor need one presuppose a specific elaborate Sophistic discussion by someone like Protagoras, as envisaged by K. F. Strohecker, Historia 2 (1953-4) 381412. The case for a Persian source is most strongly stated-perhaps even overstated-by H. Apffel, Die Veifassungsdebatte bei Herodot, esp. 48-83, where also an exhaustive survey of the literature on the Debate between 1930 and 1957 is to be found on pp. 9-23. For the discussions up to 1935 see K. Wiist, Politisches Denken bei Herodot 47-50. H. Erbse in Glotta 39 (196 I) 228-30 has presented strong arguments against Herodotus' borrowing of the Debate from another author. I
,
\
I
,
Page 118 \Ve do not know whether the capital assets of a Theban citizen had to consist entirely or predominantly of agricultural real estate, or whether monetary or other kinds of wealth were recognized; see Cloche, op. cit. 74, and Moretti, op. cit. 133. Larsen, op. cit. 32, suggests that a law, cited by Arist. Pol. 3. 5, 1278'25-6, may belong to this constitution, which excluded from office anyone who had engaged in trade within the preceding ten years. That the hoplite census was the minimum property requirement is suggested by a number of considerations. In the first place, since each councillor was a member of the executive for one quarter of his tenure of office, he would have to have an income sufficient to free him from the necessity of having to work for his living for at least that period. This argument is used for the federal councillors by Cloche, op. cit. 73, but it no doubt also applies to the local councils. Secondly, as Larsen, op. cit. 32 with p. 203 n. 2 I, has pointed out, the prominence of infantry in the Boeotian army suggests the hoplite census as a minimum requirement for full citizenship. And third, the constitution 'drafted for the future' by the Athenian oligarchs of 41 I B.C., which contained, according to Arist. Ath. Pol. 30, such features of the Boeotian system as the four councils, limited eligibility to the councils to the Five Thousand, who belonged to the hoplite census, see Arist. Ath. Pol. 33. 1-2 and Thuc. 8.65' 3. The parallel with Athens in 41 II IO B.C. is most instructive for our purposes, especially if G. E. M. de Ste. Croix is right in arguing-as I believe he is-that the lower classes retained the franchise under the Five Thousand, making the 'oligarchy' considerably more 'democratic' than is generally believed, although I would not go as far as he does in calling it 'basically democratic', see Historia 5 (1956) 1-23. That the lower-class Thebans also had the franchise is quite possible (p. I 18 n. 3 above). Page 119 Any difficulties about the meaning of laovofLla in the fourth century vanish once we realize, as I have tried to show above, that (a) it is the principle of political equality and not a form of government, that it is, therefore, (b) more closely related to democracy than to any other form of government, but not confined to democracy nor identical with it, and that (c) political rights include the potential exercise of political power. Isocrates, Areopagiticus 20, only mentioned in passing by Vlastos, IP 9 n. 2, matches the 7Tapp7Jala of his contemporary democracy against the laovofLla which, he claims, prevailed in the 'good old' democracy (of Solon and Cleisthenes, ibid. 16). Although la7Jyopla would have been a more natural contrast, laovofLla is quite
comprehensible as a thoroughly respectable principle of political equality, of which freedom of speech was one of the main characteristics in the fourth century. In Panathenaicus 178 the laovofLia and 87JfLoKparia which the Spartans are said to have adopted for themselves are contrasted with the oligarchical way (d"iyovs OVTas, ibid. 179) in which they deprived the 8ijfLos of the perioikoi of their lands and their political power (ibid. 179-80). I would not go as far as Vlastos, IP 18-'2I, in reading a moral norm into the lao- prefix here; the moral censure is directed at the Spartans not for lacking equalitarian principles themselves but for their refusal to apply these principles to the perioikoi. Plato is the only other fourth-century author in whose works laovofLia occurs. The general tenor of the context in which the noun appears in Menexenus 239 a has been well discussed by C. H. Kahn, 'Plato's Funeral Oration', CP 58 (1963) 220-34., esp. 225-6, as well as by Vlastos, IP 22-33, esp. 31-3. I have nothing to add to Vlastos' analysis of laovofLia here, but I should like to emphasize the following points. Plato treats lcrovofLia in the Menexenus as a principle which will result in the appointment of the wisest and best, i.e. it embodies the 'geometric' kind of equality based on merit, hinted at in Gorgias 508 a and fully developed in Laws 6. 756 e-758 a. Of particular interest from our point of view is the demand that laovofLla be sought 'in terms of law' (Kard vOfLOV). If, as I believe, the written statutes are meant here, we have in this passage the most explicit statement we have so far encountered of a close relation between lcrovofLla and 'statute'. Very similar to the use of laovofLia in the Menexenus is its meaning in two passages in the Seventh Epistle, where it is not only applied to an as-yet-unattained principle, but apparently also related to the enactment of statutes. The relation to statute is possibly, but not necessarily, envisaged in the earlier of these passages (326 d), where laovofLos is coupled with oiKaws as an epithet of a form of government opposed to the ever-changing tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies. That the adjective may mean 'having equitable laws' is suggested by the second passage, in which Dion's friends are exhorted to invite men from Sicily, the Peloponnese, and even Athens bT~ 7TC1.a7JS };LKE"las KaroLKwfLoV rE Ka~ laovofLlav (336 d). This may of course refer to a 'resettlement of all Sicily on the basis of political equality'; but since laovofLla is placed into the context of Plato's hope for an end of faction in Sicily and the establishment of VOfLOLKowol, which regard the interests of victors and vanquished alike (337 a), he may well have had in mind 'equitable laws' for all, which, if Dion's plans had succeeded, would have resulted in 'most men having the same opinion
182
ENDNOTES
concerning excellence, which, once accepted, would have saved' the state (336 b). As in the Menexenus, we have here an laovofL{a related to equality based on merit and realized, it seems, through the enactment of statutes. The value attached to laovofL{a in the Menexenus and in the Seventh Epistle stands in sharp contrast to the negative treatment which Plato gives it in Republic 8, where it is ridiculed as tl:e principle ?f an equalitarian democracy which 'deals out some kmd of equalIty to equals and unequals alike' (558 c): the democratic man, who surrenders himself indiscriminately to the necessary and the unnecessary pleasures, is said to lead the life laovOfLtKoiJ nvos clvSpos (56 Ie), and the laovofL{a Kd E'AwBEp{a which exist in a democracy between men and women are severely censured (563 b). Vlastos, IP 34-5, solves the discrepancy by rejecting the Seventh Epistle as not genuine, arguing, inter alia, that we should have expected an explicit statement of his change of views somewhere between the Republic and the Seventh Epistle. But the rather similar use in the Menexenus makes such a solution too radical, and the absence of laovofL{a from Plato's works between Republic and Seventh Epistle is no more surprising than is its complete absence from the fourth-century orators and especially from the works of Aristotle. The central idea inherent in it came to be subsumed under the more general concept of laoT7JS and TO taOV (see especially Arist. Pol. 3. 9, 1280'7-25, and 5. I, 1301'19-1302'8) and Plato's change of heart on that point, recognized by Vlastos, IP 34 (citing Laws 3. 694 a and 695 d), and his elaboration of the two equalities at Laws 6. 756 e-758 a are sufficient to account for the favourable view of laovofL{a in the Seventh Epistle. Cf. Polybius 6. 8. 4, who uses laoT7JS 7ToAmK~ to express the idl"'ainherent in laovofL{a. Page 136 Any discussion of the Harmodius skolia is honour-bound to voice an opinion on the enigmatic first lines of stanz~s 10 and 12:. EV fLV~T~V KAaSL TO g{q,os q,op~aw. I have deliberately aVOIdedany mentIOn of It m the text because I believe that we know too little to base upon it any view with any degree of confidence, a conclusion at which Ehrenberg, HL 6 I-5, also arrived after a searching discussion of all the opinions that have been advanced. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a critical statement of some earlier interpretations and add a reasoned conjecture of my own simply to enlarge the list of possible solutions, but without any confidence in its correctness. (a) The earliest and simplest solution offered is that of a scholiast on AI'. Lys. 632, and ofSuda, s.vv. clyopaaw and EV fLVPTOV KAaSL TO g{q,os q,op~aw, namely that Harmodius and Aristogeiton actually hid their
swords in boughs of myrtle before they drew them against Hipparchus. The obvious objection to this is that it would have been a singularly inept way of trying to hide swords and would have been more likely to attract attention than to escape detection. In fact, if we are to take the singular literally (although there is no need to do so), one bough or branch would hardly have sufficed. Moreover, there is no evidence for young men carrying boughs of any kind at the Panathcnaic festival: only the carrying of olive branches by old men is attested (Etym. Mag., s.v. BaAAoq,opoS and schoI. to AI'. Vesp. 544). (b) It has been assumed that the myrtle was not meant as a covering for the sword but as a wreath for its wearer. Thus, L. Ziehen, RE s.v. 'Panathenaia', believes that myrtle wreaths were worn by the participants in the Panathenaic procession. But since he cites no evidence other than the first lines of the first and third stanzas of the Harmodius skolia, this argument is a non liquet. (c) Many scholars subscribe to the view that the myrtle bough adorned neither the sword nor its wearer, but the person singing the skolion at a banquet. Thus, W. Vollgraff argues in Mnemosyne 49 (1921) 246-50 that the reference in the Harmodius skolia is to the wreath worn by the singing banqueter. The objection to this is that, although we know that wreaths were worn at banquets (see Ganszyniec, RE s.v. 'Kranz'), we know of no relation between the wreath and the singing of drinking songs. (d) A more sophisticated version of (c) refers to the passing of a myrtle bough from one person to the next at banquets as an invitation to sing (or perhaps to cap the song of the preceding singer). This practice is attested perhaps as early as AI'. Storks, frg. 4-30,and was known to Plutarch (Q.uaest. conv. 1. I, 615 b) ; cf. also the scholia to AI'. Vesp. 1222 and 1239, to Nub. 1364, the scholiast on PI. Corg. 451 e, and Tzetzes, IafL{3ot TEXVtKoL 7TEPL KWfLcpS{as 85-9 (in Kaibel, Comicorum Craecorum fragmenta I. 42-3). The most recent supporter of this interpretation is Bowra, CLP 392 n. I, and it is perhaps the least unlikely of the views that have so far been advanced. But it is open to three objections. In the first place, despite the parallels advanced by Vollgraff, lococit., to which Ehrenberg (HL 62 with nn. 13 and 14) adds a phrase from Archilochus and one from a fifth-century vase inscription (W. Peek, Hermes 68 [1933] II 8-2 I), the phrase EV fLVPTOV KAaS{ seems too elliptical to suggest this kind of procedure. Secondly, it is difficult on this interpretation, as Ehrenberg has pointed out (HL 63), to see any connection between sword and myrtle bough, since it would be ludicrous to assume that the singer wore a sword while singing the skolion. And finally, this interpretation assumes, though perhaps rightly, that the Harmodius song H
originated as a skolion, sung under the same conditions under which skolia were sung at the time of Ar. Storks, where the passing of the myrtle bough is first attested, while the earliest mention of 'the Harmodius' as a skolion is in AI'. Vesp. 1222. If this proves that the Harmodius was sung at banquets as early as 422 B.C., it does not necessarily mean that it was originally composed for that purpose and that the passing of the myrtle bough was an essential part of its recitation from the beginning. (e) A suggestion made but not elaborated by J. H. Jongkees, Mnemosyne 3rd ser. 13 (1947) 159-60, is that the myrtle bough refers to wreaths placed upon the heads of the statues of the tyrannicides, originally the group of Antenor and after 477 B.C.on the heads of the Critius and Nesiotes group. Several vase paintings with representations of these statues show Harmodius and Aristogeiton wreathed. The earliest of these, a black-figure lekythos in Vienna (Oesterr. Mus. Vienna, Inv. No. 5247, see C. H. E. Haspels, Attic Black-figured Lekythoi 167; 264, No. 39) is believed by Becatti, Archeologia classica 9 (1957) 97-107, esp. 100-7, to belong to the last decade of the sixth century and to represent Antenor's group. The others are all dated about 400 B.C.On three Panathenaic amphorae the wreathed statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton by Critius and Nesiotes appear as a shield device. Two of these come from Benghazi and are at present in Hildesheim (Inv. Nos. 1253 and 1254, see J. D. Beazley, A]A 47 [1943] 454-5, The Development of Attic Black-figure 96, and Attic Black.figure Vase-painters 412), and one from Teucheira is in the British Museum (Inv. No. B 605, see CVA III H f, pI. 6, and Beazley, Development, loco cit.). Finally, there is a red-figure oenochoe from the Dexileos grave, which is now in the :Museum of Fine Arts in Boston (Inv. No. 98'936, see W. Hahland, Vasen urn Meidias 6-7, pI. 6a). Brunnsaker, who discusses all these vases on pp. 102-6 in greater detail and with ampler bibliography than can be done here, concludes from these representations that there may have been an occasion on which real wreaths were placed upon the statues, and he suggests the 'Panathenaic festival with which the memory of Harmodios and Aristogeiton was especially closely connected' as the most likely occasion (p. 150). If there is any merit to this suggestion, and if the wreaths were made of myrtle boughs (for which there is no evidence whatever), the first lines of stanzas 10 and 12 might be taken as referring to this event, celebrating the anniversary of their attempt. The consequence of this would be that the group of Antenor and the first institution of the wreathing ceremony would become the terminus post quem for the composition of these two stanzas. This would not affect our date for the first stanza (10), since the Antenor group and
the celebration of Athens as laov6p.ovs are contemporary. But it would compel us to move the date of the third stanza (12) from 514-510 B.C.to after 507 B.C. I am aware that this reconstruction stands on very feeble legs indeed. Although it is free from--or at least less encumbered withthe objections I raised to Vollgraff's interpretation in that it permits EV P.VpTOV Kt..u8£ to be construed with wa7TEp :4pp.6ows KUL JiptaToyE{TWV, in that it establishes a closer relation between myrtle and sword, and in that it does not assume that the Harmodius originated as a skolion, it is a conjecture based upon a conjecture based upon five vase paintings, which do not talk but depend on the judgement of the critic. Still, since there seems to be nothing intrinsically improbable about it, its value consists in cautioning us against overconfidence in the dates for which we have argued above. Page 144 Cleisthenes' reasons for complying with Cleomenes' demand remain obscure: did he really regard himself as subject to the curse? And if so, how did he reconcile the curse with his return to Athens in 511/10 B.C. and again after the expulsion of Isagoras? Is PI. Laws I. 642 d right in dating the purification of Athens by Epimenides of Crete to about ten years before the Persian Wars, i.e. to approximately the time after the restoration of the Alcmaeonids in 507 B.C.? Or was Cleisthenes confident that his cause would prevail even in his absence? Or did he give up his reforms as a lost cause, only to be surprised by the depth of the support he had gathered? There is also some difficulty about the other EvuyEi:S: the imperfects EtE{JUt..t..E at Hdt. 5. 70. 2 and 72. I suggest that initially Cleomenes merely demanded the expulsion of other families with Cleisthenes and that Cleisthenes was the only one to comply voluntarily before Cleomenes' arrival in Athens. The P.ET' UVTOV at..t..ovs 7TOt..t..OUS Ji(JTJvu{wv (70. 2) and TOUS EVUyEUS (72. I) are thus identical with the seven hundred families expelled after Cleomenes' arrival, of which both Herodotus and Aristotle speak. The number seven hundred seems rather large and has, therefore, been doubted, e.g. by Wilamowitz, AA I. 31-2; but Wade-Gery, Essays 150 n. I, may be right in pointing out that 'the Curse had passed for three or four generations in both lines, male and female ... and was shared in the original generation by all who had accepted the surrender of the Kylonians'.
On.ly wo~k~ cite~ in the text 01' in the notes are listed here. Special lexica, dlctlOnanes, and collections are not included. Sec also the Index Locorum for classical tcxts and collections of fragments. A. BOOKS ADCOCK,F. E. Thucydides and his history. Cambridge, 1963. ALLEN, T. W., HALLIDAY, W. R., and SIKES, E. E. (cdd.). The Homeric hymnsz. Oxford, 1936. ANDREWES, A. Probouleusis: Sparta's contribution to the technique of government. Inaug. lecture, Oxford, 1954. -The Greek tyrants. London, 1956. APFFEL, H. Die Verfassungsdebatte bei Herodot. Diss. Erlangen, 1957. BARRON,]. P. The silver coins of Sam os. London, 1966. BEAZLEY.']. D. The development oj Attic black-figure. Berkeley, 1951. -Attxc black-figure vase-painters. Oxford, 1956. BELOCH, K.]. Griechische Geschichte2, I and 2. Strasbourg, 1912--16. Vo!' 3, Berlin and Leipzig, 1922-7. BENGTSON,H. (ed.). Die Staatsvertrage des Altertums, 2. Munich, 1962. BENVENISTE,E. Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indo-europeen. Paris, 1948. BOER, W. DEN, Laconian studies. Amsterdam, 1954. BOWRA, C. M. Problems in Greek poetry. Oxford, 1953. -Greek lyric poetryz. Oxford, 1961. -Pindar. Oxford, 1964. BRUCE, 1. A. F. An historical commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. Cambridge, 1967. BRUNNSA.KER, S. The tyrant slayers of Kritios and Nesiotes. Lund, 1955. BUCK, C. D. The Greek dialects. Chicago, 1955. BUSOLT, G. Griechische Geschichte2, 1-2. Gotha, 1893-5. Vo!' 31, Gotha, 1897-19°4. -and SWOBODA, H. Griechische Staatskunde. 2 vols. Munich, 1920-6. CHAMOUX,F. Cyrene sous la monarchie des Battiades (= Bibliotheque des Ecoles franc;aises d'Athenes et de Rome, Fasc. In). Paris, 1953. CLOCHE, P. Thebes de Beotie. Louvain and Paris, I952? DALE, A. M. (ed.). Euripides: Helen, Oxford, 1967. DENNISTON,]. D., and PAGE, D. L. (edd.). Aeschylus: Agamemnon. Oxford, 1957.
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SEGAL, C. P. 'Sophocles' praise of man and the conflicts of the Antigone', Arion 3. 2 (1964) 46-66. SEGRE, :M. 'La legge ateniese sull'unificazione delIa moneta', Clara Rhodos 9 (1938) 151-78. STARR, C. G. 'The credibility of early Spartan history', Historia 14 (1965) 257-72. STIER, H. E. "Nop.o, BauIAEvs', Philologus 83 (1928) 225-58. STROHECKER,K. F. 'Zu den Anfangen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik', Historia 2 (1953-4) 381-412. THOMPSON,W. E. 'The archonship of Cleisthenes', C] 55 (195960) 217-20. -'Three thousand Acharnian hoplites', Historia 13 (1964) 400-13. VALETON, 1. M. J. 'Quaestiones Graecae: De inscriptione Lygdamensi', Mnemosyne N.S. 36 (1908) 289-334. VLASTOS,G. 'Solonian justice', CP 41 (1946) 65-83. -'Equality and justice in early Greek cosmologies', CP 42 (1947) 156-78. -'Isonomia', AJP 74 (1953) 337-66. ~-" 'Iuovop.la 1ToAITIK1J",in J. Mau and E. G. Schmidt (edd.), Isonomia: Studien ::;ur Gleichheitsvorstel!ung im griechischen Denken (Berlin, 1964) 1-35. VOLLGRAFF,W. " 'Ev P.VpTOVKAaSl", Mnemosyne N.S.49 (192 I) 246-50. WASER, O. "Evvop.la", RE 6 (1909) 1129-31. WELLMANN,M. 'Alkmaion von Kroton', Archeion I I (1929) 156-69. -'Die Schrift 1TEPL[pi), vovuov des Corpus Hippocraticum', Archivfiir Geschichte der Medi::;in 22 (1929) 290-312. WHITE, M. E. 'The duration of the Samian tyranny', ]HS 74 (1954) 36-43. WILHELM, A. 'Inschriften aus Erythrai und Chios', Jahresh. d. Osterr. arch. Inst. Wien 12 (1909) 126-41. -'Die lokrische Madcheninschrift', Jahresh. d. Osterr. arch. Inst. Wien 14 (191 I) 163-256. WOODBURY,L. 'Apollodorus, Xenophanes, and the foundation of Massilia', Phoenix 15 (196 I) 134-55. WOODHEAD,A. G. "'Iu7]yopla and the Council of 500", Historia 16 (1967) 129-40. WOTKE, F. "Nop.o8€TaI", RE Supp!. 7 (1940) 578-81. WUST, F. R. 'Zu den 1TpvTavIE, TWV vavKpapwv und zu den alten attischen Tritt yen' , Historia 6 (1957) 176-9 I. -'Zu Kleisthenes', Historia 13 (1964) 370-3. ZIEHEN, L. 'Panathenaia', RE 36. Halbb. (2) (1949) 457-93.
All references to classical authors are based on the Oxford Classical Texts or, where these are not available, on the Teubner or Bude editions. Exceptions are indicated by the editor's name placed in parentheses after the name of the ancient author. Collections of fragments are identified by the following abbreviations: CGF DiehlJ DK6 Dox. Edmonds
G. Kaibel, Comicorum Graecorumfragmenta, I (Berlin, 1899). E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca3, 3 fascc. (Leipzig, 1954-5)· H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. by W. Kranz, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1951-2). H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879). J. M. Edmonds, The Fragments of Attic Comedy, 3 vols. (Leiden, 1957-61). F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (Berlin and Leiden, 1923- ). E. Lobel and D. (L.> Page, Poetarum Lesbiorum fragmenta (Oxford, 1955). A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorumfragmenta2• Supp!. by B. Snell (Hildesheim, 1964). D. L. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci (Oxford, 1962).
Aelian, Varia Historia 2. 25 Aelius Aristides (Keil): 11. 80 28. 138 Aeschines: 1.5
23 3· 154 19° Aeschylus:
Agamemnon 151 221 312 594 1142 12°7 1564
13 with n. 2, 18
391-3 124 n. I 3 n. 5
84 n. 2 157 n. 2 84 n. 2 4 n. 5, 17 n. 3
41
448-50 4n.5,
13, 18 17,18 4 n. 5, 13, 18 41 n. I 4 n. 5, 13, 18 4 n. 5, 13, 18 33 n. 2
484 491 571
576 615 681
693 61 n. 1,86
86 53 25
778-g (= 808-9) Persae 693 Prometheus 149-50 4°2-3
Supplices
61 n. 1,86
241
15 24
387-g1 670-3
150-1
41
4°0
22
7°8 1034 frg. (Nauck»
Choephoroe93
34 37 with n.
I
28 44 n. I 43-4,44 n. I 43-4
41
220
22
424 989-90
28
Eumenides 171
41 43,44,58-9,
120, 161 28, 120 15
198
13 with n. 3 62 n. 3, 72 with n. 2, 73
6-7
Aeti us, Placita 5: 19·5 (Dox. 430-1) 26. 4 (Dox. 438-g) Alcaeus, frg. (L.-P.): 6.27 35. I 72•6 129.25 181. I 249 Alemaeon, frg. (DK6) 4
105 n. 2 104 n. 2 120 34 34 34 34 127
n. n. n. n. n. n.
I 6 6 6 6 4
99-106, 177-8 Aleman, frg. (PAIG): 10.10
61 n. 1,62 n. 2 21
4° 64 Alexander of Aphrodisias: De mixtione 3 (Bruns 216.28-217.2) Quaestiones I. 9 (Bruns 19·30-2) Anacreon, frg. (PMG) 61 Anaxagoras, frg. (DK6): 4 6
64
102 102 102 102 102 100
n. n. n. n. n. n.
3 3 3 3 3 I
17 Anaximander, frg. (DK6) I Anaximenes (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. 12) 22 112 n. 2 Anaximenes of Lampsacus, frg. (FGR) 24 49 n. 2 Andocides: I De mysteriis I 7 2 n. 3 140 with n. 3 43 81 3 n. 3, 5 n. 2, 15 82 5 n. 2 83 I n. 2, 3 n. 3, 5 and n. 2, 15 84 In.2 85 I n. I 86 In·4 87 I, 2, 3, 5, 57 89 In·4 108 n. 2 97 106 148 n. 4 2 De reditu suo 26 138, 148 n. 4 27 108 n. 2 Anonymus Iamblichi (DK6): 3· I 88, 92 n. 3 6 92 n. 3 4·3 92 n. 2
6.
92-4
92 nn. 3 and 4 92 n. 3 92 n. 5 93 7· 12 94 n. I 12-16 94 n. 2 Antiphanes, frg. (Edmonds) 85 124 n. I Antiphon, frg. (DK6) 44A: I. 17-23 23-31 Archilochus: frg. (DiehI3) 22. 3 120 n. I (Bude) 230 34 n. 6 Aristophanes: Acharnenses 45 157 n. 2 532 48,57 773 39 123, 124 n. I 980 1093 123 n. 4, 124 n. I Aves 331 4 n. 5,14 518 43 755-9 39 1038-9 49 22 1344-5 1346 49 1347-8 22 n. 2 22 n. 2, 48 1353-4 I53g-40 73 1650 48 1655--6 48 Ecclesiazusae 130 157 n. 2 216 24 609 34 n. 3 49 n. I 759 49 n. I 762 49 n. I 944 53 n. I 987-8 1022 49 n. I 1041 49 n. I 1049 49 n. I 1056 49 n. I 1077 49 n. I Equites 447-8 142 n. I Lysistrata 63 1-3 126 Nubes 1040 34 n. 3 1183-7 48 34 n. 3 14°° 1421--6 36 Plutus 789 37 795 37 914 49 I
3 4
Ranae 761-4 Thesmophoriazusae 361-2 379 947 1039 1137 Vespae 467 1222-6 124 1227 frg. (Edmonds) 430 Aristophanes: Scholia to: Acharnenses 980 Lysistrata 273 632 Nubes 1364 Vespae 544 1222 1239 Aristotle: Athenaion Politeia 3·4 4.
I
7-12 I
3
8. 3 4 9.
I
5
14.
I
3 4 15. I 2
16·4
6 7 8 9 10
17.
2
3-4 18·4
138-9 I
2-6 2
3
20 20. 1-3
59
2
12·4 13·4
19 19.
123 with n. 4 146 n. I 182 125 n. I, 183 183 183 183
16,18, 174-5 3n·3,5n.2,15,175 112 n. 2 174 5 3 and n. 3, 4 n. I, 5 n. 2, 15 156 6 n. 2 162 156, 162 n. 2
3 4 7.
49 49 157 n. 2 43 88 43 49 and n. I, 184 124 n. 2 124 n. I, 183
3 n. 5 141, 147, 156 n. I, 165 n. 3 141 129 n. 2, 147, 156, 165 n·3 147, 156 n. I 147, 156 n. I 156 n. I 141 n. 4 147 n. 2 147 and n. 2, 148 148 147, 165 n. 3 147 4 n. 2, 16, 18, 59, 140 with n. 2 129 n. 2 139 n. I 140 n. 4, 141 n. 4, 142 n. I
I
21 21. I 2
3 4 5 6 22.
I
4 5 26. 4 29. I 3 3°
125 n. 4, 148 n. 2 130 n. I, 134 139 127, 129, 130, 134, 138, 143 n. 2, 148 n. 3 139 n. I 129 n. I 139 150 n. 2 143-5 3 n. I, 140 n. I, 142, 143 n.4, 148 n. 5, 150 n. I, 157 n. I 144 and n. 2 144, 145 3 n. I 127, 129, 130, 134, 138 n. 5,148 n. 3 130 n. I, 143-5 3 n. I, 143, 150 n. 2 3 n. I, 150 n. 4, 155 155 151 and n. I, 152 n. 2, 154 n. 2, 155 n. I 152, 153 152 n. 2, 154, 166 n. I 148, 156, 159 132
14° 46 n. 3 108 n. 2 108 n. 2 180 112 n. 2 30. 2 180 33.1-2 4,5,59 35. 2 3,5 n. 2, 60,108 n. 3,174 41. 2 62. I 153 Ethica Nicomachea 5.3, 1131"23 10, 1I37b28-9 AIetaphysica 98 n. 4A, 986"27-9 97 n. 2 29-30 102 n. 4 31-4 105 n. 2 [De Mundo] 5, 396b35 De Partibus Animalium 104 with n. I 2. 7, 652b36 103 with Physica 7. 3, 246b4-6 n. 5 Politica 2.9, 1271"6
Aristotle, Politica (cont.) : 12, 1273b38 1274a7 22-31 b15-16 3·2, 1275b34-7
36-7
108 n. 2 108 n. 3 60 n. 2 5 n. 2 141 n. 2 151 with n. 2 180 182
5, 1278a25-6 9, 1280a7-25 16, 1287a6-8 172 4·4, 1291b34-5 108 n. 5 I 292a36-7 2 n. I 8, 1294a3-7 84 n. 2, 94 n. 3 9, 1294b14-34 117-18 15, 1300bl-3 112 n. 2 5. I, 1301a19-1302a8 182 117 n. 2 3, 1302b29 1I8 n. I 7, 1306b30 36-1307a2 81 81 n. I 38 81 n. 2 1307al-2 9, I 31Oa28-3 2 108 n. 5 10, 1312b7-8 139 n. I 6.2, 1317a40-b3 106 n. 3 108 n. 5 40-b17 b18-20 106 n. 3 4, 1319b19-27 163 n. 2 22-3 164 with n. 3 25-6 155 Rhetorica 3. 18, 1419a31 112 n. 3 Topica 4.2, 122b26-31 103 n. 2 123a4 103 n. 2 6.2, 139b21 103 n. 5 6, 145b8 103 n. 5 Arrian, Anabasis: 3. 16·7-8 132 n. 3 7. 19,2 132 n. 3 Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae: 15.667 f 53 n. I 693 f 127 96 with n. 3, 694 c-695 f 126-9 695 a-b (= PMG, Nos. 893-6) 96 with n. 3, 121-36, 182-5 Bacchylides (Snell B): 13·186-9 15·53-6 Carmina Convivialia 884-g(7) : No. 1-5
72 with n. 4 72 with n. 3 (PMG, frgg.
3 I~ 6 127 n. 2 7 127 with n. 3 8 127 with n. 4 9 127 n. 2 10-13 96-7,121-36,182-5 14-18 129 19 127 n. 2 20-2 127 n. 2 23-4 127 25 127 n. 2 Chrysippus, frg. (von Arnim 3. 121) 471 103 n. 5 Cicero, De Natura Deorum: I. 50 96 n. I
9
10
Cleidemus, frg. (FGH) 8 Cratinus, frg. (Edmonds): 116 127 Critias, frg. (DK6):
25· 5
frg. (DK6):
125 266 Demosthenes: 15.18 20·92 158 23·51
62 24. 20-3 3° 105 139 149
27· 5 36. 8 [43] [43]. 57
[44] [46]. 18 [48]. 19 Dio Cassius 52. 4·3 Dio Chrysostom 2. 63 Diodorus Siculus:
7.
12 I
8. 30. 2
I.
109 n. 2 2 n. I 5 n. 3 5 n. 3 5 n. I In.2 I n. I 162 n. 2 84 n. 2 45 n. 4 59 n. 3 59 n. 3 59 n. 2 5 n. I 59 n. 2 59 178
105 n. 2 102 n. 4
2. I I
Empedoc1es, frg. (DK6): 8
9· 5 17·4-8 16-20 21
22
26 3°
Ephorus, frg. (FGH) 139 Etymologicum AJagnum: S.v. Bu>..>..oq,opos Euripides: Alcestis 56-7 683 Andromache I 76 243 491 Bacchae 331
387 484 891
C)clops 299 338 Electra 234
905-6 1268-9 Hecuba 291 799-801
846-g 864-7 866
127
974 Helena 866
102 n. 3 38-g 102 n. 3 102 n. 3 102 n. 3 102 n. 3 102 n. 3 100 n. I 60 n. 2 183 lon.2
23 25 48 33
87 34 n.
I
87 33
995-6 (= 1015-16)
178 81 n. 5 82 n. 3 163 n. 2
140 n. 4 170 n. 2 164 n. 3
74. 6
5. I. I 6. 66. 4 Epistula ad Ammaeum
VEf-LW
9
12.
128-9
53 n. I 4,15 n. 2
51 51 52 n. 1,91 n. I
9 4° Democritus,
96 n. I 152 n. 6
10. 17.2 I I. 84. 7-8 14·34.6 Diogenes Laertius: 8.26 83 97 n. 3, Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Antiquitates Romanae
800
871 1241-3
34 n. 3 87 with n. 3,89 n. I
25 48 34 n. 3 53 with n. 4 48 48 29,38 39
47 57 36 42 n. 3 12 with n. 6
42 42 n. 5
1246
1258 1429 1561 Heraclidae 141 292-3 963 1009-11 Hercules 723 757 778-80 1316 1322 1361 Hippolytus 91 93 98
461 866 1043-4 1046 1328 Ion 20
42 n. 5 42 n. 5 34 24 n. 3 48 n. 2 36 48 43 90 90 with n. 3, 91 26, 90 with n. 4 25 48 42 38 38 22
53 44 n. I 53 n. 3 53 26 36
25
36
2~
~
442-3 48, 91 with n. I 643 43 with n. 2 1047 26 125°-6 48 n. 2 1312-13 42 1322 29 Iphigenia Aulidensis 399 87 with n. 4, 88 n. 2, 89 n. I 23 694 42 734 26,90 1°95 Iphigenia Taurica 35 43
38 275 277
465 586 958-60
48 9°,91
48 43 48
42,52-3
97° 1I62 1189 1458 Medea 238
48 44 n. I
494 538 812 1000 Orestes 429
4 n. 5,15 32
48 42,53
25
25 89 42
202
INDEX
LOCOR
Euripides, Orestes (cont.): 34 n. 3 487 33 495 25 5°3 33 n. I 523 571 36 892 53 941 48 1426 34 n. 4 88 n. I 1455 Phoenissae 18-20 87 294 36 380 87 Stheneboea (Page, Greek Literary Papyri 1. 128) 15 15 n. I, 18 Supplices 45 86 n. 3 32 313 377-8 22 4°6-8 106 n. 3 34 n. 3 43° 29 431-2 433 47 42 n. 4 526 540-1 42 n. 4 42 n. 4 563 671 42 n. 4 Troades 231 44 n. I 266-7 4 n. 5, 17,42 n. 5 42 324 1031 53 1210 25 [rg. (Nauck2) 52. 8 38 n. 3 122. I I 88 141 39 172 48 n. 4 228.8 36,53 252 32 282. 13 36 38 n. 4 292.4-6 25 337 25,36 346 4 n. 5,15 360.45 25-6 388.3 48 n. 3 4°2 433 33 469 36 530.9 36 597 48 853 33 920 22 n. 4 1049.2 42 n. 3 1064. I 26 1091 26 n. I
UM
Galen, De TemjJeramentis 1.2 4 6 8 9 2. I 2
-
4 3·4 Gorgias, [rg. (DK6): 6 II. 7 I I a. 30 36 Hellenica Oxyrhynchia
INDEX (Helmreich): 101 n. 105 n. 104 n. 104 n. 105 n. 105 n. 104 n. 104 n. 104 n.
4 2 6 6 2 2 6 6 6
26,51 89 51 n. 5
88,89
n.
I
(Bartoletti) 16.2 118 with n. 3 Heraclitus, [rg. (DK6): I 27 n. 4 27 32 33 3° 4430, 33 100 n. I 5::; 100 n. I 80 100 n. I 94 26-8, 30, 33, 100 n. I, 120 114 118 [HerodesJ, Peri politeias 30-1 n. 5 Herodotus: 88 1. 8. 3-4 5 n. 4, 46, 60 n. 3 29 35. I 41 14° 59-61 156 n. I 59·3 141 n. 4, 147, 156 4-5 4, 15, 147 59. 6 156 n. I 60.1-3 147 5 61. I 24 156 n. I 2 141 n. 4 4 156 n. I 62. I 141 n. 4, 148 n. 5 64 65-8 75-9 65. I 76 76 with n. 2, 85 2 2-66. I 76-7 82 n. 3 3 77 with n. 2 4 77 with n. 3, 78 with n. I 5 66. I 78 nn. 2 and 4, 80 n. I [-2 76
3-4 67. 1-68.6 69·3 82. 7-8 9° 94. I 96. 2-97· 3 97·3 131. I 132.3 136. 2-137. I 140. 3 144. I 3 146.3 152.3 158.2 162. I 172. I 173- 4 195.2 196.1-4 197 199·1-5 200 216. I 2.35.2 36. I 37. I 39·4 42. 3 45. 2 65·3 79. I 92. I 113·2-3 124. I 136.2 147·3-4 177·2 180 3.2.2 16. 3-4 20.2 31. 2-5 3 4 38.4 47. I 80. I 2-82 2 3-5
LOCORUM
76 76 145 n. I 35 25 34 n. 4 73-5,89 62,89 41 41 35 35 n. I 91 41 52 145 n. I II5 n. I 88 34 n. 4 34 n. 4 35 n. 2 35 n. 2 35 n. 2 35 n. 2, 41 35 n. 2 35 34 n. 4 41 35 41 41 34 n. 4 41 34 n. 4 34 n. 4 41 73 with n. 3 47 n. 2 53 47 n. 2 138 24 41 34 n. 4 47 n. I 14,18 35 n. I 33,37-8 77 n. I 178 107, II 1-13, 178-g 107 n. 7, 164 n. I 112
2°3 6
II
112, 114-15, 115 n. I, 166 n. 6 81. I I I I, II5 n. I I I I, 179 3 82. 1-2 115 n. I III 4 34 n. 4, 179 5 I I 1,166 n. 2 83. I 2-84. I 179 2 115 n. I 34 n. 4 3 87 179 118. I 47 n. I 123. I 165 107-9, 165-6 142-3 142-4 179 108 and n. I, 166 n. I 142.2 107 n. 6, 164 n. I 3 108, 166 n. I 4 5-143. I 165 143. 1-148. I 165 108 n. 4, 166 2 4.26. I 35 39. I 39 68.2 35 n. 3 78.4 41 80. 5 34 n. 4 103. I 35 n. 3 105. I 34 n. 4 106 31 107 34 n. 4 117 35 n. 3 109 n. 3, 167 137·2 163 with n. 3, 163-5 159-61 161 163-5 161. 3 163 nn. 4 and 5, 166 n. I 168. I 34 n. 4 169.2 34 n. 4 34 n. 4 17° 171 34 n. 4 172.2 35 n. 3 187. I 34 n. 4 35 n. 3 19° 200. I 115 n. I 201.2 44 n. I 34 n. 4 5·3·2 6.1-2 35 n. 3 16.2 24 18. 2-3 35 n. I 19.2 44 n. I 109-1 I, 167 37.2 110 and n. I 38.2 42. 2 46 n. 4, 60 n. 3 I,
2°4 Herodotus 5 (cont.): 77 n. I 49. 8 131 n. I, 138 n. 4,139 n. 2, 55 148 n. 2 131 n. I 57· I 62-5 130 n. I, 134, 138-9 62.2 125 n. 4, 127 n. 5, 148 n. 2 129 n. I 63· 2-4 64. 2 148 66-730 I 143-5 66. I 140 n. I 3 n. I, 130 n. I, 142, 2 143 and n. I, 150, 157 n. I 69·2 3 n. I, 130 n. I, 149 nn. I and 2, 150, 151, 156, 157 n. I 70 148 n. 5 70. I 144 n. 2 2 185 2-71 144 72. I 144, 185 4-73. I 144 n. 7 73.1 I~ 2-3 145 74. I 144 n. 6 1-2 145 75. I 146 2 46 n. 4, 60 n. 3 3 146 76 115 n. I 77. 1-2 146 78 109, 135, 146, 157 n. 2, 159 88. 2 35 n. 4, 52 92. I 115 n. I 1/.5 108 n. 2 94. I 129 n. 2 99.2 110 n. 2 103. I 110 6. I I. 3 61 n. 2 38. I 23 39. I 138 n. 3 43·3 107 n. 4, 108 n. 2, 109 n.4, III and n. I, 167, 178, 179 52. 3 46 n. 4, 60 n. 3
58.
2
41
67. I 70
145 n. I 145 n. I 33 47,60 n. 3 146 n. 2 138 n. 3 128 n. I 41
86 {3. 2 89 100. 1 103. 3 105 106. 3
I I I. I 123.2
139
13°.2
41
131. I
108 n. 2, III n. I, 130 n. I, 146 n. 3, 150 47 n. I 34 n. 4 24 33 35 n. 4 31,32 109 34 n. I 164 n. I
7.2.
I
8 a. I 41. I 102. I 103. I 104·4 104.4-5 136. 1 164. I 209.3 238. 2
46
8. 34 55
65 89.
I
106·3 9·41. 4 48. 2
78--g 99·3 104 I I I. I Hesiod: Opera et Dies 11-16
35 91 n. 2 II5 n. 1 129 128 n. 4 24
53 34 n. 4 24 91 n. 2 44 n. I 44 n. I 35 n. I
65 n. 6, 66 n. 5 219-24 65 n. 6, 66 n. 5 236-7 70 n. I 250 65 n. 6, 66 n. 5 259-64 65 n. 6, 66 n. 5 276-80 21 276 52 n. 2 388 23,94 Theogonia 63-7 2 I n. 5 74 21 n. 5 217-19 63 n. 3 226-32 66-8 307 86, 89 n. I 417 4° 901-6 63-4, 66-8, 71 n. 3 frg. (Rzach3) 221 40 n. 3 Hesychius, S.V. ;4pp.o8iov
p.€>.o, [Hippocrates] : De Aiire, Aquis, Locis 12. 18-19 14 16 19
105 n. 2 35 22
35 n. 6
22 22
23 24 De Morbo Sacro 17
39 39 103 n. 4 103 n. 3 22 n. 4 103 n. 3
20
De Natura Hominis 4 De Prisca lvfedicina 5 De Victu I. I I
3· 69 Homer: Iliad 5. 70 555 I I. 741 15. 186-95
27 n. I 27 n. I 27 n. I 178 178
2°9 O,ryssey I. 3 9.106 112-15 17·487 18.130 19.482 23. 177-230
21 n. 2 77 77 63,65 n. 4 27 n. I 27 n. I 12
18 12 and n. 2 27 n. I 325 12 n.2 Scholia to Odyssey 23. 296 Homeric Hymns: 12 n. I 8.16 30. II-12 69 n. 7
183-204 296
Iamblichus, 104 257 267 Isaeus:
De Vita Pythagorica: 97 n. 3, 98 n. 3 100 n. 4 97 n. 3
1.2
35 10. 13 Isocrates:
20
12. 178-80
Melica Adespota, frg. (PMG): 937. 11-15 13 1018 (b). 6-7
Parmenides, 8.55-61 9
108 162 108 108
n. n. n. n.
2 2 2 2
69 n. 7 71 n. I 64 n. 2
(Anthol. 70 n. 2
frg. (DK6):
12
16 Pausanias: 1.8·5
102 102 102 102
n. n. n. n.
3 3 3 3
132 nn. 3 and 4, 133 129 170 n. 2 4·24·7 138 10·5·13 Pherecydes of Syros, frg. (DK6) 2, co!' 2 Philo, De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini (II p. 268 M) 5 79 n. I 129 Philochorus, frg. (FGH) 67 Philoponus on Aristotle, De Anima 405"29 97 n. 4 Pindar (Sne1l3): Isthmians 2. 38 24 5.22 62n·3,71 43 30 n. 4 ~ 20 15, 18 Nemeans I. 72 29 27. 2
3.55 4. 33 9. 29-30 10.33 11.27 Olympians I. 37-8 6.69
7.88 178 178 59 n. 3
5·39 7.16
Lysias: 2.18 10.16 12.42 13. 12
Nicodemus of Heracleia Gr. 6) 316
8. 25-7
78
24 15, 18 62 n. 3, 7 I 13, 18 13n·4,18 62 n. 3, 70 13,18 13 13 n. 5, 18
4°
64 n. 1,71 64 with n. 1,69 n. 7 71 12, 18, 174 13,18 72 with n. I, 73 34 14,18 29 30-1 61 n. I 10. 70-1 34 n. 2 frg. 169 20, 37-8, 40 n. I Scholia to Nemeans I. 72 29 n. I Olympians 13. 29 174Plato: Cratylus 384 d 7 9. 15-16 13.6-8 6-10 29 40 Paeans I. 10 Pythians I. 62 64 2.43 86-8 5.67
Plato, Cratylus (cont.): 388 d 12 In·3 181 Epistulae 7. 326 d 182 336 b 181 d 181 337 a Gorgias 482 e G I n. 3 482 e--484 c 4° 51 483 b e 23 181 508 a Hippias lUaior 284 d-e 51 n. 6 Leges I. 642 d 185 2. 674 b 7 In·3 182 3·694 a 182 695 d 10 n. 2 4·714 a 181, 182 6. 756 e-758 a 780 d 5 In·3 7. 795 a I In·3 8.835 e 5 In·3 836 e 4 In·3 10.889 e 6 In·3 8go d 4 In·3 6 In·3 904 a 9 In·3 cg In·3 I I. 927 b 6 74 n. 2 181 Menexenus 239 a Phaedo 58 b 5 In·3 Phaedrus 235 d 4 n. I 256 d 7 In·3 Politicus 29 I e 2 In·3 61 n. 2 Protagoras 337 a 22 n. 4 c-338 b Respublica 2. 369 c-4. 445 c 100 n. 5 108 n. 3 8.555 b 61 n. 2, 182 558 c 119 n. 4,182 561 e 108 n. 3 562 a 182 563 b 9. 587 a 10 In·3 c 2 In·3 10.604 a 10 In·3 b6 In·3 In·3 9 607 a 7 In·3 Symposium 182 a 7 In·3 186 d 104 n. 7 Timaeus 60 e 2 In·3 Plato: Scholia to: Alcibiades I. 121 e 97 n. 4
Gorgias 45 I e Leges I. 629 a Pliny, Naturalis Historia: 34· 17 7° Plutarch: Agis 5 8
125 n. I, 183 82 n. I 132-3, 142 132 n. 3
n. 2 n. 2 n. 2 9 II Il. 2 Lycurgus 5·4 75 n. 1,82 n. 3 6 7 n. 2 6.10 81 n. 5 7 n. 2 13 13. I 46,49 Pericles 37·3 46 n. 3 Solon 3. 5 3 n. 5,15 II 138 n. 6 15 3 n. 5 18.2 156 162 19. I 3 n. 4, 15, 18 4 20.2 59 141 n. 5 24 4 n. I 25·3 141 n. 4 30.3 Themistocles 23. I 144 n. I Moralia 303 e-304 c (Quaest. Gr. 57) 165 n. 3 615 b-c (Quaest. Conv. I. I) 125 n. I, 183 644 c (Quaest. Conv. 2. 10) 10 n. 2 833 d (Vit. X Or. Antiph. 2O) 2 n. 3 862 b-c (De Malig. Her. 26) 128 n. 2 91 I a (De Plac. Phil. 5. 30) 177-8 Pollux: 128 n. 2 8.91 106 4 n. 3 1I0 143,144 n. I Polyaenus: I. 22 140 n. 4 165 n. 3 6. 45 182 Polybius 6. 8. 4 Polyclitus (DK6 I. 391) 24, 102 n. 6 29-36 Porphyry, De Abstinentia 4. 22 3 n. 3 Sextus Ernpiricus 9 (Ad". Physicos I) 54
7 7 7 7
52 n. I
Sirnonides, frg. (PMG)
65 I
127 with n. 3 Sirnplicius on Aristotle, De Anima 97 n. 4 4°5a29 Solon, frg. (DiehIJ): 64-9 3 3. 1-10 67 68 n. I 5 68 n. I 7 68 Il. I 8 8-g 65 n. 5 68 n. I 9 68 n. I II 67 14-25 68 n. 2 16 68 n. I 19 26-g 67 68 with n. 5 3° 65n.l,gon.1 31-2 68 n. I 33 65 n. 3, 85 n. I 33-8 65 n. 4, 68 n. I 34 65 n. 6, 66 36 65 n. 6, 66, 68 n. I 37-8 65 n. 2, 68 n. I 38-9 81 n. 5 3a 81 n. 5 3b 65 n. 5 5·9-10 6 81 n. 5 23. 21 178 24. 15-16 3 n. 5, 43 n. 3 18-20 3 n. 5, 15, 18 Sophocles: Ajax 350 25 25 548 712 17 7°-1,87 n. 2 713 34 n. 3 1°73 4 n. 5,17 11°4 1108 83 n. 3 113° 41 1160 83 n. 3 1247 47 1343 41 Antigone 24 41 31 59 44 n. I 156 29 177 178-91 38 34 n. I 191 213 29 282-8 41 n. 2 41 n. 2 285-7
34 n. 3 368 382 31 n. I, 47 n. 3, 58 n. 2 449 31 n. 1,47 n. 3, 58 n. 2 22 45°-2 58 454-5 47 n. 3, 58 n. 2 481 41 519 613-14 23 663 47 n. 3 16 Il. 8 797 800-1 4 n. 5, 14 with n. 4 47 n. 3, 58 n. 2 847 53 908 25 914 1113-14 31 Electra 87 105 n. 2 52 with n. 3 580-1 1043 53 1506 31 Ichneutae 189 24 Oedipus Coloneus 125-37 87 86-7,91 142 168 25 34 n. 4 337-8 47 548 907-8 52 31 914 29 1382 61 n. 2 Oedipus Tyrannus 579 29 863-71 Trachiniae 616 25 682 4 n. 5,17,18 86 with n. 4, 8g n. I 1095-6 25 1I77 Stobaeus, Florilegium (WachsmuthHense): I. 1.5: see Tragica Adespota, frg. 471 4. 2: see Tragica Adespota, frg. 502 4. I. 48 4 n. 3 10 n. 2 138 177 36. 29 177 37·2 Strabo: 6. I. 8: see Ephorus, frg. 139 81-2 8.4.10 Suda: S.V. ayopa.uw 182 EV f£VP'TOVKAa81 'TO g !1'o, 182 q,op~aw 167 with n. 2 'Hp68o'To, OvSbroT ' €yw Toihov imo8.gof£uL 123 n. 4 71'apOLVOS 123 n. 4 7 nn. 2 and 4 po/paL
INDEX Theognis
LOCORUM
(Young) :
45 30, 94 3°
54
55-6 289-9° Theophrastus:
22
De Sensibus (Dox. 502-3)
12-15
104 (Dox. 508) 32 104 (Dox. 510) 39 104 (Dox. 5I1) 41 104 (Dox. 512) 46 104 (Dox. 515) 58 104 Metaphysica (DK6 58. B 14) 33 105 Thucydides: I15 1·9·2 12 44
17 18.
80
n.
2
5° 32
32
84· 3 103.3
115·3 125. I 126.2
8 12
127. I 2. 3. 2 I
5 35·I 37·I 3 39·4
52.4 53·I 4
65.8 72.2 I
97·4 3·34·4 37·3 4 5
42. 6 43. 2
56.
170 108 115 144
n. 2 n. 2 n. 2 n. 3 174 144 n. 3 144 n. 3 115 n. 3 36, 175-{) 175
49 34 n. 3, 50,114 n. 3 50 with n. 1,58 5°
42 90 with n. 2 5° 115 n. 2 115 n. 2 I15 n. 2
36 33 n.
2
5°
33 n.
2
115 n. 2 115 n. 2 115 n. 2
5° 5° 115 n. 2
2
23
58. 3
23 n. I I13, 114 115,116-19
62. 3 3-4 3-5 64·3
65.1-2 66.2
3 67·5 6
70. 5-6 n. 3 n. I
33 115 n. 2
3
47. 2
n. 2
52
4° 41 72•2 77. I
73.
2 3 4 4 4 5
79-80, 139 n. I 36
I
24. 2
34.
n. n. n. n. n. n.
46. 4
6 82.6
8 [84]. 2 3 95. 2
32
32 n. I 88 with n. 3 23,88 88 88 23 n. 1,88 49,60 n. 4 115 n. 2 31,41 I14, 115 31 n. 2 22 n. 3
176
4·21. 3 22.2
115 n. 3
3
115 n. 2 49 n. 3, 60 n. 4 115 n. 2 108 n. 2 108 n. 3,119 115 113,114 n. 2 I15 n. 2 89,91 I18 n. 5 91 n. 2 36 n. I 36 115 n. 2 115 n. 2
38. 66.
I I
74·3
76.2 78.2-3 3
84. 2 92.7 93·3 97-101
97. 2 98.2 105. I 106.2 118 133·3 5·27·2 30. I
31. 6 41.3
45·I 49·I 60. I 2
5
63·4 66. 2-3 69·I 2
115
n.
2
42 49 I15 n. 2 I15 n. 2 119 115 n. 2 115 n. 2
49 I15 34 115 49 n. 3, 60 49 n. 3, 60
n. 2 n. I n. 2 n. 4 n. 4 178
36
36 I15 n. 2 I15 n. 2 23,52 5° 38 173 4 34 n. 3 18·7 115 n. 2 33. 2 49, I 14 with nn. I and 4, 5 115 39. I 114 n. 4,178 54·5 147 6 33 n. 2,14°,147,148 n. I 55. 1-2 140 with n. 2 3 141 n. 4 57. I 141 n. 4 4 140 n. 4, 142 n. I 58.2 141 n. 4 59. 2 138 n. 4, 148 n. 2 2-3 139 n. I 4 139 and n. 2 60.4 115 n. 2 89.4 I15n.2 7.75.6 178 8. 9. 3 115 n. 2 48. 3 I15 n. 3 53.2 33 n. 2 64·5 176-77 65·3 180 72 108 n. 2 75.2 108 n. 3 76.6 33 n. 2 31. I I15 n. 2 92.9 115n.2 97. 2 103 n. 3, 106 Timotheus, Persae (P !vIG, frg. 791) 237-40 69 n. 7 Tragica Adespota, frg. (Nauck2): 26 39 n. 2 99 33 n. I 471 29n·5
7°
84·3 85. I 105.2 6.14 16.2
502 Tyrtaeus,
29 n. 5 frg. (DiehI3): 81 n.4 81 n. 5 81 n. 5
2
3 a, b
6 Tzetzes, Jllap..{joL T€XVLKOl (CGF 42-3) 85-9
Xenarchus,
7TEpl KWP.c.{JOtUS
frg. (Edmonds)
183
4. 22
5 n. 3 Xenophanes,
frg. (DiehI3): 69-70 69 n. 4,71 69 n. 5
2 2. 19
22
Xenophon:
Anabasis 4. 6. 14 6. 6. 28 Apologia 21 Cyropaedia:
I18 n. I 7 n. 2
178
2. I. 31 2. 18 21
3·5 4.6.
12
Alemorabilia: I. 2.4°-6 42
51 n. 6 2 n. 3, 5 I n. 6 4·4·13 5 I n. 6 Oeconomicus 14. 4 5 n. 3 Respublica Lacedaemoniorum 10. 7 118 n. I
[Respublica Atheniensium] : 1.8
8-9 9 10
18
3·2 II
79 n.
I
82-5 50 n. 3 50 n. 3 50 n. 3 2 n. 3, 50 n. 3 117 n. 2,169 n. 2
INDEX B 1-2 16-24 19-20
ATL D 14 III. 14-15 D 15.41-2
48
n. 2 42 n. I 101 n. I, 120 n. 2 50
Bengtson, Staatsvertriige Buck, CD, 2.19-20
NO.2
32 34-5 23·28-g 52. C. 19
-3
57
170
57· 46 59. A.
2, No. 145 42 n. I 44 n. 3, 167-70 44, 167 n. 2, 167-8 44,167 44,167 7 n. 7 16 n. 7, 18
I
13-14 14
16 n. 5, 18, 170 8 n. 6, 16 n. 3, 18 16 n. 4,18 8 n. 6, 16 n. 3, 18
178
Hesperia: 135 n. 2, 137 8 (1939) 59-65 10 (1941) 284-95 17 n. 3 14 (1945), No. II. 7 51 n. 2 32 (1963) 187-208 135 n. 2 4 n. 4, 16 n. 6, 36 (1967), No. 15 18
Schwyzer, DCE: No. 51 4°9 410.5 41 I. 3 412 413 414 418.19 424. 10-1 I
IC: 12• I.
I
n. n. 2 n. 42, 168 n. 102 n. I, 120 n. 2
3. 16
4. 26 15·30-1 37 77 77-6 94. 17-18 23-5 110.15-17 1I5·4-5
5-6 5
Gortyn, Law of (Kohler-Ziebarth): III. 20 8 n. 2 29-30 8 n. 2 IV. II 8 n. 2 31 8 n. 2 45-6 8 n. 2 48 8 n. 2 50-I 8 n. 2 VI. 15 8 n. 2 31 8 n. 2 VII. 47-8 8 n. 2 VIII. 10 8 n. 2 25-6 8 n. 2 29-30 8 n. 2 35-6 8 n. 2 40 8 n. 2 IX. 15-16 8 n. 2 23-4 8 n. 2 X.44-5 8 n. 2 46 8 n. 2 53 178 XI. 19-23 8 n. 2 26-7 8 n. 2 28-9 8 n. 2 XII. 15-19 8 n. 2 22-3 8 n. 2
POxy: 2256, frg. 3 2450, frg. I
485 22• 10.6-7 4·493 5. 1,20.2-3 1I55 1498.12 5.2, 159 A. 8 B.20 12. 8, 263. 7 14·645· 145-6 151
2
48-9 59 51 51 152 5
n. 2 n. 3 n. 3 n. 2 n. I 51 51 n. I, 173 with n. I 3 n. 2, 5 n. I, 15, 18,51 n. I, 173 n. I 133 n. 2 51 n·4 7 n. 8 7 n. 2 42 n. 2 7 n. 3 8 n. 5, 17 n. 2, 18 8n·5,I7n.2,I8 168 n. I 7 n. 5 7 n. 5
J1cfarmor Parium (Jacoby): ep. 46 54 Meiggs and Andrewes: B 26. 27 33
30 87·15 116 116. A 21-2
3 3 3 2 2
142 with n. 2 132 n. 4 169 n. 3
169 n. 3 169 n. 2 168 n. 2
45-6 45, 168 n. 2, 169 n·4 45-6, 168 n. 2, 169 n. 4
LOCOR
45, 169 n. 4 46 168 n. 2, 169 n. 4
59 n. 4 37 n. 2, 38
42 n. 7 n. 8 n. 14 with nn. I and 7 n. 6, 8 n. 7 n. 6, 8 n. 7 n. 8 n. 8 n.
2 6 I 2 I I 6 I I
SEC: 10, No. 17 103 352 II, No. 1178 Tod, CHI: 12, No. I 1.2 24 24. 26
42 n. I 51 n. 3 135 n. 2, 137 14 with nn. I and 2
161-3 7 n. I, 162-3 45, 170-3 45
211
UM 27 28 3° 45 46 25 25·19 19-20 32 34-5 44 86. 15-17 87·4-5 5 19-20
96. 15-16 2, No. 100.6 1I6.21 137·13-14 162. 15 [36] 181. 25 200.217 246 204. 11-14 12
45 45 45 n. 2 45 8 n. 6, 16 n. 5,18,45 44, 167-70 8 n. 3, 167-8 44, 167 n. 3 44,167 44,167 170 with n. 3 152 n. 2 5 n. I 51 n. I 3 n. 2, 5 n. I, 51 n. I 34 n. I In·4 In·4 In·4 In·4 In·4 In·4 In·4 In·4 14 with n. 3, 18 4 n. 3
associated with vop.os, 109. associated with 100vop.La, 108, 166, 182. associated with democracy, 108. £TalpELal, in Athens, 142-3. £vOuva, I 12. Evvop.Eop.al, in Aeschines and Demosthenes, 84 n. 2. in Anonymus Iamblichi, 93. in Herodotus, 62, 73-4, 76. in Thucydides, 79-80. in [Xenophon], 82-5. Evvop.La, 62-85, 92-5. etymology of, 61, 73 n. 3. as a quality of personal behaviour, 62,63,65, 70-1,94. as condition oflaw-and-order, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 73, 74-5, 76-8, 80, 83,94· associated with owrppoovvTJ, 72-3, 176-7. opposed to iJ(3plS, 63, 65, 7 I, 72. opposed to avop.La, 70, 94. opposed to ovovop.La, 65-9, 70, 94· association with wealth not an essential attribute of, 69-70, 80. constitutional change not implied in, 74-5,82. associated with constitutional workings of the state, 84. religious overtones in, 68, 7 I with '>.wIJEpLa,
in Sophocles, 58. I with n. 4. in Thucydides, 58. aOlKos, associated with avop.os, 87, 88, 89,92 n. 3· aoos, legal term in Halicarnassus, 8, 167-8, 169, 170. in Thasos, 168 n. I. alJEOs, associated with avop.os, 87, 88. a[vos, legal term in Epidaurus and Delphi,8. dJ)aypa4>€;~ rwv vO/LWV, in Athens, 5 I. dvaKaAv1TT~pLa, 40. avop.Ew, in Anonymus Iamblichi, 93. in Herodotus, 91. avop.La, etymology of, 61. meaning of, 85-94. opposite of Evvop.La, 70, 94. relation to Ovovop.La, 70. associated with iJ(3plS, 86, 89. religious overtones in, 86-7, 88, 89, 90, 91. does not imply vop.os = 'statute', 85, 86, 89, 90, 94· meaning of influenced by vop.os = 'statute', 91, 92-4. in Anonymus Iamblichi, 92-4, 95. in Euripides, 26, 90-I. in Herodotus, 73, 74, 89-90. not in Solon, 69 n. I, 90 n. I. in Thucydides, 90. avop.os, in musical sense, 61 n. I, 86. associated with aOlKos, 87, 88, 89, 92 n. 3. associated with aIJEOS, 87, 88. in Aeschylus, 61 n. 1,86. in Anonymus Iamblichi, 88. in Aristophanes, 88. in Euripides, 87-8. in Gorgias, 88. in Herodotus, 88. in Hesiod, 86. in Sophocles, 86-7. in Thucydides, 88. a"op.ws, in Euripides, 89. in Gorgias, 89. in Thucydides, 89. aypa1rTa
ayparpos
vop.lp.a,
vop.os, in Andocides,
title kingship, 6.
(3am>'EVS,
survives
institution
(3ov>'r, 0TJP.OOLTJ,in sixth-century
of
Chios,
162. in Gortyn code, 8. 2 with n. 3. yparpos, term for 'statute' in Olympia, 8. yparpw-derivatives in Gortyn code, 8. ypap.p.aTa, yparpr,
1rapavop.wv,
in Herodotus, 107 n. 4, 109 n. 3, I I I. opposed to TvpavvEvop.al, 109 n. 3. 0TJp.oKpaTLa, not identical with 100vop.La, 120. relation to 100vop.La, 107, 111-13, 181. not appropriate name for Cleisthenes' reforms, 153-4. describes Plataean constitution during Persian Wars, I 17. not used in Alemaeon, frg. 4, 106. first attested in Herodotus, 120 n. 2. in Herodotus, 109 n. 4, I I I n. I, 120 n. I. in Athenian treaty with Colophon 447/6 B.C., 120 n. 2. 0TJP.OTlKOs, 147 with n. I, 165 n. 3. OlmpTJrplop.OS, 141-2, 151. OLKTJ, in Hesiod, 2 I. related to vop.os, 2 I, 94. ooPVrpOPOl, 141 n. 4, 142 n. I. OvvaoTELa, form of oligarchy in Thucydides, 113. rules Thebes during Persian Wars, 113, 115, 116-19. opposed to democracy and to d>'lyapXLa loovop.os, 113, 116-17. 0TJp.oKpaTEop.al,
Ovovop.La,
65-9.
etymology of, 6 I. opposite of Evvop.La, 65-9, 70, 94. relation to avop.La, 70. relation to KaKovop.La, 85 n. I. in Hesiod, 65-7. in Solon, 65-9, 90. personification of, 66-7. Tel .zpTJp.Eva, term for 'statute'
nae,7·
in Myce-
n.
I.
does not imply 'statute' before [Xenophon], 68, 70, 74-5, 78, 80. meaning of affected by vop.os = 'statute', 62, 82-5, 92-4. EuvofLla:
in Egypt, 73. in Media, 73-5. in Sparta, 64, 75-82, 82 n. 3, 84 n. I. in Aleman, 64. in Anonymus Iamblichi, 92-4. in Aristophanes, 73. defined by Aristotle, 84 n. 2, 94. in Bacchylides, 72-3. in Herodotus, 73, 76, 78. in Hesiod, 63-4, 65, 69-70. in Homer, 63, 64, 65· in Pindar, 64, 71, 72, 73· in Solon, 64-9, 84. in Sophocles, 70- I. in Xenophanes, 69-70, 7 I. in [Xenophon], 62, 82-5, 95.
personification
of, 63,
64-7,
71,
72-3. as title of Solon, frg. 3, 64. as title of Tyrtaeus, frg. 2, 81-2. Eilvop.os, musical sense of, 61 n. I. in Aeschylus, 61 n. 1,62,72, 73. in Aleman, 6 I n. I. in Pindar, 61 n. 1,62,7°,71-2. Tel FEFaOTJPoTa, legal term in Naupactus, 17°,171. IJEIJP.WV, see IJEOP.WV. IJEIJ(r)p.os, see IJwJLos. IJEOJLWV, IJEOJLla, Nemean Games as TEIJJLWV of Heracles, 13 n. 4. constitution of Naupactus as IJEIJJLWV,
16,45, 170-3· in Aeschylus, 15, 17. in Euripides, 15, 17. in Herodotus, 15. TEIJJLWS in Pindar, 15. of Athens, 4, 16,59, 140, 174-5· last used of 'statute' 511/10 B.C., 4, 59, 158. IJWJLolJha,,6, 16, 174-5. IJWJLOS, basic idea in, 18-19, 55. etymology of, 9- 10. not found on Linear B tablets, 10 n. 3. not necessarily written, 16-17. used of Draco's statutes, 3, 5, 15,51, 57,59, 175· used of Solon's statutes, 3-5, IS, 57· uses of, before end of fifth century B.C., 17-18. = thing placed in significant location, 12. = something stored away, treasure, 12.
= place of burial, 13 n. I. = fundamental regulation, 13-15.
= establishment of fundamental institution, 13. = institution of celebrating victors in song, 13, 174· = establishment of athletic games, 13· = founding act, 13. = status conferred
agency, 13. = rule of propriety haviour, 15.
by and
external good
be-
O£a/-,os (cont.): = specific religious or political regu-
lation, 4 with n. 4, 15-17. = written statute, 6, 15-16, 57.
= written statute: in Locris (nO/-,os or T£TO/-,OS), 8, 16. at Olympia (O£O(T)/-,OS) 14. in Tegea, 8,17. last used in Athens 5 I 1/ IO B.C., 4, 59,158. replaced by vo/-,os in Athens, 55-6, 57, 96, 158-60, 173· in Aeschylus, 13, 17. in Anacreon, 12. in Aristophanes, 14. in Democritus, 17. in Euripides, 12 with n. 6. in Herodotus, 14. in Homer, 12, 13. in Pindar (nO/-,os), 12, 13-14, 15, 174· in Sophocles, 14, 17. in ephebic oath in Athens, 4, 14. in Phyle epigram, 17. Ow/-,oq,opos, attribute of Demeter, 13 with n. 1. laTJyop{a, 109, 135, 146-7, 157 n. 2,180. lao/-,oLp{a, 105, 178. TO raov, 182. laovo/-,Eo/-,aL, in Thucydides, laovo/-,{a, 96-120, 180-2.
114 n.
I.
in Epicurean philosophy, 96 n. I. etymology of, 61. reflects political senses of vO/-,os, 119-20, 158. affected by vO/-,os = 'statute' in fourth century, 119, 181-2. laovoJLla: and democracy, 96, 97, 106, 107, 1°9-11, 111-13, 113-14, 115, 120, 121, 130, 135-6, 137, 147. associated but not identical with 0TJ/-,oKpaT{a, 120, 18I. associated with JAwO£p{a, 108, 166, 182. associated with TrAijOos, 114-16. opposed to tyranny, 97, 101, 107, 109-1 I, II3. opposed to /-,ovapx{a, 99-102, 106. opposed to oligarchy, 107, 113, 114. associated with oligarchy, 114, 116-
19·
as principle of political equality, 97, 106, 108-9, III, 113, 115, 116 with n. I, 117, II8-19, 121. alleged association with nobility, 122-3· as propaganda term, 113-14, 115, 135, 153-5, 158. attempted establishment of, in Samos, 107-9, 165-6. granted to Miletus by Aristagoras, 109-1 I. in Athens, in Cleisthenes' reforms, 96, 101,122-3, 130, 135, 137, 153-7. possible models of, 161-6. in AIcmaeon of Croton, 99-106, 107, II3, II9· in Herodotus, 107-13, 114, 116, I r9-2o, 166-7. in Isocrates, r80-I. in Plato, 181-2. in Thucydides, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120. laovo/-,LKOs, in Plato, 182. laovopoos, in Harmodius skolia, 96-7, 101, 107, 113, 121-36, 161. in Plato, 181. in Thucydides, 113, 114, 116-19. laorT]S, 182. KaO{aTTJfLL, 77, 108. KaKovopo{a, relation to ovavofL{a,
85 n. I. in [Xenophon], 82-5, 95. KaKOVOJLOS, 61 n. I. in Herodotus, 76-7, 78-9, 85. KoAa~w, 83 n. 3. KOPOS, opposed to £vvofL{a, 65, 7 I. KOPVVTJq,0POL, 141 n. 4, 147. KpaatS,
see aupopo£TpOSKpaaLS.
KwAaKpETaL,
tions,6
title survives original funcand n. 3.
wO{aTTJfLL, 77, 108. po£Taf3aAAw, 108 n. 3. poofpa, division in Cyrene in Demonax'
reform, 163. opposed to laovopo{a, 106.
poovapx{a,
99-102,
title survives original functions, 6. VEfLW, 9-10, 61, 73 n. 3,81. vaUKpapoL,
Vfo1ToAi'TaL,
151.
v£oXpoos, revolutionary
connotations
of,
44 with n. I. vopoas, 9-10. vOJ.L€V~, g. "opo~,
,'o/-,La,
9·
in Naupactus and Eastern LOCl'is, 45, 170-2. vopoLpoa, in Sparta, changed by Lycurgus, 77, 78. in Sophocles, 58. vopooOw{a, I with n. 2. VOPOOL,of all Greeks, 33, 36, 39, 41, 43· of non-Greeks, 33. of Aegina, 52. of Aetolia, 36. of Argos, 35, 49, 52. of Athens, 36, 41, 42, 46, 60. of Babylonia, 35, 4 I. of Caria, 52. of Corcyra, 42, 49, 60. of Corinth, 47, 60. of Egypt, 35,41,43,47,53. of Erechtheids, 36. of Issedones, 35. of Libya, 35 n. 3. of Makrokephaloi, 35. of Massagetae, 35. of Nasamones, 35 n. 3· of Odrysians, 36. of Olympia, 49. of Persia, 35, 41, 47· of Phoenicians, 36. of Sauromatians, 35 n. 3· of Scythians, 35 nn. 3 and 6, 41. of Sparta, 35-6, 46, 49, 60. of Syracuse, 49. of Taurians, 35 n. 3, 43, 48. of Thracians, 35 n. 3. VOfLOS, = pasture, abode, district, 9. vOfLoS, = melody, tune, 10, 21-2, 86. VOfLOS, basic idea in, 20-1, 54, 55· etymology of, 9-10, 61. compounds of, 60-1, 62-136, 157--8. not on Linear B tablets, 10 n. 3. not in Solon, 3 n. 5. may have beginning in time, 52-3. may be god-given, 21. may control the gods, 29. related to O{KTJ, 2 I, 94. associated with JAevO£p{a, lO9. opposed to tyranny and narrow oligarchy, 32, 47.
inhibits human freedom of action, 47-8, 50. depreciation of, begins in philosophy and science, 38-9. in Antiphon, 37. in Aristophanes, 36-7, 39. in Democritus, 39. in Empedocles, 33-9. in Euripides, 36, 38, 39, 42, 47-8. in Herodotus, 39. in Hippocratic writings, 39. in Athens and Corcyra, 42. = way of life, 21-2. = normal order of things, 22-3. = normal way in which something is done, 23-4, 94· = normal or proper conduct of individual, I n. 3, 24-6, 62, 85, 86, 87, 90, 93, 94· treated like statutory enactment,
26, 91. = source
issuing and guaranteeing norms, 26-9, 120, 158. = law-and-order, I n. 3, 30-3, 62, 85,94· = mores of a social or political group, 33-4· social practice, I n. 3, 34-7· treated like statutory enactment, 36-7, 48 n. 3. = conventional belief, I n. 3, 37= custom,
4°·
= religious practice,
custom, or belief, I n. 3, 40-3, 87· = precedent, 52-3. = rule, as in a game, 53. = statute, as political and judicial regulation, 43-52, 120, 158. indifference in fifth century whether or not it is written, 43-52, 60, I7 I. in Athens, relation to 1~q,wpoa, 1-3, 168, 169. possible antecedents of, 16773used of Draco's and Solon's laws only by later authors, 3,5,51, 173· used of Cleisthenes' laws, 3, 158-60. not used before 5II/1O B.C., 6,
59·
vOjJ,o<; (cont.):
=statute in Athens (cont.) : replaces BEajJoos, 55-6, 158-60, 173· first attested 464/3 B.C., 43, 589, 95, 161. first explicit mention as written, 57. established as written by 403/2 B.C., 1,2,5,7, 10,57,96. identified by name of proposer, 51. affects connotations of £!JvojJola, 62, 8,2-5', 92-4. of aV0jJo,a, 9 I, 92-4. of laovojJola, I 19-20, 158. in Aeschylus, 22-3, 24, 25, 28, 33 n. 2, 34,37,41,43,53,58-9, 120, 161. in Aleaeus, 34 n. 6. in Aleman, 21-2. in Antiphon, 37, 51. in Archilochus, 34 n. 6. in Aristophanes, 22, 24, 34 n. 3, 36-7, 39, 43, 48-9, 53 n. I, 57· used by Callicles, 23, 40, 5 I. in Critias, 51-2. in Democritus, 39. in Empedocles, 38-9. in Euripides, 22, 23, 24 n. 3, 25-6, 29, 32-3, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42, 47-8, 52-3, 57· in Gorgias, 26, 51. in Heraclitus, 26-8, 30, 33, 120. in Herodotus, 23, 24, 25, 31, 33, 34 n. 4, 35, 39, 41, 46-7, 52, 53· in Hesiod, 21, 23-4,4°. in Hippocratic writings, 22, 35, 39. in Pherecydes of Syros, 40. in Pindar, 20, 24,29,3°-1,34,37-8,
41. in Plato, I n. 3, 23, 40. in Sophocles, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32, 34nn. 3 and 4, 38, 41,47, 52, 53· in Theognis, 22, 30, 94. in Thucydides, 23, 31-2, 33, 34 n. 3, 36,38,42,49-50,58,60, 175-6. in Erythrae c. 450 B.C., 45-6, 168 n. 2, 169. in Halicarnassus c. 460-455 B.C., 44, 167-70, 172. in treaty between Athens and Colophon 44716 B.C., 41-2, 168 n. 2. in Naupactus, 45 n. 2, 170-3. in tribute assessment of 425 B.C., 168 n. 2.
See also aypaq,os vOjJoos and written legislation. vOjJoos-q,va,s controversy, 22, 23, 35, 36, 39-40, 51. first attested
oA,yapx1a,
in Herodotus,
120 n. 2. in Thebes 427 B.C., 113, II{, 115, 116-19. opposed to democracy and Dvvaaula,
o>.,yapx1a
laovojJoos,
"3·
as political slogan, 114. as appropriate name for Spartan constitution, I 17- I 8. See also laovojJoos. 0PPos VOjJoLOS,in Naupactus, 45, 171.
°
1TapavojJo€w, 88, 9 I. 1TapavojJola, 85. 1TapavojJows, 23, 88. 1T<1.TpLOSvOjJoos, 36, 175-6. 1TMiBos, associated with laovojJola,1
14-16.
in Herodotus, I I 1-12, 114-15. in Thucydides, 115-16. 1TpoaETa,pl'ojJoa"inHerodotus,1 42-3, I 57. p~Tpa,
in in in in in in
legal term in Chios, 7, 162-3. Cyprus, 7. Heracleia, 7. Messenia, 7. Olympia, 7, 8. Sparta, 7. Tarentum, 7.
a1TovDoq,opo" I n. 4. av>'>'oyos, in Halicarnassus,
168, 172. meaning of, 102-5. in Alemaeon, frg. 4, 102-5. in Aristotle, 103-4. in doxography, 103-4. in Galen, 104. awq,poavvTJ, associated with .tJvojJola, 72-3,176-7. aVjJojJoETpOS KpaaLS,
Tagl,s,20. T€BjJoLOS, see B€ajJoLOV. uBjJoos, see BwjJoos. T€TBjJoos, see BwjJoos. TupavvEvojJoa" 109
opposed to DTJjJooKpaTfojJoa"
n. 3.
associated with avojJola, 86, 89. opposed to £!JvojJola, 63, 65, 71, 72.
v{3p,s,
in Athens, relation to vOjJoos, 1-3, 168, 169. in Erythrae c. 450 B.C., 45, 169. ifiijq,os, 2 n. 4. ifi~q"ajJoa,
.\dlllctuS, Attic skolion on, 129. Aeacidae, 15. Aegina, 13, 15· vOjJoos of, 52. called EUVOjJoOSby Pindar, 7 I. Aesehines, .tJvojJo€ojJoa, in, 84 n. 2. Aeschylus, avojJoos in, 6 I n. I, 86. €uvojJoos in, 62, 72, 73· (JEup.,ta in, 15, 17. BwjJoos in, 13. vOjJoos in, 22-3, 24, 25, 28, 33 n. 2, 31, 37,41,43,53,58-9,120,161. Aetolians, I n. 4, 36. Agariste, daughter of Cleisthenes of Sieyon,41. Agis, king of Sparta, 49 n. 3· Ajax, Attic skolion on, 129. Aleaeus, author of Attic skolion, 127· vOjJoos in, 34 n. 6. Aleibiades, 38. Alemaeon, Athenian commander in First Sacred War, 138. Alemaeon, archon 50716 B.C., 143-4, 145,149· Alcmaeon of Croton, dates of, 97-9· relation to Croton, 106. not a Pythagorean, 97-8. frg. 4, textual problems, 177-8. laovojJola in, 99-106, 107, 113, "9· in, 102-5· Alemaeonids, curse on, 144, 145, 185. exiled by Hippias, 138. led opponents of Peisistratids at Leipsydrium, 138. influence in Delphi, 138. role in liberating Athens from tyranny, 130, 134, 138-9, 150. alleged opposition to, in 507 B.C., 131, 132 n. I, 134-5. See also Cleisthenes. Aleman, EvvojJola in, 64. EVVOJLOS in, 6 I n. I. VOJ.LOS in, 21-2. Alexander the Great, restores tyrannicide group to Athens, 132. Amasis, 47 n. 2. aVjJojJoETpOSKpaa,s
Anaxagoras, contemporary of late years of Alcmaeon of Croton,
98-9' aUjJojJo€Tpla and KpaaLS in doctrine
of,
104.
Anaxandrides and Ariston, kings of Sparta, defeat Tegea, 76. Anchimolius, leads Spartan troops against Hippias, 129, 139. Andocides, cites law of 403/2 B.C., differentiating between vOjJoos and ifi~q,wjJoa, I, 3, 5, 7, 57· uses BwjJoos and vOjJoos indifferently of Draco's laws, 5. Anonymus Iambliehi, alleged authorship of, 92 n. I. avop.€w in, 93. avojJola in, 92-4,95. avojJoos in, 88. €Vvop.EOfl-at in, 93. €vvopia in, 92-4. Antenor, see tyrannicides. Anthesteria, 42. Antiphon, speech against Demosthenes, 2 n. 3. vOjJoos in, 37, 51. Aphrodite, sexual relations as BwjJoos of, 13· Arcadia, Spartan designs against, 76. scene of Philippides' vision of Pan, 128. Arcesilaus II of Cyrene, 163. Archedemides, archon 464/3 B.C., 59· Archestratus, enacted vOjJoo, at Athens, 5· Archidamus, praises Spartan adherence to vOjJoo" 32. Archilochus, vojJoos in, 34 n. 6. archons, Athenian, oath exacted from,
3-4· Areopagus, Council of the, under Solon, 162. as BwjJoos for trials of homicide established by BwjJoos of Athene, 13· equal votes for and against accused result in acquittal, 48. Argos, vOjJoo, of, 35, 49, 52.
Argos (cont.): source of mercenaries for Peisistratus, 14I. Aristagoras, grants laovofL{a to Miletus, 109-II, 167. Aristarchus, 12, 2 I n. 2. Aristion, proposes bodyguard for Peisistratus, 147, 156. Aristogeiton, tortured after murder of Hipparchus, 140. See also Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Ariston, see Anaxandrides and Ariston. Aristophanes, earliest explicit mention of written vOfLO' in, 57. earliest reference to Harmodius skolia in, 123-4, 126. avofLos in, 88. €uvopla in, 73. vOfLoS in, 22, 24, 34 n. 3, 36-7, 39,43, 48~9, 53 n. 1,57· Aristophanes of Byzantium, 12. Aristotle, gives archon date for fortification of Munichia and surrender of Peisistratids, 139. account of events in Athens 508/7507/6 B.C., 143-5. uses OWfLOS and VOfLOS indifferently of Draco's and Solon's laws, 5. defines €VVOfLW, 84 n. 2, 94. aVfLfL€TpOS KpiiaLS in, 103, 104. Artaphernes, satrap, 145. Artemis, Attic skolion on, 128. Assembly, Athenian, majority vote validates law, 2 n. 3, 3. under Solon, 156, 162. votes bodyguard for Peisistratus, 147, 156-7. possibly attended by aliens under Peisistratus, 142. instrument for passing Cleisthenes' reforms, 155-7, 158, 159. addressed by Corinthians to oppose Corcyrean alliance, 52. in [Xenophon], Constitution of Athens, 82-4· assembly, in Halicarnassus, 8, 168. in Naupactus, 172. in Opus, I 72. in Sparta, II2. Asychis, 47 n. 2. Athenaeus, Attic skolia in, 96, 121, 126-30.
source of Harmodius skolia, 96, 121, 123, 126-7· Athenagoras, 114. Athene, establishes Areopagus as her OWfLOS by means of a OWfLoS, 13. Tritogeneia, Attic skolion to, 128. Athens, vOfLO' of, 36, 41, 46, 50, 60. regarded as written by 442 B.C., 57-8. abandoned during the Plague, 42. laws defining paternal authority over daughters, 59. laws on inheritance, 59, 170. liberation from tyranny, see tyranny, in Athens. requests alliance with Persia 507 B.C., 145· withdraws support from Miletus in Ionian Revolt, I 10. tolerates oligarchy in Miletus 450/49 B.C., 169. treaty with Colophon 447/6 B.C., 41-2, 120 n. 2, 168 n. 2. colony sent to Brea c. 445 B.C., 170. applies same commercial laws to herself and to her allies, 50. tends to support democracies during Peioponnesian'Var, 113. armistice with Sparta 423 B.C., 42. Babylonians, vOfLO' of, 35, 41. Bacchylides, influenced by Hesiod, 72. €tJVop.la in, 72-3. Battus II Eudaimon of Cyrene, 163. Battus III of Cyrene, 163. Boeotia, defeated by Athens 506 B.C., 109, 135, 145-6. constitution of member states of League, 118. Brasidas, march through Thessaly 424 B.C., II3, II5~I6. Thracian expedition of, 82. Brea, Athenian colony sent to, c. 445 B.C., 170. Callicles, VOfLOS used by, 23, 40, 5 I. Cambyses, 47 n. I. Carians, vOfLOS of, 52. Chalcis, defeated by Athens 506 B.C., 109, 135, 145-6. Cheops, 73. Chersonese, Thracian, 23. Miltiades despatched to, c. 516 B.C., 138.
Chios, pTJTpa used for 'statute', 7, 162-3· constitution of, as possible model for Cleisthenes, 161-3. Choes, festival, 42, 53. Cimon, father of Miltiades, 138. Cineas commander of Thessalian cava'lry allied with Hippias, 129, 139· citizenship, in Erythrae, possibly defined by law, 46. in Thebes, 118-19, 180. granted by tyrants to their supporters, 141. Athenian, criteria of, 141-2, 151, 154· possible grants of by Peisistratus and his sons, 141-2. Pericles' law on, 46. Cleisthenes, archon 525/4 B.C., 135, 137· exiled under the tyranny, 138, 148. opponent of Isagoras, 131, 133, 140, 142-5, 148. attitude to Athenian nobility, 152, 154, 157, 158. attitude to Athenian demos before 508/7 B.C., 149, 156. appeals for support to demos, 143, 155-7· exiled by Cleomenes and Isagoras 508/7 B.C., 144, 145, 185. recalled from exile, 145· establishes democracy 507 B.C., 130, 133, 135-6, 146, 150, 154, 161. preserves Solonian institutions and statutes, 158-9. change from OWfLoS to vOfLOS, 55-6, 158-60. reforms of, 141, 143, 144, 145, 14960. passed by Assembly, 155-7, 158. enacted as ifiTJq,{afLaTa, 3 with n. I, 158-9' tribes in, 150-1, 154-5, 156, 164. demes in, 151-3, 154, 157· trittyes in, 152, 154· as expression of laovofL{a, 96, 101, 122, 132, 135, 153-7· possible models for his laovofL{a, 161-6. use of lot, 154 n. 2. enfranchisement of aliens, 141 n. 2, 151-2. vOfLo, in, 3, 158-60.
Cleisthenes of Sicyon, betroths his daughter to Megacles, 41. Cleomenes, leads Spartans liberating Athens from tyranny, 130, 134, 139, 144, 148. called to Athens by Isagoras 507 B.C., 144, 145, 149, 150, 160, 185. withdraws from Athens under safeconduct, 144. tries by force to reinstate Isagoras, 144 n. 6, 145-6· Cleon, attitude to vOfLoS, 50. cleruchs, Athenian, established on Euboea 506 B.C., 146. coinage, decree on, 422 B.C., 51. Colophon, treaty with Athens 447/6 B.C., 41-2, 120 n. 2, 168 n. 2. oath exacted by Athens, 41-2. common people, see demos. Corcyra, vOfLO' of, 42, 49, 60. Corinthian speech against, before Athenian Assembly, 52. party warfare in, 3 I . Corinth, VOfLO' of, 47, 60. in Pindar, home of Eunomia, Dika, and Eirena, 64, 7 I . defects from Peloponnesian army 506 B.C., 146. speech against Corcyra before Athenian Assembly, 52. Council of Five Hundred, in Athens, candidates elected by demes, 153· majority vote validates
law,
2
with
n·3· in [Xenophon], Constitution rif Athens, 82-4· Council of Four Hundred, in Athens, under Solon, 162. resists Cleomenes in 50817 B.C., 144, 149,160. passes Cleisthenes' reforms, 144, 158. councils, in cities of Boeotian League, II8. in Thebes, 118-19. Crete, source of Lycurgus' reforms in Sparta, 77. Critias, VOfLOS in, 51-2. Critius, see tyrannicides. Croesus, relation to Delphi, 25. hears of Spartan victory over Tegea,
76. Croton, Alcmaeon's
relation to, 100.
Cyclopes, in Homer, lack O£!-"'i, 77. Cylonian conspiracy, 144, 174, 185. Cyprus, M'Tpa used for 'statute', 7. Cyrene, reforms of Demonax as possible model for Cleisthenes, 163-5. Darius, 47 n. I, 109, 110, III, 145, 17g· Debate of Persian Conspirators in Herodotus, 107, I I 1-13, 163-4, 166-7· source of, 166, I 78-9. decrees, see laws and decrees. Deioces, 73-5, 8g. Delium, battle of, 8g. Delphi, uses alvos as legal term, 8. uses nOW)S as legal term, 16. Alcmaeonid influence in, 138. Oracle, source of Lycurgus' reforms in Sparta, 77. consulted by Spartans before attack on Tegea, 76. consulted by Croesus, 25. authority to dispense oracles called vO!-,os, 2g. prods Sparta to liberate Athens from tyranny, 130, 134, 138. Temple of Apollo, order of worship as vo!-'os 43. destroyed 548/7 B.C., 138. operation of shrine guaranteed 423 B.C., 42. Demaratus, king of Sparta, defects at Eleusis, 46 n. 4, 146. has vision before battle of Salamis, 128. attributes Spartan freedom to vO!-,os, 31, 32, 109. deme, in Athens, membership as proof of citizenship, 151-2. self-government of, 152-3. election of candidates for Council, 153· Demeter and Kore, orgies in honour of,
43· invoked in Attic skolion, 128. See also Ow!-,oq,opO'i. democracy, and Luovo!-,ta, g6, 97, 106, 107, 109-II, II 1-13, 113-14, 115, 120, 121, 130, 135-6, 137, 147. associated with £/o.wOEpta, 108. opposed to Suvaunta, I 16- I 7. opposed to monarchy, 112.
not likely in Samos in earlv sixth century, 165 n. 3. offered to Samians by Maeandrius, 108. established by Mardonius in Ionia 4g2 B.C., 109, 110, 167, 17g. desired by Miletus, 110-1 I. in Plataea during Persian \Vars, I 17. in Thebes before battle ofOenophyta, 117 n. 2. praised by Athenagoras, 114. supported by Athens during Peloponnesian War, 113. Athenian, establishment in 507 B.C. celebrated in Harmodius skolia, 126, 130, 133-6, 137, 153, 15g. establishment of brings change from Ow!-'os to vo!-'os, 55-.6, 15860. credited with defeat of Boeotia and Chalcis 506 B.C., 109, 135, 146, 15g· rotation of office in, 106. in [Xenophon], Constitution cif Athens, 82-3. democratic institutions, in sixth-century Chios, 162. democratic sentiments, in late sixthcentury Ionia, 109, 166-7, 173. Democritus, lived later than Alcmaeon of Croton, g8. alleged author of Anonymus Iamblichi, 92 n. I. 'well-proportioned mixture' in, 104. Ow!-'os in, 17. vo!-'os in, 3g. Demonax of Mantinea, reformer at Cyrene, 163-5. demos, in Athens, political role under tyranny, 147-8, 156-7. political role after overthrow of tyranny, 142-5, 148-60. Demosthenes, general, 2 n. 3. Demosthenes, orator, ElJVo!-,£o!-,a' in, 84 n. 2. Dicaeus, has VISiOn before battle of Salamis, 128. Dieitrephes, abolishes qemocracy in Thasos 41 I B.C., 176. Dike, sister of Eunomie, 63, 64, 68, 7 I. attendant of Eunomia and Themis,
72• in Solon, 67-8.
Diodotus, attitude to vO!-,os, 50. Diogenes, KpaUE< UV!-'!-'E'TPOSin doctrine of, 104. Dionysia, reorganization of possibly celebrated in Attic skolion, 12g. doxography, UV!-'!-'E'TPOSKpaa,s in, 103-4. Drabeskos, battle of, 175. Draco, issued first written legislation in Athens, 60, 174. Ow!-'os as term for 'statute', 3, 4, 5, 51, 175· vo!-'os used of his statutes by later authors, 5, 5 I, 173· legislation against tyranny revived 511/10 B.C., 4 with n. 2, 16, 59, 140.
laws on homicide republished 409/8 B.C., 3, 5, 50-1,173· drinking songs, see skolia. Dysnomie, personification of, 66-7. Eastern Locris, early fifth-century O£O!-'wv, on colony at Naupactus, 16, 45, 170-3· laws on inheritance and property, 170-1. See also Naupactus. Egypt, vO!-,o' of, 35, 41, 43, 47, 53· £vvo/Lla in, 73. Eirene, sister of Eunomie, 63, 64, 7 I. in Solon, 67. Eleusinian Mysteries, I n. 4. Eleusis, occupied by Spartans 506 B.C., 145-6· Empedocles, contemporary of late years of Alcmaeon of Croton, g8-g. vO!-'O'i in, 38-9. UV!-,!-,E'Tpta Tfj'i KpauEws in doctrine of,
4.
10
enfranchisement, of aliens by Cleisthenes, 141 n. 2, 151-2. act of 404/3 B.C., 51. ephebic oath, see oaths. Ephialtes, enacted vO!-,o' at Athens, 5. Epidaurus, uses alvos as legal term, 8. Erechtheids, vo!-'os of, 36. Erythrae, citizenship possibly defined by law, 46. medized under her tyrants, 16g n. 3. regulation of judicial procedures c. 450 B.C. contains vo!-'os and .p~q,w!-,a, 45-6, 168 n. 2, 16g.
Eunomia, personifications of, 63, 64-7, 71, 72-3· sister of Dike, 63-4, 71, cf. 72. sister of Eirene, 63-4, 7 I. sister of H6rai, 63-4. sister of Moirai, 63-4. sister of Tycha, 64. daughter of Promatheia, 64. daughter of Themis and Zeus, 63,
67, 7 I. Euripides, first tragedian to speak of written vo!-'o" 57. takes background of written legislation for granted, 48. avoj-Lfa in, 26, 90- I. G.vo!-'os in, 87-8. avoJLw~ in, 8g. O£u!-'wv in, I 7. vo!-'os in, 22, 23, 24 n. 3, 25-6, 2g, 32-3, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42, 47-8, 52-3, 57· Five Thousand, government of, in Athens, 103 n. 3, 106, 180. Funeral Oration, Pericles', in Thucydides, 58 with n. I, 114. Galen, UV!-,!-,ETpOS KpaU''i in, 104. Gephyraei, genos of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, 130- I. Gerousia, 112. Gorgias, G.vo!-'os in, 88. dvo!-,w'i in, 8g. vo!-'os in, 26, 5 I. Gortyn, laws of, described as ypa!-'!-'aTa or by ypaq,w-derivatives, 8. Gytheion, vo!-'os in lex sacra of, 42 n. 2. Halai, festival of Artemis at, 42, 53. Halicarnassus, law of c. 460-55 B.C., 44, 167-70, 172. uses uSos as legal term, 8, 167-8, 16g,
'170. uses vo!-'os = 'statute',
44,
167-70,
172• excluded from Dorian pentapolis, gl. Harmodius, death of, 514 B.C., 122, 142 n. I. and Aristogeiton, g6-7, 121-2, 124 n. I, 130-1, 133-6, 148, 15g. Harmodius skolia, Athenaeus as source of, g6, 121, 123, 126-7. date of, 97, 121-36, 185.
Harmodius skolia (cont.): form of, 123-5. first referred to in Aristophanes, 1234, 126. significance of myrtle bough in, 182-5· as earliest testimony of laovo/1-La, 121-30, 161. celebrate establishment of Athenian democracy in 507 B.C., 126, 130, 133-6, 137, 153, 159· laovo/1-os in, 96-7, 101, 107, 113, 121-36,161. Harpactides, archon 511/10 B.C., 13940• Hecale, 154. Hecatompedon inscription, 2 n. 3. Hegesicles, see Leon and Hegesicles. Heliaia, Solonian, as possible model for Chios, 162. possibly attended by aliens under Peisistratus, 142. Heracleia, uses p~Tpa for 'statute', 7. Heracles, establishes Olympic Games as T€(J/1-oS, 13. establishes Nemean Games as TfI· (J/1-LaV, 13 n. 4. Heraclitus, lived earlier than A1cmaeon of Croton, 98. ),oyos in, 27. Vo/1-0S in, 26-8, 30, 33, 120. Hermotimus, 53. Herodotus, leaves Halicarnassus for Samos, 167. as interpreter of Pindar, 37-8. Debate of Persian Conspirators in, 107, I I 1-13, 163-4, 166-7. source of, 166, 178-9. account of Lycurgus' reforms at Sparta, 75-9. account of events in Athens 50817507/6 B.C., 143-6. fails to differentiate between written and unwritten vO/1-0" 46-7. aVOfL€W in, 91. aVO/1-La in, 73, 74, 8g-90. aV0/1-0S in, 88. C,7JI-LaKpaTEO/1-a, in, 107 n. 4, 109 n. 3, III. c,7J/1-0KpaTLa in, 109 n. 4, I I I n. I, 120
n.
I.
"}VO/1-E0/1-a, in, 62, 73-4, 76. "}VO/1-La in, 73, 76, 78.
laovo/1-La in, 107-13, 114, 116, 119-20 166-7· KaKoVO/1-0S in, 76-7, 78-9, 85. vO/1-0S in, 23, 24, 25, 31, 33, 34 n. 4, 35, 39,41,46-7, 52, 53· 7TArj(JOS in, I I 1-12, 114-15. 7TpOa€Ta,pL'O/1-a, in, 142-3, 157. Hesiod, influence on Solon, 65-7. on Pindar, 71. on Bacchylides, 72. aVO/1-0S in, 86. SlK7J in, 21. c,vavo/1-La in, 65-7. Evvo/1-La in, 63-4, 65, 69-70. Vo/1-0S in, 2 I, 23-4, 40. Hipparchus, murder of, 514 B.C., 122, 125,134,138. Hippias of Elis, alleged author of Anonymus Iamblichi, 92 n. I. use of vO/1-0S, 22, 51. Hippias, tyrant of Athens, relations with Athenian nobility, 137-9, 148, 165-6. actions after Hipparchus' murder, 125, 138, 140, 148. helped by Thessalian cavalry against Spartans, 129, 139. fortifies Munichia, 139. expelled from Athens 511/10 B.C., 129,130,133,134,148. See also Peisistratids. Hippocratic writings, On Ancient Medi. cine later than A1cmaeon, 98. conjoin /1-ETPLaS and Kpiia's to express balanced mixture, 103. vO/1-osin,22,35,39. Histiaeus, argues against revolt in 512 B.C., 109, 167. Homer, influence on Solon, 65. attributes lack of (JE/1-'S to Cyclopes, 77EVVO/1-La in, 63, 64, .65, hoplite census, as requirement for Theban citizenship, 118-19, 180. H6rai, 63-4, 67. Hypoknemidian Locris, see Eastern Locris. Hysiae, captured by Boeotians 506 B.C., 145· Inheritance, laws concerning, Athens, 59, 170. in Eastern Locris, 170- I.
in
Ionia, democratic sentiments in late sixth century, 109, 166-7, 173. revolt of, 109- I I. !rasa, battle of, 163. Isagoras, may have stayed in Athens during tyranny, 148. opponent of Cleisthenes, 131, 133, 140, 142-5, 148. archon 508/7 B.C., 142-3, 145, 148-9. attempts to establish oligarchy at Athens, 144, 150, 155. calls Cleomenes to aid against Cleisthenes, 144, 145, 149, 150, 160. Isocrates, laovo/1-La in, 18o-I. Issedones, vO/1-0' of, 35. Isthmian Games, as TE(J/1-oS of Poseidon, 13· Kedon, attempt against tyranny in Atticskolion, 127, 129, 130, 134, 138, 148. Labyadai, phratry at Delphi, use of TE(J/1-oS by, 16. laws and decrees, 48. of Argos, on succession to priesthood of Hera, 49. of Athens, define father's authority over daughters, 59. first issued in writing by Draco, 60, 174· Draco's against tyranny, 4 with n. 2, 16, 59, 140. on homicide, 3, 5, 50-I, 173· Solon's, 2, 46, 48, 59, 170. left intact under the tyranny, 4, 15, 140, 147-8. preserved by Cleisthenes, 158. prohibiting torture of Athenian citizen, 140-1. on Salamis, 2 n. 3. on ostracism, 156, 159. enacted by Ephialtes and Arches· tratus,5· Pericles' on citizenship, 46. on maintenance in Prytaneion, 48-9. treaty with Colophon 447/6 B.C., 41-2, 120 n. 2, 168 n. 2. on colony at Brea c. 445 B.C., 170. Megarian Decree, 48, 57. on coinage 422 B.C., 51.
on allocation of funds to sanctuaries 418/17 B.C., 51. revision of, under the Thirty, 5. of Teisamenus 403/2 B.C., I n. 2, 3 n. 3, 5· of 403/2 B.C., differentiating be· tween vO/1-os and ifJ+pw/1-a, 1-3, 5,7,57· of Corcyra on precinct of Zeus and A1cinous, 49. of Corinth, 47. of Erythrae c. 450 B.C., 45-6, 168 n. 2, 169. of Gortyn, 8. of Gytheion, 42 n. 2. of Halicarnassus on real estate c. 460-55 B.C., 8, 44, 167-70, 172. of Eastern Locris on inheritance and property, 170-1. on colony at Naupactus, 16, 45, 170-3· of Ozolian Locris on new lands and on homicide, 16. of Naupactus, 16,45, 170-3. of Olympia on attack during Olympic truce, 49. of Sparta, 7, 46, 49. of Syracuse, 49. See also written legislation. Leipsydrium, defeat commemorated in Attic skolion, 127, 129, 130, 134, 138, 148. Leobotes, son of A1cmaeon, accuser of Themistocles, 144 n. I. Leogoras, great-grandfather of Andocides, 138. father of Andocides, 2 n. 3. Leon and Hegesicles, kings of Sparta, fail at Tegea, 76. Leucon, battle of, 163. Libyans, vO/1-0' of, 35 n. 3. Linear B tablets, do not have (JW/1-oS, or vO/1-0S, 10 n. 3. Locris, use of TE(J/1-oS, 8, 16. See also Eastern Locris and Ozolian Locris. Lycurgus, reforms of, in Sparta, 75-82. enacts pfjTpa' in Sparta, 7 n. 2. Lygdamis, tyrant of Halicarnassus, 167-9. Lysagoras, archon 509/8 B.C., 142.
Maeandrius (cont.): Laovoll-in in Samos, 107-9, 110-11, 164, 165-6. Magi, 47 n. I. Makrokephaloi, vop.os of, 35. Marathon, battle of, 128, 175. vop.os gives polemarch command of right wing, 46. vop.os prevents Spartans from participating in, 41. Mardonius, deposes tyrants and establishes democracies in Ionia 492 B.C., 109, 110, 167, 179. Massagetae, vop.o, of, 35. Media, £I1vop.{a in, 73-5. Megabyzus, III. Megacles, archon, 144. father-in-law of Peisistratus, 24. father of Cleisthenes, 41. Megarian Decree, 48, 57. Melian Dialogue, 23, 52. MeJite, deme decree of, 4 n. 4. Messenia, p~Tpa used for 'statute', 7. Spartan wars against, 77 n. I, 81-2. Miletus, granted laovop.{a by Aristagoras, 109-11, 167. loyal to Aristagoras, I 10. oligarchical regime tolerated by Athens 450/49 B.C., 169. Miltiades, archon 524/3 B.C., 23, 137-8. sent to Thracian Chersonese c. 516 B.C., 138. sacrifices to Artemis after battle of Marathon, 128. mixture, see avp.p.£TpOS Kpaa's. Moirai, sisters of Eunomie, 63-4, 67. children of Night, 64. monarchy, opposed to democracy, 112. Munichia, fortified by Hippias 511/10 B.C., 139. Mycenae, Ta £lp"'lp.Eva used for 'statute', 7· myrtle bough, significance of, in Harmodius skolia, 182-5. Mysacheis, in Naupactus, 170-1. Nasamones, vop.o, of, 35 n. 3. naukraries, replaced by demes III Cleisthenes'reforms, 152. Naupactus, (UOp.,ov concerning settlement of, 16,45, 170--3. has assembly of all citizens, 172.
oath exacted in judicial proceedings, 45, 171. uses vall-La, vOJLOS, and 'Ta F€Fu81]ooru as legal terms, 45, 170--3. Nemean Games, as dOP.LOV of Heracles, 13 n. 4. N esiotes, see tyrannicides. Nicias, attitude to vop.os, 50. nobility, Athenian, alleged association with laovop.{a, 122-3. under Peisistratus, 147. under Hippias, 137-9, 148. after the fall of the tyranny, 140, 142-3, 148, 156, 160. Cleisthenes' attitude to, 152, 154, 157,158. oaths, at Athens, exacted from archons,
3-4· ephebes, 4, 14· heliasts, 45 n. 4. exacted by Athens from Colophon 447/6 B.C., 41-2. at Erythrae, 45. at Halicarnassus, 44, 167 n. 3, 171. at Naupactus, 45, 17I. Odrysians, vop.os of, 36. Oinoe, captured by Boeotians 506 B.C., 145· oligarchical sympathies, in ETa'p£taL, 142.
oligarchy, sortition and dJOuva in, 112. not mentioned in Alemaeon, frg. 4, 101-2. relation to laovop.{a, 107, 113, 114, 116-19. called lluvaaT£{a in Thucydides, 113. Isagoras attempts establishment at Athens, 144, 150, 155. at Miletus, tolerated by Athens 450/49 B.C., 169. supported by Sparta during Peloponnesian War, 113. Olympia, p~Tpa, TO yp6.q,OS, and O£O
Ozolian Locris, uses T£TOP.OS for law on homicide, 16. Pagondas, speech before battle of Delium,8g. Pallene, battle of, 14I. divided among three demes in Cleisthenes' reforms, 154. Pan, establishment of cult in Athens in Attic skolion, 128. Panathenaic festival, reorganization possibly commemorated in Attic skolion, 129. occasion of Hipparchus' murder 514 B.C., 125, 138, 184. contest of men's choruses introduced 509/8 B.C., 142. Pandrosus, in Attic skolion, 128-9. Parthenion mountains, scene of Philippides' vision of Pan, 128. Peisistratids, in Attic skolia, 129-3°. attitude to Solonian constitution, 140. relations with Sparta, 138-9. besieged on acropolis 511/10 B.C., 139, 144, 148. expelled from Athens 511/10 B.C., 4, 130, 140, 148. withdraw to Sigeum 511/10 B.C., 139. names proscribed on stele, 140. See also Hippias. Peisistratus, in Attic skolia, 129-3°. marries daughter of Megacles, 24. his rise to power, 140, 156-7. bases his power on approval of Assembly, 147, 156-7. his geniality, 147. did not change OEafLLa of Athens, 4, 15, 147· develops Attic industry, 141. may have granted citizenship to aliens, 141-2. relations with Athenian nobility, 147. reorganizes Dionysiac and Panathenaic festivals, 129. interest in Salamis and Troad, 129. Peitho, sister of Eunomia in Aleman,
64· Percothariae, in Naupactus, 170-I. Pericles, defines VOfLOS as written statute, 5 I. citizenship law in Athens, 46. Megarian Decree as written VOP.OL. 57·
his exile demanded by Spartans, 144 n. 3. vop.os in his Funeral Oration, 49-50. no mention of laovofL{a in Funeral Oration, 114. Persephone, see Demeter and Kore. Persia, VOfLOLof, 35, 41, 47· Debate of Conspirators in, 107, 11113,163-4, 166-7, 178-9. law of succession in, 24. Spartan relations with, 145 with
n. I. alliance requested by Athens 507 B.C., 145· Pherecydes of Syros, vOfLOS in, 40. Philippides, vision of Pan on his way to Sparta, 128. Phoenicians, vop.os of, 36. phratry, political role of, in Athens, 141-2, 151-2. Phyle, epigram on the dead of, 4 n. 5, 17· Pindar, influenced by Hesiod, 71. £!JVop.{a in, 64, 71, 72, 73· dlvOfLoS in, 61 n. 1,62, 70, 71-2. vop.os in, 20, 24, 29, 30-1, 34, 37-8, 41. T£OfLoSin, 12, 13-14, 15, 174. Plague, in Athens, influenced attitude to vOfLoS, 50. created avofL{a, 90. Plataea, has democratic constitution during Persian Wars, 117. argument against Thebes 427 B.C., 23, 32, 88, 116. Plato, laovofL{a in, 181-2. laovofJ-tl<6s in, 182. laavoJLos in, IS!. vOfLoS in, I n. 3, 23, 40. polemarch, commands right wing at Marathon on basis of vOfLoS, 46. offers sacrifice to Artemis on anniversary of Marathon, 128. Polycrates of Samos, 107, 165. Poseidon, establishes Isthmian Games as a 7£OfLoS, 13. Probalinthus, 154. Promatheia, mother of Eunomia in Aleman, 64. Protagoras, alleged source of Debate of Conspirators, 179. alleged author of Anonymus Iamblichi, 92 n. I.
Prytaneion, law on public maintenance in, 48-9. Pythagoreans, Alcmaeon of Croton alleged member of, 97-8. Pytheas of Aegina, 72. Pythia, see Delphi.
Salamis, Peisistratus' interest in, 129. Athenian decree on, 2 n. 3. Salmacis, 167-8. Samos, democracy not likely in early sixth century, 165 n. 3. attempt to establish laovofLla in, 107-9,164. Sauromatians, vOfLo, of, 35 n. 3. Scamandrius, archon 510/9 B.C., 141, 142• Scythians, vOfLo, of, 35 nn. 3 and 6, 41. called EvvofLo, by Aeschylus, 72. Sigeum, 129, 139. . Simonides, possibly author of Attic skolion, 127. skolia, traditions concerning, 124. Attic, in Athenaeus, 96, 121, 126-30. to Athene Tritogeneia, 128. Demeter and Persephone invokedin, 128. Pandrosus in, 128-9. on Admetus, 129. Ajax and Telamon in, 129. Peisistratus and Peisistratids in, 129-3°· possibly commemorate reorgani~ation of Dionysia and PanathenaIa, 129· commemorateKedon,127, 129, 130, 134, 148. commemorate battle of Leipsydrium, 127, 129, 130, 134, 148. commemorate victory at Marathon, 128-9, 130. . commemorate sacrifice to Artemis vowed by Miltiades, 128. commemorate establishment of Pan cult, 128. commemorate victory at Salamis, 128-9, 130. See also Harmodius skolia. slaves, in Cleisthenes' enfranchisement, 151 with n. 2. Solon, influenced by Hesiod, 65-7.
influenced by Homer, 65. includes thetes in Athenian Assembly,156. alleged originator of institution of funeral oration, 49 n. 2. his constitution as possible model for Chios, 162. admits skilled craftsmen as citizens to Attica, 141 n. 5. weakness of his constitution, 151, 154. constitution and laws left intact under tyranny, 4, 15, 140, 147-8. institutions and laws preserved by Cleisthenes, 158-9. ovavofLla in, 65-9, 90. EvvofLla in, 64-9, 84. laws of, called 8EafLol, 3-5. called vOfLo, by later authors, 3, 5,60. enacted without ratification by Council and Assembly, 2. in Aristophanes, 48. in Herodotus, 46, 60. on inheritance, 59. Sophocles, ayparrTa vOfL'fLa in, 58. avofLoS in, 86-7. £vvofLLa in, 70- I. 8WfLoS in, 17. VOfLOS in, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32, 34 nn. 3 and 4,38,41,47,52,53. sortition, 112. Sparta, vOfLo, of, 35, 36, 46, 49, 60. freedom of attributed to VOfLoS, 3 I,
9.
10
prevented by vOfLoS from fighting at Marathon, 41. praised by Archidamus for adherence to vOfLo" 32. ';>7Tpa used for 'statute', 7. and EvvofLla, 75-82, 82 n. 3, 83,
84 n.
I.
changed by Lycurgus, 77. constitution as mixture of democracy and oligarchy, 117-18. . . Gerousia and assembly decide poltcy, 112. use of Ev8vva in, I 12. law regulating succession to army command, 49 n. 3· law preventing Agis from commanding army unsupervised, 49 n. 3. during Messenian Wars, 81-2. war with Tegea, 76. war with Argos, 35. vOfL'fLa
relations with Persia, 145 with n. I. puts down tyrannies in Greece, 80. relations with Peisistratids, 138-9. prodded by Delphi to liberate Athens, 130, 134, 138. invasion of Attica under Anchimolius, 129,139. liberates Athens from tyranny under Cleomenes, 130, 134, 139, 148, 159· withdraws from Athens 506 B.C., 135· demands Pericles' expulsion, 144 n. 3. tends to support oligarchies during Peloponnesian War, 113. judges between Plataea and Thebes 427 B.C., 23, 114, 116-19. armistice with Athens 423 B.C., 42. Speusippus, accused rrapavofLWV by Leogoras, 2 n. 3. Syracuse, oligarchs in, I 14, I 15. VOfLoS bars young men from office, 49·
Theramenes, alleged author of Anonymus Iamblichi, 92 n. I. Therrikleion, phratry shrine, 4 n. 4, 16. thesmothetai, in Athens, early functions of, 174-5. Thessaly, sends cavalry under Cineas to help Hippias, 129, 139. Brasidas' march through, 424 B.C., 113,115-16. sanctions ovvaaTEla rather than laovOfLla, I 13, I 15. Thirty Tyrants, at Athens, revision of laws by, 5. Thrace, vOfLO' of, 35 n. 3. mercenaries of Peisistratus recruited from, 141. Thucydides, has no explicit reference to written legislation, 49. calls Thebes an oligarchy, 119. public burial at Athens as rrD.TPtOs vOfLos, 36, 175-6. praises government of Five Thousand as fLETpla gUyKpaatS, 103 n. 3, Tarentum, pTJTpa used for 'statute', 7. 106. Taurians, vOfLO' of, 35 n. 3, 43, 48. dvofLla in, go. Tegea, war with Sparta, 76. o.vofLOS in, 88. 8wfLoS used for 'statute', 8, 17. avofLWs in, 89. Teisamenus, decree of, 403/2 B.C., 1 3uvau'Tda in, I 13. n. 2, 3 n. 3, 5. EvvofLEofLa, in, 79-80. Telamon, in Attic skolion, 129. luovop.€Oj.LUt in, 114 n. I. Telesarchus, frustrates Maeandrius' iaovoJ-L{a in, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120. planned laovofLla, 165. laovoJ.Los in, 113, 114, 116-19_ Tetrakomoi, 154. VOfLoS in, 23, 31-2, 33, 34 n. 3, 36, 38, Thasos, uses UOOS as legal term, 168 n. I. 42,49-50,58,60,175-6. revolt from Athens 411 B.C., 176-7. rr;>'~8osin, 115-16. Thebes, constitution of, 118-19. Thyreae, 35. citizenship in, 118-19, 180. tribes, in Athens, increased to ten by characterized by EvvofLla in Pindar, Cleisthenes, 143, 150- I. 71-2. Trichonians, I n. 4. justifies pro-Persian policy in 480/79 Tritogeneia, see Athene. B.C., 32, 113, 115, 116-19. Troad, Peisistratus' interest in, 129. has democratic regime before OenoTycha, sister of Eunomia, 64. phyta, 117 n. 2. tyrannic ides, statue group by Antenor, argument against Plataeans 427 B.C., 132-4, 142, 159, 184-5. 2 23, 3 , 88, 113, 114, I 16-19. by Critius and Nesiotes, 132,184. ruled by o;>"yapxla laovofLos in 427 cult of, 131, 132. B.C., 113, 114, 115, 116-19, 180. See also Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Themis, mother ofEunomia, 63, 64,71. tyranny, as caused by avofLla, 93-4. attended by Dika, 72. opposed to VOfLos, 32, 47. Themistocles, 131-2, 144 n. I. opposed by iaovofLla, 97, 101, 107, Theognis, vOfLOS in, 22, 30, 94. 109-11,113. theokolos, official in Olympia, 14. Spartan opposition to, 80.
tyranny (cont.): in Samos, 107, 165. friendly to Persia in Erythrae, 169 n·3· initially no obstacle to acceptance into Delian League, 169. abolished in Ionia by Mardonius 492 B.C., 109, 110, 167, 179. in Athens, role of the demos under 147~8, 156-7. opposition to, 122, 125-6, 127, 130, 134-5,138,139, 140, 165. liberation from, 511110 B.C., 109, 123,125,13°,131,133,134,135, 139, 146, 150, 151. Draco's law against, revived 5 I 1/10 B.C., 4 with n. 2, 16, 59, 140. Tyrtaeus, 81-2.
voting,
procedure
in fifth century,
2
n·4· written legislation, interest in beginnings of, 60. begins in Athens with Draco, 60. not necessarily implied in (lEap.!", 16-
17· not necessarily implied in fifth century, 43-50.
vOfJoOS
in
to be assumed as background of Sophocles, 17. of Euripides, 48. of Aristophanes, 49. not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides,49· VOfJoOS in first explicit references to, 47, 57,58. as VOfJoOS in Aristophanes, 48-9. VOfJoO, defined as, by Hippias and Pericles, 5 I . praised by Gorgias, 51. implied in VOfJoOS after 403/2 B.C., 57. See also V0fJo0" Xenoerates of Acragas, 24. Xenophanes, EVvofJo{a in, 69-70, 7 I. [Xenophon], Constitution if Athens, date of, 82. attitude to Council and Assembly, 82-4· EVVO/L€O/LUL in, 82-5. EVvoll.la in, 62, 82-5, 95. KaKOVoJL{a in, 82-5, 95. Xenophon of Corinth, 12, 174. Xerxes, 24, 132. Zenodotus, 2 I n. 2. Zeus Eleutherios, 108. Zeus Karios, 140.