The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (Bibliographies of Battles and Leaders)

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN, 1915

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THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN, 1915 Historiography and Annotated Bibliography

Compiled by Fred R. van Hartesveldt

Bibliographies of Battles and Leaders, Number 21 Myron J. Smith, Jr., Series Adviser

Greenwood Press Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data van Hartesveldt, Fred R. The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 : historiography and annotated bibliography / Fred R. van Hartesveldt. p. cm.—(Bibliographies of battles and leaders, ISSN 1056-7410 ; no. 21) Includes index. ISBN 0-313-29387-2 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1914-1918—Campaigns—Turkey—Gallipoli Peninsula— Historiography. 2. World War, 1914-1918—Campaigns—Turkey— Gallipoli Peninsula—Bibliography. I. Title. II. Series. D568.3.V26 1997 940.4'26—dc21 97-33142 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1997 by Fred R. van Hartesveldt All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 97-33142 ISBN: 0-313-29387-2 ISSN: 1056-7410 First published in 1997 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

@T The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

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Contents Acknowledgments 1. Introduction and Tactical Overview of the Campaign

vii 1

2. Overviews, Archival Sources, and Periodicals

12

3. Politics and Strategy

18

4. Anzac

25

5. Conclusion: Who Was Responsible?

28

6. Annotated Bibliography

32

Index

144

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Acknowledgments There are always many people who contribute to a book length manuscript. Space prevents thanking them all, but it is necessary to acknowledge the most important. The nature of this work requires unusual demands on librarians, and the staffof the Hunt Memorial Library responded effectively to every one. The greatest amount of work fell on the interlibrary loan specialist, Robbie Walton Robinson, who found many an obscure work needed for the bibliography. Two friends, John Hutcheson of Dalton College and Jerry Sweeney of South Dakota State University read parts of the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. Their generous and knowledgeable aid resulted in many improvements, and so the flaws that remain are clearly my own fault. Finally, my wife Mary Ann refused the usual role of long suffering support and pitched in to help with many parts of the project. She made useful comments, proofread, and indexed. She also encouraged more effectively than anyone else.

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1 Introduction and Tactical Overview of the Campaign The passage of time has not slowed the production of books and articles about World War I. The two World War I volumes so far published in the Battles and Leaders series (of which the current volume will be a part), The Battle of Jutland by Eugene L. Rasor and The Battles of the Somme, 1916 by Fred R. van Hartesveldt, have together almost 1,400 entries, with relatively little overlap. A.J.P. Taylor's Illustrated History of the First World War [No. 688], written more than thirty years ago, has never been out of print. In the last three years several major scholarly works about the war have been prominent in general-interest bookstores. These include Lyn Macdonald's 1915: The Death of Innocence [No. 452], Martin Gilbert's The First World War: A Complete History [No. 272], and Paul Halpern's A Naval History of World War I [No. 306]. In that same time period, there were two major studies of the campaign that is the subject of the bibliography that follows: Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli [No. 674] and Michael Hickey, Gallipoli [No. 330]. Popular interest is also strong. In the decade following the war, the campaign drew attention and comment [Nos. 342, 566], and such interest in the war and the Dardanelles continued into the current period. The 1962 movie Lawrence of Arabia was a blockbuster, and the B.B.C.'s twenty-six part series on World War I in 1964 caused much discussion. Concerning the Dardanelles, there was a successful Australian film, Gallipoli [68] starring Mel Gibson and directed by Peter Weir in 1981 and a documentary Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore in 1988. Joan Baez's 1995 album, Ring Them Bells, includes Eric Bogle's song "And the Band Played Waltzing Matilda," written in the early 1970s, lamenting the suffering of Australian soldiers at Gallipoli. As Baez's performance makes clear, the agonies of eighty years ago can still bring tears. It is also notable that April 25, the day of the first landings on Gallipoli, is celebrated as Anzac Day in Australia. It is treated very much like an independence day celebration and is an important element in Australian [Nos. 173,217,258-61, 363-65, 392,401,414,424,464, 471,494, 599,

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

601, 606, 623, 658, 681-83, 691, 730] and New Zealand [No. 401] national identity. Guides to the battlefield, hardly a draw to tourists other than for its history, continue to be published [Nos. 646, 670]. Public interest is also suggested by the amount of information concerning World War I and the Dardanelles now to be found on the Internet, but unlike the Battle of the Somme, the Dardanelles Campaign does not have a home page. A collection of World War I materials may be found at http://www.woHd warl. com/reflib.htm. Because the net is an ephemeral medium, however, the easiest way to find electronic material about the war is to use a search engine. The current volume is intended to be a guide to the historiography and bibliography of the Dardanelles Campaign, including the Gallipoli invasion. It is divided into two parts. The first provides background about the campaign, discusses the major sources of information about it, and lays out the major interpretive disputes. The second is a comprehensive annotated bibliography. An exception to the practice of annotation is made for volumes in Turkish, due to language difficulties, but such books are acknowledged if they are accessible in American libraries. Each book or article in the bibliography is numbered and these numbers are used for reference in the historiographical section. Although the Battles and Leaders series is intended to cover military history, any discussion of the Dardanelles must consider the political struggles in London over the strategic conception and the diversion of men and materiel from the Western Front. Decisions made in the War Council and Cabinet proved to be central to the outcome of the invasion of Turkey, and while a serious effort was made to avoid turning the volume into a bibliography of politics in wartime, political histories that give significant attention to the handling of the Dardanelles Campaign are included. It is certainly necessary to consult such works to acquire a thorough understanding of the military situation. Since the relationship of the experience of fighting on the Gallipoli peninsula with the growth of nationalism in Australia and New Zealand has influenced the historiography of the campaign, works on that subject are also included in the bibliography and historiographic discussion. Selection of them was based on their significance for understanding the campaign and its historiography, for the intention of this work is not to be a bibliography of the rise of national consciousness in the antipodes. TACTICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN By the beginning of 1915, expectations of an exciting but quick war, widespread in the summer of 1914, were rapidly disappearing. The failure of the Schlieffen Plan was followed by the spread of lines of trenches across Belgium and northern France. The Western Front was already a stalemated casualty mill. In the East, the brilliant German victories at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes suggested that the Eastern Front might offer some possibility of maneuver, but the initial hope of the Entente Powers that a Russian steamroller would crush Germany and Austria soon

Introduction and Tactical Overview of the Campaign

3

dimmed, though it did not disappear before mid-1916. Although the German presence had been growing in Turkey for some time before 1914, in the first few weeks of the war the Entente powers hoped for the Porte's neutrality. However, Enver Pasha, a leader of the Young Turk movement and as Minister of War a major political force, was pro-German, and the longstanding British influence in Constantinople had been squandered in recent years through a mix of incompetence and taking Turkish loyalty for granted [No. 251]. Furthermore, the Turks had to fear the likelihood that their empire would suffer in the division of the spoils if they sat out the war. Their decision was also influenced by considerations of which side was most likely to most respect their interests in return for an alliance. Could they trust London to protect them from the territorial aspirations of their traditional Russian foes? The decision by Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, to seize two warships ordered from British shipyards and already paid for by the Turks is generally regarded as having given the Germans an opening. Two German ships, the Goeben and the Breslau, were in the Mediterranean at the beginning of the war. Although the Royal Navy was supposed to keep track of them, action was delayed pending a formal declaration of war between London and Berlin. The ships escaped, and with the help of Enver Pasha, passed through the Straits to Constantinople, where they were given to the Turks. The German crews put on fezzes and "joined" the Turkish navy, and German Admiral Wilhelm Souchon assumed overall command. The final steps to war were taken when the German officers, obviously in control of the Sultan's fleet, attacked Russian ports in the Black Sea. Turkey officially became one of the Central Powers [Nos. 251,466, 501, 711], despite some last minute under-the-table British efforts to buy her neutrality [Nos. 11, 60, 373]. David Fromkin [No. 251] offers a somewhat different version of these events, suggesting that Enver Pasha was seeking to manipulate the Germans into a deal which neither Berlin nor most other Turkish leaders wanted. In Fromkin's version, Admiral Souchon deliberately precipitated a crisis by exceeding his orders and taking the Goeben and Breslau to the Straits, but Berlin still did not think an alliance with Turks worthwhile. Fromkin believes that Berlin changed its mind when Enver Pasha, although he knew that the British were confiscating Turkey's new dreadnoughts, offered the more powerful Osman to the Germans anyway. The prospect of adding one of the most powerful ships afloat to the High Seas Fleet drew the Germans into an alliance, which without Enver's scheming was unlikely at best. Although Fromkin does not offer overwhelming evidence for this argument, it would, if true, relieve Winston Churchill of much of the indictment that he drove the Turks into the hands of the Germans. Meanwhile in London the group of leaders who came to be known as the Easterners-due to their belief that the focus of war effort should be shifted from the stalemated Western Front-was emerging. Most important among them were Churchill and David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer (later Minister of Munitions and then Prime Minister). They were joined, at least in their hope of

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

using the Royal Navy rather than trying to compete on land with the traditional land powers, by Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot "Jackie" Fisher, the First Sea Lord [Nos. 39, 60, 347]. A number of schemes were advanced: Fisher, for instance, favored a landing in the Baltic for a drive into Germany. Churchill thought an amphibious attack to protect the Channel ports and flank the German lines should be attempted, but he had also suggested the possibility of using the navy to force passage through the Dardanelles to take Constantinople and force Turkey out of the war. Although he had ordered a bombardment of forts on the Gallipoli peninsula, which formed the western shore of the Dardanelles, the idea of striking at Constantinople does not seem to have been foremost in his thinking [No. 142, 269]. The steps leading to the Dardanelles Campaign began with a request from the Russian Grand Duke Nicholas for action against Turkey to help reduce pressure on Russian forces in the Caucasus. Although London felt constrained to help its ally, Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, insisted that no troops were available. Churchill, eager for action, suggested a naval demonstration. Kitchener approved, and Churchill quickly moved forward with the idea of forcing the Straits. He and others [Nos. 208, 513, 661] believed that the presence of a Royal Navy squadron off Constantinople would result in Turkey leaving the war, thereby opening the Straits for military supplies to reach Russia and grain to move in the other direction. There was also the likelihood that Balkan states might join the Entente (or at worst stay neutral) allowing aid to Serbia and possibly pressure against Austria. Many people thought it was an effort which, if successful, would win the war [Nos. 180, 252,486,546,594,651]. In a leading question, Churchill requested the views of the admiral on the scene, Sir Sackville Hamilton Carden, and got the reply that a systematic step-by-step approach to destruction of the shore fortifications and sweeping of the mines in the channel was feasible. It was good enough for the First Lord and some of his advisers [No. 374], and he presented his plan to a tired and frustrated War Council in mid-January. Despite ambiguous historical precedent and a technical analysis of 1906 [No. 120] saying the Straits could not be forced, Churchill was sure of success. However, he did note that if problems developed the attack could be ended and portrayed as a demonstration [Nos. 120, 459] Chuchill's eloquence swayed Fisher, who as First Sea Lord was the key technical naval advisor, and Maurice Hankey, the soldier serving as secretary to the War Council. The politicians on the council were delighted with a plan to escape the hopelessness of the Western Front, especially if it were done without the commitment of troops. No one asked what later seemed to be obvious questions, such as what was to happen if the Turks yielded and there were no troops present to garrison Constantinople. The navy's initial efforts appeared promising. Admiral Carden began his efforts to shell the fortifications into submission on February 19 and by March 16 seemed on the verge of success. Long-range shelling had so quieted resistance that parties of marines had been landed to destroy artillery positions. Although some of these groups had met serious opposition, by and large the effort seemed to have gone

Introduction and Tactical Overview of the Campaign

5

well. The defenses had, however, been improved with German help. General Otto Liman von Sanders, active with the Turkish forces before the war began, was given charge of Gallipoli [Nos. 395, 615, 706]. The forts had gotten improved artillery four years earlier, and mobile howitzers, a difficult target under the best of circumstances, were now deployed. The early success was more apparent than real [Nos. 227, 615]. The navy's great, and as it turned out final, push was to be March 18, by which date Carden had broken down physically and was replaced by Admiral John Michael de Robeck, his second in command. The squadron was made up of seventeen pre-dreadnought battleships (three of them French), which Churchill and others regarded as obsolescent and expendable, plus assorted smaller vessels. It was augmented, at the suggestion of Admiral Fisher, by H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth, a super-dreadnought, which was to complete her sea and gunnery trials by participating. The plan was for three lines of battleships to engage the inner fortresses (the outer ones supposedly having been reduced already) at increasingly short range and, as the defenses were destroyed, for mine sweepers to clear the way to move through the Straits. The first wave, made up of the Queen Elizabeth, four pre-dreadnoughts, and the battle cruiser Inflexible, seemed to be accomplishing its task, but as it turned away and the second line of four French battleships moved up, Turkish fire was renewed and the French Bouvet was sunk by a mine with virtually all hands. Nonetheless victory seemed in hand, and so the third line of six battleships was ordered forward with the mine sweepers. Then H.M.S. Inflexible hit a mine and also sank, although most of her crew was rescued. This was very shortly followed by major damage to H.M.S. Irresistible and the French Gaulois. In the late afternoon, Admiral Roger Keyes took a destroyer supported by H.M.S. Ocean and H.M.S. Swiftsure in an attempt to save Irresistible, only to have Ocean mined so that both were ultimately lost. The improved defenses and possibly an alert from a bombardment in November of 1914 (Fromkin [No. 251; see also 139, 142] insists that the Turks took no warning), had paid dividends [No. 706]. The most important change, as it turned out, was a short row of mines laid parallel to the shore (all others were across the channel) and undiscovered by the attackers which all the badly damaged ships hit. Mine sweeping went poorly because the trawlers assigned the job were not powerful enough to move with any speed against the current and were easy targets for the Turks. Civilian crews had a tendency to give up the effort quickly causing Churchillian amazement that the operation ended before any serious casualties were taken. By the end of the day on the 18th, de Robeck was dispirited. His second in command, Admiral Roger Keyes, however, was convinced that victory only required one more thrust which should be undertaken on the next day. He also proposed using naval crews on mine sweepers and fitting out destroyers to do the job if more power was needed to negotiate the currents. Keyes' view is the center of much of the historiographical speculation about the navy's effort. Could the navy have won through and carried the day by promptly

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

renewing its attack? Keyes [Nos. 305, 397-98] was completely convinced it could and pressed repeatedly for renewed naval assaults-even going to London late in 1915 to argue against his commander's support for evacuation and in favor of a new sea borne assault. His ideas are supported by many historians and some military men [Nos. 61, 86, 143, 162, 251, 350, 405. 427, 663, 717, 733] who believe that since the defenders were dispirited and out of ammunition, a renewed attack on the 19th would have resulted in victory. Even Liman von Sanders [No. 615] and his adjutant [No. 579] suggest that the defense was in trouble, as do some Turkish sources [Nos. 418, 698], but the memoirs of officers on the defeated side written for sale after the peace must be viewed with some caution. Current scholars, however, tend to question such hopes of success. Paul Halpern [No. 304] praises de Robeck's caution, and others, most importantly Kevin Fewster [No. 227] argue that the Turks were adequately supplied and could have successfully warded off a second attack. Unfortunately there was no pudding for the eating to prove. General Sir Ian Hamilton, appointed to head the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, had arrived on the scene for the attack of the 18th, and after meeting with the naval commanders, advised Kitchener that a combined arms approach was necessary. De Robeck, whether from the desire to escape responsibility or sincere concurrence, agreed, and the decision to wait for the army was taken. On paper Hamilton certainly did not seem an inappropriate choice for command. He was a career soldier who had served as Kitchener's chief of staff in South Africa and was known for his scholarly approach to his profession. His performance at the Dardanelles, however, is frequently condemned [Nos. 330, 372, 405, 412-13, 590]. Although his nephew's biography [No. 314] is an unconvincing tribute, among those who have written about the campaign he does have his defenders [Nos. 43, 422, 640]. These defenses tend to suggest that he was asked to make bricks without straw. He was told there would be no reinforcements, and to go immediately—he had to leave without much of his staff even being selected. He was given little information—the 1906 evaluation asserting that storming the Straits was impossible was not mentioned in his cursory briefing, and the few maps supplied were out of date and inaccurate. The transports with his forces had been loaded with no thought about combat priorities for landing their contents. Facilities at Mudros, the harbor from which the actual assault was to be mounted, were limited and so the ships were sent back to Egypt to be unloaded and appropriately repacked. The landings were finally made on April 25. Whether or not the several weeks of delay proved advantageous to the defenders is a matter of controversy [Nos. 147, 290, 314, 427, 561, 633, 640, 693], but Liman von Sanders [No. 615] says that it was decisive. Hamilton had several options for the invasion, and chose to strike at Cape Helles, the tip of the peninsula, with landings at several points-S, V, W, X, and Y beaches-and further up the coast at Ari Burnu, an area that became known as Anzac because the forces committed there were from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps commanded by General Sir William Birdwood [No. 75]. The French contingent was to land at Kum Kale on the Asiatic side of the Straits as a

Introduction and Tactical Overview of the Campaign

7

diversion, and then be withdrawn and landed at Helles because Kitchener had forbidden extended operations in Asia. The Royal Naval Division [Nos. 294, 37880, 598, 624, 688] also was to make a diversionary attack and then withdraw to form the reserve. The idea was that while the Turks tried to determine the main axis of the attack, the British forces would drive up from Helles while the Anzac units pushed across the peninsula to cut off both reinforcement and retreat. Naval forces would be able to provide both logistic and artillery support, although some officers reported orders not to fire after the landings for fear of hitting their own men [Nos. 114, 172, 722]. Although the concept has gotten good marks from many [Nos. 314, 422, 508, 590, 633], Denis Winter, who can be counted upon for a revisionist view well made, suggests that the planning was revised so often that the tactical commanders, even on the 25th, did not fully know what they were to do, and success would have been little short of a miracle [No. 750]. Frank Knight [No. 405; see also 40, 176, 186] agrees firmly about the muddled planning. The worst situation at Cape Helles was at V Beach where an old ship, the H.M.S. River Clyde, was grounded to provide a landing passage-a real innovation in amphibious operations [No. 686] but also an obvious target for the defenders. The attackers here were met by determined resistance based on well-sited machine guns and barely got any men ashore alive before dark. Although the defenders were relatively few there was also serious resistance at W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers lost half of their men and became famous for winning six Victoria Crosses. The best was Y Beach where the landing was unresisted, and S Beach was also taken easily. The officer in charge of the landings, General Aylmer Hunter- Weston, commander of the 29th Division, remained offshore and has often been damned for being out of touch with the situation He insisted on sticking to the original pattern of landing~V and W were the main thrust-to avoid confusion, even though that meant continuing to disembark troops at the beaches where the defense was strongest. He even rejected a fairly strong suggestion from Hamilton that troops be diverted to "Y" Beach. Hamilton was convinced that the commander-in-chief should not interfere with the conduct of an operation after it was underway and was afflicted with a degree of diffidence rarely found in a successful military man. Thus, he did no more than suggest diversion of secondary assaults to the beaches with little defense, even when he knew of problems. The situation on shore was worsened because Hunter-Weston's orders were so vague that units which made successful landings did not know what to do next. Two officers at Y Beach walked unimpeded to the village of Krithia, which would be the goal of three futile and bloody attacks (April 28, May 6-8, and June 4) and returned to their beachhead for lunch. The units also made no effort to support other landings. A stroke from S beach could have taken the Turks who were slaughtering the men trying to land from the River Clyde in the rear and potentially saved many British lives. Lacking orders and experienced officers who might have taken the initiative, the troops merely waited. Those on Y Beach eventually were evacuated as Turkish reinforcements arrived and began counterattacks. The heroism

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

of the men has been generally praised [Nos. 55, 148, 164-65, 333, 413, 494 for instance], and the incompetence of the leadership almost as commonly damned [Nos. 405, 481-83, 508, 605, 645, 668, 684 for instance]. The latter criticism is mitigated in some accounts on grounds that the troops and officers were inexperienced and inadequately trained—situations over which the commanders of the expedition had little or no control [Nos. 43, 94, 350,422, 517, 640]. Condemnation is not universal. Geoffrey Till and Cortez Stephens [Nos. 686, 649] argue that much did go right and that given the lack of experience or even doctrine concerning amphibious operations the results were better than might have been expected. Some sources from the defending side suggest that the attack came closer to success than the final result suggested [Nos. 390, 523, 579, 594]. Nonetheless, the situation at Cape Helles quickly bogged down into trench warfare reminiscent of the Western Front and no more significant progress occurred. The landing at Anzac, between Gaba Tepe and Ari Burnu, also went badly. Hasty, frequently changed planning and/or problems of currents and poor navigation resulted in the troops reaching the beaches at unexpected places and with units mixed. The small unit officers were given the plans so late they lacked adequate knowledge of the terrain to compensate for the errors and there was much confusion. Although these problems are commonly regarded as the result of the fog of war, Eric Bush [No. 114] who, as a midshipman, commanded one of the landing tows, insists that inexcusably poor navigation by the navy was at fault. Denis Winter [Nos. 749-50] says the planning was the real flaw and that blaming the currents or navigation is an effort to shift the responsibility. He charges such dissembling was extended into the evidence presented to the Dardanelles Commission, which investigated the situation. The enthusiastic Australian and New Zealand troops drove inland anyway and were in a fair way of reaching the vital high ground-Sari Bair Ridge and the summit at Chunuk Bair. The landing confusion slowed initial progress, and then Turkish resistance, very limited at first, grew strong. The possibility of withdrawal was put to General Birdwood, but for once Hamilton rejected the opinion of the man on the scene and the Anzacs successfully dug in. Unfortunately for the Allied cause, the defense fell into the hands of a ruthless and brilliant officer-trie sort of leader the Allies lacked throughout the campaign-named Mustafa Kemal Ultimately to be Atattirk, the leader of a new Turkey, at Gallipoli Kemal drove himself and his men to heroism and sacrifice almost beyond reason. Badly outnumbered initially, Kemal was able to hold and force a stalemate at Anzac [Nos. 30, 178, 249, 403, 456, 499, 518,554,594,705,712,723]. Although Keyes continued to press for an aggressive effort, the Royal Navy was not to have a decisive effect at the Dardanelles. Successful submarine penetration of the Straits and attacks on Turkish shipping in the Sea of Marmora was good for morale, but did little to change the situation on Gallipoli. Some commentators, including Liman von Sanders [No. 615], have suggested, however, that a more sustained effort might have crippled the Turkish logistics [Nos. 155, 329].

Introduction and Tactical Overview of the Campaign

9

Unfortunately for the Royal Navy, the Turks and Germans also had a sea borne sting. On May 13 a Turkish destroyer torpedoed H.M.S. Goliath, and then toward the end of the month a U-boat sank H.M.S. Majestic. The German submarine activity [Nos. 328,344,420,475,480,496] led the Admiralty to pull the battleships out of the area. The troops not only had to watch the Majestic go down, but also saw the strongest elements of their naval support, especially the Queen Elizabeth, flee. The replacement of the capital ships with monitors, less vulnerable to torpedoes, did not restore the lost morale. In London, the U-boat crisis contributed to a final break between Fisher and Churchill (see Chapter 3), and the former's resignation undermined the latter, so that the most ardent supporter of the Dardanelles Campaign lost much influence. The early and mid-summer at Gallipoli was a period of frustration and suffering. Savage fighting was frequent, with lines in places only ten to twenty yards apart. Casualties were heavy, and were greatly increased by sickness as the summer progressed. A plague of flies, understated by being called Biblical in proportion, fed on the thousands of unburied corpses (an early truce to bury the dead was not repeated) and spread disease, especially dysentery. Evacuation of 1,000 men in a day was not uncommon. Drinking water was usually in very short supply, especially in Allied lines. Men often had to get by with about a canteen full a dayfor drinking and washing. Frequent reports of soldiers swimming in the sea, when observers thought they should have been fighting, are in part explained by the need to wash off at least some of the filth in which they were living. The diet was monotonous and almost entirely lacking in vegetables. Medical arrangements for casualties and sanitation were inadequate, and although there was some improvement during the course of the campaign, never really very good [Nos. 15, 115, 186, 201, 385, 417 for instance]. As the situation became a disaster in the making, Hamilton overcame his awe of Kitchener enough to ask more forcefully than in the past for reinforcements. Concerned that the prestige of the empire would suffer irredeemably if the campaign failed, Kitchener was actually prepared to send more troops, but although four divisions came for the August attack, some commentators think the numbers were so few the effort was doomed [Nos. 32, 114, 310, 428, 523]. With the availability of reinforcements—mostly untried Territorial Forces which some have argued should have been used as replacements rather than inserted as new units [No. 72]-Hamilton planned a new initiative: a landing just above Anzac at Suvla Bay, where the terrain would allow a drive across the narrowest point in the peninsula. Turkish forces would be trapped and positions commanding the Straits taken, thus allowing the navy to sail into the Sea of Marmora. Diversionary attacks were planned at Helles, with Krithia once again the goal, and at Anzac to take the position known as Lone Pine. If for once the planning of an operation in the Dardanelles Campaign was welldone, the tactical elements were as badly handled as ever. Kitchener rejected Hamilton's request for a youthful, energetic general from France to command the

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

offensive. Basing his choice on seniority, he sent General Sir Frederick Stopford, who at sixty-one had never commanded troops in battle. His most recent field service was in the Boer War. Stopford, only recently recalled from retirement, was convinced that he lacked adequate artillery for an offensive and drifted away from Hamilton's emphasis on reaching the high ground-the Anafarta Ridge-until successfully landing troops became his main objective. Due to a wrenched knee he did not go ashore for several days after the landing, and he ignored increasingly urgent messages from Hamilton about pressing the attack against the ridges. On shore confusion often reigned. Officers had not been given assignments in time to study them thoroughly, and units got lost due to poor maps and ignorant guides. Nonetheless there were chances for successes that might have turned the whole campaign in favor of the British. Perhaps most unfortunate was a unit that stopped within a few hundred yards of the undefended key summit of Chunuk Bair to have breakfast and await a supporting column. Turkish forces reached the summit first and held. There were, however, some limited successes. The Australian assault on Lone Pine resulted in very bloody, hand to hand fighting but took the position, and at the end of August, Hill 60 was taken. Individual heroism during the campaign was so common as to be taken for granted, but without focus and determination at the top it was futile. Examples of missed tactical opportunities are really beside the point. The real failure was that of commanders from the top down who did not make clear to subordinates or did not themselves understand that success required vigorous and rapid assault on the high ground. Hamilton had planning reports that made clear that Stopford was scaling back expectations to little more than establishing a beachhead, but he failed to intervene. He also did not correct faults during the battle, even though he had chances to do so. The troops were bitter [Nos. 334-35] and historians critical [Nos. 72, 226, 335, 483]. The lack of naval support [Nos. 145, 172] and poor logistical arrangements [Nos. 9,43, 87, 310, 465, 472, 624, 647, 679, 698] have been cited as contributory factors, and once again the battle bogged down. After the failure at Suvla, evacuation began to be considered. The critique of the campaign was furthered by the action of some correspondents. Ellis AshmeadBartlett [Nos. 22, 24-25], a newspaper correspondent, was on the scene and very critical of the conduct of the campaign from the beginning. His dispatches were subject to censorship, as were all such reports. C.E.W. Bean [Nos. 51-55], the official Australian press representative, regarded the censorship as appropriate and reasonable, but Ashmead-Bartlett wanted to make a case. A visit by Keith Murdock, an Australian reporter, officially looking at the arrangements for mail to soldiers, provided an opportunity. Murdock, who had sought appointment as the Australian correspondent but lost out to Bean, asked for a chance to visit Gallipoli. A brief visit left him appalled, and he agreed to carry a very critical letter from Ashmead-Bartlett to London. Another correspondent, concerned about the violation of the terms accepted by all reporters, (to submit all reports to military censorship), warned Hamilton. Murdock was intercepted and the letter confiscated.

Introduction and Tactical Overview of the Campaign

11

He wrote friends in the government in Australia describing in sometimes lurid terms the conditions at Gallipoli. A copy reached Lloyd George, who then helped to ensure H. H. Asquith, the Prime Minister, also saw it. The letter was soon circulating through official and unofficial channels. Meanwhile, Hamilton's staff had arranged for one of their own, Guy Dawnay, to be sent back to London to report on the situation. Although not hostile to Hamilton, his report was not encouraging [Nos. 234, 576]. Inspections-first by General Charles Monro, who in late October replaced Hamilton, and later by Kitchener-confirmed that evacuation or massive reinforcement were the only viable options. The entry of Bulgaria into the war in alliance with the Central Powers, however, made the flow of German supply, especially artillery, to Turkey more convenient, and so further attacks, even with reinforcements, seemed unlikely to succeed. Churchill [No. 147] said of Monro: "He came, he saw, he capitulated." The general's biographer [No. 47], however, argues that Monro was a competent professional soldier who acted responsibly in contrast to the mercurial amateur in London. Initial fears of massive losses during evacuation proved false. Organized by Colonel C.B.B. White, careful progressive reductions in force combined with imaginative ruses to make the Turks think all was normal resulted in complete withdrawal with no casualties at all. This was accomplished despite a storm that smashed piers and caused flooding that drowned men in trenches and drove many to open ground followed by a bitter cold spell that resulted in hundreds of cases of frostbite and even deaths from exposure. The Anzac area was empty of Allied troops by December 20 and Helles by January 9. Accounts from both the Allied [Nos. 47, 152, 218, 229, 41, 506. 529, 592] and Turkish [No. 635] sides make it clear that the withdrawal was ironically the triumph of the campaign. Geoffrey Till [No. 686; see also 120, 240, 255, 484, 495] insists that it proves how much was learned and shows the campaign had been a success as part of the process of learning modern warfare. The fighting was over. The disputes about whether it should have been attempted and why it failed were just beginning.

2

Overviews, Archival Sources, and Periodicals From its beginning, the Dardanelles Campaign has been a subject of controversy. The questions of whether failure was due to the strategy or the tactics-or both, and of which individuals-politicians, sailors, and/or soldiers-were at fault have been repeatedly answered. The best introduction to the controversies can be found in Edward Spiers contribution to The First World War and British Military History [No. 643]. There are some patterns to this commentary, and outlining the overviews that have been advanced should help make interpretations of the campaign understandable. Many surveys, although they are often the starting point for investigations of a topic and frequently the only portrayal students ever read, do not necessarily offer a very balanced interpretation. The war was not over before the armchair quarterbacks, unrestrained by the lack of information, produced overviews second guessing soldiers and politicians about the Dardanelles. Such early works such as John Masefield's [No. 485 see also Nos. 537, 577,631] offer an appreciation of the heroism and suffering of the troops, but the authors had little access to documentary evidence and were constrained by governmental censorship. Granville Fortescue [No. 237] is particularly critical of the strategy, arguing that the Straits were impregnable, but Henry Nevinson [No. 537] insists the strategic concept was sound and failure was due to the refusal of political and military leadership in London to provide the campaign with adequate support. Sydney Mosley [No. 517] damns other writers for their harshness, attributing failure to unavoidable human error. What would become a flood of memoirs also began almost immediately after the withdrawal. While these authors had little more to offer in terms of military and political information, many gave good accounts of their experiences. John Gallishaw's Trenching at Gallipoli [No. 257], apparently the first book about Gallipoli to appear, is a good example [see also Nos. 257, 273-74, 389, 741]. More documentation emerged with the 1916 publication of the reports [No. 290] of the Dardanelles Commission, established to investigate the failure of the

Overviews, Archival Sources, and Periodicals

13

campaign, and then the Mitchell Report in 1919 [No. 504]. Although they did not include the actual evidence collected, the Dardanelles Commission reports did develop several lines of criticism that continue to appear. These include the foolishness of launching a purely naval attack, without adequate consultation with professional naval officers; the indecisiveness about the provision of troops; lack of staff work; excessive concern about the impact of withdrawal at the War Office; and poor leadership on the scene. Denis Winter [No. 750] argues, however, that witnesses deliberately mislead the Commission to divert blame from themselves and their friends. This very real possibility makes caution important when using the reports. Perhaps the most important of the works in the few years just after the war were correspondent Henry Nevinson's [No. 537], in which the strategy is praised and failure blamed on lack of surprise and tactical error; Charles Callwell's [No. 120] somewhat self-serving denunciation of the strategy planned without attention to his earlier critical evaluation of an attack on the Dardanelles; and C.E.W. Bean's Story ofAnzac [No. 55]. Bean was the accredited Australian war correspondent, official historian, and a prolific writer. He spent much more time at the front than other newspapermen and developed deep emotional ties to the Anzac troops. He also exhibits a strong sense of nascent Australian nationalism [No. 55-56]. Although an admirable scholar, his criticism of the Dardanelles plan, which he regards as an impossible task forced on the military by politicians, must be considered as possibly biased by his Australian sympathies. Although his involvement with the strategic thinking about the Dardanelles is detailed in Chapter 3, as the author of the monumental survey of the war, World Crisis [No. 147], Winston Churchill must also be considered here. As First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill took responsibility for planning the campaign, and in fact he originated the idea for it. Churchill's history includes a vigorous defense of his conduct and set the tone for much of the subsequent debate about Dardanelles Campaign. Churchill regards the strategic conception for the campaign as sound and the failure as the result of a series of strategic and tactical errors over which he had no control-"terrible ifs" he calls them. Although Robin Prior [No. 580] insists that Churchill's account is extremely self-serving, it continues to have a powerful impact on how the Dardanelles Campaign is viewed. Churchill got support from several Cabinet colleagues in the years immediately following publication of his book. Lord Grey, the Foreign Secretary [No. 293], H. H. Asquith, the Prime Minister [No. 556], and David Lloyd George, in 1915 Chancellor of the Exchequer [No. 437] all published memoirs that absolved Churchill from the worst of the blame. Still, as members of the War Council they had agreed to the First Lord's plans and would have to share some of the blame if he were judged too harshly. Some German works, including memoirs and official histories [Nos. 523, 579, 594, 615], supported Churchill, suggesting that the Dardanelles Campaign came very close to success, as did the British official history. [No. 27]. This is also the era when Basil Liddell Hart [Nos. 426-29] began his career-long defense of the indirect strategy. Liddell Hart, a veteran of the war

14

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

before he was a historian, regarded the view that the war had to be won in France by frontal assault to break the German line as murderously foolish. Any alternative to the Western Front seemed wise, and, although he was too good a scholar not to acknowledge that there were tactical errors in the handling of the Dardanelles Campaign, he supported the strategy. By the time of the Second World War, the dominant interpretation-despite some continued criticism of the Dardanelles Campaign/?^ se [Nos. 24-25, 211] and as a distraction from the vitally important Western Front [No. 60, 486-87, 673, 672]~was that the strategy was somewhere between reasonable and brilliant but that the tactical and logistical handling of the campaign ranged somewhere between unsuccessful and criminal. John North's Gallipoli: The Fading Vision [No. 546] pulled together these various themes providing a (perhaps overly) moderate survey of the campaign. Alan Moorehead's unusually well-written Gallipoli [No. 508] reopened the Dardanelles debate in the 1950s. Moorehead strongly defends the strategy, insisting the naval attack had the potential to reach Constantinople and that the Turks were little short of hysterical at the prospect. The failures were not pressing the naval attack after the disappointments of March 18 and in the land tactics after the invasion of Gallipoli. Even at that, he argues, the campaign nearly carried the day. The publication of Maurice Hankey's memoirs [No. 316] put paid to the positive outlook. Colonel Hankey had been secretary to the War Council and despite some early support for the Dardanelles idea, had warned the Council repeatedly that large numbers of troops would be required. He was ignored, and his comments left little doubt of his disdain for the strategic and technical knowledge of the politicians who made the decisions about the campaign. Hankey's memoirs were followed by Robert Rhodes James's Gallipoli [No. 372]. James's attitude is that the Dardanelles Campaign was a foolish idea conducted foolishly. Subsequently, John Laffin [Nos. 412-13] and Peter Liddle [No. 433] agreed. Laffin went so far as to list the faults of every general officer, and many others, who served on Gallipoli in a chapter entitled "Guilty Men." Denis Winter in 25 April 1915: The Inevitable Disaster [No. 750] was extremely critical of the planning by Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff, suggesting that haste, repeated changes, and failure to inform mid-level officers who would lead the actual combat produced confusion and led to failure. Some recent surveys of the campaign are somewhat less condemnatory. Edwin Hoyt's Disaster at the Dardanelles, 1915 [No. 350] returns to the idea that the failure was in not carrying through the initial concept. He blames the lack of will of the admirals and generals who decided to wait for combined arms after the initial naval failure, thus allowing defensive preparation. Harvey Broadbent's work [No. 95], despite a rather bizarre explanation of British motivation (see Chapter 6 below), also focuses on tactical errors. Nigel Steel and Peter Hart in Defeat at Gallipoli [No. 647] condemn the planning, which was overly tied to politics, and question whether victory would have produced as much gain as was hoped. Some success would have been possible, however, were it not for the mind-boggling series of tactical errors. They do not, however, single out any individual as particularly at fault. Michael Hickey in Gallipoli [No. 330] also damns poor

Overviews, Archival Sources, and Periodicals

15

leadership but shies away from excessive fault finding. The volumes by Steel and Hart and Hickey are, however, quite good factual surveys of the campaign. In both cases the descriptions of the campaign are clear and interpretations are logical and judicious, if cautious. These books are, currently, the best choices for initial introductions to the campaign. ARCHIVAL SOURCES Archival resources for researching the Dardanelles Campaign are substantial. The bulk of them, and the most important by far, are English and Australian, although some other records are available. The limited French involvement may be pursued at the French Military Archives, Chateau de Vincennes and the Ministere de la Marine, Paris. German involvement was very limited, but some military archives may prove of use. There are some German sources on microfilm at the National Archives Record Service in Washington, D. C. There are useful guides to the British sources. Janet Foster and Julia Sheppard's British Archives: A Guide to Archive Resources in the United Kingdom, 3rd edition [No. 239] should be consulted, as should Robin Higham's A Guide to the Sources of British Military History [No. 332]. Peter H. Liddle's "Report on Gallipoli Research in Australia and New Zealand" in Archives and Manuscripts [No. 434] provides some information concerning the collection of soldiers' reminiscences that he has assembled. S. L. Mayer and W. J. Koenig's The Two World Wars: A Guide to Manuscript Collections in the United Kingdom [No. 491] is also useful. These should be supplemented with the guides provided at particular archives-especially the Public Record Office at Kew and the Imperial War Museum in London. The following is a list of archives which hold major collections of manuscripts and records of importance to the study of the Dardanelles Campaign. The most important collections at each archive are listed as well. The New Zealand National Archives in Wellington and many local and regional libraries in both Australia and New Zealand hold various diaries of soldiers and other participants in the Dardanelles Campaign (see No. 185 for the LaTrobe Library of Victoria, Australia), but space does not permit even an attempt to list such collections. Australian War Memorial, Canberra Birdwood Papers Bean Papers Monash Papers War Diaries Australian National Library, Canberra Monash Papers Murdock Papers Churchill College, Cambridge

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

(As of fall 1996 some information about this archive could be found on the Internet at www. chu. cam. ac. uk/archives/guide, html.) Churchill Papers De Robeck Papers Fisher Papers Godfrey Papers Hankey Papers Murdock Papers Wester-Wemyss Papers British Library, London Keyes Papers Hunter-Weston Papers Balfour Papers House of Lords Records Office Lloyd George Papers Keyes Papers Imperial War Museum, London Interviews with Veterans Eric Bush Papers Dawnay Papers Birdwood Papers Mustafa Kemal Diary (typescript) Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London Ian Hamilton Papers Public Record Office, London War Office and Admiralty Records Maurice Hankey Papers Kitchener Papers PERIODICALS The study of the Dardanelles Campaign has, of course, produced many popular and scholarly articles. These are listed in the annotated bibliography that comprises the second section of this volume. Some periodicals, such as veterans' groups' organs, have been left out. These are difficult to get in the United States, often have limited and/or irregular publication runs, but they do have articles giving personal reminiscences and articles by scholars. They include The Gallipolian, the journal of the Gallipoli Association; Stand To, the journal of the Australian Capital Territory Branch of the Returned Services League; Le Bulletin des anciens des

Overviews, Archival Sources, and Periodicals

17

Dardanelles (triennial issues); The Anzac Bulletin (apparently only published in 1917); Reveille; Coo-ee; Duckboard; Mufti', Dinkum Oil; Standeasy (New Zealand); Gallipoli Gazette. Newspapers are often not of much importance for the study of military campaigns due to censorship, but The Age and the Argus of Melbourne did carry many articles from Gallipoli. The ingenuity of soldiers in finding ways to publish trench newspapers is amazing, and the men at Gallipoli were no exceptions. Although examples of their writing can be gotten from The Anzac Book [No. 494], The Dardanelles Driveller and The Peninsula Press offer a look at the attitudes of the men on the scene at various times in the campaign.

3 Politics and Strategy The strategic planning for the Dardanelles was controversial from its inception. Much of the initial thinking came from Winston Churchill, for whom the choice was between diverting the military effort from France or, as he put it, continuing "to chew barbed wire." He was not alone in this view. Several powerful politicians and some military officers agreed [Nos. 255, 426-29, 437, 556]. The whole concept of an Eastern strategy has been part of a major historiographical dispute since the war. Perhaps the most vehement disputants have been Churchill , whose World Crisis [Nos. 147] cannot be dismissed as merely defensive, and Basil Liddell Hart [Nos. 426-29] on the side of the Easterners and John Terraine [Nos. 672-74] and Peter Liddle [Nos. 431-33] on that of the Westerners. It is, however, an on-going argument and has at no time lacked for advocates on either side, but many observers agree that the failure of the Dardanelles Campaign was the turning point in deciding that the major effort had to be made in France [Nos. 87, 255, 352, 674, 716]. Although there were a number of proposals for attacking the Central Powers somewhere other than France, the eventual choice was an assault on the Ottoman Empire by forcing the Straits and taking Constantinople. This was not anyone's first choice, but when the Russians asked for help with the Turks, Easterners, especially Churchill, embraced it. An attack via the Hellespont could hardly fail to be attractive to the classically educated English and actually offered some strategic possibilities. Even at the beginning of 1915, it was hard to deny that Germany was the key to the Central Powers, but pre-war emphasis on the importance of allies left the sense that if those allies could be defeated, a great power would be fatally weakened. Hence knocking out Turkey, ensuring that the Balkan states would remain neutral or even join the Entente, and threatening Austria-Hungary seemed attractive. It does not seem to have occurred to the planners that her Eastern allies were more a drain than an addition to German power and could provide little more than a diversion to hold Entente forces away from the Western Front. More practically, opening the passage from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea offered

Politics and Strategy

19

the possibility of supplying the Russians with much needed military equipment, though the shortage of shells in France suggested there was little to supply, and getting needed grain from the Ukraine. Although often criticized, the basic idea has drawn approval from a number of students of strategy. C.R.M.F. Cruttwell [No. 170] in his survey of strategy supports the idea of striking away from the Western Front, though not at the Dardanelles, especially in view of what is now known about German plans to focus their efforts on Russia in 1915. William McPherson [No. 470] asserts that, if the effort had been given the necessary support with men and materiel, Germany would have been defeated before the United States got involved. Even Frederick Maurice, a military officer and Westerner in overall interpretation [No. 486], avers that there was strategic merit in the concept. Although David French [Nos. 246,248] is more critical, those scholars who focus on strategy per se have generally suggested that the Dardanelles had a chance to succeed. Students of other aspects of the situation have not always agreed. As Clement Attlee said of him years later, Churchill always had numerous solutions for a problem and rarely much sense of which of them was the best. He was not a man of halves, however, and once he adopted the Dardanelles operation he poured his enormous charisma, eloquence, and energy into getting it adopted. German success in reducing Belgian fortresses with artillery fire convinced him the Royal Navy could blast its way through Turkish defenses at the Straits. The difference between the high-angle fire of German howitzers and the flat trajectory of naval guns appears to have given him no pause. Although the Sea Lords, the First Lord of the Admiralty's technical advisors, later claimed to have known better all along [Nos. 159, 211, 270, 291, 573], their comments at the time were, at best, hesitant, crabbed, and often oblique. Churchill has been condemned frequently for pressing his plan despite his lack of technical expertise [Nos. 270-71, 348-49, 371], and on the question of guns he was indeed wrong. The greater fault, however, was with the specialists who knew better than he did but allowed him to so overawe them that they failed to speak up. Later claims that they had recognized the error early on do them little credit. Churchill does appear to have preferred a combined arms approach. Yet, faced by Kitchener's firm assertion that there were no troops available for use outside of France, the Russians' call for help with the Turks, and his own enormous urge to do something, Churchill asserted that the Royal Navy could force the Straits alone and that the mere appearance of a squadron off Constantinople would produce the collapse of the Turkish government [Nos. 27, 28, 137, 147, 717]. Presented to a tired, frustrated War Cabinet in January, the idea was irresistible. The shimmering prospects of a major victory-there had been few so far~a link to Russia, and perhaps even a Balkan coalition against the Austrians blinded the politicians to the difficulties of turning the theory into practice. Besides, Churchill assured them that in the unlikely event the thing went wrong, the operation could be depicted as merely a demonstration and abandoned without loss of face. Many have suggested that this was the beginning of a deliberate effort on

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

Churchill's part to mislead his colleagues as a means to get them committed to the campaign [Nos. 211, 265, 291, 371-72, 557]. George Cassar [No. 130] extends the charge of deception to Churchill's dealings with the French, suggesting that the Minister of Marine in Paris was taken in by Churchill and then misled his own colleagues so as to avoid responsibility for the Dardanelles plan. For an English Cabinet member to deliberately mislead his colleagues is a political sin of enormous magnitude, and Churchill seems unlikely to have gone so far. Tuvia Ben-Moshe, a harsh a critic of the First Lord, however, rejects the idea [No. 64]. Richard Hough's idea that Churchill's mix of sincerity, exuberance, and eloquence carried the Cabinet [No. 348], which is echoed by many [Nos. 96, 211, 216, 349, 555, 573, 602] seems more likely. Churchill's motives, of course, do not mean that his colleagues were not misled. Although a number suggest in their memoirs (see Chapter 2) that they must share the responsibility, several of their biographersMackay on Balfour [No. 459], Owen on Lloyd George [No. 555], Cassar on Kitchener [No. 131], and Bacon on Fisher [No. 39] for instance-suggest that they did believe that the attack was to be limited or portrayed as a demonstration should it go badly. In any case the First Lord was allowed to plunge ahead without restraint. Restraining Churchill was, of course, heavy work. Before the idea of forcing the Straits emerged, he had already ordered a bombardment of the Dardanelles shore forts, thereby possibly warning the Turks and dooming his own scheme [Nos. 145, 706]. Apparently aware of the danger of delay, Churchill was eager to get on with the effort. Stating that he was ready to employ, and lose if it came to that, quite a number of obsolescent pre-dreadnought capital ships, he framed a question to Admiral Carden about how the Straits might be forced, rather than whether doing so was a good idea. Carden allowed there was no hope of rushing the Straits but that they might be forced in a series of steps. With adequate firepower-he asked for fourteen battleships along with many other vessels-the outer and then the inner fortifications might be silenced, the minefields swept clean, and finally a squadron could force its way through to the Sea of Marmora and ultimately Constantinople. Churchill seized upon Carden's reply, and on January 28th the decision was finalized. This handling of Carden has drawn criticism. Although Admiral Henry Oliver, one of the Sea Lords, supported Carden's approach [No. 374], the First Lord is accused of manipulating Carden and ignoring his technical advisors [No. 349]. Gregory Paget [No. 558] has gone further suggesting that virtually all of the leadership, including Churchill, knew the plan was faulty, and the Sea Lords, as they had when the question of the effects of bombarding forts with naval guns had arisen, said little. They were more likely to whisper to one another about their hesitancies than to tell political leaders [Nos. 159, 211, 270, 347, 349, 478, 513, 602]. Three men were in positions to put a stop to the Dardanelles Campaign at the beginning or force the strategic thinking into more realistic patterns: Fisher, Kitchener, and Asquith. Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher, the First Sea Lord, was popular if eccentric and widely respected for his work modernizing the Royal Navy

Politics and Strategy

21

at the beginning of the century. The First Lord of the Admiralty had brought the septuagenarian Fisher out of retirement at the beginning of the war, and the two had a powerful if enigmatic bond. Fisher did favor the Eastern strategy but preferred an amphibious strike in the Baltic to other plans. Although like many he later proclaimed himself a foe of the Dardanelles idea from the beginning, in fact, he not only approved the idea but also proposed sending H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth, the newest of the super-dreadnoughts, to complete her gunnery trials by shelling the Turks. By the end of January, this enthusiasm was waning, and Fisher was increasingly opposed to the diversion of resources-now he even claimed that the pre-dreadnoughts were too valuable to risk. On January 28, having even taken his concerns to the Prime Minister, he started to walk out of a War Council meeting when his ideas were not put before the group. Kitchener stopped him, appealing to duty. Churchill's eloquence kept Fisher from resigning for several months, but his subsequent claim that he could not speak out because as a technical military advisor he was obligated to support his minister unless asked specifically for his views is disingenuous. Fisher was an inveterate intriguer who knew and used the game of political manipulation from the beginning of his career. Before he finally resigned in May, asserting that he had always opposed the Dardanelles campaign but had been overwhelmed by Churchillian eloquence, he used what today would be called "leaks" to help the Conservative Party leader Andrew Bonar Law force Asquith into a coalition government, formed May 26 [No. 146]. He was no naif, and historians have been too kind concerning his role in this situation. R. H. Bacon [No. 39] is part-icularly supportive, suggesting that Fisher believed the attack would be broken off if the initial stages failed and that the civilians in the War Council were at fault for not insisting on hearing his views. Richard Ollard [No. 551] blames Fisher's friendship and loyalty to Churchill for his hesitance. The First Sea Lord has, however, faced some criticism. Patrick Beesley [No. 60] asserts that Fisher was initially much more in favor of the project that is usually indicated—much as he proclaims himself in his memoirs [Nos. 232-33] which are generally so overstated that few credit them. Richard Hough [No. 349], though he faults Churchill more, regards the First Sea Lord's hesitance as inexcusable. Arthur Marder [No. 479] suggests that Fisher had clear information, which he failed to present to the War Council, early in February that troops would be needed. Fisher's own efforts to obscure his role [No. 232-33] and his attractive personality-tile most recent biography [No. 515], virtually a panegyric, barely mentions the Dardanelles-seem to have preserved his reputation. His involvement in the Dardanelles decisionmaking deserves more investigation. Ultimately Fisher's resignation doomed Churchill, who was relegated to the position of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the coalition government, though he did keep his seat in the War Council (now renamed the Dardanelles Committee). Eventually he was forced out of the Cabinet entirely when Lloyd George replaced Asquith in 1916. With Churchill marginalized, the key strategic thinker and most enthusiastic supporter of the Dardanelles had little influence on the

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

latter half of the campaign. Thus the common tendency [Nos. 187, 211, 573, 602, 604] to blame Churchill for the whole of the ultimate failure is questionable. The other military member of the administration who could have effectively stopped or refocused the Dardanelles-and finally did so-was Herbert Horatio, Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of War. Kitchener was famed for his participation in colonial wars; he had led a relief force down the Nile in a vain attempt to relieve Charles "Chinese" Gordon at Khartom in 1885. Perhaps the best known of living English soldiers, he had been in London in August, 1914, and seemed both the inevitable and convenient choice for Secretary at War when the Liberal Government, hardly rife with martial leadership, faced the outbreak of World War I. Lloyd George compared his mind to a lighthouse-sometimes brilliantly piercing the darkness and at others utterly black. For instance, he was one of the few to predict that the war would last for several years rather than months, but in connection with the Dardanelles he only appears indecisive, and destructively so at that [No. 472]. Kitchener was delighted when Churchill broached the Dardanelles idea because he wanted to make a positive response to the Russian request that the Turks be drawn away from the Caucasus. For all his interest, however, he firmly maintained there were no troops available, and seemed~so some of his biographers assert [Nos. 131, 216]-to regard the plan as a naval operation. Then, perhaps because the invasion became very prominent in the press, he decided that defeat would so undermine the prestige of the empire (always his bailiwick heretofore), especially with Muslims, that the army would have to undertake whatever parts the navy could not accomplish [Nos. 131, 610]. Troops, it turned out, were available after all. Unfortunately, Kitchener never gave the Dardanelles top priority, so he made little effort to ensure that the campaign had what it really needed for tactical success. After several reversals of decision, he did send the 29th Division, the only regular army force not yet committed to the war, but the rest of the forces were inexperienced. Their leadership was not the best, and in the case of Frederick Stopford, a "dugout" (i. e., dug out of retirement) sent to head the Suvla landings, an absolute disaster [Nos. 405, 481-83, 508, 590, 605, 645, 668, 684]. At first Kitchener told the expedition commander, Ian Hamilton, that there would be no reinforcements, but when problems arose he sent some-always in penny packets. In the end, whatever chance there was for tactical success (See Chapter 1) was lost due to the lack of resources-human and materiel-and the fault for this must ultimately lie with Kitchener. That his failure to make a firm decision about the strategy of the Dardanelles was central to the tactical failure has been one of the two most common criticisms of Kitchener's policy [Nos. 21, 67, 162, 291, 319, 350, 423, 470, 472, 561, 600, 633]. He has been defended, however. Early biographers such as George Arthur [No. 20], C. R. Ballard [No. 264], and Victor Germains [No. 264] maintain that his hesitance reflected honest and legitimate concern about the needs of other fronts, and although such earlier works tend to be quite uncritical, Trevor Royle, writing in a very good 1985 study [No. 610], also defends his actions. The other common criticism of Kitchener regarding the Dardanelles is that he tried to handle too much

Politics and Strategy

23

of the operation himself, ignoring his own staff. The result was delay and inconsistency, especially as information already known to many involved often reached him late and/or in incomplete form. The most effective analysis of this problem comes from George Cassar [No. 131], but John Gooch [No. 280], C. O. Head [No. 323], and Philip Magnus [No. 472] all concur. Although the recent works by Royle and Cassar concerning Kitchener improve our understanding of his performance as Secretary for War, more attention to his responsibility for the problems in the Dardanelles is certainly warranted. The third leader who could have significantly influenced Dardanelles planning was Herbert Henry Asquith, the Prime Minister. Asquith's technique for handling political questions was to allow the advocates of various positions to follow the dialectic, and when consensus or exhaustion made a decision convenient, he acted. Although this got him a reputation for dilatoriness, his leisurely pace did little harm in domestic matters and he proved an effective head of government. Decisions about military operations in war, however, must be quick, and Asquith was unable to adapt. Generally his biographers have concentrated on his role in domestic affairs and passed lightly over his lack of success as a war-leader [Nos. 96, 410]. George Cassar [No. 129], however, has systematically exposed his faults regarding the Dardanelles. He charges that Asquith was too concerned about papering over disputes, especially that between Fisher and Churchill, and that the Prime Minister was too deferential to Kitchener, whose opinion, though quite firm whenever expressed, changed from time to time. Cassar notes that Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the War Cabinet, had warned Asquith (not to mention others) that the naval attack was unlikely to succeed but the cautions had been unheeded. Stephen Roskill [No. 605] makes the same point as does Hankey in his memoirs [No. 316]. Cassar's work should be consulted for any study the Dardanelles' strategy as should John Turner's work on wartime politics [No. 699] and Paul Guinn's study [No. 298] of the relationship of strategy and politics for background. All told then, the strategic thinking about the Dardanelles was dominated by Churchill initially, and later, once land operations were decided upon and Churchill's star was fading, by Kitchener. The debate over the practicality of the concept is extensive. Could the navy have carried the Straits and if so would its presence off Constantinople have caused the Ottoman government to sue for peace? Although modern scholars tend to be dubious on both counts [Nos. 114, 124, 270, 479, 580], Jeffrey Wallin [No. 717] argues vigorously that Churchill was entirely correct in his thinking and that the failures were entirely tactical. Henry Morgenthau [No. 513], the American ambassador in Constantinople, and Lewis Einstein [No. 208; see also 137, 252, 611], another American diplomat, asserted that the city was in a panic and the government preparing to flee at the mere suggestion in March that the Royal Navy was about to force the Straits. There has also been discussion of whether the Allies had the resources to supply Russian needs-even minimally-while continuing to build their own military presence in France. There was little virtue in diverting resources to opening a supply line over which little or nothing would pass. Some have also suggested that the surrender of

24

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

the Ottoman Empire would have done the Germans more good than harm. These commentators [Nos. 604, 693] have turned the argument of knocking the props from under Germany around: it was, they believe, Germany that was propping up her allies (German officers did speak of the Austrian alliance as being shackled to a corpse). These speculations, although fertile ground for ongoing historiographical controversy, must remain speculations, for they presume a victory that was not achieved. The tactical failure meant that none of the larger goals could be tested. It ultimately left final strategic considerations in the hands of the commanders on the scene, until the authorities in London resolved on evacuation.

4 Anzac Although this volume is intended to explore the military historiography of the Dardanelles Campaign, there are several reasons to examine the Australian-New Zealand involvement in the campaign separately and somewhat more broadly, though not exhaustively. The term Anzac was originally an acronym for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, but it quickly was accepted as a word meaning a soldier of that corps and/or the area where elements of that corps landed on the Gallipoli peninsula. The speedy and universal acceptance of the neologism suggests the importance of the Anzac contribution, which is, perhaps, somewhat overplayed in the body of literature concerning the campaign. For Australians and New Zealanders the experience of Gallipoli became a nationalistic symbol. April 25, the day of the initial landings on the peninsula, is Anzac Day: a national holiday on which the independence and national identity of these nations is celebrated [Nos. 5, 217, 259-61, 362-65, 414, 559, 601, 697, 730]. There are novels [No. 68] and even accounts for school children [No. 154]. A recent television series [No. 95] and Peter Weir's 1981 film Gallipoli, starring popular Australian actor Mel Gibson, indicate its continuing importance. The film has become part of scholarly analysis of Australian nationalism and versions and analyses of the screenplay have been published [Nos. 95,261, 682]. Such views are not quite universal, however, for Humphrey McQueen [No. 471] and E. M. Andrews [No. 14] question the importance of the campaign as a factor in the growth of Australian national consciousness. Anzac Day is, in part, the equivalent of the Fourth of July in the United States, though the revolutionary overtones are lacking. Because of its nationalistic importance, Australian scholars have devoted an enormous amount of study to the campaign, which is a reason that isolating the Anzac experience as part of the Dardanelles historiography is useful. Good scholarship and nationalistic passion frequently provoke persuasive argument, and so Anzac scholarship has had significant influence on the general view of the situation. Too much influence some

26

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

maintain, especially regarding the military history of the campaign. For instance, when the British official historian suggested that there was significant straggling among Australian soldiers during the first days after the landing at Anzac Cove, Australians pressed for changes in his text [No. 683]. E. M. Andrews in The Anzac Illusion [No. 14] suggests that the importance of the Anzac contribution to the campaign has actually, been exaggerated, and Nigel Steel and Peter Hart in their Defeat at Gallipoli [No. 647] argue that the focus on the Anzac aspect minimizes the contribution made by the English troops, who were after all in the majority. Steel and Hart have attempted to redress this balance without seeking to deny due praise to Australians and New Zealanders who served with notable heroism and at great cost on Gallipoli. The common portrayal of men from the antipodes suggests they were unusual indeed. Physically superb specimens (especially in comparison to the stunted English), they were brave, self-sacrificing, and inclined to a haphazard, casual response to officers, reserving clear signs of respect for those who proved themselves effective. Although probably exaggerated in many accounts [Nos. 148, 158, 164, 221, 341, 490, 658 for instance], some of this was no doubt true. Australians greeted the outbreak of war in 1914 with a burst of loyalty to the mother country and some of the same enthusiasm that had European youth singing as they marched to the staging areas for their units. The war would allow them to show their mettle during the few months it would last, and so one must act quickly to get involved before it was over. Australians, often accustomed to a fairly rugged outdoor life, were more likely to be able to ride and shoot and to be physically fit than their counterparts in the British Isles. An attractive and typical example of the Anzac spirit is the tale of John Simpson Kirkpatrick, the man with the donkey [Nos. 69, 149]. Simpson, as he was known, was a stretcher bearer (or water carrier who undertook medical work on his own) who found a donkey and began using it to extract wounded soldiers from the front. Although killed early in the campaign, he developed a reputation for being able to walk unharmed through storms of enemy fire. His devotion to saving his mates became the epitome of Anzac self-sacrifice and casual disregard for danger. Central to the creation of the idea of the Anzac spirit was C.E.W. Bean [Nos. 381, 449], the official Australian correspondent and historian. Bean provided accounts of the experiences of Australian soldiers from enlistment to discharge. He was more likely than any other correspondent or historian to be in the thick of combat, and despite the occasional misstep~as when he criticized the poor discipline of Australians during training in Egypt-he was popular with the soldiers. Bean's writings [Nos. 51-56] lend support to the special nature of Australian soldiers, but the cornerstone of the whole concept comes from The Anzac Book [No. 494], a collection of prose, poetry, and art by Anzac soldiers collected and edited by Bean. D. A. Kent [No. 393] asserts Bean manipulated the material in The Anzac Book to create a particular image of Australian soldiers, omitting any account that portrayed the real suffering that the campaign produced. He also omitted any work

Anzac

27

that suggested a less than heroic role for soldiers and with only 150 submissions from 40,000 soldiers, his claim of representing the whole is dubious. Kent's interpretation has gotten much attention, but Denis Winter has demurred [No. 748]. Winter believes that like the books of Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett [No. 25] and John Masefield [No. 485] which helped establish the Anzac idea, The Anzac Book was produced within the confines of British propaganda control and censorship (the British authorities even added an item without Bean's knowledge) and that had Bean given a more realistic picture, his freedom to travel with the forces and access to information would certainly have been restricted. Winter criticizes Kent's use of sources and the thoroughness of his research, as well. John Robertson in ANZAC and Empire [No. 599] also rejects the idea that Bean created an Anzac myth, though without the sort of analysis of Bean's work that Winter offers. Scholars writing from the Anzac point-of-view have offered a number of other interpretations beyond mainstream ideas about the campaign. Writing about the prowess of New Zealanders, O. E. Burton [No. I l l ] suggests that the physical weakness of English soldiers contributed significantly to the final defeat of the Allies. Kevin Fewster [No. 227] indicates that Anzac soldiers often regarded their English counterparts as cowards because of their tendency not to rush into combat with abandon. Although expressions of Australian bitterness toward the British are not uncommon, Frank Legg, in his biography of Gordon Bennett [No. 423], an Australian officer, presents dramatic illustrations of Anzac bitterness over casualties and contempt for English leadership which had put them into a hopeless situation. There is also some discussion [Nos. 119, 564, 625, 639] about General John Monash, who became a very successful general and a favorite of David Lloyd George later in the war. Monash was a brigade commander on Gallipoli and is more often than not regarded as competent at his job. He has been spared criticism for problems, as he had little influence on strategic planning, of which he was critical [No. 506]. Although his role at Gallipoli was limited, his later prominence makes his earlier performance worthy of note. The literature concerning the rise of Australian national consciousness is more extensive than is indicated here. Because its relevance to the military history of the Dardanelles Campaign is limited to its influence on interpretations of military and political decisions, its inclusion has been accordingly constricted. The books and articles noted were selected to show that influence and not for their significance in Australian and/or New Zealand domestic history.

5 Conclusion: Who Was Responsible? The thought that there might be any credit due for performance in the Dardanelles Campaign has not crossed many minds. George Cassar subtitled his study of the French involvement in the campaign [No. 130] "A Study of Failure in the Conduct of War." Eliot Cohen and John Gooch use Gallipoli as an example in their book Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War [No. 150]. Robert Rhodes James [No. 372] and John Laffin [No. 413] find virtually nothing to praise. None of these scholars denies due credit for bravery to the soldiers and sailors who fought the campaign, but most of the few accounts that buck the current of opinion asserting that the campaign was an unremitting failure were written in the years shortly after the evacuation of the peninsula [Nos. 180, 278, 353, 501, 484] and seem more like works of public relations than scholarship. The arguments made generally concern the value of diverting and holding large numbers of enemy troops and so weakening the Ottoman Empire's forces that they could play only a minimal role in the rest of the war. At least one modern scholar, Geoffrey Till [No. 686; see also 484, 649], however, considers the campaign a military success. He believes that the campaign was an educational experience. The problems at the beginning reflect a lack of knowledge of amphibious operations since such operations had been rare in the past and had never been attempted with modern technology. He suggests that the campaign went better and better, culminating in the supremely successful withdrawal. Till's ideas are part of the recent revisionist theme regarding World War I generalship and strategic thinking. This new theme asserts the military response was from the outset reasonable and improved as the problems of modern warfare were increasingly well understood. His essay appears in a volume edited in part by Peter Liddle, who has made significant contributions to this revisionist view in a book concerning the Battle of the Somme. Still, most of the thinking about the campaign, old and new, regards it as a failure. The responsibility for that failure is widely distributed, however, amongst

Conclusion: Who Was Responsible?

29

various politicians, military men, and occasionally even the Turks (accounts from their side, of course, take a different view, though they agree that the Allies were beaten), or to some technical problem that was really beyond the control of all the people involved. Space prevents recounting every charge that has been made, for they are indeed legion. Outlining the patterns, though, will provide an understanding of the schools of historiography that have developed. The lightning rod for criticism of the Dardanelles Campaign has been Winston Churchill. The First Lord of the Admiralty was the driving force behind the concept, although it was not his first choice as an alternative to the Western Front and may have been first introduced by Hankey [Nos. 251,316]. Perhaps the worst criticism of Churchill is that he was a foolish amateur who by eloquence—some would say deliberately misleading eloquence—and passion driven by an egotistical lust for fame pressured his ideas into practice [Nos. 142, 211, 265,270, 602]. Most would not go that far, but many have argued that the concept for the campaign, which was mostly Churchill's, was faulty. Despite the claims of Henry Morgenthau [No. 513], the American ambassador at Constantinople, and others [Nos. 208, 661], about the virtual collapse of Ottoman government at just the possibility of Allied success in the naval attack of March, 1915, not everyone believes that the Turks would have given up even had the city fallen [Nos. 114, 124, 227]. It is also frequently asserted that the surrender of the Ottoman Empire would have significantly weakened the Germans, who were the core of the Central Powers and that the Germans, although unable to adequately supply the Turks during the Dardanelles campaign [No. 693], were actually more drained than helped by such allies [Nos. 142]. Some scholars, however, absolve Churchill and claim that had his concept been properly supported it would have been completely successful [Nos. 76, 84, 143, 251, 272, 350, 427, 513, 561, 594, 661, 688, 717 for instance]. There have also been a number of assertions that Churchill made other key mistakes that doomed the military effort. His order to shell the forts on Gallipoli in the very early months of the war presumably warned the Turks so that they upgraded their defenses [Nos. 145, 706]. On the other hand, some counter either that the Turks did not take action or failed to take heed of the possibility of such an attack [Nos. 139, 142, 251.]. The First Lord is also accused of overestimating the effect of naval guns on shore fortifications due to his observations of German reduction of forts in Belgium, by howitzers, the shells of which fall at a steep angle, unlike those of naval guns [Nos. 73, 193, 265, 270, 347, 349, 371]. Few defend him on this point, though the failure of technical advisors to speak up is offered as a mitigating factor [No. 159,211,270,291, 573]. Thus it is clear that Churchill has often been portrayed in may ways ranging from the evil genius responsible, virtually alone, for the entire disaster of the campaign through almost every degree of blame all the way to being characterized as a master of strategy whose excellent concept for escaping the deadly stalemate of France was sabotaged by the incompetence of others. The two professional military men serving at the highest levels of British government in the first years of the war, Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher and

30

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

General Herbert Horatio Kitchener (Earl Kitchener of Khartoum), have also had to bear significant criticism and blame. Fisher is most often condemned for his failure to voice his growing doubts about the wisdom of the campaign [Nos. 347, 350, 573, 460, 602, 604]. His initial enthusiasm for the idea is sometimes downplayed, perhaps because of his own efforts to suggest he had always had doubts and his artless defense that as a technical advisor he could only speak when asked for his opinion [Nos. 347, 350, 573, 460, 602, 604]. His biographers tend to focus on his early career [Nos. 283, 375, 515], as the modernizer of the Royal Navy, and his degree of responsibility of the problems in the Dardanelles deserves more study. Kitchener, the Secretary for War in Asquith's Cabinet, has been the subject of more critical study and cannot hide behind the claim of not being in a political role. Kitchener's on-again-off-again approach to the Dardanelles Campaign has been central to the criticism of him [Nos. 21, 67, 291, 319, 350,423, 470, 600, 651]. He has been blamed for giving those responsible for making decisions about the campaign the idea that there could be no troops (or later, no more troops) and then sending them when the chips were down. This had the effect of confusing the planners, kept the overly diffident Hamilton from asking for what he needed, and resulted in the sending of forces in numbers too limited to carry the day [Nos. 32, 72, 114, 310, 428, 523]. Adequate forces could have been victorious on several occasions, according to some analysts [Nos. 25, 72, 314, 427-28, 523]. Kitchener too has his defenders, who assert that his hesitation was based on legitimate concern for the needs of other fronts, that he was misled by Churchill into thinking that the campaign would be primarily naval and abandoned if problems arose, and that he was trapped by publicity into making more of a commitment than he intended [Nos. 132, 247, 602]. Kitchener's role has been more analyzed than Fisher's, but there is not consensus among historians about his degree of responsibility. Among those whose role was not directly military there has been criticism of the Prime Minister (see Chapter 3) for not maintaining control and insisting that the various factions in the War Council sort out their differences and come to a consensus [Nos. 129, 132, 170]. More diffuse charges~or perhaps more accurately implications-have emerged that British diplomatic forces were concerned about promises to Russia that she could have Constantinople and the straits once victory was achieved [Nos. 28, 104, 235, 293, 396,457, 534, 620, 636, 716]. Writers from Russia [Nos. 104] and Australia [No. 95] and England [No. 28] have suggested that the poor handling of arrangements for the campaign reflected a desire to avoid yielding control of Constantinople to the Tsar. The Russian also claims that the Russian navy was fully prepared to launch a supporting attack at Constantinople from the Black Sea but the request from London and Paris never came [No. 104], though British sources tend to argue that such an effort, if possible at all, was to come only once the Straits were forced. These speculations remain out of the mainstream of historiography, but they would be an explosive element if ever positively confirmed. Another school of thought, while it does not necessarily absolve politicians from blame, is more critical of the officers who conducted the operations. General Sir

Conclusion: Who Was Responsible?

31

Ian Hamilton was a professional soldier with a good reputation and, on the surface, not a bad choice to command the expedition. His critics, however, suggest that he was old-fashioned in his insistence that the officer on the scene be allowed to make decisions without interference. He was also more inclined to scholarly contemplation than to an active role in command. They point out his failures to require the reinforcement of success during the initial landings on April 25 and to intervene during the Suvla landing in August when it became clear that his goal of seizing the high ground and pushing quickly across the peninsula was being abandoned [Nos. 29, 75, 187, 266, 268, 372, 412, 481-82, 508, 546, 590]. The latter was the responsibility of General Sir Frederick Stopford, chosen on the basis of seniority (at Kitchener's insistence) and clearly beyond his capabilities [Nos. 169, 412, 590]. Although Hamilton's plans for both the initial and Suvla landings have been praised [Nos. 314,422, 508, 590, 633] there is no consensus concerning the likelihood of success had the tactical commanders, who come in for their share of criticism also [Nos. 144,428,433, 747, 751], followed them exactly. As in the case of the politicians, the student of the campaign is left unsure whether the failure was the result of a totally unrealistic expectation or of individual failures in the effort to carry out a workable concept. One element in the entire situation, often ignored, at least in the English accounts, is the quality of the defense. The British are sometimes criticized for a racist assumption that the defenders would be inept [Nos. 227, 247-48, 251, 371, 627], and although sometimes the effectiveness of the defense is credited to German influences, it is clear that planners did not give adequate weight to the abilities of their foes. In the years since the campaign respect for Mustapha Kemal has grown substantially [Nos. 30, 178, 249,403,456,499, 518, 549, 554, 705, 712, 723], and the soldiers on the scene quickly came to respect Johnny Turk and to regard him as a dangerous and tenacious but honorable foe [No. 627]. Accounts by German officers who served with the Turkish forces make the same point [Nos. 390, 579, 615]. Perhaps the definitive assessment of the Dardanelles Campaign will never be written. It certainly has not been yet. The most interesting element in the current historiography arises from the tendency to find elements to praise in World War I generalship, presenting the question of how far that trend will go in regard to this campaign. In the meantime, the pattern of blaming and defending various significant participants seems likely to continue.

6 Annotated Bibliography 1.

Abbott, G.F. Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922. London: Methuen, 1922. Abbott provides background concerning the question of possible Greek participation in the Dardanelles Campaign and its rejection due primarily to Russian objections.

2.

Adam, Colin Forbs. Life of Lord Lloyd. London: Macmillan, 1948. Although the material concerning the Dardanelles Campaign in this volume is mostly superficial, it does provide some quotations from intelligence gathered for General Birdwood of the Anzac forces.

3.

Adamow, E. Die Europdischen Mdchte un die Turkei wdhrend de Weltkrieges: Konstantinople und die meerengen. Nach de Geheimdokumenten des ehem. Ministeriums fur Auswdtige Angelegenheiten. [The European Powers in Turkey During the World War. Constantinople and the Straits. From Previously Secret Documents. Ministry for foreign Affairs.] 4 Vols. Dresden: Carl Reissier, 1930-32. Provides an account, with documents, of Liman von Sanders' mission to Turkey.

4.

Adam-Smith, Patsy. The Anzacs. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Adam-Smith describes the activity of Anzac troops during the entire war, and devotes several chapters to Gallipoli. Her account is very much focused on the individual soldier's experience and includes numerous excerpts from diaries and letters. She highlights such problems as the suffering of the wounded and the shortage of water. Although episodic, the account is a good source for personal details and human interest.

Annotated Bibliography

33

5.

Adcock, A. St. John. Australasia Triumphant! With the Australians and New Zealanders in the Great War on Land and Sea. London: Simpkin, Marshal, Hamilton and Kent, 1916. Adcock's is a superficial account of the campaign on Gallipoli with some overtones of the Anzac myth. He does provide some personal details and photo illustrations that increase the value of his book.

6.

Ahmad, Amin. Turkey in the Great War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930. Ahmad's work is a useful survey of Turkey's involvement in the war and is valuable in setting the Dardanelles Campaign in context.

7.

Aitken, Alexander. Gallipoli to the Somme: Recollections of a New Zealand Infantryman. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Aitken reached Gallipoli in September, 1915, and so experienced little of the fighting—he does give a soldier's eye view of conditions however.

8.

Akcecelik, Rahmi, ed. Before and After Gallipoli: A Collection of Australian and Turkish Writings. Melbourne: Australian-Turkish Friendship Society, 1986. Provides illustrations of attitudes about the Dardanelles Campaign from the two sides that fought at Anzac.

9.

Alexander, H. M. On Two Fronts: Being the Adventures of an Indian Mule Corps in France and Gallipoli. London: William Heinemann, 1917. Alexander served with the 9th Pack Mule Corps, and his observations of the Gallipoli Campaign provide some insight to the problems of logistics that dogged it from beginning to end.

10.

Allanson, C.J.L. The Allanson Diary. N. P.: 6th Queen Elizabeth's Own Gurkha Rifles, 1977. The Gurkha troops proved very aggressive and were generally effective at Gallipoli, and Allanson provides a description of the unit he led. Allanson's criticisms of John Monash, although used by some historians, seem defensive and intended to protect the reputation of his own men.

11.

Allen, C.R.C. "A Ghost From Gallipoli." Royal United Service Institution Journal 108(1963): 137-38. Allen includes an interesting account, based on the diary of George Griffin Eady, of British efforts to negotiate a financial settlement that would get Turkey out of the war.

12.

Allen, George H., et al. The Great War. 5 Vols. Philadelphia: George Barrie's Sons, 1915-21. These books are a descriptive history with little analysis, but the authors do note approvingly in their discussion of the Dardanelles Churchill's comment that had the same effort been made in

34

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Gallipoli as was in France, Turkey would have fallen.

13.

Allen, W. E. D., and Paul Murator. Caucasian Battlefields: A History ofthe Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953. Although the accounts of the AngloFrench invasion of 1915 are quite brief in this volume, it provides an enormous amount of background about the overall Turkish military situation.

14.

Andrews, E. M. The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations During World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Andrews' effort to analyze the meaning of Anzac participation in the war is very interesting. He suggests that the importance of Gallipoli and Anzac involvement has been exaggerated. He also believes that although the Dardanelles strategy was good, the tactics were ill-conceived and poorly planned with the result that the Australian sense of British military competence was destroyed. He locates the origins of the Anzac legend in the works of Ashmead-Bartlett and Bean. Although the focus is the imperial relationship rather than the military situation, this is a valuable book for any study of the Dardanelles Campaign.

15.

Andrews, Martin. Cannon's Folly. London: Michael Joseph, 1974. This is a volume of memoirs by a chaplain who served briefly at Gallipoli and was invalided due to illness. He then helped with arrangements for Gallipoli casualties at Mudros, and so the book not only supplies some details about the lives of soldiers during the campaign but is also useful for information concerning provision of medical care.

16.

Andrews, Ted. Kiwi Trooper: The Story of Queen Alexandra's Own. New Zealand: Wanganui Chronicle Co., 1967. Queen Alexandra's Mounted Rifles, part of the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment, landed May 8 at Anzac Cove. After intermittent fighting through July it was part of the August assault fighting at Chunuk Bair, Sari Bair, and Hill 60. It was evacuated at the end of the year. Andrews provides much detail of the fighting but little context.

17.

Anzac, An. Twelve Months With the Australian Expeditionary Force. London: George Newnes, 1916. Includes personal account of experiences on Gallipoli.

18.

Anzac Memorial: Soldiers'Stories of Gallipoli. London: Fisher Unwin, 1916. First-hand accounts, although sometimes clouded by emotion, which provide important insights into the situation on Gallipoli.

Annotated Bibliography

35

19.

Armstrong, H. C. Gray WolfMustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator. London: Arthur Barker, 1932. Provides a readable but superficial account of the situation at Gallipoli.

20.

Arthur, George. The Life of Lord Kitchener, 3 vols. London: Macmillan, 1920. Arthur's biography is old and much too admiring of its subject, but retains value for its comments concerning Kitchener's role in decision making about the strategy Britain would follow, including the Dardanelles campaign. Arthur argues that Kitchener was a Westerner but supported operations outside of France as ways to win new allies and ensure security of imperial interests in the East. Kitchener also always expected that the navy would carry the burden of the Dardanelles, and the accusation of the Dardanelles Committee that he gave up that hope by May is in error. His repeated hesitance first to commit troops followed by dispatch of reinforcements reflected legitimate concerns about the situation on other fronts.

21.

Ashley, Maurice. Churchill as Historian. London: Martin Seeker and Warburg, 1968. Ashley evaluates Churchill's World Crisis as more an effort to explain for posterity than to write history, but he generally agrees with the explanation. Ashley is firm that the party truly responsible for the failure at the Dardanelles was Kitchener.

22.

Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis. Ashmead-Bartlett's Despatches From the Dardanelles. London: George Newnes, 1916. Ashmead-Bartlett's work as a newspaper man, though opinionated, had influence on public perceptions and on the government. Reading his accounts can help with understanding the changing attitudes about the Dardanelles Campaign.

23.

Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis. Australians in Action: The Story of Gallipoli. Sydney: W. A. Gullick, 1915. This work is a pamphlet apparently done for school use.

24.

Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis. Some of My Experiences in the Great War. London: George Newnes, 1918. The author was a war correspondent who was very critical of the situation in Gallipoli. This book tends to be mostly description of the conditions there.

25.

Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis. The Uncensored Dardanelles. London: Hutchinson, 1928. Ashmead-Bartlett denounces command-control failures at all levels and faults Hamilton's strategic planning as completely unrealistic. Troops were slaughtered in frontal assaults that even if successful could not change the Turkish dominance. He also faults government for not providing adequate manpower and supplies.

36

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Churchill gets off pretty easily except for not being realistic about what was needed and what could be done. Keyes gets good marks, though author does not think the navy could have forced the Straits. The book is important for Ashmead-Bartlett's personal account of his uncensored letter criticizing the campaign, smuggled back to Europe by Australian Keith Murdock but seized at Marseilles by the War Department. Asquith confirmed that such a letter sent privately to the P. M. was acceptable and eventually saw it. The author ultimately managed to publish his views on the situation in the Sunday Times and to spread his critical attitude to influential sorts like Northcliffe, which helped prompt the decision to evacuate.

26.

Ashworth, Tony. Trench Warfare, 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980. Although Ashworth's analysis of soldiers' efforts to find ways to survive in the trenches is mostly focused on the Western Front, he does make some interesting comments about the lack of unofficial truces during the fighting on Gallipoli. He attributes this difference from the situation in France to the relative inexperience of the Gallipoli troops.

27.

Aspinall-Oglander, C. F. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Military Operations: Gallipoli. 2 Vols. London: William Heinemann, 1929-32. The official history of the campaign, this volume has much detail—some of which is hard to find in other published sources. The author supports the Churchillian idea that the fighting on the Western Front was futile and praise the effort to find an alternative. Citing German accounts such as Liman von Sanders' memoir, he suggests that the original naval attack as well as the landings in April and August came very close to success.

28.

Aspinall-Oglander, Cecil. Roger Keyes: Being the Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes ofZeebrugge and Dover. London: Hogarth, 1951. Keyes believed to the bitter end that the navy could force the Straits ifjust given vigorous leadership and a free hand. This biography provides a good account of Keyes' and the navy's activity in the campaign, but the author is conservative in his evaluation of Keyes' ideas, and suggests that success was unlikely. He does indicate that there was some chance in March, and suggests that the failure to renew the attack really arose from hesitance about letting Russia have Constantinople if it were to be taken rather than any military consideration.

29.

Asprey, R. B. "Gallipoli." Marine Corps Gazette 38 (Oct., 1954): 57-65. Asprey provides a brief but thorough survey of the campaign, highlight-

Annotated Bibliography

37

ing particularly problems of command-control as the source of failure. 30.

Ataturk, Moustafa Kemal. Souvenirs du Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pacha, version frangaise remaniee d'apres Voriginal turc. [Memoirs of Mustafa Kemal, French Version Taken from the Original Turkish.] Translated by Jean Deny. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1927. Taken from a Turkish government journal, Milliyet (March-April, 1926), and includes comments about Gallipoli, where Kemal made his reputation.

31.

Atkinson, C. T. The History of the Royal Hampshire Regiment. 2 Vols. Winchester: Regimental Head Quarters, 1952. Several battalions of the Royal Hampshires served at Gallipoli: the 2nd with the 29th Division, the l/8th with the 54th (East Anglican) Division, and the 10th (Service) with the 10th (Irish) Division. Atkinson provides some details about the activities of these units.

32.

Atkinson, C. T. The History of the South Wales Borderers, 1914-1918. London: Medici Society, 1931. Serving in the 29th Division, the South Wales Borderers landed at S Beach in the initial attack on Gallipoli. The landing went well, but lack of reserves prevented exploitation. They took part in the fighting at Krithia and later the Suvla landing. Atkinson, who wrote a number of unit histories, provides a good account of the fighting and eventual withdrawal, providing more context than is common in such works.

33.

Atkinson, C. T. The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 1914-1919. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent., 1924. A battalion of this regiment was at Suvla from August 10 to December 13. It suffered little in battle but was decimated by illness, and the account is a valuable description of conditions during the campaign.

34.

Auphan, Paul. "L'expedition des Dardanelles (1915)." [The Expedition to the Dardanelles.] Ecrits de Paris. (Avril, 1965): 56-71. This article is a fifty year retrospective of the policy that led the Entente powers into the Dardanelles Campaign.

35.

Austin, Ronald J. As Rough as Bags: The History of the 6th Battalion, 1st A. I. F., 1914-1919. McCrae, Vic: R. J. and S. P. Austin, 1992. Provides a useful account of a unit at Gallipoli.

36.

Austin, Tom. Dear Mother. Perth: St. George Books, 1990. Provides a personal account and details of the campaign.

37.

Autuc, Ibrahim. 1915 Canakkale savasi. Istanbul: Kastas Yayinlari, 1992.

38

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

38.

Babington, Anthony. For the Sake of Example: Capital Courts Martial, 1914-1920. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. This interesting study of morale indicates that despite the horrible conditions of combat and living there were only three men executed for lapses of duty during the Gallipoli invasion.

39.

Bacon, R. H. The Life ofLord Fisher ofKilverstone: Admiral of the Fleet. 2 Vols. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929. Bacon defends Fisher over the Dardanelles question, pointing out that the admiral's early support was predicated on prompt action and a willingness to break off if things went badly. He criticizes the civilian government for not insisting that professionals speak for the military and allowing Churchill, a civilian, to do so. Bacon is particularly hard on Churchill for misleading his colleagues about support for the Dardanelles at the Admiralty and about the value of the older ships that might be lost. Fisher was right, according to Bacon, most of the time in this situation, and the War Council should have taken the responsibility to request his analysis.

40.

Bacon, Reginald, and F. E. McMutrie. Modern Naval Strategy. London: Frederick Muller, 1940. These authors are very critical of the planning and execution of the Dardanelles Campaign. The greatest failings were those of politicians.

41.

Bagnal, Nigel. The Human Story. London: Woolrich Building Society, 1992. This work is a pamphlet-one of the Gallipoli Memorial Lecture Series~in which Bagnal discusses the impact of the Anzac experience on the individual.

42.

Bagnall, N. T. "ANZAC." Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 87 (196364): 192-96. This article describes an attack of dismounted Australian cavalry (3rd Light Horse) at Gallipoli.

43.

Baldwin, Hanson. World War I. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Baldwin's work is an overview of the war including the Dardanelles Campaign. He attributes the Allied failure to poor planning and inadequate logistical support.

44.

Ballard, C. R. Kitchener. London: George Newnes, 1936. Ballard is very supportive of Kitchener, absolving him of all guilt for the failure of the Dardanelles Campaign.

45.

Banks, Arthur. A Military Atlas of the First World War. London: William Heinemann, 1975; rpt. 1989. Banks has good maps showing the Dar-

Annotated Bibliography

39

danelles Campaign including Gallipoli in the Naval War section of this volume. 46.

Banoglu, Niyazi Ahmet. Turk bas ininda Canakkle gunleri. Istanbul: Turk Basin Birligi Yayini, 1982.

47.

Barrow, George. The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro. London: Hutchinson, 1931. Monro, who was sent late in 1915 to make a report about the advisability of evacuating Gallipoli once and for all, was a Westerner and regarded the Dardanelles Campaign as "illconsidered and ill-prepared." He recommended evacuation of Suvla and Anzac, and Barrow gives him much credit for the successful withdrawal. Churchill remarked, "He came, he saw, he capitulated," but Barrow contrasts the mercurial, brilliant, impractical politician unfavorably with the solid, dependable soldier.

48.

Bastier, Jean. Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Soldat de la grand guerre, 19141919. [Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Soldier of the Great War, 1914-1919.] Paris: Albatros, 1989. Provides account of the Dardanelles Campaign.

49.

Bavin, W. G. Swindon's War Record. Swindon: John Drew, 1922. Provides sympathetic and detailed accounts of troops at Anzac and is particularly good concerning the August attacks.

50.

Beach, Hugh. The Murderous Responsibility: Gallipoli Memorial Lecture. London: Brassey's, 1985. This author tends to blame the British failure primarily on the limited communications technology available in 1915.

51.

Bean, C.E.W. Anzac to Amiens: A Shorter History of the Australian Fighting Services in the First World War. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1946. Bean, the Australian official historian, was with Australian troops in the front lines and is able to combine a sense of first-hand observation with very good historical writing.

52.

Bean, C.E.W. Frontline Gallipoli: Diaries From the Trenches. Selected and annotated by Kevin Fewster. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990. Provides excerpts from the diary of Bean, who was the official Australian war correspondent during the war and later the best of the official historians.

53.

Bean, C.E.W. Gallipoli Correspondent: The Front Line Diary of C.E.W. Bean. Selected and Annotated by Kevin Fewster. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983. In addition to describing the situation on Gallipoli, Bean's diary documents the correspondent's ambiguity about

40

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 refraining from criticizing the conduct of the campaign for fear of revealing useful information to the enemy.

54.

Bean, C.E.W. Gallipoli Mission. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1948; rpt. 1990. Although intended for the general reader, this volume, by the Australian official historian, is well grounded in research and provides significant analysis from the Turkish point-of-view, based on interviews with Turks.

55.

Bean, C.E.W. The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: The Story ofAnzac. 2 Vols. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1921-24. These are the first two volumes of twelve in the official history. Bean's work is the best of the official histories of World War I. He sets his detailed account into context and despite his fondness for the Anzac soldiers, provides a balanced account. He does condemn politicians and high com-mand for putting men into a hopeless situation.

56.

Bean, C.E.W. Two Men I Knew: William Bridges and Brudenell White Founders of the A. I. F. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1957. Bean, who was a journalist on the scene and became a superior historian, provides some insight into the thinking of the Australian command at Gallipoli. White (Bridges was killed during the campaign.) was critical of poor preparation, and although he approved of the goals, he criticized Churchill's involvement because the First Lord was not able to supply the operation with what it needed.

57.

Beaverbrook, Lord. Politicians and the War, 1914-1916. 2 Vols. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1928-32; rpts. 1960, 1968. Beaverbrook was personally involved with the politicians~in the government and in the Opposition-who made the decisions about the Dardanelles. His comments about the political elements of the campaign are insightful.

58.

Becke, A. F. The Order of Battle of Divisions. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1935-45. A very useful description of the organization and movement of British units from armies down to brigade level.

59.

Bedford, C. W. Legs Eleven: History of the 11th Battalion A. I. F. Perth: Imperial, 1940. Useful unit history.

60.

Beesly, Patrick. Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982. Beesly provides some comments about the efforts to buy a settlement with the Turks before the Dardanelles Campaign began, and an intriguing account of more enthusiastic support from Fisher for the campaign than is usually indi-

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41

cated. He raises an interesting question of Fisher's responsibility. 61.

Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J. H. Godfrey. London: Hamish Hamilton. 1980. Godfrey was a junior officer in 1915 and served on Admiral Wemyss' staff on the Euryalus and later on a troopship. He provides a view of the problems for the smaller ships in the operation and offers the opinion that the navy could have forced the Straits had the original assault been renewed. Ultimately poor planning and irresolution doomed the whole enterprise.

62.

Behrend, Arthur. Make Me A Soldier: A Platoon Commander in Gallipoli. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1961. Provides a good account of living conditions and some description of combat in May and early June, but the author was then invalided home with dysentery.

63.

Bell-Davies, Richard. Sailor in the Air. London: Peter Davies, 1967. BellDavies was a vice admiral and describes the efforts at naval air support for the Gallipoli operations. His account is well-written and includes bombing attacks as well as the more mundane and common artillery spotting and reconnaissance missions.

64.

Ben-Moshe, Tuvia. Churchill: Strategy and History. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatshaft, 1992. Provides an assessment of Churchill's role in strategy making and suggests that his belief in moving through the offensive in a series of stages and his haste did much to block the adoption of a combined arms approach. Nonetheless, Churchill did not intend to mislead the War Council about the need for troops, and the military authorities must take a significant share of the blame for the problems since they failed to do obvious preparation and planning. Ben-Moshe thinks that on the one hand there has been too much focus on Churchill in this situation, but that his reputation from World War II has biased most efforts to assess his involvement in the first war. He also notes that the strategic impact of defeat in the Dardanelles was minimal, but it is usually treated as if it were the reverse.

65.

Ben-Moshe, Tuvia. "Churchill's Strategic Conception During the First World War." Journal of Strategic Studies 12(1989): 5-21. Churchill's goal was total victory, but if his strategy of 1915 had been fully followed, the Allied victory of 1918 would have been impossible.

66.

Benn, Wedgewood. In the Side Shows. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919. This memoir by an officer of the Middlesex Yeomanry (2nd Mounted Division) takes up the story of the Gallipoli campaign ten days after the Suvla landing. Benn describes the attack of August 21, which

42

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 was to move through Anafarta and reach the narrows on the other side of the peninsula. In the event, the first objective, W Hill, was not obtained. Benn provides a good description of the fighting, mostly on Chocolate Hill where brush fires added to the casualties caused by heavy Turkish fire. After a rest, his unit held trenches during the fall, and Benn describes conditions in the field. He was evacuated with dysentery in October.

67.

Bennett, Geoffrey. Naval Battles of the First World War. London: Batsford, 1968; rpt. 1983. Bennett believes that Churchill had the right strategy in his plan for the Dardanelles and that success would have been very a valuable gain in the struggle against Germany. Unfortunately, Fisher and Kitchener did not have the heart to stay the course and delays which they helped produce were fatal to the enterprise.

68.

Bennett, Jack. Gallipoli. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1981. This is a novel based on the screenplay for the 1981 motion picture entitled Gallipoli.

69.

Benson, Irving. The Man With the Donkey: John Simpson Kirkpatrick, The Good Samaritan of Gallipoli. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965. The true story of the stretcher bearer who, using a donkey and working on his own, carried the wounded from the battlefield to the beach at Anzac has become part of the Australian national legend.

70.

Bidou, Henry. Histoire de la Grande Guerre. [History of the Great War.] Paris: Gallimard, 1936. Solid survey history from the French point-ofview including a discussion of the Dardanelles.

71.

Bienaime, Vice-Admiral [Amedee Pierre Leonard]. La Guerre Navale, 1914-1915: Fautes et Responsabilites. [The Naval War, 1914: Faults and Responsibilities.] Paris: Jules Tallandier, 1920. Bienaime regards the idea of the Dardanelles Campaign as good. Problems arose because the defense was underestimated and plans for a combined arms assault should have been made from the outset.

72.

Bigwood, George. The Lancashire Fighting Territorials. London: Country Life, [1916]. Bigwood has organized his narrative by following the activities of each battalion of the Lancashires, which tends to make the volume choppy and episodic. He does provide details of combat at Helles and defends the soldiers against charges of failure due to inexperience. Bigwood blames poor planning, ineffective leadership, and the lack of replacements for the defeat. Reinforcing existing units would have allowed experienced men to help newcomers. Instead old

Annotated Bibliography

43

units were replaced with new ones. 73.

Binney, T. H. "Gallipoli and Normandy." Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 90 (Feb., 1945): 33-35. The author, who served with the naval forces at Gallipoli, suggests that the problems with flat trajectories and improper ammunition that helped cause failure in 1915 have been corrected and that fears based on those problems should be dismissed for the future.

74.

Bird, Wilkinson D. "Lost Opportunities in 1915?" Army Quarterly 34 (1937): 237-47; 35 (1937-38): 37-49. Bird argues that the various suggestions that the Allies had a chance of success in the Dardanelles are pipe dreams and that there were no opportunities to lose.

75.

Birdwood, William. Khaki and Gown: An Autobiography. London: Ward, Lock , 1941. Birdwood was commander of Australian troops in the Dardanelles Campaign. He made more of an effort to be in the front lines than most general officers and provides an interesting account of the situation. He seems inclined to think that the campaign came close to success and blames failure at Suvla on the failure of the commanders to give the troops a sense of urgency.

76.

Birkenhead, Earl of. Churchill, 1874-1922. London: Harrap, 1989. Birkenhead is very supportive of Churchill, calling the Dardanelles "a brilliant strategic conception squandered." He is inclined to take Churchill's justifications at face value and refers to Fisher's resignation as "desertion." He argues strongly that Keyes' plans for use of destroyers for mine sweeping would have worked and that the naval assault should certainly have been renewed.

77.

Bishop, Edward. Better to Die: The Story of the Gurkhas. London: New English Library, 1976. Bishop's account of Gallipoli is brief, but he does cover the activities of the Gurkha units and comments about the friendly fire incident that drove Gurkhas off Sari Bair, doing much to ensure failure of the Suvla offensive.

78.

Blake, George. The Path of Glory. London: Constable, 1929. Blake's novel is one of only a few set in the Gallipoli campaign, and provides a realistic picture of the situation.

79.

Blanchard, J., and Marcel Blanchard. "Les Dardanelles a la Pointe d'Europe: le Debarquement (25-30 Avril 1915)." [The Dardanelles at the Headland of Europe: The Landing (April 25-30, 1915).] Revue Historique des Armees No. 2 (1981): 129-66. This article provides

44

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 eyewitness accounts of the French 175th Infantry Regiment which landed at Sedd el Bahr to reinforce the British 29th Division on April 26. The French were part of the drive toward Krithia which was driven back by heavy Turkish fire.

80.

Blumberg, H. E. Britain's Sea Soldiers: A Record of the Royal Marines During the War. Devonport: Swiss and Co., 1927. This is a well done account including an analysis of the Dardanelles operation focused on the amphibious elements in the campaign.

81.

Blythe, Ronald. Akenfield. Harmonds worth: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969; numerous rpts. Blythe's collection of reminiscences of the people of an English village includes a personal account of soldiering at Gallipoli.

82.

Bond, Brian. The First World War. Vol. 12, The New Cambridge Modern History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Bond, an excellent historian, provides sensible judgments about the problems of the Dardanelles Campaign.

83.

Bond, Brian, and Simon Robbins, eds. Staff Officer: The Diaries of Walter Guiness (First Lord Moyne), 1914-1918. London: Leo Cooper, 1987. Guiness arrived at Gallipoli October 13, missing most of the fighting, but he provides a good picture of the final days of the campaign and the suffering of the troops due to the poor weather. He also makes clear his distaste for the staff work done by those assigned to the Dardanelles.

84.

Borak, S. Atatuk'un ozel mek tuplari. [AtatUrk's Private Letters.] 2nd ed. Istanbul: Varlik Yayinevi, 1970. Provides comments about the Gallipoli fighting.

85.

Bosquet, Fernand. Face aux Balkans, 1914-1918. [Confronting the Balkans, 1914-1918.] Albi: Imprimerie cooperative, 1939. This discussion of the situation in the Balkans also includes an account of the Dardanelles Campaign's affect on that region.

86.

Boswell, L.A.K. "The Naval Attack on the Dardanelles, 1915." Royal United Service Institution Journal 110 (1965): 144-47. Boswell concludes that the British fleet could have forced the Straits and missed a very good opportunity by backing off. Fast-moving modern destroyers were not threatened by mobile batteries and the Turks were almost out of effective ammunition. Torpedo threats were minimal.

87.

Bourne, J. M. Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918. London: Edward

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Arnold, 1989. Borne provides a solid survey of both domestic and military aspects of the war. His conclusion about the Gallipoli invasion is that failure was due to its being starved of resources. He is dubious, however, about the expected outcomes. He also notes that the failure was a telling blow to the supporters of the Eastern strategy. 88.

Bowes, Joseph. The Anzac War Trail. London: Milford, 1917. Provides an early and somewhat nationalistic account of Anzac service.

89.

Bowyer, Chaz. For Valour: The Air VCs. London: Grub Street Aviation Classics/Distributed by Hills Book Distributors of Cincinnati, 1992. Provides an account of Squadron Commander Richard Bell Davis at Gallipoli, although his V. C. was won in Bulgaria in November, 1915.

90.

Boyle, R. C. A Record of the West Somerset Yeomanry, 1914-19. London: St. Catherine Press, 1922. Boyle provides an excellent account of fighting at Suvla Bay.

91.

Brereton, C. B. Tales of Three Campaigns. London: Selwyn & Blount, 1927. Brereton served with the New Zealand Division and one of his three campaigns was the Dardanelles. He provides an officer's view of the situation.

92.

Bridges, R. The Immortal Dawn: The Australians at Gallipoli. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917. Bridges's account is superficial.

93.

Bridges, T. C. On Land and Sea at the Dardanelles. London: Collins, 1915. Provides personal accounts and observations of the campaign.

94.

Broad, Lewis. Winston Churchill. London: Hutchinson, 1941; rev. eds. 1946 and 1951. Broad largely exonerates Churchill from blame for the Dardanelles problems. The land elements of the campaign were outside his control, and the delays that caused much of the difficulty for the naval attack were due to others. He pictures Fisher as piqued due to his advice not being taken, and also suggests that the campaign would have occurred even if Fisher had made his objections clear to all because of the need to help Russia.

95.

Broadbent, Harvey. The Boys Who Came Home: Recollections of Gallipoli. Crowsnest, N. S. W.: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1990. This book was drawn from research for the Australian television program "Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore" (1988). It traces the campaign and includes numerous excerpts from interviews with veterans describing their experiences. It concludes with speculation that the poor handling

46

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 of the campaign was, in reality, an effort to avoid living up to the promise that Russia might claim the Straits if the Allies took them.

96.

Brock, Michael and Eleanor Brock, eds. H. H. Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. The selection of letters presented in this volume makes Asquith seem better informed and more astute in his handling of the Dardanelles than is often suggested. He was quite wrong to agree to the "ships alone" idea, but that was due to Churchill's influence. After that he was quite right in not calling the War Council because doing so would exacerbate the tension between Fisher and Churchill, of which he was quite aware. Furthermore decisions from March to May had to be made by the military commanders on the scene. Asquith really favored renewal of the naval attack after the disappointments of March 18th but believed that a second attack should not be ordered from London.

97.

Brock, Ray. Ghost On Horseback: The Incredible Ataturk. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954. Brock provides substantial detail about the fighting at Gallipoli and asserts that it is a much more important battle than most realize. Unfortunately, he provides no references to support his position.

98.

Brodie, C. G. Forlorn Hope 1915: The Submarine Passage of the Dardanelles. London: Frederick Books/W. J. Bryce, 1956. Brodie's account of submarine warfare during the Dardanelles Campaign is readable and informative.

99.

Broinowski, L., ed. Tasmania's War Record, 1914-1918. Hobart: Walch, 1921. Provides information about New Zealand's soldiers in the Dardanelles.

100. Brown, Malcolm. The Imperial War Museum Book of the First World War. A Great Conflict Recalled in Previously Unpublished Letters, Diaries and Memoirs. London: Sidgwickand Jackson, 1991; rpt. 1993. This publication makes available a sampling of the large collection of autobiographical materials in the collection of the Imperial War Museum. The volume contains several reminiscences from men at Gallipoli. 101. Brownrigg, Douglas. Unexpected: A Book of Memories. London: Hutchinson, n. d. The author served with the 13th Division and arrived in Gallipoli in late June. He remained until the final evacuation in January, 1916. His division was blooded at Helles and then took heavy casualties at Anzac in August. The account is brief but does offer some

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details about the division's activities. 102. Bruce, Anthony. An Illustrated Companion to the First World War. London: Michael Joseph, 1988. This volume has encyclopedia-like articles about people, places, and things involved in World War I and is a handy reference for details about the Dardanelles Campaign. 103. Bryant, G. Where the Prize Is Highest. London: Collins, 1972. Provides an account of New Zealanders in action at Anzac. 104. Bubnov, A. V Tsarskoy Stavke. [In the Tsar's Headquarters.] New York: Chekov Publishing House of the East European Fund, 1955. The author, a Russian admiral stationed in the Black Sea, suggests that British failure to establish communication with the Russian navy indicates that London really did not want Russian help with the Dardanelles Campaign. He maintains that the Russians had troops and ships ready to support any success, though the lack of transport restricted possible action. 105. Buchan, John. History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1678-1918. London: Thomas Nelson, 1925. The l/4th and l/5th Battalions of the Royal Scots Fusiliers served at Helles as part of the 52nd (Lowland) Division from June, 1915, to January, 1916. Buchan gives a brief account of the unit's activity. 106. Buchan, John. Nelson's History of the War. 24 Vols. London: Thomas Nelson, 1915-19; also published in 4 volumes as History of the Great War (1921-22). The author was a war correspondent and later Director of Information for the British government and wrote in some haste. Although his work has much useful detail about the Dardanelles Campaign, it cannot be entirely trusted for accuracy. The four volume version was revised but remains less than trustworthy. 107. Buckland, J. V. "Opportunity Knocked." Contemporary Review 207 (1965): 243-48. Buckland suggests that there were four missed opportunities for success in the Dardanelles between February 18 and August 7. 108. Buley, E. C. Glorious Deeds of Australians in the Great War. London: Andrew Melrose, 1915. Buley's account makes the war seem like an adventure movie with Australian soldiers as the heroes. 109. Burness, Peter. The Nek. Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1996. Provides an analysis of one of the most disastrous attacks during the Gallipoli

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 fighting, and made famous in the 1968 film entitled Gallipoli.

110. Burrows, John W. The Essex Regiment. 5 Vols. Southend-on-Sea: John H. Burrows, n. d. Includes descriptions of regimental battalions in action at Gallipoli. 111. Burton, O. E. The Silent Division: New Zealanders at the Front, 19141919. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1935. Burton traces the activity of New Zealand troops from the beginning of the war to its end. His coverage of the Dardanelles is detailed and good. He is inclined, however, to blame much of the failure of the campaign on the physical deficiencies of the English soldier, especially in comparison with the typical New Zealander. 112. Burton, Ormond Edward. The Auckland Regiment; Being an Account of the Doings on Active Service of the First, Second and Third Battalions of the Auckland Regiment. Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1922. A battalion of the Auckland Regiment served in the New Zealand Infantry Brigade at Anzac. 113. Bush, Eric W. Bless Our Ship. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958. Bush was a teenaged midshipman on H.M.S. Bacchante in 1915 and commanded a picket boat in the landings at Anzac in April and Suvla in August. His account focuses on personal experiences but does note that he was unaware of landing troops at the wrong place in April. He also gives interesting details of supply efforts and of efforts to evacuate the wounded. 114. Bush, Eric W. Gallipoli. London: Allen and Unwin, 1975. Bush was a youthful midshipman pulled out of Royal Naval College at Dartmouth to serve on H.M.S. Bacchante and his book is a mix of memoir and history. He notes failure to supply adequate forces. He is firm in his view that the naval assault should have been promptly continued after the initial attack on March 18. Churchill, Bush believes, was blocked by Fisher, who did, however, have a case. He blames the Royal Navy for landing the Anzacs a mile north of the planned beach, and sneers at military leaders and historians—such as Julian Corbett the Official Historian—for suggesting that it was due to current or was only a few yards. He says it was poor navigation. OfthebigpushonMay 6, Bush comments mostly on the confusion and the crowded formations that led to slaughter. The August offensive failed for similar reasons. He asserts that there is now general agreement that the idea of the Dardanelles campaign "was one of the few great strategic concepts of World War I." The problem was poor planning and conduct. He

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criticizes the lack of planning for success and raises the question of whether the Turks would surrender, though he cites Morgenthau as saying they would. Turkish success did much for their morale. He claims that naval gunfire was ineffective because the ships were too far away to aim and that destroyers were initially told not to fire in support of troops on shore. 115. Butler, A. G. The Gallipoli Campaign. Vol. 1, Part 1, The Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914-1918. Melbourne: Australian War Memorial, 1930. Butler traces the activities of the medical services step by step through the campaign providing interesting details of both combat injuries and the illnesses that were serious problems for troops at Gallipoli. 116. Byrne, A. E. Official History of the Otago Regiment, New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Great War. Dunedin: J. Wilkie, n. d. An Otago battalion served in the New Zealand Brigade at Gallipoli and was part of the fighting at Anzac. 117. C [Viscount Cobham]. The Yeomanry Cavalry of Worcestershire, 19141922. Sourbridge: Mark and Moody, 1926. This unit first fought at Suvla, August 21, 1915, and then spent three months in the Gallipoli trenches before returning to Egypt. The account is well-written and provides useful a description of battle planning. It also has good illustrations. 118. Callahan, Raymond. "What About the Dardanelles?" American History Review 78(1973): 641-48. In this review essay about the Dardanelles Campaign, the author suggests that Martin Gilbert was not entirely fair in his criticisms of Churchill's role and that Fisher was the main negative force. The best account, he indicates, would be a combination of the works of Gilbert, A. J. Marder, and David French. 119. Callinan, Bernard. Sir John Monash. Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1981. This work, actually a pamphlet, devotes only a brief section to Monash's service at Gallipoli. The author does, however, defend Monash against some of the criticisms~that he was not well suited for tactical command for instance-leveled against him in the Australian official history. 120. Callwell, C. E. The Dardanelles. London: Constable, 1919; rpt. 1924. Callwell argues that the demands of other theaters prevented adequate resources from being provided for Gallipoli but does not suggest that the invasion was a mistake. He is particularly interested in amphibious

50

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 tactics and provides a good description of the landings and evacuation. He concludes that better planning and more study of such tactics were needed. As he does not think that combat on the peninsula offers important lessons about war, he gives it less coverage.

121. Callwell, C. E. Experiences of a Dugout, 1914-1918. London: Constable, 1920. Callwell, who had served as Director of Military Operations, wrote a paper outlining the problems of military action against the Hellespont in 1906. His report was not discussed during the initial planning of the Dardanelles, although Asquith presented it to the War Cabinet in May, 1915. Callwell wrote a memorandum opposing the initial proposal for the Campaign by Churchill, but without effect. Not surprisingly he is quite critical of the whole operation. He also defends the lack of strategic preparation by asserting that the General Staff was eclipsed during Kitchener's tenure at the War Office. 122. Callwell, C. E. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries. 2 Vols. London: Cassell, 1927. Wilson, first liaison to the French command and later Chief of the Imperial General Staff, thought that if the navy could succeed at the Dardanelles Britain's cause would be furthered. But he was convinced that final victory would come only from the Western Front, and troops would be wasted in any effort other than killing Germans. 123. Campaign des Dardanelles. [The Dardanelles Campaign.] Translated by M. E. Larcher. Paris: Chiron, 1924. The Turkish Official History, this volume provides a brief survey of the strategy and tactics of the Dardanelles Campaign, but includes little about the defending forces. 124. Carcopino, Jerome. "Souvenirs de I'Armee d'Orient." [Memoirs of the Army in the East] Revue des Deux Mondes 4 (Avril, 1970): 120-134. Carcopino notes that the Turks were unprepared and might have been overwhelmed but is dubious that the gains would have been worth the effort. 125. Carcopino, Jerome. Souvenirs de la Guerre en Orient, 1915-1917. [Memoirs of the War in the East, 1915-1917.] Paris: Hachette, 1970. The author describes his experiences with French forces in the Dardanelles Campaign and is quite critical of the conduct of the campaign, which he regards as unlikely of success and of little value except to Russia. 126. Carr, W. G. By Guess and by God. London: Hutchinson, 1930. Carr describes life in the British submarine corps, which was quite successful

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in passing through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora and sinking Turkish vessels. 127. Carter, Violet Bonham. Winston Churchill: An Intimate Portrait. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965. Published in England as Winston Churchill as I Knew Him, this biography provides a personal perspective on Churchill's feelings and behavior, but the author accepts quite uncritically his sometimes self-serving accounts of events in the Dardanelles Campaign. 128. Carder, Raymond, and Jean-Pierre Cartier. La premiere Guerre Mondiale. [The First World War.] 2 Vols. Paris: Presses de la cite, 1982-84. These volumes are a solid survey of the war with two chapters devoted to the Dardanelles. 129. Cassar, George H. Asquith as War Leader. London: Hambledon Press, 1994. In a detailed account of decision making, Cassar is hard on Asquith concerning the Dardanelles. Asquith was too dominated by Kitchener and should not have hidden the dispute between Fisher and Churchill. Although he told the Dardanelles Committee otherwise, Asquith knew from Hankey and other sources that a purely naval assault was unlikely to succeed, but it cannot be denied that Churchill led the War Council into error, and politically Asquith could see little hope other than the Dardanelles due to the less than positive military developments of late 1914 and early 1915. 130. Cassar, George H. The French and the Dardanelles: A Study of Failure in the Conduct of War. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971. The author tends to blame the politicians more than the military, and suggests that Churchill's persuasive power got French cooperation, especially that of the Minister of Marine, who kept the rest of his government in the dark so that if there was trouble he could blame it on Churchill. The two allies never cooperated about planning the Dardanelles and were often at odds over command and influence in the Middle East. 131. Cassar, George H. Kitchener: Architect of Victory. London: William Kimber, 1977. Cassar provides a very detailed description of the decisionmaking process concerning the Dardanelles and Kitchener's involvement in it. He tends to be favorable to Kitchener, who accepted Churchill's ideas without realizing that publicity would commit the government to continue the campaign no matter what. He believes that, intentionally or not, Churchill misled his colleagues, and Churchill was most seriously at fault, although the War Council did have other sources of

52

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 information and still did nothing. Kitchener's failures came from trying to do too much rather than using the General Staff, so that policy regarding the Dardanelles shifted too often. Ultimately, for the Dardanelles Campaign to be successful there had to be actual ministerial control of the military and it had to have adequate resources devoted to it. Neither of these was the case.

132. Castle, Wilfred T. F. Grand Turk. London: Hutchinson, n. d. In brief remarks about the Dardanelles Campaign, the author clearly blames Turkish foolishness for the Anglo-Ottoman breakdown. 133. Cavill, H. W. Imperishable Anzacs: A Story of Australia's Famous First Brigade. Sydney: William Brooks, 1916. Provides personal narratives. 134. Qeliker, Fahri. "Turkey in the First World War." Revue d'Histoire militaire (1980): 164-203. Survey of the Ottoman Empire's involvement in World War I. 135. Chabanier, Jean. "Avec les combatants de 1915 dan la Presqu'Tle de Gallipoli." [With the Combatants of 1915 in the Gallipoli Peninsula.] Revue Historique de TArmee 21 (May, 1965): 49-56. Provides an eyewitness account of the Gallipoli campaign with particular attention to the struggles with the environment and to maintain morale. 136. Chack, Paul. Des Dardanelles aux Brumes du Nord. [From the Dardanelles to the North Winds.] Paris: Les Editions de France, 1937. Chack's work is popular in style but provides a good description of parts of the campaign. 137. Chack, Paul. Pavilion haut. [The High Banner.] Paris: Les Editions de France, 1929. Provides an account of the French marines at the Dardanelles. 138. Chack, Paul, and Jean-Jacques Antier. Mediterranee. Vol. 2, Histoire maritime de la Premiere Guerre mondiale. [Naval History of the First World War.] Paris: France-Empire, 1969; rpt. 1992. This is a solid history which makes clear French weaknesses, for instance in the performance of their submarines at the Dardanelles. 139. Chambers, Frank P. The War Behind the War, 1914-1918: A History of the Political and Civilian Fronts. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939. Chambers' account of the Dardanelles Campaign includes the assertions that Liman von Sanders was preparing for defense before the initial bombardment so the warning of an attack to come was irrelevant. A

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successful naval assault, possible if done early in the campaign, he suggests, would have produced chaos and collapse in the Turkish government. 140. Chapman, Guy, ed. Vain Glory: A Miscellany of the Great War 1914-1918 Written by Those Who Fought in It on Each Side and On All Fronts. London: Cassell, 1937; 2nd ed. 1968. Two short chapters have brief reminiscences of veterans of the Dardanelles Campaign. 141. Charles-Roux, Francois. L'expedition des Dardanelles aujour lejour. [The Expedition to the Dardanelles from Day-to-Day.] Paris: A. Colin, 1920. This memoir provides details of the situation. 142. Charmley, John. Churchill: The End of Glory. London: Hutchinson, 1993. Charmley is quite critical of Churchill, suggesting that he was little less than Pollyanna-like in his disregard of the practical difficulties in the military schemes he frequently advocated. He also suggests that Churchill so convinced himself of his own correctness that he did not care to hear counter views and rode roughshod over those who expressed them. In Charmley's view the Dardanelles Campaign and its failure were fully Churchill's fault. 143. Charrusse, P. "Le Forcement des Dardanelles (18 Mars 1915) ou I'Occasion Manque." [The Forcing of the Dardanelles (March 18, 1915) or the Missed Chance.] Revue Maritime (1966); 1263-80. Having virtually forced the Ottoman Empire into German arms, the Entente, at Churchill's urging, sought to force the Straits by naval force, only to back off when success was in sight. The failure prolonged the war by at least two years. 144. Chattaway, T. P. History of the 15th Battalion, Australian Imperial Forces. Brisbane: W. Brooks, 1948. The author describes the 15th's efforts fighting at Anzac, making a point of problems with illness which he thinks John Monash failed to handle effectively. 145. Chatterton, E. Keble. Dardanelles Dilemma: The Story of the Naval Operations. London: Rich and Cowan, 1935. Chatterton's analysis suggests that the initial failure in the Dardanelles arose from not using combined arms from the outset and giving up surprise due to the initial bombardment. The second came from not realizing that the ships would be exposed to unacceptable enemy fire even before reaching the narrow parts of the Straits. The third was due to withdrawing major vessels in the face of U-boats and not giving adequate support to the Suvla landing. Although his conclusions are not unusual, Chatterton's clear picture

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 and use of sailors' narratives makes his book quite useful.

146. Churchill, Winston S. i(Lord Fisher and His Biographer." In Great Contemporaries. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1937; rpt. 1990. Although he professes respect and affection for Fisher and his biographer, Reginald Bacon, Churchill indicts both for ingratitude. He also asserts that Fisher was dishonorable by having contact with opposition leaders and failing to live up to his commitments to the Dardanelles plan and the government for which he worked. 147. Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis. 5 Vols. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923-29; numerous rpts. Churchill's central role in the conception and planning of the Dardanelles Campaign makes his account particularly significant. It is clear that he wrote with an eye to minimizing his own responsibility for the problems of the campaign, but he provides details of his own ideas about the strategy that are vital for understanding both strategy and tactics. He argues that he always realized that combined arms would work best, but when Kitchener (Churchill is very critical of his colleague) said no troops could be spared, the Admiralty~not he alone-prepared a plan using expendable ships without land support. Delays that let the Turks prepare were not of his making. Churchill's account should be read in conjunction with Robin Prior's analysis [No. 580]. 148. Cobber, Lance Corporal. The ANZAC Pilgrim's Progress: Ballads of Australia's Army. Edited by A. St. John Adcock. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, and Kent, n. d. This little book of poetry gives its reader a strong sense of the spirit of the men of Anzac, making the myth seem powerfully real. 149. Cochrane, Peter. Simpson and the Donkey: The Making of a Legend. Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1992. Simpson was an Anzac water carrier, who, using his donkey, rescued many wounded soldiers. Cochrane tells his story and looks at its development as a myth in Australian folklore. 150. Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: The Free Press, 1990. The authors argue that military failure arises from failing to learn, failing to anticipate, and failing to adapt and that catastrophic failure results from combinations of these flaws. The Gallipoli invasion provides their example of an army failing to adapt to unanticipated problems. 151. Coindreau, R. "Souvenirs des Dardanelles." [Memoirs of the Dardanelles.]

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Revue Maritime (1965): 195-207 and No. 219: 320-332. Coindreau served on the Suffren, one of the French battleships assigned to the Dardanelles fleet and was involved from the initial bombardment in November, 1914, through the landings at Gallipoli. 152. Collett, H. B. The 28th. A Record of War Service with the A. I. F., 19151919. Perth: N. P., 1922. The author was a battalion commander and arrived at Gallipoli in early September. Although most of the major offensive action had already occurred when he landed, his descriptions of the impact of the winter weather and the evacuation make this a valuable book for the study of the Dardanelles Campaign. 153. Collier, Basil. Brasshat: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. London: Seeker and Warburg, 1961. Wilson was an influential Westerner, and thought the Dardanelles idea was little short of crazy. He suggests that Kitchener was really forced into supporting the scheme, and although he became a little more moderate later, his biographer maintains this was really just the adaptation of a staff officer in a new job (Wilson eventually became Chief of the Imperial General Staff). 154. Collins, Dale. Anzac Adventure: The Story of Gallipoli Told for Young Readers. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1959. Collins has prepared a simplified account of the campaign for school-aged children. 155. Compton-Hall, Richard. Submarines and the War at Sea, 1914-1918. London: Macmillan, 1991. The decision to send submarines to the Dardanelles was pressed on the Admiralty by Churchill and Roger Keyes, but the effort was too little too late in that campaign. The subs did help restore the prestige of the navy, putting on so much pressure that German commander Liman von Sanders said that had it been done sooner and expanded, the Turks would have been forced to yield. Compton-Hall's account is popular and lacks references. 156. Condliffe, J. B. Te Rangi Hiroa: The Life of Sir Peter Buck. Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1971. This biography of a Maori physician and scholar includes an account in the subject's own words of caring for the sick and wounded at Anzac in August, 1915. 157. Cooper, Bryan. The Tenth. (Irish) Division in Gallipoli. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1918; rpt. 1993. This is a well-written divisional history. The inexperienced division landed at Suvla in August and suffered heavy casualties during its two and a half months on the Gallipoli peninsula. 158. Cooper, John Butler. Coo-oo-ee: A Tale of Bushmen from Australia to

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Anzac. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916. This fictional account gives a sense of the Anzac spirit and of Australian feelings about casualties.

159. Corbett, Julian and Henry Newbolt. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Naval Operations. 5 Vols. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920-31. The official British naval history, filled with detail of operations but less than incisively critical as far as British activities are concerned. The Dardanelles Campaign is discussed in the first two volumes. Although they agree that the strategy was valid, the authors are critical of Churchill, and insist that the professional naval officers at the Admiralty knew the plan was flawed from the beginning. 160. Cowan, James. The Maoris in the Great War: A History of the New Zealand Native Contingent and the Pioneer Battalion. Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1928. Provides an account, including description of combat, of the Maori forces on Gallipoli. 161. Cowland, W. S., ed. Some Accounts of the 10th and 12th Battalions of the Hampshire Regiment 1914-1918. Winchester: Warren and Son, [1930]. Cowland has put together a good day-by-day account, but unfortunately only covers a short period in August concerning Gallipoli. 162. Cowles, Virginia. Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. This is a popular but full account concluding that a combined arms approach from the first would have been successful in driving Turkey out of the war and convincing Bulgaria not to join the Central Powers. Kitchener's vacillation about the commitment of troops and de Robeck's refusal to carry on the naval assault were key elements in the defeat of the British. Cowles, apparently without the thought that such decisions are likely to be politically motivated, argues that the failure of the Dardanelles Commission to charge Churchill with misconduct is evidence that he committed none. 163. Cramm, Richard. The First Five Hundred: Being a Historical Sketch of the Military Operations of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment in Gallipoli and on the Western Front. New York: Williams, n. d. This volume is a work of pride, but does offer a worthwhile picture of Newfoundlanders at Gallipoli. 164. Craven, Digger [As Told to W. J. Blackledge]. Peninsula of Death. London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1937. Australian soldier's account of derring do and horrifying scenes during two periods on Gallipoli. A

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full-fledged example of the Anzac spirit. 165. Creagh, O'Moore, and E. M. Humphris, eds. The VCandDSO. 3 Vols. London: Standard Art Book Co., n. d. Listing of every winner of the V. C. and D.S.O. from the Crimean War to the end of World War I with biographical sketches and photos. 166. Creighton, O. With the Twenty-Ninth Division in Gallipoli: A Chaplain's Experiences. London: Longman, Green, 1916. Creighton arrived at Cape Helles at the beginning of May and left the peninsula in July. This volume, his diary, provides an almost day-by-day account of his activity and observations and includes many useful details. He, unfortunately, made little effort to expand beyond personal elements before publication, and so the value of his book is limited. 167. Crisman, Herbert Henry. "Naval Operations in the Mediterranean During the Great War 1914-1918." Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1931. Provides useful background to the campaign in the Dardanelles. 168. Crutchley, C. E., ed. Machine Gunner, 1914-1918: Personal Experiences of the Machine Corps. Northhampton: Mercury Press, 1973; 2nd ed., 1975. This work provides a brief account of the Gallipoli campaign with numerous quotations from veterans but fails to establish any special role for machine gunners. 169. Crurtwell, C.R.M.F. A History of the Great War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934; 2nd ed. 1936. In one of the best accounts of the war, Crurtwell notes the vagueness of the plan for the Dardanelles Campaign, especially the failure to define success or failure and the foolishness of allowing seniority to force Ian Hamilton to accept General Stopford, who proved to lack the drive necessary to force his officers to act with dispatch. He also comments on some tactical errors but does not make any definitive assignment of blame for the campaign's failure. 170. Crurtwell, C.R.M.F. The Role of British Strategy in the Great War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936. Crurtwell asserts that a campaign in the East in 1915 had real potential because, as has become known, the Central Powers were committed to a drive against Russia, which the Allies knew after May 2. He believes that an attack on the Danube would have been better than the Dardanelles Campaign, but the latter could have made a difference in the Balkans and possibly helped Russia. The failure was due to the Cabinet's indecisiveness, which left the French in a position to insist on continuing the main effort in France.

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

171. Cunliffe, Marcus. The Royal Irish Fusiliers. London: Oxford University Press, 1952. The 5th and 6th Battalions of the Royal Irish Fusiliers were in Gallipoli from August to October and fought at Suvla Bay, Chocolate Hill, and Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Cunliffe provides a much better than average unit history. 172. Cunningham of Hyndhope, Lord [Andrew Cunningham]. A Sailor's Odyssey. London: Hutchinson, 1951. Includes an account of the author commanding H.M.S. Scorpion, a destroyer, off V Beach on April 25. Cunningham condemns the failure to supply artillery support to the troops, which, he believes, the navy could have done. 173. Curran, Tom. Across the Bar: the Story of Simpson, The Man With the Donkey. Yeronga: Ogmios Publications, 1994. Simpson, who used his donkey to rescue numerous wounded Anzacs during the early part of the fighting on Gallipoli, became a hero and symbol of the Anzac effort in the campaign. Works concerning him provide information about the fighting, but are more important for discussion of the nationalist impact of Gallipoli in Australia. 174. Currey, E. H. How We Kept the Sea. London: Thomas Nelson, n. d. Currey's is a very popular account of the heroics of seamen. His example for the Dardanelles is Lieutenant Guy D'Orley-Hughes who swam ashore from a submarine to blow up a railroad and barely got back to his boat. 175. Curtright, Lynn H. Muddle, Indecision and Setback: British Policy and the Balkan States; August 1914 to the Inception of the Dardanelles Campaign. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986. Curtright provides valuable background concerning the situation in the Balkans and concludes with a discussion of the impact of the campaign on that region. 176. Dane, Edmund. British Campaigns in the Nearer East, 1914-1918: From the Outbreak of War With Turkey to the Taking of Jerusalem. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917 [sic]. Dane, a war correspondent, provides a detailed description of the campaign and blames poor planning and leadership for its failure. 177. Daniell, David Scott. Cap of Honour: The Story of the Gloucestershire Regiment (The 28th/61st Foot) 1694-1975. London: White Lion, 1951. Provides a brief account of the unit in combat at Chunuk Bair, August 7, 1919.

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178. Danisman, Hasan B. "The Last Ottomans." Asian Affairs 17(1986): 16176. This article uses oral history drawn from Turkish soldiers in World I, including Mustafa Kemal, who made his reputation at Gallipoli. 179. Dardanelles, The: An Epic Told in Pictures; A Hundred Photographs, Many Taken Under Fire. London: Alfieri, 1916. Provides visual images of the campaign. 180. Dardanelles, The: Their Story and Their Significance in the Great War, by the Author of "The Real Kaiser." London: Andrew Melrose, 1915. The author of this propagandistic account suggests that the losses in the campaign will be more than compensated by the results when success is obtained. 181. Darde, Fernand. Vingt Mois de Guerre a Bord du Croiseur "Jeanne-D'Arc," 9 Aout 1914-12 Avril 1916. [Twenty Months of War Aboard the Cruiser Joan of Arc, from August 9, 1914 to April 12, 1916.] Paris: Librairie Academique, 1918. Darde's diary provides daily accounts of service with French naval forces at the Dardanelles, but his time there was unfortunately quite short. 182. Darlington, Henry. Letters From Helles. London: Longman, Green, 1936. These letters provide a vivid and accurate account of life in the trenches at Helles from April to the end of the September, as seen by a member of the 1/5 Manchesters. 183. David, Robert P. F. Le Drame ignore de VArmee d'Orient: Dardanelles, Serbie, Salonique, Athens. [The Unknown Drama of the Army of the East: The Dardanelles, Serbia, Salonika, Athens.] Paris: Plon, 1927. Provides an account of French forces in the Balkans and Middle East. 184. Davidson, George. The Incomparable 29th and the "River Clyde." Aberdeen: James Gordon Bisset, [1919]. Davidson, a doctor with the 89th Field Ambulance, provides his daily diary accounts of activities with the 29th Division, with few changes from the text as written on the battlefield. 185. Davis, Shona. Having a Lively Time: Australians at Gallipoli: A Catalogue of Material Held in the Australian Manuscripts Collection, LaTrobe Library, State Library of Victoria. Melbourne: Council of the State Library of Victoria, 1990. Useful guide to the archives. 186. Day, Henry C. An Army Chaplain's War Memoirs. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1937. Day's memoirs have been published in several

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 versions. This one focuses on his experiences as a Roman Catholic chaplain in the British army. He was at Gallipoli from August 18 to October 9 and provides an account of life on the peninsula, the problems of the wounded, and combat, particularly at Chocolate Hill.

187. Delage, Edmond. La Tragedie des Dardanelles. [The Tragedy of the Dardanelles.] Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1931. Translated by Winifred Ray. London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1932. Delage gives much credit to the bravery of the soldiers and sailors in the campaign, but suggests the entire strategy of the Dardanelles was an illusion created and promoted by Churchill's eloquence. The capture of Constantinople, even if possible, would have created as many problems as it solved. He is also critical of the military leadership. Delage particularly criticizes Hamilton for poor planning and rigidity about tactics. 188. De Loghe, Sydney. The Straits Impregnable. London: John Murray, 1917. Superficial but personal account of the Anzac part of the Gallipoli action by an Australian soldier. Presented as a true account, but some elements seem fictionalized. 189. Denham, H. M. Dardanelles: A Midshipman's Diary, 1915-16. London: John Murray, 1981. Provides a personal account of a youth's experiences of serving with the Royal Navy during the Dardanelles Campaign. 190. Denman, Terry. "The 10th (Irish) Division 1914-1915: A Study in Military and Political Interaction." Irish Sword 17(1987): 16-25. Formed as part of the British Home Guard, the 10th Division was sent to Gallipoli despite being quite poorly trained. It suffered high levels of casualties which notably reduced Irish support for the war effort. 191. Denton, Kit. Gallipoli Illustrated. Adelaide: Rigby, 1981. Denton is quite open about attempting to appeal to readers' emotions rather than attempting to write an objective history, but the numerous illustrations ensure that the book is worth consulting for an understanding of the situation at Gallipoli. 192. Denton, Kit. Gallipoli: One Long Grave. Sydney: Time Life Books in Association with John Ferguson, 1986. Provides a very popular account with numerous illustrations. 193. Dewar, K.G.B. The Navy From Within. London: Gollancz, 1939. Dewar, who commanded a ship at the Dardanelles, regarded the campaign as impossible. He condemns both Churchill and Fisher for poor planning. He claims to have believed at the time that naval guns would not be

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successful against forts. 194. Deygas, F.-J. L'Armee d'Orient dans la guerre mondiale, 1915-1919. [The Army of the East in the World War.] Paris: Payot, 1932. Deygas includes an account of the Dardanelles in his survey of the French forces in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 195. Dinning, Hector. By-ways on Service: Notes From an Australian Journal. London: Constable, 1918. Dinning was in Gallipoli at the end of the campaign and gives a description of conditions from October through the evacuation. 196. Djalaheddin Dey. The Battle of Kum Kale. Istanbul: Turkish War College, 1920. The author provides an account of the fighting from the Turkish military's point of view. 197. Djemal Pasha, Ahmed. Memoriesof a Turkish Statesman—1913-1919. New York: George H. Doran, 1922. Djemal, a Cabinet minister and general, was not at the Dardanelles, but he provides background about the Turkish army and political leadership. He argued that the Straits could not be forced and called for calm when the attack came. 198. Donnell, Anne. Letters of an Australian Sister. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1920. Donnell provides a brief description of the hospital at Mudros, but unfortunately she was much more interested in reporting her sightseeing than her experiences as a nurse. 199. Dontas, Domna. Greece and Turkey: The Regime of the Straits, Lemnos andSamothrace. Athens: G. C. Eleftheroudakis, 1987. Although the author's focus is postwar, the introductory discussion provides background concerning the negotiations about possible Greek participation in the Dardanelles Campaign. 200. Drage, Charles, Chindwin to Criccieth: The Life of Godfrey Drage. Caernarvon: Gwenlyn Evans, 1956. Drage was at Suvla Bay in August, 1915, got promoted for valor, and was sent home sick. His account is useful mostly for eyewitness details. 201.

Drew, H.T.B., ed. The War Effort of New Zealand: A Popular History of Minor Campaigns in Which New Zealanders Took Part; Services Not Fully Dealt With in the Campaign Volumes; The Work at the Bases. Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1923. Provides some description of medical services provided for Gallipoli casualties.

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

202. Dunstan, K. No Brains at All. New York: Viking, 1990. Provides account of action at Anzac including the bitter struggle at Lone Pine. 203. Dupuy, Trevor N., and Grace P. Hayes. The Military History of World War I: The Campaigns on the Turkish Fronts. New York: Franklin Watts, 1967. Although apparently aimed at high school level students, this volume provides a simplified but clear and accurate account of the situation. 204. East, Ronald, ed. The Gallipoli Diary of Sergeant Lawrence of the Australian Engineers—1st A. I. F. 1915. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1981. This diary provides an excellent daily account of Lawrence's experiences and makes clear the suffering and endurance of the soldiers. It covers the Gallipoli campaign from mid-May to mid-December. 205. Edinburgh, Duke (Philip) of. "Ends and Means." Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 117(1987): 263-275. Discussion of the key people involved in planning the Dardanelles Campaign. 206. Edmonds, James. A Short History of World War I. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. The author provides an excellent survey covering all campaigns, but with an emphasis on the Western Front. 207. Edwards, Kenneth. We Dive at Dawn. London: Rich and Cowan, 1939. Edwards' book is a detailed but popular account of British submarines during World War I, and includes accounts of action in the Dardanelles Campaign. 208.

Einstein, Lewis. Inside Constantinople: A Diplomatist's Diary During the Dardanelles Expedition. London: John Murray, 1917. An experienced American diplomat, Einstein knew Turkey and liked its people. He gives an interesting account of the situation during the Allied invasion attempt and believed that if they succeeded in reaching Constantinople, Turkey would leave the war.

209. Ekstein, Michael G. "Russia, Constantinople and the Straits." In British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey. Edited by F. H. Hinsley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Provides an account of Britain's efforts to convince Turkey to reject the possibility of a German alliance and is useful background to the decisions about the Dardanelles Campaign. 210. Elliot, G. F. Scott. War History of the 5th Battalion King's Own Scottish

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Borderers. Dumfries: Robert Dinwiddie, 1928. Provides a detailed description of fighting in July going hour by hour at crucial times and is a good source for details. 211.

Ellison, Gerald. The Perils ofAmateur Strategy. London: Longman, 1926. Ellison argues that Winston Churchill, an amateur, was able to impose his ideas about strategy concerning the Dardanelles on the War Council. He acknowledges the force of Churchill's personality but condemns the professionals who should have advised the Council but were silent.

212. Emin, Ahmed. Turkey in the World War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930. Although Emin's focus is domestic rather than military history, he provides very important background information about Turkey. His work is very helpful in understanding the Turkish involvement and attitudes about the Dardanelles Campaign and the war as a whole. 213.

Enser, A.G.S. A Subject Bibliography of the First World War: Books in English 1914-1987. 2nded. Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1990; orig. 1979. Enser has provided a useful reference for those seeking a general bibliography of the war. His book, however, is hard to use if a subject not among his headings is sought. He provides only twenty-eight references under Dardanelles.

214. Erikan, Celal. Canakkale de Turk zaferi. Ankara: Gunzel Sanatkr Matbaasi, 1964. 215. Esat, Pasa. Esat Pasanin Canakkaanilari. Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1975. 216. Esher, Reginald, Viscount. The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1921. This volume, drawn quite directly from Esher's diary, pictures Kitchener as concerned about a unified strategy and fearful that the Balkan states would enter the war against the Entente. He wished to hold troops in reserve against such contingencies, but Churchill's enthusiasm carried the War Council and Cabinet in favor of the Dardanelles. Warnings from earlier studies and from Hankey were ignored, and Kitchener told Churchill that men would be found if the fleet got through the Straits. 217. Evans, Raymond. "The Anzac Story: Myth and Reality." History Teacher: The Magazine of the Queensland History Teachers Association 21 (1983): 10-13. This article examines the claims that the experience of Gallipoli had a unifying effect on Australians and how the defeat may have influenced such attitudes.

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

218. Ewing, John. The Royal Scots 1914-1919. 2 Vols. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1925. Battalions of the Royal Scots were at Gallipoli for much of the campaign. This history is most useful for a description of the campaign winding down and the final evacuation of the peninsula. 219. Ewing, William. From Gallipoli to Baghdad. London: Hodder and Stoughton, n. d. Ewing, a chaplain, was at Gallipoli, but he makes little distinction between what he saw and what he got from other sources. His account is often superficial but occasionally becomes lively and detailed (perhaps suggesting personal knowledge). His descriptions of No. 11 casualty clearing station, where he notes having served, and rear echelon life are particularly good. 220. Facey, A. B. A Fortunate Life. Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre, 1981; rpt. 1983. Facey's autobiography provides a detailed account of his front line experience with Anzac forces at Gallipoli, from landing on April 25 until being evacuated due to wounds in mid-August. 221.

Fallon, David. The Big Fight: Gallipoli to the Somme. London: Cassell, 1918. Fallon served at Gallipoli with the Australian First Division. His book is a rather histrionic account of combat at Anzac-including some rather improbable stories such as the murder of a German spy serving as (or pretending to be) a British lieutenant.

222. Falls, Cyril. The Great War. New York: Capricorn Books, 1959. The title for the English publication of this work is The First World War (1960). Falls' survey is an excellent and even-handed account of the war. His view of the Dardanelles Campaign is focused on missed opportunities. 223. Falls, Cyril. War Books: A Critical Guide. London: Peter Davies, 1930; rpt. 1989. Although dated, Falls' acute comments make this bibliography valuable. It is well organized and easy to use. 224. Fellows, George, and Benson Freeman. Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Yeomanry, 1794-1924. Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1928. Given the period covered, the space devoted to any one event is limited. The authors do manage to describe the unit's service in Gallipoli effectively. 225.

Ferguson, D. History of the Canterbury Regiment, N.Z.E.F., 1914-1918. Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1921. Canterbury battalions fought at Gallipoli and the unit history provides information about their experiences.

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226. Feuille, H. Face aux Turcs: Gallipoli, 1915. [Confronting the Turks: Gallipoli, 1915.] Paris: Payot, 1934. Feuille provides an artillery captain's account of the problems of the French at Gallipoli. His book includes dated entries in diary form, letters, and undated narrative sections. He is critical of the Suvla operation and argues that Hamilton should have been on the scene. 227. Fewster, Kevin, Vecihi Basarin, and Hatice Hurmuz Basarin. A Turkish View of Gallipoli. Richmond: Hodja, n. d. Although the source material, other than accounts by Germans serving with the Turks, is not heavily Turkish in origin, this book does provide an unusual perspective in a survey of the entire campaign. In contrast to many European accounts, the authors argue that the Turks had adequate munitions to carry on the fight if the naval assault of March 18th had been renewed. They also assert that the planning for the Suvla landing in August underestimated the potential for counterattack, despite adequate intelligence and painful experience, and they claim that the British assumed that once the high ground was taken the resistance would end. There is little basis for the latter assumption, and it was foolish to create a situation in which failure anywhere meant overall failure. 228.

Fifth Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 1914-1918, The. Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson and Co., n. d. This is a good account of a unit in action at Gallipoli.

229. Findlay, J. M. With the 8th Scottish Rifles. London: Blackie, 1926. Although not part of the force which landed under fire at Helles, Findlay describes some of that situation. He follows with details of the fighting in late June and decimation of his unit. He then turns to the evacuation with little notice of events of the intervening six months. His book is useful for facts about the periods he covers. 230. Firkins, Peter. The Australians in Nine Wars: Waikato to Long Tan. Adelaide: Rigby, 1971. Firkins provides a descriptive survey of the Gallipoli campaign which might serve as a useful introduction. 231.

"First Turkish Reinforcements at Suvla, August 7th-9th, 1915, The." The Army Quarterly 19(1929-1930): 92-103. Particularly valuable account because it is written from Turkish sources.

232. Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord. Records. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919. Fisher's comments here are choppy and lack cohesion, but he does give a vigorous defense of his views, especially of his idea for an invasion in the Baltic, support for which was a major factor in his

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 eventual opposition to the Dardanelles project.

233.

Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord. Memories. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919. Although not so designated, this books is essentially a second volume of memoirs and it and the preceding volume are often cited as Memories and Records.

234. Fitzherbert, Margaret. The Man Who Was Greenmantle: A Biography of Aubry Herbert. London: John Murray, 1983. Herbert was an intelligence officer on Ian Hamilton's staff and did much of his work in the front lines. 235.

Florinsky, M. T. "A Page of Diplomatic History: Russian Military Leaders and the Problem of Constantinople During the War." Political Science Quarterly 44 (1929): 108-115. Includes correspondence between Foreign Minister Sazonov and Prince Kadasky, the representative of the Russian foreign office at army headquarters with comments about the Dardanelles situation.

236.

Fortescue, Granville. Russia, the Balkans and the Dardanelles. London: Andrew Melrose, 1915. Fortescue's analysis of the political and diplomatic interplay in the Balkans provides useful background to the decisions about the Dardanelles campaign.

237.

Fortescue, Granville. What of the Dardanelles? London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915. This critical volume, written during the campaign, shows that many of the problems of the Dardanelles were known and understood at the time but not resolved. Fortescue was convinced that the Straits were impregnable.

238.

Foster, H. C. At Antwerp and in the Dardanelles. London: Mills and Boon, 1918. Foster was a chaplain, and his account focuses on the suffering of the soldiers.

239. Foster, Janet and Julia Sheppard. British Archives: A Guide to Archive Resources in the United Kingdom. 3rded. New York: Stockton Press, 1995. These authors have provided an excellent resource for scholars interested in primary source research. 240. Foster, Simon. Hit the Beach!: Amphibious Warfare From the Plains of Abraham to San Carlos Water. London: Arms and Armour, 1995. Foster's descriptions and critique of the tactics at Gallipoli are excellent, but his presentation of the strategy and politics behind the campaign are not in depth.

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241.

Fox, Frank. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in the World War. London: Constable, 1928. The 1st battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers served with the 29th Division at Gallipoli and the 5th and 6th (Service Battalions) with the 10th (Irish) Division. Fox provides details of the units' activities.

242.

Frame, T. R. and G. J. Swindon. First In, Last Out: The Navy at Gallipoli. Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1990. This is a study of the Australian navy in the Gallipoli Campaign. It includes an account of the AE 2, the first Allied submarine to reach the Sea of Marmora and of the Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train which was a unit involved in engineering work on Gallipoli. The authors are eager that the Australian navy get fair credit for its efforts in the campaign.

243.

France. Ministere de la Guerre, Etat-Major de I'Armee. Service Historique, Les Armies francaises dans la Grande Guerre [Service History, The French Army in the Great War.], 11 Tomes. Paris, 1922-37. The official French history of the war detailing the activities of French forces. The account of Gallipoli is in Tome 3 and is fairly extensive.

244.

Fraser, Peter. LordEsher. London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1973. Esher was privy to the inner circles of government, and Fraser discusses the decision making process concerning the Dardanelles which Esher observed.

245.

Freeman, Benson. The Yeomanry of Devon, 1794-1927. Edited by Earl Fortescue. London: St. Catherine Press, 1927. Brief account of the Devons serving, dismounted, at Gallipoli.

246.

French, David. British Strategy and War Aims. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986. French does an excellent job of setting strategic decision making into political, diplomatic, and economic context. His ideas concerning the emphasis on the Western Front provide an interesting analysis of problems in the Dardanelles.

247.

French, David. "The Dardanelles, Mecca, and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914-1916," War and Society 5 (May, 1987): 45-61. The belief of British imperial leaders that power in non-white colonial areas rested on "prestige and bluff' and fear of a resurgence of Islam was a strong force in the decision in favor of the Dardanelles Campaign as was the racist under estimation of the Turks as a foe. In fact, most non-white colonial people knew little about and had little interest in the war.

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248. French, David. "The Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign Reconsidered." History 68(1983): 210-24. French is quite critical of the British intelligence effort and the tendency to jump to conclusions about the situation-especially the quality of the defending forces-which were keys in the initial failure of the campaign. 249. Froembgen, Hanns. Kemal Ataturk: A Biography. Translated by Kenneth Kirkness. New York: Hillman-Curl, 1937. Provides a good account of the Turkish defense at Gallipoli. 250.

From Dartmouth to the Dardanelles: A Midshipman's Log. Edited by His Mother. London: William Heinemann, 1926. The midshipman in question was sixteen and died when his ship was sunk. His reconstructed diaries (the actual volumes were lost with the ship) are very personal and lack context.

251.

Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Henry Holt, 1989. Fromkin provides an account of the entire campaign as it affected the situation of the Ottoman Empire. He suggests some unusual interpretations of several aspects of the political and diplomatic situation .

252. Frothingham, Thomas G. The Naval History of the World War: Offensive Operations.

3 Vols. Cambridge, MA: Military History Society of

Massachusetts, 1924-26; rpt. 1971. Frothingham argues that the fall of Constantinople would have resulted in victory for the Allies, but the attack on the Dardanelles was so badly handled that the importance of its objective has been obscured. The effort should have been one of combined arms from the outset and given full support. 253.

Fry, Gavin. Nolan's Gallipoli. Adelaide: Rigby, 1983. Although only born in 1917, Sidney Nolan did a series of 252 paintings portraying the situation at Gallipoli, which he called "the great modern Australian legend." His representation of the campaign is in a more heroic vein than most such art. This book presents a sampling of Nolan's Gallipoli paintings .

254. Fuller, J.F.C. The Decisive Battles of the Western World. 3 Vols. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956. Fuller argues that the strategic concept behind the Dardanelles was superb, and failure came from the poor support and handling of problems on the scene. Hamilton, not to mention mention many of the other officers, was too old-fashioned to have the drive and ruthlessness needed for success when faced by the

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pressures of World War I. 255. Fyfe, Albert J. Understanding the First World War. Vol. 37 of Series IX: History, American University Studies. New York: Peter Lang, 1988. Fyfe notes that the Dardanelles was the first major modern amphibious operation and was incompetently handled by soldiers and politicians alike. The operation's failure seriously weakened the cause of the Easterners in the debate over British strategy. 256.

Gallipoli; der Kampfum den Orient, von einem Offizier aus der Stabe des marshalls Liman von Sanders. [Gallipoli: The Battle in the East by an Officer of the Staff of Marshall Liman von Sanders.] Berlin: A. Scherl, 1916. Provides a valuable glimpse of the leaders of the defense of the peninsula.

257. Gallishaw, John. Trenching at Gallipoli: A Personal Narrative of a Newfoundlander with the Ill-Fated Dardanelles Expedition. New York: Century, 1916. Written from the perspective of the private soldier, this volume provides an intimate look at the situation in the trenches. It is, perhaps, the first soldier's memoir of the campaign published. 258. Gammage, Bill. "Anzac." In Intruders in the Dust: The Australian Quest for Identity, Edited by John Carroll. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982. Gammage's analysis of the significance of the Anzac experience at Gallipoli provides insight into the motivation of Australian soldiers who made a very positive reputation fighting the Turks. 259. Gammage, Bill. The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974. The experience of Anzac forces at Gallipoli became a symbol for Australian nationalism, and the experience of Australian forces ultimately reduced proempire sentiment in favor of an independent Australia. Gammage does an excellent job of presenting this experience and establishing its impact. 260. Gammage, Bill. "The Crucible: TheEstablishment of the Anzac Tradition, 1899-1918." In Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace, Edited by M. McKernan and M. Browne. Canberra: Australian War Memorial with Allen and Unwin, 1988. Gammage provides some account of the Gallipoli campaign set in the much broader context of the impact of military service on the development of Australian national consciousness. 261.

Gammage, Bill and David Williamson. The Story of Gallipoli. Ringwood:

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Penguin, 1981. This volume includes Williamson's screenplay for the 1981 film Gallipoli and a description of the Campaign drawn from Gammage's The Broken Years [No. 258]. It also includes some comment about the impact of the Anzac experience on Australians as exemplified by the film.

262. Gasson, James. Travis, V. C Wellington: A. H. and A. W. Reed, 1966. Dick Travis, a New Zealander in the Otago Regiment N. Z. E. F., was famed for his ability to traverse no man's land in search of intelligence. Although his greatest fame came from service in France, this biography includes an account of his early experiences at Gallipoli. 263. Genoccan, Mehemet Ihsan. Canakkale savaslar indan menkibeler. Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi, 1990. 264. Germains, Victor W. The Truth About Lord Kitchener. London: John Lane, 1925. Vigorous defense of Kitchener in all aspects of his involvement in World War I. 265. Germains, Victor Wallace. The Tragedy of Winston Churchill. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1931. Germains attacks Churchill, strongly insisting that despite his success as a peacetime minister, he was an amateur who failed to understand that the only important naval objective was the destruction of the German fleet. He has little good to say for Churchill, who Germains claims misjudged the effectiveness of naval guns against forts, was overly willing to sacrifice older ships that were really needed for security, lost the chance at surprise, and misled his colleagues to get support for the operation. His account, however, lacks balance and gives the impression of a diatribe. 266. Gibbon, Frederick P. The 42nd. (East Lancashire) Division, 1914-1918. London: Country Life, 1920. Sent early to Egypt, the 42nd was one of the first units committed to Gallipoli and spent its summer at Helles. Gibbon's account of the fighting and conditions is quite good. 267. Gibbons, T. With the 1/5th Essex in the East. Colchester: Benham, 1921. The unit's involvement at Gallipoli began with the landing at Suvla in August. It subsequently moved to the Anzac area, suffered through the very bad weather of the early winter, and was evacuated. Gibbons account is largely descriptive. 268. Gibson, T. A. "Eyeless in Byzantium: The Tragedy of Sir Ian Hamilton." Army Quarterly 91 (Oct., 1965): 82-96. Gibson is critical of Hamilton's conduct of the Gallipoli Campaign.

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269. Gilbert, Martin. Atlas of World War I. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Gilbert provides an excellent layout of the geographical situation of all campaigns in the war. The maps are clear and easily read. 270. Gilbert, Martin. The Challenge of War, 1914-1916. Vol. 3, Winston Churchill. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971. Gilbert refutes the idea that Churchill was obsessed with attacking Turkey, and insists that the November, 1914, bombardment was not rash because the enemy already knew an attack was likely. He also points out that none of the professional naval officers at the Admiralty raised technical questions such as the problem of using naval guns against forts, when Churchill proposed his plan. Such questions were the job of the technical advisors not of the First Lord. Gilbert argues, then, that Churchill was on solid ground until Kitchener refused to send the 29th Division in February and at that point should have withdrawn his support from the whole operation. He believes that Churchill changed his mind about the likely success of an unsupported naval operation, but was so desperate for action that he continued to push for the attack even when it was clear that any significant success was unlikely. Churchill really believed that once through the Dardanelles the navy could force Turkish surrender and even after the naval assault was not renewed that proper reinforcement could win the day. 271.

Gilbert, Martin. Churchill: A Life. London: William Heinemann, 1991. Martin, the official biographer of Churchill, provides here a valuable one volume account of his subject's career. Among his points is that Churchill was bitter about Asquith's role in his loss of office, although he denies this in his own account.

272. Gilbert, Martin. The First World War: A Complete History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994. Gilbert's survey, while quite good, is somewhat episodic due to an emphasis on the experience of the individual soldier. He devotes a full chapter to the Dardanelles Campaign and makes some additional comments. 273.

Gillam, John G. Gallipoli Adventure. London: Frederick Muller, 1939. Gillam was a veteran of the Dardanelles Campaign and provides numerous interesting details of the situation in this rather chatty autobiographical account.

274. Gillam, John G. Gallipoli Diary. London: Allen & Unwin, 1918; rpt. 1989. Gillam was an officer serving with the 29th Division, and his diary provides an account of virtually the entire operation on Gallipoli. It has

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 been left in the day-by-day format in which it was written.

275. Gillon, Stair. 77**? K.O.S.B. in the Great War. London: Thomas Nelson, n. d. Gillon's account follows the various battalions of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and so tends to be episodic. Some of these units were with the 29th Division at Gallipoli, where it distinguished itself, and Gillon's descriptions of the smaller units is a useful perspective. 276. Gillon, Stair. The Story of the 29th Division. London: Thomas Nelson, 1925. The 29th enhanced an excellent reputation due to its service in Gallipoli, where its units served at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove. Gillon's account is good but often lacking in historical analysis. 277. Giradoux, Jean. Carnet des Dardanelles. [Notebook of the Dardanelles.] Paris: LeBaelier, 1969. Provides the author's notes concerning his experiences from March, 1915, to January, 1916, and a passage from his Adorable Clio (1939). 278. Giraud, Victor. Histoire de la Grande Guerre. [History of the Great War.] Paris: Hnchette, 1919. Giraud's brief account of the Dardanelles suggests that the losses of the Turks made them unable to mount major operations in the future. 279. Godley, Alexander. Life of an Irish Soldier: Reminiscences of General Sir Alexander Godley. London: John Murray, 1939. Godley trained New Zealand troops before 1914 and commanded them at Gallipoli. 280. Gooch, John. The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. Gooch provides valuable background for understanding the plans for the Dardanelles. He suggests that Kitchener's tendency to dominate and the consequent eclipse of the General Staff left the War Council adrift and prone to adopt goals without completely understanding the military elements involved. 281. Gooder, John. "Gallipoli: The Heroic Campaign: The Battle of Koj a ChemenTepe." Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 112(1982): 6269. Provides description of the struggle to take Koja Chemen Tepe by the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade based on the reminiscences of Corporal John Gooder, who was a scout and saw the development of the battle. 282. Gorman, Eugene. "With the Twenty-Second": A History of the TwentySecond Battalion, A. I. F. Melbourne: H. H. Champion, 1919. Pro-

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vides accounts of the fighting at Anzac. 283. Gough, Barry M. "Admiral Sir (later Baron) John Arbuthnot Fisher." In The First Sea Lords from Fisher to Mountbatten, Edited by Malcolm H. Murtett. Westport: Praeger, 1995. Although brief, this sketch of Fisher's career provides background to his role in the Dardanelles situation. 284. Graham, J.G. Gallipoli Diary. London: Allen and Unwin, 1918. Provides a first-hand account of the situation on Gallipoli. 285. Grant, Amy Gordon. Letters From Armageddon: A Collection Made During the Great War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930. Includes some fifteen pages of letters from soldiers and sailors serving in the Dardanelles Campaign. 286. Grant, I. Jacka, VC Melbourne: Macmillan in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1989. Albert Jacka, an Acting Lance Corporal in the 14th Battalion of the A. I. F., single-handedly held back a Turkish attack at Courtney's Post, a key point in the Anzac line on May 19, 1915, and was awarded a V C. His experiences provide much insight into the Australian situation at Gallipoli. 287. Graves, P. P. The Question of the Straits. London: Ernest Benn, 1931. Provides background concerning the diplomatic and political situations in the Balkans and the potential impact of the Dardanelles Campaign in terms of states in that area entering the war. Does not discuss the military aspects of the campaign. 288. Gray, Edwyn. The Killing Time. London: Seeley, Service, 1972; rpt. as The U-boat War, 1914-1918. London: Leo Cooper, 1994. Gray's focus is the German submarine effort, and he provides a brief account of U-boats at the Dardanelles. 289. Gray, Edwyn. The Underwater War: Submarines 1914-1918. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Includes five chapters about the Dardanelles. His account is straightforward and factual with little interpretation. 290. Great Britain. Dardanelles Commission. First Report, C M D 8490. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917; Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, C M D 371. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1918. The British Parliament often issues collections of documents as Parliamentary Command Papers (C M D) to explain and

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 justify actions and decisions of the government. Although these are often convenient ways to get access to official records, it must be remembered that they are not balanced accounts. The Commission's conclusions were that the campaign failed due to the lack of surprise, the risks of failure outweighed the chances of success, the initial investigation of the situation was inadequate, success would have required that the major concentration of British force be shifted from France.

291.

Gretton, Peter. Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy. London: Cassell, 1968. In this broad study of Churchill's influence on the British navy, Gretton tends to support the idea that had a variety of people handled planning and tactical matters more effectively the Dardanelles would either never have been begun or would have succeeded. He believes that Churchill misled the War Council about the Sea Lords' degree of support for his ideas, but maintains that Kitchener's imperious and sometimes uninformed control and Fisher's failure to speak out in the beginning were worse faults.

292. Grey, Jeffrey. A Military History of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Grey provides a brief description of the Gallipoli action. 293. Grey of Fallodon, Viscount. Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925. Grey, the Foreign Secretary, recalls the Dardanelles being accepted by the War Council as a naval operation that would be called off in case of failure and says that the blame for allowing publicity to result in a larger commitment must be shared by all involved. Of the campaign, he notes that it almost succeeded and needs no more defense. Concerning the possibility of Greek involvement in the campaign, Grey insists that to accept such help would have caused much trouble with Russia, perhaps even driving the Tsar out of the war. It was the Dardanelles Campaign, Grey asserts that resulted in the reluctant Anglo-French agreement that Russia might have Constantinople after the war. 294. Grey, W. E. 2nd City of London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) in the Great War. London: Royal Fusiliers, 1929. Competent account of the 2nd Battalion which was with the Royal Naval Division in Gallipoli. 295. Grieve, W. Grant, and Bernard Newman. Tunnellers: The Story of the Tunneling Companies, Royal Engineers, During the World War. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1936. Provides brief account of tunneling at Gallipoli which started with the Turks but was quickly adopted by the Australians, who had some harrowing experiences underground.

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296. Guedalla, Philip. Mr. Churchill: A Portrait. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1941. This is a brief popular account that minimizes Churchill's faults. 297. Guepratte, P.-E. L'Expedition des Dardanelles, 1914-1915. [The Dardanelles Expedition, 1914-1915.] Paris: Payot, 1935. Guepratte was commander of the French naval force at the Dardanelles and warm supporter of the naval effort. He provides a personal account to the time of his departure in September. 298. Guinn, Paul. British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. Guinn is particularly concerned with the ties between decisions about the war and domestic politics. He evaluates strategy in relation to both politics and tactics, arguing that these issues are inseparable. Two chapters in the book are devoted specifically to the Dardanelles. 299. Gullett, H. S. "Australia in the Great War: Military." In Australia, Vol. 7, Part 1, The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Edited by J. Holland Rose, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. Gullett's description is relatively brief but does provide some details of the Australian and New Zealand forces in action at Gallipoli. 300. Gunesen, Fikret. Canakkale savaslari. Istanbul: Kastas A. S. Yayinlari, 1986. 301. Gwyn, Sandra. Tapestry of War: A Private View of Canadians in the Great War. Toronto: HarperCollins, 1992. Despite an idiosyncratic organization, this volume provides interesting and unusual details of the Newfoundland troops at Gallipoli. 302. HairiBey. The Battles of Anafarta. Istanbul: Turkish War College, 1920. Turkish military's account of the fighting. The author was a corps chief of staff during the battle. 303. Halpern, Paul G., ed. "De Robeck and the Dardanelles Campaign." In The Naval Miscellany-Volume V. Edited by N.A.M. Rodger. Vol. 125, Publications of the Navy Records Society. London: George Allen and Unwin for the Navy Records Society, 1984. Admiral John De Robeck took command of the Dardanelles fleet, due to the illness of Admiral Carden, just before the March attempt to force the Straits. He was central in making the decision to wait for a landing by the army before renewing the effort after the losses in the first attack. The editor of this volume suggests that his caution was appropriate. The papers provided

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 offer insight into his thinking about the situation.

304. Halpern, Paul G., ed. The Keyes Papers, Vol. I: 1914-1918. Vol.117, Publications of the Navy Records Society. London: Navy Records Society, 1975; rpt. 1979. Keyes was consistently an advocate of using a naval squadron to force the Dardanelles, even trying to get one last opportunity while the decision to abandon the campaign was being taken. His papers provide an account of the campaign from the perspective of the naval high command on the scene and are, perhaps, the best source for an understanding of his view. 305.

Halpern, Paul G. A Naval History of World War I. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Halpern's survey is both well researched and well written. He does an excellent job of setting the Dardanelles Campaign into the context of the naval conflict.

306. Halpern, Paul G. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1914-1918. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Halpern includes the Dardanelles in this well-done survey. His descriptions are excellent, but although he identifies the key questions concerning the naval aspects of the campaign, he does not answer them. 307. Halpern, Paul G., ed. The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, 1915-1918. Vol. 126, Publications of the Navy Records Society. Aldershot: Temple Smith for Navy Records Society, 1987. This volume contains scattered records concerning the Dardanelles Campaign, which is covered in detail in other volumes of the Navy Records Society series. 308. Hamilton, A. S. The City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders). London: Hamilton Press, 1936. Hamilton includes a full chapter on the Suvla landing and fighting near Scimitar Hill in mid-August. The unit remained in Gallipoli until November, leaving before the general withdrawal. 309. Hamilton, Ian. The Commander. Edited by Anthony Farrar-Hockley. London: Hollis and Carter, 1957. This volume of Hamilton's papers provides only limited comment about the Dardanelles Campaign, but it does include Hamilton's defense of his own actions. He contends that real progress was being made, especially by the August attack and that winding down after that was foolish because the Turks were on their last legs. 310. Hamilton, Ian. Gallipoli Diary, 2 vols.. London: Edward Arnold, 1920. Hamilton was the general in charge of the expeditionary force and his

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previously good reputation suffered due to the failure in Gallipoli. He believed strongly in the concept of the campaign. His diary provides much detail about his planning and actions in the campaign, but after the fashion of published diaries, tends to hold the author blameless for difficulties. His bitterness about London's failure to provide adequate manpower and logistical support for the campaign is clear. 311. Hamilton, Ian. Ian Hamilton's Final Despatches. London: George Newnes, 1916. Although Hamilton was not always forthright in his reports, knowledge of the commanding officer's official positions is very important in the study of the Dardanelles Campaign. 312. Hamilton, Ian. Listening for the Drums. London: Faber and Faber, 1944. Hamilton's comments about the Dardanelles in this volume are brief and scattered, but his central role in the campaign gives his comments significance. His remarks seem mostly defensive. 313. Hamilton, Ian. Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches From the Dardanelles. London: George Newnes, n. d. This volume provides the indicated dispatches but no comment. 314. Hamilton, Ian B. M. The Happy Warrior: A Life of General Sir Ian Hamilton. London: Cassell, 1966. The family connection shows in this biography written by the subject's nephew. The book does provide a detailed account of Hamilton's activities during the Campaign. The author defends Hamilton against many charges, such as pressuring the naval commanders to include ground assault and excessive delay in making the initial attacks. He tends to ignore some criticisms such as Hamilton's tendency to allow subordinates to follow destructive strategies without intervening. He blames failure on the shortage of ammunition and reinforcements. 315. Hammerton, John A., ed. The Great War: I Was There! 3 Vols. London: The Amalgamated Press, 1938-39. An anthology of participants' accounts of the war, originally published in fifty-one parts. 316. Hankey, Maurice. The Supreme Command 1914-1918. 2 Vols. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961. Hankey, a professional soldier who was secretary to the War Cabinet, had a foot in the camps of both brasshats and frockcoats. His account suggests that he made repeated efforts to get the Dardanelles planning better focused and more realistic. 317. Hanna, Henry. The Pals at Suvla Bay: Being the Record of "D" Company of the 7th Dublin Fusiliers. Dublin: Ponsonby, 1917. Hanna's account

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 of the rank and file's experience at Suvla is well-written and provides some insights into Irish attitudes. The most important focus is attacking Chocolate and Green Hills on August 7.

318. Hargrave, John. At Suvla Bay: Notes and Sketches. London: Constable, 1916. Hargrave, a sergeant in the medical corps, provides personal observations of the Suvla landing and subsequent fighting. 319. Hargrave, John. The Suvla Bay Landing. London: MacDonald, 1964. The author, a sergeant in the medical corps, provides a mix of narrative history and personal experience. He compliments the strategic thinking behind the Dardanelles, but condemns Fisher and Kitchener for offagain-on-again arrangements and has no good word for the military leadership of the expedition at any level. It is hard to imagine a more negative view of the officers involved. 320. Haythomthwaite, Philip. The World War I Source Book. London: Arms and Armour, 1992. Haythomthwaite has provided a very convenient source for checking facts and details about the Dardanelles Campaign and the war as a whole. 321. Haythomthwaite, Philip J. Gallipoli 1915. London: Osprey, 1991. Haythomthwaite, in this short, heavily illustrated volume, has done an excellent job of writing a clear outline. He also makes clear his belief that incompetent leadership, at all levels, was the central source of failure. His book is an excellent starting point for students seeking an overall picture of the situation. 322. Hazelhurst, Cameron. Politicians at War, July 1914 to May 1915. New York: Knopf, 1971. Hazelhurst provides useful insight into the political elements of the Dardanelles situation and has an unusual view of Churchill and the May, 1915, crisis that brought down the government. 323. Head, C O . A Glance at Gallipoli. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1931. The author is very critical of the high command, suggesting that the failure at Gallipoli was due to "military mismanagement." He particularly condemns Kitchener for attempting to do the work of a chief of staff while serving as Secretary of State for War. He also regards the strategic goals, such as forcing the Turks out of the war, as far-fetched and unlikely to have resulted from military success. His description of the campaign is detailed but based primarily on secondary sources, although he did visit the peninsula in 1930. 324. Heichen, Walter. Im Kampfum die Dardanelles Erzdhlung aus dem Welt-

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krieg. [In Battle at the Dardanelles, A Tale of the World War.] Berlin: Mars-Verlag C. Swinna, 1916. Fictional account of the campaign. 325. Herbert, A. P. Secret Battle. London: Methuen, 1919. This novel, in which the hero distinguishes himself at Gallipoli, only to be shot for cowardice after the experience of the Western Front, offers a sense of the psychological impact of World War I combat as well a picture of the soldier's life during the Dardanelles Campaign, which the author knew first-hand. 326. Herman, Gerald. The Pivotal Conflict: A Comprehensive Chronology of the First World War, 1914-1919. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. Herman provides a day-by-day account of the war. 327. Hermann, Gerhard. Die Dardanelles [The Dardanelles] Liepzig: W. Goldmann, 1936. Provides a discussion of the campaign from the German point of view. 328. Hersing, Otto. U-21 rettet die Dardanelles [The U-21 Saves the Dardanelles.] Zurich: Amalthea Verlag, 1932. U-21 arrived in Dardanelles May 21 after an adventurous voyage. She torpedoed the battleships H.M.S. Triumph and H.M.S. Majestic and some other vessels, which helped convince the British to restrict naval activities and replace newer capital ships with monitors. A second patrol was less successful. Hersing, U-21's captain, provides a first-hand account. 329. Hezlet, Arthur. The Submarine and Sea Power. London: Peter Davies, 1967. Although the author does not devote extensive analysis to the Dardanelles Campaign, he does note the importance of marine logistics for the Turks, and considering the success of nine British and four French submarines, he thinks that a greater effort could have cut that supply line. He also notes the effectiveness of German U-boats in driving away significant elements of the Royal Navy. 330. Hickey, Michael. Gallipoli. London: John Murray, 1995. Hickey has written a thorough survey account of the entire campaign. His descriptions are clear and complete, and although he does not focus on the question of fault, he attributes most failures to problems of leadership. 331.

Higgins, Trumbull. Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles: A Dialogue in Ends and Means. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1963. An in-depth study of the political machinations that surrounded the British decisions concerning the Dardanelles. It argues that the politicians-especially

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Churchill-bear greater fault than the military for the failures of the campaign.

332. Higham, Robin, ed. A Guide to the Sources of British Military History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Higham has provided an excellent reference for both primary and secondary sources concerning the British military. The broad chronological coverage—prehistory to modem times-makes completeness impossible, but the book is the starting point for any research in the field. 333. Hiley, Nicholas. '"Enough Glory for All': Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and Sir Ian Hamilton at the Dardanelles." Journal of Strategic Studies 16 (1993): 240-64. Provides a discussion of the controversy between the correspondent Ashmead-Bartlett, who was quite critical of the Gallipoli operations, and the high command, which wished to censor dispatches to avoid public disclosure of problems. 334. Hill, A. J. Chauvel of the Light Horse: A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1978. Chauvel and his unit served at Anzac and this biography includes a description of the action and of Chauvel's relationship with Monash. 335.

Historique des troupes coloniales pendant la guerre 1914-1918 (fronts exterieurs). [History of Colonial Troops During the War of 19141918(Overseas Fronts).] Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1931. Provides an account of French colonial troops in the fighting on Gallipoli.

336.

History of the Dorsetshire Regiment, 1914-1919. Dorchester: Henry Ling, 1933. Officers wrote the stories of their own battalions with help from professionals Dudley Ward and C. T. Atkinson. The 5th (Service) Battalion was at Suvla and did well there. This account is good for details but has little analysis.

337. History of the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1929. The Gurkhas, long known for bravery and determination, distinguished themselves at Gallipoli. This unit history provides details of combat, especially in early July. 338. History of the Old 2/4th (City of London) Battalion the London Regiment Royal Fusiliers. London: The Westminster Press, 1919. This Battalion was on the Gallipoli peninsula from October 16, 1915 to the end of the campaign in January, 1916. The history provides an account of life on the peninsula in the waining days of the campaign. It is in diary form, apparently almost as written, with details of soldiers' experiences.

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339. Hodges, Arthur. Lord Kitchener. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1936. Provides a brief summary of the problems Kitchener faced in dealing with the Dardanelles Campaign. 340. Hoehling, A. A. The Great War at Sea. London: Barker, 1965; rpt. 1995. This popular history does not devote a section to the Dardanelles campaign, but does discuss it, though briefly, as part of other aspects of the sea war. 341.

Hogue, Oliver. Trooper Bluegum at the Dardanelles. London: Andrew Melrose, 1916. Although Hogue served at Gallipoli, he portrays the campaign as adventurous derring-do.

342. Holmes, Jessie. Pilgrimage to Gallipoli. London: Alexander-Ouseley, n.d. This volume is an account of a 1926 memorial visit to Salonika and Gallipoli and is significant only as a testimony to the lingering impact of Gallipoli in the minds of Englishmen. 343. Holmes, Richard. The Little Field-Marshal: Sir John French. London: Jonathan Cape, 1981. Holmes provides the perspective of the High Command on the Western Front about the diversion of men and supplies to the Dardanelles. Direct comment about the strategy and tactics of the Dardanelles Campaign, however, is quite limited. 344. Hoover, Karl D. "Commander Otto Hersing and the Dardanelles Cruise of S.M.U.-21." American Neptune 36(1976): 33-44. Provides an account of the trip of the U-21 from Wilhelmshaven to Constantinople and its successful action against the Allied fleet, during which it sank the battleships Triumph and the Majestic, losses which were significant blows to the British effort. 345. Horn, Daniel, ed. War, Mutiny and Revolution in the German Navy: The World War Diary of Seaman Richard Stumpf. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. This diary, translated by the editor, is the only one included in the minutes of a Reichstag committee which investigated the causes of German defeat and was originally published by the legislature. The diarist served on the Helgoland, and was not at the Dardanelles. He does, however, offer comments about that campaign, providing insight into the attitudes of a rank and file German about the situation. 346. Home, Charles F., ed. Source Records of the Great War. N. P.: National Alumni, 1923. Volume 3 by Henry Morgenthau, Henry Nevinson, and Gaston Bodart includes the Dardanelles Campaign. The work is more

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 narrative than sources in the sense of excerpts from original works, although the authors had personal experience of the war.

347. Hough, Richard. First Sea Lord: An Authorized Biography of Admiral Lord Fisher. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969. Published in the U. S. as Admiral of the Fleet: The Life of John Fisher. New York: Macmillan, 1970. Hough argues that Fisher made three basic errors in dealing the with Dardanelles situation. First, he initially supported the idea, even offering the Queen Elizabeth as support and allowed Churchill's eloquence to prevent the hard questions from being asked. Second, he let himself be talked into quiescence at the January 28 War Council meeting when he started to raise objections to the plan. Third, he focused his objections on his own preference for action in the Baltic rather than making the case against the Dardanelles, especially the difficulty using naval gun fire against forts. 348. Hough, Richard. Former Naval Person: Churchill and the War at Sea. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985. Hough provides good accounts of the naval war both on the sea and at the Admiralty. He is inclined to be critical of Churchill in connection with the Dardanelles Campaign. Poor staff work and less than competent admirals were problems, but Churchill helped create the staff and tolerated the presence of incompetents on it and in command. Ultimately, the problem was that although Churchill knew much about war in the abstract, he did not understand modem naval conflict in practice. 349. Hough, Richard. The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Hough argues that despite his dominance over strategic decisions, Winston Churchill did not really understand sea power and was not popular in the navy. He blames Churchill for ignoring the numerous indications that forcing the Dardanelles was impossible in his eagerness for action. The First Lord did not understand the technical elements of the campaign such as the difference between howitzers and naval guns, and used his political skills to out maneuver Fisher and other technical advisors. Hough credits Churchill as an excellent First Lord in peace time but insists that he should never have held the office during war. 350. Hoyt, EdwinP. Disaster at the Dardanelles, 1915. London: Arthur Barker, 1976. Despite the title, this volume only considers the naval attacks and concludes with the decision to land troops. It is a useful survey of the navy's efforts, however, and blames the failure upon Kitchener's vacillation, Fisher's failure to make his objections known from the beginning, and De Robeck's repeated refusals to continue the attack after the losses

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of March 18. Hoyt almost entirely absolves Churchill who either did not know of problems or was unable to exercise control to deal with them. 351. Hughes, W. M. The Splendid Adventure: A Review of Empire Relations Within and Without the Commonwealth of Britannic Nations. Toronto: Doubleday, Doran and Gundy, n. d. Hughes briefly discusses the Dardanelles in context of imperial relations and how the experiences of the war affected the relations of Britain and her former colonies. 352. Hunt, Barry, and Adrian Preston. War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War. London: Croom Helm, 1977. The essays in this volume contribute to the understanding of the impact of the Dardanelles Campaign on various belligerents. Most importantly, the failure of the campaign helped ensure the dominance of the British army leaders' position that the war had to be fought out on the Western Front and that the military/civilian split over war aims would continue to be a problem. The campaign also influenced the decision of Italy to enter the war. 353. Hunter-Weston, Aylmer. "War and Peace at the Dardanelles." The Army Quarterly 3 (1921-22): 70-76. The commander of the 29th Division revisits the scene of the campaign and comments on the situation. He believes that the Turks and even the Germans were weakened by their losses in the Dardanelles. The general's comments are mostly a eulogy to those who fought and died on the peninsula. 354. Hurst, Gerald B. With Manchesters in the East. London: Longman, 1918. Short, well-written account of service with the 42nd Division including campaigning at Gallipoli. 355. Hutcheson, John A., Jr. "From Constantinople to Coalition: British Press Reaction to the Dardanelles Campaign and the Fall of the Liberal Government." M. A. thesis. University of North Carolina, 1968. Hutcheson provides an interesting study of the political ramifications of the Dardanelles Campaign. 356. Hyde, Robin. Passport to Hell: The Story of James Douglas Stark, Bomber. Auckland: Auckland University, 1986. Provides account of Gallipoli. 357.

Idriess, Ion L. The Desert Column. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1932; rpt. 1951. Although much of Idriess' diary concerns Sinai and Palestine, it begins with his arrival at Gallipoli in May and continues through September when he was finally evacuated. His depiction of daily life

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 and combat in the trenches is good, but his best contribution is his description of the experience of a minor wound becoming infected and several weeks on a hospital ship. His experience of military medicine was not pleasant.

358. Igdemir, Ulug. Ataturk ve Anzaklar. [Ataturk and the Anzacs.] Ankara: Turk tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1978. 359. Ilcev, Ivan. "Great Britain and Bulgaria's Entry into the First World War (1914-1915)." Bulgarian History Review 10(1982): 29-48. Suggests that the failure of the Dardanelles Campaign was an important element in the Bulgarian decision to enter the war in support of the Central Powers. 360. Ilgar, Ihsan. Cankkale savaslari, 1915. Ankara: Kultur ve Turizm Bakanligi, 1982. 361.

Imperial War Museum. Department of Sound Recordings. Gallipoli: Oral History Recordings. London: Imperial War Museum Department of Sound Recording, 1994. Useful guide to the museum's oral history records of the Gallipoli campaigning.

362. Ingle, Judith A. From Duntroom to the Dardanelles: A Biography of Lieutenant William Dawkins: Including His Diaries and Selected Letters. Canberra: J. Ingle, 1995. This self-published biography provides an account of Dawkins' experiences as an Anzac. 363.

Inglis, K. S. "The Australians at Gallipoli." Australian Journal of Science 32(1970): 351-61. Although Inglis'focus is the impact of the Gallipoli Campaign on Australian national consciousness, he does devote significant amounts of this article to events during the campaign.

364. Inglis, K. S. "The Australians at Gallipoli." (Parts 1 and 2.) Historical Studies 14(1970): 219-30; 361-75. Inglis discusses the impact of the Gallipoli landings on the growth of Australian national consciousness and includes a number of quotations from veterans about their experiences in the campaign. 365. Inglis, K. S. C.E.W. Bean: Australian Historian. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1970. In this pamphlet, Inglis devotes only limited space to the Dardanelles Campaign. In view of Bean's important role in shaping attitudes about that campaign, however, comments about both him personally and as an historian are certainly germane to the study of it.

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366. Irdesel, Mehmet. Gelibolu ve yoresi tarihi: Gelibolu'yu taniyalim, Canakkale tarihi, Pirireis: Canakkale savaslari ve Milli Park, Troya-Assos ve turn eski kentler tarihi. Gelibolu: Geltur Ajans, Turkistile Yayinlar, 1994. 367.

Izzedin Dey and Burhaneddin Bey. The Battles of Ari Burnu. Istanbul: Turkish War College, 1920. Turkish military's detailed account of the fighting.

368. Jabotinsky, V. Turkey and the War. London: Fisher Unwin, 1917. Surveys such as Jabotinsky's are most valuable for setting the Dardanelles Campaign into context. 369. Jackh, Ernest. The Rising Crescent. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944. The author was a frequent visitor to Turkey and friend of leading Turks. He provides much background on the Dardanelles situation but little about the actual campaign. 370. Jackson, William, and Lord Bramall. The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff. London: Brassey's, 1992. The authors provide a discussion of the conflict between the heads of the army and navy over strategy and control of combined arms operations and how the failure to come to agreement on such questions was a problem in the Dardanelles. 371. James, Robert Rhodes. Churchill: A Study in Failure. New York: World Publishing, 1970. James is very critical of Churchill. He notes that the initial attack that gave away surprise was Churchill's idea, and insists that the First Lord misrepresented the ideas of his naval advisors about the overall campaign. The use of troops was discussed even in January, but Churchill continued to insist that they would be needed only as an occupying force. Since the weather was unlikely to make landing possible early in the spring, Churchill's claim that the earlier release of the 29th Division would have made a difference is not valid. James is not so extreme as to put all the blame on Churchill and makes reference to the War Council's failure to use good judgment, but he never allows the reader to forget that Churchill was the central figure. He also makes clear how uninformed Churchill was about the practical aspects of the campaign. James feels that Churchill badly underestimated the Turks, and that at no time were they on the verge of being overwhelmed. 372. James, Robert Rhodes. Gallipoli. London: Batsford, 1965; rpt. 1989. A solid account from a very good historian, but one who takes a very dim view of Winston Churchill. James is firmly convinced that the strategic

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 conception of the Dardanelles Campaign was foolish and that there is no reason to think it came even close to succeeding. He is quite critical of Hamilton as over-optimistic, rigid, and poorly prepared.

373. James, William. The Eyes of the Navy: A Biographical Study of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall. London: Methuen, 1955. This volume includes background on British efforts to buy Turkish neutrality before the Dardanelles Campaign and discussion of Churchill's influence through eloquence at the Admiralty. 374. James, William. A Great Seaman: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry F. Oliver. London: H. F. and G. Witherby, 1956. Oliver was assigned to study the Turkish forts along the Dardanelles in preparation for the attack and concluded that they could be destroyed in a series of operations. He also believed that given the stalemate in France Churchill was right to press for the Dardanelles Campaign. The material provided concerning the Dardanelles in this biography is limited, but Oliver's work and views provide support for Churchill in the debate over strategy and should not be overlooked. 375. Jameson, William. The Fleet That Jack Built: Nine Men Who Made a Modern Navy. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962. Of the two biographical sketches in this volume that are relevant to the Dardanelles, that of John Fisher has little information. The other, concerning Roger Keyes, provides a superficial account of the campaign and Keyes' aggressive approach to it. 376. Jameson, William. Submariners V. C London: Peter Davies, 1962. Jameson provides accounts of the patrols of the E 14 commanded by Lieutenant Commander E. C. Boyle and the E 11 commanded by Lieutenant Commander M. E. Nasmith. Each of the boats made successful attacks on Turkish ships in the Sea of Marmora during the Dardanelles Campaign. 377. Jeans, T. T. Reminiscences of a Naval Surgeon. London: Sampson Low, Marston, [1927]. Jeans served on the Euryalus and later the Swiftsure and was involved in both the April and August landings. He asserts that it was generally understood among naval officers that taking the Achi Baba heights was vital for success in April and that all knew that the expedition had failed by the second morning of the offensive. He also criticizes army officers for depending on naval gunfire without knowing about the limits of the technology. More within his own area of expertise, he criticizes provision of medical supply and evacuation and describes a trip to the River Clyde to care for the wounded left in the

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beached ship after it was grounded. 378. Jerrold, Douglas. Georgian Adventure. London: Collins, 1937. Jerrold's memoir is rather episodic and wandering, but he does provide some details of the British Naval Division during the Gallipoli Campaign. 379. Jerrold, Douglas. The Hawke Battalion: Some Personal Records of Four Years. London: Ernest Benn, 1925. The author, who is a professional writer, gives an interesting account of his experiences including service in Gallipoli. The Hawke Battalion of the Naval Division saw action at Cape Helles near Achi Baba, and remained in the area until final evacuation of the peninsula. 380. Jerrold, Douglas. The Royal Naval Division. London: Hutchinson, 1923. Very well written account of the service of the Naval Division, which fought as an infantry unit in Gallipoli but was technically part of the Royal Navy. Units of the Division were in most of the Gallipoli operations. 381. Joffre, Joseph J. C. Personal Memoirs, 2 vols., Translated by T. Bentley Mott. New York: Harper, 1932. The French supreme commander, Joffre was opposed to diverting forces from the Western Front. His books gives his version of his debate about the Dardanelles with the government and with General Sarrail with first-hand details not available elsewhere. 382. Johnson, R. M. 29th Divisional Artillery War Record and Honours Book, 1915-1918. Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution, 1921. Provides daily but brief accounts of the 29th Divisional artillery at Gallipoli during periods of combat and during long periods of less active times, and documents the limited ammunition available for use during the campaign. 383. Johnson, Walter H. "The Dardanelles Expedition." Coast Artillery Journal. 59 (1923): 1-35. This account, prepared at the U. S. Army War College, is a survey of the decision making in the campaign. 384. Johnstone, Tom. Orange, Green and Khaki: The Story of the Irish Regiments in the Great War, 1914-1918. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992. In four chapters about Gallipoli, Johnstone provides a detailed description of the experiences of Irish soldiers, including numerous quotations from them. His coverage is particularly good for the landing at Helles, Anzac in August, and the Suvla attack.

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385. Jones, Denis. The Diary of a Padre at Suvla Bay. Manchester: Faith Press, n. d. Although he was as often at Helles as at Suvla, Jones does provide an account of life during the Gallipoli campaign, especially care for the wounded. Unfortunately, hardships are quite understated. 386. Jones, Jonah. Gallipoli Diary. Chester Springs: Dufour Editions, 1989. A soldier's account of his experiences during the Gallipoli invasion during the Dardanelles campaign. A valuable source for students interested in the lives of soldiers during World War I. 387. Jose, Arthur. The Royal Australian Navy, 1914-1918. Vol. 9, The Official History ofAustralia in the War of 1914-1918. Melbourne: Australian War Memorial, 1928; rpt. 1987. Although the Australian navy was not prominent in the Dardanelles campaign, this volume does provide an account of the AE 2, the first submarine to reach the Sea of Marmora. The account isfirst-handfromthe boat's commander, H.H.G.D. Stocker, who was captured after technical problems prevented submerging and the AE 2 was sunk. 388. Jourdain, H.F.N., and Edward Fraser. The Connaught Rangers. 3 Vols. London: Royal United Service Institution, 1928. Provides a solid and detailed account of daily life and combat at Gallipoli from landing at Anzac on August 5 until the beginning of October, when the unit was withdrawn. 389. Juvenis. Suvla Bay and After. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916. The author was with the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 10th Irish Division. His account, one of the first, of the landing at Suvla Bay is well-written and gives an accurate picture of an extremely difficult situation. 390.

Kannengiesser, Hans von. The Campaign in Gallipoli. Translated by C.J.P. Ball. London: Hutchinson, 1928; orig. Gallipoli: Bedeutung undverlaufder Kampfe. Berlin: Schlieffen Verlag, 1927. The author commanded a Turkish division during most of the fighting on the peninsula. He insists that Krithia could have been taken on either the second or third time the British assaulted it had one more attack been made. He also tells the tale of holding Koj a Chemen Tepe with a few men during the Suvla Bay landing. These accounts from the Turkish perspective are very valuable for gaining a full understanding of the campaign.

391.

Karatay, Baha Vefa. Mehmetcik ve Anzaklar. Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari, 1987.

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392. Kearsey, A.H.C. Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1934. Provides summary of the campaign including numerous quotations from dispatches. There are some factual errors, especially about the locations of units. 393. Kent, D. A. "The Anzac Book and the Anzac Legend: C.E.W. Bean as Editor and Image Maker." Historical Studies [Australia] 21 (1985): 376-90. Kent suggests that the image of the Anzac soldier was created by The Anzac Book published in London in 1916. This was an anthology done by Bean at the time of the withdrawal from Gallipoli. Kent maintains that Bean's selection of the fifty-five literary and fifteen art pieces in the book was made with an eye to making the troops look good. 394. Kent, Marian. "Asiatic Turkey, 1914-1916." In British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Edited by F. H. Hinsley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Although Kent provides relatively little about the military aspects of the Dardanelles Campaign, her article is good background concerning the problems between Britain and Turkey. 395. Kemer, Robert J. "The Mission of Liman von Sanders: The Crisis." Slavonic Review 6(1927): 12-27; 344-63; 543-60; 7 (1928): 90-112. Kemer provides important background concerning the German involvement in the Ottoman Empire, but does not discuss the military campaign. 396. Kemer, Robert J. "Russia, The Straits, and Constantinople, 1914-15." Journal of Modern History 1(1929): 400-15. Kemer's discussion of the diplomatic background to the Dardanelles campaign provides valuable context for the military aspects of the story. 397. Keyes, Roger. The Fight for Gallipoli. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1941. This volume, drawn from Keyes' Naval Memoirs, follows the Dardanelles campaign from beginning to end. It provides a full account of Keyes' enthusiasm for the strategy and his several efforts to urge on the attacks-first by the navy and later a combined effort rather than the planned withdrawal. 398. Keyes, Roger. Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keys. 2 Vols. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1934. Keyes was second in command at the Dardanelles and consistently argued that the naval attack could be successful and should be continued. Even when the decision to evacuate was being discussed, he was lobbying for a renewal of the navy's effort to force the Straits.

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399. King, Jere C. ed. The First World War. Documentary History of Western Civilization. New York: Walker, 1972. The chapter of this volume concerning Gallipoli is taken from the account by General Liman von Sanders, who commanded the defensive forces. 400.

King, Jere, C. Generals and Politicians. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. Good description of the struggle between the military and civilian leaders for control of the war in general and the Dardanelles campaign in particular.

401.

King, Michael. New Zealanders at War. Auckland: William Heinemann, 1981. Although King's account of New Zealanders as part of the Anzac force at Gallipoli is relatively brief, it is heavily illustrated and includes a number of first-hand accounts. He also refers to the "myth" that the Anzac experience produced an evolution of national awareness in New Zealand and Australia.

402.

Kingsford, Charles L. The Story of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment. London: Country Life and George Newnes, 1921. Kingsford includes detailed accounts of fighting at Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay in July and August.

403.

Kinross, Lord. Atatiir k: The Rebirth of a Nation. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964. Kinross devotes two chapters in this solid biography to the Dardanelles Campaign and is better than most biographers at establishing Kemal's pivotal role without making him larger than life.

404. Kirchberger, Joe H. The First World War: An Eyewitness History. New York: Facts on File, 1992. Provides numerous excerpts from personal accounts of the Dardanelles. 405. Knight, Frank. The Dardanelles Campaign. London: MacDonald, 1970. Knight's short account is very critical of the military command especially for what he regards as confused, incomplete planning and failure to communicate requirements clearly to small unit officers. 406.

Knyvett, R. Hugh. "Over There" With the Australians. London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1918. This is a first-hand but superficial account of Australian forces at Gallipoli from the initial landing to the final evacuation.

407.

Koebsell, Eberhard. Der Kampfum die Dardanelles [The Battle for the Dardanelles.] Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1936. Koebsell surveys the campaign. This volume has also been published under the pseudonym

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Clemens Laar. 408. Koeltz, Louis. La Guerre de 1914-1918: Les Operations militaires. [The War of 1914-1918: Military Operations.] Paris: Sirey, 1966. Koeltz provides some detail concerning both the naval and land operations in the Dardanelles, and notes the arrival of submarines as a particular problem. 409. Koss, Stephen. Asquith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. Koss's discussion of the Dardanelles is brief but does set the military situation into the context of the Prime Minister's political problems in 1915. 410. Koss, Stephen. Lord Haldane: Scapegoat for Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Koss, a brilliant political historian, provides unusual insight into the machinations of the Cabinet over questions of the Dardanelles and particularly the crisis of May, 1915, that brought down the government. 411.

Kurat, Y. T. "How Turkey Drifted Into World War I." In Studies in International History, Edited by K. C. Bourne and D. C. Watt. London: Longman, 1967. Kurat provides background to the campaign, especially concerning the relationship of the Turks and Germans.

412. Laffin, John. British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One. London: Alan Sutton, 1988. Laffin refers to Gallipoli as a fiasco, and damns Hamilton as the source of the failure. The general should have controlled the situation, for instance at Suvla, where he might have insisted on pressing the attack rather than moving slowly, consolidating and waiting for artillery. He allowed Stopford and Hunter-Weston to bungle, and although he was unlucky and poorly treated by his own superiors, he cannot be excused. 413.

Laffin, John. Damn the Dardanelles! The Agony of Gallipoli. London: Osprey Publishing, 1980; rpt. 1989. According to the author, "The purpose of this book is to explain the defeat, to apportion the blame, and to let the soldiers speak." He accomplishes his purpose.

414. Laffin, John. Digger: The Legend of the Australian Soldier. Rev. ed. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1986; orig. 1959. In his discussion of the quality of the Australian soldier, Laffin includes a description of the fighting at Gallipoli. The account of the campaign is episodic but has details of a variety of individuals' experiences. 415. Laffin, John, ed. Letters From the Front, 1914-1918. London: J. M. Dent,

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 1973. Laffin includes a number of letters describing the situation at Gallipoli.

416. Laird, John. The Australian Experience of War. Dalinghurst: Mead and Beckett, 1988. Laird includes excepts from A. B. Facey [No. 220] and some poetry concerning the Gallipoli Campaign. 417. La Maziere, Pierre. UHopital Chirurgical Flottant. [A Floating Surgical Hospital.] Paris: Albin Michel, 1919. This volume is the diary of an orderly on a hospital ship during the Gallipoli campaign. His description of the medical care provided to the wounded shows it to be brutal. 418. Larcher, M. La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale. [Turkey in the World War.] Paris: Etienne Chiron and Berger-Levrault, 1926. Larcher provides a survey of the Turkish war effort including the Dardanelles. His work is particularly valuable due to his heavy use of Turkish sources. 419. Latter, J. C. The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers. 2 Vols. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1949. Includes accounts of the landing and advance at Helles, the three battles of Krithia, the Suvla landing, and the final evacuation of the peninsula. 420. Laurens, Adolphe. Histoire de la guerre sous-marine allemande (19141918). [History of German Submarines, 1914-1918.] Paris: Societe d' Editions Geographiques Maritimes et Coloniales, 1930. Laurens' survey of German submarine activity includes a brief section noting the operations of several U-boats in the Dardanelles. 421.

Layman, R. D. Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Layman has done a good job of covering all aspects of his subject, including the Dardanelles. He provides good background about the use of naval air power in the campaign.

422. Lee, John. "Sir Ian Hamilton and the Dardanelles, 1915." In Fallen Stars: Eleven Studies of Twentieth Century Military Disasters. Edited by Brian Bond. London: Brassey's, 1991. Lee makes a forceful defense of Ian Hamilton, arguing that the commander was asked to do far too much with far too little support or materiel. Lee is mostly inclined to blame Kitchener. 423.

Legg, Frank. The Gordon Bennett Story. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1965. Bennett was a young Australian officer who became a battalion

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commander by battlefield commission during the Gallipoli Campaign, in which he served from April 25 to mid-September. His biographer weaves the personal elements of character development and learning to soldier with accounts of Bennett's combat experiences and heroism. It is clear that Bennett was bitter about the high casualty rates his men suffered and that he blamed vacillation and unrealistic planning by those in charge of the campaign for its failures. 424. Lewis, Brian. Our War: Australia During World War I. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980. Although more a commentary about Australia than a military history, this volume does include a chapterlong account of Australian forces at Gallipoli. 425. Lewis, Bruce. A Few of the First. Conshohocken: Combined, 1996. This detailed study of the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service includes coverage of the latter's work in the Dardanelles Campaign. 426. Liddell Hart, Basil H. The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy. London: G. Bell, 1929. Liddell Hart is always eager to support the Easterners and makes clear his belief that the Dardanelles Campaign was an excellent idea that failed due to an almost incredible series of errors. 427. Liddell Hart, Basil H. "The Military Strategist." In Churchill Revised: A Critical Assessment. New York: Dial Press, 1969. Liddell Hart is well-known for his belief in the Eastern strategy, and the case of the Dardanelles is no exception. In his view, the fault was in the execution, not the conception, specifically the failure to employ adequate force initially. He believes that the March 18th attack, if renewed, would have been successful because the Turks were out of ammunition. Delays gave them the advantage. He cites German general Falkenhayn's view that opening the Black Sea route to Russia had the potential to be decisive. He does note that Churchill was impetuous and ignored practical, logistical problems. 428. Liddell Hart, Basil H. The Real War, 1914-1918. Boston: Little Brown, 1930; enlarged ed. entitled A History of the World War (1934). Liddell Hart regards the Dardanelles Campaign as an excellent example of the indirect strategy which he devoted his career to defending. It would have worked were it not for the inexperience of the troops employed and the lack of vigorous tactical leadership. He is also critical of the decision not to concentrate adequate force for the initial (or any other for that matter) attack during the campaign.

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429. Liddell Hart, Basil H. Through the Fog of War. London: Faber and Faber, 1938. Liddell Hart provides a brief account of the war and a series of sketches including descriptions of Ian Hamilton and the fighting at Gallipoli. A leading critic of the Westerners, he asserts that success in the Dardanelles was possible, but lost due to a lack of support from the government and high command and tactical errors in the field. 430. Liddle, Peter H. The Airman's War 1914-18. Poole: Blandford Press, 1987. This well-illustrated volume presents the flyer's view of the war using many quotations from veterans. Concerning the Dardanelles Campaign, Liddle comments about the importance of the air service for artillery observation both for the navy and the army. He notes the difficulties of the situation for the relatively crude machines of 1915, and identifies several heroes. 431.

Liddle, Peter H. "The Dardanelles Gallipoli Campaign: Concept and Execution." In Home Fires and Foreign Fields: British Social and Military Experience in the First World War, edited by Peter Liddle. London: Brassey's, 1985. Liddle traces the changing ideas of goals and operations in the Dardanelles, and although he cautions about the dangers of hindsight in judging complicated situations, he leaves no doubt that he thinks the whole campaign was from inception a mistake that could and should have been avoided.

432.

Liddle, Peter H. Gallipoli 1915: Pens, Pencils, and Cameras at War. London: Brassey's, 1985. Provides a selection of photographs, sketches, and reproduced handwritten accounts of the Gallipoli campaign. The value of the book is lessened by the very limited effort to set the material into context.

433.

Liddle, Peter H. Men of Gallipoli: The Dardanelles and Gallipoli Experience, August 1914 to January 1916. London: Allen Lane, 1976. Liddle's main intention is to portray the experience of the men who served in the Dardanelles, and he does so quite vividly. He also makes clear, however, that he believes the politicians should have known better than to drift into the campaign without a clear plan and the soldiers, although asked to do the impossible, made tactical errors that worsened the situation.

434. Liddle, Peter H. "Report on Gallipoli Research in Australia and New Zealand." Archives and Manuscripts 6(1974): 11-19. Liddle has made an amazing effort to collect oral history accounts of World War I. This article discusses the contributions of Anzac-men to the archives he was building at Sunderland Polytechnic University.

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435. Liddle, Peter H. The Sailor's War, 1914-1918. Poole: Blandford Press, 1985. Provides a good description of the life of a sailor with numerous illustrations and quotations from veterans. Includes account of experiences at the Dardanelles. 436. Liddle, Peter H. The Soldier's War, 1914-1918. London: Blandford Press, 1988. Liddle provides a good account of the life of a soldier with numerous illustrations and quotations from veterans. Concerning Gallipoli he notes that poor preparation and inexperience should not be allowed to obscure the excitement and sense of mission felt by the troops. 437. Lloyd George, David (Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor). War Memoirs. 6 Vols. London: Nicolson and Watson, 1933-36; numerous rpts. Although Lloyd George was not directly involved in the military effort, his role, along with Churchill, as critic of the army's focus on the Western Front as he rose to Prime Minister makes his comments a necessary part of studying British strategy. When discussing the Dardanelles, he defends Churchill and blames Kitchener 438.

Lockhart, J. G. The Sea Our Heritage. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940. This is a very popular account written to buoy spirits at the beginning of World War II. It provides several accounts of heroism at the initial landings on Gallipoli and among submariners but no analysis or criticism.

439. Londres, Albert. Si je t'oublie Constantinople. [If I Forget Constantinople.] Paris: Union generated'edition, 1985. Provides a Frenchman's account of the campaign. 440. Longmore, C. The Old Sixteenth: Being a Record of the 16th Battalion, A. I. F. During the Great War, 1914-1918. Perth: Imperial, 1921. The 16th served on Gallipoli, and the unit history provides information about its activities. 441.

Lowe, C. J. "Italy and the Balkans, 1914-1915." In British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Edited by F. H. Hinsley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Although he does not analyze the Dardanelles Campaign per se, Lowe does recount the events in regard to Italy. His conclusion is that despite the problems of the campaign, its effects on Italy were positive in the sense of bringing that state into the war on the side of the Entente.

442. Lucas, Charles, ed. The Empire at War. 6 Vols. London: Oxford Uni-

96

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 versify Press, 1921-26. Lucas divided the empire roughly by continents and discusses each colony's contribution to the war.

443.

Lundeberg, Philip K. "Undersea Warfare and Allied Strategy in World War I. Part I: To 1916." Smithsonian Journal of History 1 (Autumn, 1966): 1-30. Lundeberg reviews the use of submarines and mines from their earliest prototypes through World War I, and provides an account of their importance during the Dardanelles Campaign.

444. Lushington, R. F. A Prisoner With the Turks, 1915-1918. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, and Kent, 1923. This memoir is by an Australian who was captured during the evening of the day of the first landings at Anzac. 445.

Lynn, Escort. LadsoftheLothians. London: Chambers, 1920. This historical novel is based on the experiences of the 5th Royal Scots which served with the 29th Division in Gallipoli. It tends to be old fashioned in its depiction of young men eager to serve king and country, but such lads existed in 1915. The book remains worth reading for those interested in attitudes of soldiers.

446.

Lyons, Michael. World War I: A Short History. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994. Lyons provides a solid overview. He suggests that the Allied failure in the Dardanelles was due to poor leadership and that tactical victory was unlikely to achieve the hoped-for strategic goals anyway.

447. MP, An [Aubrey Herbert]. Mons, Anzac and Kut. London: Edward Arnold, 1919; rpt. 1930. The author was an intelligence officer and provides some details of information gathering and psychological warfare with his account of the fighting. 448. McAdie, Alexander. War Weather Vignettes. New York: Macmillan, 1925. This a meteorologist's account of the significance of weather in military operations. Although the author seems to know relatively little about military matters, he does provide an interesting account of prevailing climatic conditions, which the soldiers would have profited from having had at the time of the campaign. 449. McCarthy, Dudley. Gallipoli to the Somme: The Story of C.E.W. Bean. London: Leo Cooper, 1983. McCarthy does an excellent job of following the story of Anzac through the eyes of Bean, who was more involved in the front line at Gallipoli than was usual for correspondents. The account is somewhat episodic but supplies useful first-hand details

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of the situation. 450. MacCustra, L. Gallipoli Days and Nights. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916. Provides some first-hand observations of Gallipoli. 451. MacDonagh, Michael. The Irish at the Front. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916. Provides a popular account of the 10th (Irish) Division at Gallipoli, especially the Suvla Bay landing and the capture of Chocolate Hill. 452. Macdonald, Lyn. 1915: The Death of Innocence. London: Headline Books, 1993. Macdonald is virtually unparalleled in her ability to weave oral history research into an account of a military situation. Her account of the Gallipoli battles is another triumph in this regard, but unfortunately she does not add her usually incisive analytical comments. 453. Macdonald, Lyn. 1914-1918: Voices & Images of the Great War. London: Joseph Donald, 1988. Macdonald's collection of excerpts from comments about the war is useful for impressionistic scenes but offers little narrative cohesion. 454. Macdonald, Lyn. The Roses of No Man's Land. London: Michael Joseph, 1980. Macdonald's account of nurses includes descriptions of the medical problems at Gallipoli. 455.

McEntee, Girard, L. Military History of the World War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. Although this is an outline history, the author's inclusion of numerous maps makes the volume a useful introduction to the Dardanelles Campaign.

456. Macfie, A. L. Ataturk. London: Longman, 1994. This brief biography is more focused on Mustafa Kemal's political career than on his military exploits. The author does, however, describe the Gallipoli situation in which Kemal's heroism proved the foundation for his later rise. 457.

Macfie, A. L. "The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-18." Middle Eastern Studies 19(1983): 43-74. Includes a discussion of the impact of the failure of the Dardanelles Campaign on Russia.

458. McGibbon, Ian. The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand, 18401915. Although his focus is primarily pre-World War I, McGibbon does conclude with a brief discussion of New Zealanders at Gallipoli. 459. MacKay, Ruddock F. Balfour: Intellectual Statesman. Oxford: Oxford

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 University Press, 1985. Provides an account of the debates in the War Council concerning the Dardanelles Campaign with the goal of explaining Balfour's initial support-he thought the campaign would end if the navy failed-and later failure to oppose continuation-Kitchener was too dominant over military decisions to be resisted. Once he became First Lord of the Admiralty, Balfour felt Britain was too fully committed to the operation to withdraw, although that would have been the most reasonable course.

460. MacKay, Ruddock F. Fisher of Kilverstone. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. MacKay is critical of Fisher for not doing more to make his objections to the Dardanelles known, especially to the War Council. His early support and his tendency to combine objections with recommendations for action in the Baltic made it easy for others to dismiss his remarks. Fisher's later assertions that technical advisors were not supposed to speak out unless asked are specious-he did not hesitate to inform Andrew Bonar Law, leader of the Opposition, about his views. Fisher had the support of the other Sea Lords on the position that the First Sea Lord should have control of strategy, and he could have used this to stop Churchill. Instead of doing so, he resigned. 461.

MacKenzie, Clutha N. The Tales of a Trooper. London: John Lane, 1921. The author, son of the High Commissioner for New Zealand served with the New Zealand Mounted Rifles at Gallipoli, where he was blinded.

462. Mackenzie, Compton. Gallipoli Memories. London: Cassell, 1929. Mackenzie was an author who had youthful military experience and through friends managed an appointment with Ian Hamilton's staff. His book provides some useful first-hand details. He thinks reasonably well of the strategic concept of the campaign, but criticizes Hamilton for overestimating the mostly inexperienced units under his command and for not demanding better support from the War Office. 463. Mackenzie, K. W. The Story of the 17th Battalion, A. I. F. in the Great War. Sydney: Chipping, 1946. The 17th served on Gallipoli, and the unit history provides information about its activities. 464. McKernan, Michael, The Australian People and the Great War. Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1980. McKernan's focus is attitudes of Australians about their forces during the war, but he repeatedly notes the impact of the Gallipoli campaign. 465.

Macksey, Kenneth. For Want of A Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications. London: Brassey's, 1989. Macksey's brief ac-

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count of the Dardanelles Campaign emphasizes problems of mobility presenting some little known facts such as the supply problem created by the failure to land more than 160 mules in the first forty-eight hours after the Suvla invasion in August. 466. McLaughlin, Redmond. The Escape of the Goeben: Prelude to Gallipoli. London: Seeley Service, 1974. Although this book provides useful background to the Dardanelles Campaign, it has little information about the campaign itself. 467. MacMunn, George. Behind the Scenes in Many Wars, Being the Military Reminiscences of George MacMunn. London: John Murray, 1930. MacMunn is quite critical of the leadership at Gallipoli, which he regards as a hopeless folly. He served on the peninsula trying to establish a system of communications, a task he thinks was undertaken much too late. 468. MacMunn, George. "The Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles." Army Quarterly 20 (1930): 52-63. MacMunn notes the failure to study communication problems before embarking on the campaign, and is quite interested in the problems of coordination between the navy and army. He seems critical of the former but concludes that the real problem was differing approaches to amphibious operations. 469. McPherson, William L. A Short History of the Great War. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920. Brief descriptive history, but the author does suggest that the Dardanelles was an opportunity missed by the Allies. 470. McPherson, William L. The Strategy of the Great War. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919. McPherson considers the idea behind the Dardanelles campaign sound, and suggests that victory would have allowed the Allies to drive into the heart of Eastern Europe thus winning the war without U. S. involvement. He blames hesitancy, delays, and lack of total commitment by the high command and government for the failure. 471.

McQueen, Humphrey. Gallipoli to Petrov: Arguing With Australian History. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984. McQueen rejects many of the arguments about Gallipoli's role in the development of Australian national consciousness, but with his focus on the domestic impact of the campaign he gives little attention the military aspects of it.

472. Magnus, Philip. Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist. London: John Murray, 1958. Magnus's work is one of the best biographies of Kitchener. He acknowledges Kitchener's faults, especially concerning the delays in

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 getting forces to the Dardanelles, and points out that the confusion about what to do, especially whether to evacuate, was a major cause of Kitchener's loss of influence in the Cabinet. Kitchener was too independent and so had to bear the blame for the failure, which went far to destroy his political influence.

473. Malthus, Cecil. Anzac: A Retrospect. Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1965. This account blames the failure at Gallipoli on poor logistics, especially the shortage of bombs (hand grenades) and trench mortars, which would have made the difference in breaking Turkish defensive lines and opening the way to Constantinople. 474. Manchester, William. Visions of Glory, 1874-1932. Vol. 1, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill. Boston: Little, Brown, 1983. Manchester is an unabashed admirer of Churchill and defends him against critics that assert his responsibility for the failures at the Dardanelles. 475. Mantey, Eberhard von. AufSee unbesiegt mit Bildern gefallener Helden. [Unvanquished at Sea With the Inspiration of Fallen Heroes.] 2 Vols. Munich: Lehman, 1921-22. This study of naval operations provides accounts of U-boats at the Dardanelles. 476. March, Francis A. History of the World War: An Authentic Narrative of the World's Greatest War. Philadelphia: United Publishers, 1919. March provides a descriptive overview. 477. Marder, A. J. From Dardanelles to Or an. London: Oxford University Press, 1974. In this excellent scholarly book, Marder provides a clear account of the Royal Navy's Dardanelles Campaign and suggests that the potential gains made the resumption of the attack in April worth the risk. This is a more favorable attitude than in the author's earlier work. 478.

Marder, A. J. Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. Although Richmond did not serve in the Dardanelles, his papers offer details of behind the scenes activity at the Admiralty. He did think Turkey a tempting target, but he also made clear, in a February 14, 1915, memorandum to Fisher, that a large force of troops would be needed and that the attack had to be accomplished very quickly.

479. Marder, A. J. The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, Vol. 2, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 19041914. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Although Marder defends Churchill against charges that he did not consult the profes-

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sional staff at the Admiralty when planning the Dardanelles, he does think that the First Lord overstated the degree of support he got from those officers when presenting the plan to the War Council. He regards the idea that the navy could take a city as foolish, but had the decision to send troops been taken in the first stage of the campaign there would have been a realistic chance of success. Churchill knew all of this and should not have continued to press his idea. A better system of coordination between the branches of the military and between the military and the political leaders could have either stopped the campaign or given it the support in required for possible success. 480. Marine-Archiv und Kriegsgeschichfliche Forschungs anstalt des Heers. Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918: Der Krieg in den tiirkischen Gewdssern. [The Sea War 1914-1918: The Battle in Turkish Waters.] Edited by Herman Lorey. 2 Vols. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1928-38. This official history provides an account of German naval, especially submarine, activity in the Dardanelles and contests the British claims concerning the tonnage sunk by their subs. 481.

Marshall, S.L.A. "Suvla Bay." In Great Military Battles, Edited by Cyril Falls. London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964; rpt. 1969. Although the landing was successful, Hamilton was too cautious and failed to press his subordinates to advance, with the result that skilled leadership by Liman von Sanders and Mustafa Kemal led to defeat.

482. Marshall, S.L.A. "Suvla Bay." Military Review 43 (Nov., 1963): 60-68. Marshall reevaluates the significance and effect of Suvla landing in the Gallipoli Campaign. He is critical of Hamilton for not realizing the significance of stress on the individual soldier, but even more so of Stopford for agreeing to such a terrible plan. 483. Marshall, S.L.A. World War I. New York: American Heritage, 1964; rpt. 1987. Marshall provides a good survey of the military aspects of the war. He tends to be critical of British leadership. 484. Marshall, William. Memories of Four Fronts. London: Ernest Benn, 1929. Marshall commanded a brigade in the 29th Division and provides accounts of landing, fighting at Gully Ravine, Helles, and Suvla, and the evacuation from Suvla. Marshall admits that the offensive failed, but insists that Turkish losses (worse than those of the Allies), keeping the enemy tied down, and the lessons learned about amphibious operations made the effort worthwhile. 485. Masefield, John. Gallipoli. London: William Heinemann, 1916. This

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 account both profits and loses from the author's poetic skills. He is eloquent in portraying the emotional elements of the situation, but weak in analyzing the military situation.

486. Maurice, Frederick. British Strategy. London: Constable, 1929. Although he acknowledges the strategic potential of taking Constantinople, Maurice provides the view of a Westerner making the point very clear that the issue concerning the Dardanelles was the continuing cost of committing to a significant effort away from the Western Front. 487.

Maurice, Frederick. "The Eastern and Western Controversy." Contemporary Review 114 (1918): 623-30. Maurice, a British general, condemns all policies, including the Dardanelles, that weakened the effort on the Western Front.

488. Maurice, Frederick. Lessons of Allied Co-operation: Naval, Military and Air 1914-1918. London: Oxford University Press, 1942. Writing from the perspective of the early days of World War II, Maurice stresses that lessons in cooperation had been learned from the first war. Concerning the Dardanelles Campaign, however, he ignores the fact that Churchill misled his French counterpart when the expedition was first being planned and that the Frenchman did not tell his own government the whole story so that in the case of failure he could blame the English. Maurice has an interesting perspective, but has not dealt fully with the situation. 489.

Maurice, Frederick. The 16th Foot: A History of the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment. London: Constable, 1931. Although this is a good history, the Regiment's battalions were scattered—one at Gallipoli-and in attempting the follow all of them the author's accounts must be brief.

490.

Maxwell, J. Hell's Bells and Mademoiselles. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1932. Maxwell's account of war-time service, including Gallipoli, as an Australian soldier is exuberant.

491.

Mayer, S. L. and W. J. Koenig. The Two World Wars: A Guide to Manuscript Collections in the United Kingdom. London: Bowker, 1976. The authors provide an excellent guide for those interested in researching the Dardanelles Campaign.

492.

MehatBey. The Battles of Sedd el Bahr. Istanbul: Turkish War College, 1920. Turkish military's account of the fighting.

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493. Members of the Regiment. History of the 5 th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) 1858-1928. 2 Vols. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, n. d. The Gurkhas proved themselves formidable soldiers fighting at Cape Helles in June and in the Anzac area in August. This account, although largely descriptive, does give a sense of the spirit of these colonial troops. 494. Men of Anzac, The. The Anzac Book. Edited by C.E.W. Bean. London: Cassell, 1916. Provides a collection of writing and art done by the solders of the Anzac forces. Bean has been accused of picking these carefully to further the myth that Anzacs were tough, irreverent, but good soldiers. 495. Merle, Ferdinand. L Admiral Guepratte. [Admiral Guepratte.] Brest: Edition de la cite, 1988. Guepratte commanded French naval forces in the Dardanelles and was a strong supporter of the naval campaign. He was eager to try new ideas about amphibious warfare. 496. Michelsen, Andreas. Der U-bootskrieg, 1914-1918. [The Submarine War, 1914-1918.] Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1925. Provides discussion of the use of submarines during the Dardanelles Campaign. 497. Middlebrook, Martin, ed. The Diaries of Private Horace Bruckshaw, 19151916. London: Scholar Press, 1979. These diaries—two notebooks written in pencil—kept by a private in the Royal Marine Light Infantry offer little insight into the larger issues of strategy and politics of the Dardanelles campaign. They are, however, filled with the day-to-day experiences of a soldier living in the trenches during the Gallipoli invasion. Bruckshaw supplemented his descriptions with some drawings, and provides an excellent record of the campaign from the point of view of the rank and file. 498. Midwinter, C. Memoirs of the 32nd Field Ambulance, X (Irish) Division. Privately Printed, 1933. A brief account by a sergeant that provides some details of the medical service at Suvla. 499. Mikusch, Dagobert von. Mustapha Kemal. Translated by John Linton. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1931. Provides a descriptive account of Kemal's endeavors at Gallipoli, but with little comment other than how his heroism affected his subsequent career. 500. Miles, Sherman. "Notes on the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915." Coast Artillery Journal 61 (Dec. 1924): 506-21); 62 (Jan., Feb., March, 1925): 23-42; 119-43; 207-25.. Provides a good account of the campaign but is quite hard on the British navy.

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

501.

Milne, A. Berkeley. The Flight of the Goeben and the Breslau. London: Eveleigh Nash, 1921. Milne was one of the British commanders in the Mediterranean who allowed the Goeben and Breslau to reach Constantinople, where they became part of the Turkish fleet and helped start the series of events that ultimately led to the Dardanelles Campaign.

502. Miquel, Pierre. La Grande Guerre. [The Great War.] Paris: Fayard, 1983. Miquel sets his discussion of the Dardanelles in a section concerning the war in Asia, providing a useful context for examining the campaign. 503. Mitchell, Elyne. Light Horse: The Story of Australia's Mounted Troops. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1978. Mitchell traces the activities of Australian cavalry in the Boer and First World Wars, providing an episodic and incomplete description. 504. Mitchell Report, The. Report on the Enemy Defense of the Dardanelles Straits. London: Dardanelles Committee, 1921. Originally issued in 1919 the government "Confidential Book" is the result of an official investigation of all aspects of the Dardanelles Campaign. 505. Mitchell, T. J., and G. M. Smith. Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War: Official Medical History of the War. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931. This is a useful collection of information, but the accuracy of the casualty figures included in it has been questioned. 506. Monash, John. The War Letters of General Monash. Edited by F. M. Cutlack. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1935. Monash was a brigade commander in the Anzac Corps, and makes a point of how well the rear echelon support worked for his troops. He supports the Anzac myth with his accounts of Australian morale, gallantry, and lack of reverence for authority. His comments continue all the way to the evacuation, which he calls the greatest joke as well as feat of arms in history. 507. Montgomery, Ina. John Hugh Allen of the Gallant Company: A Memoir. London: Edward Arnold, 1919. Memoir of an Anzac prepared by his sister. 508. Moorehead, Alan. Gallipoli. London: Hutchinson, 1956; new ed. 1967; rpt. 1982. This book is a good read, but not entirely trustworthy for factual information. Moorehead regards the strategic concept of the Dardanelles as excellent and blames poor leadership for the disasters at

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Gallipoli. Hamilton planned competently, but failed to make his plans clear to his corps commanders who themselves were elderly and/or inexperienced. When corps and divisional commands failed to pursue goals vigorously, Hamilton failed to press them for action. Hence attacks faltered on the edge of success even though the Turks were at times on the verge of collapse. 509. Moorhouse, Geoffrey. Hell's Foundations: A Social History of the Town of Bury in the Aftermath of the Gallipoli Campaign. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992. Moorhouse provides a chapter surveying the Gallipoli experiences of the Lancashire Fusiliers, whose headquarters were in Bury. He notes that the Anzac troops had a rather low opinion of the British Tommies to the point of regarding them cowards, a charge he does not support. His discussion of the "six V. C.s before breakfast" won by the Fusiliers suggests that despite the true heroism of the men, the awards were made due to politics and were really a recognition of the whole unit. Much of the book is a discussion of the impact of the Gallipoli Campaign on the veterans and on the town of Bury in the years between the World Wars. 510. Mordal, Jacques. "L'expedition des Dardanelles 3 Novembre 1914-9 Janvier 1916." [The expedition to the Dardanelles November 3, 1914-January 9, 1916.] Revue Historique de I'Armee 21 (May, 1965): 27-48. Provides a review of the background and operations of the Dardanelles Campaign. 511.

Moreau, Laurent. A Bord du Cuirasse "Gaulois" (Dardanelles-Salonique 1915-1916). [Aboard the Battleship Gaulois.} Paris: Payot, 1930. The Gaulois was at the Dardanelles in February and March, and Moreau's diary provides a day-by-day account of naval activity for that period.

512. Morgan, Ted. Churchill: Young Man in a Hurry, 1874-1915. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982. Although more political than military in focus, Morgan's chapter concerning the Dardanelles does discuss the strategic decisions that shaped the campaign. It is mildly pro-Churchill, pointing out the faults of others much more carefully than those of the First Lord. This is a popular biography but worth reading as background and introduction to Churchill's role in the campaign. 513.

Morgenthau, Henry. Secrets of the Bosporus: Constantinople 1913-1916. London: Hutchinson, 1918. This book was published in the U. S. as Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (1918). The American Ambassador in Constantinople, Morgenthau suggests that the Allied fleet gave up its attack on the Straits just as the Turks, virtually out of ammunition, were

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 facing disaster and about to abandon their capital city. He insists that had the attack been pressed with resolution Turkey would have left the war. All the leaders, German and Turk, except Enver Pasha, Morgenthau asserts, believed the British would win.

514. Morris, Jan. "Fisher's Face." M. H. Q.: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 6 (Autumn, 1993): 58-67. This article, essentially a biographical sketch, very briefly covers Fisher's involvement in the decision making about the Dardanelles. 515. Morris, Jan. Fisher's Face or, Getting to Know the Admiral. New York: Random House, 1995. Although Morris provides no new factual information about Fisher's role in the Dardanelles situation, her rather odd and episodic biographical study does give insights into the character of the admiral and help explain his sometimes rather erratic behavior. 516.

Morrow, Edgar. Iron in the Fire. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1934. Morrow was with the 28th Australian Infantry in Gallipoli, although he was only 17 at the time. He was wounded and is very critical of the leaders of the expedition.

517. Moseley, Sydney A. The Truth About the Dardanelles. London: Cassell, 1916. The author, an official war correspondent, insists that he wishes to provide a fair account of the Dardanelles. He then damns the other early commentators such as Ashmead-Bartlett and Fortescue for being critical. He blames the failure on understandable human error, insists that the problem between Churchill and Fisher was a personal matter, and that the problems were thoroughly understood before the decision to attack was taken. His "fair account" is more accurately called a whitewash. 518. Mousharrafa, M. M. Ataturk: A Biography. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, n. d. Provides a good though brief description of Kemal's work on Gallipoli, but offers little comment beyond the importance of his heroism on his subsequent career. 519. Moynihan, Michael, ed. People at War, 1914-1918. Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1973. Collection of stories from individuals about the war. Includes a chapter concerning Gallipoli but lacks context to give the personal details meaning. 520. Moynihan, Michael, ed. A Place called Armageddon: Letters From the Great War. London: David and Charles, 1975. Contains chapters with letters from Gallipoli, especially concerning the effort to use the H.M.S.

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River Clyde in landing troops. 521.

Muhlmann, Carl. "Die deutsche Militarmission in der Turkei." [The German Military Mission in Turkey.] Wissen und Wehr 19 (1938): 84755. The author provides background on German activity in the defense of Gallipoli.

522. Muhlmann, Carl. Das Deutsch-Turkishe Waffenbundnis Im Weltkriege. [The German-Turkish Military Alliance in the World War.] Leipzig: Verlag Koehler and Amelang, 1940. Muhlmann, who was an important part of the German official history effort, provides a brief account of the Dardanelles in this volume. 523. Muhlmann, Carl, ed. Der Kampfum die Dardanellen 1915. [The Stmggle for the Dardanelles 1915.] Band 16, Reichsarchiv Schlachten des Weltkriegs . Oldenberg: G. Stalling, 1927. This volume of German official history lauds the Turkish effort at Gallipoli, but suggests that the British might have been successful if they had acted more promptly after initiating the naval bombardment. After mid-March, however, the German view is that the British were consistently too late with too little. 524. Mullaly, B. R. Bugle and Kukri: The Story of the 10th Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1957. The Gurkha troops proved themselves extremely tough, but this account emphases the suffering of the men from exposure in the winter of 1915. Their experience differed dramatically from that of the 5th Gurkha Rifles. 525. Mure, A. H. With the Incomparable 29th. London: W. and R. Chambers, 1919. Memoir of service with the 5th Battalion, Royal Scots from the landing at Helles to the first Battle of Krithia. Concludes with an interesting account of suffering from battle fatigue and being evacuated. 526. Murphy, C.C.R. History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914-1927, The. London: Hutchinson, n. d. The 5th Battalion of the Regiment arrived at Mudros on August 6 and six days later attacked at Kavak Tepe and Teke Tepe. Despite significant resistance, it advanced some 1,500 yards only to be pulled back 200 to a line that it would hold till the evacuation of the peninsula. Its four months at Gallipoli cost it some 800 casualties. Murphy's account is descriptive but detailed. 527. Murphy, C.C.R. Soldiers of the Prophet. London: John Hogg, 1921. Based on Turkish sources, Murphy has prepared an order of battle for the Turkish forces at the times of the April Allied landing, the Suvla landing in August, and the evacuation in January, 1916. Although, as

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Murphy acknowledges, the first of these is incomplete, this is a valuable contribution to knowledge of the defense.

528. Murphy, H.W. "The Landings at Gallipoli If Carried Out Today." Army Quarterly 32 (1936): 25-30. This article is focused on improving technology to show that many the problems faced at Gallipoli would be easily avoided twenty years later. The key in Murphy's mind is the improved quality and use of aircraft. 529. Murray, Joseph. Call to Arms: From Gallipoli to the Western Front. London: William Kimber, 1980. Murray was in the Royal Naval Division and served at Gallipoli for the entire campaign. His account, reconstructed from notes taken in lieu of a diary, unfortunately skips much-June-December~of the period. He does describe the initial landing at Helles and the evacuation. 530. Murray, Joseph. Gallipoli As I Saw It. London: William Kimber, 1965. Murray was a miner and gives a vivid account of the dangers and excitement of work underground in both offense and defense. His descriptions of the landings and of combat are also well done. 531. Naismith, George. G. Canada's Sons and Great Britain in the World War. Toronto: John C. Winston, 1919. Naismith provides a descriptive account of the Gallipoli campaign. Canadians were few among the troops present and their activities are, oddly, not particularly singled out by Naismith. 532. Neilson, Keith. "Kitchener: A Reputation Refurbished?" Canadian Journal of History 15(1980): 217-229. Neilson strongly defends Kitchener in the question of commitment of troops to the Dardanelles. Having to consider the demands of the various fronts forced Kitchener to be cautious and as the situation in one place changed he had to adjust his plans for another. 533. Neilson, Keith. Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 191417. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984. The Dardanelles Campaign was, for most of Britain's leadership, intended to help Russia both by freeing her from fighting the Turks and opening communications from the Mediterranean. Neilson provides context for understanding the problems Britain faced in dealing with Russian needs and suggests that economic and transport problems might well have been too great to be solved by opening the Black Sea to commerce. 534. Nekrasov, George. North of Gallipoli: The Black Sea Fleet at War, 1914-

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1917. East European Monographs No. CCCXLIII. Boulder: East European Monographs (Distributed by Columbia University Press), 1992. Nekrasov regards the Dardanelles as "truly brilliant strategic thought" especially when compared to efforts on the Western Front. The campaign offered chances to eliminate Turkey, which was an important German ally, free British, French and Russian troops from fighting Turks, open a supply route to Russia, and influence morale on both sides. Unfortunately this excellent idea was poorly planned and executed. 535. Nelson, John E. "Irish Soldier in the Great War." Irish Sword 11 (1974): 163-79. Autobiographical account of Nelson's experiences including service at Gallipoli. 536. Nelson, Robert, Frank Morgan, Peter Breen, Stuart Read, and David Evans. A Pictorial History of Australians at War. London: Paul Hamlyn, 1970. Although the text in this volume is minimal, the illustrationsphotographs, paintings, and posters-provide visual images of the war including the troops at Anzac on Gallipoli. 537. Nevinson, Henry W. The Dardanelles Campaign. London: Nisbet, 1918. Nevinson writes well and was an eyewitness to many of the events of the campaign. His work remains worth reading but overall modem scholars offer much fuller accounts. Nevinson supports the strategic conception, which he regards as brilliant. He attributes failure to numerous errors including the premature naval bombardment; delays in concentrating forces in the area; command-control difficulties and the use of inexperienced, poorly trained troops. The greatest failure in Nevinson's view was that of the political-military high command in London for not recognizing the potential of the campaign and giving it adequate support. 538. Nevinson, Henry W. "The Dardanelles Landings." English Review. (June, 1929): 654-660. This article is actually a rather positive review of the first volume of the British official history concerning Gallipoli [No. 159]. 539. Nevinson, Henry W. Last Changes Last Chances. London: Nisbet, 1928. Includes a chapter sketching the Dardanelles Campaign. 540. Newbolt, Henry. A Naval History of the War, 1914-1918. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920. This general history of the naval war provides a description of the Dardanelles Campaign and valuable context for understanding it.

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

541. Newbolt, Henry. Submarine and Anti-Submarine. London: Longmans, Green, 1918. Popular account of the derring-do of submariners in the Dardanelles Campaign. 542. Newton, L. W. The Story of the Twelfth: A Record of the 12th Battalion, A. I. F. During the Great War of 1914-1918. Hobart: J. Walch, 1925. Newton provides a thoroughly detailed but primarily descriptive account of the 12th Battalion's activity at Anzac from April through November, 1915. 543. Nicolson, G.W.L. The Fighting Newfoundlander: A History of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment. Newfoundland: The government of Newfoundland, n. d.. A solid but mostly descriptive narrative of the Regiment's activities. It joined the 29th Division in September, 1915, at Gallipoli, and the book provides accounts of the campaign from that time until the evacuation. 544.

[Nicolson, Lothian, and H. T. MacMullen.] History of the East Lancashire Regiment in the Great War, 1914-1918. Liverpool: Littlebury Brothers, 1936. The l/4th and l/5th battalions of this regiment fought at Krithia in June with the 42nd Division and the 6th (Service) Battalion was at Sari Bair and Suvla with the 13th Division. The regimental history provides an account of these battalions in action and traces their stay on Gallipoli through the campaign.

545. Nohn, E. A. "Die Konzeption Des Grossen Belagemngskriges: Gedanken tiber Gallipoli 1915." [The Concept of the Large-scale War of Siege: Thoughts on Gallipoli 1915.] Wehrwissenschaftliche rundschau 9 (1959): 239-53. Nohn discusses the strategic concept of interior lines in context of the Dardanelles Campaign and seeks to apply the idea to modem atomic strategic thinking. 546. North, John. Gallipoli: The Fading Vision. London: Faber and Faber, 1936; rpt. 1966. North is an Easterner and believes that the Dardanelles had the potential to shorten if not end the war. He praises Churchill for the concept and since he had not operational control, excuses him from blame. Among the politicians, he blames Kitchener for failing to ensure that the expedition was adequately supported. He condemns the tactical handling of the operation as well, but he lays the blame for this on the soldiers involved and does not think it detracts from the virtues of the strategic conception. He acknowledges the many problems Hamilton faced, but is quite critical of his failure to press his subordinates for decisive action.

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547. Oatts, L. B. Proud Heritage: The Story of the Highland Light Infantry. London, Thomas Nelson, 1961. This volume, although written independently, is the third in a set concerning the Highland Light Infantry. The unit was involved in the attack on Achi Baba in July and remained in Gallipoli until late December. The author has done a better job of providing context than most unit historians. 548. Ogilvie, D. D. The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry and Nth (F. and F. Yeo.) Battn.,R.H, 1914-1919. London: John Murray, 1921. This unit was sent at short notice and without its horses into the attack at Suvla. Its experience suggests some of the planning problems that dogged the Dardanelles Campaign. 549. Okse, Necati. "AtatUrk in the Dardanelles Campaign." Revue Internationale Militaire (1981): 167-183. Provides the background of the attack and follows Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) through the campaign. 550. Olden, A.C.N. Western Cavalry in the War: The Story of the 10th Light Horse. Melbourne: Alexander McCubbin, n. d. This is an account of a unit that served on Gallipoli, arriving shortly before the Suvla attack. 551. Ollard, Richard. Fisher and Cunningham: A Study in the Personalities of the Churchill Era. London: Constable, 1991. Ollard's discussion of activity in the Dardanelles is limited, but he makes more of a case than most scholars that Fisher's friendship and loyalty to Churchill was central to his ambiguity about the Dardanelles Campaign. 552. O'Neill, H. C. The Royal Fusiliers in the Great War. London: William Heinemann, 1922. Although episodic, this volume does provide a good account of the Fusiliers landing at Helles. 553. O'Neill, Robert. "For Want of Critics...The Tragedy of Gallipoli." Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 121(1991): 69-83. Surveys the Anzac activity in the Dardanelles campaign and discusses the causes of failure. Also available as a pamphlet (1990) in the Gallipoli Memorial series. 554. Orga, I. andM. Ataturk. London: Michael Joseph, 1962. Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) made his reputation by his spirited leadership on the battlefields of Gallipoli. This biography provides details of the battles. 555. Owen, Frank. Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George—His Life and Times. New York: McGraw Hill, 1955. Although Owen does not spare Lloyd George his share of responsibility for the continuation of the campaign, he does suggest that initially his subject was drawn into support by

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Churchill's eloquence and did not think that the army should be used if the navy failed.

556. Oxford and Asquith, Earl of. Memories and Reflections, 1852-1927. 2 Vols. London: Cassell, 1928. Asquith, Prime Minister for the origin and first stages of the Dardanelles Campaign, provides a detailed account of the decision-making process that led up to and influenced the conduct of the battle. Although he tends to support Churchill, his account does not, however, deal with the charges that his own dilatory style contributed to the delays that caused the ultimate failure. 557. Paget, Gregory. "Alliance Politics and the 1915 Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign." Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 71 (1986): 268-85. Paget asserts that the plan for the Dardanelles was unworkable and that many British leaders including Churchill knew that it was so. 558. Paget, Gregory. "The November 1914 Straits Agreement and the Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign." Australian Journal of Politics and History 33 (1987): 253-60. The 1914 agreement allowed Russia passage of the Straits after the war, and the Dardanelles Campaign was more intended to help keep Russia in the war than to drive Turkey out or open a Balkan front. Despite the failure the effect was helpful in dealing with Russia. Paget suggests that the commitment to Russia was really the driving force behind decisions to keep the campaign going. 559. Paluel-Marmont, M. Le general Gouraud. [General Gouraud.] Paris: Plon, 1939. Gouraud was a corps commander at Gallipoli and was wounded on June 30. Despite two broken legs and the loss of an arm, he was back at work in December. 560. Patterson, J. H. With the Zionists in Gallipoli. London: Hutchinson, 1916. The author commanded the Zion Mule Corps which was responsible for transport in Gallipoli. His account provides a useful picture of the logistical difficulties that dogged the invasion. 561.

Payne, Robert. The Great Man: A Portrait of Winston Churchill. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1974. Payne regards the concept of the Dardanelles Campaign as good and suggests that success would have been a disaster for Germany. The delays that allowed the defenders time to prepare was a major mistake as were the hesitations of Kitchener about troops and de Robeck about renewing the naval assault.

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562. Pearl, Cyril. Anzac Newsreel: A Picture History of Gallipoli. Sydney: Ure Smith, 1963. This collection of photographs gives a better impression of conditions at Gallipoli than many verbal descriptions. 563. Pedersen, P. A. Images of Gallipoli: Photographs From the Collection of Ross J. Bastiaan. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988. Provides photographs of Gallipoli. 564. Pedersen, P. A. Monash as Military Commander. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1985. Pedersen in a very detailed account of the situation at Anzac and particularly "Monash Valley" portrays his subject as a talented but naive brigade commander. He learned quickly, was careful about administrative necessities, and became an effective leader. 565. Pelling, Henry. Winston Churchill. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974. Pelling's interest is more politics than military affairs, but he does make a mild defense of Churchill's Gallipoli plans, insisting that he was not an intriguer and blaming others in the government for not being consistent in attitude about the plan. 566. Pemberton, T. J. Gallipoli Today. London: Ernest Benn, 1926. This account is based on a visit to the peninsula eight years after the war. It is, however, useful for its picture of the geographic features of the battlefield. 567. Petre, F. Lorraine. The History of the Norfolk Regiment, 1685-1918. 2 Vols. Norwich: Jarrold, n. d. Three battalions of the Regiment served in Gallipoli, and although Petre's accounts are quite brief, he does give some details of their situation. 568. Philpott, William. "Kitchener and the 29th Division: A Study in AngloFrench Strategic Relations, 1914-1915." Journal of Strategic Studies 16(1993): 375-407. Although Philpott discusses the questions raised about the use of the 29th Division at Gallipoli, his focus is Allied cooperation more than the military campaign. 569. Pitt, Barrie and Peter Young, eds. PurnelTs History of the First World War. London: Pumell for B.P.C. Publishing, 1969-1971. Published in 128 parts by various authors, this work includes a number of pieces concerning the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. 570. Poincare, Raymond. Au service de la France. [In the Service of France.] 7 Vols. Paris: Plon, 1930-31. Translated by George Arthur as The Memoirs of Raymond Poincare. New York: Doubleday Doran, 1931).

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Important source for any study of French politics in the period, especially since the author included summaries of Cabinet meetings of which no minutes were taken.

571.

Pollard, A. F. A Short History of the Great War. London: Methuen, 1920. Unusually well-written volume by a very good historian. The author provides much critical comment along with the narrative.

572. Pomiankowski, Joseph. Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches: Erinnerungen an die Turkeiaus der Zeit des Weltkrieges. [The Failure of the Ottoman Empire: Recollections of Turkey in the Era of the World War.] Zurich: Amalthea Verlag, 1928. Although Pomiankowski provides only limited discussion of the Dardanelles Campaign itself, he does provide insight into the German involvement in Turkey and the problems of that state in the war. 573. Ponting, Clive. Churchill. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994. Although his focus is more political than martial, Ponting does discuss Churchill's involvement in the strategic decisions behind the Dardanelles Campaign. He believes that Churchill was overly sanguine and was appropriately dismissed from office, since he initiated and sold the plan to the War Council. The failure of the other members to reject or even question the idea does, however, mitigate the First Lord's responsibility. 574. Powell-Edwards, H. I. The Sussex Yeomanry and 16th (Sussex Yeomanry) Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment, 1914-1919. London: Andrew Melrose, 1921. Well-written account of the battalion's service, which included fighting in Gallipoli. 575.

Powles, C. G. The History of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, 1914-1919. Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1928. This unit served at Gallipoli, arriving before the Suvla landing in August.

576. Presland, John. Deedes Bay: A Study of Sir Wyndham Deedes, 1883-1923. London: Macmillan, 1942. Deedes had served as a diplomat in Turkey before the war and ended up as an intelligence officer for Ian Hamilton during the Gallipoli action. His account, although showing himself to be suspiciously prescient about problems, provides valuable detail about the staff work during the campaign. 577. Price, W. H. With the Fleet in the Dardanelles During the Campaign in the Spring of 1915. London: Andrew Melrose, 1915. Dramatic account of experiences on a ship (H.M.S. Triumph) in action at the Dardanelles.

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578. Priestman, E. Y. With a Baden Powell Scout in Gallipoli: A Record of the Belton Bulldogs. London: Routledge, 1916. Provides account of a unit in the Gallipoli Campaign. 579. Prigge, E. R. Der Kampfum die Dardanellen. [The Struggle at the Dardanelles.] Weimar: G. Kiepenheuer, 1916. Prigge, Liman von Sanders' adjutant, in a straightforward and first-hand account suggests that the Allies came very close to success. 580. Prior, Robin. Churchill's'World Crisis'as History. London: Croom Helm, 1983. Prior provides a detailed analysis of the account of the Dardanelles Campaign in The World Crisis, Churchill's history of the war. Prior argues effectively that Churchill by careful selection of material and interpretation minimized his own responsibility for the problems of the campaign. Prior is convinced that most of Churchill's assumptions about the Dardanelles were incorrect and that there was little if any hope of military victory. He also questions the belief that the results of a military victory would have been strategically significant. Whether one accepts Prior's analysis, The World Crisis should not be used without reference to this volume. 581.

Pugsley, Christopher. Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story. Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984. The author has attempted to tell the story of the New Zealanders at Gallipoli by using quotations from veterans. He adds narrative as needed for cohesion and makes clear his sense that the whole campaign was a matter of muddling through and unlikely of success.

582. Puleston, W. D. The Dardanelles Expedition: A Condensed Study. Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1926; 2nd ed., 1927. This study was intended for the U. S. military so that it would not make the same mistakes Puleston believes the British did. 583. Puleston, William Dilworth. High Command in the World War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934. Puleston argues that the initial losses at the Dardanelles were given too much publicity and seemed worse than they really were. Hence the original plan to break off the attack if it were too expensive could not be implemented. He also indicates that the Allies learned little from the Dardanelles since they promptly opened another secondary front at Salonika. The gains, containing Turkish forces and hurrying Italy into the war, were not worth the cost. 584. Purdom, Charles B., ed. Everyman at War: Sixty Personal Narratives of the War. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1930. Contains two accounts of

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Gallipoli: one is the brief tale of a very young soldier of the initial fighting and the other an account of the stmggle against the elements at Suvla Bay in November, 1915.

585. Raleigh, Walter, and H. A. Jones. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. The War in the Air. 6 Vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1922-37. Although air power played a limited role at the Dardanelles, it was important for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. There were also some attacks against Turkish positions on the ground. Unfortunately, inexperience of flyers and relatively crude equipment resulted in a less effective effort than was common later in the war. Raleigh and Jones provide a detailed description in volume two. 586. Rasor, Eugene L. British Naval History Since 1815: A Guide to the Literature. New York: Garland, 1990. This large volume provides an enormous amount of information concerning writings about the Royal Navy. Its breadth, however, prevents it from being more than an introduction to a specific campaign such as the Dardanelles. 587. Ray, Cyril. The Lancashire Fusiliers. London: Leo Cooper, 1971. Ray's short chapter about Gallipoli is focused on the heroism-six V. C.s before breakfast at W Beach—of the unit. 588. Raymond, Ernest. The Story of My Days. London: Cassell, 1968. Raymond was a chaplain at Gallipoli, and his account tends to focus on the suffering of the men. 589. Raymond, Ernest. Tell England. London: Cassell, 1922. Raymond's novel provides an emotional account of his activities as a chaplain in action at Gallipoli. 590. Regan, Geoffrey. Great Military Disasters: A History of Incompetence on the Battle Field. New York: M. Evans, 1987. In a long chapter concerning the Suvla Bay landing, Regan paints a picture of a good plan undermined by incompetent, dilatory leaders. From Hamilton, who failed to push his subordinates to press on vigorously, to Stopford, who virtually lacked all energy, to smaller unit commanders hampered by both ignorance and personal pique, the Gallipoli campaign's failure was, Regan argues, the result of massive human error. 591.

[Regimental Committee]. History of the East Lancashire Regiment in the Great War 1914-1918. Liverpool: Littleburg Brothers, 1936. Descriptive accounts of several battalions which fought at Gallipoli.

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592. Regimental History Committee. History of the Dorsetshire Regiment 19141919. Dorchester: Henry Lyng, n. d.. This account is compiled battalion by battalion, and includes a description of the 5th landing at Suvla where it fought and remained until the final evacuation of the peninsula. 593. Rehkopf, Ned B. "The Landing at Gallipoli." The Coast Artillery Journal 68 (June, 1928): 475-91; 69 (July, 1928): 19-35. Rehkopf was an American military officer seeking to learn from the British experience. 594. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Die militarischen operationen zu Lande. [The World War 1914-1918: Military Operations on Land.] 14 Vols. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1925-1944. Volume 9, Die Operation des Jahres 1915 was published in 1933. In a brief account it takes the position that an Allied victory would have been disastrous for Germany and indicates that the defense only barely held due to the courage of the Turks and skill of Liman von Sanders. 595. Reid, John. Australian Artists at War: Compiled From the Australian War Memorial Collection. 2 Vols. Melbourne: Sun Books, 1977. Volume one includes paintings and drawings of Gallipoli. 596. Renzie, William A. "Great Britain, Russia and the Straits, 1914-1915." Journal of Modern History 42(1970): 1-20. Provides analysis of the British decision that Russia should have the Straits as a result of the war-more political and diplomatic than military in focus. 597. Repington, Charles a Court. The First World War, 1914-1918. 2 Vols. London: Constable, 1920. Repington was the Times war correspondent and often had access to the upper ranks of the military and government. His account of the Dardanelles includes summaries of a talk with Ian Hamilton in December, 1915, about the question of evacuation and of Cabinet talks about the campaign. He portrays himself as having argued that although Constantinople was a good target, Britain lacked the men and materiel to take it. He also criticizes the planning of the operation. 598. Ribblesdale, Lord. Charles Lister: Letters and Recollections. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917. Provides a description of the landing of the Hood Battalion of the Royal Naval Division at Gallipoli and some details of experiences in the campaign. The letters, however, tend to be personal and the author does little to tie the details to the larger picture. 599. Robertson, John. ANZAC and Empire: The Tragedy and Glory of Gallipoli. London: Leo Cooper, 1990. Provides effective account of the Gallipoli

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 fighting with the focus on the Australian units involved. Robertson rejects the idea that C.E.W. Bean created an Anzac myth. He believes that the combination of camaraderie, irreverence about authority, unless earned by merit, and a growing sense of Australian nationalism did, in fact, establish a special quality in the men and contribute to the emergence of an independent Australia. As far as Gallipoli is concerned, Robertson does not believe that victory was possible.

600. Robertson, William. Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-1919. 2 Vols. London: Cassell, 1926. Robertson, who served for most of the war as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was a firm Westerner. He provides a good account of the dispute about the use of troops outside of France, and criticizes Kitchener for failing to stick to his original resolve not to send any. He tends to credit Churchill as the driving force behind the expedition and blame him for pushing every decision to its limit to get more support. He also criticizes the planning, noting that Hamilton, who was to command in Gallipoli, was not shown earlier reports about the difficulties of military operations there. Overall Robertson is firm in his conviction that the effort was not worth the cost. 601.

Robson, L. L. The First Australian Imperial Force: A Study of Its Recruitment, 1914-1918. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970. Although its focus is on Australia, this volume provides some picture of the Gallipoli action, and makes clear how the impact of the Anzac experience influenced public opinion.

602. Rose, Norman. Churchill: The Unruly Giant. New York: Free Press, 1994. Rose believes that Churchill realized the Western Front was the decisive theater, and even that the idea of the Dardanelles was foolish. The First Lord was driven, however, to find glory and to reverse the impression made by early naval setbacks and his own performance at Antwerp, when he went personally to attempt to hold that city against the Germans. Seizing on Kitchener's suggestion of a demonstration to help draw Turkish forces from pressing Russia, he used his powers of persuasion to convince and sometimes mislead sailors and politicians alike. Fisher was an early doubter but did not make his reservations widely known. When the naval attack faltered, Kitchener spoke against backing down for fear of losing prestige in the East, and Churchill, knowing his political future was on the line, carried on to complete disaster. 603. Roskill, S. W., ed. The Naval Air Service, 1914-18. London: Navy Records Society, 1969. Provides details of the sea planes on the carrier Ark Royal at the Dardanelles.

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604. Roskill, Stephen. Churchill and the Admirals. London: William Collins, 1977. Although the bulk of the book is devoted to the Second World War, the initial chapters concern Churchill and World War I. Roskill is convinced that Churchill's energy, brilliance, articulateness, and ruthlessness forced through the Dardanelles plan. He criticizes Churchill for not keeping the War Council fully informed of the views of professionals at the Admiralty. He notes the failure of others, particularly Fisher, to speak in opposition, but does not think any one could have deflected Churchill. In the end, however, he argues that the Germans could have resupplied and reinforced the Turks faster than the navy could have landed men and materiel at Constantinople, so the expedition was really hopeless. 605.

Roskill, Stephen. Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vol. 1: 1877-1918. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970. Roskill effectively traces Hankey's (the secretary of the War Council) support for the Easterner (or in his words maritime) strategy, making clear that he always favored use of combined arms in the Dardanelles. Hankey, according to Roskill, circulated among the members of the War Council the 1906 report that argued strongly that a naval attack was very unlikely to succeed. Hankey always believed in the strategic virtues of the campaign, and was one of if not the only British authority who thought seriously about the tactical problems and post-Gallipoli victory arrangements. Hankey's report after his visit to Gallipoli in late July, 1915, makes clear the problems of leadership and staff work that doomed what Roskill considers a second real chance at victory through the Suvla landing. This biography gives Hankey very high marks concerning the Dardanelles and suggests that had he been listened to the campaign would have been the success its advocates dreamed about.

606. Ross, Jane. The Myth of the Digger: The Australian Soldier in Two World Wars. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1985. Although her discussion of Gallipoli per se is quite limited, Ross does provide background concerning the Anzac spirit that is so often a part of discussions about Australian forces in World War I. She points out a number of the varying interpretations about the growth of Australian national consciousness, but concludes with an account of the continuing importance of Anzac Day. 607. Ross, Malcolm, and Noel Ross. Light and Shade in War. London: Edward Arnold, 1916. The authors of this volume were New Zealanders, father and son, correspondent and soldier. They provide some personal observations of life at Gallipoli during the latter part of the campaign.

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608. Roux, Charles. L'Expedition des Dardanelles. [The Dardanelles Expedition.] Paris: Armand Colin, 1920. Roux was a priest with the French forces and provides details and comments about their activities. 609. Rowland, Peter. David Lloyd George: A Biography. New York: Macmillan, 1975. Although Rowland's account of the Dardanelles Campaign is quite brief, he does discuss Lloyd George's involvement in the discussions and decision making about it in London. 610. Royle, Trevor. The Kitchener Enigma. London: Michael Joseph, 1985. Royle's opinion of Kitchener isfriendlythough not eulogistic. He does an excellent job of laying out Kitchener's ideas of strategy and fitting the Dardanelles into them. Kitchener was very concerned to keep the Russians in the field until the New Armies were ready to deliver a knock-out blow in the West. He was also concerned about maintaining adequate protection against an invasion of England. He initially supported the Dardanelles naval campaign as a way to help Russia without committing troops, but his experience in the East led him to believe that abandoning a highly publicized attack would be a disastrous for imperial prestige, hence his willingness to send troops when the navy failed. Austro-German successes against Russia in the summer of 1915, however, led him to the decision that a fall offensive in France was necessary to draw German forces back to the West, leading to his decision to deny Hamilton reinforcements. His subsequent indecisiveness about withdrawal from Gallipoli then became one of the factors that seriously undermined his influence. His major mistake, according to Royle, was secretiveness about his strategic ideas, which frustrated his civilian colleagues and caused confusion. Royle believes that Kitchener was basically right and would have gotten support had people understood what he was trying to do and why he changed policies. 611.

Ruhl, Arthur. Antwerp to Gallipoli. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916. The author was a correspondent who spent some time with the Turks, and although he gives little information about the fighting, he does provide profiles of several German and Turkish officers involved in defending the peninsula.

612. Rule, E. J. Jacka's Mob. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1933. These memoirs concern activity with the 14th Australian Infantry Battalion which served in Gallipoli. They provide a detailed description of the situation, although the focus is the particular unit involved and the heroism of its commander. 613.

Runcie, R.A.K. "The God of Battles and the Fight for Faith." Army Quar-

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terly and Defense Journal 119 (1989): 153-63. Runcie, a veteran of World War II and Archbishop of Canterbury, provides a discussion of religion in the Dardanelles Campaign and more generally in World War I. 614. Samson, C. R. Fights and Flights. London: Ernest Benn, 1930. Samson was Air Commodore and provides an account of the R.N.A.S. efforts which included bombing but were mostly reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Samson's account is vivid and has moments of drama, such as his attack on a staff car carrying Mustafa Kemal. 615.

Sanders, Liman von. Five Years in Turkey. Annapolis, MD: William Wilkins for U. S. Naval Institute, 1927; orig. FunfJahre Turkei. Berlin: August Scherl, 1919. Sanders was head of the German Military Mission to Turkey and organized the defense of Gallipoli. He provides a detailed overview of the strategic and tactical thinking of the defense. He suggests that the British came very close to success in their effort. The section of Sanders's work concerning the Dardanelles has been translated by F. H. Schulz as The Dardanelles Campaign. Fort Humphres, VA: The Engineer School, 1931. Schulz added comments about the text to his version.

616. Saracoglu, A. Cemaleddin Canakkale zaferi, 18 Mart 1915. Istanbul: Himi Kitabevi, 1953. 617.

Saray, Mehemet. Canakkale muharebeleri 75nci Yil armagani. Ankara: Genelkurmay Busim Evi, 1990.

618.

Sarrail, Maurice P. Mon commandement en Orient. [My Command in the East.] Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1920. Sarrail was a very political general and a rival to Joffre. He commanded the Allied forces in Salonika (1915-17), an operation that competed with the Dardanelles for resources.

619. Sauer, Wilhelm. Admiral Souchon auf grosser Fahrt. [Admiral Souchon's Great Expedition.] Reutlingen: Entzli and Laiblin, 1938. Souchon was German commander in the Mediterranean and then of the Turkish navy. 620. Sazonov, Serge. Fateful Years, 1909-1916. London: Jonathan Cape, 1928. Sazonov, Foreign Minister of Russia (1910-16), makes a number of comments about the Dardanelles Campaign, which he calls a disaster for Russia. He claims not to have thought the military concept was very good, and makes clear Russia's concerns about the future of the Straits and the agreement that they would be turned over to Russia.

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621.

Schmitt, Bemadotte E., and Harold C. Vedeler. The World in the Crucible 1914-1919. New York: Harper and Row, 1984. A volume in the respected Rise of Modem Europe Series, this survey provides an excellent overview of the Dardanelles Campaign in the context of the overall war.

622. Schon, Walter von. Die Holle von Gallipoli; der Heldenkampf an den Dardanellen. [The Hell of Gallipoli; The Heroic Stmggle at the Dardanelles.] Berlin: Ullstein, 1937. Provides a graphic picture of the stmggle in the Dardanelles Campaign. 623.

Schuler, Philip. Australia in Arms. London: Fisher Unwin, 1916. Schuler's account tends to show his nationalist bias, especially in his tendency to find some virtue in failures, but he is at times accurate in his depiction of the fighting.

624. Sellers, Leonard. The Hood Battalion; Royal Naval Division: Antwerp, Gallipoli, France 1914-1918. London: Leo Cooper, 1995. These troops, sailors serving as infantry, were on Gallipoli from the time of the initial landing and examining their activities is a valuable contribution to the study of the campaign. 625.

Serle, Geoffrey. John Monash: A Biography. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1982. Monash commanded the 4th Brigade at Anzac, and Serle provides a detailed description of the situation. He gives Monash good marks, noting his bravery in the front lines. He thinks that the concept behind the campaign made good sense, and although the operational failure doomed it, he argues that Monash had no part in the planning and carried out his duties quite competently.

626. Seymour, Alan, and Richard Nile, eds. Anzac: Meaning, Memory, and Myth. London: University of London, 1991. Provides an interesting discussion of the impact of the Anzac experience. 627. Shadbolt, Maurice. Voices of Gallipoli. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968. Interviews with twelve veterans of the Gallipoli fighting. Leaves the impression that prejudice about the inferiority of Turks was common, at least at first. 628.

Shankland, Peter, and Anthony Hunter. Dardanelles Patrol. London: William Collins, 1964; rpt. 1971, 1978, 1983. Popular account of submarine E-l l's expedition into the Sea of Marmora during the Dardanelles Campaign.

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629. Shaw, S. J., and E. K. Shaw. The History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197677. These volumes are a solid scholarly survey that thoroughly set the details of the Gallipoli fighting into context of Turkish history. 630.

Shotwell, James T., and Francis Deak. Turkey at the Straits: A Short History. New York: Macmillan, 1940. Although the authors'account of the military campaign in the Dardanelles is limited, it provides valuable background concerning the involvement of Russia in the overall situation.

631.

Silas, Ellis. Crusading at Anzac, Anno Domini, 1915. London: British Australasian, 1916. The author is attempting to portray the war as the rank and file experienced it. The book is more important for sketches than verbal comments.

632. Simpson, C. R. History of the Lincolnshire Regiment, 1914-1915. London: Medici Society, 1931. The 6th (Service) Battalion of the regiment served with the 11th (Northern) Division and took part in the Suvla operation. Simpson provides some details of the unit's activities. 633.

Sixsmith, E.K.G. British Generalship in the Twentieth Century. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1970. Sixsmith rejects most of the strategic arguments offered in favor of the Dardanelles Campaign, and suggests that the Easterners were really looking to the use of naval power to limit British involvement in the war. He believes that Churchill and Kitchener were so strong that the struggles between them tended to block thoughtful planning and that in handling of the military Kitchener was too independent, with the result that needed staff work was not done. Concerning the Dardanelles Campaign, Sixsmith maintains that the two key errors were launching the initial naval attack without ground support and then calling off that attack to wait for army support. He praises Hamilton's plan for the Suvla landing, but criticizes the general for not ensuring that everyone understood the need for taking the high ground as quickly as possible and seeing that this was done. Overall, failure resulted from the limited effort due to lack of support, and Hamilton's reluctance to press his subordinates to get on with their jobs.

634. 65 R. E. A Short Record of the Service of the 65 th Field Company Royal Engineers. London: W. Heffer, 1920. Interesting study of the unit's work at Gallipoli, Macedonia, and Palestine. 635.

Skander Bey. "The Tactical Withdrawal by Night: The Lesson of Gallipoli." Journal of the United Service Institution of India 55 (Jan.,

124

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 1925): 47-56. Provides an analysis from the Turkish side of why the evacuation of Gallipoli was so successful.

636. Smith, C. Jay, Jr. "Great Britain and the 1914-1915 Straits Agreement With Russia: The British Promise of November 1914." American Historical Review 70(1965): 1015-1034. Provides analysis of British Cabinet decision that the Ottoman Empire should be destroyed and Russia allowed control of Constantinople. 637.

Smith, Michael Douglas. "Britain, Russia, the Gallipoli Campaign and the Straits." Ph. D. Dissertation, Florida State University, 1979. Provides useful background concerning diplomatic relationships and the Dardanelles Campaign.

638.

Smith, Staniforth. Australian Campaigns in the Great War: Being a Concise History of the Australian Naval and Military Forces, 1914-1918. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1919. Provides a detailed but primarily descriptive account of the Australians at Anzac Cove from April to November, 1915, but gives minimal attention to the evacuation. The author does, however, note that the removal of Winston Churchill from office in May of 1915 was a major blow to the Campaign's chances of success.

639.

Smithers, A. J. Sir John Monash. London: Leo Cooper, 1973. This is a good biography providing details of the fighting and of Monash's efforts to team his profession. It also has a useful description of the problems of mid-level command during the Dardanelles Campaign.

640. Smyth, John. Leadership in Battle 1914-1918. Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1975. Smyth argues that the Dardanelles Campaign failed due to poor preparation, most of which was not the fault of Ian Hamilton or other military officers involved. He does indicate that Hamilton underestimated the quality of the resistance. Other problems including the failure of naval guns against forts, lack of adequate communications, lack of maps and intelligence, and the delays that gave the Turks a chance to prepare resulted from lapses by higher authority. Concerning leadership Smyth devotes much attention to the Australians and Sikhs. 641.

Snelling, Stephen. VCs of the First World War: Gallipoli. London: Alan Sutton, 1995. Provides descriptions of the heroic actions and brief biographies of the thirty-nine winners of the Victoria Cross during the Gallipoli action.

642.

Sparrow, Geoffrey, and J. N. MacBean Ross. On Four Fronts With the

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Royal Naval Division. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918. Although the authors were surgeons, their account of activities at Gallipoli is a descriptive narrative with little comment about medical problems. 643.

Spiers, Edward. "Gallipoli." In The First World War and British Military History. Edited by Brian Bond. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Spiers' essay, part of an excellent volume of historiography, provides an overview of the interpretations historians have made of the Dardanelles Campaign.

644. Stake, H. Fritz M. The Worcestershire Regiment. Kidderminster: Cheshire, 1928. The 9th Battalion of this regiment was with the 13th Division at Gallipoli. Because the author seeks to follow the Regiment's Battalions, which were quite scattered during the war, accounts are brief and episodic. The account of Gallipoli does cover the entire land campaign, however. 645.

Stamps, T. Dodson, and Vincent J. Esposito, eds. A Short Military History of World War I. West Point: U. S. Military Academy, 1950. This account suggests that the British effort at Gallipoli failed generally due to poor planning and preparation. These problems were worsened at Helles and Suvla by a lack of aggressive leadership, inexperienced troops, and poor communications, though better leaders could have coped. The failure at Anzac was more the result of difficult terrain and exhausted, often ill, soldiers.

646. Steel, Nigel. The Battlefields of Gallipoli: Then and Now. London: Leo Cooper, 1990. The author's goal is to describe the geography of the battle area as it was during the campaign, describe how it has changed, and relate the military events to geography. He has done so effectively. 647. Steel, Nigel, and Peter Hart. Defeat at Gallipoli. London: Macmillan, 1994. These authors focus on the English soldiers, who were the majority at Gallipoli, to correct what they assert has been a tendency to overemphasize the Anzac contribution. They strongly criticize the poor planning that was more concerned with politics in England than the military aspects of the operation, but they do not single out any individual as central to the failure. They seem to think that the expedition had some chance of success but was unlikely to accomplish as much as its supporters hoped. Tactical and logistical problems combined with poor leadership to prevent any success. 648.

Stegemann, Hermann. Geschichte des Kriegs. [History of the War.] 4 Vols. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1917-1921. Stegemann's

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 work is straightforward and realistic.

649. Stephens, Cortez D. "Gallipoli-What Went Right?" Marine Corps Gazette 77 (1993): 72-77. The U. S. Marine Corps studied the Gallipoli operation as part of its effort to learn about amphibious tactics, and found that many things did go right. 650. Stewart, A. T., and C.J.E. Peshall. The Immortal Gamble and the Part Played in It by H.M.S. Cornwallis. London: A. and C. Black, 1918. The Cornwallis was involved in the Dardanelles Campaign from the first shot of the naval effort to force the Straits and was the last ship to leave Suvla Bay. The volume is essentially a unit history and provides an interesting account of the naval elements of the campaign from the perspective of a particular vessel. 651.

Stewart, H. The New Zealand Division. Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1921. An accurate but descriptive account of the New Zealanders at Gallipoli.

652. Stienon, Charles. L'Expedition des Dardanelles'. Sur le Chemin de Constantinople. [The Dardanelles Expedition: On the Road to Constantinople.] Paris: Chapelot, 1916. The author traces the French aspects of the Dardanelles Campaign through the entire operation. 653.

Still, John. A Prisoner in Turkey. London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1920. Still served with the 6th Battalion of the East Yorkshire Regiment. On August 9 due to a delayed message his unit attacked in unnecessarily difficult circumstances at Teke Tepe. After taking heavy casualties, they retreated only to encounter superior Turkish forces and were taken prisoner. His account includes some histrionic though not necessarily untrue reports of mistreatment and other observations of the Turks.

654. Stoker, H. G. Straws in the Wind. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1925. The author commanded the first British (actually the Australian AE 2) submarine to reach the Sea of Marmora. Forced to surface, he was taken prisoner and held by the Turks for the rest of the war. His adventures provide some information about the beginning of the naval effort in the Dardanelles campaign. 655.

Stokesbury, James. "British Concepts and Practices of Amphibious Warfare, 1867-1916." Ph. D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1968. Stokesbury is very critical of the Dardanelles Campaign, suggesting that there was little or no planning, staff work, or effective combined arms cooper-

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ation. He thinks the campaign had no chance of success. 656. Stokesbury, James L. AShort History of World War I. New York: William Morrow, 1981. This volume is an excellent, even-handed one-volume survey of the war. The Dardanelles Campaign is well covered. 657. Stone, Norman. The Eastern Front, 1914-1917. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975. One element in the objectives for the Dardanelles Campaign was to open a route to Russia, and early in 1915, the Russians were expecting this to happen. Although the Anglo-French failure at the Straits ended such hopes, the background of the Eastern Front, welldescribed by Stone, is important for a clear understanding of planning for the Dardanelles effort. 658. Story of the Anzacs, The: An Historical Account of the Part Taken by Australia and New Zealand in the Great War. Melbourne: James Ingrain, 1917. This account, which ends with the evacuation of Gallipoli, has many useful details of the Anzac forces, but it is uncritical and overly imbued with the Anzac spirit. Problems are ignored or treated as bad luck or inevitable, except for a few comments about shortages of ammunition. No account of an Anzac's death is left without the individual's urging that his mates be cared for first. 659. Struz, Rudolph. Der Weltkrieg: Ein deutsches Voltsbuch vom dem Weltgeschehen 1914 bis 1918. [The World War: A German Popular Account of the World Stmggle From 1914 to 1918.] Berlin: Verlag Scherl, 1933. A survey of the war from the German point-of-view, and although the Dardanelles Campaign was of less significance to Germany than many other campaigns, Stuz devotes a chapter to it. 660. Student, A. The Gallipoli Campaign: An Outline of the Military Operations. London: Sifton, Praed, 1923. This book was intended for individuals preparing for army examinations and hence detail is limited. It does, however, provide a clear description of events. 661.

Stuermer, Harry. Two War Years in Constantinople. Translated by F. Allen and the Author. New York: George H. Doran, 1917. Stuermer was in Turkey during the British assault and insists that German gunners believed that with just a little more effort the March attack would have broken through. The Turks were so convinced that they were moving government records and vital materials out of Constantinople. He also asserts that the August attack could have produced victory if pressed more effectively. Stuermer ultimately came to admire the British and Australians and asserted the Germans were wrong to start the war.

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662. Sutton, F. A. One-Arm Sutton. New York: Viking Press, 1933. Sutton's service at Gallipoli was brief. He tells the story of losing his hand when trying to throw a Turkish grenade back to the enemy lines. His account provides an example of heroism but little else for the study of the Dardanelles Campaign. 663.

Swing, Raymond. Good Evening. London: The Bodley Head, 1964. Swing was an American newspaper correspondent stationed in Turkey. He was present during the naval attack on the Dardanelles and comments on the shortage of ammunition for Turkish guns and the assumption that on the second day (March 19) the British would force the Straits.

664. Taffrail, Henry [Taprell Dorling]. Endless Story: Being an Account of the Work of the Destroyers, Flotilla-Leaders, Torpedo-Boats and PatrolBoats in the Great War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1931. Provides an account of British destroyers during the war including activity in the Dardanelles. 665. Taffrail, Henry [Taprell Dorling]. Swept Channels: Being an Account of the Work of the Minesweepers in the Great War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1935. Mines were a key to the Turkish defense of the Dardanelles, and the failure to eliminate them virtually assured the British naval defeat. Taffrail believes that the strategy behind the Dardanelles Campaign was sound, but poor execution made success impossible. 666.

Tale of a Territorial The: Being a Record of Experience at Home and Abroad During the Years 1914, 1915, and 1916. Wellingborough: Perkins, [1918]. This book is a very detailed memoir of a soldier at Anzac. It does not, however, provide much context into which the details might be set.

667. Taylor, A.J.P. English History, 1914-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Taylor does a good job of setting the Dardanelles Campaign into political and military context. He points out the problems of leadership during the operation and notes that the defeat marked the last actual attempt to shift the focus of the war away from the Western Front. 668. Taylor, A.J.P. Illustrated History of the First World War. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963; numerous rpts. Taylor is a bit inconsistent in that he dismisses the Dardanelles as one of the sideshows that could not have a significant effect on Germany, which had to be defeated to win the war and then calls the Dardanelles strategy "brilliant." He attributes failure to inadequate leadership, insisting that the fleet could have easily

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pushed through to Constantinople had the initial (March) attack been renewed. 669. Taylor, A.J.P., ed. Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. Stevenson was Lloyd George's mistress, and he often revealed himself to her, although at times he seemed more interested in making himself look good than in telling the truth. The comments about the Dardanelles are scattered through the diary but do provide insight into the thinking of one of the key politicians involved in the decision making about the campaign. 670. Taylor, Phil, and Pam Cupper. Gallipoli: A Battle Field Guide. Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1989. The authors provide a very detailed geographical description of the battlefields on the Gallipoli Peninsula with an overview of the campaign to provide context. 671.

Teichman, O. The Diary of a Yeomanry, M. O. London: Fisher Unwin, 1921. Teichman's writing is much better than average and his diary provides a useful and detailed picture of the Gallipoli campaign as well as his other war experiences in the Middle East and Italy.

672. Terraine, John. The First World War. London: Hutchinson, 1965; rpt. 1983 and 1984. Terraine's account of the Dardanelles Campaign is relatively brief and reflects his belief that the war could only be won on the Western Front and that resources shifted to other theaters were essentially wasted. 673. Terraine, John. "1915—The End of an Epoch." Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 101(1956): 76-79. In his discussion of the various problems of 1915, Terraine, a strong supporter of the Westerners, suggests that the Dardanelles marked the shift of British military policy from dominant naval to land strength. 674. Terraine, John. White Heat: The New Warfare, 1914-18. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982. Terraine, one of the most prolific of World War I historians, has written little about the Dardanelles. In this volume he reviews the campaign as part of a discussion of trial-and-error teaming early in the war. It was, he asserts, a mistaken effort to evade the cost of the Western Front and the last ever effort by Britain to achieve traditional naval supremacy. 675. Thomas, Lowell. Les Corsaires sous-marins. [The Submarine Corsaires.] Paris: Payot, 1930. Interviews with submariners.

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676. Thomazi, A. La Guerre Navale aux Dardanelles. [The Naval War in the Dardanelles.] Paris: Payot, 1926. Provides an excellent summary and makes significant use of French official documents. 677. Thomazi, A. Les Marins a terre. [The Marines on Land.] Paris: Payot, 1933. The Dardanelles is one of a number of operations included in this volume concerning French marines. 678. Thompson, C. W. Records of the Dorset Yeomanry (Queen's Own), 19141919. Sherbome: F. Bennett & Co., The Parade, 1921. The Dorsets were part of the 2nd Mounted Division, and this unit history provides much detail of individuals in combat most significantly at Scimitar Hill following the Suvla landing. Subsequent events are covered in much more cursory fashion. 679. Thompson, P. A. Lions Led by Donkeys: Showing How Victory in the Great War Was Achieved by Those Who Made the Fewest Mistakes. London: T. Werner Laurie, 1927. Thompson praises the concept of moving the focus of the attack on the Central Powers to the Dardanelles, which he credits to Churchill and Fisher. The idea, however, should have been dropped as soon as the decision was taken not to send troops, especially since the Russians had defeated the Turkish attack that had prompted their initial request for help. The invasion, if it was to be continued, should have been given adequate supplies and troops but was not. Thompson's account is opinionated but superficial. 680. Thompson, R. R. The Fifty-Second. (Lowland) Division, 1914-1918. Glasgow: Maclehose, 1923. Much better than average divisional history with military details set in context. Most of the 52nd's service was in the East including Gallipoli, where most of its units fought at Cape Helles. Some of its artillery was at Anzac and Suvla, however. 681. Thomson, Alistair. Anzac Memories. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994. This study of the Anzac spirit and the rise of Australian nationalism covers all of World War I, and so the coverage of the Gallipoli is limited. It does provide a great many oral history sources based on interviews with veterans, however. 682. Thomson, Alistair. "Gallipoli-A Past That We Can Live By?" Melbourne Historical Journal 14(1982): 56-72. Provides discussion of Australian memories of Gallipoli as presented in the film Gallipoli and discusses the importance of historical interpretation for national consciousness.

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683. Thomson, Alistair. "History and 'Betrayal': The Anzac Controversy." History Today 43 (1993): 8-11. Thomson's focus is Australian unhappiness about the suggestions in the British official history of the Gallipoli fighting that Anzac soldiers actually straggled in large numbers during the initial landing in April, 1915, and that the history was revised accordingly. His article is important for the study of the Dardanelles Campaign because it gives some reason to think that the official history should not be trusted. 684. Thoumin, Richard. The First World War. Edited and translated by Martin Kieffer. London: Martin Seeker and Warburg, 1963. First published as La Grande Guerre. [The Great War.] 3 Vols. Paris: Rene Julliard, 1960. This book is extracts from primary but published sources. The American edition reduced the space given to the poilu and adds some material concerning English speaking soldiers. The failure at the Dardanelles is blamed on poor preparation, difficult terrain, the toughness of the Turks, and inadequate leadership. 685. Throssell, Ric. My Father's Son. Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1989. Includes account of H.V.H. Throssell who won the Victoria Cross at Hill 60, August 29, 1915, while serving with the 10th Australian Light Horse. 686. Till, Geoffrey. "Brothers in Arms: The British Army and Navy at the Dardanelles." In Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced. Edited by Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle. London: Leo Cooper, 1996. Till's analysis of the campaign in terms of a combined arms/amphibious effort proves an excellent way of clarifying the problems of the effort and explaining the continued good feelings between the army and navy even at times of great stress and failure. 687. Tilton, Mary. The Grey Battalion. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1933. Author was a nurse who cared for Gallipoli wounded in Egypt. Her memoirs are well written and although her experience of Gallipoli was indirect, her experiences are useful for knowledge of the casualty situation. 688. Tisdall, Arthur Waldeme St. Clair. Verses, Letters, and Remembrances of Arthur Waldeme St. Clair Tisdall. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1916. Tisdall was the first member of the Royal Naval Division to win a V. C. at Gallipoli. His heroic efforts were at the River Clyde and on V Beach where he was killed. 689. Travers, T.H.E. "Command and Leadership Styles in the British Army: The

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 1915 Gallipoli Model." Journal of Contemporary History. 29 (1994): 403-42. Travers argues that there has been excessive focus on the failures of individuals at Gallipoli. The fundamental problems, he believes, were structural, that is the British military doctrine had not adapted to the new nature of war emerging in 1914-15. The struggle on Gallipoli ultimately developed many tactics similar to those emerging on the Western Front such as bite and hold and seeking to reverse setbacks by constantly seeking more men and supplies. The high command at Gallipoli, like that of the Western Front, became detached from the situations and people at the front. What are seen as errors in judgment by officers at Gallipoli are often decisions grounded in the training and experience these men had had. There were certainly individual failings, but the operation was, in reality, beyond the capacities of the British military in 1915.

690. Triton, Romolo. "Dardanelli e Monte Cassino: Errori Delle due Guerre Mondiali." [The Dardanelles and Monte Cassino: Errors of the Two World Wars.] Rassegna Italiana di Politica e di Cultura 36 (1959): 376-388. Triton suggests that Churchill, who was made to look bad due to the failure at the Dardanelles, was seeking to redeem himself with the strategy that produced the Battle of Monte Cassino in World War II. 691.

Trooper Bluegum [Hogue, Oliver]. Love Letters of an Anzac. London: Andrew Melrose, 1916. The author, a member of the 14th Australian Light Horse Regiment shows the Anzac spirit of eagerness, aggressiveness, and disdain for authority. He also leaves the impression that British anti-German propaganda was very effective.

692. Troubridge, Laura. Memories and Reflections. London: William Heinemann, 1925. Troubridge was Admiral Ernest Troubridge's sister-in-law, and she provides an account of the escape of the Goeben and the Breslau from British squadrons, one commanded by Troubridge, in the Mediterranean. This incident, which resulted in the German ships being added to the Turkish navy and Admiral Wilhelm Souchon coming to command that fleet, was part of series of events that brought Turkey into the war and is important background to the Dardanelles Campaign. 693. Trumpener, Ulrich. "German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation." Journal of Modern History 32(1960): 145-149. Trumpener shows that the Germans were having significant difficulty in getting military aid to Turkey and that in early 1915 the Turks were virtually on their own. His research suggests that the idea that Germany would have rushed help to their ally had the British attack gone well is questionable.

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694. Trumpener, Ulrich. Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Tmmpener discusses the problems of Liman von Sanders in getting and keeping control of the Turkish forces on Gallipoli and other aspects of the German-Turkish relationship during the Dardanelles Campaign. His work is excellent. 695. Trumpener, Ulrich. "Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance." Journal of Contemporary History 1 (Oct., 1966): 179-92. This article provides valuable background on the German general who commanded the defense of Gallipoli and his involvement with the Turks. It does not deal with the military aspects of his career, however. 696. Tuaegiul, Afif. Bizim harblerimiz. Istanbul: T. C. Deniz Basimeri, 1956. 697. Tubby, A. H. A Consulting Surgeon in the Near East. London: Christophers, 1920. Tubby provides details of the medical corps activities, but his view is wide enough to include observations about the campaign in general. 698.

"Turkish General Staff History of the Campaign in Gallipoli." Army Quarterly, 11 (1925-26): 343-53; 12 (1926): 88-95. The Turkish officers suggest that a stronger, sustained naval attack might have succeeded, and blame the later failures on logistics and problems with disease. This is valuable as an account from the Turkish point-of-view in English, but must be consulted with caution as the conclusions may have been what the authors thought the British wished to hear.

699. Turner, John. British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Turner's focus is on politics and offers little material of importance to the study of tactics and the battlefield, but it is essential for understanding the decision-making that determined the course of the Dardanelles Campaign. 700. Turner, John. "Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats: The Higher Direction of the War." In War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919. Edited by Kathleen Burk. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982. Turner provides a useful overview of the political aspects of strategic decision making, a significant aspect of the problems in the Dardanelles Campaign. 701.

Tyquin, Michael B. Gallipoli, The Medical War: The Australian Army Medical Services in the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915. Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1993. The author focuses on the April landing, the August offensive, and the December withdrawal to

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The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 show the strengths and weaknesses of the medical services provided for the troops. The Australian Army Medical Corps was under-prepared and hence overwhelmed by the situation. It found both cooperation with the British and supply significant problems, but improved over the course of the campaign.

702. Ullrich, Volker. "Entscheidung im Osten Oder sichemng der Dardanellen: Das Ringen um den Serbienfeldzug 1915." [Decision in the East or Protection for the Dardanelles: The Struggle Over the Serbian Campaign of 1915.] Militdrgeschichfliche Mitteilungen (1982): 45-63. Provides analysis of the relationship between the Dardanelles effort by the British and the German plan for action in the Balkans in 1915. 703. Uluaslan, Heuseyin. Gallipoli Campaign. Canakkale: Salih Zeki and Geurol Ulusalan, 1987. Provides a brief account of the fighting on Gallipoli from a Turkish point-of-view. 704. Ulug, Nasit Hakki. Canakkale destaninin 50. Ankara: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, Turizm ve Tanitma bakanligi, 1966. 705. Unaydin, R. E. Anafartalar kumandant Mustafa kemal He muldkat. [Interview With Mustafa Kemal, Commander at Anafartalar.] Istanbul: Hamit Matbass, 1930. This volume includes Kemal's own detailed description of his activities at Gallipoli. 706. Usbome, C. V. Smoke on the Horizon: Mediterranean Fighting, 19141918. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1933. This naval officer's account provides extensive detail of the naval battles, including submarine efforts, in the Dardanelles Campaign. In his limited comments about causes for failure, Usbome tends to blame strategic planners in London for lack of forethought about what was needed and available for the campaign. 707. Vader, John. Anzac. London: New English Library, 1970. This is a brief book celebrating the Anzac military tradition from the Boer War to Vietnam, and it has a chapter concerning World War I, including a discussion of the Dardanelles. 708. Vale, W. L. History of the South Staffordshire Regiment. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1969. Provides brief account of units from the Regiment in action at Gallipoli. 709. Vansittart, Peter. Voices from the Great War. London: Jonathan Cape, 1981; rpt. 1845. Vansittart's collection of short comments and excerpts

Annotated Bibliography

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about the war includes remarks about the Dardanelles. The choppy nature of the material makes the book much more useful of impressions and pithy observations than for factual information or narrative continuity. 710. Vassal, Joseph. Uncensored Letters From the Dardanelles, Written to His English Wife by a French Medical Officer ofL 'Corps Expeditionnaire d'Orient. London: William Heinemann, 1916. First-hand accounts of the situation of the French contingent in the Dardanelles Campaign are rather unusual, making those available particularly valuable. 711.

Vat, Dan van der. The Ship That Changed the World: The Escape of the Goeben to the Dardanelles in 1914. Bethesda: Adler and Adler, 1986. Provides useful background and a brief account of the Dardanelles Campaign as part of discussion of the consequences of the Goeben's escape.

712. Volkan, Vamik D., and Norman Itzkowits. The Immortal AtatiXrk: A Psychobiography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Provides a description of the Gallipoli fighting and argues that the experience was a major factor in Kemal's emotional development. 713.

Waite, Fred. The New Zealanders at Gallipoli. Vol. 1 of Official History of New Zealand's Effort in the Great War. Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1919. Waite has written popular history and leaves out the details of command and hierarchy, but he does give a good picture of the overall campaign and the situation of the New Zealanders in it. He supports the idea of the Anzac spirit contributing to the sense of national identity in New Zealand.

714. Walker, Rob. To What End Did They Die?: Officers Died at Gallipoli. Upton upon Severn: R. W. Walker Publishing, 1985. Critical account of casualties at Gallipoli. 715.

Wallace-Crabbe, Chris. The Shapes of Gallipoli. Warrandyte: K. WallaceCrabbe at the Cotswold Press, 1975. An Australian's poetry and sketches depicting the horrors of Gallipoli.

716. Wallach, Jehuda L. Uneasy Coalition: The Entente Experience in World War I. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993. Wallach discusses the problems of the Allies with Russia over plans for the Dardanelles Campaign and how evacuation affected the issue of giving priority to the Western Front.

136

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

717. Wallin, Jeffrey D. By Ships Alone: Churchill and the Dardanelles. Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1981. Wallin strongly supports Churchill's conception of the naval attack at the Dardanelles, and insists that the failings were those of commanders and their staffs. He believes that a renewal of the attack after the setback of March 18 might have succeeded. He also defends Churchill against attacks by scholars such as Robin Prior that he had information that should have warned him against the whole idea of the Dardanelles. 718. Wallin, Jeffrey. "Politics and Strategy in the Dardanelles Operation." In Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Sir Winston Spenser Churchill, Edited by Harry Jaffa. Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1981. Wallin provides critiques of both A. J. Marder and Martin Gilbert, who suggest that Churchill was at fault in the Dardanelles failure. Wallin is convinced that Churchill always believed that the navy had a reasonable chance of success and thought that more force should be provided as insurance rather than changing his mind about the success of the navy alone. 719. Wanliss, N. The History of the Nth Battalion, A. I. F. Melbourne: Arrow, 1929. This unit history provides accounts of combat at Anzac including the heroism of Albert Jacka at Courtney's Post, for which he won a Victoria Cross. 720. Ward, C. H. Dudley. History of the 53rd. (Welsh) Division. Cardiff: Western Mail, 1927. The 53rd fought in Gallipoli, and Ward gives a thorough account of its activities. 721.

Ward, C. H. Dudley. Regimental Records of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 4 Vols. London: Forster Groom, 1928-29. Ward, a good historian, devotes volume four to the regiment's service outside of France which includes Gallipoli. He does a good job of keeping the focus on the Royal Welsh Fusiliers without losing the larger context of the situation.

722.

Warner, Oliver. Admiral of the Fleet: Cunningham ofHyndhope. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1967. Cunningham served on board the destroyer Scorpion at the Dardanelles and provides a description of the navy's role, especially the landing of troops and the problems of artillery support for the troops on shore.

723.

Wartham, H. E. Mustapha Kemal of Turkey. Boston: Little, Brown, 1931. This account is superficial but does provide a description of Kemal's role at Gallipoli.

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724. Watkins, Charles. Lost Endeavour. Privately Printed, 1971. Watkins was a private in the 6th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers and a "professional" sniper. He provides details of fighting in the Cape Helles area. 725.

Watson, S. H. "The Gallipoli Blunder." Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 112 (1982): 178-83. Watson, a veteran of the campaign, suggests that the key mistakes were failing to attack on land in March and landing the Anzac forces on the wrong beach.

726. Weaver, Lawrence. The Story of the Royal Scots. London: Country Life and George Newnes, n. d.. The 5th Battalion of the Royal Scots was in the 29th Division, and Weaver provides an account of the initial landing, storming Gully Ravine, and subsequent fighting. 727.

Webster, F.A.M. The History of the Fifth Battalion: The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment (T. A.). London: Frederick Warne, 1930. This battalion reached Gallipoli in August to be part of the landing at Suvla Bay and remained until the final evacuation. Webster's account is mostly descriptive but quite detailed.

728. Wedgwood, Josiah Clement. Essays and Adventures. London: Allen and Unwin, 1924. Wedgewood was a machine gunner on the River Clyde at V Beach and provides an account of that terrible situation on April 25. 729. Wedgwood, Josiah Clement. With Machine Guns in Gallipoli. London: Darling and Son, 1915. Although actually a pamphlet, this work offers first-hand details of the situation on Gallipoli. 730. Welborn, Suzanne. Lords of Death: A People, A Place, A Legend. Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1982. Welborne's study is focused on Western Australians who served in the war and includes chapters about Gallipoli. Her account is dominated with the personal experiences and reactions of the men and is some times a bit histrionic. It does, however, provide many details about the situation on Gallipoli and insight into the impact of the experience on the development of Australian national feeling. 731.

Weldon, L. B. "HardLying;" Eastern Mediterranean, 1914-1919. London: Jenkins, 1925. The author commanded the Anne, which served in the Dardanelles campaign as a base for sea planes.

732.

Wester Wemyss, Lady. The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1935. Wester Wemyss, at first governor

138

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 of Lemnos and later in command at Mudros, was consistently a supporter of naval action in the Dardanelles, which he believed could succeed.

733.

Wester Wemyss, Lord. The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924. The author combines memoirs, letters, and accounts from others to fill in aspects of the situation he did not observe to produce a full account. Wester Wemyss was admiral in command of the base at Mudros. He believes the campaign had a chance of success. He speaks eloquently of the heroism of the soldiers and sailors involved and notes that the admirals had decided land action was needed before Hamilton arrived to consult about the use of army forces. Better coordination between soldiers, sailors, and politicians would have made the campaign more likely to succeed.

734. Westlake, Ray. British Regiments at Gallipoli. London: Leo Cooper, 1996. Westlake's work is meticulous and the result is an excellent reference book for tracing battalions through the Gallipoli operations. The lack of a bibliography is regrettable. 735.

Whalley-Kelly, H. "Ich Dien" The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire) 1914-1934. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1935. The 6th (Service) Battalion of this unit was at Suvla and Sari Bair. The descriptions tend to be brief but include some detail not likely to be found in other published volumes.

736. White, A. S. A Bibliography of Regimental Histories of the British Army. London: Society for Army Historical Research in Conjunction With the Army Museum's Ogilby Trust, 1965. Although it is thorough, the lack of annotations makes this bibliography difficult to use, for entries even include recruiting brochures. It is, however, a very useful reference for finding works about a particular unit. 737. White, T. A. The "Fighting Thirteenth": The History of the Thirteenth Battalion A. I. F. Sydney: N. P., 1924. Provides a thorough description of the battalion at Anzac. 738. Whitehorn, A. C. and Thomas O. Marden. The History of the Welsh Regiment. Cardiff: Western Mail and Echo, 1932. Welsh troops were prominent in the fighting at Gallipoli, and this account is a useful though episodic description. They held Sari Bair for several hours and fought bravely at Suvla. 739. Whitton, Frederick E. The History of the Prince of Wales' Leinster Regi-

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ment. (Royal Canadians), 2 Vols. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1924. Whitton's second volume concerns World War I, and while not very good, does include an account of the regiment's battalions in action at Gallipoli. 740. Wilkie, A. H. Official War History of the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment 1914-1919. Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1924. This unit-without its horses-took part in the Anzac operation at Gallipoli, and Wilkie provides a detailed description of its activities. 741.

Wilkinson, Norman. The Dardanelles: Colour Sketches From Gallipoli. London: Longmans, Green, 1915. Wilkinson was aboard a number of vessels during the Gallipoli action and his account, included with a large number of sketches and paintings, provides details of sailors' activities and the naval involvement in the campaign.

742. Wilkinson, Spenser. Government and the War. New York: McBride, 1918. Wilkinson included a chapter concerning the Dardanelles Committee. 743.

Williams, H. R. The Gallant Company: An Australian Soldier's Story of 1915-1918. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1933. Williams was a lieutenant who rose from sergeant and gives a good account of activities in the various units to which he was assigned. He was not long in the Dardanelles, however.

744.

Williams, Jeffrey. ByngofVimy: General and Governor General. London: Leo Cooper, 1983. Byng arrived to take command at Suvla in midAugust. A Westerner, he was quickly convinced that evacuation should occur and need not be costly—though almost everyone else expected 50 percent casualties or more. He resisted pressure from Hamilton above and divisional commanders to attack until adequate artillery munitions were at hand, and in the end there was no attack. He was then a key figure in organizing successful withdrawal. He got a K. C. B., but never again saw his old friend and patron Kitchener because Kitchener seems to have felt humiliated that Byng could get out with no loss when he had predicted massive ones.

745.

Williams, Orlo. "The Gallipoli Tragedy." The Nineteenth Century and After 106 (July 1929): 82-94. Williams felt compelled to respond to the official history, and based his account on his diary written during the campaign. He is quite critical of Kitchener and thinks that Hamilton was too deferential in dealing with him.

746.

Wilson, Michael. Destination Dardanelles: The Story of H.M.S. E 7.

140

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 London: Leo Cooper, 1988. Using the diary of the submarine E 7's first officer, Wilson traces the activities of British submarines through the first two years of the war. The E 7 made a very successful first patrol into the Sea of Marmora. The first officer, injured on the trip, remained behind when the E 7 went on a second patrol and was sunk, most of the crew being taken prisoner by the Turks. The book provides a valuable look at the activity of submarines during the first half of the Dardanelles Campaign.

747. Wilson, Trevor. The Myriad Faces of War. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986. Wilson provides an account of the entire campaign. He believes that it had little chance of success even had there been competent leadership and luck. Without thorough preparation and surprise-neither achieved at Gallipoli-defeat was far and away the most likely result. Wilson also points out many tactical errors, sometimes suggesting that the experience of the Western Front should have prevented them. This seems dubious since the war was only a few months old when the Dardanelles Campaign began. Wilson seems to expect the leaders and troops at Gallipoli to have learned from the experience of another front, which few of them had even visited, faster than those actually fighting there. 748. Winter, Denis. "The Anzac Book: A Re-Appraisal." Journal of the Australian War Memorial 16 (April, 1990): 58-61. Winter rejects the critical commentary [See especially No. 393] that accuses Bean of deliberately trying to overly glorify Australian soldiers and the "Anzac spirit." Winter argues persuasively that The Anzac Book was part of the British propaganda effort, and that had Bean even attempted to portray the darker side of the conflict his position as correspondent and official historian would have been jeopardized. 749. Winter, Denis. "The Anzac Landing~The Great Gamble?" Journal of the Australian War Memorial 4 (April, 1984): 13-21. Winter suggests that planning and execution of the Anzac landing were confused and poorly organized. The assertions of various officers that problems arose due to an unexpected current or poor navigation by inexperienced, youthful midshipmen commanding the tows are part of a deliberate cover-up that extended to actual lying in evidence to the Dardanelles Commission. 750. Winter, Denis. 25 April 1915: The Inevitable Tragedy. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1994. As suggested by his title, Winter is a strong critic of the Dardanelles operation. In addition to the usual criticism of leadership, he is particularly hard on the logistic arrangements, or really lack of such arrangements. He also suggests that there was more discussion of the operation in preparation for it than is usually

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thought and that there were three successive plans for the April 25th attack made so hastily that confusion was virtually certain. 751. Woods, William Seaver. Colossal Blunders of the War. New York: Macmillan, 1931. Woods defends the strategy of the Dardanelles and condemns various tactical and logistical errors for the failure of the campaign. His own factual errors call his conclusions into question. 752.

Woodward, David R. Lloyd George and the Generals. Newark: University of Delaware Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1983. Although Woodward's focus is more political than military, his analysis of the struggle of Lloyd George to shift the focus of the war away from the Western Front is central to the strategic decisions concerning the Dardanelles. He also provides interesting information about the role of politics in decisions about how much support was to be given to the campaign.

753.

Woodward, Llewellyn. Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918. London: Methuen, 1967. Although more concerned about politics than military operations, Woodward does discuss the Dardanelles, and is critical of Hamilton's planning for the campaign.

754.

Wren, E. Randwich to Hargicourt (History of the Third Battalion, A. I. F.). Sidney: R. G. McDonald, 1935. This unit history provides details of action at Anzac including the desperate struggle at Lone Pine.

755. Wykes, Alan. "Gallipoli." British History Illustrated 1(1974): 32-39. Wykes describes the problems caused by poor coordination and preparation of the plan for the Dardanelles Campaign. 756. Wylly, H.C. The Border Regiment in the Great War. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1924. Two battalions of the Regiment served at Gallipoli, and although Wylly wrote a number of effective unit histories, his account here is brief as he tried to cover the scattered battalions of the regiment throughout the war. 757. Wylly, H. C. The Green Howards in the Great War. Richmond, Yorkshire: [Butler and Tanner], 1926. The 6th (Service) Battalion was at Gallipoli, arriving in July. It took part in the Suvla operation and remained there until final evacuation. Wylly wrote a series of unit histories, and he was a competent historian. 758. Wylly, H. C. History of the Queen's Royal Regiment. 7 Vols. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, n. d. Only volume 7 of this work concerns World War

142

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 I, and its accounts, focused on individual battalions of the regiment, are brief. One battalion did serve in Gallipoli, fighting at Suvla and Scimitar Hill.

759. Wylly, H. C. Neill's "Blue Caps." 3 Vols. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, n. d. This unit, the Royal Dublin Fusiliers was part of the 29th Division. It was part of the disastrous attempt to use the steamer River Clyde at V Beach as a gangway for landing troops in the initial assault on Gallipoli. It also fought at Suvla, storming Scimitar Hill, and was part of the final evacuation. The best part of Wylly's account is the chapter about the early landings. 760. Wyrall, Everard. The Die-Hards in the Great War: A History of the Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment) 1914-1919. 2 Vols. London: Harrison and Sons, 1926-1930. Provides information about Middlesex regiment battalions in combat in the Dardanelles Campaign. 761.

Wyrall, Everard. The East Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War, 19141918. London: Harrison, 1928. Wyrall does a good job of setting the situation in context, and following the activities of the unit at the Suvla landing and the Battle of Scimitar Hill in August.

762. Wyrall, Everard. The Gloucestershire Regiment in the Great War, 19141918. London: Methuen, 1931. Battalions from this Regiment served in various battles during the Dardanelles Campaign. 763.

Wyrall, Everard. The West Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War 19141918. 2 Vols. London: John Lane The Bodley Head, n. d. Yorkshire troops arrived for the landing at Suvla in August and were involved in some of the heavy fighting especially at Scimitar Hill. Wyrall's account is mostly descriptive but well-done.

764. Yildirim, Huseyin. Canakkale savaslari bibliyografyasi. D.Z.K.K.Tigi Karargah Basimevi, 1995.

Ankara:

765. Yiicel, Yasar. "Turkei: Bibliography of the First World War." NeueForschungen zum Ersten Weltkrieg: Literatur beichte und Bibliographen. [New Research about the World War in the East: Testimonial Literature and Bibliography.] Edited by Jurgen Rohwer. Band 25: Schriften der Bibliothekfur Zeit geschichte. Koblenz: Bernard and Graete, 1985. This chapter provides references to a number of Turkish language sources concerning the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. Many of these sources are not available in the U. S. The larger volume, composed of chapters concerning most of the countries of the world, is a useful

Annotated Bibliography

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bibliographic reference but of necessity provides mostly major sources for the more important belligerents.

Index Numbers shown in regular type refer to entry numbers in the annotated bibliography. Numbers in bold type refer to pages in the bibliographical essay. Numerals have been treated as if they were spelled out. A Bord du Cuirasse "Gaulois, "511 Abbott, G. F., 1 Achi Baba, 377, 379, 547 Across the Bar, 173 Adam, Colin Forbs, 2 Adamow, E., 3 Adam-Smith, Patsy, 4 Adcock, A. St. John, 5, 148 Admiral Guepratte, L', 495 Admiral of the Fleet: An Unauthorized Biography of Admiral Lord Fisher, 347 Admiral of the Fleet: Cunningham of Hyndhope, 722 Admiral Souchon auf grosser Fahrt, 619 AE 2 (Australian Submarine), 242, 387 Ahmad, Amin, 6 Airman's War 1914-18, The, 430 Aitken, Alexander, 7 Akenfield, 81 Akoecelik, Rahmi, 8 Alexander, H. M., 9 Allanson, C.J.L., 10 Allanson Diary, The, 10 Allen, C.R.C., 11 Allen, George H., 12 Allen, W.E.D., 13 "Alliance Politics and the 1915 DardanellesGallipoli Campaign," 557 Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, 513 amphibious operations, 120, 240, 255, 468, 495, 649, 686, 7

Anafarta, Battle of, 302, 10 Anafartalar kumandant Mustafa kemal He muldkat, 705 Andrews, E. M., 14,25-26 Andrews, Martin, 15 Andrews, Ted, 16 Anne, H.M.S., 731 Antier, Jean-Jacques, 138 Antwerp to Gallipoli, 611 "ANZAC," 42 "Anzac" (Gammage), 258 Anzac (Vader), 707 Anzac: A Retrospect, 473 Anzac Adventure, 154 Anzac, An, 17 ANZAC and Empire, 599 Anzac Book, The, 393, 494, 748, 26-27 "Anzac Book and the Anzac Legend: C.E.W. Bean as Editor and Image Maker, The," 393 "Anzac Book: A Re-Appraisal," 748 Anzac Cove, 16, 276, 402, 7, 9, 12, 27 Anzac Illusion, The, 14, 26 "Anzac Landing~The Great Gamble?, The," 749 Anzac: Meaning, Memoty, and Myth, 626 Anzac Memorial: Soldiers' Stories of Gallipoli, 18 Anzac Memories, 681 Anzac myth, 5, 14, 148, 158, 164, 173, 341, 27

Index Anzac Newsreel: A Picture History of Gallipoli, 562 ANZAC Pilgrim's Progress, The, 148 "Anzac Story: Myth and Reality, The," 217 Anzac to Amiens, 51 Anzac War Trail, The, 88 Anzacs, The, 4 Ari Burnu, Battle of, 367, 6, 8 Ark Royal, H.M.S., 603 Armee d'Orient dans la guerre mondiale, L\ 1915-1919, 194 Armstrong, H. C , 19 Army Chaplain's War Memoirs, An, 186 Arthur, George, 20, 22 As Rough as Bags, 35 Ashley, Maurice, 21 Ashmead-Bartlett's Despatches From the Dardanelles, 22 Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis, 14, 22-25, 333, 517, 10,27 Ashworth, Tony, 26 "Asiatic Turkey, 1914-1916," 394 Aspinall-Oglander, C. F., 27-28 Asprey, R. B., 29 Asquith, 409 Asquith as War Leader, 129 Asquith, H. H., 96, 129, 271, 409, 556, 11, 13,20-21,23,30 At Antwerp and in the Dardanelles, 238 At Suvla Bay: Notes and Sketches, 318 Atatuk'un ozel mek tuplari, 84 Ataturk, See Kemal, Mustafa Ataturk, Moustafa Kemal, 30 "Ataturk in the Dardanelles Campaign," 549 Ataturk (Macfie), 456 Ataturk (Orga), 554 Ataturk: A Biography, 518 Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation, 403 Ataturk ve Anzaklar, 358 Atkinson, C. T., 31-33 Atlas of World War I, 269 Au service de la France, 570 Auckland Regiment, The, 112 Auf See unbesiegt mit Bildern gefallener Helden, 475 Auphan, Paul, 34 Austin, Ronald J., 35 Austin, Tom, 36 Australasia Triumphant!, 5 Australia, 5, 8, 14, 17, 23, 25, 42, 51-52, 5456,69,75,92,95, 108, 115, 119, 133, 144, 148-49, 158, 164, 173, 185, 188, 195, 198, 204, 217, 221, 230, 242, 253, 258-61, 281, 286, 292, 295, 299, 363-

145 65, 387, 393, 401, 406, 414, 416, 42324, 434, 444, 464, 471, 490, 503, 506, 516, 536, 557-58, 595, 599, 601, 606, 612, 623, 638, 640, 658, 661, 681-83, 685, 691, 701, 715, 730, 743, 748-49, 12,11,15-16,2 6-28,30 Australia in Arms, 623 "Australia in the Great War: Military," 299 A ustralia: Two Centuries of War and Peace, 260 Australian Army Medical Corps, 115, 701 Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914-1918, The, 115 Australian Artists at War, 595 Australian Campaigns in the Great War, 638 Australian Experience of War, The, 416 Australian Imperial Force, Units of: 11th Battalion, 59 15th Battalion, 144 1st Division, 221 14th Battalion, 286, 612, 719 4th Brigade, 625 14th Light Horse, 691 17th Battalion, 463 16th Battalion, 440 6th Battalion, 35 10th Light Horse, 550, 685 3rd Battalion, 754 3rd Light Horse, 42 13th Battalion, 737 12th Battalion, 161,542 28th Battalion, 152,516 Australian nationalism, 173, 217, 258-61, 363-65, 392, 401, 414, 424, 464, 471, 494, 599, 601, 606, 623, 658, 681-83, 691,730 Australian People and the Great War, The, 464 "Australians at Gallipoli, The," 363 Australians in Action, 23 Australians in Nine Wars, The, 230 Autuc, Ibrahim, 37 "Avec les combatants de 1915 dan la Presqu'ile de Gallipoli," 135 Babington, Anthony, 38 Bacchante, H.M.S., 114 Bacon, R. H., 39-40, 146, 20-21 Bagnal, Nigel, 41 Bagnall, N. T., 42 Baldwin, Hanson, 43 Balfour, 459 Balfour, Arthur J., 459 Balkans, 85, 170, 175, 183, 287, 558

146 Ballard, C. R., 44, 22 Banks, Arthur, 45 Banoglu, Niyazi Ahmet, 46 Barrow, George, 47 Basarin, Hatice Hurmuz, 227 Basarin, Vecihi, 227 Bastier, Jean, 48 Battle ofKum Kale, The, 196 Battlefields of Gallipoli, The, 646 Battles ofAnafarta, The, 302 Battles ofAri Burnu, The, 367 Battles ofSedd el Bahr, The, 492 Bavin, W. G., 49 Beach, Hugh, 50 Bean, C.E.W., 14, 51-56, 365, 393, 449, 494,599,748,10,13,16,26-27 Beaverbrook, Lord, 57 Becke, A. F., 58 Bedford, C. W., 59 Beesley, Patrick, 60-61,21 Before and After Gallipoli, 8 Behind the Scenes in Many Wars, 467 Behrend, Arthur, 62 Bell-Davies, Richard, 63 Bennett, Gordon, 423 Ben-Moshe, Tuvia, 64-65, 20 Benn, Wedgewood, 66 Bennett, Geoffrey, 67 Bennett, Jack, 68 Benson, Irving, 69 Better to Die, 11 Bibliography of Regimental Histories of the British Army, A, 136 Bidou, Henry, 70 Bienaime, Vice-Admiral, 71 Big Fight, The, 221 Bigwood, George, 72 Binney, T. H., 73 Bird, Wilkinson D., 74 Birdwood, General William, 2, 75, 6, 8,16 Birkenhead, Earl of, 76 Bishop, Edward, 77 Bizim harblerimiz, 696 Blackledge, W. J., 164 Blake, George, 78 Blanchard, J., 79 Blanchard, Marcel, 79 Bless Our Ship, 113 Blumberg, H. E., 80 Blythe, Ronald, 81 Bonar Law, Andrew, 460, 21 Bond, Brian, 82-83, 422, 643 Borak, S., 84 Border Regiment in the Great War, The, 756

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Boswell, L.A.K., 86 Bourne, J. M., 87 Bourne, K. C , 411 Bousquet, Fernand, 85 Bouvet, 5 Bowes, Joseph, 88 Bowyer, Chaz, 89 Boyle, Lieut. Commander E. C , 376 Boyle, R. C , 90 Boys Who Came Home, The, 95 Bramall, Lord, 370 Brass hat, 153 Breen, Peter, 536 Brereton, C. B., 91 Breslau, 501,692, 3 Bridges, R., 92 Bridges, T. C, 93 Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918, 87 "Britain, Russia, the Gallipoli Campaign and the Straits," 637 Britain's Sea Soldiers, 80 British Archives: A Guide to Archive Resources in the United Kingdom, 239, 15 British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One,4\2 British Campaigns in the Nearer East, 19141918, 176 "British Concepts and Practices of Amphibious Warfare, 1867-1916," 655 British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, 209, 394, 441 British Generalship in the Twentieth Centwy, 633 British Naval History Since 1815: A Guide to the Literature, 586 British Politics and the Great War, 699 British Regiments at Gallipoli, 734 British Strategy, 486 British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918, 298 British Strategy and War Aims, 246 Broad, Lewis, 94 Broadbent, Harvey, 95, 15 Brock, Eleanor, 96 Brock, Michael, 96 Brock, Ray, 97 Brodie, C. G., 98 Broinowski, L., 99 Broken Years, The, 259, 261 "Brothers in Arms: The British Army and Navy at the Dardanelles," 686 Brown, Malcolm, 100 Browne, M., 260

Index Brownrigg, Douglas, 101 Bruce, Anthony, 102 Bryant, G., 103 Bubnov, A., 104 Buchan, John, 105-06 Buckland, J. V., 107 Bugle and Kukri, 524 Buley, E. C , 108 Bulgaria, 359 Burhaneddin Bey, 367 Burk, Kathleen, 700 Burness, Peter, 109 Burrows, John W., 110 Burton, O. E., 111-12,27 Bush, Eric W., 113-14,8,16 Butler, A. G., 115 By Guess and by God, 126 By Ships Alone: Churchill and the Dardanelles, 117 Byng of Vimy, 744 Byrne, A. E., 116 By-ways on Service, 195 C [Viscount Cobham], 117 C.E.W. Bean: Australian Historian, 365 "Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats: The Higher Direction of the War," 700 Call to Arms, 529 Callahan, Raymond, 118 Callinan, Bernard, 119 Callwell, C. E., 120-22,13 Cambridge History of the British Empire, The, 299 Campaign des Dardanelles, 123 Campaign in Gallipoli, The, 390 Canada's Sons and Great Britain in the World War, 531 Canakkale de Turk zaferi, 214 Canakkale destaninin 50, 704 Canakkale muharebeleri 75nci Yil armagani, 617 Canakkale savaslar indan menkibeler, 262 Canakkale savaslari bibliyografyasi, 764 Canakkale savaslari, 300 Cankkale savaslari, 1915,360 Cannon's Folly, 15 Cap of Honour, 177 Carcopino, Jerome, 124-25 Carden, Admiral Sir Sackville Hamilton, 303, 4, 5, 20 Carnet des Dardanelles, 277 Carr, W. G., 126 Carroll, John, 259 Carter, Violet Bonham, 127

147 Cartier, Jean-Pierre, 128 Cartier, Raymond, 128 Cassar, George H., 129-31, 23, 28 Castle, Wilfred T. F., 132 Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War: Official Medical History of the War, 505 Caucasian Battlefields, 13 Cavill, H. W., 133 Cecil, Hugh, 686 geliker, Fahri, 134 Cemaleddin Canakkale zaferi, 18 Mart 1915, 616 Chabanier, Jean, 135 Chack, Paul, 137-38 Challenge of War, 1914-1916, The, 270 Chambers, Frank P., 139 Chapman, Guy, 140 Charles Lister, 598 Charles-Roux, Francois, 141 Charmley, John, 142 Charrusse, P., 143 Chattaway, T. P., 144 Charterton, E. Keble, 145 Chauvel of the Light Horse, 334 Chiefs, The, 370 Chindwin to Criccieth, 200 Chocolate Hill, 66, 171, 186, 317, 451 ChunukBair, 16, 177,8,10 Churchill, 573 Churchill, Winston S., 21, 25, 27, 39, 47, 64, 76,96, 114, 118, 121, 126, 129-31, 14243, 146-47, 155, 159, 162, 187, 193, 211,216, 265, 270-70, 291, 296, 322, 331, 347-50, 371-74, 427, 437, 460, 474, 479, 488, 512, 517, 546, 555-57, 561, 565, 573, 580, 600, 602, 604, 632, 638, 679, 690, 717-18, 3-5, 11, 13-14, 16,18-23,29,30 Churchill: A Life, 21 \ Churchill: A Study in Failure, 371 Churchill and the Admirals, 604 Churchill as Historian, 21 Churchill, 1874-1922, 76 Churchill Revised, 427 Churchill: Strategy and History, 64 Churchill: TheEndofGloty,\42 Churchill: The Unruly Giant, 602 Churchill: Young Man in a Hurry, 512 "Churchill's Strategic Conception During the First World War," 65 Churchill's 'World Crisis' as History, 580 City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders),

148 The, 308 Cobber, Lance Corporal, 148 Cochrane, Peter, 149 Cohen, Eliot A., 150,28 Coindreau, R., 151 Collett, H. B., 152 Collier, Basil, 153 Collins, Dale, 154 Colossal Blunders of the War, 751 "Command and Leadership Styles in the British Army: The 1915 Gallipoli Model," 689 Commander, The, 309 "Commander Otto Hersing and the Dardanelles Cruise of S.M.U.-21," 344 Compton-Hall, Richard, 155 Condliffe, J. B., 156 Connaught Rangers, The, 388 Constantinople, 187, 208, 293, 396, 439, 473,501,597,604,636,661 Consulting Surgeon in the Near East, A, 697 Coo-oo-ee, 158 Cooper, Bryan, 157 Cooper, John Butler, 158 Corbett, Julian, 114, 159 Cornwallis, H.M.S., 650 Corsaires sous-marins, Les, 675 Cowan, James, 160 Cowland, W. S., 161 Cowles, Virginia, 162 Cramm, Richard, 163 Craven, Digger, 164 Creagh, O'Moore, 165 Creighton, O., 166 Crisman, Herbert Henry, 167 "Crucible: The Establishment of the Anzac Tradition, 1899-1918, The," 260 Crusading at Anzac, Anno Domini, 1915, 631 Crutchley, C. E., 168 Crurtwell, C.R.M.F., 169-70,19 Cunliffe, Marcus, 171 Cunningham of Hyndhope, Lord [Andrew Cunningham], 172 Cupper, Pam, 670 Curran, Tom, 173 Currey, E. H., 174 Curtright, Lynn H., 175 Cutlack, F. M., 506 Damn the Dardanelles! The Agony of Gallipoli, 413 Dane, Edmund, 176

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Daniell, David Scott, 177 Danisman, Hasan B., 178 Dardanellen, Die 327 Dardanelles, The, 120 "Dardanelles a la Pointe d'Europe: le Debarquement (25-30 Avril 1915), Les," 79 Dardanelles: A Midshipman's Diary, 189 Dardanelles: An Epic Told in Pictures, The, 179 Dardanelles aux Brumes du Nord, Des, 136 Dardanelles Campaign, The (Nevinson), 537 Dardanelles Campaign, The (Schulz), 615 Dardanelles Campaign, The (Knight), 405 Dardanelles: Colour Sketches From Gallipoli, The,14\ Dardanelles Commission, 290, 749, 8, 13 Dardanelles Committee, 20, 21 Dardanelles Dilemma, 145 "Dardanelles Expedition, The," 383 Dardanelles Expedition: A Condensed Study, The, 582 "Dardanelles Gallipoli Campaign: Concept and Execution, The" 431 "Dardanelles Landings," The, 538 "Dardanelles, Mecca, and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, The," 247 Dardanelles Patrol, 628 Dardanelles: Their Story and Their Significance in the Great War, The, 180 "Dardanelli e Monte Cassino: Errori Delle due Guerre Mondiali," 690 Darde, Fernand, 181 Darlington, Henry, 182 David Lloyd George, 609 David, Robert P. F., 183 Davidson, George, 184 Davis, Shona, 185 Dawnay, Guy, 11, 16 Day, Henry C , 186 De Loghe, Sydney, 188 "De Robeck and the Dardanelles Campaign," 303 De Robeck, Admiral John, 303, 350, 561, 56,16 Deak, Francis, 630 Dear Mother, 36 Decisive Battles of the Western World, The, 254 Decisive Wars of History, The, 426 Deedes Bay, 576 Deedes, Sir Wyndham, 576 Defeat at Gallipoli, 647, 1,15, 26

Index Delage, Edmond, 187 Denham, H. M., 189 Denman, Terry, 190 Denton, Kit, 191-92 Destination Dardanelles, 746 Deutsch-Turkishe Waffenbundnis Im Weltkriege, Das, 522 "Deutsche Militarmission in der Turkei, Die," 521 Dewar, K.G.B., 193 Deygas, F.-J., 194 Diaries of Private Horace Bruckshaw, The, 497 Diary of a Padre at Suvla Bay, The, 385 Diary of a Yeomanry, M. O., 671 Die Hards in the Great War 1914-1918, The, 760 Digger: The Legend of the Australian Soldier, 414 Dinning, Hector, 195 Disaster at the Dardanelles, 1915,350,15 Djalaheddin Dey, 196 Djemal Pasha, Ahmed, 197 Donnell, Anne, 198 Dontas, Domna, 199 D'Orley-Hughes, Guy, 174 Drage, Charles, 200 Drage, Godfrey, 200 Drame ignore de I'Armee d'Orient, Le, 183 Drew, H.T.B., 201 Dunstan, K., 202 Dupuy, Trevor N., 203 E 11 (British Submarine), 376, 628 E 14 (British Submarine), 376 E 7 (British Submarine), 746 Eady, George Griffin, 11 East, Ronald, 204 East Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War, The, 761 "Eastern and Western Controversy, The," 487 Eastern Front, 1914-1917, The, 657 Easterners, 87, 247, 255, 426-27, 487, 546, 605, 633,3,18 Edinburgh, Duke (Philip) of, 205 Edmonds, James, 206 Edwards, Kenneth, 207 Einstein, Lewis, 208, 23 Ekstein, Michael G., 209 Elliot, G. F.Scott, 210 Ellison, Gerald, 211 Emin, Ahmed, 212 Empire at War, The, 442

149 Endless Story, 664 "Ends and Means," 205 English History, 1914-1945,661 "'Enough Glory for All': Ellis AshmeadBartlett and Sir Ian Hamilton at the Dardanelles," 333 Enser, A.G.S., 213 "Entscheidung im Osten Oder sicherung der Dardanellen: Das Ringen um den Serbienfeldzug 1915," 702 Enver Pasha, 513, 3 Erikan, Celal, 214 Esat, Pasha, 215 Esat Pasanin Canakkaanilari, 215 Escape of the Goeben, The, 466 Esher, Reginald, Viscount, 216 Esposito, Vincent J., 645 Essays and Adventures, 728 Essex Regiment, The, 110 Europaischen Machte un die Turkei wahrend de Weltkrieges: Konstantinople un die meerengen, Die, 3 Euryalus, H.M.S., 61,377 Evans, David, 536 Evans, Raymond, 217 Everyman at War, 584 Ewing, John, 218 Ewing, William, 219 Expedition des Dardanelles, L (Guepratte), 297 Expedition des Dardanelles, L (Roux), 608 Expedition des Dardanelles aujour lejour, L\ 141 "Expedition des Dardanelles (1915), L'," 34 Expedition des Dardanelles: Sur le Chemin de Constantinople, L ', 652 "Expedition des Dardanelles 3 Novembre 1914-9 Janvier 1916, L'," 510 Experiences of a Dugout, 1914-1918, 121 "Eyeless in Byzantium: The Tragedy of Sir Ian Hamilton," 268 Eyes of the Navy, The, 373 Face aux Balkans, 85 Face aux Turcs: Gallipoli, 1915, 226 Facey,A. B.,220,416 Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced, 686 Fallen Stars, 422 Fallon, David, 221 Falls, Cyril, 222-23,481 Fateful Years, 1909-1916, 620 Fellows, George, 224 Ferguson, D., 225

150 Feuille, H., 226 Few of the First, A, 425 Fewster, Kevin, 52-53, 227, 6, 27 Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 122 Fife and Forfar Yeomanry and Nth (F. and F. Yeo.) Battn., R.H., The, 548 Fifth Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 1914-1918, The, 228 Fifty-Second. (Lowland) Division, The, 680 Fight for Gallipoli, The, 397 Fighting Newfoundlander, The, 543 "Fighting Thirteenth, The," 737 Fights and Flights, 614 Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, 290 Findlay, J. M., 229 Firkins, Peter, 230 First Australian Imperial Force, The, 601 First Five Hundred, The, 163 First In, Last Out: The Navy at Gallipoli, 242 First Report of the Dardanelles Commission, 290 First Sea Lord, 347 First Sea Lords From Fisher to Mountbatten, The, 283 "First Turkish Reinforcements at Suvla, August 7th-9th, 1915, The," 231 First World War: An Eyewitness History, The, 404 First World War and British Military History, The, 643, 12 First World War, The (Bond), 82 First World War, The (Falls), 222 First World War, The (King), 399 First World War, The (Gilbert), 272, 1 First World War, The (Repington), 597 First World War, The (Terraine), 672 First World War, The (Thoumin), 684 Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord, 232-33 Fisher, Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot, 39, 60, 67,94,96, 114, 118, 129, 146, 155, 193, 283, 291, 347, 349-50, 375, 460, 478, 514-15, 517, 551, 602, 679, 1, 4, 5, 9,16,20-23,29,31 Fisher and Cunningham, 551 Fisher of Kilverstone, 460 "Fisher's Face," 514 Fisher's Face or, Getting to Know the Admiral, 515 Fitzherbert, Margaret, 234 Five Years in Turkey, 615 Fleet That Jack Built, The, 375-76

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Flight of the Goeben and the Breslau, The, 501 Florinsky, M. T., 235 For the Sake of Example, 38 For Valour, 89 For Want of A Nail, 465 "For Want of Critics... The Tragedy of Gallipoli," 553 "Forcement des Dardanelles (18 Mars 1915) ou I'Occasion Manque, Le," 143 Forlorn Hope 1915, 98 Former Naval Person, 348 Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy, 291 Fortescue, Granville, 236-37, 517, 12 Fortunate Life, A , 220 42nd. (East Lancashire) Division, 19141918, The, 266 Foster, H. C , 238 Foster, Janet, 239, 15 Foster, Simon, 240 Fox, Frank, 241 Frame, T. R., 242 France, 9, 12, 20, 26, 137, 172, 243, 263, 290, 374, 571, 600, 610, 624, 721, 2, 9, 14,18-19,23,29 Fraser, Edward, 388 Fraser, Peter, 244 Freeman, Benson, 245 French, David, 118, 246-48, 19 French and the Dardanelles, The, 130 French Involvement at Dardanelles, 13, 7071, 79, 125, 130, 137, 297, 329, 335, 381, 439, 488, 495, 568, 570, 608, 652, 676-77,710 Froembgen, Hanns, 249 From Constantinople to Coalition, 353 From Dardanelles to Oran, Ml From Dartmouth to the Dardanelles: A Midshipman's Log, 250 From Duntroom to the Dardanelles: A Biography of Lieutenant William Dawkins, 362 From Gallipoli to Baghdad, 219 From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 479 Fromkin, David, 251, 3, 15 Frontline Gallipoli, 52 Frothingham, Thomas G., 252 Fry, Gavin, 253 Fuller, J. F. C , 254 FiinfJahre Turkei, 615 Fyfe, Albert J., 255 Gaba Tepe, 8

Index Gallant Company, The, 743 "Gallipoli" (Asprey), 29 "Gallipoli" (Spiers), 643 "Gallipoli" (Wykes), 755 Gallipoli (Bennett), 68 Gallipoli (Bush), 114 Ga////?o//(Hickey), 330, 1,15 Gallipoli(James), 372, 14 Gallipoli (Masefield), 485 Gallipoli (Moorehead), 508, 15 Gallipoli: A Battle Field Guide, 670 "Gallipoli-A Past That We Can Live By?" 682 Gallipoli Adventure, 273 "Gallipoli and Normandy," 73 Gallipoli As I Saw It, 530 Gallipoli: Bedeutung und verlaufder Kampfe, 390 "Gallipoli Blunder, The," 725 Gallipoli Campaign (Uluaslan), 703 Gallipoli Campaign, The (Butler), 115 Gallipoli Campaign, The: An Outline of the Military Operations, 660 Gallipoli Correspondent, 53 Gallipoli Days and Nights, 450 Gallipoli; der Kampfum den Orient, 256 Gallipoli Diary (Gillam), 274 Gallipoli Diary (Graham), 284 Gallipoli Diary (Hamilton), 310 Gallipoli Diary (Jones), 386 Gallipoli Diary of Sergeant Lawrence of the Australian Engineers--!st A. I. F. 1915, The, 204 Gallipoli Illustrated, 191 Gallipoli Memories, 462 Gallipoli Mission, 54 Gallipoli 1915,321 Gallipoli 1915: Pens, Pencils, and Cameras at War, 432 Gallipoli, 1981 Film of, 68, 261 Gallipoli: One Long Grave, 192 Gallipoli: Oral History Recordings, 361 Gallipoli: The Fading Vision, 546, 14 "Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore" (1988 Television Show), 95 "Gallipoli: The Heroic Campaign: The Battle of Koja Chemen Tepe," 281 Gallipoli, The Medical War, 701 Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story, 581 Gallipoli to Petrov, 471 Gallipoli to the Somme, 1 Gallipoli to the Somme: The Story ofC.E. W. Bean, 449 Gallipoli Today, 566

151 "Gallipoli Tragedy, The," 745 "Gallipoli-What Went Right?," 649 Gallishaw, John, 257, 12 Gammage, Bill, 258-61 Gasson, James, 262 Gaulois, 511, 5 Gelibolu ve yoresi tarihi, 366 General Gouraud, Le, 559 Generals and Politicians, 400 Genoccan, Mehemet Ihsan, 263 Georgian Adventure, 378 Germains, Victor W., 264-65, 22 "German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation," 693 Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 694 Geschichte des Kriegs, 648 "Ghost From Gallipoli, A," 11 Ghost On Horseback, 97 Gibbon, Frederick P., 266 Gibbons, T., 267 Gibson, T. A., 268 Gilbert, Martin, 118, 269-72, 718, 1 Gillam, John, 273-4 Gillon, Stair, 275-6 Giradoux, Jean, 277 Giraud, Victor, 278 Glance at Gallipoli, A, 323 Glorious Deeds of Australians in the Great War, 108 Glostershire Regiment in the Great War 1914-1918, The, 762 "God of Battles and the Fight for Faith, The," 613 Godley, Alexander, 279 Goeben, 466, 501,692, 711,3 Goliath, H.M.S., 9 Gooch, John (with Cohen), 150, 28 Gooch, John, 280, 23 Good Evening, 663 Gooder, John, 281 Gorden Bennett Story, The, 423 Gorman, Eugene, 282 Gough, Barry M., 283 Government and the War, 742 Graham, J. G., 284 Grand Turk, 132 Grande Guerre, La, (Miquel), 502 Grande Guerre, La, (Thoumin), 684 Grant, Amy Gordon, 285 Grant, I., 286 Graves, P. P., 287 Gray, Edwyn, 288-89 Gray Wolf Mustafa Kemal, 19 "Great Britain and Bulgaria's Entry into the

152 First World War (1914-1915)," 359 "Great Britain and the 1914-1915 Straits Agreement With Russia: The British Promise of November 1914," 636 Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918, 753 "Great Britain, Russia and the Straits, 19141915," 596 Great Contemporaries, 146 Great Man: A Portrait of Winston Churchill, The, 561 Great Military Disasters, 590 Great Seaman, A, 314 Great War, The (Allen), 12 Great War, The (Falls), 221 Great War: I Was There!, The, 315 Great War at Sea, 1914-1918, The, 349 Great War at Sea, The, 340 Greece, 1, 199,293 Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922, 1 Greece and Turkey, 199 Green Howards in the Great War, The, 757 Gretton, Peter, 291 Grey Battalion, The, 687 Grey, Jeffrey, 292 Grey, W. E., 294 Grey of Fallodon, Viscount, 293, 13 Grieve, W. Grant, 295 Guedalla, Philip, 296 Guepratte, P.-E., 297 Guerre de 1914-1918: Les Operations militaires, La, 408 Guerre Navale, 1914-1915, La, 71 Guerre Turque dans la Guerre mondiale, La 418 Guide to the Sources of British Military History, A, 332 Guiness, Walter (Lord Moyne), 83 Guinn, Paul, 298, 23 Gullett, H. S., 299 Gully Ravine, 484, 726 Gunesen, Fikret, 300 Gurkhas, 10,77,337,493,524 Gwyn, Sandra, 301 H. H. Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley, 96 Hairi Bey, 302 Haldane, Lord, 410 Hall, Admiral Sir Reginald, 373 Halpern, Paul G., 303-07,1,6 Hamilton, A. S., 308 Hamilton, General Sir Ian, 25, 234, 254, 269, 308, 309-14, 333, 372, 412, 422, 462, 481-82, 508, 546, 590, 597, 600, 610,

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 632, 640, 733, 745, 753, 4, 6-7, 9-11, 14,17,22,30,31 Hamilton, Ian B. M., 314, 24 Hammerton, John A., 315 Hankey, Sir Maurice, 129, 216, 316, 605, 4, 14,16,23,29 Hankey: Man of Secrets, 605 Hanna, Henry, 317 Happy Warrior, The, 314 "Hard Lying;" Eastern Mediterranean, 1914-1919, 731 Hargrave, John, 318-19 Hart, Peter, 647, 1,15, 26 Having a Lively Time, 184 Hawke Battalion, The, 379 Hayes, Grace P., 203 Haythomthwaite, Philip J., 320-21 Hazelhurst, Cameron, 322 Head, C. O., 323, 23 Heichen, Walter, 324 Helles, Cape, 72, 101, 105, 182, 276, 379, 384-85, 419, 484, 493, 525, 645, 680, 724,6,7,9,11 Hell's Bells and Mademoiselles, 490 Hell's Foundations, 509 Herbert, A. P., 325, 447 Herman, Gerald, 326 Hermann, Gerhard, 327 Hersing, Otto, 328 Hezlet, Arthur, 329 Hickey, Michael, 330, 1, 15 Higgins, Trumbull, 331 High Command in the World War, 583 Higham, Robin, 332, 15 Hiley, Nicholas, 333 Hill, A. J., 334 Hill 60, 16,685,10 Hinsley, F. H., 209, 394,441 Histoire de la Grande Guerre (Bidou), 70 Histoire de la Grande Guerre (Giraud), 278 Histoire de la guerre sous-marine allemande, 420 Histoire maritime de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale, 179 Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Yeomanry 1914-1924, 224 Historique des troupes coloniales pendant le guerre 1914-1918, 335 "History and 'Betrayal': The Anzac Controversy," 683 History of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, The, 575

Index History of the Canterbury Regiment, N.Z.E.F, 1914-1918,225 History of the Dorsetshire Regiment, 592 History of the Dorsetshire Regiment, 19141919, 336 History of the East Lancashire Regiment in the Great War, 59 \ History of the East Lancashire Regiment in the Great War, 1914-1918, 544 History of the 15 th Battalion, Australian Imperial Forces, 144 Histo^ of the Fifth Battalion: The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, The, 727 History of the 5 th Royal Gurkha Rifles, 337 History of the 5 th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force), 1858-1928, 493 History of the 53rd. (]\;elsh) Division, 720 History of the Nth Battalion, A. I. F.,l\9 History of the Great War, 106 History of the Great War, A, 169 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Military Operations: Gallipoli, 27 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Naval Operations, 159 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. The War in the Air, 585 History of the Lancashire Fusiliers, The, 419 History of the Lincolnshire Regiment, 632 History of the Norfolk Regiment, The, 567 History of the Old 2/4th (City of London) Battalion the London Regiment Royal Fusiliers, 338 History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, The, 629 History of the Prince of Wales' Leinster Regiment. (Royal Canadians), The, 739 History of the Queen's Royal Regiment, 758 History of the Royal Hampshire Regiment, The,3\ History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, 16781918, 105 History of the South Staffordshire Regiment, 708 History of the South Wales Borderers, 19141918, The, 32 History of the Suffolk Regiment, The, 526 History of the Welsh Regiment, The, 738 History of the World War, A, 428 History of the World War: An Authentic Narrative of the World's Greatest War, 476 Hit the Beach!: Amphibious Warfare From

153 the Plains of Abraham to San Carlos Water, 240 Hodges, Arthur, 339 Hoehling, A. A. 340 Hogue, Oliver, 341,691 Holle von Gallipoli, Die, 622 Holmes, Jessie, 342 Holmes, Richard, 343 Home Fires and Foreign Fields, 431 Hood Battalion; Royal Naval Division, The, 624 Hood Battalion, Royal Naval Division, 598, 624 Hoover, Karl D., 344 Hopital Chirurgical Flottant, V, 417 Horn, Daniel, 345 Home, Charles F., 346 Hough, Richard, 347-49, 20-21 "How Turkey Drifted Into World War I," 411 How We Kept the Sea, 174 Hoyt, Edwin P., 350 Hughes, W. M., 351 Human Story, The, 41 Humphris, E. M., 165 Hunt, Barry, 352 Hunter, Anthony, 628 Hunter-Weston, Aylmer, 353, 412, 7,16 Hurst, Gerald B., 354 Hutcheson, John A., Jr., 355 Hyde, Robin, 356 Ian Hamilton's Final Despatches, 311 Idriess, Ion L., 357 Igdemir, Ulug, 358 Ilcev, Ivan, 359 Ilgar, Ihsan, 360 Illustrated Companion to the First World War, An, 102 Illustrated History of the First World War, 668 Im Kampfum die Dardanellen, Erzahlung aus dem Weltkrieg, 324 Images of Gallipoli: Photographs From the Collection of Ross J. Bastiaan, 563 Immortal Ataturk, The, 712 Immortal Dawn, The, 92 Immortal Gamble and the Part Played in It By H.M.S. Cornwallis, The, 650 Imperial War Museum, 361 Imperial War Museum Book of the First World War, The, 100 Imperishable Anzacs, 133 In the Side Shows, 66 Incomparable 29th and the "River Clyde, "

154 The, 184 Inflexible, H.M.S., 5 Ingle, Judith A., 362 Inglis, K. S., 363-65 Inside Constantinople, 208 Intruders in the Dust, 259 Irdesel, Mehmet, 366 Irish at the Front, The, 451 "Irish Soldier in the Great War," 535 Iron in the Fire, 516 Irresistible, H.M.S., 5 Italy, 352,441,583, 671 "Italy and the Balkans, 1914-1915," 441 Itzkowits, Norman, 712 Izzedin Dey, 367 Jabotinsky, V., 368 Jacka, Albert, 286, 612, 719 Jacka, VC,286 Jacka's Mob, 612 Jackh, Ernest, 369 Jackson, William, 370 Jaffa, Harry, 718 James, Robert Rhodes, 371-72, 14, 28 James, William, 373-74 Jameson, William, 375 Jeans, T. T., 377 Jerrold, Douglas, 378-80 Joffre, Joseph J. C , 381 John Carroll, 259 John Hugh Allen of the Gallant Company, 507 John Monash: A Biography, 625 Johnson, R. M., 382 Johnson, Walter H., 383 Johnstone, Tom, 384 Jones, Denis, 385 Jones, H. A., 585 Jones, Jonah, 386 Jose, Arthur, 387 Jourdain, H.F.N., 388 Juvenis, 389 K.OS.B. in the Great War, The, 275 Kampfum die Dardanellen, Der (Koebsell), 407 Kampfum die Dardanellen, Der (Prigge), 579 Kampfum die Dardanellen 1915, Der, 523 Kannengiesser, Hans von, 390 Karatay, Baha Vefa, 391 Kavak Tepe, 526 Kearsey, A.H.C, 392 Kemal Ataturk: A Biography, 249

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Kemal, Mustafa, 19, 30, 178, 249, 403, 456, 481, 499, 518, 549, 614, 705, 712, 723, 8,16,31 Kent, D. A., 393 Kent, Marian, 394 Kerner, Robert J., 395-96 Keyes, Admiral Roger, 24-25, 28, 76, 155, 304-05, 375, 397-98, 5-6, 8,16 Keyes Papers, The, 304 Khaki and Gown, 75 Killing Time, The, 288 King, Jere C , 399-400 King, Michael, 401 Kingsford, Charles L., 402 Kinross, Lord, 403 Kirchberger, Joe H., 404 Kiretch Tepe Sirt, 171 Kirkpatrick, John Simpson, 69, 149, 26 Kitchener, 44 "Kitchener and the 29th Division: A Study in Anglo-French Strategic Relations, 1914-1915," 568 Kitchener Enigma, The, 610 Kitchener, Herbert Horatio, Lord, 20, 44, 67, 121, 131, 147, 153, 162,216,264,270, 280, 291, 323, 339, 350, 437, 459, 472, 532, 546, 561, 568, 602, 610, 632, 745, 4,6-7,9,11,19-23,30-31 "Kitchener: A Reputation Refurbished?," 532 Kitchener: Architect of Victory, 131 Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist, 472 Kiwi Trooper, 16 Knight, Frank, 405, 7 Knyvett, R. Hugh, 406 Koebsell, Eberhard, 407 Koeltz, Louis, 408 Koenig, W. J.,491 Koja Chemen Tepe, 281, 390 "Konzeption Des Grossen Belagemngskriges: Gedanken ttber Gallipoli 1915, Die," 545 Koss, Stephen, 409-10 Krieg zur See 1914-1918, Der, 480 Krithia, 79, 390, 419, 525, 544, 7, 9 KumKale, 196,6 Kurat, Y.T., 411 La Maziere, Pierre, 417 Laar, Clemens, 407 Lads of the Lothians, 445 Laffin, John, 412-15,14,28 Laird, John, 416 Lancashire Fighting Territorials, The, 72

Index Lancashire Fusiliers, The, 587 "Landing at Gallipoli, The," 593 "Landings at Gallipoli If Carried Out Today, The," 528 Larcher, M. E., 123,418 Last Changes Last Chances, 539 Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill, The, 474 "Last Ottomans, The," 178 LaTrobe Library, 185 Latter, J. C , 419 Laurens, Adolphe, 420 Layman, R. D., 421 Leadership in Battle 1914-1918, 640 Lee, John, 422 Legg, Frank, 423, 27 Legs Eleven, 59 Leinster Regiment. (Royal Canadians), 739 Lessons of Allied Co-operation, 488 Letters From Armageddon, 285 Letters From Helles, 182 Letters From the Front, 1914-1918, 415 Letters of an Australian Sister, 198 Lewis, Brian, 424 Lewis, Bruce, 425 Liddell Hart, Basil H., 426-29, 14, 17-18 Liddle, Peter H., 430-36, 686, 15,14,18, 28 Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss, The, 732 Life of an Irish Soldier, 279 Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, The, 47 Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, The, 39 Life of Lord Kitchener, The, 20 Life of Lord Lloyd, 2 Light and Shade in War, 607 L ight Horse: The Story of A ustralia 's Mounted Troops, 503 "Liman von Sanders and the GermanOttoman Alliance," 695 "Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles, The," 468 Lions Led by Donkeys, 679 Listening for the Drums, 312 Little Field-Marshal: Sir John French, The, 343 Lloyd George, David, 437, 555, 609, 669, 752,3,11,13,16,20,21-22,27 Lloyd George: A Diary By Frances Stevenson, 669 Lloyd George and the Generals, 752 Lockhart, J. G., 438 Londres, Albert, 439 Lone Pine, 754, 9

155 Longmore, C , 440 Lord Esher, 244 "Lord Fisher and His Biographer," 146 Lord Haldane, 410 Lord Kitchener, 339 Lords of Death, 730 Lorey, Herman, 480 Lost Endeavour, 724 "Lost Opportunities in 1915?," 74 Love Letters of an Anzac, 691 Lowe, C. J., 441 Lucas, Charles, 442 Lundeberg, Philip K., 443 Lushington, R. F., 444 Lynn, Escort, 445 Lyons, Michael, 446 McAdie, Alexander, 448 McCarthy, Dudley, 449 MacCustra, L., 450 MacDonagh, Michael, 451 Macdonald, Lyn, 452-54, 1 McEntee, Girard, L.-, 455 Macfie, A. L., 456-57 McGibbon, Ian, 458 Machine Gunner, 1914-1918, 168 MacKay, Ruddock F., 459-60, 20 MacKenzie, CluthaN.,461 Mackenzie, Compton, 462 Mackenzie, K. W., 463 McKernan, Michael, 260, 464 Macksey, Kenneth, 465 McLaughlin, Redmond, 466 MacMullen, H. T., 544 MacMunn, George, 467-68 McMutrie, F. E., 40 McPherson, William L., 469-70, 19 McQueen, Humphrey, 471, 25 Magnus, Philip, 472, 23 Majestic, H.M.S., 9 Make Me A Soldier, 62 Malthus, Cecil, 473 Man Who Was Greenmantle: A Biography ofAubry Herbert, The, 234 Man With the Donkey, The, 69 Manchester, William, 474 Mantey, Eberhard von, 475 Maoris in the Great War, The, 160 March, Francis A., 476 Marden, Thomas O., 738 Marder, A. J., 118,477-79,718,21 Marine-Archiv und Kriegsgeschichfliche Forschungs anstalt des Heers, 480 Marins a terre, Les, 611

156 Marmora, Sea of, 126, 242, 376, 387, 628, 654, 746 Marshall, S.L.A., 481-83 Marshall, William, 484 Masefield, John, 485, 12, 27 Maurice, Frederick, 486-89, 19 Maxwell, J., 490 Mayer, S. L.,491 Medical care, 15, 33, 62, 66, 115, 149, 156, 184, 186, 198,200,202,219,318-19, 357, 377, 385, 417, 454, 498, 505, 671, 687,697,701,710,9-10,26 Mediterranee, 138 Mehat Bey, 492 Mehmetcik ve Anzaklar, 391 Memoirs of Raymond Poincare, The, 570 Memoirs of the 32nd Field Ambulance, X (Irish) Division, 498 Memories, 232 Memories and Reflections, 692 Memories and Reflections, 1852-1927, 556 Memories of a Turkish Statesman--19131919, 197 Memories of Four Fronts, 484 Men of Gallipoli, 433 Merle, Ferdinand, 495 Michelsen, Andreas, 496 Middlebrook, Martin, 497 Midwinter, C , 498 Mikusch, Dagobert von, 499 Miles, Sherman, 500 Military Atlas of the First World War, A, 45 Military History of Australia, A, 292 Military History of the World War, 455 Militaiy History of World War I: The Campaigns on the Turkish Fronts, The, 203 Military Misfortunes, 150, 28 "Military Strategist, The," 427 Milne, A. Berkeley, 510 Ministere de la Guerre, 243 Miquel, Pierre, 502 "Mission of Liman von Sanders: The Crisis, The," 395 Mitchell, T. J., 505 Mitchell Report, The, 504, 13 Mitchell, Elyne, 503 Modern Naval Strategy, 40 Mon commandement en Orient, 618 Monash, John, 10, 119, 144, 334, 506, 564, 625,639,16,27 Monash as Military Commander, 564 Monro, General Charles C , 47, 11 Mons, Anzac and Kut, 447

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Montgomery, Ina, 507 Moorehead, Alan, 508, 14 Moorhouse, Geoffrey, 509 Mordal, Jacques, 510 Moreau, Laurent, 511 Morgan, Frank, 536 Morgan, Ted, 512 Morgenthau, Henry, 114, 513, 23, 29 Morris, Jan, 514-15 Morrow, Edgar, 516 Moseley, Sydney A., 517, 12 Mousharrafa, M. M., 518 Moynihan, Michael, 519-20 MP, An [Aubrey Herbert], 447 Mr. Churchill: A Portrait, 296 Muddle, Indecision and Setback, 175 Mudros, 15, 198,256,732,733 Muhlmann, Carl, 521-23 Mullaly, B. R., 524 Murator, Paul, 13 Murderous Responsibility, The, 50 Murdock, Keith, 25, 10 Mure, A. H., 525 Murphy, C.C.R., 526-27 Murphy, H. W., 528 Murray, Joseph, 529-30 Murtett, Malcolm H., 283 Mustapha Kemal, 499 Mustapha Kemal of Turkey, 723 My Father's Son, 685 Myriad Faces of War, The, 141 Myth of the Digger, The, 606 Naismith, George. G., 531 Nasmith, Lieut. Commander M. E., 376 Naval Air Service, The, 603 "Naval Attack on the Dardanelles, 1915, The," 86 Naval Aviation in the First World War, 421 Naval Battles of the First World War, 67 Naval History of the War, A, 540 Naval History of the World War: Offensive Operations, The, 252 Naval History of World War I, A, 303 Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keys, 398 Naval Miscellany, The, 304 Naval Operations in the Mediterranean During the Great War 1914-1918, 167 Naval War in the Mediterranean, 306 Navy From Within, The, 193 Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign, The, 733 Nee, The, 109

Index Neill's "Blue Caps," 758 Neilson, Keith, 532-33 Nekrasov, George, 534 Nelson, John E., 535 Nelson, Robert, 536 Nelson's History of the War, 106 Neue Forschungen zum Ersten Weltkrieg: Literatur beichte und Bibliographen, 765 Nevinson, Henry W., 537-39, 12-13 New Cambridge Modern History, The, 82 New Zealand, 5, 7, 16,91,99, 103, 111-12, 116, 160, 201, 263, 279, 299, 401, 434, 458, 461, 581, 607, 651, 658, 713, 2, 6, 8,15-17,25-27 New Zealand Division, The, 651 New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Units of Auckland Regiment, 112 Canterbury Mounted Rifles, 575 Canterbury Regiment, 225 New Zealand Division, 91, 651 Otago Regiment, 116, 262 Queen Alexandra's Own Mounted Rifles, 16 New Zealand nationalism, 5, 401, 658, 713 New Zealanders at Gallipoli, The, 113 New Zealanders at War, 401 Newbolt, Henry, 159,540-41 Newfoundlanders, 99, 163, 257, 279, 301, 543 Newman, Bernard, 295 Newton, L. W., 542 Nicholas, Russian Grand Duke, 4 Nicolson, G.W.L., 543 Nicolson, Lothian, 544 Nile, Richard, 626 1915 Canakkale savasi, 37 1915: The Death of Innocence, 452, 1 "1915-The End of an Epoch," 673 1914-1918: Voices & Images of the Great War, 453 No Brains at All, 202 Nohn, E. A., 545 Nolan's Gallipoli, 253 North, John, 546, 14 North of Gallipoli, 534 Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign, 392 "Notes on the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915," 500 "November 1914 Straits Agreement and the Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign, The," 558

157 Oatts, L. B., 547 Ocean, H.M.S., 5 Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: The Story of Anzac, The, 55,13 Official History of New Zealand's Effort in the Great War, 713 Official History of the Otago Regiment, New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Great War, 116 Official War History of the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment, 740 Ogilvie, D. D., 548 Okse, Necati, 549 Old Sixteenth, The: Being a Record of the 16th Battalion, A. I. F. During the Great War, 440 Olden, A.C.N., 550 Oliver, Admiral Henry F., 374, 20 Ollard, Richard, 551,21 On Four Fronts With the Royal Naval Division, 642 On Land and Sea at the Dardanelles, 93 On Two Fronts, 9 One-Arm Sutton, 662 O'Neill, H. C , 552 O'Neill, Robert, 553 Operation des Jahres 1915, Die, 594 "Opportunity Knocked," 107 Orange, Green and Khaki, 384 Order of Battle of Divisions, The, 58 Orga, I., 554 Orga, M., 554 "Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign Reconsidered, The," 248 Ottoman Empire (See also Turkey), 143, 251,395,572,629,636,694 Our War: Australia During World War I, 424 "Over There" With the Australians, 406 Owen, Frank, 555, 20 Oxford and Asquith, Earl of (See also Asquith, H. H.), 556 "Page of Diplomatic History: Russian Military Leaders and the Problem of Constantinople During the War, A," 235 Paget, Gregory, 557-58, 20 Pals at Suvla Bay, The, 317 Paluel-Marmont, M., 559 Passport to Hell: The Story of James Douglas Stark, Bomber, 356 Path of Glory, The, 78 Path to Gallipoli, The, 458

158 Patterson, J. H., 560 Pavilion haut, 137 Payne, Robert, 561 Peace to End All Peace, ,4, 251 Pearl, Cyril, 562 Pedersen, P. A., 563-64 Pelling, Henry, 565 Pemberton, T. J., 566 Peninsula of Death, 164 People at War, 519 Perils of Amateur Strategy, The, 210 Personal Memoirs, 381 Peshall, C.J.E., 650 Petre, F. Lorraine, 567 Philpott, William, 568 Pictorial History of Australians at War, A, 536 Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Soldat de la Grand guerre, 48 Pilgrimage to Gallipoli, 342 Pitt, Barrie, 569 Pivotal Conflict, The, 326 Place called Armageddon: Letters From the Great War, A, 520 Plans of War, The, 280 Poincare, Raymond, 570 Politicians and the War, 1914-1916, 57 Politicians at War, July 1914 to May 1915, 322 "Politics and Strategy in the Dardanelles Operation," 718 Pollard, A. F., 571 Pomiankowski, Joseph, 572 Ponting, Clive, 573 Portrait of an Admiral, 478 Powell-Edwards, H. I., 574 Powles, C. G., 575 Premiere Guerre Mondiale, La, 128 Presland, John, 576 Preston, Adrian, 352 Price, W. R , 577 Priestman, E. Y., 578 Prigge, E. R., 579 Prior, Robin, 147,580,717,13 Prisoner in Turkey, A, 653 Prisoner With the Turks, A, 444 Proud Heritage: The Story of the Highland Light Infantry, 547 Pugsley, Christopher, 581 Puleston, W. D. 582-83 Purdom, Charles B., 584 Purnell's History of the First World War, 569

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Queen Elizabeth, H.M.S., 347, 5, 9, 21 Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 1914-1919, The, 33 Question of the Straits, The, 287 Raleigh, Walter, 585 Randwich to Hargicourt, 754 Rasor, Eugene L., 586,1 Ray, Cyril, 587 Raymond, Ernest, 588-89 Read, Stuart, 536 Real War, The, 428 Records, 233 Record of the West Somerset Yeomanry, 1914-19, A, 90 Records of the Dorset Yeomanry, 678 Regan, Geoffrey, 590 Regimental Records of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 721 Rehkopf, Ned B., 593 Reid, John, 595 Reminiscences of a Naval Surgeon, 377 Renzie, William A., 596 Repington, Charles a Court, 597 "Report on Gallipoli Research in Australia and New Zealand," 434 Report on the Enemy Defense of the Dardanelles Straits, 504 Ribblesdale, Lord, 598 Richmond, Admiral Herbert, 478 Rising Crescent, The, 369 River Clyde, H.M.S., 184, 520, 688, 728, 759,7 Robbins, Simon, 83 Robertson, John, 599, 27 Robertson, William, 600 Robson, L. L., 601 Rodger, N.A.M., 304 Rohwer, Jiirgen, 765 Role of British Strategy in the Great War, The, 170 Room 40, 60 Rose, J. Holland, 299 Rose, Norman, 602 Roses of No Man's Land, The, 454 Roskill, Stephen, 603-05, 23 Ross, J. N. MacBean, 642 Ross, Jane, 606 Ross, Malcolm, 607 Ross, Noel, 607 Roux, Charles, 608 Rowland, Peter, 609 Royal Army Divisions 11th (Northern) Division, 632

Index 54th (East Anglia) Division, 31 52nd (Lowland) Division, 105, 680 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, 266, 354, 544 Royal Naval Division, 294, 378, 380, 529, 598, 624, 642, 688 2nd Mounted Division, 66, 678 10th (Irish) Division, 31, 190, 241, 389, 451 13th Division, 101,544,644 29th Divisional, 32, 79, 184, 241, 270, 274-76,353,371,382,445,484, 525, 543, 568, 726, 758 Royal Army, Indian Units of 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, 337, 493, 524 9th Pack Mule Corps (Indian), 9 Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles, 524 6th Queen Elizabeth's Own Gurkha Rifles, 10 Royal Army Regiments Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire Regiment, 489, 727 City of London Yeomanry, 308 Cameronians, The (Scottish Rifles), 229 Connaught Rangers, 388 Devonshire Yeomanry, 245 Dorsetshire Regiment, 336, 592 East Lancashire Regiment, 544, 591 Essex Regiment, 110, 267 Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, 548 Gloucestershire Regiment, 177 Hampshire Regiment, 31, 163 Highland Light Infantry, 228, 547 King's Own Scottish Borderers, 210, 275 Lancashire Fusiliers, 419, 509, 587, 724 Lincolnshire Regiment, 632 London Regiment, 338 Middlesex Regiment, (Duke of Cambridge's Own), 66, 760 Newfoundland Regiment, 163, 543 Norfolk Regiment, 567 Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 33 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 317, 759 Royal Fusiliers, 552 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 241, 389 Royal Irish Fusiliers, 171 Royal Scots, 218, 326, 445, 525. Royal Scots Fusiliers, 105 Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 402 2nd City of London Regiment, 294 South Nottingham Yeomanry, 224

159 South Wales Borderers, 32 Suffolk Regiment, 526 Sussex Yeomanry/Royal Sussex Regiment, 574 Worchestershire Regiment, 644 Worcestershire Yeomanry Cavalry, 117 Royal Australian Navy, 1914-1918, The,3%l Royal Engineers (65B Field Co.), 634 Royal Fusiliers in the Great War, The, 552 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in the World War, The, 241 Royal Irish Fusiliers, The, 171 Royal Naval Air Service, 63, 89, 421, 425, 430,603,614 Royal Naval Division, The, 3S0 Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, The, 307 Royal Newfoundland Regiment, 543 Royal Scots 1914-1919, The, 218 Royle, Trevor, 610, 22-23 Ruhl, Arthur, 611 Rule, E. J., 612 Runcie, R.A.K., 613 Russia, 1, 28, 94-95, 104, 125, 170, 209, 235-36, 293, 396, 427, 458, 533-34, 558, 596, 602, 610, 620, 630, 636-37, 657,679,716,2-4,18-19,30 "Russia, Constantinople and the Straits," 209 Russia, the Balkans and the Dardanelles, 236 "Russia, The Straits, and Constantinople, 1914-15," 396 S Beach, 32, 7 Sailor in the Air, 63 Sailor's Odyssey, A, 172 Sailor's War, 1914-1918, The, 435 Salonika, 183,342,583,618 Samson, C. R., 614 Sanders, Otto Liman von, 3, 27, 139, 256, 395, 399, 481, 579, 594, 615, 695, 5-6, 8 Saracoglu, A., 616 Saray, Mehemet, 617 Sari Bair, 16,77,544,735,738,8 Sarrail, Maurice P., 618 Sauer, Wilhelm, 619 Sazonov, Serge, 235, 620 Schlachten des Weltkriegs, 523 Schmitt, Bemadotte E., 621 Schon, Walter von, 622 Schuler, Philip, 623 Schulz, F. H., 615 Scimitar Hill, 308, 678, 757-59, 763 Scorpion, H.M.S., 172,726

160 Sea Our Heritage, The, 438 2nd City of London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) in the Great War, 294 Secret Battle, 325 Secrets of the Bosporus, 513 Sedd el Bahr, 79, 492 Sellers, Leonard, 624 Serle, Geoffrey, 625 Service Historique, Les Armees francaises dan la Grande Guerre, 243 Seymour, Alan, 626 Shadbolt, Maurice, 627 Shankland, Peter, 628 Shapes of Gallipoli, The, 715 Shaw, E. K., 629 Shaw, S. J., 629 Sheppard, Julia, 239, 15 Ship That Changed the World, The, 711 Short History of the Great War, A (McPherson), 469 Short History of the Great War, A (Pollard), 571 Short History of World War I, A (Edmonds), 206 Short History of World War I, A (Stokesbury), 656 Short Military History of World War I, A, 645 Short Record of the Service of the 65th Field Company Royal Engineers, A, 634 Shotwell, James T., 630 Sije t'oublie Constantinople, 439 Silas, Ellis, 631 Silent Division, The, 111 Simpson, C. R., 632 Simpson and the Donkey, 149 "Sir Ian Hamilton and the Dardanelles, 1915," 422 Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches From the Dardanelles, 313 Sir John Monash, (Callinan), 119 Sir John Monash, (Smithers), 639 Sixsmith, E.K.G., 633 16th Foot, The, 489 Skander Bey, 635 Smith, C. Jay, Jr., 636 Smith, G. M., 505 Smith, Michael Douglas, 637 Smith, Staniforth, 638 Smithers, A. J., 639 Smoke on the Horizon, 706 Smyth, John, 640 Snelling, Stephen, 641 Soldiers and Statesmen, 600

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Soldiers of the Prophet, 527 Soldier's War, 1914-1918, The, 436 Some Accounts of the 10th and 12 th Battalions of the Hampshire Regiment 1914-1918, 161 Some of My Experiences in the Great War, 24 Souchon, Admiral Wilhelm, 692, 3 Source Records of the Great War, 346 "Souvenirs de I'Armee d'Orient," 124 "Souvenirs des Dardanelles," 151 Souvenirs du Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pacha, 30 Souvenirs de la Guerre en Orient, 19151917, 125 Sparrow, Geoffrey, 642 Spiers, Edward, 643, 12 Splendid Adventure, The, 351 Staff Officer, 83 Stake, H. Fritz M., 644 Stamps, T. Dodson, 645 Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Sir Winston Spenser Churchill, 118 Steel, Nigel, 646-47, 1, 15, 26 Stegemann, Hermann, 648 Stephens, Cortez D., 649, 8 Stewart, A. T., 650 Stewart, H., 651 Stienon, Charles, 652 Still, John, 653 Stocker, H.H.G.D., 387, 645 Stokesbury, James, 655-56 Stone, Norman, 657 Stopford, General Sir Frederick, 169, 412, 482,590,10,22,31 Story of Gallipoli, The, 261 Story of My Days, The, 588 Story? of the Anzacs, The, 658 Story of the Royal Scots, 726 Story of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, The, 402 Story of the 17th Battalion, A. I. F. in the Great War, The, 463 Story of the Twelfth, 542 Story of the 29th Division, The, 276 Straits Impregnable, The, 188 "Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-18, The," 457 Strategy and Supply, 533 Strategy of the Great War, The, 470 Straws in the Wind, 654 Struz, Rudolph, 659 Studies in International History, 411 Stuermer, Harry, 661 Subject Bibliography of the First World

Index War, A, 213 Submarine and Anti-Submarine, 541 Submarine and Sea Power, The, 329 Submariners V. C.,316 submarines (See also U-boats), 98, 126, 15556, 174, 207, 242, 289, 329, 376, 387, 408, 438, 443, 480, 541, 675, 746, 8-9 Submarines and the War at Sea, 1914-1918, 155 Suffren, 151 Supreme Command, The, 316 Sussex Yeomanry and 16th (Sussex Yeomanry) Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment, The, 574 Sutton, F. A., 662 Suvla, 33, 47, 75, 77, 90, 113, 117, 171,200, 227, 231, 384-85, 389, 402, 412, 465, 484, 498, 544, 548, 584, 590, 632, 645, 678, 680, 735, 738, 744, 757-58, 75961,10 "Suvla Bay," 481-82 Suvla Bay and After, 389 Suvla Bay Landing, The, 319 Suvla landing, 31, 66, 145, 308, 318, 390, 419, 451, 481-82, 527, 592, 632, 727, 761,9,22,31 Swept Channels, 665 Swiftsure, H.M.S., 377, 5 Swindon, G. J., 242 Swindon's War Record, 49 Swing, Raymond, 663 "Tactical Withdrawal by Night: The Lesson of Gallipoli, The," 635 Taffrail, Henry [Taprell Dorling], 664-65 Tale of a Territorial, 666 Tales of a Trooper, The, 461 Tales of Three Campaigns, 91 Tapeshy of War, 301 Tasmania's War Record, 1914-1918, 99 Taylor, A.J.P. 667-69, 1 Taylor, Phil, 670 Te Rangi Hiroa: The Life of Sir Peter Buck, 156 Teichman, O., 671 Teke Tepe, 526, 653 Tell England, 589 Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George--His Life and Times, 555 Tenth. (Irish) Division in Gallipoli, The, 157 "10th (Irish) Division 1914-1915: A Study in Military and Political Interaction, The," 190 Terraine, John, 672-74, 18

161 Thomas, Lowell, 675 Thomazi, A., 676-77 Thompson, C. W., 678 Thompson, P. A., 679 Thompson, R. R., 680 Thomson, Alistair, 681-83 Thoumin, Richard, 684 Throssell, Ric, 685 Through the Fog of War, 429 Till, Geoffrey, 686, 8, 11,28 Tilton, Mary, 687 Tisdall, Arthur Waldeme St. Clair, 688 To What End Did They Die?, 714 Trage die des Dardanelles, La, 187 Tragedy of Lord Kitchener, The, 216 Tragedy of Winston Churchill, The, 265 Travers, T.H.E., 689 Travis, V. C, 262 Trench Warfare, 1914-1918, 26 Trenching at Gallipoli, 257, 12 Triton, Romolo, 690 Triumph, H.M.S., 577 Trooper Bluegum [Hogue, Oliver], 691 Trooper Bluegum at the Dardanelles, 341 Troubridge, Admiral Ernest, 692 Troubridge, Laura, 692 Trumpener, Ulrich, 693-95 Truth About Lord Kitchener, The, 264 Truth About the Dardanelles, The, 517 Tuaegiul, Afif, 696 Tubby, A. H., 697 Tunnellers, 295 Turk bas ininda Canakkle gunleri, 46 "Turkei: Bibliography of the First World War," 765 Turkey (See also Ottoman Empire), 3, 6, 11, 14, 134, 162, 176, 199, 208-09, 212, 270, 368-69, 394, 411,418, 478, 513, 521, 534, 558, 572, 576, 615, 629-30, 653, 661, 663, 692-93, 723, 765, 2-4, 8, 11,18 Turkey and the War, 368 Turkey at the Straits, 630 "Turkey in the First World War," 134 Turkey in the Great War, 6 "Turkey in the World War," 212 "Turkish General Staff History of the Campaign in Gallipoli," 698 Turkish View of Gallipoli, A, 227 Turner, John, 699-700, 23 Twelve Months With the Australian Expeditionaiy Force, 17 28th. A Record of War Service With the A.I.F 1915-19, The, 152

162 25 April 1915: The Inevitable Tragedy, 750 Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916, 293 29th Divisional Artillery War Record and Honours Book, 382 Two Men I Knew, 56 Two War Years in Constantinople, 661 Two World Wars, The, 491 Tyquin, Michael B., 701 U-boats, 145, 288, 328-29, 344, 420, 475, 480, 496 U-bootskrieg, 1914-1918, Der, 496 U-21 rettet die Dardanellen, 328 Ullrich, Volker, 702 Uluaslan, Heuseyin, 703 Ulug, Nasit Hakki, 704 Unaydin, R. E., 705 Uncensored Dardanelles, The, 25 Uncensored Letters From the Dardanelles, 710 "Undersea Warfare and Allied Strategy in World War I. Part I: To 1916," 443 Understanding the First World War, 255 Underwater War: Submarines 1914-1918, The, 289 Uneasy Coalition, 116 Unexpected, 101 Usborne, C. V., 706 V Beach, 688, 728, 759, 7 VC and DSO , The, 165 VTsarskoy Stavke, 104 Vader, John, 707 VainGloiy, 140 Vale, W. L., 708 Vansittart, Peter, 709 Vassal, Joseph, 710 Vat, Dan van der, 711 VCs of the First World War: Gallipoli, 641 Vedeler, Harold C , 621 Verses, Letters, and Remembrances of Arthur Walderne St. Clair Tisdall, 688 Very Special Admiral, 61 Vingt Mois de Guerre A Bord du Croiseur "Jeanne-DArc," 9 A out 1914-12 Avril 1916, 181 Visions of Glory, 474 Voices From the Great War, 709 Voices of Gallipoli, 627 Volkan, Vamik D., 712 W Beach, 587, 7 Waite, Fred, 713 Walker, Rob, 714

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 Wallace-Crabbe, Chris, 715 Wallach, Jehuda L., 716 Wallin, Jeffrey D., 717-18,23 Wanliss,N., 719 War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War, 352 "War and Peace at the Dardanelles," 353 War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 700 War Behind the War, 1914-1918, The, 139 War Books, 223 War Cabinet, 121,316 War Council, 39, 64, 96, 129, 131, 211, 216, 291,293,347,371,479,604-05 War Effort of New Zealand, The, 201 War History of the 5 th Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 210 War Letters of General Monash, The, 506 War Memoirs, 437 War Weather Vignettes, 448 War Years to the Eve of Jutland, The, 479 War, Mutiny and Revolution in the German Navy, 345 Ward, C.H.Dudley, 720-21 Warner, Oliver, 722 Wartham, H. E., 723 Watkins, Charles, 724 Watson, S. H., 725 Watt, D C , 411 We Dive at Dawn, 207 Weaver, Lawrence, 726 Webster, F.A.M., 727 Wedgwood, Josiah Clement, 728-29 Welborn, Suzanne, 730 Weldon, L. B.,731 Weltkrieg: Ein deutsches Voltsbuch vom dem Weltgeschehen, Der 659 Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Die militarischen operationen zu Lande, Der, 594 West Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War, The, 763 Wester Wemyss, Lady, 732 Wester Wemyss, Lord, 732-33 Western Cavalry in the War: The Story of the 10th Light Horse, 550 Western Front, 26-27, 122, 163, 206, 246, 325, 343, 352, 381, 437, 486-87, 529, 534, 602, 667, 672, 674, 689, 716, 747, 752, 1 Westerners, 20, 47, 153, 429, 486-86, 600, 673, 744 Westlake, Ray, 734 Whalley-Kelly, H., 735 "What About the Dardanelles?," 118

Index What of the Dardanelles?, 237 Where the Prize Is Highest, 103 White, A. S., 736 White, C.B.B., 11 White Heat, 674 White, T. A., 737 Whitehorn, A. C , 738 Whitton, Frederick E., 739 Wilkie, A. H., 740 Wilkinson, Norman, 741 Wilkinson, Spenser, 742 Williams, H. R., 743 Williams, Jeffrey, 744 Williams, Orlo, 745 Williamson, David, 261 Wilson, General Sir Henry, 153 Wilson, Michael, 746 Wilson, Trevor, 747 Winston Churchill (Broad), 94 Winston Churchill (Pelling), 565 Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles, 331 Winston Churchill: An Intimate Portrait, 127 Winston Churchill as I Knew Him, 127 Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man, 162 Winter, Denis, 748-50, 7-8,13-14, 27 With a Baden Powell Scout in Gallipoli, 578 With Machine Guns in Gallipoli, 729 With Manchesters in the East, 354 With the 8th Scottish Rifles, 229 With the l/5th Essex in the East, 267 With the Fleet in the Dardanelles During the Campaign in the Spring of 1915,511

163 With the Incomparable 29th, 525 With the Twenty-Ninth Division in Gallipoli, 166 "With the Twenty-Second": A History of the Twenty-Second Battalion, A. I. F., 282 With the Zionists in Gallipoli, 560 Woods, William Seaver, 751 Woodward, David R., 752 Woodward, Llewellyn, 753 WorChestershire Regiment, The, 644 World Crisis, The, 21, 147, 580, 13,18 World in the Crucible, The, 621 World War I (Baldwin), 43 World War I (Marshall), 483 World War I: A Short History, 446 World War I Source Book, The, 320 Wren, E., 754 Wykes, Alan, 755 Wylly, H. C, 756-58 Wyrall, Everard, 760-62 X Beach, 7 Y Beach, 7 Yeomanry Cavalry of Worcestershire, 19141922, The, 117 Yeomanry of Devon, 1794-1927, The, 245 Yildirim, Huseyin, 764 Young, Peter, 569 Yiicel, Yasar, 765 Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches, Der 572

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About the Compiler FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT is Professor of History at Fort Valley State College, Fort Valley, GA. His previous publications include The Battles of the Somme, 1916: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (Greenwood, 1996).