The Development of the Komnenian Army, 1081-1180 (History of Warfare)

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HISTORY OF WARFARE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOMNENIAN ARMY 1081-1180

General Editor KELL Y DEVRIES Loyola College

BY

JOHN W. BIRKENMEIER FO/llulill,t; Edi/O/:\'

THERESA VANN PAUL CHEVEDDEN

VOLUME 5

BRILL LEIDEN' BOSTON' KOLN 2002

Illustration Ol! the cover: A pole-framed trebuchet illustrated in the manuscript of the Chronicle of]ohn Skylitzes in Madrid (Bib!. Nac. Cod. 5-3, N2, /01. 15 Iv.).

This book is printed on acid-li-ee paper.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP.Einheitsaufnahme Birkenmeier,John W. : The development orthe Komnenian army / by John Vv. Birkenmeier. - Leiden j Boston j Koln: Brill, 2002 (History of warfare ; Vcl. 5)

ISBN 90-04-11710-5

To JI1y Mother and Father Library of Congress Cataloging.in-PubIication Data Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is also available

ISSN 0928-0731 ISBN 90 04· 11710 5

© Copyright 2002 by KOllillklilke Brill NT~ Leidell, The Netherlands All fights reserved. No j1Ol't !if this publication 1Il1!)' be reproduced, translaled, stored in a retrieval SjJstem, or transmitted in arry jimn or by an)1 meClllj~ electronic, mechGlzical, Ph%co/!ying, recording or o/hen/lise, wit/lOut prior written permissionfi'DIn the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal 01' /JeI:mllal use is granted 0' Brill provided that the apjJl'OJJriatfJ foes are paid direcl0' 10 The Cop),light Clearance Cente1; 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are sulject 10 change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

For their love, encouragement and support Throughout my studies

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CONTENTS

Acktl()wlt~dgclncnts

IX

Xl

List of IVlaps ..............................................................................

xv

rvlaps ..........................................................................................

XVII

(ampler Onl' Textual Sources for l2th- and 13th-Century I-li:;t( H'Y .................................................................................... (:haptcl' Tw() Historical Overview of Eleventh- and 'l'wdlth-Celltury Byzantium ..................................................

27

The Campaigns of Alexios I Komnenos

Chapter Three (lOB 1 III B)

..........................................................................

56

Chapter Four The Campaigns of John II Komnenos ( 11113-13) ................................. , ........................................... .

85

Chapll'r Five The Campaigns of Manue! I Komnenos (1 1·1<-1 HO) ................................................................................

100

Supporting the Komnenian Army ................ ..

139

Chapter Six

Chapter Seven

Komncnian Siege -Warfare

182

Chapler Eight

The Komnenian Army in Battle ..................

206

Conclusiun

................................................................................

231

Appendix

The Sieges oCJohn II and Manuel I ............ ..

237

............................................................

239

Appendix 1 Glossary

• viii

CONTENTS

Appendix 3 Chronology of the Komnenian Historians

243

Bibliography

.. "." ......... "..........................................................

245

..........................................................................................

253

Index

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project has taken many years to come to fruition, and many people deserve thanks for their help. Professor George Dennis, SJ., first directed my attention to the army of the Komnenian period. He has been a patient and accessible advisor, and he has also been as good a friend as he has been a professional mentor. I cannot thank him enough for all of his help. Dumbarton Oaks provided me with a Junior Fellowship for the year 1996-97, which enabled me to complete the basic research for this work. The Byzantine library, and in particular Dr. Ire ne Vaslef and the latc Dr. Virgil Crisafulli, have provided invaluable help with courtesy and professionalism. Dr. Vaslef deserves particular thanks; without her guiding hand the Byzantine library would be a lesser placc. I would also like to thank John Rosser of Boston College's Department of History for introducing me to the Byzantines, and for nurturing my enthusiasm through the travails of early graduate study. My patient and persistent editor, Mr. Charles Dibble of the Amcrican Research Center in Egypt, deserves very special thanks. He has corrected many of my errors, and made many suggestions that have improved this work. Any errors that remain are mine. Dr. Karen Rasmussen of Archeographics deserves thanks for the first-rate maps she has provided for this work. An additional note of appreciation is due to Dr. Ralph Bellamy, Associate Profcssor of Surgery, of the F. Edward Htbert School of Medicine, and to Ms. Colleen Quick, Associate Editor of the U.S. Army's Textbook qf Military Medicine, for their help with Chapter Eight. I would also like to thank my publisher, whose patience in waiting for this book has been exemplaIY· My deepest gratitude is always owed to my parents, whose love and encouragement has followed wherever my studies have led me.

PREFACE

This work grew out of a fascination with the military society of the Komnenian Emperors. It seemed almost miraculous that the Byzantine Empire managed to survive the destruction of its army at Manzikert (1 071) and the military collapse that followed. How did the empire recover so many lost territories, pursue aggressive military policies, and flourish economically? Furthermore, the Komnenian period is rich in historical documents; historians and orators loved to praise or vilify the Komnenian emperors. These sources are engaging, and if exarnined together provide a clear picture of Komnenian military policy, goals, and army structure. Alexios I Komnenos (1 081-1118), John II (1118-1143), and Man uel I (1143--1180) restored the political and military fortunes of the Byzantine state. This included rebuilding the army under Alexios, who simultaneously parried invasions of Normans from the west, Seljuk Turks from the east, and Pecheneg and Cuman raiders from the north. John extended the empire's borders in Asia Minor, laying siege to dozens of cities and attempting to control the crusader states in the Levant. Manuel further extended Byzantine military operations, personally campaigning in Serbia, Hungary, and in Syria. Hc also launched large expeditions under subordinate commanders that attacked Egypt and the Norman Kingdom in Italy. Finally, he twice gathered the formidable Byzantine siege train and attempted to destroy Ikonion, capital of the Byzantines' greatest foe in the east, the Seljuk Turks. The goal of this study is to examine the restoration and use of the IZomnenian army: how, and with what resources the Komnenian emperors restored the Byzantine military position in thc Balkans, Asia 1vlinor, and the Levant. We will examine the army as an institution, considering how Alexios rebuilt it, and how John and Manuel modified it. We will examine the Komnenian campaigns, looking for patterns that might shed light on Byzantine military and political policy. Wc will observe how the army was supported, and how the Byzantine army conducted its most characteristic activity-the siege. It is my hope that these topics and questions will provide a basis {'or further inquiry into the nature of Komnenian society; how the

s

XlI

PREFACE

empire was preserved in an era of increasingly complicated interstate relations. The military system that had provided the empire's defense between the eighth and the late eleventh centuries was destroyed before Alexi08 came to power. Alexios spent twenty years developing a new army, o~e that was composed of .native Byzantine soldiery, albeit always Wlth several mercenary contmgcnts. The native soldiers came from Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, which replaced the empire's As~a M~nor recruiting grounds. By the end of Manuel's reign the ASia M1110r coastlands and western provinces were filled with military colonies, districts, and fortified enclaves; these provided a new defensive system against the empire's Turkish enemies. This structure .w~s not ~s resilient as had been the earlier system of large prov111cIal armIes and defense in depth. However, it was as effective ~s could be managed with the resources available to the Komnenmn emperors. I:Iistorians frequently place great importance upon field battles, whIch occurred when armies lined up their cavalry and charged each ~ther. Despite th~ prominence of such accounts in our sources (and 111 the secondalY hterature), close examination of eleventh and twelfth century texts and oratorical sources provide a different picture. Succe~sful Komnenian warfare was marked by aggressive military camp~lgns culminating in sieges, followed by defensive warfare and ~Iplomac: to preserve gains. Open battles, even important clashes hke Mynokephalon (1176), were not desired. The army existed to protect the siege engines and transport them to their destination. There, they would crush the enemy's walls (as well as the interior civilian, buildings), and enable the imperial soldiers to storm th~ burning and demoralized city. Field battles were avoided because they were uncertain affairs, a fact that both emperors and their chroniclers recognized. ~e~ios, ,10hn, and Manuel each developed military strategies for theIr differmg goals. These goals did not (generally) include the reconquest of central Asia Minor. Alexios and John were more often than ~ot successful in their military operations. Manuel's military operatIOns were not as successful. There were inherent limitations to medieval military operations. Defensive operations (whether between armies, or in defense of cities) usually held a considerable advan~age. This explains why the Komnenian emperors were both unwillmg and unable to reassert control over the lost heartland of Asia

PREFACE

XJll

Minor. It also demonstrates why ostensibly friendly crusading armies were so dangerous to the Byzantine state (and were clearly perceived as such by the Byzantines). Supporting them meant allowing them past all defensive perimeters, fortifications and armies. This was antithetical to the basic strategy of the Komnenian emperors, which was to fight enemies at the frontier, using fortifications and terrain to delay them until disease and fatigue weakened their fighting capabilities. Imperfect hindsight can lead us to see this fear (particularly during the first crusade) as a bit paranoid. However, this attitude, as with other military problems, reflected a realistic and finely tuned Byzantine perception of military threats and strategic necessities.

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.. XVll

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CHAPTER ONE WO)'S)IHdVlI?03H)lIV'MMM

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR l2TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

Domestic division and an increasingly complex external political enviromncnt destroyed the Komnenian Empire in the late twelfth century, but for a period of one hundred years, under the emperors Alexios I, John Il, and Manuel I, the Byzantine state flourished. It regained m.uch of its old military and political preeminence in Balkan and Middle Eastern politics, and engaged in aggressive military policies. These policies resulted in vast territorial gains and increased frontier stability in Asia Minor, and the stabilization of the empire's European frontiers. Furthermore, thc empire's economic prosperity was also the result of these territorial gains. These advantages could not have been achieved without an effective army. The goal of this study is to understand the fighting capability of the Komnenian army, how it was maintained, and how it replenished its manpower. Ideally the military historian seeks sources that provide detailed tactical and strategic information about the army and its campaigns. With one exception Komnenian battle accounts were not written by soldiers but by imperial secretaries, civil officials, and relatives of emperors. There is no Komnenian Strategikon, the seventh-century Byzantine military manual that provides much of our inform,ation for the army of that period. Historians of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries wrote to glorify or criticize emperors, to promote their own interests, or perhaps simply to ask why God permitted so many calamities to befall His people. Nikephoros Bryennios is the only soldier among our sources; his Historia ends in 1079 with the rebellion of Nikephoros Botaneiates. This work lacks the polish and literary quality of other contemporary accounts, but his history describes military events precisely and cogently. I Although Michael Attaleiates was not a soldier, he was a military logothete in Romanos IV's army, and accompanied the army on the iVlanzikert

I

Anna Komnene was married to the general and historian Nikephoros Bryennios,

CHAPTER ONE

TEXTI1.'\J. SI l\ JRCFS F()R I ~,[,l!- ANIl I :frll-CENTlIR \' IlIST()R '\'

campaign, where the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan defeated the Byzanlim·,. Attaleiates' Historia describes Romanos' recruits and gives an accollnt of how they performed during the campaign against the Sdjuks. Michacl Psellos, eounselor to several emperors, was a skilled politician with access to imperial documents and to individuals who participated in the campaigns he describes, but he himself was not al rhe battle of Manzikert, nor at any of the other military events rhat he recounts in his Chronographia. Anna Konmene, daughter of .\lexios I, offers a detailed description of military events during her lilllwr's reign, but her account is limited to Alexios' activities. She ilillfJreS the presence of Alexios' heir, her brother and enemy, the lillun' emperor John II Komnenos. Ioannes Zonaras' Epitome histo/lOll is, a chronicle of world history with little specific detail, although h,t: of/Cl'S a I.nore balanced appraisal of Alexios than does Anna. John KIllIJamos lived during Manue!'s reign and served as the emperor's '('CTt:tal~', accompanying the emperor on his travels. Although Kin1l:1~1l0S f~'equently provides first-hand location descriptions, the reliah,Illty of. his account is skewed by his obsequious praise of the KOllllI('lllan emperors, in particular of l'vIanucl. Niketas Choniates i~.Lj:ilil?17) wrote his histolY in the late twelfth century, after KlIlllalllos .work was finished, He achieved high rank under Isaac If ;\II~f:.lfJS (1185-95), and wrote after the last Komnenian emperor .\wholllkos I, was deposed (1185). Choniatcs completed his histm; altt'1' sack of Consta?tinople in 1204. The major textual sources (.tu b( ."uppl~·mcnte.d WIth a number of epistlographic and rhetoriI .tllthol's. of Thcssalonike occasionally mentions details "f ~~~;ap();ls or milItary tactics, while PseUos' orations and the poems ') Il'O( ore Prodroll1os can be mined for useful fragments Pro droIllOS Irequently refers to events that do not ot! . " .,( IlIrl'(~S \ .. ' tt· I. B , · . 1erwIse appeal 111 . . , \ 11 tn.)} yzan tme chrolllclers. The followin . b . f . III tht' sources IS designed to o f f " . . . g ne survey . I I' '. ' . Cl cl conCIse guIde to the problems dJl( llilSt~s oJ the Byzantine sources for the K . omneman army.

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4

CHAPTER ONE

had they been active in the 1080s, would have been octogenariam in the 1140s. When examining Anna's account we should remember two things: even the last events of Alcxios' reign, the Turkish campaign of 1117, took place twenty-five years earlier than the point at which Anna wrote about them, and that all of her military descriptions arc derived from hearsay. She mentions that imperial documents were available to her, and the precision of her description of the Treaty of Devol appears to support this, but Anna seldom differentiates between incidents drawn from her memOlY, from hearsay, or from documents. Finally, we must remember that Anna Komnene did not witness any of the battles she describes, except [or the arrival ~f the First Crusade and perhaps such skirmishes near Constantmople as cou~d have. been seen from the safety of the city'S walls. Anna selectIvely mmed her husband's chronicle for accounts of ~vents pr~ceding Alexios' accession to the throne, and relied upon court gOSSIp for the first twenty years of her father's reign. This still le,a~es us with a ~cscripti~n of Alexios and the events oC his reign b.ased UPO~l ~nna sown cbm memOlY and third-hand accounts. Pre;-Ise descnptIons of tactics, equipment, and men are particularly ~nportant to a study such as this one, but the limitations imposed y memo~ are compounded by Anna's tendency to glorify her father's actIons to. th: detri~ent of accurate description. The milita~ events of ~b(los. pre-relgn, as corroborated by Nikephoros' his~01')A' arc deSCrIbed WIth precision and detail. They arc marred only y nna's focus on her father to th ' f I . . . e excI USlOn 0 ot ler partICIpants. fI er tendency to mdulge i I b I . " I. , ' . n lyper 0 e lllcreases m dIrect proportion ~o ,le r fjlack of dctalled mformation. A good example of this is AlexlOS de eat at Dy rac h' 1 army f R b rC . lOn, Wlere the Norman cavalry and infantry o 0 ert Ulscard compl t I h i ' cavalry and d. h fi e .e y overw e med the Byzantme , lOVe t em rom the fi Id A escape firo D h' le . nna recounts the emperor's . m yrrac lOn upon a . I 1 . , I ,n mIracu ous capmg horse -I but we are Clt to 6'Uess what ha d' ' AI.' .' c · ppene to AlexlOs' men. In battles where CXIOS IS present as. an actI've par t"ICIpant the Id' mercl), su!)portI'llg h h ,common so Iers arc . c aracters W ose t' . . ac Ions serve to hIghlIght the I Alf.tialie, I, 164. Anna's lcapin '. g hors . tlw dellouements of Alexios' battl. Th e Imagery IS typIcal of her descriptions of " , 'cs, e more poor! !\] . f: ' DIe compensatury glory his daught 11'1 I r y eXlos arcs ll1 combat the ters describing the battle and anoth~~ e to) Ige~1 ~o create. Anna spends two cl1aptwo descnbmg Alexios' "glol'l'o us "11'IgIIt.

III

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

5

emperor's courage and perspicacity; they disappear once Alexios' retreat moves the action away from the battlefield. Alongside the to])OS of the miraculous, Anna also employs the topos oC the emperor's cleverness. The best example of this is Anna's muddled description of the "new formation" supposedly employed by her father on his last Turkish campaign. This account provides no practical information that would distinguish the formation from an ordinary phalanx: what made it new, presumably, was Anna's lack of understanding." The only novelty of the 1117 campaign was that Alcxios' men were well disciplined and followed orders during a difficult retreat. Anna also wrote to cast aspcrsions upon the motivcs and characters o[ Alexios' opponents, and this purpose permeates her account of events, along with more traditional Byzantine prejudices noted by Gyula Moravscik, such as dislike of westerners and a lack of understanding of Islam. h Anna argues that the laws oC history prevented her from interpolating her own opinions and biases into her history, but her truth is often skewed. 7 This habit is particularly in evidence whcn shc ignores her brother, the future emperor John n. John was an adult for the last decade of Alexios' reign (1108-18), but Anna omits any substantive mention of Alexios' successor, who appears occasionally in treatics she transcribes, but who never takes any praiseworthy action. Anna states that John left Alexios' death-bed and hurried to the Imperial Palace to crown himself. Her implication is that he acted prematurely, and committed what amounted to usurpation. This description of Alexios' last hours does little to increase the reader's confidence in Anna's description of Alexios' relationships with his other near-peers. Surely Alexios' system of governing, which came to rely increasingly upon family me,mbel:s to fi~l important positions, would have included the emperor s he.lr. TIns deliberate omission is particularly significant when we conSIder the :. Alexiade, Il, 19B-l99. Anna's description ?f Alexios' new battle fo~'mat~on is th~ must disappointing DC her descriptions. D~spltc her. m~lddled. efforts It neIther tells us how the men were arranged nor why It was eHectlve ag~mst the Turks. Ii Gyula Moravscik, B.yzallfilloturcica 1, Akademie Verlag ~Bcrlm, 19?3), 219. Alexander Kazhclan essentially agrees. Sce his Change in Byzalltme Culture In the Eleventh and '[we/fill C'fIlturil's (Bcrkcley, 1(85), 214, .' . 7' Al " /. 11 173, Anna tries to J'ustiGy her excessIve prmse of her father. It IS n.C,\/{/ct., , ' II b t.' An a's usually impossible tn determine which events she aetm: y saw, u gIven 11. position and gender, ~hl' would not have been an eyewItness to battles.

6

CHAPTER ONE

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR I2TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

time and effort Anna spends demonstrating the importance of other members of the imperial family. Prominent examples of this include her grandmother Anna Dalassene, her mother Irene, and her own husband Nikephoros. Anna oflers little information on the relationship between Alexios and John. The rather meager descriptions of Niketas Choniates and John Kinnamos offer our only other window on a critical imperial succession. s Anna's affection for Alexios is sincere, but we must weigh her praise of her father against her silence with respect to her brother. Anna's glorification of Alexios affects her depiction of military events. Eulogy takes precedence over the accurate depiction of bat9 tles. This reflects a more general Byzantine literary attitude towards the army. An emperor who was victorious while avoiding combat, deserved more praise than one who was victorious in pitched battle, which Byzantines regarded as a matter of luck modified by planlo ning. In this context, it makes sense that Anna was not interested in the equipment, training, and recruitment of Alcxios' men particularly when generals otller than the emperor commanded 'them. Anna Komnene's account provides a wealth of geographical and chronological information, information that Michacl PseIlos for example, usually omits. She tells us where Alexios went with his army and what troops it contained, if not in any great detail, and this enables us to analyze Alcxios' campaign strategies. For example, the ~ove~ent of armies during the Pecheneg and Cuman campaigns is 1l1credibly complex. Anna's very complete account of these wars (fl'om 1087 to 1091) enables us to follow march and counter-march and the raising and disbanding of armies. This is also true of Al~xios' camp~igns again~t Robert Gui.scard and Bohemond, and of the general course of hIS last campaIgn against the Seljuk Turks. Despite

11

Ni~etas Choniates, Nice/ae G'lwlliatae His/ona cd. J. Van Dieten CFI-IB (B' f :)-~' 10-12. (~creafter abbreviated as 'CJlOn'iatcs, Historia')' Choniatesc~:,~~

1975),.

~ems ~~1 a,togctlhcr dlffcrent account of John's succession. He indicates that A1ex~os ,IV,I: very p eased that he had outwitted his wife !rene, and that Iolm had

ascended the throne. Furthermore Choniat .' \'.. h· I. . . . t r I '" es mOcates t at I ene was the II1stlga . or ~ t le Int.tml coup, in which both Anna and her husband N'k' h ' " . c.-

;~~~~~~~~jo~~n:~~~n~~rr~;~rs

little further information other than

A/exiade, I, 164--166. Alcxios' flight ll'om D ' I" lanei/hl descriptions ynac , . ., ,'lIld 1'0" ,'1 good cxamp Ie 0 t'llOW Anlion . •

!I

hlI g.Up"., 'In tIle n " arratlve. III Alexiade, n, 195, 100-101.

,I

t~a~I~I~~~:)s ~~~~

, , onc I .of. Anna . s. most na uses lel Imagm
7

her prejudiccs and omissions, Anna Komnene provides detailed descriptions of many of Alexios' campaigns. John Zonaras was a high imperial official in the court of Alexios I, and as such, his history ofters a counter-point to Anna's biases. II Zonaras' Historical Epitome is a chronicle of world history from the Creation until the end of Alexios' reign, at which time Zonaras probably lost his position as megas dmungarios tes viglas. 12 A member of Constantinople's civil elite, Zonaras is critical of Alexios' policy with relation to the Senate-the leading aristocrats of the capital. For example, he states that Alexios treated the empire like his own house (oiko.l') , granting fiscal exemptions and state properties to his friends and rclatives. I:1 He occasionally comments upon military events. For example, when discussing Nikephoros Phokas, he informs us that the emperor's tax policy forced farmers to be taxed as soldiers, and soldiers to be taxed at the next higher grade of military taxation. This only refers to Nikephoros' reign, and no similar information is provided when he discusses Alexios, whether with respect to tactics and strategy, or with respect to the state's military finances. The J-{yle Histmias of Nikephoros Bryennios, who served both Alexios and J 01111 Komnenos as a military ofEcer, is the third source for the tactics and organization of the Komnenian army. His analysis is that of an experienccd commander who has observed other experienced commanders. His prose is straightforward, and his description of military events is clear and lucid. This is especially evident when he describes Alexios' battles against Bryennios the elder and Basilakios, which occurred while Alexios was Domestic of the West. Nikephoros Bryennios is similar to most Byzantine chroniclers in that he was more interestecl in the motivation and character of commanders rather than in the maneuvers, men, and materieI they employed. But Nikephoros, more than any author of the Komnenian period, includes descriptions of the troop types and recruiting grounds of the Byzantine army and of the tactics used by the opposing forces.I'1 11

ODR, IU.

:n2~.

I~ ODB, 1II, 2229. Thc

drollllgarios was originally a military title, roughly equivalent to the rank of regimental commander. By thc late eleventh century the IIlq;as rir()/l/I(llIrios Its Ilia/a had become a judicial post. 1:< John Zm;:u'as, E/litollloe Hisioriarum, cc\. M. Pinder and Th. Buttner-vVobst, :3 Vols., C:SHB (Bonn, lfHl-97), Ill, 766, I. 11-19.. .., 11 Nikep!to['()s BrYCl111ios, .Nlcejilwre B~yerlllios Hls/oz]'e, BIle Hls/onas, er HE, ~d. P. Gamier (Brussels 1975), 269-71, nl-7B, for the anmes and battle of AiexlOs and Hryl'lll1ios, and 1I :1- 1tl.

8

CHAPTER ONE

Nikephoros also provides much of Anna Komnene's source material for the campaigns of Alexios before he became emperor. It is reasonable to suppose that Nikephoros also providcd much of the anecdotal detail that fills the later chapters of Anna's history. Nikephoros' history ends in 1079, two years before Alexios I came to the throne. His account, which examines thc army of each rebel in the Byzantine civil wars of 1071 to 1079, gives the most coherent account of the size, composition, and capabilities of the army at the time of Alexios' accession. Bryennios describes the early career of Alexios, tracing his service as a general, and subsequently as Domestic of the West under the emperor Nikephoros Botaneiates. ~e.causc .of this high post, Alexios was a witness to (indecd, a partIcIpant m) many of thc battles that Nikephoros Bryennios recounts. But Bryennios' history has value not only for his depiction of Alexios' rather mclimentary tactical ability. It also provides concise descriptions of the armies of Nikephoros Basilakios, Nikephoros Melissenos, Nikephoros Bota~eiates, and finally of Alexios himself during his te.nure as. DomestIc of ~he West. These accounts describe an army stIll recrmted from natIve Rlzomaioi-"Romans," as the Byzantines called themselves until the fall of the Empire, and complement Anna's account of Alexios' army and recruitment capabilities in 10S1. Eleventh-century Byzantium was a multi-ethnic empire, but to the extent that all troops recruited from within the empire's territories were nominally Byzantine, then all of the above-mentioned armies were Byzantines fighting other Byzantines. 15 Mercenaries were used but we h~ve little information from Bryennios about the capabilitie~ of Byzantme forces against foreign foes. Nikephor~s' history straddles only nine years, and includes the last two years of Romanos IV's ill-starred reign, the disastrous reign of Pscl1~s' protege Michael VII, and finally the rebellion and victory ~f ~lkephoros B~taneiates and his first year as emperor. Despite its hmlted chronolOgIcal Scope, Bryennios' history is essential to an under-

All' What constituted "Byzantine" identity has been the subject of much debate ass~x~~d~r ~azhdan po~tlllated the existence of a homo 0zantinllS, whose traits were; m.1 a~lOlnl :nto Byzantme language and culture, and acceptance within the Byzant:' me Hoem uerarchy as ti Th' h' . I " a. na ve. IS Istonca construction is partially the result f o sources p:'eJudlccd against anyone who lacked Greek language and culture It appears senSible to regard as "Byzantinc" those who pa'd th ' who I 'd d ' . I e emperor taxes or . I t )roVl e service to him as a result of grants from imperial lands or the I'm'j)c na reasury. ,_

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TI-I-CENTURY HISTORY

9

standing of the tensions within the empire in 1081. Attaleiates and Psellos provide graphic examples of how impcrial decline had affected the army's upkeep, culminating in the disastrous battle of Manzikert (1071). Blyennios enables us to analyze the army from 1071 to 1081, the decade during which the empire lost Asia Minor. To be sure, Bryennios' prose is less polished than that of other, better-educated Byzantine authors, but his thesis that imperial politics and the events of the civil war were driven by the ambitions of powerful family coalitions is a sophisticated and realistic appraisal of events. lli Constantine Psellos, known today by his monastic name of Michael, was a complicated personality; his motivations in writing his history clearly included self-justification and self-promotion. 17 The value of his Chronograpltia for the purposes of this study lies in its account of military events during the reigns of Romanos IV Diogenes and Michael VII; it is, moreover, the most important account of the empire from the death of Basil II (1025) until the rise of the Komncnoi. Pesllos sketches the chronology of events that destroyed the empire's eastern territorics: The years 1058 to 1068 had witnessed an epidemic of Turkoman raids. III Following the battle of Manzikert, during the war between Romanos and Michael, the empire's eastern frontier was stripped of its last defenders, as each rebellious general or magnate tried to obtain troops for his march on the capital. Michael VII's policy of denying funds to several strategically critical Anatolian military units exacerbated this situation and provoked rebellions from 1071 until 1081, rebellions that ended only when Alexios Komnenos became emperor. Psellos watched imperial power collapse and wrote about it from the perspective of an insider.

\(, Kazhdan, G'lwnge in Byzantine Culture, 106: "The work of Ni.kcj~hoJ'()s. Bry~l1ni()s is probably the most aristocratically biased Byzantine history o[ tlllS penod; It presented the noble warrior in a Illlly gencralized and idealized form. The caesar Bryennios ... was, in all, the idcologue of the Comnenian military aristocnlcy." 17 Michcl Pscllos, G'l17'01lOgrajl/Zie, cd. and tr. E. Renauld (Paris, 1967),. Il, 128-~9 (Bk. 6, 22-28). Ps ell os j usti!1es his criticisms, 0[' the emperor, .Cons tan tme ~X--1~1 spite 0[' the evident favoritism that Constantmc had shown hun-by assertmg hiS high purpose: impartiality. , , III Gcorge Ostrogorsky, Histmy qf the Byzantme Sta:e (Ne;-v B.nmswlck, NJ., .1969); 343. The most notable of these raids were the sackmg n[ Al1I and Cacsarca 111 the years 1065 and 1067 respectively. 0[' all of BY7.antillm's enemies, the Turknmans, Turkish raiders who were outside of Se~juk control, were the greatest threat to Byzantine sovereignty throughout the Komnenian period. The ~eUuk rulers made treaties with emperors, but the TurkOluan tribes ignored the agreements and were a particular threat in the empire's borderlands.

>

10

CHAPTER ONE

I~e recognized that the bureaucratic government slripped the frontlers of manpower in times of crisis, while ignoring his own attendant ~esp~nsibility (as a distinguished member of this bureaucracy) [o~' . cnpplIng the provincial military class at a time when a strong l~l~l:ary was crucial to imperial survival. This lack of personal responS~bIhty for misguided policies in which he was a key adviser is partIcularly evident during the reigns of Constantine X and Michael VII. Psellos claims to have profouncUy influenced both emperors, whose reigns-militarily-were failures. 19 During the reig1I of Michael VII, Turkish raiders poured across the fi'ontier while the rebellions of Nikephoros Melissenos and Nikephoros Bot~neiatcs were a conse.quence of the emperor's incompetence. These rebellions, combined wIth the denuding of the frontiers to defend the capital, destroyed any pretense of imperial control in Asia Minor. 20 PscUos, however, refuses to acknowledge his role in these difficulties, despite his claim to h~vc been the primary influence upon these emperors. MIchael PseUos misunderstood the struggle for power between the cen.tral government and local centers of authority, interpreting all SOCIal struggles as evidence of the importance of the emperor, rather than as evidence of other social difficulties. Central authority assumed two forms. Onc was the control of taxation and the disbursement of the collected monies and produce. The other was control of the central bureaucratic apparatus, including control of the throne. A bureaucracy concentrated in the capital ruled Byzantium during the e~eventh century, which kept resources out of the hands of pr~vin­ ctal me~1. of power (dynatoi). Constantinople's control of the empire's productIOn surplus prompted the provincial leadership to seek to control the bureaucratic apparatus. Between 1071 and 1081 six Anatoli~n provincial leaders rebelled, each of whom attempted to make hImself emperor. Psellos' analysis demonstrates a smprisingly rudimentary understanding of this struggle: to Michael, the emperor se~med so clearly the focus of power that it was impossible to conceIve of permanent alternative centers. This point of view was natural for Byzantine chroniclers, most of whom resided in Constantinople, the seat of the emperor's power and the one region the emperor

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

could almost always absolutely control. Constantinople, "the City" to RllOmaioi everywhere, received constant reminders of imperial glory in the form of festivals, donations of monasteries, and military parades, not to mention more mundane but immediatc1y practical works such as charitable foundations, aqueducts, cisterns, and defensive fortifications. vVhen a usurper seized the throne, the chronicler inevitably saw this as a manifestation of the importance of the imperial position rather than evidence or forces opposed to it. Despite his urbane sophistication, Michacl Psellos is in this respect no different from other Byzanline chroniclers. While recognizing that thc army and the provincial elites were crucial to the empire's survival, he focuses on the character and personality oC each emperor to the exclusion of their deeds. To be f~lir to Michael, there is more to this than mere scandal mongering.~l Michael VII chose counsellors such as Michacl Psellos and the eunuch Nikcphoritzcs, and apparently enjoyed the delights of philosophy more than any satisfaction he might have obtained from solving (or !lying to solve) the empire's pressing problems. During his reign, Byzantine influence in the Balkans collapsed as a result of internal rebellions and the attacks of the Hungarians and Pechcnegs. In the cast, Turkish raids grew in force anclll-equency. All the same, only an emperor could request military aid frorn a western ruler. Michael appealed to Pope Gregory VII for aid against the Turks, an appeal that laid the groundwork for the Crusades. The personality of the emperor was critical to the strength 0[' the state, but whether PseUos understood how important the provinces were to the cmperor and the empire is open to question. Alexander Kazhdan considers Psellos' C1Zl'01wgrajJ/iia to represent it break with an idealizing tradition in Byzantine chronicle: Psellos' characters, in contrast to those of earlier chroniclers, are believable and ftlUy formed human beings.~~ It may be that his interest in human character and its clfect upon political activity came at the

Psc\los, 11, 12H<21). Kazhc1an, (;/w//ge ill Ib',ulllti//{! Cllltlll)', 211-~ 13. This contention is debatah!t> Certainly Psel10s was a pl'I'ceptivl' analyst of BY"
22

• HI PseUDs, !I, 149, 176-77. PseUos claims to have personally prevented ConstantIne from gmng to war, and asserts that Michac1 VII trusted him more than his own brothers. . 2(} PseUDs, Il, 182-85. Alexiade, I, II ~-38.

11

12

CHAPTER ONE

expense of a more modern notion of the effects of economic and social forces. For example, Romanos IV's army in 1071 was dangerously unprepared for a major campaigll.~:l According to Michacl Attaleiates, the levics drawn from Asia Minor had rusty weapons, little equipment, and almost no training. H PseUos however, attributes the disaster at Manzikert to faults in Romanos' personality, despite all of the evidence that he musters in support of a contrary (and more plausible) argument. 25 The example of Michael IV, who despite a wasting disease successfully campaigned against the Bulgarians, is a notable exception. 2li It is tempting to see Michael's fascination with the character of Byzantine rulcrs as rhetorical excess. In an imperial monarchy there was an understandable tendency to look for a connection between the emperor's health (and particularly his mental health) and the vitality of the state. Hcalth was considered a reflection of the divine will, or at least a mirror of the ruler's character. Michael's aristocratic prejudices and personal tics to several emperors led him to assume that the fate of the empire lay exclusively under the control of the emperor himself. Whether we agree with him or not, Michael Psellos identified personal virtue~ "greatness"-with the office of emperor. Revolts were an indication of the importance of the imperial position~part of an automatic process in which great men were drawn to the throne. PseUos' attitude towards the military reflects the prejudices and priorities of the professional bureaucrat. His summary descriptions of battles bespeak a lack of personal military experiencc, and they also reflect PseUos' belief that leading an army into battle was a science, governed by rules and traditions as rigid as those of rhetoric or medicine. War, like other disciplines, was a fit subject for theoretical speculation. As with all things in Michael's cosmos, onc would

23

Pseilos,

n,

159-62 .

. 2~ Michael Attale~at7s, Histaria, ed. 1. Bekker (Bonn, 1953), 103. Attalciates pnlv~des the best descnptlOn of the puor training and condition of the Byzantine soldiers. The men lac~ed weapons, had little training, and had been so long neglccted

that they were soldiers in name only. " .2:. Pscllos" I~, 1~~-59. Michael,. the epi.tome of the courtier, objects strenuously to R~manos mabllLty to take adVIce. ~11lS was the character Haw that, according: to 2;;rlchael, caused Rom~nos to lead Ius army to disaster. Psellos, I, ?8-79. ~ftc~ael's .endurance on campaign while wracked with dis?ase .calls to mmd. Alex!O~ l~st ;llness. The accounts of these campaigns, led Iw l11vahd. emperors, IS one lllchcatlOn of how important military valnr was to t h~· Byzantmes from the eleventh century onwards.

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR I2TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

meet with success if a venture were begun with well-ordered pIaIlS.·'; PseUos contrasts the haphazard way in which Romanos IV prepan:cl for war with the "proper" method of waging war, ascribing the dccision to divide the Byzantine forces before the battle of Manzikert to the emperor's ignorance of military science.~1I Romanos, h()\\"CHT, was campaigning in the barren highlands of southcrn Armenia, where a large army needed to disperse in ordcr to find supplies; Psdlos seems to have ignored or put no credence in the cxigcncics of campaigning. Doubtless in the atmosphere of thc Doubs court during the 1170s, any criticism of Romanos was welcome, hut Romanos' decision was a sound one, since hc had to provision his army. Byzantine scouts failed to discern that the emperor faced the full Seliuk army, rather than the local contingents that the emperor expected. Romanos might have won the battle evcn under these circumstances, but the treachery of Andronikos Doukas, who withdrew his units at the critical moment, ensured defeat. Michael confuses military expertise with the administration of a branch of the imperial bureaucracy: a general's responsibility was essentially administrative-organizatioIl and planning. In practice, however, pcrsonal participation and luck often played as great a role as dispassionate calculation.~~l While complaining that Romanos lacked knowledge of military science Psellos himself demonstrates only the most rudimentary f~lmil­ iarity ~ith the art of tactics. Bardas Skleros, a Byzantine general, fought as a mercenary for the Arabs in 979. In recounting the events of a battle fought by Skleros' cavalry, Psellos says that th~ ~yzan­ tine cavalry charged its opponent from the two flanks; no mformation about equipment or their opponent's tactics is provided. 'o When Michael VI fOlJght the usurper Isaac Komnenos in 1057, Psellos was onc of Michael's courtiers and should as a consequcnce have been familiar with the events of the battle, but his account of the battlel~ne refers only to flanks and a center without an~ details. p?el~()S' description of this battle rcsembles Michael Atta1cIates' descnptlOl1

27

Psellos,

"

n, 161- 6 2.

PseUos subsequently berates Rmnanos

]" . I' . tDentic Ul

IIS.HI

lea2~ership.

•

II 158 161-62. (Bk. 7,20). Michacl believed that gt:neral should Iw ..Psello s, ? , . where he could conduct the battle with a cuul head. b~~~~~:t~n~~~,II~~'t~~~s c~~~i~d utherwise, but Mic:hael appears unaware of this. Scc Psellos, I1, 158. 1~) Psellos Il, 161-63. . ~ I :11) P~ellos: r, 7~"9. Psellos does not specify the enemy Skleros (lug It.

15

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

1+

CHAPTER ONE

of...the r actlOns l' , " tl11S case , .events at NI anZl'k· ert. rle of a smgle man, m I :i,tac e dVIctOry ' I' . ' K.olllnenos , ,nsure lor t1le rebels, Pscllos claims that t Ile ImperIal troop s eau Id not d'IS I0 d ge Isaac because they physically pressed hiIn ham botl1 SI'dcs, b ut th\' . .lmage . IS IS mere Iy a rhctoncal A. nl1a KOlnnene fa un d'It suffi' .. ~ clentIy conVIncmg that she used the account for her d " f AI . , . ~ . .1, .. . ,escnptlOll 0 eXlOS herOlcs durmg the first batt 1c. of DyrrachlOll·. lI C'lVen IlIS . assumptIOn . t1lat 11lstonca ' . I events were c nven by the actions of powerful individuals, it is characteristic of Pscllos . ttn 'b u t e VIctOry . . character of Isaac, fightmg ' .. . '.to ,a. to the herOlc dS an IndIVIdual, rather than to his ability as a commander. . 1 anaIYSIS ' an cl pro, PseUos ' . offers Ollly tl1C mos t rueI'unentary tactlca vIdes httle other military 1l110rmatIOn , I' • h Id I I I , t at wou le p t 1e I' 1lstonan understand the army. When he does offer detail as he does in his account of the battle 0 f 1\lv~anZI , r ' kert, we are lortunate C'" . .. " m 1lavlng ~ttalcl~tes account as corroboration.:l2 PseUos provides valuable informatIon for understanding the rivalries that led to the decline of B-:zantine l~ili~ary power. He is a less useful source for showing how ploblems wlthm the army contributed to the decline of the middle Byzantine state, , The seven books of John Kinnamos' History encompass the period flOm I 1 18 to 1 1 76> spanning the reign of John 11 Komnenos and that of Manuel I until his defeat at the battle of Myriokephalon (1176). We know little about Kinnamos' life and career, although Charles Brand has argued that several of Kinnamos' remarks inclicate he was a soldier.33 Kinnamos claims to have been an eyewit~less at ~he ,battle of Zeugminon in 1165, and his geographical 111[o1'matlO11. IS often precise and detailed, especially so in his de scrip-

II, 90-91', / IteXIOf. . Ie, I , I 63• -64· (4, 7). c fhese accounts arc sufficiently .' :ll' ,PseJloR . ',. sll!lll~l that w~ can assume that Anna had read PseUos, and that she consciously Psellos account. Attaleiates, 159-63, Andronikos Doukas was commander of' the Byzantinc l:cRerve. :'Vhen he I~arned that Romanos was under attack by the Seljuks and was Cl~t off fl ~m the mam b,?dy t1~e army, he took his troops and fled tile Eeld. iVIoHt of the
lUUTlICS :11

.of

tion of the Hungarian frontier.:H Although the precision of his account suggests a back~round in the military, Kin~1amos could just as plausibly have been a civil official accompanpng the empero,r. In~eed, elements of the history suggest that this may be the more hkely Identification. Kinnamos, for example, remarks at one point that he frequently discussed Aristotle with Manucl,3~ a bantering that might have been more likely a topic of diSCUSSIOn between the emperor and an imperial secretary than with militmy personnel. We know with certainty, however, only that John served as a mid-level.bureau.crat, a career t.hat ex~ended from the middle of. Manuel's l~~ilgn unul some indetenmnate tlme after the battle of Mynokephalon. He had close contact with Manucl, but he never indicates that this led to an important position. Like Niketas Choniates, Kin~a~o~ had .no direct contact with Manuel's father, John Il, and hIS mformatlOn . about john's reign is second-hand. Kinnamos' prose is simple, often consisting of deelarat~ve sentences, without rhetorical nourish. This is particularly true of 111S account of the reign of John n. In many instances, the account ,resemb.les a monastic chronicle--a list of elates and events, only occaslOnally mterrupted by excursions into the underlying reasons behi.nd events. The orations Kinnamos creates for his emperors and theIr grandees arc routine, varying little in content or constructionY The chron~logy of John's history is also imprecise. He describes ev.cnt~ .assocIated with a particular person out of sequence, when the ~ndlVIdual h~p­ pens to first appear in the narrative. (a common trait of ~y~antll1:~1 chroniclers who loved to show off thelT knowledge of court ll1tngue). This skew~d chronology, although disconcerting to readers unfal~il­ iar with the events, does not usually disrupt Kinnamos' narratIVC.

:H

Brand, 3.

:I', John Kinnamos, ]oannis Cimwmi, 290-91. Naturally John would. want

l~}ilomi,

eel A. Mell1ck~~ (Bo:1Il, 11336), 17~'-71," a clo~c re\atlOnS~lJP .bct~vecl:. I:~n:s~~l . '

to imply

and the emperor. Kinnamos nught have been a soldier ,:t some pomt 111 Ius C,UCCl, but there is no fimnal evidence to support that contentIOn. . . . :lh Kinnamos, 206-· 7. Kinnamm claims he will dis,:uss Mynokephalun later 111 IllS account but his history abruptly in book seven, before the battle. . :17 K·'. used1 by I· Klllnamos II1n,lmos,. 26-·2C). , 17'3-74 . ' The lirst is ,John's death .speech, ", 1'1 to justify Manuel's claim to t1;c tl.lI:one over the :~h:l.m o~ Ius brotl:1:. saa~. .1,e second speech is a similarly llnlllspJrlng and unrc .

,

>'

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

16

17

CHAPTER ONE

john's accuracy suffers, however, in his account of Manucl's deeds and decisions. Whenever Manuel appears, Kinnamos falls prey to a prolific obsequiousness. At one point, John states that he personally s~w Man~el drive off entire units of foes.:l9 This hyperbole is partIcularly tIresome since John's bare-bones account of military events frequently needs supporting information. Nevertheless, exaggerated deeds. of imp:rial prowess were what his audience expected, and John IS profiCIent at providing such descriptions. Kinnamos shared the typical Byzantine aversion toward the Latins.'1O He calls the Venetians corrupt and vulgar and maintains that the Second Crusade was an excuse on the part of thc French and the Germans to seize the empire. With the exception of marriage, Latins al:d Byzan~ines seem to have had no morc common ground than dId Byzantmes and Turks. Nlarriage was used as a means of secur~ng alliances, but thesc alliances seldom provided opportunities for 1l1creased cultural understanding between east and west. Kinnamos' belief that the Second Crusade, although it reached Asia Minor, posed a grave threat to Byzantium is consistent with Anna Komnene's suspicions. Unlike Anna, moreover, Kinnamos does not credit Latins with ~u~erior military prowess. John believed that Byzantine cultural supe~lOnt~ .was equally manifested in tactical and strategic supremacy, and m mIhtary valor. . Kinnamos, like Psellos before him, believed that history was created by the decisions of great men. For both chroniclers armies automatically obtain the character of their leaders. Manuel'~ armies always perform well, while the armies of the hapless Stephen IV of Hung~ry, reflecting his weak and unstable charactcr, melt away.+1 John mvokes fortune as an explanation for why evil happens to good

traditional punishn:cnts for. t;eason, execution or mutilation, to those tied to them br bloo;:!. Androntkos exlnblts constant dereliction of duty' his intri 01 le with the hunganans• W as we1l k nown. H'IS al1aJrs "". were scandalous ' ' comments as b were his about Manucl's liaison with his first cousin ' . . 3fl Kinnamos, 191-94. . ·10 Kinnamos " 280 67-68 . TI' .. lIS passage, . m whIch Klllnamos mentions being surrounded by the enemy, is the only evidence that he may have been a soldier Kinnamo~ a~~o says t~at wh~n he w~s in. th~ palace he had many times heard ~f the empclOr s prowess. Certamly.the lmphcatlOn here is that he usually did not aCCOI11pal~y tl~e emperor on campaIgn. Kmnamos, 217. rvIanuel warned Stephen IV not to return to Hun a since hbc chl~arly lackled popular support thcre. Stephen was finally betrayed anlm~~dereci y IS counse aI's. .

01.1kas for example met defeat in Italy after a long luen. John D ' , . , string of victories, but even here Kinna~uos ar~'ues that It was Doukas pride and inexperience that caused lum to hght unde: un~avorabl~ conditions. 42 Fortune also appears as a vague threat 111 Kinnamos staged speeches. l:l This appears to imply a st~ong element of [a:a1. but fatalism and fortune are used by Kinnamos as rhetOrIcal Ism, . dl tools rather than to account for how the U11lverse operates, an t le terms rarely appear outside of formal (n?~ to ~ay ~tilted) s~eecl~es. There is likewise little theological determll1lsm 111 Kinnamos notIOn of history; rather it is the individual who determines events-and the emperor outshines all other individuals. The Byzantine army in Kinnamos' works ser:es as a pretext, to highlight Manuel's glory. Like Anna Konmenc, .Kinnamo.s Ol;ly ralely treats the mechanics of military events, but mstead hIghlIghts the emperor's personal role. Occasional detailed inforn: atiOl: on tl~e l~um­ bers and equipment of various soldiers serve~ pnmarlly to mdlcate disparities in the armies'fighting force, but given the sh~er number of campaigns Kinnamos describes, these accounts prOVIde a good source for estimating the composition and size of Nlanucl's army. John also offers con~iderable detail about Byzantine ~ampaigns at~d maneuvers during the Hungarian wars. He recounts, 111 some detaIl, the rise and fall of Stephen IV, the Hungarians' repeated abro~a­ tion of treaties, and of both sides' weapons and tactics. John'S descnp-, tions demonstrate a deeper knowledge of events in the west than 01 Manuel's eastern campaigns. . ' Kinnamos' foremost goal is to glorify Manuel, but hIS encom.ta of the emperor sometimes furnish valuable bits of military realm: a description of Manucl':i helmet with its mail face guard; the lanc~, sword and mace armament of Byzantine heavy cavalry; and Manucl s "inno~ation" of a long, Norman-style shield, with the lance used. as a primary weapon, in place of the "old" Byzantine style of fight111g

---~.--

.1'2 17" . 151 16 c) 168- G9 Much of Kinmunos' account of Italy is second· , .,. . " 1 I1 ' T " ",Illnalnos, hand and speculative. He states that the cmJ~er~r. Manuel was pro)a 1 y ,mgry when he heard of the defeat of Doukas at BrIllCiIsI. . . .. Il Kinnarnos, 230. Byzantine authors had dillicu~ty dctcnnIl1I~1g th: .p.l.~c,c (~~'~~~ in their literary cosmos. Fate, borrowed by ~y7.antIDc au.thors iron; ~~<~~~IC or. ~t \~ a weaker l;lI'ce.~thc capricious extension oi an ]l1chvldual s ablhty to m,lkc mis-

takes and undermine his own plans.

TEXTUAL SOORCES FOR I2TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

18

19

CHAPTER ONE

with bow ' , . anc1 roun d sl' 11dd, 44 Although Kinnamos' claim of innovatIOns In cqui pment and ' must be treated with caution his tactICS account accord S WI'd1 Cllomates " " ,111 one particular' In b J descnptlOns at \r~~~~unts the emperor appears brave to the point of rcckiessness, ' .1'lo..J.nnam , < os ' fiocus on M anuel, moreover has the effect of concentratlng the d'ISCllSSIon , on N,runuel ,s mIlItary .. 'operations' the pretext may well be' , f1details . a tt ery" b ut t1le substance throws light on' interesting I' 1 .of 1111htary tactrcs and techniques, and it allows John to highIgNlt'klllS personal knowledge of the Byzantine frontier with Hungary '£1 T7' , h1 etas Choniates . wro teater .1' 1o..111namOS and he becran his carecr' 111 t e B ' CIVIl '" serVIce at the very end, b yzantmc of Manuel's reign,
the failure of Byzantium by showing why God withdrew his favor from the RhomaioiY Choniates' love of Constantinople and its inhabitants make the calamitous events that he describes all the more poignant. Choniates' chronicle of the Komnenian golden age and of the empire's subsequent collapse encompasses the eighty-six years from the beginning of John Il's reign (1118) until the disaster of 1204, when the Fourth Crusade ransacked Constantinople and destroyed the empire, He organized his history in books, each of which corresponds to the reign of an emperor, and wrote the earlier sections after 1183, The final books, which examine the period from 1183 to 1204, werc written later, after the Latins had taken the city, According to Gyula .Nloravscik, Niketas also used other sources, among them, Eustathios of Thessalonike for the Norman wars, church documents and synodal decisions, and Kinnamos' chronicle,'HI Niketas' account of John n's years is as fragmentary as Kinnamos', Both were born aftcr John had died, Choniates' account of Manuel's reign is more detailed and complete than his description of John n's, although he did not begin his own imperial service until soon before Manucl's death in 1180,49 It is possible to take exception to Choniates' criticism of Manuel. Choniates' lack of personal experience 'with the emperor might seem to downplay the chronicler's account. However, unlike Kinnamos, who exemplifies the sycophancy associated with the Byzantine system of imperial patronage, Choniates is a realist, and his portrait of Manuel is believably human,5o Choniates places blame for the collapse of Byzantium in the late twelfth century on the Komnenian emperors, By implication this places responsibility for Byzantium's weaknesses squarely on Manuel.',1 It is not thc purpose of this study to cxamine the political and diplomatic effects of Manuel's policies, but an examination of the emperor's military policy inevitably draws conclusions that reflect upon his ability to

J

!6 Choniates, Historia 57-58 81 120 Cl . show popular sentimen; inr or' agaimt the l~mates, freque~ltly ,in,serts incidents that John Poutze for his ni 'lrdlincss A I e perm and hiS minIOnS, He lampoons 'so niggardly that he ~~pped ;" ,ltklOugh <11 wealthy imperial confidante, John was " . 0 plC up a lOrseshoe he saw I' · 1 ,od J' ~h e road, Chonmtcs says that some children had h,. . d' ,'I I ymg at t le SI e 0 mg that he would not pass u the 0 ortuni e,tte l,t Icc - 1O~ as ~ prank, knowto Kosmas the Deacon was per~ecuted PIP ~'1 ty I ob1taln anythll1g free of charge, , . , 1y lY. anue anc curs d tl ' s.aym l e d' empress S I wOlnb, ' g t.hat she would not bear a 'son , TIle st reet ' yend orseba t lelr workbenches to make 11.m of KT' A' I. h ' " nge Iron too s upon I 1.1 Is .Ill, t c Selluk sultan, !

{) Paul Magdalino, 'flze Em/lire (!f Alonuel 1 KOlllllfIlO,\' (Cambridge, 199:3), 14·, {B Moravscik, 445-46, '9 H, Magoulias, 0 Ci!y (if Byzantium: Annals qf Niketa.r CilOniate.r (Detroit, 1984·), xii, Magoulias dtcs Michacl Chonintes' letter to Pontus early ill Manue]'s reign as evidence that this marked his entry into imperial service, 511 Choniates, Historia, 53-54·, fiO, 95-'9fi, Chonilltcs describes Manud's afikirs, his arguments with Anclronikos and his reluctance to kill his cousin, and I'vlanucl's inter-

est in astrology. "I Magoulias, xxiv, Magoulias summarizes tbe calamities that befell Choniates after the collapse Ilf tbe empire in 1204.

•

20

CHAPTER ONE

govern. In this regard it is difficult not to agree with Choniates that Manuel's implementation of policy was deeply flawed. Whatever onc's opinion of Manuel, Niketas Choniates provides a useful cOllnterpoint to Kinnamos, as Zonaras does for Anna Komnene, and he also provides us with an account of Manual's defeat at Myriokephalon, which Kinnamos' account sadly lacks. Unlike John Kinnamos, Niketas Choniates reached the Byzantinc bureaucrat's pinnacle of success, serving as logothete of the sekreta (a high judicial official) under Isaac II Angelos. 52 Choniates' chronicle attests to his advanced education, as well as to his attitudes and prejudices. In contrast, Kinnamos remained securely and constantly among the ranks of the middling bureaucrats. Both maintaincd the same Byzantine prejudices against westerners and anyone less well educated, but Kinnamos lacks Choniates' polish and rhetorical nourish. This rhetorical style is not necessarily a virtue, and Choniatcs' rhetorical descriptions can muddle the facts or events that he is recounting.5~ Choniates was contemptuous both of the masses and of court dandies. Particularly obnoxious to him were the attcmpts or the courtiers to seduce the widowed and lonely empress Maria or Antioch following Manuel's death in 1180. 5'1 Of all the chronicles of the middle Byzantine pcriod, Choniates' elitism finds its closest parallel in Michael PseUos' Chronogmj)/zia. Both define "nobility" as the measure of a person's valuc, but each possesses a different notion of what constitutes nobility. PseUos belicved that nobility of the mind was the highest form of nobility, a COIlcept that finds its logical extension in the figure of the philosopheremperor. In emphasizing intellectual prowess (at the expcnse or wisdom and sound governance), and with due allowance {ClI' the chronicler's politically motivated obsequiousness, Pscllos finds much to praise in the juvenile character and disastrous reign of Michad VII. Choniates' notion of nobility includes education, but other qual5j

Magoulias, xiv.

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

21

ltles are equally significant. Above all, individual merit is a function of noble birth. According to Alexander Kazhdan, this reflects a shift in values among the Byzantinc elite, and is not solely characteristic of Choniates' literary work. 55 choniates also sees nobility in the mil· itmy arts, an identification repeatedly demonstrated in his descrip. tions of Manuel's courage in battle. In order to demonstrate how this represented a shift in the Byzantine zeitgeist, consider the fol· lowing: Anna Komnene believed that Alexios' personal prowess demonstrated God's grace toward her father, and expressed her observations in the language of Homeric hyperbole. Kinnamos valued military events as evidence of the general superiority of the RflOrnaioi, and of Manucl in particular. Choniates' more expansive conccption of nobility included military prowess, physical perfection, education, and birth."1i While this is a more balanced view of per· sonal worth than that followed by other Byzantine chroniclers, it still exhibits a bias toward ability over moral character. Andronikos Komne nos, Manuel's cousin, seduced the wife of the Icing of Jerusalem (provoking an inter-state incident), rebelled against the emperor, (enlisting a substantial band of barbarian Cumans by force of his personality), and failed in the military undertakings with which Manuel entrusted him. Yet, Choniatcs inevitably praises him for his cleverness, physical demeanor, and wit. Andronikos' nobility inheres in his personality and physical demeanor: Choniates' dislike of Andronikos's moral corruption and self-serving narcissism is overshadowed by his grudging respect for Andronikos' charisma, and his abilities as a courtier and intriguer. Choniates believed that histOlY should bring to life the virtuous dead and parade their dceds as an example to the livingY He reiterates Plutarch's view that histOlY exists for the betterment of the reader, by introducing him to men worthy of praise while damning lhe deeds of evil men.')1I Niketas, like most Byzantine chroniclers, disclaims any attempt at rhetorical flourish: he is record~ng (or. so he claims) the simple truth. For all that) his language )s poetIC and

,,3 .C!1oniatcs, His/ona, 146. For example, Choniatcs comments as filllows, .dieT

clcs~nhmg how Mantlel an'csted and tonsure cl the jl1lJ/O.Iira/or Alexios Axouch: "\'Vhct\lL'r .J\1~tlc~ was wrath with the emperor over this unjust action, I shall not recollnt at tlus lIme. It bchoovecl Manuel, who was worldly wise and not at all an ignorant a~cl unlet,tere~ man, not to waste ~is labor s,eeking out him whose naml: began with alpha as, thc OI;e to ,succeed him and brmg an end to his rule, but tn leave the char?c nf the rel~s of government to him who says he is the alpha and lIlIIl!f1{/, as lOhn lI1~tructs ~e I,n the Apocalypse," Translation by Magoulias, 8:'\' " .; Chomates, fIts/ona, 223-225.

5. Kazhclan, C/zall,t;e in B.Yl:.rmtine Culture, 112-13, 2~4-30, Th~ chronicles, in prais • ing individual bravery and noble birth, attest to thiS cha~ge I~ valu~s" '5/; Choniatcs, His/m'ia, 114·-1.5, \03-08 Compar~ Cho.mate: descnpt\o~1 o~ John, Kameratos, the gluttonous, corclax-dancing courtler, with hiS characterization of Andnmikos Knmnenos, dashing, capable--and completely amoral. ',7 Chnnialcs, His/oria, I, ',/I Choniates, His/oria, 2.

.,2£

22

CHAPTER ONE

rhetorically complex; he even sometimes surpasses Psellos in his ability to create obscure and grammatically difficult passages. 59 Nonetheless, Choniates provides highly detailed accounts of battle-plans, including personnel and equipment, and he delves at some length into the political and military motives of the commanders. PseUDs describes the motives of his main characters, but prefers to focus on b.road tl~emes such as ~scal pro~ig~?, moral degeneracy in the imperIal famIly, and the fOIbles of mdiVldual emperors. Choniates is not only interested in the emperors, but also in the activities of their family men:bers and close associates. He describes the collapse of the Byzantme fleet and the subsequent growth of piracy during . fiO He aIso recounts the adventures of Andronikos Manue1,s reIgn. Komnenos, which covered a territory stretching from Cappadocia to ~unga:y, and t~le po~itic~l in~rig~e that resulted in the blinding of StyppelOtes, an ImperIal tavonte.) Psellos mentions the existence of intrigue; Choniates describes their intimate minutiae. Furthermore Chon.ia~es' visceral ~islik: of the Latins does not prevent him fro~ e.xamm:n~ the growmg bes and tensions between Latins and Byzantmes Wlthm the empire; his account of Manuel's seizure of Venet~an property in 1171 is ilie most often cited example in the secondary 62 hteratu;'C. Nevertheless, despite the loss of everything he owned to the ~atm con~ueror~ of Constantinople in 1204, Choniates genuinely ad:11lred cert~ll1 LatIn lords. This admiration was not compartmentahze~:-that IS, reserved for discrete elements of their character (such ~s llIta:: prowess);, Ann~ K~mnene was similarly capable of this lImited, se.gm.e~ted admiratIOn. In Choniates' histOlY, foreigners appear as mdlVlduals, not as caricatures. 53 The author's nuanced treatment of his subject may be one reason that Choniates' history appeals to the modern reader.

:n

:,'1 Choniales, HistOlia 143 Tl is . ' r CllOmates . lions an ullerlv c f' .' " 1 lfS one 0 most characteristic de scrip" I on usmg account 0 nothing 'dixit b t' fi 11 1 I M . BY7..ll ntillOturcica I 4.67 call Cl . " ~, ' cau 1 u y p 1rasec . oravsClk, Cl! Ch' '. s 1011lates prose pompous and bombastic" lJtuatcs Hzstoria "4 55 Cl . . llnappl'oachal;i~ financi;/ m~~is' , 10nlates reports that John of Poutze, ManueI's the provisioning of a fleet and ~~I, .~o~~ the tmoney collected from the islands fat' in piracy. ' ' , elver e It to t le treasury. The result was an increase lil Ch~niates, His/aria, 103-8, 129-32, 138 42 f, II 1~:-I? fll~ the fall of Styppeilltes. -or Andronikos' adventures, and - Chol1lates, HislO1ia 171-74 "I K ,. , a;~hdan, Change in Byzantine Culture, 184,

11

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TI-I-CENTURY HISTORY

23

Nikctas Choniates seems to have had a more sophisticated understanding of military operations and upkeep than did Anna Komnene or John Kinnamos. First, he recognizes the necessity of careful planning in military operations. lil Most Byzantine authors write as if battle were matter of luck or fate, treating militmy planning as drawingroom conversation. Psellos complains of Romanos IV's lack of "militalY science" as if the practice of the military art were a purely academic discipline like the rules of rhetoric. Kinnamos and Anna glorify the military prowess of individual emperors, while generally ignoring key elements of military strategy such as proper planning and securing of military materiel. Choniates' measured explanation of John's failure at the Battle of Kinte, in Pontos (1139),li'> and his description of Manuel's defeat and personal breakdown at Myriokephalon demonstrate that he understood the practical side of combat: the necessity of careful planning, the effects of proper leadership, lili and the value of training, discipline, and equipn1.ent. Choniates' nonpartisan approach to analysis of imperial actions gives the reader greater confidence in the accuracy of his description of militmy events. Kinnamos briefly mentions Myriokephalon, saying that Manuel's valor forestalled disaster. li7 By contrast, when Choniates describes the battle, he provides specific information about the emperor's lack of leadership and his psychological instability. He describes Manuel's foolish decision to march through the mountainous defiles of lvlyriokephalon without properly determining whether the pass had been cleared of Turkish soldiers, an error of judgment that caused the destruction of the strongest army Manuel ever assembled. Indeed, no Byzantine army until the end of thc empire in 1453 would ever

,;+ Choniates, His/aria, 110 ·-1 I, Manue! disbands his troops at Antioch and they are attacked on the road homc. For Manuel's attack on Serbia (and an indictment of his lack of' planning), sce Choniates, llistmia, 92. I;; Choniatcs, His/oria, 34·-35. In this campaign the pack animals and war horses died of malnourishment, and.John was forced to give infantry stanclards to his cavalrv to pretend he had more mounted soldiers. ';,; Choniatcs, Hislaria, 180 -81. Manue! failed at Myriokephalon, where the 1';1OI'C maneuverable Turks ambushed his troops in narrow defiles. Here, as at Manz1kcrt a hundrecl years earlier, the Byzantine defeat was due to command l~lilurc and a lack of proper scouting. Choniatcs (p. 187) describes iVIa:lllel's lo~s of nerve at the battle, proposing to flee with his ofTlcers and leave the loot solchcrs to be slaugh-

tercel. ,;) Kinnamos, 207. This weak and disingenuous passage is Kinnamos's only commental), on the battle; his account breaks ofT as Manucl is gathering troops [ill' his campaign.

24

TEXTUAL SOURCES FOR 12TH- AND 13TH-CENTURY HISTORY

CHAPTER ONE

approach the size and strength of the one lost at Myriokephalon. Whether describing the misuse of naval funds or the loss of an initial advantage in the Italian wars, Niketas' account of Nlanud's reign contains a balanced array of useful military infonnation. liII Choniates lived through a series of events that led to the empire's destruction in 1204, for which he placed general blame on the Komnenoi, and in particular on Manuel. His bitterness is understandable: Choniates suffered many personal hardships as the result of policies enacted by Manuel and Andronikos Komnenos. This brings us to a central difference (succinctly characterized by Alexander Kazhdan) between Choniates and previous Byzantine chroniclers: PseUos wrote with the belief that the empire of the Rlwmaioi would emerge victorious and renewed. Choniates with the benefit or hincl. ' SIght, wrote a history in which he was convinced Byzantium was doomed. According to Kazhdan, Choniates introduced a "tragic I'calism"tB . 1 '·' IGY . ' 0 y~ant1~e 1lstonograp 1y. But does Choniates' tragic reallsm or fatahsm 111 fact mean that the empire was unable to stand up to its enemies, or that it was weaker in 1180 than in 1100? This study maintains that the Byzantine Empire was stronger in 1180 than it had been in 1118, when Alexios I Komnenos died. The empire was also an economic powerhouse' as strong or stronger tl1'ln . L 1t had been since the ninth century. Why, then, did the empire collapse. so suddenl~ and completely in 1204? Manuel's alliances depended on tIes of marnage and personal agreements with individual rulers. The army M~nuel had at h.is disposal was the same army fielded by John .Il, 1118 father, .recrUlted from the same, vulnerable regions ~nd eontmued to contam large numbers of mercenaries. The Byzantme army of the 1170s was about as strong as it had been in the earl~ twelfth century; Byzantium's enemies were far more formida~Ie 111 1180 t.han they had been in 11 18. Robert Guiscard, the great nval of AlexlOs I, was nearly the empire's equal in military p~wer. When the Ge.rman emp:ror Frederick I Barbarossa marched through the Ba~kan,s 111 1189 111S mere presence upset in a moment all of BYZ~~1tlU~ s. e~rcfully constructed alliances. Despite this apparent fragIhty, It IS lmp~rtant to remember that the military and social weaknesses, so cVldent to the modern reader, were relative. The L

<.-

@

f>9

Choniates, Historia, 180. Kazhdan, Change in Byzantine Culture, 229.

25

empire's political and military situation was far more complex in the late twelfth century than it had been even fifty years before. To a "Roman," the empire still had the resources to dominate the stt'ategic heartland between Islam and the West. However, the Latin West had become better organized and more powerful, as Byzantium would soon find out. Alexios inherited an army that had been starved of funds by bureaucratic administrations of the mid-eleventh century and further damaged by civil wars during the reigns of Michael VII and Nikephoros Botaneiates. The process of military reconstruction was critical to the empire's ability to survive its external enemies, as was Alexios' reliance upon his relatives to maintain his position amid the disasters of the first half of his reign. Political and militmy reconstruction were intimately linked. The marginalization of the imperial bureaucracy was mirrored by a "de-professionalization" of the army: during earlier periods, soldiers were recruited and paid relatively regularly by the state, whether in gold or in land, and there was a consistent rank structure. In other words, professional troops were tied to the state by a structure that disbursed pay and determined advancement. This highly organized system is less evident in the Komnenian sources than it is in the sources from earlier periods of Byzantine history. " . Alexios' military goal was to create an army capable of fightll1g Normans, Pechencgs, and Turks, each of which possessed different military tactics and strategic goals. Politically, ~exios attempted to rule independent of the imperial bureaucracy, Sll1ce he had ample cxperience with its ability to starve the eleventh-century arm~. Al~x­ ios' army became increasingly irregular and merc~nalY. ~~ hIS reIgn progresscd. Allied levies, paid foreigners, and Byzanun~ mllitla. replaced the themata (provincial units) and the tagmata (gua~d umts). Th~s change was initially beneficial. Byzantium fought defenSIVe wars dur~ng .Al~x­ ios' reign, and the army relied upon irregular warfare and skirmlshl~lg for many of its campaigns. Irregular forces were ~dvant.agcous tor this type of warfare. Mercenaries supplemented WIth leVIes ,eventually-with time, training, and experience proved capable of defeat~ ing Alexios' enemies in battle. Anna Kom~ene descnbes the~e :ve~ts and transformations in some detail; combmed, the accounts ~f Ps:I. . dA Komnene prOVIde lmlos Attahates Zonaras, Bryenmos, an nna , '. .' . fh 1 - B antine army changed tonans WIth a coherent plcture 0 ow t 1e yz ' and developed between 1071 and 1118.

26

CHAPTER ONE

By the. time of John Il's accession in 1118, the Byzantine Empire had surVIved forty years of constant warfare. John continued his father's campaigns, extending Byzantine control along the southern Anatolian coastline. Most of his policies were directed at securing Antioch ,
1:

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ELEVENTH- AND TWELFTH -CENTURY BYZANTIUM

The empire that Alcxios Komnenos wrested from Nikephoros Botanciates in 1081 bore little resemblance to the state bequeathed by Basil II to his brother Constantine fifty-six years earlier. In the west, the empire's northern frontier along the Danube River was unstable, and the Pechcnegs raided Bulgaria and Macedonia with impunity. With the growing power of the Arpad kings, the Serbian frontier was also insecure. The only remaining Byzantine outpost in Italy was lost in 1071. In the 10405 the Byzantine general George Maniakes conquered eastern Sicily and with proper logistical support might have seized the entire island. Mismanagement and neglect of Sicily and southern Italy, however, resulted in the expulsion of the Byzantines from these territories a mere thirty years later. In the east, a decade of civil war disrupted the reigns of Michael VII and Nikephoros Botaneiates (1071-81). During these reigns, emperors and usurpers alike began to employ substantial numbers of Turkish mercenaries. Nikephoros Mclissenos made use of Turkish troops in his unsuccessfi.ll bid ror the throne; when his rebellion railed, these mercenaries occupied the cities they had been sent to garrison, and ruled them. Imperial authority in Asia Minor was also threatened by the proximity of territory occupied by the Turks to the Aegean Sea. This made land-based communication with beleaguered eastern outposts nearly impossible. The extent of thl: empire's disorganization can be gauged by Botaneiates' inability to recruit more than a few hundred men in Asia Minor during his own rebellion. The men he was able to gather were probably the personal retainers or his adherents rather than soldiers who left their farms to join his cause. A few posts along the Black Sea, Herakleia, Sinope, and parts or Paphlagonia remained under nominal imperial control. Cilicia, held by Armenian autarchs, maintained a precarious independence. The Gabras family established itself in Trebizond, and the Pontos Mountains protected the empire's territories along the Black Sea littoral.

U"~ .... ~

28

CHAPTER TWO

Asia Minor and the Turkish Conquest At the beginning of his reign, Alexios' empire consisted of the Aegean and Pontic coastal regions. Inland territory followed the course of the great Balkan river valleys of the Strymon and Vardar. The Danube River was a largely theoretical frontier until the decisive defeat of the Pechcnegs in 1092. The natural boundaries that had protected the empire in Asia Minor--the Taurus Mountains, the Cappadocian passes, and the highlands of western Armenia--were controlled by bands of Turks or by rebellious Armenian officers who had defected from the imperial army. The densely populated and fertile river-valleys and coastal plains of western Asia Minor, as well as the Maiander River valley, were under Turkish control, ruled by dynasts such as Tzachas, the overlord of Smyrna. I The Turks also controlled the central plateau of Anatolia, where the imperial horse and sheep herds had once grazed. The Seljuk state controlled ten'itory roughly coterminous with the central Asia Minor plateau. The Seljuk capital, Nicaea, stood just off the plateau to the west; Ikonion, the other great Rum Seljuk city, was situated at the southeastern border of central Anatolia. The Danishmendids another Turkish tribe, occupied the mountainous and strategic u~lands of the fO.rmer .provinces of Anatolikon and Armeniakon. The complicatedlmpenal system of defense, based upon themes (military provinces) c()mmaJ?~e~ by strategoi (generals), kleisourai (passes) commanded by droullgan.ol (heut~nants)., and kastra (forts) for local defense had disappeared III the dislocatIOns associated with the Turkish invasion. This system had defended imperial territory from the seventh through the late eleventh centllry' . . no eVl'dence 10r C" ' " . , the'le IS Its contmuatlOn 111 sources from Al " . R b 11' . exIOs reIgn. e e lOus commanders stripped the . frontIers of men , and the meageI' 1.esourees tIlat remall1ed were used for local defense and we' th ' 1 bI 2' I e us unavm a e to the central government. l'or example, the city of Trebizond, situated on the far east-

(V~I'~lJ{)la rt:lT.lIlCjl?:I: /~~exiadf, e~1.

Be:nard Leib, 3 vols. (Paris, 1937-76) II 110 (ISCllSSlOn of 1 urks III general see AI . d I ( , .' Zonaras, Ejlllmllae !lislorimUlI! cd M P' I d'TI B fxm e , 131 (III.9.3), John (I~ClIl1l, IIHHJ7), VD\. 1II, 7:16.17_73/~ce~ an 1: uttner-Wobst, 3 vols., CSHB bl!jJire. 102.j 1~)(}4' '1 Polill·c'll H' I (L' (X VIII.22), and M. Angolcl, TIle Byzantzne '" ••• ~ • '. < IS o~y on don, 19tH), 110. . for. de counts of how the civil wars of th. d , . ',. afleet('d Im~erial control nf Asia Minor sce th e ec: aclc p.rc~edll1g AlcXIOS r.cIgn (recounted In Michael Attaleiates fl·.,'· I e re be lhc)J1s of NIlccphoros Botanelates ., l.\ 017a, ec. l . Be kker (Bonn, 1953), 238-43) and • .

.1

• •

• • (H ,I

s

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND I2TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

29

ern frontier of the empire, was briefly overrun by Turkish tribesmen (1071) and was unable to provide money or manpower to the imperial government in Constantinople. Within several years local Byzantine forces under the Gabras family seized the city and rc-organized the southern frontier along the Pontic Mountains, but Trebizond still failed to provide resources for the central government.:J The Norman adventurer Roussel of Bailleul successfully defended another Anatolian province, Kastamonou in the old theme of Paphlagonia, but Nikephoros Botaneiates, the emperor, considered this independent activity to be a threat to the government in Constantinople, and had Roussel captured and blinded by Turkish mercenaries. Onc must ask why Botaneiates worried about a rebellious Norman servant defending a remote block of territory near the Black Sea, when the Turks had overrun most of Asia Minor. Michael Angold finds a cause for this behavior in Roussel's establishment of an independent authority and his proclamation of caesar John Doukas as emperor. These concerns may have been prominent in Constantinople since John Doubs had been the imperial general sen.t against Roussetf Anna Komnene suggests that Tzaehas, the Turkish ruler of Smyrna, Robert Guiscard, and most of the crusader leaders also aspired to the imperial throne. It should therefore come as no .surprise, that emperors ignored larger ?~oblems bec~use of these mm~r rebellions; emperors had to be senSItIve to orgamzed threats to theIr imperial position. Angolcl's argument that the imperial aspiratio~~ of certain adventurers prompted a response is a reasonable SUppOSItIOn. A more likely rcason for Botaneiates' desire to eliminate Ro~sse~ was that Rousscl's rebellion was a smaller problem than the Turkish mvasion; this was a problem the emperor was capable of handling. This required the help of the emperor's Turkis~ .allies, but successful resolution of any problem of this type was pohtleally useful to a usurperemperor who was having difficulty holding onto the throne. Byzantines soon saw the Turks in the same way th~y h.ad se:n the Slavs of the seventh ccntury." The Slavs had occupied Impcnal of Ni~eph~:s Melissenos (on which see Alexiade, ,I, 90 (H.9.1); Zonaras Iil , ::l~; For the rebellion of Rousscl, see Attaleiates, 183-93, Alexzade, I, 10 (I.i-:-2.) on~l~as HI 709-12 Botanciates and Melisscnos placed Turkish mcrcenanes 111 t~~ C\tIes th<~t they obtained, while Roussel gathered imperial soldiers of western ongm. :1 Angold, 96. ·f Angolcl, 93-95. I I b I' I ·hm·lditcs J 11 210-12 , (X.5.) Turks arc sometimes cal cc af ),mans, or s , .. , J leXllllle" :,

{'

L.

30

Cl-IAPTER TWO

telTitory and made communication difficult, but the empire eventually successfully absorbed them. The Turks were also occasional! willing to serve the empire for pay. This maintained the illusion th~ the emperor controlled the territories, populated by Greeks, which they loose!y occl~~ied. In hindsight it seems foolish that emperors and rebelh~us Imhta;y leaders of the eleventh centmy placed cities and strategJc places 111 the hands of foreign mercenaries. G We must remember that the Turks entered Asia Minor both as raiders and as mercenaries in the civil wars that followed Romanos IV's defeat ~t Manzi~ert. Why would .we expect the Byzantine government, with SIX centunes of success aSSImilating foreign peoples, be any more dismayed by the prospect of assimilating some loose Turkish bands than they had been by the incursions of Slavs, Bulgarians, Armenians, or Serbs? Why would there be more danger in employing eastern Turks than the western Tur~s, Pechenegs, who continued to prove both controllable and effectIve as mercenaries?

Europe The eastern te.rritories were outside of imperial control. As a con-

s~:uene:, AlexlOs w~s forced to rely upon the European portion of empIre for recrUIts and tax revenues. Until lO 14 th . t ' f '" e 111 enor 0 t le empire s. European territories had been controlled by an independent Bulgana unde T S lB' , .r sal' amue. ulgana appears only once in Anna Komnene s list of places that supplied men to the imperial ~rt~~. B~l~aria during t~e Komnenian period, bounded on the south y e almos Mountams and on the west by the Strym Ri does t . on vcr, at d' Jn~ appear 111 any discussion of Byzantine manpower. Alexios O I b n fought battles there, and the Pechenegs used the regi.on as a ase for their ra'ds b t . 1d I " u our source accounts of battles do not me II e mention of Bulgarian troops. Vlachs, who supplied men for IllS

-I

f~ut the Latins consistently are depicted. , " T' tllle chroniclers descril)c h tl ,IS al rogant, greedy and unreasonable. Byzan'. a.1 comfJete 1\ t ' \"h'l the Lat'01 .1 races • cl ,- d _- I a war. .v let Ile Turks can be treacherous allies ill other ways. S~c also:' J~h'n al e. escnl~c as ~)Oll~. lrca~her~us and contemptible (Bon n, IB:J6), 201; (1V.24), 59.l~r~)a~~~16 ~oamlls Gmllaml, Ejntomi, eel A. Mcineke, Attalciates, 105. Nikctas Ch~I' ' .' pt 7, (I,Ll ~,) Zonaras, IL, 635-6; (XV1I,25.) CI::HB (Berlin, 1975). 1i6-22, 1:~t;s:75.1retae ClIomalae His/mia, cd. J. Van Dieten, Angold, 96-'97.

a

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND I2TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

31

Alexios' army at Mt. Lebounion, came from the Haimos Mountains, the Manicheans lived near Philippopolis and even the Pechenegs, following their suppression, were settled in the Vardar valley, north of Thessalonike. 7 Hellas is also a militmy dead zone in our literary sources. Ghoniates mentions that the islands normally provided tbe money for naval expenses, but this does not refer to mainland Greece, and these expenditures were naval, not army expenditures. 1I The most impor~ tant example of military activity in Greece under the KomnenOl appesrs in Choniates' and Kinnamos' descriptions of tbe ~orm.an attacks on Corinth and Thebes while Manucl was preoccuplcd With the passage of the Second Crusade through imperial territory. We know that Manuel garrisoned Greece and fortified the most important cities, but we have no evidence that this region providcd men for any Komnenian field army. Despite Choniatcs' insistence that the garrison of Corinth was sufficient for its dcfense, and that ~he citadel was well fortified, Manuel does not seem to have taken further measures for thc protcction of Greece after the Norman sack of Corinth and Thcbes. 9 Southcrn Greece was not an imperial priority. The four remaining European provinces-Thrace, l\Ilacedonia, Thessaly, and Thessalonike provided the Komnenian army with most of its native manpower. The Komnenian emperors also spent most of their time defending these rcgions. Alexios' campaigns across the Haimos Mountains should be interpreted as attempts to forestall Pecheneg penetration of this economic and military heartland. Alter

7 For details on the geography or the weslern half' or the empir;, sec 7irlmla 1lllj;erii By.:rllltini; Bd. (): Thl'akien, Peter SO~lslal (Vienna, ~ 99 ~); ,a~ld, !-IB., BC,I:. ~: HeIlas and Thessalia, Herbcl'l Hunger (Vienna, 1976.) ha' mioll11
and urban activity in Asia Minor and the rest of the empire sec, A.H.MJone~, nle Cities qf tlIe Eas/em Roman Provinces (Oxfi)rd, 1971.) . !l Choniates, I-lis/oria, 55. John or Poutze diverted flll1ds provided by the Islands (which were used to support the Aegean naval squad~'olJs) to the centr~1 treasury, According to Choniates the central govcrnm.cl1t then .dlvc.rled tl:ese m~l1!cs to other, uses, the Heels decayed and this caused an II1creasc !11 piracy. rherc IS no echo of this in Kinnamos. . . . !) Choniatcs, Hisloria, 74-76, 11. 59-7ft Choniates says that wl1llc the CJledal of Acrocorinth was nearly impregnable, the garrison, leel by Nikepl~oros ,C:ha~ouphes, was unwarlikc and allowed it to he captured because they remamed Inactive during the Norman attack. Kinnamos also examines this incident. Kil1l~a.m()s, 9~; (1II.2.) As with mosl iniclI'Ination that reflects poorly upon Manud's decJSJons, KmnalJlos does not report, as Nikctas Ch(~niatl's does, ~h,~t t~lc incompetence of the loeal commander anel his men resullt,cl JI1 the loss of (.ol1nlh.

D

32

CHAPTER TWO

years of raid and counter-raid, Alexios mustered the full Byzantine army only when the Pechenegs invaded Thrace and blocked the communication route between Thessalonike and Constantinople. III In 1122, John II fought the Pechenegs, "destroying" them a second time. Alexios' Norman wars were attempts to keep the Normans out of ~his ~~artl~nd by restricting them to the western plain of Epiros until polItICal factors forced them to return to Italy. John and Manuel's western policies did not extend imperial tcrritory, but crcated buffer start:s around ~he European troop- and revenue-producing provinces. I he .strat:gIc center of the Komnenian Empire became the narrow strIP of the Aegean littoral, interrupted by occasional river valleys tha~ extended imperial territory into the interior. This took the ph~ce Of. the tenth- and early-eleventh century recruiting grounds of ASia. Mmor. However, the thematic militmy structure of the eastern provmces, was not replaced by like structures in the west. The theme system of. recruitment, with its local military units organized under a •droungarlOS or strateaos was never as 11CllIly deve,1 ope d'111 t1le western • . " plOVllices as 111 t~e east." Furthermore, Balkan geography provided the wes.tern provll1ces with little defense against invasion. During s.(.lll~e ~\,lI1.ters the ,Da.nube river froze, and in this condition it pro'.Jell cl d hIghway for mvaders. 12 Justinian had tried to build fortificatJon n~~tlworks and patrol fleets to hold back the trans-Danubian tribes t)ut WIt lOut success. The . M . . . ", '. I. . emperor aunce, author of the strategzkon Ios t IlIS t lronc wlllle campai' I f ' . 11' ' . gnmg nort 1 o· the Danube ' in an attell1pt to f'Ol'esta 1 .' TI C ' ..t\,.. ·f". IlIVaSJOn. 1~ arpathtan Mountains also funneled tribes (\av Jom t le Hunganan I' d rron~ier. The g .th' f p am, an toward the empire's Danube ro\\ 0 a powerful Hun a' k' d . eleventh and t ·.1£1 h ' g nan mg om dUl"lUg the we t centUrIes onlY exacerbate d thIS . tendency. South '" cl/exilldl', II, 139 -44 T , • Ill!!!... (\III.5.1-9.) fhls was the battle of Lebounion in Aj)ril 'I ~r ' . • lchael F. Hendy, S/urili:s ill the B . , Imdg;(·. 1'11·'(12 ?)Il?antzne Ij\Ionetary EconOlllll (C',lm. 19115)' , . . . . Hen cl y has prod I ."" c. 300-14r::n .)V. physH'al t'('onomy of the Byzant' . E .uc:c t 1e be~t aVailable discussion of" the gl'Il),(I'aphy, and ils clll'ct upon t:~e • mplre, he descnbes the climate and physical 11,· also ('x:tmint's how Ihes(' 1>ll.t(C. CC(n)~omy of both the Balkans and Asia Minor ,. I· I . I 1 ' ,. lIS a ected the d' '1' . . , ;~ "all( 1 It.' n'-establishment of B zan . I~tn )utlon of magnates, imperial .. Alt'\IIIr/;, 11, III "2; (VI.l4), lB~~l1e pow~r III the coastlands of Asia Minor. (I("'('d hy U!\'adt:rs. But Scc also II' 92' ' }XIVY) The Danube River was easily \ eut Il,lmIt of the Danube K' .' ,(\ II,6) for use of the imperial fleet to I) _ "IlIP''!'lIl' I I.' . mndmos. 7, 113-14 201-02 c re , . alJ( t.H C.umans crossiu the D ' . ' lor the Pechenegs, the (kllIlI.Il1S an' saJ(1 to have crossed ~I . I anube. Ch ol1lates, HistOlia 93- 94 The , 1I1~ tll Ih<'ir ho!'s,'s ." le stros (Danube) with ease f)y'ty' . 'fl I . ..• II1g III atce

u/

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

33

of the Danube, the Haimos Mountains provided an unreliable barrier; did not succeed at keeping out Pecheneg and Cuman raiders. vVest of Thrace was Macedonia, divided into the provinces of Thessalonike and the Sttymon. Macedonia's valleys run north south and provided useful routes for northern invaders. The only secure bordcr was to the west, where large and difficult mountains blocked access and provided defensible passes. In 1083 Bohemond sent Norman armies north and south of these mountains but was unable to cross them against Byzantine resistance. His main army marched south and east, and wintered in the Thessalian plain before moving north into the Thessalonike region. This was the same strategy pursued by Lucius Aemilius Paullus against Perseus of Macedonia in 168 B.C. I:1 In 1106 Alexios I garrisoned several kcy points--Dyrrachion, Avlona, Canina, Petroula, and the passes of Arbanus--and used the geography or Epiros to restrict the Norman army to the Epirot littoral. 11 The strategic use of geography was essential to the success or the Komnenian emperors' defensive campaigns.

TIle Loss if Asia Minor A full discussion of the economy of Asia Minor, and of the complex political and economic changes in this region bctween 1025 and 1071 would require et substantial independent study. Speros Vryonis, MichacI Hcndy, and Mark Whittow have thoroughly examined the reasons this region became vulnerable to Turkish attack.I" Nevertheless, thc Byzantine loss of Asia Minor, the largest and most important portion or the empire, does require some explanation. This 11 Livy, Hi.rtoire ROl1laine, VCl!. 32 (books 43--44), ed. P. Jal (Paris, 1976), 4·0-4·2, contains a good description of the military geograp~y. of Thessaly and the routes north into Macedonia . ..Jlexiade, JI, 22-2+; (V.5.1-3). Ihe Nonnans attacked northward, taking Skuplje, and occupying Ochri.d. Faili~1g to take the citedal of Ochrid, he turned north and attacked other places m SerbIa. He then turned south to Kastoria and besieged Larissa, in Thessaly, for six months. 11 Alf.l:illile, Ill. 104 5 (XIII.5.1-:~.) . ' . 1-, John Haldoll, "'l'he Army and the Economy: The AllocatIon at~cl Red~stnbu­ tion of Surplus 'Vealth in the Byzantine Stat~," }vier/ltmanean H1S!0I:lcal Revzew 72~ (1992), HH' 53. Sec Mark Whitlow, TIle Makl1l,l!, (If Orthodox Linantlllm, 600-10.2:J (London, ISJ9!i), 1B1- 9G, I{)r tht' size of the army to the end of the tenth century. Sce Hencly lOB :1!i, If)!' a cliscussion of the monctary economy. Jean-Claude Cheynet, PlJ1l11oir'et Con/e.l/ati(J//.1 ({ B),Z!IIICf (1)(;3--1210) (Paris, 1990), 326-·28. )ean-Claudc Cheynet, "Les ellectili; clans -I'armt~e Byzantine" in Cahier.r de CivilisatlOll Medrevale, 38: 4·,

&-

34

CHAPTER TWO

will provide a basis for understanding the constraints that CIrcumscribed the military decisions of Alexios and his successors. One theory is that conflicts between aristocratic factions in the capital, and the provincial landed gentry, left the Byzantine army of the late eleventh century without men and matericl. This line of argument contends that landowners of the provinces increased their power by buying up the holdings of smaller farmers. 16 According to this thesis, the droughts and famines of the late tenth century forced small landowners to sell their holdings. Reduced production, in combination with level or rising taxation, rendered these small economic units vulnerable, because they lacked the power to resist imperial taxation. However, the important question is not when "soldier farmers" lost their patrimonies and became dependent upon large land owners, but whether soldier farmers were the most significant method of financing the army.17 Did the soldier-farmer of Byzantium ever exist in the form propose~ by Ostro.gor~ky?1fl In The Byzantine Revival, Warren Treadgold provIdes finanCIal lllformation on soldiers' pay and allotments fi'om the eighth and ninth centuries, and assumes that the soldiers were soldier-farmers, albeit paid by the central treasury.19 Others argue tha~ a variety o~ methods of financing soldiers existed, but reject the notIOn tl:at soldIer-famers would be capable of the levels of training and eqU1p~ent necessary for effective campaigning. 211 But the army ~f The~pllllos at Amorion, which was composed largely of Anatohan leVlcs, demonstrates all the inefficiencies that historians believe

O~tob~e-Decem?r~ (1995), 319-35. Spero~ Vryonis,.Jr., 77le Decline qfMetiieval HellenlJlIl In ASia i\lJlIlm and the Process qf Islalllz<.atlOll .fi'om the Eleventh through the Fij/eenth Century (Berkeley, 1971), 103-14. If; ',J~hittow! Orth~dox BYZantium, 113-27; Kazhdan, C'lwnge ill Byzantine Culture 56-62' V rYOl1lS, Declme, 26, 76-78. ' , 17 Ostrog?rsl,;y, 272-76. The Byzantine "soldier farmer" was supposed to have b cen a soldier who supported hl'm If 'tl k' . IS own WOI' as a farmer or With . se Cl ler hy h'· the support and aid of other families in his village. There has been much debate about these men were exc I ' I 11' I I f I whether " '. u~IVe ~ .so e lers, ane a so about the legal status o I~ le I,mds they held to support thell' ITIlhtary duties. Ostrogorsky, 272-76. Ostrogorsky discusses the struggle between the central g?v~.rnm?nt ~.nd the '~owerful' landowners to control the I~nds of peasants and soldl~~IS. It IS Ius contentIOn that the central government eventually lost this struggle , Warren Treadgolc1, 77le By,zll1!tine Revi;;lll: 780-842 (Stanlorcl 1988)' 349-51 . ~() John Halclon, "Military Service, Military Lands and the Status ~f' Soldie;s' Current Problems and Interpretations" DOP 4-7 (199'3) 24· 6"-66' J I IeI II " 77ze St t i t } 1i'b , .' , ,J , 0111 .,a con, a e anG le 1'1 utary J 10de qf Productio1l (London-New York, 1993), 129-35, 198.

.-

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IIT1-I- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

35

would make local soldiery ineHectivc. The thematic soldiers were often undisciplined and easily frightened. They eventually deserted the emperor and his elite guardsmen. Their lack of discipline, l:owever, did not mean they were without military value. The thematlc system that the Byzantines used to recruit and support their army was not constructed to produce the best soldiers possible, but rather to make it possible for the state to produce soldiers as cheaply as possible. We should also be careful judging thematic levies by their performance in large battles where lines of cavalry charged each other. The skills and styles of fighting necessary to prevent raids differed {i'om the organized discipline of open battle. The levies were used to the irregular warfare of skirmishing and raiding as practiced on the frontie~s. Neither the widespread depopulation of Asia Minor, nor the transfer oC large sections of land from smallholdings to grazing land is necessary to explain the decline in the quali.ty and usefulness of Asia Minor thematic levies. By 1071 these leVIes had not been used in thirty years. Their poor state of preparedness during Romanos IV's levy was just as possibly due to the central government's neglect oC its lists of available soldiers, as to active attacks upon soldiers' livelihoods. Old soldiers died. If the gover~1l11el1t did not continue to register new soldiers, it should not surpnse us that a generation later any soldiers who responded to Romanos' sumons were poorly equipped and trained. Our sources--Michael Psellos, Michael Attaleiates, Anna Komnene and Nikephoros Bryennios--all describe social dislocation in Asia Minor, but social dislocation alone does not imply that army units completely disappear. 2 I The elevent~l­ century evidence demonstrates that neglect alone was enough to rum Basil Il's anny. The argument that soldiers disappeared because they lost their holdings to large landowners assumes that thesc sm~l11holdings provided the bulk of the imperial soldiery. This assumptlOn is now being re-examined. ~1 The moti~es of the Seljuk Turks also bear re-examination. 'Why did the Byzantine frontier defenses stop Arab armies that penetrated to the sea DC Marmora, hut could not stop the Seljuks, whose attacks were less systematic? The answer to this is in the fact that the Scliuks were not equivalent to the Arabs in military equipment, tactics, and

21

22

Attaleiates, 103, 11. 1(i 19. \'Vhiunw, Orthodox 1~J'Zllllti/{lII, 116, I B1-93.

:u:.

36

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

CHAPTER TWO

purpose. First, the the Seljuk Turks were just as sophisticated militarily as had been the Arab armies that confronted emperors Ii'om Herakleios to Nikephoros Phokas. Between the 9708 and I 07l, when the Seljuks dominated the Persian and Arab imperial heartlands, they conquered dozens of large cities, from Isfahan to Tehran, Tabriz, Samarkand and not least, Baghdad. One need only examine the policies and administration of Nizam Al-Mulk and of sultans such as Alp-Arslan and Malik Shah for evidence that the Seljuks understood how to govern the cities and agricultural regions of Persia and Mesopotamia. No city they encountered in Asia Minor was comparable to the rich Islamic centers they already ruled. The sultans correctly considered Asia Minor to be an unimportant backwater. The Armenian highlands, which dominated communication routes north to AzerbaUan .and ~ast to Te!lran and Isfahan, were far more important. That ASIa Mmor was Important to the Byzantine Empire did not mean that the Seljuks of Mesopotamia and Iran also valued it. On. the other hand, historians have correctly recognized that the SelJuk sultans had little control over the raiders who initially penetrated the i~perial fi'ontiers in the 1060s, and equally loose control over the raIders and mercenaries who entered the peninsula aner tl:e battle of Manzikert in 1071. 2:l The Seljuk sultans of Baghdad dId not want to control this region. They wanted the unruly Turkomans to move .west and live anywhere but in the rich agricultural lands that proVIded the tax base for their empire?' Turkoman settlers posed bl l' h B . . pro ems lOr t e yzantll1e government because "1 e, orgamzed . . . they dId not fIorm a smg army, and they were

outsIde the contr~l of the Seljuk leadership in Mesopotamia. A vig'orous defense agamst the'd ' se rar ers was precIuded by the destruction •R f .. wars of the folo . omanos IV .s army at M'k anZI ert, an d tIle CIVIl Iowmg ten years The emp'r d· d fl 'bl I e nee e a eX! e and aggressive dcfcnse agamst raIders who brou ht th··· . fI. fig en own means of lIvelihood in the orm o. sleep, goat, and horse herds. Unlike Arab armies Turkoman tnbesmen were looking for pasture1ands outside of tl~eir own L

"

L

•

• •

Claude Cahen, "La Campagne de Man'k ' . . D . tZI ert d apres leR sources mURulmanes " , , Cl. ryoms eclme 148-,55 V .. ' " Illan allacks and the Sult'ln's In' ' ~f' . ryolIIs conSIders thc furko11 O· 1 ,. ' ancuvers as I they we' . . f . 11 t le Sclluks Sl'{" C'lalld C' I ' r : an overall I)lan . e ,a Icn 11/1" b ( Ie 0part '0 . . ., .. ,,' 19H); Claude Cahen !n or:.' .' wry<.allllla et l'lens Clmstianlls (London 'rJ •. ,. , . . 1wf/we pre-otfomane (Ista b I 1988) . , 1 !le .~ebllk i'e,elrnte:..t Stlllfy o{Ul!il Adll' . t t' 10' nu, , Carla L. Klallsner ." mlls ra 1011, 55-1194 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973.) .

111

l'

l!yzalltiOIl 9 (19:14) fl212" V·

37

government's control. They were happy to winter or settle in areas of Anatolia considered inhospitable by the Byzantines. These upland grazing regions were located in the strategic center and center-west of the peninsula. The Byzantine military roads and supply points (aplekta) were located in this region. Pastoral cultures also possessed a military advantage over pre-gunpowder, agricultural settlers. Their economic base-sheep, goats, and horses-was easily moved and protected, while their opponent's source of livelihood, crops, were easy to destroy.25 Large groups of pastoral nomads prevented trade and the transfer of surplus production to the central government. 26 Consequently, we must recognize two separate Turkish societies. The first was the Seljuk state, well organized and wealthy from the cities and productive capacity of Mesopotamia and Persia. The Byzantines recognized and negotiated with Ikonion, the vassal sultanate of the Seljuk Empire. The other society was composed of frontier Turkoman tribes who crossed the border as settlers or mercenaries. The Seljuk government shunned and distrusted them, so they sought opportunities in the quasi-steppe of central Anatolia. Successive Byzantine governments had difficulty understanding that the Seljuk government did not control this second group. Twenty years after Manzikert, Anatolian Turkomans controlled most of the land that the Crusaders called "Romania."27

Political Ove17Jiew

In the late tenth century Byzantium'S eastern enemies were relatively weak Arab emirates such as Aleppo and the Hamdanid remnants. Capable generals such as Nikephoros Phokas, John Tzimiskes, and Basil II defeated these emirates. The Armenian principalities of the Van region were incorporated into the imperial military and political ;~, HallS(m, Victor Davis, 77ze Western Way rif War, (New York, 1989), 33. Hanson disagrees, noting that to destroy vinyards with axcs and hand weapons was a eOllRiclerable task. ;6 Angold, 96- 97. ., .. 11 Rosalincl Hill, ed. Gesta Fmnconlln et alwTllm flzero.mlzmltanorum: 77w Deeds qf t}~e Franks alld the Other Pilgrims to .Jerusalem (London, I?62), 3.. "Rum" is all the. te,rntorv to the east of the Helles]Jont. Raymoncl D'Agmlcrs, flutona Franco1'llm QYl Ceperlmi Iheru.mlelll, eeL and tl'. John and Laurita Hill (Phila~elphi~, 1968), 27. Here Romania designates everything outside of the cmperor's terrItory, 111 other words, the land occupied by the Turks.

38

CHAPTER TWO

structure during the reigns of Basil II and Constantine VIII.21\ Bulgaria, which threatened Byzantine control of the Balkans during the early eleventh century, was obliterated by 1020. Imperial provinces in southern Italy-Apulia and Calabria--were stable, and the empire would soon attempt to re-conquer Sicily. The Rus appeared momcntmily on the Byzantine military stage (989) but the rebellions that Basil II faced throughout his reign were a greater threat to imperial stability.29 Romanos III Argyros avoided similar difficulties only by capitUlating to the nobility and abrogating the land-laws of Basil and of Romanos Lckapenos.~o Constantine's successors-Romanos III (1028-34), Michael IV (1034-41), Michael V (1041-42), Zoe and Theodora (l042)-had peaceful reigns because each was ineffectual, and none placed limits on power of either thc provincial aristocracy or the bureaucracy of Constantinople. The pattern of civil war prevalent during the reign of Basil II again recurred, beginning with the reign of Constantine IX (1042-55), and it continued for another fifteen years until the accession of Alexios I in 108 LlI The. civil. wars between 1071 and 1081 caused the loss of Italy and ASIa Mmor. When Alexios' coup succeeded in 1081, the empire had two new enemies established on imperial territOlY. First, Seljuk Turks ruled from Nicaea, and dominated western Asia Minor, while the Normans controlled southern Italy and sought Lebellsmum to the east in Epiros and other Byzantine territory in the Balkans. Hungary had also begun to expand its power into traditional Byzantine 18. Ferdinand Chalandon, Essai sur le regne d'Alexius ler Comlle,ze (1081-1118 1 :~ vols. (Pans, 1900), I, 9-1 ~,

o.

:n J ean-ClaudeC~le~net,. Pal/voir et contes!atians ~ Byzance (.963-1210) (Paris, 1990), 27 37, There were nll1e Important rebellions after Basil II reached adulthood and too~ complete control of the empire, including those of Bardas Skleros (976"79), B~sl,1 .Lekapenus (986), Bardas Phokas (987-89), Bardas Skleros (987- 89), John i\I~alakenos (996), Mcles (1009-19), Gcorge Tzoulas (1016) N. Gabras (I0lB) and Nlkephoros Phok,lS (1022). " ' ,311 Ostrogursky, 322·-23. Note that the existence of land-laws does not imply a ~tt Ol;g peasantry, but ~nly a method for emperors to exert control over the nobilIty. :lllS was a I~~al tflp-wire that all?wed an emperor to smash the power or anv no.ble who he beh:vcd was beco~nmtng too powerrul. Paul Lemcrle, TIll! 11 Tmria;/ H~stotJ! if Byza~lb/lm. From the Ongms to the Twe!flh Century (Galway 1979) Il~!i-56 26970, He chscusses ' f I· "., ' , the land ccIpJOperty 0 t le stratlotes, and provides an index of Icga I sources. . . :lI, C~.c'ynet, Pouv~il', 57-90. These r~bellions include: Leo Tornikcs, Gcorge Maniakes, r~
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

39

spheres, such as Serbia and western Bulgaria. The arrival of the Pechenegs north of the Danube during the tenth century made trade and communication with the Rus difficult, while the increasing sophistication and naval power of the Venetian republic meant that after one thousand years of near monopoly, Byzantium no longer controlled the Adriatic and Ionian seas. Byzantium's naval impotence was a fiscal inevitability. Nevertheless, an empire that consisted of the littoral of three disconnected seas-the Ionian, Aegean and Pontic--needed a fleet. Byzantium's lack of a navy in her home waters meant that Venice could regularly extort economic privileges, determine whether invaders, such as the Normans or Crusaders entered the empire, and parry any Byzantine attempts to restrict Venetian commercial or naval activity. ~2 A few examples will demonstrate this point. A powerful Byzantine fleet could have prevented a Norman invasion; instead of a decade of war, Alexios' reign could have been a decade of peace and rebuilding. A powerful fleet would have enabled the Byzantines to provision the Crusader kingdoms of Syria and Palestine, rather than leaving this important task in the hands of the Italian trading cities. Of course, pirate-lords like Tzachas of Smyrna would have been unable to threaten Alexios into making common cause with the empire's most dangerous enemy, Suleyman and the Seljuk state at Nicaea. Several historiographical assumptions have becleviled Western historians of this period. rvlost of these are assumptions about the "unchanging" nature of Byzantium, its "weakness" during this period, and the "economic destructiveness" of the Seljuk invasions. Most of these opinions are based on the emotionally charged and biased descriptions of authors such as Odo of Deuil and Ekhard of Aura, or upon narratives written during or just after the First Crusade. Unfortunately, historians of the Latin west have not pursued the Byzantine sources as eflcctively as Byzantinists have mined Crusader accounts. It is important to examine these misconceptions, as several :\; Alexiatle, I1, 52 54; (Bk. (i, ch. :i. 11. 5- \0), i\lcxios' and the Venetians. Kinnamos, 2B I; (b., I D) C:SHB lill· thc conflict between John II and the Vcnctians. Kinnamos, 2B I 2BG; (G" I 0) fill' Mal1l1d's cliHiclllties with the Vcnetians. Sec also: A.R. Gac\olin, "A\cxius I COllll1l'JlUS and the Vcnctian Trade Privileges: A New Interpretation," liy,:allliol/ :)(): I (I ~JB()). The best monographic account of Byzan~illc relations with Venicl' is DOl1ald M. Nicol's l~vzllJltiuJll and Venice: A Stu4Ji 1Il DtjJlomalic alld Cultural RelfI/io/l.l (CamiJridge, 19BB).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _gmL'~~~~. .- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

40

CHAPTER TWO

relate to the military history of latc eleventh and twelfth-century Byzantium. Contemporary western sources unanimously condemn Byzantine forces as weak and ineffectual. The Byzantincs arc nearly absent from reccnt accounts of thc First Crusade published by Jonathan Riley-Smith. Kenncth Setton's A History qf the Crusades provides a more balanced account; the only gcneral work that provides an integrated picture of Latin and Byzantine perceptions of the Crusades is Step hen Runciman's A History qf the Crusades. 3:l This lack of a good, general history that recognizes the importance of Byzantium fosters the impression among students of Westcrn Europe that the study of Byzantium properly belongs with "other," nonwestern civilizations. Modern historians' selective choice of subject matter and source material has created this incorrect impression. Byzantium, however, was not an alien civilization to the Latin Crusaders, unlike the Arab principalities in Palestine. Neither Byzantium nor Islam, however, was entirely alien to the Crusaders. By the late eleventh centmy pilgrims regularly traveled to the Holy Land. 34 When the brief persecution of pilgrims under the Fatamid caliph al-Hakim ended, travel eastward again became free of organized impediments. There is little evidence that the new Scljuk masters of Syria and Palestine harassed or abused pilgrims any more th~n ~he Arabs had. Pilgrimage was always a risky affair, and many pIlgnms who survived returned in poverty.:l5 Byzantium w~s an important way station on the pilgrimage routes from the mId-eleventh century onward, and remained so until the end of the thirteenth century and the Latin sack of Constantinople.

.:13 A Hisfory qf the entsades, vol. 1. The First Hundred Years, ed. lvIarshall W. Baldwm, (MadIson, 1969), 289-304·. Jonathan Riley-Smith, TIle Cmsades: 11 Short History (~ew I-raven,. 1987), Chapters 1 and 2 of Riley-Smith contain only passing references.. to t1;e ll1volvement of the Byzantine emperor in calling for and supporting t1;e Fmt ,Crus~cle. Stcphen Ru~ciman\ il History qf the Crusades, vo!. 1. TIze First ~~sade (Camhndge, 19~1) contains the most balanced examination of the First Crusa ; ~~)m the perspective of the Byzantine Empire. Jonathan Riley-Smith's Attar q(/TI~ :'/ISad~s (New yor~, 1991), cons~ders the crusades separately from the ;~Iea oi' pI gI,lm'BIge , aI~d begms lls treatment 111 1095. Throughout there is little reference to t le yzalllll1Cs. :H Runcill1an, 46-50.

en:'; ~t1I(f~~:)n'2~~-79. ~f.R.B. ~haw, ;.. ~ ~.~ fi

41

Nor was travel by westerners to and through Byzantium unusual. Historians have assumed that Byzantium's conflicts with the Crusaders were due, in part, to cultural misunderstanding bred by little contact. However, the sack of Constantinople in 1204 was the result of Byzantium's integral involvement in western politics and dynastic maneuvering. Also, the wars Alexios I fought against the Normans were natural extensions of the wars the Normans and Byzantines had fought in southern Italy during the previous thirty years. We can imagine that Robert Guiscard would have found another excuse for war, but his daughter had been betrothed to Constantine, the son of Michael VII. It was undoubtedly useful for Guiscard to maintain peace when his daughter would be the next empress of Byzantium. When the government of Alcxios I ignored Helen, and when Constantine was betrothed to Alexios' daughter Anna, Guiscard had a convenient excuse for war. This is also an example of the ease with which Byzantium interacted, albeit unsuccessfully, with western states. The Byzantine policy of hiring mercenaries from among the Normans, English, and other westerners also belies the statement that there was little interaction between Byzantium and the west. Finally, Michael VII's negotiations with GregOly VII for a papal militalY mission resulted in Gregory's plan to accompany the expedition. Whether or not GregOly's intentions were serious, this plan was precluded by Gregory's involvement in the investiture struggle with the German Emperor Hel11Y rv.:l(i There is a natural tendency for the historian to project his own rationalistic approach upon confused decision-making situations. This temptation is great when examining the 11r8t ten years of Alexios' reigl1, when Byzantium's external relations were complicated by chaos in Anatolia, invasions by trans-Danubian tribes, and incessant warfare witl1 the Normans. However, little coherent policy-making appears to have been present. Anna Komnene's often confused description of internal politics during Alcxio::;' reign likely reflects the level of policy and decision- making of which Alexios was capable during the chaotic, early years of his reign. Alexios reacted to situations forced upon him; this is not policy-making. Likewisc, the reign of Manuel provides ample information that belies the existence of rational

ecl., ]oillvitte and Vitlehardouin: Chronicles of the

,proVIdes an. 111te~esting example Joinville's negotiations to 'allevc~tte IS l~an~la! problems. WhIle thiS account is from the mid-thirteenth centur J an de JomVllle s problems supporting himself and a band of h'· k . I '. y, the problems r tI b f . IS mg Its mll rut' . 0 le mcm el'S 0 the Fmt Crusade. See Gesta Francorum, 33-34.

t

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

".

:lh Utc-Rcnatl' BiuII1l'I1thai, nil? h/1l~.I'Ii//ll'f Cim/rom'I'D' (Philadelphia, 1988), This is the dearest aIld m()st c()mprehensive short study the conflict between Pope Grego],y VII ane! HeIlI'y IV Gt·rmilny.

or

or

42

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF I ITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

CHAPTER TWO

policyY Manuel frequently relied upon astrology to aid him in his ·· ki311 . deCISlon-ma ng, an d use d new tItles to bind officials to him. He also governed through relatives and personal associates, but did not examine the effects of this policy on the long-term stability of the 3 empire. '1 In order to govern, Manuel needed the consent of his marriagc-all~es and of collateral br~nches of the Komnenian dynasty (wjtness le111ent treatment of rebellIous family members). It was this need, exacerbated by an increasingly complex international environment that led him to promote and forgive rather tllan to punish.'11l Andronikos Komn:nos c~~~itted a variety of offences, including incompetence governmg CIIlCla; treasonous negotiations with Geza, the lung of Hungary; and ~any o~her, smaller acts of lese majeste. The emperor was una~le to nsk famII!, censure by lulling Andronikos. Manuel promoted fnends and famIly members, and he used titles to control a syste~ o~ family alliances that he needed in order to govern. But nec.esslty I.S no~ the same thing as a deliberately chosen and reasoned polIcy. Hlstonans, whose job is to examine patterns of evidence ~ften assume t.hat policy was constantly present, rather than assum~ mg th.at the hI~tOly of a decade or two in a society was driven by expec1!ent reactlO.n to external events. Nevertheless, such ad hoc govemment by r:actlon wa~ an integral feature of the Komnenian period, and to .exam~ne. the eVIdence for military and strategic policy without takmg thIS mto account would be misleading.

41

:4P8a~1 Magd~lino, TIle E,mj!il'e qf Manllel I KomnenoJ 1143-1189 (Camhridge 1993) " ',[ .. '. ' See Magdahno for a din,et"en t optl1lon. AI' , .)3-57. f 1V anuel hke IllS grandhther ; extOlS, .0 ten aPhPears to ~e reacting to events outside of his' eontroi ~a;her' tln;l Jorrnu atlllg a co erent pohe M· I' I' ' when cxamining his dccisi y. (~tu~.~. use 0 a~trology. should not be ~Iiscounted of StV(llJciotcs Sec II" 011S, I age a rno, ,pp. ;)-8). Kmnal11os, 1134, Jor the fall J • • ... mnal11os 23-131 lor And . , I IT' 265-'270, for the fall f AI . .' 'A ' , ' romos ae ventures. ,,-lllnamos, .. 10 c()r St . 0 CXIOS xOlleh. Ostrogorsky, 346. Choniates Hi,tol'ia 111 ", " YPpcIOtcs. ' . , Choniatcs, His/01ia, 103-8 129-32 138-42 f' . . , . H'3'-6 fOl' /\Iex' Axoue I' , , 01 Andromkos. Chol1lates ' Hist01ia , ~) • IOS 1. .111 CII' H"zs/mU! 95-· 6 1~ "-4 220-2 ,ontates, '\'> 1'1 " .J.' , , , le rebellion of Andl'onikos the f 11 f ios Axouch were events tll'lt ',' I I

S

HI

Magdalino, 18(i-87, 192. Angolcl, 12".1. .

.

43

MiLita!y OUeJ7Jiew The military systern of Basil II and his several predecessors had functioned as follows: The empire's heartland in the east was protected by the Armenian buffer states, as well as by vassal princes in Syria. The empire fortified border cities such as Antioch, Edessa, Kaisareia, and Mclitene. An invader who passed these obstacles would then have to breach the passes of the Taurus Mountains. Anatolia's interior, through which any invader would have to move, was dry and barren, with the great fortress cities of Amorion and Dorylaion upon its western boundary. Thematic troops stationed in the border themes provided ready manpower either for harassing actions against an invader, or for fighting in field actions. If an invasion warranted it, the emperor could employ the iagmata, which were stationed in the capital. Furthermore, a powerful ne et maintained eontrol over the coastlands and islands of the Aegean, Adriatic, Pontic, and eastern Mediterranean littoral. In contrast to this system, replete with defensive bal'1'iel's, was the Komnenian system. Asia Minor was lost by the beginning of Alexios' reign, with only a few bastions such as Sinope, Trebizond, and Cyprus remaining under imperial control. Tzachas of Smyrna produced a pirate fleet that ravaged the Aegean against ineffectual Byzantine resistance. Even after the restoration of imperial control over the Asia Minor coast following the First Crusade, the empire remained on the strategic dcfc'nsive. For the second half of Alexios' reign, and through the following two reigns, the imperial defensive systcm relied upon playing off aggressive Turkish leaders against eaeh other, and fighting as a last resort. The Komnenian emperors had no buffers between them and thcir enemies. They no longcr held ranges of mountains with narrow passcs to stall or confine raids. They had few well-fortified cities. The themes and their men were no more, and now only the reconstituted remnants of the tagmata, supplemented by European levies, were available for clefense. This was a much less resilient system, and onc that placed emphasis upon meeting an enemy in pitched battle, always a dangerous prospect. The Turks were a formidable enemy in such a fight, but the everyday problem was more with the Turkoman raiders, and the Komnenian system did little other than threaten them. Armies, as opposed to soldiers stationed in provinces, can defeat raiders by virtuc of sheer numbers, but cannot prevent them from rcturning once the soldiers have

-

--__________------------------------_______

.~_~=c.----------

44

CHAPTER TWO

left. This was the essential problem that confronted the Komnenian emperors: protecting territories against constant incursion with an army called up for temporary duty. It was a problem that Alexios, John, and Manuel never solved.

The Campaigns In 1081, when Alexios I seized the throne, the empire had narrowed to its smallest territorial extent in its history. Because of circumscribed imperial fr~ntiers and constant invasions, Alexios' campaigns were almost ex~luslvely defensive. His negotiation to have Sulcyman, the sultan of Nlcaea, betray his rival and father-in-law Tzachas the lord of Smyrna, for example, was a stopgap measure that avc;ided having to direct resources eastward when a larger problem-the Norman invasion-loomed in the west. Alexios was forced to allow a h~stile Turkish state, the Seljuk sultanate, to become established at NIcaea, o~e of the ~eat Ch~istian cities of Asia Minor. In hindsight, the establIshment of the Se~uk state in Asia Minor was the seminal event of Alexios' reign. However, imperial preoccupation with the Normans prevented Alexios from paying attention to his eastern territories. Alexios fought his first major war against Robert Guiscard and the Normans of South Italy. Following the rebellion and death of Gcor~e Maniakes in 1043, Byzantine control over Italy had slowly deterIorated. The last Byzantine outpost, Bari, was lost in 1071, the s~me year as the battl~ of ~anzikert. Robert Guiscarcl then negotIated an agreement WIth Mlchael VII that the Norman's daughter H:-lcna woul~ marry Michael's heir Constantine. This was an admU'able solutl?n to the problem of a militant Norman state just across the Io;uan Sea. However, Michael VII was deposed, and his suce~ssor, . NIkephoros III Botaneiates, was himself dethroned by AlexIos I 111 1081. . The, events follo~ng Alexi~s' accession arc unclear. Initially, it appealed th~t AI~XlOS would discard his wife, Irene Doukas, for the empr?ss. Mana, wIfe of the former emperor Botaneiates. During these l:egotJatlOns, C.onstantine, Maria's son, had his position as heir confIrmed by ~eXlos. The earlier betrotl1al of Guiscard's daughter Relen to ConstantJ~e was ignored, (Anna Komnene was eventually betrothed to Constanu ne ),gtVIng .. G' Ulscard an excuse to attack the empire. He

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF I1TH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

45

used a monk who claimed to be Michael VII to create a pretender, a pseudo-Michael VII, to draw support away from Alexios. He then transported an army across the Adriatic Sea and besieged DyrrachionY We will examine the details of Alexios' defeat at Dyrrachion in 1081, in our discussion of his tactics and strategy. It is sufficient to note here that the battle marked a turning point in the development of the eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantine army. The defeat was so catastrophic that Alexios lost most of the army he inherited from Botaneiates. Although Alexios never won a battle against Robert Guiscard, when the emperor allied with Henry IV of Germany the Normans were forced to return to Italy. Pakourianos, the grand domestic, remained with the imperial army while Alexios returned to Constantinople. While Robert attempted to stabilize his holdings in southern Italy, his son Bohemond continued to attack the empire, pressing southward into Thessaly. Several skirmishes occurred. Anna Komnene attempts to present these battles as victories, but they end with Alexios' forces in retreat. Finally, Alexios managed to bribe some of the Norman officers. Short of cash with which to pay these men, Bohemond retreated to the coast. The Venetian and Byzantine fleets seized the initiative and drove the Normans from their stronghold on Kerkyra. Bohemond retreated to Italy in 1084.

17l.e Pechenegs Between 1089 and 1092 Alexios fought another war, this time against the Pechcnegs and Cumans. The Pechenegs werc a Turkic people who first appear in Byzantine sources in Constantine Porphyrogenitus' De Administrando Impel'io:12 In 1047 they crossed the Danube River and raided much of Bulgaria north of the Haimos Mountains. Reacting to the weakened state of imperial authority along the Danube frontier, they penetrated imperial territory several times a year between 1089 and 1092. The Pechenegs presented an entirely different set of military problems than did the Normans. The Normans were dangerous in an open field-battle, where their superior discipline and highly trained cavalry repeatedly defeated their Byzantine

·fl

12

Alexiade, L 143-45; (4., 1., 1.1-4). Zonaras, Ill, 734,. 17 to 735, 9. . Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Impeno, eel. Gy. Moravcslk,

RJH. Jenkins (Washington, 1967),49--57, 167-175.

tl'.

&--

46

CHAPTER TWO

counterparts. The Pechenegs were simply difficult to bring to battle. Alexios crossed the Haimos Mountains several times to fight them, most notably at Great Preslav. 4:l But the mountains were not high enough to present a serious barrier to invasion; the Peehenegs soon extended their pillaging to Thrace, the empire's heartland. In 1091, at Lebounion, Alexios and his Cuman allies decisively defeated the Pechenegs, but the Cumans soon turned against Alexios and constituted a threat of their own:H Alexios had to modify his tactics when fighting light-armed, agile mounted opponents like the Pechenegs and Cumans. The campaigns against these mounted steppe-warriors provided a training ground for the second Norman war, which was fought against Bohemond between 1105 and 11 OB. In this campaign Alexios ordered the Byzantine army to refuse to fight a field battle against the more eHcctive Norman cavalry. Instead, the emperor denied them supplies and matericl by blocking the passes around their base at Dyrrachiol1. This strategy was successful, and the Treaty of Devol, Icll'C:ed upon Bohemond in 11OB, marked the end of the Norman threat during Alexios' reign. It also marked the point at which wc can say that Alexios had developed a new army, and new tactical doctrines with which to use it. The Treaty of Devol was not a political success for the Byzantines. It traded Bohemond's freedom for a titular overlordship of southern Italy that could never be effective, and 101' an occupation of Antioch that could never be carried ouL l ', Onc of the treaty's benefits was that it provided the legal basis for imperial claims to that city during the reigns of John II and Manucl I. Ant~och, th: great Christian center of Syria, and the largest Ortho~ox C.HY ou.tslde of Constantinople, was the centerpiece of much Impenal polIcy for the next seventy years. The empire did not have ~oherent eastern policy before the Crusaders arrived and gave AlexIOS the opportunity to regain the coastal provinces of Asia Minor. The: emperor fought by proxy, using the Scljuk sultan Suleyman agalllst Tzachas, and then using the Danishmendid Turks against Suleyman. Before the arrival of the Crusades, Alexios did not even tly to control the Asiatic cities closest to Constantinople. \!\Thcn the crusaders reached Constantinople in the summer of 1096, Alexios +1 AIe.t!rllle, Il, 93-98, (7., 3., 1.1). :: Alexl.ade, Il, 189, (10., 2., 11). Zonaras, rn, 7'14, 5-15 . Alex/a{le, rn, 125--139 , (13 ., 12 ,..11-28) . Z onaras, III , . 7"0 A J , '1·--14.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

47

used them against the Seljuks. To influence their decisions and to take possession of cities they stormed, Alexios ordered a unit commanded by his general Tatikios to accompany the crusading army to Antioch. Tatikios deserted the Crusaders outside Antioch, and this was used by Bohemond as an excuse to seize the city for himself, in violation of the agreements he had made with the emperor in distant Constantinople. following the settlement of the Norman and Pecheneg problems in the west (after 1108), the emperor was finally able to turn his attention to eastern matters. This attention resulted in several campaigns between 1112 and 1116, in which the emperor attempted to impose imperial control over western Asia Minor. These campaigns were not successful. Alexios was able to resettle only a few groups of captive Byzantine citizens within the imperial frontier, but these military actions demonstrate that by 1112 the empire had successfully re-established control over the western and southern eoastlands of Asia Minor. Control of Antioch and the re-establishment of an imperial frontier on the Euphrates River, prerequisites for extending imperial control over central Anatolia, required a clear communication and supply route across Asia Minor. Alexios failed to establish control over the land routes east, and John II and Manuel I also failed in this. However, historians should recognize that expeditions against the SeUuks at Ikonion, as well as campaigns to fortify and reinforce the Euphrates frontier, were usually directed at . controlling Antioch, and were not aims in themselves. By 1118, the date of John Il's accession to the throne, ~he terntorial integrity of the Byzantine Empire had been re-estab.hshed. Its borders stretched from the highlands of southern SerbIa, to the Danube, to the edges of the central Anatolian plateau. Its. permanent form, including the integral association of the T~~ks WIth Anatolia had been decided. Because of this relative stabIlIty, John had the luxury of engaging in aggressive campaigns. While territo.rial gains were not signiflcant considering ~he effort expended, partICUlarly with respect to Antioch, the empIre usually fO~g~lt o~ enemy territory, rather than on imperial lands. This was a dlstm~t. Improvement in Byzantium'S strategic position relative to the pOSItIOn of the Turks Normans and Hungarians. YvIilitary activi~ during John Il's reign can be divide:d into three phases. from 1 118 until 1128 .John stab~lized th~ empIre's Danube frontier. This included successful campaIgns agamst the Pechenegs

48

CHAPTER TWO

(in 1122), the Serbians, and the Hungarians, who had begun to challenge the empire's hegemony over the Dalmatian coast and Danubian boder territories (1128). The empire's alliance with Venice (entered into by Alexios in 1082), had been used against the Norman kingdom of Sicily; when Sicily no longer appeared to be a threat,John abrogated his father's treaty with the Venetian Republic. John's second phase of military activity began with a rapprochement with the Venetians in 1126. This rapprochement was a necessity because the emperor intended to turn east and begin the considerable task of controlling the distant, mountainous province of Cilicia, as well as extending the imperial frontier deeper into Turkish territory. Between 1130 and 1138 John campaigned against Kastamonu a~d Gangra, accompanied by an extensive siege train; during John's relgn the Danishmendid emirs of northeast Anatolia appeared to be a greater threat than the Seljuks at Ikonion. Six years of campaigning resl:lted only in the acquisition of Kastamonou and its surrounding terntory. Leo, the Roupenid prince of Armenian Cilicia had spent this time wresting territory from the control of local imperial commanders. John's campaign of 1137 against Leo was successful and Leo submitted quickly, as did Prince Raymond of Antioch,' although Raymond's submission was due largely to threats against Antioch mounted by Zangi of Aleppo, a powerful Turkish atabeg. In 1138 John campaigned in Syria but accomplished nothing, and while returning through Antioch his army's looting resulted in a popular revolt; the people of Antioch besieged the emperor in the citedal. Over the ~ext two years, 1141-42, John laid the groundwork for a more extens~ve campaign to Cilicia and Syria. He fortified the Sangarios frontIer, and established lines of communication between the Maiander ~alley and Attalcia, the major Byzantine port on the south Anatohan coast. J ohn'8 suspicious death in 1143 from a poisoned arrow wound brought his son Manuel to the throne. John's reign produced limited military successes for the empire; a meagre return for an emperor who fought annual campaigns. In the west, John defended the Danube frontier against Turkic raiders while Hungary was foiled in its attempt to extend its control south 'to the ~driat~c Sea. In the east, where John waged offensive ca~paigns, hlS .gams we~e more limited. John managed to preserve Byzantine terntory agamst the Danishmendid emirs but made few advances

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

49

against them. He fortified the Byzantine frontier with Il~onion, but was unable to expand that frontier onto the central Anatohan plateau; the old Byzantine fortified points of Amorion, Dorylai.on and .Ikonion remained in Turkish hands. The Euphrates frontlcr rcmamed wealdy held. Byzantine control remained depe~dent ~pon th~ empero.r's presence in in Cilicia to overawe the Armeman pnnces .. 1 he ~mplre that Manuel i.nherited from his father was therefore httle different from that which his father had inherited from Alexios. In the west, the Normans were quiescent, but Hungary remained a military threat. The Danishmendids were reduced in power, but the Seljuks of Ikonion were stronger. Also, relative to the growing power of Ikonion, the kingdom of Hungmy. and the Ge.rman ~m~ire, the .Byz~nt~ne Empire was weaker than It had been III AlexlOs day. It IS d1lS relative weakness that we must keep in mind when we examine Manucl's diplomatic effiJrts. The world of Alexios was one in whieh the Byzantines and Latins fought m<~or wars for the first time. Manucl's world was one in which war and conflict with western states was a constant threat. Manual's empire had relatively stable military frontiers. Trade with the Pisans, Amalfitans, Genoese, and especially the Venetians helped re-establish the economic prosperity that the invasions of thc late eleventh century had ruined. Hi In his policy Manuel first attempted (unsuccessfully) to complete his father's work in the east .by s~izing Antioch. He then turned west, launching an unsuccessful IllvaSlOn of southern Italy. He fought inconclusive wars with the Hungarian kingdom. At thc end of his reign, like his grandfather, he attempted to placate public opinion by attacking the Seljuk sultanate. This resulted in the defeat at Myriokephalon of the largest army mustered by any Komnenian emperor. One might even say that ]\I1anua1 squandered the gains accumulated by his father and grandfatl;er ... Unlike the military events of john's reign, Manuel s mlht.alY endea~­ ors do not fall into geographically and chronologically ch~crete per.lods of activity. Manuel began his reign with a campmgn 111 Anatoha that brought him to the suburbs of Ikonion in 1146, but he ~neoun­ tercd serious diH-iculties when forced to retreat after ravagmg the

1'; A!exiade, I, 115-4·6, (4., 2., 1.1-3). Nicol, Donald M. J-!yzwzlilllll alld Venice: a .l'tllr!y ill dijllomalir alld milura! relatiolls (Cambridge, 1992). 60-63.

50

CHAPTER TWO

territory around the Seljuk capitalY As with all Komnenian campaigns, one should note that within one day's march from the Maiander valley, the emperor was in a foreign land, without local support. Following this brief military display, Manuel was [()I'ced to support the crusade of Louis VII and Conrad Ill, launched in response to the fall of Edessa to the emir Zangi in 1144. Like the First Crusade, the second arrived piecemeal. Conrad In appeared outside Constantinople in 1147, and immediately western and Byzantine troops clashed near the walls of the imperial city. The imperial troops were successful in this encounter, and the Germans crossed the Bosphoros into Asia. Marching east of Dorylaion, they were attacked and defeated by the Seljuks, and turned back. Louis' forces arrived later and received a more cordial welcome, and also took the more leisurely and better-protected route down the coast and across southwestern Anatolia to Attaleia, joined by the remnants of Conrad's army. Manuel's naval support at Attaleia, where the Byzantines were supposed to meet the Crusaders, proved insufficient. The Byzantines were only able to ship the greater barons to the Holy Land. The Seljuks destroyed the army's infantry while it was marching overland to Syria. One of the most interesting aspects about the Second Crusade is Niketas Choniates' attitude toward the emperor's "support" of the Crusade. Choniates was disgusted by the emperor's treatment of the crusaders, accusing him of minting debased coins with which to pay them, and of ordering the adulteration of bread lll ~vith lime: Although these sentiments may not represent the opinIOn o[ the average Byzantine, the assumption of Odo of Deuil and the westerners, that Byzantine support was half-hearted and conditional, appears to have been justified. Manuel spent 1155 managing the passage of the German and Fren~h. ~[ Crusaders across Asia Minor. During this interval, Roger II of SICIly t~ok advantage of the emperor's preoccupation to seize Kerkyra, an Island that layoff the west coast of Epiros. This was a natural stagin~ point [or any expedition against Hellas or Epiros. Roger then raIded the prosperous cities Corinth, Thebes and Athens

Killna~los, 3.9'-44,

Manucl'x first campaign against Ikonion and 29C)-'30fl " . , Sc;c Chol1lates, His/oria, 52-53, [or the first campaign (1146); and 177--91 {(W Myrtokcplialon (I 176). 1II Choniatcs, HiJtOlia, 06--67. , ,7

{ill'

{or prcparau~Jns tor thc second campaign.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND I2TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

51

in the theme of Hellas. I !) Throughout the reigns of Alexios and his predecessors (1025-1118), these two provinces remained military backwaters Increased economic and military contacts with the west, however, meant that these provinces, located on the naval route to Constantinople, assume a greater degree of prominence in our sources."o Thc Venetians recognized the strategic value of the ports on the coast of the Pcloponessos. When John expelled them in 1122, they attempted to take the port of Monemvasia, and after the sack of Constantinople in 1204, they seized most of the important ports of central and southern Hellas. The Sicilians did not want military outposts or permanent control over Hellas and the Peloponnesos; this expedition appears to have been a form of economic warfare. At Corinth, weavers, dyers, and young women were siezecl and transported to Roger's kingdom. This occurred despite an adequate garrison in the city, and despite the powerful fortifications of the citadel. Choniates reports that the incompetence of the imperial commanders accounted [or the Italian successes, rather than lack of preparation or surprise. Kerkyra was crucial to imperial defensive planning; it was a potential staging point [or expeditions against Epiros and south into Hellas. Control or KCl'kyra would do much to prevent Norman raids on Greece. Norman control o[ Kerkyra, moreover, was a direct challenge to Venetian naval hegemony in the Adriatic. Following Venice's commercial agreement with Alexios I (l082), the Venetians had become the predominant naval force in the eastern Mediterranean. J oIm II was unable to challenge their naval power; he was forced as a consequence to restore them to their position of favor after four years of conflict.-d rr the Sicilians continued to hold Kerkyra, they could run patrols betwecn Apulia and Epiros. It also meant that they could potentially block the Venetian trading Heets, all of which

Chnniates, Hi.l/oria, 74·--7l), . ' Choniates, His/(J11'([, 73. The Normans next tried to take the [oruficc1 town of j\.loncmvasia, ofT the east coast of the Peloponnesos, It proved ton strong for them. Kinnamos clue~ not mention this eVl'nt. :01 Cholliates, I-hl/oria, 172--·74·. Choniatcs does not mcnlionJohn's war ,:"ith Venic~; he ilnalyzes Manuel's ckcisiull 10 conflscale V cnetiall ,goods ~s a. reactIOn to :I~:lr earlier lampooninp; of the emperor at Kerkyra. Chomates, HIs/ana, ,Sl). Note h,lebearing ships,' 'nees t!},lj!/wroi' (V~E~ 1t'UpcpoPOt),P. 172, I. r~, ~~nt alter. the .fle~mg Venclians. Killllamos, 2B 1·--H2, Sce 2B I--So, 101' IVlanuel s lmhtary actions agalllst the Vcnelians, including the llse or Greek fire (2B3). .!!)

',11

52

CHAPTER TWO

had to pass Kerkyra and Apulia. Roger's actions threatened the Venetians more than they threatened the Byzantine Empire. The Venetians had very good reason to ally with Manuel against the Normans, and accordingly mounted an expedition against the Normans in Kerkyra, in 1147-48. A sudden Cuman invasion meant that Manuel could not give this expedition his full attention. By 114.9, despite the uninspired leadership of Stephen Kontostephanos, and a quarrel between the Byzantines and their Venetian allies that came to blows, it was apparent to the Norman garrison that the combined imperial and Venetian fleets would continue to prevent any Norman relief foree from coming to their aid. The garrison surrendered and the officers in charge promptly entered service with Manuel. 52 Manuel now turned his military policy towards the west. Despite several brief interludes of military activity in the east, including the 1167 expedition to Egypt, Manuel's policy became directed towards controlling the Dalmatian coast and southern Italy. It is a mistake to consider Manuel's Italian and Hungarian policies separately. Manue! hired armies in Italy; these distracted Roger Il. Manue!'s outposts 111 that kingdom prevented Norman raids by forcing Roger to concentrate upon his Italian possessions. Like Roger when he conquered Kerkyra, lVIanuel sought staging areas for further action, and outposts for the naval domination of the straits of Dyrrachion. Simultaneously, Manuel mounted expeditions against Serbia and Hungary. To forestall the annual Hungarian advances into Dalmatia and Byzantine Serbia, between 1151 and 1167 the Byzantines sent thirteen expeditions against the Hungarians. 5:1 These wars culminated in the exten.sive campaign in which the Byzantine army invaded Hungary, and 111 1167 Andronikos Kontostephanos defeated the Hungarian army at Semlin. Manuel failed to maintain the gains his armies had ~ade in the Norman kingdom in Italy, but by 1158 military confhct had been replaced by a policy of rapprochement with the Normans and with an alliance against Frederick I Barbarossa, the emperor of Germany. By 1167 Manuel had achieved many of his military goals in the west: Byzantine power now extended further west than it had at any time since the reign of Basil Il; The emperor had rights con52 C~oniates, His/ona, 88-89; Kinnamos, 96-101. The officers undoubtedly relt that their dogged dere:1SC would win them better terms of employment from Manuel than they would receive from Roger, whose fortress they had jllst surrendurecl. 53 Angold, 174. .

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IlTH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

53

cerning the disposition of the Hungarian crown; Byzantine relations with the papacy, now represel\ted by Alexander Ill, were cordial;51 The emperor had also managed to fight the Normans to a stand-still, and they posed no threat to Manuel for the remainder of his reign. Following these policy gains, Manucl embarked upon a new set of ambitious policies which threatened to overturn much of what he had accomplished ovcr the first twenty five-years of his reign. First, in 1171, he attempted to abrogate Venice's trading privileges within the Byzantine Empire. The immediate cause of this action was the Venetian sack of the Genoese trading offices in Constantinople. Manuel, quite obviously, did not want two Italian trading states fighting a private war in his capital. 55 Manuel was worried because Venetians who married Byzantines, becoming in effect Byzantines themselves, retained the privileges granted to "foreign" traders. Angold and Hendy argue that there were f~lr fewer of these traders than most historians assume, numbering in the thousands rather than the tens of thousands, even in the capital. Nevertheless, it is natural to assume that the emperor, sensitive to the granting of privileges and rightsperhaps the greatest representation of imperial prerogatives and power-would want to control a rogue group of citizens who remained under thc laws and control of a foreign power while maintaining themselves as economically privileged citizens of the emperor. The agreement by which Alcxios extended trading privileges to the Venetians also specified that they would resolve disputes in their own courts. The the emperor saw the Venetians who married Byzantines in the Orthodox rite as Orthodox Byzantines who wished to remain outside the emperor's authority. Manuel's war with the Venetians was mainly fought on the sea, and resembled the similar situation John II instigated. This conHiet lasted from 1171 until 1175, when the emperor decided that fighting a naval war was too expensive. Between 1171 and 1175, Manucl also attempted to affect a rapprochemcnt with Frederiek I Barbarossa. This became necessary because Manucl's diplomacy with Alexander IIl, directed against Frederick, and Manud's support or the League of Verona against the German empire, became irrelevant aftcr plague swept through

"lODE, I, ':J 7. In 1167 l'vlanuci senl Ihe .lehll.I/OJ lnrclanos III negotiate with Alexancler Il L The substance o/' the nq!;otiations was that Manuei would organi1.c a unioll of churches if Alexander recognized him as emperor oJ' both cast and west. ,,', Magdalino, 93- 94, 1:17 - :1B; Angojd, 199 --20 I.

c

54

CHAPTER TWO

Frederick's army in 1167, and the German threat to Italy disappeared. The Byzantines were bitterly disillusioned by the sudden change in papal policy, and when negotiations with Frederick proved useless, the emperor found himself isolated both from the papacy and from the German emperor. Manuel still had influence in Hungary, but the emperor's policy of controlling the balance of power in. the west, against whoever threatened to control Italy, was now a faIlure. In the context of these failures, Manuel turned eastward against Ikonion and the Seljuks. Following his first attack upon Ikonion, in 1146, Manuel had personally led only one major campaign in the east, in 1158. He usually relied upon his vassals and proxies in Antioch, and upon generals such as Alexios Axouch, sent to Syria in 1164 in response to the defeat of Bohemond III of Antioch by Nur ed-din. In 1173 Fredcrick Barbarossa negotiated with Kilij Arslan, the Seljuk sultan; these negotiations between Manuel's two great enemies appeared to threaten a combined attack from both east and west upon the empire. The next y~ar Manuel began preparations [or his largest campaign in Anatoha. In 1175, he wrote to Pope Alexander IIl, stating that the r.oute to the !foly Land was open because he had captured and fortlfied DorylalOn. This was a thinly disguised invitation for the pope to send bands of crusaders at precisely the time that Manuel was planning the destruction of the Seljuk state. 56 The emperor spent ~~st of 1175 fortifying Soublaion and organizing diversionary expedlt~ons t~ Amaseia and Neokaisareia. He developed a large siege tram, h1Ch .un~oubtedly was one of the reasons the army proved so unWIeldy m Its advance up the Maiander valleyY The effects of ~he defeat th.e emperor suffered at Myriokephalon in 1176 were limIted to the mternational perception of imperial weakness. In fact, Manuel only disabled his advanced base at Soublaion, constructed t?e year before ..He retained control of the fortress of Dorylaion, nght. on ~he SelJuk border, although his truce with Kilij Arslan reqUIred ItS. destruction. ~onsequently, in 1177, the Seljuks sent ~O,OOO men. 111to the Byzan~ne coltrolled Maiander valley. The Byzantll1e~ handIly defeated thIS expedition. Therefore, the battle of Mynokephalon had very little effect upon the eastern military fron-

v:

56

Angold, 189.

Michacl Hcndy describes the battle of Myriokephalon, citing Roger of Howden, Chromca, ed. W. Stubbs, 4- vols. (London, 1868-71), Il, 103. 57

. 2

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IITH- AND 12TH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

55

tier. Nevertheless, it was the most significant military force mustered in Manuel's reign. It was also unique because it was the only campaign in which Manuel sought to destroy an enemy, rather than to influence or intimidate an opponent. The failure of Myriokephalon was not an indication of Byzantine weakness, but rather an indication of the limitations of warmaking against the Turks. These limits had always been present. John II had been equally unsuccessful in his attempt to destroy the Danishmendicls. Manuel's military activities continued after 1176, despite the emperor's personal absence from any further campaigning. A large fleet attacked Egypt the next year, and imperial armies continued to campaign in Anatolia. That these were defensive wars is not any after-effect of Myriokephalon, but simply Cl reflection of the fact that most imperial campaigns in Anatolia were defensive in nature.

L

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS (108I-IUS)

57

So , in addition to external troubles, internal dissention further damaged an already weakened Byzantine army. CHAPTER THREE

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS (l081-1118)

The. army Alexios inherited from Nikephoros Botaneiates in 1081 was III deplorable condition. The army of Romanos IV in 1071 had at least poss~ss:d ampl~ ~:lmbers of recruits and an experienced general. AlexlOs army 111ltlally contained few Anatolian recruits while Europeal~ recruits were drawn from only two areas: Thrace and Macedom~. Pec!leneg and CUIllan raids made control over Bulgaria probl~matIc dun~g ~arge portions of Alexios' reign. Furthermore, the defectIOn of SerbIa 111 the 1070s, the invasions of the Norman lords ~obert Guiscard and Bohemond, and the piratical raids of the Turk 1z~chas ensured that large parts of the empire's European ten'itones were under foreign control for many years. Greece, called HeUas by the Byzantines, was not a viable source of recruits in part . was difficult to move men from so far ' south to, per1laps, because It whe.r e they were needed in the north and west. Thrace and MacedOl~la had the critical adv~ntage of being close to the capital, and :"ele protected by the Hmmos Mountains, which blocked northern mvaders. Anot?er pro.blem for th~ development of a new army was the uncert~111 allegiance of soldiers who, during the 1070s, had participa~ed 111 several rebellions. Nikephoros Bryennios, Doux of Dyrrach1On, :ebelled with much of the western army in 1077. Nikephoros Botanelate.s r;belled and became emperor in 1078. Upon Nikephoros Bryenmos defeat and capture by Alexios, Nikephoros Basilakios gatl;ered Bryennios' rebellious troops and continued the struggle aga111st. the new e~peror Botaniates. Nikephoros Mclissenos, who ~e­ bel!ed 111 1080, dIsrupted what remained of Asia Minor. Rousscl of Bmll~ul c~rved out a principality for himself in Asia Minor in 1073. I AleXlos hImself rebelled successfully and in 1081 obtained the throne.

I Anne Comncne, illexiade (Paris, 1937--76) ed B LCl'b I 10-11 Al . , " ." exlOS cap tured R i b b 'b' y n mg ROllssel's Turkish allies to seize him and s~ll him to th~

empcror~usse

Campaigns against Rebels Anna Komnene's remarks about her father's first campaign reinforce the impression that the army was in terrible condition. She says, " ... the empire of the Romans had been reduced to its last resources. In the East the armies were everywhere scattered, while the Turks had spread out so that they had all the near territories ... But in the west [the troops] Howed to Bryennios."~ The soldiers available to Alexios constituted a meager force compared with the powerful armies of Basil n. Alexios' army included the Immortals, three hundred Chomatenes, and a few Kelts (Frankish mercenaries). Botaneiates also sent for men from his Turkish allies.:l Alexios advanced to the Halmyros River, where it became apparent that the large size of Basilakios' army made a pitched battle undesirable. Anna mentions that Alexios deliberately held his army off from Nikephoros' troops because he was afraid the rebel would attack if he realized how few men Alexios had under his command:1 The grandson of the rebel Bryennios was Nikephoros the Caesar. He became Anna Komnene's husband, and is Anna's source for this campaign, which occurred before shc was born. By the time Anna wrote, in the 114·0s, few were living who could have recalled these events. Her precise description of Alcxios' military preparations paraphrases Bryennios, and Bryennios' rcports of military events arc usually detailed." Alexios fought Bryennios at the Halmyros River. Bryennios placed his brother John on the right wing with five thousand men. These

1 Alexiade, I, 17-18, (I, 4·. 1.10-19). The combined Byzantine forces included both Alcxios and Bryennios' men. If Alexios had enough men to take the field, hut a somewhat smaller {()rce than Bryennios (which might explain his reluctance to give battle), we can estimate the entire Byzantine military contingent in the west at between twenty thousand and twenty-fIve thousand men. This is admittedly guesswork, but such is the nature of Anna's account. :l Alexiade, 1, 18. Nikephnros Brycnnios, .Nicephore Bryenllios His/oire, Hyle Hislmias, CFHB, ed. P. Gauticr (Brussels, 1975), 13B. + Alexiade, I, 19. 5 illexiade, I, I B jT:; Bryennios, I :1G:1B.

.......

&

58

included the veterans of Maniakes from Sicily, and Thessalian and Frankish cavalry. The left consisted of three thousand men of the Macedonian and Thracian squadrons. Bryennios held the center with Thracians, Macedonians, and picked Thessalian cavahy troopers. No numb~r is specified, but if the army was organized in three groups there IS no reason to suppose there were fewer than three thousand in this center group also. Beyond the left flank, Bryennios stationed some Scythiall allies, some two stacIcs off.6 Facing him, Alexios' forces are reported by both Bryennios and Anna to have been considerably smaller. Nikephoros says that Alexios watched the enemy force ~pproa?h and was dismayed by their overwhelming numbers.7 AlcxIOS decIded he had to fight although the Turkish mercenaries had ~ot ye: ar~ived. Alexios' force was both less disciplined and numerIcally mfenor to that of his opponents, but strong enough to offer some hope of victory. If Bryennios had about twelve thousand men it is reasonable to assume somewhat fewer for Alexios, perhaps eight to ten thousand. Fewer men than this might seem foolhardy but we do not know what pressure was being placed upon Alexios to fight. Alexios' line consisted of two groups, a left flank of Franks and Immortals (athanatoi) uncleI' his Own command, and a right containing troops from thc Choma region and some Turks.u These were ordered ~~ keep. an eye on the Scythians, on the left side of Blyennios' line. I he thIrd part of Alexios' army, of unlisted composition but perImps composed of pettasts (light-armed assault infantry) was off Alexios' ~ef~l hidden in some hollows for an ambush. T11e position of Alex~os Immortals and Franks at the outset of the battle is not stated nor .IS the. ~isposition of Alexios' other forces given in any detail: Th:lr pOSItIOns, however, become clear during the course of the actIOn. Anna reports that John Bryennios struck down a soldier from the corps ?f 'The Immortals' facing him, and this tells us where they were_ relatlVe to. Blyennios' '. !J l,V I ',. ' !10lces. v e can pace AlexlOs cont111gent on the left, facmg the powerful right flank of Bryennios' army.

I.

7 11

Brycnnios, 136. BIYCllllins, 131)-37.

TI

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXlOS I KOMNENOS (108I-IlI8)

CHAPTER THREE

I

.

le InInortals first appear during the reign nf'Jollll IT· . k ' . 971 TI were a cav·llry 'c . 1 1 . zllms es, In, . lCY of Ale xi os Ko~~e~~~l~ltol~l~_~~tf~1 ~~~~ th.c \.var~ Of. the Norma~s durin~·the reign im,_ 1O. [~Ild 11. }ahrlutndert (Vienna;' 1991 H) ~~stoaclllm Kuhn, Die byzantlTllsclie Annee , .1Iexlade, I, 20 '-21. ,46.

i

59

Alexios hoped that the soldiers he had placed in ambush would throw Bryennios' formation into confusion so that his Franks and Immortals would be able to break them. Nikephoros' best men faced Alexios' ambush, and it was easily driven ofI Next Alexios' Immortals broke. A general rout followed. Alcxios' Franks deserted to Brycnnios, and the rest of the units under Alexios' personal command retreated. lo Bryennios' Scythians then attacked and drove off Alcxios' right flank, and the whole imperial force fled beyond its camp, which the Scythians and the rest of Bryennios' army began to loot. By chance, a group of Alexios' Turkish allies arrived and reinforced his troops. They skirmished with the enemy and quickly drew Brycnnios' victorious, overconfident troops into an ambush. I I Alexios had remained on the field oC battle, and in command of at least a unit of his men. Bryennios allowed his troops to loot, and he lost control of them. Alexios took advantage oC his opponent's JUOInentary lapse to captUl'e Brycnnios and win the battle. It is clear from this account that the Byzantine army was composed primarily of Byzantine recruits. The striking arm of Alexios' force was Frankish cavalry supported by the Immortals. For purposes of determining total Byzantine numbers and ethnic composition, we must consider the whole force of both sides at the Battle of the Halmyros River as the "Byzantine" army. European recruits dominated this force; Chomatenes are the only Asian soldiers mentioned by Anna. The rest of the Byzantine troops were Macedonian, Thessalian, and Thl'ac:ian (native Byzantine) cavalry. These regions were relatively protected from outside raiding and ravaging and were dose enough to the capital to allow a speedy call-up or forces. This army was Cl combined-arms force. It utilized a combination of infantry and cavalry, operating in support of each other. Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry units were protected by heavy armor: helmets and breastplates,l~ and are later identified by Anna as

Bryennios, 138. Alexiade, I, 24. . A lexiadc, I, 25. (I, 6, I. 21 If) When it at lirst appeared that Brycl1mos had WOJl, Alexios stayed on thc field of battle a~ long as. possibl~ .. Hc was, undoubtcdly unenthusiastic ahout returning to COllstant11loplc aiter a mdIlary de/cat. Bc then III II

met a force of his Turkish itllics, and Alexios and these Turkish t]"ClOPS moved against Brycnnios' i(ll"l:es. At lirst they engaged the enemy, thell they pretended to flee ill order to draw the l'ncmy into an ambush. 12

Alexiru":, I, 20.

,I

!,,

60

CHAPTER THREE

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXWS I KOMNENOS (WBI-I1I8)

61

13

kataphraktoi. It contained jJe/tasts (fast-moving, elite infantry), missile ~en,. and sp~armen. Alexios' army outside of Constantinople, durmg hIs rebellIon, contained these classes of infantrymen, so we know that they existed and were used in Byzantine armies. The best cavalry and infantry were in the center, the other troops presumably on the flanks. The light archers and slingers (psiloi), were drawn up ~eparately, although our sources do not specify where they were statIoned. . Alexios'. army operated around a base line of heavy and light mfantry, wIth cavalry on the flanks, often massed on one side or the o~her. A small reserve of picked troops frequently appears. Bryenn~os protected his weak flank with Scythian skirmishers. Alexios placed hIS own Turkish skirmishers opposite these Scythians on his Own weak flan.k. Neither Alexios nor Bryennios attempted anything other ~han a pItched battle; diversionary maneuvers (skirmishing, harassmg) were not used. Each rebellion ended only after a field action that eliminated either the rebellious army or the rebellious leader. ~ebels needed to fight to prove their legitimacy; in this case, Alex10S f~ught because he needed to keep Bryennios away from Constantmople. The preference for pitched battles-whether deliberate or circu~nstantial-was to prove a problem when the Byzantines were faced WIth the Norman tactical system, which proved morc effective in this kind of combat.

Normans

~na's descri~tion

of Norman recruitment and training is problem-

atI~, for she IS more concerned with proving the recklessness of

GUlse~rd's attack ti:an in accurately representing the enemy army. NeveItheless, there IS no reason to doubt Anna's claim that the Norman army comprisec: thirty thousand infantry and cavalry, and one hundred and fi~ty ShIpS.ll Th.e Normans fought differently than did the other enemIes of ByzantIUm. The Seljuks, the Pechenegs, and the. Cumans fought fluid, feint-and-retreat battles. They sought to aVOId close combat, where their lighter arms and armor would prove 1:1 1I

Alexiade, I, 90. Alexiade, I, 56.

a disadvantage. They had no goal beyond loot and escape. This meant they were a less dangerous foe than the highly organized Normans, who had territorial ambitions. The danger posed by the Normans also accounts for Alexios' disregard of the Seljuk threat. The east half of the empire was forgotten as the Byzantines fought to keep the Normans from advancing out of Epiros toward Constantinople. The Normans constituted the most serious threat to the empire that Alexios faced during his thirty-seven year reign. His generalship reached its highest level by learning to handle their tactics and training. The Byzantine campaign of 1106-07 against B.oh:mond is the best example of the Byzantine army's strategy of mdlrect warfare during Alexios' reign. In previous campaigns Alexios had allowed his armies to face the Nonnans in frontal combat, with predictably disastrous results. In this campaign, by contrast, Alexios avoided battle with the Normans; instead, he slowly wore them down. I:; This strategy was not born overnight. Certainly it does not seem to have been used during the emperor's first campaign against Robert Guiscard. A strategy of indirect warfare presupposes considerable experience and a high level of discipline among the ordinary soldiers. At Dyrrachion it also required a large fleet such as only .t~1e V:neti~ns possessed. Indirect warfare also required a stable pohtIcal SItuatIOn in the capital, for it risked creating the impression of cowardice. The Normans relied upon the shock of a massed cavalry attack to defeat an enemy army. 11; Recent Byzantine experience had been battles against the Turks, Pechenegs, and against rebellious generals. When needed, Frankish mercenary units provided Byzantine armies with shoek troops. Heavily arl110recl Frankish cavalry was less useful than archers, peltasts, and skirmishing cavalry when fighting an enemy such as the Turks. Faced with a Norman army whose strength consisted of mounted warriors, protected by ehain mail and mounted on specially bred horses, the Byzantine kataphraktos was virtually powerless. 17 When the Byzantincs chose to fight the Normans in open battle, cavalry against cavalry, the result was usually disastrous. I; This strategy was not new, but it was new .to ~lcxios. The Slmlegikoll or Ma~­ rice, bk. 11, describes the proper way to deal WIth. han.k~ ancl.Lo~nbarck tu aV(~I~ battle and instead wear them down by constant mdecIslve skmmshcs. Georgc I. Dennis, (cd.) Das Stmt~i;ik{)n Des Mawikiu.I (Vienna, 1981). Ib Alexiade, rn, I J4.-II:i. . . 17 Alexiade, Ill, 114-·"115; 11, 109. The f1rst account. dcscnbes typIcal ~Url1lall equipment: (chainmail, kite shield, helm, and lance), whIle the second deSCrIbes the

• 62

CHAPTER THREE

theT~l:::I~~r~~a~h~e~:t~l fie,lded in the first N~rman campaign was Sides had used dunng the civil wars of 1071-81 T h . . e mmy of the reb lB· ' (1 imately twelve tl d e ryen1110S 077), comprised approxthat the arm All~usan dmen~ half the Byzantine total. This meant d y eXIOS use agamst R b ·t G' 0 el Ulscar numbered between twenty th d d. d . ousan an twenty fi e tl - v lousan men, mcluding his Turkish allies Th .

exko~bitoi h:l~~f ~~o~:: ;~l~l~:e:~~d

the ea by Annda KoI mnene includes c was un er t le command of Constantine 0 os T airy' these wereP 'd he}re were also Macedonians, undoubtedly cavd 17 b ' . , , un er tle command of Al commanded tl T 1 f: ,exan er ....a aSIlas. Tatlkios le ur (S rom Ochnd-P I ec lenegs-and Anna mentions 2 800 M ' also pre' t al11cha eans, .The vestia1itai, the household troO}JS were ' sen , as was th e regtm t fl F under Humbertopoulos. lfl Las~n ~ t~ :ran~(s (ton Frangikon tagma.ton), where they had d " y: le arangtans were at DyrraehlOn, , . a eClSlVe role 111 the battle that ended Al·' , fi. campaign agamst Robert. 1!i exlOS 1St

Dyrrachion Anna's account of the b I f ' . with Homeric-style d att e 0 DyrrachlOn IS muddled and filled makes it clear that ~7ec, o:es about Alexios. Nevertheless, her account eXIOS strategy relied upon two conditions. First Venice would h< ' ave to control the Ad' . S troops would have to defeat the No natlc. ea. Seco~d, Alexios' . rma~ army after It had been weakened by an unsucces Cl' sm Wl11ter SIege of D 1. A . that a third of the Norman fI . . yrrae :Ion. nna clatms ten thousand men and fi ~reeddIed d~nng ,the Wll1ter of 1107-08: succeed Robert's arm 1ve un red. km~hts. 20 For Alexios' plan to , y lad to remal11 p111l1ed t D h' . was accomplished by th h . a yrrac IOn. ThIS e erOle efforts of th . , George Palaiologos who . e CIty s commander, was supported by the Venetian fleet. ,

---

gift to Alexios of 150 . I tI . ..' . spew\ horses, along with 'i00 k . I '.... lc~e W
THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS

(lOBI-IUS)

63

The importance of Dyrrachion needs some explanation. Dyrrachion was the most important Norman base for further operations against Alcxios, Robert began his campaign by taking Kerkyra, but the seizure of Dyrrachion would provide the shortest crossing of the Adriatic for men and supplies. Furthermore, Robert could hardly leave the city in enemy hands while a Venetian fleet prowled the Adriatic. The opportunity for the Byzantines and Venetians to land hostile troops at his rear, should the city remain in imperial hands, necessitated its capture. Dyrrachion is Anna's best description of a campaign, and its precision (and plausibility) are exceptional among Byzantine battle accounts. Dyrrachion was fought in 1081, and Anna was born in 1083/4·. We can only assume that Anna had access to some source of precise information. The accuracy of her information with respect to units involved and terrain covered bespeaks first-hand experience combined with a well-reasoned account. She begins with George Palaiologos' warning to Alexios that it would be foolhardy to risk a battle, even after the hardships suffered by Guiscard during the previous winter. 21 Certainly she relies upon Palaiologos' memory, and it is safe to assume that whatever notes or reminiscences Nikephoros Bryennios used were also at her disposal. What induced Alexios to fight? Several possibilities suggest themselves. First, the fall of Dyrrachion would have given Robert the advanced base he needed to continue his campaign, and would have offered his army a refuge in the event of defeat. Second, and more important, a Byzantine victory, together with Venetian control of the sea, would have destroyed Robert's army. George Palaiologos' advice was to skirmish the enemy to death and disrupt his foraging. This advice was discarded in favor of a plan supported by younger officers-a night attack-which never occurred. Wc cannot know whether partisans in Alexios' camp warned Robert, or whether his actions were coincidental. Before the Byzantincs could put their subterfuge into action, Robert moved his forces out to the plain near Dyrrachion and formed up in battle order. Anna observes that Alexios had already dispatched a portion of the Varangians to attack the camp of Guiscard, and these were not present during the battlc. 22 The battle lines were as follows. 21

22

Alexiade, 1, 155. Alexiade, I, ISH. George Palaiologos is an appealing Hgurc···-bravc, rcsourcellll,

f;4

CHAPTER THREE

, Robert commanded the center of his army, which was divided three parts, The left was under Bohemond's command; the right, :i1nng the sea, ,und~r Count Amiketas, Alexios drew up his armyfacmg Robl'rt, WIth Ius left Bank against the sea. Alexios took the centl'~'; on the right was the caesar Nikephoros Me1issenos, and on the I:·lt Pakollrianos the Armenian, whose title at court was Grand Domestic :,Hr.~~l\' ~oll/e,\'tikos). In front of the imperial line was a unit of "barlJanans with axes-Varangians-but it is unlikely that they were 1l11Il1(Tt,JlIS enough to have a frontage as long as that of the whole Byzam,mt: army: Guiscard also employed the "English" later in his t .. tIlI J .l;ug n, and It, m,~y be that many of these men hired themselves ollt d~ Illcrccnanes 111 the two decades following' 1066 d " '1'(11'IV t IlC I>>yz'mtllle ' ,an wele 11, 'I, . I '\ ' , almy to supp ement the Varangian contingU~t. I'. I;~a n:marks that they were armed with two-handed swords 'I;H IS ~le s, and she also notes that they gTew weak under the weigh t I) t It'll" arms and 'trmor 23 Th' , , I1 " ' , I S suggests ll1dIcates that they were , ,() \\('anng some form of h ' ;lI'Illor \\"lS ~(J 1\" I ' eavy armor, perhaps cham mail. This ,,' t,iVV t lat It was WOl I' 1 tit' " , ' " , ' I l on y m t 1e expectation of bat',h Jt Was at the battle of Stamford B 'd ' " ', n ge, whIch ended WIth Ih,' ,/;tlwhtt'1' of rh ' 1 ' ,j . \llh('l'~ '~\1'n' fll'l('elc'l ~Igel' y uIlarmOl,'ed force of Harold Hardrada). . "" I!l )etwcen the 'I' , \ ;u ;tllgians with instru "t' k' mam me of AlexIOs and the " , , C IOns to S Irmish with t1 I Iwluud the shield \!' 11 I I le enemy auc retreat R \
1,,,,,11 IJld

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;!llmits ill Ill) " " ,. 17.), an important· 'fi. II;Jir'.'Hl(lit. Apparently he was not Oll~()llr~e 01, all her accounts Jil 11", l'lII/,' \ 'tl I ~.t1 of the LOtlr[, but '1lsQ Al ' .Y' hke Nlkephoros Bryen, \11 Ill' Svtl" , " 'eXIOs cia' f" cl H 1',/" '" /" I... , "JIlt',' I' (, 1I.11lS and ClImans as \vell ,\.' se ,lien, e appears . . I 'I' I' cS l!l an Int " t ' , , ) I ""II,tl'.1 1"1',1' illl lJ I11 17' ,~ , , \\It I ancred's I'l ' 1, elCS ll1g Illcldcnt , ' , " ISO enee towa'l tl /,;' li'i,;., I. 1,11 /I ill, le 1e emperor, and 1, L I i'l I )"J" J; ~(I; , " " , )';",!;!fdllI, Ill; I "e I')') I' ; I ,it i'J lil,,'rm/IlI,: '~,J" ~~' ,2 1 2.1-. GrOPe T D,' , :' ""'1'1 \lld"'iH ',I/dl '\ 11' .,\ft/ilfJ~l' ,\/rait:r;.r (Philadell)j~i' j'98,;,)nI1IS, A1mm,ce's Strate' .. I." I I)IHls, who'll' ,
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THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS (1081-1118)

tCll" sudden operations to react quickly and nimbly to developing siluations; hence the term "assault troops" for peltasts who carried liltle more than a few javelins and a shield, To return to the battle of Dyrrachion, the Nonnans who faced the left: Hank of the Byzantine army comprised the infantry and cavalry under Amiketes, This division charge cl the Varangians and their leader Nampites, presumably still supported by archers and peltasts, The NOl"lnans were routed. As at Hastings, the English foot soldiers followecl up their victory by advancing far beyond the main linc of their army, Guiscard sent reserves against the Varangians, and the Varangians broke.~li Anna t~lIls prey at this point to her Homericizing tendencies, but it is clear that the breaking of the huscarles, like the breaking of the Immortals by Bryennios, was the signal for a general charge by the enemy, Guiscard's fClrces drove back the Byzantine line and routed lhc whole army in short order,27 The imperial camp was overrun, the baggage train was captured, and the army was so dispersed Lhat the emperor took night for two days, only stopping once he reached Ochrid. The magnitude Alexios' defeat at Dyrrachion begs the question: could Alcxios have conducted this battle differently? Alexios' peculiar tactic of deploying archers behind a shield wall of Varangians appears to be his f-irst attempt to gTapplc with the power of the Norman cavalry charge. \Vhether the Varangians would have been better used in another role, or as a reserve, is a moot point. Behind them, the main battle line or cavalry gave way to the first charge the enemy, The Normans probably appreciated the resisting power I-Iuscarle inllmtry against their charge, and perhaps Alexios was also counting upon a certain amount Norman-English rivalry to , , ' men.-'Ill '1"' A '1'se , Norlnal1 glve a greater . lncentlve to IliS ,0" nna' s surpl., , inftll1try were sllcccssilll in breaking and slaughtering the Varangtans, whom Anna represents as highly undisciplined. 2!' Despite Anna's

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1,. The reason tha t AI('xios hacl sn many English recrulls IS a LJ,lICstlO11 which is not clillic-lIlt to ,ltlSlI'l'r, Until 1072 the Nurmans were engaged 111, wars to. senll'l' their English possessio liS, In 1069 70 thc,re were. seven rc~)clho~s agall1st Norll1an rut.- in England, Alter I[Hi(i many Enghshmcn louncl servIce wah Byzantint' emperors" "q ,1If'l'iadl' I Sl. Nichlllas', titere,

" ' . I (iD, SOI11C 01 the huscarlcs escaped and fled to the sanctudr~ 01 NOl'ln
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66

CHAPTER THREE

remark that the Varangians advanced well beyond the Byzantine line, thereby inviting their defeat, it is just as likely thal Anna is covering up her father's failure to exploit the Varang;ian victory over the Norman right wing. In this case, the defeat of the Varangiam; could be ascribed to Alexios' lack of support for them. Had they advanced too far beyond the imperial line, or had the imperial forces and their commander failed to support them properly? The latter see~s the more plausible explanation. The Byzantines gained a great tactIcal advantage when the Norman right collapsed, but failed to exploit it. They lost the battle as a result and were forced into another twenty-five years of intermittent warfare with lhe Normans. Alexios nonetheless deserves some credit, particularly for his quick use. of peltasts to deal with the emergency on his left. The Byzantine am battle line's inability to withstand the Norman charge resulted 111 defeat. The use of Varangians, petlasts or other special troops was se~ondary to th: battle's outcome, but only because the emperor faI~ed to apprecIate adequately what they had accomplished. The qUIck rout of the Byzantine cavalry, veterans of ten years of civil war and battle after battle against the Turks is a strong' indicator ~hat Byzantine cavalry was more lighlly arm~d and arn~ored than Its western foes. Reinforcing this supposition is Anna's remark that Alexios' ~orse was a "real" war-horse, obtained when Bryennios was defeated . cavalry use as mounts, t le yzantme . ..lO What d'ICI tlle rest 0 fiB If only the emperor had such a horse? . The extent of t~1e Byzantine defeat is most strongly indicated by the fa:t th~t AlexlOs was forced to call up recruits, who needed to be.tramed ~n horsemanship, archery, drills, and skirmishing.:lI At this po~nl, AlexlOs was lucky; his diplomacy with Henry IV of Germany off, and Robert was recalled to defend his Italian possessions, whlle Bohemond . . remained at Dyrrac h'IOn;'12 B0 h emond appears comet nt : as, a m~I~tary commander, but he seems to have lacked his ~l1scard s polItIcal clout, and he does not appeal' to have maintamed .control Over h'IS Brac t'·IOUS no bI e subordinates. Bohemond's first ~a~paJ~~ v:e~t well enough. He advanced southeast to Ioannina in 5 < :11'1° , ortl~Yll1g and garrisoning the city. W11en Alexios moved his new y reCl'lllted army there' th 111 e summer of 1108, the emperor

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Alexiatle, I, 164,. Alexiatie, Il, 13' 14. Alexiarle, Il, 1:3- H.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS (1081--III8)

67

remained outnumbered, and resorted to a stratagem in an attempt to disrupt the Norman cavalry charge, ordering the construction of wagons, which Anna calls chariotso:l:l Like their ancient counterparts in the battles of Gaugamela (332 B.C.) and Magnesia (198 B.C.), they were ineffective. The Normans maneuvered around them by splitting their army into two groups and then simultaneously charged the Byzantine right and left flanks. Alexios' army was quickly put to rout. If indeed wagons were used as Anna indicates, their location in the center of Alexios' army would have had the added disadvantage of preventing troop movements by Alexios, which might have prevented the Norman encircling maneuver. The use of "chariots" was a strategem that proved disastrous. Alexios again retreated northward, to Ochricl, to gather mercenaries and muster his forces. Because George Palaiologos successfully defended Dyrrachion, these early battles, which Alex~os lost, were fought in Epiros rather than further east. If DyrrachlOn had fallen earlier, the Normans would have been able to throw their full military force at 1Vlacedonia and Thrace. Thessalonike would have been under siege, not Dyrrachion. If the Norman army had been encamped around Thessalonike, Alexios WOUld. have had difficl~lty raising an army with the 1\I1acedonian, Thracmn, and Thessahan contingents that comprised much of his cavalry.. . Alexios' next battle was fought near the Vardar RIVer. He agam sought some form of strategem that would break the apparently irresistible Norman charge. The emperor planned to place a fie.ld of caltrops in front of his army. A force of lancers would be s~atloned in front of these dcvices to entice the enemy center forward mto the caltl'op field. When the enemy became enm~shed. i~ the c~ltrops, the Byzantine jJeltasts would hammer them WIth mISSIles, ",:hlle t~e Byzantine cavalry assaulted their Hanks. 3+ The Normans agam anticipated Alexios' maneuver. They wheeled their cavalry around the field of caltrops and the stationary lancers, and sn:ashed the Byz~n­ tine flanks. Bohemond's own center remained statlOnary, preventmg Alexios' lancers from~ moving to the aid of their compatriots. ~he~ his flanks had retreated, Alexios was left only with the men m 1118

T; 11 00 d 11 1'l-' 19 Anna provides liltle real information about t.his campaign. f exza e, " . I' ., I TI t 0y IS pOS The movement of armies and individual events appeoar (lsJomlC(. 11S SOlo sibly an exaggeration, or it may be completely iabncaled. H Alexiade, Il, 20.

68

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center. He wisely elected to flee. According to Anna, the soldiers were afraid of the Normans (having twice met defeat at their hands) and performed poorly.30 What this battle demonstrates is the uselessness of tricks and stratagems against a highly disciplined cavalry force, such as that commanded by Bohemond. It also demonstrates the superior tactical flexibility of the Normans, who always managed to improvise and maneuver, while the Byzantines were constantly forced to react defensively. This flexibility, combined with shock power, made the Norman army an extremely efficient oJfensive force. To prepare for the next stage of the struggle against thc Normans, Alexios requested aid from his Turkish allies and rcceived seven thousand cavalry from Suleyman, the Seljuk sultan of Nicaea. He also collected other mercenaries, probably the "Sarmatians" mentioned in Anna's account of the ensuing battle.:lIi On this occasion Alexios took advantage of the overconfidence that thc NOl'mans had built up during their recent victories over the Byzantine armies. In each o.f these previous battles, the Normans quickly dispersed the Byzant111e cavahy and then pursued it for many miles. Alexios took advantage. of this tendency and ordered his army to retreat at first ~nt~ct WIth the NO.rmans. When the Normans followed in pursuit, exlOS and .some ehte cavahy troopers would stage an ambush and sack the Lat111 camp. Alexios ordered his archers to fire at the encmy ~orses .rather .than at th~ rid~rs. As a. result of these measures, the yzantmes gamed a partIal VIctory WhIle skirmishing with the Latin rear-guard. Tl' . tory was mucI1 needed, smce . lIS .VIC the Byzantine cavally w:re .be~omll1g well practiced in the art of escapeY After fiJrther skirmlshmg, the Normans retreated north and west to Kastoria, where Bohemond had diffiulty paymg . IlIS . no ble subol'dmates. . ,c Impe. 1'1al forces soon took the city. Alexios, t~rough ~hrewd political maneuvering, (probably supplebrIbery of B0 Ilemon . d' s no blcs), managed to restore mented by lrberal . the B~zantll1e-Norman border to its line at the beginning of the cam] pargl~ (10.83). Robert's second campaign was short-lived and enc cd WIth hIS death'm IOB4 . W l. ' e wrl·therefore move directly to :\" Alexiade, n, 20. 11 . d I ~ eXIa e, I, 30-3l. These 'Sarrnatians' , l! d S . r arc eIther the Pcchcncgs or C . .\.' ca.e aU/()maton by Anna I\.()ITI11ene, lions. They arc probabl Pe \ umans ! la! ~eXI0S :lsed for these types of opcra:17 Alexiade, n, 27.30. y C lcnegs that AlexlOs enlisted after lheir clcleat in I O~) I. :1Ii

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS

r

KOMNENOS

(roBr-llIB)

69

the campaign conducted by Bohemond in 1107-0B. This campaign demonstrates the generalship of Alexios at its most experienced and energetic. Anna Komnene describes Alexios' preparations for this campaign in detail. The emperor first called for a fleet from the Cyclades. 911 Army units were sent out under the best young leaders, and the passes around Dyrrachion were seized. This prevented the Normans from foraging properly once they had plundered the supplies from the area around the city.39 Other soldiers were sent to interfere with Norman operations and to divert them from their attack on Dyrrachion. The N o1'mans sought to engage the Byzantines in skirmishes, but the emperor ordered his men to avoid battle, and these Norman forays did not break the Byzantine cordon around their forces. Anna's description of Alexios' tactics is reminiscent of the sixth-century Strategikon: "A general's supreme task is to win, not merely by force of arms, but also by ... treaties ... some-times ... an enemy can be beaten by fraud. ".1() A chance engagement near Dyrrachion resulted in a Byzantine victory, and this seems to have limited the 41 Norman's ability to leave camp in foraging groups to forage. The Byzantines appear to have had considerably ~ess difficulty v;ith the~e skirmishing forces and beat them back, burmng Bohemond s fleet 111 the process. Anna's account of Alexios' advice to his men preceding these actions, though subject to question, is more than usually .detailec~. Alcxios' advice to his men demonstrates a sounder grasp of hIS army s tactical and strategic problems than he previously displayed. !"le ordered thc mounted archers to skirmish with the enemy, harasslllg the Norman cavalry with archery-fire in the same way the Seljuks harassed Crusader forces. Lancers were. statione.d behind the s~ree~ of archers to take advantage of any dIsorder III the enemy hne. The archers were ordered to shoot exclusively at the enemy's horses. No mention is made of the infantry during these skirmishes, only a highly mobile, flexible cavalry. Alexios' plan of campaign was a

:m Alexiade, Ill, 65. :m Alexiatle, nI, 93. . . d.fA C· [New York If) Alexiade, Ill, 101. (trans. E.R.A. Sewtcr, The AleXia q, nI/a omnena ,

1987], 405). .\1 Alexiatle, Ill, \09. ·12 A lexiade, Ill, 114·.

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70

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS (108r-III8)

CHAPTER THREE

masterpiece of indirect warfare. He blocked the Norman access to forage, prevented Bohemond from using the ocean to transport supplies, and harassed his exhausted troops with constant skirmishes. Alexios also sowed dissention within enemy ranks by oHcring bribes, and by planting false letters that seemed to implicate certain COl11manders. Disease and demoralization, combined with the Byzantine's aggressive defense, accomplished what three major defeats and five to six years of warfare had not been able to: Bohemond was forced into a humiliating treaty without the necessity of another pitched battle.

Pec/zenegs, Cumans, and Se!juks Alexios' campaigns against the Pechenegs, Cumans, and Seljuks presented entirely different problems from his campaigns against eithcr fellow-Byzantines or Normans, both of whom sought to fight decisive battles. In the case of a usurper, the dangcr to the Byzantine state was simply a change of ruler. The Norman threat was far more s:rious; a. deci~ive defeat could have meant the end of the Byzantlne Em~IrC. 1 he problem posed by a war against the Seljuks and t~e furkie steppe peoples was that decisive victory was exceedingly difficult to secure because their armies were mobile and able to avoid combat with the heavily armed Byzantine contingents sent against the~l. The strategy that Alexios followed during his last campaign agamst Bohemond resembles the tactics that the Pechenegs and Cumans employed against him. His strategy was to attack and retreat, offer battle when expedient, flee and again skirmish as soon as the enemy had turned its back. This method of warfare can exhaust an opponent who wishes to bring his more agile foe to combat. Bohe~ond discovered this, and Alexios experienced similar difficulties in Ius tw~ great campaigns against the trans-Danubian tribes. Al~XlOS l.earned that the only way he could counter the constant furklSh raids. and invasions in the East was to fight fire with fire: to employ 11lS own, well-trained skirmish el's against those of his enemy.l:l In th . 'e European terntories of the Byzantine Empire, the r

71

problem proved far greater: the armies of skirmishing Cumans and Pechenegs were so large that they threatened Byzantine control of Thrace and Bulgaria between 1081 and 1091, and intermittently thereafter. Anna describes the depredations of the Scythians during this period, and devotes almost the entirety of the Alexiad's Book 7 to an account of Alexios' skirmishes with these tribes, Anna makes them appear suddenly, as if attacks from beyond the Danube River were unknown before Alexios' reign. This is pure literary form, of course; Anna portrays routine events as exceptional and calamitous in order to cast Alexios' actions in a more glorious light. vVe first hear of the Scythians in an account of their raid on the region near Adrianople in 1080.+1 Tatikios, who was frequently employed by Alexios on difficult missions, crossed from Kyzikos with some two hundred Franks, under the command of Humbertopoulos. He proceeded to Adrianople, where he drew recruits from the surrounding countryside:f5 The Scythians, laden with booty, were decisively defeated and withdrew north of the Danube. In spring of 1087, a Pecheneg army, which Anna estimates (implausibly) at eighty thousand, entered the empire and pushed south of the Haimos Mountains before a Byzantine army was able to stop them:16 These two invasions demonstrate the weakness of Byzantium's northern border dcfenses, if any actually existed at this time. They attest as well to the dangers of being unable to maintain a standing army sufficient to meet sudden threats. The Franks, serving as Byzantine mercenaries, saw continuous service. But Alexios always drew his army {i'om the surrounding countryside in Thrace and Macedonia. Soldiers could noL be called up overnight, and the Pechenegs continued to raid while the imperial army was called up and organized. The local population suffered during the time it took the emperor to muster a force sufficicnl to drive off large raids. The defeat of the Pecheneg horde and the dcath of its leader, Tzelgu, did not, however, remove the threat of the Pechcneg army,

r

,j Alexiade, I, 136-137 Anna r ' inli,ll1tty skinnishers' tll.' ' Clmarks. that ,at first only soldiers committed were , , , ey operatec at mghl lrom 11 0 I j' I . ' I1 ga eys. n y a tcr t 1(' co<[slltnc around the Bosllhnros had 1 '" lcen partJa y cleared of Turkish activity did these men

receive horses, and begin to skirmish actively during the day, They were ordered not to engage in any major battles, " , . H 'Scythians' was a generic term that meant the trtbes ,beyond the Danube, (Istros) river. Here it refers to the Pcchenegs and Cumans Jl1 the sat.ne way t,hat Kelt usually referred to Norman knights, but could also mean FrankIsh, Flemtsh, German, and English knights, I:, ,I"

Alexiade, Il, 133, Alexiarle, Il, 137.

• 72

which was supplemented by what Anna terms Dacians (Hungarians), and Sarmatians (Cumans),'f7 The Pechenegs retreated north, out of Thrace and Macedonia, but they remained in the Paristrion region, on the Byzantine side of the Danube, and held it completely. The former rebel Bryennios the elder, considered an expert on political and military questions, warned Alexios to expect defeat if he crossed the Haimos Mountains. 4u Alexios ignored this advice and advanced north to Drista, rejecting a Pecheneg embassy. His army contained the ubiquitous Frankish mercenaries, the levies Tatikios had called up, and the "Manichaeans", a force that Anna estimates numbered about three thousand men.-f9 vVith this force, the emperor unsuccessfully attempted to seize Drista, and then turned south to Great Preslav, where the main Pecheneg army was encamped. Anna's description of this campaign provides interesting information about the tactical system of the Pechenegs, which holds true for the armies of all the steppe peoples the empire faced. She reports comments made by George Palaiologos and Gregory Maurokatakalon, both experienced military commanders, who said that the Scythians had no .chance of victory if they fought the Byzantines exclusively with theIr cavalry and not with their "chariots."5o The "chariots" that George and Gregory discuss were war wagons rather than the lighter chariots described in classical Greek and Roman sources. Pechenegs often placed these devices in a circle, as a fortified camp. When the battle turned against them, they would retreat to this enclosure and inflict heavy casualties upon any force that assaulted it. Indeed, this stratagem could not be defeated by a cavalry army alone, as attested by the experience of John Il, who destroyed a Pecheneg army in 1122. J:Ie could ~ot break their circle until he threw in the heavily armed mfantry, hIS Varangian Guard, which was finally able to penetr'ate the wagon-lager and rout the Pechenegs. In this battle, the Peehenegs placed their wagons in a fortified circle and drew up their cavalry in front. They attacked the Byzantine

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THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXrOS I KOMNENOS (ro8r-IlI8)

CHAPTER THREE

Alexiade, n, 87. Alexiade, n, 90 .

..19 The Manicheans ,.vere dualistic herelics, either Paulicians or Bogomils both of whom were settled In Macedonia and Thrace, near Philippopolis. Sinc~ elsewhere :"-nna Komn~ne mentions the Paulicians by name, lhese were probably the n?g?mll~, who AlcxlOs persecuted and attempted lo destroy in the last several years of hls relgn. 50 Alexiade, Il, 95-96.

73

army after harassing it with skirmishers. Alexios positioned himself at the center of his battle-line with his relatives and companions, and with the Frankish mercenaries under Adrian. Caesar Nikephoros Melissenos commanded the army's left wing, whose composition Anna does not specify. Tatikios and Kastamonites led the right wing; they commanded the Byzantine troops and the allied contingents led by the Turks Ouzas and Karatzes. These allies would have been light cavahy, probably armed and accoutered like the Pechenegs they faced. It is even possible that they were Peehenegs or Cumans who were induced to fight for the emperor against their former compatriots and clansmen."1 It is reasonable to assume that the bulk of Alexios' army consisted of the same men Tatikios had recruited earlier: Thracians and Macedonians. The most interesting aspect of this battle is that Alexios linked his infantry and cavalry squadrons. This strategy was similar to the one that he had pursued against the Normans, in 1081, when he used his peltasts to deflect the Norman cavalry attack. We have no way of knowing whether the infantry squadrons that Anna describes were spearmen or jJeltastJ'. But because they are described as linked to cavalry squadrons, it is likely that they either possessed missile troops with which to support the cavalry, or heavy spearmen who could provide a base of support should the cavalry fail in their assaults. The description, moreover, implies that the infantry were working in cooperation with the cavalry along the length of the battle line. This contrasts with the usual Byzantine cavalry-infantly formation, which positioned cavalry on the flanks, and infantlY in the eenter. It seems most likely that the infantry stationed with the cavalry were jieltasts, since it is difficult to believe that disjointed units of less-agile heavy speannen could have formed up quickly enough to provide a line behind which the cavalry could hide, while peltasts would have been useful in any kind of action against missile-armed cavalry. Alexios' plan demonstrates that he understood the need for a flexible battle-formation against the Pechenegs. With the army arranged in a checkerboard formation, the infantty could provide missile support, and perhaps a refuge for retreating cavalry; the cavalry provided mobility and assault power.,,2

',I ;2

Alexiade, fl, 97. Alexiade, Il, 979B.

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74

CHAPTER THREE

The battle that ensued was an equal, bloody f-ight until Pccheneg reinforcements of thirty-six thousand men (according to Anna's account) arrived late in the afternoon. This relief force routed the Byzantines. Although it is unlikely that either the emperor's army or the army of his opponents were as large as Anna claims, the account of this action indicates that the battle was a long, brutal affair. It reportedly lasted all afternoon-one of the longest battles that Anna describes. The emperor and his men scattered; Alexios next appears at Verroia, where he ransomed Byzantine soldiers who had been captured in this battle.":! This battle presents historiographic problems, since it follows the course of the battle of Adrianople (478) so closely that wc must question the veracity of Anna's account. There is no mention of linked infantIY and cavalry squadrons at Adrianople. However, the account of the emperor's assault upon the Pecheneg force, their success as Cl consequence of a wagon-lager, and the arrival of a relief force that put the imperial army to rout closely mirrors Ammianus Marcellinus' account. Certainly a battle occurred, and Alexios was defeated; Anna would not have failed to mention a victory, and because soldiers or sons of soldiers involved could have verified the battle account, wc can accept Anna's description of the end of the action; a Pccheneg relief force arrived and destroyed the Byzantine army. The audience would have probably recognized this as an allusion to earlier and greater events. This was useful to Anna as a literary device. The emperor was defeated, yet he would gain some amount of reflected glory from the allusive comparison of his deeds with those of Valens, an eI~peror from ~ time of greater imperial power. ~s III so. many tImes past, the empire benefited from the disunity Its enemIes. The vic~orious Pechenegs, returning to their allies (the C.umans), refused to grve them a share of the booty. The Cumans turned upon the exhausted Pechenegs and defeated them. Nevertheless, when the Pechenegs again moved south, Alexios offered them the terms they had demanded before these battles. The Pechencgs acccl)ted Alexios' ter'ms' . to rest an d . . '. . ' tllI'S g'ave tll em an opportumty then contmue rardmg and pillaging; they almost immediately broke the treaty. At Aclrianopl . . . e, Al' exlOS co 11 ected a second army. Tatllnos had mustered IllS army at Philil)POpolis ' blI t now tlle P ecIlenegs Ilac1

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:Jleviade, Il, 101.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXIOS I KOMNENOS (ro8I-IIl8)

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crossed the Haimos Mountains, and were in Thraee proper, a province that until 1090 had been spared foreign invasion. Since Alexios' forces were insufficient to permit a direct confrontation, he practiced the same tactics of skirmish and retreat that he had used against the Turks on the Bosphoros, at Kyzikos in 108l. Unfortunately, this sniping was unable to prevent the Scythians from going where they wished and taking whatever booty they desired. They proceeded south along the Hebros River to Kypsella, where they established a winter camp. Alexios followed their maneuvers by first going to Bulgarophygon, from which he could intercept them if they moved either north towards their homes or east towards Constantinople. While at Bulgarophygon, Alexios' army again took shape. Two thousand arc!wntopouloi (sons of veterans), were mustered, and five hundred Flemish knights arrived to serve the emperor. The corps of Maniakes also arrived, and this induced Alcxios to give battle. 54 The emperor marched his army to Rousion; there it fought a sharp skirmish in which Alexios dismounted his archers and used them to drive off the enemy's attack."'> This Byzantine 'victory' nevertheless necessitated a retreat; because of this we should be careful to accept only the most obvious details from Anna Komnene's account. The emperor retreated to Tzouraulos, which he fortified and surrounded with a trench. Again, these were hardly the actions of a victorious and confident commander. Alexios won a second victory at Tzouraulos, by using the strategem of wagons rolled clown a slope into the advancing Pechenegs. Whether or not this was a real victory, Alexios again did not feel confident enough to pursue the enemy. The Pcchenegs remained undestroyed, and a raiding party next appeared ten slades from Constantinople.:lli "f Tlw Ardwntopu/oi appear to have been a corps of cadets, trained and equipped by Alexios and his personal stalf These m?n may have been .the sons of I:obles, or Df cavalry veterans. See also Mark Bartusls, The Late ~yzantme Army,lPhlladelof Maniakes took its name lrom the Byzantme '· It)02) 206 TIle CUl'I)S . pIlJa, ••1 . , "1 f, troops C under the general George Maniakes, who had n.early conquered SIC! y or onstantinc IX (1040-4·2). These men were clearly (111 1090) not the same men who had l'ought in Sicily, or the veterans would have been at least seventy ye~ll's old. In all probability, the corps was mai.lltaine~ as a s~paratc Ul1lt .after M~l11akes .death. This appears surprising, since Marm:kes (hed whIle. enga~ed 111 rebelhon. It IS. p~s­ siblc that the name of this corps re/creel to those Impenal troops w.ho were legrstered in the army of l'vlaniakes, and to their replacemen.ts. If so, thIS offers a clue to the method of' enlistment and maintenance of these lrsts. ','0

'0.;

A/exiade, 1I, 122 12:i. A/exiade, Il, 12B.

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After the events at Tzouraulos, the emperor disbanded his veterans to the "western cities," in order to protect them fi'om the marauders. However, he was now forced to call them to service again. Anna's list of soldiers called up includes Vlachs, Bulgars, Frankish mercenaries, and presumably the archontopouloi and the Varangians as wellY With these men, Alexios proceeded southwest toward the main Peeheneg concentration at Aenos, on the coast of the Aegean Sea. Alexios was forced to reeonnoiter the enemy by boat, an indication that Pechenegs controlled the countryside. With his armyfive thousand Vlachs, an unspecified number of Bulgarians, five hundred knights from Flanders, the arclwntopouloi, and a reported "forty thousand" Cumans, he advanced against the Pechenegs, crossing the Haimos Mountains and setting up a fortified camp. Anna Komnene carefully describes the battle of Lebounion (1091). Alexios stationed himself in the center of his army, which was divided into three parts. The army faced north, with George Palaiolog'os in command of the right, eastern wing, and Constantine Dalassenos in command of the left-presumably, the western wing, Anna regrettably does not provide further details about the placement of indi:i~ual units, however she does make it clear that the Byzantine mfantly was posted in the center, and the cavalry on the wings. We cannot be certain of Alexios' total numbers. Anna reports that t~le I~yzantines' Cuman allies numbered forty thousand, but impenal forces could hardly have reached that number if Alexios was dc1ighte~ by the arrival of five thousand 'highlanders, '-probably 5 Vlach tnbesmen. i! The imperial and Cuman forces almost certainly outnumbered the Pechenegs; the two cavalry flanks of Alcxios' army advanced fa~ter than the infantry center, and the Pecheneg army was caught III the semi-circle thus created. This maneuver would have been .velY, difficult to perform had the Pechenegs outnumbered th~ Byza~ltme-Cuman forces. Once the Pechenegs had been defeated, tillS partl~l envelopment would account for the slaughter that followed. It IS noteworthy that Alexios used tIle IocaI popu IatlOn ' to run water up to his front-line soldiers. This was a wise expedient, one

2[~~/he

Vlachs (BA&XOl) inhabited Thessaly and the northern Balkans. See ODB,

',11 :lIexiade, 11, [<W. (8,5,1.[0-13) Am . ". . lallders ',oined Alexios' al'lny '1'1 la says that five thousand of these hlgh'. . lest' men were I)rob 1I .\. VI h I . . IlICI'l't'llant's in the ;mnies of Alcxios, a) y t le ae s w 10 appear as

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that was not prac6eed by the Pechenegs. 59 The Byzantines and Cumans inflicted a severe defeat on the Pechenegs, but they were not, as Anna claims, annihilated in 1091."0 The Crusaders would later complain of Alcxios' Pecheneg mercenaries, when they were ordered to follow the Crusaders and prevent their army from pillaging the countryside. li ! Alexios' final campaign against the Cumans was caused by their support of an imposter who claimed to be a son of the deceased emperor Romanos IV. The Vlachs, always-unreliable allies, showed the Cumans unguarded passes, and again Alexios was forced to fight the enemy in Thrace itself. He mustered his army at Anchialos, where he could rely both on the natural defenses of the city and upon his Heet. 1i2 The Cumans advanced, and Alexios drew up his ranks between the city and sea on the right, and the rough ground on the left. This was a clever strategy because as Anna says, the rough gTound prevented any sort of cavalry maneuvers, while the sea obviously prevented any maneuvers on that flank. Therefore the Cumans could not use their greater numbers against the emperor, but would have to assault the imperial line, a form of warfare in which the Byzantines, together with their Frankish allies, were quite capable. In this instance the Cumans were defeated, although in view of their numbers, it is understandable that Alexios declined to allow his men to pursue them. Alexios' last Cuman campaign demonstrates his increased skill as a general; he certainly controlled his men with a higher degree of proficiency than he had in his early campaigns against the usurper Bryennios. When confronted with a force of twelve thousand Cumans who occupied a ridge above him, he enticed them from their superior position by sending against them some Uze Turkish allies, armed 63 with bows. These troops harassed the Cumans with archery fire. When the Cumans could no longer withstand the casualties caused by this fire, they advanced from their hilltop position. This is w~lat Alexios wanted them to do; it gave the advantage to the Byzantme 5'1 Alexiade, n, 14·3, "" Alexiade II 143, lil Le 'Lib;)" de Raymolld D'Agllilm, eel, JB. & L.L. Hill (Paris,. 1969), 38. RaymOllel, eI'Aguilers, His[ol'ia FrallcrllLllll Old Ce/Jerllrlt Iherusalem. Tr. I-Illl, John Hugh & Laurita L. (Philadelphia, 19GB), 113-19. I;~ Alexiar/e, Il, 194-%. G:l Alexiar/e, Il, 201-02.

EL

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heavy cavalry. These troops engaged the Cumans in hand-to-hand combat and broke them. Alexios finally destroyed the Cumans in another battle north and west of Adrianople, calling back his heavier troops once the enemy had been broken, and pursuing the Cuman force out of Byzantine territory with his lighter-armed cavalry.t'''

The Seg'uks Alexios fought the last campaign of his reign in Anatolia, against the Seljuk Turks. Anna provides accounts of two of these battles. The first was a surprise attack against a small Turkish force; the second was a skilled fighting retreat from Seljuk territory when the main Seljuk army arrived.ti,S This difficult campaign demonstrates that both Alexios' and his army's experience had increased. However, Byzantine difficulties with the Seljuks were not over, and the campaign of 1116-17 is attests to the strengths and weaknesses of the army that Alexios developed between 1081 and III 7. This last army of Alexios was composed of the regular Byzantine troops, supplemented by foreigners and mercenaries. 1iG These forces took time to muster, leading one to suppose that Alexios was drawing not only upon his Thracian contingents, but also upon those in Macedonia and perhaps Thessaly. During the summer of 1116 Alexios took this army, minus the mercenaries, who had not yet arrived, and scouted southwestward from Nicaea. He defeated a small force of Turks at P~emanenon before returning to his base at Lopadion. !he m~rcenanes arrived while the army was encamped. The most 1l1terestu:g aspec~ of this campaign is that, despite the Crusaders' success ~n restonng much territory to Byzantium, Turkish raiding' forces stIlI appeared near the Bosphoros. . While he was regrouping his army at Lopadion, Alexios received w~rd that a large Turkish force was advancing upon the city of NI:ae~, the largest Byzantine urban possession in the east. At this POlt1t III her narrative, Anna Komnene resorts to onc of her most remarkable rationalizations. Alexios' political opponents in the capIi+ All'xiade, Il, 204-05. "' Alexiade, III, 169-72•• lil> Ale~i~de: Ill, 187. Anna says that foreigners, mercenaries, and Alexins' own


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ital had criticized him for his inaction at Lopadion. Anna presents the following story: Alexios abandoned his attack upon the Sultan because his defense of western Asia had frightened the Turks so much that he was worried an overt move would cause them to flee back to 1konion, thus depriving Alexios of the battle he sought. G7 Despite this rationalization, she reports, "there was much criticism and whispering against the Emperor, for after having made such preparations, and having gathered such a force against the barbarians, nothing great was accomplished, but he retired to Nicomedia. "Iill Anna again seeks to justify a decidedly passive response: the greatest general is not always the one who fights; victory can be obtained in many ways. Anna's subtext is that Alexios' army was too small for battle against the Sultan's main army, so he retired to Nicomeclia to recruit more men. GU With this reinforced army Alexios advanced to Santabaris and thcn to Philomelion, which his army seized. Meanwhile, parties of scouts were sent out to recover prisoners that the Turks had taken. Whcn these were recovered (and this was the only success of the campaign), Alexios marched back towards Nicomedia. He had heard that a large army of Turks was advancing against him from the north. The Turks made contact with the Byzantine army, which assumed a de1ensive formation; the Greek refugees from Turkish territOlY were in the center, with thc Byzantine infantry in a square around them. Anna's account of this fighting retreat is one of the most interesting battle descriptions in the Alexiad. 70 This kind of discipline while under attack was very difficult to maintain, particularly in retreat. Nevertheless, Alexios' men did not break ranks. 7 I Usually we need to be wary of Anna's praise of Alexios, but in this case it appears warranted. After failing to defeat Alexios' army, t~e S?ljuk sultan, Malik-Shah, made a treaty with the emperor. ThIS fmlure prompted his brother, Mas'ud to rebel, and Malik-Shah was blinded

Alexiade, A"?xiadl', Alexiar/e, Alexiade,

IH, 193. Ill, 194. ';'1 HI, 19:i. . '1 d I'" " 711 Ill, 204- 05. It was during this rctreat ~hat AlexIOs .unvcl e ~IS. ncw. battle Ilmnatiol1, which appcars to have been. the s~mplc ~xpedlent of fOlmmg hIS inlil1llry into Cl ~qllare and marching back to Impenal. terrItory. '. . 71 '1/'" d If I 203--06. Malik-Shah had by now arnved and led a nUIJor
!;II

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and executed. The successful march to Philomeliol1 and back is the most interesting campaign of Alexios' later years because it indicates how proficient the Byzantine army had become: the army maintained an exacting discipline on the march, which prevented the Scljuks from inflicting serious damage. This alone indicates the profound difference between the army that Alexios received from his predecessor, Nikephoros Botaneiates, and the army that he led against the Seljuks.

Conclusion Although most of Alexios' campaigns were defensive, the primary difference between the Turkic campaigns (against the Peehenegs, Cumans and Seljuks) and those conducted against Byzantine usurpers, or the Normans, is that the Turkish peoples were interested in raiding and plunder. They were not tied to fixed locations and could choose to give or refuse battle as they wished. Unlike Robert Guiscard and Bohemond, or the rebel Bryennios, the Turks had no goal other than booty. Upon entering imperial territory they split up, coming together to fight, and avoiding battle whenever possible. They could be caught only when weighed down with captives and plunder. Tatikios attacked such a group near Philippopolis, but more often these raiding parties would make peace until the emperor disbanded his men. Since the Pechenegs were essentially always on campaign, they found it easy to take advantage of the peacetime dispersal of Byzantine troops, and the seasonal nature of imperial campaigning. Campaigns against the Pechenegs and Cumans were thus difficult because the emperor had to decide whether to disperse his men to prevent plundering, or to risk a pitched battle against an enemy that could easily flee in defeat and was tenacious in pursuit of a defeated foe. The Byzantine soldiers had more difficulty fleeing, and if they did, it was their own territOlY that would suffer. The Peehenegs and Cumans posed only an indirect threat to the Byzantine state. However, the wide range of their raids, their ability to concentrate and disperse, and their numerical superiority made them a great threat to Thrace, one of the few areas relatively safe from foreign invasion. Thrace and Eastern Macedonia were also two of th: three major recruitment areas for Byzantine soldiers, and the EmpIre could hardly survive if it lost them.

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Alexios' tactics against the Pechenegs, like those against the Normans, constitute evidence of an increasingly intelligent employment of combined arms. His use of archers to provoke an attack at Tzouroulos, and later against an isolated band of six thousand Pechenegs, and his pairing of infantry and cavalry squadrons in support of one another in the battle at Great Preslav, show a high degree of tactical sophistication, as well as a high level of discipline among his troops. His choice of terrain at Anchialos, forcing a numerically superior enemy to fight hand-to-hand, the Byzantines' preferred style, was masterful. Alexios had difficulty achieving complete victory against the Pechenegs and Cumans because they were an enemy whose quick horses made them difficult to pin down and destroy-even when beaten in battle. The exception to this rule was the battle of Lebounion, in which a horde of Cumans also participated, and in which the combined allied forces considerably outnumbered the Peehenegs. The Pechenegs were outflanked on either side and surrounded. In this type of battle, hand-to-hand and at close quarters, the Byzantines and the heavily armed Franks held a great advantage. The tenacity of Alexios' detcnse of Thrace and the abundant use of Byzantine gold to buy the services of Peeheneg survivors as mercenaries kept them from being a threat until the reign of his son, John n. Alexios Komnenos' campaigns were consistently reactive. The attacks of the Normans, the Pechenegs, the usurpers, and the Turks of Ikonion forced the emperor into defensive wars, fought almost entirely within the empire, where failure threatened Alexios' political survival as well as the survival of the state. The usurpers that Alexios fought were recruited, armed, and trained from much the same population, as were his armies. Macedonia, Thrace, Thessaly, and Choma provided the men who fought for both the emperor and the usurpers. Furthermore, the tactical doctrine followed by each side was similar. What is most striking about Alexios' battle against Blyennios is the way the forces mirrored each other in their tactical disposition. It is probably unfair to judge Alexios' military capabilities in these early campaigns. He did not have complete freedom of action, ~nd the presence of political foes in the capital meant that every heSItation or sign of weakness could prove politically fatal. As a tactic~an, Alexios appears no worse than his opponents. But battles agamst armies armed and organized like his own provided no unexpected tactical challenges. If numbers were equal, the better-disciplined force

82

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usually won. While we should discount Anna's descriptions of miraculous escapes and brilliant stratagems, there is something remarkable about an emperor who held power through so many defeats in battle and so many coup attempts. Thirty-seven years was a long time for any emperor to reign in even the best of times, let alone in times of nearly constant crisis. Despite these trials and difliculties, Alcxios died in bed, attended by his wife and by his daughter, Anna. Alexlos had great difficulty adapting his army to the Normans' battle tactics. Accustomed to fighting pitched battles, Alexios at first fought the Normans directly, which no doubt pleased Robert Guiscard. After several defeats (Dyrrachion in 1081; Kastoria in 1083), it became clear to Alexios that the Byzantine kataphraktos was no match for the enemy in open battle. Whether it was the superiority of the enemy's horses, the weight of their armor and heavy lances, their aggressiveness and training, or a combination of these factors, the emperor's cavalry were never capable of beating the Normans in a straight fight. The weight and striking power of the Norman formation did not detract from its tactical Hexibility. At Dyrraehion the emperor sent forward his Varangian guard. The Norman cavalry allowed the huscarles to tire, and then Guiscard threw his own heavy infantry at them. When the exhausted huscarles routed, the Norman cavalry drove the Byzantine cavalry from the field. In several cases the emperor attempted to use stratagems such as caltrops; the Normans maneuvered around them and crushed the Byzantine cavalry before it could react to their maneuver. Only after considerab~e experience, including his first war against the Peehenegs was AlexlOs able to practice indirect warfare against the Normans. In the 1108 campaign, he cut off their supplies by sea, blocked the passes around Dyrrachion, and harassed the Normans mercilessly. This s~rategy was su~cessful; when the Byzantines eventually fought the tIred, starved, dIsease-ridden Normans, they were victorious. Alexios ne~er. developed an equivalent strategy against the steppe peoples; the. lImIted .resources of the eleventh- and early twelfth-century Byzantme EmpIre meant that any strategy was bound to be less ~han totally successful against them. With money and stable recruitmg grounds, something like the mobile cavalry army of the late fourth-ce~tury Roman Empire might have solved Alexios' problems. But AlexlOs could call up his levies only during emergencies. The sole cavalry that remained constantly under arms were the versatile

83

Frankish mercenaries. The desperate financial condition of the Byzantine Empire prevented the creation of an army capable of dealing with both the Norman and Scythian threats. The emperor used men he could call up or hire on short notice, and while he achieved some remarkable successes with this force, an army constantly raised and disbanded was dependant upon the energy and skill of its commander. By the time of the Seljuk campaign Alexios' men were veterans. They were used to his style of leadership and to his tactics, and tlley operated in a disciplined and professional manner under the most adverse conditions. It is to Alexios' credit that he knew how to delegate authority. When he found men he trusted, such as Tatikios, George Palaiologos, Ouzas, and even some others of uncertain loyalty but great skill (such as Humbertopoulos), he relied upon their leadership. Because of the constant presence of potential rivals and rebels in Constantinople, it was essential that the emperor be able to send out a commander sufIkiently competent to handle his responsibilities, but sufI1ciently loyal to his emperor. Alexios' captains deserve a large part of the credit for his successes. They frequently recruited his armies, and they were often sent as advanced commanders to threatened regions. \Vithout men such as George Palaiologos, Alexios' reign would likely have ended in disaster. The emperor's capable lieutenants deserve a share in Anna's abundant praise of Alexios. It is uncertain how deliberately Alexios Komnenos planned the restoration of the Byzantine army. He spent most of his long reign fighting wars he had not provoked. Nonetheless, the Byzantine army did develop during his reign. Alexios found effective ways of dealing with both Norman and Scythian tactics, and, if he did not always have the resources to be victorious in battle, he never decisively lost an entire war. His use of cavalry and infantry in support of each other, his orders to his archers to shoot at enemy horses (rather than their riders), his pairing of peltasts with lancers against marauding Crusaders/~ all point to Alexios' awareness of the limitations and strengths of his army. Over time, discipline as well as Hexibility increased, although the types of men (Frankish mercenaries, Byzantine

n

A/exiode, II, 223.

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cavalry, spearmen, pellasts, archers, and Turkish cavalry mercenaries) remained constant. No great strides appear to have been made in siege-craft, but Anna is largely silent about this less glorious form of warfare. As a tactician, Alexios at the peak of his abilities was flexible and resourceful, well aware of the capabilities and limitations of his men and their commanders. He had a penchant [or tactical ruses and gimmicks that more often than not got him into difficulties, but he was also a sound tactician, who used terrain and the inclinations of his opponents to his best advantage. His campaigns demonstrate a clever single-mindedness more than any great genius of exeClltion. Given the materials he had at hand, the best one could say of any general in his position was that he won his wars.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CAMPAIGNS OF JOHN II KOMNENOS (1118-43)

John II has been called the greatest of the Komnenian emperors.' Alexios was forced to fight defensive wars, and Manuel faced a complex military situation that usually placed him at a disadvantage. John, by contrast, planned and fought focused, aggressive campaigns. Our perceptions of this could be credited to source bias, since neither John Kinnamos nor Niketas Choniatcs were adults during John's reign, and therefore their accounts arc informed not by their personal experience, but entirely by hearsay. Stories developed around John's successful campaig11s, and thcse naturally influenced our chroniclers' presentation of events. However, there is more to John's reputation than mere mythologizing. John carefully selected his campaigns: his offensives focused on taking cities in Cilicia, northern Syria and northwestern Asia l\IIinor. His Hungarian and Pecheneg wars were defensive and were the only wars he fought in Europe. john's campaigns therefore demonstrate a coherent military policy. The emperor sought to control the cities of Cilicia and northern Syria in order to control Antioch. His campaigns in Paphlagonia and Pontos were intended to contain the power of the Turkish Danishmendids, who in the early twelfth century constituted a greater military threat to the empire (or so it seemed) than the Seljuks. There are anomalies within this simplc presentation of John's campaigns. John initiated a war with the Venetians in 1126 by outlawing their presence within the empire. John's concentration of funds in large Byzantine land armies, to the detriment of his fleet, resulted in Byzantium'S defeat in thc war against Venice. Byzantine emper.'ors seldom understood the potential of naval power used strateglcally, to accomplish goals independent of the land army. They usually 2 saw naval power as a method of supplying distant armies. John also

1

GeorgL: Ostrngorsky, Hist()~J! qf the Byzantine State, (New Brunswick, NJ., 1969),

37" Niketas Choniates, Nicetae C'lwlliatae Historia, ed . .J. Van Dicten, C~HB, (Ber,lin, 1975), 17--18. John used his fleel lo supply his army when he campaIgned agamst

2i

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attempted to create an alliance with the Seliuk Sultan Mas'ud against the heir of the Danishmend emir. This was also a failure because neither the heirs of Danishmend nor the Sultan could gain by destroying the other. Both the Danishmendids and successive Scljuk governments understood that Byzantium constituted less of a threat in the presence of another Turkish state that could divert the emperor's attention at critical moments. John's grand strategy comprised three goals: security on the eastern border, control of Antioch, and containment of the Danishmendids. Unlike the military activities of both his father and of his son, John's campaigns usually included sieges. Our sources indicate that John conducted approximately twenty-five sieges (an average of one siege per year between 1118 and 114·3), including actions where a siege was begun or completed. Subordinate commanders, whose deeds are not recorded by our chroniclers, probably conducted many more actions of this type. Siegecraft was an altogether exceptional strategy during the reigns of Alexios and Manuel. The most notable example was Alexios' siege of Nicaea, conducted by crusader contingents from France, Normandy, and Flanders, with the aid of some two thousand Byzantine peltasts and Byzantine siege engines. 3 Manuel also conducted sieges on occasion: Zeugminon was stormed and sacked by the Byzantine army in 1165, and Kerkyra was taken after a siege in 1155.+ The n~ost important siege Manuel planned was his 1176 attack upon Iko111on, but the cumbersome siege train that followed his army contributed to his army's defeat. These, however, arc isolated examples. No other offensive sieges appear in Alexios' reign, and Manuel fortified more places than he attacked.

the' Hunga C'I"lela. !v. "1anuel used It . mdepcnclently . . . : ians, an d'I~ 1142'm,j agamst the

Venetl~ns III 11? I, qUIte successfully, and against the Egyptians at Damictta. The great .dIfnc~~ty 101' a pre-modcrn fle?t was t.hat a blockade was nearly impossible; Venctlan pl~ates could o~erate at wIll, despIte the presence of a strong Byzantine fleet .. A tcrnb~e (and deCIdedly il.l-advised) .conclusion was drawn li'om the experience. that the ~cct was ~scless m protectmg the empire. The way the Nonnans C

tr~nsported armlcs to Epll'os was forgotten, and the notion that that a fleet could would take an army to Constantinople was never considered 1 Anne Com?cne, Alexiade, ed. B. Leib. (Paris, 1937-76), III '12-13. f For Zeugrnmon see Ch ',. H'Istana, . 13 4-135;,Iohn . . ' ". on~ates, Kmnamos, Deeth ()j)()/lII and j\i!anuel Comnenlls,John KUll1amos, t1'. C. Brand (New York 1976) l()' For Kerkyra, see Choniates, Hist01ia, 82 If; Kinnamos, 96-101. ' ,. Cl!

(III8-43)

87

The Byzantine Empire possessed no more than a few, isolated outposts in Asia Minor until the arrival of the Crusaders. Cities occupied by Byzantine forces in their wake (1197-1100) created the first Byzantine frontier in Asia Minor since 1071. Before 1071 the frontier was aligned with the mountain chains at the eastern cnd of the Anatolian peninsula. When Turks permanently breached this frontier, individual cities, Greek and Norman autarchs, and Armenian lords defended local territories, but there was no coordinated defense against the invaders. Alexios was too busy with defensive wars against the Normans and Pechenegs to plan the defense of the Byzantine eastern frontier. The only major action in Asia Minor during his reig'n was his campaign of 1116-17. His large army ventured out of Byzantine territory, gathered Greeks who were under Turkish rule, and retreated to the safety of the frontier. John's policy of conducting sieges was part of a deliberate strategy to construct a stable defensive frontier by retaining key cities such as Gal1gra and Neokaisareia, and fortresses in Ci1icia. John planned to defeat his enemies not by destroying their armies, but by occupying strategic fortified cities and controlling the surrounding territory. John fought battles when the tactical situation required that he destroy enemy contingents before attempting to take their cities. Examples of this occur at Aleppo, Kastamon, Shaizar, and at Neokaisareia. 5 Choniates and Kinnamos never indicate that this was a deliberate policy of the emperor, but they are generally silent about emperors' grand strategies. For Basileus John, fortifications and cities just north of Anatolia's central plateau provided bases against the Danishmendids. John's control of Ci1icia effectively cut Seljuk communication with the larger Seljuk sultanate further east. Byzantine control or Cilicia also provided outposts for military action against the Scljuks and against John's enemies in Syria. We should also not underestimate the importance of Cilicia as a base against Antioch. Alexios,John, and Manuel all attempted to control this city. Alexios had to fight to preserve the empire's core territory around the A:gean littoral; John realized that offensive gains were more precanously gained when obtained through large field battles. John understood that control of Cilicia or Paphlagonia was dependent upon control of key cities. Whether Manuel's policy of not engaging in aggressive

" Choniates, His/aria, 20, 2H-30, 34-30; Kinnamos, 19-20, 13, 21.

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siegecraft was a deliberate one is open to debate; it may be that the complexity of politics in the empire prevented him from focusing military resources upon sieges, as had his father. .John's campaigns, however, were conducted with the aim of capturing cities, and we should remember this as wc examine individual tactical actions from his reign. Before we begin our examination ofJohn's tactics, we should evaluate whether John's strategy of siege-craft improved the empire's military and economic power. First, were substantial numbers of new cities held, and did these cities add to the empire's economic and ~ilitary pos~tion-its ability to protect its territory while interfering m the se:L~nly of surrounding states? This is relatively easy to judge by exammmg the sources for incidences of enemy incursions as well ~s th~ effectiveness of the emperor's countermeasures. Economic positIOn IS .more difficult to quantify, in part because of the scarcity of tax reg1sters, cadastral surveys, or even gross receipts from port duties of large cities during this period. This difficulty is pronounced with the Cilician and Paphlagonian cities John attacked. They remained on the edge of Byzantine controlled territory, and our chroniclers knew little about them. Furthermore, these cities remained in intermittent Byzantine control. Thus the current statc of research on these ci~ies does not permit us to determine whether they contributed anythmg t? the Byzantine economy. As military commodities, they were ~heor~tlcally v.aluable, but we have little evidence that they were used 111 . thIS capac.lty. John used Cilicia as a base for his Syrian cam~aJ?,ns. Yet WIthout the ,emperor'~ presence, Cilicia repeatedly regained Its md:~e.ndence. Jo~n s c~mpalgn to hold the cities of Paphlagonia and CIl;e.Ia was a failure 111 an offensive, strategic sense. John took many CItIes, but few were held for any significant period of time, and .they were apparently not used as bases against the Seljuks and Dal11shmendids . .~hese. cities,. however, were important not only as strongholds 101' ~lhtary 111curSlOns by the Byzantine army. Like Manuel's campaigns 111 Italy . . C·l·· . ' John's campaIgns 111 1 ICla and Paphlagonia forced his enemIes to fight d.e~ensively rather than invade imperial territory. When John took Cltles , h·· . 1la d to expend resources to reIS enemIes take th.em, rath~r t:lan to attack the empire. This strategy improved Byzant111e secunty. m Asia M·mar, al·h . .1 t oug1· 1 It reqUlred constant vig1 anc.e and ~ampalgning, which became impossible when Byzantium\ relatIons WIth other states b ecame more complex, and when the'

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Byzantine emperors of the Angelos dynasty (1185-1204) proved incompetent.

Sozopolis The first example of tactical combat from john's reign occurs during the campaign of 1120. The purpose of this campaign was to conquer Sozopolis, a city in Pamphylia. It was the earliest attempt by John to open up a route of communication and supply to the east. The attack upon Sozopolis was a siege; it was quickly concluded, despite Kinnamos' comment that the city was so well situated that it was impossible to besiege with siege-engines. G John instructed Paktarios, a cavalry commander, to fire arrows at the enemy troops who occupied the gates. When the Turks sallied out in fi:ustration, Paktarios was supposed to feign flight until the emperor's main force ambushed them. This was a difficult maneuver, one that involved careful timing. It was common for feigned flight to become a real rout as soldiers became disorganized and disconcerted by the troops pursuing them. Alexios employed this maneuver outside of Larissa against Bohemond's Normans, with mixed results. At Sozopolis, it was highly successful. The pursuing Turkish force was surrounded, the Byzantine soldiers were able to press through the gates, and the city was taken. Three components of this incident are significant. First, John inherited troops with a high degree of discipline, capable of performing potentially dangerous maneuvers that required considerable timing. Second, although Kinnamos calls the Byzantine cavalry group commanded by Paktiarios and Deknos doryphoroi, (spear- or lance-bear7 ers) their activities indicate they were also armed with bows. They weI:e thus capable of both archery fire and of fighting hand-ta-hand with Turkish cavalry. Third, feigned flight followed by an ambush is precisely the type of maneuver for which the Tur~s were famous. Here we see all of the elements of a mature, well-tramed army: tactical combat discipline, careful coordination between units, and skill with both lance and bow. John'S actions, moreover, are those of an ,; Kinnamos comments that Sozopolis was taken effortlessly,. despite bei~g impossible to besiege wilh engines: Kinnamos, 6-7. See also Chol1lates, Hls/ona, 13. 7 Kinnamos, 6.

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experienced general. He successfully commanded his officers complex military action, at the velY beginning of his reign.

THE CAMPATGNS OF JOHN II KOMNENOS 111

a

Pechenegs and Hungarians In 1122, the Pechenegs crossed the Danube. This tribe had been quiescent since 1091, when Alexios defeated their army at Levunion. The survivors of that struggle enlisted in the Byzantinc army, and harassed the Crusaders on their journey across the Balkans. John brought this new band of Pechenegs to battle near V crroia, in prcsentday Bulgaria. Like Alexios, John wanted to prcvent the Pechcnegs from entering the rich lands of Thrace and Macedonia. Kinnamos remarks that the Byzantines were victorious. 1I Choniates states that the Pecheneg cavalry charged and fired missiles constantly. The Byzantines forced the enemy back to their wagon circle, but were not able to penetrate this fortified enclosure. It withstood several assaults. J?hn's personal intervention at the head of his Varangians (whom Kmnamos calls Britons) broke the wagon lager of the Pechenegs and caused their defeat. This incident is interesting for two reasons. First, Alexios never ag~in ~ade use of the Varangian guard after the slaughter at DyrrachlOn m 1081. They served as palace troops when John seized the ~hrone ~po~ Alexios' final illness, but their reappearance in battle 1ll 1122 mdIcates that they had been reconstituted as a combat-worthy corps. Secondly, this battle indicates that Pecheneg tactics had ~ot changed since Alexios faced them in the 1mlOs. They still {'(JUght III ",:aves of mounted archcrs, relying upon a circle of wagons to proVIde defense. John was forced to use his best infantry, the Varangian guards, to break their circle. In 1.127--28 John fought a brief war against the Hungarians, a cam~aIgn that was strategically defensive. The Hungarians sacked B.ramcevo and Sardica, and John responded by attacking them with IllS ~~my aJ:d fleet in. the spring of 1128. While his army travcled overl,and, hIS fleet SaIled up the Danube River. The fleet ferried John s army acro,ss the river, and he defeated the Hungarian forces on the far shore . U A rive'I crosslllg " III th e f:ace of a determmec! " foe

11 !I

Choniates, Hisloria, 13-16. KiI1ll'llTIOS 8 Choniates, Hisloria, 17. '., .

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is one of the most difficult of all military operations. John's forces must have been well disciplined and well protected by archers and missile-machines on the imperial ships. Kinnamos reports that the emperor sent an allied detachment of Ligurian knights and Turks upriver, where they crossed the Danube. This distraction enabled the emperor's army to join with the allied contingent. This combined army defeated the Hungarians. The Byzantine army remained north of Zeugminon into the next year 1129, when peace was made. The Hungarians did not disturb the Byzantine Empire for the rest of John's reign. Thereafter-from 1128 until his death in 1143John's campaigns focused on the eastern territories: Cilicia and Paphlagonia.

The Cilidan Wars In the decade following Manzikert (1071-81), the Armenian princes of Cilicia became virtually independent of imperial control. Simultaneously, Byzantine officials (Theodore Gabras and Philaretos Brachamios) in Trebizond and Antioch becamc de facto independent rulers of these cities and regions. The First Crusade complicated an already rnuddlcd political and military situation. The independence of Cilicia under Armenian rulers did not become a, problem for the empire until Leo Roupenid, the most powerful of the Armenian despots, obtained control of most of Cilicia and began to expand his power south, threatening the Byzantine-controlled cities along the coast of eastern Anatolia. Choniates reports that Leo wanted to s~ize Seleukeia, the most important Byzantine port in southern Asia Minor. John decided to bring Cilicia and Lycia under his co~­ trol, and advanced south at the head of a large army through ASIa Minor to Cilicia. First John seized Adana and Tarsus. Baka, a fortified city situated on a precipice, and Anazarbos, likewise fortified, resisted his efforts. As at Sozopolis, John sent lightly armed mounted archers--this time Turks-against the walls of Anazarbos. Mean10 while, siege engines threw stones against the walls. Choniates describes how John surrounded his engines with ramparts made of c~ay bricks, much as present-day tanks seek defilade positions from whIch to fire. The "flaming iron pellets" that the defenders had used to

III

Choniales, Hi.lloria, 25- 26, Kinnamos, 17-18.

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burn previous engines were useless against these defenscs. 11 The emperor's engines shattered the city's walls. This is one of thc few instances in medieval military history in which a decisive victory was rapidly produced by siege engines. This campaign should be considered together with the emperor's journey to Syria, which followed it. Mter attacking Cilicia, the emperor traveled southeast and entered Antioch as an ally and overlord of Prince Raymond, the Crusader ruler of Antioch. His campaign in Syria had the effect of strengthening thc hold of Prince Raymond and the count of Edessa, Joscelyn II of Courtenay on these tcrritories. It did not, however, directly strengthen the Byzantine position. Why would the emperor strengthen cities historians have assumed he wished to possess outright? The sultan of Ikonion, Mas'ud, attacked Byzantine cities nearer Constantinople while the emperor was far from the Byzantine core territories. Byzantine control of Cilicia ofTer-cd many opportunities to influence Antioch. If the emperor remained unable to conquer Antioch, or to do more than intimidate the Syrian Turkish principalities, strong Crusader states strengthened John against his own Turkish enemies. Likewise, Mas'ud realized that Byzantine control of Antioch would leave the emperor better prepared to act against him. It was in his interest to do just enough militarily to distract John from his purpose in Syria. John remained undistracted; his Syrian campaign lasted three years (11 '37-1139.) Even though john's Syrian campaign was primarily an exercise in siege craft, we can still learn something about the emperor's field tactics. Choniates offers tactical information about the siege of Pisa, a city near the Euphrates. According to Choniates, the LByzantinc vanguard was initially defeated. The city's defenders pursued it until the emperor arrived with additional troops, described as "thc men of his personal phalanx."12 The Byzantine use of the Greek word phalanx can mean a close formation of either infantry or cavalry, so we cannot determine whether these troops were John's Varangian guard, or a cavalry guard. It is noteworthy that the Byzantine vanguard operated. separately from the main army. When John retreated from Hungary III 1128, the Hungarians concentrated their attentions

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93

on the Byzantine rear-guard, suggesting that in both cases the vanguard and the rear-guard operated separately from the rest of the £1rmy,I3 This implies that the army of John II had a standard order of march, with a vanguard, a main body, and a rear-guard. When the vanguard approached a city, it attempted to seize it swiftly, before the defenders could react. These independent actions imply considerable tactical initiative by these sub-commanders; battle was frequently begun before the emperor was present. These facts support the contention that the army of John Komnenos was well trained and professional, with an officer corps that was encouraged to take independent action. Another event that sheds light upon John's military organization was the parade outside the city of Shaizar in 1138. This was organized to strike fear into the defenders of Shaizar. H John divided his almy into Macedonian, Keltic, and Pecheneg divisions. The Varangians were doubtless present, since J olm took them on other campaigns against mounted foes. According to Choniates, each of these units was armed differently: each unit carried its own equipment, according to its national custom. I:; The most interesting aspect of this rcmark is that it implies that these units were usually not tactically arranged by race. The fact that Choniates remarks on it suggests that he considered this kind of organization unusual. John's 1139 campaign in Paphlagonia also provides significant information about his organization and tactics. The goal of this campaign was to bring to heel the rebellious Constantine Gabras, ruler of Trebizond, to restore order to the theme of Armeniakon, and to provide a bulwark against Danishmendid expansion. John brought a large army of cavalry and infantry, which he marched along the lb Paphlagonian coastline in order to avoid Turkish ambushes. When the Byzantine army moved inland, the Turks attacked. Most of the Byzantine warhorses perished, and the Turks relentlessly harassed bis army with hit-and-run attacks. When the emperor was abl~ to fight an open battle with the Turks, the Byzantine cavalry was dnven

d Hisloria, 29-30. Choniates reports that thes~ men were arrange I d ' I ··d t ··1 other a clyptlc remark (hilt has no , by race so that they cou proVIC e ,11 0 eac 1 , . . . . military signil1cance. Choniiltes' ?bserv~tion that each of the~e dIVISIons had a dIStinct kind of weaponry is more mterestmg. 1.\ Choniatcs, Hislorirz, 29"-30. lIi Choniates, His/aria, :14-. 1:1

Kinnamos, 13.

1+ Choniatcs

1 ~ I'-!ikephoros Basilakios, Nicephori Basilacae, Oraliones el E'pirlolae eel A G'u'zy'\ (LeipZIg, 1984),61,11. 25 IT. ' . . ("' 12 Choniates , Histaria , 27-28 . 1/\' 19 ffi·· r 1 . . ,.. nnamos, ,0 elS ,ew c ctaJls on the sIege.

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back. Reorganizing his army in its camp, John used a ruse to give the illusion that his numbers were greater than they were, gathering all the infantry standards and giving them to the cavalry. He assigned the best horses to his best riders, described as both Latins (Franks) and Byzantines skilled with the lance. The Byzantines returned to the attack and proved victorious. 17 Cavalry remained the striking arm of the army, despite the rough terrain of Cappadocia, which would normally suggest the use of infantry. The cavalry arm was initially defeated and driven back; presumably they took refuge with the infantry, which possessed a multitude (pleistous) of standards. If the defeated cavalry could use a multitude of infantry standards to give the appearance of great numbers, the emperor must have brought a large infantry force with him. Furthermore, the fact that John ordered the best (evgene, literally, well-born) horses to be gathered together and used as a unit reflects the qualitative differences possible within the simple designation 'warhorse.' The cavalry again are the decisive arm in battle, but this account also indicates the critical importance of good infantry. The foot-soldiers, whether in battle-line or protecting the camp, provided a refuge within which the emperor reorganized his defeated force. john's army was composed of Frankish and Byzantine cavalry of varying qualities, which fought in front of the infantry, together wit~ another group of infantry that provided camp guards and the mam supporting force. What conclusions can be drawn from an examination of John's tactics? First, the sources limit the information we have available. Kinnamos provides details of the military events he chooses to describe, but these are sparse and virtually cease in the mid-l 130s. From 1130 on, he lists John's military contests but does not describe them in detail. ~honiates describes events throughout John's reign, but he is seldom mterested in tactical maneuver. Of course, neither Choniates nor Kin.namos was particularly interested in battles; they place greater emph~sls on court i~trigue and the events of John's reign. Neither chromcl:l' had expenence as a soldier. Unlike Anna Komnene, neither claimed to rely upon soldiers' accounts. For those reasons, wc canno~ .rely upon their judgment concerning the importance of particular mlhtary occurrences, and we should question their selection of

17

Choniates, His/on'a, 34..

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events, which tend to focus on imperial campaigning. As we read their accounts, we should wonder how many other campaigns were led by subordinate officers and ignored by our sources. These actions occasionally appear because of their importance, for example the Battle of Semlin in 1167, when Kontostephanos led the Byzantine army, or the 1177 campaign against the Turks invading the Maiandel' valley, which was led by John Vatatzes. The day-to-day fighting that comprised most frontier warfare is notably absent. It did not fit into the pattern of "imperial" events and personalities that forms the thematic basis for both Choniates' and Kinnamos' chronicles. What can be said about John's army? He inherited a highly professional army, capable of turning defeat into victory, as at Neokaisareia, or at least enabling the army to conduct a fighting retreat. What is most striking about john's army is its ability to conduct this difficult maneuver. The army proved its flexibility in action in Pontos (1139), Cappadocia (1136-39, 1142), Syria (1137), and in Paphlagonia (1130, 1135). The army marched divided into a vanguard, a main body and a rear guard. Thus organized, it fought its way out of ambushes, conducted battles, sieges, and pursuits; it seldom succumbed to undisciplined pursuit of a broken enemy and was never seriously damaged while conducting a fighting retreat. The regions in which John campaigned-the mountains of Armenia, the plains of Syria, thc ~al1eys of west Asia MinOl--each had their dangers for the Byzantll1e army. Romanos III had found the deserts of Syria to be too much for the veterans who had fought under Basil n. III In Cappadocia and Armenia, Romanos IV, an experienced general, had been unable to supply and control the separate units of his army. In western Asia Minor, the Crusaders found themselves continually harassed and in want of supplies. When attacked, they fought; otherwise, they merely attempted to survive. 19 John'S army, on the other hand, moves about Asia Minor and fights in any kind of terrain. Instances such as Kinte,

Michel Psellos, Chronograplzie, ed. r~. Renault (Paris, 1967), 3G--37. Rosalind Hill, cd. Ges/a Francorurn et aliorum Hierosolimitallo1"Um: The Deeds q[ the Frankl and the Other Pi~grims to ]ent.llliern, (London, 19(2), 23 .. "We. therefo,rc purst~ed them through a land which was deserted, waterless, and ul1Il,lhabltable, from wl~lch wc barely emerged or escaped alive, fill' wc suHered greatly from hunger and durst, and fOllndnothing at all to cat except prickly plants which we gathered and rubbed between our hands .... L\Vjc lost most of' our horses." III

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where. the ar~y was ill supplied and the horses died, are altogether eXC?ptlOnal. fo be sure, we are now discussing the intersection of tactI~s and strategy. For the army to be well supplied required the c~e.a~o~ of a~equate military bases. It also required adequate requ~sItlOl11ng whIle on campaign outside imperial territory. While it is dIfficult to evaluate John's personal capabilities as specifically as we can those of Alexios or Manuel, it is clear from our sources that he was a ~aster of t~le siege and that he was comfortable fighting in mountamous terram. He also won victories in open battle on the pl~ins of Sy:ia near Shaizar. 20 He never displayed the sort ~f paralYSIS .th.at gnpped Manue! at Myriokephalon, although the lack of detail 11: Our sources would probably prevent any such description. DespIte our sources' very positive portrayal of John's military career, our assessment of him as a general must begin with the fact that he ap~ears fully trained at the beginning of his reign. Kinnamos and Chon~ates do not demonstrate that his tactics developed, and the same IS true ~f their presentation of his enemies. When John fought the Hunganans, when he campaigned in Syria and when he was able to t . k tl T k . , . d' nc le ur s mto open battle, the Byzantme lancer an hIS Latin allies usually proved superior. In the mountains, the emperor made use of both cavalry and infantry, and siege engines usually accompanied his forces, regardless of the terrain they had to be .dr~gged through. John liked to build fortresses and to take them. ThIS .1S partieularly evident in his eastern campaigns. 21 :"'Ith respect to the physical constraints of tactics (the weapons, umt types, and maneuvers), our ability to analyze is aO'ain limited d ' l N evertheless wc can form some b by ac lack f • • 0 source etm. conclus~ons .. FIrst, the Varangians were present and capable in specialized SItuatIons much as were E " . , uropean sappers or pIoneers 111 later penads. They were mmed with long shields and axes. Byzantine lancers were drawn from Mac d ' I Th ' . . .. e Ol11a anc race and constItuted major dIVISIOns of John's L '. . . army. atms proVIded a second division of the ~o Choniates, HislOIia, 29-31; Kinnamos 19-20

A short list of the 1 . J I .' . '.' (fortified), Sozopolis (besk ~~s ~i~~at~~egcd ?:. [orli~ICd would inc!uc!c: La~dikeia Kastumon (besieged) Rh/ d~k . (I' . 'fi ~ry~lItls (beSIeged), Zcugmmon (beSIeged), & TaJ'slIs(besieged) Anazar~os (~~sieOl~~1e ang~'a & Kastamon (besieged), Adan
J.'

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cavalry; they wc re heavily armed, like the Norman and Flemish mercenaries who had served emperors since the 1060s. The Turkish division would have included Pechenegs, Cumans, and Asiatic Turks. These were cavalry, and carried lighter melee weapons. We cannot be certain whether they carried with them the light spears of the Syrian Turks, or possessed other melee wcapons. They always carried bows. Choniates implies that the Byzantines and Normans, as well as the Turks, were armed differently, since against the army of Shaizar each division "appeared before them with their different . " or t Ile T urk'IS 11 "d'IVI. arms. "22 In several places PecI1eneg " recrUIts, sion," are mentionedY The "Macedonian Legion" also appears, as well as "newly levied troops. "21 Serbians, "Triballoi," are also listed as having been part of the Byzantine army. 2', 'vVe are fortunate in knowing that the Latins Pecheneot>'s, ancl l\Ilacedonians were cavalry. The geographical origin of the infantry is a more difficult question. As a defensive force even in tactical operations, they do not appear to have determined the course of battles and are therefore less fi'equently mentioned. Nevertheless, we should remember the assault of the Varangians on the Pecheneg' wagon circle in 1122. And we should remember they were important enough to be mentioned when john's army was in trouble, at Neokaisareia, and this perhaps characterizes their role in most campaigns. They provided protection, support, and a refuge of last resort for the cavalry. How was each group within the Byzantine army used? Our sources present the Pechcnegs as skirmishers, while the Latins and Byzantines provide John with shock troops. Other infantry, in considerable numbers, supplemented the Varangians, if we are to judge by Alexios' 1116 campaign against lkonion?i Thcse troops were certainly always L

"

~2

Choniates, Hi.llol'ia, 29-30. Choniates, J-Jisloria, 2.1. "The emperor sent ahead a portion of his tl'OOpS who were enrolled among hi~ Turkish divisions." H. rVlagoulias, () Ci!>, I!! Byzantiu1II: AnI/all r!f Hiketas G'l101;za/es (Detroit, 19B4), 15; Choniates, Historia, 2? "[.John] gave her over to be looted by the soldiers, especially the recruited Pat";l!1ak troops who had taken her ... " Transl., lvlagoulias, 17. H For the "Macedonian legioll," see Choniates, Hisloria, 23. 2" Choniates, His/ana, 16. "i Alexiade, Ill, 199 n: Anmi's description of' an outer ring units, not connected to onc another and an inner (liTe that would respond to threats, is not so revolutionary as sh~ makes it sound. The outer (iJl'Ce was undm~bteclly inHu1try, \;I;i1.c the reaction tiJrce was probably the cavalry troops, snrroundmg the baggage. IillS ~:l

or

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present in John's army. Many of John's campaigns began or ended with sieges, where infantry support troops transported and protected the engines of war. Furthermore, since these campaigns frequently involved sieges, the baggage train that the army carried with it must also have been extensive. The largely invisible infantry accomplished all of this work. So whether we assume the continued existence of Immortals, arc1lOntopouloi, or others, it is clear that there were substantial numbers of infantry of all types in John's forces. 27 John Komnenos was an incessant campaigner. Like his father, he ruled from the saddle, and he died while on campaign. He passed on to his son, Manuel I, a seasoned army, one that had experience fighting Hungarians, Pechenegs, Seliuks, the Turks of Syria, and the Danishmendids. He brought his son on campaign with him, and this undoubtedly accounted for Manuel's military expertise, as well as his personal courage; the emperor had to restrain his son from risking himself in combat. john's campaigns usually ended with sieges, and it was his deliberate strategy to obtain fortified points that would enable him (in the east) to threaten his most important foes, the Danishmendids. In the west, he campaigned defensively. John'S strategy was onc of gradual gain-he fought the Danishmendids to a standstill with his aggressive campaigns in northern Asia Minor, while his campaigns in Cilida temporarily gained that province for the empire. John seldom fought large, open battles, and when he did (against the Hungarians and the Pechenegs), it was to defend the empire's core territories, rather than to attempt to gain new territory. In contrast, Manuel would engage in several aggressive pitched battles. John was more comfortable conducting sieges, and this careful, rational strategy may not have offered the empire the opportunity for large territorial gains, but it also protected it from sudden

method of travel, with the infanlry phalanx divided into units, with arms facing outward, is well chronicled. See George T., Dennis, (cd.) Das Strategikall Des Jvlau~ rikioJ, (Vienna, 1981),466-67. . , 27 Hans:J oachim Kuhn, Die hyzalllinische Armee im 10. unci If. Jahrhundert: Studiell zur O~gal!isatioll der Tagma/a (Vienna, 1991),250 for the arc/lOnla/Jalllai, 243-46 for the immortals (athanatoi). Kuhn provides the best description of the developmenl of these two units, tracing their origins to the reign of Alexios I and John I, respectively. In the case of the a/hanatol, this unit disappears from our sources until it is mentiO!~ed in the reign of Michacl VII (1071-78), when alternative sources for the tagmatlc troops were sought, following the widespread dislocation that made Asia wIinor useless for purposes of recruitment.

I as those that followed the battle of Manzikert. .J0h~'s milprotected the empire while ~radually exte~d~~f ~ts ~~~ t1'01 in the strategic regions of Paphlagoma, Pontus, an 1 Jc~a. Id was a much more reasonable policy than the one M anue wou

1

i~~~s ;~~~y pursue.

Q

THE CAMPAIGNS OF MANUEL I KOMNENOS

CHAPTER 1"1 VE

THE CAMPAIGNS OF MANUEL I KOMNENOS (114'3-80)

Unlike the wars of John Il, the campaigns of MallucI 1 Komnenos do not fall into easily distinguishable chronological categories. Manucl's reign began with an abortive invasion of the Sdjuk sultanate of 1konion and was immediately followed by skirmisiH~s between Bvzantine troo?s ~nd the Frenc~l a~d Gen:mn crusaders \vhn passed tlll:ough the empIre s Balkan terntones dunng the Second Crusade. Mallucl ~attled the Normans over Kerkyra and then stagcd a cO\lnter-invaSlon of Norman territory in Italy, seizing much or Aplllia. Simultaneously, Manuel fought Stephen III or Hungary and engaged in several unsuccessful raids of Serbia. CilieiH rebelled, and l'vlal1ucl's cousin ~dronikos Komnenos was unable to regain the territory for the empIre. Manuel briefly visited Antioch in 1159, but a year later he was ag~in in Europe, where he fought the Hung·arians. Subse.quently (m 1162-63) he reorganized the PhyrgiUl cities; the war wIth .Hung~l)' continued until 1167. In 1168, Manucl again invacled ~erbla, w~ll1e a Byzantine fleet attacked Damiella, an imporlanl port m FataJmd Egypt, l'n COIl'June t'Ion WIt . 11 Latm . ('orces {'rom the kmg. dom of Jerusalem. In 1171, Manuel exiled the Vcnetian rcsicle;1t merchants and seized their property (the worst policy decision of lhe Komnenian period) . At t1l e en d 0 f IlIS . reIgn . 11nIIanuc I I'ciOl'uhccl ' .' sev.. eral CItIes on the edge of tIle cen . t., IdI p I' am 0 l' A nato I'la and launched an uns~cc?ss~ul campaign against the Seljuks or Ikonioll. Intermittent sklrmlshmg' in weste rn A,'sm M'mor contmued . .. untIl. Manud's death m 1180. There . . appears to be no d erb 1 crate, strategIc pattern to l'vlanuel's campaigns' . . ' was there at least a pol'ICY t·1lat.'tIes tIlem together, not1011ally If not chronoloo-ically? Tl b' • le argument can be made that there was policy' or at I t· ,. . a coherent " eas·an attempt at one. 1 hr5t Byzanlosses in tl ' d" . ' tme terntonal . le cast ma e It llnperatlve to find new wealth 111 the west for the landed families. This led the Komnenian I

Paul Magdalino , the E»,h' ,r M, I I er ll'lre 0 mlUe llomnenos (Cambridge, 199:1), 104·, IOfi 011.

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emperors to divert most of their wealth and military power toward their European territories. Manucl's policy in Asia Minor was to regroup and fight defensively. His most substantial achievement was to reduce Hungary and Antioch to vassalage. Manud's ability to apply pressure upon these states through Byzantium's superior military power meant the partial extension of Byzantine policy to these states. Money sent to the west, including payments to western soldiers from jJronoia (land holdings) was a response to the growing power of the western peoples. Finally, following Choniates, it has been assumed that Manucl's army was heavily composed of foreign troops.2 Several of these assertions are outside the scope of our study of Manuel's campaigns. On the other hand, if Manuel's policy in Asia Minor was a deliberate reorganization of border territories for militaI), defense, then this has military ramifications. Whether Hungary and Antioch were Byzantine clients is also militarily significant. The question of the nature and function of pronoia will ~e. deferred to Chapter Six, but the extent and importance of pronoza IS. ~entral to an understanding the Komnenian army. Finally, the ethmclty of the Byzantine army is related to both the topic of pronoia and to the . army's place in Byzantine society. How did Byzantine influence in Hungary and AntIoch affeet Byzantine military power? Our sources do not indicate that M.anue~'s achievements in HungaI), and Antioch provided any substantIal mIlitary benefit. The Myriokephalon campaigIl was delay~d while 'N!~n:lcl fruitlessly waited for Hungarian auxiliaries. The AntlO~hene ~l:lslOn was the first to be routed at Myriokephalon, and thIS preCIpItated the general collapse of the Byzantine army. Manu~I's successors were unable to muster either Antiochene or HungarIan support. What was the value of Manuel's forty years of warfare if the result was. a vassalage that was merely personal, a tie t~ Ma~uel tha; resulted. 111 meager military benefits, and no loyalty after hIS death: Magdahno correctly asserts that Manucl did not add to the as~ets c~~atecl ~y John IP But the lack of improvement in the By~ant1l1e mlhtary Sl~­ uation coincided with a more complex political enVIronment. Manucl s

2 :I

Mngdalino, 9-10. M agdalino , 3.

102

THE CAMPAIGNS OF MANUEL I KOMNENOS

CHAPTER FIVE

failure to eliminate any of his foes meant a real decline in Byzantium's military position relative to each of its enemies. Manud '8 diplomacy, and his concept of universal empire, was an elaborate fiction that could not survive a serious military threat. Although Myriokephalon was not in fact the military catastrophe that Chro~l­ iclers tend to assert, it nonetheless destroyed the flimsy diplomatic structure that was the mcUor accomplishmcnt of Manuel's reign. Venetian aggression and the incompetent emperors who followed Manuel combined to destroy what was left of the empire. There is little evidence that Manuel had a consistent policy in Asia Minor. He wanted to control Antioch, and occasionally directed his attention to other problems in Asia Minor, although usually on an ad hoc basis. The only exceptions to this were his fortifications in the regions of Pergamon, Atramyttion, and Nenkastra. Manucl had a Syrian policy that consisted of diplomatic and military inter~ud~s in ~upport of and against the Crusader kingdoms, but his polIcy.m ASIa Minor was reactive, usually determined by SeUuk threats. TI1lS was expediency rather than policy-making. Finally, was the ar;ny pri~arily ~omposed of foreign elements? Historians have accepted thIS theSIS, relymg upon Choniates' statement about jll'Olloia at the end of his description of Manuel's reign. 4 But Nikctas Choniates was far fro~ bei~g an unbiased observer. He reacted angrily to the transfer of llnpenal land revenues to western soldiers. This is the reimlt of the. even:s of l204~the crusader sack of Constantinople-of which Chomates IS the most eloquent witness. The army, as it fights its way through the pages of Choniates and Kinnamos, is COml)Osecl of "nat'Ive "Byzantme . soId'Iers. The chroniclers describe the presence of ~any foreigners, but Byzantines, Rhomaioi, whatever their ethnic herItage, are usually the officers, and Byzantine natives provide most of the cavalry. . The, question of how. prevalent foreign elements were in the Byzantm~ aImy may be less Important than historians have supposed. The claIm that the army was composecI " . 0 f mercenanes IS seductive According to this argum en t , th e d'Isaster . o·f 1204 proved the danger. Niket'ls Ch . t N' C" lcetae ,~lOmatlle Histmia, ed . .J. Van Dieten CFHB (Berlin , . ol1mtes complains th,t' .' I . . ' . ' that the Byzallt' 11' a lmpclla lnSpcctlOns preVIOusly ensured mc so Clers were fit a I 11 . d 11 . )oiicy of . . ,nc we cqUlppe . - C c1alll1S that !'v!allud', gWlng grants of provision '" .. ... . I army in the cxpectati f " money cncomaged the UIl\V
(1I43-80)

103

of involvement with western military powers. Our question is the same one that troubled the Komnenian emperors: which soldiers v"ere most effective? Their answer was to employ good soldiers from everywhere. We should not forget that this had long been stanclard Byzantine policy. Basil II remained in power in part because he received six thousand Rus, "foreigners," from Prince Vladimir of Kiev. If some disaster had befallen the Byzantine Empire shortly after Basil's reign, and these men had turned on his successors, doubtless the same arguments would be made: that the army was no longer primarily Byzantine, and that it was the composition of the army that precipitated the destruction of the empire.

Initial Actions The first appearance of tactical combat in Manuel's reign is in 1146, during the emperor's retreat from Ikonion. The ostensible purpose of this campaign was to punish the Seljuk sultan Mas'ud, whose countrymen had been plundering Byzantine possessions in Asia Minor. In fact, Niketas Choniates indicates that Manuel's goal was somewhat more ambitious: to besiege and conquer the Se~juk capital, Ikonion. Shortly before Manuel's campaign against tl~e Se~j~tk Turks, Prince Raymond of Antioch had attacked Byz~ntme ~Itles in Cilicia; a fleet and an army were sent to reinforce thiS provll1ce. Turkish attacks between 1143 and 1146, however, demonstrated how tenuous John's territorial gains really were. Upon John's death, :Nlas'ud's Turks ravaged the area near the sea of Marmora. Tl.1ey took Nlelangeia, a city just east of Nicaea.'J Manucl's c~mpaign agamst Ikonion would have re-established Byzantine power m east~rn A~a­ tolia. Manue! advanced up the Maiander valley, and at Phll?mehon fought a battle that opened the way to Ikonio~. The tactics use~ during Manuel's subsequent retreat from 1ko111on res.emble I~ost Komnenian military actions against the Turks. Accordmg to Choniates, the Turks sct up ambushes and occupie~l, wooded gl:o~1l1cl · f march l\IIanuel's army had chfhculty retredtmg, ..' .. '1 a1ong t1le 1me o · before finally reaching safety." Choniates prOVIdes !rttle speCific detal

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